Guideline for Port Business Continuity Management

SATREPS Chile Tsunami Project
Publication Series
Volume 4
Guideline for Port Business
Continuity Management
（DRAFT）
SATREPS Chile Tsunami
Research Project on Enhancement of Technology to
Develop Tsunami-Resilient Community
March 2016
1
BCP Guidelines for Chilean ports
Drafted on January 8, 2016 by F. Caselli
Updated on Feb. 27 - March 1, 2016 by K. Ono,
2
About this Document
Since the Central Chile Earthquake and Tsunami in 2010, and the Great East Japan Earthquake
in 2011, both countries have shared a growing concern of large scale tsunami disaster destroying
national socio-economy and coastal communities; therefore they have done an international joint
research project, namely SATREPS-Chile (Science and Technology Research Partnership for
Sustainable Development between Japan and Chile).
The project included, as an overarching approach to create tsunami resilient community, a
research segment of preparing business continuity plan (BCP) in the Chilean ports to facilitate
minimizing aftermath negative impact of the disaster on the socio-economy, as well as promptly
mobilizing port functions for emergency relief logistics (ERL).
This document is a result of that
research.
Members of group 4 involved in this document
Escuela de Ingeniería Civil Oceánica, Universidad
•
Julio Pérez, DOP Iquique
de Valparaíso, Chile
•
Juan Barboza, Empresa Portuaria de
Iquique
•
Felipe Caselli Benavente
•
Mauricio Reyes Gallardo
•
Mario Beale Esquivel
•
Michael Rojas, Empresa Portuaria de
Iquique
•
…
Dirección de Obras Portuarias, Ministerio de
Obras Públicas de Chile
•
Ariel Grandón
•
Raúl Oberreuter
Disaster prevention Research Institute, Kyoto
University, Japan
•
Kenji Ono
•
Yasuhiro Akakura
Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Tourism of
Japan
•
Yoshikazu Takino
•
Koichi Sase
With the collaboration of
3
About this Document ..................................................................................................................... 3
Outlines of the Guidelines ............................................................................................................. 9
1
Significance and outline of the business continuity management ............................... 13
1.1
Business Continuity Management in Ports ................................................................. 13
1.2
Requirements to the port management ...................................................................... 15
1.3
Overview of port BCM procedures .............................................................................. 16
1.4
Business Continuity Plan core elements ..................................................................... 18
2
Context of the business continuity in ports ................................................................. 18
2.1
The national and regional economy and port development
2.2
Interested parties ........................................................................................................ 17
2.2.1 Governance and ownership ........................................................................................ 20
2.2.2 Clients and suppliers ................................................................................................... 20
2.2.3 Workforce .................................................................................................................... 19
2.2.4 Community .................................................................................................................. 19
2,3
Port cargo handling demands in the aftermath of disasters
19
5.2.1. Supply-Demand Relation-ships in port logistics
5.2.2. Cargo handling demands in the aftermath of disasters
5.2.3. Estimation methodologies for cargo handling volume in the disaster area
3
Establishing BCM Policy ............................................................................................. 22
3.1
Significance of BCM Policy
3.2
Policy ipreparation guidance ....................................................................................... 23
4
Establishment of BCMS .............................................................................................. 24
4.1
Business Continuity Team .......................................................................................... 27
4.2
Leadership and collaborative actions to be undertaken
5
Analysis and appraisals .............................................................................................. 29
5.1
Business impact analysis (BIA) ................................................................................... 30
5.1.1 Work sheets system for BIA ........................................................................................ 32
4
5.1.2 Evaluation of impact due to the business suspension ................................................ 30
5.1.3 Identifying Key Elements and an extraction of resource bottlenecks .......................... 33
5.1.4 Determination of Critical Operations and setting the recovery time/level objectives
5.2
37
Risk assessment and appraisal .................................................................................. 41
5.2.1 Risk identification ........................................................................................................ 42
5.2.2 Risk analysis ............................................................................................................... 43
5.2.3 Risk evaluation ............................................................................................................ 46
5.2.4 Risk treatment
6
Development of business continuity strategy and program ........................................ 48
6.1
Basic idea of port business continuity strategy and program ...................................... 53
6.1.1 Overall strategic approach for port business continuity
53
6.1.2 Risk Acceptance Strategy
54
6.1.3 Risk Avoidance Strategy
54
6.1.4
Risk
Sharing
and
Transfer
Strategies
55
6.1.5 Risk Mitigation Strategy
6.2
55
Developing port business continuity strategy and program ........................................ 55
6.2.1 Continuity and early recovery of critical port logistics function and shipping services 56
6.2.2 Securing the port administration and control functions ............................................... 56
6.2.3 Securing and maintaining the information and communication system ...................... 56
6.2.4 Financing .................................................................................................................... 57
6.2.5 Regulatory compliance ............................................................................................... 57
6.2.6 Ensuring consistency with public policy and efforts of social infrastructure operators 57
7
Planning ...................................................................................................................... 58
7.1
Drafting and determining BCP .................................................................................... 58
7.1.1 Business continuity plan for port logistics (Port BCP) ................................................. 58
5
7.1.2 Implementation program of the proactive measures ................................................. 589
7.1.3 Education and training program .................................................................................. 59
7.1.4 Implementation program for review and improvement ................................................ 60
7.2
8
BCP documentation .................................................................................................... 60
Proactive measures, and education and training ........................................................ 61
8.1
Implementation of the proactive measures ................................................................. 61
8.2
Implementation of education and training ................................................................... 61
8.2.1 Practice of education and training methodology ......................................................... 61
8.2.2 Programing the exercises ........................................................................................... 63
9
Inspection and corrective actions ................................................................................ 64
9.1
Inspection and evaluations ......................................................................................... 64
9.2
Corrective actions to be taken by port management .................................................. 64
9.3
Correction and improvement ....................................................................................... 64
9.4
Sustainable improvement ........................................................................................... 64
10
Recommendations to the Management and the Economic Community ..................... 65
11
Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 66
12
References .................................................................................................................. 70
13
Checklists .................................................................................................................... 71
Appendix A
Continuity Policy Example.................................................................................. 72
A1)
Example 1 .....................................................................................................................
A2)
Example 2 .......................................................................................................................
Appendix B
Risk Identification ............................................................................................... 86
B1)
Earthquake and tsunami impacts on Ports .....................................................................
B2)
Risk identification techniques ..........................................................................................
B3)
Internal and external threats ...........................................................................................
Appendix C
BIA: Business Impact Analysis through Work Sheets ........................................ 85
6
C1)
Step 1: Selecting core business of the Port ....................................................................
C2)
Steps 2 & 3: Business flow analysis ...............................................................................
C3)
Steps 4 & 5: Identifying dependency among business resources ..................................
C4)
Step 6: Resources dependency matrix ...........................................................................
C5)
Step 7: Deciding MTPD ..................................................................................................
C6)
Steps 8 & 9: Deciding RTO & RLO .................................................................................
Appendix D
RA Worksheets .................................................................................................. 89
Appendix E
Risk Assessment techniques for Port infrastructure and Facilities .................... 95
E1)
Finite element analysis ...................................................................................................
E2)
Chart based seismic capacity diagnosis program ...........................................................
E3)
Ichii’s Fragility diagram ...................................................................................................
E4)
Design conditions analysis ..............................................................................................
E5)
Analysis of historical damage .........................................................................................
E6)
Tsunami and debris modeling .........................................................................................
Appendix F
Past experiences in Japan
105
7
Figure Index
Figure 1 - Basic idea of BCP ...........................................................................................................
Figure 2 - PDCA model applied to BCMS processes ......................................................................
Figure 3 - Schematic view of the BCM procedures .........................................................................
Figure 4 - Port governance relationships ........................................................................................
Figure 5 - Schematic view of the analysis and appraisals for port logistics BCMS .........................
Figure 6 - Major indices of Business Impact Analysis .....................................................................
Figure 7 - Flow chart of BIA procedure ...........................................................................................
Figure 8 - Modified job card for Port BCP preparation ....................................................................
Figure 9 Example of a business flow analysis based on the IDEF0 method ..................................
Figure 10 - Example of risk map (Earthquake and tsunami) ...........................................................
Figure 11 - Example of usage Worksheet No.1 ..............................................................................
Figure 12 - Estimated deformation by FLIP of quay structures due to earthquake .........................
Figure 13 - Example of Ichii’s fragile curve .....................................................................................
Figure 14 - Damage rate of warehouses in ports and tsunami height ............................................
Figure 15 - Damage rate of warehouses in ports and inundation depth .........................................
Figure 16 - Damage rate of front-line breakwaters and the parameter (ηmax / H1/3) ....................
Figure 17 - Possible container loss in association with the tsunami inundation depth ....................
Table Index
Table 1 - Proposed worksheet for screening port core business ................................................ 33
Table 2 - Options for proactive measures to reduce PRT ...............................................................
Table 3 - Possible criteria to screening core business ....................................................................
Table 4 - Overall view of techniques for RA of Port facilities ..........................................................
8
Outlines of the Guidelines
Business Continuity Plan (BCP) is a kind of business strategy that would not interrupt specified
critical operations at the time of a disaster and if business activities are interrupted, enables a
company to resume critical functions within the target recovery time, and protects the company
from an outflow of customers to competitors, and declines in market share and valuation of
business in connection with an interruption of business. Such measures as improving back-up
systems, securing back-up office, speedy confirmation of safety, securing personnel and
alternative production facilities are carried out. BCPs here do not merely mean plans, but include
holistic management perception. If management is emphasized, the term BCM (Business
Continuity Management) may be used.
This guideline will provide a methodology for port authorities to develop some strategies to
manage the continuity of ports operations as a response to the permanent hazard of earthquakes
and tsunamis in Chile and, thus, secure the function of the port system of the affected areas.
Likewise, the managing of the continuity of port operations could secure the means of entry to
cities affected by a natural disaster, which would allow the authorities provide faster response in
emergency and relief activities.
The reader will find a framework for the development of the
activities necessary for implement a management system that allow preparation, implementation
and monitoring of BCPs on ports, which will allow the later management of the business
continuity in case of disaster.
The requirements and tasks included in these guidelines are
consistent with the requirements defined in the ISO 22301: 2012 Societal security – Business
continuity management systems – Requirements; thereby port authority can certify the system
under this standard, if it deems beneficial. (See Table 1)
The main clauses of ISO 22301 describe the steps to be taken to implement and operate a
Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) : According to Clause 4 of the standard, it will,
in a first step, be necessary to illuminate the context of the organization with its requirements
relating to compliance and the resources needed - services, raw materials, human resources and establish the scope of certification. In contrast to EN ISO 9001 and ISO/IEC 27001, ISO
22301 does not only make it possible to certify business areas but also products, services or
processes.
ISO22301 set a specific requirements for developing and maintaining a Business Continuity
Management System for decreasing the possibility of a disruptive incident, and if such incident
occurs, to respond in an appropriate way, and thus drastically decrease the potential damage of
such incident. Here BCMS is defined as a concept including BCP and business continuity
management (BCM) as illustrated in Figure 1.
9
Table 1 Contents of ISO 22301
Introduction
6 Planning
0.1 General
7 Support
1 Scope
8 Operation
2 Normative references
9 Performance evaluation
3 Terms and definitions
10 Improvement
4 Context of the organization
Bibliography
5 Leadership
BCMS
BCM
BCP
Figure 1 – Relationships between BCP, BCM and BCMS
10
The hazard of tsunamis in Chilean coast is permanent; the continental territory of Chile is located
just over the subduction zone where the Nazca and South American plates converge.
Consequently, Chile is prone to earthquakes and tsunamis, as can be observed in historical data
and geologic evidence, from several studies.
In fact, since 1562 more than 31 near-field
tsunamis have ravaged the coasts of Chile, producing even the devastation of entire cities like
Arica in 1604 and Concepción in 1751 [1].
Generally speaking the majority of earthquakes in
Chile meet the conditions of being tsunamigenic, as result Chilean ports are in permanent risk of
being damaged, risk that must be managed in order to secure the continuity of their operation.
Since the mid-80s, Chile has defined its development strategy through exports growth, so both
elements are closely related [2] [3]; as a result, the exports show a significant sustained growth
over the last 35 years [4].
This export growth is closely related to port infrastructure; in fact
nowadays approximately 95% of the international trade happens through ports [5].
Thus, a
disruption in the operation of ports could generate adverse impacts on the national economy, so
there is the need to have strategies to ensure the continuity of those operations.
The basic idea is that establishing a set of plans will allow to port managers accelerate the
recovery; Figure
represents the function depicting the increase in the operating level of the port
given the passage of time, t0 represents the moment of disruption of operation (a disaster), the
red dotted line shows what could happen without proper plans to manage the continuity, which
could cause a slower recovery than desired and even the dropping out from market, with these
plans to manage the continuity, the port could accelerate the recovery process to reach a desired
recovery level (RLO in the y-axis) in a desired time (RTO in the x-axis), the development process
and implementation of the plans would allow the port to establish a continuity management
system and carry out activities to strengthen its operating system (represented by the area
number 1), and create conditions for rapid recovery (represented by the area number 2), which
would mean an alternative function depicted by the blue line; therefore, this new function would
mean to be able to secure minimum capacity, an early recovery (quickly recovering
competitiveness of industry), and helping in emergency and recovery logistics for coastal zones.
The business continuity management goes beyond the initial disaster recovery.
11
Figure 2 - Basic idea of BCP
This document focuses on Business Continuity Management (BCM) of port logistics in the
context of responding to natural disaster, for securing local residences and communities, as well
as regional and national economy, it is for this that is intended to be use by port authorities in
order to achieve the continuity of the whole port, including the different constituents of its
operation.
However, this methodology can be used for any kind of hazard, even at any kind of
company.
It’s important to note that the reference to “business” in this document, as well as in
the standard, is intended to be interpreted broadly to mean those activities that are core to the
purposes of the organization’s existence.
12
1 Significance and outline of the business continuity management
Given the importance ports logistic for regional and national economy, it is a good management
practice to carry out the necessary activities so the company is able to ensure the continuity of its
operations.
At the same time, the strategical position that ports occupy in case of a large scale
disaster, in order to reach coastal communities, is also a compelling reason to develop those
activities.
It is undeniable that the port is a key player in the context of economic and social
development of its hinterland; therefore the importance of resilience of the port for providing with
credibility to the variety of its stakeholder.
On the other hand, another advantage of preparing
and undertaking BCM for ensure the business continuity is to maintain profitability of the port.
In order to be able to have a proper business continuity management system, is necessary to
have appropriate business continuity plans and means for ensure that people involved have the
necessary skills to meet the assigned responsibilities and authorities, i.e. everyone is prepared to
do what they should do, as well as the means to ensure a continuous improvement; this includes
training and drills to verify the subsequent execution of the plans.
This kind of system include
the monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improvement of the business continuity and, in order
to be certified, must have evidence of that.
Following are presented some particular aspects of the development process of a BCMS.
1.1 Business Continuity Management in Ports
In the ISO 22301:2012 (p.3) Business Continuity Management is defined as a “holistic
management process that identifies potential threats to an organization and impacts to business
operations those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building
organizational resilience with the capability of an effective response that safeguards the interests
of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities” [6].
The process mentioned above can be understood in the context of the PDCA 1 model for
continual improvement, as presented in the following figure:
1
Plan - Do - Check - Act
13
Figure 1.1 - PDCA model applied to BCMS processes
Source: Adapted from ISO 22.301:2012
As shown in Figure 1., the management of port’s continuity must be focused on the requirements
from the various stakeholder of the port for maintaining and promptly recovering logistics capacity,
among these are included concessionaires, shipping companies, consignees/consigners, port
industries, local communities, disaster management authorities (such as ONEMI), etc.
Starting from that context of the port, in order to create a favorable environment for permanently
manage the business continuity, it is necessary for the port authority to [6]:
-
understand the port’s needs and the necessity for establishing business continuity
management policy and objectives, according to the characteristic of the national port
system
-
implement and operate controls and measures for managing a port’s overall capability to
manage disruptive incidents, which includes all of the companies operating in the port
-
control and review the performance and effectiveness of the BCMS, and
-
continual improvement based on objective measurement
Thus, the process of BCM takes the requirements of the stakeholders and the risks associated
with the threat of natural disasters to prepare the Business Continuity Plans (BCP), where those
strategies to ensure continuity of port business will be defined.
Therefore, given the variety of participants in the port system, the methodology presented in
these guidelines allows, and even encourages, the involvement of the various stakeholders in the
14
process of assess the impact of a disruption on the port business, on one hand, and on the other
in the process of assess the risks to which the port is subjected, in order to identify and prioritize
the activities to mitigate this risks and secure a fast recovery of operations.
1.2 Requirements to the port management
For development and implementation of business continuity plans, with the tasks involved, it is
necessary to have a well-defined leadership from the port authority, especially where are
concessionaires operating.
Given the complexity of the port system, should be designated a
leader who can motivate and encourage companies operating in the port to participate in
managing the continuity of operations of the port as a whole , as well as with enough authority to
coordinate all the elements of the system.
This means that the top management of the port enterprise must be committed to this process, to
support the leader and ensure that the BCM is properly developed, implemented, maintained and
improved.
This commitment must be expressed through a policy of continuity management that
is public and known to the stakeholders of the company (both internal and external).
Also, it is recommended to appoint a "continuity team", in which representatives of various
companies from the port are included, depending on the complexity of the port.
These
representatives must have the appropriate empowerment to request information of the various
units of the company2, when necessary, and to reach top management with continuity strategies
proposed by the team.
It is recommended that the role of the team is not limited to the development of business
continuity plans, but also reach the maintenance and updating of the system continuity.
This
means that must be assigned company resources permanently for this purpose.
2
Infrastructure, information and communication technologies, equipment and commercial issues, among
others, should be analyzed by the team, so they will need the support of different operational areas of the
company.
15
1.3 Overview of port BCM procedures
To implement a business continuity system, the following activities should be undertaken:
1. Establishing necessary policies to ensure the commitment of the company with respect to
the BCMS.
In particular, the continuity policy should be in line with the context of the port,
so the system responds to the expectations of the stakeholders.
2. Appraisal of the context of the port regarding the occurrence of a natural disaster (or any
disruptive event); this considers analysis of the impact that could have the disruption on
the port business and the assessment of the risks that may produce a disruption of the
operations.
3. Analysis and selection of business continuity strategies appropriate to mitigate the
identified risks and to achieve fast recovery of port operations; these strategies include
actions to be undertaken before the occurrence of a disaster, as well as actions to be
undertaken after the disaster.
4. Development of plans; which includes the documentation of the selected continuity
strategies as well as the planning for training and improvement.
5. Implementation of preliminary measures to prepare for the identified risks and to train
people involved.
6. Reviewing of the plans; which include the evaluation of the BCP through drills or other
exercises, review by the management, implementation of corrective actions, etc.
As stated before BCM is a dynamic task, on one side the context of the business changes in
accordance with changes in the business activities processes, resources, requirements of clients,
etc., and on the other the need for continuous improvement may lead to some changes in some
aspects of the system.
This makes a strategic need to have a systematic approach to the port
business continuity efforts, BCP documentation, and ensuring PDCA cycle.
The following figure shows a schematic view of the whole procedures of BCM including policy
development for the port continuity management, analysis and appraisals of the risks and
business impact, BCP documentation, human resource development, and PDCA cycles. (See
Figure 1.2)
16
Figure 1.2 - Schematic view of the BCM procedures
Source: Adapted from Guidelines for business entities, Cabinet Office, Japan, 2013
17
1.4 Business Continuity Plan core elements
While a business continuity plan can be customized to fit the needs of a specific port, it should
contain a few core elements.
plans.
This section will introduce you to the core elements in most
Further details can be found on the following pages.
ü Business continuity planning team: Identifies the team members and contact information
for the creation and maintenance of the BC plan.
This can also reference the
departments consulted or involved in its creation.
ü Context of the port: Identifies those key elements that provide a description of the port:
who the customers are, type and volume of cargo, related companies, type of
infrastructure and machinery, strategies and policies in general, etc.
This will allow
define a policy of continuity that fits the reality of the port.
ü Continuity policy: Shows the commitment of the organization for creating, maintain,
testing and implementing the plan/system.
This also sends the message that business
continuity is an important management priority.
The policy must be consistent with the
context of the port.
ü Business impact analysis: Identifies processes needed to maintain critical functions
during a disruptive action, such a natural disaster, as well as how long each process can
be suspended before the impacts on the port become unacceptable.
Resources needed
to recover are also outlined.
ü Risk analysis: Identifies and assesses the risks to which it is subjected the port, shows the
evaluation of the fragility of the operational resources of the port, as well as the fragility of
the operation of the port.
Also indicates the predicted recovery time of the port
operations for each disruptive scenario.
ü Business continuity strategies and program: Strategies for mitigation that will help the port
to lessen and / or prepare for the impact on their operations from disruptive actions.
Also
strategies for helping the port recover from disruptive actions and return to normal
operations.
ü Plan Training, Drills & Maintenance: The BCP is like any other initiative to improve quality.
It must outline a process to train staff, perform drills, and update and maintain the plan.
2 Context of the business continuity in ports
A BCMS for the port must respond to the expectations of the stakeholders, in harmony with its
characteristics and business interests.
The analysis of the context of the port, provides an input
regarding all matters (both internal and external) that are relevant to port’s purpose and affect its
18
ability to achieve the intended outcomes of its BCMS.
This analysis should make explicit port’s activities, functions, services, products (including main
throughputs), partnerships, relationships with interested parties and other port operational
conditions including political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental factors.
This will be of tremendous importance in the development of the continuity policy and subsequent
analysis for the development of the BCMS.
2.1 The national and regional economy and port development
Since the mid-80s, Chile has defined its development strategy through exports growth and
showed a significant sustained growth over the last 35 years. The export growth is most certainly
accompanied by increasing importance of port infrastructure. In fact nowadays approximately
95% of the international trade happens through ports. The close relationship among Chilean
economy, the international trade and port logistics could be seen in 2009 after a sharp decline in
exports that caused deterioration in expectations for the economic growth, employment and
income, eventually causing a fall in GDP in 2009 over 2008. Thus, port business continuity in the
Chilean ports is needed to be considered in the context of adverse impacts on the national and
regional economy.
Figure 2.1 Why should business continuity in ports be focused on?
19
2.2 Interested parties
When establishing the BCMS must be identified all relevant interested parties and their
requirements (needs, expectations, values and perceptions); in order to ensure the pertinence of
the continuity objectives.
2.2.1.
Governance and ownership
Identification of the governance of the port community and the relationship of its constituents will
allow an optimal establishment of the links between the different participants and their role on the
continuity strategies (from early preparation to response after the disaster).
The knowledge of these roles and the names of the counterparts in the different activities after
the disaster may be the key to a faster recovery, especially in the response stage.
The Figure
2.2.2 shows state port governance general relationships, it is recommended to identify the role
played by each within the BCMS (for example, document the activities to be done to achieve the
opening of the port to support emergency activities at an early stage, and for larger vessels at a
later stage, identifying the different actors involved in these activities).
Figure 2.2 Port governance relationships
2.2.2.
Clients and suppliers
The port shall identify its main clients and transferred products (cargo type), this task may be
done by an analysis of historical cargo throughput (on both revenue and volume transfer) and
should include identification of location of these customers; this input should be taken into
20
account for the development of the continuity policy, and will be required at analysis stage of the
process.
2.2.3.
Similarly, the port shall identify its main suppliers.
Workforce
The port shall identify its workforce for the later analysis stage of the process.
In the port system
it is common to find, within the same port, workforce with dependence on various companies; is
the case of drivers in most port companies (terminals), as well as mooring service and
stevedores, among others, particularly in the multi operator companies.
This affects the
continuity management, and, therefore, must be included in the analysis.
2.2.4.
Community
It is highly recommended that the port identify expectations, perceptions and needs of the
community regarding risk management and continuity of the operation of the port.
Two
advantages can be visualized from this; on the one hand, one of the strategic port functions in the
phase following a disaster is to support logistics operations in emergency and rescue; therefore,
having this knowledge will allow the port to prepare the participation in these activities.
On the
other hand, the knowledge generated can be valuable in relations with the port city that houses it.
2.3 Port cargo handling demands in the aftermath of disasters
4.4
Supply-Demand Relation-ships in port logistics
After a disaster, cargo handling demands at ports decline and gradually recover in association
with local manufacturing and consumptions resuming their activities, however, cargo handling
capacity at the port only recovers after completion of removing obstacles on the seabed and
water surface of the port water area such as access channel and turning basin. Rehabilitation
works of the quay structures, apron pavement, quay cranes and access roads are also required
for reopen the port for the public service. Actually, it was observed at the time of previous
earthquake disasters a misfit between the recovered port capacity and cargo handling requests
as shown in Figure 2.3. The primary mission of port BCM, in this regard, is considered to
minimize this misfit so as to reduce the negative impact to business of the port client sufficient to
continue using the port.
21
Cargo Demand
/Handling Capacity
100%
Outbreak
of Disaster
Cargo Demand
Supply-Demand Gap
Alternative Port
Effect of
Port-BCP
Handling Capacity
Elapsed Time
Figure 2.3 Supply-Demand of Containerized Cargo Transport
2.3.2.
Cargo handling demands in the aftermath of disasters
Port logistics encompasses many functions, such as transporting containerized cargos dry bulk
cargos transport, and liquid bulk cargos. Roll-on/roll-off transportations including ferry services
are also major port operation. Just after a disaster, the transport of humanitarian relief goods will
be of critical importance. Among these various shipments for local industries, dry and liquid bulk
cargo transportations are originated from or destined to the mining, oil refinery, petrochemical
industries, and other basic material industries adjacent to the port. Thermal power plants
consume a large volume of crude/heavy oil, coal and natural gas liquid, therefore are also main
port users. Since a limited number of clients are involved in such a bulk cargo transportation,
possible port cargo handling volume after the disaster may be estimated based on the BCP, and
other data and information provided by the respective user company.
On the other hand, loading and unloading volume of containerized cargo in the aftermath of
disasters needs more investigation to estimate because of the wide range of involved shippers.
Possible recovery periods of regional and local economy, in particular those of local industries
and merchandising, are considered dominant factors of the containerized cargo volumes, thus
needed to be investigated.
Figure 1.4 demonstrates the estimated on port cargo volume in the aftermath of 2010 Chile
Earthquake.
22
Port Cargo Volume Rate
(2010/2012)
1.50
1.25
The Other Customs
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Talcahuano Customs
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2010/2012
Figure 1.4 Impact of 2010 Chile earthquake on port cargo volume
On the vertical axis in Figure 1.4 appears port cargo volume ratio and indicates a proportion of
monthly port cargo volumes in 2011 to those in 2010. The port cargo volume ration of
Talcahuano port area, which suffered severe damaged by the earthquake and tsunami,
dramatically decreased by more than 80 percent in the March, and gradually recovered in the
Talcahuano
following months. This suggests that the port cargo handlingThe
demand
Others is notably weak hence
recovery works are possibly undertaken in the two months after the disaster.
2.3.3. Estimation methodologies for cargo handling volume in the disaster area
As stated above, it is vital for the port managers to properly estimate recovery degree of port
cargo handling demand of the port users. The extent of cargo throughput downturn and recovery
speed depends on industrial structure, business conditions, and scale and nature of the hazard.
In this view, the authors consider it necessary for the port community, in collaboration with the
academia, to undertake survey for identifying possible damage of local industry due to disaster
and its consequences on cargo handling demand at port in the aftermath of the disaster.
Among the currently undertaken studies, a series of demand recovery curves may provide a
reference for the expected survey in Chilean ports. Tsunami inundation depth and seismic
intensity by Japan Meteorological Agency were considered for the chart as the main parameter of
hazard intensities. The chart was developed based on the survey data from Great East Japan
Earthquake, and estimates degree of risen demand in the aftermath of disaster. (Akakura et al.
2015)
23
3 Establishing BCM Policy
3.1 Significance of the BCM Policy
Top management shall define an explicit business continuity policy. Establishment of a BCMS
should be considered of strategic importance for the port; therefore, top management, as well as
other relevant management roles throughout the port community, should actively participate and
commit to this system activities and demonstrate their leadership during the process.
Implementing a BCMS involves every part of the organization, and is a process usually
conducted by a team comprising staffs appointed by top management (the “business continuity
team”), for which resource allocation and vesting responsibilities is essential. Therefore, it is
essential that every member entity of the port community recognizes the importance of the team,
and provides the required support in the activities of the team. The persons in top management
are the ones called to motivate members of the port community to contribute to the active and
effective mobilization of the BCMS. This is particularly important in complex port activities, with
multi-layered port operation, management and administration system structure comprising a
variety of government offices under different authorities, and terminal concessionaires of the port.
The BCMS final goal is maintaining the continuity of the whole port functions as a single system,
therefore the policy should clearly state how to organize the port community in this regard: e.g. a
possible institutional arrangement to set up a cross-organizational consultative body and to
create a multi-layer but single BCPs structure among the port community).
An explicit business continuity policy provides part of the needed support to BCM activities, from
design to improvement phase, and will shows the commitment of the port community to the port
stakeholders.
Furthermore, in complex ports, where various stakeholders meet and varied resources are
mobilized, it may be necessary to make complex decisions for properly allocating resources in
the different stages of recovery. A prioritization of recovery objectives, based on the context of
the port’s mission of the respective port, may be one of the likely options which should be
reflected in the business continuity policy.
The business continuity policy should include the definition of the scope of the BCMS, because
different ports have different sizes and complexity level, and therefore most likely have to
undertake different BCM activities.
Considering all above, the business continuity policy should: i) be adopted by resolution of port
community with the endorsement of the CEO (and be known by the board of directors), ii) state
24
those key elements for the organization, be appropriate to the purpose of the port (aligned with
other policies, or even be a part of a general policy document), iii) provide a framework for setting
business continuity objectives, iv) identify a necessary commitment to meet stakeholder’s
requirements, and v) obtain a commitment of the community members to continual improvement
of the BCMS.
3.2 Policy preparation guidance
The business continuity policy document should state commitment of the port community
members and set out an appropriate approach for managing port logistics continuity. The policy
should include statements concerning:
a) Identified mission of the port based upon the current port functions and importance in
terms of sustainable development of the national, regional and local economy, industries,
and communities.
b) a definition of ports operation continuity including the overall objectives and scope, and
the importance of BCM for the port;
c) a management focus commonly shared by the port community including the principles of
business continuity and goals in line with the port business strategy and objectives;
d) a framework for setting continuity objectives and controls, including the structure of the
port BCMS;
e) a brief explanation of the compliance requirements of particular importance in the context
of business continuity in ports, including:
1) legislative, regulatory, and contractual requirements;
2) emergency response education, training, and awareness requirements;
3) BCPs of port community member entities; and
4) consequences of security policy violations.
f)
a definition of general and specific responsibilities for BCM, including reporting incidents;
g) references to the documentation which may support the policy: e.g. international and
national standards, national, regional, and local emergency responding programs, and
more detailed security policies and procedures for specific event or emergency rules
which should be complied with the port community.
Particular focus to be considered in the context of port business continuity mission will be a
massive transportation capacity of ports, which enable i) an quick deploy of search and rescue
parties to the disaster sites, ii) efficient emergency relief logistics for maintaining health and
humanity of the affected people, and iii) prompt recovery of local transportation and logistics
25
capacity for resuming function of supply chain network system. Table 3.1 summarize requested
logistics missions in the aftermath of the disaster.
Table 3.1 Agenda of logistics at the disaster site
Logistics
View points
Emergency Relief Search and rescue
Logistics（ERL） ü Assisting SDFs, PD, and
FD in deploying personnel
and equipment.
Health and food security
ü Delivering relief supplies
ü Assisting medical care and
welfare
ü Transferring evacuees
Transition to market-based
Logistics for
reconstruction
Socio-economic
ü Minimizing socio-economic
Reconstruction
loss of national and global
and Development
economy
ü Recovering supply chain
for local industries
ü Securing local
employments
Issues
• Last mile issue
• Isolated community
• Transportation means
and fuel.
• Mass transportation for
ERL.
• Quick recovery of
transportation infra.
• Promptly resuming
commercial transport
systems.
• Business continuity of
local supply chain.
This business continuity policy should be communicated throughout the port community and port
users in a form that is relevant, accessible and understandable to the intended reader. Also, the
policy should be reviewed at planned intervals or if significant changes occur to ensure its
continuing suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness. In Appendix A you will find two examples of
continuity policy for ports.
4. Establishment of BCMS
The port must create the management structure that supports the BCMS, such as budgetary and
institutional arrangements, preparation of education and training programs for human resource
development and enhancement of responding capacity; the necessary structure of PDCA cycle,
in consistency with the business continuity policy.
26
4.1
Business Continuity Team
The Business Continuity Team (BCT) is a group of various staff members that lead the activities
that support the BCMS, i.e.
research and development of the Business Continuity Plan, and the
later implement, control and improvement of it.
The BCT will review the finished Business
Continuity Plan with all departments and the organization, to ensure accuracy, and lead training,
drills, reviewing and updating the completed plan; however its leadership may change of hands
regarding the phase.
The BCT should be comprised of staff members from various departments.
Ideally, should
include one staff member representing each department of the organization; for some ports may
be appropriate the role of a coordinator of continuity and different teams by area.
The BCT may
also be made up of an existing emergency preparedness committee.
Ensure that there are members representing Engineering and maintenance, Business area,
Operations Area, ICT, and other business units in the organization, including representatives of
the different organizations (units) within the port (including concessionaires).
On the other hand, at some ports may not be practical to have a member from each department.
In this case, individuals from specific departments may be asked to attend specific meetings
where their input is necessary.
The port shall recognize the importance of the BCT, to empower the team members to achieve
the continuity objectives. It is advisable to appoint someone from top management to be
responsible for the implementation of the BCP, to support the continuity team and to whom must
respond the team leader.
4.2
Leadership and collaborative actions be undertaken
Chapter 4 of ISO22301 places particular emphasis on the leadership, which is vital for efficient
and effective implementation of the BCM. This is of particular relevance for the ports, given its
administrative and business characteristics, as follows.
One of the particularities of undertaking BCP preparation in a port is likely to be its governance
structure, which normally includes multiple independent entities, from public regulatory
organizations such as port authority, harbor master, CIQ offices and local municipality, to port
businesses such as shipping companies, stevedoring companies, shipping agencies and port
service providers. These entities normally evaluate and respond to risks independently, based on
their respective information, business interests and norms. This is what primarily to be discussed
for developing port BCPs in line with smooth and effective implementation of BCM.
27
Lessons learnt discussed and concluded under SATREPS Chile project suggest that only
possible corporative BCM activities to be included in the port BCP may be: i) sharing risk scenario
for developing the common target of the port BCM among the port community, ii) identifying and
agreeing on the mission of respective port entities to be included in their own BCPs or emergency
responding programs, iii) improving capacity to undertake respective BCM under cooperation and
mutual assistance among the community, and iv) integrating risk management efforts of the
community members for reviewing the risks scenario and awareness. These actions may pave
the way of preparing an overarching plan for improving port logistics continuity with common
MTPD, RTO and RLO, and mutual assistance arrangements in order to cope with requests from
the port clients.
Fig. 4.1 An indicative schematic view of implementation framework for port BCMS
28
Among above mentioned members of the port society, DOP regional office may be considered a
candidate to chair the BCT and lead BCM implementation of the respective port based on their
functions of undertaking initial response, facilitating emergency rehabilitation of port facilities, and
managing emergency chip callings.
5 Analysis and appraisals
Following the principles of ISO 22300:2012, the port shall establish, implement and maintain a
formal process for business impact analysis and risk assessment that:
a) establishes the context of the assessment, defines criteria and evaluates the potential
impact of a disruptive incident,
b) takes into account legal and other requirements to which the port subscribes,
c) includes systematic analysis, prioritization of risk treatments, and their related costs,
d) defines the required output from the business impact analysis and risk assessment, and
e) specifies the requirements for this information to be kept up-to-date and confidential.
A schematic view of the BCP preparation procedures is shown in Figure .1, which includes three
major portions for analyzing and appraising potential risks of the port logistics functions, ie: the
business impact analysis (BIA), the risk assessment (RA) and business continuity strategy
development.
BIA and RA are detailed in the following points of this chapter.
29
Figure 5.1 Schematic view of the analysis and appraisals for port logistics BCMS
5.1 Business impact analysis (BIA)
The BIA enables port managers to understand the magnitude of operational and financial impacts
associated with a disaster, and provides information about the business interests of the port
customers, assessing the impacts over time of not performing activities that support the provision
of port services, in order to maintain port business continuity.
Another important objective of the BIA is to identify critical resources needed for the sound port
operation.
The meaning of a disaster is, in short, a loss of some resources needed for livelihood
and economic activities; “resources” include human resources, assets and opportunities of
receiving social services. These resources are often under mutual interdependent relationships;
multiple resources sometimes rely on the supply of only a few other resources, which are in
general called “bottleneck resources”, recovery of these bottleneck resources will define
30
necessary time for recovering port function.
As such, the bottleneck resources are of great
importance for the port to meet the clients’ requirements.
5.1.1.
Work sheets system for BIA
The BIA process starts from selecting the most important port businesses, namely “port core
businesses”, and identifying important port operations needed for conducting such businesses, to
later identify the resources needed to conduct such operations.
Possible negative impact on the logistics business caused by port shutdown should be evaluated
under broad discussion, reason why is recommendable include participating of the site managers,
practitioners as well as port management, even members of institutions related to port
governance and to civil protection plan (DOP, MTT, DIRECTEMAR, ONEMI, etc.). The
procedures, discussions and analysis should be properly documented and reported for future
review and improvement of BCP.
Many BCP textbook offers templates of worksheet for
preparing BCP, based on which the authors figure out a series of worksheets for undertaking BIA
and RA for BCPs.
The procedure to undertake a BIA is divided into eight steps, for which worksheets have been
prepared for guiding the BIA analyst; Figure 5.2 shows the flow chart of the worksheet
BIA procedure proposed in this document, in each step is indicated the correspondent worksheet.
One of the advantages of the worksheet system is that increases transparency in the procedures,
making much easier for the practitioner, and for third parties, trace and understand the BIA and
RA analysis with this “step by step” approach for obtaining BCP parameters. As such, the
worksheet system is expected to facilitate broader participation of port community members and
wider echelons of ranging from top management to site staff in the BCM preparation,
implementation
and monitoring.
Another mean to facilitate broad participation may include
working group discussions for aggregating in-site expertise, knowledge and information for the
BCP preparation.
Following sections introduce general descriptions of each step grouped in the three categories
listed in Figure 1.2; detailed procedures and examples are in Appendix B.
31
Figure 5.2 Flow chart of BIA procedure
5.1.2.
Evaluation of impact due to business suspension
Outcome: The port shall identify its core business to set the continuity objectives.
Screening core business: BIA starts by screening current port businesses to select its “core
business” in order to focus the development of plans towards activities of greater relative
importance. It is noteworthy that this selection does not mean that the rest of the businesses are
not important, probably they are; it just means that the selected ones must be prioritized in the
business continuity management.
Given the continuous improvement nature of this process,
the businesses not selected in a first step can be addressed in the future.
For this step the port shall decide the criteria to be used to identify the core business, this must be
consistent with the context of the port and the different supply chains to which it belongs (for
some examples of criteria see Appendix B1).
The worksheet assists in selecting the core businesses to be included in the BCM by rating
possible negative impact of the port shutdown in association with the criteria, such as possible
32
future port development, securing major shipping links and financial soundness of the port
management.
In the worksheet N° 1 the user must evaluate, using a rating scale, the impact of
interruption of each business for the company, for each criteria. The business that generates the
greatest impact is selected.
Table 5.1 shows an example of Worksheet No. 1 using a rating
scale of 3 elements (0: low impact; 1: medium; 2: high)
Once selected the core businesses, its business flow is to be analyzed as explained in the next
section.
Table 5.1 - Proposed worksheet for screening port core business
5.1.3.
Identifying Key Elements and an extraction of resource bottlenecks
Outcome: The port shall identify the key elements for restoring port’s core activities, to prepare
continuity strategies.
Identification of activities included in the core business:
the authors recommend to
3
employ business flow analysis based on the IDEF0 method as an indicative methodology for
identifying the detail steps of business operations and resources needed. It is necessary to note
that, as shown in Figure 5.1, the first step of BIA is to identify the core business of the port; in
which business flow analysis will be undertaken to clarify what kind of activities are involved and
what the procedures for implementing are.
The business flow analysis is a technique that use diagrams to breakdown the business process
3
IDEF0 (Function Modeling Method) is a method designed to model the decisions, actions, and activities
of an organization or system.
33
structure. The IDEF0 is a function modeling method designed for identifying decisions, actions,
and activities included in an organizational function or social/information system. An example of
business flow diagram, and a template of job card modified by the authors for port BCP
preparation, is illustrated in Figure 5.3 and エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 5.4.
A business flow diagram is described as an event chain system, where the job card identifies: i)
necessary operational steps, and ii) essential resources, for properly implementing the port core
business. For this analysis there are two inputs to take under special consideration in each job
card: ie. “mechanism” from below and “control” from the top, as shown Figure 7. The mechanism
includes resources directly needed for processing the step, and control represents necessary
information for processing such as permission, notification, order, guidelines, program, and any
other regulations and conditions of concern.
As a result of the business modeling it should be obtained a complete description of the core
business, including the direct resources needed.
The following task is to identify the
dependency among resources, for which is recommended the use of the worksheet system.
Figure 5.3 - Modified job card for Port BCP preparation
34
Figure 5.4 Example of a business flow diagram
Identification of resources needed for business activities: The work flow diagram
provides information about what kind of resources are needed for implementing each step of the
port's core business. Once the resources have been identified through the work flow analysis, the
wise use of the worksheet system enables BIA analyst to systematically collect, remove
duplications of and categorize the resources.
Table 5.2 Suggested worksheet for identifying operational resources
Opera
-tions
Control
A Entry in Customs
1 port
clearance,
Entry
permission,
A Moorin Anchoring
2g
permission
A Docking Berth
3&
window
mooring control
Resources
Executing
Resource for activity
agency Resource for control
Customs,
Harbor
master,
Port
Harbor
master
Terminal
operator,
Stevedores
CIQ officers/offices,
Harbor master officer,
Port MIS, SeaNACCS,
Harbor master office,…
Harbor master officer,
Telecommunication
service operator staff,
Terminal
Terminal operation
system, Electric/water
Access channel, Tug boat,
Pilot, Port radio,
Electric/water/fuel supplies,
Telecommunication service,
Anchoring area, Service
vessels
Turning basin, Quay wall,
Tug boat, Line men, Port
security system, …
35
In the 6th column of Table 5.2, direct input resources are transcribed from “mechanisms” section
and needed procedures such as ship entry permission are obtained from control section, based
on which analyst identifies regulatory/business entities in charge and finds resources needed for
activities of the entities.
Classification of resources: Identified resources are classified on the worksheet as shown in
Table 5.2, where five categories are employed: i.e. outside supply, human resources, facility and
equipment, ICT systems, and building and offices. The out-side supply category includes electric
supply, telecommunication service, city gas, public transportation, fuel oil, and water supply, the
human resources; staff and workers of port related authorities and business entities, the facilities
and equipment; port waters, quays, cranes stock yards, warehouses, the ICT systems; all port
related information systems, and building and offices; port related authorities’ offices. .Based on
these categories, resources are to be classified into one of each category for every business
activities. (Table 5.3) The classification of resources may be one of wise steps for examining
resource bottlenecks because resources with the same category tend to be similar characteristics,
hence, may facilitate efficiency of BIA analyst’s works.
Table 5.3 Suggested worksheet for classifying operational resources
Opera
-tions
Outside
supply
Resources for control and operations
Human
Facilities
ITC systems
resource
/equipment
A Entry in
1 port
Electric/fuel/ CIQ officers/
water supplies offices, Pilot,
A Mooring Water supply Harbor master
2
officer
A Docking Electric/fuel/ Line men
3 &
water supplies
A 船内荷役
mooring 電力、通信、
…
本船荷役担
4
Access
channel, Tug
Anchoring
area
Quay wall,
Turning
basin, Tug
Port MIS,
SeaNACCS,…
Telecommunicati
on service
Terminal
operation system
Buildings
/offices
CIQ offices,
Harbor building,
Terminal
operation station
水道、ガス、 当、ｶﾞﾝﾄﾘｰｸﾚｰ
After completion of resource classification shown in Table 5.3, resources of each business
activities are to be summarized into one of five categories. Table 5.4 demonstrates the result of
listing resources for control and mechanism referred from a case history in a Japanese container
terminal.
.
36
Table 5.4 List of identified operational resources of a container terminal
Resources for control and operations
Outside
supply
Human
resource
Electric/fu
el/water
supplies,
Telecomm
unication
service
CIQ officers, Port
authority staff,
Harbor master
officer, Pilot, Line
men, Stevedore's
staff, Dock
workers, Crane
(5 items） operator, Yard
planner, track
driver, RTG
operator, Gate
clark,…
Facilities
/equipment
ITC systems
Buildings
/offices
Access chainnel,
SeaNACCS,
Anchorage, Turning Port MIS
basin, Quay wall, (Management
Tug boat, Service Iinformation
vessel, Epron, Quay system), Port
crane,
radio,
Trailer/Chesse,
Terminal
RTG, Container
operatin
slot, Reefer
system, Port
concent, Gate,
security
Access road, CIQ system
inspection
equipments,…
(5 items)
Harbor building,
Port authority
office, Harbor
master office,
Harbor traffic
control office,
Shipping agent
office, Terminal
operation
station,
Stevedore's site
office, Marine
house
(24 items)
(9 items)
(18 items)
Identification of dependency among resources: Now the resources directly used for port
operations (Hereinafter called as “direct operational resources”) can be lined up based on listed
operational resources in Table 5.4. Important consideration here is the fact that these resources
may have possibilities of relying on other resources for being functional to contribute to the port
operations. In a disaster scene, there are many resources found not to be available, therefore,
BIA analyst must ensure if some other resources affect the port operations in an indirect manner,
or not. There are also interdependent relationships among the operational resources. Table 5.5
is a worksheet designed for finding resources which are relied by the direct operational resources.
By mobilizing the worksheet, the BIA analyst undertakes extraction works for the each direct
operational resource.
The above mentioned dependency among the operational resources may be described as a
matrix which comprises elements of 0 and 1, namely “Dependency matrix” Columns of the matrix
represent direct operational resources, which rely on the resources lined up in a law direction. In
the matrix, when resource “C” relies on “B”, then the element of raw C and column B is 1 as
illustrated in Figure 5.5.
37
Table 5.5 suggested worksheet for finding critical resources
Resources
Outside supply
Critical Resources
Human
Facilities
resource
/equipment
Electric
supply
Telecommuni
-cation
Incoming panel
/transformer
Tel. wire/ switch
board
Fuel oil
Refueling facility
ITC
systems
Buildings
/offices
Customs
officer
Electric supply,
Telecommunication
Inspection equipment SeaNACCS
Harbor
building
Quarantine
officer
Electric supply,
Telecommunication
Inspection equipment Port MIS
Harbor
building
Harbor
Electric supply,
master officer Telecommunication
Port MIS
Harbor
building
Pilot
Telecommunication
Service vessel
主航路
Resourcesreliedon
Nameof
resources
Direct
Resources
A
B
C
D
・
・
A B C D ・ ・ ・
00 00
0001
01 00
00 00
Figure 5.5 Schematic view of Dependency matrix
Tracing mutual dependency of resources: Since consideration of the resource dependency is
a critical for finding the bottleneck resource, BIA analyst is requested to carefully trace these
dependency relationships among resources. Schematic view of the tracking operation of the
dependency for finding possible bottleneck resources is shown in Figure 5.6.
38
Figure 5.6 Analyzing critical relationships among resources
An example is the dependence tracking for wharf, fuel oil, mobile crane and tug boat is
demonstrated in Figure 5.7. The wharf cannot undertake loading and unloading operation
without assistance of those facilities, which fully rely on fuel oil supply; therefore, function of wharf
eventually relies on the fuel supply. So, fuel oil is found to be a critical resource through tracking
process of resource dependency. These tracking processes are also reflected in the dependency
matrix, which sequentially follows dependency of resources and find possible bottleneck
resources for the port core business.
Figure 5.7 Example of the resource dependency matrix operation
5.1.4. Determination of Critical Operations and setting the recovery time/level objectives
Outcome: The Port shall identify a critical port operations by determining MTPD and setting the
recovery time/level objectives (RTO/RLO), and decide continuity objectives:.
Concept of Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption: The port community shall understand
clients’ limitation of the tolerance regarding the port service shutdown period due to the disaster.
impact of the disruptive incident on business will become clearer.
39
These requirements are met in the concept of the maximum tolerable period of disruption (MTPD)
which is essential for estimating recovery time objective (RTO) and recovery level objective
(RLO) of the port logistics function.
The BIA is expected to provide accurate and objective
evaluation of MTPD, RTO and RLO based on the possible scientific and systematic approaches.
Schematic view of the MTPD, RTO and RLO is shown in Figure 5.8, which suggests that
normally the period of RTO is less than MTPD because of the time rug needed for mobilizing
BCP responding actions and for preparing resume of the service
Timerug
RTO
Timerug
Disaster
Elapsedtime
BCP
response
RLO
MaximumTolerablePeriodofDowntime
Figure 5.8 Major indices of Business Impact Analysis
The port community needs to evaluate and judge how long can they wait for the recovery of port
logistics function and what is the minimum port level of service needed to meet the requirements
for their business activities at the port. A concept of Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption
(MTPD) is useful in this regards.
MTPD indicates the maximum period the port logistics can be suspended.
Once fail to meet this
requirement, it may affect the market credibility and competitiveness of the port’s core business,
resulting in losing market position; RTO and RLO are determined by considering the time rugs
and minimum requirements of the port logistic functions under the aftermath of the disaster.
Decision of MTPD, RTO and RLO of core business: The worksheet for evaluating MTPD for
port of Iquique developed by the authors is shown in Figure 5.. Impact of the shutdown of port
core business is evaluated in association with the client’s tolerance. The criterion should be set
forth under discussions among site managers and commitment of the top management. Based
on the criterion, the port community evaluates an negative impact of port shutdown from low to
high, and judges from the end of client’s tolerance: i.e. the time of negative impact reaching to
“high”. Note that RTO is calculated based on MTPD with considering time rug parameters: i.e. 0.5
days for mobilizing BCP and recovered resources.
RLO description is also specific in the port BCM, for which RLOs are recommended to be
40
indicated in more specific manner than those for business company BCP. This is because
shipping company requests the port community to accommodate a certain size ship for loading
and/or unloading a certain type of cargos on a specific day and time, hence, the specifications of
recovery target of the port can be clearly defined.
Decided RTOs and RLOs in Figure 5.9 indicate how long the port community is allowed to spend
for recovering the port function, in other words, when is the target date of port recovery and how
is the target port service level as shown in the figure: i.e. target 1: Supporting ERL activities,
target 2: avoiding shipper’s migration, target 3: supporting local industries. These recovery
targets set forth respective BCP goals which the port community are requested to take an
concerted actions.
Figure 5.9 Suggested worksheet for deciding MTPD, RTO and RLO
41
Identifying required resources for undertaking operations according the objective level:
Above mentioned recovery targets including RTOs and RLOs provide clear goals of BCM
activities, for which selection of operational resources and their specifications are needed. A
business flow diagram shown in Figure 5.10 is an example of those for interim recovery to
accommodate coastal cargo ships. The business flow indicate only limited resources and
specifications are required because of small ship size and domestic trade. Worksheets shown in
Table 5.6 are developed based on the operational resource identification worksheet in Table 5.2
by removing some of resources unnecessary for fulfilling the target.
Entrance
permission
/report
Entryinto
port
Ship
arrival
[0.5hr.]
A1
Access
channel* Arrival
atthe
(-7.5m)
wharf
Berth
allocation
Docking&
mooring
[0.5hr.]
A3
Ship
stowage
plan
Loading&
Unloading
Turning Completion [3hrs.]
A4
ofmooring
Basin*
Wharf*,
Terminal
Berthwindow
control
management,
system,
Wharf*,
Mobile
cranes,
Cargo
handling
Note*: Port water depth of -7.5m
equipment,
is enough to accommodate
Chesses,
coastal cargo ships
Dockworkers
Clearance
permission
/report
Release&
Undocking
Comple [2hrs.]
A5 Departure
-tion of
tothe
loading
Access nextport
/unloading channel*,
Turningbasin*,
Wharf*,
Berthwindow
management,
Unloaded
＊
＊ cargo
Cargoto＊
beloaded
c
Figure 5.10 Example of a business flow diagram (Interim recovery for coastal shipping)
Exactly same procedures for resource classification, dependency identification and bottleneck
finding are adopted to line up all resources needed to meet a required RTO and RLO in the
interim recovery basis. Please refer to an example of operational resource needed for
accommodating coastal shipping. The listed resources are to be tested by risk assessment if the
resources are substantially and practically become available within the requested recovery
periods or not.
42
Table 5.6 reproduced operational resources identification table for an interim service level
Opera
-tions
Control
Resources
Executing
Resource for control
Resource for activity
agency
A Entry in Entry
Harbor
Harbor master officer
1 port
permission master, Port and office, Port MIS,
authority
Port authority staff and
office
A
2
A Docking Berth
Terminal
Terminal operator staff,
3&
window
operator,
Terminal operation
mooring control
Stevedores system, Electric/water
Access channel (-7.5m),
Port radio
Turning basin, Quay wall,
Tug boat, Line men, Port
security system, …
5.2 Risk assessment
According to ISO 22301, the port community shall establish, implement and maintain a formal
documented risk assessment process that systematically identifies, analyses, and evaluate the
risk of disruptive incidents in the organization. These process is normally named the risk
assessment (RA), which is a process as illustrated in Figure 5.11 As well as for BIA, a worksheet
approach is recommended to facilitate the RA implementation procedures. (See Figure 5.12)
Following each step this section presents methodologies for undertaking RA.
Risk assessment
Risk management
Risk Identification
Identifying possible incidents
and evaluating vulnerability of
core
business
operation
(operation resources)
Risk Analysis
Evaluating risk levels such as
PRTs/PRLs of core business
operation resources.
Risk Evaluation
Judging
disruption
risks
based on comparing risk level
with risk criterion. (PRT≶RTO)
Risk Treatment
Considering risk responding
plan/strategy.
43
Figure 5.11 RA for managing business disruption risks
[ RA procedures ]
RiskIdentification
Identifying port logistics disruption risks
RiskAnalysis
Risk mapping / Risk
matrix techniques
Corebusinessresources
Evaluating resource fragility
BIA implementation
RLOofcorebusiness
Estimating predicted recovery
time (PRT) of the resources
Finding resource mobilization
bottlenecks
Risk
Evaluation
RTOofcorebusiness
PRT≦RTO
Documentation of
BCP
RiskTreatment
Considering risk responding plan
Yes
No
Reevaluation of the risks
Implementing the risk responding
plan
Figure 5.12 RA procedures for port logistics
5.2.1. Risk identification
What is the possible treat to the prioritized port logistics functions and it occurs when, where, how
and why? Are there any threats except for to the natural hazards? For answering this question,
risk identification is undertaken to identify, recognize and describe the risks.
The BCM executing agency shall identify risk of disruption to the prioritized operations of the port
logistics including the necessary administration processes and systems, information and
communications, staffs and workforces, facilities and assets, external supply, and any other
resources needed.
There are several types of threats (hazards), both internal and external
surrounding the port (see Appendix C3).
The risk map based on the evaluation of consequence and likelihood of the hazards may be one
of the most common systematic approaches for finding risks to be considered by the BCM.
Although this guideline is focus on earthquakes and tsunami, the procedures and methodologies
could be used to approach any kind of threat to the port logistics continuity.(See Figure 5.13)
44
It may be noted that the consequence of the risk depends on the geographical conditions and
exposures such as the distance from the predicted epicenter, geological condition and formation
of the port area including propagation characteristics of seismic wave, and risks of liquefaction
and tsunami inundation, therefore, it is important for the appropriately identifying the risks to
develop risk map for the respective port.
High
Plate
boundary
Epicentral
Middle
(interlocking)
Plate boundary
(single event type)
Low
Law
Consequence
Riskmatrixofearthquakes
Low
Law
Middle
High
Likelihood
Figure 5.13 - Example of risk map (Earthquake and tsunami)
The risk map will help to identify BCM targeted incidents, and prioritize the treatment of the
different incidents.
5.2.2. Risk analysis
Risk analysis is a process for understanding the nature of risk; estimate the level of risk such as
the damage to port logistics operations.
Final goal of the risk analysis is to determine predicted recovery time (PRT) for the respected
recovery function level of the port logistics (predicted recovery level, PRL).
Risk analysis starts
from systematically evaluating fragility of port operation resources based on the damage
estimation of resources needed for port operation such as port facilities, human resources,
information and communication systems and external supplies.
Worksheet technique is useful as a matrix type checklist, which enables to undertake damage
estimation of wide range resources without any omission; in addition to the fact that worksheets
are also expected to enhance transparency of the estimation process and help information
sharing among the parties concerned.
45
Fragility analysis for the port operation resources may be initiated by identifying required
resource levels for port operation which include minimum requirements for full and limited
operations.
Based on the assumed hazard for BCM, estimated damage of the port operation
resources leads to the initial loss of the port logistics function, of which needed recovery time and
its recovery level is to be estimated for respected recovery options such as the implementing
emergency rehabilitation, securing in advance alternatives resources and undertaking the
reconstruction /procurement of the resources.
Most common fragility analysis for the port operation resources is damage estimation of main port
facilities such as quay structures and break waters due to earthquake and tsunami forces. FLIP:
Finite element analysis program of liquefaction process and response of soil-structure systems
during earthquakes (FLIP) is currently one of most sophisticated techniques for evaluating safety
and deformation of the port structures.
Taking into consideration a high expertise, time and effort, and cost to be requited for running
FLIP, some FLIP-based simplified techniques for assessing seismic damage has been
developed, among which the Chart-based Seismic Capacity Diagnosis Program and Ichii’s
fragility diagrams are increasingly used for estimating damages of main port facilities during the
earthquake and tsunami.
In addition to those of FLIP-based techniques, more convenient approaches in association with
past experiences, observations and records are being sought by researchers to cover the
wide-rages of damage estimation of entire port operation resources facilities.
The methodology
also expected to provide the site practitioners with quick insight and ideas of the port facility
damages.
Pragmatic use of worksheet here may be as illustrated in Table 5.7, where damage of port
operational resources and their consequences are examined and indicated based on the
identified incident.
Estimating fragility of the port users and the recovering process are also vital for determining the
maximum tolerable period of downtime (MTPD), for which fragility of operation of port related
industries and its recovery curves are of great importance.
One of indicative techniques
includes that based on the intensive survey undertaken by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism, Japan, and Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University,
which provided recovery curves of production and shipment from the port related industries
based on observations during the east Japan great earthquake.
46
Table 5.7 Indicative worksheet for resource fragility assessment
Operational
resources
Incident
Port operation risks
Damage estimation
O ceantrenchearthquake
w ithM w of8.3,epicenter
Telecom m unication of20kilom eteroffshore,
grandm otionw ithM ercalli
service
scaleofV III,　andtsunam i
Fueloilsupply
heightof10m eters.
Electricsupplyshutdow n,andsw itch
boardinundated.
P ortauthoritystaff
Electricpow er
Malfunction/failure
P ow ersupplyshutdow n.
Telephonew iredisconnected
Linecongestion.
Damagedbankerfacilities&fueloil.
O utageoffueloil.
H um anloss,dam ageofhouse,and
outageoftransportationservices
D elayinm astering.Staff
vacancyandshortage.
10m etertsunam i.
Floatingdebrisandseabed
obstacles.
P ortaccessnotavailable.
V IIIgrandm otionand10
m etertsunam i.
D eform ationofthestructures.
B erthingnotavailable.
D am ageofcrane
structures/derails
O utageofcargohandling
operation.
H arborm aster
officer
Term inalcontroller
C raneoperator
Tractordriver
A ccesschannel
TurningB asin
Q uaystructure
C uaycrane
ﾄﾗﾝｽ ﾃ ﾅ ｰ （R TG )
Another important operation on the RA may be an evaluation of resiliency of the resources: i.e.
ﾄﾗｸﾀｰ
estimating predicted recovery time (PRT). PRT is the expected time period for recovering,
replacing and procuring resources, which for example include an emergency rehabilitation of port
facilities, repairing cranes, mobilizing alternative cargo handling equipment and procuring new
machines by considering degrees of damages caused by the grand motion and tsunami
inundation. Possible resource recovery level is named as predicted recovery level, which is
assumed to be more than RLO of the needed operational resource.
Table 5.8 illustrates by example an indicative worksheet for estimating PRT, for which two
recovery scenarios are prepared: i.e. standard scenario for recovering resources as planned, and
worst scenario, where most pesimistic expectation or unpredicted situations are employeied.
Usually, standard based PRTs of resources are estimated based on the fragility analysis with
normal rehabilitation or repair techniques and normal procurement procedures, while the worst
scinaro based PRTs are decided by the discusions and insight of BCP analysts and staff
concerned.
47
Table 5.8 Indicative worksheet for estimating predicted recovery time of resources
Operational
resources
Resource resiliency
Planned treatment (Std)
Em ergencyrehabilitationof
electriclineandsw itchboard.
A uxliarypow ergenerator
vates. rehabilitationof
Telecom m unication acti
Em ergency
service
telephonew ires,sw itchboard,
and
internet
server.
A cti
vati
Fueloilsupply
Em
ergency
rehabi
litati
on
ofng
fuei
oiltankandbankerfacilities.
PRT（Std）
Worst scenario
PRT（Wst）
2
Longcontinuedpow ersupply
shutdow nandfueloil
shortageforgenerator.
7
Electricpow er
P ortauthoritystaff Staffsafetyconfirm ation.
A rrangm entofthem astering.
H arborm aster
2
7
2
officer
2
Term inalcontroller C onfirm ingsafetyandarranging
w orkingschedule.
C raneoperator
3
Tractordriver
3
A ccesschannel
TurningB asin
Floatingandseabeddebris
surveyandclearance
Q uaystructure
Em ergencyverificationand
rehabilitationofquaystructures.
C uaycrane
R eplacem entbym obilecrane.
地震力による車体の変状等の確認。応急
補修。
5.2.3.
2
3
Longcontinued
telecom m unicationservice
shutdow
n.nuedfueloilsupply
Long
conti
outage.
Lossofstaffw ithspecial
know ledge/techniques.
3
14
7
7
6
Longcontinuedlisence
holderabsence.
7
M assivedebrisfound.
7
7
7
3
5
7
B igdam ageofquay
structures.
D elayincranearrangem ent.
3
30
6
5
Risk evaluation
Risk evaluation involves results of the risk analysis (predicted recovery times (PRTs) and
predicted recovery levels (PRLs) of operational resources), and the risk criteria (recovery time
objective (RTO) and recovery level objective (RLO) of the core business)) for deciding whether
the nature and magnitude of the risk is tolerable or not.4 Practically this operation is undertaken
by comparing PROs with RTO. Note that all PRTs are assumed to satisfy RLO, and resources
with the longest PRT may become bottleneck resources which will be compared and substantially
decide the risk evaluation. Detailed steps to calculate PRT after consideration of dependency
spillover (herein after described as “PRT*”) is illustrated in Figure 5.14, where PRT* will be
4
Risk criteria: conditions indicating seriousness for evaluation of risk consequence.
48
obtained as a product of PRT and an element of resource dependency matrix. AS such the
resource dependency matrix stated in section 5.1.3 is important to define bottleneck resources
without which it is almost impossible to properly implement the port core businesses. An example
of whole table for identifying bottleneck resources will be created as shown in Figure 5.15. The
port managers can give to those resources the first priority to secure them for properly meeting
the requirements from clients.
FE
9
Epron
リソース名
Electricity
Telecom
Watersupply
FuelOil
Portauthority
staff
Harbormaster
officer
Quaycrane
operator
Terminal
controller
Truckterdriver
Transtener
operator
ｹﾞｰﾄｸﾗｰｸ
航路
FE
10
FE
11
FE
9
Quay
Yard
crane chassis
Epron
(PRT)　⇒
FE
10
FE
11
Quay
Yard
crane chassis
30
6
4.5
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
1
1
0
1×6
4.5
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
1
1
0
1×6
4.5
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
0
0
0
0×6
0
0
0
0
Figure 5.14 Calculation steps for obtaining PRT*
49
Figure 5.15 Indicative worksheet for identifying bottleneck resources
50
15
6
7
30
6
5
5
14
FuelOil
Port
authority
staff
Harbor
master
officer
Quaycrane
operator
Terminal
controller
Truckter
driver
Accsess
channel
Quay
Epron
Quaycrane
operator
Trannsfer
crane
Trannsfer
crane
Trucktor
Container
slot
Reefer
consent
Checkin
gate
ﾀｰﾐﾅﾙ
ｵﾍﾟﾚｰｼｮﾝ
ｼｽﾃﾑ
Portoffice
Bld.
Control
tower
Marine
house
OS
HR
HR
HR
HR
FE
FE
FE
ICT
BO
BO
BO
FE
FE
FE
FE
FE
FE
FE
HR
14
Electricity
OS
10
5
0
0
10
10
5
30
7
7
7
7
Resource
Cat.
PRT
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
0
7
7
0
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
0
7
7
0
0
0
0
0
14
14
14
14
14
14
0
14
0
14
0
14
0
0
14
0
14
Category
OS
OS
Resource Electr Fuel
icity Oil
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
0
0
0
15
15
0
0
15
HR
Port
authority
staff
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
6
0
6
6
0
6
0
6
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
HR
HR
Harbor Quay
master crane
officer operator
0
0
0
7
7
7
7
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
7
HR
Terminal
controller
0
0
0
0
0
7
7
7
0
7
7
0
7
0
7
0
7
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
HR
FE
FE
Truckter Accses Quay
driver
s
channe
l
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
FE
Epron
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
6
0
6
6
0
6
0
6
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
FE
Quay
crane
0
0
0
0
0
4.5
4.5
4.5
0
5
4.5
0
4.5
0
4.5
0
4.5
0
0
0
0
4.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
10
10
10
0
10
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.5
FE
FE
FE
FE
Yard
Trannsfe Trucktor Check
Chassi rcrane
in
s
gate
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
5
0
5
0
5
5
5
5
5
0
5
5
0
5
0
5
5
5
0
0
0
0
5
ICT
BO
BO
Operation Port office Control
system
Bld.
tower
14
0
0
0
0
14
14
14
0
14
14
0
14
0
14
0
14
0
0
0
0
14
14
7
7
10
7
0
0
14
14
14
14
30
30
15
14
7
14
15
15
14
7
0
2
2
0
3
0
0
4
4
10
8
0
0
8
7
0
8
8
0
0
0
BO PRT with Tranck
Marine dependenc -ing
effect
house y
5.2.4. Risk treatment
After completion of risk evaluation operation, the bottleneck resources may give clear indications
of necessary actions to be taken in advance to improve business continuity capacity.
Based upon the above information, the BCM executing agency shall determine which disruption
of port operation is critical for the future development and requires treatment, and identify
treatments commensurate with the continuity of port logistics for developing Risk Response Plan,
which enable the agency to take necessary proactive measures for reducing the value of PRT
and improve PRL.
The proactive measures to be considered by the agency include: i) strengthening seismic
resistance capacity of the port facilities including construction of the earthquake resistance quay
and reinforcement of breakwater, ii) increasing stockpiles of construction material for emergency
rehabilitation works, iii) sharing among ports inventory information of resources needed for initial
response and backing up each other, iv) streamlining and simplifying in advance procurement
procedures for accelerating replacement of resources, and v) improving redundancy of resource
supply. (See Table 5.)
51
Table 5.9 - Options for proactive measures to reduce PRT
Strengthening Stockpile
structure
Infra structure
Human
resiurce
Portfacilities
○
Road
○
Supplies
Acceralating
procurement
procedures
Redundancy
○
○
C ivilw orks
○
○
C argohandling
Port
operation
Portservices*1
○
△
○
△
Shipcrue
○
△
○
○
○
○
C argohandling
equipm ent*2
○
○
Portservice
equipm ent*3
○
○
○
△
C onstruction
Reconstru m aterial
ction
Equipm ent
Materials /
equipment
Shearing
inventry
information
○
O peration
Ship
○
Electricity
○
○
W atersupply
○
○
C itygas
○
○
W astedisposal
○
○
*1：includesportadm inistration,H arborm asterw orks,P ilotage,m ooringlineservices
*2：includesquaycrane,falklift,truckandtrailer,w arehouse,passengerterm inal
*3：includesboatsandsm allvesselsoperatedbyportauthority,harborm asterandharborpolice,andtugboat.
The agency shall review possible recovery options listed above and improve the Risk Response
Plan until the PRT/PRL meets to the required RTO/RLO, and include in BCP documentation.
52
6 Development of business continuity strategy and program
Business continuity strategy and program is a strategic approaches of action program to be
designed for promptly recovering critical operation of port logistics within the recovery time
objective. It should include the protection of prioritized activities and the mitigation. At some point
it should be included the requirement of resources to implement the selected strategies.
6.1 Basic idea of port business continuity strategy and program
After selection of risk treatment measures from the possible options to meet requirements of the
port stakeholders, the port community will prepare a port business continuity strategy and
program.
In general, it is essential for modern business entities to develop strategies for responding all kind
of risks as a part of organizational management strategies, because the strategies developed
and the entities with practical, pragmatic paths for dealing with these risks. Clearly defined and
articulated strategies enable the senior executives to take ownership of organizational risk
responses with being ultimately responsible and accountable for risk decisions.
This may be the case for the port community to consider the business continuity strategy and
program for dealing with a variety of risks through wide range of risk treatment options. There are
five basic types of responses to risk: ie. i) accept, ii) avoid, iii) mitigate, iv) share, and v) transfer.
While each type of response can have an associated strategy, there should be an overall strategy
for selecting from among the basic response types.
6.1.1.
Overall strategic approach for port business continuity
Risk response strategies specify:
i) individuals, port business entity subcomponents, or the specific port community members that
are responsible for the selected risk treatment measures;
ii) dependencies of the selected risk treatment measures on other risk treatment measures;
iii) dependencies of selected risk treatment measures on other factors (e.g., implementation of
other planned risk responding programs and securement risks specific port operation resources);
iv) implementation timeline for risk treatments;
v) plans for monitoring the effectiveness of the risk treatment measures (e.g., port clients’
satisfactions, and cost and technical constraints of port facility rehabilitation works); and
vii) interim risk treatment measures to be employed for accommodating port client’s requests, if
appropriate.
Port business continuity strategy and program may include interim treatment measures which are
53
chosen to implement for temporarily meet the port clients’ requests. An overall strategic approach
provides a port-wide concerted actions for the selected risk treatment measures among the risk
treatment options for a given risk situation.
There is need for a well-defined, established organizational path for selecting one or a
combination of the risk responses of acceptance, avoidance, mitigation, sharing, or transfer. A
decision to “accept risk” must be consistent with the tolerance of port community and its member
for risk. Port community may be placed in situations where there is greater risk than the
designated senior executives desire to accept. Or it may be possible to avoid risk or to share or
transfer risk, and some risk mitigation is probably feasible. Avoiding risk may require some
organization-wide reengineering of the port business processes which might accrue some
business process innovation for the port. Mitigating risk requires expenditure of limited resources
and may quickly become cost-ineffective due to the pragmatic realities of the degree of mitigation
that can actually be achieved. Lastly, risk sharing and transfer have ramifications as well, some of
which if not unacceptable, may be undesirable. The port business continuity strategies are to
empower senior executives to make risk-based decisions compliant with the goals, objectives,
and broader organizational perspectives of port BCP.
6.1.2.
Risk Acceptance Strategies
Risk acceptance strategies are essential companions explicitly or implicitly to the port BCP
statements in terms of risk tolerance. The objective of establishing a port-wide risk tolerance is to
define a limit of the port for risk—that is, how far the port community is willing to take risks to its
operations including missions, functions, image, reputation and future development of the port,
port assets and individuals, and the national interest. Real-world operations, however, are
seldom so simple as to make such risk tolerance statements. Risk acceptance policy places the
acceptance of risk into a framework of organizational perspectives on dealing with the practical
realities of operating with risk, and provides the guidance necessary to ensure the extent of the
risk being accepted in specific situations
6.1.3.
Risk Avoidance Strategies
Of all the risk treatment procedures, risk avoidance strategies may be the key to achieving
adequate risk treatment. The trustworthiness of the port may be maintained through availability of
port logistics service even under resource constraints in the aftermath of disasters, but it is not
the case, if no appropriate risk avoidance is undertaken. Typical risk avoidance measures include
reinforcement of port facilities such as quay structures and cranes, and liquefaction prevention
works for the ground, through which disruption risks of the port logistics services will be reduced
54
dramatically. Accelerating insurance examination and payment procedures, and procurement of
consulting services and civil works for rehabilitating port facilities and equipment may be another
major consideration of risk avoidance measures. These acceleration measures are expected to
shorten the disruption periods of the service.
Yet such approaches can be in great tension with
port community’s desires not to mobilize large amount of financial resources or to change ordinal
due process and practices. Strong leaderships of and full mandates to senior executives of port
community entities are needed in this regard.
6.1.4.
Risk Sharing and Transfer Strategies
Risk sharing and risk transfer strategies are also key elements in the risk management of the
Chilean ports, which mostly depend on insurance scheme for financing rehabilitation expense of
port facilities and equipment. Damage estimations and endorsement undertaken by DOP is key
element for processing an insurance claim, therefore, quick response of DOP regional office is
essential , as observed in 2014 Iquique earthquake.
6.1.5.
Risk Mitigation Strategies
Risk mitigation strategies reflect an organizational perspective on what mitigations are to be
employed and where the mitigations are to be applied, to reduce risks of large negative impact to
the port business, local industries and households, and the regional and national economy. Risk
mitigation strategies are the primary link between respective port BCM and area wide port
operation risk management. Risk mitigation strategies may be discussed in the context of
enabling ports community to avoid catastrophic damage caused by possible long continued
service disruption. Sharing inventory information and mutual accommodations among ports of
repair parts and components of cargo handling equipment, for instance, may be one of most
practical measures to mitigate shutdown risks of port cargo handling operations. Lesson learnt
from experiences of the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) also suggests possible mutual
backup among ports in terms of ship calls. One example may be the supplement and alternate
operations in the aftermath of GEJE among the Tohoku area ports, among which container
cargos from/to damaged ports of Sendai-Shiogama and Hachinohe were detoured through ports
of Akia, Sakata and Niigata on the Japan Sea. Based on the experiences, an area-wide BCP has
developed in Tohoku area for arranging in advance to mutually supplement and alternate
accommodation of ships in case of large scale disaster.
6.2 Developing port business continuity strategy and program
Taking into account the findings and possible solutions of BIA and RA, port business continuity
strategy is to be established and port business continuity is to be prepared in order to achieve the
55
goals in terms of the port business continuity.
6.2.1.
Continuity and early recovery of critical port logistics function and shipping
services
The targeted port operational resources involved port infrastructures, superstructures, storages
facilities, access road and railways, workers, staff, equipment and offices of port business
stakeholders, port information and processing systems among which some of the port
infrastructures and superstructures were found critical in the past disaster. For example,
demolished quay structures of the port of Iquique completely paralyzed Terminal 1 operated by
EPI.
In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, primary obstructions of resuming port
services in the northern ports were the tsunami debris on and bottom of water, which prevented
ships from sailing in the port. On the other hand, major trouble was damaged quays, cranes and
warehouses in the southern ports. This was because of the differences of intensity and
characteristics of seismic shaking and tsunami of the respective region, however, suffered
continuity of the port logistics function anyway.
The above experiences strongly suggest it essential to identify the needed port operational
resources and assess their vulnerability and resiliency, in particular those of the port
infrastructures and superstructures. The BIA and RA is of great importance in this regard. These
analysis may be helpful to find possible critical resources for which risk treatment measures are
needed to be prepared for establishing port business continuity strategy and program.
It should be noted that there may be some lead time for resuming commercial shipping services.
Some of facilities and equipment of the shipping companies may be damaged by the disaster. It
take a longer time, however, once the port loses shipping business creditability.
6.2.2.
Securing the port administration and control functions
Every business activities in ports involves a number of port administration and control procedures.
BIA may identify some of critical resources closely related to the port administration and control
functions such as personnel, staffs and officers from port related authorities, and offices and
equipment needed for the authorities’ operations. It should be noted that these resources are
always at risks of the earthquake and tsunami, therefore, should be evaluated their business
continuity capacities, and risk treatment measures if needed, through BIA and RA as a due
course of preparing port BCP.
56
6.2.3.
Securing and maintaining the information and communication system
Information and communication system for administrating and managing port operation, and
processing port trades are also essential for port logistics. These systems are normally supported
by telecommunication services providers, ICT specialists, and servers and terminal computers,
for which necessary vulnerability and resiliency assessments are needed. This is also included in
BIA and RA procedures.
6.2.4.
Financing
Affected enterprises need funds for recovering damaged or burnt-out offices or worksites, as well
as for maintaining financial credit. Financial considerations may involve insurance and reserving
bank’s disaster loans.
It is also wise to consider eligibility for public post-disaster funds.
The port infrastructure is covered by some insurance, it is recommendable to include in the
checklist the procedure to execute insurance policy for accelerating insurance claim process.
6.2.5.
Regulatory compliance
Even at the disaster scene, all parties from the port community are still under the jurisdiction of
the country and are subject to the legal requirements, which however are not always set forth by
considering such an emergency situation, therefore are sometimes not sufficient for quickly
recovering disaster damages and securing business continuity. In view of this, it is considered
necessary for the port community to discuss in advance with the authorities concerned on
possible deregulation measures for smoothly implementing BCP.
6.2.6.
Ensuring consistency with public policy and efforts of social infrastructure
operators
Port business continuity plan aims to secure continuity of port function for enabling emergency
relief activities and facilitating early recovery of local, regional and national economies. Some of
these targets are needed in line with the emergency responding programs of local, regional and
national levels. AS such, port BCPs are always requested to be consistent with the National Civil
Protection Plan, and the national, regional, provincial and municipal risk management and port
administration policies.
57
7 Planning
For smooth and effective implementation of business continuity management (BCM) at ports, and
efficient PDCA cycles for improving business continuity management system (BCM), planning
procedures for developing BCMS is of primarily importance. Here planning procedures include
preparing: i) an implementation program of the proactive measures, ii) emergency responding
program, iii) education and training program, and iv) implementation program for review and
improvement (PDCA program). Port BCP is a documentation of all BCM related programs as well
as institutional and management arrangements for implementing BCM.
.
7.1 Drafting and determining BCP
As stated in Section 4.1, port communities normally involves a variety of administrative agencies
and business entities, therefore, overarching strategy, and common road map and timeline action
plan is vital for effective BCM implementation in port. The port BCP is of an importance as a
documentation of describing BCMS in details, including BCM common incidents, port function
recovery target, identified missions of respective party concerned, emergency responding
institutional arrangements, human training and human resource development plan, and
communication and consultation networks. As such port BCP is expected to work as a norm of
the port community for properly responding to the emergency situation and maintaining port
logistics continuity.
7.1.1.
Implementation program of the proactive measures
It is necessary to confirm whether critical operations are actually recovered within the target
recovery time. The judgement should be made on the basis of the BIA and RA, which provides
with necessary information including findings such as possible bottleneck resources and loss
levels and predicted recovery times of the resources. As shown in Figure 2 and stated in details
on the Table 5.10, there are three kinds of approaches to treat port disruption risks: ie. i)
increasing robustness of port functions through mainly anti-seismic reinforcement of port facilities
and liquefaction prevention earth treatments, ii) facilitating earlier resource recovery mainly
through streamlining of procurement procedures of consulting services, equipment and civil
works, and iii) securing alternative port logistics services through detour transportation. Financial
and institutional arrangements are required for materializing these options, thus, implementation
program of proactive measures are needed. As a financial mitigation, insurance coverage is also
major consideration in Chile, therefore, confirmatory inspections should be made to see if
58
required recovery materials and equipment can be procured within the prescribed time. If tasks
are supposed to be processed manually in the event of a system shutdown, simulation and other
confirmatory steps should be taken to confirm whether the prescribed work load is realistic.
7.1.2.
Emergency responding program
Emergency responding actions may be another main stream treatments for quickly responding
the disaster and minimizing its damages in order to increase port function continuity. Emergency
responding program normally includes steps, staff assignment and responsibility of conducting
staff safely confirmation and summon, port damage investigation, information sharing and public
announcements, emergency rehabilitation and repair works. Since these actions should be taken
in a quick manner, the emergency responding program are required to give a clear and simple
instructions to the staff concerned.
7.1.3.
Education and training program
It is essential for both management and employees to recognize the importance of business
continuity as a common perception, or as an established culture. This also emphasizes the need
to hold education and training sessions on an ongoing basis5. It is an unrealistic expectation that
in the event of a disaster, all interested people can reliably carry out their assigned tasks simply
because all of the required tasks are documented. As a result, it is required for ports, immediately
after the establishment of BCMS, to undertake holding drills and training sessions as appropriate
on a routine basis. These sessions should provide a wide variety of programs ranging from basic
knowledge education to desk-top drills and decision-making training for key people, field
evacuation exercises, fire drills, backup system operation training, and countermeasures
headquarters setup drills for which annual and five years midterm-term, for example,
implementation programs are needed to prepare for the step-by-step BCM capacity building.
Because emergency situations do not allow employees time to read and understand emergency
response manuals on the spot, people who are familiar with these manuals should be trained as
a contingency. Major objectives of a BCP exercise program may be:
Ø
Create a learning environment so that all participants can learn about the BCP, and
Ø
Document changes and updates (including omissions) to the BCP,
A structured Walk-through exercise is normally the first step of the above mentioned BCP
exercise program. Targets of which may include:
5
It should take into account labor mobility, which provides an additional reason why training and education
are important
59
Ø
Determine the readiness of the BCP implementation, and
Ø
Validate the BCP resource list (people and inventories) are sufficient to effect recovery of
business operation.
7.1.4.
Implementation program for review and improvement (PDCA program)
The drills and training sessions are going to contribute to not only the capacity building for BCP
implementation, but also to provide with some lessons learnt for the feedback to the BCMS
arrangements. Daily port business operations may also give some input for further improving
BCMS at the port. PDCA program comprising procedures and mile stones of review and
improvement actions for the BCMS may ensure continuous efforts for revising port BCMS
undertaken by the port community. Implementation program of the proactive measures are duly
authorized, nevertheless implementing proactive measure program are delayed or incomplete
because of the rack of technical and/or institutional supports, or legal restrictions.
7.2
BCP documentation
The chapter 7 (Support) of ISO 22301 put particular emphasis on documentation of the BCM
implementation
procedures
as
well
as
securing
resources,
improving
organizational
competencies, and risk awareness and communication. The document is so called “BCP”, which
comprises one of the most important elements of BCMS. BCP includes outlines and results of
BIA and RA, the business continuity strategy, the emergency responding program, institutional
arrangements, and Implementation program of the proactive measures such as materials and
equipment mobilization, facility reinforcement, and drills and staff training,. The documentation is
a record of all BCMS structure, contents data and other important background information,
therefore, is expected to contribute to the efficient and effective review and improvement works
for PDCA cycle of BCMS.
BCP possibly discloses some managerially and operationally sensitive information, which in
particular may work to the detriment of business entities for competing in the port market. On the
other hand, BCP enhance the creditability of the port logistics. As such the coverage of the port
BCP documentation should be deemed as one of top management issues.
60
8 Proactive measures, and education and training
Implementing proactive measures, and education and training is a main stream process of BCM
as steps of securing risk treatments included in a business continuity strategy.
8.1 Implementation of the proactive measures
In the preventive stage of disaster risk reduction and mitigation, proactive measures deliberately
designed and included in the port BCP need to be taken in a prompt and accurate manner before
the disasters occur. Of great importance in the implementation stage of the proactive measures
may be earmarked financial and human resources, however, due consideration should be made
for technical, institutional and legal aspect, which substantially determine effectiveness of
efficiency of these proactive actions.
8.2 Implementation of education and training
8.2.1.
²
Methodology and practice of BCM exercises (testing)
For capacity building of the port community and human resource development (HRD) to
foster port BCP specialists, BCM exercises (testing) are of great importance. For more
emphasis on HRD, the wording may be education and training for implementing BCM.
According to
“A Professional’s Guide to the Contents of a Business Continuity Plan”
prepared by William M. Adney from InfoSolutions, Inc., the BCP can be verified and validated
using any one of the following methodologies:
a)
Structured walk-through exercise
b)
Tactical exercise (“war game”)
c)
Technical exercise for the IT staff
d)
Hot site exercise
e)
A combination of the above
Indicating some methodologies that can be used to achieve the goals of exercise (professional’s
guide)
An IT Examination Handbook published by Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC), USA also stated that all BCP implementation procedures are duly tested periodically to
ensure viability of BCMS, and provided classification of the procedures, i.e.: i) emergency
response procedures, such as escalation and notification processes; ii) alternate processing
procedures; and iii) full recovery procedures for returning to the normal port processing. The
handbook also provided “the testing methods” to be employed: “Orientation/walk-through”,
“Tabletop/Mini-drill”, “Functional testing”, and “Full-scale testing”.
61
Orientation/walk-through is the most basic type of testing method. Its primary objective is to
ensure that critical personnel from the port community are familiar with the port BCP. It is
characterized by:
a)
Discussion about the BCP in a conference room or small group setting;
b)
Individual and team training; and
c)
Clarification and highlighting of critical plan elements.
Tabletop/Mini-drill is somewhat more involved than an orientation/walk-through because the
participants choose a specific event scenario and try to apply the BCP to it. It includes:
a)
Practice and validation of specific functional response capability;
b)
Focus on demonstration of knowledge and skills, as well as team interaction and
decision-making capability;
c)
Role playing with simulated response at alternate locations/facilities to act out critical
steps, recognize difficulties, and resolve problems in a non-threatening environment;
d)
Mobilization of all or some of the crisis management/response team to practice proper
coordination; and
e)
Varying degrees of actual, as opposed to simulated, notification and resource
mobilization to reinforce the content and logic of the plan.
Functional testing is the first type that involves the actual mobilization of personnel at other
sites in an attempt to establish communications and coordination as set forth in the BCP. It
includes:
a)
Demonstration of emergency management capabilities of several groups practicing a
series of interactive functions, such as direction, control, assessment, operations, and
planning;
b)
Actual or simulated response to alternate locations or facilities using actual
communications capabilities;
c)
Mobilization of personnel and resources at varied geographical sites; and
d)
Varying degrees of actual, as opposed to simulated, notification and resource
mobilization.
Full-scale testing is the most comprehensive type of test. In a full-scale test, the institution
implements all or portions of its BCP by processing data and transactions using back-up
media at the recovery site. It involves:
a)
Validation of crisis response functions;
b)
Demonstration of knowledge and skills, as well as management response and
decision-making capability;
62
c)
On-the-scene execution of coordination and decision-making roles;
d)
Actual, as opposed to simulated, notifications, mobilization of resources, and
communication of decisions;
e)
Activities conducted at actual response locations or facilities;
f)
Enterprise-wide participation and interaction of internal and external management
response teams with full involvement of external organizations;
g)
Actual processing of data utilizing back-up media; and
h)
Exercises generally extending over a longer period of time to allow issues to fully evolve
as they would in a crisis, and allow realistic role- play of all the involved groups.
The above mentioned exercise (testing) methodologies are needed deliberately
8.2.2. Programing the exercises
As stated in the section 7.1.4: Education and training program, a BCP exercise program
create a learning environment so that all participants can learn about the BCP, and reflect the
lessons learnt from exercise to update BCP. In this context, the BCP exercise program shall start
from a structured Walk-through exercise, and move to the tabletop/Mini-drill, and functional and
full-scale testing stages by considering progress and achievement degree of PDCA procedures.
Defining basic policy for undertaking exercises in annual and mid or long term basis is of great
significance in this regard. It may be recommended to include in the exercise program both a
combination of one structured walk-through and one technical exercise annually.
63
9 Review and improvement
Reviews and corrective actions for improving BCMS is a main stream of PDCA cycle included in
BCPs. The parties concerned from the particular port are requested to participate in the PDCA
activities for improve the port BCMS through the procedures.
9.1 Inspection and evaluations
Port community members should evaluate their conditions of business continuity activities as part
of an annual operation audit (or more frequently at regular intervals). Inspections should be
conducted to see what has and has not been covered by exercises, and identified insufficiencies
should be improved during routine operations. The results of evaluations and details of
improvements should be reported to the management of respective members for reflecting PDCA
cycles of port BCMS.
A certain organization or a person may be available to examine and certify that the BCMS meets
requirements of the ISO standards. This kind of system is called “Third party certification system”.
An organization or person must have no direct transactions (third party). The third party
certification system is expected to provide a creditability of BCMS established by the port
community, hence to certify the business continuity capacity of the port.
9.2 Review by port management
On the basis of the results of regular inspections or by considering the third party certification, the
management of the port should identify the items to be improved, review business continuity
activities as a whole, and define the direction of activities for years to come. To do this, the
management should have a correct recognition of the current situation while keeping up with
changes in business activities. Managerial reviews should be repeated at regular basis are
essential for making port BCMS more effective to cope with the disaster risks.
9.3 Correction and improvement
Additional benefits of PDCA actions for BCP improvement may include improvement in overall
port operation efficiency. Business process is reviewed and redundant business activities and
procedures can be found for streamlining the procedure. Extra resource input cut may be
identified, thus possible cost is materialized. These spin-off benefits may further motivate the
management.
9.4 Sustainable improvement
PDCA is to be undertaken periodically. Based on the exercise implementation program, testing
results or some feedback may be given annually, therefore theoretically review and improvement
64
in an annual or biyearly basis is possible. Even if it is not the case, continuing and sustainable
improvement of BCP through PDCA cycle is obviously important.
10 Recommendations
Community
to
the
Management
and
the
Economic
Recommendations to the port management and the local economic community in terms of
importance of addressing business continuity of the port function are as the followings
(1)
There is a need to let more port community members to know that a future port
development with wider and profitable port business opportunity may be derived from the
creditability of port clients for the resiliency of port logistic functions and reputations among
stockholders, business partners, consumers, administrative officials, and employees for
their preparedness with business continuity measures against possible disasters. The task
that lies ahead is to actively expand this preparedness.
(2)
Developing BCMS may be a kind of exercise of prioritizing business operation targets,
which may provide strategic and tactical change in the business scope, core business
concentration, and streamlining and downsizing, which is expected to improve corporate
management and operational capacity.
(3)
Business continuity capacity of the ports may contribute to strengthening not only the port
competitiveness but for resiliency of local production and economic activities, resulting in
creating more attractive community. The local community must pay further attention to the
fact and port management should take necessary actions accordingly.
65
11 Glossary
Business Continuity Plan (BCP): An documented and approved set (usually by senior
management and/or a Board of Directors) of arrangements, resources, and sufficient procedures
that enable an organization to respond to a disaster and resume its critical functions within a
pre-defined time frame without incurring unacceptable financial or operational impacts
Business Continuity Strategy: A management-approved, documented, and funded course of
actions to be used in the development and implementation of an organization’s BCP.
Business Impact Analysis (BIA): Process that confirms the impact on operations and financing
by the business interruption. It identifies critical business, operations and processes and relevant
business resources and performs analysis of the impact on business continuity. For example, it
follows those procedures set forth below: (1)sorting out of critical businesses, (2)analysis of
business processes, identification of critical elements (bottleneck) in business continuity,
(4)determination of priority in recovery, (5)setting out of target recovery time.
Blackout: It means the conditions in which interactive exchange of information is impossible
between the organizations and related parties.
Bottleneck: The original definition is the narrow part of a bottle by the lip. Here it means, in
business continuity and operation recovery, the key elements without which the entire process is
prevented from progressing.
Business Suspension Losses: Defined as a decrease in sales and accompanying loss of
profits arising from suspension of business.
Back-up Office: An office secured in advance in preparation for the cases where main office
becomes unable to be used due to natural disasters or terrorism. It accommodates personnel
required for business continuity and is equipped with facilities and functions required for
operations.
Crisis Communications: Sharing of information in case of an emergency, including press
conferences at the time of an emergency. Crisis communications are included in risk
communications.
Crisis: An event that threatens the security, integrity or facilities of an organization and/or the
safety of its employees. A Crisis may range from a building evacuation due to a bomb threat to a
full-scale, easily recognized disasters. For planning purposes, a Crisis includes, but is not limited
to, severe weather threats or occurrences (snow, tornadoes, etc.), power and communications
outages, medical emergencies, bomb threats, earthquakes, etc., in addition to an obvious,
easily-recognized disaster.
66
Crisis Management Plan (CMP): An approved set (usually by senior management and/or a
Board of Directors) of arrangements, resources, and sufficient procedures that enable an
organization to effectively respond to a crisis.
Crisis Management Team (CMT): The senior management team that activates the crisis
management plan (CMP) in response to a crisis.
Critical Path: Where there are several bifurcations in the process of a project, the critical path is
the working path that can complete all processes in the shortest time. It is necessary to monitor it
selectively as a delay on this path will affect other processes.
Decision-making Training: Defined as training on deciding and giving directions in a short time
as how to cope with and how to procure organization, personnel, and funds, assuming an
incident or an accident occurred.
Desk Training: Desk training is one of the forms of decision-making training. It involves training
on important items along a time axis based on a scenario of incident or accident.
Disaster Loan: Many municipalities have systems of loans for disaster damage and lend money
to the victims of earthquakes, major fires, and wind and water damage. Subjects and terms of
loans are published on the home pages of municipalities. Regarding loans to small and
medium-sized enterprises, governmental financial corporations establish systems for loans to aid
recovery from disasters.
Emergency responding program: Defined as a previously prepared plan for procedures to
respond to emergencies (Contingency Plan).
Hazard Map: A hazard map is a map that shows forecasted damage. Municipalities engage in
disclosing and publishing hazard information depending on the situations of localities and cities.
Items include volcanic eruptions, areas with a danger of landslides, and flood or evacuation sites,
evacuation routes at the time of an earthquake
ISO
(International
Organization
for
Standardization):
International
Organization
for
Standardization is an international organization for standardization, comprised of standardization
organizations representing each country and engaged in development and amendment of
international standards for all industrial fields (mining and manufacturing, agriculture and
pharmaceuticals, etc.), except for electricity, electronic technology and communication fields.
ISO
(International
Organization
for
Standardization):
International
Organization
for
Standardization is an international organization for standardization, comprised of standardization
organizations representing each country and engaged in development and amendment of
international standards for all industrial fields (mining and manufacturing, agriculture and
67
pharmaceuticals, etc.), except for electricity, electronic technology and communication fields.
Initial Response System: Defined as the system immediately after occurrence of accident or
disaster. It is an organization that designates the chief of the headquarters and can make
decisions. It has the authority to give commands and orders to the sites and has an
information-gathering function.
Management System: Defined as a standardized method of management. Managers participate
and repeat a cycle of policy development, planning, doing, checking, and reviewing.
Mitigate: To make or become milder, less severe, or less painful.
National Civil Protection Plan: Standardized organizational and administrative structure of the
National Civil Protection System, which intends to give a multi-sectoral planning for the civil
protection, and dedicated to develop "permanent actions for prevention and attention of
emergency and / or disaster, from a comprehensive disaster management vision"
Opening-up of waters: Defined as removal of obstacles on or sea bottom in the access channel
and turning basin of port to secure water surface traffic route.
Quantification of Risks: Defined as numerically making an objective assessment of the
frequency and the degree of impact of risks by some method.
Recovery Time Objective (RTO): The maximum length of time, in hours or days, that can lapse
before the loss of a port business function causes unacceptable financial impacts and/or
operational Impacts to the port community as documented in the BIA. The RTO has five (5)
components:
(1) The time before a disaster is declared;
(2) The time required to activate the BCP;
(3) The time required for the port community to restore port logistics service;
(4) The time required by an affected business unit to perform assigned tasks to the point at which
business operations can be resumed including the time to verify that restored port logistics
service is sufficient to the port users; and
(5) The time for each business entity to re-enter/process all backlog (including manually
processed work, if applicable) to bring business operations into current status.
Risk: The potential for exposure to loss. Risks, either man-made or natural, are constant
throughout our daily lives. The potential is usually measured by its probability in years.
Risk Analysis: Defined as identifying causes using available information systematically and
analyzing the event probability and degree of impact of identified events.
68
Risk Communications: Defined as activities and processes for promoting mutual understanding
of risks through a sharing of risk information between senders and receivers of risk information.
Information sharing includes both that between organizations and within the organization (see,
Crisis Communications).
Risk Management: Defined as anticipating risks and contriving to minimize the impacts of risks if
a risk is realized. It means management, expertise, system, and countermeasures for
overcoming risks.
Tactical Exercise (“War Game”): A simulated, scenario-based exercise of the BCP conducted
in a “War Room” format in a large room. The exercise moderator conducts the exercise and
reads a prepared scenario. All team leaders and alternate team leaders are required to
participate and “perform” their tasks under supervised conditions. Each team has a separate
table or work area and can only communicate with another team using written notes that are
given to “couriers” for delivery to simulate the communications problems (e.g., incomplete
information) that occur during a disaster. The written communications are time-stamped so that
an exercise report can be prepared. During the exercise, roving “referees” ensure there is no
talking among the teams. This type of sophisticated exercise requires a considerable amount of
planning and coordination, even though the actual event may take only a day or less.
Third Party Certification System: A system, in which regarding whether a certain organization
or a person has been engaged in activities conforming to the requirements of the standards, an
organization (third party) that has no direct transactions with the organization or person makes an
examination and provides certification. Certification by each organization such as an enterprise
or municipality or a person shall be referred to as first party certification, certification by the other
party of the organization or person, including the client, shall be referred to as second party
certification.
69
12 References
i.
ISO 22301. Societal security - Business continuity management systems - Requirements,
2012.
ii.
Business continuity guideline, Central Disaster Management Council, Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan, 2015.
iii.
BS 25999-1. Business continuity management - Code of practice, British Standards
Institution.
iv.
BS 25999-2. Business continuity management - Requirements and guidance for use,
British Standards Institution.
v.
ISO/IEC 17799 Information technology - Security techniques - Code of practice for
information security management, 2005
vi.
Business
continuity
plan,
executive
summary
for
lenders,
MOHELA,
2005.
(https://www.mohela.com/dl/forms/publicInfo/finance/BCP%20Executive%20Summary%
20for%20Lenders.pdf, last review 16-08-2015)
vii.
Business continuity policy template for SMBs, Paul Kirvan, SearchSMBStorage.com,
2011
(http://searchsmbstorage.techtarget.com/Free-business-continuity-policy-template-for-S
MBs, last review 16-08-2015)
viii.
Business continuity plan template, Primary Care Development Corporation and National
Association of Community Health Centers, 2011,
(https://www.nachc.com/client//BCP%20Template%20Final.docx,
last
review
16-08-2015)
ix.
Methodology and procedure of business impact analysis for improving port logistics
business continuity management. Felipe Caselli Benavente, Mauricio Reyes Gallardo1,
Mario Beale Esquivel, Yasuhiro Akakura and Kenji Ono. (Submitted on Jenuary 31, 2015),
Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk Management.
x.
A Professional’s Guide to the Contents of a Business Continuity Plan, William M. Adney,
Kelley Goggins, MBCP
xi.
Business Continuity Planning Booklet - IT Examination Handbook, Page 19, - Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council, March 2003
70
13 Checklists
When a disaster strikes, employees will not have time to consult bulky manuals on the spot.
Therefore, responsible persons who assume leadership roles should have checklists at hand,
which will help them check policy or direction, required minimum actions, progress control,
procedures for sustaining critical operations, etc.
71
Appendix A
Continuity Policy Example
Following are to examples of policy statement, the first one is an example of an exhaustive
continuity policy for the port and the second one simplified; in any case both are just examples
and neither of them must be considered as the only way to draft it.
A1) Example 1
Introduction
[Port of X] is committed to providing the best possible experience to its customers and the best
possible relationships with employees, shareholders, suppliers and the community.
To ensure
the consistent availability and delivery of its services, [Port of X] has developed the following
business continuity and disaster recovery (BC/DR) policy in support of a comprehensive program
for disaster recovery, business continuity and overall business survivability.
[Port of X], is exposed to potential risks that could disrupt or destroy critical business functions.
Our strategy for continuing business in the event of an incident is to ensure the safety and
security of all employees; to provide support to authorities in the emergency and relief logistics for
the community and to continue critical business functions in the shortest time as possible.
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of the BC/DR policy is to ensure that all of the Port business activities can be kept at
normal, or near-normal, performance following an incident that has the potential to disrupt its
activities.
The scope of this policy is the entire [Port of X], its concessionaires, employees and operational
resources.
Statement of Policy
Each company operating in the Port is responsible for undertaking business impact analysis and
risk assessment to be used as the foundation of the plan.
Each unit will participate in preparing
relevant and comprehensive business continuity plans (BCP) for the port operations, including
disaster recovery plans (DRP), when appropriate, to ensure that any damage or disruptions to
critical assets can be quickly minimized and that these assets can be restored to normal or
near-normal operation as quickly as possible.
When a plan is completed, approved and implemented, each plan will include procedures and
support agreements which ensure on-time availability and delivery of required products and
services.
Each plan must be certified annually with the business continuity policy compliance
72
process through the BC/DR Team.
[Port of X] acknowledges that it will use the ISO 22300:2012 as the guidance and structure for its
business continuity activities.
[Port of X] recognizes the importance of an active and fully supported BC/DR program to ensure
the safety, health and continued availability of employment of its employees and the production
and delivery of quality services for customers and other stakeholders.
[Port of X] requires the
commitment of each employee, department and vendor in support of the activities required to
protect assets, mission and survivability of the port.
Policy Leadership
[Name of Executive], from [name of the state port company or concessionaire], is
designated as the corporate management liaison responsible for the BC/DR program, during the
period [X].
Resolution of issues in the development of, or support of, all BC/DR plans and
associated activities should first be coordinated with the BC/DR Team and appropriate internal or
external organizations before submitting to the corporate management liaison.
The issue
resolution process is defined in the following section.
Verification of Policy Compliance
BC/DR compliance verification is managed by the BC/DR Team with support from other relevant
internal departments.
Each plan must define appropriate procedures, staffing, tools and
workplace planning activities necessary to meet compliance requirements, which will be audited
according to an annual program by the BC/DR Team (or part of it).
Waivers for temporary compliance verification may be given if a detailed written waiver request
issued by the department manager is approved by the BC/DR Team corporate management
liaison.
Maximum delay for compliance is one year from the original date of compliance.
Penalties for Non-Compliance
In situations where a unit of the Port does not comply with the BC/DR policy, the BC/DR Team
will prepare a brief stating the case for non-compliance and present it to the BC/DR corporate
management liaison for resolution.
Failure to comply with BC/DR policies within the allotted
time for resolution may result in verbal reprimands, notes in personnel files, termination and other
remedies as deemed appropriate.
73
A2) Example 2
The Business Continuity Plan (BCP) for [Port of X] has been developed to address what is
necessary to resume business operations as quickly and efficiently as possible after a
disaster/emergency event, given the exposure to potential risks that could disrupt or destroy
critical business functions.
The [Port of X] has determined the need for a comprehensive BCP
which includes:
Ø [Top Reason #1, example: a commitment to providing the best possible experience to its
customers and the best possible relationships with employees, shareholders, suppliers
and the community]
Ø [Top Reason #2, example: ensure the consistent availability and delivery of its services]
Ø [Top Reason #3, example: ensure the safety and security of all employees]
Ø [Top Reason #4 (optional), example: provide support to authorities in the emergency and
relief logistics for the community]
Ø [Top Reason #5 (optional), example: continue critical business functions in the shortest
time as possible]
Both a Business Impact Analysis and Risk Assessment approach have been used as the
foundation of the plan, coordinated by the continuity team.
This BCP supports [Port of X]
efforts to prepare and maintain all business functions and related items (i.e.
supplies, records) necessary to support the port operations in the event of a disaster.
equipment,
This BCP
allows each staff member and business department to be prepared for disaster related to
earthquakes or tsunami [a more general statement could be: to be prepared for all
emergencies that may occur, including natural, technological or human induced
disasters].
[Port State Company] requires the active cooperation and commitment from all units,
departments and employees in the preparation and maintenance of the plan.
The
implementation of the plan will be audited according to an annual program by the BC/DR Team
(or part of it).
The BCP is to be incorporated into job duties at all levels, and staff will be trained
and exercised accordingly in order to support the Plan.
Further, staff response will become
incorporated into overall job performance evaluation, and an ongoing dialogue and feedback on
the matter will be encouraged.
This will ensure a successful implementation of the plan, if ever
warranted.
74
[Port of X] Senior Leadership and the Board of Directors support the Business Continuity Plan in
the promotion of diligent mitigation and efficient response as well as maintaining and resuming
business operations and support to the community as soon as possible after a disaster.
75
Appendix B
BIA: Business Impact Analysis through Work Sheets
The BIA is a procedures to: select core port business, analyze business flow structure, identify
business operation resources, and estimate client’s tolerance to service disruption. This
complicated processes are needed to be properly guided and assisted, hence a worksheet
system is introduced as a effective and efficient tool.
Entire BIA worksheets system are illustrated in Figure B-1, where eight worksheets are to be
prepared. Of which some examples and templates of major worksheets are shown in this section.
Explanation on how to use the BIA work sheets to go from the deciding of the core businesses, to
the resource identification and the interdependency matrix.
BusinessImpactAnalysisfile
Screening/selection Listofbusinessactivities
corebusiness
Dependencymatrix
Classificationofbusiness Dependencyofbusiness ofbusinessoperation DecidingMTPD/RTO/RLO Necessaryresourcesto
Listofbusiness
operationresources
maintainRLO
operationresources
operationresources
resources
Worksheet1
Worksheet3
Worksheet2
Identifiedcore
business
Businessflow
analysis
Identified
business
activities
Worksheet4
作業ｼｰ ﾄ4
Worksheet5
Worksheet6
Worksheet7
Worksheet8
作業ｼｰ ﾄ8
作業ｼｰ ﾄ8
Identified
resources
(Resourcebottleneckevaluation)
(RiskAssessment)
Figure B-1 Structure and system of BIA worksheets
B1) Step 1: Selecting core business of the Port
Given the context of the port, the Continuity Team must identify those businesses that are more
important to the functioning of the Port; this importance will depend on the criteria used to
evaluate, which will depend on general mission, vision and policies followed by the port.
Table
In
are some possible criteria to be used in the screening process
Table B-1 - Possible criteria to screening core business
Criteria
Specific impacts/risks of losing business.
Sustainable development of the local
Negative impact on the growth of local industry including
economy
business in ZOFI, and fishery and mining.
Livelihood of the local people
Negative impact on the people's livelihood due to supply
disruption of consumer goods. Undertaking efficient and effective
Risks failing to meet requirements for the emergency relief
Emergency and Relief Logistics (ERL).
logistics by sea.
76
Port competitiveness and market share
Risks of the terminals to lose out in competition with the
rival ports and/or competing land surface transportations.
Financial soundness of port operation
Risks of the port operating entities to lose incomes and
profit.
Loss/fine
Risks of the port operating entities to incur penalty or
compensation for port service disruption.
Figure
shows an example of usage of Worksheet N°1, in this case the businesses from the first
two columns are to be selected to be analyzed.
Selectionpolicy
Rating
Container
terminal
operation
Multi-purpose
terminal
operation
Logistics
center
operation
Fishingport
operation
Negativeimpactonthegrowthoflocalindustry
Sustainabledevelopment
includingbusinessinZOFI,andfisharyandmining.
ofthelocaleconomy
A
A
A
B
Livelihoodofthelocal
people
Negativeimpactonthepeople'slivelihooddueto
supplydisruptionofconsumergoods.
A
B
C
B
Uindertakingefficient
andeffectiveERL.
Riskstofailtomeetrequirementsforthe
emergencyrelieflogisticsbysea.
A
A
C
C
Risksoftheterminalstoloseoutincompetition
Portcompetitivenessand
withtherivalportsand/orcompetinglandsurface
marketshare
transportations.
A
A
A
C
Financialsoundnessof
portoperation
Risksoftheportoperatingentitiestoloseincomes
andprofit.
A
A
A
C
Loss/fine
Risksoftheportoperatingentitiestoincurpenalty
orcompensationforportservicedisruption.
B
B
C
C
Totalscore
11
10
6
2
InclusionorexclusioninBCP
Include
/exclude
Include
/exclude
Include
/exclude
Include
/exclude
Criteria
Specificimpacts/risksoflossingbusiness.
(Impactrating:A=high[2],B=Medium[1],C=low[0])
Figure B-2 - Example of usage Worksheet No.1
B2) Steps 2 & 3: Business flow analysis
Once decided the core business the Continuity Team must identify all the resources needed.
One way of achieve this is to identify all the activities that must be done, and then to identify the
resources of each activity.
77
For this, is recommended to use the IDEF0 method, which was designed to model the decisions,
actions, and activities of an organization or system; as an analysis tool, IDEF0 assists the
modeler in identifying what functions are performed and what is needed to perform those
functions, among others6.
It is important to notice that IDEF0 is not intended to be used for
modeling activity sequences, so it’s not appropriate interpret the model in such way; nevertheless,
since the output of some activities will provide the input to others, is common that the model is
shown as a sequence.
[Breakdownofthecorebusinessstructure]
Commercial-ship
accommodation
Container/multipurposeterminal
operation
Inboundcargo
delivering
Terminal
yard
operation
ERL-ship
accommodation
Outbound
cargoShipping
[Businessflowofcommercialshipaccommodation]
Entrancepermission
/notice
Arrivalatoffshoreport
Entryinto
port
[1hr.]
Anchoring
permission
Anchoring
offshore
port
(Refuse)
A1
(Acceptance)
Accesschannel
DockPilotage,
Tugboat,
Arrival
atthe
wharf
Berthallocation
Docking&
mooring
[1hr.]
A3
Turningbasin
Tugboat,
Completion
wharf,
Mooringline ofmooring
service,
Berthwindow
management,
Note:IDEF0isoneofbusinessprocessmodelingtools,whichwere
developedbyaresearchgroupinUSairbaseinOklahoma.
A2
Anchoring
Shipstowage area
plan
Loading&
Unloading
[8hrs.]
Clearancepermission
/notice
A4
Terminalcontrol
system,Wharf
Quaycranes,Cargo
handlingequip.
Chesses,Dock
workers
Tallymen
Cargoto
beloaded
Completion
ofloading
/unloading
Unloaded
cargo
＊
＊＊
Release&
Undocking
[2hrs.]A5
Departureto
thenextport
Accesschannel,
Turningbasin,
Wharf,
Tugboat,
Mooringline
service,
Berthwindow
management,
Figure B-2 Developing a workflow diagram of port operation through IDEF0 methord
The next Figure B-3 displays the elements of IDEF0 identified from the IDEF0 model, the
information should be organized in the worksheet No.3, for this the Continuity Team may copy
the data directly into the correspondent cell, as shown in Figure B-4.
6
http://www.idef.com/idef0.htm, revised 11-09-2014
78
Step3: Identifyingresources neededforimplementingbusinessactivities.→WorksheetNo.03
ID
Nos
Business activities
Resources
Control
administrations/
Managements
Control
Direct input
Needed for control
A1 Entry into port
Entrance permission/notice
Harbour master.
Port authority
Access channel, Dock Pilotage, Tug boat
Harbour masrer staff, Hqs. building, and OA equipment
Port authority staff, office and OA equipment
A2 Anchoring off the shore port
Anchoring order
Harbour master.
Anchoring area
Harbour masrer staff, Hqs. building, and OA equipment
A3 Docking & mooring
Berth allocation
Port authority
Turning basin, Tug boat, Wharf, Mooring line service,
Port authority staff, office and OA equipment
A4 Loading & Unloading
Ship stowage plan
Terminal operation
company
Wharf, Quay cranes, Cargo handling equip., Chesses,
Dock workers, Tally men, Berth window management
Staff, office, and OA equipment of the terminal operation
company.
A5 Release & Undocking
Clearance premission/notice:
Terminal operation
company
Access channel, Turning basin, Wharf, Tug boat, Mooring Staff, office, and OA equipment of the terminal operation
line service, Berth window management,
company.
Figure B-3 Preparing worksheet No. 03
B3) Steps 4 & 5: Categorizing resources and Identifying dependency
Step 4
In order to identify the dependency among business resources the data in the Work Sheet03 it is
proposed to divide the resources in 4 categories: Outside Service (ie power supply, water supply,
etc.), Work Force, Facilities and Equipment, ITC and Network, Buildings and Offices, this must be
done in the Work Sheet04, as shown in the next Figure B-4.
Note that in the last row are
included all the resources (by category) needed in the activity, this will help for the next step.
Step4: Categorizationofresources.→WorksheetNo.4
Resources
Businessactivities
Control
Outsideservices
Powersupply
workforces
Facilities&equipment
ICT &networks
A 1 Entryintoport
Entrance
permission/notice
Harbourmasrerofficial,port Accesschannel,Tugboat
authoritystaff,dockPilotage
OAequipmentofharbourmasrer
andportauthority
A 2 Anchoring off the shore port
Anchoring order
Harbourmasrerofficial
OAequipmentofharbourmasrer
A 3 Docking&mooring
Berthallocation
Powersupply
Portauthoritystaff,linemen Berth,turningbasin
Berthwindowmanagement,OA
equipmentofportauthority
A 4 Loading&Unloading
Shipstowageplan
Powersupply
Dockworkers,tallymen,staff Wharf,Quaycranes,cargohandling
oftheterminaloperation
equipment,yardtrailer/chassis
company.
Terminalcontrolsystem,OA
equipmentofportauthority
A 5 Release&Undocking
Clearance
premission/notice:
Powersupply
Harbourmasrerofficial,port Accesschannel,Turningbasin,Wharf, Berthwindowmanagement,
authoritystaff,dockPilotage, Tugboat
linemen
Anchoringarea
Figure B-4 Preparing worksheet No. 04
Step 5
In the worksheet No. 05, dependency of these resources needed for implementing core business
operation. Practically, BIA analyst are required on the worksheet to seek other resources on
which the resources rely, based on the discussion not only among the analysts but also with
other practicians and the management in charge. One example is shown in Figure B-5.
79
Resources
Dependence
Outsideservices
workforces
Facilities&equipment
ICT &networks
Building/Office
1
Portauthoritystaff
Powersupply,watersupply
Portauthorityoffice
2
Harbourmaster
officers
ITIstaff
-ditto-
Harbourmaster　office
3
-ditto-
ITIoffice
4
Shippingagentstaff -ditto-
5
DockPilotage
6
Mooringlineservice -ditto-
Marinehouse
7
Dockworkers
-ditto-
8
Tallymen
-ditto-
Stevedoringcompanyoffice,
marinehouse
Marinehouse
9
Tugcrew
Powersupply,watersupply
Shippingagentoffice
-ditto-
ITIstaff,tugcrew
Tugboat,Serviceboat
Bunkerzonefacility
10 Accesschannel
11 Turningbasin
12 Patrolboat
Powersupply,fueloilsupply
Harbourmasterofficers/crew Bunkerzonefacility
Marine(port)radio
13 Tugboat
Powersupply,fueloilsupply
Tugcrew
Bunkerzonefacility
Marine(port)radio
14 Serviceboat
Powersupply,fueloilsupply
Portauthoritystaff
Bunkerzonefacility
Marine(port)radio
15 OAequipment
Powersupply,
Quaycraneoperater(Dock
worker）
Cargohandlingequipment
Cargohandlingequipment
Terminalcontrolsystem
Quaycranes
Terminalcontrolsystem
operator（
Dockworker）
Cargohandlingequipment
operator　（
Dockworker）
Cargohandlingequipment
Terminalcontrolsystem
16 Wharf
17 Quaycranes
Powersupply,fueloilsupply
18 Cargohandling
19 equipment
Yardtrailer/chassis
Powersupply,fueloilsupply
20 Bunkerzonefacility
Powersupply,fueloilsupply
Powersupply,fueloilsupply
Figure B-5 Preparing worksheet No. 05
B4) Step 6: Dependency matrix
Dependency matrix of operational resources may be mathematically described as the following
way: i.e. Matrix elements (X !" ) is 1 when dependency relationship exists, and 0 when it does not.
An expressions of (1) and (2) describe the structure of the matrix. 𝐷! is a set of resources on
which resource 𝑥! relies.
X!" =
Ｄ =
1: 𝑥! ∈ 𝐷!
0: 𝑥! ∉ 𝐷!
𝑋!!
⋮
𝑋!!
⋯
⋱
⋯
𝑋!!
⋮ 𝑋!"
(1)
(2)
Here, m and n represents the number of resources in column direction and law direction,
respectively. Both figures are integer numbers, and 0≦i,≦m, 0≦ｊ≦ｎ, m<n.
When any resource (𝑥j) included in Di also relies on 𝑥𝑘. a member of Dj, then the set of
resources on which 𝑥j relies is an union of Di and Dj, as follows.
80
𝐷!∗ =𝐷! ∪𝐷! (3)
This spillover effect stops when the following condition is satisfied.
𝐷!∗ =𝐷!
(4)
An algorism comprising equation (1) - (4) will provide a resource dependency matrix under
*
consideration of dependency spillover (Ｄ ) as the followings.
𝑋!" =
Ｄ *=
1:
0:
𝑥! ∈ 𝐷!∗
𝑥! ∉ 𝐷!∗
(5)
𝑋!!
⋮
𝑋!!
⋯
⋱
⋯
(6)
𝑋!!
⋮ 𝑋!"
*
An flow chart diagram for developing Ｄ based on the algorism is obtained in Figure B-6.
START
Ẋij=Xij
i,j =1～ m
i =1
j=1
Xij=1
Yes
k=1
No
No
j=j+1
Yes
i=i+1
No
i=m
Yes
No
Yes
j=m
Xik=1
Xjk=1
No
k=n
No
k=k+1
Yes
Xij=Ẋij
i,j =1～ m
Yes
END
Figure B-6 Algorism for tracing spillover effect of resource dependency
81
As a result of tracing spillover effect of resource dependency, dependency relationship among
resources are sometimes dramatically increases. Table B-2, and B-3 demonstrates it from case
history conducted in the port of Osaka. BIA was conducted by researchers from Disaster
Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University.
Table B-2 Sample dependency matrix (primary)
Operation P ort
adm .
/Critical
system
resources
P ortadm in.
1
officer
D irectM ar
0
officer
C ustom s
0
officer
Im m igration
1
officer
Q uarantine
1
officer
P orttraffic
0
controller
D ockpilot
Shipping
agent
Linem en
Term inal
controller
D ock
w orkers
Q uaycrane
operator
Yardcrane
operator
Tractor
driver
Stevedore
staff
G ateC lark
C ustom s
inspection
eq.
Q uarantine
inspection
eq. fic
Traf
signal
A ccess
channel
Tugboat
Service
boat
M ooring
basin
Turning
basin
Q uay
structure
C ustom s Term inal A dm .
system
operatio O ffice
nsystem
C ustom s Q uaran O pera Electri Telecom W ater Fuel Tug P ort Service C ustom s O A
B anker C ustom P ort
office
-tine
-tion city
service supply supply crew servic boat
system equip facility s
radio
office tow er
estaff crew
operator m ent
system
term inal
Traffic
control
center
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
82
Table B-3 Sample dependency matrix (After tracing dependency)
Operation
/Critical
resources
P ortadm in.
officer
D irectM ar
officer
C ustom s
officer
Im m igration
officer
Q uarantine
officer
P orttraffic
controller
D ockpilot
Shipping
agent
Linem en
Term inal
controller
D ock
w orkers
Q uaycrane
operator
Yardcrane
operator
Tractor
driver
Stevedore
staff
G ateC lark
C ustom s
inspection
eq.
Q
uarantine
inspection
eq. fic
Traf
signal
A ccess
channel
Tugboat
Service
boat
M ooring
basin
Turning
basin
Q uay
structure
P ort
adm .
system
C ustom s Term inal A dm . C ustom s Q uaran O pera Electri Telecom W ater Fuel Tug
system operatio O ffice office
-tine
-tion city
service supply supply crew
nsystem
office tow er
P ort Service C ustom s O A
B anker C ustom s P ort
servic boat
system
equip facility system radio
estaff crew
operator m ent
term inal
Traffic
control
center
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
83
B5) Step 7&8: Deciding MTPD, and RTO and RLO
The following worksheets are examples of estimating MTPD, and RTO and RLO for container
terminal operation in the port of Iquique,
WorksheetNo.07:
[Targets]
CoreBusiness
Decidingrecoverytime/levelobjectivesofthecorebusiness
[Impact Rating]
Containerterminal
operation
DireccióndeObras
Portuarias
Majorstakeholder IquiqueInternational
Terminal(ITI)
IquiquePortCompany(EPI)
Obｊ
ectives
ERL
RTO (days)
13
[Time rag parameters]
Impact
Low
High
Shippers‘migration
Partial,
Recoverable
Full-scale.
Unrecoverable
Portcreditabilityundermined
Temporal,
Recoverable
Full-scale.
Unrecoverable
Withdrawalofshippingline
Businessuse
Medium
Noimpact/
verysmall
expected
Temporal,
Recoverable
i)ERLoperation
Mobilizationof Mobilizationof
BCP (day)
facilities (day)
1
0.5
Long-term,
Dead-end
ii)Commercialportoperation
Mobilizationof Mobilizationof
BCP (day)
facilities (day)
87
177
75%
100%
Impactofport
shutdown
3days
1week
2week
1months
3months
6months
1year
MTPD(day)
RTO(day)
RLO
CreditibilityasERLport
L
M
H
H
H
H
H
14
12.5
50%
Shipperstomigrate
neighborports
L
L
L
M
H
H
H
90
87
75%
Withdrawalofshipping
line
L
L
L
L
M
M
H
365
362
75%
Shutdownorrelocation
oflocalindustries
L
L
L
L
M
H
H
180
177
100%
RLO （％）
50%
Limited,
companies,
Recoverable
Shutdownorrelocationof
localindustries
Major
establishment.
1
2
N ote:ERL:Em ergencyReliefLogistics.
Figure B-7 worksheets No.7 for deciding MTPD, and RTO and RLO
B6) Selected operational resources for interim use of port
WorksheetNo.08:
[Targets]
CoreBusiness
Majorstakeholder
Decidingrecoverytime/levelobjectivesofthebusinessactivities.
[Major Recovery Targets ]
Containerterminal
operation
DireccióndeObras
Portuarias
IquiqueInternational
Terminal(ITI)
Requirements
RespondingtoERL
RTOofthecore
business
RLOofthecore
business
12.5 days
50%
87 days
75%
177 days
100%
Preventingfrommajorshippers'migration
SupportingBCPsoflocalindustries
[RTO/RLOs of major recovery targets]
A1
A2
RecoveryTarget1
Responding to ERL
Businessactivities
RTOofBusinessactivities
RTOofcore
Leadtimeof
Accum.lead
business
RTO
activities
time
(Days)
（days）
(days)
(days)
Entryintoport
Docking&mooring
A3
Loading
A4
Release&Undocking
12.5
12.5
12.5
0.5
0.1
2.0
2.6
2.1
2.0
9
10
10
RLOofBusinessactivities
RLOofcore
business
Servicelevel
RLO
50%
Waterdepthofaccesschannellimitedto-7.5m.
Noassistancebypilotandtugboats.
50%
50%
Waterdepthofturningbasinlimitedto-9m.
Noassistancebytugboats.
50%
50%
Onlytruckcraneavailable.
Limitedquayareasuchasapronavailablefor
unloadingERLcargos.
50%
Renarks
Figure B-8 worksheets No.8 to identifying RTOs and RLOs by business activities
84
Table B-4 Operational resources needed for achieving recovery target example:
(Accommodating coastal container shipping)
Resources for control and operations
Outside
supply
Human
resource
Electric/fu
el/water
supplies,
Telecomm
unication
service
Port authority staf,
Harbor master
officer,
Stevedore's staff,
Dock workers,
Crane operator,
track driver, RTG
(5 items） operator, Gate
clark
(8 items)
Facilities
/equipment
Access
chainnel,Turning
basin and Quay
wall, Epron, Quay
crane,
Trailer/Chesse,
RTG, Container
slot, Gate, Access
road,
(12 items)
ITC systems
Port MIS, Port
radio,
Terminal
operatin
system
(3 items)
Buildings
/offices
Port authority
office, Harbor
master office,
Harbor traffic
control office,
Shipping agent
office, Terminal
operation
station,
Stevedore's site
office, Marine
house
(7 items)
85
Appendix C
Risk Identification
Risk may be defined as a possibility of some exposure to meet incident, resulting in a loss. Risks
traditionally include man-made and natural one, however, risk of natural incident triggered
technological (industrial) disaster is recently drawing an attention after Fukushima No.1 nuclear
power station accident in 2011.
Several techniques have been developed to identify these potential threats, of which Risk
mapping/positioning technique are introduced here.
C1) Earthquake and tsunami impacts on Ports
Even there’s no tool that provides a precise estimation on the probability of occurrence of an
earthquake or a tsunami-genic earthquake; however, the continental territory of Chile is located
just over the subduction zone where the Nazca and South American plates converge, which
means is prone to earthquakes and tsunamis.
In fact, the historical record shows that more than
110 earthquakes with a magnitude greater than 7.0 have occurred since the year 1570 AC, and
that since 1562 more than 31 near-field tsunamis have ravaged the coasts of Chile, producing
even the devastation of entire cities like Arica in 1604 and Concepción in 1751 (Winckler et al.,
2010)7.
Knowing that an earthquake and tsunami can occur, it’s important to identify how vulnerable is
the Port; the vulnerability will explain, in some way, the possible impact of the threat on the Port.
Each Port will have their own vulnerabilities, and here are some examples8:
²
Structural vulnerability to liquefaction
²
Structural vulnerability to shaking
²
Structural vulnerability to tsunami impact
²
Structural vulnerability to debris/vessels impact
²
Floating objects trajectories/final location/recovery
²
Headquarters location/communication network
²
Ship evacuation protocol
7
Winckler, P., Reyes, M.
and Sepúlveda, I., 2010.
The tsunami of February 27, 2014 in Robinson
Crusoe Island, Archipelago of Juan Fernandez, Valparaiso: Universidad de Valparaiso.
8
Reyes M.
& Miura F., 2013.
(in Spanish)
A Proposal of Tsunami Risk As-sessment Method for Iquique, Chile.
Bulletin of the International Institute of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering ISSN 0074-655X CODEN
IISBB2.
2014, vol.
48, pp.
103-108
86
²
Combustible spots/fire control systems/protocols
²
Drill experience - Personnel training/evacuation
²
Damage survey protocol
²
Dredging operations/debris removal
²
Safe quay for emergency operations
²
Alternative operational routes
²
Alternative land access routes
²
Critical information backup/protection
C2) Risk identification techniques
Risk mapping (Risk matrix) technique may be one of the most common methodology for
identifying potential threat also for the port operation. Risk map (risk matrix) is defined as a
coordination with likelihood/possibility of treats in horizontal axis and the consequence in the
vertical axis. Consequence depends on the geographical conditions and exposures: ie. distance
from the predicted epicenter, geological condition and formation of the port area including
propagation characteristics of seismic wave, and risks of liquefaction and tsunami inundation.
In the Figure C-1, many treats are considered, and some of them are chosen as target of risk
management. For assisting this selection, risk positioning classification is useful. (Figure C-2)
High
Plate
boundary
Epicentral
Middle
(interlocking)
Plate boundary
(single event type)
Low
Law
Consequence
Riskmatrixofearthquakes
Low
Law
Middle
High
Likelihood
Figure C-1 Schematic view of risk map (risk matrix)
87
High
Avoid
Middle
Law
Consequence
Transfer
Reduce
Retain
Law
Middle
High
Likelihood
Figure C-2 Schematic view of risk positioning exercise
Objects of risk management are normally threats located in the area of “Reduce” or “Transfer”.
Based on these consideration, threats are being screened for identifying BCP target risks.
C3) Internal and external threats Environmental disasters
²
Earthquake
²
Tsunami
²
Storm surge
²
Subsidence or landslide
²
Fire (in the port or in the surroundings)
²
Floods and other water damage
²
Severe weather (high wind, dense fog, heavy rain, freezing conditions)
²
Air contaminants
²
Hazardous chemical spill
²
Oil/fuel spill
²
Ship collision
²
Roads failure
²
Train failure
Organized and/or Deliberate disruptions
²
Fraud, theft or blackmail
²
Sabotage
²
Terrorism
²
Arson
88
²
Labor disputes / industrial action
Equipment or System Failure
²
Internal power failure
²
Air conditioning failure
²
Cooling plant failure
²
Equipment failure (excluding IT hardware)
²
IT system failure
Loss of Utilities and services
²
Communication services breakdown
²
Electrical Power failure
²
Equipment and software failure
²
Loss of gas supply
²
Loss of water supply
²
Petroleum and oil shortage
²
Loss of drainage/waste removal
Other emergency situations
²
Workplace violence
²
Neighborhood hazard
89
Appendix D
RA Worksheets
Risk analysis (RA) is a process for understanding the nature of risk and evaluate the level of risk
such as the possible damage to port logistics operations. (likelihood and consequences of the
risk)
Final goal of the risk analysis is to determine predicted recovery time (PRT) for the respected
recovery function level of the port logistics. (predicted recovery level, PRL)
Risk analysis starts from systematically evaluating fragility of port operation resources based on
the damage estimation of resources needed for port operation such as port facilities, human
resources, information and communication systems and external supplies.
Worksheet techniques are recommended to be introduced as a matrix type check-list, which
enable to undertake damage estimation of wide range resources without any omission. The
worksheets are also expected to enhance transparency of the estimation process and help
information sharing among the parties concerned.
Fragility analysis for the port operation resources may be initiated by identifying required
resource levels for port operation which include minimum requirements for full and limited
operations. Based on the assumed hazard for BCM, estimated damage of the port operation
resources leads to the initial loss of the port logistics function, of which needed recovery time and
its recovery level is to be estimated for respected recovery options such as the implementing
emergency rehabilitation, securing in advance alternatives resources and undertaking the
reconstruction /procurement of the resources.
Most common fragility analysis for the port operation resources is damage estimation of main port
facilities such as quay structures and break waters due to earthquake and tsunami forces. FLIP
(Finite element analysis program of liquefaction process and response of soil-structure systems
during earthquakes) is currently used as one of most sophisticated techniques for evaluating
safety and deformation of the port structures.
Taking into consideration a high expertise, time and efforts, and cost to be incurred for running
FLIP, some FLIP-based simplified techniques for assessing seismic damage has been
developed, among which the Chart-based Seismic Capacity Diagnosis Program and Ichii’s
fragility diagrams are increasingly used for estimating damages of main port facilities during the
earthquake and tsunami.
In addition to those of FLIP-based techniques, more convenient approaches in association with
90
past experiences, observations and records are being sought by researchers to cover the
wide-rages of damage estimation of entire port operation resources facilities. These
methodologies are also expected to provide the site practitioners with quick insight and ideas of
fragility of the port operational resources.
Estimating fragility of the port users and the recovering process are also vital for determining the
maximum tolerable period of downtime (MTPD), for which fragility of operation of port related
industries and its recovery curves are of great importance. One of indicative techniques includes
that based on the intensive survey undertaken by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism, Japan, and Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, which provided
recovery curves of production and shipment from the port related industries based on
observations during the east Japan great earthquake.
Indicative schematic view of the detailed RA procedures and needed analytical approaches for
evaluating fragility of port logistics are provided by SATREPS Chile WG4b as the followings.
Riskmap/Riskmatrix
technique
Step1: Identifyingrisks
Resourcesforimportantbusiness
operationsidentifiedthroughBIA
RAcoreelements
Step2: Evaluatingfragility
ofoperationresources
Damageestimation
ofportfacilities
→Sheet10
Step3: Identifyingrecovery
optionsofoperation
resources.→Sheet11
Step4: Estimatingpredicted
recoverytime(PRT)ofthe
resources.→Sheet11
Step5: Risk
evaluation.
PRT<RTO
Yes
Workplansfor
rehabilitatingresources
Resourcesmutualdependencyand
bottlenecksidentifiedthroughBIA
RTO/RLOdecidedthroughBIA
Seismicintensity,
acceleration,
Tsunamiheight,
flowvelocity,
inundationmaps
Deformation
analysisofport
structures
(ex.FLIP*,Chart
basedseismic
diagnosisprogram,
Ichii’s diagram)
Empiricaldataand
methods
*Finiteelementanalysis
of Liquefaction Program
Documenting,implementingand
reviewingBCP
No
Step6: DevelopingRiskResponsePlan
Step7: Re-evaluationoftherisks.
Figure D-1 Schematic view of fragility evaluation of port logistics
91
Considering easier access to the fragility evaluation of port operation resources, of which broad
range is included such as external supplies, human resources, facilities and equipment,
information systems, and offices and buildings, a variety of techniques should be provided for
BCP preparation.
An overall view of the fragility estimation techniques is suggested through SATREPS Chile WG4b
discussions.
Stringency
=Costly
① Finit e element analysis
as FLIP
such
② Char t based seismic capacit y
diag nosis pr og r am.
③ Fr ag ilit y diag r am pr epar ed by
Dr . Ichii.
FLIPbased
simulation
and
normalization
④ Compar ison of t he quay desig n
condit ions wit h t he hazar d.
Proximity
=Low-cost
⑤ Judg ment based on t he past
r ecor ds and exper iences.
Figure D-2 Various techniques for fragility estimation of port facility
Detailed worksheet system for implementing risk assessment (RA) is presented in this section
with resource bottleneck evaluation worksheet system. Typical worksheet for risk analysis for
assessment/management is also shown in Table .
（BusinessImpactAnalysis）
RiskAssessmentfile
Resourcebottleneckevaluationfile
Worksheet14
ListofRLO-specific
resources
Evaluatedresource
resiliency
Resourcerecovery
strategy
Resultoftracking
resourcedependency
Identifiedresource
bottleneck
Listofbottleneck
resources
Worksheet9
Worksheet10
Worksheet11
作業ｼｰ ﾄ8
Worksheet12
作業ｼｰ ﾄ4
Worksheet13
Resource
interdependency
Resourcefragility
evaluation
作業ｼｰ ﾄ8
(BusinessImpactAnalysis)
Figure D-3 Worksheet system for port risk management
92
Table D-1 Worksheet No.10: Evaluating resource fragility
93
Operation resource
Ground
motion
Tsunami
inundation
Risks
Possible damages/supply disruption.
Consequence
2 C om m unication
service
()lines(fixed
phone),
3 Fueloil
()kl/m onthsupplycapacity.
U pto5m etersat D am ageofpetroleum distributionstation
oildistribution
inIquiqueandabunkerzonefacilitiesof
center.
theportofIquique.
4 A gricultureand
LivestockService
(SA G )officer
(　)staffs.
5 N ationalH ealth
Service(SN S)officer
(　)staffs.
Inundationof12.5m etersinthe
portareaandup
to4m eterinthe
city.
6 D irectem ar(harbor
m aster)officer
(　)staffs.
Lim itedoperation.
7 C ustom sofficer
8 P oliceforce(P D I)
cer
9 offi
Shipagent(“
ventanilla
(　)staffs.
(　)staffs.
Servicesuspended.
Lim itedoperation.
(　)staffs.
Servicesuspended.
10 D O P (Tarapaga)
officer
11 Im m igrationofficer
(　)staffs.
Servicesuspended.
(　)staffs.
Servicesuspended.
12 D ockpilot
(　)staffs.
Servicesuspended.
13
14
15
16
(　)staffs.
(　)staffs.
(　)staffs.
(　)staffs.
Servicesuspended.
Servicesuspended.
Servicesuspended.
Servicesuspended.
Human resource
Outside supply
()kW .
M M scaleof U pto5m etersin P ow ercabledisconnection,and/or
P ow ersupplyshut-dow n
(Ⅷ)seism ic thecityarea.
inundationofdistributionboard.
intensity.
Telephonelinedisconnection,inundation C om m unicationdisruption
oftelephonesw itchboard,andcongestion
oftelephonelines,
Supplyshortageofdieseloilandheavy
oilC .
P ersonnellossduetoearthquakeand
Servicesuspended.
tsunam idam age.D elayinpersonnel
m usteringduetotrafficcongestion,tow n
turm oilandfam ilycare.
Servicesuspended.
única”)
M ooringlinem en
ITI(EP I)staff
D ockw orker
Yardtractordriver
18 A ccesschannel
19 A nchorage
Facilities&equipment
Hazard
1 P ow ersupply
17 G ateclerk
20 Turningbasin
21 W harf
22 A pron,C ontaineryard
23 Q uaycranes
24 Tow ingtractor
25 Yardchassis
26 Tugboat
27 Serviceboat
28 C ustom sinspection
area
29 Q uarantinespace
Facilities&equipment
Minimum
requirement for the
required operation
(　)staffs.
Servicesuspended.
Inundationof1- Tsunam idebrisandsm allboatsfloatingon O utofserviceforshipnavigation.
2.5m etersinthe andbelow thew ater.
O utofserviceforanchoring.
portarea.
O utofserviceforshipturninground.
Slightdeform ationofthequayline.
Stoppageofshipm ooring.
C rackinpavingslab,andcollapse/caving N oflatspaceavailableforcargo
ofterm inalyardduetoliquefaction.
handling.
D am ageofthecranelegpartsand
N ocargoloading/unloading.
travelingdevise.
Shortandfaultycircuitofelectricsystem N oserviceoftow ingchassis.
duetotsunam iinundation.
Saltdam age.
M M scaleof Inundationof1- D am ageduetocollisionw ithotherships
(Ⅷ)seism ic 2.5m etersinthe orquaystructures.
intensity.
portarea.
C ontam inationduetotsunam iinundation
w ater.
C ontam inationduetotsunam iinundation
w ater.
N ochassisavailablefortransferring
containers.
N otow ageserviceavailable.
N oassistancefordockpilot
N ocustom sclearanceavailable.
N oquarantineclearance.
30 P ortsecurityfacilities
(yardfence,security
cam era)
C ollapseordam ageoffence,short-out N oaccom m odationofshipcall
andfaultyofsecuritycam era,and
perm ittedunderSO LA Sconvention.
disconnectionofopticalfibercabledueto
tsunam i.
31 Forklifts
Shortandfaultycircuitofelectricsystem N ofunctionforstackingem pty
duetotsunam iinundation.
containersandassistingcustom sand
quarantineinspections.
Shortandfaultycircuitofelectrical
N otransferoperationavailablefor
system duetotsunam iinundation.
containerstorage.
Di
am
ageofm
achi
necom
ponentdueto
D
fferenti
alsettl
em
entduetol
iquefaction. N oavailabilityofcontainerstorage
yard.
D am ageofplugsocketboardandshort
N opow ersupplyforrefercontainer.
circuitofelectricsystem .
32 Yardcrane
33 C ontainerstorageyard
34 R efercontainerplug.
35 C heck-ingate
36 C heck-outgate
D am ageofgatestructureduetoseism ic
force.
Failureofgateequipm ent.
N oadm ittanceofcontainer
trucks/trailers.
N ocontainercheckoutprocedure
available.
Table D-1: (Cont.)
94
Operation resource
ICT &networks
37 “ventanillaúnica”　IT
system （SIA N ）
Minimum
requirement for the
required operation
(Inform ationabout
thesystem details
required)
38 ITI(EP I)term inal
-dittooperationsystem
39 P ortsecuritycontrol
-dittosystem
40 InternationalV H Fradio -dittotelephone(portradio)
Building/Office
41 SA G office
Hazard
Ground
motion
Risks
Tsunami
inundation
Possible damages/supply disruption.
M M scaleof Inundationof1- D am ageofO A equipm entsuchas
(Ⅷ)seism ic 2.5m etersinthe term inalP C andservercom puter.
intensity.
portarea.
D isconnectionofelectriccircuitand
opticalfibercable.
Consequence
N oaccesstotheelectricdata
interchangesystem forprocessingport
procedures.
N oterm inaloperationcontrolavailable.
P ortsecuritysystem halt.
D am ageofV H Fradiotelephone
equipm ent.
42 SN Soffice
(officedetails,
buildingaddressand
structureneeded).
-ditto-
43 D irectem aroffice
-ditto-
44 C ustom soffice
-ditto-
45 P D Ioffice
-ditto-
46 Shipagent'soffice
-ditto-
N oavailabilityofofficeroom for
shippingagencybusiness.
47 D O P (Tarapaga)office
-ditto-
N oavailabilityofofficeroom for
nationalportadm inistration.
48 Im m igrationoffice
-ditto-
N oavailabilityofofficeroom for
im m igrationclearance.
49 ITIm anagem entand
operationoffice
50 M arinehouse(site
officeofITI)
-ditto-
N oavailabilityofofficeroom forITI
term inalbusiness.
N oavailabilityofsitecrew station.
Worksheet10:
Inundationof1- D am agetobuildingstructure,facilitiesand
2.5m etersinthe officeequipm ent.
portareaandup
to4m eterinthe
city.
N oV H Fradiotelephonecom m unication
available.
N oavailabilityofofficeroom for
agricultureandlivestockquarantine
i
Nnspecti
oavailon.
abilityofofficeroom forhealth
checkinspection.
N oavailabilityofofficeroom forharbor
m asterservice.
N oavailabilityofofficeroom for
custom sclearance.
N oavailabilityofofficeroom forlaw
enforcem entoperation.
-ditto-
Table D-2:
(Resiliency)
Work sheet 10 (Predicting recovery time (PRT))
Resources resiliency
Human resource
Outside
Operation resource
Initial
PRT
Initial recovery scenario
Worst
PRT
1 P ow ersupply
Expectedrecoveryafterfivedays.
5 Expectedrecoveryafterfivedays.
5
2 C om m unication
service
Expected50%recoveryafteronew eekand90%;after
tw ow eeks.
7 Expected50%recoveryafteronew eekand90%;aftertw o
w eeks.
7
3 Fueloil
R esum ingfueloilsupplyaftertw ow eeksw henem ergencyrehabi
14 Rlitati
esum
onoffaci
ingfueloi
litilescom
supplyafter4w
pleted.
eeksduetoseriousdam ageofoil28
distributioncenter.
4 A gricultureand
vestockServi
5 Li
N ati
onalH ealth ce
Serviceresum edonthethirdday.
3 Serviceresum edonthe5thday.
5
3
5
ce(SN
S)officer Fulloperationfrom the3rdday.
6 DServi
irectem
ar(harbor
aster)offi
cer
7 mC ustom
soffi
cer
Serviceresum edonthe3rdday.
3
5
3
5
8 P oliceforce(P D I)
Fulloperationfrom the3rdday.
cer
9 offi
Shipagent(“
ventanilla Serviceresum edonthe3rdday.
única”)
3
5
3
5
2
5
2
5
3
5
3
5
10 D O P (Tarapaga)
11 Ioffi
m mcer
igrationofficer
Serviceresum edonthe2ndday.
12 D ockpilot
Serviceresum edonthe3rdday.
13 M ooringlinem en
14 ITI(EP I)staff
Serviceresum edonthe2ndday.
2
5
15 D ockw orker
Serviceresum edonthe3rdday.
3
5
3
5
16 Yardtractordriver
17 G ateclerk
Serviceresum edonthe2ndday.
18 A ccesschannel
P artiallynavigableafter1w eek.1)
Table
NA orestri
ctionafterthreew
eeks.eek.1)
vailableforanchori
ngafter1w
19 A nchorage
20 Turningbasin
21 W harf
2
D-2:
A vailableforshipturningintheselectedareaafter1
eek.1)
Rw esum
ingshipm ooringintheselectedareaonthe
2rddayafterdam ageinspection.
ment
Worst recovery scenario
5
7 P artiallynavigableafter10days.
(Cont.)
ctionafter4w
eeks.
7 NA orestri
vailableforanchori
ngafter10days.
7 A vailableforshipturningintheselectedareaafter10days
2 R esum ingshipm ooringintheselectedareaonthe7thday
afterdam ageinspection.
10
7
7
957
22 A pron,C ontaineryard R esum ingcargohandlingintheselectedareaonthe
3rddayafterdam ageinspection.
3 R esum ingcargohandlingintheselectedareaonthe7th
dayafterdam ageinspection.
7
23 Q uaycranes
3 A vailableforloading/unloadingcargoafterdam age
nspectitractorsavai
onandoperati
onal
check.i(after7day)
2 iSeveral
labl
efortow
ngserviceafter
7
24 Tow ingtractor
A vailableforloading/unloadingcargoafterdam age
iSeveral
nspectitractorsavai
onandoperati
onal
check.i(after3day)
labl
efortow
ngserviceafter
operationalcheck.(after2day)
operationalcheck.(after7day)
7
Resources resiliency
Operation resource
18 A ccesschannel
Initial recovery scenario
Worst
PRT
7 P artiallynavigableafter10days.
ctionafter4w
eeks.
7N
A orestri
vailableforanchori
ngafter10days.
A vailableforshipturningintheselectedareaafter1
w esum
eek.1)
R
ingshipm ooringintheselectedareaonthe
7 A vailableforshipturningintheselectedareaafter10days
7
2 R esum ingshipm ooringintheselectedareaonthe7thday
afterdam ageinspection.
7
22 A pron,C ontaineryard R esum ingcargohandlingintheselectedareaonthe
3rddayafterdam ageinspection.
3 R esum ingcargohandlingintheselectedareaonthe7th
dayafterdam ageinspection.
7
23 Q uaycranes
A vailableforloading/unloadingcargoafterdam age
i
nspectitractorsavai
onandoperati
onal
check.i(after3day)
Several
labl
efortow
ngserviceafter
3 A vailableforloading/unloadingcargoafterdam age
nspectitractorsavai
onandoperati
onal
check.i(after7day)
2i
Several
labl
efortow
ngserviceafter
7
operati
onal
check.
(after2day)
Several
chassi
savai
lableforcargotransferservice
afteroperati
onal
check.
(after2day)
Tugboatsm ostlyavailabl
efortow ingserviceafter
onal
check.
(after7day)
2 operati
Several
chassi
savai
lableforcargotransferserviceafter
operati
onal
check.
(after7day)
2 Tugboatsm ostlyavai
lablefortow ingserviceafterdam age
7
dam
ageandoperati
onallcheck.
(after2day) ceafter
A few
serviceboatavai
ableforescortservi
dam
(after3day) hen
A
vaiageandoperati
lableforcustomonal
sclcheck.
earanceafter7dayw
check.(after7day)
3 andoperati
A few servional
ceboatavai
lableforescortserviceafter
dam
(after7day) henclearance
7A
vaiageandoperati
lableforcustomonal
sclcheck.
earanceafter7dayw
7
w atercom
pleted.
7 ofdebri
A vailablsandtsunam
eforquarantiinescl
earanceafter7dayw
hen
cl
earanceofdebri
sandtsunam
i
w
atercom
pleted.
7 R esum ingaccom m odationofinternati
onalshi
psonthe7th
7
ergencyrehabi
litationofthefaci
liticeafter
esand
2 dayafterem
A few forkliftsavai
lableforcargohandl
ingservi
m
ai
ntenanceandoperati
onal
check.
(after7day)
3 A vailableforstackingcargoafterdam ageinspectionand
7
20 Turningbasin
21 W harf
2rddayafterdam ageinspection.
Facilities&equipment
Worst recovery scenario
P artiallynavigableafter1w eek.1)
N
ctionafterthreew
eeks.eek.1)
A orestri
vailableforanchori
ngafter1w
19 A nchorage
24 Tow ingtractor
25 Yardchassis
26 Tugboat
27 Serviceboat
28 C ustom sinspection
29 area
Q uarantinespace
cl
earanceofdebri
sandtsunam
iw atercom pleted.
A vai
lableforquaranti
nesclearanceafter7dayw
hen
cl
earanceofdebri
sandtsunam
iw atercom
pleted.
30 P ortsecurityfacilities R esum ingaccom m odationofinternati
onalshi
pson
security the7thdayafterem
ergencyrehabi
litati
onofthe
31 (yardfence,
Forklifts
A few forkliftsavailabl
eforcargohandl
ingservi
ce
afterm
ai
ntenanceandoperati
onal
check.
(after2day)
32 Yardcrane
A vailableforstackingcargoafterdam agei
nspection
onalcheck.
(after3day)
33 C ontainerstorageyard andoperati
A vailableforcontai
nerstorageafter7dayw
hen
earanceofdebri
sandtsunam
iw atercom
pleted.
34 R efercontainerplug. cl
N eedtorepl
acereeferpl
ugsandpow
erlines.
35 C heck-ingate
36 C heck-outgate
ICT &
37 “ventanillaúnica”　IT
SIA Ni）
38 system
ITI(EP I（
)term
nal
Tem
porarywacecheck-i
orksrequire2w
eeks.
N eedtorepl
nequi
pm ent.Tem porary
w
orksrequi
re2w
eeks.
N eedtoreplacecheck-outequipm ent.Tem porary
w
orksrequi
re2w accessw
eeks.
R esum
ingsystem
ithin24hours.
R esum ingsystem operationafter1dayw hendam age
inspecti
onoftermoperati
inalcomonafter2w
putersandsystem
R
esum ingsystem
eeksw hen
operati
onsystem
39 P
ortsecuri
tycontrol
agei
nspecti
onandm
aintenanceofm
onitori
40 system
InternationalV H Fradio dam
R esum
ingradi
ocasti
ngafter3daysw
hendam
ageng
tel
ephone(portradi
o)
i
nspecti
onandm
ai
ntenanceofV
H
Fradi
otel
ephone
41 SA G office
R esum ingofficeuseafter7daysw henroom cleaning
42 SN Soffice
andreplacem entofO A equipm entcom pleted.
43 D irectem aroffice
Building/Office
Initial
PRT
44 C ustom soffice
45 P D Ioffice
46 Shipagent'soffice
47 D O P (Tarapaga)office
48 Im m igrationoffice
49 ITIm anagem entand
onoffice te
50 operati
M arinehouse(si
officeofITI)
1)Providedthatprioritizedbathymetricandwatersurfaceclearance
workscompleted.
onal
check.(after7day)
7 operati
A vailabl
eforcontai
nerstorageafter7dayw henclearance
sandtsunam
iw atercom
pleted.
14 ofdebri
N eedtorepl
acereeferpl
ugsandpow
erlines.Tem porary
orksrequire2w
eeks. nequipm ent.Tem poraryw orks
14 w
N eedtorepl
acecheck-i
requi
re2w
eeks.
14 N eedtoreplacecheck-outequipm ent.Tem poraryw orks
re2w
eeks. accessw ithin48hours.
1 requi
R esum
ingsystem
10
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
14
14
14
2
1 R esum ingsystem operationafter3dayw hendam age
inspecti
onoftermoperati
inalcomonafter2w
putersandsystem
m aintenance.
14 R
esum ingsystem
eeksw hendam
age
14
3
onandm
aintenanceofm
onitori
ngdispl
ays,nspecti
serveron
3i
Rnspecti
esum ingradi
ocasti
ngafter7daysw
hendam
agei
andm
ai
ntenanceofV
H
Fradi
otel
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pm
ent.
7 R esum ingofficeuseafter14daysw henroom cleaningand
14
7 replacem entofO A equipm entcom pleted.
14
3 R esum ingofficeuseafter7daysw henroom cleaningand
repl
acem
entofO
A equipm entcom pl
eted. cleaningand
7R
esum
ingoffi
ceuseafter14daysw
henroom
14
acem
entofO
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eted. cleaningand
3 repl
R esum
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ceuseafter7daysw
henroom
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acem
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equi
pm
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eted. cleaningand
7 R esum ingofficeuseafter14daysw henroom
14
acem
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R esum
ingoffi
ceuseafter7daysw
henroom
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entofO
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equi
pm
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eted. cleaningand
7 R esum ingofficeuseafter14daysw henroom
14
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14
7
14
7
7
7
7
1)Providedthatprioritizedbathymetricandwatersurfaceclearanceworks
completed.
By coupling with the predicted recovery time (PRT) and the predicted recovery level (PRL), this
resource dependency matrix defines bottleneck resources, without which it is almost impossible
to properly implement the port core businesses. The port managers can give to those resources
the first priority to secure them for properly meeting the requirements from clients.
In comparison with the recovery time objective (RTO) and the recovery level objective (RLO) as
stated in the sections 3.1 and 4.3, the bottleneck resources may give clear indications of
necessary actions to be taken in advance to improve business continuity capacity.
96
Appendix E
Risk Assessment techniques for Port infrastructure and
Facilities
Once the Port's Continuity Team have identified their resources they must evaluate the possible
impact that the decided hazard could have on them; in general basis the Continuity Team will
have to use their imagination and expertise for evaluate those impacts.
However, there are
some techniques that can be used, and their selection will depend on the nature or
characteristics of each resource.
Nevertheless, there are some resources very common among
Ports: quays, warehouses, water way, cargo handling equipment, among others; therefore, here
are included some techniques that will allow the Continuity Team achieve a better evaluation of
the risk of such resources.
The next table shows an overall view of the techniques presented in this document.
Table E-1 - Overall view of techniques for RA of Port facilities
Technique
Resource involved
Finite element analysis
Quays, Yard
Chart based seismic
capacity diagnosis
program
Quays
Ichii’s Fragility diagram
Quays
Design conditions
analysis
Quays
Output
Tool
FLIP
Warehouses,
breakwaters
Honda’sDamagerate
chart
Stacked containers
Kumagai’stsunami–
induceddebrisoffreight
containers
Analysis of historical
damage
It is important that the Continuity Team use a technique with which they feel comfortable
(availability of tools, time, skills, etc.) and, at the same time, provide enough information to allow
them make decisions regarding the Continuity of the Business.
97
E1)
Finite element analysis
Figure E shows result of damage estimation for the Hachitaro P wharf, of port of Hachinohe. The
Hachitaro P wharf is designed and constructed as one of the high earthquake resistance quays of
the port, and mainly used for accommodating ro-ro vessels. The port authority expect to mobilize
the quay for the emergency relief logistics immediately in the port BCP, therefore undertook FLIP
analysis for estimating deformation of the structure in order to prepare emergency rehabilitation.
Figure E-1 Estimated deformation by FLIP of quay structures due to earthquake
98
E2) Chart based seismic capacity diagnosis program
By mobilizing FLIP, combination of the parametric study results enables the performance
evaluation in a simplified manner
Effects of geotechnical and earthquake conditions:
evaluation of normalized residual horizontal
displacement (d/H) based on equivalent SPT N-value
for a prescribed level of shaking (Figs. 5. 6 or 5. 7)
Effects of thickness of soil deposit below the wall:
correction for D1/H (Fig. 5. 8)
Effects of width to height ratio W/H:
correction for W/H (Fig. 5. 5)
normalized residual
horizontal displacement
d/H
入力項目
高さ:H
幅:W
置換砂厚：D1
備　考
(m)
(m)
(m)
0<等価N値≦25
（別途算定ﾌﾟﾛｸﾞﾗﾑあり）
基盤最大加速度 (gal) 100gal～600galが概ね適応範囲
1=直下型　2=海溝型
3=海南波(海溝型)
地震動のタイプ
4=撫養港波(海溝型)
5=羽田波(海溝型)
地盤の等価N値
標準タイプの場合
補正係数（各パラメータ毎の
補正係数の積）
残留水平変位(m)
残留鉛直変位(m)
水平変位
鉛直変位
出力項目
備　考
天端標高
(m) 値は、D.L表示
液状化の発生する可能性
残留水平変位
(m)
①
②
③
④ 残留鉛直変位(沈下量) (m) 正の値=沈下
(m) 値は、D.L表示
⑤ 津波高さ
護岸形状による津波高さ
⑥ の補正係数
⑦ 排水沈下量
⑧ 地盤沈降量
⑨ 余裕高さ
当面の間は、1.0
(m) 正の値=沈下
(m) 正の値=沈下
(m) ⑨=①-④-⑤×⑥-⑦-⑧
入力例
10.0
11.0
5.0
7
400
Inputtheconditionofthe
targetfacility
2
1.75
0.57
1.05
2.04
計算例
4.7
高い
1.9
1.2
4.1
1.0
0.15
0.95
-1.70
Automaticpickupofthe
standard(mostresemble)
casefromdatabase
Correctionfactorforthe
differenceofconditions
Betweenthetargetandthe
standardcase
Thesystem(chartsystem)
iseasytouse
(MicrosoftEXCELbasedsystem)
Example：Standard case 0.57× correction factor 2.04＝ about 1.2 m
Figure E-2 Chart based seismic capacity diagnosis program on Excel sheet
99
E3) Ichii’s Fragility diagram
Ichii (2004) proposed a series of fragility curves for estimating seismic deformation of the gravity
type quay structures based on the FLIP analysis and past damage record obtained in the
Japanese port including those in Hanshin-Awaji great earthquake in 19979.
Figure E- shows an
example of these fragility curves.
Figure E-3 - Example of Ichii’s fragile curve
9
Ichii K., Fragility curves for gravity-type quay walls based on effective stress analysis, 13th
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Paper No. 3040, Vancouver, B.C., August, 2004
100
E4) Design conditions analysis
Comparing the quay design with the seismic force may be one of the most simple and useful
techniques to judge a primary safety degree of the facilities against earthquake and tsunami.
Example:
𝐾
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐
1.Evaluationmethodology
𝑍
𝐺
𝐼
ℎ=
×
Damage level
Level
Safetyfactor
0
1.5
≧
×
Sig. gal = Rand (Lower limit, Upper limit)
Safety factor = Kh/Sig.gal (Monte Carlo simulation)
2.Casestudy
Int’ltradequayinTohoku
5U pper
cG
cI
0.13
1.2
1.5
6Low er
6U pper
Level0
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
26.3%
0.0%
0.0%
Level1
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
73.7%
1.9%
0.0%
Level2
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
31.1%
0.0%
Level3
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
67.0%
0.0%
Level4
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
100%
100%
80%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
4
5Lower
5Upper
6Lower
6Upper
Seismicintensityscaleｓ
Level1
Level2
Level3
7
≧
1.0
2
≧
0.8
3
≧
0.5
4
＜
0.5
7
Exceedanceprobability
Exceedanceprobability
Occurrence probability
4
5Low er
cZ
1
Legend
• Level-0：
Nosubstantial damage.
• Level-1：
Slightlydamaged.
• Level-2：Minordamage.Urgentlyrecoverable.
• Level-3：Majordamage.Needlongtimeforrehabilitation,
• Level-4：Completelydestroyed.Reconstructionneeded.
60%
40%
20%
0%
4
5Lower
5Upper
6Lower
6Upper
7
Seismicintensityscaleｓ
Level4
Level0
Level1
Level2
Level3
Level4
101
E5) Analysis of historical damage
Quake
<Industries>
Production lines down
2-3 days 1. Confirming employee’s safety
2. Inspecting production lines
later
3. Collecting information
1 week
later
1 month
later
6 month
later
1 -2 yrs.
later
Rehabilitation policy
1. Collection of information
(transportation route etc)
2. Deciding rehabilitation
scenario.
Resuming production
Car/electronics: 6days later,
Chemical industry: 7days later,
Glassware industry: 8days later
Brewing industry: 10days later
Food industry: 50days later
Iron & steel: 90days later
<Shipping lines>
<Port facilities>
Suspending ship call, and
taking emergency steps: ie.
1. Switching reefer container to emergency power,
2. Placing semi-container vessels into the line.
Mobilizing contingency plan
for disaster recovery.
Shifting ships to the
alternative ports
Resuming operation of
the damaged port: ie
1. Cargo handling by mobile
crane (8 days later),
2. Transportation alternative to
Osaka port (21 days later),
3. Opening feeder links with
Gaoxiong port.
Rehabilitation plan
decided.
(14 days later)
Overseas liner
calling (27 days
later)
Gantry crane
operation (62 days
later)
Recommencement of shipping line
operation up to 70 %. (7 months later)
Return to the container linkage level
before the quake.(1 yrs. later)
Figure E-4 Mile stones of disaster recovery (The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake case)
102
Damage to Warehouses and Breakwaters
Figure E-5 Damage rate of warehouses in ports and tsunami height
Figure E-6 Damage rate of warehouses in ports and inundation depth
103
Figure E-7 Damage rate of front-line breakwaters and the parameter (ηmax / H1/3)
Source: Honda, K.: Damage to Port Facilities by the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku
Earthquake Tsunami.
Engineering Conference.
Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth International Ocean and Polar
Busan, Korea, June 15-20, 2014
Tsunami-induced Debris of Freight Containers
Figure E-8 Possible container loss in association with the tsunami inundation depth
104
Source: Kumagai, K, Tsunami-induced Debris of Freight Containers due to the 2011 off the
Pacific Coast of Tohoku Eartquake.
JSCE Disaster Fact Sheet, JSCE, FS2013-T-0003, 2013.
Remark: The red lines are suggested by SATREPS WG4b research groups
Figure E-9
E.
Mas, S.
Koshumura, A.
Yamazaki, and F.
Imamura.
Suppasri, M.
Matsuoka, T.
Yoshii, C.
Jumenez, F.
Developing tsunami fragility curves using remote sensing and
survey data of the 2010 chilean tsunami in dichato.
Natural Hazards and Earth System
Sciences, 2012b.
105
E6)
Tsunami and debris modeling
The following document developed by SATREPS Chile WG” is available for the reference:
Guía para la estimación de inundación y daño por tsunami (Guide for estimation of tsunami inundation
and damage)
Table E-2 Results of tsunami modeling
Figure E-10 Predicted tsunami Inundation of Iquique city area
106
Appendix F
Past experiences in Japan
F.1) Recovering tsunami debris water
One of the highlighted recovering works of the port function during the Great east Japan
Earthquake was opening-up of port waters blocked by tsunami debris. It was unexpected time
consuming works for Japanese port community to remove floating debris, and to sound sea
bottom obstacles and sedimentation for securing water depth clearance to enable ship
accommodation. There were, for example in the Sendai area of the port of Sendai-Shiogama,
531 irregular points were detected for further investigations and dredging works as shown in
figure F-1 with red dots. . The works are also influenced by the tsunami alert which continued 51
hours after the earthquake occurrence. The recovery works had started only on March 14, 2011,
almost two days later.
PortofSendai-Shigama
[Sendaiarea]
Trailer
Car
Container
Nakano
wharf
Takamatsu
wharf
Container
Work area
Takasago
wharf
Source:TohokuRegionalDevelopmentBureau(RDB)
Figure F-1
Clearance work of the sea bottom debris in the port of Sendai-Shiogama
107