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“National and institutional collaboration
on European security and defence
at a time of austerity.”
Ms Fotini Bellou, ([email protected])
Assistant Professor of International Relations
Dept of International and European Studies
University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
Facing a curious paradox?
Two strategic realities:
1. ascending security threats find most of NATO
allies to have reduced their defence expenditures
and capabilities
2. European allies are expected to bear a greater
burden for their defence in light of American pivot
The current defence paradox
To spend more on defence
or
Coordinate effectively and efficiently?
The new European strategic environment
The neighbourhood of the EU neighbourhood
Major threats and challenges in the wider
region
•Hubrid threats in the immediate and wider
neighbourhood
•International organized crime
•Terrorism connected to Islamic fundamentalism
•Cyber attacks within the EU
•Energy security
•Uncontrolled irregular migration is feared to also
facilitate the entrance of segments of islamic radicals
•Border management
•Proliferation of WMD
•State failure in the immediate neighbourhood
New Strategic landscape
1. The Crisis in Ukraine
2. The compounding chaos in MENA region
3. The American pivot to Asia
territorial defence is to be added in an already
demanding security agenda in which the internal and
external dimensions of security are closely related in an
inevitable nexus.
European Allies are expected to play a more committed
role in this regard in light of American pivot
In effect: In such a perplexed strategic environment,
EU/NATO cooperation becomes indispensable
EU/NATO cooperation
A number of serious questions need to be answered:
Will the US temporarily pause its rebalancing towards
the Pacific?
If not, what should European allies do to efficiently
respond to a mounting security agenda facing their
region?
THE PARADOX
At a time of mounting security concerns, European
allies, including major EU/NATO military powers,
are found in decreasing their defence budgets.
2000-2013 by major NATO/EU members
EU defence spending after the financial crisis
(EUISS: 2015 Olivier De France)
PROJECTED REGIONAL DEFENCE AS % OF
2007
New responses – New expenses?
Self defence (Territorial defence and augmented
deterrence) evolves into the primary responsibility of
the Alliance while crisis management and
peacebuilding to be followed or be allocated
elsewhere?
The reduced defence budgets, in light of such
damanding security environment, appear to forbid
the luxury of redundancies and duplications in
european defence structures.
To re-consider defence structures and policies?
Collective defence (territorial defence and deterrence) is
not cost free (a cost effective perspective challenges
military efficiency)
Crisis management does permit “pooling and sharing” or
“smart defence” whether in a combined structure of
EU/NATO or in “ad hoc formations” ie. “framework
nation” and (EDA policies can be of particular support)
Cooperative security (non NATO states in supporting and
enabling roles of the above two).
Separable but not necessarily separate
The above is explained if one looks at:
Lisbon 2010 (the three pillars of the Alliance) from
which NATO cannot abdicate
While new budgetary realities fostered the approach
adopted in
Chicago 2012 (smart defence and CFI) whereas
“Crimea and Ukraine” manifested the need for
Wales 2014 (emphasis on collective defence)
Chicago Summit 2013: Smart defence
SD is primarily an economic programme which aimed at
offering “more for less” but it seems that we cannot
ultimately expect anything else than delivering
“slightly less for less” (Martin Zaphe)
It aims at reducing costs through greater cooperation in
procurement, training, maintenance and administration.
Yet, its driving objective is reducing costs and not
military imperatives (efficiency).
Can these two be combined?
SD proved a good base but seem to require elaboration in
order to meet the Wales criterion.
Chicago Summit 2012: Connected Forces
Initiative –CFI (NATO forces 2020)
CFI aimed at preserving and improving interoperability by focusing
on “updated, modified and intensified training cycle” while also
involving high visibility and adapted scenarios”
Effectively, CFI seems to take precedence over Smart Defence even
if the latter was until now found “at the heart of the Alliance’s
approach.”
Its adaptability logic to new communication and technological
requirements have rendered CFI very important for the Alliance.
For this reason it was included in the “Readiness Action Plan”
(RAP) adopted in Wales in 2014.
Wales Summit 2014: collective defence
Russian aggressive behaviour against Crimea and eastern
Ukraine did not leave space for anything less than the
upgrading of the “collective defence” concept in NATO’s
agenda.
Accordingly, the logic of CFI was incorporated to the
decision of a reformed NRF- the VJTF (around 5000
troops) deployable within 2-5 days.
Requirements vs challenges
NATO/EU collaboration means:
• A common understanding and commitment of the required
common endeavours at the strategic level (Pending)
• The need for a standardization process and the Smart
Defence logic to be augmented in a non exclusive
framework. (to be sought)
• Common training (the Connected Forces Initiative –CFI
of 2012 is in the right direction, partners included)
• Yet, what can be agreed by governments to be fully
integrated under the principles of multinationality?
In effect
Key decisions are required from governments regarding
the optimum modes of cooperation in the context of
both institutions.
To what institutions and alliances can be committed to
largely depend on the will of governments to take
decisions.
As long as decisions are driven by shared objectives and
common purposes, then institutional recalibration can
be possible.