Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939-1945

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Dedication
For
WILLIAMandAMELIE
thenextgeneration
Contents
Cover
TitlePage
Copyright
Dedication
Introduction
1BeforetheDeluge
1SEEKERSAFTERTRU TH
2THEBRITISH:GEN TLEMEN AN DPLAYERS
3THERU SSIAN S:TEMPLESOFESPION AGE
2TheStormBreaks
1THE‘ FICTION FLOOD’
2SHADOWIN GCAN ARIS
3MiraclesTakeaLittleLonger:Bletchley
1‘ TIPS’AN D‘ CILLIS’
2FLIRTIN GWITHAMERICA
4TheDogsthatBarked
1‘ LU CY’ S’PEOPLE
2SORGE’ SWARN IN GS
3THEORCHESTRAPLAYS
4THEDEAFMAN IN THEKREMLIN
5DivineWinds
1MRSFERGU SON ’ STEASET
2THEJAPAN ESE
3THEMAN WHOWON MIDWAY
6MuddlingandGroping:TheRussiansatWar
1CEN TREMOBILISES
2THEEN DOFSORGE
3THESECON DSOU RCE
4GOU REVITCHTAKESATRAIN
7Britain’sSecretWarMachine
1THESHARPEN D
2THEBRAIN
3ATSEA
8‘Mars’:TheBloodiestDeception
1GEHLEN
2AGEN T‘ MAX’
9TheOrchestra’sLastConcert
10Guerrilla
1RESISTERSAN DRAIDERS
2SOE
11Hoover ’sG-Men,Donovan’sWildMen
1ADVEN TU RERS
2IVORYTOWERS
3ALLEN DU LLES:TALKIN GTOGERMAN S
12Russia’sPartisans:TerrorisingBothSides
13IslandsintheStorm
1THEABWEHR’ SIRISHJIG
2N OMAN ’ SLAN D
14ALittleHelpfromTheirFriends
1‘ ITSTIN KS,BU TSOMEBODYHASTODOIT’
2AMERICAN TRAITORS
15TheKnowledgeFactories
1AGEN TS
2THEJEWELOFSOU RCES
3PRODU CTION LIN ES
4IN FERN ALMACHIN ES
16‘Blunderhead’:TheEnglishPatient
17EclipseoftheAbwehr
1HITLER’ SBLETCHLEYS
2‘ CICERO’
3THEFAN TASISTS
4THE‘ GOOD’N AZI
18Battlefields
1WIELDIN GTHEU LTRAWAN D
2SU ICIDESPIES
3TARN ISHEDTRIU MPH
19BlackWidows,FewWhiteKnights
1FIGHTIN GJAPAN
2FIGHTIN GEACHOTHER
3THEEN EMY:GROPIN GIN THEDARK
20‘Enormoz’
21DecodingVictory
PictureSection
Acknowledgements
NotesandSources
Bibliography
Index
AlsobyMaxHastings
AboutthePublisher
Introduction
ThisisabookaboutsomeofthemostfascinatingpeoplewhoparticipatedintheSecondWorldWar.
Soldiers,sailors,airmen,civilianshadvastlydiverseexperiences,forgedbyfire,geography,
economicsandideology.Thosewhokilledeachotherwerethemostconspicuous,butinmanyways
theleastinteresting:outcomeswerealsoprofoundlyinfluencedbyahostofmenandwomenwho
neverfiredashot.WhileeveninRussiamonthscouldelapsebetweenbigbattles,alltheparticipants
wagedanunceasingsecretwar–astruggleforknowledgeoftheenemytoempowertheirarmies,
naviesandairforces,throughespionageandcodebreaking.Lt.Gen.AlbertPraun,theWehrmacht’s
lastsignalschief,wroteafterwardsofthelatter:‘Allaspectsofthismodern“coldwaroftheair
waves”werecarriedonconstantlyevenwhenthegunsweresilent.’TheAlliesalsolaunchedguerrilla
andterroristcampaignswhereverinAxis-occupiedterritoriestheyhadmeanstodoso:covert
operationsassumedanunprecedentedimportance.
Thisbookdoesnotaspiretobeacomprehensivenarrative,whichwouldfillcountlessvolumes.It
isinsteadastudyofbothsides’secretwarmachinesandsomeofthecharacterswhoinfluencedthem.
Itisunlikelythatanymoregame-changingrevelationswillbeforthcoming,savepossiblyfrom
SovietarchivescurrentlylockedbyVladimirPutin.TheJapanesedestroyedmostoftheirintelligence
filesin1945,andwhatsurvivesremainsinaccessibleinTokyo,butveteransprovidedsignificant
post-wartestimony–adecadeago,Iinterviewedsomeofthemmyself.
Mostbooksaboutwartimeintelligencefocusonthedoingsofachosennation.Ihaveinstead
attemptedtoexploreitinaglobalcontext.Someepisodesinmynarrativeareboundtobefamiliarto
specialists,butanewperspectiveseemspossiblebyplacingthemonabroadcanvas.Thoughspies
andcodebreakershavegeneratedavastliterature,readersmaybeasastonishedbysomeofthetales
inthisbookasIhavebeenondiscoveringthemformyself.Ihavewrittenextensivelyaboutthe
Russians,becausetheirdoingsaremuchlessfamiliartoWesternreadersthanarethoseofBritain’s
BletchleyPark,America’sArlingtonHallandOp-20-G.Ihaveomittedmanylegends,andmadeno
attempttoretellthemostfamiliartalesofResistanceinWesternEurope,noroftheAbwehr ’sagents
inBritainandAmerica,whowereswiftlyimprisonedor‘turned’forthefamousDoubleCross
system.Bycontrast,thoughthefactsofRichardSorge’sand‘Cicero’s’*doingshavebeenknownfor
manydecades,theirsignificancedeservesarethink.
Theachievementsofsomesecretwarriorswereasbreathtakingastheblundersofothers.AsI
recounthere,theBritishseveraltimesallowedsensitivematerialtobecapturedwhichcouldhave
beenfataltotheUltrasecret.Meanwhile,spywritersdwellobsessivelyonthetreacheryofBritain’s
CambridgeFive,butrelativelyfewrecognisewhatwemightcalltheWashingtonandBerkeleyfive
hundred–asmallarmyofAmericanleftistswhoservedasinformantsforSovietintelligence.The
egregiousSenatorJosephMcCarthystigmatisedmanyindividualsunjustly,buthewasnotwrongin
chargingthatbetweenthe1930sand1950stheUSgovernmentandthenation’sgreatestinstitutions
andcorporationsharbouredanastonishingnumberofemployeeswhosefirstloyaltywasnottotheir
ownflag.True,between1941and1945theRussiansweresupposedlyalliesofBritainandtheUnited
States,butStalinviewedthisrelationshipwithunremittingcynicism–asamerelytemporary
association,forthenarrowpurposeofdestroyingtheNazis,withnationsthatremainedtheSoviet
Union’shistoricfoesandrivals.
Manybooksaboutwartimeintelligencefocusonwhatspiesorcodebreakersfoundout.Theonly
questionthatmatters,however,ishowfarsecretknowledgechangedoutcomes.ThescaleofSoviet
espionagedwarfedthatofeveryotherbelligerent,andyieldedarichtechnologicalharvestfrom
BritainandtheUnitedStates,butStalin’sparanoiacrippledexploitationofhiscropofotherpeople’s
politicalandmilitarysecrets.ThemostdistinguishedAmericanhistorianofwartimecodebreaking
toldmein2014thatafterhalfalifetimestudyingthesubjecthehasdecidedthatAlliedintelligence
contributedalmostnothingtowinningthewar.Thisseemstooextremeaverdict,butmyfriend’s
remarksshowhowscepticism,andindeedcynicism,breedandmultiplyinthecourseofdecades
wadinginthemorassoffantasy,treacheryandincompetencewhereinmostspymastersandtheir
servantshavetheirbeing.Therecordsuggeststhatofficialsecrecydoesmoretoprotectintelligence
agenciesfromdomesticaccountabilityfortheirownfolliesthantoshieldthemfromenemy
penetration.Ofwhatusewasit–forinstance–toconcealfromtheBritishpubliceventheidentities
oftheirownspychiefs,whenforyearsMI6’s*mostsecretoperationswerebetrayedtotheRussians
byKimPhilby,oneofitsmostseniorofficers?TheUSgovernmentrepudiatedabilateralintelligence
exchangeagreedwiththeNKVD*byMaj.Gen.WilliamDonovanofOSS,butofficialcautiondid
littlefornationalsecuritywhensomeofDonovan’stopsubordinateswerepassingsecretstoSoviet
agents.
Intelligence-gatheringisnotascience.Therearenocertainties,evenwhensomeoftheenemy’s
correspondenceisbeingread.Thereisacacophonyof‘noise’,fromwhich‘signals’–truthslarge
andsmall–mustbeextracted.InAugust1939,ontheeveoftheNazi–SovietPact,aBritishofficial
wrunghishandsovertheconfusedmessagesreachingtheForeignOfficeaboutrelationsbetween
BerlinandMoscow:‘Wefindourselves,’hewrote–usingwordsthatmaybeappliedtomost
intelligence–‘whenattemptingtoassessthevalueofthesesecretreports,somewhatinthepositionof
theCaptainoftheFortyThieveswhen,havingputachalkmarkonAliBaba’sdoor,hefoundthat
Morganahadputsimilarmarksonallthedoorsinthestreetandhadnoindicationwhichwasthetrue
one.’
Itisfruitlesstostudyanynation’ssuccesses,itspearlsofrevelation,inisolation.Thesemustbe
viewedinthecontextofhundredsofthousandsofpagesoftriviaoroutrightnonsensethatcrossed
thedesksofanalysts,statesmen,commanders.‘Diplomatsandintelligenceagents,inmyexperience,
areevenbiggerliarsthanjournalists,’wrotetheBritishwartimespyMalcolmMuggeridge,whowas
familiarwithallthree,andsomethingofacharlatanhimself.Thesterilityofmuchespionagewas
nicelyillustratedbyFrantišekMoravecofCzechintelligence.Onedayin1936heproudlypresented
hiscommandingofficerwithareportonanewpieceofGermanmilitaryequipment,forwhichhe
hadpaidaninformanthandsomely.Thegeneralskimmedit,thensaid,‘Iwillshowyousomething
better.’HetossedacrosshisdeskacopyofthemagazineDieWehrmacht,pointedoutanarticleonthe
sameweapon,andsaiddryly,‘Thesubscriptionisonlytwentycrowns.’
InthesamecategoryfelltheAbwehrtranscriptofaDecember1944USStateDepartmentmessage
appointinganeweconomicaffairscounsellortothePolishexilegovernmentinLondon.Thisread,
inpart:‘Histransportationexpensesandperdiem,TunistoLondon,viaWashington,DC,
transportationexpensesandperdiemforhisfamilyandshipmenteffectsdirectauthorised,subject
TravelRegulations.’Apage-longtranslationofthisdecryptwasstamped‘TopSecret’byitsGerman
readers.Theman-hoursexpendedbytheNaziwarmachinetosecurethisgemreflectthefashionin
whichintelligenceservicesoftenmovemountainstogivebirthtomice.
Trustisabondandprivilegeoffreesocieties.Yetcredulityandrespectforprivacyarefatalflaws
toanalystsandagent-runners.Theirworkrequiresthemtopersuadecitizensofothercountriesto
abandonthetraditionalidealofpatriotism,whetherforcash,outofconviction,oroccasionally
becauseofapersonalbondbetweenhandlerandinformant.Itwillalwaysbedisputedterritory,
whetherthosewhobetraytheirsociety’ssecretsarecourageousandprincipledheroeswhoidentifya
higherloyalty,asmodernGermansperceivetheanti-HitlerResistance,orinsteadtraitors,asmostof
usclassifyKimPhilby,AlgerHiss–andinourowntimesEdwardSnowden.Thedayjobofmany
intelligenceofficersistopromotetreachery,whichhelpstoexplainwhythetradeattractssomany
weirdpeople.MalcolmMuggeridgeasserteddisdainfullythatit‘necessarilyinvolvessuchcheating,
lyingandbetraying,thatithasadeleteriouseffectonthecharacter.Inevermetanyoneprofessionally
engagedinitwhomIshouldcaretotrustinanycapacity.’
Stalinsaid:‘Aspyshouldbelikethedevil;noonecantrusthim,notevenhimself.’Thegrowthof
newideologies,mostsignificantlycommunism,causedsomepeopletoembraceloyaltiesthat
crossedfrontiersand,intheeyesofzealots,transcendedmerepatriotism.Morethanafewfeltexalted
bydiscoveringvirtueintreason,thoughotherspreferredtobetrayforcash.Manywartime
spymasterswereuncertainwhichsidetheiragentswerereallyserving,andinsomecases
bewildermentpersiststothisday.TheBritishpettycrookEddieChapman,‘AgentZigZag’,had
extraordinarywarexperiencesastheplaythingofBritishandGermanintelligence.Atdifferenttimes
heputhimselfatthemercyofboth,butitseemsunlikelythathisactivitiesdidmuchgoodtoeither,
servingonlytokeepChapmanhimselfingirlsandshoeleather.Hewasanintriguingbutunimportant
figure,oneamongcountlessloosecannononthesecretbattlefield.Moreinteresting,andscarcely
knowntothepublic,isthecaseofRonaldSeth,anSOEagentcapturedbytheGermansandtrainedby
themtoserveasa‘double’inBritain.IshalldescribebelowthepuzzlementofSOE,MI5,MI6,MI9
andtheAbwehraboutwhosesideSethendedupon.
Intelligence-gatheringisinherentlywasteful.Iamstruckbythenumberofsecretserviceofficers
ofallnationalitieswhoseonlyachievementinforeignpostingswastostayalive,atheftycosttotheir
employers,whilecollectinginformationofwhichnotasmidgeonassistedthewareffort.Perhaps
one-thousandthof1percentofmaterialgarneredfromsecretsourcesbyallthebelligerentsinWorld
WarIIcontributedtochangingbattlefieldoutcomes.Yetthatfractionwasofsuchvaluethatwarlords
grudgednotalifenorapound,rouble,dollar,Reichsmarkexpendedinsecuringit.Intelligencehas
alwaysinfluencedwars,butuntilthetwentiethcenturycommanderscoulddiscovertheirenemies’
motionsonlythroughspiesanddirectobservation–countingmen,ships,guns.Thencamewireless
communication,whichcreatedrollingnewintelligencecornprairiesthatgrewexponentiallyafter
1930,astechnologyadvanced.‘Therehasneverbeenanythingcomparableinanyotherperiodof
historytotheimpactofradio,’wrotethegreatBritishscientificintelligenceofficerDrR.V.Jones.‘…
Itwastheproductofsomeofthemostimaginativedevelopmentsthathaveeveroccurredinphysics,
anditwasasnearmagicasanyonecouldconceive.’Notonlycouldmillionsofcitizensbuildtheir
ownsetsathome,asdidalsomanyspiesabroad,butinBerlin,London,Washington,Moscow,Tokyo
electroniceavesdropperswereempoweredtoprobethedeploymentsandsometimestheintentionsof
anenemywithoutbenefitoftelescopes,frigatesoragents.
Oneofthethemesinthisbookisthatthesignalsintelligencewar,certainlyinitsearlystages,was
lesslopsidedintheAllies’favourthanpopularmythologysuggests.TheGermansusedsecret
knowledgewelltoplanthe1940invasionofFranceandtheLowCountries.Atleastuntilmid-1942,
andeveninsomedegreethereafter,theyreadimportantAlliedcodesbothonlandandatsea,with
significantconsequencesforboththeBattleoftheAtlanticandtheNorthAfricancampaign.They
wereabletoexploitfeebleRedArmywirelesssecurityduringthefirstyearofOperation
‘Barbarossa’.Fromlate1942onwards,however,Hitler ’scodebreakerslaggedeverfurtherbehind
theirAlliedcounterparts.TheAbwehr ’sattemptsatespionageabroadwerepitiful.
TheJapanesegovernmentandarmyhighcommandplannedtheirinitial1941–42assaultsonPearl
HarborandtheEuropeanempiresofSouth-EastAsiamostefficiently,butthereaftertreated
intelligencewithdisdain,andwagedwarinafogofignoranceabouttheirenemies’doings.The
Italianintelligenceserviceanditscodebreakershadsomenotablesuccessesintheearlywaryears,
butby1942Mussolini’scommanderswerereducedtousingRussianPoWstodotheireavesdropping
onSovietwirelesstraffic.RelativelylittleeffortwasexpendedbyanynationonprobingItaly’s
secrets,becauseitsmilitarycapabilityshranksorapidly.‘OurpictureoftheItalianairforcewas
incompleteandourknowledgefarfromsound,’admittedRAFintelligenceofficerGroup-Captain
HarryHumphreysabouttheMediterraneantheatre,beforeaddingsmugly,‘So–fortunately–wasthe
Italianairforce.’
Thefirstrequirementforsuccessfuluseofsecretdataisthatcommandersshouldbewillingto
analyseithonestly.HerbertMeyer,aveteranofWashington’sNationalIntelligenceCouncil,defined
hisbusinessasthepresentationof‘organizedinformation’;hearguedthatideallyintelligence
departmentsshouldprovideaserviceforcommandersresemblingthatofshipandaircraftnavigation
systems.DonaldMcLachlan,aBritishnavalpractitioner,observed:‘Intelligencehasmuchin
commonwithscholarship,andthestandardswhicharedemandedinscholarshiparethosewhich
shouldbeappliedtointelligence.’Afterthewar,thesurvivingGermancommandersblamedalltheir
intelligencefailuresonHitler ’srefusaltocountenanceobjectiveassessmentofevidence.Signals
supremoAlbertPraunsaid:‘Unfortunately…throughoutthewarHitler…showedalackof
confidenceincommunicationsintelligence,especiallyifthereportswereunfavourable[tohisown
views].’
GoodnewsfortheAxiscause–forinstance,interceptionsrevealingheavyAlliedlosses–were
giventhehighestpriorityfortransmissiontoBerlin,becausetheFührerwelcomedthem.Meanwhile
badtidingsreceivedshortshrift.BeforetheJune1941invasionofRussia,Gen.GeorgThomasofthe
WiRuAmt–theWehrmacht’seconomicsdepartment–producedestimatesofSovietweapons
productionwhichapproachedthereality,thoughstillshortofit,andarguedthatthelossofEuropean
RussiawouldnotnecessarilyprecipitatethecollapseofStalin’sindustrialbase.Hitlerdismissed
Thomas’snumbersoutofhand,becausehecouldnotreconciletheirmagnitudewithhiscontemptfor
allthingsSlavonic.Field-MarshalWilhelmKeiteleventuallyinstructedtheWiRuAmttostop
submittingintelligencethatmightupsettheFührer.
ThewareffortoftheWesterndemocraciesprofitedimmenselyfromtherelativeopennessoftheir
societiesandgovernance.Churchillsometimesindulgedspasmsofangertowardsthosearoundhim
whovoicedunwelcomeviews,butaremarkablyopendebatewassustainedintheAlliedcorridorsof
power,includingmostmilitaryheadquarters.Gen.SirBernardMontgomerywasaconsiderable
tyrant,butthosewhomhetrusted–includinghisintelligencechiefBrigadierBillWilliams,a
peacetimeOxforddon–couldspeaktheirminds.AlltheUnitedStates’sbrilliantintelligence
successesweregainedthroughcodebreaking,andwereexploitedmostdramaticallyinthePacific
navalwar.Americangroundcommandersseldomshowedmuchinterestinusingtheirknowledgeto
promotedeceptions,asdidtheBritish.D-Dayin1944wastheonlyoperationforwhichthe
Americanscooperatedwholeheartedlyonadeceptionplan.EventhentheBritishwereprimemovers,
whiletheAmericansmerelyacquiesced–forinstance,byallowingGen.GeorgePattonto
masqueradeascommanderofthefictitiousAmericanFirstUSArmyGroupsupposedlydestinedto
landinthePasdeCalais.SomeseniorAmericansweresuspiciousoftheBritishenthusiasmfor
misleadingtheenemy,whichtheyregardedasreflectingtheirally’senthusiasmforemployingguile
toescapehardfighting,therealbusinessofwar.
GC&CS,theso-calledGovernmentCodeandCipherSchoolatBletchleyPark,wasofcoursenot
merelythemostimportantintelligencehuboftheconflict,butfrom1942Britain’soutstanding
contributiontovictory.FolklegendholdsthatAlanTuring’screationofelectro-mechanicalbombes
exposedGermany’sentirecommunicationssystemtoAlliedeyesbybreakingtheEnigma’straffic.
Thetruthisfarmorecomplex.TheGermansemployeddozensofdifferentkeys,manyofwhichwere
readonlyintermittently,oftenoutof‘realtime’–meaninginsufficientlyrapidlytomakepossiblean
operationalresponse–andafewnotatall.TheBritishaccessedsomeimmenselyvaluableEnigma
material,butcoveragewasneverremotelycomprehensive,andwasespeciallyweakonarmytraffic.
Moreover,anever-increasingvolumeoftheGermans’mostsecretsignalswastransmittedthrougha
teleprinternetworkwhichemployedanentirelydifferentencryptionsystemfromthatusedby
Enigma.TheachievementofBletchley’smathematiciansandlinguistsincrackingtheLorenz
Schlüsselzusatzwasquitedistinctfrom,andmoredifficultthan,breakingtheEnigma,eventhough
recipientsinthefieldknewtheproductsofallsuchactivitiessimplyas‘Ultra’.*BillTutte,theyoung
Cambridgemathematicianwhomadethecriticalinitialdiscoveries,isscarcelyknowntoposterity,
yetdeservestobealmostascelebratedasTuring.
UltraenabledtheAlliedleadershiptoplanitscampaignsandoperationsinthesecondhalfofthe
warwithaconfidencevouchsafedtonopreviouswarlordsinhistory.Knowingtheenemy’shanddid
notdiminishitsstrength,however.In1941andinto1942,againandagaintheBritishlearnedwhere
theAxisintendedtostrike–asinCrete,NorthAfricaandMalaya–butthisdidnotsavethemfrom
losingthesubsequentbattles.Hardpower,whetheronlandoratseaorintheair,wasindispensableto
theexploitationofsecretknowledge.So,too,waswisdomonthepartofBritishandAmerican
commandersandtheirstaffs–whichprovedconspicuouslylackingatkeymomentsduringthe1944–
45north-westEuropecampaign.Intelligencedid,however,contributeimportantlytomitigatingsome
earlydisasters:youngR.V.Jones’sachievementinshowingthepathtowardsjammingtheLuftwaffe’s
navigationalbeamssignificantlydiminishedthepaininflictedbytheBlitzonBritain.Atsea,Ultra’s
pinpointingofGermanU-boats–withanalarmingnine-monthinterruptionin1942–madeit
possibletorerouteconvoystoevadethem,anevenmoreimportantcontributiontoholdingopenthe
Atlanticsupplylinethansinkingenemysubmarines.
TheAmericanshadsomereasontosuspecttheiralliesofromanticismaboutdeception.Col.
DudleyClarke–famousnotleasttoSpanishpolice,whooncearrestedhimwearingwoman’sclothes
inaMadridstreet–conductedamassivecoveroperationintheNorthAfricandesertbeforethe
October1942BattleofElAlamein.HistorianshavecelebratedClarke’singenuityincreatingfictional
forceswhichcausedRommeltodeploysignificantstrengthwellsouthofthefocalpointof
Montgomery’sassault.However,suchguiledidnotspareEighthArmyfromthefortnightofhard
fightingthatprovednecessarytobreakthroughtheAfrikaKorps.TheGermansarguedthatClarke’s
activitieschangednothingintheend,becausetheyhadtimetoredeploynorthwardsbeforethe
decisiveBritishassault.InBurmaCol.PeterFleming,brotherofthecreatorofJamesBond,wentto
elaborateandhazardouslengthstoleaveahaversackfullofdeceptive‘secretpapers’inawrecked
jeepwheretheenemywereboundtofindit,buttheJapanesetooknonoticeofthishaulwhentheygot
it.From1942onwards,BritishintelligenceachievedanalmostcompleteunderstandingofGermany’s
airdefencesandtheelectronictechnologiestheyemployed,butAlliedbomberforcescontinuedto
sufferpunitivecasualties,especiallybeforeUSlong-rangefighterswreckedtheLuftwaffeintheair
inthespringof1944.
WhateverthecontributionofBritishtacticaldeceptionsinNorthAfrica,Allieddeceivershadtwo
importantandalmostindisputablestrategicsuccesses.In1943–44,Operation‘Zeppelin’createda
fictitiousBritisharmyinEgyptwhichinducedHitlertomaintainlargeforcesinYugoslaviaand
GreecetorepelanAlliedBalkanlanding.Itwasthisimaginarythreat,notTito’sguerrillas,that
causedtwenty-twoAxisdivisionstokicktheirheelsinthesouth-eastuntilafterD-Day.Thesecond
achievementwas,ofcourse,thatofOperation‘Fortitude’beforeandaftertheassaultonNormandy.It
bearsemphasisthatneithercouldhaveexercisedsuchinfluencehadnottheAlliespossessed
sufficienthardpower,togetherwithcommandofthesea,tomakeitcrediblethattheymightland
armiesalmostanywhere.
SomeRussiandeceptionsdwarfthoseoftheBritishandAmericans.Thestoryofagent‘Max’,and
thevastoperationlaunchedasadiversionfromtheStalingradoffensive,atacostof70,000Russian
lives,isoneofthemostastonishingofthewar,andalmostunknowntoWesternreaders.In1943–44,
otherSovietrusespromptedtheGermansrepeatedlytoconcentratetheirforcesinthewrongplaces
inadvanceofonslaughtsbytheRedArmy.Airsuperioritywasanessentialprerequisite,intheEastas
intheWest:theambitiousdeceptionsofthelaterwaryearswerepossibleonlybecausetheGermans
couldnotcarryoutphotographicreconnaissancetodisprovethe‘legends’theyweresoldacrossthe
airwavesandthroughfalsedocuments.
TheWesternAlliesweremuchlesssuccessfulingatheringhumintthansigint.*NeithertheBritish
northeAmericansacquiredasinglehighlyplacedsourcearoundtheGerman,JapaneseorItalian
governmentsorhighcommands,untilin1943OSS’sAllenDullesbegantoreceivesomegood
Berlingossip.TheWesternAlliesachievednothingliketheRussians’penetrationofLondon,
Washington,BerlinandTokyo,thelastthroughtheiragentRichardSorge,workingintheGerman
embassy.TheUSgotintothebusinessofoverseasespionageonlyafterPearlHarbor,andfocused
moreeffortonsabotageandcodebreakingthanonplacingspies,asdistinctfromparamilitary
groups,inenemyterritory.OSS’sResearchandAnalysisDepartmentinWashingtonwasmore
impressivethanitsflamboyantbutunfocusedfieldoperations.Moreover,IbelievethatWestern
Alliedsponsorshipofguerrillawardidmoretopromotethepost-warself-respectofoccupied
nationsthantohastenthedestructionofNazism.Russia’spartisanoperationswereconductedonafar
moreambitiousscalethantheSOE/OSScampaigns,andpropagandaboostedtheirachievementsboth
atthetimeandinthepost-warera.However,Sovietdocumentsnowavailable,ofwhichmyRussian
researcherDrLyubaVinogradovnahasmadeextensiveuse,indicatethatweshouldviewthe
achievementsoftheEasternguerrillacampaign,atleastuntil1943,withconsiderablescepticism.
Asinallmybooks,Iseekbelowtoestablishthe‘bigpicture’framework,andtoweaveintothis
humanstoriesofthespies,codebreakersandintelligencechiefswhoservedtheirrespectivemasters–
TuringatBletchleyandNimitz’scryptanalystsinthePacific,theSoviet‘RedOrchestra’ofagentsin
Germany,ReinhardGehlenofOKH,WilliamDonovanofOSSandmanymoreexoticcharacters.The
foremostreasontheWesternAlliesdidintelligencebestwasthattheybrilliantlyexploitedcivilians,to
whomboththeUSandBritishgovernmentsgranteddiscretion,influenceand–wherenecessary–
militaryrank,astheiropponentsdidnot.WhenthefirstvolumeoftheBritishofficialhistoryof
wartimeintelligencewaspublishedthirtyyearsago,IsuggestedtoitsprincipalauthorProfessor
HarryHinsley,aBletchleyveteran,thatitseemedtoshowthattheamateurscontributedmorethandid
careersecretserviceprofessionals.Hinsleyrepliedsomewhatimpatiently,‘Ofcoursetheydid.You
wouldn’twanttosuppose,wouldyou,thatinpeacetimethebestbrainsofoursocietywastedtheir
livesinintelligence?’
Ihavealwaysthoughtthisanimportantpoint,echoedinthewritingsofanotheracademic,Hugh
Trevor-Roper,whoservedinbothMI5andMI6,andwhosepersonalachievementmakeshimseem
oneofthemoreremarkableBritishintelligenceofficersofthewar.Inpeacetime,mostsecretservices
fulfilledtheirfunctionsadequately,oratleastdidlittleharm,whilestaffedbypeopleofmoderate
abilities.Onceastrugglefornationalsurvivalbegan,however,intelligencehadtobecomepartofthe
guidingbrainofthewareffort.Clashesonthebattlefieldcouldbefoughtbymenofrelativelylimited
gifts,thevirtuesofthesportsfield–physicalfitness,courage,grit,alittleinitiativeandcommon
sense.Butintelligenceservicessuddenlyneededbrilliance.Itsoundsbanaltosaythattheyhadto
recruitintelligentpeople,but–asmorethanafewtwentieth-centurysagesnoted–inmanycountries
thisprinciplewashonouredmostlyinthebreach.
Afewwordsaboutthearrangementofthisbook:whilemyapproachisbroadlychronological,to
avoidleapingtooconfusinglybetweentraitorsinWashington,SovietspiesinSwitzerlandandthe
mathematiciansofBletchleyPark,thenarrativepersistswithsomethemesbeyondtheirtime
sequence.Ihavedrawnheavilyonthemostauthoritativepublishedworksinthisfield,thoseof
StephenBudiansky,DavidKahnandChristopherAndrewnotableamongthem,butIhavealso
exploitedarchivesinBritain,GermanyandtheUS,togetherwithmuchpreviouslyuntranslated
Russianmaterial.Ihavemadenoattempttodiscussthemathematicsofcodebreaking,whichhasbeen
donebywritersmuchmorenumeratethanmyself.
ItisoftensaidthatIanFleming’sthrillersbearnorelationshiptotherealworldofespionage.
However,whenreadingcontemporarySovietreportsandrecordedconversations,togetherwiththe
memoirsofMoscow’swartimeintelligenceofficers,Iamstruckbyhowuncannilytheymirrorthe
mad,monstrous,imagineddialogueofsuchpeopleinFleming’sFromRussiaWithLove.Andsome
oftheplotsplannedandexecutedbytheNKVDandtheGRUwerenolessfantasticthanhis.
Allhistoricalnarrativesarenecessarilytentativeandspeculative,buttheybecomefarmoreso
whenspiesareinvolved.Inchroniclingbattles,onecanreliablyrecordhowmanyshipsweresunk,
aircraftshotdown,menkilled,howmuchgroundwaswonorlost.Butintelligencegeneratesavast,
unreliableliterature,someofitproducedbyprotagonistsfortheirownglorificationorjustification.
OneimmenselypopularaccountofAlliedintelligence,BodyguardofLies,publishedin1975,is
largelyaworkoffiction.SirWilliamStephenson,theCanadianwhorantheBritishwartime
intelligencecoordinationorganisationinNewYork,performedavaluableliaisonfunction,butwas
nevermuchofaspymaster.Thisdidnotpreventhimfromassistinginthecreationofawildly
fanciful1976biographyofhimself,AManCalledIntrepid,thoughthereisnoevidencethatanybody
evercalledhimanythingofthesort.MostaccountsofwartimeSOEagents,particularlywomenand
especiallyinFrance,containlargedosesofromantictwaddle.Moscow’smendacityisundiminished
bytime:theKGB’sofficialintelligencehistory,publishedasrecentlyas1997,assertsthattheBritish
ForeignOfficeisstillconcealingdocumentationaboutitssecretnegotiationswith‘fascist’Germany,
andindeeditscollusionwithHitler.
AlliedcodebreakingoperationsagainstGermany,ItalyandJapanexercisedfarmoreinfluencethan
didanyspy.Itisimpossibletoquantifytheirimpact,however,anditisbafflingthatHarryHinsley,the
officialhistorian,assertedthatUltraprobablyshortenedthewarbythreeyears.Thisisastendentious
asProfessorM.R.D.Foot’sclaim,inhisofficialhistoryofSOEinFrance,thatAlliedcommanders
consideredthatResistancecurtailedtheglobalstrugglebysixmonths.UltrawasatooloftheBritish
andAmericans,whoplayedonlyasubordinateroleinthedestructionofNazism,whichwas
overwhelminglyaRussianmilitaryendeavour.Itisnomorepossibletomeasurethecontributionof
BletchleyParktothetimingofvictorythanthatofWinstonChurchill,Libertyshipsorradar.
Likewise,publicistswhomakeclaimsthatsomesensationalmodernbookrecounts‘thespystory
thatchangedWorldWarII’mightaswellciteMaryPoppins.OneofChurchill’smostprofound
observationswasmadeinOctober1941,inresponsetoademandfromSirCharlesPortal,aschiefof
airstaff,foracommitmenttobuild4,000heavybomberswhich,claimedtheairman,wouldbring
Germanytoitskneesinsixmonths.Theprimeministerwrotebackthat,whileeverythingpossible
wasbeingdonetocreatealargebomberforce,hedeploredattemptstoplaceunboundedconfidence
inanyonemeansofsecuringvictory.‘Allthingsarealwaysonthemovesimultaneously,’he
declared.Thisisanimmenselyimportantcommentonhumanaffairs,especiallyinwarandaboveall
inintelligence.Itisimpossiblejustlytoattributeallcreditforthesuccessorblameforthefailureof
anoperationtoanysinglefactor.
Yetwhilescepticismaboutthesecretworldisindispensable,sotooisacapacityforwonder:some
fabuloustalesprovetrue.Iblushtorememberthedayin1974whenIwasinvitedbyanewspaperto
reviewF.W.Winterbotham’sTheUltraSecret.Inthosedays,youngandgreenandamerecasual
studentof1939–45,liketherestoftheworldIhadneverheardofBletchleyPark.Iglancedatthe
about-to-be-publishedbook,thendeclinedtowriteaboutit:Winterbothammadesuchextraordinary
claimsthatIcouldnotcreditthem.Yetofcoursetheauthor,awartimeofficerofMI6,hadbeen
authorisedtoopenawindowupononeofthebiggestandmostfascinatingsecretsoftheSecond
WorldWar.
Noothernationhaseverproducedanofficialhistoryexplicitlydedicatedtowartimeintelligence,
andapproachinginmagnitudeBritain’sfivevolumesand3,000-pluspages,publishedbetween1978
and1990.Thislavishcommitmenttothehistoriographyoftheperiod,fundedbythetaxpayer,reflects
Britishprideinitsachievement,sustainedintothetwenty-firstcenturybysuchabsurd–asdefinedby
itsnegligiblerelationshiptofact–yetalsohugelysuccessfulfeaturefilmsas2014’sTheImitation
Game.WhilemosteducatedpeopletodayrecognisehowsubordinatewasthecontributionofBritain
toAlliedvictoryalongsidethoseoftheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates,theyrealisethatherewas
somethingChurchill’speopledidbetterthananybodyelse.Althoughtherearemanystoriesinthis
bookaboutbunglesandfailures,inintelligenceasineverythingelserelatedtoconflictvictoryis
gainednotbythesidethatmakesnomistakes,butbytheonethatmakesfewerthantheotherside.By
suchareckoning,theultimatetriumphoftheBritishandAmericanswasasgreatinthesecretwaras
itbecameinthecollisionbetweenarmies,naviesandairforces.ThedefiningrealityisthattheAllies
won.
Finally,whilesomeepisodesdescribedbelowseemcomicorridiculous,andreflecthuman
frailtiesandfollies,wemustneverforgetthatineveryaspectoftheglobalconflict,thestakeswere
lifeanddeath.Hundredsofthousandsofpeopleofmanynationalitiesriskedtheirlives,andmany
sacrificedthem,ofteninthelonelinessofdawnbeforeafiringsquad,togatherintelligenceorpursue
guerrillaoperations.Notwenty-first-centuryperspectiveonthepersonalitiesandevents,successes
andfailuresofthosedaysshoulddiminishourrespect,evenreverence,forthememoryofthosewho
paidthepriceforwagingsecretwar.
M A X H A STI N GS
WestBerkshire&Datai,Langkawi
June2015
*Agents’codenamesinthepagesthatfollowaregivenwithinquotationmarks.
*Britain’sMI6isoftenknownbyitsothername,SIS–theSecretIntelligenceService–butforclarityitisgiventheformername
throughoutthiswork,evenindocumentsquoted,partlytoavoidconfusionwiththeUSSignalsIntelligenceService.
*TheSovietintelligenceserviceanditssubordinatedomesticandforeignbrancheswererepeatedlyreorganisedandrenamedbetween
1934and1954,whenitbecametheKGB.Throughoutthistext‘NKVD’isused,whileacknowledgingalsofrom1943thecounterintelligenceorganisationSMERSh–SmertShpionam–andtheparallelexistencefrom1926oftheRedArmy’smilitaryintelligence
branch,theFourthDepartmentorGRU,fiercerivaloftheNKVDathomeandabroad.
*AmericansreferredtotheirJapanesediplomaticdecryptmaterialas‘Magic’,butthroughoutthistextforsimplicityIhaveused‘Ultra’,
whichbecamegenerallyacceptedonbothsidesoftheAtlanticasthegenerictermforproductsofdecryptionofenemyhigh-gradecodes
andciphers,althoughoddlyenoughthewordwasscarcelyusedinsideBletchleyPark.
*‘Humint’isthetradetermforintelligencegatheredbyspies,‘sigint’fortheproductofwirelessinterception.
1
BeforetheDeluge
1 S EEK ER S A F TER TR UTH
Thesecretwarstartedlongbeforetheshootingonedid.OnedayinMarch1937,aletterdroppedonto
thedeskofColonelFrantišekMoravec,addressedto‘thechiefoftheCzechoslovakIntelligence
Service’–whichwashimself.Itbegan:‘Iofferyoumyservices.FirstofallIshallstatewhatmy
possibilitiesare:1.Thebuild-upoftheGermanarmy.(a)theinfantry…’andsoonforthreecloselytypedpages.TheCzechs,knowingthemselvestobeprospectivepreyofHitler,conductedespionage
withanintensitystillabsentelsewhereamongEurope’sdemocracies.Theyinitiallyrespondedtothis
approachwithscepticism,assumingaNaziruse,ofwhichtherehadbeenplenty.Eventually,however,
Moravecdecidedtoriskaresponse.Afterprotractedcorrespondence,theletter-writerwhomPrague
designatedasagentA-54agreedarendezvousintheSudetentownofKraslice.Thiswasalmost
wreckedbyagunshot:oneofMoravec’saideswassonervousthathefiredtherevolverinhispocket,
puttingabulletthroughthecolonel’strouserleg.Tranquillitywasfortunatelyrestoredbeforethe
Germanvisitorarrived,tobehurriedtoanearbysafehouse.Hebroughtwithhimsheavesofsecret
documents,whichhehadblithelycartedthroughthefrontierpostsinasuitcase.Amongthematerial
wasacopyofCzechoslovakia’sdefenceplanwhichrevealedtoMoravecatraitorinhisownranks,
subsequentlyhanged.A-54departedfromKraslicestillnameless,butricherby100,000Reichsmarks.
Hepromisedtocallagain,andindeedprovidedhigh-gradeinformationfortheensuingthreeyears.
OnlymuchlaterwasheidentifiedasPaulThummel,athirty-four-year-oldofficeroftheAbwehr
intelligenceservice.
SuchanepisodewasalmosteverydayfareforMoravec.Hewasapassionate,fiercelyenergetic
figureofmiddlingheight.Akeengame-player,especiallyofchess,hespokesixlanguagesfluently,
andcouldreadsomeLatinandGreek.In1914hewasaneighteen-year-oldstudentatPrague
University,withaspirationstobecomeaphilosopher.ConscriptedintotheAustro-Hungarianarmy,
likemostCzechshewasunwillingtodiefortheHapsburgs,andonceatthefrontseizedthefirst
opportunitytodeserttotheRussians.HewaswoundedundertheirflaginBulgaria,andfinishedthe
warwithaCzechvolunteerforceontheItalianfront.WhenCzechoslovakiabecameanindependent
statehegratefullycastoffthesetangledloyalties,tobecomeanofficerinitsnewarmy.Hejoinedthe
intelligencebranchin1934,andtookoverasitschiefthreeyearslater.Moraveclearnedthetrade
mostlyfromspystoriesboughtoffbookstalls,andsoondiscoveredthatmanyreal-lifeintelligence
officerstrafficinfiction:hispredecessor ’ssupposedinformantsprovedtohavebeenfigmentsofthe
man’simagination,acloakforembezzlement.
Thecoloneldevotedmuchofhisservice’sresourcestotalent-spottinginGermanyforinformants,
eachnetworkpainstakinglyring-fenced.HesetupapaydayloancompanyinsidetheReich,targeted
atmilitaryandcivilserviceclients.Withinayearninetyofthebank’srepresentativeswereroaming
Germany,mostbonafideemployees,butsomeofthemintelligencepersonnelwhoidentified
borrowerswithaccesstoinformation,vulnerabletobriberyorblackmail.TheCzechsalsopioneered
newtechnology–microdotphotography,ultra-violetrays,secretwritingandstate-of-the-art
wirelesses.Moravecwasplentifullyfunded,arecognitionofhisroleinhisnation’sfrontline,and
wasthusabletopayaLuftwaffemajornamedSalm5,000Reichsmarks–about£500–asaretainer,
andafterwardsthehugesumofamillionCzechcrowns–£7,500–forGöring’sairforceorderof
battle.Salm,however,flauntedhisnew-foundwealth,andfoundhimselfarrested,triedandbeheaded.
Meanwhileotherpeople’sspieswerenotidleinCzechoslovakia:Prague’ssecurityofficersarrested
2,900suspectsin1936alone,mostofthemallegedlyactingforGermanyorHungary.
Everymajornationprobedthesecretsofothersinthesamefashion,usingbothovertandcovert
means.AfterRussia’sMarshalTukhachevksyvisitedBritaininApril1934,heconveyedpersonallyto
StalinaGRUagent’sdescriptionoftheRAF’snewHandleyPageHampdenbomber,detailingits
BristolandRolls-Royceenginevariantsandattachingasketchshowingitsarmament:
TheAbwehrsomehowlaidhandsonthe1935fixturelistofanICIplant’sfootballteam,whichin
thecourseoftheseasonplayedatmostofthecompany’sotherBritishfactories;Berlinthus
triumphantlypinpointedseveralchemicalinstallationstheLuftwaffehadhithertobeenunawareof.
TheAustralianaviatorSidneyCottonconductedsomepioneeringaerialphotographyoverGermany
atthebehestofMI6’sWing-CommanderFredWinterbotham.ThesummerroadsofEuropeteemed
withyoungcouplesontouringholidays,someofwhomwerefundedbytheirrespectiveintelligence
services,anddisplayedanunromanticinterestinairfields.MI6sentanRAFofficer,designatedas
Agent479,togetherwithasecretarytoassisthiscover,onathree-weekspinaroundGermany,
somewhathamperedbythefactsthatLuftwaffestationperimetersseldomadjoinedautobahns,and
neithervisitorspokeGerman.Theairmanhadoriginallyplannedtotakehissister,whowasfluent,
butherhusbandrefusedconsent.
IntheNazis’interests,inAugust1935DrHermannGörtzspentsomeweekstouringSuffolkand
KentonaZündappmotorbike,pinpointingRAFbaseswithprettyyoungMarianneEmigridinginhis
sidecar.ButEmigtiredoftheassignment,orlosthernerve,andGörtz,aforty-five-year-oldlawyer
fromLübeckwhohadlearnedEnglishfromhisgoverness,feltobligedtoescortherbackto
Germany.Hethenreturnedtocollectacameraandotherpossessions–includingplansofRAF
Manston–thatthecouplehadleftbehindinarentedBroadstairsbungalow.Unluckilyfortheaspiring
masterspy,thepolicehadalreadysecuredtheseincriminatingitems,followingatipfromthespyconsciouslandlord.GörtzfoundhimselfarrestedatHarwichandsentencedtofouryears’
imprisonment.HewasreleasedanddeportedinFebruary1939;morewillbeheardofHermann
Görtz.
Forprobingneighbours’secrets,everynation’sskirmisherswereitsserviceofficerspostedto
embassiesabroad.ProminentamongBerlinmilitaryattachéswasBritain’sColonelNoelMasonMacFarlane.‘Mason-Mac’wasshrewdbutbombastic.Onedayin1938,hestartledanEnglishvisitor
tohisflatbypointingoutofthewindowtothespotwhereHitlerwouldnextdayviewthe
Wehrmacht’sbirthdayparade.‘Easyrifleshot,’saidthecolonellaconically.‘Icouldpickthebastard
offfromhereaseasyaswinking,andwhat’smoreI’mthinkingofdoingit…Withthatlunaticoutof
thewaywemightbeabletogetsomesenseintothings.’Mason-MacFarlanedidnothingofthesort,
ofcourse.InhistemperatemomentsheforgedclosefriendshipswithGermanofficers,and
transmittedtoLondonastreamofwarningsaboutNaziintentions.Butthevignetteprovidesan
illustrationoftheroleplayedbyfantasyinthelivesofintelligenceofficers,totteringonatightrope
betweenhighpurposeandlowcomedy.
TheUSgovernmentwassaidbyscornfulcriticstopossessnointelligencearm.Inanarrowsense,
thiswasso–itdidnotdeploysecretagentsabroad.Athome,J.EdgarHoover ’sFederalBureauof
InvestigationwasresponsibleforAmerica’sinternalsecurity.ForalltheFBI’strumpetedsuccesses
againstgangstersandintensivesurveillanceoftheUSCommunistPartyandtradesunions,itknew
littleofthearmyofSovietspiesroamingAmerica,anddidnothingtodissuadehi-techcorporations
fromboomingtheirachievements.GermanmilitaryattachéGen.FriedrichvonBötticherobserved
boisterouslyabouthisyearsofserviceinWashington:‘Itwassoeasy,theAmericansaresobroadminded,theyprinteverything.Youdon’tneedanyintelligenceservice.Youhaveonlytobe
industrious,toseethenewspapers!’In1936BötticherwasabletoforwardtoBerlindetailedreports
onUSrocketexperiments.AnAmericantraitorsoldtheGermansblueprintsofoneofhiscountry’s
mostcherishedtechnologicalachievements,theNordenbombsight.ThegeneralurgedtheAbwehr
nottobothertodeploysecretagentsintheUS,topreservehishosts’faithinNazigoodwill.
Intelligenceagenciesovervalueinformationgainedfromspies.Oneofthemanyacademics
conscriptedintoBritain’swartimesecretserviceobserveddisdainfully:‘[MI6]valuesinformationin
proportiontoitssecrecy,notitsaccuracy.Theywouldattachmorevalue…toascrapofthird-rate
andtendentiousmisinformationsmuggledoutofSofiainthefly-buttonsofavagabondRumanian
pimpthantoanyintelligencededucedfromaprudentreadingoftheforeignpress.’Americanforeign
correspondentsanddiplomatsabroadprovidedWashingtonwithavisionoftheworldnoless
plausiblethanthatgeneratedbyEurope’sspies.MajorTrumanSmith,thelong-servingUSmilitary
attachéinBerlinandawarmadmirerofHitler,formedamoreaccuratepictureoftheWehrmacht’s
orderofbattlethandidMI6.
America’snavalattachésfocusedonJapan,theirmostlikelyfoe,thoughtheywereoftenreducedto
photographingitswarshipsfrompassingpassengerlinersandswappinggossipintheTokyo
attachés’club.Assecretaryofstatein1929,HenryStimsonhadcloseddownhisdepartment’s‘Black
Chamber ’codebreakingoperation,reasoninglikemanyofhisfellow-countrymenthatanationwhich
facednoexternalthreatcouldforgosuchsordidinstruments.Nonethelessboththearmyandnavy,in
isolationandfiercecompetition,sustainedsmallcodebreakingteamswhichexertedthemselves
mightily.TheachievementofWilliamFriedman,borninRussiain1891andeducatedasan
agriculturalist,whosearmySignalsIntelligenceServiceteamledbyformermathematicsteacher
FrankRowlettreplicatedtheadvancedJapanese‘Purple’diplomaticciphermachineandbrokeitskey
inSeptember1940,wasallthemoreremarkablebecauseAmerica’scryptanalystshadshoestring
resources.TheymadelittleattempttocrackGermanciphers,becausetheylackedmeanstodoso.
TheJapanesespiedenergeticallyinChina,theUSandtheEuropeanSouth-EastAsianempires,
whichtheyviewedasprospectivebooty.Theiragentswerenothingifnotcommitted:in1935when
policeinSingaporearrestedalocalJapaneseexpatriateonsuspicionofespionage,suchwasthe
man’sanxietytoavoidcausingembarrassmenttoTokyothathefollowedtheE.PhillipsOppenheim
traditionandswallowedprussicacidinhiscell.TheChineseNationalistsheadedbyChiangKai-shek
sustainedaneffectivecounter-intelligenceservicetoprotecthisdictatorshipfromdomesticcritics,
butacrossAsiaJapanesespieswereabletogatherinformationalmostunhindered.TheBritishwere
moreinterestedincounteringinternalcommunistagitationthanincombatingprospectiveforeign
invaders.Theyfounditimpossibletotakeseriously‘theWopsoftheEast’,asChurchillcalledthe
Japanese,or‘thelittleyellowdwarfslaves’,inthewordsoftheheadoftheForeignOffice.
Britain’sdiplomatswereelaboratelycarelessaboutprotectingtheirsecrets,adheringtothe
conventionsofVictoriangentlemen.RobertCecil,whowasoneofthem,wrote:‘Anembassywasan
ambassador ’shouseparty;itwasunthinkablethatoneoftheguestscouldbespyingontheothers.’As
earlyas1933theForeignOfficereceivedawake-upcall,albeitunheeded:afteroneofitsstaffputhis
headinagasoven,hewasrevealedtohavebeensellingBritishcipherstoMoscow.Nextaclerk,
CaptainJohnKing,wasfoundtohavebeenfundinganAmericanmistressbypeddlingsecrets.In
1937alocalemployeeinBritain’sRomeembassy,FrancescoConstantini,wasabletoriflehis
employer ’spapersforthebenefitoftheItaliansecretservice,becausetheambassadorassumedthat
onecouldtrustone’sservants.Atthatperiodalso,Mussolini’smenreadsomeBritishcodes:notall
Italianswerethebuffoonstheirenemiessupposed.In1939,whenJapaneseintelligencewantedthe
codebooksoftheBritishconsulateinTaipei,itsofficerseasilyarrangedforaJapaneseemployeeto
becomenight-dutyman.DuringtheensuingsixmonthsTokyo’sagentsrepeatedlyaccessedthe
consulatesafe,itsfilesandcodebooks.
Yetnowhereintheworldwasintelligencewiselymanagedandassessed.Thoughtechnological
secretswerealwaysusefultorivalnations,itisunlikelythatmuchofthefeveredsecretpoliticaland
militarysurveillancetoldgovernmentsmorethantheymighthavegleanedfromacarefulreadingof
thepress.Endemicrivalriesinjuredorcrippledcollaborationbetweenintelligenceagencies.In
GermanyandRussia,HitlerandStalindiffusedpoweramongtheirsecretpolicemen,thebetterto
concentratemasteryintheirownhands.Germany’smainagencywastheAbwehr,itstitleliterally
meaning‘security’,thoughitwasresponsibleforbothintelligence-gatheringabroadandcounterespionageathome.Abranchofthearmedforces,itwasdirectedbyAdmiralWilhelmCanaris.When
GuyLiddell,counter-espionagedirectorofMI5andoneofitsablestofficers,laterstrovetoexplain
theAbwehr ’sincompetence,heexpressedasincerebeliefthatCanariswasinthepayoftheRussians.
TheNazisalsohadtheirownsecuritymachine,theReichssicherheitshauptamtorRSHA,directed
byErnstKaltenbrunnerwithintheempireofHimmler.ThisembracedtheGestaposecretpoliceand
itssistercounter-intelligencebranchtheSicherheitdienstorSD,whichoverlappedtheAbwehr ’s
activitiesinmanyareas.AkeyfigurewasWalterSchellenberg,ReinhardHeydrich’saide:
SchellenberglatertookovertheRSHA’sforeignintelligence-gatheringservice,whichsubsumedthe
Abwehrin1944.HighCommandanddiplomaticcodebreakingactivitieswereconductedbythe
Chiffrierabteilung,colloquiallyknownasOKW/Chi,andthearmyhadalargeradiointelligence
branchthateventuallybecameOKH/GdNA.Göring’sAirMinistryhaditsowncryptographic
operation,asdidtheKriegsmarine.EconomicintelligencewascollectedbytheWiRuAmt,and
Ribbentrop’sForeignMinistrygatheredreportsfromembassiesabroad.GuyLiddellwrotecrossly:
‘UnderoursystemofgovernmenttherewasnothingtostoptheGermansfromgettingany
informationtheyrequired.’ButtheelaborateNaziintelligenceandcounter-espionagemachineswere
farmoreeffectiveinsuppressingdomesticoppositionthaninexploitingforeignsources,evenwhen
theyheardsomethingusefulfromthem.
France’sintelligencedepartmentsenjoyedalowlystatusandcorrespondinglymeagrebudgets.
PessimismoverlaiduponignorancecausedthemconsistentlytooverstateGermanmilitarystrength
byatleast20percent.FrantišekMoravecbelievedthatpoliticscrippledFrenchsecuritypolicyaswar
loomed:‘Theirdesireto“know”seemedtodecreaseproportionatelyastheNazidangerincreased.’
MoravectheCzechfoundhisFrenchcounterpartshalf-heartedcolleagues,thoughhereturnedfrom
oneinter-AlliedconferencewithapresentfromafamousFrenchcriminologist,ProfessorLocarde
ofLyons:achemicaldeveloperwhichprovedusefulforexposingsecretwriting.
Sincethebeginningoftime,governmentshadbeenabletointercepteachother ’scommunications
onlywhenspiesoraccidentsofwarphysicallydivertedmessagesintotheirhands.Now,however,
everythingwasdifferent.Wirelesscommunicationwasascienceslightlyolderthanthetwentieth
century,butthirtyyearselapsedbeforeitbecameauniversalphenomenon.Then,duringthe1930s,
technologicalbreakthroughspromptedaglobalexplosionoftransmissions.Theetherhummed,
whinedandcrackledasmessagesprivate,commercial,military,naval,diplomatictraversednations
andoceans.Itbecameindispensableforgovernmentsandtheirgeneralsandadmiralstocommunicate
operationalordersandinformationbyradio,toeverysubordinate,shipandformationbeyondreach
ofalandline.Makingsuchexchangessecuredemandednicejudgements.Therewasatrade-off
betweenthespeedatwhichasignalcouldbedispatchedandreceived,andthesubtletyofits
encryption.Itwasimpracticabletoprovidefront-linearmyunitswithcipheringmachines,andthus
insteadtheyemployedso-calledhand-orfield-ciphers,ofvaryingsophistication–theGermanarmy
usedaBritish-derivedsystemcalledDoublePlayfair.
Forthemostsecretmessages,theonlyalmostunbreakablecodewasthatbasedupona‘one-time
pad’,anamethatreflecteditsdesignation:thesenderemployedauniquecombinationofletters
and/ornumberswhichbecameintelligibleonlytoarecipientpre-suppliedwiththeidenticalformula.
TheSovietsespeciallyfavouredthismethod,thoughtheirclerkssometimescompromiseditbyusing
aone-timepadmorethanonce,astheGermansfoundtotheiradvantage.Fromthe1920sonwards,
someofthemajornationsstartedtoemploycipherswhichweredeemedimpregnableifcorrectly
used,becausemessageswereprocessedthroughelectrically-poweredkeyboardmachineswhich
scrambledthemintomulti-millionsofcombinations.Themagnitudeofthetechnologicalchallenge
posedbyanenemy’smachine-encryptedsignalsdidnotdeteranynationfromstrivingtoreadthem.
ThisbecamethemostimportantintelligenceobjectiveoftheSecondWorldWar.
ThebrighteststaroftheDeuxièmeBureau,France’sintelligenceservice,wasCapitaineGustave
Bertrand,headofthecryptanalyticalbranchinthearmy’sSectiondesExamens,whohadrisenfrom
therankstooccupyapostthatnoambitiouscareerofficerwanted.OneofhiscontactswasaParis
businessmannamedRodolpheLemoine,bornRudolfStallman,sonofarichBerlinjeweller.In1918
StallmanadoptedFrenchnationality;simplybecausehelovedespionageasagameinitsownright,
hebegantoworkfortheDeuxième.InOctober1931heforwardedtoParisanofferfromoneHansThiloSchmidt,brotherofaGermangeneral,tosellFranceinformationaboutEnigmainordertodig
himselfoutofafinancialhole.Bertrandaccepted,andinreturnforcashSchmidtdeliveredcopious
materialaboutthemachine,togetherwithitskeysettingsforOctoberandNovember1932.Thereafter
heremainedontheFrenchpayrolluntil1938.SincetheFrenchknewthatthePoleswerealsoseeking
tocrackEnigma,thetwonationsagreedacollaboration:Polishcryptanalystsfocusedonthe
technology,whiletheirFrenchcounterpartsaddressedencipheredtexts.Bertrandalsoapproachedthe
British,butattheoutsettheyshowednointerest.
Britain’scodebreakershadacquiredanearly-modelcommercialEnigmaasearlyas1927,and
examineditwithrespect.Sincethen,theyknewthatithadbeenrenderedmuchmoresophisticatedby
theinclusionofacomplexwiringpatternknownasaSteckerbrett,orplugboard.Itnowoffereda
rangeofpossiblepositionsforasingleletterof159millionmillionmillion.Thatwhichhuman
ingenuityhaddevised,itwasatleasttheoreticallypossiblethathumaningenuitymightpenetrate.In
1939,however,nooneforamomentimaginedthatsixyearslaterintelligencesnatchedfromthe
airwaveswouldhaveprovedmoreprecioustothevictors,moredisastrousforthelosers,thanevery
reportmadebyallthespiesofthewarringnations.
2 TH E BR I TI S H : GENTLEM ENA ND P LAYER S
ThereputationofMI6wasunmatchedbythatofanyothersecretservice.ThoughHitler,Stalin,
MussoliniandJapan’sgeneralssharedascepticism,orevenscorn,abouttheoldlion’sfitnessto
fight,theyvieweditsspieswithextravagantrespect,indeedcherishedabeliefintheiromniscience.
Britishprowessinclandestineactivitydatedbacktothesixteenthcenturyatleast.FrancisBaconwrote
inhisHistoryoftheReignofKingHenryVII:‘AsforhissecretSpials,whichhedidemploybothat
homeandabroad,bythemtodiscoverwhatPractisesandConspiracieswereagainsthim,surelyhis
Caserequiredit.’QueenElizabethI’sSirFrancisWalsinghamwasoneofhistory’slegendary
spymasters.MuchlatercametheromancesofRudyardKipling’sKim,ofJohnBuchan’sRichard
Hannay,ofdashing‘clublandheroes’whoplayedchessforEnglandwithathousandlivepieces
acrossaboardthatspannedcontinents.AwartimeBritishsecretservantobserved:‘Practicallyevery
officerImetinthatconcern,athomeandabroad,was,likeme,imagininghimselfasHannay.’The
greatDanishphysicistNielsBohrtoldthescientificintelligenceofficerR.V.Jonesthathewashappy
tocooperatewiththeBritishsecretservicebecause‘itwasrunbyagentleman’.
BritishintelligencehadenjoyedagoodGreatWar.TheRoyalNavy’scodebreakers,suchmenas
DillwynKnoxandAlastairDenniston,labouringintheAdmiralty’sRoom40,providedcommanders
withawealthofinformationaboutthemotionsoftheGermanHighSeasFleet.Thedecryptionand
publicrevelationofBerlin’s1917ZimmermannTelegram,urgingtheMexicanstotakeaggressive
actionagainsttheUnitedStates,playedacriticalroleinbringingtheAmericansintothewar.Fortwo
yearsaftertheNovember1918Armistice,thesecretservicewasdeeplyinvolvedintheAllies’
unsuccessfulattempttoreversetheoutcomeoftheRussianRevolution.Evenafterthiswas
abandoned,thethreatfrominternationalcommunismremainedtheforemostpreoccupationofBritish
espionageandcounter-espionage.
Yetamidtheinter-warslump,fundingwassqueezed.MI6mouldered,toanextentlittleunderstood
byeitherBritain’sfriendsorfoes.HughTrevor-Roper,thehistorianwhobecameoneofitswartime
officers,wrote:‘ForeignintelligenceservicesenviedtheBritishsecretservice;itwastheiridealised
model…Itenjoyedthereputationofaninvisible,implacableforce,likethePlatonicworld-spirit,
operatingeverywhere.TotheNazigovernment,itwasatthesametimeabogeyandanideal…The
reality…wasratherdifferent.’MI6’sseniorofficersweremenofmoderateabilities,drawnintothe
organisationbythelureofplayingoutapasticheofKipling’s‘GreatGame’,andoftenafterearlier
careersascolonialpolicemen.
Theymasqueradedaspassportcontrolofficersinembassiesabroad,orshuffledpaperinthe
service’saustere–indeed,franklysqualid–headquartersbesideStJames’sParkundergroundstation,
inBroadwayBuildings,aplaceofthreadbarecarpetsandunshadedlightbulbs.MI6sustainedaquirky
traditionofpayingitsstafftax-freeandincash,butsosmallapittancethataprivateincomewas
almostessentialforofficerswhoaspiredtoanupper-middle-classlifestyle,whichmeantallofthem.
Thoughitsbudgetwasprogressivelyincreasedfrom£180,000in1935to£500,000in1939,few
graduatesenteredtheservice,becauseitsbossesdidnotwantthem.MI6,intheviewofone
practitioner,wasdesignedmerelytoreceiveintelligenceratherthanactivelytoprocureit.Itwasrun
byacoterieofanti-intellectualofficerswhosawtheirprincipal,ifnotsole,taskasthatofcombating
revolutionarycommunism.TheshiftofemphasistomonitoringNazisandfascistsduringthelate
pre-warperiodcausedgreatdifficulties.
Somerecruitsofthatperiodprovedill-suitedtotheessentialnastinessofespionage.Lt.Cmdr
JosephNewill,aretiredsailorpostedtoScandinaviain1938onthestrengthofspeakingNorwegian,
wailedtoLondon:‘IdoubtwhetherIhavethenaturalguilesoessentialforthiswork!’Newill
complainedthathisroleinvolvedmuchmorehardlabourthanhehadexpected.Hetoldhisstation
chiefpetulantly:‘Iam52andIamnotgoingtoworkmyselftodeathatmytimeoflife.’Buthewas
keptinthejob,andcontrivedtomeetBroadway’sundemandingstandards.MI6’sShanghaistation
chief,HarrySteptoe,operatedundercoverasvice-consul.Ajauntylittlecock-sparrowfigurewho
affectedamoustacheandmonocle,hepuzzledaforeigndiplomatbyhisappearanceatreceptionsina
lovat-greensuitadornedwithgoldbraid.Wasthis,demandedthediplomat,thefull-dressuniformof
theBritishsecretservice?WhentheJapaneseinternedSteptoein1942,theydismissedthepossibility
thatsuchacomicfigurecouldbeaspymaster,andinsteadsubjectedtobrutalinterrogationahapless
BritishCouncilrepresentative,whosefieldofknowledgewasexclusivelycultural.
BroadwaystruggledtosecureintelligencefromtheContinent.In1936anewMI6departmentwas
formedtomonitorGermanyandItaly.ZSectionwasrunbyClaudeDansey,aformerimperial
soldierwhoboreahaversackgroaningwithblimpishprejudices,amongthemaloathingfor
Americans.Itbecameanalmostindependentfiefdom,whichoperatedundercommercialcoverfrom
officesinBushHouseinTheStrand.ItssourcesweremostlyelderlyretreadssuchastheLithuanian
BaronWilliamdeRopp,whoformorethanadecadeextractedfromtheBritish£1,000ayear–a
handsomecompetence–inreturnforfragmentsofGermanpoliticalgossip.TheNaziswerewell
awareofdeRopp’srole,andfedhimwhattheywantedLondontohear.InAugust1938theBaron
decidedthathissecretlifehadbecometoofraught,andwiselyretiredtoSwitzerland.
NavalengineerDrKarlKruger ’sstoryhadadarkerending.From1914to1939hefedsomegood
informationtotheBritishonacash-and-carrybasis,butvanishedfromsightamonthbeforethe
outbreakofwar.HisfileatBroadwaywaseventuallymarked‘Agentpresumed“dead”.’Thiswasnot
surprising,becauseKruger–likemostofMI6’sGermaninformants–wascontrolledbyitsHague
station,whereoneofthelocalstaff,FolkertvanKoutrik,wasontheAbwehr ’spayroll.Theservice’s
bestpre-warhumintsourcewasWolfgangGansEdlerzuPutlitz,pressattachéattheGermanembassy
inLondon,anaristocratandhomosexual.HewasrunbyKlopUstinov–fatheroftheactorPeter–a
Russian-bornjournalistwholosthisnewspaperjobin1935becauseofhisJewishness.WhenPutlitz
wastransferredtoTheHaguein1938,UstinovfollowedhimatMI6’sbehest.AfterFolkertvan
KoutriklaterbetrayedtheBritishoperationinHolland,PutlitzhastilysoughtasyluminLondon.
TheflowofintelligencefromtheContinentwasthin.TheAirMinistrycomplainedaboutthe
paucityofmaterialontheuseofaircraftintheSpanishCivilWar,animportantissueforplanners.
Britain’sambassadorinBerlin,SirNevileHenderson,sharedwithhisfellow-diplomatsadisdainfor
espionagewhichcausedhimtorefusediplomaticstatustoBroadway’s‘PassportControlOfficers’.
EvenwhereMI6triedtoprovideGermaninformantswithwirelesssets,mostwerereluctanttotake
them,becausediscoveryofsuchequipmentbytheGestapoensuredadeathsentenceforthepossessor.
Veryoccasionally,amongthemountainofrubbishthataccumulatedinBroadway’sfilestherewas
apearl.Inthespringof1939anagentcodenamed‘theBaron’,withgoodsocialconnectionsinEast
Prussia,reportedtohishandlerHarryCarrinHelsinkithattheGermansweresecretlynegotiating
withStalin.HefollowedthisupwithafurthermissiveinJune,assertingthattalksbetweenBerlinand
Moscowweremakinggoodprogress.YetthissensationalpointertotheloomingNazi–SovietPact,
whichafterwardsprovedtohavecomefromgossipamongaristocratsworkingintheGerman
ForeignMinistry,wasdismissedinBroadway.ToMI6’sseniorofficers,adevils’pactbetweenStalin
andHitlerseemedafantasticnotion.Anauthenticscoopwasmissed;first,becauseMI6,likemost
intelligenceorganisations,hadaninstinctiveandusuallyprudentscepticismaboutitsownsources;
second,becausewhat‘theBaron’reportedrancontrarytohisemployers’expectations.Atthattime,
andindeedthroughoutthewar,MI6hadnointernalmachineryforanalysingincomingintelligence,
thoughitschiefscouldpointoutthattheAxisPowerslackedthisalso.
CzechoslovakiaandPolandoccupiedthefrontlineintheEuropeanconfrontationwithHitler.MI6
showedlittleinterestincollaborationwiththeirintelligenceservicesuntilMarch1939,whenthe
strategicpicturechangeddramatically:theBritishandFrenchgovernmentsgaveasecurityguarantee
toPoland.ThisgalvanisedBroadway.
On25July,aBritishdelegationcomposedofanavalintelligenceofficertogetherwithAlastair
Denniston,directoroftheGovernmentCode&CypherSchool,andDillwynKnox,oneofits
foremostcodebreakers,joinedFrance’sGustaveBertrand–himselfnocryptographer,butanotable
facilitatoranddiplomat–atanexploratorymeetingwiththeirPolishcounterpartsledbyCol.Gwido
Langer,heldattheircryptographiccentreintheKabackiewoodsnearPyry,southofWarsaw.The
firstday’stalks,conductedinmixedFrenchandGerman,wentverybadly.Knox,forreasons
unknown,wasinaviletemper,andhighlyscepticalthatthePoleshadanythingtotellworthhearing.
Heseemedunabletounderstandthemethodsbywhichtheyclaimedtohaveachievedthe
breakthroughwhichhadenabledthemtoreadsomeGermannavaltraffic.Allthepartiespresentwere
fencing,todiscovereachother ’sstateofknowledge.Warsaw’sdecisiontoinvolvetheBritishwas
promptedbynewdifficultiesthathadfrustratedtheirowncodebreakerssincetheGermanson1
Januaryadoptedanenhancedsteckerboard,fortheirEnigmas,withtenplugsinsteadofseven.Onthe
secondday,26July,theconference’satmospherewastransformedforthebetter.Inthebasementof
thebuildingthePolesshowedofftheir‘bomby’,primitivecomputingdevicesdesignedtotest
multiplemathematicalpossibilities.Thentheyproducedacoupdethéâtre:theypresentedboth
visitingdelegationswithmimickedcopiesoftheEnigmabuiltbytheirownmen.Knox’sscepticism
crumbled,andthemeetingendedinamoodofgoodwillandmutualrespect.EverybodyatBroadway
recognisedtheimportanceofthePoles’gesturetotheiralliesasacontributiontothesecretstruggle
againsttheNazis.MarianRejewski,aformermathematicsstudentatWarsawUniversitywhohad
joinedtheKabackiewoodsteambackin1932,istodayacknowledgedasapioneeramongthosewho
laidbarethesecretsofEnigma,evenifitfelltoothers,inBritain,toadvanceandexploitRejewski’s
achievement.
StewartMenzies,thendeputychiefofMI6,wassoimpressedbytheoutcomeofthePolishtripthat
heturnedupinpersonatVictoriastationtogreetGustaveBertrand–andtoinspectthemimicked
Enigma.KnoxsentthePolesagiftofscarves,decoratedwithimagesofDerbyrunners,withtheletter
thankinghishostsfortheir‘co-operationandpatience’.Atoraroundthistimealso,thePoles
providedtheBritishwithfiveoftheEnigma’seightalternativerotors.Achasmstillyawned,however,
betweenunderstandinghowthemachineworked,andachievingtheabilitytoreaditstraffic.Though
atrickleofGermanmessageswerebrokenbyhumaningenuityduringthewinterof1939–40,traffic
wasbreachedonanindustrialscaleonlyfrom1941onwards,followingthecreationofrevolutionary
electro-mechanicaltechnology.Nonetheless,theassistanceoftheFrenchandPolesdramatically
acceleratedprogressattheGC&CS,nowevacuatedfromLondontoasafercountryhome.Physical
possessionoftheenemy’sencryptioninstrumentenableditscryptanalyststograspthemountainous
challengetheymustovercome.
Until1939,andinlargemeasurefortwoyearsthereafter,Britishintelligenceremaineddependent
foritsviewoftheworlduponhumint–reportsfrominformantsabroad.HowwelldidMI6fulfilits
responsibilitytobriefthegovernmentaboutthemountingthreatfromNaziGermany–‘Twelveland’
inBroadwayparlance?ItproducedmanyreportsarguingthatHitler ’slong-termambitionslayinthe
East,andthiswasfundamentallycorrect.Unfortunatelyforitscredibility,however,in1940Germany
chosefirsttoseektodisposeoftheWesterndemocracies.MI6wasinnodoubtthatHitlerwas
rearmingfast,butinsistentlyemphasisedtheweaknessoftheindustrialbasefromwhichheaspiredto
makewar.ResponsibilityforgatheringeconomicdatarestedwiththeIndustrialIntelligenceCentre,
anoffshootadministeredsince1934bytheForeignOffice,butrunbytheveteransecretservice
officerMajorDesmondMorton.Duringthe‘wildernessyears’,MortonpassedtoWinstonChurchill
–withthesanctionofprimeministerStanleyBaldwin–detailsofGermanrearmamentwhich
empoweredtheunheededprophettocryforthwarningstotheworld.Ironically,theMajorwildly
overstatedthegrowthofHitler ’smilitarymachine:Mortonneverhadmuchgraspofeconomicsin
general,noroftheNazieconomyinparticular.
Butmodernhistorianscriticalofpre-warBritishintelligencefailuresmisssomeimportantpoints.
Inthosedaysfewpeopleofanynationalityunderstoodeconomicanalysis.TheIICwascorrectin
judgingthatGermanywasill-preparedtoconductalongstruggle,andwasrenderedvulnerablebyits
dependenceonimportedcommoditiesandespeciallyoil.TheGermaneconomy,asAdamToozehas
shown,wasnotstrongenoughtomeetthehugechallengeHitlersoughttofulfil,ofconqueringthe
mostadvancedsocietiesonearth.Germany’sGDPwasnolargerthanBritain’s,andherpeople’sper
capitaincomeswerelower.In1939,Hitler ’sexpendituresonarmamentshadreducedhiscountry’s
financestoaparlouscondition.Butitwasaskingtoomuchofanyintelligenceservicetogaugethe
potentialofGermanindustryunderthestimulusofconflict:totheveryendofWorldWarII,thebest
brainsintheAlliednationsfailedfullytoachievethis.MI6couldnotbeexpectedtopredictHitler ’s
conquests,whichdramaticallyenhancedhisaccesstooil,rawmaterialsandslavelabour.
Onthemilitaryside,neitherMI6northeservicedepartmentslearnedmuchaboutthenew
technologyandtacticsbeingdevelopedbyBritain’senemies.Norabouttheirlimitations:theywildly
overratedtheLuftwaffe’sabilitytodevastateBritain’scities.In1938,Broadwayreportedthatthe
Germanshad927first-linebomberscapableofmounting720sortiesadayanddropping945tonsof
ordnance(thiswasanexaggerationof50percent),andprojectionsoflikelycasualtieswereeven
moreinflated.WarOfficeappreciationsoftheGermanarmywereequallymistaken,especiallyin
estimatingitspotentialmobilisedstrength.Thesesuggestedin1939thatHitlerwasalreadymasterof
thelargestwarmachinehisnation’sresourcescouldbear.Rearmament,coupledwithvastpublic
expenditure,‘hadtaxedtheenduranceoftheGermanpeopleandthestabilityoftheeconomicsystem
toapointwhereanyfurthereffortcanonlybeachievedattheriskofabreakdownoftheentire
structure’.
AFebruary1939StrategicalAppreciationbythechiefsofstaff,draftedbytheJointPlanning
Committee,assertedthatBritaincouldsurvivealongwarbetterthanGermany.Thiswastrue,butthe
chiefssaidnothingaboutthedangerthatitcouldmeanwhileloseashortone.Moreover,theynever
pressedthecabinettoacknowledgetheshockingweaknessofBritain’sFarEastempire.Thethree
services’intelligencebrancheshadnocontactwitheachother,andtherewerenojointstaffs.
Asforpolitics,anMI6officerwroteinaNovember1938reportfortheForeignOffice:‘Noteven
Hitler ’sintimates,accordingtooneofthem,knowsifhewouldreallyriskworldwar.’Afewmonths
later,theservice’scredibilitywasseverelyinjuredbyitsissueofwarningsthatGermanyintended
imminentlytostrikeatWesternEurope,startingwithHolland.Embarrassmentwasincreasedbythe
factthattheForeignOfficeforwardedthisalarmcalltotheUSgovernment.OneoftheBritish
recipients,seniorcivilservantSirGeorgeMounsey,deliveredablastagainstMI6whichechoed
aroundWhitehall.TheForeignOffice’sstandingwasdamaged,hesaid,byactingonthebasisof‘a
highlysensationalandhighlydisturbingkindofinformationwhich[MI6]areunabletoguarantee’.
Mounseywasdismissiveofallcovertsources,agentswhoserumour-mongeringhadprompted
Broadway’swarning:‘Theyhaveasecretmissionandtheymustjustifyit…Ifnothingcomestohand
forthemtoreport,theymustearntheirpaybyfindingsomething…Arewegoingtoremainso
attachedtorelianceonsecretreports,whichtieourhandsinalldirections?’Mounseyhadhisown
agenda:tosustainthepolicyofappeasementadoptedbyNevilleChamberlainandLordHalifax,
whomheadmiredprodigiously.Hisviewsnonethelessreflectedageneralscepticisminhighplaces
aboutBroadway’sperformance.
GladwynJebboftheForeignOffice,oftenacriticofMI6,onthisoccasionleapttoitsdefence.
Whileacknowledgingthefrustrationsofdealingwithsecretorganisations,hesaidthathecouldnot
forgetthatitsofficers‘didwarnusoftheSeptember[1938Munich]crisis,andtheydidnotgiveany
colourtotheridiculousoptimismthatprevaileduptotherapeofCzechoslovakia,ofwhichour
official[diplomatic]reportsdidnotgiveusmuchwarning’.InDecember1938Broadwayoffereda
soundcharactersketchofGermany’sFührer,atatimewhenmanyBritishdiplomatsandpoliticians
stilldeludedthemselvesthathewasamantheycoulddobusinesswith.‘Amonghischaracteristics,’
assertedtheMI6report,‘arefanaticism,mysticism,ruthlessness,cunning,vanity,moodsofexaltation
anddepression,fitsofbitterandself-righteousresentment,andwhatcanonlybetermedastreakof
madness;butwithitallthereisgreattenacityofpurpose,whichhasoftenbeencombinedwith
extraordinaryclarityofvision.Hehasgainedthereputationofbeingalwaysabletochoosetheright
momentandrightmethodfor“gettingawaywithit”.Intheeyesofhisdisciples,andincreasinglyin
hisown,“theFührerisalwaysright”.Hehasunboundedself-confidence,whichhasgrownin
proportiontothestrengthofthemachinehehascreated;butitisaself-confidencewhichhaslatterly
beentemperedlessthanhithertowithpatienceandrestraint.’
ItiseasytocataloguetheshortcomingsofMI6.LikemostofitssisterservicesontheContinent,in
1939itcommandedlittlerespectinhighplaces,andhadsmallinfluenceonpolicy-making.Itseems
necessarytogobeyondthis,however,andposethequestion:whatmightitsspieshaveusefully
discovered,grantedmoreresourcesandclevererpeople?Thelikelyansweris:notmuch.MI6’s
reportingwasmatchedbyadailybombardmentofnewspaperheadlines,bothshowingbeyond
peradventurethatGermanywasrearming.MoreaccurateanddetailedinformationaboutHitler ’s
armedforceswouldhavebeenusefultotheWarOfficeandDowningStreet,butthecriticalissue,the
vitaluncertainty,wasnotthatofGermany’scapabilities,butratherthatofitsintentions.
Itseemsquitemisplacedtoblamewrongorinadequateintelligenceforthecalamitousfailureof
BritainandFrancetodealeffectivelywiththeNazis.Bothnationscorrectlyassessedtheoptionsat
Hitler ’sdisposalforonslaughtsEastorWest.MI6canscarcelybeheldresponsibleforfailingto
anticipateexactlywhereorwhenhewouldattack,becausehehimselfwasanopportunistwho
reservedhisdecisionsuntilthelastmoment.SirAlexanderCadogan,permanentunder-secretaryat
theForeignOffice,wrotemuchlater:‘Weweredailyinundatedbyallsortsofreports.Itjust
happenedthatthesewerecorrect;wehadnomeansofevaluatingtheirreliabilityatthetimeoftheir
receipt.(Norwastheremuchthatwecoulddoaboutit!)’Ratherthanafailureofintelligence,what
matteredwasthedemocracies’failureofwill–therefusaltoacknowledgethattheNazisconstituted
anirreconcilableforceforevil,whichtheverysurvivalofEuropeancivilisationmadeitessentialto
destroy,ratherthantobargainwith.
MostofHitler ’sopponentsinsideGermany,andindeedacrossEurope,werecommunistswho
consideredtheRussianstheonlypeoplebothwillingandabletochallengefascism.Everythingsaid
anddonebytheBritishandFrenchgovernmentsbeforetheoutbreakofwarconfirmedanti-Nazisin
thatview.Thus,peoplewhowishedtocontributetoundoingHitlerofferedinformationtotheagents
ofMoscowmuchmorereadilythantothoseofLondonorParis.Itwasanti-Nazis’pooropinionof
NevilleChamberlainthatmadethemreluctanttolooktohiscountryasashieldagainstHitler,not
theirperceptionofMI6.
ItisfarmoreplausibletoarguethatBritain’sdiplomatsshouldhaveexposedthedictators’
intentionsthantosuggestthatitsspiesmighthavedoneso.Inpeacetime,goodintelligenceofficers
canassisttheirgovernmentstograsptheeconomic,militaryandtechnologicalcapabilitiesof
prospectiveenemies,butitisunusualforasecretservicetoprovideareliablecribabouttheir
intentions.Topdiplomatsoughttohavebeenclevererthanintelligenceofficers.Theirtraining,
experienceandaccesstosourcesshouldhaveempoweredthemtoassesstheworldwithgreater
wisdomthanBroadway’soldsoldiers.ItseemsfarmorediscreditablethatHenderson,Britain’s
ambassadorinBerlin,waswillingforsolongtothinkwellofHitler,thanthatMI6withitsmeagre
resourceswasunabletotellthegovernmentwhattheFührerwoulddonext.IfaGermananti-Nazihad
turneduponHenderson’sembassydoorstep,offeringinsideinformation,itislikelythathewould
havebeensentpacking.
AdmiralSirHughSinclair–‘C’,astheheadofthesecretservicewasalwaysknown–died
suddenlyinNovember1939,havingoccupiedhispostforsixteenyears.WinstonChurchill,asFirst
LordoftheAdmiralty,pressedtheclaimsofRear-AdmiralJohnGodfrey,directorofnaval
intelligence,tosucceedhim.Instead,however,Sinclair ’sdeputy,forty-nine-year-oldGuardsofficer
BrigadierStewartMenzies,convincedtheForeignOfficeandtheprimeministerthathehadbeen
anointedbythedyingSinclairashisrightfulsuccessor.Hethusinheritedamantlethathewaswidely
consideredill-fittedtowear.TheninthDukeofBuccleuch,whohadbeenMenzies’fagatEton,tolda
friendthat‘C’s’contemporariesweremystified‘howsounbelievablystupidamancouldhaveended
upinsuchaposition’.HughTrevor-RopersneeredatMenziesas‘athoughtlessfeudallord,living
comfortablyonincomeproducedfromthelabourofpeasantswhomhehadneverseen,working
estateswhichhehadnevervisited’.
Thiswashyperbolic,asweremostofthehistorian’sprivatejudgementsonhiscolleagues,butit
wastruethatMenzieshadlearnedhiscraftinabadschool–notsomuchEtonasserviceonthestaff
ofBrigadierJohnCharteris,Field-MarshalSirDouglasHaig’segregiousintelligencechiefonthe
WesternFront.Menzies’DSOandMCshowedthathedidnotlackcourage.Hissocialskillssufficed
towintheconfidenceofMaj.Gen.Hastings‘Pug’Ismay,soontobecomeChurchill’schiefofstaff,
andinsomedegreethatoftheprimeministerhimself.But‘C’knewlittleofthewiderworldhe
aspiredtospyupon,andtoleratedinBroadwayabevyofevenlessinspiredsubordinates.
Decisionswerepowerfullyinfluencedbyhistwojointdeputies,ValentineVivianandClaude
Dansey,whohatedeachother.VivianwasaformerIndianpolicemanwhowascreditedwithamajor
roleinfrustratingthemachinationsoftheComintern–theCommunistInternational–inSouth
AmericaandtheFarEast;hewasalsoanofficeintriguerofenergyandskill.MeanwhileDanseywent
brieflytoBerninSeptember1939,totrytoorganiseintelligencelinksfromneutralSwitzerlandto
Germany.Aplentifulsupplyoffraudulentinformantsemerged,ofwhombynomeansthemost
imaginativewasaGermanrefugeeinSwitzerlandwhousedhisnation’sArmyListtofabricatea
mobilisationprogrammewhichheattemptedtosell.OneofthefewusefulsourcesDanseyidentified
wasanAustrianPole,CountHorodyski.He,inturn,introducedtheBritishtoHalinaSzymańska,wife
oftheformerPolishmilitaryattachéinBerlin,nowanexileinSwitzerland.ShebecameoneofMI6’s
mostusefulconduits,withconnectionsintheAbwehr.DanseythereafterreturnedtoLondon,where
heexercisedapowerfulinfluenceonthewartimefortunesofMI6,mostlytoitsdetriment.
Duringtheyearsthatfollowed,Britain’ssecretservicerecruitednumbersofoutstandingofficers
andagents,whodidsomeusefulandafewimportantthingsfortheAlliedcause,butitschieftains
inspiredonlylimitedrespect.Thestimulusofwarwouldgenerateanintelligencerevolution,andgive
birthtooneofBritain’smostdazzlingachievements.However,thisdidnottakeplaceinBroadway
Buildings,butinsteadoutsideadrearysuburbantowninBedfordshire.
3 TH E R US S I A NS : TEM P LES O F ES P I O NA GE
Justbeforenoonon23May1938,PavelSudoplatovoftheNKVDstrolledintotheAtlantarestaurant
inRotterdamandgreetedaUkrainiannationalistleaderwhomhehadcometoknowwell,intheguise
ofbeingasympathiserwiththeman’scause.Sudoplatov,newlyarrivedonamerchantshipfrom
Murmansk,presentedthemanwithahandsomeboxofchocolatesadornedwiththeUkrainiancrest.
Thetwochattedforafewmomentstoarrangeafurtherrendezvous,thenMoscow’sagentbadehis
companionfarewellandmovedon.Hewasasafedistancedownthestreetbythetimehehearda
sharpexplosion.Atimingdevicehaddetonatedabombinsidethebox,killingthenationalist.This
wasatypicalMoscowCentre*operationoftheperiod,onethrustintherelentlesscampaignto
liquidatestateenemies,realorsupposedtraitors.Sudoplatov’ssuccessearnedhimafour-hour
meetingwithStalin’sforemostsecretpoliceman,LavrentiBeria,whomarkedhimforbiggerthings,
suchasmanagingtheassassinationofLeonTrotsky.
TheSovietUnionownedthemostactiveandbest-resourcedintelligenceorganisationsintheworld
–theRedArmy’sGRUandtheNKVD,thelattercontrolledbyBeriafromDecember1938.The
foremostpurposesofJosephStalin,masteroftheKremlin,werethepromotionofsocialismabroad
throughtheCominternandthemaintenanceofhisownpoweragainstdomesticandforeignenemies.
Bothrequiredspiesinprofusion.Throughoutthe1930s,Russiapursuedastrategymorefar-reaching
initsmeans–theplantationofdeep-penetrationagents–anditsends–theworldwidetriumphof
communism–thanthoseofanyothernation.Howfarthefundsandenergylavishedonitssecretwar
profitedtheSovietUnionwillbeconsideredbelow.Here,itsufficestosaythattheespionage
networksitestablishedintheUS,Britain,JapanandEuropewereonascalefarbeyondthoseofany
othernation,andmanifestedinbigthingsandsmall.WhenJapanesepolicearrestedaSovietagent
carryingaLeicacamera,Tokyo’sintelligenceofficerswerepatheticallyenvious:theycouldnot
affordtoequiptheirownspieswithtechnologyremotelysosophisticated.Thiswasatimewhentens
ofmillionsofRussianswerestarving,yetStalin’sagentsspentwhateverseemednecessaryto
purchaseinformationandthedeathsofenemies.FromSwitzerlandtoMexicotheyleftroadsides
studdedwithcorpses,andcreatedsomeofthemostremarkableagentnetworksinthehistoryof
intelligence.
TheRussianaddictiontoespionageandconspiracywasasoldastime.In1912,whenaccordingto
officialfiguresGermanyspent£80,387onitssecretservice,France£40,000andBritain£50,000,the
Russiansavowedabudgetof£380,000,plusafurther£335,000forthetsar ’ssecretpolice.Tsarist
codebreakersachievedsomenotablecoups,andtheirsuccessorssustainedthetradition.Inthe1930s
theNKVD’sFourthDepartment,theworld’smostlavishly-fundedsignalsintelligenceunit,wasbased
intheForeignAffairsbuildingonMoscow’sKuznetskybridge.Itschief,GlebIvanovitchBokii,
achievedareputationasakillerandsexualpredatormatchingthatofBeria.ThoughBokii’steam
neverbrokewartimeGermanEnigmamessages,itenjoyedusefulearlierandlessersuccesses,such
assecuringthesecretprotocoltothe1936Anti-CominternPactbetweenGermanyandJapan,before
itschieffacedafiringsquadthefollowingyear.Stalinpersonallyreadmanydecrypts;likeChurchill
later,hetrustedthecodebreakers’productasheneverdidhumint.TheKremlindisplayedasbrutala
carelessnessaboutcasualtiesamongitsspiesasitdidtowardsthefateofitssoldiers.In1936
FrantišekMoravecofCzechintelligencereceivedaSovietproposalthathisserviceshouldprovide
crashespionagetrainingforahundredRussians,whowouldthenbedispatchedintoGermany.
Moravecexpostulatedthatsuchnoviceswouldfacewholesaleextinction.HisMoscowcontact
shrugged:‘Inthatcase,weshallsendanotherhundred.’
TheSovietUnionenjoyedacriticaladvantageinbuildingitsempireofespionage.Whilefascism
gainedmillionsofsupportersinGermany,ItalyandSpain,itnevermatchedtheappealofworldwide
communismduringthedecadesbeforethelatter ’sbloodstainedrealitywaslaidbare.Ineverynation,
menandwomenofbrainsandeducation,loftyidealsandunboundednaïvetéqueuedtobetraytheir
ownsocieties’secretsforwhattheydeemedahighercause.FromMoscow,hundredsofmenand
womenweresentforthtodirectnetworksinJapanandtheUnitedStates,Germany,Franceandother
Europeannations.TheNKVDachievedexcellentpenetrationoftheFrenchForeignOffice,and
frequentlyquoteditsambassadors’dispatches.Manyofitsinformantsdeludedthemselvesthatthey
werepassingsecretsnottotheSoviets,butinsteadtotheComintern–whichwasintruthmerelya
postboxfortheKremlin.
PavelSudoplatovbecameoneoftheprincipalpuppeteersoftheKremlin’sdansesmacabres.He
wasaUkrainianmiller ’sson,bornin1907,whoservedasacipherclerkwiththeRedArmybefore
joiningtheBolsheviksecurityservice.Asateenager,Sudoplatovrananetworkofinformersinhis
hometownofMelitopol.Secretpoliceworkbecameafamilyaffairwhenhemarriedin1928,since
hisJewishwifeEmmawasamoreseniorofficerthanhimselfintheOGPU,forerunneroftheNKVD.
HewastrainedbyitsforeigndepartmentbeforebeingpostedtoGermanyasan‘illegal’,posingasa
Ukrainiannationalist.Heledarovinglifeintheyearsthatfollowed,travellingacrossEuropeand
spendingamonthinaHelsinkijail.Hesawhiswifejustonce,whensheturnedupinParisasa
courier.In1938hevisitedSpain,describingitscivilwaras‘akindergartenforourfuture
operations’.AtanearlystageofhisrelationshipwithBeria,Sudoplatovnotedacuriosity:thismost
terribleofSovietsecretpolicemendisplayedmeticulouscivilitytolittlepeople–juniorstaff–while
treatingbigones–hisrivalsintheKremlinhierarchy–withlaceratingrudeness.‘Beriahadthe
singularabilitytoinspirebothfearandenthusiasm,’hewrote.
Sudoplatovbecameoneofthespychief’smostdevotedservants,graduatingfromfieldworkto
seniordeskroles,assistedbythedemiseofrivals.Between1937and1939,thousandsofintelligence
officersofallranksdiedbeforefiringsquadsorweredispatchedtothegulag.Stalinlashedoutatthe
intelligenceservicesduringameetingoftheSovietMilitaryCouncilinlanguagethatdefiedparody:
‘Wehavedefeatedthebourgeoisieonallfronts.Itisonlyontheintelligencefrontthattheybeatus
likesmallboys.Thisisourchiefweakness…Ourmilitaryintelligenceservice…hasbeenpolluted
byspies.[Itschiefs]wereworkingforGermany,forJapan,Poland,foranyonebutus…Ourtaskis
torestoretheintelligenceservice.Itisoureyesandears.’Inhismadness,Stalininsisteduponnot
merelytheexecutionofscoresofseniorofficersoftheGRUandNKVD,butalsoontheseveranceof
MoscowCentre’srelationswiththeirinformantsinthefield,thousandsofwhomwerebrandedas
fasciststool-pigeons.Thechaosthatfollowedimpactedvariouslyupondifferentdepartmentsand
regions,butparalysedsomenetworksuntil1941andbeyond.AfterthedestructionofNazism,in
ViennaaveteranNKVDofficermetanoldGermansource,oneofmanywithwhomhehadbroken
contactinaccordancewithordersbackin1938.Now,thismandemandedoftheRussian:‘Whereon
earthwereyouallthroughthewar?IwasGeneralKesselring’spersonalorderly!’
AmongtheforemostoftheNKVD’soverseasagent-runnerswasTheodoreMaly,aHungarianwho
inhisyouthhadbelongedtoaCatholicmonasticorder.HewastakenprisonerasaHapsburgofficer
in1916,joinedtheBolsheviksandforsworeGod.In1936MalywaspostedtoLondon,wheremany
ofMoscow’sBritishinformantslatertestifiedtotheirrespectandaffectionforhim.Yetin1938he
wasamongthoserecalledtoMoscowandshotasasupposedtraitor,alongwiththeNKVD’sequally
talentedRomeresidentandseveralofitsBerlinmen.Anobviousquestionpersists:whydidany
officerwithabrainobeytheordertogohome,whentheycouldsurelyhavereadtherunes?Themost
plausibleansweristhateveninthosecrazedandbloodydays,adherentstotheworldsocialistideal,
suchasMalywas,cherishedalingeringfaithintheSovietsystem,thoughhealsoprofessedfatalism
ifhisdeathwasdecreed.
ManyRussiankneesquakedduringthePurges.Thirty-nineseniorGRUofficers,intelligence
veterans,areknowntohavebeenshot,andtheNKVDsufferedinproportion.PavelSudoplatov
survivedaninvestigationandthethreatofexpulsionfromtheParty;hebelievedafterwardsthathe
mighthavebeenpreservedbyStalin’spersonalintervention.Clamberingoveramoundofcorpses,
heacquiredhisownofficeintheLubyankabuildingat2LStreet–cosilyreferredtobyitsoccupants
as‘DomDva’,‘NumberTwo’,aplaceofdreadforeverypasser-by,andforanyprisonerwho
crosseditsthreshold.LikeallthosewhoprosperedinStalin’sdreadfuluniverse,Sudoplatovlearned
toregardthegrotesqueasnormal,theunspeakableasfamiliar.Duringfamilyconversationsintheir
apartment,forinstance,heandEmmaneverdeviatedfromarigidlydomesticscript,becausethey
tookitforgrantedthateverywordspokenwasrecordedbyBeria’seavesdroppers.Hewrotelong
afterwardsinanapparentlyhalf-truthfulmemoir:‘Iacceptedthebrutalityandsternorderthat
characterisedourcentralisedsociety;itappearedtheonlymethodofpreservingthecountrywhenit
wassurroundedbyGerman,PolishandJapaneseenemies.’
Meanwhile,elsewhereintheforestanagentoftheGRU,whowouldlaterbecomefamous,or
notorious,forhisassociationwiththeGermanRedOrchestra–theextraordinaryespionagenetwork
tobedescribedlater–wasputtingdownrootsinforeignparts.AnatoliSukolov-Gourevitch,bornat
KharkovinNovember1913,wasthesonofJewishparentswhowerebothpharmacists.Hestarted
workin1929asanapprenticedraughtsmaninafactory,andhatedthelife.Fromanearlystage,and
likemostSovietcitizens,heacquiredthehabitofobsessivesecrecy,writinginhismemoirs:‘I
learnedtohidemyfeelingsandtroublesfrommynearestanddearest,myfriends,andindeedfrom
everyone.’Desperatetoescapefromthecommonruck,whilestillveryyounghebecamea
communistfunctionary,andsomehowsecuredanappointmentasalectureronmilitarystudiesata
LeningradschoolforIntouristguides,thereafterservinginintelligence.
In1937hewasrecruitedtotraveltoSpainasoneoftheSovietmilitarygroupassistingthe
embattledRepublicangovernment.GourevitchthoroughlyenjoyedhissubsequentSpanishadventures
–aswhowouldnot,aftersamplingSovietfactorylife?Hewasabletodresswithanelegance
unimaginableathome,andthereafterfavouredaWarsawtailor.Hetookatripinasubmarine,
travelledinFranceandlearnedconversationalFrench,SpanishandGerman.Onreturningto
Moscow,hewasselectedfortrainingasaforeignagentoftheGRU.Askedmuchlaterifithad
troubledhimtojointheSovietUnion’smurderoussecretservices,likeSudoplatovheshruggedthat
hiscountrywasencircledbyenemies;hethenbelievedthatitsdefendersdidonlywhattheyhadto.
Hischief,thegaunt,jug-earedintelligenceveteranMajorSimonGendin,enquiredwhetherhehad
anymarriageplanswhichcouldcomplicatehisfuturecareeroverseas.Gourevitchrepliedthathewas
indeedinlove,withagirlnamedLialiawhomhehadmetwhentheywerebothworkinginSpain,and
whowasnowanIntouristinterpreter.Gendintoldhisstafftoaddhernametothebrieflistof
intimateswithwhomGourevitchmightcorrespond,thoughthatrelationshipperished,likesomuch
else,duringtheyearsthatfollowed.OngraduationfromtheGRU’sspyschool,Gourevitchhimself
expresseddoubtsabouthisfluencyasacoderandwireless-operator–helackedasensitiveearfor
Morse.Gendinreassuredhim:hewouldnotneedspecialisedradioskills,forhewasdestinedto
becomeanintelligence-gathererandagent-runner.
GourevitchwasbriefedtotraveltoBrusselstoworkwithanotherSovietagent,codenamed‘Otto’,
thentomoveontoSwedenafterestablishinghimselfandimprovinghislanguageskills.Hewould
exploithisknowledgeofSpanishbyadoptingacoveridentityas‘VincenteSierra’,aprosperous
businessmanwithaUruguayanpassport.Forthenextthreeyears,Moscowfurnishedhimwithfunds
tosustainanappropriatelyflashylifestyle.Yetalthoughhewasinstructedabouttheimportanceof
dressingsmartly,affectingthehatandglovesthatwerethenbadgesofbourgeoisrespectability,
Gourevitchlatercomplainedthathewasuntutoredinsocialskills.Whenhecheckedintoasmart
HelsinkihotelonthefirstlegofhisjourneytoBelgium,hewasbewilderedwhenaporterpickedup
hissuitcaseandcarrieditupstairs:neverinhisshortlifehadhereceivedsuchapersonalservice.He
gaspedonseeinganopenbuffetinthehoteldining-room,whichatfirstheassumedwassetfora
banquetratherthanforthedailyfareofguests.Later,inBrussels,ashefumbledhiswaytowardsan
entréeintorelativelysmartsocialcircles,hewasembarrassedtobetakenasideoneeveningbyan
acquaintancewhotoldhimthatonlywaitersworewhitebowtieswithsmokingjackets.‘Iwas
completelyignorantofthesesubtleties,’hewroteruefully.
‘Otto’,theSovietagentwhomGourevitchjoinedinBrussels,wasLeopoldTrepper,bornin1904
thesonofaGalicianshopkeeper,oneofthekeyfiguresinRussia’sEuropeanintelligenceoperations,
andlateraheroicSovietlegend.Asayoungman,TrepperranaParisnetworkwhichwasrolledup
bytheFrenchin1933.HefledfirsttoGermany,thentoRussiawherehefoundemploymentwith
Stalin’sspymasterswhilemoonlightingaseditorofaJewishjournal.Earlyin1939hewasdispatched
toBrussels,whichwasdeemedasecurebasefromwhichhecouldforwardinformationfromthe
GRU’snetworkinsideGermany.CentreboastedofrunningtwoimportantBerlinagents:IlseStöbe,
whoworkedinthepressdepartmentofRibbentrop’sForeignMinistry,andadiplomatnamedRudolf
Shelia.TreppercarriedaCanadianpassportinthenameofAdamMikler,stolenduringtheSpanish
CivilWar.Hewasmarriedwithtwosons,butonlyoneaccompaniedhimtoBrussels–theother,
seven-year-oldMichael,remainedinMoscow.TrepperbecameknowntohissourcesinWestern
Europeas‘legrandchef’,whileGourevitchwas‘lepetitchef’.Sovietnarrativeslavishpraiseonthe
Treppernetworkforitsservicestothesocialistcause,anditwasplainlyusefulasapostofficeforthe
messagesofStöbeandMikler.ButitseemsunlikelythatTrepperrecruitedusefulinformantsofhis
own.TheforemostachievementoftheGRUagentsinBelgiumwastostayatliberty,makesome
friendsandcreatelifestylesthatsupportedtheircoverstories.
OfmoreimportancetoMoscow–certainlyfrom1941onwards–weretheGRU’sorganisations
basedinSwitzerland.ThesewouldlaterchanneltowardstheKremlinmaterialderivedfromBerlin
sourcessuchasWesternagent-runnerscouldonlydreamof.Onenetworkhadbeenestablishedin
1937byGerman-bornRachelDübendorfer.Alargergroup,whichbecameknownasthe‘Lucy’Ring,
wasrunbyDrAlexanderRadó–‘Dora’–a‘sleeper ’permittedbyhischiefstoslumberalmostas
longasSleepingBeauty.AHungarian,Marxistfromhisyouth,Radóservedasacommissarin
Budapest’s1919RedTerror.ObligedtofleewhenAdmiralHorthybecameHungary’sdictator,fora
timeherananémigréResistancegroupinVienna.HethendecampedtoMoscow,wherehereceived
intelligencetraining,andwasdeemedsufficientlysignificanttobeintroducedtoLenin.Postedto
WesternEurope,heservedasanagentinBerlinandParis,undercoverasacorrespondentforthe
SovietnewsagencyTASS.AftermarryingaGermancommunistwithwhomhehadtwochildren,he
triedtosettleinBrussels,butwassentpackingbytheauthorities,whoheldathickdossieronhim.
InsteadhewenttoSwitzerland,whereheparleyedalifelongpassionformapsintothecreationofa
cartographicpublishingbusiness,whichquicklybecameprofitable.
TheSwisspolicewatchedRadóforawhile,thenlefthimalonewhentheydecidedhewaswhathe
seemed–aquiet-livingfellow,fortyin1939,whosimplywantedtoturnanhonestpenny.Radówas
word-paintedbyoneofhiswireless-operators,anEnglishmannamedAlexanderFoote:‘Withhis
mildeyesblinkingbehindglasses,helookedexactlylikealmostanyonetobefoundinanysuburban
trainanywhereintheworld.’MoscowinstructeditsmantodonothinguntilEuropeerupted.Radó
settleddownquitehappilywithhismaps,whichenabledhimtomakealivingwithoutmuchrecourse
toGRUfunds.WhenhishandlerwasrecalledtoMoscowduringthePurges,Radóforatimelost
contactwithhischiefs.Buthemadeusefullocalfriends,someofthemcommunists,othersnot.One
wasaSwisssocialist,OttoPunter,whoadmiredtheSovietUnionandhadworkedfortheRepublicans
inSpain.PunterforgedconnectionsinGermany,andwithsomeGermanémigrésinSwitzerlandsuch
asBaronMichelvonGodin.VonGodinrecruitedtheVichyFrenchpressattaché,LouisSuss,
codename‘Salter ’.TheChinesepressattachéPaoHsienChu–‘Polo’–wasanothersource,and
PunteralsohadconnectionswithinfluentiallocalCatholics.
Radó’scomradeAlexanderFootealwaysclaimedtohavebeenanadventurerratherthana
communistideologue.Around-faced,bespectacled,mildlyseedyyoungEnglishman,inSeptember
1938hereturnedfromserviceinSpainwiththeInternationalBrigade.Afewmonthslater,oneof
Moscow’sBritishrecruitersofferedhimunspecifiednewemploymentfortheworkers’causein
Switzerland.Cheapmelodramawasnotlacking.Inobediencetoinstructions,Footereportedtothe
mainpostofficeinGenevaatnoononeday,wearingawhitescarfandholdingaleatherbelt.Hewas
approachedbyawomanwhofulfilledhersideoftheidentificationprocedurebyholdingastring
shoppingbagandanorange.SheaskedinEnglishwherehehadboughthisbelt,andhereplied
implausibly,atanironmonger ’sshopinParis.Whenhehadthenaskedwherehecouldbuyanorange
likehers,sheintroducedherself.Shewas‘Sonya’,UrsulaHamburger*oftheGRU,whomFootewas
pleasedtofindwasnosquatcommissar,butinsteadanattractivewomanofthirty-one,with‘agood
figureandevenbetterlegs’.ThisremarkablepersonalitywasthedaughterofaBerlineconomist.At
theageofelevenshewasbrieflyachildactressbeforetakingupanalternativecareerinespionage.
ShewasalreadyaveteranofexploitsinChinaforwhichshehadbeenawardedtheOrderoftheRed
Banner.
HamburgerinstructedFootetotraveltoMunich,establishhimselfinthecity,learnGermanand
makefriends.Hewasgiven2,000Swissfrancsandtoldtomeetheragaininthreemonthsin
Lausanne–onceagain,atthepostoffice.KeepingthisrendezvousafteraGermansojournthatwas
uneventfulsaveforachanceglimpseofHitlerlunchinginarestaurant,hewastoldthathewasnow
ontheGRUpayrollasa‘collaborator ’,atasalaryofUS$150amonthplusreasonableexpenses.
Giventhecovername‘Jim’,andvariousmeansofmakingcontactif‘Sonya’disappearedforany
reason,hewasthensentbacktoMunichwithanadvanceofUS$900incash.Nothingsignificant
happenedthereafteruntilinApril1939hewasvisitedbyanoldInternationalBrigadecomradefrom
Spain,LenBrewer,British-bornsonofGermanparents,whomheappearstohaveintroducedto
Hamburger,whopromptlyrecruitedhim.InAugusthewassummonedtoyetanothermeeting,this
timeatHamburger ’shome,achaletatCaux-sur-Montreuxwhereshelivedinincongruousbourgeois
domesticitywithhertwochildren,MaikandJanina,andanoldGermannurse.Footewasdisconcerted
bythecasualnesswithwhichhishostessleftcomponentsofherwirelesstransmitterlyingaroundthe
house.
TheGRUringinSwitzerlandwasastraumatisedasmanyothercommunistsaroundtheworldby
theAugust1939Nazi–SovietPact.FootefeltthatithitHamburgerevenharderthanhimself;thather
faithintheomniscienceofthePartywasshattered:‘Ithinkthatfromthattimeonwardsherheartwas
notinthework’–thisseemsimplausible,sinceshelaterbecamecourierfortheatomicspyKlaus
Fuchs,anddiedanavowedStalinist.DesperatetogetoutofSwitzerland,shedivorcedherhusband
andmarriedLenBrewer.Initially,accordingtoFoote,thiswasmerelyanarrangementof
conveniencetosecurea‘shoe’–apassport–butthenthecouplefellinlove.Theirplanswere
momentarilythreatenedwhentheirmaid,Lisa,becamedisaffectedandtelephonedtheBritish
consulatetodenouncethemanonymouslyascommunistspies.Butthegirl’sEnglishwassopoorthat
nobodyattheotherendunderstood,oratleasttooknotice.
Daysbeforetheoutbreakofwar,FooteboardedatrainboundforGermanyoncemore,onlyto
findhishandlersuddenlypushingherwayalongthecarriagetoreachhim,justbeforedeparturetime.
Shetoldhimtogetoff,fast.NewordershadcomefromMoscow:warwasimminent;hemuststayin
Switzerland.Duringtheperiodthatfollowed,inwhichthe‘Lucy’Ringwastemporarilydormant,
whilelivingatasmallpensioninMontreuxbothFooteandLenBrewerlearnedhowtooperatea
shortwaveradiotransmitter.TheypractisedonHamburger ’sset,thoughitsperformancewasnot
improvedbybeingburiedinhergardenbetweentransmissions–thenwaitedtobegivenmessagesto
transmittoMoscow.
EvenastheGRU’sSwissnetworkswerebeddingdown,Centre’sGermansourceswerealready
producinginformationofextraordinaryquality.Thefirstmusicianinwhatbecameknowntohistory
asthe‘RedOrchestra’wasrecruitedfollowinganapproachtotheSovietembassyonedayin1929,by
anex-BerlinpolicemannamedErnstKur.Heofferedhisservicesasaninformant,andwaspromptly
recruitedbythelocalNKVDresidentasagentA/70.Kur,aracketyandoftendrunkenboor,hadbeen
dismissedfromthepolice,butprovedtohaveacriticalcontactinitscounter-intelligencebranch,who
wassoondesignatedbytheRussiansasagentA/201.On7SeptemberMoscowmessageditsBerlin
station:‘Weareveryinterestedinyournewagent,A/201.Ouronlyfearisthatyouhavegot
yourselvesintooneofthemostdangerouspredicamentswheretheslightestindiscretiononthepart
ofeitherA/201orA/70couldleadtomultiplemisfortunes.Wethinkitnecessarytolookintothe
issueofaspecialchannelofcommunicationwithA/201.’InvestigationshowedthatitwasA/201–an
officernamedWillyLehmann,whohadpromptedKur ’sapproachtotheRussians,usinghimasacutoutduringtheirexploratorydealings.
Lehmannwasbornin1884,andservedtwelveyearsintheKaiser ’snavybeforebecominga
policeman.HisNKVDfilespokeinthehighesttermsofhischaracter,thoughnotingtheexistenceof
along-termmistress,FlorentinaLiverskaya,athirty-eight-year-oldseamstresswholivedandworked
at21Blumenstrasse.Shewasdescribed,somewhatungenerously,asashortwomanwithreddishhair
andaplumpface.WhenKurstartedusinghispaymentsfromtheSovietembassytofundextravagant
drinkingsprees,Lehmannandhishandleragreedthatthisnowredundantintermediarymustbegot
outoftheway.WithunusualsensitivityforCentre,insteadofbeingpushedunderatram,in1933the
dissoluteex-copwasrehousedinSweden,wherehepassedtherestofhisdaysasasmalltrader,
occasionallymoonlightingasaninformant.
Lehmann,codenamed‘Breitenbach’,thereafterbecameoneofMoscow’smostvaluedGerman
agents.ForsometimehishandlerwasVasilyZarubin,anNKVDstar.Bornin1894,highlyintelligent
andpersonablethoughlargelyself-educated,ZarubinservedsuccessivelyinChinaandEuropeasan
‘illegal’,latterlyundercoverasaCzechengineer.Acheerfullygregariousfigure,thoughwithample
bloodonhishands,hespokeseverallanguagesandforgedawarmrelationshipwithLehmann.
AlthoughZarubinoccasionallygavethepolicemanmodestsumsofmoney,Lehmannneverappeared
greedy,andseemedkeentoassisttheRussianssimplybecausehedislikedhisownnation’s
government–ananimositythatbecamemuchmoremarkedaftertheNazisgainedpower.
LehmanngaveMoscowdetailsaboutthestructureandactivitiesofGermany’svariousintelligence
organisations,andwarnedofforthcomingoperationsagainstSovietinterests.Heprovidedsamples
ofAbwehrcodes,andpassedongossipaboutNazipowerstruggles.Hehimselfworkedlatterlyinthe
Gestapo’sDepartmentIVE,ultimatelyunderHimmler ’scontrol,andwasmaderesponsiblefor
securityatespeciallysensitivedefenceplants.Thusin1935heattendedsomeearlyGermanrocket
testsatPeenemünde,andproducedareportonthemwhichreachedStalin.Healsoacquired
considerableinformationaboutothermilitaryandnavaltechnologicaldevelopments.AstheNazis
tightenedtheirgripduringthe1930s,LehmannbecameincreasinglynervousaboutmeetingZarubin,
orindeedanySovietagent.Hefoundhimselfundersurveillance,asaresultofabizarrecoincidence.
Awomanquarrelledwithherlover,anddenouncedhimtotheauthoritiesasaRussianspy:this
provedtobeanotherGestapoofficer,alsonamedLehmann.Themuddlewaseventuallyclearedup,
andtheshadowwasliftedfrom‘Breitenbach’.Butin1935heaskedforafalsepassportincasehehad
toruninahurry,andthiswasdulyprovided.WhenZarubinreportedthatLehmannhadfallen
seriouslyill,thenewspromptedapanicinMoscow:CentredeclaredthatitsmostpreciousGerman
sourcemustbekeptaliveatanycost,andthattheNKVDwouldmeethismedicalbillsifthemoney
couldsomehowbelaundered.‘Breitenbach’recovered.
LaterthatyeartheGRUmadeasuddendecisiontowindupitsGermannetworksamidtheNazis’
ruthlesspersecutionofknowncommunists,andtomakeafreshstart,beginningatthetop.Boththe
BerlinstationchiefandhisdeputywererecalledtoMoscowandliquidated.Earlyin1937,the
NKVD’sZarubinalsofellvictimtothePurges.Hewassummonedhome,andataninterviewwith
Beriaaccusedoftreason.Afterinterrogation,unusuallyhewasneitherexecutednorcleared,but
insteaddemoted.HeremainedforatimeinMoscow,servingasassistanttoanoviceintelligence
officer,VladimirPavlov.
BeforeZarubin’sabruptdeparturefromBerlin,hetransferredthehandlingof‘Breitenbach’toa
womannamedClemens,oneofhisstaff.ShescarcelyspokeGerman,buttherewasnobodyelse,and
hehimselfexpectedsoontoreturn.Asmattersfellout,Clemenswasobligedtoassumeongoing
responsibilityfortherelationship,exchangingenvelopescontainingordersandinformation,which
werethenpassedtoanotherNKVDillegal,Ruben,whosoonfoundhimselfthesolesurviving
memberoftheBerlinstationasthePurgesclaimedevermorevictims–theGRU’sMajorSimon
Gendin,whohadsentGourevitchtoBrussels,wasshotinFebruary1939.
Zarubin,inMoscow,contrivedtosendanoteto‘Breitenbach’,assuringhimthathewasnot
forgottenbyhisfriends;thatheshouldcontinuehisintelligenceactivities,whileexercisingextreme
caution.TheGestapoofficerreplied:‘Ihavenoreasonstoworry.Iamsurethatthey[inMoscow
Centre]alsoknowovertherethateverythingisbeingdoneresponsiblyhere,everythingthatcanbe
done.Sofarthereisnogreatneedforanyonetovisitfromthere.Iwillinformyouifthiswill
becomenecessary.’AstheNKVD’ssilencebecameprotracted,however,Lehmanngrewfrustrated
andimpatient.HesentanothermessagetoZarubinviaClemens:‘JustwhenIwasabletomakegood
deals,thecompanytherestoppedbeinginterestedindoingbusinesswithme,forcompletelyunknown
reasons.’Zarubinrespondedsoothinglythat‘thecompany’tremendouslyvaluedhiswork,and
besoughthimtokeepgoing–whichhedid,untilNovember1938.Butthen,astheSovietintelligence
machinebecameparalysedbyitsdomesticcontortions,allcontactbetween‘Breitenbach’and
Moscowwaslost:therelationshipwasnotrestoreduntiltheautumnof1940.
WillyLehmannwasbynomeansMoscow’sonlyGermansource,norevenanylongeritsmost
important.Onedayin1935aLuftwaffeofficernamedHarroSchulze-Boysen,whoheldaseniorpost
inHermannGöring’sAirMinistry,contactedtheSovietembassyinBerlinwithanofferof
information,whichwasimmediatelyaccepted.Hewasgiventhecodename‘Corporal’,andNKVD
file34122.Schulze-BoysenwasachampagnesocialistfromasmartBerlinfamilyofintellectual
inclinations–AdmiralTirpitzwasamonghisforebears.FromhisdeskintheAirMinistryheforged
contactsinarmystaffcommunications,amongAbwehrofficers,andalsowithHansHenniger,a
governmentinspectorofLuftwaffeequipment.Göringgaveawaythebrideathis1936wedding,to
thebeautifulandexuberantLibertasHaas-Heye,whohadworkedforatimeasaBerlinpressofficer
forMGMFilms.ShenowlearnedtoshareSchulze-Boysen’spoliticalconvictionsandtheburdenof
hislaboursfortheSovietUnion,andherbedwithalegionoflovers.
Ataboutthesametime,butindependently,aseniorcivilservantintheeconomicsministry,Arvid
Harnack,contactedtheSovietembassy,andwaslikewiserecruitedasagent‘Corsican’,NKVDfile
34118.Harnackwasbornin1901intoascholarlyfamilyinDarmstadt.Hequalifiedasalawyerand
practisedasaneconomist,spendingsometimeintheUnitedStates.AttheUniversityofWisconsin’s
MadisoncampushemetMildredFish,astrikinglyhandsomeandserious-mindedstudentofEnglish.
Theyweremarriedin1929,andelectedtoliveinGermany.BothwerekeenlyinterestedinMarxism–
theymadeatouroftheSovietUnion,andin1932launchedapoliticalstudygroup.WhenArvid
begantopassinformationtotheRussians,andtorecruitfellow-foesofHitlertohisring,hejoined
theNaziPartytoimprovehisprotectivecolouring.MeanwhilebothheandSchulze-Boysensteadily
extendedtheirgroupsoflike-mindedintellectualfoesofHitler.Betweenthem,by1939theyhad
openedwindowsintosomeofthemostinfluentialinstitutionsinNaziGermany.
Moscownowmadeaserioussecuritymistake:itorderedthatthetwonetworksshouldcollaborate.
Theirguidingspiritshadverydifferenttemperaments.Schulze-Boysenwasanexuberant,impulsive
extrovert;Harnackwasaquiet,intenseintellectual,whoseimpeccablemiddle-classbackground
enabledhimselfandhisfriendsforyearstoescapetheattentionoftheGestapoandtheAbwehr.The
twomennonethelessforgedacloserelationship,drivenbysharedhatredoftheNazisandromantic
enthusiasmfortheSovietUnion.UntilJune1941theyhadnoneedofwirelesses,merelytransmitting
informationthroughtheRussians’Berlinmilitaryattaché.
Oneofthemoststrikingaspectsofespionageisthatitsprocesses,themerebusinessoflivinga
covertexistence,acquirealifeoftheirown,heedlessofspies’achievementsascollectorsof
information.AnatoliGourevitch,inhismemoirs,touchesonaweaknessinhisowntrainingwhich
mightbeappliedtotheexperienceofmanyotheragents.Hewasexhaustivelyinstructedintechniques
–secretinks,passwordsforrendezvousandsuchlike.Nomatchingeffort,however,wasexpended
uponexplainingthepurposeofhismission:‘WhywassolittleheedpaidtothemeansbywhichI
mightobtaininformation,tothewholeorganisationalaspectofthebusinessofintelligencegathering?’Inotherwords,andasGourevitch’ssubsequentcareerillustrated,formanysecretagents
themanagementandperilsofdailyexistenceconsumedalion’sshareoftheirenergies,often
overwhelmingthefunctionthatmattered–theacquisitionofinformationofvaluetotheirserviceand
itsgovernment.
ArrivedinBrusselsearlyin1939,freshfromtheGRUtrainingschool,Gourevitchtookroomsin
alodginghouse,enrolledhimselfinalanguageschoolinhisguiseasaUruguayanvisitor,and
reflectedthathisownabsoluteignoranceofcommerceseemedlikelytoproveanimpedimenttohis
intendedcoverlife,helpingtorunalocallybasedbusiness.Thisconcernreceded,however,inthe
faceofamoreseriousone:disillusionmentonfirstmeetinghisboss,LeopoldTrepper.Gourevitch
hadforgedaheroicmentalimageofthissecretagentsomuchesteemedbyMoscowCentre,yetnow
hewasconfrontedbywhatheafterwardsclaimedwasadrab,unimposingreality.Hehadbeenbriefed
tosupposethatasolidbusinesscoverhadbeenestablishedfor‘Otto’s’networkinBelgium,whereas
onthespothefoundonlyalittlesuburbanexportbusinessemployingjustthreepeopleandpeddling
‘theForeignExcellentTrench-Coat’.ItssecretarywasayoungRussianémigré,marriedtoaformer
tsaristarmyofficer,whowasapparentlycompletelyignorantoftherealnatureofthefirm’s
operations.AllthemanagerswereJews,whichmustmaketheminstantlyvulnerableintheeventofa
GermantakeoverofBelgium.
Gourevitchfeltmoreconfidenceinhisfellow-agent‘Andre’,athirty-five-year-oldAlsatiannamed
LeonGrossvogel,whohaddesertedfromtheFrencharmyin1925,thendriftedaroundGermany
beforetravellingtoPalestine,wherehebecameacommunist,andforgedafriendshipwithTrepper.
AfterthreeyearstherehereturnedtoBelgium,wherehisparentslivedandranasmalltradinghouse
named‘AuRoi’.ItwasthepresenceoftheGrossvogelsthatpersuadedTreppertocometoBelgium,
andtoexploittheircommercialcontactsasacover,whenin1938Moscowchargedhimwiththe
formationofaWestEuropeanespionageorganisation.Hisnewdeputynonethelessdecidedthat
Trepper ’ssupposednetworkofimportantintelligencecontactswasnothingofthesort.Whilelarge
allowancemustbemadeforthefactthatGourevitchpublishedhisversionlongafterhehimselfwas
denouncedasatraitor,thethrustofhisremarksmakessense.WhateverTrepper ’stradecraftskills,
togetherwithhisplausibilityincomposingreportswhichfoundfavourinMoscow,itishardto
imaginewhatusefulintelligencehecouldhaveacquiredinlow-gradeBelgianandFrenchbusiness
circles,theonlysocietythathehadaccessto.CentreseemedcontenttoacceptTrepper ’sclaimtohave
createdasystemthroughwhichmaterialcouldbegatheredandpassedtoMoscowfromitsBerlin
sourcesintheeventofwarwithGermany.ButGourevitchdismissedas‘completelyfalse’theclaims
ofpost-warSoviethistoriansthatTrepperranalargenetworkofimportantagentsextendinginto
Scandinavia.
Ontheeveofwar,MoscowCentrecouldboastthattheSchulze-Boysen/Harnackgroupsin
GermanyprovidedexcellentinformationfromtheNazis’innercircle.The‘Lucy’Ringin
Switzerlandhadestablisheditselfsoundly,butonlybegantoprovideimportantintelligencefrom
1941onwards.TheTrepper–Gourevitchnetworkstrodwateruntil1940.TheextensiveSovietsecret
machineintheUS,whichwillbedescribedelsewhere,producedasteadystreamoftechnological
intelligence,whichwouldhavebeenmoreusefultotheRussiansinadvancingtheirowndefencebase
iftheirindustrieshadbeencapableofexploitingit.
WehavelefttolastthebestofallMoscow’smen–orrather,themostspectacular.RichardSorge
gripstheimaginationofposterity,morebecauseofwhathewasthanthroughhisinfluenceonhistory,
whichwasmarginal.HedispatchedtoMoscowaflowofprivilegedpoliticalandstrategic
information,acquiredthroughanaccesstohighplacesachievedthroughsheerforceofpersonality.
Muchofhismaterialwasignored,however,ormerelyduplicatedsimilarreportsfrommore
authoritativeBerlinsources.SomehistorianswhoselectivelyquoteSorge’soccasionalbrilliant
insightshaveignoredhismisjudgementsandfalseprophecies–‘noise’.Hischaracterandcareeras
anagentwerenonethelessextraordinary.
‘Ika’,asSorgewasnicknamed,wasborninBakuin1895,oneofninechildrenofaGerman
petroleumengineerandaRussianmother.AftercompletingschoolinGermanyhefoundhimself
thrustintotheKaiser ’swarasayoungsoldier.WhileconvalescinginKönigsbergaftersufferinga
badwound,hewasindoctrinatedintocommunistideology,allegedlybythefatherofoneofhis
nurses,thoughtherewasalreadyafamilyprecedent:Sorge’sgrandfatherhadbeenanassociateof
MarxandEngels.WhenthewarendedhebecameaMarxistinstructor,andacquiredaPhDinpolitical
science.In1921hemarriedChristianeGerlach,havingpersuadedhertoabandonaprevioushusband.
Hiscommunistandrevolutionarylinksattractedtheunfavourableattentionofthepolice,andhe
foundGermanybecomingtoohottoholdhim.In1924thecouplemovedtoMoscow,whereSorge
wasrecruitedandtrainedasaSovietagent.Uncertaintypersistsabouthismovementsinthenextfive
years,thoughitisknownthathevisitedBritain.Christianelefthim,withouttheformalityofadivorce
–hisimmenseappealtowomenmadehimcarelessaboutwhethertheystayedorwent.The
combinationofrough-hewngoodlooksandahypnotic,drivenpersonalityenabledhimtoattract,and
oftentomaintainintandem,animpressiverangeofloversofallshapesandsizes.Thoughsceptics
latercondemnedSorgeasacharlatanaswellasabetrayer–afundamentallyshallowfiguredespite
hisintellectualpretensions–hewasastrikinglysuccessfulone.
In1929theRedArmy’sFourthDepartment–latertheGRU–offeredhimanoverseasassignment.
HerequestedChina,andarrivedinShanghaithatNovemberundercoverasafreelancejournalist,
withawireless-operatorintow.HeachievedrapidsocialsuccessintheEuropeanconcessions,and
madewell-informedfriends.Alsoagents.HehimselfwasmasqueradingasanAmerican,butdropped
theposewithAgnesSmedley,theAmericanChinatraveller,whomheenlistedinMoscow’sservice.
In1930hemettwenty-nine-year-oldHotsumiOzaki,astrugglingmagazinewriterwithcommunist
sympathies,whomhealsorecruitedandwhoplayedanotablepartinhissubsequentcareer.Like
almostallthosewhoworkedwithhim,Ozakifellundertheforeigner ’sspell.Longafterwards,
anotherofhisJapanesenetworksaidwonderinglyofthesuperspythatSorgebecame,‘Youmeeta
manlikehimonlyonceinalifetime.’TheGRUagentthrewhimselfintoresearchingeveryaspectof
Chineselife,andhisreportsearnedwarmapprovalfromhischiefs.
InJanuary1933hereturnedtoMoscow,wherehe‘married’again:ayoungRussiangirlnamed
YekaterinaMaximova–‘Katcha’–towhomhewroteemotionallettersthroughtheyearsthat
followed.HehimselfwantedtostayinRussia,butwhatusewasaforeignspyinhisemployers’own
country?TheGRUdecidedtoposthimtoTokyo.Inpreparationforthisassignment,Sorgetravelled
toGermany,nowNazi-ruled,tosecureappropriatecredentials,andachievedanotherbrilliantsocial
andprofessionalsuccess,whilesomehowevadingexposureofhiscommunistpast.Hemetthe
publisherofZeitschriftfurGeopolitik,anardentNationalSocialist,andsecuredfromhimbotha
contractasa‘stringer ’andaletterofintroductiontotheGermanembassyinTokyo.
Healsogainedthegoodwillofthemagazine’sfounder,KarlHaushofer,asecond‘stringing’
arrangementwithTäglischeRundschau,andaletteraddressedtoLt.Col.EugenOtt,aGermanofficer
servinganexchangetermwithaJapaneseartilleryregiment.Theeditor-in-chiefurgedOttto‘trust
Sorgeineverything;thatis,politically,personallyandotherwise’.Throughthesesponsorsthespy
pulledoffafurthercoup:hebecameamemberoftheNationalSocialistParty.Thusarmoured,this
avowedNazisetoffforTokyoviatheUnitedStateswithawireless-operator,BrunoWendtoftheRed
Army,carryinginhisluggageacopyofthe1933GermanStatisticalYearbooktoprovidethekeyfor
hiscoding.Sorgewasthirty-eight,andonthethresholdofoneofthegreatestespionagecareersin
history.
ArrivedinJapan,withremarkablespeedheestablishedarelationshipwiththeGermanambassador
HerbertvonDirksen,aPrussianaristocrat;andamuchcloseronewithColonelOtt,whoembraced
anotherformerFrontsoldatenaskin.Sorge,withcharacteristicrecklessness,promptlybeganan
affairwithOtt’swifeHelma,anAmazoniansix-footerwhowasherselfaformercommunist.This
appearstohavedonenoharmtothespy’srelationshipwithherhusband,whoseemed,ashe
remained,mesmerisedbyhisnewfriend.Thecolonelwasanaustereandunbendingfigurewho
perhapssawqualitiesinSorgewhichheenvied,notleastexuberance.Thenewcomeralsoingratiated
himselfwiththeconvivialandcharmingCaptainPaulWenneker,whojoinedtheGermanmissionin
1934asnavalattaché.
Sorge’sintimacywiththeembassywonhimsomerespectandattentionfromtheJapanese,though
atthisstagetheTokyogovernmenthadbynomeanscommitteditselftoanalliancewithHitler–
Germanresidentsweresubjecttopolicesurveillanceasintrusiveasthatimposedonotherforeigners.
Sorgethrewhimselfintoacquiringinformationofallkindsaboutthecountry,itspeople,historyand
culture,formingalibraryofoverathousandbooks,thoughheneverlearnedtoreadJapanese,nor
eventospeakitwell.Hissexualindiscretionswouldhaveearnedcensureinanyspyschool,buthis
managementoftherelationshipwiththeGermandiplomaticcommunityatthecolonnadedand
handsomelygardenedembassyofferedamasterclassinpenetration.DespitehisavowedNational
Socialistallegiance,hewasgailycriticalofGermangovernmentpolicies.
AtmeetingswithDirksenandOtt–whowasnowtransferredtobecomemilitaryattaché–Sorge
appearedtoprovideasmuchinformationashereceived.Indeed,theyrecognisedthatthejournalist
knewmoreaboutJapanthantheydid.Hestartedtoassistinthecompilationofdiplomaticreportsfor
Berlin,andforgedalong-distancerelationshipwiththeeditoroftheNaziPartynewspaper,
contributingtoitscolumnsandattendinglocalTokyobranchmeetings.Meanwhile,patientlyand
skilfully,SorgebuiltuphisnetworkofinformantsforMoscow.HotsumiOzaki,hisoldfriendand
sourcefromShanghai,wasnowarespectedjournalistinOsaka,whencehewasabletotransferto
Tokyo.Inthatpre-social-mediauniverse,forthenexttwoyearsSorgewasabletopreventOzaki
fromdiscoveringhisrealname:theGermanwasknowntohimonlyas‘MrJohnson’,theAmerican
coveridentityhehadworninhisChinadays.
Anotherrecruit,YotokuMiyaki,wasapainterbornin1903,whosefamilyhadmovedtoCalifornia
whenhewasachild.TheAmericanCommunistPartytalent-spottedMiyakifortheComintern,andthe
slightly-builtyoungmanwaspersuadedtomovebacktoJapan,whereheprovedasuperbagent.In
keepingwithMoscow’sstringentfinancepolicies,thoughMiyakireceivedasalaryfromSorge,he
supplementedthisthroughgivinglanguagelessonsandsellinghispictures,whichcommanded
respectableprices.AnotherkeySorgesubordinatewasaYugoslav-bornjournalist,Brankode
Voukelitch.TheFourthDepartmentperemptorilyinstructedVoukelitchtostrengthenhiscoverby
divorcinghiswifeEdithandmarryingaJapanesewoman.Thisthecompliantagentdulydid,
confusinghimselfaswellashisassociatesbyfallingsincerelyinlovewithawell-bornlocalgirl,
YoshikoYamasaki,whoeventuallymarriedhim.
ItwasareflectionofColonelOtt’sintimacywithSorgethatwhenhetouredManchuriain1934,he
tookalongtheRussianspyashiscourierintheNaziinterest.SorgesubsequentlyghostedOtt’sreport
tothearmyeconomicdepartment,whichwonplauditsinBerlin.Thefollowingyear,theJapanese
policebrokeupanotherSovietspyringinTokyorunbyanAmerican,JohnSherman,adevelopment
whichincreasedMoscow’sdependencyonSorge.Heoncesaid,‘Spyingworkmustbedonebravely,’
andindeedhebecameafamousfigureinTokyo’ssocial,journalisticanddiplomaticcircles,
careeringaboutthecityonamotorbike,drinkingheroicquantitiesofalcohol,beddingeverywoman
withinhisreach.Herentedatwo-storeyJapanese-stylehouseat30NagasakiMachi,andMoscowkept
himsuppliedwithsufficientfundstosustaintheracketylifeheloved.Hehadahousekeeperwho
becamedevotedtohim,togetherwithamaidandalaundrymanwhowereroutinelyquizzedbythe
police.ButeventhepathologicallysuspiciousJapanesehadnocluethatSorgemightbeaspy;they
regardedhimmerelyasaninfluentialacolyteoftheNazis.
HeperformedadailytourofnewspaperofficesandtheGermanClubbeforemakinghiswaytothe
embassy,wherehenowspentsomuchtimethathewasprovidedwithhisownofficeinwhichto
conductresearchandpreparematerialfortransmissiontoBerlin;privacywasalsousefulfor
photographingdocumentsforMoscow.AGermandiplomatspokelaterofSorgeas‘agay,dissolute
adventurerwithabrilliantmindandanunassailableconceit’.Thespywroteamemorablyironicletter
tohisMoscow‘wife’Katchain1937:‘itisveryhard,aboveallthissolitude’.
ItwasindeedaceaselesschallengefortheSovietagenttosustainamasqueradeasaNazistooge
whilehepartiedandwomanised.Intheeveningshefrequentedastringofbarsandclubs–
Lohmeyer ’srestaurantintheGinza,whichhadaloyalGermanclientèle;theseedylittleFledermaus;
andtheRheingold,whoseproprietorHelmutKetelwasanardentadmirerofHitler.Itwastherethat
Sorgemet‘Agnes’,oneofmanybargirlswhofellforhim.Agnesprovedtohavestayingpower.She
wastwenty-three,andherrealnamewasHanakoIshii.Shebecameincreasinglyafixtureinhishouse,
andhepaidforhertotakelessonstofulfilacherishedambitiontobecomeasinger.ButSorgewas
nomorefaithfultoHanakothantoanyotherwoman:heconductedalongparallelrelationshipwith
AnitaMohr,wifeofalocallybasedGermanbusinessman,whowasdescribedasa‘blonde
bombshell’.Hanakoappearstohaveprovidedaconvenienceratherthananobjectofrealaffection.
Sorge’sprioritywasalwaysservicetoMoscow.AstheweightofGRUmaterialincreased,sodid
thedifficultiesoftransmittingit.Wendt,hisradioman,wasincompetent,andSorgeinsistedthata
bettermanmustbefound.In1935thespyleftTokyo,supposedlyonholiday,boundfortheUnited
States.FromtherehetravelledcovertlytotheSovietUnion,toconferwithhischiefsandsortoutthe
communicationsissues.InMoscowhewasrebriefedaboutpriorities,foremostamongwhichwasto
exploreJapan’sintentionstowardstheSovietUnion.Thereafter,indescendingorderhewasordered
tostudytheJapanesearmyandindustry;policiesinChina;positioningtowardsBritainandtheUS.
SoonafterSorge’sreturntoTokyo,anewwireless-operatorandcourierjoinedhimfrom
Moscow.MaxClausenheldofficer ’srankintheRedArmy.Toprovidecoverheestablisheda
blueprint-copyingbusinessinTokyo,whichbecameanotablyprofitablepetproject.Clausen’sfirst
intelligencetaskwastobuildhisownwirelessset,commonpracticeamongagentsincountriesto
whichitwasdeemedtoodifficultordangeroustodispatchaprofessionallyconstructedone.Heused
adomesticradioreceiver,attachedthetransmittertoaBakelitepanelmountedonawoodenbox,and
woundtuningcoilsfromcoppertubingintendedformotormanufacture.Intheabsenceof
instrumentstomeasurewavelengths,Clausentransmittedona37–39metreband,andreceivedon45–
48.
Sorgepersuadedafriendandfellow-journalist,GuntherStein,toallowtheSovietoperatorto
messageMoscowfromhisflat.Steininitiallyrecoiledfromacceptingthisappallingrisk,but
eventuallyassented.SinceClausendarednotsetupanexternalaerial,hestretchedtwocopperstrandedwires,sevenmetresinlength,aroundtheroomfromwhichhetransmitted.Steinalso
becameausefulinformantfortheSorgering,exploitingfriendshipshehadformedattheBritish
embassy.SotoodidToraoShinotsuka,ownerofasmallmilitary-equipmentfactoryinKansai,who
providedextensivematerialonmilitaryaircraftandnavalarmaments.AnnaClausen,Max’sadored
wife,arrivedinTokyofromMoscowtosharethewireless-operator ’shazardousexistence.
TheSovietnetwork’smembershipthusexpandedataperiodwhenJapanwasenteringaperiodof
paranoiaaboutforeignespionage,andreinforcingitsdomesticsecurityagencies.In1936therewasa
badmomentwhenTokyopolicearrestedTaikichiKawaiattherequestoftheirManchurian
counterparts.Kawaihadbeenaninformantof‘MrJohnson’inShanghai.Incaptivityhewasbrutally
interrogated.Unlikemostagentsundertorture,however,hegaveawaynothingsignificant.Sorge’s
luckheld.Hisworkwasgivingthehighestsatisfactiontobothofitsbeneficiaries,MoscowCentre
andtheForeignMinistryinBerlin.Thelatterwasespeciallydelightedbyareportwhichhecompiled
onthe1936Japanesearmyrevolt,butwhichheinsistedshouldcirculateamongtheNazihierarchy
onlyunderthecoyinitials‘RS’,becauseheremainedfearfulofaGestapoinvestigationofhis
politicalpast.
HehelpedOttandDirksendraftacabletoBerlin,askingforinformationaboutarumoured
German–Japanesenegotiation.SorgesoughttopromoteMoscow’sagendabyurgingontheGerman
embassyteamtheviewthatsuchanalliancewouldbemistaken,androotedinabsurdrumoursthat
Stalin’sfallwasimminent.HepublishedanarticleontheJapanesearmyinDieWehrmachtmagazine.
HisreputationwiththeTokyoembassyandwithBerlinsoaredafterthefulfilmentofhisprediction
thatJapan’swarinChinawouldproveprotracted.Moreimportant,however,wasthemassof
informationaboutJapanesedeploymentsontheSovietborderwhichOttprovidedtoSorge,who
swiftlyforwardedittotheGRU.Moscowalsoprofessedappreciationofindustrialdatadeliveredby
HotsumiOzakiatmonthlyrestaurantmeetings.Thejournalisthadbecomeinfluentialingovernment
circles,andcorrespondinglywell-informed:foratimeheevenservedintheJapaneseprime
minister ’sofficeasanexpertonChina.Eventhoughhelostthatrolewhenthegovernmentchanged
in1939,hesecuredanewjobasaTokyo-basedresearcherforJapan’sKwantungarmyinManchuria.
In1938HerbertvonDirksenwasinvalidedhome.Hissuccessorasambassadorwasnoneother
thanColonelOtt.SorgethenceforwardfoundhimselfdraftingtheGermanembassy’sdispatchesfor
Berlin,whiletransmittinghisowntoMoscow.Onhisforty-thirdbirthdayhewaspresentedwitha
signedphotographofNaziforeignministerJoachimvonRibbentropasatokenofBerlin’s
appreciationforhisservices.NoforeignpenetrationofaBritishdiplomaticmissioncouldbe
comparedinsignificancewiththatachievedbySorgeofHitler ’sTokyoembassy.WhenaRussian
generaldefectedtoTokyoin1938,thespywasimmediatelyabletowarnMoscowthatitscodeswere
compromised.InMay1939,whentensionsontheRusso–Japanesebordereruptedintolocalclashes,
thankstoOzakiSorgecouldtellMoscowauthoritativelythattheJapanesehadnointentionof
escalatingthe‘NomohanIncident’intoawiderwar.Onthisissueasonmanyothers,however,doubts
persistabouttheusemadeofhismaterial.SorgesupposedlygavetheSovietsdetailedJapanese
order-of-battleinformation,butGeorgiZhukovastheRedArmy’slocalcommandercomplained
bitterlyabouttheabsenceofsuchdata.ItseemslikelyeitherthatSorgelaterexaggeratedhisown
contribution,orthattheGRUfailedtopassonhismaterial.
HesoughttostrengthenhiscoverbypubliclytauntingSovietdiplomatswhenhemetthemat
internationalreceptions,butthestressofhisfantastichigh-wireactincreasinglytoldonhim,andwas
reflectedinmassiveinfusionsofalcohol.InthecompanyofHanako,hesuccumbedtomorose,drinkfuelledmonologues,especiallywhenshebeggedhimtogiveherachild:‘Iamanoldman.Iam
goingtodiesoon.Icandowithoutababy!Oh,poorSorge.Youshouldstudysothatyoucanget
alongwithoutSorge…’Onenighthecrashedhismotorbike,withagonisingconsequences–many
daysinhospitalandthelossofhisteeth.Fortherestofhislifehecouldswallowmeatonlyifitwas
minced.
Hehadsenseenoughtoabandonbiking,andinsteadacquiredasmallcar.Heembarkedona
whimsicalculturalimprovementprogrammeforHanako,persuadinghertoreadGoneWiththe
Wind,whichhehimselfconsidered‘magnificent’.Severalhundredpageslatershesaid,‘Ilike
CaptainButler.’Perhapsprovidingaglimpseofhisself-image,Sorgedemanded,‘DoyouthinkIam
likeRhettButler?’ButClausenwrotelaterabouthim:‘Heisatruecommunist…Heisamanwho
candestroyevenhisbestfriendforthesakeofCommunism.’Hecouldalsodestroyacomrade.The
spy’streatmentofhiswireless-operatorwascavalier,evenbrutal.Andhislifestylewasevermoreat
oddswiththeidealofadedicatedservantoftheParty.Sorgehadmadehimselfprobablythebestinformedsecretagentintheworld.Nonetheless,hisrashnessmadeanultimatetrainwreckinevitable,
evenifin1939thisstilllayasurprisingdistanceinthefuture.
Bythecomingofwar,theSovietUnion’shugeexpenditureonespionage,anditsaccesstohighly
placedcommunistsympathisersinmanylands,shouldhavemadetheKremlinthebest-informed
centreofgovernmentontheplanet.YetthoseinMoscowwhoreceivedandprocessedthereports
fromthefieldwerefartoofearfulofoffendingtheonlyaudiencethatmattered–JosephStalin,
masteroftheKremlin–toforwardanyintelligencethatwaslikelytoproveunwelcome.Evenwhen
importantinformationreachedMoscow,itwasseldomproperlyreviewed,farlessexploitedby
policy-makers.ChristopherAndrewhaswritten:‘TheSovietcapacitytounderstandthepoliticaland
diplomaticintelligenceitcollected…neverapproacheditsabilitytocollecttheintelligenceinthe
firstplace.’Stalinactedashisownanalyst,preferringtodrillendlesswellsofespionageinsearchof
imaginedconspiraciesratherthantouseintelligencetoinformpolicy-making.Sovietintelligence
officersfearedfortheirlives,withgoodreason,iftheytoldStalinwhathedidnotwanttohear.He
seemedtocreditonlyreportsthatidentifiedplotsagainsthimselforthestate,athomeandabroad.
Wherethesedidnotexist,Russia’smostseniorintelligenceofficersinventedthem.Stalinusedthe
productofhiscodebreakerstosomeeffectwhereandwhenthiswasavailable,butenteredthegreatest
conflictinhistoryalmostblindthroughhisownactsofwill.
AfterMunich,withthedoomofCzechoslovakiasealed,theCzechintelligencechiefFrantišek
Moravecwasapproachedbythreerivalbiddersforhisservices:AdmiralWilhelmCanarisforthe
Germans,ColonelLouisRivetfortheFrench,andMI6’slocalman,MajorHaroldGibson,forthe
British.MistrustingtheFrench,MoravecdeterminedtothrowinhislotwithBritain.Inanticipationof
theNazioccupationhedidhisutmosttoreinforcelinkswithlocalinformantsbeforehimselfleaving
hiscountry.HewasabletotransfertoLondonlargesumsofforeigncurrency,andhopedthusto
ensurethathecouldsustainaCzechintelligenceserviceinexile,thoughfewofhisagentswereever
heardfromagain.On3March1939theAbwehr ’sPaulThummel,Moravec’sbestGermansource,
methiminPragueandreportedthatthecitywouldbeoccupiedonthe15th.‘AgentA-54’alsowarned
thathisentirestaffwouldbeseizedbytheGestapo,andcouldexpectnomercy.Moravecwasamazed
thatThummeldeclaredhimselfwillingtocontinuehisowncollaboration.Theonlyproviso,saidthe
Abwehrman,wasthattheCzechsmustensurethateverythingabouthimselfintheirfileswas
destroyed.Withthatassurance,thetwomenparted.Thummelsaid,‘Goodluck,Colonel.Thisisnot
goodbyebutAufwiedersehen.’TheGermanofficertookawaywithhimtwoaddressesforfuture
correspondence,oneinHolland,theotherinSwitzerland.
InPragueonthenightof13March,HaroldGibsonofMI6–‘Gibby’,asMoravecalwayscalled
him,asmall,slightfigurewithamoustacheinproportion–droveacarintotheCzechIntelligence
Department’sgarage.Thiswasloadedwithhundredsoffilespackedincanvasbags,whichwere
borneawaytotheBritishembassy.Thefollowingafternoon,aDutchcivilianplanecharteredby
BroadwaylandedatRuzynairfieldoutsidePraguetocollectpassengersforEngland–Moravecand
tenofficersofhisstaff.Hechosethemunsentimentally,hewrotelater,takingthosewhowouldbe
mostvaluableinLondon,andthosewhoknewtoomuchtobelefttotheGestapo.Hefeltobligedto
leavebehindhisownwifeandtwodaughters,andindeedtoconcealfromthemhisintended
destination:hesaidhewasmerelymakinganovernighttriptoMoravia.
Theplanetookoffwithdifficultyamidstasnowstorm,whichforatimethreatenedtoforcethem
downintothepathoftheapproachingGermans.Moraveccarriedabriefcasecontaining200,000
Reichsmarksand100,000Dutchguildersincash–about£32,000–toprovidehislittleteamwith
furtherseedmoneyforfutureoperations.Astheplanepassedoverthemountainswherelay
Czechoslovakia’sfrontier,thecolonelburiedhisheadinhishandsandsobbedunashamedlyatthe
prospectofexile.AfterabriefstopinAmsterdam,thepartylandedsafelyatCroydon.Whenformer
CzechprimeministerEdvardBenešlaterarrivedinLondon,MoravecreportedtohisPutney
residencetoofferhisservicesandthoseofhisofficers,whichwerereadilyaccepted–hisrolewas
formalisedthefollowingyear,whenBenešformedagovernmentinexile.Thecolonel’swifeand
childrenescapedfromPragueandwalkedtosafetyinPoland,fromwhencetheyjoinedhimin
Britain.
InJune1939Moravecwasdelightedtoreceivealetter,forwardedfromaZürichcoveraddress,
whichbegan,‘DearUncle,IthinkIaminlove.Ihavemetagirl.’Onthesamepagewasasecretink
message,appointingarendezvousinTheHague.ItwasfromagentA-54,theAbwehrcolonelPaul
Thummel.TheCzechofficerwhodulymethimearlyinAugustwarnedThummelthatMoravec’s
shrunkenorganisationnolongerhadcashtolavishuponhimasgenerouslyasinthepast,butthe
Germanrespondeddismissivelythat‘moreimportantmattersthanmoneyareatstake’.Hetoldthe
CzechthataninvasionofPolandwasplannedfor1September,andprovideddetailsofthelatest
Wehrmachtorderofbattle.HealsohandedoveralistofPolishtraitorsworkingfortheGermans.
ThummelsubsequentlyprovidedtheNazis’amendedtimetable,includingon27Augustafinaldate
forthePolishinvasionof3September1939.ForthepeopleofCzechoslovakia,Poland,andnowof
allWesternEurope,thesparringwasover:thedeathstrugglehadbegun.
*BoththeGRU’sandNKVD’sofficersandagentsreferredtotheirrespectiveheadquartersas‘Centre’.
*Hamburger,likemanyothersinthisbook,usedavarietyofnamesinthecourseofhercareer,startingoutasKuczynskiandendingup
asWerner.Toavoidconfusion,onlyonenameisusedthroughoutforallthosedescribed.
2
TheStormBreaks
1 TH E ‘ F I C TI O N F LO O D ’
ThefirstsignificantexcitementoftheBritishsecretservice’swarcameinNovember1939.A
documentlaterknownasthe‘OsloReport’wassentanonymouslytotheBritishlegationinNorway,
thenforwardedtoLondonbyitsnavalattaché.TheparcelthatreachedBroadwaycontainedseveral
pagesofGermantypescriptandasmallcardboardbox.Itrepresentedtheoutcomeofanearlier
‘feeler ’messagetothelegation,sayingthatiftheBritishwantedtoreceivedetailsofnewscientific
developmentsinGermany,theyshouldmakeaminorchangeinthewordingofaBBCbroadcastto
Germany:insteadofstarting,‘Hello,thisisLondoncalling’,itwastosay,‘Hello,hello,thisis…’
Thiswasdulydone,andafterashortdelaythe‘OsloReport’wassubmitted.
Itsnarrativecoveredaremarkablerangeofenemyactivities.Theanonymousauthorassertedthat
theGermansweredevelopingacousticandradio-controlledtorpedoes;detailedthewavelengthson
whichGermanradarstationswereoperating;suggestedbombingtheLuftwafferesearchstationat
Rechlin;andmuchelse.Theboxcontainedatriggertube,tobeemployedfornewanti-aircraftshell
proximityfuses.Butthecredibilityofthewholedocumentwasunderminedbytheinclusionoftwo
nonsenses:aclaimthattheLuftwaffe’sJu-88bomberswerebeingproducedattheimpossiblerateof
5,000amonth;andthataGermanaircraft-carrier,theFranken,wasapproachingcompletionatKiel.
ThesemistakescontributedtoaverdictbyWhitehallthatthedocumentshouldbedismissedasa
Germanplant.
ButthereportwasalsoreadbyDrReginaldJones,theoutspoken,combative,twenty-eight-yearoldassistantdirectorofAirMinistryscientificintelligence.Jonesshinesforthasanauthenticstarin
thewartimesecretfirmament.Hewasasocialhybrid,sonofasergeantintheGrenadierGuardswho
displayedprecociousbrillianceathissouthLondonschool,andlaterprovedasmuchateaseholding
forthatgrandcountry-housepartiesasfightinghiscornerinmeetingschairedbytheprimeminister.
HavinghadanotableearlycareerinphysicsandastronomyatOxford,whereforatimeheworked
underFrederickLindemann–laterLordCherwell–hebecamefascinatedbythepossibilitiesof
exploitinginfra-redtechnologyforthedetectionofaircraft,andin1936wenttoworkfortheAir
Ministry.Hewasintolerantofslow-mindednessorbureaucracywhereverheencounteredit,andthere
wasplentyofbothatBroadwayBuildings,whereafterabriefstintatBletchleyParkhewasinvitedto
shareanofficewithFredWinterbotham.
InthecourseofthewarRegJonesbecameoneoftheforemostBritishinvestigatorsofGermanair
technology.InNovember1939,however,hisachievementsstilllayinthefuture,andhewasseenin
Whitehallsimplyasapushyyoung‘boffin’whoseemedtoofreewithhisopinionsinthepresenceof
seniorofficers.Jones,almostalone,electedtobelievethattheOslodocumentwasauthentic.His
instinctbecameanear-certaintyinthesummerof1940,whentheLuftwaffebegantousetheWotan
navigationalbeamtoguideitsbombersoverBritain,exploitingprinciplesmentionedbyOslo’s
author.R.V.Jones,asheisknowntoposterity,foundtheinformationinvaluableindevisingcountermeasuresduringthe‘BattleoftheBeams’thatinfluencedtheBlitz–whichgainedhimtheearandthe
admirationofWinstonChurchill.Againandagainthroughtheyearsthatfollowed,whentheBritish
gainedhintsaboutnewGermanweapons–theacoustictorpedo,forexample–Joneswasableto
pointouttoservicechiefsthatOslohadwarnedofthem.Afterthewar,inaretrospectiveonhisown
intelligencecareer,thescientistusedtheexampleofthe1939documenttourgethat‘casualsources
shouldnotbetreatedflippantly.Itwasprobablythebestsingle[scientificintelligence]reportreceived
fromanysourceduringthewar.’
OnlyafteranintervalofalmostfortyyearsdidJonesestablishthedocument’sauthorship.Itwas
theworkofaforty-five-year-oldGermanphysicistnamedHansFerdinandMayer,whoadopteda
scientificcareerafterbeingbadlywoundedonhisfirstdayinactionasaconscriptin1914.Hehad
beenemployedbySiemenssince1922,doingworkthatresultedintheawardofeighty-twopatents
andthepublicationofforty-sevenpapers,andalsospentfouryearsasprofessorofsignalstechnique
atAmerica’sCornellUniversity.Duringtheinter-waryearsheformedawarmfriendshipwithan
EnglishmanworkingforGECnamedCobdenTurner,whobecamegodfathertoMayer ’ssecondson.
TheGermanwasespeciallyimpressedbyagooddeed:whenhetoldTurneraboutthetragiccaseofa
JewishschoolchilddisownedbyherNazifather,theEnglishmanarrangedforthelittlegirltocome
toEngland,whereforeightyearsshelivedasamemberofhisownfamily.
Whentheinternationalhorizondarkened,onwhatprovedTurner ’sfinalvisittoGermanyMayer
toldhimthatifwarcame,hewouldtrytosupplyBritainwithinformationaboutGermanscientific
andtechnologicalprogress.Inlate1939thescientistexploitedachancebusinesstriptoNorwayto
makegoodonhispromise.HeborrowedanoldtypewriterfromtheporterattheHotelBristoland
composedthe‘OsloReport’,whichwasdispatchedintwopartstotheBritishembassyon1and2
November.MayeralsowrotedirectlytoCobdenTurner,suggestingfurthercontactthroughan
intermediaryinneutralDenmark.ButalthoughthislettercausedtwoBritishsecurityofficerstovisit
andquestiontheGECman,forreasonsunknownnothingwasdonetoopencommunicationwith
Mayer–MI6’sofficialhistorymakesnomentionofthiscourageousGerman.InAugust1943Mayer
wasarrestedbytheGestapoinhisofficeatSiemens,andchargedwithlisteningtotheBBC.Hewas
confinedinDachau,butwasfortunateenoughtobeemployedinatechnicalplant,wherehesurvived
thewar.HisbravegesturewaspromptedbyadmirationforCobdenTurner,whomhelikedtoregard
asarepresentativeEnglishman.RecognitionofMayer ’scontribution,however,cameonlyfromReg
Jones.
Amongthereasonsthe‘OsloReport’receivedsuchachillyreceptionisthatitwasdebatedin
WhitehalljustastheBritishsecretcommunityreeledinthewakeofasuccessfulGermanruse.On9
November1939,duringthefirst,passivephaseofthewarthatbecamederisivelyknownasthe
‘sitzkrieg’,thetwoseniorMI6officersintheneutralNetherlands,CaptainSigismundPayneBestand
MajorRichardStevens,drovewithaDutchofficerinBest’sLincolnZephyrcartoarendezvousatthe
CaféBackus,situatedbetweentheDutchandGermanbordercustomsbarriersatVenlo.Within
minutesoftheirarrival,theywereseizedbyarmedmen.WhentheDutchmandrewapistolandfired
atoneassailant,hewashimselfshotdead.Best,Stevensandtheirlocaldriverwerethenhustled150
yardstothefrontier:theirkidnapperswereNazicounter-intelligenceofficersoftheSD,ledbythe
branch’slaterboss,WalterSchellenberg,whowasnarrowlymissedbytheDutchofficer ’sbullet.The
Britishspieswerefortunateenoughtokeeptheirlives,butspentmostoftherestofthewarin
Sachsenhausenconcentrationcamp.Incontradictionofmythsaboutheroicsilenceunder
interrogation,StevensandBesttoldtheirabductorswhattheyknewaboutMI6,whichwasplenty:its
ContinentaloperationswerechieflyconductedfromtheirownHaguestation.
‘TheVenloincident’,asitbecameknowninWhitehall,derivedfromanapproachsomeweeks
earlierbysupposedlyanti-NaziGermangeneralseagertonegotiatewithBritain.MI6becamemuch
excitedbytheprospectofbrokeringadeal,thoughtheForeignOfficewasprudentlysceptical.Sir
AlexanderCadoganwroteinhisdiaryon23October:‘Ithinkthey[theGerman“plotters”]areHitler
agents.’Thewarcabinetwasinformedaweeklater,andWinstonChurchill,thenstillFirstLordofthe
Admiralty,expressedviolentobjectionstoanyparley.ButthegovernmentauthorisedMI6tocontinue
discussions,provided–asCadoganstrictlyinstructed–nothingwasputinwritingtothesupposed
dissidents.TheBritishignoredthedangerthattheirinterlocutorswouldplaynotmerelyadiplomatic
gamewiththem,butarougherone.Theyshouldhavebeenalerttosuchanoutcome,becausethe
Nazishadpreviousformascross-borderkidnappers:inApril1934theyhadluredtotheGerman
frontieraCzechintelligenceofficer,twenty-nine-year-oldCaptainJanKirinovic,thenrushedhim
across.AGestapowitnessgaveevidenceatKirinovic’ssubsequenttrialthathehadbeenarrestedon
Germansoil,andKirinovicwassentencedtotwenty-fiveyears’hardlabour.Althoughinthe
followingMarchtheCzechofficerwasexchangedfortwoGermanspies,hediedinsaneafewyears
laterasaresultofthedrugsadministeredtohimbytheGestapo,notablyscopolamine.
InNovember1939,itwassymptomaticofMI6’sinstitutionalweaknessthatitsHaguestation
employedFolkertvanKoutrik,anAbwehrinformant.Thesupposedrepresentativeofthedisaffected
Germangenerals,‘MajorSchaemmel’,wasintruththeRSHA’sSchellenberg,whomtheBritish
officersobliginglysuppliedwithawirelesstransmitter.EitherHitlerorHimmlerpersonally
authorisedthekidnapping,whichtheBritishatfirstsoughttokeepsecret.Whenanofficialasked
Cadoganwhatwastobesaidabout‘thebrawlinHolland’,thesubjectoffeveredrumourand
speculation,thepermanentunder-secretaryorderedtheissueofa‘D’Notice,forbiddingmentionofit
intheBritishpress.Amazingly,forafortnightafterVenlotheGerman‘conspirators’sustaineda
dialoguewithMI6,untilon22NovemberHimmlerlostinterestandtheGermansshutdownthe
exchangeaftersendingalastderisivemessagetoBroadway.TheNazisthenpubliclyannouncedthat
BestandStevenshadbeenengagedinanassassinationplotagainstHitler.MeanwhilevanKoutrik’s
betrayalwentsofarundetectedthathesecuredemploymentwithMI5inLondon,anditwasvery
fortunatethathebrokeoffcontactwiththeAbwehr–perhapsforlackofmeansofcommunication–
becauseitwaswithinhislaterknowledgetohavebetrayedelementsoftheDoubleCrosssystemto
them.
InsideWhitehall,MI6soughttotalkdownVenlo,arguingthattheGermanshadbehavedcrasslyby
grabbingthetwoofficersinsteadofsustainingadouble-crossgamewiththem.Itishardtooverstate
theepisode’ssignificance,however,forthefuturecourseofthesecretwar.Britishespionage
activitiesontheContinent,suchastheywere,sufferedadevastatingblow:theGermanswereableto
relieveBestofalistofhisstation’scontacts,whichhehadtakeninhispockettotherendezvous.The
reputationofthesecretservicewithintheBritishgovernment,nothighbeforethedébâcle,afterwards
saggedlowindeed.GuyLiddellofMI5speculatedinhisdiarythatBest,apreposterousfigurewho
affectedamonocle,mighthavebeenadoubleagent–‘therealniggerinthewoodpile.[He]had
apparentlybeeninfairlylowwateranditwasnoticeablethatafterhebecameassociatedwith[Dr
Franz]Fischer[aNazidoubleagentinHolland]heseemedtobeverywellinfunds.’Thereisno
reasontothinkLiddell’ssuspicionsjustified.Merebunglingwasresponsibleforthefiasco,though
WalterSchellenbergassertedlaterthatBestwaswillingtobe‘turned’.Meanwhile,theDutchwere
embarrassedbytherevelationthatoneoftheirownintelligenceofficershadbeencomplicitina
Britishplot,whichstrengthenedtheNazis’propagandahandbycompromisingHolland’sproclaimed
neutrality.
AfurtherconsequenceofVenlowasthattheBritishbecamemorbidlysuspiciousofanyapproach–
andtherewereseveral,laterinthewar–byGermansprofessingtorepresentan‘anti-Hitler
Resistance’.Inonesensetheircautionwasprudent,becausemostofthearistocratsandarmyofficers
whobecameengagedinplotsagainsttheNazischerishedabsurdfantasiesabouttheGermanythey
mightpreservethroughanegotiationwiththeWesternAllies.FormerLeipzigmayorKarlGördeler,
forinstance,wasanationalistwithviewsonGermanterritorialrightsinEuropethatwerenotfar
shortofHitler ’s.EvenhadtheFührerperished,therewouldhavebeennothingplausiblefor
Germany’senemiestodiscusswithhisdomesticfoes.Attheveryleast,however,Britishparanoia
aboutsufferingarepeatoftheVenlohumiliationpermanentlyexcludedMI6fromsomeuseful
sources,whichtheRussiansandlatertheAmericanswerelefttoexploit.Moreover,fortherestofthe
warBroadway’schiefsmaintainedanexaggeratedrespectfortheirGermanadversaries,derived
fromthememoryofhavingbeenfooledbytheminNovember1939.
Throughtheicywintermonthsofthe‘PhoneyWar ’,theGC&CSatBletchleystruggledwiththe
intractableEnigmaproblem,whileBroadway’sspiesproducedlittleornousefulinformationabout
theenemyandhisintentions.KennethStrongofWarOfficeIntelligencewrote:‘Wehadacontinuous
streamofcallersfromtheServiceswithanextraordinaryvarietyofqueriesandrequests.Whatwere
themostprofitabletargetsforairattacksinthisorthatarea,andwhateffectwouldtheseattackshave
ontheGermanArmy?Wasourinformationaboutthesetargetsadequateandaccurate?Howwasthe
GermanArmyreactingtoourpropagandacampaigns?Ifoundsomequitefantasticoptimism
regardingtheeffectsfrompropaganda.Thedroppingofleafletswasconsideredalmostamajor
militaryvictory.’
SomeMI6officerswenttoelaboratelengthstoconcealtheirlackofagentnetworks.RegJones
citedtheexampleofWilfred‘Biffy’Dunderdale,whowasresponsibleforFrance,andfedtoJones’s
branchasuccessionoftastytitbitsontheGermanJu-88bomber,allegedlycollectedbyspies.First
therewasinformationaboutitsengines;thenitselectrics;andsomewhatlateritsarmament.Jones
teasedDunderdalethathemusthavesecuredacopyoftheaircraft’soperatinghandbook,thenfed
extractstoBroadway,tocreateanimpressionofmultiplesources.Thehaplessofficeradmittedthat
Joneswasright,butbeggedhimtokeephismouthshut.Hecouldkeephisbossesmuchmore
interested,hesaid,bydrip-feedingthedata.ThiswasnottheonlyoccasionwhenDunderdale–like
officersofallintelligenceservices–soughtto‘sexup’themeansbywhichhismaterialhadbeen
acquired.HealsoproduceddetailsofGermantroopmovementssupposedlysecuredbyagent
networks,whichinrealityderivedfromFrenchintercepts.
Muchcouldbelearnedfromanenemy’swirelesstransmissions,evenwithoutbreakinghiscodes,
through‘trafficanalysis’–thestudyofsignalorigins,volumeandcallsignstopinpointunits,ships,
squadrons.Usefulinformationwasalsogleanedbythe‘YService’,eavesdroppingonvoice
transmissions,andbybreakingsimpleenemycodesusedforpassinglow-grademessages.The
Frenchforwardcryptographicalunitwasbasedat‘StationBruno’,intheChâteaudeVignobles
locatedatGretz-Armainvilliers,fifteenmileseastofParis.Brunoreceivedanimportant
reinforcementfollowingthefallofPoland.GuyLiddellofMI5recordedon10October1939that
seventeenPolishcryptanalystswereseekingasyluminBritain.BletchleyParkshruggeddismissively
thatithadnouseforthem,eventhoughitschiefAlastairDennistonhadmetsomeofthesamemenin
Warsawafewmonthsearlier,andknewthattheirclaimstohavepenetratedRussianandGerman
ciphers‘cantosomeextentbemaintained’.
DennistonsuggestedthattheywouldbemoreusefulattheChâteaudeVignobles,workingwith
GustaveBertrand,whichwaswheretheyweresent–thoughBletchleylaterchangeditsmindandtried
invaintogetthemback.ItwasatBruno,on17January1940,thattheex-Warsawgroupbrokeitsfirst
wartimeEnigmasignal.By11MarchCol.LouisRivet,headoftheFrenchsecretservice,waswriting
inhisdiary:‘ThedecryptsoftheEnigmamachinearebecominginterestingandnumerous.’During
themonthsthatfollowed,however,materialwasreadfartooslowly–outof‘realtime’–toinfluence
eventsonthebattlefield.Instead,Alliedintelligenceofficersstrovetomakesenseofajumbleof
humintwarnings,ofvaryingdegreesofplausibility,aboutwhenHitlerintendedtostrikeintheWest.
ThefirstofthesehadcomeinthepreviousNovemberwhenMajorGijsbertSas,Dutchmilitary
attachéinBerlin,receivedadramatictip-offfromhisfriendColonelHansOsteroftheAbwehr:the
Wehrmacht,saidOster,wouldlaunchafull-scaleoffensiveagainsttheBritishandFrencharmieson
the12thofthatmonth.Thiscoincidedwithseveralotheridenticalorsimilarwarnings–includingan
importantonefromCol.Moravec’sCzechsinLondon,relayedbytheirmaninSwitzerlandfrom
AgentA-54,theAbwehr ’sPaulThummel.Whennothinghappenedon12November,theBritishand
FrenchchiefsofstaffassumedthattheywerethevictimsofNazidisinformation.TheDutchalready
suspectedSasofbeingadoubleagent,andthecredibilityoftheothersources,includingA-54,
sufferedaccordingly.Yetthewarningswerecorrect.Hitlerhadindeedintendedtostrikein
November.Hewasenragedthathisgeneralsinsisteduponalast-minutepostponementuntilspring,
becausethearmywasunreadytomove.Herewasavividillustrationofapreceptlateradvancedbya
BritishArmyintelligenceofficer:‘Perfectintelligenceinwarmustofnecessitybeout-of-dateand
thereforeceasestobeperfect…Wedealnotwiththetrue,butwiththelikely.’
ThenextexcitementtookplaceonedayinJanuary1940:thickfogcausedaGermancourier
aircraftflownbyMajorErichHönmannstoforced-landinneutralBelgium.Localpolicearrestedthe
pilotandhispassenger,anofficernamedReinberger,interruptingthemastheyattemptedtoburn
paperstheycarried,andretrievedthecharredsheetsfromastove.Withinforty-eighthourstheFrench
andBritishhighcommandswerereadingtheWehrmacht’splanforitsintendedinvasionofFrance
andtheLowCountries,focusedonathrustthroughHollandandBelgium.Herewasatextbook
exampleofagenuineintelligencecoup,withwhollyunhelpfulconsequences.TheFrenchwere
confirmedintheirconvictionthattheGermanswouldattackthroughBelgiumastheyhaddonein
1914,andasallFrance’sdeploymentsanticipated.TheBritishsuspectedanenemydeception:the
materialseemedtoogoodtobetrue.GuyLiddellofMI5wrotewearilyon14January:‘AGerman
aeroplanecamedowninBelgium…withcertainpapersfoundonthepilotindicatingprojectedattack
bytheGermansonBelgiumandHolland.Itlooksratherasifthismayhavebeenpartofthescheme
forthewarofnerves.’CadoganattheForeignOfficedescribedreceiving‘completeplanofGerman
invasionoftheLowCountries.Veryodd.Butonecan’tignorethesethings,andallprecautionstaken.’
KennethStrongwroteruefullyafterwards:‘SooftenIhavehearditsaidthatifweonlyhadthe
plansoftheothersidethingswouldbesimple:whentheyactuallycameourwaywefoundgreat
difficultyinpersuadingourselvesthattheyweregenuine.’Mostimportant,however,thecapture
immediatelyforfeitedallvirtue,becausetheGermanproprietorsoftheplanknewthattheAllieshad
it.Thus,Hitlerinsistedonchangingtheinvasionconcept,tothrustinsteadthroughtheArdennes,
whichprovedtheoneauthenticstrategicinspirationofhislife.Herewasanothercriticallessonabout
intelligence,especiallyimportantforcodebreakers:capturedmaterialbecameworthlessifits
originatorsdiscoveredthatitwasinenemyhands.
AlexanderCadogannotedinhisdiaryfor19January1940thatStewartMenziesnowseemedto
expecttheGermanstoattacksoonafter25January,andaddeddismissively,‘buthe’srather
mercurial,andratherhastyandsuperficial(likemyself!)’.Ifthisremarksomewhatshort-changedthe
diarist,itwasscarcelyaringingendorsementof‘C’.Therewasonefurtherstrand:low-grade
AbwehrmessagesdecryptedbyMI5’sRadioIntelligenceServiceofferedindicationsaboutthe
loomingonslaught.Atthattime,however,machinerywaslackingtoanalysesuchmaterial,tofeedit
intothemilitarycommandsystemandensurethatnoticewastakenbycommanders.Inthatpre-Ultra
universe,politicians,diplomatsandgeneralswerechronicallyscepticalaboutintelligenceofall
kinds.WhenanewwarningreachedMI6viaMoravec’s‘LondonCzechs’–thatAbwehrofficerPaul
ThummelexpectedagreatWehrmachtthruston10May,itvanishedinthewelterof‘noise’that
spring.
The9AprilGermaninvasionofNorwaycaughttheWesternAlliestotallybysurprise.Thoughno
decryptswereavailable,theAdmiraltyignoredormisreadplentifulcluesaboutHitler ’sintentions.
WhentheWehrmacht’samphibiousforcesbegantolandontheNorwegiancoast,theRoyalNavy’s
majorunitswerefaraway,awaitingananticipatedbreakoutintotheAtlanticbyGermanbattleships.
Throughtheweeksthatfollowed,WehrmachteavesdropperseasilytrackedtheBritishbrigades
strugglingtoaidthelittleNorwegianarmy,whileintelligencelearnedlittleornothingaboutthe
invaders’lightningmovements.
On10May1940,HitlerlaunchedhisBlitzkriegintheWest.Thepanzerssweptthroughthe
Ardennes,acrosstheMeuse,andthencetotheChannelcoastandintotheheartofFrance.Muchofthe
informationsentbackfromthefrontbyFrenchunitswassofancifulthataheadquartersintelligence
officer,AndréBeaufre,dismisseditcontemptuouslyasa‘fictionflood’.Gen.MauriceGamelin,the
Alliedcommander-in-chief,rejectedeveryreportthatcontradictedhisobsessivebeliefthatthe
GermansstillplannedtomaketheirmainattackthroughBelgium.
ThecampaignprovedatriumphfortheGermanarmy’sintelligencedepartment,aswellasforits
generals.Ananglophileandbonviveur,Lt.Col.UlrichLiss,headedForeignArmiesWest–FHW,the
Wehrmacht’sprincipalintelligenceevaluationdepartment.Liss,whowasexceptionallyableand
energetic,calledsigint‘thedarlingofallintelligencechiefs’,becauseitcouldbetrustedasspies
couldnot–andinMay1940thebestofitwasinthehandsofhisownstaff.Duringthelong,static
winter,GermaninterceptorshadidentifiedthelocationsofmostoftheAllies’formations,much
assistedbytheinsecurityoftheFrencharmy’swireless-operatorsandheadquartersstaffs,whooften
discussedplansanddeploymentsinplainlanguage.Col.Handeeming,radiointelligence’s
interceptionchiefwithArmyGroupA,wasexplicitlycommissionedtomonitortheFrenchSeventh
Army’sadvanceintoBelgium,whichhedidwithnotableefficiency.
Liss’smenalsobenefitedfromsecuringvastnumbersofAlliedprisoners.Allarmiesgleaned
muchfromPoWinterrogation.Throughoutthewar,eveniffewprisonersknowinglybetrayed
secrets,amidtheshockofcapturemostgavetheircaptorsmorethantheregulation‘name,rankand
number ’.Rommel’sintelligencestafffoundthatBritishprisonerstalkedfreelyuntilalatestageofthe
NorthAfricancampaign.OneofMontgomery’sofficersenthusedtotheGermans,withalmostinsane
indiscretion,thatEighthArmy’sradiomonitoringservicewas‘brilliantineveryrespect’.AGerman
wrotethatBritishofficerswererepeatedlycaptured‘carryingimportantlists,codesandmaps’.Itwas
astandardtechniqueforintelligenceofficerstoengagePoWsinapparentlyinnocentconversation
aboutnon-militarysubjects.TheWehrmacht’s‘GuidelinesfortheinterrogationofEnglishprisoners
ofwar ’,datedBerlin,16April1940,urgedcommanderswheneverpossibletouseinterrogators
familiarwithBritainandtheBritish.‘Ifcordiallyaddressed,’saidthebriefingnote,‘every
Englishmanwillatonceanswerallquestionsentirelyfrankly.’Beyondimmediatetacticalissues,the
IntelligenceDepartmentadvised:
SpecialvalueissetonprobingprevailingeconomicandsocialcircumstancesinEngland.Answerstothefollowingquestionsare
useful:
a)WhatareyoutoldaboutHitler?
b)WhatareyoutoldabouttheNazis?
c)WhatareyoutoldabouttheGestapo?
d)WhatareyoutoldabouttheJews?
e)WhatareyoutoldaboutfoodconditionsinGermany?
f)Whatareyoutoldaboutmilitarysuccesses?
g)Howdoyoumakepropaganda?
h)Howarewomenandchildrencaredfor?
i)Doyoutakecareofelderlyparentsnolongerabletowork,whosesonsaresoldiers?…
k)Whatisthefoodsituation–especiallymeat,vegetables,eggs,butter,andbread?
l)Whatdoyouthinkoftheblack-out?
m)WhoiscurrentlythemostpopularmaninEngland?
n)WhodoyouconsiderthemostforcefulpersonalityintheBritishcabinet?
o)DoyoulistentoGermanradio?
p)Doyoulike[Lord]Haw-Haw[theNazipropagandabroadcasterWilliamJoyce]?
q)HowareyourrelationswiththeFrench?
r)DoyoubelievethatGermanyisbentonworldconquest?
s)Wouldyoumakepeacetomorrow?
ThebehaviourofmostPoWswasstronglyinfluencedbytheirownnation’simmediate
circumstances.Atthistime,whenAlliedfortuneswereplumbingthedepths,areportonthehandfulof
GermanPoWsinBritishhandsrecordedgloomily:‘Theofficers(andmostofthemen)werequite
immunetopropaganda,thinkHitlerisagodandrefusetobelieveasinglewordoftheBritishnews.’
Bycontrast,aSouthAfricanRAFpilotnamedSgtEdwardWunschprovidedhisGermancaptorswith
ahighlysympatheticviewoftheNazicause,asrecordedbyhisinterrogator:‘LikeallSouthAfricans
whohaveenteredDulagLuft,Wunschisanunashamedanti-Semite…[Hesays]Thereisnohatred
towardsGermanyinSouthAfrica,noenthusiasmforthewaratall.Mostpeoplebelievethenonsense
pressandpropagandatellthemaboutGermanatrocitiesbut…W.thinksitpossiblethatoneday
SouthAfricacouldagreetoaseparatepeace,ifGermanycontinuestobemilitarilysuccessful
[author ’sitalics].’
TheAllieslostthe1940battleforFranceformanyreasons.Ithasbeenasourceoffiercecontroversy
eversince,whethertheFrencharmy’sdefeatresultedfromafailureofjudgementbyMaurice
Gamelin,Alliedcommander-in-chief,orinsteadfromanationalmoralcollapse.Itisunlikelythatany
amountofintelligenceoradvancewarningcouldhavechanged1940outcomes.TheGermanarmy
showeditselfanincomparablymoreeffectivefightingforcethantheAllies’,andtherewouldbeno
victoriesuntilthatchanged.IfBritishandFrenchintelligencewaspoorin1940,sowaseverything
else.
AstheContinentwasevacuated,therewasalateflurryofbuccaneeringbysecretserviceofficers
andfreelances:MI6’sMajorMontyChidson,aformerheadoftheHaguestation,rescuedapriceless
haulofindustrialdiamondsfromAmsterdam.PeterWilkinsongotmostofthePolishgeneralstaff
outofFrance.TommyDavies,apeacetimedirectoroftheCourtauldstextilebusiness,escapedfrom
itsCalaisplantwithaloadofplatinumhoursbeforetheGermansarrived.Buttheselittlecoupswere
fleabitesinthegreatschemeofaffairs.MI6hadmadenocontingencyplansforstay-behindagents,to
reportfromFranceintheeventofitsoccupationbytheNazis,andBroadwaywouldprobablyhave
beenaccusedofdefeatismhaditdoneso.Throughmanymonthsthatfollowed,Britain’sintelligence
serviceswerethusalmostblindtoeventsontheContinent,tothefrustrationoftheprimeminister.
Beleagueredontheirisland,theybecamedependentforknowledgeofHitler ’sdoingsonthevagaries
ofairreconnaissance,andreportsfromneutraldiplomatsandcorrespondents.
Thesecurityserviceexploredthelimitsofthepossibleandtheacceptableinhandlingastreamof
AbwehragentswhodescendedonBritain,andwerepromptlycaptured.MI5spurnedtortureasa
meansofinterrogation,butinSeptember1940atCamp020,theservice’sinterrogationcentreat
LatchmereHousenearHamCommon,oneofitsofficersassaultedandbatteredthecapturedAbwehr
agent‘Tate’–HarryWilliamson–untilhewasdraggedoffhim.GuyLiddelldeploredthisepisode,
sayingthatheobjectedto‘Gestapomethods’onbothmoralandprofessionalgrounds.Col.Alexander
ScotlandwaslikewisepreventedfrominjectingWilliamsonwithdrugs.NavalIntelligenceDivision
interrogatorstesteddrugsoneachotherasameansofextractinginformation,andconcludedthatit
wasawasteoftime.Skilledquestioning,theydecided,wasnotmerelymoreethical,butmore
effective.
Asthenextactofthegreatglobaldramaunfolded–Hitler ’sairassaultonBritain–neither
BroadwaynorBletchleyParkhadmuchtocontribute.ThemostsignificantaidtoFighterCommand
initsepicstruggletorepelGöring’sairfleetswaswirelesstrafficanalysisofthefloodofMorse
fromtheGermans’newFrench,Belgian,DutchandNorwegianbases,togetherwithmonitoringof
LuftwaffecockpitchatterbytheGermanlinguistsoftheRAF’sinfantYService,mostofthem
women.
Theprimeministerandthechiefsofstaffwereformanymonthspreoccupied,evenobsessed,by
twoquestions:wouldtheGermansinvade;andifso,when?InthemadmoodprevailinginLondonin
theautumnof1940,ablendofheroicdefianceandabsurdity,theWarOffice’sdirectorofmilitary
intelligencesuggestedexploitingcapturedAbwehragentstotrytoprovoketheGermansinto
hasteninganinvasion,whichhefeltsurecouldbedefeatedbytheRoyalNavyandtheBritishArmy.
ThisproposalfoundnofavourinWhitehall.MeanwhilethedisasterinFrancehadendowedthe
Wehrmachtwithalmostmagicalpowersinthemindsofthegenerals,manyofwhomconvinced
themselvesthatHitlermightlaunchanamphibiousassaultonBritainwithonlyafewweeks’
preparation,offeringnonoticetothedefenders.
TheRoyalNavy’sCommanderGeoffreyColpoyswasresponsiblefordeliveringtoDowning
Streeteachdayat1p.m.areportfromtheSpecialInvasionWarningCommittee,whichformostof
theautumntookitforgrantedthataGermanassaultwasimminent,andconcerneditselfchieflywith
thetiming.TheJointIntelligenceCommittee,chairedbytheForeignOffice’sVictor‘Bill’CavendishBentinck,onlyoncesoundedthealarmtosuggestthatinvasionwasimminent,on7September,when,
asBentinckhimselfnotedsardonicallylater,hehimselfwasbrieflyabsentandthearmy’ssomewhat
unstabledirectorofintelligence–thesamemanwhoadvocatedincitingtheWehrmachttoland–
temporarilyheldthechair.Churchillhimselfwasalwaysscepticalaboutaninvasion,buthedeemedit
politicallyimperativetosustaintheBritishpeople’sbeliefinthethreatnotonlyin1940,but
throughoutthefollowingyearalso,topromotetheirvigilanceandsenseofpurpose.On31JulySir
AlexanderCadoganexpressedhisownconvictionthattheGermanswouldnotcome,butwould
insteadthrustatGibraltarandEgypt,thenadded,‘our“intelligence”givesnothingtocorroboratethis
theory.Butthenthey’reawfullybad.’NowhereintheworldwereBritishagentsproviding
informationofmuchassistancetothewareffort.TheBritishC-in-CinSingapore,Air-MarshalSir
RobertBrooke-Popham,wroteinfrustration:‘LittleornorelianceisplaceduponMI6information
byanyauthoritieshereandlittlevaluableinformationappearstobeobtained.’Thesamewastrue
nearerhome.
FormanymonthsaftertheGermanoccupationofWesternEurope,theonlynationstillabletoexploit
secretsourcesonalargescalewastheneutralSovietUnion,throughitsnetworksinBelgium,
GermanyandSwitzerland.Inthosedaysitsagentsdidnotevenneedtotroublewithwireless:they
simplypassedreportstotheirnearestSovietdiplomaticmission.InMay1940theGRU’sLeopold
TreppermovedfromBrusselstoParis,takingwithhimhismistress,theexoticallynamedGeorgiede
Winter,atwenty-year-oldAmerican,andleavinghisdeputyAnatoliGourevitchtoarrangethe
Trepperfamily’sreturntoMoscow.Gourevitch’sownpersonalaffairswerescarcelyuncomplicated.
Underhiscoverasa‘Uruguayanbusinessman’hehadasuccessionofgirlfriends,butfeltobligedto
breakoffrelationswiththeprettiestwhensherevealedthatherfatherknewSouthAmericawell.‘In
othercircumstances,’hewrotewistfully,‘Icouldprobablyhavelovedher,butsuchgoodfortuneis
deniedtoasecretagent.’Thereafter,however,heformedafriendshipwithaneighbouringfamily
namedBarcza,whoseelderlyHungarianhusbandwasmarriedtoMargaret,amuchyoungerBelgian
blondewithaneight-year-oldson.Followingherhusband’ssuddendeath,Gourevitchbeganan
intenseaffairwithher.MikhailMakarov,theotherGRUcareerofficerinBelgium,wasalsoleading
whatGourevitchdescribedprimlyas‘anexcessivelydissipatedlife’,inwhichprostitutesplayeda
conspicuousrole.
TheGermaninvasionofBelgiumgaveGourevitchsomebadmoments:Brusselspolicearrested
hissupposedEnglishfriendandlanguageteacher,whoturnedouttobeanAbwehragent;theman
waspromptlyliberatedwhenhiscompatriotsoverranthecapital.TheGRUnetwork’scovercompany
‘AuRoi’collapsedwhenitsJewishfrontmenfledandthebusinesswassequestered.Moscowordered
GourevitchtotakeovercontroloftheBelgianoperation.HeenteredMargaretBarczaonCentre’s
books–allegedlywithoutherknowledge–asasourceunimaginativelycodenamed‘theBlonde’.The
mostbelievableaspectofhisownlateraccountofthewholesagaisitsemphasisontherickety,
racketynatureofaspyringthathistory–especiallySoviethistory–hasdignifiedasoneofthegreat
secretoperationsofalltime.GourevitchassertedthatLeopoldTrepper ’smuch-vauntedintelligence
networkinFranceandBelgium‘wascomposedalmostentirelyofhisoldPalestinianfriends’,and
providedMoscowwithnousableintelligenceaboutGermany’sdescentsonPoland,Scandinaviaor
WesternEurope.ItseemsunlikelythattheRussianslearnedmuchmorefromitsactivitiesduringthe
yearthatfollowedthanChurchillandhisgeneralsgleanedfromtheirmorningpapers.
IntheabsenceofseriousBritishmilitaryoperationssaveinNorthAfrica,secretwarbecamea
massivegrowthactivity,impelledbytheprimeministerhimself.SpecialOperationsExecutivewas
createdinJuly1940,to‘setEuropeablaze’,whilethearmedforcesspawnedcommandos,
paratroopersandastringof‘privatearmies’,notablyintheMiddleEast.Newrecruitsofallkinds
floodedintoBroadway,someofthemexotic.‘Writersofthrillers,’wrotethesupremelycynical
MalcolmMuggeridge,‘tendtogravitatetothesecretserviceassurelyasthementallyunstable
becomepsychiatrists,ortheimpotentpornographers.’ThuswasGrahamGreenedispatchedto
Freetown,SierraLeone,Muggeridgehimself–aveteranforeigncorrespondent–toLourenço
Marques,inPortugueseMozambique,andthejournalistKimPhilbywelcomedintoBroadway.It
becameasourceofdismaytocareerintelligenceofficers,protectiveofMI6’sreputation,thatits
wartimerecruitswholatercommandedmostpublicattentionwerealleithermavericksortraitors.
LackingitsownagentsontheContinent,BroadwayturnedtotheEuropeanexilegovernmentsin
Londonforassistanceinidentifyingsources.ThePolesbegantobuildimpressivenetworksintheir
owncountry,thoughtheysufferedgrievouslyfromthefact–thenofcourseunknowntothem–that
theGermansreadtheciphersinwhichtheycommunicatedwiththeiragents.FrantišekMoravecand
hisCzechgroupachievedformalrecognitionastheintelligencearmoftheirgovernment;MI6
providedthemwithwirelessfacilitiesanddocuments.TheCzechsestablishedanewbaseinthreelittle
adjoiningsuburbanhousesinRosendaleRoad,WestDulwich,untiltheseweredestroyedbythe
Luftwaffe,thenlatein1940movedtoanewbuildinginBayswater.MI6didnot,however,givethem
money.Moravec,afterspendingthelastofthecashhehadbroughtoutofPrague,wasobligedto
negotiatealoanof£50,000,topayhisnetwork’soutgoingsof£3,000amonth.Forsometimehe
continuedtoreceiveEastEuropeanmaterialviaZürich–CaptainKarelSedlacekhadservedas
Moravec’sstationchieftheresince1934,undercoverasanewspapercorrespondent;sincehelacked
anyliterarygiftshewasobligedtopayaghosttowritecopyinhisname.TheAbwehr ’sPaul
ThummelusedtheCzechofficerashislinktoLondon;whenhewasarrestedbytheGestapoinMarch
1942,Moravec’slittlegroupranoutofsources.
TheBritishenjoyedoneimmensepieceofgoodfortunefollowingtheirevictionfromthe
Continent:nowheredidtheGermanscapturepeopleordocumentsthatbetrayedAlliedprogressin
crackingEnigma.Between1940and1944manyFrenchmen,includinghundredsofthousandsof
servantsoftheVichypuppetregime,collaboratedwiththeiroccupiers.ButVichy’smilitary
intelligenceofficers,andseveralPolesattachedtothemwhowereprivytothepioneeringEnigma
codebreakingoperation,revealednothingevenlaterinthewar,whentheywereexposedtoenemy
interrogation.ThecapaciousnetscastacrossEuropebytheNazisfocusedoverwhelminglyon
huntingdissenters,notmachines.Intheearlyyearsofoccupation,whenmostpeopleintheconquered
societiesacquiescedintheirfate,Berlin’sspiesandpolicemenuncoveredlittletoruffletheirmasters’
complacency,andmercifullynothingthatcausedthemtodoubtthesecurityoftheirown
communications.
Inthewinterof1940–41,noneoftheprincipalbelligerentsknewmuchmoreabouteachother ’s
affairsthantheylearnedfromstudyingtheinternationalpressandwatchingsuchmovementsasthey
couldseeoftherivalarmies,naviesandairfleets.Mostofthesuccessfulcodebreakingthatwas
takingplacewasbeingdonebytheGermans,andespeciallybytheKriegsmarine’sB-Dienst.The
Britishlackedpowertoaccomplishanythingsavethefeedingoftheirownpeople.Hitlerpreparedto
launchthemostdramaticandambitiouslungeofhiscareer,theassaultontheSovietUnion,anact
thatcouldonlyhavebeenundertakenbyamaneitherbereftofaccurateintelligenceaboutthe
economicstrengthofhisintendedvictim,orrecklesslyindifferenttoit.
2 S H A D O W I NG C A NA R I S
TheGermanshadmadethemselvesmastersofEurope,andshowntheWehrmachttobethemost
formidablefightingforceintheworld.Bycontrast,whateverthelimitationsoftheBritishandother
Alliedintelligenceservices,thoseofHitler ’sAbwehrwereincomparablyworse.Inthesummerof
1940thechiefsoftheNazis’information-gatheringmachinetoyedwithaschemetoplantanagenton
awreckedshipofftheEnglishsouthcoast,thoughtheynevercameupwithacrediblenotionofwhat
suchahaplesscastawaymightachievethere.TheyalsodiscussedlandingagentsinKent,whowould
beinvitedtoscalethewhitecliffs,aplanthatwasfrustratedbyashortageofspieswith
mountaineeringskills.MeanwhiletheLuftwaffe’sintelligencedepartmentmisjudgedeveryaspectof
theBattleofBritain,fromrespectiveaircraftstrengthsandlossestotargetselection.InSeptember
1940,followingtheinterrogationsofthefirstenemyspieslandedinBritain,KennethStrongofWar
Officeintelligenceprofessedhimselfbaffled.HecouldnotreconcilehislifelongrespectforGerman
efficiencywiththerisiblemanagementoftheNazis’espionageactivities.
TheAbwehrbungledtheselection,training,briefingandequipmentofagentsforserviceabroad;
seldomweretheyevenprovidedwithdecentforgedpassports.Itishardtodistinguishbetweenreality
andfantasyinthedoingsofitsoperationalsection,AbwehrII,becauseitswardiarywascompiledto
impresshigherauthority,andthusincludedreportsfromagentswhoneverexisted,aboutoperations
thatnevertookplace.Itschief,AdmiralWilhelmCanaris,whowasregardedfordecadesafterthewar
asanimportantpersonalityandevenasaherooftheResistancetoHitler,wasinrealityatemporiser
wholackedboththemoralcouragetochallengetheNaziswhomhedespised,andtheskillstorunan
effectivesecretserviceintheirinterests.
ThefirstmantograspthiswasnotaGerman,butayoungEnglishhistorianwithadisdainfor
mankindingeneral,andprofessionalsecretserviceofficersinparticular.ThemannerinwhichHugh
Trevor-RoperbecamenotthenemesisofCanaris,butinsteadhisshadow,isoneofthemore
remarkablestoriesofthesecretwar.Thebrilliant,testy,supremelyarrogantOxforddonwho,while
nothomosexual,professedadeepdislikeofwomen,hadjustwrittenhisfirstbook,astudyof
ArchbishopLaudwhichheoftenrereadduringthewaryears:‘Iamforeverdiscoveringyetmore
exquisitebeauties,lurkingunsuspectedamongyetprofoundertruths.’Hespenttheyearsbetween
1940and1945monitoringthewirelesstrafficoftheAbwehr,firstforMI5thenforMI6.TrevorRoperlivedandbreathedCanarisandhisorganisation,exceptondayswhenhewentfoxhunting.In
growingdegree,andcomprehensivelyfrom1943onwards,theEnglishacademiclearnedmoreabout
Germany’sintelligenceservicesthananymanintheNazihighcommandknew–certainlymorethan
Canarishimself,becauseTrevor-RopercouldidentifytheAbwehr ’smanyfalseinformants,
controlledbytheso-called‘TwentyCommittee’ofintelligenceofficersinLondonchairedbyMI5’s
J.C.Masterman.Theyoungacademicmayhavenurturedaprivatelonging,notunusualamong
intellectuals,toshowhimselfalsoamanofaction.Hewasimmenselyrespectfulofalankythough
never-metcousin,RichardTrevor-Roper,ownerofasmallestateinWales,whojoinedtheRAF’s
BomberCommandandservedasrear-gunnertothedambustingVCGuyGibson,winningaDFMand
DFCbeforebeingkilledinactiononhisfiftiethoperation,agedtwenty-nine.
InDecember1939HughTrevor-Roper,thentwenty-five,wassummonedfromMertonCollegeto
workalongsideWalterGill,alecturerinelectricitywhohadachievedcelebrityascollegebursarby
installinglightinginMerton’squadrangles.DuringWorldWarI‘Gilly’hadservedinanarmy
wirelesssectioninEgypt,whereherananaerialuptheGreatPyramid.Helistedhisrecreationsin
Who’sWhoasriding,wirelessresearchand‘rebukingsin’.NowheandTrevor-Roperformedthe
nucleusoftheRadioSecurityService,abranchofMI5initiallyquarteredinthecellsatWormwood
ScrubsjailinwestLondon.Dayafterday,PostOfficeoperators,previouslyemployedtocatch
unlicensedprivatewirelesstransmissions,scouredtheairwavesforsignalsfromenemyagents
transmittingfromBritain,whomitwouldthenbetheroleoftheMertonpairtoscotch.
GillandTrevor-Roperfoundthemselvesfrustratedbytheemptinessoftheether,orratherbythe
absenceofsuchtrafficastheysought.Theywerefailing,soitseemed.Onlyslowlydidtheycometo
understandthatthiswasnotbecausetheirowneavesdropperswereincompetent,butbecauseno
Germanspiesweresignallinghome.Findingtheiroriginalfunctionredundant,ontheirowninitiative
thetwodonswidenedtheirresearches:theybegantogatherinterceptsfromstationsinEuropethat
usedknownAbwehrcallsigns.Oneevening,intheflattheysharedinthewestLondonsuburbof
Ealing,overteaandbiscuitstheycrackedanAbwehrhand-cipher–alowerencryptionsystemused
byCanaris’sbasesforcommunicationswithout-stationsandagentslackingEnigmamachines.
Trevor-Roper,afluentGermanlinguist,startedtoreaditsmessages.
WhenthiscametothenoticeofAlastairDenniston,chiefofBletchleyPark,hewasnotamused.
TheRSS’samateursweretoldthattheyweremeddlinginmattersofnoproperconcerntothem.
DennistonaddedcrosslythattheAbwehrmaterialwasunimportantanyway.Infairness,hisdismay
abouttheRSS’sfreelancingreflectedmorethanpettyjealousy.Months,indeedyears,layahead
beforeBletchley’scodebreakingoperationsachievedmaturity,butfromtheoutsetitwasobviousthat
iftheGermansgainedaninklingofwhatwasbeingachieved,thegamewouldbeover.Themore
diffusedwasBritishcryptographicactivity,thegreatertheriskofaleak.Broadwaysteppedin,tovent
itsownjustifiedanger,whenitwaslearnedthatTrevor-Roper ’sreportonAbwehractivitiesinNorth
AfricawascirculatedtoadistributionlistthatincludedthePostOfficewirelesssection.
GillandTrevor-Roper,stubbornandmischievousmenboth,persistednonetheless;theyweresoon
readingmuchoftheAbwehr ’strafficwithitsout-stations.Tothedons’glee,evenwhenBletchley
establisheditsowncelltomonitorthesameCanarislinks,itwasRSSandnotGC&CSwhichbroke
thenextfourhand-ciphers.Inthespringof1941RSSacquiredanewinterceptioncentrewith
AmericanequipmentatHanslopeParkinBuckinghamshire,andbegantoestablishitsownoutstationsabroad.Inthecourseofthewar,thelittleservicepassedonamillionsignalstoBletchley.
MI6eventuallymadeasuccessfultakeoverbidforRSS,whichwaslogical,givenBroadway’s
suzeraintyoversignalsintelligence.Trevor-RoperfoundhimselfworkingwithStewartMenzies’
communicationssupremo,oneofthesecretservice’smoreexoticfigures,ColonelRichardGambierParry.Thecolonelwasoneofmanyluminariesof‘secretshows’whowasabletoexploittohisown
advantagetheirfreedomfromaccountabilitytoaservicehierarchy.Gambier-ParryestablishedMI6’s
communicationscentreatWhaddonHallinBuckinghamshire,whichhealsomadehispersonal
residence.Akeenhorseman,hetookoverthepre-warowner ’spackofhoundsandplacedthe
huntsmenonBroadway’spayroll;ononenotableoccasion,thehoundsinhotpursuitstreamed
throughthesecuritygateofBletchleyPark,arousinginthemindofamountedspectatorintheknow
aboutitsactivitiesanidyllicvisionofthebrutesgorgingonhalf-digesteddecrypts.Gambier-Parry
livedlikeamedievalbaron.Trevor-Roper,whoknewhimasafellow-foxhunter,marvelled:‘Inthe
worldofneuroticpolicemenandtimidplacemenwhorulethesecretservice,hemoveslikeFalstaff,
orsomefigurefromBalzac,ifnotRabelais.’ItshouldbeaddedthatfortherestofthewarGambierParryranMI6’scommunicationswithenergyandflair.
HughTrevor-RoperbecameheadoftheintelligencesectionofMI6’sRadioAnalysisBureau,run
byFelixCowgill,aformerIndianpoliceman.Cowgillintenselydislikedhisnewjunior,whomhe
deemedguiltyof‘irreverentthoughtsanddangerouscontacts’.TheOxfordhistoriantookitupon
himselftogowellbeyondtheproductionofrawintelligence,conductingevaluationandanalysisina
fashionMI6hadalwaysspurned,becauseitlackedofficerscleverenoughtodosuchwork.TheRAB
begantoproduce‘purpleprimers’,localguidestoAbwehrpersonalitiesandagentsaroundthe
world,whichsoonrantomanypages.ThebureaunotedthattheItalians,whobeforethewarhad
enjoyedsomenotableintelligencesuccesses,werenowalmostentirelydependentformaterialonthe
Germans,andthusacquiredtheirweaknesses.
Inthesummerof1941Trevor-Roperacquiredanassistant,twenty-one-year-oldCharlesStuart,
whohadjustleftChristChurchwithaFirstinhistory,andthetwowerejoinedbyanotherOxford
man,GilbertRyle.PatrickReilly,agiftedyoungdiplomatwhobecameStewartMenzies’personal
assistant,thoughttheirlittlecell‘ateamofabrillianceunparalleledanywhereintheIntelligence
machine’.Trevor-RoperbegantoserveassecretaryofthejointMI5–MI6WirelessCommittee,in
whichrolehecametoknowalmosteveryonesignificantinthesecretworld.Thepeering,
bespectacledhistorianbecameoneoftheoutstandingBritishintelligenceofficersofthewar.His
masteryofGermanoperationsincreasedsteadily,especiallyafterBletchley’sDillwynKnoxbroke
intotheprincipalAbwehrmachinecipherinDecember1941.WhilethechiefsofBroadwaybelieved
–moresofollowingtheVenlofiasco–thattheirenemies’intelligenceofficerswerewizardsof
guile,fromanearlystageTrevor-RoperbecameconvincedoftheGermans’institutional
incompetence.AsfortheAbwehr ’schief,hesaid,farfrombeingamasterspyCanariswasalostlittle
mandriftingonthetidesoffate.
AdmiralWilhelmCanariscamefromafamilyofRhinelandindustrialists.AfterserviceasaU-boat
officerinWorldWarIhebecameengagedinright-wingpolitics,whileplayingaroleinrebuilding
theGermannavy.Aseniorofficer ’s1926personalreportextolledhisskillsatthemilitary-political
interface:‘Withthefinestfeelforforeignpsychologyandmentality,togetherwithuncommon
linguisticability,heknowsinexemplaryfashionhowtodealwithforeigners(fromthelowesttothe
prominent).’Interestingly,however,othernavalofficers,includingErichRaederandKarlDönitz,
dislikedCanaris,thinkinghimsly.
DuringtheearlyyearsofHitler ’sruleheingratiatedhimselfenthusiasticallyandsuccessfullywith
theforemostNazis.In1935,agedforty-eight,hewasappointedchiefofGermany’sintelligence
service,controllingbothespionageabroadandcounter-espionageathome,thoughHimmlerranhis
owndomesticsecurityservice,theRSHA,underErnstKaltenbrunner,withtheGestapoasits
enforcementarm.AsTrevor-Ropernoted,‘AllGermanpoliticiansofconsequencesoughttosetup
theirowninformationbureaus(justastheyalsosoughttoestablishprivatearmies)asadditional
supportsfortheirpersonalauthority;anditwasessentialtothepurposeofthesebureausthattheir
resultsshouldbetheprivatepropertyoftheirchiefs.’
TheRSHAwasnomoreefficientthantheAbwehr,butitwieldedmoreinfluencethroughitsdirect
subordinationtoHimmler.MI6notedthatitachievedgoodpenetrationofneutralembassiesinBerlin,
whichyieldedusefulinformation.Meanwhile,Canaris’sservicehadstationsaroundtheworldand
intelligencecellswithineveryformationoftheWehrmacht.Theadmiral’searlyyearsofofficesawa
dramaticexpansionofhisempire;heachievedareputationforadministrativeefficiencyand
diplomaticskills,bothinhishandlingoftheNazihierarchyandindealingwithprominentforeigners.
Untilatleast1942,theservice’sprestigestoodhighbothinsideGermanyandabroad.
Canariswasinstinctivelysecretive,evenbeforehebecameaspymaster,andmoresothereafter.
WithintheramblingwarrenofofficesinarowofconvertedmansionsonBerlin’sTirpitzüfer,where
theAbwehrhaditsheadquartersuntilitwasbombedoutin1943,heseemedtoglidealmostinvisibly
fromoneroomtoanother.Sohedidtooonhisfrequenttravelstoothercountries,especiallySpain:a
signedportraitofFranco,itsdictator,adornedhisofficewall.Heseldomworeuniform–anoddity
inNazisociety,whichwasobsessedwithfancydress.Hewaselaboratelycourteous,notleastto
subordinates,andsomethingofahypochondriacwhotooktoomanypills.Herelaxedbyriding
regularlyandplayingasmartgameoftennis.Hispassionforanimalswasmuchremarked:hewas
followedaroundAbwehrheadquartersbytwodachshunds,towhichhetalkedconstantly.Oneofthem
oncefellillwhileCanariswasvisitingItaly,andhetelephonedatlengthtoBerlintodiscussits
condition.HisItaliancompanionsassumedthathewasspeakingincodeaboutgreatissuesofstate,
buthisobsessionwiththedogwasauthentic.Heoftensaidthathetrustedanimalsmorethanpeople;it
wasprobablymoreaccuratetosaythathelikedthembetter.Inconversation,whetherprofessionalor
social,hewasamasterofequivocation.FewpeoplewereeversurewhatCanarisreallythought,
whichwassupposedbycontemporariestoreflecthisdepthofcharacter.Morelikely,itmasked
chronicindecision.
AlthoughtechnicallyabranchofOKW,theAbwehrquicklybecameCanaris’spersonalfiefdom.
Throughoutthewarhismenachievedconsiderablesuccessinsuppressingdissentandcapturing
WesternAlliedagentsoperatinginHitler ’sempire,whichdidmuchtosustaintheadmiral’sstanding
inNazihighplaces:Col.FranzvonBentevegni,whorancounter-espionage,wasoneofCanaris’sfew
impressivesubordinateappointments.YettheRussianswereabletosustaintheirastonishing
espionageactivitiesinsideGermanyuntil1942,andmilitaryleakagespersisteduntil1945,evenifthe
hugematterofGermany’sbrokencodeslaybeyondCanaris’sremit.
Theagentshisofficersdispatchedtogatherinformationabroadwerealmostallunfitfortherole.It
isoddthatBerlinneverattemptedtorecruitspiestodispatchtoBritainwhomighthavepassedfor
gentlemen.Evenin1940,theaccentandmannersoftheupperclassremainedapassporttosocial
acceptanceinChurchill’sembattledisland.ThewriterCyrilConnollywroteanangrylettertotheNew
Statesmancomplainingthatwhenhehimselfwasdetainedasapossiblespy,hewasimmediately
releasedwhenitwasdiscoveredthathehadbeeneducatedatEton.TheexperienceoftheCambridge
Spies,deemedbeyondsuspicionasmembersoftheupper-middleclass,suggeststhatiftheAbwehr
haddispatchedtoBritainafewNaziswithpassabletablemannersandsomeskillasfly-castersor
grouse-shooters,theywouldhavebeenaskedtoallthebesthouses.
Asitwas,however,whentwoofCanaris’skeymen,Col.HansPieckenbrock,theheadof
intelligence,andCol.ErwinLahousen,headofsabotage,weresackedin1943,thiswasnogestureof
Nazispite,madeforpoliticalreasons;itwastheconsequenceoftheirobviousincompetenceandof
theirdepartments’failure.Germansecretoperationsabroaddeployedimmenselabourfornegligible
results.OneoftheAbwehr ’smostnotablerecruitswasnavallieutenantHeinrichGarbers.Hewasa
vegetablefarmer ’sson,apassionateNazi,whoin1938hadsailedacrosstheAtlanticinathirty-foot
yacht,theWindspiel,whichheconstructedhimself.AmidtheAlliednavalblockade,theGermans
devisedthenotionofdispatchingagentstofar-flungplacesinsailingboatstoohumbletoattractthe
attentionoftheenemy.In1941and1942GarbersmadeepicforaystoSouthAfricaandNamibia
respectively.ThereafterhecaptainedthelittleschoonerPassim,whichmadetwoimmensevoyagesat
anaveragespeedofsixknots.TheboatsailedunderthenameoftheSantaMaria,andflew
successivelyFrench,SpanishandPortuguesecoloursasGarbersdeemedappropriate.In1943he
carriedthreeAbwehrmen,codenamed‘Walter ’,‘Fred’and‘Jim’,toArgentina,inwhatheafterwards
describedlaconicallyas‘anuneventfulvoyageof65days’.
Inanauticalsenseitmaybetruethatnothingmuchhappened,butrelationsonboardwerepoisoned
bythemutualloathingofWalterandFred,whileJimwasperpetuallyprostratewithsea-sickness,
whichcosthimadrasticweightloss.Thepassengersweresuccessfullydeliveredtoareception
committeeofArgentinesympathisersatRiodelPlata,whopresentedthePassim’screwwithcoffee
andorangesbeforethelittlevesselturnedaboutandsailedhome.Garbers,plainlyamanofiron,
seemedwhollyuntroubledbyhisexperiences.HereturnedsafelytoEuropeandreceivedthe
Ritterkreuz.Thereisnoevidence,however,thathispassengerscontributedanythingtotheNaziwar
effort.Likewise,theHungarianairforceofficerCountLászlóAlmásycrossed2,000milesofNorth
AfricandeserttodelivertwoagentstoEgyptinMay1942,aremarkableachievement,andAlmásy
laterinspiredthenovelandfilmTheEnglishPatient,thoughitsversionofthisenthusiasticNaziwas
fanciful.Hispassengers,however,didnothingonarrivaltojustifytheirepicjourney.Nearerhome,it
becameincreasinglycleartotheBritishmonitoringtheAbwehr ’swirelessedreportsthatitsnetwork
ofoverseasstationsandinformantsproducedalmostnothingthatwasbothnewandtrue.
AsTrevor-Roperpursuedhisresearchesthroughtheever-growingharvestofBletchleydecrypts,
‘Wesoonbecameawarethat“thelittleAdmiral”wasafarmorecomplexandcontroversialcharacter
thanwehadsupposed.Astheincompetenceofhisorganisationwasprogressivelyrevealedtous,we
discovered,ordeduced,somethingofthepoliticsinwhichhewasinvolved,andwenotedhisfeverish
travels,ineverydirection,butespeciallytoSpain,whichdistinguishedhimsharplyfromourown
moresedentarychief’–StewartMenzies.Forseveraldecadesafterthewar,Canariswastreatedasa
majorfigureoftheera,thesubjectofseveralweightybiographies.Theforemostelementinthe
CanarismythologywasaclaimthathehadbeenasecretcrusaderagainstHitler,whohadgivenactive
assistancetotheAlliedcause.SeveralGermanwritersenergeticallypromotedthisview,becausetheir
post-warsocietywasdesperatetoidentifyvirtuousmenwhohaddaredtoraisetheirhandsagainstthe
vastevilofNazism,andsufferedmartyrdominconsequence.
Itisnowplainthatsuchclaimswereunfounded.Until1938Canariswasanardentsupporterofthe
Nazis,andforyearsthereafterHitlerfrequentlyusedhimasapersonalemissaryabroad.Theadmiral
workedamicablywithReinhardHeydrichoftheRSHA.Thetwofamiliessocialised:FrauCanaris
andtheexecutiveplanneroftheHolocaustsometimesplayedtheviolintogether.From1939onwards,
theadmiralbecameincreasinglygloomyandnervous–colleaguesnotedhimdrinkingheavily.
Trevor-RoperregardeditasanabsurddelusionthatCanariswasthedirectingbrainof‘theother
Germany’.TheAbwehr ’schief,inhisview,wasamanoflimitedgifts,whoconfinedhisanti-Nazi
activitiestomakinghisorganisationahavenforofficerswhosharedhisrisingdistasteforHitlerand
hissupporters,andwhoresistedactivecomplicityintheNazis’atrocities.Canaris’sfastidiousnature
recoiledfromthecoarsenessoftheirconduct,perhapsmorethanfromitsinsensatebarbarity.
TheonlyAbwehrofficerknowntohavebeenasourceforMI6wasHans-BerndtGiseviusin
Switzerland,aPrussianlawyerofgiantphysicalproportionswhoservedfiveyearsintheGestapo
andhatedit,beforetransferringtotheMinistryofInternalAffairsin1938andthencetotheAbwehr.
CanarissenthimtoZürichunderdiplomaticcoverasvice-consul,andthereafterhepassed
informationtoHalinaSzymańska,whomheknewwasaninformantforbothBritishandPolish
intelligence.Giseviusprovidedmaterialfortwenty-fivereportsdispatchedfromBerntoBroadway
betweenAugust1940andDecember1942,someofthemcitingCanaris’sprofessedopinions;also
amonghissourceswasHitler ’sfinanceminister,HjalmarSchacht.
Szymańska,theconduit,wastheformidableandbeautifulwifeoftheformerPolishmilitaryattaché
inBerlin,andoncedinedwithCanarisinBern.MuchofGisevius’smaterialwasaccurate:inJanuary
1941SzymańskapassedonhisreportaboutGermanaircraftstocks,togetherwiththeAbwehrman’s
opinionthataninvasionofBritainwas‘off’.InAprilshequotedGisevius’sview,basedon
informationfromSchacht,thatHitlerwouldinvadeRussiaduringthefollowingmonth–which
indeedwasthenhisintention.But,asusualwithintelligence,theGermanalsopassedonsome
rubbish:on28March1941hetoldSzymańskathatGermanforceswouldnottaketheoffensivein
Libya–twodaysbeforeRommellaunchedamajoronslaught.
Gisevius’scontribution,andthoseofahandfulofhiscolleagues,scarcelymadetheAbwehra
pillarofResistanceagainsttheNazis.Itswartimeshortcomingsweretheproductofindolenceand
incompetenceratherthanofconsideredtreachery.Canariswasapoordelegator,whochoseweak
subordinates.Germanintelligencehadonenotablesuccessabroad,insuborningYugoslavofficers
aheadoftheirarmy’s1941emergencymobilisation,intimetosabotagetheprocess,butthereafterits
espionageoperationswereuniformlyunsuccessful.TheadmiralwasnonethelesstoomuchaGerman
patriotactivelytoassisthiscountry’senemies.Likemanysuchpeopleofthetime,heharboured
muddledpoliticalviews.Amonarchistandaconservative,Franco’sSpainwashisspiritualhome;he
travelledthereasoftenashecould,notmerelytovisitthelargeMadridAbwehrHQatCalleClaudio
Coello151,butalsotocommunewithlike-mindedSpanishpoliticiansandgrandees.TheAbwehr ’s
ship-watchingserviceinSpain,theUnternehmenBodden,monitoringAlliedmovementsthroughthe
StraitsofGibraltarwiththeaidofadvancedinfra-redtechnology,andreportingthemtothe
KriegsmarineandtheLuftwaffe’sAirFleet1inItaly,formedthemostimpressiveelementinthe
organisation’soverseasoperations.
YetifCanarisbearsmuchresponsibilityfortheshortcomingsofGermany’s‘bigpicture’
intelligence,hecouldneverhaverunanhonestoperationunderthedeadhandofHitler,anymore
thanMoscowCentrecoulddosointheshadowofStalin.Reportsontheconditionandprospectsof
theenemywerepermittedtoreachconclusionsonlywithinparametersacceptabletotheFührer.This
cripplingconstraintwassymbolisedbyHitler ’sannotationonanimportantintelligencereportabout
Russianagriculturalconditions:‘Thiscannotbe.’KurtZeitzler,chiefofthearmygeneralstaff,wrote
on23October1942,theeveofStalingrad:‘TheRussiansnolongerhaveanyreservesworth
mentioningandarenotcapableoflaunchinglarge-scaleoffensives.’Himmlerin1944declared
withoutembarrassmentthathisfirstrequirementfromGermany’sintelligenceserviceswasnottruth,
butloyaltytotheFührer.Thiswasanimportantstatement,themostvividexpressionofthehuge
weaknessoftheAbwehrandtheRSHAthroughouttheSecondWorldWar.
HistorianMichaelHandelhaswritten:‘Leadersinademocraticsystemaregenerallymoreinclined
toconsiderawidevarietyofoptionsthanthosewhohavealwaysfunctionedwithinauthoritarianor
totalitarianpoliticalsystems.Inauthoritariancountries,wheretheclimbtothetopisanunrelenting
struggleforpower,habitsofcooperationandopennessareusuallylessdeveloped…Tolerancefor
ideasthatdeviatefromthe“partyline”…areseenaspersonalcriticism.’Thesefeaturesofalmostall
dictatorshipscrippledGermanintelligenceactivitiesbeyondthebattlefield,andsometimesalso
withinit.Himmler ’sdeputyReinhardHeydrich,forinstance,wasfarmoreinterestedinusingthe
RSHAasaweaponagainsttheNaziempire’sinternalenemiesthanasameansofsecuring
informationaboutitsforeignfoes.Hitlerneverwishedtouseintelligenceasaplanningorpolicymakingtool.Herecogniseditsutilityonlyatatacticallevel:theNaziswerestrikinglyincuriousabout
Abroad.
YetthefactthattheAbwehrwasanunsuccessfulintelligence-gatheringorganisationdidnotmean
thatHitler ’sarmedforceswereblindonthebattlefield:theiraccesstotacticalintelligencewas
generallygood.InthefirsthalfofthewarGermany’swirelessinterceptorsandcodebreakersenjoyed
successeswhichwouldtodayseemimpressive,weretheynotmeasuredagainstthoseoftheBritish
andAmericans.TheWehrmachthadexcellentvoice-monitoringunits,whichineverytheatreofwar
providedimportantinformation.‘TheYServicewasthebestsourceofintelligence,’saidHans-Otto
Behrendt,oneofRommel’sstaffinNorthAfrica.InAugust1941,aidedbyanItalianemployee,two
agentsoftheSezionePrelevamento–the‘extractionsection’ofItalianintelligence–openedthesafe
ofthemilitaryattaché’sofficeattheUSembassyinRome.Theyremovedhiscodebook–Military
IntelligenceCodeNo.11–andphotographedit.ThisenabledtheAxistoreadsubstantialtraffic
throughtheensuingtenmonths,andprovedaseriouslysignificantintelligencebreak.In1942ithad
especiallygrievousconsequencesforEighthArmyinthedesert,sincetheUSmilitaryattachéin
Cairo,Col.BonnerFellers,reportedindetailtoWashingtononBritishplansandintentions.A
Germanintelligenceofficerpaidgeneroustributeto‘thisincomparablesourceofauthenticand
reliableinformation,which…contributedsodecisivelyduringthefirsthalfof1942toourvictories
inNorthAfrica’.
Atsea,someoftheRoyalNavy’scipherswerefoundaboardtheBritishsubmarineSeal,captured
offtheGermancoaston5May1940,owingtoanextraordinaryandculpablefailurebythe
minelayer ’sofficerstodestroyitsconfidentialpapers.TheKriegsmarinewasabletoreadmuchof
theRoyalNavy’sNorthSeatrafficuntilAugust1940,andsomewarshipcommunicationsuntil
September1941.Throughoutthefirsthalfofthewar,theKriegsmarine’sB-DienstreadtheRoyal
Navy’sconvoycodes,withgrievousconsequencesforAlliedshippinglosses.Evenwheresignals
couldnotbedecrypted,radio-trafficanalysisenabledAxisintelligencestaffstojudgeenemy
deploymentsremarkablyeffectively,atleastuntilthesecondhalfofthewar,whenAllied
commandersbecamemoreastuteandsecurity-conscious.Patrolling,airreconnaissanceandPoW
interrogationsallprovidedstreamsofusefuldatatoGermanoperationalcommanders,asdidopensourceinformation–enemynewspaperandbroadcastmonitoring.
Inthefirstphaseofthewaruntil1942,whiletheWehrmachtwastriumphantonbattlefieldsacross
Europe,thesesourcessufficedtotellitscommandersallthattheyfelttheyneededtoknowaboutthe
world,andabouttheirenemies.VictoriesmaskedtheabjecthumintfailuresoftheAbwehr.Aslongas
Germanywaswinning,whyshouldanyonemaketroubleaboutimperfectionsinthewarmachine?It
wasonlywhenHitler ’sarmiesstartedlosingthathardquestionsbegantobeaskedabouttheReich’s
abysmalpoliticalandstrategicintelligence.Hitlerhimselfwas,ofcourse,muchtoblame,butCanaris
exercisedoperationalresponsibility.Theadmiralfellfromgrace,thoughitwasbythenfartoolate–
probablyimpossible,forreasonsinstitutionalisedintheNazisystem–torepairhiscorruptand
ineffectiveespionageorganisation.
Whileanxiousnottobeabadman,Canarislackedthecouragetobeagoodone.Farfrombeinga
substantialhistoricalfigure,hewasasmallone,grapplingwithdilemmasanddifficultiesfarbeyond
hiscapabilities.Trevor-RoperprofessedtoseeacloseresemblancebetweentheadmiralandMenzies,
hisBritishcounterpart.Bothmenwereconservative,honourable–andweak.Byatrifling
coincidence,CanarishadamistressinViennawhosesisterwasmarriedtoMenzies’brother.TrevorRopercametoregardtheAbwehras‘amirrorimageof[MI6],withmanyofthesameweaknesses
andabsurdities…Irecognised,acrosstheinterveningfogofwar,oldfriendsofBroadwayand
WhaddonHalltransmutedintoGermanuniformintheTirpitzUferoratWansee.’Theadmiraldid
littletomerithiseventualfateatthehandsofHitler ’sexecutioners:hefrequentlytalkedtreason,but
didnothingtofurtherit.Farfrombecomingamartyrtothecauseofa‘goodGermany’,hewas
merelyanincompetentservantofanevilone.
3
MiraclesTakeaLittleLonger:Bletchley
1 ‘ TI P S ’A ND ‘ C I LLI S ’
Inthewinterof1939,MI6cameunderscrutinyandfiercecriticismwithinWhitehall,intensifiedby
theVenlofiasco.StewartMenzies,knowingtheprecariousnessofhispositionas‘C’,compileda
twenty-six-pagedocumentdefendinghisservice,inwhichheriskedplayingonecardwhichmight–
anddid–savehisbacon.Hepromisedhismastersthatthecountrywas‘abouttoreapthefruits’of
MI6’sliaisonwithAlliedsecretservicesinafashion‘whichshouldbeofinestimablebenefitstothe
AirMinistrywithinafewweeks,andprobablytotheAdmiraltywithinamonthortwo’.The
significanceofthisvaguelyexpressedclaimwasthatMenziesbelievedthatBletchleyPark,withthe
helpoftheFrenchandPoles,wasclosetocrackingsomeGermanciphers.Suchsuccessescouldgo
farindeedtowardscompensatingforMI6’shumintfailure.Hisexpectationswouldremainunfulfilled
formuchoftheyearthatfollowed.Fewevenwithintheintelligencecommunitydaredtohopethat
Britaincouldemulate,farlesssurpass,the1914–18triumphsofRoom40.AdmiralGodfrey,headof
navalintelligence,wrotetoMenzieson18November,sayingthat‘whetherornotCryptanalysiswill
everagaingiveustheknowledgewehadofGermanmovementsinthelatewar ’,MI6shouldexert
itselftoplantagentsinenemyportstoreportshippingmovements.Godfreydidnotseemtoexpect
muchfromthecodebreakers.
Inpeacetime,fewnationscommittheirfinestbrainstonationalsecurity.Brilliantpeopleseldom
choosecareersinintelligence–or,forthatmatter,inthearmedforces.Astrugglefornational
survivalalonemakesitpossibleforagovernmenttomobilisegenius,orpeoplepossessing
somethingclosetoit,intheinterestsofthewareffort.TheBritish,andlatterlytheAmericans,didthis
moreeffectivelythananyotherparticipantsinWorldWarII.Aremarkableproportionoftheir
nations’brightestandbestsoonerorlaterfoundthemselvesperformingtasksworthyoftheirtalents–
inhigherarmystaffpostsalongsidethelikesofEnochPowell,JohnFreeman,TobyAldington;in
scientificortechnicalresearch;andespeciallyinintelligence,whichabsorbedthousandsof
outstandingintellectsfrommanywalksoflife.TheoutbreakofwarenabledtheGermansectionof
Britishmilitaryintelligence,forinstance,torecruitsuchwritersandacademicsasNoelAnnan,Eric
BirleyandAlanPryce-Jones.Annan,aCambridgedonwhohadonlyapassableacquaintancewith
GermanandFrench,observedwonderingly:‘WithinaweekIwaspiecingtogetherthereportsof
agentsintheBalkansandtheearlystutteringsofUltra.’
DonaldMcLachlan,ajournalistwhoservedunderGodfreyattheAdmiralty,afterwardsarguedthat
allwartimeintelligencedepartmentsshouldberunbyciviliansinuniform,becausetheyare
unburdenedbythelifetimeprejudicesofcareersoldiers,sailorsandairmen:‘Itisthelawyer,the
scholar,thetraveller,thebanker,eventhejournalistwhoshowstheabilitytoresistwherethecareer
mentendtobend.Careerofficersandpoliticianshaveastronginterestincookingrawintelligenceto
maketheirmasters’favouritedishes.’MI6remaineduntil1945undertheleadershipofitsoldhands,
butmostofBritain’ssecretwarmachinepassedintothehandsofableciviliansinuniformwho–
afteranintervalofmonthsorinsomecasesyearswhiletheyweretrainedandtheirskillsrecognised
–progressivelyimprovedthequalityofintelligenceanalysis.TheAdmiralty’sSubmarineTracking
RoomwasdirectedbyRodgerWinn,abarristerandfuturejudge.Gen.SirBernardMontgomery’s
chiefofintelligencefromAlameintoLuneburgHeathwastheOxforddonEdgar‘Bill’Williams,
latterlyabrigadier.RegJonesmadehimselfalegendinscientificintelligence.
Thesemen,andafewhundredothersthroughoutthearmedforces,spentmuchofthewar
exploitingandassessinginformationderivedoverwhelminglyfrominterceptionanddecryptionof
theenemy’swirelesstraffic.BillWilliams,whoservedintheMediterraneanuntil1943andinEurope
thereafter,statedinanimportant1945report:‘ItmustbemadequiteclearthatUltraandUltraonlyput
intelligenceonthemap.’Untildecryptsbegantobecomeavailableinbulkin1942,‘Intelligencewas
theCinderellaofthestaff…Informationabouttheenemywasfrequentlytreatedasinterestingrather
thanvaluable[though]ofcoursethisattitudevariedaccordingtothecommander.’
Scepticismwasoftenmerited,becausemuchmaterialwasdownrightspecious.The1940wardiary
ofthearmy’sMiddleEastintelligencesectioninCairoincludedcomicallyfrivoloussnippets:‘All
HungariancabaretartisteshavebeenorderedtoleavethecountrybytheendofMay.’Dataaboutthe
Italianarmywasscanty,sothaton9Augustthesectionrecorded:‘Thepresentlocationand
organisationofLibyantroopsinEasternCyrenaicaisobscure.’Adespondentstaffofficeraddeda
weeklater:‘Therehasbeennofurtherreliableinformationoffresh[Italian]groundunitsor
formationsarrivinginLibyafromoverseas.’On27September,theBritishhighcommand’sweekly
intelligencesummaryincludedaparagraphondomesticconditionsinGermany:‘Aneutraltraveller
totheLeipsicfair,whosepersonalobservationsarebelievedreliable,reportsthatrelationsbetween
the[Nazi]PartyandtheArmyarenotgood.’Threemonthslater,theheadofMI6’sPoliticalSection
wrunghishands:‘Itispiteoustofindourselvesinthisstateofignorance’aboutbothGermany’s
internalconditionandeconomy.
OnlywhenAlliedwarlordswereempoweredtoreadthemessagesbeingexchangedbetween
enemygeneralsinthefieldandtheirhigherheadquarterswasscepticismaboutthevalueof
‘intelligence’replacedbyincreasinglyferventbelief.Ultraforcedcommanders-in-chief,notto
mentiontheprimeminister,totreatseniorintelligenceofficerswitharespecttheyhadseldom
receivedinthepre-Bletchleyuniverse.BrigadierIanJacobofthewarcabinetsecretariatsaid:‘My
impressionisthatoncetheUltrabusinessgotwell-established,Churchilldidn’tlookatanythingelse.’
Eisenhower ’sintelligencechiefKennethStrongwrotein1943,inamemorandumontrainingstaff
officers:‘Wenolongerdependonagentsandcloak-and-daggersourcesforourinformation.Modern
methodshavecompletelytransformedintelligence.’
Hemeantcodebreaking,ofcourse,andinBritainthefountainheadofsuchactivitywasthe
GovernmentCode&CypherSchoolatBletchley.Inthemonthsfollowingtheoutbreakofwar,
GC&CSexpandeddramaticallywiththearrivalofastreamofacademics,manyofthemearmarked
byitsrecruitersbeforethewar.Thoughsomeweresecondedfromthearmedforces,itwas
understoodthattherewasnoneedtotraintheuniversities’contingenttomarch,blancowebbing,and
namethepartsofarifle.Theyremainedtheirsallow,tweedy,pipe-smokingyoungselveswhen
housedinlodgingsaroundthedrearysuburbantown,andenlistedonthegovernmentpayrollwithout
uniformorceremony.Twenty-year-oldmathematicianKeithBateyfoundhislandladydemandingan
assurancefromhisemployerthathewasnotadespised‘conchy’–conscientiousobjector–beforehe
joinedthegrowingbodyofacademicsworkingonataskofsupremeimportancetotheircountry,
fulfilmentofwhichmightdosomethingtoassuageitsshockingvulnerability.Whatwasthetask?
Bletchley’slittleband,169strongin1939includingsupportstaff,understoodonlythatthenation’s
enemiescommunicatedinamultitudeofcodesandciphers,vulnerabletointerception.Ifevena
portionofthesecombinationsofnumbersandletterscouldberenderedintelligible,information
mightbegainedofpricelessvaluetothewareffort.
Nobodyknew,inthebeginning,whetheragivenmessagehijackedfromtheairwavesmightbean
orderfromHitlerforhisarmiestomarchonWarsaw,orarequestfromaLuftwaffeairfieldin
easternGermanyforadeliveryoffilingcabinets.Aheadofthecodebreakerslayamammothmenuof
requirementswhichcouldonlybeaddressedasmobilisationsluggishlymadeavailableears,brains
andhandstomonitortheenemy’sfrequenciesaroundtheclock,logsomeofhisvastoutputof
messages,fixthelocationsandpossibleidentitiesofthesenders–diplomatic,police,military,naval
orairforce.Thencamethemuchgreaterchallenge,ofdiscoveringwhatthemessagesmeant.
Allradiocommunicationsinvolvedatrade-offbetweenspeedandsecurity.Atthesimplestlevel,
battlefielddirectionbyland,seaandairrequiredsomevoicelinkage.Thisenabledtheinstantaneous
passageofordersandinformation,atthecostofbeingoverheardbyanybodyelsewhocaredtotune
toagivenfrequency.Crudesecuritycouldbeintroducedbyusingcodedcallsignsinplaceofnames
andsuchlike–duringtheBattleofBritainfightercontrollersadded5,000feettoindicatedaltitudes,
toconfuseeavesdroppers.Butvoicemessagingwasinherentlyinsecure:sensitiveinformationshould
neverbepassedverbally,thoughitoftenwas.
MostmilitarymessageswereinsteadwirelessedbyMorsekey.Low-levelmaterialcouldberapidly
encryptedunderbattlefieldconditionsbyrelativelyunsophisticatedpersonnelusingso-calledhandorfield-ciphers,usuallyinvolvinggroupsoftwoorthreelettersornumbers–theKriegsmarine
employedtwenty-sevenvariants.Moresensitivetraffic,issuingfromhigherechelons,wastranslated
bymachine-generatedormanualciphers,usuallyinvolvingcombinationsoffourorfivelettersor
numbers.TheBritishthoughtjustifiablyhighlyofthesecurityoftheirType-Xmachines,thoughthey
neverhadenoughofthem.*TheAmericansrightlytrustedtheirSigaba,afifteen-rotorsystem.
Forsubstantialperiodsbetween1939and1943theGermansbrokesomeAlliedcodes,including
thoseoftheUSStateDepartmentandmilitaryattachés,alongwiththetrafficofseveralexile
governments,notablythePolesandFreeFrench.Theysometimesalsoaccessedmessagesofallthree
Britishservices,includingtheRAF’sfour-charactercipher,andlaterhadsuccessesinattacking
productsoftheUSArmy’sM-209field-cipheringmachine.ItdeservesemphasisthatAlliedcodesecurityweaknesses,andenemyachievementsinexploitingthem,gavetheGermansmuchmore
operationalassistancethansomeWesternhistoriansacknowledge,especiallyintheBattleofthe
Atlantic.However,higherBritish,AmericanandRussiancommunicationsdefiedenemyscrutiny:
NazieavesdroppingontransatlantictelephoneconversationsbetweenChurchillandRoosevelttold
Berlinlittleofvalue.ModernclaimsthattheGermansbrokeintoRussianhigherciphersdeserveto
betreatedwithcaution:certainlyfrom1942onwards,thereisnoevidencethatHitler ’sgenerals
profitedfromanysuchinsights;iftheyhad,theywouldhavebeenlessoftendeludedbySoviet
deceptions.
MostGermanseniorofficers–thoughbynomeansalltheircryptographers–wereconfidentthat
Enigmacipheringmachines,whichscrambledmessagesbymeansofshiftingrotorsandaplugboard,
andrenderedthemcomprehensibleonlybyamatchingmachinewithidenticalsettings,wereimmune
totheattentionofanyenemy,andindeedtotheworkingsofthehumanbrain.Itisunsurprisingthatin
1939theydiscountedthepossibilitythatelectro-mechanicaltechnologymightdramaticallyaccelerate
exposureoftheEnigma’ssecrets,becauseitdidnotthenexist.Itisextraordinary,however,thatsuch
sereneconfidencepersistedthroughsixyearsthatfollowed,evenfollowingthediscoverythatthe
Poleshadbrokensomepre-warEnigmatraffic,andseveralwarningsfromtheirownexperts.
AmazinghubriswasexpressedbytheWehrmacht’slastsignalschief,Lt.Gen.AlbertPraun,who
preenedhimselfbeforehisAlliedcaptorsafterthewarended:‘TheachievementsofGerman
communicationsintelligence…mayspeakinfavouroftheGermantypeofintelligence
organisation.’Hisorganisation,hesaid,‘gaveGermancommandersahithertounattaineddegreeof
[signal]security’.
TheBritishbreakingoftheEnigma,thensubsequentlyandseparatelyofGermanteleprintertraffic,
wasaprogressive,incrementaloperationwhichattainedmaturityonlybetween1943and1945,and
wasneveruninterruptedorcomprehensive:evenatpeaks,onlyabouthalfofallinterceptswereread,
manyofthemtoolatetoprovidepracticalassistance‘atthesharpend’.WhatwasdoneatBletchley
Parkwasindeedmiraculous,butthecodebreakerswereneverabletowalkonallofthewater,allof
thetime.
The1939–40PhoneyWarconferredfewbenefitsonBritain,butitgrantedGC&CSprecioustime
tobolsteritsstrengthandrefineitsmethods.WithoutmechanicalaidsBletchley’sbrainstormersmade
modestanddelayedbreachesinasmallnumberofenemyciphers.TheGermansemployedacronyms
andcodenameswhichtookweeksormonthsfortheirenemiestointerpret.Theimportanceofwhat
happenedatBletchleyinthefirsttwoyearsofwarwasnotthatitenabledBritain’sgeneralstoavert
orarrestadisastrousrunofdefeats,whichitcertainlydidnot,butthatitlitacandleofhopeabout
whatthecodebreakersandtheirembryotechnologymightaccomplishinthefuture.Itenabledthe
directorsofthewarefforttolayupontheboardafewscatteredpiecesofavastjigsaw,whichwould
befilledonlyduringtheAllies’yearsofvictory.
BletchleyPark–StationX,Box111c/oTheForeignOffice–wasanotablyuglyVictorianpileof
bastardarchitecturaloriginssurroundedbyfifty-fiveacresoftreesandgrassland,locatedfiftymiles
fromLondon.Itwaspurchasedin1938tohouseGC&CSatasafedistancefromGermanbombsby
AdmiralSirHughSinclair,thenheadofMI6;aslegendhasit,heused£7,500outofhisownpocket,
butmoreplausiblyhepaidwithsecretfundsunderhiscontrol.WhateverMI6’shumintweaknesses,
theservice’schiefs,especiallySinclair,deservefullcreditforbackingtheestablishmentofBletchley
atatimewhenresourcesweredesperatelyconstrained.Workbeganatonceonlayingdirectphone
andteleprinterlinestoLondon,andinthefollowingyearMI6’sskeletonteamofcryptanalystsmoved
fromBroadwaytothePark,wheretheycameundertheordersofAlastairDenniston.Oneofhis
colleaguesfromtheoldAdmiraltydays,DillwynKnox,anexpertonancientEgyptianpapyri,became
anearlyBletchleystalwart.ThemostprominentoftheyoungerrecruitswereGordonWelchmanof
SidneySussexCollege,Cambridge,HughAlexander,StuartMilner-Barry,JohnJeffreys–andAlan
Turing.
Thislast,thetwenty-seven-year-oldsonofanIndiancivilservantandtheproductofanaustereand
emotionallyaridchildhood,hadjustreturnedfromastintatPrincetonclutchingoneofhisown
creations,aso-calledelectricmultipliermachinemountedonabreadboard.Hisheadmasterat
Sherbornehadoncewritten:‘Ifheistostayatapublicschool,hemustaimatbecomingeducated.If
heistobesolelyaScientificSpecialist,thenheiswastinghistime.’Intheheadmaster ’sterms,Turing
hadindeedbeen‘wastinghistime’:hehadevolvedintoashy,narrow,obsessive.NoelAnnanwrote:
‘Ilikedhissly,secrethumour…Hisinnerlifewasmorerealtohimthanactuality.Hedisliked
authoritywhereverhewas…[and]enjoyedgamesandtreasurehuntsandsilliness…Turingwasthe
puresttypeofhomosexual,longingforaffectionandlovethatlasted.’Moreeventhanbyhissexuality
andhisoftenchildlikeimmaturity,however,histragedywastobeafflictedbytheexquisitelypainful
lonelinessofgenius.
Otherdraftsofyoungacademicsfollowed,variouslycodebreakersandlinguists,togetherwiththe
firstofwhatbecamesuccessivewavesofyoungwomen,whowouldplayavitalroleintheoperations
of‘BP’.ThefirsttwooftheseweredaughtersofgolfingpartnersofDenniston,reflectingthe
importanceofpersonalconnectionsinBletchley’srecruitmentprocessintheearlydays,before
industrialisationbecameinescapable.Indeed,thewholewartimeintelligencemachineemphasisedthe
cosinessoftheupperreachesofBritishlife.OxfordUniversityPresswasentrustedwith
responsibilityforprintingvastquantitiesofcodes,mapsandreports,becauseofitspre-war
experienceproducingexaminationpapersundersecureconditions.TheAdmiralty’sliaisonwithOUP
washandledbyMargaretGodfrey,wifeofthedirectorofnavalintelligence.TheRoyalNavy’s
TopographicalPhotographicLibrarywashousedinthebasementofthenearbyBodleianLibrary,
whicheventuallydispatched300,000imagesamonthtooperationalareas.TheWorldWarI
intelligenceveteranAdmiralSirWilliam‘Blinker ’HallintroducedGodfrey,hismodernsuccessor,
totheCityofLondonbankinggiantsMontaguNorman,OlafHambroandtheRothschilds,who
helpedtoidentifysuitablerecruitsfortheNID.
CandidatesbeingscrutinisedforBletchleywereoftenasked:‘Doyouhavereligiousscruplesabout
readingotherpeople’scorrespondence?’Twenty-year-oldHarryHinsleywasinterviewedatStJohn’s
College,CambridgebyAlastairDennistonandCol.JohnTiltman,theseniorcodebreaker.Theysaid:
‘You’vetravelledabit,weunderstand.You’vedonequitewellinyourTripos.Whatdoyouthinkof
governmentservice?Wouldyouratherhavethatthanbeconscripted?’Hinsleywouldindeed,and
joinedtheNavalSectionlocatedinBletchley’sHut4.Throughtheicywinterof1939–40,suchmen
andwomenwrestledwithEnigmatraffic.Workingconditionsweredismal,withstaffmuffledin
overcoatsandmittens.ThefirstbreakintoaLuftwaffeEnigmakey–designated‘Green’–isthought
tohavebeenmadeon25October1939.InDecember,byunaidedintellectualeffortAlanTuringis
believedtohavebrokenfivedays’worthofoldnavalmessages.BytheendofMarch,theFrench–or
rather,thePolesworkingatFrance’sStationBruno–hadbrokentwentydays’worthofoldsignals
andBPaboutthirty,allLuftwaffetraffic.
Turingwasmuchmoreimportantlyengaged.Hecompileda150-pagetreatiseonEnigma,studded
withschoolboyishblots,deletionsandillegibilities.Whilemostcodebreakersaddressedeachother
byfirstnamesornicknames,heedlessofageandstatus,almosteveryoneknewTuringas‘Prof’
ratherthanasAlan.WhenhisEnigmastudywascirculatedlaterin1940,itbecameknownas‘the
Prof’sbook’.Healsosetaboutfulfillinghisconceptfora‘bombe’,aprimitivebutrevolutionary
electro-mechanicaldeviceforexploringmultiplemathematicalcombinations.Thisborrowedits
name,thoughnotitsdesign,fromthePolish‘bomby’,andwouldbecapableofexaminingthe17,576
possiblewheeldeploymentsforathree-rotorEnigmainabouttwentyminutes:theorderforthefirst
machinewasplacedinOctober1939,andtheprototypebecameoperationalsixmonthslater.
Meanwhile,outsideinthepark,workmensawedandhammeredatanever-wideningarrayoflow
woodenbuildingswhichhousedthegrowingstaff.Eventually,onlyadministratorsworkedinthe
mainbuilding,wherethetelephoneswitchboardwasestablishedintheballroom.Inthehuts,signals
wereshiftedfromonesectiontoanotheronasmalltrolleypushedalongamakeshiftwoodentunnel.
Hut8attackedGermannavaltraffic,whichwasthenpassedtoHut4fortranslationandprocessing.
Hut3performedthesamefunctionforWehrmachtandLuftwaffetrafficdecryptedbyHut6.The
formerwouldeventuallyplayapivotalroleinAlliedwartimeintelligence,butinitsearlyincarnation
ithadastaffofjustfour.FrankLucas,whowasoneofthem,wrote:‘OnasnowyJanuarymorningof
1940,inasmallbleakwoodenroomwithnothingbutatableandthreechairs,thefirstbundleof
Enigmadecodesappeared.[We]hadnoideawhattheywereabouttodisclose.’Afewscoreyards
away,Hut6runbyGordonWelchmanwrestledwitharmy-Luftwaffe‘Red’keytraffic,whichwasthe
firsttobebrokeninbulk.
Fromtheoutset,painsweretakentodisguisefromallbutthemostsenioroperationalcommanders
thefactthatinformationwasbeinggainedfromcodebreaking.Thisgaveanunintendedboosttothe
prestigeofMI6,andtothatofStewartMenziesinparticular.WhenRegJonesgaveadisguisedreport
basedonanUltradecrypttotheRAF’sdirectorofsignals,AirCommodoreNutting,theairman
professedastonishedadmirationforthecourageofthepresumedspieswhohadprovidedthe
information,saying,‘ByJove,you’vegotsomebravechapsworkingforyou!’Theever-growing
scaleoftheenemytraffictobetrawledwasintimidating.Itisameasureoftheexpansionof
communicationsasabranchofwarfarethatbyAugust1943,305,000personnelamongthe
Luftwaffe’stotalstrengthof2.3millionwereemployedonsignalsduties–transmitting,receivingor
processing–andthesamewastrueonbothsidesofthewar,andofallarmedforces.
AtGC&CStherewereinevitablepersonalityclashes.GordonWelchman,whosecreative
contributionbecamesecondonlytothatofTuring,andwhoseorganisationalskillswerealso
priceless,foundithardtoworkwiththehighly-strungandfractiousDillwynKnox,acontenderfor
thehotlycontestedtitleofBletchley’sstareccentric.Anotoriouslyawfuldriver,Knoxgiggled:‘It’s
amazinghowpeoplesmile,andapologisetoyou,whenyouknockthemover.’Hesustainedastream
ofintemperatecomplaintsanddemandstoDenniston,hisoldcomradefromRoom40,aboutstaff
shortages,workingconditions,lowpay,togetherwiththeintrusionofandexcessiveauthority
concededtonon-cryptanalysts:serviceintelligenceofficers‘whomaulandconcealourresults’.
KnoxwasseriouslyillwiththecancerthatwouldkillhiminFebruary1943,butmeanwhileheand
Welchmanbickered:theoldermanaccusedtheyoungerofexceedinghisnarrowinitialbrief,andwas
alsoimpatientofTuring,writing,‘Heisverydifficulttoanchordown.Heisverycleverbutquite
irresponsibleandthrowsoutamassofsuggestionsofalldegreesofmerit.Ihavejust,butonlyjust,
enoughauthorityandabilitytokeephimandhisideasinsomesortoforderanddiscipline.Butheis
veryniceaboutitall.’TuringpromptedmirthbyjoiningBletchley’sHomeGuardbecausehewas
seizedbyanimpulsetolearntoshoot,thenprovokedtheapoplecticrageofitscolonelbyabsenting
himselffromparadesoncehehadfulfilledthisprivatepurpose.Hisunworldlinesscouldprovoke
realexasperationamongthoseunderrelentlesspressuretoproduceresults.Acolleaguespokeof
Turing’s‘almosttotalinabilitytomakehimselfunderstood’.
Therewereplentyofminortantrumslowerdownthehierarchy,unsurprisingwhenstaffwere
performingstressfultasksthroughlonghoursinbleakworkingconditions.AngusWilson,thelater
novelist,onceventedsuchastormofragethatacolleaguesaidwearily,‘Dostopit,Angus,otherwise
we’llputyouinthelake!’Wilsonretorteddefiantly,‘Don’tworry,I’lldoitmyself,’anddulyplunged
intothewaterinfrontofthehouse;onanothersuchoccasionhehurledabottleofinkataWren.
Manywartimecodebreakerssufferedtemporaryorpermanentphysicalormentalcollapses,brought
onbytheirwork:WilliamFriedman,oneofAmerica’spioneerpractitioners,underwentanervous
breakdowninJanuary1941whichincapacitatedhimforthreemonths.HughTrevor-Roper
languishedforseveralmonthsataboutthesametime,andothersregularlysuccumbed.
Germansignalswereatfirstinterceptedbyabatteryofarmywireless-operatorsstationedinanold
navalfortatChatham,arolelaterassumedbyGambier-Parry’sorganisationatWhaddonHall.Inthe
earlywaryearstherewereneverenoughoperators,andboththeRAFandthearmywerereluctantto
acknowledgethepriorityofmeetingGC&CS’sdemands.Signalswerebroughtinbatchesto
Bletchley’sguardroombymotorcyclecouriers,atallhoursandoftenindreadfulweather,then
distributedbetweentherelevanthuts.Fromanearlystage,thecodebreakerslearnedtoidentify
Germansendersbytheunencryptedpreambletotheirmessagetexts,noneofwhichwaslongerthan
250words.Itwasthenamatterofsittinghunchedoveradealtablethroughthehoursofashift,
ponderingajumbleofnumbersandlettersfromwhichonlymen–andBletchley’shandfulofwomen
–withremarkablelogicalormathematicalpowersmighthopetoextractfragmentsofmeaning.‘The
idealcryptanalyst,’StephenBudianskyhaswritten,‘wasBeethovenwiththesoulofanaccountant.’
WhenChristopherMorriswasanewrecruittoBletchleyheheardoneofhisseniorcolleagues,asked
therequirementsforthejob,respondlaconically,‘Oh,Isupposeasharppencilandapieceofsquared
paper.’Morrishimselfthoughtthatthemainrequisites–exceptattheexaltedlevelofKnox,Turing,
WelchmanandlaterMaxNewman–were‘patience,accuracy,stamina,areasonablyclearhead,some
experienceandanabilitytoworkwithothers’.
Theyopenedwhatbecamevastcardindexes,stackedinshoeboxesalongthesidesofthehuts,
cataloguingenemyunits,personnel,codenames,locations,abbreviationsandmilitaryhardware;
differentEnigmakeysweredistinguishedbycolour–forinstance,yellow,green,redandblue,
respectivelyindicatingNorway,Wehrmacht,army-Luftwaffeandairtrainingcodes.‘Whenanew
wordcameupinthemessageyouweretranslating,’wroteHughSkillen,‘anewtypeofjetfuel,or
machinepart–youlookedforit,andifitwasnotthere,theindexerputitinwithareferencetimeand
datestamp.’Bletchley’smeticulousrecord-keepingbecameacriticalelementinitstriumphs.
Forsecurityreasons,thePark’soperationswererigidlycompartmentalised,andtherewaslittle
exchangeofinformationorgossipbetweensections.EvenWelchmanremarkedyearslaterhowlittle
heknewaboutwhatcolleaguesweredoingafewyardsawayfromhisownHut.Asthestaffgrew
fromhundredsintothousands,facilitieslaggedbehind:asectionheadcomplainedthattwohundred
menandwomenenjoyedtheuseofjustonelavatory.ThefoodintheBletchleycanteenwaspooreven
bywartimestandards.FormerdebutanteSarahNortononenightfoundacookedcockroachinher
meat:‘IwasabouttoreturnittothecateringmanageresswhenmyfriendOsla,whohadtheappetite
ofalionesswithcubs,snatchedtheplateandsaid:“Whatawaste–I’lleatit!”’Thenearestavailable
delicaciesoutsidethewireweretobefoundattheStationInninBletchleytown,whichofferedox
heart.Welchmanrecalledhavingtoprovidehisownnewspapertowrapfishandchipsatthelocal
shop.Thecodebreakersworkedaroundtheclockinthreerotatingshifts,startingwith8a.m.to4p.m.
Whentheexhaustedmenandwomencycledortookabusthroughtheblackouttotheirlodgings,they
foundfewcomforts:dimlighting,hotbathsoftenrationedtooneaweek,draconianrulesaboutintersexvisiting.
ItisdeeplyimpressivethatthosewhoworkedatBletchleysustainedsuchdedicationwhileworking
dayafterday,monthaftermonth,inadrabworlddevoidofglamour,excitement,variety,gloryand
decorations.InHut3,thewatchsataroundahorseshoetable,translatingdecipheredsignals,eachone
resemblingatelegraphflimsy,forwardedfromHut6.Ideally,decryptswerecomposedofcomplete
Germanwords,butoftentherewereinterruptionsandcorruptionsinthetexts,whichdemandedleaps
ofimaginationfromthelinguists.WilliamMillwardrecalledwithshameanightwhenheinventeda
placenamed‘Senke’,nearQataraintheNorthAfricandesert–havingforgottenthatSenkewasthe
Germanwordforageographicaldepression.Schoolmastersprovedidealaswatchchiefs,wrote
PeterCalvocoressi,becausetheywerenaturallymeticulous:‘Ifnotsatisfied,theywouldthrowbacka
translationatevenaneminentprofessor.ItremindedmeofChiefExaminersat“A”Levelwhowould
sendbackscriptstoanAssistantExaminertore-mark.’NoonecouldworkatGC&CSwhodidnot
lovebraingames.Thereweredreary,idleyetsleeplesslulls,whennotrafficarrivedforthewatches
toworkon.PeterHiltononceusedsuchadoodletimetocomposeapalindrome:‘DOCNOTE,I
DISSENT,AFASTNEVERPREVENTSAFATNESS.IDIETONCOD’.
AlthoughAlanTuringwasacknowledgedasthehighestintellectatBletchley,itsachievementwas
supremelyateameffort;thecreativeinputofsomeothers,Welchmanprominentamongthem,was
almostasimportantasthatofTuring.OnenightinFebruary1940,severalmonthsbeforethearrival
ofthefirstbombe,twenty-one-year-oldCambridgemathematicianJohnHerivelwassmokingapipe
beforethefireinhisbillet,andconcentratingfuriouslyonencodedmessagesevenashedriftedin
andoutofadoze.Aninspirationstruckhimashegazedwiththemind’seyeataGermanEnigma
operator.Heperceivedsuchamanstartinghismorning’sworkboredorwearyorhungover,andthus
nottroublingtochangethepreviousday’sringsettingonhismachinebeforestartingtocipher
messages.Herivelscarcelysleptthatnight,ashewentontodeducehowsuchanactofcarelessness
mightbedetected,thenexploitedtobreakamessage.
Welchman,whohadsupervisedhimatCambridge,immediatelysawtheimportanceofthisflashof
insight,amarriageofmathematicalbrilliancetoagraspofhumanweakness.Hetoldtheyoungman
ferventlythathe‘wouldnotbeforgotten’,andindeedhisinspirationbecameknownas‘theHerivel
tip’.DillwynKnoxhadalreadyidentifiedanotherentrypointtomessages,rootedinoperatorerrors
andtextsettings–whatthecodebreakerschristened‘Cillis’or‘Sillies’.Welchmanwrotelaterthat
Bletchleyremained‘entirelydependentonHeriveltipsandCillisfromtheinvasionofFrancetothe
endoftheBattleofBritain’.Inotherwords,untilthearrivalofthebombes,codebreakingwasbeing
donebyrawbrainpower,withoutsignificantmechanicalassistance:atthisearlystage,theBritish
laggedbehindtheirAmericancounterpartsinexploitingtechnology–boththeUSArmyandUS
NavycodebreakingteamsusedHollerithpunched-cardsorters,ofakindthatonlybegantoappearat
BletchleyinMay1940,becausechiefcodebreakerCol.JohnTiltmanhadbeenscepticalaboutthem.
Ultraprovidednoimportantmaterialduringthesummerof1940,butseveralindicationsaboutthe
postponementof‘Sealion’,theNaziinvasionofBritain,notableamongthemaSeptemberLuftwaffe
messageorderingthedismantlingofairtransportequipmentatDutchairfields.
FredWinterbotham,theMI6officerwhoeventuallybecameoverseerofthe‘SpecialLiaisonUnit’
networkwhichfedUltradecryptstocommandersinthefield,describedthefirstbombe–christened
‘Agnus’,corruptedto‘Agnes’–asresembling‘someEasterngoddesswhowasdestinedtobecome
theoracleofBletchley’.ItwasinstalledinHut11on14March1940,butsufferedsubstantialteething
troubles.GordonWelchmanmadeanimportantcontributiontoTuring’screationbydevisinga
‘diagonalboard’,anelementintroducedintothefirstreallyeffectivemodel,whichcameintoservice
inmid-August.Agnesanditsmanysuccessorswerenotcomputers,becausetheyhadnomemory.
Theywereinsteadelectro-mechanicalkey-findingaids,sixandahalffeethighandsevenwide,
mountedinbronze-colouredcabinets,andcontainingthirty-sixbanksofhigh-speedelectricallydrivenEnigmareplicas.Eachbombecontainedelevenmilesofwiringandamillionsoldered
contacts.BuiltbytheBritishTabulatingMachineCompanyatLetchworth,theydependedpartlyon
componentsassembledinscoresoflocalvillagehalls,bycasualworkerswhohadnoclueofthe
importancetothewareffortofthetwenty-six-waycablesandothersmallelectricalpartsthey
contributed.
Withtheassistanceofaclueor‘crib’–avitalidentifyinglink,usuallyacodebreaker ’sguessabout
thenatureofpartofagivensignal–abombecouldtestmillionsofmathematicalpossibilitiesforthe
settingsofthreeEnigmarotors.Figuratively,Agnesandherkinwerebloodhoundsneedingaslipper
orhandkerchieftotakeupascent.Iftherewasno‘crib’,thebombecouldnotsolvethekey–but
mercifullyoften,therewasone.Subsequentmachines,miraclesofreliabilitygiventheircontinuous
operation,weregiventheirownnamesbytheWrenswhomannedthemaroundtheclock,usually
thoseofwarships–Warspite,Victoryandsuchlike.Thebombesdidnottakeinenemycipher
messagesanddisgorgetheminfluentGerman.Theywereinsteadpricelessaccelerators,oncethe
codebreakerssecuredaninsightintothenatureofagivensignalortrafficstream.Alsousefulwasa
batteryofBritishType-Xciphermachines,modifiedtomatchthebehaviourofEnigmas,onwhich
Wrenoperatorstestedspeculativemessagesolutions.Oneoftheprincipalconstraintson
codebreaking,especiallybetween1940and1942,wasthataccesstothescarcetechnologyhadtobe
apportionedbetweencompetingclaimantsofthethreeservices,andtherewasneverenough‘bombe
time’togoaround.
Throughout1940,humanbrainpowerremainedthedominantelementinBletchley’ssuccesses,
whichincreasedwitheverypassingweek.Itwas‘theHeriveltip’,notbombes,thatenabledtheteamto
crackthearmy-Luftwaffe‘Red’keyinMay.Theoverwhelmingbulkofenemytrafficreadthrough
therestoftheyear–aroundathousandmessagesaday–wasthatoftheLuftwaffe,anduntiltheend
ofthewarairforcematerialwasaccessedmoreswiftlythanthatoftheotherservices.Animportant
requirementforsuccesswaswhatthecodebreakerscalled‘depth’–possessionofsufficientmessages
inagivenkeytogivethemplayingspaceforcalculationsandspeculations.
LuftwaffesignalsprovidedmanycluestotheWehrmacht’sparallelactivities,butintheearlydays
interpretationwasimpededbylackofunderstandingofGermanterminologyandabbreviations.In
September1940,BletchleybrokesometrafficfromGöring’spathfinderunit,KGr100,whichenabled
ittoforecastthetargetsofseveralbomberraids.Butwarningwasoflittlepracticalusefulnesstothe
defenderswhenhardpower,intheformofradar-guidedRAFnight-fighters,waslackinginboth
numbersandeffectiveness.
Asmorebombeswerebuilt–by1945therewere211ofthem–theyweredispersedaroundthe
LondonsuburbsasaprecautionagainstanenemyairattackonBletchley.Theoperators,chiefly
youngwomenoftheWRNS,foundlonghoursbesidethehot,smelly,clatteringmachines
extraordinarilygruelling,especiallywhentheywereobligedtousetweezerstoadjustthedelicate
electricalwiring.Somegirlswereunnervedbythemonotonousracket.Oneofthemsaid:‘Itwaslike
alotofknittingmachinesworking–akindoftickety-clicketynoise.’Theywenthomewiththeirshirt
cuffsblackenedbyafinesprayofoilfromthebombes’revolvingdrums.
NavalEnigmaremainedformanymonthsimpenetrable.Thiswaspartlybecauseitssystemofeight
rotors,ofwhichthreewereusedatanyonetime,posedgreaterdifficultiesthanthearmy’sfive,and
partlyalsobecausetheKriegsmarine’soperatorsweremoredisciplinedthantheirLuftwaffe
counterparts,andcommittedfewererrorstoprovideopeningsforBletchley.Therewasabriefspasm
ofsuccessinlateApril1940,whenfivedays’trafficwasread,butthereaftermorethanayearelapsed
–aneternityinthemindsofthosewhowrestledvainlywiththeproblemdayafterday,weekupon
week–beforethebigbreakthrough.DennistonsaidgloomilytoFrankBirch,a1918veteranof
Room40whonowheadedthenavalsection:‘Youknow,theGermansdon’tmeanyoutoreadtheir
stuff,andIdon’tsupposeyoueverwill.’AlanTuringhimselfhadbeendallyingwiththe
Kriegsmarine’strafficalmostsincehisarrivalatBletchley.Acolleague,HughAlexander,observed
thathebecameengagedbecausenobodyelseseemedtobemakingheadway,andinhisremote
fashionhewasfascinatedbytheabstractchallenge.
ItwasTuringwhodevisedanewmethodchristened‘Banburismus’,employinglongpunchedpaper
sheetsmanufacturedinthetownofBanbury,whichassistedthefirstimportantbreaksinto
KriegsmarinemessagesbyreducingthenumberofpossibleEnigmarotororderstobetestedfrom
336toaroundeighteen.Thissystemwasintroducedinthespringof1941,justasBritishlossestoUboatsbegantobecomealarming.Onland,theBritishinthosedayslackedpowerandopportunityto
domuchwithsuchknowledgeoftheWehrmacht’smovementsastheysecured,andtherewasalarge
elementofluckaboutwhatmessageswerebroken.InNorthAfricainearly1941,theBritishArmy
profitedfromsomegoodsigintderivedfromeavesdroppingontheItalians,butfewEnigma
messageswerebrokenquicklyenoughtoassistdecision-makingonthebattlefield.Atsea,by
contrast,therewasanearlygoldenprizeforGC&CS’slabours.
Theimpetustowardssuccesswasprovidedbyaseriesofcapturesfaroutontheocean,which
dramaticallyincreasedBletchley’sknowledgeoftheenemy’snavalcommunications.On23February
1941,BritishcommandosraidingtheLofotenIslandsseizedtheGermanarmedtrawlerKrebs,from
whichsparerotorsforanavalEnigmawererecovered,thoughthemachineitselfhadbeenthrown
overboard.This‘pinch’promptedtheRoyalNavytolaunchanoperationexplicitlydesignedto
capturemoreEnigmamaterial,targetingGermanweather-reportingtrawlersbetweenIcelandandJan
MayenIsland.On7May,asweepbythreecruiserslocatedandseizedtheMünchen–buttoolateto
saveitsEnigmaandassociatedcodingdatafromtheArcticdeep.On25Junethenavycaughtitssister
vesseltheLauenburg,againminusitsEnigma,butwithausefulhaulofciphermaterial.
Hut8nowhadenoughinformationtoreadsomeU-boatsignals,buttheseizurewhichopenedthe
traffictofluentdecryptionwasthefruitofchanceandhighcourage,ratherthanofdesign.On9May
1941aconvoyescortgroupattackedandforcedtothesurfaceJuliusLempe’sU-110.Aboarding
partyfromHMSBulldogcommandedbySub-LieutenantDavidBalmesecuredthesubmarine,
preventeditssinking,andbroughtbacktohisdestroyerpearlsbeyondprice:documentationfor
currentEnigma.ThoughU-110latersankundertow–fortunatelyso,fromasecurityviewpoint–the
shortsignalbook,officercipheringinstructionsandothermaterialreachedBletchleysafely,andthe
secretofthesubmarine’scapturewaspreservedbeyondthewar ’send.AnEnigmamachinewasalso
recovered,butperverselythiswastheleastusefulelementofthebooty,becauseBletchleyhadone
already,togetherwithassortedrotorsseizedinother‘pinches’.Withindays,Hut8wasreadinga
steadystreamofGermannavalmessages.RalphErskine,oneoftheforemostexpertson
codebreakingatBletchley,believesthattheParkwasalreadyclosetoreadingtheKriegsmarine
traffic,evenwithouttheU-110haul.Whatisforcertain,however,isthatitwasimpossibletobreak
theU-boatcipherswithouttheassistanceofcapturedmaterial,whichwouldagainbecomeavital
issuelaterinthewar.
ThebreakthroughintotheKriegsmarinecipherscamejusttoolatetoinfluencethepursuitofthe
BismarckinthelatterdaysofMay1941.Conventionaldirection-findingonthebehemoth’swireless
transmissions,supportedbyairreconnaissance,werethekeyfactorsinenablingtheRoyalNavyto
interceptandsinkitonthemorningofthe27th,thoughassistedinthelaststagebydecryptionofa
LuftwaffesignalrevealingBrestasBismarck’sdestination.Thereafter,Bletchleyproducedasteady
streamofmessagesthatrevealedU-boatpositionsandintendedcourses.Theso-calledHydracipher
waslaidbare,andotherkeyswereprogressivelybroken:themoretheParkknew,themoreitwas
abletodiscover.Theflowofdecryptswasneverassured,however,anddisturbingdelayssometimes
tookplace.‘Huff-Duff’–High-FrequencyDirection-Finding–playedanimportantsecondaryrolein
thelocationofU-boats.TheoutcomewasarelentlessshiftinthebalanceofadvantageintheBattleof
theAtlanticthrough1941andinto1942.Herewasacasewhereintelligenceindisputablyand
importantlyinfluencedevents.
BletchleywasalsoreadingasignificantportionofItaliannavaltraffic.On25March1941,oneof
thesmallnumberofwomendecrypters,nineteen-year-oldmathematicianMavisLeverinDillwyn
Knox’steam–hewasfamouslysupportiveoftalentedgirlsinamale-dominatedinstitution–playeda
criticalroleinbreakingamessagewhichrevealedthattheItalianfleetwouldshortlyputtoseato
attackBritishconvoys.ThewarningenabledtheMediterraneanC-in-CAdmiralSirAndrew
CunninghamtocontriveanencounteroffCapeMatapanduringtheafternoonandnightof28March
whichendedinastrikingvictoryfortheRoyalNavy.Bydawnonthe29th,threecruisersandtwo
destroyershadbeensunk,whilethebattleshipVittorioVenetowasdamaged,anoutcomethatdeterred
theItaliansurfacefleetfrommakinganyfurtherattempttointerdictBritishtroopmovementsto
Greece.
SpringbroughtanincreasingflowofdecryptsaboutWehrmachtoperationsintheEastern
Mediterranean.SeniorofficersstrovetostreamlinethetransferofinformationfromBletchleyto
battlefields,sothatmaterialreachedcommandersinrealtime.Oneofthemostsignificantintercepts,
detailingGermanplansfortheMay1941invasionofCrete,reported‘probabledateofending
preparations:17/5.Proposedcourseofoperation…Sharpattackagainstenemyairforce,military
campsandA/Apositions…TroopsofFliegerkorpsXI:parachutelandingtooccupyMaleme,Candia
andRetiomo;transferofdive-bombersandfighterstoMalemeandCandia;air-landingoperationsby
remainderofFliegerkorpsXI;sea-transportofflakunits,furtherarmyelementsandsupplies.’
Churchillpersonallyannotatedtheflimsy:‘InviewofthegtimportanceofthisIshdliketheactual
texttransmittedbyMOSTSECRETtogetherwithwarningsaboutabsolutesecrecy.’Thisinformation
waspassedtoWavellandFreyberg,therelevantcommanders,at2340on6May.Thelossofthe
subsequentBattleofCrete,followingtheGermaninvasionwhichbeganonthemorningofthe20th,
emphasisedafundamentalrealityaboutEnigmadecrypts:theycouldchangeoutcomesonlywhen
Britishcommandersandtroopsonthegroundweresufficientlystrong,competentandcourageous
effectivelytoexploitthem.StuartMilner-BarryofHut6saidthatheandhiscolleagueslookedback
onCreteas‘thegreatestdisappointmentofthewar.Itseemedanearcertaintythat,with…everydetail
oftheoperationspeltoutforusinadvance…theattackwouldbeignominiouslythrownback.’
TheCretansignal,informingBritishgeneralsofGermanintentionsintimetorespond,wasan
exceptionratherthanacommonplacein1941.Bletchleywasabletoprovideanever-growingflowof
informationaboutthedeploymentsoftheenemy,notleastinEasternEurope,mostofitderivedfrom
Luftwaffeandarmy-Luftwaffedecrypts.Wehrmachttrafficstubbornlyresistedpenetration,but
Germanrailwaycodesprovidedinformationabout–forinstance–troopmovementstoYugoslavia,
GreeceandEasternEuropeinthesummerof1941.Hitler ’sloominginvasionoftheSovietUnion,the
toweringeventofthewar,wasalsothefirstgreatstrategicdevelopmentforwhichUltraintelligence
providedexplicitwarning.WhileBritainhadnopowertoinfluenceorimpedeHitler ’sOperation
‘Barbarossa’,itwasclearlyofthehighestimportancetoChurchillandhisgeneralstobeableto
monitoritsunfolding.
ItbecameasourceofincreasingfrustrationtotheprimeministerthatBritishtroopsinNorth
AfricafailedtofrustrateordefeatRommelwhentheyhadnotonlysuperiorityinmen,tanksand
guns,butalsoanever-growingstreamofinformationaboutGermandeploymentsandmovements,
forinstanceatHalfayaPassinMay.ChurchillporedintentlyoverhisowndailyfileofUltramaterial.
WhenhereadadecryptreportingpetrolstocksatvariousLuftwaffeairfieldsinLibya,hescrawled
onitinhisredink:‘CAS[ChiefofAirStaff]Howmanyhoursflyingcantheira/cdoonthis–about?
WSC.’AirChiefMarshalSirCharlesPortalrespondedtestily:‘Unfortunatelyitisnotpossibleto
makeanygeneraldeductionsincethefiguresonlyrelatetothestockatBenghazi.Wedonotpossess
completefiguresforthesupplyandconsumptionofoilandpetrolthroughoutLibya.Allweknowis
thatthereareindicationsofanoverallshortagewhichislimitingoperationsintheforwardarea.’
Thisproblemwasendemicwhendecryptswerefragmentary.StewartMenziesperformedan
importantservicebydissuadingtheprimeministerfromfulfillinghisfrequentdesiretodispatchraw
Ultradirecttocommanders-in-chiefinthefield,ashehaddoneinthecaseofCrete.‘C’wassurely
correct,onsecuritygrounds,andalsobecausedecryptsthatlackedthecontextofotherintelligence
couldbehighlymisleadingtountrainedeyes.
Onland,in1941Bletchleyprovidedmoreguidancetostrategythantotactics:itgaveChurchill’s
highcommandanauthoritative,thoughnevercomprehensive,pictureofGermandeploymentsin
everytheatreofwar.UltracoulddolittletoassisttheRAF’songoingstrugglewiththeLuftwaffefor
masteryoftheskies.OnlytheRoyalNavygainedimmediateadvantage,bothintheMediterraneanand
theAtlantic.Nothingalteredthefactthat,untiltheworldwidebalanceofstrengthbegantoshiftinthe
Allies’favourinthelatterpartof1942,theoperationalsuperiorityofGermanandJapaneseforces
enabledthemtokeepwinningvictories.Bletchleywasanincreasinglyimportantweapon,butitwas
notamagicsword.
ThepracticesanddisciplinesofGC&CSevolvedprogressively,withmanywranglesandturfwars
alongtheway.DeputydirectorNigeldeGreycomplainedaboutthe‘verylowstandardsofmilitary
behaviour ’prevailinginwhatwassupposedtobeamilitaryestablishment.Buthowcoulditbe
otherwise?NoelAnnanwrote:‘ManyofthecryptanalystswhoproducedUltrawereagnostic,
heterodoxdonswhodidnotsetmuchstorebythenormalinterpretationsofpatriotismand
democracy.’Itwasnoteasytocombinethedisciplineessentialtotheoperation’ssmoothfunctioning
withsensitivitytothewaywardandfranklyeccentriccharacterofsomeofitsresidentgeniuses.Col.
Tiltmanwroteruefullyon2March1941:‘Cryptanalystshavetobehandleddelicatelyanddonottake
kindlytoservicemethodsofcontrol,whichareessentialtothegoodworkingofsignals.’Whenthe
directoroftheRoyalNavy’swomenpersonnelvisitedthePark,shedemandedindignantly:‘Whyare
myWrensworkingwithcivilians?’WAAFsintheteleprinterroomexpressedresentmentabouttaking
ordersfromcivilians.InDecember1940theWarOffice’sdirectorofmilitaryintelligencestageda
grabforBletchley’smilitaryoutput.Until1941,theAdmiraltytriedtocontinuesomecryptographic
workunderitsownroof.InHut3,rowseruptedbetweenrepresentativesofthethreearmedservices.
StewartMenziesreceivedaconstantstreamofcomplaintsfromrivalinterests,whileBletchleystaff
referredtoBroadwaywithoutenthusiasmas‘theotherside’.Oneofthemostdurablecriticismsof
‘C’isthathewasevereagertoacceptcreditfortheachievementsofthePark,whiledecliningto
engagewithitschronicresourceproblems,whicheventuallypromptedtheOctober1941letterto
ChurchillsignedbyTuringandhiscolleaguespleadingformorestaff,thatcausedChurchilltosend
hisfamous‘ActionThisDay’message:‘Makesuretheyhavealltheywantonextremepriority.’Itisa
seriouschargeagainstMenzies,thathewasanabsenteelandlordofGC&CS.
Yetallthismademercifullylittleimpactontheworkofthecodebreakers.EdwardThomas,anaval
officerwhoworkedatthePark,wasimpressedbytheabsenceofhierarchicaldistinctions:‘Despite
thehightensionofmuchofthework…anyoneofwhateverrankordegreecouldapproachanyone
else,howevervenerable,withanyideaorsuggestion,howevercrazy.’Fewpeopleofanyrankor
statusfeltdeniedavoice–anunusuallyrareandprivilegedstateofaffairsinthewartimeinstitutions
ofanynation.From1941,theCambridgescientistandnovelistC.P.SnowbecameakeyWhitehall
intermediary,responsibleforchannellingsuitablemathematiciansandotherscholarstoBletchley.
GC&CSalsoemployedthousandsofhumblerfolk,recruitedchieflyfortheirlanguageskills.Itsfiles
recorddetailsofsomeRAFpersonnelinterviewed,suchasLeadingAircraftsmanBerry,agedtwentythree,whohadstartedtrainingasapilotbutre-musteredowingtohisconscientiousobjectionsto
droppingbombs.HisGermanlanguageskillsweregradedonly‘B’,andtherecruitersnoted:‘if
interestedinworkmightdowell,butneedscarefulhandling’.
LACGraywasalsoex-aircrew,‘groundedasresultofcrash’,had‘B’gradeSpanish.CplHodges,
agedtwenty-six,wasunfitforaircrew,‘anxioustousehisGerman“A”,incivillifeworkedin
architect’soffice’.AC1Tew,atwenty-eight-year-oldclerk,hadGerman‘A’,aswellassomeSpanish,
FrenchandDanish,acquiredwhileworkinginhisfather ’sleather-tradingbusiness.Therewasmuch
snappingbetweenBletchleyandtheAirMinistryaboutthelatter ’sreluctancetograntcommissioned
ranktoRAFmensecondedtocipherorwirelessinterceptionduties.Group-CaptainBlandyoftheY
Servicecomplainedthatsuchpeoplewere‘pickedindividualshavingconsiderablelinguistic
qualificationsandahighstandardofeducation…[MereAircraftsmen]andNCOslackthenecessary
authorityrequiredtocarryouttheirdutiesefficiently.’
NotallthepersonnelpostedtoBletchleyprovedsuitedtoitsdemands.AMarch1941reportonan
RAFofficerreturnedtogeneraldutiesafteraspellatBPnoted:‘Althoughanexcellentlinguist,he
doesnotappeartometohaveanyaptitudeorinclinationfortheresearchsideofthework.Hehad
beenrelegatedtoclericaltasks,butdidnotseemthustojustifyhispay.’Therewereequallybleak
verdictsontheperformanceofsomewomenstafferslowerdownthehierarchy:‘WrenKenwickis
inaccurate,veryslowandnotabitkeenonherwork,notveryintelligent.WrensBuchananandFord
areunintelligentandslowandseemunabletolearn.WrenRogerssuffersfrommildclaustrophobia
andcannotworkinawindowlessroom.’Thereportconcluded:‘Theremainder…aredoingmost
excellentwork,’buttheselectorswereurgedtorecognisetheimportanceofthejobsthewomenwere
requiredtofulfil,‘andnottosendustoomanyoftheCookandMessengertype’.
Enfoldedwithintheiroppressivesecurityblanket,Bletchley’speoplelived,lovedandlargely
playedwithintheirowncommunity.Almostallwerepaidapittance:nineteen-year-oldmathematician
MavisLever,oneof‘Dilly’Knox’steam,initiallyreceivedthirtyshillingsaweek,ofwhichshepaid
twenty-oneshillingsforherlodgings.Whenstaffdidescapeintotheworldbeyondtheperimeter
fence,thecivilianstatusoftheyoungmenincurreddarksuspicionsamongtheuninitiatedabouttheir
absencefromanybattlefield.ThedramasandpantomimesperformedbythePark’samateurdramatic
societybecamehighspotsintheannualcalendar:FrankBirch,formerlyofKing’sCollege,
CambridgeandnowheadofHut4,wascelebratedforhisappearancesastheWidowTwankeyin
productionsofthepantomimeAladdin.
By1942,commonsensehadachievedsomeimportantsuccessesinthePark’smanagement.Each
sectionworkedtoitsappointedhead,irrespectiveofrankorlackofit.CryptanalysisforallBritain’s
armedforceswashandledentirelyatBletchleyanditsIndianout-stations,aconcentrationofeffort
thatneitherGermanynortheUnitedStatesevermatched.GordonWelchmanemergedastheforemost
lubricator,curbingfeuding;severalnotoriouslystupidserviceofficersweretransferredout;the
popularEricJoneswasappointedtoheadHut3.Itwasacknowledgedthattheciviliancodebreakers
mustberiddenonthelightestpossiblerein,thoughthedirectorwaspronetooccasionalsurgesof
authoritarianism.
On1February1942,AdmiralKarlDönitzintroducedareflectororfourthrotorintotheAtlantic
U-boatservice’sEnigma,withimmediateandcalamitousresultsforAlliedfortunesintheBattleof
theAtlantic:thisimposedatwenty-six-foldincreaseintherangeofpossiblesettings,andblinded
Bletchley.Sinkingssoared.Atsea,theRoyalNavywasobligedtorelyupon‘Huff-Duff’tolocate
enemysubmarinesuntiltheseapproachedwithinrangeofunderwaterdetectionbytheAsdicsof
convoyescorts,whichwereimpotentagainstnightsurfaceattackers.Breakingwhatwasnow
designatedthe‘Shark’submarinekeybecamethePark’sforemostpriority,achallengeunresolved
forninefrighteningmonths,byfarthemoststressfulperiodofthewarforthoseengagedinthetask.
Theyknew,astheysathunchedovertheirlaboursinthoseausterehuts,thatatseamenweredying
everydaybecauseoftheirfailure–thoughnorationalpersonwouldhavecalleditsuch.
Alsoon1February,coincidentally,AlastairDennistonwaspushedasideintoasubordinateLondon
role,tobereplacedbyhisdeputy,EdwardTravis.Insomemeasurethisdevelopmentreflectedaclash
ofpersonalities–DennistonandStewartMenziesdislikedeachother–togetherwiththeinfighting
characteristicofanylargebureaucracy.ButitwaswidelyfeltatBletchleythatitsoperationalhead
wasbeingoverwhelmedbythestrainsofrunninganestablishmentthatsincetheoutbreakofwarhad
increasedfourfoldinsize,andmanytimesthatmuchinitsimportancetothewareffort.Power
struggleswereunavoidable.Dennistonwasagoodandkindmanwhohaddonemanythingswell,but
Bletchleyhadoutgrownhim.Travis,whoseedictswereissuedinacurioustrademarkbrownink,was
generallyconsideredasuccessinhisnewrole,notleastbysuchinfluentialcreativefiguresas
Welchman.Whenanothercodebreaker,RalphBennett,returnedthatsummerfromdetacheddutyin
theMiddleEast,hefoundthattheatmospherehadchangedmarkedly:‘Ihadleftasoneofagroupof
enthusiasticamateurs.Ireturnedtoaprofessionalorganisationwithstandardsandanacknowledged
reputationtomaintain.Successwasnolongeranoccasionalprize,butthenaturalrewardofrelentless
attentiontodetail.’
Throughout1942,Bletchley’sactivitieswerehamperedbyadesperateshortageofbombes,and
thusbyargumentabouttheirbestemployment.InJanuarythearmy-LuftwaffeHut6wasreceiving
1,400interceptsaday,ofwhichanaverageof580werebroken,aproportionthatslowlyincreased,
reachingabout50percentbyMay1943.Oftennomorethanonethree-wheelbombewasavailableat
anygiventimetoworkontheSharkU-boatcipher,becausetheothersofwhatwasstillonlyahandful
ofmachineswerecommittedtobreakingarmyandairtraffic.Thecodebreakerssaidlaterthatthey
wouldhaveneededtenfour-wheelbombes–whichdidnotthenexist–significantlytoaccelerate
theirprogress.ByNovember,anoteofdesperationhadenteredtheAdmiralty’spleastothePark
aboutShark.TheBattleoftheAtlantic,saidthenavy’sOperationalIntelligenceCentre,was‘theone
campaignwhichBParenotatpresentinfluencingtoanymarkedextent–anditistheonlyonein
whichthewarcanbelostunlessBPdohelp’.Acriticalbreakthroughwasimminent,however.On30
OctoberintheEasternMediterraneanU-559wasattackedbyanescortgroup,andforcedtothe
surfacebydepth-charging.TonyFasson,thirty-year-oldfirstlieutenantofthedestroyerPetard,along
withAbleSeamanColinGrazier,hastilystrippednakedandswamsixtyyardstothestricken
submarine,thenhauledthemselvesintotheconningtower.Thecrewhadopenedtheseacocksbefore
abandoningtheirboat,andtheseawasfloodinginevenasthetwomensearchedthecontrolroom
withdesperateurgency.
Theyfoundtreasure:thesecondeditionoftheWetterkurzschlussel,orweathershortsignalbook,
foritsEnigma.Havingwrappedthisandotherdocumentsinwaterproofing,FassonandGrazier
handedthemupthehatchtosixteen-year-oldNAAFIcanteenassistantTommyBrown,whohad
followedinswimmingtotheU-boat.Heinturnpassedthepackagestothecrewofawhaleboat,which
arrivedalongsideinthenickoftime.Brown,acivilian,livedtoreceiveaGeorgeMedalforhis
daring,butthetwosupremelydedicatedBritishsailorspushedtheirluckbyplungingoncemoreinto
thesubmarine’scontrolroom,possiblyinthebeliefthatthattheymightretrieveaciphermachine.
Bletchleydidnotneedthis,forithadalreadyreconstructedthewiringofafour-rotorEnigma:itwas
thesignalbooksthatmattered.U-559suddenlyvanishedintotheMediterranean,takingwithitFasson
andGrazier,bothofwhomreceivedposthumousGeorgeCrosses.Thecaptureddocumentsreached
Bletchleyon24November,andmadepossiblethecriticalbreakintotheSharkkeyon13December,
assistedbydatafromweatherdecryptssecuredbyHut10.
Thatday,thecodebreakersteleprintedtotheAdmiralty’sOperationalIntelligenceCentrelocations
fortwelveAtlanticU-boats.Theirpositionswerebynowaweekoutofdate,buttheysufficedto
providecriticalguidanceabouttheGermans’likelycourses.Thereafter,Sharksignalswere
frequentlybrokenwithintwenty-fourhours,thoughthedelaysometimesextendedtoforty-eight.This
wasoneoftheindisputablydecisivemomentsoftheintelligencewar.OnceregularSharkdecrypts
begantoflowthroughtotheRoyalNavy,thebalanceinthewaratseashifteddramatically.Though
Hut8latersufferedmoredelaysanddifficultieswithShark,neverthereafterwasBritishcontrolof
theAtlanticsearouteseriouslythreatened,andU-boatsinkingssoared.
AmongmuchelseremarkableaboutBletchleywerenotitsperiodicrowsandtantrums,butthatthe
front-linecodebreakers,whoseaverageagewastwenty-three,sustainedsuchadegreeoffellowship.
DerekTauntdescribedhowtheyfelt‘devotedtothetaskofoutwittingtheenemyandhappytobepart
ofacomplicatedorganizationdesignedtodojustthat’.RolfNoskwithpaidtributetowhathe
describedastheHuts’‘exemplaryleadership’.Theintegrityofthedecodingoperationwasmuch
assistedbythepersonalfriendshipbetweenStuartMilner-BarryofHut6andHughAlexanderofHut
8.Buttranquillitycouldneverbeattainablewhenthousandsofmenandwomenwereworkingunder
appallingpressurearoundtheclock,monthuponmonth,yearafteryear,knowingthatlivesdepended
upontheirefforts.On15May1943WelchmanwrotetoNigeldeGrey,apologisingforanexplosion
ofrageduringadiscussionaboutorganisationandshortageofresources,anongoingbugbear.‘My
touchiness,’hewrote,‘isprobablyduetothefactthatIalwayshavetheextremevalueandurgencyof
ourworkverymuchonmymind.ThroughoutthewholehistoryofHut6therehasneverbeenatime
atwhichIfeltthatwewerebeingasefficientaswecouldbeandyoucanimaginethatthishasbeena
heavyandcontinualstrain…Thepresentsituationisanabsolutescandal,butthereisnothingwelack
nowthathasnotbeenaskedforagainandagain.Sopleaseforgivemeforbeingsomewhatbitterand
ill-tempered.’
Headded:‘Agreatdealoftheworkisterriblymonotonousanddeadlydull,andthishasavery
seriouseffectonmoraleoveralongperiod.Someofthegirlsarealmostphysicallysickatthesight
ofaType-Xmachine.Now,ifourgirlscrackupasmanyhavedone,weareabsolutelysunk,andno
amountofbelatedassistancewillsaveus…Incidentally,couldyoupossiblypersuadeTravistoget
[Air-MarshalCharles]Medhurst[RAFdirectorofintelligence]and[theCIGSGen.SirAlan]Brooke
tospendevenoneminutetellingthegirlsthattheirworkisimportant?YourseverGordon.’But
difficultiespersistedinsecuringqualifiedpersonnel,notleastbecausesofewpeopleinWhitehallhad
anyinklingofthesupremepriorityofGC&CS’swork.WhenBPneededpersonneltooperatepunchcardmachines,itsrecruitersturnedtoemployeesoftheJohnLewisPartnership,thedepartment-store
chainwhichhadpersonneltrainedtousethem.Astoundingly,aftertenwomenhadbeenselected,the
MinistryofLabourinsistedthattheyshouldinsteadbedispatchedtodolandwork.Aninternalmemo
attheParkseethed:‘TheJohnLewisepisodeisadisgrace.’Thegirlswereeventuallyreleasedto
GC&CS,butonlyafterabitterwranglewiththecivilbureaucracy.
Fromthewar ’sfirstdaytoitslast,securitywasanobsessionofeveryAlliedofficerprivytothe
Ultrasecret.In1941acertainCol.Gribble,whohadservedasanairliaisonofficerwiththeRAFin
Francein1940,publishedabookentitledDiaryofaStaffOfficer,whichcausednear-hysteriawhen
Whitehallnoticed,becauseitcontainedreferencestounidentified‘secretsources’.Gribble’swork
hadbeenpassedbyacensorwhoknewnothingofBletchleyPark.WhatifsomebodyinBerlinreadit,
anddrewlethalinferencesaboutthevulnerabilityofGermany’sciphers?MI5boughtupandpulped
7,000unsoldcopiesofthebook,trustingtoluckthatnoneofitsexistingbuyershadGermanfriends.
BeforethefallofSingaporeinFebruary1942,thekeylocalUltraandYServicepersonnelreceived
priorityforevacuation,asdidtheirAmericancounterpartsonCorregidortwomonthslater.Hadthey
fallenintocaptivity,notonlywouldtheyhavesufferedaghastlyfatealongsideotherBritishand
Australianprisoners,andtheirrareskillshavebeenlost,buttherisktoAlliedcodebreakingwas
frighteningiftheywereexposedtointerrogationandtorture.
MostofBletchley’sstaffdisplayedmarvellousconscientiousnessaboutsecrecy,allthemore
remarkableamongyoungmenandwomen–StationX’sfootsoldiers–performinghumdrum
functions.In1941aciviliandoctorinNottinghamwrotetotheGC&CSauthorities,reportingthatone
ofhispatients,aWrennamedAdeleMoloney,wasinbedwithahightemperature,havingoverstayed
herleavewithsymptomsofacuteexhaustion.Hewrote:‘MissMoloneyhashypertrophyofthe
consciencetosuchanextentthatshewillnotdivulgethesmallestdetailofwhatshedoes,eventhough
itisagainstherinterests.AsIfinditdifficulttobelievethatthisyounggirlisonworkwhichisso
importantthatherdoctormusthavehishandstiedbylackofknowledge,IthoughtIwouldwriteto
askforyourcomments.’Bletchleyrespondedblandlythat‘thereisintheordinarywaynothingthat
weknowofintheworkthatshedoesthatisinanywaylikelytobeprejudicialtoherhealth.Thesame
workisdonebyalargenumberofothergirls,noneofwhomsofarasweknowhavesufferedinany
way.’ButBPtoldthedoctorthatMissMoloney’sdiscretionwasnotmerelycorrect,but‘highly
commendable’,andsoindeeditwas.
Therewasmuchuneaseamongtheadministratorsaboutthesecurityriskposedbytherolling
populationofcooks,cleanersandworkmenwhoservicedStationX.A1941reportreflecteduneasily:
‘NewfacesarebeingsentdailyfromtheLabourExchangetoBletchleyPark.’Aseriesofflagrant
breachesinthespringof1942promptedamagisterialmemorandumtoallpersonnelfromthePark’s
seniorsecurityofficer:‘Therehavebeenrecentinstancesamongyouofaspiritofsuchreckless
disregardfortheconsequencesofindiscretionaswouldseemtoarguenotonlyaconditionof
ignoranceorfolly,butacontemptforthelawsbywhicheachoneofusknowshimselftobebound.In
oneinstance[aBPstaffer]disclosedthenatureoftheirdutieswithinherfamilycircle…[this]was
repeatedbyoneofitsmembersinmixedcompany,actuallyatacocktailparty,whenceitwasduly
reportedtome.Inanotherinstanceoneofthemostvitaltasksinwhichtheorganisationisengaged
wasdisclosed,possiblyinaspiritofprideorostentation,inanafter-dinnerconversationtothe
Seniorsofthisperson’soldCollege,whenceareportreachedme…Itwouldbeareflectiononyour
intelligencetosupposethatyoudonotrealise…thatanidlepieceofboastingorgossip…maybe
passedtotheenemyandcause,notonlythebreakdownofoursuccessfuleffortshere,butthe
sacrificeofthelivesofoursailors,soldiersandairmen,perhapsyourownbrothers,andmayeven
prejudiceourultimatehopesofvictory.’
Ifthisbroadsidewasfiercelyworded,itwasnotinthesmallestdegreeextravagant.BletchleyPark
wasthejewelinthecrownofBritain’swareffort,oneofitsprincipalassetsinthestruggletosavethe
nationfromNazienslavement.AlanBrookewroteinhisdiaryaftervisitingGC&CSinApril1942:
‘Awonderfulsetofprofessorsandgenii!Imarvelattheworktheysucceedindoing.’Betrayalofits
secretscouldovernighthavecrippledthecauseoffreedom–mostimmediatelybydenyingtothe
RoyalNavyitskeytothelocationsofDönitz’sU-boats.WellbeforetheSovietUnionbecamea
supposedallyinJune1941,BritishtraitorswerepassingtoNKVDagentswhateverpearlsofUltra
theythoughtmightbeofinteresttoMoscow;itwasfortunatethatStalindidnotinformHitlerof
Bletchley’sdoings–inthemonthsbefore‘Barbarossa’,hewasdesperatetoappeaseBerlin.
ItwasanevenlargerstrokeoffortunethatGermany’scommanderssustainedtheirdoggedbelief
inEnigma’sinviolability.Earlyinthe1930stheheadcryptanalystofGöring’sForschungsamtcipher
unit,DrGeorgSchröder,assertedpassionately:‘thewholeEnigmaisgarbage!’Noheedwastakenof
hiswarning,whichwasdeemedonlyrelevanttothecommercialmachine,whichlackedaplugboard.
InOctober1939Lt.Col.Ruzek,formerheadofCzechcryptanalysis,revealedtoGerman
interrogatorsthatthePoleshadbeenworkingwiththeFrenchtobreakEnigmatraffic.Incaptured
Polishfiles,theNazisdiscoveredthree1938plain-languagetranslationsofsignalsfromaGerman
cruiserinSpanishwaters.PolishPoWswereexhaustivelyinterrogatedinattemptstodiscoverhow
thesemessageshadbeendecrypted,buttheAbwehrdrewablank:almostallthemenwhoknewthe
answerswereatthattimebeyondtheirreach.OKW/Chi’scryptanalystsinBerlinfeltintensely
frustratedthat,whiletheyweresupposedlyresponsibleforensuringthesecurityoftheWehrmacht’s
communications,theywereexpresslyforbiddentoconducttestsonbreakingEnigmatraffic.They
nonethelessbelievedthesysteminstitutionallysafe,andarguedthatoccasionalsignalscouldonlybe
brokenifdispatchedbycarelessoperatorswhoneglectedprocedure.Evenin1946theWehrmacht’s
chiefcryptanalyst,WilhelmFenner,maintainedstubbornly:‘TheEnigmawasregardedasantiquated,
butitwassecurewhenproperlyused.’
ItispossibletoidentifyseveralmomentsofthewaratwhichBritishblunderscouldhaveenabled
theGermanstorecognisethattheircipherswerecompromised,andplugthegusherofintelligence
flowingfromBletchleyPark.On24August1941,ChurchillmadeaBBCbroadcastinwhichhe
alludedtoexplicitnumbersofJewsknowntohavebeenmurderedbytheSSbehindtheEasternFront.
TheGermansnoticed,andwithindaysOberstgruppenführerKurtDaluegeissuedanorderthatdetails
ofsuchkillingsshouldnolongerbementionedinradiotraffic:‘Thedangerofenemydecryptionof
wirelessmessagesisgreat.Forthisreasononlynon-sensitiveinformationshouldbetransmitted.’
OneconsequenceofChurchill’sslipwasthatwheninOctober1942theForeignOfficecompileda
reportonknownGermanatrocities,especiallythosecommittedagainstJews,thiswasnotpublicly
released,toavoidanynewriskofcompromisingintelligencesources.
ItwasremarkablethattheGermanhighcommandfailedtodrawfar-reachingconclusionsfrom
Churchill’sAugust1941words,andlikewiseayearlaterwhenGermaninterrogationofAllied
prisonersrevealedthatMontgomery’sEighthArmyhadbeenexpectingtheAfrikaKorps’attackat
AlamHalfainNorthAfrica.Earlyin1942also,DönitzbecameacutelysuspiciousthattheAllieswere
monitoringhiscommunicationswithU-boats.Hewaspersuadedthathisfearsweregroundlessby
Britishcarelessnesswiththeirownconvoycodes,whichwerebeingbrokenbytheKriegsmarine’s
decryptionservice,theB-Dienst.IfEnigmawasindeedinsecure,theadmiralreasoned,theBritish
wouldhavelearnedaboutthisyawningchasmintheirownsecurity:anationcleverenoughtocrack
U-boatsignalswouldemploybettercodesofitsown.TheU-boatchiefwascarefulenoughto
introducethefour-rotorEnigma,butinsufficientlysotoquestionthefundamentalbasisofthesystem.
PotentiallythemostdangerousthreattotheUltrasecretalsocamein1942.On5MaytheAustralian
freighterNankinsailedfromFremantleforCalcuttawithacargoofexplosives,180crewand162
passengers.IntheIndianOceanearlyonthemorningof10May,asmallfloatplanecircledtheship.
Soonafterwardsitsparent,theGermanraidingcruiserThor,closedinandopenedfire.Nankin
signalled‘Raidersighted,’andhercaptainjettisonedtheconfidentialbooksbeforesurrenderingan
hourafterthefirstshot.ThepassengersandcrewweretransferredtoThoranditsaccompanying
supplyship,alongwithhundredsofsacksofmail.Amongthese,theGermansidentifieda
consignmentfromtheCombinedOperationsIntelligenceCentreatWellington,NewZealand.Its
contentsincludeda‘MostSecret’summaryfortheperiod21Marchto20April,largelybasedon
Ultramaterial,whichgavethepositionsofeveryknownAlliedandenemywarshipandmerchant
vesselinthePacificandIndianOceans.Withcriminalcarelessness,thesedocumentshadbeen
dispatchednotbyhandofNankin’scaptain,butinsteadwiththegeneralmail.
EventhoughtheCOICdatawaswelloutofrealtime,imaginativeanalysisoftheintelligence
summarybytheAbwehrwouldhaveshowntheGermansthatsomeatleastoftheirciphers,aswellas
thoseoftheJapanese,werecompromised.Suchscrutinyappearsnevertohavetakenplace.The
Thor’scaptainsawnospecialurgencyaboutsendingthecaptureddocumentstoBerlin.Onlyatthe
endofJuly,aftertheraidingcruiser ’ssupplyshipdockedatYokohama,didGermany’snavalattaché
inTokyoreceivetheCOICpapers.AfurthermonthelapsedbeforeBerlinauthorisedhimtopassthe
documentstoitsAsianally.Thereafter,theJapanesenavychangeditsmaincode,sothattheUSNavy
lacked‘realtime’decryptstoempoweritsoperationsduringthe11–12OctoberBattleofCape
Esperance,the26OctoberBattleofSantaCruz,andthe13–15NovemberGuadalcanalactions.
ItwouldbefancifultosuggestthattheNankincapturesthusalteredthecourseofthenavalwar,
becausethecodealterationwaspartofaregularroutine:theJapanesestilldoggedlyrefusedto
acknowledgethattheirentirecommunicationssystemwasvulnerable.ButiftheyhadreadtheAllied
COICdocumentssoonaftertheGermansgottheirhandsonthem,andhadpossessedamore
sophisticatedcapabilityforassessingintelligence,theywouldhavechangedtheirciphersweeks,
insteadofdays,beforelaunchingtheirJuneassaultonMidway,withmomentousconsequences.The
BritishdonotappeartohavetoldtheAmericansabouttheNankinloss.Thismayhavebeenbecause
theysufferedanattackofwell-deservedembarrassmentaboutamajorbreachofsecurity.Itwasthe
samestorywhenthesecondoftwocopiesoftheJapanesePurpleciphermachine,presentedtothe
BritishbytheirAmericancreators,wasdispatchedtotheUltrateaminSingaporebyfreighter.Itis
knowntohaveleftDurbaninDecember1941,butthereaftervanishedwithouttrace,itsfateunknown
fromthatdaytothis.
NoWhitehallcorrespondenceconcerningtheNankinhasthusfarbeenfoundinBritisharchives,
anditwouldbeunjustifiedtobuildtoohighatowerofspeculationarounditsstory.TheAllies
escapedsignificantconsequencesfromtheirblunder–andfromtheotherscitedabove–becausethe
intelligencesystemsofGermanyandJapanlackedthecoherenceandimaginationtoprofitasthey
shouldhavedonefromtheirhaulofAlliedsecrets.Onefurthercriticallydangerousmomentshould
bementioned:inNovember1942theGermanssweptacrossunoccupiedFrance.Amongthosewhom
theytookintocustodyinVichywerethreePoleswhohadservedinGustaveBertrand’scodebreaking
departmentsince1940,andbeforethathadbeenengagedinPoland’sowncryptographicoperation.In
March1943,twosuchprisonerswereinterrogatedbyGermansigintexpertsinthepresenceofan
Abwehrofficer.Hadthementoldwhattheyknew,orcouldhavesurmised,abouttheAllies’progress
incrackingEnigma,theworstcouldhavehappened.Fortunately,beforebeingquestionedthePoles
werebrieflyalonetogether,andcoordinatedexplanationswhichwereaccepted:thatwhilesome
traffichadbeenbrieflybrokenin1938,improvedGermansystemsthereafterclosedthebreach.Here
weretwomorepeopletowhomtheAlliesowedadebtfortheirrolepreservingtheUltrasecret.
CleverermeninBerlinandTokyomighthavemademuchofthematerialandprisonersthatfellinto
theirhands,andabruptlyhaltedthemusicfortheAllies’wondrousdanceacrosstheether.
2 F LI RTI NGW I TH A M ER I C A
FromthedayWinstonChurchillbecameprimeministeruntilPearlHarbornineteenmonthslater,his
foremostpoliticalpurposewastodragtheUnitedStatesintothewar,becauseonlythuscouldthe
embattledislandhopetoaccomplishmorethanitsownsurvival.Tothatend,theBritishsoughtthe
closestcooperationtheAmericanswouldcountenance.Theyprofessedtowishtoextendthisto
intelligence,butintruthsoughtanotablyone-sidedrelationship,whichprotectedmostofBritain’s
secrets.Inthespringof1940,StewartMenziesaskedtheCanadianbusinessmanSirWilliam
StephensontotrytoopenalinktoJ.EdgarHoover,directoroftheFBI.Stephenson,eagerforatoptableroleforhimself,setaboutthismissionwithawill,usinganunlikelymutualacquaintance,the
formerworldheavyweightboxingchampionGeneTunney,withwhomhehadsparredinFranceback
in1918.InthosedaystheCanadianhadbeenafighterpilot,whowentontomakeafortunebefore
creatinghisownindustrialintelligencenetworkinthe1930s,fromwhichheofferedmaterialtothe
Britishgovernment.ThisopenedarelationshipwithDesmondMortonandDickEllisofBroadway,
whichcontinuedaftertheoutbreakofwar.Hoover,beforemeetingtheebullientCanadian,tookcare
tosecureWhiteHouseapproval.StephensonreportedbacktoLondonthattheFBIchiefwaskeento
cooperatewithMI6,andhadsuggestedthathisvisitorshouldsecuresomeofficialtitletoformalise
hisstatusintheUS.
MenziespromptlygaveStephensonamodestcoverroleasPassportControlOfficerinNewYork,
wherehesetupshopon21June1940.ThereaftertheCanadianbuiltasubstantialorganisationwhich
inJanuary1941acquiredthetitleofBritishSecurityCoordination.BSC,quarteredonthe35thand
36thfloorsoftheRockefellerCenteronFifthAvenue,waschargedwithsabotagingAxisoperations,
liaisingwiththeAmericansandgatheringintelligenceaboutenemyactivity.Italsomanagedanti-Axis
propagandathroughouttheAmericas.Initsroleasaflag-carrierforBritainanditsspies,itenjoyed
considerablesuccessuntiltherespectivenationalintelligenceservicesbegantobypassBSCinfavour
ofdoingbusinesswitheachotherdirect,inthespringof1942aftertheUScameintothewar.
NewYorkbecameMI6’smostimportantout-station,fromwhichitsagentssetforthtotryto
penetrateAxis-runcompaniesandforeignembassies.BSCcouldclaimcreditforsuchcoupsas
tippingofftheFBIinNovember1940,whenaMexicoCityinformantrevealedthatfourGerman
shipsintendedtoruntheBritishblockadeacrosstheGulfofMexico:theUSNavystoppedtheships.
Likewise,J.EdgarHooverwarnedBSCthattheItaliansintendedtotransfertoSouthAmericaalmost
$4millionincash,whichmightbeusedtobankrollsabotage.Two-thirdsofthemoneygotthrough,
butaBSCagentalertedpoliceinMexicoCityaboutthesmugglingoperation:theyopenedthebags
andconfiscated$1.4million.Onthedebitside,however,Stephensonwasallegedtohaverecruited
somefranklydisreputableofficers.GuyLiddellofMI5fumedaboutoneinparticular,IngramFraser,
whowasallegedtohavebeen‘runningamistressinWashingtonDCwhowassupposedtobeacting
asanagentontheFinns.Shewasgetting$500amonthforherflatand$500forherservices,allpaid
outofofficefunds.’BSCwastedasmuchenergyonabsurditiesaseveryotherintelligence
organisation:threeofitscleverestofficers–OxforddonsFreddieAyer,BillDeakinandGilbert
Hignet–spentweeksplanningaresponsetoapossibleJapaneseinvasionofSouthAmerica.
Whatmatteredmost,however,wasStephenson’sliaisonrole:heforgedclosepersonalrelations
withmanyprominentadministrationfigures,andespeciallywithColonelWilliamDonovan,who
wouldbecomethemostinfluentialsinglepersonalityinAmerica’swartimeforeignintelligence
operations.Donovanwasanaturalshowman,wheretheotherbelligerents’spymastersweremenof
theshadowsor–inthecaseofStalin’sintelligencechiefs–creaturesofthenight.Bornin1883,
‘WildBill’rosefromapoorIrishbackgroundinupstateNewYorktobecomeaclassmateof
FranklinRooseveltatColumbiaLawSchool;helaterbecameaninfluentialfriendofthepresident.He
foughtwithPershingagainstPanchoVilla,thencommandedtheNewYorkIrish69thRegimentonthe
WesternFrontin1917–18,returninghomeashisnation’smostdecoratedsoldier,acolonelwiththe
MedalofHonorandareasonablyauthenticreputationasahero.ThereafterhefulfilledseveralfactfindingmissionsfortheWhiteHouse.Followingthefirstofthese,tothenewSovietUnionin1919,
DonovanurgedWashingtonagainstsupportingWhiteRussia,describingworkersinSiberiaas
‘yearningforBolshevism’.AsUSAttorneyfortheWesternDistrictofNewYork,hebecamefamous
–ornotorious–forhisenergeticenforcementofProhibition.Later,thoughhimselfaRepublican,he
visitedAbyssiniaandSpainasanemissaryforRoosevelttheDemocrat.Hereturnedhomean
implacablefoeofHitler,andadvocateofUSengagementinEurope.
In1940and1941,DonovanmadetripstoLondonduringwhichStephensonensuredthathe
receivedred-carpettreatment,includinglunchwiththeprimeminister.SomeBritishofficersrecoiled
fromthevisitor ’sbrashness.Maj.Gen.JohnKennedy,directorofmilitaryoperations,wroteinhis
diary:‘Donovan…isextremelyfriendlytous&ashrewdandpleasantfellowandgoodtalker.ButI
couldnotbutfeelthatthisfat&prosperouslawyer,acitizenofacountrynotinthewar…possessed
verygreatassurancetobeabletolaydownthelawsogliblyaboutwhatweandotherthreatened
nationsshould&sh[oul]dnotdo.’
Donovan’sinfluenceattheWhiteHousenonethelessensuredcontinuingBritishgratitudeand
goodwill.InSeptember1940hepersuadedRoosevelttocommittheUStoapolicyofintelligence
collaborationwithChurchill’snation.WhenGodfrey,thedirectorofnavalintelligence,visitedtheUS
inMay1941withhispersonalassistantCommanderIanFleming,inNewYorkthetwomenstayedat
Donovan’sapartment.Theadmiral’stripwasnotanunqualifiedsuccess:hewasshockedbythedepth
ofhostilitybetweentheUSArmyandUSNavy,andgotlittlechangeoutofHoover,whowasless
interestedinjoiningthewaragainsttheAxisthaninsecuringtheFBI’smonopolycontrolofthe
nation’sintelligenceactivities.Inthis,Hooverwasunsuccessful.WhilehisBureauretained
responsibilityforcounter-espionage–theroleofMI5inBritain–GodfreyandStephensonplayed
somepartinconvincingtheRooseveltadministrationthatthecountryneededanewintelligence
organisation,andthatDonovanwasthemantorunit.FromJuly1941heheldthetitleofCoordinator
ofInformation,thoughinrealityhisnewOfficeofWarInformationwasanembryosecretservice,
andhesetaboutsupervisingitsbirthandprecociousgrowthwithenergyandexuberance.
DonovanandStephenson–thelatterknownintheUSas‘LittleBill’ratherthan‘Intrepid’,which
wasmerelyhistelegraphicaddress–werebuccaneersboth,whosharedcreditforsecuringa
reasonablyfreehandforBritishintelligenceoperationsintheAmericas,againstthewishesoftheFBI
andtheStateDepartment.Theirrapportdidnot,however,changeanoverarchingreality:thewartime
relationshipbetweenBritainandtheUnitedStateswascharacterisedbytensionsandsuspicions,
merelypaintedoverbythemagnificentrhetoricofChurchillandRoosevelt.In1940–41theBritish
werefightingfortheirliveswhileAmericanswerenot,andindeedoperatedacash-and-carrypolicy
forthemodestquotaofweaponsandsuppliestheysoldtoChurchill’speople.MostofAmerica’s
defencecommunityhadsomerespectforBritain,butlittleaffection.
TheBritishofficersprivytotheUltrasecretknewthattheywerecustodiansofoneoftheir
country’smostpreciousassets,whichwouldbecomeinstantlyforfeitifanyhintoftheirgrowing
successesreachedBerlin.Americansecuritywaspoor,asmightbeexpectedofapeoplenotyet
committedtothestruggle,whowereanywayconstitutionallyill-suitedtokeepingsecrets.British
intelligencechiefswereeagerforAmericangoodwill,butdoubtfulhowmuchofpracticalvaluetheir
UScounterpartscouldtellthem.Pendingevidencethatatwo-waytrafficcouldbenefittheirembattled
island,theydeterminedtogiveawayaslittleaspossible.Moreover,asananguishedWhitehallhand
scribbledduringthe1941debateabouthowmuchtotellavisitingUSdelegation:‘Whatwillthey
thinkiftheyfindwehavebeenreadingtheirownstuff?’–amildembarrassmentaboutwhich
ChurchillcamecleantoRoosevelton25February1942,withtheassurancethatdecryptionofUS
materialhadstoppedimmediatelyafterPearlHarbor.
Thesparse1940–41meetingsandexchangesbetweenthetwonation’scodebreakersand
intelligenceofficerstookplaceinaclimateofmutualwariness,anditwastheAmericanswho
displayedgreaterfrankness.On31August1940theBritishweretoldthattheSignalsIntelligence
ServicehadbrokentheJapanesePurplekey.Thisrevelationpromptednoimmediateinvitationto
Bletchley:whentheTizardmissionvisitedtheUSinSeptembertoshowoffsuchrevolutionary
technologyasthecavitymagnetron–atemptingmorsel,keytonew-agetacticalradar,andintended
topromoteAmericanreciprocity–informationaboutUltrawasexplicitlyexcluded.OntheAmerican
side,LauranceSaffordoftheUSNavy’sOp-20-Gcodebreakingteamwaslikewiseopposedto
sharingitssecretswiththeBritish.InDecember1940thetwonationsreachedanagreementtopool
informationaboutcodebreaking,butbothwereslowtobringthisintoeffect.OnlyonJapanese
materialwasthereimmediateclosecollaboration:inFebruary1941theBritishcryptanalysisteamin
SingaporeanditsAmericancounterpartinthePhilippinesexchangedliaisonofficers,who
discoveredthatbothwereinaboutthesameplacewithTokyo’scodes.Intheearlywaryearsthe
BritishdidbetterthantheAmericansinmonitoringsomelow-levelJapanesearmedforcestraffic,
thoughtheyfailedtobreakintotheirhigherciphers.Nonetheless,whenBritishforcesin1941
requestedurgentAmericanassistanceinsecuringhigh-altitudephotographsofJapan’snavalbases,
Washingtonvetoedtheproposal.
AttheheightoftheLuftwaffeBlitzonBritaintwoFBIagents,HughCleggandClarenceHince,
visitedLondontostudy‘lawenforcementintimeofwar ’.GuyLiddellofMI5thoughtthatwhilethe
visitorslookedsomewhatthuggish,Cleggseemed‘averygoodfellow’.Suchwarmthwasnot
reciprocated.Ontheirreturn,thetwomendeliveredtoHooverareportdepictingtheBritish,
explicitlyMI5andtheMetropolitanPolice,intermsofwitheringscorn.Theycomplainedthatitwas
difficulttoarrangemeetingsbefore10a.m.orafter4p.m.because‘thetransportsituationisvery
difficult,youknow’.Theysaidthat‘Thefact“exploratoryluncheons”wereusuallytwohoursin
lengthmadeourworkingdayratherlimited,particularlywhencomparedtothecustomaryhoursthat
officialsoftheFBIareengagedinofficialbusiness.’TheyconcludedthattheBritish‘mightwinthe
wariftheyfinditconvenient’.ThisreportsetthetonefortheFBI’sviewoftheBritishfordecades
thereafter.
InJanuary1941,whenanAmericancodebreakingteam–twoarmy,twonavy–paidapioneering
visittoBritain,theybroughtwiththemaremarkablygenerousgift:amimickedPurplemachine,of
whichasecondcopywashandedoverlater.TheBritish,however,reciprocatedcautiously.With
WinstonChurchill’sexplicitsanctiontheyadmittedthevisitorstoBletchley,andexplainedtheHut
system.Theyrevealedthebombes,GC&CS’smostcriticalinnovation,butthereafterprevaricated
aboutfulfillingAmericanrequeststobegivenanexampleofwhatWashingtondescribedas‘a
cypher-solvingmachine’.Therewereverygoodreasonsforthis–theUSwasnotinthewar,andthe
bombeswerescarcepearls.TheAmericansrecognisedthattheyhadseeninactionasystemway
aheadofanythingtheUSarmedforcesweredoing.AlfredMcCormack,whobecamethesecretary
forwar ’sspecialassistantoncomint,saidlaterofBletchley:‘It’snotgood–it’ssuperb.’
SomepeopleinWashington,however,wereirkedbyapparentBritishpusillanimity.They
themselvesmadelittleseriousheadwayinreadingEnigmatrafficuntilfloodgatesopenedin1943,
and–inthewordsofanexasperatedBritishofficer–‘showednoappreciationoftheextentofthe
problemsfacingBletchleyParkandBritain’.ThePark’sWashingtonrepresentative,CaptainEdward
Hastings,reportedinNovember1941that‘thereisgraveunrestanddissatisfactionaboutfree
exchangeofspecialintelligence’.SomeAmericansweredoggedlyconvincedthattheBritishwere
holdingoutonthem.AslateasDecember1942,whenAlanTuringvisitedtheUS,hewasdenied
admissiontotheBellLaboratoriesinrevengeforallegedBritishfoot-draggingaboutcollaboration,
andwasfinallyallowedinsideonlyafterahugeandprotractedtransatlanticrow.AlthoughWilliam
FriedmanlaterforgedwarmpersonalrelationswithBP’sseniorpersonnel,hehimselfmadehisfirst
visittoBritainonlyinMay1943,aboutthetimeaformalandindeedhistoricintelligence-sharing
pactwasagreedbetweenthetwonations.Meanwhilecollaborationremainedwaryandincomplete.
EvenafterPearlHarbor,BletchleyanditsownersremainedfearfulnotonlyaboutAmericansecurity
shortcomings,butalsoaboutthedangerthatthisbrightestjewelintheimperialcrownmight
somehowbesnatchedfromthembytheboundlesslyrich,irresistiblydominantnewpartnerinthe
GrandAlliance.AlastairDennistonwrotethatforBritainUltrawas‘almostlifeblood’,whereasthe
AmericansseemedtoviewEnigma,withthedetachmentofdistanceandfreedomfrommortalperil,
merelyas‘anewandveryinterestingproblem’.
TheWarOffice’sdeputydirectorofmilitaryintelligencewroteon17February1942,tenweeks
afterPearlHarbor,thatintalkingtotheAmericans,‘thegeneralpolicyistobeasfrankaspossible
butnoinformationwillbegivenregardingourownfutureoperations,orsourcesofinformation,
norwillanyinformationbepassedwhichemanatesfromspecialmostsecretsources[Ultra]’.On16
MarchthecabinetsecretarySirEdwardBridgeswroteamemorandumwarningthattelephone
conversationsbetweenLondonandWashington‘stillrevealinstancesofgross[American]lackof
discretion’.StewartMenziesandhisofficersatMI6remainedreluctanttoopentheirheartsandfiles
totheirnewbrothers-in-arms.
Unfortunately,theBritishobfuscationwhichpersistedthroughmuchof1942prompted
misunderstandingsandmountingangeramongsomeAmericans.Thesecrystallisedaroundabelief–
entirelymistaken–thatBletchleyhadbrokenintotheU-boatSharkkey,butwasrefusingtotellthe
USNavyaboutit.Op-20-G’seventualexasperatedripostetoBletchley’sunwillingnesstosurrendera
bombewastoannounceinSeptember1942–andtobegintofulfilinAugustthefollowingyear–its
owncommitmenttobuildfour-rotormodelsbythehundred.ThiswasatimewhentheBritishhadjust
thirty-two.TheAmericanmachinesprovedtechnicallysuperiortotheBritishmodels,andalsomore
reliable:inOctober1943thirty-ninewereoperationalandbyDecemberseventy-five,thoughbythe
timethesebecameoperationalmuchoftheircapacityprovedsuperfluoustoUSNavyneeds.
Intheearlywaryears,BritishintelligencecollaborationwiththeUSwascautious;onlyfrom1943
onwardsdiditbecomewholehearted.AswithsomuchelseaboutAnglo–Americanrelations,
however,itislesssurprisingthattherewassomuchsquabblingattheoutset,intheyearsofAllied
defeat,thanthatthepartnershipeventuallyachievedtheintimacythatitdid,intheyearsofvictory.
*TheType-Xwasdevelopedin1934byWing-CommanderO.C.LywoodandErnestSmithofAirMinistrySignals,improvingupona
borrowedcommercialEnigma,andenteredBritishservicethreeyearslater.
4
TheDogsthatBarked
1 ‘ LUC Y’ S ’ P EO P LE
TheextraordinaryincidentoftheKremlin’sdogsinthenightwasthattheybarked,andbarked.
Operation‘Barbarossa’,theJune1941NaziinvasionoftheSovietUnion,wasthedefiningeventof
theSecondWorldWar–anditsmostbaffling,becauseitachievedsurprisewhenitsimminencewas
manifest.ItwasatributetothelengthandstrengthofStalin’sarmthathumint–agentsofinfluence
abroad–providedhimwithcomprehensivewarnings.AsearlyasJuly1940,NKVDmenoperatingin
German-occupiedPolandwerereportingintenseWehrmachtactivity,barrack-buildingandtroop
movements.Thatautumn,heinstructedCentretoopenaspecialfileonHitler ’sintentionscodenamed
‘Zateya’–‘Venture’.InSeptemberthisshowedmassiveGermanredeploymentsclosetotheRussian
border,togetherwithcontinuingconstructionoftroopaccommodation.TheGermans’Moscow
embassywasreportedbyaSovietagentwithinitswallstobestrivingtorecruitWhiteRussiansand
intellectualdissidentsfortheAbwehr.InNovember1940Stalinwastoldthateighty-fivedivisions,
comprisingmorethantwo-thirdsofHitler ’sinfantry,weredeployedalongtheRussianfrontier.
Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,however,someofthesetroopswereshiftedtothreaten,andthen
tooccupy,RomaniaandGreece.Neitherin1941norsincehavemostWesternersgraspedtheintensity
ofStalin’sconvictionthatHitler ’sambitionswerefocusedontheBalkans,whereRussiaalsohadvital
interests.NordotheyacknowledgethedepthofhishatredanddistrustofBritain.Itwasbarelytwenty
yearssinceWinstonChurchillhadledacrusadetoreversetheBolshevikRevolutionbyforceof
arms.Stalinsawhimself,bynomeansmistakenly,astheobjectofasustainedChurchilliancampaign
todriveawedgeintohispactwithHitlerandforcehimtofightGermany,againstRussia’sinterests
andinpursuitofthoseoftheBritishEmpire.
ThemasteroftheKremlinrecognisedthatwarbetweentheNazisandtheSovietUnionmight
ultimatelyproveunavoidable.AnAugust1940GRUreport,quotingHitler ’sambassadorinBelgrade,
showedthatthiswascertainlytheotherparty’sview:‘ForGermanytheBalkansarethemost
significantassetandoughttobeincludedinthe[Nazi-controlled]neworderofEurope;butsincethe
USSRwouldneveragreetothat,awarwithherisinevitable.’Stalin,however,remainedconvinced
thatitwasoverwhelminglyagainstHitler ’sintereststobreaktheNazi–SovietPactthatwasdelivering
hugesuppliesofoilandcommoditiestoGermany.HebelieveditwasintheKremlin’sgifttoappoint
thehourforashowdown,whichwasnotyet.Heclungtotheview,slavishlyendorsedbyBeria,that
Hitlerwasengagedinamassivebluff,designedtocowRussiaintolettingGermanyhaveitswayin
theBalkans.AugustoRosso,theItalianambassadorinMoscow,wroteon21September1940:‘The
Germanshaveraisedabarrier[againsttheRussians]:themarchtothesouthhasbeenstopped,theoil
isatthedisposaloftheGermans…TheDanubeisaGermanriver.Thisisthefirstdiplomaticdefeat
ofComradeStalin…andthedefeatisevenmorehumiliatingbecauseitexplodesthedreamwhich
throughoutthecenturieshasoccupiedaspecialplaceintheRussiansoul:[dominance]ofthesouthern
meridian.’
FriedrichvonderSchulenberg,Germany’sambassador,helpedtoassuageMoscow’sfearsabout
Berlin’sintentions,becausehisownhonestyandsincerityweremanifest,anddirectedtowards
preservingpeace.BeriatoldStalinthatonceVichyFranceandSpainhadjoinedtheAxisasexpected,
HitlerplannedtoinducehimtojoinapactthatwouldcloseasteelringaroundBritain:‘Pressurewas
tobeexertedonRussia,’theSovietintelligencesupremowroteon24October1940,‘toreacha
politicalagreementwithGermanywhichwoulddemonstratetotheentireworldthattheSovietUnion
willnotholdaloof,andactivelyjointhestruggleagainstBritain,tosecureanewEuropeanorder.’In
NovemberMolotovwasdispatchedtoBerlin,todiscover‘therealintentionsofGermany’sproposals
fortheNewEurope’.TheforeignministermadeplainthatStalinstillsoughtcontrolofthemouthof
theDanube,whichHitlerhadnointentionofconceding,andthevisitconfirmedGermany’sleaderin
hiscommitmenttowar.
TheNKVD’sinformantsinLondonasserted,correctly,thatmanyofBritain’sbusinessmenand
bankersfavouredacompromisepeace.Moscowwasappalledbysuchaprospect,whichwouldmake
Hitlerunstoppable.TheKremlinaspiredtoseeGermanyweakened,tomakeHitlermorebiddable.
Thus,forallStalin’sdisdainforChurchillandhispeople,hewasdelightedbyBritishsuccesses
againsttheLuftwaffeathomeandtheItaliansinNorthAfrica.IvanMaisky,theSovietambassadorin
London,waxedlyricalabouttheprospects,writingon3November1940:‘Englandhasnotmerely
survived,buthasstrengtheneditspositioncomparedwiththatwhichprevailedafterthefallofFrance
…inthe“BattleofBritain”.Hitler,likeNapoleon135yearsearlier,hassufferedadefeat,hisfirst
serioussetbackofthiswar;theconsequencesareimpossibletoforesee.’
Throughthewinterof1940–41,Stalinwasbatteredbycontrarywindsandfears.TheNKVDand
GRUreportedinsistentlyandaccurately,ontheauthorityofitssecretWhitehallinformants,thatthe
BritishwereconsideringabomberassaultonhisBakuoilwells,whichweresupplyingRussianfuel
totheLuftwaffe.TheKremlinwasevenmoredismayedbyAxispreparationstoinvadeGreece,which
couldpresageseizureoftheDardanelles,acenturies-oldRussiannightmare.IfTurkeycameintothe
waroneitherside,StalinthoughtitsarmyliabletoinvadetheCaucasus,ofwhichtheOttomanshad
beendispossessedbarelyseventyyearsearlier.VsevolodMerkulov,Beria’sdeputy,reportedintense
TurkishintelligenceactivityontheRussianborder.MeanwhiletheTurks,fortheirpart,werefearful
ofNaziaggression,andinJanuary1941theirembassiesbegantobrieftheRussiansaboutthe
Germanbuild-upinRomania.TheGRUassertedon27January1941thattheBalkans‘remainedthe
decisivefocusofpoliticalevents,particularlysinceaheadlongclashofGermanandSovietvital
interestshasarisenthere’.
ButalthoughStalinwasreceivingastreamofintelligenceabouttheNazithreattotheBalkans,
therewasatorrentaboutthedirectmenacetotheSovietUnion.On5December1940Vladimir
Dekanozov,SovietambassadorinBerlinandaveteranintelligenceofficer,receivedananonymous
letter:‘ToComradesStalinandMolotov,veryurgent.Russia,pleasebealert,asHitlerissoongoing
toattackyou.Itwillsoonbetoolate,butRussiaisasleepnow.Can’tyouseewhatishappeningonthe
borders,fromMemeltotheBlackSea?EastPrussiaisfilledwithtroops,newunitsarearrivingday
andnight…’MoscowwasinformedbyitsBerlinmilitaryattachéjustelevendaysafterHitlersigned
hisDirective21on18December,callingontheWehrmacht‘tocrushSovietRussiainarapid
campaign’.Inmid-March1941theSovietmilitaryattachéinBucharestreportedaGermanofficer
tellingafriend:‘Wehavecompletelyalteredourplans.WeaimattheEast,attheUSSR.Weshall
seizetheSoviets’grain,coalandoil.Weshallthenbeinvincibleandwillbeabletocontinuethewar
againstEnglandandtheUnitedStates.’
BeriaandStalinnonethelessagreedthattherewasalternativeevidencetoshowthistobemere
sabre-rattling:HitlerwasmakingashowofforceonRussia’sbordertoadvancehisBalkanpurposes.
A20March1941GRUassessmentbyGen.FilipGolikovstatedwhatheknewhisreadershipwished
tohear:‘ThemajorityoftheintelligencereportswhichindicatethelikelihoodofwarwiththeSoviet
Unioninspring1941arederivedfromAnglo-Americansources,whoseimmediateobjectiveis
undoubtedlytopromotetheworseningofrelationsbetweentheUSSRandGermany.’TheSwedish
ministerinMoscow,VilhelmAssarasson,wasconsistentlywellinformedaboutNazidecisionmaking,andknewaboutthecommitmentto‘Barbarossa’.ButAssarasson’stipwasdiscounted,
becauseitwasforwardedtotheKremlinbyStaffordCripps,theBritishenvoy.TheNKVDintercepted
thedispatchesofTurkishambassadorHaydarAktay,whoalsocitedAssarasson’sinformation,along
withreportsofHitler ’sindiscretionstoPrincePaulofYugoslavia,predictingwar.Aktay’sviewwas
alsodismissed.
InMarchSovietintelligencesufferedashock.Moscowconsidereditanimportantinteresttokeep
YugoslaviaoutofHitler ’sgrasp.WhenitbecameawarethatPrincePaul,therulingregent,intended
tothrowinhislotwiththeAxis,Gen.SolomonMilshteinandabandofGRU‘illegals’were
dispatchedtoBelgradetoorganiseacoupagainsthim.TheywereconfoundedwhenBritain’sSOE
pre-emptedthem,launchingitsowncouptoinstallKingPeterII.Moscowwasevenmoreappalleda
fewdayslater,whentheWehrmachtsweptacrossYugoslaviainthefaceofnegligibleresistance.Yet
eventhoughtheRussianssympathisedwithitspeople,asfellow-Slavs,Stalindismissedtheirpleasfor
militaryassistance.HeremainedstubbornlydeterminednottobeprovokedbytheBritish–ashesaw
it–intoanarmedstruggleagainstGermanyoverYugoslavia.HemerelysignedameaninglessnonaggressionagreementwithBelgrade,shortlybeforeGermantroopssweptitsnewgovernmentaside.
Hehadsetacourse–tobuytimebeforeconfrontingHitler–andwasdeterminednothingshould
deflecthimfromit,leastofalltheintelligencereportsthatswampedMoscowCentrebetween
September1940andJune1941.
ItishardtoassessthecontributionofSovietagentsinSwitzerlandatthistime,becausemodern
knowledgeisalmostentirelydependentontheprincipals’latermemoirs.Allwerecompulsiveliars,
bentuponinflatingtheirownroles.Thus,whatfollowsisevenmorespeculativethanmostaccounts
ofRussianactivities.TheonsetofwarhadcreatedfinancialandlogisticaldifficultiesforAlexander
Radó.TherewasnoSovietlegationinBernthroughwhichcashcouldbechannelledtohim,andhis
cartographicbusinesslanguished.Hewasleftwithlittlemoneytofundhimselfandhisfamily,far
lessaspynetwork.AlexanderFoote,trainedbyUrsulaHamburgertoserveasRadó’swirelessoperator,wasstrivingwithequallymeagrefundstosustainamasqueradeasaBritishgentlemanof
leisure,hopingtositoutthewarinthecomfortofLausanne.Wirelessassumedanewimportancefor
thenetworkafterthefallofFrance,becauseRadócouldnolongerusecourierstoshiftpaperreports
viaParis.ToprovidegreatersecurityfortheRing’scommunications,heopenedasecondtransmitter
operatedbyaGenevaelectricalengineernamedEdmondHamel,whowastrainedbyFoote.Hamel
inspiredmockerybecausehewasaverysmallmanmarriedtoaverylargewife,Olga,buthe
cherishedanidealisticenthusiasmfortheSovietUnion.
InMarch1940,MoscoworderedAnatoliGourevitch–‘MonsieurKent’–totravelfromBrussels
toGenevatohandoveranewcodeto‘Dora’–Radó.Thiswasabreachofeveryruleofespionage,
barringcontactandthustheriskofcontaminationbetweennetworks,buttheGRUmanwaspleasedto
begivensuchanopportunitytospreadhiswings.Asasupposedrichyoung‘Uruguayantourist’,
VincenteSierracommissionedThomasCooktomakehisarrangements,andtookafatbookof
travellers’chequestosupporthiscover.OnthetrainfromParistoGeneva,amanwholooked
familiartooktheseatoppositehim.Gourevitchwasamazedwhenhiscompanionintroducedhimself
asJeanGabin,greatestFrenchfilmstaroftheage,onhiswaytoGenevatoseehissonmakehis
debutasacircusperformer.Thetwoexchangedvisitingcards.TheenchantedyoungRussiandecided
thatbeingasecretagenthadmanycompensations.
InstalledinGeneva’sHôtelRussie,hedividedhistimebetweentourism,nightclubvisitstosupport
hiscover,andacautiousreconnaissanceof113,RuedeLausanne,theaddressCentrehadgivenhim
forRadó.HecalledtheHungarian’snumberfromatelephonebox,thenwenttoacinemaandleftin
themiddleofthefilm,towalktoRadó’shouse.Hewaswelcomedwarmly,butwithsurprise,
accordingtoGourevitch.ThevisitorlaterclaimedthathehadbeenbemusedbyRadó’s‘carelessair ’,
andbytheagent’sclaimthat,despitethedepredationsinflictedbywar,hestillhadsomemoney
becausehismapbusinesswasnotdoingbadly.RadóintroducedhiswifeLena,thenthetwomen
closetedthemselvesinhisstudy.GourevitchhandedoveraFrenchnovelwhichprovidedthenewkey
forcodingmessages.Overthecourseofthenextfewhourstheypractisedtheroutinerepeatedly,until
bothweresatisfiedthatRadóhadmasteredit.Thentheyparted,agreeingtomeetagaininLausanne,
whichwasconvenientlynearMontreux,wherethe‘Uruguayantourist’hadbookedastayofseveral
days.Followingthissecondmeetingtheylunchedtogetherinarestaurant,thenwanderedthestreets.
MostRussiansabroadsufferedseverelyfromhomesickness.WhenSovietagentsmetandhad
leisureenoughtogossip,thefirstquestiontoamanorwomanfreshfromMoscowwasalmost
always‘Whatnewsfrom“thevillage”?’,astheycalledtheirowncountry.ThoughRadówas
Hungarian,accordingtoGourevitchtheytalkedindiscreetlyabouteachother ’sexperiencesofCentre.
RadóallegedlybeggedhiscontacttoemphasisetoMoscowtheloftynatureofhissourcesinBerlin.
TheGenevaagentalsotoldhimtheGermanswereplanningtoattacktheSovietUnion.Yetitis
implausiblethatinApril1940RadóshouldhavesaidGermanywaspreparingtoinvadeRussia,
becauseatthattimeHitlerhadmadenosuchdecision,norevencomeneartoit.Whatseemscertain,
however,isthatCentrewasrashinsendingGourevitchtoGeneva,andthatitsspiestoldeachother
thingstheyshouldnothavedone,dangeroustobothnetworks.
AttheendofDecember1940UrsulaHamburgerleftSwitzerlandforEngland,whereherGerman
communistbrotherwasalreadylivinginexile.ShewassoonfollowedbyherhusbandLenBrewer.
Herset–a‘musicalbox’intheirjargon,justasaforgerwasa‘cobbler ’andpolice‘thedoctor ’–
wastakentoGeneva.AlexanderFootemovedbacktoLausannewithhisowntransmitter.Itwastoo
dangeroustoinstallanexternalaerialonhisapartmentbuilding.Instead,hepersuadedanearby
wirelessshoptosupplythedeficiency,sayingthathewantedtolistentotheBBC.Formonths,
however,heprovedunabletoraiseMoscow.DespitepassingcountlesshourshunchedoveraMorse
keyinthekitchen,hisurgentpulsesvanishedintoavoid.Thenon12March1941camean
electrifyingmoment:intohisearphonesflickeredaresponse‘NDA,NDA,OK,QRK5.’Hewasin
touchwithCentre.
SwissintelligencemusthavebeenawareoftheRadógroup’stransmissions,butatthatstagethey
madenoattempttointerfere,evenwhentheGestapoprotestedfiercelytoBernaboutthefloodof
signalsitsoperatorsmonitoredfromacrosstheborder.Thespiesnowboastedathirdtransmitter:
RadóhadmetayoungwomannamedMargritBolli,daughterofstronglysocialisticparents,who
saidthatshewaseagertohelpthecommunistcause.TheRingtrainedthetwenty-three-year-oldgirl
inMorsetechnique.InitiallyshetransmittedfromthefamilyhomeinBasle,butwhenherparentsnot
unreasonablybaulked,shemovedtoGeneva.TheGestapo,listeninginfrustrationtothesignals–still
unintelligibletothem–floodingacrosstheetherfromBolli,FooteandtheHamelschristenedthem
‘DieRoteDrei’–‘TheRedTrio’.
WhowasgivingRadótheinformationfromGermanywhichwasforwardedtoMoscowinan
averageoffivemessagesaday?Theactivitiesof‘Cissie’,RachelDübendorfer,hadnowbeen
mergedintothoseofhisgroup.ColleaguesdescribedherasacharmlesswomanofBalkanorigins.
ShelivedwithPaulBöttcher,aformerGermancommunistillegallyresidentinSwitzerland:
DübendorfermorethanonceusedhernominalSwisshusband’sidentitydocumentstopreserve
Böttcher ’sneck.Itisallegedthatoneofhersourcesprovidedanexplicitwarningof‘Barbarossa’.
MeanwhileoneofRadó’smessages,dated21February1941,quotedaSwissintelligenceofficer,
MayrvonBaldeggor‘Luise’,predictingaGermaninvasionattheendofMay,aforecastperhaps
securedbytheSwissVikingintelligencenetworkinsideGermany,andendorsedbyaprominent
Japanesediplomat.ThenetworkalsobecameaconduitthroughwhichsomeCzechintelligencewas
passedtoMoscow,mostofitultimatelyderivedfromtheAbwehr ’sPaulThummel.AttheendofMay
RadócitedaFrenchdiplomat,LouisSuss,predictinganinvasionon22June–thismessageprovoked
anicyresponsefromMoscow.SodidanotherreporttothesameeffectfromRudolfRössler,who
wouldhenceforwardbecometheforemostsourcefortheRadónetwork.Hiscodename‘Lucy’has
passedintohistory,sincetheGRU’sSwissoperationbecamefamiliarlyknownasthe‘Lucy’Ring.
Rössler,asmall,grey,bespectacledGermanémigrébornin1897,wasanimpregnablyenigmatic
figure,ofakindthatpopulatesmanyspysagas.Asocialistjournalist,hefledfromtheNazisin1935
andsetupalittlepublishingbusinessinLucerne–thecitythatpromptedhiscodename.Hebegan
writingunderthenameofR.A.Hermes,describingtheNazipersecutionofJewsandwarningthatthe
NaziswouldreoccupytheRhineland.Berlinidentified‘Hermes’,andin1937deprivedRösslerofhis
Germancitizenship.Henonethelessretainedmanyconnectionsinhishomeland,especiallywithinthe
Wehrmacht.ShortofbothfriendsandcashinSwitzerland,hebegantoprovideinformationtoa
privateintelligenceagencycalledBuroHa,basedattheVillaStutzsouthofLucerne,andrunbyan
ardentanti-NazinamedCaptainHansHausamann.BuroHahadinformallinkstoSwissintelligence,
whichforaseasonthereafterprovidedsomeprotectionforRössler.
HesecuredasteadyflowofinformationfromGermany,andapportionedvaryingquotastoSwiss,
British,CzechandSovietpurchasers.Thoughhisanti-Nazicredentialswerenotindoubt,hewas
principallyandofnecessityamercenary–allhiscustomershadtopaycash.By1942hehadbecome
byfartheGRU’smostimportantSwisssource,thekeyfigureintheRadónetwork.MoscowCentre,
mistrustfulofthisshadowyfigure,insistentlydemandedthatRadóshouldmakeRössleridentifyhis
sources,andthejournalistequallystubbornlyrefusedtodoso.Forallhislaterimportance,itremains
unclearhowmuchintelligenceheprovidedin1941.Rösslerwenttohispost-wargravestillsilent
abouttheidentityoftheGermanswhohadprovidedhimwithuseful,evensensationalmaterial.
SubsequentspeculationhasfocusedonCol.HansOster,deputyheadoftheAbwehr;HansGisevius;
formerLeipzigmayorGördeler;andtwounnamedWehrmachtgenerals.
UncertaintyalsopersistsaboutthetimingandwordingofsomeoftheSwissRing’smessagesand
theirsupposedwarningstoMoscow,bothbeforeandafter‘Barbarossa’.Allthatcanconfidentlybe
saidisthattheGRUreceivedastreamofmessagesfromSwitzerlandinthespringof1941,someof
whichstronglyindicatedthatHitlerintendedtoattackRussia.Equallysignificantforthestrategic
debateinMoscow,CentrelearnedthatRudolfRösslerhadbeen,andprobablycontinuedtobe,an
informantofMI6’sBernstation.Itwasonlyonestepfromthisknowledgetoabeliefinsidethe
Kremlinthatthe‘Lucy’RinghadbecomeaninstrumentofChurchill,peddlingfalseinformationto
dragRussiaintothewar.
2 S O R GE’ S WA R NI NGS
Stalin’sJapanesesourcestoldmuchthesamestoryashisSwissones,thoughsincetheoutbreakof
warinEuropethestrainofsustainingtwinlives,occupyingamuchhigherprofilethanthe‘Lucy’
spies,hadexactedaneverworseningtollonitsprincipalagent.RichardSorgestrovetousehis
influencetodissuadetheGermansfromwarwithRussia.HetoldtheTokyoembassythatNomonhan
–thesummer1939Russo–Japaneseborderclashes–hadbeenadisasterfortheJapanese,andthat
BerlinshouldnoticetheeffectivenessoftheRedArmyandofZhukov,itslocalcommander.Then
camethehugeshockoftheNazi–SovietPact,whichstunnedtheJapanesegovernment.
AndSorge.Thespyreportedon12August1939themovementoftwelveJapanesedivisionsto
KoreaandManchuria–therealtotalwastwenty–incasethegovernmentdecidedonwar,buthe
expressedhisownconvictionthatJapanwouldholdback,andindeedon4SeptemberTokyoformally
announcedapolicyofnon-intervention.SorgetoldMoscow,onHotsumiOzaki’sauthority,thatthe
countrywouldenterthewaronlywhenitwasconfidentthatithadidentifiedthewinner.Headdedthat
theGermanembassyexpectedtheJapanesetoremainneutral,andwasevennervoustheymightjoin
theAlliedcamp.
Sorge’ssurrealrelationshipwithCol.Ott’smissiontookanewtwistwhenhewasofferedastaff
postasitspressattaché.Hedeclined,asusualbecausehewasfearfulofthesecuritychecksintohis
pastthatacceptancewouldhaveprovoked,butheworkedfourhoursadayintheembassybuilding,
whileassuminganewjournalisticroleasastringerforFrankfurterZeitung.Itwasscarcely
surprisingthatinOctobertheJapanesepoliceforeignsection,theTokko,committedanagent–
twenty-eight-year-oldHarutsuguSaito–toshadowSorge.Theysuspectedthathewasspying…for
Germany.SaitonoticedMaxClausenandbegantotakeaninterestinhim,too.
Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,stressesonthenetworkintensified.BrankodeVoukelitch
disclosedhisworkfortheSovietstohisadoredJapaneseloverYoshiko.In1940thecouplewere
married,andsheneverbetrayedhim,buthisindiscretionwasappallinglyrisky.MaxClausenbecame
grosslyoverweight,andhishealthdeteriorated.Bedriddenforsometime,hehadtogethiswifeAnna
toassemblethetransmitterbeforetappingoutmessagestoMoscowfromhissickroom.His
employerswereunsympathetic.ClausenwasperemptorilyinformedbytheFourthDepartmentthat
fundingwastight:paywasbeingreduced.Hislittleblueprintreproductioncompanyemployed
fourteenpeople,hadopenedabranchinMukdenandwasfulfillingassignmentsfortheJapaneseWar
andNavyMinistries.Moscowsaidthathemusthenceforthsubsidisehimselfoutofitsprofits.Ina
farcicaltwist,ClausenbecameincreasinglyadmiringofHitler–whowas,afterall,nowsupposedly
Stalin’sfriend.
Buttheradiomankeptsending:in1940hetransmittedsixtytimes,sending29,179wordsofSorge’s
wisdom.Prominentamongthespy’sscoopswasthedraftofaproposedJapan–Chinapeacetreaty.It
wasdeemedavitalSovietinteresttokeeptheChinawargoing,becauseitsterminationwouldfreethe
JapanesearmytostrikeatRussia.Whenthetreatyleakedandthedraftwastornup,Sorgewasalso
abletosupplythesubstituteversion–thoughthis,too,remainedunsigned.FromtheGermanembassy
hesecureddataontheMitsubishiandNakajimaaircraftfactories.Heprovidedaccurateforecastson
Japan’saggressiveintentionstowardsFrenchIndochina.Hewasnotinfallible,however,andgave
Moscowsomecauseforscepticism.Hepredicted,forinstance,thattheBritishwouldrejectTokyo’s
demandforclosureoftheBurmaRoadsupplyroutetoChinashortlybeforetheydidsoforthree
months.Asissooftenthecasewithintelligence,Sorge’soriginalreportwasnotmistaken:Churchill
simplychangedhismind.
Bytheendof1940,Sorge’sstandingwashigherinBerlinthanintheKremlin.Indeed,the
excellenceofhisreportsfortheNazisalmostcausedhisundoing:SchellenbergoftheRSHArana
securitycheckwhichrevealedhiscommunistpast.TheGestapo’sJosephMeisingerwaspostedto
Tokyoasembassysecurityofficer,withorderstolookcloselyatSorge,thoughasyettheNazishad
nosuspicionofhissupremeduplicity.Meisingerwasill-equippedforhistask:acreatureofReinhard
Heydrich,hewasathugwhosereputationresteduponafewmonthsoforchestratingbrutalityin
Warsaw.Muchmoreseriousforthespyringwasthefactthatsomeofitsprincipalmemberswere
breakingdown.ThoughSorgesustainedhisjournalisticcareer,penningfifty-onearticlesfor
FrankfurterZeitunginthefirstsixmonthsof1941,hisnerveswereshredded.Hisdrinkingworsened,
andHanakofoundhimanincreasinglyviolentlover.Whenshesobbedandbeggedhimtoexplain
himself,herespondedsullenly,‘Iamlonely.’Shesaid,‘Howcanthisbe,whenyouhavesomany
GermanfriendshereinTokyo?’Hemuttered,‘Theyarenotmytruefriends.’InaSeptember1940
signaltoMoscow,hesaidthathewasforty-fouryearsoldanddesperatelytired.Heyearnedtobe
allowedtogo‘home’toRussia,thoughhemusthaveknownthatCentrewouldnevercountenancethis
untilthewarended.
MaxClausenbecametoosicktokeeppacewithtransmissionofSorge’sfloodofmaterial,and
begansecretlytodestroyunsentasubstantialproportion,arbitrarilyselected.Thus,whileitisknown
whatinformationSorgeclaimedtohavepassedontotheFourthDepartment,itisunclearwhat
actuallyreachedthemin1941:Russianreleasesofsomeofhismaterialinthe1990smustbetreated
withcaution,becauseselective.Fromtheendof1940onwards,Sorgewaspersonallyconvincedthat
GermanyandtheSovietUnionwouldgotowar.Hewasdeeplytroubledbytheprospect,andbyits
implicationsforhimself.Duringtheearlymonthsof1941hereportedanincreasingJapanesefocus
ona‘Strikesouth’strategyagainsttheEuropeanAsianempires.On10MarchhewroteofGerman
pressureonJapan‘toinvigorateherroleintheTripartitePact’byattackingtheSovietUnion.But
Sorgeaddedthatthiswarwouldonlystart‘oncethepresentoneisover ’.
InMayheassertedthatHitlerwasresolved‘tocrushtheSovietUnionandkeeptheEuropeanparts
…inhishands’,butsuggestedthattherewasstillscopefordiplomacytopreventwar.Laterthat
monthhesaidthathisGermancontactsexpectedaninvasiontobelaunchedbeforeJune,butthen
addedthatsomeimportantvisitorsfromBerlinbelievedthattheprospectofsuchactiontakingplace
in1941hadreceded.BoththesesignalsprobablyreflectedSorge’sconversationswithLt.Col.Schol,
aWehrmachtofficerpassingthroughTokyoenroutetotakingupthepostofmilitaryattachéin
Bangkok.On30Mayhewirelessed:‘BerlinhasinformedAmbassadorOttthattheGermanoffensive
againsttheUSSRwillbegininthesecondhalfofJune.Ottis95percentsurethatthewarwillbegin.
TheindirectproofsthatIseeatthepresentareasfollows:TheLuftwaffetechnicaldelegationin
[Tokyo]hasbeenorderedhome.Otthasrequestedthemilitaryattachétohaltthetransmissionof
importantdocumentsviatheUSSR.TheshipmentofrubberviatheUSSRhasbeenreducedtoa
minimum.’
Sorge’sreportswereasgoodasanygovernmentatanymomentinhistorycouldaskfromasecret
agent,buthewasoneamongmanyvoicesthatcriedinthewildernesssurroundingtheKremlin.Stalin
wasnomorewillingtotrustthewordofhisTokyomanthanthatofanyothersource.Heonce
describedSorge,aboutwhomhehadbeenbriefed,as‘alyingshitwhohassethimselfupwithsome
smallfactoriesandbrothelsinJapan’.AlthoughtheSovietwarlordwasnotoriouslywrongabout
‘Barbarossa’,fewnationalleadershavelostempiresbydecliningtoaccepttheunsupportedwordof
secretagents.Historianscarvespies’coupsinlettersofgold,butseldomdetailthevastlylarger
volumeofhumintthathasbeenpartiallyorwhollymisleading.Molotovsaidinoldage:‘Ithinkthat
onecannevertrusttheintelligence…Theintelligencepeoplecanleadtodangeroussituationsthatit
isimpossibletogetoutof.Therewereendlessprovocateursonbothsides…Peoplearesonaïveand
gullible,indulgingthemselvesandquotingmemoirs:spiessaidsoandso,defectorscrossedthelines
…’StalinwouldhavebeenmorelikelytobelieveSorgehadthespyreportedthattheGermans’
posturingsformedpartofaplotconcoctedbythefarawayBritish.
3 TH E O R C H ES TR A P LAYS
ThemostauthoritativeintelligencesenttoMoscowinadvanceof‘Barbarossa’camefromthe
Russians’Berlinnetworks.WhatbecameknownastheRoteKapelle–theRedOrchestra–wasnota
singleentity,thoughsupposedtobesuchbytheGermans.ItwasaclusterofseparateGRUandNKVD
networks,whichonlycarelesstradecraftandoperationalemergenciescausedtobecomeentwined.
TheRoteKapellewaslessimportantforitsimpactonthewar,whichprovedslight,thanforthefact
ofitsexistence.TheWesternAlliessecuredextraordinarymilitaryintelligencethroughUltra,but
neverhadhumintsourcesofanysignificanceinsideGermany–unlessweincludeaproductof
Purple,describedlater–untilsomemembersoftheanti-HitlerResistancecontactedAllenDullesof
theOSSin1943.TheRussians,bycontrast,controlledashafttoagoldmine.
TheHarnack/Schulze-BoysennetworksuppliedMoscowwithinformationfromanever-widening
circlehostiletotheNaziregime.Althoughtheythemselveswerepeopleoftheleft,theyappearto
haveforgedlinkswithsomeconservativeResistancefiguressuchasDietrichBonhöffer,andalsoto
havehadcontactwiththeWhiteRosegroupinMunich.Giventhenumberofinformantsinvolved,
andtheirrecklessinsoucianceaboutsecurity,thegroup’ssurvivaluntil1942wasareflectionof
AbwehrandGestapoblindnessratherthanoftheRoteKapelle’sguile.ArvidHarnackwasso
passionateinhiscommitmenttothecausethatheinvolvedhisgroupinprintinganti-Nazipamphlets
andevenactedpersonallyasawatcherwhileothergroupmemberspastedwallpostersbynight.Such
grandstandingwascourageous,butendangeredhismuchmoreimportantintelligencework.
Throughoutthefirsttwenty-twomonthsofthewar,whiletheBritishstrovetopiercethefog
obscuringtheirviewoftheContinent,theRussianswereabletocontinuespyingalmostunimpeded.
Asneutrals,theychannelledtoMoscowthroughtheirdiplomaticmissionsagentreportsfromall
overtheworld,withoutneedforusinghazardouswirelesslinks.InBerlin,theGestapo’sWilly
LehmannhadlanguishedsinceMoscowshutdowncontacttohiminthewakeofthe1939Nazi–Soviet
Pact.Lehmannwasaloner,andhisself-purposehadcometorevolvearoundhisintelligence
activitiesfortheRussians.Whyhadtheyabandonedhim?InSeptember1940,seasonoftheBattleof
Britain,heriskedslippingaletterintotheSovietembassymailbox,addressedto‘themilitaryattaché
orhisdeputy’.Init,‘Breitenbach’pleadedforaresumptionofrelations.Hesaidthatunlesshecould
servetheNKVDoncemore,‘myworkattheGestapowillbecomepointless’,andprovideda
passwordfortelephonecontact.
Thisletter,andthequestionofwhethertoreactivateLehmann,werereferredtoMoscow.
DraconianinstructionsfromtheKremlindecreedthattheBerlinNKVDshouldneitheroffernor
respondtoanyprovocationthatmighthelptojustifyGermanaggression.Nonetheless,afteradebate
Centredispatchedanableyoungofficer,AlexanderKorotkov,codename‘Stepanov’,tobecome
deputystationchief.HecontactedLehmann,andreportedbackafteralongmeeting:themanseemed
sincerelydesperatetoreopenhislinetoCentre.On9September1940,apersonalorderfromBeria
reachedBerlin:‘Nospecialassignmentsshouldbegivento“Breitenbach”.[But]youshouldacceptall
materialthatfallswithinhisdirectsphereofknowledge,andalsoanyinformationhecanofferabout
theoperationsofvarious[German]intelligenceservicesagainsttheUSSR.’‘Breitenbach’s’
extravagantenthusiasmkeptaliveBeria’ssuspicionthathewasaGestapoplant,testingthesincerity
oftheKremlin’scommitmenttotheNazi–SovietPact.Hencethesecuritychiefemphasisedthatthe
Berlininformantshouldbepressedtoprovidedocumentaryevidenceforeveryassertionhemade.So
impoverishedwastheNKVD’sstaffinthewakeofthePurgesthatacompletenovicewasdispatched
toactasLehmann’scourier:BorisZhuravlevscarcelyspokeanyGerman,andafterarrivingin
Berlinhisfirststepwastohirealanguagetutor.Theyoungmanalsoboughtabicycle,inorderto
startlearninghiswayaroundthecity.Fromtheoutsethewasalmostoverwhelmedbytheflowof
documentsLehmanndeliveredateveningmeetings,whichhadtobecopiedovernight,thenreturned
beforetheinformantsetoffforhisoffice.
On20September1940,forinstance,theGestapomanwarnedMoscowthattheAbwehrwas
planningahoneytrapforSovietmilitaryattachéNikolaiShornyakov,usingasingerfromtheRioRitabarnamedElisabethHolland,anAustrianfriendoftheattaché’slandlady.Breitenbachgavea
detaileddescriptionoftheAbwehrcaseofficer,SiegfriedMuller:tall,blue-eyed,blackhair,small
moustache,sunkencheeks,piercingstare,withbigearsandathinneck.Mullerwasrashenoughto
seektopasshimselfoffasamemberoftheGestapo.Whenthiswasbroughttotheattentionof
ReinhardHeydrich,Himmler ’sdeputydispatchedastingingrebuketoAdmiralCanarisforallowing
theAbwehrmantoflyfalsecolours.
MeanwhileAlexanderKorotkovwasalsochargedbyMoscowtoreopencontactwiththe
Harnack/Schulze-Boysengroups.Toachievethis,inmid-Septemberheriskedrepeatedlycallingon
Harnackathishome.OnseveraloccasionshewasinformedbyahousekeeperthatHerrHarnackwas
out.Onlyonthe16thdidKorotkovatlastmeethisman.Theirinterviewwasinitiallytense,for
Harnackwaswary.Whenatlasthewasconvincedofhisvisitor ’sbonafides–ifthatisnota
contradictorytermforanNKVDofficer–hehadplentytosayabouthisownrangeofcontacts.Most
significantly,hetoldtheRussianthatheandhisfriendswereconvincedthatHitlerintendedtoinvade
theSovietUnioninthefollowingyear,1941.Backattheembassy,KorotkovmessagedLt.Gen.Pavel
Fitin,headoftheforeignsectionoftheNKVDinMoscow,underthesignatureofhisnominalboss,
AmayakKobulov,‘Zakhar ’:
Topsecret
TocomradeViktor
‘Corporal’haslearnedfrom‘Albanian’whohasspokentoatopWehrmachtofficer,thatGermanyintendstoinitiateawaragainst
theSovietUnionearlynextyear…
16September1940
Zakhar
YetMoscowhadreasontobescepticalaboutthesesensationaltidings.Historyshowsthattheywere
correct,buton16September1940Hitlerhadnotyetcommittedhimself.AninvasionofRussiawas
beingfeverishlydebatedbyprominentNazisandthearmyhighcommand.ButOperation
‘Barbarossa’remainedacontroversialoptionratherthanasettleddecision.ThefactthatArvid
Harnack’spredictionwasultimatelyfulfilleddoesnotaltertheimportantfactthatitremained
speculativeatamomentwhenheasserteditsfinality,asdidtheearlierreportofthe‘Lucy’Ring’s
AlexanderRadó.OnlyinNovemberdidHitlerdecide.
TheaffairsoftheBerlinNKVDweremuchcomplicatedbythefactthatKorotkov,theirbestman,
washatedandresentedbyhisstationchief.TheCzechFrantišekMoravec,whohadextensivedealings
withtheRussiansbeforethewar,hastestifiedtothebrutishpersonalitiesofmostoftheirintelligence
officers.Onesuch,AmayakKobulov,nowrantheNKVD’sBerlinstation,whereheproveda
blunderermoreineptthanMI6’sBestandStevens.Kobulov’sonlyclaimonrankwasaslavish
devotiontothePartyhierarchy.BornintoafamilyofArmeniansmalltradersinTbilisi,heworkedas
abookkeeperbeforejoiningthesecurityforcesin1927.Heowedhissurvival,andindeedrapid
advancement,tohiselderbrotherBogdan,anintimateofBeria.Kobulovservedasanotoriously
murderousdeputycommissarforUkraine,andwasthenappointedtoBerlindespitenotspeakinga
wordofGerman.Onarrival,hetoldhisstaffthatherequiredtheirabsolutesubservience.Whena
youngintelligenceofficerprotestedaboutbeingobligedtoserveasthechief’sdomesticvaletrather
thantorunagents,hisbossthreatenedtodispatchhimtorotinthedungeonsoftheLubyanka.
KobulovalsotookviolentexceptiontoKorotkov,andseizedanexcusetoreturnhimtoMoscow
withahighlyadversepersonalreport.Beria,receivingthis,summarilysackedtheyoungofficerin
January1941.Hesoonretractedthisdecision,butforsomemonthsKorotkovwasconfinedtodesk
workintheLubyanka.MeanwhileKobulovarrangedapersonalmeetingwithHarnack.This
encounterwentunnoticedbytheGestapo,butcouldeasilyhavebeenfataltothenetwork.Attheturn
oftheyear,CentreacknowledgedthatonlyKorotkovwascompetenttohandleliaisonwithitsBerlin
informants.HewassentbacktoGermany,withanewbrieftopassontoHarnack.TheNKVDwanted
theGermaninformant’sgrouptoconcentrateoneconomics,notstrategy.TheNKVDFifth
Department’sordersinstructedKorotkovtoexploretheextentoftheGermandomesticopposition,
andhowfaritmightbeexploited.NothingwassaidaboutprobingGermany’smilitaryintentions
towardstheSovietUnion–fromresidualcautionlestHarnackproveaGestapoplant,orfindhimself
undertorture.
Theorderwasendorsedinredpencil:‘ApprovedbythePeople’sCommissar.[Pavel]Sudoplatov.
26.12.40.’Korotkovcounter-signedthelastpage:‘Read,learnedandreceivedasanorder.
“Stepanov”,26.12.40.’HedulypassedonthemessagetotheBerlingroup,bypassingKobulov,his
nominalchief.Throughthemonthsthatfollowed,theGermansdeliveredasteadyflowof
intelligence.On29January1941,HarnackreportedthattheEconomicsMinistryhadbeenorderedto
compileindustrialtargetingmapsoftheUSSR,similartothosewhichhadbeenmadebeforetheBlitz
onBritain.HetoldMoscowthattheheadoftheRussianDepartmentinBerlin’sBureauforForeign
LiteraryExchangeshadbeenwarnedforpossibledutyasamilitarytranslatorandinterpreter;and
thattheRussianDepartmentoftheEconomicsMinistrywascomplainingbitterlyaboutshortfallsin
promiseddeliveriesofcommoditiesfromtheUSSR,underthetermsoftheNazi–SovietPact.
HarnackmadeexplicithisownconvictionthatHitlerwaspreparingtoinvadeRussia.Healso
providedcopiousdetailsonGermany’seconomicsituation–coal,ironandsteelproduction;
syntheticrubberconsumption;industrialmanpowerdifficulties,togetherwithGermanplanstomake
thesegoodbyrecruitingworkersfromoccupiedEurope–informationMI6wouldhavegivenrubies
toaccess.Harnackconcluded,intermsthatweakenedhiscredibilityinMoscow,byrevertingto
gossip:‘AccordingtoHitler ’scircle,heisnowinaveryunbalancedstate,suddenlyrunstowatcha
filmduringthenight,or–ashashappenedmorethanonce,toredownthecurtainsinafitoffury.’
TheNKVD’sBerlinstationreportedtoMoscowon26February1941:
TopSecret
ToComradeViktor
AccordingtoinformationthatHarnackobtainedfromErnstvonArnim,[DrKarl]Gördeler’s[anti-Hitleropposition]grouphasmade
anattempttoachieveanagreementwiththearmyleadershiptoformanewGermangovernment…Thenegotiationshadanegative
resultduetothenegativereactionfromthemilitaryleadership.However,accordingtoErnst,sometopgeneralssympathisewith
Gördeler’splan…
Zakhar
TheBerlinstationwasnotaloneindispatchingwarningstoMoscowabouttheinvasionthreat:on7
February1941theNKVD’sThirdDepartmentciteditssource‘Teffi’inAnkaraasdiscussing
‘rumoursaboutapossibleGermanoffensiveagainsttheUSSR.Accordingtooneversionthiswill
onlyhappenaftertheGermansdefeatEngland.Accordingtoanotherversion,whichisregardedas
moreprobable,GermanywillattacktheUSSRbeforestrikingatEnglandinordertosecureits
supplies.’NextdaycameanotherreportfromHarnack,declaringawidespreadbeliefatOKW
headquartersthatfullGermanoccupationofRomaniawouldbecomeapreliminarytoaninvasionof
theUSSR.ThiswasfollowedbyafurthermessageearlyinMarch,claimingthattheworseningfood
situationinGermanywasintensifyingthepressureontheNazileadershiptoattackRussia.Col.Gen.
FranzHalder,saidtheBerlininformants,wasplanningalightningstrikesimilartothe1940French
campaigntooccupyUkraine,beforetheWehrmachtdrovesouthtoseizeStalin’soilfields.Harnack
alsodescribedconcernsinhighplacesthatGermany,insteadofprofitingeconomicallyfrom
invadingRussia,wouldfindsuchawardraining.Inanotherreportafewdayslater,hedescribed
intensiveLuftwaffeaerialreconnaissanceactivityoverRussia,andoperationalplanningforan
offensivethatwouldreachtheUralsinforty-fivedays.
Merkulov,Beria’sdeputy,readthe11MarchreportfromBerlin.LikeallSovietofficialswho
wishedtosurvive,hewassupremelycautious.Bornin1895,hehadworkedwithBeriainthetransCaucasianregion,androseyappingathisheelsthroughtheSoviethierarchy;hismostrecenttriumph
hadbeentopresideoverthemassacreof25,000PolishofficersatKatyn.Now,hedemandedofFitin,
‘Aren’tthereothersourcesonthisexceptHarnack?Howcanwechecktheinformationwithoutletting
anyinformantsknowwhatitis?Thetaskshouldbepresentedtotheminageneralandcautiousform.’
TheMarchreportsfromHarnackwerecorrect,thoughMoscowCentrealsoreceivedplentyof
nonsense.‘Breitenbach’reportedthattheBritishwerepreparingtounleashchemicalwarfareagainst
Germany,andthattheGermansintendedtousepoisongasontheRussiansintheeventofwar.
Schulze-Boysenclaimedthathe‘knowsforsure’thattheAmericanairforceattachéinMoscow‘isa
Germanagent.HepassestotheGermanstheintelligencedatawhichhe,inturn,receivesfromhis
contactsintheUSSR.’
On15MarchCentreincreasedtherisklevelforitsBerlininformantsbyorderingKorotkovto
establishadirectlinkwithSchulze-Boysen,cuttingoutcouriers,soastohastenevaluationofhis
reports.TheirfirstmeetingtookplaceinHarnack’sflat,whereSchulze-BoysengavetheRussiana
momentaryfrightbyturningupinhisLuftwaffeuniform.‘Ididn’thavetimetochange,’heexplained.
KorotkovreportedtoMoscow:‘Wetalkedexclusivelyabouttheinformationonanti-Sovietplansthat
wasavailabletohim.Heisabsolutelyconsciousofthefactthatheisdealingwitharepresentativeof
theSovietUnion[asdistinctfromtheComintern].Myimpressionisthatheishappytotellus
everythingheknows.Heansweredourquestionswithoutequivocationoranyattempttoobfuscate.
Moreover,itwasobviousthathehadpreparedforthismeeting,bywritingdownsomequestionsfor
usonascrapofpaper…WehopetoestablishacloseconnectionwithSchulze-Boysen.However,at
presentheisconfinedtobarracksandisonlyoccasionallyandunpredictablyfreetotravelintotown,
oftenwhileitisstilllightandeveninhisuniform,ashappenedwhenImethim.Anyrendezvousmust
beflexible.’
Ontheeveningof19April,inHarnack’sflatKorotkovmetAdamKuckhoff,awriterandtheatre
director,whowaspromptlyrecruitedwiththecodename‘OldMan’.KorotkovmessagedMoscow
abouthiminfranklycondescendingterms:‘Kuckhoffstrikesoneasaculturedandeducatedman
whoseviewshavebeeninfluencedbyreadingtheworksofLenin.HestillkeepssomeofLenin’s
worksandthinkshimselfacommunist.’InMoscowtheCominterncheckeditsfilesonKuckhoffand
endorsedhiscredentials.TheytoldKorotkovthat‘OldMan’‘wasdeeplyaffectedbythegeneral
crisisofthebourgeoiscultureandbecameclosetothe“unionofIntellectuals”’.Thewriternow
becameaprominentmemberoftheHarnackgroup.
TheinsistentthemeofallthereportingtoMoscowwasthatofloomingNazionslaught.On8May
1941‘Zakhar ’reported:‘rumoursaboutGermany’sattackontheSovietUnionareconstantly
increasing…Warisgoingtobedeclaredinmid-May.’A.S.Panyushkin,whounusuallycombinedthe
roleofSovietambassadortotheChinesegovernmentinChongqingwiththatofNKVDstationchief,
reportedtoMoscowearlyinMaythatHitlerwasexpectedtoinvade.TheChinesemilitaryattachéin
BerlineventoldtheRussiansoftheGermans’intendedaxesofadvance.
TheNKVDteaminBerlinwasfortunatetoescapedisaster,livingthroughthisuniquelysensitive
periodinRusso–Germanrelationswithanoafasitsstationchief.Kobulov’sfallfromgracebegan
withadrunkenrowataMay1941embassybanquetforavisitingSovietdelegation:hepublicly
slappedthefaceofthedeputytraderepresentative.Thisepisodepromptedtheambassadortodemand
theNKVDofficer ’srecall.KobulovcounterattackedbyaskingBeriatobringhimhome;heclaimed
todislikethefeudinginsidetheembassyasmuchastheBritishbombingofBerlin.Beriafeltobliged
toreportthebanquetepisodetoStalinandMolotov,butrejectedthedemandforhisman’srecallin
returnforKobulov’smaudlinpromiseoffuturegoodbehaviour;hewasorderedbyMoscowtorisk
nofurtherpersonalcontactwithHarnack.
TheNKVDmanattemptedtoredeemhimselfasaspymasterbyrecruitingasaninformanta
Latvianjournalistcodenamed‘Lycéestudent’,who,heassuredMoscow,was‘mostreliable’.This
man,OresteBerlings,wasalreadyontheGestapo’sbooksasagent‘Peter ’,adoubleofwhom
Ribbentropsaidcomplacently,‘Wecanpumpwhateverinformationwewantintohim.’This
foolishnesswouldhavebeentrivialhaditnottakenplaceinthelastweeksbeforetheGermans
launched‘Barbarossa’,whenintelligencefromBerlinshouldhavebeenofcriticalimportanceto
Sovietdecision-making.Kobulov’sblunderingcontributedtotheKremlin’sstubbornscepticism
aboutNKVDreporting.
On18April1941,heedlessofStalin’sinsistencethatnoclashwithGermanywasimminent,
Russia’sintelligenceservicesformallyshiftedtoawarfooting:theGRUandNKVDwarnedtheir
networksacrossEurope,andstrengthenedtheirstationsinSwitzerlandandBerlin.Buttheydidlittle
toimprovethemanagementofinformantsinthefield,chieflybecauseexperiencedhandlerswerein
suchshortsupply.Evenmoreserious,theyfailedtoprovideagentswithmeansoflong-range
communications.Russian-builtwirelesseswereofpoorquality:NKVDcommunicationsimproved
onlylaterinthewar,whentheLubyankasecuredAmericansets.Intheprotractedmeanwhile,contact
betweenMoscowanditsoverseasagentsremainedprecarious.On1May1941theBerlinstation
urgentlyrequestedtransmittersfortheHarnackgroup,incasecontactthroughtheembassywaslost.
Harnackhimselfwasreluctanttoacceptsuchequipment;hesaidthatwhileheknewnothingabout
wireless,hewasacutelyconsciousoftheubiquityoftheAbwehr ’sandGestapo’sdirection-finders.
Eventually,however,heacquiescedinastepwhichmerelyreflectedthelogicofhisconvictions:that
warwasimminent,andhewishedtocontinuetoworkagainstHitler.Afterseveralweeks’delay,in
mid-Junehishandlerspresentedhimwithtwosets.ThefirstwasaportableD-6,witharangenot
muchoverfivehundredmilesandbatterieswithtwohours’life.TheNKVDmanpromisedmore
batteries,butthesewereneverforthcoming.Thesecondsetwasalittlemorepowerful,butrequired
mainselectricity.
Korotkovexplainedthatcodingprocedurewaseasy:thespiesneededonlyrememberthenumber
38745andthekeyword‘Schraube’.HeurgedHarnacktomakeKarlBehrenshissecondwirelessoperator,buttheGermanbaulked.Thiswasahugelyriskyassignment,hepointedout,andBehrens
hadthreesmallchildren.Hewouldneverforgivehimselfifthemanwascaught,andpaidtheprice.
BehrenswasanywayunderGestaposurveillance,havingprovidedfalsepapersforaJewishbrotherin-law.Asecondpossiblecandidate,KurtSchumacher,wascalledupformilitaryduty.Eventuallythe
secondwirelesssetwasplacedinthehandsofamannamedHansKoppi,suggestedbySchulzeBoysen.Withinweeks,however,Hitler ’shostshadsweptacrossRussia,drivingtheSovietsmany
milesback,beyondreachofBerlin’sfeeblesignals.ThesetsgiventoHarnackfellsilent.He
continuedindustriouslytogatherintelligence,butlackedmeanstopassiton.Thisimpassepersisted
throughthefirstfivemonthsoftheEasternwar.
MeanwhileWillyLehmann’smaterialalsobegantoincludeevidenceofGermany’scommitmentto
warwithRussia.On28Mayhetoldhishandlerthathehadbeenorderedforundisclosedreasonsto
organiseatwenty-four-hourdutyrosterforhissection.Afewdayslaterhishealthcollapsed,andhe
wasobligedtotakesickleave,fromwhichhereturnedonlyon19June.Whathethenlearnedinhis
officecausedhimtodiscardtradecraftandcallanimmediatemeetingwithZhuravlev,hiscourier:the
GestapohadbeenformallyinformedofanordertoinitiatemilitaryoperationsagainsttheSoviet
Union.ThisreportwasimmediatelyforwardedtoMoscow,butitseemsunlikelythatBeriashowedit
toStalinuntilthelasthoursbeforetheGermaninvasion.
AnothersignificantNKVDGermansourcewasCaptainWalterMariaStennes,onceanenthusiastic
NazistormtrooperandfriendofHitler.Stennes–‘Friend’inMoscowCentre’sbooks–hadsince
experiencedadramaticchangeofheart,becominganardentfoeoftheregime.Havingsurviveda
brieftermofimprisonment,hedepartedforChinawherehebecameChiangKai-shek’sairadviser
andwasrecruitedbytheRussians.On9June1941,followingaconversationwithahigh-ranking
Wehrmachtvisitor,heinformedVasilyZarubinthattheinvasionhadbeenplannedforMay,then
postponed,andthatathree-monthcampaignwasnowscheduledtostarton20June.Zarubinalsotold
MoscowthatStenneshadmetSorgeinShanghai,whohadheardthesamestory.
Schulze-BoysenwrotetohisNKVDbosseson11June,warningtheRussiansto‘preparefora
surpriseattack’.HeurgedMoscowtobombtheRomanianoilfieldsandrailjunctionsatKönigsberg,
StettinandBerlin,aswellastolaunchathrustintoHungary,tocutoffGermanyfromtheBalkans.
ThiswasanextraordinarystepforaGermanofficertotake,evenoneasdisaffectedfromhisown
governmentasSchulze-Boysen–explicitlytourgeaforeignpowertobombhisowncountry.Butto
suchapasshadmatterscome.Inall,betweenSeptember1940andJune1941,HarnackandSchulzeBoysenprovidedforty-tworeportswhichremainextant–andperhapsmorewhichhavebeenlostor
neverreachedMoscow–offeringevermorecircumstantialdetailaboutHitler ’spreparationsand
operationalplanning.Moreover,on20JuneaRomesourceinformedCentrethattheItalian
ambassadorinBerlinhadsenthisForeignMinistryacodedtelegramreportingthattheGerman
invasionoftheSovietUnionwouldstartbetween20and25June.
4 TH E D EA F M A N I NTH E K R EM LI N
Thus,fromearly1941onwardsafloodofintelligencereachedMoscow,conveyingacommon
message:Hitlerwasonthebrink,thoughthereweremanydivergencesofopinionaboutwhenhe
wouldattack–unsurprising,sincetheWehrmacht’stimetablewasrepeatedlypushedbackby
operationaldelays.Inthosedays,however,theSovietUnionwasbetterprotectedagainstitsown
peoplethanagainstforeignfoes.Russia’sintelligencechiefswerepreoccupiedwithenemieswithin.
TherewerefearsaboutrisingUkrainiannationalism.BeriareportedsubversiveactivitybyJewish
andZionistorganisations–headvancedtheimplausibleclaimthatthesewereactingonbehalfofthe
Nazis.Merkulovdescribedsuccessfulpurgesof‘anti-Sovietelements’intheBalticrepublics,with
14,467peoplearrestedand25,711exiledtoSiberia.
ThemanchieflyresponsibleforanalysingincomingintelligencewasLt.Gen.PavelFitin,whohad
headedtheforeignsectionoftheNKVDsince1939,whenheascendedtoofficeinthewakeofthe
Purges.Hewasanunlikelyappointment,selectedforpoliticalreliability.AformerKomsomolleader
andPartyofficial,hehadstudiedatMoscow’sagriculturalmechanisationschoolbeforeworkingfor
someyearsatafarmingadviceservice.OnlythenwasheselectedtoattendSHON,theforeign
intelligencetrainingschoolestablishedatBalashikha,fifteenmileseastofMoscow.Students–120in
thefirstthreeyears,justfourofthemwomen–wereperfunctorilyintroducedtobourgeoisWestern
living:teacherswithEuropeanexperiencelecturedthemondress,manners,‘goodtaste’.Trainees
spentfourhoursadaystudyinglanguages,twoonintelligencetradecraft.Fitinwasalreadythirtyninein1938,whenhestartedworkattheNKVD.AvisitingAmerican,gazingathislongfairhairand
blueeyeswhichconveyedanillusionofinnocence,suggestedthathelookedmorelikeacruise
directorthanaspymaster.Althoughnofool,FitinwouldneverpresenttohissuperiorsMerkulov,
BeriaandbeyondthemStalinanythinglikelytoincurtheiranger.Wheninmid-June1941anNKVD
agentinHelsinkireportedlarge-scaleFinnishtroopmovements,anervousFitinscribbledtohis
deputy,‘PleaseprocesscarefullyforHozyain’–‘theMaster ’,asStalinwasalwaysdescribed.
Thelastlinkintheforeignintelligencechainbefore‘Barbarossa’wasWinstonChurchill.British
perceptionsoftheSovietUnion,andofthepotentialoftheRedArmy,werecolouredbytheloathing
ofmostsoldiers,diplomatsandTorypoliticiansforeverythingtodowiththebloodstained
Bolsheviks.Moreover,theirexpectationsofGermanstrategyweredistortedbyanationalistic
convictionthatHitlersawvictoryoverBritainashisforemostobjective.WhenSirVictorMallet,
Britain’sambassadorinStockholm,reportedinMarchthat‘allmilitarycirclesinBerlinare
convincedofconflictwithRussiathisspringandconsidersuccesscertain’,theForeignOffice
dismissedhisdispatchasreflecting‘theusualcontradictoryrumours’.On24March1941,Stafford
CrippscabledfromMoscow,reportinghisSwedishcounterpart’sinformation:‘Germanplanisas
follows:theattackonEnglandwillbecontinuedwithU-boatsandfromtheair,buttherewillbeno
invasion.AtthesametimeadriveagainstRussiawilltakeplace.Thisdrivewillbebythreelarge
armies:thefirstbasedatWarsawundervonBock,thesecondbasedatKonigsberg,thethirdbasedat
CracowunderList.’
TheJointIntelligenceCommitteerejectedthiswarning.InearlyApriltheJIC’sassessmentwasnot
dissimilarfromthatofStalin:‘1.ThesereportsmaybeputoutbyGermansaspartofthewarof
nerves2.GermaninvasionwouldprobablyresultinsuchchaosthroughoutSovietUnionthatthe
Germanswouldhavetoreorganiseeverythingintheoccupiedterritoryandwouldmeanwhilelose
supplieswhichtheyarenowdrawingfromtheSovietUnionatanyrateforalongtimetocome3.
Germany’sresources,thoughimmense,wouldnotpermithertocontinuehercampaigninthe
Balkans,tomaintainthepresentscaleofairattackagainstthiscountry,tocontinueheroffensive
againstEgypt,andatthesametimetoinvade,occupyandreorganisealargepartoftheSovietUnion
…5.TherehavebeenindicationsthatGermanGeneralStaffareopposedtowarontwofrontsandin
favourofdisposingofGreatBritainbeforeattackingSovietUnion.’
Herewasamanifestationoftheforemostsininintelligenceanalysis:theJICreachedconclusions
foundeduponBritishandnotNazilogic.Theprimeminister,however,hadlongnursedahunchthat
HitlerwouldturnEast.On21AprilhedispatchedapersonalwarningtoStalin,inspiredbyCripps’s
messageandsomeUltraindications.Thiswasreceivedwithderision.Maisky,theSovietambassador,
tauntedBrendanBracken:‘SincewhendoesChurchilltendtotaketheinterestsoftheSovietUnionso
closelytohisheart?’HetoldBracken,Churchill’sintimate,thatsuchmissivesfromLondonhad
entirelytheoppositeeffecttothatwhichwasintended.Hedidnotaddavitalcorollary:that
Whitehall’straitorshadbriefedtheKremlinabouttheJIC’sdisbeliefthatHitlerwouldinvade.Aslate
as23May,theCommitteereportedthatanewagreementbetweenGermanyandRussiamightbe
imminent.Foolishthoughsuchspeculationsoundstoday,itwasthenlessthantwoyearssincejust
suchasatanicpacthadbeensigned.Ifthetwotyrantshadstruckabargainbefore,whyshouldtheynot
dosoagain?NorwasMoscowtheonlyplacewhereChurchill’ssinceritywasquestioned.Bjorn
Prytz,theSwedishambassadorinLondon,toldMaiskyhethoughtBritain’sprimeministerhadno
ideahowtowinthewar,savebytryingtodragtheRussiansin.CrippstoldtheAmericanambassador
inMoscowthathecouldwellimaginetheBritishacquiescinginaGermaninvasionofRussia,if
HitlermadeacompromisepeaceoffertoBritain.
Wheninformedandinfluentialforeignersclungtosuchopinions,Stalin’scynicismaboutwar
warningsfromChurchill,whomheknewtobedefyingtheviewsofhisownadvisers,becomesless
baffling.InApril,HozyainorderedtheRedArmyandtheintelligenceservicestoignorebothalleged
Germanmilitarypreparationsbeyondtheborder,andrepeatedLuftwaffeviolationsofSoviet
airspace.AttheendofthemonthMerkulovsubmittedareportdesignedtosilencethe‘warmongers’
andtalkupprospectsforadiplomaticrapprochementwithBerlin.HesaidthatGermansuccessesin
NorthAfricahadencouragedHitlertofinishoffBritainbeforeopeninganynewfront.Muchwas
madeofthedissensionbetweenHitlerandhisgenerals,whichwasrealenough.TheNKVDalso
suggested–atravestyofthetruth–thattheLuftwaffewasunwillingtofightRussiabecauseofthe
RedAirForce’srecognisedsuperiority.Stalinbriefedhisintelligencechiefsthattheirfirstobjective
wasnowdiplomatic:toclarifyHitler ’sdemands–thepricehewouldseektoextractfromMoscow
forkeepingthepeace.TheyrespondedthatBerlinwaslikelytowantanincreasedflowofgrain,oil
andothercommodities.VonderSchulenberg’sdiplomacyplayeditspartinfeedingStalin’s
delusions:aslateasmid-May,theGermanambassadorurgedtheSovietdictatortowritetoHitler,
exploringcommonground.MeanwhileRussia’sNeutralityPactwithJapan,signedon13April1941,
representedasincereanddesperateSovietattempttoavertwarbetweenthetwocountries,andthusto
reducetherangeofthreatsfacingtheSovietUnion.WhenforeignministerYōsukeMatsuokaleft
Moscowbearingthesignedtreaty,inanalmostunprecedentedgestureStalinwenttothestationtosee
himoff.
SovietembassiesandintelligencestationsadheredrigidlytoordersfromMolotovandBeriato
reportnothingwhichsuggestedtheinevitabilityofwar.On24May,whentheFinnishambassadorin
IstanbulgavehisSovietcounterpartdetailsofGermanformationsdeployedontheSovietborder,
Stalin’smanaskedcontemptuouslywhethertheFinnhadcountedthesoldiershimself.Aweeklater,
TimoshenkoandZhukovweresummonedtotheKremlin,andarrivedexpectingorderstoputSoviet
defencesonfullalert.InsteadtheywerehandedStalin’sacceptanceofatransparentlyfraudulent
requestfromBerlinthatsquadsofGermansshouldbeallowedtoroaminsideRussia’sborderin
searchof1914–18wardead.ThegeneralswereobligedtofumeinimpotencewhileHitler ’sscouts
surveyedtheirchosenbattlefields,protectedbyspadesandHozyain’sorders.
TheBritishgovernment’sclumsyhandlingofthe10MayparachutedescentonScotlandbyDeputy
FührerRudolfHessconvertedwhatshouldhavebeenapropagandadisasterforHitlerintoamajor
embarrassmentforhisenemy.ItpersuadedStalinthatboththeGermansandtheBritishweretoying
withhim,whilepreparingtomakeaseparatepeacewitheachother.LordBeaverbrook,asupreme
mischief-makerwhoseinterventionswereallthemoredamagingbecausehewasaknownintimateof
Churchill,toldMaiskyinLondon,‘OfcourseHessisanemissaryofHitler.’Thepresslordclaimed,
rightlyenough,thatHesssoughttopromoteacommonfrontagainstBolshevikbarbarism.Maisky
deducedthatBritain’sfutureconductdependednot–ashehadhithertosupposed–onChurchillian
resolution,butinsteadontheacceptabilityoftheGermantermsheassumedHesstohavebroughtwith
himfromHitler.
Inthelatespringof1941StalindailyexpectedtoreceivedetailsofanAnglo–Germancompromise
peace,followedbyademandfromBerlinthatRussiashouldjointheAxisandaccelerateitseconomic
supportforGermany.AslateasOctober1942StalinwrotetoMaisky:‘AllofusinMoscowhave
gainedtheimpressionthatChurchillisaimingatthedefeatoftheUSSR,inorderthentocometo
termswiththeGermanyofHitlerorBruningattheexpenseofourcountry.’Withbreathtaking
hypocrisy,hechosetoforgetthatinthemoodofpanicthatovertooktheKremlinafter‘Barbarossa’
began,theNKVD’sPavelSudoplatovhadbeenorderedtopasstotheBulgarianambassador,for
forwardingtoBerlin,asecretKremlinmessageinvitingacompromiseRusso–Germanpeace.Only
becauseHitlerwasuninteresteddidthatapproachgonowhere.AtanOctober1944dinnerinthe
KremlinStalincouldstillofferamockingbutatleastsemi-serioustoastto‘theBritishintelligence
servicewhichhadinveigledHessintocomingtoEngland’.
InJune1941theNKVDdraggedfromacellintheLubyankaCaptainAleksandrNelidov,an
erstwhileAbwehrmaninWarsaw,toinvitehisopinionofHess’sflighttoBritain.Theoldsoldier
respondedimmediately:‘Thismeanswar,withoutanydoubt.HessisrecruitingEnglandasanally
againsttheUSSR…’Nelidov,bornin1893,wasaformertsaristgunnerofficerwhohadroamed
Turkey,FranceandGermanyfollowingtheWhiteArmy’sdefeatinRussia’scivilwar.Hestruckup
friendshipsintheGermangeneralstaff,andattendedseveraloftheir1930swargames.Earlyin1939
hewasfoolishenoughtoacceptfromCanarisanassignmenttoWarsaw,wherehewaspromptly
seizedbythePoles.WhentheRussiansoverraneasternPolandandfoundhimlanguishinginLvov
prison,asaknownNaziintelligenceagenthewasdispatchedtoMoscow.
BythetimeZoyaRybkina,thetall,strikinglyattractivesenioroperationsofficeroftheGerman
sectionoftheNKVD,washandedhisfileinmid-1940,Nelidovwasabrokenman.Rybkinawrote
contemptuouslyinher1998memoirs:‘Hisbehaviourwasservile…Ifeltamusedbyhimbutalso
ashamedofhim,asanofficeroftheoldschool.’Thewretchedcaptainwasrepeatedlysummoned
fromhiscelltobequizzedabouttheWehrmachtthroughthedayandfarintothenight:‘Hislunchwas
broughtfromourcanteen,andwhenhesawaknifeandforkforthefirsttime,hepushedthemaway
andsaidinterrorisedtones:“ButIamnotsupposedtohavethese.”’
RybkinasetNelidovtoworkcomposinganarrativeoftheGermanwargameshehadattended,
completewithmapsandorder-of-battledetails.HetoldtheNKVDofficerthattheGermanplanfor
invadingRussiaassumedthatMinskwouldfallonthefifthday.Rybkinawrote:‘Iburstoutlaughing.
“Howcome,onthefifthday?!”Hewasembarrassedandsworebyeverygodthatthiswaswhat[Gen.
Wilhelm]Keitel[chiefofOKW]reckonedon.’ShepassedonthejoketoFitin,whosnarled,‘This
bastardissuchaliar.Justthinkaboutit,Minskonthefifthday!’Golikov,theRedArmy’schiefof
intelligence,laughedevenlouder:‘Sotheyhavedecidedtodrivewedgesforward.Andimagine–
theyplantotakeMinskonthefifthday!Welldone,Keitel,youareastrongman,suchastrongman!
…’ButNelidovalsotoldhisjailersthatGen.HansvonSeekt,thehoaryoldformerarmychiefof
staff,predicteddisasterforaGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnion,becausethelogisticswere
unsustainable.
Doubtspersist,unlikelyevertoberesolved,astowhatpreciselytheRedArmyknewbefore
‘Barbarossa’.MarshalZhukovinsistedtotheendofhisdaysthathewaskeptinignoranceofmuchof
theforeignintelligencethatwenttotheKremlin.IftheGermansinvaded,hehimselfexpectedthemto
drivesouth-westwardstosecureUkraineanditsimmensenaturalresources,thoughhethought
possibleanalternativeattackonanaxisRiga–Dvinsk.Sovietmilitaryattachés,especiallythoseinthe
Balkans,provideddetailedandbroadlyaccurateinformationaboutGermandeployments.Russian
frontier-watcherscontributedsubstantiallymorethantheNKVD’sorGRU’sforeignagentstothe
Stavka’sgraspoftheWehrmacht’sorderofbattle.ByAprilZhukovrealisedtheimportanceofthe
centralfrontinGermanplanning–largeforceswereconcentratedinEastPrussiaandPoland.But
conflictingevidencereflectedcontinuingargumentsbetweenHitlerandhisgenerals.
ItisoftenstatedthattheRedArmywaswhollysurprisedwhentheGermansattacked.Thisisless
thantrue.Intheweeksbeforewar,despiteStalin’sscepticismheallowedlargeforcestobe
redeployedintheWestandbroughttoarelativelyhighstateofreadiness.Thedisasterssubsequently
sufferedbytheRussianswereoverwhelminglyattributabletotherottenconditionofthearmedforces
andtheirleadership,ratherthantolackofimmediatepreparedness.Stalindeservesmostoftheblame
forwhatbefelltheSovietUnionin1941,butsurprisewastheleastofthereasonsforcatastrophe.The
RedArmywasoutfoughtbytheWehrmachtateverylevel,savethatsomeofitsunitsdisplayedan
animalsacrificialcouragethatastonishedtheirfoes.Beforetheinvasion,on12MayZhukovhad
movedintoforwardpositionsfourSovietarmies,800,000men.On2JuneBeriatoldStalinthatthe
Germanswereatahighstateofreadinessalongtheentireborder.Onthe12thafurtherreporton
GermandeploymentswenttoStalin,notingahighlevelofhostileintelligenceactivity:the
Wehrmachthadsometwohundred‘line-crossers’scoutingintheSovietborderregion.Inresponse,
Stalingrudginglyagreedthatwarreadinessshouldbereducedtotwohoursforrifledivisions,three
formotorisedandartillerydivisions.Thisscarcelyconstitutedabsolutepassivityinthefaceofthe
threat.
BoththeRussiansandtheBritishwerenaïveenoughtoexpectanultimatumtoprecedehostilities.
On11June,SirStaffordCrippsreturnedhome‘forconsultations’.Thepurposeofhisrecallwas
exactlyasstated–toenabletheBritishgovernmenttodiscusswithhimthebewilderingand
momentousdevelopmentsthatwereunfolding.LondonwasdismayedbyaGermanpropaganda
campaign,designedtopersuadetheworldthatanewRusso–Germanrapprochementwasimminent.
TheKremlinwasshockedbyCripps’sjourney,fortheoppositereason:Stalinassumedthatthe
Britishwerepreparingsomebyzantinediplomaticstroke,whichwouldleavetheSovietUnion
isolated.On16JuneMaiskywassummonedtoBritain’sForeignOfficeandgivenacoolrecitalofits
latestintelligenceonGermandeployments,basedonUltra.TheWehrmachtwasthoughttohave
eightydivisionsinPoland,thirtyinRomania,fiveinFinlandandnorthNorway,115inall.Thiswas
littlemorethanhalfthereality,substantiallyfewerthantheGRUhadalreadyidentified.Itwasa
reflectionofthelimitationsofUltrain1941,andoftheWarOffice’spooranalyticalcapabilityatthis
stage,thattheygotthenumberssobadlywrong.ButevenformerscepticsontheJICnolonger
doubtedtheoverarchingreality:HitlerwasabouttoinvadetheSovietUnion.
InMoscow,theNKVDadoptedadesperatelast-minuteploy:itsoperativesinterceptedtwoGerman
diplomaticcouriers,abouttoleaveMoscowforBerlinwiththeGermanembassy’sdispatches.One
manwastrappedinahotellift,whiletheotherwaslockedinthebathroomofhissuite.Inthefive
minutesbeforethelift-boundcourierwasfreed,theNKVDphotographedtheGermanambassador ’s
correspondencebeforerestoringittoitsbriefcase.Thecontents,whenexaminedintheLubyanka,
provedequivocal:SchulenbergreportedthathewasconfidentSovietintentionsremainedpeaceful.
ButhealsostatedthathehadobeyedinstructionsfromBerlintoreducehisstafftoanabsolute
minimum,anobviouspreliminarytowar.
OnCripps’swaybackfromLondonhestoppedinStockholm,wherehetoldthedirectorofthe
ForeignMinistryaboutrumoursofanewRusso–Germanagreement.Rubbish,saidtheSwede.His
country’sintelligenceservicehadinterceptedorderstoGermanforcesinNorway,whichmadeplain
thattheywouldattackbetween20and25June.TheSwedishambassadorinMoscow,doyenofthe
diplomaticcommunity,reported:‘Theonlycertainthingisthatwefaceeitherabattleofglobal
significancebetweentheThirdReichandtheSovietEmpireorthemostgiganticcaseofblackmailin
worldhistory.’ZoyaRybkina,keyNKVDanalystofGermany,describedhowon17Juneshe
preparedasituationreportforPavelFitintopresenttoStalin,basedchiefly,butnotentirely,onthe
RedOrchestra’smessages–Sorge,ofcourse,reportedtotheGRU.Shelaterprofessedtohave
concludedthatwarwasinevitable:‘AllofGermany’smilitarypreparationsforarmedaggressionare
complete,andanattackcanbeexpectedatanytime.’Inreality,however,thedocumentwasmore
equivocalthanitsdraftersafterwardstriedtoclaim.Tocoverthemselves,theyrepeatedlyusedsuch
phrasesas‘Itisnotindicatedonwhatdatathesourcehasreachedhisconclusions…Harnackdoes
notknowwhere,when,orinwhatconnectionHalderhadexpressedthispointofview…Harnack
doesnottakeatfacevaluethestatementofGöring,andreferstohisnotoriousbragging.’Knowing
thattheKremlinstillstubbornlyrejectedtheirownnear-certainty,theyfeltobligedtoassertdoubts
theydidnothave.
MerkulovandFitinwenttogethertotheKremlinatnoonon17June.Thelatter,whohadseldom
metStalin,afterwardsacknowledgedhisowntrepidation,whichmightmorejustlybecalledterror.
Thetwogrey,bleak,mercilessheroesofsomanystatekillingsagreedtheirlinebeforeentering
Hozyain’spresence:theywoulddescribetheirownintelligenceassessmentasmerely‘likelytobe
true’,ratherthancertain.TheyfoundStalincalm,pacingtheroomaswashiscustom.Fitinsawthe
mostrecentdecryptfromBerlinlyingonhisdesk.‘Ihavereadyourreport,’murmuredStalininhis
accustomedslow,understatedfashion.‘SoGermanyisgettingreadytoattacktheSovietUnion?’And
hestaredatbothFitinandMerkulov.
Theyhadnotbeenexpectinghimtoaddresstheissuesobaldly,andfeltlost.‘Weweresilent,’
recalledFitin.‘Onlythreedaysbefore,on14June,newspapershadpublishedtheTASSstatement
sayingthatGermanywasstillunwaveringlyadheringtotheconditionsoftheSoviet-Germanpact.’
BothheandMerkulovpreservedthestone-facedsilencethatseemedtooffertheirmostplausiblepath
tosurvival.StalinfiredastringofcontemptuousquestionsabouttheNKVD’ssources.Fitindescribed
theSchulze-Boysen/Harnacknetworks,thenStalinsaid:‘Listen,intelligencechief,thereareno
Germansthatcanbetrusted,exceptWilhelmPieck’–theComintern’ssecretary,nowexiledin
Moscow.ThenfollowedasilencethatseemedtothevisitorsinterminablebeforeStalinoncemore
lookedup,gazedhardatthemandbarked,‘Misinformation!Youmaygo.’Inanotherversionofthe
conversation,heinstructedtheintelligencechiefstogobacktothesources,checktheirinformation
andoncemorereviewtheNKVDassessment.WhatiscertainisthatStalinrejectedthewarwarning.
Rybkinawrotelater:‘ItishardtodescribethestateofourteamwhileweawaitedFitin’sreturn
fromtheKremlin.Hecalledtohisofficemeand[Pavel]Zhuravlev’–theveterandirectorofthe
Germansection,muchadmiredbycolleagues.Fitintossedthestapleddocumentontothecoffeetable
atwhichhistwosubordinatessat.‘I’vereportedtotheBoss,’hesaid.‘IosifVissarionovichstudied
yourreportandthrewitbackatme.“Thisisbluff!”hesaidirritably.“Don’tstartpanic.Don’tdeal
withnonsense.You’dbettergobackandgetaclearerpicture.”’Fitintoldthenonplussedintelligence
officers:‘Checkthisonemoretimeandreporttome.’Oncealonetogether,Zhuravlevsaidto
Rybkina,withtheparadeofconvictionindispensabletosurvivalintheSovietuniverse:‘Stalincansee
furtherfromhisbell-tower.ApartfromourreportsheisbeingbriefedbytheGRU,ambassadors,
trademissions,journalists.’Rybkinaprofessedtoagree,butadded:‘Thismeansthatouragents,who
havebeentestedoveryears,mustbeconsidereduntrustworthy.’Zhuravlevshrugged,withauthentic
Russianfatalism,‘Weshalllive,weshallsee.’Beria,ingrovellinganticipationofHozyain’swishes,
orderedthatfortyNKVDofficerswhohadpassedonwarningsofwarshouldbe‘groundintolabour
campdust’.HewrotetoStalinon21June:‘Iagaininsistonrecallingandpunishingourambassador
toBerlin,Dekanozov,whokeepsbombardingmewith“reports”onHitler ’sallegedpreparationsto
attacktheUSSR.Hehasreportedthatthisattackwillstarttomorrow…ButIandmypeople,Iosif
Vissarionovich,havefirmlyembeddedinourmemoryyourwiseconclusion.Hitlerisnotgoingto
attackusin1941.’
Muchinkhasbeenexpendedbyhistoriansonattemptstodeterminewhatproportionofthe
intelligencegarneredbyRussia’ssecretservicesreachedtheKremlin,ratherthanremaininginthe
deskdrawersofBeria,MerkulovandFitin.Thiscontroversyseemsspurious.Beyonddoubt,Stalin
wasprovidedwithoverwhelmingevidenceabouttheGermanmilitarybuild-upontheSovietborder.
TheHomericblunderlayinhisanalysisofitssignificance.PosterityderidesStalinforrejecting
obvioustruth.ButhemerelychosetosharethestrategicviewheldbytheBritish,andespeciallytheir
JointIntelligenceCommittee,withthesoleexceptionofChurchill,untilthelastdaysbefore
‘Barbarossa’.Thisseemsimportantincomprehendingthetyrant’sconduct.ThankstoWhitehall
traitors,theKremlinknewthatBletchleyParkhadbeguntoreadGermanwirelesstrafficona
substantialscale,whichincreasedStalin’sbeliefinLondon‘somniscience.Aperverselyexaggerated
respectfortheskillofBritain’ssecretservicesandtheguileofitsdiplomacythuscausedhimto
acceptWhitehall’sviewofHitler ’sintentionsinpreferencetothatofhisownmarvellousnetworksof
spies.HecouldneverbelievethatChurchill’spersonaljudgementaboutHitler ’sintentiontoattack
Russiawasbothhonestlyexpressed,andsuperiortothatofBritain’sintelligenceapparatus–untilthe
JICchangeditsmind,thankstoUltra,justbeforeHitlerstruck.
HerewasthemostremarkableaspectofKremlinbehaviourinadvanceoftheinvasion:
‘Barbarossa’didnotrepresentafailurebytheSovietintelligence-gatheringmachine.Fewmilitary
operationsinhistoryhavebeensocomprehensivelyflagged.Therewas,instead,simplyahistoric
misjudgementbytheheadofstate.Stalin’sdeafnessduringtheovertureto‘Barbarossa’emphasised
theindissolubilityofthelinksbetweenintelligence,diplomacyandgovernance.Unlessallthreedid
theirparts,eachonewasuseless.
Intheearlyhoursof22June1941,theLubyankawasalmostsilent.TheNKVD’sheadsofdepartment
customarilywenthomeat8p.m.,thoughneverwithoutanodfromBeriaorMerkulov.Pavel
Sudoplatovwasamongthebuilding’sfewoccupantsabovecelllevelwhen,at3a.m.,thetelephone
rang.ItwasMerkulov,whoannouncedthataGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnionhadbegun.
Sudoplatovbeganhastilycallingstaffintothebuilding,includinghiswifeEmma,whohad
abandonedoperationalworktobecomeanagenttrainer.LeonidEitingon,hisdeputy,almost
invariablycrackedajokeortwoonarrivalintheoffice;butlikeeveryotherRussianthatfateful
morninghefoundnothingtojustifybreachingthebuilding’smoodofstunnednear-paralysis.
ThememoirsofSovietintelligenceofficerssometimesconveyanillusionthatlifewithinthe
LubyankawaslittledifferentfromthatinBroadway,butglimpsesnonethelessbreakthroughofthe
institutionalisedterror.TheWhiteRussianofficerAleksandrNelidov,oneofthosewhohadpredicted
‘Barbarossa’,wastoldnothingofitsoccurrenceuntilon22July1941hewasdraggedfromhiscell
intotheofficeofZoyaRybkina.Hegrewwide-eyedwhenhefoundhersittingbehindblack-out
curtainsamidthecrumpoffallingbombsandanti-aircraftfire.‘ZoyaIvanovna!’heexclaimed.‘They
arefiringrealshells.Thisiswar!’Shenoddedandsaid,‘Todayisexactlyamonthsinceitstarted.
AndMinskdidfall,notonthefifthdayasyousaidthattheGermanspredicted,butonthesixth…’A
guardcamerunning,outofbreath,totakeNelidovbacktohissubterraneanquarters.Theoldtsarist
saidgloomily,‘Farewell,ZoyaIvanovna.YoucantrustallthatIhavewrittenhere,inthisroom.’He
crossedhimselfandbowedashedeparted,plainlyexpectingtobeshot.
Twodayslater,however,hewasreturnedtoRybkina’soffice,abruptlyhandedasuitcaseofclothes
toreplacehisprisonrags,andorderedtogointoanadjacentroomandchangeintothem.Theguard
returnedafewminuteslaterandreportedthatNelidovwassittingsobbing,paralysedbyfear.The
prisonerkeptaskingwhytheyneededtodresshimsosmartlybeforekillinghim.Rybkinamarched
nextdoorandtoldthewretchedmantopullhimselftogether.‘Comeon,AleksandrSergeevich,how
couldyouletyourselfgolikethis?Youneedtogetagrip.Iamtakingyoutomeetmybosses.’They
proceededfirsttotheofficesofPavelZhuravlevandhisdeputyPavelSudoplatov,thenalltogether
presentedthemselvesbeforePavelFitin.ThegeneralinvitedtheastoundedNelidovtobecomean
NKVDagentinTurkey,acountryheknewwell.
Nelidovsaidwithachoked,hystericalgiggle,‘ButfirstofallIshouldbe…executed…’Fitin
respondedimpatiently,‘IamaskingwhetheryouwouldagreetoworkinTurkey.Turkey,asyou
know,isneutral.’Nelidovmuttered,‘Whateveryouwant.’Rybkinastaredreproachfullyather
ungraciousprotégé,whosimplymutteredagainandagain,‘Whateveryouwant…’Shetookthe
stupefiedmanbacktoheroffice,whereheaskedwhyallthechiefshemetwereintroducedasPavel;
wasthisacommoncodename?No,no,saidhisnewemployerirritably,merelyamatterofchance.
SheledhimoutofthebuildingtoanearbyrestaurantcalledtheAragvi,wheretheysatamongtables
occupiedbyRedArmyofficers,andsherecommendedthekebab.
Herguestremainedtootraumatisedtoeat.Whensheorderedwine,fearfulofbeingpoisonedhe
beggedtobeallowedtoswapglasses.Atlasthetookacautioussip,thenasked,‘Sowhenarethey
comingforme?’Rybkinarespondedwearily,‘Didn’tyouheartheorderforyourreleasebeing
read?’Herguestpersisted:‘Idon’tunderstand.HowcanIbeforgiven?’Afterlunchshesuggestedthat
sheshowhimaroundanearbyagriculturalexhibition,andtheydrovedownGorkyStreet,where
everyshopwindowwassandbaggedandthetrafficpolicemencarriedgasmasks.Sheleftherman
thateveningattheMoskvahotel,tellinghimthatVasilyZarubinhadbeenappointedashiscase
officer.
Rybkina’snarrativeoftheseeventsisshotthroughwithmercilesscontemptfortheweaknessof
Nelidov.Forallherstrikinglooks,shewasnotawomantowhomanyprudentmanwouldofferhis
back,farlesshislips.NelidovneverwenttoTurkey.WhenZarubinknockedonhisdoornext
morning,itremainedunopened.Onbreakingin,hefoundhisnewrecruitsuspendedfromarope
madeoftornsheets.ThetransitionfromdoomedprisonertofavouredprotégéoftheLubyankawas
toomuchforhisbrokenspirit.WhocansaythatNelidov’slastdecisionwasill-judged?
5
DivineWinds
1 M R S F ER GUS O N’ S TEA S ET
TheJapanesemadelesseffectiveuseofintelligencethananyotherwarringnationbetween1942and
1945.Butinthemonthsbeforetheywenttowar,theirdecisionsweresignificantlyinfluencedbyan
extraordinaryBritishindiscretion.ItwouldbeanexaggerationtosaythatMrsVioletFerguson’stea
set,scarcelyamasterpieceofthepotter ’sart,causedJapantoattacktheBritishEmpire.Butthe
incidentinwhichitplayedapartwasanexampleofanintelligencecoupthathelpedtodecidethefate
ofnations.
On11November1940SSAutomedon,ahumble7,528-tonBritishmerchantshipoftheBlueFunnel
Line,exoticallynamedforAchilles’charioteer,wasploughingalonelycourseforPenang,ina
stretchoftheIndianOceanwestofSumatrafarfromanyactivetheatreofwar.Nonetheless,at7a.m.
whentheofficerofthewatchspottedadistantship,hewokehissleepingcaptain.‘Theoldman’,
veteranseafarerWilliamEwan,quicklymadehiswaytothebridge,justforwardoftheship’sspindly
funnel.Ewanpeeredhardthroughhisbinoculars,decidedthatthestrangerwasaDutchliner,andheld
course.At8.03theothervesselwaslessthanamiledistantwhenitbrokeouttheinternationalflag
hoists‘Donotraisethealarm’and‘Stop’,thenfiredawarningshotacrossthebowsofthefreighter,
whichhadleftLiverpoolon24September,justastheBattleofBritaingavewaytotheBlitz,carrying
amixedcargoofaircraft,cars,machineparts,microscopes,militaryuniforms,cameras,sewing
machines,beer,550casesofwhisky,2.5millionChesterfieldcigarettes,andsixmilliondollarsin
newlyprintedStraitscurrency.
TheinterloperwasthedisguisedGermanarmedmerchant-cruiserAtlantis,oneofthemost
successfulcommerceraidersofthewar,whichhadalreadycapturedandsunktwelveAlliedvessels
sinceleavingBremenon31March.Theships’11Novembermeetingwasnotamatterofchance.The
Atlantis’scaptain,forty-one-year-oldBernhardRogge,hadcapturedasetofBritishMerchantNavy
codesaboardthefreighterCityofBaghdadon11July,whichassistedhimininterceptingother
vesselsthereafter.Moreover,anItalianintelligenceunitintheMediterraneanforwardeddecrypts
whichhelpedtopinpointthefreighter.Automedon’sbridgecrewfailedtoreadtheGermanflaghoist,
andtheship’sradio-operatorbegantappingoutan‘RRR’emergencysignal.ThedoughtyCaptain
Ewanshouted‘Hardonthewheel!’andhisshipbegantosheeraway.Hethensaid,‘Comeon
everyone,let’sdoit–we’regoingtofight.’Onthesterndeckofthemerchantmanwasmounteda
singleelderly4-inchgun.UnfortunatelyfortheBritish,however,Atlantiscarriedfive5.9-inchguns
andasophisticatedfire-controlsystem.HavinginterceptedtheBritishship’sdistresscall,the
Germansstartedshootinginearnest.ThefirstshellofAtlantis’sopeningsalvo,firedatpoint-blank
range,smashedintothebridge,followedbyafurthersuccessionofhammerblowswhichbrought
downthewirelessantenna,killedorwoundedalmostascoreofmenandtransformedAutomedon’s
upperworksintoatangleoftwistedsteelinterruptedbygapingholes.BynowAtlantiswassoclose
thatwhenaBritishseamanranaft,aGermanofficercalledthroughaloudhailerinEnglish,‘Donot
approachthegun,orwewillblowyououtofthewater!’
SecondOfficerDonaldStewartregainedconsciousnessonthebridgetofindhiscaptainlyingdead
besidehim.FirstOfficerPeterEvan,knowingthatprotractedresistancewasimpossible,haddashed
fortheship’ssafetodestroytheconfidentialpapersassoonastheenemyopenedfire,butfellvictim
tothesameshellthatkilledEwan:Evancollapsedseriouslywoundedonthethresholdofthecaptain’s
cabinwherethesafekeywaskept.Inall,sixcrewmemberswerenowdeadandtwelveothers
wounded.Bothshipsstopped.Stewartandthedeckhandswatchedgrimlyasalaunchboreaboarding
partyfromAtlantistoAutomedon.AstreamofshockedandscaldedChinesefiremenemergedfroma
hatchwayleadingtothefreighter ’sengineroom,whereblasthadcausedsteamleaks.
TheGermanshadplannedtocommandeerAutomedonasasupplyship,butonseeingthescaleof
damagecausedbytheirshells,insteadtheybegantosetscuttlingcharges.Lt.UlrichMohr,Atlantis’s
adjutant,madeahastytourofthecaptureduringwhichheblewopenitssafe,removingcashand
confidentialpapersalongwithaweightedgreencanvasbagfoundinthechartroom,which
Automedon’sdeadofficershadbeentaskedtothrowoverboardinanyemergency.TheGermans
enlistedtheaidofBritishseamentoshiftfrozenmeat,whiskyandcigarettestoAtlantis,beforethe
crewwastransferredtotheGermanship.Personalmoneywasconfiscated,thoughtheircaptors
issuedreceiptsforthecontentsofeachman’swallet.CaptainRoggewasnotonlyanexcellentseaman
andtactician,butamanofhonourwhotookpainsforthewelfareofprisonersfromtheshipshe
seizedonhisremarkableeight-monthcruise.AmongtheBritishpersonneltransferredtoAtlantis
werethreepassengers,includingachiefengineeroftheStraitsSteamshipCompanynamedAlan
Ferguson,andhisthirty-three-year-oldwifeViolet,onpassagetoSingapore.Encounteringthe
AtlantiswasonlythelatestofseveralunfortunateadventuresthathadbefallenMrsFergusonsinceher
marriagein1936,includingamiscarriageandanenforcedflightfromFranceinJune1940aboard
thelastferryoutofBordeaux.Now,intenselyemotional,shewenttoCaptainRoggeandpleadedwith
himthroughtearstosaveherluggage–twotrunkswhichcontainedalmostallherworldly
possessions,includingaprizedteaset.TheGermantookpity.HesignalledMohr,stillonthedoomed
Automedon,tomakeaquicksearchfortheFergusons’luggage.
DonaldStewart,theonlyBritishofficerremainingaboard,didhisbesttodeflectMohrfromthe
lockedstrongroombelowthebridgewheretheluggagewasheld,buttheAtlantis’sadjutantwould
brooknodistraction.SeeingadoorthatansweredMrsFerguson’sdescriptionofthebaggagespace,
hehaditblownopen.Beyond,aswellashertrunkshefoundsackuponsackofmailbags,someof
themprominentlylabelledascontainingofficialcommunications.ThelaunchthatboreMohr,Stewart
andtheboardingpartytoAtlantis’ssidesoonafterwardsrepeatedthetripheapedwithmailbags,as
wellasMrsFerguson’sluggage.
ThefreighterwasdispatchedtothebottomafewhoursafteritsfatefulencounterwithAtlantis.As
theGermanraiderhastenedtoputdistancebetweenitselfandAutomedon’slastknownposition,
RoggeandMohrsettoworkonthetreasuretroveofdocumentsbroughtacrossfromtheBritishship.
TheMerchantNavy’scodesandsailingorderswerefamiliarstuff.ButthenthetwoGermansfound
themselvesscanningmuchmoreinterestingmaterial–amassofreportsandcorrespondencedestined
forBritishmilitaryandintelligenceoutpostsinSingapore,Shanghai,HongKong.Themostsecret
papersofallincludedcorrespondenceaddressedtoAir-MarshalSirRobertBrooke-Popham,British
commander-in-chiefintheFarEast.Thisgavedetailsofawarcabinetmeetingtodiscussthestrategic
situationinAsia,heldatDowningStreeton8August1940,presidedoverbyWinstonChurchill.
AppendedtothiswasahighlydetailedreportonthedefencesofBritain’sFarEasternempire,
preparedforthegovernmentbythechiefsofstaff.
Roggeimmediatelyrealisedtheurgencyoflandinghiscatch.TheBritishofficialmailwasplaced
aboardthecapturedNorwegianfreighterOleJacob,whichsailedwithmostofAtlantis’sprisoners
andasmallprizecrewtoKobe,inneutralJapan,whereitarrivedon5December.TheBritish
documents,nowreposinginalockedchest,wereforwardedunderescorttotheGermanembassyin
Tokyo,wherenavalattachéPaulWennekerstudiedthemwithalltheattentiontheydeserved–itis
unknownwhetherhesharedtheirsecretswithRichardSorge.Hecabledadigestofthehighlightsto
Berlin,thensenthomecopiesofthekeymaterialviatheTrans-Siberianrailway,inthehandsofLt.
PaulKamenz,CaptainRogge’sprizeofficer.Fivedayslater,Wennekerwasgivenorders,personally
endorsedbyHitler,topassthedocumentstotheJapanesegovernment,withonestipulation:the
Abwehrwantedthecredit.Theembassywastoldtosaynothingaboutthepapershavingbeen
removedfromaBritishfreighter–perhapspartlybecausethismightsuggesttotheJapanesethat
Churchill’sgovernmentdidnotmuchvaluethematerial.Instead,Wennekerwastoldtoconveyan
impressionthattheprizehadbeensecuredbybrilliantGermansecretservicework.
On12DecemberWennekertookthedocumentsandtranslationspersonallytotheofficesofthe
Japanesenavalstaff,placedthemwithoutcommentonthedeskofVice-AdmiralNobutakeKondo,
Yamamoto’svice-chief,andsatinsilencewhiletheywereread.Kondowasappropriatelystunned–
andgrateful.ThateveningheentertainedWennekertothebestdinnerTokyocouldprovide,
expressingrepeatedthanksandsayingwonderingly,‘suchsignificantweaknessesintheBritish
Empirecouldnotbedetectedfromoutwardappearances’.Whatdidthedocumentscontain,that
causedKondosuchamazement?Byfarthemostimportantrevelationwasafifteen-pageBritish
chiefsofstaffreport,presentedtothewarcabineton8August,entitled‘TheSituationintheFarEast
intheEventofJapaneseInterventionAgainstUs’.Itwasheaded:
SECRETCOPY72
COS(40)302(alsoW.P.(40)302)
TOBEKEPTUNDERLOCKANDKEY
Itisrequestedthatspecialcarebetakentoensurethesecrecyofthisdocument.
TheBritishchiefscorrectlypredictedthelikelihoodofdeeperJapaneseincursionsintoFrench
Indochina,threateningMalaya.Churchill’sgovernmentasserteditsunwillingness,foundedon
avowedmilitaryweakness,togotowarwithJapanoverIndochina.ItacknowledgedthatHongKong,
pearloftheBritishEmpireontheChinacoast,wasindefensible:intheeventofwar,onlytoken
resistancecouldbeofferedtoaJapaneseassaultonthecolony.TheRoyalNavywaspatheticallyweak
inFarEasternwaters,butuntilthetideofwarhadturnedintheMediterranean,theBritish
acknowledgedtheirinabilitytosendmajorreinforcements.Atbest–orrather,indireemergency–
onlyabattlecruiserandasingleaircraft-carriercouldbesparedfortheIndianOcean.IfJapan
attackedAustraliaorNewZealandtheonlycredibleresponsewouldbeanappealtotheUnitedStates
tosendforcestotheiraid.Thedominantthemeofthechiefsofstaff’sreporttogovernmentwasan
assertionofBritain’sstrategicweakness:‘TheforcesinMalayaarestillfarshortofrequirements,
particularlyintheair…OurowncommitmentsinEuropearesogreatthatourpolicymustbe
directedtowardstheavoidanceofanopenclashwithJapan…Ourgeneralpolicyshouldbetoplay
fortime;tocedenothinguntilwemust;andtobuildupourdefencesassoonaswecan.’Thepaper
alsoshowedthattheBritishwereunawareofJapan’sformidablestrengthinnavaltorpedo-bombers,
amongthedeadliestweaponsinitsarmoury.
This,then,wasthethrustofthedocumentshandedoverbytheGermansinDecember1940,ata
momentwhenBerlin’sforemostforeignpolicyobjectivewastodragJapanintothewar.Thehaul
waspassedtothearmy’snewlyestablishedAsiaDevelopmentAgency,headedbyLt.Col.Yoshimasa
Okada,whichwasexplicitlytaskedtostudythedefencesofBritain’sAsianempire.Hisfirst
instinctivereactionwastoassumethatthepapersmustbeaGermanplant,fabricatedforpolitical
purposes–theJapaneserightlydeclinedtobelievethatanymerespycouldhavesecuredsuch
material.ButasOkadaandhiscolleaguesstudiedtheBritishorderofbattle,theyfoundthatthis
closelymatchedassessmentsmadebytheintelligencestaffsofboththeJapanesearmyandnavy.
Beliefgrew,andfinallybecameabsolute,thatthepaperswereauthentic.TheywerepassedtoJapan’s
primeminister,whowasasimpressedashadbeenAdmiralKondoandCol.Okada.
ItwouldbeasabsurdtosuggestthattheAutomedonpapersdeterminedJapantoriskwarin
December1941asitistoattributeanyotherdecisiveeventinhistorytoasinglecause.Butthe
evidenceisplainthatthecaptureddocumentsacceleratedtheseachangeinJapanesethinkingthattook
placeduringthewinterof1940–41.HavingbeenallowedtodiscoverthattheBritishthemselves
believedtheirSouth-EastAsianempiretobeacutelyvulnerable,theJapanesearmyandnavybecame
increasinglypersuadedthatthe‘southernstrategy’ofassaultingtheWest’soverseasempiresoffered
amoreattractiveoptionthanthealternative‘northernstrategy’ofengagingtheSovietUnion.Asis
thewayofwarlords,becausetheAutomedonmaterialencouragedthemtowardsacoursetheywere
mindedtotakeanyway,Japan’sleaderswilfullyneglectedotherintelligencefromEurope,especially
reportsfromtheirnavalattachés,whichcastdoubtupontheprospectofGermanvictory,and
especiallyuponitsimminence.TokyoadheredstubbornlytoabeliefthatHitlerwasdestinedto
triumph.ConvictiongrewuponthegeneralsthatiftheywishedtoshareinthespoilsofloomingAxis
victory,toavoid‘missingthebus’theymuststrikesoonagainsttheWesternPowers.
AtlantiswasscuttledbyherowncrewsouthofStHelenaon22November1940,afterreceivinga
firstsalvofromthe8-inchgunsoftheBritishcruiserDevonshire.TheGermanraiderthusbecame
itselfavictimofsecretintelligence:ithadbeenorderedtomakearefuellingrendezvouswithU-126,
atapositionintheSouthAtlanticrevealedtotheRoyalNavybyBletchleyPark.BernhardRoggeand
hiscrewtooktotheboats,escapedcapture,andsurvivedthewar.TheAutomedondocumentswere
recognisedinTokyoasthecaptain’snotablecontributiontoJapan’s1941–42triumph:afterthefallof
SingaporeRoggewaspresentedwithasamuraiswordbyagratefulJapaneseEmperor–Göringand
RommelweretheonlyotherGermanrecipientsofthiswartimehonour.
AlanFergusonandhiswifeVioletcamethroughthewar,afterenduringyearsofinternment.So
too,remarkably,didherteaset.ThetrunkinwhichitreposedaccompaniedhertoGermany,thenwas
recoveredintactbyBritishforcesin1945.ItwasdispatchedtoSingapore,whereFergusonresumed
hiscareerasanengineeringofficer,whileenjoyinghiswife’sgenteelafternoonentertainingashore.
AsfortheBritishgovernment’spricelessdocuments,theircapturewithAutomedonreflecteda
notableandbynomeansuniquecarelessnesswithsecretpapers.Whitehallwenttoelaboratelengths
toconcealtheblunderfromtheworlduntilitwasrevealedaccidentallymanydecadeslater,by
discoveryofsomeofWenneker ’smessagesinaGermanarchive.Thesagavividlyillustratesthefact
thatsomeremarkableintelligencecoupsarethefruitsofrawluck,ratherthanofinspiredespionage.
2 TH E J A PA NES E
TheAutomedondocumentscontributedtoTokyo’simpressivelycomprehensivelocalintelligence
picturebeforeitsforcesattackedPearlHarborandtheWesternEuropeanAsianempiresinDecember
1941.TheJapanesetookmoretroubletoinformthemselvesabouttheirimmediateobjectivesahead
oftheoutbreakofwarthanevertheydidafterwards.FormonthstheiragentscycledacrossMalaya,
exploredtheUSPacificFleet’sHawaiianchorages,parleyedwiththeHongKongTriads.This,
althoughthebulkoftheJapanesearmy’sattentionandresourcesremainedfocusedonChina,where
itsmenhadbeenfightinganddyingsince1937,andwhereintelligence–joho–waseasilysecured
andNationalistcodesreadilybroken.InMay1940,duringtheYichangoffensive,armycodebreakers
enabledTokyo’sarmiestoanticipatethemovementsofalmosteveryChinesedivision.Inthesummer
1941BattleofSouthShanxi,thankstodecryptstheyinflicted80,000casualtiesonmuchlarger
Chineseforces,whilethemselveslosingonly3,300men.CaptainKatsuhikoKudowashailedas
Japan’sacecryptanalyst,andbecamethefirstintelligenceofficertobeawardedtheKinshiKunsho–
‘GoldenKite’–decorationforhisachievementsinChina.
TheJapanesearmy’s‘Chinahands’wereknownasShina-tsu,ofwhomthemostcelebratedwas
Gen.KenjiDoihara,dubbed‘LawrenceofManchuria’forhisespionageactivities.InJuly1940Kioya
Izaki,theShanghaiintelligencecentre’sdeputychief,spentamonthvisitingHongKong,Cantonand
Taipeiundercoverasatrader.Thestationrancovertoperationswithcodenameslike‘Sakura’
(‘CherryTree’),‘TakeBambo’,‘Fuji-Wisteria’.Oneofthese,in1941,floodedChinawithforged
currency,printedbytheArmyInstituteforScientificResearchonspeciallyimportedGermanhighspeedpresses.MeanwhiletheShanghaicounter-intelligencebranchboastedastrengthof1,500men.
Thenavy’sSpecialDutiesSectionuseddisguisedfishingboatsforoffshoresurveillanceoffreight
movementstotheNationalists,especiallybytheBritish,andopenedaprivatetradingcompanyasa
coverforagent-running.
YetTokyolearnedlittleaboutthecommunists,partlybecauseMaoZhedong’sforcesused
intractableSovietcodes.Anddespitealltheactivitydescribedabove,aningrainedsenseofcultural
superiority–whichalsocausedthemtocondescendtoAnglo-Saxons–madetheJapaneseunwilling
seriouslytoengagewithChinaforintelligencepurposes.Astaffofficeracknowledgedafterthewar:
‘WefailedtorealisethatwewerefightingtheChinesenotonlyinthemilitaryfieldbutalsointhe
political,economicandculturalfields.Wewerealmostblindinthelatter.’OneJapaneseagentin
ShanghaiwasreducedtoforwardingtoTokyoassourcematerialAgnesSmedley’sbestsellingbook
China’sRedArmyMarches.
Untilatleast1942theRussians,acrosstheborderinManchuria,werethetargetsofmuchmore
ambitiousJapanesecovertoperationsthantheWesternPowers.Tokyowasmorbidlyfearfulofits
communistneighbours,andafteritsdrubbingatNomohanin1939theImperialArmysustaineda
profoundrespectfortheirmilitaryabilities.Mostofthe22,000Kempeitaimilitarypolicedeployed
overseaswereeitherperformingsecuritydutiesinChinaorwatchingtheRussians.Soprimitivewas
theirtrainingthatJapanesespiesweretaughttomeasurethelengthofbridgesintheSovietUnion
frominsideclosedtrainsbycountingthenumberofbumpsaswheelspassedoverrailjoins.Atthe
ManchurianpostofHsinking,320listenerstappedphonesandmonitoredvoiceradiocommunication.
EightsigintsitesmonitoredRussianwirelesstransmissions,andtheJapanesesometimeschanged
borderguardsatSakhalinjusttoprovoketheRussiansintosendingsignals,inthehopethatthese
couldbedecrypted.In1940aformerPolisharmycodebreakerassistedtheJapanesetocracksome
low-gradeRedAirForceanddiplomaticcodes.ThreehundredJapaneseofficersayearattendedthe
RussianlanguageschoolinHarbin.
Sevenhundredsoldierswerecontinuouslyemployedpeeringthroughbinocularsacrosstheborder
fromManchuriaintotheSovietUnion,recordingthemovementsofeveryman,horseandvehicle,
togetherwithallshiptrafficinandoutofVladivostok.Severalex-tsaristofficersscrapedalivingin
HarbinscanningPravda,IzvestiaandotherSovietpublicationsforTokyo’sbenefit.Aceaseless
pingponggamewasplayed,whereintheJapaneserecruitedRussianexpatriates,dispatchedthem
acrosstheManchurianborderonlyfortheSovietsto‘turn’them:theaverageJapaneseagentsurvived
atlibertyforjustaweek.In1938Gen.GenrikhLyushovoftheNKVD’sFarEasternDirectorate
escapedafiringsquadbyfleeingintoManchuria.Hespenttheensuingsevenyearsunderhousearrest
inTokyo,buthishostsfoundthattheirprizehadfrustratinglylittletotellofpracticalvalue.Inthe
wakeof‘Barbarossa’,asteadystreamofRussiandeserters–130ofthembytheendof1941–
crossedintoJapaneseterritory,butmanyprovedtobeNKVDplants.
SomeJapaneseinitiativeswerespectacularlyunprofitable:theIntelligenceDepartmentenlistedthe
aidoftheArmyInstituteforScientificResearchatNoboritotodeviseachemicaltoparalyseRussian
guarddogs’powerofscentandstimulatetheirsexualappetite,tomakethemlessmanageable;both
dogsandhandlersremainedunmoved.AttemptstouseassourcesJapanesebusinessmenvisiting
Russiaachievedlittle,forwheneversuchvisitorslefttheirhotelstheyweredoggedbyNKVD
watchers,aswereattachésinMoscow.Anintelligenceofficer,Lt.Col.SaburoHayashi,complained
thatprobingSovietsecretswas‘likesearchingforveryfinegolddustinmud’.
Japan’sideasaboutgatheringforeignintelligencefocusedoverwhelminglyuponespionage.Its
agentspenetratedtheSovietembassyinBeijing,andin1941oneconcealedhimselfinacupboardof
thelibraryoftheBritishconsulateinTaipei,wherethesafewaslocated.Themancollapsed
unconsciousinhisstiflingconfinement,butherevivedintimetowatchtheconsulopenthesafeand
tomemoriseitscombination,whicheventuallyyieldedafewcrumbs.Japaneseagentnetworks
operatedinCaliforniaandMexicoundercoverasfishermen,dentistsandbarbers;therewasachain
ofJapanesebarber/agentsinthePanamaCanalZone.SomeBritishandAmericanrenegadeswere
recruitedassources:formerRoyalNavysubmarinerLt.CmdrCollinMayersprovidedinformation
forcashuntilhisarrestin1927.Anex-USNavyyeomannamedHarryThompsonreceived$200a
monthfromhisJapanesehandleruntilsentencedtofifteenyears’imprisonmentin1935.
CmdrFredRutlandwasadecoratedBritishairmanwhomadehislivingafterretirementby
briefingtheJapaneseandpromotingdudcompaniesattheirexpense–foratimetheymaintainedhim
inamansioninBeverlyHills.BothMI5andtheFBIwerewellawareofhisactivities.Thelatter
decidedthathewasJapan’sprincipalagentintheUS,thoughaMay1935reporttoTokyofrom
RutlandinCaliforniawasafairsampleofhisunimpressivewares:‘The[US]ArmyandNavywant
warandinmyviewthismightbeputoffforafewyears…EveryoneIhavemetinAmericathinksa
warwithJapanisinevitable.’Lt.CmdrArataOka,Japan’snavalattachéinLondon,arguedthat‘it
wouldbewrongtorelyonRutlandaloneincaseofwar ’,whichwasanunderstatement.TheJapanese
nonethelesslikedtheirtametraitorsufficientlytogivehimanother£4,000whenherevisitedJapanin
1938.TheungratefulRutlandthensailedtoAmericaandapproachedCaptainEllisZacharias,theUS
Navy’sAsianintelligencespecialist,toproposeasaleofJapanesesecrets.ThislefttheFBI
bewilderedaboutwhichsideRutlandwason,buthewasplainlyatroublemaker,andwasfinally
arrestedon6June1941.London’sanxietytoavoidapublicscandalcausedhimtobedeportedto
Britain,wherehewasinterned.Fouryearsafterhisreleaseattheendofthewar,Rutlandkilled
himself.
CmdrOkadidnobetterwhenhehiredHerbertGreene,anephewofWilliamGreene,asenior
AdmiraltyofficialandbrotherofthenovelistGraham.Okacodenamedhim‘Midorikawa’–‘Green
River ’–paidhim£800andcherishedhopesthatGreenehadanentréetothesmartLondonclubland
wheresecretswerediscussed.Instead,inDecember1937Greeneproclaimedhishalf-hearted
treacherytotheDailyWorker,whichblazonedalloveritsfrontpagehisannouncementthathewasa
Japanesespy.InJuly1941,whenJapanwasstillaneutral,itsnavalattachéformallyrequestedfrom
theBritishgovernmentdetailsofthenationalelectricitygrid.GuyLiddellofMI5brandedthis
‘characteristicimpertinence’,sinceBritishsurveillanceofficershadjustseenamemberofthe
JapaneseembassystaffpassGermancashtoanAbwehragentoperatingunderDoubleCrosscontrol.
TheonlyadvantagesenjoyedbyJapanesespies,saidLiddell,wasthattheywereveryhardtowatch
‘astoaEuropeantheyalllookalikeandthereistheadditionaldifficultyoftheblackoutandfour
exitsfromthemilitaryattaché’soffice’.TheJapanesenavy’smostusefulintelligenceconnectionin
LondonwasRear-AdmiralLordSempill,anenthusiasticNazisympathiser.Whenitwasfoundthathe
hadbeensellingclassifiedinformationtoTokyo,in1941hewaspermittedtoresignquietlyfromthe
RoyalNavyandretiretohisScottishcastle;Churchillflinchedfromatreasontrialattheheartofthe
oldaristocracy.
ThelastsignificantJapanesespyinAmerica–ifshecanbedignifiedassuch–wasVelvalee
Dickinson,whopassedinformationonnavalmattersthroughafriendinBuenosAires.Bornin
Sacramentoin1893,aStanfordgraduate,sheworkedforsomeyearsinaSanFranciscobank,then
assistedherhusbandLeeinabrokeragebusinessthatfailed.ThereaftershefoundworkinNewYork
CityasadollsaleswomanatBloomingdale’s,beforestartingamodestlysuccessfuldollstoreofher
ownonMadisonAvenue.HerassociationwithTokyobeganwithherhusband’smembershipofa
Japanese-Americansocietybeforehisdeathin1943.AsaninformantforJapaneseintelligenceshe
received$25,000,atthecostofalsoreceivingaten-yearjailsentencefromafederalcourtfor
violationofcensorshipstatuteswhenarrestedandconvictedin1944.OtherclumsyJapanese
espionageeffortsonbothsidesoftheAtlantic,includingtheextensiveCalifornianTachibana
network,werecurtailedwithoutmuchdifficulty,andwithnegligiblelossofAlliedsecrets.
TheleadersofJapan’sarmedforcesdisagreedaboutalmosteverythingelse,butwereofonemind
inregardingintelligence-gatheringasamechanicalprocesswhichcouldreadilybecarriedoutby
juniorofficers–theirviewwasevenmoremyopicthanthatofHitler ’sOKW.Analysis,suchasit
was,wasconductedbythearmy’s2ndDepartmentandthenavy’s3rd.Thenavydesignatedsigintas
Toku-jo–specialinformation;codebreakingasA-jo;telephonetapsasB-jo;DFdirection-findingas
C-jo.Itidentifiedfourlevelsofreliabilityforinformation:Ko–certain;Otsu–almostcertain;Hei–
alittleuncertain;Tei–uncertain.Aswithothernations,intheJapanesearmyandnavyapostingto
intelligencewasacareerdead-end.Evenwhenwarcameandcleveruniversitygraduateswere
conscriptedintouniform,almostallweredispatchedtobecomecannonfodder,ratherthanassigned
tomilitaryornavalroles–intelligenceinparticular–wheretheirbrainsmighthavebeenuseful.
Japan’snavalcodebreakersachievedlittlesuccessinbreakinghigherBritishandAmerican
ciphers,andthusconcentratedinsteadonradiodirection-findingandtrafficanalysis.Sobitterwasthe
rivalrybetweentheservicesthatwhenthearmybrokesomelow-gradeAmericanstripcodes,the
soldiersconcealedtheirknowledgefromthesailorsuntil1945.Atnotimebefore1943didJapan
devoteanythinglikethepersonnelandresourcesnecessarytomakeeavesdroppingandcodebreaking
majorsourcesofintelligenceagainsttheWesternPowers,nordidtheircommandersseemmuchto
careaboutthisweakness.
Withnationalisticcomplacency,Japantookforgrantedthesecurityofitsowncodes,diplomatic,
militaryandnaval.CaptainRisaburoItowarnedthenavythatitstrafficwasvulnerable,butwas
ignored.Japan’sType91and97ShikiO-bunInjikiciphermachines,createdbynavalengineerKazuo
TanabeandknowntotheAmericansas‘Red’and‘Purple’respectively,weredeemedimpregnable–
theForeignMinistryusedthelatter,andthenavy’s‘Coral’and‘Jade’employedsimilartechnology,
differingfromEnigmabecauseitemployedtelephonestepping-switchesinsteadofrotors.The
army’s‘Green’machinealoneusedthelatter.SupremelyfortunatelyfortheAllies,Tokyoignoredan
April1941warningfromtheGermanembassyinWashington,derivedfromanAmericantraitor ’stip
totheSoviets,thatUScodebreakershadcrackedPurple.WhenBerlinpresentedtheJapanesewith
severalEnigmasandurgedthemtomanufacturecopiesfortheirownuse,themachineswereleftto
rust;Japanpersistedwithitshome-grownmodels.GiventhedifficultiesexperiencedbyAmerican
andBritishcodebreakersinreadingtheJapanesearmy’straffic,theymaywellhavebeenbetteroff
doingso.
Japan’smilitarycounter-espionageorganisationwasbizarrelynamedthe‘ConspiracySection’,
devotedtorootingoutplotsagainstthenation.InDecember1937anintelligencetrainingcentrewas
opened,laterknownastheNaganoSchool.Thisofferedtheusualtradecraftcourses,withoptional
extrasinlock-picking,ninjamartialartsand‘Kokutai-gaku’–‘StudyforNationalStructureand
Mind’,ideologicalindoctrination.Nagano’steachingwasunusual:itencouragedofficerstostay
alive,ratherthantoconductbanzaichargesandcommitritualsuicideintheeventoffailure.A
weaknessofthecounter-espionageservicepersisted,however:itlavishedextravagantenergyon
monitoringJapan’sowncivilianpoliticians,notforevidenceoftreason,buttoensurethattheydid
notdeviatefromtheirownarmy’sforeignpolicyobjectives.InJuly1937,whenPrinceKonoyeas
primeministerdispatchedenvoystoNankintodiscusspossiblepeacenegotiationswiththeChinese
Nationalists,thearmydecryptedcablesaboutthetalks,andpromptlysentmilitarypolicetoarrest
Konoye’scouriers.
HachiroArita,apre-warforeignminister,moaned:‘InJapanweareinaverydifficultpositionfor
conductingrealdiplomacy,becauseJapanesepoliticiansarealwayswatchedbythemilitary.Icannot
makegooduseofflatteringordiplomaticlanguage…IfIsaysomethingwronginatelegram,the
Japanesearmyandnavyinterceptitandimmediatelycriticiseme…Thesituationissoawkward.’
JapanhadaCabinetIntelligenceDepartment,intendedtobrieftheprimeminister,butthenavyand
armyinsistedonsustainingmonopolyinfluenceoverthenation’sinnercouncils,andsecuredits
emasculation:theCIDbecameamerepropagandaorgan.
TheWarMinistryhaditsowncounter-intelligenceorganisation,withafifty-strongstaffcharged
withconcealingJapan’spreparationsforwar.InMitsubishi’sNagasakishipyard,workonthenew
battleshipMusashiwascarriedonbehindvasthempcurtains,screeningitfromview.Theluggageof
foreignrailtravellerswasroutinelyexamined.TheKempeitai’s6thSectionmaintainedRDF
surveillanceforillegalwirelesstransmissionsbyforeignagentsinJapan.Almostallforeigners’
correspondencewasinterceptedatTokyo’sCentralPostOfficeandphotographedbeforeonward
dispatch.OutsidetheUSembassyJapanesesecretpolicemen,strippedtotheirunderpantsagainstthe
heat,maintained24/7surveillancefrombehindcurtainsinasupposedlybroken-downcar–‘thespy
wagon’,asitwasknowntodiplomats.In1936,militarypolicechancedonaletterinEnglish,signed
only‘Jimmy’andpostedattheTeikokuhotelinTokyo;itgavedetailsoftherefittingofthebattleship
Nagato.AninvestigationswiftlypinnedauthorshiponlocalReuterscorrespondentandMI6
informantJamesCox.Hewasarrested,andthreedayslaterdiedafterbeingthrownorthrowing
himselffromthefourthflooroftheTokyopoliceheadquarters.
ItwasneverestablishedwhetherCoxcommittedsuicideorwasmurdered–thelatterseemsmore
plausible,giventhebrutalityoftheKempeitai.TheBritishForeignOfficegavehiswidowa£5,000
pay-off,presumablytosecurehersilence.Norwasherhusband’stheonlymysteriousdeathofan
Englishman:inOctober1938aRoyalNavylieutenantnamedPeacockealsovanishedwithouttrace.In
July1940alone,fifteenBritishcitizenswerearrestedonsuspicionofespionage,thoughmostwere
laterreleased.IfthesecasesrepresentedsupposedsuccessesforJapanesecounter-intelligence,it
remainsstrikingtobeholdthat,forallJapan’sincreasinglyfeverishxenophobiaandintensive
surveillanceofforeigners,theSorgespyringfunctionedforeightyearsattheheartofAxisstrategymaking.
Japan’sintelligence-gatheringmachinefailedmiserablywhereitmatteredmost:inprovidingthe
nation’srulerswithanunderstandingoftheprincipalenemywhomtheyproposedtoattack–the
UnitedStates,mostpowerfulindustrialnationonearth.AfterJapan’sdefeatCol.ShinobuTakayama
ofthearmy’sOperationsDepartmentacknowledgedruefullythatitwouldhavebeenprudentto
researchAmerica’sactualandpotentialwarmakingpowersbeforeembarkingonaconflictwithit.
ThemoststrikingcharacteristicofJapan’sleadershipwasitsrefusaltoexamine,farlesstoactupon,
unpalatableinformation.Nosinglebranchofgovernmentwasresponsibleformakingand
coordinatinggrandstrategy.Thechiefofarmyintelligence,Major-GeneralYuichiTsuchihashi,was
notconsultedabouttheimplicationsofjoininganalliancewithGermanyandItaly,becausehewas
knowntoopposeit.ThearmypaidlittleattentiontoAmericanmatters,whichitsgeneralsconsidered
thebusinessofthenavyandtheForeignMinistry.Theyreadsomelow-gradediplomaticwireless
traffic,andgainedalittleintelligencefromniseis–immigrantslivingintheUS–butmostlyrelied
onopensources,whichmeantattachésreadingnewspapers.SeveralofficersexploredthePhilippines
anditsgarrison,buttherewasnoseriousanalysisoftheUSArmy’sactualandpotentialstrength.
Oncethewarbegan,someofficerswhohadspenttheirentirepreviouscareersstudyingtheSoviet
UnionwerearbitrarilytransferredtomonitorAmerica.Japan’sSouthAreaArmyeventually
abolisheditsUSandBritishintelligencesections,becauseitsseniorofficersdecidedthattheywere
producingnothingofpracticalvalue.Operationsdepartmentsdespisedintelligenceofficersasold
womenwhoraisedobjectionstointendedcoursesofaction,andthemselvespreferredtorelyupon
front-lineeyeballobservationbysoldiersinthefield.WhenthearmymovedintoIndochinain1940,
itsOperationsDepartmentsummarilyappropriatedallintelligenceresponsibilitiestoitself,andran
theinvasionasiftheintelligencestaffdidnotexist.
TheattitudeoftheJapanesenavybeforePearlHarborreflectedaprofoundcontradiction:thoseof
itsseniorofficerswhousedtheirbrainsrecognisedtheirownnation’sstrategicvulnerability,because
ofitsdependenceonimportedoilandcommodities,butmadelittleattempttoimposetheirviews
upontheTokyogovernment.TheyknewthatitwouldbeeasytoannihilatetheRoyalNavy’ssmall
forcesintheFarEast,butrecognisedtheimmensepoweroftheUSNavy.OperationschiefCaptain
TasukuNakazawawrotebeforehostilitiesbegan:‘Wehavenochancetowinawar[withBritainand
theUS].Wargamesresultedinheavylossesinshippingandlossofcontrolofoverseasshipping
lanesandlinesofcommunication.’AdmiralIsorokuYamamotowasforemostamongthosewho,
whiledislikingandresentingtheUnitedStates’policies,recogniseditseconomicandindustrial
supremacy.Heandhiscleverestsubordinatesknewthatiftheyfailedtosecurevictoryfast,they
wouldnotgetitatall.AFebruary1941assessmentconcluded:‘After1944,theUSNavywouldbe
confidentofvictory.’
In1941also,anewNationalInstituteforTotalWarStudiescarriedoutexhaustivewargaming,
presuminganadvanceintoSouth-EastAsia.ThisconcludedthatwithintwoyearsJapanwouldbeon
itsknees,withSovietentryintothewardeliveringacoupdegrâce.Gen.HidekiTojo,soontobecome
primeminister,readtheInstitute’sreport,thencommented:‘Youdidagoodjob,butyourreportis
basedonakindofarmchairtheory,notarealwar…Warisnotalwayscarriedoutasplanned.We
shallfaceunpredicteddevelopments.’Tojochoseinsistentlytobelievethatthesewouldoperatein
favouroftheAxis.InSeptember1941theEconomicPlanningSectionoftheWarMinistryreached
thesameconclusionastheWarStudiesInstitute,butonceagainthefindingswererejectedbythehigh
command.TheImperialJapaneseArmy’schiefofstaffdeclaredthat‘thereportisagainstour
nationalpolicy’,andorderedittobeburnt.
Thearmy’sironmenalmostalwaysprevailed,recitingtheirmantrathatthegovernmentand
peopleoftheUnitedStateswouldsuccumbtoamoralcollapseaftersufferingtheearlydefeatsand
humiliationsthatJapanwasrightlyconfidentofbeingabletoinflictuponthem.Thesoldierswere
alsoconvincedofGermaninvincibility,andspurneddoubters.In1940Japan’snavalattachéin
LondonandmilitaryattachéinStockholmemphasisedBritishsuccessesinresistingtheGerman
onslaughtontheirisland,andthescaleofLuftwaffelosses.On25Julythearmy’smonthly
intelligencereportexpressedrespectforthestrengthofBritain’sresistanceintheairbattleoverthe
island:‘TheUKismaintainingthefightagainstGermanywithgreatdetermination…Britishpublic
opinioncontinuestosupportthegovernment’shard-linepolicy.’Thereporthighlightedthe
postponementofHitler ’sinvasion,Operation‘Sealion’,becauseofGermanlackofamphibious
capability,andfailuretoachieveairsuperiority.
IJAheadquartersdismissedtheauthorsofthesereportsashavingsuccumbedtoBritish
propaganda,andinsteadembracedthesupremelyoptimisticdispatchesofBaronŌshima,the
JapaneseambassadorinBerlin.UntilJune1941theForeignMinistrymadepolicyonanassumption
thatfollowingBritain’sdefeat,theNaziswouldforgeanalliancewiththeSovietUniontodividethe
spoils.Japan’sgeneralssuccumbedtoeuphoriafollowingthesigningofthe13April1941Soviet–
Japaneseneutralitypact,whichtheyconvincedthemselvesmadethenationsafefromatwo-frontwar.
WhenŌshimareportedthatHitlerplannedtoinvadetheSovietUnion–hiswarningsbecameexplicit
on18April1941andwerereinforcedon4June–theJapanesegovernmentsimplyrefusedto
considerthisnewandunwelcomescenario.OnlyafortnightbeforetheGermanonslaught,foreign
ministerMatsuokadoggedlyinsistedthattherewasonlya40percentprospectofsuchanevent.War
ministerTojosaid:‘Idonotthinkitisanurgentmatter.’Thecabinetdeferreddiscussionofthe
implicationsofaRusso–Germanwar,clingingblindlytoitspolicyofsupportingtheNazismoreor
lesswhatevertheydid.Withoutreferencetothecivilianpoliticians,thearmydispatchedlarge
reinforcementstoManchuriaincaseadecisionwasmadetojoinHitler ’sassaultonStalin.
Before‘Barbarossa’waslaunched,intelligenceofficerLt.Col.SaburoHayashisuggestedthatif
theRussianscouldgetthroughwinterundefeated,theirarmiescouldregroupandsustainalong
struggle,buttheOperationsDepartmentandhighercommandersdismissedthisassessmentoutof
hand.HayashiwroteagaininAugust:‘ItisexpectedthattheGermanswilloccupyMoscow,buthave
nomoresuccesswithin1941.WhenwintercomestheSovietArmywillhaveanopportunitytocatch
itsbreath,andwillneversurrender.TheCommunistPartyisstrongandsolid.Followingthefallof
Moscow,theGermanswillbeobligedtocontinuethewar,whilemaintainingcontrolofhuge
capturedterritories.Tosummarise:thewarwillnotendquickly.’Yettheall-powerfulOperations
DepartmentinsteadpredictedStalin’sloomingoverthrowbyhisowngenerals.InJapanasinNazi
Germany,ithadbecomeaninstitutionalpreceptthatnointelligenceassessmentcouldbe
countenancedbypolicy-makerswhichrancontrarytoadesirednationalcourse.Againandagain
betweenthe1930sand1945,strategywasdistortedtoconformwiththevisceralinclinationsand
ambitionsofcommanders,ratherthanwithrealities,ofwhichbyfarthemostimportantwere
America’seconomicsuperiorityandGermany’sprecariousstrategicpredicament.
ThemostpenetratingappreciationofJapan’sprospectsbeforePearlHarborwaspresentedto
Tokyonotbyitsownanalysts,butbyWinstonChurchill.InApril1941hedispatchedamemorandum
totheJapaneseforeignministerwhichwasdesignedtodeterwar.‘Iventuretoaskafewquestions,’
wrotetheBritishprimeminister,
whichitseemstomedeservetheattentionoftheImperialJapaneseGovernmentandpeople.
1.WillGermany,withoutthecommandoftheseaorthecommandoftheBritishdaylightair,beabletoinvadeandconquerGreat
Britaininthespring,summerorautumnof1941?WillGermanytrytodoso?WoulditnotbeintheinterestsofJapantowait
untilthesequestionshaveansweredthemselves?
2.WilltheGermanattackonBritishshippingbestrongenoughtopreventAmericanaidfromreachingBritishshores,withGreat
BritainandtheUnitedStatestransformingtheirwholeindustrytowarpurposes?
3.DidJapan’saccessiontotheTriplePact[withGermanyandItaly]makeitmorelikelyorlesslikelythattheUnitedStates
wouldcomeintothepresentwar?
4.IftheUnitedStatesenteredthewaratthesideofGreatBritain,andJapanrangedherselfwiththeAxisPowers,wouldnotthe
navalsuperiorityofthetwoEnglish-speakingnationsenablethemtodisposeoftheAxisPowersinEuropebeforeturningtheir
unitedstrengthuponJapan?
5.IsItalyastrengthoraburdentoGermany?IstheItalianFleetasgoodatseaasonpaper?Isitasgoodasitusedtobe?
6.WilltheBritishAirForcebestrongerthantheGermanAirForcebeforetheendof1941,andfarstrongerbeforetheendof
1942?
7.WillthemanycountrieswhicharebeinghelddownbytheGermanarmyandGestapolearntoliketheGermansmore,orwill
theylikethemlessastheyearspassby?
8.IsittruethattheproductionofsteelintheUnitedStatesduring1941willbe75milliontonsandinGreatBritainabout12½,
makingatotalofnearly90milliontons?IfGermanyshouldhappentobedefeated,asshewaslasttime,wouldnotthe7
milliontonssteelproductionofJapanbeinadequateforasingle-handedwar?
FromtheanswerstothesequestionsmayspringtheavoidancebyJapanofaseriouscatastrophe,andamarkedimprovementinthe
relationsbetweenJapanandthetwogreatSea-PowersoftheWest.
Tokyo’sanodynereplywasinevitable:‘TheforeignpolicyofJapanisdetermineduponafteran
unbiasedexaminationofallthefactsandaverycarefulweighingofalltheelementsofthesituation
sheconfronts.’YetsuchaprocessnevertookplaceinTokyo.Japan’srejectionofstrategic
intelligenceassessment,andofrationaldecision-making,wasresponsibleforitscommitmenttoa
pathtocatastropheon7December1941.
TheonlyspeciesofintelligencetheJapanesehighcommandtreatedseriouslywasthatwhich
concernedimmediateobjectives.Thus,inthemonthsbeforethearmyandnavywenttowar,both
energeticallyprobedthedefencesoftheEuropeanSouth-EastAsianempires,thePhilippinesand
PearlHarbor.Tokyo’sappetiteforanadvanceintoIndochinawassharpenedbytheJuly1940
decryptionofatelegramtoWashingtonfromtheAmericanconsulinSaigon,sayingthattheBritish
wouldmakenomilitaryresponsetosuchaJapaneseinitiativewithoutapromiseofUSsupport,
whichwouldnotbeforthcoming.FurtherdecryptsofdiplomaticmessagesinAugust,notably
includingthoseoftheVichyFrenchauthoritiesinIndochina,confirmedtheinabilityorunwillingness
oftheWesternPowerstoresistaJapanesetakeover.Thus,on22September,theJapaneseforceda
Frenchsignatureonanagreementwhichadmittedtheirtroopsnextday.Herewasacasewhere
intelligenceplayedasignificantrole,albeitinconfirmingJapan’scommitmenttoacourseitsrulers
favouredanyway.
Thearmy’sSouth-EastAsiaGroup,establishedin1939,wasresponsibleforexploringthe
defencesoftheEuropeanempires.BecauseThailandwastheonlyindependentcountryintheregion,
theJapanesemadeitthehuboftheirintelligence-gathering,directedbymilitaryattachéCol.Hiroshi
Tamura,whofocusedespeciallyonidentifyingMalayaninvasionroutes.Hissoldiersmeasuredevery
roadandbridgefromIndochinaandThailandintoMalaya.AgentsexploredthehugeDutchoil
refineriesatPalembangsodiligentlythatwhenJapaneseparatroopslaterdescendeduponthem,each
mankneweverydetailofthetarget.TheJapaneseacknowledgedthattheBritishhadsomeformidable
codebreakingtalent,focusedintheirFarEastCombinedBureauinSingapore,whichworkedclosely
withBletchleyPark.Anavalcodebreakerwhomonitoreditstraffic,CommanderMonotono
Samejima,decryptedmaterialwhichshowedthattheBritishhadbeenreadingsomelow-grade
Japanesesignalswithintwenty-fourhoursoftransmission.Samejimarecalledlater:‘Ibecameaware
ofthetremendouscapabilityofUKintelligence.’Hissuperiors,however,caredonlyaboutcounting
theirenemies’soldiers.Bytheendof1940athousandJapanese‘tourists’,allgraduatesofthearmy
intelligenceschool,wereworkingoutofThailand.BritishtroopsexercisinginMalayafound
themselvesfollowedeverywherebybicyclingJapaneseequippedwithpencilsandnotebooks.Their
findingswerecirculatedthroughoutthearmyasan‘IntelligencerecordofBritishMalaya’,which
includedmapsoftheSingaporegarrison’sinstallations.Thegeneralstaffconcludedfromsuch
agents’reportsthattheethnicdiversityofBritishimperialforceswasaweakness.Itwasdismissiveof
theAustralians:‘Theirqualityisbad.Thetroopsarecomposedchieflyofjoblessmenandrough
individuals.Theyarenotawell-disciplinedarmy.Theirvalourinbattleisfamous,buttheirtraining
andequipmentarenotadequate.’TokyoassertedthatmanyIndiansoldierswerebothill-trainedand
anti-British;theycouldfightbravelyinahead-onpositionalclash,butwerevulnerabletorapid
flankingmovements–ashrewdassessment,vindicatedbyeventsinthesubsequentcampaign.
Inthecourseof1941JapaneseagentsmadecontactswithIndian,MalayanandBurmesenationalist
groups,offeringcovertsupportfortheirambitionsforindependence,whichmanyfoundanattractive
proposition.AJanuary1941telegramfromTokyotoJapan’sconsul-generalinSingaporeordered
himtoaccelerate‘agitation,politicalplots,propagandaandintelligence’.InMay,Japan’sForeign
Servicecabledallitsmissionsintheregion,urgingthemtohastentheexpansionofclandestine
networksontheperipheryoftheIndianOcean,becausewarwasobviouslylooming.TheIndians,
especially,wereurgedtopromotedisaffectionamongsoldiersoftheRaj,andbegantodosoin1939;
whentheassaultonMalayawasunleashed,thepoorperformanceofseveralIndianregiments
suggestedthattheJapanesepropagandaoffensivehadachievedsomesuccess:the1stHyderabads,for
instance,arebelievedtohaveshottheirownBritishcolonelandadjutantatanearlystageofthe
battalion’sdisintegrationonthebattlefield.
TokyothoughtBritishaircrewgreen,anditwastruethatmostofthepilotsdeployedinMalayaand
Burmawerelessexperiencedthantheirenemycounterparts.TheJapaneseprobablyreceivedsome
informationfromatraitorintheBritishranks:forseveralmonthsduring1941CaptainPatrick
Heenanof300AirIntelligenceLiaisonSectionappearstohavewirelessedinformationaboutRAF
dispositionsfromasecrettransmitter.Thirty-one,borninNewZealand,Heenanhadinheritedfrom
hisfatherawarmsympathyfortheIrishRepublicanArmy.HewasrecruitedbyTokyoduringa1938
leavespentinJapan,andendedhisespionagecareerbybeingshotagainstaharbourwallin
Singaporejustbeforeitsfall.
AsforPearlHarbor,inAugust1941twenty-eight-year-oldEnsignTakeoYoshikawaoftheUS&
BritishsectionofJapanesenavalintelligencearrivedinHawaiiwithdiplomaticcover,andspentthe
monthsthatfollowedexploringeveryaccessibleareaofinteresttotheplannersbackathome,while
conductinganuncommonlyenergeticoff-dutylovelife.HereportedthreetimesaweekbyPurple
cipher,andthoughhismessageswereroutinelyintercepted,theUSSignalsIntelligenceServicein
Washingtonwasoftenthreeweeksinarrearsdecryptingthem,notleastbecauseithadonlytwofluent
andaccurateJapaneselinguists.InOctober,Yoshikawa’sbossLt.CmdrMinatoNakajimamadea
personalvisitonaJapaneseliner,andreceivedtheensign’swrittenreportontheUSNavy’slocal
strengths,deploymentsanddefences.ThoughYoshikawawasinternedafterPearlHarbor,hewas
subsequentlyallowedtoreturnhomeundertheagreementonexchangeofdiplomaticpersonnel.
Furtherinformationwasacquiredbythelocalconsularstaff,assistedbythelargeJapanese
expatriatecolonyonHawaii–41,346ofthem.Theirdataconfirmedthenavyinitsdeterminationto
strikeatPearlHarborratherthanagainstthealternativeAmericananchorageatLahainaPort.Neither
thearmynortheMinistryofForeignAffairswasinformedabouttheagreedobjectives,andPearl
wasneverexplicitlymentionedinnavalradiotraffic.Thecriticalmistakeintheplanningofthe
onslaughtwasnotoneofintelligencecollection,butofanalysis:theadmiralsbackinJapanfailedto
recognisetheimportanceofPearl’shugeoil-tankfarmsandrepairfacilities,andneverincludedthese
intheirtargetprogramme.AsforJapaneseperceptionsoftheUSArmy,theyassessedAmerican
troops–especiallythePhilippinesgarrison–asindividualistswholackedstayingpowerandfighting
spiritforaprotractedstruggle.Japan’sgeneralsplannedforavictoriousterminationofthePacific
warinthespringof1942,whereupontheywouldlaunchamajorassaultontheSovietUnion.
ThusJapanwenttowarknowingmuchaboutitsimmediateobjectives,butwilfullyignorantandnaïve
aboutwhatwouldfollow.Yamamoto’sairsquadronstookoffforPearlHarboron7December1941
atjustthemomentwhenGermanfailurebeforeMoscowwasbecomingapparentinBerlin.Theonly
successoftheadvocatesofcautioninTokyowastopersuadeJapan’srulerstoconfinethemselvesto
assaultingtheUSandWesternEuropeanempires,andtoavoidjoininghostilitieswiththeSoviet
UnionuntilGermanvictoryseemedimminent.ThejudgementsonwhichtheJapanesebasedtheir
decisiontofight–toshacklethemselvestoatotteringgiant–werefantasticallyill-informed.They
overvaluedGermanmight,underratedthatoftheUnitedStates.Moreover,theypersuadedthemselves
thattheycouldconductalimitedwar,whichtheycouldterminatebynegotiationatamomentoftheir
ownchoice.Instead,ofcourse,theyfoundthemselvesengagedinanexistentialstruggleinwhichthey
musteitherachievetotalvictoryorfacealmostannihilatorydefeat.
3 TH E M A NW H O W O N M I D WAY
ThesurprisesufferedbytheUnitedStatesatPearlHarborwasasgreatasthatwhichtheSovietUnion
incurredatthelaunchof‘Barbarossa’,andequallyinexcusable.ItsarmycodebreakersledbyFrank
RowletthadachievedanextraordinaryfeatbycrackingJapan’s‘Purple’diplomaticcipherinAugust
1940.DuringtheweeksanddaysbeforetheJapaneseattackonHawaii,almostasmuchinformation
becameavailabletotheUSgovernmenttoindicatetheimminenceofwarasStalinreceivedbefore
Hitlerattackedhim.ButtheUSadministration’sresponsewasassupineashadbeenthatofthe
Kremlin.JustastheBritishrequiredmanymonthsunderthestimulusofwarbeforetheydeveloped
effectivemachineryformanagingandexploitingintelligence,sotheAmericanarmedforcesbegan
todosoonlyamidthewreckageofthebattleshipsofitsPacificFleet.
AdmiralJohnGodfrey’sJuly1941BritishreportonUSintelligenceconcludedthat‘cooperation
betweenthevariousorganisationsisinadequateandsourcesarenotcoordinatedtothemutualbenefit
ofthedepartmentsconcerned.Thereislittlecontactbetweentheintelligenceofficersofthedifferent
departmentsandthedesiretoobtaina“scoop”isfairlygeneral…Thevalueofthematerialobtained
bytheUSintelligenceorganisationsfromEuropeisnotconsiderable,thoughinformationonthe
PacificareaandSouthAmericais…onthewhole,high-grade…TheOfficeofNavalIntelligenceis
indangerofdegeneratingintoagraveyardforstatisticsbecauseitisinclinedtoregardintelligence
asanendinitself…Manyofthefaultswhichhavebeenenumeratedwillberecognisedassimilarto
thosefromwhichBritishIntelligencesufferedbeforethewar.’GodfreyconcludedthatonceWilliam
Donovan’snewintelligence-gatheringorganisationgotgoing,manygoodthingsmightbepossible,
‘butitwouldbeprudenttoconcludethatUSIntelligenceisunlikelytobeofmuchassistancetothe
jointwareffortformanymonthstocome’.
Thisprovedtobetrue.TheUSArmyandUSNavycontributednothingsignificanttoAllied
knowledgeofAxismotionsformonthsafterPearlHarbor.Butthen,inJune1942,fromoutofadank
basementintheNavyYardonOahucameasinglepiercingshaftoflightthatilluminatedtheentire
Pacifictheatre.ItmadepossibletheUSNavy’svictoryatMidway,whichinsideforty-eighthours
transformedthecourseofthewaragainstJapan.Itwasarguablythemostinfluentialsingle
intelligenceachievementoftheglobalconflict.
WhiletheBritishevenbeforethewardeployedbrilliantcivilianstospearheadtheircodebreaking,
theUSNavychosetorelyinsteaduponanalmostrandomlyselectedgroupofcareerofficers,among
theleastvaluedoftheirservice.Withpitifullyslenderresources,theirachievementcouldnotmatchin
scalethatofBletchleyPark,nordiditsavetheUSfromhumiliationontheDecember1941‘Dayof
Infamy’.ButtheofficerwhomadethegreatestsinglecontributiontosubsequenttriumphatMidway
retiredfromhisservicewithlittlehonour,andwenttohisgraveknownonlytohistorians.
JosephRochefortcutanawkwardfigure:hewasapoorseaman,withnotalentformaking
importantfriends.Withouthisgifts,however,itisunlikelythatadecisivebattlewouldhavebeen
foughtinthePacificbetween4and7June1942,andevenlessplausiblethatitwouldhavebeenwon
bytheUnitedStates.Whathappenedthatdaywastheoutcomenotofasuddenflashofinspiration,but
oftwodecadesofweary,thanklesslabour.
Rochefortwasbornin1900,youngestsonofIrishparents;hisfatherwasanOhiorugsalesman.
Anuntidychild,inhighschoolheexcelledonlyatmaths.AtseventeenheenlistedintheUSNavyas
anelectrician3rdclass,thenscrapedacommissionasareservistandbecameanengineer.AttwentyonehemarriedElmaFay,hischildhoodsweetheart,thoughhewasCatholicandsheaBaptist.In1921
hemanagedtotransfertotheregularnavy,buthiscareerlanguished:henarrowlyescapedcourtmartialwhenatankeronwhichhewasdutyofficerdraggeditsanchorinSanFranciscoBayamidsix
destroyers.In1925hewasdetachedfromserviceonthebattleshipArizonatostudycryptanalysis,for
whichskillatbridgeandcrosswordsseemedtofithim.HeworkedintheNavyDepartmenton
Washington’sConstitutionAvenue,buttheassignmentdidnotrepresentpromotion:intelligence
rankedlowontheservice’stotempole.TheUSNavyhadthusfarachievednothingtomatchthe
achievementofthearmy’scodebreakingdepartment,the‘BlackChamber ’establishedin1917under
HerbertYardley,whichbrokeaJapanesediplomaticcipherasearlyas1921.
Thenavywaslearning,however.RochefortstartedbyreadingthebookElementsofCryptanalysis,
writtenbytheWarDepartment’sWilliamFriedman.HeworkedunderthebrilliantLt.Laurance
Safford,aformerchiefyeomanintheUSNavalReserve,whobecamehistutorandmentor.They
wereassistedbyacivilian,AgnesMeyerDriscoll,whoalsomadeanotablecontribution.Rochefort
foundhimselfenjoyingthework.Breakingacode,hesaidlater,‘makesyoufeelprettygood,because
youhavedefiedthesepeoplewhohaveattemptedtouseasystemtheythoughtwassecure…Itwas
alwayssomewhatofapleasuretodefeatthem.’InFebruary1925Safforddepartedforanalmost
mandatoryspellofseaduty,leavingRochefortinchargeoftheresearchdesk.Thisconsistedofonly
threefull-timers:himself;anex-actornamedClausBogel,whodidlittletojustifyhisrations;and
Driscoll,dubbed‘MadameX’,whocursedfluently,despisedmake-up,butrubbedalongprettywell
withRochefort.Japan’ssecretswerealwaystheprincipaltargets.In1920theOfficeofNaval
Intelligencehadruna‘blackbagjob’,photographingacopyoftheJapaneseRedCodefromtheNew
Yorkconsulate.Itbecameobviousthathigherlanguageskillswereindispensableifthecodebreakers
weretomakeseriousheadway:Lt.CmdrEllisZacharias,acareerintelligenceofficerandfluent
Japanesespeaker,wasdraftedintothesectiontoworkalongsideRochefort.
Zachariaswrotelater:‘Thefewpersonswhowereassignedtothissectionweretaciturn,secretive
peoplewhorefusedtodiscusstheirjobs…Hourswentbywithoutanyofussayingaword,just
sittinginfrontofpilesofindexedsheetsonwhichamumbo-jumbooffiguresorletterswas
displayedinchaoticdisorder.’GiventhattheUnitedStateswasatpeaceanddeterminedtostaythat
way,theintensitywithwhichahandfulofnavalofficerslabouredattheirarcanecraftseems
extraordinary,andfarremovedfromthelazytempothatprevailedelsewhereintheUSNavy.Those
menandthatoneremarkablewomanwereobsessives,whoworkedallhoursandignoredSundays.
Theofficewaspermanentlyshroudedintobaccosmoke:Rochefortchain-smokedcigarettes,apipe,
theoddcigar.Theysometimeswenthometootiredtoeatuntiltheyhadunwoundforseveralhours.
Alllostweight.
SaffordhadestablishedachainofinterceptstationsinShanghai,Hawaiiandelsewhere,which
liftedJapan’ssignalsfromtheether.OncethemessagesreachedRochefort’soffice,thesection
workedtogethertocrackthem,withAgnesDriscollprobablytheablestanalyst.Occasionally,new
officersweresenttothem,totesttheirsuitabilityascodebreakers.Mostwerewashedout:theylacked
thepeculiar,indispensablesensefortherhythmofpuzzles.
Aftertwoyears,Rocheforthadhadenough–notofcodebreaking,butofNavyDepartmentpolitics.
Hissection’sactivitiescameunderCommunications,butIntelligencewagedconstantwartotakeit
over.Stillalieutenant,Rochefortbecameexecutiveofficerofadestroyer.Atseahistactlessness,
carriedtothepointofboorishness,exasperatedsuperiors.InhissparetimehecheckedouttheUS
Navy’scodes,andtoldthecommander-in-chiefthatthecommunicationssystemwascloggedwith
trivialmessagesthatshouldneverhavebeenencrypted.Thiswaspoorlyreceived.
In1929hisoldcolleagueEllisZachariasarrangedforhimtobepostedtoJapan,tolearnthe
language.Whileservingthereforthreeyears,RochefortbecameaclosefriendofanotherAmerican
navalofficer,EdwinLayton;itisameasureofhisalmostmorbidsenseofdiscretionthatinalltheir
hourstogether,hetoldLaytonnothingabouthisbackgroundincryptanalysis.Thereafter,Rochefort
spentmostofthe1930satsea,successivelyasagunnery,intelligenceandnavigationofficer.In
October1939hewaspostedtoPearlHarbor,wherehewasappalledbythecasualroutines,butshared
thedelusionsofhissuperiorsthatnoenemywoulddaretoattackHawaiiorthePhilippines.
LauranceSaffordnowheadedOp-20-G,thenavy’scodebreakingoperation.Withhalftheworldat
warthiswasmodestlyexpanding,whileJapaneserelationswiththeUSdeteriorated.Between1934
and1939theUSgovernmentandarmedforceshadfaithfullyrespecteddomesticlaw–explicitly
Section605ofthe1934FederalCommunicationsAct,whichbarredinterceptionofmessagesbetween
USandforeigncountries,radioorcable.Thereafter,GeorgeMarshallgrantedsomelatitudetothe
variouscodebreakingagenciesandtheireavesdroppers,whichmadepossiblethesmallmiracleof
Purple.Safford’sactivities,likeFriedman’s,nonethelessrepresentedlawbreaking.Heaskedfor
RocheforttoheadupthePearlstation,knownasCOM14.Rochefortacceptedthepostingreluctantly,
becauseofhismemoriesofthedepartmentalstruggles.Butwhereelsewashetogo,atforty-one,
withnobodyclamouringforhisservices?InJune1941hetookuphisnewresponsibilities,reporting
directtoAdmiralHusbandKimmel,PacificFleetC-in-C.Onlybelatedly,fourmonthslater,didhe
receivealong-delayedpromotiontocommander.
COM14–‘StationHypo’–whereRochefortandhisteamweretomakehistory,wasquarteredin
theechoing,unlovelybasementoftheNavyYardadministrationbuilding,enteredthroughatimelockedunmarkeddoorguardedbymarines.‘TheDungeon’,asitwasdubbedbyinmates,lookedlike
asmall-townpoolhall,evenuntothechronicsmokehaze,becauseeverybodyworkedwithacigarette
stuckinhismouth.Achiefpettyofficer,TexRorie,satatadeskbythedoor,screeningvisitors.The
floorwasundressedconcrete,thewallswerepaintedwithmud-colouredsealant,andtheprimitive
ventilationsystemrecycledstaleair.WhenRochefortfirstjoined,muchofthebasement’shundred
feetbyfiftywasemptiness,butthroughthemonthsthatfollowed,itfilledrapidly.AbatteryofIBM
Hollerithpunch-cardtabulatingmachinesclatteredrelentlessly:theircontributiontoHypo’s
successes,asindeedtoallUScodebreaking,deservesemphasis.InSeptember,fiveJapaneselanguageofficersjoinedthesection.Soonthereweretwenty-threemen,workinginfoursectors:the
languageteam,trafficanalysts,ship-plotters,cryptanalysts.Lt.CmdrThomasDyer,ashort,dark
officerwithheavyspectacleswholookedmorelikeaneccentricprofessorthananavalofficer,was
consideredthebestofthelatter,andbecameaheroofAmerica’scryptographicwar.Othersincluded
Lt.HamWright,whoboreapassingresemblancetotheactorWallaceBeery;andLt.CmdrJack
Holtwick.Rochefortnolongerthoughtofhimselfasacryptanalyst;instead,hesaid,‘[I]fancied
myselfatranslator.’
Theyworkedintheatmosphereofauniversitylibrary–therewasnochatterorloudtalk,insteada
fierceearnestness.WhenJasperHolmes,anex-submarinerinvalidedoutoftheservice,joinedthe
team,hewasawedbytheintensityofitslabours:‘HadInotwitnesseditIneverwouldhavebelieved
thatanygroupofmenwascapableofsuchsustainedmentaleffortundersuchconstantpressurefor
suchalengthoftime.’Butheadded:‘theresultstheyachieveddidnotappearproportionatetotheir
efforts’.In1941–42,whenBletchleyParkwasalreadyoperatingadozenbombes,thetoolsmostused
byRochefort’steamwerepaper,pencilandtheIBMtabulators,thoughHoltwickexperimentedwith
anothercrudemechanicalaid.Thecryptanalystsusedmathematicalskillstoexposethecodegroups
inamessage–iftheycouldgetthatfar–thenturneditovertothelinguists.Theintroductory
briefingfornoviceswassimple:‘Gentlemen,hereareyourdesks.StartbreakingJapanesecodes.’
TheDungeon’spersonnelworkedinanatmosphereofalmostdefiantinformality.Theyaddressed
eachotherbyname,notrank,andcarednothingfordress.Rochefortaffectedslippersandamaroon
smokingjacket,whichheclaimedprotectedhimfromthechronicchill.JasperHolmesfoundnothing
companionableabouthischief,butimmediatelyrecognisedhisstrengthofleadership.Theyworked
aneight-dayweek:sixon,thentwooff.Apaintedsignwasaffixedtoapillarnearthedesks:‘Wecan
accomplishanything…provided…noonecareswhogetsthecredit.’Rochefort,alwaysobsessed
withsecurity,causedHypotobeofficiallydesignatedas‘NavyCommunicationsSupplementary
Activity’.ThosepersonnelintheNavyYardwhoknewwhattheteamwasdoingregardedthemwith
condescensioninthosedays;theycommandednorespect,becausetheyhaddonenothingtoearnit.
AsatBletchleyinthebeginning,onlythecodebreakersthemselvesunderstoodwhattheymightbe
abletoachieve,andhowvastcouldbethesignificanceofsuccess.
Pearl’slisteningstationswerelocatedatWahiawaandLualuale,withadirection-findingfacilityat
thelatter,somethirtymilesfromtheNavyYard.Operatorsrecordedmessagestransmittedinthe
JapaneseversionofMorse:thiscustomarilyusedablendofthekanasyllabaryandromanjii
transliteratedcharacters,superimposedonatelegraphiccode–‘JN-25’messagescontainedonly
numbers.Inthelateautumnof1941,astartlinglackofurgencycharacterisedthelogisticsofthe
codebreakingoperation.AlthoughboththeinterceptoperatorsandHypohadbeguntomaintain
watchesaroundtheclock,therewasnosecureteleprinterlinkbetweenthereceivingstationsandthe
Dungeon,onlyapartyphoneline.Onceeverytwenty-fourhours,thelatestcropofmessageswas
collectedbyjeepfortheforty-minutetriptotheNavyYard.USNavycodebreakersaroundtheworld
couldcommunicatewitheachotherbyprivateciphersystem,usinganECMIImachinewithfifteen
rotorsinthreerows,butliaisonbetweenthemwascriminallypoor.Rochefort’steamwasnot
informedthatthearmyinWashingtonwasbreakingtheJapanesePurplecipher,norabouttheONI’s
May‘pinch’oftheOrangecodefromaJapanesefreighterinSanFranciscoharbour.Indeed,Hypo
wastoldnothingaboutwhereitsownlaboursfittedintoabiggerpicture.AtPearl,theofficeofFleet
IntelligenceOfficerEdwinLayton–Rochefort’soldcomradeinTokyo–waslocatedamilefromthe
NavyYard,attheFleetsubmarinebase.
MostoftheweaknessesofUSNavyintelligence,matchingthoseoftheUSArmy,wererootedin
Washington,foundedintheinabilityofseniorofficerstograspthepropernatureofinformationgatheringandmanagement,whichtheyunderstoodlittlebetterthandidtheirJapanesecounterparts.
TheyunderratedJapan’sairpower–whenTokyonavalattachéStephenJurickasawaZeroonthe
groundatanairshowandsenthomeadetailedreport,hewasrebukedfortakingtheplaneso
seriously.In1940afriendlyinformantinJapangavetheUSembassydetailsofthenewType93
‘LongLance’,anoxygen-fuelledtorpedothatwasthebestofitskindintheworld.TheBureauof
Ordnancedismissedthisreport,declaringsuchaweapontobeimpossible.Herewasareflectionof
thetribalismofmanynations’armedforces:ifWehavenotcreatedsuchaweapon,howcouldThey
havedoneso?ItwasastoundingyetcharacteristicthatBrigadier-GeneralHayerKroner,headofthe
army’sintelligencedivision,toldaPearlHarborinquiryin1942thathehadnotbeenprivytohisown
service’sJapanesedecrypts.Meanwhilewithinthesignalsdepartments,achildishinter-service
agreementhadbeenreachedin1940,wherebythearmyandnavyreadPurpleonalternatedays,and
delivereditsoutputtotheWhiteHouseinalternatemonths.Thedysfunctionbetweenthenavy’s
operationsandintelligencedivisionswasnotimprovedbythefactthatin1941thelatterhadthree
successivedirectors.OnlybrutalwarexperiencecausedtheUSarmedforcesslowlytolearntotreat
intelligence,andespeciallycodebreaking,withtheseriousnessandsensitivityitmerited.
InDecember1941,HypohadnotcomeclosetobreakingtheJapaneseFlagOfficers’Code,notleast
becausetherewastoolittletraffictoworkon,butitwasenjoyingsomesuccesswithsecondary
systems.Formostof1941,justtenmembersofOp-20-GwereworkingontheJapanesenavy’sJN-25.
AtthatstagethemostimportantweaponinRochefort’sarmouryforproducingradiointelligencewas
trafficanalysis–locatingJapanesewarshipsthroughtheirwirelessmessaging,eventhoughthe
contentwasunreadable.Evenforachievingthis,theUSNavylackedthetechnologytheBritishhad
developedandemployedintheirFarEastCombinedBureauinSingapore:‘radiofingerprinting’
throughcine-camerarecordsoftheoscilloscopeimagesofeachuniquesignalpattern,enabling
interceptorstoidentifyindividualships.
InthedaysbeforePearlHarbor,itwasevidenttotheteamintheDungeonthattheJapanesewere
planningsomethingbig,thoughtheyhadnonotionwhatitmightbe.Theydetectedanunprecedented
concentrationofnavalairpower,butAdmiralYamamotoputdownadenseelectronicsmokescreento
maskitspurpose.FormonthsRocheforthadbeentrackingthemovementsofmajorunitsofthe
Japanesefleet,butinmid-Novemberhelostitssixcarriers.HiscounterpartsattheCaststationinthe
Philippinessaidtheywereconfidenttheflat-topswerestillinhomewaters.Nothoughtofanassault
onPearlcrossedRochefort’smind:knowingJapanashedid,andasadoggedlylogicalman,he
thoughtitimplausiblethatHirohito’snationwouldstartawarwiththeUSwhichitwascertaintolose.
SopoorwasintelligenceliaisonthatRochefortwastoldnothingofthe24Septembermessagefrom
TokyotoitsHawaiiconsulate,askingforthepreciselocationsofUSbattleshipsinsidePearlHarbor.
ThiswassentintheJapaneseconsularcode,designated‘J-19’,whichwasdeemedalowpriorityfor
breaking,andthusthecodedmessagewasnotflowntoWashingtonuntil6October,amidamassof
othermaterial.Evenwhenthesignalwasread,neithertheUSArmynorUSNavyintelligence
directoratesthoughtitsignificantenoughtoreplaytoHypo.
ButRochefortwassufficientlysureoftheimminenceofsomemajorJapaneseinitiativethaton29
Novemberhedispatchedfourofficerstotheinterceptstationtomaintainalisteningwatchfora
‘Winds’actionmessagethattheyknewmustbecoming.Nextday,theJapanesechangedalltheir
ships’identificationcallsignsforthesecondtimeinamonth–yetanotherindicationthatabig
operationwasimminent.On3December,WashingtonatlastcondescendedtoinformPearl–and
Rochefort–thattheJapanesehadorderedalltheirdiplomaticmissionstodestroycodesandciphers.
AnFBItapontheJapaneseconsulinHonoluluconfirmedthathetoohadbeentoldtoburnhiscodes.
Butstillno‘execute’ordertotheJapanesefleetwasinterceptedonHawaii.Intheweekbeforethe
stormbroke,RochefortpleadedguiltytoneglectingonemessagetoaJapanesesubmarinethatwas
notbrokenuntil12December.Butevenhadthisbeenread,giventheinstitutionalisedpassivityofthe
USgovernmentandarmedforces,itishardtosupposethatitwouldhavechangedanything.On
Saturday,6DecemberanexhaustedRochefortwenthomeatlunchtime.Thatafternoonalastcoded
cablefromtheJapaneseconsulate,detailingthepositionsofbarrageballoonsandtorpedonets
aroundthePearlanchorage,washandedinattheRCAofficefordispatch.Butthecopyearmarkedfor
America’scodebreakerswentuncollecteduntilmuchlater.
ThelegendoftheDayofInfamybeganatBainbridgeIslandinPugetSoundearlyon7December,
whenaUSNavylisteningpostinterceptedciphermessagesdispatchedfromTokyotoWashingtonon
thecommercialcircuitoftheMackayRadio&TelegraphCompany.Bainbridgere-transmittedthem
totheNavyDepartment’s20-GY,wheretheywerereceivedbyLt.(JuniorGrade)Francis
Brotherhoodasheapproachedtheendofhisnightshift.Brotherhoodhadalreadyseenthirteenparts
oftheJapanesemessagetoitsembassy,inresponsetotheUSdiplomaticnotedemandingJapan’s
withdrawalfromChina.Now,ashortfinaldecryptclatteredofftheprinter–inJapanese.Itwasjust
after5a.m.Lt.CmdrAlwinKramer,chiefUSNtranslator,arrived150minuteslater,at7.30a.m.,and
withinminutesrecognisedthatthelastmessage,breakingoffnegotiations,mustmeanwar.Anarmy
messengersetforthwithacopydestinedfortheWarDepartment,whileothersweresenttotheWhite
HouseandtheNavyDepartment.At9a.m.–3.30a.m.inHawaii–RufusBratton,chiefoftheFar
Easternsectionofmilitaryintelligence,readthedecrypt,fourhoursbeforetheJapaneseambassador
wasinstructedtodeliverhismomentousmessagetotheStateDepartment.Brattonattemptedtocontact
Gen.GeorgeMarshall,andwastoldthathewasoutriding.Anaidewhowentinsearchofthechiefof
stafffailedtofindhim.At10.30,BrattonatlastspoketoMarshall,stressedtheurgencyofthenews,
andofferedtodashouttohisquartersatFortMyer.MarshallinsteaddrovetotheWarDepartment,
whereheinsistedonreadingallfourteenpagesoftheJapanesemessageinsequence,thoughKramer
urgedhimtogostraighttotheend.At11a.m.,withtwohoursstilltogobeforePearlwashit,the
chiefofstaffvetoeduseofthescramblerphonetocontactHawaii,onthebizarregroundsthatitwas
insecure.InsteadhesentawarningcableviatheWarDepartment’smessagecentre,whichreached
HonoluluviaRCAat7.33a.m.ItwasfinallydeliveredtoGen.WalterShort,localarmyC-in-C,at
2.40p.m.,asfiresragedaroundthefleetanchorage.
InHawaiiat7.55onSundaymorning,JoeRochefortwaspackinguphiscarforafamilypicnic
whenthefirstJapaneseaircraftstreakedacrosstheskyabovePearlHarbor.Momentslater,Dyer
calledhimtoproclaimemotionally,‘We’reatwar.’OneofRochefort’smensaidmuchlater,‘[All]of
usfelttheremorseofparticipatinginatremendousintelligencefailure.’Thissentimentwasquite
unjustified.Whattookplacerepresentedapoliticalandoperationalfailure,matchingthatofthe
Kremlinlessthansixmonthsearlier.Rowlett’sachievementinbreakingPurplewasentirelywasted
whenitsrevelationsmatteredmost.ThankstotheSignalsIntelligenceService,overwhelming
evidencewasinthehandsofthenation’sexecutivebranchandarmedforceschiefstoindicatethatthe
Japanesestoodpoisedonthebrinkofoffensiveaction.Whiletherewasacaseforsupposingthatthe
BritishandotherEuropeancolonialpowersinAsiamightbeTokyo’stargets,ratherthantheUnited
States,failuretoplacethenation’sdefencesinthemaximumstateofreadinessreflectednegligenceat
thehighestlevel.ItwasonlybecauseGeneralGeorgeC.Marshallcommandedsuchaffectionand
respectthatheescapeddevastatinganddeservedpersonalcensurefortheblowthatfelluponhis
countryon7December.Thesamemightbesaidaboutthepresidentandhisdepartmentalheads.
Instead,however,blamewasallowedtostopwiththeservicecommanders-in-chiefonHawaii,and
withtheUSNavy’schiefofoperations,anoutcomejustifiedonpragmaticgrounds,thoughnoton
principledones.
Whatmatterednowwastostrikeback.Rochefortsaidlaconicallytohisteam,‘ForgetPearlHarbor
andgetonwiththewar.’InthefirstdaysofJanuary1942,thenewPacificC-in-CAdmiralChester
NimitzvisitedtheDungeon.Itwasnotahappyoccasion.Rochefort,preoccupiedwithaJapanese
signalhewasworkingon,gaveaperfunctoryreceptiontothisnewarbiterofhisdestiny.Nimitzwas
anywayinnomoodtobeimpressed,becauseheregardedthe7Decembercatastropheasrepresenting
aculpablefailurebythenavy’ssignalsintelligenceofficers.FromWashington,LauranceSafford
warnedRochefortthattheNavyDepartmentsharedNimitz’sview.ItconsideredthatHypowas
blameworthy,becauseithadbeenfooledbyJapanesedeceptions.InthefollowingmonthSafford
himselfjoinedthecasualtiesoftheDayofInfamy,beingremovedandreplacedbyCommander
JosephRedman,anofficermoreskilledinself-promotionthancryptanalysis.Redmanhadone
significanttalent:heunderstoodtheimportanceofradiodeceptioninmodernwar,andhadwrittena
paperaboutitforthechiefofnavaloperations.ButhewasnofanofRochefort,whowouldprobably
havelosthisownjobbutforthesupportofEdwinLayton,whomNimitzretainedasfleetintelligence
officer.
Hypowasnowinundatedwithwork,createdbyacontinuoustorrentofintercepts.Onemorning
JasperHolmeswastalkingtoanavalfriendoutsidetheintelligenceloop,whosawThomasDyer
emergefromtheDungeonunshaven,dishevelled,utterlyexhaustedafterhoursoftoil.Theother
officergazedatDyerwithoutenthusiasmandsaid,‘Now,theregoesabirdwhoshouldbesenttosea
togetstraightenedout.’Onereasonthecodebreakersheldlowlyrankswasthattheyhadspent
insufficienttimeafloattoqualifyforpromotions.Holmes,evermindfulofRochefort’sinsistenceon
security,merelymumbledastheywatchedDyerwalkaway,‘Oh,he’sallright.’Afterwards,however,
hefeltthathehadletdownHypo’smostbrilliantcryptanalyst,‘likePeterwhenhebetrayedtheLord’.
Thechallengewastocracktheenemy’snewJN-25bFleetCode.Dyer,WrightandHoltwickwereat
theforefronthere–Rochefortfocusedontryingtoanalysethesignificanceofthefragmentarytraffic
theyread.Nowthattheimportanceofmechanicalassistancewasrecognised,moremenwereneeded
toruntheIBMsorterswhichconstitutedHypo’smemorybank;eachinterceptrequiredsometwo
hundredpunchcards.Theonlyhandsavailablewerebandsmenfromthewreckedbattleship
California.WhentheFBIsetaboutscreeningthemenforhigh-securityduty,severalwithforeign
namesweremarkedforexclusion,butRocheforttookthemanyway;LaytongotanodfromNimitz.
Intheweeksthatfollowed,theDungeon’sstandingwiththecommander-in-chiefremainedlow.He
repeatedlydemandedinformationfromRochefortaboutthemovementsofJapan’scarriers,and
againandagaintrafficanalysisproducedthewronganswers.ButthenRochefortandhismennoted
thebuild-upofJapaneseforcesatTruk,andcorrectlyguessedthattheywereheadingforRabaul.His
stockrose.HehighlightedJapaneseweaknessintheMarshallsandtheGilbertIslands,which
promptedstrikestherebyHalsey’sandFletcher ’staskforces.Hypobeganpassingintelligenceabout
prospectivetargetstoFleetsubmarineheadquarters,thoughthisyieldedmeagreresultsbecause
Americantorpedoesfailed–astheycontinuedtodountiltheendof1943.Nimitztransferredsomeof
Rochefort’sJapaneselinguiststotheUScarriersatsea,tomonitorthevoicetrafficofenemypilots.
Thiswasasignificantlosstothecodebreakers,butprobablyavalidswitchofadesperatelyscarce
resource.
Frommid-January1942onwards,HypowasreadingfragmentsofJN-25bmessages,albeitwith
manywordsmissing.On2MarchRochefortpredictedanairraidonHawaiionthe4th.Sureenough,
twobigflying-boatsattackedatnight–theJapaneseenjoyedtheassistanceofbeingabletoread
Americanweatherreports.SomebombsfellharmlesslyinthemountainstenmilesfromPearl,others
inthesea;USfightersfailedtointercepttheattackers.ButRocheforthadproducedanaccurate
prediction,anddidsoagainwhenhewarnedofaMarchairraidonMidwayisland.Themost
importantaspectofthislastbreakwasthatitgaveHypotheJapanesecodedesignationforMidway:
‘AF’.BytheendofMarchtheAmericanswerereadingasubstantialnumberofJN-25bmessages.
WhentheCastcodebreakingteamwasevacuatedfromdoomedCorregidoritwasre-establishedasa
jointoperationwiththeAustraliansinMelbourne,andwassoonmakingitsownsignificant
contribution.
TheunrelentingstressafflictingtheinmatesoftheDungeonwasnowintensifiedbyovercrowding
–fortyofficersandahundredenlistedmenwerecrammedintothebasement,whereJasperHolmes
comparedtheatmospheretothatofanoperationalsubmarine.Heandothersupportingstafffelt
guiltythattheycoulddonothingtoalleviatethestrainonthehandfulofcryptanalysts,whocarriedso
muchoftheload.RochefortandDyerstartedanewroutineoftheirown,eachalternatingtwenty-four
hourson,twenty-fouroff.Hypo’schief,scarcelyasunnysoulnoranenthusiastforsmalltalk,
seemednevertorelax.HespokelessandlessaboutanythingsavetheJapanesesignalofthemoment.
Heworkedtwentyhoursadayandsometimesmore,breakingoffonlytosnatchalittlesleeponacot
inacorneroftheDungeon.Dyer,meanwhile,subsistedonadietofBenzedrineinthemorning,
Phenobarbitalatnight.Eventhoseoftheirstaffwhomanagedlongerbreaksfoundthemselvesbored
andlonely,existinginasweat-stained,subterranean,monasticallymasculineworld.HamWright’s
quartersnearthesubmarinebasebecamealoungewhereofficerscouldlistentohisoperarecords
andtakeadrinkiftheyleftaquarterbehind.
Rochefort’srecordatthistimewaspatchy,thoughnolesssothanwasthatofBletchleyinitsearly
days.BetweenDecember1941andJune1942,whileOp-20-GinWashingtonrecovered16,000
Japanesecodeadditives,Hyporecovered25,000–theIBMmachinesplayedanimportantrolehere,
usingtwotothreemillionpunchcardsamonth.On8April1942,itschiefcorrectlypredictedthatthe
JapanesewereheadingforPortMoresbyinPapuaNewGuinea,havingidentified‘RZP’asitscode
designation.Butmanyotherlocationsremainedobscure,andRochefortprovedmistakenin
supposingfiveJapanesecarrierstobeatsea–atthattimetherewereonlythree.Hemadeanaccurate
appreciationofJapaneseintentionsaheadofthe7–8MayBattleoftheCoralSea,butmisjudgedtwo
criticalJapanesecarriermovements.Theoutcomeoftheclashwasadraw,butastrategicsuccessfor
theAmericans,becausetheJapaneseabandonedtheirthrustagainstPortMoresby.
EarlyinMay,RochefortinformedNimitzthatitwasplaintheJapanesewereplanningamajornew
initiative,thoughhewasunsurewhat.Amonghisvirtueswasafabulousmemoryforplaces,words,
callsigns.TheNavyDepartmentdecreedthatthethreecodebreakinggroupsinWashington,
MelbourneandHawaiishouldeachaddressenemymessagesrelatingtodesignatedgeographical
areas.Rochefortignoredthisclumsyconstraint,andstrovetograspthestrategicbigpicture.Hypo
wasnowreceivingbetweenfivehundredandathousandinterceptsaday,about60percentofall
Japanesetransmissions,ofwhichitsofficersmanagedtoreadfragmentsofsome40percent.By9
May,RochefortwasabletotellNimitzthattheJapanesefleetwouldsailforamajoroperationonthe
21st,butadded:‘Destinationoftheaboveforceisunknown.’
TheC-in-CspeculatedthattheJapanesemightintendanewassaultonPearl,orevenagainsttheUS
WestCoast.Hypo,awarethatYamamotowasinterestedintheUSbaseintheAleutians,ponderedthe
possibilitythathemightlaunchnotjustonemajoroperation,buttwo.13Maywasacriticalday:
decryptsmadeplainthatPearlandtheAleutianswerenottheforemostJapanesepriority.Instead,this
wastobeMidway,themostforwardofallAmericanPacificbases,1,200milesnorth-westofHawaii.
AninterceptedmessageinstructedthesupplyshipGoshuMarutoloadstoresatSaipan,thenproceed
to‘AffirmFox’–AF.RochefortrecalledsignalsbackinMarchwhichidentifiedAFasMidway.He
pickedupthesecurephonetoLayton,tellinghim,‘It’snotcutanddried,butit’shot!’Theintelligence
officersaid,‘Themanwiththeblueeyeswillwanttoknowyouropinionofit.’
Nimitzwasassuredlyinterested,butpreoccupiedwithotherbusiness.Onthemorningof14Mayhe
sentCaptainLyndeMcCormick,hisnewwarplansofficer,todiscussthepossiblethreattoMidway.
OnplysheetslaidupontrestlesintheDungeon,Rochefortandhisteamsetouttheirexhibits–a
successionofkeyintercepts,togetherwithequallyimportanttraffic-analysisdata,andtalked
McCormickthroughthem.Thisprovedafiercelyintense,protractedconversation,whichcontinued
formostoftheday.Attheendofit,McCormickreturnedtoNimitz’sofficeandreportedthathe
believedRocheforthadgotthestoryright.ThoughHypohadnoindicationofthefullJapaneseorder
ofbattle,itseemedplainthatYamamotointendedtocommitfourcarriersinsupportofan
amphibiousassaultonMidway.
Thiswasadebateofsupremeimportanceanddelicacy,ofwhichWashingtonwasinformed.The
USstrategicpositioninthePacificwasstillrelativelyweak,theJapanesefleetverystrong.Amidthe
ocean’smillionsofsquaremiles,mostwarshipstooktwenty-fourhourstotraversesixorseven
hundredmiles.Withonlytwo,oratbestthree,operationalcarriersofhisown,Nimitzcouldnot
dividehisforces.Ifhewishedtoengagetheenemy,hemustbettheranchonasinglerendezvous.A
misjudgementabouttheintendeddestinationofthebulkofJapan’snavalairforcewouldbealmost
impossibletoundointimetoavertanewdisasterforAmericanarms.AdmiralErnestKing,chiefof
navaloperations,gavehisPacificC-in-Clittlehelpwiththedecision-making.WhileKingprofessed
tofavourengagingtheJapanesewhereverpossible,hewaswaryofanycourseofactionthatmight
inflictfurtherattritiononAmerica’sdangerouslysmallcarrierandcruiserforce.
TheOfficeofNavalIntelligencestillthoughtthemostlikelyenemyobjectivewasJohnstonIsland,
anatoll720mileswestofPearl;itwasafurtherreflectiononthenavy’slamentablecoordinationthat
theONIdidnotknowthatRocheforthadalreadyidentifiedJohnstonasJapanesedesignation‘AG’.
MeanwhiletheCaststationinMelbournethoughtYamamotowouldcommithismainforceagainstan
islandintheMarshalls.LaytonclungtoabeliefthatPearlcouldbeatarget.RedmaninWashington,
noadmirerofRochefort’sviewaboutanything,simplyrejectedthisone.BySaturday,16May,
however,themanwhomatteredwasincreasinglyconvincedthatRochefortwasright.Nimitzaccepted
thattheJapanesewereheadedforMidway,andhisjudgementwasconfirmedbyanimportantnew
interceptthatday,givingthefly-offpositionfortheJapanesecarriers.Yetthistoofailedtoconvince
WashingtonthatMidwaywastheirtarget.Rochefort,exasperated,dismissedRedmanandhis
comradesas‘thoseclowns’–buttheywerealsohissuperiorofficers.
Earlyon19Mayanimpromptuconferencetookplaceinthebasement,aroundthedeskofJasper
Holmes.HowcouldthedoubtsaboutMidwaybedispelled?ItwasHolmeswhoconceivedasolution,
whichwasimmediatelyadopted:thenavalairstationonMidwaywassentacipheredmessageby
underseacable,instructingitsoperatorstosendaplain-languagewirelesssignaltoPearl,reporting
difficultieswithitsdistillationplantandrequestingsuppliesoffreshwater.AnAmericannotinonthe
secretexclaimedfuriously,‘ThosestupidbastardsonMidway,whatdotheymeanbysendingouta
messagelikethisinplainlanguage?’Holmes’srusewasbrilliantlyjudged,however:thewaterissue
wasjusttriflingenoughtobecrediblyflaggedinaplain-languagesignal,yetitssubstancewas
sufficientlyinterestingtoJapaneseeyestomeritforwardingtonavalheadquarters.
On20MaytheDungeon’sRedLasswellbroketheJapaneseoperationorderforMidway,though
unknowntotheAmericans,thisdisclosedonlyapartofYamamoto’splan:theyhadnohintofthefact
thathismainforceofbattleshipswouldtrailsixhundredmilesbehindthecarriergroup,poisedto
closeinandfinishofftheUSPacificFleetwhenthisappearedontheMidwaybattlefield–asTokyo
anticipatedthatitbelatedlywould.Nimitznowlaunchedaneffectivelittledeception:theseaplane
tenderTangierwassenttoflyoffplanestostageatokenairraidonTulagi;thisperfectlyservedits
purpose,convincingtheJapanesethataUScarriergroupmustbewithinrange,andthusthousandsof
milesfromMidway.
NextdaytheCastteaminMelbournedeclaredthatitwasnowpersuadedRochefortwasright.On
22MaytheBritishFarEastCombinedBureaualsoconcludedfromitsowndecryptactivitiesthat
MidwaywastheJapaneseobjective.ButinWashington,RedmanandOp-20-Gwerefuriousthat
RocheforthadpersuadedNimitztoundertakethewater-signalrusewithoutreferencetothem.
Stimson,attheWarDepartment,saidtheUSArmystilldoubtedRochefort’sassessment,andfeared
HypowasfallingvictimtoanelaborateJapanesedeception.Nimitzwroteuneasilyinhisown
assessmenton26May:‘oursolesourceofinformationis[sigint]…Theenemymaybedeceiving
us.’
ItishardtooverstatethepersonalstrainonRochefortinthosedays.Thisunloved,awkwardman
wasmakingacaseagainstthejudgementofmostofhispeers,especiallyinWashington.Seldomin
historyhassomuchhunguponthewordofasinglejuniorofficer.Ifhewaswrong,theUnitedStates
couldsufferastrategicdisasterinthePacific.Onthemorningof27May,Rochefortdonnedaclean
uniform:hewasscheduledtobriefNimitzandhisstaff.Justashewasabouttoleavethebasementfor
theC-in-C’soffice,JoeFinneganandHamWrightbrokeasignalthatidentifiedthedatesofthe
Japanesestrikes:3JuneagainsttheAleutians,the4thforMidway.ThiscausedRocheforttoarrive
halfanhourlateforNimitz’smeeting,toacorrespondinglystonyreception.Hewastoldtodescribe
whathethoughtheknew,withoutmentioninginthepresenceofofficersnotinonHypo’ssecretthe
meansbywhichtheinformationhadbeensecured.
HeoutlinedtheJapaneseplanfortwinstrikes,thoughmistakenlysuggestingthattheAleutians
thrustwasamerediversion:inreality,itwasmuchmoresubstantial.Inconsequenceofthatwrong
call,Nimitzsentonlycruisersanddestroyersnorthwards.ButthePacificC-in-Cmadethepivotal
decisiontocommitallhisthreecarrierstomeettheenemyatMidway,justbeforeabitterblowstruck
theAmericans.TheJapanesechangedtheircodes,introducingJN-25c.Thisdevelopmenthadbeen
expected,buttheconsequencewastoslamshut,foraperiodofseveralweeks,Hypo’speepholeon
themotionsoftheirfoes.Rochefortandhisteam,duringthedaysofelectrictensionbefore4June,
wereobligedoncemoretorelysolelyupontrafficanalysisofenemytransmissions,andtherewere
preciousfewofthese:Yamamotohadimposedwirelesssilenceonhisattackingforces.
AmericancarelessnessjeopardisedNimitz’strap.Ashisshipssetforthtomeettheenemy,they
talkedtoomuch:therewasasharpincreaseinUSNavywirelesstraffic,andtheJapanesenoticed.But
Yamamotoscentedonlyamousewhenheshouldhavesmeltagiantrat.Inoneofhismajor
misjudgementsofthewar,hedecidednottobreakwirelesssilencetoinformVice-AdmiralChuichi
Nagumo,commandinghiscarriergroup,thattheAmericansmightbeuptosomething,perhapseven
headingforMidway.Herewasamomentwhenacommander ’sfearoftheconsequencesof
dispatchingastreamofMorseacrosstheetherprecipitatedaworseoutcomethanhadhedoneso.At
Pearl,tensionrosetoanalmostunbearablelevelthroughthelonghoursof3June,asMidway’s
reconnaissanceaircraftgainednoglimpseoftheexpectedenemyflat-tops.Then,at5.30a.m.next
day,exactlyinaccordancewithRochefort’sprediction,atlastaCatalinaflying-boatsenta
momentoussignal:theenemy’sprincipalcarrierforcewasinsight.
TheAmericantriumphthatfollowedwasanythingbutordained.DestructionofNagumo’sfour
carriers,thetransformationofthebalanceofthewarinthePacific,wasachievedbyphenomenalluck
aswellastheskillandcourageoftheUSNavy’sdive-bomberpilots.WhileNimitzhadgambled
courageouslytobringabouttheclash,theoutcomecouldhavegonedisastrouslytheotherway.Only
on5JunedidHypodiscoverYamamoto’sbattleshipsclosinginonthescene,whichpromptedthe
Americancarriergroupstobeatahastyandprudentretreat.ButMidwaywasaboveallelsean
intelligencevictory,sharingwithBletchley’sbreachoftheGermanU-boatcodesthestatusofmost
influentialWesternAlliedintelligenceachievementsofthewar.Nimitzrecognisedthiswhenhesenta
cartobringRocheforttoattendhisowncelebrationparty.TheHypochief’sluckwasaslousyas
ever:hearrivedonlyaftertheguestshaddispersed.ButNimitz,inthemidstofconductingastaff
conference,usedtheopportunitytopaytributetothecodebreaker:‘Thisofficerdeservesamajor
shareofthecreditforthevictoryatMidway.’
ThosewordsweretobeRochefort’sonlyreward.WhenhewasproposedforaDistinguished
ServiceMedal,thecitationwasquashedbyRear-AdmiralRussellWillson,theCNO’schiefofstaff:‘I
donotconcurintherecommendation…hehasmerelyefficientlyusedthetoolspreviouslyprepared
forhisuse.Itwouldbeinappropriatetoawardamedalonlytotheofficerwhohappenedtobeina
positiontoreapthebenefits,ataparticulartime,unlessinactualcombatwiththeenemy.’Jasper
Holmeswroteofthepost-MidwaymoodintheDungeon:‘therewasnogreatmomentof
exhilaration’.RochefortenjoyedonemoreimportantsuccessaschiefofHypo:herevealedthe
JapaneselandingonGuadalcanalon5July,whichprecipitatedadramaticandultimatelytriumphant
Americanripostewithland,seaandairforces.HewasalsoabletoalertMacArthur ’scommandtothe
JapaneseattempttocrosstheOwenStanleyrangeandfallonPortMoresby.
SofarasWashingtonwasconcerned,however,farfromRochefortbeingdubbedtheheroof
Midway,hewassimplyaninsubordinatecusswhomnobodyliked.On14October1942hewas
relievedofhispostandassignedtocommandafloatingdrydockinSanFrancisco.Hewassucceeded
byCaptainWilliamGoggins,anofficerwithnopreviousexperienceofcryptanalysis,whowas
deemedacompetentadministrator.Althoughallhierarchiescommitsomearbitraryinjustices,this
wasanexceptionallybrutalandmean-spiritedone.Intheautumnof1944Rochefortgainedsufficient
rehabilitationtobeputincommandofthePacificStrategicIntelligenceUnit,buthediedundecorated
in1976.Onlyin1985washeposthumouslyawardedtheDistinguishedServiceMedalthathadbeen
deniedhimin1942.
ItwasasortofmiraclethatRochefortandhisteamachievedwhattheydid,withthemakeshift
resourcesavailable.Thearmy–navyfeudwhichcausedtheUSforsolongtodivideitscodebreaking
operationswasworsenedbythelowpriorityaccordedtointelligence.By1942,Bletchleyandthe
Britishserviceintelligencedepartmentsdeployedhundredsofthefinestcivilianbrainsinthecountry
alongsideahandfulofcareerprofessionalsoldiers,sailorsandairmen,togetherwithtechnologyin
advanceofanythingbeingusedbyHypoorCast.Rochefortwasmerelyahighlyexperienced,not
personallybrilliantcrypto-linguistandanalyst,andhisteamwasagroupofhithertolowlyregarded
navalofficers.
Thepost-warnarrativeoftheUSNavy’sPacificCombatIntelligenceCenterstatedbluntly:‘Inthe
defensivestagesofthewar[1941–43]radiointelligencewasnotonlythemostimportantsourceof
intelligenceintheCentralPacific,itwaspracticallytheonlysource.Therewereveryfewcaptured
documentsorprisonersofwar.Therewerenophotographsofenemypositions…Excludingthe
SolomonsandNewBritain,spiesandcoast-watchers’reportsneversuppliedanyimportant
intelligence.’TheoperationaldiaryoftheJapanesenavygeneralstaffrecordedbitterlyafterMidway:
‘theenemyhadgraspedourintentionsbeforehand’.ButnotforamomentdidYamamotoorhis
officersconsiderthepossibilitythattheircipherswerecompromised;theyattributedthedisaster
merelytothemischancethattheircarriershadbeenspottedbyAmericanreconnaissanceaircraftor
submarines.
JoeRochefortwasnotpersonallyindispensable.AfterhisdeparturetheUSNavy’sintelligenceand
codebreakingoperationsbecameevermoresophisticatedandeffective,althoughthedifficultiesof
breakingJN-25’svariantspersisteduntil1944,andsometimesevenbeyond.Thecottageindustryof
1941–42becameFRUPAC–FleetIntelligenceRadioUnitPacific–adepartmentemployingfive
hundredmen,aformidabletoolinNimitz’shand.ButRochefortdeservestoberememberedasaman
whochangedhistory,whilethehonouroftheUSNavywastarnishedbythescurvyingratitudewith
whichitschiefsrewardedhim.
6
MuddlingandGroping:TheRussiansatWar
1 C ENTR E M O BI LI S ES
NoonewhocherishesillusionsabouttheskillandomniscienceofRussia’ssecretservicescould
sustaintheseafterstudyingtheirwartimerecord.Itwascertainlynobetter,andinmostrespects
worse,thanthatoftheWesterndemocracies.Hitler ’sinvasionon22June1941precipitatedacrisis
forStalin’sintelligenceorganisations,whichliketheRedArmyhadbeencrippledbythePurges.
PavelSudoplatov’srewardfororganisingTrotsky’skillinginAugust1940,togetherwithhis
unflinchingparticipationinmanyotherliquidations,wasanappointmentamonthafterthestartof
‘Barbarossa’toheadtheNKVD’s‘AdministrationforSpecialTasks’,officiallyresponsiblefor
‘sabotage,kidnappingandassassinationofenemies’,ajobdescriptionworthyofIanFleming’s
novels.SudoplatovhandedBeriaalistof140intelligenceofficersconfinedinprisonsorthegulag
forpoliticaloffenceswhoseserviceswerenowvitallyneededbythestate,eithertospyortorun
spies.Henotedthatthefilesshowedallthosenamedtohavebeendetainedonthepersonalordersof
eitherStalinorMolotov.Now,Beriaaskednoquestionsabouttheprisoners’guiltorinnocence,
merelydemanding,‘Areyousureweneedthem?’Thenewheadofspecialtasksresponded,‘Yes,I
amabsolutelycertain,’andwasorderedtoarrangetheirrelease.Unfortunately,asSudoplatov
observedunemotionallyinhismemoirs,threeofthebestmenprovedalreadytohavebeenexecuted.
Theremainderreturnedtointelligenceduties,invaryingconditionsofreliefandtrauma.
IfthelivesoftheNKVD’sofficerswereprecarious,theyalsoenjoyedtheperquisitesthataccrued
tofavouredservantsoftheSovietstate–forinstance,thechildrenof‘illegals’operatingabroadwere
admittedtouniversitieswithoutbeingrequiredtopassentranceexams.Sudoplatovoccupieda
relativelyspaciousapartmentabovetheDynamosportsstoreonGorkyStreet,inablockexclusively
tenantedbytheKremlin’ssecretsoldiers,includingforeignintelligencechiefVsevolodMerkulov.
AftertheJune1941massreleaseofpoliticalsuspectstoresumeintelligencework,severalmovedin
temporarilywithSudoplatov,theirdeliverer.OnenightMerkulovsuddenlytelephonedtoannounce
thathewascomingdowntotalk.Thenewly-liberatedofficerswerehastilyherdedintohidinginthe
bedroom,lesttheirpresencepromptembarrassment.Sudoplatovhadsufficientsenseofselfpreservationtohavetakencarenottosigntheirrehabilitationdocumentspersonally.Insteadhegot
Fitintodoso–which,hesaid,probablysavedhislifein1946,whenhisownsurvivalhungbya
thread.
Theintelligenceofficersrescuedfromthegulagrejoicedintheirfreedom,insomecasestoosoon.
Oneofthem,IvanKavinsky,dancedaboutSudoplatov’sflatinthethree-piecesuitwithwhichhehad
beenissuedinplaceofprisondenims.Howwonderfulitwas,Kavinskyexulted,tobeacknowledged
atlastasapatriot.Hourslater,hewasdispatchedtoserveasastay-behindagentinZhitomir,deepin
Ukraine,whichwasabouttobeoverrunbytheGermans.There,hewasalmostimmediatelybetrayed
byUkrainians,asmanyotherservantsofMoscowwerebetrayed.Arrivingatarendezvousand
sensingatrap,Kavinskyshothimself.Theremainderofhiscellperishedinasubsequentgunbattle
withtheGestapo.InthesamefashionseveralotherimportantNKVDresidentswereswiftlyeliminated
bytheGermans.OneofBeria’smostcynicalruseswascarriedoutinAugust1941:NKVDagents
disguisedasNaziparachutistsweredroppedintotheVolgaGermanautonomousregion,totestthe
loyaltyofitscitizens.Villageswherethenewarrivalswereofferedshelterwereliquidatedwholesale;
theentireregion’ssurvivingpopulationwaseventuallydeportedtoSiberiaandKazakhstan.
Someintelligenceofficersliberatedforwarservicehadsufferedunimaginablehorrorsinjailsof
thekindtowhichtheyhadbeenaccustomedtodispatchothers.DmitriBystroletov,apre-waragenthandlerinBerlin,wastorturedwithaball-bearingswungonasteelcable.Aftersigningaconfession,
in1939hewassentencedtotwentyyears’imprisonment.HiswifeShelmatovawassenttothegulag,
wheresheslitherthroatwithakitchenknife;Bystroletov’selderlymothermeanwhilepoisoned
herself.Itishardtosupposethatrehabilitationnowsecuredhimmuchhappiness.Anothersuchfigure
wasPyotrZubov,whohadbeendisgracedforfailingtocarrythroughanattemptedcoupin
Yugoslavia.Since1939SudoplatovhadbeenurgingZubov’squalitiesasanintelligenceofficer–
withoutmentioningtheman’simportantroleinBeria’sascenttopower.Inprisonherefusedto
confesstonon-existentcrimesagainstthestate,evenafterhiskneesweresmashedwithahammer,
renderinghimalifelongcripple.ZubovwasconfinedinthesameLubyankacellasCol.Stanislas
Sosnowski,formerheadofPolishintelligenceinBerlin,andhiscompatriotPrinceJanuszRadziwiłł.
TheNKVDsetaboutturningbothfortheirownpurposes,andZubov’sroleinachievingthisenabled
Sudoplatovtosecurehisrelease.Zubovbecameoneofhissectionheads,limpingandshuffling
aroundtheLubyanka.
SosnowskistartedworkingfortheRussians,whosoughttoexploithisoldsourcesinBerlin,most
ofthemwomen.HisoldnetworkhadbeenbrokenupbytheNazisbackin1935,whenhehimselfwas
imprisonedforespionage,thenobligedtowitnesstheguillotiningofhisagentsatPlötzenseejail.He
waseventuallyexchangedfortheleaderoftheGermanminoritycommunityinPoland,butwas
sackedfollowingafinancialscandal.HewaslivinginretirementwhentheRussiansscoopedhimup
duringtheir1939invasion.HeclaimedjusttwosurvivingGermansources,andreactivatedtheseat
theNKVD’sbidding.Sudoplatovassertedthatheprovidedsomevalueforhisjailersuntil1942,and
thereafterwaskeptintheLubyankafortheusualSovietreason:‘Hewasamanwhoknewtoomuch.’
PrinceRadziwiłł,aformerconservativepolitician,sixtyyearsold,washandledpersonallyby
Beria,becausehewasthoughttohavefriendsinNazihighplaces,amongthemGöring.Oncethe
NKVDwassatisfiedthathewasunderitscontrol,RadziwiłłwaspermittedtoreturntoBerlin.Beria
toldhim,‘Peoplelikeyou,Prince,willalwaysbeneededbyus.’ButtheRussiansoverestimatedthe
nobleman’sintimacywiththeReichsmarschall,andindeedhisintelligencevaluegenerally.Hebroke
contactwithMoscowin1942,andpaidthepricethreeyearslater,whenoncemorehefellinto
Russianhands,thistimewithhiswife,whodiedinaSovietprison.Thefamily’svastpossessions
wereconfiscatedbythenewPolishcommuniststate.
Evenmoresothantheplotsofmostintelligenceservices,thoseoftheNKVDlurchedbetweenthe
imaginativeandtheridiculous.Inthewinterof1941,atStalin’spersonalbehestaplanwasdevised
forthekillingofHitler,involvingbothPrinceRadziwiłłandOlgaChekhova,actressnieceofthe
playwright,whowasaSovietagent,albeitanineffectualone,livinginBerlin.Theprincipalassassin
wastobeanNKVD‘illegal’namedIgorMiklashevsky,aformerboxingchampion.InDecember
1941hesucceededingainingaccesstoGermany,posingasadefector.Hisauthenticityinthisrole
wasattestedbyhisuncle,agenuineexiledopponentofStalin.
Miklashevsky’ssubsequentcareeralmostdefiesbelief.HefoughtaboutwithGermany’sheroMax
Schmeling,whichhecontrivedtowin.HereportedtoMoscowthatwhileitseemedimpossibleto
reachHitler,itwouldbeeasytoassassinateGöring.Centrerejectedthisproposal,forGöring’s
removalseemedmorelikelytoassisttheNaziwareffortthantheSovietone.Miklashevskyremained
inGermanyuntil1944,whenhemurderedhisuncleandescapedtoFrance.Stalinmeanwhile
withdrewhisorderforHitler ’sassassination,fearinghisremovalwouldprompttheWesternAlliesto
seekaseparatepeacewithasuccessorGermanleadership.AftertheliberationofFrance
MiklashevskyspenttwoyearsintheWesthuntingdownUkrainianrenegadesofHitler ’swartime
‘Vlasovarmy’,thenreturnedtoMoscow,whereheboxeduntilhisretirement.
AstheGermansclosedinonMoscow,theNKVDstruggledtoorganisestay-behindespionage
groupsagainsttheeventualityofthecapital’sfall.Theypreparedkeyinstallationsfordemolition,
includingPolitburomembers’dachas.SomanyNKVDstaffhadquittheLubyankathatSudoplatov’s
SpecialTasksgrouptookoversomeofficesforthesaboteurs.ZoyaRybkina,whowasoneofthem,
describedhowsafeswereclearedofsecretfilesandinsteadcrammedwithweapons,ammunition,
compasses,explosives,fusesandevenMolotovcocktails.Duringthehoursofdarkness,teamsset
forthtoburyarmsdumpsinthecity’sparks.‘Wedidnotgohomeforahundreddays,’wrote
Rybkina,‘sleepinginsteadinairraidshelterswithagasmaskcaseinplaceofapillow.’Eachstaybehindgroupwasorganisedasa‘family’,witha‘grandpa’or‘grandma’asitshead–usuallyanold
BolshevikchosenbytheveteranColonelGeorgyMordinov;somewereveteransoftheInternational
BrigadeinSpain,thoughmostofthesewereformerspiesnowtoooldformilitaryservice.Radio-
operatorsandcipherclerkswereappointedastheir‘grandsons’and‘granddaughters’.Rybkinaonce
calledatMordinov’sapartmentinBegovaya,andfoundtheoldrevolutionaryasleeponabed
composedoftrotylexplosiveblocks.
Seniorofficersdespairedofamassingsufficientchargestominethelargeststructures,forinstance
theDynamostadiumandrailstations.SudoplatovclaimedinhismemoirsthatSpecialTaskscould
callupontheservicesofamotorisedbrigadeof20,000menandwomen,includingtwohundred
foreignersofmanynationalities–Germans,Austrians,Spaniards,Americans,Chinese,Vietnamese,
Poles,Czechs,Bulgarians,Romanians.Healsoboastedofaparatroopunitonpermanentstandbyto
counterattackanyGermancommandoattack–forinstance,againsttheKremlin–withitsown
squadronoftransportaircraft.SomeoftheUSSR’sfinestathleteshadbeendraftedintoservice,and
someofthesewerepromptlydesignatedforpartisanoperations,workinginplacesandcircumstances
wheresupremefitnessandhardinesswereneeded.
Sudoplatovfailstoacknowledge,however,thatmostoftheseeliteunitsbecameavailableonlylater
inthewar:inthewinterof1941theNKVDwasreducedtopitifulimprovisations.ARussianofficer
recordedthecaseofoneofthousandsof‘line-crossers’deployedatthistime,aprettyyoung
UkrainiangirlnamedOksana.TheSovietTwelfthArmyseveraltimesdispatchedherthroughthe
enemyfrontintheDonbasin.Shewaseventuallydenounced,however,ashavinggoneovertothe
Axis.Afterinterrogationsheadmittedthatshehadbeencaught,andchosetosaveherownlifeby
‘acceptingtheprotection’ofanItalianofficer.TheSoviettribunalwhichtriedherallegedlywaived
thedeathpenaltyandinsteadgaveheralongprisonsentence,butalmostallsuchpeopleofbothsexes
weresummarilyexecuted.Itishardtocreditthatmercywasshowninthiscase,atthisworstofall
timesforSovietfortunes.
Withthenewimportanceofspecialforces,SudoplatovroseintheSoviethierarchy.InFebruary
1942hebecameacommissarofstatesecurityandlieutenant-general,andinAugusttravelledwith
BeriaandMerkulovattheheadofanNKVDmissiontotheCaucasus,flyinginAmerican-suppliedC47stoarrangetheblockageofmountainpassesandstay-behindsabotageoperations.TheSpecial
Taskschiefadmittedlaterthathavingnomilitarytraining,hefeltoutofhisdepthatawarfront.So
didhisfollowers,whohadbeenchosenfortheirskillsasmountaineersratherthanassoldiers:those
whostayedtofightintheCaucasussufferedheavylosses.BeriasuggestedthatProfessorKonstantin
Gamsakhurdia,aprominentlocalintellectual,shouldbedesignatedtoheadtheCaucasusgroups.
Sudoplatovthoughtthiswasaterribleidea:GamsakhurdiawasonlyontheNKVD’sbooksbecausehe
hadbeenblackmailedintoserviceasaninformeryearsearlier,througharashattachmenttothe
Georgiannationalistmovement.NowhemettheprofessoratTbilisi’sIntouristhotel,andwas
unimpressed:‘Heappearedtomeunreliable,andbesideshisexperienceasanagentwasnotin
inspiringpeople,onlyinformingonthem.Hewastoopreoccupiedwithwritingversesandwhathe
believedtobegreatnovelsintheGeorgianlanguagesuchasAbductionoftheMoon,amediaeval
saga.’
SudoplatovpreferredfortheleadershiprolealocalplaywrightnamedGeorgiMachivariani,who
wasentrustedwithasmallfortuneingoldandsilvertofinancepartisanoperations.Intheevent
TbilisiwasnevertakenbytheGermans.Afterthetideofwarhadturned,theNKVDchiefdescribed
hisamazementwhenMachivarianirefundedhistreasureundiminished,thoughhedoesnotspeculate
aboutwhetherhisconductreflectedhonestyorterror.WhenBeriaandhisdeputiesreturnedto
Moscow,Stalinreprimandedthemforhavingventuredintoacombatzone.Heneededhisspymasters
closertohome.
2 TH E END O F S O R GE
JapanassumedapivotalimportanceafterGermanyinvadedtheSovietUnion,adevelopmentwhich
deeplydistressedRichardSorge,asallthosearoundhimobserved.Moscowneededtheanswertoa
criticalstrategicquestion:wouldtheJapaneseseizetheopportunitytostrikeatRussiafromtheeast,
forcingtheRedArmytofightontwofronts?Sorge’sinformantHotsumiOzakiwieldedsignificant
influencethroughhismembershipoftwogovernmentadvisorygroups,uponbothofwhichheurged
thatJapanshouldmovesouth,againsttheEuropeans,ratherthanagainsttheRussians.On29June
MaxClausenwirelessedtoMoscowaSorgemessagereportingthatJapanwasstagingatest
mobilisationforwarwithRussia,butthatprimeministerKonoyeremainedopposedtobelligerence.
Theoperator ’smentalhealthcannothavebeenimprovedbyaroutinevisitfromtheKempeitai
militarypoliceduringthistransmission.
On10July,SorgetoldMoscowthatwhileJapanwouldcontinuecontingencypreparationsforwar
withtheUSSR,themainthrustofitspolicywouldbetopursuenegotiationswiththeUnitedStatesand
toplanforwarwiththeEuropeanempires.TokyowouldattacktheSovietUniononlyifitscollapse
seemedimminent.Nonetheless,itisimportanttonotethatthewordingofhisdispatchesremained
equivocalandinconclusive.TheyreflectedthefactthatwhileSorgeandWenneker,theGermannaval
attaché,thoughtJapanwouldnotfightRussiain1941,Ottandhismilitaryattachédisagreed,
believingthatTokyowouldbecomeabelligerentbyautumn.SorgeseveraltimesassertedthatJapan
wouldprobablybetippedintoattackingtheSovietUnionbythefallofLeningradandMoscow,butat
notimedidheexplicitlyanduncompromisinglyassureMoscowthatRussiawassafefromany
Japanesethreat.Contrarily,hereportedthehighcommand’sconvictionthattheWehrmachtwould
enterRussia’scapitalwithinweeks–whichwouldalmostcertainlyprompttheJapanesetoattackthe
reelingSovietsfromtheeast.
ForyearsitwasclaimedthatSorge’sintelligencechangedthecourseofhistory,byenablingStalin
toshiftmajorformationsfromtheEast,tochecktheNazionslaughtintheautumnandwinterof1941.
Intruth,sucharedeploymentbeganasearlyasMay.AmodernRussiansourceassertsthatMoscow
Centrereceivedinformationfrommanyforeignsourcesinthelatterpartof1941confirmingthat
JapanhadnointentionofattackingRussia,allegedlyonthebasisofdocumentsintheMoscow
intelligencearchive.On17July,theNKVDinLondonsentthetextofaBletchleydecryptofa
telegramfromtheJapaneseForeignMinistry,announcingthedecisionofanimperialconferencenot
tojoinHitler ’sattackontheSovietUnion.TheTokyospy’sdispatchesmayhaveincreasedthe
Stavka’swillingnesstoreducetheRedArmy’sAsianforces,butasinallmattersrelatingto
intelligence,manysourcesandfactorsinfluencedStalin’sdecision,andthecodebreakingoperation
describedbelowmayalsohaveplayedapart.Thereportsofspies,howeverwellplacedandhowever
romantictheirstories,canneveroffernationalleaderscertainty,norevenprobability.J.C.
Masterman,orchestralconductoroftheBritishDoubleCrosssystem,haswritten:‘Itisamistaketo
supposethatthewell-placedperson,friendly,letussay,withaCabinetministeroranofficialinthe
ForeignOfficeorahighlyplacedstaffofficerisnecessarilyinthehighestgradeofagents.The
individualremarksofministersorgeneralsdonotcarrymuchconviction,anditisatruismof
historicalresearchthatwhendealingwithdiplomaticconversationsandtherumoursofembassies,we
areintheveryrealmoflies.’
NomorethananyotheragentcouldSorgecompletestrategicjigsawpuzzles,norevenprovide
piecesinthesamefashionasdidsignaldecryptsorcapturedenemydocuments.Hecouldmerely
offercluesandpointers,forinstanceaboutthedispositionsoftheJapanesearmy,thoughOzaki
achievedanimportantcoupbysecuringdetailsofJapan’spetroleumreserves.InJuly,Ottdispatched
SorgetoShanghaitoinvestigatetheprospectsofamediatedJapan–Chinapeace.Onhisreturn,
Hanakosaidthatshehadbeenquestionedabouthimbythepolice.Whenanofficervisitedthehouse
againshortlyafterwards,Sorgewasangryenoughtohittheman.Heescapedarrestfortheassault,
butitisplainthathewasclosetoanervousbreakdown.
HereportedtoMoscowthattheJapanesehadbeenreinforcingtheirtroopsinManchuria,butever
moreofhismaterialwasfailingtoreachtheGRU–forinstance,asignificantmessageabout
shrinkingJapanesepetrolstocks–becauseClausencouldnothandlethestackofmessagesawaiting
encryptionandtransmission.On20August,however,asignaldidgettoitsdestination,sayingthat
Japan’smilitaryleadershipwasstillunwillingtoenterthewar,pendingdecisiveGermansuccessin
theWest,butthisended–again,inconclusively–‘Japanmightnotjointhewarthisyear,althoughthe
decisionhasnotyetbeentaken.’InAugustalso,OzakivisitedManchuriainhisroleasanimportant
advisertotherailwaymanagement.On14SeptemberthisyieldedareporttotheRussiansthatthe
JapanesewerereducingtheirimmediatemilitarycommitmentinManchuria,butwerebuildinganew
strategicroadtothefrontierinpreparationforapossiblewarwiththeSovietUnionin1942.On
Saturday,4October,afurthermessagestatedthatanearlyJapaneseattackonRussiawasnowhighly
unlikely.ThisprovedtobethelasttransmissionMaxClausenevermade.
On10October1941theTokkosecuritypolicearrestedfirstTomoKitabayashi,thenYotoku
Miyagi,bothformermembersoftheAmericanCommunistParty.Inthelatter ’sroomsearchers
foundareportonJapan’soilstocks,unlikelyreadingmaterialforaprofessionalartist.Duringhis
interrogation,Miyagisuddenlysprangtohisfeetandleaptoutofawindow,inasuicidebid.Hefell
twostoreys,asdidapoliceofficerwhojumpedinpursuit.Bothmensurvived.Underfurther
questioningMiyagitoldallheknew,revealingthenamesofClausen,Voukelitch,Ozaki–andSorge.
AtfirsttheTokkoflatlydeclinedtoconsiderarrestingthelastofthese,becauseofhisstatusasa
prominentmemberoftheGermanembassycommunity.On15October,however,Ozakiwasarrested
athishome,andatMeguropolicestationbegantotalkalmostimmediately.Hebecameoutspokento
hisinquisitors,declaringconfidentlyonthe18thwhentheTojogovernmentsucceededthatofPrince
Konoye:‘ThiscabinetistheonewhichisgoingtowaragainsttheUnitedStates.’Clausen,Voukelitch
andSorgewereallarrestedintheirhomesonthatsameday.Thewireless-operatormadenoattempt
todestroyhiscodes,andhadpreservedcopiesofscoresofmessageshehadtransmitted.Insteadof
killingthemselves,astheircaptorsexpected,mostoftheprisonerstalkedtheirheadsoff.Itremains
disputedwhetherthiswasaconsequenceoftortureor–quiteplausibly–becausetheyweremorally
exhausted.AllwerequestionedinEnglish.
Sorge,alone,initiallyheldout.HewasvisitedbyEugenOtt,whowasnotmerelyfuriouslyangry
withtheJapanesepolice,butalsostubbornlydisbelievingofhisfriend’sguilt–asheremainedinto
oldage.On24October,however,thespysuddenlybroke.Hewrotewithapencil:‘Ihavebeenan
internationalCommunistsince1925,’thenburstintotears.Hisinterrogators,overwhelmedbythe
compulsivefloodofdisclosuresthatfollowed,providedhimwithatypewriter.Hesetabout
composingadetailednarrativeofhisexperiences,mostofwhichwassubsequentlydestroyedinthe
1945Tokyofire-bombing.HeaskedhisjailerstocontacttheRussiansandattempttoarrangean
exchange,aproposalwhichelicitedastonyresponsefromtheSovietembassy.TheGermanmission
succumbedtoasustainedtrauma,shockwavesfromwhichreachedBerlin.TheGestapo’sJoseph
Meisingerwasdisgracedforhisegregiousfailureassecurityofficer,andWalterSchellenbergwas
reprimandedbyHimmler.Ottwassummarilyrecalled,andHitlerinformed.Yetinaccordancewith
theerraticconductoftyrannies,theFührerchosenottoexactdrasticpenalties.Theambassador
suffereddismissal,butescapedtheexecutionerswhowouldsurelyhaveawaitedhiminMoscow,had
hebeenStalin’sservant.
ThespiesmeanwhilelanguishedinTokyoprisons.DuringtheSecondWorldWartheJapanese
behavedwithinstitutionalisedbarbaritytowardsvastnumbersofenemiesintheirpower.Itisbizarre,
therefore,thattheTokkoandthejusticesystemappeartohavetreatedRichardSorgeandmostofthe
membersofhisringrelativelyhumanely,thoughtheyspenttheensuingthreeyearsinprisoncells.
Whileallwererepeatedlyandsometimesharshlyinterrogated,thereisnoevidencethattheywere
tortured,asTokyo’sprisonersweresooftentortured;noneoftheirfamilymembersorassociates
werepersecutedorkilled.Japaneserestraintwasprobablypromptedbyareluctancegratuitouslyto
provokeMoscow,atatimewhenTokyowasincreasinglydesperatetoavoidwaronanewfront.
VoukelitchdiedinprisononHokkaidoon13January1945,butClausensurvivedthewarandwas
releasedon8Octoberthatyear.HeflewtoMoscow,andthereafterlivedinretirementwithhiswifein
EastGermany.
ThetrialsofSorgeandOzakidraggedonuntilSeptember1943,whenthetwomenbecamethe
onlymembersoftheringtoreceivecapitalsentences.Thesewerecarriedouton7November1944,
atTokyo’sSugamoprison.Itsgovernor,KikuyasaIchijima,attendedindressuniform.Ozakichose
todonablackceremonialkimonoandblacktabibeforehewashoodedandbound.Fourexecutioners
sprangthetraptogether,sothatnoonemanboretheresponsibilityforkillinganother–this,inthe
midstofawarinwhichtensofmillionswerebeingslaughtered.Sorgewasthensummoned,wearing
darktrousers,anopen-neckedshirtandloosejacket.Thegovernordemandedformally:‘Areyou
RichardSorge?’andthecondemnedmanassented.Thenheasked,‘Isittoday?’anditwasthe
governor ’sturntonod.SorgestatedthathewishedhispropertytogotoAnnaClausen,wifeofhis
wireless-operator,andshedulyreceivedtheyenequivalentofsomeUS$4,000–Hanako’sslavish
loyaltytohimwasnotreciprocated.Hewasofferedtheritualteaandcakes,whichhedeclined,asking
insteadforacigarette.Thegovernorsaidthiswasagainsttherules.TheattendingTokkoofficer
urgedallowingthislastrequest,butIchijimawasfirm.
Sorgeremainedcalmashewasbound,thencriedoutinhaltingJapanese,‘Sakigun!’–theRed
Army;‘KokusaiKyosanto!’–theInternationalCommunistParty;‘SovietKyosanto!’–theSoviet
CommunistParty.TheTokkowitnesssaidlaterthathespokelikeamanutteringaprayer.Other
versionsofSorge’slastwordshavebeensuggested,butthisoneseemsthemostcredible:hesought
todignifythelaboursofhislifeatitsending,andspokeinthelanguagewhichwouldensurethathe
wasunderstood.At10.20a.m.thetrapwassprung,andafternineteenminuteshewaspronounced
dead.NeithertheGermannortheSovietembassywantedanythingtodowithhisbody,andthusitwas
committedtotheprisongraveyard.
Likemostsecretagents,RichardSorgewasanabnormalhumanbeing,whogainedanemotional
chargefromhiscomplexexistenceandmultipledeceits.Hehadmorethanalittleincommonwith
KimPhilby–charmandastreakofrecklessnesswhichrenderedastonishingthelongevityofboth
menintheirroles.Sorgeretainscelebritybecausehewasaremarkablepersonality,andalsobecause
veryfewspies,andcertainlynowartimeBritish,AmericanorGermanagent,gainedsuchaccessto
highplaces.Itismuchmoredoubtful,however,thathealonechangedanyhistory:‘Allthingsare
alwaysonthemovesimultaneously.’
3 TH E S EC O ND S O UR C E
ThearrestofRichardSorgeandthebreak-upofhisnetworkisoftensupposedtohavemarkedthe
endofSovietpenetrationofwartimeJapan.Yetthiswasnotthecase.Centrehadanotherimportant
sourceonTokyo’saffairs–andpossiblyalsoaccesstosomeofitscodes.CaptainSergeiTolstoy,the
JapanesespecialistintheNKVD’sFifth(Cipher)Directorate,becamethemostdecoratedSoviet
cryptanalystofthewar,closelyfollowedbyBorisAronsky.SomemodernRussianwriterssuggest
thatTolstoy’steamthusprovidedtheKremlinwithinformationaboutTokyo’sintentionsbasedon
betterauthoritiesthanSorgeoffered.InOctoberandNovember1941eightSovietrifledivisions,a
thousandtanksandathousandaircraftweremovedtotheWesternFront.TheRussiansclaimtohave
reada27NovemberinstructionfromTokyotoBaronŌshimainBerlin:‘seeHitlerandRibbentrop,
andexplaintotheminsecretourrelationswiththeUnitedStates…ExplaintoHitlerthatthemain
Japaneseeffortswillbeconcentratedinthesouthandthatweproposetorefrainfromdeliberate
operationsinnorth[againsttheSovietUnion].’ThissignalwasallegedlyforwardedtoMoscowby
KimPhilby,viatheNKVD’sLondonstation.Allthatseemscertainisthatinthemonthsfollowingthe
onsetof‘Barbarossa’theRussianshadplentyofinformantsotherthanSorgetellingthemthattheir
easternflankwassafe.
TheyneverremotelymatchedtheachievementsofBletchley,ArlingtonHallandOp-20-G,because
theywereincapableofbuildingbombes,andwouldneverhavelicensedthesortofyoungiconoclasts
wholedtheBritishoperation.Westerncryptographicexpertsalsoarguethat,tohavereadPurple
consistently,theywouldneedtohavematchedtheAmericanachievementinbuildingareplicaofthe
machine,forwhichSoviettechnologicalskillswerealmostcertainlyinadequate,andforwhichthe
Russianshaveneverproducedevidence–theGermans’OKW/ChifailedtobreakPurple.Itisnot
unlikelythatTokyo’scabletoŌshimawaspassedtoMoscowfromWashingtonorLondonbyan
AmericanorBritishtraitor,ratherthanbrokenbytheFifthDirectorate.
YettheRussianshadmoresuccessinreadingatleastlowerenemywirelesstrafficthanis
sometimesrecognised.ThereisnownodoubtthatvaluablecodingmaterialwasprovidedtoCentre
byaJapaneseinformant,IzumiKozo,whosestorydeservestobebetterknown.Hewasanunusually
giftedlinguistwhospokebothRussianandEnglish.Attheageofthirty-threein1925,hewasposted
tohiscountry’snewlyopenedMoscowembassy.Herentedaroomfromageneral’swidownamed
ElizavetaPerskaya,whosedaughterElenawasaliteraturegraduatewhoworkedinthelibraryofthe
InternalAffairsMinistry.KozofellinlovewithElena,andtheyweremarriedtwoyearslater.The
wholefamilywas,inevitably,onthebooksoftheOGPU,notleastbecauseElizaveta’ssonhadbeen
executedforanti-Bolshevikactivities.
ItseemsalmostcertainthatElenawasorderedbyacaseofficertostartarelationshipwithKozo.
WhenhewasrepostedtotheJapaneseconsulateinHarbin,hiswife,mother-in-lawandababyboy
accompaniedhim.Thereafter,however,ElenabrokeoffcontactwiththeNKVDandwasdeprivedof
herSovietcitizenship.WhenhermotherElizavetawasrashenoughtoreturntoMoscow,shewas
promptlyarrestedandsentencedtotenyears’imprisonmentforespionage.Aseconddaughter,Vera,
wasshotalongwithherhusband,thoughthefamilywastoldthatshewasconfinedinapsychiatric
hospital.ItishardtobelievethattheKozofamilydiscoveredmanycausesformirthintheirlives.
In1935IzumibecamethirdsecretaryattheJapaneseembassyinPrague.Twoyearslater,Elena
presentedherselfatthelocalSovietembassytodeliveraformalrequestforhercitizenshiptobe
restoredsoshecouldreturnhomeandbringuphersoninMoscow.Theboywasnot,shesaid,the
sonofKozo,thoughthediplomathadadoptedhimassuch.MoscowCentreconsideredthisproposal.
Thetroubledwomanwasaskedifherhusbandworkedinintelligence;shesaidsheonlyknewthathe
hadbeenlearningFrenchandGerman,andspentalotoftimereadingtheRussianémigrépress.The
NKVD’sverdictwasthatitshandlersshouldreopencontactwithElena,inhopesofsecuringaccessto
Japan’sdiplomaticcodes.Theyhadtwolevers:whateverElenafeltaboutherhusband,hewas
passionatelycommittedtobothherandtheboy;moreover,hedeploredJapan’saggressiveforeign
policy.
CashprovidedafurthermotivetoMrsIzumi,ifnottoherhusband:atameetinginPragueon3
May1938,ElenaofferedsevenJapanesecodebooksfor£10,000,andwhenthisdealwasrejectedshe
tookthematerialbacktotheembassy.InSeptembersherenewedthenegotiation,thistimeaskingfor
£5,000and£100amonth.Itremainsuncertainhowmuchshefinallyreceived,buttheNKVD’sPrague
residentdulyreceivedsevencodebooksandassortedsecrettelegramswhichwerewelcomedin
Moscow,andappeartohaveenabledtheSovietstoreadsomeTokyodiplomatictraffic.Amidthe
post-Munichcrisis,JapaneseembassyfamilieswereevacuatedtoFinland,butKozoremainedin
PragueuntillateOctober.Thoughnotaprofessionalintelligenceofficer,hewasperformingsome
intelligencetasks,andwassoonabletodiverttohisNKVDcaseofficertelegramsanddetailsof
Tokyo’slocalagents.On4Octoberhedeliveredabatchoftwenty-fivemessagesfromBerlin,
twenty-ninefromLondon,thirteenfromRomeandfifteenfromMoscow.Aweeklaterheprovideda
memorandumontheorganisationofJapaneseintelligenceabroad.TheNKVDremainedcautious
aboutKozo,however,anddecidedtoworkchieflythroughhiswife,whomtheywereconfidentthey
couldcontrol.TheveteranintelligenceofficerZoyaRybkinawaspostedtoHelsinkitohandleher.
Attheirfirstmeeting,ElenabesoughtRybkinatobeallowedtoreturnhome,butMoscowdecided
thiswasunacceptable,becauseherdeparturewouldbeboundtorouseTokyo’ssuspicionofKozo.
Throughmuchof1939theJapanesediplomat–codenamed‘Nero’–channelledastreamofreports
totheNKVDviaElena,aboutJapan’sintentionstoseekamilitaryalliancewithGermany,including
detailsofaconferenceinBerlinaboutajointintelligenceassaultonRussia.Kozohadjustbeenasked
fordetailsoftheJapaneseWarMinistry’snewcodewhentheRusso–Finnishwarerupted,andcontact
waslostuntilthespringof1940.ThediplomatwasthenpostedtoSofia,whereonefinemorning
ElenaarrivedunannouncedattheSovietembassy,anddemandedtoseetheNKVDresident.Shetold
himherhusbandwashappytoresumehisactivitiesonbehalfofMoscow,butthatsheherselfwanted
todivorcehimandtocomehome.Onceagain,Centreprevaricated,whilewelcomingthematerial
fromKozo.InNovember1940hehandedoverthelatestJapanesediplomaticcodes–bynow,of
course,Purplewasinforce–followedbyothermaterial,climaxinginApril1941withanotherbatch
ofciphertelegrams–302pagesinall–whichappearstohaveenabledMoscowthroughthesummer
toreadsometrafficbetweenTokyo’sembassies.
InMay1941,afterdomesticsceneswhichcanbeimaginedbetweenthelovelornJapaneseandhis
bitterlyalienatedRussianwife,ElenawasatlastgrantedherwishtoreturntoMoscowwithherson.
AfterherdepartureKozocontinuedtoforwardinformation,butneveragainsoughtcash;heasked
thatpaymentsshouldgotoElena,thoughitisunknownwhetherthiswasdone.Hissubsequent
offeringsincludeda21MayreportdescribingGerman–JapanesediscussionsinBerlinaboutan
attackontheSovietUnionintendedtostartwithintwomonths.On22June,followingtheonsetof
‘Barbarossa’,Tokyochangedallitsdiplomaticcodes,butKozowasquicklyabletoprovidethenew
onesforEurope,themoreeasilybecausehehimselfwaspromotedtoactingchargéd’affairesin
Sofia.HewentonpassingMoscowimportantcodinginformationuntil1944,whenamidthegeneral
turmoilofEuropecontactwithhimwasbroken.
AfterthewarheresumedhisworkfortheNKVD,whichcontinueduntil1952.Nothingisknownof
thelaterfortunesofElenaorhermother.AslongastheintelligencefilesoftheNKVDandGRU
remainclosedtoresearchers,itisimpossibletoknowhowmuchJapanesediplomatictrafficwasread
inMoscow.AsBletchley’sexperienceshowed,itwasnotenoughtosecuredetailsoftheenemy’s
cipheringtechnologyandcodebooks:immenseintellectualinputandelectro-mechanicalaidswere
alsorequiredinordertoreadenemysignalsquicklyenoughtobeofoperationalusetotheRed
Army.But,givenKozo’sundoubtedroleasaninformant,itseemsplausiblethathismaterialenabled
theRussianstoaccessatleastsomeofthesameinformationasSorgesentfromTokyoaboutJapan’s
decisionnottoattackStalinuntiltheSovietUnion’sdoomwasassured.Andunlikethespy,he
continuedtopasscodingsecretsuntilthelaststageofthewar.
4 GO UR EV I TC H TA K ES ATR A I N
AwirelessmessagefromCentretoMoscow’sforeignstationsconfirmedthenewsof22June1941:
‘Fascistbeastshaveinvadedthemotherlandoftheworkingclasses.Youarecalledupontocarryout
yourtasksinGermanytothebestofyourability(signed)Director.’TheagentsofthevastSovietspy
networksinEuropewereprofoundlyshaken,aswelltheymightbe,byearlyGermansuccesses,and
discussedthemfeverishlywhenevertheymet.InSwitzerland,the‘Lucy’Ringintensifieditsefforts
anditsreporting.On2July,AlexanderRadóreportedthatMoscowwasHitler ’smainobjective,and
thathisarmies’otherthrustswerediversionary.Germany’sgeneralscertainlywishedthatthiswas
true,whichmayhelptoexplaintheinformationpassedtoRadófromBerlin.Inreality,however,to
thegeneralstaff’sfuryHitlerhadinsistedonstrikingsouthwithequalvigour,towardstheoilofthe
Caucasus.On7AugustRadócitedanassurancebytheJapaneseambassadorinBernthattherewasno
questionofhiscountryattackingtheSovietUnionuntilGermanywasvictorious.Before
‘Barbarossa’,AlexanderFootetransmittedtoMoscowonlytwiceaweek,at1a.m.Nowhewas
dispatchingmessagesalmostdaily,someofthemcontainingdetailedGermanorder-of-battle
material.
FundingbecameaproblemforthespiesonceRussiabecameabelligerent,sincecashcouldno
longerbechannelledthroughitsdiplomaticmissions.MoneywasthelifebloodoftheRing,notleast
because‘Lutzi’–RudolfRössler,themercenary–wouldnotsingwithoutit.Once,absurdly,Centre
instructedAlexanderFootetotraveltoVichytoreceiveapayment,asifanEnglishmancouldstrollat
willintoalienterritory.EventuallyMoscowdevisedasystemwherebymoneywaspaidintoaUS
bank,whichwasthencreditedtoitsGenevabranch.ThissuitedtheAmericans,whomadea100per
centprofitoneverytransactionbyemployingtheofficialdollar–francexchangerate,ratherthanthe
realblack-marketone.Hundredsofthousandsofdollarswereeventuallytransferredinthisway,
thoughCentreneverentrustedanagentwithmorethan$10,000atatime,lestthetemptationto‘go
private’becameirresistible.
RösslerwasrepeatedlypressedbyMoscow,throughRadó,torevealhissources,andequally
insistentlyhedeclinedtodoso.DrChristianSchneider,aGermanémigrécodenamed‘Taylor ’,
joinedRössler ’sbusiness.AsatestofhisworthhewasinvitedtoidentifyGermanformations
deployedontheSouthernFrontinRussia,togetherwiththenumberofWehrmachtPoWsinSoviet
hands.Whenherespondedcorrectlytobothquestions,Moscowwassuitablyimpressed.Wehrmacht
chiefofstaffGen.FranzHalderlaterragedabouttheleakinessofOKWandOKH:‘Almostevery
offensiveoperationofourswasbetrayedtotheenemyevenbeforeitappearedonmydesk.’
Speculationhaspersistedintothetwenty-firstcenturyaboutthesourceofRössler ’sextraordinary
informationstream.HehimselfindicatedthathehadarangeofcontactsintheGermanhigh
command.EasternFrontintelligencechiefReinhardGehlenlaterclaimed,absurdly,thatMartin
BormannwasinRössler ’spay.
RadórevealedafterthewarthatthesourcesheandRösslerhadguardedsozealouslyforsolong
were…stripsofpunchedpaper.Eachdayofthewar,morethan3,000teleprintermessageswere
dispatchedfromOKW’scommunicationscentretotheFührerquartier,unencryptedsincethelinkwas
asecurelandline.OneofRössler ’sagentspersuadedtwofemaleteleprinteroperatorstopasstohim
‘spent’ribbons,intendedfordestruction.Bythismeansthespyreceivedcopiesofsome4,500top
secretmessagesandeighthundredspecialreports,whichweresubsequentlycarriedbycourierto
Switzerland.Ifthisversionofeventsisaccurate,thenRössler ’snotionalsub-agents–codenamed
‘Olga’,‘Werther ’,‘Teddi’,‘Anna’,‘Ferdinand’–wereinrealitymerepapercreations.
Thetruthwillneverbeknown.AllthatiscertainisthatRösslersuppliedtoRadóforonward
transmissiontoMoscowanastonishingvolumeofhighlyclassifiedinformation,ofwhichfragments
interceptedbytheAbwehrhavebeenpublished.HewarnedinMarch1943oftheGermanintentionto
attackatKursk.On15AprilhepassedonHitler ’soperationalorderfortheoffensive,thenon20and
29Aprilflaggedsuccessivedelays,finallyreportingthatOperation‘Citadel’wasscheduledfor12
June.On17Aprilhecataloguednewtankandinfantryformationsbeingcreated,withtheirlocations
andidentifications;a28JunesignaldetailedtheLuftwaffe’sorderofbattle,whileanother
summarisedPanthertankproduction.On25Septemberheprovidedminutesofaneconomic
conferenceheldatHitler ’sheadquarters.IfRadó’sstoryofthestolenteleprintertapesseems
implausible,onlythatoranotherequallyastonishingnarrativecanexplainthequalityofhismaterial.
ThoughtheSwissring’sintelligencedidnotmatchthevolumeandprecisionofthatwhichtheBritish
garneredthroughBletchleyPark,itprovidedtheRussianswithincomparablybettermaterialthanthe
GermanssecuredaboutAlliedmilitaryoperations.
Theevidencesuggests,however,thatMoscowappreciatedthe‘Lucy’Ring’soutputbelowitstrue
worth.Inparticular,insteadofrecognisinginconsistenciesandinaccuraciesasreflectionsofchanges
ofplaninBerlin,thefamiliar,corrosiveSovietparanoiapromptedarisingconvictionintheminds
oftheNKVD–whichpersistedtothewar ’send–thatRösslerandRadóoftheGRUwereconsciously
orunconsciouslyinvolvedinaNazideception.ThemostfantastictwistherewasthatSoviet
suspicionssoaredwhentheyfoundthatsomeGermanmaterialbeingpassedtothembyBritish
traitorsmatchedthatemergingfromSwitzerland.Could‘Lutzi’andherfriendsbepartofan
elaborateBritishplot?NobodyinMoscow,asfarascanbediscovered,hitupontherealandsimple
explanation–thattheGRU’sSwissagentswereforwardingsomeofthesameGermansignalsbeing
interceptedbyGC&CSatBletchleyPark.
CommunicationbetweentheRedOrchestraandMoscowwaslostfromJunetoNovember1941,when
theWehrmachtswepteastwardsintoRussia,drivingtheNKVD’swirelessreceiversbeyondrangeof
theirBerlinagents’weaktransmitters.ItbecameamatterofurgencyfortheRussianstoregain
contactwithHarnack,Schulze-Boysenand‘Breitenbach’,andifpossibletodiscoverthefateoftheir
networkinPrague,whichhadalsogonesilent.InconsequenceCentrebrokeeveryruleofespionage
byorderingtheGRU’sLeopoldTreppertofindmeanstocontacttheNKVDnetworksinHitler ’s
capital.Thoughthespies’wirelesseswereoutofreachofMoscow,ifprovidedwiththenecessary
codesandschedulestheycouldtransmitmessagestoBelgium,forforwardingtoCentre.In
September,TrepperreturnedtoBrusselsfromParistodiscussthisassignmentwithAnatoli
Gourevitch,‘MonsieurKent’.
Gourevitch’smostnotableachievementsince1940hadbeentocreateinBelgium,withMoscow’s
moneyandloansfromfriends,anentirelynewtradingcompany,christened‘Simexco’andbasedin
elegantrentedofficesontheRueRoyale,toprovidecoverforthenetwork–and,eventually,
amazinglysubstantialprofits.Heboughtacompanycarandhiredachauffeur.Heworked
energeticallyatcreatingrelationshipswiththenewGermanmastersofBrussels,mostofwhom
provedeminentlycorruptible,especiallyMajorKranzbühler,aprominentfigureintheNazi
administrationwhocheerfullyprovidedpasses,curfewlaissez-passersandlettersofintroductionfor
thecompany’sdirector-general,whowassopleasinglyeagertocollaborate.Gourevitchcemented
Kranzbühler ’sgoodwillbyprocuringanabortionfortheGerman’slocalmistress.Withhisown
loverMargaretBarczaactingashostess,theGRUagentbegantoprovidelavishentertainmentsfor
Germansandfellow-collaborators,whobaskedinCentre’slargesse.Heacquiredontheblackmarket
petrolcouponswhichenabledhimtodrivewithMargaretintothecountrysidetobuyhams,chickens,
butterandsuchlikedelicaciesnowdeniedtoordinaryBelgians.
HeforgedbusinessrelationshipswithGermancompanieseagertobreakintotheprofitable
marketsofoccupiedEurope,andespeciallywiththeNazis’TodtOrganisation.Fromthelatterhe
securedandfulfilledalargeorderforcheapspoonsandforkstobeissuedtoGermany’smultitudeof
prisoners,politicalandmilitary.AParisbranchofSimexco,calledSimex,openedanofficeabovethe
famousLidorestaurant,fromwhichitservicedmanyofTrepper ’sagents.Whilethisremarkableand
expensiveoperationwasusefulforsustainingtheGRUnetworks’cover,thereisnodoubtthat
Gourevitch,thepharmacist’ssonfromKharkovandformerstalwartoftheYoungCommunist
movement,alsohugelyenjoyedhismasqueradeasarichbusinessman,playboyandpatronofthe
blackmarket.
Heprovidednotestimonyabouttheattitudeadoptedtowardshimselfandhiscirclebyordinary
Belgians,whohatedtheoccupationandlivedinterroroftheNazis,butitiseasytoguess.Thereis
littleevidenceaboutwhatintelligence‘Kent’s’informantscollectedforMoscow,thoughheprofessed
thathisTodtOrganisationcontactsenabledhimtojointhe‘Lucy’Ringinwarningofthe
forthcominginvasionofRussia.WhatiscertainisthatCentre’sfundingofthenetworksstopped
abruptlyinJune1941,withtheexpulsionofSovietdiplomatsfromWesternEurope.Thereafter,
GourevitchandTrepperweredependentforcashupontheprofitsofSimexcoandSimex.Itwasa
drolltwistthatthetwoagentswerethusobligedtobecomeenergeticandnotablysuccessfulcapitalist
entrepreneursaswellascommunistintelligence-gatherers.
Now,inSeptember1941,herewasTrepperaskingGourevitchifsomebodyfromSimexcocould
findacredibleexcusetovisitPragueandBerlin.‘Kent’saidthathehimselfwastheonlypersonwith
thecoverandconnectionstosecurethenecessaryauthorisations.Hebeganbythrowingalavishrural
picnic,followedbyadinnerathome,forhisforemostGermanfriends,atwhichhetoldKranzbühler
ofthebusinesstriphewantedtomake.TheNaziofficerrespondedwithouthesitationthat‘Vincente
Sierra’hadalwaysbeenhelpfultoGermaninterests;hewassurethenecessarydocumentscouldbe
provided.Andsotheywere.InOctober1941Gourevitchtravelledwithouthindrancethrough
GermanytooccupiedPrague,wherehesetaboutreconnoitringtheaddressessuppliedtohimby
Moscow.Hedislikedwhathefound.Thepremisesechoedempty.Hefeltaninstinctiveunease–and
walkedaway.Hishunchwasright:theGermanshadrolleduptheGRU’sPraguegroupmonths
earlier.
GourevitchmovedontoBerlin,wherehecheckedintothecity’sgrandExcelsiorhotel.Hethen
addressedthecontactsnamedbyCentre:IlseStöbe,HarroSchulze-Boysen,ArvidHarnackand
others.Inresponsetoaphonecall,Stöbe’smothertoldhimthatIlsewasinDresden,and
uncontactable.NexthetriedKurtSchulze,theformertaxi-driverwhoactedastheStöbenetwork’s
wireless-operator–andmetwithmoresuccess.HevisitedSchulze’shouseandspentseveralhours
briefinghimonnewradioschedules,alsosupplyingthebookphrasenecessarytoencodemessages.
ThenGourevitchsetofftoreconnoitre19AlternburgerAllee,whichhedescribedas‘abig,
imposinghouse’–theSchulze-Boysens’home.HereturnedtotheExcelsiorwithoutapproachingit,
havingmerelysatisfiedhimselfthathewasnotbeingfollowed,thenfilledthefollowingmorning
withbusinessmeetingsonbehalfofSimexco.Thatevening,atlasthetelephonedtheSchulzeBoysens,andgaveanagreedpasswordtoHarro’swifeLibertas.Shecheerfullyurgedhimtocome
onover;herhusbandwasatworkintheAirMinistry,butshewouldbehappytoseehim.Gourevitch
suggestedthatinsteadtheyshouldmeetatanearbyU-Bahnstationandtakeawalk.Hewouldbe
readilyidentifiablebythecigarhewassmokingandthecrocodilebriefcasehecarried.Fifteen
minuteslater‘anelegantyoungwoman’,walkingrapidly,approachedhimwithouthesitationand
extendedherhand.‘CallmeLibertas,’shesaid.HerfriendlinessdispelledtheRussian’sapprehension.
Hewasimpressedbyherprofessionalism:nowatcher,hesaid,wouldguessthattheyweremeeting
forthefirsttime.‘IneverforgetthatIamactingapart,’shesaid.Sheaddedthatherhusbandhadlong
awaited‘Kent’s’arrival–hewantedtheGRUmantomeetsomeoftheirfriends.Thenetworkwasin
fineshape,shesaid–‘weareallsafeandsound’–workinghardandabsolutelycommittedtotheir
commonideals.Tobesure,lifewasnoteasy,‘butthefuturelooksbrightertodaythanitdid
yesterday’–becauseoftheSovietagent’sarrival.
Shewarnedhimnottotelephoneagain,becausetheyassumedthattheirlinewastapped;forallhis
fluencyinGerman,Gourevitch’saccentwasobviouslyforeign.Sheaskedhisname,which
momentarilyembarrassedhim,becausehewasunabletoreciprocateherfrankness.‘CallmeValdes,’
hesaid.Theybothlaughed.LibertastalkedaboutherworkforthePropagandaMinistry,producing
cartoonfilmsfortheregime.Shewarnedhimthathisclothes,inwhichtheGRUmantooksuchpride,
markedhimoutasaforeigner.Thentheyparted,andtheRussianreturnedtotheExcelsior.
Thefollowingevening,amidaheavysnowfall,heapproachedanagreedrendezvous,atwhichhe
almostsufferedheartfailurewhenapproachedbyauniformedofficer.ThenHarroSchulze-Boysen
oftheLuftwaffeintroducedhimself,sayingeagerly,‘I’mthrilledtoseeyou.’HeledGourevitchto
hishome,wheretheydonnedslippersastheycameinoutofthewhiteness.Thevisitorwasshown
intoahandsomelibrary,inwhichhenoticedRussianbooksalongsideGermanones,someofthem
Sovietpublications.Schulze-Boysencouldscarcelybedescribedassecurityconscious,thoughhe
saidthathecouldexplainawaysuchreadingmattertotheGestapoasnecessaryforhisworkatthe
AirMinistry.HetoldGourevitchthatnotonlydidhelovepoetry,healsowroteversehimself,though
henowfoundthetimesunsympathetictohismuse.Heprofferedaglassofvodka,observing
laconically,‘spoilsofwar ’.Thentheysatdowntodinner.
Astheytalked,Gourevitchreflectedlater,‘Icouldnotridmyselfofasenseofunreality.Itseemed
completelyincrediblethat,amidareignofterror,wheneverybodywasspyinguponeverybodyelse,
agroupofmencouldhavesuccessfullypenetratedtheorgansofstateandthearmedforcesatriskof
theirlives,sothatGermanycouldregainitshonourandtheGermanpeopletheirfreedom.’He
sufferedadifficultmomentwhenSchulze-BoysenaskedhimdirectlyhowitwaspossiblethatRussia
wassurprisedinJune1941,whenhisowngrouphadwarnedrepeatedlyof‘Barbarossa’s’imminence.
Neither‘Kent’noranymansaveStalincouldprovideananswer.
Gourevitchrecordedthat,inconversationalonewithSchulze-BoysenwhenLibertasleftthemafter
dinner,theyagreedthattherewasnopurposeinhismeetingothermembersofthegroup;itsufficed
thatthevisitorhadgiventhevitalcommunicationsinstructionstoKurtSchulze.Theypartedafter
warmembraces,andtheRussianreturnedtohishotel.Hethenspenthourscomposingadetailed
reportforMoscowontheconversation,writteninsecretinkinapocketnotebook.Byyetanotherof
theblackcomicchancesinseparablefromespionage,onreachingBrusselsinthefirstdaysof
November1941hefoundthathis‘invisible’noteswereperfectlylegible,probablyexposedbythe
heatintherailwaycarriagefromBerlin–‘Kent’wouldhavebeenatthemercyofanyinquisitive
borderpoliceman.Butnosuchfigureintervened,andhesurvivedhisperilousjourneyunscathed.He
dispatchedalongreporttoMoscow,detailingtheGermanarmedforces’predicamentinRussiaas
describedbySchulze-Boysen.ThiswassupposedlyshowntoStalin,thoughitincludedonefalseand
highlydamagingpieceofinformation:aclaimthatCanarishadsuccessfullyrecruitedtotheAxis
causeAndréDewavrin,‘ColonelPassy’,GeneraldeGaulle’schiefofintelligenceinLondon.
TheBerlinnetworksnowbegantorelayreportstoMoscowviatheTreppergroup’stransmitters.It
wasduringthemonthsthatfollowedthattheGermanspickeduptheirsignals.Whilestillignorantof
theidentitiesofHarnack,Schulze-Boysenoranyoftheircontacts,theydeducedthatthesewere
communistagents,addressingMoscow,andchristenedthenetworkDieRoteKapelle–theRed
Orchestra.Thisnamedistinguisheditfromtheregime’sotherimportantsecretenemy–DieSchwartz
Kapelle,theBlackOrchestra,thenamegiventothosestrivingtoencompassHitler ’sdeath.
AmongearlyfruitsoftheOrchestra’srenewedlabours,asrelayedtoStalin’sStateDefence
Committeeon2December1941,wasareportontheWehrmacht’sfuelstate,showingreserves
adequateuntilFebruaryorMarch;thereafter,theGermanswerepinningtheirhopesonexploitingthe
SovietoilwellsatMaikop.MoscowwastoldthattheLuftwaffehadsufferedseverelosses,especially
inCrete,andwasreducedtoaserviceablestrengthof2,500aircraft.AfurtherDecemberreport
warnedofanewMesserschmittvariantarmedwithtwocannonandtwomachine-guns,capableof
600kph;aproximity-fusedanti-aircraftshell;developmentworkonhydrogen-peroxide-fuelled
aircraft.ArmyGroupB,saidtheRoteKapelle,wouldattackonanaxisthroughVoronezhinthe
spring–asindeeditdid.Berlinintendeditstroopconcentrationstobecompletedby1Mayforthe
advanceontheCaucasus.On17JanuarytheStavka–armedforceshighcommand–alsoreceivedan
interceptedItalianciphertelegramfromBucharest,reportingablockonRomanianrailtraffic,to
allowthroughhundredsofGermantrooptrains,headedforsouthernRussia.
TheRussianswerewarnedofaGermandeceptionplancodenamed‘Kremlin’,designedto
promoteexpectationsthatHitler ’sforceswouldrenewtheirwinterassaultonMoscow–conspicuous
Luftwaffereconnaissanceofthecityapproaches,afakeattackorderdated29May1942,signedby
Field-MarshalKlugeofArmyGroupCentre.By23MarchtheGRUwasasserting:‘Thissummerthe
GermanswillattemptnotmerelytoreachtheVolgaandCaspian,butalsotocarryoutmajor
operationsagainstMoscowandLeningrad.’TheRedOrchestraremainedinsistentthatMoscowwasa
secondaryobjective–thatStalingradandtheCaucasuswereHitler ’sprimetargets.TheStavka,
however,chosetoignoreitsagents;Stalindeployedhisarmiesforthe1942fightingseasononthe
assumptionthatthethreattothecapitalwasthemostserious.TheinformationgarneredbytheRed
Orchestraandthe‘Lucy’Ring,atsuchrisktosomanylives,alteredlittleintheKremlin’sdecisionmaking,butwouldsoonsweepawaythespies:Germany’scounter-intelligenceagenciesbeganto
fumbletheirwaytowardsexposureofthenetworksledbyHarnackandSchulze-Boysen.
7
Britain’sSecretWarMachine
1 TH E S H A R P END
Britain’sintelligencemachineryworkedbetterthanthatofanyothernationatwar,andexercisedan
especiallycriticalinfluenceonthewaratsea.Acasehistory:justafterthefallofdarknesson8
November1941,asquadronoftheRoyalNavy,ForceK,ledbythelightcruisersAuroraand
Penelope,sailedfromMalta’sGrandHarbour,thensteamednorthathighspeed,thrashingthesea.At
4a.m.,140mileseastofSyracuse,theBritishwarshipsmetanItaliansupplyconvoyboundforNorth
Africa.Havingworkedup-moonwithouttheirpresencebeingdetected,thecruiserstrainedtheirsixinchgunsandopenedfire,burstingopenthenightwithstarshellbeforeraininghighexplosiveonthe
haplessenemy.Forhalfanhourtheywroughtdevastation:sevenmerchantmentotalling39,000tons
wereleftsinkingorsunk,togetherwithoneofthesixdestroyersoftheItaliancloseescort.From
Aurora’sbridge,CaptainWilliamAgnew’sonlysignaloftheactionwasawarningtohisships,‘do
notwasteammunition’,becausestocksatMaltawerelow.Anenemycoveringforceoftwoheavy
cruisersandfourmoredestroyers,lackingradar,failedtointervene.At1p.m.thetriumphantBritish
squadronreacheditsMalteseanchorageunscathed,toreceivethecongratulationsofAdmiralSir
AndrewCunningham,C-in-CMediterranean,onanactionthathedescribedas‘abrilliantexampleof
leadershipandforethought’.Mussolini’sforeignministerCountCianofumedinhisdiaryaboutthe
engagement,‘theresultsofwhichareinexplicable.All,Imeanall,ourmerchantshipsweresunk.’
TheRoyalNavyhadfallenonthem‘aswolvesamongthesheep’.
On24November,ForceKrepeatedthissuccess.Itscrewswereenjoyingaroisteringshoreleave
whennewsreachedVallettaofanotherAxisconvoyintransit.Thesailorswerehastilyherdedbackon
board,thenthesleekcruiserssetforthtosea.Afterhoursofmanoeuvringtodeceiveenemy
reconnaissanceaircraftabouttheircourse,at3.45p.m.theycaughttwoGermanfreighters,Maritza
andProcida,carryingfueltotheLuftwaffeatBenghaziinjerrycansstackedasdeckcargo.Escorting
torpedoboatsfled.TheBritishcruiserslaunchedadramaticattackduringwhichtheiranti-aircraft
gunsfoughtoffLuftwaffeJu-88bombers,whilethemainarmamentrangedbyradaronthe
merchantmen.Thecrewshastilyabandonedshipasthefuelcargoeseruptedinflames.Thedestroyer
LivelypickedupGermanandItaliansurvivorsbeforethesquadronretiredtoMaltaattwenty-eight
knots.
Thesesuccesses,andothersinthesameseason,werenotthefruitsofmere‘forethought’bynaval
officers,asCunningham’scongratulatorysignalsuggested–theyrepresentedearlyachievementsof
Ultrainthewaratsea.FromJune1941BletchleywasreadingnotmerelytheLuftwaffe’straffic,
whichhighlighteditschronicallypoorfuelpositioninNorthAfrica,butalsoanincreasingstreamof
signals–sixhundredinJuly1941,risingto4,000ayearlater–reportingenemyMediterranean
convoymovements,andRommel’slogisticaldifficultiesashore.ItwastruethattheGermansalsohad
significantwirelessintelligencesuccessesintheMediterraneanwar–theB-Dienstwasbreakingand
reportingBritishmessageswhichrevealedsomeoftheirownconvoymovements,andtheAfrika
KorpsenjoyedthefruitsofexcellentsigintaboutBritain’sEighthArmy.ButUltra’scontributionwas
criticalinenablingCunningham’swarshipstointerdictAxissupplytrafficuntilearly1942,when
BritishnavallossesandGermandominance,especiallyoftheair,forseveralmonthsmadeit
impossibletoexploitdecrypts,intheabsenceofwarshipstomountattacksandfighterstocoverthem.
Here,aseverywhere,theunchangingrealitywasthatintelligencealonewasuseless,unless
sufficientforcewasavailableatsea,inthesky,oronthegroundtousesecretknowledgeeffectively.
UltraneverprovidedforewarningofallGermanmovements.Untiltheveryendofthewar,there
wereperiodsinwhichtheenemy’simpositionofwirelesssilence,delaysorinterruptionsinthe
deliveryofdecrypts,preventedtheAlliesfromputtingthemtopracticaluse.Churchilldemanded
testilyofAuchinleck,thenhisMiddleEastC-in-C:‘Areyougettingthesepricelessmessages(which
havenevererred)ingoodtime?’TheresponseacknowledgedthatUltrawas‘ofgreatvalue’,but
added,‘somearriveintimetobeoperationallyofuse,othersnotso’.Eventhecombinationofspies,
airreconnaissanceandUltrafailedtopreventoneofthenotableBritishhumiliationsof1942,the
passageup-ChanneloftheScharnhorst,GneisenauandPrinzEugen,prideofHitler ’sfleet,within
twentymilesofthecliffsofDover.ThiswasaneventthatshockedParliamentandChurchill’speople
inthatseasonofheavydefeatsinthedesertandtheFarEast.
TheshipshadbeendeployedtoBrestinthespringof1941,atahigh-watermarkofNazi
expansionism,butithadsincebecomeplaintoBerlinthattheyservednousefulpurposeonthe
AtlanticcoastsavetoprovidetargetsfortheRAF’sBomberCommand,whichhaddamagedallthree.
ThedestructionoftheBismarckinMayshowedthatHitler ’sbigshipscouldnolongerhopeto
ventureintotheAtlanticshippinglanes.HethusdeterminedthattheyshouldreturntoaGermanport–
whichbecameknowntotheBritish.FrenchagentsofMI6maintainedaharbourwatchatBrest,while
RAFphotographicreconnaissanceaircraftdailymonitoredtheships’condition.On24Decemberthe
AdmiraltyinformedRAFCommandsthataGermanbreakouteastwardcouldtakeplaceatanytime.
LateinJanuary1942,UltrarevealedScharnhorst’sguncrewsexercisingaboardtheheavycruiser
ScheerintheBaltic.MultipleintelligencesourcesreportedallthreebigshipsslippingoutofBrestfor
nightsteamingtrials,thenreturningbeforedawn.TheyalsonotedthereinforcementofGermanlight
forcesintheChannel,andintensiveminesweepingactivity.TheFirstSeaLord,AdmiralSirDudley
Pound,toldthechiefsofstaffon3FebruarythataconcentrationofLuftwaffefightersontheChannel
coastsuggestedthatScharnhorstanditsconsortsintendedtobravethepassage,thoughhewas
unawarethatHitlerhadgivenordersforthemtotackletheNarrowsindaylight,whenGermanair
superioritywouldbemosteffective,andwouldalmostcertainlydetertheRoyalNavyfrom
committingitsownheavymetal.
HowdidtheBritishproposetodealwiththeGermanrunforhome?Acriticalpointwasthatno
capitalshipsoftheHomeFleetweredeployedanywherewithinrange.Itwasindeeddeemed
unthinkabletoriskthemwithineasyreachoftheLuftwaffe,especiallyafewweeksafterthe
destructionofPrinceofWalesandRepulsebyJapanesetorpedo-bombers.Responsibilityforstopping
Vice-AdmiralOttoCiliax’ssquadronwouldrestwithdestroyerandtorpedo-boatflotillasstationed
alongtheEnglishsouthcoast,andevenmorewiththeRAFandFleetAirArm,whosesquadronswere
broughttoshortnoticeinaccordancewithaplanforthiscontingency,codenamed‘Fuller ’.Justtwo
Britishsubmarineswerealsoavailable,topatroloffBrest.
On5February,UltrarevealedCiliaxhoistinghisflagaboardScharnhorst.Threedayslater,AOC
CoastalCommandwarnedRAFFighterandBomberCommandsthatabreakoutwaslikely‘anytime
afterTuesday10thFebruary’.Onthe10th,however,C-in-CBomberCommandstooddownhalfof
hismodestFullerforce,withoutinformingtheAdmiralty.Thismaynothavebeeninkeepingwiththe
spiritofeffectiveair–seacooperation,butitreflectedtheRAF’scavaliermindset,whichresistedany
responsibilitytoassistthenavy,whenitsownoverridingprioritywastobombGermany.Astreamof
UltrainterceptsshowedtheKriegsmarineconductingintensiveminesweepingoperationsin
HeligolandBight,whichremovedthelastlingeringdoubtsabouttheGermanships’destination.
AdmiralCiliax’ssquadronsailedfromBrestat10.45p.m.on11February,andfromthatmoment
everythingthatcouldgowrongfortheBritishdidso.BletchleyParkencounteredunusualdifficulties
breakingintonavalEnigma:messagesfor10,11and12Februarywerenotdecrypteduntilthe15th.
ThesubmarineSealion,havingbravedimmenseriskstopenetrateBrestapproachesontheafternoon
ofthe11th,withdrewtorechargeitsbatterieshavingseennothingunusual.HadtheGermanssetforth
asplannedat5.30p.m.,Sealionmusthaveseenthem,butCiliax’ssailingtimewasputbacktwohours
becauseofanRAFbombingraid.ThreeCoastalCommandnight-reconnaissanceaircraftwerealoft,
monitoringthetracktakenbytheGermansquadron,buttheASVradarofthatperiodwasprimitive.
Amidthedarkness,onecrewsawnothingonitsscreen;asecondfounditssetunserviceable;athird
wasrecalledearlybecauseoffogatbase,beforetheGermanshipsreacheditssearcharea.Evenwhen
daylightcameandaphotographicreconnaissanceaircraftoverflewBrest,lowcloudandaGerman
smokescreenpreventeditscrewfromseeingthatthebigshipsweregone.Britishcoastalradar
stationsfailedtodrawappropriateconclusionsfromconcentrationsofenemyfightersintheairand
attemptstojamtheirownwavelengths.
TwoSpitfirepilotswerefirsttosighttheGermansquadron,at10.42a.m.,justwestofLeTouquet.
Theyobservedstandardoperatingprocedure,however,whichmeantwirelesssilence,andreported
thesensationalnewsonlyafterlandingat11.09a.m.Sixteenminuteslatertheirtidingswerebroadcast
toallBritishcommands,precipitatingasuccessionoffutileassaults.Lt.CmdrEdwardEsmond
receivedaposthumousVCforleadingalow-levelattackbysixpitifullyold,slowSwordfishtorpedo
biplanesfromManstoninKent,allofwhichplungedintotheChannelamidahailofanti-aircraftfire.
TheGermanswerealreadythroughtheNarrowswhenthe‘Stringbags’madetheirrunsat12.42p.m.,
andallof825Squadron’storpedoesmissed.FiveMTBsdashedoutfromDoverharbour,ofwhich
onequicklybrokedown.Theleaderoftheotherfour,onsightingtheGermanships,decidedthatit
wasimpossibleforhisboatstopenetratetheescortingscreen.Theythuslaunchedtheirtorpedoesat
extremerange,withouteffect.Anotherthreeboats,boundingforthfromRamsgateinworsening
weather,failedtofindtheScharnhorstanditsconsorts.
Inthecourseoftheafternoonofthe12th,asuccessionofnavaltwin-enginedBeaufortsand
HudsonsstagedpiecemealtorpedoandbombattacksontherecedingGermans,withouteffectand
withthelossofseveralaircraft.At3.43p.m.fivedestroyersfromHarwich,underfierceGerman
gunfire,launchedatorpedoattackatarangeof3,000yards,againwithouteffect.Meanwhile242
BritishbomberswerelaunchedagainstCiliax’ssquadron,ofwhichjustthirty-ninedroppedtheir
loadsinthevicinitywithoutscoringahit,andfifteenwereshotdown.TheRAFalsolostseventeenof
398fighterscommitted.
TheGermandashup-ChannelhadprovedatriumphfortheKriegsmarine’splanning,skill,daring
andluck.Orhadit?ScharnhorststruckoneBritishair-droppedmineat2.31p.m.,withoutmuch
effect,asdidGneisenauat7.55p.m.At9.34p.m.,however,offTerschellingclosetohome,
Scharnhorsthitasecondmine,whichinflictedgravedamage.Theshipeventuallycreptinto
Wilhelmshavenearlyon13Februarywithitsportenginesunserviceable,itsconsortsfollowingat7
o’clockthesamemorning.TheBritishpeopleknewnothing,however,ofthelatedisasterwhich
befelltheGermans,causingHitler ’snavalstafftocharacterisetheepisodeas‘atacticalvictory,buta
strategicdefeat’.Churchill’scountrymensawonlythatanenemysquadronhaddefiedthemightofthe
RoyalNavyinbroaddaylight,withinsightofthewhitecliffs.TheTimesthunderedthatAdmiral
CiliaxhadsucceededwheretheSpanishArmadahadfailed.Ajudicialinquirywasheld,ofwhichthe
findingsreflectedpoorlyonalltheBritishforcecommandersinvolved.
Intruth,thoughtheChannelDashcausedtheBritishgovernmentdeepembarrassmentatabadtime,
itwasunimportant.UltrainformedtheAdmiraltyofthedamagetoScharnhorst,whichwasrestored
tooperationalfitnessonlyinJanuary1943,whenitjoinedTirpitzintheNorwegianfjords.
Meanwhile,on26February1942,RAFbombershitGneisenauindockatKiel,cripplingthecruiser
soseverelythatitneversailedagain.Itwasdeemedimpossible,however,tobroadcastanyofthis
goodnewstotheBritishpeoplewithoutcompromisingBletchley’ssecurity.TheGermanshipswere
thusgenerallysupposedtohaveescapedscot-free.Publicbitternesslingeredforyearsaboutyet
anotherpresumeddefeat.
BlameforfailuretodestroytheshipsintheChannelNarrowscertainlydidnotliewith
intelligence,whichprovidedcommanderswiththebestinformationtheycouldconceivablyhave
expectedabouttheenemy’sintentions,uptothemomentofsailing.Commandersdrewappropriate
deductions,andwerealerttoCiliax’slikelycourse,savethattheyexpectedhimtoclosetheEnglish
coastbynightratherthanbyday.Theproblem,assooften,laywithlackofappropriateforcesto
challengetheGermansquadron.Anti-shippingcapabilitywasachronicweaknessofboththeFleet
AirArmandtheRAF.Itisoftensuggestedthat,iftheBritishhadknownearlierthatCiliaxhadputto
sea,theoutcomecouldhavebeendifferent.Thisseemsunlikely.Inthecourseoftheconflict,many
Britishairattacksagainstenemysurfaceshipsfailed.Asever,knowledgewasnotenough,unless
matchedbypower.
2 TH E BR A I N
ThewaryieldedplentyoffailuresanddisappointmentstomatchthatofFebruary1942intheChannel
Narrows,buttheydonotdiminishtheachievementofBritain’s‘brain’,thecommandstructureand
bureaucracywhereinthecollection,analysisanddistributionofintelligencewereintegrated.
BletchleyPark’scodebreakerswouldhaveachievedmuchless,butfortheexistenceofathreshing
machinefortheirgoldenharvest.Thiscouldhavebeencreatedonlyunderthehandofawiseprime
minister,whothoroughlyunderstoodthemakingofwar.
Churchilldominatedhisnation’sdecision-makingmuchmorethandidRooseveltthatoftheUnited
States.Althoughheoftenbaulkedatassessmentswhichdidnotconformtohisownviews,unlikethe
dictatorsheneverquestionedtherightanddutyofthechiefsofstaffandtheirintelligenceofficersto
speaktheirminds.HewasacriticalforceinmakingBritain’ssecretservicestheleastineffectivein
theworld.Becausehehimselfrespectedintelligence,heensuredthatitsagencies,andespecially
BletchleyPark,wereadequatelyresourced.
Theprimeministeruseddecryptsasoftenasweaponsinargumentwithhisownchiefsofstaff,as
againsttheenemy.‘Churchillhadatendencytocreatehisownintelligence,’saidtheJointIntelligence
Committee’schairmanVictor‘Bill’Cavendish-Bentinck,somewhatdelphically.Butthechiefsseldom
deviatedfromtheprincipleofattemptingtoanalyseevidenceobjectively.‘Thebestarrangement,’
wrotealaterchairmanoftheJIC,PercyCradock,‘isintelligenceandpolicyinseparatebutadjoining
rooms,withcommunicatingdoorsandthinpartitionwalls,asincheaphotels.’Thisiswhathappened
inWhitehall.Atleastinthesecondhalfofthestruggle,asBritain’swareffortbecamemorecoherent,
animpressivelyrobustyetsensitivesystemcollatedandexaminedinformation,thentransferredit
fromthesecretdepartmentstooperationalcommanders.
BillBentinckthoughttheRAF’sAirChiefMarshalSirCharlesPortalthecleverestofBritain’s
threeservicechiefs,whilebeingirkedbyCIGSGen.SirAlanBrooke’ssurgesofstubbornnessin
pursuitofhisownhobby-horses.Inlate1941,forexample,againstthefirmopinionoftheJICandall
theevidencefromBletchley,BrookepersuadedhimselfthattheGermansretaineda‘massof
manoeuvre’,uncommittedtotheEasternFront,whichmightstillinvadeBritain.Itwaswidelythought
thatsuccessiveWarOfficedirectorsofintelligenceweretooeagertotellthehighlyopinionated
armychiefwhathewantedtohear.TheJIC,bycontrast,didnothingofthesort:itsreportingwas
almostunfailinglyhonest,evenwhenitwaswrong.
TheJointIntelligenceSub-Committeeofthechiefsofstaff–togivetheJICitsfulltitle–assumed
unprecedentedimportanceafterthe1940ascentofChurchillandthefallofFrance.Itmetinahouse
ownedbyBillBentinck’suncleinRichmondTerrace,abriskwalkfromthewarcabinetoffices.The
chairmanenjoyedimpeccablyaristocraticorigins,andhimselfendedlifeasthelastDukeofPortland,
buthehadanunusualandunenviablepersonalhistory.Bornin1897,hewaseducatedatWellington
College,wherehewasunhappy.In1918heservedbrieflyinthearmywithoutreachingthefront,then
joinedthediplomaticservice,wheregoodlooks,easymannersandanairofbenignwisdommight
havespedhimtothetophadhenotmadeadisastrous1924marriagetoanAmericannamedClothilde
Quigley,withwhomhehadtwochildren.AsayoungersonBentinckwasrelativelypoor–moreso,
aftersomerashstockexchangespeculations.Hiswifenonethelessspentlavishlyandquarrelled
spectacularlywithotherdiplomaticwiveswhereverherhusbandwasposted.Bentinckwastransferred
fromtheprestigiousParisembassyfirsttoAthens,thentoSantiago,leavingeverywhereatrailof
acrimonylaidbyClothilde.BackinLondonin1939,hewasappointedchairmanoftheJICwhileit
wasstillinitsembryophase,becausenobodycouldthinkwhatelsetodowithhim,aslongashe
remainedencumberedbyhistermagantofaspouse.
Soonafterwarbegan,hereceivedathisofficeanalmostincomprehensibletelephonecallfromthe
family’sHungarianmaid,whoeventuallymadehimunderstandthatMrsBentinckhadpackedher
bagsanddepartedwiththechildren,apparentlyforGlasgowtocatchaboattoAmerica.‘Itwaslikea
Frenchfarce,’saidtheJICchairmandrylylongafterwards.Bentinckadoptedamaskofpatrician
stoicismtoconcealthetraumathiseventmusthavecausedhim.Thereafter,thoughhiswifemade
troubleuntiltheyweremessilydivorcedin1948,hedevotedhimselfsingle-mindedlytohisjob,and
mostobserversthoughthimwellsuitedtoit.NoelAnnanfoundBentinck‘veryimpressive…Hehad
atemperamentofextremescepticism,yettotalbeliefthattheAlliesweregoingtowin.’Foratime
whenMenzies’thronetottered,BentinckwastoutedashispossiblesuccessoratMI6.
Thechairmanwasnobrainbox,buthehadanativeshrewdness,impeccablemannersandarelaxed
charmwhichenabledhimforsixyearstomanagethepassionsthatoftenswirledatJICmeetings.The
Committee’scleverestandmostassertiveservicerepresentativewasJohnGodfrey,directorofnaval
intelligence,buttheadmiral’sarroganceexasperatedthosewhohadtoworkwithhim.Meanwhile
Godfrey’sarmyandairforcecounterpartswereunimpressiveofficers,andtheMinistryofEconomic
Warfare’srepresentativeonlybegantoexertrealinfluencelaterinthewar,whenSirGeoffrey
Vickerswasappointedtotherole.Thoughalawyer,hewasaWorldWarIVCwhohadonce
commandedaninfantrybattalion:theservicerepresentativeswouldhavefoundithardtosnub
Vickers.
TherangeofissuesaddressedbytheJICwasextraordinary.Inadditiontothebigstrategic
questions,inJulyandAugust1941itsstaffproducedreportsonsuchmattersas‘Military
PreparationsbyVichyFranceagainstChad’,‘RumoursDesignedtoMisleadtheEnemy’–arunning
theme,‘Madagascar ’,‘Press,CinemaandBroadcastingCorrespondentsinIceland’,‘Anadvanceby
theAxisintoSudanandArabia’.EveryTuesdaymorningat10.30,theCommittee’smembersreported
tothechiefsofstaffintheCabinetWarRoomsbeneathGreatGeorgeStreet–whatBentinckreferred
towrylyas‘leadingmychoir ’.Theirassessmentsmight,ormightnot,influencethechiefs’
decisions,whichwerepassedtotheJointPlanningStafffortranslationintooperationalproposalsand
orders.TheJPS’sofficers,famouslyclever,oftenworkedallnighttoprepareappreciationsforthe
chiefs’next8a.m.meeting.ChurchillgrumbledtoAlanBrooke,‘Thesedamnedplannersofyours
plannothingbutdifficulties.’UtterlyunlikeHitler,however,theprimeministeracknowledgedthat
thiswastheirjob–evenifitafterwardsbecametheirdutytoidentifysolutions.
ThemostimportantelementoftheJICwasitssupportingbody,theJointIntelligenceStaff,which
wascreatedin1941andthereafterprovidedtheCommitteewithin-houseanalysisofmaterialfrom
allsourcesbeforemembersdebatedit.Thenewageoftechnologyprovidedanalmostinfinitelywide
fieldforexploration,aswellasmeansofaddressingthis:thetrickwastofocusattentionwhereit
mattered.Group-CaptainPeterStewart,whorantheRAF’sphoto-reconnaissanceoperations,was
exasperatedbyaseniorofficerwhoaskedfor‘allavailablecover ’ofoneEuropeancountry.Stewart
respondedthathecouldonlyprovidehelpfulinformationifheknewroughlywhatintelligencethe
suppliantwanted–‘naval,military,airorecclesiastical’.R.V.Jonesmadethepointthat,especially
whentechnologywasinvolved,itwasessentialtomakeacleardecisionaboutwhatcommanders
neededtoknow,thentoexploitanappropriatemixofaerialreconnaissance,PoWinterrogationand
signaldecrypts,‘ratherasanarmycommandermightusehisvariousarmsinabalancedattackwith
artillery,tanksandinfantry.Thespecificobjectivetobeattackedmightbesuggestedbywhatweknew
wasbeingdevelopedbyourownside,andwhichthereforemightalsobeunderdevelopmentbythe
enemy,radarandatomicbombsbeingtwosuchexamples.’
TheJISrecruitedsomeoutstandinglyableciviliansinuniform.OnceaweekBentinckassembled
itsthirty-oddofficersfora‘brainstrust’,anopendiscussionabouttheenemy’sdispositionsand
activities.Juniormemberswereencouragedtospeaktheirminds–whichtheydid,aboutforinstance
theman-for-mansuperiorityoftheWehrmachttotheirowntroops.NoelAnnanputitbluntly:‘The
BritisharmiesandthenewAmericanarmieswerenotthematchoftheGermanarmiesin
professionalismandperhapsbravery.’TheJIC’sjudgementwasfarfromperfect,butmoreoften
rightthanwrong.Itopposedtheill-fatedSeptember1940descentonDakar,arguingthattheFree
FrenchwerefartoooptimisticabouttheirlikelyreceptionfromVichyforces.Itdeservescreditfor
acknowledginginitsreportsthroughout1940–41thatmuchoftheworldexpectedChurchill’speople
tolosethewar,thoughitwassufficientlynationalisticnevertowaverfromtheassumptionthat
BritainwasGermany’sprincipalenemy.Thusinmid-June1941theCommitteeviewedthelooming
NaziinvasionoftheSovietUnionasameregambitinHitler ’scampaignagainstBritain.TheJIS
arguedthatoneofhiskeyobjectiveswouldbe‘tousetheSoviet[front]toembarrassandextendusin
everyway,therebyhelpingtoachievehissupremeobjective,thedefeatoftheBritishEmpire’.
Throughoutthesummerandwinterof1941,theBritishassumedSovietdefeattobeinevitable.A
28JulyreportbytheJISmitigateditsowngloomonlybyexpressinggratitudeforthebreathing
spacegrantedtoBritainby‘Barbarossa’:‘AssumingthatthecampaignagainstRussiaresultsina
militarysuccessforGermany,theremustbesomepauseforregroupingandrefittingbeforethe
GermanArmycanembarkonmajoroperationselsewhere.’TheJICdisplayedbetterjudgementin
monitoringincreasingJapaneseaggressioninAsia.On25June1941itweighedtheprospectsof
JapanseizingtheopportunitytostrikeatRussia,thenconcluded:‘Wethinkherinclinationwillbeto
abstainfrominterventionagainstSovietUnionatpresentstageandtocontinuepolicyofSouthward
expansioninwhichcasenextmovewillprobablybeintensifiedpressureonIndo-Chinaforbasesand
facilities…ItisagreedthatGermanattackontheSovietUniondoesnotinanywaylessentheneedto
pressonwithourownpreparationsforresistingJapanoraidingChina.’Thereafter,theJICassessed
withnotableshrewdnesslikelyJapanesebehaviouruptotheirDecemberattackontheEuropean
empires.
InJuly1941theJICdiscussedanapproachthrougha‘mostsecretsource’byDrCarlGördeler,exmayorofLeipzig,‘aGermanintouchwitharmyelementsinGermanywhowasinfavourofa
compromisewiththiscountrybeforetheoutbreakofwar ’.TheJIScommenteddisdainfully:‘Heis
not,however,regardedasreliable,anditmaybethatheisbeingusedconsciouslyorunconsciously
bytheGermangovernment.’Gördelerhadtoldhiscontact,accuratelyenough,thatGen.FranzHalder
andotherseniormembersofthegeneralstaffhadopposedthelaunchingof‘Barbarossa’.ButtheJIS
commentedprimlythatsuchaclaimdidnotaccordwith‘otherreliableinformation’reaching
London.
Moreover,Gördelerandhisfriendsproposedconditionsfordiscussionswhichwereboundtobe
unacceptabletotheBritishgovernment:‘asapreliminary…theyrequiredaguaranteethatGreat
Britainwouldagreetoanarmisticeandthatshewould,withtheUnitedStates,forcetheRussiansto
cometoreasonabletermswithGermanyoverthedemarcationofthePolishfrontier ’.Thisapproach
wasrebuffedascoollyaswereotherslaterinthewarbyprominentmembersoftheanti-Hitler
opposition,forinstancethelettersenttoLondonviaStockholminMarch1943byHelmuthvon
MoltkeoftheAbwehr.TheconsequenceofthisfastidiouspolicywasthattheRussians,andlaterthe
AmericansthroughAllenDullesinBern,enjoyedanear-monopolyofwartime‘humint’frominside
Germany,thoughthisdidlittletoinfluencetheirpolicies.
Theintelligencemachinesometimesreachedconclusionswhichwerethenrejectedbytheprime
ministeroroneofthechiefsofstaff.Inthespringof1942asuccessionofreportshighlightedthe
failureofAxisairforces’attemptstodestroytheBritishsubmarineflotillabasedatMalta,and
emphasisedthedifficultiesofpenetratingthevastconcreteU-boatpensatBrestandLorient.The
RoyalNavynonethelessinsistedthattheRAFshouldpersistwithitscostlyandfutileattacksonthe
bases.AsFirstSeaLordinJuly1942,AdmiralSirDudleyPoundoverruledhisownintelligencestaff
tomakeadisastrouspersonaljudgementthatArcticconvoyPQ17wasthreatenedbyGermancapital
ships,andmustscatter,ablunderwhichprecipitateditspiecemealdestruction,andforwhichhe
shouldhavebeensacked.Intelligencecouldachievenothingifitwasthusignored.Yet,whilesuch
follieshaveincurredjustcensurefromhistorians,itisimportanttoemphasisethatunliketheirenemy
counterparts,Britain’sleadersrelativelyseldomdefiedthecounseloftheirintelligenceand
operationalstaffs.
Thisdidnotpreventargumentaboutthesignificanceofcontradictoryevidence.In1944,for
example,theMinistryofEconomicWarfarearguedthatGermany’smanpowersituationwas
deteriorating,whiletheWarOfficesawanalarminggrowthintheWehrmacht’sstrength,asrecorded
intheJIC’stwice-yearlyEnemyStrengths&Dispositionsreport.Onlybelatedlywasitdiscoveredthat
Hitlerwasmanipulatinghisarmies’divisionalnumberstoinflatetheirapparentmight.Inthesame
way,inthesummerof1944theJICalloweditselftobepersuadedbyGeoffreyVickersofMEWthat
lackofoilwouldprecipitateanearlyGermancollapse.TheCommitteewascorrectinacknowledging
theimportanceofoil,andHitler ’sdireshortageofit,butwasover-optimisticaboutthespeedat
whichhisarmies’resistancewouldbecomeunsustainable.TherewasanothernotoriousJIC
misjudgementon5September1944,inthewakeoftheliberationofFrance,whentheCommittee
alloweditselftosuccumbtoeuphoria:‘WhereastheGermanshaveatthemomentanorganisedfront
betweentheRussiansandtheGermanfrontier,intheWesttheyhavenothingbutdisorganised
remnantsincapableofholdingtheAlliedadvanceinstrengthintoGermanyitself.’Theprime
ministerflatlydisagreedwiththisview,arguingthatHitler ’speoplewerestillfarfrombeaten.His
owninstinctprovedsounderthantheJISanalysis.
Everyintelligencepractitionerwasawareofthedistinctionbetweensecrets,whichwereknowable,
andmysteries,whichwereusuallynot.Onceadatewassetforagivenoperationitbecameasecret,
vulnerabletodiscoverybytheotherside.Buthowtheenemywouldbehaveinas-yet-unrealised
circumstanceswasoftenamystery,becausehehadnotmadeuphisownmind.TheJISmadesome
importantmisjudgementsinpredictingGermanstrategicresponsestoAlliedinitiatives–forinstance,
theNovember1942‘Torch’landingsinNorthAfrica,andtheJune1943invasionofSicily.Oneofthe
JISstaffwroteafterthewar:‘Ourfailureslayreallyinourinabilitytoappreciatetheextreme
obstinacyofHitler.MorethanonceweforecastthathewouldwithdrawtoshorterlineseitherinItaly
orRussiaortheBalkansinordertoeconomiseondivisions.’Headdedwryly:‘Istillbelievethathe
wouldhavedonebetterifhehadfollowedouradvice.’TheconsequencesoftheJIC’s1941scepticism
aboutaGermaninvasionofRussiahavebeendiscussedabove–itmademoreimpactinMoscowthan
inLondon,byfeedingStalin’sexpectationofChurchillianconspiraciesagainsthimself.Butifthe
difficultiesofintelligenceassessmentinwartimeareaccepted,evenwiththeassistanceofUltra,the
JIC’srecordseemsimpressive.ThehistorianG.M.Trevelyanoncewroteofasixteenth-century
Englishqueen’srelationshipwithherintelligencechief:‘IfElizabethhadtakenWalsingham’sadvice
oneveryoccasionshewouldhavebeenruined.Ifshehadnevertakenitshewouldhavebeenruined
noless.’ThesamemightbesaidoftherelationshipbetweenChurchillandtheJIC.
TheBritishcommandstructurewasmuchmorecentralisedthanthatoftheUS:whileChurchill’s
generalsinthefieldwereinnodoubtthattheytooktheirordersfromLondon,acrosstheAtlanticin
Washingtonintelligencestaffsbecamedispiritedbyconsciousnessthatlocaltheatrecommanders,and
especiallyGen.DouglasMacArthurintheSouth-WestPacific,madedecisionsalmostheedlessof
PentagonorNavyDepartmentopinions.Moreover,althoughamongtheBritishtherewerefrequent
inter-servicedisputes,theprincipleof‘jointery’wassincerelyembraced,asitwasnotbetweentheUS
ArmyandUSNavy.Meanwhile,PresidentRooseveltrarelybecameengagedinoperationaldebates,
andseemsseldomtohavebotheredtoreadmuchoftheUltramaterialdeliveredtohim.
Itwasmucheasiertoachieveinter-servicecooperationonBritain’ssideoftheAtlanticbecauseits
rulingvillagewassuchasmallplace.TheseniornavalrepresentativeontheJISwasanablesailor
namedCharlesDrake.TheprimeministerapproachedhimonedayathisofficeinGreatGeorge
Street:‘Ithink,Captain,’saidChurchillinthatfamiliarslow-marchdrawl,‘wemustbekin.’Drake
replied,‘Ithinkweare,’whichpromptedChurchilltotesthimbyasking,‘Whydoyousaythat?’The
navalofficerachievedatriumphbyrespondingthathehadreadbothvolumesofthestatesman’sLife
ofMarlborough,inwhichChurchillrecordedthefirstduke’spedigree,assonoftheseventeenthcenturySirWinstonChurchill–andhiswifeElizabethDrake.Theprimeministerquizzedthenaval
officerfurther:‘Andyoubelieveit?’Yes,indeed.‘Good,Captain,thenwe’rekin.’Thisanecdote
helpstoexplainwhyBritain’ssupremelywhimsicalprimeministerwassobeloved;andhowits
bureaucraticbrainfunctionedamidanintimacyunmatchedbyanyotherwarringpower.
Thechiefsofstaffsometimesdeploredtheinfluenceexertedbyloosecannonoutsidetheformal
hierarchy,amongthemDesmondMorton,whomChurchillhadfirstmetinFrancein1916.InMay
1940hetookthemajorintoDowningStreettoserveashisliaisonofficerwiththeintelligence
services.Mortonwasbrieflyinfluential,buthisauthoritydeclinedashismeagrediplomaticskills
becameapparent.HughDalton,ministerresponsibleforSOEuntilFebruary1942,wrotethatthe
notoriouslyill-temperedmajor‘spokeillofmanyandwellofno-one’.TheAmericansreferredto
himwithoutenthusiasmas‘DesperateDesmond’,whileRobertBruceLockhartdubbedhim‘the
P.M.’sKitchenDoor ’.BillBentinckdescribedMortonunenthusiasticallyas‘acuriouscreature.An
awfullotoftalk.Hedidn’treallyplayanimportantrole.’ThoughMortonlikedtobrandish
Churchill’snameinsupportofhisinterventionsinWhitehall’swars,hefailedinseveralattemptsto
makehimselfsupremoofthesecretservices.Farfrombeingtheprimeminister ’séminencegrise,he
shrankintoasuperiorclerkandrunneroferrands,mostlywiththeFreeFrench.Althoughheknew
whatBletchleydid,hisnamewasconspicuouslyabsentfromthedistributionlistforitsoutput.
From1942onwardsUltradominatedtheJIC’sandJIS’sactivities.Althoughthousandsofpagesof
paperwerealsogeneratedbyMI6andMI5,few,ifany,couldmatchtheauthorityofdecrypts.Itis
remarkablethatthehierarchiesofbothservicessurvivedthewarunreformed.AtMI5,the1940–41
actingdirector-generalwastheincompetentBrigadierOswald‘Jasper ’Harker,replacedbythe
slightlymoreeffectiveSirDavidPetrie,formerlyofMI6,whosedeputyhethenbecame.Kathleen
Sissman,oneofthesecurityservice’sfewwomenandanintelligenceofficerofthehighestgifts,
fiercelydenouncedHarker ’sunfitnessforhisduties,andinconsequencefoundherselfsackedand
obligedtotransfertoMI6.FortunatelyforMI5,HarkerandPetriehadseveraloutstanding
subordinates,suchasGuyLiddellandLt.Col.TomRobertson,togetherwithsomeofthecivilians
whojoinedforwartimeservice.ThesamewastrueatMI6,thoughStewartMenziesandhissenior
men–Dansey,Vivian,Cowgill–sustainedanuneasyrelationshipwiththeir‘hostilitiesonly’staff,
HughTrevor-Roperprominentamongthem.‘WhenIlookedcoollyattheworldinwhichIfound
myself,’thedonwrote,‘Isometimesthoughtthat,ifthiswasourintelligenceservice,wewere
doomedtodefeat.’ThehistorianconsideredMenziesanhonestanddecentman,ashismostsenior
subordinateswerenot,but‘Idonotthinkheeverunderstoodthewarinwhichhewasengaged.’
Trevor-Roperhadlittletroublecollaboratingwithsuchfellow-amateursasthearmy’sBrian
Melland,hisowncousin;theRAF’sJohnPope-Hennessy,anarthistorian;barristerEwenMontaguat
theAdmiralty.HehadthehighestrespectfortheBletchleystaff,andforLiddellatMI5.Buthe
complainedtoLordSwinton,chairmanofWhitehall’soversightbodytheSecurityExecutive,about
thefailingsofMI6,andwroteinequallysavagetermstotheprimeminister ’sintimate,Lord
Cherwell,whomheknewwellfromChristChurch,throwinginforgoodmeasureadenunciationof
Gambier-Parry,hisownsuperior.TheseinterventionsquicklybecameknowninBroadway,and
earnedTrevor-RoperaformalreprimandfromMenziesandVivian.
Quiteunperturbed,followingBletchley’sChristmas1941breakingoftheAbwehr ’sprincipal
EnigmacipherTrevor-RoperdemandedthatanewMI6sectionshouldbecreatedtostudyCanaris’s
organisationbyexploitingtheflowofnewUltra.Findinglittleenthusiasmforthisproposalinside
Broadway,hetookitinsteadtoCherwell.Itisscarcelysurprisingthatthissortofhigh-handedness
incurredtherageofTrevor-Roper ’sbosses.NigeldeGrey,deputychiefofBletchley,wrotecrossly,
‘Isitnecessarytoarguewithajuniorofficer?…PersonallyifhewereinmyemployIshouldtell
himtoshutup–ifhepersistedIshouldsackhim.’ForsometimedeGreydeclinedtoallowTrevorRoperaccesstothePark,assertingthathewas‘notasuitableperson’.Internecinewarfareescalatedin
1942.Trevor-RoperfoundhimselfintroubleafteraholidayinIrelandduringwhichFrankPakenham
precipitatedhisarrestbyIrishpoliceasaBritishspy,anepisodewhichdidnotamuseBroadway.
ThenTrevor-RoperleakedtoGuyLiddell’sstaffthefactthatMI6waswithholdingfromMI5
interceptsaboutBritishagentsabroadwhomtheGermanshadidentifiedorsuspected.Vivianand
Cowgill,learningofTrevor-Roper ’sresponsibilityforthedisclosure,clamouredforhissacking,
thoughLiddellwarnedthemthattheywouldbedeprivingBritishintelligenceofahugetalent.
Amazingly,andtothecreditofMenzies,Trevor-Ropergothisway,becomingchiefofanewAbwehr
section,witheventualpromotiontomajor.
‘C’kepthisownjobpartlybecauseDesmondMortonandotherWhitehallcriticslackedthecloutto
unstickhim.Moreimportant,MenziesexploitedhissupervisoryroleoverBletchleyParktodeliver
personallytotheprimeministerchoicespecimensofUltraintelligence,codenamed‘Boniface’,
whichwentfartoobscurethedeficienciesofMI6’shumintactivities.Insecretservicesmorethan
mostinstitutions,inthewordsofR.V.Jones,‘Ifgoodworkresultsinsuccess,thecreditwilltendto
fallonthoseofficerswhopresenttheresultstotheforumwheretheyaremadeknowntothe
operationalorpoliticalstaffs.’LikewiseBillBentinck:‘OnlyBletchleykept[Menzies]inhisjob.He
wasnotaverystrongmanandnotaveryintelligentone.’WhereasmanyBritishinstitutionswere
turnedontheirheadsandremadeinthecourseofthewar,BroadwayBuildingsescapedsuchafate.
But,giventhatnonationalsecurityapparatusisperfect,whatseemsremarkableisnotthatMenzies
andhissubordinatesconstitutedaweaklink,butthatotherpartsofthemachineworkedwell.
ArthurSchlesingerofOSSwrote:‘Intelligenceisonlyaseffectiveasitsdissemination…eventhe
best-designeddisseminationsystemcannotpersuadebusypeopletoreadpoliticalanalysisunlessit
affectsthedecisionstheyareabouttomake.’Theprimeministerandchiefsofstaffwerefarmore
likelytotakeheedofUltradecrypts,fillingatmostonesideofaflimsy,thanlongJISanalytical
papers,howeverablydrafted.ItwouldbemistakentopretendthatbecauseChurchillcreatedan
admirablesystem,thisalwaysworkedsmoothassilk.Howcoulditbeso,whenhehimselfwasa
uniquehumanbeing,whoseattitudesanddemandswereneverpredictable?Itbecameafamiliarmoan
throughoutWhitehall,thechiefsofstaffs’officesandthesecretwarcommunitythatChurchillabused
snippetsofintelligencewhichreachedhim,tomakefoolishorill-informedinterventions.Sir
AlexanderCadogancomplainedtohisdiaryonedayin1941:‘It’shopelessconductingbusinesslike
this.AnthonyEden[theforeignsecretary]seesnopapers,heisdraggeduptoLondonfor24hours,
dineswithP.M.Theybothhappentoseean[Ultra]interceptwhichmakesitlookasifwemightget
GermansoutofAfghanistan.Sotheygetonthehop,andIgetmessagestosaythatitmustbedoneat
once.Butthereareconsiderationsofwhichtheyareblissfullyunaware,poorchildren.’
Onthecreditsideoftheledger,however,thesystemfordistributingUltradecryptsto
commanders-in-chiefinthefieldbecameevermorerefined.On5March1941,BletchleyParksenta
momentoussignaltothedirectorofmilitaryintelligenceinCairo,announcingthatthenceforward
decryptscontainingoperationaldataaboutGermanforceswouldbesenttohimdirect,sothathours
wouldnolongerbewastedintransitviaserviceministriesinLondon.Suchmessageswouldbe
prefixed‘OL’:‘Theyaretoberegardedasabsolutelyreliable,butmustreceiveutmostsecurity…
Sourceofthisinformationthoughknowntoyouisnevertobementioned.Endeavourtocheckany
laxityofsecurityanddrasticallyconfinepersonnelwhoseesignalstoabsoluteminimum.’The
systemofSpecialLiaisonUnitswascreated:cellsatmainheadquarters,whosemembers–MI6
personnelinuniform–livedandworkedentirelyseparatelyfromthelocalarmyintelligencestaff,
andwerealoneresponsibleforreceivingandprocessingincomingEnigmadecrypts.Thesewerethen
passedtoseniorofficerswithappropriatewarningsabouthowbesttodisguisetheircontentsbefore
anypartwaspasseddownthecommandchain.Theorganisation,anditssecurityarrangements,
workedwell,thoughonlyinthelatterhalfof1942didUltraflowsufficientlyregularlyandspeedily
tosecurethefullconfidenceofBritishgeneralsinthedesert.Moreover,itremainedforeveralong
marchtotranslateknowledgeoftheenemy’sdeploymentsintovictoryoverhisforcesonthe
battlefield.
TheBritishservicewhichusedintelligenceleastimaginativelywastheRAF.Foralltheundoubted
clevernessofPortal,fromOctober1940chiefoftheairstaff,itsintelligencedepartmentwasweak.It
washardertomeasuretheenemy’soperationalairstrengththantocounthisshipsortanks.
Throughoutthewar,allairforceswildlyoverstatedtheirpilots’combatsuccesses,andthusthe
numberofenemyaircraftdestroyed.PerhapstheworstAlliedintelligencefailureofthewarwas
misjudgementoftheGermaneconomy.ThiswaspartlybecauseUltraprovidedfarlessassistancein
informingtheAlliesabouttheenemy’sindustries,whichexchangedinformationonpaperorby
telephonelandlinemorethanbywireless.Theweaknesswaswellillustratedbythereportofthe
LloydCommitteeonGermanoilresources,whichestimatedthatRAFbombinghadbyDecember
1940alreadyachievedacutof15percentinenemyfuelavailability,atamomentwhenBerlinwas
unawarethattheBritishwereevenengagedinasystematicairattack.
Mattersdidnotmuchimprovelaterinthewar.SirGeoffreyVickerswroteinaretrospective5
February1945reportoneconomicintelligence:‘Thescienceofdestroyingorganisedwarindustry
…aninfinitelycomplexsocialandmaterialorganism,wasunbornwhenthiswarbegan…Service
commanders,whenattackingindustry,areevenlessprofessionallyqualifiedthantheirservice
advisers…Thechoiceofindustrialobjectivesdependsonananalysisoffactorsfarmorecomplex
thanthosewhichdeterminethestrategyofacampaignandcanrelylessonscienceoronexperience
…Thecorrectionofappreciationsisverifiedbyeventsmuchmorecloselyandmuchlesscertainly
thanthosewhichdeterminestrategyinthefield…Economicintelligenceinthiswarhassuffered
continuouslyfrominadequatecontactwiththosewhowereplanningandorganisingourownwar
economy.’
Acombinationofmeagreevidenceandpooranalysis,basedonmistakenassumptionsaboutthe
Naziindustrialmachine,togetherwithobsessivewishfulthinkingbytheRAF’s‘bomberbarons’,
causedtheairmenconsistentlytooverstatewhatairbombardmentmightachieve,wasachievingand
hadachieved,especiallyagainstGermany.TherewasalsotheproblemthatUltraprovidedmuchless
industrialdatathanmilitaryandnavalinformation.Ingeneral,thisbookarguesthatwhat
distinguishedtheWesternAllies’wartimeintelligenceprocessesfromthoseoftheAxiswasthatthey
stroveforhonestyandobjectivity,eveniftheywerenotalwayssuccessful.Inthecourseoftheair
war,however,thisprinciplewasbreached.SofixatedwereseniorRAFandUSAAFofficerswiththeir
determinationtodemonstratethatstrategicairbombardmentcouldwinthewar,thatthehistoryofthe
bombercommands’intelligencedepartmentsshowsaninstitutionalisedcommitmenttofantasy,ofa
kindmoreusualintheGermanandJapanesehighcommands.
TheUSAAF,liketheRAF,wasforyearsmoreresistanttointelligenceinputfromoutsideagencies
thantheAlliedarmiesornavies,preferringtoemployitsownairmentomaketheirownassessments,
especiallyaboutbombingtargets.In1939,Gen.‘Hap’Arnoldconvenedaboardoffourofficersto
studybombingtargets.Inthesummerof1941Gen.HeywoodHansellreturnedfromavisittoBritain
withatonweightofRAFtargetfolders,andhisownopinionthatAmericansknewmoreabout
Germany’soilandpowersystemsthandidtheBritish,thoughtheRAFseemedquitewellinformed
aboutenemyaircraftproductionandtransportsystems.ArnoldtoldHanselltosetuphisown
organisationtoscourciviliansourcesforintelligenceabouteconomictargets,andanofficewasduly
establishedinNewYorkCity.Thisrecruitedabandofcivilianacademics,someofthemveryable:
WilmaBrun,whotaughtGermanatColumbia;MarvinDickey,aGermanprofessoratCornell;a
businessmannamedMalcolmMoss,whoprovedhighlyeffective–itwashewhosuggestedhiringa
friendnamedMcKittrick,whohadstudiedGermanandAustrianpowerstationsforAmericanbanks.
McKittrick,accordingtoHansell,proveda‘goldmine’.Byautumn,alongtargetlisthadbeen
compiled,dominatedbyeconomicratherthanmilitaryobjectives.Implausibly,somewerelocatedin
SouthAmerica,whereWashingtonhadsomefearsofaGermandescent.Yet,until1944,theresultsof
allthisenergeticdelvingweremeagre.TheUSAAFjoinedtheRAFinconductingbomberoperations
againstGermanythatrepresented,inChurchill’sphrase,‘abludgeonratherthanarapier ’.
Scientistsandstatisticianswhosoughttoconductobjectiveanalysisofwhatairattackwas,orwas
not,achieving,suchasFreemanDysonofRAFBomberCommand’sOperationalResearch
Department–afamousfigureintheUSafterthewar–foundthemselvesmarginalised,theircounsel
dismissed.OnlyinthelastfifteenmonthsofthewardidtheAmericanairstaffsdosomewhatbetter,
assistedbyanevermoreformidableincreaseinhardpower–bomberandfighternumbers.The
USAAFachievedthedestructionoftheLuftwaffeintheair,andcorrectlyidentifiedsyntheticoil
plantsastheweakestlinkinHitler ’swareffort.ItisstrikingtonoticethatBletchleyPark’sAir
SectionconsideredtheUSAAF,andnotBritain’sownairmen,itsclosestpartnersandmost
enthusiasticconsumersofintelligence.TheAirMinistrycouldclaimnomatchingaccessofwisdom.
3 AT S EA
TheRoyalNavy’sintelligencedepartment,indeedtheentireAdmiralty,fulfilledaverydifferentrole
fromtheWarOfficeandAirMinistry,whichmerelysetpolicyandadministeredtheirrespective
services.Theoccupantsofthemagnificenteighteenth-centurybrickcomplexonthenorthsideof
HorseGuardsParade–thefirstpurpose-designedofficebuildinginBritain–notmerely
administeredBritain’sfleet,butalsoactedasitsoperationalheadquarters,dailydirectingthemotions
ofhundredsofshipspatrolling,oiling,convoying,repairing,fighting.Fromthedawnofnaval
warfare,theforemostchallengeforcommandershadbeentolocatethevesselsoftheirfoes:Nelson
spentyearsofhislifeploughingtheseasattheheadofafleet,merelyseekingtofindtheFrench.In
thetwentiethcentury,however,wirelesstransformedthestory:itenabledcommandersashoreata
moment’snoticetogiveorderstochangethecourseofwarshipsthousandsofmilesdistant,andalso
madepossiblethedetectionandlocationofthoseoftheenemy.
TwothousandmenandwomenservedintheNavalIntelligenceDivision,amongwhomAdmiral
JohnGodfrey’spersonalstaffoffifteenclusteredintheAdmiralty’sRoom39.Thiswasformally
knownas‘NID17’,flagbridgeoftheintelligencewaratsea,withitsbigwesterlywindowslooking
downontheDowningStreetgarden,theForeignOffice,thelakeinStJames’sPark,andHorse
GuardsParade,thelastdisfiguredbywartimeclutter–barrageballoons,vehicles,temporary
hutments.DonaldMcLachlan,oneofGodfrey’swartimestaff,admiredhischief,butunderstoodwhy
othersweregalledbyhim:‘Likethedriverofasportscarinatrafficqueue,hesawnodangeror
discourtesyinacceleration.’Godfrey’simpatienceandirascibilitypromptedhisreplacementatthe
endof1942,thoughthemachinehecreatedremainedalmostunchangeduntiltheendofthewar.
Outsidetheadmiral’sgreenbaizedoorsathispersonalassistant,thedashingformerjournalist
CommanderIanFleming.McLachlanagain:‘ifnotthewisestofthestaffinRoom39,themostvivid
…Hisgiftwasmuchlessfortheanalysisandweighingofintelligencethanforrunningthingsand
fordrafting.Hewasaskilledfixerandavigorousshowman…agiantamongname-droppers.’The
NIDalsoemployedwritersandhistoriansincludingHilarySaunders,WilliamPlomerandCharles
Morgan;anarthistorianwhohandledPoWinterrogationreports,CharlesMitchell;andtheformer
headofThomasCook’sWestEndoffice,whorantheScandinaviansection.Room39wasknownto
the‘secretladies’andtypistsas‘theZoo’.
McLachlanitemisedinorderofimportancethematerialfromseventeensourceswhichwas
collatedandreviewedbyGodfrey’sstaff.Unsurprisingly,thelistwasheadedbydecryptedenemy
wirelesstraffic:untiltheendof1943AdmiralKarlDönitzandhissubordinatesashoresoughtto
micro-manageGermany’sU-boatcampaign,andthusconstantlyexchangedsignalswithcaptainsat
sea,muchtotheadvantageoftheBritish.Thereafterintherollcallofintelligencesourcesfollowed
captureddocuments;bearingsonenemyshippingsecuredby‘Huff-Duff’;interceptedvoice
messages;airphotographs;shipsightingsbyaircraft;informationfromagentsorfriendlysecret
services;PoWinterrogations;wirelesstrafficanalysis;enemycommuniqués;hintsfromintercepted
civiliancorrespondence;topographicalandtechnicalinformationfromopensources;friendlyand
neutralobservers;tacticalinformationgatheredduringoperationsatsea;sightingsbymerchantships
andcoast-watchers;intelligenceforwardedfromotherservices;instructionsfromenemyintelligence
organisationstodoubleagentsunderBritishcontrol.Allmaterialwasgradedinreliabilityand
importance,from‘A1’to‘D5’.
Therewasincessant,fractiousandsometimesfierceargumentabouthowfarprotectionofthe
Ultrasecretshouldbeallowedtoconstrainoperationsagainsttheenemy.On11March1942C-in-C
PlymouthwrotetoGodfrey,asDNI,complainingthatinformationaboutanenemyvesselthatwas
beingtowedtoCherbourg,andaboutanescortedGermantankeronpassage,hadbeeninBritish
handsintimetoattackthem,butreachedoperationalcommanderstendayslate.AdmiraloftheFleet
SirCharlesForbes–knowntohisownserviceas‘WrongWay’ForbessinceheshiftedtheHome
FleetbeyondreachofNorwegianwatersjustbeforetheApril1940Germaninvasion–fulminated:
‘Theintensesecrecywhichshroudsallinformationconveyedby“Ultra”messageshasbeenfoundto
militateagainsttheusefulemploymentofthisinformationforoperationalpurposes.Thereis,indeed,
atendencytoplacetheclaimsofsecuritybeforetheclaimsofoffensiveaction…Idonotthinkitcan
betoostronglyemphasisedthathoweversecretmaybethesourcesfromwhichintelligenceis
obtained,suchintelligencecanneverbeanendinitself,andifitdoesnotleadtoactionitis
valueless.’
Forbes’sletterissignificant,becauseithighlightsthedailydilemmasfacedbytheguardiansof
Ultra.Moreover,itillustrateshowwiselyandwellBritishandmost–thoughbynomeansall–
AmericanofficersservedtheAlliedwareffort,byresistingmanytemptationstoexploitdecrypts,in
orderthattheymightprotecttheAllies’widerinterestsinthesecretwar.Inthelatterhalfof1942,
whenairinterdictionofRommel’sMediterraneansupplylinesattaineddevastatingeffectiveness,
guidedbyUltra,almosteveryRAFattackwasprecededbyareconnaissanceoverflight,tomaskthe
sourceofBritishknowledge.
IfBletchley’soutputwasthemostimportantsourceofintelligence,supplementaryaidswere
indispensable.Sigintcouldnotbereliedupontoprovide–forinstance–warningofsailingsof
Germancapitalships,oftenscreenedbywirelesssilence.Norwegianagentsmonitoringthefjord
anchoragesofTirpitzanditskindprovidedvitalalertsaboutwhethertheywerepreparingtoputto
seaorhaddoneso.Anavalintelligenceofficerwrote:‘Soreliablewasthisservice…thattheOICin
Londonhadcompletefaithin[theagents’]accuracyandregularity.’HerewassomethingMI6did
well.Meanwhile,aerialreconnaissancewasinvaluablewhentheweathermadethispracticable,
thoughitremainedaninexactscience,especiallyifnavalintelligenceofficerswereobligedtorelyon
apilot’srememberedglimpses,ratherthanonphotographswhichcouldbesubjectedtoexpert
interpretation.Itwashardforaircrew,thousandsoffeetup,todistinguishbetweenabattleship,a
heavycruiserandabigdestroyer.InJuly1942aLuftwaffepilot’ssightingofasingleBritishplanein
theskyoffNorwaydeterredtheGermansfromdispatchingTirpitzagainstPQ17.Theairman
reportedseeingacarrieraircraft.Inrealitythishadbeenamerefloatplane,buttheKriegsmarine
declinedtheriskthataRoyalNavycarriergroupmightbewithinrangeoftheirpreciousmonster.
IntheearlywaryearsBritishtechnicalknowledgeaboutU-boatswaspoor,partlybecausetheNID
lackedsophisticatedinterrogatorswhoknewwhatquestionstoaskprisoners.By1942,mattershad
improved:U-boatcrewmeninBritishcampsrevealedtheexistenceofthePillenwerfer,thebubbleejectiontechniqueforfoxingAsdicdetectors;alsodetailsofGermantorpedoesandsearch-receivers
forradartransmissions.Interrogatorslearned–asdidtheirLuftwaffecounterpartsquizzingAllied
airmen–toconfoundprisonersbyshowingoffknowledgeoftheirdomesticaffairs,forinstancethe
charmsofthered-hairedwaitressatLorient’sCafédeRennes.Aproblempersisted,thattheRoyal
Navywasunwillingtobelievethattechnologyitsownshipslackedmightworkfortheenemy–
severalU-boatrefinements,andbig5.9-inchgunsmountedondestroyers.
Someinterrogatorsfavouredofferingrelativelylavishhospitalitytocelebrityprisonerswhomight
provideimportantinformation.InOctober1944thedirectorofintelligencethrewuphishandsin
horrorwhenhelearnedthathisofficershadspent£2onwininganddiningaU-boatcaptain.TheDNI
issuedaformalwarningagainst‘entertainingattheRitzandthepurchaseofconsiderablequantities
ofgin.Ifthesefactsbecameknown,theremightbegoodcauseforscandal.Furthermore,Iandmany
othersarequiteunabletoenjoytheseluxuries,anditisoutofallproportionthatourenemiesshould.’
Theinterrogatorrespondedimpenitentlythatitseemedworth£2oftaxpayers’moneytoconvincea
scepticalNazithattheRitzwasstillstanding.
Perversely,evenasthetideofwarturneddecisivelyagainsttheGermans,someofDönitz’s
crewmeninAlliedhandsbecamestubbornlysecurity-conscious.On12March1944theDNIbriefed
theFirstSeaLordonrecentPoWinterrogations.Some70percentofU-boatcrewsbythenaccepted
thatthewarwaslost,and25percentwouldfranklyavowthistoaBritishofficer.Butcrewswere
bettertrainedtoresistinterrogation;evenatthislatehourfortheNaziempire,‘thereisageneral
beliefthatthosewhodivulgeinformationwillbepunishedafterthewar ’.Whencensorsdiscovered
thatcapturedU-boatcrewmenwereusingasimplecodetoconveysensitivematerialinlettershome
toGermany,thetrafficwasallowedtocontinue,inhopesthattheNIDwouldfindusesforsuch
disclosures.
NextdoortotheAdmiralty,theOperationalIntelligenceCentrewaslocatedinthenewCitadel
building,adankconcretemass,muchovercrowded,whoseinmatessufferedfromchroniccoldsand
viralinfections.TheOIC’ssurface-shipsection,runbyCommanderNormanDenning,tookcentre
stageinBritishnavaloperationsduringsuchcrisesasthepursuitoftheBismarck,the‘ChannelDash’
andtheArcticagonyofConvoyPQ17.Duringhoursanddaysofintensedebateandharshdecisionmaking,theFirstSeaLordandhisacolytesbecamefrequentvisitorstotheOIC.Intheearlywaryears
therewerepersistentdelaysinimplementingoperationaldecisionsfollowingthereceiptofdecrypts.
TheFarEastCombinedBureau,Bletchley’sSingaporeout-stationthereafterevacuatedtoColombo,
brokeJapanesesignalsreportingthesightingofPrinceofWalesandRepulse,aswellastheenemy’s
attackorders,fourhoursbeforethefirstbombsandtorpedoesstruckthegreatwarships.ButAdmiral
TomPhillips,onPrinceofWales’sflagbridge,learnedofthisonlywhentheJapanesewerealready
overheadandhisdoomwassealed.FortunatelyfortheRoyalNavy,thetransmissionofsuchurgent
materialwasmuchacceleratedthereafter.
Thetacticalwaratseawasmorepowerfullyinfluencedbysigintthanthelandcampaigns,partly
becauseconvoysandsubmarinestravelledmoreslowlythantanks.Giventhatdecryptionofenemy
signalsrequiredatbesthours,andsometimesdays,itsfruitsweremorelikelytoreachcommanders
intimetotriggeranoperationalresponseontheoceanthanwasusuallypossibleonalandbattlefield.
Onmanydaysbetween1941and1945,themostimportantplaceinBritishnavalheadquarterswasits
SubmarineTrackingRoom.There,CommanderRichardHall–sonof‘Blinker ’–gaveordersto
rerouteconvoys,inaccordancewiththelatestappreciationsofU-boatpositionsmadebytheRoom’s
overlord,theimmenselyrespectedCommanderRodgerWinn.TheRoom’swrybutdeadlyearnest
mottowas‘Neverthetwainshallmeet.’Winnhimself,cursedsincechildhoodpoliobyalimpanda
twistedspine,wasaremarkablepersonality,whotreatedseniorofficerswithsuitablerespect,likethe
formerbarristerhewas,inthecompanyofajudge,suchashelaterbecame.Yetheneverfailedto
asserthisownconvictions.Hismoststrikingcharacteristic,whichdistinguishedhimfrommany
peersonbothsidesofthewar,wasmoralcourage.Hedrovehisstaffhard,rebukedmistakeswitha
bitingtongue,andinsistedthattheTrackingRoomdeliveredasinglecollectiveviewoneveryissue.
Informalitynonethelessprevailed:colleaguesweretreatedasequals,heedlessofrank.Civilian
watchkeepersandresearchersmaintainedtheRoom’ssignallogandcompileditsrecordsand
statistics.Onthewalls,graphsrecordedpeaksandtroughsofmerchant-shipandU-boatsinkings,
togetherwiththeprogressofnewconstruction.TheRoom’shubwasan8ftx8fttable,onwhichwas
mountedachartoftheNorthAtlantic.Here,foruptofourteenhoursaday,Winnorhisdeputysat
chininhand,plottingdistancesandcalculatingspeedsandangles,withoneeyeontheteleprinterthat
spasmodicallyclatteredintolife,disgorgingflashesfromBletchley.Ontheplot,thelimitsofAllied
aircoverwereshownbyredarclinespaintedacrosstheocean.U-boatpositionswereindicatedby
colouredpins:redforafirmfix,whiteforasighting,blueforaDFbearing.
SometimesduringaU-boatwolf-packattack,theRoyalNavy’sescortsmightsecureuptofortyDF
‘fixes’inanhouronDönitz’ssubmarines.Tosecureareasonablyaccuratebearing,ashipneededto
bewithinfortyandfiftymilesoftheU-boat’stransmissions;togetapreciseone,tentofifteenmiles.
Ingoodweather,aconvoymightaverageaspeedofseventonineknots.ThoughasurfacedU-boat
couldmanageelevenknots,itssubmergedspeedslowedtojusttwoorthree.ThusitwasthatAllied
aircraftexercisedacriticalinfluenceaslongasconvoyssailedwithintheirsweepradius,byforcing
submarinestodiveevenifair-droppeddepth-chargesfailedtosinkthem.Sincethesenavalbattles
tookplaceinrelativelyslowmotion,divertingthecourseofaconvoycouldrenderitimpossiblefor
Dönitz’shunterstocatchup.
EverymorningWinnorhisdeputyheldatelephoneconferencewiththeC-in-CWestern
ApproachesinLiverpool,andthechiefofstafftotheC-in-CofRAFCoastalCommand,during
whichWinndescribedthemaineventsoftheprecedingnight.AtmiddayHalldispatchedafour-page
situationreporttoChurchill’sWarRoom.Onceaweek,theentiretableplotfromtheTrackingRoom
wastransferredtonewchartsheets,astheoldonesbecamepepper-pottedwithpinpricks.Acolleague
wroteofWinn’s‘uncannyflairforguessingaU-boat’sbehaviour ’.Duringrunningconvoybattles
thatpersistedthroughseveraldaysandnights,‘theintenseintellectuallabourthatwentintothisbattle
oftacticswastolerabletothehumanbeingsengagedonlyifitbecameforthemvirtuallylikeagame
ofchessorbridge…theyhadtokeepincheckanyleapofimaginationwhichwouldhavepicturedin
termsofappallinghumansufferingtheirfailuresay,toextricateatankerconvoyfromtheassailing
pack.Otherwisethestrainwouldhavebeentoogreat.’Thus,theywereonceobligedtopreservean
icycalmwhileoneoftheirownformercolleaguesintheTrackingRoom,acertainCommander
Boyle,ledaconvoyfromTrinidadofwhicheleventankersweresunkonebyone,untiljustoneship
reachedport.
InDecember1942,WinncameunderimmensepressuretodetachfromasouthboundAtlantic
convoytheWhiteStarlinerCeramic,carryingairfieldspecialists,becausethesemenwereurgently
neededatTakoradiinWestAfrica.Forfourdaysherefused,assertinghisconvictionthatthe
Germansweretrackingtheconvoyandwouldsoonattack.Thenheyieldedtotheinsistenceofthe
MinistryofShipping.Ceramicracedahead–andwassunkwithonlyasinglesurvivor.By1943,so
greatwasrespectforWinn’sjudgementthatanAdmiraltystandingorderwasintroducedthatnoship
orconvoyshouldberoutedagainsthisadvice.Yetsogreatwasthestrainimposedbyhis
responsibilitiesthatforamonththeCommanderhadtoquithispost,aftersuccumbingtonervous
exhaustion.
SomuchhasbeenwrittenaboutBletchley’striumphinbreakingtheU-boatcodes–whichwasreal
enough–thatthestoryoftheBattleoftheAtlantichasbecomedistorted.Thematchingachievement
oftheKriegsmarine’sB-Dienstintelligenceservicedeservesmorenotice.Foraboutayear,fromJuly
1942toJune1943,thoughwithsomeintermissionsanddelays,Dönitz’scodebreakersprovidedthe
U-boatcommandwithanextraordinarywealthofinformationaboutconvoymovements,whichmade
almostasimportantacontributiontosoaringAlliedshippinglossesasdidthedeadlycoincidenceof
BP’sinabilitytobreaktheSharkcipherformuchofthesameperiod.
U-boatoperationswerecontrolledbyatightly-knitgroupoffivestaffofficersaroundDönitz,at
BdUheadquarterslocatedsuccessivelyinLorient,Paris,and–fromJanuary1943–Berlin.Among
themostimportantpersonalitieswasthesignalsspecialistKapitänzurSeeHansMeckel.Thelossof
everysubmarinewassubjectedtometiculousinquiry,notleasttoconsiderwhetheranybreachof
securitymighthavecontributedtoanAlliedsinking.TheB-Dienst,headedbyKapitänzurSeeHeinz
Bonatz,wasbasedinnavalheadquarters,situatedliketheAbwehrinBerlin’sTirpitzüfer,andgrewto
astrengthof6,000menandwomen.Teleprintersdisgorgedsignalsfromlisteningstationsallover
Europe,ofwhichthelargestwasinHolland.Itscodebreakers,ledbytheveteranformernaval
wireless-operatorWilhelmTranow,benefitedfromthefactthatDönitzwasoneofthefewGerman
seniorofficersofanyservicetotakeintelligenceseriously.LikehisAlliedcounterparts,he
recognisedthatthefirstimperativeofthewaratseawastolocatetheenemy.
Duringthespringandsummerof1940,theB-Dienstreckonedtoreadaround2,000British
messagesamonth,thoughthisdeclinedsteeplyinAugustaftertheRoyalNavychangeditscodes.
From1940until1944,Bonatz’smenachievedreasonablyregularbreaksintotheMerchantNavy
code.Aftercapturingitslatestversion,‘MersigsII’,inMarch1942,theyconsistentlypenetrated
convoysignals,allottingnamestodifferentvarietiesofBritishtrafficinthesamefashionasdid
BletchleytoGermanones:Köln,Frankfurt,MünchenBlau,MünchenRot.Atthistimealsotheybegan
tomakeeffectiveuseofIBM-typepunch-cardtechnology.
OneofthemostseriouswartimefailuresofBletchleyParkwasthatitssmallciphersecurity
sectionfailedformanymonthstorecogniseandalerttheAdmiraltytothevulnerabilityofsomeofits
codes,despiteseveralrequestsforadviceandassistancefromthenavalofficerresponsible.The
GermansreadthesignalsofNewYork’sharbourcaptain,whogavethecompositionandoftencourse
updatesofeastboundconvoys,evenwhenreroutedbyRodgerWinn.TheB-Dienst’sbreakintothe
RoyalNavy’sCypherNo.3wasnotcomprehensive:manymessageswerereadonlyafteraninterval
ofdays,andonlyaboutoneintenbecameavailablefastenoughtoconcentrateU-boats.Butthanksto
sigint,Dönitz’sgeneralviewofAlliedoperationswasstrikinglywell-informed.
Thepost-warAmericanstudyofGermannavalcommunicationsintelligence,basedonexhaustive
interrogationsofpersonnelandstudyofcaptureddocuments,inthiscasetheB-Dienst’s,concluded:
‘TheenemypossessedatalltimesareasonablyclearpictureofAtlanticconvoyswithvarying
degreesofaccuracyastotheroutesandday-by-dayplotting…Convoydiversionsweresometimes
learnedfromdecryptionintimetore-arrangeU-boatpatrollinesaccordingly…Themostcomplete
singlestatementofGermanconvoyintelligenceeverseenhereinGermannavaltrafficcameina
seriesofmessages…inDecember1943andJanuary1944.Thesemessagesapparentlyreproduced
the[Allies’]currentconvoychartfortheNorthAtlantic…Theconvoysthenatseawerecorrectly
identifiedbothbydesignatorsandnumbers,andaccurateinformationgivenonconvoycycles,speeds
andgeneralrouting.’
TheAmericanstudymakesabundantlyclearthatthewirelesswaratseawasbynomeansonesided.BritishsinsofomissionandcommissionbothattheAdmiraltyandBletchleycostshipsand
lives.TheB-Diensthadcodebreakersofconsiderableskill,ifnotquiteintheclassofHut8’speople.
Inthetendays9–19March1943,duringtheperiodwhentheKriegsmarinewaswinningthesigint
waragainsttheRoyalNavy,fourconvoys–SC121,HX228,SC122andHX229–eachlostoneinfive
ofitsships,adisastrousattritionrate.Yetactionsorlapsessometimeshadperverseconsequences.
ThisveryfailureoftheRoyalNavy’scodesecurityconferredapricelessboonontheAlliedcause,
albeitatheavycost.Atintervalsthroughoutthewar,andinitiallyasearlyas1941,Dönitzentertained
serioussuspicionsthatEnigmahadbeenpenetrated.On28September,aBritishsubmarineambushed
U-67andU-111atarendezvousneartheCapeVerdeislands,offSenegal.Itstorpedoesmissed,andit
wasitselframmedbyathirdU-boatonthescene,buttheadmiralsaidwhentoldofthisdramatic
incident:‘ABritishsubmarinedoesnotappearbychanceinsucharemoteplace,’andlauncheda
majorinquiry.Yetthisconcludedthat‘themoreimportantciphersdonotappeartohavebeen
compromised’.AsecondinvestigationinFebruary1943reachedthesameconclusion,onceagain
reassuredbythevulnerabilityofBritishcodes,whichpersisteduntilJune.IftheRoyalNavyhadthe
powertoreadtheGermanhand,itschiefswouldsurelyhaveclosedthiscostlyhole.
MeanwhiletheU-boatcommandignoredtheurgingsofWilhelmTranowtouseacodebookrather
thanaciphermachineforitswirelesstraffic,suchasgravelyinconveniencedUScodebreakerswhen
theJapanesearmydidso.Later,inAugust1943,aninformantinSwissintelligencetoldanofficerof
thelocalAbwehrstationthattheAllieswerebreakingU-boatcodes,awarningpromptlypassedto
submarinecommandinBerlin.Dönitzorderedyetanotherinvestigationintociphersecurity.Yetatits
conclusion,amazingly,heallowedhimselftobereassured.
Theadmiralwroteafterthewar:‘Whetherandtowhatextenttheenemyreactedtoradio
transmissionswassomethingwhich,tryaswemight,wewereneverabletoascertainwithany
certainty.Inanumberofcasesdrasticalterationsinthecourseoftheconvoyledustoassumethathe
did.Ontheotherhand,manycasesoccurredinwhich,inspiteofU-boatradioactivityinthearea,
enemyshipssailingindependently,andconvoysaswell,wereallowedtosailstraightonandintothe
samearea.’HavingsatisfiedhimselfaboutEnigma’ssecurity,Dönitzchosealsotoignoreawarning
ofitsvulnerabilityfromLt.Hans-JoachimFrowein,basedonhisownresearchesusingpunch-card
technology.IftheAllies’conductoftheBattleoftheAtlantichadsuggestedomniscienceratherthan
fallibility,however,itisoverwhelminglylikelythatDönitzwouldhaveguessedtheUltrasecret.
On1June1943theRoyalNavyabandonedNavalCyphersNo.3andNo.4,introducingNaval
CypherNo.5,alsoadoptedbytheAmericansandCanadiansforAtlanticoperationson10June,
whichtheB-Dienstprovedunabletobreak.Bletchleywasfuriousthattheswitchtooksolong,having
warnedeightmonthsearlierofthepreviousciphers’vulnerability,buttheAdmiraltypleadedthehuge
administrativechallengeofissuingnewcodestothousandsofships.Moreover,GC&CS’sCipher
Securitysectionhadalsobeenblameworthy.
Whilethewaratseawasfarmoredecisivelyinfluencedbycodebreakingthanwasanyland
campaign,itisquitemistakentoviewtheBattleoftheAtlanticexclusivelyasastrugglebetween
BletchleyandtheB-Dienst–here,aseverywhereelse,hardpowerwasvital.In1943,beyond
GC&CS’striumphinbreakingtheSharkcipher,theAlliesenjoyedasurgeofnavalandairstrength
thatembracednewescortgroups,escortcarriersandVeryLongRangeAircraft,mostlyLiberators,
togetherwithimprovedtechnology.Thispromptedapolicyshiftawayfromreroutingconvoysin
favourofgoingheadtoheadwithattackingU-boats.Bythewinter,whiletheB-Dienstwasonceagain
achievinggoodbreaksintotheBritishMerchantShipcode,Dönitz’sforcelackedthecapability
effectivelytoexploitthem.TheGermanslaunchedspasmodicattacksonconvoysuntilthelastdaysof
thewar,buttheircampaignwaslonglost.TheprincipalreasonthatDönitzfailedtostranglethe
AtlanticsupplyroutewasthathelackedU-boatsinsufficientnumberstoachievesuchafeat.Ultra
muchassistedtheAllies’slaughterofenemysubmarinesinthesummerof1943,especiallyin
providingtargetsfortheairwingsofUSNavyescortcarriers,buttorevisitChurchill:‘Allthingsare
alwaysonthemovesimultaneously.’
AfterthewarDonaldMcLachlancataloguedwhatheandhiscolleaguesconsideredtheRoyal
Navy’sIntelligenceDepartment’sprincipalwartimeblundersandlapses.Foremostwasfailureto
realisethattheKriegsmarinewasreadingimportantBritishwirelesstraffic.TheScharnhorst’s
ChannelDash,andindeedseveralotherforaysbyGermanbigships,remainedlastingsourcesof
embarrassment.TheAdmiraltyunderratedthethreatfromItalianfrogmen,whoinflictedsome
cripplinglossesin1941,andrespondedtoolittleandtoolatetorevelationsofthechronic
vulnerabilityofwarshipstoairattack.ItfailedtoreviveusefullessonsaboutGermanU-boattactics
fromWorldWarI,andformanymonthsrefusedtobelievethatDönitz’scraftwereattackingonthe
surfaceatnight.Beforethewar,theAdmiralty’sdirectorofsignalsopposedanextensionoftheDF
wirelessnetworkforfixingwarshippositionsbydirection-finding:hedeclaredthatsuchequipment
wouldbeawasteofresources,becauseinoperationalconditionstheenemywouldmaintainwireless
silence.AlltheaboverepresentedcasesinwhichtheBritishacquiredsufficientinformationto
counterorforestalltheenemy’smoves,hadtheAdmiraltymadeimaginativeuseofthis.YettheNID
wasthebestofthethreeBritishservices’intelligencedepartments,anditswartimerecordwasmore
impressivethanthatofitsfoes.Dönitzneveracknowledgedthegapingholeinhismostsensitive
communications,whiletheBritishpluggedtheirownintimetosecurevictory.
8
‘Mars’:TheBloodiestDeception
1 GEH LEN
HowcantheincompetenceandmyopiaofGermanintelligencebeexplained?Herewasanationofthe
highestcultural,technologicalandscientificachievements.Hitler ’sarmyshoweditselfforatimeto
bethefinestfightingforcetheworldhaseverseen,albeitinaghastlycause.Itisnolongersupposed
byresponsiblehistoriansthatAdmiralCanarisassistedtheAlliedcause–inotherwords,thathewas
explicitlyatraitor.TheAbwehrandGestapowereproficientinsuppressingResistanceactivityand
capturingAlliedagentsinoccupiedterritories,eveniftheRedOrchestraescapedtheirattentionfor
sevenyears.Canariswasrisiblyunsuccessful,however,inconductingintelligence-gathering
activitiesabroad.BeyondlosingeveryspydispatchedtoBritain,hisagentsfarednobetterinthe
UnitedStates.Theadmiral’sJune1942Operation‘Pastorius’landedeightwould-besaboteurs,who
fellintoFBIhandswithinafortnight.Sixofthemwenttotheelectricchair,andGermanoperations
elsewhereweresimilarlybungled.Partoftheexplanationforthisinstitutionalfailure,banalasit
seems,isthatmostoftheAbwehr ’sofficersdidnottryveryhard.Alargeproportionofthoseposted
abroadwerecontentmerelytoenjoyanexistencemuchmorecomfortablethanwasavailableinthe
Reich,tofiddletheirexpensesandtransmittoGermanyanyhotchpotchofinformationfertile
imaginationscouldcontrive,assistedbyinputfromdoubleagentscontrolledbyMI5.Nobodyin
Berlinsoughttoimposepurposeandrigour.
TheGermansinvadedRussiawithsucharecklesslyarrogantmindsetthatforsomeweeksthey
madenoseriousattempttobreaktheRedArmy’scodes,becausetheywereconfidentofvictory
whatevertheirfoesdid.ThismoodchangeddramaticallyasSovietresistancehardened.Hitler ’s
forcesreceivedtheshockoftheirlivesafteroccupyingKiev:aseriesofmassiveSovietdemolitions
eruptedaroundthem,triggeredbyradiocontrol.TheWehrmachtbegantoacknowledgethenecessity
ofmonitoringtheairwaves.Inthewinterof1941,themostdisturbingintimationofthevastresidual
strengthoftheRedArmycamefromGermaninterceptionofmessagesfromdivisionswithnumbers
ina‘400’series–this,whenattheoutsetBerlindismissedanynotionthatStalincouldmustersuch
vastforces.ThedistancesofRussiacreatedchronicsigintproblems:evenwhenahundred
WehrmachtinterceptionstationsweredeployedontheEasternFront,theseneversufficedfor
comprehensivemonitoring.
TheGermanslearnedmuchaboutSovietwirelessproceduresaftercapturingCol.Kurmin,signals
chiefoftheRussianTwelfthArmy.TheBritishwerealarmedwhenBletchleyinterceptedsignals
suggestingthatmuchSovietcommunicationstrafficwasvulnerable:‘theGermanscanreadimportant
Russiannaval,militaryandairforcecodeswithpromptitude…[Yet]thisgravehandicapisnotinthe
leastrealisedbytheRussians.’ThereisnodoubtofthevulnerabilityoflowerRedArmycodesin
1941–42,northatGermanradiointelligencereadatleastsomecommandmessagessentbyoperators
whore-usedone-timepads.But,inordertobelievethattheGermansachievedusefulandconsistent
penetrationofSoviethigherciphers,evidencewouldbenecessarythatthiswasexploitedbyHitler ’s
armycommanders.Instead,thereisonlyathinpatchworkofdecryptedStavkamessages,noneof
muchsignificance,togetherwithobvioussignsthatsomeinterceptsderivedfromRussiandeceptions.
ThedominantfactsofthefirstyearofthecampaignontheEasternFrontwerethat,withorwithout
breaksintoSovietcodes,theGermansfailedtosecureMoscowandLeningrad,theirprincipal
strategicobjectives.Theflowofdecryptsslowedgreatlyafter1April1942,whentheRedArmy
introducednewcodesandcallsigns.
Lt.Col.ReinhardGehlen,seniorintelligenceofficeroftheWehrmachtontheEasternFrontfrom
thattimealmostuntiltheend,nonethelessachievedthehighestwartimereputationofanyGermanin
hisfield.HewasborninErfurtin1902,sonofabookseller.Hejoinedthearmyin1920,servedinthe
artilleryandmarriedadescendantofadistinguishedPrussianmilitaryfamily,HeratvonSeydlitzKurzback.Hegraduatedtothegeneralstaffin1935,andintheearlywaryearswongoldenopinions
asanoperationsofficer.InJuly1941hewaspromotedlieutenant-colonelandattachedtotheFremde
HeereOst,orFHO,theintelligencesectionofthehighcommand,ofwhichhebecamechiefinApril
1942,afterhispredecessorwassackedforpoorperformanceduringthewinterbattlesaround
Moscow,oneamongmanyscapegoatsfortheWehrmacht’sfailure.
Gehlenwasanausterefigure,taciturnandphysicallyundistinguished,whoskilfullyingratiated
himselfwithhissuperiors,atthesametimemaskingfromhiscomradesruthlessambition.He
broughttohisworkanewenergyandimagination:whilemostofhiscounterpartsthroughoutthe
armyrecruitedconventionalstaffofficers,Gehleninsteadhiredclevermenheedlessoftheirmilitary
accomplishments.HecombedtheWehrmachtforlinguists,geographers,anthropologistsand
lawyers,whodramaticallyraisedthequantity,ifnotthequality,ofreportingandanalysis.Hemade
gooduseofpatrols,togetherwithinterceptionoflow-gradeRussiansignalsandvoicetraffic.Gehlen
alsofocusedenergeticallyonPoWinterrogation,exploitingthemanyseniorRussianofficersin
Germanhands.Herana‘celebritycamp’inEastPrussia,knownasFesteBoyen,whichheldan
averageofeighty‘guests’,ofwhomthemostimportantwereaccordedsinglerooms.Allprisoners
receivedfullWehrmachtrations,andthemostcooperativestayedindefinitely,toprovideinstant
responsestoquestionsFHOneededansweringfromdaytodayandweektoweek.
SomePoWsstubbornlyrefusedtotalktoGehlen’sofficers,whonotedanoddity:better-educated
menoftencollaborated,whilehumbleronesstayedmute.Muchdependedonprevailingbattlefield
conditions.WhentheRussiansseemedtobelosingandmoralewaslow,asoneveryfrontprisoners
weremorewillingtogiveinformation.Whenthetideofwarturned,cooperationdeclined,because
prisonerswhoaidedtheNazisfearedtheirfate–withgoodreason–ifStalinprevailed.Thechief
impedimenttogettingintelligenceoutofRussiansoldierswasthattheyservedthemostsecretive
societyintheworld:fewevenamongseniorofficersknewmuchaboutanythingbeyondtheirown
unit.
Gehlenwasnofool,andmoreofarealistthanmanyofhiscolleagues,buthewasalsoaskilled
waffler.Consider,forinstance,his29August1942analysisofRussia’scondition,andofMoscow’s
optionsintothewinter.Thiswasacriticalmomentofthewar,theeveofStalingrad.FHO’schief
offeredtheGermanhighcommandanextensivemenuofalternativescenarios.Thisdeserves
attention,becauseitwastypicalofthematerialproducedbytheWehrmacht’smostcelebrated
intelligenceofficer.Gehlenassumed,hesaid,thatLeningrad,StalingradandthenorthCaucasus
wouldbeoverrunbyGermanforces,andacontinuousfrontestablishedbetweenPersiaandthe
Arctic.Russianactionsthereafterwouldbedeterminedby‘theresultsofthesummer–autumn
campaign;relativeresourcesavailabletoGermanyandRussia;theevolvingviewsoftheRussian
leadership;Russianobjectives’.TheRussianswantedtohusbandresourcesandfightingroomfora
wintercampaign,saidGehlen.
‘TheyseemwillingtoacceptthelossofLeningrad,Stalingrad,thenorthandperhapsalsosouthern
Caucasus,andevenMoscow.Russianlossesin1942havebeenlowerthanin1941.Theyseemcontent
tohaveinflictednotinsignificantGermanlosses,andarethemselvesachievingmanpowergainsby
cuttingexemptionsfrommilitaryservice,mobilising1.4millionmenbornin1925,andreducingthe
strengthofdivisions.Itmustbeanticipatedthatthiswintertheenemywillagaincommitalarge
numberofnewformationstothebattlefield.Onthewhole,thereisnosignthat,intheforeseeable
future,theGerman–Russianbalanceofstrengthwillshiftdecisivelytothedisadvantageofthe
Russians’–herewasacircumlocutionworthyoftheNKVD.
GehlensuggestedthatBritish-suppliedwarmaterialcouldbecomeasignificantfactor,especially
intheCaucasus.TheRussians,hesaid,werelearningfast,andhadadoptedmanyGermantactics:air
forceclosesupportfortheRedArmy,aggressivepatrolling,deploymentoftanksindefenceonly
behindaforwardinfantryscreen.However,Russianmiddleandjuniorleadershiphaddeclined.‘All
inall,’wrotetheintelligencechief,‘itmustbeexpectedthattheenemywillkeepmovingonhis
autumnandwinteraxes,usingtriedandtestedmethods,especiallywithguerrillasandairborne
forces.TheRussianswillseektoachievedisruptionoftheGermanfrontatasmanypointsas
possible,shiftingtomajoroffensiveswhereopportunitypermits…Thispossibilityseemstoexist
especiallyonArmyGroupB’sfront(Stalingrad)andthatofAGCentreatSmolensk…OnAGA’s
front,afterthelossoftheNorthCaucasustheenemyhasconvenientdefensivefacilitiesinthe
Caucasusmountainswhereitmustbeanticipatedthathewillprogresstoheavycounter-attackswhere
thegroundseemssuitable,aimedespeciallyatdisruptingGermanoilproduction.’
GehlenconcludedthattheSovietarmieswouldapproachwinter‘enfeebledbutnotyetdestroyed,
andthuswithanoptiontoinitiatenewoperations…DependingontheforcesavailabletotheRussian
leadershipandthefrontpositionsfollowingthesummer–autumncampaign,heavyRussianoffensives
willbelikelyata)StalingradandwestofStalingrad.b)WeaksectionsoftheAllied[Axis]front,
especiallywheretheRussiansholdbridgeheads.c)Voronezh.d)Mtsensk–Orel.e)Sukhinichi.f)
Rzhev.g)InthegapbetweenArmyGroupsCentreandNorth.h)Leningrad…OnlyiftheRussians
failtoachievesubstantialsuccessesinthewinterof1942/43;ifasecondfrontin[Western]Europe
becomeslesslikely;andiftheeconomicconsequencesofthisyear ’slossesofterritory(including
Baku)makearealimpact,canwereckononfinallybreakingRussianresistance.Thiswill
presumablynottakeplacebeforethesummerof1943.’
Thiswasnotastupiddocument:itreviewedperfectlyrationallytheoptionsopentotheRussians.It
mentionedStalingrad,thoughonlyinthecontextofsixotherpossibleobjectivesforSoviet
offensives.Ascepticalreadermightbetemptedtocompareitsequivocationstoapredictionthat,ifa
manturnsoverthefifty-twocardsinadeck,hewillfindfouraces.Butduringthemonthsandyears
thatfollowed,GehlengravelymisjudgedmostofthebigmomentsontheEasternFront.Hefirst
insistedthattheRussians’Operation‘Mars’,theirnorthernoffensiveagainstArmyGroupCentre,
wasStalin’sbigpush,towhich‘Uranus’–theStalingradpincermovement,turningpointofthewar–
wasmerelyopportunisticandsubsidiary.
On25July1943,afortnightaftertheacknowledgedfailureofGermany’sgreatoffensiveatKursk,
GehlenassuredthehighcommandthattheRussianshadnoplansforabigassaultoftheirown–only
localattacks;ninedayslater,theRedArmydrovewestahundredmiles.On30March1944,Gehlen’s
assessmentofthefrontshowedhimobliviousoftheloomingSovietoffensiveagainstCrimea,which
broughtnewdisasterupontheWehrmacht.BeforetheRussians’summerOperation‘Bagration’,
greatestAlliedoffensiveofthewar,hedismissedSovietpreparationsonArmyGroupCentre’sfront
as‘apparentlyadeception’,andpredictedthatStalinwouldinsteadstrikesouth,intotheBalkans.
YetCol.Gehlenretainedhisjob,andtherespectofGermany’sgenerals,almosttotheendofthe
war.Thiswaspartlybecauseofhisunflaggingplausibilityandpalacepoliticalskills,butchiefly
becauseofhissuccessinrunningagentsbehindtheSovietfrontwhoprovidedinformationof
extraordinaryquality,reportsthatmadearealimpactonGermandeployments,andthusonthefateof
theEasternFront.Gehlenmaythusbeconsideredoneofthemostinfluentialintelligenceofficersto
serveoneithersideintheSecondWorldWar.Butwhoseinterestsdidheserve?Thelatestevidence
suggeststhathewasthevictimofSovietmanipulation–maskirovka–onanastoundingscale;thatfar
frombeingthewizardofhisself-createdlegend,Gehlenwasasupremelygullibledupe.
2 A GENT ‘ M A X ’
Earlyin1942,duringthedisastrousphasewhenStalinstillinsisteduponexercisingpersonalcontrol
ofRussia’smilitaryoperations,hedecreedawholesalereorganisationofmilitaryintelligence,
dissolvingitsmachineryforhandlingbattlefieldinformation,whichpromptedchaosinitsactivities
throughthefirsthalfofthatyear.IgorDamaskin,oneofthemorecrediblemodernRussianhistorians
oftheperiod,haswritten:‘ThechaosintheGRUduringthisperiodblightedoperationsandwas
responsibleforheavylosses,asfieldheadquartersweredesperatelyshortofinformationaboutthe
enemy.’Stalinrejectedallreportsthatflewinthefaceofhisowninstincts:inMarch1942,for
instance,theGRUcorrectlypredictedHitler ’sOperation‘Blue’:‘Preparationsforaspringoffensive
areconfirmedbythemovementofGermantroopsandmaterials…Thecentralaxisof[theenemy’s]
springadvancewillshifttothesouthernsectorofthefrontwithanadditionalthrustinthenorthanda
simultaneousdemonstrationattheCentralfrontagainstMoscow…Themostlikelydateofthe
offensiveismid-ApriltoearlyMay1942.’Stalincastigatedmilitaryintelligenceforsuccumbingto
whathedescribedasobviousGermandeceptions.HeinsistedonlaunchingtheMayoffensiveat
Kharkov,whichprecipitatedanewdisasterforSovietarms.Evenaslateas19June,whendocuments
foundinashot-downGermanaircraftconfirmedHitler ’semphasisonthesouthernthrustsagainst
StalingradandtheCaucasus,HozyaindismissedthemasanobviousGermanplant.
Withinweeks,however,hewasforcedtoacknowledgetheterrificstrengthofPaulus’sSixthArmy,
drivingeastforStalingrad.Atlast,themasteroftheKremlinbowedtoreality:thesummerof1942
witnessedaseismicshiftinthemannerinwhichtheSovietUnionmadewar.Stalinimplicitly
acknowledgedhisownfailureasastrategistanddirectorofRussia’shosts.Hedelegatedauthorityto
hisgenerals,atleastuptoarmygrouplevel,andallowedintelligencedepartmentsonceagainto
functioninacoherentandprofessionalmanner.Fromtheautumn,whenthebattleforStalingrad
began,theRussiansbegantodoremarkablethingsinthefieldofstrategicdeception.TheirOperation
‘Monastery’becameoneofthegreatestsuchschemesofthewar,atleastasimportantastheAngloAmerican‘Fortitude’,whichbroadcastconfusionaboutD-Day.
‘Monastery’wasoriginallyconceivedinJuly1941,withthelimitedobjectiveofpenetratingthe
enemy’sintelligenceapparatusandidentifyingtraitorscollaboratingwiththeNazis.Itseems
remarkablethatsuchaplancouldhavebeeninitiatedinthosedarkdays,whentheRedArmywas
fallingbackeastwardsinheadlongretreat,butsoitwas.TheNKVDandGRUworkedtogetherto
createamythicalanti-Soviet,pro-GermanResistancemovementoperatingattheheartoftheRussian
highcommand,codenamed‘Throne’.Itwasfoundeduponanetworkofdoubleagentsamongtheold
Russiannobleclass–thoseleftaliveafterdecadesofpersecution.‘Monastery’mobilisedhistoric
Russianconspiratorialskills.AnoldmannamedGlebov,whosewifehadservedatthecourtof
Alexandra,thelasttsarina,wasdesignatedasthe‘Resistancemovement’s’figurehead.Helived
almostasabeggarinNovovevichymonastery,butwaswellknowninWhiteRussianémigrécircles.
However,theprincipalactiveNKVDparticipant,oratleastglovepuppet,wasanagentnamed
AlexanderDemyanov,whowasassignedthemostperilousrole.Bornin1911,hisbackgroundwas
impeccablyaristocratic.HisgrandfatherfoundedtheKubanCossacks;hisfatherwaskilledfighting
forthetsarin1915;hismotherwasafamousMoscowbeauty.Thefamilylivedinpovertyafterthe
Revolution,andAlexander ’soriginsdebarredhimfromhighereducation.Hewasobligedtoscratch
alivingasanelectrician,andin1929wasarrestedonachargeofspreadinganti-Sovietpropaganda.
Heescapedexileorexecutionbytheusualmeans–agreeingtoserveasaninformer,forwhich
purposehewasgivenajobintheelectricalbranchoftheCentralCinemaStudio,Moscow’s
Hollywood.Acheerfulextrovert,Demyanovbecameapopularfigureamongthestarsandliterati.
TheNKVDpaidforhimtoacquireahorse,torideoutnotonlywiththefilm-makersbutalsowith
foreigndiplomatsandbusinessmen,includingagoodmanyGermans.Hemarriedagirlnamed
TatianaBeresantsov,arespectedtechnicianatMosfilms,whosefatherwasaphysicianpermittedthe
extraordinaryprivilegeofmaintainingaprivatepractice.
CentredecidedthatDemyanovwassopromisingadeep-penetrationagentthatheshouldnotbe
thrownawayonmereinformanttasks.Hebecamewell-knownandtrustedinanti-Sovietand
nationalistcircles.TheNKVD’sgleeknewnoboundswhen,shortlybefore‘Barbarossa’,theyoung
manreportedanapproachfromamemberofaGermantrademission,whowasobviouslyworking
fortheAbwehr.Demyanov’shandlerinstructedhimtoshownointerest,lestover-eagernessfrighten
offtherecruiter.BerlinanywayopenedafileonDemyanov,whowasgiventhecodename‘Max’.
WhenwarbrokeoutheenlistedinaRedArmycavalryregiment,butwasquicklyretrievedbyPavel
Sudoplatov,whoregardedhimasanidealSpecialTasksagent,withadecade’sexperienceofroleplaying.Inthelatesummerof1941SudoplatovtoldBeriathiswasjustthemantotakealeadin
Operation‘Monastery’.
ThusitwasthatonedayinDecemberthatyear,duringthedarkestdaysofthestruggleforMoscow,
AlexanderDemyanov–codenamed‘Heine’byCentre–setoffonskisfromtheRedArmy’slines
nearGzhatsk,120milessouth-westofthecapital,todefecttotheGermans.Hisextraordinarily
perilousmissionalmostcollapsedattheoutset:whenhereachedtheWehrmachtpositionsand
announcedhimselfasaNazisympathiser,nobodybelievedhim,partlybecauseheclaimedtohave
crossedthelinesbyaroutethattraversedaGermanminefield.DemyanovlatertoldtheNKVDhehad
beensubjectedtoamockexecutiontoinducehimtotalk.Whetherornotthiswastrue,heobviously
cameclosetobeingshotoutofhand.Instead,however,hewashandedovertotheAbwehr.Itsofficers
proveduninterestedinhistaleaboutthe‘Throne’Resistancegroup,butimmediatelyenlistedhimas
anagent–oneamongthousandsofsuchpeoplewhowereperfunctorilytrained,deployedand
expended.
TheGermansbecamemoreexcited,however,whenacheckwiththeirfilesshowedthatDemyanov
hadbeenearmarkedasaprospectiveagentbefore‘Barbarossa’.Hisbackgroundamong‘former
people’–aristocrats–wassuchthathecouldpassmusterinémigrécirclesasananti-Sovietzealot.
ThoughtheAbwehrstillshowednoenthusiasmforfollowingtheoriginalNKVDscript–supporting
aphoneycounter-revolutioninsideRussia–itshandlersthoughtDemyanovsufficientlysmartand
wellconnectedtobecomeanimportantspy.Hismainproblem,duringthetrainingthatfollowed,was
tohidethefactthathewasalready–forinstance–anaccomplishedwireless-operator.Onenightin
February1942,aLuftwaffeaircraftcrossedthelinestoagridreferencewestofMoscow,where
DemyanovandtwootheragentstaskedtoassisthimhurledthemselvesintodarknessoverSoviet
territory.
Theymadetheirparachutedescentsinterribleweather,andlostcontactwitheachotherasthey
stumbledthroughasnowstormnearYaroslavl.AlexanderpromptlyreportedtothenearestNKVD
headquarters,andadayortwolaterhisassistantswerepickedup.Duringtheweeksandmonthsthat
followedCentre’soperation,overseenbySudoplatov,becameevermorebyzantine.Demyanov’s
Moscowflat,wherehelivedwithhiswifeandfather-in-law,becamethefocusofthesupposed
Resistancegroup–thewholefamilywasmadeprivytothescheme.AsuccessionofAbwehrcouriers
reportedthere,someofwhomwereforatimeleftatliberty,toseewhomtheymet.Otherswere
‘turned’,othersagainwerejailedandpresumablyshot.AfewwerepermittedtoreturntotheGerman
linestoreport.
ForDemyanovhimself,thesupremelyperilouspartoftheoperationwasover:hewasbackwith
hisownside.Italmostdefiesbeliefthatanyman,howeverhighlydevelopedhissenseofadventure
andtasteforthesecretlife,couldhavedoneashedid,exposinghimselftothepowerandwrathof
NaziGermanyinagameofsuchsubtletyanddeadliness,butMI5deployedtheBritishEddie
Chapmaninthesamefashion,thoughtomuchlessadvantage.Demyanovwasthereafterrequiredonly
toplayoutapartundertheeyesofhisownspymasters.TheGermanshadequippedhimwitha
wirelessset.Centre’s‘WilliamFisher ’wasdeputedtomanagethesubsequentradiooperation–this
wasnoneotherthanRudolfAbel,borntoRussianparentsinNewcastleuponTyne,whoafterthewar
becameaSovietagentintheUS.
ThechallengewasforSudoplatovandhiscolleaguestoplayoutthehandagainsttheAbwehr.
BeriawarnedtheSpecialTaskschiefthathewouldbeheldpersonallyresponsibleifanyactof
sabotagewascommittedonSovietterritoryinthecourseofthe‘Max’operation.Attheoutset,the
Russianshadnoconceptionthattheyhadstartedsomethingthatwouldcontinueforyears–most
radiogamesweredetectedbytheenemywithinweeks.TheNKVD’sfirstobjectivewastobuildup
‘Max’s’credibilitywiththeGermans.Hereportedtothemthatthe‘Throne’groupwasconducting
railwaysabotagenearGorky,andSovietnewspapersdutifullycarriedreportsoftrainaccidentsto
supportthestory;theBritishoccasionallyusedthesameruse,usingdoubleagentstocarryout
allegeddemolitionsinBritain.
Inthelatterpartof1942,DemyanovreportedtotheAbwehr,andthencetoReinhardGehlenand
FHO,thathehadbeenassignedasajuniorcommunicationsofficerattheSoviethighcommand
headquartersinMoscow,apostingwhichexplainedhow,thereafter,heappearedtoenjoy
extraordinaryaccesstoRussiansecrets.Throughthemonthsandyearsthatfollowed,hesignalledto
Gehlen’sstaffamassofmaterialabouttheRedArmy’sorderofbattleandstrategicintentions,which
reachedBerlinandFHOviaSofia.TheGermanarmyintheEast–inthepersonofGehlen–became
convincedthatitwasreceivingintelligenceofthehighestquality,andincreasinglyeagerto
acknowledgeitsauthenticity.AstreamofFHOsignalswaxedeuphoricaboutitsman’sproduct.
Moscownowsawopportunitiestoexploit‘Max’s’reportsinsupportofamajordeception
operation,forwhichtheNKVDandGRUcollaborated.Thelatter ’schief,Col.Gen.FedorKuznetsov,
fulfilledtheroleoccupiedbyCol.JohnnyBevanasheadoftheLondonControllingSectionandBill
BentinckoftheJIC–overseeingtheschemeandsupplyingmenusofmingledinformationand
disinformationforpresentationtotheGermans.Byfarthemostimportantandhistorically
controversialdevelopmentof‘Monastery’cameinNovember1942,apivotalmomentoftheSecond
WorldWar.Onthe19th,theRedArmylaunchedOperation‘Uranus’,itshistoricdoubleenvelopment
behindtheGermanSixthArmyatStalingrad.Fourdayslater,however,asecondthrustbysixarmies
wasunleashedontheKallininfrontatRzhevahundredmilesnorth-westofMoscow–Operation
‘Mars’.ThisengagedlargeGermanforces,butendedinacostlyrepulse,withallfourthrustsbeing
smashedbytheWehrmachtatacostof70,000Russiandead.MarshalGeorgiZhukovlater
acknowledged‘Mars’asoneofhisownfailures.
Morethanhalfacenturylater,however,PavelSudoplatovassertedinhismemoirsthat‘Mars’was
betrayedinadvancetotheGermans,withoutZhukov’sknowledgeandontheexplicitordersofStalin,
aspartofthedeceptionoperationtodivertGermanforcesfromthecritical‘Uranus’atStalingrad.
AlexanderDemyanovwastheinstrumentbywhichtheinformationwasconveyedtotheenemy’shigh
command.Thisversionofeventsremainsdisputedamonghistorians,butislargelyacceptedby
Russianones.SomeWesternersfinditinconceivablethatevenStalincouldhaveknowingly
consignedhundredsofthousandsofhisownpeopletodeathordisablementmerelytosupportaruse
deguerre,albeitforhugestakes.Buttheevidenceseemsstrong,indeedalmostconclusive,that
Sudoplatovtoldthetruth.ThereisnodoubtthatDemyanovwasanNKVDoperative,workingunder
Moscow’scontrol.ItisalsocertainthattheGermansregardedhimastheiroutstandingSovietsource:
ReinhardGehlenwenttohisgravein1979stillproudlyassertingthebrillianceofhisownhandling
of‘Max’s’material.Mostsignificant,‘Max’s’voluminousreportsarereadilyaccessibleinthe
GermanmilitaryarchiveinFreiburg.
Amongthemoststrikingmessagesisonedated6November1942andheaded‘ForeignArmies
East–ImportantIntelligenceReports’.Thisreads:
Agent(Max):On4November,councilofwarinMoscow,chairedbyStalin.Present12marshalsandgenerals.Atthismeeting,the
followingprincipleswerelaiddown:a)Carefulapproachtoalloperations,avoidingmajorlosses.b)Lossesofterritoryare
unimportant.c)Preservationofindustrialandsupplysitesbyearlyremoval[ofplant]fromendangeredareasisvital,onthisaccount:
directivetoremoverefineriesandmachinefactoriesfromGroznyandMakhachkalatoNew-Baku,Orsk,andTashkent.d)Relyon
ownforces,notonassistancefromallies.e)Severemeasuresagainstdesertion,thatisontheonehandbyexecutionandintensified
controlbytheStatePoliticalDirectorate,ontheotherbystrongerpropagandaandimprovedrations.f)Executionofallplanned
offensiveoperations,ifpossiblebefore15November,asfarasweatherconditionspermit[‘Mars’waseventuallydelayedbypoor
weather].
Chiefly:
–fromGroznytowardsMozdok
–closetoNizhnyandWerchny-MamonintheDonarea
–closetoVoronezh
–closetoRzhev
–southofLakeIlmenandLeningrad.
Necessaryforcesshouldbebroughtforwardfromthereservetothefront.
Thissignal,whilesomeofitscontentisgeneralandvagueratherthanexplicitabout‘Mars’,seemsto
provideconclusiveevidencethatunderordersfromMoscowCentreDemyanovgavetheGermans
goodwarning,ornamentedwithcircumstantialdetail,aboutaloomingSovietthrustagainstArmy
GroupCentre,contemporaneouswiththeRussianencirclementofHitler ’sSixthArmyatStalingrad.
The6Novemberreportshouldbereadinthecontextoffrequentorder-of-battledispatchesfrom
‘Max’duringtherun-upto‘Mars’,suchasthesamplesbelow,whichdeservequotationbecausethey
illustratethecreativeeffortinMoscowthatwasexpendedoncompilingthem:
ImportantIntelligenceReports:1.)8October,agent(Max):1cavalrybrigade,1horsedartilleryregiment,and1pioneerbattalion,
allfromthefront,arrivedinTuapse.Theywillremainthereinreserve.2.)8October,agent(Max):1rifledivision,3tankbattalions,
andartilleryaswellasseveralspecialdivisionsconductingdemolitionsinthecourseofretreats,allfromMakhachkala,arrivedin
Grozny.3.)8October,agent(Max):120Englishand70Americantankswith60EnglishandAmericaninstructorsarrivedinZarev,
assignedtotheStalingradfront.4.)8October,agent(Max):1cavalrydivision,4mixedtankbattalions,2artilleryregiments,and
40anti-tankgunsarrivedinKaluga.TheyareassignedtothewesternsectionoftheKalugafront.5.)9October,agent(Max):In
Mischina(45OWRzhev),combatgroupsarebeingassembledfromtankbattalions.Manyanti-tankgunsandafueldepot[are
located]inMischina.6.)8October,agent(Max):Amilitarydelegationconsistingof2infantrygenerals,1tankgroupgeneral,1air
forcegeneral,2admiralsand2militaryengineers,leftMoscowforLondonbyair.
TheGermansloveditall.Itwaspricelesstotheself-esteemoftheAbwehrandFHOtobelievethat
theirchiefsweresuccessfullyrunningagentsinsidetheSovietcorridorsofpower.Asfarasis
known,onlyoneseniorAbwehrofficer,DrWagnerDelius,headoftheAbwehrstationinSofia,
questionedtheauthenticityofthe‘Max’material.ButaninquiryhadscarcelybegunbeforeFHO–a
furiousReinhardGehlen–intervened.The‘Max’reportswere‘indispensable’,hesaid,‘andmuston
noaccountbejeopardised’.Theinvestigationstopped.TheNKVD,knowingthatDemyanov’s
standingstoodsky-highafterthefailureof‘Mars’,continuedtofeedasteadystreamofintelligence
totheenemy,suchasthis3Decemberreport:
Fromagent(Max):ConferenceinMoscow,chairedbyStalinwithZhukov,Timoshenko,andKosslow:Inthenorthernsectionofthe
Rzhevfront[where‘Mars’hadtakenplace][sacking]of5divisioncommanders.Theywerereplacedby5majors,whowere
appointedcolonels.StalinisdissatisfiedwiththecourseoftheoperationsbetweenRzhevandVelikiyeLuki.Zhukovasksfor
armouredandinfantryreinforcements.Stalin[saysthathe]issurethattherehavetobetreacherousinformantsatthetop,sincethe
Germansaresowell-informedaboutSovietmovements,plans,andtroopstrengths.HeordersaStatePoliticalDirectorate
committeetobecreated,forstrictcontrolandinvestigation[ofpossibletraitors].
Thereisafascinatingcross-bearingonthisstory:intheautumnof1942theBritish,inthepersonof
HughTrevor-Roper,begantoponderdecryptsofthistrafficwhichwascausingsomuchexcitement
intheenemycamp.Trevor-Roperrecognisedthatthematerial,classifiedbyFHOandtheAbwehr
underthegeneralcodenameof‘Klatt’,was‘veryhighlyvaluedbytheGermans’.Heandhissection
puzzledendlesslyoverwhether‘Max’andhisallegedsub-agentsinsidetheSovietUnionwere
doublescontrolledbyMoscow.Atfirstthisseemedhighlylikely–especiallysowhenLondon
warnedtheRussiansabouttheleaks,andtheyshowednointerestinstoppingthem.On31July1943,
however,theRadioSecurityServicesaiditsformerview–thatthe‘Max’reportswereRussianplants
–mustbereviewedinthelightofthefactthatrecentdispatches‘appearedtocontainaccurate
predictionsofRussiantacticalmoves’.
‘Max’hadforecastimpendingSovietinitiativesinthecriticalKursk–Orelsector.TheWarOffice
MI14’sMajorBrianMellandcommented:‘Thepossibilityof“MAX”reportsbeing,perhapsinpart,
plantedmaterialmust,wefeel,bediscarded…ThereisampleevidencethatGermanintelligenceand
Operationsconsider“MAX”reportstobeofgreatvalue;anditisquitepossible,infact,thatthese
reportsformthebestfieldintelligenceobtainedbytheenemy.’ByAugusttheBritishwereconvinced
–temporarilyatleast–that‘Max’andhisfriendsweregenuinearticles–orrather,authentictraitors
intheSovietcamp:‘Arecentexaminationhasshownthemtohavebeensingularlyaccuratein
forecastingRussianoperations.’GuyLiddellofMI5wroteon12August:‘MAXmustberegardedas
asuccess[fortheAbwehr]…reportshavebeensingularlyaccurateinforecastingRussianoperations
andthetheorythatitisaRussiandouble-crossrathergoesbytheboard.’
Trevor-Roperwasstilluncertainabout‘Max’whenhewrotehisApril1945valedictoryreporton
theAbwehr.Hesaidthatthematerialseemedtohisteam‘suspiciouslyfreefromtheadministrative
hitchestowhichmostspy-systemsareliable’.InformationwastransmittedtotheGermanspunctually
andinbulknotonlyfrom‘Max’himselfinMoscow,butalsofromallegedsub-agentsinLeningrad,
Kuibishev,Novorossiysk.‘AlthoughweinformedtheRussiansofthefacts,andthenamesofthe
personsinvolved,noactionwastakenbythemtosuppressthisapparentdangerousleakage.Aftera
varietyofotherhypotheseshadbeenfounduntenable,itwasconsideredinthisoffice(althoughit
couldneverbeconclusivelyproved)thattheevidenceshouldonlybesatisfactorilyexplainedbythe
assumptionthat“Klatt”,atleastinrespectofthe“Max”Reports,wasaRussian-controlleddeception
agent(althoughitispossiblethathehimselfmayhavebeenunconsciousofthefact).’TheBritish,in
short,neverentirelyfathomed‘Monastery’,partlybecauseitwasbeyondtheimaginationoftheir
intelligenceofficers,eventhesupremelycynicalTrevor-Roper,thattheRussiansshouldsurrenderso
muchauthenticinformation,atapricepaidintorrentsofblood,topromotestrategicdeceptions.
TheSovietintelligenceserviceswereastrangecombinationofbrutishincompetence,exemplified
bytheir1939–42mismanagementoftheRedOrchestrainBerlin,contrastedwithsuperb
sophistication,ofwhichOperation‘Monastery’wasperhapsthemasterstroke.OnlyinStalin’s
dreadfulworldcould70,000liveshavebeensacrificed,withoutsentimentorscruple,toservethe
higherpurposesofthestate.Thebetrayalof‘Mars’totheGermansmayhelptoexplainwhy,untilthe
lastyearsofthetwentiethcentury,theRzhevbattlereceivedsolittleattentioninSoviethistories.
AlexanderDemyanov’sdoublecareercontinueduntiltheendofthewar–laterSovietdeception
operationsthroughAgent‘Max’willbedescribedbelow.HereceivedtheOrderoftheRedBanner
fromtheNKVDforhisservices–andtheIronCrossfromReinhardGehlen.Hiswifeandfather-inlawalsoreceivedmedals,inappreciationoftheirsupportingrolesinthewebofdeceitwovenaround
thefamily.
Itshouldnotbesupposed,however,thatthetriumphantmanagementofDemyanovsufficedtowin
bouquetsallroundinMoscow.ViktorIlyin,hispersonalhandlerintheLubyanka,sufferedadreadful
fateinoneoftheendemicpowerstruggleswithinSovietintelligence.ItsuitedStalintosustainViktor
AbakumovasacounterweightandrivaltoBeria.In1943,hemadeAbakumovheadofSMERSh,
chargedwiththedetectionandliquidationoftraitors,anddeputytohimselfasministerofdefence.In
anearlyexerciseofpowerinthisrole,AbakumovtrumpedupchargesagainstIlyin,directorofthe
NKVD’sSecretPoliticalDepartment.Ilyinhadrun‘Heine’forfiveyears,andwasregardedbythe
likesofPavelSudoplatovasoneofthefewhonestmenintheupperreachesofSovietintelligence.He
wasafriendofMaj.Gen.BorisTeplinsky,designatedtobecomechiefoftheheadquartersdepartment
oftheRedAirForce.AbakumovdenouncedTeplinskyasanenemyofthepeople,andassertedthat
Ilyinhadconspiredtopreventhisexposure.Stalinauthorisedthearrestofbothmen.Abakumov
personallyconductedTeplinsky’sinterrogation,breakingtwoofhisfrontteethonthefirstnight.
Batteredintoawreck,thewretchedmanconfessedthathehadtoldIlyinyearsbeforeofhissympathy
formenexecutedinthePurges,andthatIlyinhadcoachedhimabouthowtoescapeexposure.
WhenthegeneralwasconfrontedwithIlyininthebasementoftheLubyankaandrepeatedhis
farragoofnonsense,theNKVDmanslappedhimandtoldhimtobehavelikeaman.Ilyinresolutely
refusedtoconfesstoanything.Defiancedidnotsavehim,however.Hewasheldinsolitary
confinement,repeatedlyinterrogatedandbeatenforfouryears,between1943and1947.Throughit
allheretainedagallowshumour,oncedemandingofoneofhistorturersthenatureoftheribbonon
hischest.Whenthemananswered‘theOrderofLenin’,Ilyinsaidthathewasgladhisowncasewas
deemedsoimportant.Evenwhentheinterrogationswereabandonedin1947hewasheldinjailfora
furtherfiveyears,until–inthedementedfashionofhigherSovietaffairs–hewassuddenlybrought
forthtotestifyagainstAbakumov,nowhimselfdisgracedandimprisoned.Teplinskyremaineda
prisoneruntil1955.
PavelSudoplatovistoomodesttomentionseveralSovietdeceptionoperationsthatfailedtofoolthe
Germans–forinstance,whentheRedArmylaunchedattacksintheDonbasinJuly1943,andinthe
Chernyov–PripyatregionduringAugustandSeptember.PoorRussianradiosecurityenabledGerman
eavesdropperscorrectlytopredicttheSovietaxisofattack.Ingeneral,however,theStavka’sstrategic
deceptionsinthesecondhalfofthewarwerenotablysuccessful.Asecondmajoroperation,
‘Couriers’,alsorequiredStalin’sendorsement,toprotectitsparticipantsfromfiringsquads:noman
daredcreateevenafictionalanti-Sovietmovementwithouthispersonalauthority.
Fifty-four-year-oldBishopVasilyRatmirovoftheRussianOrthodoxChurchworkedinKalinin
underthecontroloftheNKVD’sZoyaRybkinawhenitwasoccupiedbytheGermans.Havingthus
establishedhispatrioticSovietcredentials,MoscowCentreturnedtohimtoprovidecoverfor
‘Couriers’.AstheGermanswerepushedwestwardsin1943,thebishopwasinstalledinSamara,in
theVolgaregion.HedispatchedtwoclericalnovicestoPskovmonastery,south-westofLeningrad,in
German-controlledterritory,supposedlybearinginformationforitschief,whowascollaborating
withtheenemy.ThesemenwereinrealityNKVDagents,oneofthem,VasilyIvanov,trainedby
EmmaSudoplatov.Themission’splanningwasnotwithoutdifficulties.Thebishopaskedforan
assurancethatthemenwouldnot‘committhesacrilegeofbloodshedinGod’ssanctuary’.Inthe
courseoftrainingtheagentstopassaspriests,helostpatiencewithacoarse,brashex-Komsomol
wireless-operatorwhomockedthesacrament,saying,‘OhFather,butterthepancakesinheaven.
Bringthepancakestothetable!’Thismanwasreplacedbytwenty-two-year-oldSergeantIvan
Kulikov,whowasbaffledtobequizzedinadvancebyanNKVDofficerabouthisownhistoryof
churchattendance,andonlyacceptedwhenhedisplayedanappropriaterespectforthevestmentshe
wasrequiredtowear.
TheysetforthinAugust,firstforKalininandthereafterforPskov,appropriatelyheavilybearded,
supposedlyasrepresentativesofaChurch-basedanti-SovietResistancegroup,andpresented
themselvestotheGermansinthisrole.TheAbwehrprovidedthemwithwireless-operators,Soviet
PoWs,whoprovedreadilyconvincedinprivateconversationwiththetwo‘novices’thatitwasin
theirbestintereststofollowCentre’sorders,ratherthanCanaris’s.Thereafter,theGermans
complacentlysupposedthattheywereinregularcommunicationwithaclericalnetworkfarbehind
theRedArmy’slines,whichwasinrealitycontrolledbytheNKVD.WhentheRussiansatlastoverran
theirlocation,BishopRatmirovandhistwonovicesweredenouncedbylocalpeopleasGerman
collaborators;theywerethreatenedwithexecutionbySMERShuntiltheNKVDintervened,togarland
themasheroes.
Oneconsequenceofthemission’ssuccesswastopersuadeStalinthattheOrthodoxChurchwas
loyal;heamazedhissubordinateswhenherewardedthepriesthoodbyallowingitsmembersonce
moretoelectapatriarchin1943,aceremonyattendedbyPavelandEmmaSudoplatov.Afterthewar,
Ratmirovbecameanarchbishopandwasawardedagoldwatchandamedalinrecognitionofhis
contribution.IvanKulikov,promotedtocaptain,marriedagirlhehadmetinhiscongregationin
Kalinin.
Beyond‘Monastery’and‘Couriers’,SudoplatovtestifiesthattheRussiansranafurtherforty
wartimeradiodeceptionoperations,whichwerecontrolledbySMERShratherthantheNKVD.
Russianwirelesssecurity,andtacticalpenetrationofGermancommunications,wereimproved
dramaticallyfollowingthecaptureofPaulus’sSixthArmyheadquartersatStalingradon2February
1943,despiteitsstaff’sattemptstodestroysecretdocumentsandciphermaterial.Maskirovka
achieveditsgreatesttriumphinthesummerof1944,whentheRussianssuccessfullypersuadedthe
Wehrmachttoexpecttheirmainassaultinsouth-eastPolandratherthanBelorussia,thenhaving
smashedthreeGermanarmiesswitchedaxistoPolandintheautumn.ThoughReinhardGehlenkept
hisjobasGermany’sEasternchiefofintelligenceuntilthelastdaysofthewar,themodernevidence
suggeststhathewasbear-ledbytheStavkainMoscowevenmoreeffectivelythanwereOKW’s
WesternintelligenceofficersbytheBritishandAmericansin1944.WhateverthelimitationsofSoviet
wartimeintelligence,itsdeceptionoperationsweremasterpiecesofconspiracy.
9
TheOrchestra’sLastConcert
Fromtheautumnof1941,alltheRussians’Europeanspynetworksoperatedonthebrinkofa
precipice,renderedmortallyvulnerablebytheexposureoftheidentitiesofthemainplayersinboth
theNKVD’s‘Lucy’RingandtheRedOrchestratoLeopoldTrepperandAnatoliGourevitch,together
withtherecklessconductofMoscowCentreandoftheGermandissidentsthemselves.Toomany
peoplealloverEuropenowknewtoomanynames,sothatasingleinitialarrestprecipitatedavast
andterribleunravelling.TheOrchestra’sdoomwassealedbytheGermans’capturethrough
direction-findingofthewireless-operatorMikhailMakarov–‘CarlosAlamo’or‘Chemnitz’–inthe
RuedesAtrebates,Brussels,intheearlyhoursof13December1941.
OnthepreviousdayTreppermadeasudden,unheraldedreappearanceinBrussels.Relations
betweenhimselfandGourevitch,alreadyshadowedbymutualsuspicionandjealousy,thereafter
deterioratedrapidly.Twodaysafter‘Otto’s’arrival,GourevitchwasatSimexco’soffices,dealing
withtheastonishinglyprofitablebusinessissuesentwinedwithitschiefs’espionageactivities,when
hewassummonedbyphonetoanurgentmeetingwithTrepperathisapartment.Whenhearrived
there,hefoundhisvisitorinastateofalarm.Treppersaidthathehadjustbeenquestionedbythe
Germans,andproposedtoreturntoFrancebythefirsttrain.Gourevitchwasappalledthatthechief
shouldhavecalledathishomewhenalreadyundersuspicion.Heranamentaleyeovertheentire
networkforweaklinksandfixedhisattentionon‘Chemnitz’,whoembracedlouchetastesandan
extravagantlifestyle,thoughGourevitchhimselfscarcelypractisedausterity.Thewireless-operator
knewMargaretBarcza,Gourevitch’slover,andmanyofthegroup’sothercontacts.Suddenlythe
doorbellrang,andtheRussianwasdisconcertedtoopenittoaBelgianacquaintancewhoworkedfor
theGermanKommandatur.Thismaninvitedhimselfin,andaskedforaloan.Gourevitchhanded
oversomecashtogetridofhim,thenaccompaniedTreppertothestationtocatchaParistrain.
GourevitchnowtoldBarczathatBrusselswasbecomingtoowarmforcomfort.Hehimselfproposed
todecamptoFrance,andheurgedhertotrytoreachherparents,refugeesintheUnitedStates.She
promptlyburstintotearsandinsistedonaccompanyinghimwhereverhewent,withheryoungson
René.Gourevitchacceded,thoughheknewthatCentrewasboundtobeenragedbytheirrelationship,
whichwasnolessdangeroustohisdutiesthanTrepper ’sliaisonwithGeorgiedeWinter.
Theyquittheirflatimmediately,andtooktemporaryshelterinabighouseoccupiedbythe‘front’
directorofSimexco,whichherentedfromthenephewofBelgium’sforeignminister.Gourevitch
gavehisservantsseveralmonths’wages–theyoungGRUagenthadcertainlyrisenintheworld–to
supportthepretencethathewouldbecomingback.Heoccupiedthenextfewdays‘puttingtosleep’
theagentsofhisnetwork.ThenheboardedatraintoParis,followedtwodayslaterbyMargaretand
René.TheytookupquartersinahouseneartheBoisdeBoulognewhichGourevitchhadusedon
previousvisitstotheFrenchcapital.AssoonashemetTrepper,itwas‘leGrandChef’s’turntovent
violentdismay.Gourevitch’sarrival,hesaid,couldcompromisehisFrenchcovercompany,aswell
astheintelligencenetwork.Heinsistedthathisdeputyshouldleave,fast.Theydecidedheshouldhead
forMarseillesinunoccupiedVichyFrance,whereSimexhadabranchoffice.MargaretandRené
Barczaleftfirst,travellingsouthwithoutdifficulty,usingtheTreppergroup’scontactsandtakingup
lodgingsinMarseilleswithaCzechfamily.
Meanwhile,GourevitchmetHerschandMyraSokol,twoyoungPolishcommunistswhoactedas
Trepper ’sPariswireless-operators.ThefugitiveafterwardsclaimedthatheusedtheSokolstosenda
messagetoCentretoreportthethreatenedcollapseofhisnetwork,andhisownflightfromBrussels.
Buthiswarnings,hesaid,weretransmittedatamomentinDecemberwhentheGRUhadevacuatedits
headquartersinthefaceoftheGermanassaultonMoscow,andlackedhiscode.Thushisemployers
learnedoftheBrusselscrisisonlymuchlater,inFebruary1942,adelaywhich,hebelieved,
contributedtohis1945indictmentfortreason.GourevitchreachedMarseillesinJanuary1942,aftera
journeywithoutincident.Heremainedthereinnotuncomfortablehidingfortheensuingtenmonths,
makingnopretenceofconductinganyespionage,andchieflyamusinghimselfwithMargaret.Thanks
toCentre’sremittancesandSimexco’shandsomeprofits,theyhadamplemoney.Thisidyll–as
Margaretafterwardsrecalledit–continueduntil9November;onthatday,Gourevitch,hisloverand
animpressivecacheofcigarsandsilkstockingswereabruptlyseizedintheirflatbyFrenchpolice.
ThetwoprisonerswerehandedovertotheGermans,thensweepingacrosstheVichyzoneto
completetheiroccupationofFrance.TheGermanshadatlastbrokenintotheRedOrchestra,and
eachsuccessiverevelationfromacapturedagentproducedreverberationsthroughoutEurope.
Moscow’scontributiontowhatbecameadreadfuldébâcledatedbacktothespringof1942,when
thefortunesoftheNKVD’sAlexanderKorotkovwereoncemoreascendantwithintheLubyanka.He
tookagamble.GiventhedifficultiesandupsetsinBelgiumandFrance,hesoughttore-establish
directcontactbetweenBerlinandCentre,byprovidingtheOrchestrawithnewcodesandcrystals,and
thereafterwithmorepowerfultransmitters.ZoyaRybkinadescribesinhermemoirshowsheandher
husband‘Kin’,whonowrantheNKVDstationinStockholm,wereinstructedtoidentifyacourier
whocouldmakeadeliverytoSchulze-BoyseninBerlin.Afterconsiderabledifficulties,theyfounda
Swedishbusinessmanwhowaspersuadedtodothejob.Shesewedthecodesandinstructionsintoa
tie,andputthecrystalsintoacufflinkbox,tobeleftinacemeteryfortheLuftwaffeofficer.The
SwedereturnedfromhisnextvisittoGermanytoconfessfailure:hehadbeentooterrifiedtofulfil
themission,hesaid–everyoneontheBerlinplaneseemedtobestaringathistie.Afterasecondtrip
thefollowingweek,however,hereportedsuccess;heclaimed–truthfullyorotherwise–thathehad
leftthecodesandcrystalsatthedesignated‘deaddrop’.
MeanwhileKorotkovinMoscowselectedtwoagentstotraveltoGermany,carryingnewwireless
setstotheRoteKapelle,andwithfurtherorderstocontact‘Breitenbach’,theGestapoofficerwhose
existencewasunknowntotheOrchestra.ThemessengerswereveteranGermancommunists,Albert
HesslerandRobertBart,bothintheirearlythirties.Hesslerhadcommandedacompanyofthe
InternationalBrigadeinSpain,wherehewasbadlywounded.HehadsincemarriedaRussiangirl,
andaftervolunteeringfortheRedArmywastrainedasawireless-operator.Bartwasaprinterby
trade,whoservedaspellinPlötzenseejailduringtheearlyNaziyearsbeforebeingconscriptedinto
theWehrmacht,withwhichheearnedanIronCrossduringthe1940Frenchcampaign.Soonafter
beingpostedtotheEasternFront,hedefectedtotheRussians.
BothmentookafantasticriskbyagreeingnowtotraveltoBerlin,allegedlywillingly,thoughthis
deservestobedoubted.Theywereprovidedwithfalseidentities,respectivelyasalieutenantand
sergeant-majoronleave,thendispatchedaboardaC-47ofNo.1Long-RangeAviationDivisionfrom
PodlipkinearMoscow,andparachutedtoapartisanreceptioncommitteebetweenBryanskandGomel
inoccupiedBelorussiaduringthenightof5August1942.Guidesledthemtoarailstationfrom
which,afteraweek-longjourneyviaBialystok,WarsawandPoznan,theyreachedBerlinwiththeir
tworadiosets,initselfaconsiderableachievement.
TheywentinitiallytotheapartmentofaRoteKapellecontact,KurtSchumacher,whoreceived
them,thenseparatedthevisitorstotakerefugeinthehomesofsympathisers.Hesslerinitially
transmittedfromthestudioofanexoticdancernamedOdaSchotmüller,afterwardsfromthe
apartmentofCountessErikavonBrokdorf.Inmid-AugusthetoldMoscow:‘everythingisgoing
well.Thegrouphasexpandedconsiderablythankstothestrengthoftheanti-fascistmovement,andis
workingactively.IwillsendadditionalinformationfromHarnackandSchulze-BoysenwhenI
receiveanacknowledgementofthismessage.Ampresentlybusyfindinglodgings.’Fromanearly
stage,bothNKVDmenappeartohavebeenunderGestaposurveillance.LeopoldTrepper ’sBrussels
wireless-operator,aGermannamedJohannWenzel,hadbeenseizedon30June1942,againafterhis
transmissionsweretrackedbydirection-finders.Thoughthetruthwillneverbeconclusively
establishedaboutwhogaveawaywhomandwhen,underinterrogationbothMakarovandWenzel
seemtohavetoldalltheyknew,whichwasagreatdeal.Ripplingwavesofarrestsfollowedacross
Europe.TheGestapoformedaspecialSonderkommando,headedbyHaupsturmführerHorstKopkow,
toinvestigatetheSovietring.Itsofficerswereappalledbywhattheydiscovered:penetrationofsome
ofthehighestheadquartersoftheThirdReich;systematicbetrayalofGermanybyhundredsof
Germans.InAugust,theGestaponetbegantocloseonHarnackandSchulze-Boysenandtheirgroups.
TheNKVD’sAlbertHesslerwasarrestedinmid-September,alongwiththosewhohadshelteredhim.
Hemadehislastapparentlygenuinetransmissionon3September;althoughhemessagedagainonthe
21st,bythenhewasalmostcertainlyactingunderGestapocontrol.
Moscowwasslowtorealisewhathadhappened.Centre’sfirstdetailedaccountofthedisasterwas
delayeduntilApril1943,andthenarrivedbyatortuousroute:WolfgangHavemann,anephewof
Harnack,wasinterrogatedbytheGestapo,thenreleasedforlackofevidence.Hewassenttothe
EasternFront,whereatthefirstopportunityhegavehimselfuptotheRedArmy.Heconfirmedtothe
NKVDthetotaldestructionoftheBerlinring,accompaniedbyforty-eightexecutions.Amongthose
seizedwereamarriedcouple,HansandHildaCoppi.He,aradio-operator,waskilledalmost
immediately.She,however,heavilypregnant,waskeptaliveuntilhersonhadbeenbornandattained
theageofeightmonths.ShewasthendecapitatedinAugust1943,andherchildhandedovertohis
grandparents,withwhomhesurvivedtopursueacareerasahistorianofGermanResistance.
RobertBartwastrappedbecausehecouldnotresistseeinghiswifeandson.Unbeknownto
Moscow,theGestapokeptthefamiliesofallmissingpoliticalsuspectsundersurveillance:Bart’s
desertiontotheRussianshadbeenassumed.Hiswifefellsick,andinAugust1942languishedina
cliniconBerlin’sNollenstrasse.TheSovietagenttooktheunderstandablebutinsaneriskofvisiting
her.Hewasbetrayedbyanurse,andarrestedattheclinicon9September.Almostimmediately
thereafterhebegantotransmittoMoscowunderSDcontrol.Helaterclaimedtohavegivenan
agreedMorsewarningon14October,whichaninexperiencedCentreoperatorfailedtonotice–
exactlyashappenedwhenSOEwirelessesinHollandbecamepartofanotherAbwehrradiogame.
Centreobliginglyrespondedbyprovidingdetailsoftheprocedureformeeting‘Breitenbach’.InmidDecember1942WillyLehmann,nowfifty-eightyearsoldandsurelyawearymanafterhisprotracted
secretservice,wastelephonedathomeonenighttohearMoscow’scodedintroductionofthecalleras
‘collegePreuss’–‘colleaguePreuss’.Lehmannpresumablygavetheappropriateresponse:‘Come
andseemeinmyoffice.’Thissignifiedarendezvousat5p.m.nextdayonthepavementof
Kantstrasse,betweentwocinemasofwhichonewasnamedtheOlympia.Thecontactprocedurewas
toapproachLehmannandaskdirectionstohisstreet.Hewassupposedtoreplythathelivedthere,
andwouldwalkthemantoit.
TherendezvouswasdulymadebyayoungGestapomannamedOlenhorst.Lehmannwasarrested
andinterrogated,nodoubtexhaustively,thensecretlyexecutedafortnightlater,andhisbody
cremated.Hiswife,whoknewnothingofhisworkfortheSoviets,wastoldthathehadperishedwhile
onamission;theGestapowasprobablyanxioustoconcealthefactthatoneofitsownhadbeena
traitor.Lehmann’sfatewasconfirmedonlyinMay1945,whenanNKVDteamfounddocumentation
mentioninghisdemiseintheruinsofGestapoheadquartersinBerlin’sPrinz-Albrecht-Strasse.Bart
survivedthewarandsurrenderedtotheAmericans,whopromptlyhandedhimovertotheRussians.
Hewasexecutedbyfiringsquadon23November1945,thoughheenjoyedthedoubtfulsatisfaction
ofbeingrehabilitatedbytheRedArmy’schiefmilitaryprosecutorin1996.
ZoyaRybkinarecordsthatsheandherhusbandinStockholmweresubjectedtobitter
recriminationsfromCentrefollowingthecollapseoftheOrchestra;inthecourseofatrawlfor
scapegoatsthatstraddledhalfEurope,itwassuggestedthatSchulze-Boysenandtheresthadbeen
betrayedbytheSwedishbusinessmanwhomtheyhadrecruitedtocarrycodestoBerlin.‘Kin’was
recalledtoMoscowinthesummerof1943,andformonthshiswifewasobligedtocontinueserving
theNKVD’sStockholmstationwhileignorantofwhetherhehadbeenshot.Shewrote:‘Centrekept
sendingtelegramsenquiringaboutcasesthat“Kin”hadbeeninchargeof,andIcouldn’tunderstand
why.’SheherselfreturnedtoMoscowinMarch1944,whereshefoundthatherhusband’sentire
Jewishfamily,saveoneyoungerbrother,hadperishedatGermanhands.Afterprotracted
investigationsandmonthsunderfantasticsuspicionofhavingthrownintheirlotwithBritish
intelligence,bothRybkinandhiswifewererehabilitatedandrestoredtofavourascolonelsinthe
Lubyanka.
ExposureoftheRoteKapellehadtwoimportantconsequencesforHitler ’sregime.First,it
representedavictoryfortheRSHA,whosemenclosedthenetwhiletheAbwehrremainedoblivious.
Second,itseverelydamagedthestandingofGöring,whoseministrywasshowntoberiddledwith
communisttraitors:theReichsmarschallhadgivenawaythebrideattheSchulze-Boysens’wedding.If
thefailureoftheLuftwaffeintheairwasamoreimportantcauseofGöring’sfallfromgrace,the
RoteKapelleaffairwasasubordinateone.InRussia,‘thefatman’wouldhavebeenshot.Asforthe
Alliedcause,muchhasbeenmadeoftheAbwehr ’sdestructionofSOE’sandMI6’sDutchnetworks
(describedbelow),butthefateofMoscow’sRedOrchestrawasafargravermatter,becauseits
sourceshadaccesstomoreimportantsecrets.BetweenthemtheRoteKapelle,‘Lucy’Ringand
Treppernetworksclaimed117informants:forty-eightinGermany,thirty-fiveinFrance,seventeenin
Belgium,seventeeninSwitzerland.LeopoldTrepperhimselfforsomemonthsescapedarrest,though
hisinformantsinFrance,BelgiumandHollandweresweptup.Theveteranspywasseizedonlyon24
November,inaParisdentist’swaiting-room.Thereafterheappearstohavetalkedfreelytothe
Germans,apparentlywithoutneedforrecoursetoviolentmethods;heevendispatchedinvitationsfor
informantstoattendrendezvousesatwhichtheywerearrested.AlltheRussians’codesfellintothe
handsoftheSD.
ThevictoriousGermansdealtswiftlyandruthlesslywiththeirhome-growntraitors.Harro
Schulze-BoysenhadbeenarrestedattheAirMinistryon31August1942.Aweeklater,Harnackand
hiswifeMildredwereseizedwhileonholiday.ThecondemnedprisonerFlorestansingsin
Beethoven’sFidelio,‘MyheartisatpeaceforIhavedonewhatisright,’andHarnackseemstohave
cherishedthesamesentiment.WhileFlorestanwassavedatthelast,however,theBerlinspieswere
not.On22December1942,sixmenandthreewomen,membersoftheRedOrchestra,were
guillotinedatPlötzenseejail.OnthesamedaySchulze-BoysenandHarnack,togetherwiththe
former ’swifeLibertas,sufferedcontrivedlylingeringdeathsbyhanging.Harnackwroteinalast
lettertoMildredthat‘despiteeverything’,helookedbackonalife‘inwhichthedarknesswas
outweighedbythelight’.Alltheirbodiesweredispatchedforanatomicaldissection,inorderthatthe
remainsshouldbeunidentifiable.
TheGestaporetained116otherRoteKapelleprisoners,ofwhomalmosthalfwereexecutedonce
protractedinterrogationshadbeencompleted.AmongthesewastheAmericanMildredHarnack.She
wasinitiallysentencedtoameresixyears’hardlabour,butHitlerintervenedpersonallytoinsistupon
aretrialatwhichshewascondemnedtodeath.ShespentsomeofherlasthourswithPastorHarald
Pölchau,aprisonchaplainwhosolacedhundredsofHitler ’spoliticalvictims;sheaskedhimtorecite
the‘PrologueinHeaven’fromFaust,beforeherselfsinging,‘Ipraytothepoweroflove’.Herlast,
wonderingwordsbeforebeingbeheadedon16February1943were:‘AndIhavelovedGermanyso
much.’Shewasjustforty,andherfairhairhadturnedwhiteduringhermonthsofconfinement.She
musthavefeltafar,farjourneyfromWisconsin.
SomuchsentimenthasbeenlavisheduponthemenandwomenoftheRedOrchestrathatit
deservestobenoticedthattheirespionageactivitiesrenderedthemequallyliabletocapital
punishmentunderBritishorAmericanjurisdiction.Butthecouragewithwhichtheyworkedagainst
Hitlercommandstherespectofposterity,foralltheirillusionsabouttheSovietUniontheysoughtto
serveinstead.Cynicsmayask:whatrenderedHarnack,Schulze-Boysenandtheircomradesmorally
superiortosuchBritishandAmericantraitorsasKimPhilbyandAlgerHiss?Tobesure,they
resistedonetyranny,buttheychosetoserveanotherthatwasequallyrepellent.Anyanswertothat
questionmustbesubjective,butitseemsincomparablyeasiertojustifytreasonagainstamurderous
dictatorshipthanagainstademocracygovernedbytheruleoflaw.
AnatoliGourevitchwroteinhismemoirsaboutthedaysfollowinghisarrestinNovember1942:
‘Thenopenedthedarkestperiodofmylife,andthatofMargaret.’TheGermansatfirsttreatedthe
couplewithremarkablecourtesyastheytravellednorthfromMarseilles.Theywerefedinrestaurants
andgenerouslypliedwithwine.Initialexchangeswiththeircaptorstooktheformofconversations
ratherthaninterrogations.Atnightduringthelongcarjourneytheywereallowedtosharea
bedroom,thoughtheirclotheswereremovedandtheyweredeniedknivesandforksatthebreakfast
table.TheygavetheescortmoneytobuythecigarettesGourevitchsmokedincessantlyashestroveto
decidewhattoconfessortodeny.Afterthreedaysontheroadthelittlepartyfoundthemselvesonce
moreinBelgium,atthefortofBreendonk,whereGourevitchandMargaretwereplacedinseparate
cells.Theirfoodcontinuedtobeexcellent,however,andthequestioningwascivil.HansGiering,
leaderoftheRedOrchestrainvestigation,wasjoinedbyanAbwehrofficer,HarryPipe,whomthe
Russianfoundthoroughlyinformedabouthisactivities.GourevitchpersuadedtheGermansthathe
neededtranslationoftheirquestions,tobuytimetodeviseresponses.Helateradmittedthathewas
disorientatedbyhiscaptors’affabledemeanourandconsiderateconduct.
WhilepartsoftheGRUman’smemoirofhisexperiencesseemcredible,thenarrativeofevents
followinghisarrestcontainsirreconcilableinconsistenciesandobviousimplausibilities.He,and
afterwardsTrepper,weretreatedgenerouslynotbecausetheGestapodiscoveredvirtueinhumanity,
butbecausetortureprovedunnecessary.Itwillneverbeknownhowfartheirrevelations,asdistinct
fromthoseofotherGRUagentsandwireless-operators,wereresponsiblefortheGestapo’sround-up
oftheirinformants.Alllaterblamedeachother.TheGermanstoldGourevitchthatMakarov–
‘Chemnitz’–hadnamedhimaschiefofSovietintelligenceinBelgium.WhentheGRUmandenied
this,GieringorderedguardstofetchanothercapturedMoscowagent,‘Bob’–HermannIsbutski–
whowasbroughtforthfromhiscellabrokenman,plainlythevictimoftorture.Heimmediately
identifiedGourevitch,whowasstunnedbytheencounter.Theinterrogationscontinuedforhourson
end,thoughGieringprovidedplentifulfood,coffeeandevenbrandy.Afteraboutaweek,theGerman
producedtwodevastatingdocuments:first,Moscow’sinstructionfor‘Kent’totraveltoBerlintomeet
HarroSchulze-Boysen;second,hissubsequentreporttoCentre.Itwasplain,saidtheRussian,thatthe
Gestapohelddecryptsofsomeofhiswirelessmessages,retrievedfromoneoftheoperators.
HewasallowedameetingwithMargaret,lateatnight,andfoundhershatteredbyherexperiences,
whichisunsurprisingsinceGourevitchclaimedthatshehadnopreviousknowledgeofhisespionage
activities,noreventhathewasnottheUruguayan‘VincenteSierra’.AnorderarrivedatBreendonk:
GourevitchandBarczaweretobetakenforthwithtoBerlin.Nextdaytheysetoffathighspeed,the
twoprisonersseatedbetweenarmedguards.Thecarscarcelyhalteduntilitdrewupoutsideahuge,
greybuildinginHitler ’scapital:thiswas8Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse,Gestapoheadquarters.The
Russianwastakentoacell,whilehiscompanionwasremovedtoawomen’sprisonon
Alexanderplatz.AlthoughGourevitch’smemoirssaynothingabouthisterrors,theweeksthat
followedmusthavebeenrepletewiththem.HemetGestapochiefHeinrichMuller,andwasshownthe
evidenceofhisdealingswiththeRedOrchestra.HewasconfrontedwithIlseStöbe,whomhehad
failedtomeetonhisearliertriptoBerlin,butwhowasnowravagedbytorture,herappearance
‘terrifying’.AninterrogatorsoughttosuggestthattheSchulze-Boysensweresexuallydepraved,and
producedphotographsofLibertasnakedtosupporthiscase.GourevitchwastoldthatLeopold
TrepperwasnowheldinFresnesprison,andwascooperating.Hehimselfremainedinsolitary
confinementinthecellsofPrinz-Albrecht-Strasseformorethanamonth.Onemorningashewas
beingescortedtothelatrinehepassedHarroSchulze-Boysen.Neithermangaveanyhintof
recognition.TheRussiansaidthathisformerdiningcompanionshowednovisiblesignsofhaving
beentortured:‘Ididnotknowthathehadonlyafewdaystolive.’
AttheendofDecember1942,GourevitchwastakenbacktoParis.Hewastobecomeaparticipant
withTrepperinaGestaporadiogamewithMoscow,whichcontinuedthroughmanymonthsthat
followed.HehimselfwasbrieflyheldinFresnes,thentransferredtoHansGiering’sheadquartersin
theRuedesSaussaies.GourevitchafterwardsclaimedthatheresistedforsomemonthsGerman
blandishmentsactivelytojointheFunkspiel.ItisamatterofrecordthatTrepper ’stransmitterbegan
tooperateunderGermancontrolonChristmasDay1942,whilethatofGourevitchcametolifeon3
March1943,butthelattercanonlyhavebeenallowedtoleaveBerlinforParisoncetheGermans
wereconfidentoftheirdominionoverhim.
Afewmonthslatertheentire‘turned’Sovietteamwasmovedintoaspacioushouseonthe
BoulevardVictorHugoinNeuilly,outsideParis.TrepperandGourevitchalikeoccupiedspacious
quarterswiththebestoffood,abletowashandirontheirownclothes.InJuly1943,advancedthroat
cancerobligedGiering–whodiedinthefollowingmonth–toresignhispostinfavourofHeinz
Pannwitz.InSeptemberTrepperescapedwhileonanescortedshoppingtripintoParis,without
apparentlycausingmuchconcerntohisjailers,whohadbythenextractedfromhimalltheywere
evergoingto.HesuccessfullyresumedcontactwithGeorgiedeWinter,andthetworemainedin
hidingwiththeassistanceoftheso-called‘Spaak’Resistancegroup.TheGermanssofarrelaxed
Gourevitch’scaptivitythathereturnedtoParis,wherehewaspermittedtocohabitwithMargaret
Barcza;sheproducedasonnamedSachainmid-April1944.TheSonderkommandowhichpresided
overthiscosyarrangementwasastrangelyill-assortedgroupthatincludedaprettyyoungEnglish
girlnamedToniaLyon-Smith,whosestatuspuzzledvisitors:shemendedclothesandmadetea,and
wasneverallowedoutofthebuildingunescorted,butitlateremergedthatshehadbecomethe
mistressofGestapointerpreterKarlGagel.Herstorywaspathetic:thedaughterofaBritishArmy
officer,attheageoffourteenshehadbeencaughtinBrittanyin1940withhernannyandteddybear
whentheGermansoverranFrance.Thereaftershespentsometimeinaninternmentcamp,then
roamedthecountryforawhilebeforetakingtemporaryresidencewiththeSpaakResistancegroup.
SheappearstohavehadsomecontactwithTrepperandGeorgiedeWinterontherun,andindeed
wrotealettertoafriendaskinghertohousedeWinter–whichtheGermansfoundontheAmerican
girlwhenshewascaptured.TheBritishlatersuspectedLyon-SmithofrevealingSpaakgroupsecrets
whensheherselffellintoGestapohandsinmid-1943,achargeshedeniedfortherestofherlife.Her
experienceisyetanotherofthecountlesssmallmysteriescontainedinthestoryoftheTrepperring.
ItwillneverbeknownhowfarPannwitz’sindulgencetowardsGourevitchreflectedthedepthofthe
latter ’scollaboration,ortheformer ’sconcernforhisownfuture.AccordingtotheGRUman,the
Gestapoofficerrecognisedthatthewarwaslost,andhadbecomedesperatetoavoidWesternAllied
captivitybecausehehadledNaziretributionforthe1942murderbySOE-trainedCzechsofReinhard
Heydrich,includingthemassacreoftheinhabitantsofLidice.GourevitchpersuadedtheGermanthat
hewouldreceiveawarmwelcomeinMoscow,andnodoubtbelievedthathecouldimprovehisown
prospectsbyreturninghomewithaseniorGestapoofficerasapersonaltrophy.Gourevitchsustained
acloserelationshipwithPannwitzuntiltheyretreatedtoGermanybeforePariswasliberated,
returningonlyinMay1945.MeanwhileLeopoldTrepperremainedsafelyinhidinguntiltheAllies
overranhisrefugeinSeptember1944.
Afterthebreak-upoftheRedOrchestra,the‘Lucy’RingbecameMoscow’sonlymeansofaccess
toBerlin’shighplaces.Unfortunately,however,justasunauthorisedsexualpassionshadcaused
complicationsforTrepperandGourevitch,sotheydidalsofortheSwissspies.AlexanderRadó
suddenlydecidedthathewasinlovewiththewireless-operatorMargritBolli,whowashalfhisage.
Withalmostinsaneindiscretion,hebeganvisitinghereveryday.Tofacilitatetheirmeetingshe
himselfstayedinGenevawhilerentingaflatforhisfamilyinBern.
Thisstorydescendedintoblackfarcewhenthegirldecidedthatshewasinlovewithsomeoneelse
–ahandsomeyounghairdressernamedHansPeter,whowasaplantcodenamed‘Romeo’,controlled
fromtheGermanconsulatebyAbwehrofficerHermannHensler.TheTreppernetwork’smenin
GermanhandshadidentifiedRadó,andtheGermanssetaboutclosingdownboththeagentandhis
contacts.Bolliwassobewitchedbyher‘Romeo’thatsheinvitedhimtodallyintheflatwhereshe
kepthertransmitter.TheSwisspolicehadhithertoshownastubbornreluctancetoactagainstthe
‘Lucy’Ring,butitsactivitieshadnowbecometooconspicuoustoremainignored.On27October
1942,EdmondandOlgaHamelwerearrested.Theymanagedtohidetheirtransmitter,andwere
eventuallyreleased,buttheirdaysinMoscow’sservicewereended.TheAbwehrsucceededin
readingsomeoftheGRU’sSwissmessagesduring1942,whichrevealedastringofagents’
codenames.On16March1943thebesottedBollisentanenclairwirelesssignalto‘Romeo’,which
furtherassistedGermanintelligence.TheAbwehrnowhadRadóandmostoftheRingunder
intensivesurveillance,andexertedimmensediplomaticpressureontheSwisstoarrestthem.
FromJune1943onwards,AlexanderFooteknewthathetoowasbeingwatchedby‘thedoctor ’–
localpolice.HetoldMoscowthathecouldnotsafelytransmitmorethantwiceaweek,buttheGRU
withcharacteristicruthlessnessinsistedthatheshouldmaintainamuchmoreintensiveschedule,
whichmadethedirection-finders’taskeasy.Earlyonthemorningof20Novembertherewasa
dramaticrushofmenintohisflat.OneofthempresentedapistolandcriedinGerman,‘Händehoch!’
ForaghastlymomentFootefearedthathisvisitorswerefromtheAbwehr.Itusuallysuitedthe
warringnationsthatthereshouldbenoviolencebetweentheirrespectiveagentsinSwitzerland,but
therecouldalwaysbeafirsttime.TheEnglishmanwasoneofthefewlocalspieswhocarriedagun,
a.32automatic:‘itgavememoralcomfortatsomeofmymoredifficultrendezvous’.Butnowthat
Footewascornered,itneveroccurredtohimtotrytoshoothiswayout.
HeexperiencedasurgeofreliefwhenhefoundthathewasmerelyinthehandsoftheSwisspolice,
whoseinterceptorshadpinpointedhistransmitter.Beforebeingtakenawayhemanagedtoswallow
somemessagesandnamesconcealedinsideatorch.Heafterwardsclaimednottohavedislikedthe
prisontowhichhewascommitted:‘ForthefirsttimeforyearsIwasabletorelaxcompletely.’He
waspermittedtowearhisownclothesandeatfoodbroughtinfromoutside.On8September1944he
wasreleased,thoughhisroleinthe‘Lucy’Ringwasatanend.
Onebyone,Moscow’sotheragentsinSwitzerlandwereremovedfromcirculation.Amongthem
wasAnnaMueller,aveteranSovietinformantwhomAlexanderFootedescribedas‘amotherlyold
soulwholooked–andIhavelittledoubt,inthepast,hadactedas–asuperiorcharwoman’.Mueller
wasthecut-outbetweenthenetworkandacorruptofficialintheSwisspassportoffice.Shewaslured
toGermanybyaphoneymessagesayingthathersister-in-lawinFreiburgwassick,discoveredtoo
latethatitwassentbytheGestapo,andspenttherestofthewarinaconcentrationcamp.Footenoted
drylythattheGRUneverpaidherasinglemarkorfrancinrecompenseforhersufferingsforthe
socialistcause.
RachelDüberndorfer–‘Sisi’–afterbeingarrestedbytheSwissandchargedwithespionage
claimedathertrialthatshewasworkingfortheBritishsecretservice,inhopesthatthiswouldsecure
moregeneroustreatmentfromthelocalauthorities.Althoughsentencedtotwoyears’imprisonment,
shewasindeedsoonbailedandallowedtodisappear.ButtheclaimfuelledtheNKVD’sdarkest
suspicions,andcausedherarrestandconfinementintheLubyankaonarrivalinMoscowin1945.
AlexanderRadówentintohidingfollowingthearrestsofhiswireless-operators,andeventually
crossedsecretlyintoFrance,wherehelivedundergrounduntiltheliberation.RudolfRösslerwas
arrestedbytheSwisspoliceinMay1944andremainedincustodyuntilSeptember.Hewasthen
released,butthe‘Lucy’Ring’sgamewasplayedout.
TheRussiansafterwardsclaimedthatinearly1944theyhadninety-sevenagentsoperatinginside
Germany,ofwhomtenwereGermans.Amongthemostactive(saidMoscow)was‘Ian’–Ferenz
Pataki,aHungarianwhohadonceworkedfortheCheka,whowaseventuallybetrayedandexecuted.
‘Dozen’,HermannSalinger,wasaformerInternationalBrigadefighterwhowasdroppedinto
GermanyinJanuary1944–withBritishhelp,accordingtotheRussians,thoughthereisnorecordof
‘Dozen’inWesternfiles.‘Sharp’,HeinzGlodjai,wasparachutedintoEastPrussiain1943,and
providedintelligenceuntilhewaskilledintheRAF’sAugust1944bombingofKönigsberg.
Nonetheless,itisonethingtoboast,asdothemodernofficialchroniclersofRussianintelligence,
abouttheNKVD’sandGRU’sGermansourcesinthelatterphasesofthewar,andanothertoshowthat
theseproduceduseful,usableinformation,whichseemsunlikely.Followingthebreak-upoftheRed
Orchestra,AbwehrinterceptorsfailedtofindanyfurtherevidenceofAlliedagentstransmittingout
ofGermany,anditseemsreasonabletodiscountsuggestionsthattheNKVDandGRUdeployed
substantialnumbersofactiveagentsinsidetheReichbetween1943and1945.CertainlynoRussian
covertsourceinGermanygeneratedintelligenceremotelyasauthoritativeasthatproducedearlierby
theRedOrchestraandthe‘Lucy’Ring.Inthelastyearsofthewar,however,strategicintelligencehad
becomemuchlessimportant,becauseRussiandominanceofthebattlefieldwasoverwhelming.
Moreover,despitetheSoviets’convictionthattheWesternAlliesdeniedthemimportantmaterial,the
BritishandAmericansroutinelyinformedMoscowaboutallGermanmilitaryactivityrevealedby
Ultrawhichthreatenedtheirinterests,ormightassistSovietoperations.Centredidnot,ofcourse,
returnthecourtesy.
10
Guerrilla
1 R ES I S TER S A ND R A I D ER S
Veryoccasionallyinthecourseofthewar,amarriagebetweenintelligenceandmilitaryaction
provedperfectlyarranged.AthisParisflatintheavenuedelaMotte-Picquet,onthenightof24
January1942,GilbertRenault–theGaullistResistancenetworkchief‘ColonelRémy’–decrypteda
radiomessagefromLondon.Itdeliveredarequestwhichconstitutedaverytallorderindeed:to
obtain,atutmostspeed,detailsofconditionsprevailingaroundaGermanChannelcoastalinstallation
atSaint-Bruneval,nearCapd’AntiferinNormandy;andmeanwhile‘todeceivebochesineventyour
agenttakenbereadytoreplytosamequestionnotonlyforplacechosen,butforthreeorfourother
similarplacesoncoast’.Renault,thirty-sevenyearsold,leanandintenselypatrioticbutrejectedas
over-ageformilitaryservicein1939,wasoneofthemoreremarkablefiguresofthesecretwar.His
Catholicismwasasignificantmotivationalforceinhisworkasanagent,andhewroteferventlylater:
‘Iwouldneverhavebeenabletocarryoutthisassignmentinaforeigncountryorforalessrighteous
cause.’HedescribedhisResistanceroleas‘puttinglivingtileuponlivingtile’,andrecruited
informantsfromaremarkablerangeofbackgrounds:ex-militarymenandarchitects,peasantsand
aristocrats.Thoughhimselfanextremeconservative,inthesacredcauseofFrancehesuppedwith
communists.HewasviewedinLondonastoocarelessaboutsecurityandtradecrafttobeagreat
spymaster,butheenjoyedaremarkablerunbeforetheseweaknessesundidhim.Nowhedispatched
RogerDumont,aformerairforceofficercodenamed‘Pol’–forPolRogerchampagne–to
reconnoitreBruneval.
AttheendofJanuaryanother‘Rémy’contact,aLeHavregarageproprietornamedCharles
Chauveau,drovetoParisinhisSimca5topickupDumont,adoptingfalsenumberplatesforthelast
kilometresintothecapital.ThetwomenthenreturnedtoLeHavre–amidGermansurveillancethat
merecarjourneywasadangerousventure.Attheporttheagenttookaroominashabbyhotelso
coldthathecouldnotsleep,butinsteadshiveredthroughthenight,fullydressedonachair.Next
morningheandChauveaurattledtwelvemilesnorthtoBruneval,withchainsontheSimca’styresto
contendwithafreshsnowfall.TheownerofthelittleHôtelBeauminetinthehamlet,PaulVennier,
wasafriendofChauveau,amanwhomthegaragisteendorsedas‘oneofthebest’.Vennierwasable
toenumeratetheLuftwaffecrewbilletedinthebigfarmcompoundatTheuville,andtotellthem
aboutaguardpostatavillabythebeach,‘StellaMaris’.HereportedthatthelocalWehrmacht
garrison,aplatoonstrongcommandedbyanefficientandenergeticFeldwebel,waslodgedinthe
Beauminet.Vennierknewnothingaboutwhatwashappeningatthelonelyhouseandneighbouring
‘radiostation’halfamileawayontheclifftop,butatDumont’surgingheledhimdowntothe
Germanwireentanglementjustshortoftheseasidetoseeforthemselves.Aconversationwitha
friendlysentryrevealedtothespythatasupposedminefieldabovethebeachwasafiction,todeter
intruders.Havingexploredtheareaaswellasanymancould,DumontreturnedtoLeHavre,and
thencetoParis.Onthenightof9February,GilbertRenault’sSOE-trainedwireless-operator‘Bob’–
RobertDelattre–MorsedtoLondontheagent’sreportonBruneval.Thefactthatthemissionhad
succeededwithoutincidentshouldnotforamomentmaskthefactthatithadinvolvedalltheparties
concernedinmortalrisk.Dumont’saccountofBrunevalmadeplainthatitwasgarrisoned,butnotin
greatstrength.
Thequestfortechnicalintelligenceabouttheenemy’sweaponssystemswasanuntiring
preoccupationofeveryparticipantinthewar.Itwaspursuedthroughspies,photographic
reconnaissance,patrollingandprisonerinterrogation.Ifsoldiers,sailorsandairmenweresometimes
sceptical,indeedcynical,aboutstrategicandpoliticalintelligence,theycouldallgrasptheimportance
ofsecuringdataabouttechnologybeingemployedbytheenemy,sothatmeanscouldbedevisedto
counterit.TheairwaroverEuropeengagedthemostsophisticatedequipmentavailabletobothsides,
andinspiredcorrespondinglyfeveredeffortstounderstandeachother ’s.TheGermanshadtheeasier
task,becausetheycouldexplorethewreckageofBritishandAmericanaircraftshotdownover
Europe,fittedwiththelatestdevicestoaidnavigationandbomb-aiming.TheBritish,however,
separatedfromtheairbattlefieldbytheChannel,dependedonthebrainpoweroftheirintelligence
officersandscientiststopenetratetheLuftwaffe’ssecrets.
Inthewinterof1941theyrealisedthatGermannight-fighterswereguidedfromthegroundbytwo
linkedradarsystems,codenamed‘Freya’and‘Würzburg’.R.V.Jones,thetwenty-nine-year-old
assistantdirectorofscientificintelligenceattheAirMinistryandadvisertoMI6,togetherwiththe
‘boffins’oftheTelecommunicationsResearchEstablishmentthenatSwanage,identifiedtheseaskey
elementsintheso-called‘KammhuberLine’,anetworkofguidancestationsthatenabledthe
LuftwaffetoinflictpunitivelossesontheRAF’sBomberCommand.TheyknewthatFreyas,withtheir
hugeaerialarrays,monitoredBritishbombers.TheyguessedthatWürzburgsguidedthefighters,but
hungeredforanopportunitytodissectaspecimen.On5December1941,ayoungSpitfirepilotofthe
RAF’sPhotographicReconnaissanceUnit,TonyHill,carriedoutalow-levelsweepofthelonely
clifftopchâteauatBruneval,fromwhich53-cmradartransmissionshadbeendetectedinBritain.
JonesporedoverHill’spictures,whichshowedaFreyasetashortdistancefromthehouse,andwhat
thepilotdescribedasa‘bowlheater ’sometenfeetindiameter–obviouslyaparabolicreceiver
whichwassurelythatofaWürzburg–somefourhundredyardssouthwards.
Thesitewasonlyastone’sthrowfromthesea,lessthanaquarterofamilefromabeach.Itwas
protectedbynovisibleobstacles,suchaswireentanglements.Surelyitshouldbepossiblefora
daringraidingpartytogetin–thenmoreimportant,out,havingsecuredpricelessbooty.Joneshad
alreadyachievedanentréetotheinnermostcouncilsoftheBritishwarmachinebyhisbrilliant1940
workontheLuftwaffe’selectronicnight-bombingguidancesystems.Now,hisproposalforadescent
onBrunevalwasenthusiasticallyacceptedbytheAirStaff,DowningStreetandCombinedOperations
HQ.Itwasdecidedthattheattackersmustlandfromtheair,thenescapebysea.
AcompanyofthenewlyformedParachuteRegiment,the‘RedBerets’,commandedbyMajorJohn
Frost,wasbriefedandtrainedtolandjusteastofthehouseanditsnearbyinstallation,thenseizeboth
inaswiftcoupdemain.AsectionofengineersledbyLt.DenisVernonwasdetailedtodismantlethe
setandremoveitskeycomponents,aidedbyanRAFradarmechanic,Flight-SergeantCharlesCox.
CoxwasrushedthroughthejumpschoolatRingway,thenheandVernonwerebriefedbyJonesand
settopractisingtheirroleonaBritishgun-layingradarset.Alltheraidersspenthoursmasteringthe
topographyonadetailedscalemodelofBruneval.TrainingontheDorsetcoastwasdoggedbyvile
weatherandrepeatedmishaps,wherebybothdroppingaircraftandshipsmadethewrongrendezvous.
Thelastexercise,onthenightofSunday,22February,endedwiththeparatroopersstrugglingin
chest-deepfreezingwaterassailorslabouredtoextricatethelanding-craftfromsandbanks.Allthis
auguredillforthemission,asalsodidthegloomoverhangingtheRoyalNavyandtheBritishpeople
aftertheChannelescapethepreviousweekofScharnhorstandGneisenau.
Theraidmusttakeplacewithinthefivenightsofafullmoon,toprovidelightfortheRAFand
Frost’smentoseetheirobjectives.Onthefirstthreepossibledatestheweatherwasunsuitable,
dampeningthespiritsoftheraiders.Fridaythe27thofferedthelastpossiblewindow;itwasavast
reliefwhen,at5p.m.,wordcamethattheoperationwas‘on’.TheassaultshipPrinsAlbert,carrying
theseaborneelement,setforthundermotorgunboatescort.At9.52p.m.sixlanding-craftwere
lowered,eachcarryingCommandobren-gunnersaswellasnavalcrews.Bycoincidence,evenas
twelveWhitleybombersoftheRAF’s51SquadronflewsouthacrosstheChannelthatnight,bearing
Frost’sparatroopers,aLysanderlightaircraftpassedthemheadingnorth,taking‘ColonelRémy’
fromFranceforameetinginLondonwithdeGaulle’sintelligencechief.Rémy’spartinOperation
‘Biteback’wasdone,evenasthatoftheraidersbegan.
Justbeforetake-offfromThruxtoninWiltshire,thepartylearnedofafreshsnowfallinnorthern
France.Thewhitecoverallspreparedforthiseventualityhadbeenleftbehindintheirtemporary
barracksatTilney,butonbalanceFrostthoughtthesnowabonus,becauseitwouldgivehismen
morelight.Abagpiperplayedawailingpibrochastheparachutistsboardedtheaircraft,which
pleasedtheScotsamongthem.Theweatherwassuddenlyclearandfine,afterawildweek,andthe
raiderstookoffwarmedbymugsoftealacedwithrum.Onceairbornetheysangoldfavourites–
‘AnnieLaurie’,‘TheRoseofTralee’,‘Lulu’.Aftertwohours,atafewminutespastmidnightthefirst
‘stick’plungedinsuccessionthroughholesinthefloorsoftheWhitleys,andaminutelatermost
foundthemselvesmakingperfectlandingsinsoftsnow:Bruneval’sproximitytothecoastmade
possibleuncommonlyaccuratenavigation.Mostofthemenurinatedbeforedoinganythingelse–in
theair,Thruxton’steahadwreakedhavocwithbladders.AsFrostassembledhismen,hereflected
ruefullythatonthisclearnighttheymustalreadyhavelostsurprise.Yetawonderfulsilencepersisted,
andtherewasonlyonepieceofbadnews:twosections,twentymeninall,weremissing,having
obviouslylandedoff-target.
Therewasnotimetowaste,noquestionofsearchingforabsentfriends.Withintenminutesof
landing,Frostledhisassaultpartyatafasttrottowards‘LoneHouse’–thechâteauwherethe
Würzburgwasinstalled–whileasecondgroupsetforthtosecurethebeachfortheirretreat.
Reachingthebuilding,themajorwasastonishedtofinditsdooropen.Heblewhiswhistleand
chargedin,findingonlyoneGerman,whomtheykilledashefiredatthemfromupthestairs.
MeanwhileLt.PeterYoung’spartyhadoverruntheWürzburgposition,whoseoccupantsfled,
bewilderedbythecrackleofsmallarms.Flight-SergeantCoxtoreasidethecurtainmaskingthe
entrancetothecabinintheradarpit,andfoundthesetstillwarm–ithadobviouslybeentrackinga
Germanfighternotmanyminutesearlier.Lt.Vernon,leaderoftheRoyalEngineersteam,began
takingflashlightphotographs,whichprovokedGermangunfirefromsomewhereoutinthedarkness.
TheBritishfoundthattheWürzburgoccupiedarotatingplatformonaflatbedtruck,protectedby
thickstacksofsandbags.Onesapperattackedthecasingwithahammerandchisel,removing
Telefunkenlabelsandserialnumbers.Coxwasobligedtouseacrowbartopriseoffthetransmitter ’s
fascia.Then,amidincreasinglyheavythoughill-directedgunfirefromGermansafewhundred
metresaway,theBritishloadedkeycomponentsontoatrolleytheyhadbroughtforthepurpose.One
ofFrost’smenwaskilledbyastraybullet,butVernon,Coxandtheothersremainedunscathed.The
plancalledforthesapperstobegiventhirtyminutestoguttheGermanset.Afteronlyten,however,
truckheadlightsshowedenemyreinforcementsapproaching.ThemajortoldVernontosettleforwhat
heandhismenhadgot–whichincludedalltheelementsthatmatteredtoRegJonesandhis
colleagues–andgetmoving.
ThepartytaskedtoclearthebeachfoundthemselvesbrieflypinneddownbytheGermans;
machine-gunfireseriouslywoundedCompanySergeant-MajorStrachan.AsFrost,Coxandthe
othersbegantomovetowardsthecoast,theysawthattheGermanshadalreadyreoccupiedthe
château.Suddenlytherewasanoutburstofheavyfiringfromthesouth-east:thetwosectionsdropped
off-targethaddoubledtowardsBruneval,andnowattackedtheGermansfromtherear,alucky
diversionwhichenabledtheircomradestoclearthewaytothebeach.Afewminutesofacutetension
followed:Frost’sradiobeacon,summoningthenavy,failedtoelicitaresponse.OnlyaftertheBritish
firedasuccessionofgreenflaresdidthelanding-crafthasteninupontherendezvous,totheintense
reliefofthewaitingparatroopers.Shortlybefore3a.m.theraiders,togetherwithFlight-Sergeant
Coxandhispreciouscargo,wereloadedaboard.OnceoffshoretheWürzburg’scomponentswere
transferredtoanMGBwhichdashedforPortsmouthattwentyknots,leavingFrost’smentofollowat
amoresedatepaceinthelanding-craft,towedbyothergunboats.Theattackersleftbehindonlytwo
menkilledandsixmissing,whospenttherestofthewarincaptivity;theGermanslostfive,andthree
morewerebroughtbacktoBritainasPoWs.At6o’clockthateveningof28Februarytheentireparty
boardedthePrinsAlbert,whereatriumphantpressconferencewasheld.Inthatchillseasonof
defeats,herewasatinybutinfinitelyprecioustriumphtowarmtheheartsoftheBritishpeople.
TheBrunevalraidwasthemostsuccessfulsuchoperationofthewar.Throughasmallinvestment
ofresources,andatnegligiblecost,MajorFrost’sparatroopersandFlight-SergeantCoxbrought
homeforBritaintheintimatesecretsoftheWürzburgradar:itsaerial,receiver,receiveramplifier,
modulatorandtransmitter.ThesesufficedtoenableR.V.Jonesandhiscolleaguestograspthesystem
onwhichtheKammhuberlinewasbased–achainof‘boxes’,withineachofwhichFreyaand
Würzburgradarsetsguidedanight-fighterontothetrackofabomber.Oncethiswasunderstood,the
RAF’sresponsebecameobvious:topushaircraftthroughthenightskyoverthelineatmaximum
density,swampingtheelectronicdefences.‘Streaming’worked,andrenderedKammhuber ’ssystem
obsolete.Althoughbomberlossesremainedsevere,Brunevalprovidedapreciousintelligencebreak
totheAllies.Moreover,initswaketheGermansfeltobligedtofortifytheircoastalradarchainso
heavilythatthereaftereverystationwaseasilypinpointedbyphotographicreconnaissance.
Theattackrepresentedatextbookcollaborationbetweenthe‘boffins’,ledbyJones,whoidentified
whattheyneededtoknow;spiesontheground–‘ColonelRémy’s’men–whoreconnoitredthetarget
forMI6;planners,whomarriedtheagentreportstodatasecuredbyairphotography;andspecial
forces,whichexecuted‘Biteback’.Inadditiontothedecorationsawardedtotheairborneforce,Jones
wasmadeaCBE.Theattackerswereaidedbythefactthatacoastaltargetwasrelativelyeasyforthe
RAFandnavytofindandreach.InFebruary1942theFrenchcoastwasdefendedmuchlessheavily
thanitbecametwoyearslater.Perhapsmostimportant,theBritishhadluckontheirside.‘Rémy’s’
agentswerenotcaught,assomanyspieswerecaught;theparachutedropwasrelativelyaccurate,as
manydropswerenot;theGermansputuplittleeffectiveresistance;andCoxwasabletocarryaway
thetreasure.Manytimesbetween1940and1945,Britishplannershadcausetolamentthatthecourse
ofsecretwarseldomransosmooth.
2SOE
FollowingthefallofFranceinJune1940,foralmostfouryearsWinstonChurchillwagedwarwith
theconvictionthatBritain,evenaftertheaccessionofRussiaandtheUnitedStatesasfellow-foesof
Hitler,lackedpowertoconfronttheNazis’militarymightontheContinent.Thismadeitessentialto
challengetheenemybyothermeans–thestrategicbomberoffensiveagainstGermanyandguerrilla
campaignsintheoccupiedcountries.ThecreationofBritain’sSOEandthePoliticalWarfare
Executive,followedlaterbythatoftheAmericanOSSandOfficeofWarInformation,was
encouragedbyadelusionthatHitler ’s1939–41Blitzkriegshadsucceededpartlybyexploitationofa
‘FifthColumn’ofsecretsupporterswithinthevictimnations.Manypeople,theprimeminister
notableamongthem,believedthishadplayedthesameroleintheenemy’sonslaughtsassappersin
siegesofold,whotunnelledbeneathcitywallsbeforestormingpartiesattacked.Hethussoughtto
createhisownFifthColumntoservetheAlliedcause.Hefearedthatifthepeoplesofoccupied
Europewerelefttotheirowndevicestheywouldremainsunkinpassivity,acquiescence,
collaboration–andhewasprobablyright.
InpromotingraidsandResistance,theprimeministerhadfourobjectives.Thefirst,andleast
important,wastofulfilmilitarypurposes,whereinthereweremanyfiascossuchasOperation
‘Colossus’,a1941CombinedOperationsparachutedroptodestroyaCalabrianrailviaduct,the
August1942Diepperaid,andsomeearlysabotageattemptsinNorway.Thesecondpurposewasto
promoteamongBritishpeopleandacrosstheworldabelief–ill-foundeduntilatleastlate1942–
thatthewarwasbeingenergeticallyandeffectivelycarriedon;whatthisauthorhaselsewheredubbed
‘militarytheatre’.AthirdobjectivewastoobligeHitlertoexpendresourcesontheinternalsecurity
ofhisempire.Thefourth,andmostimportant,wastostimulatetension,recrimination,hatredbetween
theNazisandtheirsubjectpeoples.Farfromacknowledgingthatactsofrepressionshouldprompta
curbonResistanceactivity,ChurchillsawNazisavageryasfurtheringhisaims.‘Thebloodofthe
martyrs,’hetoldameetingoftheCabinetDefenceCommitteeon2August1943,‘wastheseedofthe
Church.’Thefactthatbythewar ’sendmostofEurope’soccupiedpeoplesloathedtheGermanswas
partlyaconsequenceofpoliciesHitleranywayadopted;butitwasalsoattributabletotheinsurgencies
sponsoredbyBritainandlatertheUS.ThemilitaryachievementsofResistancewereverymodest,the
moralonesimmense.
Operationsbyarmedciviliansbehindenemylineswerefarremotefromthedoingsofbespectacled
mathematiciansandchessplayershuddledovercryptogramsatBletchleyPark,ArlingtonHallandthe
NKVD’ssigintcentreintheoldSelecthotelonDzerzhinskyStreet.Nonetheless,guerrillacampaigns
becamecriticalelementsofthesecretwar,eventuallycommandingresourcesaslargeasthose
expendedonintelligence-gathering,andoftenoverlappingwithit.InJuly1940SpecialOperations
Executivereceivedtheprimeminister ’smandateto‘setEuropeablaze’.Inhisdeterminationtowage
anewkindofwarwithnewmenandnewmeans,heentrustedhisbrainchildtoHughDalton,the
raffishministerofeconomicwarfareandaLabourMP,ratherthantothechiefsofstafforBroadway.
Acabinetcolleaguetoldtheforeignsecretary,LordHalifax,‘Youshouldneverbeconsultedbecause
youwouldneverconsenttoeverything;youwillnevermakeagangster.’Thoughtheoldsecret
servicefoughtasfiercelyagainstitsupstartrivalasitdidagainsttheGermans,SOEeventually
becameamoreeffectivebodythanMI6,andwasrunbyablerpeople.
Between1940and1943,however,itsoperationsweredoggedbythefactoftheAxisPowers’
dominationofthestruggle.GermanyandJapanwereseenbymostinhabitantsofoccupiedterritories
aswinners,whomitwasmadnesstochallenge.BentinckoftheJICtoldDaltonhewasthoroughly
opposedtorousingthecivilianpopulationsofEurope:‘Thetimeisnotripe,andalotofunfortunate
peoplewillbeshot.’Daltonshrugged:‘Thesearetheprimeminister ’sorders,andmustbecarried
out.’Theminister,anambitiousandindiscreetmanmistrustedbymostofhiscolleagues,yearnedfor
alivelierroleinthewareffortthanhisaridresponsibilityforadministeringblockade:stewardshipof
Britain’sguerrillaoperationspromisedtoprovidethis.AnSOEofficerwrotelaterthatDalton,who
aspiredtosupplantAnthonyEdenasforeignsecretary,‘tendedtogiveChurchillandothercabinet
ministersforecastsofResistanceactivitiesbasedonassumptionsofawilltoresistinexcessofany
realisticviews,untiltheaccessionoftheSovietUnionandUnitedStatestotheAlliedcausegavethe
peoplesofoccupiedEuropearealhopeforanAlliedvictory’.
Until1944,whenitbecameplainthatHitlerwouldsoonbedefeated,mostoftheContinental
societieswantedtohavenothingtodowithrevolt,thefrightfulperilstotheirownhomesandfamilies
ofassistingthedistantallies.JeanCocteau,amongthemorenotoriousFrenchintellectual
collaboratorswiththeNazis,saidscornfullytoayoungpoetwhotoldhimthatheintendedtojointhe
Resistance,‘Vousaveztort.Lavieestplusgravequeça’–‘Youarewrong.Lifeismoreseriousthan
that.’PosterityisconfidentthatitwasCocteauwhowaswrong,butespeciallyintheearlywaryears
hisviewwaswidelysharedamongthesocialandpoliticalelitesoftheEuropeannations.Inthedays
beforetheGermansoccupiedYugoslaviain1941,SOEdistributedsevenwirelesssetstoprospective
localstay-behindoperators,butnoneevertransmitted.Thehandfulofextraordinarilybrave
inhabitantsoftheoccupiednationswhostartedResistancenetworksinthoseearlydays,suchpeople
asMichelHollardandMarie-MadeleineFourcadeinFrance–intheircasesworkingwithMI6–
deservethehighestadmirationforbreakingrankswiththeircowedfellow-countrymenlongbefore
theAlliedcausebecamefashionable.
RobertBruceLockhart,director-generalofthePoliticalWarfareExecutiveandaveteranofBritish
secretserviceoperationsinRussiaaftertheBolshevikRevolution,spoketothechiefsofstaffon29
May1942aboutthelimitationsofResistance.Enthusiasts,hesaid,sometimesforgotthatlocal
supportmustebbandflowwiththeAllies’perceivedmilitarysuccessorfailure.Britishprestigehad
beengrievouslydamagedbyyearsofdefeats.Moreover,aruthlessoccupierenjoyedgreat
advantagesovercivilianResisters:‘IntheRussianrevolutionof1905–6workerswithriflescould
stillgetbehindbarricadesandputupashowagainsttroops,’readBruceLockhart’snotesofthe
meeting.‘Todaynochanceagainstafewtanksandadive-bomberortwo.Taskofcontrollingmuch
easier…Gestapo,anti-sabotageunitsveryruthless.’Heconcluded:‘Idon’tthinkmuchhopeof
stimulatingresistancetoamoreactivestageuntilthereissomeconsiderablemeasureofAngloAmericanmilitarysuccess.Propagandacan’treplacemilitarysuccess…Weshouldnottryto
promoteaprematurerevoltwhichcanbeeasilycrushed.’TheGermanpolicyofrepressionwas
highlyeffectiveinstiflingrevoltamongmostoftheoccupiedpeoples.
SOE’schiefsattributedtheslowgrowthofResistance,especiallyinFrance,tolackofarms:the
RAFdeclinedtodivertbombersinsignificantnumberstosupplypartisansuntil1944,whenDowning
Streetinsisted.However,theonlylikelyconsequenceofarmingResistersearlierinthewarwould
havebeenthattheGermanskilledmoreofthem.Untrainedciviliansgivengunswerecapableof
assassinationsandnuisanceattacks,butlarge-scaleclasheswiththeWehrmachtandSScouldhave
onlyoneoutcome–bloodydefeat–aswasrepeatedlyprovenaslateas1944–45.AnOSSofficer,
MacdonaldAustin,saidofthemaquis:‘Sometimestheywoulddomarvellousthings,butonehadto
realisethatonthenextoperationtheycouldhaveforgottentocrankupthegazogènes’–thecharcoalfuelledcarsonwhichoccupiedFrancedependedformobility.ABritishSHAEFintelligenceofficer
said:‘Youcouldnevermakeanymilitaryplandependentontheparticipationofguerrillas,because
youcouldneverbesuretheywouldturnup.’
From1938untiltheestablishmentofSOE,MI6maintainedasmallsabotageunitknownas‘Section
D’,runbyatall,lanky,absurdsappermajornamedLaurenceGrand,whoaffectedalongcigaretteholderandacarnationinhisbuttonhole.Grandwasafountofexoticideas,noneofwhichcameto
much.IntheearlydaysofthewarhepromotedsuchstuntsaspayingSloveniangangstopoursand
intotheaxle-boxesofrollingstockboundforGermany.AnewassistantwhojoinedGrandwas
disbelievingwhenorderedtofundsomeEastEuropeansabotagegroupsbysendingthemcash
throughthepost.NobodybelievedinGrand.TheForeignOffice’sGladwynJebbpressedforhis
removal,writingcontemptuouslytoCadogan:‘TheonlygoodpointthatIhavebeenabletodiscover
isthatheisgenerous&likedbyhisstaff,whichincludesoneortwoablepersons.Buttopitsucha
managainsttheGermanGeneralStaff&theGermanMilitaryIntelligenceServiceislikearranging
anattackonaPanzerdivisionbyanactormountedonadonkey.’
Hearingallthis,theprimeministerintervenedtoinsistthataneworganisationshouldbe
establishedtomakemayhemacrossEurope,theBalkansandlatertheFarEast.SpecialOperations
ExecutivewasinitiallyrunbySirFrankNelson,aformerimperialmerchant,MPand1914–18
intelligenceofficer.NelsonwasreplacedinMay1942bythebankerSirCharlesHambro,ofwhomde
Gaulle’sintelligencechiefAndréDewavrinsaid:‘Acharmingfellow,butalmostinvisiblebecauseof
hisinnumerableresponsibilitieselsewhere.’FromanearlystageSOE’smosteffectivepersonality
provedtobeColinGubbins,itsdirectorofoperations,aHighlandsoldierwithabackgroundin
militaryintelligencewhohadservedattheWarOfficeunderthefamouslyimaginativeirregular
warriorCol.JohnHolland.InSeptember1943Gubbinsbecameamajor-generalandsucceeded
Hambroasheadoftheorganisation.
SOE–‘theracket’,asmanyofitsstaffirreverentlyreferredtoit–startedlifeat64BakerStreet,
withacovernameastheInter-ServiceResearchBureau.By1945ithadexpandedtooccupysixacres
ofofficespacebetweenBakerStreettubestationandPortmanSquare.Itrecruitedstaffvariously
amongservicepersonnel,civilianswithspecialistknowledgeofoccupiedcountries,refugees,and
adventurerswhofittedinnowhereelse.ItestablishedtrainingschoolsinsabotageatStevenage,black
propagandaatWatford,fieldcraftatLochAilortandguerrillatechniquesatArisaig.Themost
celebratedinstructorsattheschoolforsubversion,basedinAstonHousenearKnebworth,weretwo
ex-Shanghaipolicemen,CaptainsFairburnandSykes,whowereallegedtoconcludealllessonsin
unarmedcombatwiththewords,‘andthenkickhimintheballs’.AnotablefailingofMI6wasthatit
madelittleattempttotrainitspersonnel,whowereexpectedtolearnonthejob,initsgentlemanamateurtradition.EvenBroadway’sofficialhistorianacknowledgesthatSOEprovidedgood
instruction:severalofitstrainingschoolswereincorporatedintothepost-warsecretservice.
FielddutywithSOEdemandedalmostentirelydifferentskillsfromthoseofMI6’speople.‘The
manwhoisinterestedinobtainingintelligencemusthavepeaceandquiet,andtheagentsheemploys
mustneverifpossiblebefoundout,’wroteBickhamSweet-Escott,whoservedinbothorganisations.
Bycontrast,theagentsentintothefieldtopromoteguerrillawarisboundtomakeanoise,‘anditis
onlytoolikelythatsomeofthemenheuseswillnotescape’.Intheearlydays,SOEmademany
mistakesthatemphasiseditsinexperience.JackBeevor,alawyerandWorldWarIgunnerofficer,was
postedtoitsstationinneutralLisbon,whereherentedaflatinhisownname.HethenallowedhisMI6
counterpartstouseitforameetingwithinformants,whichthelandlordreportedtothePortuguese
authorities,whopromptlyexpelledtheSOErepresentative.Inthespringof1942amemberofanSOE
landingpartywascapturedbytheItaliansontheMediterraneanislandofAntiparos;heprovedtobe
carryingalistofBritishcontactsinAthens,anactofcarelessnesswhichcostthosehaplessGreeks
theirlives.InIstanbulharbour,SOEplantedlimpetmineswhichfailedtoexplodeontankerscarrying
RomanianoilfortheAxis.
Sweet-Escottdescribedhow,intheworstearlydays,hesharedthewidespreadWhitehallbeliefthat
theneworganisationwas‘nothingmorethanawickedwasteoftime,effort,andmoney…Our
recordofachievement…wasnegligible.Butoursuccessorfailuredependedinthelastresortonthe
willingnessofmenandwomeninenemy-occupiedterritorytorisktheirlivesintheAlliedcause…
Theirreadinesstodosowastemperedbydoubtsastoourfinalvictory.Thisattitudeontheirpart
limitedthescopeforsuccessfuloperationsonours.’In1941–42,SOEwasbesiegedwithrequeststo
attacktargetsdeepinenemyterritory–forinstance,theLuftwaffe’sCondorlong-rangemaritime
reconnaissanceaircraft,basedatairfieldsaroundBrest–butitsFrenchsectionlackedanylocal
supporterstoundertakesabotage.TheAbwehrwasbemusedthattheBritishdidnotattackGermany’s
vitalRomanianoilfields,astheyhaddoneinWorldWarI,butthereagainBakerStreetlackedmeans.
AmongSOE’searlyassignmentswastoorganisedemolitionpartiestodestroyvitalinstallationsin
thewakeofaGermaninvasionofBritain.Thereafter,itsetabouttrainingyoungmenandwomento
belandedinoccupiedcountrieswherevercontactcouldbemadewithlocalsympathisers–noeasy
task–andwhenevertheRAFwouldprovideaircraft,anevenbiggerconstraint.BakerStreet’sfirst
bigsuccesswasOperation‘Rubble’inMarch1941,whereinGeorgeBinneystage-managedthe
escapefromGothenburgofaconvoyofeightfreightersladenwithscarcecommoditiesand
industrialmaterials,amissionthatuniformedpersonnelcouldnotundertake,becauseitbreached
Swedishneutrality;asecondsimilarcoupwasstagedlaterintheyear.MeanwhiletheflamboyantGus
March-PhillipsledaWestAfricanraidto‘cutout’the7,600-tonItalianlinerDuchessad’Aosta,which
wasenjoyingPortuguesesanctuaryoffFernandoPó.Heseveredtheship’scablebeforetowingitinto
internationalwaters,wheretheRoyalNavytookover.Operation‘Postmaster ’,asMarch-Phillips’
raidwaschristened,madeusefulpropaganda,becauseitshowedthelengthofBritain’sreach.
SomeSOEschemesexploredthewildershoresoffantasyinafashionworthyoftheAbwehr.A
January1942BakerStreetpaperproposedthatagentsshouldbedispatchedtorallyAfghantribes–
Barakzais,FopalzaisandAlizais–onaprospectiveGermanlineofadvancetoIndia.Therewasalso
aplantolaunchbiologicalwarfareagainstJapanbyparachutinghostileinsectsontoitscrops.An
officerwhodiscussedwaysandmeanswithoneoftheNaturalHistoryMuseum’sexpertsinLondon
reportedafterwards:‘Hetellsmethatbollweevilisnotthebestinsect.Afarmoreseriousthreat
wouldbethepinkbollworm,platyedraGossypiellaSaunders,whichdoestenmillionpounds’worth
ofdamageannuallyinEgypt.’UnliketheJapanese,however,whodidindeedlaunchbiological
warfareinChina,BakerStreetneitherexperimentedonhumanguineapigs,norimplementedtheboll
wormplan.
SOEhadmanycritics.Ascornful1941cabletoLondonfromtheBritishembassyinBelgrade
denouncedsuchyoungofficersasJulianAmery,committedto‘actionforaction’ssake’.Thiswasa
widespreadcomplaintbydiplomatswhofailedtounderstandthat‘actionforaction’ssake’was
exactlywhattheprimeministerwanted.WhiletheEuropeangovernmentsinexileinLondon
favouredalow-profilepolicytowardsResistanceuntilthedayofliberationwasathand,Churchill
soughtimmediate,conspicuousactsofarmeddefiance.Therewerefurthercriticismsaboutthereal
usefulnessofSOE’sproclaimedachievements.ThedestructionoftheGorgopotamosviaductin
Greecewasanotablefeatofarms,butthelong-intendeddemolitiondidnottakeplaceuntiltheendof
November1942,whenBritain’sEighthArmywasalreadyadvancingwestwardsfromEgypt,andthus
theGermansupplylinethroughGreecehadbecomeirrelevanttotheNorthAfricancampaign.
EvenBakerStreet’sownmenconsideredthatsomeoperationsdidmoretofulfilthefantasiesofits
adventurousyoungofficersinthefieldthantohastenAlliedvictory.BickhamSweet-Escottopposed
oneoftheorganisation’smostfamouscoups,theCretankidnappingofaGermandivisional
commander,becauseoftheinevitabilityoflocalreprisals.‘Thesacrificemightpossiblyhavebeen
worthwhileintheblackwinterof1941whenthingsweregoingbadly,’helaterwrote.ByApril1944,
however,whenSOE’sintrepidbuccaneerscarriedouttheoperationwhichbroughtthemfame,the
murderousGen.FriedrichMüllerhadbeenreplacedbya‘comparativelyharmlessgeneralcalled
[Heinrich]Kreipe…Theresultofcarryingitoutin1944,wheneveryoneknewthatvictorywas
merelyamatterofmonthswould,Ithought,hardlyjustifythecost.’
Manylocalpeoplesinalloccupiedcountriesweremoreinterestedintheirownfactionalstruggles
thaninacceptingordersfromLondonabouthowtoservetheAlliedcause.Bold,brashyoungmen
andafewwomenfromSOEandOSSarrivedontheirthresholdsdemandingthattheyshouldsetaside
localdifferencestopursuethesupremepurposeofdefeatingtheAxis.ButmanyFrenchmen,Greeks,
Yugoslavs,Italians,Albanians,MalaysandBurmesespurnedsucharguments.Itmightsuitforeigners’
intereststofighttheGermans,Italians,Japanesetotheexclusionofallelse,butitdidnotsuitmany
partisans.NoneoftheseBritishorUSofficersplannedtoliveintheircountriesafterthewar;the
visitorshadnostake,beyondtheirownlives,whichtheyheldcheapastheyoungandunattacheddo,
inthesocietiesonwhichtheysoeagerlyurgedrevolt.
NigelCliveofMI6signalledareportfromGreeceinApril1944whichemphasisedthepopular
expectationofliberationbymid-summer,andofferedashrewdforecast:‘Whatmattersmostiswhat
willhappenthereafter.Thereisuniversalapprehensionoftheimmediateaftermathofliberationwhen
itlooksasifthetownswillbecomethebattlefieldsofwhatisnowamountaincivilwar.Public
clamourisforthefollowingthingsinthisorder:food,freedomfromtheGermanoccupationanda
minimumofsecuritysothatasemblanceofdemocraticlifemaybeginagain.Nopoliticalmovement
infreeGreeceiscapableofmeetingthelastrequirement.Allarmedpoliticalmountainparties
engenderdifferentdegreesofmistrust.’ThesamewastrueinYugoslavia,whereunorthodoxlocal
rulesofthegameprevailed:theGermanswereinfuriatedtodiscoverfromawirelessinterceptthatan
ItaliangeneralcapturedbyGen.MihailovićandhisCetnikshadsubsequentlybeenfreedinexchange
forthesurrenderofafieldgunandammunitiontothepartisans.
InJanuary1943StewartMenziesstagedoneofhisfrequentexplosionsofwrathaboutSOEto
RobertBruceLockhart,whorecordedtheconversation:‘Couldnothingbedoneaboutthisshow,
whichwasbogusthroughandthrough?’‘C’demanded.‘Theyneverachievedanything,they
compromisedallhisagents,andtheywereamateursinpoliticalmatters…[Menzies]reckonedthatif
theycouldbesuppressedourIntelligencewouldbenefitenormously.’GuyLiddellofMI5wroteon3
April1943:‘Lackofunitybetweenourselves,[MI6]andSOEisaseriousmenace.’Fractioushorsetrading,aswellasbittersquabbles,someofthemcomic,doggedtherelationships.InNovember1941
therewasanegotiationaboutcodenameswhichresultedinAirCommodoreArchieBoyleofSOE
minutingClaudeDanseyatBroadway:‘TheGreekAlphabet,togetherwithnamesofmotorcars,big
game,fruitandcoloursarereservedfor[MI6]…IhaveabandonedfruitsforSOEpurposes…I
understandthatyouwillsuggestto[MI6]asadditionalcategories,musiciansandpoets,andIshall
thereforekeepoffthem.’ChildishrivalrycausedBroadwayandBakerStreettorunseparatewireless
organisations.Differencesinthefieldcouldbecomeextreme:SOEofficerSpikeMoranshotdead
CostaLawrenceofMI6,anunhingedGreekwhobecamesofanaticallyenthusiasticaboutthe
communistELASfactionthathetriedtobetraytotheGermanstheBritishteamattachedtotherival
EDES.
SOEalmostprecipitateditsowndemisebyasuccessionoffolliesthatcostlives,togetherwith
massiveembarrassmentwhentheywererevealed.ByfartheworsttookplaceinHolland,andalso
involvedMI6.Inthesummerof1941oneofBroadway’sagentswascapturedwithalargepileof
backmessages–acommonsinofcommissionbysecretwireless-operators–whichenabledthe
Abwehr,withtheaidofaGermancipherexpertnamedSergeantMay,tobreakitstraffic.On13
February1942twomoreMI6agentswerecaptured,oneofwhomtalkedfreely.
MeanwhiletwoDutchSOEagentsweredroppedundercircumstanceswhichsuggestedfantastic
carelessnessinBakerStreet:bothwereissuedwithforgedidentitycardsonwhichtheroyalarmsof
Hollandwererepresentedbytwolionswhichbothfacedthesameway,insteadofaddressingeach
other.Evenmoreincredible,HubertusLauwersandThysTaconiswereissuedwithidenticalcivilian
clothes.WhentheyremonstratedwiththeirconductingofficerinthebriefingshedatNewmarket
beforebeingdroppedonthenightof6–7November1941,hewavedasidetheirconcerns,sayingthat
noonewouldnotice.Theyarrivedsafelynonetheless,andwenttoworkrespectivelyinTheHague
andArnhem.TaconisreceivedassistancefromalocalmannamedRidderhof,whowasasecretVMann–aVertrauensmänner,orGermaninformer,ofwhichHollandhadmanyin1941.Everything
TaconisdidwasreportedtotheAbwehr ’seffectiveandingeniousMaj.HermanGiskes.On6March
1942Lauwerswasseizedinmid-transmissionataflatinTheHague,carryingcopiesofseveralold
messages.Whenheresumedtransmission,thereceivingoperatorfailedtonoticethathegavethe
agreedsecuritywarningthathewasunderenemycontrol.Thereafter,agentafteragentwas
parachutedintoHollandtobereceivedbyGiskes’men.Amidtheirshock,andbitternessatbetrayal,
mostoftheprisonerstalked,sothateachnewsubjectforinterrogationwasdisorientatedbythe
discoveryofhowmuchtheGermansalreadyknew.Lauwersinsertedfurtherwarningsinsubsequent
transmissions,includingtheword‘CAUGHT’,buttheNSectioninLondonblithelyignoredthem.
TherapidexpansionofSOEmeantthatmanyagents,andespeciallywireless-operators,were
dispatchedintothefieldhastilytrained,asweremostoftheirWhaddonHallcounterparts.AnAbwehr
interceptionspecialistlatercapturedbytheBritishexpressedscepticismaboutSOEradiodisciplinein
France.AloisSchwarze,atwenty-four-year-oldNCO,saidthatmanyAlliedagentstransmittedvery
slowly;theyreportedtheintendedtimingsoftheirnextscheduleinplainlanguageorverysimple
code;theirthree-lettercallsignswereeasytopickup,asweretheir‘hellos’and‘goodbyes’.Heand
hiscolleagueswereamazedhowoftencapturedwireless-operatorshadfailedtonoticethattheywere
beingmonitoredbyGermandirection-finders.Theywerealsooftencaughtinpossessionofcopies
ofoldsignals,inthefashionoftheDutchmen.Muchofthislackofprofessionalismwasinevitable
whencivilianswererushedthroughtrainingasspiesanddispatchedintothefield,butmorethana
fewmenandwomenpaidforitwiththeirlives.
Itisamyth,vividlyexposedbytheDutchexperience,thatAlliedagentsandResistanceworkers
whofellintoGermanhandsseldomtalked.Almosteveryprisonerofanynationalitygaveawaya
littleormuch,withorwithoutundergoingtorture.Controllersexpectedonlythattheirfieldofficers
andagentsshouldwithholdnamesforaminimumoftwenty-fourorforty-eighthours,toenable
meetingstobecancelled,contactstoflee.TheGestapoinParisemployedLatvian,Dutchandindeed
Frenchcollaboratorstoconductthetortureofprisoners,whileGermanofficersaskedthequestions.
Capturedagentswereusuallyoffereda50percentchanceoflifeiftheytalked,andsuchbargains
weresometimeskept.AnSDinterpreternamedCorporalWeigel,whotookpartinmany‘extreme
interrogations’atVersailles,recalledthenamesofjusttwoprisonerswhoremainedsilent:onewasa
MadameZiegler,whomhebelievedtobeAlsatian,theotheraCaptainTinchebray,takeninJune1944
atSaint-Marcelle.Thosewereexceptionstoaharshgenerality,recognisedalikebyoccupiers,
ResistersandtheirLondonsponsors.Thebroadtruthaboutspiesofallnationalitieswhofellinto
enemyhandswasthattheywerekeptaliveaslongastheycouldserveapurpose,andshotwhentheir
usefulnessexpired.Theemotiveword‘murdered’isoftenusedbypost-warwriterswhenmentioning
SOEagents,andespeciallywomen,killedbytheGermans.Intruth,allofthemknewthatiftaken
deathwouldalmostcertainlybetheirfate,legitimisedbythelawsofwar.Everycapturedagentwho
wantedtolivestruggledtodecidehowmuchheorshemightrevealwithoutbecomingatraitor,and
somemisjudgedtheanswer.
GiskeseventuallyoperatedfourteenBritishwirelesssetsinhisEnglandspiel,whichcontinuedfor
morethantwoyears,withsuccessiveconsignmentsofarmsandexplosives,togetherwithsaboteurs
andwireless-operators,parachuteddirectlyintoGermancustody.Fifty-onemenfromSOE,nine
fromMI6andonewomanfromMI9wereeventuallytaken,ofwhomallbutahandfulwereshot.
WhenfivemadeanescapeinAugust1943andsentamessagetoLondonwarningofthedisaster,all
unknowingtheyentrustedittoaV-Mann,andthusitwasneverforwarded.Whiletwooftheescapers
wereontheirwaytoBritaintheAbwehrsignalledtoSOEononeofitsownsets,reportingthemento
beunderGestapocontrol,withtheresultthatwhentheyarrivedtheywereconfinedforsomeweeksin
Brixtonprison.ItwasGiskeshimselfwhodecidedthathehadexhaustedthepossibilitiesofhis
Operation‘NorthPole’,andonAllFools’Day1944sentafinalmockingsignaltoSOE:
‘WHENEVERYOUWILLCOMETOPAYAVISITTOTHECONTINENTYOUMAYBE
ASSUREDTHATYOUWILLBERECEIVEDWITHTHESAMECAREANDRESULTASALL
THOSEYOUSENTUSBEFORESTOPSOLONG.’BeyondtheMI6andSOEagentswhowerelost,
hundredsoflocalResistanceworkersperishedasaresultofthegrossmisconductofSOE’s
NetherlandssectionbyMajorCharlesBlizardandMajorSeymourBingham.HughTrevor-Roper
wroteon19June1944,acknowledgingthatforallhisdisdainforGermanintelligence-gathering,its
officersdisplayedformidableeffectivenessincounteringResistance:‘WhatevertheRSHA’s
deficienciesintheevaluationofintelligence,itscompetenceincounter-espionagecannotbe
questioned.’
ThosewhomocktheGermansforhavingswallowedforsolongtheproductionsoftheBritish
DoubleCrosssystemshouldtakeheedofthegullibilityofSOEandMI6intheirDutchoperations.All
thatwasdifferentwasthatwhiletheintelligencetransmittedbytheAbwehrdoubleagentsunder
BritishcontroladdressedissuesofhighstrategicimportancetoGermany,theDutchconnectionhad
onlylocalsignificancefortheAlliedwareffort.Thescandal–forsuchitwas–soenragedthe
NetherlandsgovernmentthatforatimeafterthewartheybelievedMajorBinghamtohavebeena
double,servingtheNazis.Intruthhewasmerelyincompetent,buthewiselyemigratedtoAustralia,to
startanewlifeinacontinentwherehisshamewasunknown.SOEnarrowlysurvivedWhitehall
demandsthatitshouldbewoundupafterthefiascoinHollandwasrevealed,becauseChurchill
rejectedanywholesalereorganisationofthesecretservicesuntilthewarended.
Ananonymouspost-warcritic,obviouslyfamiliarwiththesecretworldandperhapshimselfa
veteranoftherivalMI6,wrotethatmanyofSOE’sseniorpersonnel‘displayedanenthusiasmquite
unrestrainedbyexperience,somehad[communist]politicalbackgroundswhichdeservedarather
closerscrutinythantheyevergot,andafewcouldonlycharitablybedescribedasnutcases’.YetBill
Bentinck,whoknewallthesecretservices’topmenintimately,inhisoldageofferedwarmpraisefor
SOE,assertingthatithad‘goodpeople,verygoodpeople’.IfColinGubbinswasnotbrilliant,hewas
acapableorganisersupportedbysomeableciviliansinuniform.BentinckemphasisedMI6’s
weakness,bycontrast:‘Therewerealotofoldboys,peoplewho’dbeentherefromWorldWarIand
hadbeenhangingon…Theyfanciedthemselvesasspy-masters.’NigelClive,himselfanMI6field
agent,said‘SOEwasunquestionablythebest.’
Bothatthetimeandsince,someextravagantclaimshavebeenmadeabouttheabilityofResistance
movementstoinfluencethemaincourseofthewar.R.HarrisSmith,anadmiringchroniclerofthe
AmericanOfficeofStrategicServices,wrote:‘Partisanwarfarewasaviablealternativetofrontal
assault,butSOEandOSSofficerssenttoestablishlinkswiththeResistancewerehamperedbyantipartisanprejudiceatAlliedheadquarters.’BritishandAmericanseniorsoldierswereindeedsceptical
abouttheusefulnessofguerrillas,buttherewereexcellentreasonsfortheircaution.Partisansmadea
marginalcontributiontothewareffortinseveraltheatres,buteveninYugoslaviaandRussiathey
couldnotprovideasubstituteforthemightandmassofregulararmies.Resistanceinmanysocieties,
especiallywithintheBalkans,hadmuchmoreinfluenceonpost-wareventsthanonthedefeatofthe
Axis.
From1943onwards,YugoslaviabecamethefocusforSOE’smostambitiousoperationsinsupport
ofTito’spartisanarmy,whichreceivedvastlymoreweaponsthananyothernationalguerrillaforce;
butFranceremainedBakerStreet’smostcelebratedtheatre.Itprovedrelativelyeasytoinsertagents
bylightaircraftinthenorth,andbyparachutefurtherafield.Between1941and1944theRAFflew
320Lysandersorties,ofwhich210weresuccessful,landing440passengersandevacuating630,ata
costofonlysixpilotskilled.Inthecountryside,manyBritishagentsandwireless-operatorssurvived
atlibertyforlongperiods.ButinFrenchcities,inasocietyruledbycollaboratorsandriddledwith
informers,therateofattritionwashorrific.On5June1943,SirDavidPetrie,chiefofMI5,notedina
generalbroadsidetoMenziesthatbothMI6andSOEhad‘formonthspastbeensufferingserious
lossesofagentsonthecontinent’becauseofGermanpenetration–andthatwasbeforetheDutch
disasterwasrevealed.
AmajorityofallAlliedagentscapturedbytheGermansinEuropewerevictimsofbetrayal.Oluf
Reed-OlsenwroteofhisexperienceasaBritishspyinNorway:‘Onewasmostafraidofone’sown
people;Ithinkallagents,saboteursandother“visitors”inNorwaywillagreethiswasso.Andthere
weremanywhostoodaside,fromhateandfearofRussia,wheneventhesmallestcontributiontothe
causewasaskedofthem,becausetheyconsideredtheAlliedcausetobetoomuchaffectedby
Communism.’Olsen’sstricturesappliedequallyinFrance,whereafewBritishtraitorsalsodid
terribleharm.Theescape-lineleader‘PatO’Leary’–CaptainAlbertGuerisseoftheBelgianarmy–
usedasoneofhishelpersinthenorthduringthewinterof1941amanwhocalledhimselfCaptain
HaroldCole,supposedlyanevaderleftbehindaftertheBEF’s1940evacuation.MI9–thesecret
escapers’branchoftheWarOffice–foundnoofficerofthatnameontheBritishArmy’sbooks,but
insteadaSergeantHaroldColewhohaddesertedfromhisunit,takingwithhimitsmessfunds.
GuerissewasalreadysuspiciousthatColewassquanderinghisLine’scashonextravagantliving.
Afteratensemeeting,hedispatchedthemantoLilleindisgrace.
WithinafewdaysofhisarrivalinthecityinDecember1941,ColehadassistedtheGermansto
arrestoneoftheLine’smostdevotedhelpers,theAbbéCarpentier,whohadbeenprintingdocuments
forescapersonaprivatepress.Longafterwards,itwasdiscoveredthattheAbwehrhadbeenusing
theEnglishmanformonths,undervariousaliases.AnorderwentouttoResisterstoshoothimon
sight.InMay1942,however,ColewasarrestedbyVichypoliceintheunoccupiedzoneofFranceand
givenalongprisonsentence,whichremovedhimfromResistanceview.Hereappearedonlyin1945,
whenarrestedintheAmericanZoneofGermany,againmasqueradingasaBritishcaptain.He
escapedfromdetentionandfledtoParis,wherehewaseventuallykilledinashoot-outwiththe
police.MI9consideredhimresponsibleforfiftydeathsofmembersofthe‘Pat’Lineandtheir
connections.
FormuchofthewarafundamentaldivisionpersistedbetweentheBritishandFreeFrenchvisionsof
Resistance.Churchillwaseagertostimulateandhastenarmedrevolt,toassisttheAlliedarmiesin
achievingthedefeatofNazism.Gen.CharlesdeGaulle,bycontrast,cherishedapoliticalconcept–
salvationofthesoulofFrancefromthesloughofhumiliationintowhichithadbeenplungedby
surrenderin1940.HedefinedResistanceas‘anationalexpression’.FreeFrenchintelligence,which
dependedonSOEforoperationalfacilities,wasdirectedfromLondonbyAndréDewavrin,‘Colonel
Passy’,anengineerofficerbornin1911,agraduateoftheParisÉcolePolytechniqueandaformer
instructoratSaint-Cyrmilitaryacademy.Dewavrin’sclevernesswasneverindoubt,norhis
considerablepersonalpresence–tall,withthinningfairhairandadeceptivelysoftvoice.Heproveda
skilledpoliticalinfighter,aswasindispensableinthesnakepitofLondonexilepolitics.He
customarilyworecivilianclothes,andSOEofficersnotedthatwhenheappearedinuniform,itwasa
sureweatherwarningthattherewastobearowwithsomebody.Hisdepartment,theBureauCentral
deRenseignementsetd’Actionmilitaire,orBCRA,washousedat3StJames’sSquare,justacrossPall
MallfromdeGaulle’smainheadquartersinCarltonGardens.Dewavrinrecruitedsomeremarkable
personalities,prominentamongwhomwas‘Rémy’,GilbertRenault,whowasoriginally
commissionedtoorganiseanescapelinethroughSpain,withtheslendercredentialsthathehadonce
directedamovieaboutChristopherColumbus.Hisorganisation,theConfrérieNotre-Dame,became
justlycelebrated,respectenhancedbyitscontributiontotheBrunevalcoup.
Forthemostpart,however,deGaulleandDewavrinviewedtheiragentsinthefieldmoreas
emissariesof‘their ’FrancethanasinstrumentsofAlliedvictory.FreeFrenchprestigeslumpedwhen
thefirstBCRAmandispatchedintothefield,latein1940,reachedhisdroppingzoneinanRAF
aircraft,butthenrefusedtojumpandspenttherestofthewarasastaffofficerinCarltonGardens.In
thesummerof1941theBCRAcontrolledjusttwowirelessesinoccupiedFrance,oneofwhichwas
shutdowninAugust.SOEappropriatedthemostpromisingrecruitsforsecretserviceamongthe
refugeeswhoarrivedinBritainfromFrance,toreceiveprotractedinterrogationandscreeningatthe
QueenVictoriaPatrioticSchoolinWandsworth,‘atowerofBabel’.Moreover,deGaulle’spolitical
designforahighlycentralisednationalmovementrenderedtheBCRA’snetworksespecially
vulnerabletoGermanpenetration.
ThegeneralprofessedtobeinsultedbytheunwillingnessoftheBritishtoconfidetheirsecretsto
hispeople–whowererigorouslyexcludedfromtheUltraloop.MI6describedrelationswiththeFree
Frenchas‘liketryingtoliveamicablywithajealous,touchyanddomineeringwife’.British
codebreakingrevealed–forinstance–deGaulle’smenconductingsecrettalkswiththeChinese
aboutsecuringtheirassistancetoregainIndochina.Asumof£5,000hadtobepaidfromBritish
secretfundsinMay1944tosilenceaFrenchmannamedDufours,whobroughtalegalactionagainst
theLondonGaulliststosecureredressforhisownunlawfulimprisonmentandtorturebythem.
CarltonGardenswasindifferenttowhattheBritishregardedasascandal.Itschiefstooktheviewthat
theyhadtherighttotreattheirownnationalshowevertheysawfit,evenintheheartofLondon.
TheBCRAinheritedfromtheFrencharmyarecklessattitudetosignalsecurity,usingcodeswhich
theGermansbrokeevenafterMI6warnedCarltonGardensoftheirvulnerability.TheWehrmachthad
capturedatrainloadofFrenchintelligencedocumentsduringtheBlitzkriegwhichtooklackadaisical
Abwehranalyststwoyearstoworkthrough.In1942theydiscoveredthatamongthishaulwasalistof
allFrenchsourcesinGermany,togetherwiththesumsofmoneypaidtothem.Byfarthelargest
recipientwasknownas‘Asché’,orsimply‘He’,whomtheGermansbelatedlyidentifiedasHansThiloSchmidt,theAllies’pre-warinformantaboutEnigma,whowasarrestedinApril1943and
perishedinSeptember,thoughitisuncertainwhetherhewasexecutedorcommittedsuicide.
Thatspring,AndréDewavrinmadeapersonaltourofFrance,toexploreforhimselfoccupation
conditions.Thiswascertainlycourageous,and‘Passy’returnedsafely,butitrepresentedagrotesque
riskwhenhewasprivytoallhisorganisation’ssecretsandcontacts.Flamboyancewasimmensely
dangerousinsecretagents.DeGaulleandChurchillwerealikeattractedtosuchResistersas
Emmanueld’AstierdelaVigerie,achildofprivilegewhobecameoneofthegeneral’smost
prominentsupporters.DelaVigerie,however,wasconsideredbymanyofthosewhomethimtobe
anunstablefantasist.OnatourofAmericaheoncegaveapressconferencewithasackoverhishead,
supposedlytomaskhisidentity,whichwaswell-knownfromBerlintoWashington,DC.Atameeting
attheForeignOffice,‘C’andSOE’schiefexpressedtheirsharedview‘thattheleadersoftheFrench
Resistancemovements,includingM.Emmanueld’Astierhimself,werenotnearlysointerestedin
fightingtheGermansasinbuildingupanorganisationwhichwouldseizepowerwhentheGermans
weredrivenout’.Therewastruthinthis.MI6andSOEassembledmostoftheimportanthumintto
comeoutofFrance,especiallyinadvanceofD-Day.Dewavrinwasembarrassedtodiscoverthat
HenriFrenay,leaderofthe‘Combat’Resistancegroup,wassellingintelligenceforhandsomesums
ofcashtoAllenDullesofOSS,ratherthandonatingittotheFreeFrenchcause.
BritishapprehensionabouttheelaborateGaullistpoliticalstructureinsideFrance,andits
vulnerabilitytoinformers,wasvindicatedinthespringandsummerof1943,whentheGestapo
conductedmassarrests.VictimsincludedJeanMoulin,principalstandard-bearerofthe‘London
French’,whowastorturedandexecuted,andGen.CharlesdeLestraint,asixty-three-year-old
nominatedbydeGaulleasleaderofhisso-calledArméeSecrète.Lestraintpossessednoaptitudefor
secretwar,norindeedmuchmeritsavehisoppositiontoFrance’sVichyrulers.Hisarreston6June
1943wasnolosstotheAlliedwareffort.ThoughpropagandamadedeGaulleagiantinhiscountry
bythetimeofD-Day,cynicsassertedthattheBCRAcreatedmoremartyrsthanusefulResisters.
Itwashardforcitizensofdemocraciestoadapttotheirondisciplinesofintelligencework–lifein
asecretuniverseinwhichtrustinone’sfellowmanorwomanwasadangerousself-indulgence.It
meantmuchtopeoplewhonursedtheshameofdefeatandoccupationtoconfideinothersaboutthe
worktheyweredoingforthecauseoffreedom,sothattheymightwalkalittletallerintheirstreets,
butthiswasmortallyperilous.OlufReed-Olsenavowedthehabitualindiscretionofhisownpeople:
‘itwasnotexclusivelyaNorwegianweakness…andinourcasethereasonmayhavebeenthatthere
hadbeennowarinourcountryforabout125years.Loquacitywasourgreatdifficulty…Itwashard
togetfellow-workerswhocouldresistthetemptationtotelltheirfriendsandrelationswhattheywere
doing.’AnoverwhelmingmajorityofdedicatedResistersweredrawnfromthehumblersectionsof
society.TheofficialhistoriansofMI9wrote:‘Escapersandevadersfoundalmostuniformly…every
sortofreadinesstohelpthemamongthepoorersortsofpeopleandeverysortofreserveamong
mostoftherich.’Thesamewastrueofallbranchesofsecretactivity:itmayconfidentlybesaidthat
thosewithmostmateriallytolosedidleasttoopposetheGermanoccupiers,whilethosewithleast
propertydidmost.
GeorgeHiller,whoservedasanSOEagentinruralFrancein1943–44,latergaveathoughtfuland
movingaccountofhisexperiences.Therecouldbenocloserbond,hesaid,thanthatbetweenthe
hiderandthehiddeninsuchcircumstancesasthoseinwhichhefoundhimselfintheLot:he,aBritish
agent,dailyplacedhislifeinthehandsoflocalFrenchmenandtheirfamilies–almostinvariably
littlepeople,peasantsorteachersortradesunionists–whomhehadnevermetbefore,fromwhomin
peacetimehewouldhavebeenseparatedbyanunbridgeablesocialandculturaldivide.They,
meanwhile,harbouredhimintheknowledgethatiftheirhospitalitywaseverrevealed,conceivably
byhimselfasaprisonerundertorture,theirlivesandallthattheyownedwouldbeforfeit.
Civilianbystanderswhosuddenlychancedonmanifestationsofsecretoperationswerechiefly
concernedtosavethemselvesfrombeingsweptawayintherecriminationsorreprisalsofthe
occupiers.OnedayReed-OlsenfoundhimselftravellingonaNorwegiantrainwhichwassubjectedto
asurprisesearch.Hethrewopenawindowandhurledoutintothecountrysidethreepassports,a
revolverandwhirlingwadsofcash,whilenearbypassengerswatchedinterror,aswelltheymight.
JamesLangleyofMI9suggestedafterthewarthatoneResistanceworkerforfeitedhisorherlifefor
everyAlliedsoldierorairmanwhousedasecretescapeline.Whenthefamous‘Comet’networkwas
eventuallypenetratedandmanyofitsmemberslayimprisonedandawaitingdeath,Langleydelivered
anemotionalpleatoMI6totrytosavesomeofthem.ClaudeDanseyrespondedwithaharshness
worthyofMoscowCentre:‘Yourtrouble,Jimmy,isthatyouloveyouragents.’
TheMediterraneanbecametheforemosthappyhuntinggroundofSOE,sceneofsomeofits
agents’mostdramaticexploits.CriticsthoughtthatthewrongtonewassetbyGreyPillars,Baker
Street’sCairoheadquarters,whichseemedtoocomfortableforthehubofamilitaryoperation.In
1941–42thebuilding’satmospherewaspoisonedbyfeudsandmutualsuspicions:onecoloneltriedto
getalisteningdevicefittedtohisphone,sothathisconversationswithcolleaguescouldberecorded.
In1943therewasamajorpurgeoftheorganisation,butSOECaironeverbecameahappyship,not
leastbecauseoftensionsbetweencommunistsympathisersandindeedpromotersamongitsBritish
officers,andcolleaguesofmoreconservativemien.
TherewaslastingbitternessaboutthemannerinwhichSOEtransferreditssupportfromthe
royalistGen.MihailovićtothecommunistTitoinYugoslavia,causingtheincidentaldeathsofseveral
Britishagents.Personalitiespowerfullyinfluencedthisoutcome:themenoperatingwithMihailović
werelacklustrereporters,whilethedispatchesofChurchill’sformerhistoricalresearcherMajor
WilliamDeakin,andlaterofToryMPCol.FitzroyMaclean,weredraftedinscintillatingand
inspirationalterms,temperedbyamonumentalnaïvetéaboutTito’scharacter,politicalobjectivesand
dallianceswiththeGermans.DeakinandMacleanbecametwoofthemostinfluentialsecretagentsof
thewar;theirreportsweredecisiveinpersuadingtheprimeministertothrowBritishsupport,
manifestedinhugedeliveriesofarmsandequipment,behindthecommunistcause.
From1943,asresourcesbecamefreelyavailable,SOECairoevolvedintoamassiveoperation.By
OctoberitwashandlingeightyfieldmissionsintheBalkans,withairtransportmovementsorganised
byanex-NottinghamTramwaysmanagernamedWigginton,whogainedareputationforformidable
efficiency.Meanwhile‘Skipper ’PooleranthesuperblynamedLevantineFishingPatrol,transporting
suppliestoGreece.FactionalstrifewasanoccupationalhazardofliaisonwithResistancegroupsin
everytargetnation.WhenNigelCliveofMI6wasparachutedintoGreeceinDecember1943,hespent
hisfirsthouronthegroundlisteningtoalitanyofcomplaintsfromSOE’sFredWrightaboutthe
frustrationofbeingunabletodomuchsabotage,because‘allhisenergieshadbeenconcentratedon
thepoliticalassignmentoftryingtopreventanextensionofthecivilwarbetweenEDESandELAS’.
Clivewrote:‘Politicalratherthantechnicalorstandardmilitaryqualificationswerewhatwouldbe
requiredofthosewho[organised]theGreekresistance.’
AproblembesettingSOEuntilthe1944eveofD-DayinFrancewasthatitlackedaclear,
overarchingstrategicdirective,settingouttheultimatepurposeofstimulatingResistance.‘SetEurope
ablaze’didnotamounttoacoherentprogramme.WasBakerStreetseekingtocreateguerrillaarmies
toconductpitchedbattleswiththeGermans?Togatherintelligence?TosabotagetheAxiswareffort?
ColinGubbinswroteaboutthedifficulty‘ofcarryingouttwobroadtaskssimultaneously,whichwere
themselveshardlycompatible,thatisaction,daybydayandweekafterweek,inspecificattacks
againstselectedtargetsinoccupiedcountries,andatthesametimethecreationofsecretarmies,
equipped,organisedandtrained,readytocomeintoactionasorderedwheninvasionshouldcome.
EveryattackcarriedoutnaturallyalertedtheGestapo.’Churchill’sromanticvisionneverattractedhis
ownservicechiefsofstaff,whodislikedandevendeploredthepiratesofSOE.Theywereright,ina
narrowlymilitarysense,thattheContinentwouldnothavebeenfreedfromNazityrannyasingleday
laterhadResistanceneverexisted.Butposteritymaychoosetoseeitssponsorshipasasignificant
elementinChurchill’sgeniusasawarleader,becauseheunderstooditsimmensemoralvalue.
Asthetideofthewarturned,from1943onwards,inSweet-Escott’swords‘thereweremanymore
menandwomenpreparedtotakerisksintheAlliedcausethantherehadbeenayearbefore’.Bythe
middleof1944,SOE’soperationsinWesternEuropeweresupportedbyathousandairsortiesa
month,flownbyfivesquadronsofRAFbombers.During1944–45,Germaninterceptorsidentified
hundredsofAlliedagent-orpartisan-operatedwirelesstransmittersoperatinginterritoriestheNazis
werestillstrivingtocontrol,orwheretheyhadimportantinterests.TheydetectedtwentyinPoland,
sixinCzechoslovakia,seventeeninNorway,fourinDenmark,twenty-twoinHolland,twenty-seven
inBelgium,thirty-fiveinParis,twentyinwesternFrance,sixty-oneinsouthernFrance,fifteenin
NormandyandBrittany,teninSpain,fourinSwitzerland,twenty-fiveinnorthernItaly,eightin
southernItaly,thirtyinYugoslavia–and140inRussia.TheAbwehr ’sdirection-findersprompted
thirtyarrestsin1941,ninetyin1942,160in1943and130in1944;thesefiguresillustratednotso
muchGermanvigilanceastheever-increasingenergyofResistance.
Asthestorydrewtoanend,withtheprogressive1944–45liberationofGerman-occupied
societies,therewasfiercedebateaboutwhethertheoutcomeofSOE’sactivitiesjustifiedtheircost.
BakerStreetcouldpointtosuchnotableachievementsastheFebruary1943sabotageoftheRjukan
heavy-waterplantinNorway,andthesinkingayearlateroftheferrycarryingtoGermanyrailtanker
wagonsladenwith15,000litresofpreciousproductfromtheplant.ThreeNorwegianagents,Knut
Haulkelid,KnutLier-HansenandRolfSorlie,boardedtheferrydisguisedasgreasers,andlaid
delayed-actionchargeswhichexploded,sinkingthevessel,inthemidstofLakeTinnjo.Onlyafterthe
wardiditbecomeknownthatNaziatomicresearchhadmadefartoolittleprogressforthe
consignmenttocontributeanythingtotheirwareffort;butthisdidnotnegateeitherthewisdomof
launchingthemission,orthemarvellouscourageandingenuityoftheagentswhocarrieditout.In
France,beforeandafterD-Day,ResistancegroupslaunchedwidespreadattacksontheGermanlines
ofcommunicationwhich,thoughmuchlessstrategicallyinfluentialthanAlliedbombing,causedthe
occupiersintenseannoyance.
Scepticspersisted,especiallyintheBalkans,wherecommunistinfluencewasstrongest,most
ruthlessandpernicious.DavidWallace,anSOEofficerkilledinactionon19August1944,reported
savagelytoCairoshortlybeforehisdeath:‘OureffortinGreece,inmenandmoney,hasnotonly
beenoutofallproportiontotheresultswehaveachievedagainsttheGermans,butalsotothevalue
oftheGreekpeople,whoarenotcapableofbeingsavedfromthemselves,norarethemselvesworth
it.ThisisalsotheunanimousopinionofallBritishliaisonofficers,whohavebeenlonginthis
country.’WallacewasquitewrongtosuggestthathiscynicalassessmentwassharedbyallhisBritish
comradesinGreece,orelsewhereinWesternEurope.NigelClivedescribedanexuberantpartyinthe
communityinwhichheserved,heldtocelebratethe1944GermanwithdrawalfromGreece.Heused
thesortofemotionallanguageoftenadoptedbyBritishandAmericanofficerswhosharedsecretlife
inoccupiedlands:‘Ienjoyedoneofthoseraremomentsofpride,thatIhadlived,worked,struggled
andfoughtwiththekindofpeoplewhohadsharedthisevening’scelebration.Tohavegonesome
waytobeingacceptedasoneofthemseemedtohavemadethewholeoftheadventureworthwhile…
Beforethesepeople,whosetitleswerenotintheirmilitaryranksbutintheirChristiannames,Icould
onlybowmyhead.Theyhadnogreatclaimsonlife.Theywerenotdreamingofmarblehallsandthe
gleamingtinselofvictory.Theirsimplevillageliveshadbeendisruptedbyforeigninvasionsand
theirconsequences.Inresponsetheyhadgivenallthatwasbestwithinthem:theircourageand
instinctiveguile,theirrefusaltosubmit,theirintelligentandcriticalreserveaboutthemotiveofsome
oftheirleaders…TherewasanunquestionedacceptanceofthevalueoftheBritishconnection.’
Thiswasaromanticperception.Therecordshowsthatinmanycountriestheweaponsprovidedto
ResistancebytheAllieswereusedmoreenergeticallytopromotefactionalinterests–mostly
communist–followingliberation,thantofighttheAxisduringtheoccupation.AnOSSmajor
droppedintonorth-westItalyreportedthatthepartisanswere‘20percentforLiberationand80per
centforRussia.WesoonfoundthattheywereburyingtheGermanarmstheyhadcaptured.’Since
1945,manyfancifulaccountshavebeenpublished,whichexaggeratethematerialdamageinflictedon
AxisforcesbyAlliedagentsandResistance,especiallyinthewakeofD-Day.Itissalutarytocompare
thesewithGermanwardiaries,whichshowhowrelativelysmallwerethecasualtiesimposedby
guerrillas:forinstance,the2ndSSPanzerDivision,whichtravelledfromMontaubantoNormandyin
June1944,sheddingriversofinnocentbloodonitsway,lostjustthirty-fivekilledoutof15,000men.
Sabotageandlocalattacksoftenrequiredacceptanceofhigherrisksandlossesthantargetsmerited
innarrowlymilitaryterms.Col.DickBarry,Gubbins’sveryablechiefofstaffatBakerStreet,said
longafterwardsaboutitswartimecontribution:‘Itwasonlyjustworthit.’YetSOE’soperationswere
importantthen,andseemjustifiednow,bytheirmoralimpactandcontributiontofomenting
insecurity,tension,sometimesmurderoushysteriaamongGermanoccupyingforces.Itwaschiefly
thankstotheaidprovidedtolocaloppositionmovementsbySOEandOSSthatalegendofpopular
insurrectionwascreated,whichcontributedimmenselytorevivingtheself-respectofEurope’s
occupiedsocietiesafter1945.NevercouldenemiesofdemocracyclaimthatBritainandtheUnited
Stateshadabandonedtheoccupiednationstotheirfate.
AcrossEurope–theAsianstorywillbediscussedbelow–themenandwomenwhoservedas
SOE’sfieldagentsofferedasacrificetothecauseoffreedomwhichbecameevidenttothepeopleof
mostoccupiedsocietiesafterthewar,eveniftheyknewnothingofitduringtheiryearsoftrial.
Moreovernoneofthefollies,failuresandembarrassmentsdescribedaboveshouldbeallowedto
maskthetoweringhistoricalrealitythatsomehundredsofthousandsoffineandbravepeopleinthe
occupiedcountriesriskedeverythinginthecauseofResistance.OnlySOE’ssupport–withmoney,
arms,wirelesses–empoweredthemtomakethatchoice.Toomuchpost-warattentionandadmiration
hasfocuseduponthedeedsoftheforeigners,SOE’sBritishagents,whohazardedonlytheirown
younglivesinthecauseofagreatandindisputablyromanticadventure;toolittleuponthepeoplesof
Europe,ofallagesandbothsexes,whojoinedoneofhundredsofResistancenetworks.Their
contributionshouldbejudgedmuchmorebythemagnitudeoftheirstakesandtheirsacrificesthanby
themilitaryachievements,orlackofthem.ForallSOE’sextravagancesandfollies,itbecamethe
mosteffectiveBritishsecretoperationsorganisationofthewar,andjustifiedtheChurchillianleapof
imaginationthatinspireditscreation.
11
Hoover’sG-Men,Donovan’sWildMen
1 A D V ENTUR ER S
‘WildBill’Donovan’snew-bornforeignintelligenceservice,theOfficeofStrategicServices,
encounteredmostofthesamedifficulties,dramasandcriticismsasSOE,andmoreofthem.Oneday
earlyin1945,deepineasternFranceaUSArmydivisionalstaffofficerheldforthtocolleaguesin
frontofoneofDonovan’smen:‘Gentlemen,IamgoingtotellyouabouttheOSS…themost
fantasticdamnedorganizationinallourarmedforces.Itspeopledoincrediblethings.Theyseduce
Germanspies,theyparachuteintoSicilyonedayandtwodayslaterthey’redancingontheStRegis
roof.Theydynamiteaqueducts,urinateinLuftwaffegastanks,andplaygameswithIGFarbenand
Krupp,but’–throwinguphishands–‘90percentofthishasnotagoddamnedthingtodowiththe
war.’
Thestaffofficer ’srantmayhavebeeninfluencedbythefactthatthevisitorwhoprovokeditwasa
Hollywoodfilmstar,thinlydisguisedasoneofDonovan’smen.Butitwastheactorwhorecordedthe
story,andhimselfhalf-acceptedthecynicalviewofOSSadoptedbymanyuniformedsoldiers:theUS
WarDepartmentinWashingtonrefusedtoopenitsfilestoDonovan’speople,orindeedtoinclude
himontheUltradistributionlist.Maj.Gen.GeorgeV.Strong,GeorgeMarshall’sintelligencechief,
regardedDonovan’sactivitieswithunremittingscorn,asdidhis1944successor,ClaytonBissell.OSS
wasexuberant,ill-disciplined,unfocusedandwildlyextravagant,inkeepingwiththepersonalityofits
founder.Acoolerfiguremighthavebuiltamoremeasuredservice.ButtheUnitedStatesfacedan
extraordinarychallenge,tocreatefromastandingstartinthemidstofaworldwaranorganisation
withglobalresponsibilitiesforintelligence,sabotageandguerrillaoperations,arangeofmissions
thateveryotherbelligerentusedseveralservicestofulfil.
AnSOEmanvisitingWashingtonin1942wasenchantedtoobserveasigninasidestreetnearthe
WhiteHouse:‘NOPARKING:U.S.SECRETSERVICEONLY’.America’snot-very-‘secretservice’
officerswereresponsibleonlyforguardingthepresidentandsuppressingforgeryofthedollar.
OSS’sfolliesandfailuresweremanyandvarious,butlittleworsethanthoseofitsAlliedandAxis
counterparts.Allthatwasdifferentwasthatwhereothernationsafterwardssoughttoburytheir
excessesandfailures,theAmericanscharacteristicallyavowedthem.Moreover,OSScouldclaimto
havecreatedthemostimpressiveresearchandanalysisarmofanyintelligenceserviceintheworld.
DuringthemonthsbeforeandafterPearlHarbor,theBritishwerefearfulthatDonovan’sascentto
powerwouldbefrustratedbyanglophobes,becausethecolonelwassoconspicuouslyenthusiastic
aboutChurchill’speople.ManyofhisearlystruggleswerenotagainsttheGermans,butagainstJ.
EdgarHooveroftheFederalBureauofInvestigation.Incommonwiththesecurityservicesofevery
othernation,theFBIexpandeddramaticallyduringthewaryears,its1941strengthof2,280risingby
1945to15,000,including5,000specialagents–the‘G-men’,astabloidslangdubbedthem.Bya
directiveof23December1941,theWhiteHouseagreedthattheFBIshouldextenditsremittocover
counter-intelligenceactivitiesthroughouttheAmericas.ThisempoweredHoovertocreateanew
corporation–ImportersandExportersServices,withquartersinNewYork’sRockefellerCenter–as
acoverforitsagentsoverseas.Later,theBureaupersuadedbonafidecompaniestodotheirpatriotic
dutybyprovidingcredentialsforitsmen–Reader ’sDigest,TwentiethCentury-Fox,Paramount,
Procter&Gamble,H.J.Heinz.SpecialAgentRichardAuerbach,whotravelledtoBogotáasa
supposedrepresentativeofWallStreet’sMerrillLynch,claimedtohavesold$100millionworthof
stocksandbondsdownthere.
Hooverhurriedtopre-emptDonovanbydeployinghisownmeninSouthAmerica,butthe
logisticaldifficultiesofwartimeforeigntravelwereimmense,evenforUSsecretservants,andfar
fromanycombatzone.WhenSpecialAgentRichardCrowwasassignedtoLaPaz,hestartedoutby
plane,thenbecamestrandedinPanamafortendaysbeforecatchingaflighttoColombia,wherehe
kickedhisheelsforafurtherweekbeforeflyingtoLima.Afterfivedaysthere,heabandonedhopeof
gettinganotherplaneseatandinsteadrentedacartosouthernPerubeforecatchingatrainrideto
LakeTiticaca.Hecrossedthewaterinanativeboat,thengotatraintotheBoliviancapital.Whathe
didwhenhegotthereisunrecorded,andwasperhapslessinteresting.
WhiletheFBIcouldclaimsuccessinprotectingtheUnitedStatesfromAxisintelligence–a
relativelyeasytask,giventheclumsinessofAbwehrandJapaneseattemptsatpenetration–itschief
quarrelledwitheverybranchofthearmedforcesbecauseofhisrefusaltocollaborate,toshare
informationorinformantsthatfellintohisclutches.TheOfficeofNavalIntelligencewasespecially
exasperatedbyHoover ’sintransigence.On13August1942oneofitsofficers,CommanderW.S.
Hogg,launchedafierceattackontheBureau’s‘inabilitytofitintoaplaceinanycoordinatedmilitary
activity.[The]FBIisacivilianorganisationwithabackgroundofpeace.Ithasbeenbuiltonits
publicity,itsfavourwiththepublicandCongressanditsreputationasaprotectorofthepeople.Itis
ambitious,properlysoinpeacetime,perhaps,butquestionablysointimeofwar…Ex-agentsofFBI
havesaidthateveryAgentoweshisallegiancefirsttoHooverandsecondtotheUnitedStates.’
AcharacteristicepisodetookplacewhenanescapedGermanairman,PeterKrug,wasarrestedin
SanAntonio:armedforcesintelligencebrancheswerenotinformeduntilaftertheFBIhadhelda
triumphantpressconference.MeanwhileLauranceSaffordofOp-20-Ghadamajorrowwiththe
BureauoverownershipofsomeGermandiplomaticcodesthatFBIagentsseizedinSanFrancisco.
HooverlaunchedabitteroffensiveagainsttheinfantOSS’searlyventuresinSouthAmerica,
denouncingDonovan’salleged‘interferencewiththeBureau’sresponsibilityforhandlingand
controllingoperationsofenemyespionageagentsintheWesternHemisphere’.Thedirectorwaseven
morehostiletoChurchill’snationanditsintelligenceservices.TheFBI’sinternalhistorycomplains:
‘TheBritishMI6displayeditsuncooperativeattitudetosuchadegreethatonFeb4,1944,theBureau
founditnecessarytomakeavigorousprotesttotheBritishSecurityrepresentativeinNewYorkand
totheLondonheadquarters.’Foritsownpart,MI6abandonedearlyandunsuccessfuleffortstowork
withtheFBI’smenonthegroundinSouthAmerica,andcollaboratedinsteadwiththeUSArmy’sG-2
department.
Allintelligenceservicesseektopromotefactionalinterestsandinflatetheirownachievements,but
thewartimeFBIcarriedthispracticetomaniclengths.TheBritishwereexasperatedthatHoover
preferredtosnatchheadlinecreditforhigh-profilecaptures,ratherthanprivilytrackorturnenemy
spies.Theywereespeciallyannoyedwhentheirownprizedoubleagent,‘Garbo’,spentsometimein
theUSin1941–42,andtheFBImismanagedhimsogrosslythathewasalmostblown.Moreoverthe
Bureauhadthechutzpahtoboastthatitwasitselfresponsibleforthecreationandmanagementofthe
DoubleCrosssystemwhichhelpedtoconfusetheGermansaboutD-Day:theFBIEspionageSection’s
quarterlysummaryof‘outstandingaccomplishments’,composedon1May1944forcirculation
throughoutthehigherechelonsoftheRooseveltadministration,recorded:‘OnMarch17thefirst
messagecalculatedtodeceivetheGermansastothedateoftheEuropeaninvasionbytheAllieswas
sentthroughthe[FBI’s]doubleagentPatJbyradio.Thismessagewasfollowedbysimilarmessages
forthesamepurpose…Theoperationofdoubleagentsduringthisquartercontinuedtoaddtothe
Bureau’sknowledgeofthemodusoperandiandpersonnelemployedbytheGermanintelligence
service.’Inthewinterof1944theFBIcirculatedamemorandumwhichconcludedmagisterially:
‘Considerationisbeinggiventocontinuingsomeofourdoubleagentstopenetratethe[German]
undergroundaftercessationofhostilities.’Toagreaterdegreethananyotherintelligenceand
securityorganisationtheFBI–or,moreexplicitly,Hooveritschieftain–chosetoviewthewaras
providingatheatrefortheextensionofhisownpowerandprestige,ratherthanasamissiontodefeat
theAxis.
WhiletheFBIwagedasuccessfulexpansionistcampaignintheAmericas,elsewhereintheworld
Donovantriumphed,andsoonpresidedoveralargeempire.BillBentinckoftheBritishJICnever
waveredinhisviewthattheprimeminister ’screationofSOEasaseparateserviceandrivaltoMI6
hadbeenamistake.HeurgedDonovantokeep‘skulduggery’andintelligence-gatheringunderone
roof,andsoindeedtheAmericansdid.InJune1942,byexecutiveordertheOfficeofWar
InformationbecametheOfficeofStrategicServices.Itwashousedmostlyinbuildingsvacatedbythe
PublicHealthService,andsooncomprisedfourbranches:SecretIntelligence(SI);SecretOperations
(SO);psychologicalwarfareor‘MoraleOperations’(MO);counter-espionage(X-2).
Washingtonbulgedwithpeople–70,000newarrivalsinthefirstyearafterPearlHarbor–and
5,000morefederalworkersarrivedeachmonththereafter,manybringingtheirfamilieswiththem.
Thetelephonesystemstruggledtograpplewithincreaseddemand,especiallyforlong-distancecalls.
Thegovernmentspent–andwasted–cashonsuchascaleastheworldhadneverseen.‘Tempos’,
buildingsrushedupinacoupleofmonthstohousenewdepartments,appearedoneverygreenspace
aroundthecitycentre.Paper,filingcabinetsandtypewriterswereindesperatelyshortsupply;amida
nationalappealforusedmachines,radiostationsplayedajingle:‘Anidletypewriterisahelpto
Hitler.’Thecapitalwastransformedoveradecadefromaquietbackwaterintoanoisy,crowded,
expensivecityboastingamushroomgrowthofacronyms,eachonesignifyinganeworganisation:
WPB,OPA,WMC,BEW,NWLB,ODT–andnowOSS.
TheBritishweredelighted,exceptClaudeDanseyofMI6,whoexpresseddisgust.Hatingboththe
UnitedStatesandSOE,hewasappalledthatthelatterwasnowtohaveanAmericancounterpart,bent
onpursuingthesame‘noisypaths’,andrunbyaflamboyantofficerwho,inDansey’sview,was
‘completelysoldonpublicity’.BroadwayjudgedthatDonovanwasmoreinterestedinthethrillsand
spillsofsponsoringparamilitaryoperationsinenemyterritorythaninintelligence-gathering.One
keyareaofUSsecretactivitieswasring-fencedbeyondOSS’sremit:thecolonelhadnoinfluence
overtheUSArmy’sandUSNavy’scodebreakers,whorepresentedbyfarthemostimportant
elementsofAmerica’swartimeintelligenceeffort.Moreover,in1942,andtoDonovan’schagrin,
propagandawashivedofftoElmerDavis’sOfficeofWarInformation.Hisownmenweretobe
spies,saboteursandsponsorsofguerrillacampaigns.
Underthestimulusofitsmanicallyenergeticfounder,OSSexpandedlikeagiantpartyballoon.
DonovanpromisedFDRanorganisationbasedonmenwhowere‘calculatinglyreckless’,with
‘disciplineddaring’,and‘trainedforaggressiveaction’.ItsNewYorkfacilitystruckoneofficeras
resemblingapantomimerepertorycompany:‘Everyonewasworkingupascheme.Everything
shimmeredinsecrecy,anditwasararemanwhoknewwhathisfellowsweredoing.BrooksBrothers
wastheunofficialcostume-makerwhileAbercrombie&Fitchfunctionedasanuptown
QuartermasterCorps,supplyingairmattressesandsleepingbagsandalltheparaphernaliasodearto
theheartsofsmallboysandciviliansturnedsemi-guerrillas.’WhenArthurSchlesingerjoinedthe
organisationin1943,hewrotetohisparentsthatnobodyseemedtoworktoohard,thematerialwas
interesting,andtherewereniceperquisitessuchasprivatescreeningsofHollywoodnewreleasesfor
Donovan’sintimatecircle.Buttheyoungacademicdeploredtheremotenessfromreality,ashesawit,
oftheneworganisation:‘Forallthedeathlysecrecyofmuchofthematerial,thereisanivory-tower
serenityabouttheplace.’
OSSeventuallyemployedover13,000Americanstogetherwithmanymoreforeigners,and
enjoyedalmostunlimitedfundingforweapons,planes,cars,officeequipment,houses.Malcolm
Muggeridge,MI6’smaninLourençoMarques,complainedthatthearrivalthereofanOSS
representativepromptedsoaringinflationinthelocalbribemarket.AUSofficerdispatchedtothe
Mediterraneanwrote:‘ThechiefsofthevariousOSSheadquartersoverseashadaspectaculartalent
forlivinginstyle.TheCairovillalookedlikeabastardversionoftheTajMahal.Thehighwall
arounditwaspiercedbyatallirongate;therewerebroadverandasofinlaidtileandaprofusionof
shadetreesabovevaststretchesoflawn.Aplatoonofservantsglidedinendlesscircles,thepunkahs
revolvedoverheadandthroughaleafycrevasseyoucouldgazeeachdawnonapairofyoung
Egyptiangirlsastheycombedeachother ’shair.’OSSsetupitsIndianheadquartersat32Ferozshah
Road,inDelhi’ssmartestneighbourhood,withanimplausiblesignonthegateproclaimingittobe
theresidenceof‘DrL.L.Smith,AmericanDentist’.
Donovanhadnopatiencewithadministration,andlesswithaccountancy,whichenabledsomeOSS
officerstostealsubstantialsumsofcash.MajorWilliamHolohan,aforty-year-oldHarvard-educated
formerlawyerfortheSecurities&ExchangeCommission,wasparachutedintonorthernItalyfor
OSSinSeptember1944with$16,000inoperationalfundsandanItalian-Americaninterpreter,Lt.
AldoIcardi.IcardithereafterreportedhischiefkilledinaGermanambush.Afterthewar,however,
anItaliancourtfoundinabsentiathatIcardiandhissergeant,aNewYorkfactoryworkerofSicilian
extraction,hadpoisonedthenshotHolohan,dumpedhisbodyinalakeandseizedhispriceless
dollarsforthebenefitofacommunistpartisangroup.Thetruthofthatepisoderemainsdisputed,but
OSScheerfullyacknowledgedemploymentofsomebloodstainedcharacters,includingaccredited
membersoftheMafia.
AlthoughmostofDonovan’smenworeuniform,therewasnosalutingnordresscode.Where
everyotherwartimeintelligencechiefwasacreatureofhisrespectivegovernment,hewasentirely
hisownman,possessedofacheekfoundedonapersonalmandatefromthepresident.Thiswasa
sourceofexasperationtotheBritish;fortherestofthewartheirintelligencechiefsweretorn
betweencondescensiontowardsDonovan,whomtheyregardedasacharlatan,andgrudging
acknowledgementofhiscloutinWashington.BruceLockhartwroteafterameetinginLondonin
June1942:‘Thecolonelhasagedandisnotveryimpressive.AccordingtoDesmondMorton…The
PresidentlikesColonelDonovan,sayshemustbehelpeddown,butthatheisnoorganiserandisa
childinpoliticalmatters.’
WithintheUnitedStatesthenewserviceacquiredinstantglamour,andareputationastheplacefor
anywell-connectedwarriorwhowishedtoservehiscountryonmorecongenialtermsthanlineduty
couldoffer.AmericaninfantryleadershipwasasmuchweakenedaswasthatoftheBritishArmyby
thediversionofofficersandNCOsto‘privatearmies’,ofwhichDonovan’swasthemost
conspicuousexample.Allmannerofclever,upmarketAmericansgravitatedtoOSSwhohadcourage
inplenty,butnoappetitefordisplayingitinfoxholes.FewofDonovan’srecruitshadmilitary
experience;mostwere,instead,formercorporateexecutives.TheMadisonAvenueadvertising
agencyJ.WalterThompsonprovidedOSS’schiefofplanning,Cairo’sexecutiveofficerand
Casablanca’sblack-propagandaspecialist.ThereweremanyrichIvyLeaguers,includingbothofJ.P.
Morgan’ssons;inWashingtonaDuPonthandledFrenchintelligenceactivities;AndrewMellon’sson
PaulwasLondonadministrativeofficerofSpecialOperations,andhisbrother-in-lawDavidBruce
becameheadofstation.OnlyRockefellerswerelacking:Nelson,whoservedasthegovernment’s
CoordinatorofInter-AmericanAffairs,gotintoaturfrowwithDonovan,asaresultofwhichthetwo
menwerenolongeronspeakingterms.OSSalsorecruitedmanyWhiteRussians,including‘Prince’
SergeObolensky.
Thentherewerethehumblerpersonnel,manyofthemwomen,pioneerswhoseprevious
experienceoftheworldoutsidetheirownstate,nevermindtheUS,couldbedescribedonapostage
stamp.ThefilesrecordthousandsofclericalstaffsuchasCeciliaChapmanJustice,twenty-four,just
fivefeettwoinchestall,fromGrossePointe,Michigan:shehadbeenanairlineticketagent,then
spentafewmonthsasacryptanalystforAirTransportCommandbeforeshejoinedOSS,andwas
postedtoIndia.Shewroteinherownsubmissionforsuitability:‘ThetrainingIhavereceivedsinceI
havebeenwithOSSgivesmeconfidencethattheassignmentIamtohaveabroadwillbeoneIcan
handlewithassurance.BecauseoftheknowledgeIhaveacquiredofthepoliticsofthisorganisation,I
amsureIcancomplywiththem.ForthetimeIwasemployedbyATCIlivedcompletelyindependent
ofmyfamily,andIfeelsurethatIshallbecompetenttotakecareofmyselfwhileoverseas.Iama
ProtestantandIdonotbelongtoanyorganisationwhichadvocatestheoverthrowoftheUS
Government.’
Thearchivescataloguehundredsofothersuchlittlepersonalodysseys.Posteritymaywonderwhat
MarthaBelleKershawmadeofCeylon,LauraWolcottTuckermanofCairo,orThelmaStoneCarson
ofLondon.WhatwasforsurewasthatAmericandiplomatshadnomoretimeforDonovan’spushy
peoplethandidtheirBritishcounterpartsforSOE.TheUSambassadorinAnkaraprotestedfuriously
againstdemandsthatOSSpersonnelshouldbegranteddiplomaticcover.Hisofficewroteto
Washington:‘HefeelsverystronglythattheEmbassymustnotbeusedtogivecovertoOSS…He
himselfbelievesthattheentireideaof“cover”forOSSisridiculous.’TheUSambassadorin
ChongqinglikewiseopposedaccreditingDonovan’spersonnelunlesshewasgrantedsomeauthority
overtheiractivities,whichthegeneralwouldnevercountenance.
TheUSconsulinTangierresistedaplantosendOSS’sColonelHarryWanvigintoSpanish
Moroccodisguisedasacivilian,pointingoutthathewasalreadyknowntotheSpanishauthoritiesas
anarmyofficer,andthat‘hispresenceherewouldservenousefulpurposeandwouldfurthermorebe
undesirablefromsecuritypointofview’.TherewerealmostceaselessStateDepartmentprotests
againsttheballooningscaleofOSSofficesandstaffing,asastreamofitspersonnelofallagesand
bothsexesdescendedoneverymajorcitywheretheAllieshadafooting.Donovanandhis
subordinates,however,wavedasidethenay-sayersand–atleastuntiltheautumnof1944,whenhis
influenceintheWhiteHousebegantodeclineprecipitously–gotawaywithplentymorethanmurder.
EventhoseOSSfieldofficersnotrecruitedfromthesocialelitewereoftenexoticpersonalities.
ProminentamongthemwasSterling‘Buzz’Hayden,whobecameoneofDonovan’sstars.Hewas
bornin1916,sonofanimprovidentNewJerseynewspaper-spacesalesmanwhodiedwhenhewas
nine.ExposuretoNewEnglandharboursbredintohisrovingandracketychildhoodapassionforthe
seawhichprovedlifelong.Atsixteenheranawaytojoinasailingschooner,andthereafterservedon
aBanksfishingtrawlerbeforeskipperinganeighty-nine-footbrigantinethroughahurricaneto
Tahiti.Hefellinlovewithalotofgirls,andplentyofthemsuccumbedtohisruggedgoodlooksand
venturesomespirit.HespenteverythinghehadsavedtobuyKaiserWilhelmII’soldyacht,onlyto
haveitwreckedunderhiminastorm.In1939hisgodfather,aNewYorkbusinessman,said,‘Gollys,
youngfeller,you’vehadquiteatimeforyourself,haven’tyou?Don’tyouthinkit’sabouttimeyou
settleddownandmadesomethingofyourself?’
Inafashion,sohedid.Hissix-foot-four,220-poundfigurecaughttheeyeofaHollywoodtalent
scout.In1940hestartedworkatParamountona$600-a-monthcontract,andwaspromptlycast
oppositeMadeleineCarroll,theBritish-bornBirminghamUniversitygraduateandformer
schoolteacherwhohadbecomethemosthighlypaidfemalestarintheworld.Theymadethemovie
Virginiatogether,andfellinlove.Shewastenyearsolder,butsomebodyoncedescribedthecouple
as‘thetwomostbeautifulhumanbeingsintheworld.’HaydenmetRooseveltattheWhiteHouse
beforerejectingtheleadinForWhomtheBellTollstojointhewar.HehatedHollywood,andstruck
upanacquaintancewithBillDonovan.InNovember1941hesailedtoEngland,completing
commandoandparachutecoursestherebeforeinjuringhimselfonajumpinMarch1942and
returningtoAmerica,wherehemarriedCarroll.
HaydenwasrefusedaUSNavycommission,onthegroundsthathewasalmostuneducated.Instead
hejoinedtheMarineCorpsbywayofParrisIslandbootcamp,thentransferredtoOSS.Hewasbent
uponsheddingtheHollywoodfamehedespised,andchangedhisnameforoperationalpurposesto
‘JohnHamilton’.Hiswife’ssisterhadbeenkilledintheLondonBlitz;thispromptedCarroll,too,to
quitthefilmbusiness:fortherestofthewarsheservedwiththeRedCrossinEurope.‘Lt.Hamilton’
becameoneofthesmallarmyofOSSpersonnelwhocrossedtheAtlantictoplayapicaresquebitpartinthatbiggestblockbustermelodramaofall:TheWar.
OSSLondonstationchiefWilliamPhillipsdescribedhisownmissionintermsechoedbyhis
counterpartsaroundtheworld:‘MydutywastopursueDonovan’sgoalofaglobalUSintelligence
service,whileresistingalleffortsoftheBritishSecretInformation[sic]togobbleusup.’TheOSS’s
LondonbaseonBrookStreet,afewblocksfromtheUSembassy,eventuallyboastedfourteen
outlyingbranches,andgrewtoastrengthof2,000people,includingastellarconstellationof
academicssuchasWaltRostow,CraneBrinton,ChandlerMorse.MostofDonovan’smenwereanticolonialist,whichsustainedchronictensionswiththeBritishandFrench.ColonelHaroldHoskins
planneda1942expeditionthroughArabcountrieswhichhehopedtopersuadetoexpeltheBritish.
Unsurprisingly,thistripwasblockedinLondon;theForeignOfficeandSOEstrove,albeitwithout
success,toexcludeOSSfromtheentireMiddleandFarEast,andespeciallyIndia.Therewasanearly
Donovanplottooverthrowthepro-VichyprimeministerofTunisia,forwhichthecolonel
establisheda$50,000warchest.RobertMurphyoftheStateDepartmentvetoedtheschemebecauseit
mustenrageVichyandfrustrateanyhopesofrecruitingitsarmedforcestotheAllies.Amidthe
contortionsofAmericanpolicytowardstheFrenchaftertheDecember1942assassinationofAdmiral
Darlan,anewOSSpro-GaullistcommandounitwasformedunderthedirectionofaHarvard
anthropologistandArabistimpossiblynamedCarletonCoon.
StateabortedasuccessionofotherOSSprojectswhichitconsideredlikelyto‘upsetcolonial
relationshipswithlocalnativepopulations’.ManyofDonovan’smenbegantoworkontheprinciple
that‘inintelligence,theBritisharejustasmuchtheenemyastheGermans’.Fromeverycornerofthe
globeAmericanofficersfiredoffastreamofcomplaintsaboutlackofcooperationfromtheir
Anglo-Saxonallies.WhentenOSSmenperishedafterplanesflownbyinexperiencedUSAAFcrews
crashedwhilecarryingthemtoNorway,itwasallegedthatthemishapoccurredbecausetheBritish
refusedtoallowtheagentstobedispatchedinRAFaircraftpilotedbyNorwegians.
Mistrustanddisdainweremutual.HughTrevor-RoperwrotewithcharacteristicscorninJanuary
1943abouthisAmericancounterparts:‘thesecallow,touchy,boastful,flatulentinvaders,whoseemto
thinkthemselves,aspoliticians,amatchforthecase-hardeneddouble-crossersofstruggling,tortured
Europe.Willtheyneversee…thattheyareonlygreatchildren,pamperedchildrenoftherich,
amongexperiencedanddesperatesharpers?’WhenajointOSS/SOEheadquarterswasestablishedin
Algiers,thetwonations’officersconcealedinformationandplansfromeachother,andtheBritish
tooklunchanhouraftertheAmericans’12–1break,inordertodotheirmostsecretbusinessinthe
absenceoftheirallies.BickhamSweet-EscottofSOEwasback-handedlydelightedwhena
distinguishedIndianmajorwithaDSOwoninthedesertturnedupinWashingtononatourto
recoverfromhiswounds,andwasrefusedaccesstoabarbecauseofhiscolour.Afterthatepisode,
theBritishofficersaidthathefeltmuchlessembarrassedwhenOSSmenfulminatedinhispresence
about‘Britishimperialism’.
AsUSchargéd’affairesinLisbon,GeorgeKennanhadtointervenetostoptheOSSfomentinga
revoltagainstPortugueseruleintheAzores:Donovan’sagentsviewedPresidentdeOliveiraSalazar
simplyasonemorefascistdictatorwhoseremovalmustrepresentagooddeedintheworld,andwere
mortallydispleasedtobepreventedfromperformingit.Meanwhile,Eisenhower ’sstaffinNorth
AfricaquashedanotherprojecttoassassinateGermangeneralsintheirheadquarters,thoughBritish
commandoshadalreadytriedunsuccessfullytokillRommel.In1942anOSSofficerquizzed
AdolpheBerleoftheStateDepartmentaboutUSpolicytowardsThailand.Berleturneduphispalms:
‘Wehaven’tgotanypolicyyet.’ThisvacuuminWashington,whichextendedtomanypartsofthe
globe,enabledDonovan’sfieldmentoinventtheirownpartylineinthenameoftheUnitedStates.Dr
WalterClineoftheOSSRabatstationtoldthepashaofMarrakech,‘TheFrenchhavenothingtodo
[inMorocco]…excepttoleaveit,’aremarkthatnaturallyoutragedthecolonialpower.Donovan
wrotedismissivelytoFoggyBottom,sayingthatClinewasdoingworkof‘greatvalue’,and
authorisedhimtocarryonregardless.
An11January1944meetingattheForeignOfficeinLondondiscussedwithalarmDonovan’s
assertiontojournaliststhathewasdeterminedtocreateaUSsecretserviceregardlessofopposition
fromanyquarter.Menziessaid‘heassumedthisreferencetooppositionwasdirectedagainstMI6and
SOE…InhisviewtherewasnopossibilityofpreventingGeneralDonovan[ashehadnowbecome]
fromproceedingashewished,andtheonlypossiblecoursewastofightarearguardactionwitha
viewtopreventinghimfromcausingunnecessarymischief.’SOEandMI6agreedaboutalmost
nothingelse,butwereatoneintheirfearsofthehavocthatmightbewreakedbyOSSofficersinthe
field,especiallyintheMediterraneanandSouth-EastAsia.InJuly1945,USplanesdroppedOSS
leafletsonTonkin,draftedbyDonovan’sfanaticallyanti-colonialistofficerinHanoi,Captain
ArchimedesPatti.TheseproclaimedtotheVietnameseonbehalfoftheUS:‘Weareshortlycomingto
Indo-Chinatofreeyou,butwedonotactliketheFrenchwhoareonlycomingtooppressyou,weare
yourtrueliberators.’
OneofthemostextraordinaryOSSmissionswasthatofBrookeDolanandIlyaTolstoy,exiled
grandsonofthenovelist,whoweredispatchedfromChinainSeptember1942tovisittheten-year-old
DalaiLamainLhasa.Theoverlandjourneytookthemthreemonths.Theyweregreetedamiably
enoughbytheTibetans,whorequestedaradiotransmitter.TheStateDepartmentobjectedthatthis
wouldupsettheChinese,whohadclaimsonTibet,butinNovember1943thesetwasdulydelivered
toLhasa,withoutmuchvisibleimpactonthewar.ThetwoAmericansgotbacktoChongqinginJuly,
afteraseven-monthodyssey,andwerehastilydispatchedhomeincasetheymetwithan‘accident’at
thehandsofChiangKai-shek’ssecretpoliceasthepriceoftheirimpudenceinhavingtraffickedwith
theTibetans,whomChinaregardedasitsownsubjects.
By1944OSSspecialoperationspersonnelwereoperatingineverytheatreofwar–indeed,thesize
andconspicuousnessofsomeAmericanpartiesrenderedthemespeciallyvulnerable.Atwenty-strong
teamparachutedintothelowerTatramountainson25September1943tocontactguerrillasinthefar
eastofCzechoslovakiaspentweeksinhidingasitssuppliesdwindled,thenwasbetrayedtothe
GermansbyaSlovakian;onlytwomenescapedtotheRussianlines.Fifteenwholandednorthof
AnzioinMarch1944tosabotagetheLaSpezia–Genoaraillinkwerepromptlycapturedandshotby
theGermans,inaccordancewithHitler ’s1942CommandoOrder.Col.FlorimondDukeandhis
fellow-membersofaMarch1944OSSmissiontotheHungariangovernmentwerehandedovertothe
Germansassoonastheylanded,thoughtheywerefortunateenoughtosurvivethewar.InFebruary
1945,Berlinannouncedthataseventeen-strongOSSandSOEpartycapturedinCzechoslovakiahad
beenshotatMauthausenconcentrationcamp–thisincludedJoeMortonofAssociatedPress,theonly
warcorrespondenttobeexecutedinthecourseoftheconflict.
Theleft-wingenthusiasmsofmanyOSSofficersledtospecialdifficultiesinGreece,wherethey
threwtheirfullsupportbehindthecommunists.GeorgeVoumas,aWashingtonattorneyinDonovan’s
Cairostation,chargedthatChurchill’sofficers‘werenotinterestedinGreekliberationoreven
effectiveprosecutionofthewar,butinnaked[imperialist]politicalinterest’.Britishpolicytowards
thefantasticallycomplexGreekimbrogliowasindeedoftenfumbled,buttheOSS’smenwerenaïve
insupposingthatthecommunistsofEAM-ELASwouldimposeabenignpolityiftheygainedcontrol
ofthecountry.InGreeceasinneighbouringYugoslavia,allthepoliticaloptionsbeforetheAllies
wereunpalatable,butitprovedmistakentoallowyoung,idealisticandusuallyignorantOSSandSOE
officersonthespottomakejudgementswhichinfluencedthefateofnations.Manysawtheirown
roleinunderstandablyromanticterms,aslatter-dayLawrences,andsomemanagedtocreatenoless
troublethanhedid.
‘Here,IwasAmerica,’anOSSofficerwhoservedinYugoslaviawrotewonderingly.‘Ihada
message,perhapsmerelywords,ofcourse,ofencouragementtoalong-sufferingpeople.’Sterling
HaydensaidofayearhespentworkingwiththeYugoslavs:‘Weestablishedatremendouslyclose
personalfeelingwiththesepeople.Wehadenormous,Iwouldsayunlimitedrespectforthewaythey
werefighting.Wegotquitesteamedupbyit.Imyselfwassteamedupconsiderablybyit.Ihadnever
experiencedanythingquitelikethat,anditmadeatremendousimpressiononme.’Hewasfirstposted
torunanoperationsbaseontheItaliancoastatMonopoli,southofBari,shippingarmstothe
partisans.Thislifelongadventurerfoundhimselfdirectingashuttleserviceoffourteenschooners,
sixketchesandtwobrigantines,runningeightymilesacrosstheAdriaticatanaveragespeedofseven
knots.
Hefellinlovewiththeexperience,andwiththefourhundredYugoslavsworkingthevessels.He
wroteinthethirdpersonthathe‘foundhimselfcommittedinawayhehadneverknownbefore…He
hadneverknownsuchmen.Therewasaferocityaboutthem…strainingandsweatingforhourson
end,refusingtopauseoracceptreliefuntilorderedtodoso.’Likemorethanafewleft-wing
AmericanandBritishpersonnelservinginthetheatre,hecametoidealiseTito’smen,writingtoa
friendintheUSon22January1944:‘Itoldyouinearlierlettershowreluctantsomeofthelocal
BritisharetoreallygoalloutfortheYugoslavs.Myeyesarebeingopenedtoalotofthings…I
knownowthatmyentirelifebeforethiswasoneendlesssearchforpleasure.Well,maybeitisn’ttoo
latetomakeupforthewastedyears.’
Whocouldblamejuniorofficersforsuccumbingtoromanticism,whentheirchiefwasthe
foremostromanticofall?DonovanflewoverJapanese-heldterritoryinaTigerMothbiplanetovisit
anOSScampinBurma,andappearedatRooseveltandChurchill’sNovember1943Cairosummitto
proposea‘Unity’planforthepartitionofYugoslaviabetweenrivalfactions,whichFDRendorsed.
Thegeneralannouncedanintentionhimselftoparachuteintothewilderness,tostage-managea
reconciliationbetweenTitoandMihailović.ThisplangotnowherebecausenoneoftheYugoslavs
wereinterested;theAmericansafterwardsblamedChurchillforthrowinghissupportbehindTito.
BothWesternAlliesmisreadYugoslavia,anditisunlikelythatanypeacefulnon-communistoutcome
wasachievable.InMay1944DonovanburstintoLondon,inspectedtheOSSstationandaccusedits
staffofdoingtoomuchplanning,notenoughfighting.Heexhortedthem:‘Throwyourplansoutof
thewindow!’Confusion,supposedlycreative,wasrestored.Donovanwassokeenforevenhis
chairboundoperativestosmellpowderthatthatOctoberhecausedtwoacademicsfromOSS’s
Research&Analysisdivision,DavidColinandGeorgePeck,tobeparachutedintothePovalleywith
onlyrudimentaryspecialforcestraining.TheywerepromptlycapturedbytheGermans,which
causedanOSSofficertoexpresssomewhatheartlessconcernthattheirexperienceofconductingPhD
oralexaminationsmighthaveleftthemill-preparedtoresist‘unusualmethodsofinterrogation’.
OSSpersonnelwerefamousspenders,asattestedbyinnumerablepaymentdocketsinthearchives,
togetherwithaccompanyingprotestsfromtheStateDepartment.Atruckdrivercouldearn200,000
francs–theequivalentof$US4,000or£1,000–bycarryingaboxofdocumentsacrossFrancetothe
Spanishborder,withafurther50,000francsonoffertoanybodywhowouldtakesuchacargoonthe
lastlegofthejourney,acrosstheborderintoSpain.AcharacteristicsignaltotheUSembassyin
Madriddemanded:‘PleaseturnovertoOSSrepresentativeagainsthisreceiptonemillionpesetas
fromfundstoyourcreditunderauthorisation37…Youareauthorisedtopay$2000repeattwo
thousanddollarstoColonelW.A.Eddy…YouareauthorisedtopaytoColonelRobertA.Solborgin
oneorseveralpaymentsatotalof$100,000…Ihavearrangedfreedollarcreditforpurchasebyyou
ofonemillionAlgerianfrancswithfurtherpurchaselater…YouareauthorisedtopayColonelW.A.
EddyonbehalfoftheOSSthesumof$50,000…’
Theabove-mentionedColonelWilliamEddywasborninSyriatomissionaryparents,servedasan
intelligenceofficerinWorldWarI,thenheadedtheEnglishdepartmentatCairo’sAmerican
university,whereheintroducedEgyptianstobaseball.InApril1942,inTangierduringDonovan’s
pre-OSSincarnation,hedemandedhalfamilliondollarsinoperationalfundstosubvertandthenarm
VichyFrenchforcesinNorthAfrica.Whenthechiefsofstaffbaulked,Eddymessagedcrossly:‘If
[Robert]MurphyandIcannotbetrustedwithafewmillionfrancsinanemergencythenIshouldbe
calledbackandsomebodywhocanbetrustedsent.Wearedesperatelyhopingandwaiting.’Oneof
Donovan’smeninWashingtoncommentedhistrionically:‘ThewarmaybewonorlostbyColonel
Eddy,andcertainlythedayofvictorywillbeindefinitelyadvancedorretarded.’Thechiefsofstaff
remaineddoggedlyunsympathetic,andEddyfailedtogethismoney.
SomeswaggeringinitiativesbyDonovan’sagentsalarmedAlliedcodebreakers,amongtheman
OSSraidontheJapaneseconsulateinLisbon.ArlingtonHallandBletchleywereappalledwhenthey
heardthattheAmericanshadstolencodebooks.Thelastthingtheywantedwasactionthatmight
prompttheenemytobelievethathiscommunicationswerecompromised.Towardstheendof1944
FinnishintelligenceapproachedtheOSSinStockholm,offering1,500pagesofSovietcodes,
includingkeys.Donovanhastenedtoaccept,andgleefullyinformedtheWhiteHouseofthewindfall.
PresidentRoosevelt,however,attheurgingofEdwardStettinius,hisnewsecretaryofstate,ordered
thatthecodebooksshouldbehandedovertotheRussianswithoutcopiesbeingmade.Donovandefied
theWhiteHousebyphotographingthebooksbeforesurrenderingthem,butthiscanhavegiventhe
Americanslittleadvantage,whensomanyOSSstaffersweresecretlybriefingtheNKVD.
Evenbythestandardsofthesecretwar,someOSSmessagetrafficwasoutlandish,forinstancethis
on3October1944fromCaserta,inItaly,toWashington:‘WelearnthatKingMichaelofRumaniahas
urgentlyrequestedOSSrepresentativesinBucharestthat4,000roundsof.45caliberammunitionand
3,000of30millimetercarbineammunitionbesentbyplanefortheRoyalPalace.’InChina,theOSS’s
AlghanLusey,aformerUPIcorrespondentinShanghai,requestedadeliveryofsawn-offshotguns
fortheuseofChiangKai-shek’sagentsinoccupiedterritories,whomhedescribedas‘aswellbunch
ofhard-hitting,honestmen,goodgunmen’.LuseywasrecalledtoWashingtoninJuly1942.
Donovan’sstationheadlatercametobelievethatTaiLi,Chiang’ssecretpolicechief–themanwho
wantedtheshotguns–wasresponsiblefortheliquidationofseveraloftheOSS’sChineseinformants.
DavidBruce,anearlyOSSrecruitandlatterlyadistinguishedheadofitsintelligencebranch,
wrote:‘Woetotheofficerwhoturneddownaprojectbecause,onitsface,itseemedridiculous,orat
leastunusual.’AlthoughSouthAmericawasnotionallyFBIturf,Donovanplungedenthusiastically
intothecontinentanyway.BreckinridgeLongoftheStateDepartmentcomplainedthatDonovan‘is
intoeveryone’sbusiness–knowsnoboundsofjurisdiction–triestofilltheshoesofeachagency
chargedwithresponsibilityforawaractivity…hashadalmostunlimitedmoneyandaregulararmy
atworkandagentsallovertheworld’.
TheUSambassadortoSpain,CarltonHayes,sharedwithhisBritishcounterpartSirSamuelHoare
ahorrorofspecialoperationsandtheirperpetrators,whichcausedfrequentembarrassmentsinthe
Allies’relationswiththefascistdictatorshipofGen.FranciscoFranco.FrankSchoonmaker,authorof
asuccessfulseriesofEuropeantravelguides,wascaughtbySpanishpoliceinthespringof1943
passingOSScashtoaFrenchResistancecontact,andlanguishedforsixmonthsinaSpanishjail
beforebeingsprung.InJunethatyear,theBritishnavalattachéCaptainAlanHillgarth,wholiaised
closelywithMI6,persuadedOSS’sCol.Solborgofthemeritsoflaunchingajointoperationto
deposeFrancoandreplacehimwithamilitaryjunta.Londonwiselyvetoedthisscheme,onthe
groundsthatitwasbythenobviousthatFrancohadnointentionofenteringthewar.
ThefrustrationofthatschemedidnotdeterDonovan’smenfromalmostimmediatelystarting
another,organisedfromNorthAfricabyDonaldDownesinsupportoftheanti-FrancoSpanish
Resistance.HedispatchedOSS-trainedSpanishagentstomakecontactwiththeRepublicansin
Malaga.Theoutcomewasspectacularlymessy:Franco’smentrappedthemall.SomeofDownes’s
menwerecaptured,alongwiththeirAmericanweapons.Theprisonerstalked,andnamedDownes
andhiscolleagueArthurGoldbergastheirsponsors.WhentheStateDepartmentconfrontedtheOSS
withthisconsiderableembarrassment,GoldbergandDonovanpleadedignorance.TheUS
nonethelessmadeaformalapologyinMadrid.TheOSS-sponsoredSpaniardswereexecuted.
ThereafterDonovanbowedtotheUSambassador ’sinsistencethatthereshouldbenomore
operationsagainstFranco.
SomeofthecoolerheadswithinDonovan’sorganisationrecognisedthatitsexcesseswere
squanderingresourcesandinjuringitsreputation,toscantpurpose.Inthesummerof1943,whilethe
brigadier-general–Donovan’snewrank–wasoffroamingtheworld,aclutchofinternalreports
expressedalarmaboutOSS’scondition.Oneseniorofficer,GeorgePlatt,compiledamemorandum
inAugustwhichwasforwardedtoDonovan.Plattwroteof‘adeteriorationofmorale’.Nobody
exceptafewpeopleclosesttothegeneral,hesaid,‘canputhisfingeronanythingconcretethatthe
organisationhasaccomplished’.Anotherseniorfigure,ElleryHuntington,warnedof‘adangerous
lackofcohesion’.DonovanreturnedtoWashingtoninOctobertofindasix-pagememorandumfrom
agroupofseniorstaffers,whichstatedbrutally:‘OSShasgrowntoobigandisengagedintoomany
diverseactivities.’ThegroupconcludedbyproposingthatDonovanshouldrelinquishexecutive
controloftheorganisation,effectivelybecoming‘chairmanoftheboard’whiledepartmentalchiefs
ranitsoperations.Itwasplainthattheseviewsweresharedbysomeoftheablestandbest-informed
ofOSS’sseniorstaffers.Thecriticshitabrickwall,orratherDonovan.Hedismissedtheirproposals
outofhand,anduntilthewarendedheldOSSonthecoursehehadsetforit.Hehimselfremaineda
defiantlyfreespirit,servingasringmasterforahostoflike-mindedindividualistsandadventurers.
OSSearnedareputationascontroversialasthatofSOEforpromotingcommunistinterestsin
occupiedEuropeandtheBalkans.Donovanwaswarnedthathehadrecruitedmanyknown‘Reds’,of
whommorebelow.Heshruggedinresponse,‘Inthatkindofgame,ifyou’reafraidofwolves,you
havetostayoutoftheforest.’Gen.AlbertWedermeyer,oneofAmerica’smoreruthlessproconsuls
inChina,wrotesourlyafterthewar:‘Wewereverymuchinthepositionofbeinginafootball
contest,goingouttowinthegame,andthenwithvictoryachieved,proposingonlytoreturnhometo
celebratethevictory.Wewerejustthatnaïve.Wedidnotseemtounderstandthatinfightingwarswith
theGermansandtheItaliansinEurope,andwiththeJapaneseintheFarEast,weshouldstriveto
createtheconditionswhichwouldbringarealisticandenduringpeace.’Yetitwasaskingtoomuchof
mostWesternAlliedsoldiers,politiciansandsecretagentstoconductoperationsagainsttheAxiswith
aneyeovertheirshoulderstowhatwouldfollowvictory.EvenWinstonChurchillonlybegantodo
solatein1944,whenthewar ’soutcomewasassured.StalinaloneamongtheAlliedwarlords
conductedpolicyandstrategyinironcladaccordancewithhisownpost-warpurposes,inwhichhis
AmericanandBritishadmirersstrovemanfullytoassisthim.
2 I V O RYTO W ER S
ItisaseasytomockOSS’s‘trackandfieldstars’andtheirexoticoperationsasitistoderideSOE’s
wilderactivities.InWashington,however,Donovancreatedsomethingverydifferentandmore
impressive.TheResearch&AnalysisdivisionrecruitedsomeofthefinestbrainsinUSacademe,
whichbetween1942and1945producedanextraordinaryrangeofreports,mostoftheminteresting,a
fewoutstanding.Nowarringnation’sintelligenceservicesmatchedthequality–andquantity–of
R&A’sstudies.ThedivisionwasheadedbyJamesFinneyBaxter,presidentofWilliamsCollege,and
drewitsanalysts–someofthemlaterNobelPrize-winners–fromthirty-fivecampusesacrossthe
nation.BickhamSweet-EscottofSOEtouredthedepartmentwhilevisitingtheUS,andcamehome
lamentingthelackofanythingcomparableinLondon.Britain’sJointIntelligenceStaffhadonlya
handfulofmenundertakingresearchtowhichR&Acommittedhundreds.
ThedepartmentstarteditslifeintheannexeoftheLibraryofCongress,thenmovedtoabuildingat
23rdandEStreetwhicheventuallyhousedninehundredanalysts,coveringeverycorneroftheglobe,
togetherwithclericalandsupportstaff.Theacademicswhodominatedthepayrollincludedadozen
enemyaliensandfortyhistorians,sevenofthempastorfuturepresidentsoftheAmericanHistorical
Institution.WhenDonovanquizzedonerecruit,PaulSweezy,followingwarningsthathewasa
notoriousStalinist,Sweezysoothedthecolonelwithoutmuchdifficulty,sayingthathewasamere
socialist,‘moreorlesslike[Britain’sHarold]LaskiandNyeBevan.Theonlything[Donovan]was
interestedinwaswhetherIwasinfavourofthrowingbombsandstreetrioting.IassuredhimIwas
not,whichseemedtosatisfyhim.’R&Aalsohiredsuchwell-knownMarxistsasFranzNeumann,
HerbertMarcuse–OSS’sleadinganalystonGermany–andOttoKirchheimer.
Theyreadpressreports,transcriptsofenemybroadcastsmonitoredbytheFederal
CommunicationsCommission,PoWinterrogationsandcablesfromOSSstations.Inthelastyearof
thewartheyalsoaddressedlikelypost-warproblems.R&Aproducedreportsonsubjectsasdiverse
asrailtransportontheEasternFront,thepoliticalviewsofCharlesdeGaulle,inflationinBurmaand
theguerrillacampaigninthePhilippines–thoughSWAPO’sC-in-CGeneralDouglasMacArthur
refusedtoallowDonovan’speopletooperateinhistheatre.
SomeR&AanalystssharedtheOSS’scollectivedelusionsaboutthepotentialofguerrillaactionto
influencegrandoutcomes.TheCentralEuropeansectionassertedthatinternalpoliticalResistance
wouldcontributeasmuchasexternalmilitaryforcetothefinalcollapseofNaziGermany:‘The
record[ofResistance]isatributetohumanenduranceandcourage,andtherevelationofagreat
hope.’ThisviewreflectedthevisionaryhopesofitsGerman-bornauthors,ratherthanrepresenting
anevidence-basedpoliticaljudgement.Theywereonstrongergroundintheiroppositiontothe
Allieddoctrineofunconditionalsurrender,whichtheysaidfosteredNaziclaimsthattheonlychoices
forGermanywerevictoryorannihilation:‘WhatiswantedisapositivegoalforGermanywhichwill
dispelthisfearandencourageGermansoldiersandcitizensaliketorevoltagainsttheirNazileaders.’
Theanalystssuggestedthattheonlycrediblegroupingaroundwhomtoformadomestic
ResistancetoHitlerwerethecommunists.TheyurgedtellingtheGermanpeoplethatifthey
overthrewtheNazistheircountrycouldescapeAlliedinvasion.Whenthechiefsofstaffdeclaredthat
theAlliesshouldaspiretooccupyGermanyaheadofanyinternalrevolution,FranzNeumann
stronglydissented:‘ArevolutionarymovementaimingattheeradicationofNazismmaybehighly
desirable.’InAugust1944,whenSHAEFissueda‘HandbookforMilitaryGovernment’,thecontent
ofwhichwasmuchinfluencedbyR&A,USTreasurysecretaryHenryMorgenthauwasoutragedto
discoverthatitincludedproposalsforrevivingtheGermaneconomy–hehimselfwastheprincipal
advocateofpastoralisingtheentirecountry.Thedepartmentwasmoreconsciousthananyother
governmentbodyoneithersideoftheAtlanticaboutwhatHitlerwasdoingtotheJews,formanyof
itsstaffwerethemselvesJewish.InOctober1943LeonardKreigernotedinawidelycirculatedpaper
thatavisittoDenmarkbyAdolfEichmannindicatedthat‘theDanishpogromisthebeginningofthe
finalcampaigntoridEuropeoftheJews’.
TheOSSteamresearchingtheEasternFrontwashandicappedbythewallofsilencebehindwhich
theSovietUnionconducteditswar–evencopiesofPravdaandIzvestiareachedWashingtonsix
weekslate.SolittledatawasprovidedbyMoscowthatitprovedeasiertoestimateGermanoffensive
potentialthanSovietdefensivecapabilities.AverellHarriman,USambassadorinMoscow,refusedto
acceptOSSmenonhisstaff,judgingthathehaddifficultiesandembarrassmentsenoughalready;
onlyinApril1944didayounganalyst,RobertTucker,jointheembassytomonitorSovietforeign
policy.R&AnonethelessproducedsomeprescientreportsonHitler ’spredicamentanddifficultiesin
Russia,thefirstofthemin1942.ThroughmanymonthsduringwhichthemilitaryleadersofBritain
andtheUSwerechronicallyscepticalaboutRussia’sprospectsofsurvival,Donovan’smen
emphasisedtheGermans’hugesupplydifficulties,andquestionedtheirlikelihoodofsuccess.The
study’smethodologywasremarkable,includingtheuseoftechnicalinformationontheefficiencyof
locomotivesatsub-zerotemperatures,andtheproblemsofconvertingEuropeanrollingstockto
Russiantrackgauge.InovercrowdedWashingtonbackoffices,OSSresearchersstudiedthedaily
foragerequirementsofthetypeofhorsesusedbyGermaninfantryandcomputedammunition
expenditurebyinfantry,panzerandmotoriseddivisionsrespectively,atdifferentintensitiesofcombat
activity.Theydeployedmeteorologicaldatatoassessthesupplyrequirementsoftwohundred
divisionsfightingacrossa1,500-milefrontfor167days.Atwo-hundred-pagestudyoftheEastern
Frontproducedinthemidstofthe1942–43Stalingradbattlecorrectlyidentifiedtheinsuperable
logisticalproblemsfacingPaulus’sbeleagueredSixthArmy.
R&A’seconomicsub-division,headedbyEmileDespres,attheoutsetmademanyofthesame
mistakesastheBritish,supposingHitler ’sindustrialbasefullymobilisedin1941;throughoutthe
yearthatfollowed,OSScontinuedtounderestimateGermanproduction.Laterinthewaritdidbetter,
tearingupBritishintelligenceestimatesofGermanaircraftandtankproductioninfavourofitsown
‘deductiveproductivecurves’.OSSeconomistsrightlyjudgedthatmanpower,ratherthanoilorfood,
wouldprovethekeybottleneck.SvendLarsen,aneconomistofDanishorigin,decidedthatBritish
intelligenceestimatesofenemybattlecasualtiesweretoohigh.Hebegantoextrapolatefromthe
deathnoticesofofficersinGermany’spress–OSSinBernforwardedfifty-sevenGerman
newspapers–andLarsen’sestimateswereafterwardsfoundtohavebeenamazinglyaccurate.
MeanwhileR&Abecamefascinatedbythepossibilitiesoftabulatingvehicleserialnumbersto
computeGermanproduction.Afteroneofitsfieldresearcherscheckedeverywreckedpanzeronthe
Tunisianbattlefieldin1943,thedepartmentreported–correctly–thatwhileGermanproductionwas
lowerthanhadbeenthought,itwasstillincreasing.Therewasanin-housejokethatwhenanR&A
manwasaskedforaphonenumberhereplied,‘Don’tknow,butIcanestimateit.’
R&A’sjudgementwasleastimpressive,mostnaïve,abouttheprospectsforfutureWestern
relationswiththeSovietUnion,thoughthisisunsurprisingwhensomanyofitsleadinglightswere
communists.TheirreportsadoptedanalmostuniformlybenignviewofStalin’spolity.PaulSweezy
warnedthattheimperialisticBritishmightforceAmericaintoanunnecessaryconfrontationwith
Stalin.ThedepartmentpressedforUSpolicytodistanceitselffromthatofBritain.GeroidRobinson
cabledtheLondonOSSteamon20May1944,expressinghisconviction‘thateverythingpossible
shouldbedonetoavoidaclashofinterestsbetweentheBritishandtheAmericansontheonehand,
andtheRussiansontheother ’,thoughheadmitted:‘Itwillnotbeeasytodevelopaworking
compromisebetweenanexpandinganddynamicpower(theSovietUnion),adevelopingbut
essentiallysatisfiedpower(theUnitedStates),andapowerthatshowssymptomsofdecline(the
BritishEmpire).’HearguedthatitbehovedtheWesttoerronthesideofgenerosityinmaking
concessionstoStalin.GivenwisdomandenergyinLondonandWashington,hesaid,peacefulcoexistencewasattainable.
BeforeYalta,R&Aproducedareportassertingthatattheendofthewar‘Russiawillhaveneither
theresourcesnor,asfaraseconomicfactorsareconcerned,theinclinationtoembarkonadventurist
foreignpolicieswhich,intheopinionofSovietleaders,mightinvolvetheUSSRinaconflictora
criticalarmamentsracewiththeWesternPowers.’Theywerecorrect,however,inpredictingthatthe
USSRcould,ifitchose,pursueitspost-wareconomicandindustrialreconstructionwithoutneedfor
Americancash,whichtheStateDepartmentstillassumedwouldproveaninvincibleforcein
Washington’sdealingswithMoscow.R&AwasrightalsotoacknowledgetheneedfortheUStotreat
theUSSRasanequalinthenewworld.
R&AcamenearerthananyotherorganisationintheworldtofulfillingtheBritishnavalofficer
DonaldMcLachlan’svisionthatproperlyconductedintelligenceworkshouldbeascholarlyprocess.
Someofitsreportswerefanciful,butothersreflectedtheremarkablegiftsoftheirauthors.R&A
producedmaterialmoreimpressivethananythingissuedbyMI6,theAbwehror–sofarasweknow
–theNKVDandGRU.Unlessintelligenceservicesachieveextraordinaryaccesstothehighplacesof
enemiesorprospectiveenemies,asdidRichardSorge,inHughTrevor-Roper ’swords‘morecanbe
deducedfromanintelligentstudyofpublicsourcesthanbyanynumberof“reliable”butunintelligent
“agents”listeningatkeyholesorswappingdrinksatbars’.AsignificantpartofR&A’sachievement
wasitsexploitationofopensourcesalongside,andindeedmoreintensivelythan,secretones.
Howmuchdidthisterrificconcentrationofbrainpowerinfluencethewareffort?OSS’sreports
wereroutinelycirculatedacrosstheadministration.Unfortunately,however,andlikeallintelligence
material,fewofthemgotreadbydecision-makers.America’sgeneralsinthefieldwerechronically
scepticalaboutOSS-generateddata.OneofthecomplaintsaboutR&A’soutputwasthatoperations
staffsfoundithardtopersuadethescholarstoproducequickbriefsinrealtimeaboutissuesthat
commanderswereobligedtoaddresswithinhoursordays.Thedivision’sintellectualspreferred
insteadtolabourforweeksorevenmonthson‘big-picture’themes.BarryKatz,thehistorianof
R&A,acknowledgesthatitsactivitieshad‘atbestalimitedinfluenceontheprosecutionofthewar ’,
thoughheisconsoledbythereflectionthatitrepresented‘anindisputablybrilliantepisodeinthe
historyofideas,ofintellectuals,andofintelligence’.
TheBritishintelligencemachinebenefitedinthesecondhalfofthewarfromretainingaleavening
ofprofessionalsoldiersamongitsclevercivilians,whoimposedaminimumofdisciplineand
emphasisedoperationalimperatives.Theuniformedcontingentunderstoodhowtosecureanaudience
fortheirwaresamongthechiefsofstaffand–onthewhole–contributedsomecommonsensetothe
headydeliberationsoftheacademics.OSS’sR&Amighthavemademoreimpactonthewarhadit
pursuedthesamepersonnelpolicy,ratherthanleavingitseggheadstoploughtheirfurrowsin
isolationfromthearmedforces’hierarchy.
OneoftheNKVD’shighlyplacedAmericaninformants,identifiedonlyas‘Z’,reportedinlateJuly
1944:‘ThemainprincipleoftheentireOSSistheprincipleofamateurism…poorlytrained…the
CinderellaoftheAmericansecretservices…TheOSSowesitsexistenceonlytoGeneralDonovan’s
personalpopularityandnottoitswork.’Donovanandhisstationheadsoccasionallycaughtthe
attentionofAlliedwarlordswitharemark,signalorreport.Butnonationalleaderorchiefofstaff
hadtimeorinclinationroutinelytostudythecerebrationsofR&A,andmostofOSS’soutputwas
ignoredbyitsintendedconsumers.America’smilitaryleaders,liketheirBritishcounterparts,
focusedoverwhelminglyonenemywirelessinterceptsastheirprincipalsourceofintelligence,andit
ishardtoarguethattheywerewrongtodoso.
Nooneindividual,notevenRooseveltorMarshall,exercisedthesameauthorityovertheUSwar
effortasdidChurchillinBritain,andthustherewasnobodyinWashingtontoimposeoverarching
disciplineontheintelligencecommunity,tocurbtherivalryandindeedanimositybetweentheUS
ArmyandNavy,andtametheexcessesofDonovan’sorganisationinafashionthatmighthavehelped
ittosecuremorerespect.BecauseAmericaisamuchlargercountry,itsintellectualcommunityis
lessintimateandmorediffuse.Duringthewaryearsitscodebreakersrecordedextraordinary
achievements,buttheynevermobilisedanddeployedtheirnation’scivilianbrainsaseffectivelyas
BritainuseditsOxbridgevillages.
ThemindsetandconductofOSSreflectedthatofAmericaatlarge.Itsmenandwomenexudeda
confidenceunharrowedbythehorrorsofBlitzkriegandofdefeatssuchasRussia,Britainandmany
otherwartornnationshadknown.Theytookforgrantedawealthofresourcesnootherbelligerent
couldmatch.ArthurSchlesinger,oneofthemanyacademicsontheOSSpayroll,madethecasefor
itschief’sdefence:‘Donovanwasinhiseccentricwayaremarkableman,awinningcombinationof
charm,audacity,imagination,optimismandenergy–aboveallenergy.Hewasadisorderly
administratorandanimpetuouspolicymaker,racingfromheretotherewithideasandinitiativesand
thencheerfullymovingontosomethingelse…Hewasexasperatingbutadorable.’
StewartAlsopandThomasBraden,whoservedasfieldagents,declared,‘heranOSSlikea
countryeditor ’.MostofDonovan’sofficersreachedactivetheatresonlywhenthedarkestdaysofthe
conflictwereover,andvictorywasnotindoubt.Theirbeliefthatnothingwasimpossiblewasin
manywaysadmirable.ButtheirimpatiencewiththecautiousandscepticalBritishreflectedalackof
understandingofwhatChurchill’speoplehadbeenthrough,andoftheconstraintswhichBritain’s
relativepovertyimposedonitswar-making.Moreover,ifsomeofthepoliticaldifficultiesand
dilemmasidentifiedbytheBritishbecameexcusesforinertia,theOSS’slungesintoactionwerenot
infrequentlyill-judged.Theorganisation’smostimpressivecontributionwasthatofitseconomic
analysts,whodidbetterthananyoneelseintheAlliedcamp,BritishorAmerican,inprobingthe
realitiesandvulnerabilitiesofHitler ’swareconomy.By1945Donovan’smenhadlearnedalot.
BickhamSweet-EscottofSOEwrote:‘[OSS’s]bitterestdetractorswouldbeforcedtoadmitthatthey
hadbecomequiteasgoodastheBritishatgettingsecretintelligenceandcarryingoutspecial
operations,andIpersonallythoughttheyweredoingitbetter.’
Itiseasytolavishscepticism,evenscorn,ontheexcessesofbothAmericanandBritishwartime
specialforces,OSSandSOEforemostamongthem.TheGermansmadelittleuseofirregularunits,
thoughtheNazileadershipsometimesfantasisedaboutthem:Himmlerwassufficientlyimpressedby
Russia’spartisansthatin1942heorderedWalterSchellenbergtosetupasimilarorganisation,
codenamed‘Zeppelin’,whichtrainedanddispatchedreconnaissancegroupsbehindtheRussianlines,
thoughnottomuchpurpose.In1943theSSchiefinstructedSchellenbergtocontactafamouspre-war
mountaineer,MaxSchaefer,andinstructhimtoorganiseanewHimalayanexpedition,toinclude
agentswhocouldoperateinsideIndia.Inreality,however,onlytheBrandenburgRegimentandsuch
buccaneersastheSS’sOttoSkorzenycarriedoutsignificantspecialoperations;theWehrmacht
remainedinstitutionallyscepticalaboutthem.
YetitisinterestingtospeculateabouttheconsequenceshadtheGermansdonemoresooner,when
theyhadbothmeansandopportunities.IfBritainhadbeenraidedin1940–41,largeresourceswould
havehadtobedivertedtodomesticsecurity:theHomeGuard–‘Dad’sArmy’–wouldnothave
sufficed.AparatroopassaultonChurchill,mostplausiblyatChequers,couldhavepaidenormous
dividends.Likewise,afewU-boat-launchedcommandoraidsontheUnitedStates’sshorelinecould
havewreakedhavocandpanic,howeverslightthematerialdamagetheyinflicted.TheAllied
approachtosecretwarmayoftenhavebeenwastefulandmisguided,butitwasmoreimaginativethan
thatoftheWehrmacht,anddeliveredsomerealsuccesses,especiallyduringthelongyearsbeforeDDayinJune1944,whenonlyrelativelysmallBritishandAmericangroundforceswereengagingthe
Axis.AsWinstonChurchillbrilliantlyunderstood,specialoperationssustainedasenseofmomentum
inthewareffortwhichwaspartlyspurious,butmorallyimportant.TheactivitiesofSOE,OSSand
thearmedforces’‘privatearmies’consumedextravagantresourcesandsometimesdegeneratedinto
juveniletheatricals.Buttheymadeapropagandacontributionlargerandmoreusefulthantheir
militaryone.
3 A LLEN D ULLES : TA LK I NGTO GER M A NS
OneAmericangainedmorepersonalcreditfromthesecretwarthananyother.AllenDulles,‘Mr
Burns’,OSScodenumber110,afuturechiefoftheCIA,washailedin1945asthenearestthingtoa
masterspyhisnationhadproduced.HewasaNewYorker,sonofaliberalPresbyterianministerwith
influentialfamilyconnectionsinWashington,whoattendedPrincetonandtravelledwidelyinEurope,
includingadiplomaticpostinginSwitzerland.HeservedwiththeUSdelegationtothe1919Versailles
peaceconference,andthereafterspentsomeyearsattheStateDepartmentbeforetakingupacareeras
acorporateandinternational-relationslawyer.InthatrolehemetpoliticiansincludingNeville
Chamberlain,RamsayMacDonald,LéonBlum–andAdolfHitler.Aprominentinterventionistlong
beforePearlHarbor,forsomemonthsin1941–42heservedasNewYorkbureauchiefoftheCOI,
forerunnerofOSS,locatedintheRockefellerCenteralongside‘LittleBill’Stephenson’sBritish
SecurityCoordination.
InNovember1942DonovanpostedDulles,thenagedforty-nine,tobecomeOSS’smaninBern,
underdiplomaticcoverasspecialassistanttotheUSminister,LelandHarrison.Heacceptedno
salary,butreceived$1,000amonthinexpensestosustainamodestlyluxuriouslifestyle.Hiswife
Cloverstayedathome,probablynogreatsorrowtotheembryospymaster,whoseinfidelitieswere
manyandvarious:inSwitzerlandheformedacloserelationshipwithCountessWallyToscanini,wife
ofanItalianpoliticianwhospentthewarthere,supposedlyengagedonreliefwork.
Dulleswasasmartman,whosebenign,avuncular,pipe-smokingmannerinspiredconfidence.He
establishedhimselfinaflatat23Herrengrasse,assistedbyGerovonGaevernitz,aresidentGerman
businessmanwithaUSpassport.UntiltheAugust1944liberationofFrance,theOSSstaffin
Switzerlandwasrestrictedtofiveofficersandtwelvecipherenesandsecretaries,becauseofthe
logisticalproblemsoftransportingAmericansintothelandlockedcountry.Beyondorder-of-battle
reports,adominantthemeinDulles’cablestoWashingtonwasfunding.GettingcashintoBernwas
complicated,andtheOSSteamspentplenty:by1944,thestationhadfortyinformantsongenerous
salaries.DullescomplainedbitterlyabouttheshortageofcredibleSwisssources,claimingthathehad
topaythepriceofbeingaJohnny-come-lately;between1939and1942otherAlliedsecretservices
hadsweptupalltheavailablelocalinformants–indeedmany,includingRudolfRössler,multi-tasked
forseveralnations.TheOSSstationchiefhadmanyAmericanfriendsincommonwithFrederick
‘Fanny’vandenHeuvel,hisMI6counterpart,buttheirrelationshipwascharacterisedbyrivalryrather
thancollaboration.
Dullesbecameanimportantsemi-overtdiplomaticfigure,ratherthanamanoftheshadowslike
AlexanderRadó.Hewasahigh-profileAmerican,readilyaccessibletoinfluentialGermans.Itwas
evidenttoallthosewithaneyetothefuturethattheUnitedStateswouldbearbitratingthis,and
rumourassertedthatDulleswasasecretrepresentativeoftheWhiteHouse.Farfromhimneeding
painstakinglytobuildnetworksofinformants,everybodywhoknewanything–togetherwitha
generousquotaoffraudsterswhopretendedto–beatapathtohisdoor.Hebecamefriendlywith
RogerMasson,theSwissintelligencechief,andmetHansHausamann,founderoftheBuroHa,atthe
homeofZürichpublisherEmilOprecht.HeheldconversationswithMajorMaxWaibel,whoran
Swissintelligence’sLucernestation,thoughWaibeldidnotdisclosehis‘Viking’intelligencelineinto
Germany.AnintermediaryactingonbehalfofWalterSchellenbergalsoconductedaninconclusive
dalliancewiththeAmerican.Allthepartiesexchangedagooddealofinformation,theusualblendof
truthandfalsehood.
Dulleswasnothinglikeatraditionalofficerofanynation’ssecretservice;hehadambitionsforhis
ownrole,farbeyondmereespionage.NealPetersen,editoroftheDullespapers,haswritten:‘Hewas
notjustasemi-autonomousintelligenceproconsulwithintheOSS,butawould-begrandstrategistfor
theWest.’ItisworthconsideringDulles’reportsinsomedetail,becausetheyvividlyillustratethe
virtuesandvicesofAmerica’smostprominentoverseasintelligenceofficer.Herecognisedfromthe
outsetthatnobodyinWashingtonhadacoherentvisionofhowEuropeshouldemergefromthewar,
andhimselfsetaboutfillingthatvacuum.InDecember1942hewastoutingCountCarloSforzaas
Italy’smostrespectednon-fascistpolitician,andurgingthattheAlliesshouldfeedunrestinthat
countryratherthaninvadeit,withtheprospectoffightingacampaign‘againstaunitedGermanand
Italianmilitaryopposition’.TotheveryendofthewarhearguedagainsttheAlliedpolicyof
insistenceuponunconditionalsurrender:‘WhateverourfinalpolicytowardsGermany,weshould
todaytrytoconvincetheGermanpeoplethatthereishopeforthemindefeat,thattheinnocentwillbe
protected,whilethepunishmentoftheguiltywillbethroughlegalprocess.’
ManyofDulles’dispatchesreadlikethereportsofanewspaperforeigncorrespondent,suchasone
of14December1942:‘ItalyisfullofGermantroops,andtotalestimatedstrengthisbetween150and
200thousand…Naples:EveryonecriticizesMussolini.Thereisunbelievableconfusion.Itis
importanttonotethatpeopleunderstandthatbombingraidsarenecessary.Rome:Governmentoffices
areallgoingtoFrosinone,Avezzano,Chaeti,AguilaandRieti;andhotelsarebeingrequisitionedfor
warpurposes…Pistoia:mainconnectionbetweenBolognaandFlorence…railroadbridges.Novi
Ligure:twoimportantrailroadbridges.Verona:shouldbebombedimmediatelysinceitisan
extremelyimportantrailroadcenter…Modena:AttheendofJanuaryaspecialschoolforflamethrowingunitswillgraduate780candidatesaslieutenants.’
DullesprovidedanongoingstreamofreportsabouttheGermandomesticopposition–‘the
Breakers’,ashecalledthem–whosespokesmenvisitedhimwithafrequencythatsuggested
remarkablecarelessnessabouttheirownsecurity.TheforemostofthesewastheenormousHans
Gisevius,theAbwehr ’sZürichagent,whomtheOSSmandubbed‘Tiny’.Dulles’cookreportedthese
visitstotheGermanembassy,butuntilFebruary1944GiseviuswasabletocoverhimselfinBerlinby
assertingthathemettheAmericanonCanaris’sinstructions.Amongmuchelse,heprovidedalistof
allegedlytrustworthyanti-Naziswhomightserveinapost-warGermangovernment.Dulleseagerly
forwardedthistoWashington,andcabledinJanuary1943:‘Iamoftheimpressionthatthisisthe
momentforadriveofvigortoeffectaseparationoftheNazisandHitlerfromthebalanceofthe
Germanpeople,andholdoutatthesametimehopetotheGermanpeoplethatsurrenderontheirpart
doesnotmeanthatdestructionwillbefalltheindividualandthestate.’On3Februaryhedescribeda
meetingwith‘theprominentpsychologistProfessorCGJung’:‘hisopinionsonthereactionsof
Germanleaders,especiallyHitlerinviewofhispsychopathiccharacteristics,shouldnotbe
disregarded’.
Hedispatchedmanyreportsonenemysecretweapons,notallfanciful,fortheyhadbeensupplied
byhisGermanvisitors:robottanks;‘offensivepreparationsforwarfarebygas.Therearenow
availableinquantities,large-calibregasbombs’;testflightsoffleetsofflying-boatsdesignedtobe
crashedonLondonladenwithexplosives.On8August1943heannouncedthat‘Gotham,andother
pointsonourAtlanticseaboard,willbesubjectedtobombingbyplanesthatarenowbeinginstalled
inseveralU-boats.’On25April1944hesuggestedthat‘inParisdogsarebeingrequisitionedinlarge
numbers’,andthatGermanandJapanesescientistswereexploringbiologicalwarfare.On2May
DullesreportedtheGermansexperimentingwithaweapontofreezetheatmosphereto250degrees
belowzerobytubesconnectedtotheundersidesoftheirfighters,whichwouldthenflyoverAllied
bombersandprecipitateicing.‘TheNazisregardtheresultsasdefinitive.’
FritzKolbe,aminordiplomatbornin1900whowasservingasaGermanForeignOfficecourier,
arrivedinBernduringthesummerof1943withabriefcasebulgingwithsecretdocuments,whichhe
initiallyofferedtotheBritish.MorbidfearsabouttraffickingwithsupposedlydisaffectedGermans–
memoriesofVenlo–causedMI6torebuffhim.HeturnedinsteadtoDulles,whowelcomedhimwith
openarmsandgavehimasourcecodenameas‘GeorgeWood’.Thereafter,thecouriersmuggled
morethan1,600classifieddocumentstotheAmericans,includinginformationonthelocationsofV1andV-2plants;about‘Cicero’s’raidsonthebriefcaseoftheBritishambassadorinAnkara;
genocideinHungary;togetherwithamoundofJapanesematerial.TheBritish,andespeciallyClaude
Dansey,continuedtoinsistthatKolbewasadoubleagent.Intruth,hewasmerelyadrabcivilservant
whoattractedlittlenoticefromhismasters,butwasmotivatedtodefyandbetraythembyaprofound
decency.
DulleswasunlovedbyMI6,whosechiefsclaimedthathe‘lendshimselfeasilytoanystriking
proposalwhichlookslikenotoriety’.DanseyincludedtheOSS’sBernchiefinabroaderdismissal:
‘Americanseverywhere“swalloweasilyandarenotcritical”.’BothBroadwayandHansGisevius
alertedDullesthatsomeUScodeswerecompromised,thoughtheAmericanswereslowtoheedthe
warningandchangethem.DanseywasentirelywronginquestioningtheauthenticityofGiseviusand
Kolbeassources,buthewasjustifiedinsuggestingthatDulleswasnaïve,especiallyaboutthe
GermanResistance.ThoughitsmembersopposedtheNazis,mostwereconservativesandnationalists
whocherishedextraordinarydelusionsthatinanegotiationwiththeAlliesfollowingthefallofthe
regimetheymightsuccessfullyupholdGermany’sclaimsontheswollenfrontiersHitlerhadseized.
DullestoldWashingtonlittleaboutthegrotesqueSwissprofiteeringfromtheconflict,notablyby
traffickingwiththeNazisforashareofthespoilsoftheslaughterofEurope’sJews.Hemusthave
knownsomethingatleastaboutthis,butwasprobablyreluctanttoexposedirtylinenthatmight
threatenhisamicablerelationshipwiththeSwissauthoritiesandthesecurityofhisbaseofoperations
–neitherMI6northeOSSstationeverincurredthesortofharassmentbyRogerMasson’s
intelligenceservicethatfellupontheSoviet‘Lucy’Ring.
TheAmericanhadplentytosayaboutGermansecretweapons,whichconfirmedreportsreaching
theWesternAlliesfromothersources.On24June1943hesentareasonablyaccuratereporton
Germanrocket-testingatPeenemünde,sayingthatquantityproductionwasexpectedtobeginin
SeptemberorOctober,withlargermodelsatanexperimentalstage.Healsomentionedlong-range
giantcannon,butsaidthathelackedthetechnicalknowledgetoevaluatetheirpotential.On9
September1943hewarnedthatthe‘rocketbombshouldbetakenveryseriously’,andinDecember
identified‘Professor[Wernervon]Braun’asakeyfigureinitsevolution.On10Decemberhe
reportedworkonnewadvancedGermansubmarinesfittedwithSchnorkelunderwaterbreathing
devices.HeprovidedinformationontheGermannuclearresearchprogramme,thoughhecouldnot
offeranycluestotheonlyquestionthatmattered:howclosewereHitler ’sscientiststobuildinga
Bomb?
AsfortheplightofEurope’sJews,on10March1943DullestoldWashingtonthatthusfarinthe
year,15,000GermanJewshadbeenarrested.On12JunehedescribedHitler ’sangertowardsthe
BudapestregimefordecliningtohandoverHungary’sJewishminority.Ingeneral,however,neither
fromBernnorfromotherAlliedintelligencesourceswastherewasmuchtrafficaboutthe
Holocaust,eveninthelatterstagesofthewar.Thisreflectednotaconspiracyofsilence,butrathera
pervasiveconsciousnessthattheNaziswerekillinglargenumbersofpeoplealloveroccupied
Europe–Poles,Greeks,French,Russianprisoners,Yugoslavs,Italians–togetherwithafailureto
recognisethatthescaleandnatureoftheJewishgenocidetranscendedallothermanifestationsof
massmurder.Alliedintelligence-gatherersfocusedoverwhelminglyontransmittingandanalysing
informationthatseemedrelevanttowinningthewar,ratherthantoilluminatingtheplightofHitler ’s
victims.
On12June1943,DullesforwardedtoWashingtonabrieffromGiseviusaboutHitler ’spersonal
dominanceofmilitaryoperations;thefactthattheStalingraddisasterderivedfromtheFührer ’s
acceptanceofGöring’sassurancethathecouldsupplythegarrisonbyair;thatBerlin’sdecisionto
reinforceNorthAfricareflecteddefianceofhisgenerals’advice.DullesdescribedKlugeand
MansteinastheablestGermancommanders,butsaidthatneithertheynoranyoftheirpeershadthe
couragetoresisttheFührer ’swill.ThiswasusefulandreasonablyaccuratebackgroundforUS
strategy-makers.
AlltheintelligencereachingAlliedcommandersbeforetheAnglo-AmericanlandingsinSicilyon
9July1943andatSalernoon3SeptemberconfirmedHitler ’sintentiontoabandonsouthernItaly.On
7JulyDullescabledfromBern,reportinghisGermaninformants’viewthatBerlinintendedtotreat
theItalianpeopleruthlessly,butthattheWehrmachtwouldoffernoseriousresistanceinthesouth,
stakingeverythingonadefenceofthePovalley.On29Julyhewentfurther,saying,‘Wehavereports
thatsouthernItalyisbeingvacatedbyNazitroops’–thesamemessageaswasreachingthejoint
chiefsofstaffthroughUltra.TheyhadnomeansofguessingthatHitlerwouldchangehismindwhen
Kesselring,aftertanglingwiththeAnglo-AmericanarmiesatSalerno,reportedthathewasconfident
ofbeingabletocontaintheminthesouthformanymonths.
ThedominantthemeofDulles’reportingtoWashingtonforthelasttwoyearsofthewarwasthatif
theUSthrewitssupportbehindtheGermanoppositionmovement,Hitlercouldbeoverthrownanda
peacenegotiatedwithanewmoderateregime.On23August1943hesentanemotionalmessage
suggestingthatthedomesticmoodinGermanyhadbecomedesperate:‘Therearenopolitically
strongGeneralsinview,butFalkenhausenandRundstedtarebothknowntobeanti-Nazis.Göringis
ineclipseandrumorinBerlinhasitthathemadeanattempttogettoSweden.BormannandHimmler
areincontroversy.’Nextday,hewaxedevenmoreoptimistic:‘anythingmighthappeninGermany…
Ifwekeepapplyingpressure[Hitler ’soverthrow]mostlikelywillhappenbeforetheendoftheyear.’
On19Augusthepleaded:‘CanwenotdosomethingduringoraftertheQuebec[Roosevelt–Churchill
summit]conferenceinthewayofappealingtothemassesintheAxiscountries?…Ifwetake
concertedmeasuresinboththepsychologicalandmilitaryfieldsofwarfare,wecancrackGermany
andendthewarthisyear.’
Formonths,WashingtonremainedscepticalaboutAllenDulles’materialfromFritzKolbe,which
seemedtoogoodtobetrue.TheOSSmanwascorrecttoemphasisethatonlytheGermanarmyhad
thepowertoremoveHitler,andthatfearoftheSovietsdominatedallGermanperceptions,reporting
on6December1943:‘ItispossiblydifficultforyouinWashingtontorealizetheextentofthereal
apprehensionofRussiainthispartoftheworld.’Muchofhisinformationaboutthetensionsand
powershiftswithintheNazihierarchywasaccurate,forinstanceaNovember1943reportthat
Himmlernolongerthoughtthewarmilitarilywinnable,andthatSpeerwasnoweconomicsupremo.
InJanuary1944hebegantotellWashingtonaboutGermanResistancegroups’hopesofkillingHitler.
Forthemostpart,BernOSS’spoliticalreportingaboutconditionsinGermanywasreasonably
sound,butDullesrevealedashakygraspofmilitarymatters–scarcelysurprisinginalawyer.Like
manyothersecretwarriors,hewildlyoverratedthecapacityofguerrillamovements,andespecially
oftheFrenchResistance,tomakeastrategiccontributiontotheadvanceoftheAlliedarmies,though
hewascorrectinhisbittercriticismsoftheRooseveltadministrationforrejectingdeGaulleasthe
legitimatestandard-bearerofFreeFrance.
InthelaterwaryearstherewassurelyastrandofenvyintheattitudeofMI6andSOE,whichwere
facedwiththeembarrassmentthatahostofEuropeansofallpoliticalhueswhowerepeddling
informationorstrivingforinfluencesoughtoutDulles,nowthelocalAmericangrandee,in
preferencetoBritishagents.HecabledWashingtonon30July1944,deploringBritishattemptsto
claimownershipofFrenchandItalianpartisans:‘AmsorrytostatethattheBernZulu-SOEChief’s
generalattitudeistotrytomonopolizerelationswithResistance.’Hedevotedmucheffortto
compilinganddispatchingmaterialontheWehrmacht’sorderofbattle,thoughthiswasfarless
accurateandcomprehensivethanwasderivedfromUltra.OnoneoccasionhereportedTirpitzsetto
sailinninedays,thoughthegiantbattleshipwasthenunfitforsea.On29April1944heurged
parachutingOSSagents,armsandequipmentintoPoWcamps,toempowertheirinmatestorise:‘A
fewsuchoutbreaksbyprisonerswouldhaveagravepsychologicaleffectinGermany.’Herewasan
exampleofthesortofsillinessthatsometimesovertookOSSandSOE–implementationofsucha
planwouldhaveprovokedwholesaleNazimassacresofAlliedPoWs,fornomilitaryadvantage
whatever.
On19February1944,Dullessentalongdispatchoncemoreurgingtheimportanceofbuilding
foundationsforadefeatedGermany:‘Theonlyrealquestiontodayiswhetherconstructive
regeneratingforceswillcontrolanddirectthefateofEurope,orwhetherforcesofdisintegrationand
anarchywillprevail.’HeurgedthattheWesternAlliesshouldimmediatelyembarkonacollaboration
withtheGermanResistancetocreatealeft-of-centreBerlingovernment-in-waitingthatoffereda
crediblealternativetocommunism.Theflawinallthiswasthatitignoredtoweringrealitiesonthe
ground:theRussianswerestormingwestwards,anddoingmostofthehardfightingtodestroy
Nazism.ThepolicyadoptedbytheBritishandAmericangovernments,offocusingonmilitary
victoryfollowedbyanoccupationofGermany,wastheonlyrealisticcoursewhenanypolitical
designembracingGermanfactionsmustopenadisastrousbreachwithMoscow.
On7April1944DullesreportedthattheGermanopposition,ledbyGen.LudwigBeck,wasready
tomoveagainstHitler.Headdedtendayslater:‘IdonotbelievethatanyableNazimilitaryofficials
arepreparedasyettothrowopenthewesternfronttous.Idobelieve,however,thatthecollapseof
Germanymightfollowaveryfewmonthsafterwards,ifwecouldgetasolidtoeholdintheWest.’He
constantlypleadedwithWashingtontoauthorisehimtoofferpoliticalincentivestoanti-Hitler
Germans–andwasrebuffed.On10July1944,tendaysbeforeStauffenberg’sbombexploded,he
reportedbyradiophonetoWashington:‘Arevolution[insideGermany]isnottobeexpected;the
peoplearetooapatheticandtoocloselysupervisedbythepolice.Acollapsecanonlycomeasthe
Alliedtroopsarrive.Further,noBadogliodevelopmentislikelyhere.Theoppositionmovementsare
notinanypositiontotakesuchastep.’Threedayslater,however,hebelatedlywarnedWashington
thatsomebigGermandevelopmentmightbelooming,though‘Iamnotmakinganyforecastsof
success’.
InthesamemonthhespeculatedaboutwhetherthepassivityoftheU-boatfleetindicatedthatitwas
beingheldinreadinesstoevacuatetheNazileadershiptoJapan.On9AugustheclaimedthatGen.
StülpnagelinParishadattemptedsuicide.HereportedrealisticallyonthemoodinsideGermany
followingthefailureoftheHitlerbombplot,sayingon19AugustthatGermansweretoo
preoccupiedwithcopingwiththemiseriesandprivationsofdailylifetobecomepoliticallyinterested
ortoconcernthemselveswithanythingmuchbeyondtheirpersonalhorizons.Hewrotelikewiseof
theirattitudetoAlliedairbombardment:‘Theirreactiontotherepeatedraidsisratherlikethatofan
injuredanimalheldatbaywithoutanyobviousmeansofescape…TheGermanscanseenowayout
excepttocontinuethebattle.’
Hereportedon18January1945:‘NorwayandItalymaywellbethefirsttheatersfromwhich
German[troop]withdrawalsstart.’HewasanenthusiasticbelieverinaNazilast-ditch‘redoubt’in
southernGermanyinthespringof1945,andwaslessthanperceptivewhenhereportedina
radiophonedispatchon21March1945:‘TheRussiansaretreatingtheGermansintheoccupied
territoryonthewholeveryfairly…TheGermansfeelthattheRussiansaremakingasuccessoftheir
occupation,andthereisagrowingfeelingthattheywillmakeagreatersuccessthantheEnglishand
Americanswilloftheirs.’DullesledtheUScrusadeforAustriaanditspeopletobetreatedasHitler ’s
victimsratherthanaccomplices,whichhelpstoexplainwhymostofAustria’smanywarcriminals
escapedindictment.
IndefenceofDulles,hegotnomorewrongthandidmostintelligenceofficersofallnationalities.
Heprovidedausefulconduitforanti-NaziGermanstocommunicatewithWashington,evenifthe
exchangesdidthemnopracticalgood.Perhapsthemostsignificantconsequenceofhiscontactswith
theResistancewastofuelSovietparanoiaaboutthepossibilitythattheWesternAllieswouldmakea
secretpeacewithGermany.TheRussians’Americanagentsinhighplaceskeptthemapprisedof
Dulles’contactswithGermans–andofsomemeetingsthatwereproductsofthetraitors’over-fertile
imaginations.On14June1944,forinstance,theWashingtonNKVDstationreportedtoMoscowthat
DulleshadtoldtheStateDepartmentofapersonalvisittohimselfinBernbyGen.Waltervon
BrauchitschoftheGermangeneralstaff,offeringpeacetermsonbehalfoftheWehrmachton
conditionthatnoSoviettroopsshouldenterGermanterritory.CordellHull,theUSsecretaryofstate,
hadrespondedtoDullesthat‘theAmericansarenotgoingtoconductanynegotiationswiththe
Germanswithoutotherallies’.ThesamesignalalsodescribedDullesreceivingoverturesfrom
prominentGermanswhoofferedtoevacuateWesternAllied-occupiedterritories,iftheywereleft
freetocontinuethewaragainsttheUSSR.
TherecordsuggeststhatDulles’emergencefromthewarasasupposedprinceamongspieswas
undeserved.Hegotsomethingsright,becauseinformedGermansapproachedhim,asaprominent
andaccessibleAmerican,ratherthanbecauseheperformedanynotablefeatofagentrecruitment,or
displayednotablejudgementasananalyst.Gooddiplomaticreportingoftenachievedasmuchas,or
morethan,spiesintheenemy’scamp.PavelSudoplatovwrote:‘Some80percentofintelligence
informationonpoliticalmatterscomesnotfromagentsbutfromconfidentialcontacts.’Theseare
morelikelytobemadeinembassiesorchancelleriesthanatsecretrendezvousonstreetcorners,and
itisinterestingtocomparethetoneofDulles’reportingwithsomeofthedispatchesfromAllied
ambassadorsinneutralcapitals.On30November1942,forinstance,theBritishambassadorin
StockholmwrotetoLondon,reportingaconversationwithawell-connectedSwedewhohadjust
returnedfromBerlin.OneofMoscow’smeninWhitehall,probablyDonaldMaclean,obligingly
passedthistotheNKVD,sothatitwasalsoreadbyBeria.
SirVictorMallet,theambassador,assertedthatallimportantGermanstrategicdecisionswerenow
beingmadebyHitler,oftenagainstthestrongopinionofthearmy’sgeneralstaff.Opponentsofthe
regimewithinthearmy‘couldundercertaincircumstancesbecomeleaderofanuprising’,but
HimmlerandtheSSwereimmenselystrongand‘verydangerous’.IntheviewofMallet’sinformant,
alongseriesofmajormilitarydefeatswouldberequiredbeforetheNaziregimebecamevulnerable.
IntelligentGermanswerethoroughlyawarethattheWehrmachtfacedacrisisontheEasternFront(at
Stalingrad):‘CiviliansinBerlincanimaginethehorrorsoftheRussianmassacresinGermanyif
Germanylosesthewar.ItisthesefearsmorethananythingelsethatrestrainoppositiontotheNazis
fromactivedemarches…Militaryandcivilianleadersoftheoppositionfullyrealizethatanytruce
betweentheAlliesandHitleroranyonefromhiscliqueisimpossible.’
ThiswasasoundassessmentofthemoodinsideGermany,writtenbyanaccrediteddiplomat,andit
ishardtoimaginehowanysecretagentorsignaldecryptcouldhaveimproveduponit.Mallet’s
remarkscloselymatchedthoseoftheOSSfromBern.AllenDullescouldhavefunctionedjustas
effectivelyhadhebeenUSambassador–hisprincipalsourceonHungary,forinstance,wasnospy
butinsteadthelocalHungarianminister,BaronBakách-Bessenyey.TheOSSstationchiefwasa
cleverNewYorklawyerwithlessunderstandingofinternationalaffairs,intelligence,war-makingor
Europethanhesupposed.ItwasfortunatethattheadministrationinWashingtonignoredhispleasthat
itshouldnegotiatewiththeGermanopposition:therewaspatheticallylittleofthis,anditspolitical
expectationswereentirelyatoddswithreality.IftheAmericanshadopenedbilateraltalkswith
Germansofanyhue,theRussianswouldhavebecomeevenmoreimpossibletodealwiththanthey
werealready.Asitwas,theywhippedupastormwhenwithoutSovietconsentDullesarrangedterms
forthesurrenderofGermantroopsinItalywithLt.Gen.KarlWolffon2May1945,threedays
beforethegeneralcapitulation.Perhapsthemostremarkableaspectofthosenegotiationswasthat
DulleswasabletoplaceanuncommonlycourageousOSSwireless-operator–aCzechnamedVáclav
Hradecký,‘LittleWally’–inWolff’snorthItalianheadquarters,fromwhichhetransmittedtoBern
forseveralweeks,andlivedtotellthetale.
AftercompletinganexhaustivestudyoftheOSSwartimereportsfromBern,NealPetersenwrote:
‘Oneishard-pressedtoidentifyasingleexampleofaDullesreportofitselfhavingdirectimpactona
top-levelpolicydecision.’LikesomuchotherOSSmaterial,mostofDulles’dispatchesdisappeared
intothemawofwartimeWashingtonbureaucracy,withoutchangingheartsandmindseitheramong
theUSchiefsofstafforattheWhiteHouse–whichwere,likeWinstonChurchill,muchmore
receptivetotheirdailydoseofUltra.
12
Russia’sPartisans:TerrorisingBothSides
On3July1941,Stalin’sfirstbroadcastappealtotheSovietpeoplesechoedChurchill’searlierclarion
callstotheoccupiednationsofEurope:‘Conditionsmustbemadeunbearablefortheenemyandhis
collaborators;theymustbepursuedandannihilatedwherevertheyare.’Whatfollowedacrossvast
tractsoftheSovietempireinthenextthreeyearsbecamepartoftheheroiclegendofRussia’swar,a
taleofitspeoplesunitedinresistingthebarbarousinvader.Contemporaryevidencenowavailable,
however,tellsamorecomplicatedstory.From1943onwards,guerrillaoperationsinfluencedthe
struggleontheEasternFrontmoresignificantlythananyothertheatreofwar.Partisanscouldoperate
morereadilyinRussia’sforests,mountainsandsuchwildernessesasthePripyatmarshes,thanacross
mostofWesternEurope.Stalinsufferednobourgeoissqueamishnessaboutcasualties,norabout
collateraldamagetocivilians.Thetestimonyofmanywartimepartisansshowsthattheyconducted
dualcampaignsofterror:againsttheAxis,andalsoagainstmillionsoftheirownpeoplewhofelt
neitherloyaltytoStalin’spolity,norwillingnesstoriskalltorestoreit.Inthis,asinsomuchelse,the
struggleintheEastattainedanextraordinaryferocity,andtheparticipantssufferedexperiencesfar
bloodierthanthoseofWesternEurope.
Intheearlywaryears,Stalin’spartisansfacedthesamedifficultiesastheircounterpartselsewhere:
theylackedorganisation,arms,supplyaircraftandwirelesses.PavelSudoplatovclaimedinhis
memoirsthattheNKVDhadmadeelaboratepreparationsforstay-behindoperationsinthewakeof
Germanadvances.Thisisfalse.Inthe1930s,Stalinhaddismantledtheentireexistingnetworkof
partisanbasesandcadresacrossthecountry,asathreattohisownauthority.Manyveteranguerrilla
leadersofthecivilwarwereshotinthePurges.Throughoutthelatermonthsof1941Sudoplatovand
hiscomradeswereobligedtostriveandscrabbletoimproviseintelligence-gatheringandpartisan
groups.Theirearlyoperationswereshambolic,costly,futile.Almostallthemenconscriptedwere
untrained,andmanywerealsounwilling.Theywereoftendeployedinregions–notablyUkraine–
whoseinhabitantshadcelebratedliberationbytheGermansfromStalin’shatedtyranny.Partisans
wereregardedbylocalpeopleasMoscow’screaturesratherthanaspatriots,asthreatstotheirhomes
andcompetitorsfordesperatelyscarcefood.Moreover,untilStalingradtheGermanswereseenas
winners,theSovietsaslosers.IntheBalticstates,duringthemonthsbefore‘Barbarossa’Beriahad
conductedpurgesinwhichtensofthousandsofpeoplewereexecutedorshippedtothegulag,which
explainswhysomanyLithuanians,EstoniansandLettsgarlandedthemenoftheWehrmacht.While
Britain’sSOEmadenoattempttostimulatefull-scalerevoltinoccupiedEuropebetween1940and
1944,inthedesperatecircumstancesofembattledRussiathousandsofmenwerethrustinto
operationsintheimmediatewakeof‘Barbarossa’.Russiawaspayingsodreadfulaforfeitthatthe
partisans’murderouslossesvanishedunnoticedintothegreatcauldronofbloodsetbubblingby
HitlerandStalin.
Guerrillascanonlyswiminaseaoflocalsympathisers,toparaphraseMaoZhedong.InUkraine,
focusofMoscow’sfirstclumsyeffortstopromoteguerrillawar,therewerefewsuchpeople.The
localCommunistParty’ssecretaryreceivedareportfromCommissarVasilySergienko,detailing
partisanoperationsinthefirstyearofwaronSovietsoil.TheNKVD,thisstated,claimedtohave
established1,874groups,withatotalstrengthof29,307;ithaddispatched776agentsandcouriersto
workwiththesebands.Yeton1May1942MoscowCentreacknowledgedjustthirty-sevengroupsas
operationalinUkraine,withacombinedstrengthof1,918men.Whathadhappenedtotherest?Some
surrenderedtotheGermansatthefirstopportunity,whileotherswerecapturedorkilled.Many
simplyfadedbackintolocalcommunities,abandoningtheirmissions.Therewasnocoordination
betweenrivalPartybodiesandintelligenceorganisations,eachofwhichcreateditsownlocalforces.
Sergienkocomplainedinhis1942report:‘Responsibilityforinfiltratingpartisangroupsthroughthe
enemy’sfrontisoftenentrustedtopeoplewhohaveabsolutelynoexperience…Partisangroupsare
givencontradictoryinstructionsandtasks.’
TheNKVDandGRUstruggledtogainaccesstoscarceaircraft.Mattersbegantoimproveonlyin
May1942,whenacentralstaffforallpartisanoperationswascreated,followedsoonafterwardsbya
partisanair-transportorganisation,bothunderdirectPartycontrol.NKVDcellswereattachedtoall
thegroups,mostofwhichnumberedbetweenfiftyandahundredmen.Armsandsuppliesremained
chronicallyshort.TheworstthatGen.FranzHalder,Hitler ’scommanderintheEast,couldsayabout
partisansin1942wasthattheyconstituted‘ratheranuisance’.Onlyintwoareasofnorth-eastern
Ukrainewereguerrillasthenoperatingeffectively,andevenlaterinthewarthesurvivalofsuch
bandsdemandedforestbases,wheretheGermansstruggledtolocateanddestroythem.
Theleaderofonegroup,acomradenamedKovpak,dispatchedtoUkrainiancommissarNikita
Khrushchevon5May1942areport,countersignedbyhisownband’scommissar,whichasserted
baldlythatcivilians‘weredemoralizedbytheretreatoftheRedArmyandtheGermanreignof
terror,whilecertainstrataofthepopulationandanumberofUkrainianvillageswerehappyaboutthe
arrivalofoccupationtroopsandhostiletowardspartisansandtheSovietregime’.On21August1941
MikhailovKartashev,anNKVDagentinKiev,wrotetoSudoplatovinMoscow,paintingableak
pictureofthechaosofpartisanoperations:‘DearPavelAnatolievich!Thisletterisaprivateonesince
theissuesbelowarenotwithinmydirectcompetence.Idon’ttakepartintheoperationofourorgans
inKiev…AlltheinformationbelowhasbeenobtainedwithoutreferencetoofficialsofthePeople’s
Commissariat,andisthusstrictlytruthful…Itishardtosaywhoisperformingworst,butitisclear
thattheworkofourorganisationsislessthanbrilliant.’Kartashevwentontodescribethefateofone
150-stronggroupestablishedinKharkov,whichwasorderedtocrossthefrontinBessarabia.Itsmen
setforthwithoutguidesormaps,dressedinciviliancityclothes,carryingonlypistolsorrifles,and
enoughofthosetoarmjusthalftheband.Theyhadnoorders,noradios,nopasswordsbywhichto
re-enterSoviet-heldterritory.Likemostsuchparties,theywereneverheardfromagain.Kartashev
continued:‘informationaboutthefateofpartisangroupsonlybecomesavailableifsurvivorsmakeit
backthroughthelines’.Theylackedbriefingsaboutenemydeployments:‘Youhaveprobablyread
reportsaboutinstanceswherepartisansattemptingtocrossthelinewere“drivenback”.Thisphraseis
inherentlyfalsebecausethereisnocontinuousfront,onlyGermanconcentrations,andofcourse
line-crossersbumpintothemiftheyhavenoideawheretheyare.’
Therewasablack-comicepisodeofthissortwhenacertainSergeantBondarenkowasguidinga
partyintruckstoarendezvouswhereitsmenweretodismountandcrosstheenemylinesonfoot.A
RedArmysentrywaveddowntheconvoytowarnthatonlyGermanslayinfront–andwasignored.
Thepartisansdroveblithelyonuntiltheymetahailoffire,whichkilledtheircommanderandmost
oftheparty.ThirtysurvivorsfledbacktotheSovietlines,withouttheirweaponsorvehicles.Another
partywalkedintoaGermanmortarbarragewhichaccountedforseveralmen;thesurvivorsspent
fivedayshidinginaswampbeforetricklingbacktotheSovietlines.
TheNKVD’sKartashevcataloguedthepartisans’deficienciesofarmsandequipment:theyhad
riflesforonly50percentoftheirstrength,andfortyroundsaman,whichtheywereobligedtocarry
intheirpocketsorbootsforlackofbandoliersandpacks.Somehadnoammunitionatall.Onegroup
arrivedfromKharkov,composedofhighly-motivatedandwell-armedPartycadres,whowere
promptlydeployedtoguardthelocalNKVDheadquartersratherthantofight.Kartashevobserved
witheringlythatofficialreportstoMoscownotmerelyfailedtoadmitthesefiascos,butpretendedthat
partisanoperationswerebeingsuccessfullycarriedout.TheinstitutionalisedmendacityoftheSoviet
systemwasunshakeable.
Afewofficialreportsdidtellthetruth,however,suchasonedated21November1941,addressed
toNikitaKhrushchev.ThisrecordedtheexperiencesofabattalionoftheNKVD’s1stPartisan
RegimentinAugust,whenitwassurprisedbytheGermanswhilerestinginthevillageofOsintsy,
nearZhitomit.Atwo-hourbattletookplaceinwhichthebattalioncommander,hischiefofstaffand
commissarwerekilled.Justtwomensurvivedoutofahundred,toreturntotheSovietlineswiththe
sorrytale.ThereporttoMoscowconcluded:‘Wemayassumethatthe1stBattalion’sfailurewas
causedbythefollowing:anunsuitablespotchosenforahalt;lackofnecessaryreconnaissanceand
poorsecuritywhichallowedtheGermanstoapproachunnoticedtowithin50metres;and,finally,
possiblebetrayaloftheunitbytwopartisanswhohaddesertedontheeveningbeforethebattle
(Levkovetsdoesnotknowtheirnames).DeputyPeople’sCommissarofInternalAffairsofUkrSSR,
Savchenko.21November1941.’
YetanotherreporttoKhrushchev,dated24November1941andmarked‘TOPSECRET’,detailed
thefateofagroupcommandedbyoneKhalyava,whoreturnedfromamission.Hehadsetforthwith
twenty-fourmen,hand-pickedassupposedkeenPartyactivists,albeitlackingmilitaryexperience.
Mostofthem,hesaid,surrenderedtothelocalGermanKommandaturinKrasnoarmeiskwithinhours
ofthattown’soccupation,andbecamedriversfortheWehrmacht.Hehimselfreturnedalonetothe
Russianlineson18November.Agroupofforty-sevenmensenttoKiev,thenstillinRussianhands,
wasorderedtocrossthefrontandmakeforVinnitsaandBerichev,headedbyacommandernamed
Rudchenko,who–unusually–wasgivenawirelesstransmitter.Withindays,Kievwasoverrunbythe
Germans.ThenexttheNKVDheardofRudchenko,hehadbeenspottedsurrenderingtothe
occupiers,alongwithmostofhismen.Theeyewitness,ayounglieutenantwholaterreachedRed
Armypositionsfurthereast,saidthathewarnedthesupposedpartisanleaderthathewascommitting
treason,butwasignored.Thereportconcludeddarkly:‘Measureshavebeentakentoverifythis
information.DeputyPeople’sCommissarofInternalAffairsofUkrSSR,Savchenko.24November
1941.’
Intheaftermathofthewar,theSovietUnionidentifiedforglorificationseveralgroupswhich
survivedformonthsinthecatacombsbeneaththeBlackSeacityofOdessa,whichwasoccupiedby
Axisforcesfor907days:in1969thetunnelswereopenedasamuseumdubbed‘TheMemorialto
PartisanGlory’.Theofficialnarrativedescribedhow,beforeOdessafellinOctober1941,local
Komsomolmeetingswereheldtoplanstay-behindResistance.Laterveterans’testimony,however,
toldinsteadofanorgyofdespairingdrunkenness,followedbyfist-fightsbetweenMoscowand
OdessaNKVDmen.Inthelongmonthsthatfollowed,competingsecretservicegroupsfoughteach
othermuchmoreenergeticallythantheyengagedtheGermans.OneMoscowofficer,Captain
VladimirMolodstov,aformerminercapturedandexecutedbytheGermansinJuly1942,waslater
madeaHerooftheSovietUnion.Followinghiscapture,however,arivalnamedLt.Kuznetsov,a
memberoftheOdessaNKVD,disarmedandthenkilledallbutoneofMolodstov’smen,claimingthat
theyhadbeenplottingagainsthim.
On28AugustKuznetsovshotanothermanforstealingapieceofbread.Amonthlater,hekilled
twomorefortakingfoodand‘lackofsexualdiscipline’,whateverthatmeant.Amonthlater,
Kuznetsovhimself–who,ifnotunhinged,wasobviouslyabrute–wasshotbyoneofhisownmenin
anundergroundrefugeknownas‘theMirrorFactory’.OnlythreeNKVDofficersthereafter
survived,andtheirmentalconditionmusthavebeendire.Abramov,themanwhohadkilled
Kuznetsov,urgedsurrender.Anotherofficerchoseinsteadtoleavethecatacombs,andspentthe
remainingmonthsofOdessa’soccupationhidinginhiswife’sapartment.Afterthecity’sliberationhe
claimedtohavekilledAbramov,butthatofficersomehowsurvived.Thelastofthethree,named
Glushenko,alsolivedtoseeOdessaoverrunbytheRedArmy,butthenreturnedtothecatacombsfor
someill-definedpurpose,andperishedwhenagrenadeexplodedinhishands.Thisaccountisriddled
withinconsistenciesandunconvincingtestimony.Theonlycertaintyisthatthe‘partisangroup’
accomplishednothingsavetoendureasubterraneanordealthatkilledmostofthem.
Thesamefatebefellanothersimilarparty,whosestoryisknownonlythroughanintelligence
reporttotheprimeministerofRomania,Hitler ’sallyIonAntonescu,compiledon18April1942.It
wasbasedoninterrogationsofcapturedsurvivorsfromthecatacombs,andhasaringofauthenticity.
ThisRussiangroup,fortymennominatedbythelocalPartyhierarchy,wascommandedbytwo
captains,FrolovandLemichik.On10September1941theywereorderedtopenetratetheRomanian
sectoroftheAxisfront,butwerespottedandreturnedindisarraytoOdessa,reducedtoastrengthof
eighteen.Astheenemyswepttowardsthecity,twelvetookrefugeinitscatacombs,whichwerehastily
provisioned,wheretheyweresupposedlytoawaitopportunitiestocarryoutespionageandsabotage
operations.OnedayinOctoberthisgroup,whichnowincludedtwowivesandwascommandedby
AleksandrSoldatenko,descendedintotheirsecretrefugethroughanentranceat47DalnitskayaStreet.
Itiseasytoimaginethetension,uncertaintiesandterrorsofthedaysandnightsthatfollowed,
entombedbeneathacityinthehandsoftheenemy.Thepartywasheavilyarmed,buttowhatpurpose?
ThreetimesinearlyNovemberonepartisan,LeonidCherney,riskedventuringabovegroundby
night,inanattempttocontactawomancourier.Hefailed,andreturnedtoreportmerelythatthe
occupierswereeverywhere.On13NovemberRomaniansecuritypolice,whohadbeenwarnedofthe
partyfarbeneaththeirfeet,soughttopenetratethecatacombs.Afirefightfollowedinthedarkness,
whichpersuadedtheRomaniansthatitwouldbeeasiertoimprisontheirfoesbysealingthe
catacombs’entrances.Thereafter,notawordwasheardofSoldatenko’spartyuntilFebruary1942.
Theirexperienceintheinterludewasamongthemoredreadfulofthewar.
Severalpartisans,succumbingtodespairandhungerwhentheirprovisionsranout,demandedthat
thegroupshouldascendintothecityandsurrender.Thispropositionwasrejectedoutofhandby
Soldatenko.AmannamedByalikandhiswifeZhenya,prominentamongthoseclamouringfor
surrenderandanywayvulnerableasnon-Partymembers,wereshot.Duringthedaysandweeksthat
followed,theywerealsoeaten.Disputesandresentmentspersistedamongthesurvivors.On1
February1942,fourmensuccessfullyescapedthroughanimperfectlysealedexit,andwerethenrash
enoughtomakefortheirownhomes.Threewerepromptlydenouncedbyneighboursandseizedby
theRomanians,whileonemadegoodhisescape.
Odessa’soccupiersnowpumpedgasandsmokeintothecatacombstoflushouttheremaining
partisans.Thispromptedapanicunderground,andanewrevoltinwhichSoldatenkoandhiswife
Elenawereshotdead.Whenescapeprovedimpossiblethethreesurvivorsreturnedtotheir
undergroundlair,andsubsistedforseveraldaysbyeatingportionsoftheSoldatenkos.Then,atlast,
allhopegone,thesedesperatemenmadetheirwaytothesurfaceandsurrendered.ARomanianpatrol
venturedbelowandexploredthepartisans’refuge.TheyfoundthebonesoftheByaliks,togetherwith
thehalf-eatencorpsesoftheSoldatenkos.
IntheannalsofWesternEurope’sexperienceofthewar,themassacreofthepopulationofthe
villageofOradour-sur-GlanebyGermantroopsinJune1944holdsaspecialplace,becausealthough
thousandsofFrenchResistantsandhostageswerekilledbytheNazis,theextinctionofanentire
communitywasauniqueoccurrence.IntheEast,however,suchthingsweredoneconstantlyby
Hitler ’sforces.Fromtheearliestdaysof‘Barbarossa’hedecreeddreadfulreprisalsforanyactof
civilianResistance.On23July1941heinstructedhiscommandersthattheyshouldcreatesucha
reignofterroraswould‘causethepopulationtoloseallinterestininsubordination’.On16
Septemberhischiefofstaffquantifiedthis,decreeingatariffoffiftytoahundredexecutionsof
hostagesforeveryGermandeathatthehandsofpartisans.Thepolicywasenthusiastically
implementedbyErichvondemBach-Zelewski,whowouldachievespecialnotorietyforhisblooddrenched1944suppressionoftheWarsawRising.Nazirepressionwasforsometimesuccessful:
acrosstwo-thirdsofoccupiedSovietterritorytherewasnosignificantpartisanactivity.Rearareasin
thesouthernUSSR,wherethemajorGermanoperationsof1942tookplace,werenotablytranquil:
thesteppesofferednorefugestoguerrillas.Here,onceagain,experienceinRussiamirroredthatof
France,whereResistancewasstrongestinthecentralandsouthernwildernesses,leaststrategically
importanttoHitler.
InBelorussia,inamonthfollowingthekillingofjusttwoGermans,the707thInfantryDivision
shot10,431people,mostofthemwomenandchildren.InJuneandJuly1942,SecondPanzerArmy
conductedtwoanti-partisansweeps,codenamed‘Birdsong’and‘GreenWoodpecker ’,against
partisansintheBryanskarea.Thefirstoperationinvolved5,500Germantroopsandendedwith
claimsof3,000partisanskilled,woundedorcaptured.Mostofthesewere,however,merelylocal
civilians,andBirdsongcosttheGermansfifty-eightkilledand130wounded.GreenWoodpecker
farednobetter.ThereweredeadRussiansinplenty,tobesure,butmostpartisanssurvived.InArmy
GroupCentre’srearareas,coveringsome90,000squarekilometres,inthefirstelevenmonthsof
‘Barbarossa’8,000allegedpartisanswerekilled–anumberfarinexcessofthetotalthenoperating
intheregion,andonlyexplicablebyassumingmostvictimstohavebeencivilians–inexchangefor
1,094Germanfatalitiesupto10May1943.InJanuary1943,AGCentreclaimedtohavekilledan
astoundingtotalof100,000‘bandits’.SuchreportsmakenonsenseoftheWehrmacht’sdenialsof
complicityinNaziwarcrimes.
OnemanifestationofescalatingpartisanactivitywasreportedbyMaj.Gen.Nagel,inspectorgeneralofoperationsforEconomicStaffEast,theinstitutionresponsibleforplunderingtheoccupied
regionsoffoodandlivestock.Duringthesummerof1942hetoldBerlinthatithadbecometoo
dangeroustosendpartiesintoforestsinArmyGroupCentre’ssectortocuttimberforrailway
sleepers.Moreover,localGermancommanderswereunwillingtocontinuewholesaleseizuresof
livestock,forfearofincreasingpartisansupportinlocalcommunities.Millionswhohadinitially
acquiescedinGermanoccupation,thenbecomecowedbyrepression,hadnowbeguntobelievethat
onlySovietvictorymightdeliverthemfromstarvationanddestitution.SixteenthArmyHQreported
thatbetweenMayandJuly1942,thirtyattackshadbeenmadeonbridgesandeighty-fouronrailways
initsarea,involvingdestructionoftwentylocomotivesand130wagons.InArmyGroupCentre’s
sector,betweenJuneandDecember1942therewere1,183attacksonrailways,anaverageofsixa
day.
Theexistenceofthepartisanbandswasbrutishintheextreme.LiketheFrenchmaquis,they
practisedbanditrytosupporttheirownexistenceswithatleastasmuchzealastheyfoughtthe
Germans.OnedayinSeptember1942,agroupofstarvingmencrawledintoapotatofield,andbegan
franticallyscrabblingintheearth.Oneofthem,namedKovpak,heardanoisebehindhimandturned
toseeawomangazingcontemptuouslydownatthem.Shesaid,‘MyGod!MyGod!Hereyouare,big
healthyguys–andreducedtostealingpotatoesfromus!’Manymenfroze,starved,wereshotin
clasheswithrivalbandsorfacedsummaryexecutionforsomeallegedbreachofdiscipline.‘Weshot
Kozhedubforfiringhisguntwicewhilehewasdrunk,causingpanicinthecamp,’wroteapartisan
namedPopudrenkoinFebruary1942.‘Thiswasagooddecision.Intheeveningwehadanamateur
concert,sangtoanaccordion,danced,andtoldfunnystories…ComradeBalabai[killed]one
bastard,aforesterwhowasworkingfortheGermans.’Thestorywasthesameeverywhere.‘Inthe
morningIreceivedareportthataformer[Soviet]prisonerofwarwhoservedinthe2ndCompany
haddeserted,’scrawledapartisangroupleadernamedBalitskyon3August1943.‘Hewascaptured
inthevillageofLipno…Havinglittletodiscusswiththisspy,ImerelypulledoutmyMauserand
endedthisnobody’sexistencewithasingleshot.’
AlargeproportionoftheSovietfightersweremerefugitives,morethanafewofthemJews
seekingarefugefromNazipersecution,ratherthanSovietpatriotscommittedtoarmedstruggle
againsttheAxis.Aroundhalfofallpartisanswerelocalpeasants,forcedintoserviceatgunpoint.
Everybandlivedindreadofbetrayal,andcollaboratorsrevealedtheirlocationstotheenemyasoften
ashappenedtothemaquisardsofFrance.Casualtieswereappalling:whentheGermanslocatedand
surroundedapartisansanctuary,itwasnotunusualforeverymaninagrouptoperish.Butwhen
Moscow’swillwasserved,itwasthepartisanswhodidtheattacking.Popudrenkorecordedon27
February1942:‘WelearnedlastnightthatgrainwasbeingassembledfortheGermansinKlyusy.We
sentthirtymenwhobroughtbackmorethan100poods,therestwasdistributedamongcollective
farmers.’Afortnightlater:‘WeattackedaHungarianbattalionstationedinIvanovkavillage…First
Companyattackedfrontally,Secondheldtheflank,ThirdandFourthgavefiresupport.Resultsofthe
battle:killed92Hungariansamongthem4officers,64policemen.Capturedoneheavymachine-gun
and2light,15,000cartridges,ananti-aircraftgun,103blankets,sevenrifles,onetransmitteretc.We
havelosttenmenkilledandsevenwounded.’ItisreasonabletoguessthatmanyoftheHungarian
deadwereshotafterbeingtakenprisoner,thecustomonbothsidesofpartisanwar.
On18August1942HitlerissuedanewDirective,No.46,giving‘Guidelinesforanintensified
fightagainsttheplagueofbanditryintheEast’.Forthefirsttime,thisproposedcarrotsaswellas
sticksinthemanagementoftheoccupiedterritories:collaborationistcommunitieswouldreceive
enhancedrations,andbeexcusedfromforcedlabour.Inreality,however,thisbelatedconcessionwas
seldomobserved.AndonlytwomonthslaterHitlerissuedaneworder,statingthattheEastern
partisanwarmustnowberecognisedas‘astruggleforthetotalextirpationofonesideortheother ’.
Asubsequentgeneralorderof11November1942statedthat‘capturedbandits,unlessexceptionally
…enlistedinourfightagainstthebands,aretobehangedorshot’.Germany’smodernPotsdam
historianshavewritten:‘Theoccupyingpowerwasneitherwillingtocreatethepoliticalframework
forpacificationnorabletoenforcesuchaconditionbymilitarymight.’
TheGermansultimatelydeployedaquarterofamillionmenforanti-partisanoperationsandrearareasecurityintheEast,whichrepresentedarealachievementforStalin,MoscowCentreandPavel
Sudoplatov,whoprovidedtheNKVDagentsandwireless-operatorswhoservedwiththepartisans.
MostoftheGermantroopsengagedinsecuritydutiesweremenunfitforfront-lineservice,butthey
hadtobearmedandfed,andthusbecameasignificantdrainonHitler ’swareffort.During1943the
partisans’fieldstrengthincreasedfrom130,000toaquarterofamillion.On28JulyAllenDullesin
BernsignalledWashington,reportinghisBerlinsourcessayingthatpartisanswerenowmakinga
majorimpactbehindtheEasternFront,seriouslydisruptingtheWehrmacht’slinesofcommunication.
GermansigintofficersconsideredtheradiodisciplineofthepartisansbetterthanthatofSoviet
regularunits,probablybecauseeverygroupknewthatitssurvivaldependedonoutwittingGerman
locators.Intheautumnof1943amonthlyaverageof2,000telephonepolesandthreehundredcables
werecutbyguerrillasbehindArmyGroupCentre’sfrontalone.Itsheadquartersintroducedaspecial
‘partisanwarning’radiochannel,broadcastingtoallunits.
Wehrmacht‘specialintelligencegroups’handledsecurityandinterrogationintheGermanrear
areas,amongtheugliestaspectsoftheanti-partisanwar.ABritishfileonsomeofthepersonalities
involved,mostlybasedonUltramaterial,includedsuchfiguresasVladimirBedrov:‘Formerly
employedbytheNKVDinLeningrad.DesertedtotheGermans.Employedasaninterpreterand
translator.Extremelybrutaltowardsprisoners.DesertedinFebruary1944andarrestedinEstonia.
SenttoaconcentrationcampinEasternGermanyforpeoplewhoknowtoomuch.’Anotherman,
SergeantBohme,camefromRiga,hadlivedinVienna,spokefluentRussianandEnglish,‘ranan
agentnetworkrecruitedfromRussiaPWandthreeorfourwomen’.FieldPoliceInspectorKarl
BrenkerwasdescribedinhisBritishdossieras‘guiltyofeveryconceivablecrimeagainsttheRussian
population.Averitablebeast.Carriedoutexecutionshimself.Particularlybrutaltowardswomen.
Decoratedwiththegoldenanti-partisanbadge.’
TheNKVD’sFourthDirectoratewasresponsiblefordirectingwhatbecameknownas‘theRailway
War ’becauseofitsemphasisonhittingGermancommunications.‘Anenemytrainwasblownupat1
a.m.,’apartisanleadernamedBalitskywroteinhisdiaryfor25August1943.‘Itconsistedofthirtyeightwagonsandwasheadingtowardsthefront.Wetookpartofitsloadandburnedtherest.[Most
of]thetrain’sescortwerekilledandfivecaptured,afterputtingupheavyresistanceinwhichfifteen
partisanswerewounded.’TheattackonGermanEasternFrontcommunicationsduringtheRussians’
hugesummer1944‘Bagration’offensivemademoreimpactonthemainbattlefrontthandidthatof
theResistanceinFranceinsupportofD-Day.TheSovietsatlasthadtheresourcestoorchestrate
majoroperationsbehindthelinesaswellasagainsttheGermanarmies.Theydeployed‘strategic
intelligencesections’,eighttotwelvestrong,operatingtentosixtymilesbeyondthefront,andwere
alsoabletosustainreasonablyregularairdropstohundredsofpartisangroups.Noreliablebalance
sheetispossible,thoughitseemsreasonabletoassumethat–asineveryotheraspectofthewarinthe
East–thepartisancampaigncosttheRussiansfarmorepeoplethantheGermans.Butinthelasttwo
yearsofthewartheymadeadifference.InthewordsofaGermangeneral,partisansbecame
‘formidable,well-trainedunits…aplaguewithwhichallrear-areaheadquarters,supply,
transportationandsignalunitshadtocontendeveryday’.
Between1941and1945,SudoplatovclaimedinhismemoirsthattheNKVDdispatchedatotalof
212teamstoleadguerrillagroups,and7,316agentsandwireless-operatorstoworkbehindenemy
lines.ItssabotageschoolstrainedathousandmenfortheRedArmy,andanother3,500foritsown
operations.Hesuggestedthat2,222‘operationalcombatgroups’servedbehindthefrontinthecourse
ofthewar.TheSovietofficialhistoryprofessedthatpartisanswereresponsibleforkilling137,000
Germans–whichmustbeanabsurdlyexaggeratedfigure–including2,045allegedcollaboratorsand
eighty-sevenseniorNaziofficialsexplicitlytargetedforassassination.TheSovietUnionafterthewar
producedarollofhonourofheroesofpartisanoperations,ledbysuchnamesasKuznetsov,
Medvedev,Prokupuk,Vaopshashov,Karasyov,Mirkovsky.Kuznetsov–evenlessappropriately
codenamedthanmostwartimeagentsas‘Fluff’–wasanNKVDmanofstrikingblondgoodlooks.
Bornin1911,beforethewarhehadservedtheLubyankabysharingwithforeigndiplomatsseveral
Bolshoiballetstarsaslovers.HehadgrownupinGerman-speakingSiberia,andthuswasableto
passhimselfoffasaWehrmachtofficer,‘OberleutnantPaulZibert’,operatingbehindenemylines.In
thisroleheassassinatedseveralprominentGermans.HewasnamedaHerooftheSovietUnionafter
beingkilledbyUkrainiannationalistswhiletryingtocrossbacktotheRedArmy’slinesin1944.
FromStalin’sperspective,themostimportantachievementofRussia’sguerrillaswastosustaina
semblanceofSovietauthorityinregionsfarbehindthefront,andtocreateapropagandalegendof
nationalunityagainsttheinvader.Inreality,theoccupiedareasoftheSovietUnionspawnedasmany
differentresponsestoHitler–asimilarquotientofResisters,amatchingproportionofcollaborators
–asdidWesternEurope.TheconsequencewasthatMoscowexactedaterribleretributionfromthose
who,followingtheGermanretreat,weredeemedtohavedonelessthantheirdutytotheMotherland.
In1943BeriareportedthattheNKVDhadarrestedanddetainedforinterrogation931,549suspectsin
territoriesliberatedbytheRedArmy.Ofthese,hesaid,80,296hadbeen‘unmaskedasspies,traitors,
deserters,banditsandcriminalelements’.
ManypartisangroupskilledmoreRussianpeoplethanGermans,withthedeliberatepurposeof
makingthemmorefearfulofthewrathofStalinthanthatofHitler.AFebruary1942reportbythe
commanderoftheKopenkingroup,operatinginPoltavaoblast,meritsquotationatlength,not
becauseitisunusual,butbecausetherearemanyotherslikeitindeclassifiedarchives,marked‘TOP
SECRET’:
Idiscoveredbyinterviewinglocal[Party]activistsinOstanovkithatthreevillagers,includingthecollectivefarmforeman,were
loyaltowardstheGermansandbetrayedourpeople.Thesethreepersonswerearrestedandtakentotheforest3–4kmfrom
Postanovkiwhereweshotthem.Atdawnon30October1941,thedetachmentreachedKhoroshkisettlement,andspentthedaylight
hoursinaschool.Newmembersofthedetachmenttooktheoath.Werestockedwithsuppliesfromthecollectivefarm’sreserves,
andonecartwastakentocarrythemachine-guns.IlearnedfromlocalactiviststhattheGermanshadappointedtheformerlocal
schoolteacherstarosta[villagehead]inKhoroshki.Wetookhimwithuswhenleavingthevillageandshothimafterdrivingfor3
km…InCherevkiwearrestedthenewlyappointedstarostaandanothermansympathetictotheGermans.Weshotboth.
InBolshayaObukhovka…wearrestedandshottwostarostas,fivepersonsrecruitedbytheGermanintelligence,seventeen
peopleassociatedwiththechurch,andthreedeserters.AllfivepersonsrecruitedbyGestapowere14–19yearsold.Accordingto
thecommanderoftheMirgorodpartisandetachmentcomradeAndreev,sixlocalsfromObukhovkaweresupportingtheGermans.I
sentagrouptoarrestthesesixpersons,whowereafterwardsshot.
AccordingtotheinformationofcomradesIvashchenkoandAndreev,afamilywithfoursonslivinginBolshayaObukhovkawere
producinganddistributingareligiousleaflet[whichstated]:‘Everyonewhofindsthisshouldwritetenmoreandgivethemtopeople.
PrayfortheGermans,ourliberators.GodhassavedusfromJewsandcommunists.’Agroupofsixpartisansweresentto[the
village]ledbycomradeTereshchenko.Theycametothe[evangelists’]houseandaskedthemtoopenthedoor,buttheoccupants
didnotobey,insteadbarringthedoorsandwindowswithwoodenbeams.Afterwaitingfortwohours,Tereshchenkoaskedfor
permissiontobreakdownthedoor…Inthemorning,thefatherandfoursonsweretakenandshotintheforest.Ihaveestablished
byquestioningthelocalsthatthree[Red]ArmymenhavebeenlivinginBolshayaObukhovkaforoveramonth.Iarrestedthem
withhelpfromlocalpartisans.Questioningthemrevealedthattheyhadgotmarriedandhadnointentionofreturningtothefront.I
shotthesethreemenasdesertersandtraitorstotheirmotherland.
AccordingtotheinformationfromcomradesIvashchenko,AndreevandlocalactivistsinthevillagePanasovka,aformerkulak
wasappointedthestarostathere.Isentagrouptoshoothimandhisfamily,asweknewthathiswife,daughterandmotherwere
activeinspreadingunpatrioticrumours,suchasthattheSovietregimeisgoneforever,andthatGermanauthorityistheonlyauthentic
one…Theirpropertywasconfiscatedforpartisanuse.AccordingtoinformationreceivedfromlocalpeopleinOlefirovka,the
collectivefarm’sagronomist,whohadbeenappointedvillagechief,refusedtoissuegrain,sayingthattheSovietregimewasno
more,andtheGermansneededit.IsentcomradeKaminyartoshoot[themanandhiswife]anddistributearoundsixtytonsofgrain
amongthecollectivefarmers.
Thisreportcoveredthreemonths’activitybyasinglegroup,andsuchcampaignsofterrorwere
takingplaceacrosstheentirewesternSovietUnionoccupiedbytheGermans,incompetitionwith
thoseoftheNazis,andlikewiseresponsibleforahostofdeaths.
TheNKVDsoughttoexercisefarmorerigorouscontrolofpartisanoperationsthandidSOEor
OSS,becauseitwasconductingastruggleinwhatthenpassedforitsownhomeland.Inoneimportant
respect,theSovietsenjoyedanadvantageovertheBritishandAmericansinpromotingguerrillawar.
IfChurchillwassometimescallousaboutthehumancostof‘settingEuropeablaze’,Stalinwas
unfailinglyso.Hisindifferencetolossesamongthefighters,andtoconsequencesforthecivilian
population,renderedthepartisancampaignoneofthedarkestmanifestationsoftheKremlin’s
commitmentto‘absolutewar ’.
13
IslandsintheStorm
1 TH EA BW EH R ’ S I R I S H J I G
Manyofthenationsinvolvedinthewarwererivenbyinternalfactionalstruggles,sometimestothe
death,whichpersistedthroughouttheyearsinwhichtheAlliesgrappledwiththeAxis.Thiswastrue
ofChina,France,Italy,Greece,Yugoslavia,Burma,India,SouthAfrica,Canada,FrenchIndochina
andtheDutchEastIndies,tonameonlyafew.Themajorbelligerentsthusfoundthemselvesstriving
toinducelocalactiviststodirecttheirfire–sometimesliterally–attheothersideintheglobal
struggle,ratherthanattheirowncompatriots.Thisoftenprovedmoredifficultthancalmingrival
wolfpacks.
Irelandoccupiedamarginalplaceintheglobalstruggle,butbothsidescherishedmirror
apprehensionslestitshouldbecomeahavenfortheirfoes.TheIrishFreeState,orEire,hadachieved
aqualifiedindependencefromBritainlessthantwentyyearsbeforewarbrokeout.Tothechagrinof
nationalists,sixcountiesofpredominantlyProtestantUlsterremainedpartoftheUnitedKingdom.
Memoriesoftheugly1916–21struggletoexpeltheBritishremainedraw.ThoughEirewasstillin
namepartoftheBritishCommonwealth,throughoutthewarprimeministerÉamondeValera
espousedastubbornneutrality,resistingallblandishmentstojointheAlliedcauseevenwhen
America,Ireland’swarmestfriend,becameabelligerent.YetwhiledeValeradefiedthewrathof
WinstonChurchill,onwhomtheIrishdependedfortheirsubsistence,hewasalsoobligedtocombat
domesticfoes.Therumpoftheso-calledIrishRepublicanArmy,madeillegalinEirein1936,
remainedfanaticallyopposedtotheisland’spartition,andtothesettlementwithBritain.IRAterrorists
sustainedacampaignofsabotageandmurderagainsttheBritish–in1939therewereextensive
bombingsonthemainland–andalsodefiedtheDublingovernment.
Attheoutbreakofwar,theGermansidentifiedIrelandasfertilesoil,andtheBritishagreed.Latein
September1939MI6deliveredaluridlysensationalistreportonconditionsinEire,claimingthat‘an
attemptatrevolutionbytheIRAdoesnotappeartobeoutofthequestion’.AGerman-ownedhotelat
InverinDonegalbecameafocusofBritishconcern,becauseHitler ’sembassystaffsometimesstayed
there–thoughsodidBritishofficers,includingyoungLt.PhilipMountbatten,RN.FromBerlin’s
viewpointtherewaslittlemeritinintelligence-gathering,becauseIrelandharbourednosignificant
militarysecrets,andtherewereonly318Germanand149Italianresidentsinthewholeislandto
provideexpatriatesupport.TheAbwehrremainednonethelessconvincedthatiftheundergroundIRA
couldbepersuadedtoresumeitscampaignofsabotageagainstmilitarytargetsintheBritishNorth
andonthemainland,Berlinwouldprofit.Thus,between1939and1943aprocessionofAbwehr
emissariesstrovetolinkarmswiththeterroristsagainsttheircommonfoe.
ApervasivestrandinallGermany’sIrishoperationswasanawesomeignoranceofthecountry,
muchgreaterthanthatoftheBritishaboutsay,Albania.Berlin’sfirstagent,dispatchedinFebruary
1939beforehostilitiesbegan,wasoneOscarPfaus,whowasbriefedaheadofhisdeparturebya
CelticfolkloreenthusiastnamedFranzFromme,whoboredtheagenthalftodeath.Pfaus,having
travelledtoDublinviaHarwich,presentedhimselftothehard-drinking‘General’EoinO’Duffy,
leaderofIreland’sfascistBlueshirts,spiritualalliesoftheNazis.CouldO’Duffyputhimintouch
withtheIRA?SincetheBlueshirtsandtheRepublicansrepresentedbitterlyopposedinterests,this
suggestionoutragedthe‘general’.ButPfauseventuallycontrivedtomeettheIRAArmyCouncil,and
inthebesttraditionofstagespiestoreupapoundnoteandpresentedonehalftotheRepublicans,so
thatwhentheysentarepresentativetoGermanytodiscussarmsshipments,hemightidentifyhimself.
ThenPfauswenthome.
TheIRAdecidedtopursuetheGermanoffer,anddispatchedasitsnegotiatorJimO’Donovan,who
tookaboattoHamburgaccompaniedbyhiswife.Ontheirarrival,Germancustomsdiscoveredthat
MrsO’Donovanhadconcealedaboutherpersonseveralcartonsofcigarettes,andsubjectedhertoa
robuststrip-search.Thehigh-mindedO’Donovanexplodedwithrage:thecoupledepartedhomein
dudgeon,withoutanyguns.Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,theAbwehrbecameincreasingly
exasperatedbywhatitconsideredtheirresponsiblebehaviouroftheIRA,whichattackedEnglish
cinemas,phonekiosksandletterboxesinafashionthatcontributednothingtoGermanvictory,norto
Irishunification.InJanuary1940,whentheRepublicansstagedaspectaculararmsraidontheIrish
army’smagazineatPhoenixPark,theexasperateddeValeraroundedupeveryIRAmanhis
policemencouldcatch,andintroducedinternmentwithouttrial.IftheprimeministerhatedtheBritish,
henowdislikedhiserstwhilefellow-freedomfightersalmostasmuch.ThePhoenixParkraidwasa
turningpoint,becauseitmadeIreland’sgovernmentexplicitfoesofGermany’sRepublicanallies.
TheAbwehrnowdispatchedanewagent,toinstilsomeTeutonicdisciplineintoIRAoperations.
ErnstWeber-DrohlwasadiminutiveAustrian,alreadyoversixty,whohadforgedanincongruous
careerasacircusstrongman.HissolequalificationtorepresentHitlerwasthathehadfatheredtwo
childrenbyanIrishgirl.JustbeforehesetoutbyU-boatfortheEmeraldIsle,hisintendedwirelessoperatoravowedsuchaviolentdislikeforDrohlthatherefusedtoaccompanyhim.InMarch1940
thelittlestrongmanthusfoundhimselfaloneashepaddledadinghythroughdarknessandheavysurf
totheshore,clutchingawirelesstransmitterandabundleofmoney.Therubberboatcapsized,theset
waslost,andabedraggledspyflounderedashoreandmadehiswaytoDublin.
TherehepresentedhimselfatthehouseofJimO’Donovan,whowaivedthememoryofthe
Hamburgcustomshumiliationandbecamehistemporaryhost.Drohldeliveredamessageaddressed
totheIRACouncilandsignedbyhimself,ofwhichthemostsignificantpassageread:‘ThePfalzgraf
SectionveryurgentlyrequestsitsIrishfriendsandIRAmemberstobesogoodastomake
considerablybettereffortstocarryoutthe[Abwehr ’s]S-plan…andtobemoreeffectualagainst
militaryasopposedtocivilianobjectives.’TheAustrianaddedanapology:insteadofhandingoverto
thesecretarmyUS$15,100entrustedtohimbyBerlin,theamountwas$600short,becauseheneeded
cashhimself.Shortlyafterwards,whilestayinginaDublinhotelhewasarrestedbythepoliceand
chargedwithenteringIrelandillegally.IncourttheagentclaimedthathehadcometoIrelandmerely
toseekouthischildren–hiswifewasinNuremberg.TheIrishTimesreported:‘Weber-Drohl’s
lawyersaidthattheaccusedhadhadnoevilintentionswhenhesteppedontoIrishsoil.Rather,the
motiveswhichhadoccasionedhiscourseofactionwereextremelypraiseworthy.’Although
dischargedafterpayinga£3fine,hewasalmostimmediatelyre-arrestedandinterned.When
eventuallyreleasedtheAbwehr ’sagentstayedinIreland,ekingalivinginhisoldcircusrole,having
lostinterestinservingtheFatherland.
TheGermanembassynowurgedBerlinthatNaziagentsshouldhavenofurthertrafficwiththe
IRA,whichmerelyworsenedrelationswiththeIrishgovernment.YettheAbwehr ’sfascinationwith
exploitingGermany’senemies’enemiesasfriendsremainedundimmed.Athirty-five-year-old
politicalsciencelecturerandardentNazi,DrEdmundVeesenmayer,wasappointed‘SpecialAdviser
Ireland’.TheAbwehrconsultedwithFrancisStuart,anintellectualfanaticallycommittedtothe
nationalistcause,whoturnedupinBerlininthemidstofaworldwartolectureonAnglo-Irish
literature.AnIRAmannamedStephenHeldalsoarrivedviaBelgiuminApril1940,andpresentedthe
IrishhalfofOscarPfaus’stornpoundnote.HeldadvancedanimaginativeproposalthattheGerman
armyshouldeffectanamphibiouslandingnearDerry,tooccupyBritishUlster,thoughheofferedno
adviceabouthowtheRoyalNavy’sobjectionstosuchaventuremightbeovercome.Inthefollowing
month,IRAchiefofstaffSeanRussellalsoreachedtheNazicapital,havingtravelledfromNewYork
viaGenoa.AllthesemenurgedtheGermanstoseizeahistoricopportunity.
TheAbwehr ’snextemissarywasHermannGörtz–thebikerwhohadspiedhiswayintoBrixton
prisonbackin1936.Itseemedanextraordinarychoice,todispatchtoIrelandamiddle-agedlawyer
whohadneverseentheplaceinhislife,butwitnessesattheairfieldfromwhichhisHeinkelIII
bombersetforthontheeveningof4May1940wereimpressedbyhischeerfulnessandeven
insouciance.HehadtrainedwithNo.800ConstructionDemonstrationBattalion,thecommandounit
whichlaterbecametheBrandenburgRegiment,andnurturedheroicaspirations.Görtzparachuted
fromthenightskywithoutaccidentbutlandednearBallivor,Co.Meath,seventymilesfromhis
intendeddropzone.Duringthedescenthelostbothhiswirelesssetandthespadewithwhichhe
intendedtoburyhisparachute.
Hedumpedhisflyingsuit,toreuphismapsandthrewthefragmentsinariver,thenstartedwalking
southinsearchofMrsIseultStuart,wifeoftheRepublicanliterarylecturerinBerlin.Hewasnow
cladinbreeches,ridingboots,pulloverandaberet,andalsocarriedhisWorldWarIcampaign
medals,asomewhatindiscreetgestureforasecretagent.Afteralong,hardtrekhereachedMrs
Stuart’sdooratLaraghCastle,justwestofDublin.ShesummonedJimO’Donovan,whodroveto
collectthevisitor.Görtzwrotelater:‘ThenIcametoDublinwhereImetsomepleasantpeoplewho
neitherknewnorwantedtoknowanythingaboutmeandImovedaroundfreely.’Butthespywas
broughtfacetofacewiththechaoticloyaltiesofIrelandwhenhemetfouryoungRepublicanswho
demandedthecashhehadbroughtfromGermany,andmenacedhimforhalfanhourbeforehewas
takentothehouseoftheIRA’sStephenHeld.
On7May1940,inthemidstofDublinanIRAgangsoughttoseizeacouriercarrying
correspondencetoSirJohnMaffey,Britain’srepresentativeinIreland.Thispromptedashoot-out
betweenthegunmenandthepolice,andinfuriatedtheIrishgovernment.HermannGörtzventedonhis
hostsapassionateharangueabouttheirresponsibilityofsuchconduct;itwasobviousthattheIrish
authoritieswouldnowharrytheterrorists.TheGermanwasfearfulofbeingimprisonedand
convictedasamerespy,ratherthan–ashesawhimself–acolour-bearerforhisnation’sallconqueringarmedforces.HebulliedtheIRAintomountingasearchfortheLuftwaffeuniformhe
haddumped.Whentheyunsurprisinglyfailedtofindthis,hedemandedthatatailorshouldbefound
whocouldmakehimanother.
Onthenightof22Maytheinevitablehappened:policeraidedtheHelds’house.TheymissedGörtz
butfoundhisparachute,togetherwithcodebooks,informationonIrishmilitaryinstallations,anda
thickwadofcurrency.TheyarrestedStephenHeldandIseultStuart,thoughthelatterwasswiftly
released.Görtz’snextmovementsremainuncertain.Helaterclaimedtohaveescapedthepolice
dragnetandtakenrefugeintheWicklowmountains,wherehesufferedmuchfromhungerandrain,
butthisversionisdisputed.Allthatisassuredisthatthroughthemonthsthatfollowedseveral
women,impassionedRepublicans,shelteredhiminDublin,underanaliasas‘MrRobinson’.He
dispatchedreportstohisemployersthroughseamensailingtotheContinent,noneofwhichever
reachedBerlin,andwhichwouldhavedonelittlegoodtotheAbwehriftheyhad.Thislonely,
unhappy,culturedandfranklypitiablefigurebecamesodesperatetogethomethathestroveinvain
tobuyaboatinwhichtosailthere.
TheGermanambassadorinDublin,DrHempel,saidcrosslythatheassumedtheGörtzsagawasa
Britishplot,designedtodragIrelandintothewarontheAlliedside;theDublingovernmentwas
furiousthatBerlinwascollaboratingwithitsterroristenemiesoftheIRA.YetstilltheAbwehr
refusedtogiveup.AsplanningadvancedforOperation‘Sealion’,aninvasionofBritain,Berlin
becamedesperatetodeployagentsinIreland,incasetheislandbecamestrategicallyimportant.In
June1940,twomoreagentsofAbwehr1’sHamburgsectionweredispatched.WalterSimonwas
anotherremarkablyelderlycandidateforpartisanwar,fifty-eight,aGermanseamanwhohadspent
theFirstWorldWarinanAustralianinternmentcamp.LikeGörtz,hewasaveteranofanearlier
unsuccessfulespionagemission:in1938,whilereconnoitringBritisharmamentfactoriesand
airfields,hemetsomeWelshnationalistswhoclaimedawillingnesstoserveGermany,andgaveeach
£20andaRotterdammailingaddress.InFebruary1939hewasarrestedatTonbridge,imprisoned,
andinAugustsummarilydeported.Itmightbeexpectedthatthisexperiencewouldhavedimmed
Simon’senthusiasmforsecretwar,butnowheacceptedtheidentitydocumentsofCarlAnderson,a
Swedish-bornAustralian,andsetforthforIreland.HewastoldtostayawayfromtheIRAand
communicatewithBerlinthroughacodebasedonthefirstverseofSchiller ’s‘DasLiedevonder
Glocke’,whichhehadlearnedbyheart.
Onthenightof12June,aU-boatstoleintoDinglebayandlandedSimon,whoburiedhiswireless
setandheadedforDublin.Hewasquicklyspotted,trailedfromTraleeandarrested.Hispossessionof
alargewadofcashwasincriminatingenough,butheknewhisfatewassealedwhenhiswirelessset
wasalsoproducedincourt.CommittedtoMountjoyprison,hewaspromptlyaccostedbyastartled
prisonerwhoexclaimed,‘Areyouheretoo?’Simonripostedangrily,‘Idiot!’Thetwomenwerenot
supposedtoknoweachother,but‘PaddyMitchell’wasWillyPreetz,theAbwehr ’ssecondagent,who
hadbeenlandedseparatelyonthesamemission.TheBritishtippedoffDublinthatSimonwasa
knownGermanagent,andthetwomensettleddownforalongwarbehindbars.
AndstillAbwehrbunglerskeptcoming:theGermansconvincedthemselvesthatBretons,fellowCelticnationalists,mightbewovenintotheirIrishnarrative.InJuly1940aBretonhelmsmansailed
thethirty-six-footyachtSoizictoIrelandbearingthreespies–DieterGaertner,HerbtTributhand
HenryObed–allcarryingpapersasSouthAfricanstudents.Theirmissionwascodenamed‘Lobster
I’,buttheagentswerefarfrombeingmarinecreatures,spentthevoyageprostratewithsea-sickness,
andwereimmediatelydetainedonlanding.On8August,attheheightoftheBattleofBritainaU-boat
sailedfromFrancecarryingSeanRussell,theIRA’schiefofstaff,togetherwithFrankRyan,aleftwingveteranoftheSpanishCivilWar.AboutahundredmileswestofGalway,Russellbecame
violentlyill,expired,andwasburiedatsea.RyanthereuponchosetoreturntoBerlin,whereevery
kindofdarksuspicionarose,asitsoondidalsoinDublin.HadRussellbeenpoisoned?Intruthhe
wasalmostcertainlythevictimofaburstgastriculcer.
TheGermans’nextagentwasHelmutClissman,whoatleasthadtheadvantagesofknowingthe
countryandbeingmarriedtoanIrishwife.TherewasnoU-boatforClissman,however.Hispassage
wasentrustedinsteadtoahighlyexperiencedsailor,ChristianNissen,aboardacutternamedtheAnni
Braz-Bihen.ClissmanhadreceivedtrainingwiththeBrandenburgers,andwasaccompaniedbya
wireless-operator.AlltheGermans’preparationswereconfounded,however,whenthecuttercollided
withathree-dayAtlanticgale,gustingtoForce10.Theenginebrokedown;thecrewprovedgrossly
incompetent.NisseneventuallydecidedtotakehisexhaustedanddisaffectedchargesbacktoBrest,
wheretheyarrivedinSeptember.
Intheautumnof1940HermannGörtzfoundhimselfreceivingdiscreetvisitsinhissecrethavens
fromallmannerofIrishmen,prominentpoliticiansamongthem,whowereeagertoforgelinkswith
arepresentativeofthenationthatlookedsettosecuremasteryofEurope.TheGermanagent
imploredhisIRAhoststomaketheirpeacewithdeValera,thoughhehadbynowrealisedthat
statesmanshipwasnotamongtheirskills.Hewrotebitterly:‘Nothingmorethanweakeningintrigues
andexchangesoffirewiththepolicewereachievedinsteadofbattlewiththeenemy,whichtheyhad
promised.’StephenHayeshadsucceededRussellasIRAchiefofstaff,andGörtzrebukedJack
McNeela,hisADC:‘YouknowhowtodieforIreland,buthowtofightforityouhavenotthe
slightestidea!’
AgrumpyIrishgovernessnamedMrsDalywaspersuadedinNovember1940tobecomea
passengerontheneutralJapaneseshipFushimiMaru,sentfromSpaintoevacuateahandfulof
JapanesenationalsfromDublin.InadditiontocarryingacodebookforHermannGörtzhiddeninan
alarmclockandmessagessecretedinherunderwear,shewasalsonominatedofficialcourierforthe
IrishambassadorinMadrid.GörtzeventuallyreceivedMrsDaly’smessages,whichrevealedthe
Abwehr ’sconfusionabouthowbesttoactinthewinterof1940–41,whenathreatofBritishinvasion
seemedtoloomoverIreland.InDecember,theIrisharmy’sGeneralHugoMacNeillheldtalkswith
HenningThomsen,the‘struttingNazi’whoservedascounsellorattheGermanembassy,aboutsucha
contingency.TheBlueshirts’O’Duffywasalsopresent–aferventhateroftheBritishwhoaskedthat
ifChurchilldidinvade,theGermansshouldparachuteweaponscapturedontheContinenttoarmIrish
Resistance.
BerlinofferedapromisethatIrishportsweresafefromLuftwaffebombsunlessoruntiltheBritish
seizedthem.Görtzsomehowgotholdofawirelessset,andpersuadedAnthonyDeery,anIRA
memberwhohadadayjobasaDundalkpostofficeradiotechnician,todispatchhismessages.This
Deerydid,untilcaughtbythepoliceearlyin1942andsentencedtofiveyears’imprisonment.Inthe
interval,Görtz’sdispatchesdidlittleservicetotheNaziwareffort,formostmerelylamentedhisown
troubles.
TheAbwehr ’snextattempttoplaceanagentinIrelandtookplaceon21March1941,whena
HeinkelIIItookofffromAmsterdam’sSchipholairportcarryinginitsbombbaytwenty-nine-yearoldSgtGuntherSchütz.ThesergeanthaddonesomeamateurespionagewhileattendingtheGerman
CommercialSchoolinLondonin1938.Hehadbeensecondedfromwartimeserviceintheartillery
toservetheAbwehr,briefedtotransmitweatherandshippingreports,andespeciallyinformation
abouttheBelfastshipyards.Hehadbeentrainedinmeteorology,andcarriedamicroscopewithwhich
tocreateandreadmicrodotmessages.AswellasacopyofanEnglishnovelentitledJustaGirlas
keytohiscoding,togetherwith3,000genuineUSdollarsandathousandEnglishpoundswhichhe
soondiscoveredwereforged,hecarriedaSouthAfricanpassportinthenameofHansMarchner,
alongwithabottleofcognacandasalamitosolacehisfive-hoursojourninthebellyoftheHeinkel.
Schützleaptfromtheplaneintobrightmoonlight6,500feetaboveIreland,andwasknocked
unconsciousbytheforceofhislanding.Awakingwithanosebleedtofindhimselfbeingstudiedwith
interestbyalocalman,heburiedhisparachuteandflying-suit,andstartedwalking.Forhourshedid
notdareaccostanybody,butwasfinallydriventoaskthewaytoDublin.Itwassixtymilesaway,he
learned–hehadbeendroppedinCo.Waterford,farsouthofhisintendeddestination.Twopolicemen
onbicyclessoonstoppedhimanddiscoveredhiswirelesssetandequipment.Heenquirednervously
whatwouldhappennext.‘Don’tworry,wewillhangyou,that’sall,’saidtheconstableamiably.
NobodyhadtoldthewretchedSchützaboutIrishjokes,andhesuffereddaysofterrorbeforefinding
himselfimprisonedwithmostofhisAbwehrcomrades.
HermannGörtzwasarrestedon27November1941,duringapoliceraidinDublin’sBlackheath
Parkdistrict,launchedinsearchofIRAmen,notGermanspies.TheAbwehr ’sfinalbidtoputagents
intoIrelandendedasswiftlyandabsurdlyasalltheothers.On16December1943ayoungIrishman
namedJohnFrancisO’ReillywasparachutedintoCo.Clare,nearMorveen.Threedayslaterhewas
followedbyasecondman,thirty-five-year-oldJohnKenny,whohadofferedhisservicestothe
GermansafterbeingdetainedintheoccupiedChannelIslandsandinternednearBrunswick.On
landinginIreland,bothmenwereswiftlypickedupbythepolice–O’Reillyhadacceptedhis
assignmentmerelytosecureapassagehomefromtheLuftwaffe.Soonafterthewarended,allthe
AbwehrmeninAthlonecampwerefreed,butHermannGörtzwasinformedthathewastobe
deportedtotheBritishZoneofoccupiedGermany.On23May1947,onreceivingthisnewshe
immediatelytookpoisonintheAliens’RegistrationOfficeatDublinCastle.Hewasfifty-seven,a
patheticandinsomewayssympatheticfigure,tormentedbyself-pityandalmostinsanelymiscastasa
foreignagentoftheThirdReich.
YetifGörtz’sstoryendedwithadeath,theGermanswholandedinIrelandknewthatwhatever
hardshipstheymightsufferinAthlonecamp,nobodywasgoingtokillthem.Operatinginaneutral
state,theyenjoyedthecomfortableassurancethatthepriceoffailurewouldbemereimprisonment,
notarendezvouswiththeexecutioner.Andbeforelaughingtooloudlyattheabsurdityofthe
Abwehr ’soperations,itshouldberecalledthatifHitlerhadconqueredBritain,Irelandwouldhave
shareditsfate.IrishjokeswouldhavestoppedasassuredlyasIrishneutralitywouldhavebeenforfeit.
2 NO M A N’ S LA ND
Otherneutralstateswhichoptedoutoftheirneighbours’existentialstruggleprovidedtheatresmuch
moreimportantthanIrelandforthetwosides’secretoperations.Incitieswherelightsburnedbrightly
andasemblanceoftranquillitypersisted,therivalbelligerentssustainedtheircontestformastery,but
withbuttonedfoils.Therewaschildishjostlingforadvantage:GermanattachésinAnkaraflaunted
beforetheirBritishcounterpartstinsofGoldFlakecigarettescapturedbytheFallschirmjägerin
Crete.InLourençoMarques,wherethelocalBritish,GermanandItalianagentssharedquartersinthe
Polanahotel,therewerespatsaboutwhichnation’sradionewsbulletinsshouldbeairedinthehotel
lounge,resolvedonlywhenthemanagementbannedallofthem.
Bern,Lisbon,Madrid,Stockholmbecameintelligencestreetmarkets,whereagent-handlers
rendezvousedwiththemenandwomenwhodevilledforthematmortalriskinenemyterritory.Inthe
PressRoomofStockholm’sGrandhotel,BritishandAmericancorrespondentsandspiesmingled
dailywithGermans.Goldandcashwerepassed–sometimeshugesumsinmanycurrencies–stolen
documentsreceived.Localpolicemengaveaidtofavouredclients:Portugal’ssecuritychiefAgothino
Lourenço,anardentpro-NaziandcloseacolyteofPresidentSalazar,ensuredthatthelocalAbwehr
receivedcopiesofeverypassengerlistforBOAC’sClipperflightstoEngland.TheSpanishuntil
1944indulgedahugeGermanespionageoperation.AsearchatBritishBermudaoftwoSpanish
liners,theCabodeHornosandCabodeBuenaEsperanza,homeboundfromtheUS,revealedthemto
becarryingAxisagentswithdispatcheswritteninsecretink.
ThejungleofallegiancesbecameespeciallyintricateinAfghanistan,wherealmosteverysenior
militaryandpoliticalfigurewasinthepayofonebelligerentoranother,andoftenofseveral.Axis
intelligencechiefsconvincedthemselvesthatIndiannationalismwastheproductoftheirsubtle
machinations–thoughintruth,ofcourse,itderivedentirelyfromdomesticsentiment.BhagatRam
GumassatwasthebrotherofanationalisthangedbytheBritishformurderingthegovernorofthe
Punjab.HebecameafrequentguestattheGermanembassyinKabul,wherehehelpedtoarrangethe
journeytoBerlinofhisleader,SubhasChandraBose.(TheRussians,obscurely,convinced
themselvesthatevenwhenBoselaterrecruitedan‘IndianNationalArmy’tofightagainsttheBritish,
hewasinthepayofMI6.IntheNKVD’swords:‘HemaintainedpersonalcontactswithHitlerwhich
allowedBritishsecretservicestobeinformedoftheGermans’planswithregardtoIndiaandthe
MiddleEast.’)GumassatarrivedonemorningattheSovietembassyinKabultoexplainthat,though
theGermanssupposedhimtobetheirman,hewishedinsteadtoserveMoscow.Centretookhimon
itsbooksasagent‘Rom’.InFebruary1942theAbwehrgavehimsomeweaponsandahandsomesum
ofcash,topromotesabotageinIndia.Inafinaldizzyingtwist,Romgavemostofthemoneytothe
USSR’sDefenceFund.
Ineveryneutralcapital,intelligenceofficerspuzzledovertheperennialenigmaoftheirtrade:
whichsidewasthisorthatsourcereallyserving?Oftentheanswerwasbothorneither,merelytheir
ownpockets.InIstanbul,anArmenianTurkishinformernamedShamlireceived650Turkishpounds
amonthfromtheJapanese,350fromtheGermans,thesameagainfromtheHungariansandasimilar
sumfromEuropaPress,anewsorganisation.AlargeItaliancolonyinthesamecitygossipedinthe
Casad’Italia,theformerSavoyardembassynowasocialcentre.Rome’sintelligenceoperationswere
controlledbyitsmilitaryattaché,Lt.Col.StefanoZavatarri,whomnobodyheldinmuchregard.A
Turkishsecretpolicemansaidcontemptuously:‘TheItaliansareHitler ’s“petitschiens”–“lapdogs”–
theymakeuseofthelowesttypeofagent–mongrelGreeks,Armenians,moslems,Jewsfromthe
slums.TheTurksgetwhatevertheywantfromthistypeofagentandthen,whentheydeemthetime
propitious,lockhimup.’TheItaliansdidnobetterinRiodeJaneiro,whereinOctober1941they
persuadedEdmonddiRobilant,aseniorexecutiveoftheLatiairline,tostartasecretshippingmovementmonitoringservice.Hewasgivenawirelessand$2,600,someofwhichheusedtorenta
rabbitfarminJacarepaguáfromwhichtotransmit.Thefactthathefailedtoprovideasinglereport
didnotsparehimfromafourteen-yearsentenceforespionageafterBrazilianpolicearrestedhimin
September1942.
SSSturmbannführerHansEggentravelledregularlytoSwitzerlandtocollectinformation,notably
fromtwobusinessmen,PaulHolzachandPaulMeyer-Schwertenbach.Each,however,briefedSwiss
intelligenceaboutthemeetings,andnobodywasconfidentabouttheirallegiance,evenafterOSS’s
AllenDullesreceivedreportsbasedonUltradecryptsspecifyingtheinformationtheyhadgivento
Berlin.MeanwhileinStockholmCol.MakotoOnodera,theJapanesemilitaryattaché,whowas
esteemedinTokyo,reliedheavilyoninformationfromaPolishofficernamedPeterIvanov–who
alsoreportedtothePolesinLondon.
ForeignersarrivinginPortugal’scapitalfromthebatteredanddarkenedcitiesofEuropewere
enthralledbythejanglingwhitetrams,caféorchestras,flowerseverywhere.MalcolmMuggeridge
wrote:‘Lisbon,withallitslights,seemedaftertwoyearsofblackoutlikeacelestialvision…Forthe
firstdayorsoIjustwanderedaboutthestreets,marvellingattheshops,therestaurantswiththeir
interminablemenus,thesmartwomenandcaféssprawlingoverthepavements…Bynightthe
cabarets,thedancinglights,theburstsofjazzmusiccomingthroughhalfopeneddoors–Pleasure
stalkingthestreets,withmanytrailingit.’GermanoperationsinLisbonwerebasedontheirfivestoreyconsulate,mostofitoccupiedbytheAbwehrandSD,thoughMI5alsoheldalistof135local
addressesusedbytheirstaff,oftenforprivatepurposes.Inthespringof1942theAbwehr ’sMajor
Brede,aLuftwaffeofficerunwillinglypostedintointelligence,informedCanaristhathisLisbon
stationwascorruptfromtoptobottom.Theadmiraldismissedthechargeoutofhand,butofcourseit
wastrue.
Mostmeetingsandtransactionsonneutralturfwereconducteddiscreetlyanduneventfully,because
itsuitedeverybodytopreservethetranquillityoftheinternationalbrokeragehouses.InSeptember
1940theMI6officer‘Biffy’DunderdaleusedLisbon’sSanGeronimochurchasarendezvousto
deliverawirelesssetandcodestoaFrenchintelligencemanwhoborethembacktoVichy,from
whichsomeoftheDeuxièmeBureau’smen,prominentamongthemtheFrenchcodebreakingchief
GustaveBertrand,sustainedcontactwithLondonuntilNovember1942.Hethenwentontherununtil
hewasextractedfromtheMassifCentralbyanRAFaircraftinJune1944.
Amidalltheindulgentwininganddininginneutralcapitals,however,atintervalstherewere
dramasandspasmsofviolencewhendealswentwrong,suspectedtraitorsweresilenced,orthelocal
authoritiescheckedspies’perceivedexcesses.On20April1940MI6’smaninStockholmwas
arrestedandchargedwithseekingtosabotageSwedishironoreexportstoGermany.Thisprovoked
oneamongmanyexplosionsfromtheBritishambassador,SirVictorMallet,whowrotetoLondon:‘I
donotwantyoutothinkthatIamblindtothefactthatitmaysometimesbenecessarytoemploy
methodsofthiskindwhenwearewagingawaragainstanenemywhohitspersistentlybelowthebelt.
Butmycomplaintsare,firstly,thatoursleuthsseemtobethoroughlybadattheirjob:sofartheyhave
achievedlittleinSwedenbeyondputtingmeandthemselvesinanawkwardposition.Secondly,Iam
inclinedtodoubtwhetherthegameisworththecandleinacountrywherenotonlyarethepoliceand
themilitaryverymuchonthealert…butwhereapolicyofmutualconfidencehasshownitself
repeatedlytobetheonewhichpaysbest.’Broadway’smaninStockholmreceivedaneight-yearjail
sentence,itsseverityreflectingtheperceivedmightofGermanyandweaknessofBritaininthe
summerof1940.
StalindemandedthedeathsofforeignenemiesevenmorewhimsicallythandidHitler.Whenhe
heardthattheformerGermanchancellorFranzvonPapen,nowservingasHitler ’sambassadorto
neutralTurkey,hadheldameetingwiththePope,andwasbeingtoutedasapossibleheadof
governmentiftheNaziscouldbeousted,hewassoangrythatheorderedvonPapenkilled.AnNKVD
attempttookplaceinAnkaraon24February1942whichfailedwhenMoscow’sBulgarianassassin
blewhimselfupwithhisownbomb,leavingvonPapenonlyslightlyinjured.MeanwhiletheKremlin
convinceditselfthatArgentina,hometoaquarterofamillionGerman-speakers,wasamajorNazi
base,andonStalin’spersonalorderstheNKVDburneddowntheGermanbookshopinBuenosAires
andarrangedscoresofotherincendiaryattacksonenemyproperty.Chargeswereplantedin
warehousesholdinggoodsboundforHitler ’sempire,andaboardshipsthatcarriedthem.TheFBI
andOSSsharedRussianparanoiaaboutArgentina,andweredisgustedbyitsgovernment’s
interpretationofneutrality,wherebywhenagivennumberofallegedNaziagentswerearrestedand
jailed,thesamenumberofAlliedsympathiserswasalsoroundedup.Similareven-handednesswas
displayedoverreleases:whenArgentina’smilitarygovernmentbelatedlybrokeoffrelationswith
GermanyinJanuary1944,116knownorsuspectedAxisagentswerearrested.Most,however,were
soonsetfree,andintheFBI’sbitterwords‘areundoubtedlyonceagainactiveonbehalfoftheReich’.
TheWesternAlliedsecretservicesseldommurderedanyone;assassinationwasseenasa
dangerousgametostart,aswasconfirmedbythereprisalsfollowingthe1942killingofReinhard
HeydrichinCzechoslovakia.In1944MI6considered,thenrejected,aschemefortargetedkillingsof
AbwehrpersonnelinFrance.BillBentinckagreed,sayingthatwhilehewasnotsqueamish,this
seemed‘thetypeofbrightideawhichintheendproducesagooddealoftroubleanddoeslittle
good’.AnepisodeinSpainbecameoneofMI6’suglierlegends.PaulClairewasaFrenchnaval
officeremployedtohelprunagentsintoFrancebysea.InJuly1941theBritishembassyinMadrid
reportedinacutealarmthatClairehadvisitedtheVichyFrenchnavalattaché,confessedhissecret
warrole,anddemandedhelptoescapeintoFrance.Whatwastobedone?Ifhecrossedthefrontier,
hewouldbefreetotelltheGermanswhateverhechose.AlanHillgarth,thebuccaneeringnaval
attaché,wasgivenadramaticmandatebyBroadway:‘liquidateClaire’orseizeamemberofhis
familyasahostagetosecurehissilence.
At1a.m.on25July,MI6officerHamiltonStokesreportedthatheandHillgarthhadsuccessfully
luredClairetotheBritishembassyand‘druggedhimintounconsciousness’.Thepairthensetoutby
carforGibraltarwithClaireprostrateonthebackseat.‘C’draftedapersonalsignaltotheRock,
orderingthatthetraitorshouldbeseizedonarrival,chargedwithtreasonandheldincommunicado.
Thisorderbecameredundant,however,whenMI6’sMoroccorepresentative,whochancedtobein
Gibraltar,signalled:‘Consignmentarrived…completelydestroyed…owingtoover-attentionin
transit…DamageregrettedbutIsubmititisforbest.’AlaterreportexplainedthatClairehad
suddenlyrecoveredconsciousnesswhilethecarpassedthroughavillageinAndalusia,andstarted
shriekingatpassers-byforhelp.Hiscaptorssilencedhimbyacrackovertheheadwitharevolver
whichprovedfatal.
SirSamuelHoare,theMadridambassador,wasfuriousaboutthepotentialscandal.Menzies
admittedthatClaireshouldneverhavebeenpostedtoSpain,andtherewasindeedembarrassing
fallout.VichyFrenchdiplomatsinMadridprotestedtotheSpanishForeignMinistry,andon12
AugustRadioFrancebroadcastamoreorlessaccuratereportoftheaffair,describinghowClaire’s
captorshadsilencedlocalvillagerswhoheardhisscreamsbysaying,‘Don’tgetupset,it’sonlya
memberoftheembassygonemadandwearetakinghimtoaSanatorium.’On14AugusttheLondon
DailyTelegraphcarriedamockingstoryheaded‘NazisInventaKidnapping’.Asisoftenthecase
withsuchsagas,thereportseemedsofantastic,andBerlinsochronicallymendacious,thatfew
readersathomeorabroadgaveitcredence.InJuly1942CommanderIanFlemingofnaval
intelligenceinformedtheRedCrossthatClairewas‘missingbelieveddrowned’enroutetoBritain
ontheSSEmpireHurst,whichhadbeensunkbyenemyaircrafton11August1941,afortnightafter
theFrenchman’sactualdeath.MI6feltobligedtopayClaire’swidowapensiontosustainthisfiction,
‘howeverrepugnantitmaybetorewardthedependantsofatraitor ’.
Ontheotherside,on12May1944,BletchleydecryptedasomewhathystericalmessagetoTokyo
fromtheJapaneseministerinMadrid,complainingaboutayoungfellow-countrymanofhisnamed
Sakimura,whohadbeenroamingtheSpanishcapitalexpressingenthusiasmfortheAlliedcause.The
ministertoldtheForeignOffice:‘Underthesecircumstancesitseemstomethatthereisnoother
courseopentousbuttosetasideallhalf-heartedorhumanemethodsandtakedrasticsteps,availing
ourselvesoftheassistanceofsomesuchorganastheGestapo,andeliminatinghim.’Thereisno
evidence,however,thatAxisagentsactedonthisundiplomaticproposal.
Stockholmwasakeyobservationpostforeveryintelligenceservice,thoughintheearlywaryears
Britishship-watchingoperationswerehamperedbysomestronglypro-NaziSwedishnavalofficers.
TheNorwegiansmaintainedanintelligencemissionledbyCol.RosherLund,whichdidusefulwork
amongitsfellow-Scandinavians.ThelocalMI6stationgeneratedsevenhundredreportsamonth,
mostlyfragmentsofinformationaboutGermanforcesintheregion,collectedbytravelling
businessmen.AmongthemanycharlatanswhoofferedinformationwasaRussianémigréwho,latein
1943,offeredMI6asourceintheJapaneselegation,togetherwithaneconomistinBerlinwhocould
providegossipfromGöring’shousekeeper.MoreprofitablewasaDanecodenamed‘Elgar ’who,for
morethanayearstartinginDecember1942,deliveredsheavesofmaterialaboutNaziindustry,
includingsomeV-weaponintelligence.Ononeoccasionintheautumnof1943,‘Elgar ’arrivedin
StockholmwithaconsignmentofindustrialacidbroughtfromGermany,inwhichwerehiddenglass
bottlescontainingthreehundredfilmedreports.InJanuary1944‘Elgar ’wascaughtbytheGestapo
andtoldeverythingheknewabouthisMI6contactsinStockholm.Forgoodmeasure,hethrewin
somefantasiesaboutBritishspygroupsinBerlin,Hamburg,Bonn,KönigsbergandVienna.These
revelationsmayhavesavedtheDane’sneck,sincehesurvivedthewarinGermancaptivity.
TheNKVD’sColonelBorisRybkin,undercoverasembassyfirstsecretary,playedakeyrolein
SovietcovertoperationsinStockholm,manyofwhichwereconcernedwithsecuringsuppliesof
commodities.ApopularSwedishactor,KarlEarhardt,becameanintermediaryforpurchasinghightensilesteelforaircraftconstruction.TheWallenbergfamily,whichcontrolledtheEnskildaBank,
profitedhandsomelyfromexchangingRussianplatinumforscarceindustrialmetals.Rybkin’swife
Zoya,hisfellow-NKVDofficer,describedhowonedayshesawseveralingotsonherhusband’sdesk.
‘Tin?’sheaskedcuriously.‘Tryliftingone,’saidthecolonel,andshefoundherselfbarelyabletodo
so.Nonetheless,whateverthesuccessesoftheNKVD’sStockholmasacommercialconduit,the
modernofficialhistoriansofSovietintelligencefranklyadmitthatitfailedtoestablishnetworksin
neighbouringScandinaviancountries,andespeciallyinitsattemptstoexploreGermannuclear
research,heavywaterproductioninNorwayandsuchlike.TheprincipalintelligencevalueofSweden
totheRussians,astoalltheAllies,wasasawindowonGermany.
MalcolmMuggeridge,MI6’smaninPortugueseMozambique,lodgedatthePolanahotelin
LourençoMarquesalongsideDrLeopoldWerz,theGermanvice-consulandAbwehrrepresentative–
‘youthful,blond,pinkandearnest’.WerzhadescapedfrominternmentinSouthAfrica.Hishistory
waswell-known,becauseluridarticlesabouthisNaziintelligenceconnectionshadappearedin
newspapersonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.AlsolivingatthePolanawasMussolini’sstandard-bearer,
anItaliannamedCampiniwhostruttedinemulationofhisDuceandevenlikewiseaffectedacloak.
MuchofCampini’strafficwasinterceptedatBletchley,forinstanceasignalof13January1943,
reporting:‘AconvoyoftenAmericanshipswithtroops,warandaviationmaterialleftCapetownon
11/1for?Sydney.’Intheweeksthatfollowed,Campinialsowirelessed:‘6Loadedtankersfrom
PersianGulfreachedDurbanon11/1’;‘TheEnglishhaveraisedthesalariesofsailorsto£27a
month’;‘28.1.43alargeAmericanconvoyboundforAustraliapassedthroughCapetown’;‘4tankers
haveleftDurbanforPersianGulf.’On29March1943anMI5officernotedontheseintercepts:
‘AssumethismaterialcomesfromLEO.SendingsamestuffasWerz.IfLEOisDoctorWERZin
LourencoMarques,hewouldseemanadmirablecreaturetohavestuffplantedonhim,ashislittle
items,whichsofarseemtobewhollyinaccurate,reachthethreeAxiscapitalsinamatterofdays.’
MuggeridgeenjoyedaccesstosomefacilitiesdeniedtohisAxisrivals,suchassummariesoftheir
outgoingmaterial,forwardedbyKimPhilby.Theembryospylearnedhistradebyexperience:when
hefirstattemptedtobribealocalpoliceinspector,themanspurnedhislargessewithcontempt,saying
thattheGermanspaidthreetimesasmuch,theJapaneseandItaliansevenmore.Themostinteresting
revelationtocomeMuggeridge’swayduringhisearlymonthswasthatDrWerzwenttobedina
hairnet.Moreserioustasksincludingthekidnapping,andtransfertoBritish-administeredSwaziland,
ofanItalian-paidship-watcher,whowasreportingAlliedconvoymovements.TheMI6agent’smost
excitingassignmentwastoorganisethehijackingofaGreekmerchantship,whosecaptainwas
discoveredbyBletchleytobeplanningarendezvouswithaU-boatintheMozambiquechannel.The
arrangementsforthiscoupweremadeinMarie’sPlace,alocalbrothel.Membersofthecrew,
subornedbylargebribes,dulyseizedtheircaptainandsailedtheshiptoDurban.
Muggeridgeformedanacquaintancewithaglamorousenemyagent,thehalf-estrangedwifeofa
localGerman,andwithJohann,herlover,whohadworkedforHimmlerandreminisced
entertaininglyabouthim.TheMI6manalsoscreenedagroupofPolishJewswhomtheJapanesehad
releasedfrominternment,andwhowerethereafterdispatchedtoBritishTanganyika.Thesesmall
encountersandeventswerethehighlightsofatwo-yearsojourninLourençoMarques,thoughlikeall
agentshedispatchedcopiousreports,dominatedbytrivia.Inonesense,andasthecynicalspyhimself
declared,hisactivitieswerefatuous.Butinthemidstofaworldatwar,itwasindispensableforevery
nationtoberepresentedinsuchplacesasMozambique,ifonlytoensurethattheothersidewasnot
leftfreetomakemischiefthere.
NeighbouringSouthAfricawasahotbedofNazisympathisers,eagertoassisttheReich.Paul
Trompke,theGermanconsul-generalinLourençoMarques,aportlyfifty-year-old,rananAfrikaner
agentnetworkoutofMozambique.OneofthesewasSydneyRobeyLeibbrandt,aformerSouth
AfricanheavyweightboxingchampionwhospentthreeyearsinGermany,joinedtheWehrmachtand
wastrainedasaparatrooperandsaboteurbytheBrandenburgRegimentbeforereturninghome
secretlyinJune1941,equippedwithawirelesssetandardentNaziconvictions,inaschooner
captainedbytheastonishingHeinrichGarbers.Leibbrandtfoundfriendsandsympathisershappyto
hidehim,butfewwhowishedtojoinarevolt.OnChristmasEve1942hewasarrestedwhiledriving
betweenJohannesburgandPretoria,andsentencedtodeathbyacourttowhichhetestifiedonlyby
givingaNazisalute.
RecognisingthevulnerabilityofAfrikaneropinion,primeministerJanSmutscommutedthe
sentenceonthisnationalsportinghero.Likewise,whenMalcolmMuggeridgetriedtoget
JohannesburgpolicetopickupacourierdrivingtothecitycarryingmessagesfromtheLourenço
MarquesAbwehrstation,hewascrisplyinformedthattherewasnotanAfrikanerhomesteadinthe
TransvaalwhichwouldnotbeproudtofeedBerlin’smanandspeedhimonhisway.Bletchley
interceptedasteadystreamofwirelessmessagesfromAfrikanerpro-Nazis,whichprompted
occasionalround-ups,suchasoneinJuly1942whichresultedintenarrestsandthediscoveryof
someweaponsanddynamiteintendedtobeusedforsabotageinDurban.Butthesignaltrafficmadeit
plainthatmostenemysympathiserswerecontenttoawaitaGermanvictoryratherthanprecipitatean
immediateuprising.Twocodedmessageswerefoundinapro-NazihouseinEastLondon.Thefirst
read:‘Everythingalrightworksomewhatsluggishpeoplealsopoor…notmuchsabotageherein
EastLondon.’Thesecondwailed:‘Itisdamnedhopelesstoworkalone.’Itwasfortunateforthe
AlliesthattheAfrikanerslackedbothaccesstoinformationofvaluetoHitlerandscopeforraising
muchmayhem.
Switzerland,atthehubofEuropebetweenGermany,FranceandItaly,wasthemostimportantofall
intelligencejunctions,ateemingsoukofspies,refugees,diplomatsandcrooksofallnationalities.In
asinglemorning,amanmightvisittheBernofficesofMI6,OSS,theAbwehrandSD,allwithina
fewhundredyardsofeachother.Thecityplayedhosttomanyexiledpoliticians,someofthem
prominentandwell-connectedinGermany,Austria,France.Secretwirelesscommunicationsenabled
theBritish,AmericansandRussianstotransmitamassofinformationandfabricationderivedfrom
sourcesinsideGermany.TheNazislikewisesoughttousethecountryasawindowontheworld.In
Bern,theAbwehrpickedupinformationfromProfessorKeller,headoftheSwisscommercial
delegationtoLondon;fromthemanageroftheBankofInternationalSettlements;andfromafew
seamenhomeonleave.Oneagentcodenamed‘Ober ’broughtbackfromGibraltardetailsoffootball
matchesbeingplayedbetweenBritishunitteams,whichsupposedlycontributedtoorder-of-battle
intelligence.TheGermans’mostvaluedagentwas‘Jakob’,otherwiseWalterBosshardofSwiss
intelligence.TheAbwehrclaimedinalltohaveathousandinformantsinSwitzerland,whileithadits
ownGestapobranchoffice,‘BureauF’,attachedtotheBernembassy.
Thelocalespionageindustry,whichinvolvedrepresentativesoftheChinese,PolesandCzechsas
wellasthemajorbelligerents,posedaconstantdilemmafortheBerngovernmentabouthowfarto
indulgeit.Swissintelligencehadbeenheadedsince1937bytheenergeticLt.Col.RogerMasson.
FrantišekMoravecheldMassoninhighrespect,notleastbecausetheSwissnevertroubledtheCzech
intelligencecellinZürich.Thecolonel’sresponsibilitywastopreserveSwitzerland’sindependence
byensuringthatnobelligerent,aboveallneighbouringGermany,feltsufficientlythreatenedor
provokedtobomboroccupythecantons.Amongthenation’spopulationofsixmillion,asmallbut
vociferousminoritylobbiedanddemonstratedfortheprivilegeofincorporationintheThirdReich.
BankersandindustrialistsmadelargeprofitsbyexportingcommoditiestoGermany,providing
financialservicesfortheNazileadershipcollectivelyandseverally,andexploitingthemurderofrich
Jews.YetmostSwiss,asdemocrats,preferredthattheAlliesshouldwinthewar.TheGermansknew
this:followingtheir1940occupationofFrance,theylaidhandsondocumentswhichrevealed
discussionsbetweenBernandParisaboutjointresistanceintheeventofaGermaninvasionof
Switzerland.
Massonintervenedagainstforeignagentsandmadearrestsonlywhenahubbubamongthespiesof
onenationoranotherbecametooconspicuoustobeignored.HealsostrovetopreventSwisscitizens
fromcausingembarrassmentbytakingsides.Inthecourseofthewar,1,389peoplewerearrestedin
Switzerlandforbetrayingsecrets.Militarycourtspassed478sentences,283onSwissnationalsand
195onforeigners.Lifewasbynomeansalwaystranquilforthelocalsecurityforces.GRUoperator
AlexanderFootereportedconsternationintheinternationalespionagecommunitywhenaSwiss
policemanwasblownupbyaninfernalmachinehechancedupon,andattemptedtodefuse.The
Englishmanwrote:‘Weneverknewwhosebombitwas.’
Inmostcapitals,diplomatswerebetterinformedthananyspy.TheGermanambassadorinLisbon,
BaronOswaldvonHoyningen-Huene,wassharp,energeticandwellliked;hewasoncloseterms
withtheintimatesofPortuguesedictatorAntónioSalazar,andranaspecialunitforpurchasing
foreignnewspapers,whicheverywarringnationminedasintelligencesources.MI5became
concernedaboutsensitivematerialbeingpassedtoMadrid–andthencetoBerlin–bytheDukeof
Alba,theSpanishambassadorinLondon,whowascaressedinBritisharistocraticcirclesasan
impeccably-manneredgrandee.Hisacquaintance,includingsuchmembersofthegovernmentasSir
JohnAnderson,werecontenttooverlookAlba’sroleastherepresentativeofFranco’smurderous
tyranny:hisdispatches–secretlyinterceptedandreadbyAnthonyBlunt–revealedhimasbeneficiary
ofmorethanafewwell-sourcedindiscretions.GuyLiddellwrote:‘Probablyagooddealof
informationgoeswestoverthesecondglassofport.’Alba,likemanyotherdiplomatsaroundthe
world,almostcertainlyprovidedmorereliableintelligencethanhisnation’ssecretagents.
14
ALittleHelpfromTheirFriends
1 ‘ I T S TI NK S , BUT S O M EBO D Y H A S TO D O I T’
GuyLiddellofMI5wroteinJune1943,followingthediscoveryofacommunistcellintheAir
Ministry:‘Unfortunatelythelawissomewhatinadequateinthecaseofamanwhoisspyingonbehalf
ofanally.’Theprincipallinkinthering,InternationalBrigadeveteranDouglasSpringhall,was
attemptingtopasstotheRussiansdetailsof‘Window’,BomberCommand’stopsecret–andthenstill
unused–radarbaffler.Springhalleventuallyservedfourandahalfyearsofaseven-yearprison
sentence.InthecourseofMI5’sinvestigation,itwasdiscoveredthathewasalsoincontactwithan
MI6officer,RayMilne,whowaspromptlysacked,andwithCaptainDesmondUrenofSOE’s
Hungariansection,whoreceivedaseven-yearprisonsentence.Liddellwrote:‘Penetrationofthe
servicesbytheCommunistPartyisbecomingratherserious.’
TheSecondWorldWarwasneverasimpletwo-sidedcontestbetweentheAlliesandtheAxis,
convenientlydefinableasthecausesofGoodandEvil.Allmannerofforceswereinplay.Currents
swirledceaselesslywithinsocieties,assupportersofleftandright,ofimperialismandantiimperialism,orofrivalfactionalinterests,viedforprimacyinthepost-warworld.Churchillcreated
thenecessaryrhetoricalmythofthe‘GrandAlliance’,anoblepartnershipofBritain,Russiaandthe
UnitedStates.YetthethreePowerscherishedentirelydifferentvisionsofthenewuniversethey
wishedtoemergefromvictory.Stalinwasthemostclear-sightedwarlord:hisaccommodationwith
RooseveltandChurchilltosecurethedestructionofHitlerdidnotabatebyajotortittlehisdesire
thereaftertopulldowntheedificeofbourgeoiscapitalismabouttheirheads.Whereasneitherthe
BritishnortheAmericansspiedontheSovietUnionduringthewaryears,Stalin’sagentsconducted
hugelyambitiousespionageoperationsagainstthedemocracies.HeedlessofNaziinterruptions,the
KremlinneverallowedtheRevolutiontosleep.
ItwashardforWesterncounter-intelligenceservicestoassesstheriskposedbyleft-wing
sympathisersinthetumultuouspoliticalclimateofthemid-twentiethcentury.Therewasmockery
then,andhasbeenmoresince,aboutMI5suspicionsfocuseduponsuchcommunistjournalistsas
ClaudCockburn.Paranoiaisanoccupationalhazardofintelligenceofficers:LordCherwell’soffice
onceshowedR.V.JonesalistofBritishscientistsandengineerswhoseloyaltywasconsidered
doubtful.Amongthirty-oddnames,Jonessawseveralwhomitwasridiculoustomistrust,foremost
amongthemthatofBarnesWallis,creatoroftheRAF’sdambustingmines.Ittranspiredthatasecurity
officerhadcompiledmostofthelistfromhisownfancifulimagination.
Yethundredsofimpeccablymiddle-classBritishandAmericanmenandwomen–includingIvor
Montagu,brotherofEwen,thenavalofficerwhoranthe‘Mincemeat’deception–didindeedbetray
theircountrytotheSovietUnion,whileahandfulofBritishfascistsympathisers,andmanymore
Europeanones,lenttheirservicestotheNazis.MI5initiallyrecommendedrejectingthearthistorian
AnthonyBluntforemploymentinmilitaryintelligence,becausehehadvisitedRussiaandonce
offeredacontributiontoaleftistmagazine.Posteritywouldderidetheuseofsuchcriteriatocast
doubtonaman’strustworthiness,hadnotBluntbeenlaterexposedasatraitor.NoelAnnan,an
academicwhospentthewarinthesecretworld,wroteabouttherecruitmentofsuchfiguresasKim
PhilbyandGuyBurgess:‘Theintelligenceserviceswerestaffedinpeacetimewithmenwhoregarded
Stalinasthefirstenemy,andHitleradisagreeablefellowbutapotentialally;[civilisedpeople]
rejoicedtoseeintelligentmenoftheleftbeingrecruitedtoredressthebalance.’
Itwashardtobalancetherivalclaimsofpersonalfreedomandnationalsecurityinthemidstofa
war.MI5hadachievednotablesuccessesagainstSovietspyringsinBritainduringthe1920sand
1930s.Itsofficersdisplayedimagination,indeedbrilliance,inhandlingand‘turning’Nazispies.The
securityservicenonethelessfailedtoidentifythemostimportantoftheBritishcommunisttraitors
whopenetratedWhitehallandthesecretcommunity.AnthonyBlunt,bythenservinginMI5,toldhis
NKVDhandlerthathefounditpersonallyreassuringtodiscoverthatthepre-warSovietinformant
CaptainJohnKingwasexposedonlywhenadefectordenouncedhim.
FromJune1941until1945theWesternAlliedgovernments,andespeciallytheBritish,were
cautiousabouthowmuchtheytoldtheRussians,aboveallbecausetheyfearedleakageoftheUltra
secret.TheyconstantlyforwardedoperationalinformationthatmightassisttheRedArmy,but
sourcedittonon-existentAlliedagentsinGermany.Evenonthoseterms,thetrafficmadeBroadway
uneasy,partlybecauseitwentexclusivelyoneway.Inthefirstweeksof‘Barbarossa’,Bletchley
interceptedanorderdirectingFourthPanzerArmytosupporttheencirclementofSmolensk,while
theLuftwaffebombedraillinksbehindtheRedArmy’spositions.Ontheeveningof15July1941
Churchill,afterreadingthisdecrypt,scribbledbelowthetextinhisredink:‘Surelyitisrighttogive
themwarningofthis.Pleasereportbeforeaction.’
StewartMenziestookstrongexception,minutingtheprimeminister:‘Iamoftheopinionthatthe
source[Broadway’stermforUltra]woulddefinitelybeimperilledifthisinformationwaspassedto
Moscowinitspresentform,asitwouldbeimpossibleforanyagenttohavesecuredsuchinformation
regardingoperationsforthe16thJuly.Ihave,however,arrangedwiththeWarOfficeforthegistto
beincorporatedwithothermaterial.’Menziesadded:‘IwouldpointoutthatGeneral[Mason-]
MacFarlane[BritishmilitaryattachéinMoscow]wasinstructedtoinformtheRussiansthatwe
possessawell-placedsourceinBerlinwhohasoccasionalaccesstooperationalplansanddocuments.
ThisexplanationhasbeenacceptedbytheRussians.Ihave,however,refusedtofurnishthemwith
detailed[unit]identifications,whichmightwellarousetheirsuspicionsastotherealoriginofthe
information.’
SuchprecautionswereconfoundedbythefactthattheNKVDandGRUwerereceivingasteady
streamofdocumentsandUltrainterceptsfromhighly-placedBritishinformants.Amongthemost
notableofthese,JohnCairncrossworkedearlyinthewarasprivatesecretarytoLordHankey,a
cabinetminister,andthereafteratBletchleyandelsewhereforMI6.Thereisalsoallegedtohavebeen
anotherSovietinformantattheParkearlierinthewar,neveridentified,andcodenamed‘Baron’.
AnthonyBluntworkedforMI5.KimPhilbybecameaseniorofficerofMI6.GuyBurgesswas
successivelyemployedbyMI6,theBBCandtheForeignOffice.DonaldMacleanworkedintheupper
reachesoftheForeignOffice.OtherBritishsourcesprovidedtechnicalintelligence,aboveallabout
theatomicbombprogramme.
GuyLiddellofMI5wroteinNovember1942,amidreflectionsonthesagaofRichardSorge,
whichhadbeenreportedtoLondonbyinformantsinTokyo:‘ThereisnodoubtthattheRussiansare
farbetterinthematterofespionagethananyothercountryintheworld.Iamperfectlycertainthat
theyarewellbeddeddownhereandthatweshouldbemakingmoreactiveinvestigations.Theywill
beagreatsourceoftroubletouswhenthewarisover.’Liddelldidnotknowthehalfofit.Soviet
penetrationoftheBritishgovernment,scientificinstitutionsandintelligencemachinewasalready
moreextensivethanhecouldhaveimaginedinhisnightmares.OncetheSovietUnionbecameanally,
however,ChurchillwasinsistentthatnointelligenceoperationsshouldbeconductedagainstStalin’s
regime.TheForeignOfficeformallyinstructedthesecretservicesthatevenscrutinyofBritish
communistsshouldbecircumspect,andthatnoinformantsshouldberecruitedinsidetheSoviet
Union.VerylittlewasdonebyMI5eventomonitorNKVDandGRUactivitiesinBritain,and
Bletchley’ssmallRussiansectionwasshutdowninDecember1941.Thesehonourablescrupleswere
notcreditedbyMoscow,ofcourse,farlessreciprocated.
Britishfolklegendtreatstheso-calledCambridgeFiveasauniquegalleryofscoundrels,
exemplarsoftherottennesswithintheclasssystem,aknotofgildedyoungmenwhosystematically
betrayedtheircountryasnoothersdid.Itseemsmoreappropriate,however,toconsiderthem
alongsideMoscow’sBritishagentsfromlessprivilegedbackgrounds–thelikesofthelethally
effectivenuclearspyMelitaNorwood–togetherwithhundredsofAmericanswholikewisebetrayed
nationalsecretstoStalin’styranny.Communismasacreedenjoyedwidespreadsupportacrossthe
Westernworld,inthaterawhenmanypeopleontheleftchosetoblindtheirconsciousnesstothe
institutionalisedinhumanityoftheSovietUnion.Intheireyescapitalism,whetherrepresentedby
RepublicancorporateinterestsintheUnitedStatesorbytheConservativePartyinBritain,sustained
theoppressionoftheworkingclass.‘Lookingaroundusatourownhells,’saidPhilipToynbee,the
historianwhobecameacommunistatCambridge,‘wehadtoinventanearthlyparadisesomewhere
else.’
MoscowCentre’srecruitersprofitedmightilyfromtheSovietUnion’sstatusasprincipalstandardbearerforcommunismasacreed.ManyNKVDandGRUsourcesaroundtheworldembracedthe
fictionthatbygivingsecretstotheComintern,theywereaidinganinternationalidealratherthanany
narrowlynationalcause.ZbigniewBrzezinskidefinesideologyascombiningtheoryandactionwith
a‘consciousnessofpurposeandofthegeneralthrustofhistory.Itgivesitsadherentsasenseof
consistencyandcertaintythatistoooftenabsentamongthose…broughtupinthetraditionofshorttermpragmatism.’EvenbeforetheenormityofthefascistmenaceinGermany,ItalyandSpain
becameapparent,left-wingsocialismattractedmanyenlightenedandcompassionatepeople.The
creedcamedressedinmanyguises.Explicitlytoavowcommunistsympathieswasnobarrierto
admissiontoculturedLondon,ParisorWashingtonsociety,becausecommunismwasnotthen
universallyidentifiedwiththebarbaritieslaidbareinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.James
Klugmann,aMoscowinformantwhoworkedforSOE,saidlater:‘Wesimplyknew,allofus,thatthe
revolutionwasathand.Ifanyonehadsuggesteditwouldn’thappeninBritainforsaythirtyyears,I’d
havelaughedmyselfsick.’
Inthe1930scommunistsseemedtobetheonlypeoplewhowerechallengingfascismwithany
conviction,andthe1936outbreakoftheSpanishCivilWardramaticallyenhancedthecredibilityof
theSovietUnioninintellectuals’eyes.TheybecameobsessedwithSpaininanevenmoreprofound
sensethanalatergenerationembracedVietnam.NoWesternersinthe1960s,howeverhostileto
Americanpolicy,tookuparmsforHoChiMinh.YetthousandsofEuropeansandAmericansfought
fortheRepublicansinSpain,orworkedtoassistthem.Millionsofpeoplearoundtheworldidentified
withthecausewithanalmostreligiousfervour.Inthisfebrileclimate,perhapsmoreintensely
politicisedthanatanytimebeforeorsince,Moscowrecruitedyoungidealistsofallnationalitiesto
serveascovertwarriorsforcommunism.
Centre’sBritishandAmericaninformantswerediversecharacters,unitedbyamessianicbeliefin
theirownrightness,indispensabletoenablethemsystematicallytobetraytheiremployers,colleagues
andcountry.HughTrevor-Roperreflectedlongafterwardsthatheandmanyothersofhisgeneration
hadunderestimatedtheperilsposedbycommunistswithinBritishandotherdemocraticsocieties,
becausetheyhadmistakenlyperceivedadherentstothecreedas‘merelythemostradicalofourallies
againstfascism,themilitantsontheextremeleftofacoalitioninwhichmenagreedtodifferwith
mutualrespect.EducatedliberalEnglishmenandAmericansfailedtounderstandthatcommunismisa
religion…[which]cantotallyparalysethementalandmoralfacultiesofitsconvertsandcausethem
tocommitanyturpitudeandtosufferanyindignity,foritssake.’
Yetmanyofthosewhocalledthemselvescommuniststhroughoutthe1930sfeltobligedtorecantin
thefaceofthesupremecynicismoftheAugust1939dealbetweentheNazisandtheSoviets.Trevor-
Roperwrote:‘Manyofourfriendshadbeen,orthoughtthemselves,communistsinthe1930s,andwe
wereshockedthatsuchpersonsshouldbedebarredfrompublicserviceonaccountofmerejuvenile
illusionswhichanywaytheyhadnowshed;forsuchillusionscouldnotsurvivetheshatteringimpact
ofStalin’spactwithHitler.’Thus,asthehightideofenthusiasmforcommunismrecededinthe
Westerndemocracies,allbutthemostdoctrinaireconservativesbecamereluctanttoholditagainst
youngmenandwomenthattheyhadavowedenthusiasmforMoscowbeforetheNazi–SovietPact
exposeditsturpitude.
ItremainsnonethelessremarkablethattheCambridgeFive,andothersoftheirkind,sustainedfor
somanyyearsparallelrolesinthesecretservicesofBritainandRussia.Thespieshadincommon
dysfunctionalpersonalities,togetherwithanangeragainstfamily,classorsocietywhichimpelled
theirtreacheryand,intheirownminds,justifiedit.Allhadintellectualgiftsandvaryingdegreesof
charm.JohnCairncrosswastheoutsider,bornthesonofaLanarkshireironmongerin1913.He
becameascholarshipboyfirstatGlasgowUniversity,thenatTrinity,Cambridge.Frailanduntidyin
appearance,adornedwithashockofredhair,hisearnestnessandgaucheriecausedhimtobe
dismissedbyChurchill’sprivatesecretaryJockColvilleas‘verybrilliant,veryboring’.Thelatter
handicapsethimapartfromtheother,famouslypersonableCambridgespies,thoughbrainssecured
himagovernmentjob.In1936Cairncrosspassedtopofhisyearintothecivilservice.
Liketheothers,hewasrecruitedtotheNKVDbyArnoldDeutsch,aVienneseJewandenthusiastic
sexualliberationistwhosince1934hadoccupiedaflatinLawnRoad,Hampstead,nextdoorto
AgathaChristie.Deutschpursuedastrategyofwooingyounghighflierswhoseemedtobeintransit
towardsthecorridorsofpower.KimPhilbylaterdescribedhimas‘amarvellousman’,funnyand
brilliant,whotreatedtheFiveascomradesratherthansubordinates.Helaterassertedthathenever
hesitatedforamomentbeforeembracingDeutsch’sproposal:‘Onedoesnotlooktwiceatanofferof
enrolmentinaneliteforce.’DonaldMaclean,afterhis1951flighttoMoscow,justifiedhisown
treasoninmoredisdainfulterms:‘It’slikebeingalavatoryattendant.Itstinks,butsomebodyhasto
doit.’
CairncrosswasintroducedtoDeutschbyJamesKlugmanninRegent’sParkinMay1937.Afew
monthslater,theNKVDmanwasrecalledtoMoscowduringthePurges.Hissuccessorsasthe
Cambridgespies’handlersnever,intheireyes,matchedDeutsch’scharmandprofessionalism.
Thoughhenarrowlypreservedhisownlife,heremainedsuspectedbyhisemployers,andtheFive’s
associationwithhimsustainedtheNKVD’swarinessofthem.Awinter1938assessmentbyMoscow
CentrewarnedthattheLondonintelligenceoperation‘wasbasedondoubtfulsources,onanagent
networkacquiredatatimewhenitwascontrolledbyenemiesofthepeopleandthereforeextremely
dangerous’.AlthoughCentreforatimekeptopenitslinkswiththeFive,theirmaterialwastreated
withtheutmostcaution.
Earlyin1940,Russiansuspicionsmounted.LavrentiBeriabecameconvincedthattheCambridge
spieswereservingeithertheBritishortheGermans,andnotthecauseofsocialism.Herecalledto
MoscowAnatolyGorsky,soleremainingmemberoftheNKVD’sLondonlegalresidency.For
severalmonths,whilethegreatestwarinhumanhistoryunfolded,Sovietintelligenceconductedno
significantoperationsinBritain;Stalinmadeitplaintohisspymastersthathewasmoreinterestedin
killingTrotskythanindiscoveringwhatHitler–or,forthatmatter,Churchill–wasdoing.Onlylate
in1940didtheintelligencepolicyoftheKremlinshiftwithitsaccustomedabruptness.Thewordwent
forththatCentrewastorebuilditsforeignagentnetworks,whichhadbeenallowedtoatrophy.
WhenrelationswiththeFivewereresumed,thenewNKVDresidentagentarrangedmeetingswith
theminKensingtonGardens,becausetherendezvouswashandyforthenearbySovietembassy.The
spiesresumedtheircovertcrusadeforsocialism,eventhoughatthistimeStalinwassupposedlythe
associateofHitler.Cairncross’sabsenceofsocialskillscausedhimtobetransferredfromthe
ForeignOfficetotheTreasury,andthenin1940tobecomeprivatesecretarytoLordHankey.Ifthere
wasanythingMoscowCentredidnotknowaboutthestructureandactivitiesofBritain’sintelligence
services,HankeynowfilledthegapsthroughtheagencyofCairncross.Theministerhadconducted
anexhaustiveinquiryintoMI6andBletchley.CairncrossslippedhisNKVDhandleracopyof
Hankey’sinterimreport,whichhadbeenfirstcirculatedwithinWhitehallinMarch1940.
Thereafter,hespentayearasacodebreakerinBletchley’sHut3beforehishealthfailed,
promptingatransfertoMI6.Between1941and1945hepassed5,832documentstotheRussians,
includingmanydecryptedGermansignals.Cairncrosswassotechnicallyincompetentthathewas
incapableofphotographingmaterial:hecouldonlycopyextractsbyhand,ortemporarilyfilchthem
forhishandlertofilm.TheNKVDresidentoftenfoundhimselfunabletocopewithencipheringall
thematerialhisinformantsupplied,buthewassufficientlyappreciativetogiveCairncrosscashto
buyacartomakeiteasierforhimtodeliverstolensecrets.Thespy’spersonalunpopularitywith
colleaguesprovednobarriertohiscontinuedemploymentbyMI6,andMoscoweventuallypresented
himwiththeOrderoftheRedBannerinrecognitionofhiscontributiontoitsowninterests.
GuyBurgesswasanavalofficer ’sson,bornin1911,whoattendedEtonandTrinityCollege,
Cambridge,thenbegantoscrapealivingfromtheBBC,whilepartyingonthefringesofLondon
intellectualandpoliticalcircles.Eveninaneraofharddrinking,Burgess’sconsumptionofalcohol
amazedhisacquaintance.Hisfavouritetipplewasalargeport,whichbecameknowntowaitersatthe
ReformClubinPallMallas‘adoubleBurgess’.AmidthedefiantsqualorofhisflatinBondStreet,
hesometimescookedastewofporridge,kippers,bacon,garlic,onions‘andanythingelselying
aboutinthekitchen’tosustainhimthroughaweekend.InDecember1938hiswitandsocial
connectionscausedhimtoberecruitedintoMI6’spropagandadepartment.Aftersomemonthshe
transferredtotheBBC,whereheproducedtheradioprogrammeTheWeekinWestminster,apassport
tousefulpoliticalcontacts.
Thereafterheenjoyedaracketyexistence,commutingbetweenBroadcastingHouseandthe
Fitzroviaintellectualworld,thewildershoresofhomosexualLondonandthedarkercorridorsofits
secretworld,bothBritishandRussian,whileexcusedfrommilitarycall-upthroughthegoodoffices
ofBluntatMI5.Howheavoideddisastermystifiedallthosewhoencounteredhisreckless
indiscretionlongbeforehewasexposedasanagentofMoscow.Acharacteristic1942Burgess
contributiontothewareffortwastorecruitasanMI5sourceAndrewRevoi,leaderoftheso-called
FreeHungariansinLondon–whomhehimselfhadputontheNKVDpayrollbackin1938.During
theearlywaryearsBurgesscontributedlesstoCentre’sintereststhantheotherCambridgespies,but
in1944SirAlexanderCadoganincomprehensiblyappointedhimtotheForeignOfficeNews
Department.BetweenJanuaryandJuly1945Burgesspassed389topsecretfilestohisSoviethandler.
DonaldMacleanprovidedMoscowwithitsmostimportantsecretpoliticalintelligence.Hisfamily
wereHighlandScots,oppressivelyPresbyterianandcommittedtotemperance;hisfatherwasa
lawyerwhoeventuallybecameaLiberalcabinetminister.YoungDonald,bornin1913,waseducated
atGresham’s,aharshNorfolkpublicschoolwhereboyshadtheirtrouserpocketssewnupto
discourageputtinghandsinthem.Maclean,tallandhandsome,wasoncedescribedbyanadmiring
Naziashaving‘perfectAryangoodlooks’.Fromanearlyage,withhisBalkancigarettesand
loungingcharm,hecultivatedaposeofmandarinease.PhilipToynbeewroteofhisfriend’s‘lazywit
andsophisticatedgoodhumour ’.MacleanandtheothersrecruitedbyMoscowatCambridge
professedtobelieve–andperhapsinitiallydidso–thattheywereworkingfortheCominternrather
thanexplicitlyfortheSovietUnion.MacleanjoinedtheForeignOfficeandbegantopassdocuments
tohisNKVDcontroller.In1937KittyHarris,borntopoorRussianparentsinLondon’sEastEndand
brieflybigamouslymarriedtoAmericancommunistleaderEarlBrowder,assumedthisrole.Sheand
Macleanconcludedtheirfirstmeetinginbedtogether,andthereafterforsomemonthsconductedan
affair.ThefollowingyearhewaspostedtoParis.RobertCecil,whohadknownMacleaninhis
youngerdaysandwasnowanembassycolleague,thoughthisdemeanourhadbecomeuneasyand
hesitant,incontrasttohisearlierself-assurance.AtthetimeCecilwasbemusedbythechange,but
muchlaterheidentifieditasreflectingguiltaboutMaclean’sdoublelife.Thehandsomeyoung
diplomatwasbynomeansuniversallyliked:typistsreferredtohimdisdainfullyas‘smarty-pants’.
NonethelessMelindaMarling,anAmericangirlwhomMacleanmetinParis,gaveaglowing
accountofhimtohermother:‘Heissixfoottall,blondewithbeautifulblueeyes…Heisthesoulof
honour,responsible,asenseofhumour,imagination,cultured,broadminded(andsweet),etc.’InJune
1940shefoundherselfpregnantamidthechaosofFrancebeingoverrunbytheGermans.Thesetwin
shockscausedhertobrushasideearlierreservationsaboutmarryingMaclean.Afterahastywedding,
theywereevacuatedtoBritain.MelindathensailedforNewYork,wheretheirfirstchildwasborn–
andswiftlydied.Onlyintheautumnof1941didshereturntolivewithDonaldinLondon.Itseems
almostcertainthatfromanearlystagetheleft-leaningMelindawasawarebothofherhusband’swork
forMoscow,andofhisbisexuality.
TheenforcedaccessionoftheSovietUniontothestruggleagainstHitlerliftedthespiritsofthe
WesternspiesservingMoscow.NowthatBritainandRussia,andsoonafterwardsalsotheUnited
States,werefightingthesamefascistfoes,suchpeopleasMacleancouldpersuadethemselvesthat
passinginformationto‘UncleJoe’wasnobetrayal,butinsteadmerelyameansofassistinga
commoncause.In1942alone,thedocumentshestoleorcopiedfromtheForeignOfficefilledfortyfivefilesintheNKVD’sMoscowarchives.Maclean’srichcropincludedmuchmaterialabout
Britain’srelationswiththeSovietUnionanddetailsofBritishpositionsinnegotiationsandbefore
summitmeetings.InApril1944hewaspostedtotheBritishembassyinWashingtonasfirstsecretary,
whereheplayedtenniswithLordHalifax,andraisedhisgameasapurveyorofAnglo-American
secrets.ThestrainoflifeasaspyandbisexualshowedinMaclean’sincreasingconsumptionof
alcoholandlapsesintouglyscenesunderitsinfluence.Buthisintelligenceandcharm,leavenedwith
ForeignOfficeandclasssolidarity,enabledhimtokeepbothhisjobandhisroleastheSoviet
Union’smostimportantsourceonWesternforeignpolicy.
AnthonyBlunt,avicar ’ssonbornin1907andeducatedatMarlborough,wonamathematics
scholarshiptoCambridgeandlatertookaFirstinforeignlanguages.Thereafterhebecameadonand
anembryoarthistorian.Bothhishomosexualityandhisleft-wingsympathieswerewellknown–his
friendGuyBurgessmayhavebeenresponsibleforrecruitinghimtotheNKVD.Butin1939neither
politicsnorsexualityprovedabartohisjoiningtheIntelligenceCorps,withwhichheservedfor
somemonthsinFrance.FindinghimselfhomelessafterDunkirk,hebecameatemporaryLondon
lodgerofVictorRothschildofMI5,throughwhomGuyLiddellrecruitedhimtothesecurityservice.
Bluntwonimmediateplauditsasanintelligenceofficer,especiallyforhisdexterityinexamining
thecontentsofneutraldiplomaticbags.AnMI5secretaryofthetimelaterrecalled:‘MyGod,hewas
acharmer!PoorAnthony!WewereallabitinlovewithAnthony,youknow…Heusedtowander
aroundwithhiscod-liveroilandmalt,saying“That’swhatTiggerslikeforbreakfast.”Heknew
WinniethePoohverywell.HehadaLeslieHowardface–amatineeidol–aratherthinanddrawnlookingfacebutitwasthefaceofLeslieHoward.EveryonewasinlovewithLeslieHowardatthat
time.’OnseveraloccasionsBluntwassenttorepresentMI5atmeetingsoftheJointIntelligence
Committee,andin1944hewassecondedtoSHAEFtoworkondeceptionplanning.Inhisparallel
NKVDroleherecruitedandranasasub-agentLeoLong,whoworkedinmilitaryintelligence.Blunt
providedastreamofMI5documentsandsomeUltradecrypts,includingsignalsrelatingtothe1943
battleforKursk,thesubstanceofwhichhadbeenconveyedtoMoscowthroughBritishmilitary
channels.HealsobriefedtheRussiansabouttheactivitiesoftheTwentyCommittee,whichran
‘turned’NaziagentsinitsmasterlywirelessgamewiththeAbwehr.
Harold‘Kim’Philby,mostnotoriousoftheCambridgegroupbecausehegainedaccesstothemost
sensitivesecretsandhistreacheryultimatelycostmostlives,wasthesonoftheArabistscholarSt
JohnPhilby,anobsessivepersonalitywhototteredontheedgeofinsanity.Theelderlysagedeclared,
forinstance,thatHitlerwas‘averyfineman’,andin1940becameconvincedoftheinevitabilityof
Britishdefeat,whichcausedhimtobebrieflyinternedinIndia.AfterWestminsterandCambridge,the
NKVDgavePhilbycareercounselling:getintonewspapers,saidArnoldDeutsch,whichwould
provideanidealplatformforhisMoscowwork.Duringthelater1930sPhilbybecameawellregardedjournalist,servinginSpainduringitscivilwarasacorrespondentforTheTimesaswellas
anagentoftheNKVD,whodoubledhisnewspaperincome.Philby’spersonalextravagancemade
Russia’scashasimportanttohimasthepleasureofassuaginghisclosetcontemptforBritainby
servingitsenemies.Peopleofpowerandinfluencelovedhimasthemostcongenialofcompanions:
hewassponsoredformembershipofLondon’saugustAthenaeumClubbythemilitarytheoristBasil
LiddellHart.AjokethatpleasedPhilbymightilywasthatFrancothefascistawardedhimSpain’sRed
CrossofMilitaryMerit,thoughin1937theRussiansbriefedhimtogatherintelligencetofacilitate
Franco’sassassination.
Thereafter,however,duringthePurgesandtheperiodoftheNazi–SovietPacthefoundhimself
droppedasabruptlyasweremanyotherNKVDinformants.Hisoffersofnewmaterial,forwardedto
MoscowthroughDonaldMaclean,werespurned.HewasobligedinsteadtobusyhimselfasaTimes
warcorrespondentwiththeBritishExpeditionaryForceinFrance.PhilbywasappointedtoMI6in
1940,afterexpressinganinterestinanintelligencecareertooneoftheservice’stalent-spotters,
HarrietMarsden-Smedley.ValentineVivianwasafriendofStJohnPhilby,andcheerfullyaccepted
theoldman’sassurancethathissonhadforsworndalliancewiththeleft.Kimstartedhiscareerwith
Britishintelligencebylecturingontechniquesofsubversivepropagandatoforeignexilesrecruited
toSOE.Heoftenopenedhisflamboyanttalksbyurginghisaudiences,manyofwhomrecognised
StalinandHitlerasmatchingmonsters:‘Gentlemen,Ihavenowishtopreventyoublowingupthe
Russians,butIwouldbegyou,forthesakeoftheAlliedwareffort,toblowuptheGermansfirst.’
PhilbywontheaffectionaswellasthewarmapprovalofBroadwaycolleaguesandchiefs,andin
October1941waspromotedtoheadtheIberiansectionofMI6.
TheRussianshadrenewedcontactwithhimninemonthsearlier,buthisinitialreportsaboutlifeat
Broadwayearnedtheirscorn.HeassertedthattheSovietUnionstoodonlytenthonMI6’spenetration
targetlist,anincrediblepropositiontoCentre,whichwasconvincedthattheexistentialpurposeofthe
BritishsecretservicewastoachievethedestructionoftheSovietUnion.Russia’sleadersinhabiteda
societyinwhichnobilityofconductwasalien,indeeddangeroustothestate.Theywerethusunableto
creditthefactthatforthewar ’sdurationeventhemostimpassionedanti-communists,including
Churchill,hadsetasidetheirhostilitytothroweverythingintothestruggleagainsttheAxis.Thiswas
emphasisedin1940whenWalterKrivitsky,theformerNKVDresidentinHolland,defectedtothe
Americans.On23January,MI5debriefedhimatLondon’sLanghamhotel.Krivitskydescribed
almostahundredSovietagentsinEurope,sixtyofthemworkingagainstBritishinterests,including
sixteenwhowereBritishsubjects.YetMI5,overwhelminglypreoccupiedwiththeNazimenace,felt
abletocommitonlyasingleofficertoinvestigateSovietpenetration,anditisthusunsurprisingthat
hefailedtoidentifyanunnamedBritishjournalist,mentionedbyKrivitskyashavinghelpedthe
NKVDinSpaintoplanFranco’sassassination,asKimPhilby.
Moscow’sinterestwasreawakenedbyPhilby’sappointmenttoheadtheIberiansection.Thereafter
heprovidedCentrewithalmostathousandwartimesecretdocuments,channelledthroughAnatoly
Gorsky,nowreappointedasNKVDresidentattheSoviets’Londonembassy.Shortandfat,Gorsky
wasacaricatureStalinistwhosemercilesschillrousedtherepugnanceoftheCambridgespies,
thoughinsufficientlysotoputthemofftheirwork.Atthisstage,Philby’smostsignificant
contributionwastofuelSovietparanoiaabouttheprospectthatBritainwouldmakeacompromise
peacewithHitler,throughtheagencyofDeputyFührerRudolfHess.Thiswaspuremischief-making,
presumablydesignedtoraiseitsagent’sstandingwithCentre.Inthesamespirit,Philbyreportedthat
hisMI6mastershadabandonedaplantokillAdmiralCanarisononeofhisfrequentvisitstoSpain,
allegedlybecausetheBritishanticipatedthathemightbecometheintermediaryinbilateral
negotiations.
InsideBroadwayBuildings,Philbyaffectedanold1914–18armytunicofhisfather ’s.Withhis
stammer,shabbyclothesanddiffidentmannerheseemed,inRobertCecil’swords‘likeoneof
GrahamGreene’sseedyanti-heroes’.YetMalcolmMuggeridgewarmedtoanapparentfellow-free
spirit:‘Hisromanticvenerationforbuccaneersandbuccaneering,whatevertheideologicalbasis–if
any–mightbe.Boozers,womanisers,violenceinallitsmanifestations,recklessnesshowever
directedhefoundirresistible.’PhilbyoncetoldMuggeridge,inafamiliarhalf-self-mockingkey,that
Göbbelswasamanhefelthecouldhaveworkedwith.
Philby’squalitiescommandedanextravagantpremiuminsideBroadway:HughTrevor-Roper
foundhim‘anagreeableandeffectiveperson…intelligent,sophisticatedandevenreal’.The
historianwashatedbymanyofhiscareercolleaguesbecauseheneverconcealedhiscontemptfor
them,butPhilbyflatteredandcaressedthem.TheconsequencewasthatTrevor-Roperthepatriotwas
mistrusted–repeatedlythreatenedwithdismissalandoncewithaprosecutionfortreason,for
conveyingdetailsofBroadway’sfailingstoLordCherwell–whilePhilbythebetrayersecuredhis
masters’absoluteconfidence.
CommontoalltheCambridgeFivewasadisdainforloyaltynotmerelytocountry,butalsoto
familyandfriends.In1935Philbyrifledhisownfather ’spapersonNKVDorders.Hemademuchof
hisrelationshipwithanoldWestminsterschoolfriend,TomWylie,inhopesofexploitingWylie’s
roleasaWarOfficeofficial.GoronwyReesbrokecontactwithCentrefollowingtheNazi–Soviet
Pact,anideologicalbridgetoofarforhim.DonaldMacleanspatatRees:‘Youusedtobeoneofus,
butyouratted!’Thewriterpromisedtheothertraitorsthattheirsecretremainedsafewithhim,and
kepthisword,anunedifyingmoralcompromise.Burgess,however,remainedfearfulofRees’s
knowledge.Inthespringof1943heurgedhisSoviethandlerthathisfriendshouldbemurdered.
WhenMoscowdismissedthissuggestionasaclumsyBritishprovocation,atameetingwithGorsky
on20JulyBurgessofferedtokillReeshimself,whichwasalsothoughtsuperfluous.
CentreoftensoughttopressmoneyonitsBritishagents.Mostprofessedscruples,declaring
themselvesenthusiastsforanidealratherthanmercenaries.AnthonyBluntoncesurprisedhishandler
bydemanding,andreceiving,£200forsomeundisclosedpersonalpurpose.Hesignedareceiptfor
thecashwhichthereafterreposedintheNKVD’sfiles,muchtothesatisfactionofCentre:thelong,
lean,boundlesslydeviousarthistorianwasthuschainedtoitsoar.Meanwhile,Philby’slifestylecould
onlybesustainedbyanincomefromMotherRussiaaswellasfromMI6.
Asisoftenthecasewithdoubleagents,bothsideshadmomentsofdoubtabouthisloyalty.In
November1942StuartHampshire,oneoftheRadioIntelligenceBureau’sOxforddons,producedan
importantreportonthepowerstruggletakingplaceinGermanybetweenHimmlerandCanaris.
Philbysecuredabanonitscirculation,withoutgivingareason.ThiscausedHampshiretosay
thoughtfully,‘There’ssomethingwrongwithPhilby,’thoughneitherhenorhiscolleaguescould
figureoutwhat.Longafterwards,theyconcludedthatKimwasprobablyunderordersfromMoscow
tostifleanyinformationthatmightencouragetheBritishtotalktoGermanoppositiongroups.Atthe
time,HughTrevor-RoperwassoannoyedbyPhilby’sbehaviourthathegaveacopyofHampshire’s
documenttoLordCherwell,whichearnedhimyetanotherformalreprimandfromMenziesand
ValentineVivian.Hewasorderedtowriteaformalapologyforcommunicatingwiththeprime
minister ’sadviser,ratherinthespiritofaschoolmasterpunishinganerrantchildbyimposing‘lines’.
MeanwhileinMoscow,atexactlythesametimeElenaModrzhinskaya,oneoftheNKVD’smost
respectedanalystsandanobsessiveconspiracytheorist,urgedthatalltheCambridgeFivewerepart
ofaBritishplot,‘aninsultinglycrudecapitalistprovocation’.Thisseemedthemorecrediblesince
threeofthegroup’searlyhandlers–Deutsch,TheodoreMalyandAlexanderOrlov–hadalready
beenbrandedastraitors.ModrzhinskayacomplainedthatthecontentofthecopiesofMI6’ssignalsto
theBritishembassyinMoscow,passedtoCentrebyPhilby,werefartoobanaltobeauthentic.The
RussiansneverabandonedtheirconvictionthattheirowncountryteemedwithBritishspies.An
NKVDreportof30October1945stated:‘TheEnglishintelligenceorganstookadvantageof
improvedopportunitiesduringthewarandintensifiedtheespionageagainsttheSovietUnion.Atotal
ofaround200BritishagentsworkedintheUSSRduringthewar,ofwhich110wereinMoscow,30in
Murmanskandover20amongvariousdelegations.’Thiswasanexquisitefantasy.MI6hadlacked
anyMoscowstationsince1936,andtheBritishambassadorvetoedaproposaltoestablishone.
Bycontrast,inthecourseof1941theNKVD’sLondonstationforwardedtoMoscow7,867British
classifieddocuments,715onmilitarymatters,fifty-oneonintelligence,127oneconomics,andthe
restonpoliticalorothertopics.Asimilartrafficflowwassustainedthroughthelaterwaryears.To
preservethesecurityblanketoversources,insideCentrealmostalloriginalmaterialwasdestroyed
afterbeingtranslatedandparaphrasedbydeskstaff.Suchwasthebulk,however,andsoseverethe
shortageofEnglishlinguists,thatthousandsofpagesweredispatchedtotheincineratorsunexamined.
YuriModin,oneofsevenMoscowdeskstaffchargedwithhandlingthismountainofmaterial,later
reflectedsardonically:‘Whatwould[thespies]havethoughtiftheyhadknownthattheirtelegrams
andreportshadbarelya50percentchanceofbeingread?’WhenPhilbyprovidedanaddressbookof
Britishagentsinfar-flungplaces,theNKVDbrusheditaside:itschiefswantedonlymaterialabout
MI6activityincountrieswhereMoscowhadexplicitinterests.
ButsomeoftheBritishspies’reports,trueandfalse,foundtheirwayintotheKremlin.Atypical
missivefromCentretotheUSSR’sStateDefenceCommitteewasdated21April1942:‘Thisistopass
ontoyoutheinformationfromanagent,whichNKVDoftheUSSRhasreceivedfromLondonasa
resultofconversationsbetweenthesourcesandanofficialfromtheAmericanembassy(“Gilbert”)
andanumberofMPs.1.OnTheSecondFront.Ithasbecomeclearthat…apartfromactive
opponentsofChurchillwhothinkheissabotagingtheopeningoftheSecondFrontfromhishostility
towardstheUSSR,thedelayisbeingviewedfromtwoangles:Politicalaspect:thereisdisagreement
amongmembersofthegovernmentastowhenoffensiveoperations[aninvasionoftheContinent]
shouldstart…ManyofthosewhoknowChurchill,includingLloydGeorge,saythatheremains
hauntedbythefailureoftheDardanellescampaign[in1915]whenhewasblamedfortheGallipoli
disaster…Accordingto“Gilbert”…only4Britishdivisionshavehadspecialisedamphibious
training.’Thisreport,whichcontinuesatlength,isnotmuchdifferentinstyle,accuracyand
usefulnessfromroutinediplomaticandforthatmatternewspaperreporting.
AsimilarNKVDreportfromLondon,dated28July1942,wasbroadlysoundinsubstance,but
quotedsomerisiblesources:‘OurfixedagentinLondonsentthefollowinginformation,obtainedby
anagent.MostofficialshaverecentlybeenassertingthattheSecondFrontwillnotbeopenedthis
year.SuchpeopleasLadyColefax–theagent-informantoftheConservativeParty’sexecutive
committee…arenowdeclaringwithalmostcompleteassurancethattheSecondFrontwillnot
happen.’SibylColefaxwas,inreality,ameresocialalpinistandconspicuouslyfoolishwoman,of
whomacontemporaryjokesuggestedthatshescrawledononeofherluncheoninvitations‘tomeet
themotheroftheUnknownSoldier ’.
MeanwhileDonaldMacleantoldMoscowthatPoland’sGeneralWładysławSikorskidismissedtalk
thattheKatynmassacresofPolishofficerswereNaziwork,sayinghewasconfidentthattheyhad
beencarriedoutbytheNKVD,asofcoursetheywere.AnthonyBluntwarnedthatthePolish
governmentinLondonwouldneveraccepttheproposedredrawingofitscountry’sborders.Thiswas
oneoftheBritishmessagesthatappearstohavehadsomeinfluenceontheKremlin,confirming
Stalininhisdeterminationtospurnthe‘LondonPoles’andcreatehisownpuppetregime.TheMI5
officeralsoprovidedMoscowwithausefullistofBritishsourcesrecruitedamongthepersonnelof
exileEuropeangovernmentsinLondon.
TheRussiansreceivedmuchinformationthatwasplainwrong,andreflectedonlytheirobsession
withsupposedconspiraciesagainstthemselves.Forinstance,on12May1942‘areliablesource’
reportedtoMoscowthatanofficialfromtheGermanembassyinStockholmhadarrivedinLondon
aboardaSwedishaircraftbearingpeaceproposalswhereby:‘Englandwillstayintactasanempire.
TheGermanswillwithdrawtroopsfromCzechoslovakiaandrestoreitsoldborders.AllEastern
Europewillberestoredtoitspreviousborders.TheBalticstateswillalsoremainindependent.After
EnglandacceptstheseconditionsGermanywillreachanagreementwiththeUSSR.’TheRussians
assumedtheworstaboutadmittedlymuddledAnglo-AmericanpolicyinYugoslavia.On28March
1943anNKVDsourceinAlgiers–possiblyanOSSinformant–messagedalmosthysterically:‘In
collaborationwiththeAmericanstheEnglishhaveinstructed[General]Mihailovićnottojoinany
activeoperations[againsttheGermans],butinsteadtobuildstrengthandmaterielandmakehisarmy
ascapableaspossible[foroperationsagainstTitoandhiscommunistpartisans].TheEnglishand
AmericansarehelpingMihailovićdespitebeingwellawareofhislinkswiththeGermans…In
parallelwiththistheEnglishhavedecidedtoexploitallopportunitiestocompromiseMarshalTito.
AmongotherthingstheyareusingtheneutralSwissmediaforthispurpose.’
MoscownursedarunninggrievanceabouttheBritishrefusaltoforwardtothemrawUltra
recrypts.ThemodernRussianintelligenceofficialwebsiteassertsasfactin2015:‘Althoughthe
BritishintelligenceservicewasgettingreliableinformationoftheplansofGermanarmyleadership
attheEasternFront,theEnglishpreferredtokeepthisinformationsecretfromtheirSovietally.It
wasthroughagentsamongtheBritishsecretservicethattheSovietforeignintelligenceservicedid
acquirethisinformation.’YetYuriModinadmittedthatLondonhadreasononitsside.TheRussians
werethemselveshauntedbyfearsofNaziagentsinsideSovietheadquarters–includingtheNKVD–
whichwereprobablyunjustified,butcosttwosuspectgeneralstheirlives.
InMay1943,MI6createdanewSectionIX,taskedtostudycommunismandSovietespionage,
thoughitsstaffwasauthorisedtoworkonlywithsuchmaterialascouldbegatheredoutsidethe
SovietUnion.InaccordancewithChurchill’ssterndiktat,nopenetrationactivitieswerecarriedout–
notthatthesecouldhaveachievedmuchanyway.WhenanEstoniannamedRichardMaasingwas
debriefedbyMI6,Philbydisplayedakeeninterest,unsurprisingtoposterity:hewantedtodiscover
whowereMaasing’scontactsinterritoriesclaimedbytheSovietUnion.EarlyinJuly1944,MI6’s
LisbonstationreceivedsomewarningoftheHitlerbombplotfromOttoJohnoftheAbwehr.Philby
wasinsistentthatthisreporthadnosignificanceandshouldbe‘spiked’–almostcertainlyforthe
familiarreasonthathisMoscowordersobligedhimtodoeverythingpossibletofrustrateAllied
intercoursewiththeGermanResistance.AftertheAbwehrofficerPaulVehmehren’s1944defection
inIstanbulandsubsequentdebriefing,PhilbypassedtotheRussiansVehmehren’slonglistofCatholic
conservativecontactsinGermany:allthoseintheEastwereliquidatedbytheRussiansin1945–46,as
actualorpotentialanti-communists.
Moscow’ssuspicionsofPhilbynonethelesspersisted,intensifiedbyanepisodeintheautumnof
1943.HesuppliedtohishandlersacopyofasupremelysensitiveUltradecryptofasignaltoTokyo
fromtheJapaneseembassyinBerlin,detailingBaronŌshima’s4OctoberconversationswithHitler
andRibbentrop.TheversionwirelessedtoMoscowomittedtheconcludingparagraph,because
Bletchleyhadonlyacorruptedtext.WhentheNKVDsecuredfromanothersourceacopyofthesame
signal,butincludingthemissingsectionwhichdiscussedapossibleseparatepeace,Fitin,thechiefof
theFirstDirectorate,assumedthatPhilbyhaddeliberatelyomitteditfromhisdeliveryonBroadway’s
orders.Moreover,alltheCambridgeFiveweredamnedbytheircontinuingfailuretoprovidedetails
ofthenon-existentBritishspyringsintheSovietUnion.On25October1943CentretolditsLondon
residencythatitwasplainPhilbyandhisfriendsweredoubleagents.Itdispatchedeightmento
Londonwithanexplicitbrieftosecureconfirmationofthis,byshadowingtheirmovements.Since
noneofthenewcomersspokeEnglish,the‘tailing’operationagainsttheNKVD’sownsourceswas
lessthansuccessful.
OnlyinAugust1944wasthereachangeofheartinMoscow,arenewalofbeliefthatthe
CambridgespieswereservingSovietratherthanBritishinterests.CentrewrotetoitsLondonstation
thatnewevidenceaboutPhilby‘obligesustoreviewourattitudetowardshimandtheentiregroup’,
whowere‘ofgreatvalue’.InMoscowandLondonalike,rivalemployersnowclamouredforhis
services.HisoldnewspaperTheTimesstrovetopersuadehimtoreturntojournalism;oneofits
seniorexecutivescharacterisedhimas‘steady,experiencedandwise’.Philbydidindeedconsider
suchacareerchange,butinsteadcontinuedonhispathofsecretdevastationatBroadway,facilitated
bythedisastrousdecisionofStewartMenziestoappointhimtoheadMI6’santi-communistespionage
section.‘C’s’protégérewardedhiminhisowninimitablefashion,byspendingmanyhoursatMI6’s
StAlbansout-station,photographingthefilesofitsagentsforMoscow’sedification.
Longafterwards,followingtheexposureofPhilby,BurgessandMaclean,andamidatidalwaveof
recriminationsagainsttheintelligencecommunityforadmittingsuchmentotheircouncils,Hugh
Trevor-RoperreflecteduponboththeirrecruitmentanditscosttoBritishinterests:‘If[Philby]had
beenturneddownasanex-communist,andneverafterwardsexposed,ourfashionableleft-wingers
wouldhavedenouncedhisexclusion,justastheynowdenouncehisappointment,asaninfamous
exampleofsocialandintellectualdiscrimination…Until1944IdonotbelievethatPhilbyhadmuch
opportunity,ormuchneed,todoharm.HisworkwasagainsttheGermans,inSpain,whereRussia
waspowerlessand,bynow,uninterested.Hehadnoaccesstopoliticalsecrets.Anywaytheinterestof
theRussianswas,atthattime,thesameasours:thedefeatofGermany.’
PhilbythenwrotefromhisMoscowrefuge,commentingonTrevor-Roper ’sremarks,andbitter
stricturesagainsthim:‘Inotethatyouabhortreason.SodoI.Butwhatistreason?Wecouldspend
manydaysmotoringaroundIraqanddiscussingthiswithoutgettingmuchneareragreement.’
Trevor-Roperresponded,‘“Whatistreason?”Yougailyask,and,likejestingPilate,donotwaitfor
answer…Toserveaforeignpower,eventospyforaforeignpower,doesnotseemtome
necessarilytreason.Itdependsontheforeignpower,andtheconditionsofservice…Buttoserve
unconditionally,toequatetruthwiththereasonofstateofanypower,thattomeistreasonofthe
mind;andtomakethissurrendertoaformofpowerthatiscynical,inhuman,murderous,thattome
istreasonoftheheartalso.’
SomeofMoscowCentre’sofficersretaineddoubtstothebitterendabouttheloyaltiesofthe
Cambridgespies.ElenaModrzhinskayaattendedPhilby’s1988funeral,inordertoviewhisopen
casket.ShewashauntedbysuspicionsthatevenindeaththeBritishtraitormightsomehowhave
achievedalastdeceit.WhateverthedefiantclaimsofPhilbyandhiskintohavetakenprideinserving
Moscow,thealcoholismandprematuredecaywhichovertookallsaveBluntsuggestthattheyfound
littlecontentmentintreason.OnPhilby’sarrivalinMoscowhewascrestfallentodiscoverthathe
lackedanyNKVDrank–nomereforeigninformantwasgrantedone.Trevor-Ropersaidhebelieved
thatPhilbyhadenjoyedhissupposedtriumphoverbourgeoiscapitalismlessthanhepretended:‘Did
JudasenjoytheLastSupper?Idoubtit.’
SirDickWhite,laterheadofbothMI5andMI6,wrotetoafriendaftertheCambridgespieswere
exposed:‘Onbalanceitwasnotsuchabadbettofightthewaronaunitedfront.Thecostwastohave
hadBluntin[MI]5,Philbyin[MI]6andB[urgess]andM[aclean]intheF.O.Ontheothersideofthe
equationamassiveintakeofbrainandabilitiesfromtheUniversitieswhichsetentirelynewstandards
ofintellectualachievement.’Thiswasanextremepost-factorationalisationofadisasterforthe
reputationofBritain’ssecretservices.YetWhitewasthusfarright:thatBritain’swareffort,notto
mentionitsstandingasabastionoffreedom,wouldhavebeenmuchthepoorerhadeveryofficer
withaleft-winghistorybeenexcludedfromitsinnercouncils.
HowmuchdamagedidthetraitorsdotoBritishinterests?Untilthelatewartimeyears,thelikely
answeris:notmuch.ForlongperiodsMoscowrefusedtobelievethattheBritishweresostupidasto
allowavowedcommunists–albeitsupposedapostates–accesstotheirdeepestsecrets.Probablythe
mostsignificantcontributionoftheCambridgeFive,andexplicitlyofDonaldMaclean,wastokeep
StalininformedaboutBritishpoliticalanddiplomaticintentions;animmensevolumeofcabletraffic
concerning–forinstance–Anglo-AmericanweaponsandsupplydeliveriestotheUSSRwasalso
passedtoMoscow.TheRussians’defaultdiplomaticposturetowardstheWesternAlliesofstonefacedindignationsuccessfullyconcealedfromWashingtonandLondonthefactthat,atsummit
meetings,theSovietdelegationwasfullyinformedinadvanceofintendedBritishandAmerican
positions.Churchillespecially,whooftenawaitedapprehensivelyStalin’sresponsetounwelcome
surprises,especiallyaboutdelaystoD-Day,mighthavesparedhimselfdiscomfort.The‘surprises’
werenothingofthesort:theSovietdictatormerelybrilliantlysimulatedamazement,thenunleashed
angertoorder.ItwasimpossibleforChurchillandRoosevelttoplaypokerwiththeKremlin,because
Stalinknewtheirhands.Meanwhile,itisknownthatAnthonyBluntatMI5handledmanyJapanese
Purpledecrypts,anditislikelythathegavesometotheRussians,evenifIzumiKozo’smaterialdid
notenablethemtobreakthecipherontheirownaccount.
ApologistsfortheCambridgespiescitesomeoftheaboveindefenceoftheirmen.Philbyandthe
rest,theyargue,gaveaidnottoBritain’senemies,buttoitsforemostallyinthestruggleagainst
Nazism.Wasitnotshameful–acauseforrighteousangertopeopleofconscience,todayasinthe
1940s–thatBritaindidsolittletoaidRussiainitsdesperatehour,andevendeniedMoscowaccessto
Ultra,theforemostweaponinChurchill’shands?Thefirstanswertosuchadefenceisthatthetraitors
providedinformationtoMoscowlongbeforeRussiabecameanally,indeedwhiletheSovietUnion
wascoupledtoNaziGermany,fromAugust1939toJune1941,aperiodthatembracedsuchtriumphs
forMoscowCentreastheKatynmassacres.Evenafter‘Barbarossa’,whenBritain,Russiaandlater
theUSwerejoinedinthestruggleagainstHitler,Stalinneverwaveredinhisperceptionofthe
WesternAlliesasultimatefoes.ThetreacheryofPhilbyandhisfriendslatercostthelivesofmany
goodmenandwomen,executedforthemerecrimeofresistingtyranny.
Meanwhile,BletchleyParkwasthemostsecretorganofBritishwar-making.Thedangerwas
enormousthatonceitsdoingswereknowninMoscow,aleak–perhapsthroughacompromised
Russiancode–wouldalerttheGermanstoEnigma’svulnerability.Thefactthatthisdidnothappenin
nowayexcusestheconductofthosewhorevealedtheUltrasecrettotheKremlin.TheRussianswere
careless,orworse,withthesecretsofothers;itshouldberememberedthat,whileStalinwasstill
Hitler ’sfriend,theSovietambassadorinWashingtontoldhisGermancounterpartthattheJapanese
Purplecipherwasbroken.ThemostthatcanbesaidaboutPhilbyandhiskinisthatitwasfortunate
allofBritain’ssignificantwartimetraitorsgavetheirallegiancetotheSovietUnion,thelooming
menacetofreedomanddemocracy,ratherthantoNaziGermany,itspresentdanger.
2 A M ER I C A NTR A I TO R S
TheUnitedStatesisatempleoffreedom,andthusalsoofindiscretion.EvenafterPearlHarbor,
Americansfoundithardtoadjusttotheimperativesofsecurity,toshakeoffhabitsacquiredover
centuries.Operationalpilotsgossipedovervoicelinks;politiciansandserviceofficersdiscussed
plansovercocktails;newspapermenandbroadcasterschafedagainstcensorship,andpublished
informationofvaluetotheenemy–mostnotoriouslytheChicagoTribune’s1942revelation,reprised
byWalterWinchell,thatUStriumphatMidwayhadbeengainedbybreakingJapanesecodes–
whenevertheythoughttheycouldgetawaywithit.Theeasternseaboard’sblazingilluminations,
whichpersistedforweeksafterthe‘DayofInfamy’,muchtotheadvantageofU-boatcaptainswho
sankscoresofmerchantmensilhouettedagainsttheirglare,weresymbolicofmuchelsethatmightbe
magnificent,butwasalsoperilous,inanationatwar.
FortunatelyfortheAlliedstruggleagainsttheAxis,GermanspieswholandedonUSsoilwere
roundedupwithlittledifficultybypoliceandtheFBI.TheJapaneseenjoyedaslittlesuccess
intelligence-gatheringinAmericaastheydidnearerhome.TheSovietUnion,however,exploitedthe
opensocietytosponsorespionageinsidetheUnitedStatesonascaleunmatchedbyanyothernation.
The1950sallegationsofSenatorJosephMcCarthy,whopromotedawitch-huntinaclimateof
hysteriaandparanoia,wereunfoundedagainstmanyindividuals,buthadsubstanceinthegenerality.
HundredsofAmericansofleft-wingsympathies,andasmallernumberwhoworkedforcash,
systematicallybetrayedtheircountry’ssecretstoMoscow.Theatomictraitors,tobediscussedlater,
havebeenthefocusofmuchhistoricalattention,whiletheRussians’hostofotherwartimeinformants
havereceivedlessnoticethantheydeserve.NKVDandGRUsourcesinWashingtonwereprivyto
someofthenation’smostsensitivepolicydebates.
Untilthepost-warera,theFBIhadnegligiblesuccessinidentifyingAmericantraitors,andtheguilt
orinnocenceofsomehigh-profilesuspectsremainsunproventothisday.Asearlyas15July1941a
StateDepartmentofficialwrote:‘AmpleevidenceexiststhatAmericancommunistsaretaking
advantageofthepresentsituationtoattempttoingratiatethemselvesinhighgovernmentcirclesas
advocatesofdemocracyundertheguiseofadvocatingall-outaidtotheSovietUnion.’FBIattention,
however,focusedmorecloselyontheUSCommunistPartythanonSovietagent-runners.Thereare
sheavesofreportsintheWashingtonarchivesconcerningAmericancommunistsympathisers,but
untilthelater1940stheFBI’ssurveillancetargetswerealmostallpeopleatthelowerendofsociety–
dockworkers,tradesunionactivistsandsuchlike.TheFBIbreathedheavilyuponsuchbodiesasthe
NationalCouncilofSoviet–AmericanFriendshipandEastEuropeanexpatriateandnationalist
groups.ItheldabulgingfileontheNationalMaritimeUnion’sallegedsubversiveactivities.Ithad
onesuccessagainsttheSovietUnioninApril1941,whenitsecuredtherecalloftheNKVD’sNew
YorkstationchiefafterFBIagentsarrestedhimatameetingwithaninformant,butthiswasthetipof
ahugeiceberg,invisibletoJ.EdgarHoover.
ThewartimeFBIclaimedknowledgeofjustfiveAmericancitizensspyingforRussia,while
subsequentrevelationsandconfessionsidentifiedatleastanothereighty.The1948Venonadecrypts
providedcodenamesfortwohundredRussiansourcesintheUS,ofwhomhalfremainunidentifiedin
thetwenty-firstcentury.SincetheVenonamaterialcoveredonlyapartofMoscow’soperations,itis
reasonabletoassumethatinthe1930sand1940sthereweremanymoreAmericantraitors,aview
supportedbythememoirsofcontemporaryNKVDandGRUofficerswhoservedintheUS.
IntheFBI’sdefence,Hoovercouldpleadthatthenation’sdeclaredenemies–Germany,Italyand
Japan–enjoyednosignificantespionagesuccesswithinthecontinentalUnitedStates.AfterJune1941
theRussianswereAmerica’sprofessedalliesratherthanfoes,andPresidentRoosevelthimself
treatedthemwithtrustandrespect.ApologistsfortheBureau’sfailureagainsttheNKVDmightsay
thatthismerelyreflectedawidernaïveté,extendingtothesummitofUSgovernment,aboutthescale
ofthemenaceposedbytheSovietUnion.TheFBIalsofacedsomeofthesameproblemsasdid
AbwehrandGestapomenhuntingtheRedOrchestra:mostofthesignificantplayersinhabitedupper-
middle-classsocialandprofessionalcircles,wherelawenforcementagencieswereunaccustomedto
tread.
Aselsewhereintheworld,theNKVD’sAmericanoperationsbecamealmostmoribundbetween
1939and1941,andmostofitsUSsourcesbecameperforcesleepers.Thefirstattempttoreactivate
networksfailedwhenArnoldDeutsch,rehabilitatedanddispatchedtobecomeUSstationchief,
appearstohavedrownedwhenhisshipwassunkinmid-Atlantic.InDecember1941,Itzhak
Akhmerovwasappointedinhisstead.HehadservedintheUSsincearrivingtherein1934under
coverasastudent,andashetoldanaudienceofKGBtraineestwentyyearslater,‘switchingfromthe
statusofaforeignstudenttothestatusofanAmericaninsuchalargecityasNewYorkwasnot
difficult’.AfteratimehemovedtoBaltimore,whichwashandierformanaginghisWashington
sources.HeandanotherNKVDofficersettleddowntorunafurrier ’sshop,whichprovedsuccessful
initsownright,turningagoodprofitaswellasprovidingcover;buthehadindifferentsuccess
recruitingnewinformants,arolethatothersfilledbetter.
TheNKVD’sthreeacknowledgedstations–attheSoviets’AMTORGtradeorganisationinNew
York,theWashingtonembassyandtheSanFranciscoconsulate–wereeachmannedbythirteen
intelligenceofficers,supportedbyothersatsub-stationsinLosAngeles,Portland,Seattleand
elsewhere.ScoresmoreagentsworkedundercoverofSovietfrontorganisations–theTASSnews
agency,Sovfilmexport,theRussianRedCrossandsuchlike;someAmericanmaterialwasalso
channelledthroughtheNKVD’sMexicoCitystation.ItmightbesupposedthatSovietspies,arriving
fromthemostrepressiveandausteresocietyonearthattheirusualfirstportofcall,NewYorkCity’s
Tafthotel,wouldbedazzledbyAmericanwealth,glitz,glamour,inexhaustibleenergy.Yet
remarkablyfew‘wentprivate’–defected–andeventhosewhowrotememoirslongaftertheTerror
endedsaylittleornothinginpraiseoftheUS.Mostseemtohavelivedandworkedinagreycocoon
ofRussiannessandsocialistrectitude.
Sovietespionagewasoftenafamilybusiness.WhenAlexanderFeklisovleftMoscowforanNKVD
postinginNewYork,hehadthecustomaryfarewellmeetingwithforeignministerMolotov,who
expresseddismaythathewasabachelor:‘Wedon’tsendsinglemenabroad,especiallytotheUSA.
Theywillimmediatelyfoistabeautifulblondeorbrunetteonyou,andahoneytrapwillbeready.’
Feklisov’sbossreassuredMolotovthatthereweresomegoodRussiangirlsservingatSoviet
institutionsinNewYork,andabridecouldbefoundamongthemforthenoviceagent.In1944the
dutifulFeklisovindeedmarriedaRussianstudentsenttostudyatColumbia.
ItzhakAkhmerovdidwedanAmerican–butshewasHelenLowry,nieceofUSCommunistParty
leaderEarlBrowder.WhenVasilyZarubin,freshfromparticipationintheKatynmassacresof25,000
Poles,leftMoscowtobecomeWashingtonstationchiefinDecember1941,hetookwithhimhiswife
Elizabeth,herselfanNKVDcaptain,whoplayedanimportantroleasrecruiterforherhusband’s
network,andwhooftentravelledtoCaliforniatomeetRobertOppenheimerandotherusefulcontacts.
Shepassedeasilyasasophisticated,cosmopolitanEuropeanwoman,equallyfluentinEnglish,
German,FrenchandHebrew.Shecamefromafamilyofrevolutionaries,andwasoneofCentre’s
mostruthlessoperatives.HavingcutherteethworkingasacaseofficerfortheterribleFelix
DzerzhinskyaftertheRevolution,shewaspostedtoTurkey.Thereshegaveimpressiveproofof
loyaltytoBolshevismbybetrayingherthenhusband,YakovBlumkin,anotherSovietagent.Hehad
beenentrustedwiththesaleofMoscow’sHasidicLibrary,andrashlygavesomeoftheproceedsto
Trotsky,whowasthenexiledinTurkey.AlmostbeforetheechooftheshotsfromBlumkin’sfiring
squadhaddiedaway,hiswidowmarriedZarubin.Forthirteenyearsthereafterthetwotravelledand
spiedtogetheracrossEurope.InAmerica,ElizabethplayedherrolesoskilfullythattheFBIidentified
herasacareerintelligenceofficeronlyin1946,afterherreturntoMoscow.Sheandherhusband
meanwhileplayedapivotalroleinCentre’sglobalespionageprogramme.BeforeOctober1941,
StalinhadtakenlittlepersonalinterestintheUS–thoughalwayseagertostealitstechnology–
becausetherewasnodirectclashbetweenSovietandAmericaninterests.Now,however,itspolicies
becameatoppriority:StalinmetpersonallywithZarubinbeforehedepartedforhisAmerican
posting,tourgeitsimportance.
ThenewNKVDresidentwasforty-sevenwhenhearrivedinNewYork.HissubordinateAlexander
Feklisov,whoidolisedZarubinasagiantamongSovietspies,describedhimthus:‘Hewasof
mediumheight,slightlyoverweight,withthinfairhairwhichhebrushedback.Heworeglassesina
whitemetalframe,andhiseyeswereforeverinflamedfromoverwork.Hewasimmenselystrong,
verygoodattennis,fulloflifeandanobviousleaderinanycompany.Helovedsingingandplayed
severalmusicalinstruments…Hespokequicklyandhisvoicewassomehowtrumpet-like,thoughhe
wasalsoagoodlistener,easyandfriendlywithsubordinates.Hedemandedtheyshouldshow
initiative,boldness,evenrecklessness.Hederivedhisstrengthfromhisimmenseexperienceand
professionalism,thoughhecouldsometimesbeindiscreet.Hehadallkindofconnectionsamong
foreigners,andwasagreatrecruiter.Hehandledourmostimportantagentspersonally.’Feklisov
omittedtomentionthatZarubin,asecretservantoftheSovietstatesince1925,wasalsoaruthless
killer,thoughthisdidnotsparehimfromhimselfoncefeelingthewarmthoftheexecutioner ’s
breath.AtameetingBeriainvitedhimtostand,thensaid,‘TellusaboutyourlinkstotheFascist
intelligenceservices.’Zarubinsternlyrejectedtheslander–andsufferednoconsequences.Butthose
whowitnessedthescenelefttheroomtrembling.ZarubindominatedSovietespionageintheUnited
Statesuntilhisexpulsionin1944.
IntheUSasinBritain,theCominternprovidedafigleaftospareinformantsfromthediscomfort
ofacknowledgingthattheyweregivingsecretstoaforeignpower.Thoseinvolved,saidtheIowanbornMarxistwriterJosephineHerbst,‘tookgreatprideintheirsenseofconspiracy’.Amongearly
recruitswasHaroldWare,aradicalNewDealerintheAgricultureDepartment,killedina1935car
crash.AttheStateDepartmenttheGRUsecuredtheservicesofAlgerHiss,whiletheNKVDfromthe
mid-1930sreceivedasteadystreamofinformationfromNoelFieldandLaurenceDuggan.Thelatter
wasapoliticalromantic,muchinfluencedbyhisformidablewifeHelenBoyd,whomaRussian
describedas‘anextraordinarilybeautifulwoman:atypicalAmerican,tall,blonde,reserved,wellread,goesinforsports,independent’.HeddaGumpertz,aGermanexileandpassionateanti-Nazi
workingfortheNKVD,hadcultivatedDugganasafriendofField.Dugganwasoncehandeda
birthdaypresentbyhisSoviethandler:amonogrammedcrocodiletoiletriescase.Herejecteditinthe
samespiritthatsomeoftheBritishtraitorsdeclinedmoney,‘statingthathewasworkingforour
commonideasandmakingitunderstoodthathewasnothelpingusforanymaterialinterest’.
TheRussiansprofitedfromthinkinglong.SincetheSovietUnionsawitselfinahistoric
adversarialrelationshiptotheWesternPowers,itsrulerswerecontentforagentstospendyearsin
trainingandorientationfortheirroles.SemyonSemyonov,forinstance,wasashort,stockyfigure
withaducknoseandbigeyes,whorubbedalongeasilywithpeopleandcouldpassforamiddle-rank
corporateexecutive.InJanuary1938,agedtwenty-six,hewassentatMoscow’sexpensetodo
advancedstudiesattheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology–theNKVDintendedhimtobecomea
scientific-technologicalintelligenceofficer.AtMITtherewerecomplaintsthatSemyonovwaslazy
andconceited,butheprovedanadeptwhenhestartedhiscareerasanagent.By1943hewasrunning
twenty-eightAmericansources,elevenofwhomprovidedmaterialonchemistryandbacteriology,
sixonradio,fiveonaviation.Amongthemorenotablewasthirty-three-year-oldHarryGold,bornin
SwitzerlandtoRussianrefugeeparents.GoldcametoAmericaasaninfant,andstartedspyingforthe
Sovietsinhisfirstjob,wherehestoleadry-iceprocessthatstoppedicecreammelting.In1942he
abandonedhisdayjobasachemisttomanagehisownagent-runningoperation,meetingSemyonov
onceaweektoarrangeassignments.
CentrewasuneasythatsomanyofitskeyWashingtonsourceskneweachother,mostlythrough
linkstoleft-winggroups,butcoulddolittleaboutit.Onemanwhomighthaveexposedtheextentof
itspenetrationintheUSwasIgnatzReiss,anNKVDofficerwhoquitandfledforhislifeduringthe
Purges.Hisemployerscaughtupwithhim,however,inaLausannerestauranton4September1937.
Hewasshotnearby,hisbodydumpedbytheroadside.Thisprovedausefulexecution,forotherspies
whoconsideredwithdrawingtheirservicestendedtodroptheideawhentheyrememberedReiss’s
well-publicisedfate.MaybetheyalsoknewaboutJulietPoyntz,anAmericaninformantwhodecided
toleavetheSoviets’employ,butinsteadvanishedfromtheNewYorkWomen’sClubon3June1937
andalsoappearstohavebeenliquidated.
ThoughsomeAmericanleftists’faithinthesocialistdreamwasshakenbytheNazi–SovietPact,it
wasrenewedinfullmeasureby‘Barbarossa’,whichthrewuponRussiathechiefburdenofdefeating
Hitler.WhenAlfredSlack,aninformantworkingatEastmanKodak,wasoffereda$150bonusforan
unusuallyusefulpieceofinformation,hetoldhishandlertosendthemoneytoMoscowforthe
‘JosephStalintankcolumn’,apopularfundofthetime.SemyonSemyonov,theagentinquestion,
solemnlygaveSlackareceipt,tokeepalivetheflameofhisillusions.
Others,however,shamelesslysoldsecretsforthemoney.Semyonovlikedtotellthestoryofan
AmericanchemistatDuPontwhopassedtheRussiansmaterialonnylonandexplosives,withoutany
pretenceofideologicalmotive.‘Democrats,Republicans,fascists,communists,theyareallthesame
tome,’themansaid.‘ImeetyoubecauseIneedcash.Ineedtobuildahouse,educatemydaughter,
dresshernicelyandmakesureshemarrieswell.’Ateveryrendezvoustherewasprotractedhaggling
betweentheRussianandtheAmericanaboutthevalueofhiswares,whichcustomarilystartedwiththe
sellerdemanding$1,000,thentakinghometwoorthreehundred,togetherwithaburningindignation.
SemyonovtoldhiscolleagueAlexanderFeklisovthathealwaysfeltexhaustedaftermeeting
‘Hustler ’,astheDuPontmanwascodenamed.IttooktheRussianhourstorecoverhissangfroid,as
hedebatedwhethertheangryAmericanwouldseehimagain.Feklisovasked,‘Whynotpaytheguy
more?’Semyonovanswered,‘Becauseifhebuyshishouseandsavesenoughmoney,hewillstop
workingforus.’Asitwas,theirexchangescontinuedforyears.
BycontrastLaurenceDugganoftheStateDepartment,whowashandledbyItzhakAkhmerov,did
thebusinessforlove.InOctober1939,State’ssecurityofficerswarnedhimthathisloyaltywasbeing
questioned,buttheyhadnoinklingofthemagnitudeofhistreachery,andafteracursory
investigationhewasallowedtokeephisjob,becomingapersonaladviseronLatinAmericato
CordellHull.InJuly1944DugganresignedfromStateandjoinedtheUNreliefagencyUNRRA.
Fouryearslater,afterbeingquestionedbytheFBIhejumpedfromthesixteenthfloorofhisoffice
building,buteventhentheauthoritieswereobliviousoftheimportanceofhisNKVDrole,revealed
onlybythe1990openingofaMoscowarchive.ArthurSchlesinger,whoknewandlikedDuggan,
wrotelongafter:‘Onewonderswhatimpulsesofidealismmayhaveinextricablyentangledthis
decentmanwiththeharshmachinationsofStalinisttyranny.’SomeofthosewhospiedforMoscow
remainedunidentified.‘C-11’,awomansourceintheNavyDepartment,ceasedproviding
informationinthesummerof1940,whenthreatenedwithexposure.AnotherAmericanwoman,
codenamed‘Zero’,whoworkedforaSenatecommitteeandpassedonreportsfromtheUS
commercialattachéinBerlin,soughtworkintheStateDepartmentbutwasrejected,partlybecauseit
wasreluctanttoemployJews.ShenonethelesssecuredtranscriptsofCordellHull’sconversations
withforeignambassadors.
TheSovietsalsohadplentyofdudsontheirpayroll.MarthaDodd,daughterofAmerica’s1933–38
Berlinambassador,wasrecruitedbytheNKVD’sBorisVinogradov,withwhomshefelldesperately
inlove.EvenbySovietstandards,Centre’smanipulationoftheirrelationshiptouchedextremes:hours
beforehisexecutionduringthePurges,VinogradovwaspersuadedtowritealettertoDodd,urging
hertokeepspyinginexpectationofbeingreunitedwithhim.Hisdeathwasconcealedfromher,and
shesustainedcontactwithherhandlersthroughthewaryears.AnNKVDreportasserted
contemptuously:‘SheconsidersherselfaCommunistandclaimstoaccepttheParty’sprogram.In
reality,however,“Liza”isatypicalrepresentativeofAmericanBohemia,asexuallydecayedwoman
readytosleepwithanyhandsomeman.’Moscowwasinexceptionallycredulousmoodwhenitgave
Dodd’sbrotherWilliam$3,000tohelphimbuyasmallnewspaper,theBlueRidgeHerald.By1945he
wasworkingintheNewYorkofficeoftheTASSnewsagency,runbytheNKVDstationchief,and
wasunderunsurprisinglycloseFBIsurveillance.MoscowgainednothingfromtheDoddsaftertheir
fatherlefttheBerlinembassy.
MichaelStraightwasanotherRussianfailure,arichyoungAmericanrecruitedbytheNKVD’s
LondonstationchiefTheodoreMaly,supposedlyactingfortheComintern.Hissubsequenthandler,
ArnoldDeutsch,dismissedStraightasadilettantewithmoremoneythansense,whooncewrotea
chequefor£500tohelpfundthecommunistnewspapertheDailyWorker.Ontheyoungidealist’s
returntotheUS,hesecuredajobwiththeStateDepartment.WhentheNKVD’sWashingtonstation
expressedscepticismabouthisvalue,MoscowCentrecautionedsternly:‘Straightisprospectivelya
bigagent,andburninghim…isnotourintention.’TheNazi–SovietPactcausedStraighttoresign
fromtheStateDepartment–andfromtheNKVD.Henever,however,revealedtheknowledgehehad
acquiredinLondonaboutthetreacheryofBluntandBurgess.TheRussians,cynicallyandperhaps
correctly,believedthatthiswasnotoutofloyaltytotherenegades,butbecausethefateofIgnatz
ReissshowedwhathappenedtothosewhobetrayedCentreoritsagents.
SincetheUnitedStatesisanationofimmigrants,itwasimpossibletomonitorahostofsuch
citizensasBorisMorros,borninStPetersburgin1891,whobecameaminor-leagueHollywood
director-producer.TheNKVDrecruitedhimin1934,chieflytoprovidecoverforotheragentsrather
thanasasourceofinformation.MorroshadthreebrothersstillintheSovietUnion:onewasexecuted
afterincurringthedispleasureoftheParty,buthisownNKVDroleenabledhimtosavethelivesof
theothertwo.In1944VasilyZarubindroveMorrostomeetMarthaDoddandherrichhusband
AlfredStern,whomhepersuadedtoinvest$130,000intheproducer ’smusicpublishingbusiness.
ThisnotonlyprovedapoorinvestmentforStern,butalsoawasteofeffortfortheNKVD,whogot
littleornothingofvaluefromMorrosbeforehewasbelatedly‘turned’bytheFBIin1945.Likewise
‘Leo’,afreelancejournalist,provedaconmanwhoinventedintelligenceforcash,asdidNewYork
congressmanSamuelDickstein,bornaLithuanianandcontemptuouslycodenamed‘Crook’,who
nonethelessreceived$12,000ofSovietfundsbeforeMoscowdecidedhewasnotworthanymore
money.TheonlysignificantserviceDicksteinperformedwastosecureaUSpassportforanAustrian
NKVDagent.Hediedin1954,agedseventy,ajusticeoftheNewYorkSupremeCourtwhosework
fortheSovietswasunrevealed.
Moscowwasasvulnerabletosuchunrewardingsourcesaseveryotherintelligenceservice,butit
couldalsoboastsuperbones.AlgerHissoftheStateDepartment,recruitedbytheGRUin1935,was
bornin1904intoaprominentBaltimorefamily.Hesufferedachildhoodtragedywhenhisfather
committedsuicide,butbecameabrilliantstudentatJohnsHopkinsandHarvardLawSchool.His
wife,NewYorkwriterPriscillaFansler,wasaneageraccompliceinhisespionageactivities.In
August1939HisswasdenouncedtoassistantsecretaryofstateAdolphBerlebyWhittakerChambers,
aformerfellow-comrade.Thespynonethelesskepthisnerve,andhisjob.TheComintern’sresident
hitmanOttoKatzexploredthemeritsofkillingChambers,andwasdeflectedonlybytheintended
victim’swarningthathehadconcealeddocumentswhichwouldcriticallydamageSovietinterestsin
theUSifanythinghappenedtohim.In1941,bothHiss’sfriendDeanAchesonandhismentorFelix
Frankfurterassuredtheyoungmantheyhadcompletefaithinhim.Suchwasthereluctancetobelieve
illofthisbrilliantdiplomatthatheroseonwardandupwardintheStateDepartment,servingwiththe
USdelegationatthe1945Yaltaconference.
BeforeeverymajorAlliedsummitofthewar,theNKVDbriefedtheSovietpolitburoaboutthe
membersoftheAmericanandBritishdelegationsand–inPavelSudoplatov’ssmugwords–
‘indicatedwhethertheywereunderourcontrolasagents’.Thiswasagrossimplicitexaggeration:
onlythreeorfourseniorAmericanandBritishdiplomatswereSovietsources.Butitwasindisputably
truethat,thankstoStalin’swellwishersinWashingtonandLondon,heenteredeverysummit
comprehensivelyinformedaboutthepolicypositionsofhisfellow-warlords.Ifthishelpedlittle
towardsachievingvictoryovertheAxis,itcontributedsignificantlytosecuringRussia’sobjectivesin
thepost-warsettlement.
SudoplatovbelievedthatwhenHissbriefedtheRussians,hewasactingatthebehestofRoosevelt’s
aideHarryHopkins.HopkinscertainlyprovidedimportantinformationtoMoscow.Hewarnedthe
SovietembassythattheFBIhadbuggedameetingatwhichanNKVDofficerpassedcashtoan
Americancommunist.HealmostcertainlybriefedCentre’sagentsaboutthesubstanceofthe
Roosevelt–Churchillbilateralsummits,andprobablyaboutmuchmore.Thisshouldnotimply,
however,thattheprominentNewDealerwasconsciouslybetrayingAmerica’ssecretstoanenemy;
rather,hewascommittedtoseekingaworkingcollaborationbetweentheUSandtheSovietUnion.
Hethought,asdidhismasterFranklinRoosevelt,thataparadeoftrustwasanimportanttooltowards
achievingthis.Hopkinssaidwithoutembarrassment:‘SinceRussiaisthedecisivefactorinthewar
shemustbegiveneveryassistanceandeveryeffortmustbemadetoobtainherfriendship.’The
relativelyconfidingattitudeofhimselfandsomeotherprominentadministrationfigurestowardsthe
Russianshelpedtomakesubordinatesfeeljustifiedingoingmuchfurther,betrayingundoubted
secrets.
Russian-bornWilliamWeisband,aknownpost-warSovietsource,servedinwartimeUSArmy
signalsintelligence,latterlyatArlingtonHall,andisbelievedtohavepassedinformationfroman
earlystage.TheOSSwasawashwithMoscowinformants.KarlMarzaniworkedinthegraphics
department,JuliusJosephintheFarEastsection.OtherstaffersservingtwomastersincludedBella
Joseph,DonaldWheeler,JaneZlatowsky,HorstBerensprung,HelenTennei,GeorgeWuchinich,
LeonardMintz.TheNKVD’sOSSinformantsprovidedfarmorematerialthanCentre’sfive-manUS
deskcouldtranslate.TheLatinAmericandivisionwasheadedbyaformerUniversityofOklahoma
professornamedMauriceHalperin,whokeptacopyoftheDailyWorkerconspicuouslyonhisdesk,
submittedreportsinstrictaccordancewiththeParty’sline,andworkedtirelesslytopromoteits
interestsinthecountrieswithinhissphere.Hewaslesssuccessful,however,inwinningplauditsfrom
Centre,whothoughtlittleofhismaterial.FranzNeumann,aneconomistintheGermansection,
receivedhighermarksforpassingonavoluminousAmericanstudyoftheSovieteconomy.Noel
Field,whoprovidedsomeassistancetoAllenDullesinBernwhileEuropewasoccupied,in1945
soughttopromoteaPartyagendathroughOSS.ArthurSchlesingerwrote:‘FieldwasaQuaker
Communist,filledwithidealism,smugnessandsacrifice.Whatstruckmemostwashisself-righteous
evasiveness…HesoughtnothingmorethanalifeofpiousdevotionontheothersideoftheIron
Curtain.’
JuliusJosephandhiswifeBellabecameprimeMoscowsourcesonUSpolicytowardsChina,
JapanandKorea.Evenfollowingthecouple’sacrimoniousdivorce,sostrongwasherloyaltytothe
SovietsthatshedidnotexposeJulius.DonaldWheeler ’sNKVDhandlerwrotethat‘hetreatshisOSS
colleaguesverycritically,andconsidersallempty-headed’.Wheelertookprideinhisowncontempt
fortheriskofexposure,saying,‘Itmakesnosensetobeafraid:amandiesonlyonce.’Hepassedto
theSovietsallOSSanalyticalmaterialonGermany,and–farmoredangerously–identified
Donovan’sagentsinEurope,includingsomewhowereoperatingundercover.AftertheGerman
defeat,WheelerfingeredaUSAirborneofficerwhowasengagedonasecretmissionintheSoviet
Zoneofoccupation,toreportontheRussians’removalsofindustrialplant.
ArthurSchlesingersaid:‘DonovanknewaboutsomeOSScommunistsbutnotperhapsabout
others.’Thegeneralshrugged:‘I’dputStalinontheOSSpayroll,ifIthoughtitwouldhelpusdefeat
Hitler.’ItisnonethelesshardtobelievehewasawarethathisownpersonalassistantwasaSoviet
informant.DuncanLeeprovidedastreamofstrategicinsights,thoughtheUSgovernmentwould
havegivensomeofthesetotheRussiansthroughopenchannels,forexampleLee’sMarch1944
warningthatD-DayhadbeendelayeduntilJune.HedidbetterserviceforCentrebywarningits
agentsaboutsecurityprobes,includingoneonDonaldWheeler.Latein1944Leestartedaloveaffair
withhisex-NKVDcourierMaryWolfePrice,secretarytothegreatjournalistWalterLippmannand
thusherselfaconduitformanyprivilegedconfidences.ThisthoroughlyannoyedCentre,becauseit
shiftedhispriorities.On3February1945theNKVD’sJosephKatzreportedtoMoscow:‘SawLee
lastnight.Afterbeatinghischestaboutwhatacowardheis,howsorryhefeelsaboutit,etc.,hetold
mehemuststicktohisdecisiontoquit…Inmyopinionthereisnosenseinusinghim.Heistotally
frightenedanddepressed.Hesuffersfromnightmareswhereheseeshisnameonlists.’Katzhadtwo
moremeetingswithLee,whosenervesweresoshreddedthathishandsshook.Theywouldhave
shakenevenmorehadheknownthathisSovietvisitor–nottobeconfusedwithhisnamesakeOtto,
alsoakiller–hadpersonallyliquidatedseveralinformantswhoseloyaltywassuspect.Lee,however,
wasallowedtosurvive.InApril1945theNKVDsimplybrokeoffcontactwithhim.
On25November1943,afifty-four-year-oldRussianJewnamedJacobGolosdiedofaheartattackin
hisNewYorkapartment.Thiscausedpassionategrieftohisloveroffiveyears’standing,Elizabeth
Bentley–andtoMoscowCentre,whoseforemostAmericannetwork-runnerhethenwas.Goloshad
fledhishomelandasaBolshevikbackin1910,joinedtheUSCommunistParty,thengonehometo
sharetheheadyjoysofRevolution.Later,however,heabandonedawifeandsonintheSovietUnion
toreturntoAmericaasanintelligenceofficer.HebecameaUScitizen,andin1938tookupwith
Bentley,astrappingthirty-year-oldex-Vassargirlwithaweaknessforleft-wingcausesandunusual
foreignmen.Goloswasbusytrainingherintheartsofintelligenceworkwhenhehimselfwas
arrestedasaspy–hardlysurprising,sincehewasaclosefriendofPartyleaderEarlBrowder.Buthe
escapedwithashortsentence,and–amazingly–feltabletoresumehisactivities.
GolosrecruitedhisfriendNathanSilvermaster,aveterancommunistwhobecameMoscow’smost
importantAmericanconnection,andinturnsecuredtheservicesofHarryDexterWhite–‘Lawyer ’–
andotherkeyWashingtonsources.JuliusRosenberg,muchlatersenttotheelectricchair,firstgave
informationtoGolos.CedricBelfrage,aBritishjournalistworkingforSirWilliamStephensonin
NewYork,wasanotherusefulcontact.JosephGregg,anofficialwhomovedtotheStateDepartment
in1944,providedinformationabouttheUSArmyandNavy,andalsoforwardedFBIreportson
communistactivityinCentralandSouthAmerica.Asignificantnumberofthenetwork’sinformants
haveneverbeenidentified.In1943acommunistcodenamed‘Buck’andworkinginUNRRA,who
reportedfirsttoGolosthentoSilvermaster,passedonasixty-five-pagereportontheUSmachinery
industry,theninlateJune1945providedanagendaforUSpositionsatPotsdam.‘Arena’hadaccess
toinformationfromthePentagon’smilitaryintelligencedepartment,wherehiswifeworked.
From1940onwards,GoloswasobligedtosubjecthimselftotheForeignAgentsRegistrationAct,
andsoonthereaftertoFBIsurveillance.NoneofthisinhibitedhiminsustaininghisNKVDcareer,
usingElizabethBentley–‘Umnitsa’–tomakehiscontacts.Hisemployerswerehighlynervousabout
him,however,andmaderepeatedattemptstopersuadehimtoreturnhome,verylikelyforexecution.
Golosnotmerelyrefusedthesedemands,shruggingthathecouldnotgetapassport,butmadesure
Centreknewthathehadtakenout,orratherhidden,alifeinsurancepolicy:asealedenvelope
containingdetailsofMoscow’soperationsintheUS.TheSovietswereequallyunsuccessfulin
persuadinghimtoturnoverhissourcestootherUSNKVDstations.GolostoldBentleythatnoother
RussianintheUSunderstoodAmericansashedid.Thenheheardthatbackhomehissonhadjoined
theRedArmy,andtalkedofwantingtojoinhim.Hetooktheconsiderableriskoftravellingto
WashingtontomeetVasilyZarubin,towhomhecomplainedbitterlyaboutbeingaskedtotransferhis
sources.
Then,suddenly,hewasdead.Amidsthergrief,ElizabethBentleyremainedcoolenoughtodestroy
thesealedenvelopeinasafedeposit,whichcontainedthesecretswithwhichGoloshadshielded
himselfagainstavisitfromMoscow’sexecutioners.ItzhakAkhmerovassumedresponsibilityfor
handlingher,andassuredCentrethatBentley,whomheliked,was‘onehundredpercentourwoman’.
ButMoscowremaineduneasy,especiallyasheralcoholconsumptionrose.Sheshowedgrowing
signsofstrain,andwailedthatsheneededamaninherlife.Eventually,underpressurefrom
Akhmerov,sheturnedovertohimNathanSilvermasterandthushisgroup.
SilvermasterwasborninOdessain1898,emigratedtotheWestCoastin1914,andwasforyears
anactiveUSCommunistPartymemberbeforetakingajobattheUSTreasury.There,inMoscow’s
interestsheforgedlinkswithastringoffellow-sympathisers,someofwhombecameblackcomicallymuddledabouttheirallegiances.FrankCoe,forinstance,complainedthathisworkloadas
aSovietagentwashamperinghiscareerattheTreasury.Silvermaster ’ssourcesproducedmaterial
fromalloverWashington.Therewasdataonmilitary-equipmentprocurementprogrammesandthe
viewsofpolicy-makers,whichprobablycamefromHarryDexterWhite,asenioreconomistatthe
Treasury.June1941broughtreportsontheWehrmachtfromtheofficeoftheUSmilitaryattachéin
London.Moscowlearnedon5Augustthatata31JulyWashingtonlunch,navysecretaryFrankKnox
betagainstMorgenthauoftheTreasurythatHitlerwouldhaveMoscowandLeningradinsidea
month.HarryHopkins’sreporttotheWhiteHouseonhissummer1941visittoMoscowwasalso
passedtoCentre,togetherwithanoteontheUScabinet’sdiscussionofAverellHarriman’smission
totheSovietUnion.
Intriguingthoughallthisgossipwas–andStalinhimselfreadsomeoftheSilvermastermaterial–
theNKVDwantedmore.In1942theWashingtonstationwastoldtobriefitsmantodiscoverwhether
theUSwasfulfillingitsLend-Leasepromises,andifnottoidentifythosemembersofthe
administrationwhoblockedprogress.WhatwereAmericanintentionsaboutopeningasecondfront?
Whatweretheadministration’sviewsaboutpost-warfrontiers,especiallythoseoftheSovietUnion?
Wasthereanyevidenceoffifth-columnsabotageintheUS?Centrealsosoughtmoredetailonpolicy
discussions.ItshighestprioritywastopenetratetheWhiteHouseandtosecureinformationfrom
HopkinsandMorgenthau,becauseoftheirintimacywiththepresident.
Meanwhile,CentrewasreceivinggovernmentmaterialfromRobertMiller,CharlesFlato,Harold
Glasser,VictorPerlo,CharlesKramer,JohnAbt.HarryMagdoff,astatisticianattheDepartmentof
WarProduction,deliveredastreamofdataonweaponsoutput.ItissurprisingthatMoscowdidnot
runoutofcodenamesforitsAmericansources;thereweresomanythatitbecamenotunusualfor
themtorunintoeachotherinthecourseoftheirofficialduties,sometimeswithknowledgeofshared
disloyalties.Field,DugganandStraightcrossedpaths.AccrediteddiplomatandcovertNKVDhandler
AnatolyGorskyfoundhimselfintheUSTreasuryDepartmentonedayinDecember1944,toreceive
atrivialbriefingaboutGermanpostagestamps.HewasdirectedfirsttotheofficeofHarryDexter
White,andthen–inWhite’sabsence–tothatofHaroldGlasser.BothmenwereSovietagents:White
protectedGlasserfromasecurityinquiryabouthiscommunistlinks,thoughthetwomen’spersonal
relationshipbecamestrainedwhentheirwivesquarrelled.Glasserconsidereditprudenttorejectan
offeredpostonthetopdeckoftheStateDepartment,becausehewouldbeunlikelytosurvivethe
securitycheckstheappointmentrequired.HewasnonethelessabletoprovideMoscowwithimportant
cablesaboutUSpost-warpolicyplanning,includingdetailsofWashington’sviewsonfinancialaidto
Russia.Inanambitiousmoment,VasilyZarubinsoughttotargetErnestHemingwayasaninformant,
thoughhesuspectedhimofbeingaTrotskyiteratherthanaStalinist.Inanyevent,thewaywardwriter
showednoenthusiasm.
JustasathomeinRussia,withintheextendedSovietsecretfamilyinAmericadenunciationswerea
wayoflife,andofdeath.InAugust1944theNKVD’snewresidentinSanFrancisco,Grigori
Kasparov,signalledtoMoscowablisteringcritiqueofhiscounterpartinMexicoCity.Kasparov
accusedhimofbunglingeffortstoliberateTrotsky’sassassin,RamónMercader,andofadoptinga
‘grandlifestyle’,whichincludedbreedingpoultryandparrots.Similarly,theNewYorkdeputychief
claimedthathisownboss,twenty-eight-year-oldStepanApresyan,was‘utterlywithouttheknackof
dealingwithpeople,frequentlyshowinghimselfexcessivelyabruptandinclinedtonag…Aworker
whohasnoexperienceofworkabroadandcannotcopeonhisown.’Apresyanwasdemotedtothe
SanFranciscoresidenceinMarch1945.
TheZarubinswereundonenotbytheartificeoftheFBI,butbyadisgruntledsubordinatecolonel
namedVasiliiMironov.Mironov’sfirstshotathischiefwastowritetoStalin,assertingthatZarubin
wasdoublingfortheAxis.Whenthisgothimnowhere,hedispatchedananonymouslettertoJ.Edgar
Hoover ’soffice,fingeringZarubinasaSovietspy,andalsonamingtenotheragents,including
HollywoodproducerBorisMorros.DuringthewaryearstheBritishweretoofearfulofstraining
theirdifficultrelationshipwiththeSovietstoexpelevenidentifiedSoviet‘illegals’,butin1944the
AmericansinsistedontheZarubins’departure;boththeyandtheiraccuserwenthome.Thehusbandand-wifeteamreceivedaheroes’welcomeinMoscow;hewasloadedwithmedals,andendedhis
careerasdeputychiefofforeignintelligence.MeanwhileMironov,surprisingly,wasallowedtolive
–foratime.BackinMoscow,hewasdiagnosedasschizophrenicanddispatchedtoanasylum.While
suchSovietinstitutionswerescarcelyhavensofcompassion,giventhedamagetheerrantcolonelhad
inflicted,itisastonishinghewasnotshot.Hewaslessfortunatein1945,however,whenheattempted
toinformtheUSembassyaboutSovietmassacresinPoland;thistimehewassilencedbyafiring
squad.
Inthespringof1942,asaknowncommunistNathanSilvermasterwasinvestigatedbytheHouse
Un-AmericanActivitiesCommittee.Thisprovednothingagainsthim,thoughinJunetheUSNavy’s
intelligencedepartmentinsistedonhisdismissalfromtheTreasury.Furtherinquiriesintohis
politicalactivitieswerequashed–itisthoughtthatHarryDexterWhiteandanotherfriend,Lauchlin
Currie,aCanadian-bornsenioreconomicadvisertotheWhiteHouse,intervenedonhisbehalf.
AlthoughnothingwaseverprovedagainstCurrie,itseemsalmostcertainthathetoowasaSoviet
informant.SilvermasterstayedinWashington,withanewjobintheFarmSecurityAdministration.
Thoughthishadnoaccesstosensitivedefenceinformation,hepromptlybecameamemberofthe
WarProductionBoard,whichdid.
Moscow’sAmericansourceswerenothighlytrainedintelligenceprofessionals,butinstead
enthusiasticamateurs.OverhalfofthehundredsofUSgovernmentdocumentsphotographedby
WilliamUllmannin1944,forinstance,provedunreadablewhenCentre’smenporedoverhisfilms,
forwardedbyElizabethBentley.Whatcouldbedecipheredwasimpressive,however;Ullmannwasa
formerTreasurymandraftedtothePentagon,whosuppliedamassoftechnicaldataonUScombat
aircraftandindustrialproduction.InMarch1945theimportantnuclearspyTedHallpassed
informationoutofSantaFeonthedesignofAmerica’satomicbombwhichhehadcopiedontoa
newspaper,usingmilkasink.TheRussiansfumedatsuchhamfistedness.
MuchmaterialreachedMoscowoutofrealtime.AnexasperatedmemofromFitintoMerkulovin
July1944complainedthatdocumentssuchasacopyofanAnglo-AmericanLend-Leaseagreement
arrivedmonthslate,asdidaforty-one-pageTreasurymemorandumonpost-wartraderelations
betweenWashingtonandMoscow,andadraftbyHarryDexterWhiteofanewUS-USSRLend-Lease
deal.FitinsoughtauthoritytoshiftamanfromLosAngelestoNewYorktohandlethegroaning
caseload.TheSovietswereevenmoreexasperatedbyemotionalcomplications:WilliamUllmann
startedanaffairwithNathanSilvermaster ’swife.AkhmerovcomplainedtoMoscow:‘Surelythese
unhealthyrelationsbetweenthemcannothelpbutinfluencetheirbehaviourandworkforus
negatively.’HealsoreportedthatSilvermasterbulliedhissources.VladimirPravdin,nowthe
NKVD’sNewYorkstationchief,urgedAkhmerovtoreininthewaywardspy.Akhmerovresponded
bluntly:‘Themainthingistogetresults.Fortwenty-fiveyears,wecouldn’tgetinformationaboutthe
politicsofthiscountry.Now[Silvermaster]isdoingatremendousjobandgivingourgovernmenta
completepictureof[US]politicsonallquestions.’InAugust1944,FitinatCentrerecordedthatsince
JanuarytheWashingtonnetworkhadhandedover386importantUSgovernmentdocuments.Hewas
sufficientlyimpressedbytheSilvermasters’worktocontributea$6,000down-paymentonafarmthe
couplewantedtobuy.NathanwasawardedaSovietdecoration,whichhewaspermittedtoglimpse
beforehishandlerreturnedittosecretsafekeeping.ThevolumeofinformationpassedtoMoscowby
allitsAmericannetworksrosespectacularlyinthecourseofthewar,fromfifty-ninereelsof
microfilmin1942,to211in1943,sixhundredin1944and1,896in1945,withtheSilvermasters
amongthemajorcontributors.
HowdidtheRussiansgetawaywithsomuchforsolong?Mostcitizensofdemocraciesacceptthat
partofthetariffimposedforfreedomisthattheirdefencesagainstsubversionandtreacheryareless
comprehensiveandeffectivethanthoseofatotalitarianstate,andsuchapriceusuallyseemsworth
paying.YettheFBI’sincompetencewasastonishing.ItsagentschargedwithmonitoringSoviet
activitiesshowedthemselveslessthanastute.AlexanderFeklisovwroteinhismemoirs:‘Therewere
manygreenyoungmeninthe[FBI’s]footsurveillanceteams…andourofficersexposedthemby
usingsimpletricks.Tailswereprobablyselectedfromyoungmenrearedinsmalltowns,whowould
startworkingagainstusaftertwoorthreemonths’training.Onecouldseestraightawaythatthey
wereprovincials–bytheirclothes,theguilty,larcenouslookintheireyes;theirclumsiness.Theyfelt
lostwhentheyrealisedthattheyhadbeenspotted,anddidn’tknowwhattodo.Theywouldturnaway,
orwalkquicklyintothefirstbuildingtheysaw.’
Feklisovsometimeswalkedstraighttowardshistail,forthefunofseeingthemanfleebeforehim
inembarrassment.Surveillanceishighlylabour-intensive,requiringback-upcarsincaseasuspect
grabsabusortaxi.‘Ioftenspottedfollowerswhengettingintothesubwayorstandingonthe
platform.TheyweresoscaredtheywouldlosemewhenIboardedatrainthattheyalmostrandown
thestairs.Onceontheplatform,Inormallychoseaspotwhereitwashardtoseeme:behindapillar,
bythewall,inthecrowd.Therewereoccasionswhentheonlypeopleinaquietsubwaystationwere
myselfandthetail.InsuchcasesInormallytriedtothinkaboutsomethingnice,smiledandhummeda
popularAmericantunewhilepacingalongtheplatformwithacarefreelook,toshowthatIpaidno
attentiontothesurveillance.Thetailsdressedmodestly,mostlyindarkdullsuitsandovercoats.In
summertheymostlyworetheirshirtshangingout,withnotie.OnoneoccasionIwaswatchedbya
teamoffour.Oneofthemworearmyuniformforhalftheday.Isawhimontheescalatorinthe
metro,thenhefollowedmeintotheCunardWhiteStarofficewhereIbookedsteamshipticketsfor
SovietcitizenstravellingtoLondon.Isawthis“soldier”yetagainwhenlunchingatacafeteria.’
Hoovercouldfireonlyonecounter-chargeagainsthismoreskilfulandsubtleBritishcounterparts:
hisownBureauwasneverinfiltratedbyaSovietagent,aswasMI5.
TheRooseveltadministrationapparentlyagreedabouttheFBI’slimitations.InJuly1941the
Soviets’Washingtonambassador,KonstantinUmansky,reportedtoMoscowanemotionalappealby
HenryMorgenthau.Thetreasurysecretarysaidthathewasasking‘notonbehalfoftheAmerican
government,butonmypersonalbehalf’thatiftheRussiansknewtheidentitiesofkeyGermanagents
intheUS,theyshouldprovidethemtohimselfandthepresident,‘sincetheFBIworkspoorlytoday
…leavingthecoreofNazileadersfreeandstillcarryingontheirunderminingwork’.AMoscow
Centrehandscrawledexclamationandquestionmarksonthiscable.Morgenthaurepeatedthesame
demandtoUmansky’ssuccessor,MaximLitvinov.EarlyinMarch1942Moscoworderedthe
ambassadortorejectanyrequestsforintelligencecooperation:‘TheNKVDoftheUSSRisnot
interestedinestablishingthisliaison.’Inthesummerof1944,andpartlyinresponsetoconcernabout
thesecurityoftheManhattanProject,theFBIplantedwiretapsinallknownSovietheadquarters
buildings,throughwhichtheylearnedagoodmanycodenames,togetherwithindisputableevidence
ofItzhakAkhmerov’sintelligencerole.Hewasdeclaredpersonanongrata,andwenthometoreceive
ahero’swelcomeinMoscow.HewaspresentedwiththeOrderoftheRedBanner,andhiswifeHelen
withtheRedStar.
BytheendofthewarCentrewasconvincedthatElizabethBentleywaschronicallyunstableanda
menacetotheirUSoperations,especiallyaftersheformedafriendshipwithamanwhowasplainly
anagentofeither‘theHut’–theFBI–or‘theArsenal’–theUSWarDepartment;inreality,itwasthe
former.CentredecideduponherkidnappingandextractiontoMoscowforliquidation.Itwastoolate:
shewasalreadysingingalongariatoHoover ’smen,newsthatwasconveyedtoheremployersby
KimPhilby.Inapost-mortemontheGolos–Bentleysaga,Centreconcludedthatitwasaserious
mistaketohavealloweditsagenttoforgelinkswithmembersoftheAmericanCommunistParty,and
tobecome‘themainpillarofourintelligenceworkintheUS’.Itwasextraordinarythataspyso
carelessastomeetinformantsintheirownapartments–asdidBentley–escapedexposureforso
long.
ThesameargumentsareadvancedtoexcuseAmerica’scommunisttraitorsastheirBritish
counterparts:thatitisscarcelysurprisingsomanyliberalssoughttoassisttheSovietUnion,whenthe
institutionalbarbarityofStalin’sregimewasinadequatelyunderstood,andRussiansborethe
overwhelmingburdenofthestruggletodefeatfascism.AstheEastGermanspychiefMarkusWolf
laterputit,Moscow’sinformantsconsideredthemselvesmembersofanelitesecretclub,fightingfor
anobleideal.PierreCot,aformerministerinseveralFrenchgovernmentslivinginexileintheUS,
undertookalong1944missiontoMoscowfordeGaulle.Heconcludedhissubsequentreport:
‘Libertydeclinesunceasinglyundercapitalismandrisesunceasinglyundersocialism.’Aremarkable
numberofAmericanandBritishintellectualslikewiseembracedthisidiotjudgement.From1941to
1945,RussianswerethealliesoftheUnitedStatesinthegreatestconflictinhistory.
Inresponse,however,itmaybearguedthatfewinformedpeople–whichincludedalmostallthe
Americanspies–couldhavefailedtobeawareofthehorrorsoftheSovietsystem,hadtheychosen
tomakethemselvesso.Apologistsalsoarguethatthetraitors’actionshadnoadverseimpactuponthe
AlliedcauseintheSecondWorldWar.Thatisonlynarrowlytrue:recalltheSovietleaktothe
GermansabouttheAmericanpenetrationofPurple.ThosewerestillthedaysoftheNazi–SovietPact:
Hitler ’semissarypassedonthismomentouswarningtotheJapanese.BaronŌshimamessaged
Japan’sforeignministerfromBerlinon3May1941–adispatchsubsequentlybrokenbythe
Americans–sayingthat‘itisquitereliablyestablished[bytheGermans]thattheU.S.governmentis
readingAmbassadorNomura’scodemessages[fromWashington]…drasticstepsshouldbetaken
regardingthismatter ’.ThefactthatTokyowasfoolishenoughtotakenoheeddoesnotalterthe
gravityofthethreattoUSinterests.ItisalsovirtuallycertainthattheRussiansacquiredthisvital
secretfromoneoftheirAmericaninformantsintheupperreachesoftheadministration.Thisman
mayhavesupposedthatbybriefingMoscowhewasmerelyaidingtheinternationalsocialistcause.It
wasonlybyamiracle,however,thathisactiondidnotcausetheUStoloseitsaccesstoPurple.
ArthurSchlesingerwroteinhismemoirs:‘ThereisnoevidencethattheinformationOSSmoles
gavetheKremlindidmuchdamagetotheUnitedStates.ThediscoverythatOSSwasnotplanning
subversiveoperationsagainsttheSovietUnionmaywellhavesoothedStalinandreducedanychance
ofhismakingaseparatepeacewithHitler.’Here,thehistorianmakesavalidpoint:Sovietpenetration
oftheorganisationwouldhaveinflictedseriousdamageatthetimeonlyifMoscow’sagentshadbeen
passingintelligencethatshowedtheUnitedStatesdouble-crossingitssupposedally–whichwasnot
thecase.YetatnotimeduringtheSecondWorldWardidStalinentertainanynotionofsustaining
peacefulco-existencewiththeWesternPowersonceitwasended.TheAmericanandBritishtraitors
didsubstantialharmtotheirownnations’interests,byensuringthatWashingtonbargainedwith
Moscow–forinstanceatYaltaandattheUnitedNations’foundingconferenceinSanFrancisco–ata
seriousdisadvantage:SovietdelegationsknewpreciselywhereAmericanandBritishfinalpositions
lay.
TheAmericanswhogavetechnologicalandscientificdatatotheSoviets,ofwhommorebelow,
didgreaterharmtotheirownnation’sintereststhanthosewhomerelypeddledpolitical,diplomatic
andstrategicinformationduringthewaryears.MostoftheRussians’immenseinvestmentin
espionageintheUSachievedlittle.ThebestthatcanbesaidoftheAmericanswhoservedtheircause
isthattheyweremonumentallynaïve–theRussianscertainlythoughtso.TheUSinformantswho
workedsoenthusiasticallywithVasilyandElizabethZarubinmighthavesuppedlesseagerlyhadthey
seenthebloodstainedfootprintsthatmarkedeverystepoftheirpathsfromMoscowtoWashington
DC.
15
TheKnowledgeFactories
1 A GENTS
Britain’sintelligenceservicesemployedhundredsofimpressivelydeterminedandcourageousyoung
fieldagents,ofwhomtheNorwegianOlufReed-Olsenmaystandasanexemplar.InSeptember1940,
agedtwenty-two,heescapedtoBritainfromhisownoccupiedcountrybycrossingtheNorthSeain
aneighteen-footboat,survivingextraordinaryhazardsandtempestsduringthetwo-weekpassage.
ThereafterhespenttwoyearsasapilottraineeinCanada,andflewseveraloperationsforRAF
CoastalCommandbeforeacceptingatransfertoagenttraining,inthecourseofwhichhebrokeboth
legsparachuting.InApril1943theplanecarryinghimtoNorwaytwiceturnedback,becausewind
speedsweredeemedtoohighforajump.Thethirdtime,heinsistedonmakingthedescent,landedin
atreetopandbadlydislocatedhisknee.ThiscausedhimtospendamonthinaNorwegianhospital,
constantlyexposedtobetrayal,havingfluiddrainedfromtheinjury.Onbelatedlystartingintelligence
work,hebrusheddisasterateveryturn.CarelessnesspromptedhimtouseEnglishphrasesinpublic
places.HisBritishbriefershadknownnothingaboutnewregulationswhichrequiredhimtocarrya
travelpermit.Hefoundithardtocreateanetworkfromscratch:‘Mostofthepeoplewhoatthattime
werecapableofdoingajobefficientlywerealreadyuptotheirnecksinillegalactivityelsewhere…I
wouldnotletanymanworkformeandinotherorganizationsatthesametime.Thiswasamistaketo
whichfartoomanyfellvictims.’
Hewastedamonthbivouackedinawildernesswithtwocompanions,wirelessinghisAKYcallsign
intonothingness,beforehissignalstoWhaddonHallreceivedanacknowledgement:‘PBO…PBO.’
Hethenspentthirtyminutestransmittingasituationreport:‘Thedifferenceitmadetoourspirits–
afterourweeksoftoilandincreasingsetbacks–cannotbedescribed.Itwaslikeabreezeof
encouragementblowingthroughalltheblackness.’Olsenandhiscompanionslivedforsometimeon
semi-starvationrations–threeboiledpotatoesadaywithalittlebread,mackerelorherring.Poor
dietgoesfartoexplainhowinjuredmeninthefieldoftenprovedvulnerabletosepticaemia.Only
aftermanymonthsdidOlsen’steamreceivetheirfirstparachutedrop,ofwhichthemostvalued
ingredientswerenotweaponsorexplosives,but270poundsofchocolate,5,000cigarettes,dried
plums,apricots,apples.AlthoughtemporarilydrivenfromtheareabyaGermansweep,theywere
fortunateenoughtoreturnlatertofindthesupplycacheundisturbed,inacaveamidthickwoodland.
Secretwarriorsspentmuchoftheirtimepreoccupiedwithhumdrumsubsistenceactivities,rather
thanwithcollectingintelligenceorblowingupbridges.Reed-Olsensometimesfoundhimselftoiling
acrossamountainsidecarryinganeighty-poundload–anMI6transmitterweighedalmosthalfof
that,withitsbatteries.Foragentsobligedtoliveinruralareas,ithelpedtobecountrywise:theyoung
Norwegianwasoftenalertedtointerlopersbythecrosscallofastonechatorblackbird.Hismainjob
wastomonitorandreportshippingmovementsandGermantroopdeployments.InOctober1943,
afterweeksofplayingcatch-as-catch-canwithAbwehrdirector-findersmonitoringhiswireless
transmissions,hewasobligedtofleetoneighbouringSweden.FlowntoLondoninJanuary1944,he
tooktwomonths’leaveinCanadatogetmarried,beforebeingparachutedbackintoNorwayinMay.
Thereafterhetransmittedlocalweatherreportsseveraltimesaday,andansweredsuchquestionnaires
asthislateJulyexamplefromBroadway:
1.IsthereadivisionalstaffinArendal?Givenumber,HQandnameofCO.
2.IsthereaGrenadierregiment’sHQinKristiansandSouthand/orLyngdal?Givenumber,locationofHQandnameofCO.
3.ArethearmytroopsinMandalsubordinatedtoLyngdalorKristiansand?
Thiscontinuedthroughsixmorequestionswithmultiplesub-headings.
InthelastmonthsofthewarReed-OlsenwasabletorecruittwoGermandeserters,abandoningthe
sinkingReich,toassistinaddressingsuchrequestsfromLondon.Hewaslatterlysuccessfulin
evadingGermanDFunits,thoughtheseoftentauntedhimacrosstheethertorepeatcodegroups,and
finallysent‘HEILHITLER!’inplainlanguage.
Reed-Olsen,likehundredsofhiscomradesaroundtheworld,livedforyearsinperilofcapture
andaghastlydeath.AttritionwasespeciallyhighintheLowCountries,wheretheterrainwasillsuitedtocovertactivity,informersweremanyandtheAbwehr ’scounter-intelligencebranchnotably
efficient.Ofeighty-nineMI6agentsdispatchedtooccupiedBelgiumandHollandduringthewar
years,thirty-ninewerecaptured,ofwhomjustelevensurvivedthewar.By1945,onlythirteenMI6
wirelessesremainedoperationalintheregion.
MeanwhileinthemountainsofGreece,byJuly1944NigelClivewasusingtworadio-operatorsto
processaconstantflowofmilitary,politicalandeconomicmaterial:‘Thegoodintelligencewewere
receivingwasareflectionoftheskillanddeterminationofouragents.Theyhadtheadvantage,
however,thatalmosteveryonebelievedthattheGermanswouldsoonbegone.Inthesecircumstances
openopportunitieswereofferedtoouragentstoapproachthosewhowishedtohedgetheirbets.’
Clivewasconsciousofthetrivialityofmuchoftheinformation:‘IwouldbetoldthatAndreashad
justbeenconscriptedbytheGermansintoalabourforceforbuildinganairstrip;thatEvangeloshad
acousinwhosebrother-in-lawwasnowservingin[thecommunist]ELASagainsthiswillandwanted
todefecttoZervas;thatMacros’suncleinIoanninahadheardthattheGermanswoulddefinitelybe
outofGreecebeforethesummer;thatLeftherishadheardfromhissisterinArtathatEDESwas
planninganattackonthetowninthefollowingweek…Ialwayslistenedpatientlytoeverythingthat
wastoldmeandnaturallyassuredCostakisandotherswhoapproachedmedirectlythateveryscrap
ofinformationwasofgreatvalue.ThiswastheonlydeceptionIpractisedandithelpedmetobe
acceptedasamemberoftheircommunity.’
AftertheGermansquit,Clivesufferedasuccessionofunwelcomerevelations.First,hislabourson
theenemy’sorderofbattlehadservednousefulpurpose.TheWehrmachtevacuatedGreeceofits
ownvolition,withoutfightingabattleforwhichhisjigsaw-buildingmighthavebecomerelevant.He
alsodiscoveredthatGermanknowledgemirroredhisown:thelocalenemycommanderLt.Gen.
HubertLanz‘knewaboutuswhatweknewabouthim’,frominformersandinterception.Itwaseven
morebewilderingfortheBritishagenttolearnthatZervas,theguerrillaleadertowhosegrouphe
wasattached,hadbeenconductingparleyswiththeGermans,aimedatachievingacommonfront
againstthecommunists.AsignalfromLanztohigherheadquarters,dated7August1944and
eventuallypassedtoClive,spokeofZervas’s‘uptonowloyalattitude’–towardstheoccupiers.
Finally,thespyfoundthathehadbeenthevictimofcynicism,incompetenceortreacheryhigherup
theintelligencefoodchain:theheadofMI6’spoliticalsectiontoldhiminJanuary1945thatnotone
ofhislongandoftenperceptivepoliticalreportshadreachedBroadway.Itwillneverbeknown
whethertheseweresuppressedforideologicalreasonsbycommunistsympathisersinsidethe
Service,especiallyinCairo,or–equallyplausible–lostamidthemorassofunreadpapergenerated
bytensofthousandsofintelligenceofficersofallnations,atriskoftheirlives.Thatisnottosaythat
fieldagentactivitywaswasted:DonaldMcLachlanofNIDpaidgeneroustributetothevalueofthe
reportsofNorwegianship-watcherssuchasReed-Olsen,whowarnedofsomeenemymovementsand
especiallyU-boatsailingsthatescapedUltra’snet,althoughitwasanothermattertoputthe
informationtopracticaluse:throughoutthewartheRoyalNavyandtheFleetAirArmhadlittle
successininterdictingScandinaviancoastaltraffic.AsforGermantroopdeployments,whetherin
Norway,GreeceorelsewhereinoccupiedEurope,whileUltraprovidedagoodpicture,thiswas
nevercomprehensive,anditwaseverywhereusefulforitscoveragetobesupplementedbymenon
theground.
BritishintelligenceneverachievedsignificanthumintpenetrationinsidetheReich.PlentyofantiNaziGermanswereeagertoescapetoAlliedterritory,butnotmanywereinterestedinreturningto
Hitler ’sempirethereafterasspiesorsaboteurs.JohnBruceLockhartofMI6–nephewoftheoldspy
Robert–wroteruefullyin1944thattherewere‘plentyofratsthatleavethesinkingship,andweshall
getmore,butpreciousfewarepreparedtogobacktognawanotherholeinherbottom’.InItaly,
BroadwayabandonedattemptstorecruitagentsfromamongItalianPoWs,becausethehuman
materialavailableprovedsopoor.OnlywhentheAlliesbegantofightinsidethecountry,and
partisangroupsprovidedrelativelysaferustichavensbehindenemylines,didBritishandAmerican
officersoperatethereinnumbers.Moreover,notallMI6agentsoverseaswereasconscientiousas
Reed-OlsenandClive:thenovelistGrahamGreenetreatedespionage,andindeedthewholewar,asan
absurdity.HesignalledBroadwayfromFreetown,SierraLeone,in1942,proposingthattheservice
shouldopenabrothelforVichyFrenchsailorsfromtheRichelieuonaPortugueseislandoffthe
battleship’sbaseatDakar.FollowinghisrecalltoBritain,GreenejoinedMI6’ssub-sectionatSt
Albans,runbyKimPhilby.ThoughthenovelistpersonallydislikedPhilbywhileheworkedwithhim,
hetreatedhimwithindulgencewhenhewasrevealedasatraitor,asmerelyanothertraderina
ridiculoussecretsbazaar.
TheRussiansprovidedtheWesternAllieswithscarcelyanyinformationabouttheirownoperations,
farlessthoseoftheAxis.Foratimetheygrudginglysuppliedcopiesofdecryptsoflow-level
Wehrmachtcodestheyhadbroken,buton1December1942thisservicestoppedabruptly,andwas
neverresumed.Inthespringof1944aRoyalNavymineandsabotageexpert,Lt.Shirley,wassentto
theBlackSeatosurveyGermandemolitionsinrecapturedRussianportsbeforetheAlliesfacedthe
problemofclearingcapturedFrenchharboursafterD-Day.When6Junecame,however,Shirleywas
stillkickinghisheelsinSevastopol,vainlyawaitingRussianconsenttobeallowedtoinspectharbour
installations.
TheneedtosustainasemblanceofcollaborationcreatedotherdilemmasinLondon.Backin
December1941,whenBritishhopesofanintelligencepartnershipwiththeSovietsranmuchhigher
thantheystoodeighteenmonthslater,theNKVDdispatchedfourAustrianstoBritain,whomtheRAF
weresupposedtodropbackintotheirnativeland.Thespiesarrivedonlyafterlongdelaysand
adventures–oneman’sshipwassunkenroute,withthelossofhiswireless.Allcomplainedbitterly
aboutthepoorqualityoftheirforgedidentitydocuments,andasecondsetsentfromMoscowproved
nobetter.TheNKVD’sagentsflatlyrefusedtoundertaketheirmissionwithsuchpapers,andalso
rejectedreturntoRussiaonthenotunreasonablegroundsthattheywouldbeexecuted.TheAustrians,
whowereplainlyeagertosecurepermanentbilletsinBritain,toldtheirhoststhattheirmissionhad
littletodowithdefeatingHitler:theywerebriefedinsteadtoformaComintern‘sleeper ’cell,to
promotepost-warcommunistinterests.Whetherornotthiswastrue,theBritishfeltunableto
frogmarchthemenaboardanRAFaircraftboundforenemyterritory.Yettheyalsoflinchedfromthe
diplomaticstormthatmustfollow,ifthespiesweregrantedasylum.InApril1943,MI5’singenious
andhumanesolutionwastodispatchthembacktoRussiaviaPanama,wheretheywereallowedto
jumpshipanddisappear.
Broadway’sactivitiesandstaffingexpandeddramaticallyinthecourseofthewar,withdepartments
spillingoverintoanetworkofout-stations.SectionV,forinstance,grewfromastrengthofeightin
1940to250fiveyearslater.MI6’sseniorofficers,however,remainedlittlechanged,andHugh
Trevor-Roperthoughtnobetterofthem:‘Acolonyofcootsinanunventilatedbackwaterof
bureaucracy…Abunchofdependentbumsuckersheldtogetherbyneglect,likeaclusterofbatsinan
unsweptbarn…Thehighpriestsofaneffetereligionmumblingtheirmeaninglessritualstoaverta
famineorstayacataclysm.’AnofficerwhoservedinMI6notedthatitstopbrass,whoregarded
themselveswithunflaggingseriousness,neverarrivedontimeforameeting:theyexcusedtheir
unpunctualitybyimplyingthattheyhadbeenheldupattendingacabinetcommittee.Anintelligentand
notunsympatheticobservertoldoneofMI6’sofficersthatinrecruitingpersonnel,‘wearetooready
tobesatisfiedwithgoodsecond-raters’.Evenattheheightofaworldwar,theForeignOfficetreated
theServiceas‘poorandratherdisreputablerelations’.Adiplomatcomplainedaboutthe‘lowsocial
status’ofMI6’srepresentativesonhispatch,thoughthisreflectedmoreuponForeignOffice
snobberythanontheagentsconcerned.Wastewasprodigious:Broadwaypurchasedanaircraftto
scourthecoastofArgentinaforGermanshipping,animpossibletaskgiventhedistancesinvolved,
andanywaydirectedagainstanon-existentthreat.
AnobsessionwithsecuringadvantageinWhitehall’swarspersistedatBroadway,asinTirpitzüfer
andMoscowCentre.MI6’sofficialhistorianwritesofClaudeDansey’sattitude,manifestedinhisrole
supervisingtheescapeorganisationMI9:‘Hefrequentlygavetheimpressionthathisengagementwas
asmuchtodenyanyothergovernmentdepartmenttheopportunitytomeddleontheContinentasit
wastorescueBritishpersonnel.’OnedayDanseystrodeintotheofficeofPatrickReilly,thebrilliant
youngdiplomatwhoservedforatimeasStewartMenzies’personalassistant.‘Greatnews,’hesaid.
‘Greatnews.’HisexultationwascausedbythecollapseofamajorFrenchagentnetworkrunbySOE,
whomDanseyhatedevenmorethantheAmericans.Reillywrote:‘Misery,tortureanddeathformany
bravemenandwomen,BritishandFrench:andDanseygloated.’Reillyrecordedthathehimselffelt
sick.
Menzies’personalsanctumwasguardedbytwovenerableladieswhoaddressedeachother,even
afteryearsofsharedservice,as‘MissJones’and‘MissPettigrew’.Theformerwasthemilderand
better-looking,whilethelatterwaslargeandformidable.Bothweredrawnfromthesameextensive
stableoffemaleservantsofBroadway–genteel,loyal,discreet,tireless.MalcolmMuggeridge
observed,surelyrightly,thatacommoncharacteristicofpeoplewhoserveintelligenceservicesisa
delightinopacityforitsownsake,aconceitderivedfromaccesstoknowledgedeniedtoothers:
‘Thissenseofimportance,ofcherishingsecretsbeyondthekenofordinarymortals,was
characteristicofSISpersonnelatalllevels,particularlythefemales,who,howevercarelessthey
mightbeabouttheirchastity,guardedtheirsecuritywithimplacableresolution.’
In1943,RobertCecilsucceededReillyasMenzies’personalassistant,andthereafterbecamea
sturdydefenderofhischief.‘C’s’mostimportantcontribution,hearguedyearslater,wastoensure
thattheUltrasecretwaspreserved.TheSpecialLiaisonUnitswhichservedwithcommandersinthe
field,createdbyBroadway’sFredWinterbotham,wereabrilliantsecuritydevice,saidCecil.Every
Alliedcommander-in-chiefhadhispersonalSLU,livingapartfromtherestoftheheadquarters,and
chargedwithfilteringdecryptssecurelyintotheintelligenceprocess.‘C’alsoretainedaclearsense
ofthepurposeofhisorganisation’sexistence.Inamemorandumtohisstaffon10November1942,
heexpresseditsrationale:‘allIntelligenceabouttheenemy,whethercollectedbysecretmeans,orby
openfieldIntelligence,shouldbebasedontheolddictumthat“Intelligenceisthemainspringof
Action”…SIS’sprimefunctionistoobtaininformationbysecretmeanswhichmayadmitofor
promoteaction…Informationonwhichnoactioncanbetakenmaybeofinterest,itmaybeuseful
forrecordsorforthefuture,butitisofsecondaryimportance.’
LifeatMI6’sheadquarterswasnomorefreefromhazardthaninthatofanyothercentralLondon
office:onSunday,18June1944CecilandMenzieswereworkinginBroadwayBuildingwhenaV-1
flyingbombdescended,onewingtouchingQueenAnne’sMansionsnextdoorbeforetheprojectile
slewedintotheGuardsChapelandexplodedduringaservice,killing120ofthecongregation.Cecil
arguedthatawartime‘C’neededtobeamanof‘coolcourageandhighintegrity,seekingonlyhow
besttoapplytheingenuityofothersinthecommoncause.Menzieswastherightmanintheright
placeattherighttime.’Cecil’scaseforthedefencedeservesnotice.Ithasbeenasourceof
exasperationtoBritishintelligenceofficerssince1945thattheirservice’sbest-knownchroniclersof
itswartimeexperiencewereHughTrevor-Roper,GrahamGreeneandMalcolmMuggeridge,all
notoriouslyerraticpersonalities.Ofthethree,onlyTrevor-Roperdistinguishedhimselfasan
intelligenceofficer,andevenheseemedtorecogniseinhispost-warwritingthatblanderqualities
thanhisownwereneededinthemanagersofasecretservice:‘Apparentlymiraculousachievements
aretheresultsnotofmiraculousorganisations,butofefficientroutines.Theheadofanintelligence
serviceisnotasuperspybutabureaucrat.’BillBentinckoftheJICwasoncecanvassedasacandidate
tosupplantMenzies,buttherewasnoappetitetochangejockeysrelativelylateintherace,when
Bletchley’sachievementwasbeingcelebratedthroughoutthecouncilsoftheAlliedwarlords.
Inallthebelligerentcampstherewasfiercedebateaboutthemeritsofcentralisationversus
dispersalofintelligenceeffort.Empire-buildingandrivalrybyBritain’sMI5,MI6andSOE,
especially,causedduplicationandwastedresources.Butthisalsoenableddisparategroupsofmen
andwomen,someofthehighestintellect,topursuetheirownideasandcourses,totheadvantageof
theAlliedcause:athousandseedsweresown.Thoughmanyprovedsterile,someproducedwondrous
blooms,theRadioSecurityServiceandRadioAnalysisBureaunotableamongthem.IfintelligencegatheringandsabotagehadbeencentralisedunderMI6’scontrol,theweaknessesofBroadwaywould
merelyhavebecomemoredeeplyembedded.AndeventhenotoriousfeudsbetweenMI6andSOEdid
lessinjurytotheAlliedwareffortthandidtheglacialrelationshipbetweentheUSArmyandUS
Navy.
ThemostplausibledefenceofBroadway’swartimerecordistoposethequestion:whichother
nation’ssecretserviceperformedbetter?StewartMenzieswasalimitedman,butheshowedhimselfa
stablerpersonalitythanDonovan,Canaris,Schellenberg,Fitin–hiscounterpartsintheotherwarring
capitals.Onthedebitside,MI6creatednothingcomparablewithOSS’sResearch&Analysisdivision.
Itneverforgedlinkswithanti-HitlerGermans,especiallyinthearmy,asdidtheRussiansandlatterly
theAmericans.Buttherewasaconstrainthere:theprimeministerhadimposeddraconianrestrictions
uponanycontactswithGermanywhichmightfeedStalin’smorbidfearsthattheWesternAllies
wantedaseparatepeace.ItwasthisthatcausedtheForeignOfficerepeatedlytospurnapproaches
fromanglophilemembersoftheGermanResistancesuchasHelmuthvonMoltkeandAdamvon
Trott.Onlyontechnologicalissues,suchastheV-weaponsdiscussedbelow,canitbearguedthat
well-placedhumintsourcesinGermanycouldhaveexercisedimportantinfluence.Ultraprovided
suchpeerlessinsightsintotheenemy’scampthatitishardtoimaginewhatspiesmighthavedone
better.
2 TH E J EW EL O F S O UR C ES
ThetriumphoftheUSSignalsIntelligenceServiceinsecuringaccesstotheJapanesePurple
diplomaticciphercontributedlittletowinningthewar,becauseitwasnotamilitarychannel,but
notableamongitsachievementswasrecruitmentoftheJapaneseambassadorinBerlinasasource.It
wasadrolleryofthetimethatthestrivingsandsacrificesofAlliedsecretagentssecurednohumintas
interestingasthatunconsciouslycontributedbyBaronHiroshiŌshima.Hisdispatches,decryptedby
ArlingtonHallandBletchleyPark,providedawindowontheNazihighcommand,andoccasionally
onHitler ’sintentions.Ōshimawasnotacleverman–indeed,hismilitaryandpoliticaljudgement
wasterrible.Untiltheendof1942heremainedanunswervingbelieverinHitler ’simpending
triumph,andimpatientforJapantosharethespoils.From1939onwards,herepeatedlyurgedhis
countrymen:‘Don’tmissthebus!’Hisshort,chunkyfigurewasoftenphotographedgazing
admiringlyupattheFührer.In1942Göbbelswroteinhisdiary:‘Oshimareallyisoneofthemost
effectivechampionsofAxispolicies.Amonumentoughtinduecoursetobeerectedinhishonour.’
Thissentimentwouldhavebeenechoed,fordifferentreasons,inWashingtonandLondon,because
theNazileadershipconfidedmorefreelyintheJapaneseambassadorthaninanyotherforeigner,and
theAlliesbecameprivytoeverythinghelearned.HesenttoTokyoseventy-fivedispatchesin1941,a
hundredin1942,fourhundredin1943,sixhundredin1944andthreehundredinthelastmonthsof
thewar,someofthemvoluminous,andallreadbytheAllieswithinaweekorsooftheir
transmission.
Ōshimawasbornin1886,sonofapoliticianwhoservedaswarministerintwo1916–18Tokyo
cabinets.HeknewGermanyintimately,havingbeenfirstpostedthereasmilitaryattachéin1934,and
becameapopularfigureontheBerlindiplomaticcircuit,amusic-loverandkeenparty-goerwho
sometimesconsumedanentirebottleofkirschwithoutvisibleill-effects.In1938hewaselevatedto
ambassadorandlieutenant-general.ThoughrecalledtoTokyointheautumnof1939,hewas
reappointedinDecember1940,bywhichtimeWashingtonwasreadingPurple,andsoonprovidedthe
Britishwiththemeanstodolikewise.Thereafteruntiltheendofthewarsome2,000ofŌshima’s
dispatchesandmessagesweredecrypted,translatedandcirculatedtoRoosevelt,Marshall,Churchill
andseniorintelligenceofficersonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.Ifhisassessmentsandpredictionswere
oftenpoor,hisaccountsofconversationswithtopNazisappeartohavebeenaccurate,andhewasan
intermediaryforimportantexchangesbetweenTokyoandBerlin.
Forinstance,on10May1941foreignministerYōsukeMatsuokasentalettertotheambassadorfor
onwardpassagetoRibbentrop,urgingrestraintintheGermangovernment’spublicremarksaboutthe
UnitedStates:‘OurmutualloyaltymakesmedeeplyanxioustocausetheAmericanPresidentto
reflectandcheckhisrecklessplans,and…Ihavebeenworkingnightanddaytothisend.By
preventingthestagingofArmageddonandtheconsequentdownfallofmoderncivilization(ifanact
ofmancanmakethatpossible)IshalltherebydischargemydualresponsibilitytoGodandman.’On
24MayŌshimareportedaconversationwithCiano,Mussolini’sforeignminister,inwhichthelatter
said:‘DoyounotthinkthatoutbreakofwarbetweenGermanyandSovietUnionisvirtually
inevitable?’
On4June1941ŌshimareportedtoTokyo,andthustoWashingtonandLondon,theviewsofHitler
andRibbentropthat‘ineveryprobabilitywarwithRussiacannotbeavoided’.Afewdayslaterhe
expressedtheviewthatGermanywouldsecurevictorytooquicklyfortheAmericansandBritishto
beabletoofferStalinusefulhelp;itwasthedecryptofthisdispatchthatbelatedlyconvincedtheJoint
IntelligenceCommitteeinLondonthatHitlerwasindeeddeterminedonwar.AttheendofJuly
ŌshimatoldTokyoofhisconvictionthattheUSwouldsooncomeintothewar;theonlydoubtinhis
mindwashowfartheAmericanswouldbeabletogivemeaningfulassistancetoBritain.Tokyo,
however,toldhimnothingaboutitshardeningcommitmenttostrikingfirst.Throughout1941the
AlliesremaineduncertainaboutJapaneseintentionstowardstheSovietUnion–aswasBerlin.The
TokyogovernmentasserteditsintentiontojointheGermansinattackingtheRussians,butrefusedto
specifyatimescale.Ōshimasenthomefullandfrequentdispatchesabouttheprogressof
‘Barbarossa’,whichreinforcedAmericanandBritishperceptionsthattheRussianswereontheropes.
WhenŌshimareportedon25AugustthattheRedArmywasestimatedtohavesufferedbetweenfive
andsixmillioncasualties–nogreatexaggeration–howcouldWesterngovernmentsfailtobe
impressed?BylateNovember,however,Tokyowastellingthebaronthatitwouldwelcomeapeace
dealbetweenHitlerandStalin.
From1942onwardsŌshimareportedthesailingstoJapanofblockade-runningvessels,andlater
submarines.ThecombinationofinterceptsfromhisBerlinembassyandKriegsmarinesignalssnared
byBletchleyandOp-20-GenabledtheAlliestowreakhavocwithattemptsbytheJapanesetobreak
theAlliedblockadeandcarryeithercommoditiestoEuropeortechnologicalprizeshomeward.Once
surfaceblockade-runnershadbeendisposedof,andtheAxiswasreducedtounderwater
communication,from1942onwardsfifty-sixload-carryingsubmarinesweredispatched,ofwhich
twenty-nineweresunk,threeabandonedtheirmissionsandonewasinterned.Oftwenty-threewhich
completedaone-waypassage,onlyfivesucceededinreturninghomeintact,survivorsofdevastation
bysigint.
Churchillwaspromptedtolaunchapre-emptiveBritishinvasionofFrenchMadagascarbya17
MarchdispatchfromtheambassadorassertingthatJapanwouldreceiveGermany’sfullsupportin
attemptingtosecuretheislandforitself.On27JulyTokyotoldthebaronthatallhisurgingshadbeen
invai