Copyright by HOLLAND DEMPSEY WATKINS

Transcription

Copyright by
HOLLAND DEMPSEY WATKINS
1968
PLUTARCO ELIAS CALLES:
EL JEFE MÁXIMO OF MÉXICO
by
HOLLAND DEMPSEY WATKINS, B.S., M.S.
A DISSERTATION
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of Texas Technological College
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved
Accepted
August, 1968
T3
_
rio. 3 ^
'
PREFACE
A tumultuous century vjhich began in México with
Father Hidalgo's famous cry for independence in iBlO climaxed in revolution against Porfirio DÍaz in I9IO.
Dur-
ing much Oi* th.ô ~j3-r:^c^ cc^.r.-'''' - :^ in México were chaotic.
Instabillty in government and society, rapid and frequent
changes in rulers, foreign intervention, and domestic graft
and corruption characterized developments in the nation.
One hundred years of uncertainty within such a framework
produced a political inconstancy there which came to be
accepted as an almost natural course of events.
With the Mexican Revolution of 1910j> however, the
nation entered a new stage in its growth.
transformations began to occur.
Certain basic
After frightful military
convulsions, stability slowly settled on the nation.
cial action and reforms gradually appeared.
So-
Foreign na-
tions became more reluctant to interfere in México's domestic affairs.
And there víere attempts at honesty by in-
creasing numbers of public officials.
The responsibility for leadership in the Revolution of 1910 went to Francisco I. Madero, a Coahuilan who
had studied in both France and the United States.
Imbued
with democratic ideais Madero began his campaign against
the long dictatorial control of his nation by Porfirio
DÍaz.
Other forces of discontent increased Madero's
• •
11
iii
following against DÍaz until, faced by overwhelming opposition, the old dictator resigned and fled to France.
A
decade of fighting among members of the revolutionary group
culminated in the Mexican Constitution of 1917^ a document
written to altv r tho type of society which had helped create grievances among the Mexicans.
Several leaders who played active parts in the
military phase of the Revolution eventually occupied the
presidency of the Republic.
These men included Venustlano
Carranza (I916-I920), Álvaro Obregái (1920-1924), and Plutarca Elias Calles (1924-1928).
To these leaders went the
task of stabilizing the nation and enforcing the laws written into the Constitution of I917.
Little change took place during Carranza's term,
but Obreg<5h brought to the executive position a more revolutionary outlook than his predecessor.
However, when
Calles became president, he immediately set to work to
comply fully with the letter of the law.
His efforts to
implement revolutionary articles of the Constitution
evoked vigorous opposition by forces which stood to suffer
from his actions.
The Roman Catholic Church and investors
from the United States especially resented Calles' interpretations of the Constitution.
It is with the various programs which Calles attempted during his four year term as president of México
that the following study is concerned.
Though brief
iv
mention is made of his life before and after his administration, special attention has been placed on certain
major challenges Calles faced as president and to his attempted Solutions of the many ills v/hich beset the Mexican nation during the decade of the 1920's.
These debilita-
tions included land distribution, illiteracy, poor health
conditions and lack of sanitation, the Church-State controversy, working conditions, and a depressed economy.
In each case an attempt has been made to evaluate Calles'
efforts to resolve these basic problems.
The work which follows could not have been possible but for the help of certain friends and advisors.
A note of gratitude should be written for the committee
which directed the dissertation and included Dr. Jacquelin
Collins, Dr, James William Davis, Dr. Lawrence Lester
Graves, Dr. Benjamin Havelock Newcomb, and Dr. Ernest
Wallace.
A very special statement of appreciation is due
Dr. David Martell Vigness, who chaired the committee, directed the dissertation, and offered such kind and helpful
suggestions.
Mr. Frank Simpson and Dr. Don Whisenhunt deserve
my thanks for their timely encouragements.
I must express
appreciation to Miss Linda Jones of Ângelo State College
for assistance with rough drafts and typing.
Finally, I
am obligated to Senorita Judith Licea y Ayala of the
Biblioteca Nacional and the National University of México.
V
It is not too much to say that without her kind words,
her encouragement, and her persistence in helping locate
sources, this work could not have been completed..
TABLE CP CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE
ii
CHAPTER
I.
II.
THE ROAD TO CHAPULTEPEC
. . .'
1
THE MEXICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR
31
III. AN EDUCATION WHICH TRANSFORMS
IV.
CHURCH AND STATE:
. '
59
THE CALLES CONFRON-
TATION
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
88 .
"LAND IS FOR CAMPESINOS"
121
AI/EERICAN INTERESTS IN MÉXICO
150
A MEXICAN'S INTEREST IN MÉXICO
l86
REACTION AND REWARD
.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
.......
VI
220
243
CHAPTER I
THE ROAD TO CHAPULTEPEC
That México is a land of extremes has often been
noted.
This fact is especially evident in the social
structure where the millions of people in the lower classes
and the relatively small number of aristocrats are separated by a gulf now being filled by a middle class.
Econom-
ically, the masses are reduced to abject poverty while the
aristocrats are often millionaires.
apparent even in geography.
The differences are
The land varies widely--from
the mountainous, arid North to the wet, low-lying South.
One of the states. Sonora, is the nation in microcosm.
Its borders encompass the nationally characteristic
differences in classes of people, in land variations, and
in economic divergences.
Situated in the northwest of México
and contiguous with Arizona in the United States, it contains some of the richest land in the nation.
This land in
the Sonoran Desert has been described by Moisés Saenz as
"one of the most fertile áreas in the western hemisphere,
an área of hot lands, copious streams for irrigation, and,
in parts cultivated, of fabulous agricultural utility. . .
."
But productive acreage is comparatively small, its price
Moisés Sáênz and Kerbert I. Priestley, Some Mexican
Problems (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1925), 91.
is high, and it is owned by the wealthy few.
The majority
of the people of the state live on and work small plots of
practically sterile land while the aristocrats own the good
land in large es.tates.
Ownershlp of rich or poor land thus
seems to determine the two major classes, which have little
in common.
The dominant physical feature of the state is
the masslve Sierra Madre Occidental, whose serrated peaks
form a major obstacle between Sonora and the rest of the
nation; they are a barrier to river travei, an enemy to the
railroad.
It is a hard and varied land, a land which has
produced strong and complex men.
Out of the turmoil of the Revolution of I9IO three
men from this state rose to play such significant roles in
the public affairs of the nation that they have been called
the "Sonora Dynasty. "
Calles.
One of these men was Plutarco Elí'as
Destined to govern México in 1924, Calles was born
in Guaymas, the largest of the scenic ports on the Gulf of
//^
3
Califórnia, the Sea of Cortd's, on September 25, I877.
His
2
The expression refers to three highly important
revolutionaries: Álvaro Obregc5n, Adolfo de Ia Huerta, and
Calles. At one time, each member of the "Dynasty" served
as president of México. The group of. three Sonorans has
been compared to the three important leaders from the state
of Virgínia who emerged during the early national development of the United States. See Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern México (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice•^The actual circumstances of Calles' birth are not
clear and are a matter of controversy. His national origin
parents, Plutarco Elias and Dona Jesus Calles, themselves
natives of the northern part of the state, were regarded
as humble but industrious and honorable people.
However,
three of Calles' uncles were wealthy and occupied positions
of importance.
One, Francisco S. Elias, was governor of
Sonora twice as well as secretary of agriculture.
4
Calles' rich and influential relatives were no
direct help to him, and he spent his early life in abject
conditions.
Poverty and the suffering of other neighbor-
ing Guaymans
help explain his strong desire to become a
revolutionary.
5
Calles himself called attention later to
his early environment as a motivating factor in his earnest
hope to raise the living standards of Mexicans.
6
Despite the fact that formal education under the
Diaz regime was not well-developed, Calles received a sound
is also questionable. Enemies variously labelled him Jewish, Syrian, and Turkish because of his physical appearance; and the name El Turco became commonly applied to him.
Further, a constitutional question arose, the claim being
held that Calles was not Mexican by birth. See as examples:
James A. Magner, Men of México (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1942), 529; "Plutarco Elias Calles," The
Living Age, CCCXXXV (November, 1929), l88; Fernando Medina
Ruiz, Calles: Un Destino Melancólico (Mixico: Editorial
Jus, S. A., I90O), 41; Francisco Gómez dei Rey and Hernán
Diaz, The Black Czar: Plutarco Elias Calles, Bolshevik
Dictator of México (El Paso: El Diário de ei Paso Preso,
192tí), 4.
Magner, Men of México, 520.
^Manuel Gonzales Ramirez, Calles (Hermosillo, 1950),
81; Amado-Chaverri Matamoros, El Verdadero Calles (México:
Edici(5nes Pátria Grande, 1933). ^19.
6
y
Djed Bcirquez, [Juan de Dios Eojorauezj
(Guatemala: Sanchez and DeGuise, 1923), 26.
Calles
education in the school of Don Benigo L<^pez y Sierra, who
reportedly predicted to the entire class that Calles would
7
one day be governor of Sonora.
Obviously young Plutarco
had distinguished himself as a student, and impressed teachQ
ers frequently lauded his diligence and promise.
While a student in Don Benigno's school, Calles
worked in the office of the secretary to pay part of his
expenses.
At the same time, he wrote for several periodi-
cals in Hermosillo, directing his attention to the improvement of conditions of the producers and laborers.
Glow-
ing reports indicate that in his articles he "echoed the
9
sufferings of the masses and demanded their emancipation."
In 1893 the future president appeared for the first
time in public life:
he became an instructor of beginning
classes at the impoverished municipal school in Guaymas.
Soon he began to receive visits from older students in
whom he instilled ideas of revolution and independence.
10
Many of his students were later to become his collaborators
rj
Alberto Morales Jiménez, Frente a Frente (México:
n.p.; n.d.), 93. Magner, Men of México, 520.
o
B(írquez, Calles, 26.
•^Manuel Becerra Acosta, "The Real Calles," in El
Excelsior, September I6, 1925Ramoh Puente, "Plutarco Elias Calles," Historia de
Ia Revoluclón Mexicana, ed. Jos^ T. Mel^ndez, (México:
Edici(5nes Aquilas, S. A., 1940), II, I8O; Magner, Men of
México, 521.
or subordinates either in the revolution or in the govem4- 1 1
ment.
In addition Calles taught in public schoo.ls at
Hermosillo and at the Escuela de Ia Moneda under the direction of the teacher Encisco.-^^
also tutored privately.
From time to time he
cy^
There is general agreement that
he was a successful teacher.
Moreover, he engaged in ad-
ministrative work, inspecting schools and assisting in
curriculum planning for his district.
More than anything,
however, Calles " . . . was distinguished because of the
spirit of independence which he fomented in'his pupils,
...
Seemingly, he forged with his lectures definite
and individual characters.
ence as. a teacher.
And he never forgot his experi-
As he campaigned for the presidency
of the republic, after years of military and civilian leadership, he remarked that teaching was "his career."
Not ali of Calles' early ventures were as success15
fui as his teaching vocation.
While he was treasurer
llMagner, Men of México, 521.
•^^B(5'rquez, Calles, 26.
Âmado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 420.
-'-^Statement to the Civic Progressive Educational
Party, April 20, 1924. Cited in Robert Hammond Murray,
(ed), México Before the World: Public Documents and Addresses of Plutarco Elias Calles (New York: The Academy
Press, 1927), 42.
IS
-^See, for example: Ruiz, Calles. . . . Ruiz claiir.s
that even as a teacher Calles was a failure, and that the
children commonly called him "Maestro Mechas" because of
his habit of appearlng at school drunk.
of the Guaymas Teachers' Association, money in his trust
mysteriously disappeared.
Petitions alleging misappropria-
tion of funds Ied to his dismissal.
Similar circum-
stances developed later when he became municipal treasurer.
In that instance he barely escaped arrest only because the
missing amounts were recovered.
Unsuccessful business enterprises followed his
failure as a public official. He worked with his half-.
brother, Arturo Malvido Elias, who operated the Hotel
México in Guaymas, beginning as a bartender and soon becoming a part owner in the hotel. A fire broke out but Calles
could not collect full damages because the Insurance company alleged arson.
Following still another failure (the bankruptcy of
a farm belonging to one of his uncles), he v/as placed in
chargé of a flour mill in the pueblo of Fronteras in northern Sonora.
The mill belonged to the New York firm of
Smithers and Nordelhos, and the manager, James Smithers,
often entrusted Calles with keeping order in the municipality. At dreary Fronteras, Calles served his apprenticeship
for future political activity.IQ
-^
Ruiz, Calles . . ., 27. Magner, Men of México,
521.
'Daniel Moreno, Venustlano Carranza, Álvaro Obregdh, Plutarco Elias Calles (México: México Edits, 1950),
4Y,
18RUÍZ, Calles . . .,29.
"Puente, Historia de Ia Revolucldh . . ., II, l8o.
7
Calles' .political novitiate occurred during the
iron rule of Porfirio Diaz.
Under the' Pax Porflriana dis-
content had existed, especially in Sonora.
Something of a
permanent condition of war prevailed between federal troops
and the Yaqui Indians over spoliation of the Indian lands
along the Yaqui River.
The conflict and resulting military
abuses disgusted the people of the state.
Calles shared
the disgust; when slavery for the Indians became a military
20
policy, disgust changed to loathing.
At twenty-three, Calles began his professional political life by joining the Club Verde to oppose the domin21
ation of Sonora by a group of Diaz's lieutenants.
A
triumvirate, Luis G. Torres, Licenciado Rafael Izabal, and
Ram(5h Corral (the only Sonoran) made the state a "special
fief, . . . [whose] governments became wealthy in combination with the military . . . [while] the rest of the inhabitants lived in strlctest misery."^^
Calles and many
of his former students in the Club Verde opposed this government through the newspaper La Regeneracldh.
Itself a
manifestation of the growing unrest throughout the nation.
20
Puente, Historia de Ia Revoluci(5h . . ., II, l80.
PI
Comitê* de Homenajes, Biografia dei Senor General
Plutarco Elias Calles hecho . . . por los Gobernadores y
Legislaturas de Ia República (México, 192b), 4.
Puente, Historia de Ia Revolucicin . . ., II,
180.
8
the paper was printed in Los Angeles, Califórnia, to avoid
23
censorship and was secretly distrlbuted in Sonora.
In the same year that Calles joined the Club Verde
an event of some slgnificance for Sonorans occurred.
Prospectors uncovered important copper deposits, and an
American, William Green, established foundries to smelt
the ore.
The mines, called Cananea, offered the "distant
24
promises" associated with the name.
The region quickly
became famous.
Sonorans and others converged there, shar-
ing a dreara of easy riches.
Within a few years, hov/ever,
the luster of the copper was tarnished by the conditions
of the miners.
The hopes for wealth faded rapidly.
Workers--those
who remained after the initial boom--discovered that financial reward went to mine owners and industrialists.
The
capitalists profited while laborers spent long hours sweating, toiling, and exhausting themselves for pitifully low
wages.
It was not difficult for the miners to imagine a
conspiracy betv/een the owners and the state government, because the legislature never acted to improve hours or
salaries.
And by I906 strikes began against the Cananea
Consolidated Copper Company and its North American owner
while political demonstrations broke out against Governor
23
Comitê' de Homenajes, 4; B(5'rquez, Calles, 26.
24
Puente, Historia de Ia Revoluclón . . ., II, I80.
9
Rafael Izabal, vího was sympathetic v/i th Green.
In both
instances the action resulted from the influence of Ricardo
Flores Magon, founder of La Regeneracidn, and his followers.
25
Seething discontent spread to the port of Guaymas.
There, spurred by the actions of Calles and the Club Verde,
open rebellion erupted against Izabal and his followers
who were seeking to thrust Ramoh Corral into high public
office.
Corral, who had been called earlier from Sonora
to various offices in the national government, had succeeded finally to the vice-presidency and was the obvious
successor to the octogenarian Porfirio DÍaz.
Opposition
to this eventuality in Sonora, among other places, took
form in the movement to support the candidacy of General
Bernardo Reyes, of Nuevo Leon, as a replacement for Diaz
in the election of I910.
Calles' involvement in the Cananea strikes and the ^
political action at Guaymas drew him inexorably deeper
into the vortex of Mexican politics.
An important side
effect during the disturbances was his association with
PR
-^Lowell L. Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution, Baja
Califórnia, 1911 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1952), ü. Ricardo Flores Magdn and his brother,
Enrique, were active during the last stages of the Diaz dictatorship. Ricardo hid his anarchist views behind demands
for socialist programs. He plotted revolution--often from
exile in the United States--for northwestern México and his
ideas received support in many parts of México. IV.e Flores
Magon brothers are precursors to the revolution by Madero
which overthrew Porfirio Diaz.
10
many revolutionaries, including such figures as the Bracamontes brothers, Benjamin Hill, Juan Cabral, Juan José
Rios, and Manuel M. Dieguez, with whom he was to Join in
long years of conspiracy and fighting to rid México of
Diaz and others.
Meanwhile Francisco I. Madero, a member of a
wealthy landholding family in Coahuila, created wide public attention by proclaiming that México needed reforming.
He became a national figure when he began touring the Republic to awaken the people to demands for changes.
Oppo-
sition to Diaz began to form around the rather unimposing
Madero, and by I910 a full-scale revolution had begun.
Following the initial triumph of Madero in mid-1911, Calles,
supported by friends from Guaymas, became a "candidate for
deputy to the state congress.
Ia Huerta, opposed him.
A fellow Guayman, Adolfo de
After the hotly contested election,
the committee which canvassed the results named De Ia Huerta
winner.
Backers of Calles quickly pointed out that their
candidate was the first to express congratulations.
They
maintained that Calles' generous conduct proved that he
respected the ideas of democracy and popular suffrage.2o
The next year Calles became a law offlcer in the'
small frontier settlement of Água Prieta, across the border
^Âmado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 421; Comitê
de Homenajes, 4.
11
from Douglas, Arizona.27' Though near significant copper
foundries, the tiny, squalid town did not merit even the
establishment of a municipality.
Calles' obscure and isom
Iated position did not bring him public attention, but his
sympathizers found merit in it. Historian Ramon Puente
wrote that one of the best proofs ". . . of the character
and strength and destiny of Calles ..."[was] his time
spent in that place of humble origin . . . where the water
turned black due to the particles of soot which floated in
28
the air."
Evidently Puente believed that only the indi-
vidual with the greatest vision and determination could
overcome such a meager station and derive increased stature
as a man.
Puente's estimation of his character is partially
supported by the fact that the future president was very resourceful at weary Água Prieta.
There Calles opened a
store, a saloon, and a gambling hall, ali of which were
frequented by the tourists crossing the border from South29
e m Arizona.
His business allowed him to accumulate
some wealth as well as to become thoroughly familiar with
the North American visitors.
27
Álvaro Obregoh, Ocho Mil Kilometros en
(México: Fonda de Cultura Econômica, 1959). 30;
Leán, "El Presidente Calles," Historia Mexicana,
Diciembre, I960), 320.
28
Puente, La Historia de Ia Revolucion .
182.
^^Magner, Men of México, 522.
Campana
Luis L.
X (Octubre. ., II,
12
Calles' stay in Água Prieta provides additional
evidence of his cruelty.
Instances have been cited to
point up a severity and callousness which characterized
much of the public life of the "Iron Man."
For example,
when a laborer in Água Prieta shouted insults to Madero
in the street, Calles condemned him to be hanged by barbed
30
wire from a railway bridge near town.
' The sanguinary
disposal of opponents was a method Calles did not hesitate
to employ.
Calles' military career was also launched from Água
Prieta.
Before the completion of his first year there, he
experienced the risks involved in administering a stable
government.
In Chihuahua the devious Pascual Orozco re-
belled against Madero's shaky government, claiming that
the president had betrayed the revolution, and he invaded
Sonora.
The fighting to rid the state of the intruder,
successful by late 1912, furnished Calles the opportunity,
with aid from Pedro Bracamontes, to recruit and build a
•^ Ruiz, Calles, . . ., 3131
-^ A good example of this attitude concerned events
which also began in Água Prieta. In I912 Dr. Manuel Huerta
intervened to save Calles' life v/hen Calles was captured by
a detachment of soldiers loyal to Victoriano Huerta. Six
years later, as governor of Sonora, Calles learned of a
plot against him by refugees in Douglas, Arizona. The conspirators were captured and among those executed was Dr.
Huerta.
13
military force.
32
Not long after the failure of orosquismo, a new
movement arose attempting to overthrow President Kadero.
This revolt, begun in México City under Felix DÍaz and
Bernardo Reyes with the cuartelazo de Ia ciudadela, set
the stage in México for several years of continuous and
dramatic struggle, marches, battles, victorles, losses,
and intrigues in which the military naturally played a
prominent role.
It was to clímax in the Plan of Água
Prieta.
The fali of Madero and his vice president, Josd
M a n a Pino Suárez, ushered in a new era for Calles.
News
that Victoriano Huerta had succeeded to the presidency of
the nation reached Sonora at a time when the caudillo's
forces recruited for the campaign against Orozco had not
yet been totally disbanded.
The comisaria of Água Prieta
was one of the first to receive messages from the governor
of Coahuila, Venustlano Carranza, who called for allegiance
to constitutional government and opposition to the usurper
33
Huerta.
Calles and Pedro Bracamontes thus took the lead
as the governor of the state, José Maytorena, sympathized
with the central government.
The forces of
32obregon, Ocho Mil Kilometros . . ., 35í Leon, "El
Presidente Calles," 320.
•^-^Morena, Venustlano Carranza, . . ., 48; Puente,
Historia de Ia Revoluclón . . ., ltí3.
14
"constitutionalism" in Sonora soon locked in battle with
Huerta's federal troops.
Calles and his band of volunteers marched south
«
from Água Prieta early in 1913.
At Naco they met federal
troops commanded by General Pedro Ojeda.
astrous defeat, they fled northward.
Suffering a dls-
Meanwhile, Colonel
Álvaro Obregoh began assuming command of" the constitutional
revolutionary movement in Sonora.
From Hermosillo, his
force travelled north, and during the campaign Calles and
Obregoh—both destined to play leading roles in shaping
^4
México's future—met for the first tirne."^ 'In ensuing
battles at Nogales, Cananea, and Naco in the spring of
1913, the revolutionaries were triumphant.
At Naco, Lleu-
tenant Calles reportedly so distinguished himself that he
was named in the north of Sonora as the "defender of the
revolutionary ideal. "-^-^
Calles maintained his headquarters at Água Prieta.
As the state's defender of constitutionalismo, he faced
the problem of strengthening his position in the "Republic
of Água Prieta," as he was dlsposed to name it.
Federal
forces finally were ousted from Sonora, and Obregón left
the state to continue the campaign elsewhere.
Before
leaving, however, he promoted Calles to the rank of colonel
3^0breg(íh, Ocho Mil Kilometros . . ., I05.
B<5'rquez, Calles, 3I.
15
and named him jefe of the forces stationed in Sonora."^
Opposition continued from Governor Maytorena, and the
forces of the two leaders soon engaged in several battles
for the control of the state.
Meanwhile, the revolution against Huerta was
spreading.
Pancho Villa rose in Chihuahua, and in Mata-
moros, Lúcio Blanco "pronounced."
Calles, a great admirer
of both men, was encouraged by their action to increase his
37
own efforts.-" About mid-September 1913 a signal event
for the revolution occurred in Calles' native state. Venustlano Carranza, former governor of Coahuila who issued the
Plan de Guadalupe against the Huerta government, arrived
at Hermosillo as El primer jefe dei constitutionalismo.
He came to meet several revolutionaries there to give direction to the rebellion.
The First Chief named Obregoh
Commander of Operations in the north and west of the RepubQO
lie.
To Calles went the responsibility of recruiting and
organizing the corps which accompanied Obregáh in his cam39
paign.
The área included Chihuahua, where Villa operated.
Amado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 421; Moreno,
Venustlano Carranza, . . ., 4Ò.
Puente, Historia de Ia Revoluci($n . . ., I83.
Puente, Historia de Ia Revoluclón . . ., I83.
39Obregoh, Ocho Mil KilometrQs . . ., 105.
16
Por almost two years following Carranza's departure from Sonora in February 1914, Calles fought against
40
Maytorena.
The feud between the two leaders had an im-
portant though weakening effect on the revolutionary
forces.
Both Obregoh and Villa attempted to settle the
dispute with little success.
In early battles with the
maytorenistas, Calles' revolutionary forces fought unsuccessfully, but later won important victorles over the
governor's troops at Divisaderos, near Nogales, and at Naco.
42
Calles also withstood attacks by Villa at Água Prieta.
Following these military triumphs, Calles was promoted to
general and Carranza named him military governor of
43
Sonora.
The predictlon by Calles' old headmaster was
becoming a reality.
Late in 1915 pro-Carranza forces Ied by Calles and
Benjamin Hill still struggled against Maytorena.
By mid-
October the carrancistas were strongly entrenched in the
sun-baked border town of Naco. Fortified in a semi-circle
Howard A. Lamb, "Calles—The Teacher and Statesman," The Nation, CXIX (December 3, 1924), 595.
4l
•
X
Martin Luis Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa, trans
Virgínia H. Taylor (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1965), 298-299; Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution.
I914-I915 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1900), 69
42
Amado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 447.
43
Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LXXX (May
1946), 299; Comitê de Homenajes, 5.
17
with their backs to the American border, they defied Maytorena to remove them.
The soldiers of Maytorena, composed
primarily of Yaqui Indians, began the assault on October
l4.
Successive attacks were of no avail, "and soon the
Mexican half of Naco was a town no longer.
Instead it was
a system of fortifications by which 1,500 constitucionalistas
44
warded off perhaps 2,000 maytorenistas."'
Finally, in January 1916, through intervention by officials of the United
States whose citizens were being killed or wounded, a truce
was arranged to end the hostilities.45
^
The battle at Naco brought Calles to public attention. During the siege he had answered defiantly several
h6
calls by the attackers to surrender.
The action was later
mentioned to compare Calles favorably with another famous
Mexican hero, when it was remarked that "as Morelos, he endured a siege of more than one hundred days, and like that
caudillo who contributed so much to making independents of
47
us, he broke the siege and won."
Eventually, following
several months of combat, Calles drove Maytorena out of
Sonora and claimed the state for the carrancistas.
^^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 159^^Villa, Memoirs, 402-403; Obregón, Ocho Mil Kilometros . . ., 266; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 153.
h6
y
'Comitê" de Homenajes, 4. The reference to Morelos
concerned the siege by royalist troops on Cuautla during
the Mexican struggle for independence.
c^
18
With the triumph of constitutionalism by late 191^.
Calles entered Hermosillo as Provisional Governor and Military Commander of Sonora. As such, there were continued
military responsibilitles. Yaqui Indian uprisings caused
him to leave the capital, with Adolfo de Ia Huerta serving
as Ínterim governor.
Following the partially successful
Yaqui campaign, Calles returned to Hermosillo to prepare
for elections for a constitutional governor.
His almost
certain victory was overwhelmingly certified by over 90
per cent of the voters.
The program Calles projected as governor was an
extension of his administration as military governor when
he had enacted several laws in encampments under his control.
The decrees, later sanctioned by the state congress,
were a portent of future events. One of these, the celebrated Decree No. 1, outlawed alcoholic beverages. Among
other things, including the claim of a direct relation between crime and the use of intoxicants, the decree stated
that:
Considering: That one of the causes of the decadence of the people has been the use of intoxicating beverages which, in addition to producing
physical decay and moral perversion of the individual, constitutes one of the principal factors
48
Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LXXX (May
1946), 299; Bórguez, Calles, 45; Amado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 422.
19
of [México's] economic ills . . .:
1. The importation, sale, or manufacture of
intoxicating beverages is absolutely
forbidden in the state of Sonora.
2. Beverages which contain any aIcohol^^whatsoever are considered intoxicating.'^"
The penalty for violation was five years imprisonment with
a two or three year term for accomplices.
The decree re-
ceived excited attention as a radical departure from Mexican tradition, and it was soon taken up by other states.
The notoriety of the law was due largely to the
measures, real and rumored, by which it was enforced. Noticing that widespread violations took place, Calles asked
the death penalty for any further infringement.of the de50
X
cree.
Charges have been made that six peones were the
first to face the firing squad for having liquor in their
possession.-^
Though Borquez has denied that such extreme
measures were taken, Sonorans were alarmed because of the
terror imposed by such strictness, so much so that the cen52
trai government ordered Calles to modify his policy.
Although the decree proved partially ineffective, some benefits—such as being able to work regularly and save money-resulted for the laboring classes, particularly the field
49Quoted in Amado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 422
50Lamb, "Calles--The Teacher and Statesman," 595.
^Magner, Men of México, 523^Puente, Historia de Ia Revolucion . . .,185.
20
workers. And women especially thanked Calles for the endeavor.53
Calles achieved other goals. He created,, for example, the Cruz Galvez School in 1917-I8, a model industrial and agricultural institution.
He stated his reason
for its establishmentâs follows:
After the revolution it became our duty to look
after the orphans left by the war. My first
idea was to create a school home, which should
at the same time be a workshop, excluslvely for
the orphan boys, but later I expanded the plans
and the result was the Cruz Galvez School for
boys and girls.54
The founding was particularly noteworthy because it took
place during the time when "México shook her mane of
55
fire."
Revolutionary action had left many governments
without resources for programs of any sort; Sonora was no
exception.
State funds were simply not available for con-
struction of the school. As Calles later mentioned:
[We] . . . succeeded principally because everyone
responded to my initlative. The school was founded
upon a basis of popular will. There was no one who
did not contribute his mite. There was not a town
or a family which failed to give. J\s fast as the
money came in, we began to build.5o
53Amado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 423.
5Înterview by Esperanza Velasquez Bringas, in Murray, México before the World, 217.
Comitê' de Homenajes, 5.
56
Murray, México before the World, 217.
21
Similar action created means to sustain the school.
"Committees were formed in cities and towns, benefits were
given, money was collected among the Jefes and the soldiers
of the military, from businessmen, industrialists . . . who
57
responded readily to the call by Calles."
In addition,
for three days the state government allowed American tourists to visit freely the town of Água Prieta.
Profits
from the border activities of drinking and gambling aided
in educating orphans.
To publicize the school further, Calles became something of a theatrical manager.
Films of the school, stu-
dents, and entertainers were loaded on railroad cars, and
the entire assembly travelled the country, even into the
United States. Remarking about the successful tour, Calles
later told visitors that "in this way we managed to keep
the school going until it could pay its way, which it is
now doing."
As constitutional governor, Calles, aided by a congress with an enthusiastic revolutionary outlook, also enacted legislation embodying certain ideais of the revolution.
The major laws issued by his congress during I918
were the Ley Agraria and the Ley Obrera.
The acts, designed
58
Murray, México before the World, 2l8. The remark
was made to visitors, in August, 1923, v;hen organized labor groups informed him that he was their unanimous choice
as candidate for president of México.
22
to give voice, respectively, to those aspects of the revolution which called for more distribution of land to the
people and less exploitation of the workers, indicate
Calles' attempts to crystallize the principies of the revolution into practlcal form.
The land law, designated as
Decree No. 5. prohibited the inclusion in contracts for
the sale of lands of a pacto de retroventa, or resale to
the original vendor."^-^ The law, aimed at the latlfundistas
and the problem of caclquismo, attempted to end a practice
6c)
which amounted to a legal form of despotism.
It served
as an example for several other states, and the workers'
law received acclaim as the most favorable labor legislation of any state.6l
Tv;o more laws which Calles passed as governor are
of special importance.
The first of these acts practically
59
The pacto was a device used by landowners to maintain control of large amounts of land. Though records
might show lands from a large hacienda owned by various
persons, actual ownershlp remained with the hacendado because of the pacto.
60
Latifundlsta is an expression describing the
owner of a vast estate or latlfundla. The owner is also
known as an hacendado. Caclquismo is similar to the"bossism" of the United States. The cacique, or chief, was
that individual who commanded local support and followers,
often for no other reason than personal magnetism. The
alliance between the latifundlsta and the cacique often
worked to the disadvantage of the local people.
ôlBcírquez, Calles, 45.
23
abolished the State Supreme Court by making its decisions
subject to revision by the executive, while the second,
very significantly, allowed the Governor to expel Catholic
62
priests from Sonora.
Both laws reveal definite characteristics of Calles' personality, and partially disclose
the man's view of the executive position and of religion.
When President Venustlano Carrenza established the
"constitutionalist" government at the national capital in
1919, he called Calles from Sonora to be Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor.
In that position Calles soon
disclosed that he was a "friend and powerful defender of
the workers of the country.
cabinet was short.
,,63
But his tenure in Carranza's
In Pebruary 1920, as one of a group of
followers of Álvaro Obregoh, Calles resigned to dedicate
64
himself to political labor in behalf of that leader.
He described the post he left as "insupportable, both because of the bitter opposition which ali we partisans of
General Obregón suffered . . . " and resigned because he
did not want to be considered an accomplice to "ali the
errors and ali the acts of the most corrupt administration
recorded in the annals of the government of México.
62Moreno, Venustlano Carranza, . . ., 49.
64Moreno, Venustlano Carranza, . . .,49.
,,65
24
Having resigned, Calles returned to Sonora to become a
political propagandist in the presidential candidacy of
his fellow Sonoran.
By early 1920, then, Calles lived quietly in
Sonora as a prlvate citizen.
He was not a general in ac-
tive service, nor a governor, nor even an official of the
Republic.
Pully matured, in his early forties, he had ex-
perienced a full life. He had been a soldier, lawmaker,
counselor, and politician.
He had controlled the destiny
of a state, had commanded troops, and had founded schools.
He was at that point in life where many men are content to
retire; however, his life as a prlvate citizen .ended soon.
Actions by Carranza's central government interrupted the comparative calm.
The framers of the Constitu-
tion of 1917 had attempted to legislate against the concentration of lands by the few and allen ovmership of property.
This revolutionary concern received much of their attention.
The lawmakers provided for distribution of lands by
future governments by writing into the Constitution an
article which authorlzed the nationalization of properties.
A portion of Article 27 applied similar features to waters,
and the Carranza government, under its authorlty, claimed
the Sonora River.
The gesture was as much a means to dis-
play Carranza's control over obregonistas in Sonora as it
was to introduce irrigation programs. An immediate protest
by an aroused state legislature developed into a movement
25
to maintain at ali cost the sovereignty of the state.
66
Opposition in Sonora and other states also included protests against Carranza's attempts to impose Ignacio Bonillas, former ambassador to the United States, as his successor in 1920. The Liberal Constitutionalist Army of Sonora
was raised to oppose the Carranza government and leadership went to Plutarco Elias Calles. Thus a civilian was
awarded command of the military which made cause against
the central government.
Justification for the action against Carranza was
embodied in the Plan de Água Prieta of April 23, 1920.*^
This plan, signed by a large group of revolutionaries including Luis L. Leon, Francisco S. Elias, Abelardo Rodríguez, Fausto Topeto, and with the name Plutarco Elias
Calles heading the list of signatures, called for the removal of Carranza because he "abused in a systematic manner the popular vote; . . . suspended . . . individual
guarantees; . . . [and] repeatedly acted against the sov68
ereignty of the states. . . ."
According to the plan,
Adolfo de Ia Huerta, the constitutional governor of Sonora,
66 X
Borquez, Calles, 5o.
67
Photostatic copy in Amado-Chaverri, El Verdadero
Calles, Appendix. A plan was a document or pronouncement
which declared that the existing government no longer ruled
It usually provided for a temporary government until a constitutional
68 election could be held.
Plan de Água Prieta, April 23, 1920.
26
became Ínterim Supreme Chief of the Army. When victorious,
the authors of the plan would name a provisional president
to rule until elections could be organized.
A large part of the regular military adhered to
the plan, deserting Carranza.
Supporting the plan also
were those segments loyal to the ideais of the martyred
Emiliano Zapata in southern México and the now powerless
Pancho Villa in the north, which composed a determined ele69
ment in the fight against the central government.
Paced
by such strong opposition, Carranza fled the capital, only
to be assassinated in the tiny village of Tlaxcalatongo,
Pueblo, on the night of May 21, 1920. With his death one
of the most intense phases of the revolution came to an
end.
As a result of the Obregón triumph within one
month of the "pronouncement" at Água Prieta, a triumvirate
6Q
^Zapata and his agrarians were probably the most
tenacious of the various revolutionary groups during the
turbulent years after 19IO. The cry of tierra y libertad
(land and liberty) denoted the goal for the zapatistas.
A successful military revolution in México necessarily included land refonn or faced trouble from Zapata. He became disillusioned by Madero and then Carranza because
neither seemed to favor widescale land distribution.
Followers of Pancho Villa opposed the Carranza
government from the days of the Aguascalientes convention
of 1914. At that time revolutionaries opposed to Victoriano Huerta met to give order and direction to their movement. Carranza did not attend and practically ignored the
convention. Villa's conventionists, then, supported the
Plan de Água Prieta as a vehicle for continued opposition
to the chief executive.
27
composed of Obregoh, Calles, and De Ia Huerta took command of the national government. While awaiting legally
constituted elections, the three men.ruled according to
the plan, designating De Ia Huerta as provisional president.
Calles became Minister of Interior, and Obregoh
continued his electoral campaign against the conseirvative
candidate Robles Domínguez.
With Obregoh's victory in September 1920, De Ia
Huerta ended his Ínterim presidency and became Secretary
of Treasury, a most important post because of the priority
70
given to petroleum negotiations.'
The disturbed political
atmosphere continued.
De Ia Huerta "pronounced" in 1923
because Obregón selected Calles as a presidential successor, just as the Sonora Dynasty had done when Carranza
chose Ignacio Bonillas.
In December 1923 support for
De Ia Huerta grew when Guadalupe Sanchez, of Vera Cruz,
and Enrique Estrada, of Jalisco, declared for him.
Soon
other revolutionaries joined, including Salvador Alvarado
71
and Antônio Villarreal.
However, in spite of early advantages, such as the defection of almost one-half of the
military, the rebellion collapsed and De Ia Huerta fled to
the United States.
^Miguel Alessio Robles, "La Rebelion de Ia Huertista," Historia de Ia Revolucic5h Mexicana, ed. José T.
Meléhdez, II, 1Ü7.
'^"^Robles, "La rebelion de Ia Huertista," I87.
28
Calles commanded federal troops in the campaign
against De Ia Huerta. By March 1924, however, he announced
that "in view of the control of the attempted revolution"
72
he had resigned from the army.
One month later an American visitor to México interviewed Calles. Marked changes
had taken place in the leader's appearance, and the visitor noted that:
The wrinkled face and the whitening hair of the
old veteran were a sure indication what m.anner
of experience this recent period had brought to
the inner man. During three years he had aged
ten, passing the border between youth which
naturallv makes war and age which easily takes
counsel.'3
He also added that "with the aging mind there has come a
softer manner, a milder tone."74 If the remarks meant
that Calles had iQst his characteristic severity, later
events proved otherwise.
With De Ia Huerta in Los Angeles, Califórnia, pursuing a musical career, Governor Angel Flores of Sinaloa
offered the only real opposition to Calles' presidential
hopes.
Conservative forces supported Flores and threatened
violence in the July 1924 election.
The callistas protested
that so great was the popularity of their man "that the
^^New York Times, March 27, 1924.
'^•^New York Times, April 5, 1924.
'^ New York Times, April 5, 1924.
29
election . . . [was] ali over but the fireworks." To this
the opposition answered:
"True enough . . . but the fire-
works are not going to be of the sort you expect to ignite
in celebration of so easy a victory. "'^5 ^g election time
neared, tension increased, and attacks on Piores, campaigning in Querétaro, caused him to discontinue his cam76
paign trip and disappear for a time.
Fears that election excitement might lead to widespread violence proved ill-founded.
Despite rvimors that
Flores would not accept the result of the election and
that there would be a revolt to challenge the expected outeome, no discord followed the announcement of the Sinaloan's
defeat.
The presence of federal troops aided greatly in
maintaining order, particularly in México City.
The election, though controlled it may have been,
offered encouragement to believers in self government.
Balloting occurred--unusually enough--without the customary disorders. Also, the number of voters proved larger
77
than at any previous election.
Even the popular vote revealed some semblance of democracy; it disclosed close
races in certain áreas. In his native state, the
^5New York Times, April 5, 1924.
"The Presidential Dilemma in México," Foreign
Affairs, III (September 15, 1924), 82.
'^'^"The" Presidential Dilemma in México," 82.
30
conservative candidate received 21,212 votes to Calles'
11,289.
In Lower Califórnia, Piores won by a scant margin
of 716 votes from almost 7.000.
It was in the state of
Oaxaca, largely Indian and rural, that a great difference
could be seen. There Calles received 130,000 votes while
his major opponent tallied only 1,200.
In states where
conditions similar to those in Oaxaca existed, voting
indicated that the rural populace either favored the program of the revolution and its Supreme Chief, or they were
more easily influenced by the central government. Pinai
tabulation of the ballots showed Calles polled 1,3^0,634
votes to 252,599 íôr Piores. Other candidates-received
78
only 3^ votes.
On September 29, 1924, President Álvaro Obregón
performed his last official act when he signed the congresslonal decree of the electoral college declaring Calles
victorious. "^ He cabled his congratulations and named
November 30 as the date for the inauguration of El jefe
máximo.
78
The figures for the election are from El Excelsior, September 28, 1924.
'^^l Excelsior, September 30, 1924.
"^
CHAPTER II
THE MEXICAN FEDERATION OP LABOR
The México City newspaper Excelsior reported on
November 29, 1924, that the nation prepared to celebrate
a "noble and transcendental act in . .. . history:
the
peaceful transmission of power." The inauguration of
Plutarco Elias Calles, the paper noted, would be the first
such orderly transfer of power in almost half a century.
The spectacular ceremony took place in the huge national
stadium in the capital. Observers variously estimated the
crowd to have been between 30,000 and 50,000 persons.
Masses of citizens and visitors gathered to witness the
first open-air inauguration in three centuries and, significantly, the transfer of executive power without the cus«
tomary violence.
Red and black standards of the labor organizations
of México appeared everywhere, carried by thousands of
workers who trooped to the stadium to cheerand applaud
the new president. Visitors from outside the republic
came largely from north of the Rio Bravo. Especially
noticeable among representatives of organized labor were
Alva W. Taylor, "Viva Obregón! Viva Calles!"
The Christian Century. XL (January 1, 1924), l4; Excelsior, December 1, 1924.
31
11
1^
32
some three hundred from the United States, Ied by Samuel
Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor.
The embrace of Luis Morones, president of the Mexican
Federation of Labor and his American counterpart before
2
the huge assembly received an enthusiastic ovation.
It was only natural that delegates of organized
labor should be so prominent at the occasion because Calles
had based his campaign almost entirely on appeals to the
broad force of Mexican v/orkers.
Organized labor, though
not the voice of the entire nation, represented what Carle3
ton Beals called the "common denomlnator" óf México and
4
one of the "two horses" v/hich Calles must ride to achieve
a successful and stable administration.
Most of Calles'
speeches Indicated his intention to enforce labor legislation, his friendliness toward and concern for the workers
and their problems.
For instance, at a meeting organized
by his supporters in the íris Theater in México City,
September 1923, he emphatlcally declared:
"Transmission of Executive Power in México,"
Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LIX (February 1925),
TÕT":
~~~~"
3
Carleton Beals, "Tasks Awaiting President Calles
of México," Current History, XXI (February 1925). 678.
Cited in Excelsior, November 10, 1924. The newspaper attributed the remark to the "socialist" Beals. The
statement referred to the army, controlled by Obregón, and
organized labor, Ied by Morones.
33
I am frankly a Laborite . . . [and] an ardent
defender of the rights guaranteed to labor by
. . . the Constitution of 1917. I have never
made a secret of this. . . . I have fought in
order that the workers might obtain a part of
what was due them, ln proportion to . . . the
part of their life which they have sacrificed
to production.5
Again, at Querétaro, while presenting a "Eulogy to the
Youth of the Revolution," Calles said:
I always have had, and still have, faith in the
working classes, because I have always felt that
they are the nerve of the nation and that only
through them and their action it is possible for
us to hope for the betterment of México, inasmuch as it is they who are directly Interested
in bringing it about.^
Despite his frank admission that he sought the support of organized labor and that he sympathized with the
worker, Calles was accused of conspiring with Morones.
Widespread rumor suggested that Calles had guaranteed the
7
labor leader a cabinet membership in return for support.
Copies of the alleged agreement, which appeared ln both
México and the United States, included statements that the
two men had agreed upon the following points:
^Calles, Speech at íris Theater, México City, September 20, 1923, cited in Murray, México before the World,
Calles, Speech in Querétaro, in Murray, México
before the Xôrld, 65.
'Wllfred Hardy Callcott, Liberalism in México,
1857-1929 (Hamden, Connectlcut: Anchor Books, 19^5). 3^4.
34
1.
Facillties and funds . . . [to be provided
by the administration] to sustain the Mexican Federation of Labor.
2.
Designatlon of . . . Morones -as Minister of
Industry, Commerce and Labor to allow him to
organize the v/orkers ln accordance with the
program of the Federation.
3.
Gradual dissolution of the army within one
year from the time Calles took control, and
replacement^by the workers' syndicates of the
Federation.^
It would seem that Calles did not need such a pact
because Obregoh had selected him as successor to the presidency, an act v/hich vlrtually assured success.
But shortly
after his inauguration, Calles acted ln a manner which
gave support to charges of bargainlng.
He named Luis Mo-
rones as Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor; he began a program of reducing the size of the army; and he
showed leniency to workers' battallons in their disputes
with management.
The new president was not without experience concernlng abuses of workers and attempts by labor to organize.
Much of Calles' early life paralleled the poor con-
ditions of the worker during the Diaz rule, the growing
unrest caused by indiscriminate exploitation of the peones.
^Cited in Aquiles P. Moctezuma, El conflicto religioso de 1926, sus orígenes, su desarrollo, su soluci(^n,
(México: Editorial Jus, April I90O), II, 307- See also:
Ruiz, Calles . . ., 96. The "pact" was also printed in
the Conp:ressional Record, 69th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume E3~, Part 4 (Washington: United States Government Prin oing Office, 1927), 4598.
35
and the often abortive efforts at organization by labor
groups.
The days spent in Guaymas had made him aware of
conditions which cried for refonn; his association with the
Club Verde in Sonora had brought him into contact with organizations seeking that change; and his involvement at
the Cananea copper mines had taught him the importance of
the strike as a device for transforming society.
As governor of the state of Sonora, Calles had confronted similar conditions to those he faced as president.
He had displayed then a firmness to management which was
supported by his sympathy to the worker.
He had established,
prior to the Constitution of 1917, a minimum wage for the
unskilled city worker and the agricultural workers in the
state at one and one-half pesos per day, one of the highest
9
in the Republic.
While governor, Calles also had settled difficulties
at the Cananea mines.
After several deaths had occurred
there in a bloody and violent strike, federal troops were
sent in to establish order.
American miners were also sped
across the border ostensibly to protect the American citizens there.
American owners, displeased by the miners'
Q
^Marjorie Ruth Clark, Organized Labor in México
(Chapei Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934),
11.
Clark, Organized Labor in México, 47.
36
attempts to organize, closed and vacated the huge mines.
Governor Calles re-opened the works immediately and allowed the miners to operate them independently.
The
owners returned from a three weeks' absence and claimed
damages against the state.
In answer, Calles invoked
Section XXI of Article 123 of the federal constitution and
the owners reluctantly withdrew their claims, paid the men
for the time they had operated the mines, re-opened the
works, and even began improvements of working conditions.
11
Calles also had gained experience with national
labor problems.
As a member of Carranza's cabinet, he had
served as Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor--an
appointment he received as a reward for loyalty to the
First Chief during revolutionary fighting.
Though Calles
served only a short time before resignlng, he did occupy
the office at an important tlme--when labor groups first
attempted to organize.
Unlike several previous Mexican
presidents, then, Calles was not unfamillar with the needs
and demands of Mexican workers nor of abuses committed
against them by management.
At the time Calles became president, the Mexican
laboring class existed in frightful conditions.
The
-^-^Lamb, "Calles--The Teacher and Statesman," 595.
The section of the Constitution concerned workers' wages
when a lockout occurred without atte^r.pts at settlement
through a Board of Conciliation and Arbitration.
37
workers' situation had improved but little since the DÍaz
era, when salaries for a country laborer came to twentyfive centavos daily plus a small ration of c o m and beans. "^^
Wages for unskilled city v/orkers had reached aMost sixty
centavos, but the city workers did not receive a portion
of food.
Though wages had increased, ranging from seventy-
five centavos to three pesos daily for the farmer and three
to four pesos for the city worker, other problems continued
because industry and management exercised an arbitrary con13
trol over labor conditions.
It was against the long-standing abuses by management that the framers of the Constitution of I917, sympathetic to workers, added Article 123 to the Constitution.
This important article, designed to better workers' conditions, brought legislation for the "protection of the working man and for the organization of labor" in México up-to14
date with other countries.
Sectlons ln it called for an
eight-hour day, a seven-hour night, child labor restrictions,
equal pay for equal work, and special consideration to
12
A good description of labor conditions in México
in the early twentieth century can be. found in Ernest Gruening, México and Its Heritage (New York: The Century Company, T 5 2 B T 7 3 3 5 :
13
Figures here were taken from Saenz and Priestley,
Some Mexican Problems, 3^-50.
Moisés Sa'enz and Guy Stevens, The Mexican Situation, Foreign Policy Association, Pamphlet No. 5^ (^^^w
York, 1929), 10.
38
women employees. 15
Article 123 also aimed at lessening the employer's
power of mistreatment or dismissal of the worker .by calling for the creation of Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration to settle disputes between the employer and the laborer.
Employers were also required to provide comfortable
and healthy dwellings to rent to the workers, schools, public markets, health centers and the like when factories
were located away from population centers, but only when
the labor force of a plant exceeded one hundred persons.
The inclusion in the Constitution of I917 of articles written to improve labor conditions, however, did
not guarantee fulfillment of purposes.
The labor article
provided only that state legislatures should enact laws
embodying the constitutional principies, for these did not
have strength of law.
As has been noted:
. . . it took the workers a very short time to
realize that legal rights meant nothing if the
government in power was determined not to grant
such rights. The battle was not won by the promulgation of the new constitution; it simply entered upon another phase, the struggle of labor
to gain in some measure, inâctuality, the rights
already possessed legally.-^^
l5By the terms of the article, women could not be
worked at night. During the last three months of pregnancy,
they could not be used for hard physical labor. Following
childblrth the mother received one nonth off with pay as
well as two rest periods per day during the lactation
period.
16
Clark, Organized Labor in México, 53.
39
More than a decade passed before a national labor
law was enacted, and state labor laws were often ineffective because local agencies could be influenced, .or bribed,
17
by industrialists to rule against labor groups.
Never-
theless, Article 123 recognized Labor's right to organize,
to bargain, and to strike.
Labor organizations found it
the first crack in the armor with which capital had protected itself.
Organized labor did not gain strength until Calles
granted executive protection to the Mexican Federation of
-; O
Labor, commonly known as the CROM.^
Luis N. Morones,
Calles' Secretary of Labor, had guided the course for the
Federation during its early years.
Through the Grupo Accion,
a unique inner body composed of never more than twenty men,
19
Morones controlled decisions made by the CROM.
Organized during Carranza's constitutional rule, the Grupo grew
in strength until, under Calles, it exercised almost complete power over the labor forces in México.
Political activity by the CROM came by means of
El Partido Laborista Mexicano, the Mexican Labor Party.
17
Gruening, México and Its Heritage, 378.
Confederaci(5h Regional de Obreros Mexicanos, or
Regional Confederation of Mexican Labor.
19
y
The Grupo Accion sprang from meetlngs of labor
leaders in México City who wanted, as they expressed it,
to "get action. "•
4o
The party, known as the PKM, agreed with President Calles
that labor groups should restrict political activity;
individuais should take responsibility in the political
20
process.
Consequently, the party called for workers to
mass support for those candidates who seemed most in sympathy with labor's cause rather than to nominate and run
party candidates.
The PLM, expecting rewarding benefits,
supported Obregcin and then Calles.
President Calles did not disappoint the CROM leaders.
The selection of Morones to a position in the cabinet
indicated Calles' seeming gratitude, and the optimism
created by the President's friendliness to labor groups had
a favorable effect on the Federation.
Membership in the
CROM grew rapidly over the first year of Calles' administration.
A report made to the Seventh Convention of the
Mexican Federation of Labor which met in México City in
1926 showed amazing increases.
The total membership ln
1925, according to the report, was 1,500,000 compared to
800,000 in 1923.^"^
20
Calles, Interview given to El Democrata, April
18, 1924, quoted in Murray, México before the World, 36.
21
The report disclosed membership for certain years,
In 1918 the CROM had 7,000 members. Tne figure increased
to 50,000 by 1920. The numbers for 1925 represented membership in 75 local federations containing 2.605 syndicates.
Though figures indicating total membership vary according
to the reporting agency, still they indicate a trem.endous
growth. Saenz and Priestley, Some Mexican Problems, 38.
41
The growing strength of organized labor was not
the only change apparent in Mexican labor circles.
nif icantly, the types of workers was changing.
Sig-
By the
first year of Calles» administration, industrial workers
had replaced agricultural workers in importance.
A color-
ful, yet telling, description of the transforríiation was
that given by Moisés Saenz before a group of American students.
Depictlng a masslve Labor Day parade of more than
75,000 organized workers in México City in 1925, he remarked:
Watching the parade from a little elevation,
one was struck by the predominance of the blue
color. The men were dressed in blue--they were
the blue overalls knoi^/n the world over. Like a
river, the mighty stream clad in blue, surged
through the avenue. One could not help remembering that had a parade of this sort been possible
twenty-five years ago, the color would have been
not blue but whlte--the white of the calico dress
of the peasant. In twenty-five years, México
City has changed from white calico dress to overalls, from peasantry to Industrialism. The
change is more or less evident in ali the cities
of México.
Growth of the CROM did not occur merely because of
promises by the Federation to better the conditions of the
worker.
Tactlcs employed by the powerful union ln bring-
ing pressure on independent unions to affiliate with the
Mexican Federation, while adding large numbers of workers.
22
Saenz and Priestley, Some Mexican Problems, 33.
42
often created bitter fighting within the ranks of labor
groups.
Invariably, Calles sided with the CROM, which
grew stronger with each victory over an independent union.
The battle for control of organized labor ln México produced turbulence and chãos during the early part of Calles'
administration, and the CROM policies were largely responsible.
The struggles also showed Calles supported Morones
and his union members.
The Federation first displayed its favored position early in 1925 ln the action against railway employees
in México City.
The workers, members of an independent
union, the Federation of Streetcar Workers, seemed in satisfactory accord with the México City Power and Light Company which operated the city transportation system.
But
the CROM intervened and at Morones' insistence organized
its own union, the Alliance of Workers and Employees of
Buses and Street Cars.
The Allanza, as the new union was
named, began demanding recognition by the Canadian-owned
company in place of the older, independent union.
Manager
G. R. G. Conway of México City Llght and Pov/er Company refused on the grounds that the Allanza represented a minority,
23
about one-fourth, of the four thousand employees.
Morones
answered with a called strike which lasted nearly two weeks.
23
Excelsior, March 1, 1925; Clark, Organized Labor
in México, 111; Gruening, México and Its Heritap;e, 3à'2~.
43
The strike, a particularly bitter one which seemed
to have no resolution, became of great importance to the
CROM as a show of strength.
A victory xvould add prestige
to the confederation and also nev/ members from among the
large numbers of independent unions.
The tactlcs of the
Allanza included violence, threats, and the burning of
several company car barns.
Members of the CROM also called
on Calles to invoke Article 33 of the Constitution against
24
Conway and other high officlals in the company.
As the strike progressed, Conway attempted to gain
public support by use of the newspapers.
On Sunday, March
8, a week after the strike began, he published.a full-page
notice in a México City newspaper explaining the problem.
Stating that since the Allanza controlled only 27 per cent
of the street car workers though they claimed a majority,
Conway suggested that the problem could be solved only
through "bona flde representatives of the majority of the
25
workers of the company."
President Calles, meanwhile, had been exerting
26
pressure on the company to recognize the Allanza.
He
24
Excelsior, March 8, I925. Article 33 of the
Mexican Constitution gives to the executive the exclusive
right of expelling allens.
25
Excelsior, March 8, 1925.
26
Ramon Ross, governor of the Federal District,
had been rejected by the company as arbiter, leaving Calles
as the major hopeful of both disputants.
44
ordered Conway to pay 100,000 pesos ln indemnitles for
salaries lost and other damages to the strikers.^'^ The
government's attitude, a grov/ing sympathy among other labor groups in México City v/ith the Allanza's cause, a populace which fearfully stayed Indoors, and the fact that the
strike was costing the company 30,000 pesos daily helped
bring a settlement.
Despite Conway's repeated vow not to
relent, the company finally adopted a resolution, more from
fear of Calles' threats than any concern about the CROM.
A new labor contract was negotlated which favored the workers and which recognized the CROM-sponsored Allanza.
The
CROM had used the strike to better its ov/n position; however, conditions for the workers did improve.
Though vio-
lence and bitter feelings characterized the attitude of the
three principais involved, relations between the company
and the government eventually became more friendly.
The streetcar workers' strike symbolized labor developments and CROM action during the first years of Calles'
presidency.
The events involved were described by Ernest
Gruening as typical of the development of organized labor
in México.
Writing ln 1928, Gruening stated that:
27
New York Times, March 26, 1925; Clark, Organized
Labor in México, 112; Gruening, México and Its Heritage,
363, lists the indemnitles as wages for tv/o weeks "amounting to 150,000 pesos."
45
The street-car workers story is in a sense the
exican labor eplc to date. Oppression, strivlngs,
repression, conflict, defeat, conflict, victory,
setbacks, failure through Inexperlence, betrayals,
internai squabbles, personalism, and finally -success--the achievement of dignlfied, body and soul
sustaining employment, in which labor and capital
can meet on aobasis of mutual obligation, respect,
and service.
X'i.
The victorious union used the tactlcs it employed
ln the streetcar workers' strike several times, with the
President's approval, during the first years under Calles.
Often, when rival independent unions became Involved in
labor disputes, Calles declared their strikes illegal, removed executive support, and weakened the independents.
He also used the threat of federal troops to break strikes
by radical unions.29 The combination of CROM power and
executive favor had the effect of diminishing widescale
labor difficulties, and by August 1925 sources outside the
Republic reported that laborites in México had "caMed
30
down."
Control of the various labor groups and syndicates in México gradually centered in the CROM as it
gathered strength for the battle against management.
In May 1925 Calles threatened radical strikers
against the Huasteca 011 Company in Tampico with force.
See Excelsior, May 15. 1925: New York Times, May l6, 1925
In 1927 troops were used against radical strikers at the
Ampara mines in Jalisco. Excelsior, September 1, 1927.
30New York Times, August I6, 1925.
46
Though the strike was the major weapon at the outset of the struggle, it gradually became less and less important,
The table below indicates the decreasing use of
31
strikes for the years examined.
Year
Strikes
Strikers
Days Lost
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
197
146
138
51
232
15
18
71,736
62,070
32,985
9,861
2,977
1,005
549
692,399
601,466
595.491
96,939
42,222
30.595
Losses (Pesos)
•
5,349,369
4,362,663
6,432,477
504,365
265,212
44,216
The figures above, complied from government
sources, concern only those strikes reported and represent
a definite trend away from the use of the strike.
Explana-
tions for this development include the fact that labor and
management reached agreements more readily as time passed.
Too, the CROM gained more control of independent labor
groups which had prevlously been striking on their own.
Finally, fev/er strikes were registered with the Department
of Labor as being "legal strikes."-^
^ Figures for 1922-1924 are from Estadístlca
Nacional, July 3I, 1925, I8. Others were taken variously
from Clark, Organized Labor ln México, 119; Calles, Informe
rendido por ei C. General Plutarco ÊXias Calles, Presidente
Contituclonal de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos ante ei H.
Congreso de Ia Unlóh ei dia 1 de Septiembre de 192b (México
Talleres Gráficos de Ia Nación "Diário Oficial," I928) 111;
and Gruening, México and Its Heritage, 337.
32
Clark, Organized Labor ln México, 120.
47
Conflicts between workers and employers during
the Calles administration occurred for a variety of reasons.
Strikes during a two-year period prior to 1924 re-
volved around demands for v/age increases."^^ In 1924, however, the demand for implementation of the legal working
day of eight hours became the most important reason for
34
disturbances.
Unjustified discharge of workers Ied the
35
list for 1926 and again in I928.
In most cases where strikes occurred, the workers also demanded improved working conditions, and it was
to correct labor abuses that Calles turned much of his attention.
The average worker in México needed better con-
ditions. Accldents, many of which resulted in deaths,
were quite common because safety codes in major industries
were practically non-existent.
Figures released by the
Department of Labor indicate that reforms occurred in several important industries while Calles was president.
33Foregolng figures are from Estadístlca Nacional,
July 31. 1935. 18.
-Êstadístlca Nacional, July 3I, 1935, I8.
35Calles, Informe . . ., 1926, 47; Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, IW,
3 Estadístlca Nacional, September I928, 36. The
following table indicates the frequency of occupational
accldents and deaths in mâjor industries over a seven year
period leading to and including Calles' term.
Industry
Railroad
1921 1922
937 1,106
1923
2,o68
1924
1,195
1925
1926
3,692 5,478
1927
6,150
48
To help reduce industrial accldents and death,
Calles sent federal inspectors to the major centers of industrial activity to investigate working conditions and to
suggest needed changes and safety measures.
Though acci-
dent figures showed a general increase during Calles' administration, the number of deaths remained relatively
stable.
Improvement under Calles in the matter of accl-
dents and deaths is obvious when it is realized that during
the years covered the numbers of workers exposed to employment risks rose considerably and that percentages of employees involved in accidental deaths remained fairly
37
levei.
In I928 Calles informed Congress that the Department of Labor reported only seventy-six deaths for that
Industry
192I
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
Mines
3.970 5.342 13.126 13.376 14,076 17,626 16,169
Petroleum
17
24
214
447 2,794 3,628 2,001
Textiles
26
12
67
382
236
506
728
Deaths
283
362
469
348
389
405 ' 384
The primary reason for the sudden increase in 1925, particularly in the petroleum industry, lies in the fact that it
was not until then that several industries began sending Information to the. Department of Labor v/ith any regularity.
Slightly different figures for 1922-24 appear in Estadístlca
Nacional, July 31, 1925, 22.
3'Êstadistica Nacional, September 1928, 36. The
Department's figures for accldents, deaths, and workers
involved are as follows:
Year
Workers
Accldents
Deaths
% Accid.
% Deaths
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
85.380
5,224
112,438
162,809
119,074
111,038
7,498
17,675
184,563
152,083
18,201
22,464
30,002
28,860
283
362 •
469
348
389
405
384
6.2
6.5
10.8
15.0
20.0
16.0 •
18.0
.33
.32
.28
.29
.35
.22 .
.25
49
year, and that ln the hazardous minlng industry, accldents
and deaths had decreased 48 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively, over the four years he was chief executive.-^
The means- for settling disputes between labor and
management also received Calles' consideration.
VJhereas
prevlously companies had paid accident victims only bare
hospital or burial expenses, and often had neglected these,
during Calles' administration the situation improved perceptlbly.
The total yearly compensation to workers rose
gradually from 1,010,001.12 pesos ln 1924 to nearly twice
that amount by 1928, figures which indicate 'an equal increase in average compensation to families of workers who
39
,
died in industrial accldents.
In 1924 companies paid
slightly less than three hundred pesos per death, but by
40
1928 the average had reached more than I50O pesos.
There
is strong evidence that not ali the payments made went to
the worker but Instead lined the pockets of labor leaders
such as Morones.
Nevertheless, the general condition re-
garding compensation for the laborer did improve under
Calles.
Difficulties such as strikes and recompense to
workers were not the only problems confronting Calles.
3 Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 110.
^Êstadístlca Nacional, September I928, 37.
^Êstadístlca Nacional, September I928, 37.
The
50
President also faced accusation that his support of Morones
and the CROM was communistic.
The early labor disturbances
had created a climate of fear among business men and industrialists ln both the United States and México, and
Morones' visits to European countries to establish friendly relations with other trade unions added to anxleties.
United States investors applied terms such as "radical" and
"Bolshevist" to Calles' policies and believed stories that
he intended the destruction of industries being developed
m México.
The accusations of communlsm and industrial destruction Calles flatly labeled as lies.
He emphasized that
his program did not Include economic chãos—quite the contrary.
The President knew the benefits which accrued from
prospering industry, and he understood the need for cooperation between labor and management.
The latter fact is made
clear by his many speeches on the subject, ln one of which
he included the following remarks:
I ask only for more humane relations betueen employers and workers. I ask them . . . [the employers]
not to regard the worker as something less than a
machlne, or if he dies . . . not to regard him as
just one name less on the payroll."^^
^-^See, for example, the text of Secretary Kellogg's
statement on "Bolshevik Aims ln México," given to the press
January 13, 1927, in Congresslonal Record, 69th Cong., 2nd
Sess., Vol. 68, Part 2, 1549; Amado-Chaverri, El Verdadero
Calles, 423.
^^"Calles Speaks," The Nation, CXIX (August 27,
1924), 22.
51
To quiet rising vjorrles, particularly among United
States investors in México, Calles repeatedly assured business interests they had nothing to fear and that he welcomed future Investment.
However, he announced that future
investors and industrialists should discontinue the old
abuses, the exploltatlons, and the making of wealth without contributing to the Mexican nation.
43
Support of Calles' viewpoints came from his Secretary of Labor.
Speaking at an American Chamber of Com-
merce luncheon given in his honor, Morones attempted to
assure investors present that Calles' purpose was not the
destruction of capitalism.
He readily admitted the admin-
istration was pro-labor and revolutionary, but added that
Calles acted within the concept of constitutional law.
Recognizing that the term revolutionary itself aroused
fears of United States investors, Morones remarked that
44
"México is revolutionary, but please don't get scared."
However, he gave warning to the business group v/hen he told
his audience that "México would rather go to its grave than
45
allow others to dictate its actions."
Businessmen,
•^Calles, "México Today," The Nation, CXXXI (July
1, 1925), 18-19.
Luis N. Morones, "Regeneration of México," The
Ai-íierlcan Federationist, XXXII (August 1925), 638; Excelsior, June 20, 1925^5Excelsior, June 20, 1925-
52
investors, and industrialists, seeking special prlvlleges,
Morones remarked, would find none in México under Calles.
Attempts by Calles and Morones to placate foreign. investors, however, proved largely Ineffectual and the cries in
the United States of communlsm ln México did not dimln• V. ^6
ish.
Despite the extensive accusations, the Mexican
labor movement never associated with communlsm more than
by mere comjnon sympathy.
Relations between the CROM and
communists had received a serious setback when Morones,
on a trip to Europe in 1922, had been refused a visa to
47
travei into Rússia.
.
The year before, labor representa48
tive Eulalio Martmez had been received with distrust.
Communists themselves branded Calles as a reactionary; they
were angered by his efforts to establish a government that
v/as "seeking to corrupt the industrial workers, to create
,,49
a burgeois industrial workers' aristocracy. . . .
^6congresslQnal Record, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol.
68, Part 2, 1549.
'Samuel Gompers, "Mexican Federation of Labor,"
The American Federationist, XXX (July 1923), 568.
J. H. Retinger, Morones of México:
the Labour Movement in that Country (London:
Publlshing Company Limited, 192bj, 49.
A History of
The Labour
E. Varga, "México Today," The Labour Monthly,
VIII (November 1926), 69O.
53
There were independent labor unions during Calles'
presidency which definitely labeled themselves "Reds."
These xmions, however, gained very little strength.
Calles
refused to support them, and they were often attacked by
the CROM.
From the first days of his ministry Morones
warned communists to keep "hands off" Mexican labor and
not "to try to use México as a channel of propaganda to the
United States."^^
Too much opposition to communlst influence in
México prevented organized labor from being strongly affected by Marxian principies.
Labor "circles" of the
Catholic Church formed a formidable bulwark against communlsm.
Nationalism, at a strong pitch ln the post-
revolutionary period, also counteracted the influence.
Then, too, the CROM brooked no competition on the labor
union market and often took overt action against communlst
51 Finally, communlsm had little opportunity
activities.-^
to succeed in México because of a lack of understanding
or communication on the part of the rural masses.
As one
observer noted, "to speak of Marx, of socialism, of surplus value to men who have not the slightest notion of the
importance of money in the civilized world would be simply
5Êxcelsior, December 4, 1924.
•^ Karl M. Schmitt, Coinraurxism in México (Austin:
University of Texas Press, I905), 5.
54
ridiculous."5^
The primary reason that communlsm gained little
influence in organized labor, according to Vicent.e Lombardo Toledano, one of the early labor organizers, was a
fault of the leaders themselves.
Labor organizers such
as Morones, Lombardo Toledano stated, did not "orient the
workers in regard to the theory of the class conflict and
the immediate and ultimate objectives of the proletariat.
„53
•
•
•
Calles seemed unconcerned about revolutionary programs in a communlst framework and attempted to bring
progress to organized labor by constitutional means.
Im-
plementing the laws, however, he found to be a difficult
matter due to the wide divergences which existed between
the various state and local Boards of Conciliation and
Arbitration.
These boards had been authorlzed by the Con-
stitution in Article 123.
Composed of representatives of
management, organized labor, and government, the Boards
often based decisions on pressure or influence.
In places
where management was strong--and government weak--decisions
obviously favored businessmen.
Corruption, bribery, and
52
Retinger, Morones of México, 97.
^^Lombardo Toledano, "The Labor Movement," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, CCVIII (March 1940), 50-
55
outright buylng of the Boards were not unknown.
54
On September 22, 1927, Calles created the Federal
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration to bring uniformity
to the decisions m.ade by the state and local Boards.
The
Federal Board began functioning within one year, officially to resolve conflicts ln áreas where the Department
55
of Labor lacked executive action.
Regional Boards were
also established throughout the Republic, and ln places
where there were no permanent Boards, temporary Boards, or
Juntas Accldentales de Conciliacion, were drawn up when
occasion demanded.
56
The creation of the various local and regional
boards brought a change to organized labor in México.
Much better direction and organization came to settlements
of disputes.
sulted.
More equltable and uniform decisions re-
And, significantly, the CROM began losing some of
the power it had wielded through threats of violence and
strike.
The CROM also lost executive support as time passed.
By 1928 Calles Insisted that workers' demands against industry could lead to an economlc paralysis of the nation.
^ Gruening, México and Its Heritage, 347.
55calles, Infor-e . . .,
1928, 112.
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 112.
56
a decrease in available jobs, and a prejudice to the liveli.
hood of the worker.5'
The President's attitude, though
ostensibly a call for fair play, created an image of his
administration becoming more and more conservative, favoring industry and capital.
To be sure, the tone of his
speeches had definitely changed since his inauguration
and indicates a gradual decrease in his support for the
CROM.
Probably the worst blow to hopes by the CROM for
an eventual firm control of México's labor forces came
during a period of election excitement in the summer of
1928.
The voting disclosed a clear victory for Álvaro
Obregcin who immediately announced that one of the most essential measures he would undertake would be the regulation
58
of the labor law, Article 123.
The Article was one of
the few important constitutional features which had escaped
regulatory decrees by Calles.
However, Obregón never
57
According to Vicente Lombardo Toledano, President
Calles began losing his revolutionary enthusiasm "about
the middle of his administration. . . . " Lombardo Toledano, "The Labor Movement," 50. As early as 1925, reports
held that Calles had greatly modified the program he had
outlined in his campaign. "México's Latest Turmoil,"
Literary Digest, LXXXVII (December 19, 1925), 1?. Toledano stated that a definite change in Calles' attitude
could be seen in the example of the Amparo Mining Company
strike of I927 from which^moment "the decline of the CROM
set in, for it had ceased to be a force ln the defense of
the proletariat." Lombardo Toledano, "The Labor Movement,"
50.
5Êxcelsior, July 17, 1928.
57
fulfilled his declared intention--on the same day he had
pledged labor regulations, the president-elect was assassinated.
The tragic death of Obregoh at the hands of a
religious fanatic resulted in political chãos.
Factions
and leaders stood ready to accuse their opponents, and in
the turmoil several members ln the Chamber of Deputies
branded Labor Leader Morones as one of the instigators ln
the assasslnatlon plot.
Although a lengthy Investigation
revealed that a youth named José de Leon Toral had acted
almost alone, the implication that Morones had been involved created a furor.
Within a fev/ days following Ob-
regoh's death, the CROM leader resigned as Secretary of
Labor and disappeared for almost a month.
Calles, though
denylng that Morones was involved in the slaying, accepted
the resignation and appointed Dr. José M. Puig Casauranc
59 And even though Morones remained
as the new secretary.
for some time the spokesman for the CROM, the labor organization never regained the strength which it had knovm and
had displayed under Calles' protection.
President Calles, from the first years of his term,
helped create a climate for growth of organized labor in
general and the CROM ln particular.
While it enjoyed the
President's blesslngs, the CROM produced som.e results which
were beneficiai to Mexican labor.
Wages and working conditions
59Excelsior, September 4, 1928.
58
generally improved for many workers.
Not ali of the Fed-
eration' s activities, however, v/ere favorable for íêxico.
In many instances the CROM disrupted pleasant relations
betv/een management and independent unions solely to gain
power, without much thought being given to the workers
themselves.
Also, Morones and his group gave too little
attention to agrarian workers while concéntrating their
efforts on industry.
Finally, the inner core of labor
leaders became very wealthy at the expense of further bene-
C
fits which could have been provided for laborers in México.
i
V
CHAPTER III
AN EDUCATION WHICH TRANSFORMS
President Calles considered a general program of
education as basic to the solution of the burdensome problems which beset the nation.
The plan he proposed did not
mean education per se; the single goal of combating illiteracy did not satisfy the President's desire to uplift the
people.
Calles hoped that by reaching the millions of iso-
lated Mexicans, especially the remote Indian groups, great
numbers of individuais could become a productive and important part of the Mexican Republic.
The core of his pro-
gram included the means to alter completely the living conditions and hablts of the people.
Calles wanted to intro-
duce a plan of education which he hoped would raise México
to a levei comparable to nations such as the United States.
He faced a difficult task because conditions in México
since the days of Porfirio DÍaz prevented the founding of
any well-developed program of public education.
Illiteracy among the Mexican people during the
reign of DÍaz, though widespread, seemed for the time an
almost natural condition.
Despite their acclaim for science
/^.
and progress, the científicos,
believing the Indian to be
inferior, did little to educate him.
Obviously, programs
•'-The científicos represented lawyers, econoir.ists,
59
6o
designed to alter the repressing conditions of ignorance
in México could not be effected during the revolutionary
chãos which lasted until 1920.
Consequently, the first
concerted effort for educational reforms in the Republic
had not come until Obregoh became president.
But despite
heroic attempts by José Vasconcelos, Obregón's Secretary
of Public Education, to upgrade education in México, only
a few belated changes had taken place by the time Calles became president.
The emphasis the new president placed on improved
education could have been predicted in view of his early
career.
As a teacher he had observed the beneficiai trans-
formation which learning had wrought in the lives of many
of his students.
Also, as the governor of Sonora, he had
displayed a prominent interest in the profession when he
introduced important reforms for teachers in the state.
Then, he had increased the numbers of instructors and had
raised their salaries to among the highest in the nation.
He also had introduced programs of rewarding teachers for
2
honorable service.
and social scientists who surrounded and influenced Calles.
As strong believers in progress, they came to look upon
the Indian as a deterrent to national development and the
European and his penchant for making money as the salvation
of México. As foreign capital entered the Republic, the
position of the Indian and even the mestizo often worsened.
See Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of ^.exico (Cambridge:
The Riverside Press, I96Ó), 299-303.
^Calles, Statement to the Civic Progressive
^
61
The improvements Calles made in Sonora became a
basis for one part of his platform in 1924. Speaking at
a meeting of the Civic Educational Party during his campaign, he remarked that his ideas for education programs
were " . . . faithfully exemplified in . . . [his] work as
a state governor, which was eminently practlcal and which
3
gave effective results." He supported his statement by
boasting that of a state income of 3,500,000 pesos,
2,600,000 had gone for public instruction and added that
"a law was passed establishing a rural elementary school
in every village where there were twenty children."
4
His background as a teacher and the state governor
thus equipped the President for his fight against ignorance when he embarked optimistically on a policy designed
to transform México.
Calles selected Dr. José M. Puig
Casauranc to direct the program as Secretary of Public
Education, and the two men pledged to follow the revolutionary education program of the Obregán administration.
Education Party in México City, April 20, 1924, cited in
Murray, México before the World, 43. For example, in some
states the salaries were 150 pesos ln paper money monthly,
while ln Sonora the salaries were 3,000 pesos or the equivalent in gold and sllver. One veteran teacher received
a permanent seat in the state legislature.
^Calles, Statement to the Civic Education Party,
in Murray, México before the World, 42.
4
Calles, Statement to the Civic Education Party,
62
Fortunately, Vasconcelos had left a foundation on which
to build.
Calles and his aides began work immediately.
De-
spite presidential restrictions on the national budget,
the Secretary of Education reported conslderable progress
during the first year.
According to Casauranc, the ex-
pense for education in public schools ln'México City ln
1895-1896 amounted to only 201,176.99 pesos, whereas during the first year of the Calles administration the Department of Primary and Normal Education alone spent
8,875,430.20 pesos.
In 1896 the capital city contained
113 primary schools, the Federal District, 174, and the
federal territories, I30.
schools came to 48,776.
The total enrollment of the
By the end of 1925, government
figures showed there were 13,46o public schools.
Stu-
dents in schools in the Federal District numbered 132,666,
o
and in the city schools, 84,045.
o
nation was 1,156,383.
The enrollment for the
•^Calles, Statement to the Civic Educational Party,
Secretaria de Educaciái Publica, La Educacion
Publica en México (México: Publicaciónes de Ia Secretaria
de Educacién, I926), XII.
"Êstadístlca Nacional, December 1930, 564.
"secretaria de Educacioh Publica, La Educacion
Piíbllca en México, XIII.
9Estadística Nacional, December 1930, 570. It
might be argued that the above figures merely reflect a
63
The President's general policy for improved education had for its focus the enlightermient of the Indians,
many of whom had been untouched by civillzing Influences.
Denylng that the Indians of México were incapable of learning or of accepting progress, Calles initiated a plan of
rural education by which he hoped to "educate and elevate
,,10
them to the dignlty of full manhood.
He believed that
rural México could be improved only by a system of education which was applicable to the entire community and which
embraced a complete way of life.
He promised no miracles
or sudden change and warned the people against being unduly
12
optimistic.
The President was cautious because of the many
obstacles which confronted him.
These problems included
an appalling illiteracy rate, over^z/helming transportation
and communication problems, and a necessarily stringent
budget.
The natural hostility and suspicion of the Indian
groups created additional difficulties.
The enormity of
normal, steady growth, but the fact remains that events
which occurred between the dates used for comparison prevented any gradual progress in educational development.
"^^Calles, Speech in Theater Ocampo, Morelia, quoted
in Murray, México before the World, 6l.
•^-^Gruening, México and Its Keritao:,e, 419•^^Calles, Infor-T:e . . . , 1925, 92.
64
the situation was described by the Secretary of Education
when he depressingly remarked that:
There are 4,000,000 Indians in the country, df
which 2,000,000 are unable to speak Spanish,
they lack any communication with the rest of the
citizens and they live in the worst conditions,
as strangers in their own land; there also exist
a number of mestizos who labor in the fields,
subjected, as the Indians, to isolation, mlsery,
and routine, raising to more than 7,000,000 the
number in need of civillzing factors.^3
The Indians and mestizos to be contacted by a relatively
small force of educators amounted to almost one-half of
the nation's total population.
Calles named Manuel Gamio, sub-secretary of Education, to carry out the program of rural education.
This
selection proved both practlcal and astute, as Doctor Gamio
had prevlously engaged ln a process which offered the "key
14
to the entire Mexican riddle."
The Columbia Universltytralned scholar had introduced, at San Juan Teotihuacan, a
program of education which attempted to utilize the Inherent abilities of the inhabitants to produce beneficiai
•^Secretaria de Educacion Publica, El Esfuerzo Educativo en México, La Obra dei Gobierno Federa.l en ei RariO
de Educacion Publi^ca durante Ia administracion dei presjT
dente Plutarco Elias Calles. Presentada ai H. Congreso de
Ia unión por ei Dr. J. M. Puig Casauranc, Secretaria dei
Ramo (Máxico: 1928), I, 12.
14
Ernest Gruening, "Emerging México," The Nation,
CXX (June 17. 1925). 683.
65
results for the villagers.
Though Gamio later resigned
because of political arguments with Calles, his method
"to restore native pride, to promote solidarity, teamwork,
cooperation, . . . to revaluate the racial heritage and
15
incorporate it in the national life"
was employed throughout the Republic.
To aid ln the program of rural education and to
bring order and unity to the rural schools, Calles also
completely reorganized the Department of Education.
Rural •
schools heretofore dependent on offices of the states and
the schools of native culture--though many were not excluslvely for the Indian-^^—became the responsibility of
federal agency, the Department of Rural Schools and Native
17
Cultural Incorporation.
The unity, according to Secretary Casauranc, provided an organization sufficiently vital
to alter condition.
Recognizing that the task before the government involved the betterment and happiness of the people, the
15
Carleton Beals, "Frontier Teachers," Bulletin of
the Pan American Union, LIX, 445.
Secretaria de Educacion Publica, El Esfuerzo Educativo en México . . ., I, 12.
'Secretaria
cativo en México . .
uary 1925. The name
de Escuelas Rurales,
Cultural Indígena.
de Educaci(5h Fablica, El Esfuerzo Edu. , 1 , 13- The change occurred in janlater v;as lengthened to Departmento
Primarias Foraneas y Incorporacióh
^6
o
Department began sending educators into the remote villages
and tov/ns to acquaint the inhabitants with the purposes of
the rural education program.
The ideais of the project
were revealed in a speech given by Manuel C. Tellez, on
March 11, 1925 (Mexican Radio Night).
The Mexican "Ambassa-
dor to the United States remarked rather floridly that:
Our road is hard and our progress miust necessarily
be slow, but our faith and determination are unfllnching, our ideais high and our purposes unselfish. Fnatever our devotion, our efforts and our
endeavors m.ay accomplish, will be, with deliberate
purpose in the service of the common destinies of
manklnd. -^^
But if officlals in México City spoke ln idealistic
tones and saw a ponderous task ln the program of rural education, the teacher confronted less lofty matters and faced
a chargé which seemed insuperable.
Nevertheless, armed
with the same Idealism, the rural teachers, the "missionaries, " prepared to meet the challenge.
From rural com-
munlties they pushed into the mountains and into the jungles.
Determination, patience, and discipline were re-
quired; sacrifice was unconditional.
The physical hard-
ships involved and the resistance often encountered can be
imagined from the following observation by Carleton Beals,
who wrote in 1925 that:
-^^"The México of Today," Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LIX (May 1925). 443.
67
They [the rural teachers] penetrate into the most
outlying districts; teachers sometimes have to
ride horseback a whole v/eek after leaving the railroad station. In some places they arrive only to
find that the Indians have fled to the mountain
fastnesses.19
The teachers left civilization, as it were, to bring a segment of México's society back to that same civilization.
The basic program for rural education aimed at
changing a firmly fixed pattern of life, a mean life which
had been followed for generations, even centuries. To
Calles, environmental change came through education, and
he consequently strongly urged the rural teacher to become
completely immersed in the affairs of the community. From
letters written by one of the teachers to others who might
follow, it is possible to discern what the President expected of the instructors. One such note advised:
Inasmuch as you are going to surrender yourself
completely to education, the men of the future
v/i 11 require ali the time each day which you can
give to them; ali of your activities will regard
relations with them and only them. You are not
only going to change your small students; the
country hopes you will also transform ali the
people, opening to them new horizons to better
lives.^0
^9Beals, "Frontier Teachers," 449.
20Esperanza Mendieta de Nunez Mata, Cartas a una
rai ((Oaxaca: Talleres Tipográficas dei Gobierno,
maestra rural
I93I). 2.
68
The home visits disclosed that the rural population
lived a very low economic and moral levei.
One of the
teachers described conditions in her área as follows:
Frequently I have been astonished by individuais
miserably dressed, who live in huts, lacklng furniture or other comforts; but they are owners of a
regular incom.e which should allow them a life more
in accord with their specie. . . . Our rural people
are v/ithout . . . [rooms and sanitation] not through
lack of a piece of land, but through laziness; and
we see also that a single room serves them to live
in horrible promiscuity, even as animais.21
To alter those gloomy surroundlngs the rural teacher directed much of his time and energy.
The exacting process for changing lives, for mak22
ing a "peasant of the peon,"
frequently took place in
what one official of the Department of Education optimistically described as a "humble structure." -^ Often, however,
the rural teacher at first worked in a thatched hut or a
clearing in the forest. Not surprising, a buildlng of some
24
type became one of his foremost objectives.
On many occaslons the grateful people enthusiastically erected a
^^Mendleta de Nunez Mata, Cartas . . ., 14-15.
^%eorge I. Sanchez, "Education," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCVIII
(March 1940), 149.
"
^Saenz and Priestley, Some Mexican Problems, 74.
^^Beals, "Frontier Teachers," 449.
69
school buildlng, sometimes the only structure in a community.
If not the only ediflce, the.school was usually
the cleanest and best constructed.
Though the Department
of Education occasionally donated some materiais, including pamphlets, a few tools, and window glass, 5 furniture,
tools, and some scanty equipment for the' buildlngs came
from community effort because the budget for education did
26
not allow those items.
Because they v/ere the result of
common endeavor, the rural schools became a source of pride
27
for the people in an área.
The buildlngs, however, needed capable.teachers,
and to meet the demand for better rural instruction Calles
created the Cultural Mission.
Despite a budget for 1926
which scarcely provided the basic needs for organization
and operation, the President established a separate bureau
within the Department of Education to administer the Mls?8
sions.
The Bureau of Cultural Missions, founded to alleviate the condition which Calles described as the most
^^Sanchez, "Education," l49.
^Secretaria de Educacion Publica, El Esfuerzo
Educativo en México . . ., I, 10.
^'^Secretaria de Educaci(ín Publica, El Esfuerzo
^Secretaria de Educacion Publica, BI Esfuerzo
70
urgent problem in education (the im.provement of teachers),
launched a plan for carrylng better m.ethods of instruction
29
to the teachers themselves.
The rural teacher had definite need of the Mission.
He usually was very poorly prepared, having attended a
normal school for a few days only.
More often, the teacher
v/as "an ambitious boy or girl from the village with very
30
little formal education."
And even though his rudimentary knowledge surpassed the education of his neighbors,
the rural teacher became the subject for improvement by the
Mission.
The aim of the Cultural Missions, according to
Calles, included three broad categories:
ing of the teacher in service, 2)
teachers, and 3)
1)
the better-
the addition of new
the improvement of rural communities.31
To accomplish these goals, a unique method began by which
groups of educators toured the Republic conducting institutes.
The groups, known as mislohes ambulantes after
their practice of traveling, usually consisted of a leader
who was also a teacher of health and education, and a
teacher concerned with small industries.
The composition
of the Mission gives some indication of what the rural
^^Calles, Informe . . •, 1928, II7-II8.
^^Sáhchez, "Education," l49.
^•^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, II7-II8.
71
teachers were expected to impart to their students and
their communlties.
In each section visited, the Mission usually held
a month-long institute to which the rural teachers came
from the surrounding áreas.
Those who attended were not
only from the federally sustained rural schools.
Many
state-supported schools and prlvate schools sent teachers
32
who desired counsel and instruction.
Study included
"academic subjects, agriculture, gardening, fruit culture,
domestic economy, cooking and sewing, sports and physical
culture, and small industries, such as preserving fruits
33
and vegetables, soap making, [and] weaving. . . . "
Ob-
viously the wide range of material could not be mastered
in a four-weeks course, but even a basic understanding of
many of the subjects was far above that of the Indian or
campesino for whom the knowledge was ultimately intended'.
Under the direction of the Bureau of Cultural Missions, in 1927, a total of 3.243 teachers attended 45 of
the seminars conducted by 6 of the Missions in 20 states
34
and territories.
The following year, with one additional
Mission, 52 institutes in I8 states attracted a total of
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, II8.
^Êdmundo Gonzáles, "The New Religious Teaching in
México," Religious Education, XXII (April 1927). 317.
"^4
Callcott, Liberalism in México, 335-
2,846 teachers.
35
72
Tcie cost of operating the Missions in
the final year of Calles' administration amounted to
102,159.75 pesos--more than one-third of the budget for
the Bureau.
Where the Ci-ltural Missionr provided a "crash program" based on urger.cy. ...o ..eglonal normal schools offered a long-range plan for Improvem.ent of the teaching
profession.
Calles established the schools to provide a
new generation of rural teachers qualified to act as directors and social leaders of small communlties, thereby
transforming the adult population of México -into an asset
to the nation.-^'
By the end of I928, ten rural normal
schools founded ln wide-ranging geographic locations produced benefits for the several sectlons of México.
Sites
chosen included the towns of Tixtla, Guerrero; Actopan,
Hldalgo; Oaxtepec, Morelos; Erongarícuaro, Michoacán; San
Antônio de. Ia Cal, Oaxaca; Matamoros Izucar, Puebla; San
Juan dei RÍo, Querétaro; RÍo Verde, San Luis Potosí;
Xocoyucan, Tlaxcala; and La Paz, the capital of the federal
territory of Baja Califórnia.-^
The importance to the
35Calles, Informe ..... 1928, II8.
36secretaría de Educacion Publica, El Esfuerzo
Educativo èn México . . ., I, 127.
37secretaría de Educacion Publica, El Esfuerzo
^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 119.-
73
administration of this part of xhe education program is
evidenced in the budget from 1928, where 192,699.00 pesos
of the 382,698.75 pesos allocated for education went to
sustain the normal schools."^"
Students selected to attend the schools were those
who had demonstrated a strong desire to accept the "noble
mission encharged to the rural teacher."
Many of the
pupils, depending on the school, were on penslons and
fellowships provided from federal and local sources.
Others attended at their own expense. Figures for the
final year of the Calles administration showed that of 697
4l
students under some type of aid 507 received federal help.
The program for improving the quality of instructors and increasing their numbers expanded considerably
under Calles. Between 1926 and I928 the number of normal
42
schools in the Republic exactly doubled.
The increase in
graduates, Calles hoped, would augment the number of rural
teachers and in turn increase the number of rural schools.
However, as has been noted, the founding of a rural school
^^Secretaria de Educacion Publica, El Esfuerzo
Educativo en México . . . , 1 , 127.
40Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, II9.
41.
"Secretaria de Educacidh Publica, El Esfuerzo
42
Estadístlca Nacional, Decem.ber 1930, 564.
^
^
••••
• •!
•.•
I
••
»
I I
•
••
• •
74
was not easy, and many communlties were without schools.
Where áreas lacked schools, the administration
established small libraries.
Calles began severa.l types
of libraries directed toward different leveis in society
and in mentality.
The most important types Calles listed
were rural, industrial, popular, Institutional, children's,
lj.3
and scholars'. -^ Though often very poor, hundreds of the
new libraries opened throughout the Republic.
Within the
first six months of his term, Calles reported the establishment of 1,256, containing 94,432 volumes which were of
interest primarily to the urban workers, to agriculturists,
and to scholars.'^
Each year thereafter the administration
added new libraries, purchased more volumes, and witnessed
a growing use of them.
Providing rural education and establishing libraries
was not the "complete education" of which Calles had spoken.
Libraries mattered little to the large numbers of Mexicans who could not read, and rural teachers reached only a
portion of the llliterate.
People living in the poorest
and most crowded quarters of the cities, especially the
capital, lacked many of the educational benefits, and the
President created an important part of his program--"open
air" schools--to reach those sectlons of society.
43calles, Informe . . . . 1925, 99.
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 99-
The need
75
for an "open air" school is disclosed by the following
remark by Ernest Gruening:
In the pátio of a Casa de Vecindad, . . . br
tenement, I saw a girl of thirteen, who had
gathered some twenty-five children about her,
marking letters and figures on the pink-tinted"
plaster wall, while the mothers paused in their
washing around the central stpne fountain to
gaze with admiration and awe.45
The first of the escuelas dei àire libre was the
"Álvaro Obregoh."
Constructed in the capital in 1925, in
the district of Allampa, the school became a model for the
later development of other inexpensive urban schools.46
By means of these open air schools, rudimentary education
could reach large numbers of the population which prevlously had been neglected.
Education did reach increasing numbers of the
people, even in remote áreas, as shown by the constantly
growing enrollment for the years covering Calles' term as
chief executive.
Official government figures disclose a
steady increase in both enrollment and in the number of
47
schools established.
^Gruening, México and Its Heritage, 5l8.
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 92.
^'Êstadístlca Nacional, December 1930, 564, 570.
Despite the decrease in total number.of schools for 1928,
the enrollment continued in growth at about the rate of
previous years. The decline in schools for 1928 is
76
The number of teachers also increased.
Totais for
the Republic in ali types of schools reveal that never
fewer than 1,600 new instructors yearly entered the profession during Calles' presidency.
Over the same number
of years more than 10,000 new teachers began their ca48
reers.
An examinatlon of the 1928 total shows that of
the 39,452 teachers, 11,458 taught at federal schools,
21,152 were with local and state schools, and the remaining 6,852 were employed by prlvate schools and academies. "
Calles also planned for the increase and improvement of secondary education.
He issued a study plan
attributed to the economic difficulties of the previous
year. School and enrollment figures are as follows:
Year
Schools
Enrollment
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
13:,46o
15,.351
18.,462
17:>923
19.,412
1,156,383
1,211..927
1,400..733
1,506,,681
1,662.,371
^Êstadístlca Nacional, December 1930, 582. The
following table represents numbers of teachers in ali
types of schools for the years mentioned.
Year
1925
1926
1927
, 1928
1929
Numbers of Teachers
29,015
32,381
37,836
39,452
42,310
^Êstadístlca Nacional, December 1930, 582.
77
reorganizing secondary schools and establishing a regular
secondary system designed to fill a serious educational
void.
Secondary education, according to Professprs José
Manuel Ramos and Eliseo Garcia of the planning committee,
should be concerned with the basic fact of individual differences and strive for development of a true democracy
50
in México.
Consequently, the program needed to support
the idea that the secondary school as a social agency
should reflect an improved society for the nation and prepare the individual for a rewarding life.
Hopefully, the
program would develop responsible citizens who, by personal improvement, would indirectly benefit the whole of
society.
The precepts which served as a guide for the
development of a project for secondary education included
a plan whereby the school would be subordinated to the
needs and possibilities of the society where the school
operated.
Any plan of study should be formulated in a
manner by which it could be adapted to individual differences of the students.
And the plan should harmonize so-
cial interests with the individual desires of the stu51
dents.
50ggç,pg.|-^P^^ ^Q Educacion Publica, Asamblea general
de estúdio de problemas de educaci(5n secundaria y preparatória (México: 1930), 27.
51secretaria de Educacion Publica, Asamblea general . . . d e educacion secundaria y preparatória, 35. lhe
guides which the planning committee recommended were
78
These recommendations of the planning committee
became a reality in August 1925 when President Calles, by
presidential decree, authorlzed the Secretary of Public
Education to create secondary schools along organizational
lines which the latter deemed necessary and expedient in
52
conformity with the plan.
Moisés Saenz, the sub-
secretary of Education who became the supervisor of the
project, immediately announced that the official objectives
would embody the ideais of the planning committee.53
r^Q
program which evolved introduced two cycles of learning.
The first phase, an outline for secondary education, allowed a three-year period of general training.. College
preparatory work, or work tov/ard a bachelor's degree and
entrance to a university, made up the second cycle.
The efforts by Calles and Saenz resulted in some
increase in secondary education.
Whereas in 1923 the
National Preparatory School had been the only public
obviously based upon the ideas of John Dewey. SubSecretary Gamio had been educated ln the United States,
and Secretary Casauranc and members of his department made
several trips to the United States to study education programs and techniques there. Dewey also visited México
during the 1920's and his influence on México's educational
programs is apparent.
Secretaria de Educacion Publica, El Esfuerzo Educativo en México . . ., 44l.
53secretaría de Educacion P;íblica, El Esfuerzo Educativo en México . . ., 441.
79
secondary school in the Republic, Calles reported that the
six federal secondary schools established in 1928, when
added to prlvate secondary schools incorporated into the
federal system, had brought the total to fifteen.
(The
fact that the prlvate schools voluntarlly engaged in the
federal program added unity and harmony to the overall
plan).
Also, enrollment in the schools by I928 had reached
a total of 7,046 pupils, of v/hich number almost 5,000 attended the federal schools, a 25 per cent increase over
54
1927.
By the end of the Calles administration, second-
ary education had improved enough so that entrance examinations had become more difficult and the selection of pupils
more discriminating.-^-^
As a unique addition to the overall program of education, Calles founded the Student National Bank of Savings and Loans, La Caja Nacional Escolar de Ahorras y Presr 56
tamos, which began operations on January 1, 1925.
Soon
after the program began Calles remarked that the amounts
saved within the first seven months alone, "by weekly deposits of 5 centavos by the students enrolled in primary
57
schools, . . . [amounted] to 95,000 pesos."
Savings ln
54calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 120.
55calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 121.
^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 126.
57
Calles, Inform.e . . ., 1926, 54.
8o
the banks at different times came to the following:
130,000 pesos in 1926; 11,000 pesos in 1927; and 89,000
pesos through August 3I, I928.
By the end of August a
total of 351 of these banks had been founded from kindergarten through the secondary schools, and the savings of
58
some 50,000 pupils amounted to 330,000 pesos.
The
speedy success of the project, designed to "encourage
thrift [and] to educate the young people in the habit of
savings and economy," was a source of pride to the Presi-
59
dent.-^^
In still another attack on illiteracy in the Republic, Calles founded the House of the Indigenous Student,
the Casa dei Estudiante Indígena, which began operations
in México City in I926.
Purê Indians qualified and were
60
nominated to the school by the state governors.
The
institution seized the important purpose of bringing together tribal members from ali over México under one roof,
and it gave the Indians an opportunity for daily contact
with the criollo and mestizo of the city as well.
More
importantly, it provided a liaison between the students'
remote homes and civilization, between the rural and urban.
The hope of the administration was that the Indian students
58calles, Informe . . ., 1926, 54.
55calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 126.
81
6"]
would return to their original homes as teachers.
Though
critics argued that the program was useless in that the
62
graduates would neither leave the city nor teach,
Calles
announced that by September I928 the first class, numbering some sixty-five, would soon depart as teachers. -^
If for no other reason than that expressed by the
President, the Casa was of importance to 'the nation and
the world in disclosing Information about the Indian which
had heretofore been lacking, or at best, negligible.
Speaking to the chambers shortly after the opening of the
Indian school, Calles declared that:
. . . by results already obtained in this notable
experiment of collectlve social psychology, I can
affirm the mental force, the faculty of immediate
adaptation and the importance of the Indians as a
factor of civilization and of progress, as opposed to that attitude affirmed by their constant
slanderers and exploiters.64
The President believed that exploitation and abuse
of the Indians, as well as other groups in México, could
be ended if education included a method such as technical
training to create new classes of people.
To gain support
Secretaria de Educaci(5n Publica, El Esfuerzo Educativo en México-. . ., 124.
62
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 119.
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1926, 54.
82
for his views, he established a separate bureau in the
Department of Education for organizing and administering
industrial and agricultural schools where prevlously there
65
had only been a board within the Scholastlc Department.
The primary purpose of the advance in technical learning
was to help the student achieve a means of economic independence through a type of practlcal education.
The admin-
istration retained the older centers of technical education
and established new schools to expand the program.
Though
budget reductions limited the program, funds obtained by
sale of products from the school workshops allowed the purchase of machinery, tools, laboratory equipment, and other
necessary items.
The basic model for the industrial, technical, and
commercial schools was the Cruz Galvez school which the
President had established at Hermosillo and v/hich itself
underwent reorganization to increase efficiency.
66
By the
end of 1926 Calles reported that twenty-nine of these
schools had been founded by the federal government in various
parts of the republic and that the income from products of
the schools had been applied to further the development of
the schools themselves.^"^ And by the end of his
65Calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 94.
66calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 94.
^'^Calles, Informe . . . . 1926, 55.
83
administration there were, including locally supported and
prlvate schools, 225 schools, 35 of which were federally
68
sustained.
Enrollment in the several technical schools
steadily gained from 22,635 students in 1925 to 26,998 by
the end of 1928.^
In the agricultural schools farming methods v/ere
modernized in áreas of production and marketing.
An example
of the schools designed to change agricultural conditions in
the nation is seen in the following statement:
On 2500 acres of land, some 200 boys betv/een thirteen and sixteen come to a thoroughly equipped
boarding-school. . . . A fine, healthy, promising
group of youngsters they appeared after six months
of healthful living there! At the end of three
years they are to emerge competent farmers and
ranchers.'^
The students, sons of rural farmers, learned modern techniques
in ali phases of farming and animal husbandry.
Within three years after his inauguration, Calles
reported that four such schools had been established—one
each in Hldalgo, Guanajuato, Michoacán.and Chihuahua—with
71
a total enrollment of 705 students.
And by the end of
his administration three more had been placed into operation.
6QEstadística Nacional, December 1930, 564-565.
69Estadística Nacional, December 1930, 570-571.
70callcott, Liberalism in México, 336; Gruening,
México and Its Heritage, 527.
^loruening, México and Its Heritage, 527.
84
It was hoped that the marketing of the produce from experimental farms would make of each school a self-sustaining
unit and contribute importantly to the aim of "making a
72
farmer out of the peasant."
Calles looked to the University as the most important agency for social benefit and began definite attempts
to modify its role in national life.
He'felt that the
National University should translate acquired knowledge
73
into practlcal contributions'-^ and that rapprochement between the University and the people was the best course of
action for the nation to meet the needs of the time.'^
Consequently, the programs of the diverse schools of the
University were submitted to thorough evaluation and revision if necessary to conform with the President's conviction.
scope.
Thus, the work of the University broadened in
Extension divisions v/ere amplified, courses for
rural teachers were created and added, and new schools
were established. As a result of Calles' desires, the pro-
75
gram for social action grew.
' Sáênz and Priestley, Some Mexican Problems, 74.
'''•^Calles, Informe . . ., 1926, 55.
74
Secretaria de Educaciái Piíblica, El Esfuerzo Educativo en México . . ., I, 539.
'^5secretaría de Educaci<áh Publica, El Esfuerzo Educativo en México . . ., I, 539.
85
The University's increased enrollment during the
first years of Calles' administration created a demand for
centralization and more efficient organization.'^
Accord-
ingly, the National School of Fine Arts and the National
Conservatory of Music became a part of the University;
formerly they had been connected with the Department of
Fine Arts in the Department of Public Education.'^'^ Relations with other universities increased, and the interchange between the National University and the University
of Paris became particularly strong in physiological and
psychological studies.'
The addition of a school of
Physical Education in I928 brought the total number of
schools within the University to thirteen.
Improvements
of the University came about because of a steadily increasing budget.
Calles remarked at the end of his term that
he was pleased with the progress made by the school over
79
the four year period.'-^
^ In 1925 the enrollment totalled 11,071, an increase of 2,303 over the first semester of 1924. Calles,
Informe . . ., 1925, 96. Foreign students especially continued to increase during Calles' terai, more and more pupils attended from the United States. Gonzáles, "The New
Religious Teaching in México," 317.
'^'^Calles, Informe . . ., 1925. 96.
'^Calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 96.
'^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 125.
86
As a means to increase literacy Calles also used
the radio to spread Information throughout the states of
the Republic.
He authorlzed the Secretary of Public Edu-
cation to acquire a broadcasting station from the United
States--it reportedly became "one of the best stations
M80
in México.
Receiving apparatus were granted to a ma-
jority of the federal schools through which programs of
cultural propaganda from the Department could be heard.
The transmissions varied from lectures and concerts to
children's stories, from weather bulletins and agricultural advice to musicais, and they were heard in a number
of nations of the Western Hemisphere.
By 1928 education by radio was reaching the rural
segment and was stimulating a desire for learning.
Rural
teachers obtained receiving sets by which an entire community listened to programs aimed at ali leveis of Mexi-"
can society.
Radio education became increasingly important,
The process allowed one professor to diffuse knowledge to
thousands ,of people, hundreds of miles apart, thereby,
fíl
according to Calles, "converting each home into a school.'
The importance of the Calles administration to education came not from remarkable reductions in illiteracy.
^^Gonzáles, "The New Religious Teaching in México,
317-318.
^•^Calles, Informe . . ., 1 9 2 8 , 126.
tt
87
Illiteracy rates continued high long after Calles' term.
The slgnificance of the Calles efforts stemmed from new
techniques, emphasis on agricultural and technical education, and the project of rural education.
Taking educa-
tion to the people, stressing the importance of learning,
and establishing a basis for future programs were Calles'
major contributions to education in México.
10
CHAPTER IV
CHURCH AND STATE:
THE CALLES CONFRONTATION
The Roman Catholic Church resented Calles' efforts
to enforce constitutional articles restricting its power.
Resentment Ied to revolt, and the question of the role of
the church in national affairs created criticai conditions
which plagued the President during most of his term.
A
settlement was temporarily reached, but only after Calles
displayed a firmness, a resoluteness—a stubbornness, according to many--which had not been seen in México since
Benito Juárez had faced the might of the Church.
"The
México of 1857," wrote George A. Miller in I926, "was ecclesiastically a very sick patient and Benito Juárez and his
compatriots prescribed heroic medicine."
The lllness, a
long-developing affliction of Mexican society, was diagnosed as a condition whereby the Roman Catholic Church occupied a position harmful to Mexican politics and economics,
The strong influence of the Church began when
Cortes received the blesslngs of Rome in 1519-
For more
than three centuries thereafter the Church controlled Mexican life.
By the l850's it had acquired an enormous amount
of land and wealth, controlling from one-third to one-half
•^George A, Miller, "Is There Religious Persecution
in México?" The Christian Century, XLIII (April 1, I926),
411.
88
I a
li«S
"<
«I.,
"\
89
of the riches in México.
And despite claims by the Church
of aid and improvement it had provided, the Mexican people
benefited little from the institution during the period
from Cortes to Juárez.
A revolution and a refonn constitution in I857 attempted remedies for the oppressive conditions in the nation.
Among other things, the^constitution and subsequent
laws disestablished the Roman Catholic Church and nationalized its properties.
But as time passed, the Church re-
'••::
3
a
grouped its strength until, by the time of The Revolution--
*j
largely because of conservative presidential policies--it
2
dominated society.
México, by I9IO, appeared much the
"'^
same as it had in I850.
The task Juárez began was continued in I917 by the
framers of a new constitution at Querétaro.
The convention
adopted a number of measures designed to restrict the religious institutions and clergymen.
free and secular.
Instruction was made
Monastic orders of "whatever denomina-
tion" were forbidden.
Every citizen was entitled to "em3
brace the religion of his choice."
2
Outsiders view México as a country of countless
revolutions. Emphasis by historians is placed primarily on
three: I810, I857, and I910. To the Mexican of today,
there is only "The Revolution" of 1910.
3
-^The constitutional inclusions v/hich are listed
above are from Leyes y códigos de México: Constituci6n
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (México: Editorial Porrua, S A., 19bò), 7-l«.
90
These articles attacked the very foundations upon
which the Roman Catholic Church based its control, and
threatened the perpetuation of religious dogma by removing
primary education from Church influence.
No longer would
the only people receiving an education be forced to do in
a religious environment.
Other anti-clerical articles re-
quired that neither the president of México nor congressmen
could be minlsters of any religious creed.
However oppressive the Church felt the above legislation to be, it considered two other articles to be much
more unacceptable.
The first of these, Article 27, stated
that religious institutions, irrespective of creed, could
neither hold nor administer real property.
According to
the article, ali places of public worship became property
of the nation "as represented by the federal government,
which shall determine which of them may continue to be de-
4
voted to their present purposes."
The second of the hated articles, Article 130, gave
to the federal government the power to intervene in matters
of religious worship.
State legislatures were granted the
exclusive power to determine the mâximum number of minlsters
of religious creeds, "according to the needs of each locality."
Also, only a Mexican by birth could become a
Leyes y códigos de México, 22.
5
^
/
Leyes y códigos de México, 97-99.
91
minister of any religious creed in México.
Additionally,
the Article provided that minlsters of any religious creed
could not criticize the law, authorities, or government in
general.
Clerics could not vote, be eligible for office,
nor be entitled to assemble for political purposes.
Ali
clergymen were required to register with civil authorities.
And finally, "no trial by jury . . . [should] be granted
for the infraction of any of the preceding provlsions."6
The regulatory decree necessary for enforcing the
anti-clerical articles had not been issued prior to Calles'
administration, although an event occurred during Obregón's
presidency which offered an excellent opportunity.
In
January I923 Roman Catholics held an elaborate celebration
on the occasion of laying the cornerstone of a monument to
Cristo Rey, Chrlst the King.*^ Upwards of 50,000 people
attended, including many of the highest officers of the
Church.
The outdoor ceremony obviously violated the Con-
stitution.
To allow such an act to go unnoticed, Obregón
reasoned, would be to make a farce of the law; consequently.
6
^
^Leyes y códigos de México, 99.
'Moctezuma, El conflicto religioso . . ., I, 284.
The monument was placed near the geographic center of the
Republic on a hill called Cubilete, which, according to ^
Moctezuma, became known among the Catholics as the Montano
de Cristo Rey. It was there Moctezuma reported that the
"^lessed" cry of (Viva Cristo Rey! was first pronounced,
289.
92
he expelled from México the Apostolic Delegate, Monsenor
Ernesto Filippi, for having attended the ceremony in vioo
lation of the Constitution.
Protests from Church offi-
cials in México brought a harsh response from Obregáh in
which he accused the Catholic clergy of "systematic ob,1
9
struction
of effective social programs.
Though Obregón
blamed the Church directly for its problems with the government, he consented to an agreement which prevented a
complete break between México and Rome.
Calles inherited the strained relations between
the government and the Church.
The fact that he had pub-
licly pledged a continuation of Obregón's policies caused
few people to consider his campaign promise to enforce
several articles of the Constitution as anything more than
political propaganda.
However, shortly after his inaugura-
tion he announced his intention to comply with the law of
the land, including enforcement of the anti-clerical articles.
The Church not only encountered government opposition but also faced defiant groups within the institution
o
Moctezuma, El conflicto religioso de 1926 . . .,
I, 289.
~ ~
^Cited in Arturo Elias, The Mexican People and the
Church (n.p.: n.d.), 48. See also Callcott, Liberalism in
México, 295-296.
-'•^Walter Lippmann, "Church and State in México: The
American Mediation," Foreign Affairs, Viil (January 1930),
188.
93
itself.
Late in Pebruary 1925, an insurgent sect seceded
from the Church of Rome and adopted the name of the Catholic Apostolic Church of México.
Led by a one-time military
man, José Joaqum Perez, the schismatics forcefully occupied the Church of La Soledad in México City.
Rioting en-
sued and the police controlled the Church for a time.
Calles quickly announced that action similar to that by
11
the schismatics would not be tolerated.
Eventually, La Soledad was closed completely to
both groups.
The President stated that followers of Perez
were not to be allowed possession of the Church because of
their disregard for legalities.
On the other hand, Calles
refused occupancy to the Roman Catholic group because it
had excited the masses to riot, and had spoken against
12
government ovmership of churches.
Catholics retorted
that Calles sympathized with and supported the cismaticos
and that he sent troops to aid them.
They pointed out
that he gave Pe^rez the more conveniently located cathedral
13
of Corpus Christi.
The temple of Corpus Christi became the center of
cismatlco activity.
On June 11, 1925, crowds gathered
there for the inauguration of the. Mexican Catholic Church.
^Êxcelsior, February 24, 1925^^Calles, Informe . . . . 1925, 12-1313Moctezumia, El conflicto religioso . . ., II, 309-
94
The principal speaker. Benigno Gomez, delivered a scathing
attack against the Roman Catholic Church.
Reviewing the
history of the Church, "the mother of heresy and -persecution," Gámez denounced the great Church orders and exclaimed that:
Rome, in its doctrines and distinctive practices,
is against the Bible. Its doctrines of confession,
of indulgences, of papal supremacy, of the celebration of divine worship in an unknovm tongue, of
denylng the chalice to the faithful in communion,
of imposing priestly celibacy, of prohibiting the
reading of the Bible, of fomenting idolatry, of
selling the sacraments, and much else, are doctrines
and practices opposed to the teachings of the sacred
scriptures.1^
The schismatic movement never gained the strength
necessary to replace the strongly entrenched orthodox
Church.
However, it symbolized a growing Mexican national-
ism which found expression under Calles and treated the
Roman Catholic Church as an alien institution.
While the Roman Catholic Church fought the problem
created by the cismaticos, it was also undergoing attacks
by several syndicates in the Mexican Federation of Labor.
Workers accused the Church of causing labor disputes to
embarrass Calles' administration.
Labor groups charged
that the Knights of Columbus fomented riots, issued anti-
•^^Cited in Alva W. Taylor, "Will México Have a
Living Church?" The Christian Century, XLIII (January 12
1926), 48.
95
labor propaganda, and posted circulars which labelled
Calles the "most vehement Mason in the country. ""^^ During the labor disputes which took place early in the administration, workers associated with the Mexican Federation of Labor frequently refused to work until members of
the Knights were discharged.
The major problem for the Church, however, was
President Calles' program to enforce the Constitution.
In
his first year, Calles, through his Secretary of Interior,
Adalberto Tejeda, began implementing Article I30 of the
Constitution.
Consequently, several state legislatures
passed anti-clerical laws limiting drastlcally the number
of priests within their boundaries.
In addition, religious
schools were ordered to discontinue activities.
Catholics
protested the President's anti-clerical policies through
organizations such as the National League for the Defense
of Religious Liberty in México, the Young Men's Catholic
Association, and the Knights of Columbus.
Serious conflict began when Pope Plus XI sent to
Mexican archblshops and bishops an apostolic letter dated
February 2, I926.
According to the letter, the lav/s were
neither reasonable nor useful and did not merit even the
name of laws.
The Pope called for a united Catholic front
15
Excelsior, February 5, 1925-
96
. ^ ^^
16
opposed to the government's policy.
Two days later, on Pebruary 4, El Universal, a
leading México City newspaper, published a declaration by
the Mexican Archbishop, José Mora y dei RÍo, which categorically stated that the Church could not, and would not,
obey the anti-clerical provlsions of the Constitution.
The Archbishop explained that the doctrine of the Church
was invariable, that the episcopacy, the priests, and the
catholics did not recognize and would combat the anticlerical articles, and that no true catholic could be ex17
pected to alter his position.
The intranslgent attitude
expressed in the Archbishop's statements helped create a
conflict which was described at the time as one upon which
"the fortunes of Rome in Latin America will be decided,
perhaps for ali time."
18
Responding to Mora y dei RÍo, Calles initiated a
program of more specific enforcement of the anti-clerical
clauses of the Constitution.
On Pebruary 24, the Presi-
dent telegraphed instructions to state authorities calling
-^6The apostolic letter is printed in full in William
P. Montavon, The Facts Concernlng the Mexican Problem (Baltimore: The Belvedere Press, 1926), 45-51.
•'"'^The intention of the paper or the interview is not
clear. Víhether the editor merely exercised the act of news
reporting or whether there was a design to create more difficulties is not known. If the latter was intended, it was
certainly successful.
"Church and State in México," The New Statesm.an,
XXVII (August 7, 1926), 463.
97
for leglslative action against the Church.
On the same
day the Minister of Interior notified churches in the Republic that they must be licensed as places of public wor19
ship or expect to be closed.
The administration also
began demanding registration of foreign priests, a move
which the Church considered very serious.
Registering
priests and property, the Catholics argued, meant subjecting both to civil authorlty.
The government replied that
it intended nothing more than a compilation of statistics
and inventories.
obeyed.
Calles maintained that the law must be
Regardless, the program for registering the priests
became one of the most important steps taken by the government to comply with the Constitution, and the Church pre20
pared to resist.
Refusal by the Roman Catholic Church to comply with
the govemmental regulations proved that it regarded itself
superior to civil authorlty.
Though Catholics labeled
Calles' actions against the Church as persecution, the
"moves were in this case actually consistent with his policy
directed toward foreign investors, who also had to register.
During the religious quarrel, the jefe máximo also became
involved in the question of alien land ownershlp, and he
•^%ontavon, The Facts Concernlng the Mexican Problem, 11.
20
John Dewey, "Church and State in México," The
New Republic, XLVIII (August 25, 1926), 10.
98
could hardly apply the Constitution to foreign-owned properties and none else.
The drive for uniformity in law reflected Calles'
evenness of purpose, an attitude which he had cleariy expressed to labor delegates meeting in México City the previous spring.
At that time the President vowed that "the
Government will continue to carry out its full program
without heeding the cries of the priests . . . [and] will
21
not bend before any pressure."
Calles also promised that
as long as he was the executive the Constitution of 1917
would be made effective.
And in keeping with Calles' pro-
gram of effectiveness, authorities continued enforcing
laws against the Church.
Government officials closed
schools which the Catholics failed to disguise, and Catholic leaders and teachers appealed for aid.
Asking—though
futilely—for the Archbishop to intercede with Calles in
their behalf, a group of Catholic educators representing
thirty-six communlties of nuns described the conditions in
México as follows:
We have erased the names of our institutions because
they may not contain any evidence of religion. We
have removed the sacred images from our parlors and
reception rooms. We have transformed our chapeis
into social halls and, what is even worse, we have
taught the pupils to conceal the fact that they are
^ % e w York Times, March 6, I926.
99
being taught religion, that they recite a brief
prayer at the opening of class.^^
Church officials also contacted the Secretary of
Education, pleading that the images of Chrlst be allowed
in schools.
Casauranc refused, but he did establish a
mixed commission to study the situation.
The report by
the commission stated that "the time was"not opportune to
present a favorable . . . petition to the consideration
of the President."^^
Not ali steps taken by representatives of the Church
followed such a mediatory path, however.
Bishop Jes\ís
Manrique y Zarate of Huejutla, for example, defiantly set
forth his conviction that "temporal society must be and
by right is subject to the Church in everything which af24
fects both societies."
The Church, according to Manrique, possessed divine rights completely independent of
any civil power; it was a "true and perfect society" which
enjoyed "ali the rights and prlvlleges . . . which its
25
divine founder conferred upon it."
The Bishop argued
that civil officials had no authorlty to define the rights
^^Cited in Montavon, The Facts Concernlng the
Mexican Problem, 37-38.
^3puig Casauranc, La cuestion religiosa en relacion
con Ia educacion (México: 192B), 37.
^Âlva W. Taylor, "México's Church War," The Chrisjian Century, XLIII (September 30. 1926), II98.
^^Taylor, "Mexico's Church War," II98.
100
of the Church or determine the conditions under which they
existed.
In indignation, he sharply rebuked Calles' anti-
clerical stand by publicly declaring:
I denounce, I condemn and I abhor each and every
crime which the goverrmient of México has, during
my days, committed against the Church, esnecially
and above ali, its ill-disguised purpose to root
up and destroy once and for ali time. the Catholic
Church in México.^^
Such an overt disrespect for federal authorlty demanded
attention, and Calles ordered the Bishop arrested and
charged with civil disobedience.
Manrique's protestations encouraged the many Catholic worshippers in the Republic.
Reports from México de-
scribed numerous instances of rioting and violence wherever
government officials attempted to enforce the controversial
legislation.
The first bloodshed occurred early in March
1926, in Nayarit, in the western part of México.
There, a
crowd of people, including women and children, resisted
27
efforts by local officials to close a Catholic church.
The authorities were beaten so badly that they died soon
after.
Increasing numbers of similar reports reached people
in other countries as the administration intensified its
26
Quoted in Montavon, Tae Facts Concernlng the Mexican Problem, 38.
^"^New York Times, March 13. 1926.
101
program of enforcement.
Newsmen wrote of severe persecu-
tions, of the selling of nuns into prostitution, and of
28
the turning of children out into the streets.
Many of
the stories had the single purpose of creating widespread
sympathy for the Catholics who faced such lâmentable conditions in México.
Calles, seemingly, paid little attention to worldwide opinion.
However, he did feel that Catholic officials
in México were directly responsible for the violence and
propaganda.
Consequently, the President wrote to Mora y
dei RÍo in June I926 that the Church pursued the v/rong
course.
Calles advised the Archbishop that Church offi-
cials should "understand once and for ali" that the agita29
tion which they created would bring severe punishments.
The firm intent promised by the President became
evident within a month.
In July Calles and his Minister
of Interior issued a decree v/hich enlarged the penal code
to include violations of the anti-clerical laws and pro30
vided stiff penalties for those who disobeyed.
The law
was scheduled to take effect July 31. 1926, and copies of
it were ordered displayed at ali churches and religious
pO
New York Times, April 1, I926.
The full text of the letter can be seen in the
New York Times, June 4, 1926.
Por the full text of the decree reforming the
Penal Code, see Murray, México before the World, 133-l4l.
102
institutions.
The decree reemphasized that minlsters and
churches must register with civil authorities, and it ordered foreign-bom priests to cease performing religious
ceremonies.
In-a matter of days the President issued an-
other decree which regulated teaching in prlvate schools.
According to the new law, ali teachers should be lay persons and the interlors of the schools could contain no
altars, chapeis, or religious decorations.
As expected, these decrees brought forth a storm
of protest.
The National League for the Defense of Re-
ligious Liberty organized a nation-wide economic boycott
to be launched when the decrees went into effect.
Catho-
lic dignitaries, led by the Archbishop, issued a pastoral
letter suspending church services beginning August 1 in
places serviced by priests required to register.
They ex-
plained regulations injured the divine rights of the Church
and were "so contrary to the Mexican constitutional rights"
32
that it was impossible to yield to them.*^
Averring that
the presidential decree was a device to make México unCatholic, the clergymen continued:
. . . we protest against the decree before God,
before civilized humanity, before the country and
^•Êxçelsior, July 23, 1926.
^^For the full text of the letter, see New York
Times, July 26, 1926.
103
before history. With God's help and your
[Catholics] cooperation we will work to effect'
an amendment of the decree and the anti-religious
provlsions of the Constitution, and we will not
desist from our purpose until it is attained.33
In response to the declarations by the President
and the Archbishop, Catholics staged masslve religious
demonstrations throughout the Republic.
thedrals overflòwed with excited people.
Churches and caCarleton Beals,
an observer to the events at the Shrine of Guadalupe, the
national center for Catholic worship, described the spectacle as follows:
Ali the potential religious fervor of the Mexican
masses was here short-circuited into a blaze of
fanaticism. . . . The populace fought madly for
last-minute confirmation, baptism, confession,
marriage. . . . The great tatterdemalion throngs
sv/ayed to the sound of wails, droning prayers,
clanking censers, bawling infants, to choir and
organ--in a last minute orgy of emotional abandon—
before that fateful day of August first when
priests were to deny the spiritual miyiistrations
to which the people were accustom.eà.-^"'"
Similar displays of .faith occurred every\^rhere in
México.
People dressed in black and draped their towns
and villages for mourning.
Special religious services,
the "Service of Sorrow," were held in ali Catholic churches
Reports of the activities on the last day for holding
^%ew York Times, July 26, 19.26.
3^Beals, "The Mexican Church on Trial," The Survey,
LVII (October 1, 1926), 13.
104
services mentioned long lines of faithful Catholics at ali
churches, crowded roads and highways, riots, and violence.
The tired priests extended church hours and, toward the
last, performed ceremonies such as marriage for many couples
simultaneously.
When August l--the fateful day—arrived the Catholic
threat became reality.
Religious services ceased.
The
government stepped in, took control of the churches—not
without some resistance by the people--and inventoried
what possessions had not been taken by the priests when
they abandoned their posts.
As Protestant chapeis ln many instances remained
open, the report spread that Calles favored Protestantism
and that he interpreted the Constitution as anti-Catholic.
The difference, according to Reverend George A. Miller,
Bishop of the México área of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
was that Protestants had complied with the early requests
35
of the President, a fact verified by Calles.
As early as
February, the Protestants had arranged for Mexican nationals
to take chargé of their services and thus Protestant services continued after the July decrees.
36
^5Calles, Statement to the New York Herald Trlbune,
Pebruary 23, 1926, cited in Murray, México before the World,
104.
2^0. R. Wellman, "México," Religious Education,
XXII (April 1927), 311.
105
The measures taken by Calles in July were not without support.
Ex-president Obregón announced his approval
and declared that the "high dignitaries of the Catholic
Church provoked the conflict. "^'^ As a show of confidence
in the President, 50,000 CROM workers paraded through
México City on the day that Catholic services ceased,
though some memb.ers of the labor group refused to march
because of conflicting loyalties.^^
On August 16, Archbishop Mora y dei RÍo and Bishop
Pascual DÍaz of Tabasco, the president and secretary respectively of the Episcopal Committee of the Republic, in
the name of ali the Catholic priests and laymen in México
petitioned President Calles for amendment to the Constitution.
The petition asked for a suspension of the articles
and the penal code prescribed for their enforcement in
such a way as to create a situation of tolerance. Answering charges that the Church was guilty of rebellion because
it had suspended public worship, the Archbishop declared
30
that "nothing could be more unjustified. . . ." ^
To the
question as to why the clergy had not used the right of
petition prior to the present problem. Mora y dei Rio
37
-^^New York Times, August 3 , 1926.
38
Excelsior, August 1, 1925.
39
Memorial of the Mexican Prelates to the President,
August 16, in Murray, México before the VJorld, Appendix, I99.
io6
answered that since neither Carranza nor Obregón had urged
enforcement of the anti-clerical legislation, petitions
had not been necessary.
According to the Archbishop, Calles
created the lâmentable situation which made necessary the
Church»s recent action.
The President replied to the Archbishop within
three days.
He verif ied the legality ofthe petition as
it had been addressed to either the president, the federal
congress, or the state legislature.
However, formality in
the note ended when the jefe máximo wrote that he was less
likely than the other branches of government to approve the
petition because he was in complete "philosophical and
political accord with the Constitution." "^ The President
added that the same beliefs served to explain his modifications of the penal code and that the administration did not
accuse the Catholics of rebellion simply because they had
suspended public worship.
Acts considered rebellious were
those which consisted of taking a position of open, public
hostility to the law—even m.ore, resistance by illegal
41
means.
One month later, Calles reported to Congress that
his administration had been actively carrylng out the
40
Calles, Reply of the President to the Memorial of
the Mexican Episcopate, in Murray, México before the World,
I2T:
•
4l
Calles, Reply of the President to the . . . Mexican Episcopate, in Murray, México before the World, 12?.
107
provlsions of the Constitution and the decrees implementing
them.
He told the assembled legislators that his officials
thus far had closed 42 churches and chapeis, 73 Convents,
and 7 distribution centers of religious propaganda.
In
addition, I85 foreign priests had been exiled or had left
42
the country.
Calles then pledged to continue his anti-
clerical program because he believed a great majority of
the Mexican people supported him and wanted to see the work
carried to its intended objective.
Opposition to Calles' program, largely because of
the acts of local authorities, continued through 1927.
Tomas Garrido Canábal, the governor of Tabasco, who had
named his sons Lenin, Lucifer, and Satan, ordered Church
images seized and burned and crosses removed from monuments
43
and graveyards.
Several other state and local officers
busily enforced the law regarding foreign priests and the
limitations on the numbers of priests within their juris-
44
diction.
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1926, 10.
^3chester Lloyd Jones, "Roots of the Mexican Church
Conflict," Foreign Affairs, XIV (October 1935), 135.
^îlliam F. Montavon, the Director of the National
Catholic Welfare Council in the United States, claimed that
of eleven states ln México, the number of priests was reduced from 2,335 to 875. In the state of Potosí, for example, only 25 priests served a population of more than
625,000; in Puebla, one priest remained for each 4,000
Catholics. See Montavon, The Facts Concernlng the Mexican
Problem, 42-44.
io8
Many people considered the policy of restricting
priests a mlstake.
They argued that limiting the priest-
hood to natives downgraded the educational and charitable
work in which Catholics had engaged and that it made illegal the activities of Protestant missions.
Thus the ob-
jective of the religious laws would be defeated, for the
destruction of the Roman monopoly could best be achieved
45
by creating a "healthy rivalry of sects."
Regardless,
the limitations continued.
46
The controversy was not limited merely to the Church
and the administration.
Newspapers took up the issue and
often distorted facts to discredit and embarrass the President.
Anti-administration, more particularly anti-Calles,
pamphlets and posters--many of which had been printed in
the United States—appeared everywhere.
The CROM supported
Calles and imposed a censorship on items printed for Mexican consumption, an easy task since the majority of tjrpesetters were members of the Federation.
Workers either
45
Robert Bruce Brinsmade, "The Religious Crisis in
México: The View of a Liberal," Southwestern Political
and Social Science Quarterly, IX pTune 192b), 53.
h-6
Excelsior, March 3, 1926, reported the state of
Veracruz fixed the number of priests at 1 for each town of
10,000 inhabitants, 2 for cities of 10,000 to 30,000, and
only 4 for cities of 30,000 to 6o,000. Laws denied more
than 6 priests for any city, regardless of size.
109
refused to print material which attacked the government
position or reported the matter to a labor official.'^'^
In either case, the government triumphed in the propaganda
campaign within the Republic; but in the struggle for the
sentimental, emotional support of the masses, the administration had to concede the advantage to the Church.
Catholics in the United States, as well as the
rest of the world, took active part in the propagandizing.
In the United States, late in I926, the Catholic Episcopate
printed and distrlbuted more than a mlllion copies of an
inflammatory pastoral letter.
Though the letter rejected
the idea that its purpose was to seek intervention by the
United States in the internai affairs of México (the denial
itself brought attention to that point), there is doubt
that mere Information was its only aim.
The pastoral let-
ter added to Catholic anxiety over México.
48
47
Clark, Organized Labor in México, l42.
48
The letter included the argument that Calles consciously sought the destruction of religion and the educational and charitable works the Church had effected. In
addition, a long treatise on "What the Church has done for
México" described the beneficiai activities of the Church
such as a social uplifting of the Indians and the poor
masses. See Knights of Columbus, Supreme Council, Pastoral
Letter of the Catholic Episcopate of the United States on
the Religious Situation in México (New Haven: Committee of
the American Episcopate, December I926), 12-13. The Pastoral Letter is also printed in Congresslonal Record, 69th
Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 68, Part 2, 1693-1700.
110
Catholic sympathy in the United States was demonstrated when the National Council of Catholic Men, at a
convention held in Cleveland, October 19, 1926, adopted a
resolution which declared "the minority government in
México, through military power, has enacted laws which deprive the Catholic Church of the right to live and function
in that co\intry."^^
The council also pledged its support
to the League for the Defense of Religious Liberty in its
boycott and opposition to the religious laws.
Not ali Catholics in the United States, however,
took similar points of view.
Harry Pascoe, a former United
States vice-cônsul at Torreón, published a scathing attack
on the Church in México.
The article, which appeared in
the November I926 issue of Current History, outlined the
history of the religious problem and criticized exploltatlons by the Church, its land holdings, and its selfishness.
The Church, according to Pascoe, prevented progressive measures and attitudes in Mexican society.
The Mexican gov-
ernment, he wrote, should be supported by the United States
50
and not denounced--as usual—as Bolshevistic.
^Quoted in Charles W. Hackett, "México's Campaign
for Enforcement of Church Regulations," Current History,
XXV (December I926), 411.
^^Harry W, Pascoe, "The Catholic Church Conflict
in México: An American Catholic's Criticism of the Church,"
Current History, XXV (December I926), 4ll.
111
Protestants in the United States also became interested in the controversy, and their attitude approached
glee at the position of the Catholic Church in México.5-^
During the controversy, a delegation of twenty-two Protestant minlsters and laymen from the United States visited
México on a good will tour.
One of these, the Reverend
Hubert C. Herring, wrote of México in glowing terms. He
praised Calles and glorified Morones and several other
cabinet members.
Recognizing that ali was not well within
the nation, still he maintained that the difficulties were
common to most countries.
But he warned optimistic Protes-
tant missionaries that "México does not want Protestantism
[because] it is too cold, too lacking in mystical sweep
52
and poetry."
Even so, México did not want the Roman
Catholic Church as it was.
The Church controversy became much more widely debated in the United States newspapers and magazines than
in México, where the censorship acted as a deterrent to
public airing of the question.
Groups of delegates, minls-
ters, laymen, reporters, and magazine writers from the
United States made trips into México and reported their
observations to reveal the "true facts."
Inevitably, their
accounts made a false comparison between the Roman Catholic
5lMiller, "Is There Religious Persecution in México?"
412.
^^Hubert C. Herring, "México's Spiritual Rebirth,"
The Christian Century, XLIII (July 22, 1926), 917-
112
Church of México and of the United States, a somewhat
foolish approach because the histories of the tv/o countries revealed little on which to draw such a comparison.
However, for the reader in the United States the method
provided a frame of reference with which he'could identify,
53
thus the writings were widely distrlbuted and read.
Because of the great amount of publicity given to
the religious controversy, Calles reportedly had to defend his position.
He denied that persecution of any groups
existed in México and scoffed at the chargé that he was
anti-religious.
Perhaps the best statement of the reasons
for his actions he gave in an interview to a group of American visitors to México in January 1927.
In the course of
the talk, the President revealed as cleariy as at any other
time his stand on the religious issue.
He repeated that
his government persecuted no individual or group.
Then he
Por examples of articles defending the Church,
see: Prancis C. Kelley, "The Church Side of the Mexican
Conflict," The Survey, LVII (October 1, 1926), 19; Constantine E. McGuire, ^'The Church and State Conflic-c in
México: The American Catholic View," Current History, XXIV
(July 1926), 489-490; Charles Phillips, "Official Catholic
Defense of the Church in México," Current History, XXV
(November I926), 168-I69; John A. Ryan, "The Religious Persecution in México," The Outlook, CXLIII (August 1926),
534.
For articles opposing the Church, see: Beals,
"The Mexican Church on Trial," l4; Pascoe, "An American
Catholic's Criticism of the Church," 157; Bishop uames
Cannon, Jr., "The Conflict Between Romanism and the Mexican Government," The Methodist Quarterly Review, LXX>:VI
(April 1927), 221; Earle K. James, "üpen Letter to Arcnbishop Curley," The Fórum, LXXXVI (August 1926), 309-311.
113
reminded those present that:
The clergy of the Roman Catholic Church in ali
Latin American countries has constituted itself
as a power superior to that of the state and has
, always aimed at temporal power. It has not limited itself to its mission, it has invaded the
sphere of politics, it has organized and conducted internai wars. In sober truth it has been
the greatest handicap and incubus of these countries, . . . the effect of the Catholic clergv
on the mass of the people has been sinister.54
He agreed that Roman Catholics had accomplished much good
^
by establlshing schools, orphanages, hospitais, and simi- •
5
í.->
lar institutions.
.'^
However, he claimed that the schools
and convents were only for the rich.
Besides, he asked,
"Where are the elementary or primary or rural schools of
the Catholic Church?"
And then he challenged those present
to try to find beneficiai works by the Catholic Church.
Charges against Calles often exceeded the accusations of persecution.
Among the most outlandish claims
against the President were those of Pedro Vera y Zoría,
Archbishop of the Church of La Puebla de Los Angeles.
From
exile ln the United States, Vera published his fantastlc
"Decalogue" which he avowed Calles planned to impose on
the Mexican people.
These commandments, according to the
Archbishop, consisted of the following points:
5 The interview can be read in Willlam English Walling, The Mexican Question (New York: Robins Press, 1927),
201.
S
114
1. Adore the state, personified in Calles and his
followers.
2.
Hate God, hate the Church.
3.
Jeer at ali that is sacred.
4. and 5. Persecute the bishops, the priests and
ali those who proclaim the existence of God,
the sanctity of the Church, the right to think,
to believe and expound the truth.
6.
Practice free love.
7.
Steal those things of God, the possessions of
the Church.
8.
Slander and lie to sustain the policies of the
Government.
9. and 10. Denounce the possessions not only of the
Church, but whatever you please, under the P^^^gr
text that they are possessions of the Church.55
Vera further reduced the ten commandments to two:
"(1)
Do not leave standing anything which calls Catholicism to
mind, and (2) above the rubbish and ashes raise the Mexican Communlst Republic.
Vituperation and adverse publicity seemingly had
little effect on Calles.
Statements'such as those by Vera
were hardly worthy of answer.
Overt acts by the Catholics
against the administration, however, caused much concern,
and to them the President turned his attention.
Arzobíspo Pedro Vera y Zoría, Diário de mi destierro (El Paso: Editorial Revista Católica, 1927). ^5.
Vera y Zoría, Diário de mi destierro, 45.
39
-a
;3
jS
íS
I
115
The two most serious problems which resulted from
the religious controversy were the economic boycott and
rebellion by religious fanatics.
In both cases, .Calles
attempted to describe difficulties as inconsequential.
The boycott, he claimed, was unsuccessful because the
"economic life of México . . . [did] not depend upon a few
dozen agitators who utilized the Catholic religion as a
pretext for venting their spleen upon the man and the gov57
ernments of the revolution."
Yet, by the end of I926,
reports arrived in the United States from México that the
boycott had more effect than the President admitted, and
that pressure was mounting for the administration to seek
58
some solution of the dilemma.
It seems reasonable to
say, though, that tactics such as the boycott did not produce intended results.
Had other methods used by the
Catholics been successful, the fighting which broke out
late in I926, and which became knovm as the Cristero rebellion, would never have occurred.
The conflict began in the western sectlons of the
Republic where religious groups known as Cristeros (after
57
Calles, Statement to the Hearst Newspaper, in
Murray, México before the World, I08.
5^New York Times, December 11, I926. It is difficult to assess the actual effect of the Catholic boycott
because it occurred during a time v/hen México suffered from
a decrease in trade with the United States and a drop in
revenue from the oil companies in the Republic.
116
their rallying cry, (Viva Cristo Rey!) armed themselves
against government forces.
The administration blamed
Catholic priests for leading the rebellion, a faot which
was never officially disavowed by the Church.
On the other
hand, the government found itself denylng the inevitable
accusations of atrocities committed against the Catholics.
An example of the type of charges against the administration can be seen from the following list of barbárie acts
published by Vera y Zoría:
R. Melgarejo, Jamora, Michoacán:
of ears and tongue.
amputation
g
José Valencia Gallardo, Leon, Guanajuato:
tation of tongue.
ampu-
Sefíorita Maria Guadalupe Chairez, Ciudad Victoria:
various mutilations, amputation of fingers.
Genaro Sáhchez, Tecolotlán, Jalisco: hanged six
times because no strong rope was available.
Anacleto González Flores:
slashed.
hanged by fingers,
Juan sanchez, Totatiche, Jalisco:
of ears and death by beating.
17 priests, México City:
amputation
shot in a group.
Sabá^s Reyes, Guadalajara; Jalisco: in place
of being shot ^J,th mercy, sprinkled with benzine
and set afire.
55vera y Zoría, Diário de mi d e s t i e r r o , 112. For
examples of similar accusations, see Ruiz, Calles . . . ,
115-117.
117
Similar stories became quite common in both the
United States and México as newsmen published conflicting
and confuslng reports about the Cristeros.
Calles mini-
mized the conflict by claiming that sensationallsm of reporters from the United States obscured the true perspective of the rebellion.
The outbreaks, he insisted, were
the work of isolated groups which the federal troops had
little difficulty defeating.^^
Although the rebellion had practically ended by
the middle of July 1927. sporadic fighting continued and
secret organizations had been formed to sustain the
Cristero movement.
Catholics claimed that the conflict,
Consolidated by the League for the Defense of Religious
Liberty, became stronger each day.
In fact, as late as
October 8, I928, on the fiesta d£ Cristo Rey, General Enrique Gorostieta "pronounced" in Jalisco.
His pronounce-
ment upheld the League as "the genuine and legitimate national representative body."
Nevertheless, by late 1928,
federal troops had succeeded in defeating rebels in ali
62
but isolated áreas.
Victory by arms, however, did not
6n
Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 75Documentos para Ia historia de Ia persecuclon
religiosa en México, de Mons. Leopoldo Lara y Torres"^
m m e r Obispo de Tacámbaro (México: Editorial Jus, 1954),
^^^^^
mr-
62
Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 75.
.118
mean a solution to the religious problem in its entirety.
Not until June I929, did the religious question
reach a temporary conclusion with a settlement between
President Emilio Portes Gll and Archbishop Leopoldo Ruiz
y Piores.63
The agreement of I929. an outgrowth of media-
tion efforts which began during Calles' presidency, followed
an interview between United States Ambassador Dwight Whitney Morrow and Father John J. Burke, General Secretary of
the Catholic Welfare Conference.64
A secret meeting held
in Veracruz on April 4, I928, between Father Burke and
President Calles resulted in an understanding between the
6^
two men.*^-^ Though not official at the time, it became the
basis for the later arrangement under Portes Gil.
One reason for delay v/as the Pope's reluctance to
accept the terms of the agreement immediately.60
More
important, the assasslnatlon of President-elect Álvaro
^3During the controversy, the aged Archbishop Mora
y dei Rio died and was succeeded by Ruiz y Flores. See
Excelsior, April 23, 1928.
^^The suggestion for the intervlex\r came from Cardinal Hayes and Judge Morgan J. 0'Brien, both of Nev/ York,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
j;>tates, 192Ò, (3 vols.; Washington, D. C : United States
Government Printing Office, 1942-1943), III, 326.
65 E x c e l s i o r , A p r i l 6, I 9 2 8 .
6 6 L . Ethan E l l i s , "Dwight xMorrow and t h e ChurchS t a t e C o n t r o v e r s y i n M é x i c o , " H i s p a n i c Am.erlcan I - I i s t o r i c a l
Review, XXXVIII (November 1 9 5 8 ) , 4 9 2 .
S
^'
119
Obregón in July I928 created a tense atmosphere which
Morrow believed made inopportune any further negotiations.
The Ambassador's attitude stemmed from the fact that
Calles blamed clerical action for Obregón's death.
Later
attempts to rush a conclusion to the religious controversy
before the end of Calles' term failed, due again to delays
by Rome. 6'^
Finally, on June 21, I929, newspapers in México
City announced that a modus vivendi had been reached between
President Portes Gil and the Archbishop of México.
The
settlement, which followed eighteen months of diplomatic
work by Morrow, represented a compromise.
Although the
government agreed not to license priests who were not suggested by their superiors and to respect the Church's
right to petition, the Church received very little from
the agreement.
fied.
The constitutional articles were not modi-
Compulsory registration, tempered in that only those
priests in chargé of property were required to register,
and the limitation of numbers of priests were retained.
The government made concessions in administrative procedures only and in assurances it would not interfere in the
spiritual functions of the Church.
"Dwight Morrow and the Church-State Controversy in México," 496.
67EIIÍS,
120
On June 27, 1929, the Catholic churches returned
•i.
to control by the clergy, who publicly celebrated masses
for the first time in almost three years.
Hov/ever, the
1
Constitution—including the revolutionary articles—remained unchanged, and a final settlement awaited the
future.
i
..«I ;
r"i:
CHAPTER V
"LAND IS FOR CAMPESINOS"
Land distribution in México—a basic appeal to the
banner of revolution--became a major problem for ali of
the revolutionary presidents.
To be successful, Mexican
leaders had to meet demands of the peones for land.
The
salvation of the degraded people in México, it was felt,
would follow if the individual could own a plot of ground.
Leaders who failed to recognize the cry for land soon
found that their positions were insecure.
Consequently,
the breaking up of large estates and the redistribution of
these lands became one of the major objectives of the revolutionary forces.
The demand for land distribution in the twentieth
century, though perhaps revolutionary at the time, would
have restored México to the condition the country had actually occupied four centuries earlier.
Pre-Cortesian
México was characterized by lands being held in common by
Indian groups.
Only after the coming of the conquistador
did prlvate ov/nership of land come to be accepted.
Several
generations of Spanish rule in México gave rise to a land
system knovm as latifundismo, a vast acreage under the
personal control of an individual or family.
The early
latifundlsta, or owner, might be awarded, along with land,
121
122
groups of Indians for working his farms and mines.
These
groups, known as encomiendas, and the lands of the owner
increased alongside the communal Indian lands, or ejidos."^
Prlvate ovmers gradually extended their holdings to include lands claimed by Indian villages.
A quasi-feudal
system of land holding developed, and the Indians became
virtual slaves.
Attempts by Benito Juárez to alleviate the condition of the peones were frustrated under the rule of Porfirio DÍaz, who actually allowed the landed class better
opportunities to increase holdings.
By the time of the
revolutionary outbreak inequities in land ownershlp had
increased to the point where 90 per cent of Mexican land
was controlled by a small group of hacendados and the
Roman Catholic Church.
Of the 69,549 rural communlties
in México, more than 8o per cent were located on large
2
privately ovmed estates.
By 1910 also, less than nine
hundred families owned haciendas ranging from 22,000 up to
6,000,000 acres, and twenty individuais controlled the entire state of Morelos, leaving the other l8o,000 Mexicans
3
there landless.-^
-^The best study of the encomienda is that by Lesley
Byrd Simpson, The Encomienda in Nev/ Spain: The Beginning
pf Spanish México (Berkeley: University Press, 1950).
^Prank Tannenbaum, "Land Reform in México," Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
cL (July 1930), 245.
3
"^Philip Challis, México: Facts vers\;.s Propaganda
123
In addition, the large landholders controlled the
áreas best suited to cultivation and irrigation, yet often
they farmed only a small portion of the land.
land for the sake of possession and status.
They owned
Even worse,
the hacendados continued a policy of absenteeism whereby
4
foremen operated the estates.
To produce a salary for
himself, the overseer exploited—often ruthlessly—the
workers and created the discontent which characterized
conditions in México in 19IO.
Widespread abuses by the hacendados added to a
revolutionary sentiment.
For years even after the Revo-
lution, official pamphlets continued to arouse.public sympathy for the rural worker, or campesino, by descriptions
of past life on a hacienda.
One such publication has noted
that:
Counting our suffering, our helplessness, and our
despair in that epoch . . . [prior to distribution]
would be long and tirlng. Ali of our brother
campesinos, who for so many long years supported
the hard tyranny of the overseer, know from bitter
experience of this cruel destiny . . . receiving
daily wages of 50 centavos for exhausting work,
from sun to sun, and with a "kindhearted" assist
from a feeble ration of corn, such as one gives
(London:
September, 1927), 25.
^Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, El Problema
Agrário en ei estado de Hldalgo^ (Tacubajra: Imprenta de
Ia t)ireccion de lí:studlos Geográficos y Climatologlcos,
1926), 6.
124
a beast in order that it could stand up to thí
pull of the plow and the sting from the whip.Because of such conditions, the land problem became a matter of grave concern to the makers of the Constitution of
1917.
Considered to be one of the more radical elements
of the Constitution, the celebrated Article 27 represented
a means for an answer to the question of land ownershlp.
One of the first statements of the Article invoked the nationalizing of public lands, as follows:
Section 1: The ownershlp of land and waters
comprised within the limits of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which
has had, and has, the right to transmit title
thereof to prlvate persons, hereby constituting
prlvate property.^
The section permits prlvate ownershlp of land but only
with the consent of the national government.
To quiet
•^The government publication describes the ancient
hacienda of Huaracha, an extensive estate v/hich included
several ejidos. Considered "typical," hacienda Huaracha
was located in the municipality of Jlquilpán, Michoacán.
Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal, Sociedad colectiva
agrícola industrial "Rafael Picazo*' (México: Talleres
tiráficos de Ia Nación, 1937), 7.
Translation of the article can be seen ln H. M.
Branch, "The Mexican Constitution of 1917 compared v/ith
the Constitution of I875," Annals of the Am.erican Academy
pf Political and Social Science fMay 1917), 15-25; also,
liyler N. Simpson The Ejido: México's Way Out (Chapei Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 19'37), Appendix B,
749-755.
125
fears that Section 1 was confiscatory, the writers included the declaration that "private property shall not
be expropriated except for reasons of public utility and
7
by means of indemnification."
Section 3 established the means by which the
ejidos could be created or amplified by stating that:
The nation shall have at ali tim.es the right to
impose on private property such limitations as the
public interest may demand as well as the right to
regulate the development of natural resources,
which are susceptlble of approprlation, in order
to conserve them and equitably distribute the publie wealth. For this purpose necessary measures
shall be taken to divide large landed estates;
to develop small agricultural properties in operation; to establish nev/ centers of rural population with such lands and waters as may be indispensable to them; to encourage agriculture and to
prevent the destruction of natural resources, and
to protect property from damage detrimental to
society. The centers of population v/hich lack
lands and water or do not possess them in sufficient quantities for their needs, shall have the
right to be provided with them from the adjoining properties, always having due regard for
small agricultural properties in operation.o
By the terms of the section, a solution to agrarian problems could be reached through redistribution of lands
taken from the hacendados.
Land which was expropriated
and given to individuais or communlties should include,
where possible, the benefits of irrigation.
'^Simpson, The Ejido, 749Leyes y ccídigos de México, l8-19.
Successive
^/n
§'1
^;I«
-^
^_*
»;! 3
gf
\
c
f
J
r
j
r
126
sectlons of Article 27 set forth the procedures by which
the individual might acquire lands.
Article 27, then, provided a method for land reform.
However, as in the case of the anti-clerical pro-
vlsions of the Constitution, very little had been done by
Carranza or 0breg(5h to meet revolutionary demands for
equltable distribution of lands and waters.
Obregoh did
implement land laws, but only on a small scale and amidst
such confusion that the people realized few benefits.
By 1924 changes in the conditions of the masses
were scarcely noticeable, though several years had passed
since the Constitution had been adopted.
President Calles"
quickly upon his inauguration expressed his intention to
comply with the laws and the Constitution.
The chief execu-
tive, he held, carried the duty of following the program
of the Revolution, and that meant land reform, complete
with redistribution and a program of agricultural education
and improvement which would make the land an economic asset
to the owner and the nation.
Calles expressed to a gathering of ejidatarios at
Irapuato, Guanajuato, his concern for a change which he
believed had been too long neglected.
The landed aris-
tocracy, he claimed, pretended to a divine rule over the
people and kept the masses submerged by relentless exploitation.
Asking to see what the landowners had done through
•the centuries for national agriculture, to be shown
127
irrigation systems and modern agricultural machinery, he
answered his ovm questions in the following manner:
I have not seen anything of this sort, despite the
fact that I have travelled in ali parts of the
Republic. I have seen only in an enormous majority of the cultivated fields of my country . . .
in the lands of the large proprietors, long lines
of miserable oxen, . . . and the peon, v/retched
and exploited, struggling as the oxen struggle
with the primitive Egyptian plows, . . . and I am
absolutely certain that the cry of,our consciences,
. . . protests against secular injustice and aspires vehemently to implant this reform which is
demanded in México by the most elemental justice
and by human dignity.9
5
»5
•mr
< «
r
There can be little doubt that the President sincerely desired reform of land systems in México. He had
become familiar with the throes of poverty, he had seen
and lived with the landless peasants of the*revolutionary
forces, and he had attempted to bring about land reforms
in his native Sonora while he was governor. Unlike many
others demanding reform, he did not look upon mere distribution as an elixir.
The President answered cries for
immediate, unequivocal distribution by explaining that the
process should be tempered by dellberation and thorough
planning.
To satisfy this necessity, the breaking up of the
large estates which are yet intact and which, because of their size and the system under which
^Quoted in Murray, México before the World, 24-25.
íl
128
they are worked constitute a monopoly of the soil,
must be brought about through evolutionary proceedings, amply planned and studied, backed by a
firm system of agricultural credit and by the organization of cooperative societies by the small
farmers.lo
Calles believed distribution to be a means for
making the exploited economically free.
This reform
should be accomplished by orderly methods; the solution
to a "national necessity" should be found within the limits
set forth by law.
He hoped for a program of land refonn
which would prevent any loss in national agricultural production.
Since complete and immediate reversal of land
holding might bring disaster, planning was necessary.
Land should be distrlbuted first to those who had experience in farming, while others should be taught modern agricultural methods.
The President issued a stern warning
when he told those v/ho would receive lands that they were
obligated to cultivate and improve them, or return them.
to the government.
Calles' program and ideas respecting agrarian problems were cleariy pronounced in a notable interview he
gave to the newspaper El Democrata shortly before the voters named him president.
During the conference the ques-
tion arose regarding benefits of the ejido, the merits
•^^Calles, Speech at íris Theater, México City,
September 20, I923, in Murray, México ceforc the World,
8.
129
of which had long been debated.
Calles confirmed that the
e.IldQ needed recognition and protection as a land system,
but pointed out that it was not the final solution to
agrarian difficulties.
In fact, he considered it merely
preliminary to establishing small rural land holdings.^"^
He added that:
Community operation of the ejidos, . . . will
not stimulate industry. Oftener than not it is
apt to give rise to disputes among the villagers.
But this system, as I have said, is . . . merely
a transitory condition ln preparation for the advent of the small proprietor in México.1^
Ejidal legislation, prior, to Calles' presidency,
was not unknown.
However, it had become unwieldy and had
slowed the process of land distribution.
Also, ejidos
which had been formed from distrlbuted lands had been subject to corruption and abuse by adminlstrators.
Peasants
in Orizaba complained to Calles and the National Agrarian
Commission that the local agrarian commissions were continuing the old abuses despite distribution.
As one ejidal
spokesman stated:
"We have merely changed the name of the
people who are exploitlng us."13
•^•^Gil PÍhaloup, A., El general Ca^lles y ei sindicalismo, problemas sociales de México (México: Herrero
Jriermanos Sucesores, I925), 1312
Calles, Interview in t^ Dem.ocrata, México City,
April 18, 1924, quoted in Murray, México before the World
37-38.
13Excelsior, June 15, 1925.
130
Through his Secretary of Agriculture, Luis L.
Leon, Calles called for improved agrarian policies. According to Secretary. Le(5h, communal ownershlp in .ejidos
was unsuccessful because production declined and local
14
adminlstrators were corrupt.
Local chiefs confiscated
the best farms of the ejidos and were still charging rents
for lands which had been distrlbuted to the peasants.
Changes were necessary, and to improve conditions Calles
enacted the Law of Ejidal Patrimony on December 19, 1925.
Critics of the existing land policies had helped
to bring action on the new law.
Land holders who feared
a complete loss of property had protested that mistaken
policies had exercised a "depressing effect upon the
spirit of enterprise of both the large and the small farm,,16
ers.
They pointed to declining crop production in the •
first year of Calles' administration as proof that the
program of distribution had failed.
According to Luis
Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, Cuales son
los lineamientos de Ia política agraria dei gobierno
(Tacubaya: Imprenta de Ia dlrecciòn de estúdios geográficos y climatologlcos, 1925). 8-I3.
1 £r
Recopllacioh de Ias principales leyes ex-pedidas
por conducto de Ia Secretaria de Ag^rlcultura y Fomento
Clacubaya: Imprenta de Ia dlrecciòn de estúdios geográficos y climatologlcos, 1927). 7-15; Diário Oficial, December 31, 1925.
-j c
Letter printed in "México's Agricultural Slump,"
The Nation, CXXI (September I6, 1925). 3l4.
131
Cabrera, Minister of Finance under Carranza, problems in
agriculture in I925 resulted from the method of distribution.
Cabrera argued that only cultivated lands .v/ere
being distrlbuted and that:
. . . the problem should be solved by taking from
the large landowners uncultlvated lands and placing them at the disposition of rural,communlties
that are in a position to cultivate them. Instead
of this, the present policy is to take from the
landowners lands which are under cultivation and
give them to rural communlties which do not cultivate them. 17
The former minister agreed with the program of land exchange, but he denied its effectiveness under Calles.
Cabrera claimed that the hacendados had at least possessed
the capital and equipment necessary for cultivation and
that land which had been worked should not be distrlbuted
to people lacking the means for production.
When the Law of Ejidal Patrimony became effective
early in I926, new critics arose.
The framers of the
legislation had follov/ed Calles' beliefs that provision
should be made for parceling crop lands of the ejidos to
individuais in whom titles would be vested.
The action
would eventually make the ejidatarios owners of small
private farsm.
Opponents of the new land law voiced the
sentiment that it betrayed the "ideais of the
•^'^"México's Agricultural Slump," 3l4.
132
revolution. "-^^
• Agriculture Secretary Leín answered the critics
from the revolutionary ranks by remarking that Calles had
established ejidos to benefit the campesino who needed
land for himself and his family:
. . . but we believe that there are peasants who
. . . are superior to the others and have higher
ambitions. In time, . . . these individuais . . .
will not be satisfied v/ith the ejido parcel and
will seek . . . a larger farm. Also many of the
children of the present ejidatarios v/ill have to
leave the ejido and seek . . . in some other form
of activity (commerce and insustry) satlsfaction
for their ambitions. The ejido parcel will be
. . . a refuge . . . in case of failure, but ali
of those restless splrits of higher ambitions will
leave the ejido and seek to better their condition outside of it.19
Calles supported the Secretary's remarks by stating directly that the future stability of México depended
on land reform which would eventually make the ejidatarios
owners of small private holdings.
According to the Presi-
dent, "the work of any truly nationalist government should
20
be directed to creating small property."
He believed
that "by making of each campesino a property owner, future
1o
Simpson, The Ejido, 334.
^Luis L. Leon, open letter printed in Recopllacioh
de Ias principales leyes . . . de Ia Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, 361-362.
20
13.
y
Gll Pihaloup, El general Calles y ei sindicalismo,
'
133
revolutions would be prevented and . . . [there would] be
created interests for a guarantee of the established social
order."
Calles hoped that the point could be reached
where the masses, having become landowners, would stand
to lose by revolutionary action.
The administration distrlbuted land to the ejidos
by two methods, dotation and restitution.
Dotation in-
volved compensation and was the procedure most often followed.
The federal government paid for lands which it
took from hacendados for redistribution to villages if
the inhabitants of the town could not prove they had prevlously held titles.
If title could be proven, restitu-
tion ensued, and the government refused payment.
The fol-
lowing table shows a sampling of distribution made after
January 6, I915, when the first decree for restoration was
promulgated.
It dlscloses that in a majority of cases the
government v/illingly offered compensation.
Presidential Confirmation of Ejidal Lands
(Ali figures in hectares)
Year
Dotation
Restitution
Total
1917
1920
1922
1925
45,327
128,670
147,903
847,845
18,121
68,550
22,886
46,411
63,448
197.220
170,790
894,257
Gil PÍhaloup, El general Calles y ei sindicalismo, 13.
22
y
Estadístlca Nacional. May 3I, 1927, 12-20.
hectare is equivalent to 2.4771 acres.
A
134
The Constitution established the method for compensation and provided that amounts paid be based on the
tax valuation of lands increased by 10 per cent and the
value of improvements.
Payments by the federal government
for lands taken were usually slow.
Delays came either
because of a lack of funds or because of the landholders'
unwillingness tò accept government bonds for payment.
In
either case the method of payment and the delays involved
gave rise to frequent cries of confiscation by the administration.
The administration did not take lands arbitrarily
or haphazardly; nor did it distribute the land' ln that
fashion.
The process for distribution followed limitations
which prevented complete indiscriminatlon by officials.
For example, only the inhabitants of villages located away
from plantations received land.
Also, individuais who held
public office, who possessed capital equal to a certain
amount, or who could qualify in occupations or skills other
than farming could not receive lands.
The individual, to
receive land, had to be at least eighteen years of age and
to have some knowledge of farming, and, importantly, he
23
could not already be a landowner. ^ Once land was
^3Reglamento de Ia ley sobre reioarticion de tierras y constitución dei patrim.onlo parcelario ejida-,
Diário Oficial, Aprir3~ 1926; Recopilacicii de las principales leyes " . . . de Ia Secretaria de Agricultura y
Fomento, 25.
135
distrlbuted, receivers had to meet the demands Calles had
specified.
The land must be worked; if not, title re-
verted to the government.
The Calles administration, in spite of a steppedup program of distribution, could not keep up with demands,
and the masses, to whom land had been promised, often resorted to extra-legal confiscation of acreage from large
landholders.
Force, the people argued, was simply a means
of assisting the President to fulfill his revolutionary
obligations.
Calles, however, v/arned agrarians that laws
would be equally and judicially applied and that abuses
24
would not be tolerated.
Federal force had to be used by"
the President on several occaslons to prevent armed takeover of major haciendas.
Agrarian discontent was most apparent in the states
of Pueblo, Morelos, and Guerrero.
Violence by airoed bands
occurred until Calles intervened.
He warned those involved
that:
The executive pov/er . . . cannot tolerate [such
violence] any longer, because public opinion as
well as the elem.ental principies of humanity and
civilization require . . . such procedure be continued as it seems that ^n the State murder is
becoming rather a hablt.
"^Êxcelslor, January 7, 1925^New York Times, September 11, 1925.
136
Federal troops began to disarm and arrest scattered groups
of agraristas.
Although isolated violations of land laws
persisted, Calles never recognized the forcible transfer
of land.
To meet the revolutionary demands for land and to
help prevent disorder, Calles enacted a bewildering assortment of land laws during his four years.
By use of the
legislation, the President attacked the agrarian problem
from a variety of angles, and gradually formulated a definite program for reform.
He based his plan on the idea
that land should be placed into the hands of the ejido,
but that private ownershlp should eventually succeed communal holding.
Land v/ould be restored primarily by dota-
tion, compensation being made to the hacendado for any
loss.
Also, funds would be made available, through the
Agricultural and Ejidal Banks to allow landholders to improve cultivation by purchaslng seed, equipment, and, later,
more land.
Waters for irrigation purposes would be more
equitably distrlbuted to the new landholders than in the
past.
Finally, detailed controls and classification of
P6
The most important of the acts were the lav/s establishing the National Bank of Agricultural Credit and
the Ejido Agricultural Banks, April I926; tne Law of Irrigation with Federal Waters, January I926; the Lav/ of Dotation
and Restitution, April 1927; and the Lav/ of Colonization,
April 1926. The laws may be seen in Recopilaclon de las
principales leyes . . . de Ia Secretaria de Agricultura y
Fomento.; Júlio Cuadros Caldos, Catecismio An:rario (México:
Comisión Nacional Agraria, 1929).
137
lands v/ould allow development of new agricultural colonies.
Of the acts by which Calles hoped to end agrarian
problems, the Lav/ of Colonization was probably the most
important.
The statute designed to end the easy means by
which speculators had gained national lands for personal
exploitation, called for the development of new agricultural colonies by the compulsory subdivision of large estates and the sale of small plots.
If the hacendado were
unwilling to subdivide his land, his property could be condemned and the program undertaken by the federal government.
Ali colonization projects were to be operated only
by federal permit or franchise and under extensive govern27
ment controls.
The lav/ further provided that the colonization
tract should have direct access to a road of some type.
If the lands were located in an irrigated área, each lot
should be supplied with water.
Alienation of lots v/ould
be strictly controlled by government officials, and failure
by the individual to fulfill his contract obligations would
be cause for a loss of land.
In addition, the act allov/ed
the Secretary of Agriculture to control the numbers and
classes of allens who received land as well as to supervise
^'^Frederick F. Barker, "Nev; Laws and Nationalism
in México," Foreign Affairs, V (July 1927), 599.
138 ,
the elected representatives who governed the colony.^^
Armed with legislation either newly passed by
his administration or laws still in effect from previous
periods, Calles began increasing the effectiveness of his
program to improve lands and to make better farmers of the
peasants.
His attack on the agrarian problem is demon-
strated by the example of the state of Hldalgo.
Though
perhaps not entirely typical, changes in the state provide
certain generalizations which can be applied to other sec2Q
tions of the Republic.
Hldalgo is centrally located in xMexico, not far from
the capital.
Prior to the Revolution large latifundlas and
the corresponding exploitation of peones had characterized
3Q
the economy of the state.-^
Despite generations of lati-
fundismo the masses in Hldalgo never forgot their claims
31
to the land,
and the state became knovm for violence
even before revolution began in I910. By 1926 peace and
^°Cuadros Caldas, Cateclsmo Agrário, 123-127; Recopilaclon de las principales leyes . . . de Ia Secretaria
de Agricultura y Fomento, 5^3-599.
^^Lands ln the state of Hldalgo were slightly better than the average for the nation.
3Êxamples of haciendas in the state Included San
Javier and San Ignacio, containing 48,831 hectares; San
José ei Zoquital, 36,294 hectares; Tlahuelilpa Ulapa,
31,926 hectares; and San Antônio and El Márquez, 27,000
hectares. See Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, El
problemo agrário en ejL estado de Kiáalgo (Tacubaya: Im^prenta de Ia dlrecciòn de estúdios geográficos y climatologlcos, 1926), 5.
•^Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, El -rcblemo
agrário . . . de Hldalgo, 5.
139
tranqullity had gradually been restored by means of land
distribution.
"^^ hacienda of San Javier and San Ignacio in
Hidalgo demonstrates the effect of the land program on
the large estates.
The total acreage of the hacienda,
prior to distribution, came to 48,831 hectares. Agricultural Secretary Leoh remarked that though the área was reputedly a productive region:
. . . it was commonly knovm and proven that the
proprietors never carried out cultivation on more
than 500 hectares of this gigantic latifundo and
that the heads of the property presented v/ith
pride their numerous vats for making pulque; but
never showed a single machlne, not even a trace
of equipment or techniques for cultivating the
land.32
Follov/lng the Revolution, the campesinos received a total
of 10,188 hectares of the former hacienda.
Eleven ejidos
were formed from the lands which were suitable for farming and stock raising.
In ali, during the years betv/een
1917 and 1927, villages in the state received 162,429
hectares of lands which formerly belonged to hacendados,
and a large portion of the total acreage the Calles ad33
ministra tion distrlbuted.--'-^
32secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, El problemo
agrário . . . de Hidalgo, 5.
33Erom the total distribution 125 e?láos v;ere either
created or amplified. The am.ount of land involved, hov;ever,
was less than eight per cent of the total área of the state.
Estadístlca Nacional, May 31, 1927, 25.
i4o
The mere fact of land redistribution did not, for
Calles, constitute total reform.
The integral solution
to the agrarian problem must include some type of credit
program for the new landowner, some means of providing the
capital he had never been able to accum.ulate as a peõh.
To benefit the ejidatarios financially, Calles established
the Ejidal Agricultural Bank in Tula.
In its first year
of operation, the bank advanced l47 loans to 52 of the
cooperatives, totaling 56,561 pesos.^^
The money went
primarily for the production and harvest of barley, v/hich
the bank claimed increased thriteen pesos per kilogram
through its supervision of marketing controls.^5
Overall reform also Included a means to educate
the ejidatarios, and for that purpose Calles established
a central agricultural school for the state.
The lands
for the school came from the purchase of 560 hectares of
the hacienda El Mexe, in the district of Actopán.
The
purpose of the school was obvious—to prepare farmers to
make their lands more productive.
Naturally the plan of
studies emphasized agricultural topics, but-it did not
neglect other aspects of the student's education.
Classes
34
^
The bank began operations on May 1, 1926. Secretaria' de Agricultura y Fomento, SI problemo agrário . . .
de Hidalgo, 17.
Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, El problem:0
agrário . . . de Hidalgo, 16.
141
included such subjects as the national language, arithmetic
and agricultural geometry, history, government, and physical culture.
More to the primary purpose, however, was
instruction in ali types of farming and ranching activities
including agricultural industries, carpentry, farm mechanics, and conservation.
The improvement of the agricultural knowledge of
the students v/as not the only reason for the school.
Calles used El Mexe as a showplace.
He hoped that the im-
mediate effect would be that the knowledge gained by farmers visiting from the surrounding área would be applied
when they returned home.
The school at El Mexe became a
model for other regions of the country, and the methods
applied there and in the state of Hidalgo became characteristic of Calles' attempts at nationwide agrarian reform."^
Agricultural schools located throughout the nation
were not the only means employed to educate the growing
number of small farmers in México.
The administration
printed and distrlbuted through the cooperative societies
hundreds of thousands of pamphlets covering a variety of
agricultural matters.
In conjunction with the Department
of Education, the Department of Agriculture encouraged the
rural teachers to make special efforts to aid the farmer
S6
"^ See Chapter III.
142
in his work, to teach him means of fighting crop disease,
and to suggest crop rotations and use of legumes.^'^
The administration applied to the rest of the nation methods similar to those effected in Hidalgo.
How-
ever, not ali of the programs could be spoken of in the
same optimistic tone with which the Secretary of Agriculture described the activities in that state.
A good ex-
ample of a lack of success is seen in the irrigation district of El Mante in Tamaulipas.
In 1927 the lands along '
the Rio Mante which were subject to irrigation totaled
3,100 hectares, one-half of which were farmed.
Prior to
government development of the irrigation district, prices
for lands came to 150 pesos per hectare for irrigated land
and 50 pesos for dry land.
Following Calles' visit to the
region in 1927, the government created the district and
included l6,400 hectares of mountain land, which had sold
for ten pesos per hectare.
The federal government fi-
nanced the project at a cost of 4,500,000 pesos, which paid
for dams, canais, and other necessary works.
37Direcclòh de Ia Escuela Nacional de Agricultura
y de Propaganda Agrícola, Departamento de Propaganda,
Secclon de Publicldad, Mucho Maiz con Poço Dinero (Tacubaya, México: Imprenta de Ia Dirección de í^tudios Geográ^ficos y Climatol(5gicas, 1924), 12.
3Êmíllo L(ípez Zamora, La situacion de distrito
de riego de ei Mante (México: Editorial Ramirez Alonzo,
1939). 13-16.
143
Later investigation of El Mante disclosed a number of interesting facts.
For example, none of the m.en who
held land ln the district prior to the irrigation project
contributed to financing the program, as called for by
Calles' national irrigation laws.
Also, officials of the
district inequitably distrlbuted the 19.500 hectares which
composed the district.
Figures shov/ed the Elias Calles
family owned 12 per cent of the lands, the Hernandez family
claimed 10 per cent, and the Ozuna family owned 13 per cent.
Small proprietors and ejidos held less than 20 per cent of
the entire district, and the value of land per hectare had
increased to as much as five hundred pesos within a twoyear period.
39 Thus, in El Mante, as in numerous other
instances, the agrarian program became a vehicle for opportunism by some of the revolutionaries.
Some benefits, however, did come from Calles' plans
to add to the irrigated lands in México.
To offset the
lack of water available to farms, the President began an
ambitious program of irrigation projects throughout the
nation.
Construction often involved both federal and pri-
vate agencies, an economic means by which the government
39
X
^
Zamora, La situacion . . . de ei Mante, 16.
40
Por other examples of corruptness and failures
in the agrarian program, see Simpson, The Ejido . . .,
211-216.
144
hoped to reduce its total costs.
Private companies re-
ceived electricity generating rights for their efforts
while the government retained the irrigation benefits.
Total construction during Calles' presidency came to some
80,000,000 pesos, and included several major projects
which were either completed or underway by the time Calles
left office.
The entire program added a vast amount to
the acreage under irrigation in México, and the President
expressed the hope that the additional irrigated farms
would, under supervision by experts, greatly benefit the
economy of the nation.
4P
The new or improved lands added to the-cultivated
área in México came rather late in Calles' term and consequently did not materially alter agricultural production
over the four-year period.
Nevertheless, claims by critics
îThe Irrigation projects included: (1) Rio Salado
Dam, in Coahuila and Nuevo Leon, v/hich provided irrigation
for 65,000 hectares of land, impounded 1,400,000,000 cubic
meters of water, and cost 15,000,000 pesos, (2) Calles
Dam, at Águas Calientes, which cost 3,000,000 pesos and
impounded 340,000,000 cubic meters of water and (3) Tepuxtepec Dam, in Michoacán, which irnipounded 500,000,000 cubic
meters of water to irrigate 50,000 hectares of land. In
addition, Calles noted in his final presidential address
to Congress, plans included projects for the Mezquital
Valley in Hidalgo, for dams on the Yaqui River in Sonora,
for another irrigation work in Michoacán, and for the
states of Chihuahua, Durango, and San Luis Potosi. Calles,
Informe . . . . 1928, 89-91; Beals, "Plutarco Elias Calles:
A Record of Statesmanship," Current History, XXIX (January,
1929). 556.
42
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 192-^', 90.
145
that the agrarian program was destroying production were
disproved by figures released by the Department of Agriculture.
Production decreased in 1925, but it remained
relatively stable during Calles' complete term.
Increase
or decline in harvests depended primarily on specific crops,
and in many cases production actually increased.
Statistics published by the administration for the
period 1924-1928 provide some insight into crop production
under Calles.
Table Number I [page l46] gives a compari-
son for production of certain crops between the first
and last years of the administration, showing in the main
43
an advance in cultivation and yields per hectare.
Table
Number II is used to show comparisons in total production
for the years mentioned, as well as the per cent of change
over the same period.
In most instances cultivation ac-
tually increased, and for most crops the average yield per
unit showed improvement.45
Êstadístlca Nacional; figures for
from March 1930, «5; for cotton, oune 1930,
May 1930, I7I; chickpeas, August 1930, 319;
1930, 32; and wheat, February 1930, 44.
^Êstadístlca Nacional; figures for
the same as for Table I.
sugar cane are
211; tomatoes,
tobacco, August
Table II are
^5it should be noted that figures are those of the
Department of Agriculture, and the agency may have altered
statistics when it seemed favorable for propaganda purposes
For disclosure of trends, rather than actualities, -che
figures are sufficient.
146
TABLE NUMBER I
Hectares
cultivated
Yield pe^
hectare
1928
1925
1928
171.929
203,243
253
268
15.956
17.792
584
708
Chickpeas
111.179
108,899
555
635
Wheat
457.387
519.070
554
578
Sugar cane
87.211
81,937
46,894
47.157
Tomatoes
21,844
29,329
2,745
3.029
CroD
1925
A.
Cotton
Tobacco
•X-
In kilog;rams
TABLE NUiySER I I -
Total Production
(Tons)
Crop
Cotton
Tobacco
Chickpeas
Wheat
Sugar cane
Tomatoes
1925
1928
Comparative per
cent of change
área
yield
produce
43.467
60,376
-1-3.0
-9.15
-6.52
9.334
12,607
+10.0
+20.61
+33.12
61,134
61,727
-7.8
+16.72
-7.49
250,741
300,201
+0.8
+6.13
+7.27
4,089.635
3.863.872
-8.3
+2.03
+10.16
59.979
88,831
+8.5
+16.44
+26.31
147
By issuing production statistics, the administration sought to halt complaints against its distribution
program.
Haciendas, critics argued, were more capable of
efficient production than were the ejidal plots. However,
statistics reveal that shortly after the end of Calles'
presidency, capital invested in ejidos came to only 10 per
cent of total funds invested in Mexican farming.
As much
as 80 to 90 per cent of equipment such as tractors, plows,
trucks, and the like, v/ere located on privately owned
farms.
In addition, the ejidos included only 13.4 per cent
of the land which was cultivable.
The average yield for
corn on ejidal land, by 1930, reached 586 kilograms per
46
hectare, but only 511 on privately owned lands.
Perhaps
one explanation might be the fact that ejidal lands were
better irrigated than private lands.
Regardless, there
seems little basis for the argument that the ejidal program was ineffective when compared to the production on
the hacienda.
Comparisons of crop production in México with other
nations were much more revealing than i-iere domestic differences, and they caused a greater effect on Calles' ejidal
program. "^ In an effort to Increase harvests, Calles
^^Simpson, The Ejido, Appendix A, Table 83. 702705.
^7Miguel A. Quintana, El nroblejT.a de Ia tierra
(Me^xico: Sociedad Mexicana de G-eografia y Estadístlca,
1930), 473-474,
148
parceled out more land to individuais and amplified existing ejidos in larger amounts than did either Carranza or
Obregón.48
Distribution had actually been carried out as a
relatively slow process of the post-revolutionary period.
Despite increased attention under Calles, lands distrlbuted
amounted to less than 2 per cent of the total área of the
Republic. And by the end of his administration, Calles had
begim to slow down the program of distribution.
Lands par-
celed out in 1928 amounted to approximately 300,000 hectares less than in the previous year and represented the
lowest yearly total for his entire term. As a result,
Calles' opponents claimed that he put the Revolution to rest
and the program of land reform was incomplete.
The President
48
/
Departamento Agrário, Resume estadístlca correspondiente ai movimlento agrário aesde ei ano de 1915 ai
31 agosto de 1940 (México: 194o). Figures below give the
yearly totais of land distribution from the beginning of
the program in 1916 through the Calles administration.
Figures through I926 are from Estadístlca Nacional, May 3I,
1927. 12-25. Iê remaining amounts are from Simpson, The
Ejido, Appendix A, Table 17. 699Year
Área (in hectares)
Year
Área (ln hectares)
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
5.313
63,488
68,752
65,426
197,221
438,012
170,790
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
456,388
534,265
894,257
694,998
991,366
638,864
149
answered that he had decreased land distribution because
he recognized that the program had not achieved desired
49
results. ^
He maintained that his original aim of creat-
ing small private ov/ners of land was the solution to México's agrarian problem and that continued amplification of .
ejidos was harmful.
It is true that Calles slowed distribution.
His
general program for agrarian reform, however, effected a
few significant benefits for México.
Foremost among these
were the increased number of agricultural schools and the
construction o f irrigation w o r k s .
Legislation for improved
S
d
r>
g
g
conditions a n d better organization of ejidos and n e w coloni-
S
g
zation áreas v/as b e n e f i c i a i , b u t only to the extent allowed
by local o f f i c i a l s . Calles did amplify m a n y ejidos, h e
r
;:
'^
made private landowners o f m a n y individuais, but h e also
distrlbuted reduced amounts o f land a s time passed.
Later
presidents, n o t a b l y Lázaro Cárdenas, were to prove that
Calles could have accomplished m u c h m o r e i n h i s program of
land distribution.
^^Clted i n A l i c e Can.-.ichael, "Calles and t h e _ M e x i can M a l a i s e , " T h e A m e r i c a n M e r c u r y , XXXIV (March 193:?). 345
í«
CHAPTER VI
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN MÉXICO
In the famous and electrifying Informe of September 1, 1928, President Calles included the statement that
associations with other nations were such that he left the
presidency with the nation free of any International problems for the first time in two decades.
The fact that
harmony obtained, particularly with the United States, was
of great slgnificance and perhaps Calles was singularly
proud of this achievement.
Friendly relations were de-
veloped in spite of severe obstacles.
By the end of his
four years Calles told Congress that:
Now I announce to my country that I leave the Executive Power free of ali difficulties with the neighbor or the Republic of the North and that the situation has been resolved. The relations with the
United States have been radically modified and are
found in good understanding of cooperation and sincere cordiality.-^
The agreeable conditions referred to definitely
had not existed in previous years.
Exactly one year be-
fore, Calles had remarked rather bluntly to Congress that
the "relations with the United States, which are fundamentally important to our national life . . . have
^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 52.
150
151
unfortunately assumed an indeterminate character. . . . "^
The uncertainty at that time stemmed from the President's
desire to implement those articles of the Constitution pf
1917--especially Article 27--which involved United States
economic interests.
The attitude of United States businessmen v/ith investments in México had been uneasy ever since the outbreak of the Revolution in I9IO.
Campaign statements by
Calles had created additional fears in the United States
that oil properties in México might be confiscated when
he became president.
Hov/ever, calm developed soon after
the inauguration of the man from Guaymas.
Quick action
by Calles early in March 1925 to protect the American administrator of the Evans estate in Puebla from agrarian
3
elements received warm response in the United States.
Relatively unnoticed, however, were Labor Secretary Morones'
public complaints about oil companies operating in áreas
which violated the constitutional limits.
4
American business interests also moved quickly to
assure smooth relations between Calles and the United
States.
Early in February 1925 C. C. Walsh, president of
^Calles, Informe . . ., 1927, cited in Murray,
México before the World, 172.
% e w York Tim.es, March 6, 1925.
Excelsior, February 2, 1925.
152
the West Texas Chamber of Commerce, called on President
Calvin Coolidge and invlted him to Texas. An invitation
was extended also to Calles in hopes the two leaders could
meet at the border and produce beneficiai results for both
5
countries.
Edward Doheny, of Doheny and.Bridge Oil Com-
pany, busily explained to newspapers in Califórnia that
the future appeared bright for the oil industry in México.
Publications speculated that millions of dollars would be
invested in México.
There were forecasts that México
would soon need no financial aid, and former Postmaster
General Frank H. Hitchcock, in México on oil business,
predicted that Calles would go down in history.as a "great
figure."'^
Business interests in the United States had gained
confidence in Calles for a number of reasons.
The Presi-
dent 's remarks that he would force strict economies on the
nation and rid his administration of corrupt practices had
been a promoting factor.
Furthermore, warnings against
communlst propagandists in México were well received in
Washington.
In March 1925 the Mexican Secretary of Poreign
Affairs, Aarcfn Saenz, publicly guaranteed Calles' protection, wherever possible, of foreign-o^med property.
5Excelsior, February 5, 1925.
Excelsior, February 11, 1925'Êxcelsior, February 21, 1925.
Saenz
153
and the United States Ambassador Jam.es R. Sheffield seemed
in pleasant accord on most matters of mutual interest.
By
April, then, relations between México and the United States
had steadily improved to the point that the press in both
nations claimed that they were "never friendlier."
Within another month, however, there were rumors
to the contrary.
Although both Sá"enz and Sheffield denied
the rumors, signs of friction were apparent.
The United
States Ambassador had remarked early in May that "relations
between the United States and México are just as friendly
o
as when I first came here,"
but by the middle of the month
he publicly avowed that conditions would soon improve because Calles knew "fully the attitude of the United States
9
regarding the rights of American citizens."
Disturbing
c
changes in the tone of the public statements by the foreign offices slowly appeared, and amidst denlals of strained
relations Ambassador Sheffield late in May left for the
United States.
On his arrival in New York City, Sheffield publicly
praised the Mexican government and Calles' actions.
After
his conference v/ith Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg,
however, the attitude of the State Departmênt suddenly
changed.
Kellogg issued a highly inflammatory statement.
Êxcelsior, May 10, 1925.
^New York Times, May 17, 1925-
154
After admitting that conditions in México involving American lives and properties had improved and that relations
with the country were still friendly, he announced that
the United States government expected restoration and in10
demnity.
The Kellogg statement, which Hubert Herring called
a "tactless and untimely letter, the kind of letter which
makes wars,"
included words which alarmed people of both
the United States and México.
The Secretary of State had
remarked that he had:
. . . seen the statements published in the press
that another revolutionary movement m.ay be im.pending in México. . . . It should be made clear that
this Government will continue to support the Government in México only so long as it protects
American lives and American rights and compiles
with its International engagements and obligations.
The Government of México is now on trial before
the world. . . . We have been patient and realize
. . . it takes time to bring about a stable government but v/e cannot countenance violation of
her obligations and failure to protect American
citizens.12
•^^New York Times, June 12, 1925; Foreign Relations,
1925, II. 517.
•^•^Herrlng, "Hands Off, Mr. Kellogg!"
Century, XLII (July 2, 1925). 856.
The Christian
•^^New York Times, J'ane 12, 1925; Foreign Relations,
1925, II, 51b; Excelsior, June 13. 1925. Attacks by journiTIsts in the United States were numerous and bitter.
The Nation carried editoriais that the press release v/as a
"naked club, publicly brandished in the face of a friendly
Government, . . . a üublic announcemient to revolutionary
adventures that the United States Governmen-G will encourage
any attempt to overthrow the Calles Government in México
-»
2
155
Obviously, the executive of México could not allow
Kellogg's announcement to go unanswered or unchallenged.
Calles responded immediately through a press release.
The accusation that México's government seized lands without indemnification and ignored its International obligations had been proved wrong, Calles argued, by the fact
that:
. . . although, according to International law,
she was not bound to do it, . . . [México] invlted
ali the nations whose citizens . . . might have
suffered damages . . . during political upheavals
. . . in the country with a view to conclude with
them a convention to establish joint commissions
that might consider said damages in order to grant
due indemnization.-^3
'7
Agrarian laws which had been applied, the President pointed
out, were an exercise of México's sovereignty, and the
5
^
jJ
tf
United States State Department had accepted the manner of
indemnification which followed.
As for continued support by the United States government, Calles seemed little concerned.
The suggestion
of pressure, however, he considered as another matter, and
he insisted that Kellogg's remark embodied ". . . a threat
unless the Calles Goverrmaent gives special protection to
Am.erican property interests. Such a document is a disgrace
to the United States." See "Our Threat to México," The
Nation, CXX (June 1925). 706.
•'•Êxcelsior, June 15. 1925; Foreign Relations. 1925.
II. 519.
^^-
156
to the sovereignty of México that she cannot overlook and
rejects with ali energy because she does not accord to any
foreign country the right to intervene in any foím in her
domestic affairs. . . . "
Further, the Mexican president
emphatlcally declared that "if the Government of México,
as affirmed, is now on trial before the world, such is the
case with the Government of the United States as well as
15
those of other countries."
According to Calles, if the
remarks by Kellogg intended that México was on trial in
5
the "guise of a dependent," then the Mexican administration
i
•Si
rejected the imputation "which in essence would only mean
i|
an insult."
••7
In a wave of nationalistic fervor, the Mexican
people wholeheartedly defended their president.
News-
papers headlined the message and the National Congress
"firmly supported" Calles.'^'^ Ex-President Obregc5h cabled
his congratulations from his chickpea ranch in Cajame,
Sonora."^^
Evidently, Calles had spoken for the entire na-
tion when he replied that México would endeavor to meet ali
of her International obligations to protect the lives and
^^xcelsior, June 15. 1925; New York Times, June
15. 1925.
lÊxcelsior, June 15. 1925.
-^Êxcelsior, June 15. 1925.
•^'^Calles, Inform.e . . . , 1925. 129.
l ^ E x c e l s i o r , June 17, 1925.
3
157
property of foreigners, but that she would not allow any
of the governments of the world either to intervene in
' internai affairs or to establish privileged situa.tions in
the country for any of its citizens.
Anxiety created in the United States by Calles''
declarations and by general unstable conditions in México
were assuaged for a short time by assurances from various
sources that there was nothing to fear. 19 It was not long
before representatives of both countries remarked that the
;
Calles-Kellogg controversy was merely a misunderstanding
i
and that relations were cordial and the outlook bright.
:^
>
By the end of July, Arthuro S. Elias, the Mexican Cônsul
^
f
to New York and half-brother to the President, announced
20
that the affair had been forgotten.
"
2
-)
Calles himself had helped mâtters considerably during the explosive incident when he spoke to the Mexican
people regarding communistic activities, of which the
United States investors were so fearful.
The President
warned that propaganda from communlst sources would not be
tolerated in México.
Communists were to be allowed freedom;
^^Soon after Kellogg's statement, Luis N. Morones
spoke to the Mexican Chamber of Comrnerce. In a strong attack on those seeking special prlvlleges, the Labor Secretary warned that "México would rather go to its grave than
allow others to dictate its action." However, at the same
luncheon, he repeatedly v:elcom.ed foreign investors to México,
and vowed safeguarding their rights. i^xcelsior, June 20,
1925. '
^^Calles, Informe . . . . 1^-23, 129.
f
158
in the Republic as long as their activities were not contrary to law.
Despite the outward appearance of a settlement,
the problem which brought forth the Kellogg statement still
existed late in 1925. The question of property rights con-
t
cerned American interests in land and oil in México, which
^
had been a source of friction between the two countries
for over a decade.
One reason for the confused nature of
j,
3
the problem v/as t h e h i s t o r y of t h e ov/nership of s u b s o i l
^
A
deposits in México.
Generally, during the Spanish co-
lonial period, ov/nership of underground wealth was vested
in the crown.
Grants to prlvate individuais were made
from time to time, but ali ov/nership rights were given or
taken by royal prerogative. The same policy continued
after independence into the early 19th century until the
reform constitution of 1857 brought a change. At that
time control of the minlng industries went to the states.
In 1884 the first Federal Mining Code was promulgated.
It placed petroleum with "those minerais which
„21
were the exclusive property of the owner of the soil.
The interpretation of subsoil rights given by the l884
law was continued and even expanded under Porfirio DÍaz.
Thus, the practice came to be accepted that the ownershlp
Îjohn P. Bullington, "The Land and Petroleum. Laws
of México, " The American Journal of j.nternatlonal lav-S
XXII (January 1926), 52.
~^
^
;j
>
l
^
159
and exploitation of underground deposits were the individual 's excluslvely.
Significantly, it was also under
Diaz that foreign investors, including many from .the
United States, made great ir.roads in México under the
ilx^ ^^cci expressed by the Mining Code of 1884 was
in effect when the Constitution of I917 v/as adopted.
The
most important feature of the Constitution concernlng the
question of subsoil rights was Article 27. That part
which ref ers to petroleum reads, in part, as follov/s:
In the nation is vested direct ov/nership of ali minerals or substances which in veins, layers, masses,
or beds constitute deposits v/hose nature is different from components of the land. Such as minerais from which metais and metaloids used for industrial purposes are extracted; beds of precious
stones . . . [and] solid mineral fuels; petroleuiri22
and ali hydro-carbons--solid, liquid, or gaseous.
American property owners in México concurred with
the l884 code, but the Constitution reversed ownershlp,
granting it to the nation instead of individuais.
Because
of the contradiction, the question of ownershlp of underground deposits created an almost constant clash betv/een
the governments of México and the United States. Beginning in earnest with the presidency of Venustlano Carranza,
22
Leyes y ccidlgos de México, 19. For an English
translation, see Simpson, Ine iLjiao, Appendix B, 749-7r)5
i
J
>
;
3
?
^
l6o
continuing through the Obregoh interlude, and still imsettled by the time Calles assumed control, the problem
v/as, in several instances, "settled," only to flare up
anew.
From time to time strong pressures v/ere placed on
the State Department, by American oil interests, to use
its influence for a solution which would be advantageous
to the investors.
Carranza had attempted through regulatory decrees
4
to effect the petroleum related sectlons of Article 27.
and though little was done in enforcing his efforts, the
United States Department of State endeavored to treat with
his government for a guarantee of the "rights which attached before the Constitution of 1917 was promulgated." 3
Carranza's decrees, and the refusal by various foreign
oil companies to comply, led to the famous amparo cases
in which oil interests fought Carranza in the Mexican
24
Supreme Court.
The major issue in the amparo cases centered on a
retroactive interpretation of laws following the promulgation of. the Constitution of 1917. The cases against the
Carranza decrees were decided by early 1922, and the
23Guy Stevens, "The Doctrine of Positive Acts,"
The American Journal of International Law, XXIII (January
1929). 32.
~
•
^\he term amparo literally means protection or .
shelter. In a legal sense the nearest translation is tne
English word injunction.
;
I6l
decision in the-case of the Texas Oil Company of México
was that Article 27 was not retroactive in respect to persons who had performed a "positive act. "^5
Court's viev/point became a "doctrine"
rp^g Supreme
which concerned
works by persons or companies which disclosed some inten27
tion of reducing the petroleum to possession.
Enumerated
acts included such operations as leaslng, drilling, exploration, and exploitation of the subsoil.
Persons who had- ac-
tively engaged in one or more of the positive acts prior
to adoption of the Constitution in I917 were in no danger
\
j
of having their property confiscated.
The decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court, which
had been arranged by Obregc5h, still did not satisfy the
28
United States.
The State Department wanted a treaty;
Obreg(5h desired recognition by the United States.
The
respective attitudes led to the Bucareli Conferences, or
dlscussions by commissioners regarding Mexican petroleum
^5stevens, "The Doctrine of Positive Acts," 34-35.
26
In México the decision by the Supreme Court in
as many as five similar cases without intervening dissent
took the aspect of effective legislation which was held
binding in future cases. The five amparo cases were decided by early 1922.
27
Bullington, "The Land and Petroleum Laws of
México," 53.
Howard F. Cline, The United States and México
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1965), 206.
162
and agrarian legislation.
Though no treaty of commerce was
forthcoming—México took the atand that such action and the
question of rights of American nationals in oil and agriculture would injure her dignlty—recognition by the United
States resulted in 1923.^^
Special and General Claims Com-
missions were provided for and statements of the position
of the two governments over the petroleum question were
made.
According to the Mexican commissioners, Ramcín Ross
and Fernando González Roa, the Obregoh administration would
]
j
s
uphold the decisions by the Supreme Court in the Texas Company case and defend the doctrine of positive acts.
Strangely, the Mexican statement included the promise that
the Obregoh policy would be that of future Mexican govem30
ments.
Consequently, any new legislation which was con-
trary to the Obregc^n position could be deemed a violation
of the agreement.
And though Calles did not feel bound.
to the conference, he had announced that he would follow
the revolutionary program of Obregoh.
In 1925 Calles added to the petroleum question a
factor which seriously affected United States-Mexican
^9A. H. Feller, Tne Mexican Claims Com.missions,
I923-I934, A Study in the Lav/ and Procedure of International
Tribunais (New York: The Macmîllan Com.pany, 1935), 20.
30
Bullington, "The Land and Petroleum Lav:s of
México," 53.
163
affairs for much of the Calles interval. By the end of
September, newspapers in México City carried notices of
a proposed alien land bill v/hich accompanied Calles'
Informe for the year.
The bill regulated Section 1, Article
27. of the Constitution of 1917 and stated that a foreigner
who wished to own lands in México must agree to be considered as a National ". . . in respect to the part of the
property which is his share in [a] corporation, . . . " and
not to invoke his government's protection in case of legal
difficulties.
With news that the Senate Committee had favorably
reported the bill and that it was under consideration by
the Chamber of Deputies, Sheffield informed Kellogg that
he felt the time had come for immediate protest. Kellogg,
however, answered his ambassador that the proposed law was
not cleariy retroactive and thus it v/as not advisable to
enter a foimal protest.
Future action would depend upon
Calles' interpretation of the law. Furthermore, Kellogg
feared that a note sent to México might actually hasten-32
not stop—the passage of the bill.-^
On November 17, 1925, an aide-memolre from Kellogg
to Minister sáenz suggested that a treaty of amity and
3Êxcelsior, September 30, 1925; Foreign Relations,
1925, II. 522.
^^Foreign Relations, 1925. II. 524.
í
164
commerce be negotlated.
Kellogg denied that he made the
overture because of the impending land law, but added
that " . . . Americans with acquired rights will appeal to
this government, which is naturally boimd to do its utmost
33
on their behalf."
Within ten days, a second aide-memolre reached sá'enz.
By then, the land bill had passed the Chamber and was under
consideration by the Senate.
Prospects for passage v/ere
I
good, and public opinion indicated increasing support for
the measure.
J
Kellogg's attitude was that the proposed
legislation was confiscatory and, in parts, retroactive.
The alde-mémoire v/as delivered one day after the Mexican
34
!
:
Chamber of Deputies had approved a new petroleum bill.
Because of the enormous amounts invested in México
by the oil industry, the new petroleum law had a much
greater impact on the relations between the two countries
than did the land law.
The importance of the question to
the United States can be seen from figures published in
1926 which disclosed that American investmicnts in México
35
ran as high as two billion dollars.
Slightly over 90
•^^Foreign Relations, 1925. II. 528.
34
Translated and printed in Foreign Relations,
1925, II. 531-537.
"^5Robert W. Dunn, Amierican Foreign Investments
(New York: B. W. Huebsch and the YiKlng Press, 192o), 91,
Though an approximation, perhaps erroneous, the figure
received support in México from Moisés Sáenz. Tlie latter
;
»
165
per cent of the oil activity was in the hands of American
and British concerns, and American companies controlled
36
57.7 per cent of the business.
In ali, American citizens
held one-fifth of the total foreign debt of México.
The petroleum bill v/as sent to Kellogg along with
Calles' reply to the Secretary of State's alde-memoires.
"Clouds upon the horizon of friendship" between the two
countries to v/hich Kellogg had referred in his correspondence simply could not be perceived by the Mexican president.
México, Calles assured, was dlsposed to enter a
treaty of amity and commerce.
As for the intention of the
United States government not to interfere with-the Mexican
legislation, Calles suggested that the American Secretary's
repeated reference to the petroleum bill argued otherwise.37
And he denied that the so-called Bucareli Conferences had
resulted in any formal agreement other than for claims
conventions.
estimated that total foreign investments in México reached
2 billion dollars, almost one-half of which was in oil.
Of that total, America made up the largest portion of investment. Sáenz and Priestley, Some Mexican Problems, 9.
The Congresslonal Record, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 68,
Part 2, 22Ò4, lists the follov/ing Amierican investm.ents
in México: rural property, $l66,047.000; urban,
$35.771.000; oil lands, $318,638,000; refineries,
$50,171,000; mines, $317.427.000; and railways, $248,158,000
^ sáenz and Priestley, Some Mexican Problems, 9^'^Foreign Relations, 1925. II. 539.
166
A most logical reply to the Kellogg aide-memories
was a note by Saenz, in December 5. in which the Mexican
minister remarked that the American representations v/ere
somewhat extraordinary because legislation in the formative stage could be harmful to no person.
According to
sáenz, "susplcious minds" would see in the action by the
United States Department pressure upon the Mexican government not to pass the projected legislation, "especially
since these observations . . . [had been] preceded by
|
press publications. . . ."^
i
i
Despite diplomatic protest and pressure by power-
'
I
fui United States business interests, the controversial
land and petroleum bills became laws late in 1925.39
gy
December 24, the Alien Land Law passed the lov/er house un40
opposed.
A few days later, the Petroleum Law, regulating
3^Foreign Relations, 1925. II. 54l.
39A dramatic example of the economic life in México
prior to promulgation of the oil and land laws is seen by
the following speech by Saenz to a group of United States
students: "From what we have said about the amount, nature,
and distribution of foreign investments in México, the following conclusions seem clear: (1) more than tv/o-thirds
of the wealth of México belongs to foreigners; (2) m.ost of
the foreign owners are absentee ov/ners; (3) foreign investments are on the increase; (4) one nationality far outstrips the others in the amiount of interests controlled;
(5) one enterprise, the oil business, is by far the m.ost
important, the oil production in México being larger than
the combined production from ali other countries except
that of the United States. . . . " Saenz and Priestley,
Some Mexican Problems, 11.
40
Excelsior, December 24, 1925.
1
167
Article 27. passed.
It became law on Decem.ber 31, 1925,
v/hen it was published in the Diário Oficial.
Articles 1 and 2 of the new oil law reiterated
that "direct dominion over ali deposits of natural compounds of hydrogen carbide" was "inalienable and imprescriptible."
Only under express authorization of the fed-
eral executive could petroleum operations be carried out,
so the policy of ovmership of subsurface wealth, by 1926,
had completed a circle, reverting to the early colonial
arrangement by the Spanish kings.
Articles 14 and 15 were the features of the new
law which caused the most concern for foreign interests.
Article l4 read:.
Without any cost and by means of concessions granted
to this "law, the follov/ing rights shall be confirmed:
I. Those that may be derived from land on which
operations of petroleum exploitation may have been
commenced prior to May Ist, 1917.
II. Those that miay be derived from contracts
executed by the surface owner of his assignes
prior to May Ist, 1917. íôr the express purpose
of petroleum legislation.
The confirmation of these rights carjiot be
granted for more than fifty years, reckoned from
the time when exploitation v/ork may have commenced
^•^Diario Oficial, Decem.ber 31, 1925. The full texi
of the PetroleuLi iâw, as v/ell as its regulating decree, is
printed in English in The Mexican Petroleum âw and its
Regulations (México: S. Galas y nno., 15270^ 3-
168
in the case of Section I, and, in the case of
Section II, from the date when the contracts
were executed.'^'^^
Article 15 set the time limit under which oil companies
had to apply for confirmation rights as one year from the
date the law became effective.
Failure to apply meant
that the rights v/ere canceled.
On January 8, I926, Ambassador Sheffield presented
a formal note to the Mexican foreign office, listing specific objections to the Mexican legislation which was in
effect by that time.
The State Department claimed that
the law failed to protect either the rights acquired prior
to 1917 or the amparo decisions of the Mexican Supreme
Court and contradicted the statements made by the Mexican
commissioners in I923.
43
Kellogg, believing that new
legislation violated the principies of International law
and equity, wrote that:
In view of the foregoing my Government directs
me to inform your Excellency that it hereby reserves on behalf of citizens of the United States
v^hose property interests are or may hereafter be
affected by the application of the laws, ali
rights lawfully acquired by them under the Constitution and laws of México in force at the time
of the acquisition of such property interests and
. . . points out that it is unable to assent to
42
The Mexican Petroleum. .L-a^v and its Regulations,
^*
43
The objections also applied to the pending land
lav/ which was published in the Diário Oficial, January 21,
1926.
169
an application of the recent lav/s to American o\med
properties so acquired which is, pr may hereafter
be retroactive and confiscatory.44
Despite careful assurances by Saenz and Calles
that the new law was neither retroactive nor confiscatory,
Kellogg remained unsatisfied.
Much of the misunderstand-
ing concerned the conferences of 1923.
Kellogg maintained
that the declarations by the Mexican commissioners constituted a "binding force," but Calles took the position that
the statements made at the Bucareli meeting were simply a
relation of the purposes of the Obregón government.
Though
approved by Calles and followed in its main points, the
policy by a former president, Calles felt, could in no way
be considered as concrete as a treaty which any future
president of México should observe.
The voluminous correspondence between the two
governments over the Allen Land and 011 Laws which began
with the November alde-memoires lasted for one year to the
day.
Much of the diplomatic exchange included lengthy
Communications between Saenz and Kellogg which repetitiously
defended the respective positions of México and the United
States.
By October I926 the notes became brief and exact
and disclosed a rigid adherence by the disputants to their
expressed views.
The United States goverrmient asked that
44Foreign Relations, 1925. II. 554.
170
the rights of the investors be respected; Mexican officials stated that the regulations in question would be enforced.
Secretary Kellogg concluded the correspondence
with words that his government expected México "to respect
in their entirety the acquired rights of American citizens
. . . and . . . not to take any action . . . either directly or indirectly, to deprive American citizens of the
full ovmership, use and enjoyment of their said properties
and property rights. "^5
-phe final note represented the
state of affairs in the controversy when, on October 29,
1927. the new Ambassador to México, Dwight W. Morrow, presented his credentials to President Calles.
During the exchange of official notes, investors
in México had added to the problem.
As many as forty
amparo cases were filed by foreign oil companies in the
Mexican courts within the first thirty days of passage of
the petroleum law.
The legal procedures had resulted from
a conference held between representatives of the petroleum
interests and Ambassador Sheffield and were attempts to
delay enforcement of the law as well as to seek a favorable
government attitude toward the companies.47 Ali of the
45 Foreign Relations, 1926, II, 670.
J. Reuben Clark, "The 011 Settlement with México,"
Poreign Affairs, VI (July 1928), 608.
^Êxcelslor, January 23. 1926.
171
injunctions were denied, which prompted Guy Stevens, the
Director of the Association of Producers of Petroleum in
México, to announce belligerently that the "petroleum law
confiscates now and completely every petroleum right that
has ever existed in the Republic of México.:
Affairs concernlng the petroleum lav/ v/ere not
limited to the courts of México.
In the United States,
representatives of the press, Congressmen, and private
citizens became involved in the matter.
Resolutions in-
troduced in Congress called for v/ithdrawal of recognition
of México.
Speeches in the Senate suggested attempts by
various factions, including the nation's major-oil interests, to bring war. "
Secretary Kellogg released press
statements on "bolshevik aims" ln México and declared that
48
Charles W. Hackett, "México Faces Crisis Over
Alien Land Bills," Current History, XXIII (March I926),
891.
49,,
Efforts to Involve the United States in War
v/ith México," Speeches of Honorable J. Thomias Heflin of
Alabama ln the^^Senate of the United States (Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1927). Senator
Heflin claimed the Knights of Columbus raised $1,000,000
to help carry on propaganda to bring war with México and
that such men as Doheny and Harry F. Sinclair v/ere involved. The threat of war, even if only in talk, created
a situation in which private individuais becamie involved.
During the height of the controversy, Calles proposed that
the question over oil and land rights be submitted to
International arbitration. Petitions bearing long lists
of names, primarily those of college professors, v/ere sent
to the Senate urging acceptance of Calles' proposals.
Congresslonal Record, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 68, Part
2, 2197.
172
that nation served as a base for propaganda against the
United States.
Opposition to the State Department's Mexican policy
came from a variety of sources. The New York Times editorialized that Kellogg was "too easily scared."5^ An
Emergency Foreign Policy Conference, composed of four
senators and ten representatives from across party lines,
met in Chicago in March I926 and issued a public statement
v/hich called for the United States to recognize Mexican
sovereignty over property rights. The spokesman for the
group, Representative John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, condemned the "tendency of the State Department tõ interfere
with the internai affairs of México and to attempt to
coerce México by direct and indirect threats of the withdrawal of recognition. ,.51
In spite of the raging debate, there were indications by the spring of 1927 that a solution to the rankling
problem would be reached. Mexican Ambassador Manuel C.
Te'llez publicly notified Arturo S. Elias, Financial Agent
to the United States, that the difficulties would be settled without a diplomatic break and to the satlsfaction of
5^New York Times, January 13. 1927; also printed
in the Congresslonal Record, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol.
68, Part 2, 1649.
^"Êxcelsior, March 15. 1926; "The Coolidge Business
Policy," The Christian Century, XLIII (March 4, 1926), 279.
173
52
both countries.-^
But just v/hen a settlemient seemed near,
citizens in both the United States and México v/ere made
aware of a plot designed to heighten suspicions between
the two govermnents.
Docximents ^^/hich were stolen from
the United States embassy in México City were altered,
forgcM .\...J. oúnt to Calles to make it appear that the
Coolidge administration harbored hostile intentions toward
him and México.
A flurry of activity by the State Depart-
ment included the return to Washington of Lieutenant
Colonel Edward Davis, United States Military Attaché to
53
México, to take part in an investigation of the incident."^-^
The disclosure that the documents had been forged and that
the United States personnel were innocent soothed the
troubled feelings.
During the excitement created by the investigation,
the presidents of the two nations became directly involved,
beginning with a major foreign policy address by Coolidge.
Speaking to the United Press Association on April 26, the
President of the United States outlined his view of the
Mexican situation.
Protection of American personal and
property rights abroad, he insisted, was a "distinct and
binding obligation on the part of self-respectlng
5Êxcelsior, April 1, 1927.
53Excelsior, April 10, 1927.
174
,54
governments. ^
He related a brief history of Mexican
legislation which affected property rights and concluded
by saying that México was disregarding the "great elementary principie" of fair com-pensation for property taken.55
The next day, Calles replied to the Coolidge speech.
His attitude was that the remarks by the United States
President were "satisfactory."
But he added that the spe-
cial economic conditions of México had dictated the methods
for compensation.
Payments had been offered in the best
manner which the situation in México would permit.
Accord-
ing to the Mexican president, his government had never
denied compensation.
Trouble had arisen over payments be-
cause many investors ln México had been reluctant to receive government bonds as valid payment for claims.
The
relatively congenial exchange by the two executives gave
rise once again to talk of a settlement in the oil problem.
But even more important than the positions taken
by Coolidge and Calles was the conduct of the oil companies
themselves--the central figures in the controversy.
The
petroleum industry in México had the financial power to
paralyze the economy of the nation and, along with the
doubt in the minds of possible new investors, oil industries
5^Foreign Relations, 192^^, III, 213.
55Foreign Relations, 1927, III, 2l6.
175
brought about decreases in the annual revenues for México.^^
The question of an improved economy, which Calles considered so vital, became increasingly urgent with each drop
in revenue caused by lessening oil operations.
Severe re-
ductions in tax money produced mounting pressure on the
Mexican president to reach an agreement with the United
States and the oil interests.
The oil companies, led by Guy Stevens, drastlcally
curtailed the production in México and gave serious consideration to a complete suspension of operations.
Though
total work stoppage never became a fact, production declined seriously throughout Calles' administration.
The
total oil production and its value during several of the
Calles years are disclosed by the following figures.
Year
Metric Tons
1921
1924
1925
1926
1927
30,746,834
22,206,406
18,364,817
14,375.353
..,...,...
Barreis
Value (Pesos)
193.397.587
139,678,294
115,514,700
90,420,973
64,100,000
365.873.635
272,084,563
299,268,632
225,122,242
...........
5^Chandler P. Anderson, "Basis of the Law Against
Confiscating Foreign-OT>med Pronerty," The Araerican Journal
of International Law, XXI (July 1927), 526.
57
Figures for I92I-I926 are from Challis, México,
Facts Versus Propaganda, 33. The year 192I is considered
as a high point in Mexican oil production. See also Secretaria de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo, Departmento de
Petróleo, La industria ciei petróleo en Mcxico, su asnecto
legal y su reglam.entaci(^n, por José Colomo y Ei estado actual de esa industria, por Gustavo Ortego, (México:
1'alleres Gráficos de Ia Nación, 1927), 19. Tne effects of
the decline may also be seen in figures published by the
176
Even sharper reductions in revenues can be seen
from tax yields.
In I921 the oil industry contributed
62.7 millions of pesos to the Mexican treasury. .By I925
the amount dropped to 42 millions; in 1926 the figure
came to 34.8; and for 1927 it fell to an alarming low of
o
58
18.9.
During the first six mônths of I928, the revenue
from oil production reached scarcely more than 4,000,000
59
pesos.
Though the decline in production had begun prior
to the new petroleum law, it became more pronounced after
1925 and plagued Calles for most of his term.
The decrease was not simply a response to legislation, nor was it due solely to conservation. Weather also
played a part in hampering output—the rich oil regions of
Tampico were subject to periodic lashings by tropical
storms—and aided a definite design by the companies to
Mexican Department of Commerce. Exports on crude petroleum
and its derivatives also dropped sharply over the years.
From the peak production of I92I which included both light
and heavy crude petroleum and combustlble oil and fuel products reaching figures of 18.5 and 7.4 millions of cubic
meters, reductions under Calles came to the following:
(Figures from Annuario Estadístlca, 1930, XXXI).
Crude Petroleum
Combustible Gas and Oil
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
12.2
7.5
8.7
5.8
6.0
5.6
4.3
3.2
3.0
1.4
5 Stanley R. Ross, "Dv/ight W. Morrow, Amibassador to
México," The Américas, XIV (January 1958), 274. Albert D.
Brokaw, "ÜiH México," Foreign Affairs, VI (October 1927).
Charles W. Hackett and J. Lloyd Mecham, President Calles Declines Renomination," Current History, XXIX
(October 1928), l40.
177
force Calles into m.oderating his stand on the controversy.
Further assistance to the industry came from the related
factors of unemployment and emigration of the labor force
v.^hich resulted from lagging oil activity.
A num-ber of the imgoortant producers obstinately refused to submit to the Calles law.
Names of the concerns
were made public through an interesting part of the correspondence during the controversy.
In an unusual ex-
change of telegrams, Senator Willlam E. Borah of Idaho
and President Calles exposed those companies v.-hich had not
applied for the confirmatory concessions as prescribed by
the petroleum law.
Calles' reply, printed in the Nev; York
Times of March 1, 1927. listed 22 producers v/hich had refused to accept the regulations.
The most important of
these were Standard Oil of Indiana, Huasteca Petrolei^m,
Mexican Sinclair, Doheny and Bridge, and Mexican Tuxpam.
Later, Calles emphasized that 125 of the l47 oil producers
in México had submitted, and only 22 refused the petroleum
legislation.
The importance of the situation, however,
is more cleariy realized when it is understood that in
I92Ó, though the 22 protestlng companies held titles to
only 6 per cent of the entire national land área they had
^^Calles, Inform.e . . ., 1927, cited in Murray,
•íexico before the VJorld, Itip".
178
produced over 70 per cent of the oil extracted in lêxico.6l
Though relations between the United States and
México remained unchanged through much of 1927, in the
fali of that year events rushed rapidly to a conclusion.
A major breakthrough in the diplomatic impasse occurred
when Dwight W. Morrow of the J. P. Morgan firm replaced
Sheffield as ambassador to México. Many' people in México,
though somewhat anxious about the new ambassador, were not
unhappy over Sheffield's departure.
The latter had, on
more than one occasion, advocated strong measures in dealing with México.
But with Morrow's arrival in México City, there
was almost immediate change in attitudes; the nev/ ambassador was an instant success. The Mexican people rejoiced
over his first official address, given when he presented
his credentials to Calles. At the ceremony, Morrow expressed his "earnest hope" that "we shall not fail to adjust outstanding questions with that dignlty and respect
which should mark the International relationship of two
62
sovereign and independent states."
The choice of the
word sovereign was warmly received by the people who were
highly sensitive about the ponderous influence of the
J. Fred Rippy, "Fundamentais in the Present Mexican Situation," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, CXXXll (July 1927), lo9.
62
New York Times, November 3. 1927.
179
United States below the Rio Grande.
Calles received the new ambassador and asked Morrow to confer personally with him.
In asking that Morrow
call directly, Calles admitted that he was not a diplomat
and stated that he felt the "differences of opinion between the two governments could readily be adjusted in
personal meetings . . . [and] that diplomatic notes tended
to separate further the governments." "^ The attitude expressed by the Mexican president, and which Morrow's own
outlook complemented, definitely helped in bringing better understanding to the problems confronting the two nations .
The presence in México of two famous American personalltles also enhanced the opportunity for smooth relations between México and the United States. Will Rogers,
the noted humorist, visited México and accompanied and
entertained Calles and Morrow on frequent tours of the
Republic.
More meaningful, however, was Colonel Charles
A. Lindbergh's non-stop flight between the nations' capitais.
The trip, in December 1927. received the whole-
hearted approval of Calles and the Mexican people.
Thou-
sands of citizens, some of whom had waited as long as fourteen hours, were on hand to meet the heralded aviator.
^^Foreign Relations, 1927. I H , l88.
180
While the American flyer visited México, numerous
honors were bestowed upon him.
The Chamber of Deputies—
in extraordinary session—presented him with a Me.dal of
Gold, and the Secretary of Public Education took him to a
school festival in the national stadium where thousands
of pupils saluted him.
The Secretary of Foreign Relations
paid him the highest tribute, however, when he expressed
the opinion that:
There is no doubt that this feat and the earlier
one by Colonel Lindbergh represents one of the
most successful forces for the drav/ing nearer of
México and the United States.64
The presence, then, of the American celebrities,
together v/ith the earnest desire by Morrow to understand
the Mexican nation and its people, was a very important
element in bringing satisfactory solutions to many of the
questions facing the United States and México.
As one
diplomat wrote later, "Dwight Morrow, Will Rogers, and
Charles Lindbergh made a trinity that Calles and most Mexi65
cans could not resist."
Memória de Ia Secretaria de Relaciones Exterlorers
de Agosto ^de 1927 a Júlio de 192b, presentada ai H. Congreso"
dela Uni ón (Mexi c o: Imprenta de Ia Secretaria de Relaclones Exteriores, 1928), 582.
Hill:
5josephus Daniels, Shlrt-Sleeve Diplom.at (Chapei
The University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 278.
I8l
Important also in the relation between the two
countries was the type of diplomacy engaged in between
Calles and Morrow.
Private breakfasts, held either at
Chapultepec Castle or at the President's home in Cuernavaca, received much favorable publicity by nev/smen v/ho
wrote of "ham and eggs" diplomacy.
At one of the informal
conferences at Chapultepec, Calles set in motion a course
which led to a solution to the petroleum problem.
Morrow
went alone to the meeting which was held in the presence
of Thomas A. Robinson, an American citizen and son-in-law
to Calles, and James Smiithers, who acted as interpreter.
66
Por over an hour the oil question was the subject of conversation, and gradually an answer to the problem developed
In his characteristically taciturn manner, Calles
asked Morrow directly v/hat the ambassador believed could
serve as a solution.
Morrow, who had studied the problem
at length, answered that "a preliminary to any solution
would be a clear decision of the Supreme Court following
67
the Texas 011 Company cases."
A new decision, the Am-
bassador added, should sustain that of the Texas Company
cases and would clear the air for settlement of the oil
^^James Smithers v/as an old friend of Calles. He
had been closely associated with the President from early
days in Sonora when Calles was governor. He has been referred to as the "Colonel House of General Calles.
See
Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat, 307.
^^Foreign Relations, 1927. I H . 190.
182
matter. ^íhereupon Calles surprised and astonished his
visitor by predicting that such a decision could be expected in tv/o months.
United States oil companies were rather quiet during the Morrow-Calles talks and were told by the State
Department "not to get off the reservation" pending the
Supreme Court deliberations.
On November 17, 1927, hope
for settlement came with decisions by the Supreme Court in
a suit for amparo by the Mexican Petroleum Company of Califórnia against acts of the Department of Industry, Commerce
and Labor.
The judgment of the court confirmed the amparo
and defended the company against a revocation of its per68
mits to drill.
The revocation had been based upon Ar-
ticles 14 and .15 of the petroleum law, and once the decision was reached, Calles informed Morrov/ that now it would
be proper for the government of México to alter the law or
regulations so that:
1.
Section 14 of the petroleum law, v/hich . . .
[provided] for a grant of a 50-year concession instead of a perpetuai right would
be altered or repealed;
2.
Full confirmation of rights to take out oil,
unllmited in time, v/ould be given to those
who had such rights prior to the Constitution
of 1917;
68
English translation of the decision may be seen
in Foreign Relations^ 1927. III. 197-209. See also The .
American Journal of International Lav/, XXII (May 1926),
421-432.
183
3. A sufficient time, probably one year, would
be given to ali such ovmers of the surface
to come inland get their rights to the oil
confinned.'^-^
Before the end of the year, Calles introduced in
the Congress a bill to amend Articles l4 and 15. Article
14, as amended, included the following rights to be confirmed:
1.
Those derived from lands on which petroleum
exploitation works v/ere commenced prior to
May 1, 1917.
2.
Those derived from contracts entered into
prior to May 1, 1917, by the o;mer of the surface or his representatives for petroleum exploitation purposes.'^
Confirmation of the rights were to be granted without limit
of time when they were made in favor of the owners of the
surface.71 Article 15 was amênded tò allov/ a period of
one year from the date of publication to soliclt confirmation of the rights which Article l4 allov/ed.
The bill
passed December 29, 1927. With its publication in the
Diário Oficial on January 10, 1928, it became law.
011 companies were still unsure about their positions.
The major question regarded doubts about whether
^ôreign Relations, 1927, III, 196.
7QDiario Oficial, January 10, I928. English translation is in Foreign Relations, I928, III, 293.
'^•^Foreign Relations, I928, III, 293.
184
the industries taking confirmatory concessions under the
new law v/ould get a new grant or have their old rights
confirmed.
In a letter to H. N. Branch, representative
of the Huasteca Petroleum Company, dated January 9, I928,
Secretary of Industry Morones assured the companies that
taking confirmatory concessions under the amended law meant
receiving confirmation of their old rights.'
Amended regulations of the petroleum law, promulgated by March, verified Morones' statements and a settlement seemed assured.
Press releases by Morrow and the
Department of State on March 28, one day after Calles' decree which regulated the law, confirmed the fact that adjustment of the petroleum problem was in sight.
The State
Department noted that:
The petroleum regulations just promulgated by
President Calles constitute executive action
which completes the process beginning with the
decision made by the judicial branch of the
Mexican Government on November 17, 1927. and
followed by the enactment of the new petroleum
law by the legislativo branch on December 26th
last.
Together, these steps, voluntarlly taken by the
Mexican Government, would appear to bring to a
practlcal conclusion the dlscussions which began
ten years ago with reference to the effect of the
Mexican constitution and lav/s upon foreign oil
• companies. The Department feels, as does Ambassador Morrow, that such questions, if any, as
may hereafter arise can be settled through the
^^Foreign Relations, 1928, ill, 294.
185
due operation of the Mexican administrative
departments and the Mexican courts.73
V/ithin a few days, nev/spapers carried the story that
Huasteca Petroleum had accepted the petroleum regulations
and would make application for confirmatory concessions
under the amended law and its regulations.
Acceptance by
the powerful oil company meant the nominal acceptance by
the industry, and the oil question was "settled" once
again.
73New York Times, March 28, 1928; Foreign Relations,
1928, III, 307-3O6.
CHAPTER VII
A MEXICAN'S INTEREST IN MÉXICO
Economic stability, an urgent program for sanitation and improved health, and a design to decrease the
powerful influence which the m.ilitary had exercised are
among several major domestic developmenfs credited to
Calles' administration.
The President attempted to de-
stroy the historie tradition of graft and financial chãos,
vanquish lllness and disease among his people, and unravel
the military-political entanglement which had debilitated
México. A victory over any one of these problems would
have signified a successful presidency, and Calles was determined to be a success. Improvement in México's financial affairs was his chief goal.
He felt that reforms in
other áreas would follow more easily if necessary funds
could be made available. He also felt that political independence for his people would come only when the nation
freed itself of a colonial economy and the oppressive burden of militarism.
Stringent--even frugal--economic poli-
cies became necessary.
Considering the amount of Mexican indebtedness and
the almost natural state of bureaucratlc graft and corruption, a balanced budget was an elusive goal.
The debt,
both foreign and domestic, actually amounted to an unknown
186
187
quantity.
Funded debts, those covered by agreem.ents v.âth
the International ComjTiittee of Bankers of México, made up
between 8o and 90 per cent of the "precisely defined" portion of the total governmental indebtedness.-^ Added to
specific obligations were certain liabilities which had
not been settled by 1924. Agrarian bonds for payments of
lands taken by the government under the program of redistribution and the unsettled claims resulting from damages during the Revolution composed an additional undetermined amount.
National indebtedness had been complicated by the
activities of Adolfo de Ia Huerta whose I923 rebellion
created an additional déficit for the government.
By the
time Calles became president the total déficit amounted
to 41,627.000 pesos, and Calles regarded balancing the
budget as one of his most urgent and difficult problems.
2
To help discharge México's staggering debts, many
of which were long-standing, Calles introduced a program
of strict economy.
Budgets were slashed, excess personnel
in the multiple and overlapping agencies were laid off,
and attemipts were made to make revenue sources more efficient and productive.
An example of the economy enforced
•^Herbert Feis, "Financial Reconstruction in México,"
Foreign Affairs, VII (July 1929), 662.
Êxcelsior, December 28, 1924.
188
is the reduction required each year for various departmental budgets. The allocation in I923 for the executive
branch of the government, which included the presidency,
the various departments of the cabinet, and the public
debt was 338,718,174.37 pesos. In 1924 the figure was
lowered by more than 50,000,000 pesos. Reductions were
enforced in ali departments, especially in 1924, and attempts were made to continue the trend throughout Calles'
four-year term. Where the Department of War and Navy received 32.5 per cent of the total budget in I923, the percentage was 23.6 in 1924.3 The Department of Public Education budget fell from 52,362,913.50 pesos in' 1923 to
27.014,693.80 pesos in 1928.
Similar decreases Calles
effected in ali of the governjnent's branches.
At the same time, funds available for the payment
of the public debt increased.
In I923 the amount destined
for that purpose was 41,470,000 pesos, or 12 per cent of
the budget, while the next year the figure was 72,375.261.11,
or 24.3 per cent.
In 1925 the budget showed 84,169,672.95
pesos applied to service the debt, but from that time on a
Êstadístlca Nacional, December 1930, 56O-56I.
The outbreak of revolution in I928 created a demand for
increased military funds, and ln that year the percentage
rose to 29.
Estadístlca Nacional, December 1930, 56O-56I.
189
decline became obvious.
In spite of opposition, Calles seemed determined
to remove from México one major economic liability-bureaucratic deadweight.
Bureaucracy, which included
numerous administrative offices and agencies, seemed a
natural condition in México because of the Spanish colonial
heritage, and because of the need to support revolutionaries without a revolution.
Recognizing that the practice
of supporting friends at the expense of the government was
both debilitating and costly, Calles declared that:
The time has come for the disappearance of the
administrations which are organized solely for
the personal benefit of the men v/ho compose them,
and it is absolutely necessary to clean house, to
place rascals where they belong and honorable men
in their place. The old mixture of rascals and^
honest men in government is no longer possible.6
In keeping with the attitude of cleaning house,
the President ordered various ministries to discharge
superfluous employees.
By July I925 Calles announced that
14,000 employees of the National Railv/ays would be dismlssed, an act which would save the government some 800,000
5
y
-^Figures were from Estadistica Nacional, December
1930, 56O-56I. The decrease was due to a number of factors
including a loss of revenue from petroleum operations, the
economic boycott by Catholics, and the fact that numerous
small loans were paid up.
c
Speech at Nuevo Le(5h, February I8, I926, cited in
Murray, México before the World, 85.
190
pesos monthly.
Salaries of the remaining railwaymen were
also to be readjusted to create a government saving of another 700,000 pesos monthly.'^ Many inexperienced and incapable government employees found themselves without jobs.
Calles answered the critics by avowing that discharged
workers were actually a boon to the nation because now
they must produce—no longer could they expect something
for nothing.
Personnel reductions coincided with Calles'
attack on the common policy of officials to enlarge their
accounts, and though the system was not completely corrected, some important savings in departmental budgets
o
were reported.
Due to the program of economy, the government,
during the first six months of Calles' administration,
saved thirteen mlllion pesos.
By August 1925, seventy-
eight mlllion pesos had been saved, and the public debt
had been reduced.^
One important reason for the reduction
was the paying of over twenty-six mlllion pesos for overdue salaries of government employees and old debts to
'Êxcelsior, June 30, 1925.
o
Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Informe
dei C. Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos ai H.
Congreso de Ia Unión, parte correspondiente a Ia Secretaria
de Hacienda y Crédito Público, por ei periodo de 1 de agosto
de 1927 a 31^de julio de 1926 (México,'D. F.}, 11.
Êxcelsior, August 2, 1925.
191
merchants and manufacturers.
By September 1925 the initial
déficit of 41,627.000 pesos had been reduced to 14,291,039"^*^
and by payment on the floating debt an actual balance of
25.450,060 pesos- had been created.
Further attempts at economy in the government included the reorganization of the National Railways. At the
beginning of the Calles administration, the Railways operated at a heavy loss.
Between the years 1914-1924, the
sustained loss was over 8,000,000 pesos, and the debt be12
tween the years 1920-1924 was over 32,000,000 pesos.
Early in I925 Calles reorganized the Railways; he placed
them under the authorlty of the Secretary of Communications
and Public Works, and he appointed Mariano Cabrera to direct them. Workers were considered as government employees
and were caught up in the retrenchment policies. Many were
fired without any indemnification, although relocation pro13
grams helped some to find employment elsewhere.
There were several reasons for the lack of profit
on the National Railways. For one thing, damage during'
Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LIX (December 1925). 1271.
•^•^Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LIX (December 1925). 1271.
•^Êxcelsior, February 21, 1925.
•^Êxcelsior, November 27. 1925.
192
the revolutionary struggles was often great.
Rolling
stock needed frequent replacement, and services to the
government, such as passes and military train movements,
created an actual loss to the company.
Strikes by the
railway workers, though declared illegal by the government,
also added to the difficulties.
Finally, the debt caused
by the action of the Carranza government in taking over the
railroads created conditions which both Obregón and Calles
had to face as part of the foreign debt.
In spite of the
economies instilled, and even though Calles forced the
railmen to accept new conditions of wages and employment,
the Railways never operated on a paying basis.- Eventually
frustrated by his attempt at reform the President returned
the railway companies to private management.
Taking another step to save money and to increase
the efficiency of the administration in economic affairs,
Calles altered practices in the office of the Controller.
Early in 1925 the President created a commission to study
and to devise means to upgrade that department.
The group
of planners reported that the office operated within a
framework of "outmoded financial regulations, duplications
of offices, ambiguous laws, and parallel agencies.
til4
A
new law, designed to combat the above problems and bring
. ^^Contraloría de Ia Federacion, Memória, 1925-1928
(México,D. F.: Editoria "Cultura," 1928), 26.
193
about the desired efficiency and economy, became effective
15
by January I927.
And the department soon reported that
the modemization techniques had improved conditions.
The outstanding work of Calles' government in the
matter of economic and fiscal reform was the establishment
of a national bank.
The Banco de México, a sole bank of
issue, represented a major objective formulated by Calles
for Mexican economic reform.
By virtue of the savings ef-
fected during the first year of his administration, Calles
established the bank—despite earlier predictlons outside
16
of the nation that such a task would be very difficult—
which opened its doors for business on September 1, 1925•
The pressing need for a bank was readily apparent.
Por several years prior to the establishment of the bank,
currency consisted of many different types.
During much
of the revolutionary period from I9IO to 1920, ali sorts
of bills had been Issued by the several groups in power.
Hard money practically disappeared, and the fractional
coins had even been replaced by small pieces of cardboard
called "cartones." ' Under Carranza, as political
•^5contraloría de Ia Federacicín, Memória, 1925-1928,
40.
G. B. Sher-v^/ell, "The Financial Outlook in México,"
The Bankers Magazine, CIV (March 1922), 493.
^7sherwell, "The Financial Outlook in México,"
491.
194
stability increased, a noticeable improvement came when
the government withdrew paper issues and coined large
quantities of gold and sllver.
Metal, then, was -the major
type of currency in use at the time Calles began to reconstruct the country's financial system.
Though advantageous
in many respects, such as being less subject to fluctuation in value than paper issue, metal currency alone was
inadequate for the needs of the growing nation.
The new institution v/as established under the terms
of Article 28 of the Constitution of I9IO.
The bank had
actually been functioning with a temporary charter under
the name of the Monetary Comjnission when Calles enacted
the law organizing the Banco de México.
The capitalization of the bank consisted of
100,000,000 gold pesos in 1,000,000 registered shares of
18
100 pesos each.
The shares were ln two series: Series
A which represented at least 51 per cent of the bank's
capital, and to which only the government could subscribe,
and Series B which could be subscribed by the federal gov19
ernment or by the people.
The majority of the shares.
were owned and controlled by the Mexican government; but
there was no lack of interest by prlvate concerns.
As
Calles, Informe . . . . 19'^^3.
^Bulletin of the Pan Am.erican Union, LIX (December 1925). 1270.
195
many as 4,000,000 pesos worth of stock in the bank were
subscribed on opening day, the Bank of London taking
20
13.000 new shares alone.
The bank could issue .bills
for a sum not more than double the amount of gold reserve
on hands, and was the sole source of government issue.
Crowds thronged to the bank from the first to exchange
gold for the new issue.
Though the government owned and controlled a majority of the shares, its influence ceased at that point.
By the very nature of the law which established the bank,
the federal government was prevented from interfering with
its operations.21 The lav/ for the bank organization was
drafted by several of México's financial experts without,
22
as Calles pridefully noted, "outside help."
The purpose
in excluding foreign advisors insured a lav/ which fit
Mexican society, and assured conditions of conservatism
in the bank's operations. Foreign banking authorities who
examined the law expressed admiration for it; their only
criticism was that the new law was too conservative, too
^Êxcelsior, September 3. 1925.
^-^The only exception to this rule was the power of
veto given to the Finance Minister over the Board of Directors when the minister felt their resolution might adversely affect the economic equilibrium of the country.
^^Calles, Speech before the people of Nuevo Leon,
February l8, 1926, cited in Murray, México before the
World, 86.
196
inflexible, and restricted the eaming power of the bank.^^
Under its Director General, Alberto MascareHas,
pii.
the infant institution began successful operation^.
Its
profit for the first year was 3.223,381 pesos.^5 rp^g
same year, the bank handled gold, silver, and foreign
currencies amounting to 6.5 billion pesos, which, together'
with amounts handled by various branches, meant currency
transactions of nearly 10 billion for the first year.
The encouraging growth of the bank can be seen from the
27
following list of deposits as of December 31 of each year.
Year
Amount in Banco
Other Banks
1925
1926
1927
1928
1,973.103
5,043,592
3,382,628
5,473.000
5.329.383
3,956,042
8,372,691
10,835.000
^3"Banco de México, México City," The Bankers
Magazine, CVI (May 1928), 791; Murray, México before the
World, 223.
^\[ascarenas' father founded the Bank of Sonora,
with which MascareHas was connected for thirteen years.
Also, Alberto had been Mexican Financial agent and Cônsul
General to New York in I923 and 1924.
^5Murray, México before the World, 223.
26
J. M. Bejarano, "Development of Banking Institutions in México," Bulletin of the Pan American Union, LXI
(December 1927), 1184^
'
^Êstadístlca Nacional, January 1930, I8. The decrease in deposits from 192b to 1927 v/as caused by a number of factors including the economic boycott by Catholics,
the oil controversy and the Gomez-Serrana rebellion. The
overall grov/th was greater, comparatively, than that of
private banks.
197
The bank rapidly gained the confidence of business
communlties within México and in foreign countries, and
it served the vital purpose of creating a favorable climate for the operation of private institutions.
Because
of financial practices during the time of Huerta (such as
large-scale issuance without backing), Mexicans had regarded banks with suspicion and uncertainty.
Many finan-
cial institutions failed or were practically without busi28
ness.
But under the terms of the Calles banking law and
because of a restored public confidence that resulted from
the creation of the goverranent bank along conservative
lines, a few private banks began doing business successfully.^^
Renewed confidence in banking institutions and a
general upswing in business resulted also from the rather
liberal loan and interest policy of the Banco de México.
The national bank sustained a rate of 10 per cent in its
operations, and as a consequence the rates of other banks
fluctuated between 10 per cent and 15 per cent annually,
as opposed to the 2 per cent or 3 per cent monthly rates
30
which prevailed prior to the establishment of the Bank.
^^Sherwell, "The Financial Outlook in México," 490.
^^Bejarano, "Development of Banking Institutions
in México," ll84.
^^Secretaría de Hacienda y Credito PÍblico, Informe
. . ., 1928, 26.
198
By 1928 the Bank of México had so cheapened money that
many businessmen could obtain operational funds for as low
as 9 per cent, a rate comparable to that in several other
31
nations.
Another important objective of Calles' economic
policies was the resumption of payments on the public debt.
Of this debt the President concerned himself with the payments owed the International Committee of Bankers on
México, which was the agency overseeing México's foreign
indebtedness. The Committee, with Thomas W. Lamont acting
as American chairman, came into existence in 1919 to attempt, for the purposes of negotiation, to consolidate ali
foreign and domestic bonds owned abroad under one central
32
agency.
By an agreement the Committee reached with
Obregoh's government on June I6, 1922, a schedule of gradually increasing payments was adopted. According to its
terms, proceeds of the oil export tax plus 10 per cent of
the gross revenue of the National Railways would go to the
Committee for payments. At the same time, the Railways
were to return to private operators. However, the revolt
by De Ia Huerta made apparent the need for a new agreement.
The result was the Lamont-Pani Agreement, reached on
^^"Banco de México," 793^Sranz Schneider, Jr., "The Financial Future of
México," Foreign Affairs, VII, (October 1928), 92.
199
October 23. 1925.
The Administration made a rather inausplcious beginning on paying the obligations to the Bankers'- Committee.
By July of 1925 México was eighteen m.onths in default on
the foreign debt payment.
The country was $27.500,000 in
arrears, and newspaper editors speculated that a repudia33'
tion of the debt might be forthcoming.*^
Hov/ever, the new
arrangement between Secretary Pani and Chairman Lamont
called for a resumption of payments on the $500,000,000
foreign debt beginning January 1, 1926.3
The new agree-
ment, which slightly modified the Lamont-De Ia Huerta
treaty, also provided for the return of the National Railways of México to private management.
The agreement came
during a period of prosperity in the oil industry which
served as an important source of government revenue, a
fact which proved unfortunate.
Payments on the foreign debt were made for 1926
but then the government began experiencing serious economic
difficulties.
The year 1927 proved almost dlsastrous for
the financial stability of the country.
The Catholic boy-
cott and the dispute with the oil companies had important
consequences.
Taxes on oil production and exports had been
^Êxcelsior, July 1, 1925.
^ New York Times, November 12, 1925.
i i t V t t i i t V t t ik
200
for some time the main source of revenue which the government applied toward servicing of the foreign debt, and
the amounts during the dispute dropped dangerously.^5
From 1921, a peak year ln oil production, v/hen
193.396,587 barreis of oil were produced at a value of
365.873.635 pesos, figures dropped by I926 to 90,420,973
barreis valued at 225,122,242 pesos.^^
The I926 figures
represented a decrease of over 24,000,000 barreis from
1925 and involved a decline of over 16,000,000 barreis
slated for export.^''' The figures for 1927 were even more
alarming to Calles because of a 31.1 per cent drop in production from 1926.-^
Production and export taxes realized
that year had fallen from nearly 86,000,000 pesos in 1922
to only 19,000,000 in 1927.^^
35
•^-^011 production over the period of Calles' presidency can be seen in the table on page 175.
Challis, Facts versus Propaganda, 33.
Secretaria de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo,
Departamento dei Petróleo, La industria dei petr(^leo en
México, su aspecto legal (Talleres gráficos de Ia Nacióh,
1927). 19-20.
^Êxcelsior, February 27, 1928.
^^Schnelder, "The Financial Future of México," 88.
Together with the damage to the economy by the Catholic
economic boycott and the decreased oil production, México
also suffered a decline in revenue from export taxes. By
1926 both imports and exports with the United States dropped to leveis below figures prior to Calles. Excelsior,
Pebruary 6, 1927.
201
Calles tried frantically to alleviate the conditions of the country's finances by a number of devices.
Income tax lav/s were reformed to add further to government revenue.
A severe cutback in the budget for the year
1927 was arinounceJ v;.iich would save 12,000,000 pesos.
Workers in various government jobs were even asked to donate two days free labor to departmental projects.
of the measures taken v/ere not enough.
Ali
By the middle of
the year it was necessary for the President to negotiate
a $2,000,000 loan to help ln the financial reconstruction
of his country.
The debt, negotlated v/ith the International
Committee of Bankers, was to be paid-in twelve monthly in-.
40
stallments beginning January 1928.
As the end of 1927 approached, it became increasingly evident that México's treasury could not meet its
obligations.
Included in the indebtedness by that time
were 77,000,000 pesos in foreign debts and an overall debt
of upwards of 2,000,000,000 pesos.'^•^ President Calles,
believing the foreign debt service as fundaraental for maintaining credit abroad, exposed openly to his nation's
creditors the current and probable future economic conditions of México.
Calles hoped this move would gain for
40
Excelsior, July 29, 1927.
^-^Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Informe
. . ., 1928, 13.
202
him sympathy and a delay in pay:rcnts.
At the invitation of Calles, two representatives
of the Bankers Committee, Joseph E. Sterratt and -Joseph S.
Davis, visited México to investigate the financial and
economic situation.
They stayed for the first three months
of 1928 and conducted their activities with cooperation
of Mexican authorities, traveling extensively throughout
the republic and conferring whenever possible with Ambassador Morrow.
Their advice included plans for a new
agreement based upon actual conditions in México, using a
more normal base in economic activity, and not one drawn
42
at the height of an oil boom.
Any new arrangement, they
noted, should be based on the principie of México's "capacity to pay."
An upward trend ln the nation's economy came during the last year of Calles' presidency.
The prospects
for settlement of the oil controversy improved business ln
general.
An unexpected increase in revenues the first six
months of the year of over 10,000,000 pesos above predic43
tions contributed greatly to conditions of the treasury.
Propaganda for a program. of tourism brought increased
travelers and dollars during the summer, and optimism in
4P
Schneider, ^Îha F i n a n c i a l Future of México," 9 3 .
^ S e c r e t a r i a de Hacienda y Credito P u b l i c o , Inforrr.e
. . . , 1928, 10.
203
industrial and financial circles in the United States over
the bettering of economic conditions in México remained
44
high.
The improved conditions lasted through t.he re-
mainder of Calles' term.
Though payments on the foreign
debt still lagged, the fact that México operated upon a
financial basis which provided for paying its current bills
and federal salaries inspired confidence in bond holders.
The situation had improved so much, in fact, that by the
time Calles' four years came to an end a surplus of over
one million pesos was left to the treasury. 5
Calles' plans for economic stability definitely
influenced other aspects of his domestic programs such as
a project for improved national health standards.
But in
spite of the economies enforced by the President on the
various departments, the Department of Public Health effected a widespread program in its field.
However, the
budgets for the Department over the years 1924-1928 show
that it was one of the few agencies to escape the large
cuts óf 1927 and indicate Calles' interest in the public
health program.
The Department was fortunate enough to
enjoy an almost steady increase in funds over the four
years mentioned.
Though not commanding a large portion
^ \ e w York Times, June 25, 1928.
^5New York Times, Decem-ber 1, I928.
204
of the entire executive budget--approximately 1 per cent
in 1924--the share rose to almost 3 per cent by 1927, and
the actual amount increased nearly four times.^^.
Conditions of health and sanitation in México,
particularly in the capital city, v/ere so terrible that
Public Health Secretary Bernardo J. Gastelum received practically dictatorial powers, in accordance with Article 73
of the Constitution, to fight the spread of contagious diseases.
Early in 1925 the severe measures which the Depart-
ment often found necessary to invoke in carrylng out its
work made themselves felt by the people of Veracruz where
a smallpox epidemic raged. Vaccination was made obligatory
and refusal to comply meant arrest.47
An appallingly high death rate which hovered near
30 deaths per 1,000 people in the capital made apparent
the need for a program of health education.48 Health and
4^The amounts fixed for the yearly budget of the
Department of Health are as follov/s: 3.705.214.50 in 1923;
2,796,847.70 in 1924; 3.466,759.20 in 1925; 5,107.589.20
in 1926; 8,403.547.50 ln 1927; and 7,505,278.80 in I928.
Figures are from Estadístlca Nacional, December 1930, 56O561.
47
'Excelsior, January 9. 1925.
^°For example, ln 1925, during 15 days of medicai
examinations given to some 490 public bath attendants,
authorities discovered 60 of those checked were 111 with
transmissable dlseases, and 35 had syphilis. Calles,
Informe . . ., 1925. 102. In the same year, México led
the world in infant mortality, almost every third child
died before the age of 10. Excelsior, July 9, 1925.
205
sanitation practices had been almost non-existent.'^^ .
Smallpox, digestive dlseases, circulatory ailments, hookworm, tuberculosis, and fevers caused most of the deaths
or illnesses in the Republic; many of these ailments were
a result of the lack of any specific program aimed at their
eradication or control.
It v/as against just such dangers
that the Department of Health directed a major portion of
its campaign.
The program for better health attained solid
legal foundation in a new Federal Sanitary Code which gave
the central department the authorlty to extend action to
50
the entire nation.
Correspondent to the adoption of the new code, the
Department began action on a completely new plan of propaganda for health education.
National anti-venereal com-
missions, operating much as did the Cultural Missions of
the Department of Public Education, traveled the states
in the battle against syphilis.
Houses which did not meet
health standards for water and sewage services were t o m
down; construction of new houses was disallowed if the same
51
standards could not be met.
The Department also
decretaria de Salubrldad Piíblica, Memória de los
trabajos realizados por ei Departamento de Salubrldad Piíbllca, 1925-1926 (México: Edicióhes dei Departamento de
Salubrldad Piíblica, 1928), 1, 237.
^Âdopted in June I926.
^•^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 135.
206
established sanitary delegations in each state, and congresses of local sanitary officials met yearly in México
City to standardize the functions of the authorities and
to plan active campaigns against disease.
Local sanitary
units sprang up almost daily, more than one thousand having
been established by I928.
Though the administration attacked the public health
problem from many different angles, much of the work centered on the problem of sanitation in the capital and in
the Federal District.
In those places, orders were issued
in 1925 for new regulations for the sale of milk and milk
products.
Sidewalk venders selling foods and drinks were
ordered to obtain health certificates (free) from the Department of Health.
Calles directed ali businesses, lodg-
ing houses, and markets--in short, ali places where the
public gathered--to conform to new standards of cleanllness.
If the regulations were not met, the business was flned or
closed, or both.
The campaign for improved sanitation for public
places Increased in intensity each year.
In I925 the num-
ber of visits to public places by representatives of the
Department of Health more than doubled the inspections made
in 1924.
Over 50,000 places were examined in I926 and the
5^Calles, Informe . . ., 1927, in Murray, México
before the World, 166-169.
207
next year authorities checked 62,836 businesses.
Of those
visited yearly, only 21 were closed in 1924 for violations
of the Sanitary Code, but in I925, I08 were closed.
Health
authorities, under regulations of the new code for I926,
shut down 179 establishments the first year of the new
authorlty and the following year closed 603.
,53
semester of I928 there were 443 closings.
In the first
To help the program of national vaccination in particular, and to better public health in general, a National
Institute of Hygiene was constructed in Popotla.
Fines
gathered by the Health Department from infractions of sani54
tary codes provided funds for the buildlng.*^
The Insti-
tute, among other things, became responsible for the preparation of serum and vaccine used in fighting smallpox and
similar illnesses.
It contributed effectively to combating
epidemics more conveniently and at a lower cost because it
eliminated the problem of buylng medicines from other countries.
Workers at the Institute prepared almost 12,000,000
doses of vaccine during the time Calles v/as president and
administered over 2,000,000 of those doses over the same
53
/
Figures are from. Departamento de Salubrldad Publica, Memória . . ., 1925-1928, 1, 317-318.
5^Calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 100.
208
55
period.^-^
The effect of the campaign against smallpox can
be seen from figures published by the Department .of Public
Health.
In I925 there were I08 cases of smallpox regis-
tered in the Federal District.
The number of cases the
next year was 58. In I927 only 15 cases were reported.
And by I928 health authorities noticed only 9 cases of
56
the disease.
The campaign against smallpox represented
probably the greatest health gain by the administration.57
Creditable also was the Department's struggle
against hookworm.
In áreas with warm climates, such as
were found in the states of Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Chiapas,
the disease created the greatest problem--with the exception of malária—faced by the health authorities.5^
Secretaria de Salubrldad Piíblica, Memória . . .,
1925-1928, I, III. In many instances local custom, fear,
or suspicion prevented the vaccination program from becoming effective. People often refused, fleeing before the
authorities arrived. See Gruening, México and Its Heritage,
547. Carleton Beals, in "Plutarco Elias Calles, A Record
of Statesmanship," 558, states that "over 5 million were
vaccinated in 2 years." This figure seems a bit high considering the fact that it means almost 1/3 of the total
population was vaccinated during that comparatively short
period.
56
Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 134.
57
•
Beals, "Plutarco Elias Calles, A Record of Statesmanship," 558.
58
/
Secretaria de Salubrldad Pública, Memória . . .,
I925-I928, I, 99. The Health Departmênt reported that ln
1925 between 60 per cent and 70 per cent of the population
of the three states were affected by the disease.
209
The battle against hookworm, aided by cooperation from the
Rockefeller Foundation, began in earnest in I926. The
year before, health authorities had helped in the. construction of 632 sanitary latrines as part of the program for
eradication of the ailment.
latrines were erected.
In 1926, however, over 6,000
By the middle of I928, under the
direction of public health officials, workers in the states
had built a total of 14,227 new latrines. The same fouryear period included treatments totaling over 350,000.^
As in the case of other health programs, the fight
against hookworm was complicated by a lack of education
on the part of those people visited.
The people in áreas
characterized by the example of backwardness found in
Oaxaca were susplcious and resentful of new customs, and
they made an already difficult task much harder for authorities.
Consequently, the administration, with help
from the Rockefeller Foundation, launched an increasingly
beneficiai program of conferences, lectures, and movies
to be held for people over a wide área to quiet superstitious fears.
A further significant feature of the Calles plan
for improved national health included regulations aimed at
59Figures are from Secretaria de Salubrldad P\íblica,
Memória . . ., 1925-1928, I, 101.
^^Calles, Inform.e . . ., 1926, 58.
210
the removal of venereal disease which the Department of
Sanitation described as "major."
Syphilis, in particular,
was widespread—even commonplace--among the people of
61
México.
In a vigorous attack on the problem, Calles
doubled the number of people engaged in that particular
62
campaign during his first year in office.
Once again
health authorities faced a hostile public attitude.
In propagandizing against venerai dlseases the
Department of Health left very little undone and rarely
concerned itself with "niceties." National anti-venereal
commissions began their educational tours to various states
of the Republic.
The urgent message had to reach the
people in any manner.
As one North Aríierican visitor to
México at the time observed:
Rather blatant posters spread warnings from public
billboards and walls, in street cars, trains and
buses. The warning is sent over the radio. It is
flashed in the movies, and traveling lecturers
with vivid slides tour the country.ó3
That people were contacted and made cognizant is evidenced
6lDr. Luis Lara Prado, a physician of México City,
wrote that venereal disease v/as so common that only under
exceptional circumstances did one reach adult life without
having contracted it. He added that "these dlseases cannot spread further, because the population is already
saturated v/ith them. " Cited in Gruening, México ana Its
Heritage, 543.
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 103.
^^Beals, "Plutarco Elias Calles, A Record of Statesmanship," 558.
211
by the fact that large numbers of citizens began visiting
the dispensaries established for examinations for social
dlseases.
A highly necessary aspect of the war on syphilis
included establishing contact between the health authorities and the many prostitutes in the nation's capital.
Registration of the prostitutes had long been required,
but because of methods involved many of the women hesitated,
or they avoided the procedure entirely.
Prior to the adop-
tion of the new Sanitary Code, women who had registered
had been assigned classifications or degrees according to
certain conditions such as age or attractiveness. A personal tax was then assigned to the registrant according to
her classification.
Health officials under Calles believed
that the procedure was doubly defective because of the arbitrary and embarrassing classification and the indebtedness
due to the personal tax.
64
The new Sanitary Code corrected the system of registration. According to the new law ali women registered
equally, and none paid a personal tax.
The tax became the
responsibility of the proprietors of houses of prostitution.
The effectiveness of the lav/ in its intent is dis-
closed by the fact that in 1926, the first year of the law.
64secretaría de Salubrldad Publica, Memória .....
1925-1928, I, 114.
212
3,794 v/omen registered as com-pared to l,7l8 the previous
year.
Also, taxes collected by the Health Department
from the registered houses aLm:Ost tripled from I925 to
1926.^5
From the taxes v/hich the houses paid, as well as
from fines imposed for various violations of the Sanitary
Code, the health administration completely reconditioned
Morelos Hospital ln México City.
The hospital, for women
who were found Infected with various venereal dlseases,
furnished the Departm.ent a m.eans to isolate and treat illnesses.
Also, the Department of Health wldened the causes
for which prostitutes were forced into Morelos Hospital
to include leprosy, câncer, and other serious ailments.
In splte of the intensive campaign, the program
for combating venereal disease did not produce any startling effects.
The records show, however, a large amount
of activity in regard to inspection and hospltalization
of women.
In the period covered up to the last six months
of the Calles administration, the Health Department inspected 166,479 v/omen and reported 150,784 were free of
disease.
Over 8,000 of those Inspected were remltted to
Morelos Hospital for cure, and the rem.ainder were treated
Secretaria de Salubrldad Publica, Memioria . . .,
1925-1928, I, 124.
^^Calles, Informe . . ., 1925, 100.
213
at various health dispensaries for other dlseases.
But
three and one-half years is a relatively short time to
6P>
eradicate a problem which had long plagued México.
The
actual benefits from the efforts of the administration
are not to be measured in numbers, but in the development
of a widescale attempt to educate the people and to attack
systematically the many health problems. At least, as
Gruening has observed, " . . . the first determined attack
on Mexican ill health came with the Calles administration."
69
Also included in Calles' national program, was a
plan to reform the country's military forces, specifically
the army.
This would have political consequences and would
also be a measure of economy.
To help in the change, Calles
appointed the capable Joaquín Amaro to be Secretary of War
and Navy. Within the first month of his ministry Amaro
dismlssed over 1,000 civilian employees of the War Office.
In January 1925 Calles ordered the retirement of 1,400
70
officers, including 400 generais.
The generais involved
were submitted to the Secretary to determine fitness and
'^Secretaria de Salubrldad Publica, Memória . . ., •
1925-1928, I, 118-119.
^^The death rate dropped from 29.3 per 1,000 in
1924 to 24.9 in 1926. However, by 1927 the rate had climbed
again to 27.8 per 1,000.
^Gruening, México and Its Heritage, 544.
'^Êxcelsior, January 9, 1925.
214
capability.
The President also ordered the wide variety
of often colorful military dress done away with and replaced by plain khaki.
their own uniforms.
Officers were ordered to pay for
Padded accoxmts began to disappear.
Chiefs of Operations, v/ho had prevlously divided large sums
of money for extraordinary expenses, saw such quantities
reduced to amounts necessary for their functions.71
The various ills and the abundance of personnel
had created a conslderable drain on the national treasury.
The budget for the War Department which involved payments
for superfluous employees had never, since 1919. operated
at less than 100,000 pesos. Figures for 1921 indicate that
as much as 65 per cent of the budget had been used for war
72
purposes.
As a consequence of such expenditures, military allotments suffered the greatest cuts in Calles' budget for 1925. Further reductions were made in the next two
years imtil domestic conditions created a demand for in73
creased military spending.
7lEmilio Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Política Mexicana (México, D. F.: Ediciónes Botas, 1941), 2^2.
'''^Sherwell, The Financial Outlook ln México, 489.
'^3The budgets for the War Department show allocations for 1923 amounted to 113,305,332.53 pesos, or 32.5
per cent of the executive budget. The next year, 32.0 per
cent or 97,752,974.40 pesos was allov/ed. By 1925 the budg
et came to 83,508,352.92 pesos, or 28.6 per cent. In 1926
the amount totalled 78,950,166.20, not quite 2o per cent.
The 1927 budget was 75,050,000, or 23 per cent. In 1926
the budget increased due to Yaqui Indian uprisings and the
Gomez-Serrano rebellion.
215
More significant than a dovmward revision of the
budget v/as the plan to limit the political activity and
importance of the military.
Army generais and chieftains
had long been a deterrent to democratic institutions.
They had led revolutions during many electoral campaigns
or had been quick to rise if balloting proved unsultable
to their private whims.
The people of México, consequently,
by the 1920's expected the cuartelazo as an almost natural
part of elections.74
One reason for the ease with which the military
leader could disrupt elections or administration plans for
progress v/as the common soldier's dependence on his chief.
Calles attempted to channel the personal loyalty into national loyalty and pride.
The soldier became a student
when many of the barracks were converted into the schools
for instruction in reading and writing.
The men were put
to work constructing new barracks, gymnasiums, and barns.
The military press itself undertook an active program of
changing the attitudes of the soldier.
And early in his
administration, Calles created a commission to study and
75
suggest improvements in the national military college.
Slowly, because of the various means employed, the army in
'^^The term cuartelazo is used to describe rebellion,
mutiny, or uprising by portions of the military.
'^5Calles, Informe . . . , I926, 56.
216
México became more militarily professional and less polltically influential.
Another tactic employed by the administration to
break up the military power was the transferring of many
chiefs to new commands every six months.
This action, it
was hoped, would break up the personal loyalties of the
soldier and prevent alliances between the military chieftain, local politicians, and wealthy landowners, and thus
limit the political influence of the army.'^6
^he point
eventually was reached where severe means v/ere used to
castigate those members of the army who mixed in politics:
those found guilty were summarily dismlssed.77
And an
even worse fate awaited those who were captured while taking military action against the government.'
The Calles program for reconstruction of the military apparently met with some success.
During his temi
he faced military problems of no little consequence, and
the army for the most part remained loyal.
The interne-
cine uprising by the Yaqui Indians of Sonora in 1927 was
successfully suppressed by the army and ended in what the
76.Beals, "Plutarco Elias Calles, A Record of Statesmanship," 559.
'^Êxcelsior, July 17, 1927.
"^ The abortive Serrano-Gomez rebellion against
Calles and the election of Obregón ended in the capture
and quick execution of both men.
217
President called the "unconditional submission of the
eternal rebels."
Cristero groups which were active as
late as I928 could not gain support from the military.'^^
A cuartelazo ln I927, led by Generais Arnulfo R. Goínez and
Francisco R. Serrano, although successfully attracting
parts of the army, could not compare with the one of De Ia
Huerta ln which almost helf of the army defected.^^
There
seems to be some justification for the statement by an
ex-president, Emilio Portes Gil, that the power of the
army" . . . during the reign of Calles was limited excluO-j
sively to functions of a miilitary character."
Ali mili-
tary coups attempted since Calles' reforms have failed.
The real test of the army's loyalty came not in regard to revolution but to the situation created by the
assasslnatlon of Obregoh.
The slaying left something of a
political vacuum v^/hich many Mexican generais in the past
would have welcomed.
Instead of seeking control, the mili-
tary pledged its support to Calles or anyone else who became the chief executive.
The loyalty to the President pledged by the military leaders, however, was forced on them by Calles.
The
79Calles, informe . . ., 1928,75.
^^Charles W. Hackett, "Mexican Rebels Suffer Defeats," Current History, XXX (May 1929).
On
,
Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Política Mexicana,
242.
218
death of Obregón in I928 and the fact that Calles' presidency came to an end the same year gave rise to an unusual
situation for the outgoing President.
Calles took full
advantage of the events in startling statements to the
nation in his final Informe.
The Informe of I928, ad-
dressed to the National Chamber of Deputies on September
1, included a challenge to the army.
The President re-
marked that though the nation faced a serious problem,
created by the death of Obregoh, there was the unique
opportunity to give a "people and government of militarists
the . . . more civilized status of a people of institutions
82
and laws."
He pointed out the evils which the people of
México had suffered because of the rule of the military
chief, or caudillo, whose position in México, he declared,
had come to an end.
In the chambers at the time of the speech were
most of the political leaders of the nation, state governors, and the heads of the various military districts.
One observer described the dramatic occasion thus:
. . . ali the political pov/er of the nation was
concentrated in the Chamber of Deputies upon that
solemn occasion. The proverbial bombshell would
Op
Exposicion Preliminar dei Mensaje Presidencial
presêntado por escrito a las Câmaras Federales y Discurso
Político dei C. Gral. Plutarco Elias Calles, Presidente de
Ia Repiíblica, ante ei Congreso Nacional EJL Primer o de
Septiem.bre de 1926 (México: Talleres Gráficos de Ia Nación, 1926), 6.
219
have caused far less surprise than Calles' emphatic declaration that not only would he not be
a candidate for the Ínterim or for the regular
term but that he would never again be a candidate for the Presidency.03
Calles then held a conference with the military leaders,
from which came their endorsement of a civilian who would
symbolize the new government of institutions and laws.
I The domestic policies initiated by President Calles
were not limited merely to improved economic, health, and
military conditions. However, Calles believed those features of national life were the most important and demanded his most urgent attention. A program of economy,
he felt, would allow the government to introduce other
beneficiai projects such as better living conditions.
Economic and political stability were necessary, and Calles
improved the military environment to reduce the army's
importance.
It is difficult to measure the success of programs
of such vast importance and magnitude when they occurred
over the relatively short period of four years. The primary benefits which the nation derived from Calles' attempts to improve domestic conditions came from the attention which the President focused on major social and economic
ills.
The Calles administration laid the groimdwork for fu-
ture progressive developments in Mexican society and national
economy and stability. |
^3Gruening, "Calles: Mexico's Leading Citizen,"
The Nation, CXXVII (December 26, I928), 709.
CHAPTER VIII
REACTION AND REVJARD
Had Plutarco Elias Calles retired from active political life at the end of his presidency, perhaps history--to the present--would have accorded him kinder
treatment.
However, he did not retire and consequently
does not occupy a very high position on any list of favored
Mexican presidents.
Calles remained the pov/er behind the
executive for a number of years and lost control only when
one of his creations—Lázaro Cá'rdenas--turned on him.
During the period from Obregón's death.to the
Cardenas ascendency, Calles ruled México through a succession of presidents:
Emilio Portes Gil, an able governor
from the state of Tamaulipas, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, an engineer from Michoacán, and Abelardo Rodríguez, a close
personal friend and business partner of e_l jefe máximo
as well as a wealthy banker and gambling house owner from
Sonora.
Though one of the three—Portes Gil—has denied
that Calles exercised any strong influence on him, the
fact remains that Calles made and broke the presidents
during the six years which cover the terms of what most
Mexicans called the three "straw governments."
•^Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Política Mexicana, 87.
Portes Gil wrote that though ''. i . on more than one
220
221
The six years began and ended in the same manner-with intense political excitement.
The assasslnatlon of
Obregáh created a polltically feverish atmosphere. Bewilderment, confusion, and anxiety raced through the
Mexicans' minds.
Overshadowing ali was the question of
a presidential successor.
Elias Calles, the strongest
figure in México, was the foregone, overwhelming choice
to remain in the palace at Chapultepec. However, he astounded the nation--and the entire world--when he announced firmly in his dramatic I928 Informe to the nation
he would no longer be available for the presidency. Lamenting the death of the "hero of Celaya," he warned that
the " . . . national conscience . . . (faced) one of the
gravest and most vital problems because it is not a matter
of a merely political nature, but concerns the nation's
occasion I heard his counsel and used his military collaboration in difficult moments for the country . . ., I declare with ali frankness that never did General Calles
meddle in the affairs of the administration, much less did
he try to force me, or my colleagues, to work in a manner
distinct from that of the national good.: However, Ruiz,
in Calles, . . ., 132, mentions that a favorite anagram of
the day was CEPGSP, v/hich meant: Cludadano Emilio Portes
Gll Será Presidente. (Citizen Emilio Portes Gil v/ill be
presidenty] Reversed, it became: Pero Seguira Gobemando
Plutarco Elias Calles. (But Plutarco Elias Calles will
continue rulingX^ WTlliam Weber Johnson, in Heroic México
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1966),
404, remarks that during the "unhappy residence" of Ortiz
Rubio in Chapultepec Castle, someone painted the palace
walls: "Here Lives Senor Presidente, but the Boss Lives
Across the Way." (At that time Calles lived in Colônia
Anzures near Chapultepec Park).
222
existence itself."
2
According to the President, however, the conditions
presented to the country " . . . for the first time in history perhaps . . . a situation in which the dominant note
is the lack of caudillos."^ Calles argued that the nation faced the opportunity to direct the country's policy
toward a true institutional life away from the historie
condition of the "country of a man" to that of a "nation
of institutions and laws." The survival of México rested
on a turning away from the personalismo of the past, away
from the machinations of politicians and the military,
to the more stable factors of legislation and dellberation.
To prove his beliefs and to help give credence to
his statements, Calles eliminated himself from the presidency by adding emphatlcally that:
. . . I have decided to declare, solemnly, and with
such clarity that my words will not lend themselves to suspicions or interpretations, that I
will not seek the continuation of my mandate by
accepting a . . . designatlon as provisional president. Neither in the period v/hich follov/s the
Ínterim, nor on any other occasion, will I aspire
to the presidency of my country, adding, even at
the risk of making useless this solemn declaration. My conduct will not be limited merely to
a hope or sincere wish on my part, but will be
^Calles, Infonne . . ., 1928, 9.
^Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 10.
223
changed to a positive and immutable fact: never
and for no consideration, and under no circum-•
stance will I return to the position of President
of the Mexican Republic.4
And £l jefe máximo kept that promise--with certain limitations..
The spectacular announcements by the outgoing
President surprised and shocked the confused Mexican nation.
People in other countries familiar with the tradi-
tional viewpoint regarding opportunism and personal ambition by past Mexican leaders were even miore startled.
Messages poured into México applauding Calles.
Commenting
on the popular reaction to. the President's speech, the
paper, Excelsior editoiialized that:
•
We do not exaggerate. The fact is that the Calles
message called forth the unanimous praise of his
enemies, who say that now whatever his errors in
the past, he must be forgiven them in view of his
patriotism and renunclation of every selfish consideration for the best interests of his country.-^
The Calles statement brought forth a flurry of political activity.
(The remarks also refuted, seemingly,
the charges that he had been responsible for Obregón's
Calles, Informe . . ., 1928, 11.
5Cited in Charles W. Hackett and J. Lloyd Mecham,
"President Calles Declines Renomiination," Current History,
XXIX (October 1928), I38.
224
6
death.)
Amazingly enough--and just as Calles had pre-
dicted--the army remained relatively aloof from the events.'^
Leading contenders for the vacant position besides Portes
Gil, were Manuel Perez Trevino, Governor of Coahuila, and
General José Gonzalo Escobar, Military Commander of Coahuila.
On September 25, following heated debates in the Sen-
ate and announcements by the army that it would support
the outeome, the national congress selected Portes Gil as
provisional president.
Although he never again became president, Calles
did occupy various national offices, including that of Minister of War briefly under Portes Gil. Por the most part,
he remained true to his promise to retire from political
office.
His withdrawal did not exclude political activity
or influence however, and the programs enacted during the
I928-I934 years reflect his v/ishes. The apparent faltering
Portes Gil was a part of a delegation which visited
Calles regarding the investigation of the assasslnatlon and
Gil asked for a change in the Chief of Inspection, General
of Police Roberto Cruz, "who was not a friend of Obregón,"
to be replaced by General RÍos Zertuche, Chief of Military
Operations in Sinaloa. When the action was taken. Portes
Gil became convinced that Calles was free of any blame.
See Portes Gil, Quince Aíôs de Política Mexicana, 17.
'^General Plutarco Elias Calles, interviewed by
Licenciado Ezeauiel Padilla, El Aspecto Político de Ia
Sucesión Presidencial (Mexicoi Imprenta de Ia Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores, 1933). 14.
Êxcelsior, September 26, I928.
225
of the revolutionary program over those same years is the
responsibility of ei jefe máximo.
In the few years following his presidency Calles
attempted to occupy a position practically unknown in Mexican history--the power behind the actual president.
that role he committed two serious blunders.
In
One of the
mlstakes cost México and her people revolutionary progress;
the other was expensive to Calles personally.
The first of these grave errors was Calles' turning away from the Revolution.
conservative.
The President became too
The conservative trend which developed fur-
ing his administration solidified into hard lines while he
reigned through Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio, and Rodríguez.
In 1930 Calles announced that land distribution v/hich followed the revolutionary precepts had failed, as had the
Revolution itself.^
And the already waning support of the
CROM practically disappeared as early as the Portes Gil
term.
People in México began to say that because of the
Morrow intrusion Calles had softened his stand against
the United States and the Roman Catholic Church and was
even encouraging further investments by North Americans.
Political opponents called him reactionary, a name which
^Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Política Mexicana, 105
•^^Magner, Men of México, 549-
226
in México implied criminality.
Others compared him with
Diaz.
Although it is not necessarily axiomatic .that
wealth and age make the conservative, those two factors
seem to have definitely swayed Calles from the ranks of
the Revolution.
He and his friends, who by the 1930»s
were labeled henchmen, had profited enormously through
12
their positions of leadership.
They had purchased palatial homes in the resort área of Cuernavaca; they gave
often lavish parties for one another; they displayed their
riches in a manner which the common Mexican could not help
but observe. And it was difficult for the peon to identify the now aging leaders with the selfless aims of the
Revolution.
In fact the Revolution seemed destined to
v/ither in the environment of callism.o.
The second Calles blunder, a mlstake which has actually benefited México, was his creation of a national
political party.
There is no doubt that the National Revo-
lutionary Party, the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionário),
started México on the way to a form of- systematic rule.l3
lÂmado-Chaverri, El Verdadero Calles, 4l3-4l8.
•^^Verna Carleton Millan, México Rebom (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1939). 27.
The PNR ^^fas the forerunner to the present day
Partido Revolucionário Institutional (Revolutionary Institutional Party j.
~"~"
227
However, it seems less certain that Calles founded the Party
for that purpose.
It is likely he could see that a national
party provided means for personal control through political
machinery.
Calles himself remarked that he established the
PNR because:
After much reflection about the serious situation
which the death of General Obregcín has created, I
have thought about the necessity of establishing
an organ of political character, in which will be
fused ali the revolutionary elements which sincerely desire the fulfillment of a program and the
exercise of democracy . . . I believe that the organization of a national character will serve to
constitute a front against v/hich the aims of reaction will be broken to pieces.14
The Party, regardless of reasons for its creation,
represented a final consolidation of political power in
Calles' hands. Working within its framework, ei jefe
máximo (it was in fact the PNR which titled Calles as the
Chief of the Revolution) could control most political
leaders and groups of any consequence in México.
The first
convention of the PNR had met in March 1929 at Querétaro,
"appropriately" in the Teatro de los Heroes where the Con15
stitutlon of 1917 had been drawn up. ^ The assembly named
Ortiz Rubio (a Calles man)- as its candidate, although most
l^Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Política Mexicana,
214.
228
of those who v/ere present seemed to prefer Aaróh Saenz.
By September 1932 Ortiz Rubio, having displayed evidence
of becoming umnanageable, found himself replaced'by Abelardo
Rodríguez. 1'^ The official candidate for the 1934-I940
presidential term became Lázaro cárdenas, and his election
began a series of events which led to the doxmfall of Calles,
In the first few months of his administration,
Cardenas seemed to be following the pattern set by his
three predecessors.
But during his campaign he had built
up a large following among the Mexican people by promising
to renew the program of the Revolution, and he slowly
gained strength as the months passed.
Calles let him play
because ei. jefe had strong support in key cabinet positions,
and a majority of the members in the Senate and Chamber of
Deputies were callistas.
By May 1935. however, open hos-
tilities between groups of callistas and cardenistas v/as
noticeable, and the political climate became emotionally
18
charged.
The struggle betv/een the political antagonists
reached a premature clímax early in June 1935 when a group
L. 0. Prendergast, "Behind the Overthrow of Calles,"
The Nation, CXLI (July 17, 1935), 67.
Pineda, "The Calles Eclipse," The Commonwealth, XXII (July 12, 1935). 279.
•^'''E. R.
-j o
68.
Prendergast, "Behind the Overthrow of Calles,"
229
of callista Senators drove to Cuernavaca to confer with
the "chief" over their seemingly deteriorating power.
Calles' statements on this occasion included attacks on
labor groups because of a rash of strikes which had occurred
in the spring and which he felt were "not only ingratitude
but treason." ^
He deplored the fact that diverse elements
in the country were attempting to divide Congress into
callistas and cardenistas.
And he added to his assertions
a pointed reminder that a similar situation had resulted
in the resignation of former president Ortiz Rubio.
On
June 12, one day after the meeting, Calles' remarks were
published by the México City press, and the awaited showdown between Cárdenas and e_l jefe had begun.
Cá'rdenas' pro-labor reply "abruptly cut the umbilical cord which . . . connected the National Palace
20
with Calles's home in Cuernavaca."
The Mexican Presi-
dent quickly demanded and received the resignations of his
cabinet—an act which allowed him to reorganize his administration.
As a result of the break, the road to
Cuernavaca was busy with automobiles carrylng senators,
21
deputies, and officials who supported Calles.
Despite
l^Cited in Pineda, "The Calles Eclipse," 277.
^^"Calles Returns to México," Current History,
XLIII (February 1936), 526.
^•^Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Política Mexicana,
500.
230
the professed allegiances for ei jefe, Calles soon discovered that his opponent backed by the PNR had become too
strong to oppose. A few days later Calles announced that
he was leaving the country.
In an interview granted
Portes Gil, Calles declared that:
I am terminating my public life and .am leaving
ali responsibility in the hands of those who at
this time direct the country. As I have said,
I hope the Cardenas administration will save the
Revolution. I have recommended to my friends
that they aid in this difficult task.22
With this manifesto, Calles retired again and left México
for a vacation in Hawaii.
While Calles was out of the country, Cardenas
busily strengthened his position. He'relieved callista
officers from the army. He destroyed much of the callistas'
economic power by taking their estates and distributing
the land to the peasants. His ban on gambling and his
"anti-alcohol campaign . . . struck directly at the finan23
ciai interests of Calles and his clique." "^ Thus, when
Calles returned he v/as less wealthy and had lost much political force.
On December 13, 1935. Calles, accompanied by Luis
Morones, returned by airplane to México City.
The two men
22
/
Portes Gil, Quince Anos de Política Mexicana,
50Ôoo
"^•^R. L. Martin, "Mexican Prospects, The Yale
Review, XXV (March 1936), 513.
231
were met by numerous old friends Including generais, senators, and CROM delegates.
El jefe was also met by a
general panic among the people.
Protest and fear did not
subside even though Calles avowed "he \Nrould not mix in
24
politics."
Feverish and rapid political intrigue and action
were launched within a very short period following Calles'
return.
Changes wrought by Cárdenas in the senate, the
army, and local governments took place on a scale not witnessed in some time.
Among the officials Cárdenas removed
were two military chiefs who had met Calles at the airport.
General Joaqum Amaro, the Director General of - Military
Education, and General of Division Manuel Medinaveytia,
25
Commandant of the First Military Zone, were replaced.
Five senators--Francisco L. Terminei, Bernardo L. Bandala,
Cristóbal Bon Bustamante, Manuel Riva Palácio, and Elias
Perez Gomez—also v/ere branded as noted callistas and were
removed because of claims they had for some time plotted
26
against Cárdenas.
And still the changes continued.
cárdenas replaced the governors of Guanajuato, Durango,
24
Jorge Pino Sandoval [Ignotos], El Regreso dei
General Calles (La Tragédia dei Oportunismo Mexicana)
(México: IiEp7enta "Constitución," 1935j, l'^25 Ignotos, El Regreso dei General Calles, I6.
26,
Êxcelsior, December 15. 1935
232
Sinaloa, and Sonora^''' in spite of cries by the callistas
that his action was unconstitutional because it began in
secret session of the senate and because the four men had
been popularly elected by the PNR.
On December l6 the actual climax in the political
struggle began.
On that day Calles protested to the na-
tion that he had no part in any plot against cárdenas. He
expressed surprise at the accusations that he had intended to destroy public order. But few newspapers puby
28
lished the declarations because of Cardenas censorship.
By the l8th, Calles had also given interviev/s to foreign
press services. At a news conference with Arthur Constantine of Universal News Service and J. H. Tamez of
United Press, _e3^ jefe denied any collusion in Obregón's
death. As for his inciting rebellion, he explained that:
In this country, in order to conspire against the
government, it is necessary to make contact with
the army or at least a part of it, . . . but my
earlier declarations such as the 1928 Informe
deny any such activity.^9
^7George Stern, "México's Bloodless Revolution,"
The Nation, CXLII (May 13. 1936), 606, "Calles Returns to
México," 527.
^°The only paper of consequence to print Calles'
remarks was El Instante, and it v/as quickly suppressed as
a Calles organ.
^Îgnotos, El Regreso dei General Calles, 32.
233
Calles also declared that he was foimding a new
political party—the Partido Constitucional Revolucionário
—because the PNR had forgotten its obligation. -Through
the PCR the revolutionary postulates favoring the workers
and campesinos would be realized.
His party, which car-
denistas called fasclst, would bring necessary labor reforms.
The "chief" concluded the interview by reminding
the correspondents of the censorship against him, and he
added the extremely volatile statement that:
I believe that ali these acts by the Cardenas administration show that we are living under a complete dictatorial regime, a dictatorship which
attempts to hide its form by means of force carried
out in the most unjustified manner . . . and which •
is carrylng the country to communlsm.30
The declarations and denlals by Calles created a
national sensation.
Workers' groups which Calles had at-
tacked in J\me speeches called for a masslve demonstration
to take place December 22 to influence Cardenas.
They de-
manded Calles be exiled or sent to the penal colony at
Islãs de Manas.
Some even shouted for his head.
News-
papers headlined that Calles life was in danger and wrote
that his security was a problem for the government.
Cardenas treated the entire matter with surprising
calm.
He appeared before the v/orkers' demonstration and
30
Ignotos, El Regreso dei General Calles, 32-33.
234
spoke to them about Calles' remarks regarding ruln of the
country and a.lack of any program by the administration.
Fully aware of his strong following, he attacked .Calles
and his friends for having enriched themselves at the expense of the people.
Then he added the slight that:
It is not necessary to dictate the expulslon from
the country of any element. General Calles and
his friends are neither a problem for the government nor for the working classes . . . and . . .
it is here in the national territory where those
elements should remain . . . in order to feel the ^-,
shame and weight of their historie responsibility.•^•'•
Calles could not remain silent over Cardenas'
speech.
He replied that the discourse to the workers was
one of political passion and personal hatred.
He noted
that the President's remarks were "without logic. . . .
They excited the multitude, confused the country . . .
and were not suitable words for a chief of state."3
El jefe should have accepted the changed conditions
in México, but of course he did not. He had been misinformed by his opportunistic friends. People in México no
longer supported him.
Probably the best example of public
opinion was expressed by the historian José T. Meléhdez.
In an "Open Letter to Calles," published during the Calles-
31lgnotos, El Regreso dei General Calles, 60.
^Îgnotos, El Regreso dei General Calles, 6l.
235
Cardenas debate, Meléhdez wrote:
Your friends have made you believe that you are
still an idol of the people. What a joke! They
made you believe your presence alone v/ould be
sufficient to provoke a chaotic situation . . .
even to incite a rebellion. Your return disclosed the truth, although bitter for you. . . .
Continue your traveis in foreign.^countries.
Travei, travei much, and' forget.33
Cardenas eventually agreed with the ideas expressed
by Meléhdez.
chief.
In April 1936 he exiled the ailing supreme
He used as an excuse the mysterious bombing of the
Vera Cruz-Mexico City express, which several senators accused Calles of planting.
The administration considered
the terrorist activity as part of a plot to "undermine the
y
34
Cardenas regime."
Calles and a small group of followers
were hustled aboard a government transport which flew them.
to Brownsville, Texas. From there Calles journeyed to San
Diego, Califórnia, where he spent most of his five-year
exile.
In 1941 President Ávila Camacho allowed Calles to
return to México.
By that time the Supreme Chief had lost
his support and his zeal, and his re-entry into México
created little excitement. A new order welcomed him; the
•^-^Meléhdez, Historia de Ia Revolucioh . . ., 195196.
^ Eduardo Reyes, head of the Senate governmental
bloc, in Newsweek, VII (April I8, 1936), I8.
236
day of the caudillo had indeed passed.
The mere fact that
a Mexican president could allow polltically dangerous men
such as Calles to return to México without restriction
attested to a change.
Indicating a transformation also
was the fact that a 1942 Independence Day celebration was
attended by six living ex-presidents.^5
j ^ ^^le not too
distant past, finding one v/ould have been an accomplishment.
Calles returned to a different México. But _el jefe
had also changed.
The fire of revolution he had displayed
in Sonora was only a flicker. He was in poor health, practically senile, and he lived the rest of his days in relative obscurity.
He died in México City within a few years
after his last return to his native land.
On October 19,
1945. a peaceful death ended his violent life.
An enigma has attached to Calles' death. Reportedly, his last words were :
"no hagan nada, es iniítil" ("Don't
do anything, it is useless").37 Since those at his bedside
included several of his old revolutionary friends, the
Parkes, A History of México, 425.
•^Calles was buried with military honors in the
civilian cemetery in México City. His natural death is
practically an oddity. He was one of the few original
revolutionaries to die peacefully. Villa, Madero, Zapata,
Carranza, Obregón, and many others who took part in the
early stages of the Revolution of I9IO died violently.
37
Excelsior, October 20, 1945.
237
words could have been a warning.
Or the statements could
have been an expression of the futility in attempting
change in México.
(In many ways the nation at the time
of Calles' death had changed but little in the two decades
since his administration).
Calles represented many things in México. His life
and his personality characterized the extremes found in
that country.
Born in poverty, he accumulated great wealth,
at the expense of his people. Beginning publicly as a zealous revolutionary, he ended his career an advocate of conservative principies. Few people who met him could dismiss
him; he was looked upon with great respect and commanded
deep loyalty or he was vehemently hated.
He ruled ruth-
lessly; he brooked little disobedience, and he was often
merciless.
Yet small children loved him and called him
"Papa Calles," and he returned the affection. He was a
man who had very little to say, but his political life disclosed great activity.
The México Calles inherited in 1924 had wandered
aimlessly.
The Revolution, despite a few feeble steps
taken by Carranza and Obregoh, was a long way from becoming a reality.
It was Calles, with a strong-willed deter-
mination which drove him to adopt an enormous amount of
the Revolution's legislation, who set México on the road
to a "nation of institutions and laws."
238
Calles failed in his attempt to carry out many of
the ideais of the Revolution.
The peái and the campesino
by 1934 remained downtrodden and indigent despite the fact
that Calles had distrlbuted lands on an unprecedented
scale.
Land distribution alone, especially to the ejidos,
could not resolve the perplexing agrarian problem in México.
Agricultural production did not significantly increase
under Calles who recognized the distribution program as
a failure and turned his attention to a project more in
tune with a burgeoning industrialization.
Actually, the
revolutionary ideas for land distribution had been written
into the Constitution a decade before Calles became president, and they were both backward-looking and idealistic.
Calles attempted to follow the original precepts but changed
after he had visited other nations of the world and observed their practices in landholding.
El jefe's efforts to create better living conditions
for the multitudes, especially in health, produced few immediate results.
There were notable victorles over some
dlseases such as smallpox, and there was definite improvement in the attitudes of the Mexican people toward the
eradication of venerai disease. However, the overall death
rate for the nation remained practically unchanged during
the years Calles ruled.
Infant mortality, which was caused
largely by digestive dlseases, continued high, and the President apparently could not educate the people in basic dietary
239
principies.
His support of organized labor helped some-
what in creating better living conditions such as housing
and sanitation, but not significantly.
However, he did
at least create standards to strive for; he introduced
methods which could eventually produce a better México.
The worst stains on Calles' record were his ruthlessness and his becoming a reactionary.
He ruled with-
out mercy for his opponents or any violators of his authorlty.
Numerous executions and assassinations, especial-
ly those connected with the Church conflict, have been attributed to him.
Not ali of the deaths were his direct
responsibility, but it is doubtful that they were carried
out without his knowledge or consent. But £l jefe was
hard; he had survived an era through v/hich many men could
not survive. He had matured in the shadow of violence;
bloodshed was commonplace in México during much of Calles'
life. And he was president at a time when severity seemed
the only means to bring order.
Calles' transformation from a campaigning revolutionary to a conservative ruler might have been expected.
He obviously recognized, as time passed, that changing
México- to fit the revolutionary mold involved important
factors--namely, the United States and the foreign oil
companies—with which he had experienced few dealings prior
to his presidency.
Economic considerations and threats of
intervention would have been enough (and were) to cause
240
most Mexican rulers to avoid a program which other nations
felt infrlnged upon their International rights.
The
México of Calles' days was not economically independent
enough to allow ej. jefe to continue that part of the Revolution which adversely affected foreign relations.^^
The reactionary label also has been affixed to
Calles because he became wealthy.
Many of the callistas,
including their leader, became rich by virtue of public
office, through graft, and with the help of foreign investors.
And the riches were accumulated at the expense
of the people.
But the bureaucratlc economic ascendancy
in México is historie, and it did not end after Calles.
At the same time, however, _el jefe did attempt to force
some economy on the nation.
He inherited a depleted trea-
sury, spent more for public works than any of his predecessors, and left a small surplus in 1929.
3°The world-wide depresslon of the 1930's created
a particularly severe economic problem for México under
Calles. Tne President could hardly afford to allenate
those countries v/ith large investments ln his country.
cárdenas, however, could do so because he ruled at a time
when the United States had recently undergone a change in
its policies toward Latin America. Franklin D. Roosevelt
and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, recognized the
need for hemlspheric solidarity in the face of threats of
European wars, and they continued the program of friendship which began under Herbert Hoover. Also, Cardenas had
made sure to solidify his popularity with the Mexican
people to the point of almost unanimous support for his
actions.
241
In several instances Calles' policies havé been
definite contributions to México.
His attempts to edu-
cate ali of the people were important in creating a broad
foundation upon which future programs could be built.
His
conflict with the powerful Roman Catholic Church over matters of education and civil affairs of the nation certainly
weakened the Church in its struggle with the government and
left future presidents with much more latitude in civil
matters.
His early support of organized labor gave that
element of society its first real opportunity to grow and
demand reforms.
And the changes he promoted in the mili-
tary establishment have proved extremely beneficiai:
there have been no successful cuartelazos in México since
1920.
Calles perhaps unwittingly but yet prophetically
described the importance of his administration for México
when he left the presidency in 1928.
caudillos," he declared, "had ended."
"The day of the
The nation was pass-
ing from the condition of rule by a man to a government
of "institutions and laws."
Calles himself was the last
of the caudillos, the last of the strong men.
His suc-
cessors have occupied a vastly different role as executives
of México than had been customary.
They have been more
responsive to popular will, and m.ost of them have earned
their positions through political activity.
they have, for the most part, been civilians.
Significantly
242
The movement in México toward a government of "institutions and laws" can be attributed largely to Calles,
whether he intended it or not.
And it is in this respect
that Calles' major contribution to México can be seen.
The founding of the Partido Nacional Revolucionário gave
order and direction to the Mexican brand of the democratic
process.
The immense amount of legislation enacted under
Calles provided a legal basis for action by presidents
who came after him.
Of the revolutionary constitutional
aims, the only important measure to escape the necessary
reglamentacion was a labor code--and even that regulation
came under Portes Gil.
The laws themselves may not have
been highly effective during Calles' rule (which can be
blamed partially upon local officials), but the fact remains that they were promulgated by ei jefe, and they made
the work of later presidents much easier.
An "institution-
alized" México is Calles' most important legacy.
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