Exercise TRITON - Staffordshire Prepared

Transcription

Exercise TRITON
Post Exercise Report
October 2013
Staffordshire Prepared
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“A truly…inspiring…
demonstration of
multi-agency working”
“Quality of
par tnership
work evident”
Worcestershire County Council
Police
“Really excellent
exercise”
“An impressive exercise to be
involved with and I can only
praise the organisers for
their diligence and effor ts
in planning this event”
National Grid
DCLG RED
“Everyone involved
deser ves a pat on
the back, the exercise
planners wor thy of
special recognition”
Staffordshire County Council
“Very well run and coordinated
exercise. The emergency ser vices
who have more experience in
these matters were terrific”
South Staffs Water
“I was incredibly impressed
by the organisation
on the day and the
exercise in general”
British Transport Police
Police
“It is only now on
reflection that I
realise what a
large exercise
it was!!!”
“The exercise
appeared to be
very well organised
and run. Well done”
“The whole exercise appeared
to be very successful and
this should be attributed to the
huge amount of work/planning
put in by the Exercise
Planning Team”
RAF
“An extremely
valuable experience”
Fire
Police
“Bring on the
next one”
SSART
2
“The exercise was amazing
and you can definitely put
me down for anything
like this in future!!!”
Fire Service volunteer
“Significant
learning and
validation achieved”
Police
Contents
Table of Figures
4
Executive Summary
5
Introduction
6
Background
6
Aim and Objectives
12
Success Criteria
13
Project Development
16
Overview of exercise & scenario
18
Learning and Outcomes
20
Exercise Planning
20
Project Plan
20
Management Structure
20
Buy-In
21
Exercise Control (EXCON)
22
Player Feedback
24
Plans and Procedures
26
Learning from experience
26
Mapping
28
Partnership Working
29
Resources
29
Media Coverage
30
Media
30
Twitter
30
SCG / TCG Concept
31
Loggists and Log Books
38
First Trials
39
Full Command and Control Structure
39
Multi-Agency Communications Cells
39
Multi-helicopter interoperability
39
Police Helicopter rescue equipment
40
Fire Service Mutual Aid
41
New NHS response structures
41
Mutual Aid at a Rest Centre
41
Evaluation
42
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Next Steps
45
Summary
45
Recommendations
46
Annex A – Glossary
51
Annex B – Debrief Survey
52
Annex C – Project Plan
70
Annex D – Initial Email
77
Annex E – Example of a blank TCG Ops Board
78
Annex F – SRF Command and Control Structure
79
Annex G – Evaluation Assignment Briefing
80
Annex H – Evaluation Report
84
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Risks included in Exercise TRITON from the Staffordshire Community Risk Register
8
Figure 2: Staffordshire Resilience Forum & Blithfield Reservoir Location
9
Figure 3: Blithfield Reservoir Flood Map
10
Figure 4: Aerial Photograph of Blithfield Reservoir
11
Figure 5: Project Management Structure
13
Figure 6: Project Timeline
15
Figure 7: Locations used during Exercise TRITON
17
Figure 8: Exercise Timeline
18
Figure 9: RAF rescue a ‘casualty’ from moving water at Catton Hall
19
Figure 10: Search and Rescue at Barton Quarry
23
Figure 11: The Strategic Holding Area at Tatenhill Airfield
26
Figure 12: SCG meeting in progress at Staffordshire Police HQ
34
Figure 13: Gold, Silver and Bronze groups and functions
36
Figure 14: Army building temporary flood defences at a gas pumping station
37
Figure 15: Left to right - Police, RAF and Air Ambulance helicopters at Catton Hall
39
Figure 16: The ‘line and strop’ approach whereby the casualty is held in situ by the
Police helicopter until rescue boats can reach them
40
Figure 17: The ‘Jon Buoy’ in action
40
Figure 18: Fire Service and Environment Agency HVPs at Blithfield Reservoir
41
Figure 19: RAF Sea King landing at the TCG at Tamworth Community Fire Station
44
Figure 20: Military operating Exercise Control
50
Figure 21: Strategic Holding Area
69
Photographs supplied by Phil Greig Photography, Paul Pickard Photography and the National Police
Air Service (NPAS) Halfpenny Green (Police Helicopter).
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Executive Summary
Exercise TRITON was the largest live Civil
Response exercise ever to be undertaken
by the Staffordshire Resilience Forum
(SRF) partnership. This report outlines the
background to this exercise and how it was
delivered, before then establishing the
breadth of plans, linked to the Staffordshire
Community Risk Register, that were used by
responders over the period 3-7 June 2013.
At the heart of this report are 51
recommendations that result from a Project
Team debrief and a comprehensive multi-agency
debrief that were conducted immediately
after the conclusion of the exercise. The SRF is
invited to support the implementation of these
recommendations in full.
Taking the recommendations together, the SRF
partnership should perhaps take the following
two key learning points from its commitment to
an exercise of this scope and scale:
 That the SRF partnership is prepared to
respond to complex Major Incidents through
its established and on-going investment in
partnership working and effective, realistic
training and exercising.
 That the SRF partnership should continue to
adapt its command and control structures
in light of Exercise TRITON. Above all, this
should actively seek to develop the Tactical
Coordinating Group (TCG) and its supporting
infrastructure as the focus of all future multiagency response efforts of this size and
complexity.
Sarah Moore
Project Manager
Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit
Andy Marshall
Director of Civil Contingencies
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Introduction
Background
In June 2011, South Staffs Water approached
the Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit
(CCU) to ask for support running an exercise
to test their Onsite Plan for Reservoir
Dam Incidents at Blithfield Reservoir.
This request coincided with the creation
of the Staffordshire Prepared Generic
Offsite Reservoir Plan, which the CCU was
coordinating.
The same month, the SRF Operations (Ops)
Group approved a suggestion by the CCU
that partners use the opportunity to test a
number of emergency plans in a large multiagency exercise, revolving around an incident
at Blithfield Reservoir. Blithfield Reservoir is
Staffordshire’s largest reservoir, containing four
billion gallons of water used for drinking water,
with a surface area of 790 acres. It is classed as a
‘large raised reservoir’ under the Reservoirs Act
1975, and is therefore subjected to supervision
by a suitably qualified Civil Engineer.
“A ‘raised reservoir’ is one where some or all
of the water is held above the lowest point of
the land surrounding the reservoir. Usually,
this lowest point will be at the base of the dam
holding back the water” (The owner’s guide to
reservoir safety, Environment Agency, 2010).
“A ‘large raised reservoir’ is one where the
volume held above the surrounding land is
more than 25,000 cubic metres of water (that’s
equivalent to about 5 million gallons or 10
Olympic sized swimming pools). These must
comply with the requirements of the Reservoirs
Act 1975” (The owner’s guide to reservoir safety,
Environment Agency 2010).
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Although there is no specific threat of Blithfield
Reservoir’s dam failing, it is one of 45 large raised
reservoirs in Staffordshire, and an identified risk
on the Staffordshire Community Risk Register.
Eight risks identified on the Staffordshire
Community Risk Register were used in Exercise
TRITON:
HL11 – Railway Accident
H7 – Explosion of a high pressure
gas pipeline
HL1 – Fire or explosion at a Gas Terminal
or involving a gas pipeline
H17 – Storms and Gales
HL18 – Local Urban Flooding
HL19 – Local Fluvial Flooding
HL23 – Bridge Closure / Collapse
H44 – Reservoir Dam Failure / Collapse
These are shown on the Community Risk
Register Matrix in Figure 1, and in writing the
scenario and the response given by players, the
recommendations in the Pitt Report and the
Flood and Water Management Act 2010 were
taken into consideration.
The significant structural damage caused to
the Ulley Reservoir dam near Sheffield during
the summer 2007 flooding, raised awareness of
the possibility of dam failure, and thus using it
as the basis for a major multi-agency exercise
in Staffordshire seemed logical. To date, there
have been no such incidents in the SRF area.
A map showing the location of the SRF and
Blithfield Reservoir is at Figure 2 and a map
showing the possible extent of the water should
Blithfield Reservoir breach is shown at Figure 3.
Water from Blithfield Reservoir could impact on
Lichfield District Council and East Staffordshire
Borough Council within Staffordshire, and then
travel through Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and
Nottingham.
An aerial photograph of Blithfield Reservoir is
shown at Figure 4.
A formal project structure was adopted, with the
CCU managing a Project Team and the SRF Ops
Group acting as the Project Board, overseeing
the entire project.
The exercise ran over the course of five days in
total, including a 24 hour live play section. This
was realistic for the type of incident involved, if
not a little too short. The Strategic Coordinating
Group (SCG) operated for real during the
Cumbrian floods in 2009 for a total of six days.
Although the SRF had played in a 24 hour
exercise before in Exercise WHITE WATER
in November 2009, Gold, Silver and Bronze
command structures had never operated
together along with sub-national and national
response structures all at the same time before,
so this was a unique opportunity to truly
put SRF responders to the test, and stretch
response capabilities and Business Continuity
arrangements.
Exercise WHITE WATER was the last major
multi-agency exercise undertaken by the SRF
partnership. The SRF partnership aims to
undertake a large multi-agency exercise every
three years, but Ex TRITON was put back a year
due to the Olympics taking place in 2012. The
next exercise in 2016 will focus on infrastructure
failure.
TRITON is a mythological Greek God, the
messenger of the sea. He is the son of Poseidon
and Amphitrite, God and Goddess of the sea
respectively.
“The exercise ran over the
course of five days in total,
including a 24 hour
live play section”.
7
8
Low
Medium
High
Very High
Key
Limited
(1)
Minor
(2)
Moderate
(3)
Low(1)
Medium
(3)
H13, H36,
H43, HL43
H25, H30,
H31, H41,
HL42
H55, H57
HL18, H24
Medium
High
(4)
H54
HL24, H37,
H46
H18, HL19,
HL20, H39,
H58
H17, H48
H56
High
(5)
HL4, H33
H40,
HL10
Version – July 2013
Relative Likelihood
Medium
Low
(2)
HL1, HL2,
HL3, H14,
HL22, HL33,
H38,
H11, HL21,
HL23, H53
H12, H35
HL7, HL14,
HL28, H45
HL12
H4, H5, H7,
H9, HL9,
HL11, HL25,
HL30, H49,
H50
H44
H23
H58 Severe Wildfire
HL1
Fire or explosion – Gas Terminal / Pipeline
HL1 Fire or explosion – Gas Terminal / Pipeline
HL2
Large Toxic Release
HL2 Large Toxic Release
HL3
Localised Industrial Accident Involving Small Toxic Release
HL3 Localised Industrial Accident Involving Small Toxic Release
H4
Fire or explosion – Fuel Distribution Site
H4 Fire or explosion – Fuel Distribution Site
HL4
Major Pollution of Surface and Ground Water
HL4 Major Pollution of Surface and Ground Water
H5
Fire or Explosion at Onshore Fuel Pipeline
H5
Fire
or Explosion
at Onshore
H7
Explosion
at High
PressureFuel
Gas Pipeline
Pipeline
H7 Explosion at High Pressure Gas Pipeline
HL7
Industrial Explosions & Major Fires
HL7 – Industrial Explosions & Major Fires
H9
Large Toxic Chemical Release
H9 Large
Toxic Chemical
HL9
Aviation
Accident Release
HL9 Aviation Accident
HL10
Local Road Accident
HL10 Local
Road Accident
H11
Accidental
Release of Radioactive Material
H11 Accidental
HL11
Railway Release
Accident of Radioactive Material
HL11 Railway Accident
H12
Biological Substance Release
H12 Biological
Substance
Release
HL12
Transport
of Hazardous
Chemicals Incident
HL12
Transport
of Hazardous
Chemicals
H13
Foreign Nuclear
Accident
AffectingIncident
UK
H13
Foreign
Nuclear
Accident
Affecting
H14
Major Contamination Incident UK
H14
Major
Contamination
Incident
HL14 Local (Road) Accident Involving Transport of Fuel / Explosives
HL14 Local
(Road)
Accident
Involving
of Fuel / Explosives
H16
Aviation
Accident
– Semi
urbanTransport
area
H16 Aviation
Accident
H17
Storms
& Gales – Semi urban area
H17 Storms
& Gales
H18
Low Temperatures
& Heavy Snow
H18 Low
Temperatures
& Heavy Snow
HL18
Local
Urban Flooding
HL18 Local
HL19
LocalUrban
FluvialFlooding
Flooding
HL19 Local
Fluvial
Flooding
HL20
Localised
Flash
Flooding
HL20 Localised
Flash Flooding
HL21
Land Movements
HL21
Land
Movements
HL22 Building Collapse
HL22 Building
Collapse
H23
Pandemic
Type Disease
H23 Pandemic
Type Disease
HL23
Bridge Closure
or Collapse
HL23
Bridge
Closure
or Collapse
H24
Major Outbreak
of a New or Emerging Infectious Disease
H24 Major
Outbreak
of a New Outbreak
or Emerging Infectious Disease
HL24
Legionella
/ Meningitis
HL24 Legionella
/ Meningitis
Outbreak
H25
Exotic Notifi
able Disease
in Animals
H25 Exotic
Disease
in Animals
HL25
Fire Notifiable
or explosion
– Gas LPG
/ LNG Terminal
HL25 Fire
/ LNG Terminal
HL28
Fireororexplosion
explosion––Gas
FuelLPG
Distribution
Site
HL28 Fire
or explosion
Distribution
Site
H30
Industrial
Action––Fuel
Fire &
Rescue Services
H30 Industrial
Action
– Fire at
& aRescue
HL30
Localised
Explosion
NaturalServices
Gas Pipeline
HL30 Localised
Explosion
at a Natural
H31
Constraint
on the Supply
of FuelGas Pipeline
H31 Constraint
oncer
theStrike
Supply of Fuel
H33
Prison Offi
H33 Prison
Officer
Strike Fires
HL33
Forest
or Moorland
HL33 Forest
or Moorland
H35
Industrial
Action – Fires
Key Rail or Underground Workers
H35 Industrial
ActionDisruption
– Key Railto
orOil
Underground
Workers
H36
International
Supply
H36 International
Disruption
to Oil
Supply Incident
H37
Influx of British
Nationals
– Security
H37 Influx
of British
Nationals
– Security
H38
Technical
Failure
of Upstream
Oil /Incident
Gas Network
H38 Technical
Failure
Upstream Oil / Gas Network
H39
Failure of
WaterofInfrastructure
H39 Failure
Water Infrastructure
H40
Loss of
of Telecommunications
H41
Technical
Failure of National Electricity Network
H40 Loss
of Telecommunications
H41 Technical
Failure
of –National
Electricity
Network
HL42
Industrial
Action
Emergency
& Critical
Service Providers
HL42 Industrial
Action
– Emergency & Critical
Service Providers
H43
Human Error
– Telecommunication
Infrastructure
HL43
PlantError
Disease
H43 Human
– Telecommunication Infrastructure
HL43 Plant
Disease
H44
Reservoir
Dam Failure / Collapse
H45
Technical
Failure
of Electricity
Network
H44 Reservoir
Dam
Failure
/ Collapse
H46
Biological
Substance
ReleaseNetwork
H45 Technical
Failure
of Electricity
H48
Heat wave
H46 Biological
Substance Release
H49
Loss
of Drinking Water Supplies
H48 Heat
wave
H50
Periodic
WaterWater
SupplySupplies
Interruptions
H49 Loss
of Drinking
H53
International
Disruption
to Gas Supply
H50 Periodic
Water Supply
Interruptions
H54
International
Disruption
to Aviation
H53 International
Disruption
to Gas
Supply (Volcanic Ash)
H55
Severe Effusive
(Gas Rich)
Volcanic
EruptionAsh)
Abroad
H54 International
Disruption
to Aviation
(Volcanic
H56
Severe
Space(Gas
Weather
H55 Severe
Effusive
Rich) Volcanic Eruption Abroad
H57
LargeSpace
Scale Public
Disorder
H56 Severe
Weather
H58
Severe
Wildfi
re Disorder
H57 Large
Scale
Public
i
Significant
(4)
Catastrophic
(5)
H16
Staffordshire Community Risk Register Matrix
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Figure 1: Risks from Staffordshire Community Risk Register included in Ex TRITON
Relative Impact
Figure 2: Staffordshire Resilience Forum & Blithfield Reservoir Location
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Figure 3: Blithfield Reservoir Flood Map
10
Figure 4: Aerial Photograph of Blithfield Reservoir
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Ex TRITON brought together 39 organisations
including Category 1 responders, Category
2 responders, voluntary agencies, other
government organisations & departments,
private businesses and faith communities.
Eight NHS organisations took part,
allowing the partnership to trial the new
NHS emergency response arrangements,
following the restructure in April 2013.
Participating organisations are shown below:
1Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories
Agency (AHVLA)
2 Church of England
3Department for Communities and Local
Government Resilience and Emergencies
Division (DCLG RED)
4Department for Environment Food and
Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
5 Derbyshire County Council
6 East Staffordshire Borough Council
7 Environment Agency
8 Highways Agency (including AMEY)
9 Lichfield District Council
10 Met Office
11 Mid Staffs NHS Foundation Trust
12 Military - Army
13 Military - RAF
14 Stafford Muslim Prayer Hall
15 National Grid
16 Network Rail
17 Newcastle-Under-Lyme Borough Council
18NHS England, Shropshire & Staffordshire
Area Team
19North Staffordshire Combined Healthcare
NHS Trust
20 Nottinghamshire LRF
21 Public Health England
22 Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
23 British Red Cross
24 Severn Trent Water
25South Staffordshire & Shropshire Healthcare
NHS Trust
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26 South Staffs Water
27 St John Ambulance
28 Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit
29 Staffordshire County Council
30 Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service
31 Staffordshire Moorlands District Council
32 Staffordshire Police
33 Staffordshire Search and Rescue Team
34Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent
Partnership Trust
35 Stoke-on-Trent City Council
36 Tamworth Borough Council
37 University Hospital North Staffordshire
38 West Midlands Ambulance Service
39 West Midlands 4x4 Response
Aim and Objectives
The aim of Ex TRITON was to test the SRF multiagency response to a Major Incident.
The Objectives were as follows:
Validate Generic Offsite Reservoir Plan.
Validate Blithfield Onsite Reservoir Plan.
Test multi-agency interoperability.
To assess the effectiveness and assumptions
of agreed SRF response structures, in light
of the on-going pressure on public sector
resources.
Success Criteria
The success of the exercise was reviewed based on
feedback received from an online survey used for
debrief purposes following the exercise (shown
at Annex B). As all the feedback was positive and
constructive about the exercise, the scenario, and
the response given by players, and the aim and
objectives were achieved, it is suggested that the
exercise was a resounding success.
Project Development
Governance
A formal project management approach was taken to create Ex TRITON, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Project Management Structure
SRF Chair
SRF
SRF Ops Chair
SRF Ops Group
Director of Civil Contingencies (CCU)
Project Manager (CCU)
Project Team (Multi-Agency)
Military
CCU
DCLG
RED
East
Staffs
BC
(rep
LAs)
EA
NHS
Fire
Police
South
Staffs
Water
Amb
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Structure
The Project Team consisted of representatives from the following organisations:
Organisation
Name
Army
Lt Col Guy Chambers & Maj Simon Harris
CCU (Project Manager)
Sarah Moore
CCU representing Staffordshire County Council
Chris Hawkridge
DCLG RED
John Houlihan
East Staffordshire Borough Council
William Read
Environment Agency (EA)
Sian Pymm & Felix Chigama
National Health Service (NHS)
Tracey Malkin
Royal Air Force (RAF)
Wg Cdr Nick Nicholson
Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS)
Toby Wilson, Steve Martin & Al Bateman
Staffordshire Police
Sgt John Overend
South Staffs Water
Kate Wilkes & Alan Rogers
West Midlands Ambulance Service (WMAS)
Len Hunt, James Price & John Woodhall
The Project Manager reported updates and issues to the Director of Civil Contingencies, who gave
updates to the SRF Ops Group as required.
Project Plan
A Project Plan was created at the start of the project and updated a number of times throughout.
This is shown at Annex C. This outlined how the project would be managed, who the Project Team
was responsible to and what it was responsible for. It also contained a risk register, showing the key
risks to the project, and the mitigation measures in place to reduce the impacts those risks could
have on the exercise.
Meeting Structure
In the main, the Project Team met every month, with some additional meetings taking place
outside of these formal arrangements, to engage about specific topics such as the Bronze search
and rescue elements.
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Timeline
Figure 6: Project Timeline
June 2011
South Staffs Water approaches CCU for exercise.
June 2011
SRF Ops Group approves major multi-agency exercise.
September 2011
Early notice email of major live exercise
communicated with SRF partners (See Annex D).
October 2011
SRF approves Exercise TRITON.
January 2012
First Project Team Meeting.
June 2013
Exercise TRITON
Funding
No joint budget was used for Ex TRITON.
Instead, all organisations agreed to cover their
own costs due to the mutually beneficial nature
of the exercise for all partners. This cost is offset
by the amount of training value each individual
and organisation got out of the event.
1
Recommendation 1
Individual organisations should fund
their own input into the exercise, so
that the burden of financing the event
does not lie with one organisation.
It is estimated that Ex TRITON cost the CCU over
£10,000 in staff costs during the planning, live
play, and post-exercise stages. Although some
organisations contributed considerably more
resources than others, it can be estimated that
Ex TRITON cost in excess of £100,000 in total.
The CCU applied for, and received, a small grant
from Community Resilience of £1,720, to assist
with the costs incurred by the voluntary and
faith organisations which took part. These
organisations consisted of:

Staffordshire Search and Rescue Team
(SSART)

West Midlands 4x4 Response

British Red Cross

St John Ambulance

Church of England

Stafford Muslim Prayer Hall
In addition, DEFRA provided funding for two
photographers and a film crew. This sum came
to £3,834. Photographs are available on request
and the film can be viewed via the website
www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk.
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Overview of exercise & scenario
The exercise began on Monday 3 June 2013,
with all known Gold and Silver players receiving
emails with background information about
severe weather and potential flooding. This
continued into Tuesday, culminating in the
Environment Agency calling a Flood Advisory
Service teleconference among Silver level
participants to discuss current and anticipated
weather and flood events. Exercise Control
ensured that this teleconference finished with
the request for a Strategic Assessment Meeting
(SAM) to take place on Wednesday morning.
On Wednesday morning, a SAM was held,
where players were informed that, in addition
to severe weather, there was a problem with
the dam at Blithfield Reservoir. The problem
outlined was that the severe weather meant
that the reservoir, which was already full and
overflowing, was being blown in waves over
the dam wall, causing structural damage and
outlining potential escalation.
Following the SAM, Exercise Controllers
requested that players set up Strategic
Coordinating Group (SCG) and TCG facilities
and response structures. Individuals also backbriefed organisations and arranged rotas and
internal response structures to be activated
where appropriate.
Live Bronze play was carried out in the form
of an emergency drawdown of the reservoir,
temporary flood barriers being erected at a gas
pumping station, a Strategic Holding Area (SHA)
being used to monitor Bronze resources, two
Rest Centres caring for ‘evacuees’, search and
rescue from moving water in the River Trent
during daytime, and search and rescue from a
quarry in the evening concluding in the dark.
Exercise locations are shown at Figure 7.
At 0900hrs on Friday, Exercise Control called
ENDEX (End of Exercise). In total, the Main
Events List (MEL), which the exercise was
operated from, contained 200 serials, most of
which were injects given to players, giving them
information about the scenario.
By the end of the exercise, the current situation
was:
Burton-upon-Trent under water
Teacher missing
A refuse lorry containing a crew of four
missing
A missing child
A missing member of staff from the County
Council
Thursday morning saw the start of the 24 hour
live play section, with Gold and Silver level
responders operating throughout, and a number
of Bronze elements taking place at various times.
A member of Ambulance crew missing
During the period 0900hrs on Thursday to
0900hrs on Friday, responders were given a
variety of problems, including the collapse of
the dam at Blithfield, widespread flooding,
missing adults and children, casualties, fatalities,
a train crash, explosions, a gas pipeline leak, and
many other realistic injects.
46 reported fatalities
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Police 4x4 vehicle and two officers missing
472 reported casualties taken to hospital
A timeline for the exercise is shown at Figure 8.
Figure 7: Locations used during Exercise TRITON
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Figure 8: Exercise Timeline
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Figure 9: RAF rescue a ‘casualty’ from moving water at Catton Hall
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Learning and Outcomes
Exercise Planning
Following the exercise, a Project Team debrief
was held. This was carried out with a formal
structure, whereby the team was split into
two groups, and asked to give their views
on a number of areas relating the Project
Management and the Exercise Structure. The
following views are that of the Project Team
and / or Project Manager and are colour coded
red to signify that they are recommendations
from the Project Team Debrief.
Project Plan
The general rule when planning an exercise
in the SRF area, is to include all of the relevant
organisations on the Project Team. This works well
in terms of all organisations having knowledge
of the detail of the exercise, but inevitably a small
group of individuals do the majority of the detailed
planning. In the case of Ex TRITON, most of the
Bronze level planning was completed by Police,
Fire and CCU. Exercise WHITE WATER in 2009 was
similarly coordinated, where the core planning
team was Army, Environment Agency and CCU.
2
Recommendation 2
A ‘core planning team’ should lead
the project, with a wider Project
Team being involved when required.
Management Structure
In general, the management of the project
worked well, with CCU leading a multi-agency
team and all individuals knowing exactly what
was expected of them, and when they were
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expected to complete tasks by using an action
plan. However, there was a view that some
organisations were not represented at the
appropriate level on the Project Team. Project
Team members should be managers within their
organisations, and able to direct organisational
resources to the exercise. Correct representation
from Staffordshire County Council required
working through carefully because managers
originally on the Project Team felt that, after 12
months attending Project Team meetings, they
were unable to represent the entire County
Council. This was then picked up by the CCU, who
perform the Emergency Planning function for
Staffordshire County Council; however, specific
technical expertise from the County Council may
well be required to support the Project Team in
future exercises of this nature in order to ensure
that a credible scenario can be developed.
Securing appropriate NHS representation also
proved challenging, as there was confusion as to
whether the (then) Primary Care Trust (PCT) was
to represent all NHS organisations, resulting in
some NHS Trusts feeling unable to input into the
exercise efficiently. This was greatly improved
with the restructure of the NHS resulting in the
new NHS England, Shropshire & Staffordshire
Area Team; though as this only happened two
months before Ex TRITON, there was little time
to make major changes.
3
Recommendation 3
Project Team members should have
sufficient executive authority within
their organisations to agree actions
and commit resources at meetings.
Recommendation 4
4
If a number of organisations
(e.g. NHS Trusts and Local Authorities)
are being represented by one
organisation, separate meetings
with those organisations are vital
Buy-In
Strategic agreement to a large multi-agency
exercise to include 24 hour play came from the SRF
Ops group and the SRF in the early stages of exercise
planning. However, this information was not always
disseminated down to Tactical level management
within all organisations. This led to Project Team
members still questioning the value of running
24 hour live play up until eight months before the
exercise, which proved detrimental to the planning
of the exercise, as a lot of time was spent discussing
the pros and cons of undertaking 24 hours of live
play, instead of planning for the 24 hours.
Recommendation 5
5
All appointed leads attending
SRF and SRF Ops meetings should
back-brief Civil Contingencies staff
after each meeting, to inform them
of decisions / commitments made.
Recommendation 6
6
All Chief Executives of participating
organisations should be invited to sign
an agreement in the early planning
stages, stating what they will commit
to provide. This should include
Category 2 responders who may not
be represented at the SRF.
During the exercise itself, not all organisations
were present throughout the full 24 hours; this
included an active presence in EXCON. Prior to
Ex TRITON, the Project Team had sought and
received confirmed levels of engagement by
all participating organisations. This picture did
not prove to be wholly accurate in practice, the
knock-on effect of which was additional narrative
‘scripting’ being required around certain injects
by EXCON and gaps on the ground itself.
The Project Team planned on the agreed
requirement for a 24-hour live exercise and
ensured that his was realistic, credible, and
capable of being delivered (e.g. with premises
made available for key meetings throughout)
as far as possible. Not all participants had
perhaps understood the ‘free-running’ nature of
the exercise, namely that after the start of the
exercise, whatever meetings needed to be held
could be held at any time during the 24-hour
period, even if this fell outside of what would
routinely be described as ‘office hours’. Moreover,
not all meetings attracted the appropriate levels
of staff, as laid out in National Guidance.
7
Recommendation 7
Project Team to ensure in future
exercises, that all players are fully
aware of the concept of 24 hour
working and to be prepared to
operate throughout the night.
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Recommendation 9
Attendees of an SCG should always
have executive authority. As stated
in the document ‘The role of Local
Resilience Forums – a reference
document’ issued by the Cabinet
Office in July 2013, “SCG membership
may vary according to the scale and
nature of the incident. It will usually
be a multi-agency forum drawn
from Category 1 and 2 responders
(including the military).
The group must remain a strategic
co-ordination body, with members
holding executive positions
within their own organisations.”
All players must read and adhere to
pre-exercise briefings, to
ensure EXCON maintain control
of the exercise.
8
Exercise Control (EXCON)
EXCON staff struggled to keep control when TCG
players were speaking to Bronze players. It had
been requested in the pre-exercise briefing to all
players that no TCG or SCG players should liaise
directly with Bronze staff, but instead go through
EXCON, as they were being given different
scenario information. This was important
because SCG and TCG were being given
information about huge numbers of casualties,
explosions, resource availability etc. and Bronze
were only being asked to deal with one or two
of these problems. However, it is evident from
the actions during the exercise and the feedback
received from players, that the briefing was not
fully adhered to, leading to confusion.
22
9
Recommendation 8
EXCON communicated with DISTAFF (Directing
Staff at each of the locations) via regular
teleconference calls and an EXCON Airwave radio
channel. This worked well, apart from players
tuning into the EXCON channel occasionally,
as it meant regular updates from the various
play areas to ensure EXCON maintained
Situational Awareness. There were, however,
communications issues at Police HQ, where
EXCON was situated, because the Airwave signal
was very poor, and at times, non-existent.
10
Recommendation 10
Staffordshire Police are requested
to investigate ways of improving
the Airwave radio signal in the new
building at Police HQ.
There was a lot of emphasis on EXCON running the
exercise, rather than monitoring how players were
responding, and this meant that they did not have
the full picture about what was actually happening,
i.e. whether evacuation had been called etc.
Recommendation 11
11
During future exercises, EXCON
should ensure that they are fully
briefed following TCG and SCG
meetings, so that a full picture of the
response effort is maintained.
Figure 10: Search and Rescue at Barton Quarry
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Player Feedback
To gain feedback from exercise participants,
an online survey was created by the CCU, and
sent out to participants to complete. This was
done for a number of reasons:
1.Trying to fit individuals from 39 organisations
into one room for a debrief meeting would
have proved very difficult, especially when
some would require more than one attendee.
2.A broad spectrum of results could be
expected, as every player could feedback,
rather than one spokesperson.
3.The questions could be targeted at specific
areas of the exercise and its planning.
Some individuals did however, send in additional
feedback via email, which has also been taken
into consideration. The results of the survey,
along with Project Manager observations and
the emails from players, form the learning and
outcomes.
The total number of responses received in the
online survey was 95, which is less than 10% of
the participants. However, this is a larger number
than would have fitted into a debrief meeting,
some organisations consolidated their responses
and only completed the survey once for the
organisation, and it would not be expected of
organisations such as the military to have every
solider respond. Therefore, this is taken to be an
accurate reflection of the views of participants.
“The total number of
responses received in the
online survey was 95.”
24
Organisation
Online response
received
1
AHVLA
2
Ambulance
3
Church of England
4
DCLG RED
5
DEFRA
6
Derbyshire County Council

7
East Staffordshire Borough Council

8
Environment Agency

9
Fire

10
Highways Agency (including AMEY)

11
Lichfield District Council

12
Met Office

13
Mid Staffs NHS Foundation Trust
*
14
Military - Army

15
Military - RAF

16
Stafford Muslim Prayer Hall
17
National Grid
18
Network Rail
19
Newcastle-Under-Lyme Borough Council
20
NHS England, Shropshire & Staffordshire Area Team

21
North Staffordshire Combined Healthcare NHS Trust
*
22
Nottinghamshire LRF
23
Police

24
Public Health England

25
Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
*
26
British Red Cross
27
Severn Trent Water
28
South Staffordshire & Shropshire Healthcare NHS Trust
*
29
South Staffs Water

30
St John Ambulance

31
32

33

34
Staffordshire Moorlands District Council

35
Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent Partnership Trust
*
36
Stoke-on-Trent City Council

37
Tamworth Borough Council
38
University Hospital North Staffordshire
*
39
WM 4x4 Response





* It is acknowledged that a number of NHS organisations provided joint feedback via the NHS
England, Shropshire & Staffordshire Area Team.
25
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Plans and Procedures
Learning from experience
One of the objectives of Ex TRITON was to test
the Staffordshire Prepared Generic Offsite
Reservoir Plan. Of the feedback received, only
16% used this Plan. This is a disappointingly
low figure, and indicates that the procedures set
out by Central Government may not have been
followed, and more concerning, may not be
followed during a live incident.
A number of opportunities were missed during
Ex TRITON. Key ones are shown below:
In the early stages of the exercise, before and
during the SAM, there was a distinct lack of any
discussion about the Reservoir Plan, and instead
the focus was on the Staffordshire Prepared
Emergency Flood Plan, with 39% of responses
stating it had been used.
Relevant organisations who had agreed to play
were not called by players on the day, despite
them having a role. Two of these organisations
were Stoke-on-Trent City Council and the
AHVLA. Stoke-on-Trent City Council should
have been contacted by the TCG when they
were informed that two children and a teacher
from a Stoke-on-Trent school were missing,
and the AHVLA could have provided input
about animal diseases in the flood waters.
Despite prompts from EXCON, the TCG did not
contact either of these organisations.
This indicates a lack of understanding and
knowledge of the emergency plans available to
responders before and during a live incident.
12
Recommendation 12
CCU should raise awareness about
available multi-agency plans and their
purpose amongst its own staff and
wider partner organisations.
Responses show that other plans used during Ex
TRITON were as follows:
 Individual organisation emergency plans
 Staffordshire Prepared Tactical Leaders’ Guide
 Staffordshire Prepared Strategic Leaders’ Guide
 Blithfield Reservoir Onsite Emergency Plan
 Rest Centre Plans
Staffordshire Prepared Media &
Communications Plan
Staffordshire Prepared Highways Welfare
Arrangements
26
Figure 11: The Strategic Holding Area at
Tatenhill Airfield
A Response Coordinating Group (ResCG)
had been planned by the Project Manager,
the request for it written into the script, and
the relevant neighbouring LRFs agreed to
participate, but on the day, it was decided
by members of the SCG not to hold a ResCG
teleconference. This would have tested a
concept never before tried in the SRF. We are
also aware of the impact this had on other
Local Resilience Forum colleagues, who had
prepared to take part, and apologise for the
inconvenience caused.
13
Recommendation 13
A ResCG should be incorporated
into a future exercise, to test a
concept never before tried
by the SRF partnership.
 Teleconferencing facilities were used by
EXCON, SCG and TCG, but it was difficult to
hear everyone, as some kits did not have
extending microphones.
Recommendation 14
The CCU, Police and Fire should, on
behalf of the SRF, procure high spec
teleconference kits with extendable
microphones, to ensure that this
facility is available for future exercises
and live incidents. These kits should
operate with the IT in key partner
organisations, such as Police HQ,
Fire HQ and the CCU building.
14
 Some organisations fed back issues with
connecting their IT to the wifi at Police HQ.
Some time ago, Staffordshire Police offered all
organisations the opportunity to visit the new
building and test IT, but not all organisations
have taken Police up on this offer.
15
Recommendation 15
 Many organisations sent only one
representative to the TCG. There was an
overwhelming feeling from participants that
organisations need to send a ‘team’ to the
TCG. This ensures that each organisation is
represented at TCG meetings, while allowing
another member of staff to continue working,
and potentially have a third member of staff
as a ‘runner’. This was also evident with EXCON
and Staffordshire County Council’s Incident
Management Team (IMT) struggling to get
through to TCG via telephone.
16
Recommendation 16
Organisations should send more
than one representative to
TCG wherever possible.
 The strategic decision that SFRS would chair
the TCG meetings led to SFRS having to bring
in extra staff, which seemed effective, and
it was noted by a number of players that
the Chair should not try to represent their
organisation as well as chair.
17
Recommendation 17
The SCG and TCG Chair role should
be treated as a separate role from
representing individual organisations.
All organisations which experienced
connectivity issues at Police HQ should
rectify this as a matter of urgency prior
to another exercise or live incident.
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The TCG Chair dialled into each of the four
SCG meetings via teleconference. As the SCG
meetings peaked at 1hr 45mins long, this
took the TCG Chair out of the TCG for large
periods of time.
The Multi-Agency Mobile Coordination
Post (MAMCP) was not deployed during the
exercise, which would have provided the TCG
with much needed Situational Awareness
from the ground.
Recommendation 18
Recommendation 21
The TCG Chair should update the SCG
Chair prior to SCG meetings, rather
than dial into the entire meeting.
SCG minutes should then be sent
through to the TCG with actions
for the TCG clearly highlighted.
Deployment of the MAMCP should
be considered in all future live
incidents and exercises, to provide
commanders with Situational
Awareness from the scene.
18
21
Mapping
Feedback suggests that the TCG Chairs from
SFRS had not seen the Staffordshire Prepared
Tactical Leaders’ Guide before, which would
have helped them in advance of the meetings.
19
Recommendation 19
CCU to make the Tactical Leaders’
Guide more widely available to
individuals who may chair a TCG.
Category 2 responders such as South Staffs
Water fed back that they struggled with
some of the terminology and acronyms used
during the exercise.
20
Recommendation 20
Category 2 responders should be
invited to become a funding partner
of the SRF, therefore having access
to the full range of training
and exercises available.
28
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) were not
used effectively at either SCG or TCG throughout
Ex TRITON. Instead, basic paper maps were used.
GIS is an effective resource which is available in
most responder organisations, and allows for
up-to-date mapping to be produced quickly
and cross examined with various data sets. It is
more accurate than hand-drawn maps and saves
time when trying to ascertain, for example, the
number of properties in an area.
22
23
Recommendation 22
CCU should host a workshop for
partner GIS professionals, to ascertain
owners of data sets and capability.
Recommendation 23
Civil Contingencies lead officers in
all responder organisations should
engage with GIS leads within their
organisations, and ensure that they are
included on training and exercises.
In the planning stages of Ex TRITON, GIS lead
officers from Staffordshire County Council
identified that the GIS data for the Reservoir
Flood Maps available on the National Resilience
Extranet (NRE) required a lot of manipulation
before they would view correctly. In an
emergency, this may render them unusable.
24
Recommendation 24
Environment Agency should
investigate why the GIS layers on
the NRE are difficult to manipulate,
and amend where possible.
Partnership Working
Security Clearance remains an issue, with
Police understandably unwilling / unable to
share sensitive data about sites at risk, with
responders who are not security cleared.
25
Recommendation 25
Staffordshire Police should investigate
whether a form of temporary security
clearance or agreement is possible for
individuals responding to an incident.
Situation Reports (SitReps) will always be
required during an emergency, to provide
information up and down the chain of
command. Feedback suggests that players did
not know where to find a SitRep template.
26
Recommendation 26
CCU should ensure a standard SitRep
template is available to players before
and / or during an emergency, possibly
via www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk.
Although it was made clear to players in
advance of the STARTEX which organisations
would be playing, information still ended
up in the wrong hands where people did
not understand why they were receiving the
messages / emails. This was made worse by
some players not including the words “ExerciseExercise-Exercise” on communications. This did
and could again lead to responders thinking
they are dealing with a live incident.
Resources
Deployable High Integrity Telecommunications
System (HITS) was available to players at the
TCG, to enhance telecommunications and
email availability. However, some of the
feedback suggests that a number of players
did not understand what the HITS system was
or how it worked. Also, only three phone lines
could be used simultaneously, which led to
communication issues. These issues led to 68%
of respondents not using the facility.
27
28
Recommendation 27
HITS should form part of the
regular communications exercise,
Exercise MERCURY, to enable
local responders to familiarise
themselves with the system.
Recommendation 28
A short HITS briefing sheet should
be created, for quick dissemination
during an exercise or live incident,
by the CCU.
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Media Coverage
Media
Media and Communications lead officers
from Staffordshire County Council and SFRS
produced press releases and invited the
media along to Ex TRITON, and this led to the
Exercise being mentioned on 13 websites and
in the Burton Mail newspaper.
In addition, articles have been included in the
following publications:
Hanson Quarries staff magazine
Crisis Response Journal
Resilience magazine (Emergency Planning
Society)
ES News (East Staffordshire Borough Council’s
residents’ newspaper)
Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service staff
magazine (Burning Issues)
Environment Agency staff bulletin (Our Buzz)
Twitter
The Twitter feed @StaffsPrepared, which is
managed by the CCU, had 1,535 followers on
Friday 31 May, before Ex TRITON began, and
had 1,624 followers on Tuesday 11 June after Ex
TRITON had finished. This is an increase of 89
(nearly 6%) in an 11 day period, showing there
was a lot of interest in #ExTRITON. This is in line
with recent live incidents, where @StaffsPrepared
has seen a 10% increase in followers during the
event.
The feed also received 119 retweets during
the week commencing Monday 3 June, and 35
favourited tweets.
30
The most retweeted tweet was “#ExTRITON In
case you’re wondering what today’s tweets are
all about, here is some further information…(link
to www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk”. This was
retweeted 13 times.
29
Recommendation 29
A communications strategy detailing
the use of Twitter should be produced
prior to future exercises, to allow for
consistent messages to inform the
public about the event.
SCG / TCG Concept
The multi-agency response to Ex TRITON
consisted of a SAM on 5 June, followed by
four SCGs over 6 – 7 June and a TCG running
throughout 6 – 7 June. The SAM and SCG
were run at Staffordshire Police HQ and the
TCG at Tamworth Community Fire Station.
The SCG / TCG model is derived from the
Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and associated
Regulations and Guidance and therefore
represents nationally agreed systems and
processes for a multi-agency response and
recovery operation. A number of key lessons
were identified during Ex TRITON relating
specifically to the SCG and TCG concepts in
the SRF partnership:
 The structure provided by the Staffordshire
Prepared Strategic Leaders’ Guide provided
a solid foundation for establishing both the
SAM and the subsequent SCGs.
30
Recommendation 30
The CCU should ensure that all lessons
relating to the use of the Strategic
Leaders’ Guide during Ex TRITON
are incorporated into Version 005
of the Guide.
 SCG and TCG struggled to establish clear lines
of communication and effective exchange of
information until the evening of 6 June 2013.
Until this point, the SCG and TCG operated
almost entirely independent of each other,
with the SCG successfully establishing a
Mission and Strategic Objectives and the TCG
dealing with immediate matters relating to
the dam breach, inundation and evacuation
etc. However, a truly shared and consistent
picture about the incident was not present
until the third SCG at 2200hrs on 6 June 2013.
Recommendation 31
31
The CCU should ensure that the TCG
has received the SCG Mission, Strategic
Objectives and Battle Rhythm as soon
as they have been agreed, during all
future exercises and live incidents.
 By the evening of 6 June 2013, the SCG and TCG
implemented an agreed information exchange,
based on the information contained on the TCG
Ops Board (Example shown at Annex E). This
information formed the basis of the TCG Chair’s
update to the SCG and proved extremely
effective in allowing the SCG to understand the
current situation much more clearly and, above
all, monitor delivery against the agreed multiagency Mission and Strategic Objectives.
32
33
Recommendation 32
The SCG Chair and / or CCU Strategic
Advisor should visit the TCG after the
first SCG to ensure that the interface
between the SCG and TCG is in place.
Recommendation 33
The TCG Chair should share the Ops
Board with the SCG prior to each SCG
meeting, and should provide the TCG
update to the SCG from the information
recorded on the TCG Ops Board.
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Interpretation of the SCG role and function
varied across responders, with some
expecting the SCG to be sitting throughout
the exercise.
Recommendation 34
34
35
The SCG should not sit as a
permanent body but meet, establish
a Mission and Strategic Objectives
and then empower the TCG
to deliver against these.
Recommendation 35
The SCG should monitor delivery
against the Mission and Strategic
Objectives at all subsequent
meetings, providing maximum
flexibility and space for the
TCG to operate.
The TCG provided the ‘engine room’ for the
multi-agency operation during Ex TRITON.
However, it was hindered in doing this, both
by the constraints of the building used for
the TCG and the limited staff available to
carry out all planning roles effectively. It was
also affected by a long-standing perception
that the SCG, along with a range of specialist
supporting ‘cells’ (e.g. communications,
logistics, GIS), should lie at the heart of
a multi-agency response and recovery
operation. Ex TRITON provided evidence
for a common consensus across responders
that the TCG should be the focal point of
any future multi-agency operation and that
staffing and facilities committed to it should
reflect this.
32
Recommendation 36
36
The SRF should agree to the focus
of multi-agency operations in
Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent
being the TCG, operating from and
within the framework of Mission and
Strategic Objectives set by the SCG.
Recommendation 37
37
Staffordshire Police should
establish the primary location for
a TCG for future multi-agency
exercises and live incidents at
Police HQ and the SCG should meet
at an alternative premises.
Recommendation 38
38
39
The CCU should work with
Staffordshire Police to confirm
and implement an agreed floor
plan and facility requirements
for a future TCG at Police HQ.
Recommendation 39
Staffordshire Police should carry out
the facilities / estate management
role during the establishment and
running of a TCG at Police HQ.
Recommendation 40
40
41
42
Staffordshire Police and the CCU
should conduct a regular test of
TCG activation and connectivity,
providing formal, documented
assurance to the SRF.
Recommendation 41
The CCU should produce, maintain
and test a grab box for the TCG.
Recommendation 42
Other than in a scenario that
has an agreed Police lead
(eg Counter-Terrorism) the CCU
should carry out Tactical Advisor
and room management
functions at future TCGs.
 There was a common misunderstanding of
the concepts of SCG, TCG and their respective
equivalents within each individual responder,
commonly referred to as internal Gold and
Silver / Incident Management Team (IMT)
meetings. The relationship and distinction
between these meetings is shown at Figure 13.
 Multi-agency RAVEN exercises and oneto-one coaching provided for the SRF
partnership by the CCU gave responders
attending Ex TRITON the familiarity with, and
confidence in, the SCG and TCG environments.
Recommendation 44
44
The CCU should ensure that Exercise
RAVEN and one-to-one coaching
material incorporates all lessons
identified from the SCG / TCG
experience during Ex TRITON.
 TCG representatives from individual
organisations are required to act on behalf
of their entire organisation. Although this
takes individuals out of their comfort zones,
particularly those from Local Authorities,
who, for example, might work in education
and know very little about highways, it is
not reasonable to expect someone from
each department to be at a TCG. Therefore,
with the assistance of the CCU and training,
individuals expected to attend TCG should
familiarise themselves with expectations of
TCG representatives, and remember that,
in most cases, they will have an internal
Emergency Control Room operating, to
answer questions the individual cannot
answer alone.
Recommendation 43
43
The CCU should make the
distinction between multi-agency
and internal Gold / Silver meetings
very clear across its training
and exercise material.
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Figure 12: SCG meeting in progress at Staffordshire Police HQ
A number of players reported problems
with access to Police HQ out of office hours,
when the reception was not open. Each
organisation was issued with an electronic
pass card to enable staff to get in and out
of the car park and the building, but it
seems from the feedback that this was not
sufficient, as staff changeovers and meetings
meant that individuals were stuck outside
the main gates for periods of time.
Recommendation 45
45
Staffordshire Police is requested
to review access arrangements
to Police HQ for responders
out of office hours.
34
 The wifi at Police Headquarters worked
well for the majority of players and Exercise
Controllers. However, there were issues with
the wifi at Tamworth Community Fire Station,
with players reporting that the connection
kept ‘dropping out’, and some reporting
a total loss of communications between
0100hrs and 0500hrs on Friday 7 June. It was
also a challenge to get players connected to
the wifi in the initial stages of live play, as the
Fire Service policy is for every organisation to
be manually set up as a separate user, unlike
Police HQ, where a generic wifi account is
available for all to use.
 Feedback also shows that there is a
requirement for a specific training package
for individuals who are likely to chair TCG
meetings.
Recommendation 47
47
The CCU should create a training
package for potential TCG Chairs,
outlining what will be expected
of them, and who they are
responsible to and for.
Recommendation 46
46
Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service
is requested to review its wifi
availability, as connecting
each organisation separately
could cause a significant delay
during a live incident.
35
36
level response
BRONZE
level response
Fire fighters, Police Officers, Forward Control
Officers, etc.
Sometimes referred to as a Rendezvous Point
(RVP), where Bronze teams deploy to / from
to ensure all Bronze staff are working
to the same objective.
= Lines of communication
Deployed by a specific organisation, working
with other responders at or near the scene.
Bronze staff
Takes strategic directive from the
Internal Gold group.
Chair varies by organisation.
Only responsible for that organisation.
Internal Silver
Tactical leaders, typically middle
management, coordinate an individual
organisation’s response operation.
Usually chaired by Chief Executive.
Only responsible for that organisation.
Bronze Command / Forward Control Point
Chair is flexible depending on scenario.
Oversees more detailed management of the
response operation on the ground, while
ensuring the strategic requirements laid down
by the SCG are met.
May also be described as Silver Command
or Multi-Agency Silver.
Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)
Tactical leaders, typically middle management,
coordinate a multi-agency response operation.
Usually chaired by Police.
May also be described as Gold Command
or Multi-Agency Gold.
Internal Gold
Strategic leaders coordinate an individual
organisation’s response operation.
i
SILVER
level response
GOLD
Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)
Strategic leaders coordinate a multi-agency
response operation.
999
Figure 13: Gold, Silver and Bronze groups and functions
Figure 14: Army building temporary flood defences at a gas pumping station
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Loggists and Log Books
Out of nearly 200 trained Loggists in the SRF
partnership, only four volunteered to log at
multi-agency meetings in the run-up to Ex
TRITON. These four were from Burton Hospital,
SFRS, Stoke-on-Trent City Council and the
Environment Agency.
For the four SCG meetings, the following
Loggists were present:
1000hrs meeting -Alexis Emery –
Burton Hospital
1700hrs meeting -Linda Adams –
Stoke-on-Trent City Council
2200hrs meeting -Jill Hollinshead – SFRS
0800hrs meeting -Sarah-Jane Rockey – SFRS
The following Loggists were present at TCG:
Rebecca Gill – SFRS –
0800hrs – 1020hrs
Judy Smith – Environment Agency –
1020hrs– 1530hrs
Rebecca Gill – SFRS –
1530hrs – 1700hrs
After 1700hrs there was no Log Book kept for
the TCG due to no Loggist being in attendance,
leaving 16 hours of exercise play not recorded.
Out of the 200 trained, only 30 Loggists
responded to the original email asking for
assistance, which was sent out from CCU on 3
June 2013.
38
Recommendation 48
48
The CCU should create and maintain
a list of approved Loggists who are
experienced and willing to log
at multi-agency exercises
and live incidents.
The log books have been analysed by Loggist
trainers at the CCU, and while they provide
an accurate record, there are a few points for
consideration, which the trainers will take
forward with future training packages.
Following the exercise, the CCU requested
that all participating organisations keep hold
of relevant documentation, but it became
apparent that not all had kept theirs.
Recommendation 49
49
All organisations and individuals
should always keep documentation
and logs following an incident or
exercise of this nature, in case they are
required at a later date.
First Trials
Ex TRITON provided an opportunity to test a
number of concepts for the first time:
Full Command and
Control Structure
For the first time ever, the SRF operated the full
Command and Control structure of Gold, Silver
and Bronze, all operating concurrently, as well
as sub-national and national structures. The SRF
Command and Control structure is shown at
Annex F.
Multi-Agency
Communications Cells
In March 2013 the Staffordshire Prepared
Emergency Media and Communications
Plan was reviewed creating Version 002. This
version contained new Command and Control
structures, namely, Strategic Multi-Agency
Communications Group (SMAC) and Tactical
Multi-Agency Communications Group (TMAC).
Ex TRITON was the first occasion where these
new structures could be and were put into place
validating these areas of the Plan. It was also
an opportunity for media and communications
colleagues from across the partnership to
work together with other partners in a multiagency exercise and for partners to recognise
and understand the importance of media and
communications during an emergency.
Multi-helicopter interoperability
One of the Bronze elements of Ex TRITON
involved the Police helicopter (NPAS Halfpenny
Green), Midlands Air Ambulance and the
RAF Search and Rescue sea king helicopter
all working in very close proximity. This was
the first time they have worked so closely
together in Staffordshire, and provided learning
opportunities for all involved, including that the
Air Ambulance cannot actually fly while other
helicopters are operating in the area, which is
not an issue for the Police and RAF.
Figure 15: Left to right - Police, RAF and Air Ambulance helicopters at Catton Hall
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In addition, a Combined Silver Air Cell (CSAC)
operated during Ex TRITON, which is a concept
never before tested anywhere in the West
Midlands.
The CSAC operated by responding to air
requests from TCG and Bronze commanders
and delivering a response in line with the SCG’s
command priorities and intent. The CSAC is
the ACPO-agreed (Association of Chief Police
Officers) central tasking cell for all emergency
service air assets for such a major incident.
Previous training, with the 200ft line and strop,
was carried out over still water at a reservoir,
so the opportunity to rehearse over moving
water gave the crew a more realistic scenario to
experience and develop the techniques.
The crew also trialled a new piece of rescue
equipment called a ‘Jon Buoy’. This is a selfinflating ‘horsehoe’ life jacket which inflates
when in contact with water.
This had Liaison Officers from the Police,
Ambulance and RAF helicopters, to ensure a
joined up approach to providing air support to
the incident and operated alongside the TCG.
Police Helicopter rescue
equipment
Ex TRITON gave NPAS Halfpenny Green the
unique opportunity to exercise the ‘cold water
stabilisation’ equipment over moving water,
which had not previously been experienced.
Figure 17: The ‘Jon Buoy’ in action
This item was thrown from the aircraft to the
casualty below in the water and offers a simple,
cost effective means to keep persons afloat prior
to being rescued.
Figure 16: The ‘line and strop’ approach whereby
the casualty is held in situ by the Police helicopter
until rescue boats can reach them
40
The exercise allowed the crew to decide future
deployment techniques and report back to the
NPAS who are adopting this piece of equipment
nationwide as a result.
Multi-Agency Strategic
Holding Area (MASHA)
 Warwickshire
Tatenhill Airfield was used as a MASHA during
Ex TRITON. This had been agreed prior to the
exercise by the Project Team, and proved to be
an extremely useful site, with Tatenhill Aviation
giving players an entire section to use, including
their own access gate.
In addition, the Environment Agency mobilised
a HVP from an external supplier, which is part of
their incident management procedures.
 West Midlands
Although deploying from a single site seemed
to work effectively on the day, there is much
confusion about which organisation should lead
on the establishment and running of a MASHA.
50
51
Recommendation 50
DCLG RED should seek official
confirmation from Central
Government on the lead
organisation for a MASHA.
Recommendation 51
Designated Police, Fire and
Ambulance leads to coordinate and
organise the continuing operation
of the MASHA for the duration
of the exercise / incident.
Fire Service Mutual Aid
SFRS called on mutual aid from neighbouring
Fire and Rescue Services for Ex TRITON, to test
interoperability arrangements. This involved the
following organisations sending a High Volume
Pump (HVP) set, consisting of a pumping unit
and a hose layer:
 Shropshire
 Hereford and Worcester
Figure 18: Fire Service and Environment Agency
HVPs at Blithfield Reservoir
New NHS response structures
The new NHS structures saw NHS England,
Shropshire & Staffordshire Area Team operating
their Incident Coordination Centre (ICC) for the
first time during an exercise.
The ICC coordinated the NHS response to the
‘incident’ and all Staffordshire NHS Trusts reported
into this from Trusts’ ICCs. This then fed into the TCG
and SCG through one NHS representative at each.
Mutual Aid at a Rest Centre
One of the two Rest Centres in Burton-upon-Trent
was operated by a team of officers from other
Local Authorities, under Mutual Aid arrangements.
The authorities were Tamworth Borough Council,
Lichfield District Council and Staffordshire
Moorlands District Council, who provided the
manager. This is the first time the SRF has tested
Rest Centre mutual aid arrangements, and seemed
to worked very well, with all Rest Centre staff
having received the same training from the CCU.
A separate Post Exercise Report for that individual
part of the exercise is available on request.
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Evaluation
Trained exercise Evaluators were employed
during the initial stages of Ex TRITON. This
marked the first use of trained Evaluators in
a multi-agency exercise in the SRF area. The
reason for using trained Evaluators was to
assess how the formal evaluation process
would work in a multi-agency exercise
and to note any obstacles to the wider
implementation of the concept in future
multi-agency exercises.
6 June, with the proviso that a follow-on visit
could be conducted at the TCG after the first
SAM in order to witness how communication
of key information was passed from the SCG to
the TCG. Given the potential sensitivity of the
first use of independent, external Evaluators
and the requirement to assess whether using
them added any value, beyond those locations
identified, the Evaluation was deliberately kept
very limited in scope.
A total of three Evaluators were invited on a
voluntary basis to support Ex TRITON; two from
Norfolk Fire & Rescue Service and one from
Merseyside Fire & Rescue Service. All invited
Evaluators were known to the CCU through
them having completed the International
Masterclass for Evaluators (IMCE). The IMCE is
a week-long course during which delegates
are introduced to the theoretical background
and underpinning concepts behind formal
evaluation, followed by the practical application
of a common evaluation model in scenariobased exercises. Central to the IMCE method
is the application of the Observation – Analysis
– Judgement – Recommendation (OAJR) model
during any evaluation assignment; the OAJR
model was therefore a stipulation during Ex
TRITON.
All Evaluators attended as requested, although
a detailed OAJR was not possible for the SAM
due to the unavoidably late arrival of one
Evaluator. A formal report (shown at Annex H)
was produced by the Evaluators who attended
the SCG and subsequently the TCG and this
was followed up with a telephone conversation
between the senior Evaluator present at the SCG
and the Director of Civil Contingencies. This
provided an excellent opportunity to drill down
into the key themes that the Evaluators had
reported on.
In order to ensure that the role and function
of the Evaluators was clearly understood, a
detailed Assignment Briefing (shown at Annex
G) was produced by the CCU and circulated
to the Evaluators for their approval. This
document was well received by the Evaluators
and should therefore provide a useful template
for future Assignment Briefings produced by
the CCU. The Evaluators’ Assignment was split
over the SAM on 5 June and the first SCG on
42
In summary, the Evaluation process was
successful and it is recommended that
consideration be given not just to its wider
application in future multi-agency exercises but
to training specialist Evaluators in the CCU and
the wider SRF partnership. Key ways in which
the process added value are as follows:
The findings of the Evaluators backed up
with tangible evidence the wider themes
that were either witnessed by players or
were fed back in the debrief process.
The independent nature of the Evaluators
promoted and encouraged greater probing
and challenge during the feedback process.
 Exercise players did not report any negative
feedback or hostility towards the presence of
Evaluators.
 Any future Evaluation Assignment should
factor in a formal debrief in-person as soon
as possible after ENDEX has been called.
 Evaluators can bring a degree of peer group
reflection to the feedback process; for
example it was useful to understand where
the SRF partnership was demonstrating
progress beyond its peers but, similarly, how
it might learn from other LRFs’ experience.
 Any future Evaluation Assignment should
contain a written template for the recording
and subsequent presentation of feedback
from the Evaluators.
 The Evaluators were wholly positive about
the process and seemed keen to share their
learning with their colleagues in their LRF
area.
There would also, however, be lessons to learn
from the first Evaluation experience. These
would be as follows:
 Any requirement for the formal evaluation of
an early morning meeting should stipulate
an overnight stay, paid for by the exercise
planning team, for any required Evaluators
if they are travelling a considerable distance
(i.e. over and hour’s travelling time). This will
allow time for the Evaluator to be on site and
meet key staff ahead of the meeting that
requires evaluating.
 Be prepared for recommendations being
made that might be based on systems and
processes that are present in other LRF areas.
In other words, whilst the Observation made
by the Evaluator may be entirely valid, it
may not be completely relevant to the SRF’s
agreed structures, systems and processes.
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Figure 19: RAF Sea King landing at the TCG at Tamworth Community Fire Station
Next Steps
 All organisations are requested to action the
recommendations made in this report as
soon as possible, and feedback through the
SRF updates on those recommendations.
 The CCU should carry out a review in 12
months’ time, to check progress against the
recommendations in this report.
 The next major SRF multi-agency exercise is
scheduled to take place in 2016, focussing
on infrastructure failure.
 The recommendations made in this report
should be taken into consideration in the
planning stages of the next exercise.
 The Staffordshire Emergency Flood Plan,
last updated in 2010, will now be fully
revised, taking into account the Staffordshire
Prepared Multi-Agency Major Incident
Handbook, which means that much of
the generic response information can be
removed.
 A legal expert will be asked to review the
documentation from Ex TRITON, and give
their opinion on areas for improvement
for the SRF partnership in terms of
accountability.
 From the very positive feedback received by
those who used the Generic Offsite Reservoir
Plan, this is taken to be validated. A few minor
amendments are required, which will be done
by the CCU and then reissued to partners.
Summary
In summary, Ex TRITON gave SRF partners
and other organisations not routinely part
of the SRF structure a unique opportunity
to practise using current and new skills,
structures and equipment, in a safe learning
environment. It also gave individuals an
insight into the types of issues they may have
to respond to during a live incident, and was
quite an ‘eye-opener’ for most.
In addition, the inclusion of not only local
command and control structures, but subnational and national structures, added to
the realism and gave everyone involved the
opportunity to learn from experience.
The feedback received has been
overwhelmingly supportive, with responders
identifying opportunities for improvement,
which can only lead to a safer Staffordshire and
Stoke-on-Trent.
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Serial
Recommendation
Responsible Org
1
Individual organisations should fund their own input into the
exercise, so that the burden of financing the event does not lie with
one organisation.
All SRF partners
2
A ‘core planning team’ should lead the project, with a wider Project
Team being involved when required.
CCU
3
Project Team members should have sufficient executive authority
within their organisations to agree actions and commit resources at
meetings.
All SRF partners
4
If a number of organisations (e.g. NHS Trusts and Local Authorities)
are being represented by one organisation, separate meetings with
those organisations are vital.
NHS organisations
Local Authorities
5
All appointed leads attending SRF and SRF Ops meetings should
back-brief Civil Contingencies staff after each meeting, to inform
them of decisions / commitments made.
6
All Chief Executives of participating organisations should be invited
to sign an agreement in the early planning stages, stating what they
will commit to provide. This should include Category 2 responders
who may not be represented at the SRF.
CCU
7
Project Team to ensure in future exercises, that all players are fully
aware of the concept of 24 hour working and to be prepared to
operate throughout the night.
CCU
8
Attendees of an SCG should always have executive authority. As
stated in the document ‘The role of Local Resilience Forums – a
reference document’ issued by the Cabinet Office in July 2013, “SCG
membership may vary according to the scale and nature of the
incident. It will usually be a multi-agency forum drawn from
Category 1 and 2 responders (including the military). The group
must remain a strategic co-ordination body, with members holding
executive positions within their own organisations.”
All SRF partners
9
All players must read and adhere to pre-exercise briefings, to ensure
EXCON maintain control of the exercise.
All SRF partners
10
Staffordshire Police are requested to investigate ways of improving
the Airwave radio signal in the new building at Police HQ.
Police
11
During future exercises, EXCON should ensure that they are fully
briefed following TCG and SCG meetings, so that a full picture of the
response effort is maintained.
CCU
12
CCU should raise awareness about available multi-agency plans and
their purpose amongst its own staff and wider partner
organisations.
CCU
All SRF partners
Serial
Recommendation
Responsible Org
13
A ResCG should be incorporated into a future exercise, to test a
concept never before tried by the SRF partnership.
14
The CCU, Police and Fire should, on behalf of the SRF, procure high
spec teleconference kits with extendable microphones, to ensure
that this facility is available for future exercises and live incidents.
These kits should operate with the IT in key partner organisations,
such as Police HQ, Fire HQ and the CCU building.
15
All organisations which experienced connectivity issues at Police
HQ should rectify this as a matter of urgency prior to another
exercise or live incident.
All SRF partners
16
Organisations should send more than one representative to TCG
wherever possible.
All SRF partners
17
The SCG and TCG Chair role should be treated as a separate role
from representing individual organisations.
All SRF partners
18
The TCG Chair should update the SCG Chair prior to SCG meetings,
rather than dial into the entire meeting. SCG minutes should then
be sent through to the TCG with actions for the TCG clearly
highlighted.
All SRF partners
19
CCU to make the Tactical Leaders’ Guide more widely available to
individuals who may chair a TCG.
CCU
20
Category 2 responders should be invited to become a funding
partner of the SRF, therefore having access to the full range of
training and exercises available.
CCU
21
Deployment of the MAMCP should be considered in all future live
incidents and exercises, to provide commanders with Situational
Awareness from the scene .
22
CCU should host a workshop for partner GIS professionals, to
ascertain owners of data sets and capability.
23
Civil Contingencies lead officers in all responder organisations
should engage with GIS leads within their organisations, and ensure
that they are included on training and exercises.
24
Environment Agency should investigate why the GIS layers on the
NRE are difficult to manipulate, and amend where possible.
25
Staffordshire Police should investigate whether a form of temporary
security clearance or agreement is possible for individuals
responding to an incident.
26
CCU should ensure a standard SitRep template is available to
players before and / or during an emergency, possibly via www.
staffordshireprepared.gov.uk.
CCU
CCU
Police
Fire
All SRF partners
CCU
All SRF partners
Environment
Agency
Police
CCU
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48
Recommendation
Responsible Org
27
HITS should form part of the regular communications exercise,
Exercise MERCURY, to enable local responders to familiarise
themselves with the system.
CCU
28
A short HITS briefing sheet should be created, for quick
dissemination during an exercise or live incident, by the CCU.
CCU
29
A communications strategy detailing the use of Twitter should
be produced prior to future exercises, to allow for consistent
messages to inform the public about the event.
All SRF partners
30
The CCU should ensure that all lessons relating to the use of the
Strategic Leaders’ Guide during Ex TRITON are incorporated into
Version 005 of the Guide.
CCU
31
The CCU should ensure that the TCG had received the SCG Mission,
Strategic Objectives and Battle Rhythm as soon as they have been
agreed, during all future exercises and live incidents.
CCU
32
The SCG Chair and / or CCU Strategic Advisor should visit the TCG
after the first SCG to ensure that the interface between the SCG and
TCG is in place.
CCU
33
The TCG Chair should share the Ops Board with the SCG prior to
each SCG meeting, and should provide the TCG update to the SCG
from the information recorded on the TCG Ops Board.
All SRF partners
34
The SCG should not sit as a permanent body but meet, establish a
Mission and Strategic Objectives and then empower the TCG to
deliver against these.
All SRF partners
35
The SCG should monitor delivery against the Mission and Strategic
Objectives at all subsequent meetings, providing maximum
flexibility and space for the TCG to operate.
All SRF partners
36
The SRF should agree to the focus of multi-agency operations in
Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent being the TCG, operating from and
within the framework of Mission and Strategic Objectives set by the
SCG.
All SRF partners
37
Staffordshire Police should establish the primary location for a TCG
for future multi-agency exercises and live incidents at Police HQ and
the SCG should meet at an alternative premises.
Police
38
The CCU should work with Staffordshire Police to confirm and
implement an agreed floor plan and facility requirements for a
future TCG at Police HQ.
CCU
Police
39
Staffordshire Police should carry out the facilities / estate
management role during the establishment and running of a TCG at
Police HQ.
Police
Serial
Recommendation
Responsible Org
40
Staffordshire Police and the CCU should conduct a regular test of
TCG activation and connectivity, providing formal, documented
assurance to the SRF.
CCU
olice
41
The CCU should produce, maintain and test a grab box for the TCG.
CCU
42
The CCU should carry out Tactical Advisor and room management
functions at future TCGs.
CCU
43
The CCU should make the distinction between multi-agency and
internal Gold / Silver meetings very clear across its training and
exercise material.
CCU
44
The CCU should ensure that Exercise RAVEN and one-to-one
coaching material incorporates all lessons identified from the SCG /
TCG experience during Ex TRITON.
CCU
45
Staffordshire Police is requested to review access arrangements for
responders out of office hours.
Police
46
Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service is requested to review its wifi
availability, as connecting each organisation separately could cause
a significant delay during a live incident.
Fire
47
The CCU should create a training package for potential TCG Chairs,
outlining what will be expected of them, and who they are
responsible to and for.
CCU
48
The CCU should create and maintain a list of approved Loggists who
are experienced and willing to log at multi-agency exercises and live
incidents.
CCU
49
All organisations and individuals should always keep
documentation and logs following an incident or exercise of this
nature, in case they are required at a later date.
50
DCLG RED should seek official confirmation from Central
Government on the lead organisation for a MASHA.
DCLG RED
51
Designated Police, Fire and Ambulance leads to coordinate and
organise the continuing operation of the MASHA for the duration of
the exercise / incident.
Police
Fire
Ambulance
All SRF partners
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Figure 20: Military operating Exercise Control
50
Annex A – Glossary
ACPO
Association of Chief Police Officers
AHVLA
Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency
CCU
CSAC
Combined Silver Air Cell
DCLG RED
Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and
Emergencies Division
DEFRA
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
DISTAFF
Directing Staff
ENDEX
End of Exercise
EXCON
Exercise Control
GIS
Geographical Information Systems
HITS
High Integrity Telecommunications System
ICC
Incident Coordination Centre
MASHA
Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area
MEL
Main Events List
NHS
National Health Service
NPAS
National Police Air Service
NRE
National Resilience Extranet
PCT
Primary Care Trust
RAF
Royal Air Force
SA
Situational Awareness
SAM
Strategic Assessment Meeting
SAR
Search and Rescue
SCG
Strategic Coordinating Group
SFRS
Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service
SitRep
Situation Report
SRF
Staffordshire Resilience Forum
SRF Ops
Staffordshire Resilience Forum Operations Group
SSART
STARTEX
Start of Exercise
TCG
Tactical Coordinating Group
WMAS
West Midlands Ambulance Service
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Annex B – Debrief Survey
52
53
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55
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999
57
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999
59
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999
61
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999
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999
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Figure 21: Strategic Holding Area
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Annex C – Project Plan
EXERCISE TRITON: Project Plan
Version: 007
Date: 18 September 2012
File: G:\CCU\Training and Exercising\Exercises\Exercise TRITON\
Project Plan\120918 Ex TRITON Project Plan V7.doc
Project Approach
The project will be managed by the Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU), with the support
of Staffordshire’s responders.
Key Deliverables
The main purpose of the exercise is to test
the Blithfield Onsite Reservoir Plan and the
Staffordshire Prepared Generic Offsite Reservoir
Plan. In doing so, a number of other plans may
be tested, including:
Staffordshire Emergency Flood Plan (SEFP)
Individual responder Major Incident Plans or
equivalent
Local Authority Rest Centre Plans
Environment Agency Local Flood Warning
Plan for Staffordshire
Staffordshire Prepared Mass Transportation
Plan
Staffordshire Prepared Emergency Media
and Communications Plan
70
It has been decided by the Project Team that
Recovery, along with other Plans not listed
above are out of the scope of this exercise.
These deliverables will be achieved by partners
of the Staffordshire Resilience Forum (SRF)
taking part in a 24 hour live exercise from 09:00
on 6 June 2013 to 09:00 on 7 June 2013.
The exercise will consist of a number of levels of
Command and Control, which are highlighted in
pink on page opposite:
71
Command and Control Structures to be used during Exercise TRITON
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Project Stages
Project agreed at SRF Ops Meeting
Exercise takes place
Project Plan published
Exercise Debrief
Project Team in place
Post Exercise Report published
Exercise planning begins
Project Team Structure
Organisation
Representative
CCU
Sarah Moore
Ambulance
Len Hunt
DCLG RED
John Houlihan
Environment Agency
Felix Chigama
Sian Pymm
Fire
Toby Wilson
Alan Bateman
Local Authorities
William Read
Military
Lt Col Guy Chambers
NHS
Claire Machin
Police
Insp Paul Barker
Sgt John Overend
South Staffs Water
Kate Wilkes
Alan Rogers
Matt Bulzacchelli
Ian Benson
Project Team Roles &
Responsibilities
Sarah Moore will be the Project Manager and
will agree with other members of the Project
Team where responsibilities lie. All members of
the Project Team are expected to work towards
creating the exercise.
Project Timeline
Project agreed at SRF
19 August 2011
Ops Meeting
Project Plan published
30 September 2011
Project Team in place
28 October 2011
Exercise planning begins January 2011
72
Deputy Representative
Wg Cdr Nick Nicholson
Exercise takes place
6 June 2013
Exercise Debrief
July 2013
Post Exercise
Report published
September 2013
Project Board and
Communication
The SRF Operations (Ops) group will be the
Project Board for this project. Sarah Moore
will feed issues and updates to Andy Marshall
(CCU) to take forward to the Ops group. Chief
Superintendent David Forrest chairs the Ops
meeting and will be the ultimate Project
Director. He will feed information up to the SRF
through ACC Jane Sawyers (SRF Chair).
Project Communication Plan
SRF
ACC Jane Sawyers
C/Supt David Forrest
SRF Ops group
Andy Marshall
Sarah Moore
Project Team
Project Risk Register
Project Closure
A risk register for this project is shown at Annex
A. This document is to be regularly reviewed by
the Project Team and should be a standing item
on the Team and Board agendas.
The project will be closed when the exercise is
complete and a Post-Exercise Report (PXR) has
been written and agreed by the Ops group.
Project Administration
All SRF documentation will be stored on the CCU’s
g-drive. All documents will be date-dated e.g.
“110908 Project Plan” at the start of the file name.
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Sign-off
Signature:
Sarah Moore - Project Manager
Date:
Signature:
C/Supt David Forest - Project Director
Date:
74
3
4
2
Slippage in time
scales.
If there is no exercise
location the exercise
could be cancelled /
postponed.
Loss of skills and
expertise.
Insufficient players
and unrealistic
exercise.
The Plans are not
tested properly
because responders
fail to use them.
Members of
Project Team do
not commit to
exercise.
Loss of venue.
Loss of key staff.
Responders may
not commit to 24
hour working.
Lack of
understanding of
the Plans being
exercised.
2
3
4
5
6
7
4
3
4
A large number
of resources from
major players unable
to attend, could
result in exercise
being cancelled /
postponed.
A real emergency
occurs taking
resources from
the exercise /
resources are
unable to attend
exercise
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
4
IMPACT LIKELIHOOD
1
RESULT
Vital players not
participating may
result in the exercise
being cancelled.
RISK
Players do not
commit to the
exercise.
SER
PRE-MITIGATION
The Project Team should choose a
back-up venue to use.
Early buy-in from Project Team
organisations sought.
Exercise planned for spring to try
and avoid inclement weather.
Early agreement sought at the
SRF Ops meeting in June 2011
and again in August 2011.
MITIGATION
Very
High
High
Responders
have plenty of
notice to object.
Higher levels of
understanding of
the Plans, allowing
organisations to
use them to full
potential.
Presentation to be made available
to organisations following the
release of the Reservoir Plan.
Training on some other plans is
already available. Facilitators will
ensure players use Plans.
Other members
of staff can step
in.
4
3
1
3
3
Project Team
members are
enthusiastic and
have enough
time to commit.
Two locations
identified.
4
5
2
2
3
1
1
2
3
IMPACT LIKELIHOOD
Risk of an
emergency
occurring due
to inclement
weather is
reduced.
Responders
have plenty of
notice to object.
RESULT
Early agreement sought at the
SRF Ops meeting in August 2011.
All Project Team members asked
to nominate a deputy, and if
Medium
players cannot attend they will be
asked to send a replacement.
Very
High
High
Very
High
Very
High
RATING
POST-MITIGATION
High
High
Low
Medium
Medium
High
Very
High
RATING
Project Plan Annex A
75
76
4
Equipment already
being used
elsewhere.
Confusion leading to
mistakes.
Lack of staff
availability.
Organisations are
not made aware of
an incident.
Public concern,
impacts on housing
market etc.
Availability of
equipment.
Code words
and accepted
terminology.
Pandemic flu is
prevalent.
Initial alerting
cascade detailed
in the Reservoir
Plan fails.
Media overemphasise risk of
dam breach.
9
10
11
12
13
3
4
4
4
4
Players injured.
Health & Safety
issues.
4
4
4
4
3
3
IMPACT LIKELIHOOD
8
RESULT
RISK
High
Very
High
Very
High
Very
High
Very
High
Very
High
RATING
2
Facilitators
have terms of
reference for
instructions.
Smaller scale
exercise would
require fewer
resources.
Code words agreed by Project
Team. Also printed in facilitator
packs.
Exercise could be scaled back
to allow for a shorter, less timeconsuming exercise, or postponed
to a later date.
Responders to put emphasis on
flooding, rather than reservoir
dam breach.
Facilitators to ensure that
messages get through even if the
Alerting cascade fails.
3
Enough notice
given to booking.
Planning & advance warning /
booking. Notional play could also
be implemented if there was a
vital resource missing.
3
3
Information
still reaches
responders.
Media and the
public are not
informed of
reservoir risk.
3
4
Ensure that
all areas are
properly
assessed before
Start Ex.
Risk Assessments to be carried
out for operating sites and safety
around water and night working.
1
1
3
2
2
2
IMPACT LIKELIHOOD
RESULT
MITIGATION
POST-MITIGATION
Low
Medium
High
Medium
High
High
RATING
i
SER
PRE-MITIGATION
999
Annex D – Initial Email
From: Sarah Moore
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2011 4:24 PM
Subject: Early Notice - Major LIVE Exercise
Good afternoon
Exercise TRITON will take place on Thursday 6 June 2013. This is likely to be a 24 hour exercise,
aimed at testing a number of Staffordshire Prepared Plans. This is likely to be the first of its kind,
with live Gold, Silver and Bronze play.
Plans to be tested may include:
1. Generic Offsite Reservoir Plan
2. Individual onsite reservoir plan
3. Staffordshire Emergency Flood Plan
4. Resilient Communications Plan
5. Media and Communications Plan
6. Temporary Mortuary Plan
7. Recovery Plan
8. Individual organisation Rest Centre Plans
9. Individual organisation Major Incident Plans / equivalent
10. Mass Transportation Plan
The Project Manager is Sarah Moore from the Civil Contingencies Unit, supported by a Project Team
including representatives from Fire, Police, South Staffs Water, Staffordshire County Council and the
Environment Agency.
The Project Board is the SRF Operations Meeting, chaired by C/Supt David Forrest.
At this stage the exercise is more than 18 months away, but the Project Team will provide regular
updates as necessary.
In the meantime, can I ask that you add this date into the diaries of key members of staff, and
forward this email and any updates to colleagues who may be involved?
Kind regards
Andy Marshall
Director Civil Contingencies
01785 898608
www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk
77
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Annex E – Example of a blank TCG Ops Board
78
Annex F – SRF Command and Control Structure
(pink shows structures used during Ex TRITON)
79
i
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Annex G – Evaluation
Assignment Briefing
Key Background Information
1. Origins of Exercise TRITON. Exercise
TRITON originates from South Staffs Water,
the reservoir owner, wishing to test its
onsite plan for reservoir dam incidents.
During initial planning, South Staffs Water
approached the CCU to invite the responders
of the Staffordshire Resilience Forum (SRF)
partnership to conduct a wider multi- agency
response exercise of the off-site consequences
of a reservoir dam breach, to run coterminous
with their on-site test. The SRF agreed as it
presented an ideal opportunity to conduct
an exercise on a scale not seen before in
Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent.
2. Exercise Aim. The Aim of the Exercise is
to practise a multi-agency response to a
catastrophic dam failure in Staffordshire.
3. Exercise Objectives. The Exercise will have
the following Objectives:
To test the Blithfield Onsite Plan for Reservoir
Dam Incidents.
To test the Staffordshire Prepared Generic
Offsite Reservoir Plan.
To practice the invocation of agreed multiagency command & control arrangements.
In doing so, a number of other plans may be
tested, including:
The Exercise also provides the opportunity for
a range of multi-agency response plans to be
invoked, including:
Staffordshire Emergency Flood Plan (SEFP)
80
Individual responder Major Incident Plans or
equivalent
Local Authority Rest Centre Plans
Environment Agency Local Flood Warning
Plan for Staffordshire
Staffordshire Prepared Emergency Media and
Communications Plan
The invocation of any wider multi-agency
plans will be at the discretion of Exercise
players, through a ‘free-play’ approach. This
has been incorporated into the Exercise in
order to simulate real-time decision-making as
realistically as possible.
4. Project Management. Exercise TRITON is
an extremely complex event to plan and
manage, with 36 organisations in total
taking part. As a result, the Exercise has
been managed through a formal Project
Management approach. The ‘engine room’
of the project is the Project Team, led by
Sarah Moore from the CCU and supported
by staff from organisations across the SRF
partnership. The Project Team has operated
in accordance with an agreed Project Plan
that has been monitored by the Director of
Civil Contingencies and approved by the SRF
Operations Meeting and the SRF Meeting.
The SRF Operations Meeting has also acted
as the Project Board for the Exercise.
5. Exercise Timeline. The main focus of the
Exercise is a 24-hour element, which runs
from approximately 0900 hrs on 6 June
2013 to 0900 hrs on 7 June. However, this
will be preceded by an initial lead-in phase
throughout 3-5 June 2013, and the Exercise
will ultimately be followed by a comprehensive
debrief and lessons identified process. The
latter will conclude with the production of a
full and detailed Post-Exercise Report (PXR).
6. Exercise Locations. There will be three
main exercise locations for the multi-agency
element of Exercise TRITON:
 Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG):
Staffordshire Police Headquarters, Stafford.
 Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG):
Tamworth Community Fire Station,
Tamworth.
 ‘Bronze’ Water Rescue: Barton Quarry,
Burton-upon-Trent.
There will also be a number of sites where
single-agency exercise play will take place.
These include Blithfield Reservoir and
Staffordshire County Council.
7. Exercise Management. The Exercise will be
run in accordance with a full and detailed Main
Events List (MEL) that has been designed by the
Project Team. Injects and scenario information
will be fed into the Exercise by Exercise Control
(EXCON), in accordance with the MEL. EXCON
will be coordinated by a single Exercise Director
post. There will be four Exercise Directors
occupying this single post during the Exercise
in order to allow for enforced rest; the principal
Exercise Director will be Sarah Moore from
the CCU. In addition to EXCON, there will be a
number of Directing Staff from SRF responders
and neighbouring LRFs monitoring various
Exercise play locations throughout. Their role is
to support EXCON in ensuring that the Exercise
progresses according to the MEL. There will
also be a number of Observers present during
the Exercise.
Evaluation Assignment
8. Rationale. The SRF partnership has not
to date carried out formal evaluation of its
exercises. This is for at least two reasons:
 There remains no formal local or national
requirement to evaluate exercises.
 Culturally, evaluation has been (and
remains) a sensitive subject in Civil
Contingencies as evaluation can be
misinterpreted as ‘testing’.
However, the SRF partnership has conducted
significant numbers of exercises over the last
few years, to the point where there is likely to
be greater confidence in accepting evaluation
as the norm rather than the exception. Recent
experience from the International Masterclass
for Evaluators has provided the CCU with an
evaluation model that has been successfully
employed during major EU civil response exercises
(ORION/Floodex). The rationale behind the use of
Evaluators during Exercise TRITON is therefore:
 To test the employment of the evaluation
concept
 To employ a proven model for carrying
out evaluation
 To employ evaluators who are trained in
using the proven evaluation model
 To feedback to SRF partners on the
findings of the evaluators, based on
criteria defined by the CCU
 To feed back to SRF partners on the utility
of the evaluation concept
 To establish whether evaluation should
form part of the established architecture
of future multi-agency exercises in the SRF
area.
81
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999
9. Approach. This evaluation is to run as
follows:
1 x Evaluator to attend the Strategic
Assessment Meeting (SAM) during the
morning of 5 June 2013.
2 x Evaluators to attend a Strategic
Coordinating Group (SCG) meeting and
then a Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)
on 6 June 2013.
Evaluators to combine their respective
draft feedback in a single written
submission to the CCU for inclusion in the
Exercise TRITON PXR.
10. Methodology. The methodology to be
employed during the evaluation and
subsequent feedback is to be the ‘OAJR’,
or Observation-Analysis-JudgementRecommendation.
11. Specific Areas of Evaluation. Evaluators
are requested to focus their evaluation on
the following criteria:
Development and maintenance of
Situational Awareness
Development and communication of a
multi-agency Strategic and/or Tactical
Plan
12.Report. Exercise TRITON will be followed-up
via a detailed PXR, which will be written by
the CCU. Detailed arrangements for the PXR
will follow; the main Point of Contact for this
process will be the Exercise TRITON Project
Manager, Sarah Moore. Notwithstanding the
requirement to confirm the exact content
and layout of the PXR, there will be a separate
and distinct section to record the feedback
from the Evaluation process. To that end, the
Evaluation ‘Team’ is requested to record its
draft findings on the attached form and to
82
send the completed form to Sarah Moore at
the CCU as soon as possible, but no later than
11 July 2013. On receipt of the form, the CCU
will contact the Evaluation team to arrange a
teleconference to discuss the draft findings
in more detail, prior to then confirming
the exact submission in the PXR. During
this teleconference, the CCU would also be
interested in feedback from Evaluators on
how the Evaluation process (administration,
briefing, support etc) actually worked.
13. C
o-ordination. To make communication
and administration as simple as possible, it
is requested that Paul Hitchens, Merseyside
Fire & Rescue Service, acts as ‘Team Leader’
for the Evaluation Team.
Administration
14. Travel. The CCU agrees to reimburse
Evaluators for travel to and from the
Evaluation Assignment. This will be
reconciled at standard Staffordshire Fire
& Rescue mileage rates. Evaluators are
requested to provide the undersigned
with dates of journeys, mileage run and
registration of vehicle used.
15. A
ccommodation. If required, the CCU will
provide bed and breakfast accommodation
at a local hotel for the Evaluators travelling
from Norfolk. All other expenses incurred
(other than travel) will be the responsibility
of the Evaluators. Should accommodation
be required, please confirm this as soon as
possible with the undersigned.
16. Feeding. Meals will remain the responsibility
of individual Evaluators. A canteen and café
facility is available at Staffordshire Police
Headquarters, where the SAM and SCG
will take place. There is no such facility at
Tamworth Community Fire Station.
17. Meeting Allocation. The proposed
meeting allocation is shown below. The
Team Leader is requested to confirm this
approach with the undersigned as soon as
possible:
 SAM 5 June 2013 (Police Headquarters
insert postcode): Paul Hitchen.
 SCG 6 June 2013 (Police Headquarters):
Richard Smith & Mark Yeomans.
 TCG 6 June 2013 (Tamworth Community
Fire Station insert postcode): Richard
Smith & Mark Yeomans.
18. Security and Identification. Evaluators will
be required to possess and present a valid
Fire & Rescue Service ID card on arrival at
each of the Evaluation locations. On arrival
at each location, unfortunately it is unlikely
that there will be CCU staff available to
meet and host Evaluators. Evaluators are
therefore requested to outline that they are
taking part in Exercise TRITON and the name
of the meeting that they are attending. This
should then facilitate timely access to the
desired meeting where Directing Staff will
be expecting you. Should any problems
with access to meetings be encountered by
Evaluators, please contact the CCU using
one of the contacts shown below.
19. Wifi. Guest wifi is available at both
Evaluation locations. For assistance
connecting to wifi, please speak to the
Directing Staff at either location.
20. Parking. Visitor parking is available at both
Evaluation locations.
 The Multi Agency Major Incident
Handbook (for an overview of resilience in
the SRF partnership).
 The Strategic Leaders’ Guide (for use at
SAM/SCG).
 The Tactical Leaders’ Guide (for use at
TCG).
You are also actively encouraged to visit the SRF
website at www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk to
find out more information on the key elements
of resilience arrangements in Staffordshire and
Stoke-on-Trent.
23. Points of Contact. I will remain your Point
of Contact throughout the Evaluation
Assignment. However please note that I
will be actively playing in the Exercise so I
may not be available to speak at all times,
particularly on 6 June 2013.
Summary
24. Exercise TRITON is a significant
commitment on the part of the SRF
partnership. Within this, a number of
exciting opportunities present themselves,
most notably the chance to carry out the
first trial of formal multi-agency exercise
Evaluation in the SRF. Your support for the
Evaluation Assignment and the opportunity
it presents to further your own development
as Evaluators provides significant mutual
benefit. I thank you for your assistance and
I look forward to discussing your findings
after the exercise.
22. Supporting Documents/Links. To support
you in your assignment, the CCU will email
you three documents separately. These will
be:
83
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Annex H – Evaluation Report
Exercise Triton – 7th June 2013
Pre Brief
Evaluators – Richard Smith – Norfolk Fire and Observation
Rescue Service
I observed a very thorough pre-brief from CCU’s
Mark Yeomans – Norfolk Fire and Andy Marshall (AM) to Gold Commander Police
to develop an understanding of the situation.
Rescue Service
This was partly for exercise continuity but also
The evaluators were asked two examine the
as a way of creating initial situational awareness
two key areas within the Multi Agency Exercise
(SA).
TRITON.
I observed the Gold Commander “checking”
Development and Maintenance of
areas of common understanding and
Strategic and Tactical Situational
challenging jargon which was not immediately
Awareness
familiar with AM. I observed the six key
objectives of the CCU were set from a very early
Development and Communication of a
stage and were read, checked and agreed from
Multi-Agency Strategic and Tactical Plan
the SAM minutes to bring forward into the SCG
The evaluation team employed the OAJR
meeting.
method below.
I observed the Gold Commander requesting
Some analysis and judgement has been made
agencies present and if any other agencies were
but the evaluators believe that these areas are
required. This was at the pre-brief and the SCG.
best served by Judgement from within the
I observed clarification of use of a Loggist being
group. Any judgement or recommendations are
discussed between Gold Commander and AM
made based on observations made and do not
clarifying the need for DECISION – ACTION –
take into account all areas/actions.
RATIONALE to be used.
Observation
Analysis
Judgement
Recommendation
Development and maintenance of strategic
and tactical situational awareness.
Development and Communication of a Multiagency Strategic and Tactical Plan.
84
I did not observe this being used as a template
during logging within the SCG minutes.
SCG meeting - Stafford
I observed each agency at SCG create an
understanding of their roles within the incident
and a brief update. The updates did not follow
a consistent briefing pattern. I heard the chair
and AM make reference to maps and that
partners were invited to look at the maps
after the meeting. After the meeting I did not
observe anyone viewing the maps. I observed
that the maps needed some deciphering and
explanation to ascertain exactly the information
it was trying to get across to the group.
I observed the SCG requesting that GIS mapping
is put in place with overlay of traffic routes onto
the system. This action did not translate clearly
into the list of 15 tasks supplied to TCG and
subsequently was not implemented.
I did not observe each partner agencies
briefing/updates being recorded and then put
into a master document. The Loggist appeared
to be doing this and taking detailed notes on
behalf of the Gold Commander.
I did not see any form of written objectives or
current plan that had come from TCG to SCG.
I did not hear any “commonly understood”
briefing structures used when TCG briefed SCG
verbally.
I heard the chair of TCG join the SCG meeting
and brief the meeting by telephone conference.
I do not know how the operational updates
from TCG were recorded into SCG apart from the
minutes and log. This may have taken place as
these were not viewed.
Reference was made to wealth of “management
information” maps, flood plains, and expected
areas of breach but no direct use of them. It was
not observed that any agencies viewed these
maps which were situated in a different room.
I did not observe any “check” process to ensure
that TCG had received and understood both 6
key objectives and 15 tasks set by SCG.
TCG meeting/s – Tamworth Community Fire
Station
I observed the chair of TCG silver asking for
operational updates around the meeting from
each partner agency and reference to their
objectives on the white board.
I observed that the objectives on the white
board were not the same six key objectives set
by SCG.
I observed that the six objectives set by SCG
were not present at TCG and not used.
I do not know if they were sent.
The 15 tasks decided at the SCG were not
supplied to TCG until approx. 1410.
2nd TCG
TCG did work to the list of 15 objectives set by
SCG. I observed that these were not sent to TCG.
I observed TCG receiving information from Silver
“water representative” that the dam had burst at
1440.
I spoke to AM at 1520 and SCG were not aware
that the dam had burst.
Recommendations
1 - I would ask the group to consider using the
maps to ensure that common understanding
is created on matters of geography, distance
and location. Whilst it is not important to
understand tactics at SCG a master map may
have enhanced the briefings and sharing of
information/situational awareness.
2 - I would recommend that in initial SCGs
that two loggists are present with one taking
strategic taskings and turning them into
workable lists of objectives for TCG with the
other taking minutes.
The first set of objectives would have been
implemented in this case from 1000 until 1700
(time planned for next SCG).
Detail is of paramount importance for creating
a common operational picture and strategic
awareness together with communicating the
plan with confirmation of understanding.
85
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999
3 – CCU explore how the logs notes/
objectives are worded and passed to TCG with
confirmation of understanding - Single Point Of
Contact for communications between SCG/TCG.
Consideration of using the “stateboard” which
should create an easy template for objectives
passed between SCG/TCG with a recognised
system of receiving information and confirming
understanding.
4 - CCU examine systems which can update
decisions in real time and share information
across the groups. The group should examine
IT based systems which can turn on “layers” to
ensure that operational/tactical and strategic
level information is viewed but with access to
each other’s objectives/plans.
86
87
This report has been written by the Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit
on behalf of the Staffordshire Resilience Forum.
Stafford Fire Station
Beaconside
Stafford
ST18 0DD
Tel: 01785 898618
Email: [email protected]
www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk
Print and design by Staffordshire County Council, Print Commissioning Services. Telephone: 01785 276051
72104/10/13

Exercise TRITON - Staffordshire Prepared

Transcription

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