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 The Wall of Alexander
The Quest for a Grand Strategy in the Footsteps of Alexander and Bucephalus
Daniel K. Khalessi*
Studies in Grand Strategy Seminar, Yale University
Special Contribution to Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy
http://www.classicsofstrategy.com
April 2015
© 2015 Daniel Khalessi. All rights reserved.
*This project was supported by generous grants from the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy, International
Security Studies, and the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University. I would like to thank all of the kind
people I met during my journey who provided knowledge, hospitality, and a deeper sense of Alexander’s legacy in
the region. In the grand strategy program, I thank Professors John Gaddis, Charles Hill, John Negroponte, Emma
Sky, and Adam Tooze for their mentorship throughout the course and constructive feedback on the project. I am
also grateful to Amanda Behm, Igor Biryukov, Jeremy Friedman, Kathleen Galo, Elizabeth Gill, Alice
Kustenbauder, Jim Levinsohn, and Cristin Siebert for their assistance on the funding and logistical side of the
project. Finally, I would especially like to thank Dr. Sadri Khalessi for mentoring this project from start to finish,
reviewing the final draft prior to this publication, and providing invaluable insights on Eastern sources on Alexander
the Great. All errors are my own.
I. Introduction: The Wall of Dhu al-Qarnayn
If grand strategy necessitates an alignment of means and ends,1 what should a leader do if he
or she possesses the means to all ends? The Quran and a number of Middle Persian epics contain
the myth of an enigmatic hero named Dhu al-Qarnayn.2 According to The Quran’s account, God
gave Dhu al-Qarnayn “the ways and the means to all ends.”3 With his army, Dhu al-Qarnayn
traveled from the land where the sun sets (the West) to the land where the sun rises (the East).4
Upon reaching the East, he reached a valley between two mountains and found a “people
who scarcely understood a word.”5 These foreigners exclaimed, “Dhu al-Qarnayn! The Gog and
Magog (People) do great mischief on earth.”6 In Arabic and Persian, Yajuj and Majuj correspond to
Gog and Magog in the Old Testament. Instead of fighting Yajuj and Majuj directly, Dhu al-Qarnayn
declared, “I will build a strong barrier between you and them.”7 Dhu al-Qarnayn and his army then
placed blocks of iron between the mountains and used fire to seal the wall with “molten lead.”8
Accounts of such enigmatic characters appear in The Quran as parables and may carry a
deeper message. Interestingly, common folkloric tales of Middle East and Central Asia, as well as
some poets and scholars of Islamic history and philosophy, conjecture that the story of Dhu alQarnayn is an allegory of the conquests of Alexander the Great. Specifically, the Persian epic
Iskandarnameh (the “Story of Alexander”) by the renowned poet Nizami Ganjavi (1141-1209 AD)
speaks of Alexander as if he were Dhu al-Qarnayn. The title of one exemplary verse of Iskandernameh
1 As defined by the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale, the term “grand strategy” broadly refers to “a
comprehensive plan of action based on the calculated relationship of means to large ends.” For more information, please
see the program website here: Yale University International Security Studies. “Grand Strategy.” 2015.
http://iss.yale.edu/programs/grand-strategy.
2 The Holy Quran: Text and Translation. “Al-Kaf (The Cave).” Sura 18, Verses 83-100, translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali.
Islamic Book Trust: Kuala Lumpur. 2007 (English), p. 354 – 356. This is a republication of the 1934 and 1947
translations of The Quran by the same author and is one of the most widely cited English translations.
3 Ibid., Verse 83, p. 354.
4 Ibid., Verses 86 and 90, p. 354.
5 Ibid., Verse 93, p. 355.
6 Ibid., Verse 94, p. 355.
7 Ibid., Verse 95, p. 355.
8 Ibid., Verse 96, p. 355.
1 reads: “The coming of Alexander from the East to the land of Yajuj and Majuj.”9 The book includes
this line in red calligraphy:
Another common folkloric myth is that the Gates of Derbent near the Caucasus Mountains
are the actual Gates of Alexander—despite the absence of any evidence that Alexander or his army
travelled there. Other legends suggest that Cyrus the Great, Solomon, or Heraclius were Dhu alQarnayn.
The association of Alexander with Dhu al-Qarnayn, however, rests upon a non sequitur: it is
fallacious to conclude that two figures are the same solely because they share certain characteristics.
A rather weak justification for associating Dhu al-Qarnayn with Alexander is that the literal meaning
of Dhu al-Qarnayn is ‘the possessor of two horns.’ Since oral tradition, coins, and mosaics in Central
Asia often portray Alexander as a bearer of two horns, many assume that Dhu al-Qarnayn refers to
Ganjavi, Nizami. Iskandarnameh. Yale University Beinecke Library: Persian MSS 205. Accessed: November 2014. While
the exact date of this book is not known, it was most likely written during the latter half of the twelfth century (Nizami
lived from 1141 to 1209 AD Please note that Middle Persian texts do not contain page numbers; instead, the starting
verse is written in the bottom corner of the preceding page. Thus, the quote itself refers to the page number. I thank Dr.
Sadri Khalessi for helping me ensure the precise translation of this line. The only English translation of the epic poem is
a partial one and does not contain the abovementioned section: Ganjavi, Nizami. Iskandernameh: Book of Alexander the
Great, translated by Captain H. Wilbert Clarke. London: W.H. Allen, 1881.
9
2 Alexander.10 However, two horns could symbolize a duality, such as the simultaneous possession of
terrestrial and divine powers. As Dhu al-Qarnayn is the possessor of the ‘means to all ends,’ his
horns may represent the earthly power to overcome challenges, as well as the wisdom and foresight
to harness humanly desires. A second similarity is that both Dhu al-Qarnayn and Alexander traveled
in the same direction—West to East. However, the Quran does not speak of Dhu al-Qarnayn as a
conqueror. Moreover, traveling from the land of sunset to that of sunrise may not necessarily
represent a journey through space and time. Instead, the direction of travel may signify the
development of internal growth as a result of experience, knowledge, and faith. Therefore, East and
West may not refer to what one normally understands by such terms.
The arguments in favor of the identity of Dhu al-Qarnayn as Alexander thus do not
adequately delve into the underlying meaning of the legend. The debates about Dhu al-Qarnayn’s
identity matter less than the implications of the tale, for Dhu al-Qarnayn may not have been a
reference to a specific historical figure as explained above. One obviously cannot precisely discern
the exact intent behind the mysterious verse in The Quran and I do not purport to do so. However,
one can derive a valuable grand strategic lesson from the legend of Dhu al-Qarnayn.
The concepts conveyed by the story of Dhu al-Qarnayn can serve as an antithesis to
Alexander’s campaign. Dhu al-Qarnayn possessed the means to all ends—infinite resources to
achieve desired objectives. Nevertheless, the manner in which he aligned his means and ends was
limited: he knew when to stop. Rather than defeating or eliminating Gog and Magog, he chose to
coexist with them securely in a noninvasive and nondestructive manner. He built a wall to contain
them. Alexander, by contrast, only possessed finite means to all ends. Yet, he did not know when to
stop.
10
Obsevations of Daniel Khalessi on summer journey in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. July 2014.
3 I sought to understand how past human civilizations approached the challenge of managing
interdependencies over vast regions. Though two thousand years removed from Alexander’s time,
many fundamental challenges of governance remain the same. I spent the summer of 2014,
physically retracing Alexander’s campaign through Greece, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and India
to understand his legacy and the region he conquered. I wish it were possible to extend my trip to
Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as these countries also played a major role in
Alexander’s conquests. But such extensions were not feasible due to political circumstances, as well
as time and monetary constraints.
The argument developed in this paper is that a grand strategy of leadership and governance
requires walls. I do not refer to physical walls, but the ideas and institutions that establish, maintain,
and regulate the balance between (1) the center and perimeter of a polity; (2) good and evil; and (3)
conquest and contribution. This paper’s criticism of Alexander’s strategic mistakes is not divorced
from context. Indeed, Alexander lived during a period in which wars of conquest were the modus
operandi. However, this paper focuses on the manner in which Alexander approached and valued
conquest. Drawing upon ancient and modern biographical accounts; comparisons with other ancient
leaders; and observations from my summer journey in the footsteps of Alexander’s campaign, this
paper analyzes Alexander through the walls he should have built.11
II. The Center and Perimeter
The concept of walls is of inherent importance to empires because walls can serve as
perimeters. Without perimeters, it is difficult to define what does—and what does not—constitute
an empire. However, perimeters and their relation to the center of an empire carry even deeper
strategic implications. The center of gravity of any object is the point around which the distribution
This paper does not provide a chronological, biographical summary of Alexander. Instead, given the emphasis of the
paper on grand strategic concepts, this paper is organized thematically.
11
4 of mass is perfectly balanced. For Carl Von Clausewitz, the center of gravity referred to the “hub of
all power”—the point at which a nation, empire, or military keeps balance.12 However, if there are
no definable perimeters, there can be no center.
Under basic geometry, Alexander’s empire did not have clear perimeters and thus lacked a
clear center. The void of a center, in turn, carried a number of adverse implications for the
management, survival, and expansion of his empire.
The absence of a center resulted in the ambiguity of the identity of Alexander’s empire. Was
the empire Greek, Macedonian, Persian, Babylonian, Sogdian, or Indian? Some scholars contend
that Alexander’s empire was a novel attempt at constructing a world empire comprised of mixed
nations, races, and religions.13 However, successfully breaking down the cultural barriers of preexisting civilizations and integrating the disparate parts into a cohesive whole would have required a
clearer vision of the identity of the empire. Such an overarching identity would have had to somehow
transcend the ethnic, cultural, and civilizational distinctions. An empire centered on an ideology,
institutional framework, or broader objective might have facilitated a balance between these
disparate parts. Moreover, the manner in which Alexander integrated disparate regions was not
conducive to sustaining a coherent identity for his empire: “The royalty in the world monarchy of
Alexander had a double root in the Macedonian kingship of the Indo-European character and in the
Persian royalty of oriental characteristics.”14
The “double root” cultural identity of the empire made Alexander’s conception of the center
unclear to his people. Alexander adopted the Persian sartorial style; married two Persians and a
12 Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Knopf, 1984, pp.
596.
13 Alonso-Nunez, J.M. “The Universal State of Alexander the Great,” in Heckel, Waldemar and Lawrence A. Tritle
(eds.). Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2003, pp. 180-181.
14 Ibid., pp. 180.
5 Bactrian; and deified himself as a god in both Greek and Eastern religions.15 Furthermore, Alexander
adopted the titles of the leaders of foreign empires he conquered. Specifically, after the invasion of
Troy in 333 BC, Memphis in 331 BC, and Persepolis in 330 BC, Alexander named himself King of
Asia, Pharaoh of Egypt, and Shahnashah (King of Kings) of Persia respectively. Alexander’s
conquests did not solely alter the lands he conquered; his conquests altered his own outward identity
toward his troops. The Greek military historian Arrian of Nicomedia (86-160 AD) recounts the
assimilation of Alexander and his bodyguard Peucestas—whom Alexander appointed as the satrap
(governor) of Persepolis—upon Alexander’s return to Persepolis after his conquests in India:
[Alexander] was confident of Peucestas’ absolute loyalty … and in any case he thought
him a suitable appointment given his adoption of the oriental ways of life. This was
demonstrated as soon as [Peucestas] took over the satrapy. He was the only Macedonian
to change to Median dress and learn the Persian language, and generally to assimilate
himself to Persian norms. Alexander was all in favour of this, and the Persians were
delighted that [Alexander] preferred their own ways to the traditions of his native
country.16
Ancient Greek and Roman biographical accounts claim that Alexander’s assimilation had a
negative effect on the morale of his Macedonian troops. According to Arrian, Alexander’s outward
favoritism toward the Persian culture outraged the Macedonian troops to the point that they “could
contain themselves no longer.” 17 Alexander attempted to assuage his Macedonian troops by
marrying them to Persian brides from elite families and giving a charismatic speech in which he
called the troops his “kinsmen.”18 However, Alexander’s attempt at balancing disparate cultural
identities within a heterogeneous empire was only a temporary one. He did not institutionalize this
balance and thus his successors were unable to preserve the cultural fabric of the empire. Therefore,
if the Macedonian empire did have a center, the center was Alexander himself. For a polity to
survive, however, its core identity must outlast the mortality of its leader.
15 See: Arrian. Alexander the Great: The Anabasis and the Indica, translated by Martin Hammond. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford
University Press, 2013.
16 Lane Fox, Robin. The Search for Alexander. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980, pp. 300-303.
17 Arrian, Book Seven, pp. 205.
18 Ibid.
6 One could raise the counter-argument that Alexander was attempting to balance Western
and Eastern identities by assimilating to Persian cultural customs. However, one must differentiate
respect and assimilation, for the latter is the extreme form of the former. Cultural respect entails a
balance between sustaining the original identity of an empire and its culture, while simultaneously
allowing other parts of the empire to preserve their identity. However, when a leader continually
shifts the empire’s identity, there is no longer a stable conception of the center because it is unclear
where the leader stands. A grand strategy of governing a vast and heterogeneous empire requires
institutional and ideological ‘walls’ that can sustain a stable and long-term balance over distinct
cultures and languages.
The legacy of Alexander’s dual cultural identity was apparent during my summer journey to
the Middle East and Central Asia. This observation was particularly evident in Tajikistan—a nation
that shares a common cultural and linguistic heritage with Iran. On the first day of my arrival to
Tajikistan, I traveled to the city of Khujand. Alexander’s army established the city in 329 B.C. as
Alexandria Eskhata, which means “Alexandria the Farthest” in Ancient Greek. In the Historical
Museum of Sughd, I visited the basement gallery with modern mosaics and paintings of Alexander’s
campaign. One mosaic portrayed a funeral procession in which Alexander buried Darius the III, the
Persian king whom Alexander had defeated in the Battle of 330 BC. The museum guides noted that
a Tajik folklore suggests that Darius had an affair with Olympias, Alexander’s mother; Alexander
was then conceived through the affair. The folklore claims that Alexander’s cognizance of his true
father is why he sought to give Darius ‘a burial fit for a king.’ While it is unlikely—if not
impossible—that Alexander was the son of Darius, the legend does encapsulate Alexander’s
contradictory legacy as a Macedonian and Persian within the oral tradition of the regions he
conquered.
7 Figure 1: A mosaic illustrating the Tajik myth that Alexander wanted to give his ‘father’ Darius a burial fit for a king.
Historical Museum of Sughd. Modern-day Tajikistan.
The strategy of Augustus, however for preserving Rome’s identity in spite of the empire’s
expansion contrasts starkly with Alexander’s approach. A key facet of grand strategy is the
consideration of the psychological effect of one’s actions. Augustus understood the psychological
significance of an empire’s ideological and institutional identity. First, Augustus utilized the concept
of mos maiorum to establish a clear delineation between himself and Mark Antony. By criticizing
Antony for the Donations of Alexandria—in which Antony allocated Parthian lands to Cleopatra’s
children—and perpetuating propaganda about Antony’s favoritism toward Egypt, Augustus painted
Antony as someone who “failed to conduct himself as befitted a Roman citizen.”19 Thus, Augustus
was able to wall off his rival from the identity of Rome. Second, Augustus aligned the objective of
expanding the Roman Empire with the institutional preservation of the empire’s center: he
symbolically gave all of the lands he conquered “to the Senate and people of Rome.”20
19 Everitt, Anthony. Augustus: The Life of Rome’s First Emperor. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2007, pp.
164. pp. 167.
20 Ibid., pp. 197.
8 The center must remain strong for stability to exist within the identity of the empire. The
strength is the result of creating a synergy between all significant nodes in the empire’s network. The
failure to act upon this grand strategic concept ultimately hindered Alexander’s ability to establish an
empire definable by identity and space.
III. Good and Evil
The concept of balance is also applicable to the manner in which leaders handle
contradictory value systems. A leader’s attempt to use goodness to eliminate evil can paradoxically
result in the perpetuation of evil. Good and evil are inherently subjective terms. However, I refer to
good and evil as broad categories of contradictory values—such as courage and fear; peace and war;
and love and hate. Goodness stems from a stable balance between good and evil, not from the
dogmatic elimination of evil. A wall symbolizes this principle by serving as a mechanism that regulates
the balance between different values. This balance is important for both the psychology of leaders
and the manner in which leaders conquer their foreign subjects.
There is considerable debate over the psychology and fundamental values of Alexander in
ancient and contemporary biographical accounts. However, even the most venerating and critical
biographies of Alexander portray him as over-ambitious. Too many biographies have
psychoanalyzed the blinding effect of Alexander’s ambitions on his understanding of the realistic
shortcomings of his capabilities. However, the following section of this paper will take a broader
look at Alexander’s personality—beyond the mere question of ambition. Alexander showed an
affinity for extremes over moderation; his inability to act prudently and practice restraint led to a
number of strategic blunders.
Alexander’s extremity was both his greatest tactical asset and strategic weakness. Alexander’s
approach to the Battle of Gaugamela of 331 BC—the most decisive battle in his campaign which
ultimately led to the defeat of the Persian Empire—is a case in point. Despite being severely
9 outnumbered by the Persian forces, Alexander enhanced the morale of his troops through a
charismatic speech and then proceeded to rapidly outflank Darius’ forces.21
On a strategic level, however, Alexander under-valued the importance of negotiation,
sequencing, and consolidation. In the prelude to the battle, Darius allegedly sent a diplomatic letter
to Alexander to ask him to refrain from invading the Persian Empire.22 Using sources from oral
tradition in the Greek and Roman militaries, Arrian argues that the ancient letter alluded to the
alliance between Alexander’s father (Philip of Macedon) and the Persian emperor Artaxerxes II:
There had been a friendship and alliance between Philip and Artaxerxes. … In Darius’
own reign Alexander had not sent anyone to him to confirm the old friendship and
alliance, but had crossed into Asia with an army and done considerable harm to the
Persians … but now as king [Darius] wished to establish friendly relations with Alexander
and become his ally.23
Alexander, however, refused Darius’ overtures because Alexander did not seek to establish a
balance of power with the Persian Empire. Alexander’s objective was to defeat and conquer Asia.
Rhetorically, Alexander justified this decision because he wanted to avenge the Persian invasion of
Greece under Xerxes I in 480 BC. Arrian’s account of Alexander’s response to Darius is as follows:
Your ancestors invaded Macedonia and the rest of Greece without provocation and did us
harm. I have been appointed leader of the Greeks and crossed into Asia on a mission to
punish Persia for what you had started. … I am master of your country. … It is for you,
then, to come to me as lord over all Asia. … But if you wish to dispute the kingship, stand
your ground and fight for it: do not run away, as I shall come after you wherever you are.24
Alexander’s objective—as conveyed in the letter and the overall scope of his campaign—was
clear: to conquer the Eurasian landmass. Achieving this extreme end required the conquest of the
Persian Empire—the key to the Central Asian Plateau. However, Alexander’s extreme vision of
glory contradicted the necessary goal of any leader of a state: to preserve his or her polity. Expansion
without a concerted effort to preserve the original polity can result in imperial overstretch and the
Lane Fox, Robin. The Search for Alexander. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980, pp. 220-229.
Arrian, Book Two, pp. 54.
23 Arrian, “Summary of Letter from the Emissaries of Darius to Alexander” in Anabasis, Book Two, pp. 54.
24 Arrian, “Summary of Letter from Alexander to Darius” in Anabasis, Book Two, pp. 55.
21
22
10 failure to achieve both expansion and preservation. Alexander’s over-confidence, courage, and
ambition prevented him from understanding the consequences of rapidly defeating the Persian
Empire and managing a vast empire with an overstretched force.
A balance between courage and caution by contrast, can regulate the unrealistic ambitions of
leaders and allow for a more deliberative decision-making. Though the efficient conquest of Persia
in three years25 required boldness and tactical genius, Alexander’s rapid advance was not conducive
to building lasting institutions to maintain internal stability within his immense territory. The failure
to prioritize consolidation over conquest is evident in one of Alexander’s final decisions. After a
number of Alexander’s troops abandoned him during his Indian campaign, Alexander began the
journey back to Babylon. Despite internal revolts within his empire, Alexander initiated the
construction of a navy with plans to invade the Arabian Peninsula.26 According to Arrian, “the real
motive, it seems … was Alexander’s constant and insatiable appetite for further acquisition.”27
King Philip of Macedon, Alexander’s father, serves as a valuable case study of contrast to
Alexander. Despite his personal ambitions to invade Asia, Philip took a more gradual and sequenced
approach to conquest than his son. Philip prioritized the internal stability and consolidation of
power within Macedonia above external conquest. To achieve this priority, he understood the
strategic value in creating a balance of power between Macedonia and opposing tribes in the
Balkans.
Philip’s grand strategy was apparent in the prelude, process, and aftermath of the Battle of
Erigon Valley of 358 BC against Bardylis, the leader of a Balkan tribe known as the Illyrians. To
provide context, the Illyrians had conquered portions of western Macedonia and assassinated
Freeman, Philip. Alexander the Great. 1st Edition. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011, pp. ii.
Arrian, Book Seven, pp. 215.
27 Ibid.
25
26
11 Philip’s brother two years before the battle.28 Similar to Alexander’s Battle of Gaugamela, Philip
faced an adversary who sued for a diplomatic settlement prior to the battle.29 According to the sole
surviving account of the battle by Greek historian Diodorus Siculus, Philip rejected the diplomatic
overture and attacked the Illyrians to achieve an unconditional surrender: “Philip said that he indeed
desired peace but would not, however, concur … unless the Illyrians should withdraw from all the
Macedonian cities.”30 Despite expelling the Illyrians from western Macedonia, Philip knew when to
stop. Specifically, he decided not to expend additional blood and treasure to conquer the Illyrians
while Macedonia was still undergoing the nascent phase of its rise.31 Instead, Philip married Bardylis’
daughter and established a balance of power between Macedonia and the Illyrians so that he could
concentrate on the task at hand—building Macedonia.32 Philip knew when to temporarily cease
conquest and use diplomatic means to achieve his broader strategic objectives.
IV. Conquest and Contribution
An effective grand strategy should entail power-synthesis, not domination. The balance
between conquest and contribution is a key element of any coherent grand strategy of governance
and leadership. This balance is inextricably linked to the two previous sections of this paper.
Conquest for the sake of conquest can result in the over-expansion of an empire’s boundaries,
thereby severely weakening the linkage between the center and the periphery. Moreover, the inability
to regulate desires for conquest or expansion can inhibit leaders from seeing the broader purpose of
their conquest. Clausewitz argues that war should be subservient to policy objectives: “The political
object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation
Freeman, pp. 13.
Ibid.
30 Siculus, Diodorus. Bibliotheca Historica, 60-30 BC, Book Sixteen, Chapter Four, Sec. 4-7.
31 Freeman, pp. 14.
32 Ibid.
28
29
12 from their purpose.”33 Viewing conquest as an intrinsically valuable end is meaningless. The only
consequence of incessant war without a policy objective is the perpetuation of violence. At the same
time, a leader who focuses on contributions in the absence of power or expansion might fail to
preserve his polity and sustain its contributions. The ‘walls’ of ideas and institutions, however, can
regulate the balance between conquest and contribution.
Alexander prioritized conquest over contribution by destroying the institutions of many of
the territories he conquered and subsequently failing to establish new institutions to govern them.
Despite his eventual assimilation to the Persian culture, Alexander and his army destroyed and
looted many of the cities they conquered without leaving behind adequate cultural, linguistic, or
economic institutions behind to manage them. Many historians disagree as to whether Alexander
burned down the Persian capital city of Persepolis during a drunken tirade or whether he made a
clear policy decision to avenge Xerxes’ burning of the Parthenon a century earlier.34 Nevertheless,
most biographical accounts concur that Alexander regretted his actions and paid homage to the
tomb of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian Empire, the following morning.35 Despite
Alexander’s preservation and adoption of certain Persian institutions (see section II), he demolished
other cities without governing them.
The destruction of Cyropolis—founded by Cyrus the Great during the sixth century BC—
and the surrounding cities are case in point. Located approximately two hundred and fifty kilometers
northeast of the ancient Silk Road city of Samarkand, Cyropolis was the most populous Persian city
in Central Asia at the time of Alexander’s conquest in 329 BC.36 After establishing a forward base at
Clausewitz, pp. 87.
Lane Fox, pp. 248. Regarding the burning of Persepolis, Lane Fox writes that Alexander’s “motives have long been a
famous subject of dispute.” It is not clear as to whether Alexander burned the city as out of intoxication or policy. See
also: Hamilton, J. R. Plutarch: Alexander: a Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon P., 1969, pp. 99. In his review of the ancient
Greek text of Plutarch’s biography of Alexander, Hamilton notes that Alexander’s generals encouraged him to burn the
city.
35 Freeman, pp. 210.
36 Arrian, Book Four, pp. 103.
33
34
13 Samarkand, Alexander applied “a scorched-earth policy against the surrounding region, which only
inflamed the opposition.” 37 According to Arrian, Alexander and his army swiftly killed the
inhabitants of Cyropolis and the surrounding six cities over the span of three days:
After this capture and the enslavement of [five] cities in two days, Alexander marched
against the largest of all, Cyropolis. As founded by Cyrus, this was fortified with a higher
wall than the others, and the greatest number of barbarians in the region. … In the first
phase of the city’s capture about eight thousand of the enemy were killed. … The seventh
city was taken by assault. … Aristobulus says that Alexander took this city too by storm,
and killed all he found inside.38
The scorched-earth policy and rapid advances inhibited Alexander’s ability to consolidate his
control over the region. Alexander did indeed build fortified cities with physical walls—such as
Alexandria Eskhata—during the next twenty days.39 However, the cities were devoid of meaningful
cultural or linguistic institutions that connected them to the broader Macedonian Empire. Alexander
merely appointed his interpreter, Greek mercenaries, and barbarian volunteers to govern the cities in
Sogdiana. 40 These actions were insufficient to prevent barbarians—who had been instigated by
Alexander’s scorched-earth policy—from continually revolting against Alexander’s new cities.41
Figure 2: My journey to the hilltop where the city of Cyropolis once stood. Modern-day Tajikistan.
Wood, Michael. In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great: A Journey From Greece to Asia. London: BBC Books, 1997, pp. 155156. See also: Arrian, pp. 103.
38 Arrian, Book Four, pp. 104-105.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
37
14 Though Cyrus the Great (576-530 BC) also embarked on numerous wars of expansion, he
attempted to find a balance between conquest and contribution. Cyrus constructed institutions that
successfully integrated foreign lands into the Persian Empire. These institutional ‘walls’ included rule
of law, human rights, and language. To analyze key principles that guided Cyrus’ strategy for
defeating and integrating opposing forces, we can examine Xenophon’s biography of Cyrus from the
fourth century BC.42 Though written in admiration of Cyrus’ virtues, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia is the
oldest and most comprehensive existing source on the education, principles, and policies of Cyrus.
First, Xenophon claims that Cyrus believed that “negotiation can work better than naked force.”43
Specifically, Cyrus used skillful diplomacy to sever ties between the Babylonians and Egyptians and
turn the latter into an ally to fight against the former.44 By leveraging the power of alliances, Cyrus
generated the momentum necessary to eventually defeat the Babylonians in 539 BC with relatively
less effort than pure confrontation.45
Second, Xenophon contends that Cyrus valued post-conflict reconciliation and sought to
“persuade the defeated to help [him] consolidate … success.”46 Specifically, Cyrus issued a decree,
which stated that he would treat his Babylonian subjects humanely and grant them religious liberty.47
Though there is a debate as to whether the decree was a form of propaganda to consolidate Persian
rule over Babylon, Cyrus’ other actions distinguish him from his contemporaries. As noted in the
Old Testament, Cyrus liberated the Hebrews from the Babylonian Captivity and allowed them to
return to Jerusalem to build the temple of God.48
42 Xenophon. Cyrus the Great, edited and translated by Larry Hedrick. First edition. New York: St. Martin’s Press. May
2006, p. 216-217.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 220.
47 See introduction by Larry Hedrick in: Xenophon. Cyrus the Great, edited and translated by Larry Hedrick. First edition.
New York: St. Martin’s Press. May 2006, pp. xiii.
48 The Holy Bible. Ezra 1:1-1.4, translated by James Moffatt, pp. 530.
15 During my journey in Central Asia, I observed firsthand remnants of the linguistic, cultural,
and religious institutions of the Persian Empire. During the Soviet era, Russian was the official
language of Uzbekistan. Today, the official language is Uzbek (a Turkic language). However, while
traveling to the ancient city of Samarkand, I experimented with my Farsi (Persian). In all of my
interactions, the people of Samarkand spoke fluently with me. Their dialects were more formal and
contained less Arabic influences than modern Persian. Cyrus the Great conquered Samarkand in the
sixth century BC and the Persians last controlled the city under the Sassanid Dynasty in 651 BC.49
Despite the fact that the Macedonians, Arabs, Turks, Timurids, Mongols, and Soviets invaded
Samarkand over the past two millennia, the Persian language as an institution of the city nevertheless
persisted.
Figure 3: The Necropolis of Samarkand, which serves as a mausoleum for Tamerlane and his family. Alexander built a
palace here when Samarkand served as his forward base. Modern-day Uzbekistan.
Contextually, linguistic lineage serves as an important distinguishing factor among Central
Asians. Among the people I met, Uzbeks would refer to themselves as ‘Turkic’ while Tajiks would
Grousset, René. The Empire of the Steppes: a History of Central Asia. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970,
pp. 115-118.
49
16 self-identify as ‘Persian.’ Throughout Tajikistan, statues honored the great Persian poets Rudaki,
Ferdowsi, and Nizami (the author of Iskandernameh). The fact that neither Uzbekistan nor Tajikistan
shares borders with modern Iran elucidates the power of language as an institutional contribution
that can transcend time and space.
Furthermore, I noticed the impact of the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism on the
cultural norms and architecture of the region. Many architectural sites in both Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan included a series of triangular patterns. According to my drivers and the local visitors of
the mosques, these patterns symbolized the three pillars of Zoroastrianism: good thoughts, good
words, and good actions. In direct contrast to the lasting contributions of the ideas and institutions
of the Persian Empire in the region, few of Alexander’s contributions remained. The sole vestiges of
Alexander’s empire were Macedonian weaponry and Greco-Bactrian coins at the Museum of
Dushanbe, Tajikistan. However, my observations highlighted Alexander’s greatest grand strategic
shortcoming: his attempt to pursue tactical victories without due attention to long-term institutions.
Figure 4: The weapons and tools of Alexander's army. Museum of Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
17 V. Conclusion:
Alexander’s battles occurred millennia ago, but the lessons from his conquests still carry
relevance for modern nations, leaders, and individual people. Alexander never erected the walls that
established balance and coexistence between the different cultures within his empire. However, the
ultimate grand strategic lesson may lie in the composition of the wall of his possible antithesis—Dhu
al-Qarnayn.
As a human race, we possess a natural desire to conquer our ambitions. These desires often
take different forms—such as the thirst for wealth, fame, and power to name a few. These desires—
possibly symbolized by Yajuj and Majuj in the Quran and Persian classics—often become
unrestrained and self-justifying. When power becomes an end in itself—as opposed to a means
toward a higher purpose—it can become self-defeating. At the same time, these natural human
inclinations are sometimes necessary for survival and social progress as long as they are harnessed
and kept within moderate boundaries. They are therefore necessary evils and leaders must learn to
manage them within the human heart and psyche.
The search for a grand strategy in the footsteps of Alexander does not culminate in a
‘comprehensive’ plan of action for leadership. Instead, the contours for a grand strategy for dealing
with these enemies within may exist. Dhu al-Qarnayn’s barrier is a strong, albeit non-destructive,
defense mechanism. It is built with the help of the people who “scarcely understood a word,”50 a
possible reference to people who are helpless against life’s challenges due to the lack of knowledge,
experience, or resources. The two mountains may signify the conflicting values, priorities, and
challenges that make people suffer. However, the wall serves as a way to regulate this balance. Dhu
al-Qarnayn enhances the defensive capabilities of the wall both within and without by educating
while building. He chooses not to conquer the adversaries, yet finds a way to ensure the security of
50
The Holy Quran. Sura 18, Verse 93, p. 355 (See footnote 5).
18 the people. Through a strategic balance, prudence and mindfulness can overcome the natural urge to
conquer and destroy. True leaders conquer their own ego before conquering other people’s lands.
Their power of wisdom prevails over their urge to conquer.
Figure 5: Iskendergul (“The Lake of Alexander”). Alexander allegedly buried his prized horse, Bucephalus, here. The lake
is located sixty kilometers from the capital of Tajikistan in the mountains.
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