Country Study: Serbia

Transcription

Country Study: Serbia
June 2013
Author:
Želimir Kešetović
Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework
Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement n°284678.
Executive Summary 1
The current Serbian civil security system was established in June 2010 and still is under construction,
as a number of bylaws, directives, guidelines and documents are to be adopted. It is planned that the
system will be fully completed in 2016. The general intention was to design a comprehensive
decentralised system around the sector of emergency management of the Ministry of Interior as the
main pillar and integrator of different actors and link professional agencies and political
representatives on all levels of government in emergency management headquarters with precise
delineation of mandate and responsibilities. A crisis is prepared for and resolved where it happens,
that is primarily at the local level. If it exceeds the capacity of the local community, up scaling occurs
on the higher levels of government up to the national level in cases of large scale disasters, including
the engagement of the police and army if necessary. However, due to the uneven development of
municipalities and cities there are significant differences in the crisis management capacity between
local communities as well as in the level of awareness for crisis management among the local political
representatives, other actors and citizens. A new risk assessment methodology is to be implemented
as the basis for better planning. There is plenty of room for improving cooperation with the private
sector and volunteer organizations, as well as for citizens’ mobilization. Serbia is engaged in the
regional institutional crisis management arrangements and cross border crisis assistance and is
harmonizing its system with European standards in the context of EU accession. More time and effort
is needed in order to harmonize the new system and to evaluate all its good and bad sides.
1
This case study represents one of 22 country studies compiled in the context of the Analysis of Civil Security
Systems in Europe (ANVIL) Project. The ANVIL Project aims to map the variety and similarities in Europe's
regional civil security structures, practices and cultures and investigate how variety affects the safety of
Europe's citizens. The results give policy stakeholders a clear overview over civil security architectures and EUadded value to the debate concerning "not one security fits all". Read more at www.anvil-project.net
2
Key Findings
Due to the fact that the current Serbian civil security system was legally/normatively established only
in June 2010 and still is under normative2 and operational construction, it is rather hard to identify its
advantages and disadvantages. However, perhaps two solutions in the Serbian civil security system,
and one idea/initiative on regional resource sharing might be interesting for other European
countries:
1. The national emergency management headquarters as political-operative multisectoral body that
includes heads/leaders of different ministries (Interior, Health, Transportation, etc), other agencies
and special organizations that, within their respective areas of responsibility, have certain roles in
crisis management, as well as the civil society actors (Red Cross, Mountain Rescue Service etc.)
actually (and recently formally) is the national platform for disaster risk reduction and so far it is
functioning properly. Similar bodies are established on lower levels of political-territorial organization
(regional and local) with respective units of the sector for emergency management as their pillar. In
this way, in a bottom up manner and in project-like organization all professional crisis management
actors are mutually connected both horizontally and vertically and political actors are also involved at
all levels of government.
2. The Serbia law on emergency situations defines two categories of companies, other legal persons
and entrepreneurs particularly important for crisis management:

Authorized legal persons - companies and other legal entities entrusted to perform the
activities of special interest for the Republic of Serbia in the field of telecommunications,
energy and mining, railway transport, meteorology, hydrology, seismology, protection from
ionizing and nuclear radiation, environmental protection, water management, forestry and
agriculture, health, care and accommodation and veterinary medicine

Trained legal persons - companies and other legal entities trained and equipped for
protection and rescue activities such as: public utility companies, construction companies,
water management companies, forest management companies, catering companies, mining
companies, transport companies and other legal entities, private security companies and
commercial aviation.
On the national and district levels there are no contracts between the state and private or public
companies. There are only government decisions which explicitly specify authorised and trained legal
persons that have obligations in emergency situations. It includes a total of 108 authorised and
trained legal persons on the national and 245 on district level (Official Gazette, No 36, May 27,
2
A number of bylaws, directives, guidelines and documents are to be adopted
3
2011).3 On the local level there are formal contracts between private companies and local
governments that regulate their rights and obligations in emergency situations, while the public
enterprises have a legal obligation to participate in crisis management.
3. The Serbian Ministry of Interior with the heads of emergency management services from Albania,
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro adopted the conclusions on
establishing a network of regional specialized centres for reacting in emergencies in SEE in order to
use and develop existing capacities of the states and pooling of their resources. To avoid duplication
within the region, a network of different centres of excellence in Southeastern Europe will be
established. The main task of these centers will be disaster response training and coordination. There
should be one center of excellence situated in each of the states specialized for a certain area of
expertise. (floods, forest fire, disaster risk analysis, wildfire, coordination of response, earthquake,
cave rescue, etc.).
3
On the national level the most important among public companies are the Serbian Postal Service, power and
electricity production/supply companies, Serbian railways, hospitals and a number of faculties, and among
private companies are those engaged in pharmaceutical industry, transportation, construction, commerce, etc.
4
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ 2
Key Findings ............................................................................................................................................. 3
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 6
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 7
2. Analytical Dimensions ......................................................................................................................... 9
2.1. Cultural and historical aspects of the civil security system .......................................................... 9
2.1.1. Administrative tradition .........................................................................................................9
2.1.2. Government/social culture...................................................................................................14
2.2. Legal & constitutional aspects .................................................................................................... 15
2.2.1.Statutory basis .......................................................................................................................15
2.2.2. Political dimension ...............................................................................................................17
2.2.3. Operational dimension .........................................................................................................18
2.2.4. External cooperation ............................................................................................................21
2.3. Relations between the state and its citizens .............................................................................. 23
2.3.1. Expectations .........................................................................................................................23
2.3.2. Information ...........................................................................................................................24
2.3.3. Education ..............................................................................................................................25
2.4. Role of the private sector in maintaining civil security .............................................................. 27
2.4.1. Role of societal/non-profit organizations/ NGOs .................................................................27
2.4.2. Role of profit-oriented organisations ...................................................................................28
3. Quality Measures............................................................................................................................... 31
3.1. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................................... 31
3.1.1. Assessment through professional and political inquiries .....................................................31
3.1.2. Limits to national capacities .................................................................................................32
3.2. Efficiency..................................................................................................................................... 34
3.3. Legitimacy................................................................................................................................... 35
3.3.1. Political support ....................................................................................................................35
3.3.2. Legal support ........................................................................................................................36
3.3.3. Popular trust and support ....................................................................................................37
4. Serbian Civil Security in the EU Context ............................................................................................ 38
5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 40
Annex I: Coded Data .............................................................................................................................. 43
Annex II: H1N1 in Serbia ........................................................................................................................ 52
Annex III: Resources .............................................................................................................................. 56
5
List of Abbreviations
CBRN
CPA
EMHQ
HFA
HQ
LES
MIC
MOD
MOI
MRS
NEMHQ
NSPRE
PWMC
SEE
SEM
SWG
UNDP
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
Criminalistic Police Academy
Emergency Management Headquarters
Hyogo Framework for Action
Headquarters
Law on emergency situations
Monitoring and Information Centre
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Interior
Mountain Rescue Service
National Emergency Management Headquarters
National Strategy for Protection and Rescue in Emergencies
Public Water Management Company
South Eastern Europe
Sector for Emergency Management
Special Working Group
United Nations Development Program
6
1. Introduction
After almost two decades of rather unregulated responsibilities of particular ministries and bodies
and outdated legislation, and lack of political will to regulate this area, the current Serbian civil
security system has been established only in December 2009 when the Law on Emergency Situations
(LES) was adopted in Parliament. This law is the basis for guiding all disaster management activities in
the country. The Sector for Emergency Management (SEM) is recognized as a single body within the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) where all emergency services from MOI, Ministry of Defence (MOD) and
Ministry of Environment are integrated. Therefore, the crisis management approach is primarily
based on civilian operations and bodies, while military capabilities are only being employed upon
request of the SEM, when other resources are not sufficient. Serbia takes mainly an all hazards
approach with elements of a specific threats approach. The SEM is a coordination body that
integrates activities of all agencies.
The conflicts in the 1990s related to dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia, followed by the conflicts in the
Serbian southern province of Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the NATO bombing campaign in 1999
were among the greatest crises that Serbia’s civil security system had ever faced. Located in a region
of intense political change and civil unrest, Serbia also experienced a number of demonstration and
citizens protests during the Milosevic regime, several prison riots and the assassination of the prime
minister in 2003 as a result of conspiracy. Besides this, Serbia often has to cope with many natural
disasters, most notably floods, forest fires, extreme temperatures, heat waves and windstorms,
landslides and, from time to time, earthquakes. As a major link between Asia and the rest of Europe,
the threats of transportation accidents, terrorism and infectious disease epidemics are substantial.
(Waal, Chu and Dimitrijevic 2008:8)
In the period 2000-2012, 18 major natural disasters and infectious diseases, 5 major
industrial/transport accidents, and one signature crisis were recorded while there were no serious
infrastructures failures and major terrorist incidents.
7
Table 1: List of Crises (2000-2012)4
Year/
month
2000/IV
2000/ VII
2002/ IV
2002/VI
2003/III
Crisis
Description
Crisis
Category
Natural disaster
Natural disaster
Natural disaster
Natural disaster
Signature crisis
# of
persons
killed
2004/IV
Flood
Extreme temperature
Earthquake
Flood
Assassination
of
Prime
Minister Djindjic
transport accident
2005/IV
2006/II
2006/IV
2006/X
Flood
Flood
Flood
Explosion at a military depot
2007/XI
2008/II
Flood
Fire in a night club
2008/IV
Chemical accident
2009/I
2009/XI
Extreme temperature
Flood
Industrial/transportat
ion accident
Natural disaster
Natural disaster
Natural disaster
ion accident
Natural disaster
ion accident
ion accident
Natural disaster
Natural disaster
2009/XI
H1N1 epidemic
Natural disaster
136
2010/I
Extreme temperature
Natural disaster
3
2010/III
Flood
Natural disaster
2010/V
Flood
Natural disaster
2
2010/XI
Earthquake
Natural disaster
2
2010/XII
Extreme temperature
Natural disaster
2
2010/XII
Flood
Natural disaster
2012/II
Extreme temperature
Natural disaster
23
2012/IV
Fire in a night club
ion accident
6
Damage
# of
# of persons
persons
affected
injured
4,000
3
1
1
2,400
7,500,000
12
38
2
3,790
1,200
35,000
35
12,370
8
2
27
500
3,210
750,000 to 1
million
3,150
27,030
1,750
34,497
Crisis5 is defined in Article 7 of the Law on Emergency Situations (LES) as "a situation when risks and
threats or consequences of catastrophes, emergencies and other threats to population, environment
and material goods, are of such scale and intensity that their occurrence or consequences cannot be
prevented nor eliminated through regular activity of competent agencies and services, and for the
4
Table is based on EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster data (http://www.emdat.be/database) complemented
with data from the Serbian MOI. Four disasters from EM-DAT data base (Flood in December 2000, transport accident in July
2002, miscellaneous accident in December 2003 and extreme temperature in January 2006, are excluded as there are not
recorded in Serbian MOI. Crisis in italic letters are added to EM-DAT, and based on MOI records.
5
Generic legal term is emergency situation. Besides this more specific terms are natural hazard, technical and
technological hazard - accident, disaster and emergency also used and explained in LES.
8
mitigation or elimination of which special measures, forces and means at higher operational regime
are required."6 (Law on Emergency Situations, a.7, Official Gazette RS, 111/10).
2. Analytical Dimensions
2.1 Cultural and historical aspects of the civil security system
2.1.1 Administrative tradition
Frequent disruptions of historical and political continuity in Serbia have been reflected in the
organization of the state and security system. The tradition of the Serbian public administration is
based on comprehensive legal regulation. Serbia inherited from the periods of socialism (1945-1990)
and of the system of personal rule of Slobodan Milošević (1990-2000) authoritative legal models of
public administration. One study found that the Serbian public administration has the following
characteristics:
• A strong centralization of decision-making authority;
• A rule-oriented, risk-averse administrative culture;
• Weak mechanisms for cross-ministerial coordination;
• Lacks capacity for strategy and policy development;
• Widespread problems of motivation;
• Far reaching politicization. (The Serbian Central Government Administration, 2002)
After the regime change in October 2000, the new government adopted a Public Administration
Reform Strategy (2004), in which it is stated that public administration should not be viewed solely as
“an instrument of government”, but rather as a system performing public services. A significant
problem is replacing the previous spoil system with a system based on merit in public administration,
its politicization and state disrespect of the law and court decisions rendered in favour of the citizens.
(Milosavljevic, 2011).
Serbia is a parliamentary republic with a multi-party system. The party (or the coalition of parties)
which gets a majority of MPs in the unicameral parliament (250 seats) elects the government as an
executive state-organ. Executive authority is exercised by the prime minister and cabinet members.
The president is the head of state, and is elected by popular vote. Formally, the post of president is
6
English version of LES. Translated by MOI
9
largely a traditional role with almost no executive, legislative, or judicial authority. However, due to
the president`s legitimacy, power of suspensive veto and some other provisions, in Serbian academia
there is no consensus whether the Serbian political system is semi-presidential, (Pejković, 2010),
while most authors believe that the new Constitution (2006) has brought about a significant
rationalization of parliamentarism in favour of the executive branch of government. (Pejić, 2007).
Serbia is a unitary centralized state7 with a majoritarian democracy, and some elements of
consociational democracy as a corrective factor.8
In terms of administrative and territorial division, the Republic of Serbia is divided into

Autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija9) – regional level

Administrative areas (districts) – kind of mediator between local and regional/national level

The City of Belgrade

Cities and local level

Municipalities.10
Municipalities and cities are gathered into 29 administrative areas (districts)11, which are regional
centres of state authority (covering 3-12 municipalities or cities), but have no assemblies of their
own. They are administrative-territorial units, a type of administrative-political sub-region with few
powers of government, headed by a chief of district who is appointed by the government and
accountable to the minister for regional development and local government, in which the state
authority relocates some of its inspection and supervision services.
Besides the City of Belgrade, as a separate territorial unit established by the Constitution and law,
there are 23 cities, 28 urban municipalities, 150 municipalities, 6,158 villages and 195 urban
settlements (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2011). The municipality is the basic territorial
unit with at least 10,000 inhabitants, in which local self government is realized. The city is the local
self government established by law, which is the economic, administrative, geographic and cultural
7
According to some authors highly-centralized (Pešić, 2007)
It is primarily about the representation of national minorities in the government structure.
9
The political status of Kosovo is the subject of a long-running political and territorial dispute between
the Serbian government and Kosovo's largely ethnic-Albanian population, stemming from the breakup of
Yugoslavia in 1990s, and the ensuing Yugoslav wars. In 1999 the administration of the province was handed on
an interim basis to the United Nations under the terms of UNSCR 1244 which ended the Kosovo conflict of that
year. That resolution reaffirmed the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo but required the UN administration to
promote the establishment of 'substantial autonomy and self-government' for Kosovo pending a 'final
settlement' for negotiation between the parties. The outcome of ongoing talks between Pristina and Belgrade
under the auspices of the EU about this problem is still uncertain.
10
Besides this Serbia has five statistical regions (Belgrade, Vojvodina, Šumadija and Western Serbia, Eastern and
Southern Serbia and Kosovo-Metohija). This division is created for the purpose of statistics gathering in
accordance with the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.
11
Five of them on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija
10
8
centre of the wider area and has more than 100,000 inhabitants.12 A city can have two or more urban
municipalities. The mayor (head of city administration) and head of municipality are elected by
councillors of the Assembly.
Each administrative level has responsibility both for crisis management preparation and response,
within its constitutional/legal mandate and operative capacities.13 The local level has more of an
operational role; the administrative area level is a kind of mediator14 towards provincial/national
level of government. The national level is dealing more with strategic matters and overall designing,
coordinating, monitoring and correcting the system.
According to LES the Republic of Serbia shall ensure the establishment of an integrated civil security
system. The Parliament is responsible for adoption of a National Strategy for Protection and Rescue
in Emergencies (NSPRE) while the government is responsible for all system aspects of civil security
(adopting plans, risk assessments and other documents, ordering general mobilization of the civil
protection units, supervision of crisis preparations etc.).
The SEM, as a specialized organizational unit of MOI, coordinates the activities of all state and civil
society institutions involved in emergency and disaster management at all levels of political territorial
organization. The organization and main functions of SEM are presented below (Figure 1).
12
Law on Territorial Organization and Local Self-Government. Exceptionally, new municipalities can be
established with less than 10000, and towns with less than 100,000 inhabitants due to economic, geographic
and historical reasons.
13
For example, when it comes to organizing and implementing protection against floods and overall water
management, a municipality is responsible for waters of the second order while the responsibility for the
waters of the first order is divided between the Public Water Management Company (PWMC) “SRBIJAVODE,
PWMC “VODE VOJVODINE” for the territory of the province of Vojvodina and PWMC “BEOGRAD VODE” for the
territory of Belgrade. PWMCs are under the Water Management Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Water Management. See more on http://www.srbijavode.rs/eng/index.htm
14
The role of administrative district in crisis management is not clearly defined in LES.
11
Figure 1: Crisis Management in Serbia (Organisation Chart)
Source: http://prezentacije.mup.gov.rs/svs/HTML/organizacija.html
Besides SEM, different ministries, other agencies and special organizations15 within their respective
areas of responsibility have roles in crisis management and can even be key players in some specific
crises (e.g. pandemic or CBRN threats.
Looking top-down, SEM has its organizational units for the territory of the district and
city/municipality with a support (service) role in the district/local EMHQ as main operational and
15
Those ministries, agencies and organizations are shown on the organogram to the right of SEM.
12
expert bodies for coordinating and managing crisis response. They are permanent bodies16
established for the territory of municipality and city by respective assembly, for the territory of
administrative district by NEMHQ, and for the territory of autonomous province and republic by
respective governments. EMHQ is comprised of: commander, deputy commander in the metropolitan
and municipal HQ, head and members. If needed, EMHQ shall establish auxiliary expert and logistic
teams to execute specific tasks related to protection and rescue.
Figure 2: EMHQ structure
NEMHQ
Commander- Minister from Gvnt
Head – SEM Head
Members – ministers, head of
agencies, Red Cross….
Province
EMHQ….
MOI
Minister
SEM
Head
Ministries (Defence, Health, Transport….)
Agency for Ionizing Radiation Protection
Red Cross, Mountain Rescue Service….
Public Companies, Utility Services
district EMHQ
Commander – Chief of
District
Head / distr. SEM chief
Members – distr. chiefs
of health, transport and
other agencies,
companies directors…
local EMHQ
Commander – Mayor
Head / local SEM chief
Members – local chiefs
of administration, local
companies directors,
medical services, water
management…
SEM
District level
SEM
City/municipal
level
District branches of Public administration
(Defence, Health, Transport….)
Local branches of public administration
(hospitals , social care)
Source: MOI
In the “cold phase” of a crisis, EMHQ is coordinating activities of all actors regarding risk assessment,
planning, preparation and preventive measures (risk reduction), while in the “hot” phase, HQ is
responsible for response, i.e. implementation of crisis plans and recovery activities.
Following the principle of gradual deployment of forces and resources (LES, a. 5) in protection and
rescue activities, forces and resources of the municipality/town shall be deployed first. In cases when,
due to the size of a disaster or threat, the forces and resources of local self-governments are not
sufficient, the EMHQ shall request deployment of forces and resources from the higher level of
16
These are the bodies with permanent members – the heads of relevant institutions are automatically
members of the HQs, but in cases of specific crises, besides regular members, the HQs may include other
members, managers, experts and so on. This does not mean that they have employees that come to their
offices each Monday morning. It is more like project organizations. During the cold phase of the crisis HQ is
actually a kind of network with respective organizational unit of SEM as a main pillar.
13
government (regional/provincial/national). The police17 and Serbian Army shall be deployed when
the available forces and resources are not sufficient for protection and rescue activities.
Responsibility is delegated to higher levels of government through EMHQ. Upon the request of a
commander of a lower HQ, a higher HQ is engaged in crisis management. A decision on declaration of
an emergency situation, at the proposal of the relevant EMHQ, shall be passed by the president of
the municipality/mayor/executive body of the autonomous province/Serbian government for the
respective territory. The procedure is the same for declaring the end of an emergency situation.
Exceptionally, it is possible that the NEMHQ, as the highest authority for emergency management,
immediately assumes control of an emergency situation if it deems it necessary based on the
information and its own assessment, without waiting for the up-scaling procedure.
2.1.2 Government/social culture
According to the Geert-Hofstede survey of government/social culture (Hofstede et al. 2010) Serbia is
a society where people accept a hierarchical order without any further justification. Such a society
may be labeled as having a large power distance. Serbia is a collectivist country where people tend to
view themselves as members of an extended family or organization. They place group interests ahead
of individual needs. Also, Serbian society is a society with a high level of uncertainty avoidance. In
general, Serbian society feels a greater need for consensus and written rules, and is intolerant of
deviations from the norm. The value placed on caring for others and quality-of-life are considered to
be highly important. As a result, Serbian society is what is called feminine.18 (Lukashenko, Vlajković,
Stojanović, 2009) Those findings were confirmed also by Serbian research results that point out deep
roots of traditionalism in rural life, value transformation during socialism (collectivism, solidarity,
equality), emerging liberal values associated with introducing a market economy (slowed due to
"political capitalism" during Milosevic`s regime) and a powerful impetus to authoritarianism given by
disintegration of the country, economic collapse, civil war and UN sanctions. (Mojić, 2004).
Complementary results are in the survey on national-level value scores for 2006, where the Serbian
score for traditional/secular-rational values is 0.35 and for survival/self-expression values is 0.62.
(World Value Survey, 2012). However, as a multinational and multiconfessional society, Serbia is not
homogenous in a cultural sense.
17
18
The Serbian police force is a national centralized organization within MOI.
However, there are no data on other values like negotiation, equality, etc.
14
A turbulent transition period of the last decade added a number of uncertainties in public
administration. Today’s bureaucracy was also shaped under external factors.19 The unstable
“constitution” of the state during these transition years and the frequent changes of government are
among the factors that determined the external environment in which today’s bureaucracy is
operating, and thwarted progress of what is called ‘enabling environment for changes’. The fact that
the Serbian general public has been more ‘pro-state’ oriented also resulted in a lack of a high level of
pressure for change inside the public administration (Lukashenko, Vlajković, Stojanović, 2009). In
terms of the political and strategic culture, Serbia is divided between two opposing discourses:
national-liberational and civic-democratic, that construct two different visions of national identity.
While the former proscribes the values of national independence, defiance and civilizational
ambiguity, the latter favours EU integration, compromise and alliance with the West. (Ejdus,
2007/2008).20
The evolving civil security system is the result of these conflicting elements and values that
characterize the search for national cultural identity, after the discontinuity caused by communist rule
and the utopian project of creation of the Yugoslav federation.
2.2. Legal & constitutional aspects
2.2.1 Statutory basis
The general legal framework for the civil security system is shaped by the Constitution of the Republic
of Serbia (2006), Law on State Administration (2010), Law on Ministries (2011), Law on Local
Self‐Government, (2007) Law on Measures in case of State of Emergency (1991), Law on Police
(2006), Law on Serbian Army (2007), Law on Defence (2009) and strategic documents: National
Security Strategy (2009) and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (2009).
The Serbian civil security system is defined in LES adopted on 29 December 2009,21and its
implementation began in July 2010. LES defines how emergency situations are declared and
managed; systems of protection and rescue of citizens; rights and obligations of citizens, state
agencies and other actors; inspection and supervision, international cooperation and other relevant
19
First of all, socialist countries‘ doctrine where state administration was placed within the framework of the
"class essence of state and law" with specific repressive features (tasks of public administration defined as "tax
collection, political repression (banishment and exile, arrest), management and organization of the military,
espionage and counterintelligence, protection of the social order and national security, etc." Denisov, 1949:
165) and the "public service model" of administration prevailing in the developed European countries, derived
from the concept of the social function of the state and public administration and their role in the achievement
of general interest and social welfare (bono publico)( Duguit, 1913/1929).
20
Citizens’ support to Serbian EU integration is declining from more than 70 percent in 2003 to 47 percent in
December 2012.(BCBP, 2012)
15
issues. It is oriented towards emergency response also mentioning some elements of prevention. The
law was slightly amended in 201122 and 2012.23
The LES has generally regulated the area of crisis management at all administrative levels, so the
provincial and municipal regulations only operationalize the provisions of the LES.
Since the LES was adopted as an umbrella law in the field of emergency and disaster management, a
number of bylaw acts, which regulate rights and obligations of all stakeholders, have been adopted,
and others are currently being prepared, commented on and amended. However the legal framework
has not yet been completed because all the bylaws, decisions and directives are not adopted.24
Beside LES there are a number of complementary laws that are also relevant for the civil security
system that regulate different fields like the Law on Fire Protection (2009), Law on Defence (2009),
Law on Environment Protection (2009), Law on Water (2010), the Law on Air Navigation, (2011), Law
on Protection Against Ion Radiation and Nuclear Safety (2012), Law on Safety and Protection at Work
(2005) etc.
25
Very important laws in this area that are still not adopted are the Law on Explosive
Materials, Law on Flammable Liquids and Gases, Law on Hail Protection and Law on Private Security.
Following the adoption of the LES, the strategic documents that have been adopted include the
NSPRE (2011), Fire Protection Strategy 2012-2017 (2012). The drafting of the Action Plan for
Implementation of NPRRS is in progress,26 while the National Risk Assessment and National
Emergency Plan should be adopted by the Serbian Government in 2013.
21
Besides the knowledge and experience of Serbian experts, the LES included the recommendations of the
respective UN offices dealing with disaster risk reduction and disaster management (including UNISDR and
UNDP). A number of laws, regulating the field of disaster and emergency management in the EU countries,
were studied with the aim of implementing the best practices of other EU countries in this field. Comparatively
observed, adopted solutions are most similar to the Czech model
22
These amendments included enlargement of NEMHQ competencies, so it could serve as the National Platform
for disaster risk reduction in accordance with the HFA
23
With these amendments the mandatory payments into the budget fund for emergencies are abolished.
24
So far 29 bylaws are adopted and several are still to be adopted. Despite this, some professionals believe that
there are reasons for the adoption of an entirely new law on emergency situations (Interview with key
respondent in MoI).
25
These laws focus both on prevention and response. They define hierarchy in a functional domain and
interdepartmental relations. They do not overlap with the LES, but they are complementary and compatible
with it.
26
It was planned to be adopted in 2012.
16
2.2.2 Political dimension
A crisis management policy draft has been conceptualised by MOI (SEM) and later on discussed and
harmonized in the NEMHQ, a body comprised of ministers (Defence, Health, Transport etc.), heads of
agencies, Red Cross, Mountain Rescue Service (MRS)etc. (See Figure 2)27 and experts.
EMHQs at each level of government have both political and operational responsibility for crisis
preparedness and response as they are headed by both political representatives/commanders and
professionals/heads.28 SEM is primarily responsible to the minister of interior. Also, public officials of
other ministries/agencies that might be key players in certain types of crisis are primarily responsible
to the minister of specific departments (e.g. in case of pandemic to the minister of health), but also
to EMHQ. Commanders are accountable to respective political bodies (assemblies and governments)
and higher EMHQ. However the NEMHQ commander cannot replace or impose sanctions towards
municipal HQ but only initiate this in front of the competent body that elected him/her. The EMHQ
head is accountable horizontally to the commander and vertically to his/hers superiors within SEM
and to higher EMHQs. However, if the mayor would like to replace the EMHQ head who he holds
responsible for failures in coping with the crisis he could not do it directly, but only initiate the
process in MOI/SEM to determine his/hers responsibility.
Under certain circumstances, there are specific arrangements for crisis management response that
might mean temporary derogation of human rights. The Serbian Constitution and legislation
recognize both state of emergency and emergency situation. An emergency situation refers to natural
disasters, technological accidents and other accidents and threats to people, property and the
environment with no political dimension in which generally crisis form of government that includes
derogation of human rights should not be introduced (Milosavljevic, 2011)29. A state of emergency
can be declared by Parliament and generally refers to human causes with political dimension. As in
the Law on Defence (art. 4.), it is defined as a state of public emergency which is threatening the
viability of the state or its citizens, caused by a military or non-military challenges, as well as security
risks and threats in certain circumstances, without prescribing additional conditions under which it
could be determined. An emergency situation may grow into a state of emergency, in which case
Parliament may prescribe measures to derogate constitutionally guaranteed human and minority
rights. These derogations are permitted only to the necessary extent; derogated rights have to be
27
Members of NEHQ and lower level HQ are pre-defined. On national level they are automatically appointed
and NEHQ is formed after the government is formed.
28
Professionals/heads are responsible to the political representatives on respective level of government.
Besides this, vertically they are responsible to the head of SEM.
29
However, some human rights might be derogated, i.e. temporarily suspended (like in case of evacuation,
quarantine etc.
17
enumerated and cannot relate to the absolutely protected rights enumerated in the Constitution
such as the right to life, etc.30
At the discretion of the competent EMHQ, an emergency situation can be declared for a
municipality/town/city of Belgrade (by president/mayor) and for the territory of Serbia or a part
thereof if the threat occurs in a minimum of two municipalities if their capacities do not suffice as a
response (by the Serbian government at the proposal of NEMHQ).
2.2.3 Operational dimension
Crisis management policy is formulated by SEM on each level of government and adopted and
implemented by EMHQ. The head of SEM and SEM chiefs on lower levels are accountable for
performance of SEM. The same refers to executives in other agencies and special organizations. Each
agency and organization is hierarchically (vertically) accountable along the levels of government and
horizontally to respective political representatives. For example, the head of municipal EMHQ is
accountable to the Head of SEM and, in a certain way, to the local president/mayor as a commander
of EMHQ (See 2.2.2.)
Planning and Risk Assessment
On the national level there are

NSPRE (strategic document dealing with overall development of the civil security system),
and

National Plan of Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations (an operative /annexes
document with sub plans for different kind of crisis).31
MoI/SEM prepares drafts of all plans adopted by the NEMHQ and later on by the government while
ministries, other agencies and special organizations participate in developing national plan
documents and develop and implement the National Plan within their responsibility.
30
Secretary general of the UN and of the Council of Europe should be informed on those derogations.
Besides that, there is an annual work plan and progress report of the National EMHQ.
31
18
The basis for national plans are plans of protection and rescue on lower levels (companies/municipal/
city/administrative areas/province). Lower level plans are integrated in the national plan. However,
besides a bottom-up, a top-down approach is also applied. When national plan documents are
adopted, lower level plans have to be aligned with the national plan.
However, these plans do not currently exist.32 They will be prepared after conducting the
vulnerability/risk assessment in the described bottom-up manner.33 Only in October 2012, guidance
on the methodology for the development of vulnerability assessment and plans of protection and
rescue has been enacted. Vulnerability assessment will be conducted by certified experts for
municipalities and verified by EMHQ. The next phase will be a risk/vulnerability assessment for
administrative areas/provinces and finally for Serbia as a whole. It is projected that in mid 2013 the
Assessment of Vulnerability of Serbia to natural and other disasters will be finished. The planning
process on new grounds will follow after the vulnerability assessment.
Communication:
The Serbian system for emergency communication has two dimensions: crisis communication with
citizens (described in the section 2.3.2.) and strategic and operative communication within crisis
management actors. Different bodies and agencies on the strategic level communicate using ordinary
means of written and electronic communication, and also organize meetings of operative bodies, first
of all EMHQs. When it comes to operative communication in crisis situations traditional phone and
radio systems are used together with the TETRA system, integrated digital radio networks, and to a
certain extent internet-based platforms. The department for telecommunication of MOI is
responsible for managing the network. However due to vulnerability of the tetra system, analogue
systems have not been abandoned.
In Serbia there is no single number that citizens can call in a case of an emergency. Each emergency
service has its own emergency number and a dispatch centre (192 - the police, 193 - fire-fighters, 194
- ambulance), whose coordination is inefficient, the system for callers’ identification/location is not
functional and the database for tracking all risks, events, emergencies and disasters has not been
properly developed. The introduction of a universal system, "number 112 for emergency calls” will
32
Plans that currently exist are outdated, collecting dust on the shelves. (Interviews with key respondents in
MOI)
33
Actual vulnerability assessments are provisional, based mainly on statistic data, and rather outdated.
19
provide a coordinated, rapid and efficient intervention and assistance in emergency events in full
compliance with the EU standards. 34
Logistics:
EMHQs are responsible for coordination and logistics. At each level of government they have an
insight into resources of local communities, MOI, Red Cross, Army, public and private companies and
they distribute them in accordance with priorities. In this perspective, a special unit of civil protection
for logistic is planned. It will have its branches strategically placed around the country, in accordance
with the types of risks and dominant threats.
When it comes to distribution of resources it should be noted that due to the years of decline,
economic crisis and NATO bombing in 1999, the transport network and infrastructure in Serbia are in
poor condition. The transport organization is inadequate (Drobnjak, 2012) so it is impossible to get to
some mountain villages, especially in eastern Serbia during winter storms.
Monitoring: EMHQ are responsible for monitoring of unfolding or ongoing crises in specially equipped
situational/operational centres that are usually situated in municipalities and/or police, fire and
rescue facilities. In the capital, Belgrade, there are two situational centres, one for NEMHQ
(international crises and the main contact point for international disaster help) in the government
building and the one in the building of city government for local EMHQ. Also, the metropolitan police,
the first aid and fire brigade have their own operative centres.
Case study
The most serious challenge for the new Serbian civil security system was the extreme weather
conditions (heavy snowfalls and extreme cold) in February 2012. Following the proposal of the
NEMHQ on 5 February 2012, the government declared an emergency situation on the whole state
territory. All protection and rescue activities, as well as preventive measures were coordinated and
managed by the NEMHQ.
In this crisis 23 people died due to extreme cold, whilst 310 were rescued. Approximately 11,122
households and 34,497 people were affected (deprived of electricity, food, water etc.) while 920
households with 2,400 people were completely cut-off in the distant mountain villages. Rescue and
evacuation operations were conducted and assistance was provided to people in urgent need of
medical assistance, food supplies etc. The most affected population was in the municipalities of
Sjenica, Nova Varos, Kraljevo, Novi Pazar, Valjevo, Osecina, Ivanjica, Prokuplje, Kursumlija, Zagubica.
34
Paper work (projecting etc.) for 112 is finished but there is no money for its implementation. It is planned
that implementation will start in April 2013 and it will last two years.
20
Only local and uncategorized roads in 38 municipalities in distant mountain regions were not passable
(approximately 4,200 km). Rescuers from the emergency services reached all those in need for
medical assistance and supplies, and evacuated the affected populations from remote regions. Local
EMHQs coordinated the delivery of medicines, food supplies, warm clothes, blankets etc, and rescue
activities of the emergency services, Red Cross centres and centres for social care. Heavy
mechanizations from public companies and the Serbian Army were deployed for clearing the roads.
The government has allocated financial assistance from the budget for the affected municipalities, as
well as fuel for machines and specialized vehicles. Serbian private companies also donated fuel for
the affected municipalities, and citizens put themselves and their equipment at the disposal of the
authorities for the rescue operations. At the last session of the NEMHQ on 22 February, the members
discussed the efficiency of the actions taken, as well as the report on the current situation regarding
the risk of floods due to ice cover formation on the rivers and landslides. Following the decision of
the NEMHQ, an operational expert team for flood protection was established. It was proposed to the
government that the emergency situation should be revoked. The emergency situation in 23
municipalities remained for a while. The capacities of the Republic of Serbia have been sufficient to
deal with the situation and there was no need for international assistance (SEM/MOI Report (2012).
This typical, but extreme crisis35 was the first serious test of the new system and the system passed its
first exam.
2.2.4 External cooperation
Serbia has signed bilateral agreements on cooperation and understanding with neighbouring
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina; signing of agreements with Romania, Hungary and Croatia
is in the final phase, while agreements with Macedonia and Bulgaria are at the beginning. Due to
territorial disputes there is no cooperation or even contacts with Kosovo as an entity but only with
the northern part populated by ethnic Serbs.36
Similar agreements (memorandums) are signed with Denmark, Slovakia, the Russian Federation,37
Ukraine and Azerbaijan, while one with Greece is being prepared and with France and Italy there is a
signed letter of intention.
Bilateral agreements are very important as they regulate planning and implementing measures in
protection from floods, earthquakes, fires, environmental pollution, waterway traffic incidents,
35
Such a winter storm has not been recorded in the last 30 years.
Relations of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo with Serbia and the issue of „parallel institutions“ are subject to
ongoing negotiations under the auspices of the EU.
37
Cooperation with Russia attracted special public attention due to some speculations that the Serbian-Russian
centre for emergency situations in Niš could become a logistics base for Russian army operations. See more in
Abusara and Savković, 2009.
21
36
radiological dangers, industrial and other disasters; exchange of information on those disasters and
scientific, technical and other data, mutual help in protection, rescue and recovery and training
(courses, seminars, joint exercises) and priority border crossing procedures arrangements, including
customs and immigration controls, with a view to facilitating intra-regional and international transit
for emergency relief/recovery purposes are regulated (Mladjan, Marić and Baras, 2012). These
agreements are generally standardized, focused on the response phase of the crisis and mutual
assistance, with rather clear procedures, and floods and fires are main reasons for bilateral
cooperation. They have been activated seven times in case of fires. Serbia has up to now granted
assistance to Montenegro (3 cases) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 case) and received assistance from
Russia (4 cases).38
The Serbian MOI with the heads of emergency management services from Albania, Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro adopted the conclusions on establishing a
network of regional specialized centres for reacting in emergencies in SEE in order to use and develop
existing capacities of the states and pooling of resources. To avoid duplications within the region, a
network of different centres of excellence in SEE will be established. The main task of the centers will
be disaster response training and coordination. There should be one center of excellence situated in
each of the states specialized for a certain area of expertise. (floods, forest fire, disaster risk analysis,
wildfire, coordination of response, earthquake, cave rescue, etc.). (Interview Key respondent MOI)
Serbia participates in 10 international multilateral agreements: United Nation's Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction (UNISDR), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), European and Mediterranean Major Hazards
Agreement (EUR-OPA), Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South Eastern Europe
(DPPI), Adriatic Ionian Initiative (AII) Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the International
Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), International Sava River Basin
Commission (ICSRB or Sava Commission) and International Civil Defence ICDO (observer status).
Multilateral agreements were activated only once when UNDP gave assistance after the Kraljevo
earthquake.39
Although Serbia is not an EU member, but only a member candidate from 2012, the country
maintains communication with MIC in Brussels and acts as if it is a member state (Interview key
respondent in MOI). (See chapter 4.)
38
The data refer to period 2007-2012. There are no data for the period 2000-2007 when Serbia was in a federal
state with Montenegro.
39
It is also worth mentioning that Serbia is member of OSCE and NATO Partnership for Peace.
22
2.3 Relations between the state and its citizens
2.3.1 Expectations
According to LES, art. 4., all capable citizens perform physical tasks for the purpose of protection and
rescue, undergo training for personal, mutual and collective protection and implement the measures
and perform tasks related to civil protection. They have the responsibility to accept the deployment
schedule assigned to them upon deployment in the civil protection agencies and units; respond to
the summons of a competent civil protection body; submit data relevant to protection and rescue to
the competent body without delay; and provide data required for keeping registries relevant to
protection and rescue (LES, art. 21). Also, when required for protection and rescue purposes, citizens
shall put real estate, vehicles, machinery, equipment, material and technical and other material
resources (water, food, medical equipment and medications, clothing, footwear, construction and
other materials) at the disposal and use of the competent body for emergency situations (LES, art.
24).
So far there have been no research or opinion polls on citizen perceptions of most probable
incidences and their expectation toward government responsibility for civil security and its crisis
management capacities. In a survey conducted by CeSID, citizens were not asked if they are
concerned with disasters but with other security problems. Results showed that the surveyed citizens
are most concerned about corruption and drug addiction.40
Figure 3: Security problems that Serbian citizens face
Source: CeSID 2011
40
Actually they were not asked about fear of disasters.
23
However, having in mind the still dominant state centric concept of security (Hadžić, 2007), it can be
assumed that citizens hold government most, if not solely, responsible for coping in a crisis. There
are opinion polls on citizens’ attitudes towards MOI, which the SEM is part of. However, those
findings cannot be translated on to SEM, as most citizens identify MOI with the police.41
There are no research data or official estimations of citizens’ willingness to assist in emergencies.
There are around 80,140 volunteers in major relief organizations (Red Cross – 60,000, MRS – 140 and
voluntary fire brigades around 20,000). In certain cases citizens were absolutely not interested in
helping in firefighting,42 while there are also completely different examples.43
2.3.2 Information
According to the principle of transparency in LES, state administration, agencies of autonomous
provinces and local self-governments shall ensure for the populations in the areas potentially
affected by natural or other disasters, to be informed about the threat thereof. The state informs
citizens about impending and unfolding crises using electronic media, first of all the national TV 1
channel and Radio Belgrade 1, as those media reach the whole country, and print media in some
crisis situations. In cases of severe crisis there are legal provisions to interrupt programming and give
an announcement or warning.44
The Internet is used for the purpose of prevention and raising citizens’ awareness, general advice and
periodic informing of citizens and journalists and for SEM public relations. It is not used for operative
crisis communication and warning due to complicated and time consuming administrative
procedures of editing the MOI website45 as well as the fact that less than 50 percent of households
are connected to the net (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2010). On the SEM presentation
on the MOI site there are links to Facebook and YouTube that are used by the SEM in order to inform
41
There are significant differences due to a negative legacy from the period of Milosevic’s rule when the police
were used against the opposition. Besides that the police are authorized to use force and mediate in different
kinds of situations.
42
In the southern town of Pirot citizens were swimming in the pool, while near them firemen were trying to put
the fire under control. (Interview key respondent in MOI)
43
In a forest fire near the town of Uzice 800 volunteers were fighting fire, and refusing help from neighbouring
municipalities (Interv. Red Cross)
44
At the request of the Logistics Centre 112, the radio and television broadcasting companies with national and
local frequencies shall automatically interrupt broadcast of programmes in order to transmit adequate
information of interest to protection and rescue. Mobile telephony operators shall provide free transmission of
information of interest to protection and rescue to the telephone subscribers at the request of the Logistics
Centre 112. (LES, art. 107).
45
SEM does not have its own website but only a link on MOIs website. Besides this, very useful and accurate
information in certain types of crises can be found on the Internet site of the Republic Hydro meteorological
Service of Serbia http://www.hidmet.gov.rs/index_eng.php and Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety of the
Republic of Serbia http://www.srbatom.gov.rs/srbatom/index.htm#
24
citizens. There is a legal and technical possibility for using SMS warnings via mobile networks, but it
has not been used so far. During the NATO campaign in 1999, also sirens, as a part of the national
warning system, were widely used, but nowadays they are not in a functional condition, due to the
lack
of
finance,
and
there
is
no
equipment
for
their
manual
activation
(http://vesti.krstarica.com/drustvo/sirene-u-losem-stanju/).
In case of a national crisis, usually the head of SEM is responsible for crisis communication. However,
sometimes the MOI might take the lead. It is also possible that the head of SEM delegates the
responsibility for crisis communication to his/hers assistant or to a certain expert. However, in case
of pandemic, the minister of health is in charge of crisis communication. On the very scene of the
crisis operation the commander can give the first statement. EMHQ can also give relevant
information. In cases of local crises, heads of local SEM branches or fire brigade commanders are
responsible for crisis communication.
In order to raise awareness, campaigns are conducted periodically in the media (fire risk in the
hot/dry season, the use of fireworks for the Christmas holidays, preparing for a season of floods,
drought, etc.) setting posters in the classroom and so on.
There are no data about information channels citizens prefer and if they feel well informed on crisis
preparedness. Also, government agencies usually do not publish inspections and evaluations and use
them only for their own internal purposes.
2.3.3 Education
The LES presents a starting document for planning and organizing the education of the population. In
article 119 it defines that in order to gain necessary knowledge of personal and mutual protection,
citizens are trained and enabled for preventive protection and rescue.
We can conditionally talk of four levels of training and commitment of the civil subjects on that plane.
(Babić and Babić, 2012). The highest level of training is organized and conducted by the specialist
training department and the civil protection training department of SEM, in charge of basic training
and enabling all members of the protection and rescue system (SEM employees, all level EMHQs,
specialized units of civil protection, apparatus of the companies, other legal entities important for
protection and rescue, citizens) to gain necessary knowledge of personal and collective protection,
and also to foreign citizens in accordance with the regulations and bilateral agreements. In 2011-
25
2012, 309 members of EMHQ were trained (in 2011 - 131 commanders and in 2012 - 178 heads on a
one/two-day training course).
Figure 4: Levels of training for civil security in Serbia
Sourcе:Babić& Babić, 2012
Local self-governments (municipality/town) organize and conduct training and enabling of the
commissioner, the deputy commissioner of civil protection and the units of general purpose for their
territory, and training of organizations and citizens in personal and collective protection. On the other
hand, so far, no measures have been initiated to start training citizens according to the place of their
life and work.46
The third level of training is conducted with companies and other legal entities that plan and provide
the means for organizing, supplying, enabling and training of the units of civil protection (that they
form). The Red Cross of Serbia performs the training of citizens and the units of civil protection in
giving first aid, in accordance with the public authorization and by established curriculum and criteria.
Specialized training is provided by the MRS and voluntary fire associations.
The fourth level of training is conducted in the elementary and secondary schools. Its purpose is
gaining knowledge of the dangers from natural and other disasters and how to protect against them,
in accordance with a special law and appropriate curriculum.47
SEM also produces awareness raising materials like posters placed in schools or on the Internet and
conducts different campaigns.48
46
This is planned for 2013.
On the basis of the law, the minister of education and science was obliged to prescribe a way of training in the
elementary and secondary education, which has not been done yet.
48
Like MOI-SEM/OSCE (2012).Family Guide for Behaviour in Emergencies, Belgrade. This booklet is also available
in print (12,000 copies).
26
47
In general the way the training is handled now is not satisfying (MOI-SEM/OSCE, 2012). The NSPRE
recognized that conducted training sessions are outdated and non-functional and, as such, not in
accordance with the needs of an integrated system of crisis management, so they have to be
enhanced, modernized and improved through creating appropriate curricula.
There is an official recognition that to date there has been an inadequate use of knowledge,
innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience in Serbia (Serbia: National
progress report on the implementation of the HFA, 2009). Also the government does not support
research and technological development (Int. key respondent in MOI).
2.4 Role of the private sector in maintaining civil security
2.4.1 Role of societal/non-profit organizations/ NGOs
Non-profit organizations are important actors in the Serbian civil security system. On a general level
their role is defined in the LES. The position and responsibility of the Serbian Red Cross as the most
important partner is determined in more detail (in even 10 articles of LES), while the role of the MRS
refers to first aid and preparation and execution of tasks related to protection and rescue in
inaccessible terrain. They are also included in crisis management as members of EMHQ, participating
in planning, preparedness, exercises and crisis response. Besides those organisations, additional
associations, alliances and societies and clubs related to cynology, diving, nautical science, alpinism,
speleology, radio-amateur radio, scouts and other participants are mentioned in LES as relevant to
protection and rescue.
So far, the legal status of the Red Cross is rather clear, while the positions of the MRS and voluntary
firefighting associations are not defined by the law, nor are their status and relations with the state
(performing public powers, usage of radiofrequencies, system of licensing, rights and responsibilities
etc.).49 The main reasons for this situation are inertia, slow bureaucratic procedures and a lack of
financial resources.
The partnership between the government and those agents is not formalized in a contract,
memorandum or similar legal act that clearly determines mutual rights and obligations in performing
planned assignments (Red Cross interview). The MRS has a good cooperation with SEM based on
personal contacts and relations, (MRS interview) while among voluntary firefighting associations and
professional firefighters (part of SEM) there is a certain competition, if not even hidden antagonism.
(National voluntary fire fighting association interview; SEM interview)
49
It is planned to regulate the status of volunteer firefighters with a bylaw (Interview key respondent in CPA)
27
Except the Serbian Red Cross, in all non-profit relief organisations tasks are carried out by volunteers
and they need to bear the costs of operations themselves. The Red Cross is partly financed by the
state (when performing public powers), while the MRS is financed through projects (some of them
with SEM), donations, sponsorship and providing certain services (like protection and assistance in
skiing resorts). Voluntary firefighting associations provide funds for their own operation through
maintenance of fire extinguishers and training programs, local government donations etc. They are
also supposed to be financed partly by the state (through the Republic Fund for Emergency
Situations), but, due to the lack of financing it is in practice not functioning.
The Red Cross of Serbia is a humanitarian, independent and voluntary organization that consists of
two Provincial Red Cross branches and 183 branches in towns and municipalities. The mission of the
National Society is to alleviate human suffering with the task of providing help to the vulnerable at
times of armed conflict, natural disasters, ecological disasters and other emergencies, saving
vulnerable lives and health of people, disseminating knowledge of international humanitarian law,
working on prevention and education of citizens in the health and social welfare sector, promoting
the humanitarian values of society and, in the state of need, providing social protection and
assistance. The most important public powers conferred by the Red Cross Law are to participate in
the protection and evacuation of the population, material and other goods; to collect and distribute
humanitarian aid; to participate in the reception and in the provision of accommodation to evacuees,
refugees and displaced persons in the event of armed conflict, natural and other disasters in
peacetime and wartime; to organize solidarity actions; to train citizens to be members of the civil
defence on the territory of the Republic of Serbia to provide first aid, victim registration, family
tracing etc.
The program activities are implemented thanks to 60,000 volunteer and professional engagements
of 800 employees in the network of the Red Cross of Serbia (Red Cross, n.d.).
2.4.2 Role of profit-oriented organisations
Serbia is a transitional country and its economy is still undergoing the process of privatization. Critical
infrastructures are managed by public companies that are not only profit oriented, but have to take
care of the public interest. Companies, other legal persons and entrepreneurs are recognized as
participants in the civil security system (LES, art. 4). Besides this, the general legal provision of LES
defines two categories particularly important for crisis management:

Authorized legal persons - companies and other legal entities entrusted to perform the
activities of special interest for the Republic of Serbia in the field of telecommunications,
energy and mining, railway transport, meteorology, hydrology, seismology, protection from
28
ionizing and nuclear radiation, environmental protection, water management, forestry and
agriculture, health care and accommodation and veterinary medicine

Trained legal persons - companies and other legal entities trained and equipped for
protection and rescue activities such as: public utility companies, construction companies,
water management companies, forest management companies, catering companies, mining
companies, transport companies and other legal entities, private security companies and
commercial aviation.
On the national and district levels there are no contracts between state and private or public
companies. There are only government decisions which explicitly specify authorised and trained
legal persons that have obligations in emergency situations. This includes a total of 108
authorised and trained legal persons on the national and 245 on district level (Official Gazette,
No. 36, May 27, 2011).50On the local level there are formal contracts between private companies
and local governments that regulate their rights and obligations in emergency situations, while
the public enterprises have a legal obligation to participate in crisis management.
Concerning the Seveso directive,51 the LES envisaged special obligations and responsibilities for
informing, planning, environmental protection and crisis response in companies and other legal
persons that use one or more hazardous substances and that manage special high risk facilities
with potential disaster and terrorist risk for human lives and health.
50
On the national level the most important among public companies are the Serbian Postal Service, power and
electricity production/supply companies, Serbian railways, hospitals and a number of faculties, and among
private companies are those engaged in the pharmaceutical industry, transportation, construction, commerce,
etc.
51
Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous
substances (as amended) is a European Union law aimed at improving the safety of sites containing large
quantities of dangerous substances
29
Companies plan and ensure resources for: organizing, equipping, capacity building and training of
civil protection units they establish; organizing and preparation of personal, mutual and collective
protection and implementation of measures and tasks of civil protection of their employees, material
and other goods; while those from the sectors of health, education, social welfare and other sectors
which have protection of a large number of persons within their mandate, shall plan, organize and
implement measures and tasks of civil protection also for the persons who are beneficiaries of their
services. Companies’ plans should be aligned with the plan of protection and rescue in emergency
situations of the local self- government unit on the territory on which they are located. The manager
of a commercial company or manager of other legal persons is responsible for preparation for
protection and rescue from natural and other disasters.
In case of emergency situations, companies and other legal persons,52 owners and users, shall put the
use of the following at the disposal of the SEM: electronic communication networks and information
systems and connections; equipment and material and technical devices together with the necessary
human resources; reserves of water, food, medical equipment and medications, energy sources,
clothing, footwear, construction and other materials required for execution of tasks related to
protection and rescue. Real estate owners and users shall enable performance of works ordered by
the SEM required for protection and rescue from natural and other disasters and threats, whenever
so required on their real estate. On the other hand the state has the obligation to fairly compensate
companies, legal entities and citizens.
The activity of private security companies is in practice not regulated by the law, but some of them
are responsible for protection of critical infrastructures (like waterworks and electric power facilities)
so they might be important also in prevention and reaction in crisis situations (Interview Key
respondent private security company).
Public private partnership in Serbia is just at the beginning53 so there are no significant indications of
possible models of PPP in crisis management activities (Serbian Response to the EU Questionnaire for
the Member States on Experiences,2011). However, there are positive examples of companies’
engagement in emergencies like in floods in Trgoviste and after the earthquake in Kraljevo in 2010
(Radovic & Andrejevic, 2011).
52
This also refers to international/multinational companies, like Naftna Industrija Srbije/ Petroleum Industry of
Serbia, whose majority owner it the Russian company GAZPROMNEFT. There are ongoing debates on the
legality and legitimacy of the purchase provisions.
53
Law on PPP and concessions was adopted in November 2011.
30
Faculties and other organizations engaged in science and research have an obligation to inform the
SEM about scientific findings relevant to protection and rescue. However, cooperation between
scientific-research institutions and direct users of research results such as small and medium
enterprises and industry and other institutions of national importance is insufficient (NSPRE).
3. Quality Measures
3.1 Effectiveness
3.1.1 Assessment through professional and political inquiries
Political inquiries
In the period of 2000-2012 there was only one major political inquiry in the aftermath of the
assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic. Besides the police and court investigation, a special
commission ("Korac`s Commission") was formed with the task of examining the system of protection
of the prime minister. The commission found a number of failures in the work of the judiciary and
serious lapses in personnel, organizational and technical aspects in the system of providing security
to the prime minister and Serbian government building.54Only four lower level professionals in the
police and security agencies were on call of duty. Court process against 44 persons charged with the
assassination lasted for four years and they were sentenced to a total of 378 years. Investigation of
the political background of the assassination is still going on.
Hardly any lessons were learned from this signature crisis. Some improvements have been made in
technical equipment for protection and selection, recruitment and training of the staff responsible
for the security of high state officials. However, the system is not very clear and precise so the
president and/or prime minister are free to choose which civil or military agency will be responsible
for their personal protection, on the basis of subjective assessment and their own trust in certain
institutions or individuals (Interview with a key respondent from the Commission).
Professional inquiries
In the aftermath of a national crisis, professional inquiries and reports are being made and discussed
within MOI/SEM or NEMHQ, and later on submitted to the local/provincial/national government.
Usually they are not followed by public or parliamentary debate. Analyses are partial, from a
viewpoint of a particular agency, and with no comprehensive synthetic reports. They are usually not
54
The political background of the assassination was not within the mandate of the commission. The commission
for examining of the system of protection of the prime minister of the Serbian government dr Zoran Djidjic
(2003).
31
publically available, remaining within particular ministries or narrow circles of the professional public.
Lessons learned are not easily transferred into rules, procedures and practice. (Interview key
respondent from MOI). In general, crisis actors are in a certain way protected from responsibility in
the Serbian political context with fragile coalition governments (See 3.3.1.).
If a crisis situation occurs in military facilities, the investigation is conducted by the Army and usually
results are not available for non-military actors. They sometimes might be long-lasting and
inefficient. (Blic, 2012).
In some crisis situations on the local level there have been professional debates and judiciary
processes. The case of fire in the Contrast disco club in Novi Sad, in April of 2012 that killed six young
people is illustrative. This event triggered a series of public controversies since the facility was
inadequate for the purpose and overcrowded. After eight months of prosecutorial investigation, the
responsibility of authorities was not addressed, there were no tangible results and it was not
determined who was to blame. At the same time bars that have been closed in a campaign manner
are working again, the clubs are still burning torches, to make "fire" cocktails and everything is more
or less the same as before that tragic event. Additional exits have not been made, the clubs are still
overcrowded and it is questionable whether they have got fire equipment. Reporters got no answers
on these questions from the SEM. The father of one of the dead girls launched an initiative to amend
the three laws concerning the registration of nightclubs and restaurants, as well as the adoption of
the rules of fire protection for this kind of facility ("Tamara`s Act") to put an end to the bad practice
of registering the night clubs before they meet fire protection measures. He said that nothing
concrete has been done and that he will continue to struggle because they do not want any more
afflicted families. The public prosecutor has launched an investigation against the owner, two
tenants and an electrician, and at the request of defence counsel, the trial was postponed before it
started. Parents of the victims believe that the responsibility should be looked for also in the relevant
inspections - construction and tourism, and the SEM for inadequate inspection and intervention.
(Stepanov, 2012).
3.1.2 Limits to national capacities
Serbia formally requested assistance from the Russian Federation in 2007 in the case of a forest fire.
Ever since, each summer Russian special airplanes and crews arrive at the centre for emergency
situations in Niš as a preventive system back-up support in accordance with the bilateral agreement.
This assistance is humanitarian in nature and free of charge. The main reason for such assistance is
insufficient capacities, as Serbia does not have this kind of equipment. (Interview key respondent
form MOI)
32
A state of emergency was declared one time in the period of 2000-2012, in 2003 after the
assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic that destabilized the government. As Serbian
legislation was too liberal (in terms of police powers, duration of detention etc), the state of
emergency was introduced in order to make necessary constitutional changes and amendments to
the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Prosecutions that would enable the police to effectively
prosecute the offenders. The government mounted Operation Saber (“Sablja”), the police action
aimed at finding the assassins and striking a serious blow to organized crime. However, a number of
political opponents to the Democratic Party and its government were arrested during this action in
connection with organized criminal groups. Most were later freed. At the end of the operation, most
of the suspects for the assassination were arrested (Vasić, 2005). The state of emergency lasted for
40 days (12.3. – 22.4. 2003) and was revoked by the government after the adoption of necessary
legal changes.
Introducing the state of emergency was a signal that the whole criminal justice system was not able
to combat organized crime and it significantly contributed to improving the legislation and reform of
the security sector.
An emergency situation (described in 2.2.3.) was declared only once in February 2012 due to extreme
weather conditions. No significant improvements in coping with extreme weather conditions have
been made so far. In a similar situation in December 2012 the actions undertaken by responsible
actors were not adequate and in a timely manner.55 Due to the collapse in the road transport network
that was created in December 2012 by heavy snowfall, the prime minister criticized the minister in
charge, while the representatives of the public enterprise "Roads of Serbia" claimed they did their job
responsibly and that the blame for the current situation is on unscrupulous drivers of heavy vehicles
that are speeding and driving without adequate winter equipment and creating traffic jams. They also
criticized the "competent authorities" (not explicitly mentioning Ministry of Transport) for not having
prohibited cargo traffic on the most critical sections until crews could clear them up and the weather
would allow for cargo traffic to proceed. It was not specified who the "competent authorities “were,
nor explained how the cooperation between the Republic Hydro meteorological Service, the
enterprise "Roads of Serbia", traffic police and MOI were functioning in practice (Galovic, 2012).
55
One of the reasons is that the Republic transferred road maintenance responsibility to the municipalities, but
failed to carry out the transfer of funds for this purpose. In addition, some municipalities have signed contracts
for road maintenance with companies that have gone bankrupt.
33
3.2 Efficiency
It is very hard to apply the concept of efficiency to the Serbian civil security system. Before the
adoption of LES there was no particular budget for crisis management, and annual expenditures for
this purpose, from the budget of MOI, were only around 50,000 euro, while costs of crisis situations
were covered from budget reserves on an ad hoc basis. When the national budget is tight and there is
extreme pressure for critical resources, expending funds or distribution of funds for contingency
requirements is a difficult choice, so providing the funding to respond to a disaster was for decades
considered an ad-hoc requirement to be dealt with at the time of the emergency. Actually, the only
major investment in crisis management before adoption of the e LES was in 2007 when € 12.8 million
from the National Investment Plan was spent on purchase of vehicles for firefighters (Interview key
respondent in MOI).
LES designated the following funding sources for crisis management:

Budget (national/provincial/local)

Fund for emergency situations, and

Other sources specified in LES and other laws
It is not possible to present total expenditures for crisis management.
The budget of the Republic of Serbia shall provide funds for the permanent budget reserve, which is
used to finance expenditures for participation in eliminating the consequences of emergencies.56The
permanent reserve is up to 0.5 percent of total revenues and income from the sale of non-financial
assets for the fiscal year. The government decides on use of the permanent budget reserve, at the
proposal of the minister of finance. Besides this, the municipality/province is required to determine its
budget funds for maintenance of the system as well as provisions for elimination of consequences of
emergencies.57When the municipal/provincial fund is not sufficient for elimination of consequences of
emergencies, then, in accordance with the criteria established by a government decree, funds from
Republican budget reserves are transferred.
The newly established fund for emergency situations is aimed at the construction and maintenance of
the civil security system. In the beginning, the fund will be used for necessary building and equipping
of the system in accordance with the planned priorities, while later on all the crisis management
56
For this purpose in 2013 around €14 million is planned.
In SEM there are no centralized data of the total amount of these funds.
57
34
actors will apply with their projects for these funds. (Interview key respondent MOI). In 2011, the fund
disposed of €5 million, in 2012 -€10 million58, and €15 million are planned for 2013.
Serbia is still considered a country of “nonconsolidated democracy” with a number of political and
social tensions (Vujaćič, 2009), so the question of efficiency in disasters is more complicated.
Questions of budget on each level of governance are very important. Resources set aside for this
purpose were utterly insufficient, so that the Serbian president after the flood in Trgoviste in 2010
said that “funding for emergencies must be provided in the budget.” Regardless of official statements,
there is no money for this purpose and financing is purely reactive, without investments in
prevention and mitigation. (Radovic & Jovanovic, 2011). The efficacy of the Serbian crisis
management system will be possible to question only once its funding is stabilized and its most basic
needs satisfied, having in mind that for a number of years not even minimum funds were invested in
it.
3.3 Legitimacy
3.3.1 Political support
The legacy of the authoritarian rule, sanctions and political crisis in the 1990's, as well as the lack of
democratic and parliamentary traditions and the basic consensus among the parliamentary parties
on key social goals and values and how to solve the major problems of society have resulted in slow
progress in building democratic and stable social institutions. Due to the huge program differences
among members of the ruling coalitions, there was no stable parliamentary majority and only one
government since 2000 that lasted a full mandate which made it difficult to implement social
reforms. The greatest responsibility lies on the leadership of political parties whose narrow party,
group and personal interests and the struggle for political power and money, are "mirrored" in the
lives of all social institutions. So instead of democracy, Serbia has a partocracy, a de facto
unconstitutional dominance of political parties over constitutional and governmental agencies and
institutions (Vućetić, 2008).
In such a political context it took almost two decades for political actors to understand the
importance of crisis management and to reach a basic consensus on the foundation of the current
civil security system. The adoption of LES was preceded by several expert discussions, while the
enactment in Parliament passed without major controversies. Nowadays there is a general political
support of key players for building a new system (Interview key respondent MOI). However, political
58
Serbian budget for 2012 was around €8.5 billion.
35
actors sometimes see crisis as an opportunity for self-promotion and scoring political points,59 or
denouncing political opponents60. Political interests and assessments sometimes have a greater
impact on the functioning of local EMHQs than professional considerations. (Interview City of
Belgrade EMHQ) 61
Since the establishment of the new system of civil security there have been no major
criticisms and no political consequences for political representatives that relate to crisis
management. Just in one case, due to the inadequate reaction of the local government in
the town of Trgoviste during the floods in May 2010, the entire municipal leadership was
forced to resign three months later (Veljković, 2010).62 However, the problem related to the
decades of neglecting of systematic measures for flood prevention.
In the period of 2010-2012 there were only eight parliamentarian questions related to emergency
management. Most of them were about the compensation of damages from natural disasters and
none of them was answered by the minister of interior, but by the prime minister or other ministers)
or the answer was postponed. (Parliament, 2011) Only one question was about addressing the
responsibility for the damage caused by storm and hail and reorganization of hail protection service.
3.3.2 Legal support
There have been several complaints to the Serbian ombudsman related to natural disasters. Despite
the fact that the Law on Using Funds for Restoration and Protection from Natural Disasters is in force,
people who are affected by natural disasters face many problems. As regards large-scale damages, for
which the state and/or local self-government have allocated a certain amount of funds to help the
affected citizens, the following problems occur: a lack of regulations setting the terms, procedures
and criteria for determining the order for awarding the funds for restoration of damage (ranking); the
59
In bitter comments, citizens of mountain villages blocked in a storm in February 2012 accused the minister of
interior who visited EMHQ by helicopter that he used the trouble of people in order to gain voters. See
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/305591/Dacic-danas-u-Sjenici-i-Ivanjici/komentari
60
After the earthquake in Kraljevo representatives of the city opposition accused the government of
irregularities in the allocation of funds for the (re)construction and asked for a detailed report. The mayor said
that, "since the special account was opened, daily reports on inflow and expenditure of funds are published on
the city`s website and urged police and prosecutors to check all the charges, saying that those are irresponsible
and baseless accusations in order to collect political points See:
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/240950/Ukinuta-vanredna-situacija-posle-zemljotresa-u-Kraljevu
61
Sometimes, a commander of EMHQ on the local level can be a member of one party, and the minister of
interior, to whom the head of SEM is responsible, can be a member of another party. Those political parties can
have different interests and perceptions when it comes to the managing of a particular crisis. In this kind of
conflict, usually the more powerful political party will determine the course of action.
62
The question of accountability for a crisis in the Serbian context is slightly peculiar, taking into account that
after the disintegration of SFRY, followed by three wars and 500,000 refugees and IDPs, economic sanctions and
isolation, the highest inflation in the history of mankind, the armed uprising on Kosovo and the NATO bombing,
citizens of Serbia have somewhat grown accustomed to crises.
36
absence of a body authorised to decide on objections/appeals filed against the decisions of
competent authorities; the absence of a body authorised to control the use of funds allocated for the
elimination of consequences of natural disasters.
The citizens who have suffered smaller scale damages face different problems. According to the views
of the competent judicial and administrative authorities, they usually cannot expect the state to
participate in restoring the damage caused by natural disasters.63When they receive a decision from
the relevant city or municipal inspection on the prohibition of using a damaged residential building,
in practice they are often provided with temporary accommodation for a short period, and then the
local self-government informs them that there are no funds in its budget earmarked for repairing the
damage or constructing a new residential building, after which they are left on their own.
The situation in this field is additionally complicated by the fact that the government and the
competent minister (MOI) were obliged to adopt more detailed regulations for the implementation of
the said law within six months of its entry into force, which, according to the available information,
has not been done (Protector of Citizens, 2011: 131-135).
LES provides equal protection for all citizens in crisis situations. In addition, NSPRE insists on paying
special attention to the training of all agents of crisis management in order to provide appropriate
assistance and protection of vulnerable social groups / children, elderly and persons with disabilities
in natural and other disasters.
3.3.3 Popular trust and support
In general, the level of trust in institutions in Serbia is low, as presented in the following table
63
In the procedure of citizen complaints, the Ministry of Environment, Mining and Spatial Planning expressed its
view that the mere fact of the damage caused by natural disasters and its assessment by the authorised
commission did not produce an obligation of a public authority to compensate for and restore the damage,
bearing in mind that the damage had been the result of circumstances that could not be predicted. This
attitude was also articulated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia Rev. No.2241/2007 of 11
September 2008, stating that when the damage was caused by the so-called force majeure, the effects of which
could not be predicted, the rule on exemption from liability was generally applicable. However, when the force
majeure causes large scale damage affecting more people, then the state intervenes and commits itself and its
institutions to secure all or part of the funds for eliminating the harmful consequences according to the
principle of solidarity.
37
Table 2: Trust in institutions (%)
Church
Police/Police officers
Army/Soldiers
MOI
Educational system
Health system
MOD
Local government
Serbian Government
Judiciary
Citizens associations
Parliament
Political Parties
Source CeSID, 2011
Don’t know
No trust
4
2
7
2
4
1
7
4
3
4
10
3
4
19
25
21
26
28
36
28
42
47
52
43
53
66
Neither
have nor
haven’t
18
28
28
30
28
26
32
29
30
26
29
28
21
Have trust
Total.
59
45
44
42
40
37
33
25
20
18
18
16
9
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
There are no particular surveys on trust in institutions of civil security systems, but the presented
data show that trust in the police, MOI and MOD, as important actors of crisis management, is higher
than for all other institutions except the Church.
There are no particular data on trust in SEM, and, as said before, data for the MOI cannot be
mechanically transferred to SEM. However, some conclusions can be drawn indirectly. People in
Serbia usually perceive institutions through their leaders. So the SEM is perceived through its head,
Mr. Predrag Maric who is often in the media, trying to raise awareness, explain problems and
emphasize the importance of crisis preparedness and sharing responsibility in this area. For his work
he got several local (person of the year in capital Belgrade) and international (French medal of knight)
awards, so SEM efforts are recognized and appreciated by the community (Interview key respondent
MOI).
4. Serbian Civil Security in the EU Context
Serbia is not an EU member but only a member candidate from 2012, hence, it only has a focal point
for the exchange of information with the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Currently, after
receiving candidate status, Serbia is to enter negotiations with the European Commission by signing a
memorandum of understanding which will enable Serbian membership in the Community Civil
Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument.64
64
In the negotiations with the EU, Chapter (Group) 27 is particularly relevant -. Environment that refers to civil security
obligations (Council Directive 88/610/EEC of 24 November 1988 amending Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident
hazards of certain industrial activities incorporated by 21994A0103(70); Council Resolution of 16 October 1989 on
guidelines to reduce technological and natural hazards; Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of
38
The candidate countries and potential candidates for EU membership can co-operate with the EU in
specific fields before their full membership. This also includes civil protection with its humanitarian
mission, making both regional cooperation and the EU perspective more tangible for the citizens.
Significant progress in this cooperation was made in 2008 during the Slovenian presidency of the EU
Council. The EU Council conclusions on cooperation with the candidate countries and potential
candidates of the Western Balkans in the field of Civil Protection were adopted, serving as a basis for
the development of a comprehensive programme by the European Commission in this field (MOD of
the Republic of Slovenia- Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, 2011).
A comprehensive programme on Strengthening Cooperation in the Field of Civil Protection with the
Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates of the Western Balkans and Turkey was developed in
2010 by the European Commission program for civil protection cooperation with the candidate
countries and potential countries. The program is financed through the EU Instrument for PreAccession Assistance (IPA) and the beneficiary countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo under UNSCR
1244/99, and Turkey. The program has a budget of €4m and a two-year implementation period
(ending in May 2013) for financing events on operational and strategic level within the EU
Programme on Civil Protection Cooperation. These events are organized in three LOTs with the
emphasis on exchange of experts, training programs, exercises (field and table-top), workshops to
share experiences, lessons learned and best practices. Training courses have ended (basic training
course, operational management course, advanced training course) with 44 people participating in
them. There were organized exchanges of experts in different areas (EU Civil Protection Mechanism,
CBRN, Host Nation Support, Forest fires, IPA, Early Warning System, 112 System, National training
Centre). There were also workshops about the exchange of experiences and best practices organized
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances; 98/22/EC: Council Decision of 19 December 1997 establishing a
Community action programme in the field of civil protection; 98/433/EC: Commission Decision of 26 June 1998 on
harmonized criteria for dispensations according to Article 9 of Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances (notified under document number C(1998) 1758) (Text with EEA relevance);
98/685/EC: Council Decision of 23 March 1998 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents; 98/685/EC: Council Decision of 23 March 1998 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents; 1999/314/EC: Commission Decision of 9 April 1999 concerning the
questionnaire relating to Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous
substances [notified under document number C(1999) 856] (Text with EEA relevance); 1999/847/EC: Council Decision of 9
December 1999 establishing a Community action programme in the field of civil protection Validity extended by
32005D0012 till 31/12/2006; 2002/605/EC: Commission Decision of 17 July 2002 concerning the questionnaire relating to
Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (notified under
document number C(2002) 2656); 2005/12/EC: Council Decision of 20 December 2004 amending Decision 1999/847/EC as
regards the extension of the Community action programme in the field of civil protection; Text with EEA relevance and
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1014/2010 of 10 November 2010 on monitoring and reporting of data on the registration of
new passenger cars pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA
relevance Corrected by 32010R1014R(01) and several proposals of Council decisions
39
in different areas (EU Civil Protection Mechanism, CBRN, Host Nation Support, Lessons learned,
Forest fires, IPA, Early Warning System, 112 System). The program is one of the steps to pave the way
of the beneficiary countries towards the EU in the field of civil protection, with the overall objective
to reduce the vulnerability of those countries to natural and man-made disasters at local, national
and regional levels. It encompasses activities aiming at increasing synergies and complementarities
among EU instruments, and regional and national efforts that can be mobilized to deal with a variety
of disasters in the Western Balkans and Turkey. The program includes courses on procedures for
sending and receiving international assistance under the Mechanism, regional field exercises aimed
at practicing procedures for sending and receiving international assistance, in accordance with
existing procedures within the framework of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and exchange of
experts. 65
5. Conclusion
After two decades of legal vacuum, organizational and institutional confusion resulting from the
collapse of the civil security system adapted to the socialist society and the lack of elementary
responsibility and vision of political leadership, Serbia in 2010 set up a normative/legal basis for the
construction of a new civil security system.
When designing the new system and making the law, comparative experiences, historical background,
capabilities and capacities of the country and its prospects of EU integration, as well as the current
political constellation were taken into account. The professional community has positively assessed
the legal text. Normative regulation of the system is almost completed, but the passage of national
laws is not a sufficient response. However it puts the government in a better position in having
addressed the problem and laid the foundation for a national response capability. The
implementation or enforcement phase is facing a number of problems such as insufficient resources
available and problems related to creation of other organizational, personnel and material and
technical conditions for its successful implementation.
65
During major disasters the neighbouring countries have been the ones who most often offer assistance. The international
assistance provided to the affected state can easily turn into additional problems if the assisted country is not prepared to
receive the assistance and does not know how to deal with the incoming international teams/EU civil protection team. Most
of the neighbouring countries are parts of the EU Mechanism, and the aspiration of Serbia is to become its part as well.
Therefore, it is essential that the target region/neighbour countries are well prepared to cooperate and coordinate during
emergency response. The timely and adequate request for international assistance through the EU Civil Protection
Mechanism is essential for the efficiency and effectiveness of the provided assistance. Also, coordination and host nation
support are among the key issues for a timely response, as well as, the acceptance and deployment of international disaster
relief efforts and the provided resources.
40
There is a growing recognition that disaster prevention and emergency response must be one of the
government’s priorities. Although general political consensus on the importance of the civil security
system has been achieved, there remains a reflection of existing political divisions and interests on
professional performance, as well as an underlying political calculus in all phases of crisis
management, when political actors are more preoccupied with their ratings, than with the wellbeing
of the citizens. Relations between the state and civil society actors are not precisely defined, and
they are dependant on personal relations among people in institutions. Like in most of the SEE
countries there is significant room for national and multilateral initiatives to improve public
awareness and involvement in disaster preparedness efforts (DPPI, 2001).
The fact that the system has been in existence for only two and a half years and it is still not working
at full capacity, since it is not completed in a normative and institutional sense, makes any attempt of
serious analysis and its evaluation difficult and problematic. Nevertheless, some general remarks can
be made. In NSPRE it is stated that the current level of organization and capability of the system of
civil security in Serbia is significantly behind the assessed needs and objective possibilities of the
state. There is a need for technical innovation and equipping, as well as for improving and
modernisation of infrastructure, of informational-communication systems in accordance with EU
standards. The statistical data in Serbia show insufficient capacity of the society to respond to the
present challenges, risks and threats in an adequate way, which results in material and non-material
damage, both at the level of commercial entities and at the state level (Keković, Marić, and Komazec,
2011). Prevention seems to be the weakest point, together with the fact that in some parts of the
Serbian population there are no traces of awareness and responsibility for safety. There are also
problems related to the harmonization of different organizational cultures of staff co-opted in SEM
and overcoming the divisions between "us “and "them”.66 (Interview key respondent MOI)
The most important gaps outlined in NSPRE relate to institutional organization (lack of conditions for
the consistent application of regulations, inadequate organization and implementation of preventive
measures, lack of specialized cadastres, comprehensive risk maps, methodology for hazardous waste
management, 112 system, uneven distribution of capacities of the emergency response services in
the RS), material – technical (unsatisfactory level of road and other infrastructure, outdated,
unreliable equipment, facilities and vehicles of the emergency response services, lack of specialized
vehicles and equipment for responding to chemical accidents in road, rail and river transport etc.),
cooperation, coordination and availability of information (insufficient coordination between
protection and rescue system entities in emergency situations, between scientific and research
66
This refers to the employees of the MOD (an institution with military organizational culture) who were
incorporated into the MOI.
41
institutions and direct beneficiaries of researches, with NGOs and the private sector and international
cooperation), human resources and capacity building (inadequate professional qualification and
technological discipline of the available human resources, lack of specialized personnel, insufficient
training, unpreparedness and a low level of the local self-government capacity and underdeveloped
culture of prevention).
The system has been tested in practice in several natural disasters (floods, extreme temperatures
and an earthquake) and in one technological disaster. The general assessment is that, given the fact
that it is not fully completed, it functioned relatively well.67 The system proved relatively successful in
a crisis situation caused by a snowstorm in February 2012, but in a similar situation in December
2012, reacted poorly. Recurrence of similar technological accidents (fires in night clubs) indicates the
inability of the system to properly determine liability, draw lessons and translate them into standard
operating policies and procedures. Procedures for determining the professional and legal
accountability are complicated and take a long time so that sanctions are not effective, while due to
the overall constellation of political relations political accountability is minor.
Development and completion of the system will depend on material and technical requirements,
support of political actors and enthusiasm of the professionals in SEM and in other institutions
responsible for crisis management.
67
It can be stated that it functioned significantly better than in a similar situation before the introduction of the
new system
42
Annex I: Coded Data
ANVIL PROJECT
MAPPING PRTOCOL - WP2
SERBIA
1
Introduction
Scoring instruction
1. a
Is there an official/formal definition of crisis?
No = 0
Yes = 1
1. b
Is the crisis management approach primarily based on Military = 1
military or civilian operations?
Civilian = 2
2
1.c.
If civilian operations dominate, is the military used for No = 0
support for crisis management operations?
In exceptional situations = 1
Regularly = 2
1
Does the country take MAINLY an all hazards/generic
or MAINLY a specific/functional threats approach to
crises and disasters?
Mainly all hazard = 1
Mainly specific threats = 2
1
2
Analytical dimensions
Scoring instruction
2.1
Cultural and historical aspects
2.1.1
Administrative tradition
2.1.1.a
Is the state unitary or federal?
1.d
Unitary = 1
Federal = 2
Score
Source
Comments (in case of
specific problems with
data)
1
Score
1
Source
data)
Serbian costitution
43
2.1.1.b
Is the political system parliamentary or presidential?
Parliamentary system = 1
Presidential system = 2
1
Serbian costitution
2.1.1.c
Is the country a monarchy or a republic?
Monarchy = 1
Republic = 2
2
Serbian costitution
2.1.1.d
Is the political system a consociational or a
majoritarian democracy?
Consociational democracy = 1
Majoritarian democracy = 2
2
see section 2.1.1
2.1.1.e
Is delegation constructed in a top-down or bottom-up Top-down = 1
fashion?
Bottom-up = 2
Both = 3
2
see section 2.1.1
2.1.2
Culture
2.1.2.a.i
Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - DPI
86
http://geerthofstede.com/countries.html
2.1.2.a.ii
Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - IDV
25
2.1.2.a.iii
Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - MAS
43
2.1.2.a.iv
Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - UAI
92
2.1.2.a.v
Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - LTO
NA
2.1.2.b
World Value Survey’s national score on dimension 1 traditional vs. secular
0.35
World Value Survey’s website on
national level value scores by
country
Year 2006
2.1.2.c
World Value Survey’s national score on dimension 2 survival vs. self-expression
-0.62
World Value Survey’s website on
national level value scores by
country
Year 2006
2.2
Legal & constitutional aspects
2.2.1
Statutory basis
44
2.2.1.a
To what extent is the legal framework that regulates
civil security centralized versus fragmented?
2.2.1.b
When was the last major reform in the civil security
field undertaken?
2.2.1.c
Does the statutory basis of the civil security system
rely on formal legislation or executive order?
2.2.1.c
Are formal legal provisions in place allowing the state
to call for a state of emergency (including derogations
from political order)?
Are formal legal provisions in place allowing the state
to call for a state of disaster (facilitated operational
coordination mechanism)?
2.2.1.d
Highly centralized (1-2 key laws
regulates civil security) = 1
Neither centralized nor
fragmented (3-5 key laws
regulates civil security) = 2
Highly fragmented (6 or more
key laws regulates civil security)
=3
Provide the year of the reform
1
see section 2.2.1
2009/2010
see section 2.2.1
Formal legislation = 1
Executive order = 2
1
see section 2.2.1
No = 0
Yes = 1
1
see section 2.2.2
No = 0
Yes = 1
1
see section 2.2.1
2.2.2
Political dimension
2.2.2.a
On what level of government does executive
responsibility for civil security FIRST AND FOREMOST
rest?
At the national level = 1
At the regional level = 2
At the local level = 3
3
see section 2.2.2
2.2.2.b
On what level of government does policy formulation
for civil security FIRST AND FOREMOST rest?
At the national level = 1
At the regional level = 2
At the local level = 3
1
see section 2.2.2
2.2.3
Operational dimension
2.2.3.a
Is there a specialised agency for crisis response at the
national level?
No = 0
Yes = 1
1
see section 2.2.3
2.2.3.b
Are there specialised agencies for crisis response at
the regional level?
No = 0
Yes = 1
0
see section 2.2.3
BBK
45
2.2.3.c
Is the exercise system formalised by law or executive
mandate?
No = 0
By law = 1
By executive mandate = 2
0
see section 2.2.3
2.2.3.d
How many major exercises with a national dimension
have been organised in the period 2008-2012?
Register the number
56
Interview key informant in SEM
2.2.3.e
How many major exercises with an international
dimension have been organised in the period 20082012
Register the number
3
2.2.4
External dimension
2.2.4.a
Has the country signed bilateral agreements with all
neighbouring countries?
No = 0
Yes = 1
0
2.2.4.b
How many countries has the country signed bilateral
agreements with OTHER THAN the neighbouring
countries?
How many regional/multilateral agreements on
RESPONSE oriented disaster management (i.e. not
general conventions on environmental protection) is
the country part of?
Register the number.
5
Register the number.
10
2.2.4.d
Has the country received assistance from
partner/neighbouring country/ies in response to
MAJOR DISASTERS (not day to day cross-border help)
during the period 2000-2012?"
No = 0
One or two times = 1
More than two times = 3
0
2.3
State-citizens relations
2.3.1
Expectations
2.3.1.a
Do citizens have a formal/legal obligation or
responsibility in civil security? Please choose the
maximal score on a scale (i.e. option 2 includes yes
option 1 as well).
Not formally specified = 0
Temporary support upon
request by public authorities = 1
Regular private responsibilities
for disaster management (e.g.
mandatory civil service and/or
insurance) = 2
1
see section 2.3.1
2.2.4.c
46
2.3.2
Information
2.3.2.a
Does the country maintain a siren system?
No = 0
Yes = 1
0
see section 2.3.2
2.3.2.b
Does the government have a system for radio/TV
warnings
No = 0
Yes, at the local/regional level =
1
Yes, at the national level = 2
Yes, at both local/regional and
national levels = 3
3
2.3.2.c
Does the government have a central website with
updated information on crisis events?
No = 0
Yes, at the local/regional level =
1
national levels = 3
0
2.3.2.d
Does the government make use of social media
No = 0
(Facebook, Twitter etc.) to update citizens on relevant Yes, at the local/regional level =
crisis issues?
1
national levels = 3
Does the government have a mobile application for
No = 0
reaching citizens with vital crisis/security information? Yes, at the local/regional level =
1
national levels = 3
2
0
0
2.3.2.e
2.3.3
Education
2.3.3.a
Is civil emergency training (not/except basic FIRST
AID) part of the school curriculum?
No = 0
Yes = 1
due to lack of finance
47
2.3.3.b.
Do societal/voluntary actors offer civil emergency
training?
No = 0
To members/professional = 1
To members and limited public
outreach = 2
To member ands wide-spread
training programmes for general
population = 3
2
see section 2.3.3
2.3.3.c
Does the government run TV campaigns to raise
awareness of crisis issues among the public?
No = 0
Yes, moderately (once per year)
=1
Yes, extensively (more than once
per year) = 2
2
2.3.3.d
Does the government provide for a budget for
sponsoring research/technological developments on
civil security/crisis management?
No = 0
Yes = 1
0
2.3.3.e
If yes, please provide the overall volume of research
funding for civil security
Register the number
2.4
Role of private sector
2.4.1
Role of societal/ non-profit organisations
2.4.1.a
Do societal/non-profit actors play an official/legally
mandated role in EXCEPTIONAL crises?
No = 0
Yes = 1
1
see section 2.4.1
2.4.1.b
Do societal/non-profit actors play an official/legally
mandated role in the REGULAR provision of civil
security?
No = 0, In parts of civil security
(e.g. emergency medicine) =1
In (almost) all aspects of civil
security = 2
2
see section 2.4.1
2.4.2
Role of profit-oriented organisations
2.4.2.a
Do for-profit/private actors play an official/legally
mandated role in EXCEPTIONAL crises?
No = 0
Yes = 1
1
48
2.4.2.b
Do for-profit/private actors play an official/legally
mandated role in the REGULAR provision of civil
security?
No = 0
In parts of civil security (e.g.
emergency medicine) = 1
In (almost) all aspects of civil
security = 2
3
Quality measures
Scoring instruction
3.1
Effectiveness
3.1.2
Limits to national capacities
3.1.2.a
How many times has external assistance been
received during a crisis?
Register the number for 20002012.
4
3.1.2.b
How many times have a state of emergency or
disaster been declared AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL as a
consequence of a crisis?
Register the number for 20002012. If there are no legal
provisions for state of
emergency/disaster, note NA
Register the number for 20002012. If there are no legal
provisions for state of
emergency/disaster or data is
not accessible at this level, note
NA
2
How many times have a state of emergency or
disaster been declared AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL as a
consequence of a crisis?
3.3
Legitimacy
3.3.1
Political support
3.3.1.a
How many major reforms have been undertaken?
3.3.1.b
How many major national political debates on crisis
management structures or performance have taken
place (2000-12)?
How many formal and politically instituted
inquiries/committees on civil security have been
undertaken at the national level?
3.3.1.c
1
Score
Source
data)
N/A
1
1
1
49
3.3.1.d
Has there been a premature change in the
government (replacement of individual ministers up
to full resignation of government) due to civil security
issues?
Legal support
No = 0
1-2 instances = 1
3 or more instances = 3
How many NATIONALLY NOTED judicial challenges or
ombudsman petitions concerning the civil security
system have been filed?
How many landmark judicial or ombudsman rulings
have affected the civil security legal and/or
institutional framework?
N/A
0
see section 3.3.2
3.3.2.c.
Are there restrictions on judicial oversight powers
over the REGULAR civil security system (i.e. except in
cases of exceptional states of emergency)?
None = 0
Partial (legally defined leeway
for operational crisis
management) = 1
Extensive (e.g. no civilian
jurisdiction over military actors
in crisis management) = 2
0
see section 3.3.2
3.3.3
Popular trust and support
3.3.3.a
Based on Eurobarometer data, what percentage of
respondents feel that their country is doing enough to
manage natural and man-made disasters?
respondents feel that their country is doing enough to
fight terrorism?
Do official actors maintain registers for volunteers in
crisis management?
Record the sum percentage for
“Agree” and “Tend to agree”
N/A
Record the sum percentage for
“Agree” and “Tend to agree”
N/A
3.3.3.d
If yes to above, list number if accessible
Register the number per 1000
capita for 2011
see section 3.3.3
3.3.3.e
If no to 3.3.3.c. or 3.3.3.d is unreliable, how many
volunteers are estimated to be in the non-profit
sector?
Register the number per 1000
capita for 2011.
80,000 total see section 3.3.3
3.3.2
3.3.2.a
3.3.2.b
3.3.3.b
3.3.3.c
No = 0
Yes= 1
0
0
see section 3.3.3
50
4
Civil security in the EU context
Scoring instruction
4.a
How many times has your country activated the
Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre
(MIC) – 2007-2011?
How many times has your country contributed to a
MIC request - 2007-2011?
Register the number for 20072011
N/A
Register the number for 20072011
N/A
4.c
Does your country participate in the EU civil
protection mechanism’s training programme?
No = 0
Yes = 1
4.d
If yes to question 4.b, approximately how many
practitioners participated in the EU civil protection
mechanism’s training programme in the 2009-2010
training cycle?
Register the number for the
2009-2010 training cycle
4.e
4.f
4.b
4.g
4.h
4.i
Score
Source
0
How many EU-led civil protection simulation exercises Register the number for 2002did your country participate in between 2002-12?
2012
0
How many times has the country received financial
support through the EU's Solidarity Fund (SF) due to
natural disasters (2002-Sept. 2012)?
How much aid has the country been granted through
the SF due to natural disasters (2002-2012, Sept.)?
Register the number for 2002Sept 2012
0
Register total financial assistance
in million euro for 2002-Sept
2012
0
respondents are aware that the EU coordinates civil
protection both inside and outside the EU? (Proxy for
awareness)
respondents believe that a coordinated EU action in
dealing with disasters is more effective than actions
by individual states? Record the sum percentage for
“Agree” and “Tend to agree” (Proxy for attitude)
Register the percentage
N/A
Register the percentage
N/A
data)
51
Annex II: H1N1 in Serbia
The first alarm on the new virus in Serbia was the information from the WHO (24.4.2009), while the
first laboratory-confirmed case of H1N1 was registered in Belgrade on 24.06.2009. (imported from
Argentina) and the first death was reported in October 2009. The epidemic period lasted for 9 weeks.
Based on a special epidemiological surveillance, the estimated number of infected was 750,000 to
1,000,000 out of 7,120,666 inhabitants (Census 2011)68, the total number of hospitalized people was
6,021, and 13769 died - including 10 pregnant women. The disease frequency was the highest in the
age group of 7 to 14 years. Economic effects, without the losses in the economy caused by the fall in
production and trade, were between 6.2 to 8.2 billion dinars (64.5 to 85.5 million €). Around 1/6 to
1/8 of all costs were the costs of the preventative and anti-epidemic measures. (SWG, 2010)
The main operative and politically responsible actor in the crisis was the Ministry of Health which
established a Special Working Group (SWG) as an expert and operative body that coordinated
measures with the Institute for public health, the network of public health institutes in the country,
other ministries and agencies, local self governments and other subjects.70 The private health care
system was not particularly engaged in the crisis.
The SWG and the joint body for communication tried to provide updated information on the
pandemic, including advice and support for the public on specific questions (travel, social gathering
etc.), as well as public support for anti epidemic measures and prompt exchange of information on
the course of pandemic between health authorities, ministries, agencies and partners.
Doctors, members of SWG, representatives of the Ministry of Health and the veterinary department
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry in 2009 had 3,265 media appearances, 13 press
conferences, and one meeting with media representatives. The detailed overview of their media
activities is shown in the Table 3.
68
706 laboratory confirmed
84 laboratory confirmed
70
The Institute of Public Health of Serbia "Dr Milan Jovanović Batut" was established on the Republic level and
represents an expert institution for public health, which provides advice, support and guidance for the Serbian
government and all departments for public health and conducts independent research on issues related to
public health in Serbia. One of the main tasks of the Institute is control and prevention of infectious and noninfectious diseases, as well as maintaining and improving readiness in emergency cases.
http://www.batut.org.rs/index.php?category_id=122.During this crisis the Institute had a coordinative and
monitoring role.
69
52
Table 3: H1N1 Media related activities
Media/
Topic
Press
Flu/pandemy
Vaccinacion
Total
410
500
910
Agencies
338
500
838
Radio
307
350
657/5,500 min
TV
400
460
860/7,000 min
Total
1,455
1,810
3,265
Source: SWG
Those media activities were followed by a video on TV and a radio jingle “Stop pandemics” broadcast
on 14 electronic media free of charge.
The first serious preparations for the case of pandemic in Serbia were undertaken during the avian
influenza (bird flu) 2006 to 2009. Cooperation was established between health and veterinary
services, the training of health workers and the representatives of local government and media was
conducted, and guidelines for the functioning of the health system were made.
After the first information from WHO on the emergence and spread of the H1N1 virus, the
epidemiological situation was assessed as threatening and the nationally designed professional
methodology manual for the control of importation and preventing the spread of new virus in Serbia
was implemented through the health care system, so in each suspected case the material was
sampled for virological testing and for seven days control measures (monitoring of the patients) were
imposed over all persons in contact with infected people.
After the first laboratory-confirmed case the epidemiological situation was assessed as an emergency
and recommendations were made for the participants and organizers of mass events. After the first
100 laboratory-confirmed cases, a shift was made from measures aimed on preventing, to measures
aimed at control of spreading the virus. In September and October the epidemic has spread to
schools across the country and the epidemiological situation was assessed as unfavourable.
Therefore, a plan for immunization of priority groups was prepared. After the first reported death the
situation was assessed as unfavourable with a tendency towards further deterioration. The minister
of health declared an epidemic on 12.11.2009 and ordered measures that include emergency
immunization of certain categories of the population (like health care workers, and other first
responders, senior population and children) (Interview key respondent Military Medical Academy).
53
Minister of Health Tomica Milosavljevic stated that the pandemic was developing according to the
mildest among three assumed scenarios, while the vaccination was from the beginning subject to
negative campaign by some media, politicians and even doctors, and out of the 850,000 doses, which
had been delivered and paid for (following the decision of the government and recommendation of
local experts and WHO advice), only around 150,000 were used. During the vaccination campaign, a
negative campaign started both globally and nationally. The vaccination coverage was 2.5 percent of
the population, which is low, but it is up to five times higher than in neighbouring countries. The
activities related to combat the pandemic H1N1 were under-valued in public while superficial
comments of the health situation in Serbia belittled the victims (NasloviNet, 2010).
According to the analysis done by Professor Dragan Delić, the president of the Health Council of
Serbia,71 regardless of all quasi medical and daily political influences, the proclamation of epidemic of
H1N1 virus infection in Serbia was professionally grounded as well as the emergency measures
ordered by the SWG of the Ministry of Health for its containment. He believes that there was, at the
very least, the moral responsibility of all public figures (doctors, politicians, journalists etc.) who,
mainly due to the political reasons, advocated refusal of vaccination through public media.72 The fact
that many health care workers did not promote immunization as the most effective, easiest, safest
and most economical measure in the prevention and control of infection, but even discouraged
citizens by carrying out a negative campaign, requires a special discussion in professional
associations. Some media, by publishing the wrong information and giving space to doctors who are
not experts in this field of medicine caused particular confusion. The experience from the pandemic
indicates that campaigns should not be led by politicians, but health care workers, the health care
system and, in particular, the Institute of Public Health of Serbia.
The most important deficiencies were observed in coordinating activities in the work of multisectoral
bodies of the health system in the field of promoting immunization and in communication with the
public. Nobody even looked at the economic side of the pandemic, which is valid for any rational
society. Procurement and purchasing vaccines have nothing to do with health care per se, but are a
classic example of possible corruption in the public procurement system involving state officials, and
this caused immense damage to the health system of Serbia and the immunization program (Delić,
2012).
The pandemic crisis in Serbia was followed by a criminal affair regarding frauds in vaccine
71
Health Council of Serbia is a professional advisory body whose members are elected by the Serbian
Parliament from among eminent experts in the field of health care, dental care, professional associations of
medical doctors and Serbian Academy of Sciences.
72
Unfortunately, in Serbia even health-related issues are subject to political calculations and confrontations.
54
procurement. The prosecutor for organized crime of Serbia has filed an indictment against the exdirector of the Republic’s Institute for Health Insurance and three of her associates, the ex-director of
“Jugohemija”, the director of the company “Jugohemija farmacija”, and the director of “Detap”
company. They are suspected of cheating the state budget out of approximately EUR 1.25 million.
This is related to irregularities surrounding the supply of the vaccine for swine flu towards the end of
2009. All of the above stand accused of committing an ‘abuse of office’, which is a criminal offence
and which carries a jail term of between 2 to 12 years. According to the media, the arrested Republic
Institute for Health Insurance (RZZO) director, Svetlana Vukajlović, claims that she was the one who
initiated termination of the contract and that the former health minister was against it. On the other,
hand Minister Milosavljevic said that a decision to terminate the contract had been made at a
government telephone session due to a lack of citizens’ interest to get vaccinated (b92,2011).
There were also controversies about possible corruption in the vaccination campaign. The Anticorruption Council of the Serbian government found that the Ministry of Health spent around
€35,000 on promotion in the media which is the reason that a small number of the media outlets
reported objectively about the transaction of the urgent purchase of the vaccine, and questioned the
responsibility of the minister of health in this transaction, although it eventually turned out that the
purchase was disputable and the quantity of purchased vaccines was excessive and
unnecessary.(Anti-corruption Council, 2011:22.)
55
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58
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Interviews
Criminalistic Police Academy, 27/10/12
MOI, Sector for Emergency Management, 5/11/12
Military Medical Academy/Insitute of Epidemiology 16/11/12
Faculty of Security Studies, 20/11/12
MRS, 23/11/12
Fire Brigade Association of Serbia, 24/11/12
Red Cross Serbia ,10/12/12
Private security co. Protecta, 17/12/12
Union University/Faculty of Law, 24/11/12
Commision in case of assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic 7/12/12
59
Department for Emergency management for the City of Belgrade, 31/12/12
Institute for the Development of Water Resources „Jaroslav Černi“, 25/1/13
Serbian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, 30/1/13
60

Country Study: Serbia

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