Respondent Professional-Institute-of-the-Public-Service-of

Transcription

sec File No. 34819
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)
BETWEEN:
ELIZABETH BERNARD
Appellant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
and
PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF CANADA
Respondents
and
MICHAEL A. FEDER
Amicus Curiae
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA,
PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA,
PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA,
CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL TO EMPLOYERS,
CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION,
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION FOUNDATION,
ALBERTA FEDERATION OF LABOUR, and
COALITION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BUSINESSES AND MERIT CANADA
Interveners
FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENT
(Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules ofthe Supreme Court of Canada)
SACK GOLDBLATT MITCHELL LLP
30 Metcalfe Street, Suite 500
Ottawa, ON KIP 5L4
Ottawa, ON KIP 5L4
Peter Engelmann
Nadine Blum
T: 613-235-5327
F: 613-235-3041
E: [email protected]
Fiona J. Campbell
T: 6I3-235-5327
F: 613-235-3041
Counsel for the Respondent, Professional
Institute of the Public Service of Canada
Agent for the Respondent, Professional
Institute of the Public Service of Canada
ELIZABETH BERNARD
P.O. Box 34051
Nepean, ON K2J 5B 1
Self-Represented Appellant
Department of Justice
234 Wellington Street, Room 1148
Ottawa, ON KIA OR5
Bank of Canada Building - East Tower
234 Wellington Street, Room 1212
Ottawa, ON KIA OH8
Anne Turley
T: 613- 94I-2351
F: 613-954-1920
Christopher M. Rupar
T: 613-941-235I
F: 613-954-I920
Counsel for the Respondent,
Attorney General of Canada
Agent for the Respondent,
Attorney General of Canada
McCARTHY TETRAULT
Suite 1300, 777 Dunsmuir Street
Vancouver, BC V7Y 1K2
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP
World Exchange Plaza
100 Queen Street, suite 1100
Ottawa, ON KIP 119
Michael A. Feder
Angela M. Juba
T: 604-643-5983
F: 604-622-5614
Nadia Effendi
T: 6I3-237-5160
F: 613-230-8842
Amicus Curiae
Agent for the Amicus Curiae
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
720 Bay Street, 4th Floor
Toronto, ON M5G 2Kl
BURKE-ROBERTSON
200 - 441 MacLaren Street
Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3
Robin K. Basu
Rochelle Fox
T: 416-326-4476
F: 416-326-4015
E. [email protected]
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
T: 613-706-0020
F: 613-235-4430
Counsel for the Intervener,
Attorney General of Ontario
Agent for the Intervener,
Attorney General of Ontario
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA
1301 865 Horby Street
Vancouver, BC V6Z 203
BURKE-ROBERTSON
200 - 441 MacLaren Street
Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3
Karen A. Horsman
T: 604-660-3093
F: 604-660-3833
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
T: 613-706-0020
F: 613-235-4430
Attorney General of British Columbia
Attorney General of British Columbia
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA
Constitutional Law
4th Floor, Bowker Building
9833-109 Street
Edmonton, AB T5K 2E8
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP
2600 - 160 Elgin Street
Ottawa, ON KIP 1C3
Roderick Wiltshire
T: 780-422-7145
F: 780-425-0307
Brian A. Crane, Q.C.
T: 613-233-1781
F: 613-563-9869
Attorney General of Alberta
Attorney General of Alberta
RAVEN, CAMERON, BALLANTYNE &
YAZBECKLLP
1600 - 220 Laurier Ave West
Ottawa, ON KIP 5Z9
Andrew Raven
Andrew Astritis
T: 613-567-2901
F: 613-567-2921
Public Service Alliance of Canada
SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP
397 Gladstone Avenue, Suite 100
Ottawa, On K2P OY9
Eugene Meehan, Q.C.
T: 613-695-8855
F: 613-695-8580
Privacy Commissioner of Canada
MCLENNAN ROSS
West Chambers
600 - 12220 Stony Plain Road NW
Edmonton, AB T5N 3Y4
NORTON ROSE CANADA LLP
1500-45 O'Connor Street
Ottawa, ON KIP 1A4
Hugh J.D. McPhail, Q.C.
T: 780-482-9200
F: 780-482-9100
Sally Gomery
T: 613-780-8604
F: 613-230-5459
Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian
Association of Counsel to Employers
Agent for the Intervener, Canadian
Association of Counsel to Employers
DEWART GLEASON LLP
102-366 Adelaide Street W
Toronto, ON M5V 1R9
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP
2600 - 160 Elgin Street
Ottawa, ON KIP 1C3
Sean Dewart
Tim Gleason
T: 416-971-8000
F: 416-971-8001
Guy Regimbald
T: 613-786-0197
F: 613-563-9869
Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Canadian Civil Liberties Association
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP
P.O. Box 50
1 First Canadian Place
Toronto, ON M5Z 1B8
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP
340 Albert Street, Suite 1900
Ottawa, ON KlR 7Y6
Mark A. Gelowitz
Gerard J. Kennedy
T: 416-862-4743
F: 416-862-6666
Patricia J. Wilson
T: 613-235-7234
F: 613-235-2867
Canadian Constitution Foundation
Canadian Constitution Foundation
CHIVERS CARPENTER
Suite 101, 10426-81 Ave.
Edmonton, AB T6E 1X5
Ottawa, ON KIP 514
John Carpenter
Kara O'Halloran
T: 780-439-3611
F: 780-439-8543
Raija Pulkkinen
T: 613-482-2455
F: 613-235-3041
Alberta Federation of Labour
Agent for the Intervener
Alberta Federation of Labour
HEENAN BLAIKIE LLP
300 - 55 Metcalfe Street
Ottawa, ON KIP 6L5
HEENAN BLAIKIE LLP
300 - 55 Metcalfe Street
Ottawa, ON KIP 6L5
Simon Ruel
Andrea L. Zwack
T: 418-649-5491
F: 866-265-9976
Perri Ravon
T: 613-236-8071
F: 613-236-9632
Coalition of British Columbia Businesses
and Merit Canada
Coalition of British Columbia Businesses
and Merit Canada
INDEX
PAGE NO.
PART I- OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................... 1
A. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................ 1
B. FACTS ..................................................................................................................... 2
1) Decisions Below ............................................................................................ 2
Unfair Labour Practice Complaint at the Board ......................................... .2
Consent Order of the Board ......................................................................... 3
Judicial Review of the Consent Order at the FCA ("Bernard f') ............... .4
Board's Reconsideration Decision ("Board Decision") .............................. 5
Judicial Review of the Board's Reconsideration Decision
at the FCA ("Bernard If') ............................................................................ 8
2) Appellant's Attempt to Re-Introduce Evidence Not Before the Board ...... lO
PART II- RESPONDENT'S POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE APPELLANT'S
.................................................................................................................... 10
QUESTIONS
PART III
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT ......................................................................... ll
A. THE BOARD'S DECISION SHOULD BE UPHELD AS REASONABLE ....... .11
1) The Standard of Review is Reasonableness .............................................. .11
2) The Board's Decision was Reasonable and in Any Event Correct ........... .15
a) Determination that Contact Information is a "Consistent Use"
was Reasonable ...................................................................................... 15
b) Determination that Disclosure of Contact Information is
Required for the Institute to Meet it Statutory and Broader
Representational Obligations ................................................................ 18
c) Concerns About Abuse Speculative ..................................................... .24
d) Adequacy of Union Access to the Workplace ...................................... 26
e) Conclusion on Reasonableness .............................................................. 27
B. Charter Issues ....................................................................................................... 28
1) The Court Should Decline to Consider Charter Issues ............................. 28
2) No Charter Infringement ............................................................................ 31
a) No Infringement of Freedom of Association ......................................... 31
b) No Unreasonable Search or Seizure contrary to section 8 of the
Charter ................................................................................................... 34
3) In the Further Alternative, Any Charter Infringement is Justified
under s. 1 .................................................................................................... 35
Pressing and Substantial Objective ............................................................ 36
Rational Connection................................................................................... 37
No Reasonable Alternative/Minimal Impairment.. .................................... 38
Proportionality ........................................................................................... 38
PART IV- SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS ........................................................... 39
PART V
ORDERS SOUGHT .............................................................................................. 39
PART VI- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ 40
PART VII- STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ETC ................................................. .44
FACTUM OF THE RESPONDENT,
PART I- OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. OVERVIEW
1.
The Appellant has initiated this appeal of the Federal Court of Appeal's (the "FCA")
decision, dated March 16, 2012, upholding a March 21, 2011 decision of the Public Service
Labour Relations Board (the "Board").
In that decision, which was a reconsideration
decision at the direction of the Federal Court of Appeal (February 8, 2010), the Board held
that employee home addresses and phone numbers ("contact information") must be
provided to a bargaining agent in order for it to be able to discharge its statutory obligations
under the Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ("PSLRA") and that
the terms of a Consent Order, dated July 18,2008, with the addition of three amendments 1
providing additional protection for privacy concerns, adequately protected the privacy
interests of employees, and did not violate the Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21.
2.
The Respondent, the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (the "Institute"),
submits that the Board's decision was both reasonable and correct, and that the appeal of
the FCA's decision should be dismissed.
3.
The Appellant also raises a number of arguments in relation to her rights under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, (the "Charter"), and this Court has stated two Constitutional
Questions. The Appellant had attempted to argue Charter issues before the Board and the
FCA, below, and at both levels was not allowed to do so on the basis that Charter issues did
not form part of the reconsideration ordered by the Federal Court of Appeal. The Appellant
has also raised the argument that disclosure of her contact information is a breach of her s. 8
Charter rights, which was never raised before the Board. As a result, there is no Charter
record or issue before this Court. The Institute submits that the Court should not consider
any of the Charter arguments the Appellant raises in this appeal, and should decline to
answer its stated Constitutional Questions, for reasons discussed in detail below.
1
The Board ordered the Consent Order be amended to require the employer to encrypt or password protect the
contact information it transmits to the bargaining agent, and to inform new employees that their contact information
will be shared with the bargaining agent. It ordered the bargaining agent to appropriately dispose of contact
information after it is replaced by current contact information.
-2B. FACTS
4.
The Institute is the certified bargaining agent for the Audit, Financial and Scientific
("AFS") Group at the Canada Revenue Agency ("CRA"), an agency of the federal
government of Canada. 2
5.
The Appellant, Elizabeth Bernard, has been an employee of the CRA since 1991, which at
that time was known as Revenue Canada-Taxation, and has been in the AFS bargaining
unit, and represented by the Institute, since 1995. As is her legal right, the Appellant has
chosen to not become a member of the Institute, although she is an employee within the
bargaining unit represented by the Institute, and is required to pay dues to the Institute
under what is commonly known as the "Rand formula."
As such, the Institute has a
statutory obligation to represent her. 3
6.
This statutory representational obligation includes, inter alia, the duty to represent
employees in collective bargaining, to file and adjudicate grievances, to represent or assist
with workforce adjustments (layoffs), to prosecute complaints, to conduct strike votes and
to conduct a final-offer vote. 4
1) Decisions Below
Unfair Labour Practice Complaint at the Board
7.
In 2007, the Institute filed complaints against the Treasury Board of Canada and the CRA
("the Employer') under paragraphs 190(1 )(b) and (g) of the Public Service Labour
Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 ("the PSLRA"), alleging that the failure by both
respondents to provide employee names, position titles, telephone numbers, and regular
mail and email addresses was a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith under section
106 and an unfair labour practice under section 185. As well, these actions were alleged to
constitute interference with the administration and representation of employees by the
union, in violation of s. 186 of the PSLRA. The Institute also alleged that the employer's
2
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2011 PSLRB 34, at para. I
[Board Decision].
3
4
Board Decision, paras. 3, 13 and Bernardv. Canada, 2010 FCA 40 (CanLII) at paras. 4-5 [Bernard lj.
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Treasury Board and Canada Revenue Agency, 2008
PSLRB 13 (CanLII) at para. 60 [PIPSC].
- 3failure to disclose the requested information represented a violation of sections 2(d) and (b)
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including a claim that the union's capacity to
effectively represent all employees in the bargaining unit is protected by s. 2(d) and that this
was undermined without access to the requested information. 5
8.
In its decision, the Board found that the Employer's failure to provide the Institute with "at
least some of the contact information that it requested does comprise interference in the
representation of employees by the complainant within the meaning of paragraph 186(1)(a)
of the Act."
It further directed the parties to begin consultations "with a view to
determining whether they can reach a voluntary agreement regarding the contact
information." This decision was never challenged by way of an application for judicial
review. 6
Consent Order of the Board
9.
The employer and the union subsequently reached an agreement with respect to the issue of
contact information whereby the Employer would provide the Institute with contact
information on a quarterly basis.
10. The employer and the union requested that the terms of that agreement be made an Order of
the Board, which was subsequently done on July 18, 2008. 7
11. While bargaining agents in the federal public sector are not covered by any privacy
legislation, in the Consent Order, the Institute agreed to be bound by the principles of the
Privacy Act and regulations and the principles of the Government Security Policy. 8
12. Pursuant to that Order, the Institute agreed to the following terms, which were included to
specifically address the privacy concerns of employees:
3. ensure that the disclosed information is used solely for the legitimate purposes of the
bargaining agent in accordance with the PSLRA9;
5
Bernard I, supra, at paras. 7, 20; PIPSC, supra, at para. 5; Board Decision, para. 10.
6
PIPSC, supra at paras. 67 and 82. The Board held (at para. 72) that given the finding in favour of the complainant
under s. 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA, there was no need to consider the complainant's allegations respecting the Charter.
7
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2008 PSLRB 58 [Consent
Order].
8
Board Decision, para 172. Note that the Government Security Policy was not introduced as an exhibit at the Board
hearing.
-4-
4. ensure that the disclosed information will be securely stored and protected;
5. respect the privacy rights of the employees in the bargaining unit;
6. acknowledge that the employer is bound by the Privacy Act ... it will keep private and
confidential any such personal information disclosed by the employer to the bargaining
agent under this Memorandum of Agreement;
7. for the sake of clarity, the bargaining agent shall among other things:
a. not disclose the personal information to anyone other than bargaining agent
officials that are responsible for fulfilling the bargaining agent's legitimate
obligations in accordance with the PSLRA;
b. not use, copy or compile the personal information for any purposes other than
those for which it was provided under this agreement;
c. respect the principles of the Government Security Policy ... for the security and
disposal of this personal information; and
d. ensure that all bargaining agent officials that have access to the disclosed
information comply with all the provisions of this agreement;
8.... will ensure vigilant management and monitoring controls on this information at all
times in light of these potential risks to employees and their families ... 10
The parties also agreed to jointly inform all employees in the bargaining unit of the disclosure of
the information in question, which was done by way of an email sent on October 16, 2008. 11
Judicial Review of the Consent Order at the FCA ("Bernard F')
13. On December 17, 2008, the Appellant filed an application for judicial review of the Board's
Consent Order in the FCA, arguing that the Consent Order requires employers to violate the
provisions of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-5 ("Privacy Act"), that the Board must
9
The first term was that the Institute would withdraw its complaint, and the second was the Institute agreed "this is a
full and final settlement" of all claims in respect of home contact information for employees in the bargaining unit.
°
1
Consent Order, supra, at para. 6. Term 9 states that the bargaining agent will "recognize that the information
provided from the employer's database in place at the time of disclosure was provided by employees and that the
employer will not be held liable should a strike vote be challenged. The bargaining agent is responsible for updating
its own database."
11
Consent Order, supra, at para. 5.
-5defer to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner ("OPC") on privacy matters (which had
issued a (non-binding) ruling in favour of the Appellant in 1992 when she complained that
her employer had violated her privacy rights by disclosing her home address and social
insurance number to her then union without her consent) and violated her constitutional
right to freedom of association.
14. On February 8, 2010, the FCA issued its decisionY The Court noted that Ms. Bernard's
arguments were "overly broad," since the Board had held that some contact information
must be provided, and that decision had not been reviewed, and was not under review. The
issue was confined to the "nature of the information to be provided and the circumstances
under which it must be provided." 13 The FCA allowed the judicial review, finding that the
Board had erred in declining to exercise its jurisdiction by "simply adopting, without
analysis [of the privacy issues] the agreement between the employers and the union."
14
As
a result, the Court remitted the matter back to the Board for redetermination, with the
remittance specifically limited to considering the "information which the employer must
provide to the union in order to allow the latter to discharge its statutory obligations" under
the PSLRA. 15
Board's Reconsideration Decision ("Board Decision'')
15. The Board's decision following the remittance from the FCA was released on March 21,
2011. The evidentiary record before the Board consisted of 14 exhibits filed, two of which
the Board found to be inadmissible (1-2 and I-3). 16
16. The Board heard submissions of the parties, and correctly defined the issue to be decided in
the reconsideration as follows:
12
Bernard I, supra.
13
At para. 25.
14
At para. 40.
15
Bernard I, supra at paras. I, 24, 25, 40, 42 and 46.
16
Board Decision, at para. 60.
-6As directed by the FCA, what changes, if any, are required to the terms of the consent
order in the Board's July 18, 2008 decision (2008 PSLRB 58) to address the privacy
rights of employees? 17
17. The Appellant attempted to argue before the Board that the disclosure of her personal
information violated her "freedom not to associate" under the Charter. The Vice-Chair
ruled that her Charter argument would not be considered in the reconsideration as this issue
did not fall within the scope of the FCA's direction.
18
18. The Board carefully considered the issue of what information must be provided to a
bargaining agent in order for the bargaining agent to be able to discharge its statutory
obligations under the PSLRA, taking into consideration the privacy interests of employees
who are not members of the union.
A number of parties participated in this hearing,
including the Appellant, the Respondents, Treasury Board, other Federal Agencies, other
Federal Bargaining Agents, and the OPC. 19
19. In its decision, the Board emphasized the extent to which "it is not appropriate for a
bargaining agent to use employer facilities (including telephones and email) for its
business," and that the "ability of a bargaining agent to communicate with employees at the
workplace is clearly constrained," particularly as communications from bargaining agents
must be vetted and approved by the employer before posting, and there is no expectation of
privacy in electronic communications in the workplace. As a result, the Board held that
"work contact information is not sufficient to allow a bargaining agent to meet its
obligations to represent all employees in the bargaining unit" and that a bargaining agent
must be able to communicate directly with each employee it represents, in a private and
unfiltered way, in order to fulfill its duty of fair representation?0 In this regard, the Board
held that the bargaining agent is not part of the public but is more akin to the employer as
part of a three-way employment relationship?'
17
18
19
Board Decision, at paras. 158-160.
20
Board Decision, at para. 162, 167- 168.
21
-720. The Board found that employees provide contact information to their employers for the
purpose of being contacted about their terms and conditions of employment and this
purpose was consistent with the Institute's intended use of the contact information in this
case. As such, the Board concluded the disclosure of contact information is permitted by
paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. 22
21. Turning to the specific terms of the Consent Order, the Board found that with the addition
of three amendments, described below, the privacy interests of employees were adequately
protected. In particular, the Board noted the following privacy protections contained in the
original Consent Order:
•
The Institute has agreed to be bound by the principles of the Privacy Act and the
Government Security Policy;
•
Contact information can only be used for legitimate obligations pursuant to the PSLRA
and for no other purposes; and
•
The Institute shall not disclose the information to anyone other than those officials
responsible for fulfilling its obligations. 23
22. While many of the Appellant's arguments concerned the potential abuse of disclosed
information, the Board held that PIPSC had undertaken to protect the information it
received from the employer and found that "abuse cannot be presumed." It also noted that
the Institute has as much of an interest as the employer in protecting the information and
has agreed to be bound by privacy principles, which should prevent any abuse. The Board
held that in the unlikely event of abuse, employees have recourse under the Privacy Act. 24
23. The Board found that the manner in which contact information was provided to the Institute
by the Employer constituted an unacceptable risk factor.
It also held that there was a
legitimate concern regarding the proper disposal of expired contact information.
Accordingly, it ordered the Consent Order be amended to require the employer to encrypt
or password protect the contact information it transmits to the bargaining agent, and to
inform new employees that their contact information will be shared with the bargaining
22
23
24
-8agent. It ordered the bargaining agent to appropriately dispose of contact information after
it is replaced by current contact information. 25
Judicial Review of the Board's Reconsideration Decision at the FCA ("Bernard IF')
24. The Appellant brought an application for judicial review to the FCA to set aside the
Board's March 21, 2011 decision. On March 16, 2012, the FCA released its decision. The
court upheld the Board's decision as reasonable, and therefore dismissed the Appellant's
application for judicial review. 26
25. On this second judicial review application, the Appellant attempted to introduce new
exhibits that had not been before the Board, but the Court refused to admit them. 27 The
Court also rejected the Appellant's argument that the Board had erred in declining to
consider her Charter arguments.
In interpreting the scope of its own decision and
remittance in Bernard/, the Court ruled that the scope of the Board's decision-making
authority in the reconsideration proceeding was defined by its earlier order, and that this
had been restricted to determining how much contact information the CRA could disclose
to the Institute without infringing the Appellant's rights under the Privacy Act. 28
26. After holding that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness, the Court then
went on to address each of the Appellant's seven arguments as to why the Board's decision
was unreasonable:
i.
The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that the Board failed to afford sufficient
weight to the recommendations of the OPC, finding that the OPC had appeared before
the Board to provide its perspective, but that the Board's function was not to review
the OPC's 1993 recommendation, which had been made without union input. Unlike
the Board, the OPC's power is limited to issuing recommendations, not orders;29
25
26
Bernardv. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 92 (CanLII), at para. 5 [Bernard II].
27
Bernard II, at para. 27.
28
Bernard II, at paras. 28-31.
29
Bernard II, at paras. 41-42,
-9ii.
The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that the Board had failed to
appropriately consider alternatives to disclosing her personal information, holding
that even assuming the consideration of alternatives was relevant, the Board had met
this obligation and was entitled to accept the evidence of witnesses before it on the
feasibility of alternatives;
iii.
The Court refused to consider the Appellant's argument that the Board should have
considered the disclosure of home addresses and telephone numbers as separate
issues, as these were not raised as part of her memorandum of fact and law and, in
any event, no distinction had been made before the Board between home address and
telephone number. The Court concluded that in the circumstances, it would be unfair
to the CRA, PIPSC, and PSAC to attach much weight to this argument;
iv.
The Court rejected the argument that the fact that employees had not complained
about a lack of communication during a time when the Institute did not have access to
home contact information was proof that the arrangement was satisfactory. The Court
noted that there was no evidence to rebut the evidence from the official of PIPSC that
the union must be able to contact employees at home to provide fair representation; 30
v.
The Court also found that the Appellant's arguments respecting the disparities
between the purpose for which she had provided the CRA with her contact
information and the Institute's proposed uses of the information "misstates the issue."
The Court noted that paragraph 8(2)(a) refers to the purpose for which the
government institution obtained the information, not the purpose for which the
employee provided it. The Court found that there was "substantial overlap" between
the employment-related purposes of both employer and union, and thus the Board's
conclusion that paragraph 8(2)(a) applied was reasonable; 31
vi.
The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that she should be able to opt out of
receiving timely communications from PIPSC on employment-related matters, if that
were even possible. The Court held that she had not waived her right to fair
representation by the Institute and, in any event, that a union's ability to directly and
30
Bernard 11, at paras. 43-51.
31
Bernard II, at paras. 51-53.
- 10quickly contact members of a bargaining unit is integral to the discharge of its duties
of fair representation; and
vii.
In terms of the Appellant's arguments about the potential abuse of her personal
information, the Court found that the Board had built in safeguards to ensure
employees' privacy rights were minimally impaired, and noted that the Appellant's
concerns based on her prior experience were based on her complaint to the OPC
about the abuse of her personal information twenty years ago, when privacy rights
were less well protected. 32
2) Appellant's Attempt to Re-Introduce Evidence Not Before the Board
27. Before the Board, the Appellant attempted to introduce two letters: a letter from the OPC
dated Oct 25, 2007, 33 and a letter (undated) from Treasury Board to the OPC. 34 The other
parties objected to the introduction of the two letters as exhibits on the basis that Ms.
Bernard was not the recipient, and that there had been no opportunity to cross-examine the
authors and of relevance. The Board refused to admit these documents. 35 The Appellant
attempted again to introduce these exhibits at the FCA in Bernard IL which the FCA did
not allow. 36
28.
It is submitted that the Appellant should, once again, not be allowed to introduce these
exhibits that were not properly before the Board.
PART II- RESPONDENT'S POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE APPELLANT'S
QUESTIONS
29. The following are the Institute's positions with respect to the Appellant's questions in this
case: 37
32
33
34
Bernard II, at paras 54-55.
Exhibit 1-3 of her SCC record.
Exhibit 1-2 of her SCC record.
35
36
At para. 27.
37
Note, though the Appellant states four questions, her submissions raise a number of additional issues not stated in
Part II of her submissions. The Institute has thus attempted to reframe and supplement the Appellant's stated
questions in an effort to more accurately capture the issues raised by her in this appeal.
- 11 a) The FCA did not err in determining that the appropriate standard of review was
reasonableness;
b) The Board's decision met that standard of reasonableness;
c) The Board's determination that the provision of contact information to the union is a
consistent use under paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act was reasonable;
d) No Charter issues should be addressed in this appeal;
e) In the alternative, ss. 185 and 186(1 )(a) of the PSLRA do not violate s. 2(d) or s. 8 of
the Charter, insofar as they have the effect of requiring an employer to provide a
bargaining agent with the contact information of its employees, and, in any event, any
infringement is a reasonable limit prescribed by law, which can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter.
PART III- STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
A. THE BOARD'S DECISION SHOULD BE UPHELD AS REASONABLE
1) The Standard of Review is Reasonableness
30. The Institute submits that the FCA did not err in its determination that the standard of
reasonableness applied to the Board's reconsideration decision.
31. The specific question before the Board on reconsideration was what information the
employer must provide to the union in order to allow the latter to discharge its statutory
obligations, while still respecting the Privacy Act. The Board issued a decision on this
issue, and it was this issue that was subject to review by the FCA in Bernard II
32. The Appellant argues that the Board's decision not to address her Charter arguments was
an issue of jurisdiction or "vires," which should be assessed on a standard of correctness.
However, in declining to consider the Appellant's Charter arguments, the Board was not
making a determination of its statutory 'jurisdiction" to address Charter issues in general,
but rather was interpreting the scope of the issue before it. As stated by this Court in
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,38 '"Jurisdiction' is intended in the narrow sense of whether or
not the tribunal had the authority to make the inquiry. In other words, true jurisdiction
38
2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
- 12questions arise where the tribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory grant of
power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter."39
33. While the Board most certainly has the power to decide constitutional issues, it is
constrained, by the rules of procedure and natural justice, to the issues that are properly
before it. The Board's decision that Charter issues did not form part of the reconsideration
direction by the FCA was proper and within its jurisdiction, as confirmed by the FCA on
judicial review below. In reaching its decision, the FCA in Bernard II was interpreting its
own earlier Order in Bernard L confirming that the scope of its initial referral was limited
to the consideration of privacy issues.
Separate and apart from all the other factors
favouring deference, it is submitted that insofar as the FCA was interpreting the scope of its
own Order, its decision should be afforded deference.
34. As noted above, the FCA carefully considered the appropriate standard of review, taking
into account the principles articulated in Dunsmuir, 40 and found that the appropriate
standard of review was one of reasonableness. It is submitted that this determination was
correct.
35. Dunsmuir provides that the standard of review analysis is dependent on the application of a
number of factors including:
(1) the presence or absence of a privative clause;
(2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation;
(3) the nature of the question at issue; and
(4) the expertise of the tribunal. 41
36. In this case, the Board's decision is protected by a strong privative clause ins. 51 of the
PSLRA, which provides that "every order or decision of the Board is final and may not be
questioned or reviewed in any court, except in accordance with the Federal Courts Act on
the grounds referred to in paragraph 18.1(4)(a), (b) or (e) of that Act." 42
None of these
exceptions is applicable in this case.
39
At para. 59.
40
Supra.
41
At para. 64.
42
The relevant paragraphs of the Federal Courts Act include where the Board a) acted without jurisdiction, acted
beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice,
- 1337. Both the purpose of the tribunal and its expertise suggest a deferential standard of review.
While there are privacy issues implicated, the heart of this case is a labour relations dispute
respecting the representational duties of a union. In this regard, the purpose of the PSLRA,
which establishes the Board, "is to facilitate the resolution of labour disputes expeditiously,
inexpensively and with relatively little formality." 43 The preamble of the Act states that it
"promotes mutual respect and harmonious labour-management relations."
38. In terms of the expertise of the Board, the FCA has held that "the Board is an independent
tribunal with a specialized jurisdiction in labour relations within the federal public
service."44 Decisions of the Board, particularly those that involve determinations regarding
labour relations issues, are regularly reviewed on a reasonableness standard. 45
39. In terms of the nature of the question at issue, as noted by the Court of Appeal, the Board
was required to make findings of fact respecting CRA's purposes in collecting personal
information, and of mixed fact and law in relation to the issue of whether the Institute's
proposed use of the information and CRA's purpose in obtaining it are "consistent
purposes" and was also required to interpret its home statute to determine the union's
representational obligations under the PSLRA.
40. Adjudicators acting under the PSLRA can be presumed to hold relative expertise in the
interpretation of the legislation that gives them their mandate. 46 Deference usually results
where "a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to its
functions, and such deference has been found particularly relevant in regard to adjudication
in labour law."47
procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe; and (e) acted, or failed to act, by
reason of fraud or peljured evidence.
43
See, e.g., Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canadian Federal Pilots Association, 2009 FCA 223, at para. 55
[Federal Pilots]; Amos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 38 (CanLII) at paras. 30- 31.
44
Federal Pilots, supra at para. 55.
45
See, e.g., Federal Pilots at para. 54; Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Senate of Canada, 2011 FCA 214 at
para. 31; Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 184 at
para. I; Amos v. Canada, supra, at para. 33.
46
Dunsmuir, supra at para. 68.
47
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Senate of Canada, 2011 FCA 214 (CanLII) at para. 22.
- 1441. Thus, as the Board was interpreting the PSLRA to determine the information the Employer
needed to provide to the union for the union to be able to discharge its obligations,
deference is warranted as such determinations are central to the Board's expertise. Further
reviewing courts should generally show deference to lower courts and administrative
decision-makers on questions of fact and on questions involving mixed fact and law. 48
42. In this case, the Board was required to interprets. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. As noted by
this Court in Dunsmuir, "The case law has moved away considerably from the strict
position ... where it was held that an administrative decision maker will always risk having
its interpretation of an external statute set aside upon judicial review." 49
43. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1 SCR 157
the employer argued that since the Board was required to interpret provisions of the
Broadcasting Act and related journalistic policy, external statutes/policies to the Board's
mandate, a correctness standard was warranted. The majority of the Court rejected this
argument and applied the most deferential standard (which, at the time was "patent
unreasonableness") to the Board's decision that the employer had committed an unfair
labour practice. Justice Iacobucci noted that where an external statute is linked to the
tribunal's mandate and is frequently encountered by it, deference may be appropriate and
the fact that as part of its decision a tribunal must interpret an external statute does not
move the standard of review of the decision as a whole to correctness. 50
48
Dunsmuir, supra para. 53 and per Dechamps J.'s concurring reasons at paras 161 and 164; Rio Tinto A/can Inc. v.
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 SCR 650, at para. 65; Hausen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33,
[2002] 2 SCR 235 at para. 28.
49
At para. 54. Cory J. for the majority in Toronto (City) Board of Education v. O.S.S. T.F., District 15, [1997] 1
S.C.R. 487, where he said, at para. 39:
It has been held on several occasions that the expert skill and knowledge which an arbitration board
exercises in interpreting a collective agreement does not usually extend to the interpretation of "outside"
legislation. The findings of a board pertaining to the interpretation of a statute or the common Jaw are
generally reviewable on a correctness standard.... An exception to this rule may occur where the external
statute is intimately connected with the mandate of the tribunal and is encountered frequently as a result.
[Emphasis added.]
See also Toronto Catholic District School Board v. Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Assn. (Toronto Elementary
Unit), (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] 2 S.C.R. ix.
°Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), at paras. 48
5
50.
- 1544. While the Privacy Act is not the Board's home statute, the Act, including this provision in
particular, is regularly considered by the Board and by other administrative tribunals when
these bodies are asked to make decisions on production issues. 51
45. Thus, all ofthe factors articulated in Dunsmuir point towards a standard of reasonableness.
As noted, the core decision-making function of the Board was one central to its expertise
namely, the minimum amount of information that was to be provided to a bargaining agent
for it to be able to fulfill its statutory obligations under the PSLRA. That the Court also was
required to interpret a provision of the Privacy Act, is not a factor sufficient to shift the
standard from one of reasonableness.
2) The Board's Decision was Reasonable and in Any Event Correct
46. Contrary to the submissions of the Appellant:
a)
The Board's determination that contact information is a "consistent use" was
reasonable and in any event correct;
b) The Board's finding that the disclosure of contact information is required for the
Institute to meet its statutory and broader representational obligations was reasonable and
in any event correct;
c) The Board's finding that the Appellant's concerns about abuse of her information are
speculative was reasonable and in any event correct; and
d) The Board's finding that the Institute's access to employees in the workplace is not
adequate was reasonable and in any event correct.
a) Determination that Contact Information is a "Consistent Use" was Reasonable
47. At paras. 66
71 of her submissions, the Appellant submits that the Board erred when it
held that the disclosure of contact information was a "consistent use" under section 8(2)(a)
of the Privacy Act. This section provides that "personal information" may be disclosed:
for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or
for a use consistent with that purpose.
51
See the section, below, on "Detennination that Contact Infonnation is a 'Consistent Use' was Reasonable."
- 1648. Contrary to the Appellant's contention at para. 66 of her factum, whether or not she
subjectively believed or expected at the time she provided her information to the employer
that it would be disclosed to the union is not relevant for determining "consistent use." In
response to a similar argument before the FCA, the Court held that the Appellant was
"misstat[ing] the issue," since "[p ]aragraph 8(2)(a) refers to the purpose for which the
government institution obtained the information, not the purpose for which the employee
provided it." 52
49. While the Privacy Act does not define the term "consistent use," privacy legislation in other
jurisdictions contains a similar exception to allow the disclosure of personal information if
the information is disclosed for a use consistent with the purpose for which it was obtained.
50. For example, the British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act, 53 s. 32(a) permits disclosure of personal information if the information is "disclosed for
a purpose for which it was obtained or compiled," or "if the information is disclosed for a
use consistent with that purpose." Section 34 of that Act provides that a use will be deemed
to have a "consistent purpose" where the new use, inter alia, "has a reasonable and direct
connection to the original purpose." 54 The same definition can be found in privacy
legislation of provinces across Canada. 55
51. As the FCA held below, at para. 53:
A proposed use of information may be "consistent" with the purpose for which it was
obtained, even if the government institution's purpose and the other person's proposed
use are not identical. It is enough that there is a sufficiently direct connection between
purpose and use that an employee would reasonably expect that the information could be
used in the manner proposed.
52
Bernard II, at para. 52.
53
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165.
54
The use must also be "necessary for performing the statutory duty of, or for operating a legally authorized
program of, the public body that uses or discloses the information." In Canadian Office and Professional
Employees' Union, Local 378, 2005 BCCA 604 (CanLII) at para. 60, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that
a "reasonable and direct connection" is one that is "logically, or rationally, connected to the original purpose."
55
The same definition can be found in section 41 of Alberta's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act, RSA 2000, c F-25; s. 45 of Manitoba's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, CCSM c F175;
s. 40 of Newfoundland and Laborador's Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1; s.
38 of Prince Edward Island's Freedom oflnformation and Protection ofPrivacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-15.01; and s.
28 of Nova Scotia's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5. 55
- 1752. The FCA, in applying the "reasonable direct connection" standard for consistent use (the
statutory standard for "consistent use" in provinces across Canada),, appropriately upheld
the Board's determination that disclosure of contact information to the union was a
"consistent use." The Court's reference to what an employee would "reasonably expect" is
a clear reference to an objective standard of what a reasonable employee, with knowledge
of the purposes for which information was obtained by the employer and to be used by the
union, would expect.
53. The Board carefully considered the purpose for which the employer collects contact
information and determined that this information is collected for the purpose of contacting
employees about their terms and conditions of employment, which is consistent with
PIPSC's intended use. 56 The Board also cited authorities where disclosure of contact
information to the union was held to be permissible under s.8(2)(a). 57 Indeed, numerous
authorities have determined that information collected for employment purposes can be
disclosed to bargaining agents under s. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act. 58
54.
At paras. 72
77, the Appellant provides a limited and incomplete legislative history of
certain provisions in the Canada Labour Code (the "CLC") related to off-site workers. As
noted by the Appellant at para. 73 of her factum, the CLC applies to federally regulated
public sector employers and unions.
It is submitted that these submissions bear no
relevance whatsoever to the case at bar, which considers provisions of the PSLRA, a totally
separate regime from the CLC (with the exception of certain health and safety provisions
not at issue here), which governs federal public sector workers and unions.
56
57
58
In Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, [200 1] CIRB no. I 10 at para. 34 the Canadian Industrial Relations Board held
that it was appropriate to disclose individual salary infonnation to the union as its release would be consistent with
one of the main purposes for which it was gathered, i.e., the appropriate administration ofthe collective agreement.
The Board also noted that "The bargaining agent shares with the employer the need to utilize such infonnation for
proper, appropriate and limited purposes, and also must guard its general confidentiality." A similar finding was
made in Bank of Canada, 2007 CIRB 387 (CanLII) at para. 47. In Public Service Alliance of Canada and Treasury
Board, PSSRB File Nos. 161-02-791 and 169-02-584 (19960426)(1996)[PSAC], the Canada Public Service Staff
Relations Board ruled that the provisions of the Privacy Act did not preclude the employer from disclosing to the
union names and addresses of employees who might be subject to layoff. See also Public Service of Canada v.
Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2011 PSLRB 131 (CanLII) at para. 11.
- 1855. It is submitted that the Board's conclusion that disclosure of contact information was
permitted under s. 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, and the FCA's confirmation of same, was
reasonable and in any event correct.
b) Determination that Disclosure of Contact Information is Required for the Institute to
Meet it Statutory and Broader Representational Obligations
56. In its initial decision in this matter from 2008, the Board unequivocally found that contact
information was required by the bargaining agent in order to fulfill its statutory obligations
under the PSLRA. The 2008 decision held that, at a minimum, contact information was
required for the Institute to meet its obligations under sections 183 and 184 of the PSLRA.
As the Federal Court noted, these findings were not challenged by way of judicial review. 59
57. Subsequently, the Board considered the FCA's direction on reconsideration and concluded
that the scope of the direction included a reconsideration of "all of the obligations of the
bargaining agent that flow from the PSLRA," given the wording of the Consent Order under
review. 60
58. The Board considered the significant body of case law, evidence, and the provisions of the
PSLRA and concluded that the Institute requires contact information to fulfil both its
statutory and broader representational obligations.
59. The Board heard significant, credible evidence about ways in which the Institute requires
contact information to discharge its statutory duties
60. Chief Negotiations Officer for the Institute, Walter Belyea, testified that PIPSC requires
contact information for the purposes of gathering employee input, verifying information
provided by the employer, giving notice of a final-offer vote or strike vote (sections 183
and 184 of the PSLRA) and developing essential service agreements.
61. Section 183(1)(a) provides that:
183. ( 1) If the Minister is of the opinion that it is in the public interest that the employees
in a bargaining unit be given the opportunity to accept or reject the offer of the employer
last received by the bargaining agent in respect of all matters remaining in dispute
between the parties, the Minister may
59
PIPSC, supra at paras. 62-71; Bernard I, supra at paras. 2 and 30.
60
At para. !58 of the Board Decision.
- 19-
(a) on any terms and conditions that the Minister considers appropriate, direct that a vote
to accept or reject the offer be held by secret ballot as soon as possible among all of the
employees in the bargaining unit ... [emphasis added]
62. Section 184(1) provides that:
In order to obtain approval to declare or authorize a strike, an employee
organization must hold a vote by secret ballot among all of the employees in the
bargaining unit conducted in a manner that ensures that the employees are given a
reasonable opportunity to participate in the vote and be informed of the results.
[emphasis added]
63. Belyea also testified that employee input was required to prepare bargaining positions and
that the requirement to consult employees can arise on short notice. In terms of statutory
obligations, sections 65 and 95 of the PSLRA also provide that all employees in the
bargaining unit have the right to vote on certification and de-certification.
64. Mr. Belyea testified that that individual employees also need to be contacted to explore the
implications of pursuing a particular grievance and that when negotiating essential service
agreements, PIPSC may need to contact individual employees to understand their duties
and working situations (see sections 119 - 134 of the PSLRA, which govern essential
services).
65. Outside of the bargaining process, the Institute would need to contact employees directly if
downsizing were planned, to ascertain whether some employees were willing to take early
retirement.
The Institute may also need to contact employees when new legislation is
promulgated or when pension, benefit or employment equity issues or complaints arise. 61
66. In recent years, the Federal Public Service has seen a massive wave of surplussing. The
Institute's Collective Agreement for the AFS bargaining unit includes "Appendix G,"
which is the "Work Force Adjustment Appendix to Institute - Audit, Financial, and
Scientific Collective Agreement" (the "WFAA"). The objective of the policy is to
"maximize employment opportunities for indeterminate employees affected by work force
adjustment situations."62 The WFAA sets out extensive duties on the employer to minimize
61
Board Decision, at paras. 20- 26.
62
Cited at para. 2 of PSAC v. Treasury Board of Canada, 2013 PSLRB 37 [PSAC 2013].
-20involuntary departures through multiple methods of identifying alternative positions with
the CRA.
67. In Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 63 the Public
Service Staff Relations Board found that once a workforce adjustment situation had
occurred, the employer had a duty to "advise and consult" with the bargaining agent, under
the terms of the WF A Policy. In that case, the employer had in fact "met the spirit" of the
Policy by involving bargaining agent representatives in the process. Even despite this, the
Board found that it had breached its obligation to consult by failing to make all of the
relevant information available to the union.
68. It is essential that the bargaining agent have all relevant information because of its
representational obligations
it must ensure that the employer is taking all steps necessary
to ensure the job security, or in other words, to maximize workplace opportunities for its
employees. It is submitted that especially during times of work force adjustment, where
employees are vulnerable and under stress and may not be easily reachable in the workplace
(as, subsequent to their notice of being affected, they may no longer be regularly in the
workplace) and given the extensive duties on the employer and the potential need to contact
employees on short notice where opportunities arise, it is crucial that the Institute have
contact information for employees in the bargaining unit. 64 Note, in PSAC 199t1'5 the
PSSRB ordered the disclosure of employee names and addresses and specifically noted the
importance of such disclosure in the context of the bargaining agent's responsibilities with
respect to workforce adjustments. 66
69. A significant body of case law supports the finding that unions require contact information
to meet their statutory representational obligations.
63
[2002] C.P.S.S.R.B. No. 14. Article 1.1.9 of the WFAA requires that the CRA "advise and consult" with the
Institute regarding any work force adjustment situation and make available to the bargaining agent the name and
work location of affected employees.
64
See PSAC 2013, supra where the Board discusses the relatively short timelines involved in the "alternation
process," a process by which an employee who has been identified for possible lay-off agrees to change places with
a similarly qualified employee who has not been so identified, paras 27-28.
65
Supra.
66
At pp. 9- 10.
- 21 70. The Ontario Labour Relations Board decision in Millcroft Inn Ltd, 67 has been widely cited
across Canadian jurisdictions as a key authority for the proposition that the union is entitled
to the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the employees it represents. In Mil/croft,
the union brought an unfair labour practice complaint against the employer when it refused
to provide this information to the union without employees' consent.
71. In determining whether disclosure was warranted, the OLRB considered the union's
statutory duties, including the union's duty to represent all employees in the bargaining in a
manner that is not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. The Board noted that a union
must "diligently pursue the interests of the members of the bargaining unit it represents,"68
and noted that in pursuing grievances on behalf of bargaining unit members it must
investigate the grievances and act promptly to achieve their resolution. It must be able to
communicate with employees to ensure the collective agreement is being properly
administered and to assess the merits and impact of a grievance, may need to speak to
several employees in the bargaining unit, including those besides the grievor. 69 In the
context of bargaining, the union needs to be able to communicate with employees to assess
their objectives and formulate bargaining positions, all of which requires the union to be
able to communicate expeditiously with all employees. 70
72. Outside of its statutory obligations, the OLRB noted that the Supreme Court of Canada case
in Weber v. Ontario Hydro, 71 significantly expanded the duties of unions in terms of their
representational obligations. The effect of Weber was that it expanded the scope of the
arbitrability of disputes such that even if a cause of action does not arise expressly from a
collective agreement, if it is a dispute between an employer and an employee and the
dispute arises inferentially or essentially from the collective agreement, the dispute is
arbitrable. The result is that the union has a very wide obligation to protect the legal
interests of employees vis-a-vis the employer and, the OLRB concluded, "must be able to
67
[2000] OLRB Rep. July/August 665 (Albertyn) [Millcroft].
68
Mil/croft, at para. 22.
69
At paras. 22-23.
70
At para. 24.
71
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 929.
-22communicate with the employees. Having their names, addresses and telephone numbers
will considerably ease their difficulties in doing so." 72
73. Moreover, the representational obligations of federal public sector unions was arguably
expanded in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Vaughan v. Canada, 73 where the
majority of the Court held that even where workplace issues do not go to an adjudicator,
they cannot generally be litigated privately and must go through the union-management
grievance process. The effect is increased representational responsibility for the union.
74. In Mil/croft the OLRB noted that the employer and union are equal bargaining partners in
their collective relationship:
The employer is in no more preferential position in relation to the employees than is the
union in the context of their collective bargaining relationship. In that context, the
employer is not entitled to greater rights in relation to the employees than is the union.
To the extent that the employer is entitled to know the names, addresses and telephone
numbers of the employees, i.e. to the extent that their privacy rights to that information
are compromised by the employer sharing it, so too is the union entitled to the
information.
A consequence of the union possessing exclusive bargaining status on behalf of the
employees is that the union is placed in an equal bargaining position with the employer in
its collective bargaining relationship. To the extent that the employer has information
which is of value to the union in its capacity to represent the employees (such as their
74
names, addresses and telephone numbers), the union too should have that information.
75. The Mil/croft decision has been endorsed in a similar, subsequent OLRB case, OttawaCarleton District School Board, 75 where the Board noted additional reasons why the
employer is obliged to disclose the contact information the union sought, including that the
union needs this information to conduct strike votes and that under the Occupational Health
and Safety Act (OHSA), the union has a wide range of statutory responsibilities to ensure
72
At para. 29.
73
[2005] 1 SCR 146.
74
At paras. 34-35.
75
[2001] OLRB Rep. November/December 1426 (Albertyn).
-23employee protection at work. 76 Similarly, the Canadian Industrial Relations Board held in
Monarch Transport Inc. (Re), that "to be effective, contacts with employees to determine
their bargaining concerns and for representations purposes are a legitimate and necessary
part of the labour-management relationship." It was held that the union's capacity to
represent the employees it represents would be frustrated if access to contact information
were denied. 77 For its part, the Alberta Labour Relations Board, inAysa Pharm Inc. (Re/ 8,
held, at para. 91 that "the union needs to be able to communicate with members and nonmembers alike in order to properly represent them," and held, at para. 99, that without
access to employees' private contact information, "the Union is significantly hindered in its
ongoing responsibility to represent its membership and to address employee concems." 79
76. Furthermore, it is well established that inadequate communication between the union and a
bargaining unit member may be a breach of the union's duty of fair representation where
the lack of communication prejudices an employee. 80
77. Considering the evidence before it, the language of the PSLRA, and the general consensus
by labour boards across Canadian jurisdictions, the Board's determination that disclosure of
76
At para. 13.
77
[2003] C.I.R.B.D. No. 42 (QL) at para. 24.
78
Aysa Pharm Inc v United Food and Commercial Workers Canada Union, Local No 40I, 2012 CanLII 31284 (AB
LRB).
79
See also: Canadian Niagara Hotels Inc., [2005] OLRB Rep. Nov/Dec 932 (Albertyn) at para. 27; Oaklands
Regional Centre, [20 I 0] OLRB Rep. Sept/Oct 658 (Anderson) at paras. 17-27; Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming
Commission), [2002] O.L.R.D. No. 120 (OLRB) at paras. 9-11; P. Sun's Enterprises (Vancouver) Ltd. (Hotel Grand
Pacific) v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CA. W.Canada), Local 114, [2003] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 301 (QL) at paras. 23, 32. In Ontario Public Service Employees
Union v. Management Board of Cabinet, 2002 CanLII 11028 (ON LRB) at para. 3, the Union sought from the
Employer the names, personal identification numbers, home addresses and home telephone numbers of all members
of the OPSEU bargaining unit. The Board rejected the Employer's argwnents that disclosure would breach
employees' privacy rights and ordered that disclosure was required for the union to fulfil its duties under the Ontario
Labour Relations Act. See also PSAC I996, supra.
80
Thompson and Brewery, Winery and Distillery Workers Union, Local 300 (Re), [1997] B.C.L.R.B. No. 8281197
at paras. 32-33. This is particularly true in a situation that prejudices the applicant: L 'Hebreux and USW (Re), 2010
CIRB 515 at paras. 37-38; Canadian National Railway Co. (Re), [2010] C.I.R.B.D. No. 46 (CIRB) at paras. 37-38,
53-54. Failure to consult with a grievor about the withdrawal of his or her grievance will also be a violation of the
union's duties: Cuddy Food Products Ltd. And RWDSU (Re)(1988), 1 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 1 at para 81. Undue delay in
making a decision, or informing the grievor of a decision, may be arbitrary conduct: Kooner and USWA, Local 480
(Re), [1997] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 116 (BCLRB) (QL) at paras. 65 66, 70-72. A union that negotiations a settlement
without consulting with a grievor will likely be found to have breached its duty of fair representation: Harke and
IBEW, Local 424 (re)(2007), 141 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 81 (Alta. L.R.B.) at paras. 30-34.
-24contact information is required for the union to fulfil its statutory obligations was not only
reasonable, but was eminently correct.
78. Contrary to paragraph 71 of the Appellant's factum, where the Appellant seeks to
distinguish between home phone numbers and addresses, not only did the FCA deny her the
right to argue this issue because it had not been raised before the Board or in her
memorandum of fact and law, but in addition, it is clear that the Board, after hearing all the
evidence, and considering similar precedents, determined that employees provide both their
phone number and address to their employers so that they can be contacted about "their
terms and conditions of employment." 81 It is submitted that the evidence supports, and in
no way contradicts, the Board's finding that the employer collects both home phone number
and address information for employment-related reasons. This is true whether the
information is collected for "compensation purposes" or "in case a manager needs to reach
an employee" 82 : in either event, the information is collected, inter alia, so employees can be
contacted about their terms and conditions of employment.
79. While, as the Appellant notes at para. 93 of her factum, she has the right not to be a member
of the Institute, and has chosen not to be a member -- and so as a result, does not have a
member's right to attend union membership meetings or to vote on tentative collective
agreements -- the fact remains that the union has a myriad of statutory and representational
obligations to her and to all of its bargaining unit members, and that without access to
contact information, it cannot meet these obligations and carry out its critical and statutorily
mandated representational functions.
c) Concerns About Abuse Speculative
80. The Appellant's concerns about the potential for abuse of her personal information are
speculative, and the Board was both reasonable and correct in so finding. 83
81. In its decision, the Board held that concerns about potential abuse of the Appellant's
information were hypothetical, but nonetheless directed additional safeguards for the
81
At para. I 68, Board Decision.
82
83
At para. 95 of Appellant's factum.
-25protection of employee information including providing that contact information be
encrypted or password protected when transmitted, that new employees be notified that
their contact information would be shared with the bargaining agent, and that contact
information be appropriately disposed of after it is replaced by current contact
information. 84
82. As noted by the FCA 85 , the Board built in safeguards to ensure employees' privacy rights
were minimally impaired. The Consent Order itself provides that information is to be used
solely for "the legitimate purposes of the bargaining agent in accordance with the PSLRA,"
and the Consent Order and the amended Board Decision ensure that disclosed information
will be securely stored, transmitted and protected.
The Court also noted that the
Appellant's concerns about the abuse of her personal information occurred twenty years
ago, when privacy rights were less well protected.
83. It is submitted that the Appellant's concern that her home address will be disclosed to
members for the purpose of picketing outside of her home is totally unfounded, particularly
in light of the fact that disclosure of her information to members is prohibited by the
Consent Order and such disclosure for picketing purposes would not be for the purpose of
fulfilling the "the legitimate purposes of the bargaining agent in accordance with the
PSLRA." 86 As noted by the Alberta Labour Relations Board in Aysa Pharm Inc. (Re/ 7
"The employee information is not being disclosed to the public but to the employees' own
representative. The union has as much interest as the employer in protecting the employees
from harassment."
84. The Appellant's reference 88 to the comment by the Institute's Chief Negotiations Officer
that PIPSC's network of stewards is "sketchy," was made in the context of his description
84
Board Decision, at paras. 174, 176· 178, 180-181.
85
Bernard II, at paras. 54·55.
86
Consent Order at para. 6.
87
[2012] A.L.R.B.D. No. 38 (Alta. L.R.B.), at para. 91.
88
At para 94 of her factum.
-26-
of why stewards may not have sufficient access to the workplace to fulfil the Institute's
statutory obligations and was not a comment on the integrity of the stewards themselves. 89
85. The Appellant also raised concerns about the frequency of the disclosure of her contact
information to the Institute, which was ordered to occur every quarter. It is submitted that
this measure is, in fact, privacy enhancing. Assuming an employee's contact information
does not change over the course of a year, and safeguards are observed, there is no further
diminution in the employee's privacy by quarterly confirmation that this information is
current. The ability to maintain current information ensures that the union does not send
information to people who are not the intended recipients.
86. The Appellant's unsubstantiated concerns about the potential abuse of her information do
not affect the Board's reasonable determination, and the FCA's confirmation of same, that
the safeguards in the Consent Order, with the additional measures it imposed, were
sufficient to protect the Appellant's privacy rights.
d) Adequacy of Union Access to the Workplace
87. Contrary to the Appellant's contention that contact information is not required by the union
because it has "virtually unfettered access to employees in the workplace," 90 the Board
carefully considered the level of access the Institute has to employees in the workplace and
found it to be inadequate
noting that the ability of the bargaining agent to communicate
with employees at the workplace was "clearly constrained," and that communications from
bargaining agents must be vetted and approved by the employer before posting and that
there is no expectation of privacy in electronic communications at the workplace. 91
88. Chief Negotiations Officer, Walter Belyea also testified that part-time employees and
employees on leaves of absence or secondments do not necessarily receive mail sent to
work addresses, that work contact information is not reliable, given the frequency of
employee relocations, and that communications related to mandatory votes can only be
effected quickly when the Institute has contact information. He also noted that not all work
89
At para. 28, Board Decision.
90
At paras. 100- 102 ofthe Appellant's factum.
91
-27sites had stewards and that posting messages on the internet was inadequate due to its lack
of privacy, delays due to the need for translation, and the fact that employees have varying
levels of access to the internet. This evidence was undisputed. 92
89. That an invitation to an information session was sent by the union to employees in no way
addresses or contradicts any of the concerns above. Further, that the legal right of union
members to meet with employees at the workplace may be broader than what is set out in
the collective agreement- for example, that it may include the right of access of negotiators
to employer premises to meet with employees to discuss bargaining issues93 - similarly does
not address the general practical impediments noted above, which make relying solely on
the Institute's workplace access to employees insufficient.
90. The FCA was correct in finding that there was no evidence to rebut the testimony of the
official of PIPSC to the effect that the union must be able to contact employees at home in
order to provide fair representation. There is no basis for interfering with or reversing the
Board's finding of fact that other means of communication were not adequate to enable
PIPSC to discharge its statutory responsibilities. 94
e) Conclusion on Reasonableness
91. The reasonableness standard has been articulated by this Court as follows:
Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the
development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come
before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result.
Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals
have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A
court conducting a review for reasonableness inquiries into the qualities that make a
decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to
outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is
also concerned with whether the decision falls within a ranfe of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. 9
92
Board Decision, at paras. 27- 28.
93
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Treasury Board (Canada Border Services Agency), 2012 PSLRB 58 at
paras. 43 45.
94
Bernard 11 at para. 50.
95
Dunsmuir, supra at para. 47.
-28-
92. In coming to its decision that contact information must be provided to the bargaining agent
in order for it to be able to discharge its statutory obligations under the PSLRA, the Board
carefully considered the privacy interests and rights of employees who are not members of
the bargaining unit, and found that the disclosure fell within the exception in s. 8(2)(a) of
the Privacy Act. Noting that contact information was needed by the bargaining agent in
order to fulfill its statutory obligations, the Board carefully considered the specific terms of
the Consent Order, going so far as to add three additional safeguards to ensure that the
privacy interests of employees were adequately protected. 96 As set out above, its decision
was both reasonable and correct.
B) CHARTER ISSUES
1) The Court Should Decline to Consider Charter Issues
93. It is submitted that the Court should decline to hear any of the Appellant's Charter issues,
none of which were heard or determined by the Board or the FCA below.
94. In its decision below, the Board specifically held that "Charter arguments would not be
considered in this reconsideration" since, in remitting the matter to the Board, the Court of
Appeal's "instructions are limited to assessing the privacy rights of employees."97
Subsequently, the FCA, in Bernard II, interpreting its own earlier reconsideration Order in
Bernard I, also declined to hear the Appellant's Charter arguments, holding that these
issues were not within the scope of the reconsideration proceeding as defined by Bernard
!
98
As the FCA ruled, the FCA in Bernard I "did not authorize the Board to reconsider its
February decision in light ofMs Bernard's Charter rights." 99
95. The Board and FCA below correctly decided not to permit the Appellant to raise any
Charter issues.
96
97
98
99
Board Decision, at paras. 167-168, 172-178.
At para. 9.
Bernard I!, at paras. 28-31.
At para. 31.
-2996. Furthermore, this Court should also decline to consider the Appellant's argument that the
disclosure violates hers. 8 right to not be subjected to unreasonable seizure. This argument
was never raised before the Board. At the Board below, the only Charter argument even
raised by the Appellant was that the disclosure of her contact information infringed her s.
2( d) Charter rights. 100 The Appellant should not be permitted to introduce new arguments
that were never raised below.
97. As a result of the determinations below, no Charter record was developed and no Charter
record is available to or before this Court. In this respect, while the Court has stated
Constitutional Questions in this case respecting s. 2(d), stating a question does not oblige
the Court to answer it.
The Institute submits that the Court should not answer the
Constitutional Questions, not only because the Charter issues were not considered by the
Board or the FCA below, but also because no adequate or proper Charter record is before
this Court.
98. Even where constitutional questions are stated under Rule 32, it may ultimately turn out
that the factual record on appeal provides an insufficient basis for their resolution and the
"Court is not obliged in such cases to provide answers." 101 As this Court noted in Bisaillon
v. Keable 102 :
The parties are generally left wide latitude by the Chief Justice or other judges of this
Court in formulating the constitutional questions which they submit for approval.
However, it does not follow that the Court is bound by these questions, and that it is
required to answer them if it may dispose of the appeal without doing so or if it appears
that the facts of the case do not provide a basis for such questions. The questions may not
be used as a means of transforming an ordinary proceeding into a reference: Vadebonceur
v. Landry, 1976 CanLII 182 (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 179, atpp. 187-88.
99. Thus, in Bell ExpressVu, 103 for instance, while the Court had stated constitutional questions,
it determined not to answer them because there because there was no Charter record
permitting this Court to address the stated questions.
100
See para. 9 of the Board Decision.
101
Bell ExpressVu, [2002] 2 SCR 559 at para. 59 [Bell ExpressVu]
102
[1983]2 SCR 60, at p. 71.
103
Bell ExpressVu, supra, paras. 60, 68.
- 30-
100. As a general rule, this Court does not permit appellants to raise new issues in this Court that
would require additional evidence to be adduced at trial, absent exceptional
circumstances. 104 The Court has held that the policy of not dealing with abstract questions
is of "particular importance in constitutional matters." 105 Given the significance of the
questions posed in this case, it would be dangerous to determine these issues in a factual
vacuum. 106
101. In order to determine whether there is a Charter breach, and whether it could be upheld
under s. 1, the parties would be entitled to lead extensive evidence, including expert
evidence, on many issues, including, inter alia, how or whether the provision of contact
information interferes with any non-associational freedom the Appellant may have, the
potential impact of a failure of the employer to disclose employee contact information on
the union and/or bargaining unit members' associational rights protected under section 2(d)
of the Charter, and whether there is proportionate connection between the provisions of
contact information and the objective of the legislation.
102. The Respondent, in its original 2007 complaint to the Board, alleged that the refusal to
provide the requested information violated sections 2(d) and 2(b) of the Charter, but the
Board determined that given its finding of a violation of the PSLRA, it was unnecessary to
consider the Charter issues. As a result, there is no Charter record with respect to the
impact of a potential interference in the union's ability to receive contact information on
bargaining unit members' Charter rights. Given that that the s.l analysis in this case could
necessarily require a complex balancing of competing Charter rights, it is particularly
dangerous for the Court to attempt to consider the Charter issues in the absence of a full
Charter record.
103. In the final alternative, even if, despite the reasons of the Board and the FCA below, the
Court were of the view that the Board and FCA erred in not considering the Appellant's
104
R.W.C. v. The Queen (March 29, 2005) Doc. 30302 [2004] SCCA No. 171 (motion to state constitutional
question dismissed, without reasons); Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2013, Carswell, pp. 421 and 425-426; Bell
ExpressVu, supra at para. 58; Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, at p. 240; Idziak v. Canada (Minister of
Justice), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, at pp. 643-44, per Cory J.
105
Moysa v. Alberta (Labour relations board), [1989] I SCR 1572 at pp. 1579-1580. See also Borowski v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, at pp. 363-65.
106
Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. I 086, paras. 26-32.
- 31 constitutional claims, the Institute submits that the issue should, at most, be sent back to be
determined by the Board at first instance, where an appropriate evidentiary record could be
adduced, and where the Court would have the benefit of the expert tribunal's assessment
and reasons.
2) No Charter Infringement
a) No Infringement of Freedom of Association
104. To the extent that the Court determines to examine Charter issues in this appeal, the sole
issue would be whether sections 185 and 186(l)(a) of the PSLRA, to the extent they entitle
a union to contact information in order to carry out its representational obligations, violate
s. 2(d) of the Charter.
As reflected in the April 29, 2013 Order of Justice Rothstein
granting intervener status to a number of interveners, 107 the issue in this appeal would not
extend to whether being required to be a bargaining unit member represented by a union or
to pay Rand formula dues is in conformity with the Charter. In the Institute's submission,
that sections 185 and 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA may require an employer to provide a
bargaining agent with the contact information in no way violates any right not to associate
under s. 2( d) of the Charter.
I 05. The Court has considered whether or not the freedom to associate includes the right "not to
associate" under s.2(d) in two cases: Lavigne v. OPSEU, 108and Advance Cutting and Coring
Ltd. to9
106. In Lavigne, the Court was unanimous in its finding that the payment of dues to the Union
relating to the representation of employees in the bargaining unit for collective bargaining
purposes, or to the Union's functions as exclusive bargaining representative, does not
violates. 2(d) of the Charter. Three members ofthe 7-member Court (LaForest, Sopinka
and Gonthier JJ.) held that the requirement to pay dues was not a form of forced association
to the extent the dues were used to pay for representational and collective bargaining
107
The Public Service Alliance of Canada, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, the Canadian Association of
Counsel to Employers, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Canadian Constitution Foundation, the Alberta
Federation of Labour, the Coalition of British Columbia Businesses and Merit Canada.
108
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [Lavigne].
109
200 I SCC 70, [200 I] 3 SCR 209 [Advance Cutting].
-32-
purposes. 110 Justice McLaughlin also held that the requirement to pay Rarid formula dues
was not a form of forced association, on the basis that payment of union dues under the
Rand formula could not reasonably be seen as compelling Mr. Lavigne into ideological
conformity with the union's causes. 111 For their part, Justices Wilson, Justice Cory and
Justice L'Heureux-Dube held that s. 2(d) does not include a freedom not to associate.n 2
107. Justice La Forest adopted the views of Professor Brian Etherington, who identified four
primary liberty interests that can be threatened by compelled association:
a. governmental establishment of, or support for, particular political parties or causes;
b. impairment of the individual's freedom to join or associate with causes of his choice;
c. the imposition of ideological conformity; and
d. personal identification of an objector with political or ideological causes which the
service association supports. 113
108. He also held that the Charter does not entitle a person to artificial isolation from his or her
co-workers, and noted:
a worker like Lavigne would have no chance of succeeding if his objection to his
association with the Union was the extent that it addresses itself to the matters, the terms
and conditions of employment for members of his bargaining unit, with respect to which
he is "naturally" associated with his fellow employees. 114
109. In Advance Cutting and Coring, the issue before this Court was whether the obligation in
Quebec's Construction Act requiring workers to join one of five unions was a violation of s.
2(d). Three judges (LeBel, Gonthier and Arbour JJ.) held that the mere obligation to join a
union does not impose "ideological conformity" on an employee and thus there was no
breach of s. 2(d). 115 While taking a broader view of the test for ideological conformity,
110
At para. 251, 261.
111
At para. 285, 304.
112
At paras. 85-87, 94.
113
Para. 248.
114
Para. 251.
115
At para. 252. As Justice LeBel J. observed at para 208, "[ d]emocracy is not primarily about withdrawal, but
fundamentally about participation in the life and management of democratic institutions like unions," and allowing
individuals to withdraw would compromise their "group voice" and deny them "the benefits arising from an
association."
- 33Justice Bastarache (together with McLaughlin, Major and Binnie) accepted it as the core
underlying rationale for protecting any negatives. 2(d) freedom not to associate. 116 For his
part, Justice Iacobucci, after noting that both Justices LeBel and Bastarache agreed on
imposition of ideological conformity as the proper test for determining a breach of any
negative freedom of association, decided instead to adopt Justice La Forest's approach in
Lavigne, namely, that the negative freedom of association will only be violated where
forced association imposes a danger to one of the liberty interests identified above. 117 For
her part, L'Heureux-Dube J. maintained that there is no right not to associate under s.
2(d). 118
110. Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the entitlement of the union to
contact information under sections 185 and 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA in no way infringes s.
2(d) of the Charter. To the extent that sections 185 and 186(l)(a) require the disclosure of
contact information, it is because the information is required for the union to fulfil its
collective bargaining and representational obligations on behalf of bargaining unit members
it is statutorily entitled and obligated to represent under the PSLRA. The Board ordered that
disclosure could be for no other reason than the furtherance of the union's representational
obligations, and there is no reasonable basis, nor any evidence in the record, that this
remotely imposes any kind of ideological conformity or threatens any of the liberty
interests set out above.
111. Moreover, as a matter of both logic and common sense, the provision of contact
information to the bargaining agent in no way interferes with any protected right to "nonassociation" of the Appellant with the union. Being provided with an employee's contact
information is no more an interference with freedom not to associate than the requirement
to provide one's contact information to passport control or to one's credit card company.
116
At para. 3.
117
Paras. 285
118
At para. 79.
288.
-34b) No Unreasonable Search or Seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter
112. To the extent that the Appellant claims hers. 8 rights are violated where the union obtains
her contact information from the Employer, the Institute submits that there is no legal basis
for the Appellant's argument. The Appellant has conceded that she voluntarily provided her
personal information to the employer. 119 Her contact information has been shared with the
Union for employment purposes, consistent with the purposes for which she disclosed it to
the employer. As a result, this information has in no way been seized.
113. Justice Wilson in Thomson Newspapers, stated that a seizure is "the taking hold by a public
authority of a thing belonging to a person against that person's will." 120 To the extent that
the Appellant suggests that it is the Institute that has seized her information, the Appellant
submits that the union is not a "public authority." Public authorities are agents of the state,
like the police or a government Ministry. Therefore, there has been no "seizure" under s. 8.
114. Moreover, "seizure," within the meaning of s. 8, applies only to information obtained for
investigatory or evidentiary purposes. 121 Therefore, the Appellant's contact information has
in no way been "seized" as the disclosure ordered by the Board in no way relates to these
purposes. Therefore, the Appellant's s. 8 rights are not engaged in these circumstances.
115. Even ifs.8 were somehow applicable in these circumstances, on the principles articulated in
Smith v. Canada, 122 there would be no violation of the Appellant's rights. Smith was a case
concerning the sharing of an individual's personal information (found on a customs form)
by the Department of National Revenue with the Unemployment Insurance Commission.
The Supreme Court held that the objectives of the Commission in obtaining the information
119
Appellant's factum at para. 86.
120
Thomson newspapers ltd. v. Canada (Director of investigation and research, restrictive trade practices
commission), [1990] 1 SCR 425 at para 89 (QL). Mr. Justice La Forest in R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417
(SCC)(QL) at para. 26, stated "As I see it, the essence of a seizure under s. 8 is the taking of a thing from a person
by a public authority without that person's consent."
121
See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 51h Ed., (Thomson Carswell: Toronto), looseleaf, para. 48-4: "A
seizure is the actual taking away, by the agents of the state, of things that could be used as evidence .... A seizure
within the meaning of s. 8 is a seizure of property for investigatory or evidentiary purposes." See also: Meade v.
Armstrong (City), 2011 BCSC 1591 (CanLII) at para 27; Gerrard Trueman Tuck, Director of 2024972 Ontario Inc.
v. McKeown Estate, 2010 CanLII 62549 (ON LRB) at paras. 34-35; IBM Canada Ltd. v. Canada, 2001 FCT 1175
(CanLII) at para. 39; R c Houle, 2003 CanLII 44810 (QC CA) at paras 92-93.
122
[2001] 3 SCR 902.
- 35outweighed any reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the disclosed information,
and thus there was no violation of s. 8. Similarly here, the Appellant cannot be said to have
held a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the disclosed contact information that
outweighed the Institute's interests in meeting its representational obligations.
3) In the Further Alternative, Any Charter Infringement is Justified under s. 1
116. In the alternative, if this Court finds that sections 185 and 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA violates.
2(d) or s. 8 of the Charter, any infringement is a reasonable limit justified under s. 1 of the
Charter.
117. The Court has articulated a number of contextual factors that it will consider and balance in
determining the level of deference to be afforded to impugned legislative measures. These
include: 123
(i) the vulnerability of the group protected;
(ii) the nature of the harm, including the relative ability to assess or scientifically prove the
harm;
(iii) subjective fears and apprehension of harm -- this factor relates to the perception of
harm which the impugned provisions are intended to prevent on the part of the Canadian
public generally, and vulnerable persons more specifically; and
(iv) the nature of the infringed activity -- this factor relates to the recognition that where the
protected activity is of lesser value, it will be more easily outweighed by the government
objective.
118. It is submitted that a deferential approach to the application of s. 1 of the Charter is
warranted in this case.
First, the impugned provisions are unfair labour practice
protections, aimed at protecting vulnerable workers, and designed to constrain the power of
the employer and advance the capacity of unions to collectively and effectively represent
employees. Second, the harms that the impugned provisions are intended to guard against
relate to protecting the collective rights of bargaining unit members. By their very nature,
these harms, and the efficacy of the statutory remedy, are difficult, if not impossible, to
measure scientifically. Third, there is a reasonable perception or apprehension of harm in
123
Thomson Newspapers, [ 1998] 1 SCR 877 (QL) at paras. 90-92; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] I
S.C.R. 827, at paras. 75-77.
- 36respect of those employees the legislation is aimed at protecting; the very reason unions
exist is to strengthen employee bargaining capacity and to achieve protection against the
employer through representation by their union, and as the evidence of the Institute in this
case reflects, there are real harms associated with an inability to ensure meaningful capacity
to communicate with bargaining unit employees. Further, as noted above, courts have
limited the "right" to not associate under s. 2(d), finding that other objectives, including the
ability of unions to represent their members, outweigh any right not to associate.
Pressing and Substantial Objective
119. The Appellant has rightly conceded, at para. 103 of her factum, the legislation serves a
pressing and substantial objective. The objective of sections 185 and 186(1)(a), insofar as
they provide for access to contact information, is to enable unions to meet their
representational obligations.
120. It is to the benefit of all bargaining unit members and necessary for workplace democracy
that the union and employer have the ability to communicate effectively with all bargaining
unit employees, especially given the importance of the union's positions reflecting the
needs and wishes of its bargaining unit members. 124
Support:
As stated in Health Services and
125
Finally, a constitutional right to collective bargaining is supported by the Charter value
of enhancing democracy. Collective bargaining permits workers to achieve a form of
workplace democracy and to ensure the rule of law in the workplace. Workers gain a
voice to influence the establishment of rules that control a major aspect of their lives
121. Without access to contact information of all employees, there would be significant
prejudice to the interests of bargaining unit employees. For example:
a. Non-disclosure would undermine the fair operation of the collective bargaining
process. For example, in the context of a final-offer vote or strike vote, if the union
cannot access all voters, it, and the employees it represents, are put at an unfair
124
125
See discussion at para. 69 of P!PSC.
Health Services and Support- Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2
SCR 391 at para. 85.
-37disadvantage
vis-a-vis
the
employer
which
has
control
over
workplace
communications;
b.
If the union has reason to suspect that there are problems with respect to the working
conditions of certain members, it is crucial to the interests of the bargaining unit as a
whole that the union be able to investigate these issues by contacting employees, and
proposing changes to the collective agreement as a result, where warranted;
c. It is crucial to bargaining unit employees that the union be able to contact them for
the purpose of investigating and adjudicating grievances.
A grievor' s rights are
prejudiced, again to the potential advantage of the employer and disadvantage of
other bargaining unit employees, to the extent the union is inhibited from
investigating potential breaches of the collective agreement;
d. the bargaining agent must be able to gather information from all employees in
relation to essential services agreements.
Unions can apply to the PSLRB to
scrutinize essential services agreements. To the extent that the employer is inhibited
from collecting this information, it may prejudice all current and future employees in
that position - who may be wrongly included or excluded on the basis of incomplete
information; and
e. the bargaining agent must be able to effectively communicate with all bargaining unit
employees in order not to breach its duty of fair representation to employees and, as
discussed above, given the short timelines involved, must have access to contact
information to assist employees in the context of workforce adjustments.
Rational Connection
122. The Institute adopts its reasoning at paras. 47-92, above, in support of the rational
connection between the objective and the infringement. The Board and the FCA below
correctly concluded that the disclosure of contact information is necessary for the union to
discharge its representational obligations. While the Board was not specifically considering
the Charter, it is the expert tribunal in terms of determining the minimal requirements for
the union to meet its representational obligations and, after considering the feasibility of
other options, it determined that the disclosure of contact information was required for the
- 38-
union to be able to meet its representational obligations.
It is submitted that this
determination should be entitled to deference.
No Reasonable Alternative/Minimal Impairment
123. The measures are also minimally impairing. For the reasons stated above at paras. 56-79
and 87-90, the Board correctly held that the disclosure of home addresses and phone
numbers is the minimum contact information required for the union to be able discharge its
representational obligations.
124. Further, the nature of the information at issue here is among the least intrusive type of
"personal information" possible. Disclosure does not reveal information that is highly
sensitive like medical information, an individual's sexual preferences, or a social insurance
number. To the contrary, the information to be disclosed is of a kind that may be found in a
public phonebook or in internet directories. To the extent that there is any infringement of
the Appellant's s. 2(d) or s. 8 rights occasioned by the disclosure of her contact information
to the union, which is denied, such infringement is minimal.
Proportionality
125. To the extent there is any violation of the Appellant's s. 2(d) rights occasioned by the
disclosure of her contact information to the union, this infringement is minor and must be
balanced against the significant imperative that the union be able to represent all employees
in the bargaining unit, discussed above in paras. 56-79.
126. Moreover, in its initial unfair labour practice application before the Board, the Institute
argued that the section 2(d) rights of its other members would be violated by the employer's
failure to disclose contact information. However, as the Board was able to resolve the
Institute's complaint under s. 186(1)(a) of the PSLRA, it held that it was unnecessary to
consider the Institute's Charter arguments. 126 Thus, there is no record respecting how
disclosure obligations enforceable through the unfair labour practice provisions engage the
union's s. 2(d) rights.
Nonetheless, it is submitted that without disclosure of contact
information, the union's ability to engage in collective bargaining, protected by s. 2(d) of
126
Para 72 of PIPSC, supra.
- 39-
the Charter (see Ontario (Attorney General) v. Frase/ 27 and Health Services and Support
-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia 128) would be hampered.
127. Finally, Lavigne upheld the requirement to pay union dues, and Advance Cutting and
Coring upheld the requirement to belong to a union. In light of these findings, it can hardly
be the case that a requirement of an employer to provide the bargaining agent with contact
information for employees it is statutorily charged with representing, constitutes an
unjustified violation of s. 2(d), where the effects on individuals are even more limited.
PART IV- SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS
128. The Institute requests that this appeal be dismissed, with costs to the Respondent.
PARTV-ORDERSSOUGHT
129. The Institute therefore requests:
a) an Order dismissing this appeal;
b) its costs of this appeal; and
c) such further and other relief as counsel may advise and to this Honourable Court may
seem just.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
May 7, 2013
Pefe~
500-30 rue Metcalfe St.
Ottawa (Ontario)
KIP 5L4
Solicitor for the Respondent
Professional Institute of the Public Service of
Canada
127
2011 sec 20, [2011] 2 scR 3.
128
Supra.
- 40 -
PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Paragraph(s)
Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd, 2001 SCC 70, [2001] 3 SCR 209
104, 109, 127
Amos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 38
37-38
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, [2001] CIRB no. 110
53
Aysa Pharm Inc v United Food and Commercial Workers Canada Union, 75
Local No 401, 2012 ALRBD No 38 (Alta LRB), CanLII 31284 (AB LRB)
Bank of Canada, 2007 CIRB 387 (CanLII)
51
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559
94-95
Bernard v. Canada, 2010 FCA 40 (CanLII) [Bernard I].
Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 92 (CanLII) [Bernard II]
13-14, 25, 27, 31,
33, 95,
24-26, 31-33, 95
Bisaillon v. Keable [1983] 2 SCR 60
98
Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 342
100
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1 43
SCR 157
Canadian National Railway Co. (Re), [2010] CIRBD No. 46 (CIRB)
76
Canadian Niagara Hotels Inc., [2005] OLRB Rep Nov/Dec 932 (Albertyn)
75
Canadian Office and Professional Employees’ Union, Local 378 v. Coast 50
Mountain Bus Company Ltd, 2005 BCCA 604 (CanLII)
Cuddy Food Products Ltd. And RWDSU (Re)(1988), 1 CLRBR (2d) 1
76
Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, [1990] SCJ No 100
92 (QL)
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190
30, 32-33, 38, 4142, 88
Gerrard Trueman Tuck, Director of 2024972 Ontario Inc. v. McKeown 114
Estate, 2010 CanLII 62549 (ON LRB)
Harke and IBEW, Local 424 (re)(2007), 141 CLRBR (2d) 81 (Alta. LRB)
76
- 41 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 SCR 827
117
Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 120, 126
Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391
Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235
41
IBM Canada Ltd. v. Canada, 2001 FCT 1175 (CanLII)
114
Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1992] 3 SCR 631
100
Kooner and USWA, Local 480 (Re), [1997] BCLRB No B116/97, [1997]
BCLRBD No 116 (QL)
Lavigne v. OPSEU, [1991] 2 SCR 211
76
105-09, 127
L’Hebreux and USW (Re), 2010 CIRB 515; Canadian National Railway Co. 76
(Re), [2010] CIRBD No. 46 (CIRB)
Meade v. Armstrong (City), 2011 BCSC 1591 (CanLII)
114
Millcroft Inn Ltd, [2000] OLRB Rep. July/August 665 (Albertyn) [Millcroft]
70-71, 74-75
Monarch Transport Inc. (Re), [2003] CIRBD No. 42 (QL)
75
Moysa v. Alberta (Labour relations board), [1989] 1 SCR 1572
100
Oaklands Regional Centre, [2010] OLRB Rep Sept/Oct 658 (Anderson)
75
Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission), [2002] OLRD No. 120 (OLRB)
75
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20 [2011] 2 SCR 3
126
Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Management Board of Cabinet, 75
2002 CanLII 11028 (ON LRB)
Ottawa-Carleton District School Board, [2001]
OLRB
Rep. 75
November/December 1426 (Albertyn)
Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 232
100
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney 38
General), 2009 FCA 184
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue 4-5, 7, 11, 15-23,
Agency, 2011 PSLRB 34
27, 54, 58, 79, 8283, 88-89, 93, 97
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada Revenue 1, 9-12, 21, 83-84
Agency, 2008 PSLRB 58
- 42 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canadian Food
Inspection Agency, 2011 PSLRB 131 (CanLII)
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Treasury Board and
Canada Revenue Agency, 2008 PSLRB 13 (CanLII)
P. Sun’s Enterprises (Vancouver) Ltd. (Hotel Grand Pacific) v. National
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of
Canada (C.A.W.-Canada), Local 114, [2003] BCLRB No. 301 (QL)
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency,
[2002] CPSSRB No. 14
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canadian Federal Pilots Association,
2009 FCA 223
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Senate of Canada, 2011 FCA 214
53
6-8, 57, 121, 127
75
67
37-39
38, 40
Public Service Alliance of Canada and Treasury Board, PSSRB File Nos. 53
161-02-791 and 169-02-584 (19960426) (1996)
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Treasury Board (Canada Border 89
Services Agency), 2012 PSLRB 58
PSAC v. Treasury Board of Canada, 2013 PSLRB 37
66, 68
R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417, [1988] SCJ No 82
113
R c Houle, 2003 CanLII 44810 (QC CA)
114
Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 41
SCR 650
R.W.C. v. The Queen (March 29, 2005) Doc. 30302 [2004] SCCA No 171 100
(QL)
Smith v Canada (AG) 2001 SCC 88, [2001] 3 SCR 902
115
76
Thompson and Brewery, Winery and Distillery Workers Union, Local 300
(Re), [1997] BCLRBD No. B281/97
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 SCR 877,
[1998] SCJ No 44 (QL)
Thomson newspapers ltd. v. Canada (Director of investigation and research,
restrictive trade practices commission), [1990] 1 SCR 425 [1990] SCJ No 23
(QL)
Toronto Catholic District School Board v. Ontario English Catholic
Teachers’ Assn. (Toronto Elementary Unit), (2001), 55 OR (3d) 737 (C.A.),
leave to appeal refused, [2002] 2 SCR ix
Toronto (City) Board of Education v. OSSTF, District 15, [1997] 1 SCR 487
42
Vaughan v. Canada, [2005] 1 SCR 146
73
117
113
42
- 43 Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929
72
ARTICLES
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th Ed., (Thomson Carswell: 115
Toronto), looseleaf
- 44 -
PART VII: STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, BY-LAWS
Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7
Loi sur les Cours fédérales, LRC 1985, c F-7
Grounds of review
Motifs
18.1 (4) The Federal Court may grant relief 18.1 (4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3)
under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the sont prises si la Cour fédérale est convaincue
federal board, commission or other tribunal
que l’office fédéral, selon le cas :
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its a) a agi sans compétence, outrepassé celle-ci
jurisdiction or refused to exercise its ou refusé de l’exercer;
jurisdiction;
b) n’a pas observé un principe de justice
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural naturelle ou d’équité procédurale ou toute autre
justice, procedural fairness or other procedure procédure qu’il était légalement tenu de
that it was required by law to observe;
respecter;
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or e) a agi ou omis d’agir en raison d’une fraude
perjured evidence; or
ou de faux témoignages;
Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1
Definition of consistent purposes
40. A use of personal information is consistent
under section 38 or 39 with the purposes for
which the information was obtained or
compiled where the use
(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to
that purpose; and
(b) is necessary for performing the statutory
duties of, or for operating a legally authorized
program of, the public body that uses or
discloses the information.
- 45 Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25
Consistent purposes
41 For the purposes of sections 39(1)(a) and
40(1)(c), a use or disclosure of personal
information is consistent with the purpose for
which the information was collected or
compiled if the use or disclosure
that purpose, and
The Freedom of Information and Protection Loi sur l'accès à l'information et la protection
of Privacy Act, CCSM c F175
de la vie privée, CPLM c F175
Consistent purposes
Fins compatibles
45
For the purpose of clauses 43(a) and
44(1)(a), a use or disclosure of personal
45
Pour l'application des alinéas 43a) et
44(1)a), l'utilisation ou la communication des
renseignements personnels est compatible avec
la fin à laquelle ils ont été recueillis ou
préparés si cet usage ou cette communication :
(a) has a reasonable and direct connection to a) a un lien suffisant et direct avec cette fin;
that purpose; and
b) est nécessaire soit à l'exercice des
(b) is necessary for performing the statutory obligations légales de l'organisme public qui
duties of, or for delivering an authorized les utilise ou les communique, soit à la
service or program or carrying out an activity prestation d'un des services ou programmes
of, the public body that uses or discloses the autorisés de cet organisme, soit à l'exercice
information.
d'une de ses activités.
- 46 Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5
Use compatible for purpose information obtained
28 A use of personal information is a use
compatible with the purpose for which the
information was obtained within the meaning
of Section 26 or 27 if the use
that purpose; and
program of, the public body that uses the
information or to which the information is
disclosed.
Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-15.01
Consistent purposes
38. For the purposes of clauses 36(1)(a) and
37(1)(b), a use or disclosure of personal
that purpose; and
Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165
Use of personal information
32
A public body may use personal
information in its custody or under its control
- 47 only
(a) for the purpose for which that information
was obtained or compiled, or for a use
consistent with that purpose (see section 34),
Definition of consistent purpose
34 For the purposes of section 32 (a), 33.1 (1)
(r) (iii) or 33.2 (a), or paragraph (b) of the
definition of "data linking" in Schedule 1, a use
of personal information is consistent with the
purpose for which the information was
obtained or compiled if the use
that purpose, and
duties of, or for operating a program or activity
of, the public body that uses or discloses the
information.
Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21
Loi sur la protection des renseignements
personnels, LRC 1985, c P-21
Where personal information may be disclosed
Cas d’autorisation
8. (2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, (2) Sous réserve d’autres lois fédérales, la
personal information under the control of a communication des renseignements personnels
government institution may be disclosed
qui relèvent d’une institution fédérale est
autorisée dans les cas suivants :
(a) for the purpose for which the information
was obtained or compiled by the institution or a) communication aux fins auxquelles ils ont
for a use consistent with that purpose;
été recueillis ou préparés par l’institution ou
pour les usages qui sont compatibles avec ces
fins;
48
CANADA
CONSOLIDATION
CODIFICATION
Public Service Labour
Relations Act
Loi sur les relations de
travail dans la fonction
publique
S.C.2003,c.22,s.2
L.C.2003,ch.22,art.2
NOTE
[Enacted by section 2 of chapter 22 of the Statutes of
Canada, 2003; preamble, sections 1 to 3 and Part 1, in force
April 1, 2005, see SI/2005-22: Part 2, other than subparagraph 209(1)(c)(ii), paragraph 211(b) and section 231, in
force April 1, 2005, see SI/2005-23; Parts 3 and 4 in force
April I, 2005, see Sl/2005-24; subparagraph 209(1)(c)(ii),
paragraph 21 1(b) and section 231 in force December 31,
2005, see Sl/2005-123.]
NOTE
[Edictee par !'article 2 du chapitre 22 des Lois du Canada
(2003); pn\ambule, articles 1 a 3 et partie 1, en vigueur Ie 1"
avril2005, voir TR/2005-22; partie 2, a!'exception du SOUS·
alinea 209(1)c)(ii), de I'alinea 211b) et de !'article 231, en
vigueur le 1" avril 2005, voir TR/2005-23; parties 3 et 4 en
vigueur le 1" avril 2005, voir TR/2005-24; sous-alinea
209(1 )c)(ii), aline a 211 b) et article 231, en vigueur le 31 decembre 2005, voir TR/2005-123.]
Current to April 16,2013
Ajour au 16 avril2013
Last amended on December 31, 2005
Demiere modification le 31 decembre 2005
Published by the Minister of Justice at the following address:
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca
Publie par le ministre de Ia Justice a l'adresse suivante :
http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca
49
Public Service Labour Relations-- Apri/16, 2013
Short title
NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate and
House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
Sa Majeste, sur !'avis et avec le consentement
du Senat et de Ia Chambre des communes du
Canada, edicte:
SHORT TITLE
TITRE ABREGE
1. This Act may be cited as the Public Ser-
vice Labour Relations Act.
1. Loi sur les relations de travail dans Ia
fonction publique.
Titre abrege
INTERPRETATION
DEFINITIONS ET INTERPRETATION
Definitions
2. (1) The following definitions apply in
this Act.
2. (1) Les definitions qui suivent s'appliquent a Ia presente loi.
Definitions
"adjudicator"
« arbitre de
"adjudicator" means a member assigned to hear
and determine a grievance referred to adjudication under subsection 209( 1) or section 216 or
221 and includes, if the context permits, a
board of adjudication established under paragraph 223(2)(c), a person named as an adjudicator in a collective agreement and a person
otherwise selected as an adjudicator by the parties to the grievance.
«administrateur general» S'entend de l'administrateur general vise a l'un ou ['autre des alineas a) a c) de Ia definition de ce terme au paragraphe 11(1) de Ia Loi sur la gestion des
« administrateur
general>>
"deputy head"
gne(>>
"arbitral award"
«decision
arbitra/e >>
"arbitral award" means an award made by an
arbitration board in respect of a dispute.
"arbitration
board"
"arbitration board" means a board established
under Division 9 of Part I.
« C'0/7!1(~1/
d'arbiJraKe »
"bargaining
agent"
« Of{Cnt
nej.!OCIO/eur ))
"bargaining
unit"
<~unite
de
nigociation ))
"bargaining agent" means an employee organization that is certified by the Board as the bargaining agent for the employees in a bargaining
unit.
"bargaining unit" means a group of two or
more employees that is determined by the
Board to constitute a unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining.
"Board"
« Commission »
"Board" means the Public Service Labour Relations Board established by section 12.
"Chairperson"
«president »
"Chairperson" means the Chairperson of the
Board.
"collective
agreement"
«convention
col/eclive >>
"collective agreement" means an agreement in
writing, entered into under Part 1 between the
employer and a bargaining agent, containing
provisions respecting terms and conditions of
employment and related matters.
"core public
administration"
«administration
puhlique
centrale»
finances publiques.
«administration publique centrale» S' entend au
sens du paragraphe 11(1) de Ia Loi sur Ia ges-
tion des finances publiques.
« administration
publique
centrale>>
"core public
administration"
«agent negociateur » Organisation syndicale
accreditee par Ia Commission et representant
ce titre une unite de negociation.
<<agent
negociateur ))
"bargaining
agent"
« arbitre de grief» Commissaire charge d'entendre et de regler un grief renvoye a !'arbitrage en vertu du paragraphe 209( 1) ou des articles 216 ou 221 ou, selon le contexte, Je
conseil d'arbitrage de grief institue en vertu de
l'alinea 223(2)c) ou Ia personne soit ainsi designee dans une convention collective, soit choisie d'une autre fa9on en cette qualite par les
parties.
<< arbitre de
grief»
"adjudicator"
«Commissaire» Membre a temps plein ou a
temps partie! de Ia Commission.
« commissaire »
"member"
«Commission» La Commission des relations
de travail dans Ia fonction publique, creee par
!'article 12.
« Conunission »
"'Board'
« conseil d'arbitrage » Conseil etabli en application de Ia section 9 de Ia partie 1.
« conseil
d' arbitrage >>
'"arbitralion
board'
«convention collective» Convention ecrite
conclue en application de Ia partie 1 entre l'employeur et un agent negociateur donne et renfermant des dispositions relatives aux conditions d'emploi eta des questions connexes.
~< convention
collective >>
a
"core public administration" has the same
meaning as in subsection 11(1) ofthe Financial
Administration Act.
« cotisations syndicales » Somme que I' employeur des fonctionnaires representes par
)'agent negociateur est tenu, aux termes de
2
'~collective
agreement"
« cotisations
syndicates >>
~·membership
dues')
Relations de travail dans lafonction publique -16 avril 2013
"council of
employee
organizations''
« regroupement
"council of employee organizations" means a
council formed by two or more employee organizations.
toute convention collective conclue entre lui et
!'agent negociateur, de deduire du salaire des
fonctionnaires et de remettre ace demier.
d 'organisations
«decision arbitrale » Decision rendue sur un
differend par un conseil d'arbitrage.
syndtcales >>
"deputy head"
<<
administrateur
gfmJral
>)
"dispute"
« d(f/'erend »
"employee"
«
.fimctionnaire »
"deputy head" means a deputy head referred to
in any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of the definition
"deputy head" in subsection 11(1) of the Financial Administration Act.
"dispute" means a dispute or difference that
arises in connection with the entering into, renewal or revision of a collective agreement and
in respect of which arbitration may be requested under subsection 136( I) or conciliation may
be requested under subsection 161 ( 1).
engaged
« employeur »
"employer"
b) par l'organisme distinct en cause, dans Je
cas d'un secteur de !'administration publique
federale figurant a l'annexe V de Ia Loi sur
Ia gestion des finances publiques.
outside
a Ia partie 2, personne
employee dans Ia fonction publique, a !'exclusion de toute personne :
« fonctionnaire » Sauf
more than one third of the normal period for
persons doing similar work;
(d) a person who is a member or special
constable of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police or who is employed by that force under terms and conditions substantially the
same as those of one of its members;
a) nommee par le gouverneur en conseil, en
vertu d'une loi federale, a un poste prevu par
cette loi;
b) recrutee sur place a l'etranger;
(e) a person employed in the Canadian Se-
c) qui n'est pas ordinairement astreinte atravailler plus du tiers du temps normalement
exige des personnes executant des taches
semblables;
curity Intelligence Service who does not perform duties of a clerical or secretarial nature;
(j) a person employed on a casual basis;
(g) a person employed on a term basis, unless the term of employment is for a period
of three months or more or the person has
been so employed for a period of three
months or more;
d) qui est membre ou gendarme auxiliaire de
Ia Gendarmerie royale du Canada, ou y est
employee sensiblement aux memes conditions que ses membres;
e) employee par le Service canadien du renseignement de securite et n'exer9ant pas des
fonctions de commis ou de secretaire;
(h) a person employed by the Board;
« oJ:_~anisation
.\yndicale >>
«employeur» Sa Majeste du chef du Canada,
"di!ipule'~
a
(c) a person not ordinarily required to work
"employee
organization"
« diff6rend »
a) par le Conseil du Tresor, dans le cas d'un
ministere figurant l'annexe I de Ia Loi sur
Ia gestion des finances publiques ou d'un
autre secteur de !'administration publique federale figurant a l'annexe IV de cette loi;
(a) a person appointed by the Governor in
Council under an Act of Parliament to a
statutory position described in that Act;
locally
«differend» Desaccord qui peut faire !'objet
d'une demande d'arbitrage ou de conciliation
aux termes, respectivement, des paragraphes
136(1) ou 161(1), survenant a !'occasion de Ia
conclusion, du renouvellement ou de Ia revision
d'une convention collective.
representee:
"employee", except in Part 2, means a person
employed in the public service, other than
(b) a person
Canada;
~<decision
arbitrale >>
"arbitral award'
(i) a person who occupies a managerial or
confidential position; or
f) employee atitre occasionnel;
(j) a person who is employed under a program designated by the employer as a student employment program.
g) employee pour une duree determinee de
moins de trois mois ou ayant travaille a ce
titre pendant moins de trois mois;
"employee organization" means an organization of employees the purposes of which in-
h) employee par Ia Commission;
3
<<
fonctiormaire »
"employee"
51
Public Service Labour Relations-· April 16, 2013
elude the regulation of relations between the
employer and its employees for the purposes of
Parts 1 and 2, and includes, unless the context
othetwise requires, a council of employee organizations.
"employer"
«
employetlf »
i) occupant un poste de direction ou de
confiance;
j) employee dans Je cadre d'un programme
designe par l'employeur comme un programme d'embauche des etudiants.
"employer" means Her Majesty in right of
Canada as represented by
« fonction publique » Sauf a Ia partie 3, I' ensemble des postes qui sont compris dans les entites ci-apres ou qui en rei event:
(a) the Treasury Board, in the case of a de-
partment named in Schedule I to the Financial Administration Act or another portion of
the federal public administration named in
Schedule IV to that Act; and
contldential
position"
«poste de
direciiOn ou de
coiJflance »
"member"
« commissaire »
"membership
dues"
« cotisations
,\yndtcales »
b) Jes autres secteurs de !'administration publique federate figurant a l'annexe IV de
cette loi;
"membership dues", in respect of employees
represented by a bargaining agent, means the
amount that the employer is required to deduct
from the pay of the employees and remit to the
bargaining agent under any collective agreement that is entered into between the employer
and the bargaining agent.
"public service"
«fonctwn
"public service", except in Part 3, means the
several positions in or under
«ministre» Le membre du Conseil prive de Ia
Reine pour le Canada, a !'exception d'un
membre du Conseil du Tresor, charge par Je
gouverneur en conseil de )'application de Ia
presente loi.
«organisation syndicate» Organisation regroupant des fonctionnaires en vue, notamment, de
Ia reglementation des relations entre les fonctionnaires et leur employeur pour !'application
des parties 1 et 2; s'entend en outre, sauf indication contraire du contexte, de tout regroupement d'organisations syndicales.
(a) the departments named in Schedule I to
the Financial Administration Act;
(c) the separate agencies named in Schedule
V to that Act
« orgamsme
distinct»
« grCve »
"strike"
« ministre »
"Minister"'
« organisation
syndicate >>
"employee
organization"
«organisme distinct» S 'entend au sens du para-
« orgarusme
graphe 11 ( 1) de Ia Loi sur Ia gestion des finances publiques.
"separate
agency"
« poste de direction ou de confiance » Poste declare tel par Ia Commission aux termes du paragraphe 62(1), de !'article 63, du paragraphe
74(1) ou de l'article 75.
(b) the other portions of the federal public
administration named in Schedule IV to that
Act; and
"separate
agency"
a l'an-
«greve» Tout arret du travail ou refus de travailler, par des personnes employees dans Ia
fonction publique agissant conjointement, de
concert ou de connivence; y sont assimiles Je
ralentissement du travail ou toute autre activite
concertee, de Ia part de telles personnes, ayant
pour objet Ia diminution ou Ia limitation du rendement.
"member" means a member of the Board,
whether full-time or part-time.
"Minister" means the member of the Queen's
Privy Council for Canada, other than a member
of the Treasury Board, designated by the Governor in Council as the Minister for the purposes of this Act.
puhilque »
c) Jes organismes distincts figurant
nexe V de Ia meme Joi.
"managerial or confidential position" means a
position declared to be a managerial or confidential position by an order made by the Board
under subsection 62(1 ), section 63, subsection
74(1) or section 75.
"Minister"
« ministre ))
publique »
"public service"
a) les ministeres figurant a l'annexe I de Ia
Loi sur Ia gestion des finances publiques;
(b) the separate agency,in the case of a portion of the federal public administration
named in Schedule V to the Financial Administration Act.
"managerial or
({ fonction
«president» Le president de Ia Commission.
distinct»
« poste de
direction ou de
confiance »
umanagerial or
confidential
position',
<<
president >>
''Chairperson"
"separate agency" has the same meaning as in
subsection 11 (1) of the Financial Administration Act.
4
52
Relations de travail dans Ia fonction publique
"strike"
« gri:ve ;;
"ViceChairperson"
« l'ICe-
"strike" includes a cessation of work or a refusal to work or to continue to work by persons
employed in the public service, in combination,
in concert or in accordance with a common understanding, and a slow-down of work or any
other concerted activity on the part of such persons that is designed to restrict or limit output.
"Vice-Chairperson" means a Vice-Chairperson
of the Board.
16 avril 2013
« regroupement d' organisations syndicales »
Regroupement resultant de !'union de plusieurs
organisations syndicales.
« regroupement
d' organisations
syndicales >>
"council qf
employee
organizations"
«unite de migociation » Groupe de fonctionnaires dont Ia Commission a declare qu'il
constitue une unite habile a negocier collectivement.
«vice-pn\sident» Un vice-president de Ia Commission.
preside/11 >>
«unite de
negociation })
"bargaining
un;t"
«vice·
president»
"Vice~
Chairper:wn"
Etnployment
status preserved
Persons who are
not employees
Casual
employment
(2) A person does not cease to be employed
in the public service by reason only that the
person ceases to work as a result of a strike or
by reason only of the tennination of the person's employment contrary to this Act or any
other Act of Parliament.
(2) La personne ne cesse pas d'etre employee dans Ia fonction publique du seul fait
qu'elle a cesse d'y travailler par suite d'une
greve ou par suite d'un licenciement contraire
Ia presente loi ou toute autre loi federale.
Maintien du
statut
(3) For greater certainty, a person is not an
employee if
(3) II est entendu que n'est pas consideree
comme un fonctionnaire :
Exclusion
(a) the person is engaged under subsection
50(1 ); or
a) Ia personne dont les services sont retenus
au titre du paragraphe 50( I);
(b) the person's compensation for the performance of the regular duties of the person's position or office consists of fees of office or is related to the revenue of the office
in which the person is employed.
b) Ia personne dont Ia retribution pour
l'exercice des fonctions nonnales de son
poste ou de sa charge consiste en honoraires
ou depend des recettes du bureau oil elle est
employee.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (j) of the
definition "employee" in subsection (I), a person employed in the part of the public service
to which the Public Service Commission has
the exclusive right to make appointments is employed on a casual basis if the person was appointed under section 50 of the Public Service
(4) Pour !'application de l'alineaj) de Ia definition de « fonctionnaire » au paragraphe (1 ),
Ia personne employee dans Ia partie de Ia fonction publique dans laquelle les nominations relevent exclusivement de Ia Commission de Ia
fonction publique est une personne employee a
titre occasionnel si elle a ete nommee en vertu
de !'article 50 de Ia Loi sur I 'emploi dans Ia
Employment Act.
a
a
a
Emploi titre
occasionnel
fonction publique.
References to
occupants of
positions
(5) Every reference to a person who occupies a position, or to the occupant of a position,
includes a person who is acting in that position
or who has assumed wholly or substantially the
duties and responsibilities of that position, and
a reference to a person's position includes the
position of a person who is acting in that position or who has assumed wholly or substantially the duties and responsibilities of that position.
(5) La mention du titulaire d'un poste
ainsi que toute mention equivalente - vaut
egalement mention de l'interimaire ou de toute
autre personne qui assume Ia totalite ou !'essentiel des attributions du poste; de meme, Ia mention d'un poste vaut mention du poste occupe
par une telle personne.
Mention des
titulaires des
postes
2003, ch. 22, art. 2 «2» et 243.
2003, c. 22, ss. 2 "2", 243.
Descriptive
cross· references
3. If, in any provision of this Act, a reference to another provision of this Act is followed by words in parentheses that are descrip-
3. Les mots entre parentheses qui, dans un
but purement descriptif d'une matiere donnee,
suivent un renvoi a une disposition de Ia pre-
5
Renvois
descriptifs
53
Public Service Labour Relations- Apri/16, 2013
Supervision of
work
(2) The Executive Director of the Board assists the Chairperson in the exercise of the
Chairperson's functions and, subject to the
Chairperson's direction, directs and supervises
the day-to-day conduct of the work of the
Board, the management of the Board's internal
affairs and the work of persons employed by
the Board.
(2) Le directeur general assiste le president
dans l'exercice de ses fonctions et, sous Ia direction de celui-ci, dirige et surveille Ia
conduite des affaires courantes de Ia Commission, Ia gestion de ses affaires internes et !'execution des fonctions de son personnel.
Surveillance des
travaux et du
personnel
Other persons
49. All other persons that the Board considers necessary for it to employ are to be appointed under the Public Service Employment Act.
49. Le personnel supplementaire que Ia
Commission estime necessaire est nomme sous
le regime de Ia Loi sur I 'emploi dans Ia fonction publique.
Personae!
supplementaire
Experts and
advisers
50. ( 1) The Chairperson may engage on a
temporary basis the services of mediators and
other experts or persons having technical or
special knowledge to assist the Board in an advisory capacity and, subject to the approval of
the Governor in Council, fix their remuneration.
50. ( 1) Le president peut retenir temporairement les services de mediateurs et d'autres experts charges d'assister Ia Commission a titre
consultatif, et, sous reserve de !'agrement du
gouverneur en conseil, fixer leur remuneration.
Assistance
technique
Non-application
of Puh/ic
(2) A person engaged under subsection (1)
is not to be considered as being employed in
the public service for the purposes of the Public
Service Superannuation Act by reason only of
being so engaged.
(2) Les personnes dont les services sont retenus au titre du paragraphe (1) ne font pas partie, de ce seul fait, de Ia fonction publique pour
!'application de Ia Loi sur Ia pension de Ia
fonction publique.
Non-application
de Ia Loi sur Ia
pension de Ia
fonction
publique
Judicial Review and Et?forcement of Orders
Revision judiciaire et execution des
ordonnances
Orders not to be
reviewed by
court
51. (I) Subject to this Part, every order or
decision of the Board is final and may not be
questioned or reviewed in any court, except in
accordance with the Federal Courts Act on the
grounds referred to in paragraph 18.1(4}(a), (b)
or (e) of that Act.
51. (1) So us reserve des autres dispositions
de Ia presente partie, les ordonnances et les decisions de Ia Commission sont definitives et ne
sont susceptibles de contestation ou de revision
par voie judiciaire qu' en conformite avec Ia Loi
sur les Cours federates et pour les motifs vises
aux alineas 18.1 (4) a), b) ou e) de cette loi.
lmpossibilite de
revision par un
tribunal
Standing of
Board
(2) The Board has standing to appear in proceedings referred to in subsection (1) for the
purpose of making submissions regarding the
standard of review to be used with respect to
decisions of the Board and the Board's jurisdiction, policies and procedures.
(2) La Commission a qualite pour comparaitre dans les procedures visees au paragraphe
(I) pour presenter ses observations a I' egard de
Ia norme de controle judiciaire applicable a ses
decisions ou a I' egard de sa competence, de ses
procedures et de ses lignes directrices.
Qualite de Ia
Commission
No review by
(3) Except as permitted by subsection (1 ),
no order, decision or proceeding of the Board
made or carried on under or purporting to be
made or carried on under this Part may, on any
ground, including the ground that the order, decision or proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Board to make or carry on or that, in the
course of any proceeding, the Board for any
reason exceeded or lost its jurisdiction,
(3) Sauf exception prevue au paragraphe (I),
!'action- decision, ordonnance ou procedure
de Ia Commission, dans Ia mesure oil elle
est censee s'exercer dans le cadre de Ia presente
partie, ne peut, pour quelque motif, notamment
celui de l'exces de pouvoir ou de !'incompetence a une etape quelconque de Ia procedure:
Interdiction de
recours
extraordinaire
Service
Superannuation
Acl
certiorari.
etc.
a) etre contestee, revisee, empechee ou limitee;
18
Relations de travail dans Ia fonction publique -- 16 avril 2013
b) faire !'objet d'un recours judiciaire, notamment par voie d'injonction, de certiorari,
de prohibition ou de quo warranto.
(a) be questioned, reviewed, prohibited or
restrained; or
(b) be made the subject of any proceedings
in or any process of any court, whether by
way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition,
quo warranto or otherwise.
2003, ch. 22, art 2 «51» et 274.
2003, c. 22, ss. 2 "51", 274.
Filing of
Board's orders
in Federal Court
52. (l) The Board must, on the request in
writing of any person or organization affected
by any order of the Board, file a certified copy
of the order, exclusive of the reasons for the order, in the Federal Court, unless, in its opinion,
52. (1) Sur demande ecrite de Ia personne
ou de !'organisation touchee, Ia Commission
depose a Ia Cour federale une copie certifiee
con forme du dispositif de I' ordonnance sauf si,
ason avis:
(a) there is no indication of failure or likeli-
a) soit rien ne laisse croire qu'elle n'a pas
ete executee ou ne le sera pas;
hood of failure to comply with the order; or
Depot a Ia Cour
federale
(b) there is other good reason why the filing
of the order in the Federal Court would serve
no useful purpose.
b) soit, pour d'autres motifs valables, le de-
(2) An order of the Board becomes an order
of the Federal Court when a certified copy of
the order is filed in that court, and it may subsequently be enforced as such.
(2) En vue de son execution, !'ordonnance
rendue par Ia Commission, des le depot a Ia
Cour federale de Ia copie certifiee conforme,
est assimilee a une ordonnance rendue par
celle-ci.
Advisory Board
Comite consultatif
Minister to
establish
53. (I) The Minister shall establish an advisory board to provide advice to the Chairperson
on the compensation analysis and research services provided by the Board.
53. (1) Le ministre etablit un comite consultatif charge de conseiller le president sur les
services d'analyse et de recherche en matiere
de remuneration offerts par Ia Commission.
Etablissement
par le ministre
Composition
(2} The advisory board is to consist of a
chairperson and no more than II other members appointed by the Minister.
(2) Le comite est forme d'au plus douze
membres - dont le president de celui-ci nommes par le ministre.
Formation
Qualifications
(3) All of the members must have knowledge or experience that will assist the advisory
board to accomplish its mandate, including
knowledge of or experience in compensation
issues or statistics.
(3) Les membres doivent avoir des connaissances ou de )'experience susceptibles d'aider
le comite consultatif a accomplir sa mission,
notamment des connaissances ou de )'experience dans le domaine de Ia remuneration ou
de Ia statistique.
Qualifications
Representative~
(4) Appointments to the advisory board are
to be made such that there is an equal number
of members representative of the employer and
of employees.
(4) Le nombre des membres qui representent
les fonctionnaires doit etre ega) a celui des
membres qui representent l'employeur.
Representativite
Effect of filing
ness
pot ne serait d'aucune utilite.
19
Execution des
ordonnances
55
Public Service Labour Relations-- April 16, 2013
must certify the applicant employee organization as the bargaining agent for the bargaining
unit if it is satisfied
(a) that a majority of employees in that bargaining unit wish the applicant employee organization to represent them as their bargaining agent;
accrediter comme agent negociateur de I'unite
de negociation !'organisation syndicale sollicitant !'accreditation si elle est convaincue, a Ia
fois:
a) que Ia majorite des fonctionnaires de !'u-
nite de negociation souhaitent que )'organisation syndicale les represente a titre d'agent
negociateur;
(b) that the persons representing the employee organization in the making of the application have been duly authorized to make the
application; and
b) que Ies personnes representant !'organisation syndicate dans Ia procedure de demande
ont ete dfiment autorisees a deposer celle-ci;
(c) if the applicant is a council of employee
organizations, that each of the employee organizations forming the council has vested
appropriate authority in the council to enable
it to discharge the duties and responsibilities
of a bargaining agent.
c) dans le cas de Ia demande presentee par
Where previous
application
denied within
six months
(2) If an application for certification of an
employee organization as the bargaining agent
for a proposed bargaining unit has been denied
by the Board, the Board may not consider a
new application for certification from that employee organization in respect of the same or
substantially the same proposed bargaining unit
until at least six months have elapsed from the
day on which the employee organization was
last denied certification, unless the Board is satisfied that the previous application was denied
by reason only of a technical error or omission
made in connection with the application.
(2) Lorsque Ia Commission a refuse Ia demaude d'accreditation d'une organisation syndicale, elle ne peut prendre en consideration aucune nouvelle demande d'accreditation de Ia
part de celle-ci a l'egard de Ia meme unite, ou
d'une unite essentiellement similaire, sauf si au
moins six mois se sont ecoules depuis Ia date
de ce refus ou si elle est convaincue que ce refus a resulte d'une omission ou d'une erreur de
procedure au cours de Ia demande.
Refus d'accreditation dans les
six mois qui
suivent le rejet
d' une demande
anterieure
Membership in
council of
employee
organizations
(3) For the purpose of paragraph (l)(a),
membership in any employee organization that
forms part of a council of employee organizations is deemed to be membership in the council.
(3) Pour )'application de l'alinea (I)a),
l'adhesion a une organisation syndicale
membre d'un regroupement d'organisations
syndicales vaut adhesion au regroupement.
Adhesion it un
regroupement
d'organisations
syndicates
Representation
65. (I) The Board may order that a representation vote be taken among the employees in
the bargaining unit for the purpose of satisfying
itself that a majority of them wish the applicant
employee organization to represent them as
their bargaining agent.
65. ( 1) La Commission peut ordonner Ia tenue d'un scrutin afin de verifier si Ia majorite
des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation
souhaitent etre representes par !'organisation
qui sollicite !'accreditation.
Scrutin de
representation
(2) When the Board orders that a representation vote be taken, it must
(2) La Commission doit, lorsqu'elle ordonne
Ia tenue d'un scrutin de representation, prendre
les dispositions suivantes :
Dispositions a
prendre
vote
Arrangements
for vote
(a) determine the employees who are eligi-
un regroupement d'organisations syndicales,
que chacune des organisations syndicales
formant le regroupement a donne a celui-ci
l'autorite suffisante pour lui permettre de
remplir ses fonctions d'agent negociateur.
a) elle precise quels sont les fonctionnaires
qui ont le droit de voter;
ble to vote; and
(b) make any arrangements and give any directions that it considers necessary for the
proper conduct of the vote, including the
preparation of ballots, the method of casting
b) elle prend les mesures et donne les instructions qui lui semblent necessaires en vue
de Ia regularite du scrutin de representation,
24
56
Relations de travail dans lafonction publique- 16 avril 2013
notamment en ce qui concerne Ia pn\paration
des bulletins de vote, Ies modes de scrutin et
de depouillement, et Ia garde et le scellage
des urnes.
and counting ballots and the custody and
sealing of ballot boxes.
Employer
participation
Discrimination
Effect of
certification
Where Certification Prohibited
Refus d'accreditation
66. (I) The Board may not certifY an employee organization as a bargaining agent if it
is of the opinion that the employer, or a person
acting on behalf of the employer, has participated or is participating in the formation or administration of the employee organization in a
manner that impairs its fitness to represent the
interests of the employees in the bargaining
unit for which it is proposed to be certified.
66. (1) La Commission n'accorde pas !'accreditation si elle conclut que l'employeur ou
toute personne agissant en son nom a participe
ou participe a Ia formation ou a !'administration
de !'organisation syndicale, et qu'elle estime
que cela compromet !'aptitude de cette organisation a defendre les interets des fonctionnaires
qui font partie de )'unite de negociation.
Participation de
I' employeur
(2) The Board may not certifY an employee
organization as a bargaining agent if it discriminates against any employee on a prohibited
ground of discrimination within the meaning of
the Canadian Human Rights Act.
(2) La Commission n'accorde pas !'accreditation a !'organisation syndicale qui fait, a
l'egard de tout fonctionnaire, des distinctions
fondees sur un motif illicite au sens de Ia Loi
Discrimination
Effect of Certification
Effet de !'accreditation
67. Certification of an employee organization as the bargaining agent for a bargaining
unit has the following effects:
67. L'accreditation de toute organisation
syndicale atitre d'agent negociateur emporte:
(a) the employee organization has exclusive
au nom des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation qu'elle represente;
canadienne sur les droits de la personne.
a) droit exclusif de negocier collectivement
authority to bargain collectively on behalf of
the employees in the bargaining unit;
b) revocation, en ce qui touche les fonction-
(b) the certification of any employee organization that was previously certified as the
bargaining agent for any employees in the
bargaining unit is deemed to be revoked to
the extent that the certification relates to
those employees;
naires de !'unite de negociation, de !'accreditation de toute organisation syndicale anterieurement accreditee;
c) substitution de !'organisation syndicale
- en qualite de partie a toute convention
collective ou decision arbitrale s'appliquant a
des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation,
mais a I' egard de ces fonctionnaires seulement - a !'agent negociateur nommement
designe dans Ia convention collective ou a
tout successeur de celui-ci;
(c) the employee organization is substituted
as a party to any collective agreement or arbitral award that affects any employees in the
bargaining unit, to the extent that the agreement or award relates to those employees, in
the place of the bargaining agent named in
the collective agreement or its successor;
d) assimilation de I' organisation syndicale
a
!'agent negociateur, pour !'application de
!'article 107;
(d) the employee organization is deemed to
be the bargaining agent for the purposes of
section 107; and
e) substitution de !'organisation syndicale
en qualite de partie a toute entente sur les
a !'agent
services essentiels en vigueur
negociateur nommement designe dans !'entente ou atout successeur de celui-ci.
(e) the employee organization is substituted
as a party to any essential services agreement
that is in force, in the place of the bargaining
agent named in the agreement or its successor.
25
Droits de
I' organisation
syndicate
accreditee
57
Relations de travail dans lafonction publique
16 avril 2013
Taking of
representation
vote
95. After the application is made, the Board
may order that a representation vote be taken in
order to determine whether a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit no longer
wish to be represented by the employee organization that is the bargaining agent for that bargaining unit. The provisions of subsection
65(2) apply in relation to the taking of the vote.
95. Saisie de Ia demande, Ia Commission
peut, en prenant les dispositions pn!ivues au paragraphe 65(2), ordonner Ia tenue d'un scrutin
de representation, afin d'etablir si Ia majorite
des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation ne
souhaitent plus etre representes par !'organisation syndicale qui en est !'agent negociateur.
Tenue d"un
scrutin de
repnSsentation
Revocation of
certification
96. If, after hearing the application, the
Board is satisfied that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit no longer wish to be
represented by the employee organization, it
must revoke the certification of the employee
9rganization as the bargaining agent.
96. Si, apres audition de Ia demande, Ia
Commission est convaincue du bien-fonde de
celle-ci, elle revoque !'accreditation de l'organisation syndicale en cause.
Revocation de
I' accreditation
Certification
obtained by
fraud
97. The Board must revoke the certification
of an employee organization if the Board is satisfied that it was obtained by fraud.
97. La Commission revoque !'accreditation
de I' organisation syndicale si elle est con vaincue que celle-ci l'a obtenue frauduleusement.
Accreditation
obtenue en
frau de
Employer
of an employee organization as the bargaining
agent for a bargaining unit if the Board, on application by the employer or any employee, determines that
de !'organisation syndicale comme agent negociateur representant une unite de negociation si,
en reponse a une demande a cet effet de l'employeur ou de tout fonctionnaire, elle decide:
Participation de
l'employeurou
discrimination
(a) the employer, or a person acting on behalf of the employer, has participated or is
participating in the formation or administration of the employee organization in a manner that impairs its fitness to represent the interests of the employees in the bargaining
unit; or
a) que l'employeur, ou toute personne agissant en son nom, a participe ou participe a Ia
formation ou a !'administration de !'organisation syndicate representant !'unite de negociation en cause et que cela compromet !'aptitude de cette organisation
defendre les
interets des fonctionnaires qui font partie de
!'unite de negociation;
participation or
discrimination
a
(b) the employee organization discriminates
against any employee on a prohibited ground
of discrimination within the meaning of the
Canadian Human Rights Act.
b) que !'organisation fait, a l'egard d'un
fonctionnaire, des distinctions fondees sur un
motif illicite au sens de Ia Loi canadienne
sur les droits de Ia personne.
Abandonment of
certification
of an employee organization if the employee
organization advises the Board that it wishes to
give up or abandon its certification or if the
Board, on application by the employer or any
employee, determines that the employee organization has ceased to act as bargaining agent.
de !'organisation syndicale soit sur avis de renonciation de celle-ci, soit si elle conclut, sur
demande de l'employeur ou de tout fonctionnaire, a Ia cessation des fonctions de !'organisation comme agent negociateur.
Council of
employee
organizations
100. (I) The Board must revoke the certification of a council of employee organizations
that has been certified as a bargaining agent if
the Board is satisfied, on application by the employer or an employee organization that forms
or has formed part of the council, that the council no longer meets the condition for certification set out in paragraph 64(l)(c) for a council
of employee organizations.
100. (1) A Ia demande de l'employeur ou
de toute organisation syndicale faisant ou ayant
fait partie d'un regroupement accredite comme
agent negociateur, Ia Commission revoque !'accreditation de celui-ci si elle arrive a Ia conclusion qu'il ne remplit plus les conditions d'accreditation fixees par l'alinea 64(l)c).
33
Renonciation il
I' accreditation
Accreditation
d'un
regroupement
58
Relations de travail dans lafonctionpublique
16 avri/2013
a Ia date d'entree en vigueur qui y est
fixee, le cas echeant;
a)
(b) if no effective date is specified, the first
day of the month after the month in which
the agreement is signed.
b) le premier jour du mois qui suit immediatement celui au cours duquel elle a ete signee, dans les autres cas.
Minimum
duration
116. A collective agreement is deemed to
have effect for one year, unless a longer period
is specified in the collective agreement.
116. La convention collective est en vigueur
pendant un an ou Ia periode plus longue qui y
est fixee.
Duree minimale
d'un an
Duty to
implement
provisions of the
collective
agreement
117. Subject to the appropriation by or under the authority of Parliament of money that
may be required by the employer, the parties
must implement the provisions of a collective
agreement
117. So us reserve de I' affectation par le Parlement, ou sous son autorite, des credits dont
l'employeur peut avoir besoin a cette fin, les
parties a une convention collective commencent appliquer celle-ci :
Obligation de
mettre en
application une
convention
Parties may
amend
a
a
(a) within the period specified in the collective agreement for that purpose; or
a) au cours du delai eventuellement prevu
cette fin dans Ia convention;
(b) if no such period is specified in the collective agreement, within 90 days after the
date it is signed or any longer period that the
parties may agree to or that the Board, on application by either party, may set.
b) en !'absence de delai de mise en application, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant
Ia date de Ia signature de Ia convention ou
dans le delai plus long dont peuvent convenir
les parties ou que fixe Ia Commission sur demande de l'une ou !'autre des parties.
Amendments
Modifications
118. Nothing in this Part prohibits parties
from amending any provision of a collective
agreement, other than a provision relating to its
term.
118. La presente partie n'a pas pour effet
d'empecher Ia modification, par les parties, des
dispositions d'une convention collective, exception faite de celle qui en fixe Ia date d'expiration.
DIVISION
8
SECTION
EssENTIAL SERVICES
Modifications
permises
8
SERVICES ESSENT!ELS
Application of
Division
119. This Division applies to the employer
and the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit
when the process for the resolution of a dispute
applicable to the bargaining unit is conciliation.
119. La presente section s'applique a l'employeur et a )'agent negociateur representant
une unite de negociation dans le cas ou le mode
de reglement des differends applicable a celleci est le renvoi a Ia conciliation.
Employer
determines
levels of service
120. The employer has the exclusive right to
determine the level at which an essential service is to be provided to the public, or a segment of the public, at any time, including the
extent to which and the frequency with which
the service is to be provided. Nothing in this
Division is to be construed as limiting that
right.
120. L'employeur ale droit exclusif de fixer
le niveau auquel un service essentiel doit etre
fourni tout ou partie du public, notamment
dans quelle mesure et selon queUe frequence il
doit etre fourni. Aucune disposition de Ia presente section ne peut etre interpretee de fa<;on a
porter atteinte a ce droit.
Niveau des
services par
l'employeur
Proportion of
duties may vaty
during strike
121. (1) For the purpose of identifying the
number of positions that are necessary for the
employer to provide an essential service, the
employer and the bargaining agent may agree
that some employees in the bargaining unit will
121. (1) Pour le calcul du nombre des
postes necessaires Ia fourniture d'un service
essentiel, l'employeur et !'agent negociateur
peuvent convenir que l'employeur pourra exiger de certains fonctionnaires de !'unite de m\-
Accroissement
de certaines
fonctions lors
d'une greve
a
a
39
Application
59
Public Service Labour Relations-- Apri/16, 2013
be required by the employer to perform their
duties that relate to the provision of the essential service in a greater proportion during a
strike than they do normally.
gociation, lors d'une greve, qu'ils accomplissent leurs fonctions liees a Ia foumiture
d'un service essentiel dans une proportion plus
grande qu'a !'habitude.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the
number of employees in the bargaining unit
that are necessary to provide the essential service is to be determined
(2) Pour !'application du paragraphe (1 ), le
nombre de fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation necessaires a Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel est calcule:
(a) without regard to the availability of other
a) compte non tenu de Ia disponibilite
persons to provide the essential service during a strike; and
d'autres personnes pour foumir ce service
essentiel durant une greve;
(b) on the basis that the employer is not re-
b) compte tenu du fait que l'employeur n'est
quired to change, in order to provide the essential service during a strike, the manner in
which the employer operates normally, including the normal hours of work, the extent
of the employer's use of overtime and the
equipment used in the employer's operations.
pas oblige de changer le cours normal de ses
operations afin de fournir ce service essentiel
pendant une greve, notamment en ce qui
concerne les heures normales de travail, Ia
mesure dans laquelle l'employeur a recours
aux heures supplementaires et le materiel
que celui-ci utilise dans le cadre de ses operations.
Obligation to
negotiate
122. (1) If the employer has given to the
bargaining agent a notice in writing that the
employer considers that employees in the bargaining unit occupy positions that are necessary
for the employer to provide essential services,
the employer and the bargaining agent must
make every reasonable effort to enter into an
essential services agreement as soon as possible.
122. (1) Si l'employeur a avise par ecrit
!'agent negociateur qu'il estime que des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation occupent
des postes necessaires pour lui permettre de
foumir des services essentiels, !'agent negociateur et lui font tous les efforts raisonnables pour
conclure une entente sur les services essentiels
dans les meilleurs delais.
Obligation de
negocier
Timing
(2) The notice may be given at any time but
not later than 20 days after the day a notice to
bargain collectively is given.
(2) L'avis est donne au plus tard vingt jours
apres Ia date a laquelle un avis de negociation
collective est donne.
Delai
Application to
the Board
123. (I) If the employer and the bargaining
agent are unable to enter into an essential services agreement, either of them may apply to
the Board to determine any unresolved matter
that may be included in an essential services
agreement. The application may be made at any
time but not later than
123. (1) s'ils ne parviennent pas a conclure
une entente sur les services essentiels, l'employeur ou !'agent negociateur peuvent demander a Ia Commission de statuer sur toute question qu'ils n'ont pas reglee et qui peut figurer
dans une telle entente. La demande est presentee au plus tard:
Requete a Ia
Conunission
Determination
of number of
necessary
employees
a) soit quinze jours apres Ia date de presentation de Ia demande de conciliation;
(a) 15 days after the day a request for con-.
ciliation is made by either party; or
fied by the Chairperson under subsection
163(2) of his or her intention to recommend
the establishment of a public interest commission.
b) so it quinze jours apres Ia date a laquelle
les parties sont avisees par le president de
son intention de recommander l'etablissement d'une commission de !'interet public en
application du paragraphe 163(2).
(2) The Board may delay dealing with the
application until it is satisfied that the employer
and the bargaining agent have made every rea-
(2) La Commission peut attendre, avant de
donner suite a Ia demande, d'etre convaincue
que l'employeur et !'agent negociateur ont fait
(b) 15 days after the day the parties are noti-
Delay
Calcul du
nombre de
fonctionnaires
nCcessaires
40
Report
60
Powers of Board
16 avril 2013
sonable effort to enter into an essential services
agreement.
tous les efforts raisonnables pour conclure une
entente sur les services essentiels.
(3) After considering the application, the
Board may determine any matter that the employer and the bargaining agent have not
agreed on that may be included in an essential
services agreement and make an order
(3) Saisie de Ia demande, Ia Commission
peut statuer sur toute question en litige pouvant
figurer dans !'entente et, par ordonnance, prevoir que:
Pouvoirs de Ia
Commission
a) sa decision est reputee faire partie de
(a) deeming the matter determined by it to
!'entente;
be part of an essential services agreement between the employer and the bargaining
agent; and
b) les parties sont reputees avoir conclu une
entente sur les services essentiels.
(b) deeming that the employer and the bargaining agent have entered into an essential
services agreement.
Restriction
(4) The order may not require the employer
to change the level at which an essential service
is to be provided to the public, or a segment of
the public, at any time, including the extent to
which and the frequency with which the service
is to be provided.
(4) L'ordonnance ne peut obliger l'employeur a modifier le niveau auquel un service
essentiel doit etre foumi a tout ou partie du public, notamment dans quelle mesure et selon
quelle frequence il doit etre foumi.
Reserve
Proportion of
(5) The Board may, for the purpose of identif)ling the number of positions that are necessary for the employer to provide an essential
service, take into account that some employees
in the bargaining unit may be required by the
employer to perform those of their duties that
relate to the provision of the essential service in
a greater proportion during a strike than they do
normally.
(5) Pour le calcul du nombre des postes necessaires a Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel,
Ia Commission peut prendre en compte le fait
que l'employeur pourra exiger de certains fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation, lors d'une
gn!ve, qu'ils accomplissent leurs fonctions Iiees
a Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel dans une
proportion plus grande qu'a !'habitude.
Facteurs a
prendre en
compte
(6) Pour !'application du paragraphe (5), le
nombre des fonctionnaires de ]'unite de negociation necessaires a Ia foumiture du service essentiel est calcule :
Calcul du
nombre de
fonctionnaires
nCcessaires
(b) on the basis that the employer is notrequired to change, in order to provide the essential service during a strike, the manner in
operations afin de foumir ce service essentiel
conceme les heures normales de travail, Ia
aux heures supplementaires et Ie materiel
(7) If the application relates to a specific position to be identified in the essential services
agreement, the employer's proposal in respect
of the position is to prevail, unless the position
(7) Si Ia demande porte sur un poste en particulier a nommer dans !'entente, Ia proposition
de l'employeur a cet egard l'emporte, saufsi Ia
Commission decide que le poste en question
duties may vary
during strike
Determination
of number of
necessary
employees
Application
relating to
specific position
41
Demande
relative aun
poste
Public Service Labour Relations~ Apri/16, 2013
is determined by the Board not to be of the type
necessary for the employer to provide essential
services.
n'est pas du type de ceux qui sont necessaires
pour permettre a l'employeur de fournir lesservices essentiels.
Coming into
force of
agreement
124. The essential services agreement comes
into force on the day it is signed by the parties
or, in the case of an essential services agreement that the employer and the bargaining
agent are deemed to have entered into by an order made under paragraph 123(3)(b), the day
the order was made.
124. L'entente sur les services essentiels
entre en vigueur a Ia date de sa signature par les
parties ou, dans le cas oil elle est reputee avoir
ete conclue en vertu d'une ordonnance prise au
titre de l'alinea 123(3)b), a Ia date de celle-ci.
Duration
125. An essential services agreement continues in force until the parties jointly determine
that there are no employees in the bargaining
unit who occupy positions that are necessary
for the employer to provide essential services.
125. L' entente sur les services essentiels demeure en vigueur jusqu'a ce que Jes parties decident conjointement qu'aucun des fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation n'occupe un
poste necessaire pour permettre a l'employeur
de fournir de tels services.
Duree de
!'entente
Notice to
negotiate
amendment
126. (1) If a party to an essential services
agreement gives a notice in writing to the other
party that the party giving the notice seeks to
amend the essential services agreement, the
parties must make every reasonable effort to
amend it as soon as possible.
126. (1) Si I'une des parties a I' entente sur
les services essentiels avise !'autre par ecrit
qu'elle entend modifier !'entente, chacune
d'elles fait tous les efforts raisonnables pour Ia
modifier dans les meilleurs delais.
Avis de
negociation
Timing
(2) If a collective agreement or arbitral
award is in force, the notice may be given at
any time except that, if a notice to bargain collectively has been given with a view to renewing or revising the collective agreement, the notice may only be given during the 60 days
following the day the notice to bargain collectively was given.
(2) L'avis est donne au cours de Ia periode
de validite d'une convention collective entre les
parties ou d'une decision arbitrale ou, si un avis
de negociation collective en vue du renouvellement ou de Ia revision de Ia convention collective est donne, dans les soixante jours suivant
celui-ci.
Delai
Application to
Board
127. ( 1) If the employer and the bargaining
agent are unable to amend the essential services
agreement, either of them may apply to the
Board to amend the essential services agreement. The application may be made at any time
but not later than
127. (1) S'ils ne parviennent pas a modifier
!'entente sur Jes services essentiels, l'employeur ou !'agent negociateur peuvent demander a Ia Commission de Ia modifier. La demaude est presentee au plus tard:
ciliation is made by either party; or
Demande it Ia
Commission
b) so it quinze jours apres Ia date a laquelle
(b) 15 days after the day the parties are noti-
les parties sont avisees par le president de
son intention de recommander l'etablissement d'une commission de !'interet public en
application du paragraphe 163(2).
fied by the Chairperson under subsection
163(2) of his or her intention to recommend
the establishment of a public interest commission.
(2) The Board may delay dealing with the
application until it is satisfied that the employer
and the bargaining agent have made every reasonable effort to amend the essential services
agreement.
viguenrde
!'entente
a) soit quinze jours apres Ia date de presentation de Ia demande de conciliation;
(a) 15 days after the day a request for con-
Delay
Entree en
(2) La Commission peut attendre, avant de
donner suite a Ia demande, d'etre convaincue
que l'employeur et !'agent negociateur ont fait
tous les efforts raisonnables pour modifier I' entente.
42
Report
16 avril 2013
(3) The Board may, by order, amend the essential services agreement if it considers that
the amendment is necessary for the employer to
provide essential services.
(3) La Commission peut, par ordonnance,
modifier !'entente si elle l'estime necessaire
pour permettre I' employeur de foumir les services essentiels.
Modification de
!'entente
Restriction
(4) The order may not require the employer
to change the level at which an essential service
is to be provided to the public, or a segment of
the public, at any time, including the extent to
which and the frequency with which the service
is to be provided.
(4) L'ordonnance ne peut obliger l'employeur modifier le niveau auquel un service
essentiel doit etre foumi a tout ou partie du public, notamment dans quelle mesure et selon
quelle frequence il doit etre foumi.
Reserve
Proportion of
duties may vary
during strike
(5) The Board may, for the purpose of identifying the number of positions that are necessary for the employer to provide an essential
service, take into account that some employees
in the bargaining unit may be required by the
employer to perform their duties that relate to
the provision of the essential service in a
greater proportion during a strike than they do
normally.
(5) Pour le calcul du nombre des postes necessaires a Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel,
Ia Commission peut prendre en compte le fait
que l'employeur pourra exiger de certains fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation, lors d'une
greve, qu'ils accomplissent leurs fonctions liees
Ia foumiture d'un service essentiel dans une
proportion plus grande qu'a !'habitude.
Facteurs a
prendre en
compte
(6) Pour l'application du paragraphe (5), Ie
nombre des fonctionnaires de )'unite de negociation necessaires a Ia foumiture du service essentiel est calcule:
Calcul du
nombre de
fonctionnaires
n6cessaires
Amendment by
Board
Determination
of number of
necessary
employees
a
a
a
Application
relating to
specific position
Coming into
force of
amendment
(b) on the basis that the employer is notrequired to change, in order to provide the essential service during a strike, the manner in
operations afin de foumir ce service essentiel
conceme les heures normales de travail, Ia
aux heures supplementaires et le materiel
(7) If the application relates to a specific position to be identified in the essential services
agreement, the employer's proposal in respect
of the position is to prevail, unless the position
is determined by the Board not to be of the type
necessary for the employer to provide essential
services.
(7) Si Ia demande porte sur un poste en particulier a nommer dans !'entente, Ia proposition
de l'employeur a cet egard l'emporte, sauf si Ia
Commission decide que le poste en question
n'est pas du type de ceux qui sont necessaires
pour permettre l'employeur de fournir Jesservices essentiels.
Demande
relative aun
poste
128. An amendment to an essential services
agreement comes into force on the day the
agreement containing the amendment is signed
by the parties or, in the case of an amendment
made by order of the Board under subsection
127(3), the day the order was made.
128. La modification de ]'entente sur lesservices essentiels entre en vigueur a Ia date de Ia
signature parIes parties de !'entente Ia comportant ou, dans le cas ou elle est faite par une ordonnance prise au titre du paragraphe 127(3), a
Ia date de celle-ci.
Entree en
vigueur de !a
modification
a
43
63
Public Service Labour Relations- Apri/16, 2013
Replacement
positions
129. (I) If, at any time while an essential
services agreement is in force, a position identified in it becomes vacant, the employer may
identify a position of the same type as a replacement position. If the employer does so, the
employer must file a notice of replacement with
the Board and provide a copy to the bargaining
agent.
129. ( 1) Si, pendant Ia periode de validite
de !'entente sur les services essentiels, un poste
qui y est nomme devient vacant, l'employeur
peut y substituer un autre poste du meme type.
L'employeur envoie alors un avis de substitution a Ia Commission et une copie de celui-ci a
!'agent negociateur.
Substitution de
postes
Effect of notice
(2) On the filing of the notice, the replacement position is deemed to be a position identified in the essential services agreement and the
position it replaced is deemed to be no longer
identified.
(2) Une fois !'avis donne, le nouveau poste
est repute etre nomme dans !'entente et celui
qu'il remplace ne plus l'y etre.
Effet de !"avis
Notification of
employees
130. (1) The employer must provide every
employee who occupies a position that has
been identified in an essential services agreement as being a position that is necessary for
the employer to provide essential services with
a notice informing the employee that the employee occupies such a position.
130. (1) L'employeur donne un avis aux
fonctionnaires qui, aux termes de !'entente sur
les services essentiels, occupent un poste necessaire a Ia foumiture par l'employeur de cesservices.
Avis aux
fonctionnaires
Notification of
change
(2) A notice given under this section remains valid so long as the employee continues
to occupy the position unless the employer notifies the employee that the position occupied
by the employee is no longer necessary for the
employer to provide essential services.
(2) L'avis donne au titre du present article
demeure en vigueur tant que le fonctionnaire
occupe Ie poste, sauf revocation de !'avis par
avis subsequent donne a celui-ci par l'employeur et precisant que son poste n'est plus
necessaire a Ia foumiture par l'employeur des
services essentiels.
Revocation de
!'avis
Emergency
application
131. Despite any provision in this Division,
if either the employer or the bargaining agent is
of the opinion that a temporary amendment to
an essential services agreement, or its suspension, is necessary because of an emergency but
the parties are unable to agree to do so, either
of them may, at any time, apply to the Board
for an order temporarily amending, or suspending, the agreement.
131. Malgre les autres dispositions de Ia presente section, si l'une des parties
employeur
ou agent negociateur- estime qu'il est necessaire, en raison d'une situation d'urgence, de
modifier temporairement ou de suspendre !'entente sur les services essentiels mais qu'il leur
est impossible de s'entendre ace sujet, l'une ou
!'autre de celles-ci peut a tout moment demander a La Commission de modifier temporairement ou de suspendre !'entente par ordonnance.
Revision
d · urgence de
!'entente
Duty to observe
terms and
conditions
132. Unless the parties otherwise agree, every term and condition of employment applicable to employees in a bargaining unit in respect
of which a notice to bargain collectively is given that may be included in a collective agreement and that is in force on the day the notice is
given remains in force in respect of any employee who occupies a position that is identified in an essential services agreement and
must be observed by the employer, the bargaining agent for the bargaining unit and the employee until a collective agreement is entered
into.
132. Sauf entente a l'effet contraire entre les
parties, toute condition d'emploi qui peut figurer dans une convention collective et qui est encore en vigueur au moment oil !'avis de negocier a ete donne continue de s'appliquer aux
fonctionnaires qui occupent un poste necessaire, aux termes de !'entente sur les services
essentiels, pour permettre a l'employeur de
foumir ces services et lie les parties, y compris
les fonctionnaires en question, jusqu'a Ia
conclusion d'une convention collective.
Obligation de
respecter les
conditions
d'emploi
44
64
Relations de travail dans lafonction publique- 16 avri/2013
Extension of
ttme
133. The Board may, on the application of
either party, extend any period referred to in
this Division.
133. La Commission peut, sur demande de
l'une ou !'autre partie, proroger tout delai prevu
par Ia presente section.
Filing of
essential
134. Either party to an essential services
agreement may file a copy of it with the Board.
When filed, it has the same effect as an order of
the Board.
134. L'une ou !'autre partie a !'entente sur
les services essentiels peut en deposer une copie aupres de Ia Commission. L'entente, une
fois deposee, est assimitee a une ordonnance de
celle-ci.
services
agreement
DIVISION
Application
Request for
arbitration
When request
may be made
Contents of
9
SECTION
ARBITRAGE
Application of Division
Application de Ia section
135. This Division applies to the employer
and the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit
whenever
135. La presente section s'applique a l'employeur et a ['agent negociateur representant
une unite de negociation dans le cas oil:
(a) the process for the resolution of a dispute
applicable to the bargaining unit is arbitration; and
a) d'une part, le mode de reglement des differends applicable a l 'unite de negociation
est le renvoi a !'arbitrage;
(b) the parties have bargained in good faith
with a view to entering into a collective
agreement but are unable to reach agreement
on a term or condition of employment that
may be included in an arbitral award.
b) d'autre part, les parties ant negocie de
bonne foi en vue de conclure une convention
collective, mais n'ont pu s'entendre sur une
condition d'emploi qui peut figurer dans une
decision arbitrale.
Request for Arbitration
Demande d'arbitrage
136. (1) Either party may, by notice in writing to the Chairperson, request arbitration in respect of any term or condition of employment
that may be included in an arbitral award.
136. (1) L'une ou ['autre partie peut, par
avis ecrit adresse au president, demander le
renvoi a !'arbitrage d'un differend sur une
condition d'emploi qui peut figurer dans une
decision arbitrale.
(2) La demande d'arbitrage peut intervenir:
a tout moment dans le cas oil aucune
convention collective n'a ete conclue et aucune autre demande d'arbitrage n'a ete presentee par l'une ou !'autre partie depuis le
debut des negociations;
(a) at any time, if the parties have not entered into a collective agreement and no request for arbitration has been made by either
party since the commencement of the bargaining; or
a)
(b) not later than seven days after a collective agreement is entered into by the parties,
in any other case.
b) au plus tard sept jours apres Ia conclusion
d'une convention collective dans les autres
cas.
(3) The party requesting arbitration must
(3) La partie qui demande !'arbitrage:
notice
(a) specify in the notice every term or condition of employment in respect of which it requests arbitration and its proposals concerning the award to be made in respect of that
term or condition; and
a) precise dans !'avis Ia condition d'emploi
al'egard de laquelle elle demande !'arbitrage
et ses propositions quant a Ia decision arbitrale qui doit etre rendue en l'espece;
b) annexe a !'avis une copie de Ia derniere
convention collective conclue parIes parties.
45
Depot de
I' entente aupres
dela
Commission
9
ARBITRATION
(2) The request may be made
Prorogation
Application
Demande
Moment de Ia
demande
Avis 3 donner
65
16 avri/2013
of any employee organization that has an interest in the term or condition referred for final
and binding determination.
Vote on Employer's Offer
Scrutin sur les offres de l'employeur
183. (1) If the Minister is of the opm10n
that it is in the public interest that the employees in a bargaining unit be given the opportunity to accept or reject the offer of the employer
last received by the bargaining agent in respect
of all matters remaining in dispute between the
parties, the Minister may
183. (1) Le ministre peut, s'il estime d'interet public de donner aux fonctionnaires qui font
partie de ]'unite de negociation en cause !'occasion d'accepter ou de rejeter les dernieres offres
que l'employeur a faites !'agent negociateur
sur toutes les questions faisant toujours !'objet
d'un differend entre les parties:
(a) on any terms and conditions that the
Minister considers appropriate, direct that a
vote to accept or reject the offer be held by
secret ballot as soon as possible among all of
the employees in the bargaining unit; and
a) ordonner Ia tenue sur les offres, dans les
meilleurs delais et en conformite avec les
modalites qu'il estime indiquees, d'un vote
au scrutin secret aupres de tous les fonctionnaires de !'unite de negociation;
(b) designate the Board, or any other person
or body, to be in charge of conducting that
vote.
b) charger Ia Commission - ou Ia personne
ou organisme qu'il designe- de Ia tenue du
scrutin.
Vote does not
delay right
(2) The direction that a vote be held, or the
holding of that vote, does not prevent the declaration or authorization of a strike if the employee organization that is certified as the bargaining agent is not otherwise prohibited from
making the declaration or authorization, nor
does it prevent the participation in a strike by
an employee if the employee is not otherwise
prohibited from participating in the strike.
(2) Ni l'ordre de tenir un scrutin ni Ia tenue
du scrutin n'ont pour effet d'empecher Ia declaration ou l'autorisation d'une greve s'il n'est
pas interdit par ailleurs a !'organisation syndicale accreditee comme agent negociateur de Ia
declarer ou de l'autoriser, ou d'empecher Ia
participation a une gn!ve s'il n'est pas interdit
par ailleurs au fonctionnaire d'y participer.
Droits non
touches par le
scmtin
Consequences of
favourable vote
(3) If a majority of the employees participating in the vote accept the employer's last offer,
(3) En cas de vote favorable de Ia majorite
des fonctionnaires ayant participe au scrutin,
les parties sont liees par les dernieres offres de
l'employeur et sont tenues de conclure sans delai une convention collective incorporant
celles-ci; de plus, toute greve en cours lorsque
Ia Commission - ou Ia personne ou organisme
charge de Ia tenue du scrutin - informe les
parties par ecrit de )'acceptation des fonctionnaires se termine immediatement, Ia reprise du
travail se faisant sans delai en conformite avec
les directives de l'employeur.
Consequence
d'un vote
favorable
(4) La Commission- ou Ia personne ou organisme charge de Ia tenue du scrutin
tranche toute question qui se pose dans le cadre
du present article, notamment I' egard de Ia tenue du scrutin et de Ia determination de son resultat.
Pouvoirs a
l'egard du
scrutin
Minister may
order vote to be
held
(a) the parties are bound by that offer and
must, without delay, enter into a collective
agreement that incorporates the terms of that
offer; and
(b) any strike that is in progress when the
Board or other person or body in charge of
conducting the vote notifies the parties in
writing of the employees' acceptance must
cease immediately, and the employees must
return to work as soon as the employer determines that it is practicable for them to do so.
Powers
respectmg vote
( 4) The Board or other person or body in
charge of conducting the vote must determine
any question that arises under this section, including any question relating to the conduct of
the vote or the determination of its result.
Scmtin ordonmi
par le ministre
a
a
61
66
Public Service Labour Relations-~ Apri/16, 2013
DIVISION
11
SECTION
11
STRIKE VoTES
VoTE DE GREVE
Secret ballot
vote
184. (1) In order to obtain approval to declare or authorize a strike, an employee organization must hold a vote by secret ballot among
all of the employees in the bargaining unit conducted in a manner that ensures that the employees are given a reasonable opportunity to
participate in the vote and be informed of the
results.
184. (1) L'organisation syndicate doit, pour
obtenir )'approbation de declarer ou d'autoriser
une greve, tenir un vote au scrutin secret aupres
de tous les fonctionnaires de ['unite de negociation, de fayon que tous les fonctionnaires aient
Ia possibilite d'y participer et d'etre informes
des resultats.
Scrutin secret
Application to
have vote
declared invalid
(2) An employee who is a member of a bargaining unit for which a vote referred to in subsection ( 1) was held and who alleges that there
were irregularities in the conduct of the vote
may, no later than 10 days after the day the results of the vote are announced, make an application to the Board to have the vote declared
invalid.
(2) Le fonctionnaire de !'unite de negociation visee par un vote de greve qui affirme que
le deroulement du scrutin a ete entache d'irregularites peut, dans les dix jours suivant Ia date
alaquelle les resultats sont annonces, demander
a Ia Commission de declarer le vote invalide.
Den>ande de
declaration
d'invalidite du
vote
Dismissal of
application
(3) The Board may summarily dismiss the
application if it is satisfied that, even if the alleged irregularities did occur, the outcome of
the vote would not have been different.
(3) La Commission peut rejeter de fa9on
sommaire Ia demande de declaration d'invalidite du vote si elle est convaincue que les irregularites soulevees n'auraient eu aucune incidence sur le resultat du vote.
Rejet de Ia
demande
New vote
(4) If the Board declares the vote invalid, it
may order that a new vote be held in accordance with the conditions it specifies in the order.
(4) Si elle prononce l'invalidite du vote, Ia
Commission peut ordonner Ia tenue d'un nouveau vote en conformite avec les modalites
qu'elle fixe dans !'ordonnance.
Nouveau vote
DIVISION
12
SECTION
12
UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES
PRATIQUES DELOY ALES
Meaning of
"unfair labour
practice"
185. In this Division, "unfair labour practice" means anything that is prohibited by subsection 186(1) or (2), section 187 or 188 or
subsection 189(1 ).
185. Dans Ia presente section, «pratiques
deloyales» s'entend de tout ce qui est interdit
par Jes paragraphes 186(1) et (2), les articles
187 et 188 et le paragraphe 189(1 ).
Unfair labour
practicesemployer
186. (1) Neither the employer nor a person
who occupies a managerial or confidential position, whether or not the person is acting on
behalf of the employer, shall
186. (1) II est interdit a l'employeur et au titulaire d'un poste de direction ou de confiance,
qu'il agisse ou non pour le compte de
l'employeur:
(a) participate in or interfere with the forma-
a) de participer a Ia formation ou a !'administration d'une organisation syndicate ou
d'intervenir dans l'une ou !'autre ou dans Ia
representation des fonctionnaires par celleci;
tion or administration of an employee organization or the representation of employees
by an employee organization; or
(b) discriminate against an employee organization.
Unfair labour
practicesemployer
(2) Neither the employer nor a person acting
on behalf of the employer, nor a person who
occupies a managerial or confidential position,
b) de faire des distinctions illicites
de toute organisation syndicate.
Pratiques
deloyales par
I' employeur
a l'egard
(2) II est interdit a l'employeur, a Ia personne qui agit pour le compte de celui-ci et au
titulaire d'un poste de direction ou de
62
Definition de
« pratiques
deloyales »
Pratiques
deloyaies par
l'employeur
61
Relations de travail dans lafonction publique -- 16 avril 2013
whether or not that person is acting on behalf of
the employer, shall
confiance, que ce demier agisse ou non pour le
compte de l'employeur:
a) de refuser d'employer ou de continuer
(a) refuse to employ or to continue to employ, or suspend, lay off or otherwise discriminate against any person with respect to
employment, pay or any other term or condition of employment, or intimidate, threaten
or otherwise discipline any person, because
the person
a
employer une personne donnee, ou encore de
Ia suspendre, de Ia mettre en disponibilite, ou
de faire a son egard des distinctions illicites
en matiere d'emploi, de salaire ou d'autres
conditions d'emploi, de l'intimider, de Ia
menacer ou de prendre d'autres mesures disciplinaires a son egard pour l'un ou !'autre
des motifs suivants:
(i) is or proposes to become, or seeks to
induce any other person to become, a
member, officer or representative of an
employee organization, or participates in
the promotion, formation or administration
of an employee organization,
(i) elle adhere a une organisation syndicate ou en est un dirigeant ou representant
- ou se propose de Ie faire ou de le devenir, ou incite une autre personne a le faire
ou a Ie devenir - , ou contribue a Ia formation, Ia promotion ou !'administration
d'une telle organisation,
(ii) has testified or otherwise participated,
or may testify or otherwise participate, in
a proceeding under this Part or Part 2,
a
(ii) elle a participe, titre de temoin ou
autrement, a toute procedure prevue par Ia
presente partie ou Ia partie 2, ou pourrait
Ie faire,
(iii) has made an application or filed a
complaint under this Part or presented a
grievance under Part 2, or
(iv) has exercised any right under this
Part or Part 2;
(iii) elle a soit presente une demande ou
depose une plainte sous le regime de Ia
presente partie, soit depose un grief sous
le regime de Ia partie 2,
(b) impose, or propose the imposition of,
any condition on an appointment, or in an
employee's terms and conditions of employment, that seeks to restrain an employee or a
person seeking employment from becoming
a member of an employee organization or
exercising any right under this Part or Part 2;
or
(iv) elle a exerce tout droit prevu par Ia
presente partie ou Ia partie 2;
b) d'imposer -
ou de proposer d'imposer
-, a )'occasion d'une nomination ou relati-
vement aux conditions d'emploi, une condition visant a empikher le fonctionnaire ou Ia
personne cherchant un emploi d'adherer a
une organisation syndicate ou d'exercer tout
droit que lui accorde Ia presente partie ou Ia
partie 2;
(c) seek, by intimidation, threat of dismissal
or any other kind of threat, by the imposition
of a financial or other penalty or by any other
means, to compel a person to refrain from
becoming or to cease to be a member, officer
or representative of an employee organization or to refrain from
c) de chercher, notamment par intimidation,
par menace de congediement ou par !'imposition de sanctions pecuniaires ou autres,
obliger une personne soit a s'abstenir ou a
cesser d'adherer une organisation syndicale
ou d'occuper un poste de dirigeant ou de representant syndical, so it as, abstenir:
a
(i) testifying or otherwise participating in
a proceeding under this Part or Part 2,
a
(ii) making a disclosure that the person
may be required to make in a proceeding
under this Part or Part 2, or
(i) de participer, a titre de temoin ou autrement, a une procedure prevue par Ia
presente partie ou Ia partie 2,
(iii) making an application or filing a
complaint under this Part or presenting a
grievance under Part 2.
(ii) de reveler des renseignements qu'elle
peut etre requise de communiquer dans Ie
63
68
Public Service Labour Relations-- April 16, 2013
cadre d'une procedure prevue par Ia presente partie ou Ia partie 2,
(iii) de presenter une demande ou de deposer une plainte sous le regime de Ia presente partie ou de deposer un grief sous le
regime de Ia partie 2.
Exception
(3) The employer or a person does not commit an unfair labour practice under paragraph
(l)(a) by reason only of
(a) permitting an employee or a representative of an employee organization that is a
bargaining agent to confer with the employer
or person, as the case may be, during hours
of work or to attend to the business of the
employee organization during hours of work
without any deduction from wages or any deduction of time worked for the employer; or
(3) Ne constitue pas une violation de l'alinea (1 )a) le seul fait pour l'employeur ou le titulaire d'un paste de direction ou de confiance
de prendre l'une ou !'autre des mesures ci-apres
en faveur d'une organisation syndicate qui est
!'agent negociateur d'une unite de negociation
groupant ou comprenant des fonctionnaires travaillant pour lui:
Exception
a) permettre a un fonctionnaire ou representant syndical de conferer avec l'employeur
ou Ia personne, selon le cas, ou de s'occuper
des affaires de !'organisation syndicate pendant les heures de travail, sans retenue sur le
salaire ni reduction du temps de travail effectue pour lui;
(b) permitting an employee organization that
is a bargaining agent to use the employer's
premises for the purposes of the employee
organization.
b) permettre !'utilisation de ses locaux pour
les besoins de !'organisation syndicale.
Exception
(I )(b)
(4) L'employeur ou Ie titulaire d'un poste de
direction ou de confiance n'enfreint pas l'alinea
(!)b) dans le cas ou:
Exception
(a) if the employer or person is acting in accordance with this Part or a regulation, a collective agreement or an arbitral award; or
a) il agit en conformite avec Ia presente par-
(b) by reason only of receiving representations from, or holding discussions with, representatives of an employee organization.
b) il ne fait que recevoir les observations des
representants d'une organisation syndicate
ou qu'avoir des discussions avec eux.
Exception
(l)(a) or (b) by reason only that the employer
or person expresses their point of view, so long
as they do not use coercion, intimidation,
threats, promises or undue influence.
(5) L'employeur ou le titulaire d'un poste de
direction ou de con fiance n 'enfreint pas les alineas (l)a) ou b) du seul fait qu'il exprime son
point de vue, pourvu qu'il n'ait pas indument
use de son influence, fait des promesses ou recouru a Ia coercition, a !'intimidation ou a Ia
menace.
Exception
Exception
(6) The employer or a person does not commit an unfair labour practice under any of paragraphs (l)(a) or (b) or (2)(a) to (c) by reason
only of any act or thing done or omitted in relation to a person who occupies, or is proposed to
occupy, a managerial or confidential position.
(6) Aucune action ou omission ne saurait
constituer un manquement a I'un des alineas
(l)a) et b) et (2)a) a c) si elle vise le titulaire
d'un poste de direction ou de confiance ou Ia
personne proposee pour un tel poste.
Exception
Unfair
representation
by bargaining
agent
187. No employee organization that is certified as the bargaining agent for a bargaining
unit, and none of its officers and representa-
187. II est interdit a!'organisation syndicale,
ainsi qu'a ses dirigeants et representants, d'agir
de maniere arbitraire ou discriminatoire ou de
tie, un reglement, une convention collective
ou une decision arbitrale;
64
Representation
inequitable par
I' agent
negociateur
69
Public Service Labour Relations-· Apri/16, 2013
Unfair labour
practicespersons
189. (1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall seek by intimidation or coercion to
compel an employee
(a) to become, refrain from becoming or
cease to be, or, except as otherwise provided
in a collective agreement, to continue to be, a
member of an employee organization; or
189. (1) Sous reserve du paragraphe (2), il
est interdit a quiconque de chercher, par menace ou mesures coercitives, a obliger un
fonctionnaire :
a
(2) A person does not commit an unfair
labour practice referred to in subsection ( 1) by
reason of any act or thing done or omitted in relation to a person who occupies, or is proposed
to occupy, a managerial or confidential position.
DIVISION
Complaints
a
a)
adherer ou
s'abstenir ou cesser
une organisation syndicate, ou
d'adherer
encore, sauf disposition contraire dans une
convention collective, continuer d'y adherer;
a
a
(b) to refrain from exercising any other right
under this Part or Part 2.
Exception
Pratiques
deloyales par
quiconque
b) a s'abstenir d'exercer tout autre droit
qu'accorde Ia presente partie ou Ia partie 2.
(2) Aucune action ou omission ne saurait
constituer une pratique deloyale visee au paragraphe (1) si elle vise le titulaire d'un poste de
direction ou de confiance ou Ia personne proposee pour un tel poste.
13
SECTION
13
COMPLAINTS
PLAINTES
190. (1) The Board must examine and inquire into any complaint made to it that
190. (1) La Commission instruit toute
plainte dont elle est saisie et selon laquelle:
section 56 (duty to observe terms and conditions);
a !'article 56
(obligation de respecter les conditions d'emploi);
(b) the employer or a bargaining agent has
failed to comply with section 106 (duty to
bargain in good faith);
b) l'employeur ou !'agent negociateur a
contrevenu !'article 106 (obligation de negocier de bonne foi);
(c) the employer, a bargaining agent or an
employee has failed to comply with section
107 (duty to observe terms and conditions);
c) l'employeur, !'agent negociateur ou le
fonctionnaire a contrevenu
I' article 107
a) l'employeur a contrevenu
(a) the employer has failed to comply with
a
a
(d) the employer, a bargaining agent or a
deputy head has failed to comply with subsection 110(3) (duty to bargain in good
faith);
d) l'employeur, !'agent negociateur ou l'administrateur general a contrevenu au paragraphe 11 0(3) (obligation de negocier de
bonne foi);
(e) the employer or an employee organization has failed to comply with section 117
(duty to implement provisions of the collective agreement) or 157 (duty to implement
provisions of the arbitral award);
e) l'employeur ou !'organisation syndicate a
contrevenu aux articles 117 (obligation de
mettre en application une convention) ou 157
(obligation de mettre en reuvre Ia decision
arbitrate);
(j) the employer, a bargaining agent or an
/) l'employeur, !'agent negociateur ou le
fonctionnaire a contrevenu a !'article 132
employee has failed to comply with section
132 (duty to observe terms and conditions);
or
(g) the employer, an employee organization
or any person has committed an unfair labour
practice within the meaning of section 185.
g) l'employeur, !'organisation syndicate ou
toute personne s'est livre une pratique deloyale au sens de !'article 185.
a
66
Exception
Plaintes aIa
Commission

Respondent Professional-Institute-of-the-Public-Service-of

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