- Pakistan Society of Victimology

Transcription

Pakistan: A Victim of Terrorism (Volume III)
1
PAKISTAN : A V ICTIM OF T ERRORISM
(V OLUME III)
E DITOR
D R N OOR UL H AQ
A SSISTANT E DITOR
M UHAMMAD N AWAZ K HAN
2
IPRI Factfile
C ONTENT
Preface
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Year-wise Summary of Human Losses in Terrorist Acts:
1 January 2001 to 17 January 2011
Rah-e-Rast Operation by Armed Forces: 26 April 2009– 1
July 2009
Rah-e-Nijat Operation by Armed Forces: 17 October 2009
Onward
Casualties Suffered by Armed Forces: 2009-2010
2009: Year of Terrorism
Pakistan Lost $35bn in Three Years in War on Terror
New Dimensions of Counter-Terrorism
Suicides Bombing and Dr Tahirul Qadri’s Fatwa
Lessons from Lahore
Taliban Increasingly Unpopular in Pakistan
Taliban Distancing Themselves from al-Qaeda
332 Terror Hits Claimed 5,704 Lives Since 9/11
The Silent Surge
U.S. Defends Legality of Killing with Drones
Obama Moves to Delink Terrorism from Islam
Kohat Killings
Soft on Militancy
Get the Militant Leadership
The Rising Militancy
Militancy: Realism Needed
Terror in Lahore
Terrorism and the Economy
Search for Soul
Provinces Back Efforts to Combat Terror
A Good Anti-terrorism Move
Terrorism and Religious Identities
Quelling Terrorism
Terrorist Attacks
Quetta Attack
Lakki Marwat Blast
Deployment of More Drones Against Pakistan
The Scourge of Terrorism
v
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7
10
11
27
27
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31
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41
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55
56
57
60
63
64
65
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33. Attacking the Ghazi of Karachi
34. Drone Attacks May be Legal, But Are They Moral?
35. By Publicly Acknowledging the Price Pakistan Pays
for its Counterterrorism Policy, the U.S. is Helping Untie its
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
3
69
71
Leadership’s Hands
72
A Year of Sub-sectarian Massacre
Swabi Attack
U.S. Double-dealing
U.S. Seeks to Expand Drone Operations
Government Firm in Eliminating Menace of Terrorism:
Prime Minister
Terror Group Forms Suicidal Gang
Afghans Involved in Terrorist Activities: Minister of Interior
Pak-Afghan Joint Declaration: Accord to Knock Out
Militant Sanctuaries
U.S.-Pakistan Secret Efforts to Defeat al-Qaeda: Petraeus 85
National Assembly Body Condemns Drone Attacks
No Taliban or Quetta Shura in Balochistan: FCIG
Prime Minister Calls for Joint Strategy to Combat Terrorism
Drone Attacks in Pakistan
Pakistan Army’s Contributions in Fight Against Terrorism 103
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P REFACE
Philip J. Crowley, U.S. Asst Secretary of State, told the audience in his daily
briefing that “There is no country that has suffered more significantly from
terrorism than Pakistan itself”.1 Citing a study, Bruce Riedal of Brookings
Institution said “There were 2,113 terrorist attacks in Pakistan last year [2010].
No country in the world even comes close to that. Almost 3000 people died
and 6000 were wounded.”2 Soon after the tragedy of September 11, 2001,
Pakistan allied itself with the U.S. in the war against terror. The U.S.-led
invasion in Afghanistan commenced in 2001. The Talibans were defeated but
could not be eliminated. Their resistance transformed into an insurgency and
an armed struggle against the foreign forces and their local supporters.
During the past more than three decades (1978-2010), Afghanistan
has been in a state of war and Pakistan has had to accommodate millions of
refugees entering the country since 1978. In the beginning, their number had
risen to about six million but even at present this is not less than 2.5 million.
Since Pakistan is supporting the war against the militants/terrorists in
Afghanistan, the insurgency in that country has spilled over into Pakistan’s
FATA, adjacent to Afghanistan, and the adjoining settled areas of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa. These terrorists are a source of the numerous acts of violence
and terrorism that plague the whole country.
The fight against militants/terrorists has so far cost Pakistan 2273
soldiers of the Army killed and 6512 injured, making a total of 8785, besides
21,672 civilians killed. As against them the U.S. and NATO, comprising 43
nations, have suffered only 1582 casualties.
While the terrorist activities are on the rise, the economy is sliding
downward, the much-needed foreign investment is not forthcoming and the
development of the country is being adversely affected. The cumulative
economic impact runs into billions of dollars. Pakistan is likely to continue to
suffer as long as there is no peace in Afghanistan.
There is a perception that the tribal insurgency could drag on for an
indefinite period. The solution to the problem lies in the age-old system of jirga
(assembly of elders) and securing cooperation of all immediate neighbours of
Afghanistan (i.e., China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan) as well as the U.S., Russia and NATO to resolve the Afghanistan
imbroglio.
1
2
Frontier Post (Peshawar) on line, January 12, 2010.
Bruce Riedel introducing his book Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and Future of
Global Jihad in the Brookings Institution, Washington, on January 18, 2011.
5
The IPRI Factfile includes selected articles appearing in the print media
from December 2009 till December 2010, and relevant data depicting terrorist
activities causing losses in men and material to the people of Pakistan.
January 19, 2011.
Noor-ul-Haq
1
Y EAR -W ISE S UMMARY OF H UMAN L OSSES
IN T ERRORIST A CTS IN P AKISTAN
1 J ANUARY 2001 TO 17 J ANUARY 2011
S.No
Year
1
2001
2
2002
3
2003
4
2004
5
2005
6
2006
7
2007
8
2008
9
2009
10
2010
11
2011
Total:
No. of
*Incidents
110
56
88
159
113
1444
1820
1575
1946
2061
54
9426
Killed
LEAs Civilians
13
41
32
70
11
18
24
52
9
19
267
502
575
1677
541
2248
706
1674
502
1453
24
16
2704
7770
Injured
LEAs Civilians
72
224
110
201
46
106
152
260
32
81
645
982
1462
2065
1434
3665
1832
5544
1383
3965
46
33
7214
17126
Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Crisis Management Cell
RAH-E-RAST O PERATION B Y A RMED F ORCE
26 A PRIL 2009 – 1J ULY 2009
A SUMMARY
After the complete break down of law and order in the Swat Valley, where
followers of Fazal ullah had murdered most of the policemen and had taken
over police stations, govt and private buildings, Army was called in aid of civil
power to clear the valley of terrorists. Army conducted Swat operation in Swat
Valley in Nov 2007 and cleared the valley in five weeks. Than came the
elections in Feb 2008 and provincial government decided to have a peace
agreement in April 2008. However, the terrorists never honoured the
agreement and in the garb of peace agreement kept expanding their influence.
They started establishing check posts, kept hitting military convoys, started
recruiting young boys of Swat and surrounding areas in different areas in
training camps of varying sizes. They resorted to kidnapping of civilians,
asking for ransom, anyone opposing was killed brutally and they coerced the
population to an extent that they started accepting them as their masters.
Realizing the gravity of the situation government once again ordered
Army to launch an operation. This time under the influence of terrorists, the
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civilian population did not cooperate. Moreover during this period the
terrorists had reorganized, regrouped, rearmed and had increased their area of
influence in other parts of Swat and Malakand. The military operation had
become unpopular, with militants entrenched in built up areas. The operation
claimed lot of destruction, damage, death and displacement of innocent
citizens. At this stage the government desired to hold the operation to avoid
further damage and go for reconciliation process through TNSM to give
Nizam-e-Adal which was long standing demand of the people. As a result yet
another peace agreement with the pledge of enactment of Nizam-e-Adal was
signed.
It was soon realized that militants were not interested in Nizam-e-Adal,
rather they were using it as a slogan/rhetoric to achieve their nefarious
designs. The following statistics of their terrorist activities after the signing of
peace agreement clearly shows their lack of sincerity to the Nizam-e-Adal/
peace agreement:S/No
a.
Incident
Kidnapping incident
b.
Security Forces Personnel
Killed/Wounded
Suicide Attacks
IEDs Attacks
Ambush military convoys
Fire Raids
Schools damaged
Police Stations destroyed
Grid Stations destroyed
Banks Looted
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
j.
k.
Remarks
55 (Individuals abducted
are more than 100)
30 (Injured 44)
4
8
7
30
2
1
1
6
Their intentions got crystallized when militants in total negation of
peace agreement moved into Buner and Shangla. The real face of militants got
exposed and not only the people of Swat but whole nation gelled together in
demanding elimination of terrorists from Malakand Division through a
complete comprehensive and decisive operation.
Conduct of Operation
The plan to clear Malakand Division of terrorists was based on the assumption
that “Failure is not an Option”. The operation had to be swift, multipronged,
effective, comprehensive and all encompassing with an end strategy. The
success of this operation lived on two cardinal principles. The support of
3
public and prevent the escape of terrorists to other areas. The innocent
population had to be protected even at the cost of compromising operational
necessities and built up areas had to be cleansed and not bombed. With these
limitations and objectives the operation was launched on 26 April 2009.
Operation Tandar -1
On the request of provincial govt and people of Dir, Frontier Corps launched
the operation Tandar-1 in Islampura-Lal Qila Maidan Areas in lower Dir.
Intense clashes took place, killing over 100 militants including important
militant commander Qari Shahid. Lal Qila was finally secured and thereafter
search and cordon operations in adjoining areas continued and to date they are
being conducted.
Op Tandar –II
Early morning on 29 April heliborne forces of Frontier Corps successfully
landed at Daggar and surrounding areas and secured Daggar, the headquarters
of Buner District. Meanwhile the ground forces advanced on two axis,
Malandri axis and Ambella axis to link up with forces of Daggar. At Ambella
pass security forces confronted 13 suicide vehicles, 2 suicide motorcyclists and
4 individual suiciders and a group of 100 militants on mountain top. Finally
linkage with troops at Daggar was established. Later by 6th May operation was
launched to secure Sultanwas. After an intense engagement for over 9 days
Sultanwas was finally secured on 15 May 2009. Later Pir Baba was cleared and
and the important Karakar pass which links Buner with Swat was secured on
June 13. Finally the forces operating in Buner established link up with forces
operating in Swat at Jambil and on 1st July 2009 secured Dewana Baba route
leaving Buner with Shangla. During Operation Tander two (Buner) 305
terrorists were killed and 102 apprehended while Security Forces suffered 34
casualties and 127 were wounded. During this operation, following important
militant commanders were killed/arrested:a.
Qadir r/o Kumbar
b.
Noor Hameed r/o Kokoi Banda
c.
Aftab r/o Dabuna
d.
Yousef r/o Dabuna
e.
Iftikhar r/o Sharlara
f.
Bakht Buland r/o shagai
g.
Abu Saeed r/o Buner
h.
Misbah ud Din r/o Buner
j. Sultan Khan r/o Drushkhela
k. Ghulam Khaliq r/o Buner
-
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
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l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
Salim r/o Ambela
Sherzada r/o Ambela
Shah Sultan r/o Charbagh
Abdullah r/o Hayasarai
Hameed r/o Mera Shah
Miraj r/o Bar Maian
Mula Khan r/o Khawazakhela
-
Killed
Killed
Killed
Killed
Apprehended
Apprehended
Apprehended
Operation Rah-e-Raast -The Battle of Swat
In sync with operation at Buner Security forces launched an operation in
Shangla district on 6 May and secured Ramtallai Sar where Security forces
discovered 166 dead bodies. At the same time forces secured Chamtaliai and
Khwazakhela. Meanwhile terrorists who were targeting security forces from
Emrald Mines were targeted where 35 terrorists were killed.
•
•
•
•
•
By 9th May 09, main headquarters of militants in Loe Namal and
Matta was completely destroyed on the same day security forces
launched an Op at Gulabad and secured Chakdara and pt 2245 and pt
2266 in Loe Sar were also captured. At this stage terrorists were being
engaged from four directions i.e West, North, East and South.
On 12 May 09, in a surprise action Special Services Group landed at
the heights surrounding Peochar the headquarters of Fazal Ullah and
the main training centre, which was believed to be unreachable and
unconquerable. Here security forces came across tough resistance and
discovered elaborate training facilities, IEDS and bomb making
factories and number of tunnels, 150 feet long and 12 to 15 ft wide.
From ridge to ridge security forces cleaned the area after intense
engagement at every step and finally secured Peochar valley by 20th
June.
By 14th May 09, security forces after clearing Barikot secured the area
upto Bilgram 6 kms short of Mingora.
By 16 May 09, area from Shangla towards Khawazkela was secured
and Biadra Markaz the strong hold of terrorists on Matta Durshkhela
road was destroyed.
By 17 May 09, Op Rah e Rast entered into a new phase. Security
forces entered the town of Matta from East and from West were able
to secure area between Bilogram to Takhtaband and Kanju. At the
same time Mam Dhairi was targeted, killing 15 miscreants. The
capture of this strategic location having tunnels and extensive training
facilities gave a severe below to the resistance of terrorists in the area.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
5
By 21 May 09, Banai Baba Ziarat the highest point in the area and a
main terrorists training centre was captured after intense battle. The
capture of this strategic location having tunnels and extensive training
facilities gave a severe blow to the resistance of terrorists in the area.
On 27 May 09, security forces entered Mingora city and link up
operations from different sides commenced. The terrorists trapped
from three directions suffered heavily and a number of suicide
attempts and IEDs were foiled/destroyed. Parallel to this a strategic
bridge of utmost importance Wanai Bridge linking Matta with
Peochar was successfully secured.
On 24 May 09, on report of presence of terrorists at Malam Jabba, a
swift operation was launched and cleared in next 36 hours. Malam
Jabba located on main line of communication connects Swat Valley
with Mansehra was being used as a training centre and logistic base by
terrorists. Same day operation from Kanju to secure Kabbal the main
stronghold of militants was launched and Fizaghat and Qambar
Village were secured.
By 12 June 09, security forces secured Sakhra Valley, the main route
of terrorists moving from Peochar towards Kalam and other areas.
On 27 May 09, security forces entered Bahrain where they were
welcomed by locals with National flags in their hands, it was secured
in two days and operations towards Kalam and Gulibagh commenced
simultaneously.
By 31st May 09, Mingora was fully secured. Huge cache of Arms,
Ammunition, and Communication equipment were recovered from
different areas. Over 150 IEDs were destroyed and a number of
terrorists killed and apprehended. After securing Mingora, Security
forces turned on Buner axis and secured Najigram, to establish link up
with forces operating at Buner.
On 1st June 09, operation to secure Charbagh was launched alongwith
a link up operation to link Kabbal with Sirsanai.
By 5 June 09, security forces cleared area upto Chakesar Valley and in
other areas Cordon and search operation at a fast pace were
conducted. At the same time the local Lashkar surrounded 4 villages
of terrorists in Upper Dir killing 20 of them.
By 12 June 09, security forces secured Chuprial after intense
engagements. Here a comprehensive training center with a tunnel 150
feet long and 12 feet wide was discovered after eliminating 40
terrorists.
On 15 June 09, Aligrama was secured and huge cache of arms and
ammunition was recovered from the area.
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IPRI Factfile
•
•
•
•
•
By 16 June 09, Peochar valley was fully secured and link up of forces
operating in Peochar and Chaprial was established in an area south of
Biha valley. During this operation security forces recovered lot of
IEDs, Arms, Ammunition big and small tunnels and prepared vehicles
for suicide missions and this time Civil Administration became fully
functional in Shangla district and IDPs of Kalam started moving back.
On 24 June 09, the culminating operations to clear Shamozai in the
west and Biha Valley in the north commenced. By 26th June Shamozai
was fully secured.
On 30 June 09, the final operation, Op Shah Dheri was launched
from two direction from north Samai Killile was secured and from the
east forces secured Bhoka and Yakh Tangai Sar.
By 1st July 09, Shah Dheri was fully secured alongwith vital link up
operation in the south with District of Buner.
By Ist Jul 09, by the grace of Almighty Allah security forces completed
the securing of Malakand and Swat over an area of 5373 sq kms,
through an intense, courageous and bold operations in an inhospitable
environment and against an enemy with no face.
The casualty state below bears ample testimony to the courage/valour and
sacrifice of security forces.
Date
Own Cas
Shaheed
Wounded
April 2009
May 2009
June 2009
Total
1
82
61
144
4
246
167
417
Terrorists Cas
Killed
Wounded /
Apprehended
74
0
1152
79
373
144
1599
223
Agency wise details of incidents for the year 2009:Agency Suicide IED Rkt/SAs Ambush Abduction Phy Expl
Attk
Dir
2
10
11
0
11
0
1
Swat
5
39
144
17
52
3
5
Total
7
49
155
17
63
3
6
Source: official data.
7
R AH - E -N IJAT O PERATION B Y A RMED F ORCE
17 O CTOBER 2009 ONWARD
A S UMMARY
1.
To curb the menace of terrorism in South Waziristan Agency,
Operation Rah-e-Nijat commenced on 17th October 2009.The Operation
was started on three Axes.
a. Jandola-Sararogha Axis
(1) Ist Week
(a) On Jandola-Sararogha Axis area upto Mandana,
Kund and Tarakai feature was secured by Security
Forces on 18th October.
(b) On 19th October Security Forces secured Tor
Ghundai feature and Shishamwam. On the same day
security forces made an envelopment manoeuvre
around town of Kotkai.
(c) On 23rd October Security Forces secured important
feature of Shishamwam. This important height is
behind Kotkai village thereby seiging Kotkai village
from the east. On 24th October Security Forces took
complete control of important stronghold of TTP, the
town of Kotkai, the native place of terrorists leader
Hakim Ullah Mehsud and Qari Hussain. On the
same date Shishamwam was also fully secured.
nd
(2) 2 Week
(a) After intense engagements, Security Forces secured the
significant mountain top of Tarkona on 25th October.
Security Forces also progressed well on JandolaSararogha axis securing important ridges. Moving
forward of Kotkai Important Road Y Junction was
secured at Kazhakas, the roads leading to Inzar Kalle
and Sararogha on 26th October.
(b) On 27th October Security Forces cleared Village
Zeriwam and dominating hill features along east and
west ridges on main Axis Jandola-Sararogha. The
dominating ridges around main road and village Ganra
Kas and Konar heights were also secured.
(c) After gaining control of Kotkai, the forces moved
towards Sararogha, the Headquarters of Commander
Baitullah Mehsud Group. The town fell on 6
November amidst heavy losses suffered by the militant.
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IPRI Factfile
(3)
3rd Week
(a) Forces after consolidating their positions in Sararogha
and adjoining areas followed by mopping up operations
advanced towards Ahmed Wam which was secured on
13 November. A huge cache of arms and ammunition
was recovered.
(b) Torman fell to the troops on 13 November.
(c) Forces captured Janata on 17 November and recovered
huge cache of arms and ammunition. It was followed
by the fall of Barora Niazi on 23 November and Mir
Khoni on 25 November.
(d) To date the most important phase of operation is in
good progress. On Jandola-Sararogha Sector the
important stronghold of Sararogha has been cleared.
(e) On Shakai-Kaniguram Sector, Karma the stronghold
of Uzbeks has been cleared alongwith Kaniguram. On
Razmak-Makeen Sector security forces had cleared
Makeen.
b. Shakai-Ladha Axis
(1 Ist Week
(a) On Shakai-Ladha Axis Boya Narai and Wuzi Sar
were captured on 18th October.
(b) Sherwangi was also secured on 19th October.
(c) On 20th October Security Forces further consolidated
their positions at Sherwangi. The important heights
surrounding Sherwangi were secured and terrorists
had vacated their positions leaving behind arms and
ammunitions. On 21st October security Forces cleared
Khaisura Village linking up with Tiarza Fort. While
extending perimeters of security in North of
Sherwangi security Forces also secured area of
Gurgura Sar.
(d) Security Forces secured Chalwasti village on main
Shakai-Kaniguram-Ladha axis on 23rd October.
nd
(2) 2 Week
(a) Security Forces also cleared area along road
Sherwangi-Ladha Axis uptill road track junction.
(b) Till 28th of October security forces had achieved
substantial success on all three axes.
(c) In anticipation of stiff resistance from militants in
Kaniguram, another strongholds of the militants, the
SSG captured all the strategic heights of Karwan
c.
9
Manza, which overlooks Kaniguram. The capture of
these dominating heights resulted in the fall of
Kaniguram, Asman Manza on 2 November followed
by steadily advances towards Karama, the home town
of commander Wali-ur-Rehman, the chief commander
of Taliban chapter of South Waziristan.
(3) 3rd Week
(a) After consolidating positions in Kaniguram, forces
moved towards Ladha, another important town and
home town of militant commander Shamin. The town
witnessed fierce fighting and eventually it fell on 17
November, in which the militant suffered heavy
casualties and left behind huge cache of arms and
ammunition.
(b) The strategically located dry Nullah of Kot Langer
Khel was captured on 13 November but forces
suffered heavy losses as the militant ambushed the
convoy of the security forces with IEDs and small
arms. However they responded quickly by killing nearly
dozens militants and completely sanitized the area till
the heights overlooking Makeen.
(c) The forces captured the strategic located feature of
Kund Mela on 1 December and destroyed large
numbers of IEDs which were planted on various
tracks.
Razmak-Makeen Axis
(1) Ist Week
(a) On Razmak-Makeen Axis important features and
tactical heights were secured on 18th October.
(b) Meanwhile Security Forces consolidated their positions
at Razmak and effectively blocked the roads leading
from Makeen.
nd
(2) 2 Week
(a) Security Forces also secured Shagha feature and
Sharakai Sar in Nawazkot area. These heights
dominate Road Nawazkot-Makeen and area all
around.
(b) On 27th October security forces surrounded
Nawazkot and dominated the important ridges ahead
of Nawazkot. Forces also regained control of old FC
Post.
(c) On 29th October after fully securing Sharakai Sar
security forces successfully moved forward and secured
10
IPRI Factfile
Pakalita and Manza Sar along main axis RazmakMakeen. Important heights of Dralima and Ahnei
Kalle were secured on 30th October.
(d) The forces after overcoming resistance moved towards
China which fell on 2 November and thus exposed
Makeen.
(3) 3rd Week
(a) Nawaz Kot was cleared on 21 November, Marobi
Rogha captured on 24 November, while Makeen
Laghad was secured on 30 November and now troops
are gradually moving towards Ladha, where the
militants have blocked their advances by occupying the
ridges overlooking Makeen.
(b) The important stronghold of Kaniguram was
surrounded from three directions and forces had made
good progress on Jandola-Sararogha Axis along with
securing important heights in Nawazkot area on
Razmak-Makeen Axes.
Casualty state is as under:
CASUALTY STATE OPERATION RAH-E-NIJAT
Date
October
November
December
Total
Own
Shaheed Wounded
34
103
35
69
1
2
70
174
Killed
322
266
1
589
Terrorists
Injured Arrested
0
6
0
19
0
26
0
51
Surrendered
0
0
0
0
Source: Official data.
C ASUALTIES S UFFERED BY A RMED F ORCE 2009-2010
A S UMMARY
Casualty State: Operation Rah-e-Rast: 27-4-2009 to 24-6-2009
Date
Total
Own
Shaheed Wounded Killed
193*
658**
1537
* Including 14 Officers)
** Including 36 Officers)
Injured
818
Terrorists
Arrested
1717
Surrendered
0
11
Casualty State Operation Rah-e-Nijat: 17-10-2009 to 8-2-2010
Date
Total
Own
Shaheed Wounded
1
11
Killed
7
Injured
1
Terrorists
Arrested
210
Surrendered
0
Casualty State: 2001 to 14 January 2011
Dated
Army/FC
Wounded
8317
Shaheed
2675
2001 onward
Casualty State-FATA 2009-2010
Date
2009-2010
Shaheed
2060
Civilians
Wounded
4266
Casualty State during Suicide Bombing/Attacks All Over the Country
Shaheed
2815
Civilians
Wounded
7638
Source: Official Data
2009 – Y EAR
OF
T ERRORISM
Pakistan is at war, and this time the war is not at its borders with an enemy
country. This war is with its own people and within its own territory. Some call
it America’s war whereas the government and the army call it ‘Pakistan’s own
war’.
This war has plagued Pakistan's provinces of North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], Balochistan, and Punjab with
violence between militants and government security forces as well as terrorist
activities against innocent civilians. Though, the nature of these violent
incidents and terrorist attacks seem similar all over the country, the causes of
the conflicts vary in different regions.
In NWFP, the worst hit province in terms of terrorism, Operation Rahe-Rast against pro-Taliban groups displaced hundreds of thousands of people
in April and May 2009. The operation wrapped up on July 7, 2009 with 1,600
12
IPRI Factfile
extremists killed and 158 soldiers martyred. During the operation, around
300,000 people of Swat took refuge in camps or with relatives.
Not only displacement, residents of the province also bear the brunt of
the terrorist attacks in the country. Around 87 such incidents took place in the
province, including suicide attacks, hand grenade attacks, rocket and mortar
attacks and blasts with remote control devices. At least 824 people, including
228 security officials of different organizations and grades, were killed in
attacks during the year.
Attack on shrine of a 17th century Sufi poet - Rehman Baba - in the
Akhund Baba graveyard of Peshawar to discourage ‘shrine culture’ shocked
the nation. A letter delivered to the management of the mausoleum three days
before the attack had warned against its promotion of ‘shrine culture’.
In Balochistan, Pakistan's largest and poorest province, tribal militants
are engaged in a long-running, low-level insurgency to gain greater control of
the region's natural resources and political power. Analysts say Afghan Taliban
groups are also using Baluchistan as a base. Most of the 37 terrorist acts
reported from the province were incidents of sectarian violence. Around 66
people, including 11 security officials, were killed in the terrorist attacks. Those
killed include 3 academicians, 1 cardiologist, Balochistan Chief Mines
Inspector, Balochistan Education Minister, Vice President of Jamhoori Watan
Party, Chairman of Hazara Democratic Party, leader of Fiqah Jafria, and leader
of Jammat Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat Noorani.
Some of the militant violence has spilled into other parts of Pakistan,
with suicide and armed attacks on troops and the country's main cities.
In Punjab, 315 people were killed in 20 terrorist attacks. Those killed
include 62 security officials. The worst terrorist incidents were suicide attacks
at Moon Market, Lahore and Paradeline mosque, Rawalpindi. More than 85
people were killed in the two attacks.
Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, didn’t remain safe from the terror
wave and 28 people were killed in 10 terrorist attacks. Some of the important
incidents include suicide attack at UN World Food Program (WFP) office and
suicide attack at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
Violence erupted in Sindh after suicide attack on Ashura procession at
M A Jinnah Road, Karachi on December 28... just 3 days before the new year.
The province remained relatively safe during the year. At least 53 people were
killed in 17 terrorist activities. Majority of these incidents were target killings or
shooting incidents, which apparently had sectarian motives behind them.
Following is a time line of major terrorist attacks in all four provinces of
the country.
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Terrorist Attacks in NWFP
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January 4: A suicide bomber was killed while two people sustained
injuries near a check-post in Officers’ Colony in Bannu. The suicide
bomber blew himself up in an attempt to target a check-post but
could not succeed as the bomb exploded before he could reach his
target.
January 4: Ten persons, including 4 policemen, were killed and 27
others injured in two bomb blasts near the Polytechnic College in
Dera Ismail Khan.
January 17: In the first incident of its kind in Peshawar, religious
scholar Pir Hafiz Rafeeullah, who was kidnapped on January 16,
was reportedly slaughtered and his decapitated body was found in
the Matani area of the capital on the morning of January 17.
January 20: Four policemen and 4 civilians were injured when a
police patrol van was hit by a roadside bomb on Ring Road in the
Hazarkhwani area of Peshawar.
January 23: Two SF personnel were killed in a car suicide attack
near Mingora town in the Swat District of NWFP.
January 26: At least 5 people have been killed and several wounded
in a bomb blast in Dera Ismail Khan. The bomb, attached to a
bicycle, went off on a busy main road.
February 3: One man was killed and 18 others injured in a hand
grenade attack on a Sunni mosque at Mohallah Joginwala in Dera
Ismail Khan district.
February 5: A suicide attacker detonated an explosive-laden car near
a police station in the Mingora town of Swat District, injuring a
dozen officers and destroying part of the building.
February 9: At least 18 FC personnel were injured in amini-truck
suicide attack on the Baran Pul check-post of the Frontier Reserve
Police (FRP) in the jurisdiction of Bakkakhel police station in
Bannu District.
February 11: Alamzeb Khan, a Member of Provincial Assembly
from the ruling Awami National Party (ANP), was killed and 7
others were injured in a remote-controlled bomb blast in Momin
Town in Peshawar.
February 17: Five people were killed and 17 injured in a car bomb
blast outside the Hujra (male guest house) of the union council
chief in Bazidkhel village of Peshawar.
February 20: At least 32 persons were killed and 145 others injured
when a suicide bomber exploded himself in the funeral procession
of a slain employee of the Tehsil Municipal Administration near the
busy Shubra Square in Dera Ismail Khan.
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February 23: A police guard was killed when he flung himself onto a
suicide bomber to prevent him from entering a compound in
Bannu. The attacker was trying to enter the compound, where
judges and senior police officials live and work, when the guard
intercepted him. Two other police guards were wounded in the
attack.
March 5: One person was killed and 19 others sustained injuries
when a hand-grenade hurled by unidentified miscreants at
worshippers exploded in Ameer Hamza mosque in Dera Ismail
Khan.
March 5: Suspected Taliban militants blew an ancient shrine of a
17th century Sufi poet - Rehman Baba - in the Akhund Baba
graveyard of Peshawar. A letter delivered three days before the
attack to the management of the mausoleum had warned against its
promotion of ‘shrine culture’.
March 7: Eight persons, including five policemen, two Frontier
Corps personnel and a civilian, were killed in a remote-controlled
car bombing at Mashugagr village in Peshawar. Some villagers also
sustained minor injuries.
March 11: The NWFP Senior Minister and Awami National Party
leader Bashir Ahmad Bilour survived an assassination attempt that
left six persons, including two suspected suicide attackers, dead in
Namak Mandi in Peshawar. Four persons, including a young girl,
were wounded in the firing, grenade attack and suicide blast.
March 18: Five people including three policemen were killed and
four injured when over 100 unidentified armed men attacked a
police vehicle at the entrance of the University of Malakand at
Chakdara in Lower Dir District.
March 30: Seven persons, including 5 Army soldiers, were killed and
9 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed his
explosive-laden car into a military convoy near a filling station on
the Bannu-Miranshah Road.
April 5: Police found bullet-riddled bodies of four local aid workers,
including three women, in Shinkiari area of Mansehra District.
April 15: At least 18 persons, including nine policemen, were killed
and five others injured when a suicide bomber rammed an
explosives-laden vehicle into the Harichand Police Post in
Charsadda District.
April 18: At least 27 SF personnel were killed and 55 others injured
in a suicide attack on a security check post in the Doaba area of
Hangu District.
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April 26: 12 children were killed after playing with a bomb that
resembled a football. The children died after the toy-like-bomb
exploded in Lower Dir District.
May 1: The ISPR spokesman Major General Athar Abbas said two
Frontier Corps personnel were killed when a suicide bomber blew
up a booby-trapped house in the Buner District.
May 4: A suicide car bomber killed 4 SF personnel and wounded 8
persons in the outskirts of Peshawar.
May 5: Seven people, including 2 children and a Frontier Corps
soldier, were killed and 48 others sustained injuries when an
explosives-laden car rammed into a pick-up near a check-post on
the Bara road near Peshawar.
May 11: At least 10 people died and 27 were injured as a suicide
bomber blew up his explosives-laden vehicle near a Frontier Corps
check post in the outskirts of Darra Adam Khel.
May 16: Two handicapped children and 2 of their teachers were
among 11 people killed in a car bomb blast at congested City
Circular Road, Peshawar. At least 33 people were injured.
May 16: Six people, including two women and two children,
sustained minor injuries when a low-intensity explosive device went
off in a busy market in Peshawar.
May 22: At least 10 people were killed and 65 others were injured
when a powerful car bomb exploded near the Tasveer Mahal
Cinema hall in the busy Kabuli Chowk area.
May 28: Three policemen were killed and 9 others injured in a
suicide attack on a police vehicle at the Sra Khawra security post on
the Kohat road in the jurisdiction of Matani Police station on the
outskirts of Peshawar.
May 28: A policeman and 2 passers-by were killed and 13 people
wounded when a suicide attacker exploded an auto-rickshaw near a
police checkpoint in Dera Ismail Khan.
June 5: A suicide bomber killed 49 worshippers, including 12
children, at a mosque in a remote village of the Dir Upper District.
Dozens more were injured in the blast just before Friday
congregation in the Hayagay Sharqi village.
June 7: One non-commissioned officer was killed and five others
were injured in an attack on security forces' convoy transporting
TNSM deputy chief Maulana Alam and spokesman Amir Izaat to
Peshawar, the NWFP capital. Both leaders of banned outfits were
also killed in the attack.
June 9: A massive truck suicide attack at the five-star Pearl
Continental hotel in Peshawar killed 17 persons and injured 60
others.
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June 11: A man was killed and 13 others, including 9 policemen,
sustained injuries in a hand grenade-cum-suicide attack on a police
party in the Lateefabad area on Ring Road in Peshawar.
June 11: NWFP Minister for Prisons Mian Nisar Gul Kakakhel was
seriously injured and his two guards were killed when his convoy
was ambushed by suspected militants in Darra Adam Khel.
June 12: Five worshippers were killed and 105 others sustained
injuries when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden van
into a mosque during the Friday prayers in the Cantonment area of
Nowshera. Two soldiers were among the four persons killed on the
spot while most of the 105 wounded were reportedly Army
personnel.
June 14: Nine people were killed and over 40 injured when a
powerful explosion ripped through a busy market in Dera Ismail
Khan.
June 22: Two policemen were killed and 7 people, including 3
policemen, sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed his
explosive-laden vehicle into the Thakot Police check-post in
Battagram District.
June 24: Three policemen, including an officer, were killed when
some miscreants fired rockets and mortar shells at the Arbab Tapu
check-post in the jurisdiction of Matani Police Station.
July 2: Two policemen were killed and an equal number of people
sustained injuries when Taliban targeted a police vehicle with a
remote-controlled device in Peshawar.
July 9: A Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) employee
was killed and three injured when Taliban militants blew up an
electricity pylon using a remote-controlled device in Merra Suraizai
Payan village on the outskirts of the provincial capital Peshawar.
July 15: Two people, including an official of the UNHCR, were
killed and another injured when suspected Taliban militants
attempted to abduct UN officials at the Katcha Ghari Refugee
Camp in Nasir Bagh.
July 15: Two children were injured in a rocket attack. Taliban
militants fired three rockets from an unidentified location into the
city at about 12:30pm, and one of them hit a house in Sethi Town,
injuring a 13-year-old girl and a 15-year-old boy.
July 20: Suspected militants of the Mangal Bagh group killed four
policemen in an ambush on the outskirts of Peshawar.
August 2: In the southern Mashogagar village, terrorists killed a
prayer leader Qari Roohul Amin of Sulemankhel, who had been
abducted on June 29, and placed three kilograms of explosives with
his body to trigger it with a remote control device in the hope that
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policemen would come close to it. Officials of the bomb disposal
squad, however, defused the explosives without any damage.
August 2: Militants shot dead two policemen in Paharipura. A squad
of the Paharipura Police Station was ambushed by unknown
gunmen in Islamabad town of Peshawar around 2:30 am while
patrolling the streets.
August 10: Militants fired rockets at a paramilitary checkpoint in
Peshawar, killing two civilians. The pre-dawn rocket attack targeted
a Frontier Corps base in the city's Hayatabad neighborhood.
August 16: A soldier was killed and three others sustained injuries in
a suicide attack near a SFs checkpoint in the Swat District.
August 17: Seven people were killed and eight others injured when a
bomb placed in a vehicle exploded at a filling station in the
Shabqadar area in Charsadda.
August 18: Suspected militants beheaded a man kidnapped from the
Matani area on August 12. Kabir Hussain, who had come from the
US and was kidnapped on his way from Peshawar airport to his
village Dabori in Kohat District.
August 22: Two persons were killed and three others injured in a
suicide blast in Hayatabad area. The blast occurred in sector N-I
Phase IV of the area near the Hayatabad Medical Complex (HMC).
August 23: Three persons were killed and 15 others sustained
injuries in a powerful suicide blast close to the house of the slain AI
spokesman, Mobin Afridi, in the Momin Town area of Peshawar
August 30: At least 16 police recruits were killed and 11 others
sustained injuries after a suicide bomber detonated explosives
strapped to his body at the Mingora Police Station.
September 4: Suspected militants shot dead two FC troopers in
Nasir Bagh suburbs of Peshawar early in the morning while they
were patrolling the area.
September 12: Two policemen were injured in a suicide blast near
Doaba Police Station in the Hangu District.
September 18: At least 33 people were killed and more than 50
injured in a suicide car blast in Kohat District.
September 26: Two suicide attackers separately rammed their
explosives-laden vehicles into a Police station in Bannu and a
military-owned commercial bank in Peshawar cantonment area,
killing at least 27 people and injuring around another 200.
September 28: At least four persons, including a prominent antiTaliban cleric, were killed when a suicide bomber rammed his
explosives-laden vehicle into a car at Bannu.
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October 6: A woman, a minor girl and a boy sustained injuries when
a rocket hit a house in Miskeenabad under the jurisdiction of
Bhanamari Police Station, Peshawar at around 2 am.
October 9: At least 56 persons, including a woman and seven
children, were killed and 112 others were injured when a suicide
attacker detonated his explosives-laden car at the crowded Soekarno
Chowk in Khyber Bazaar in Peshawar.
October 12: At least 47 persons, including 9 security officials, were
killed and 45 others were injured in a suicide attack on a military
convoy in the Alpuri area of Shangla District, NWFP.
October 15: At least 11 persons, including 3 policemen, were killed
and 22 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed an
explosives-laden vehicle into the building of the Saddar Police
Station located in the military area of Kohat.
October 15: An eight-year-old boy, identified as Hamza, was killed
and 12 persons, including two policemen, were wounded when a
powerful bomb exploded in a three-storey building in the officers’
colony of provincial capital Peshawar.
October 16: At least 12 persons, including three policemen, were
killed and 24 others sustained injuries after a suicide bomber
rammed his explosives-laden vehicle into the CIA’s Special
Investigation Unit in Peshawar.
October 23: At least 15 people were injured in a bombing outside a
restaurant in the Hayatabad area. The bomb was planted in a car.
October 28: A remote-controlled car bomb killed 117 people –
including women and children – and injured around 200 others at
the Meena Bazaar in Peshawar.
November 8: At least 18 people, including a local councillor heading
an anti-Taliban Lashkar (militia), were killed and 44 others injured
when a suicide bomber blew him up in a cattle market at Adezai
village, 25 km south of the capital city of Peshawar.
November 9: Three persons, including a policeman, were killed and
5 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber riding an autorickshaw blew himself up at a police barricade on the Ring Road in
the Latifabad area of Peshawar.
November 10: Suicide car bomb blast at Farooq-e-Azam Chowk,
Charsadda. Thirty two people were killed and 80 were injured in the
incident.
November 12: Syed Abul Hassan Jaffry, media manager of the
Iranian consulate in Peshawar, was shot dead near his home in
Gulbarg. Jaffry was going to his office when he was shot at pointblank range as he turned his car towards the Swati Phatak.
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November 13: At least 17 people, including 10 military personnel,
were killed and 60 injured when a suicide bomber on an explosiveladen Shehzore truck detonated the explosive material in front of
the regional headquarters of the ISI in Peshawar.
November 13: Twelve people, including 5 security officials, were
killed and 26 injured in a suicide attack at a Police Station in the
Bannu town of Bannu District.
November 14: At least 12 persons, including a policeman and a
three-year-old child, were killed and another 35 injured when a
suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vehicle at police
check post in Pashta Kharra Chowk, Peshawar.
November 16: Four persons were killed and more than 30 others
sustained injuries in a suicide car bombing which targeted the
Badhber Police Station on the Kohat Road near Peshawar.
November 19: At least 20 people, including three policemen, were
killed and 50 others injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up
at the main gate of the Judicial Complex on Khyber Road in
Peshawar.
November 19: A bomb attack on the police van ripped through the
vehicle, killing two policemen on the spot and wounding five
civilians on the outskirts of Peshawar.
November 25: The cleaner of an oil tanker, used for NATO forces
in Afghanistan, was killed and its driver injured when unidentified
gunmen attacked the vehicle on the Ring Road near Tor Baba.
November 26: A remote-controlled bomb blast injured three
people, including two policemen and a young girl, and destroyed an
electricity pylon in Bashirabad area.
November 30: Two police officials were injured when unidentified
armed men attacked their vehicle on the Indus Highway, police said.
December 1: A leading politician, Shamsher Ali Khan, was
reportedly killed when a suicide bomber targeted a guest house
where he was present. Another 8 people, including his brother, were
injured in this attack.
December 3: A police official was injured in an explosion at a police
check-post in the Ragai area of capital Peshawar.
December 5: At least four people, including a women, were killed
and 12 people were injured in a car bomb explosion at United Plaza,
Tehkal Market, University Road, Peshawar.
December 7: At least 12 people, including 2 policemen, were killed
and 50 were injured in a suicide attack outside a court in Peshawar.
December 22: A suicide bomber blew himself at the gate of the
Peshawar Press Club, killing 3 persons including a policeman, and
injuring 17 others.
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December 24: At least 5 people, including a policeman, were killed
and 24 were injured in a suicide attack near State Life Building,
Saddar, Mall Road, Peshawar.
Terrorist attack in Balochistan
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January 4: Armed men killed a trooper of the Balochistan
Constabulary, identified as Abdul Hakeem, in the Shallkot area of
Quetta. The attack appeared to be a targeted killing.
January 5: Unidentified assailants killed two Shias on Kirani Road,
Quetta, despite tight security arrangements due to Muharram.
January 10: Unidentified men killed a central leader of the Fiqah
Jafferia along with his guard in Sibi District.
January 14: Unidentified assailants killed four policemen, including a
DSP in a shootout on Siryab Road. Three of the murdered
policemen belonged to Hazara community and were Shia.
January 26: Hussain Ali Yousafi, chairman of the Hazara
Democratic Party, was shot dead by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the
southwestern city of Quetta.
February 2: John Solecki, head of the UN High Commission for
Refugees office in Quetta, was kidnapped and his driver was killed
after his vehicle was ambushed in Quetta.
February 2: Unidentified gunmen killed a Shia trader in Quetta in an
attack apparently linked to the recent cycle of sectarian killings in
the provincial capital.
February 18: In a suspected sectarian incident, unidentified men
killed the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat-Noorani provincial
leader Maulana Iftikhar Ahmed Habibi in Quetta.
February 24: A Shia trader and three of his sons were shot dead in
an apparent sectarian attack on Sariab Road, Quetta.
March 1: In an apparent act of sectarian violence in Quetta,
unidentified men murdered a man and his son, both from the Shia
sect. The motorcycle borne attackers opened fire on the victims at
their shop on Quetta’s Double Road.
March 2: Six people were killed and 12 others, mostly students,
sustained injuries in a suicide attack on a madrassa (seminary) in Kili
Karbala in the Pishin District. The Jamaat-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur
Rehman faction JUI-F) provincial chief Maulana Muhammad Khan
Shirani, the Balochistan Assembly Deputy Speaker Syed Matiullah
Agha and provincial ministers belonging to the party were attending
a ceremony at the seminary when a 15-year-old boy blew himself up
in front of the stage. However, all the JUI-F leadership escaped
unhurt.
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March 3: Five Shias were killed in Quetta when unidentified
assailants attacked members of a family in the city.
March 9: Unidentified men on a motorbike killed two Shias in an
apparent sectarian attack in Quetta. The victims were shot in their
car on Kirani road, on the outskirts of the Balochistan capital.
April 22: Unidentified militants threw a hand grenade at policemen
deployed on the outskirts of Quetta, injuring four policemen and a
passerby. Police personnel were on duty in the Hazar Ganji area.
May 3: Unidentified assailants shot dead two policemen on the
Arbab Karam Khan Road.
May 28: At least five persons, including a woman, were killed when
unidentified attackers opened indiscriminate fire on a customer
service centre on Kalat Street, Jail Road, Quetta.
June 22: Three Shias, including a union council chief, were killed in
Quetta by unidentified men in a suspected sectarian incident.
Unidentified armed men reportedly opened fire on Talib Agha,
Union Council 47 chief in Quetta, when he was on his way home
along with his driver and security guard.
June 23: The principal of the Government Commerce College was
shot dead by two motorcycle borne assailants in a suspected
sectarian incident in Quetta.
July 23: Haji Mohammad Mohsin, principal of the Government
High School in Sariab Mills, was going to school when armed men
riding a motorcycle opened fire on him, killing him on the spot.
July 24:Unidentified assailants shot dead a Professor of the
Government Degree College on the Sariab Road.
July 29: A woman was killed and six persons, including two SF
personnel, were injured in a grenade attack on a check-post of the
Frontier Corps (FC) in the Sairab Road area.
June 30: Four people were killed and 11 wounded when a bomber
targeted a hotel in Kalat in the first-ever suicide attack in
Balochistan. The attack in Kalat District appeared to be aimed at
disrupting supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan.
July 31: Two SF personnel were killed while three others sustained
injuries when unidentified miscreants lobbed a hand grenade at a
security vehicle on the Spiny Road area.
August 12: Two persons were killed and six others sustained injuries
in a bomb blast and firing incident in the Irrigation Colony area on
Sariab Road, Quetta.
August 17: Cardiologist Dr Abid Iqbal Zaidi was shot dead by
unidentified armed men on the Fatima Jinnah Road.
August 17: A man and his two sons were shot dead by unidentified
armed men on Sirki Road.
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September 5: Unidentified militants hurled two hand grenades on
the City Police Station building, injuring 21 persons including six
policemen.
September 8: Suspected Taliban militants set ablaze eight oil tankers
near the Western Bypass, when the tankers were carrying fuel for
NATO forces in Afghanistan.
October 8: Three police officials were injured in a bomb blast at the
Spiny Road. The blast took place near a police van which was on a
routine patrol on the road.
October 12: Unidentified armed men killed the Balochistan Chief
Mines Inspector on Sariab Road in Quetta. Ashraf Ali was a
member of the Shia Hazara community.
October 13: In another incident of target-killing, the Jamhoori
Watan Party Vice-President, Muhammad Aslam Mirza, and his
driver were shot dead by unidentified armed men in the Shalkot
area.
October 15: Two persons, including a Frontier Corps trooper, were
killed and five others injured in terrorist attacks in Quetta
October 23: Unidentified gunmen killed an official of the
intelligence Bureau (IB), Tanveer Raza, while he was walking on
Zargoon Road near the office of the Railways divisional
superintendent.
October 25: Unidentified gunmen killed the Balochistan Education
Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan, a member of the Pakistan People’s
Party, outside his residence on Thogai Road, while his brother’s
father-in-law, Hydayat Jaffar, was injured in the same attack.
November 7: 13 people, including two children and a trooper, were
injured when a hand grenade exploded at a Frontier Corps
checkpost near Meezan Chowk.
November 17: DIG Police (Operations) Shahid Nizam Durrani and
his driver were injured in a bomb blast on Spiny Road. Eight
persons, mainly policemen, were injured in the blast.
November 23: Two policemen were shot dead in Quetta in what
appeared to be a case of target killing. The policemen, Sardar
Muhammad Samalani and Syed Amir Muhammad Khilji, were on
routine patrol on Qambrani Road when unidentified assailants
opened fire at them, police said.
December 7: A car bomb blast injured nine persons and damaged
several vehicles and shops at the main gate of the Junior Assistant
Colony in the Chaman Housing Society, Quetta.
December 8: The Saryab station house officer and two other
policemen were injured in a hand-grenade attack on a police convoy
on the Sabzal Road in Quetta of Balochistan.
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Terrorist Attacks in Punjab
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February 5: At least 32 persons were killed and 48 others wounded
when a suspected suicide bomber blew himself amidst a crowd of
Shia worshippers outside a mosque in Dera Ghazi Khan.
February 7: At least 7 officers were killed in an ambush attack on a
checkpoint in Mianwali in Punjab.
March 3: A convoy carrying Sri Lankan cricketers and officials in
two buses was fired upon by 12 gunmen, near the Gaddafi Stadium
in Lahore. The cricketers were on their way to play the third day of
the second Test against the Pakistani cricket team. Six members of
the Sri Lankan cricket team were injured. Six Pakistani policemen
and two civilians were killed.
March 16: At least 15 people were killed and 25 injured when a
suicide bomber blew himself up near a busy bus stand at Pirwadhai
in Rawalpindi.
March 30: Nine people, including 8 police recruits and a civilian,
were killed and 93 cadets and civilians were injured when about 10
terrorists attacked the Manawan Police Training School in Lahore
with guns and grenades.
April 05: A suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance of an
Imambargah at Chakwal in Punjab province, killing 24 people,
including three children, and injuring 140 others.
May 27: At least 27 people were killed and 326 were injured in a
suicide car bomb blast near offices of the capital city police officer
(CCPO) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Lahore. An ISI
colonel and 15 police officials were among those killed.
June 12: Seven persons, including a prominent anti-Taliban cleric
Sarfaraz Naeemi, were killed and seven injured when a suicide
attacker detonated himself at the Jamia Naeemia madrassa
(seminary) in the Garhi Shahu area shortly after Friday prayers.
July 2: At least 7 people were killed and 36 persons were injured
when a young suicide bomber rammed his motorcycle into a bus
carrying employees of the Army-run Heavy Mechanical Complex at
the Peshawar Road near Chur Chowk in Rawalpindi.
August 20: Eight people, including 4 policemen, were injured when
a bomb exploded close to a police patrol car on the Misryal road in
Rawalpindi.
September 6: Three policemen were shot dead in Hasan Abdal in
apparent act of targeted killing.
October 10: At least 14 people, including six soldiers, five SSG
commandos, three hostages, were killed in an attack on Pakistan
Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.
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•
October 15: At least 19 people, including 14 security officials, were
killed and 41 others sustained injuries in three separate terror attacks
in Lahore. The attacks were carried out at the Federal Investigation
Agency (FIA) building on the Temple Road, the Manawan Police
Training School and the Elite Police Academy on the Bedian Road.
• October 23: Eight persons were killed and 17 others sustained
injuries when a suicide bomber exploded himself at a police checkpost on the GT Road near the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex
(PAC) in Kamra in the Attock District.
• October 24: A Motorway police official was killed when a suicide
bomber detonated his explosives-laden car near Lillah Interchange
close to Kalar Kahar.
• November 2: At least 35 persons, including two women and
children, were killed and 63 others sustained injuries when a suicide
bomber blew himself up outside a branch of the National Bank of
Pakistan in Rawalpindi.
• December 4: At least 42 people were killed and 77 people were
injured in firing and two suicide blasts at Parade Lane Mosque, near
the Pakistani army's headquarters in Rawalpindi.
• December 7: Two bomb blasts killed at least 45 people, and injured
more than 100 at the crowded Moon Market in Allama Iqbal area of
Lahore in Punjab. The two bombs exploded 30 seconds apart at
8:45 PM (PST).
December 8: A group of three Taliban militants launched a gun,
rocket and suicide attack on the office of ISI, killing at least 12 people
and injuring 18people in Multan, Punjab.
Terrorist Attacks in Islamabad
•
•
•
•
March 23: A policemen was killed and 2 policemen were injured in a
suicide bomb blast at the entrance of the headquarters of the Special
Branch (SB), an intelligence agency of the Federal Capital Police, in
Sitara Market.
April 04: Eight Frontier Constabulary (FC) personnel were killed,
and seven others injured, when a suicide bomber blew himself up at
an FC check post on the Margala Road in Islamabad.
June 6: Two policemen were killed and four others injured in a
suicide attack on a Rescue 15 office at Sector G-8 in capital
Islamabad.
September 2: Religious Affairs Minister Hamid Saeed Kazmi was
injured in a brazen attack in Islamabad while his driver and a police
guard were killed.
•
•
•
•
•
•
25
October 5: A suicide bomber targeted the United Nations World
Food Programme (WFP) office in Islamabad, killing five persons,
including a UN diplomat and two women employees. Six other staff
members were injured.
October 20: Two suicide bombers targeted the new campus of the
International Islamic University Islamabad in the H-10 sector of
Islamabad, killing at least six students and staff members, including
two female students, and injuring more than 29 others.
October 22: A serving Army brigadier, Moinuddin Ahmad, and his
driver were gunned down in Islamabad.
October 27: A military officer, Brigadier Waqar Ahmad, escaped
death as two gunmen riding a motorbike attacked his car.
November 6: Gunmen opened fire on an army brigadier vehicle in
Islamabad. Brigadier Sohail and his driver were injured in the
incident.
December 2: An official of the Pakistan Navy foiled a suicide attack
on the Naval Headquarters at Zafar Chowk on the Margalla Road in
the national capital Islamabad. However, two Navy personnel were
killed in the attack, while 13 persons were injured.
Terrorist Attacks in Sindh
•
•
•
•
•
•
January 20: In a suspected sectarian incident, unidentified gunmen
shot dead a shop owner from the Ahmadiyya community outside
his house in the Kotri District of Sindh province.
February 1: An explosion in the Saddar Town of Karachi killed one
person and injured two others. One unidentified man - who
fidgeted with the bomb planted in a garbage dump, which caused
the explosion - died and two others sustained injuries.
April 15: A 28-year-old sectarian worker-turned-lawyer was shot
dead near Hamdard Dawakhana off the arterial M.A. Jinnah Road in
Karachi. Mazharul Islam, was a former member of the banned
Sunni outfit SSP.
May 22: Four persons were injured in a cross-fire between two
groups after pro-Taliban slogans were found painted on the walls of
a church in Surjani Town, Karachi.
May 24: A senior activist of the banned SSP was shot dead in a
target killing. 40-year old Allauddin was the Lines Area Unit incharge of the banned Sunni outfit, and had earlier worked for the
LeJ.
May 27: Another activist of the banned Sunni outfit SSP was shot
dead while his son Sufian was injured by two gunmen near a Tandur
in Gulshan-e-Iqbal in the Aziz Bhatti Police limits of Karachi.
26
IPRI Factfile
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
June 5: Mir Yaqub Bizenjo, legislator from Balochistan, three of his
relatives and a servant were injured after a parcel bomb exploded in
his Defence Society house in Karachi.
July 15: Unidentified men killed the central legal adviser of the
outlawed Sunni group, the SSP, Hafiz Ahmed Buksh, in Model
Colony in Karachi.
July 16: Two more activists of the outlawed SSP, including a guard
of the group’s central leader Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem, were
killed in Karachi. One of them died at a hospital after being injured
in the clash a day earlier while another’s body was recovered from
Model Colony.
August 17: Armed men shot dead Allama Ali Sher Hyderi, chief of
the banned SSP, along with his associate Imtiaz Phulpoto at
Khairpur in the Sindh province.
September 18: At least three persons sustained bullet injuries during
a sectarian clash, which erupted at Iftar time in the precincts of
Soldier Bazaar Police Station at Karachi in Sindh. The clash took
place between the Shia community and the people belonging to the
Deobandi school of thought over the use of loudspeaker during
Iftar.
November 19: Ghulam Muhammad Waezi, a Shia clericm was shot
dead in the Orangi Town area of Karachi, within the jurisdiction of
Tori Bungash Police Station.
November 20: In a suspected sectarian incident, the general
secretary of the banned Sunni outfit SSP Karachi chapter, Engineer
Ilyas Zubair, was shot dead and provincial information secretary,
Qari Shafiqur Rehman Alvi, wounded at Teen Hatti under the
Jamshed Quarters Police Station jurisdiction in Karachi.
December 7: The leader of Pasban-e-Aza, a Shia organization was
shot dead by unidentified militants in a suspected sectarian attack in
the remit of the Brigade Police Station of Karachi. The slain leader
was identified as Syed Shahid Hussain.
December 28: At least 40 people were killed and more than 90 were
injured in a suicide attack on Ashura procession at M A Jinnah
Road. Enraged people set major commercial centers around the
blast scene on fire and burnt dozens of vehicles. Violence erupted
across the city.
December 26: A remote controlled bomb blast injured nearly 26
Shia mourners at Khalifat Chowk in North Nazimabad Town of
Karachi.
December 26: Another bomb blast in Orangi Town in Karachi left
24 people injured. Angry mob had resorted to arsons and anti-
27
government protests in reaction to the blast.
Samaa TV, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, December 29, 2009,
http://www.hrcp-web.org/shownews.asp?id=39
P AKISTAN L OST $35 BN IN 3 Y EARS IN W AR
H INA R ABBANI
ON
T ERROR :
Pakistan’s direct and indirect cost in the war on terror has been around $35
billion over the last three years, Minister of State for Economic Affairs Hina
Rabbani Khar said on Friday. She expressed these views during a meeting with
Giuseppe Vegas, Italian deputy minister for economy and finance, who called
on her in Islamabad. She said the public sector development programme
allocation for the next financial year might have to be curtailed due to this
rising cost of war on terror. She said Pakistan had lost the most in the war, as
Pakistani casualties were more than the total number of casualties of all the
NATO forces combined. Vegas said his government would encourage Italian
businessmen and entrepreneurs to invest in Pakistan to take benefit from its
growing market. He also showed interest in initiating various development
projects in Gilgit-Baltistan, particularly in the tourism sector.
Daily Times (Lahore), February 20, 2010,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\20\story_20-22010_pg7_2
N EW D IMENSIONS
OF
C OUNTER -T ERRORISM
Pakistan has gone a long way in countering terrorism over the last one year. Its
civilian government and the military top brass are in harmony on dealing
effectively with the Taliban and other groups that are directly challenging the
writ of the Pakistani state.
The army authorities have shown greater determination to deal firmly
with Islamic militants despite periodic pressures generated on the security
personnel by Islamic parties and orthodox Islamic clerics who question the
legitimacy of these operations and accuse the Pakistani civilian and military
authorities of fighting against Pakistanis at the behest of the US.
Pakistan’s counter-terrorism security operations, 2009-2010, have four
major features. First, the Swat/Malakand operation initiated on April 26, 2009,
was the first successful attempt by the Pakistan Army, the Air Force and the
paramilitary forces to dislodge the Taliban from a vast territory. The security
operation in South Waziristan was launched in mid-October and by the end of
December the security forces had knocked the Taliban out of most of South
Waziristan. This was a major loss for the TTP that used South Waziristan as its
headquarters and provided military training to its fighters as well as to the
28
IPRI Factfile
activists of some militant groups from mainland Pakistan. It had also
developed elaborate facilities for training suicide bombers. As the spring
season sets in, the Pakistani military will step up its activities to establish its
control on the rest of South Waziristan.
Second, the army and its affiliates are now fighting the TTP activists and
other militant groups that have created enclaves in other tribal agencies. The
focus is on Khyber, Orakzai, Mohmand, Kurram and Bajaur Agencies. There
have been pitched battles between the security forces and different militant
groups in these Agencies where the militants had established vast underground
security networks and training centres and collected weapons. The security
forces have made considerable gains but the militant challenge continues to be
formidable.
Third, the intelligence agencies have discovered strong linkages between
various militant groups in Punjab and the TTP. Invariably, the former acted as
facilitators for the suicide bombers in the urban areas and their activists got
training in the tribal areas. Pakistan’s security agencies arrested a large number
of the activists of the Punjab-based militant groups in order to weaken their
linkages with the TTP. This partly disrupted the terrorism chain that linked
Punjab with the tribal areas.
Fourth, a major shift has taken place in the disposition of the Pakistan
Army and the intelligence agencies towards the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban
in January-February 2010. Some of the well known Afghan Taliban leaders and
TTP activists have been arrested in different cities, especially from Karachi.
According to one source, more than half of the Quetta Shura has been
arrested in February-March. The media reported the arrest of Mullah Omar’s
son-in-law from Karachi on March 3. This is a major revision of Pakistan’s
policy because until recently its security authorities denied any significant
presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s tough approach towards the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban is
the product of the down-to-earth analysis of the growing Taliban threat by
Pakistan’s security authorities and the increased interaction between the top
brass of the Pakistan Army and the US military authorities dealing with this
region during the last six months. This interaction was backed up by active
diplomatic interaction between the two countries.
Until 2009, the army top brass were not fully convinced that they should
opt for a full-fledged and sustained security operation against the local Taliban.
The civilian authorities were also divided on this. However, the army
authorities were alarmed by the ability of the Taliban to control most of Swat
and their refusal to moderate their ways even after the NWFP government
agreed to implement the Shariah-based judicial system in Swat. The Taliban
and the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) of Sufi
Muhammad showed greater defiance and the Taliban began to expand their
domain to the adjoining areas. The spectre of the Taliban advancing into
29
mainland Pakistan emboldened the hard-line Islamic clerics and groups in the
cities who began to harass women and others in the name of Islam.
Furthermore, several terrorist attacks in Lahore and other cities in FebruaryApril of last year created a crisis of credibility for the government.
The fear of losing credibility in the face of the Taliban onslaught led the
civilian government and the army to put their foot down vis-à-vis the Taliban
and other militant elements. Their counter-terrorism operations strengthened
their resolve to dislodge the Taliban because they faced tough resistance from
the Taliban and the army and the paramilitary forces lost over 200 personnel
in Swat/Malakand and the tribal areas in 2009. They also realised that the
Taliban had created a strong military infrastructure with tunnels, weapons
storage and training areas in South Waziristan, Bajaur and other tribal areas.
The army also discovered some evidence of foreign support to the Pakistani
Taliban. Also, the Taliban-backed suicide attacks during October-December of
last year, in various cities, especially in Peshawar, convinced the security
authorities that the Taliban want chaos and anarchy in Pakistan.
The Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies are now taking action
against the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban because they found out that the
Afghan Taliban were helping the Pakistani Taliban in their fight against
Pakistan. The military wants to convey a clear message to the Afghan Taliban
that if they help those fighting the Pakistan Army, then Pakistan’s security
authorities have the capacity to make their life difficult. Further, the Pakistan
Army and intelligence authorities want to tell the Afghan Taliban that they
cannot be allowed to threaten Pakistan’s interests in the tribal areas and
Afghanistan.
These arrests are also meant to help the US because Pakistan wants the
current US-led NATO operation to succeed in Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot
afford to let the Afghan Taliban capture power in Kabul, although it would
like more effective Pashtun representation in the Kabul government, including
accommodation of the Taliban that are willing to give up the military option.
Pakistan’s cooperation with the current US policy in Afghanistan is
based on the assumption that the US military authorities in the region
recognise Pakistan’s security sensitivities about India’s role in Afghanistan and
India’s pressure on the eastern border. The other consideration is that the US
would contribute to upgrading Pakistan’s capacity to fight the Taliban in the
tribal areas. If these understandings persist, Pakistan is expected to continue
with the current counter-terrorism policy.
Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, Daily Times (Lahore), March 07, 2010,
30
IPRI Factfile
S UICIDES B OMBING
AND
D R T AHIRUL Q ADRI ’ S F ATWA
It is very positive on the part of Maulana Dr Tahirul Qadri for issuing a 600page fatwa against the suicide bombing, a thing which should have been done
much earlier, that too by the Ulema in Pakistan as a whole and by leading
scholars of Islam in the Muslim world. It is also encouraging to note Dr
Qadri’s announcement on CNN and BBC channels that he would alone fight
for the cause if no other Ulema come forward in this direction. One wonders
why the Ulema in Pakistan are particularly mum over the suicide blasts across
the country. No one speaks against it. No one dares to say that suicide
bombing is Haram in Islam, it is against the text of Quran and teachings of the
Holy Prophet. The Ulema have in their access the most effective medium of
communication – the mosque. They can tell the people, that: (1) Surah AlMaeda, Ayah No. 32 says: “He who kills a human being (whether Muslim or
non-Muslim), he has killed the whole humanity. He who saves one life, it is
but equal to saving the whole humanity.” (2) In Surah Al-Nisaa, Ayah 29, it is
clearly said that suicide is Haraam: “Don’t kill yourself, there is no doubt that
Allah is Merciful to you.” Committing suicide is equal to interfering in the
working of Allah. It is as equal to rejecting the blessings of Allah the man is
bestowed with. (3) Man is not allowed to kill himself even in the heights of
unbearable pains of disease, despondency and any other circumstances. (4)
When a Muslim valiant fighter in one of the Ghazwas got unbearable wounds
and stabbed himself to death, Hazrat Jundub (RA) heard the Holy Prophet
saying: “the man has shut the doors of Jannah in bid to rush to Jannah.” His
bravery, his Jehad and all deeds of righteousness which he did in the past all
went down the drain because he took the decision of his life and death in his
hands. (5) The Holy Prophet used to give instructions to the faithful before
going for a Ghazwa, forbidding: “No one will attack the unarmed, the women,
the children, the patients, the elders, who offer no resistance, who surrenders,
who is given amnesty by anyone from the Muslims.” (6) Surah Al-Baqrah’s
Ayah 193 says: “Don’t pick up arms against other than aggressors.” (7) There
is famous Hadith of the Prophet (PBUH), which says: “He who kills himself
by iron shrapnel, will be beaten by the same iron shrapnel in the Hell.” It is the
duty of our Ulema, not to stay calm and speak against the menace of suicide
blasts. Luckily, the prestigious Jamia Al-Azhar Egypt’s Mufti-e-Azam Sheikhul-Azam Qarat Muhammad Abdul Hameed Al Bashar has come out with the
latest fatwa that suicide attacks, in Pakistan, are against the Shariah. He said
Muslims are on both sides and there is no reason to fight against each other.
He urged the Islamic scholars to preach the teachings of Quran and the Holy
Prophet (PBUH). Probably we at the labyrinth of our moral decay that we are
not even ready to pay heed to such Fatwas whereas till the early days of last
century a fatwa by Mufti Azam of Islam had held the status of decree for all
31
Muslims of the world. If the masterminds, the Taliban, al-Qaeda men, proTaliban militants of tribal areas are true Muslims, they would pay heed to my
words. Ulema must come forward in footsteps of Dr Tahirul Qadri and launch
a full fledged campaign against suicide bombing as Haram and it has nothing
to do with Jannah but they are the merchants of death and hell. Alya Alvi
Editorial, Daily Mail (Islamabad), March, 9, 2010,
http://dailymailnews.com/0310/09/Editorial_Column/DMEditorialMail.php
L ESSONS
FROM
L AHORE
As though we were watching a replay of action that has taken place before,
terrorists have once more targeted a building belonging to the FIA in Lahore.
A very similar attack on a safe house run by the agency and its principal
building in the city had taken place almost exactly two years ago in March
2008. What is unfortunate is that few lessons have been learnt from that
attack. At that time it was said that all the offices of the security agencies
would be moved out of residential areas. This has not happened. The building
struck stood in the residential suburb of Model Town. Had it been shifted,
some loss of life could have been averted with at least one schoolgirl listed
among the 11 persons confirmed so far to have been killed. There are other
lessons, too. As they have done before, both in Lahore and other places, the
terrorists struck early in the morning – at a time when security was not present
anywhere in the vicinity. Despite the fact that the building was an obvious
target, there were no pickets around it. What is more, rescue efforts were
impeded by the fact that teams had only their bare hands with which to try and
shift the massive pile of debris left as the FIA building structure collapsed.
One would have thought that by now, with terrorist attacks a not infrequent
event, equipment of some kind would have been provided to the rescue
workers assigned the task of pulling people out of rubble. …
Editorial, News International (Rawalpindi), March 9, 2010,
http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=227908
T ALIBAN I NCREASINGLY U NPOPULAR
IN
P AKISTAN
The Taliban's presence on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is
largely unwelcome, but increasingly so in Pakistan, where Gallup surveys show
they have lost much of the little appeal they had. Four percent of Pakistanis in
a November-December 2009 poll, conducted prior to Pakistan's current push
to rout the Taliban within its borders, said the Taliban's presence in some
areas of the country has a positive influence, down from 15% in June.
32
IPRI Factfile
Gallup most recently polled Pakistanis in the particularly deadly period
after the army's anti-Taliban operations in the South Waziristan tribal area
started in October. Retributive militant attacks across Pakistan reportedly have
claimed more than 600 Pakistanis' lives since then, which the public's
increasingly negative view of the Taliban may reflect.
The Taliban lost support in every region of Pakistan. But nowhere are
they more unpopular than in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP),
ground zero for a full-scale military offensive against the Taliban last May. In
November-December 2009, 1% of NWFP residents said the Taliban have a
positive influence, down from 11% in June. The percentage saying the
Taliban's influence is positive in Baluchistan, which abuts South Waziristan,
dropped from 26% to 5%.
33
On the other side of the border, Afghans agree with Pakistanis that the
Taliban have a negative influence. However, Afghans' views have remained
relatively unchanged despite the Taliban's threats and violence before the
presidential election in August. In both surveys in 2009, roughly 8 in 10
Afghans said the Taliban has a negative influence. …
Julie Ray & Rajesh Srinivasan, Gallup, March 12, 2010,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126602/taliban-increasingly-unpopular-pakistan.aspx
T ALIBAN D ISTANCING T HEMSELVES
E XPERTS
FROM
A L Q AEDA :
The blasts in Lahore are the last desperate measures of pro-Al Qaeda militants
who are now being abandoned by the Taliban, diplomatic sources told Dawn.
The sources also confirmed a Los Angeles Times report, published on
Saturday, that the Taliban militants in Fata were now refusing to collaborate
with Al Qaeda fighters.
The Taliban were declining to provide shelter or assist in attacks in
Afghanistan even in return for payment, the report said.
“Yes, Pakistani intelligence sources also confirm this assessment,” said a
senior diplomatic source who did not want to be identified.
“There is a sizeable shift away from Al Qaeda,” he said. “Very few are
left who still support Al Qaeda. The vast majority is distancing itself from
them.”
The pro-Al Qaeda militants had been weakened so much in the tribal
areas that they were shifting their people to other areas inside Pakistan, he said.
“In Lahore, they used the Punjabi Taliban to cause Friday’s blasts,” said the
diplomatic source.
“These are the leftovers of the pro-Al Qaeda militants and these are last
desperate measures.”
The militants, he said, would ultimately be forced to give up fighting or
be eradicated. “They have nowhere to go.”
The diplomatic source, like the Los Angeles Times, credited the
Pakistani military operations in Fata for this shift in sentiments against Al
Qaeda. “Their operations have been very successful,” he said.
The source, however, disagreed with the suggestion that the Haqqani
group was still effectively supporting Al Qaeda.
“The Haqqani network is not as effective as the media make it to be.
They too have been weakened. The Pakistani military forces are on a winning
streak and there’s no exaggeration in it,” he said.
Quoting US military and counter-terrorism officials, the Los Angeles
Times reported that the Afghan Taliban began disassociating themselves from
34
IPRI Factfile
Al Qaeda because they feared that links to the international terrorist network
threatened their long-term survival.
Pakistan’s stepped up military campaign, along with intensified US
drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, had made it riskier
for the Taliban to harbour Al Qaeda fighters, the report said.
The newspaper speculated that Al Qaeda’s utility to the Taliban could
also be ending. “In the past, Al Qaeda was able to offer the Taliban bombmaking experts, experienced fighters and large amounts of cash for operations
in Afghanistan in return for haven in Taliban-controlled areas near the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border”, but with Al Qaeda’s resources and operational
capacity dwindling, it is perhaps too risky for the Taliban to cooperate with
them, the report said.
However, the Pakistan-based Haqqani network --- a group active in the
Afghan insurgency --- maintained links to Al Qaeda, despite suffering heavy
casualties from drone strikes, the report added.
“Al Qaeda fighters are in some cases being excluded from villages and
other areas near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where they once received
sanctuary,” US intelligence officials told the Times.
Al Qaeda’s attempts to restore its dwindling presence in Afghanistan
were also running into problems, the officials told the paper.
According to the report, Al Qaeda is believed to have fewer than 100
operatives still in Afghanistan.
Last year, the organisation began offering stipend to Afghans who
would escort its operatives into the country, but there were indications that
many Taliban were refusing this inducement, one US official said.
The Al Qaeda-Taliban rupture has led to a debate within the US
government about whether there are ways to exploit any fissures. One idea
under consideration is to reduce drone strikes against Taliban factions whose
members are shunning contacts with Al Qaeda. “The arrest in recent months
of several top Afghan Taliban leaders may also be leading some Taliban to
reassess their ties to Al Qaeda in hopes of easing pressure from the InterServices Intelligence,” the report said.
Anwar Iqbal, Dawn (Islamabad), March 14, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/front-page/taliban-distancing-themselves-from-al-qaeda-experts-430
332 T ERROR H ITS C LAIMED 5,704 L IVES S INCE 9/11
The extent to which Pakistan has borne the brunt of the US-led War against
Terror can be gauged from the fact that during the last 102 months since the
9/11 episode, the country has averagely been rocked by terrorists every 10th
35
day during this period, which has witnessed 332 terrorism-related incidents
inflicting 5,704 deaths till date.
While 58 terrorism-related incidents have jolted Peshawar (Charsadda
and Darra Adamkhel included) since September 11, 2001, the twin cities of
Rawalpindi and Islamabad have been hit 46 times by terrorists in these last
eight and a half years.
A research conducted by The News, using statistics and chronology
recorded by the US Department of State, archives of Pakistani newspapers and
websites carrying information about global terrorism, has revealed that while
the port city of Karachi has been struck 37 times by terrorists during this
period under review, Lahore has confronted such happenings on 21 occasions,
the same number as the Swat valley.
While Quetta has so far seen blood pouring down its drains 18 times,
Dera Ismail Khan has been attacked 16 times by the terrorists during this still
ongoing war. The Pakistan Army personnel and installations of country’s
armed forces, outside the war zones of Swat, South and North Waziristan etc,
have been targeted at least 22 times during this time period under review.
Meanwhile, not fewer than 105 terrorism incidents have taken place
since in the war-ridden Bajaur Agency, Kurram Agency, Orakzai Agency,
Lower and Upper Dir, Mohmand Agency, South Waziristan and North
Waziristan agencies etc.
The NWFP cities mainly hit include Hangu, Kohat, Shangla, Buner,
Bannu, Mansehra, Buner, Haripur, Nowshehra, Lakki Marwat and Parachanar
etc. Terror has also whacked the calm of Dera Bugti four times.
The residents of Bahawalpur, Sialkot, Hub, Sargodha and Faisalabad
found themselves strapped in the grip of fear on two occasions each.
Horror also haunted Multan, Mian Channu, Taxilla, Pishin, Panjgur,
Gujranwala, Wah, Dera Ghazi Khan, Kalat, Kamra, Bhakkar, Chakwal,
Mianwali, Hassan Abdal and Muzaffarabad etc, at least once each.
During this fright-studded period, high-ranking al-Qaeda officials like
Abu Zubaida and Ramzi Binalshibh were arrested by Pakistani officials on
March 23, 2002, and September 14, 2002, respectively.
Similarly, on March 1, 2003, Wall Street Journal newsman Daniel Pearl’s
killer Khalid Shaikh Muhammed was arrested during CIA-led raids on a
suburb of Rawalpindi.
At the time of his capture, Khalid was the third highest ranking official
in al-Qaeda and was believed to have supervised the planning for the
September 11 attacks on the US.
Khalid Sheikh Muhammed was also linked the USS Cole bombing, an
attempt to blow up a civilian airliner with a shoe bomb and the terrorist attack
at a synagogue in Tunisia.
Claiming that it has lost around $35 billion since joining the stillcontinuing War on Terror, Pakistan witnessed only two terror-related incidents
36
IPRI Factfile
in 2001, 14 in 2002, just 8 in 2003, 18 in 2004, 11 in 2005, 16 in 2006, 56 in
2007, 72 in 2008, 130 in 2009 and 29 in the first two-and-a-half months of
2010 till the fling of this report.
The year 2009 of course remained the bloodiest of all with 130 incidents
claiming around 1,800 lives, followed by 2008 which saw 1,565 people falling
prey to 72 such attacks.
Terror in Pakistan claimed the lives of eminent personalities like the
two-time Premier Benazir Bhutto (December 27, 2007), banned Anjuman-eSipah-e-Sihaba chief Maulana Azam Tariq (October 6, 2003), former Interior
Minister Lt Gen (R) Moinuddin Haider’s elder brother Ehteshamuddin Haider
(December 21, 2000), noted religious scholar Ghulam Murtaza Malik (May 7,
2002), eminent Deobandi scholar and head of Islamic religious school Jamia
Binoria, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai (May 30, 2004), leading Shia scholar and
Chief of Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, Allama Hassan Turabi (July 14, 2006), Chief
of Peshawar City Police Malik Saad (January 27, 2007), former Jamiat Ulemae-Islam MNA and Wafaqul Madaris Vice Chairman Maulana Hassan Jan
(September 15, 2007), Pakistan Army’s top medic Lt Gen Mushtaq Baig
(February 25, 2008), former head of Pakistan Army’s Special Services Group
Maj Gen (R) Ameer Faisal Alvi (November 19, 2008), Awami National Party
Provincial law-maker Alam Zeb Khan (February 11, 2009), leading Sunni
Barelwi cleric Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi (June 12, 2009), Punjab-born
Balochistan Education Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan (October 25, 2009),
Balochistan’s Deputy Inspector General Nizam Shahid Durrani (November
19, 2009), ANP politician Shamsher Ali Khan (December 1, 2009), former
NWFP Education Minister Ghani-ur-Rehman (January 3, 2010), Peshawar’s
District Police Officer Iqbal Marwat (February 12, 2010) and Jamaat Ahl-eSunnat’s key leaders Mufti Saeed Jalalpuri (March 11, 2010) and Maulana
Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem (March 14, 2010).
During this particular period, former President Pervez Musharraf
survived three life attempts.
While Musharraf saw death close to him twice in December 2003, he
also managed to survive the July 6, 2006, attack aimed at his life.
Then Corps Commander Karachi Lt Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat also
narrowly escaped on June 10, 2004, when gunmen opened fire at his convoy in
Karachi.
On July 30, 2004, there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt on
the Prime Minister-elect Shaukat Aziz, while he was campaigning for a byelection in Attock District.
On August 2, 2004, Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Mohammad Yousaf
also managed to deceive death.
On April 28, 2006, the then Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Sherpao,
survived an assassination bid at Charsadda.
37
On July 17, 2007, another suicide bomber blew himself up outside the
venue of the district bar council convention in Islamabad, just be-fore the
arrival of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.
Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto also escaped unhurt on October
18, 2007, when her convoy was attacked in Karachi upon her return from a
long exile, but could not ride her luck the second time she was fatally targeted
on December 27, 2007.
On October 30, 2007, a suicide bomber struck a police checkpoint in
the high security zone of Rawalpindi, less than a kilometre from President
Musharraf’s Camp Office.
The blast also splattered the checkpost outside the residence of then
Chief of the General Staff General Tariq Majid.
On November 9, 2007, a suicide bomber detonated explosives at the
house of the then Federal Political Affairs Minister Amir Muqam in Peshawar.
The minister escaped unhurt though.
On December 21, 2007, a suicide bomber again unsuccessfully targeted
former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao.
On June 9, 2008, controversial Swat cleric and chief of Tehrik-e-Nifaze-Shariat Muhammadi Maulana Sufi Muhammad survived a remote-controlled
bomb.
On October 2, 2008, a suicide attacker targeted the Charsadda house of
ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan, who survived the attack.
On October 6, 2008, a suicide attacker targeted a gathering at PML-N
legislator Rashid Akbar Nawani’s house in Bhakkar. Nawani luckily survived
the attack.
On November 11, 2008, a suicide bomber blew himself up at a packed
Qayyum Stadium in Peshawar, minutes after the NWFP Governor Owais
Ghani had left the venue and just moments prior to the departure of Senior
Provincial Minister Bashir Bilour.
On March 3, 2009, a convoy carrying Sri Lankan cricketers and officials
in two buses was fired upon near the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore. Six members
of the Sri Lankan cricket team were injured.
On March 11, 2009, senior minister of the NWFP Bashir Bilour
survived yet another assassination attempt in Peshawar.
On June 11, 2009, the NWFP Prisons Minister, Mian Nisar Gul
Kakakhel, was seriously injured when his convoy was ambushed by suspected
militants in Darra Adam Khel.
On September 2, 2009, sitting Religious Affairs Minister Hamid Saeed
Kazmi was injured in a brazen attack in Islamabad.
On February 9, 2010, renowned politician Sheikh Rashid Ahmed was
attacked by militants in Rawalpindi, though Sheikh Rashid managed to live on
38
IPRI Factfile
by ducking the bullets.
Sabir Shah, The News (Rawalpindi), March 18, 2010,
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=229652
T HE S ILENT S URGE
Pakistan's Foreign Minister on What His Country is Doing to
Combat Militant Islamists
Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan's foreign minister, runs a balancing act: on
one side, Islamists and nationalists; on another, the United States; on a third,
India; on a fourth, Afghanistan. Qureshi was in the U.S last week for his
country's strategic dialogue with the State Department, where he affirmed his
government's willingness to fight the Taliban. Afterward, he stopped by
NEWSWEEK's New York office to chat with editors about his military's
"silent surge," the back channel with New Delhi, and the sacrifices Pakistan's
intelligence agency has made fighting militants. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: Tell us about this deal between the U.S and Pakistan
Qureshi: They were a breakthrough dialogue. We finally succeeded in putting
the message across that we have been friends with our allies, and we've had a
long relationship that has been cyclical and transactional. What we need to do
is convert this relationship into a partnership. I have been hammering on this
ever since I became foreign minister, but I think it finally has sunk in.
What do you think caused the breakthrough?
First, the recognition of the need of each other. Second, the realization in
Pakistan that this menace [of the Taliban] is blocking the progress and the
growth of Pakistan. The third factor is that for the first time, the
democratically elected government gave the fight to ownership. Even the
Army felt that we cannot fight the insurgency unless we have public support.
Finally the Obama administration has been engaging more frequently and has
been listening. The fact that they nominated a focal point for a constant
engagement helped, and so did the fact that we demonstrated our seriousness
through actions and sacrifices. Name one nation in the world that has had
31,000 casualties and has arrested, apprehended, and eliminated 17,000
terrorists.
Yet the U.S position has always been until now that you need to do
more. Is that part of the breakthrough?
Not once in this engagement has anyone said to me: "Do more." And for the
first time there is the realization in Washington that their delivery has not
matched the urgency that is required in the field. What we have succeeded in is
converting public opinion and deploying 150,000 troops on the Western
39
borders. Never in Pakistan's existence and history have we ever deployed these
numbers there.
…
Do you want to see them part of it?
That is to the Afghans to decide. For the first time, there is a qualitative
change that people are not realizing. It was often said that Pakistani
intelligence had an interest in who governs Afghanistan. You have had
elections in Afghanistan. Ask the U.N. representative and the EU envoys
there, "What was Pakistan's role?" We took a conscious decision of not
interfering. Whoever the Afghans elect through the democratic process as
their leaders, we will engage and work with them. There has been a change of
thinking in Pakistan and a greater realization in Afghanistan that we are
destined to be together. We share a border. Afghanistan is landlocked and
trade has to go through Pakistan. That is why we are negotiating a new transit
trade agreement. This is all new.
Some say that the offensive against the Taliban might have been short
of going after Taliban leaders who are friendly with Pakistan
intelligence.
You are misreading that we are differentiating between Pakistani Taliban who
are hurting us and Afghan Taliban. I think the distinction that existed is
diminishing. If you look at the late operations in South Waziristan, which was
considered as the [Pakistan Taliban's] headquarters, the myth was that it had
never been occupied by any force and that it was impossible to do it. We have
done it. The next question is: "Fine, you have done that but you are not going
into North Waziristan where the real bad guys are?" My answer is that we are,
but do we have to announce it? It's a tactic again.
Are you sending troops there?
We have troops there. But we have to move according to a plan, in line with
our resources. The strategy that has worked in Pakistan and that has not
worked in Afghanistan is simple: we clear, we hold, once we have held we can
only hold with the support of the population. Now we are at a critical phase of
maintaining the momentum we have gained, which is build and then transfer
authority from military to civilian authority.
Aren't those fierce Pashtun mountain warriors that have taken down
every empire?
Every foreign empire. We are not foreigners. They do not look at us like
aliens, but as saviors, because the people living in the tribal belt are sick and
tired of the Taliban.
40
IPRI Factfile
Do you think there will be visible action in the Northwest Frontier
province in the next six months?
The allied forces call their surge the military surge. We are doing a silent surge.
What is the endgame? Occupy and hold the entire Western region?
On the Pakistani side? Obviously. We want to hold, clear, and frankly to
amalgamate the tribal bit into the mainstream. But it will have to be done in a
phased manner.
Is there a role for American drone strikes in the silent surge?
People understand that drone strikes are a precise and superior technology
that has taken out some well-known targets. The problem has been the
collateral damage. The issue of sovereignty remains. We have used airfire of
late and nobody has complained. A missile fired from one of our planes can
also target innocents. But when a U.S drone fires and kills, people complain.
That is why we have been talking with the administration about transfer of
technology. When you give us the ownership, we will face the consequences,
as well.
What do you say to those who say that you are taking off the battlefield
certain commanders who might be more willing to enter talks and
leaving alone those who are more hardline?
People can look at it in different ways. You can also look at the positive things.
For example, we have this delegation of civilians and military and it is the first
time that you have seen such coordination between the civilian and the
military leadership of Pakistan. That is a positive thing. But some can say,
"Well, the civilians are still not in charge." It is up to you the way you look at
it.
Do you have a timeline for the silent surge?
You can't have a clear timeline. But we are encouraged by the fact that we
have performed better than our expectations. How many in the West could
have predicted that Pakistani troops would go into Swat and clear the valley in
six weeks? Timelines have to be adjusted to ground realities.
For many Americans, the low-water mark of the fight was when the
Taliban offensive came within 50 miles of Islamabad. Where is the front
now?
You cannot clearly identify the front. They can operate in small pockets, a
group of three or four can slip into a big town and carry out a terrorist activity
and run away. Will you call it a front or a hit-and-run operation?
41
In what sense does the Army have ownership of the fight now that they
didn't have before?
People's ownership. Initially it was felt that "It is not our war, why are we
being sucked into it?" But we said, "This is a war that has a direct impact on
Pakistan. Do we want Taliban to succeed in Kabul and target Islamabad with
their ideological agenda and try to impose their agenda on us?" We don't. So if
we don't, we have to stand up and fight them.
Did that change something in poll results?
Absolutely. Yesterday, the 22nd of March, in a place called D.i.Khan, which
has been a hub of activities of militancy, there was a by-election. A political
party which had sympathies and was affiliated with the [coalition of religious
parties Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal] was defeated by my party's candidate in free
elections.
How did President Obama's announcement of the drawdown of the
number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan affect the way regional actors are
behaving now?
The initial interpretation was "If they are leaving in July 2011, then just dig in,
wait, create no problem, and once they leave come out of the woods." But that
interpretation has been dispelled.
Why does the perception that the Pakistani Directorate for InterServices Intelligence (ISI) continues to play a double game persist and
what is the reality of it?
It has changed because ISI has performed significantly against the militants. In
the last 18 months, we have lost something like 300 people and had at least
600 injured. Look at how many times their headquarters have been attacked: in
Peshawar, Lahore, Multan. If ISI is helping them, why are they being attacked
and killed?
Newsweek, March 29, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/235633
U.S. D EFENDS L EGALITY
OF
K ILLING
WITH
D RONES
The Obama administration, facing questions about the legality of its drone
program—a key part of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan's Afghanborder region—is pushing back with a legal defense of a program it only tacitly
acknowledges.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions
and some legal scholars have questioned whether it is legal for the U.S. to
target and execute individuals in countries the U.S. isn't at war with. Professor
42
IPRI Factfile
Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame law school has called
the drone program "unlawful killing," and says it violates international law.
For the first time, a senior Obama administration official—Harold Koh,
the State Department's legal adviser—has publicly articulated the legal basis
for targeted killings.
"In this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority
under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force,
including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as
high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks," Mr. Koh told an
audience of international legal scholars on March 25.
The Central Intelligence Agency has used drones to kill between 400
and 500 suspected militants since January 2009, senior intelligence officials say.
The entire program has been expanded notably since Mr. Obama took office.
While critics of the program cite collateral civilian deaths, intelligence officials
say only about 20 civilians have been killed in that period—a lower estimate
than that made by some independent researchers.
National security hawks in the legal community as well as among former
Obama and Bush administration officials say they worry the legal scrum could
limit the government's ability to track down and kill suspects. The arguments
against the program echo the legal challenges that helped overturn U.S.
policies on the treatment of terrorism detainees.
Mr. Koh's defense in March won agreement from national security
experts such as Ken Anderson, of the Washington College of Law at
American University in Washington, who has urged the administration to
make a legal case to safeguard what has become an important part of the
antiterrorism arsenal.
Mr. Koh's speech was also noteworthy because, before joining the State
Department, Mr. Koh, a human-rights lawyer, was an outspoken critic of most
of the George W. Bush administration's policies regarding the war on
terrorism.Legal criticism of the drone program has continued, however. "A
number of controversial questions were left unanswered" by Mr. Koh's
speech, says Jonathan Manes, a lawyer on the American Civil Liberties Union's
National Security Project. "The speech did not say where the government
draws the line between legitimate targets—combatants and those taking part in
hostitilities—and civilians, who cannot be targeted. The speech also did not set
out any rules on where drones strikes can be used to target and kill
individuals," Mr. Manes says.
The ACLU filed a Freedom of Information suit last month in a bid to
force the government to divulge details of the classified program.
Brett McGurk, a former National Security Council official in the Bush
and Obama administrations currently at the Council on Foreign Relations, says
Mr. Koh sidestepped some of the "thorniest issues" surrounding targeted
43
killing. Mr. McGurk specifically noted questions about "the implications of
civilian agencies—the CIA—controlling the kill chain."
The drone program falls into a legal grey area. International
Humanitarian Law regulates continuous armed conflict between states, with
recognizable combatants—little of which prevails in the U.S. fight against al
Qaeda and its allies.
As a civilian agency and a noncombatant under International
Humanitarian Law, the CIA isn't governed by the same laws of war that cover
U.S. military personnel. The CIA says the program is legal. "Without
confirming any specific activity, CIA's counterterrorism operations are lawful
and precise," said CIA spokeswoman Marie Harf.
A concern voiced by legal scholars and former and current
administration officials is that without an articulated legal basis for the attacks,
U.S. officials could in the future be targeted themselves—by crusading judges
in other countries who see targeted killings as violations of humanitarian law.
Another potential pitfall: The Obama administration relies on a Bushera congressional resolution as its main authority to track and kill suspected al
Qaeda members. That 2001 resolution authorized the president to "use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons" deemed linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks—a justification that
dims as time passes.
Relying on that authorization has its limits, warns Mr. Anderson, the
American University professor as the fight widens to include individuals who
aren't necessarily part of al Qaeda or armed fighters. That roster could include
Anwar al Awlaki, a U.S.-born Muslim cleric believed to be hiding in Yemen,
where the U.S. has aided counterterrorism efforts.
"One of these days, a future president will face new threats that don't
have anything to do" with al Qaeda or the Taliban—and the 2001
congressional authorization won't serve as a legal basis for targeting those
threats, Mr. Anderson says.
Keith Johnson & Siobhan Gorman, Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303450704575159864237752180.ht
ml
O BAMA M OVES
TO
D E - LINK T ERRORISM
FROM I SLAM
U.S. President Barack Obama has ordered a revision of America’s
National Security Strategy with the aim to remove terms that link Islam
to terrorism, administration officials said.
The officials said the change would remove terms like “Islamic
radicalism” from the National Security Strategy, a document that was created
44
IPRI Factfile
by the previous administration to outline the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive
war.
The U.S. National Security Strategy outlines major national security
concerns and the methods to deal with them. Such documents are prepared
periodically by the executive branch of the government for Congress. U.S.
media outlets often refer to this document for borrowing terms to use in a
report.
The Bush-era document describes the war against terrorists as “the
struggle against militant Islamic radicalism … the great ideological conflict of
the early years of the 21st century.” The Council on American-Islamic
Relations on Thursday welcomed the announcement, saying it was a step in
the right direction.
“We welcome this change in language as another step toward respectful
and effective outreach to Muslims at home and abroad,” said CAIR National
Executive Director Nihad Awad.
He recommended that media professionals and commentators adopt
similarly neutral and objective language and avoid “loaded” terminology.
In 2008, the U.S. National Counter-Terrorism Centre produced a
document, called “Words that Work and Words that Don’t: A Guide for
Counter-Terrorism Communication,” which encouraged government agencies
and officials to avoid characterizing Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups as
“Islamic” or “Muslim,” as that could “unintentionally legitimise” their tactics.
U.S. Counterterrorism officials said the move to rewrite the security
strategy is part of an effort to assure the Muslims that the United States does
not link them with terrorism.
Since taking office, President Obama has attempted o seek
reconciliation with the Muslim world. During his landmark speech at Cairo
University in Egypt in June 2009, Mr Obama said that the U.S. did not have
any enmity with the Muslim world.
The document that the Obama administration is consulting for drafting
the new strategy — “A Guide for Counter-Terrorism Communication” —
urges U.S. officials to “avoid labelling everything ‘Muslim.’ It reinforces the
‘U.S. vs. Islam’ framework that Al Qaeda promotes.” It reminds U.S. officials
that “a large percentage of the world’s population subscribes to this religion”
and “unintentionally alienating them is not a judicious move.”
Urging officials not to use the word Islam in conjunction with terrorism,
the guide notes that, “Although the Al Qaeda network exploits religious
sentiments and tries to use religion to justify its actions, we should treat it as an
illegitimate political organisation, both terrorist and criminal.”
Instead of calling terror groups Muslim or Islamic, the guide suggests
using words like totalitarian, terrorist or violent extremist — “widely
understood terms that define our enemies appropriately and simultaneously
deny them any level of legitimacy.”
45
By employing the language the extremists use about themselves, the
guide warns, officials can inadvertently help legitimise them in the eyes of
Muslims.
“Never use the terms ‘jihadist’ or ‘mujahideen’ … to describe the
terrorists,” instructs the guide. “A mujahid, a holy warrior, is a positive
characterisation in the context of a just war. In Arabic, jihad means ‘striving in
the path of God’ and is used in many contexts beyond warfare. Calling our
enemies Jihadis and their movement a global Jihad unintentionally legitimises
their actions.”
The guide also bans the use of the word caliphate to describe Al
Qaeda’s goal. The term “has positive connotations for Muslims,” says the
guide, adding, “The best description of what (Al Qaeda) really want to create is
a ‘global totalitarian state.’”
A longer document — “Terminology to Define the Terrorists:
Recommendations from American Muslims” — says officials should use
“terms such as ‘death cult,’ ‘cult-like,’ ‘sectarian cult,’ and ‘violent cultists’ to
describe the ideology and methodology of Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups.” It recommends eschewing the terms Islamist or Islamism — the
advocacy of a political system based on Islam – while referring to terrorist
groups.
The document urges officials to consider describing Al Qaeda’s ideology
as “Takfirism” — the practice of declaring Muslims, who disagree with
extremism, apostates who can be killed.
Anwar Iqbal, Dawn (Islamabad), April 9, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/international/obama-moves-to-delink-terrorism-from-islam-940
K OHAT K ILLINGS
More than 40 people died near Kohat on Saturday when two suicide bombers
blew themselves up among a crowd of internally displaced persons queuing up
for food rations. Think for a moment about the barbarity of this attack. Warscarred IDPs, many of whom live in makeshift shelters and lead a life of abject
deprivation, somehow found themselves on the hit list of the Lashkar-iJhangvi, a banned terrorist organisation which had also claimed responsibility
for Friday’s suicide attack on a hospital in Quetta. To maximise casualties, the
second bomber waited until a crowd had gathered to help those injured by the
first explosion. In Quetta too the suicide bomber struck when the body of a
prominent Shia man who was shot dead earlier in the day was brought to a
hospital where mourners were present in large numbers. A similar pattern was
seen in Karachi in February this year when a bus carrying passengers to a Shia
procession was hit first and then another explosion took place in the hospital
46
IPRI Factfile
where the wounded were being treated. On Sunday, at least seven civilians
were killed in Kohat in another suicide attack which the Tehrik-i-Taliban
claimed was aimed at security personnel. Among other things, the recent
attacks are further proof of the fact that the Taliban and militants from Punjab
share a common cause.
Taking on the army may be seen by some as a fair fight. But the thought
of killing refugees, attacking hospitals and exploding bombs in busy bazaars
can occur only to those who have lost all touch with humanity. Such tactics
also betray the current desperation of the Taliban and their cohorts. They are
still a fighting force but the myth of invincibility that once surrounded the
militants has dissipated since the armed forces confronted them head-on in
May 2009. Since September last year, the Lashkar-i-Islam in Khyber Agency
has twice asked the government to strike a peace deal. Hitting soft targets and
offers of negotiation are signs of weakness and on no account should the
militants be accommodated in any way until they lay down arms.
Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad), April 20, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/editorial/kohat-killings-040
S OFT
ON
M ILITANCY ?
Monday's suicide bombing in Peshawar’s Qissa Khwani bazaar was an
outrageous suicide attack that left some two dozen people dead and
many more injured. The victims were mostly Jamaat-i-Islami supporters
attending a rally.
It is still not certain whether the target was the JI rally or a police
contingent guarding it. Nevertheless, what is clear is the party’s flawed logic,
for it failed to utter a single word of condemnation against the bomber, his
handlers or even those orchestrating the violence. While the Jamaat leaders
reiterated their stance that they considered the U.S. a ‘terrorist state’, they also
said that the bombing was the result of government failure, and called upon
the provincial government to quit. That was all.
The JI and other rightwing parties, such as the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and
the Tehrik-i-Insaf, have every right to oppose the military’s anti-terror
operations. In fact, they may be doing so in good faith. But what is bad form
and poor politics is their failure to unequivocally condemn the continuing
targeting of innocent women, men and children. We are not sure of the JI’s
views but its public reaction to every act of carnage makes it sound more and
more like an apologist for those perpetrating this senseless violence. Matters
have come to this pass in the erstwhile NWFP and the adjoining tribal areas as
a consequence of the cowardly Musharraf regime’s duplicitous stance on the
militants. The blame must equally fall on the then provincial government of
47
which JI was a part. It acquiesced in, if not encouraged, the activities of the
marauding militants as the latter expanded their influence.
However, we still believe that despite a perceived ideological affinity
with the militants, that perhaps forces the JI to keep quiet over terrorist
activities of the sort witnessed in Peshawar, the party needs to consider one
fact. Notwithstanding its many contradictions and lack of electoral support,
the JI still seems to strive for its aims within the ambit of the law and the
democratic process i.e. through the ballot box. Therefore, it should not allow
itself to be viewed as allied with those who push their agenda by
indiscriminately killing innocent Pakistanis.
Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad) April 23, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/editorial/19-soft-on-militancy-240-hh-02
G ET
THE
M ILITANT L EADERSHIP
In wars, the death of a leader means half the war is won. But, interestingly enough, in the
anti-terror war in this region, the leadership is intact despite the use of all air, ground and
intelligence resources against them
A latest and somewhat stunning report carried by the British media says
the dreaded Waziristan-based Taliban leader Hakeemullah Mehsud is alive.
The information is provided by the customary ‘unnamed sources’ in the
‘intelligence apparatus’ of Pakistan. It was the same ‘unnamed intelligence
sources’ quoted by all and sundry nearly more than three moths ago
confirming the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud in a predator strike carried out
by an unmanned U.S. spy plane in mid-January. Before the surfacing of reports
about Hakeemullah’s death, questions were raised from time to time, both by
the public and in the media, about the whereabouts of another militant leader
Fazlullah, the name behind the worst-ever violence and unrest unleashed in
Swat over the past more than two years.
The report about Hakeemullah being alive appeared at a time when the
government and the security forces are pushing the displaced people from
Waziristan, presently living in camps or with relatives and friends in Bannu, DI
Khan, Tank or other cities, to return to their areas and help the security forces
in the restoration of peace. How can the cowed and crestfallen people of
Waziristan, who had tasted the bitter fruits of militancy on their land over the
past few years, opt to return to their areas when the top man responsible for
their miseries is still alive and may appear at any moment to browbeat the
innocent tribesmen all over again?
In wars, the death of a leader means half the war is won. But,
interestingly enough, in the anti-terror war in this region, the leadership is
48
IPRI Factfile
intact despite the use of all air, ground and intelligence resources against the
militant and terrorist outfits since late 2001.
Al Qaeda top leader Osama bin Ladin, believed to be the mastermind of
the 9/11 attacks and the main force behind the organisation’s operatives, is yet
to be declared dead. His second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is still alive
and kicking. Leader of the Afghan Taliban and the one-time Amirul
Momineen Mullah Muhammad Omar is still alive and issues directions to his
fighters and supporters from undisclosed locations. Besides, he is also in touch
with his shura members and taking key decisions while some fresh reports
suggested that his Taliban had established shadow governments in several
Afghan districts and provinces in the backdrop of the U.S. plan to start
withdrawal of troops from the country next year.
Coming to the Taliban on the Pakistan side, one can easily assume that
Fazlullah of Swat is alive and warning the locals of his return to the valley.
Almost all Fazlullah’s key aides are also unscathed with at least four of them in
government custody now. Leader of the Taliban in Bajaur, one time deputy
leader of TTP, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, is still alive, while the Taliban leader
in Mohmand Abdul Wali alias Omar Khalid is also there. In the same token,
leaders like Mangal Bagh in Bara and Tariq Afridi in Darra Adam Khel are also
alive and kicking.
It is for this reason that the Taliban are gaining strength with each
passing month despite the military operations while only common citizens are
becoming the fuel of this anti-terror war being waged in the tribal areas and
parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. To avert the Taliban attacks, the security
measures in place in cities, particularly in Islamabad and Peshawar, appear as if
the government had gone on the defensive and the Taliban are on the
offensive, while in fact, the case should be the opposite.
This can be judged from the recent visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to
Peshawar, who inaugurated the construction of 21 schools destroyed by the
Taliban in Swat with the help of models of the schools at the fortified
Governor’s House. Still, the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are thankful to
Zardari for his visit as other leaders, like Nawaz Sharif of PML-N and Shujaat
Hussain of PML-Q, never ventured to step in there to show sympathy with
the people being devastated by terrorist attacks.
Besides, the governor and chief minister of NWFP are restricted to their
official residences while the leadership of the ruling Awami National Party
(ANP) has now shifted its centre to Islamabad from Peshawar, fearing terrorist
attacks. However, the ANP has a reason for that: its president Asfandyar Wali
Khan escaped a suicide attack at his house on October 2, 2009; its provincial
president Afrasiab Khattak also escaped a similar attack during a political
meeting (February 2008); senior minister Bashir Bilour has so far survived four
attempts on his life; ANP’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly member Alamzeb
Khan was killed in a bomb attack in Peshawar on February 11, 2009; another
49
ANP MPA Shamsher Ali Khan was killed in a suicide attack at his house in
Swat on December 1, 2009; brother of NWFP Minister for Forests Wajid Ali
Khan was shot dead in Mingora the same year while a brother and two
nephews of another ANP MPA Waqar Khan were brutally murdered inside
their house in Swat before the launch of the final stage of the operation there.
All these incidents, along with many others, happened despite claims of
‘successful action’ against the militants and the victories against them. Judging
from the past few years, it seems the situation would remain unchanged unless
the top militant leadership is dismantled and effectively removed from the
scene.
Daud Khattak, Daily Times (Lahore), May 4, 2010,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\05\04\story_4-5-2010_pg3_6
T HE R ISING M ILITANCY
Inspite of operations of all sorts and many initiatives the fact remains that
militancy is on the rise and militants are roaming and acting freely all around.
The latest incident of kidnapping of 64 persons in Hangu must be an eye
opener for those who are claiming that the militants are on the run.
Militants intercepted ten vehicles on Saturday on the boundary of
Kurram Agency and Hangu district including two trailers of Tribal Electricity
Supply Company heading for Peshawar and took into custody WAPDA
officials. One of the trailers of the power company was also set on fire.
According to reports, a large number of militants have fled to Kurram and
neighbouring regions after the military launched a major operation in South
Waziristan in October last year. They are now indulging in acts of kidnapping
for ransom and if their demands are not accepted, they kill the hostages. This
is a very serious situation as hitherto relatively peaceful areas are becoming the
hideouts of the armed criminals and if the situation was not checked, it would
deteriorate and go out of control. There is large scale deployment of army,
para military forces and police in all the agencies and adjoining settled districts
of the NWFP. Despite that level of security if the militants are indulging in
kidnappings and killings at will, it is something very alarming which must be
looked into. We are of the firm opinion that there is dire need to check the
rising militancy in tribal agencies and adjoining districts otherwise the country
would be witnessing the repeat of situation in Swat, Malakand and Buner.
Editorial, Pakistan observer (Islamabad), May 17, 2010,
http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=31397
50
IPRI Factfile
M ILITANCY : R EALISM N EEDED
Military operations are not the solution. This is a multi-pronged issue, which
needs a wholesome response. The issue is religious as well as political,
strategic, economic and social. Therefore we need to find out a multi-pronged
political and reconciliatory process.
The method of suicide bombings, an effective weapon for the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban, was transferred to them by Al
Qaeda. Previously, the Afghan Taliban considered videos and pictures
impermissible, but now they consider it a very important medium to relay their
messages. Similarly, the Internet is nowadays also a very effective weapon for
the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. This was also introduced by Al Qaeda. As
such, Al Qaeda is on the driving seat. Therefore, by ignoring Al Qaeda we can
neither think of reconciliation with militants nor solve the issue of militancy.
Tactics and preferences may differ even among members of a single
party. To see this fact, we should observe the tactics of Aitzaz Ahsan and
Babar Awan of the PPP. The same difference is also evident in the tactics and
preferences of Mullah Omar, Hakeemullah Mehsud and Osama bin Laden.
Local environments definitely affect the behaviour of all national, political and
religious parties. Our political and religious parties support the issue of
Kalabagh Dam in Punjab, but lobby against it in Sindh.
And the same differences can also be seen in the activities of Al Qaeda,
the TTP and the Afghan Taliban. But not only ideology, the shared concept of
jihad and Shariah, they also fight against common enemies. The difference is:
Al Qaeda has been interested in taking on the U.S. and its international allies,
the Afghan Taliban have restricted their activities to Afghanistan while the
majority of TTP members have a declared policy of "Pakistan first." Al Qaeda
needs the help of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan and the TTP in Pakistan.
The Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts also needed Al Qaeda.
Persistent instability and disturbance have turned this region into a
centre for proxy wars among international and regional powers. State writ is
non-existent on both sides of the Durand Line, where proxy wars among
secret services are in full swing. It is difficult to tell friend from foe. In this
situation, apart from Pakistani agencies, RAW, the CIA, Mossad, and the
Iranian and Russian agencies are active in the area. Certainly, some of the
militants would be fighting, knowingly or unknowingly, for the objectives of
these agencies, but a clear majority of these people consisted of individuals
who, under their ideology, are committed to fighting for this chosen cause as
they consider it the only way to deliverance.
Inside Al Qaeda and the TTP, extremist elements have now taken over
the reins. They consider fighting the U.S., along with its Muslim allies, as an
act of faith. They demand that if fighting Soviet allies Babrak Karmal, Dr
51
Najeebullah and their Muslim Afghan supporters was a jihad, then how come
the current fight against U.S. ally Hamid Karzai, and other Muslim leaders, is
not holy war? Now the new thinking of first taking on Arab countries and
Pakistan before attacking the U.S. is also taking root. Along with this
approach, the element of revenge is also becoming visible.
They think the Pakistani state has betrayed them. Previously, they only
targeted government employees and army personnel, but now they think that
everyone who opposes them is permitted to be killed. And under this very
approach, new literature in different languages is being prepared and
distributed.
Just like the Afghan Taliban, some of the Pakistani Taliban are intent
not on fighting with Pakistan, but the majority of them now accede to the Al
Qaeda approach. Apart from the Mehsud group, all jihadi and sectarian
militants (the Punjabi Taliban) who had flocked to the tribal areas and are now
returning to their hometowns have been infected with the Al Qaeda approach.
As compared to the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda has a greater impact on these
individuals.
In the beginning, it was claimed that there were no foreigners in the
tribal areas. But proved wrong on this count, we took to find new pretences. It
was propagated that Baitullah Mehsud was a U.S. agent, but when targeted in
U.S. drone attacks we left the field. Now confusion is being created against the
TTP and Hakeemullah Mehsud and their threats are called brags. Their
capabilities are questioned. But after humiliating Americans by targeting the
CIA station in Khost through an Arab suicide bomber, can we afford any
underestimation of their capabilities? The suicide bomber's video film with
Hakeemuallah Mehsud before setting off on the Khost mission is a clear
evidence of close relations between the TTP and Al Qaeda.
In fact, the TTP's strength is the strength of Al Qaeda, and vice versa.
The same is also true for Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Therefore,
whatever is decided for one of these partners should also be extended to the
other one. If power is used against Al Qaeda, we cannot hope for
reconciliation with the TTP or the Afghan Taliban. Good wishes for the
Afghan Taliban's victory will leave us unable to dismantle the TTP in Pakistan.
The policy of reconciliation in one area and a military operation in another,
fighting against one group and reconciliation with another is destined to
destroy us.
By changing the contours and basic approaches of internal and external
policies, we should find an inclusive political solution. Otherwise, we should
be ready for dire consequences.
Saleem Safi, News International (Rawalpindi), May 18, 2010,
52
IPRI Factfile
T ERROR
IN
L AHORE
Yet another attack in Lahore has killed scores of people and left over 100
injured. Poor security has plagued the city for a couple of years now.
The same grim questions arise. Why were the attackers able to enter the
premises so easily, especially at sites known to be targets? The Ahmadi
community was commemorating the death anniversary of Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad earlier this week, so surely more security was warranted
for houses of prayer. More generally, reports from Lahore suggest that
banners denouncing religions other than Islam had appeared in parts of
the city recently. This should have in any case put the authorities on a
heightened state of alert.
What have the Punjab police done to improve their operation
procedures to respond to an attack? Yesterday, angry scenes at the assault sites
were reminiscent of previous attacks in Lahore — ordinary, helpless people
unable to understand why they the victims were left at the mercy of militants.
If television crews can reach the scene of an attack before police
reinforcements, what does that say about the administration’s state of
preparedness?
There have been wholesale changes, summary dismissals and major
reshuffles in most other departments of the Punjab government. But the
police seem immune, despite their poor track record. Simply dismissing or
suspending officers is obviously not enough, and in any case due process
needs to be followed. The real question is: why this lax attitude towards the
one department, the police, that is responsible for protecting the lives and
property of the citizens of Lahore?
Finally, why is it that nothing ever seems to come of the arrests made, of
the gunmen themselves but also their accomplices? Convictions secured in
anti-terrorism courts are often overturned on appeal by the superior judiciary.
Sometimes it’s the evidence that isn’t collected with care, other times
statements are recorded improperly. Surely, the Punjab government — though
this isn’t a problem confined to just this province — needs to at least provide
some justice and closure to the victims and their families. Anyway you look at
it, it’s a wretched picture, past, present and future.
Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad), May 29, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/editorial/21-terror-in-lahore-950-sk-08
T ERRORISM &
THE
E CONOMY
The latest incident of attempted terrorism in the United States which has links
with Pakistan has administered another blow to our economy. The reference
53
here of course is to the attempt by Faisal Shahzad, a 30-year-old American
citizen of Pakistani origin, who attempted to detonate a bomb in Manhattan’s
Times Square.
The bomb did not go off, which is a great relief not only for the United
States but also Pakistan. Had it taken its intended toll, the repercussions for
Pakistan would have been grim. It would have set back the prospects for an
economic recovery by years. Newspapers quoted a senior official of the
Clinton administration saying the “the Times Square attempt has reminded
Americans that most of the threats to the U.S. homeland come from the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.” Fareed Zakaria in a cover story for
Newsweek described Pakistan as a terrorist supermarket.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told 60 Minutes, a widely watched TV
news programme, that there will be “grim consequences” if damage was done
by an attack that had links with Pakistan. There was pressure on President
Barack Obama to act before it was too late. There could be a reduction in the
quantum of aid flows to the county if a terrorist attack is seen to be connected
to Pakistan.
As if to underscore the Pakistani involvement in international terrorism,
an Indian court sentenced to death 22-year-old Mohammad Ajmal Kasab, the
lone survivor of the deadly assault on Mumbai on Nov 27, 2008. The assault
was launched by a group trained by a terrorist organisation in Pakistan. Kasab
was earlier found guilty on most of the 86 charges brought against him,
including murder and waging war against India. The terrorist had given a
statement to the authorities saying he was trained by members of the Lashkari-Taiba, a Pakistani group designated as a terrorist organisation by both the
United States and the United Nations.
The third reminder of terrorism’s links with Pakistan came when
another U.S. resident of Pakistani origin, David Coleman Headley, was taken
into custody in Chicago for planning the Mumbai attack, prompting India,
according to one analyst, “to repeat that extremists living in the territory of its
neighbour are exporting militancy”. This is the link that Ahmed Rashid makes
in a recent article contributed to the pages of The Washington Post where he
says that North Waziristan, one of the seven tribal agencies located in the area
that borders Afghanistan, has become “the hub of so many terrorist groups
and so much terrorist plotting and planning that neither the CIA nor the ISI
seems to have much clue as to what is going on there…. But Pakistan’s
counter-terrorism strategy, which has been extensively praised by American
generals, is now coming apart at the seams — all because of North
Waziristan.”
What is the connection between the perception that Pakistan has
become the centre of international terrorism and the country’s economic
recovery? The most important link is via Pakistan’s dependence on external
capital flows for its economic survival. Of the many types of flows Pakistan
54
IPRI Factfile
depends on, at least three would be seriously affected by the growing
apprehension that most acts of terrorism — those that have been carried out
and those that have been attempted but were thwarted — originate in
Pakistan. The suggested links to Pakistan will not help with foreign private
flows and continued assistance by the U.S. government. Even remittances sent
by Pakistanis living and working in the U.S. could be affected as those sending
money become extremely cautious about the possibility of being questioned by
the authorities in America. What should Islamabad do to address this issue and
to give the signal that it takes very seriously the use of its territory for the
launch of any form of terrorist activity on foreign soil? The first thing that
needs to be done is to develop a comprehensive strategy aimed at addressing
the problem posed by the county’s real and perceived links with acts of
terrorism. Statements by senior policymakers — and there have been many of
those in recent months — indicating Pakistan’s resolve to deal with the threat
of terrorism don’t constitute a strategy. A strategy has to include a number of
elements: a precise definition of what constitutes a terrorist attack and what
are the punishments meted out if these acts are committed; how the legal and
judicial system will work to ensure that those who violate the law of the land
will be expeditiously dealt with; and educating the youth about their
responsibility towards the state and the citizenry.
Such a strategy should be developed by a group that has a
multidisciplinary background: a group that can view the phenomenon of
terrorism from many different angles — economic, political, social, religious.
It should have the full backing of the political classes who should be called
upon to endorse the strategy, once formulated, fully and without reservations.
While it is true that Pakistan has anti-terrorism laws on the books and courts
to enforce them, they have done little to implement them. Terrorism has not
been brought under control.
The other important move by the state is to make it clear that breaking
the law of the land will not be tolerated, no matter who commits the crime.
Organisations must not be allowed to operate training camps for militant
activities, to collect funds for their operations, to run schools that don’t have
proper accreditation and to use mosques to propagate outlandish beliefs.
Politicians normally take the path of least resistance and some of these
measures may be hard to adopt and implement. But the alternative is the
country’s destabilisation and further marginalisation in the global community.
Pakistan is very isolated these days; further isolation would do it enormous
damage.
Shahid Javed Burki, Dawn (Islamabad), June 1, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/editorial/terrorism-the-economy-160
S EARCH
FOR
55
S OUL
Perhaps the only faintest ray of hope one can find in the aftermath of the
Data Darbar tragedy is the near-universal condemnation of the attack.
Major political parties and civil society groups have always been in the
forefront when it comes to remonstration against suicide bombings and
other acts of terrorism. But the silence in all this of many religiopolitical parties has often been deafening, so much so that it has led to
speculation that they might tacitly approve of such tactics.
This time round, however, it seems that the affront was much too
monstrous to stomach for even those who might share certain ideological links
with the insurgents whose mission it is to destabilise Pakistan. The Data
Darbar massacre has been condemned by people who do not approve of
drone attacks or Pakistan’s partnership with the U.S. in the fight against
Taliban-inspired militancy. This is significant in a country as conservative as
Pakistan, a land where the opinion of the religious right can mentor public
thought. When a leading religious figure says that suicide bombings are
unacceptable in Islam — without any qualifiers — we might be taking a step in
the right direction. Mindsets have to change here and our religious scholars
should go even further to stress that no person or community is ‘worthy of
death’ simply because their beliefs differ from those who cannot tolerate
divergence of opinion.
This may be the time for our religio-political parties to ponder a key
point, a defining moment as it were. The insurgents operating under the
umbrella of the Taliban — it doesn’t matter if they are Punjabis or from the
northwest frontier — are looking to dismantle a belief system. Their target is
not just people of liberal bent or the vast majority that abides by the motto of
live and let live. Ultimately they wish to unravel the fabric of society and
disempower all those who stand by democratic values. And that group
includes the religious parties who contest elections and attempt to contribute
to social welfare. The battle lines have been drawn and should be unmistakable
to anyone with foresight and a grasp of the reality on the ground.
Equally important is the acknowledgment that the enemy lies within.
Pointing to ‘hidden hands’ or foreign forces bent on creating havoc in Pakistan
may be convenient for officialdom but does not address root causes. Let there
be no doubt: the problem is homegrown. Also, let’s move beyond the myth
that ‘terrorists have no religion’. If anything, in our context suicide bombers
have been brainwashed into believing that they are more devout than the
peaceful majority.
Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad), July 4, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/editorial/19-search-for-soul-470-hh-06
56
IPRI Factfile
P ROVINCES B ACK E FFORTS
TO
C OMBAT T ERROR
Expressing concern over the fresh wave of terrorism in Punjab, a high-level
meeting presided over by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and attended by
chief ministers of three provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan supported the call for a
national conference of all political parties to discuss ways of combating
militancy in the country.
The meeting had a one-point agenda -- the law and order situation in
the aftermath of Thursday’s attacks on Data Darbar.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Information Minister Iftikhar Hussain attended
the meeting in place of the chief minister.
The prime minister accepted a proposal made by PML-N chief Nawaz
Sharif on Saturday to convene the conference to hammer out an improved
strategy to combat terrorism.
However, no tentative date for the conference was given by Information
Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira who, along with Interior Minister Rehman
Malik, briefed newsmen at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat -- the venue of the
meeting.
The meeting unanimously decided to stop forthwith activities of leaders
of the banned organisations which are accused of having links with terrorist
groups operating in Fata.
In reply to a question, the interior minister said he could not give a
definite answer as to who was involved in the Data Darbar massacre till the
completion of inquiry, but added that every act of terror in Punjab did have a
link with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
Because of a late start by one hour, an expected one-to-one meeting
between the prime minister and Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif could
not take place as the former had to attend an independence day function at the
U.S. embassy.
Mufti Munib-ur-Rahman, chief of Tanzimul Madaris, was specially
invited to the meeting. He criticised both the federal and provincial
governments for failing to put their act together in dealing with the banned
outfits which, according to him, were playing havoc with people’s lives.
According to insiders, Mufti Munib held the interior ministry and the
Punjab government responsible for incidents of terrorism. He came down
hard on the Punjab law minister for ‘inaction’ against the proscribed
organisations.
The meeting, also attended by the AJK prime minister, heads of
intelligence and security agencies, provincial chief secretaries and IGs, also
decided to introduce a fresh anti-terror law in the coming session of
parliament to strengthen the judiciary in dealing with cases of terrorism.
57
The meeting asked the interior ministry to set up a special cell at the
National Anti-Terrorism Authority. It will work as a think-tank and assist the
government in pre-empting incidents of terrorism.
The participants agreed to accelerate work on Madressah reforms.
The interior minister said that all religious seminaries had signed a
document as a basis for the proposed reforms, which would be launched soon.
Mr Malik denied that there was any acrimony between him and the
Punjab chief minister, saying he would meet him in a couple of days to discuss
ways and means to pre-empt terror attacks.
The meeting also discussed a recent proposal made by the Parliamentary
Committee on National Security for a change in national strategy for
combating terrorism and decided to look into its recommendations.
“No military operation is being launched anywhere, including southern
Punjab, and whatever action is needed it will be decided by the government of
Punjab,” Mr Malik said in reply to a question.
In his opening remarks, the prime minister said that all major political
parties, whether in parliament or outside, would be invited to the national
conference to work out an improved strategy against terrorists.
He appealed to the nation to unite against forces killing innocent
citizens, destroying schools and hospitals and desecrating mosques and
shrines.
Mr Gilani directed all security and intelligence agencies to redouble their
efforts and share information with each other to defeat terrorists.
Ahmad Hassan, Dawn (Islamabad), July 6, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/front-page/provinces-back-efforts-to-combat-terror-670
A G OOD A NTI - TERRORISM M OVE
After the rout of the Taliban by U.S.-led coalition forces, elements of AlQaeda found a safe haven in the no-go Fata territory (with the restrictions
imposed by the government), and began to operate at will on both sides of the
Durand Line. With plenty of cash from the foreigners, with religious
sentiments against the occupation of Afghanistan and with the local heritage
of spurning laws that are not essentially tribal in nature, Wana became an ideal
recruiting ground from among the youth of the area. Poverty-stricken
southern Punjab provided an additional source of recruits for the existing cells
of disparate religious militants throughout the country.
When Pakistani forces entered Fata in 2004 without proper planning,
adequate quantum of men and material, and without training for counter
insurgency (COIN) operations, Al-Qaeda—which till then had focused most
of its violence on Afghanistan and places elsewhere in the world—had the
infrastructure in place to target the Pakistani heartland with a vengeance.
58
IPRI Factfile
Notwithstanding the successful COIN operations by the Pakistani army (and
the PAF) for the past year, the terrorists continue to have a remarkable
capacity for mayhem and murder within Pakistan, and the capability to strike
at a place and time of their own choosing.
Well-coordinated terrorist attacks targeting Lahore include “suicide
bombings,” like the recent atrocity on the Data Ganj Baksh Darbar seems to
have woken up our public representatives from their apathy towards a major
problem. Rhetoric alone and chest-beating, and that too without conviction, is
pointless, since it won’t save previous human lives. Even more pathetic is the
use of the bogey of terrorism for political point-scoring, not only macabre and
demeaning but condemnable. Why should anyone use the innocent people
killed and injured for political gamesmanship? Whoever incites hatred and
ethnic/sectarian violence must be indicted and prosecuted.
Terrorists have no faith and/or ethnicity. They cannot be branded as
Punjabi, Pathan, Shia, Sunni, etc. Another hard fact has to be drummed into
our ruling elite. To quote my article of Feb 18, 2010, “countering insurgency is
far different from countering terrorism. We do not have the capacity or the
capability within the civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to counter
terrorism.” Use of the army is counterproductive: alienating the population
they will lose the goodwill gained through great sacrifice.
The excellent initiative of the government of establishing the National
Counter Terrorism Authority (NCTA) lay mostly dormant till the recent
Lahore incident. To its credit the government has now “activated” NCTA to
cope with the danger. Dedicated and concentrated effort by a well equipped,
well-trained and well-led force will be required to destroy the terrorists’
potential to spread harm and grief. This entity should be under the direct
control of the NCTA. Using their available capabilities in personnel and
training matched with technology, the U.S. (Special Operations Command),
the UK (SAS) France (CIGN), etc., have trained and equipped units
specialising in handling immediate threats. A Counter-Terrorism Force (CTF)
in Pakistan, officered both by the army and the police, must be developed on
the pattern of the tremendously successful Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) that
has almost eliminated poppy cultivation and drug smuggling. The ANF’s
existing structure could be used as the nucleus for the CTF.
The U.S. can help with funds, material and training. My article, “A
Pakistan Surge,” of March 25, 2010, noted: “The U.S. Department of Defence
(DoD) has an office called SOLIC (Special Operation and Low Intensity
Conflict) created in the 1980s. Within SOLIC there is an office called CN
(Counter Narcotics), whose funding is authorised directly by Congress. After
9/11, Congress expanded DoD authority to use CN funds for counterterrorism purposes, justified by the interplay between terrorist and insurgent
groups and their fundraising from narcotics trafficking.”
59
Counterterrorism being the top priority of the nation and a full-time
task, the NCTA (and the CTF) should be under a separate federal ministry
working in close cooperation with both the ministries of defence and interior.
Tariq Pervez, credited with turning the FIA around who has been re-employed
as chairman of the NCTA, can possibly craft policy and make assessments if
he is not inhibited by lack of cooperation and funds. Till now he was
powerless to implement a coordinated strategy. While the proposed NCTA
“think tank” is an excellent idea, various agencies presently conduct their own
assessments and plan their operations without effectiveness. This
uncoordinated “bits and pieces” effort affects security service delivery across a
broad spectrum of likely targets: e.g., the diplomatic corps, multinational
companies, expatriates and the public in general.
Notwithstanding the fact that law and order is a provincial subject,
terrorism is a federal problem. The NCTA must identify the most dangerous
threats and likely targets thereof. Among the required capabilities are to: (1)
detect people organised in terrorist activity, while simultaneously monitoring
their movements; (2) detect the sources of supply of explosive materials: the
terrorists have to procure it from somewhere; (3) mobilise the defence
capability to recognise and counter specific threats; (4) mobilise adequate and
coordinated intelligence capability, utilising both human and electronic
intelligence; (5) focus on air, sea, rail and road travel as potential terror targets;
and (6) use both electronic and physical means to guard the country’s
frontiers, involving monitoring and observation of thousands of miles of our
borders.
The NCTA’s risk assessment process should analyse and define: (1)
Related risks; (2) risk-related incidents; (3) risk impact; and (4) likelihood of
incidents. Next, it should examine the current ability of the security
authorities/stakeholders to include: (1) the organisational structures
responsible to coordinate and deal with security and security-related incidents;
(2) the emergency and other plans and procedures; (3) training standards; and
(4) other security measures used by the authorities.
The future state of security alertness must be defined next. Most
importantly, the detailed recommendation must include: (1) the specific
stakeholder/security authority; (2) rating of current status/quality/ability; (3)
recommendations must not be limited to organisational restructuring,
manpower needs and training, electronic solutions and the need for specialised
equipment; and (4) priorities must be spelt out. With many of our urban areas
vulnerable, one city can be selected as a model for a realistic exercise. External
sources and expertise must be tapped without further delay.
Those connected directly to the perpetrators and those who indirectly
give sustenance must be targeted, including funds ostensibly meant for charity.
Besides draining the country of its precious foreign exchange reserves, terrorist
funding comes through foreign exchange dealers and “havalas.”. All foreign
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IPRI Factfile
exchange must be processed through scheduled banks to stop the flow. The
civilised world still has illusions that it is possible to enforce the rule of law in a
totally lawless environment.
No country has a law against cannibals eating citizens because such an
act would be unthinkable, but it is time to bring the unthinkable into the
statute books. Does International law address killers shooting into hospitals,
mosques and society? The punishment for so-called “suicide bombings”
and/or abetting such an atrocity should be death. Those who incite ethnic
and/or sectarian violence should also receive the death penalty. After years of
vacillation our ulema belatedly seem united against this cancerous menace.
Public opinion is mobilised against the threat of terrorism. Rhetoric
must now be translated into action.
Ikram Sehgal, News International (Rawalpindi), July 8, 2010,
T ERRORISM
AND
R ELIGIOUS I DENTITIES
In the past, most suicide bombers or violent attackers used to come from the tribal areas and
the local militant groups acted as their facilitators. Now, local groups have developed skills to
undertake such actions on their own
The terrorist attack on the Data Darbar shrine in Lahore on July 1
underlined the growing threat of terrorism in urban centres and exposed the
confused state of mind of the political class on terrorism and deficiencies in
the capacity of the civilian administration to cope with it.
Two basic problems have made it extremely difficult for official civilian
circles, security authorities and the political class to articulate a coherent and
effective response to religious extremism and terrorism. Many members of the
political class and ordinary Pakistanis are not prepared to admit that religious
extremism and militancy are indigenous problems. This does not fit into their
idealised notion of religion and a highly polarised worldview tainted by
religious orthodoxy that interprets every domestic and foreign development as
part of a grand global design to undermine Islam and Muslims.
The Punjab government and the PML-N live in a state of denial. They
are not prepared to accept that Punjab has become a sanctuary for Islamic
extremist groups and others that want to destabilise the state and society. The
Punjab government does not want to acknowledge what most political analysts
and the media people know,: that the leaders of banned religious groups freely
function in Punjab, organising their loyalists and enjoying open access to the
media. Some of them even have access to official circles.
The denial issue is linked to another problem. There is a lot of
confusion on what constitutes terrorism and what are its sources. All religious
groups, irrespective of their denominational identity and political parties,
61
condemn terrorist incidents, including suicide bombings. However, most of
them are not prepared to condemn a specific group for such activities and they
offer excuses and explanations to dilute the charge of terrorism against
militant Islamic groups. Some reluctance to condemn them can be attributed
to religious-denominational commonalities of some people with hardline
Islamic groups. Almost all militant groups using violence in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, often described as the jihadis, subscribe to Deobandi, Wahabi-Salafi
and Ahle-Hadees Islamic traditions. The strict followers of these Islamic
traditions often condone their activities or avoid public criticism.
The most common explanations of various terrorist attacks in Lahore
over the last six months offer an interesting overview of the failure to accept
the reality that the current spate of terrorism is primarily domestic. In the past,
most suicide bombers or violent attackers used to come from the tribal areas
and the local militant groups acted as their facilitators. Now, local groups have
developed skills to undertake such actions on their own.
The well-known explanation of terrorism in Punjab can be summed up
as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
A Muslim cannot engage in terrorism targeting ordinary people,
places of worship and shrines. One implication of this
statement is that such acts must have been conducted by nonMuslims.
The paid agents of Pakistan’s foreign adversaries, rather than
militant Islamic organisations, engage in such activities to
destabilise Pakistan.
Various U.S. agencies working in Pakistan and Afghanistan
resort to terrorism or buy off people for terrorism to destabilise
Pakistan and thus create a justification for the U.S. and other
western countries to take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
Suicide attacks or bombings are a reaction to Pakistan’s
involvement in U.S.-led efforts to eliminate trans-national
terrorism, which does not serve Pakistan’s interests.
These incidents are a reaction to Pakistan’s military action in the
tribal areas and U.S. drone attacks.
If U.S. troops withdraw from Afghanistan and there is no U.S.
military activity in Pakistan, terrorism will stop. The Taliban and
other militants are not anti-Pakistan; they are fighting against
foreign presence in the region.
PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif condemns terrorism and the loss of
life but avoids criticising any particular militant group for
terrorism. He attributed the latest attack in Lahore to the
policies of General Pervez Musharraf as well as to the foreign
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policy of the current PPP government. He did not elaborate if
he was talking about Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S.,
dating back to the Musharraf days and Pakistan’s active role in
the ongoing global effort to control terrorism.
All political analysts agree that Punjab has become the new centre for
militant groups. Some of these groups are quite old and well known. There are
now new groups that are said to have broken off from existing militant and
sectarian groups. Most militant and sectarian groups that were banned are now
functioning freely under new names.
The policy of denial faced a challenge from the conglomerate of Barelvi
Islamic groups who threatened to launch street agitation if the government did
not take action against the group that attacked the Lahore shrine. Various Shia
groups support their demands.
The Barelvi groups became active against the militants subscribing to
Deobandi and Wahabi Islamic traditions after the assassination of Maulana
Sarfaraz Naeemi in June 2009 in Lahore. Later, they found themselves under
pressure from various Deobandi groups in Karachi. For the first time this year,
the public processions taken out by various organisations to celebrate the birth
anniversary of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) were attacked by diehard young
Deobandi groups in at least two cities.
This Barelvi activism may impel the Punjab government to take action
against hardline and sectarian Islamic groups. However, Barelvi activism is not
necessarily a positive development. After all, Barelvi groups also represent
religious orthodoxy and they question Pakistan’s current foreign and security
policies. They share most of the perspective on terrorism outlined above and
want to establish an Islamic order as articulated by them. Until the Barelvi
religious interests were not directly hit, they were not publicly critical of
Islamic militancy, although they did not participate in it.
If religious extremism and terrorism are to be eliminated, Pakistan’s
official and societal circles will have to discard the Islamic orthodoxy discourse
on issues and problems. They will have to rise above religious-sectarian or
narrow partisan political considerations and articulate the meanings of
terrorism in the context of the Pakistani state and its constitution and law.
Terrorism should be articulated as any action, planned or executed, that
involves the use or threat of violence in a planned and systematic manner to
intimidate the people, killing, kidnapping or injuring them or damaging
property. Such acts cannot be condoned or explained away on the basis of any
religious or political doctrine or regional and international political
development.
Dr Hasan-Askari, Daily Times (Lahore), July 11, 2010,
63
Q UELLING T ERRORISM
The Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2010 was tabled in the Senate by
Interior Minister Rehman Malik to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The
proposed bill aims at tightening the noose around terrorists in view of the
terror wave that has gripped the country in recent years. The Ordinance had
lapsed last month due to the government’s negligence. Fortunately, our leaders
have realised the urgency of the issue and have tabled the bill instead. The
amended bill, if passed, will empower the government to detain suspects
charged with terrorism to be kept in preventive detention for 90 days and this
detention will not be challengeable in any court; anyone possessing an
explosive substance could be arrested; illegal FM stations being used for
hatemongering would be seized; members of banned terrorist outfits would
not be allowed to carry on their activities under some other banner, and not be
able to obtain passports or travel abroad; arms licences that had been issued to
terror groups would be cancelled; bail would be denied to terror suspects,
among other things.
All these are good steps but there are certain lacunae in the proposed
bill, which should be looked at by the standing committee that will scrutinise
the draft. Under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, Section 3
(MPO-3), a person can be detained for 90 days and the period can be extended
at least twice if he/she is suspected of acting in a manner that poses a threat to
public safety. How is the new clause of detaining someone for 90 days in the
proposed bill different from MPO-3? Do we need two co-existing laws for
preventive detention? Another thing that this bill proposes is that the suspect
would be produced before an anti-terrorist court in-camera within 24 hours
(instead of a magistrate under normal procedures). Also, a confessional
statement before a district police officer (DPO) will be admissible as evidence.
Can a ‘confessional’ statement be relied upon when we know of the torture
culture that prevails in our police set up? The terrorists are most certainly a
species apart and not worthy of any mercy, but some innocents can also be
roped in on terror charges and left to the tender mercies of our police.
Adequate legal safeguards must be provided so that there is no danger of
mistreatment of innocents (or even the guilty for that matter). To ensure this,
it is necessary that the arrested person should have immediate and continuing
access to a defence lawyer.
…
Editorial, Daily Times (Lahore), July 29, 2010,
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IPRI Factfile
T ERRORIST A TTACKS
On this Monday also, the merchants of death were busy as usual. They
bombed a mosque-cum-seminary in South Waziristan killing 36 and injuring
many more, triggered a landmine killing seven participants of a meeting of
tribal elders in Kurram Agency and exploded an improvised explosive device
(IED) near Darra Adamkhel taking the life of three members of an antiTaliban force.
Given the generally inadequate medical facilities available in these places
the death toll is likely to rise. That the killing spree should go on uninterrupted
even during the holy month of Ramazan, that the perpetrators' hearts should
be shorn of any compassion for human life at the time of colossal national
tragedy brought about by unprecedented flooding in the country, one fails to
comprehend the nature of militancy in Pakistan. Who is killing whom and why
the question becomes all the more difficult to answer if you factor in three
missile attacks launched by the CIA, almost at the same time, which killed 16,
including many women and children.
Among the victims of mosque-cum-seminary in Wana, the principal
town of South Waziristan, was Maulana Noor Muhammad, a former member
of parliament and a ranking leader of Wazir tribe. But he was better known for
his mediatory skills and had had successfully brokered a number of standstill
and peace accords between the government and the Taliban. But it was his
dislike for the Uzbek inhabitants of the area, whom he wanted to leave the
Fata region that had earned him hostility of rival Mehsud leadership. Who sent
to him the teenaged suicide-bomber no one has claimed responsibility as yet.
Certainly, the one behind this murderous attack has no respect for the
mosque, nor his spirit seems to have mellowed by the sanctity of Ramazan.
The responsibility for the explosion in Kurram Agency also remains
unclaimed, probably because it was consequent to a dispute over the
ownership of a school. However, the Darra Adamkhel bombing has been
owned by the Taliban who claimed that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
has avenged the killing of two students of a seminary by the victims.
All four attacks tend to tell four different stories with not much
common between them excepting the hard reality that the tribal area of
Pakistan has become one vast jungle where there is no law except the law of
jungle. While the tribals fight for turf, sectarian leaders are out to eliminate
rivals, Taliban are at war with the security forces and the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition is busy carrying out person-specific assassinations with
missiles fired from unmanned drones.
The tribal region of Pakistan is much more than the so-called safe haven
for the Taliban and al Qaeda. Naturally, it has to be targeted not by bullet
alone. Before it explodes into something more disastrous it is imperative that
65
government revisits its policy towards Fata, essentially to consider bringing it
into the national mainstream. What to do now, any exercise to this effect has
to be different from what has been done so far. A fresh approach is required,
cashing in on the inherent sociological strength of the tribal people.
Editorial, Business Recorder (Islamabad), August 25, 2010,
http://www.brecorder.com/index.php?id=1095715&currPageNo=1&query=&search
=&term=&supDate=
Q UETTA A TTACK
It is near impossible to comprehend the level of hatred that rules the
minds of people who are terrorising Pakistan today.
They will kill Shias, be they children, women or men, simply because
they hate minorities and consider them worthy of death. Ahmadis too are
being attacked with increasing frequency by extremists who claim to hold the
moral high ground but are seen as terrorists by all right-thinking people. Take
Friday’s carnage in Quetta where nearly 60 were killed by a suicide bomber. A
procession was taken out to condemn Israeli atrocities and mark Al Quds day,
a cause that ought to be common to Muslims of all schools of thought. But it
was still fair game for sectarian terrorists because the Shia community has, in
the Iranian tradition, always been in the forefront of commemorating this
particular occasion. Two days earlier, the streets of Lahore were awash with
blood when suicide bombers attacked a Youm-i-Ali congregation.
Responsibility in both cases was claimed by groups that like to portray
themselves as champions of Islam but have no qualms about massacring
practising Muslims in Lahore, Quetta, Karachi and elsewhere. …
Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad) September 5, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/editorial/quetta-attack-590
L AKKI M ARWAT B LAST
The deadly suicide hit targeting a police station in Lakki Marwat that killed 19
innocent people, including schoolchildren on Monday, following the string of
blasts in Lahore and Quetta, shows the degree of freedom with which the
terrorists are targeting the citizenry. Besides, a security official’s statement that
500kg of explosives were used in the attack bears testimony to the fact that
there is invariably a large supply of illegal explosives and weapons available to
lawless elements turned into brainwashed suicide bombers.
Clearly, the law enforcement agencies have been unable to control the
scourge. It is a pity that the police department for instance, is still lacking
modern equipment like the cell phone tracking system which could come in
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IPRI Factfile
handy in identifying the attacker and pre\empting the attack. Another big
failure is their inability to locate the networks behind these barbaric acts and
their sources of funding. There, of course, is evidence of RAW’s involvement
and even other external forces fishing in our troubled waters, supplying
weapons to militant groups, yet the authorities’ lack of action is disgusting. It is
doubtful that the bombers creating mayhem in society during the holy month
of Ramazan are Muslims. Of late, they have been sneaking into the major cities
unarmed, thus easily clearing the security kiosks and posing as common
citizens. They do not have to worry about bringing the weapons along.
But while there is absolutely no doubt that security forces have to put their
house in order, the fact remains that the proxy war we are fighting on behalf
of the U.S. is mainly to be blamed for the sorry state of affairs. It is simply
nonsensical to assume that the military operation in the tribal areas or for that
matter indiscriminate bombing by the drones would not create a backlash. It is
high time that the policy of pursuing a negotiated settlement of the conflict
was given precedence over use of force.
Editorial, Nation (Islamabad), September 8, 2010,
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-englishonline/Opinions/Editorials/08-Sep-2010/Lakki-Marwat-blast
D EPLOYMENT
OF
M ORE D RONES A GAINST P AKISTAN
Reports that the U.S. military is secretly diverting more drones and weaponry
from Afghanistan and deploying along Pakistan border are very disturbing and
could lead to escalation of tension between the two countries. Already there
had been a significant increase in drones attacks in North Waziristan during
September, 2010 killing around 120 people.
U.S. newspaper Wall Street Journal quoting unnamed U.S. officials said
Washington has classified Pakistan’s tribal belt on the Afghan border as a
global headquarters of Al Qaeda. After four consecutive violations of
Pakistan’s airspace by NATO helicopters including attack on a check post
killing three security personnel have strained Pak-U.S. relations and in
retaliation Torkham crossing was closed for NATO supply containers.
Though Chamman crossing is still open for supplies to the occupation forces
in Afghanistan yet closure of Torkham route will adversely affect the food and
military supplies to NATO troops. A joint investigation is under way about the
circumstances, which led to the killing of Pakistani security personnel and
NATO has apologized over it yet it appears that the coming weeks and
months would be very difficult for Pakistan. We should be ready for more
drone attacks because President Obama would like to see results for additional
deployment of 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by the middle of next year.
Keeping in view the developing situation, it is essential that the political and
67
military leadership must make it clear to the NATO commander in
Afghanistan, U.S. General Petraeus, the Pentagon and CIA that Pakistan can
go to a certain extent to cooperate in the war on terror but would not
compromise on its sovereignty. At the same time the Americans must be made
to pay compensation for the innocent lives lost in the helicopter and drone
attacks as they are doing in Afghanistan. We would also caution that of late the
U.S. and its western allies have been talking of possibility of terrorist attacks in
Europe from the so-called militant sanctuaries in FATA and might make it a
pretext to launch more air strikes across the border. Pakistan has a strong
position and the West cannot win the war against terrorism without its
cooperation. We must therefore assert strongly and tell them in categorical
terms that ground or air violations by the NATO forces would not be
tolerated in any case.
Editorial, Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), October 4, 2010,
http://www.pakobserver.net/201010/04/detailnews.asp?id=55411
T HE S COURGE
OF
T ERRORISM
The fundamental flaw in the contemporary discourse on terrorism is to equate it with Islamic
doctrine. This plays into the hands of the likes of Osama bin Laden who justify the slaughter
of civilians through distortions of Quran injunctions. In this there is an unmistakable nexus
between such extremists and those whose purpose is to demonise Islam
The predominant theme of history is one of conflict and violence. The
last hundred years have been particularly blood-drenched. The two world wars
of the 20th century resulted in unparalleled devastation. In the near halfcentury that the Cold War lasted, the number of fatalities almost equalled that
of the First World War in which approximately 8,400,000 soldiers alone are
said to have died. The Nobel laureates, Heidi and Alvin Toffler, claim, “In the
2,340 weeks that passed between 1945 and 1990, the earth enjoyed a grand
total of only three weeks that were truly war-free.”
The contemporary era is no less dominated by the same sordid drama of
death and destruction except that the actors have changed. The foremost postCold War threat to global peace and security is terrorism from which no
nation, big or small, is immune. Although this scourge has neither religion nor
culture nor country, it has become commonplace after 9/11 to stigmatise
Muslims because, incrementally, the incidents of such violence have been
perpetrated mostly, but not exclusively, by a radicalised minority who profess
Islam.
Scholars have identified the sense of victimisation coupled with a real or
imagined threat perception as the two most important reasons for the
recurring acts of terrorist violence and this is not peculiar to Muslims alone.
For instance, the Daily Times issue dated February 2, 2006 carried an article by
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IPRI Factfile
Christine Fair and Hussain Haqqani in which the authors stated that the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), founded in May 1976 by Vellupillai
Prabhakaran, were “the world’s largest group of suicide bombers” whose
cadres were “not Muslim, but Hindu” and nearly 40 percent were women.
However, the impact of the LTTE was confined only to Sri Lanka and ended
with their defeat in May 2009, whereas that of so-called Muslim extremists has
been global. This has generated fanciful theories about the inevitability of
conflict between Islam and the West.
Harvard professor Samuel P Huntington’s article dated December 24,
2008 examined whether the existing “fault-lines between civilisations” would
replace “the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the
flashpoints for future crisis and bloodshed”. He quoted M J Akbar of India
who is of the opinion: “The West’s next confrontation is definitely going to
come from the Islamic world. It is the sweep of Islamic nations from the
Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for the new world order would begin.”
Huntington’s essay on this theme, ‘The Clash of Civilisations’, appeared
in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs and, according to the journal’s
editors, only George K Kennon’s ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ that he
published in the 1940s under the pseudonym ‘X’, had generated so much
comment. Kennon’s piece inspired debate in Washington’s policy formulation
circles and finally resulted in the U.S. Cold War doctrine of containment,
whereas Huntington’s article has impacted decisively on post-Cold War world
security concerns centred on the threat from terrorism.
The fundamental flaw in the contemporary discourse on terrorism is to
equate it with Islamic doctrine. This plays into the hands of the likes of Osama
bin Laden who justify the slaughter of civilians through distortions of Quranic
injunctions. In this there is an unmistakable nexus between such extremists
and those whose purpose is to demonise Islam. According to the Indian writer
A G Noorani, there is an “accord in mendacity” between “the leading
professional jihadist Osama bin Laden and K S Sudarshan, the supremo of the
virulently anti-Muslim body in India, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh
(RSS).” Both “interpret verses of the Quran in the same sense, perverted to
their respective nefarious ends. Sudarshan’s RSS physically attacks the lives
and properties of Muslims of India. Bin Laden’s al Qaeda attacks the soul of
Islam.”
Extremists such as Osama bin Laden and Sudharshan rely on two
unacceptable methods to distort the Quran’s worldview that is founded on
peace and harmony. The first is the doctrine of abrogation, which presumes
that the earlier verses of the scripture were abrogated by subsequent ones in
the 23 years that the process of revelation lasted, and the second is the textual
isolation and de-contextualisation of the passages, which inevitably results in
the misinterpretation of its fundamental principles.
69
Abrogation theologians primarily cite the Quranic statement: “Any
message which we annul or consign to oblivion, we replace it with a better
one...” (Quran, 2:106). What they ignore is that the word ‘message’ (ayah) in
this passage relates to the earlier scriptures and this is obvious from the
preceding verse that declares that the Jews and the Christians would never
accept any scripture subsequent to their own. All that is stated in this verse is
that the Quran has superseded the Bible. However, ‘ayah’ is also used in a
more restricted sense to denote any of the 6,247 verses of the Quran because
they unfailingly contain a message and this is the assumption on which the
doctrine of abrogation is based. Implicit in this questionable doctrine is a
presumption of Divine fallibility. The implication is that God made His
commandments known but then had second thoughts and amended His
earlier pronouncements.
Besides exploiting the flawed concept of abrogation, extremists have
also extracted individual passages of the Quran to justify suicide bombings and
other terrorist acts. For instance, the verses pertaining to the conditional
permission to fight only in self-defence are said to have been cancelled by
pronouncements such as: “And so, when the sacred months are over, slay
those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God wherever you may come upon
them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at
every conceivable place...” (Quran, 9:5).
The killing of “those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God” has
been taken out of context to justify violence although the verse pertains to an
ongoing war and cannot imply the initiation of hostilities because aggression in
any form is prohibited. This passage, which is misconstrued by extremists as
authorisation for indiscriminate slaughter, has been described as “the sword
verse” although the word ‘sword’ does not appear even once in the Quran. In
fact, the very next passage enjoins believers to protect polytheists that have
not attacked them and conduct them to a place of safety.
There is need for Muslims to reclaim their religion from a radicalised
minority that kill, maim and destroy in the name of Islam. Till they understand
and expose the distortions of their scripture, the false ideology of religionbased violence cannot be defeated.
S Iftikhar Murshed, Daily Times (Lahore), October 8, 2010,
A TTACKING
THE
G HAZI
OF
K ARACHI
On Thursday, two suicide bombers killed 10 and injured 70 people at the
shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi, the patron saint of Karachi. The Tehreek-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for this horrendous attack.
The attack is significant because the Taliban wanted to cause the maximum
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IPRI Factfile
damage, given that it was the busiest day of the week at the shrine. Abdullah
Shah Ghazi, a Sufi saint, has been revered as the saviour of Karachi from
tropical storms for over a thousand years. This attack by the TTP is not just an
attack on his shrine but also his teachings and beliefs.
In the recent past, we have seen a new pattern emerging. The TTP has
started attacking shrines of Sufi saints all across the country. The Taliban
before this attack have targeted a mosque and shrine in the Khyber Agency’s
Landi Kotal tehsil, a Sufi saint’s shrine in Gandhawa in the district of Jhal
Magsi, the shrine of Rahman Baba and Mian Umar Baba in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP also initially claimed responsibility for the triple
suicide attack on Data Darbar in Lahore but later backtracked and denied
involvement. This begs the question: why attack Sufi shrines? Sufism is the
single greatest threat to the Taliban and their ideology of violence and
coercion. Sufism teaches tolerance and humanism, it is non-dogmatic,
accommodative of all sects and religions and non-violent. The Sufis’ message
of love transcends the material world and embraces universal brotherhood. In
stark contrast, the Taliban use violence as the principal means to their goals
and want to impose their strict interpretation of Islam on everyone by force
and compulsion. The Taliban consider it un-Islamic to pay homage at Sufi
shrines and cite it as shirk (associating partners with God) and bidat
(innovation in religion). Knowing their open hostility towards Sufism, one
expected the government to have done some homework.
The statement “there was a security lapse” by Sindh Home Minister Dr
Zulfiqar Mirza is bewildering. The first suicide bomber struck at the main gate
check post, while the second struck at the next check post. The attackers could
have wreaked much more havoc had they managed to cross the security check
posts. In a way, Dr Mirza is admitting his department’s failure to check the
attacks in the first place. Suicide attacks are very difficult to prevent once the
attacker is on his way; it is coordinated intelligence and police work that can
help pre-empt the threat.
Contrary to popular perception, the large majority of Pakistanis adhere
to Sufi beliefs rather than the hardline views espoused by the Taliban. The
TTP feels threatened by their dwindling support and have tried to create a
sectarian divide time and again. This initially found some success with attacks
on religious minorities and places of worship. It was an attack on the shrine of
a Sunni saint Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore, whom all major sects of
Islam in the subcontinent revere, which ended up uniting the different sects.
The shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi is of similar significance to the people of
Karachi as is Data Darbar to the people of Lahore. This atrocious attack will,
in all probability, once again unite the people of Pakistan against the Taliban
71
ideology of terror.
Editorial, Daily Times (Lahore), October 9, 2010,
D RONE A TTACKS M AY
BE
L EGAL , B UT
ARE
T HEY M ORAL ?
Abdul Jabbar, a British citizen from Birmingham, was killed last week in
Pakistan by a missile launched from an American drone. If Jabbar was indeed
planning a Mumbai-style massacre in a British city, as the intelligence services
claim, his death will be a relief. Yet the degree to which it now seems to be
acceptable for the U.S. to use drones to kill those it believes to be involved in
planning terrorist attacks is alarming. Since the beginning of September alone,
President Obama has authorised at least 25 targeted killings.
The total since he came to office is more than 100. These have certainly
killed some of the senior operatives of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. They have
also killed dozens of people, including a large number of women and children,
who were not involved in terrorism. And yet there has been very little protest,
certainly compared to the storm of international criticism that greeted the
decision to hold suspected terrorists at Guantanamo – a policy that didn’t kill
anyone, let alone any innocent women and children.
The silence from human rights groups over the drone attacks is
deafening. What has persuaded them that it is acceptable to kill people,
including people who are not terrorists, but that it is inhumane to deprive
them of a good night’s sleep? There is no doubting the brutal effectiveness of
drone attacks, or that they have a lot going for them in terms of risk and
reward: they kill the enemy without exposing our forces to any danger. But the
targeting is only as good as the information it is based on – and that
information is, inevitably, often inaccurate.
Even when the targeted terrorist turns out to be in the building, there
are often others with him who are also incinerated. In August 2009, for
example, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, was killed in
a drone attack: his wife, his father-in-law, his mother-in-law, a lieutenant, and
seven bodyguards also died. No one knows exactly how many innocents have
died as a result of drone attacks, but the total almost certainly runs to three
figures. It is not easy to square that with President Obama’s insistence that his
administration is “living by our values” – unless American values now include
the endorsement of indiscriminate killing.
The President has also stressed that America now complies with
international law. Remarkably, he seems to be right: the consensus is that
drone attacks are indeed legal. The UN produced a report on the topic at the
end of May, which concluded that the best way forward is for an international
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conference of states to review the guidelines for setting targets “after a careful
review of best practice”.
Best practice? Well, I suppose there is such a thing, even when you are
involved in targeted killing. The UN’s Special Rapporteur thinks it involves
specifying very clearly, in advance, whom you are going to target, as well as
where, when, and why. That is something no country that uses drones will
ever do: their success depends on the victims not knowing when or where they
will be attacked. The fact that targeted killing has been deemed “legal” seems
to have had the effect of making many people, including the President, think
that it is morally justified. But that conclusion doesn’t follow. There are plenty
of things that are legal, but which you would not be morally justified in doing
– just as there are times when you are morally justified in doing things that are
illegal.
Perhaps using drones to kill terrorists is a legitimate way of prosecuting
the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It may be that the women and
children who get killed as a result don’t matter – although I would like to hear
someone from the U.S. government, or a human rights organisation, explain
exactly why. But we – and the Americans – are deceiving ourselves if we think
that something is OK just because international lawyers say it is.
Alasdair Palmer, Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), October 11, 2010,
B Y P UBLICLY A CKNOWLEDGING THE P RICE P AKISTAN PAYS
FOR ITS C OUNTERTERRORISM P OLICY , THE U.S. IS H ELPING
U NTIE ITS L EADERSHIP ’ S H ANDS
Viewed by the United States and its allies as one of the most dangerous places
on earth—and a country that provides a safe haven for leaders of al-Qaeda,
the Taliban and other militant movements—it’s little wonder that Pakistan has
been garnering so much U.S. attention.
Some of the most serious international terrorist plots in recent years
have been traced back to Pakistan, including one revealed just this month
involving the training of terrorists in Pakistan to conduct Mumbai-style attacks
on civilian targets in Western European cities. Meanwhile, the surprising reach
of the Pakistani Taliban became apparent in May when they tried
unsuccessfully to use U.S. citizen Faisal Shahzad to detonate a car bomb in
New York’s Times Square.
So it’s not surprising that last week saw the third ministerial-level U.S.Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in just seven months, following a March 24 session
in Washington and a July 15 session in Islamabad. U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton and Pakistan Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah
73
Mahmood Qureshi chaired the latest session, which marked among other
things a welcome shift in tone and U.S. recognition of Pakistan’s efforts so far.
Since yielding to a U.S. ultimatum in September 2001 to ally itself with
Washington against al-Qaeda in return for considerable economic and military
aid, the Islamabad government has engaged in a comprehensive campaign
against foreign militants on its soil. Yet the combination of the U.S.-led war
against the Afghan Taliban (which since 9/11 has re-established its core
support operations in Pakistan) and the escalating combat on Pakistani
territory have helped give rise to domestically-focused terrorist movements
that have been conducting a vicious campaign of suicide bombings throughout
Pakistan.
The threat to Pakistan’s stability has been compounded by local
insurgencies in the west of the country that have inflicted numerous casualties
on the Pakistani army, which remains better suited for fighting a war with
India than a counterinsurgency campaign. Meanwhile, the Islamabad
government, whether under military or civilian rule, has sought to work out a
formal or de facto truce with the insurgents.
But after publicly rebuking the Pakistanis last year for appeasing
domestic militants, Obama administration officials have now demonstrated a
welcome shift in tone. The clearest evidence is the praise it has given the
Pakistani military and its government for engaging in the fight against
domestic and violent extremists at the cost of thousands of Pakistanis killed or
wounded.
‘One thing that is not often reported enough is that the United States
has no stronger partner than Pakistan in fighting the mutual threat we face
from extremism,’ Clinton said at a joint news conference with Qureshi. ‘And
the cooperation is very deep and very broad.’
This new public line is welcome because it better addresses the
widespread Pakistani perception that the growth of Islamist militancy in their
country has been due to their leaders’ decision to provide comprehensive
support to the US war on terrorism.
But there’s been more to the administration’s Pakistan policy than warm
words. As well as the persistent (and sensible) efforts to induce Pakistani
authorities to crack down on terrorist plots, the Obama strategy has included a
commitment to providing additional economic and security assistance to
Pakistan’s civilian government. Last week’s Strategic Dialogue session, for
example, saw detailed discussions about how the United States could help
develop Pakistan’s energy, water and counterinsurgency capabilities.
At the meeting, Clinton announced that the administration would
submit to Congress a Multi-Year Security Assistance Commitment—a security
assistance package worth almost $2.5 billion that mostly finances
enhancements to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorist
capabilities. Combined with the $7.5 billion commitment to civilian projects
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IPRI Factfile
over a similar five-year period in the already approved Kerry-Lugar-Berman
legislation, the total U.S. aid figure now approaches $10 billion.
Of course making these commendable pledges is one thing, but it’s quite
another to ensure that they are implemented properly. One problem with the
$7.5 civilian aid package is that it has yet to be used to launch specific projects
on the ground in Pakistan, while the U.S. Congress also needs to enact the
legislation required to establish the U.S.-funded Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones and the Enterprise Fund. These multi-year initiatives are essential if
Pakistanis are going to see concrete economic benefits for cooperating with
the United States and if something is going to be done to help counter
perceptions that U.S. aid is skewed in favour of security assistance designed to
induce Pakistanis to fight and die for U.S. goals.
But the U.S. should go further to win over a sceptical Pakistani public.
By more visibly acknowledging Pakistani losses from the country’s
counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, Washington could help
avert the kind of public relations setback that occurred a few years ago when
some members of Congress complained that the Pakistanis were not ‘earning’
the approximately $1 billion annually in military aid they were receiving each
year from the United States.
Of course there’s plenty that Pakistan can do to convince a wary
Congress that U.S. taxpayers are getting their money’s worth. One way would
be to do more to publicize the costs it has incurred—human and financial—in
trying to combat the militant threat. Another would be to stop diverting funds
from this programme to enhance its conventional capabilities for a possible
war with India.
Overcoming U.S. scepticism won’t be easy, and the task was made all
the harder after a cell phone video began circulating on the Internet last month
depicting individuals wearing Pakistani military uniforms executing what look
to be six bound and blindfolded civilians. When asked about the issue at a
joint press conference with Clinton last week, Qureshi reassuringly said ‘that
there’ll be zero tolerance against human rights violations’ in the Pakistani
military. Still, to bolster support for the proposed military aid package, the
administration has indicated that it will suspend U.S. training and equipping
programmes for those Pakistani units that violate U.S. laws and regulations,
especially the so-called Leahy Amendment, which bans U.S. military assistance
to foreign military units that commit major human rights abuses.
But setting aside direct military aid, there are other ways that the United
States can help Pakistan boost its internal security. One would be for the
administration to pay greater attention to increasing the capacity of Pakistan’s
civilian police forces as part of its larger efforts to enhance Pakistan’s civilian
government institutions. Not only are police units often more suitable for
countering local terrorism threats, but they could also help balance the
country’s powerful military and intelligence services, including the Directorate
75
for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), many of whose leaders are reluctant to
break ties with the Afghan Taliban, which the ISI founded in the mid-1990s to
serve as a Pakistani proxy in Afghanistan’s civil war.
More broadly, though, Washington needs to take a good look at its
regional security strategy. US policymakers should take the recent interruptions
in their use of Pakistani territory to supply their forces in Afghanistan as
confirmation of the need to reduce their dependence on Islamabad’s support
for the war on terror. As well as providing the main route along which NATO
receives its non-lethal supplies, Pakistani officials also allow the United States
to conduct an air campaign against their own territory. (Indeed, media sources
have suggested that the unmanned aerial vehicles that constantly bombard
Pakistani territory are actually based in Pakistan and receive much of their
targeting intelligence from Pakistani sources).
Not only would diversifying Washington’s regional support base be
prudent in and of itself, but relying so heavily on the Pakistani government to
actively support US policy like this places Pakistani leaders in the unhelpful
position of appearing to be Washington’s regional puppets.
And there’s already some indication that such diversification could
work, with the continued improvement in Russia-NATO relations providing a
possible window of opportunity to allow these parties to consider expanding
the flow of NATO supplies reaching Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and
perhaps even through the South Caucasus, an area of special sensitivity to
Moscow due to Russian unease about NATO’s ties with Georgia.
Yet there’s another country that also looms over U.S. ties with
Pakistan—India.
Last week saw little progress over Pakistan’s requests to receive a civil
nuclear energy cooperation agreement comparable to that already negotiated
by its neighbour and rival. The problem is that the U.S. Congress, which is
now subjecting the proliferating number of nuclear cooperation agreements to
closer scrutiny, is almost certainly not going to approve such an accord with
Pakistan given its inferior proliferation record compared with India.
On the other hand, the Obama administration is aware of Pakistani
concerns over the prospect of being granted secondary status compared with
India. With this mind, President Barack Obama made sure to tell the Pakistani
delegation at the White House that while he wouldn’t go to Pakistan next
month when he travels to India, he will visit Pakistan next year and will eagerly
greet President Asif Ali Zardari in Washington.
Of course, whatever reassuring gestures Obama makes now won’t
overcome decades of U.S.-Pakistan tensions any time soon—Pakistanis have
felt misunderstood and mistreated by Washington, which they believe has
demonstrated interest in Pakistan only when it needs Islamabad’s help against
regional threats.
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U.S. policymakers, for their part, are perplexed by Pakistan’s skewed
threat perceptions and apparent insistence in believing India to be a greater
danger than Islamist terrorists. Washington believes, with some cause, that
Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons deter India from using force against
Pakistan, but offers little protection against Islamist suicide bombers.
So although the meeting between Qureshi and Clinton marks another
important step in the relationship, the two were also right to talk about a
multi-year and even multi-generation programme for rebuilding the bilateral
relationship. After all, against a background of decades of mistrust, putting ties
on a firmer footing won’t be easy, and it won’t be quick.
Richard Weitz, Diplomat, October 25, 2010,
http://the-diplomat.com/2010/10/25/what-us-gets-right-about-pakistan/
A Y EAR
OF
S UB - SECTARIAN M ASSACRE
On October 29, the Sunni Ittehad Council, led by Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan
(JUP), staged a protest in Karachi and a dozen cities of Punjab against the
destruction of tombs and shrines. This multi-city protest was triggered by the
latest attack on the shrine of Baba Farid in Pakpattan in Punjab. The protest
was ferocious because of earlier pent-up rage on the suicide bombing of
Lahore’s Data Darbar shrine when Sunni-Barelvi religious parties united for
the first time as a counterforce to the dominance of the Deobandis-Ahle
Hadith, traditionally opposed to observances of devotion at the tombs.
October emerged as the most decisive month in so far as the response
of the Barelvis graduated from passive protest to the actual creation of a
counterforce to Deobandi Islam in South Punjab. The Ahle Sunnat gathering
after the Data Darbar bombing in July looked dangerous when it threatened to
take action on its own if the government did not move against the terrorists
who had put holy shrines at risk. The backbone to this “counterforce” was
provided by Sunni Tehrik from Karachi, the only Barelvi outfit in the country
which can engage the madrassa-based and more organised Deobandis linked
to the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Ahle Sunnat gathered under the flag of Sunni
Ittehad Council and came to the notice of a national press more used to
highlighting the Deobandis because of their presence in the state-organised
jihad in Indian-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan.
Back in July, Barelvi leaders caused a minor political earthquake when
they accused Punjab’s PML-N government of courting Sipah-e-Sahaba in
South Punjab to safeguard its vote-bank from eroding in the face of the PPP.
They demanded the dismissal of Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah because
of his much-publicised contacts with the Sipah, long declared a terrorist
organisation — the ‘mother’ organisation that has provided human fodder to
77
the cauldron of the region’s multi-layered violence in the name of Islam
presided over by al Qaeda.
The shrines began to be attacked in 2005 when Islamabad’s Shia shrine,
Bari Imam, was blown up by suicide bombers sent in from the violently
sectarian madrassas of Kohat, using Lal Masjid as its place of muster. Since
then, the shrines in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have been systematically attacked
with the Taliban routinely owning up to the attacks. Karachi saw a subsectarian war between the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Sunni Tehrik, reaching its
climax in October when blasts at the great shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi
shook the country into some awareness of what was happening. For the first
time, the sub-sectarian killing in Karachi is not one-sided; hence the
conclusion that a counterforce to the state-supported Deobandi Islam has
come about. Had the government listened to the sermons all over Punjab –
available on discs – it would have realised that the next massacre was going to
be Deobandi-versus-Barelvi on the old issue of “mazar-parasti” (tombworship) which forms the fundamental devotional ritual of the more
grassroots religion of the people of Pakistan.
In Jhang, where the Sipah-e-Sahaba was born, the prime target were the
Shia but there was also a lateral argument with the Barelvis there because of
the latter’s tolerance of and friendly interaction with the Shia. The Shia-Barelvi
“union” – covert in the case of Shia action – came to the fore in Lahore when
the Sunni Ittehad Council announced this month that it would stage a long
march from Bari Imam in Islamabad to Data Darbar in Lahore. Pakistan’s
relations with Iran nose-dived in the late 1990s because of the exclusive use of
anti-Shia Deobandis in the war in Afghanistan where Shia Hazaras were to
become their prime target. In Quetta, where the Hazaras have been sheltering
from Afghanistan-based violence, sectarian attacks have become routine. This
year too, the Hazaras were attacked, but the outreach of the terrorists included
Lahore for the first time when Karbala Gamay Shah saw its devotees blown
up by a suicide bomber. Sipah-e-Sahaba and its offshoots – the Jaish-eMuhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi – were once the strategic assets of the state
of Pakistan (and if the “solution” in Afghanistan goes wrong for Islamabad in
2011 they could once again be.) But now these “assets” have linked up with al
Qaeda and become its ancillary warriors, killing innocent Pakistani citizens and
targeting the army to dissuade Pakistan from fighting the war against terrorism
and persuading the scared commentator into saying “it is not Pakistan’s war”.
The al Qaeda link appeared on the internet on the website of what al Qaeda
called Brigade 313 in September 2010, consisting of al Qaeda, Harkatul-Jihadal-Islami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jandullah (Karachi-based), Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban. The leader of Brigade 313 is
Ilyas Kashmiri, once Pakistan’s single-most important fighter in Kashmir and
suspected of being from the army’s commando brigade, SSG (though this has
been denied by ISPR). Anti-Shia violence was once traced by an intelligence
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report to Pakistan’s pursuit of covert jihad. Its use of non-state actors of a
certain brand in proxy wars worked two ways: it created multiple centres of
power within civil society which could challenge the “monopoly of violence”
of the state; and it infected the “handlers” of the warring groups, sending the
sectarian virus deep into the corridors of Pakistan’s establishment. The
“denigration of the tomb” among the urban classes journeying away from
traditional Sufi culture complicates the scene further, in a way preparing
Pakistan for a Taliban state.
Al Qaeda went sectarian in 2003 when it sent its first batch of terrorists
to Iraq to fight the Americans. Instead of focusing on the invaders, its
commander, Abu Musab alZarqawi, took on the Shia majority of Iraq and its
patron in the region, Iran. Today in Iraq, “Sunni reconciliation” has failed and
the country is expected to tilt once again into sectarian war. This was presaged
by the Yom al Quds killing of the Shia in Quetta this month. Typically, al
Qaeda, planning to attack the Shia, is persuaded by “local conditions” to kill
the Barelvis as well. Can Pakistan change? Darwin is often misquoted on the
“survival of the fittest”. He actually said, “species don’t die because they are
weak but because they are unable to change.”
Editorial, Express Tribune (Islamabad), November 1, 2010,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/70534/a-year-of-sub-sectarian-massacre/
S WABI A TTACK
The attack on Shah Mansoor Police Lines in Swabi, though first of its kind in
the area, was hardly a surprise. It was always expected that terrorists would not
easily let go and re-emerge like all guerrilla movements. With the military in a
holding position after conducting military operations in Swat and FATA, the
terrorists probe weak points of the security forces and attack whenever they
find the security loose. Another tactic is to divert the focus of the attacks to
relatively stable areas to draw the attention of the security forces away from
active military campaign. Strict security in Islamabad and Peshawar may have
prevented terrorists from carrying out an attack there, but it did not prevent
them from going after softer targets such as the one in Swabi. Shah Mansoor
police compound was fortunate that the four assailants were stopped at the
entrance, but the suicide bomber among them detonated his vest and managed
to kill two policemen and injuring 12, including seven policemen. One more
militant was killed in the exchange of fire between police and terrorists while
the rest of two fled. Security at all government offices in Rawalpindi and
Islamabad has been enhanced in anticipation of more attacks by terrorists. The
Taliban have claimed responsibility for the incident, which, according to their
spokesman Azam Tariq, has been carried out in retaliation to the rising drone
strikes.
79
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has seen scores of focused attacks on the police,
military and paramilitary forces apart from random attacks on civilian targets,
particularly ANP leadership. The murder of FC Commandant Safwat Ghayyur
and the son of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Information Minister Mian Iftikhar and
attacks on educational institutions in various parts of the province are all part
of the campaign against the state. And this is expected to continue and expand
in future unless contained by a well thought-out strategy and preparedness.
As we have argued in this space time and again, the Taliban and their
supporters are pitched against the state and only a consistent and prolonged
battle against them can hope to ultimately defeat them. This battle is not a test
of superior firepower, but a test of nerves and strategy. If conventional
military capability were any guarantee of success against guerrilla war, the US
would have succeeded long ago in Afghanistan. However, we are engaged in a
protracted warfare. We are facing an elusive enemy, which melts away when
frontally assaulted but returns when it finds the security forces in holding
position. This is borne out by a series of recent attacks in Swat, South
Waziristan and other agencies of FATA. The militants moved away to safer
areas, where they have active networks of support and returned when the
pressure of military operation eased.
The best strategy for the military would be to hand over control to the
civil administration as soon as possible after completing the operation and
conduct search and strike operations to prevent the possibility of retaliation by
the militants. The civilians, too, need to be psychologically prepared for this
drawn out battle. Public support and resolve against terrorists is essential to
win this war. If the masses are not provided the necessary psychological
support, there is a strong likelihood of them crossing over and joining militant
ranks to escape their wrath.
Editorial, Daily Times (Lahore), November 3, 2010,
U.S. D OUBLE -D EALING
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has conceded that Pakistan is paying a
big price for supporting the U.S. war on terror. Confessing that the U.S. had
funded and reared the militant groups during the Soviet-Afghan war, she
lamented that now the genie was out of the bottle. After blaming Pakistan for
decades for nourishing these elements, this realization has come. Yet this
should be seen in isolation to the U.S. foreign policy and the mindset of the
U.S. establishment, especially Pentagon. Not a day goes by when the Obama
administration is not seen slinging mud on Pakistan for showing leniency to
terrorist groups. An important point that she did not mention was the
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aftermath of the Soviet war when Pakistan was totally abandoned by the U.S.
and left to fend for itself in the face of influx of Afghan refugees, drug
trafficking, Kalashnikov culture and the scourge of militancy that continues to
plague us to this day. There is no doubt that the U.S. used us as a
steppingstone in the 1980s and is following the same policy again. It would be
naïve to assume that the Secretary of State is genuinely worried about our
plight when she says that we are paying a big price for being the front-line
state. The U.S. drones have turned our tribal areas into killing fields, with
civilian casualties having created a severe backlash against the country,
registering protest in the form of a spate of attacks killing countless innocent
citizens. It is a pity that while pursuing a negotiated settlement of the Afghan
imbroglio, the U.S. is coercing us to use force in dealing with militant groups
even with those who are willing to lay down arms and submit to the writ of the
state. The U.S. should know that our armed forces are already stretched too
thin to launch new operations. However, much to our chagrin, the do more
mantra goes on. There is no disputing the fact that the U.S. hurled us into this
maelstrom yet we must accept that we are only suffering the consequences of
our error of judgment.
Editorial, Nation (Islamabad), November 15, 2010,
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-englishonline/Opinions/Editorials/15-Nov-2010/US-doubledealing
U.S. S EEKS
TO
E XPAND D RONE O PERATIONS
The U.S. is seeking to expand the areas where American missiles can target
Taliban and al Qaeda operatives, reflecting concern that the U.S. war effort in
Afghanistan is being undermined by terrorists’ continued ability to take
sanctuary across the border, U.S. and Pakistani officials said on Saturday.
The U.S. is increasingly relying on the missile strikes by remotecontrolled drones flying over Pakistani territory to find and kill terrorists that
have free rein in the lawless areas along the border, where they plan attacks
against American and NATO troops in Afghanistan
He would not specify which new areas the American side hoped to
target, but an article in The Washington Post identified one as around Quetta
where Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Omar is believed to operate.
The drones now operate in designated “boxes” in FATA, the ISI
official said. He confirmed that US officials had sought both to enlarge the
current boxes and establish new ones outside the tribal zone where senior
Taliban and al Qaeda operatives are suspected to be operating.
Expansion: The Washington Post also reported that Pakistan had agreed
to more limited measures, including an expanded CIA presence in Quetta,
81
where the American spy agency would work with the Inter-Services
Intelligence to hunt down Taliban leaders.
Senior Pakistani officials expressed resentment over what they described
as misplaced U.S. pressure to do more, saying the U.S. had not controlled the
Afghan side of the border, is preoccupied by arbitrary military deadlines and
had little regard for Pakistan’s internal security problems. “You expect us to
open the skies for anything that you can fly,” said a high-ranking Pakistani
intelligence official, who described the Quetta request as an affront to
Pakistani sovereignty. “In which country can you do that?”
Daily Times (Lahore), November 21, 2010,
G OVERNMENT F IRM IN E LIMINATING M ENACE
T ERRORISM : P RIME M INISTER
OF
Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gillani said that the people of Khyber
Pakhtoonkhwa have shown determination and commitment combating
terrorism and facing natural calamities particularly the recent devastating
floods.
The Prime Minister was talking to the Governor Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa
Owais Ahmed Ghani and Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti at the
Governor’s House on Tuesday.
The Prime Minster arrived here, on a day long visit to meet the party
workers on the occasion of 43rd anniversary of PPP.
The government, he said, has the firm resolve to eliminate terrorism and
extremism and would ensure all possible measures to provide security to the
people. …
Dawn (Islamabad), November 30, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/2010/11/30/govt-firm-in-eliminating-menace-of-terrorismprime-minister.html
T ERROR G ROUP F ORMS S UICIDAL G ANG
Karachi - Outlawed terrorist organisation backed by Al-Qaeda and Tehreek-eTaliban Pakistan has formed a motorbike gang of suicide bombers to hit
targets including liberal political forces, rival sects, sensitive installations and
high-profile personalities.
Sources privy to the matter informed that agencies had warned some
high-profile political figures, clerics and other personalities to avoid the
unnecessary movement as terrorists could target them on intersections, narrow
lanes and other such places.
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Meanwhile, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have been put on high
alert ahead of upcoming religious month of Muharram-ul-Harram.
According to official statistics, around 45,000 religious gatherings (majalis) and
over 20,000 processions would be organised citywide within the first ten days
of Muharram. Some 30,000 personnel of law enforcement aided by
contingents of Pakistan Rangers would remain alert across the provincial
metropolis.
According to reports, Interior Ministry has stated that the banned
organisation, Lashker-e-Jahngvi (LJ), has formed group that might be involved
in snatching vehicles, including police mobiles, government vehicles and
ambulances to achieve their goals.
These militants could target any government, political or religious leader
or property. It has been also pointed out that the militant group may also
comprise young men aged between 18 to 20. It is pertinent to mention here
that CID officers have also confirmed the existence of more than 250
sharpshooters in the city and feared that these militants could target the
processions,
majalis,
political
and
non-political
personalities.
According to another source, clerics from both the Shia and Sunni sects are on
the hit list of these terrorists. Among others the Shia clerics on the hit list
include Allama Abbas Kumaili, Hassan Zafar Naqvi, Talib Jauhari, Allama
Furqan Haider Abidi, Allama Aftab Haider Jaffery, Maulana Mirza Yousuf,
Maulana Qamber Abbas, Maulana Nadir Abbas, Maulana Jaffer Subhani,
Maulana Aun Naqvi. Similarly, the Ahl-e-Sunnat clerics including Allama Shah
Turabul Haq Qadri, Hakeem Maulana Asghar Dars, Hakeem Maulana Akbar
Dars, Hamza Ali Qadri, Kaukab Noorani, and some Sunni Tehrik (ST)
members such as Sarwat Ejaz Qadri, Shahid Ghouri, Shakeel Qadri might be
the target of terrorists.
On the other hand, secret agencies have also warned with regard to any
possible attacks on police officers. Reports reveal that police officers of Crime
Investigation Department (CID) might be the target of militants.
It is not known exactly how the terrorist elements plan to carry out attacks but
the other offices of CID might come under attack. The report reveals that
terrorists would attack their offices using explosive laden vehicles.
Concerned police officers when contacted reaffirmed warnings of attacks and
said that high-ups of police had been informed about the reports of
intelligence agencies.
It is pertinent to mention here that a similar warning had been given by
same sources earlier to the blast at CID office but concerned department did
not take appropriate action to avert the incident.
Mansoor Khan, Nation (Islamabad), December 1, 2010,
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-englishonline/Regional/Karachi/01-Dec-2010/Terror-group-forms-suicidal-gang
83
A FGHANS I NVOLVED IN T ERRORIST A CTIVITIES :
R EHMAN M ALIK
Interior minister says terrorists from Afghanistan have entered Pakistan to carry out
terrorist attacks
Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik has claimed that illegal migrants from
Afghans are involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan.
He said this while talking to reporters at the Jinnah International Airport
Karachi on Thursday. “Terrorists from Afghanistan have entered our country
to carry out terrorists activities in Pakistan,” he said.
Responding to a query regarding the Balochistan situation, the minister
said the government was open to talks with all parties to bring peace in the
province. He asked the people of Balochistan to help the government hunt
down anti-state elements. “We can go to Quetta, Turbat or Mand for
negotiations on meeting their genuine demands, but we will not talk to people
indulging in desecration of our national flag,” he said.
Malik warned that the government could use other options to maintain
its writ in the affected areas of the country, saying that Baloch people have
been given benefits in the ‘Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan’ package.
To a query about disclosures made by WikiLeaks, he declined to
comment on the issue, saying that those reports were only leaks and carried no
authenticity.
While referring to the law and order situation of Karachi and Sindh, he
said that special security steps were being taken for Muharram.
Daily Times (Lahore), December 3, 2010,
P AK -A FGHAN J OINT D ECLARATION : A CCORD
O UT M ILITANT S ANCTUARIES
TO
K NOCK
Pakistan and Afghanistan renewed their commitment on Sunday to eliminate
militant sanctuaries in their territories, which could have been used for acts of
subversion in either country.
A joint declaration issued at the end of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza
Gilani’s two-day visit to Kabul said the two countries would again undertake
to effectively cooperate, combat and defeat these (terrorist) threats and
eliminate their sanctuaries ‘wherever they are’.
The commitment came as a result of fresh Pakistani demand that the
Afghan government should end Baloch insurgent infrastructure on its soil and
hand over nationalist leaders, including Brahmdagh Bugti, who are believed to
have taken refuge there.
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President Hamid Karzai had pledged on Saturday in his meeting with
Prime Minister Gilani to end Balochistan insurgency bases in Afghanistan
which, he claimed, could have been operating without his knowledge.
But, he told the delegation that he also expected Pakistan to end Taliban
safe havens in Fata that have long been alleged to foment violence in
Afghanistan.
The commitment isn’t exactly new, but what’s different this time is the
newfound understanding between the two sides that peace and stability in their
countries were mutually interdependent.
Reiterating cooperation for collectively fighting terror, President Karzai
had said: “We need to work together to end violence that continues to hurt
both of us and that we should help each other with full knowledge of reality.”
After the talks, a senior Pakistani delegate told Dawn that there was a
realisation on both sides that they were facing same issues from same
quarters—in a reference to what President Karzai had earlier described in his
media talk as ‘outside plots’ to keep both countries unstable.
“Terrorism and violent extremism and their international support
networks are a major threat undermining peace and stability in the region and
beyond,” the joint declaration noted.
RECONCILIATION: The declaration showed a change in Pakistan’s
policy nuances on the issue of reconciliation, which is thought to be critical to
peace in the war-torn country.
Neither public statements by Pakistani leaders nor the joint declaration
reflected Pakistan’s desire of helping Afghanistan in making peace with
Taliban.
The joint statement said: “Pakistan supports the efforts of the president,
government and the people of Afghanistan for peace and national
reconciliation, which should naturally be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led
efforts.”
Weeks before the Kabul visit, Prime Minister Gilani had in an interview
emphasised Pakistan’s indispensability to any settlement in Afghanistan and
said: “Nothing can be done without us because we are part of the solution; we
are not part of the problem.”
A senior Pakistani diplomat, who was part of the talks, said Islamabad
no longer sought a role in peace talks. He went on to acknowledge that
Pakistan’s unsaid longing for a reconciliation role was a ‘misplaced desire’.
This acknowledgement stems from an understanding that Islamabad’s
offer to help Kabul make peace with Taliban was being misconstrued among
the Afghans as an attempt to meddle in their internal affairs.
The reconciliation process has, according to a background briefing,
reached a point where it is ready to take off. Contacts with leaders of warring
factions have been established and a formal dialogue is about to commence
soon.
85
…
Baqir Sajjad Syed, Dawn (Islamabad), December 6, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/06/pak-afghan-joint-declaration-accord-to-knockout-militant-sanctuarie.html
US-P AKISTAN S ECRET E FFORTS ON
P ETRAEUS
TO
D EFEAT A L Q AEDA :
The commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Gen David Petraeus,
said on Tuesday that the United States and Pakistan were involved in
efforts that would bring considerable pressure on extremists groups
operating in Fata but both sides avoided discussing those efforts.
In an interview to ABC News, the general also praised Pakistan for what
he called “very impressive counter-insurgency operations”.
But “more clearly needs to be done in the tribal areas of Pakistan to
weed out Al Qaeda”, he said, adding that the U.S. would continue to put
“considerable pressure” on these areas.
When the interviewer, George Stephanopoulos, suggested that the U.S.
military would have to enter those areas if militants hiding there were found
involved in an attack on the United States, Gen Petraeus said: “Well, I don’t
think it’s productive to get into hypotheticals on all of these different – but
certainly there are efforts ongoing that we don’t talk about that do, indeed, put
pressure, considerable pressure, on Al Qaeda and some of the other groups
that are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”
A U.S. diplomatic cable released last week by the whistle-blowing
WikiLeaks site suggested that the U.S. had special operations forces in Fata
who, at least twice, had embedded with the Frontier Corps in operations
against Al Qaeda militants. Asked if he had the full cooperation of the
government, the military, and the intelligence services of Pakistan, Gen
Petraeus said he continued to have a “very close relationship with the Pakistani
Chief of Army Staff, in particular, General Kayani”.
He noted that when he was the head of the U.S. Central Command, he
saw Gen Kayani “probably every about 45 or 60 days, at the most”.
Even after moving to Afghanistan, he said, he had continued to see Gen
Kayani every 45 days or so. “Either I go there or he comes here.”
Gen Petraeus said that a trilateral relationship between the chiefs of the
Afghan military, Pakistani military, and ISAF had led to “more and more
progress” in terms of coordinating operations, sharing intelligence across the
Durand Line and in other fields.
“Now it’s also important to recognise what Pakistan has done over the
course of the last 20 months,” he added. “They’ve carried out very impressive
and very costly in terms of casualties – very – very impressive counter-
86
IPRI Factfile
insurgency operations against the Pakistani Taliban, against the Punjabi
Taliban, groups that threaten the very existence of Pakistan.”
Dawn (Islamabad), December 8, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/08/us-pakistan-secret-efforts-on-to-defeat-al-qaedapetraeus.html
N ATIONAL A SSEMBLY B ODY C ONDEMNS D RONE A TTACKS
The National Assembly Standing Committee on Human Rights on Friday
adopted a resolution expressing grave concerns on ongoing drone attacks on
Pakistani soil in sheer violation of the International law resulting in collateral
damage of both human and properties loss., asking the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to convey serious concerns to United Nations, NATO and other
concerned quarters. …
Muhammad Arshad, Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), December 11, 2010,
N O T ALIBAN
OR
Q UETTA S HURA
IN
B ALOCHISTAN : FCIG
Ubaidullah says those working against Pakistan will not be spared.
Balochistan Frontier Corps (FC) Inspector General Maj Gen Ubaidullah Khan
said on Saturday that no Taliban or Quetta Shura existed in any part of the
province.
Addressing a press conference at the FC Headquarters, he said,
“Propaganda was made that Taliban and their Quetta Shura existed in the
provincial metropolis so that Balochistan could be destabilised. There is no
truth in such allegations as no terrorists are present in the city.” Ubaidullah
said that the FC was manning the checkposts along the vast Afghan border
and had knowledge about cross-border activities. “I am confident that there is
no Taliban leadership in Balochistan,” he said.
Referring to insurgent groups, the FC chief said that problems could not
be resolved by picking up guns and taking to hills but by education.
Responding to a query, he said those who were making improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) in their houses and working against Pakistan would
not be spared at any cost nor would FC compromise on this issue. “Without
the support of society, law enforcement agencies cannot succeed in
maintaining order and peace, thus I have directed all the officers to play their
role for bridging the communication gap and remove the misperception
regarding FC,” he said.
Ubaidullah held the Afghan refugees responsible for the deteriorating
law and order situation throughout the country.
87
He conceded that law enforcement agencies, including the FC, had
failed to properly handle the refugees, thus they had become a serious threat to
the security of the country. …
Mohammad Zafar, Daily Times (Lahore), December 12, 2010,
G ILANI C ALLS
FOR
J OINT S TRATEGY
T ERRORISM
TO
C OMBAT
Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani has underlined the need for
having a common strategy by Pakistan, US, Allied Forces and
Afghanistan to fight the menace of terrorism.
He hoped for enhanced cooperation between the three sides on
defence, security and intelligence matters.
The prime minister was talking to M Michael Morell Deputy Director of
CIA who called on him at the PM House on Monday.
The prime minister said that Pakistan would support the Afghan led and
Afghan owned reconciliation process in order to bring about peace and
stability in that country as and when the reconciliation strategy by Afghan
Government is shared with Pakistan.
During the meeting, the outcome of Lisbon Nato Summit with
reference to New Exit Strategy of Nato and ISAF forces; the reconciliation
and reintegration efforts in Afghanistan; Pakistan’s front line role in campaign
against terror and cooperation between Pakistan and US in defence and
security areas also came under discussion.
Minister for Interior Rehman Malik, Senator Syeda Sughra Imam,
Secretaries Foreign Affairs, Defence and other senior officials were also
present in the meeting.
Dawn (Islamabad), December 13, 2010,
http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/13/gilani-calls-for-joint-strategy-to-combatterrorism.html
D RONE A TTACKS
IN
P AKISTAN
The United States government, led by the Central Intelligence Agency's Special
Activities Division, has made a series of attacks on targets in northwest
Pakistan since 2004 using drones (unmanned aerial vehicles). Under the
George W. Bush administration, these controversial attacks were called a part
of the U.S.' "War on Terrorism" and sought to defeat the Taliban and AlQaeda militants who were thought to have found a safe haven in Pakistan.
88
IPRI Factfile
Most of these attacks are on targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
along the Afghan border in Northwest Pakistan.
These strikes are mostly carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
operated remotely from Creech Air Force Base and have continued under the
Presidency of Barack Obama. Generally the UAVs used are MQ-1 Predator
and more recently MQ-9 Reaper firing AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The drones
have become a weapon of choice for the United States in the fight against alQaeda Some media refer to the series of attacks as a "drone war". …
Statistics
U.S. Drone Strike Statistics
Number of Drone
Total Killed
Total Killed
Year
Strikes
(Min)
(Max)
2004
1
4
5
2005
2
6
7
2006
2
23
23
2007
4
53
74
2008
34
263
296
2009
53
413
709
2010
109
530
866
Total
204
1,292
1,980
Timeline
2004 – 2007
•
June 18, 2004: 5 including Nek Muhammad Wazir killed in a
strike near Wana, South Waziristan.
•
May 14, 2005: 2 killed including Haitham al-Yemeni in a strike
near the Afghan border in North Waziristan.
•
November 30, 2005: Al-Qaeda's 3rd in command, Abu Hamza
Rabia killed in an attack by CIA drones in Asoray, near
Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan along with 4 other
militants.
•
January 13, 2006: Damadola airstrike kills 18 civilians in Bajaur
area but misses Ayman al-Zawahri.
•
October 30, 2006 Chenagai airstrike allegedly aimed at Ayman alZawahridestroys a madrassa in Bajaur area and kills 70-80
civilians.
•
January 16, 2007: Up to 30 Taliban killed in a drone strike in
Salamat Keley, Zamazola, South Waziristan.
•
April 26, 2007: 4 killed in the village of Saidgi in North
Waziristan
•
•
89
June 19, 2007: 30 killed in the village of Mami Rogha in North
Waziristan
November 2, 2007: 5 killed in an attack on a madrasah in North
Waziristan
2008
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
January 29, 2008: Abu Laith al-Libi killed in a strike in North
Waziristan along with 11 other militants.
February 27, 2008: 12 people killed in a strike near Kalosha
village in South Waziristan.
March 18, 2008: 16 killed in a strike in South Waziristan
May 14, 2008: 12 including Abu Sulayman Al-Jazairi killed near
village of Damadola, Bajaur.
June 14, 2008: U.S. drones fired three missiles at a potential
hideout of TTP leader Meshud, killing one person.
July 28, 2008: Midhat Mursi and 5 other Al-Qaeda operatives
killed in South Waziristan.
August 12, 2008: Nine killed in four strikes in the area near
Angore Adda in South Waziristan during a meeting of militants.
August 13, 2008: U.S. drone strike on a compound run by
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar killed Taliban commander Abdul Rehman,
along with Islam Wazir, three Turkmen, and several Arab fighters.
Up to 25 militants were killed in this strike.
August 20, 2008: U.S. drones fire two missiles that hit a
compound in South Waziristan, killing 8 militants.
August 30, 2008: Missile strike on Al-Qaeda training camp in
South Waziristan kills two militants carrying Canadian passports.
August 31, 2008: U.S. drones destroy a house in Tappi village in
Miranshah, killing 6 people and injuring 8 including 1 woman and
1 child.
September 4, 2008: US drones fired missiles at a house in Char
Khel in North Waziristan killing 4 people.
September 5, 2008: U.S. drones fire three missiles, destroying a
house which was potentially hosting Arab foreign fighters, killing
at least six.
September 8, 2008: 23 killed in Daande Darpkhel airstrike, near
Miranshah, North Waziristan.
September 12, 2008: The Miranshah airstrike kills 12 people
including three women and two children.
September 17, 2008: U.S. drone attack in Baghar Cheena region
of South Waziristan kills 5 militants including Al Qaeda operative
Abu Ubaydah al Tunisi.
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IPRI Factfile
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
September 30, 2008: Six killed in a strike near Mir Ali, North
Waziristan.
October 3, 2008: Two drone attacks hours apart in Datta Khel
region of North Waziristan kills 21 militants including 16
foreigners.
October 9, 2008: U.S. drone strike killed at least 6 militants
including 3 Arabs in Tappi village near Miranshah, North
Waziristan.
October 11, 2008: U.S. drone strike at a militant compound in
North Waziristan kills 5 people and wounds 2 others.
October 16, 2008: Senior Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Habib killed in
a strike near Taparghai, South Waziristan, along with five other Al
Qaeda or Taliban members.
October 22, 2008: 4 killed in a village near Miranshah by missiles
fired from suspected U.S. drone.
October 26, 2008: 20 killed in a strike in South Waziristan.
October 31, 2008: Two missiles fired by US drones kills 7 in
Wana, South Waziristan.
October 31, 2008: 20 killed including Al-Qaeda operative Abu
Akash and Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim (alias Abu Jihad
al-Masri) after 4 missiles hit Waziristan.
November 7, 2008: U.S. drones fire four missiles, killing up to 14
militants in Kumsham, North Waziristan.
November 14, 2008: 12 killed in a strike near Miranshah.
November 19, 2008: Abdullah Azam al-Saudi and 4 other
militants are killed in Bannu district.
November 22, 2008: British Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf and
4 others including Abu Zubair al-Masri killed in a strike in North
Waziristan.
November 29, 2008: U.S. drone strike on Miranshah, North
Waziristan kills 3 people.
December 11, 2008: U.S. drone strike in Azam Warzak, South
Waziristan, kills 7 militants.
December 15, 2008: U.S. drone strike in Tapi Tool region near
Miram Shah, North Waziristan kills 2.
December 22, 2008: At least 8 killed in South Waziristan by
suspected US drone strike.
91
2009
January to June
•
January 1, 2009: 2 senior al-Qaeda leaders Usama al-Kini and
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan killed in a missile strike by U.S.
drones.
•
January 2, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Ladha, South Waziristan
kills 4 people.
•
January 23, 2009: In the first attacks since Barack Obama
became U.S. president, at least 14 killed in Waziristan in 2
separate attacks by 5 missiles fired from drones.
•
February 14, 2009: More than 30 killed when two missiles are
launched by drones near town of Makeen in South Waziristan.
•
February 16, 2009: Strike in Kurram Valley kills 30, reportedly at
a Taliban training camp for fighters preparing to combat coalition
forces in Afghanistan.
•
March 1, 2009: Strike in Sararogha village in South Waziristan
kills 7 people.
•
March 7, 2009: Taliban militants shot down one of the two
UAVs over a village in South Waziristan.
•
March 12, 2009: 24 killed in attack in Berju in Kurram Agency.
•
March 15, 2009 4 killed in Jani Khel in Bannu district in NorthWest Frontier Province.
•
March 25, 2009: 7 killed in attacks on 2 vehicles by two missiles
in Makin area of South Waziristan at 6:30pm.
•
March 26, 2009: 4 killed in Essokhel area in North Waziristan.
•
April 1, 2009: 14 killed in Orakzai Agency tribal area.
•
April 4, 2009: 13 killed in North Waziristan.
•
April 8, 2009: 4 killed in attack on a vehicle in Gangi Khel in
South Waziristan.
•
April 19, 2009: At least 3 killed and 5 injured in an attack in South
Waziristan
•
April 29, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Kanni Garam village in South
•
May 9, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Sararogha in South Waziristan
kills 6 people.
•
May 12, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Sra Khawra village in South
•
May 16, 2009: U.S. drone strike in village of Sarkai Naki in North
•
June 14, 2009: U.S. drone strike on a vehicle in South Waziristan
kills 5 people.
92
IPRI Factfile
•
June 18, 2009: Two U.S. drone strikes in Shahalam village in
South Waziristan kills at least 13 people.
•
June 23, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Neej Narai in South
Waziristan kills at least 8 people.
•
June 23, 2009: Makeen airstrike kills at least 80 but misses
Baitullah Mehsud in the town of Makeen, many of which were
attending the funerals of people killed in the air strikes earlier in
the day.
July to December
•
July 3, 2009: U.S. Drone kills 17 people and injures a further 27.
•
July 7, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Zangarha in South Waziristan
kills at least 12 people.
•
July 8, 2009: U.S. drone strike on a hideout in Karwan Manza
area and on a vehicle convoy in South Waziristan kills at least 50
people.
•
July 10, 2009: U.S. drones take out a Taliban communication
center killing between 5–8 militants in Painda Khel, South
Waziristan.
•
July 17, 2009: U.S. drone strike on a house in North Waziristan
kills 4 people.
•
August 5, 2009: U.S. drone strike in South Waziristan killed 12,
including Baitullah Mehsud, his wife, and his wife's parents. The
kill was confirmed after weeks of uncertainty over their fate.
•
August 11, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Ladda village, South
Waziristan, kills 10.
•
August 21, 2009: U.S. drone strike on the village of Darpa Kheil,
North Waziristan, reportedly targeting Sirajuddin Haqqani kills at
least 21 people.
•
August 27, 2009: U.S. drone missile strike on the Tapar Ghai
area in the Kanigram (Kanigoram) district in South Waziristan
kills at 8 people. One of the dead was reportedly Tohir Yo‘ldosh
(Tahir Yuldash), leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
•
September 8, 2009: U.S. drone fired missiles kill 10 in North
Waziristan. The attack may have killed al Qaeda leaders Ilyas
Kashmiri and Mustafa al Jaziri as well as three Punjabi militants
and two or three local Taliban fighters.
•
September 14, 2009: U.S. drone fired missile kills four people in
a car 1.5 miles (2.4 km) from Mir Ali in North Waziristan.
•
September 24, 2009: U.S. drone fired missile kills up to 12
people in the village of Dande Darpa Khel near Mir Ali.
•
September 29, 2009: Two missile attacks take place. In the first, a
drone attack reportedly killed six Taliban, including two Uzbek
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
93
fighters and Taliban commander Irfan Mehsud, in a compound in
Sararogha village, South Waziristan. In the second, a missile killed
seven insurgents in a house in Dandey Darpakhel village, North
Waziristan.
September 30, 2009: U.S. drones fire missiles at a Taliban
compound and vehicle killing 8 in Novak, North Waziristan.
October 15, 2009: U.S. drone missile killed at least four people in
North Waziristan.
October 21, 2009: Alleged U.S. drone missile killed two or three
alleged militants in Spalaga, North Waziristan in territory
controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadur.[105][106] One of those killed was
reportedly Abu Ayyub al-Masri (not the same as Abu Ayyub alMasri, the Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader), an explosives expert for Al
Qaeda and a "Tier 1" target of U.S. counterterrorism operations.
October 24, 2009: Alleged U.S. drone strike killed 27, in
Damadolla , inside Bajaur tribal agency. The 27 victims were
reportedly a mix of Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives engaged in a
planning and strategy meeting. The dead apparently included 11
"foreigners". One of those reported killed was Faqir Mohammed's
nephew, Zahid and another was Mohammed's unnamed son-inlaw. The meeting was apparently being held to decide on whether
to reinforce South Wazaristan against Pakistani forces, which
Mohammed advocates, or exploit recent successes in the Nuristan
and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan, which Al Qaeda wishes to
do.
November 5, 2009: 2 killed in Miranshah town in North
Waziristan.
November 18, 2009: 4 killed and 5 injured in Shanakhora village
of North Waziristan, 12 miles (19 km) south of Miranshah.
November 20, 2009: 8 killed in the Machikhel area near the town
of Mir Ali.
December 8, 2009: 3 killed in a car near Miranshah in North
Waziristan, reportedly including 2 Al Qaeda members. Senior Al
qaeda planner Saleh al-Somali, from Somalia, is believed killed in
this strike.
December 9, 2009: Six killed in Tanga, Ladha, South Waziristan,
reportedly consisting of four Al Qaeda and two Taliban members.
December 17, 2009: 17 killed in 2 separate attacks in North
Waziristan in an area controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadur. In the
first attack, two missiles hit a car near Dosali, killing two. In the
second attack, 10 missiles fired by five drones hit two compounds
94
IPRI Factfile
•
•
•
•
in Ambarshaga, killing 15 people. Unnamed sources stated that
seven of the dead were "foreigners."
December 18, 2009: 3 killed in an attack in Dattakhel region in
North Waziristan.
December 26, 2009: 13 killed in an attack in Saidgai village in
North Waziristan.
December 30, 2009: A suicide bomber killed at least six CIA
officers and seriously injured six others at Forward Operating
Base Chapman in Afghanistan, which is used by the Central
Intelligence Agency to coordinate drone attacks in Pakistan. The
Haqqani network claimed responsibility.
December 31, 2009: Four killed in an attack in Machikhel village
in North Waziristan. According to The Frontier Post, senior Taliban
leader and strong Haqqani ally Haji Omar Khan, brother of Arif
Khan, was killed in the strike along with the son of local tribal
leader Karim Khan.
In January 2010, al Qaeda in Pakistan announced that Lashkar al-Zil
leader Abdullah Said al Libi was killed in a drone missile strike. Neither al
Qaeda nor the US has revealed the date of the attack which killed Libi, but it
appears to have taken place in December 2009.
2010January to March
•
January 1, 2010: Missile strike on a vehicle near Ghundikala
village in North Waziristan kills 3.
•
January 3, 2010: 5 people including 3 Arabs killed in an attack on
Mosakki village in North Waziristan.
•
January 6, 2010: 2 separate missile strikes one hour apart kill
approximately 35 people in Sanzalai village, North Waziristan.
•
January 8, 2010: Missile strike in Tappi village in North
Waziristan killed 5 people. It is alleged that all the militants killed
were local and were attached to Taliban Commander Hafiz Gul
Bahadur.
•
January 9, 2010: 4 killed and three injured when 2 missiles are
fired on a compound in village Ismail Khan in North Waziristan,
territory of the Haqqani network. Mahmoud Mahdi Zeidan,
bodyguard for al Qaeda leader Sayeed al-Masri, was reported
killed in either the January 8 or 9 airstrike. Jamal Saeed Abdul
Rahim who was allegedly involved in hijacking of Pan Am Flight
73 in 1986 was also reported killed in this strike.
•
January 13, 2010: Missile strike in Pasalkot village in a compound
formerly used as a religious school in North Waziristan killed 15
people among them 3 militant commanders. The apparent target
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
95
of the strike was, Hakimullah Mehsud, who reportedly left the
compound before the attack occurred.
January 15, 2010: Missile strike in Zannini village near Mir Ali in
North Waziristan kills up to 15 people, probably including Abdul
Basit Usman, an al-Qaeda terrorist.
January 15, 2010: Second missile strike of the day kills 6 in Bichi
village in North Waziristan.
January 17, 2010: Missile strike in Shaktoi area of South
Waziristan kills at least 20 people. The leader of the Pakistani
Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud sustained injuries in this attack. It
was initially believed he died but it was later learned that he
survived.
January 19, 2010: Two missiles fired at a compound and vehicle
in Booya village of Datakhel sub-division, 35 km west of
Miranshah, in North Waziristan kills 9 people.
January 29, 2010: 15 killed when drones fire 3 missiles on a
compound belonging to Haqqani network in Muhammad Khel
town in North Waziristan.
February 2, 2010: Up to 8 U.S. drones fired missiles at 4 different
villages of North Waziristan killing at least 29 people.
February 14, 2010: 5 killed in a strike near Mir Ali in North
Waziristan.
February 15, 2010: Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, leader of the
Turkistani Islamic Party, is killed by a drone missile strike in
North Waziristan.
February 17, 2010: Three militants killed by a missile strike near
Tapi, Miramshah, North Waziristan. One of those killed was
reportedly Sheikh Mansoor, a commander in the Lashkar al Zil.
February 18, 2010: 4 killed in a strike in Northwest Waziristan
including Mohammed Haqqani, the brother of Afghan Taliban
commander Siraj who leads the Haqqani network. The missiles hit
a vehicle belonging to Siraj that Mohammed was riding in, but
Siraj was not in the vehicle at the time. Mohammed and Siraj were
reportedly attending the funeral of Sheikh Mansoor, who had
been killed by a drone strike the day before.
February 24, 2010: Missiles fired by a U.S. drone killed at least 13
militants at a compound and at a vehicle in the Dargah Mandi
area of North Waziristan. Among the dead include Bahadar
Mansoor, head of Badar Mansoor group, and Rana Afzal, the man
behind the FIA HQ bombing in Lahore. Mohammed Qari Zafar,
the head of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the person responsible for the
2002 and 2006 bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi was
96
IPRI Factfile
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
thought to be killed in this Drone strike but it was later proved
that he survived the attack. He died on June 14, 2010 when he
accidentally touched some explosives which set them off killing
him in the ensuing explosion in a guesthouse he was staying in
North Waziristan.
March 8, 2010: Three missiles fired by U.S. drone aircraft killed
five militants and wounded three in Miranshah. It is alleged that
Hussein al-Yemeni (also called Sadam Hussein Al Hussami), an Al
Qaeda terrorist who planned the Camp Chapman attack died in
this strike.
March 10, 2010: Missiles fired from drones struck a compound
and three vehicles in the village of Mizar Madakhel in North
Waziristan. The attack killed at least 12 and as many as 21
militants. Five drones reportedly attacked in two waves. First,
four missiles struck and demolished the compound. After local
militants cordoned off the area and began recovering bodies, a
second volley of missiles struck. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a local
Taliban leader and chief of the North Waziristan Shura, may have
been killed in the strike.
March 16, 2010: Eight to ten militants were killed in a U.S. drone
strike in North Waziristan's Datakhel area. The militants were
reportedly al Qaeda fighters, mainly Afghan, but included two
officials from Syria and Egypt.
March 17, 2010: Two U.S. Drone strikes killed 9 militants. In the
first attack, the drones fired four missiles at a vehicle and a
militant hide-out in Miranshah, killing six militants. About 50
minutes later, drones fired 3 missiles at a vehicle in Madakhel,
killing 3 militants.
March 21, 2010: U.S. drone fires two missiles in the Datta Khel
area of North Waziristan killing at least eight people and injuring
several others.
March 23, 2010: U.S. drones fired two missiles on a militant
vehicle parked outside a compound in the suburbs of Miranshah
in North Waziristan. At least six militants were killed and three
others were wounded.
March 27, 2010: Drone strike in Mir Ali in North Waziristan kills
4 militants.
March 30, 2010: U.S. drone fired three missiles, destroying a
compound owned by Zamir Khan, a local tribesman, and used by
militants in the city of Tapi in North Waziristan killing six
militants.
97
April to June
•
April 12, 2010: 2 missiles fired by a U.S. drone kill 5 in North
Waziristan.
•
April 14, 2010: U.S. drone strike targeting a vehicle killed up to 4
people and injuring 4 others in Anbarshaga area of North
Waziristan. All of the dead and injured were Arab militants.
•
April 16, 2010: U.S. drones fired at least 7 missiles which hit two
vehicles and a house in the Toolkhel area near Miramshah in
North Waziristan killing 6 people and injuring 5 others.
•
April 24, 2010: U.S. drones kill 7 militants in North Waziristan in
the village of Marsi Khel near Miramshah.
•
April 26, 2010: Three missiles from drones strike a compound in
the Khushali Toorkhel area, about 25 km east of Miranshah,
North Waziristan, killing four or five. A Pakistani security official
stated that those killed were militant followers of local rebel
commander Haleem Khan. The official added that Khan has ties
to regional Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
•
May 3, 2010: 4 militants are killed in a drone strike in North
Waziristan
•
May 9, 2010: 10 militants are killed in a drone strike in North
Waziristan
•
May 11, 2010: At least 24 militants are killed in two separate U.S.
drone strikes in which the U.S. fired up to 18 missiles. The first
strike occurred when missiles struck cars, homes and tents in the
Doga area of North Waziristan killing up to 14 militants. Hours
later another pair of missiles hit a compound in the Gorwek area
of North Waziristan killing another 10 suspected insurgents,
including the brother of a reputed Taliban commander, Maulvi
Kalam.
•
May 15, 2010: At least 15 killed in Khyber Agency in the first
such strike in this area.
•
May 21, 2010: US drones fired two missiles on a compound used
by Afghan warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur and killed 10 people in
Mohammad Khel, North Waziristan. Saeed al-Masri, the current
3rd in command of Al-Qaeda was killed in this strike along with
his wife and 3 children. Other dead in this strike include two
foreign militants, one of whom was reportedly Filipino. Five
women and two children were reported injured.
•
May 28, 2010: U.S. drone strike killed 11 militants and wounded
three others in the Nazai Narai area of South Waziristan.
•
June 10, 2010: U.S. drone strike killed 3 people in North
Waziristan.
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IPRI Factfile
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June 11, 2010: U.S. drones fired 6 missiles on a housing
compound near Miran Shah at the Afghan-Pakistan border, killing
15 alleged militants.
June 19, 2010: U.S. drone fired a missile striking a house in
Haider Khel village near North Waziristan's Mir Ali town killing
16 militants.[187] Al Qaeda leader Abu Ahmed Tarkash was among
the dead.
June 26, 2010: A U.S. missile strike killed 7 militants in Pakistan's
tribal region near the Afghan border. The missile, fired by an
unmanned drone, destroyed a house near Mir Ali in North
Waziristan. One of the dead men was a foreigner.
June 27, 2010: A drone strike in North Waziristan killed 5
militants.
June 29, 2010: U.S. drone fired two missiles hitting a house near
in Wana, South Waziristan killing at least 8 militants including
Hamza al-Jufi an Egyptian militant belonging to Al Qaeda.
July to September
•
July 15, 2010: A drone strike in North Waziristan killed 14
suspected militants in a region under the control of Hafiz Gul
Bahadar.
•
July 24, 2010: U.S. drones fired two missiles at a militant
compound in Nazai Narai area of South Waziristan killing 16
militants.
•
July 25, 2010: U.S. drones fired two missiles and hit a doublecabin pickup carrying militants in Shaktoi village in South
Waziristan. Taliban sources said 14 militants were killed and two
others were injured in the attack. The militants belonged to the
Hakimullah Mehsud-led Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
•
July 25, 2010: U.S. drones launched their second strike of the day
when two missiles hit a house where some militants were having
dinner in Landikhel village of Srarogha Tehsil in South
Waziristan. Four militants that belonged to TTP were killed and
five others sustained injuries.
•
July 25, 2010: U.S. drones launched their unprecedented third
strike on the same day when they fired two missiles at a house in
Taipi village near Miran Shah, the main town in North Waziristan,
killing 7 suspected militants.
•
August 14, 2010: U.S. drone fired three missiles at a compound in
Mir Ali, North Waziristan, killing at least 13 militants including
Taliban commander, Amir Moaviya.
•
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•
•
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•
•
•
99
August 21, 2010: A U.S. drone strike near Miran Shah, North
August 23, 2010: Missiles fired from U.S. drones in North
Waziristan kill 13 militants and seven civilians. Four women and
three children are among the dead.
August 27, 2010: Missiles fired from U.S. drones in the Kurram
Agency hit 2 vehicle killing 5 suspected militants, the first such
reported drone strike in the Kurram Agency.
September 3, 2010: 2 separate drone strikes kill 12–15 suspected
militants in North Waziristan.The first strike was near Miramshah,
killing six "local" militants according to Dawn. The second strike
was near Data Khel, targeting the home of Gul Adam, and killed
nine militants. SAMAA TV reported that a local Taliban
commander named Inayatullah was reportedly killed in the strike.
September 4, 2010: U.S. drones struck a compound in Datta
Khel village in North Waziristan district killed eight militants
including three foreign fighters.
September 6, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan kills
6 suspected militants.
September 8, 2010: U.S. drones launch four separate attacks in a
space of 24 hours. According to anonymous Pakistani intelligence
officials: In the first attack, a house owned by Maulvi Azizullah, a
member of the Haqqani network, in Dande Darpa Khel near
Miranshah was struck killing at least 6 militants. In the second
attack, drones fired missiles striking a car traveling a few miles
from the border, killing four people associated with the Haqqani
network. In the third attack, another house near the Miranshah
area was struck killing another 4 militants. A few hours later U.S.
drones launched their fourth attack striking a compound outside
Miranshah killing at least 6 militants and wounding 5 others. All
told 24 militants have been killed in these 4 strikes.
September 11, 2010: A U.S. drone strike on the house of Hafiz
Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan kills 5 suspected militants.
September 13, 2010: A U.S. drone fires two missiles at a house in
Shawal, North Waziristan, reportedly killing 13 militants.
September 14, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills 12 militants in
Dargah Mandi near Miran Shah, North Waziristan. The numerous
strikes in September are reportedly part of a campaign against the
Haqqqni Network. The drone strikes in Pakistan against the
network are meant to support concurrent special operations raids
against the network's fighters in Afghanistan.
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IPRI Factfile
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September 15, 2010: In an ongoing unprecedented drone
offensive, a drone strike kills 4 militants in North Waziristan,
including Saifullah Haqqani, first cousin of Haqqani Network
leader Sirajuddin Haqqani.
September 16, 2010: U.S. drones fired missiles at a house in
Datakhel area, killing six militants.
September 19, 2010: U.S. drones fire missiles at a house in Datta
Khel, North Waziristan killing 5 militants.
September 20, 2010: U.S. drones launch two strikes killing a total
of 12 militants in North Waziristan, the first volley hit a vehicle in
the Datakhel region killing 5, the second hit a house in Miran
Shah killing 7. September 21, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills 16
militants in the South-North Waziristan border region, including
Taliban commander Mullah Shamsullah.
September 25, 2010: A U.S. drone fired three missiles hitting a
vehicle killing 4 militants in Datta Khel village of North
Waziristan. Among the dead was Sheikh Fateh Al Misri, AlQaeda's new 3rd in command. Al Misri was planning a major
terrorist attack in London, Paris or Berlin by recruiting British
Muslims who would then go on a shooting rampage throughout
these cities similar to what transpired in Mumbai in November
2008. The plan was thought to be its final stages and the stepped
up drone campaign in September was done to disrupt and
eliminate the key planners of this terrorist attack.
September 26, 2010: U.S. drones launch two strikes against
militants killing 7. In the first strike, drone fired three missiles at a
house in Lwara Mandi village in Datta Khel, killing 3 militants.
Minutes later, a drone fired two missiles at a vehicle in the same
area, killing 4 militants.
September 27, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in Miran Shah, North
September 28, 2010: U.S. drone fired missile at a compound
Zeba village, west of Wana, South Waziristan killing 4 militants.
October to Present
•
October 2, 2010: U.S. drones launch two separate strikes killing
17 militants. In the first attack drones fired two missile at a house
in Datta Khel killing 9 militants including 4 foreigners. The dead
were members of the Badar Mansur group, which is closely
affiliated with Al Qaeda. Four hours later another strike occurred
in the same area on a convoy of vehicles and a house killing
another 8 militants.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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•
101
October 4, 2010: U.S. drones strike a mosque in Mirali, North
Waziristan, reportedly killing 8 suspected militants of German
nationality.
October 6, 2010: Two U.S. drone strikes by Miran Shah, North
Waziristan, kill a total of 11 militants. October 7, 2010: A U.S.
drone strike on a compound in North Waziristan kills 5 militants,
included one of the Al Qaeda leaders Atiyah Abd al-Rahman.
October 8, 2010: U.S. drone strikes by Miran Shah, North
Waziristan, kill a total of 6 militants according to an unnamed
intelligence officials, who was not authorized to speak to the
media.
October 10, 2010: Drones fire 4 missiles on 2 vehicles and kill at
least 8 suspected militants in the Shewa District of North
Waziristan.
October 13, 2010: Drone attacks kill 11 militants in the Datta
Khel area of North Waziristan.
October 15, 2010: Two U.S. drone strikes kill 13 suspected
militants. The first drone strike killed six suspected militants in
North Waziristan's Machi Khel area. Officials said two missiles hit
an alleged militant vehicle. Later this day the second drone strike
killed 7 suspected militants in the Mir Ali area of North
Waziristan.
October 18, 2010: A drone strike in the Datta Khel area of North
Waziristan kills 6 militants.
October 27, 2010: Two U.S. drone strikes 12 hours apart killed 7
militants. The first strike was on a house of militant Nasimullah
Khan which killed 4 militants. The second strike was on a vehicle
in Datta Khel kill which killed 3 militants.
October 28, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in the Datta Khel area kills
7 militants.
November 1, 2010: U.S.-operated drones fired four missiles at a
house in the Mir Ali District of North Wazaristan, killing five or
six suspected militants.
November 3, 2010: U.S. drones launch three separate attacks
killing 13 militants. In the first attack, drones fired two missiles at
a vehicle in the Qutab Khel area of Miran Shah killing 5 Uzbek
militants. In the second attack, missiles struck a house and a
vehicle in Khaso Khel village, near Mir Ali, killing 4 militants. In
the third attack, four missiles were fired hitting a vehicle in Pai
Khel village in Datta Khel town, killing 4 militants.
November 7, 2010: Two U.S. drones strikes kill a total 13 or 14
militants in the Miran Shah area of North Waziristan. In the first
102
IPRI Factfile
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
attack, drones struck a house and a vehicle in the town of Ghulam
Khan, north of Miran Shah killing 9 militants. The second attack
occurred an hour later in which drones stuck several vehicles in
the neighboring town of Datta Khel, killing 4 militants.
November 11, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills 6 suspected
militants in North Waziristan.[247] The militants were reportedly
Haqqani Network fighters returning from operations in Khost
Province, Afghanistan.
November 13, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills five people in the
village of Ahmad Khel in the Mir Ali area in North Waziristan. A
Geo News correspondent reported from the attack site that the
deceased seemed to be ordinary citizens, not terrorists.
November 16, 2010: Four drone-fired missiles hit a house and
vehicle in Bangi Dar village of North Waziristan, killing 15 to 20
people, possibly including civilians.
November 19, 2010: One U.S. drone strike kills 3 suspected
militants in the region of North Waziristan.[253]
November 21, 2010: A U.S. drone strike near Miran Shah, North
Waziristan, kills 6 suspected militants.
November 22, 2010: A U.S. drone strike fired missiles at a car
and a motorcycle in North Waziristan killing 5 alleged militants.
November 26, 2010: A U.S. drone strike fired missiles at a
vehicle in North Waziristan killing 4 alleged militants.
November 28, 2010: U.S. drone missiles strike a vehicle in Hasan
Khel village, around 30 kilometers east of Miranshah. Initial
reports indicated the strike killed 3 or 4 militants. Local officials,
however, later reported that the suspected militants had survived
the strike by fleeing the targeted vehicle after the first missile
missed.
December 6, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in Khushali village, North
Waziristan, kills 5 people.
December 9, 2010: At least four suspected militants are killed by
a US drone strike on a vehicle in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. …
Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan#Statistics
(accessed December 18, 2010).
Pakistan Army Sacrifces Reference
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-real_story&id=12
P AK A RMY ’ S C ONTRIBUTIONS
T ERRORISM
103
IN
F IGHT
AGAINST
104
IPRI Factfile
PAK ARMY’S CONTRIBUTIONS SINCE 9/11
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
30,457 Casualties (Killed + Injured)
Around 10,000 Casualties in 2009 alone
10 Soldiers’ Casualties every Day in 2009
Terrorists arrested/killed 17,742
At Full Stretch and Surge to fight Terrorists
105
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/from/main.asp?o=t-real_story&id=12
(accessed December 18, 2010).

- Pakistan Society of Victimology

Transcription

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