Volume I - Reference Corporation

Transcription

THE MIDDLE EAST
ABSTRACTS AND INDEX
Volume 22E(i)
Kurdistan and the Kurds
1999
PDF edition: 2011
Editor
James Joseph Sanchez, PhD, MLS, MA
Research Assistants:
Valerie Caquias; Leslie Ford; Esther Snow;
Ramzi Baroud; Grace Britz
____________________________________________
Reference Corporation
Aristarchus Knowledge Industries
Seattle, Washington
PDF edition: 2011
www.referencecorp.com
Middle East Abstracts & Index. Volume 22E(i): 1999
© 1999 Reference Corporation
Post Office Box 45610, Seattle, WA 98145
1-800-435-8222
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written permission from this publisher.
Volume 22E(i-ii)
Table of Contents
Page
Volume 22E(i)
Introduction ..........................................................
Note on Record Structure .................................
Journals Scanned ...............................................
Kurdistan and the Kurds ....................................
iii
iv
vi
1
Volume 22E(ii)
Kurdistan and the Kurds ....................................
Author Index .........................................................
Corporate Index ..................................................
Named Persons Index .......................................
Subject Index .....................................................
581
1124
1131
1153
1163
Volume 22A:
Volume 22B:
Volume 22C:
Volume 22D:
Volume 22E:
(index for 22A-22B)
(index for 22C)
(index for 22D)
(index for 22E)
Near East
Israel-Palestine
Central Asia-Inner Asia
Maghreb-Sahel-Horn
Introduction
The MIDDLE EAST: ABSTRACTS AND INDEX is an index to materials on the Middle East
based on the concept of drawing together a wide range of material geographically, rather than on
the more traditional method of separate indices for individual disciplines. A geographic approach
is of particular importance in the Middle East because it is an area where there is a great interaction
between disciplines. Politics, economics, and history are inextricably intertwined with sociology,
psychology and education. Fields of interest included are: Anthropology, Archeology, Art,
Business, Current Affairs, Economic Development, Education, History, Language, Literature,
Politics and Government, and Sociology. Religion and philosophy are cited when they relate
historically, politically or sociologically. This broad coverage will provide the scholar and researcher
with an invaluable reference tool. A list of the journals scanned for this Volume begins on page iv
(in the A, C and D volumes). Abstracts have been provided for most major journal articles. In
addition to journal article citations, other entries include editorials, government documents,
research reports, press releases, annual reports, speeches, statements, interviews and news
conferences, doctoral dissertations and some theses, statistics, and current monographs. In the
case of doctoral dissertations, the complete abstract as printed in Dissertation Abstracts
International along with the purchasing information is provided.
This publication is divided into five volumes, with four volumes produced in the spring of each
year: in each volume citations are organized by state:
Volume 22A:
Volume 22B:
Volume 22C:
Volume 22D:
Near East
Israel-Palestine
Central Asia-Inner Asia
Maghreb-Sahel-Horn
Beginning with Volume 20, an additional E volume is produced each fall providing a bibliography
for selected topics: these bibliographies will be cumulative but will typically include 75% new
entries. Planned E volumes include:
Volume 21E: Oil, Natural Gas and Petrochemical Industries
(CD-ROM)
Volume 22E: Kurdistan and the Kurds
(1998)
(1999)
In each section, all classes of materials are listed in a single listing, arranged alphabetically by
author. A detailed, easy to use index is provided for each of Authors, Corporations, Named
People and Subjects. A thesaurus for the indexing of this volume is available in a separate
volume, the Thesaurus of Subject & Geographic Descriptors.
We welcome the submissions of pertinent materials for indexing.
James Joseph Sanchez, PhD, MLS
ii
Note on Record Structure
The titles for each record in the bibliography have several elements, illustrated in the typical title-field
presented below:
12884. Shahak, Israel. Shahak Report 69: Two Israeli Policies: Towards the Kurds and
Saddam Hussein: Part 1. Israel, April 9, 1991. [96H-19011] [19910409]
Index number: The index number “12884” is assigned for purposes of the indexing for the volumes: Author,
Corporate, Named Persons and Subject.
Author: the individual or corporate author of each document is provided. When no author is stated, the
record is tagged with “Anonymous” authorship.
Title: The bibliographic citation of the title, including the full name of the document, notation on whether there
are individual parts, sections or chapters presented in separate records. The title includes place of
publication, publisher, and date of publication.
Accession number: The Reference Corporation accession number is provided to allow retrieval of the
document across all reference products produced in our abstracting and documentation products, whether
in book form, in on-line databases, and on CD-ROMs. This is followed by the eight-digit date which is
searchable in electronic formats.
Particles:
(Appearing at the end of each record.)
[=]
This particle indicates that the fulltext of a document is included.
[TXT]
This particle indicates that the abstract includes substantively all information
provided in the source document.
iii
10000. AID. Congressional Presentation, FY 1995: Part 173:
Sustainable Development and Humanitarian
Assistance:
Humanitarian Assistance: Introduction. District of Columbia: AID,
February 28, 1994. [95H-04803] [19940228] The United States has a
long and generous tradition of providing assistance to the victims of
man-made and natural disasters. The USAID request for funding for
FY 1995 consists of International Disaster Assistance -- $170 million,
including $20 million for a new Transition Initiative. Through the US
Department of Agriculture, we are requesting $773 million for PL-480
Title II activities: $383 million for emergency food aid and $390 million
for regular development programs. Humanitarian assistance
programs for refugees are administered by the Department of State
through the Migration and Refugee Assistance Appropriation and the
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund and are
discussed in a separate Congressional Budget Presentation. US
funding for emergency humanitarian assistance has increased
dramatically in recent years. During the 1980s, the median annual
level for international disaster assistance was approximately $51
million. In FY 1993, the total was $219 million. Between FY 1989 and
FY 1993, emergency feeding programs, including both Title II and Sec
416(b) surplus commodities, increased from $205.8 million to $590.7
million. This surge in requirements results in large measure from the
increasing number of complex emergencies which the world now
confronts -- complex because they involve political and even military
conflict which impedes the delivery of relief assistance to innocent
civilians. Moreover, these man-made disasters are proving very
difficult to resolve, so relief requirements can continue for years,
rather than the few months of emergency needs which is typical for
natural disasters. Bosnia, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Liberia and
Northern Iraq are all examples of this form of disaster. Even natural
disasters now appear to have greater impact. As populations grow
and people crowd into urban slums and onto marginally viable and
unsafelands, the toll from natural disasters such as earthquakes,
floods and prolonged drought increases along with the costs of
humanitarian response. In providing assistance to meet this growing
challenge, USAID will continue to give top priority to saving lives and
minimizing human suffering. However, it is also important to
recognize the interdependence of USAID's humanitarian and
development objectives and to develop new assistance instruments to
support both. Recent experience has provided four lessons that will
guide our programs of humanitarian assistance. First, humanitarian
assistance is integral to the process of promoting sustainable
development. Emergency humanitarian assistance relieves suffering
and stabilizes nations that have experienced man-made and natural
disasters. Longer-term humanitarian assistance such as maternal
and child feeding programs can provide a social safety net to relieve
the worst aspects of poverty as development takes place. Typical
humanitarian crises such as famine, civil conflict, chronic poverty and
the inability to respond effectively to natural disasters increasingly
result directly from failures of development. Humanitarian assistance
is a necessary stop-gap response that helps nations recover to the
point where they can address the larger issues of development. The
transition from disaster or civil conflict is itself a crisis. From the
political point of view, it is best to address such crises early, before
famine and social disorder become established and the momentum of
civil conflict becomes irresistible, and before the cost of
reconstruction grows geometrically. From the development point of
view, it is best to arrest conflict and buttress institutions before social
structures collapse. Second, increasing attention must be given to
preparation for man-made and natural disasters and to prevention or
mitigation of their effects. Prevention, especially of man-made
disasters, requires attention to policy, planning and strengthening local
capacities. Disaster preparation also demands careful examination of
relief efforts and recovery plans and the assumptions on which they
are based -- before disaster strikes. Local politics and government
policies are the hidden components of all disasters, even natural ones,
for they can ease the impact of calamity or make it worse. USAID's
field missions, with their close working relationships with host
governments, play an invaluable leadership role in helping
governments in vulnerable developing countries prepare for disasters
and in designing projects that fully reflect the threat from natural and
man-made disasters.
Third, the United States cannot bear the burden alone. We must
collaborate with other donors and encourage them to contribute their
share of the spiraling costs of relief. Multilateral leadership, especially
from the United Nations, is frequently essential to resolve underlying
conflicts peacefully and to prevent discord from turning into crisis and
societal breakdown. Fourth, USAID's humanitarian activities mandate
cooperation at home and abroad. The United States must use its
resources carefully and forge partnerships with other providers of
humanitarian assistance from the United States, the international
donor community and the developing nations themselves. US private
voluntary organizations (PVOs), in particular, are essential to
successful programs of humanitarian assistance. Indigenous
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the local private sector
can also be critical partners in formulating and implementing
participatory, community-level programs for disaster prevention,
mitigation, preparedness, rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the
aftermath of disaster, their involvement is essential to the restoration
of infrastructure, social services, food security, and local political
institutions. Moreover, longer-term rehabilitation and recovery
programs to achieve sustainable growth at the national level must
build upon grass-roots activities that involve and empower local
communities and individuals. These lessons have clear relevance to
relief programs following natural disasters. They also suggest the
importance of effectively addressing so-called transitional situations - those cases where countries try to emerge from a national conflict, a
significant political transition or a major national disaster such as a
prolonged drought. For these countries, the timely provision of
assistance can help revitalize society, reinforce institutions, and
establish or preserve national order. These countries have special
needs that are not addressed by traditional disaster relief or long-term
programs of sustainable development: for example, the re-integration
of dislocated populations, including demobilized soldiers; restoration
of elementary security and infrastructure; and the creation of political
institutions. Transitional nations often are poised simultaneously for
either growth or chaos. Given the opportunity and the risks -especially from the failure to act quickly and effectively -- the donor
community must try to respond. Humanitarian assistance is not an
end in itself, but an integral part of an overall strategy for sustainable
development. By helping nations acquire the means to prepare for and
respond to disasters, and by helping them return to the path of
economic and social development, USAID can measurably contribute
to a more peaceful and prosperous world. [=]
10001. ARGK. "The Beginning Of The Formation Of People's
Power." Statement From The Headquarters Of The ARGK On The
Occasion Of The 11th Anniversary Of The Armed Liberation Struggle
In Kurdistan (Including the Kurdistan War Balance: 8/15/19948/15/1995). People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) August 8,
1995. Translated from Kurdistan Rundbrief 18/95. [99H-16918]
[19950808] On August 15, we will enter the 12th year of fighting in our
national liberation struggle against Turkish colonial fascism, which is
seeking to eradicate our people from history. We greet our people and
all humanity on this 11th anniversary of our national liberation
1
struggle, which is one of the most legitimate and humane struggles in
history, directed against one of the most barbaric regimes in the entire
world. Our national liberation struggle, which began on 8/15/1984 with
a few propaganda groups, reached the stage of 'Serhildan' (popular
uprising) by the early 1990s following a long phase of guerrilla
warfare. Today, our experienced and powerful guerrilla army has
reached the stage when liberated zones will be established. The past
year was very significant, both in terms of the fiascos which the
enemy suffered, as well as the aspects of our own development. The
year 1994 was a year of intensive and heavy war. The colonial fascist
Turkish Republic was forced to rely on major assistance from its
allies, particularly Germany and the United States. Our guerrilla
forces waged heroic resistance against the massive counterrevolutionary attacks and not only were able to keep the national
reality of Kurdistan alive in the face of these brutal assaults, but they
also transformed last year into a year of some of the most significant
developments our national liberation struggle has seen so far.
Last year, the PKK, which leads our struggle and our people's
liberation army, carried out its 5th Party Congress. The realization of
such a meeting with a long period of preparation shows the high level
which our national liberation struggle has reached, destroying all of
the plans which the enemy had made. Another significant
development last year was the fact that there wasn't only heavy
fighting between our guerrilla forces and the fascist Turkish army in
northwest Kurdistan, but in south Kurdistan as well. The military
operation which was launched by the Turkish army during Newroz
has created a situation of war in south Kurdistan which continues to
exist in different forms. This Turkish attack has helped to unify north
and south Kurdistan, and steps are now being taken by our forces to
create joint military strategy and tactics in all regions of Kurdistan.
The resistance by our forces against the Turkish attacks in south
Kurdistan turned their operation into a failure and the Turkish army
became bogged down in south Kurdistan. In this way, the revolution in
north Kurdistan is being transported to the south and is influencing the
population there. The people of south Kurdistan are on the side of our
revolution and they support it. South Kurdistan has become an
important strategic region for us and it is controlled by our guerrilla
forces. Thus, a new revolutionary phase has begun in south Kurdistan.
This phase in south Kurdistan, just like in north Kurdistan, is the
beginning of the formation of people's power.
That is the reality in Kurdistan today. The imperialists and
colonialists, who have realized that this reality does not fit with their
interests, have gathered together collaborationist forces with the aim
of halting revolutionary developments. But these dangerous counterrevolutionary measures will be defeated by us. We have not been
blind to these plans, and our revolutionary positions, which we have
struggled for, will destroy these plots and we will teach the necessary
lessons to all those who planned them. In conjunction with the 5th
Congress of the PKK, the stage which was developed in northwest
Kurdistan in the spring and summer of this year is on the path to
victory for our progressive struggle. We have inflicted serous blows
on the fascist Turkish army in the region between the Zagros
mountains and Dersim, and between the Taurus mountains and
Serhat. As our guerrilla struggle in northern and central areas
becomes further anchored, we are rapidly approaching victory in
Botan and the Zagros region. Now is the time when we will seek to
establish liberated zones and people's power based on the line of
victory. The balance of the last year of fighting is proof of this.
Kurdistan War Balance: 8/15/1994-8/15/1995:
During the past year in Kurdistan, there were 3281 armed
encounters in the form of attacks, ambushes, assaults, executions,
mine actions, and battles between Turkish army troops and our
guerrilla forces. We know of Turkish casualties for about two-thirds of
these encounters, but the results of the other one-third are unknown to
us. Of the casualty figures known to us, a total of 6493 Turkish
soldiers were killed, including 209 officers, 19 lower-ranking officers,
74 special team commandos, and 6191 normal soldiers. In addition to
these, 1099 village guards, including 9 village guard chiefs, and 285
agents and contra-guerrillas were killed. Therefore, a total of 7877
enemy forces were killed, and an unknown number were wounded.
During the same time period, we took 365 enemy forces prisoner,
including 1 lieutenant, 1 lower-ranking officer, 11 soldiers, 5 sentries,
303 village guards, and 44 agents and contra-guerrillas. We also
confiscated the following military equipment from the Turkish army
during the past year: 10 heavy machine guns; 101 medium machine
guns; 18 sniper rifles; 594 infantry weapons; 122868 rounds of
ammunition; 14 mortars; 54 flame throwers; 27 rocket launchers; 195
rockets; 6 grenade launchers; 256 hand grenades; 56 radios; 12 flare
guns; 34 night vision glasses; 97 binoculars; 1194 mines; and 2 mine
detectors.
During the past year, we completely destroyed the following: 2
airplanes; 6 helicopters; 10 tanks; 72 panzers; 204 army vehicles; 1
MIT vehicle; 146 village guard vehicles; 69 state vehicles; 59 pieces
of construction equipment; 1 radar facility; and 2 radar stations. We
also damaged 2 helicopters, 1 train, and 28 state buildings. Our forces
also carried out 11 acts of sabotage (bombings) against the KerkukYumurtalek oil pipeline. Since 8/15/1994, we have completely
destroyed 4 enemy military installations and forced the enemy to
abandon and flee from another 8. Since Newroz 1995, a total of 73
villages have been forcibly evacuated by the Turkish army, 43 of
these in south Kurdistan and the other 30 in north Kurdistan, and 73
rural villagers have been killed by Turkish troops, 47 in south
Kurdistan and 26 north Kurdistan.
In the year that has passed since 8/15/1994, 1286 of our fighters
have fallen as martyrs in confrontations with Turkish forces. Another
399 have been wounded. In addition to these martyrs, 6 popular militia
members have fallen and 14 of our fighters were wounded and taken
prisoner by the Turkish army. During the past year, we have
consistently proven that our army, which has developed through 11
years of struggle, is an unbeatable force which can secure the
survival and defence of our people. We now find ourselves at the
starting point of creating our lasting victory. May the history of the
struggle of our people stride forward with many new August 15
advances! [=]
10002. ARGK. ARGK Balance Of The War In Kurdistan, 1997: "The
Enemy Lost 8439 Men..." People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan
(ARGK), January 1, 1998. [99H-16916] [19980101] On 1/1/1998, the
Press Office of the Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army of
Kurdistan (ARGK) released its balance for the war in Kurdistan in
1997: From the period of 1/1/1997-1/1/1998, there were a total of 2306
armed clashes between the ARGK, the Turkish military, and KDP
peshmergas. The ARGK carried out 540 ambushes and 216 raids on
enemy targets. There were also 24 attacks, 451 firefights, 97 acts of
sabotage, 98 roadblocks, and 272 other actions. The results of 1542 of
the total 2306 clashes are mostly or partially known to the ARGK. The
results of the other 764 clashes are unknown. The enemy lost a total
of 8439 men. The Turkish military lost 74 officers, 2759 soldiers, and
78 police agents. Among the 2713 collaborators killed were 597
village guards and 78 KDP commanders. The number of enemies
wounded was more than double the total killed.
During the year, 5 helicopters, including 2 Super Cobra attack
helicopters, were shot down and 315 military vehicles were
destroyed. Another 6 military vehicles were confiscated by our forces.
The Turkish military carried out 615 air raids in South and North
Kurdistan. The Turkish military carried out 262 operations. Our forces
2
lost 986 heroic guerrilla fighters.
Our forces confiscated the following weapons and equipment: 21
20-mm anti-aircraft cannons; 18 mortars and grenade launchers; 82
heavy machineguns; 86 heavy rocket launchers; 14 light rocket
launchers; 14 MG-3 machineguns; 401 handgrenades; 609 AK-47
Kalaschnikow assault rifles; 145 G-3 rifles; 78 radios; 241 mines; 485
rockets; 6 mine detectors.
(Source: Kurdistan-Rundbrief, No.3, Vol.11, 10.2.1998) [=]
the conspiracy has not ended. This conspiracy is comprehensive. It
does not only target the leadership of the PKK, the PKK and the
Kurdish people, but also the people of the Middle Eastern. The PKK is
the first on the slate. There are various reasons for this. We should be
aware that after this [the PKK], they will develop other parts of the plot.
Although the US and Israel deny any involvement in this plot
[against Mr. Ocalan], it is obvious that they are directly responsible for
it. This plot was carried out by them. Turkey does not have such
capability or power. Turkey does not have the power to go and
conduct an operation like this in Kenya. We know Turkey very well. It
is a window dressing to say that Turkey went to Kenya and conducted
this operation. The basics of this operation were carried out by the US
and by Israel. Also, these two states involved some other countries
and personalities in this plot. For example, they used Russia, Greece,
Kenya and even some traitor Kurds too. But in essence, this
conspiracy is the work of the US and Israel. This is clear. This plot
was carried out in violation of all international laws. It is a piracy. This
plot targets the will of our people. The honor of our people was
trampled on. They [kidnappers] behaved very despicably.
No one should expect us, or demand from us, to behave
indifferently against these plotters. This is very clear. Generally
speaking, it was the [disinterested] attitude of Europe that paved the
way to this plot. Because our Chairman came to Europe, stretched his
hand to Europe, insisted on a political solution [to Kurdish question].
Unfortunately Europe did not shake the hand of our party leadership,
pretended not to see. In this sense, Europe acted hypocritically, did not
play its positive role. If Europe had behaved honorably, this plot would
not have ended like this. Europe's hypocrisy played an important role
in the hands of the conspirators. In this sense, at least, Europe should
see its role in this plot. Europe has both a historical and a current
responsibility in the existing reality [of the Kurds]. At least, it should
see its role [in the Kurdish tragedy] and not make a mistake from now
on. It should protect our leader's right to life. Europe should fulfill its
legal and moral responsibilities. Especially Italy should do its utmost
to fulfill its responsibility since our leader sought asylum in that
country. Not only Italy, but all European states and governments
should pressure Turkey in this regard. At least, they should safeguard
our leader's right to life. Likewise, his interrogation should be
safeguarded within the framework of the international law. If he is to
be interrogated, he should be interrogated under the guaranties of an
international court. Turkey is a fascist state.
Even Europe knows that Turkey will never conduct a fair trial.
Also, Europe can sense what is awaiting our leader. Given such fears,
Europe has the responsibility to guarantee our leader's right to life and
his right to a fair trial in an international court. If these forces [states]
do not fulfill these responsibilities, then, no international law can bind
us, shall bind us. Because, it would be a great injustice to us if Europe
expects us to be loyal to international laws when so many
international laws have been violated by so many acts of piracy [in the
kidnapping of our leader]. We have obeyed the international laws. Our
Chairman signed the Geneva Conventions - Europe knows this fact.
But, as reward for this compliance, our leader was greeted with an act
of piracy. Europe remained silent about this. It must accept its
responsibility by all means. Our people know the plotters of this
conspiracy, they will know them even better. But knowing them is not
enough, our people should use their rights to defend themselves. Our
people face a vicious aggression. They face annihilation. The honor of
our people is violated. Therefore, our people have a legitimate right to
defend themselves. However, our people should do so within the
boundaries of democracy, lawfully. The Turkish republic and some
European powers are striving to provoke the Kurds to go beyond the
lawful boundaries. This is in their interests because these powers are
trying to cover up for their conspiracy. We Kurds should not be duped
10003. ARGK. Former ARGK Commander Surrenders To The
KDP. People's Liberation Army Of Kurdistan (ARGK) (Artesa
Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan). Translated from 'Kurdistan-Rundbrief'
7/11, April 7, 1998. [99H-16915] [19980407] Semdin Sakik, a former
commander of the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK),
surrendered himself to the KDP on March 16, 1998. In the Turkish
media, this event was played up as evidence of the collapse of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and reports of Sakik's defection
were published in Turkish papers just as the annual Newroz
celebrations were set to begin in Kurdistan. In Kurdish circles close to
the PKK, however, the event was relatively unimportant. Semdin
Sakik had been a controversial figure in the movement for some time.
Among other things, he was responsible for the attack which brought
an end to the PKK's first unilateral cease-fire in 1993, and he was
responsible for other mistakes as well. In recent weeks, after he
refused to change his conduct, he was removed of all of his positions
of command and told he could leave and go wherever he wanted. Now
he is with the KDP, who may hand him over to the Turkish military.
On the evening of Newroz, Kani Yilmaz, the former European
spokesman of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK),
spoke about Semdin Sakik on the Kurdish satellite channel MED-TV:
"In the ranks of the guerrilla, Sakik had for years been disobeying
orders and had become a thorn in the side of the PKK. His flight from
the movement is the flight of a worthless personality who has become
a traitor. The Turkish state and the Turkish intelligence service have
been working for a long time to get their hands on Sakik, that's why
they chose to announce this news at this particular time with such a
degree of media hype. But for the PKK, the event is of little
significance." [=]
10004. ARGK. Statement From Commander Cemal Bayik: Victory,
Sooner Or Later, Will Be Ours! People's Liberation Army Of
Kurdistan (ARGK). UK: MED-TV, February 17, 1999. [99H-16913]
[19990217] (The following is the statement of Cemal Bayik, a
member of the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) and one of the commanders of the ARGK which were
broadcast on Med-TV's Major News Bulletin on February 17, 1999.)
In the name of all our freedom fighters, I bow with respect to the
memory of our people massacred by the Israeli murderers. I hope
Germany pays attention to this massacre and does not hush up this
crime. A conspiracy had been initiated against our leader on October
9, 1998. However, due to the great strivings of our leader it was
preempted. As you know, this conspiracy succeeded quite recently. It
is not an accident that the conspiracy was developed and was set to
work right after the Washington agreement [between Jalal Talabani
and Mesud Barzani]. This conspiracy is directly related to that
agreement. The coalition between England, Israel, Turkey and the US
initiated a new intervention into the Middle East. This intervention
targeted the PKK movement and its leader first and foremost. In a
sense, with the agreement in Washington, this intervention was put to
work. They tried to eliminate our leader on October 9, but our leader
blocked the attempt at that time. What has happened these few days is
the result of that conspiracy. This is highly significant. Even though,
they took the first step in this intervention, in this plot and succeeded,
3
into this. We should not allow it. Our people should indeed strive to
protect their democratic rights, their honor, their national rights, but
within the boundaries of the law. Our people in [Europe] have some
rights and they should be used in the most correct manner. The
Kurdish youth have the most responsibility. They should prove that
they are loyal to Apo. The youth can play a dynamic role in defending
the honor of our people. Especially in the metropolitan cities of Turkey
and in our homeland. They should lead the Kurdish uprisings
(serhildans). The youth have these sacred tasks. All evidence points
out that it is the youth, the young people who shoulder these tasks. Our
people are proud of our youth and that pride will never vanish.
We will call your attention to another issue. Some of our people
immolate themselves. This is dead wrong. This act surely makes our
enemies happy. Therefore, stop this act at once. You should
remember that our Chairman forbade self-immolation. Don't
immolate yourselves! If you are serious about defending yourselves,
serious about defending your honor against your enemies, then,
immolating oneself is not the way at all. To the contrary, you should
organize yourselves and use every right in your disposal to defend
yourselves against your enemies. This way only, shall you have a
chance to stand against your enemy. Don't think even about any other
way. The most appropriate way of putting up a stand against them is
to become an Apo yourself. This was the wish of our leader. He had
brought it to your attention in the past. That is what you should do.
Great tasks are awaiting our people in each part of Kurdistan.
Our people have risen and are claiming, owning their leader. This is
indeed an honorable mobilization. No force on earth can stand in the
path of this awakening and should not try it. Our people will use every
avenue to realize their legitimate rights. Our people should resist
against the aggressors. They should never take a step back. To take a
step back is death for our people, it will spell doom for our people.
Never forget this! Always keep it in mind. However, as I have already
mentioned, be aware of the provocations of the enemy when you take
a stand. Make sure that you remain within the boundaries of the laws,
be extra-careful not to slip into unlawfulness. You must follow the
directives and instructions of our party. Yes, you have your initiative
and you do have the right to resist. But must use this initiative
correctly, lawfully.
The enemy attacks us without mercy. He wants to pilfer our
homeland, rob our identity and end our life. He considers these to be
too much for us. Indeed, if we have an iota of dignity, self-respect, and
sense of honor, we have to defend our homeland, our identity and our
life. We should not let our honor be debased. We must use every right
in our disposal to resist to the end. Until now, our leadership exerted
extraordinary efforts to prevent a Turkish-Kurdish war among the
civilians. However, such restraint was rewarded by [the Turkish
State] with this piracy. From now on, no one can restrain our people
like him. But at times, even our Chairman was strained in his efforts
to curb our people [in the face of atrocities of the Turkish forces]. He
had warned the people on several occasions. Our party shows the
same care, however, the most recent event [kidnapping] burst the
seams of the patience of our people. It seems like, they are in a
reactive mode. One should understand this. Kurdish people are not
responsible for all that is happening, those who have imposed
genocide and annihilation on the Kurds, those powers that have
trampled on their honor are the real culprits. In no way shall we be
held responsible for the events, we are not responsible for them.
The Turkish officials are drunk with victory. They are telling us
we should turn ourselves in, that we are in a dead end. Again, persons
like Dogu Ergil [a Kemalist, social scientist] expect that we will
disperse, dissolve ourselves. There are some collaborators who
expect this too. They will receive a single response from us: They will
be disappointed. Those who sow the wind, will harvest the storm.
They will always receive a response. They will wait in vain. They will
harvest the storm. I would like to stress a point here: They should not
touch a single hair of our leader. We are warning them. If they harm
our leader, they will have to bear the consequences. They must
respect our leader. No one should miscalculate or take a wrong step.
They should remember that every PKK militant, every Kurd with
some honor is a fedai [self-sacrificer for a cause]. Never forget that.
No one should play with the honor of our people any more. No one can
gamble over the blood of our numerous martyrs, not even dare.
Our people and friends should have faith in our party, in our
army and in our front. Even though we lost a great leader, this does
not mean that our party and army is weakened. Our party, our army
and our front are on their feet. This is obvious. No one should worry
about this. Fears like, "can the party survive, will the revolution
continue, what will happen now, can something go wrong," are
irrelevant. Such fears are void. There is absolutely nothing to worry
about. The current unity in our party, the loyalty to its Chairman is
stronger than ever. I can state with confidence that, in the coming
days, it will be even much stronger. Every patriot should have
confidence in this. Taking the likelihood of an event like this,
Chairman Apo took all the measures so insure the continuity of the
party and the struggle in his absence. Today every Kurd is a candidate
to become an Apo. The Kurdish people and Apo are unified. Now,
every Kurd is an Apo.
I have some messages to the people of Europe, to the
democratic and patriotic circles and to the Greek people. The
European people, the Greek people, all of the revolutionary and
democratic segments should know that the protests were against the
powers involved in this plot [kidnapping]. We have nothing but
friendship for the European and the Greek people. Our response was
directed against those who hatched the plot. That is what it was. They
played with the dignity of a nation, they toyed with its will. The plotters
want to darken the future of the Kurds. We are sure you understand
this and you will support us. We expect this. We expect that you will
take a stand against these conspirators and call them to account. The
Kurds are an oppressed nation, they are a dispossessed nation. All
values that the Kurds possess are trampled upon. We are trying to
pull the humanity and the honor of the Kurds from underneath the feet
of the oppressors. We hope you see it this way too. In this context, you
should support Kurdish people. We invite everyone, the democrats
and the socialists, the human rights activists to be in solidarity with
our people. There should be no place for conspirators and plots in our
world. We would like to shout this out loud! We invite all the powers
that claim to be for humanity to prove their humanity. Otherwise,
humanity will be deeply wounded. Everyone should support the just
struggle of the Kurdish people, to preserve their humanity from this
disgrace. Our people stood up for their leader; they rose up to regain
their humanity. We salute this. As freedom fighters, we will put forth
all we have to be worthy of this.
Victory, sooner or later, will be ours. It will be our people's. Long
Live Our National Leader Chairman Ocalan! Long Live Our Struggle
For Freedom And Independence! (Cemal Bayik, People's Liberation
Army of Kurdistan (ARGK), February 17, 1999.) [=]
10005. ARGK. Statement From Commander Osman Ocalan:
Enough Is Enough. Take Your Hands Off Our People. Do Not Force
Us To Use Our Right To Self-Defense! People's Liberation Army Of
Kurdistan (ARGK), February 17, 1999. [99H-16914] [19990217] In
The Name Of The Central Committee Of The Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) And Commanders Of The People's Liberation Army Of
Kurdistan (ARGK): This is our call to our people in North Kurdistan,
East Kurdistan, South Kurdistan and (mini) South Kurdistan, to our
people in the metropoles and abroad, to all democratic forces and
4
human right organizations: The October 9th international conspiracy
aimed at our leadership has reached a new dimension with the
hijacking of our leader to Turkey. First and foremost, the actions taken
against our leadership are the prime examples of international piracy;
they are flagrant violation of international law and basic humanitarian
rules. The behavior of countries that champion "human rights" vis a
vis the Turkish attacks on our leadership is disgraceful.
Our peoples desire to express their longing for peace and
freedom has been blocked. Our leadership came to Europe to pursue
peace. As the leader of people threatened by genocide, people who
have sacrificed everything for an honorable and just existence, he
extended the hand of peace and asked that this hand be shaken.
However, those who talk of human rights and democracy have
adamantly refused the hand of peace, they have instead engaged in
acts of piracy that violate all norms of international law and humanity
in the pursuit of our leadership. Clearly, this conspiracy is directed at
our people. This is a conspiracy by imperialist forces sworn to deny
our people the right to live in freedom and peace they so deserve. The
western powers have demonstrated unequivocally that their petty
interests supersede the rights of people to live in peace and freedom.
They want us to submit to the Turkish genocide machine, like the
lambs in slaughterhouse. The attacks on our leadership is a
significant element of genocide directed towards our people.
Obviously our people should react to this genocide. Freedom can be
attained only through struggle against the imperialist interests. Let it
be clear: The imperialists and the reactionary forces around the world
has sacrificed our people's quest for peace and freedom to their dirty
interests. They desecrated all human values (for the sake of Turkey).
What will be the response of our people? Without a doubt, the
wishes of imperialists and the reactionaries will not be realized.
Kurdish people, both inside the country and abroad, will intensify their
struggle for freedom as directed by our leadership. The hopes of
imperialists and reactionaries will be dashed. As for any people,
freedom is our birthright. Freedom from genocide is our natural right.
No one can take away these rights from us. No economic or political
interest can justify infringement on our right to freedom and peace.
The imperialists are asking us to consent to genocide. What a folly!
The Kurds live for freedom, for honor and dignity. Let no less be
expected! Our people shall continue their struggle for freedom under
the leadership of Chairman Apo. Life shall become unbearable for the
Turkish state. Our party, army and liberation front will accomplish
these objectives in the name of our people. We will extract a heavy
price from the Turkish State for the act of piracy against our
leadership. Every Kurd, in particular, those living in the country and
the metropoles should take whatever action they deem appropriate on
this basis. They should employ all the means available to them. We
will not bow to enemy, we will only fight it. The Kurds living abroad
should not put themselves on fire, they should put the enemy on fire.
They should avoid the armed violence, but use every legitimate
avenue to defend their national rights and the leadership. Let no one
interfere with this struggle.
The US is extremely hostile to our people. We have refrained
from any hostile act against the United States. The more we refrained
from hostile acts against this country, the more intense American
hostility towards our people has became. The American authorities
have shamelessly justified the act of piracy by Turkey. All this in
pursuit of its dirty interests. The Zionist State of Israel, ever
concerned about its dirty interests, has joined Turkey in denying our
people their legitimate aspirations. Israel armed the Turkish army and
cooperated with Turkey in all international matters. We wish not to
make enemies with the Israeli people. However, the harder we tried
not to make enemies with the Israeli people, the more Israel served
Turkey, a criminal enterprise, in oppressing our people. In addition,
Germany, Italy, Russia and in particular Greece have taken part in the
conspiracy against our people. The Greek foreign minister, Mr.
Pangolos, has gone so far as to insult our people. Neither the Greek
government, nor its representatives have any right to insult our
people; they may only apologize to our people for their misdeeds. The
threat (by the Greek government) to hand over the Kurds in Greece to
Turkey just illustrates how bizarre this regime has become. Greeks
are honorable, trustworthy people; they appreciate friendship. They
will not be tools to the misguided policies of the Greek government.
We call on the Greek people, Greek patriots and democratic forces in
Greece to stand tall against the present government's dark intentions.
Furthermore, we call on all forces taking part or providing support for
crimes against Kurdish nation to desist from this behavior. You have
over the centuries supported suppression of Kurds by the Ottomans
and later Turkey. Enough is enough. Take your hands off our people.
Do not force us to use our right to self-defense!
We call on the forces of democracy and peace and defenders of
human rights to stop their silent approval of the slaughter our people
are facing. We further call on them to stand against the abduction of
our leadership by Turkey, a state best known for torture and murder. It
is a basic requirement of being a human that you should raise your
voice against Turkish piracy. Be reminded that humanity is not about
material interest! Only a neutral, international tribunal may try our
leadership. The Turkish state has no right to judge our people or our
leadership. The only one to account for its actions is Turkey. The
Turkish State has murdered hundreds of thousands of Kurds, expelled
millions from their lands and forced them into poverty. It is the
Turkish state that must account for its crimes. Neither our leadership,
nor members of our party and army, not even a single Kurd is
accountable to Turkish state. We insist that Turkey account to our
people for its crimes.
Our party is in unison with all its members and our army is in
unison with all its fighters. We are ready, able and willing to apply
directives our leadership fully. We will extract a heavy price from the
Turkish state for the conspiracy it has engaged in against our
leadership. Let no representative of the Turkish state have peace at
home. We call on our people in the metropoles to act on this basis.
We call on our people to keep in mind that the only honorable life
available to us, the Kurds is to fight for freedom. The party central
committee and army command ask that you be prepared to act on this
basis. Your actions should be intensified and sustained. We reiterate
that our leadership can not be asked to account, only the barbaric
Turkish state, the murderer's state, may account for its crimes. We
will intensify and expand our war efforts, taking all necessary actions
against the Turkish state. The best way to defend our leadership is to
intensify our struggle, our war on this basis. Once again we call on
our people in Europe to refrain from armed violence, but use all
legitimate tools available them to advance Kurdish national rights. We
reiterate that our party, army and people will run to victory on
chairman Apo's road. (Osman Ocalan, People's Liberation Army of
Kurdistan (ARGK), February 17, 1999.) [=]
10006. ARGK; Kurdistan Information Centre (UK). ARGK Command
Camp Press Release. ARGK Command Base, July 4, 1997.
Translated from Turkish original by Kurdistan Information Centre,
London, July 1997. [99H-16917] [19970704] A successful operation
was concluded on July 3, 1997 against the manufacturing centre for
the Turkish army's weapons of mass destruction at Kirikkale
Machine & Chemical Plant by the Urban Attack Detachment operating
under the command of our base camp. We exercised our lawful right
to self-defence in designating the Kirikkale Machine & Chemical Plant
as a target being the source of the manufacture of weapons of mass
destruction which the occupying forces of the Turkish army deploy in
5
their so-called "bombs which will turn the mountains into plains". The
bombs which have been used most recently in the invasion of south
Kurdistan, the slaughter of our people and to destroy the environment
of our homeland have for years been manufactured at that site. The
weapons produced by this same plant since it first opened have
caused the utter destruction of 3000 of our villages, the slaughter of
thousands of our civilians and numerous extra-judicial killings in
violation of the Geneva Convention to which Turkey is a signatory,
and in infringement of the laws governing armed conflict being
unlawfully deployed in an internal war. This particular type of
operation was carried out against a specific military target in order to
eliminate the direct threat of death which this plant has posed to our
peoplethese many long years, and the operation was successful.
From this operation it must be taken in the nature of a warning that
even before the newly-forming government starts work, it is evident
that an opportunity for a solution must be found in order to prevent the
escalation of the conflict. Failing this in the same way that we have
proven successful against military targets our ARGK Urban Revenge
Unit possesses the necessary strength and preparedness to
undermine both the economy as well as the tourism industry. We do
not want to escalate the war. But it is only natural in view of the scale
of force being brought against us that our own response should be
effective. Unless there is some understanding, if these operations do
not cease, if the war should carry on as at present, and the
government fail to take positive steps we will respond even more
effectively and will expand our organisational capacity within the army
and security forces, just as this last operation illustrates. Our action
has also proven successful because it is at the same time carried out
in the spirit of revenge necessitated by the courageous death in selfsacrifice of Zilan, a great commander, the massacres of defenceless
civilians in south Kurdistan executed by the fascist Turkish army in
collaboration with the treacherous KDP, and with the tacit support of
the United States and Israel, and for the lives of those who were
deliberately burnt to death in Sivas. It is the other side which is
responsible for the escalation of the war in deliberate defiance of our
appeal for peace and despite the fact that we are prepared to
commence a political dialogue. They seek to create an even more
dangerous situation and status quo in the south of our country. We are
warning the government quite openly. The Turkish people must also
be aware that we will not remain silent in the face of such a dirty and
vile war. These bombs are being bought with the money which at the
same time as it squeezes the life out of the Turkish people are daily
deployed to wipe out the Kurdish people whether in the mountains or
in the villages. In this same sense, this latest operation may serve as
a warning that the next blow will be to tourism, the economy and the
full scale escalation of the war. [=]
prepared to pay any price to protect our future and our rights. It has
been decided that as long as our people are denied all of their
legitimate rights, and until Chairman Apo has won his freedom, the
struggle against the Turkish state will be continued and intensified in
every field, until we reach our goal. According to this, our army and
our people are in a legitimate phase of action. Every region of Turkey
is now a region of war. This means that even the tourist regions of the
Turkish state are included. For this reason, these sensitive and
historical days must not be confused with others. In order to prevent
harm to human lives, tourists from around the world, but especially
from Europe, should not travel to Turkey. The affected states should
warn their citizens, and the tourism industry should not organize trips
to Turkey, since the lives of tourists could be put at risk. Should tragic
events occur, because the proper authorities fail to heed our warnings,
we cannot be held responsible. Therefore we take this opportunity to
inform the press and the international public, and all foreign citizens
who are considering their travel plans. (People's Liberation Army of
Kurdistan (ARGK) March 15, 1999.) (Source: Solidariteitsgroep
Turkije-Kurdistan; Translated by Arm The Spirit). [=]
10008. Abbas, Zainab; Hyman, Nicholas; Blake, Cecile [editor]; AbuOsba, Saleh K. [editor]. Libya In Perspective: Scholars' View of a
Revolutionary Nation: Part 25: Washington's Oil Weapon. S.L.:
Ministry of Information, N.D. [1987]. [99H-08043] [19870101] The
Sirte agression was part of a stridently chauvinist and bellicose mood
among the policy makers of the world's most powerful industrialised
nation. Even towards his western allies, such as West Germany and
Britain, Reagan appeared ''Bellicose''1 in his announcements
regarding the practicality of "limited" nuclear war. Towards the
Middle East and the Third World as a whole, his incipient racism was
mixed with a pseudomoralising "Americanism." To saddle Reagan
with all the responsibility for this "return to Nixonism" however,
ignores Carter's slide into similarly crude and interventionist
attitudes, in terms both of rhetoric as well as practice. (The aborted
"hostage rescue" mission in Iran is considered by many observers as
having been intended to bring about a change of government in Iran).
Already in 1977, a sympathetic historian commented on Carter's
foreign policies: "So much of Washington politics is conducted at the
top of one's voice. . . But the Carter administration seems to be setting
new records for noise". Washington was ready to resurrect the gamut
of anachronistic pressures. This included military brinkmanship, the
encouragement and virtual creation of surrogate client regimes to
threaten the recalcitrant Third World (as in Sudan, Egypt, Somalia
and other Washington-backed, repressively ruled societies), and
compelling US companies to attempt pressure on governments with
which the US was not at war.
Public opinion wanted "patriotic reporting," to judge from the
Newsweek reader who thanked "God the Reagan Administration has
the guts to stand up to those two bit Arab nations with their demented
dictators."Washington's orchestration of anti'Libyan prejudice was
coupled with menacing language—such as the statement by one
Reagan strategist: 'We don't necessarily want to kill Qaddafi, we just
want to tie him up.'" But more experienced and responsible figures on
the United States' political scene did not fail to draw attention to the
similarities between the Gulf of Tonkin in 8/1964 which led to the
catastrophe of the Vietnam war. The former chairman of the United
States Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, noted that
Sirte was in the same league of lawlessness as Israel with its
Baghdad reactor attack. "In recent months there have been many
reports in Newsweek and other media that the United States wishes
to and is planning to remove Qaddafi by one means or another, and
the scenario appears to be unfolding. . .It is of great importance to all
people to know how the United States uses its power and how its
10007. ARGK; Solidariteitsgroep Turkije-Kurdistan. Communique:
Every Region Of Turkey Is Now A Region Of War! People's
Liberation
Army
Of
Kurdistan
(ARGK).
Amsterdam:
Solidariteitsgroep Turkije-Kurdistan, March 15, 1999. [99H-16912]
[19990315] After our national leader, Chairman Apo, was kidnapped
and handed over to the Turkish state in an international conspiracy
which violated all forms of international law, we as a people find
ourselves in a new and very special phase of the history of our
struggle. On the one hand, every force whose interests do not match
those of the USA, Israel, Turkey, and certain European states are
accused of terrorism, although these states, by means of an act of
terror and piracy, have sought to completely darken our free future.
On the other hand, all of our rights and our future, personified in the
person of Chairman Apo, are to be destroyed. But we, the Kurdish
people, the Kurdish youth, and the militant forces of the ARGK, are
6
purpose is conceived by others," he went on to say. Because US
Forces "were deliberately provocative" in their "dramatic use of
superior power," Fulbright reminded Americans that "since David
confronted Goliath, small and weak people have identified with the
underdog."
Fulbright warned that "this enthusiastic use of superior force
against the background of our reluctance, if not refusal, to negotiate
arms reductions with the Russians, and our acceptance with no
serious objections of the raids on Lebanon and Baghdad, with
American planes, may well lead other nations, our friends included, to
believe that we are no longer interested in negotiation rather than
confrontation, as we profe sed to be in the era of 'peaceful
coexistence' in the early 1970s. . " Fulbright may have been opposed
to the use of brutal force, but he certainly did not challenge the general
American pattern of using pressure to achieve the United States'
goals in the Third Wor}d and elsewhere. His allusion to Washington's
desire to "remove" Libya's radical politial sysem "by one means or
another" is a symptom of a widening of Reagan's foreign
interventionism from basic military bullying to time-honored methods
of economic blackmail. Indicative of such a turn in Reagan strastegy
was the inclusion of Richard Milhous Nixon in Washington's funeral
party for Sadat's obsequies. A commentator felt "revulsion. . . at Mr.
Nixon's pre ence" in Cairo, with "everyone acting as if he was
respectable." Nixon used this triumphant return to the international
political stage to advise an oil boycott of Libya. Though "nothing
abashes him, no shame will ever keep Mr. Nixon from an occasion to
play statesman," the insensitivity of "Reagan and his people to the
symbolism involved is surprising. . tit is not, after all, as if
Washington needed to be reminded of what he is."
The commentator saw in the tacit rehabilitation of Nixon, as
evidenced by the Cairo presence the present administration's desire
to retum to the imperial style of presidency favored by the earlier
Republicanadministration. According to that view, the President
should and can act unilaterally at home and abroad, avoiding the
bother of Congressional approval and public discussion... "Abroad the
most far-reaching example was Mr. Nixon's assertion that he had the
right to bombard Cambodia in the absence of any declaration of war,
treaty of Congressional authorisation . . . Mr. Nixon's desire to act
alone and by surprise depended on secrecy and often involved secret
action by the Central Intelligence Agency. . . At his urgent orders the
agency plotted to keep Salvador Allende from his elected office in
Chile. "Those past examples of abuse, of overreaching in assertion.
of...power, all find echoe in the Reagan administration...This pattern—
the desire to bypass Congress and the public—is the same."
Sirte was the fruit of "a striking practice of this administration. . .
to make enormous commitments without asking Congress first. The
President did that with Saudi Arabia when he said casually at a press
conference, "we will not permit it to be an Iran:' Then...Haig said. . .
that the current US role in Egypt is absolutely vital to our interests in
the region and we would treat it accordingly. . ." Does that mean that
we are pledged to resist a change of policy by the Egyptians
themselves? Resist by American arms? Libya was an obstacle to the
revamped dreamworld of American power. "Bright Star" and earlier
military exercises came from the same range of destabilising
measures as the oil companies' moves urged by Washington. In fact,
Felleke Gedle Giorgis, Ethiopian Foreign Minister, spoke of "Bright
Star" maneuvres in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman as intended to
"endanger" Ethiopia and her government. He maintained that "the
governments of Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen are constantly
threatened with being overthrown by the United States. . . It is this
threat and provocation that necessitated the three countries to work
together." But United States military pressures—either in the form of
practical aggression as in Sirte, or as threats and symbolic
occupations as in "Bright Star" did not seem sufficient to bring about
the desired results. Nixon's resurgence, in a way symbolised the
moment when those in Washington—who would have preferred to
win with a clear show of military superiority—decided it was time to
reactivate all the old bag of dirty undercover tricks, political and
economic If the military alone could not bring about the downfall of the
Libyan regime, then some help from within, that is, economic and
commercial destabilisation might achieve the goal.
Already in 5/1980, "when the remaining diplomats were
withdrawn from the US Embassy in Tropoli after the ouster of four
Libyan envoys from Washington," the State Department had warned
"that US companies should remove US citizens from Libya." The
same warning was reissued just after the Sirte incident. Some US
employees of Exxon had decided to take Washington's advice and
leave Libya by mid-August. Yet there were valid "assurances by the
Libyan government" that it would "continue to protect American
citizens living there."
Though Exxon was "making arrangements" in late August "for
the evacuation of 'a number' of dependents of its American
employees," other "US oil companies with operations in Libya said
their employees. . twill remain." Thus Marathon oil explicitly poured
cold water on allegations of post-Sirte chaos or xenophobia in Libya. A
Marathon "official. . .Charles Webster" said that employees "reported
'pretty much of a normal situation' in the country following the aerial
clash," and insisted that "Marathon currently had no intention to
evacuate its employees." The same went for Occidental Petroleum.
"The situation right now has cooled, and it may not warrant an
evaluation of our people" said a spokesman for the group. He was
"maintaining contact with the US State Department concerning events
in Libya." Conoco's spokesman also insisted that "our operations over
there are normal." Some 2200 "oil company employees and their
dependents," without official US representation since 5/1980, had
enjoyed—according to Marathon's Webster "protection . . . typical of
the security provided by the Libyans to all foreigners living in their
country."
The sober continuity of the US firms' operations in Libya was
not, however, in conformity with the "scenario" Fulbright had warned
against.Thus, the companies' commercial and realistic refusal to
heed Washington's advice of 1980 was resented by, say, Henry
Schuler. This Washington energy consultant, former US Foreign
Service officer and oil company executive, wanted Washington to
force companies to abandon "Business as usual, regardless of
whether that business is pumping Libya's oil, liquifying her gas,
clamouring for construction contracts, investing her petrodollars,
meeting her import and technology requirements . . . or grasping for
any other piece of that...pie." Schuler compared the "unusual
bureaucratic and corporate courage" required for such dislocatory
presures on Libya as the then imminent Exxon pullout, to "Sadat's
personal favour. . . in accepting the dying Shah." The comparison
explicitly resented Libya's "aura of invincibility," even after Sirte, and
realised the brittle hold the postSadat regime in Egypt has upon the
realities of the region. "If America is to instill courage . . . in the new
Egyptian government . . . the United States and its allies must break
the commercial links" which Libya in Schuler's view relied upon.
Though the "allies" outside the Middle East, supposed to be enlisted in
Washington's multi-pronged attack against Libya, remained invisible
in terms of concerted pressures, the following detail heralded the
Exxon pullout. The Reagan administration, urged Schuler, needed to
put "some muscle behind its request to American companies to
withdraw several thousand American personnel from Libya:' Seeming
to bemock the companies' concern to behave responsibly, rather than
dance to the bigoted whims of the particular "national hate week"
Washington now sought to propel into the minds of the publis Schuler
7
described the companies' claim that they needed "an unequivocal
order before they risk the shutdown of Libya's petroleum industry, an
embargo on its exports to the United States, the nationalisation of their
remaining assets and the possible putting into jeopardy of their
personnel: "It is far from certain that they would be happy with such a
clarification, but it should be recognised that the State department is
equally unwilling and reluctant to accept responsibility and perhaps
government liability. So the companies ignore" the State
Department's "widely publicised request:'
Relishing the imagined prospect of a "hostage situation" with
Libya, probably because such an improbable development would not
only confirm anti-Arab prejudices but also afford new prospects of
military pressures on Libya, Schuler called for a declaration from
Washington that US passports were "invalid for Libya:' The
"withdrawal of personnel would be designed. . . to give the
administration greater freedom of action" in "future provocations:'
whether Washington's or Tripoli's "provocations" were meant, was
unclear. The withdrawal Schuler advocated "would likely prompt an
embargo of shipments" of oil to the US. In contradiction to such pleas
for an end to US companies' involvement in Libya, Occidental
obtained a new "contract concession" from Libya. The profitability of
the ''complicated'' contract" meant, according to an Occidental
spokesman in Los Angeles, that apparently "even in a weak market,
the company could make money on the lower cost oil:' Quite
obviously the alarmist picture sketched by Schuler and by
Washington had little connection with the reality as perceived by an
American company with experience in Libya herself. Until Exxon's
evidently officially inspired move in November, it was clear that after
Sirte, "Americans living in Libya—mostly employffl of US oil
companies—do not seem to have been affected, nor has Libya made
any attempt to cut off oil supplies to the United States."
The likelihood of US pressures falling short of outright military
intervention was greater after the solidarity other countries expressed
with the victim of the Sirte attack began to register in Washington.
Important in this connection, as a probable factor in the modification of
Washington's inverventionist fever, was the promise by Chadli
Bendjedid, the President of Algeria, that Libya would receive "full
military backing" from Algeria: "We have affirmed that in the event of
an aggression on Libya, Algeria will intervene with its military
potential on the side of our people in Libya:' More support for Libya
came from South Yemen President, Ali Nasser Mohammed, who
said his country would "not remain with folded arms should the
fraternal Libyan people face an aggression." [=]
to Assad would result in the creation of "hot-confrontation lines" in the
Middle East, including the setting up of permanent bases and arsenals
in Israel.
At the Benghazi meeting, there was a strong similarity in tone
between the speeches of Qaddafi, Assad and Yasser Arafat. Qaddafi
stated that "in view of the interventionism and the military and
economic pressures Washington blatantly applied to the region, we
are compelled to defend ourselves and our existence by stepping up
our moves:' The report then quoted the PLO chairman's affirmation in
the light of Sirte that "struggle is our only course as we face the
imperialist onslaught by the US and its agent." The term "its agent"
here referred to the Egyptian regime. The essentially defensive
meeting in Benghazi, took account of what David Hirst, "just returned
from Tripoli" called "a risk of super power involvement": "the Reagan
administration seems now more than ever inclined to attribute its
Middle East setbacks not to the inherent shortages of its won proteges
and policies but to local and Soviet adversaries who profit from them."
Hirst found that "no one in Libya doubts that since he took office
Reagan has been out to get 'Qaddafi. It alarms and annoys European
diplomats. . .as well as American oil companies:' The latter,
"resisting administration pressures to reduce their presence in Libya,
are reasonably hopeful that, at the end of the day" a new oil price
agreement would be reached with Libya, such as Occidental had
signed by the start of October. Though Washington probably has not
given up all ideas of usin' surrogate forces in a war against Libya, the
risk of an Egyptian at tack boomeranging—as General Shazli, the
exiled Egyptian leade, suggested it would—was enough to put such a
project temporarily on ice. Chances that the Egyptian army might, in
fact turn against the present ruling clique and 'liberate' its own country
rather than let itself be involved in adventure beyond its borders, must
have seemed too high to the Reagan administration. At the same time,
the Sudanese regime's pyrotechnics about "attacks on Libya" were at
variance with that regime's paranoid isolation from its own people and
given Sudan's economic problems making for an extremely volatile
situation, Washington could not expect to use Nimeiri and get away
with it either.
The longest shot Washington could go for was another power
outside the region. France was the only serious candidate for such a
role. A report from Paul Webster in Paris stated that "some of
France's leading secret agents in Africa are to be sacked as a result
of a suspected plot to discredit President Mitterrand... "The sacking
will take place within a general shake up of the foreign intelligence
service, the SDECE, to reinforce a badly-faulted counterespionage
section. . . In private meetings, President Mitterrand is making no
secret of the fact that there was a deliberate attempt by French agents
to draw him into a trap which could have led to warfare between
France and Libya. There are reports of "indisciplined and hostile
agents" inside the SDECE, while the President is said to have
admitted that agents had 'got out of control'.
"Fabricated" reports were intended, in Mitterrand's opinion, "to
exploit the tense situation in the area and provide a pretext for a war
against Libya that Egypt and Sudan would have joined in. It is believed
that the agents" now sacked "supported both the military policies of
President Giscard and the confrontation tactics with Libya favoured by
the United States:' A form of misreporting from the section
responsible for reporting from Africa, thus nearly managed to
precipitate a proxy war against Libya, according to the "new chiefs of
the SDECE appointed by the socialist government to replace men
appointed either by the Gaullists or. . .Giscard." Not irresponsible
reporting but irresponsible policies on Washington's part, were at the
root of Libya's dangerous position. The various attempts to embroil
France and 'agent' regimes in the region with Libya were from the
same stable of US assumptions as Sirte. At that time, the Soviet
10009. Abbas, Zainab; Hyman, Nicholas; Blake, Cecile [editor]; AbuOsba, Saleh K. [editor]. Libya In Perspective: Scholars' View of a
Revolutionary Nation: Part 26: Washington's Oil Weapon. S.L.:
Ministry of Information, N.D. [1987]. [99H-08044] [19870101] The
concern between "Syria, Southern Yemen, Algeria, Libya and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, plus an Iranian representative" was
over "ways of countering the latest US-Israeli strategic cooperation
plan." The report of the fifth meeting, held in Libya, of the
SteadfastnessandConfrontationFront (created in 12/1977) carried
the implication that the Front would bless the "treaty of friendship and
cooperation concluded with Ethiopia" by Libya and South Yemen. The
state of watchfulness evident on the part of Libya and other states
threatened by US interventionism, probably encouraged Washington's
strategists to go for an economic, rather than steppedup military
package of pressures. Qaddafi said at the meeting that the US and
Israel had "exceeded the limits" by what President Hafez Assad of
Syria reportedly described as "the strategic cooperation agreement
reached at talks between.. .Reagan and. . .Begin (which) placed the
United States in direct confrontation with the Arabs." This, according
8
Agency, Tass, commenting on the incident, said that "Washington
was trying to install military bases throughout the world in order to
organise 'various provorative manuevres and show of strength."
These bases threatened, above all, the security and independence of
developing countries." Tass pilloried "what it termed the international
terrorism style of Washington's 'interference' policy. The
unfavourable international reaction to Sirte took diverse forms. The
cumulative effect seems to have forced Washington's most hawkish
elements to stay their hands. If a Moscow commentary might have
been expected to disapprove of the aggression against Libya, the swift
declarations of other states including Jordan and Italy, confirmed the
isolation of US interventionism from the main currents of world
opinion. In Italy, "the specially convened session of the Italian Senate's
Defence and Foreign Affairs Commission, called "to debate the
neutron bomb and the placing of Cruise missiles in Sicily", spoke for
"a public opinion deeply disturbed by. . .the 'war of one minute'. . .The
shock also went deep because Italy has been trying to maintain a
reasonable relationship with Libya, in keeping with the active Italian
presence in the central Mediterranean:' There were signs that the
Italiangovernment, despite Washington's use of Naples and other
base facilities, agreed with Soviet post-Sirte concentration on "the
enormous dangers of a permanent presence of American air and
naval forces on the territories and in the territorial waters of countries
thousands of miles away from the United States."
The day after Sirte, a report from Amman described the setting
up of "a special committee. . . to discuss a boycott on American
products in Jordan," in retaliation "for hostile United States policy
towards the Arabs:' The chairman of the new committee "said the
150-member committee had been elected to represent all political,
economic, social and professional bodies." Across the Mediterranean,
Secretary-General Chedli Klibi of the Arab League drew attention in
Tunis to the "particular" irresponsibility of the United States, "as
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council:' Klibi's
statement denounced US behaviour against Libya, as "the
consequences of these maneuvres constitute a violation of the
integrity and security of an Arab state." The discrediting of
Washington's gunboat diplomacy, primarily outside the United States
but also to some extent in it own media via such venerable political
figures as Fulbright, quoted above, together with the collapse of
Egyptian, Sudanese and possibly French surrogate accords on behalf
of the United States, forced Reagan and his men to set in motion the
other, less conspicuous, destabilisation option, namely economic
blackmail. In this context, the belief held in Washington that the "oil
battle" and the "energy crisis" were open and shut cases of American
victory, (gained with the help of Saudi 'moderation' relative to the
freezing or effective lowering of world oil prices), the Reagan
administration's fallback strategy of putting pressure on the American
oil companies becomes more plausible, once military intervention
had been excluded—for practical rather than ethical reasons.
Yet Washington's strategy for smashing Libya and other nonaligned countries, while simultaneously rendering "OPEC. . . about as
important to the American economy as a Turkish bazaar" seems a
rather bizarre concoction, even if the initial assumptions were not
wishful thinking on the parts of Reagan and Co. (as the Wall Street
Journal rather suspected). Thus even American commentators—
among those who lacked the Reagan-Nixon prejudices—noticed
Libya's restraint over the mutually profitable relationship with US Oil
companies. America's blind faith in an eternally pro-US Saudi Arabia,
was questioned by Stanley Hoffman, with Libya's pragmatic yet also
radical attitude no doubt affecting his answer: "Are we committed to
the royal family or to the flow of oil? If it is to the oil, how can we know
in advance that a new regime would shut it off?" In the event, Hoffman
argued, neither Libya nor "Angola's revolutionary regime have
stopped the flow of oil to the West. A revolutionary force would have
an obvious interest in proclaiming that it would meet American,
Western European and Japanese needs."
"A commitment to the present regime" in Riyadh, implied by
Carter and made blatant by Reagan's "guarantees" of 10/1/1981 that
he "would not permit another Iran" in Saudi Arabia, "condemns us to
shoring up a government whose future may be doomed by
irreversible social and political developments. A more legitimate
commitment, to economic security, should induce us to put a certain
distance between the regime and ourselves, and to cultivate contacts
with possible opposition forces" in Saudi Arabia. But Reagan's new
second hand mouthpiece, Richard Milhous Nixon, perhaps flying a
kite for his admirers at the helm of US policy, proposed cutting Libyan
oil exports by an "economic quarantine". Echoing, unconsciously no
doubt the rhetoric Axis leaders used of British military forces in Libya
and elsewhere in Northern Africa during World War II, Nixon
personalised the US crusade against Libya and non-alignment.
Qaddafi, asserted the sage of Watergate, was "an international
outlaw:' "More than just a desert rat" he is "a threat to every friend of
America." Putting policy guidelines into the mouth of an unnamed and
possibly imaginary regional top shot, Nixon added: "One Mid East
leader put it to me bluntly, 'Why doesn't the West quit buying oil from
Qaddafi?" The United States is moving in that direction. We should
urge our NATO allies and Japan to do so."
While the attempts at an oil embargo seem part of a deeply
political and global strategic onslaught against Libya, other measures
show the irrational and racist basis US official hatred of Libya and
Muammar Qaddafi. Thus a minor storm broke out over Libyan "plans
to build a 25-storey United Nations mission." For some reason a
variety of American politicians ranging from the rumbunctious
Senator Daniel Moynihan to New York Mayor Edward Koch, seemed
to think that such a building was too tall for the world capital of
skyscrapers. Meanwhile there arose an overbearing confusion
between US power and the location of the UN in New York, as a ban
on a Libyan— Abdel-Ati Obeidi—travelling from the UN General
Assembly to Washington to make a speech was imposed. With a note
of regret that those international norms could not be overthrown by US
fiat, "the State Department noted that the United States is obliged to
allow foreign officials entry for the United Nations. But the spokesman
said this did not necessarily extend to permission to travel in the
United States. . "
General Haig's heavy hand was visible in US withdrawal of
notification from Ford Aerospasce by Congress. The deal in uestion
was the provision of "equipment for the Arabsat telephone
communications satellite being built by Aerospatiale of France for a
consortium of 21 Arab and African countries and the PLO."
Reportedly, the inclusion of Libya, South Yemen and the PLO lay at
the heart of Haig's withdrawal of the go-ahead for the sale. Such
measures, evidently, could only harm US exporters' efforts
throughout Asia and Africa. Meanwhile differences arose among the
Powers in Washington as to how to implement the oil boycott against
Libya. Reagan wanted to force improbable "worldwide" compliance
with the American scheme, whereas Nixon, who seems to have
learned some realism during his years in the wilderness, suggested
that the US should go it alone. Reagan said, "There are plenty of
customers. . . no one country could affect them by having a boycott."
The comment came after a "flurry of reports that punitive measures
against Libya were under discussion in Congress and by the
Administration." But these differences between the President and the
ex-President seemed to be academic In practice there is identity of
views between Reagan and Nixon. "Retaliation" for what, no one has
ever made very clear, unless being Libyan is in itself a crime, as in
some versions of antisemitism prior to 1945—was "in mind."
9
Occidental and other oil companies would be asked "for their
cooperation," though Exxon seems to have been out of line with the
other companies in its voluntary compliance with Washington's
desire to "punish" anothff country. If even Nixon ruled out military
intervention as potentially too hazardous for Washington, the range of
destabilising measures available short of aggression is considerable.
Libya, in the foreseeable future, is likely to feel the weight of US
displeasure, even if—like Nasser's Egypt after Suez—it is bound to
emerge from the involuntary experience with enhanced satus in the
eyes of the world and eventually even of US public opinion. [=]
occupation of Mesopotamia. The mandatory system was a farce
which had been forced on Britain by the US. It led to an uprising in
1920 in which, according to the estimate of Colonel T. E. Lawrence,
10000 Arabs were killed. The appointment of Faisal as king in 1921
and the grant of autonomy to the Kurds failed to prevent further
revolutionary outbreaks in 1922 and 1927. The British wanted to enter
into a treaty with Iraq because they preferred it to the mandate; but
there was strong opposition to a treaty also, as the Arab national
movement was growing. [From: "Part V: Iraq: 1917-1930", in A.R.C.
Bolton,Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography.
New York: June 1959. p. 2.] [=]
10010. Abdulla, J.J.; E.N. McCarus, E.N. Kurdish Readers. Three
Volumes. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1967. [86H00416] [19670101] Volume One: Newspaper Kurdish. Volume Two:
Kurdish Essays. Volume Three: Kurdish Short Stories. Kurdish in
original scripts, with additional transcriptions.
10014. Acar, Ozgen; Kaylan, Melik. "Something Like The Mafia", in
Connosseur, October 1990. p. 134. [91H-56037] [19901001] Edip Telli
and Fuat Uzulmez in Munich are central figures in the trade in
antiquities from Turkey, but there are many other operators. Other
operators include the Kolasins, the Deres, the Aydiners and Sami
Gulener's gang. Gulener runs a national network in Turkey for Telli,
and he has numerous local agents that collect antiquities found
throughout the country. Smuggled goods are taken in Bulgaria, and
from there are transshipped to Munich. The better peices are takne by
discoverers into the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul for a higher price, and
the result is that telli acquires lower quality goods. he has tried to
block the Istanbul based groups from selling into Western European
markets, but use of hit men and informing the Turkish police on his
competitors, But Sait Aydiner operates a gallery in Canada, and Selim
Dere now operates a gallery in New York. All these families come
from Mardin, in southeastern Turkey, even if it was the Kurdish
ethnicity that allowed the Tellis their start. [TXT]
10011. Abdulla, J.J.; McCarus, E.N. Kurdish basic Course. Dialect
of Sulaimania, Iraq. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press,
1967. 500p. [86H-00415] [19670101] In romanized script.
10012. Abramowitz, Morton; Fuller, Graham E. [editor]; Lesser, Ian
O. [editor]. "Preface", in Turkey's New Geopolitics: From Balkans to
Western China. A Rand Study. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1993. pp. vii-xii. [94H-26733] [19930101] The collapse of the USSR
has transformed the geopolitical environment of Turkey: a reexamination of Turkey is urgently needed. While the immidate
Turkish goal is greater integration into Europe, it seems unlikely that
this goal can be accomplished in the foreseeable future. The end of the
400 year Russian military threat probably portends and erosion of the
Turkish role in and interest in NATO. However, Turkey has now
emerged as the strongest state in its region (despite the PKK
(Kurdistan Workers Party) insurgency): now, for most Turkish elite,
the real question is whether to remain focused on Anatolia or to adopt
a more wide-ranging regional role. Turkey is likely to adopt a growing
international role in the Balkans (especially due to the question of
Bosnia), the Middle East and Central Asia: Turkey has a concern over
a revived Iraq due to the Turkish role in the Persian Gulf War, has
come into conflict with Iran over Azerbajan, has continuing problems
with Syrian and Iranian support for the PKK [sic: perhaps he means
Syria and Iraq], and faces growiung contention over water resources
with Iraq and Syria. The Turkish-US relationship will grow as Turkey
becomes more isolated from Europe. Turkey will face a growing
menace from Kurdish nationalism, both by the PKK in Turkey and by
Kurds in Iraq (many Turks would prefer a strong Iraq led by Saddam
Hussein to a partitioned Iraq that creates a Kurdish state on the
Turkish border). Finally, the threat of Muslim fundamentalism in
Turkey is a minor one.
10015. Acar, Ozgen; Kaylan, Melik. "The Turkish Connection; An
Investigative Report on the Smuggling of Classical Antiquities; The
Statue's Price in Turkey $7000, in New York $540000", in
Connosseur, October 1990. pp. 130, 132-137.[91H-56036][19901001]
Turkey is the largest source of classical antiquities to the West, and
every item is illegally exported. There are more classical sites in
Turkey than in Greece, and these sites include Halicarnassus and
Ephesus, and most major Byzantine centers. The International
Foundationfor Art Research estimates the annual illegal traffic in
antiquities is $2 billion, and half is classical antiquities. The Turkish
part of that is unknown, but certainly is hundreds of millions of dollars.
Edip Telli, a Turkish Kurd based in Munich (where he has the
Gryphos gallery), is one of the largest smugglers of classical
treasures from Turkey: his major sales have included the
Decadrachm Hoard to William Koch of Boston for $3.5 million, the
Lydian Hoard to the Metropolitan Museum of Art; and Byzantine
treasures to Dumbarton Oaks. Fuat Uzulmez, a Turkish Syriac, has
emerged as a second major antiquities dealer in Munich (with his
Artemis gallery). Telli entered the trade from smuggling consumer
goods into Turkey, while Fuat comes from a Grand Bazaar family in
Istanbul. Bruce McNall, who is now out of business, was a major
dealer for the smuggled antiquities in Los Angeles, having sold at least
on several major pieces to the Getty Museum there; another retired
supplier of smuggled antiquities to Getty is Elie Borowski.
After the disappearance of the Decadrachm Hoard, Turkish
police sought the arrest of Telli in Germany. The trade is also littered
with murders, with at least ten recent murders associated with the
smuggling. Reportedly, Telli became the major dealer after a mafia
like war with George Zacos the former, rather scholarly dominant
dealer in smuggled antiquities. Telli uses murder to keep his
organization in line, such as Sami Gulener, who strayed to the rival
Nihat Kolasin gang of antiquities racketeers in Istanbul. When
Mahboubian Gallery showed contraband sculptures in London, news
10013. Abuzyam, V. "Angliyskiy Imperializm i Irak (British
Imperialism and Iraqi)", in Mirovoye Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika,
1928. pp. 78-83. [97H-03421] [19280101] An examination of the
situation in Iraq arising out of parliament's refusal to ratify the treaty of
1927 between the British government and King Faisal. Britain
regarded Iraq as a market and as a plantation. She was interested in
Iraq because this country protected the Persian Gulf; contained
important air and land communications; constituted a buffer against
revolutionary propaganda which came in great waves from the Soviet
East; was a counterpoise to the aspirations of France and the threat
from the Wahhabis, and contained the Mosul oilfield which, although
still undeveloped, promised to be extensive. Arab nationalist
aspirations had been aroused by the British only to be dashed to the
ground by the Sykes-Picot agreement and Britain's eventual
10
reporters were threatened with death if they reported on the pieces.
Turkey is now fighting to regain the Lydian Hoard from the
Metropolitan, and the fate of numerous identified Turkish art treasures
depends on this court decision.
introduced in Turkey's policy towards the Kurds, it was illegal to
speak of or write about such things as the Kurdish people, Kurdish
language or Kurdish culture.
As Abdullah Ocalan (Ujalan), leader of the PKK, put it, "The Turks
have been thinking that Kurdistan is in the graveyard [and] that the
Kurds have no history." Moreover, Turkish Kurdistan is the least
developed region in Turkey, with unemployment rampant and
incomes very low.
These difficulties are compounded by the fact that for the last
eight years, the region has been a virtual battleground, with the
Turkish army and security forces committing some of the most
flagrant human rights violations. But does a solution to the misery and
suffering of the Kurdish people lie in marxism, which is relegated to
the museums of history in its erstwhile strongholds? The answer is
an unqualified no. The Kurdish question is just one problem of a web
of problems that has been plaguing the region for some time.
Secularism and the nation-State system cannot provide solutions.
Indeed, they lie at the root of the problem. Under the Uthmaniyyah
khilafah there was a single Kurdish people living side by side with
their brothers-in-faith: Arabs, Turks, and others. With the emergence
of three western-controlled nation-States--Syria, Turkey and Iraq--the
Kurds find themselves a fragmented, marginalized and tormented
people. The obvious solution to the so-called Kurdish question is to let
them have their own nation-State, like everybody else. But apart from
the practical difficulties--daunting by any standard--of persuading Iraq,
Turkey and Syria to grant the Kurds a measure of self-determination,
it is by no means guaranteed that a Kurdish nation-State will alleviate
the misery and suffering of the Kurdish people, especially if such a
nation-State were anchored on such dubious and suspect foundations
as Ocalan's marxism, which, as he himself has conceded, is difficult
to understand. One "would need a thousand witnesses to understand
what kind of marxist I am," he is quoted to have said recently. The
tragedy of the Kurdish people, like that of many other Muslims, is the
fact that their struggle against injustice and subordination is being led
by their own worst enemies--secularists and atheists. Ocalan, who
claims that in the process of struggle he would be building a new
Kurdish man, is in fact struggling for the same principles as Ataturk
fought for, banishing Islam from the life of its followers, Kurdish or
Turkish. He is a product of an atheist elite begun by Ataturk and his
followers, against which such men as Sheikh Sa'id Pirani, himself a
Kurd, warned and fought. In one of his fatwas against the creeping kufr
which Kemalism entailed, Sheikh Sa'id Pirani, who was martyred on
6/28/1925 while leading a jihad against Ataturk, wrote: "This atheist
government will make us atheist like themselves. Jihad against them
is an obligation." To settle accounts with their oppressors, whether
Arabs or Turks, the Kurdish people ought to do away with manifestly
discredited ideologies such as Ocalan's marxism, and instead adopt
the pristine Islamic principles of men of jihad and taqwa like Sheikh
Pirani. They must also cement their ties with their natural allies, the
Islamic movements in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. United in
Islam, Turks and Kurds could work wonders. The eviction of the
crusaders from the heartland of Islam, especially from Al-Quds, in the
Middle Ages was achieved under Turko-Kurdish leadership. Mahmud
Zanki and his son Nuraddin, who were Turks, gave the crusaders
their first battering blows, recovering such cities as Edessa (AlKuha). The work they began was completed by the greatest Kurd in
history, sultan Salah al-Din Ayyoubi, the liberator of Al-Quds. There is
no reason why similar feats cannot again be performed under the
banner of Islam. [=]
10016. Adam, Deria. "Focus: Between the Turkish Hammer and
Iraqi Rock: Plight of the Kurdish People", in Crescent International,
May 1-15, 1992. p. 4. [97H-21352] [19920501] The suffering and
misery of the Kurdish people received another sinister twist in late
March when clashes between Turkish security forces and Kurdish
demonstrators claimed more than 50 lives in three days from 3/2225/1992. It was one of the bloodiest confrontations in the eight-year
campaign waged by the marxist Kurdistan Workers' Party, who are
clamouring for an independent Kurdish State encompassing not only
Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey but also Iraq Kurdistan and parts
of Iran and Syria. This campaign, which began in 1984, has so far cost
more than 3,000 lives, mostly Kurdish civilians caught in the crossfire
between the State terror-machine of Kemalist Turkey and an equally
brutal atheist guerrilla group for whom even schools are legitimate
targets. Turkish politicians have used the Kurdish question as a
convenient means of scoring political points against each other. Pres.
Turgut Ozal, whose Motherland Party was swept from power by
prime minister Suleiman Demirel's True Path Party, began fanning
the flames in an interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet by
calling for the stamping out and bloody suppression of Kurdish
agitation. Suleiman Demirel tried to externalize the issue of existing
Kurdish grievances and agitation, by launching air-attacks against
Kurdish bases in northern Iraq and by sending warning signals to
Turkey's Arab neighbors in the form of reinforcements at the Iraq
border. Ironically, the Iraqi army began shelling Kurdish areas in
northeastern Iraq, forcing people to flee their homes at almost the
same time as Turkish planes were bombarding the area. Sometimes
they hit areas where there were no guerrilla bases. Safeen Dizayee,
the Ankara representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP-Iraqi opposition Kurdish group) has said that one attack came within
13 miles of the Iraqi village of Barzan, threatening nearby civilian
settlements. The fact that two regional powers are hounding the same
people, often targeting the same places, attests to the host of
unresolved issues and problems in the region that are the direct
consequences of the collapse of the Islamic State at the beginning of
the century and the emergence of the nation-State system, which has
fuelled some of the most obnoxious ethnic conflicts on nationalist
lines--a sort of strife virtually unknown in the Muslim polity before the
imposition of the nation-State concept. This is essentially a European
idea alien to Islam, inflicted on the Muslim body-politics as part of the
western colonial onslaught on the lands of Islam. The Kurdish people
have suffered at the hands of many. In fact, they have endured some of
the most appalling cases of human rights violations in this century.
Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussain has systematically and relentlessly
destroyed their villages and towns, burned their crops and livestock,
deported their able-bodied young to parched deserts in the south of the
country, and in the 1980s attempted the "final solution" to the Kurdish
question. Codenamed operation Al-Anfal, Saddam unleashed his
terror machine on the Kurds in an outright genocide, gassing the
Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988, which instantly killed 5,000 people.
This was just one incident among many in Saddam's attempt to wipe
out the Kurds. Turkey has not yet gassed its Kurds--10 million strong
and about 20% of the total population of Turkey--but has attempted to
liquidate the Kurdish character in more ways than one. Since 1920s,
when Kemal Ataturk put down Kurdish uprisings with exceptional
cruelty, secular Kemalist Turkey has behaved as if the Kurds never
existed. And until last year, when some cosmetic dressings were
10017. Aeppel, Timothy. "German Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg
Resigns In Wake of Tank Scandal", in Wall Street Journal, April 1,
1992. p. A8. [92H-10340] [19920401] Defense Minister Stoltenberg
11
has resigned in the wake of a scandal over his approval of tank
shipments to Turkey. The German government has moved to
distance itself from the Turkish crackdown on the Kurds by halting
arms shipments. Diplomatic relations with Turkey have deteriorated,
with Ankara calling the German arms ban similar to the policies of
'Hitler's Germany'.
phonological processes such as deletion, substitution, and insertion
are given. Chapter Four demonstrates the predictability of stress in
terms of morphology. Chapter Five describes syllable structure in
MSK and Chapter Six gives general conclusions. [Reprinted with
permission of Dissertation Abstracts.] [=]
10021. Ahmed, Hisham H. "Thinking About Palestine: The Disabled
Intifada, Part 2" in Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly, March 8,
1993. pp. 4, 15. [93H-29041] [19930308] One afternoon, I witnessed a
dispute between two families living in Bethlehem over the rental of an
apartment. After an agreement was arrived at between the two
parties, as to the cost and date of availability, one of the sons of the
family, who had previously been living in the apartment, insisted that
they would not vacate unless more money was paid and their furniture
bought by the renting family. He created the problem just hours before
the apartment was to be made available for the new residents. What a
scene it was!
On another day, the father of a good friend of mine, whom I have
known for over 12 years, had a heart attack while at work. I went to
visit him in the hospital. Talking to him, I realized that his heart attack
must have been caused by some problems he had encountered.
Without asking him about the reasons for the heart attack, I urged him
to take it easy. I remained curious, however, about the reasons for the
stress in his life. I tried to probe his friend on the subject, initially to no
avail. At long last, however, my friend relented and disclosed these
facts:
'Our neighbors, with whom we used to have strong social ties,
have recently been causing us some serious problems, and they
made it clear that they would not cease until we paid them 1000
Jordanian dinars, which we really did not have. We had to borrow the
money and in spite of all this they kept threatening to do something
bad to my father or to the house. We paid them the money, but the
problems are not over yet. Worst of all is the fact that they knew that
we are Kurds and that we do not have any support system in the
society, as others might. The society is facing gangsterism at its
worst and unless you have some people to defend you against the
greedy, some harm mught be inflicted upon you. Where elese can we
go, as Kurds? We always felt Palestinian and acted Palestinian.'
It was painful enough to observe the dispute between the two
families regarding the rental of the apartment. But it was even more
tormenting to know that the sense of solidarity in Palestinian society is
being endangered, as the story of my Kurdish friend unambiguously
domonstrates. [=]
10018. Aeppel, Timothy. "Kurds Seek Attention For Iraq's 'Other'
War. Facing Reported Onslaught, Group Appeals For Notice at
United Nations Talks", in Christian Science Monitor, September 2,
1988. p. 11. Includes map. [88H-12093] [19880902]
10019. Agasi, N. M. Review of A. Shamide, The Workers' and Trade
Union Movement in Iran (1941-1946) [In Azerbaijanian] (Baku, 1961,
180 pp.). Narodny Aziia i Afriki (Peoples of Asia & Africa), No. 3,
1962. pp. 207-208. [99H-12155] [19630301] The book includes a
criticism of Iranian and American works, and gives background on the
economy of the country and working class struggle before the war. It
is not shown clearly enough that the working class had become an
independentforcecapable of playing a leading role in the national
liberation movement. The formation and work of the Popular Party of
Iran is described, as is the Central Council of Trade Unions, and
revisionists and opportunists are scored. Considerable attention is
given the surge of the national liberation movement in Iranian
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1945-1946. [Reprinted from Soviet
Periodical Abstracts: Asia, Africa and Latin America (SPAAALA)
(Formerly Selective Soviet Annotated Bibliographies), Vol. 2 (3/4),
March 1963. Editors: Anita Navon, Ina Schlesinger. Slavic Languages
Research Institute, White Plains, NY.]
10020. Ahmad, Abdul-Majeed Rashid. The Phonemic System Of
Modern Standard Kurdish. Dissertation. University Of Michigan
(0127), 1986. pp. 169. DAI 47/03A, p.924; Publication:AAC8612458.
[93H-24230] [19860101] Modern Standard Kurdish (MSK) is a written
form of Kurdish adopted by the Iraqi Kurds to establish a standard
written Kurdish substituting for the various Kurdish dialects spoken in
Iraqi Kurdistan. MSK is based on the Sulaimani dialect, a sub-dialect
of Southern Kirmanji (Sorani). Written documents published in Iraq
after 1970 are the main source for this study.
The documents include books and articles listed in the
bibliography. They are written by the speakers of various Kurdish
dialects. I used myself as the only principle reader, i.e., I was not able
to find other readers of MSK in the United States; therefore, this initial
study should be followed by additional studies. This study is based on
the reading aloud of newly published documents and dozens of
spectrograms. My native Kurdish dialect is the Bibani dialect of the
Kirkuk Altun Kopri area. Since MSK is based on Sulaimani dialect, the
sound system of MSK corresponds partially but not entirely to the
dialect of Sulaimani. Differences between MSK and both Sulaimani
and Bibani dialect are presented. The environments for allophonic
variations such as vowel length in different environments, and
phonological changes such as substitution, deletion, and insertion are
described. The ranges of vowel length are given based on
spectrograms.
Chapter One is a historical sketch of the written form of Kurdish
in Iraqi Kurdistan. Pre-MSK is introduced from the early period of
written Kurdish when there was no Standard Kurdish until 1958 when
The Republic of Iraq was established, and the standardization period
evolved following its establishment around 1970. The evolution of
Arabic script as adopted for Kurdish is discussed. Chapter Two
introduces Kurdish vowels and gives rules for phonological change. In
Chapter Three consonants are presented. Allophonic features such as
voicing, and devoicing, of consonants are described and rules for
10022. Ahmed, Hisham H. "Thinking About Palestine: The Disabled
Intifada, Part 3" in Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly, March 8,
1993. pp. 4, 15. [93H-29042] [19930308] It was only now, after 12
years of friendship, that I learned that one of my Palestinian friends
was Kurdish. This in itself is not of importance. It is the sense that the
society is on the verge of breaking apart that is of the utmost
significance. During my visit, one story after the other unfolded and
the lawlessness became more and more apparent.
It should be remembered that the people in the occupied
territories have been undergoing an incalculable degree of frustration
and despair -- economically, psychologically, socially and politically.
Destitution is indeed the norm, due to the constant opression by the
occupiers. After five years of curfews, killings and imprisonments, the
people have found themselves unable to release their frustration
satisfactorily on the occupying authorites and thus have embarked on
a process of psychological transference if anger upon each other.
Palestinian society has tried to shake off the occupation, but the
occupation has become more entrenched. In the process, it has
succeeded in turning the Uprising in its favor. It is Palestinians who
12
are hurt by stone-throwing and tire burning, not the occupiers. This
was quite evident throughout my stay and many people have begun to
sense it.
The Intifada, which initially mobilized an unarmed population in
its entirety, has now backfired. It is my view that Palestinian society is
currently in urgent need of taking a rest. This is not to suggest that the
struggle needs to be terminated. It is to say that unless Palestinian
society is strengthened from within, and unless creative renewal is
introduced, the size of the disaster will be impossible to imagine.
The regular half-day commercial strikes and the frequent fullday strikes do not hurt the Israeli economy, but they do bring about
stagnation in the Palestinian economy. Suspension of classes on
university campuses, while meant to express students' solidarity with
a given group in the society, is an outmoded form of resistance which
disrupts the process of modernization in the society.
A critical reevaluation of the methodology and substance of the
struggle is urgently needed now, and it is the Palestinian leadership
along with the intelligentsia which bear the responsibility. The people
under occupation need a semblance of normalcy if the future is not to
become totally unpredictable. [=]
Arabia and Egypt, among others) is not meant to cripple the rulers in
Damascus as much as to have them sever their relations with
Islamic Iran. Before his departure for Washington on 7/8/1996, the
new Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said that if Syria did
not play ball, there were additional "measures" that could be brought
to bear - a euphemism for imposing sanctions. The new Israeli prime
minister was saying that he could order US president Bill Clinton to
impose sanctions against Syria! We can also decode Republican
presidential candidate Bob Dole's words to mean as much when he
says, "Despite the shuttle diplomacy of the Clinton administration,
president Asad of Syria has not demonstrated peaceful intentions.
Syria continues to occupy Lebanon, continues to harbor terrorists, and
continues its close alliance with Iran." Dole and his foreign policy
advisors are not concerned with a Syrian administration and policy
that kills the Islamic preference of its people. But when the Syrian
government for matters of hard bargaining and dare-devil deceptions
of destiny applies its wits to survive the brutal exchanges of the
Middle Eastern diplomacy, the US as the guarantor of zionist Israel
has to do something to budge Damascus out of its dual diplomacy.
For Syria this has meant the inadmissibility of fifth columnists into
Lebanon which translates into gains for the Islamic-based parties. It
also means staking bets on Palestinian "rejectionists" which
translates into offering domicile to what is turning into a popular
Islamic resistance represented by Islamic Jihad and Hamas.
Similarly, Syria holds onto a source of much-needed support from
Iran - petroleum sold to Syria at concessionary prices - and arm the
proxies in Lebanon. All of these turn out to be "security threats" to
Israel. So Washington tells Damascus via Ankara, Amman, Tel Aviv
and Riyadh that you cannot play both sides of the game indefinitely.
Meanwhile, Washington and Tel Aviv never fail to impress on all
and sundry their mutual and ever-lasting love and care for each other.
It is reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is planning
to open an office in Tel Aviv. The American public is led to believe that
the FBI is concerned with federal crimes in the US. That is only if
ones geographical information is incomplete; the fact is that Israel is
as much American as New York or California. The FBI is not
concerned about the Russian Jewish mafia that operates in Israel and
has established its crime syndicates all over the "land of the free." It is
the "Islamic terrorists" of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who are not
involved in American affairs since they are committed to the liberation
of their own homeland (Palestine) who have become the FBI's
concern. This mutual love affair is capped by the report from the
Jewish Telegraph Agency that henceforth "American Jewish soldiers
will no longer have to subsist on non-kosher meals in the field, if they
so choose. The US military announced...that 'Meals Religious
Kosher' will be available through the regularly military supply lines.
The military has contracted a [Jewish] private company to produce as
many as 200000 meals a year for three years.... Officials estimate
that thousands of observant Jews serve in the armed forces." With the
zionist-Jewish appetite to scheme, kill and then eat kosher with all the
facilities available to and from American administrations we find
Allah's Words most accurate: "Verily, as for those who suppress
aught of the revelation which Allah has bestowed from on high, and
barter it away for a trifling gain - they but fill their bellies with fire. And
allah will not speak to them on the Day of Resurrection, nor will He
cleanse them [of their sins]; and grievous suffering awaits them." (AlQuran 2:174) [=]
10023. Al-Asi Muhammad. "US Proxies Tell Syria to Make Up Its
Mind", in Crescent International, July 16-31, 1996. p. 4. [97H-17272]
[19960731] Whatever the merits or otherwise of the Iranian-Syrian
alliance - and this can be argued in light of the Hizbullah and Islamic
resistance in Lebanon and the offices and operational center of the
"rejectionist factions" of the Palestinian movement based in
Damascus - there has been a growing rift between Damascus and
Ankara in recent days. This escalating tension on the artificial "legal"
borders between Syria and Turkey has drawn in forces from both
sides.Accompanied by minor cross-border skirmishes, these are
pregnant with serious consequences. Such developments bode ill for
the popular reservoir of the Turkish and Syrian peoples' growing
common hostility towards the Israeli penetration of the northern
regions; i.e., Anatolia, Kurdistan, Central Asia and even the (Persian)
Gulf and (Arabian) Peninsula. Three other developments must be
borne in mind. In 5/1996, a series of explosions in Syria alarmed the
US state department sufficiently to issue an advisory to its citizens
stationed there. The Turkish military's ongoing assault on the Kurds in
eastern Turkey and northern Iraq has hardly raised any eyebrows in
the west. And the escalation in the Turkish military's onslaught on the
Kurds coincided with the military agreement signed with the zionist
entity in 2/1996. It appears that the zionist-American sponsors of the
"peace process" are fed up with the "now you see it, now you don't"
tactics of Syria's dual diplomacy. A few months ago, it was the
government in Tehran that showed its indignation at Syrian indulgence
in the zionist-American sponsored peace process. Tehran's
newspapers at the time carried scathing attacks against Syrian
capitulation to zionist interests. Iranian vice president Hasan Habibi
cancelled a trip to Damascus. It took a personal letter from Syrian
president Hafez el-Asad to smooth things over with the Iranians
concerning his expedition into the "peace process." This dual
diplomacy of the Syrian government has now touched, it seems, a
raw nerve in the zionist-American bureaucracy. If tensions rise
between Syria and Turkey, both the US and Israel will have ample
"justifications" to jump into the fray on the side of Ankara. Syria is
accused of a number of misdeeds: harboring "terrorists"; involvement
in counterfeit US currency transactions; and that it is a base for drug
smuggling into the US. Both the US and Israel are also armed with
bilateral "defense cooperation agreements" with Turkey, a NATO ally
to boot.
This pact of the devil among front-line zionist-based or
supported States (Israel, the US, Turkey, Jordan, Greece, Saudi
10024. Al-Khalil, Samir [Iraqi dissident and expatriate]. "Real Victory
Requires An Allied Military Liberation of Iraq", in San Diego Union,
March 31, 1991. p. C5. [91H-16325] [19910331] The insurgencies that
have emerged in Iraq after the ceasefire mark the Persian Gulf War
as the greatest watershed in regional history since the collapse of the
13
Ottoman Empire. If the United States does not intervene to use these
rebellions, neighboring countries will use the rebellions. Allied forces
must work with the rebels, the US Army must march into Baghdad,.
refugees should be allowed to cross into Kuwait, and the United States
should reshape Iraq. To fail to select a futuyre for Iraq will create
instability in the region for decades.
that a man would never marry a women who had been his girlfriend.
Women marry with little sexual experience and traditionally were
trained to fear their own sexuality (although that is easing now); Iraqi
men often are just as ignorant of sex and for many newly weds sex is
traumatic, alienating and unpleasant. For almost half the women
interviewed sex is simply a marital duty and few of the women
interviewed enjoyed sex.
In recent years, women are coming to expect a greater degree of
equality in the relationship with their husband. Yet the normal
expectations of Iraqi women about marriage, and the traditional
manner in which most partners are selected, strongly argue against
companionshipandfriendship being the major part of a marriage.
Many wopmen noted how difficult it was to engage their husband's in
conversation on other than matters of household or the children:
husband's are viewed as outsiders and women normally have
stronger ties to their brothers than to their husbands. Iraqi women
rarely engage in the normal leisure activities of women in the West:
reading and painting [sic?]; women are mainly occupied with
housework, which is largely performed by women in Iraq. While all
manner of household appliances are widespread in the affluent Iraqi
society (so widespread that it is hard to determine whether a family is
middle class just by its possessions, since such appliances are also
common in the working class), domestic servants are very rare now.
While economic development has pushed many women into the
workplace, many women feel that fulltime housewives have higher
status than women who work outside the home. Women do not
perceive independence to be an option since it ends any likelihood of
future marriage. Few women thought Western style "women's
liberation" was genuine liberation since it entailed, they argued, little
more than sexual freedom for which there are very high trade-offs;
some noted that even the activities of the General Federation of Iraqi
Women were sometimes seen as rather bold. "In Iraq, women's
oppression within the family is fairly universal", and neither
widespread access to education or a strong presence in the
workplace has made any difference in this "universal oppression".
10025. Al-Khayyat, Sana. Honor and Shame: Women in Modern
Iraq. London: Saqi Books, 1990. [97H-19981] [19900101] This study of
Iraqi women is written by an Iraqi women who has training as a
sociologist, allowing both insider and outsider perspectives to be
taken; the study is based on in-depth interviews with Iraqi women
(interviewing Muslim Arbs, Muslim Kurds and Muslim Turkomans,
and Christian Arabs; while the attituders and lives of all the Muslims
were very similar, the Christians were much more conservative).
(By contrast, she notes the observation of a well-educated Iraqi man
who states: "Why are you wasting time with those stupid women?
What can they tell you?... If you insist on adopting this method, select
a few educated men and interview them; they would tell you all you
need to know about women".) Iraq is a patriarchal society reinforced
by Bedouin tribal values that became normative during the four
centuries of Ottoman rule up to WWI; the society uses both bedouin
social values and Islamic ideology to control women. In Iraq today
education is compulsary for both sexes at the primary level (11-12
years), and in urban areas most girls go on to secondary education
and many to universities. Many traditionally male areas such as
engineering are open to women. Most jobs are open to women from
bus and truck drivers to doctors, university professors and executive
positions in Ministries; such opportunities broadened during the labor
shortages of the Iran-Iraq War; there are few women in top decisionmaking positions however. The compulsary national literacy program
includes fines for any adult that does not learn to read.
The conduct of women in Iraqi society is governed by the
concept Arab concept of honor, and of shame; the sexual conduct of a
woman can bring shame on all her kin (because her male kin have
responsibility for her conduct); immodesty can bring shame on kin as
well. Gossip may bring shame on a woman wrongly, so many
women suffer from guilt without necessarily having committed any
shameful act. The predominantly agarian nature of Iraqi society,
where the inability of girls to work in the fields as well as boys, has
"fuel[ed] the historical hatred of women"; while girls are see as weak,
boys are seen as strong (a common rebuke for a boy is "do not act
like a girl"). The birth of daughter is traditionally seen as an
inadequacy, and the burden of preserving the honor of the girl (and her
virginity) is an additional burden. For some of the women, their
childhood was scarred by domestic violence, their father's beat their
mothers: this was usually associated with alcoholism by the women,
which added the sense that the behavior was un-Islamic (and thus
reinforcing rather that subverting Islamic norms). The more general
education of Iraqi women has not dramatically changed the manner in
which they raise their children.
Marriage is almost universal in Iraq: people want children and
grandparents want grandchildren. Marriage is seen as the joining of
two families rather than of two people: traditional marriages are
arranged and the couple meets on the wedding day. Modern
marriages in which both partners select the other are becoming more
common. In Iraqi society it is very common for cousins to marry, with
favoired cousins being father's brothers children. Love is still seen by
many Iraqis as an impediment to happy marriage: until the 1940s, if a
man was known to love a woman this would preclude an arranged
marriage. Many women do not believe marriages for love can be
successful; modern affairs by student couples on university
campuses are viewed as a mere 'hobby' and most women believe
10026. Al-Rubaiy, Abdul A. "The Failure of Political Integration in
Iraq. The Education of the Kurdish Minority", in Intellect, 102(2357),
April 1974. pp. 440-444. [86H-00236] [19740401] The history of he
educational programs provided by the central government to the
Kurdish minority in Iraq is reviewed. The programs have sought the
greater integration of the Kurds into the national culture, but with
limited success.
10027. Al-Samir, Faisal. "Guidance Minister Calls for Unity", in Iraqi
Review-Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad Al-Shaab, August 16,
1959. p. 4. [97H-10559] [19590816] [Dr. Faisal al-Samir, the Minister
of Guidance, made a statement which he said was wholly inspired by
the instructions of the Premier, Abdul Karim Qassim. The following is
a summary of the statement.]
Among other things, the Revolution of 7/14/1958, aimed at
emancipating the people of Iraq from the fetters of the old regime. The
ruling oligarchy had usurped freedoms and persecuted all sincere
patriots during forty years of monarchical rule. It was their oppression
and repression which prompted our army, headed by Abdul Karim
Qassim and supported by the broad masses of the people, to initiate
the 7/14/1958 Revolution and establish the Republic. The Revolution
was, therefore, a national liberational revolution which aimed at
achieving full independence, on the one hand, and a sound democratic
rule under which freedom, general rights and stability are secured, on
the other. It was hoped that cooperation and unity of the ranks for
preserving the gains of the Revolution and further developing our
society would be strictly observed by all. It is only then that a better
14
living standard can be secured for our people. If all sincere patriots
close their ranks and unite in the service of the Republic and the
people, the rich resources of our country and will enable us to achieve
this objective easily.
Our Revolution proceeded in the right direction; it released all
patriotic forces, restored freedom of association and the press and
helped the formation of vocational organizations for students, youth
intellectuals, workers, peasants and women. All these organizations
and associations were helped, morally and materially, by the Leader
of the country himself. The purpose of this experiment, which was the
first of its kind in the Arab countries, was to help to cement the unity of
the people and raise efficiency. Besides, these organizations, it was
hoped, would help in the settlement of the problems cropping up in
their own sphere; and, above all, participate in active defence of the
Republic, if needed. Unfortunately, however, a number of mistakes
were made which led to side battles. At any rate, mistakes can
always be averted. All the peoples have, in their battle of liberation,
committed such mistakes; but, by virtue of reconsideration and
correction of mistakes, they have always eventually found the right
direction leading to a better future. The policy of our Republic, as
formulated by the Leader, aims at allowing all the adherents of any
one organization to help in raising standards in their occupation for the
service of the entire people without any bias to one particular party.
We proceed on the assumption that the individual reserves the right to
have his own opinion, religion and ideology, subject to concern for the
higher interests of the country, respect for the opinion of others and
abstaining from aggression and disorder. Freedom never was the
source of violent clashes and disunity whenever rightly understood.
The kind of democracy we want for our country must ensure security,
order and peaceful co-existence of all within the frame of public
interests. We must all, as in the developed countries, eliminate
arrogance. The common aims about which there is bound to be a
consensus of opinion are supporting the national rule for which our
people have fought for hundreds of years; uniting the ranks against
imperialism; participating in constructing a civilized society in which
freedom and well-being for all prevails; observing the Interim
Constitution and all the statements and declarations made by the
Leader, concerning the unity of Arabs, Kurds and other minorities in
Iraq, brotherly relations with sister Arab countries for the benefit of all
Arabs and establishing relations with all friendly countries on the
basis of mutual advantage, with persistent work for freedom and
peace and against aggression.
The Iraqi Press can play an important role in this respect. We
are now undergoing a great national experiment on which the very
future of our country depends. This is the reason why the Press is
required to stick to the patriotic course which has assumed greater
importance in this critical situation when the need for the unity of the
ranks is no more felt.
When the Leader, in his last press conference demanded the
cessation of quibbling, abstention from the use of obscene language
and the adoption of constructive criticism, he had all the newspapers
in mind. We urge all the papers to reconsider their attitudes and never
lose sight of what the Leader has said. Our Press, which is really
representative of the people, can help educate our people by waging a
battle against the aftermath of the old regime. Freedom of the Press is
ensured to all; the Leader has repeatedly asserted that the only real
censor of the Press must be conscience itself. This affords our Press
a good opportunity to prove that they really are worthy of the freedom
which the Leader bestows on them.
The policy of our national government, emanating from the
interests of the entire people, does not discriminate for reasons of
religion or political leanings. We repeat, once again, that the
Government promotes the rights of individuals and of the public and
will not permit the aggression of one against the other. The citizens
are brothers who must unite in times of hardship against imperialists
and greedy elements. The Government will certainly severely punish
all trouble makers without regard for nationality or politics; it will also
crush all conspirators whether from inside or outside. All citizens are
required to concentrate on productive work for the service of the Iraqi
Republic which must remain the torch of freedom and liberation to
illuminate the path for all peoples fighting for independence, freedom
and national sovereignty. [=]
10028. Alaniz, Yolanda. "Part 5: A Look At Leninist Theory", in The
Indian-Sandanista War in Nicaragua. Freedom Socialist Publications
[5018 Rainier Ave South, Seattle WA 98118; tel: 206-722-2453], April
9, 1986. [94H-29920] [19860409] Lenin spelled out the criteria of
nationhood for us: Nations are historically evolved; they constitute a
stable and distinct community with their own language, their own
common culture, and their own territory and economy--like that of the
Indios, which differs markedly from the still capitalist economy of the
rest of Nicaragua. Native people were aware of these criteria long
before Lenin wrote them down. Throughout the history of revolutionary
struggles, the question of nationhood has had to be dealt with. And true
Leninists and Marxists have supported the fundamental democratic
right to self-determination--the right of subject nations to choose
whether or not to separate into independent states: i.e., the right to
political secession. Lenin said that the right to selfdetermination does
not mean that oppressed nations must or should separate. It means
the people of an oppressed nation have the absolute right to choose
secession or not. The right to self-determination is the final guarantee
that a nation can attain full equality; if the nation cannot achieve its
rights within the larger state, it can secede to achieve its goals. ("The
Chicano Struggle: a Racial or a National Movement?" Freedom
Socialist, Autumn 1984, p. 4.) History has shown that nations have
chosen secession only when forced to by extreme oppression within
the larger state. If their economic and political rights are respected
and guaranteed, small nations choose to partake of the economic and
cultural advantages offered by political union with a larger state entity.
(Ibid.) Sandinistas take heed. Why did Lenin believe in these
principles? Because a successful revolution requires unity of the
workers of all nations. Without the unity of the entire international
working class, of the different nations, of different cultures, of people of
different languages, of men and women, of hetero- and homosexuals,
of youth and the elders, there will be no international revolution--there
will be no successful revolution in the interest of the working class.
Without this unity, governments divide and conquer. When a
chauvinistic attitude prevails, an attitude that says, "My culture is
better than yours," the resulting divisions within the working class
weaken the movement against imperialism. The Sandinistas' reason
for not granting the Indios autonomy is that they are only an "ethnic
group." But, efforts to portray the Indians as an "ethnic group" cannot
change the truth. The Indians are a nation; they have the right to
separate if they so choose. Lenin was very clear on the obligations of
socialists towards oppressed nations: "Socialist parties which did not
show...that they would liberate the enslaved nations and build up
relations with them on the basis of a free unity--and a free union is a
false phrase without the right to secede-- would be betraying
socialism." Lenin practiced what he preached. Virtually the last
political struggle of his life was conducted against Stalin's Sandinistastyle "integration" of the Georgian Republic into the Federation of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Marxists who hedge on the right of
sovereignty are issuing an invitation to anti-Marxism among people
who belong on the revolutionary side. This is what is currently
happening in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas are saying in essence that
the right to autonomy is a counterrevolutionary demand! This is an
15
anti-socialist and antiMarxist position, and one that is bound to drive
some Indios who should be natural allies of the revolution to join the
other side. The Sandinistas, by not granting Indian nations their right to
autonomy--to control their land and resources--are driving some of
the Indians to pick up arms against the Sandinistas in self-defense,
or--even though the majority of MISURASATA are not on the contra
side--to join the counterrevolutionaries. If the Sandinistas had reached
out and said "We agree with your demand, we recognize you as a
nation, we support you all the way, we recognize that you hav
e had hundreds and hundreds of years of being oppressed as a nation;
we will be better than Somoza; we will grant you your democractic
rights"--if the Sandinistas had done this from the beginning--the Indios
would have joined with them in a united front against those who want
to break the revolution. And both sides need this kind of unity. The
Sandinistas still need to say this. They need to change their policy
towards the Indian Nations of Nicaragua immediately. Not to grant the
demand of autonomy, land and resources to the Indios will result in
cultural genocide. This is how serious this issue is. Without land the
Indios do not have a basis for their culture--they will cease to exist.
Ask any Indian. Most Native Americans in this country I am sure
would agree. That is why historically Indians have fought like hell for
their land, even if it meant they were the last ones left to fight. The
Sandinistas have said they have been wrong and have erred in the
past five years, but they have made only very little concessions,
concessions on words, yes; concessions on terms, yes, but when it
comes right down to it they are still making the same mistakes that
have cost lives. For example, in 1981, MISURASATA was asked to
come back to the Sandinistas with a study of land ownership and a
map of Indian lands, and, in the meantime, the Sandinistas agreed to
stop further Indian land seizures. Matters looked hopeful. But the
Sandinistas broke their agreement. They opened Sumo land to
logging, they started to relocate the Indians by force, and, one week
before the Indian land study was to be presented to the Nicaraguan
government, the Sandinistas arrested all Indian leaders and declared
them "separatists," outlawed MISURASATA, and killed four Indians in
a church. Thus began the Indian-Sandinista War in Nicaragua. As a
result some dissident youth joined the contras in Honduras. And
MISURASATA picked up arms in self-defense and started to fight
back. How do we help resolve this conflict? What do we say to our
Indian brothers and sisters? And what do we say to our Sandinista
compaeras and companeros? We say to our Indian brothers and
sisters, we unconditionally support your democratic right to autonomy
and your demand to control your own lives, your own territory and
your own resources. And we support you in putting pressure on the
Sandinista government to change their Indian policy. And we are with
you in support of the revolution. We say to our Sandinista
companeros, for the sake of the revolution, for all our sakes, grant the
Indios their democratic rights. After all, isn't a Marxist revolution
above all a democratic struggle? It is a struggle to bring full
democracy to all of the people, and nothing less will do. History
shows that where full democratic rights of nations are not given,
disaster follows for the revolution. In the Spanish Civil War, when the
Republican government recognized the Basque people's right as a
distinct nation to secede from Spain, they won an ally against the
fascist Franco. But when they refused to recognize the right of
Spanish Morocco to independence, they lost the Moroccans to
Franco's side. The Moroccan troops fought with Franco, and with
Morocco as a base, he won the civil war.
When Iran began its revolution, thousands of women marched
into the streets to demand their democratic rights, only to be told they
were counterrevolutionaries and CIA agents. The Kurds, a national
minority in Iran, were pushed into conflict with revolutionaries who
refused to live up to basic democratic principles ofself-determination.
Iran became a bastion not of democratic socialism but of Islamic
fundamentalism.
The Sandinistas' undemocratic treatment of the Indios only feeds
the fires of US and contra counterrevolutionary propaganda among
Indian people and all over the world. I think that's why I am so angry at
the Sandinistas in a really personal way. Because they discredit the
Marxist revolutionary struggle. As a Marxist I expected more than the
Sandinistas have given to the Indians. And if the people cannot expect
and demand equality and nationhood under a Marxist government,
why the hell should they change it? Why should they replace one
oppressor with another? Why should they replace capitalism with
socialism? Why? Why, if they cannot expect better treatment,
especially on the issue of democracy?
Nicaragua's revolution is not unique in the questions that it has
raised, questions that affect us. These are historical questions that any
revolution and any vanguard party must answer. They concern the
revolutionary state's orientation to nations, to women, to gays, to
racism, to the church and to the economic structure. And the correct
answers will determine the destiny of the revolution. It is better for
revolutionaries to extend democracy all the way, rather than face
those people who should be on the revolutionary side on the other side
of the barricades. It is best to make the revolution international as
Trotsky and Lenin said, rather than confine socialism to one country
and try to run it bureaucratically, as Stalin did. It is best to claim the
goals of Marxism in opposition to the institution of religion, for these
two opposites can not be combined. And it is best, when starting a
revolution, to know what it means to make it successful. And in the
case of Nicaragua, what it means is unity. Unity--the kind of unity
obtained only by democracy. We all have a stake in the Nicaraguan
Revolution, and we hope the Sandinistas fully accomplish it; that they
are successful, because their success will belong to all of us.
QUE VIVA LA REVOLUCION DE LOS INDIGINOUS, DE LAS
MUJERS, Y DE LOS TRABAJADORES! [=]
10029. Albright, Madeleine K. "Strengthening the Coordination of
Humanitarian Emergency Assistance Madeleine K. Albright, US
Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Statement before
the UN General Assembly, New York City, 11/19/1993", in US
Department of State Dispatch, December 6, 1993. [94H-30789 ]
[19931206] Mr. President, I welcome the opportunity to address the
General Assembly today regarding the pressing subject of
humanitarian assistance. The community of nations should do all it
reasonably can to relieve the suffering resulting from natural and
human-causeddisaster. But meeting this responsibility is growing
more difficult. Devastation wrought by nature's fury is more than
matched by the fury and folly of humankind. Ethnic and other
subnational conflicts have created unprecedented demands for UN
help. The number of displaced persons and refugees—the
international homeless—is at an all-time high. The fabric of the
international relief system has been stretched taut. Over the years,
UN agencies with a relief role have saved countless lives. There are
enormous grounds for pride in what has been accomplished. But
when we contemplate current and future challenges, there are no
grounds for complacency. A look around the world tells us that the
infectious consequences of conflict continue to spread. Africa alone is
home to a dozen ongoing insurgencies and 6 million refugees.
Fighting in the Caucasus has prompted Iran to set up refugee camps
inside Azerbaijan. Armenia faces a second harsh winter cut off from
adequate supplies of food, water, and power. Hundreds of thousands
are threatened in Georgia and Tajikistan. More than 2 million Afghans
and 1 million Iraqi Kurds remain in need. And in Bosnia the war
continues, and the suffering grows worse. The quantity of resources
16
available to respond to those emergencies has not kept pace with
rising demand. There is a risk of donor fatigue and, potentially, even
donor collapse. Already, the gap between needs and responses in
many locations is enormous. All this makes efficiency a matter of
much more than bureaucratic interest. Let us never forget that the
stakes are not statistics or politics or camera placements and news
stories. Rather, what is at stake is life or death for blameless children
and grandparents and mothers and fathers. Their fate depends upon
our choices. My government believes that the UN system must
choose to become more efficient and professional in coordinating its
disaster relief programs. The effort to reform UN humanitarian
programs extends back at least to the creation of the UN Disaster
Relief Office in 1972. UNDRO was supposed to improve
coordination, eliminate duplication, and put someone clearly in
charge. It didn't. So two years ago, we created a Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, or DHA, with new tools to do the same jobs and
more. Although DHA's efforts have been spread thin by the new wave
of humanitarian emergencies, its work has begun to take root.
Consolidated appeals have been established. The Central Emergency
Revolving Fund has helped speed aid to victims. The Inter-Agency
Standing Committee could become an effective coordinating forum for
UN agencies and humanitarian organizations. The effectiveness of
these tools will be enhanced further as the conclusions reached at
ECOSOC this past summer are implemented. As I will describe in
greater detail, my government is prepared to help bolster DHA in
conjunction with reforms within that department. We are pleased that
Under Secretary General Eliasson is taking steps to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of DHA, and we fully support him in this
effort. We also believe that DHA capabilities need to be reinforced in
three critical areas.
First, DHA must have the recognized leadership role, the
authority, and the resources to ensure that the UN's rapid response to
emergencies is properly coordinated. DHA must be the party
responsible for systems-wide performance in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies.
Second, DHA must have a modern information system
encompassing all emergency requirements. This includes providing
data on assessed needs and tracking the capabilities and contributions
of agencies and donors in response to those needs.
The United States already provides funds for the International
Emergency Readiness and Response Information System. As part of
a joint initiative with Japan, the United States is now prepared to make
two new commitments as DHA implements its reforms. We will give
DHA the equipment necessary to establish a modern information
network system in New York which can be linked to Geneva and the
field. And we will provide five portable satellite communications earth
stations for links with field offices in emergencies. The total value of
this new US contribution exceeds $500000. We are pleased that the
Government of Japan is able to join us in contributing to this critical
information function, and we invite others to do so as well.
Third, and finally, DHA needs the resources necessary to
coordinate a rapid response by the UN to an emergency where
insufficient capacity exists in the field. DHA must determine when
field deployments are required, including its own when necessary,
and must be responsible for seeing that sufficient resources are put in
place. Accordingly, we urge that DHA be given access to the interest
earned by the Central Emergency Revolving Fund for this purpose
until a permanent solution is found. Let me also mention the role
Under Secretary General Eliasson has played. He has established a
new department in the midst of an unprecedented increase in
humanitarian emergencies. He has worked to help those at risk,
whether from drought in Southern Africa, from civil violence in the
wintry hills of Georgia, or from other forms of catastrophe. So I am
particularly pleased to announce today these new contributions to
support DHA. I would also like to address myself to the UN
humanihrian agencies which I hope are represented here today. As I
have said, you all have our gratitude for your dedication and
extraordinary hard work. However, the United States believes that
DHA is not the only part of the UN humanihrian system that needs to
be strengthened. We urge the UN humanitarian agencies tocooperate
with DHA and to accept its leadership in coordinating responses to
complex emergencies. That may require some loss of customary
independence, but it will result in major gains in overall effectiveness.
It is also vital that the Under Secrehry General for Humanitarian
Affairs ensure that the humanihrian dimension is incorporated into the
planning and execution of political and peace-keepingmissions.
Thedelivery of emergency relief is often among the primary purposes
of such a mission. It is both necessary and appropriate, therefore, that
the UN of ficial responsible for humanitarian affairs be involved in
developing and implementing the response. Such an integrated
approach should ensure that the peacekeeping, political, and
humanitarian elements of UN operations do not work at cross
purposes. The role of the Secrehry General is also critical. In the end,
his leadership will determine whether the UN system coordinates
smoothly in responding to humanitarian crises and whether it does
not. We urge him to take up this challenge forcefully. The DHA
planning effort must also emphasize early intervention. Droughts may
be inevitable, but famines resulting from drought are not. Human
conflicts are inevitable, but destructive wars resulting from such
conflicts are not. Early intervention requires good information, which
means UN departments and agencies must pool their data. It requires
a willingness on the part of the UN to respond quickly and
appropriately to threatened emergencies. And it requires decisive
leadership both from UN officials and from member states. Finally,
planning for disaster relief must emphasize the continuum between
emergency help and develop ment ever we respond to an emergency,
we should begin preparing for the day when the primary mission
changes from relief to recovery. Today, there is no better example of
this need than Somalia. I, myself, saw that relief efforts in that country
have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Agricultural lands once
ravaged by violence are now under cultivation. Children who seemed
to have no futures are now returning to school. Basic health needs are
being given attention. Somalia is entering the recovery phase. The test
now is whether Somalis are willing and able to take the steps that will
make an enduring recovery possible. The conference scheduled for
November 29 in Addis Ababa is a key opportunity. If Somali leaders
demonstrate their own commitment to peace, which is the
prerequisite for development, international donors will respond. If they
fail to do so, the space for effective international action will diminish.
The United States is prepared to lead by example. At the Addis Ababa
conference, we will announce an assistance package to Somalia of
approximately $100 million in new and programmed funds. These
funds will be used for humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation
projects in those regions where progress on political reconciliation
and security has been made. These funds will be available if, and only
if, Somalis make real progress in creating a secure environment and
reconciling politically. We urge other donors to participate actively in
this effort.
The international relief system is under grave strain. We should
respond by strengthening DHA and by emphasizing the kind of
comprehensive approach that complex emergencies demand. We
must also work together to overcome the obstacles created by
political and military conflict to the delivery of emergency relief
Although it is sometimes difficult to separate the humanitarian from
other components of a peace-keeping mission, there is a difference. A
combatant force may well refuse to cease hostilities, to disarm or to
17
demobilize out of a legitimate concern for survival. But there is
nothing legitimate about using force to starve or freeze innocent
civilians. There is nothing legitimate about denying medical aid so that
children lie screaming as legs are amputated without anesthesia.
There is nothing legitimate about extorting food or other supplies
meant for humanitarian relief. There is, in short, nothing legitimate
about denying access to the means of human survival. This issue of
access for relief convoys and aircraft will be especially critical in
Bosnia this winter. For many, it may mean the difference between
mere hardship and certain death. The Bosnian people are weaker
today than they were last year. Their capacity to endure hardship has
beensapped. If fighting continues, the number in need will be far
greater and the gravity of their need far more severe than last winter.
The international community is responding. The Sarajevo airlift has
now gone on longer than the Berlin airlift 45 years ago. Pilots from 20
countries have flown more than 6000 flights over 500 days. America
alone has contributed more than $400 million to the relief effort. The
US Department of Defense has developed a new food ration that is
high in nutrition; it can survive a 10000 foot airdrop and requires no
water or fuel for preparation. And 80% of the airdrops in Bosnia have
been from American planes. UN agencies have made plans for this
winter. So have the nongovernmental organizations. We are all
prepared and preparing to do more. The US is prepared to make a
major contribution to address needs during the upcoming winter in
Bosnia, and we hope this will encourage other donors to make similar
contributions. We congratulate Mrs. Ogata on achieving an agreement
between the parties in Bosnia to ensure the delivery of humanitarian
assistance by suspending hostilities and allowing free and
unconditional access to those in need. We must strive to convince
those of all factions and nations, in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere,
not to interfere with the delivery of emergency aid. One of our great
challenges is to establish the principle that the UN has a nonviolable
right to deliver humanitarian relief and that the victims of violence
have an equal right to receive it. In closing, I want to thank you once
again for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you today.
Because of the very great challenges we face, it is as important as it
has ever been that we work together to advance our common goals.
Because the need is so great, our efforts, too, must be great. We must
rise above institutional jealousies and move beyond the promise of
reform to the reality of change. And we must keep the faith that each
child fed, each refugee housed, each family reunited will inspire
others to join with us in reducing the toll of tragedy in this troubled
world. [=]
grounds for complacency. A look around the world tells us that the
infectious consequences of conflict continue to spread. Africa alone is
home to a dozen ongoing insurgencies and 6 million refugees.
Fighting in the Caucasus has prompted Iran to set up refugee camps
inside Azerbaijan. Armenia faces a second harsh winter cut off from
adequate supplies of food, water, and power. Hundreds of thousands
are threatened in Georgia and Tajikistan. More than 2 million Afghans
and 1 million Iraqi Kurds remain in need. And in Bosnia the war
continues, and the suffering grows worse. The quantity of resources
available to respond to those emergencies has not kept pace with
rising demand. There is a risk of donor fatigue and, potentially, even
donor collapse. Already, the gap between needs and responses in
many locations is enormous. All this makes efficiency a matter of
much more than bureaucratic interest. Let us never forget that the
stakes are not statistics or politics or camera placements and news
stories. Rather, what is at stake is life or death for blameless children
and grandparents and mothers and fathers. Their fate depends upon
our choices. My government believes that the UN system must
choose to become more efficient and professional in coordinating its
disaster relief programs. The effort to reform UN humanitarian
programs extends back at least to the creation of the UN Disaster
Relief Office in 1972. UNDRO was supposed to improve
coordination, eliminate duplication, and put someone clearly in
charge. It didn't. So two years ago, we created a Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, or DHA, with new tools to do the same jobs and
more. Although DHA's efforts have been spread thin by the new wave
of humanitarian emergencies, its work has begun to take root.
Consolidated appeals have been established. The Central Emergency
Revolving Fund has helped speed aid to victims. The Inter-Agency
Standing Committee could become an effective coordinating forum for
UN agencies and humanitarian organizations. The effectiveness of
these tools will be enhanced further as the conclusions reached at
ECOSOC this past summer are implemented. As I will describe in
greater detail, my government is prepared to help bolster DHA in
conjunction with reforms within that department. We are pleased that
Under Secretary General Eliasson is taking steps to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of DHA, and we fully support him in this
effort. We also believe that DHA capabilities need to be reinforced in
three critical areas.
First, DHA must have the recognized leadership role, the
authority, and the resources to ensure that the UN's rapid response to
emergencies is properly coordinated. DHA must be the party
responsible for systems-wide performance in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies.
Second, DHA must have a modern information system
encompassing all emergency requirements. This includes providing
data on assessed needs and tracking the capabilities and contributions
of agencies and donors in response to those needs.
The United States already provides funds for the International
Emergency Readiness and Response Information System. As part of
a joint initiative with Japan, the United States is now prepared to make
two new commitments as DHA implements its reforms. We will give
DHA the equipment necessary to establish a modern information
network system in New York which can be linked to Geneva and the
field. And we will provide five portable satellite communications earth
stations for links with field offices in emergencies. The total value of
this new US contribution exceeds $500000. We are pleased that the
Government of Japan is able to join us in contributing to this critical
information function, and we invite others to do so as well.
Third, and finally, DHA needs the resources necessary to
coordinate a rapid response by the UN to an emergency where
insufficient capacity exists in the field. DHA must determine when
field deployments are required, including its own when necessary,
10030. Albright, Madeleine K. "Strengthening the Coordination of
Humanitarian Emergency Assistance Madeleine K. Albright, US
Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Statement before
the UN General Assembly, New York City, 11/19/1993", in US
Department of State Dispatch, December 6, 1993. [94H-30789 ]
[19931206] Mr. President, I welcome the opportunity to address the
General Assembly today regarding the pressing subject of
humanitarian assistance. The community of nations should do all it
reasonably can to relieve the suffering resulting from natural and
human-causeddisaster. But meeting this responsibility is growing
more difficult. Devastation wrought by nature's fury is more than
matched by the fury and folly of humankind. Ethnic and other
subnational conflicts have created unprecedented demands for UN
help. The number of displaced persons and refugees—the
international homeless—is at an all-time high. The fabric of the
international relief system has been stretched taut. Over the years,
UN agencies with a relief role have saved countless lives. There are
enormous grounds for pride in what has been accomplished. But
when we contemplate current and future challenges, there are no
18
and must be responsible for seeing that sufficient resources are put in
place. Accordingly, we urge that DHA be given access to the interest
earned by the Central Emergency Revolving Fund for this purpose
until a permanent solution is found. Let me also mention the role
Under Secretary General Eliasson has played. He has established a
new department in the midst of an unprecedented increase in
humanitarian emergencies. He has worked to help those at risk,
whether from drought in Southern Africa, from civil violence in the
wintry hills of Georgia, or from other forms of catastrophe. So I am
particularly pleased to announce today these new contributions to
support DHA. I would also like to address myself to the UN
humanihrian agencies which I hope are represented here today. As I
have said, you all have our gratitude for your dedication and
extraordinary hard work. However, the United States believes that
DHA is not the only part of the UN humanihrian system that needs to
be strengthened. We urge the UN humanitarian agencies tocooperate
with DHA and to accept its leadership in coordinating responses to
complex emergencies. That may require some loss of customary
independence, but it will result in major gains in overall effectiveness.
It is also vital that the Under Secrehry General for Humanitarian
Affairs ensure that the humanihrian dimension is incorporated into the
planning and execution of political and peace-keepingmissions.
Thedelivery of emergency relief is often among the primary purposes
of such a mission. It is both necessary and appropriate, therefore, that
the UN of ficial responsible for humanitarian affairs be involved in
developing and implementing the response. Such an integrated
approach should ensure that the peacekeeping, political, and
humanitarian elements of UN operations do not work at cross
purposes. The role of the Secrehry General is also critical. In the end,
his leadership will determine whether the UN system coordinates
smoothly in responding to humanitarian crises and whether it does
not. We urge him to take up this challenge forcefully. The DHA
planning effort must also emphasize early intervention. Droughts may
be inevitable, but famines resulting from drought are not. Human
conflicts are inevitable, but destructive wars resulting from such
conflicts are not. Early intervention requires good information, which
means UN departments and agencies must pool their data. It requires
a willingness on the part of the UN to respond quickly and
appropriately to threatened emergencies. And it requires decisive
leadership both from UN officials and from member states. Finally,
planning for disaster relief must emphasize the continuum between
emergency help and develop ment ever we respond to an emergency,
we should begin preparing for the day when the primary mission
changes from relief to recovery. Today, there is no better example of
this need than Somalia. I, myself, saw that relief efforts in that country
have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Agricultural lands once
ravaged by violence are now under cultivation. Children who seemed
to have no futures are now returning to school. Basic health needs are
being given attention. Somalia is entering the recovery phase. The test
now is whether Somalis are willing and able to take the steps that will
make an enduring recovery possible. The conference scheduled for
November 29 in Addis Ababa is a key opportunity. If Somali leaders
demonstrate their own commitment to peace, which is the
prerequisite for development, international donors will respond. If they
fail to do so, the space for effective international action will diminish.
The United States is prepared to lead by example. At the Addis Ababa
conference, we will announce an assistance package to Somalia of
approximately $100 million in new and programmed funds. These
funds will be used for humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation
projects in those regions where progress on political reconciliation
and security has been made. These funds will be available if, and only
if, Somalis make real progress in creating a secure environment and
reconciling politically. We urge other donors to participate actively in
this effort. The international relief system is under grave strain. We
should respond by strengthening DHA and by emphasizing the kind of
comprehensive approach that complex emergencies demand. We
must also work together to overcome the obstacles created by
political and military conflict to the delivery of emergency relief
Although it is sometimes difficult to separate the humanitarian
from other components of a peace-keeping mission, there is a
difference. A combatant force may well refuse to cease hostilities, to
disarm or to demobilize out of a legitimate concern for survival. But
there is nothing legitimate about using force to starve or freeze
innocent civilians. There is nothing legitimate about denying medical
aid so that children lie screaming as legs are amputated without
anesthesia. There is nothing legitimate about extorting food or other
supplies meant for humanitarian relief. There is, in short, nothing
legitimate about denying access to the means of human survival. This
issue of access for relief convoys and aircraft will be especially
critical in Bosnia this winter. For many, it may mean the difference
between mere hardship and certain death. The Bosnian people are
weaker today than they were last year. Their capacity to endure
hardship has been sapped. If fighting continues, the number in need
will be far greater and the gravity of their need far more severe than
last winter. The international community is responding. The Sarajevo
airlift has now gone on longer than the Berlin airlift 45 years ago.
Pilots from 20 countries have flown more than 6000 flights over 500
days. America alone has contributed more than $400 million to the
relief effort. The US Department of Defense has developed a new food
ration that is high in nutrition; it can survive a 10000 foot airdrop and
requires no water or fuel for preparation. And 80% of the airdrops in
Bosnia have been from American planes. UN agencies have made
plans for this winter. So have the nongovernmental organizations. We
are all prepared and preparing to do more. The US is prepared to
make a major contribution to address needs during the upcoming
winter in Bosnia, and we hope this will encourage other donors to
make similar contributions. We congratulate Mrs. Ogata on achieving
an agreement between the parties in Bosnia to ensure the delivery of
humanitarian assistance by suspending hostilities and allowing free
and unconditional access to those in need. We must strive to convince
those of all factions and nations, in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere,
not to interfere with the delivery of emergency aid. One of our great
challenges is to establish the principle that the UN has a nonviolable
right to deliver humanitarian relief and that the victims of violence
have an equal right to receive it. In closing, I want to thank you once
again for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you today.
Because of the very great challenges we face, it is as important as it
has ever been that we work together to advance our common goals.
Because the need is so great, our efforts, too, must be great. We must
rise above institutional jealousies and move beyond the promise of
reform to the reality of change. And we must keep the faith that each
child fed, each refugee housed, each family reunited will inspire
others to join with us in reducing the toll of tragedy in this troubled
world. [=]
10031. Albright, Madeleine K. Use of Force in a Postold War World
Madeleine K. Albright. Address at the National War College, National
Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, September 23,
1993. [95H-07367] [19930923] To me, this auditorium—this military
institution—is the right place to discuss the Clinton Administration's
foreign policy goals and address that most crucial of topics: the use of
military force in the post-Cold War world. I believe that our national
dialogue must ensure that this nation's foreign policy is clearly
understood by those who might be asked to risk their lives in its
behalf. And policy-makers must not only explain but listen—take the
time to hear the concerns and answer the questions of our military
19
personnel. For almost half a century, whenever we talked foreign
policy, we did so within a Cold War context. A whole new vocabulary
was established of containment and deterrence, throw weights and
missile gaps, subversion and domino theories. And US military action
was almost always related— directly or indirectly—to the Soviet
threat. The world was a chessboard, and the two superpowers moved
the pieces. But then our chess rival left the table. The game has
changed and the rules to the new one are still being written. Most of us
do not for a minute mourn the Cold War era. But now there are those
from all parts of the political spectrum for whom the new world is
more confusing than gratifying. They can conceive of no threats to
America that are not Cold War threats. They look at that empty chair
on the other side of the chess table and counsel us to sit back, put our
feet up, and lose interest in the outside world. Obviously, America is
safer and more secure than it was. Anyone who feels nostalgia for the
Cold War ought to have his or her head examined. But anyone who
concludes that foreign adversaries, conflicts, and disasters do not
affect us misreads the past, misunderstands the present, and will
miss the boat in the future. Indeed, President Clinton has talked often
about the similarity between this historical moment and the early days
of the Truman Administration immediately following World War II.
Then, as now, a new President saw a dramatically altered world,
sought to redefine America's interests in that new world, and acted to
protect those interests from a rising tide of isolationist thinking. And
then, as now, the President's decisions were based on an analysis of
new threats, a recognition of our enduring interests, and the
imperative of engagement. So what are these new threats, and what
should be America's response? The Cold War is gone, but weapons
of mass destruction are not. The possible aggressive use of such
weapons remains perhaps the greatest threat to international peace
and our security. Revelations about Iraq's weapons programs should
have shocked even the most complacent among us. Besides Iraq,
serious proliferation threats exist from states that fear the future, like
North Korea; states that have fallen prey to the extremes of
intolerance, such as Iran; and states that are engulfed by regional
tension, such as in South Asia. Beyond the destructive weapons, there
are the destructive hatreds. Less than 2 months ago, the FBI
apprehended a group with apparent foreign connections planning to
blow up the building in which I work. The recent Middle East
agreement is sure to enrage further those whose insecurities and
extremism have made them blind to the promise of peace and open to
the use of terror.
The terrorist threat is aggravated by advances in technology and
by the availability of weapons of every description. I know we remain
vulnerable to terrorism, and I know it can affect our most vital of
interests— our fathers, mothers, spouses, daughters, and sons. We
also face increasing ethnic and subnational violence. Wherever we
turn, someone is fighting or threatening to fight someone else. These
disputes may be far removed from our borders, but in today's global
village, chaos is an infectious disease. Although violence in a failed
state such as Somalia may seem trivial to some, when combined
with unrest in Sudan, Rwanda, Liberia, Bosnia, Georgia, and so on,
our attention and our interests— whether political or humanitarian—
cannot help but be engaged. When a democratic government was
ousted in Haiti, drug trafficking skyrocketed, repression increased,
and the risk of a massive new influx of refugees to America grew. In
Somalia, we have indications that a tactical alliance may be forming
between Aideed's faction, terrorists based in Sudan, and the
Government of Iran. The current violence in Azerbaijan threatens to
bring Turkey, Iran, and Russia into conflict in ways that could well
threaten our interests directly. And the possibility remains that the war
in former Yugoslavia will spread to neighboring regions and nations,
swelling further the flow of refugees, straining the economic vigor of
Europe, and threatening the security of key European allies. There is
also a moral dimension to these conflicts, dramatized most hauntingly
by the brave people of Sarajevo and Mostar but embodied, as well, by
the millions of others who suffer the depredations of violence off
camera, out of sight, every day. Obviously, neither we nor anyone
else can right every wrong, nor would it make sense for us to try. But
let us never become so preoccupied with dayto-day concerns that we
lose sight of our own most basic interest, which is the preservation
not simply of American leadership but of American purpose. Ten days
ago, in Washington, I attended a lunch to celebrate the signing of an
agreement between Israel and the PLO—a day I will remember all
my life. I will remember, in particular, a comment by Israeli Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres about America's purpose. When the history
books are written, he said: Nobody will understand the United States,
really: You have so much force, and you didn't conquer the land of
anybody; you have so much power, and you didn't dominate another
people; you have problems of your own, and you have never turned
your back on the problems of others.
We should be proud that so much of the world sees America the
way Foreign Minister Peres sees America, for our leadership today
rests on the same solid foundation of principles and values—the same
enlightened selfinterest—that has made service to America from
Valley Forge to Desert Storm a badge not only of courage but of
honor. As Secretary Christopher and National Security Adviser Tony
Lake have said this week, American foreign policy has four
overarching goals: first, to strengthen the bonds among those
countries that make up the growing community of major market
democracies; second, to help emerging democracies get on their feet;
third, to reform or isolate the rogue states that act to undermine the
stability and prosperity of the larger community; and, fourth, to contain
the chaos and ease the suffering in regions of greatest humanitarian
concern.Taken together, our strategy looks to the enlargement of
democracy and markets abroad. To achieve these goals, some say
we must make rigid choices between unilateral and multilateral,
global and regional, force and diplomacy. But that is not true. We have
the flexibility in this new era to steer a reasoned course between the
counsel of those who would have us intervene everywhere and of
those who see no American purpose anywhere. We have a full range
of foreign policy tools with which to work, and we will choose those
that will be most effective in each case. As America's permanent
representative to the United Nations, I have made it clear that we
remain committed to the cause of peace and to the principle of
resolving conflicts without violence whenever that is possible. The
end of the Cold War has provided us with new and important
opportunities in this regard. Cooperation, not confrontation, is now the
norm at the UN Security Council. As a result of our assertive
diplomacy, we have been able to muster global support for sanctions
against Libya for shielding the alleged saboteurs of Pan Am 103,
against Iraq for its continued failure to meet its obligations following
the Persian Gulf war, and against Haiti prior to the agreement reached
recently to restore democratic rule. The use of sanctions has also
arisen in the case of Angola, where our goal is to encourage an armed
opposition group to abide by the results of a free election, and, of
course, in Serbia, where they have drastically weakened the economy
of an aggressor state. Diplomacy will always be America's first
choice, and the possibilities for diplomatic achievements today are
ample. But history teaches us that there will always be times when
words are not enough, when sanctions are not enough, when
diplomacy is not enough. The foremost mission of our government—
its constitutional duty— is to protect our nation's territory, people, and
way of life. We cannot fulfill that mission unless we have both the
capacity to use force effectively and the will to do so when necessary.
When neither our ability to fight nor our resolve to fight are in doubt,
20
we can be most certain not only of defeating those who threaten us but
of deterring those who are tempted to take such action. Under the
leadership of Secretary Aspin, I am confident that we will maintain
military forces that are modern, versatile, ready, and strong. It is
Department of Defense policy to maintain a military capable enough,
in concert with local allies, to fight and win two major regional wars.
The existence of such a force—and the credible threat to use
it—is the surest way to prevent our interests from being threatened in
the first place. For years, a debate has raged about whether it is
necessary to spell out a set of specific circumstances—a checklist—
describing when America will or will not contemplate the use of
military force. This Administration has wisely avoided the temptation
to devise a precise list of the circumstances under which military
force might be used or of repeating the State Department's mistake
concerning Korea 43 years ago when it defined too narrowly the scope
of America's interests and concerns. Too much precision in public,
however wellintentioned, can impinge on the flexibility of the
commander in chief or generate dangerous miscalculations abroad.
But let no one doubt that this President is willing to use force—
unilaterally when necessary. Last June, the President ordered a strike
against Saddam Hussein's military intelligence headquarters in
response to Iraq's plot to kill former President Bush. We didn't seek
anyone's permission to carry out that raid. We didn't ask anyone's
help. We did it using our own forces exercising our own right of selfdefense.The President said in his inaugural speech that America
would act militarily with others when possible but "alone when we
must." That commitment was true then; it is true today. In the future, if
America's vital economic interests are at risk—as they were in the
Gulf, or if the lives of American citizens are in danger—as they were
in Panama, or if terrorists need to be tracked down—as when
President Reagan ordered the use of force to apprehend the hijackers
of the Achillle auLro, President Clinton will not hesitate to act as a
commander in chief must act to protect America and Americans. The
President's inaugural statement also indicated that we support the use
of force on a multilateral basis when it is in our interests to do so. As
Secretary Christopher put it, we see "multilateralism as a means, not
an end." No one understands the potential advantages of
multilateralism better than the United States. That's why we proposed
NATO and helped create the United Nations. The underlying thesis of
the post-World War II strategy of containment, the legacy of such
leaders as President Truman, General Marshall, and General
Eisenhower, was that American strength is made even greater when
cemented by strong alliances and joint endeavors with other nations in
pursuit of common objectives. The history of the Persian Gulf over the
past 3 years is a classic modern example of this. I know that some of
you here today helped to plan and execute operations during that war,
including perhaps the most decisive air operation in history, along
with the complex passage to the front lines of large combat units from
different countries with different languages. I salute you for your skill
and professionalism in this most effective coalition campaign. In the
Gulf, American leadership benefited greatly from the support of other
states before, during, and after the war. UN sanctions strengthened
our cause politically, allied support spread the burden militarily, and
contributions from Arab states, Germany, and Japan reduced the
costs of the war and its aftermath financially.
The end of the Cold War has opened up another avenue for
multilateral cooperation that had long been limited by the US-Soviet
rivalry—and that is UN peace-keeping. In recent years, there has
been a dramatic increase in requests for UN assistance in resolving
ethnic and other conflicts. The statistics by now are familiar: more
peace-keeping operations in the past years than in the previous 43; a
sevenfold increase in troops; a tenfold increase in budget; and a
dramatic but immeasurable increase in danger and complexity. At
their best, UN peace-keeping operations can be very effective.
Obviously, they cannot be a substitute for fighting or winning our
own wars, nor should we allow the existence of a collective peacekeeping capability to lessen our own military strength. But UN efforts
have the potential to act as a "force multiplier" in promoting the
interests in peace and stability that we share with other nations. As I
said earlier, territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and
the total collapse of governmental authority in some states are now
among the principal threats to world peace. The UN is playing a
constructive role in many such situations by mediating disputes,
obtaining cease-fires, and, in some cases, achieving comprehensive
peace agreements. This often requires the presence of UN peacekeepers or observers either to help arrange a peace or to help keep it.
Past UN peace missions have achieved important goals in places as
diverse as the Middle East, Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia. To
the extent that future peace-keeping missions succeed, they will lift
from the shoulders of American servicemen and servicewomen and
the taxpayers a great share of the burden of collective security
operations around the globe. Particularly when circumstances arise
where there is a threat to international peace that affects us but does
not immediately threaten our citizens or territory, it will be in our
interests to proceed in partnership with the UN or other appropriate
groupings to respond to the threat involved and, hopefully, eliminate it.
In such cases, we will benefit not only from the burdensharing aspects
but from the ability to invoke the voice of the community of nations in
behalf of a cause that we support. At the same time, as America's
representative to the UN, I know that UN capabilities have not kept
pace with its responsibilities—and I have discussed this problem on
many prior occasions. Those who support the goals of the UN do it no
favors if they fail to speak out when its reach begins repeatedly to
exceed its grasp. The UN emerged from 40 years of Cold War rivalry
overweight and out of shape. Today, UN peace-keepers need
reformedbudgetprocedures, more dependable sources of military
and civilian personnel, better training, better intelligence, better
command and control, better equipment, and more money. These
limitations are not inherent; they are correctable, and the
Administration is doing its part to see that they are corrected. We
believe, for example, that the UN decision-making process on
peacekeeping must be overhauled. When deciding whether or not to
support a UN peace-keeping or peace-making resolution, we are
insisting that certain fundamental questions be asked before, not after,
new obligations are undertaken. These questions include the
following: (a) Is there a real threat to international peace and
security—whether caused by international aggression; or by
humanitarian disaster accompanied by violence; or by the sudden,
unexpected, and violent interruption of an established democracy? (b)
Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear objectives, and
can its scope be clearly defined? (c) Is a cease-fire in place, and have
the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence? (d) Are the
financial and human resources that will be needed to accomplish the
mission available to be used for that purpose? (e) Can an end point to
UN participation be identified?
These questions illustrate the kind of consistent criteria—which
do not now exist—that we are proposing that the UN take into account
when contemplating new peace-keeping operations. And we are
preparing guidelines for American participation that will promise
greatest assistance in specialized areas such as logistics, training,
intelligence, communications, and public affairs. And although the
Administration has not yet fully completed its review of our policy
toward UN peacekeeping, I can assure you of one thing: This
Administration believes that whether an operation is multilateral or
unilateral, whether the troops are US or foreign, young men and
21
women should not be sent in harm's way without a clear mission,
competent commanders, sensible rules of engagement, and the
means required to get the job done. The credibility of UN peace
operations should hinge not on how many missions there are but on
the quality of planning, the degree of professionalism demonstrated,
and the extent to which mission objectives are achieved. America
under President Clinton will be a strong supporter of the UN. We take
seriously President Truman's pledge to the first UN General
Assembly that America will work to help the UN "not as a temporary
expedient but as a permanent partnership."
At the same time, we understand that there are limits to what
that partnership can achieve for the United States. Adlai Stevenson
used to refer to the UN as the "meeting house of the family of man,"
which it is, but it is a very large family. It is the ultimate committee. It
reflects the broadest possible diversity of viewpoints. As Americans,
we command enormous influence there because of our power and the
power of our ideals. But we cannot rely on the UN as a substitute
guarantor for the vital interests of the United States. The Berlin Wall
would be upright today if we had relied on the UN to contain
communism. That ceremony on the front lawn of the White House 2
weeks ago would never have taken place if America had
subcontracted to others the job of helping Israel to survive. Sending
American military forces into dangerous situations is the most difficult
decision any President can make. History teaches us that public
support for such decisions is essential and that in each such
circumstance Americans are entitled to the facts. The Administration
has welcomed and takes very seriously the Senate's recent request to
review our policy in Somalia. We have also begun, and will continue,
a regular series of close consultations with the Congress and a
dialogue with the public on our policy toward Bosnia. I have spoken at
length in public speeches and congressional testimony about both
issues, and both are about to enter a new phase. Bosnia may be
witness to a negotiated peace that will present the international
community with its most daunting peace-keeping task ever.
Yesterday, the Security Council approved a resolution setting out
clearly that the UN's principal goal in Somalia is to bring about the
political reconciliation of that long-suffering country, in part through the
establishment of basic civic institutions, such as a functioning
judiciary and police. In the weeks ahead, we will continue our
consultations on Somalia, Bosnia, and the full range of national
security and peace-keeping issues. Now, let me summarize my
message here today. The world has changed, and the Cold War
national security framework is now obsolete. The Clinton
Administration is fashioning a new framework that is more diverse
and flexible than the old—a framework that will advance American
interests, promote American values, and preserve American
leadership. We will choose the means to implement this framework
on a case-by-case basis, relying on diplomacy whenever possible, on
force when absolutely necessary. If American servicemen and
servicewomen are sent into combat, they will go with the training, the
equipment, the support, and the leadership they need to get the job
done. Recognizing that global solutions are required to global
problems, the tools that America will use to carry out its foreign policy
will be both unilateral and multilateral. Other nations and institutions
can and should be asked to bear a substantial part of the burden of
advancing common interests. We have strong reason to help build a
United Nations that is increasingly able and effective. But America
will never entrust its destiny to other than American hands. Finally, in
keeping with a bipartisan tradition that stretches back a halfcentury,
America will remain engaged in the world. It was 50 years ago this
month that the Republican congressional leadership, mindful of what
America's periodic tendency toward isolationism had done to the
League of Nations, first went on record in support of an international
organization "to prevent military aggression and attain permanent
peace." Senator Arthur Vandenberg sponsored that resolution, in his
words: To end the miserable notion . . . that the Republican Party will
return to its foxhole when the last shot in this war has been fired and
will blindly let the world rot in its own anarchy. Under the Clinton
Administration, our nation will not retreat into a postCold War foxhole.
Under the President's leadership, we will be called upon to work
together, Republican and Democrat, civilian and military, public
official and private citizen, to protect America and build a better world.
[=]
10032. Aldhous, Peter. "Iraqi Refugee: From Hillside To Laboratory",
in Nature, May 23, 1991. p. 262. [91H-37853] [19910523] Riadh Dinha
Francis was in a refugee camp on the Iraqi-Turkish border two weeks
ago. Now he is in Sheffield, following an appeal on British Channel 4
and an effort by British scientists. Francis completed his doctorate at
Sheffield in 1985, and returned to Salahaddin University in Erbil.
Francis, with 6000-7000 students at the university, fled when the Iraqi
Army advanced to put down Kurdish guerrillas. Francis also noted
that truckloads of equipment were delivered to the university from
Kuwait after the invasion of Kuwait.
10033. Alemdar, Zeynap. "Libyan Visit Dismays Turks; Premier
Sets Off Furor With Plan To Call on Qadhafi", in Seattle Times,
October 2, 1996. p. A9. [96H-33685] [19961002] The efforts of new
PM Necmettin Erbakan to improve relations with his Islamic
neighbors is reaping criticism at home and uncertain results abroad.
The multi-billion dollar natural gas deal with Iran has been criticized.
And a diplomatic swing through Egypt, Libya and Nigeria, left Erbakan
criticized by the US for even meeting with Libya and criticized by
Libya for not protecting Kurdish human rights. Qadhafi has recently
been quoted observing that the Turks were 'butchers of the Kurds...
[adding] They had once slaughtered the Arabs as well'. Denounced by
the US for even talking with the Libyans, Necmettin's domestic
opposition joked that Necmettin should visit Taliban-ruled Kabul next.
Turkish newspapers also note that the planned visit to Nigeria will
also damage Turkey's international reputation. His supporters are
dismayed that Erbakan has note ended the defense pact with Israel,
and has backed the US Northern No-Fly Zone over Iraq. [TXT]
10034. Alemdar, Zeynap. "Turkey's Military Warns Against Islamic
Radicalism; The Army, Protector of the Nation's Modern Secular
Traditions, Pressures the Government to Curb Its Pro-Islamic
Policies", in Oregonian (Portland), June 12, 1997. p. A7. [97H-13543]
[19970612] Gen. Fevzi Turkeri states: "Radical Islamic activities
have gained momentum towards civil uprising. The basic principles
of the Turkish Republic cannot be changed, will not be changed...
Political islam works closely with Iran and some other Islamic
countries to pull Turkey into an endless darkness, away from
Western civilization." He stated that Turkey has at least 30 radical
Islamic groups that are allied with Kurdish secessionists: "Kurdish
separatist terrorism and radical Islam are Number One threats to the
country". He stated that Turkish law required the army to protect the
nation. [TXT]
10035.
Alemdar, Zeynep.
"Turks To Ease Law Limiting
Expression?", in Seattle Times, November 9, 1994. p. A11. [95H02313] [19941109] About 100 Turks, 70 journalists and about 30
academics, have been jailed under the strict freedom-of-expression
limits. Economic prof. Fikret Baskaya, for example, is jailed for his
assertion that Turkish policy vis-a-vis the Kurds has been
'chauvinistic'. Yasar Topcu, an opponent of expanding permissible
speech and member of the True Path party, notes: 'Intellectuals
22
should not have the right to harm the sovereignty and integrity of the
country of be allowed to support terrorism'. [TXT]
statement has also been made by the Stuttgart committee of the
"Kurdish Political Detainees Support Group" condemning Germany's
Kurdish policy and the recent attacks by police on Kurds in Stuttgart.
Ozgur Politika, 2/20/1996. [=]
10036. Alkeilani, Mohamed. A Record Of Ten Months In Iraq. World
Trade Union Movement (English Translation of Vsemirnoe
Profsoiuznoe Dvizhenie) (WFTU), No. 12, December1963. pp. 26-28.
[99H-03159] [19640601] An account of repression and terror under the
Baathist regime. It is in power because of the manoeuvers of the Iraq
Petroleum Company, which engineered the coup to protect the
interests of the imperialist trusts on whom it depends. The company
is particularly concerned because of the large oil deposits in
Kurdistan, which is exploited by the IPC, the feudalists and the big
bourgeoisie; these are the groups profiting by the regime. The
Baathists flirt with CENTO to get help in crushing the Kurds.
However, resistance is growing all over. [Reprinted from Soviet
Periodical Abstracts: Asia, Africa and Latin America (SPAAALA)
(Formerly Selective Soviet Annotated Bibliographies), Vol. 4 (1), June
1964. Editors: Anita Navon, Ina Schlesinger. Slavic Languages
Research Institute, White Plains, NY.]
10040. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "'Massacre
Evidence Points to State'", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H09061] [19960201] A delegation comprising Professor Laurence
Lustgarten from Southampton University, British historian-writer
David McDowell and Caroline Nolan from the Kurdish Human Rights
Project have completed their investigations in Siirt, Guclukonak, Van
and Diyarbaki r. The delegation visited the region in order to
investigate on the spot the post-election situation and human rights
violations. The delegation met relatives of those who lost family
members in the Guclukonak massacre and said: "The evidence given
by the relatives of those who died points to the state as perpetrator."
The delegation said they had been constantly followed by police and
troops and obtained evidence from people who had been detained that
was contrary to statements made by the authorities." In our report we
will ask the Turkish authorities to answer our q uestions concerning
this claim." Ozgur Politika, 2/12/1996. [=]
10037. Allen, Arthur. "Conflict Over Southeastern Turkey Heats Up
On german Soil; Violence Continues For a Second Day and Erupts in
Karlsruhe, Where Turks Attack Kurds Occupying a Consulate", in
Oregonian (Portland), June 26, 1993. p. A4. [93H-30270] [19930626]
10041. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "'Our Hope Is
Peace'", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09085] [19960401] Bekir
Ozturk, the father of Tevfik Ozturk, who was one of two soldiers
captured by the PKK in a raid on an encampment of the Mobile
Commando Units in Semdinli district on 7/4/1995, said he had applied
to all official bodies but stated that they had not shown any interest in
his son, adding: "They only say 'we're trying' they don't say anything
else. They have abandoned them to their fate. If they want to do
something let them respond to the cease-fire." Bekir Ozturk added:
"The last time I spoke to my son he said he was being sent to
Semdinli. All the troops sent with him were Kurdish. This was a
conscious thing. They want to pit Kurd against Kurd." Ozturk said that
after his son had been captured a reporter from Milliyet newspaper
had interviewed him but had distorted what he had said. Milliyet
published the story under the title: "I'm willing to sacrifice three more
sons". Ozturk said: "I definitely didn't say anything like that. Tevfik is
my youngest son. My other three sons have done their military
service. I've no other sons to send to such a war. I want to call on the
PKK. Release my son and the other soldiers or at least let us speak to
them once on the phone. The authorities have not staunched our tears,
perhaps you can." Ozgur Politika, 2/19/1996. [=]
10038. Allen, Robin. "Iran In Summit Clash With Arab States", in
Financial Times, December 11, 1997. p. 6. [98H-17472] [19971211]
There was a clash of opinions between Iran and GCC states over
peace making and security at the Organization of the Islamic
Conference meeting in Tehran. Disputes inclue the "land-for-peace"
formula in Israel-Palestine talks, Turkish military incursions into
northern Iraq, protests by Arab Gulf states on then Iranian occupation
of three disputed islands, and Iranian attempts to persuade Arab states
to end their military alliances with the US. All 55 attending states
blamed Israel for stalling the peace process; several, including Egypt,
Jordan, Syria and Palestine were uneasy with the Iranian
characterization of land-for-peace as a "losing proposition". There
was also fierce debate on whether to condemn Turkey for new
incursions into Iraq.
Separately, Kofi Annan, rejected a proposal that the Organization
of the Islamic Conference be granted a permanent seat on the
Security Council, noting that membership in the UN was "not based
on religion or anything of that kind" [sic: except in the instance of the
Vatican City and the Jewish State].
10042. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "'Solidarity
Committee with Kurdish Political Prisoners' Founded in Germany", in
AKIN News, December 1995. [99H-09053] [19951201] A committee
aiming to provide solidarity, visits, legal assistance, and other needs
to Kurdish political prisoners in Germany has been set up in Stuttgart.
The committee issued a press release stating that in the last two
years close to 100 Kurds had been remanded in custody, 41 still being
in prison, 7 of whom have been charged under Paragraph 129(a) of
the German Penal Code for alleged membership of a terrorist
organization. Ozgur Politika, 12/6/1995. [=]
10039. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "'Germany
Trying To Prevent Newroz Celebrations'", in AKIN News, April 1996.
[99H-09087] [19960401] At a press conference in Stuttgart the day
before yesterday Green Party councilor and lawyer Roland Kugler
and 4 Kurds condemned police attacks on Kurds. In Stuttgart in
particular earlier this month 98 Kurdish people were detained in one
day and held for 24 hours without charge. In Germany in general the
police have been on the alert since the German media reported that
"the PKK will attack German and Turkish concerns", based on
statements from the Federal Criminal Department and the Institution
for the Protection of the Constitution. At the press conference the
Kurds listed the reasons for the police attacks as follows: "Germany
is supporting Turkey in its efforts to break the PKK cease-fire, and
trying to prevent Newroz activities and celebrations by banning them
in advance." The Kurds also called for the bans on the PKK, ERNK
and other Kurdish associations and bodies to be lifted. Roland Kugler
said: "All Kurdish demonstrations have been peaceful. On most
occasions aggression has come from the German police." A
10043. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "'We Will
Wait a Little Longer'", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09092]
[19960401] PKK President Abdullah Ocalan stated that they would
extend the unilateral cease-fire a little longer, but said that the fact that
they had not received a response reduced the cease-fire's chances of
success. Abdullah Ocalan participated by telephone in a live debate on
MED TV in which Kurdistan Parliament in Exile President, Yashar
Kaya, HADEP President, Murat Bozlak, Dr. Haluk Gerger, Islamist
23
politician Hasan Mezarci, journalist Cihan Eren and French journalist
Jean Francois were present in the studio while former MP
Abdulmelik Firat, Mahir Kaynak and families of Turkish soldiers held
by the PKK participated by telephone. Ocalan said: "This government
is so weak it cannot even say 'I am opposed to the cease-fire, my
position on the Kurdish question is as follows'" "I have sent Mesut
Yilmaz a letter and addressed him via TV. He must reply to the letter.
(...) If he does not respond we will intensify the war. If the Turkish
peoplesuffer no one will be able to hold us responsible. We are
showing the way to achieve a resolution of the issue. If they don't want
to speak to us there are many Kurdish individuals that may be
consulted. We will make the necessary contribution to this. (...) If this
does not take place then the war will escalate from Newroz onw
ards." Ozgur Politika, 3/19/1996. [=]
10046. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "America
Arms Turkey's Repression", in AKIN News, December 1995. [99H09044] [19951201] Turkey lags behind only Israel and Egypt in receipt
of American military aid. Washington has approved $7.8 billion in
military sales to Turkey in the last decade, and has provided grants or
loans to cover most of it. This year, unless dramatic events take place
in the current House-Senate conference, Turkey will get $320 million
in American credits to finish production - in Turkey - of F16 fighters
planes. Washington now provides 85% of Turkey's arms imports and
90% of its military aid. Despite the efforts of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Democrat of Vermont, and Rep. John Porter, Republican of Illinois, to
curtail aid, Congress has not yet managed to block or place conditions
on substantial amounts of Turkish military aid. The New York Times,
10/17/1995. [=]
larges t number of votes in four southeastern provinces by
campaigning for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish nationalist uprising.
Many Kurds in that area will see their own preferred candidates
excluded from parliament in favor of others who won fewer votes.
This can only strengthen the feeling that there is no way to assert a
Kurdish identity in Turkey, except by armed struggle.
Kurdish Priorities: The Kurdish issue, along with inflation and
unemployment, is one of the priorities Mr. Necmettin Erbakan, the
Refah leader, says he would like to pursue in a coalition government.
He has not spelt out how he would solve it, and his economic ideas
such as exchange controls and the gradual abolition of interest on
bank loans would hardly improve the economy. But it is perhaps a pity
that he will not be given the chance to try. Instead Turkey is likely to
live through a further period of political instabilit y, with a divided,
fractious and probably corrupt governing coalition whose only
apparent raison d'être will be to keep Mr. Erbakan out of power. To
have a hope of success, the ruling parties must confront the economic
problems that have created the condi tions for Refah's success.
Turks Fearful Of Future After Gains By Islamists: The kind of
measures needed to correct the country's chronic economic ills,
including runaway inflation, a huge budget deficit and an inflated public
sector, will in the short term generate the sort of discontent that the
Islamists, as the country's main opposition party, would feed off. To
leave economic decline unchecked could yield the same result. Many
political experts believe that the only way to do the job without
strengthening the Islamists would be to engage them directly in the
recovery process. The logic of checking the rise of political Islam by
shutting out Refah is also flawed in that it assumes that the party is the
only propagator of Islamic ideology. There is also a strong element of
hypocrisy in the claims of Mrs. Ciller and Mr. Yilmaz t o be the great
defenders of secularism in Turkey. Both their parties have their fair
share of openly pro-Islamic deputies. Even the left-wing parties
occasionally flirt with the shadowy 'tarikats' (Islamic brotherhoods),
which, despite being banned by Ata turk, continue to wield
considerable political influence. Mrs. Ciller makes frequent
references to Allah and the Koran in speeches - and for good reason.
In many ways the election results show the depth of the identity crisis
which Turkey is going throu gh. Only 13 women will sit in the new
550-member Turkish parliament after Sunday's legislative elections,
which a pro-Islamic party won by a slim margin. The Daily
Telegraph, December 27, 1995
Keep The Monsters In Their Box: Hardly a month goes by
without an election where the principal concern is not that voters
might be intimidated but that the people might freely elect, under
impeccable democratic conditions, the "wrong party". The amount of
time and effort spent by Wester n nations, far from immune
themselves to such tendencies, in trying to prevent the "wrong" people
getting into power is well illustrated by the European Parliament's
decision this week to approve the Customs Union with Turkey.
Basically, we want to bribe the Turks into not voting for Refah, the
Islamist party, in this month's elections. The vote went through in
spite of the fact that the Turks have found no solution to their Kurdish
problem other than military suppression. Europe's capacity to
influence Ankara's policy on the Kurds will probably now diminish. In
effect, we decided keeping Refah out was more important than what is
happening to the Kurds. The Guardian, 2/16/1995. [=]
10047. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Bleak
Outlook for Turkey", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09065]
[19960201] Two weeks ago the European Parliament swallowed its
scruples over human rights and voted to approve the customs union
between Turkey and the EU, which thus comes into force next week.
More serious is the expulsion of HADEP, the party which won the
10048. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Calls for
Release of Firat", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09057]
[19960201] A broad campaign has been launched for the release of
former Erzurum MP Abdlmelik Firat, who is in custody in
Bayrampasha prison in Istanbul. Firat, who has been remanded in
custody after a statement was made by a defector from the PKK, has
10044. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "12-Year
Sentence for Journalist", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09071]
[19960201] Hasan Ozgun, the Diyarbakir representative of the closed
down 'Ozgur Gundem' newspaper, was sentenced to 12 years
imprisonment at a hearing in the Diyarbakir State Security Court on
January 16. Mr. Ozgun was found guilty under Paragraph 168 Article
2 of t he Turkish Penal Code for "being a member of an armed gang,
the PKK". Hasan Ozgun, who has been in custody in Diyarbakir
prison since 12/9/1993, read an 11-page defense in which he rejected
the accusations made against him. He said :"The charges ag ainst me
are based on materials taken from our office and letters written by the
families of detainees in Mardin prison. These letters are not evidence,
they are material for news stories". Ozgur Politika, 1/18/1996. [=]
10045. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "45000
Troops On Turkish-Iraqi Border", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H09089] [19960401] Since the beginning of February a total of around
45000 troops have been deployed on the south Kurdistan (Iraq) border.
The soldiers and heavy weaponry have been positioned along the
border between Cukurca and Sirnak. A military unit is also reported to
have joined the battalion in Semdinli town in Hakkari province and in
the town of Eruh in Siirt province soldiers have been housed in
schools, resulting in the suspension of classes. Troops are also
reported to have been moved into a students hostel in Tunceli.
Students staying in the hostel have been given military ID cards in
order to gain access to the building. Ozgur Politika, 2/23/1996. [=]
24
heart and eye problems and requires constant medical attention. The
Erzincan State Security Court, which issued the arrest warrant for
Mr. Firat, is demanding he be transferred to Gumushane or Erzurum
prison. The 547 prisoners in Bayrampasha prison are preparing to cal
l on the European Parliament and other international organizations to
make representations to secure Abdulmelik Firat's release.
Detainee's doctors among the prisoners are keeping a 24-hour watch
on Firat, who is constantly passing blood in his urine. La wyers from
the Social Law Research Foundation (TOHAV) have called for Mr.
Firat to be given a medical examination to determine what conditions
he needs for medical supervision and treatment. Meanwhile, Altan
Tan and officials from Mazlum - Der (Associatio n of Oppressed) are
collecting signatures on a petition calling for Firat's release which will
subsequently be sent to President Suleyman Demirel. Ozgur Politika,
2/9/1996. [=]
and around Divrigi, Zara, Hafik, Imranli, and Ulas in Sivas province
have been bombarded by the Turkish air force using US supplied
Cobra attack helicopters. The people living in these villages are
Kurdish Alewites, f ollowers of a moderate Islamic faith considered
too liberal by fundamentalists and too supportive of the Kurdish
liberation movement by the Turkish state authorities. According to a
CHP report, Turkish troops have arrested almost 500 villagers and 75
village leaders in the last four months. These new attacks on the
Kurds of Sivas, coming at a time when the PKK has adhered to a
unilateral cease-fire, show that the Turkish government is determined
to resolve the Kurdish question by way of force alone. KIC Press
Release, 2/12/1996. [=]
10052. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "EU Retreat
on Turkish Rights", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09078]
[19960401] EU member states have secretly watered down
provisions on human rights and democracy in Turkey which formed
an intrinsic part of a 375 million ECU aid package for the Ankara
government. Mr. Alex Falconer, MEP for mid Scotland and Fife, last
we ek wrote to the 15 EU foreign ministries in protest at the altered
text, expressing outrage that member states' parliaments and citizens
were being by-passed by the council. "How bad will things have to get
before all member states agree any action against Turkey? Mr.
Falconer said that many MEP's had only agreed to support the
customs union with Turkey last month on the understanding that their
human rights concerns could be accommodated in the text on
financial aid. Financial Times, 1/31/1996. [=]
10049. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Charges of
Brutality and Torture By Security Forces Persist", in AKIN News,
April1996.[99H-09075][19960401] On January 8, Metin Goktepe
was covering the funeral of two men allegedly beaten to death a few
days earlier in a demonstration at Umraniye Prison. Police raided the
funeral and detained hundreds of mourners along with Metin Goktepe.
According to journali sts who witnessed the scene, Goktepe showed
his press card but was beaten and dragged away to Eyup Sports
Center, where he was taken into the basement for interrogation and
where other detainees heard him crying out. The next day Metin
Goktepe, aged 27, w as found dead in a tea garden in Eyup. A few
months earlier Sayfettin Tepe, writer for `Yeni Politika' was detained
by police and taken to Bitlis Security Directorate. A week later he was
found dead in his prison cell. The police alleged he committed sui
cide. His relatives claimed that an autopsy showed he could not have
hung himself as the police claimed. Investigations have been called
for in all of these cases and in many more in Turkey, where charges
of brutality and torture by security forces persi st. Few of the cases
against the police, however, have been prosecuted. From Chair's
Letter, Center to Center, newsletter of the Writers in Prison,
Committee of International PEN, January 1996. [=]
10053. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Eleven
Villagers Burnt Alive", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09066]
[19960201] Not long after the pictures of Turkish soldiers posing with
the severed heads of guerrillas had been published in the world's
press, another atrocity has been perpetrated by the Turkish army.
According to local sources, operations have been stepped up in recent
days against villages in the Guclukonak district of Sirnak province. Ali
Nas, a former village guard, and his relative Ramazan Nas, from
Cevrimli village, Beytullah Ilhan and Abdullah Ilhan from Gumusyazi
village, Nurettin Baykara (former village guard), Halit Kaya and
Ahmet Kaya (former village guard) from Yatagankaya village and
Mehmet Oner and three villagers whose names have not been
established from Kocyandi village were detained. They were accused
of voting for HADEP in the recent elections a nd of assisting
guerrillas, and then taken to the village of Taskonak which was
emptied in autumn 1995. After being interrogated by a unit of
Gendarme NCOs, the villagers were put in a minibus belonging to a
person called Beshir (surname not known) and se nt back towards
Guclukonak. However, on leaving the village the minibus was stopped
by troops and the villagers were made to get out and were tied to the
vehicle, which was then set alight by the soldiers and the eleven men
were burnt alive. It is reporte d that another minibus driver witnessed
the incident and that when the driver Beshir went to Kocyandi village
and explained what had happened the incident became known.
Villagers from Kocyandi went to Guclukonak and asked the military
authorities what had happened. They were told that "the PKK set up a
road block and killed your relatives," and were sent back to their
village. Local sources stated that cosmetic operations were launched
immediately, helicopters being called up to bombard the area in order
to give the impression that there were guerrilla units in the area. The
governor of the Emergency Law region made a statement claiming
the PKK had burnt the 11 villagers. Why This Massacre? Kurdish
sources point to the timing of the massacre, emphasizing that the
atrocity photos had a great effect all over the world. "T he Turkish
state perpetrated this massacre, blaming it on the PKK, in order to
10050. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Deserter
Substantiates Allegations Against Turkey", in AKIN News, December
1995. [99H-09051] [19951201] New evidence has arisen which
suggests that German weapons are being used by Turkey in its fight
against the Kurds: a Kurdish asylum-seeker in Bremen claims he
was in a special unit of the Turkish army in 1991/92 and that he rode
in a former East German panzer when deployed against Kurds. The
federalgovernment has denied that panzers supplied as part of a
military agreement with Turkey were ever used against Kurds. HansEberhard Schultz, lawyer for the 28-year-old Kurd, said in an
interview with the Frankfurter Rundschau that his client was a soldier
stationed in Mardin at the time. With an East German BTR-60 panzer,
he fired at the mountains when shots from alleged rebels were heard.
He said BTR-60 panzers were also used during attacks on Kurdish
villages. In 1992, the man deserted from the army while on vacation
so that he would no longer have to fire upon his own people.
Frankfurter Rundschau, 9/22/1995. [=]
10051. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Despite the
Ceasefire, The Turkish Army Continues to Destroy Kurdish Villages",
in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09081] [19960401] The destruction of
Kurdish villages in southeastern Turkey which began in the early
1990s continues today, in spite of the unilateral cease-fire by the
Kurdish side which started on 12/15/1995. According to reports
reaching our office throughout rec ent weeks, close to 100 villages in
25
deflect criticism aimed at itself. The aim of this massacre is to distort
the agenda," they said. Kurdish circles pointed out that it was
interesting that such provocations sho uld occur at a time when the
PKK has declared a cease-fire. Ozgur Politika, 1/17/1996. [=]
10057. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Is Turkey
Preparing To Invade The South (North Iraq)?", in AKIN News,
February 1996. [99H-09054] [19960201] While the PKK's unilateral
cease-fire continues the Turkish army has begun a troop build up on
the south Kurdistan border. This build up brings forth the question "Is
Turkey preparing to invade south Kurdistan before Newroz?" The day
before yesterday almost 50 military vehicles, 9 coach loads of
soldiers, 13 refrigerated trucks and 3 large trucks carrying equipment
arrived in Sirnak via Nusaybin. Troops are also reported to have been
deployed on the Iraqi border near Cukurca, where troops from the
Hakkari Mountain Commando Brigade and Van Commando Brigade
were brought in by air on 8 February. Ozgur Politika, 2/15/1996. [=]
10054. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Esber
Yagmurdereli Faces Imprisonment Until 2018", in AKIN News, April
1996. [99H-09076] [19960401] Esber Yagmurdereli is facing over 23
years in prison after a court hearing in 12/1996. Yagmurdereli, who
has been blind since he was 10, has already spent 13 years in prison
after an unfair trial. International PEN calls for a reduction of Esber
Yag murdereli's sentence. It is also calling for the abolition of Article 8
under which many writers have been imprisoned for writing about the
Kurds. The recent amendment to the law only reduces the maximum
prison sentence under the Article from five years to three. Several
writers were released or commuted following the amendment which
was introduced to secure a customs deal with the European Union.
The EU had complained about Turkey's record on freedom of
expression. Just two months after the customs deal was passed
journalist Metin Goktepe was found dead after being detained by
police. Send appeals for Esber Yagmurdereli's sentence to be
dropped to: Justice Minister Mr. Firus, Cilingiroglu, Adalet Bakanligi,
06659 Ankara, Turkey Center to Center newsletter, January 1996. [=]
10058. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Journalist
Beaten To Death in Custody", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H09070] [19960201] It has been learned that 'Evrensel' reporter Metin
Goktepe, who was detained at the funerals of Riza Boybas and Orhan
Ozen, two prisoners killed in Urmaniye prison, was in fact, despite
the denials of the authorities, beaten to death by police. Metin Gokt epe
went to the funerals on January 9 along with 'Cumhuriyet' reporter
Kerem Ilgaz and 'Yeni Yuzyil' reporter Murat Inceoglu. Murat Inceoglu
explained what happened: "I was present when Metin was detained.
The three of us were going to the mosque where th e funerals were to
take place. Police stopped us at a checkpoint and asked for yellow
press cards. We explained that not all journalists possessed yellow
cards and showed the cards issued to us by our newspapers.
However two high ranking police officers i nsisted on seeing yellow
press cards. So we decided to wait in a cafe. Then I saw that Metin
was being taken away by the police. They also took Kerem but
immediately let him go." The police took Metin Goktepe to Eyup
Sports Hall, and according to eye witn esses he was taken away from
the hall where hundreds of people were being held, being beaten as he
went. The next morning someone who had just been released rang
'Evrensel' saying: "I was in detention. Your reporter was beaten to
death. I heard the voices . He was shouting: 'Don't hit me, you'll kill
me. I'm Murat Goktepe.'" One of the newspaper's lawyers, Kamil
Tekin Surek, had this to say: "We rang Eyup police station when we
heard our reporter had been badly beaten. The police said they'd
released Metin . Later the police rang us to say he'd been found dead
in a tea garden. The police either took him there after killing him or
when he was on the point of dying." 'Evrensel' editor Ihsan Caralan
made a statement in which he said: "Metin Goktepe was delibe rately
detained and murdered in order to intimidate the opposition
press...This intimidation will not be able to prevent us continuing the
struggle to expose and publish realities." Interior Minister Teoman
Unusan stated that Metin Goktepe had been detain ed along with
approximately 1000 people by the police who took measures in order
to stop "persons wishing to take advantage of the situation" and
prevent new incidents occurring. He said, "There were some people
detained but no instances of injury or dea th." Ozgur Politika,
1/11/1996. [=]
10055. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Former DEP
MPs in Court", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09059]
[19960201] Former DEP MPs Sedat Yurtdas, Sirri Sakik, Ahmet
Turk and independent Mahmut Alinak have appeared in the Ankara
State Security Court (DGM) for a retrial due to the decision of the
Yargitay (High Court) to quash the original verdict of the DGM
concerning t he former MPs. The former deputies, who are not in
custody, were accompanied in court by foreign observers and former
deputy M. Emin Sever. Sedat Yurtdas spoke after the defense
lawyers, recalling that DGM Chief Prosecutor Nusret Demiral joined
the MHP (Nationalist Acti on Party) after retiring adding: "Demiral
said to Trkes 'from now on I will call you Bashbug (leader)'. This
demonstrates the mentality that tried us." The case was adjourned to
a later date. Ozgur Politika, 2/10/1996. [=]
10056. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Is South
Kurdistan On The Verge of Occupation", in AKIN News, February
1996. [99H-09055] [19960201] (From a front page editorial in Ozgur
Politika) At a time when the PKK has declared a cease-fire the
Turkish army is continuing military operations without a break. Now it
is building up its forces in the region generally and along the South
Kurdistan bor der in particular The timing of this deployment is of
great significance. At this time meetings between Iraq and Syria on
the question of water are going on. The two countries have stated that
"they will have to resort to different means." Saddam has ann ounced
he will renew supplies of electricity to the Kurds and called on the
Kurdish leaders to start talks. Iran has announced it will organize a
conference in opposition to the Kurdish summit being promoted by
Syria, Jordan, Israel, Turkey and the US Now let us return to
Turkey's preparations for occupation. KDP sources say that Turkey is
exerting pressure on them to assist a reoccupation of south Kurdistan
that would take place before Newroz (March 21), and that this time
Turkey is planing a long-term stay. It seems unlikely that the KDP will
assist Turkey in its aim, but this does not mean that certain narrow
circles will not help. It appears likely that developments in the region
will be prominent on the agenda in the near future. Ozgur Politika,
2/15/1996. [=]
10059. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Kurdish
Activists in Turkey Vow To Keep Up Their Fight", in AKIN News,
February 1996. [99H-09064] [19960201] Kurdish activists in Turkey
vowed to keep up their fight for Kurdish rights despite not getting
enough votes to qualify for parliament at general elections last
weekend. "Our struggle. . . will include efforts at the personal and
institutional levels to find a solution to the Kurdish problem," Sedat
Yurtdas, a candidate for the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) in
Sunday's polls, told a news conference. HADEP, which champions
greater rights for Kurds and a negotiated end to an 11-year Kurdish
rebellion, took around 30 percent of the votes in the mainly-Kurdish
26
southeast but failed to pass a national threshold of 10 percent. Political
analysts say the 10 percent barrier meant millions of voters were
disenfranchised. "This system will get more damaged by k eeping us
out of parliament," said Yurtdas, one of 13 Kurdish MPs who were
accused of separatism and thrown out of parliament last year. He said
HADEP candidates regarded themselves as having been elected and
would behave as MPs. He did not elaborate. Reuters, 12/27/1995. [=]
stated that rights won by hunger strikes had been usurped by
governors and prison officers who did not feel the need to conceal the
fact that they were MHP supporters. The prisoners gave details of
repression in the prison. In one incident "soldiers entered a block on
the pretext of a "circumcision check". When the inmates objected the
prison officers said: 'The soldiers just want to find out whether you
areArmenians or not. They will just have a look. It will only take 5
minutes.' The soldiers then ripped off the detainees' clothes and
checked their genital organs." HADEP Igdir candidate M. Nuri Gunes,
who was recently released from Erzurum prison, said he had been in
the prison for nearly two months with the political detainees. Gunes
said that the prison was like "a bomb ready to explode at any
moment." Ozgur Politika, 2/12/1996.[=]
10060. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Kurdistan
Parliament In Exile Met in Moscow", in AKIN News, December 1995.
[99H-09050] [19951201] The Kurdistan Parliament in Exile met in
Moscow for a three-day session organized by a Russian
parliamentary committee, its third session since its inauguration on
4/12/1995. "We are guests of the Russian parliament," Darwich
Hasso, a KPE member, said. A committee of the state Duma
(Russian lower house) had organized the session at their request.
"No one can exercise pressure on us here. In addition, Russians and
Kurds have historically been very close," Hasso said. The parliament
last met for a four-day session in Vienna, Austria, in August. The
elected 65-seat assembly draws its members from all exiled Kurds.
Turkey protested to Russia about the meeting. "This development has
cast a shadow over Turkish-Russian relations and we see this as
something injurious," foreign ministry spokesman Omer Akbel said in
a statement. Reuters, 10/31/1995. [=]
10064. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "MO Calls
For Release of Soldiers", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09086]
[19960401] Van Refah Party MP Fetullah Erbas and writer Ismail
Nacar held a press statement in the Turkish Grand National
Assembly to call for the release of soldiers held by the PKK. Erbas
said that the families of lieutenant Mustafa Ozulkuler and soldiers
Ibrahim Yaylaci, Ramazan Celik, Ismail Basaran, Tuncay
Kavaklioglu, Hakan Pusat, Mehmet Sikilgan and Tevfik Ozturk were
yearning to be reunited with their children. Erbas said: "We, as the
deputies of the people, have to do all we can in order to reduce the
pain of our citizens." Ozgur Politika, 2/19/1996. [=]
10061. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Kurds in
Hakkiari Live on Food From the Rubbish Dump", in AKIN News,
April 1996. [99H-09084] [19960401] In Hakkari the population has
risen from 35000-80000 due to migration. The CHP (Republican
People's Party) major of Hakkari, Abduhraman Keskin, said that
every morning there were at least 50 people at the dump waiting for
the trucks in the hope of finding something to eat "There are 30-40
provided in one house. No aid has been provided on account of this
rising population due to migration." The major added that if aid was
not forthcoming within a week he would apply to various aid
organizations in Europe. Hurriyet, 2/10/1996. [=]
10065. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Membership
Is The Goal", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09079] [19960401] For
Turkey, the customs union is only a means to achieving EU
membership. Mrs. Ciller told her hosts at the EU's Madrid summit,
shortly after the European parliament approved the customs union,
that the struggle will continue until Turkey is a full member ." Human
rights are the largest single problem in Turkey's relations with
Europe. Mrs. Green warned that "If Turkey wants to be included in the
(European) family it must subscribe to the same norms and values as
the rest of Europe in terms of human right s and democracy."
"Disappearances", torture, murder by unknown assailants often linked
to security forces-are common. Turkey's human rights association
counted more than 400 such cases last year. About 10-20 combatants
and civilians die every day in southeastern Turkey, scene of an 11
year conflict between government forces and guerrillas of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). But prosecutors continue bringing
cases against journalists, writers, Kurdish nationalists and opposition
politicians. Financial Times, 2/22/1996. [=]
10062. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "MHP
Candidate Caught with 40 Kilos of Heroin", in AKIN News, April 1996.
[99H-09088] [19960401] Businessman Ali Riza Gurbuz, who was a
candidate in Izmir for the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) at the last
elections, was arrested in Zurich following a police raid on a garage
last Saturday during which 40 kilos of pure heroin and 150 kilos of a
chemic al substance used in heroin production were seized. Ali Riza
Gurbuz is claimed to have borrowed 70 billion lira from the Yugoslav
mafia to help finance the MHP's election campaign and to have been
unable to repay the money. He is also alleg ed to be involved in arms
smuggling and money laundering in addition to drugs smuggling.
MHP leader Alparslan Turkes said Ali Riza Gurbuz may be expelled
from the party and added: "We don't look into our members' past. We
are not an intelligence organizat ion." Ozgur Politika, 2/22/1996. [=]
10066. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Military
Operation in Cukurca", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09073]
[19960401] In spite of the unilateral cease-fire called by the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) on 12/15/1995, Turkish troops have begun their
third military operation in the district Cukurca at the border of Turkish
Iraqi Kurdistan. The operation is being conducted by the "Hakkari
Mountain Brigadier Command" that made the headlines earlier this
months as the "atrocity unit" that posed with the severed heads of
Kurdish guerrillas. (The European). While a number of F16 fighter
planes have bombed the area on a lar ge scale, there have yet not
been any clashes with PKK guerrillas since the operation started. It is
alleged that the aim of the operation is to station a higher contingent of
military in the area. DEM News Agency, 2/13/1996. [=]
10063. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "MHP
Running Erzurum Prison", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H09062] [19960201] Inmates in Erzurum prison, which has been the
scene of brutality over the last two years leading to the death of one
prisoner and the injury and permanent disablement of dozens, have
made a statement detailing the influence of the MHP (Nationalist
Action Party) on the running of the prison. The prisoners stated that;
"The MHP determine the prison prosecutor, governors and other
officials. It gets rid of those personnel that are not close to the party. . .
The legal authorities should investigate the archi ves of the local press
in which provocative news stories have appeared." The detainees
10067. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "New Award
For Leyla Zana", in AKIN News, December 1995. [99H-09045]
[19951201] Leyla Zana was awarded the annual Bruno-Kreisky
Human Rights Award which was received on her behalf by lawyers
27
for the Democracy Party (DEP). In the past year, Leyla Zana has
received the Aachen Peace Prize and the Rose Peace Prize. Ozgur
Politika, 10/1/1995. [=]
account of my membership in the PKK and ERNK, something which I
am proud of. The brutal Turkish army, police, special forces, and
paramilitary gangs have ruined my country. President Abdullah
Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers Party seek peace and have issued
calls for dialogue and a political solution in order to prevent further
bloodshed. Turkey's response has been to destroy villages,
depopulate the country, and resort to killing and torture. I am being
held in the most restrictive conditions and I expect this situation to
come to an end even if it costs me my life. I shall continue to defend
the legitimate demand for freedom of my people, who are
experiencing such pain. You are friends of my people and humanity, I
hope you will step up your efforts on our behalf." Kurdistan Information
Centre, 10/26/1995. [=]
10068. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Newroz in
Kurdistan", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09090] [19960401] At
around 11 am yesterday (21 March) about 3000 people lit a fire in the
Kurucesme neighborhood of Diyarbakir and told police wanting the
road to be kept clear and the fire to be extinguished, "This is our
festival. We are going to celebrate it, we haven 't stopped the traffic".
The police then moved towards the people in armored cars. The
crowd responded by building a barricade and stoning the armored
cars. Police reinforcements then charged the people, attacking them
with truncheons and rifle butts. Lat ife Aksoy (60), Sait Cetinkaya (13)
and Mizam Azin (24) were injured. The injured were taken to hospital
after receiving first aid from the German delegation. The people
continued to celebrate Newroz despite a second police attack,
shouting "Long live Newroz", Long Live Serok Apo" and "Long live the
PKK". Groups of 1000 and 2000 people also celebrated Newroz in
other parts of Diyarbakir. 25 people were detained by police. In Bismil
Newroz was celebrated by people who set light to tyres in the Sentepe
and Akpinar neighborhoods. Celebrations continued with fires in other
neighborhoods. There were no arrests. There were also celebrations
in Silvan, where tight security precautions were taken, and in Kulp,
where a similar situation was reported. Fires were lit in two places in
the town of Lice yesterday (21 March), where the previous night an
Italian delegation had been denied access to the town. In Hazro fires
where lit in two places distant from the town center where police
armored vehicles were positione d on the streets. In Cinar town the
people ignored the state supported celebration and held their own. In
Mardin celebrations were held mainly in the HADEP office. Fires
were lit to celebrate Newroz in Kiziltepe and Nusaybin, where the
situation was calm. Celebrations in Batman began with the singing of
"Ey Raqip" (Kurdish National Anthem) and continued with students
throwing their ties onto the fire in protest at the state's hypocritical
celebration of Newroz. A student named Abdulvahap Zeybek was
detain ed at Fatih high school for burning his blazer. 5 students were
also detained in the 19 May neighborhood during celebrations. Fires lit
in Siirt during celebrations were extinguished by police and tyres
confiscated. Arrests are also reported. Celebrations were not
permitted in the Baykan and Kurtalan districts of Siirt province where
people refused to attend state organized celebrations. However it is
reported that the people held their own celebrations in the back
streets. In Sirnak, where all vehicle ty res had been confiscated in the
last three weeks, no celebration was allowed. Ozgur Politika,
3/22/1996. [=]
10070. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "PKK Chair
Abdullah Ocalan Declares A Unilateral Cease-Fire", in AKIN News,
December 1995. [99H-09043] [19951201] On the Kurdish MED-TV
programme shown on 12/14/1995, PKK Chair Abdullah Ocalan
responded to the European Parliament's appeal for the Turkish
government and Kurdish representatives to find a "non-violent and
political solution" to the conflict by declaring a unilateral cease-fire.
Here we publish the edited text of his speech translated from Turkish.
If the approaching elections in Turkey are to have any meaning,
if a solution to the Kurdish question, from which all problems
originate, is to be found, if we are talking about a role for politics, if
politics is to find a sensible solution to problems, if terrorism, and
consequently, the PKK is being held responsible for both the economic
stagnation and redundancy of politics, we wish to take this opportunity
to explain what we want to do about a resolution of the Kurdish
question and how we see our responsibilities. We respect the
decision taken by the European Parliament yesterday concerning the
finding of a political solution through dialogue with the PKK and other
concerned bodies. To help put this decision into effect and fulfill our
responsibilities, we have also decided to bring about an end to the long
conflict between the Kurdish parties in South Kurdistan and declared a
unilateral cease-fire and halt our military actions in Turkey. In order to
demonstrate that the war waged by Turkey, which has caused such
great distress to both the Kurdish and Turkish peoples, cannot resolve
these problems, and that it is pointless to continue such a war which
closes the door to all developments, we consider it is of crucial
importance to take such a step and declare a cease-fire.
Conditions Of The Cease-Fire: This cease-fire has nothing to do
with the fact that it is now winter or with any military weakness. We
have accomplished considerable military development in South
Kurdistan and we have established firm guerrilla bases in many
strategic areas of Kurdistan. We are the strongest guerrilla movement
in the south and the only one in the north, there can be no doubt about
that. Our decision to declare a cease-fire is not a sign of military
weakness and we have not lost strength politically either. As can be
seen in the resolution of the European Parliament, we have entered a
period of growing strength in which we have developed relations with
many countries. We have broken the isolation despite their efforts to
prevent this. Turkey, on the other hand, has found itself in a tight
corner due to the war it is waging. Anyone with the slightest common
sense can see that neither Turkey's domestic or foreign policy is
functioning any longer on account of the Kurdish question, human
rights, and similar issues. For this reason, we have decided to take
this political step which we believe also serves the interests of the
Turkish people. At the end of 1995, we could resolve this war with a
political solution. If the Turkish army does not attempt to destroy us,
we will not undertake military operations in either Kurdistan or
Turkey. We will try to implement this unilateral cease-fire as of
tomorrow. If the Turkish forces attempt to destroy us, we will defend
10069. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "October 26
Demonstration To Free Kani Yilmaz", in AKIN News, December
1995. [99H-09048] [19951201] On October 26, the anniversary of his
arrest, about 700 Kurds gathered outside No. 10 Downing Street in
Londonto demand the release of ERNK European Representative
Kani Yilmaz. John Austin-Walker MP, Nejdet Buldan, member of the
Kurdistan Parliament in Exile, and Halkevi chairman Nafiz Bostanci
delivered a protest letter from the Kurdish community in London to
Prime Minister John Major. Here we also print Kani Yilmaz's
message on the occasion of the first anniversary of his arrest: "As you
are already familiar with my case you will be aware of the way in
which political interests have directed the course of events. The
clearest expression of this is the way Britain detained me without any
justification and Germany demanded that I be put on trial without any
evidence. In the German indictment it clearly states that I have no
connection with the incidents mentioned but wants me tried on
28
ourselves and also broaden our use of the right of retaliation. We are
particularly well-intentioned on this point. If military operations are
curtailed and if this convinces us, then we will be able to intensify this
process. I re-iterate, this is not a sign of weakness. On the contrary it
is a sign of our confidence in ourselves and of our intention to
accelerate the search for a political solution, which is our preference.
We hope this point will be well understood in Turkey by the parties
involved in the election and the general public. People should realize
that if they are deceived and say "they are finished, they are calling a
truce because they have been weakened", they will only intensify their
predicament. It should be the duty of every Turkish patriot and
democrat to oppose this war, which is being promoted by a few
generals and governors who do not want to lose their posts and a
handful of warmongers who profit from it.
The Role Of The Customs Union: Turkey has now joined the
Customs Union. Therefore the European Parliament is bound to take
responsibility for the resolutions it has passed. If the European
Parliament does not want war and is sincere on the question of a
political solution, it should take steps along the lines of its resolution. It
should exert its political and economic weight in particular. It should
make its financial aid dependent on democratization. If it cannot do
this, it must realize that every penny will be spent on the dirty war.
The European Parliament must not allow itself to be used by Turkey.
If they cannot ensure that Turkey accepts the cease-fire, their financial
gains will be used to slaughter our people. We are aware that Turkey
is in a difficult situation. Regardless of whether Turkey wishes to use
the excuse of having to negotiate with so-called "terrorists", the
decisive question is, as the whole world knows, does Turkey really
want a political resolution to the Kurdish question or not. If I am a
'terrorist', or the PKK is 'terrorist', there are other Kurdish circles
which are not. If they won't talk to us then let them talk with those
Kurds who have nothing to do with 'terror'. What about meeting with
these Kurdish circles? Are they terrorists too?
The Situation In Turkey And The Election: The early general
election in Turkey is being held in winter conditions. In Kurdistan in
particular the electoral process will be difficult to accomplish. Another
fact is that close to three million Kurdish voters have been forced to
leave their constituencies. We have witnessed three elections like
this: in 1987, 1991, and now 1995. These dates have been consciously
chosen in order to slow down demands for democratization and a
peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question. In the past it was forbidden
to participate in the elections with a Kurdish identity, but in 1991 some
Kurdishdeputies entered parliament through various alliances and
blocs. As you know, these Kurdish MPs were not allowed to
participate in the assembly. Therefore this election, too, is far from
being democratic. Yet despite this, we have decided to support the
"Labor, Peace, and Freedom Bloc", representing the Kurdish and
Turkish peoples' democratic preference, in order to defeat the efforts
of the warlords and not leave the field to them. Despite the repression,
opinion polls show the Bloc is leading in Kurdistan. It is also clear that
in Turkey, workers, Alevis, and public servants are showing interest
in this front. We believe that in spite of the lack of preparation, these
elections will provide an opportunity for democratic forces to make an
impression. There are two fronts in this election. One is the war front,
the other is the peace and freedom front. We want everyone in favor of
democracy, peace, and freedom to support this front, and for people to
expose the war front. Those who have supported it until now, if only
unwittingly, must realize the truth and make their preferences known
for peace, labor, and freedom on December 24. Will Turkey accept
the call for a cease-fire? I do not think the militarist government in
Turkey will consider our call for a cease-fire with a cool head. In any
case, as I emphasized earlier, our aim is not to invite this government
to take up the challenge. If it responds, this will be positive, but if it
doesn't, the present deep crisis will deepen further as a result of the
election. Our call is aimed more at the public in Turkey, the majority
of whom do not trust the political parties and have not yet decided
which one to support in the elections. We expect the people of Turkey
to realize what is going on. A dirty war is being waged against our
peoples. We want the Turkish people to see through the lies that are
being propagated by means of the accusations of "terrorism". This is
why we are declaring a unilateral cease-fire. It is of the utmost
importance to demonstrate clearly that we approach the Kurdish
question within the borders of Turkey and also that we wish to achieve
a settlement through democratic methods. The Turkish people are
being bombarded by psychological propaganda. In the runup to the
elections, some of the parties have stated they will adopt a new
stance. For example, Mesut Yilmaz has begun to speak like Ozal
during in his last period. He says he will resolve the question in four
years. Although Yilmaz's track record does not give grounds for such
a hope, we cannot just claim he is insincere and ignore him. If he does
not take the Kurdish question to a resolution, he will be finished as he
was four years ago. Yilmaz should learn from the example of the
CHP (Republican People's Party). The CHP has had it because of its
hypocritical Kurdish policy. We will expose Erbakan and demonstrate
that he will not be able to trick people by misusing the Islamic identity.
We have also made this call in order to force people to think in the ten
days before the election. May people speak out more courageously
and express the need for a political solution. We have made our call
so that the people may make their preference in favor of peace, labor,
and freedom, not militarism.
The Responsibility Of The EU And The European States: Europe
is a party to the war in Kurdistan. Germany, Britain, and France in
particular are providing a considerable amount of military and
economic aid to Turkey. In the beginning, the European Parliament
tied Turkey's membership (in the Customs Union) to a political
resolution of the Kurdish question and democratization in general.
However, the MEPs were unable to resist the pressure of their
governmentsandabandoned their initial opposition. I say to them:
Turkey is now a member of the Customs Union and it is showing
absolutely no regard for human rights and democracy. It doesn't even
recognize a people's identity and it is carrying out a war of genocide.
Why are you giving such limitless support to the Turkish regime?
This is what must be explained. You, too, have now taken the war in
Kurdistan under your control. From now on, this conflict will be played
out predominantly between ourselves and Europe. Europe should not
underestimate us. It must not lay the blame on the PKK in a partial
manner as it has up to now. We do not want to be hostile to Europe but
Europe must at least not violate its own principles and understanding
of democracy. They need Turkey's market but human rights
violations should concern Europe as much as economic interests. If
this does not materialize then not only Islamic fundamentalism but all
the peoples of the Middle East, first and foremost the Kurdish people,
will understand your real aims and take initiatives that will really put
you in difficulties. This should not be understood as a threat. If you
continue to give unlimited support to Turkish militarism, we will have
the right to make our own decisions. If this cease-fire does not receive
a response then Europe will not be able to view Turkey as a market or
tourist paradise. It must realize that it will be transformed into a hell. I
must state once again that we are able to make comprehensive plans
for war just as we can make serious plans for peace.
International Dimension: There is a definite international
dimension to our cease-fire. The USA, Europe, and some other
countries have made proposals for a solution. Iran is also a power in
the region and is renewing its Kurdish policy. There is also a strong
chance of developing our relations with Russia. We have received
signals along these lines. We are still deliberately being labeled as
29
terrorists. We wish to demonstrate who is the real terrorist, who
wants a political solution and peace and who insists on war and
massacre. It is also evident that there is a link between the cease-fire
in the north and that in the south. All these developments prove that a
new period has begun, during which the balance of forces will change.
We have therefore developed a policy accordingly. The cease-fire is
not just a short term tactic. It is a tactic to pave the way for the
strategy of peace and democracy and a political solution. But we will
not accept unconditional surrender. The other side must at least enter
into a political dialogue. Why do they refuse talking to us? I only want
to put our aims to the people in Turkey. If the people don't accept us, I
will honor their decision. Why is this fact ignored? Those who
understand democracy should realize this. They should also
understand that the repression suffered by the Kurds also affects the
Turks. The life and wealth of our peoples should not be sacrificed to
the interests of warmongers and bureaucrats. If the European
Parliament cannot convince Turkey to end the war, it means that the
$3 billion in aid it has provided will constitute a significant war fund
and that it will be a partner to the war being waged against our people.
Up to now, individual European countries have been financing the war.
As of now the European Parliament will be party to the conflict. Since
the European Parliament accepted Turkey as a member it must take
responsibility for what Turkey does, and it must take action to stop the
war. We want peace and political dialogue. -- Abdullah Ocalan, Chair
of the PKK, MED-TV, 12/14/1995. [=]
You know that in this war there have over the years been many
sacrifices in prisons, in the mountains and abroad. Thousands of
martyrs and heroic acts of resistance have given birth to a reborn
freedom loving nation. In Newroz celebrations, they expressed
themselves with the spirit of Newroz and our martyrs have created a
new breed of people and a new type of homeland. A decision made at
an opportune time leads people to victory, to their promised land.
However downtrodden, dispossessed and exploited this nation is , it
regains a new lease on life with dignity. The proper decision is that of
facing death with honor, with dignity. And out of this encounter comes
a life of freedom for the nation. Based on this premise, we want to
inform our people that we a re decidedly resolute. All of our people, all
Kurdistan, and all of the oppressed should know that however small
our number may be, however powerful the enemy may be the power
emanating from the decision we made at Newroz will be sufficient to
overcome all the enemies in the world. Today, we want to resolve the
Kurdish question through peaceful political and democratic means.
And it has been three months since we stopped the war for this
purpose. Also we sent a letter to Turkey's new Prime Minister in the
last few days. Without responding to these initiatives, they are
preparing for war behind the scene and killing innocent people
everyday. In some villages, they kill Kurdish patriots and dump their
bodiesalong the roads. They want to intimidate our people. They
pretend not to hear our calls for peace and friendship as they continue
with their war.
Today, we want to celebrate the fraternity of all nations. We
wanted to celebrate Newroz together with all people of the Middle
East. However, we saw that the enemy is determined to deprive our
people of their rights and freedoms. We want to enter into a dialogue,
but they do not respond. We called for a dialogue to explain a few
matters, but Turkish Prime Minister claims he has heard nothing, has
received no letters. It is impossible for the letter not to have reached
him in a whole week in this day of a dvanced communications
technology. He simply doesn't want to hear our calls for a dialogue.
They want to carry on their dirty war . Our people should know that
we will not remain idle as the enemy marches on us. We have had a
Newroz festivity. Nowadays, they want to take Newroz from us, too.
"It is ours. It's been ours for a thousand years. The Kurds have no
festivity to celebrate." they say. "Come let's celebrate Newroz, it is a
Turkish festivity.", they proclai m. They are taking our life, our liberty,
our history and want to take whatever else we have. This is a terrible
cruelty. Now let us think hard and reach a national decision. Faced
with an enemy who is marching on you, an enemy who rejects your
peace init iatives, you too must do something. I can now say to all
people of Kurdistan: Mazlum Dogan sacrificed his own life for a life
with dignity for the people. We have 15000 guerrillas in the mountains.
We have more than 10000 resisters in enemy's prisons. A ll these
come to the decision made by Mazlum Dogan who on a Newroz night
rejected a life stripped of dignity and honor and chose death for a life
with honor and freedom. We must never keep the significance of his
deed out of sight. Mazlum Dogan is a contemporary Kawa and an
heroic fighter. We cannot deny this. Through our 15 years of struggle,
this noble decision has become one that is shared by our people as a
whole. It is not the first time I am saying it: The enemy is aiming at
our genocide through i ts oppressive measures and edicts. In
Kurdistan and not just north Kurdistan but throughout Kurdistan the
enemy is perpetrating the harsh cruelties first inflicted on the
prisoners. The enemy shows no interest in peace. It wants darkness
to reign. At this point, it is important to make a vital decision. It is
necessary to reach this decision together with the people. We will
make this decision on behalf of the party and the guerrillas. This
decision will be like Mazlum Dogan's decision. The life the enemy
sees fit for us is one that is devoid of honor and dignity. Death is a
10071. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "PKK and
KDP Meet", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09056] [19960201]
On 7 February PKK President Abdullah Ocalan met a high level KDP
delegation. This meeting was a continuation of the process of dialogue
launched by the cease-fire in south Kurdistan announced by the PKK
on 12/10/1995. At the meeting on 7 February th e development of steps
towards peace, the consolidation of national unity and the prevention of
provocations that would obstruct the positive process that has been
launched were discussed. It was decided to include the PUK in
endeavors towards national un ity and to continue the talks in a more
comprehensive form. Daoud Baghistani, the OSCE's south Kurdistan
representative at the UN who carried out mediation in the PKK - KDP
cease-fire, was present at the meeting. Baghistani said: "These
developments are e ncouraging and an example of progress that
needs to be made." Ozgur Politika, 2/9/1996. [=]
10072. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "President
Ocalan Addresses The Peoples Of Kurdistan On Med TV: Samson
Poised To Shake The Pillars-Not For A Woman-But For The Dignity,
Honor & Freedom Of A Nation!", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H09072] [19960401] (Courtesy of DEM News Agency) This spring is
more promising than other springs. It is the spring of Kurdistan, of the
peoples of Kurdistan. As the spring rejuvenates, as it blossoms and its
flowers decorate the world, our people, too, are decorating
themselves with roses. Fourteen years ago, Mr. Mazlum Dogan
made a decision. It was a decision to face death squarely in the face. I
can emphatically say that this decision was the most honorable, the
most resolute decision in pursuit of a life with dignity. There can be no
more fai thful decisions for the Kurdish people to live with dignity, to
fight for a dignified, honorable life. This is what I said on that
occasion.: Since Mazlum Dogan overcame fear of death and lightened
its burden, as a nation we must make a faithful decision for a dignified
life. We said this decision is a bridge between the old life of bondage
and dispossession and a new life with freedom and dignity. We are at
the moment crossing this bridge. We are converting the enemy's
deprivation of life and liberty int o faith and courage as the foundation
of a better life for our people.
30
thousand times more honorable than such a life. All of our people and
friends should know that we will deny this kind of life to ourselves.
Consequently, I want to make the following call: Up to now, the
guerrillas fought in the mountains, like a military force. From now on
we will also recruit suicide brigades, those who are prepared to face
death. We will heroically face death not only in the mountains but also
in the enemy's cities . If the enemy's edict is that we must die, then
we will face death in an heroic manner. The enemy should know
clearly that the war in the mountains and the wars in the cities will
follow different courses.
We very much want peace initiatives. We want a political
solution through peaceful means. But, they don't want peace. They
have depopulated Kurdistan. They have not left one single Kurdish
village untouched. They have forced our people to migrate to the s
qualor of shantytowns in the fringes of big cities. Millions of our people
have been forced to leave Kurdistan. The ones left in Kurdistan are
unemployed, poverty stricken and with no land to cultivate. We are
ashamed of this kind of life. This kind of li fe cannot be allowed to go
on. This is the life the enemy has imposed on us. We will not accept
it. Let no one say, "Why did they take the war to the cities? Let no one
say "Why are people being killed in the cities?" Especially, the
Turkish people should know that why the war is manifesting itself in
the cities. The Turkish people, the Turkish intellectuals should know
this. If hey have any humanity left in them they should know how
many people their government is killing everyday. They should know
how t hey kill individuals their security forces detain. Why empty so
many villages? Why plunder all that belongs to us? Why, what are the
reasons? Every Turk should find answers to these questions. Either
the Turks restrain their cruel rulers and end this dirt y war or there
will be no peace for them either. Although they have been relatively
immune from the effects of this war so far, from now on the situation
will worsen. I wish to repeat it. Up to now, the guerrillas operated in
the mountains. The suicide brigades can strike not just once, twice or
thrice but hundreds of times in the city centers, in factories, and
employment places, wherever the regime gets its support and allies
who give most support to the regime. If you are going to ignore our
peace initiatives, and carry on your dirty war against our people, then
prepare yourselves for the war to heat up. the decision we've reached
on the eve of Newroz is the same decision reached by Mazlum
Dogan.
We do not want to implement such a decision. However, our
peace initiatives have been ignored for too long. And therefore, we had
to make a decision. Consequently, we want our people as a whole to
be prepared throughout the coming year. Whatever the deman ds and
sacrifices of a life with dignity and honor are, that is what our people
must do. They should discharge their obligation fearlessly. What is
bad is the situation we are already in here and now. An heroic death
will shorten the path to a proper life . No one should be afraid, the
courage our people have mustered up is a victory in itself. Even the
world is awed by the courage of our guerrillas. Why should we not
make use of the strength we've acquired, continue to prosecute the
war and deal severe blows to the enemies? Here, let us know
ourselves, let us know our people, through our people and our
people's struggle let us get to know ourselves. The enemy will not
come to the negotiating table in any other way. Otherwise the enemy
will recognize no limit in raining death and destruction upon us. Our
people are determined. In the days and years ahead, with even greater
fortitude and determination our people should think harder and search
deeper an politically strengthen themselves. The reasons we have are
not insignificant, the war will go on, the enemy will not be able to stop
us.
Lately, the enemy has been trying to mobilize its allies against
us as well. The enemy wants the USA and Germany to attack us, too.
I want to tell the USA and Germany the following: This enemy is
waging a war of annihilation and genocide against us. This is not your
war and do not move against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). We
don't want to fight against you as well! If like the enemy you come
towards us for a fight, you too will sustain great losses. The people
you have stripped of their dignity and national identity will explode in
your midst, too. We do not want to do this, but if you come upon us
with the intention of fighting us such explosions will occur. I want to
repeat and reiterate, again and again, the enemy is waging a war of
genocide. Do not aid and abet the enemy in this war. Through
democratic and political measures, we expect you to make
contributions to end this war. Do not look at our people as enemies,
give up detaining our people and end the cruelties. You have nothing to
gain from this war. We want to befriend you. Within the framework of
human rights, we want to take joint steps with you. I want to say this to
Germany again. We want to resolve some issues of joint interest with
you through peaceful political means. Do not harass our people in
Germany and other countries and stop the detentions. We do not want
to do anything harmful against your democracy and public order.
Some cabinet ministers have claimed that war has been declared
against your democracy. This is not correct.
I repeat: we respect your democracy and public order and want
you to recognize us and see the war being waged against us for what
it is. Witness the cruel oppression perpetrated against us and halt the
virtually limitless aid to our enemy. If you act in l ine with human
rights, democratic and political perspective, we will be with you all the
way. However, the issue cannot be solved through bans and
detentions of our people. Stay away from this policy. If you take
dialogue as the basis of relations, you wi ll see that our mutual
interests will be served all the way. End your hostile activities against
our resistance and struggle. Such hostilities do not serve either of us.
Let us get together again and discuss whatever you want to discuss. If
you want to pe nalize someone, first you must hear him out. Handing
down penalties without a fair hearing, without testimonies is cruel.
You have people that you have been detaining for years. Detentions
without fair hearings are unjust.
In a short time, Turkish people, those who advocate fraternal
relations and those who want democracy will favor a political solution.
Those days are not very far. We wanted to resolve the conflict with
this government [in Turkey]. We provided them with ma ny
opportunities. We even implored them. Regrettably, this government
is not for peace. We sent a letter personally to Turkish Prime Minister
Mr. Mesut Yilmaz. He did not bother to read it. He will be the loser at
the end. don't let him say, "I didn't hear". I want to make it public that
we are bound by the contents of the letter and it is an open letter. Let
him make public what he thinks is wrong in the letter. We do not want
to divide Turkey. We want democracy in Turkey. We want fraternal
relations amo ngst the people. This is not something wrong to want.
Those who want to profit and get rich through this dirty war are bad
people. They are against the Turkish people as well. It is necessary to
pressure them to move out. In connection with this, I wish Turkish
people happy Newroz as well. We want fraternal ties with them,
equality with them and a new life together. I wish unity between the
new people of `Kurdistan. I want all Kurdish parties, organizations,
men and women, the young and the aged to join the new life. Proper
and successful life does not consist of eating and drinking well,
owning a lot of properties. The kind of life we want to lead is the one
taking shape ahead of us. The new day -Newroz for us Kurds- will be
ours after thousands of years. For the first time, our new day will be
Kurdistan day. Let us congratulate ourselves and each other for
reaching such a day. Celebrate because such a Kurdistan is coming
into being and don't say "we are hungry and thirsty". And "we lack
31
unity" say no more. Our revolution is our greatest concern. Only
Kurdistan can quench our thirst and satisfy our hunger. With high
spirits and an honorable life, we are already better off. Maybe you
have more power than we do. But one doesn't need to complain when
the day of judgment arrives. We are weak today, but will be strong
tomorrow. Therefore, we propose to resolve our conflict through
peaceful means. You will see many good things about us. You will
discover that friendship with our people is a thousand times more
rewarding than animosity.
To our people: Today especially in Germany, our people can
freely celebrate their festivity in designated areas. According to what
we have heard, no one will bother our people in areas for which a
permit to celebrate has been obtained. It is therefore necessary to
refrain from actions that may contravene German laws and public
order. I believe this will be a progressive step. Our people in the
Middle East, in exile, in east and south Kurdistan can celebrate their
festivity in a normal manner. They should keep a fair distance away
from the borders, away from the enemies' bombs and barracks.
There is no sense in celebrating in small groups. And take appropriate
security measures to defend yourselves. Our people in north
Kurdistan [under Turkish control] whose festivity is denied by the
enemy should not deny either their identity or their festivity. They
should celebrate to the end through costumes and expressions. In big
or small parties, in hiding or out in the open they should celebrate their
Newroz. See this Newroz as the celebration of the decision for a life
with honor and dignity. Again, all people of Kurdistan, this Newroz
celebration takes us closer to the life with honor and dignity. All people
of Kurdistan should know that the enemy is in a swamp. It is the
enemy that is being cornered everyday. We will carry on with our
strugg le. Let's strengthen our unity. The revolution we are in is that of
a great nation and is reflected throughout the world. This is enough for
you and therefore congratulate each other. You are not a poor nation,
you are not a nation of slaves and what you have been wanting for
thousands of years is becoming real right in front of your eyes. Today
is in fact your day. This Newroz belongs to you more than other
people and with great deter mination, we will make this year your
year along with Newroz. We will make Kurdistan yours. In the light of
this determination and on the basis of realizing this life, I greet you all.
[=]
10075. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Situation in
Sivas Has Grown Tense", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09074]
[19960401] The situation in the Middle Anatolian province Sivas, that
is mainly inhabited by Alevi Kurds, has seemingly increased after
about 500 people including village elders have been arrested and
several villages have been put under siege. The notorious Specia l
Task forces of the Turkish army are engaged in a "head charge"
according to the statements of local democratic institutions. They go
to the villages dressed as guerrillas and ask for food and logistics in
order to arrest people who agree to support them under the charge of
support of a terrorist organization" In the province of Sivas about 100
villages have been evacuated in 1995. DEM News Agency,2/13/1996.
[=]
10076. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Sivas Faces
Social Explosion", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09060]
[19960201] Reactions to the emptying of villages and detention of
villagers in security operations in Sivas province are increasing.
Republican People's Party (CHP) Assistant Secretary Sinan
Yerlikaya stated that state forces were targeting Alevi villages in
particu lar and said: "The people of Sivas are on the verge of a serious
social outburst". The Democratic Left Party (DSP) has a delegation in
the area conducting an investigation. DISK (Progressive Workers
Confederation) General Secretary Kemal Daysal said the t error
experienced in Dersim last year was this year occurring in Sivas.
Daysal said the people were fed up with intensive operations, mass
arrests and village evacuations . "It is the security forces, who should
be responsible for the people's security, t hat are the cause of this,"
added Daysal, "we must not allow this to happen. If we remain silent it
will encourage the culprits. We warn all parties and their MPs. The
terror created by fanatics acting on behalf of the state may tomorrow
affect you." CHP Assistant General Secretary Sinan Yerlikaya said at
a press conference at the CHP HQ yesterday that over 500 villagers
had been detained, 300 villages blockaded and harassed. Yerlikaya
called on the authorities to change the governor of Sivas, who he
accused of targeting Alevis and left - thinking people while protecting
Sunnis and rightists. Ozgur Politika, 2/11/1996. [=]
10077. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Turkey
Border Plan", in AKIN News, December 1995. [99H-09047]
[19951201] US officials announced a joint plan to help Turkey
improve security along its border with Iraq. A network of heat sensors
and observation posts will be erected to stem the flow of Kurdish
rebels from Iraq. Jane's Defence Weekly, 11/11/1995. [=]
10073. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Reaction to
Savagery Grows", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09067]
[19960201] Following the publication of pictures in the British and
Greek press showing atrocities committed by the Turkish army, the
Spanish paper El Mundo headlined a story on January 14 thus: "They
displayed the severed heads of 4 Kurdish fighters like a trophy o f
war." The British Sunday Times published the photos under the
heading: "Grim Pictures of Army Butchery Deal Blow to Turkey's EC
Hopes", and reported that Pauline Green, leader of the socialist group
in the European Parliament, had written to Turkish Pre sident
Suleyman Demirel to express the group's horror. Ozgur Politika,
1/16/1996. [=]
Protests", in AKIN News, December 1995. [99H-09046] [19951201]
Turkey said yesterday that the European Parliament's decision to give
its 1995 Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought to a jailed Kurdish MP
did not do credit to the award. Leyla Zana, awarded the prize in
Thursday, is serving a 15-year term for involvement with the
Kurdistan Workers Party. The Guardian, 11/11/1995. [=]
10074. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Satellite
Dishes Banned in Sirnak", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09080]
[19960401] The provincial governor of Sirnak in Turkish-Kurdistan
has banned the use of satellite dishes. According to the governor and
the chief of the so-called village guards, the high percentage the
People's Democracy Party (HADEP) has won in the province in the
elections of 12/24/1995 was a result of the broadcasting of the Kurdish
Satellite station MED-TV. Already before the decree was made,
several people had been arrested under suspicion of watching MEDTV. DEM News Agency, 2/13/1996. [=]
Threatens Foreign Press", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H09069] [19960201] At a press conference in Ankara organized by the
Turkish foreign ministry, spokesman Nurettin Nurkan told foreign
press representatives that "the atrocity photos did not reflect reality"
and claimed that "a conscious campaign of defamation is being carrie
d out against Turkey". Nurkan claimed that human rights violations
did not take place in Turkey and left questions on this subject
unanswered. Nurkan added that legal action would be taken against
32
those foreign news organizations that published articles b ased on
claims that "damaged Turkey's image". Ozgur Politika, 1/17/1996. [=]
FRATERNITY to sprout more vigorously in spring with NEVRUZ
(New day) which is celebrated (!) by all our citizens with festival s." I
looked at the back of the card and, yes, you've guessed, the name of a
Turkish state institution was written there. The Public Services
Research Trust. The card had been sent from Ankara. I looked again
at the pictures on the front of the card. Ther e were pictures of
traditional dances from the Black Sea to the Caucasus, of the Sword
dance, of dances from Bursa to Afyon and Silifke but nothing beyond
Adiyaman and nothing about the Kurds. (...) At that moment the words!
"shamelessness" and "embarrass ment" came to mind. (...) The card
said peace and fraternity but blood was dripping from the card,
Kurdish blood. (...) They (Turkish authorities) are behaving as if it
was not them who fired on the people of Cizre and Nusaybin while
they danced to celebr ate Newroz. Now they say "Nevruz is peace"
It's as if they haven't perpetrated extra judicial killings, torture and
massacres. (...) Mesut Yilmaz has at one stroke turned the thousandyear-old "Newroz" into "Nevruz". He is going to celebrate it with his
w ife, at the same time his commanders shout "We are ready to write
new epics" as they despatch tens of thousands of troops, tanks and
guns to Kurdistan. When they talk about peace I see a mentality that is
prepared to send thousands of young men to their d eaths in a dirty
war without so much as blinking. Ozgur Politika, 3/21/1996. [=]
10080. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Turkish
Human Rights Activist Honored", in AKIN News, December 1995.
[99H-09052] [19951201] The German Judges' Union (DRB) sharply
criticized mistreatment and torture in Turkish prisons as well as the
suppression of freedom of expression in Turkey while handing out its
1995 Human Rights Award. Union chief Rainer Voss criticized the
excessive use of charges of "separatism" and "separatist
propaganda"by state security courts in Turkey. This year's DRB
Human Rights Award was given to Turkish lawyer Husnu Ondul.
Ondul is a lawyer in Ankara and was one of the founders of the
Human Rights Association (IHD) and the Human Rights Foundation
of Turkey, which operates centers for victims of torture. A total of
seven political indictments have been filed against Ondul; during one
visit to the Kurdish regions, his delegation was even fired upon. In his
acceptance speech, Ondul mentioned his murdered colleagues: Metin
Can, head of the Human Rights Association in Elazig, and Sevket
Epozdemir, head of the Human Rights Association in Tatvan. He
accepted the prize in the name of all those people in prison in Turkey
because of their work on behalf of the Human Rights Association.
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 9/26/1995. [=]
10084. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Why Turkey
No Longer Delights", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09082]
[19960401] Throughout his book, Kelsey is keen to get into prisons to
see for himself where and how political "criminals" are incarcerated
within. Unsurprisingly, prison governors some on a more meager diet
that their wards are reluctant to let Kelsey confirm with his own eyes
the findings of a 1987 United Nations inspection: at that time, not one
of the 644 prisons in Turkey matched minimum international
standards. Like many societies founded on unresolved impulses of
religion and secularism, Turkey is at war with itself something Kelsey
encounters wherever he goes, Turkey makes repeated bids to join the
EC, for example. To control an exploding birthrate, one of the
prerequisites for membership is the use of condoms, which is
Turkish government policy, yet what can be done in a country where
condom use offends the vast majority of consenting adults and where
many men have more than one wife? Behind the exaggerations of
Midnight Express and the yuppie enticements of Turkey's coastal
resorts lies a deeply troubled nation. Kelsey evokes its contradictions
and dangers unflinchingly, sometimes too harshly: there's not much
humor in Dervish the jokes which the Turks enjoy are generally
labored or bitter. In dealing with this anachronistic country Kelsey's
commendable lack of sentimentality, his roughness even, provides a
compelling narrative, but nobody is going to ask him to become
ambassador. From a review of Tim Kelsey's book, Sunday Times,
2/10/1996. [=]
10081. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Turkish
Human Rights Monitors and Lawyers Slam Changes to Article 8", in
AKIN News, December 1995. [99H-09049] [19951201] Turkish
human rights monitors and lawyers have slammed changes to the
restrictive law on freedom of expression, Article 8, charging the
reforms will not stop people from going to jail for things they say or
write. "This is just a trick, a type of cosmetic change that will not
protect us from being punished for our thoughts," said Akin Birdal,
head of the independent Human Rights Association (IHD) in Turkey.
"The changes are nonsense, a joke, it's like make-up that doesn't fit,"
said Mehmet Ali Birand, host of an influential public affairs television
program. The changes also will not affect the estimated 100 additional
people human rights groups say are in prison for stating their views,
such as Turkish sociologist Ismail Besikci, sentenced to a total of 103
years in prison for books and articles on the Kurds. Reuters,
10/29/1995. [=]
10082. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Union of
Journalists From Kurdistan Founded in Cologne", in AKIN News,
April 1996. [99H-09083] [19960401] The First conference of the Union
of Journalists from Kurdistan (YRK) was held in the City of Cologne
on 17-18 February. Over 100 journalists from Kurdistan, Turkey and
Europeparticipated in the meeting that was chaired by the writer
Gunay Aslan, who stated that the conference was a step towards a
professional organization of Kurdish Journalists. The Union of
Journalists from Kurdistan (YRK) will be a bridge between the
numerous Kurdish journalists in exile, and those still living in
Kurdistan or working in Turkey in spite of the censorship and high rate
of torture or killings of journalists on the country. DEM News Agency,
2/19/1996. [=]
10085. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Yasar Kemal
Speaks Out Again!", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09093]
[19960401] Yasar Kemal challenges Turkish government to respond
to cease-fire Yashar Kemal has stated that it is up to the state to
respond to the (PKK) cease-fire, saying: "Come on, declare a ceasefire - I challenge you." Yashar Kemal was speaking at his home wher
e he was visited by CHP MP Mehmet Sevigen, party members and
the media. Due to the intense press interest Yashar Kemal spoke in
the garden of his house. Kemal said that the meaning of the suspended
sentence he had received was "Don't write". He stated tha t even in
the most fascist, reactionary courts in the world no one could be
sentenced for an article, adding: "What does it mean 'Don't write'?
This is worse than the Chinese water torture. (...) Whatever the cost I
will write again and within a year be s entenced again. I won't suffer
10083. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Why
'Nevruz'", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09091] [19960401]
Extracts from a column by Rengin Avasin. A few days ago a friend
showed me a card they had received from a friend of theirs. On the
front of the card were the words "Nevruz is peace" and a map of
Turkey. Around the map were pictures representing the folk dances of
various regions. I looked inside the card. There was the following
sentence: "We earnestly wish the seeds of PEACE and
33
this torture." Yashar Kemal said:" Courts of humanity will be
established and the state sentenced. I am not a hero. I hate heroics.
(...) Human beings are not heroes. (...) But the greatest quality of
human beings is of bein g able to overcome fear." "Aren't I afraid of
going to jail? (...) But we must overcome fear. The children of the
people must not die. There must, absolutely must, be peace." Kemal
reiterated that he had been sentenced for using the word guerrilla and
sai d he would never conform to orders concerning which words and
forms to use. "No one can tell me not to say 'guerrilla' or say
'terrorist'" He also replied to those who have reproached him saying:
'Why don't you rebuke the PKK?', by stating: "Has the PKK s igned the
Human Rights convention with Europe? (...) Is Apo's signature
beneath the Paris, Helsinki and OSCE agreements? In any case you
(the state) call them terrorists not guerrillas." "They say 'You oppose
the state but not the PKK.' My target is not t he PKK. It is the state that
has to bring about peace. I challenge the state to declare a cease-fire.
I'm still blaming the state and as long as things continue like this I'll go
on writing." CHP MP Mehmet Sevigen then said that theycondemned
the sentenc e Yashar Kemal had received and added that his party
would support the writer. Ozgur Politika, 3/15/1996. [=]
providing us with this wonderful setting to celebrate Newroz. In
particular, I want to acknowledge the work of Dr. Ali, Muzaffer and
Temo. Please join me in thanking them by a round of applause. I also
want to acknowledge our singers Diyar and Sehruz who have joined
us for this occasion from Germany and Canada. I have seen Diyar on
Med Television and I have had the good fortune of listening to Sehruz.
Both are outstanding Kurdish singers. Please join me in giving Diyar
and Sehruz a round of applause as well. Tonight, we are celebrating
Newroz. It is a special night not just for us Kurds but also for our
neighbors: the Persians, the Assyrians, the Arabs and other natives of
the Middle East. It is a night of bonfires, folk dances, delicious food
and beautiful customs. It is also a time that signifies resistance,
heralded the historical liberation of the Kurds and in our recent history
marks the onward march of our national liberation struggle in northern
Kurdistan. Newroz which in Kurdish means a new day began on
March 21, 612 before Christ in what we today call southern Kurdistan.
On that day, a Kurdish iron smith called Kawa killed the Assyrian
tyrant known to his contemporaries as Dehak. The news of Dehak's
demiseunleashed such joyous emotions that bonfires were made
throughout the Middle East to spread the good news the fastest way
they knew how at the time. Ever since, Newroz has become an
integral part of the Kurdish national consciousness. As oppression
against us mounts the longing for the days of Newroz with its
symbolic bonfires and folk dances becomes more acute. In our recent
history the memory of one Dersim in which 40000 thousand Kurds
were slaughtered in 1938 is enough to shake all the Kurds. Halapja
which became the testing ground for Saddam's chemical weapons
which caused the death of 5000 Kurds will live in our consciousness
forever.
Here I am reminded of a passage from a poem by Ahmedi Xani,
the immortal author of Kurdish quest for freedom, through his works
such as Mem-u-Zin. Reflecting heavily on the problems of our people
of his time, he had this to say to his contemporaries some three
centuries ago which he could have said to us here in this hall were he
alive. Xani wrote: "Bartender, for the love of God, please pour some
wine into the crystal glass Let the glass and its wine show the world
Let there appear whatever it is that we wish Let the events ahead of us
come to light Let us know if the future holds promise for us Look! our
misfortunes have reached their zenith, Have they started to decline
now, do you think? Or will they remain so, Until comes upon us the
end of time? Is it possible, I wonder, that for us, too A Star will emerge
out of the darkness?"
We are gathered here tonight to honor not just one Kurdish star
but a growing number of them who shine like bright suns as patriots
and martyrs. We are here to celebrate the memory of the Kurds who
through the fire of Newroz have brought meaning to our lives, hope to
our hearts and light to our days. Despite the pain and immense
suffering that is borne by our people on a daily basis, we ought to feel
proud, really proud of sharing a generation with the likes of Mazlum
Dogan, Zekiye Alkan, Rahsan Demirel, Ronahi and Berivan. 1982 is
not an easy year to remember for the Kurds. Thousands were put in
Turkish jails condemned to a life of misery where death by torture
became so common that years later Hozan Seyithan reminiscing
about the infamous days would write the song, Hapsa Diyarbekire.
The mayor of that city, Mehdi Zana has a book about the ordeal called
Vahsetin Gunlugu, the Journal of Barbarity. There were others who
did not survive. Mazlum Dogan not wishing to put up with the torture
that was breaking the spirit of the Kurdish resistance, on March 21,
1982, set his body on fire to keep the hope of Newroz alive. Through
that supreme act he hoped to spark the flame of liberation in
Kurdistan. A decade and four years have passed. Mazlum's dream is
now ours: Kurdistan will be free, soon and forever. 8 years later,
Zekiye Alkan, a Kurdish student in Diyarbakir Medical School
10086. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Yilmaz Visits
HADEP", in AKIN News, February 1996. [99H-09058] [19960201]
Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Mesut Yilmaz paid a visit to the
HADEP headquarters in Ankara and met HADEP President Murat
Bozlak and other party officials. At a press conference after the
meeting, which lasted approximately 40 minutes, Mesut Yilmaz said
they had an exchange of views on the subject of injustice in the
electoral system and the problem of the "south east", Turkey's biggest
problem. Murat Bozlak stated that in order for the cease-fire to
become lasting the state must respond and that ANAP mu st make
efforts on this issue. Bozlak said that the state of emergency in
Kurdistan and village guard system had been launched in the Ozal
period, but that Ozal had realized this had not resolved anything but
had not lived long enough to end these measure s, and asked Mesut
Yilmaz to follow Turgut Ozal's legacy. Mesut Yilmaz did not
comment on what Murat Bozlak said. He said the meeting had been
useful and said that ANAP would present proposals in parliament to
change electoral law and ensure just represe ntation. Ozgur Politika,
2/9/1996. [=]
10087. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. "Young Turks
Who Never Return", in AKIN News, April 1996. [99H-09077]
[19960401] Three months ago Duzgun Tekin left home as usual for
his job in a textile factory in Istanbul's Ikitelli industrial zone. He never
came back and most probably never will. Mr. Tekin has joined the
ranks of some 400 Turks who are believed to have disappeare d since
1980 while in police custody. The story is depressingly familiar,
according to officials at the Human Rights Association (IHD). Most of
the missing are either Kurdish dissidents or, like Duzgun Tekin, Leftwing radicals with trade links. "Usually they are followed around by
security agents in civilian clothes for several days before they
disappear, "The marble slab, which was confiscated by the police a
few days ago, read: "What started in Argentina, continued in Chile and
came to Turkey, befell you, our beloved son." Daily Telegraph,
2/7/1996. [=]
10088. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. Newroz 1996,
Speech delivered by a representative of the American Kurdish
Information Network to an audience of Kurds and their American
friends in Lodi, New Jersey on Sunday, March 17, 1996. [99H-09100]
[19960317] Dear friends, fellow Kurds, First of all, I want to
acknowledge the work of the Kurdish Community of New York for
34
climbed the famous Diyarbakir wall. Again, on March 21, she poured
gasoline on herself and sparked another Newroz fire to remind her
beloved city of her hate of oppression and of her love of liberation. In
1992, the governor of Sulaymania in southern Kurdistan raised a
statute to her memory. We are grateful to the PUK leadership for this
solemn act. Again, like Mazlum, she lived not for herself but for us
Kurds and Kurdistan. In 1992, the fire of Newroz was lit again and
again on Newroz day. This time it was Rahsan Demirel. The Kurds of
Izmir were shocked to see their Rahsan on the ground as a pile of
bones and ashes. She had left a note behind for the Kurds who were
fleeing to western Turkey. She was urging them not to forget the pain
and the suffering of those who were being bombarded by the Turks
day in and day out. She was calling on them to unite, to resist and to
move onward with the struggle of Kurdish martrys who had began the
march for the independence and Kurdistan. That year saw the
unprecedented attack by the Turkish state on the Kurds who had
gathered for Newroz celebrations in Sirnak, Cizre and Nusaybin. 117
people were killed in broad day light by government troops who were
carrying orders from the top. The people in the government thought
they could make laws that would ban Newroz. But the spirit of
Newroz is older than the government and this generation of the Kurds
is not scared of guns or their bullets. The Newroz fire that began in
Diyarbakir with Mazlum and Zekiye and moved to Izmir with Rahsan
then crossed borders and was lit again this time in the heart of Europe
by two Kurdish women, Berivan and Ronahi. They too had a message
for the one million or so Kurds who had settled in Europe but who
were facing increasing hostility from the governments to abandon the
struggle of the martyrs for Kurdistan. They left the following note
behind, "To the brave people of Kurdistan: We congratulate your
Newroz, today. We remind you of the goal to live our humanity as
Kurds. We urge you, as our party leader Serok Apo does, of the
necessity to be ever more resilient. We undertake this act of selfimmolation, as part of our resistance. To you, we now entrust the
sacred struggle. To the Kurdish diaspora, we say, do own the struggle
for the humanity of the Kurds. Make the Kurdish revolution in
Kurdistan a reality."
The struggle for the liberation of Kurdistan is now entering its
twelfth year. In these years, some 30000 people have died. 3000
Kurdish villages have been leveled to the ground. Some 3 million
Kurds have become refugees. As Kurds we need to feel the pain and
suffering that is visiting our brothers and sisters who have lost all they
have had throughout their lives. The best way to share this pain would
be for each of us as much as our resources permit to take trips to
Dersim, Serhat, Amed, Botan and Tolhildan. We need to tell our
fellow Kurds that even in America we are with them in our thoughts
andthrough our support for their liberation from the foreign yoke.
Newroz has been with us for some 2600 years now. No one has the
power to take away this celebration of liberation from us so long the
Kurdish people continues to exist. Cejna Newroz piroz be! Biji
Newroz!
(American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), 2309 Calvert
Street NW number 3, Washington, DC 20008-2603; Tel: (202) 4836444; Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
s license. Portugal, following after Spain, France, and Germany, also
bowed to pressure from Turkey. MED-TV began multi-lingual
satellite broadcasts on 5/15/1995, fulfilling a need for 35 million Kurds.
Internationally, this step was welcomed as an attempt to give a voice
to the world's largest stateless people. (Kurdish-language
broadcasting is still illegal in Turkey and some other countries.)
MED-TV broadcast for 6 hours each day, providing programming in
Kurdish, Turkish, Assyrian, and Arabic. The signal could be received
in all of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, a huge potential
viewership in 34 countries. From the very beginning, the Turkish
government exerted great political pressure, coupled with economic
threats, on the governments of Europe, urging them to deny broadcast
access to MED-TV. But they had no luck for the past 16 months. The
Kurds enjoyed their very own television station! MED-TV is a legal
company, privately owned, organized by an association of
international Kurdish business people, licensed and regulated by the
Independent Television Commission (ITC) in London. The station
always fulfilled all of its legal and contract requirements, and it also
abided by European laws concerning international broadcasting. But
now, economic and political pressure from the Turkish government
are threatening the integrity of internationally-recognized standards of
free speech. MED-TV's future is now dependent on whether countries
choose to adhere to international broadcast conventions or bow to
pressure from Turkey. MED-TV has vowed to carry on. A variety of
options are being examined in order to keep fulfilling the legitimate
desire of the Kurdish people to have an uncensored voice of their own,
one which is respected by the governments of the world.
(American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) 2623
ConnecticutAvenue NW Suite number 1 Washington, DC 200081522; Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
10090. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. Press
Release Number 11: Support for MED-TV. District of Columbia:
American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), July 24, 1996. [99H09039] [19960724] Earlier this month, bowing to pressure from the
Turkish government, the broadcasting rights for the Europe-based
Kurdish satellite station MED-TV were revoked. There has been
much outcry from the Kurdish Diaspora concerning this crackdown
on freedom of expression. We received the following letters of support
for MED-TV from the jailed members of the Kurdish Democracy
Party (DEP) in Ankara Prison and from noted Turkish intellectual
Haluk Gerger. We wished to share them with you:
"MED-TV brought life to the Kurdish cultural scene the way
water and air do these things to living organisms. It was a source of
news for the Kurds and a mirror that reflected their reality to them.
Thanks to MED-TV, the Kurdish language was coming alive,
something which threatened those who wanted to suffocate it. MEDTV epitomized the hope of the Kurdish people for renewal; it was a
magnet which drew the Kurds together. For these reasons, we
condemn those who wish it to be banned and ask for its broadcasting
to resume immediately." -- Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan,
Selim Sadak (jailed Kurdish members of the Turkish Parliament) "I
am a Turkish academic. I have appeared in virtually all Turkish TV
networks as well as some foreign TV channels. I have never
experienced the complete freedom of expression that I've had in
various MED-TV programs. MED-TV was a forum where all voices
that were either persecuted or otherwise barred to express
themselves freely in countries like Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran could
find a prominent place for themselves: peace activists, members of
ethnic or religious minorities, women, politicians, spokespersons for
marginalized communities, etc. It was also a medium through which
democratic values like free discussion, dissent, criticism, and
tolerance could be transmitted to millions who never in their daily
Release Number 10: MED-TV Has Been Banned. District of
Columbia: American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), July 5,
1996. [99H-09042] [19960705] The Kurdish television station MEDTV was due to start sending out its signal via the Eutel satellite of the
Polish state television company PTT as of July 2. But due to pressure
from the Turkish government, Polish authorities have canceled the
deal. For the past three months, MED-TV was broadcast with the help
of the government of Portugal, but this country also revoked the station
35
lives have had the chance to indulge in such "luxuries". It was a
school for millions to understand and respect different cultures,
values, and perspectives. It was indeed a garden of cultures where a
thousand roses blossomed. It is disheartening, to say the least, to see
this garden brutalized and vandalized. Working for it, watching it, or
participating in its programs, we have been infected with the 'disease
of freedom', as its enemies would call our yearning for MED-TV. We
cherish this wonderful experiment and will do our best to have it
back." -- Dr. Haluk Gerger. (American Kurdish Information Network
(AKIN) 2623 Connecticut Avenue NW number 1 Washington, DC
20008-1522; Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476 E-mail:
akin(a)kurdish.org Home Page: http://burn.ucsd.edu/~akin) (The
American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) provides a public
service to foster Kurdish-American understanding and friendship.) [=]
internal affair of Turkey."
We condemn unequivocally this validation of oppression against
the inmates, the Kurds and other opponents of the Turkish
government. We salute the strikers, their loved ones, and others who
have expressed indignation over these untimely deaths. We wish it to
be known that we welcomed the statement by the European
Commissioner Hans van den Broek urging Turkey in stronglanguage
to "prevent further deaths." We ask the State Department to do no
less. (American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) 2623
Connecicut Avenue NW number 1 Washington, DC 20008-1522; Tel:
(202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
Release Number 1: Turkish Prime Minister Steps Down; PKK
Cease-Fire is Postponed. District of Columbia: American Kurdish
Information Network (AKIN), September 21, 1995. [99H-09029]
[19950920] On 9/20/1995, following the first round of new coalition
talks, Turkish prime minister Tansu Ciller officially announced her
resignation. According to official statements, the continuation of the
coalition government between the Republican People's Party (CHP)
and the True Path Party (DYP) was no longer possible due to
disagreements about the terms of the coalition. The collapse of the
government comes at a time when the number one domestic problem
in the country, the Kurdish question, was having some prospects of
solution. On 9/18/1995, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), stated in a television interview that he thought
the present conditions offered a new chance for a political solution to
the conflict. He said: "In order to prove our good will, we want to
restart the 1993 cease-fire...Particularly now, as the European Union
is about to make a decision regarding Turkey's admissibility to
Custom's Union. We would like them to know that we are not the
problem and that we are on record for wishing to seek a political
solution. If Turkey does not plan to respond to such a gesture with
more violence, we will make the announcement soon." According to
information reaching our office, Abdullah Ocalan was planning to
make the cease-fire announcement in an interview with MED- TV
scheduled for September 25. But unfortunately for the casue of peace,
the news that government in Ankara had stepped down has forced the
Chair of PKK to postpone his decision. In his words: "... until there is a
interlocutor in Ankara who could respond to our call, we are going to
wait and see." The surprise collapse of the Turkish government is
reminiscent of 1993, when Turgut Ozal, the president of Turkey at that
time, died of mysterious causes shortly after the PKK announced a
unilateral cease-fire. Claims that Ozal died of a heart attack seem
far-fetched when one considers the number of voices, even within
Turkey, which seemed to indicate that there were political motives for
his death. Against the wishes of the Turkish National Security
Council, Turgut Ozal had intended to deal with the Kurdish question at
the political level. Since all real power in Turkey is in the hands of the
military, no civilian politician is willing to take on the risk of
acknowledging the cease- fire. It seems that this government collapse
is being staged so as to prevent there being any high-ranking officials
who can take on the responsibility of utilizing the chances offered by
the cease-fire. Furthermore, a collapsed government cannot be held
responsible for failing to make use of the cease- fire, and this would
remove the burden of having to answer to international pressure.
(American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) 2309 Calvert Street
NW number 3 Washington, DC 20008-2603; Tel: (202) 483-6444;
Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
Release Number 12: AKIN Salutes the Hunger Strikers Urges
Washington to Condemn Their Untimely Deaths. District of
Columbia: American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), July 27,
1996. [99H-09040] [19960727] On 7/21/1996, a Reuters wire report
noted that Aygun Ugur, a Turkish prisoner, died as a result of an
hunger strike in Turkey. He, together with 2000 other Turkish
prisoners, had gone on a hunger strike on 5/19/1996. They had asked
the authorities in the government to stop torture and solitary
confinements, among other things, in the Turkish prison system. As
usual, no one, to this day, has bothered to talk with them. As this
statement was being prepared, 10 other Turkish and Kurdish inmates
have died. More deaths are expected. The government, the wire
reports note, is planning the option of force to break the resistance of
the inmates. When the death of second hunger striker, that of Altan
Bedran Kerimgiller, became public, the inmate's mother, the Press
noted, had wailed: "My baby has gone. Make my baby come back!"
The Turkish Justice Minister Sevket Kazan, on the other hand, instead
of healing the mother's wound was assuming the aura of a
commander: "I don't give a damn about the foreign press reports and
letters from Amnesty International. ... Turkey is an independent
country."
For years now, we have been telling the world about these tales
of Turkish oppression against their opponents. This culture of
oppression was recently the subject of an editorial by Ahmet Altan,
one of the most insightful Turkish journalists. He wrote on July 22,
1996, "I read a declaration of our Minister of Culture in the paper
Hurriyet the day before yesterday. He said that our people like
Kirkpinar fighting, (Kirkpinar refers to a city where Turkish all-in
wrestling tournaments take place) it doesn't like opera and ballet; we
like hand to hand fighting." This reminded us of another infamous
quote, from another brutal period, by one of Hitler's ideologues,
Himmler: "When I hear the word culture, I reach out for my revolver."
Some 14 years ago, on 7/14/1982, four Kurdish prisoners began a
hunger strike that culminated in their deaths over the political and civil
rights of the Kurds. Their memory has now sparked the Kurdish
liberation struggle all over the Middle East. Their pictures adorn the
Kurdish homes. Their names are given to the Kurdish boys. Today,
10000 Kurdish political prisoners still languish in Turkish jails. On
Friday, 7/26/1996, they had a joint statement indicating their decision
to join their Turkish friends, through their own hunger strike, in
solidarity. Washington, as usual, pretends to be oblivious to the
atrocities of the Turkish government. Ankara is hailed as a friend,
sometimes as a model -- when these deaths do not occur -- for others
to emulate. The statement that emanated from the State Department
was short. It said, "We deeply regret the loss of life that has
occurred." But lest this might offend Ankara, it added, "... [this] is an
Release Number 2. Turkey Surrounds Etrus Camp in Iraqi-Kurdistan;
UN Fails to Aid Against Food Embargo. District of Columbia:
36
American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), October 10, 1995.
[99H-09030] [19951010] For the past year, Turkish soldiers and their
Kurdish collaborators, the forces of Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP), have harassed Kurdish refugees who had fled from state
oppression in Turkey. Numbering some 16000 people, these Kurds
have had their livestock confiscated, their food intake reduced, and
some of these people have been apprehended. Especially in the last
month, the KDP have attacked the refugees, resulting in the deaths of
6 people and the wounding of 9 others. According to eyewitnesses, the
situation is now getting worse. In the last two weeks, Turkish secret
service forces and their local collaborators, the KDP, have
surrounded the camp, cutting it off from the outside world. Because of
a food embargo against the camp, the refugees have been left to
starve. The refugees living in Etrus camp had fled from Turkish state
terror, but the Turkish government refuses to leave them in peace. As
the local harassment continues, Turkey is also making moves at the
international level. During a recent visit to New York, Erdal Inonu,
Turkey's foreign minister, complained to the United Nations that this
camp ought to be closed and its residents repatriated to Turkey. The
Etrus refugee camp stands a testimony to the Turkish government's
policy of genocide against the Kurds. Aware of this fact, the Turkish
authorities want to put an end to this embarrassment. They, together
with their local KDP collaborators, have claimed that the camp is full
of guns and acts as a safe area for PKK guerrillas. These are
baseless accusations. The United Nations is supposed to protect the
people in Etrus camp and provide humanitarian assistance. But
according to information reaching our office, the UN is allowing these
Turkish/KDP atrocities to take place with impunity. We view this
policy as undermining the impartiality of the United Nations, making a
travesty of basic human rights. We strongly urge the UN to intervene
and rectify the situation. In addition, we urge the Red Cross, NGOs,
and human rights organizations to send representatives to the camp
and observe the situation first hand. We also urge the democratic
public to form a delegation of its own to assess the matter. (American
Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) 2309 Calvert Street NW number
3 Washington, DC 20008-2603; Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 4836476.) [=]
murdered. Violence has been a policy that has targeted all segments
of our society. Duly elected Kurdish parliamentarians have been
killed, their constitutional immunity lifted, and some are now serving
time in prison. These developments have followed the birth of our
party and the nature of our struggle. We want to stand against the
policies which seek to assimilate our people, we want to stop the
forced removal of our people into oblivion. Because all of the legal
channels by which our people sought to organize themselves
politically were barred, we undertook our struggle so as to preserve
ourselves. Despite the widening, serious problems which confront
Ankara, the government's policy is to insist on military solution. This
mind-set will cause more bloodshed in Kurdistan and harm the
interests of the people of Turkey. To pave the way for the cause of
peace, our party unilaterally declared a cease-fire on March 17, 1993
which lasted for 83 days. But the Turkish government, refusing to
accommodate the wishes of the Kurdish and Turkish peoples to live in
peace, refused to acknowledge our goodwill.
Mr. President, Despite the continuing war, our party is ready for
an unconditional, peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. If we are
not attacked, we will not attack. We are ready to start a new unilateral
cease-fire. Allow me at this time to dispel some misconceptions
about our party, namely that we are like other classic Communist
parties and that we may be seeking to change the existing borders of
Turkey or that we insist upon separation from Ankara. None of these
assertions is true. We are also opposed to acts of terror. We want to
end the pain and suffering of both the Turkish and Kurdish peoples.
We want the record to show that we, as a party, are opting for peace
and stability, not only in Turkey but also in the region as a whole. To
that end, we are open to a federal solution, one that also prevails in the
United States of America. I have reason to believe that you will
support non-violent solutions to the Kurdish question. To that end, I
trust you will persuade the Turkish side to honor such a move. Your
support will mean that genocide against a people will be averted, its
cultural identity protected, and its democratic and political rights
ensured. Allow me to convey to you my deepest respects, Abdullah
Ocalan Chair of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
cc: Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole.
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich.
(American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), 2309 Calvert Street
NW number 3, Washington, DC 20008-2603; Tel: (202) 483-6444;
Fax: (202) 483-6476.)[=]
Release Number 3. PKK Leader Offers New Cease-Fire In Letter To
President Clinton. District of Columbia: American Kurdish
Information Network (AKIN), October 27, 1995. [99H-09031]
[19951027] We received the following letter from the European office
of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) in Brussels,
Belgium. It follows for your perusal verbatim:
October 13, 1995; President William J. Clinton, 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20500. Dear Mr.
President, As you are fully aware, the Kurdish question is becoming
more violent with each passing day. A democratic solution to this
enduring problem is of the utmost necessity. In our recent past, a
policy of genocide was visited upon the Greeks and theArmenians of
Anatolia. It seems as if, with some slight variations, this same policy
is now being inflicted upon our people, the Kurds. This policy has
expressed itself in a way which has denied our people the chance to
express their identity. The very existence of our people is slated for
systematic extinction. The Kurdish people are denied the most basic
human rights which are enshrined in United Nations declarations and
other international covenants. It is the policy of the Turkish state to
forcibly assimilate the Kurdish nation within its borders. In our land,
this policy of war has led to the destruction of over 3000 villages. In
the last ten years, some 3 million Kurds have been forced to migrate
from their lands. In attacks that are clearly supported by the Turkish
state, thousands of Kurdish politicians, writers and artists have been
Release Number 4. PKK Chair Announces Unilateral Cease-Fire;
PKK Chair Declares Unilateral Cease-Fire to Test Turkey for the
Cause of Peace. District of Columbia: American Kurdish Information
Network (AKIN), December 14, 1995. [99H-09033] [19951214] On
12/14/1995,PKK Chair Abdullah Ocalan announced an unilateral
cease-fire to test Turkey for the cause of peace in an interview with
the Kurdish satellite television station MED-TV. Journalists from
Turkey and around the world were present at the live press
conference with Mr. Ocalan on MED-TV. The PKK Chair said, "We
have announced a unilateral cease-fire. We wish to see how the new
Turkish government, which will come to power after the 12/24/1995
elections, approaches the Kurdish question. It is a goodwill gesture on
our part to give them the benefit of the doubt for new ways to deal with
the issue." Ocalan continued: "During the cease-fire, if the Turkish
military does not attack PKK forces, then our guerrillas will halt all
their offensive military actions." The PKK Chair announced this
cease-fire in response to attempts by the European Parliament to find
ways for a political solution to the Kurdish question. Another factor
was the desire to create more peaceful conditions for the upcoming
general elections in Turkey. PKK Chair Abdullah Ocalan stressed that
37
the unilateral cease-fire should not be interpreted as a sign of
weakness, rather as an illustration of the party's desire to enter into a
political dialogue. The PKK's desire, he said, is not to change
Turkey's present borders, but rather to bring about the co-existence of
the Turks and the Kurds by means other than war. Several European
countries, he said, have federated political systems, and something
similar could be worked out to accommodate the Kurds in Turkey. "If
Turkey wishes to be a party to the political solution to the Kurdish
question but does not want to enter into dialogue with our party, the
PKK, some other Kurdish institution could act as an interlocutor, so
long as the the existence of the PKK is accepted as a fact and the
reality on the ground is not misconstrued." Mr. Ocalan, moreover,
called upon the nations of Europe to establish a commission to
oversee the cease-fire and to redouble their efforts for the cause of
peace so that the momentum for a political solution is not wasted. He
noted that Turkey's recent admission into the European Customs
Union by definition has made the Kurdish question a European issue.
It is the duty, therefore, of European countries to bring an end to the
war in Turkey. PKK Chair Abdullah Ocalan called upon Turkey's
political and military institutions to respect the cease-fire. He also
called on the international community to acknowledge and give their
support to this peace effort. (American Kurdish Information Network
(AKIN) 2309 Calvert Street NW number 3 Washington, DC 200082603; Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
It is the duty, therefore, of European countries to bring an end to the
war in Turkey. PKK Chair Abdullah Ocalan called upon Turkey's
political and military institutions to respect the cease-fire. He also
called on the international community to acknowledge and give their
support to this peace effort. (American Kurdish Information Network
(AKIN) 2309 Calvert Street NW number 3 Washington, DC 200082603; Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
Release Number 5: Turkey Continues to Destroy Kurdish Villages;
Despite the Cease-Fire, the Turkish Army Continues to Destroy
Kurdish Villages. District of Columbia: American Kurdish Information
Network (AKIN), February 12, 1996. [99H-09035] [19960212] The
destruction of Kurdish villages in southeastern Turkey which began in
the early 1990s continues today, in spite of the unilateral cease-fire by
the Kurdish side which started on 12/15/1995. According to reports
reaching our office throughout recent weeks, close to 100 villages in
and around Divrigi, Zara, Hafik, Imranli and Ulas in Sivas province
havebeenbombarded by the Turkish air force using US-supplied
Cobra attack helicopters. The people living in these villages are
Kurdish Alewites, followers of a moderate Islamic faith considered too
liberal by fundamentalists and too supportive of the Kurdish liberation
movement by the Turkish state authorities. Many of these villagers
have been harassed to either become "village guards" or face the
consequences of forced migration in the middle of winter. Unwilling to
become the tools of the Turkish government to fight their kin, these
Kurdish villagers have had no choice but to move to the shantytowns
of large cities in western Turkey. The plight of these Kurdish villagers
was also voiced last Wednesday on 2/7/1996, by three of their
representatives from the Republican People's Party (CHP) in the
Turkish parliament who raised the issue during a press conference in
Ankara. They said: "People are under pressure and abandoning their
homes." (Reuters World Report, 2/7/1996.) According to a CHP
report, Turkish troops have arrested almost 500 villagers and 75
village leaders in the last four months. These new attacks on the
Kurds of Sivas, coming at a time when the PKK has adhered to a
unilateral cease-fire, show that the Turkish government is determined
to resolve the Kurdish question by way of force alone. (American
3 Washington, DC 20008-2603; Tel: (202) 483.6444; Fax: (202)
483.6476.) [=]
Release Number 4: PKK Chair Announces Unilateral Cease-Fire;
PKK Chair Declares Unilateral Cease-Fire to Test Turkey for the
Cause of Peace. District of Columbia: American Kurdish Information
Network (AKIN), December 14, 1995. [99H-09034] [19951214] On
12/14/1995,PKK Chair Abdullah Ocalan announced an unilateral
cease-fire to test Turkey for the cause of peace in an interview with
the Kurdish satellite television station MED-TV. Journalists from
Turkey and around the world were present at the live press
conference with Mr. Ocalan on MED-TV. The PKK Chair said, "We
have announced a unilateral cease-fire. We wish to see how the new
Turkish government, which will come to power after the 12/24/1995
elections, approaches the Kurdish question. It is a goodwill gesture on
our part to give them the benefit of the doubt for new ways to deal with
the issue." Ocalan continued: "During the cease-fire, if the Turkish
military does not attack PKK forces, then our guerrillas will halt all
their offensive military actions." The PKK Chair announced this
cease-fire in response to attempts by the European Parliament to find
ways for a political solution to the Kurdish question. Another factor
was the desire to create more peaceful conditions for the upcoming
general elections in Turkey. PKK Chair Abdullah Ocalan stressed that
the unilateral cease-fire should not be interpreted as a sign of
weakness, rather as an illustration of the party's desire to enter into a
political dialogue. The PKK's desire, he said, is not to change
Turkey's present borders, but rather to bring about the co-existence of
the Turks and the Kurds by means other than war. Several European
countries, he said, have federated political systems, and something
similar could be worked out to accommodate the Kurds in Turkey. "If
Turkey wishes to be a party to the political solution to the Kurdish
question but does not want to enter into dialogue with our party, the
PKK, some other Kurdish institution could act as an interlocutor, so
long as the the existence of the PKK is accepted as a fact and the
reality on the ground is not misconstrued." Mr. Ocalan, moreover,
called upon the nations of Europe to establish a commission to
oversee the cease-fire and to redouble their efforts for the cause of
peace so that the momentum for a political solution is not wasted. He
noted that Turkey's recent admission into the European Customs
Union by definition has made the Kurdish question a European issue.
Release Number 6: End the War in Kurdistan. District of Columbia:
American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), March 26, 1996.
[99H-09036] [19960326] 15 members of the United States Congress,
John E. Porter, Estaban E. Torres, Michael Bilirakis, Maurice
Hinchey, Frank Pallone, Jr., Edolphus Towns, Carolyn Maloney,
Anna Eshoo, Robert E. Andrews, William O. Lipinski, Frank R. Wolf,
Gary L. Ackerman, Charles E. Schumer, Elizabeth Furse and Robert
G. Torricelli in a letter to President Clinton urged him to play the role
of a peacemaker between the Kurds and the Turks. The text of the
letter follows verbatim.
"President William J. Clinton The White House 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20500; Dear President
Clinton, On January 23, 1996, in your State of the Union address, you
said, "...we can and should be the world's very best peacemaker."We
are writing to ask your help in bringing the blessings of peace to the
Kurds who are struggling against a cruel repression in southeastern
Turkey. Little known in our part of the world, this conflict has
devastated much of the Kurdish region in the country. Regrettably,
weaponssupplied to the Turkish army by the United States have
contributed in no small measure to this calamity. House Concurrent
38
Resolution 136 of the 104th Congress notes that, "... the human toll of
this conflict has been great, with the loss of more than 20000 lives, the
displacement of more than 3 million civilians, and the destruction of
more than 2,650 Kurdish villages." This war can be brought to a close,
Mr. President. The Kurdish people want peace. Their armed
leadership declared a unilateral cease-fire on December 15, 1995 to
pave the way for the difficult but essential task of the peacemakers. A
vast majority of the Turkish people and their true friends around the
world want peace too. It is the leadership in Ankara that insists on the
course of war. We urge you, Mr. President, to stop supplying arms to
Turkey so long as its abuse of Kurds persists and to offer your good
offices to these recently estranged peoples to reconcile their
differences. We ask you, Mr. President, to seize this moment of hope
for it also accords with your vision of a world free from major
conflicts.In Kurdish lands, we want the killing to stop, peace to prevail
and the civil rights of the Kurds protected. Sincerely yours," American
3 Washington, DC 20008-2603.
(The American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) provides a
public service to foster Kurdish-American understanding and
friendship; Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476). [=]
their side. It is now obvious to us that we either convince our
adversaries to sit down with us or we make them plead for it. They
who insisted on the course of war have now had us master this art.
Their losses now, again, bear witness to the truth of my statement.
The Turkish Chief of Staff still insists that the opposite is the case.
You all heard him say that despite six feet of snow and aninhospitable
terrain, his forces had done miracles displaying acts of valor that
were the envy of the most resolute fighters. True enough, there is a lot
of snow and the terrain has some of the steepest mountain ranges. But
what the general forgot to mention is that his 30000 troops were
ferried to the mountain tops by helicopters and that his planes were at
hand to carpet bomb selected sites at will and that the treasury of a
state was at his mercy to prosecute this war. If one were to brand his
soldiers with these means as paragons of valor, then what word
would be used to describe my units who, sometimes lacking proper
clothing and on many occasions living on a rather poor ration of food,
manage to hold on to the sacred crevices that make a mockery of the
Turkish general's claims. The fire that keeps my units resisting in the
snow, as soon as it comes into contact with the Turkish state will
bring it down in flames.
"I would like to make couple of other points. The present Turkish
Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz is not serious when he states that he
wants to solve this conflict by means other than war. The same goes
for the President of the country, Suleyman Demirel. The Turkish
Chief of Staff thinks no differently. They all say one thing and all do
something totally different. This has forced us take the responsibility
of our people into our own hands. We, now, are determining their
future. If they insist on the course of war, they will find us right in front
of them. But we remain committed to cause of peace for the welfare of
not just our people but also theirs. If they beat the drums of war, we
have a promise to our people. We will rest neither in the day nor in the
night. We will live just for one goal, liberation. We will fight to the last
of us, doing so as true believers would. We view victory as a
certainty. As we wage our war in the mountains and move on to the
cities, we ask our people to side with us body and soul. We have an
enemy that refuses to recognize our humanity and insists that we all
take our place on the trash heap of history. This we will not let to
happen. The martyrs of Kurdistan have paved the way; we are only
marching to their will. This is not a choice for us; It is the calling of life
on us." (American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN); 2623
Connecticut Avenue NW number 1; Washington, DC 20008-1522;
Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
Release Number 7: "The Fire that will Consume Turkey. District of
Columbia: American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), April 11,
1996. [99H-09037] [19960411] Editor's note: The Turkish war that had
come to a grinding halt for the past 4 1/2 months in northwest
Kurdistan, southeast Turkey, because of the unilateral cease-fire on
the part of the PKK, has erupted again, taking scores of lives. Some
30000 Turkish troops were ferried to the mountain tops in Amed
(Diyarbakir) province to fight units belonging to Semdin Sakik, one of
the most wanted Kurdish commanders of the People's Liberation
Army of Kurdistan, ARGK. Last year, Turkish soldiers dropping
leaflets from helicopters all over Kurdish lands promised one hundred
thousand dollars to the Turk or mercenary Kurd who would capture
Commander Sakik dead or alive. What follows is an edited version of
his lengthy statement to the Kurdish satellite television station MEDTV on 4/11/1996.
"We are in touch with all our units who have engaged the
Turkish forces. The enemy losses now stand at hundreds of soldiers.
On our part, to date, we have had seven casualties. The attack that
began with premeditated ferocity in Amed province has somewhat
died down. Now, there are new attacks elsewhere, in Mardin, Botan,
and southern Kurdistan [northern Iraq]. In these latter skirmishes, we
have had one fighter die; the Turkish losses are high, again
somewhere in three digits. There are important lessons to be learned
from this latest coordinated Turkish attack on the Kurds. The hand that
we extended for peace remained empty in the air. Lest it may be
unclear: that hand is still in the air waiting for a shake from the
adversary. The policy makers on the other side ought to know this
truism that the military victory is and will remain a mirage relative to
us. The casualty figures of these latest battles alone point to the
inefficacy of war on their part. We are impervious to the loss of
Turkish soldiers who are becoming the casualties of this war. We
know this for a fact that we are on the right path for the type of war that
will undo our adversaries sooner rather than later. A handful of my
units have inflicted 30000 Turkish troops hundreds of losses. This
know-how is the source of our strength; an important milestone that
guarantees us success. This is an important lesson that we would like
to impart on adversaries as well. I suggest the Turkish cabinet
discuss the merits of our proposition on 4/25/1996, when they have
their periodical meeting, again. Some have raised their voices again
that we stop the war and disengage again. These people have us by
Release Number 8: Kurdish Official Arrested In Washington: Turkish
Government Convinces US to Arrest Kurdish Activist in Washington
DC. District of Columbia: American Kurdish Information Network
(AKIN), April 16, 1996. [99H-09038] [19960416] In a bold move, trying
to discredit the peaceful efforts of the American Kurdish Information
Network (AKIN), the government of Turkey persuaded the US State
Department to seek the arrest of Kani Xulam, that group's respected
spokesman in Washington, D.C. Xulam has been advising members
of Congress and the Administration of the atrocities perpetrated by
Turkish armed forces in their destruction ofover 3000 Kurdish
villages, the murder of tens of thousands of civilians, and the forced
relocation of millions. Turkey relies on US military aidto enforce its
denial of fundamental human rights to some 20 million Kurds. Xulam
comes from Turkish occupied Kurdistan, where he - as all other
Kurds - was forbidden to use his native Kurdish language. Now, on the
pretext of "passport fraud", the State Department initiated legal
proceedings which resulted in Xulam's arrest last week and his
appearance on Monday in US District Court in Washington, D.C.
In an affidavit to the court, the State Department claimed that it
39
had been informed by the government of Turkey that Xulam "may be a
member" of a terrorist organization. Based on that allegation by a
foreign power that seeks to silence Xulam, the federal magistrate
detained him. Apparently, the government is afraid Xulam may flee
the country and they want him held so that he can be deported. Some
twenty local human rights activists appeared to speak for Xulam's
character and long time commitment to seek peaceful solutions to the
present conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the Kurdish
people. Among them were Kathryn Cameron Porter, President of
Human Rights Alliance and wife of Rep. John Porter (R, IL.), Maryam
Elahi of Amnesty International, and Sister Patricia Krommer of the
Human Rights Foundation. Although the AKIN offices in Washington,
D.C. were searched and its papers rummaged, it is still operating and
will continue to campaign for the rights of Kurds everywhere.
Ralph D. Fertig, Secretary of the Board of Directors of AKIN and
a former federal administrative judge for the EEOC in Los Angeles,
commented: "It is clear that these proceedings against Xulam are
testimony to his effectiveness in alerting American public officials to
the use of US tax dollars to support and equip the Turkish government
in its violation of basic human rights of the Kurds. Xulam is a
dedicated pacifist, and his efforts have been used in the best American
tradition of peacefully petitioning the US government. Neither he nor
his cause shall be silenced." Respectfully, J. Azboy Director,
American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) 2623 Connecticut
Avenue NW number 1; Washington, DC 20008-1522; Tel: (202) 4836444; Fax: (202) 483-6476. [=]
his deportation hearing. Shortly before his release by the INS, Mr.
Xulam presented an application for political asylum, claiming that as a
result of his political and human rights work on behalf of the Kurds and
his efforts to stop US arms sales to Turkey, he would face
persecution, torture, and possibly death if forcibly returned to Turkey.
That application is now pending before the INS with a decision
expected in the next several months.
In a statement released today, attorney Peter A. Schey stated:
"We believe that the United States government's criminal and
deportation charges against Kani Xulam are politically motivated and
were encouraged by the government of Turkey. The United States
government is more concerned with its strategic relations with the
undemocratic government of Turkey than with the human and
democratic rights of the Kurds. Mr. Xulam and the American Kurdish
Information Network are dedicated to reaching a peaceful resolution of
the conflict in Turkey, a war which today continues to result in the
burning of Kurdish villages in southeastern Turkey, the massive
displacement of Kurdish refugees, and the persecution of Kurds
seeking democratic reforms."
For more information, contact: American Kurdish Information
Network, (202) 483-6444 Peter A. Schey, Center for Human Rights
and Constitutional Law, (213) 388-8693, ext. 104; American Kurdish
Information Network (AKIN), 2623 Connecticut Avenue NW number
1, Washington, DC 20008-1552. The American Kurdish Information
Network (AKIN) provides a public service to foster Kurdish-American
understanding and friendship. [=]
Release Number 9: Kani Xulam Free On Bail, Back At Work In
Washington, D.C. District of Columbia: American Kurdish
Information Network (AKIN), June 3, 1996. [99H-09041] [19960603]
On 4/12/1996, Kani Xulam, Director of the American Kurdish
Information Network (AKIN), was arrested by armed US federal
agents in Washington, D.C. Mr. Xulam was charged in federal court
with having acquired a United States passport in 1986 using an
assumed name. He was also charged by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) with having overstayed a visitors visa
after entering the United States in 1985. During the arrest, federal
agents raided Xulam's home and the offices of AKIN, seizing
computers, video tapes, and documents, all materials related to Mr.
Xulam's human rights efforts on behalf of the Kurds. The Department
of Justice initially took the position that Mr. Xulam should be held
without bail since he was allegedly linked to unidentified "terrorist"
groups operating on behalf of the Kurds of Turkey. Kani was held
without bail for approximately 40 days, often detained in solitary
confinement, before being transferred to Los Angeles, California
where the criminal charge was filed. Following his arrest, the United
States Department of Justice convinced a federal court judge in
Washington, D.C. that Mr. Xulam should be held without bail on the
criminal charge. On 5/14/1996, a federal appeals court in Washington,
in response to an emergency petition filed by attorney Daniel Alcorn,
overturned the decision to hold Mr. Xulam without bail and ordered
that his eligibility for release on bail be reconsidered by the lower
court. By the time the appeals court ruling was issued, Mr. Xulam had
been transferred to Los Angeles.
On 5/15/1996, Mr. Xulam, now represented by Los Angeles civil
rights lawyer Peter A. Schey, President of the Center for Human
Rights and Constitutional Law, was ordered released on $50000 bail
by a Los Angeles federal magistrate. Under the terms of his release,
Kani is permitted to travel throughout the United States and continue
his work on behalf of AKIN. Mr. Xulam was then transferred to the
custody of the INS. On 5/20/1996, the INS agreed to release Mr.
Xulam without bail on his own recognizance, pending the outcome of
Release: About AKIN. District of Columbia: AKIN, N.D. [1996?] [99H09094] [19960101] The American Kurdish Information Network
(AKIN) is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization established in 1993 to
serve the information needs of this country relative to the Kurds. It
does this to fulfill two needs: ours, to hold a mirror to the events that
are taking place in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, and those of the
American public, to enable them to have access to collected materials
on the subject. AKIN hopes to function as a bridge over which
friendships and knowledge are exchanged to the benefit of both
peoples. Its aim is to increase awareness about the Kurds in this
country. AKIN is comprised of Americans of Kurdish origin and recent
Kurdish immigrants and refugees from all walks of life:
entrepreneurs, blue- and white-collar workers, students, and
American supporters. AKIN collects, translates, and disseminates
information about the Kurds. It hopes to become a valuable resource
center for policy makers, scholars, and students of the region. At the
same time, it seeks to promote understanding between the Kurds and
the Americans. In Kurdistan, AKIN wants the killings to stop, peace to
prevail, and the will of the people to be respected and accepted. "One
of the greatest tragedies in Turkey's history is happening now. Our
Kurdish brothers are being slaughtered, and apart from a couple of
hesitant voices, no one is standing up and demanding to know what
the Government is doing...What will come of all this?" - Yasar Kemal,
perennial candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature
AKIN: provides the latest news on the situation in Kurdistan;
exposes every form of human rights violation and repression against
the Kurdish people; informs the public about the political and cultural
developments in Kurdistan.
AKIN aims: to disseminate information to the press and media;
to solicit the support of human rights organizations; to secure the
interest of Congress, political leaders, and other democratic and
progressive forces; to publish documents, reports, and books related
to the politics and culture of Kurdistan; to provide information and give
advice to journalists, representatives, and human rights activists
intending to visit the region.
40
AKIN publications include: press releases and occasional
newsletters; daily English translations from the DEM News Agency;
documents and resolutions from the Kurdish Parliament in Exile;
reports from government officials, lawyers, and human rights
organizations concerning human rights abuses in Kurdistan.
"We must never again leave millions of men, women, and
children at the mercy of the Turkish army." - Danielle Mitterand, wife
of the former President of France
AKIN calls for: an independent international human rights
investigation into widespread human rights abuses committed against
Kurds, particularly against Kurdish women; a UN special
investigation into torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial
executions, and for the perpetrators of these grave violations to be
brought to trial; the Kurdish people to be allowed to exercise their
fundamental universally-acknowledged right to self-determination; a
negotiated settlement to the Kurdish question, with the Turkish
government agreeing to open an unconditional dialogue with
representatives of the Kurdish people; the US, Canada, and all
European countries to immediately stop supplying weapons to Turkey
and to issue an arms embargo and impose economic sanctions; all
nations to end the deportation of Kurdish refugees to Turkey; the
United States government to recognize and support the Kurdish
Parliament in Exile; tourists to boycott Turkey as a holiday
destination.
"...Kurdish people throughout southern Turkey, very ordinary,
humble people, have decided they would rather die standing up than
spend their lives on their knees...it was the most extraordinary and
inspiring sight of my life...I hope one day they have the kind of
freedoms we take for granted." - Michael Ignatieff, writer and
broadcaster.
(American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), 2623
Connecicut Avenue NW number 1, Washington, DC 20008-1522; Tel:
(202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 483-6476). [=]
found that "weapons supplied by Turkey's NATO partners, especially
the United States, play a central role in abuses committed by Turkish
security forces". It then recommends that the US government "End all
military sales and security aid to Turkey until such time as Turkey no
longer engages in a pattern of gross human rights violations, as
required by section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act". We agree
wholeheartedly with this recommendation. The Kurdish people
continue to ask for peace, so why is it that our calls are continually
ignored? On 10/13/1995, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, sent
a letter addressed specifically to President Clinton, stating once again
that the Kurdish forces were willing to agree to an immediate
unilateral cease-fire if Turkey would call off its own attacks. As the
PKK leader stated, continuing to insist on a military solution to the
Kurdish question would only "cause more bloodshed in Kurdistan and
harm the interests of the people of Turkey". President Clinton never
responded to this letter. The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan is
of the opinion that it would be a moral and political mistake for the US
government to go ahead with its sale of ATACMS missiles to Turkey.
America should cease being a party to the genocide being carried out
against our people. The sale of these weapons would only serve to
destabilize the region even further. Representative John E. Porter,
Co-chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, outlined
such concerns in a November 15th letter to Secretary of State Warren
Christopher. In reference to past American arms sales to Turkey,
Porter siad, "Our military aid and equipment is being used to prolong
a brutal war which is overwhelmingly opposed by the Turkish
people." To quote Representative Porter again, "The Kurdish side has
repeatedly shown a willingness to find a political solution, only to be
flatly refused by the government." We remain committed to finding
peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish question. But it would
make it harder for us to continue our repeated overtures for peace if
the West's only response is to arm the Turkish forces with even
deadlier weapons. Rather than promoting war and destruction, the US
government should use its influence in the Middle East to promote
human rights and democratic forces. It is not in America's long-term
interest to continue supporting the war-mongers in Ankara. The time
is right for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. America should
not spoil this potential by selling ATACMS missiles to Turkey.
(ERNK European Representation) [=]
Release: Kurds Respond To US Missile Sale To Turkey. District of
Columbia: American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN),
November 26, 1995. [99H-09032] [19951126] (We received the
following statement from the ERNK office in Brussels, Belgium. It
follows for your perusal verbatim:) National Liberation Front of
Kurdistan (ERNK): Press Release - November 26, 1995:
The Clinton Administration has agreed to sell 120 army tactical
surface-to-surface missiles (ATACMS) to Turkey. As if the Kurdish
people have not suffered enough atrocities at the hands of the Turkish
military--artillery barrages fired on their homes, tanks patrolling their
streets, American-made helicopters destroying their villages--now
they will be the victims of ballistic missiles capable of carrying their
payload of more than 950 small bombs over distances of close to 200
km. As the Peace Process between the Israelis and the Palestinians
advances, as the bloodshed in Bosnia nears its end, and as President
Clinton prepares to travel to Northern Ireland to validate the cease-fire
there, why must the Kurdish people be subjected to ever more
destruction? Just last week, on November 21, Human Rights
Watch/Helsinki published a report entitled Weapons Transfers and
Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey. This report offered
documented proof of serious human rights atrocities committed by the
Turkish armed forces. Human Rights Watch put the figures for the
war thus far at 19000 dead, 2000 Kurdish civilians murdered by
Turkish death squads, more than two million internally displaced
persons, and over 2000 villages destroyed. Although we feel the real
figures are tragically higher, no one can deny that a profound human
tragedy is taking place in Kurdistan. The Human Rights Watch study
Release: Mrs. Clinton At Topkapi Palace. AKIN, March 26, 1996.
[99H-09098] [19960326] Hillary Rodham Clinton is on a tour of five
countries for ten days. Among the places she is scheduled to visit is
Turkey. While in that country, she is going to give a speech on the
coexistence of secular governments and religious societies. A better
topic for a speech in Turkey would be an address on the coexistence
of peoples. A talk on the virtues of tolerance coupled with the need to
lift the restrictions on the freedom of speech and freedom assembly
would be a more fitting message for t he peoples that make up
Turkey, primarily the Turks and the Kurds. Perhaps they would learn
to accommodate one another. But it looks like Mrs. Clinton asked her
hosts what they would like to hear. And the politicians in Ankara still
hurting from their recent losses to the Islamic Welfare Party asked
the First Lady to tell the citizens of Turkey to be modern with the
empha sis on the secularism. No one has come to as close to oblivion
as they have. They want the First lady to help. It is a great plot in an
equally fitting spot. The secular Mrs. Clinton delivers the coexistence
speech at the Topkapi Place, the White of House of theocratic
Ottoman Empire for over 500 years. The Turkish leaders could then
tell to the Turks, look, you could be secular and modern too just like
the First lady. One wonders if the Turks will take their guest and her
entourage to the Harem section of the Topkapi Place. There hundreds
41
of primarily European women were kept in seclusion as concubines.
If a nything, feminists should protest the choice of the spot for Mrs.
Clinton's address. Were Mrs. Clinton to chose to address the 58
million citizens of Turkey on the virtues of coexistence the ideal spot
for the occasion would be Ankara Prison. That symbol of Turkish
injustice towards the Kurds has now four duly elected Kurdish
parliamenta rians languishing behind its bars. Among them is a
woman, Mrs. Leyla Zana, who was elected to the Turkish parliament
in 1991 and who now serves a 15 years jail sentence since 1994.
The Kurdish question in Turkey now ranks as the country's
number one crisis. At issue is an antiquated constitution that legalizes
the forced assimilation of the Kurds. Turkey, home to some 15 million
Kurds, has laws that equate the cultivation of the K urdish language as
a crime. The framers of the Turkish constitution wanted to create the
"modern Turk." That meant everybody who lived in Turkey
irrespective of his heritage or cultural needs had to assume a new
identity, that of a Turkish nationalist. There are Kurds who have
assimilated at early age and now are now respected Turks. Some
have even made it to the top positions in the administration of the
government. The Turks who are opposed to the idea of giving any civil
or cultural rights to the K urds are quick to cite the names of these few
lucky Kurds supposedly to make the point that discrimination is not a
practice in the land administered by the Turks. For the advocates of
the Kurdish rights, discrimination is not the problem. They want
political rights, civil rights, cultural rights, language rights, in other
words, the rights to a heritage that is meaningful for them which they
would like to cultivate and impart on their posterity as a gift. Leyla
Zana was one of those advocates. She was a Kurd by birth and
wanted to remain so by choice. She was born in a Kurdish village in
1961 and would probably have been a refugee now had she not
married Mehdi Zana, who in 1977 became the mayor of Diyarb akir.
Since then things have never been the same for her.
In 1980, the army seized power in Turkey. Thousands of Kurds
who were demanding their political and cultural rights were thrown
into jails. The mayor of Diyarbakir was a known Kurdish activist.
Sensing the danger, he fled but was caught before he could leave
Turkey. He was kept in jail for 13 years on a charge that he had
spoken an illegal language, his mother tongue, Kurdish, with his
constituents. Leyla Zana came of age in those turbulent times. A
mother of two children, the wife of a noted Kurdish activist, she
entered the political fray, for her husband and for her people. That
meant learning Turkish which she did in her trips to the Western T
urkish cities where her husband was kept in prison. As she saw her
husband deteriorate in health and in spirit, her resolve to become a
Kurdish advocate grew. In 1991, when she ran for a seat in the
Turkish parliament, she almost always drew the largest crowds ever
assembled in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. Leyla Zana and her
friends served in the Turkish parliament for only three years. In those
years, she lost a fellow Kurdish parliamentarian to the bullets of
gunfire. Together with three of her colleagues, they are now serving a
15 year sentence in the infamous Ankara Prison. Six others fled the
country seeking political asylum in Europe. Still others got death
threats which compelled them to switch parties or be dismissed from
their jobs because they refused to be silenced.
The Kurdish question refuses to go away. Since 1984, some
30000 people have died in the Turkish state's effort to crush Kurdish
aspirations. 2650 Kurdish villages have been destroyed. 3 million
Kurds are now internal refugees. Because Leyla Zana seeks a
peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, she was awarded the 1995
Sakharov Peace Prize by the European Parliament. She was also
among the finalists for the Nobel Peace Prize for the same year. A
visit by Mrs. Clinton to Mrs. Zana would mean doing the right thing. It
would mean validating an advocate of democratic change and giving
the forces of peace in the country the recognition needed to carry on
their difficult yet essential task. In Turkey, peace, order and the human
dignity are in demand; Mrs. Clinton should not fail to deliver these
gifts.
(American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN) 2309 Calvert
Street NW number 3 Washington, DC 20008-2603; Tel: (202) 4836444; Fax: (202) 483-6476.) [=]
Release: Turkey's War Crimes. AKIN, N.D. [1996?] [99H-09097]
[19960101] Just a few weeks ago, "The European", a weekly
newspaper published in London, England, had a picture with a warning
on its front page. It showed a Turkish soldier holding the decapitated
heads of two Kurds. The caption read: "Pictures that will shock the
world."
A closer look at the pictures and the story which accompanies
them reveals that these photographs depict the triumph of five Turkish
soldiers over the dead bodies of four Kurdish rebels. In one picture,
two of the naked Kurds are headless, one lying on his back and the
other on his stomach. The first has a rope tied to his ankles and the
second has a rope tied around his trunk, betraying the not uncommon
practice of dragging dead bodies behind armored vehicles in Turkey's
southeast. Historians tell us that the warriors of Ghengis Khan did the
same to their victims, only with horses rather than army vehicles. In
another picture, a soldier in his twenties is holding the two severed
heads while smiling at the camera and his comrade in the background
is smirking. There are other pictures and other depravities. Suffice it
to note that one is uglier than the other and each alone is enough to
make Kurds and their friends sick for days. For days now, I have been
staring at these pictures. I have been telling myself: "One of the
decapitated heads is yours." It is an eerie feeling. Just stop and think
of it: somebody staring at you holding your decapitated head. I have
made a point of looking at the reactions of Kurds who confront these
pictures for the first time. They feel utterly numb. Think of a people
without faith, without love, without hope and with lots of pain. That is
what the Kurds of Turkey have become. These pictures and the
heinous crimes they show are not aberrations. These scenes are
repeated often in southeastern Turkey, the historical land of the Kurds.
Armed with East German rifles, West German armored vehicles and
sophisticated American weapons, Turkish soldiers are creating the
largest moonscape on the face the earth, raining death and destruction
on the Kurds and their land. House Concurrent Resolution 136 of the
104thCongress notes that more than 2,650 Kurdish villages have
been destroyed in this most recent Turkish assault on the Kurds. The
French philosopher Voltaire wrote that the worst kind of death is to be
obscurely hanged. The slaughter of the Turkish Kurds is a good
example of that. Ask the Kurds for the name of a people that supports
their cause for civil rights and there is not an answer.
In Turkey, where the majority of an estimated 25-30 million
Kurds live, resistance is costly; as the pictures show, even your dead
body is not immune from abuse and degradation. Public office is
costly, too, as is proven by the case of 13 duly elected Kurdish
deputies who lost their seats in the Turkish Parliament. Four were
sentenced to 15 years in prison for advocating the legitimate rights of
their people. Ankara has tried everything in its power to discourage
the Kurds from demanding their rights. It has tried force. Nothing has
come of it. It has tried the "village guard" system in which poor Kurds
are armed to teeth and inculcated with hatred for their kin. The upshot
has been a disaster: Kurds killing Kurds to the chagrin of their friends.
It has tried religion, the opium of masses in the words of Karl Marx,
and again the policy has not worked. But something quite unexpected
has taken root in Turkey because of the heavy emphasis on religion.
The Islamic Welfare Party scored the highest number of votes in
42
Turkey's latest parliamentary elections. This was the result of an
unscrupulous campaign by Turkey's leaders, first to undermine the
rising tide of Kurdish national consciousness by inculcating a
universalistic Islamic ideology which they considered less dangerous
than the Kurds, second by using the rising tide of Islamic threat in
order to manipulate opinions in the European Union and the United
States so as to secure closer military and economic ties. The late
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat encouraged Islamic fundamentalist
organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood in order to use them
against alienated Egyptian youth who were increasingly turning to
Marxism. But he himself became the victim of the forces to which he
gave a free reign. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood within the
Egyptian military gunned him down. Maybe there is something called
poetic justice in the world. Maybe we Kurds will get our civil rights
after Turkey travels the same road taken by Iran. Maybe then the
State Department will recognize our sacrifices of pain and blood and
let us have our due.
(American Kurdish Information Network American Kurdish
Information Network (AKIN) 2309 Calvert Street NW number 3
Washington, DC 20008-2603; Tel: (202) 483-6444; Fax: (202) 4836476.) [=]
tolerated in a relatively free environment which preserved them to our
own time. The Turkish Republic, which rose from the ashes of the
Ottoman Empire, was conceived on a promise of full rights for the
Kurds. Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish general who courted the Kurds to
join with the Turks to liberate the remnants of the empire, said nothing
at the time of the unitary state that he later advocated and which to this
day his successors have defended. He knew of the promises of selfdetermination made to the Kurds at the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, and
yet he succeeded in convincing them that an Islamic comity of two
peoples, that of the Turks and those of the Kurds, held forth better
prospect than the Kurds' alliance with the "infidels" of the West.
The Turkish and Kurdish war of liberating what is today called
Turkey lasted some four years. At the peace talks in Lausanne in
1923, Mustafa Kemal sought legitimacy for his gains. In a symbolic
act which his successors are emulating with the same adroitness, he
sent a Kurdish envoy, Ismet Inonu, to the negotiating table. Mr. Inonu
pleaded with his British interlocutor that the Kurds wanted no special
rights and would be happy to be part of the Turkish Republic. To
assure the British that this indeed was the case, Ankara even stooped
to the time-honored ploy of having reputable Kurdish representatives
sendtelegraphic messages to the British at the peace conference
stating that the Kurds were in favor of a "union" with the Turks. The
Lausanne Treaty of 6/24/1923 officially sanctioned the division of the
Kurdish lands among five states. Turkey proved to be the largest
beneficiary holding onto 43% of the land. Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the
Soviet Union got 31%, 18%, 6%, and 2% respectively. It is difficult to
establish the current Kurdish population figures in these states, since
the governments that have the Kurds in their custody choose to ignore
the matter or offer figures that run contrary to demographic trends.
Unofficial figures vary from a low of 25 million to higher estimates of
some 40 million Kurds. Of these, some 15-20 million live in Turkey.
The life of the Kurds after Lausanne made the theocracy of the
Ottomans seem enviable by comparison. Soon after the agreement,
Ataturk (meaning "Father of the Turks", the name now given to
Mustafa Kemal) abandoned all of his pre-war promises to the Kurds
and conceived of Turkey as being a unitary state comprised of one,
and only one, people: the Turks. His rallying cry "Turkey belongs to
the Turks!" became the creed which to this day forms the basis for
Turkish national consciousness. Even today, the Turkish Constitution
reads: "The Turkish state, its territory and people, is one and
indivisible. The language is Turkish. These facts cannot be changed,
nor can changes be proposed."
What the "facts" of the Turkish Constitution overlooked were the
rights of the Kurds, theArmenians, the Greeks, and other natives of
Anatolia who now were told to call themselves Turks because Ataturk
had so decreed. The Greeks, as late as the 1950s, were
systematically uprooted, sometimes by force and sometimes by
provocative acts which compelled them to flee and leave everything
that they had behind. TheArmenians were silenced by the massacre
of 1915, prompting Hitler two decades later to argue that what the
Turks had done with impunity, the Germans could emulate against the
Jews. The Kurds were a different matter. To begin with, there were
more of them, and they were Muslims, like the Turks. Something
more than brute force was required to undo them. Meticulous plans
were made for such an act of social engineering. The solution was
sought in forced assimilation. In a generation or two, the Turkish
social engineers wanted to erase all references to the Kurds.
Beginning in 1924, the Kurdish language was banned. Then came the
laws which enabled the authorities to give Turkish names to
everything that had a Kurdish name. All at once, Kurdish cities, town,
villages, and hamlets acquired new Turkish names. For example, the
maps that were printed when the Ottomans ruled the area have
references to the Kurds and their land, Kurdistan; modern Turkish
10106. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN. The Turkish
Ship Is Sinking The US Government Is Guiding It To The Rocks.
Statement by the American Kurdish Information Network before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe hearing on
"Turkey - US Relations: Potential and Peril", Tuesday, September 19,
1995 - Washington, D.C.. [99H-09095] [19950919] We live in an age
that has witnessed some remarkable changes. Films such as "The
Day After", which chilled us with the thought that we may be the last
generation, can now be forgotten. Apocalyptic books such as
Endgame may for now, we hope, gather some dust. But the new
times, though promising, have brought new challenges in their wake.
The emerging scenes, the clearer they become, now seem like vistas
from "The Killing Fields". The beast in us has a way of prevailing over
our nascent humanity to inflict untold misery and sufferings upon the
human family. Reported and under-reported tragedies in places like
Rwanda, Bosnia, Kurdistan, and East Timor clearly show how fragile
is the bond of our civility. In some cases greed, in others racism
prevents us from making this world a better place for all. One realm
which has remained impervious to the vast changes that have taken
us by surprise is that of Turkish/American relations. Ankara has
insisted that the special relationship it enjoyed throughout the Cold
War remain intact, arguing that nothing has changed to its north, and
that even greater menaces now lie to its east (i.e., Iran) and southeast
(i.e., the Kurds). The United States government seems to have
accepted this Turkish logic, or as some cynics would put it, the Foggy
Bottom has not yet awakened to the fact that the Soviet threat is gone.
In our view, this unchanged policy endangers Turkey's stability and
imperils American interests. The problem is the Kurdish question, -every night it is the number one issue on Turkish television news, -which has demanded a civil solution but has thus far only received a
military response. Such an approach is nothing new in Turkey. What
is new this time, however, is that Turkey faces an organized
resistance from a popular mass movement that has passed the
threshold of unbecoming by means of force. A cursory look at the
origins of this problem will reveal some rather disturbing facts. First
divided between the Ottomans and the Persians in 1639, the Kurds
lived quietly on their mountains, oblivious to the world until 1923. To
be sure, they were the subjects of the far-flung Ottoman and Persian
Empires and suffered their share of the indignities that are the lot of
captive peoples. But, most important for the subject of this paper, their
land, Kurdistan, and their language, Kurdish, were respected and
43
maps, leaving aside the impartiality of science, refer to the entire
region as Turkey.
As can be expected, the Kurds did not take lightly the death
warrant that was issued in their name. They rose to undo the
legislation that was condemning them to the dustbin of history. Long
before United Nations Resolution 3103 sanctioned the use of force in
liberation struggles, the Kurds fought on several occasions (most
notably in 1925, 1930, and 1937/38) to gain control over their destiny.
Until the 1980s, however, all their uprisings were crushed. Known
Kurdish leaders were hanged. Their relatives and followers were
deported. As if the memory of the defeats were not enough, the
Kurdishlandscape, especially visible sites such as high mountain
slopes, were selected for onerous expressions such as "Happy is he
who can call himself a Turk!", which were spelled out with stones in
large fonts. If there ever was a psychotherapist for nations, he or she
would treat the Turkish case as one that suffers from a severe
inferiority complex. In no other part of the world has one witnessed
such blatant self-adulation or environmental degradation over the
lands of subject peoples. If the purpose of these Turkish maxims all
over the Kurdish landscape were to instill love and respect for the
Turks, the opposite has happened. The Kurds have resisted and the
Turks have enforced the racist laws that were instituted by Ataturk
and his cronies. Today, the struggle has taken the form of a massive
resistance led by the armed forces of the ARGK, the People's
Liberation Army of Kurdistan, the military wing of the PKK. This
struggle has become an all-out war on the part of the Kurds to prevail
overdeath, while the Turkish military does all it can to keep the
fascist legacy of Ataturk intact. There are a number of published
reports which document the cost of this Kurdish struggle for freedom
and liberty. One of the most compelling is a small book entitled "File
of Torture: Deaths in Detention Places or Prisons", published by the
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey in 1994. It lists the violent deaths
of 420 political prisoners in custody since 1980. And, as the fighting
intensifies, other reports keep surfacing. Derya Sazak, in the July 25th
edition of the Turkish daily "Milliyet", quotes the governor of State of
Emergency Region, which states that 2665 Kurdish villages have
been destroyed in the conflict. That is an official Turkish government
statistic. The uprooted villagers, their numbers now in the millions,
have moved to the cities where they live in shantytowns, without jobs;
they are seething with anger and restlessness against the system.
The Kurdish liberation struggle has no friends at Foggy Bottom.
Washington is not even a disinterested party in this conflict. The US
administration has literally given a blank check to Turkey. Jennifer
Washburn, a research associate at the World Policy Institute in New
York, in a recent commentary in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, had this
to say about Turkish/US relations: "Since the Turkish crackdown on
the Kurdistan Workers Party began in 1984, the United States has
contributed to the conflict by arming Turkey to the hilt, exporting more
than $6.3 billion worth of weapons to an undemocratic, military-led
government engaged in a ruthless campaign of terror against its
Kurdish population. From 1987-91, Turkey bought 76% of its weapons
from the United States. From 1990-93, when the counterinsurgency
war intensified and human rights abuses worsened, that number
increased to 80%."
There is a saying in Turkish that might shed some light on the
nature of Turkey/US relations. It goes something like this: "Give a
man a hammer and he will think all problems are nails." Turkey has
been supplied with plenty of hammers by the United States
government, and it is the Kurds who are being ruthlessly pounded like
nails. This obviously has engendered anti-American feelings among
some Kurds. They assert, and the available data supports them, that
the Turkish government could not continue its dirty war against the
Kurds without massive amounts of aid and assistance from
Washington. The continuation of present policy does not serve the
interests of the US government for a number of reasons. Sooner
rather than later, it will backfire. Notwithstanding Turkish claims, it is
not just one group of Kurds but rather the Kurdish people as a whole
who are targeted by American-made weapons. If Washington wishes
to avoid a debacle in Ankara, it needs to seriously rethink the ties
which have blinded it to Turkey's war aims. Lest it not be clear, a few
Turkish generals who have appointed themselves to the National
Security Council in Ankara are pushing their country to the brink of an
abyss. It will not serve the United States government well to associate
with such brutes.
The following are our recommendations for putting Turkey/US
relations on a more healthy course:
(1) The US government should demand that Turkey make
fundamental changes to its Constitution and grant democratic and
political rights to the Kurds. Turkey says it wants the fighting to stop,
but it refuses to deal with Kurdish demands for a civil solution to the
conflict. This is like trying to solve an equation without dealing with
one of the given variables. In mathematics, this is impossible; in
politics, it is no different. The Turkish government would do itself a
favor by distancing itself from the fascist ideology of Ataturk and
accepting the values of democracy and humanity, and the laws of
science, and thereby recognize the existence of the Kurds by
reforming the republic's anachronistic Constitution. The United States
government would be a beneficiary of such a step as peace and
stability would then revisit Turkey.
(2) The US government should advocate that Turkey address its
Kurdish problem by means of democratic policy and reconciliation,
rather than taking the more dangerous route of courting Islamic
fundamentalism. Turkey is keeping the Islamic card up its sleeve, so
to speak, so as to blackmail support from the West. In the words of a
recent Foreign Relations Committee delegation which just returned
from Turkey: "Despite claims that it regards fundamentalism as a
threat to its secular heritage, the government of Turkey appears to be
encouraging and even sponsoring Islamic activities in an attempt to
bind the country together and defuse separatist sentiment." But the
Islamic movement in Turkey has a different compass than the
government officials would like it to follow, and Turkey's present
policy "could backfire and inadvertently provide a foothold for Islamic
extremists." In 1994, voters in two of Turkey's largest cities, Istanbul
and Ankara, elected Islamic mayors from the fundamentalist Refah
Party who oppose the separation of religion from the state. Turkey is
edging dangerously close to Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism. It
is not in the interests of the United States government to see an
Islamic theocracy come to power in Ankara. Rather than trying to
subvert the rising Kurdish movement by fomenting religious strife
(remember the massacre in Sivas in 1993 and the bloody scenes in
Istanbul in March of this year), Turkey should take a more sound and
reasoned approach to the issue. Only this can guarantee a place for
Turkey among the nations of the West, thus preserving a vital ally of
American foreign policy in the troubled region of the Middle East.
(3) The US government shouldencourage negotiations between
the Turkish government and Kurdish representatives. One step in this
direction would be to recognize the Kurdish Parliament in Exile. The
Kurds of Turkey are a fact of life. When their duly elected
representatives to the Turkish Parliament were jailed in 12/1994,
Kurds in Europe responded by forming a Parliament in Exile in April
of this year. This body has stated that a political solution to the Kurdish
question is the preferred option for a durable settlement. It would be in
the interest of the United States government to recognize the Kurdish
Parliament in Exile to serve as a starting point for negotiations with
the Turkish government. Such a gesture would give much needed
encouragement to those Kurds who have tried again and again to seek
44
a peaceful and democratic solution to this question, but who have met
with nothing but violence and repression at the hands of the Turkish
state.
The Kurds of Turkey, as the philosophers would put it, have
freed themselves in their thoughts. No amount of force will cause
them to abandon their natural right to life with dignity. But even the
PKK, the most militant of all Kurdish parties, has time and again
expressed its willingness to forgo its stated goal of creating an
independent Kurdistan and to entrust the complexities of the situation
to the negotiating table, hinting that a federal model could be the basis
for a solution. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, on 3/17/1993
and again on 5/25/1995, has gone on record expressing the wish to do
his share to bring an end to the this enduring conflict. But a deafening
silence has prevailed in Ankara. Historians have noted that it is the
mark of statesmanship when the policy makers have foreseen
problems and charted courses that have steered the ship of state from
rocky paths. The present Turkish government is refusing to deal with
the problem at hand, because the Turkish military is not letting them
do so. The top brass simply has too many hammers to allow the
tedious but essential work of the politicians to take over. With each
passing day, more and more body bags are flown back to western
Turkey as more and more Turkish soldiers are sent to the eastern
provinces to fight in a war which has lasted for far too long.
It is an irony of history that the head of the present US
administration, President Bill Clinton, refused to serve in the armed
forces because he opposed a war which he felt was unjust; now, two
decades later, he is fueling a conflict which nearly everyone would
agree is inhumane. President Clinton on numerous occasions has
expressed his "understanding" for Turkey's armed forays against the
Kurds. How can a man who felt the Vietnam War was immoral now
"understand" the need to wipe out thousands of Kurdish villages and
condemn millions of Kurdish civilians to live their lives as refugees?
Twenty years ago, the adventure in Vietnam was wrong; student Bill
Clinton was right to protest. Today, the war in Kurdistan is just as
wrong; President Bill Clinton, however, is pursuing a policy which is
wholly misguided from the standpoint of human rights. We trust that
Bill Clinton will help right this wrong, and do so soon. [=]
during the first decades of the republic, when there were massacres
in Genc, Palu, Ararat and Dersim. In Dersim Ataturk is seen as the
saviour of the Alevis. This is the outcome of the assimilation
programme carried out after the massacres. A cult of obedience built
around Ataturk similar to that described by Orwell in "1984" around
the figure of Big Brother has existed in Turkey since the founding of
the republic. The peoples living in Turkey must realize the reality of
the situation. Whatever Hitler was for the Jews, Ataturk is for the
Kurds. Whatever Hitler and National Socialism was for the Germans,
Ataturk Kemalism is for the Turkish people. One of the most
significant aspects of the growing freedom movement in Kurdistan is
its realistic approach to the question of Ataturk-Kemalism and its
correct analysis of this phenomenon. In order to create a free,
prosperous and peaceful life it is essential to wage a struggle against
the monster of Kemalism. This is the duty of all democratically
minded people in Turkey and is something that must be undertaken
without delay. Ozgur Politika, 2/13/1996. [=]
10108. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN; Konuk, A.
Kadir. "Angry Reactions to Atrocity", in AKIN News, February 1996.
[99H-09068] [19960201] First the Turkish embassy in London said the
soldiers in the picture "were not Turkish". Then the Turkish General
Staff claimed the photographs were "photomontage", that is the
soldiers were Turkish but, according to the Turkish General Staff, the
severed heads were specially added to the photos later. Anyone with
any common sense would find such an explanation absurd. I can also
make such claims: The chief of the General Staff Karadayi is
Erbakan's aunt. They did this with photomontage. In October 1994, the
General Staff made similar claims about the burning of villages in
Tunceli, alleging "separatist circles used pictures purporting to be
Turkish soldiers to give the impression that 'the Turkish security
forces are burning villages'". They forced a village chief to appear on
television, but when asked who had burnt the villages he said:
"Soldiers did it". What became of him I wonder? When Ciller claimed
that the PKK had helicopters, I remember how everyone made fun of
her. In fact, it is the Constitution of Turkey and its laws that are
photomontage. Take away the European label and you will see the
brutality of nomadic tribes. Take the American weapons away from
the Turkish army and nothing will remain. Ozgur Politika, 1/16/1996.
[=]
10107. American Kurdish Information Network; AKIN; Kili, Naim.
"The Alevis and the Kemalist Reality", in AKIN News, February 1996.
[99H-09063] [19960201] In Milliyet of 30 January there was an article
about a court case involving 100 people being tried for involvement in
the incidents in Gazi neighborhood in March 1995. The Secretary of
the Hack Bequeaths Veil Cultural Association Sucker Cetin saw that
th ere was no picture of Ataturk behind the judge [this is obligatory in
courts, classrooms etc. in Turkey] and said to the judge "I want Attar's
photograph to be behind you". The other defendants expressed the
same wish. It is impossible (for those who kno w the reality of
Kemalism) not to feel physically sick to hear such a request. You will
remember that during the Gaza incidents the police, educated to be
conscious of "Ataturk principles and reforms" fired on the crowd
consisting mainly of Alevis, killin g over 20 people. This they did
instead of finding the people responsible for the shooting of three
people in a cafe that sparked the protests. The Kemalist state also
arrested and tortured many of those who protested and is now trying
them. These Alevi c itizens, victims of the police, now want to be
honored by a photograph of Ataturk, who inspires the police. Ataturk
and his associates slaughtered tens of thousands of Alevis in Dersim
(1937-38), and his followers killed hundreds in Maras, Corum and
Sivas , and most recently 37 Alevi intellectuals were burnt alive in
Sivas while the police looked on. Despite this some Alevis who claim
to be intellectuals and progressives can still say "We want Ataturk".
Ataturk was declared to be the father of the Turks an d made sacred
10109. American-Jewish Committee; Anglo-Jewish Association;
Landshut, S. Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the
Middle East: Chapter 3: Iraq: Part 01. A Survey Prepared for the
American-Jewish Committee and Anglo-Jewish Association.London:
Jewish Chronicle Ltd., April 1950. pp. 42-46. [97H-00112] [19500401]
An examination of the development of Muslim-Jewish relations in Iraq
reveals two noteworthy features, apparently at variance with each
other. On the one hand, probably in no other Muslim country has the
Jewish minority been so closely associated with the whole fabric of
social and political life as in Iraq. On the other hand, in none has antiJewish feeling in recent years been so general and nowhere have
anti-Jewish measures been applied so systematically.
The Jews in Iraq constitute, as far as we know, the oldest
Jewish settlement outside Palestine. Indeed, even if the origin of the
House of Abraham in Ur of the Chaldees is disregarded, Jewish
settlements in Iraq can be said to have first taken place about 600
years before Jews from Palestine emigrated to Egypt. The majority of
the Jews now living in Iraq are the direct descendants of those Jews
who, after the destruction of the First Temple 2500 years ago, were
led into exile in Babylonia and remained there after the return of some
of their number to Jerusalem with Ezra.
But the great antiquity of the Jewish community is not, of course,
45
the sole reason for the exceptionally close bonds which unite Iraqi
Jews to their country and their non-Jewish neighbors. "They have
made themselves an integral part of the nation. Both in business and
in politics they have always played a big part." (E. Main: Iraq, 1935.)
Their close association with all aspects of the life around them is
in part due to the fact that the proportion of the Jewish minority in Iraq
to the rest of the population is far higher than in other Muslim
countries. Whereas the Jews in Egypt represent only 0.4% of the total
population, in Iraq they amount to about 2.5%, and as much as 25% in
the capital, Baghdad.
It should be noted that it is more difficult to determine the total
number of Jews in Iraq than in Egypt. For while in Egypt the Jewish
population is almost exclusively concentrated in the big towns, in Iraq
it is dispersed up and down the country, including some scattered
among the Kurdish tribes in the North.
The Kurdish Jews live somewhat apart from the rest of the
Jewish community, just as the Kurdish minority lives apart from the
Arab population. Both are different from the Arabs in general character
and daily habits. The language of some of the Kurdish Jews is Syriac
(a form of Aramaic), while those in Mosul speak Kurdish. They are
mainly traders and craftsmen and live scattered among the various
Kurdish villages and towns. In the Amadia district, however, there can
be found a number of Jews engaged in tilling the land. It is difficult to
make even an approximate estimate of how many Jews live in these
villages, perhaps 5000-6000 at most. They have remained relatively
untouched by the events of the past few years, which have had such a
revolutionary effect on the rest of the Jewish community.
The total Jewish population of Iraq is estimated at 120000.
Although this figure may be out of date, it is probably not far wrong, if
allowance is made for emigration, on the one hand, and increase in
the birthrate, on the other. Of these, between 90000 and 100000 live in
Baghdad. But neither is it the larger number of Jews in the country as
a whole nor their concentration in the capital which accounts for the
difference of their position, at least in the past, from that of their
coreligionists in Egypt.
Most important is the fact that Western influence on Iraqi Jews
being no stronger than it was on the town-bred Muslims, was much
weaker in Iraq than in Egypt. Middle class Jews in Iraq took to
European dress at about the same time as the Muslims. Likewise, in
their daily habits, their houses, and, last but not least, in theirlanguage
there was no marked difference between the two communities. Arabic
has always been, and still is today, the mother tongue of both Jew and
Muslim.
True, as a result of the higher educational facilities provided by
the activities of the Alliance Israelite Universelle and the AngloJewish Association, knowledge of French or English is more
common among the Jews than the Muslims. But this difference has
never been sufficient to detract from the central fact that Western
influence on the Jews has not been much stronger than on other Iraqi
communities. All this is in strong contrast to the situation in Egypt and,
again unlike Egypt, there has been no noticeable immigration of Jews
from European countries.
During the 19th century the Jewish community in Iraq was fairly
prosperous; and freedom to develop was assisted to no small degree
by the two proclamations issued by the Sultan of Turkey in 1839 and
1856. At that time there was already a considerable number of well to
do families. The schools of the Alliance helped to raise the
community's educational standard. When the first Chamber of
Deputies was opened in Istanbul in 1876, it included a representative
of the Iraqi Jews (Menahem Danyiel) and, later, after the Constitution
of 1900, the community was represented by Hezkiel Sassoon, a
retired senior Ottoman Government official.
During WWI, however, the Jewish community suffered great
hardships at the hands of Turkish governors. Just prior to the fall of
Baghdad in 1917, some of its leading members suffered death, torture,
and imprisonment.
When, therefore, the Arabs rose against the Turks and made
common cause with the Allies, the Jews regarded the fight for
liberation as their own. They welcomed the establishment of the new
Iraq under British Mandate, and many immediately offered their
services in the building up of its administration. From the
establishment of the new country, the Jewish community, and
especially . its leading members, have been as much bound up with
its development as their Muslim neighbors.
Hezkiel Sassoon was appointed Minister of Finance and
continued to hold this office in several successive Cabinets: A Jew,
David Jamra, was appointed Vice-President of the Court of Appeal.
Other Jews occupied important posts in various departments,
particularly those concerned with the administration of ports,
railways, and finance.
The large number of Jewish officials in the public service was
due to the fact that the sudden demand for officials and clerks could
only be satisfied in the main from the Jewish and Christian minorities,
with their higher educational standards. During the period of the
Mandate (i.e., until 1932), and even in the first years of Iraq's
existence as an independent State, the high proportion of Jews in
Government service caused no offence. Their talents and skill in
office work were most valuable to a Government seeking to prove
Iraq's readiness for independence.
The Jewish communities in Baghdad and Basra are among the
wealthiest in the entire Middle East. The names of some of the leading
families, such as the Sassoons and the Khadooris, are known even in
other countries. There also exists a large middle class of small
bankers, retailers, agents, merchants, civil servants, clerks, and
physicians and lawyers, together with other members of the liberal
professions. There are, among the poorer elements, many small
shopkeepers, and likewise many craftsmen of one sort or another,
masons, carpenters; and also domestic servants. There is no special
Jewish quarter in Baghdad, Jews being found in all parts of the town,
though they do tend to congregate in certain streets of different
quarters.
The community is well organized. In Baghdad it has established
a great number of welfare and social services, a hospital, and about
25 schools. By 1930, 7200 pupils were attending the ten schools under
Alliance administration. Thanks to these services, the state of health
and the general standard of education of the Jews are far above the
average level in Iraq. 90% of the candidates from Iraq for the London
matriculation examination, for instance, used to be Jews.
The community is governed by a lay council of 60 members,
who are entitled to impose certain taxes (e.g., on meat) and to allocate
the necessary funds to the various institutions. These funds have
made it possible to admit pupils to elementary schools free of charge.
There is also a religious council, under the Chief Rabbi, Haham
Benjamin, which maintains the communal courts dealing with all such
matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like. Until his
resignation at the end of 1949 the overall Head of the community was
the universally respected Haham Sasson Khadoori.
This partial communal autonomy arises from Article No. 79 of
the Constitution of Iraq. The internal organization of the Jewish
community is regulated by a special law passed in 1931, which laid
down the composition and functions of the various institutions of the
four communities in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and Diyalah (near
Baghdad).
The position of religious minorities, including the Jews and
Christians, was laid down by the electoral law of 1924, which allotted
46
four deputies to represent each of these communities in the Chamber
of Deputies. There has been some argument as to whether the law
permits individual Jews or Christians to be elected as representatives
of general constituencies. But the argument has been purely
academic, since no Jews or Christians have ever presented
themselves as candidates.
Apart from this, Iraqi law recognizes equal citizenship for nonMuslim minorities and their right to a full share in the public affairs of
the State. This right had until recently always been respected and was
much valued by the leading personalities of the Jewish community.
Except for a natural interest in developments in Palestine, there
has never been any feeling of solidarity with the political aspirations of
Zionism. The repeated assurances of loyalty to Iraq, which the Chief
Rabbi and other leading Jewish personalities have felt it necessary to
make during the Palestine crisis, were not merely the result of outside
pressure but were statements of fact. (For the declarations of the
Jewish community in Baghdad, and of the then Head of the
community Sasson Khadoori, see The Jewish Chronicle, 12/30/1949;
New York Times, 4/9/1947, and 3/27/1948; and Manchester Guardian,
12/10/1947.)
It is against this background of a prosperous Jewish community,
closely associated with the country since time immemorial, and not
less interested in the common wellbeing and development of Iraq than
their Muslim fellow citizens, that the gradual deterioration in mutual
relations and the growing aggressiveness of the Muslim majority
towards the Jews must be examined.
The first signs of the storm to come appeared, far earlier than in
any other Muslim country, in 1928, when the first Lord Melchett, on a
visit to Palestine, journeyed on to Baghdad. Wild rumors circulated
about the nature of his visit, which was alleged to be connected with
designs concerning the National Home in Palestine. This caused
hostile demonstrations. As far as the Jewish minority in Iraq itself
was concerned, however, there was not at that time the slightest
indication of any hostility on this ground towards it. Neither was there
any suspicion of Zionist sympathies among Iraqi Jews.
There was also an economic factor. Not only were Jews
prominent in the public service but most of the employees in large
Arab business firms were also Jewish, owing to the difficulty of
finding suitably qualified personnel among the Muslim population.
Since secondary and higher education in Baghdad had always been
freely available to Jews, and many had been granted State
scholarships for study abroad, the community's educational standards
were higher than those of the Muslims.
In the first years of Iraq's newly won independence, this liberal
attitude began to wane. In 1935 the Iraqi Government prohibited the
teaching of Hebrew. Only after repeated remonstrances was
permission finally granted for the use of Hebrew, but for strictly
religious instruction only. By 1937, Philip W. Ireland, in his book on
Iraq, was already remarking on the increased difficulties encountered
by non-Muslims wishing to enter the Government service. Doubtless
this restriction was occasioned by the increasing number of qualified
young Muslim candidates in search of appointments. In 7/1939, the
importation of any "Zionist" literature was banned.
On the whole, it would be true to say that these measures were
occasioned less by any policy directed against the Jewish minority,
as such, than by a nationalist reaction against Zionism, which the
Iraqis saw as a rival nationalism to their own, and rooted in Europe at
that. In any case, Iraq was the only Muslim country where the
recommendations of the Bludan Conference were carried into effect.
[=]
Middle East: Chapter 3: Iraq: Part 03. A Survey Prepared for the
American-Jewish Committee and Anglo-Jewish Association.London:
Jewish Chronicle Ltd., April 1950. pp. 49-53. [97H-00114] [19500401]
The most vivid example, both of vague indictment and of the
Government's financial greed, was the case of the Jewish multimillionaire, Shafiq Ades, of Basra (the only one of the accused, by the
way, who was sentenced to death and hanged in public).
Although his trial was reported and discussed in detail by all the
newspapers, it was never clearly established whether there was any
connection between his sale of surplus British military equipment to
Italy in 1946 and the alleged discovery of the same material in
Palestine two years later. The proceedings were held mostly behind
closed doors, and the court went so far as to refuse the defense
counsel admission to the courtroom. Among many other curious
details in this trial, this extremely wealthy capitalist was accused both
of "Communism" and "Zionism"! The point to note is that Ades's
sentence enriched the Government's treasury by L5 million. The day
of his execution was turned into a festival. It was declared a public
holiday; thousands of people flooded into Basra from the countryside,
and photographs depicting every detail of the hanging appeared in all
the newspapers.
There is little doubt that the majority of contributions towards the
fund raised for the prosecution of the Palestine campaign and, later,
for the assistance of Arab refugees, came from Jews. During 5/1948
and 6/1948, Baghdad radio broadcast a long list of Jewish names and
their contributions. According to reliable estimates, these total about
500000 dinars.
Over and above the swelling of the Iraqi warchest, most of the
methods adopted in the anti-Jewish campaign suggest that generally
the Government, with popular support, was actively engaged in
extorting as much money as it could from the Jewish community.
Early in 7/1948, for instance, 40 leading Jewish business men were
arrested on a charge of trading with the Soviet Union and thus
allegedly supporting a Communist regime. It so happens that many
Muslim commercial firms had engaged in similar transactions, many
of which had taken place several years before. It also happens that
these transactions were the direct result of the Soviet-Iraqi trade
agreement. But in the case of the 40 Jews these factors were quietly
ignored. The true motives for their being charged became quite
obvious when it was learnt that all 40 were released on payment of
various sums of up to 10000 dinars.
In 10/1948 of the same year the Treasury issued an order to the
effect that all Iraqi Jews living abroad would forfeit their property
unless they returned to Iraq at once. The total sum which the
Government obtained by means of fines, confiscations, "guarantees,"
andforfeiture of property was certainly a substantial proportion of
Jewish-owned wealth in Iraq. It may be computed at something well
over L10 million pounds. This official draining of Jewish resources,
moreover, was accompanied by a great deal of private blackmail,
made possible by the helplessness of the victims.
To a Western observer this record might appear proof of
systematic persecution. The thinly disguised extortions from the
Jewish community, the arbitrary, and often stupid accusations, the
onslaught on a helpless minority whose loyalty could not reasonably
be questioned. all this would appear at first glance as something more
than an attempt to make certain of public security in an emergency;
the record seems to bear all the signs of deeply rooted anti-Jewish
hostility. But if that were true, how would it be possible to explain the
excellence of the relations between the communities but a few years
ago and the obvious recognition in former years of the Jewish
population as an integral part of the nation?
The answer must be sought in the workings of the Eastern mind.
There would be no room in a survey of this kind to attempt a
10110. American-Jewish Committee; Anglo-Jewish Association;
Landshut, S. Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the
47
description of the subtle blend of human passions, age old habits, and
deep seated prejudices which have gone into the forging of the
Oriental tradition of thought or to estimate how that tradition of thought
has reacted to the impact of Western civilization, with its conception
of law and human rights. It is, however, necessary to draw attention to
certain points.
To begin with, the Arab States which emerged from WWI
represented an attempt to create the whole fabric of the Western
nation-state out of a galaxy of various semi-independent tribes, self
consciousand self centered city populations, rival clans, powerful
landowners, interspersed with minorities of different races and
religions. This complex had no common tradition beyond the
allegiance of the majority to Islam.
The consequence was that from the beginning the Arab States
rested on social foundations of the most insecure kind. Symptoms of
this have been a very characteristic shrill aggressiveness of national
outlook and an almost comic attachment to national dignity, coupled
with an exaggerated anxiety lest the State's new-found independence
should be threatened in any way or its sovereignty infringed.
In the case of Iraq, no sooner had the new State come into
existence than this excessive national sensitiveness resulted in a
wave of feeling against its very creator and helper, Britain. And when
King Faisal whose great ability and authority had succeeded in
surmounting many initial difficulties, died just at the end of the
mandatory period (1933), the struggle for key positions in the
Government was intensified thereby adding a new element of
insecurity.
Rival tribal chieftains, with their dependants and hangers-on
began competing with each other for the favors of extremist parties
and contributed to making every change of Government an event of
greater or lesser violence. Rashid Ali's coup d'etat in 4/1941, was
merely one of a series of such changes; it was only the most striking
because of its dangerous political and strategic implications in the
middle of a world war.
This ever-present latent tension was aggravated by the inability
of succeeding Governments to cope with urgent problems of social
reform, agricultural development, finance, and administration. As
early as 1942, the budget showed a deficit of L1.334733 million despite
the big royalties paid to the Government by the oil companies for the
exploitation of the oilfields. During the first six months of 1948,
imports exceeded exports by L17 million, while the country's whole
foreign trade amounted to only L27 million. Hence the prevailing
nervousness in official circles of Communist propaganda, a fear
which frequently reached hysterical proportions.
To cap everything, there has been the problem of minorities. The
absence of ethnical homogeneity has always been the weak spot of
newly created States; the more so when religious and racial
differences alienate the minorities from the majority, making the
latter, rightly or wrongly, always suspicious of the minorities.
Ever since the formation of the State of Iraq, the Kurds, a Closeknit minority numbering more than 700000 in the mountains of the
North, have repeatedly revolted against the Government in Baghdad
and not without grounds.
The unsatisfactory nature of the State's relations with the
minorities was made worse by a shocking event in 1933. In that year,
a large group of Christian (Nestorian) Assyrians, who had crossed
into Syria and wanted to reenter Iraq, was brutally massacred by a
detachment of the Iraqi Army.
The event sent a wave of horror among all the Christian
minorities dwelling in the country. (Under considerable official
pressure, the Christians, coreligionists of the victims, and, of course,
the Jews, were forced to contribute large sums towards a fund in aid
of the survivors whereas the amount of money subscribed by the
Muslim majority ,was, in the absence of any such pressure, small.)
In any case, the position of any minority dwelling amongst a
Muslim population must always be delicate. Constitutional guarantees
and protection by law will never induce the Muslim masses, with their
innate conservatism and lack of education, to abandon their inborn
distrust of the non-believer.
In the case of Iraq, whose rise as a nation-state was threatened
at the outset by minority troubles, this factor was particularly
important, especially as the predominance of British influence for
many years has made the populace hyper-sensitive about the
country's national independence.
As for the Jews, so long as general attention was not focused on
them specifically, their position was no worse than was normal for
any non-Muslim minority in an Islamic country. If anything, their age
old connection with the country, their important economic and social
position, and the obvious absence of any separatist tendency among
them made their position rather better than that of most of the other
minorities.
But the steadily growing atmosphere of political insecurity and
distrust was bound in the long run to bring about a deterioration. That
deterioration became serious as soon as it became possible for the
Muslims to suspect any sense of solidarity between Iraqi Jews and
those in Palestine.
On balance this much can be said: the nature and extent of
recent persecution does not mean that, in altered circumstances,
there can be no ultimate return of the peaceful relationship which
existed between Muslims and Jews in Iraq formerly.
Indeed, once the fever of the anti-Jewish campaign had passed
its peak, that is, by the end of 1948, there is plenty of evidence to show
that many educated Muslims had begun to have second thoughts.
Here and there Jewish officials who had been dismissed were asked
to resume their posts. The return to the premiership of Nuri Pasha alSaid (the most experienced and esteemed of all Iraqi politicians)
raised hopes of better relations, especially as the fanatically
nationalist Minister of Defense, Sadiq al-Bassam, the man largely
responsible for the sinister activities of the courts martial, was forced
to resign.
It was then that the Jewish representative in the Senate, the
universally respected Ezra Danyiel, was able to appeal to the
Government for justice and to remind the Senate of the long-standing
loyalty of the Jewish community. On the whole, this speech had a
favorable effect, and resulted in official assurances that in future the
rights of the Jews to treatment as citizens enjoying equal rights with
other citizens would be respected. Since then, Jews have been able to
reopen their businesses.
Yet the future must remain uncertain. As this Survey goes to
press, reports are being published to the effect that the Iraqi
Government has now decided to allow Iraqi Jews to emigrate, on
condition at they give up their Iraqi citizenship. It is not clear, at the
time of writing, whether there are any other conditions attached. In
view of what has happened in recent years, however, there can be
little doubt that a large scale exodus from Iraq to Israel is to be
expected in the near future.
As for those who remain, it would be idle to pretend that their
future prospects are bright. In so far as they can expect a measure of
ability and security, this must, to a large extent depend on the
governments of Israel and Iraq reaching, if not agreement, at any rate
satisfactory modus vivendi. At the present time there is not even an
armistice agreement between the two countries; and Iraq, which does
not border upon Israel territory, has shown no anxiety to improve
relations. [=]
10111. Amnesty International. Iraq: 'Disappearances': Unresolved
48
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 01: Summary. MDE 14/05/97.
London: Amnesty International, October 1997. [98H-08420][19971001]
Since the early 1980s hundreds of thousands of "disappearances"
have taken place in Iraq and remain unresolved. These became
particularly widespread during the Iran-Iraq war and during Operation
Anfal in Iraqi Kurdistan where over 100000 Kurdish civilians are
believed to have "disappeared" in a space of 3-4 months in 1988. In
addition to suspected political opponents, many of the "disappeared"
victims included those who were arrested as "hostages" in order to
force a relative, sought by the authorities for their political opposition,
to surrender, those arrested because of family link to a political
opponent,andthose arrested because of their ethnic origin. In the
latter category, entire Iraqi families of Iranian descent were deported
to Iran and thousands of male members of such families were
arrested and later "disappeared". Their fate and whereabouts remain
unknown to this date. Further "disappearances" occurred during the
1990s, in the aftermath of the 1990/1991 Gulf war and more recently,
when Iraqi Government forces were sent to Iraqi Kurdistan at the end
of 8/1996 to support forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
in military conflict with forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK). Hundreds of suspected political opponents were arrested by
Iraqi Government forces and "disappeared".
Amnesty International continues to receive reports of
"disappearances" and has raised its concems on the issue with the
Government of Iraq on a number of occasions. So far the Iraqi
Government has failed to clarify the fate of the "disappeared" or take
concrete measures to end the practice. In this report Amnesty
International renews these appeals to the Iraqi Government and calls
on the International community to ensure that Iraq complies with its
International obligations. [=]
military and security personnel the authority to execute any persons
attempting to retum to their homes. Some Kurdish estimates put the
figure at 150000-180000 "disappeared" victims. AmnestyInternational
has the names of about 17000 people who "disappeared" during that
time. About five years earlier, in 8/1983, Iraqi forces arrested some
8000 men and boys, aged between 8-70, from the Barzani clan near
Arbil. A group of 315 children and young people, aged between eight
and 17 at the time of their arrest, were among those arrested. They
were first taken to Baghdad and then transferred to unknown places.
All have "disappeared". The operation was believed to have been
carried out as retaliation for alleged Kurdish support for the Iranian
armed forces during the Iran-Iraq war. On 9/12/1983, President
Saddam Hussain said in a speech: "We will punish those who cooperate with Barzani's sons, just as we punished the Barzani sons
themselves and those who cooperated with them in the past. Those
people were severely punished and went to Hell...".
Ever since the 1960s and 1970s entire families have been
deported to Iran by the Iraqi authorities. With the outbreak of the Iranlraq war in September 1980, the practice became widespread and
thousands of families were forcibly sent to Iran. They included Arab
Shi'a Muslim families who were declared by the authorities to be "of
Iranian descent", taba'iyya, and Feily Kurds who, unlike the majority
of Kurds, are Shi'a Muslims. [Prior to the creation of the State of Iraq
in 1921, all persons living in that region were registered under either
the Ottoman or Iranian protectorates. The two protectorates were
divided along confessional lines: Sunni Muslims (both Arabs and
Kurds) were registered under the Ottoman protectorate, while Shi a
Muslims (both Arabs and Kurds) were registered under the Iranian
protectorate. When the State of Iraq was created and Iraqi nationality
introduced. each person was obliged to register on his/her nationality
form his/her original protectorate. The thousands of families deported
to Iran by the Iraqi Government in the 1980s were those whose
original protectorate was ran, referred to as tabailyya.] However,
thousands of male members, including minors, of those families who
were deported to Iran, were arrested and detained. Although the
majority were kept in acknowledged places of detention and had
access to relatives, thousands were later transferred to unknown
places and "disappeared".
At the end of the 1990-1991 Gulf war, and following the 3/1991
uprising by Arab Shi'a Muslims in the south and by Kurds in the north,
serious human rights violations were reported, including
"disappearances" and extrajudicial executions. The fate and
whereabouts of 106 Shi'a Muslim clerics and students remain
unknown. It is believed that around 12000 people arrested in
connection with the 1991 uprising continue to be detained in alRadwaniyya garrison, south-west of Baghdad. Amnesty International
has appealed on numerous occasions to the Iraqi Government to
clarify the fate of the Shi'a clerics and students but has received no
response. During the same period, when the Iraqi forces pulled out of
Kuwait, more than 600 Kuwaiti and other nationals were arrested and
taken to Iraq. Despite international pressure nothing has been heard of
them. The sole exception is Nadia Muhammad al'Anaizi, a Kuwaiti
woman, believed to be one of those arrested in Kuwait and taken to
Iraq, who was released by the Iraqi authorities in May 1996.
In 8/1996, when Iraqi forces and forces of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) seized the northern city of Arbil, until then
under the control of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), hundreds
of suspected members of opposition groups and their relatives are
believed to have "disappeared". They were reportedly taken to
detention centres and prisons in areas under the control of the Iraqi
Government.
It does not always take a major crisis such as the 1991 uprising
or the 1996 interKurdish conflict to witness an upsurge in human
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 02: Background. MDE 14/05/97.
("I cannot believe he is dead because there is no body and no grave. I
cannot rest my heart or mind until I know the truth".) These were the
words of a mother who wrote to Amnesty International in 2/1996 about
her son, Mazin. He was arrested in Baghdad in 1988 and nothing has
been heard of him since. Nearly ten years on and his"disappearance"
remains without an answer. The Iraqi authorities have remained silent
about Mazin's case and about the cases of hundreds of thousands of
others who have "disappeared" since the early 1980s. In 4/1997 the
UN Commission on Human Rights in its fifty-third session passed a
resolution condemning: "... the massive and extremely grave
violations of human rights and of International humanitarian law by the
Government ofIraq...".[Resolution1997/60,E/CN.4/1997/L.11/Add.6,
4/17/1997] A month earlier, the UN Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances submitted its report to the UN
Commission on Human Rights. Among the countries where
"disappearances" remain a major concern, Iraq topped the list with
more than 16000 submitted cases still unresolved.
Amnesty International has on numerous occasions over the
years expressed its concem at the practice of "disappearances" by
the Iraqi authorities. Cases have been documented in several reports.
The organization has obtained and continues to receive the names of
thousands of victims whose fate and whereabouts remain unknown.
As an example, according to some estimates over 100000 Kurdish
civilians "disappeared" in 1988 alone, in a space of 3-4 months, in the
socalled Operation Anfal when the Iraqi Government implemented a
program of destruction of villages and towns all over Iraqi Kurdistan,
ostensibly in order to resettle the inhabitants in areas which offered
improved conditions. An estimated 4000 villages and towns were
destroyed and razed to the ground and decrees were issued giving
49
rights violations. These are carried out on a daily basis. In September
1996 former detainees told Amnesty International how they were
arrested, beaten, tortured and then released without ever knowing the
reason for their arrest. Relatives would not inquire about their
whereabouts for fear of suffering a similar fate. For many years
Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidis and Shi'a Muslims were the
main victims of human rights violations. However, since the
imposition of UN sanctions on Iraq in 1990, even those considered to
be "safe" became the target for arrest, torture and "disappearance".
They include joumalists, businessmen, artists, female students and
army officers. This, and the harsh living conditions that have resulted
from UN sanctions, have led to a significant increase of Iraqi asylum
seekers abroad. Mass executions of prisoners and detainees continue
to be reported and in 1994 the Iraqi Government introduced a series of
decrees extending the use of the death penalty and imposing
amputation of hands and ears and branding of the forehead for theft,
army desertion and a number of criminal offences.5 In 8/1996,
however, the Iraqi authorities informed Amnesty International that the
decree imposing ear amputation and branding of the forehead for
army desertion had been annulled.
The issue of "disappearances" in Iraq remains a very difficult
area to investigate. In the majority of cases, once a person has
"disappeared" it is virtually impossible to find out any information
regarding his or her fate or whereabouts. The victims do not have
access to families or lawyers. Trials, when they take place, are
conducted in total secrecy. Families ofthe "disappeared" remain
ignorant of their fate until they are either released or confirmed to have
been executed. Inquiries directed to the authorities are met with denial
of arrest or further threats. It took nine years for the al-Hashimi family
to learn from the authorities that their father, Isma'il, was executed in
1983, three years after his "disappearance". However, when
opposition forces took control of towns and cities in northern and
southern Iraq during the 1991 uprising, prisons and detention centres
were broken into and the inmates released. Hundreds of them, who
had "disappeared" in the 1970s and 1980s, were found to be still alive,
having been held in secret underground detention centres.
This report documents cases of people who were arrested and
subsequently "disappeared" as far back as 1980, cases of victims that
the International community at large has failed to address. They are
forgotten victims whose families continue to wait and hope. In most
cases the victims were not members of any opposition political party
or grouping, either legal or illegal. They were arrested as "hostages"
in order to force a relative who may have escaped abroad to
surrender, because of their family link to a political opponent, or
simply for their ethnic origin. [=]
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in 3/1994. Neither
Amnesty International nor the UN working group has ever received
any response from the Iraqi Government. In 6/1993, Amnesty
International obtained an official document, dated 4/1984, containing a
list of 58 people whose properties and possessions were being
confiscated by the Iraqi Government. The names of three of the alHashimi brothers, Ibrahim, Iyad and Isma'il, appeared on the list. It is
a common practice for Iraqi political detainees or suspected
opponents who flee abroad to have their properties and possessions
confiscated by the government. This was the first time the authorities
had, albeit indirectly, acknowledged the detention of at least three of
the brothers. In 4/1997, Amnesty International received confirmation
that the eldest of the al-Hashimi brothers, Isma'il, was executed on
8/3/1983. A copy of the death certificate was made available to
Amnesty International. Isma'il was accused of failing to report to the
authorities about Ja'far's opposition activities. Isma'il's son,
Mohammad Hussain, who was 12 years old in 1980, witnessed the
arrest of his father inside his pharmacy in the Karada district of
Baghdad. He fled Iraq in 1994 to seek asylum abroad. No further
information is available on the six remaining brothers. [=]
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 04: Disappearance Due to Political
Activities of Family Members: Al-Sheibani Brothers. MDE 14/05/97.
In early 1980, four brothers, 'Adil, Faysal, Salam and Fazil alSheibani were arrested in the city of Karbala'. Nothing has been heard
of them since then. Their arrest is believed to be connected with their
brother, 'Adnan's membership of an illegal Islamist opposition group,
al-'Amal al-Islami. He had escaped to Iran in order to avoid arrest.
Other family members who were on a visit to Syria at the time of the
arrests did not return to Iraq for fear of being arrested. [=]
Activities of Family Members: Sayyid Muhammed Sadeq
Muhammad Radha al-Qazwini. MDE 14/05/97. London: Amnesty
International, October 1997. [98H-08424] [19971001] Sayyid
Muhammad Sadeq Muhammad Ridha al-Qazwini, a Shi'a cleric,
born in 1900, was arrested at night on 8 April 1980, at his home in
Karbala'. Security forces climbed over the walls of his garden, broke
into the house and took him away in his night clothes. At first he was
taken to Mudiriyyat 'Amn Karbala, Karbala Security Directorate, and
held there for two weeks. He was then transferred to Mudiriyyat al'Amn al-'Amma, General Security Directorate, in Baghdad, and from
there to Abu Ghraib Prison. Since then he has had no access to family
members. In 1986 a prisoner who was released from Abu Ghraib
Prison said he had seen Sayyid Mubanunad Sadeq Muhammad
Sadeq al-Qazwini there. He reported that he was still alive but had
lost his eyesight. Since that time no news of him has reached his
family. A teacher of religious studies, Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq
Muhammad Ridha al-Qazwini was not known to have been involved
in any political activities. However, his sons abroad had reportedly
taken part in political activities against the Iraqi Government. The
family believes Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq Muhammad Ridha alQazwini was arrested in order to put pressure on his sons abroad to
stop their anti-government political opposition. There are concerns for
his health as he was known to suffer from a hernia and urinary
problems. [=]
Activities of Family Members: Al-Hashimi Brothers. MDE 14/05/97.
In 1980 seven brothers of the al-Hashimi family were arrested on the
same day, 1 October, at different locations in Baghdad. They were
believed to have been initially held at Abu Ghraib Prison near
Baghdad. The fate and whereabouts of six of them remain to this date
unknown. Ahmad, a student; Wahab, a student aged 16 at the time of
his arrest; Ibrahim, a post office employee; Hussain, a chemist; Iynd,
a civil engineer; 'Abd al-Ridha, an employee at Baghdad Airport and
Isma'il, a pharmacist, were believed to have been arrested as
"hostages" in lieu of another brother, Ja'far, who had fled Iraq. He was
wanted by the authorities for his suspected opposition to the
government. Amnesty International issued several appeals on behalf
of the al-Hashimi brothers. This case was raised with the Iraqi
authorities in 1993 and then submitted before the UN Working Group
Activities of Family Members: Mazin 'Abd al-Mun'im Hassan al-
50
Samarrati. MDE 14/05/97. London: Amnesty International, October
1997. [98H-08425] [19971001] Mazin 'Abd al-Mun'im Hassan alSamarra'i, a mechanical engineer, "disappeared" around 8/1988 as he
was working in his garden at home, in Baghdad. Security off'cers
searched his car and arrested him. Nothing is known as to the reason
for his "disappearance" although this may be connected with his
father, 'Abd al-Mun'im Hassan 'Alwan al-Samarra'i. He was
undersecretary at the Ministry of Oil and was executed in 10/1986 on
charges of economic corruption. However, another reason for his
"disappearance" may be connected with Mazin's mother who was
living in the US at that time. He received a letter from her shortly
before he "disappeared". This simple fact may have exposed him to
arrest. In 7/1996 Amnesty International submitted the case of Mazin
al-Samarra'i to the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, who raised it with the Iraqi Government. No
response has been received. [=]
arrested on 6/22/1981 because of their Iranian descent. Their house
was surrounded by security forces and the entire family, 32
members, were imprisoned for about four months. Whilst the rest of
the family were deported to Iran, Deler and 'Ala al-Din were kept in
detention. Deler's brother, Ra'id, who was working in Kuwait, was
arrested by the Kuwaiti authorities in 12/1983 and handed over to the
Iraqi authorities. Deler and Ra'id were last seen in Qal'at al-Salman
Prison in 1985.
On 3/21/1981, three brothers, 'Imad, an architect, 'Adil, a
mechanical engineer and 'Atif, a student, from the 'Abd al-Hussein
'Ushair family in al-'Amara, were arrested in Hai al-Jami'a district in
Baghdad because of their Iranian descent. 'Adil and 'Imad were doing
their military service at the time. All three were first detained in Abu
Ghraib Prison, and then transferred to Qal'at al-Salman Prison in
southern Iraq, some 50 miles from the Saudi Arabian border. Family
visits were permitted once a month for the first few years until 1986
when they and other detainees with them were rounded up and taken
to an unknown destination. Nothing has been heard of them since.
Their cousins, Namir and Nasir, were also arrested in the same year
and were last seen in 1986 in Qal'at al-Salman Prison. Their families
were deported to Iran.
One morning in 6/1981, members of the security services went
to Hai al-Banuk district in Baghdad and informed Isma'il Mohammad
'All's family of the authorities' decision to deport them to Iran. Later
the same day the whole family, including 10 children, were taken to
Beit Samir Ghulam Prison in Baghdad where they were detained for
two months. All their documents and possessions were confiscated.
Isma'il Mohammad 'All, a bank employee now aged around 60, and
two of his sons, Salam and Salih were transferred to Abu Ghraib
Prison. Salam and Salih, aged 19 and 17 respectively, were high
school students at the time of their arrest. Whilst the rest of the family
was deported to Iran, Isma'il, Salam and Salih were kept in Abu
Ghraib Prison and then believed to have been sent to Nugrat alSalman Prison in southern Iraq. Nothing has been heard of them
since. In 6/1997, the youngest daughter, Jasamin, told Amnesty
International how the whole family lived in hope of seeing them one
day.
Jamal A. Ketuly, a Feyli Kurd from Baghdad, was doing his
military service in 1980 when he was arrested apparently because of
his Iranian descent. His parents and other close relatives were
deported to Iran and their properties as well as their Iraqi citizenship
documents were confiscated. Jamal was first detained in Abu Ghraib
Prison until 7/1981 when he and other detainees were transferred toan unknown place. Until 1989 his family received reports that Jamal
was alive but did not know of his whereabouts. Nothing has been
heard of him since. Distraught by Jamal's arrest and
"disappearance", his mother's health deteriorated considerably and in
4/1984 she died, aged 54. Her wish to see him before her death was
not furfilled. Three weeks after her mother's death, Jamal's younger
sister, Thikra, committed suicide at the age of 20.
In 1981, two cousins, 'Ali Mohammad Badri 'Ali al-Mousavi, a
student, and Mohammad Salman Bagher al Shakarji, an architect,
were arrested in Baghdad. They remained held and their family have
not had any news from them since 1984. Their arrest is said to be
connected with their Iranian origin. Mohammad Salman's mother
lives in Sweden. In 12/1993 she wrote to Amnest International and
signed the letter with these words: "the mother who lives in hope and
in vain since 1981... "
During the 1980s the Iraqi Government justified the detention of
those Iraqis of Iranian descent and the deportation to Iran of their
families on "security grounds". It promised that all detainees would be
released when the war with Iran ended. Although thousands were later
released, nearly ten years have elapsed since the end of the Iraqlran
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 07: Disappearance Due to
Perceived Political Opinion: The Case of 'Aziz al-Sayyid Jassem.
MDE 14/05/97. London: Amnesty International, October 1997. [98H08426] [19971001] On 4/14/1991, 'Aziz al-Sayyid Jassem, a 55-yearold well-known writer and journalist and member ofthe ruling Ba'th
Party was arrested in Baghdad. He apparently failed to write articles
supporting the Iraqi Government following the invasion of Kuwait. He
was held in solitary confinement, tortured, and his family did not
receive any news of him for over a year. In 3/1993 Amnesty
International appealed to the authorities to clarify the fate, whereabouts
and legal status of 'Aziz al-Sayyid Jassem. Arab writers and
journalists also appealed on his behalf and although the authorities
acknowledged his arrest they refused to provide any details of the
charges against him or information about his fate and whereabouts.
Immediately after his arrest, 'Aziz alSayyid Jassem was believed to
have been detained at Mudiriyyat al-Amn al- 'Amma, General
Security Directorate, in Baghdad. 'Aziz al-Sayyid Jassem is the
author of numerous books on subjects including women's rights and
the Kurdish question. He edited and wrote for various government
publications including al-Qadisiyya, al-Ghad and al-Thawra. He had
been briefly detained several times in the past, reportedly because of
his writing. He is married and has five children. [=]
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 08: Disappearance Due to Ethnic
Origin: Victims of Their Iranian Descent. MDE 14/05/97. London:
Amnesty International, October 1997. [98H-08426] [19971001]
Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the Iraqi
Government deported thousands of Iraqi families to Iran, solely on the
basis of their Iranian descent. They included Shi'a Muslim Arabs and
Feyli Kurds. A typical scenario would consist of the victims being
stripped of their Iraqi documents, and their properties and
possessions being confiscated. They were forced onto trucks or
buses under armed guard and taken to border areas where they were
told to cross into Iran. The majority of deportees have since lived in
refugee camps inside Iran while others, the lucky ones, have
managed to resettle in third countries. Entire families were deported
in this way, including children, the elderly and the disabled. However,
thousandsof male members of such families and some females,
usually aged between 16 and 40, were arrested and detained
indefinitely. Although many were released in subsequent years the
fate and whereabouts of thousands remain unknown.
Deler Hassan al-Haydari, a student, and his uncle, 'Ala' al-Din,
a businessman, both Feyli Kurds from Hai al-Jamila in Baghdad were
51
war and still the Iraqi authorities have failed to clarify the fate of
thousands of others. During the 1990s and since the Iraqi Government
lost control of the Kurdish provinces of Duhok, Arbil and Sulaimaniya,
hundreds of Kurdish families were believed to have been deported
from their place of residence in Kirkuk, Khanaqin and other parts of
government-controlled areas. In 5/1997 Amnesty International
received the names of more than 140 families who were said to be in
the process of being expelled to Chamchamal and Arbil in Kurdishcontrolled areas. The authorities are reported to have stripped the
deportees of their identity documents and other possessions.
According to some reports, in some cases a family member,
including children, is taken hostage in order to ensure that the family
does not resist the deportation order. [=]
been heard of them since. Among those arrested in Arbil were l9
members of the opposition al-'Amal allslami whose headquarters
was attacked by Iraqi forces on 31 8/1996. They are believed to be
held in Baghdad. They are 'Abd al-Karim Ahmad Salman, Ahmad
Hussain 'Affiya, 'Ali 'Abd al-Rasul Amin, Hamid Hashim Finjan,
Ahmad Jar Allah, Ahmad Hussain Khalid, Salman 'Ubeid, Sadiq 'Ali,
Ahmad 'Abbud, 'Abdullah 'Ali, Yahya al-Yadani,'Ali Hussain Hassan,
Hassan Hussain Hassan, 'Ali Ghazi Jabr, 'Abd al-Rahim (Abu
Mustafa), Ra'id Khalid, Hafidh Mtashar, Hassan Mahdi Madhlum and
Abu Dimu'. Five others whose names are not known to Amnesty
International were also arrested with them. Nothing is known about all
24 since their arrest in 8/1996.
Also arrested in Arbil were a number of members of the
Turkmeneli Party, Hizb Turkman Eli, including the parry's General
Secretary, Mohammad Rashid Tuxlu, a 44-year-old engineer. The
arrest took place on 9/2/1996 when Iraqi forces stormed the
Turkmeneli Parly's headquarters. Party documents and publications
were seized and a number of guards outside the building were
arrested and summarily executed. Mohammad Rashid Tuzlu and
others arrested with him were believed to have been taken to
government-controlled detention centres. All have "disappeared". Six
members of the Assyrian community in Baghdad, employees in the
Presidential Palace, were arrested in 10/1996, reportedly on suspicion
of involvement in an attempt to poison President Saddam Hussain.
Nothing has been heard of Gewargis Hormiz Oraha, Yousip Adam
Khamo, Amira Kora Odisho, Shimon Khoshaba al-Hozi, Petros Elia
Toma and William Maffl Barkho, since that date. In 3/1997 Amnesty
International wrote to the Iraqi President seeking clarification of the
fate and whereabouts of the six Assyrians, 33 Yazidis and all those
arrested in Arbil as well as details of any legal proceedings made
against them. No response has been received. [=]
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 09: Iraq's International Human
Rights Obligations. MDE 14/05/97. London: Amnesty International,
October 1997. [98H-08427] [19971001]
The practice of
"disappearances" by the Government of Iraq seriously contravenes
international human rights standards and Iraq's obligations as a state
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Article 9 (1) of which states that: "Everyone has the right to
liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention". Also, according to Article 22 of Iraq's own
Constitution: "It is inadmissible to arrest, detain, imprison or search a
person except in accordance with the rules of the law". The practice of
"disappearances" is also in violation of Article 2 of the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted
by the UN General Assembly in December 1992, and which states:
"No State shall practice, permit or tolerateenforceddisappearances".
[=]
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 10: Disappearances Continue.
MDE 14/05/97. London: Amnesty International, October 1997. [98H08428] [19971001] Amnesty International continues to receive reports
of arrests and "disappearances". In 7/1996, 33 men and women,
members of the Yazidi community in Mosul were arrested. They
were Shireen Mieza 'Arab, Lina Khairi Darman, Thaniya Khairi
Darman, Vian Khairi Darman, Sebil Khairi Darman, Amin Kbairi
Darman, Jala Khalil Haji, Laila Ilias Darwish, Shizad Khalil Haii,
Fahad Jalal Kbalil Haii, Milad Jalal Khalil Haji, Farhad Jalal Khalil
Haji, Faiza Jalal Khalil Haji, Amsha Ilias Darwish, Zhakharov 'Ali
Khalil Haii, Asi 'Ali Khalil Haii, Khalil 'Ali Khalil Haii, Dimitrov 'Ali
Khalil Haii, 'Issa Khalil Haji, Buza Murad Salu, Shireen 'Issa Khalil
Haji, Kasil 'lssa Khalil Haii, Khami 'Issa Khalil Haji, Nebras 'Issa
Khalil Haji, Khayal 'Issa Khalil Haji, Seynam Elias Darwish, Alnid
'Adil 'Issa Khalil, Yelzas 'Adil 'Issa Khalil, Darur 'Idu 'Abdi Nasser,
Fahmi'ldu'Abdi Nasser, Muhamad 'Idu 'Abdi Nasser 'lssa, Hilmi
'Abdu 'Idi Nasser 'lssa and Sisi 'Abdu 'Idi Nasser. Nothing is known
as to the reasons for their arrest and their fate and whereabouts are
unknown.
At the end of 8/1996, Iraqi forces were sent to northern Iraq to
support the KDP in conflict with the PUK. As a result, the city of Arbil
fell under the control of the KDP and around 70000 people fled the area
to seek refuge in Iran. At least 100 members of the opposition Iraqi
National Congress (INC) and Iraqi National Turkman Party (INTP)
were extrajudicially executed by Iraqi military and intelligence forces
following their capture in the Qoshtapa district of Arbil, on 8/31/1996.
Inaddition, hundreds of suspected members of opposition groups,
including Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen, and their families were
arrested, loaded onto trucks and taken to detention centres and
prisons in areas under the control of the government. Nothing has
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 11: Amnesty International's
Recommendations To The Iraqi Government and to the International
Community. MDE 14/05/97. London: Amnesty International, October
1997.[98H-08429] [19971001] Amnesty International is concerned
that hundreds of thousands of "disappearances" that have taken place
in Iraq since the early 1 980s remain unresolved. The organization is
calling on the Government of Iraq to clarify the fate of all
"disappeared" persons without further delay and to take concrete
steps to put an end to the practice. In addition, Amnesty International is
urging the government to implement Amnesty International's 14-Point
Program for the Prevention of "Disappearances" (see appendix) as a
matter of urgency, and provide compensation for the victims or their
families. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances should undertake a mission to Iraq, together with the
Special Rapporteur on Iraq, to investigate the systematic practice of
"disappearances". Member states of the UN should ensure that the
working group and the Special Rapporteur are granted access by the
Iraqi Government. The international community should provide
resources for the deployment of human rights monitors, which could
prevent further "disappearances". This recommendation, put forward
by Amnesty International in 7/1991 and included in resolution 1992M1
of the UN Commission on Human Rights, is yet to be implemented.
[=]
Cases Since the Early 1950s: Part 12: Appendix: Amnesty
International's Fourteen Point Program For The Prevention of
Disappearances. MDE 14/05/97. London: Amnesty International,
October 1997. [98H-08430] [19971001] The "disappeared" are people
who have been taken into custody by agents of the state, yet whose
52
whereabouts and fate are concealed, and whose custody is denied.
"Disappearances" cause agony for the victims and their relatives. The
victims are cut off from the world and placed outside the protection of
the law; often they are tortured; many are never seen again. Their
relatives are kept in ignorance, unable to find out whether the victims
are alive or dead. The United Nations has condemned
"disappearances" as a grave violation of human rights and has said
that their systematic practice is of the nature of a crime against
humanity. Yet thousands of people "disappear" each year across the
globe, and countless others remain "disappeared". Urgent action is
needed to stop "disappearances", to clarify the fate of the
"disappeared" and to bring those responsible to justice. Amnesty
International calls on all governments to implement the following 14Point Program for the Prevention of "Disappearances". It invites
concerned individuals and organizations to join in promoting the
program. Amnesty International believes that the implementation of
these measures is a positive indication of a government's
commitment to stop "disappearances" and to work for their
eradication worldwide.
(1) Official condemnation: The highest authorities of every
country should demonstrate their total opposition to"disappearances".
They should make clear to all members of the police, military and
other security forces that "disappearances" will not be tolerated under
any circumstances.
(2) Chain-of-command control: Those in charge of the security
forces should maintain strict chain-of-command control to ensure that
officers under their command do not commit "disappearances".
Offcials with chain-ofcommand responsibility who order or tolerate
"disappearances" by those under their command should be held
criminally responsible for these acts.
(3) Information on detention and release: Accurate information
about the arrest of any person and about his or her place of detention,
including transfers and releases, should be made available promptly
to relatives, lawyers and the courts. Prisoners should be released in a
way that allows reliable verification of their release and ensures their
safety.
(4) Mechanism for locating and protecting prisoners:
Governments should at all times ensure that effective judicial
remedies are available which enable relatives and lawyers to find out
immediately where a prisoner is held and under what authority, to
ensure his or her safety, and to obtain the release of anyone arbitrarily
detained.
(5) No secret detention: Governments should ensure that
prisoners are held only in publicly recognized places of detention. Upto-date registers of all prisoners should be maintained in every place
of detention and centrally. The information in these registers should be
made available to relatives, lawyers, judges, official bodies trying to
trace people who have been detained, and others with a legitimate
interest. No one should be secretly detained.
(6) Authorization of arrest and detention: Arrest and detention
should be carried out only by officials who are authorized by law to do
so. Officials carrying out an arrest should identify themselves to the
person arrested and. on demand, to others witnessing the event.
Governments should establish rules setting forth which officials are
authorized to order an arrest or detention. Any deviation from
established procedures which contributes to a "disappearance" should
be punished by appropriate sanctions.
(7) Access to prisoners: All prisoners should be brought before a
judicial authority without delay after being taken into custody.
Relatives, lawyers and doctors should have prompt and regular
access to them. There should be regular, independent, unannounced
and unrestricted visits of inspection to all places of detention.
(8) Prohibition in law: Governments should ensure that the
commission of a "disappearance" is a criminal offence, punishable by
sanctions commensurate with the gravity of the practice. The
prohibition of "disappearances" and the essential safeguards for their
prevention must not be suspended under any circumstances,
including states of war or other public emergency.
(9) Individual responsibility: The prohibition of "disappearances"
should be reflected in the training of all officials involved in the arrest
and custody of prisoners and in the instructions issued to them. They
should be instructed that they have the right and duty to refuse to obey
any order to participate in a "disappearance". An order from a
superior officer or a public authority must never be invoked as a
justification for taking part in a "disappearance".
(10) Investigation: Governments should ensure that all
complaints and reports of "disappearances" are investigated
promptly, impartially and effectively by a body which is independent of
those allegedly responsible and has the necessary powers and
resources to carry out the investigation. The methods and findings of
the investigation should be made public. Offcials suspected of
responsibility for "disappearances" should be suspended from active
duty during the investigation. Relatives of the victim should have
access to information relevant to the investigation and should be
entitled to present evidence. Complainants, witnesses, lawyers and
others involved in the investigation should be protected from
intimidation and reprisals. The investigation should not be curtailed
until the fate of the victim is officially clarified.
(11) Prosecution: Governments should ensure that those
responsible for "disappearances" are brought to justice. This principle
should apply wherever such people happen to be, wherever the crime
was committed, whatever the nationality of the perpetrators or victims
and no matter how much time has elapsed since the commission of
the crime. Trials should be in the civilian courts. The perpetrators
should not benefit from any legal measures exempting them from
criminal prosecution or conviction.
(12) Compensation and rehabilitation: Victims of
"disappearance" and their dependents should be entitled to obtain fair
and adequate redress from the state, including financial
compensation. Victims who reappear should be provided with
appropriate medical care or rehabilitation.
(13) Ratification of human rights treaties and implementation of
internationalstandards: All Governments should ratify International
treaties containing safeguards and remedies against
"disappearances",includingtheInternationalCovenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its first Optional Protocol which provides for
individual complaints. Governments should
ensure
full
implementation of the relevant provisions of these and other
International instruments, including the UN Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and comply
with the recommendations of intergovernmental organizations
conceming these abuses.
(14) International responsibility: Governments should use all
available channels to intercede with the governments of countries
where "disappearances" have been reported. They should ensure that
transfers of equipment, knowhow and training for military, security or
police use do not facilitate "disappearances". No one should be
forcibly resumed to a country where he or she risks being made to
"disappear".
(This 14-Point Program was adopted by Amnesty International
in December 1992 as part of the organization's worldwide campaign
for the eradication of "disappearances"). [=]
10123. Amnesty International. Iraq: Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 01: Summary. New York: Amnesty
International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11378]
53
[19950228] Wide-ranging and serious human rights abuses have
been committed by the Kurdish administration and political parties in
Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991. These abuses include the detention of
suspected political opponents, among them possible prisoners of
conscience; torture and ill-treatment of political and common law
detainees and the failure to investigate such abuses adequately; the
use of the death penalty and the enactment of legislation increasing the
number of offences punishable by death; executions after summary
"trials"; and unlawful and deliberate killings. Iraqi Government forces
withdrew from most areas of Iraqi Kurdistan in 10/1991. Since then,
these areas have been controlled by Kurdish forces. Amnesty
International holds them accountable for the human rights abuses
described in this report, in implementation of its mandate in relation to
abuses committed by armed political groups. This report is based on
research carried out by Amnesty International over the past three
years, including five fact-finding visits to Iraqi Kurdistan between
5/1992-7/1994. The organization's concerns in relation to the Kurdish
administration(represented in the Council of Ministers for Iraqi
Kurdistan, which is effectively the "government" in the region) focus
on two main areas: the torture and ill-treatment of detainees and the
use of the death penalty. With respect to the political parties, Amnesty
International holds the two main parties holding the reins of power in
the region - the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan - accountable for many of the abuses addressed in this
report. These include the torture and ill-treatment of detainees and the
unlawful and deliberate killing of unarmed prisoners captured in battle,
political opponents and demonstrators. The Islamic Movement in Iraqi
Kurdistan, the third political force in the region today, has also
committed similar abuses.
AmnestyInternational is issuing this report in order to mare
public its concerns in Iraqi Kurdistan and calls on the Council of
Ministers and the Kurdish leadership to act on the recommendations
contained in it. [=]
Nowche - Local party committee (term used by KDP).
PAK - Kurdistan Freedom Party.
PASOK - Kurdish Socialist Party.
Pesh Merga - Armed Kurdish forces.
PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party (of Turkey).
PUK - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
Rekkhistini Taybeti - The KDP's security and intelligence
apparatus.
Rowti Comunist - Communist Current.
Tokoshin - Organization of the Kurdistan Workers' Struggle.
UKDP - Unified Kurdistan Democratic Party. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 03: Introduction. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] Wide-ranging and serious human rights abuses have
been committed by the Kurdish administration and political parties in
those regions of Iraqi Kurdistan which have been under their control
since 1991. These abuses include the detention of suspected political
opponents, among them possible prisoners of conscience; torture and
ill-treatment of political ant common law detainees ant the failure to
investigate such abuses adequately; the use of the death penalty and
the enactment of legislation increasing the number of offences
punishable by death; executions after summary "trials"; and unlawful
and deliberate killings of unarmed prisoners and assassinations of
political activists and others. This report is based on research carried
out by Amnesty International over the past three years, including five
fact-finding visits to the region between 5/1992-7/1994. During these
visits, Amnesty International interviewed scores of detainees and
former detainees held on both political and criminal grounds, as well
as prisoners sentenced to terms of imprisonment or death. The
organization obtained testimonies from victims of torture and illtreatment, the relatives, friends and colleagues of victims of unlawful
and deliberate killings, as well as eye-witnesses and human rights
activists. Amnesty International also held discussions with the leaders
or representatives of most Kurdish and other political parties, officials
of the Kurdish administration, as well as law enforcement personnel
and members of the judiciary. the organization acknowledges the
cooperation and assistance it has received from many of them.
Amnesty International's concerns regarding the human rights
situation in Iraq as a whole have been repeatedly placed on public
record. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, gross human rights
violations on a massive scale have been committed by the Iraqi
Government with total impunity and disregard for minimum standards
of humane behaviour. They include the arbitrary arrest of suspected
or actual political opponents, among them prisoners of conscience;
prolonged detention without trial or imprisonment following manifestly
unfair trials; the torture and ill-treatment of detainees resulting in
countless deaths in custody; the use of the death penalty for a wide
range of political and criminal offences after unfair trials and in
violation of internationally established safeguards; and the
"disappearance" or extrajudicial execution of hundreds of thousands of
people - including whole communities - for political reasons. In its
campaigns aimed at alleviating the suffering of the people of Iraq,
Amnesty International faced a government which sanctioned atrocities
as a matter of policy and violated its obligations under international
law as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). The organization faced an international community
which failed to adopt a single resolution in the United Nations (UN)
General Assembly or other UN bodies condemning the Iraqi
Government until the invasion of Kuwait on 8/2/1990. It also faced a
multitude of states whose perceived geopolitical interests did not
accommodate intervention on human rights issues. Amnesty
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 02: Kurdistan Political Organizations
Glossary. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE
14/01/95. [99H-11379] [19950228] ADM - Assyrian Democratic
Movement.
AKC - Association of Kurdish Clans.
Asoyish - Ministry of Interior's internal security forces.
Dozgay Zanyori - The PUK's security and intelligence
apparatus.
ICP - Iraqi Communist Party.
IKF - Iraqi Kurdistan Front.
IMIK - Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan.
INC - Iraqi National Congress.
IWCP - Iraqi Workers' Communist Party.
KCP - Kurdistan Communist Party.
KCP - Kurdistan Conservative Party.
KDP - Kurdistan Democratic Party.
KDU - Kurdistan Democratic Union.
KHRO - Kurdistan Human Rights Organization.
KLP - Kurdistan Liberation Party.
Komite - Local party committee (term used by PUK).
KPDP - Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party.
KSDP - Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party.
KSP-I - Kurdistan Socialist Party - Iraq.
KTP - Kurdistan Toilers' Party (Zahmatheshan).
KUP - Kurdistan Unity Party (Yekgirtin).
Liq - Party branch (term used by KDP).
Liway Taybeti - Special Brigades.
Molband - Party centre (term used by PUK).
54
International has also monitored the human rights situation in those
areas of Iraq's northern provinces from which the government's
forces withdrew on 10/23/1991. Since then, these areas have been
controlled by Kurdish forces. Amnesty International holds them
accountable for the human rights abuses described in this report, in
implementation of its mandate in relation to abuses committed by
armed political groups. [=]
expression "armed opposition groups" or "armed political groups" has
sometimes been criticized as conferring legitimacy on such groups.
In fact, the organization seeks to employ neutral language which
carries no such connotation. [Similarly, as the International
Committee of the Red Cross commentary to common article 3
makes eclear, the applicability of that article's provisions to all parties
to an internal armed conflict, including armed opporition group's,
confers no legitimacy on such groups.] No organization can retain a
non-political stance once it attempts to distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate rebellion. Amnesty International has not done so and
will not do so even in relation to those groups which command the
most or the least international sympathy.
Amnesty International's opposition to abuses by armed
opposition groups stems from the same respect for human life,
security and liberty which compels it to oppose human rights
violations by governments. Amnesty International will continue to
place its primary focus on human rights violations by governments
and the responsibility of those with governmental authority to abide by
their international obligations. Its work to hold opposition groups to the
minimum humane standards complements rather than detracts from
this world, and is pursued with the same impartiality and
independence with which Amnesty International acts in its world with
governments. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 04: Introduction: Amnesty International's
Mandate. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE
14/01/95.[99H-11381][19950228] Amnesty International condemns
and actively opposes a range of human rights violations perpetrated
by governments worldwide. The organization works to secure the
immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience
[Prisoner of conscience, as defined by Amnesty International's
Statute, are people subjected to imprisonment, detention or other
physical restriction impopsod by reason of their political, religious or
other conscientiously held belief or by reason of their ethnic ongin,
sex, colour or language, provided that they have not used or advocated
violence.] and to ensure fair and prompt trials for all political
prisoners. It opposes the death penalty, extrajudicial executions,
"disappearances" and torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in all cases. Since Amnesty International
was founded over three decades ago, its mandate has been extended
in response to the human rights challenges of a changing world, most
recently in 9/1991 when several new areas of concern were
incorporated into it. Amnesty International stresses that the
international human rights norms it cites concern the protection of the
rights of individuals in relation to governmental authoriq; it is
governments which have drawn up international human rights law and
governments which are bound by it. However, in armed conflicts both
governments and those opposing them must observe internationally
recognized standards protecting the individual.
Amnesty International has for many years condemned the
torture or killing of prisoners by anyone, including armed opposition
groups - and has done so as a matter of principle. Since 9/1991, the
organization has opposed a wider range of abuses by such groups,
guided by the protection of the individual enshrined in common Article
3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. These abuses include not
only the torture and killing of prisoners, but all unlawful and deliberate
killings. Deliberate killings of people who are taking no active part in
hostilities are always arbitrary, and Amnesty International opposes
them whether the victims are targeted individually or they are the
victims of indiscriminate attacks. Similarly, the deliberate killing of
soldiers, police or other security personae! who have been
incapacitated by sickness or wounds, or who having laid down their
arms seek to surrender, is prohibited by international law and
condemned by Amnesty International.
Amnesty International focuses on the intentional killing of
civilians and others taking no part in hostilities. These are
distinguishedfromunintended killings that occur during attacks on
military objectives, including killings in crossfire between opposing
forces. Amnesty International opposes the taking or holding of
hostages by armed political groups. It condemns the arbitrary threats
to life, security and liberty which are implicit in hostage-taking.
Amnesty International also seeks to secure the release of prisoners of
conscience held by such groups.
Amnesty International take no position on the legitimacy of
resorting to violence and opposes specific abuses, not the entity which
commits them. In some contexts, governments criticize nongovernmental organizations for not condemning their opponents or for
not describing them as "terrorists". Amnesty International's use of the
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 05: Introduction: Amnesty International's
Concerns in Iraqi Kurdistan. New York: Amnesty International,
February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11382] [19950228] "It is an
outrage that the Kurds - having suffered gross human rights violations
for so long at the hands of Iraqi Government forces should once again
have to endure such abuses, only this time at the hands of their own
political leaders."
The above extract is taken from a public statement issued by
Amnesty International on 6/1/1994, appealing to Kurdish political party
leaders to end human rights abuses. It was prompted by reports of
gross abuses committed in the context of widespread military clashes
the previous month between the two most powerful political parties in
Iraqi Kurdistan - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). During the clashes both parties
were said to have deliberately killed prisoners, mutilated some of the
victims' bodies, and abducted, killed and tortured civilians on account
of their political affiliation. A third political party, the Islamic
Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), was also involved in the military
conflict in opposition to the PUK. Its forces were reported to have
tortured or deliberately killed prisoners. Five months earlier, similar
abuses were perpetrated when fierce fighting erupted between PUK
and IMIK forces. The events of 12/1993 and 5/1994 (see Chapter 5)
represented the most significant deterioration in the human rights
situation since the region fell under Kurdish control. The events in
5/1994 in particular, which were far more serious in terms of their
immediate and long-term consequences, signified in Amnesty
International's view an abandonment of fundamental human rights
principles to which the Kurdish leadership had publicly committed
itself. This was all the more regrettable since these were the same
principles which the Iraqi Government itself consistently failed to
uphold, and the consequences of which have meant endless torment
and suffering for Iraq's Kurds, Arabs and others alike. Given this, the
Kurdish leadership must bear full responsibility for the deep sense of
betrayal expressed by many people in Iraqi Kurdistan today. The
human rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan at the time of writing (1/1995)
contrasts sharply with that which existed soon after the region fell
under Kurdish control over three years ago. At that time, a number of
positive measures were adopted to ensure the better protection of
55
human rights, particularly after the 5/1992 parliamentary elections and
the appointment of the Council of Ministers effectively the
"government" in the region). These included, for example, the
separation of the central judicial apparatus from the administration's
executive machinery and the abolition of special courts. Attempts
were made to create a centralized law enforcement apparatus with
clear lines of accountability. Many detainees beld by the political
parties were transferred to acknowledged places of detention under
the jurisdiction of the police ant internal security forces. These
measures are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 addresses
human rights abuses committed by the Kurdish administration since
1992. Chapter 5 examines abuses committed by the political parties.
The distinction is somewhat artificial since the "administration" in
many respects remains merely an extension of the power base of the
two main political parties, the KDP and the PUK. The deepening
political crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan, resulting in large part from
continuing disagreements over power-sharing arrangements between
these two parties, has led to a gradual deterioration of the human
rights situation, culminating in the events of 5/1994 and the
perpetration of hitherto unprecedented human rights abuses. In
12/1994 widespread armed clashes broke out once again between the
KDP and PUC and continued into 1/1995. At the time of writing,
Amnesty International was investigating new reports of human rights
abuses,including unlawful and deliberate killings. Details of these
abuses are not covered in this report. The report ends with
recommendations which Amnesty International urges the political
leaders in Iraqi Kurdistan to implement. The organization believes that
only when such steps are taken can the human rights crisis in the
region be ended. [=]
establishmentof a "safe haven" zone in Iraqi Kurdistan stretching
between Zakho, Duhok and 'Amadiyya. An "air exclusion zone"
[Northern No-Fly Zone] was imposed on 19 April, forbidding Iraqi
fused-wing aircraft and helicopters from flying north of the 36th
parallel. This remains in force.
Many of the Kurdish refugees who had fled to Turkey and Iran
beganreturning to Iraqi Kurdistan in 5/1991, encouraged by the
presence of the allied forces. By mid-July, however, the allied forces
had withdrawn, although they maintained a Military Coordination
Centre in Zakho and allies aircraft have continued patrol the areas
north of the 36th parallel from Incirlik base in southeastern Turkey.
Between 5-10/1991, Iraqi forces retained control of most areas they
hadregained after the uprising, with the exception of Duhok from
which they withdrew in May shortly after the "safe haven" was set up.
During this six-month period, armed clashes and skirmishes between
Kurdish and Iraqi Government forces continued, resulting in the
further displacement of the Kurdish civilian population. The dashes
reaches a climax in the first half of October, when government forces
launched indiscriminate military attacks on civilian targets in the
towns of Kifri, Kalar and 'Arbat, as well as Sulaimaniya city, using
helicopters and heavy artillery. For military and other reasons, the
Iraqi Government began a total withdrawal of its armed forces and
civil administration from most of the Kurdish region on 10/23/1991.
They withdrew from the cities of Arbil and Sulaimaniya, as well as
other major towns and their surrounding plains, but remained in the
strategic city of Kirkuk. An "internal frontline" was established and the
government imposed an economic blockade on the Kurdish-controlled
region, which remains in force.
The blockade caused severe economic hardship in the region
which, like the rest of Iraq, was already suffering the effect of
sanctions imposed by the UN in 1990 in the wake of the invasion of
Kuwait. The internal blockade quickly caused acute fuel shortages and
a sharp rise in the prices of staple foodstuffs and other commodities.
The problems were compounded by the abrupt loss of income
experienced by over half of the region's working population. Upon
withdrawing its forces and administration, the government instructed
all civil servants in the Kurdish-held region to redeploy to areas under
its control (such as Mosul and Kirkuk) or face nonpayment of their
salaries. The overwhelming majority - including doctors, teachers,
municipal workers, police personnel, members of the judiciary and
employees of the courts - opted for noncompliance. They remained in
post, working without pay for several months until the Iraqi Kurdistan
Front (IKF: Berey Kurdistani 'Iraqlal-labha al-Kurdistardyya
al'Iraqiyya), [Where relevant, the names of various bodies and
politica1 parties are transliterated from Kurdish and then in Arabic.]
which assumed defacto authority, resumed payment of salaries to
civil servants performing essential duties. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 06: Chapter One: Historical and Political
Context: The Aftermath of the Gulf War. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] Following their defeat by allied forces in the Gulf War, the
Iraqi armed forces withdrew from Kuwait on 2/28/1991, putting an end
to the seven-month occupation of the country. Two days later,
rebellion broke out in the city of Basra, instigated by units of the
retreating Iraqi army. It was quickly transformed into a mass uprising,
spreading to many towns and cities in the south. Several days later a
mass uprising broke out in Iraqi Kurdistan, beginning in Chwar Qurna
and Rania. By 20 March the city of Kirkuk had fallen under the control
of Kurdish opposition forces. By the end of March, however, the Iraqi
armed forces had crushed the uprising in both the north and south.
The government then embarked on a campaign of widespread
repression against the civilian population as a whole as well as those
suspected of having participated in the uprising. In that context, gross
human rights violations were perpetrated by the advancing
government forces. The brutalities triggered a mass exodus of
civilians, both Kurds and Shi'a Muslim Arabs, to neighbouring Iran
and Turkey. Others fled towards the Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti
borders. By the end of 4/1991, their numbers had reached an
estimated 2 million, the majority of them Kurds; most were housed in
refugee camps in the border regions in Iran and Turkey. On 5 April the
UN Security Council adopted resolution 688, calling on Iraq to end
"the repression of the Iraqi civilian population" and to cooperate with
the distribution of humanitarian aid to all parts of the country. [On 18
4/1991 a Memorendum of Understanding was signed between the UN
and the Iraqi Govemment, providing the basis for UN humanitarian
operations in Iraq.] In mid-April "Operation Provide Comfort" was
launched by the allied forces (principally those of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom and France), followed by the
Context: Political Parties and Groups in Iraqi Kurdistan. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11384] [19950228] The IKF, which was established in 5/1988 to
coordinate opposidon activity against the central government, was
initially composed of five political parties: (1) Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP: Parti Dimakrati Kurdistanlal-Hizb al-Dimuqran alKurdistani) led by Masoud Barzani; (2) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK: Yekieti Nishtimani Kurdistanlal-lttihad al-Watani al-Kurdistani)
led by Jalal Talabani; (3) Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party
(KPDP: Perti Geli Dimakrati Kurdistani Hizb al-Sha'b al-Dimuqrati
al-Kurdistani) led by Sami 'Abd al-Rahman; (4) Kurdistan Socialist
Party - Iraq (KSP-I: Hizbi Sosialisti Kurdistan - 'Iraqlal-Hizb alIshtiraka al-Kurdistani - 'Iraq) led by the late Rasul Mamand; (5)
56
Kurdish Socialist Party (PASOK: Parti Sosialisti Kurdlal-Hizb alIshtirala al-KurdD led by 'Abdullah Agrin.
Three other parties subsequently joined the IKF: (6) Iraqi
Communist Party - Kurdistan Region (ICP: Parti Comunisti 'IraqHaremi Kurdistanlal Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-'Iraqi - Iqlim Kurdistan) led by
'Aziz Muhammad; (7) Kurdistan Toilers' Party (KTP: Hizbi
Zahmatheshani Kurdistani; Hizbal-Kadihin al-Kurdistani) led by
Qader 'Aziz; (8) Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM: al-Haraka
al-Dimutratiyya al-Ashurtyya) led by Younadim Yusuf.
Prior to the May 1992 parliamentary elections two of these
parties, the KSP-I and PASOK, formed a "joint leadership" and ran for
the elections under one platform. Following the elections, the "joint
leadership~ was expanded to include the KPDP, and in August 1992
all three formed a new party - the Kurdistan Unity Party (KUP: Parti
Yeigirtini Kurdistani; Hizb al-Wakda al-Kurdistani), which temporarily
retained a three-member leadership body in lieu of a single leader.
While both the KPDP and PASOK were dissolved after this unity, the
KSP-I continued to operate under the leadership of Rasul Mamand,
who had refused to join the KUP. The considerably smaller KSP-I
was itself dissolved in 12/1992 when Rasul Mamand joined the PUK
as a member of its Political Bureau.
The KUP was in turn dissolved when it joined the KDP during
the latter's Eleventh Congress in August 1993. As a result, the KDP
was renamed the Unified Kurdistan Democratic Party (UKDP: Parti
Dimakrati Kurdistan-YeigirtuIal-HW QlDunuqran al-Kurdistani alMuwahhad), [AIthough UICDP became the official name of this party
after 8/1993, in this report it is referred to throughout as the KDP in
line with the party's apparent practice in its English language public
statements. In Arabic and Kurdish, it is more often refened to as
UKDP.] and its new Political Bureau included three members of the
former KUP's leadership. Among them we, Muhammad Haji
Mahmud (formerly KSP-I) who broke away from the UKDP less than
one month later and in 10/1993 announced the re-establishment of the
KSP-I under his leadership. At its Second Conference in 11/1994, the
KSP-I was renamed the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party
(KSDP: Parti Sosialisti Dimakrati Kurdistanlal-Hizb al-Ishtirald alDimuqrad al-Kurdistani).
The ICP also underwent change. Pressure had been growing for
some time within the party for the establishment of a separate Kurdish
communist party. At the ICP's Fifth Conference in 10/1993, the
Kurdistan Communist Party (KCP: Hizbi Comunisti Kurdistan/alHizb al-Shuyu'i al-Kurdistani) was formed. The ICP (currently led by
Hamid al-Bayati) and KCP (currently led by Karim Ahmad) are
closely linked although they have separate Political Bureaux and
Central Committees.
Outside the IKF, the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK:
Bizatnewey Islamiye Kurdistani 'Iraq/al-Harata al-lslamiyya alKurdistan al-'Iraq) is the most powerful group and represents, both
politically and militarily, the third force in the region today. A Sunni
Muslim movement, it was formed in 1986 during the Iran-Iraq war,
and is headed by Shaikh 'Uthman 'Abd al-'Aziz, its Spiritual Guide. Its
leadership cadres include former members of the Union of Religious
Scholars (Yekieti Mamostayani Ayni Islam/Ittihad Uthnam al-Din),
[The Union of Religious Scholars was established in late 1971, its
principal role being the promotion of religious awareness. It became
defunct after the collapse of the Kurdish oppostiion movement in 1975,
but was reconstituted some six months after the 3/1991 uprising. It
enjoys the support of both the KDP and PUK, but many of the religious
scholars associated with it are known for their anti-IMIK stance.]
while others are veterans of the war in Afghanistan. In the past three
years, the IMIK has boosted its membership levels in Iraqi Kurdistan,
where it has established its own infrastructure in the areas under its
control.
Within the past two years, three groups were dissolved upon
uniting with mainstream parties. The Kurdistan Democratic Union
(KDU: Yekieti Dimakrati Kurdistan/al-lttihad al-Dimuqran alKurdistani), which was formed in 1978 and supported the
establishment of an autonomous Kurtish region in Iraq, joined the KDP
in 8/1993. Its founder, 'Ali Sinjari, is currently a member of the KDP's
Central Committee. Another group, the Movement of Islamic Feyli
Kurds (Bizatnewey Islami Kurda Feyliyyakan/Narakat al-Fryltyyin alAkrad al-Islamiyyin), was formed in Iran in the early 1980s principally
to draw attention to the plight of tens of thousands of Feyli (Shi'a)
Kurds forcibly exiled from Iraq by successive governments and to
protect the interests of the Feyli minority. it also joined the KDP in
8/1993 and its founder, Jalil Feyli, is currently a member of the KDP's
Central Committee. A third group, Revolutionary Banner (Alay
Shorish/Rayat al-Thawra), joined the PUK in late 1992. Formed
originally from a PUK splinter group in the mid-1980s, it was
concerned with the unification of Iraqi Marxists as a whole but also
stressed the right of Iraq's Kurds to self-determinadon. In 4/1992 Alay
Shorish united with the KTP and several of its leaders became
members of the KTP Ccatral Committee. The KTP itself split after the
5/1992 parliamentary elections and several of the former Aloy Shorish
leaders subsequently joined the PUK. Among them was the founder of
Aby Shorish, Hikmat Karim (known as Mulla Bakhtiar), who is
currently a member of the PUK Leadership Committee (Komitey
Sarkirdayetilal-Lajna al-Qiyadiyya).
Of the other political parties which espouse communism or
socialism in Iraqi Kurdistan, the oldest is the Iraqi Communist Party Base Organizations (Hizbi Comunisti Kurdistan Rekkhrawakani 'alQa'ida' lal; Hizb aI-Shuyu'i al-lraqi - Munathamaat al-Qa'ida). This
party was formed in 1984 from an ICP splinter group led by
Bahatuddin Nuri, Secretary of the ICP in the early 1950s, and is based
in Sulaunaniya. Another group, the Kurdistan Liberation Party (KLP:
Parti Rizgari Kurdistani' Hizb al-Tahrir al-Kurdistani), was formed in
1993 from a KUP splinter group, most of whose members were
originally affiliated to the KPDP and the KSP-I. It is based in Arbil. A
third group, the Iraqi Workers' Communist Party (IWCP: Hizbi
Comunisti Krekari 'Iraqlal; Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-'Ummali-Iraqi), was
formed in 7/1993 from a merger of four small communist groups. The
largest group within the IWCP is Communist Current (Rewti
Comunistlal-Tayyar al-Shuyu'i) which, according to its
spokespersons, was formed in the mid-1980s. However, it reportedly
only became active after 1989. After the uprising, it established a
presence in Sulaimaniya and formed labour organizations known as
Workers' Councils, which were short-lived. The party also attempted
to organize itself in Bahdinan during that period. Pressure from both
the KDP and PUK, however, resulted in its activities remaining
limited and semi-clandestine. The IWCP has an office in Arbil.
There are also several small Marxist groups which call for the
unification of "Greater Kurdistan" ["Greater Kurdistan" refers to the
regions inhabited by Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey and the former
Soviet Union.] and hence oppose on principle any negodations with the
central government in Baghdad. All are said to be closely linlced to the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK: Parti Kargerani KurdistonlHizb al'Ummal al-Kurdistani) of Turlcey. The oldest among these groups is
th' Organization of the Kurdistan Workers' Struggle (Rekkhrowi
Tekoshani Rendiderani Kurdistani; Mununathamat Nidal Shaghilat
Kurdistan), known as Tekoshin. According to its spokespersons, it
was formed in July 1978 and had close relations with the PUK. In late
1990 a rapprochement developed between Tekoshin and the KTP and
the idea of uniq was discussed. However, talks broke down when the
KTP supported the idea of negotiations with Baghdad after the 3/1991
uprising. It has representatives and members in Bahdinan and Arbil.
Another group with similar objectives is the Kurdistan Freedom Parq
57
(PAK: Parti Azadi Kurdistani; Hizb al-Hurrtyya al-Kurdistani).
Formed after the 1991 uprising, it is considered by some as a PKK
"creation" and to have as its principal aim the recruitment of
members for the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. It initially had some
members in Sulaimaniya and later in Duhok. They have been
arrested at various times and held outside the framework of the law,
principally by the KDP. A third group in this category is the Action
Party for the Independence of Kurdistan (Part) Kari Sarbekhoy
Kurdistani; Hizb al-'Amal li-Istiqlal Kurdistan), led by Hussain Hallaq.
Formed in 1993 from an ICP splinter group, it is based in Arbil. A
fourth group is the Democratic Alliance for the Independence of
Kurdistan (Hawpeymaneti Dimakrati bo SerbeAhoy KurdistanlalTahaluf al-Dimuqran Ii-Istiqlal Kurdistan) formed by 'Aziz 'Aqrawi in
1992 and is said to have some representatives in Arbil.
Two groups representing several of the Kurdish clans [These
include the Surchi, Khoshnaw and Bradosh.] in the region were
formed after the 1991 uprising, and for whose loyalty the KDP and
PUK competed. The Association of Kurdish Clans (AKC: Komelgay
Ashayri Kurd; Jam'iyyat al-'sha'ir al-Kurdiyya) was formed in 8/1991
and has closer relations with the KDP. It is headed by Hussain Surchi
and based in Sheqlawa. The AKC has stressed the right of the Kurdish
people to self-determination and also called for the "independence of
Kurdistan". Following the 5/1992 parliamentary elections, the AKC
split and another group was formed, the Kurdistan Conservative Party
(KCP: Parti Parezgarani Kurdistan; Hizb al-Muhafidhin al-Kurdistani).
Led by Hussain Surchi's brother, 'Umar Khadr Surchi, the KCP is
based in Arbil and has closer relations with the PUK. Its stated aims
are similar to those of the AKC. Aside from the IMIK, there are
several smaller Islamist political groups in Iraqi Kurdistan today.
Among them is Kurdish Hizbullah (Hizbullehi Kurdi; Nubullah alKurdi), led by Shaikh Muhammad Khaled Barzani (a cousin of Mas'ud
Barzani), which was formed in 1982 in Iran. The group is now based
in the region stretching between Barzan, Ramanduz and Merga Sur.
In late 1988 the group split and Kurdish Revolutionary Hizbullah
(Hirbullahi Kurdi Shorishger; Hizbullah al-Kurdi al-Thawri) was
formed, led by Adham Barzani. It is based in the Diyana region.
The vast majority of members of the Christian faith in Iraqi
Kurdistan are represented by the ADM, a party represented in the IKF.
There are also three other Christian groups: the Democratic Christian
Movement (al-Haraka al-Dimaqratiyya al-Masihiyya) and the United
Kurdistan Christian (Masihiyyi Kurdistan al-Muwabhada), both of
which are closely associated with the KDP; and the Chaldean
Christian Democratic Party (Kaldo Ashur al-Dimuqrati), which
represents Assyrians of the Chaldean sect and is closely associated
with the ICP.
The Turkman minority in Iraqi Kurdistan is represented by four
parties: the Iraqi National Turkman Party (al-Hizb al-Watani alTurkman al-'Iraqi) led by Muthaffar Arslan; the Turkman Union Party
(Hizb al-Ittihad al-Turbnanh led by Riad Jamal; the Union of
Democratic Turkman (Ittiad al-Dimuqrattyyin al-Turkman); and the
Turkman Brotherhood Party (Hizb al-ha' al-Turkman). [=]
~system as well as press and other freedoms. The last round of
formal negotiations was held in Baghdad in 8/1991, although contact
between the two sides was maintained for several months. It was not
until mid-1/1992 that the IKF finally announced that it was suspending
talks with Baghdad. It simultaneously called for elections for a Kurdish
parliament to fill the administrative vacuum in the region. The
parliament would replace the former (government-created)
Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. Those
areas of Iraqi Kurdistan which government forces failed to regain after
the uprising, as well as those which fell under Kurdish control after
10/1991, were effectively administered by the IKF. The IKF continued
to exercise de facto authority in the region until mid-1992, when
parliamentary elections were held and a Council of Ministers was
formed. Until then, military, security, administrative, judicial and
educational matters (among other things) were regulated by local
committees set up by the IKF Political Leadership. In late 8/1991 a
permanent working committee was created to coordinate and
supervise the activities of the various IKF local committees, as well
as to liaise with international non-governmental organizations
operating in the Kurdish region. Known as the Political Leadership
Acting Body (Korjeri Sorkirdoyeti Siyosilal-Hay'a al-'Amila lil-Qiyada
al-Siyasiyya), its creation coincided with the negotiations in Baghdad
becoming deadlocked and the growing conviction of the Kurdish
leadership that agreement could not be reached on the substantive
issues. The Acting Body had eight members, representing each of the
political parties in the IKF, who met on a frequent and regular basis in
Khalifan (Arbil province). After 10/1991 additional local committees
were set up for the areas vacated by Iraqi forces. All local committees
continued to liaise with and remained answerable to the Acting Body,
which transferred its base from Khalifan to Arbil. The Acting Body
effectively became redundant after the parliamentary elections and the
formation of a Council of Ministers.
On 5/19/1992 elections were held simultaneously for the 105member Kurdistan National Assembly (Anjumani Nishtimani
Kurdistan; al-Majlis al-Watani al-Kurdistani) and for the "Leader of the
Kurdish Liberation Movement". The two laws governing the electoral
process had been drafted by a body established by the DCF, [The Law
for the Election of the National Assembly for Iraqi Kurtistan and the
Law for the Elecction of Leader of the Kurdish Liberation Movement,
both issued by the IKP in 4/1992.] the High Commission for the
Supervision of the Elections in Iraqi Kurdistan." The elections were
based on a system of proportional representation with a 7% threshold.
Twelve political parties competed in the parliamentary elections, eight
of them for 100 seats and four others for the five seats reserved for
parties representing members of the Christian faith. Four candidates
contested the position of Leader. The IKF invited a number of
international observers, both governmental and nongovernmental, to
observe and monitor the elections. Among them was the International
Human Rights Law Group, which subsequently published its fintings
in 7/1992. [International Human Rights Law Group, "Ballots Without
Borders: A Report on the May 1992 Elections in Iraqi Kurdistan",
Washington D.C., 7/1992.] The preface to its report reads: "The
conduct and completion of the electoral process was a remarkable
achievement. The focus of any appraisal of the electoral process must
be on the enormous accomplishments of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan
and not on the shortcomings of the procedures. As [our] delegation
found, the process was remarkably fair and, on balance, free...
Despite flaws, the elections offered an opportunity for the will of the
people to be expressed... perhaps for the first time in their history."
This assessment was not shared by some of the smaller
political parties, who stated that the extent of multiple voting, as well
as other irregularities, cast doubt on the fairness of the elections. In
their public statements the PUK and KDP stated that the elections
Context: Kurdish Self-Rule. New York: Amnesty International,
February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11385] [19950228] In 4/1991,
in the aftermath of the uprising, negotiations began between the Iraqi
Government and the eight opposition parties represented in the IKP.
Five months later, the two sides had failed to reach agreement on a
number of issues, the most important of which were: demarcation of
the Kurdish autonomous region, particularly as regards the city of
Kirkuk; responsibility for security affairs in the autonomous region; a
new constitution; and the introduction of a multi-party political
58
were on the whole free and fair, but privately some officials from both
parties complained of irregularities. The published official results of
the parliamentary elections gave the KDP 50.8% of the vote and the
PUK 49.2%. This took into account the reallocation of votes cast for
the smaller parties, none of which reached the 7% threshold to qualify
for seats in the National Assembly. By agreement, however, the KDP
and PUK settled for 50 seats each as part of a power-sharing
arrangement. Four of the five seats reserved for the Christian parties
went to the ADM. None of the candidates competing for the position of
leader won an absolute majority. No date was subsequently
scheduled for runoff elections and the position has since remained
unfilled. The National Assembly beld its inaugural session in Arbil on
6/4/1992.
The Council of Ministers for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region
(Anjumant Wozirani Haremi Kurdistani 'Iraq/Majlis al-Wuzara' IlIqhm Kurdistan dil-'Iraq) was formed one month later and began
functioning officially on 4 July. [The Law of the Counciul of Ministers
for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (No. 3 of 1992) passed by Decree No.
15 of 16/9/92, published in the official gazette Perleman, Issue No. 2,
10/1992.] Fifteen ministries were created, including the Interior,
Justice and Pesh Merga Affairs (the latter being akin to a Ministry of
Defence). There is no Ministry of Foreign Affairs although some of the
relevant functions are carried out by the Ministry of Humanitarian
Assistance and Cooperation. Following the formation of the Council of
Ministers, separate laws defining the administrative structure and
areas of competence of each ministry were promulgated. Initially
these laws were drafted by an advisory legal body composed of three
jurists, but towards the end of 1992 this task was taken over by the
National Assembly's Legal Committee (al-Lajna al-Qanunryya). The
various ministries, however, began functioning before the
promulgation of these laws, the last of which was issued in 12/1993.
The 15 portfolios were divided along these lines: six each for the KDP
and PUK, one for the ICP, one for the ADM and one for anon-affiliated
andidate. Following a reshuffle announced in 4/1993, the allocation of
portfolios remained the same with the exception of the Justice
portfolio, which was given to a representative of the KUP. [The Justice
portfolio has been held by the KDP since 8/1993, when the KUP
dissolved itself and united with the KDP.]
On the political level, the Council of Ministers' stated aims
included the "establishment of relations between Kurdistan and the
central government on the basis of a voluntary union within a
democratic Iraq which recognizes the rights of our people"; the
establishment of good relations with neighbouring countries and
noninterference in their affairs; and working through the UN both to
exert pressure on the Iraqi Government to lift its blockade on Iraqi
Kurdistan and to exclude the region from the sanctions imposed by the
UN on Iraq. After the 1993 reshuffle, the Council of Ministers stated
that efforts would be made to "establish the relationship of the
Regional Government with the future central government on the basis
of a voluntary union and respect for a framework of a federal and
democrtic Iraq in which all the rights of our people are safeguarded".
This departure from previously stated political objectives reflected the
adoption by the Kurdish leadership in October l9 of a unified Iraq as
the basis for its future political program. The statement announcing
the "federal union", issued in the name of the National Assembly as
follows: "The Kurdistan National Assembly... decided unanimously...
to define its legal relationship with the central government, at this
juncture in [the Kurdish people's] history, on the basis of a federal
union within a democratic and parliamentary Iraq which believes in a
multi-party system and which respects human rights as recognized
by international covenants and treaties." ["Statement of the
Announcement of the Federal Union", issued by National Assembly
Decree No.22 on 4/10/1992, published in Perleman, Issue No.3,
10/1992.]
On the level of democratic freedoms and human rights, the
Council of Ministers committed itself to the following: suspending all
legislation passed by the central government which "consolidates and
protects dictatorship and destroys the spirit of liberation in Kurdistan";
guaranteeing freedom of opinion, of political and religious beliefs and
of the press, trade unions and others; protecting human rights in
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
guaranteeing die cultural rights of minority groups in Iraqi Kurdistan
(the Turkmen, Assyrians and Arabs); and enforcing the law,
protecting the independence of the judiciary and refraining from
interference in its affairs. After 4/1993 the Council of Ministers also
committed itself to making available the necessary buildings and
other requirements regarding prisons and detention centres, and to
uphold and respect human rights in these establishments; to ensure
the availability of modern means of criminal investigation; and to
respect human rights in the course of criminal investigation, including
refraining from obtaining information by coercion.
In 1993 several important laws were promulgated by the
National Assembly which were aimed at tackling security problems
in the region as well as regulating various aspects of political and
public life. The Weapons Law (No. 16 of 1993), [Decree No. 41 of
10/5/1993, published in Perleman, Issue No. 15, 11/6/1993.] passed in
October, was intended to control the amount of freely available
weaponry in the region and placed the issuance of licences for
weapons under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. Earlier, in
April, the Law on Publications for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (No. 10 of
1993) [Decree No. 24 of 4/25/1993, published in Perleman, Issue No.
11, 5/20/1993.] was passed, giving the Ministry of Culture
responsibility for issuing all publication licences. The Law on
Associations for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (No. 18 of 1993), [Decree
No. 44 of 10/31/1993, published in Perleman, Issue No. 15,11/6/1993.]
passed in October, gave the Ministry of Interior responsibility for
issuing licenses to non-profit making associations. Article 4 of this
law stipulates that the aims and activities of these associations must
preclude the spreading of religious or sectarian strife, and must
comply with democratic principles and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Article 6 guarantees the right of these associations to
hold gatherings, demonstrations, strikes and other activities in
accordance with the laws in force. Finally, the Law on Parties for the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region (No. 17 of 1993), [Decree No. 42 of 10/18/1993,
published in Perleman, Issue No. 15, 11/6/1993.] passed in October,
was aimed at regulating the establishment of political parties in the
region. Article 3 states: "The freedom to establish political parties is
guaranteed, and each party may pursue its activides with complete
freedom...". Articles 6 and 7 stipulate that applications for the
establishment of political parties must be submitted to the Ministry of
Interior and then referred to the Council of Ministers for a final
decision. Article 15 sets out a number of "obligations" which all
parties must commit themselves to, including: rejecting all forms of
terrorism; respecting the law and preserving the independence of the
judiciary; and refraining from retaining or establishing any military
organizations or possessing weapons in violation of the laws in force.
Existing political parties were expected to comply with the provisions
of the law within three months of its coming into force.
The three laws governing publications, associations and political
parties all contain provisions allowing the applicants to appeal against
a negative decision by the competent ministry. Appeals must be
lodged within a stipulated period to the Court of Cassation. Decisions
by the Ministry of Interior to dissolve any political party deemed to
have failed to comply with the law can also be appealed before the
Court of Cassation. In all cases the rulings of this court are final.
The idea of the promulgation of a constitution for Iraqi Kurdistan
59
has been discussed at various junctures by the political, legislative
and judicial authorities, and Amnesty International is aware of two
draft texts. At the time of writing, the draft texts were still under
discussion. The position of "Leader of the Kurdish Liberation
Movement" remains unfilled, although the law which regulated
elections for this position in 5/1992 was subsequently reissued by the
National Assembly as Law No. 2 of 1992 and was used as the legal
basis for the promulgation of over laws. The consequences of this
post remaining unfilled has given rise to a number of legal problems,
which are focused primarily on who should carry out the functions of
Leader as defined in Articles 10 to 12 of Law No. 2 of 1992. Article 13
of this law states: "In the absence of the Leader from his position for
any reason, the head of the executive authority will replace him."
However, Article 14 states: "If the position of leader falls vacant for
any reason, the President of the Kurdistan National Assembly will
assume his responsibilities until a new leader is elected within one
month of the posit on becoming vacant.. Disagreement arose between
the KDP and PUK over which of these articles should apply and over
the legal definitions of "vacant" and "absent."
The decision initially taken in early 1993 was that the President
of the National Assembly should carry out some of the functions of
Leader on the basis of Article 14. [Amnesty International understands
that agreement was reached between the KDP and PUK that both the
Preddentof the National Assembly and the Prime Minister would
share the function. of Leader on a temporary basis, but that for
reasons of protocol the former would take responsibility for many of
the public functions. The ratification or commutation of death
sentenece was also included in his brief.] He did so for several
months, but continuing - challenges to his authority by PUK
parliamentarians on the basis of Article 13 prevented him from
carrying on with these functions. The legality of the decision to
empower the President of the National Assembly as Leader was also
challenged by some members of the legal profession in Iraqi
Kurdistan, albeit on a different basis. Some people question the
validity of Law No. 2 of 1992 itself, since it was originally promulgated
by the IKF Political Leadership and not by a competent and elected
legislative body (the parliament). [The Law for the Election of Leader
of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement was not subsequently debated
in the National Assembly It was simply adopted in Law No. 2 of 1992
when the National Assembly came into being.] Others argue that in
any case the President of the National Assembly had exceeded his
powers by continuing to carry out the functions of Leader beyond the
one month stipulated in Article 14.
At the time of writing this issue had not been resolved. Debate
around varying interpretations of Articles 13 and 14 continued despite
the promulgation of another law in 12/1993 which ought to have made
such a debate redundant. Law No. 19 of 1993 created an eightmember Presidential Body of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (Destey
Serokayeti Haremi Kurdistani 'Iraq; Hay'at Ri'saat Iqlim Kurdistan al'Iraq), [Law for the Presidential Body of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region,
passed by Decree No 48 of 12/22/1993, published in Perleman, Issue
No l5, 12/22/1993.] which was meant to fill the vacuum created by the
absence of a Leader. Article 1 of Law No. 19 empowers the
Presidential Body to assume the authority and responsibilities defined
in Law No. 2 of 1992 "until the second phase of the election of Leader
of the Kurdish Liberation Movement is completed". In fact the
Presidential Body was short-lived and ceased to function within a few
weeks of its creation, which had coincided with the outbreak of
military clashes between PUK and IMIK forces. Law No. 19 was not
subsequently repealed, however; in theory it retains legal validity due
in practice none of its provisions is applied.
In 7/1994, as a result of an initiative by a group of independent
Kurdish intellectuals, delegations from the KDP and PUK held talks in
Paris under the auspices of the French Government in an attempt to
find a lasting solution to their political differences. A draft agreement
was produced which tackled a member of key objectives, including:
normalization of the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan in the wake of the
inter-party conflict in 5/1994; normalization of interference by political
parties in the administration's affairs and the enhancement of the role
of parliament; adoption of a unified policy cowards Baghdad as well as
the region's neighbouring countries; introducting of a system of
accountabilityinto the financial affairs of the Council of Ministers;
unification of the police and internal security forces; the disbanding of
the armed militias of the two political parties; the abolition of the
Ministry for Pesh Merga Affairs and the creation of a unified army
based on conscription. The leaders of the KDP and PUK were due to
sign the agreement formally in Paris shortly thereafter. This did not
take place and armed clashes between the two sides continued
intermittently until August. On 11/21/1994 a separate agreement,
known as the Alliance Covenant (Mithaq al-Tahaluf) was signed by
Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. A series of political and legal
reforms was agreed as a means of settling differences between the
respective parties and preventing the recurrence of the 5/1994
clashes. The Alliance Covenant also called for the prohibition and
criminalization of armed conflict between the political parties and
forces in Iraqi Kurdistan and for the condemnation of the use of
violence, assassinations and duress as a means of imposing opinions
on others. The following month, armed clashes broke out again
between KDP and PUK forces and which were ongoing at the time of
writing. [=]
Context: Background to The Human Rights Crisis. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11386] [19950228] In assessing the human rights situation in Iraqi
Kurdistan, Amnesty International recognizes the many difficulties
faced by the population and its political leadership over the pase three
years. The region was in a state of turmoil following the withdrawal of
Iraqi Government forces and administration, which happened barely
seven months after the brutal suppression of the uprising. The
prevailing military and security situation was extremely precarious,
with a constant threat of renewed military attacks by government
forces. Iraqi Government agents are believed to have continued to
perpetrate acts of sabotage, assassinations and other killings aimed at
destabilization and spreading fear. Such acts are believed to have also
been perpetratod by Iraq's neighbouring countries, namely Iran and
Turkey, including the targeting of their own opponents who have
sought refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. Coupled with this are the
consequences of two economic embargoes. The international
humanitarian assistance provided by UN agencies and international
nongovernmental organizations have undoubtedly benefited some
sectors of the population. However, this could not compensate for the
sudden loss of income and livelihoods experienced by so many
people. High levels of unemployment have in turn contributed to a rise
in crime. The uncertainties of the future, both politically and militarily,
have also taken their toll.
These factors have, however, been used time and again to justify
a wide range of human rights abuses committed by those who hold
the reins of power in Iraqi Kurdistan. In Amnesty International's view,
the failure to uphold fundamental human rights on such grounds or any
other grounds, cannot be justified: such rights should be respected in
all circumstances. The KDP and PUK, which hold the monopoly of
power in the region and have the requisite military means, bear the
greatest share of responsibility for the abuses of these human rights.
The role of the IMIK, the third political force in the region, has also
60
been significance in this regard.
The commitment to a multi-party political system expressed by
the leaders of both the KDP and PUK has not been reflected in their
practices. While several political parties have continued to function
and some are represented in either the Council of Ministers or the
National Assembly, the monopoly of power enjoyed by the KDP and
PUK has ensured that none of them develops into a viable entity with
political weight. Other smaller groups have been suppressed through
intimidation, harassment and, in some instances, the arrest or
assassination of their members by both the KDP and PUK. The only
challenge to the supremacy of the two ruling parties has come from
the IMIK, which controls territory and has a sizeable military force. Its
challenge,directed principally at the PUK, has to date manifested
itself through sheer military force. After failing to reach the seven per
cent threshold in the May 1992 parliamentary elections, and following
the failure of negotiations with the KDP and PUK over its participation
in the Council of Ministers, the IMIK distanced itself from mainstream
politics and consolidated its own structures in territory under its
control (mainly in the regions bordering Iran in Sulaimaniya Province)
and elsewhere in Iraqi Kurdistan where it had presence and
membership. In these areas it established its own system of law
enforcement, a judicial apparatus, courts and detention facilities and
provided educational, health and social services for its members.
This has been one of the continuing sources of friction between the
IMIK and the other political parties, which have accused the IMIK of
not recognizing or accepting the legitimacy of the Kurdish
administration and its institutions, and to have thereby contributed to
the destabilization of the region. At the same time, the IMIK has itself
failed to develop a substitute system of accountability as regards its
own members who commie human rights abuses, including torture
and unlawful and deliberate killings.
A high level of administrative paralysis - most critically in
dealing with the criminal justice system - has resulted from the
system of power-sharing agreed by the PUK and KDP. The dispute
over the results of the parliamentary elections was tackled by sharing
the National Assembly seats equally. The President of the National
Assembly was to be from the KDP and his deputy from the PUK.
Conversely, the Primc Minister was to be from the PUK and his
deputy from the KDP. This so-called "50-50 policy" was applied to all
other positions of power and authority in the administration. Every
KDP minister has a PUK member as his deputy and vica versa. The
head of the General Asayish Directorate [the General Secretary
Directorate] is a KDP member, while that of the General Police
Directorate is a PUK member. Their deputies are appointed on the
same basis. Within this system, each party has sought to block the
decisions of the other in accordance with its perceived interests at the
time. The problems were compounded by the insistence of both
parties that key officials and their deputies be accorded identical
responsibilities and levels of authority. The gradual application of the
"50-50 policy" to lower-level appointments has further ensured that
the administration remains but a tool in the hands of the two parties, a
means through which their political interests could be served but
which cannot hold them accountable for their actions. The absence of
accountability has allowed the KDP and PUK to continue abusing their
authority, and for individuals affiliated to them to perpetrate human
rights abuses with impunity. Prom their respective positions of
strength, both parties have undermined many of the positive
measures adopted in the name of the administration. It is widely
recognized, for example, that final decisions regarding authorization
for the establishment of political parties rest with Jalal Talabani and
Mas'ud Barzani rather than with the competent ministries. At least
two political groups have alleged that their applications under the Law
on Parties for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region have been blocked on
political grounds rather than because they failed to comply with its
provisions. [This refers to the IWCP and the KSP-I (under the
leadership of Muhammad Haji Mahmud). Muhunmad Rahim
'Abdullah, one of the KSP-I's leadership cadre who was assassinated
in 3/1994 told Amnesty International in 2/1994 that the KSP-I's
application for registration as a political party was votoed by Mas'ud
al-Barzani.] Both the KDP and PUK, among others, have yet to
comply themselves with some of these provisions.
The KDP and PUK have shown a singular lack of respect for the
independence of the judiciary. Both have actively interfered in
perverting the course of justice. They have, for example, prevented
the arrest of suspects affiliated to them and for whom arrest warrants
had been issued by investigating judges. In other instances, they have
removed such suspects from prison by force, collusion or other
means. Political interference has compromised the right of
defendants, particularly those accused of political or capital offences,
to a fair trial. It has also meant that in many cases, members of the
judiciary have been unwilling or unable to investigate claims of torture
and cases of killings. There are a number of cases where
investigating judges have been threatened with death or intimidated in
other ways to deter them from pursuing investigations. Several
lawyers and one investigating judge were assassinated (see Chapter
5). The increasing number of such killings has spread fear among the
population and has prevented meaningful investigations into such
crimes.
By far the most important factor underlying the human rights
crisis is the phenomenon of impunity, which is rife in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Despite evidence of the responsibility of forces under the authority of
the political parties for grave human rights abuses, no one has been
brought to justice. In 7/1994 Jalal Talabani acknowledged to Amnesty
Internationalthat PUK forces have committed some human rights
abuses, but stated that no measures would be taken to bring them to
justice. Mas'ud Barzani told the organization on more than one
occasion that while be would be prepared to bring to justice KDP
personnel found responsible for human rights abuses, there was "no
evidence that any were implicated in such crimes." IMIK leaders told
Amnesty International that their forces have not committed any human
rights abuses. This report provides evidence to the contrary, and
shows that all three political parties have committed gross human
rights abuses.
Impunity is one of the main problems which the Kurdish
leadership must resolve if its stated commitment to protect human
rights is to have any credibility. To date, political leaders have shown
themselves unwilling to acknowledge the scale of human rights
abuses carried out by their respective parties, to impose the
necessary controls on the forces under their authority, or to introduce
effective measures to ensure that those responsible are held
accountable before the law. The fact that the perpetrators of numerous
unlawful and deliberate killings and torture remain not only at liberty
but also in positions of authority has undermined public confidence in
the administration of justice and the rule of law. The knowledge that
crime will go unpunished - and may even be rewarded - has
contributed to the spiral of violence in society at large, which has in
turn escalated human rights abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Political leaders frequently justify their failure to act by referring
to the precarious security situation in the region, the dire economic
conditions, the political uncertainties and the complex nature of
Kurdish society. They also cite practical problems relating to law
enforcement and the administration of justice, including insufficient
resources, lack of training, lack of specialist personnel and corruption.
Real though these problems are, the Kurdish leadership must find the
political will to ensure that the forces under its control are held
61
accountable before the law and that justice is applied to all human
rights abusers and victims. [=]
raised human rights issues during debates. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 11: Chapter Two: Law Enforcement and
the Prison System. New York: Amnesty International, February 28,
1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11388] [19950228] One of the most urgent
tasks facing the IKF after the 1991 withdrawal of Iraqi Government
forces from the region was the restoration of law and order in the
major cities and towns. The civilian police forces were reconstituted
and organized administratively into police directorates for each
province, and were made directly answerable to the local committee
of the IKP. This coincided with the resumption of work by members of
the judiciary and the civil courts, and with the reopening of prisons
under the jurisdiction of the police. During the months leading up to the
parliamentary elections, the civilian police gradually took on
responsibility for the arrest, detention and interrogation of criminal
suspects, and the referral of cases to the civil courts. The legal
procedures followed from the start were said to conform to Iraq's
Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, [Penal Code, Law No.
111 of 1969 as amended; Code of Criminal Procodure, Law No. 23 of
1971amended.]both of which fall short of international standards.
However, cases involving offences of a "security" nature continued to
be dealt with by the IKF's security committees. Suspects were
arrested without warrant and interrogated while held in the custody of
the same authority, with no independent judicial supervision at any
stage in the process, as required by Article 9 of the ICCPR and other
internationalstandards.The vulnerability of detainees held in such
circumstances was compounded by the fact that although many of
them were held ostensibly in the name of the IKF, the arresting and
detaining authority was in reality one or other of the political parties.
Moreover, some of the detainees were held in unacknowledged
places of detention, where they could be held indefinitely and during
which they were deprived of the most basic rights. Those who were
subsequently charged with recognizable criminal and political
offences were brought to trial before special courts, which failed to
ensure fair trials. Detainees held by political parties outside the IKF,
notably the IMIK, were held under similar conditions. The IMIK
adopted its own judicial system, according to which detainees were
"tried" and sentenced to terms of imprisonment or to death. A number
of positive developments tool: place with regard to law enforcement
in Iraqi Kurdistan once the Council of Ministers assumed its
responsibilities in 7/1992. The political parties moved towards the
unification of their respective armed and security forces to an agreed
limit, and a centralized law enforcement structure was created with
clear lines of accountability. [=]
Context: The Promotion of Human Rights Work. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] Following the withdrawal of Iraqi Government forces from
the region, political leaders publicly committed themselves to
supporting human rights worlc, and in some instances initiated
programs aimed at promoting human rights awareness. In 12/1991
the Kurdistan Human Rights Organization (KHRO: Rekkhrawi Mafi
Mirov le Kurdistan; Munathamat Huquq al-Insanfi Kurdistani) was set
up, with branches in Arbil, Duhok, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. [The
Kirkuk branch of KHRO, based in Derbendikhan, began functioning in
12/1992.] Its membership was largely composed of lawyers,
teachers, academics and other professionals, including doctors and
engineers. The KHRO sought initially to document human rights
violations perpetrated by Iraqi Government forces, but gradually
extended its activity to cover abuses perpetrated by Kurdish groups.
These activities included registering complaints by members of the
public and intervening on their behalf with the Kurdish authorities;
visiting acknowledged places of detention and bringing to the attention
of the authorities complaints by detainees and convicted prisoners
regarding their treatment in custody as well as the dire conditions
prevailing in some prisons; and organizing seminars to promote
human rights awareness among law enforcement personnel. From
the start, however, the KHRO's work has been hampered by a dearth
of members with any experience in the field of human rights and an
acute shortage of funding and other resources. On another level, the
organization's impartiality has been called into question as a result of
some of its members or branches being perceived as too closely
associated with either the KDP or PUK. The KHRO has also been
riven by internal strife.
These problems aside, however, it is evident that as the human
rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan deteriorated, the business of human
rights investigation and protection became not only more difficult but
also more risky. KHRO representatives increasingly complain to
Amnesty International that both the political and administrative
authorities rarely respond to interventions made on behalf of individual
victims of human rights abuses or take serious steps to redress
matters raised with them. More importantly, the increase in the
number of unlawful and deliberate killings, particularly the
assassination of political activists and members of the legal
profession, has deterred committed human rights defenders from
carrying out their tasks. Amnesty International is aware of several
cases where individuals have been harassed, intimidated or
threatened because of their human rights work. A variety of groups
and associations have been set up in the past three years which are
not involved in general human rights work but focus on promote the
rights of women and specific groups of workers. Among the political
parties, the KDP, PUK and IMIK have created their own human rights
committees, specifically since the 5/1994 events. However, their
work remains largely confined to documenting human rights abuses
against their own members. Within the Kurdish administration, no
mechanism or body with a human rights mandate has been
established to date. In mid-1992, prior to the creation of the Council of
Ministers, PUK leader Jalal Talabani told Amnesty International that
the idea of creating a department within the Ministry of Justice to deal
with human rights issues would be discussed by the IKF political
leadership. No such department was subsequently created, however.
There is also no parliamentary human rights committee within the
National Assembly, although a number of parliamentarians have
the Prison System: The Ministry of Pesh Merga Affairs. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11389] [19950228] The Law of the Ministry for Pesh Mergo Affairs
(No. 5 of 1992) was promulgated on 10/1/1992. [Decree No. 19,
10/1/1992, published in Perleman, Issue 4, 11/1992.] The main
purpose of the Ministry is defined under Article 3(1) as "the defence of
the unity of Iraqi Kurdistan, its territory and its people, from all
aggression irrespective of its source." Article 4 provided for the
appointment of a Committee for the Unification of Pesh Merga forces
to work towards the recruitment and unification of these forces.
Earlier, in 7/1992, the National Assembly had passed a decree
allowing for the reinstatement to their former positions of military,
police and security personnel who had been removed from their posts
or transferred to civilian duties by the Iraqi authorities "because of
their links with the Kurdish liberation movement" [Decree No. 3,
62
7/29/1992, published in Perleman, Issue 1, 9/15/1992.] The following
March, Law No. 8 of 1993 was passed, which allowed for the
recruitment into the unified armed forces of veteran Pesh Merga
officers, provided that they had not "deviated from the aims of the
revolution and collaborated with the enemies of the Kurdish liberation
movement". [Article 5 of Law No. 8 of 1993, promulgated by Decree
No. 18, or 3/17/1993, published in perleman, Issue No. 10, 4/12/1993.]
By 10/1993 the unified armed forces had reached some 35000 in
number, according to the Minister for Pesh Merga Affairs, Jabbar
Parman. He told Amnesty International at the time that the KDP and
PUK had each contributed 15000 armed fighters, with the remaining
5000 coming from several smaller political parties. [According to
KDP sources, the unified Pesh Merga forces never reached 35000.
Amnesty International was told that the agreed target was 36000, but
that the total number actually attained never exceeded 28000-29000.
Of these, the ICDP and PUK had contributed 12000 fighters each, with
the remainder coming from the smaller political parties.] A military
college had been established in Qala Cholan (Sulaimaniya province)
at the end of 1991, although this was essentially a PUK rather than an
IKF establishment.
The Ministry for Pesh Merga Affairs does not formally exercise
jurisdiction over any prisons, although it has detention facilities for
members of the armed forces accused of military offences. These
facilities include cells located in or near the headquarters of the unified
Pash Merga forces' Special Brigades (Liway Taybatilal-Alwiya alKhassa), which Amnesty International visited in 7/1994. Detainees
have also been held on the Pesh Merga ministry's premises in Arbil.
The procedures followed by the ministry with regard to the arrest,
detention and trial of members of the unified Pesh Merga forces
accused of having committed offences are said to be carried out in
coordination with the Ministries of Justice and Interior. [=]
penalty was provided under Iraqi law, some of which were carried
out. At the same time, individual political parties retained their own
system of law and order, detaining and interrogating suspects in their
own prisons and detention centres and, in some cases, executing
them. This system continued to operate after the withdrawal of Iraqi
Government forces from most areas of Iraqi Kurdistan on 10/23/1991.
However, the withdrawal brought under Kurdish administration the
existing civil courts (including the criminal courts) in the cities of
Arbil, Sulaimaniya and other areas, form the basis of a central judicial
system for the region. These courts continued to function as before,
operating alongside the special courts set up by the IKF. The IKF
retained ultimate judicial authority for both the special courts and the
criminal courts until the appointment of the Council of Ministers in
7/1992 and the creation of a Ministry of Justice. By November that
year, all special courts had been abolished. [=]
the Prison System: The Ministry of Interior. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] The Law of the Ministry of Interior (No. 9 of 1993) was
promulgated on 3/27/1993. [Decree No. 21 of 3/27/1993, published in
POerleman, Issue No. 10, 4/1993.] Its areas of responsibility, as
defined by Article 2, include the following: to protect the internal
security of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region; to protect democratic liberties
and human rights; to combat espionage, smuggling and infiltration; to
protect the economy; and to prevent illegal entry into the region. The
law enforcement personnel over which it has jurisdiction, the civilian
police and the internal security forces, are a combination of former
Pesh Merga fighters and former members of the police under the Iraqi
Government. One of the first acts passed by the National Assembly
was to bring "all checkpoints and the internal security forces" under
the jurisdiction of a Ministry of Interior, effective from 7/15/1992.
[Decree No. 1 of 7/15/1993, published in POerleman, Issue No. 1,
9/15/1992.]
The Ministry of Interior is organized into six directorates, among
them the General Police Directorate (Mudiriyyat al-Shurta al'Amma) and the General Security Directorate (Mudirlyyat al-Asayish
al-'Amma), lmown as the Asayish. [The Asayish (literally, "security")
forces are the official internal security forces in Iraqi Kurdistan and
are henceforth referred to by that name.] The headquarters of both
directorates are based in the city of Arbil, and it is to them that the
police and the Asayish directorates in each of the four provinces are
answerable. The Law of the Ministry of Interior does not spell out the
range of crimes for which the police and the Asayish are responsible.
In general, ordinary criminal offences are dealt with by the police
while security offences, such as espionage and sabotage, as well as
drug-trafficking, are dealt with by the Asayish.
The police directorates in the provinces of Arbil, Duhok,
Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk are organized along the same line. Initially,
each police directorate consisted of three units with separate
functions: the Emergency Police Directorate (Mudiriyyat Shurtat alNajda), the City Police Directorate (Mudiriyyat Shurtat al-Balda) and
the Crime Combat Directorate (Mudirryyat Mukafahat al-Ijram).
Each of these units had separate police stations in the principal
administrative districts of the cities as well as in the provinces as a
whole. The police stations of the City Police and Crime Combat
directorateshad detention facilities where suspects were first heft
upon arrest and where preliminary interrogation took place. Most of
the allegations of torture and ill-treatment of criminal suspects at the
hands of the police which have been reported by Amnesty
International have emanated from police stations of the Crime
Combat Directorate. Following changes in the organizational
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 13: Chapter Three: The Judiciary and the
Courts. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE
14/01/95. [99H-11391] [19950228] Amnesty International is deeply
concerned that the judicial system in Iraqi Kurdistan as established
under Iraqi law and modified by legislation and practice since the
withdrawal of Iraqi Government forces has been responsible for the
unfair trials of political prisoners and the imposition of the death
penalty, and has tolerated or facilitated torture and ill-treatment by the
Kurdish administration authorities. The system of special courts using
special procedures and practices, now abolished, and the
susceptibility of judges in special courts to outside pressure has
denied political prisoners the fundamental right to be tried by
competent, independent and impartial courts. International standards
which are particularly relevant include Articles 9 and 14 of the
ICCPR, imposing safeguards against arbitrary detention and
guaranteeing the right to fair trial before competent, independent and
impartial courts, and the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary, providing that "[t]ribunals that do not use the duly
established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to
displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or tribunals".
Amnesty International is also concerned that no measures have been
taken to put an end to political interference with the administration of
justice at all levels. The emergence of a central judicial system in
Iraqi Kurdistan passed through several stages of development. During
the seven months between the end of March and the third week of
10/991, judicial authority in areas which remained under Kurdish
control was formally exercised by the IKF. This included the arrest,
detention and interrogation of suspects; the establishment of special
courts; the imprisonment of convicted prisoners; and the imposition of
death sentences on prisoners convicted of crimes for which the death
63
structure of the police forces at the end of 1993, the functions of the
three directorates were merged to a greater degree and their separate
police stations brought under a more centralized command. Amnesty
International was told that these changes were aimed at achieving
greater efficiency ant better use of scarce resources.
The Ministry of Interior is also responsible for the four main
police prisons in Iraqi Kurdistan, which are in the cities of Duhok,
Arbil and Sulaimaniya and the town of Derbendikhan. All were prisons
when the region was under Iraqi Government control, and each
continues to be known as the Detention and Deportations Prison (Sijn
al-Mawqif wal-Tasfirat). [The police prison in Arbil is more
commonly known as Sijn al-Mahatta (the Station Prison).] There are,
in addition, smaller prisons or detentdon facilides run by the police in
the major towns and some rural areas. Both convicted prisoners and
detainees awaiting trial on criminal charges are held in these prisons,
including women and children. The authorities claim that lack of
resources has prevented the construction of separate prisons for
these two latter groups. Prisoners sentenced to death are also held
there, and executions are carried out on the premises. The Asayish
forces were formally set up in 10/1992, five months before they were
legally established under the Law of the Ministry of Interior. They
were said to have started functioning effectively in 1/1993 following the
appointment of Karim Sinjari, a civilian, as head of the General
Security Directorate. [Karim Sinjan is a member of KDP Central
Committoc. He remained General Director of the Asayish until the
end of 4/1994, when he was suceeded by Ghazi al-Zebari, formaly the
KDP's representatve in Syria.] The Asayish are dso organized into
four directorates, one for each province. [There is, in addition, a
sepante directorate dealing with matters relating to residence,
passports and travel.] With the exception of Duholc Asayish
Directorate, and are headed by civilians. Each consists of several
units, [Not all directorates have established the same range of units,
apparently owing to lack of resources.] including: the Political Unit
(al-Shu'ba al-Sbassbya), the Legal Unit (al-Shutba al-Qanuiyya), the
Economic Unit (at-Shu'ba al-Iqtisadiyya), the Information Unit
(Shu'bat al-l'Iamn) and the Residence and Travel Unit (Shu'bat alIqama wal-Safar). In addition to the main urban centres, Asayish
personnel are also stationed in the main administrative tistricts, but
not in all subtistricts or villages.
Karim Sinjaritold Amnesty International that Asayish members
sre recruited on the basis of their "trustworthiness", which he ~aid
ruled out individuals who had been members of the Ba'th Party or who
had served the Iraqi Government in any capacity. He added that while
he deemed this policy to be ~contrary to human rights principles., the
Kurdish administration could not afford at this stage to place its trust in
people who had been linlced to the central authorities in Baghdad. The
image presented by Karim Sinjari of Asayish personnel does not
appear to be shared by wide sectors of the Kurdish population.
Amnesty International has received numerous and persistent
complaints suggesting that the Asayish abuse their authority, harass
and intimidate civilians, and commit other abuses with impunity.
Asayish personnel are said to receive some basic training,
including lectures run by representatives of the judiciary on the
provisions of the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. To
Amnesty International's knowledge, the training provided had no
human rights content. The organization provided Karim Sinjari with
copies of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,
urging that it form part of the training of Asayish personnel and that
immediate steps be taken to ensure its implementation. Karim Sinjari
subsequently provided Amnesty International with a copy of a letter he
had sent to all Asayish directorates, asking the officials in charge to
ensure that all personnel are made aware of the provisions of the
Code. However, no measures to follow this up are known to have
been taken. Karim Sinjari said there were plans to provide for more
intensive training in 1994 by running courses of at least three months'
duration. Amnesty International does not have details of these courses
and therefore cannot assess their potential usefulness. Formally, the
two main areas of jurisdiction of the Asayish are economic crimes
and political crimes. The former include smuggling and illegal fixing
of prices, and the latter focus principally on acts of terrorism,
sabotage and espionage. Karim Sinjari told Amnesty International that
the Asayish have also been involved in gathering intelligence on
incidents involving assassinations, politically-motivated or otherwise,
and that such information was then transmitted to the police who have
prime responsibility for investigating such crimes.
In various areas of crime combat, conflicts between the police
and Asayish forces emerged soon after the latter were set up. A
number of police officers complained to Amnesty International that the
Asayish frequently interfered in their affairs, namely by arresting,
detaining and interrogating individuals suspected of having committed
crimes which were clearly not within their jurisdiction. in such cases,
suspects were said to be frequently arrested without a warrant and
kept in detention without judicial supervision of their cases. Amnesty
International raised this matter with Karim Sinjari in 10/1993. He
conceded that the Asayish had indeed interfered in police matters "in
the early days", but that these problems had been largely resolved
following a series of meetings with police chiefs. He commented,
however, that the police apparatus in Iraqi Kurdistan was "old" and
that the "enthusiasm. found among the newly-established Asayish
forces was not shared by the police. He said that police personnel
were often "not prepared to go out at night" when called to the scene of
a crime, and "not as willing as the Asayish to make sacrifices" when
combatting crime. Such considerations, he maintained, had led the
Asayish to act in areas outside their jurisdiction. This assertion was
rejected outright by representatives of the police to whom Amnesty
International spoke, and is not substantiated by the organization's
findings about the abuse of authority by the Asayish. The arrest and
detention procedures followed by Asayish personnel are said by the
authorities to conform with Iraq's Penal Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure. However, Amnesty International has received numerous
reports of the violation of these laws by the Asayish. These include the
torture and ill-treatment of detainees and the denial of their legal
rights. Suspects in the custody of the Asayish are normally held in one
of the four main prisons under their jurisdiction in the provinces of
Arbil, Duhok, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. The prison buildings are, for
the most part, adjoining the headquarters of the respective Asayish
directorates, and range in sue from a large facility accommodating
several hundred inmates to one or two cells. The headquarters of the
General Asayish Directorate in Arbil also has separate detention
facilities, vvhere political and other detainees are held. In the
provincial districts, Asayish centres have short-term facilities which
are used to hold suspects before their transfer to the main prisons in
the cities.
The prisons run by the civilian police and the Asayish can be
described as the "official" prisons in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish
authorities have granted international humanitarian organizations,
notably the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), regular
access to these places of detention. All requests made by Amnesty
International for access to these prisons have also been granted to
date. Most are severely overcrowded, which has meant that
sentenced prisoners have been held with detainees awaiting trial
juveniles have shared cells with adult, and female detainees have not
had separate facilities. In 12/1992 Amnesty International was told that
the National Assembly had approved plans for a new central prison in
the Khalifan region to alleviate overcrowding,.improve conditions of
detention and create separate detention facilities for the various
64
categories of inmates. No such prison has been constructed to date. In
7/1994 the Minister of Interior told Amnesty International that a
decision had been taken to convert a disused tobacco factory in Arbil
into a central prison, and expressed optimism that the decision would
be implemented. [=]
By 10/1991 all the sector courts had been abolished and replaced
with the Supreme Kurdistan Court (Mahkamat Kurdistan al-'Uba),
which became the highest judicial body in the Kurdish-controlled
region. Article 1 of Decree No. 3035 issued by the IKF's Political
Leadership Acting Body on 10/5/1991 defined the competence of this
court as follows: hearing all cases of a criminal nature, except cases
referred to the Supreme Special Court for the Revolution (alMahiama al-'Ulya al-Khassa lil-Thawra, which was set up one month
later - see below); in a cessation capacity, reviewing all judgments
issued in civil cases, and in which the court's decisions were final;
and appointing judges and taking disciplinary measures against them.
Article 2 stipulated that all sentences passed in criminal cases by the
Supreme Kurdistan Court be reviewed by cessation by a General
Body (al-Hay 'a al-'Amma) of the court. The decisions of the General
Body were final except in death penalty cases where sentences had to
be upheld by the IKF.
The Supreme Kurdistan Court sat in Sheqlawa and had a threemember bench. All criminal cases which were left pending when the
sector courts were abolished were referred to this court. Its president,
Nuri Isma'il Nanakali, told Amnesty International in 5/1992 that the
court applied existing Iraqi legislation, namely the Code of Criminal
Procedure and the Penal Code. He admitted that some of the
provisions of these laws had on occasion been violated, particularly
regarding the treatment of detainees during pre-trial detention.
Amnesty International had in fact received numerous reports of gross
irregularities before the Supreme Kurdistan Court at all stages of its
proceedings, which were conducted in camera. These included the
torture or ill-treatment of detainees (including minors) during
interrogation to extract "confessions"; the acceptance of such
"confessions" as the sole basis for securing a conviction; the conduct
of trials in the absence of defence lawyers; and the denial of the right
to appeal on points of fact. The court reportedly passed numerous
teeth sentences, although officials did not provide Amnesty
International with reliable and precise data on this. Nuri Isma'il
Nanakali told the organization that the first three teeth sentences
passed by this court were carried out publicly by firing squad in
10/1991, and that death sentences passed thereafter were carried out
in secret. Among the delegations received was that the decision to
sentence prisoners to death and to execute them was, in some cases,
taken on political grounds. Political considerations were also said to
have influenced the court's decisions to impose fines rather than
terms of imprisonment.
In early 11/1991, one month after the establishment of the
Supreme Kurdistan Court, another special court was set up. The
Supreme Special Court for the Revolution (al-Makhana al-Ulya alKhassa lil-Thawra) reportedly came into being to hear cases of a
"special" or "dangerous" nature. [Amnesty International was unable to
obtain the text of the IKP decree by which the court was set up which
may have defined its areas of competence.] These included espionage
and sabotage as well as other offences of a political nature. The court
sat in Sheqlawa and had a five-member bench. In theory, it followed
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code.
In practice, its proceedings reportedly did not meet the most basic
standards for fair trial, including those contained in Iraqi legislation.
Trials before the court were said to have been summary in the
extreme and were characterized by the same irregularities described
above with respect to the Supreme Kurdistan Court. In addition, it was
widely perceived as a "political court" in the sense that its decisions
were seen as based on political rather than legal considerations.
There were also numerous cases where detainees who were
affiliated to one or other of the political parties were reportedly
released outside the framework of the law in exchange for large sums
of money (euphemistically referred to as "fines"). This was said to
Courts: The Special Courts. New York: Amnesty International,
February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11392] [19950228] One of the
major decisions taken by the IKF in 1991 was to establish special
courts, which had special procedures in practice, in an attempt to
introduce law and order to those areas which remained under Kurdish
control after the uprising was crushed. To Amnesty International's
knowledge, the first special court was set up in Diyana (Soran
district) at the instigation of Karim Sinjari, who was the IKF's
representative In that area at the time. The decision to establish this
court was taken in mid-4/1991 and the IKF Court (Mahkamat alJabha), as it came to be known, came into being shortly after. Its
bench consisted of seven judges, all said to be graduates of the
University of Baghdad's Law College. The court heard both criminal
and security cases and its sentences were said to have been ratified
by the IKF representative in the area. There was no right of appeal to a
higher court. Several other local IKF courts were set up along similar
lines in other areas, including Sheqlawa and Rania.
Little information is available to Amnesty International on the
functioning of the IKF courts, which were said by officials to have
applied existing Iraqi legislation. However, Amnesty International has
received various reports, including from individuals closely connected
with the courts, suggesting that corruption and political interference at
a high level influenced some of the courts' decisions. Allegations
included the acceptance of bribes by some members of the courts'
benches, as well as numerous attempts by IKF officials to interfere in
individual cases, particularly by trying to secure the release of certain
detainees affiliated to one or other of the political parties.
The IKF courts were short-lived. In mid-5/1991 the IKF decided
to set up a new judicial structure for the Kurdish-controlled areas. The
task of overseeing the implementation and functioning of this new
judicial system was entrusted to a senior IKF official, Qader 'Aziz
Jabbari, who is currently the Minister of Justice. These areas were
divided into four sectors (mahawir), each having a principal court: the
Arbil Sector Court, which sat in Sheqlawa; the Sulaimaniya Sector
Court, which sat in Qala Cholan; the Duhok Sector Court, which sat in
al-Qadesh; and the Gannian Sector Court, which sat in amountainous
region on the outskirts of the town of Kifri. [Kifri and other neighboring
towns were under Iraqi Government control at the time.] The
presidency of each was responsible for the judicial supervision of a
number of lower courts which were also set up within each sector to
hear different kinds of cases. These lower courts were said to include
a Criminal Court, a Court of First Instance, a Misdemeanor Court, an
Investigation Court and a Personal Status Court.
In 5/1992 Nuri Ismatil Nanakali, [Nuri Ismatil Nanakali was
assassinated in 11/1994] formerly President of the Arbil Sector Court,
told Amnesty International that the sector courts applied existing Iraqi
legislation, with the exception of those provisions ~affecting the liberty
and security of individuals.. Again, little information is available to
Amnesty International on the functioning of the sector courts.
However, the organization has received reports suggesting that they
too were characterized by grave procedural irregularities, and
subjected to interference by various political parties. Some of the
allegations appeared to implicate several judges in the torture or illtreatment of detainees, and in the clandestine release of detainees for
political, financial or other motives.
65
have been an accepted practice, and that in fact there was a verbal
agreement between the parties in the IKF to that effect. Numerous
death sentences were said to have been imposed by this court but
officials did not provide Amnesty International with accurate data in
this regard. The IKF's political Leadership Acting Body, according to
one of its members, had ratified "tens" of death sentences passed by
this court during the four months of its existence.
The extent of political interference in the affairs of the court was
believed to be the principal reason behind its paralysis towards the
end of 1/1992, when conflict arose between the KDP and PUK over a
particular case. This coincided with the death of the President of the
court, 'Umar Mustafa, at the end of that month during the PUK's First
Conference. The Supreme Special Court for the Revolution became
virtually defunct, although it was not abolished for a further two
months. In the interim, the ordinary criminal courts in the cities of
Arbil, Sulaimaniya and Duhok gradually took on more cases. This,
together with the improved security situation in the region and the
partial restoration of law and order, led the IKF to abolish the Supreme
Kurdistan Court on 1/28/1992. All cases pending before this court
were referred to the Supreme Special Court for the Revolution, which
was in turn abolished at the end of 2/1992. Nonetheless, and despite
the existence of fully functioning criminal courts, the IKF leadership
continued to believe in the necessity of having a special court to hear
cases of a security and political nature. On 3/19/1992 the IKP's
Political Leadership Acting Body decided to establish a Special Court
for the Revolution (al-Makkama al-Khassa lil-Thawra), and Decree
No. 281 was issued to that effect on 22 March. The court sat in Arbil,
using an office located in a prison attached to the city's former Police
Directorate. Its bench consisted of three civilian judges, all said to be
graduates of the Law College. Cases of a political and security nature
which were pending when the Supreme Special Court for the
Revolution was abolished were referred to this court.
As far as Amnesty International is aware, no other decree was
issued by the IKF setting out the areas of competence of this court,
which was essentially the Supreme Special Court for the Revolution
with a new name and bench. [The decree authorizing the
establishment of thi' court referrod to it as the "Special Court for the
Revolution", while the decree which abolished in in 11/1992 referrod
to it as the "Supreme Court for the Revolution."] The decree of
3/22/1992 stated, however, that the court would be charged with
examining cases referred [to it] by the political leadership~. Its
President, Faruq Jamil, told Amnesty International at the end of
5/1/992 that the court was temporary, and was set up during a
transitional period to hear cases of a security nature. These were said
to iinclude espionage, sabotage and other activity deemed to be
prejudicial to "the security of the revolution." Such acts were deemed
to have been carried out principally by agents of the Iraqi Government
operating in the region. Amnesty International was told that the court
followed legal procedures set out in Iraq's Code of Criminal
Procedure and Penal Code, and that no exceptional powers had been
grantedto the court which overrode the provisions of these laws.
Preliminary investigations into offences of a security nature were
usually carried out by a security committee within the IKP before
being referred to the court, although in some cases such
investigations were initiated by the civilian police and then referred to
the court once it transpired that the offences were of a security nature.
Faruq Jamil stated that the legal rights of detainees were respected
once they were referred to the court. An investigating judge was
appointed to examine their cases and to renew their detention periods
as necessary in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. He
added that detainees were granted access to defence lawyers? who
presented their clients' defence on two assigned days of the week; that
no torture or ill-treatment was used against them; and that, with the
exception of cases involving crimes of a "moral" nature, all trial
sessions were held in public. However, the verdicts and sentences of
the court were final and convicted prisoners had no right of appeal,
even in death penalty cases. Amnesty International then met the
court's two assistant judges. The organization was told that about 80
prisoners had been convicted by the Supreme Special Court for the
Revolution in Shaqlawa on various criminal charges, including
murder, robbery and forgery. There were also some 60 detainees
arrested mainly in 1991 who had not been tried by that court when it
was abolished, as well as 15 other detainees charged with security
offences. The prison's register showed that 230 inmates had been
entered up to 5/29/1992. Those convicted were serving prison terms
ranging from one year to life for both security and ordinary crimes.
Amnesty International was offered unrestricted access to the
inmates, and was allowed to examine sample files of both convicted
prisoners and detainees awaiting trial and to photograph some of
these documents. It was clear that in some cases proceedings had
been summary, and that some defendants had been tried and
convicted without any legal representation. One of the court's
assistant judges admitted to Amnesty International that some
defendants had not had a defence lawyer, particularly those charged
with espionage or sabotage and who were suspected of being agents
of the Iraqi Government. He said that it was not the court's policy to
deny defendants this basic right; rather, very few lawyers were willing
to defend them owing to the nature of the charges. [Nevertheless,
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR required the court in a criminal case to
assign counsel to defendants who are unable to obtain a lawyer.]
Amnesty International was subsequently told by other members of the
judiciary that trials before this court were, in fact, held in camera. The
torture or ill-treatment of detainees during pre-trial detention was "aid
to be routine" and "confessions" extracted under such circumstances
were used to secure convictions.
The Special Court for the Revolution continued to operate until it
was abolished by the National Assembly in mid-11/1992. [Decree No.
35 of 11/14/1992, published in Perleman, Issue No. 6, second half of
12/1992.] The decree which abolished it stated that all sentences
handed down by the court would be enforced by virtue of acquiring
legal validity through the IKF, which possessed defacto authority at the
time (Article 2); that all criminal cases settled by the court would be
referred for review to the Court of Cassation for the Kurdistan Region
upon its establishment (Article 3); [The provisions of Article 3 also
applied to cases involving disputes over land ownership.] and that all
cases in which no rulings had been passed by the court would be
referred to the Ministry of Justice for distribution to the competent
courts (Article 4). Although the Court of Cassation for the Kurdistan
Region was established by law in 12/1992 and became functional in
mid-1/1993, as far as Amnesty International is aware no cases from
these special courts were referred to it for review for at least six
months. It was only in late 7/1993 that the new Minister of Justice,
Qader 'Aziz Jabbari, announced the appointment of a three-member
committee to sort through cases and refer them to the competent
courts. [Order No. 2/3/203 issued by the Minstry of Justice on
7/24/1993. The three member committee composed of an invatigating
judge and two judicial investigators.] In 10/1993 the investigating judge
who headed the committee told Amnesty International that of the
hundreds of cases being examined by the committee, 274 involved
criminal offences where sentences had been passed by the Special
Court for the Revolution. He added that there were no death sentences
among them. Of the 274 cases, 250 had already been referred to the
Court of Cassation. [Amnesty International has obtained, from nonofficial sources, a partial list of some 70 defendants arrested in the
period 5/1991-3/1992 and convicted by the special courts for a variety
66
of offenses under Iraq's Penal Code. These included offenses against
the external security of the state (Articles 157, 158, 164, and 167), and
common criminal offenses such as robbery (Articles 443 and 444),
rape (Article 393) and premeditated murder (Articles 405 and 406).
Custodial sentences handed down by the courts ranged from two
years to life, but of the 35 defendants from this group convicted of
premeditated murder, four had been sentenced to death under Article
406.] He said the Court of Cassation would quash sentences in cases
where errors in the legal procedures followed were identified, and
uphold sentences where no errors were found.
The President of the Court of Cassation, Judge Rashid 'Abd alQader Salim, took a different view. In 10/1993 he told Amnesty
International that even in cases where the legal procedures followed
were deemed to have been unfair, the sentences would be upheld as
"they fell outside the framework of any review." He pointed out that the
number of such cases was very small, and that the sentences passed
were on the whole commensurate with the crimes committed. He
added that the National Assembly could issue a partial or general
amnesty if it felt that the sentences passed by the special courts were
too harsh.
The task facing the Court of Cassation in reviewing the cases
referred to it from the special courts is by no means easy. Indeed it is
potentially a highly sensitive matter. The extent of political corruption
which characterized these courts from the start, and the fact that
most, if not all, political parties were reportedly heavily implicated in
perverting the course of justice for their own interests explains, in the
view of some members of the legal profession, the apparent
reluctance of the Court of Cassation to delve too deeply into the
hundreds of cases referred to it for review following the abolition of the
special courts. These factors may also explain some of the obstacles
encountered by Amnesty International in obtaining, particularly from
official sources, access to court documentation pertaining to the
period 10/1991-11/1992.
Amnesty International has three main concerns in this area: (a)
that an unknown number of defendants, in both criminal and political
cases, were executed following manifestly unfair trials while others
remain under sentence of death; (b) that the legal procedures followed
during pre-trial detention and before the courts were manifestly unfair
in political cases and cases where death sentences were imposed,
and that those convicted may be executed or serve long terms of
imprisonment if their sentences are upheld by cessation, without
having had an effective right of appeal; and (c) that the current Kurdish
administration apparently does not intend to initiate investigations into
past abuses relating to the special courts with a view to bringing those
responsible to justice.
This is particularly regrettable as Amnesty International believes
there was a genuine desire by the Kurdish leadership in the aftermath
of the 3/1991 uprising to establish a judicial mechanism as part of its
overall efforts to maintain law and order in areas under its control.
The IKF's efforts were hampered by a dearth of qualified and
experienced judges and other members of the legal profession, many
of whom had remained in Arbil and Sulaimaniya following the return
of Iraqi government forces after the crushing of the uprising.
Information obtained by Amnesty International suggests that while
some of the judges who sat on the special courts' benches whether
politically independent or affiliated - endeavored to resist interference
in the courts' affairs by political parties, others were more amenable.
Moreover, the political parties perceived such judges as their
"representatives" on the benches through whom they could obtain the
release of some detainees or the conviction of others. The continuing
lack of respect displayed by the political parties for the independence
of the judiciary and for the laws which they themselves helped to
promulgate, has served to undermine many of the positive judicial
measures adopted in the past two years (described below). Indeed, in
Amnesty International's view, the single most significant threat to the
indepentence of the judiciary in Iraqi Kurdistan today remains the
interference on the part of some political parties - whether through
brute force or more subtle means. It constitutes one of the root causes
of many of the human rights abuses described in this report. [=]
Courts: The Ordinary Criminal Courts. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] The obstacles facing the judiciary in making the ordinary
courts functional again after 10/1991 were enormous, given the
prevailing conditions. Many court documents, including those
pertaining to the criminal investigation of suspects, had been burned
or destroyed during the 3/1991 uprising. Many criminal suspects had
escaped during the uprising: some were later rearrested by Kurdish
law enforcement personnel (particularly those charged with murder
and other serious offences), and fresh investigations had to be
launched into their cases. This added to the already huge burden
facing the courts, created by the high incidence of new cases arising
in a region where law and order had not been fully restored.
Nevertheless, the extent to which the judicial system became
functional, the speed with which this was achieved and, more
importantly, the fact that it acquired legitimacy in the eyes of the
population, represented an important step forward. Courts which
existed under the Iraqi Government continued to function under
Kurdish administration. These included the Criminal Courts
(Mahakim al-Jinayat) in the cities of Arbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniya,
the Court of Appeal (Mahiamat al-Istinaf) in Arbil, as well as other
specialized courts, such as the Juvenile Courts (Mahakim al-Ahdath).
[Other courts included the Misdemeanour Courts (Mahakim alJunah) and the Personal Status Courts (Mahakim al-Ahwal alShakhsiyya).] The ordinary criminal courts tried defendants charges
with capital offences as well as political detainees charged with
security offences. According to members of the judiciary with whom
Amnesty International held discussions in 5-6/1992, the courts
continued to apply Iraq's Code of Criminat Procedure and the Penal
Code, with the exception of certain provisions deemed to violate
minimum human rights standards - the so-called "Saddamist"
aspects of these laws.
According to the Code of Criminat Procedure, criminal suspects
can only Se arrested on the basis of arrest warrants issued by an
investigating judge. Initially the suspects are held at a police station for
24 hours, after which they must be referred to the investigating judge
or released. Upon referral, the suspects' statements are recorded in
writing by the investigating judge, who then decides whether to
release them unconditionally or on bail, or to detain them for a further
15 days. If the detention period is renewed, the suspects are
transferred from the police station to an officially recognized prison.
To allow investigations into alleged offences to be completed, the
detentionperiod of suspects can be repeatedly extended by the
investigating judge for 15 days at a time, provided that the total period
of detention does not exceed six months. If the investigations are not
completed within that period, permission for a further extension must
be obtained from the criminal court, which can order the continued
detention of suspects for further periods at its discretion. Iraqi
legislation does not set a maximum limit to the period during which
suspects may be legally detained, which can effectively lead to the
indefinite detention without charge or trial of suspects. [Amnesty
International understands, however, that in ordinary criminal cases,
the accepted norm in the criminal courts is that the periods for which
suspects may be detained beyond the six-month limit should not
67
exceed a further 90 days.]
It has not been possible for Amnesty International to assess the
extent to which the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
were applied in all cases brought to its attention. In May 1992 the then
President of the Court of Appeal, Ma'ruf Ra'uf Khadr (who was later to
become Iraqi Kurdistan's first Minister of Justice), [Ma'ruf Ra'uf
Khadr was appointed Minister of Justice in 8/1992. He held the post
until 4/1993, when he was replaced by Qader 'Aziz Muhammad
Jabbari.] told Amnesty International that legal procedures were being
applied as strictly as prevailing conditions allowed. He gave Amnesty
International access to sample files he had selected pertaining to
ongoing investigations into the cases of detainees accused of ordinary
criminal offences. In these cases, provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure appeared to have been followed. Several investigating
judges gave Amnesty International similar assurances, although it
was recognized that improvements in certain areas needed to be
made. Matruf Ratuf Khadr conceded, for example, that there were still
inordinate delays in bringing defendants to trial. This was borne out
during a visit by Amnesty International to al-Mahatta Prison in Arbil in
5/1992. Of the 238 inmates, some of whom had been charged with
capital offences, eight were convicted prisoners while the rest were
awaiting trial. The prison director told Amnesty International that a
number of them had been awaiting trial for many months, and that in
the case of one female detainee, the delay had exceeded 10 months.
He said that additional time was needed to "check the background of
suspects", a task made difficult by the absence of centralized data on
individuals which had been removed by Iraqi government officials
when they withdrew in 10/1991. He insisted, however, that in other
respects procedures were being followed, stating that no detainees
were admitted into the prison except in accordance with arrest
warrants issued by the competent authorities, and that they were
permitted unrestricted access to defence counsel. He showed
Amnesty International the prison's register of lawyers' visits, which
indicated that lawyers had made visits to the prison at varying times
of the day and on different days of the week.
One important area where the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure were not adequately applied was the investigation
of complaints of torture and ill-treatment of detainees. This remains
one of Amnesty International's major concerns with regard to the
human rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan (see Chapter 4). At the same
time, Amnesty International recognizes the positive role played by the
judiciary and some law enforcement personnel in attempting to
adhere to the law with respect to arrest, detention and trial
procedures. Their task was made that much more difficult because
they were operating amid administrative and political chaos and with
virtually no resources. More importantly, Amnesty International
believes that the gradual emergence of a central judicial system
which was not formally controlled by the executive authorities was
instrumental in affording protection, albeit partial, to detainees held in
acknowledged places of detention.
The situation altered significantly after the 5/1992 parliamentary
elections and the appointment of a Council of Ministers in 6/1992. The
legislative authorities, represented in the National Assembly, became
formally separated from the executive authorities in the region for the
first time. All laws, legislative decrees and orders which have since
come into force were debated and passed by the National Assembly
and published in the official gazette, Perleman. [Perleman is published
by the Kurdistan National Assembly on a monthly or bi-monthly basis
in both Kurdish and Arabic. The first issue appeared on 9/15/1992.] In
11/1992 a Ministry of Justice Law (No. 12 of 1992) [Decree No. 38 of
11/21/1992, published in Perleman, Issue No. 6, second half of
12/1992.] was promulgated, defining the administrative structure of the
ministry and its judicial mechanisms. Article 2 of this law states that
the ministry's objective is: "to secure justice through the development
and implementation of laws and respect for their provisions, both in
letter and spirit, such that the principle of the independence of the
judiciary is upheld, and to defend human rights in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human
rights declarations and treaties."
In the latter half of 1992, the National Assembly passed other
legislation which had a direct bearing on the judiciary. Among these
was a decree addressing the question of the status of laws passed by
the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the extent of their applicability to
Iraqi Kurdistan. Decree No. 11 of 8/31/1992 states: "AIl ministries, and
associations in the Kurdistan Region not linked to a ministry, shall
examine the laws, decrees, regulations and directives issued by the
central authorities to identify what is not compatible with the welfare of
the people of Kurdistan and shall submit these to the National
Assembly for a decision on the legitimacy or otherwise of their
enforceability in the Region. (Article 1) No laws, decrees, regulations
and directives which were issued or which will be issued by the
central government authorities after the withdrawal of the government
administration from the Kurdistan Region on 23/10/1991 shall be
enforced except after the legitimacy of their enforceability had been
confirmed by the Kurdistan National Assembly." (Article 2)
To Amnesty International's knowledge, no legislation passed by
the Iraqi Government since 10/23/1991 has been enforced in Iraqi
Kurdistan. As for legislation passed before that date, the National
Assembly has apparently issued a decree specifying the laws which
would not be enforced in the region. [This decree was not published in
the official gazette and Amnesty International has not had the
opportunity to examine it.] None of the laws or decrees which fall into
this category has been formally repealed; members of the judiciary
told Amnesty International that they are simply not enforced. Several
members of the National Assembly's Legal Committee took the view
that those laws, or specific articles within them, which were deemed
"incompatible with the welfare of the people of Kurdistan" could not be
repealed since the legal authority for such a measure did not exist in
Iraqi Kurdistan. They told Amnesty International that the formal repeal
of laws requires a republican decree (marsum jumhunri) by a "head
of state" or, in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, a regional decree (marsum
iqlimi) by a "regional leader". In the absence of such a legal authority,
any legislation deemed unsuitable would simply have to be "frozen"
until further notice.
Among the laws which have been "frozen" is the Judicial
Organization Law (No. 160 of 1979), which in 12/1992 was replaced
with the Judicial Authority Law (No. 14 of 1992). [Decree No. 44 of
12/28/1992, published in Perleman, Issue No. 7, 1/1993.] An
assessment of this new law and the extent to which it meets
Internationally recognized standards is not included in this report.
However, its promulgation was significant in several respects: it
affirmed the independence of the judiciary, it formally separated the
judicial and executive authorities in the region, and it attempted to
improve the employment rights of judges as well as regulating their
appointment. Equally significantly, the promulgation of the judicial
Authority Law closed a gap in the legal system which arose from the
severance of links between the courts in Iraqi Kurdistan and those in
government-controlled Iraq after 10/1991. The gap was the
unavailability of a Court of Cassation to service the region: Iraq has
one Court of Cassation which sits in Baghdad. Sentences passed by
the criminal courts in Duhok, Arbil and Sulaimaniya and upheld by the
Court of Appeal, and which require review by cessation, could
therefore be taken no further. This also applied to death sentences,
which under Iraqi law are automatically referred to the Court of
Cassation. In 12/1992 the then Minister of Justice, Matruf Ra'uf Khadr,
told Amnesty International that unsuccessful attempts had been made
68
earlier that year to have a number of cases reviewed by the Court of
Cassation in Baghdad. Files pertaining to several cases were
dispatched to the court, requesting a ruling on them. They were
returned with a note attached, saying: "We do not deal with
saboteurs".
The necessity of a law authorizing the creation of a Court of
Cassation for Iraqi Kurdistan was therefore one of the main driving
forces behind the promulgation of the Judicial Authority Law. In
addition to this court, Article 8 of the law identifies eight other types of
courts, most of which were already functioning. These include the
Courts of Appeal (Afahahm al-Isn'naf) and the Criminal Courts
(Mahatim al-Jingyot). [The other six types of civil courts are: Court of
Personal Status (Mahakim al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya), Labour Court
(Mahakim al-Amal), Investigation Courts (Mahakim al-Tahqiq),
Court of First Instance, (Mahatkim al-Bada'a), Misdemeanour Court
(Mahakim al-Junah) and the Juvenile Courts (Mahatin al-Ahdath).]
Article 5 establishes Kurdish as the language of the courts,
[Interpreters are provided for non-Kurdish speakers.] and Article 6
states that all trial sessions will be held in public unless the court
decides otherwise "out of regard for decency or to safeguard public
order". In all cases, the explanation of the courts' rulings must be held
in public session.
The Court of Cassation for Iraqi Kurdistan sits in Arbil, and its
bench is composed of a president and six judges, the minimum
number stipulated in Article 9. It began functioning formally on 18
January 1993. The Judicial Authority Law also created two appeal
districts (mananq isti'nafiyya) - Arbil and Kirkuk - thus providing for
the establishment of two Courts of Appeal. One sits in Arbil and
serves the Arbil and Dohuk regions, and the other sits in
DerbendiLhan and serves the Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya regions. [After
the 5/1994 events, the Kirkuk Court of Appeal was transferred to the
city of Sulaimaniya.] Each has a four-member bench.
Finally, Article 31 provides for the creation of a Judicial Council
(Majlis al-Qada'), [The Judicial Council replaced the Justice Council
(Majlis al-'Adl) which existed prior to the Iraqi Government's
withdrawal from the region and which was headed by the Minister of
Justice.] headed by the President of the Court of Cassation with seven
other members selected from senior members of the judiciary. The
Judicial Council meets at least once a month, provided that at least
three quarters of its members are present. Its decisions are carried
by majority vote. Article 32 defines its areas of responsibility, which
include the promotion, transfer and reinstatement of judges, and the
investigation of their conduct and competence, as well as the
supervision of the independence of the judiciary. The Judicial Council
also makes recommendations to the Minister of Justice regarding the
appointment of judges to the Courts of Appeal. A three-member
committee within the Judicial Council, known as the Judges' Affairs
Committee (Lajnat Shu'un al-Hukkam), is responsible for looking into
disciplinary measures against judges. [To Amnesty International's
knowledge, two cases had been referred to the Judges' Affairs
Committee by 7/1994 but no details on them were available at the
time of writing] Decisions taken in this regard by the committee can
be appealed against (by the judge in question or by the Minister of
Justice) within 30 days to the Enlarged Committee (al-Hay'a alMuwassa'a) of the Court of Cassation. The decisions of this
committee are final.
The only courts functioning in Iraqi Kurdistan at present are the
civilian courts. However, legislation currently in force in the region
does allow for the setting up of other courts, and some officials within
the Kurdish administration have expressed support for additional
courts to hear cases which they believe the existing criminal courts
cannot cope with, or which are not within their proper competence.
For example, Article 24(2) of the Judicial Authority Law allows for the
establishment of a second criminal court within the same province,
the competence of which is decided by the Minister of Justice. In
10/1993 the then General Director of the Asayish, Karim Sinjari, told
Amnesty International that he had requested the setting up of an
additional criminal court to hear cases of a security nature. He said
this was necessitated by the backlog of cases awaiting referral to the
existing courts and the resulting delays in bringing defendants to trial.
He maintained that he had secured agreement to his proposal from
the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Justice, but that no practical steps had been taken towards its
implementation. Article 3(9) of the Law for the Ministry of Interior
provides for the establishment of an Internal Security Forces Court
(Mahkamat Quwa al-Amn al-Dakhili), its competence being to hear
cases in which both parties are members of the police or Asayish
forces. However, no such court has been set up to date.
The only military court which current legislation allows for is a
Military Court of Cassation (Mahkamat al-Tamyiz al-Askariyya),
[Article 4(4) of the Law of the Ministry of Pesh Merga Affairs.] but to
date no such court has been set up. The Minister for Pesh Merga
Affairs told Amnesty International in 10/1993 that he favoured the
setting up of military courts to try members of the unified Pesh Merga
forces accused of offences under Iraq's Military Penal Code (No. 13
of 1940 as amended). He stated that disciplinary measures were
taken by the ministry with regard to less serious offences, following
the provisions of Iraq's Military Code of Criminal Procedure (No. 44
of 1941 as amended). However, for serious crimes punishable with
custodial sentences, accused members of the armed forces are
currently referred to the Ministry of Justice in coordination with the
Ministry of Interior, and tried before the ordinary criminal courts. This
practice is in accordance with Iraqi law, which allows for military
personnel to be tried before civilian courts where no military courts
exist. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 16: Chapter Four: Human Rights Abuses
By The Kurdish Administration. New York: Amnesty International,
February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11394] [19950228] Amnesty
International has two main areas of concern regarding human rights
abuses by the Kurdish administration. First, there is routine torture
and ill-treatment of detainees and the continuing failure of the Kurdish
authorities to investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment
promptly and impartially, to bring to justice those responsible,
compensate and rehabilitate victims and take other effective steps to
prevent these abuses. Second, Amnesty International is deeply
concerned about the use of the death penalty, often after unfair trials.
Most victims are common law detainees, who are usually held in
police custody, and political detainees accused of security offences,
who are usually held in Asayish custody. Relatively few political
activists are held in police or Asayish custody; they are usually
arrested and held by the various political parties, although in some
cases they are subsequently transferred to official prisons. [=]
By The Kurdish Administration: Torture and Ill-Treatment of
Detainees. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995.
MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11395] [19950228] Since 1992 Amnesty
International has received numerous allegations of torture of common
law and security detainees by police and Asayish personnel. This
chapter addresses allegations relating to personnel of the Ministry of
Interior, and the role of the judiciary in the investigation of such
abuses. The victims of torture include common law detainees held on
charges such as theft, armed robbery, murder and forgery as well as
69
sexual offences such as rape or sodomy. Other victims are detainees
accused of security offences - such as espionage or sabotage - who
are usually held in Asayish custody. The methods of torture used by
police and Asayish personnel include beatings all over the body with
fists, sticks, rifle butts, cables and hosepipes; kicking; falaga (beatings
on the soles of the feet); suspension from the ceiling or against the
wall by the hands, which in some cases are tied behind the back;
burning of the skin with cigarettes or heated metal implements;
electric shock treatment; and threats of sexual torture or execution.
Victims have occasionally included women and minors. In the
majority of cases, torture is aimed at coercing detainees to "confess"
to crimes which they are suspected of having committed, as well as
to divulge the names of others who may be suspected of involvement.
In other cases, torture or ill-treatment is used as punishment.
Torture is absolutely prohibited under international law, including
Article 7 of the ICCPR, to which Iraq is a party and which is legally
binding on all those seeking to exercise governmental authority.
Moreover, torture is prohibited under Iraqi law. Police and Asayish
personnel are bound to abide by the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure with regard to the treatment of detainees in their
custody. Article 127 of this law states that no illegal methods mag be
used to extract confessions from the accused, including ill-treatment,
threats to cause harm, psychological methods or the use of drugs and
spirits. Most law enforcement officials with whom Amnesty
International has raised its concerns have not denied that detainees
have on occasion been beaten during interrogation, and have stated
clearly that this is aimed at extracting information from them. The
prohibition of torture in the ICCPR is nonderogable in all
circumstances (Article 4), and the UN Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Convention against Torture) states clearly: "No exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture" (Article 2 (2)). Nevertheless, the
Kurdish authorities have sought to justify such treatment on two
grounds.
Firstly, they referred to the ~special circumstances~ prevailing
in Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular the lack of resources available to law
enforcement officials. This was said to include vital equipment
necessary for the proper conduct of criminal investigation, such as
that used for the analysis of blood samples or fingerprints. In such
cases, it was argued, where only circumstantial evidence was
available against a suspect, law enforcement personnel were "obliged
to resort" to beating the suspect to obtain a confession. Law
enforcement officials told Amnesty International that particularly when
"ugly" crimes such as murder were committed, it was deemed
necessary to obtain a "confession" from the suspect, by force if
necessary, where forensic and other vital evidence was not available.
They added that this was better than releasing a suspect whom they
believe to be a "dangerous criminal" and a "menace to the public",
simply on grounds of lack of hard evidence. The second frequently
cited explanation for the use of torture or ill-treatment is that it is part
of the "Ba'thist legacy". Some law enforcement personnel, including
those responsible for interrogating suspects, had performed the same
functions when the region was under Iraqi Government control, and
had therefore come to regard torture and ill-treatment as a routine and
legitimate part of interrogation. Consequently, it was necessary to reeducate such personnel and offer them appropriate training courses,
which required both time and resources.
Amnesty International rejects that any such argument justifies
torture, which violates international law under all circumstances. The
organization recognizes the need for additional resources and training
for law enforcement personnel, but it also recognizes that certain
practical measures could be adopted by the Kurdish administration
which would contribute significantly to combating and eventually
eradicating torture. To this end, Amnesty International held
discussions with ministers, law enforcement officials, members of
the judiciary and political leaders. The organization recommended
that the authorities implement their obligation to investigate torture
complaints, bring those responsible to justice and take practical
measures to safeguard the rights of detainees and protect them from
ill-treatment while in custody. [=]
Detainees: The Victims. New York: Amnesty International, February
28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11396] [19950228] The sample cases
described below illustrate the range of reports received by Amnesty
International over the past three years regarding torture and illtreatment by police and Asayish personnel. The information comes
from many sources. These include interviews and examinations of
detainees and former detainees who have been victims of torture,
sometimes supported by photographic or medical evidence. Where
possible, Amnesty International raised such cases with the relevant
officials, among them investigating judges and law enforcement
personnel. Other sources include friends or colleagues of victims,
medical personnel and human rights activists, none of whom is
identified at their request. [=]
Detainees:The Victims: (a) Common Law Detainees. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11397] [19950228] Most cases of torture and ill-treatment known to
Amnesty International involve common law detainees who have been
tortured immediately after arrest at the police station or Asayish
centre. The victims were usually not referred to a doctor for treatment
or for an examination of the injuries sustained under torture. In most
cases, the victims did not lodge a formal complaint, either because
they were unaware of their right to do so, or for fear of being tortured
again. The cases below have been selected to illustrate the nature of
these abuses.
(1) On 11/12/1992 and 11/14/1992, 17 people were arrested on
the campus of Salahuddin University in Arbil following the theft of
computer equipment. Those arrested included lecturers,
administration employees and guards employed by the university.
The arrests were carried out by police personnel of the Crime
Combat Directorate, who held the suspects at al-Iskan police station.
At least 10 of them were reportedly tortured on arrival at the station,
prior to interrogation. Isma'il Ratuf Ahmad, a KDP Pesh Merga
employed as a guard at the university, told Amnesty International
three weeks after his release: "When we reached al-Iskan they did not
ask us any questions. We were immediately blindfolded and our
hands were tied. They beat us with cables and hosepipes, and
subjected us to falaga with our feet raised. They also punched us in
our faces and trod on us with their army boots. They were telling us to
confess to the theft..."
Most of the detainees were released within two or three days.
They had been allowed family visits but had no access to legal
representationand were not brought before an investigating judge.
Upon release, they reportedly received an "apology" from the captain
in charge at al-Iskan, who told them that a "mistake had been made".
Isma'il Ratuf Ahmad and his two brothers who were arrested with
him were transferred to al-Mahatta Prison. Nine days later they were
70
brought before an investigating judge, who ordered their release on
bail within two days.
The main suspect in the case (after whose "confession" the
other detainees were released) was Munir Muhammad Mahmud, a
Palestinian born in Baghdad He was sentenced to five years'
imprisonment, and in 10/1993 Amnesty International interviewed hun
in al-Mahatta Prison. According to his testimony, he was severely
beaten with cables while blindfolded and with his hands tied to force
him to confess. Four days later he was taken to the Crime Combat's
police station in Khanaqa: "They told me to confess and threatened me
with sexual assault... Then they suspended me against the door with
my hands tied in chains. I remained at Khanaqa for two days and they
continued beating me until the pain became unbearable and I said I
would confess. Then they took me down from the door and called the
investigating judge... ~.
After his statement was recorded by the investigating judge, he
was taken back to al-Iskan and held there for 10 days. He told
Amnesty International he was tortured again after various names
were found in his address book. He was then accused of working for
Iraqi intelligence. He was taken to hospital on one occasion during this
period. Then he was transferred to al-Mahatta Prison. A former
detainee who shared a cell with him told Amnesty International that
when Munir Muhammat Mahmut was brought there, he could not
walk unassisted because of the injuries sustained under torture, and
could not eat for several days. A week later, he was transferred to the
Asayish Prison where he remained until 4/4/1993, when his trial
began before the Arbil Criminal Court: "On that day a guard came and
told me 'your trial is today'. Of course they had not notified me
beforehand. During the trial I had a defence lawyer whom I had not
seen before. I asked the judge to summon two witnesses who could
testify as to my whereabouts on the night [of the theft] but he refused,
saying I had already confessed before the investigating judge... I
explained that everything had happened under torture... I am still
waiting to hear if my case can go to appeal."
Amnesty International did not have the opportunity to check his
statement against the trial transcripts, nor to raise the case with the
president of the court. However, it did express its concerns to the
investigating judge, who told the organization that because neither
Munir Muhammad Mahmud nor any of the other suspects in the case
had lodged formal complaints with him regarding their treatment, no
investigation had taken place. While conceding that Munir
Muhammad Mahmud had clearly been beaten, he judged that he was
in reasonable health and not in need of medical treatment.. He did not,
therefore, refer him to a medical committee nor open an official
investigation into the torture. He expressed doubt that the beatings had
been as severe as the testimonies obtained by Amnesty International
suggested, unless the prisoner had been tortured at a later stage while
in Asayish custody. However, Munir Muhammad Mahmud had
testified that he was not tortured at the Asoyish prison, only at the
police stations where he was held.
(2) On 8/29/1993 two detainees needed intensive care at Arbil's
Emergency Hospital after sustaining serious injuries under torture.
Muhsin Hamad Ibrahim (born in 1968 in Koisanjaq, selfemployed)
and Luqman 'Abd al-Hakim 'Abd al-Rahman (born in 1973 in
Koisanjaq,a student at a Science Institute) bad been arrested six
months carrier on a murder charge and held in police custody in their
home town. On 29 August, shortly after their transfer to Arbil, they
were tortured while in the custody of the City Police Directorate at
Azadi police station. They were rushed to the Emergency Hospital by
several police personnel. Muhsin Hamad Ibrahim died four days later.
His death certificate, issued on 2 September, gives the cause of death
as "uraemia caused by renal failure as a result of crush syndrome,
which in turn resulted from the complications of an external trauma to
the body and inflammation of the urinary passages.. Hi external
injuries, according to the autopsy report, included "bruises on the right
side of the abdomen and chest in the form of six.wide bands of
different lengths, some of which are conflated, [and] variously shaped
bruises on the thighs and buttocks, some of which are diffuse while
the others are in the form of four or more wide bands with some
merging together..."
The other victim, Luqman 'Abd al-Hakim 'Abd al-Rahman, was
discharged from hospital some 10 days later. Six policemen were
subsequently identified as having taken part in the torture session.
Four were arrested but the two others, both non-commissioned
officers, had reportedly fled. One month later, in October, Amnesty
International met the captain in charge of Azadi police station, who
said that a three-member committee had been set up to investigate
the incident, composed of the Minister of Justice, the Deputy Minister
of Interior and a legal adviser from the Interior Ministry. He provided
Amnesty International with the names of the six policemen implicated
in the case, adding that he had been absent on leave when the incident
took place. No details were available at the time of writing into the
findings of the investigation, although Amnesty International did
examine the investigating judge's file on the case. It contained, among
other things, the statement given by Liqman 'Abd al-Hakim 'Abd alRahman before he was discharged from hospital. The following is an
extract relating to the torture inflicted on him: "My hands were tied
from behind... and I was hung onto the toilet window such that my feet
were lifted off the ground. My underclothes and pyjamas were
removed and [name withheld] took hold of my penis and wound an
elasticated string around it such that I felt extreme pain... Then he
forced me to drink three jugs of hot water and asked one of the
policemen to bring a hosepipe. He told me to confess to [the] killing
and I said I was not in Arbil during the incident so how could I confess,
and I have witnesses [to that]. He began beating me on my stomach
and I felt an urgent need to urinate but I was not able to... Then he gave
the hosepipe to a policeman and told him to beat me... Then [after
repeated beatings every fifteen minutes] he removed the string from
around my penis... When they finished beating me I heard Muhsin's
voice. He was brought [to the room and was tortured, I heard him
shout 'Allah Akbar' [God is Great]... When their duty tours were over
they left us tied up for two hours. My condition became worse and I
lost consciousness. I don't know how my hands were untied and how I
was transferred to hospital..."
To Amnesty International's knowledge, the four policemen
arrested following this incident remain in custody but have not been
brought to trial. The investigation has not been completed since the
two other policemen implicated in the case remain at large. Amnesty
International received allegations that the failure to apprehend the two
noncommissioned officers in question was because they enjoyed
protection from one of the political parties rather than because they
had fled. This could not be independently confirmed.
(3) A former detainee was beaten during interrogation while in
the custody of the Asayish in the town of Kifri (Kirkuk province) in
August1993.Photographs of his injuries, including the one shown
here, were taken shortly after his release and examined by a forensic
pathologist. The pathologist commented: "Those [photographs] show
large areas of recent bruising which is purple in colour and certainly
on the buttocks and thigh, it seems unlikely that they were inflicted
more than a few days previously... The pattern is rather strange, with
horizontal lines within the bruising on the buttocks... Possibly a multithonged whip or a handful of plastic tubes may have been used, as
some of the marks on tho buttocks are parallel and multiple... The
distribution symmetrically on the shoulders, bunocks and sides of the
thighs indicates deliberate infliction..."
71
(4) A 36-year-old former detainee from Kalar (Kirkuk province),
who was arrested at his home in 1/1994 by Asayish personnel, was
beaten by eight people upon arrival at the Asayish centre in Kalar. He
was then transferred to the Kirkuk Asayish Directorate in
Derbendikhan, where he states that he was beaten once again with
cables and burned on the hands and face with a metal implement
heated over a stove. Following this, he was taken to the Police
Directorate in the town where he was interrogated and accused of
having committed a sexual offence. He was released after being
broughtbefore an investigating judge, having spent five days in
detention. The forensic pathologist's comments on photographs taken
of his injuries read: "The face shows obvious linear marks about 1cm wide across the face and neck... consistent with healing
superficial burns... The hands show similar scaling, healing surface
marks with a red rim which again would be consistent with the impact
of a hot rod-shaped object." [=]
us that if we did not disperse, they would start firing at the
demonstrators. We went outside and told everyone that the situation
was dangerous and that they should disperse. I began to walk away
but suddenly I was grabbed by the neck by a member of the Asayish.
By that time they had surrounded the demonstrators. I resisted and
began to struggle, but they dragged me forcefully. At that point the
Asayish started shooting. The demonstrators were unarmed..."
Another leader of the demonstration told Amnesty International:
"All we wanted to do was to protest in front of the Asayish Directorate
and call for the release of the two detainees. We were not being
provocative. Our slogans were against the Turkish and Iraqi
governments, not the Kurdish government... It was around six o'clock
in the evening when our delegates came out of the Asayish
Directorate and told us to disperse. As soon as the people started to
do so, the Asayish began arresting some of them. I heard gunshots
and immediately returned to look for Ratuf and saw them taking him.
The armed guards on the roof of the building shot dead a woman who
held a responsible position in PAK... then a little girl fell to the ground
after being hit with a bullet. Several others were injured."
During these clashes, two of the Pesh Merga guarding the
Asayish Directorate were also killed. The authorities subsequently
claimed that the woman who was shot dead during the demonstration
[a Kurd from Syria identified only as Najbir, aged 25 and said to have
been a PKK Pesh Merga] was carrying a gun and had shot the guards.
In all, 13 demonstrators (nine men and four women) were arrested by
the Asayish charged with murder. [The detainees were: Ra'uf Kamel
'Aqrawi; 'Abd al-Hakim Ahmad Baban; Sami 'Ali Aziz, Sa'id 'Aziz
Mahmud; 'Amer 'Areb Shaikho; 'Abd al-Rahman Saleh; Saif al-Din
'Ali; Muhammad Amin 'Uthman; Kamal Khadr Junil (a Kurd froom
Syria); Tibat 'Abdullah Sulaimen; Payman Suhimen Hunid; Dalal
Hezel Adina; and Laila 'Ali Musa (the latter two are Kurds from
Turkey).]
In 12/1992 Amnesty International interviewed five of these 13
detainees in prison. At that time, the men were being held at the Arbil
Asayish prison and the. women at al-Mahatta Prison. Ra'uf Kamel
'Aqrawi described what happened following their arrest: "They took us
inside the Asayish Directorate and immediately started beating us.
They beat us with rifle butts, cables and with their hands and also
kicked us. Before taking me to a cell, I was hit on my eye with a rifle
and my glasses broke. For the next three days they tortured us during
interrogation, especially Muhammad Amin 'Uthman and Sa'id 'Aziz
Mahmud who were very badly tortured. After three days the torture
stopped..."
Laila 'Ali Musa, who had joined the PKK's Pesh Merga forces
two years earlier, gave Amnesty International the following testimony:
"When the shooting started I was immediately hit. Then my daughter
Kurdistan was killed as a bullet shot through her head. Tibat ['Abdullah
Sulaiman, a co-detainee] was also injured with three bullets... After
the shooting they arrested a group of us and took us inside the Asayish
building. They tortured me for about one and a half hours in one of the
offices. They beat me on the bullet wound and on my back with a
hosepipe. They took the injured ones, myself and Tibat, as well as my
dead daughter, to the Emergency Hospital. We stayed there two days
and then they took the two of us to al-Mahatta Prison."
Tibat 'Abdullah Sulaiman, who was also a PKK Pesh Merga, told
Amnesty International that she was injured in the left leg, stomach and
chest. She testified that was beaten with a hosepipe and a pistol butt
on the shoulders by the Asayish before being taken to the hospital.
Another woman, Payman Sulaiman Hamid, was arrested with her
husband, 'Abd al-Rahman Saleh. She told Amnesty International:
"They tied my hands behind my back and then suspended me from a
height against the wall. I was beaten with a hosepipe. the torture
1asted for about one and a half hours. I fainted three times and each
Detainees: The Victims: (b) Political Detainees. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] Individuals who have been held in Asayish custody in
connection with their membership of certain political groups or
organizations have included members of Rewti Comunist, the PKK
and Tekoshin. Members of other types of organizations, including the
Union of the Unemployed in Kurdistan (Yekieti Bekaran le Kurdistan;
Ittihad al-Atilin fi Kurdistan) have also been arrested by the Asayish. In
most cases, such detainees have been held without charge or trial for
short periods and then released. In other cases, they are held on
ostensibly criminal charges. A number of them alleged that they were
tortured or otherwise ill-treated while in detention. Below are the
details of one incident which serves to highlight the practices used by
the Asayish. On 8/26/1992 a group of 13 political activists were
arrested in Arbil by Asayish personnel. [AIthough the Asayiah forces
were not formally set up until 10/1992, they had begun functioning as a
recurting force several months earlier. Initially, this force was
answerable to the IKF, and after 7/1992 to the Ministry of Interior.]
They were among at least 200 men, women and children
demonstrating that day against the military bombardment of Sirnak in
southeastern Turkey by Turkish military forces some two weeks
earlier. The participants included representatives of several small
left-wing groups, such as Tekoshin, PAK and Rewti Comunist. One of
the organizers of the demonstration told Amnesty International: "We
had all agreed that it would be a peaceful demonstration and our
slogans were in the name of the people, not the political parties. We
had applied for permission from the Ministry of Interior to hold the
demonstration but they refused, telling us that there were many Iraqi
government agents operating in the region and the security situation in
Kurdistan does not allow [for such activities]. We set off from
Shaikhallah la popular district of Arbil]. The Asayish had surrounded
the area and were armed with heavy weaponry. Then we heard the
sound of gunfire. The Asayish arrested two people and said they were
members of PKK and were carrying guns. They refused to let them
go. Some of us tried to intervene, but the Asayish started hitting two
men among us on their faces ant they started bleeding..."
The demonstrators then headed for the Arbil Asayish
Directorate, located opposite the Governorate building. A delegation
from the demonstrators entered the Directorate and met the then
Asayish Director, Khorshid Shira, to urge the release of the two
detainees. Their request was refused. One of the delegates was Ratuf
Kamel 'Aqrawi, spokesperson for Tekoshin. [Ra'uk Kamel 'Aqrawi
was assassinatd in 5/1993.] He told Amnesty International: "They told
72
time they poured water on me to revive me. They burned me with
cigarettes on my legs [the scars of which were still visible at the time
of the interview]. All the time I was blindfolded. Then they threatened
to assault me sexually in front of my husband. I remained at the
Asayish Directorate for six days, but the torture was only at the
beginning. Then they brought me here..."
The fourth woman, Dalal Hezel Adina, testified: "First of all they
blindfolded me and tied my hands and feet. They subjected me to
falaga and hit me on the back. Then they suspended me from a
wooden bar fixed onto a wall by my hands, which were tied behind my
back. My right shoulder became dislocated as a result. They beat me
first with a hosepipe, then with a belt, on my legs and other parts of
my body. Afterwards they applied electricity to my wrists. I could not
see them because I was still blindfolded, but I could feel them placing
the wires on my wrists. They also suspended me from the ceiling
with a rope tied to my hands and made me revolve. In all, I was
tortured for about two hours. All the while they were telling me to
confess that I had been armed and that I had killed the two Pesh
Merga guards."
Since their arrest, the 13 detainees had been denied access to
their families and had not been brought before an investigating judge.
They had not requested access to defence lawyers, apparently in the
expectation that their cases would be resolved quickly. On 29
November they began a hunger-strike and submitted a petition to the
Ministry of Interior asking, among other things, for a meeting with the
investigating judge. This was granted on 1 December, over three
months after their arrest. Ratuf Kamel 'Aqrawi told Amnesty
International: "The investigating judge told us that a political decision
had been taken by the KDP and PUK to release us as there was no
evidence against us. He also told us that he had requested that those
responsible for the death of the girl and the others be handed over and
brought to justice." The detainees submitted another petition asking for
access to family members, a fair and public trial and to be accorded
the status of political prisoners. They ended their hunger-strike on 4
December and were eventually released on 1/11/1993 without having
been brought before a court of law. Amnesty International had raised
the cases of the 13 detainees with the Deputy Minister of Interior in
12/1992. Ahmad Sharif 'Ali told the organization that the 13 detainees
continuedto be held on the basis of available evidence and were
awaiting trial on murder charges. He added that the demonstration
should not have gone ahead without official authorization.
In 10/1993 Amnesty International sought details of any
investigation which may have been set up into the killings during the
demonstrations and the torture of the 13 detainees. It also requested
access to their court files. The investigating judge responsible for
these cases at the time told Amnesty International that he was no
longer responsible for Asayish affairs and therefore did not have
access to these files. He said, however, that the 13 detainees had
been released for lack of evidence on the basis of a court order, and
that the investigation had established that they had been tortured in
custody. He added that he had requested that those responsible for
these abuses be brought to justice but that no steps had been taken.
Amnesty International then met the new investigating judge for
Asayish affairs, who conceded that on occasion detainees are tortured
but said this was exceptional. Where it was deemed necessary to
punish detainees then other methods would be used, such as
depriving them of food or denying them family visit. With regard to the
13 detainees, he stated he had no objection to Amnesty International
having access to their court files, which he said could be found at the
Arbil Asayish Directorate. There, Sefin Mala Qara told the
organization that he had not held the post of Arbil Asayish Director
when the events in question had taken place and thus he had not been
directly involved in them. He said that no files pertaining to the cases
of the 13 detainees remained at the Directorate, and informed
Amnesty International that they could be found with the investigating
judge. To date, none of the Asayish personnel involved in either the
killing of the demonstrators or the torture of the detainees has been
brought to justice. None of the victims of torture nor the families of
those killed in the demonstration has been compensated. [=]
Detainees: Investigations of Torture Complaints. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] Officials of the Kurdish administration and representatives
of the judiciary with whom Amnesty International discussed its
concerns recognized that "excesses" have been committed by police
and Asayish personnel with regard to the treatment of detainees in
their custody. All maintain, however, that the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code are applied, and that
complaints of torture or ill-treatment are investigated. Information
gathered by Amnesty International over the past three years suggests
otherwise. The organization was unable to obtain details of a single
case where torture complaints were effectively and thoroughly
investigated, nor of a single case where the law enforcement
personnel responsible for such abuses were brought to justice.
Most of the torture complaints received by Amnesty International
in 1992 and 1993 were made by individuals who had been interrogated
by the same police or Asayish personnel who were responsible for
their arrest and detention. Torture or ill-treatment is normally inflicted
before suspects are brought before an investigating judge. In 12/1992
the then Minister of Justice, Matruf Ratuf Khadr, told Amnesty
International that one of the key problems in Iraqi Kurdistan was that
there was no judicial police force (shurta qada'fyya) answerable to the
Ministry of Justice and which could supervise the detention of
suspects at this critical stage. The police or Asayish personnel
holding the suspects at this stage are under the Ministry of Interior's
jurisdiction, and the Ministry of Justice could not intervene until
notified of a case through an investigating judge.
Investigating judges have told Amnesty International that
allegations of torture or ill-treatment are generally investigated only
when the suspect brought before them makes a formal complaint,
even though international standards require investigations of reports of
torture and ill-treatment in cases where there has not been a formal
complaint. In that event, the complainant is referred for examination to
a medical committee appointed by and answerable to the Ministry of
Health. If no complaint is made, a medical examination may not be
carried out even when it is patently clear to the investigating judge that
the physical condition of the suspect warrants such an examination.
One investigating judge told Amnesty International that there is a
general reluctance to refer ~too many cases" to the medical
committee because doing so risked acquiring a reputation as a
"troublemaker" which could mar good working relations with the
police and Asayish. Similarly, no legal proceedings are taken against
law enforcement personnel accused of torturing or ill-treating
detainees unless a formal complaint has been lodged by the victim
with the Ministry of Justice. Matruf Ra'uf Khadr stated that such
complaints may also be lodged by the victim's family, and added that
he would be prepared to consider cases brought to his attention by
Amnesty International as "formal complaints". Where complaints are
lodged, an investigative council (majlis tahqiqi) is set up, composed of
three people representing the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of
Justice and, depending on the case, either the police or Asayish
General Directorate. All three must be jurists. Preliminary
investigations into complaints are conducted by the investigative
73
council prior to the referral to the courts of any of the accused officials.
The failure of the authorities to act on reports of torture or illtreatment in the absence of a formal complaint by the victim has
meant that the vast majority of incidents are never investigated. The
most common reason for suspects' reluctance to submit complaints
is fear of reprisals, particularly if they are to be returned to the custody
of the same authority responsible for their abuse. The likelihood of
being tortured or illtreated as punishment for having made a complaint
is high. Another reason is ignorance of the law and of the rights
accorded to all people deprived of their liberty. A third reason may in
the perception that suspects will not be believed or that no effective
action will be taken. The net result is that "confessions" extracted
under torture during interrogation may subsequently be used as sole
evidence for conviction in court. Article 181(d) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure states that ~if the accused confesses to the charge made
against him and the court is convinced of the authenticity of his
confession and that he recognizes its implications, it may hear this
defence and pass its verdict on the case without the necessity for
other evidence...~. The President of the Court of Cassation told
Amnesty International that in exceptional cases it is permissible to
passsentence on a defendant from whom a confession has been
extracted under duress if other evidence available to the court
corroborates that confession. He stressed that such confessions could
never be used as the sole basis for conviction and that in all cases, the
official found responsible for torturing or ill-treating the suspect would
be punished according to the law. This practice violates Iraq's treaty
obligations under Article 14 (3)(g) of the ICCPR, which protects
defendants from being compelled to testify against themselves or to
confess guilt. Moreover, international standards require judges and
prosecutors to exclude all confessions induced by torture and illtreatment. [See, for example, the Convention against Torture (Article
15) and the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (Guideline 16).]
The Kurdish administration has yet to bring to justice any law
enforcement official found responsible for the torture or ill-treatment of
detainees. Some police and Asayish personnel have allegedly been
disciplined for abusing their authority in this manner, but such
measures have been hopelessly inadequate. For example, the then
General Director of the Asayish, Karim Sinjari, told Amnesty
International in 10/1993 that 35 Asayish personnel had so far been
found guilty of torturing or ill-treating detainees and had been
disciplined accordingly. He stated that some of them had been
dismissed from the force while others had been demoted. In none of
these cases, Karim Sinjari added, had the victims of torture lodged
formal complaints and consequently no legal proceedings had been
taken against the offenders. In relation to the police, Colonel 'Abdullah
Matruf 'Abdullah, Director of the Crime Combat Directorate in Arbil,
argued along similar lines while taking a different view of the
appropriate disciplinary measures to be taken in such cases. He told
Amnesty International in 10/1993 that if a detainee alleges torture at
the hands of the police, he is referred to a (Ministry of Health) doctor
for a medical examination. If the examination corroborates his
allegations, then disciplinary measures are taken against the accused
police personnel. No other legal proceedings are instituted against
them unless the victim lodges a formal complaint. As for the
disciplinary measures taken, Colonel 'Abdullah Matruf 'Abdullah
stated that the dismissal of either police or Asayish personnel from
their respective forces in these circumstances was "illegal" unless
the offenders had been brought before a court of law. Any measures
taken should be restricted to demoting the offenders or transferring
them to other duties. He ended by denying that police personnel inflict
torture or ill-treatment on detainees in their custody.
Police and Asayish personnel have frequently infringed various
other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These include:
delays in the referral of suspects to an investigating judge beyond the
24 hours permitted by law; failing to transfer suspects to an official
prison once the investigating judge renews their detention period; and
failing to implement other orders issued by investigating judges, in
some cases allegedly on the orders of the Minister of Interior. Other
infringements appear to have arisen as a result of varying
interpretations of the law. For example, in 12/1992 the then Director of
the Arbil Asayish Directorate, Isma'il Taher Dizayee, told Amnesty
International that suspects may be held in Asayish custody for a
maximum of 72 hours before being brought before an investigating
judge. He added that an arrest may be carried out on the basis of a
written order issued by him rather than an arrest warrant issued by an
investigatingjudge. Amnesty International subsequently sought to
clarify this matter with the Minister of Justice, who stated that such
procedures had no basis in law. [=]
Detainees: The Protection of Detainees From Torture and IllTreatment. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995.
MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11400] [19950228] The need to adopt measures
to improve the protection of detainees' rights while in custody,
particularly as regards torture and ill-treatment, was recognized by
the political, administrative and judicial authorities as early as 1992,
although no practical steps were taken until late 1993 or early 1994.
With respect to the political authorities, the leaders of both the PUK
and KDP told Amnesty International in 12/1992 that urgent measures
were needed to ensure full protection of human rights in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Jalal Talabani stated that torture must be brought to an end,
but that the implementation of laws which protect human rights was
still at its first stage. He attributed the slow progress to the precarious
security situation in Iraqi Kurdistan and the many acts of sabotage
being carried out in the region. Mas'ud Barzani stated that although he
had no knowledge of specific cases of torture, he would be prepared to
look into any cases brought to his attention. He told Amnesty
International that two meetings of the Political Bureaux of the KDP and
PUK convened the previous month had focused on drawing up
guidelines, in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior, to protect the
rights of detainees. According to details subsequently made available
by the KDP, these guidelines included measures to abolish torture and
ill-treatment, improve prison conditions and provide better health and
sanitation services. Amnesty International does not, however, have
any details of how these guidelines were followed up or implemented.
In 10/1993, during meetings with several officials of the Kurdish
administration and members of the judiciary, Amnesty International
was informed that certain measures aimed at safeguarding the rights
of detainees in police and Asayish custody were being considered.
These measures focused on formally separating the authorities
responsible for detaining and interrogating suspects, which Amnesty
International had previously recommended. Both the Minister of
Justice, Qader 'Aziz Jabbari, and the President of the Court of
Cassation, Rashid 'Abd al-Qader Salim, told Amnesty International
that there were plans to create a judicial police force. Amnesty
International understands that members of this police force would
formally be under Ministry of Interior jurisdiction, but their work would
be supervised by the courts, presumably through the Public
Prosecutor's office. Their primary function would be to investigate
crimes, which would include interrogation of suspects. Other
measures being considered included the appointment of judicial
investigators (mahaqqijin 'adliyyin) to take over responsibility for
interrogating suspects from the detaining authorities. These
investigators would be civilian employees of the courts with the
74
necessary legal qualifications.
Since the role of the judicial police overlaps in many respects
with that of the judicial investigators, it was not clear how the division
of responsibilities would be made. To date, no judicial police force has
been established. However, in 10/1993 the Minister of Justice told
Amnesty International that steps had been taken to appoint 95 judicial
investigators, and that 58 of them had already been deployed in
various police stations and Asayish centres throughout Iraqi
Kurdistan. He stated that they were all graduates of the Law College
and had been examined and selected by a panel of three judges on the
basis of their legal qualifications and experience. The Minister
stressed that although these judicial investigators had not yet been
trained, they now had sole responsibility for investigating crimes and
questioning suspects in areas where they had been deployed.
However, investigating judges later told Amnesty International that the
judicial investigators were not expected to assume their new functions
until they had one to two months' training. Furthermore, there
appeared to be some confusion about where they would eventually be
deployed. The the.' General Director of the General Asayish
Directorate told Amnesty International that there was no agreement
for judicial investigators to investigate crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the Asayish. He added that while he had no objection to
this in principle, the judicial investigators would have to be
"trustworthy". Amnesty International understands that judicial
investigators have since been deployed in a number of police stations
and that they received some training in early 1994. Members of the
legal profession to whom Amnesty International spoke welcomed this
as a step in the right direction towards affording better protection for
detainees. The organization has not had the opportunity to obtain
further details on the number of judicial investigators, their areas of
jurisdiction, and the nature of the training they received. Moreover, it
was not clear whether they could prevent detaining authorities from
interrogating those in their custody, and whether "confessions" made
to detaining authorities could still be used as evidence in court. [=]
Command Council. These resolutions have significantly increased
the number of capital offences by amending existing legislation, such
as the Penal Code, or by enacting new legislation. The law currently
provides for a mandatory death sentence for certain non-violent
political offences. The Iraqi Government has always maintained that
offences deemed to be "political" are not punishable by death, pointing
to Article 20 of the Penal Code. This Article distinguishes between
~ordinary. and "political" offences, with the death sentence being
commuted to life imprisonment in the case of the latter. Paragraph (a)
of this Article defines "political" offences as those committed with a
political motive or offences prejudicial to general or individual political
rights. All other offences are deemed to be "ordinary". The same
article, however, excludes six types of offences from the category of
political offences even if committed with a political motive. [These
are: offences committed with a "base and selfish motive"; offense
prejudicial to the external security of the state; premeditated murder
and attempted premeditated murder; attempt on the life of the
President of the Republic; terrorist offences; and immoral crimes
such as theft, embezzlement, forgery, breach of trust, fraud, bribery
and indecent assault.] Moreover, Article 2(b) states that the competent
court should indicate in its judgment whether a particular offence is
deemed to be "politicial". Although the ordinary courts in Iraqi
Kurdistan continue to apply the provisions of the Penal Code, Amnesty
International understands that in 1992 at least one amendment to one
of its articles had been formally frozen. by the National Assembly on
the grounds of being "incompatible with the welfare of the people of
Kurdistan". This was an amendment to Article 156, which provides for
the death penalty for deliberate acts endangering the independence,
unity or territory of the country. On 21 4/1984 the Revolutionary
Command Council had issued Decree No. 458, which stated that the
provisions of Article 156 would apply to "anyone whose membership
of a party or association aiming, through its acts or in its written
program, to change the system of government through armed force or
in cooperation with any foreign party, is proved."
Amnesty International does not know whether any other
provisions in the Penal Code relating to the death penalty have been
similarly suspended. In practice, however, only one article of the
Code providing for the death penalty has been invoked to date by the
criminal courts in Iraqi Kurdistan: Article 406 for premeditated murder
in aggravated circumstances (see below). At the same time, the
National Assembly has promulgated two separate laws which provide
for the death penalty for additional offences. The first of these, Law No.
6 of 1992, was passed on 1 10/1992. [Law on the Protection of
Foreigners and Employees of United Nations Organizations and
Humanitarian Organizations in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, passed by
Decree No. 20 of 10/1/1992, published in Perleman, Issue No. 5,
12/1992.] Article 2 provides for the death penalty as a mandatory
punishment for the premeditated murder of a "foreigner" or "any
employee of United Nations organizations [or] humanitarian
organizations in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region". The law also has limited
retroactive application: Article 4 states that the provisions of this law
shall apply to all cases which were still pending before the courts at
the time. This retroactive legislation violates Article 15 of the ICCPR.
The second law, Law No. 8 of 1992, was passed on 11/14/1992. [Law
on the Punishment for Possession, manufacture and Use of
Explosives, passed by Decree No. 31 of 11/14/1992, published in
Perleman, Issue No. 5, 12/1992.] It provides for the death penalty as a
mandatory punishment for "anyone who use's or attempts to use
explosives, with the aim of sabotage or collusion with the enemies of
the people of Kurdistan, in order to put people's lives in danger, cause
them grievous harm or result in their death" (Article 2).
In 12/1992 Amnesty International expressed its concern to the
Kurdish administration about the enactment of legislation increasing
By The Kurdish Administration: The Death Penalty. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11401] [19950228] Amnesty International is opposed to the death
penalty in all cases and works for its worldwide abolition, considering
it to be a violation of the fundamental right to life and the right not to be
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. In the
organization's view, it is inherently unjust and arbitrary, however
heinous the crime for which it is provided and however scrupulous the
procedures by which it is enforced. The risk of error is inescapable,
yet the penalty is irrevocable. In its work over the years to promote
and defend human rights in Iraq as a whole, Amnesty International has
repeatedly appealed to the Iraqi Government not to execute prisoners
and to abolish the death penalty in law. Similarly, in Amnesty
International's view, the execution of prisoners by the Kurdish
administration violates fundamental human rights. [=]
By The Kurdish Administration: The Death Penalty: Iraqi Law and the
Current Legal System. New York: Amnesty International, February
28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11402] [19950228] Iraq's Penal Code
(as amended) provides for the death penalty for a wide range of
ordinary criminal offences as well as political offences. The death
penalty is also provided for in other legislation, such as the Military
Penal Code, as well as in numerous resolutions having the force of
law passed by Iraq's highest executive body, the Revolutionary
75
the number of offences for which the criminal courts would be
empowered to pass death sentences. The organization was told that
there was no desire to widen the scope of the death penalty, but it was
deemed necessary to pass the new laws in response to the increasing
number of attacks on foreigners and acts of sabotage perpetrated by
agents of the Iraqi Government and others in the region. [Attacks on
foreigners continued to be perpetrated, however. Among those
targeted were: Stewart Cameron, an Australian national and
prepresentative of CARE Australia, killed on 1/7/1993; Vincent Pollet,
a Belgian national and Director of Handicap International, killed on
3/22/1993; and Lissy Schmidt, a German national and correspondent
for the news agency Agence Deance Presse, killed on 4/3/1994. In
these three cases, the Kurdish authorities named the alleged
perpetrators, who were said to have been linked to Iraqi Intelligence.]
The Deputy President of the National Assembly, Najad Ahmad 'Aziz
Agha, told Amnesty International that when the draft laws were
debated, the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians favoured
providing for the death penalty for these offences. He added that the
debates did not lead to a wider discussion about the merits or
otherwise of the death penalty, and that any moves towards its
abolition in the foreseeable future were unlikely. Both he and the
Minister of Justice told Amnesty International that there were longstanding plans for a major review of the Penal Code, when the
possibility of reducing the number of offences for which the death
penalty is provided might be discussed. They said that lack of
resources, however, had not made such a review possible to date. [=]
Initially the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
regarding appeals procedures and the ratification of death sentences
could not be applied as there was no Court of Cassation to service
Iraqi Kurdistan, and no "Leader of the Kurdish Liberation Movement"
to carry out the functions of a head of state. The first problem was
resolved with the promulgation of the Judicial Authority Law of 1992,
which established a Court of Cassation for the region (see Chapter 3).
The question of who would ratify death sentences remains a
contentious issue. In 12/1992 the Minister of Justice and the Deputy
President of the National Assembly told Amnesty International that a
proposal was being discussed to establish a "special council"
composed of the Prime Minister, the President of the National
Assembly and the President of the Court of Cassation (representing
the executive, legislative and judicial authorities) to carry out some of
the functions traditionally undertaken by a head of state, including
ratification of death sentences. However, no final decision had been
taken. The Minister of Justice told Amnesty International that the
Kurdish authorities had not been confronted with the dilemma as no
death sentences had been passed since the appointment of the
Council of Ministers. However, as Amnesty International learned
several days later, four death sentences had already been handed
down by the Sulaimaniya Criminal Court, albeit before the formation
of the Council of Ministers. Within 10 days of Amnesty International's
discussion with the Minister of Justice, three other death sentences
were handed down by the Arbil Criminal Court. In early 1993 it had
been decided that the responsibilities and functions of Leader should
be assumed by the President of the National Assembly and by 5/1993
he had ratified three death sentences. However, the continuing
challenges to his authority has meant that no death sentences have
been ratified since. During the short period of its existence, the
Presidential Body for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (see Chapter 1) had
not ratified any death sentences either. At the time of writing, the issue
was still unresolved. No other authority has since been empowered to
ratify death sentences, although the criminal courts have continued to
impose death sentences, some of which have been upheld by the
Court of Cassation. [=]
By The Kurdish Administration: The Death Penalty: Legal Procedures.
New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95.
[99H-11403] [19950228] The courts empowered under the Code of
Criminal Procedure to pass death sentences in Iraqi Kurdistan are the
three criminal courts in Duhok, Arbil and Sulaimaniya (the latter also
serves the Kirkuk region). The procedures followed by these courts
are said by officials to be in accordance with Iraq's Code of Criminal
Procedure. This law, although it contains some safeguards, is
fundamentally flawed in a number of respects. For example, it
permits the use of confessions extracted under torture if the court
concludes that they were truthful. No death sentences have been
imposed for political offences to date. In cases where the death
penalty has been imposed for murder, Amnesty International has not
had the opportunity to examine closely the legal procedures followed
during pre-trial detention and before the courts to assess whether they
conform with the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, there have
been allegations of irregularities in this regard. During a visit to the
DetentionsandDeportations Prison in Sulaimaniya in 12/1992, for
example, one prisoner under sentence of death told Amnesty
International that he did not have a defence lawyer during his trial. In
the case of another prisoner in Arbil, Amnesty International received
reports in 1994 that the murder confession obtained under
interrogation - and accepted as evidence in court was made under
threat of torture.
Death sentences passed by the criminal courts are
automatically referred to the Court of Cassation for review (Article
224(d)). There is no right of appeal under Iraqi law on points of fact,
only on points of law. Such a limited review only by cessation denies
the right to an appeal as guaranteed by Article 14 (5) of the ICCPR. If
upheld on cessation, death sentences would ordinarily be referred by
the court to the Minister of Justice, who must have the sentences
ratified by the President of the Republic before issuing an order for
their execution (Article 286).
By The Kurdish Administration: The Death Penalty: Death Sentences
and Executions. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995.
MDE14/01/95.[99H-11404][19950228] Between 3/1992-8/1994, at
least 34 death sentences were passed by the Arbil, Sulaimaniya and
Duhok criminal courts (see Appendix). With one exception, all those
sentenced were convicted of premeditated murder - 31 of them in
accordance with Article 406 of the Penal Code and two others in
accordance with Article 2 of Law No. 6 of 1992 (concerning the
murder of foreigners). The remaining death sentence was passed in
accordance with Article 2 of Law No. 8 of 1992 (concerning the
possession,manufacture and use of explosives). To date, three
prisoners have been executed after the death sentences imposed on
them were upheld by the Court of Cassation and ratified by the
President of the National Assembly. They were executed by hanging
in al-Mahatta Prison in Arbil in the presence of a representative of the
public prosecution, a judge, a man of religion, a doctor and the prison
director. The first to be executed, in 4/1993, was Sadruddin Pirdawud
Sama, a 25-year-old man from Arbil. The account of his execution
received by Amnesty International reflects clearly the cruel and
inhuman nature of the punishment. The prisoner was allegedly made
to stand on an empty ballot box. His hands and feet were deaf and a
cloth sack placed over his head. A rope was placed around his neck
and deaf to a ceiling fan. A prison guard then pushed the ballot box
from under his feet. The prisoner was said to have died from
76
strangulation over a protracted period, during which several of those
present were reportedly unable to bear the sight confronting them and
left the room, among them the representative of the public
prosecution. In mid-June, two other prisoners who had been
sentenced to death by the Arbil Criminal Court were hanged in alMahattaprison. Bara' 'Abdullah Kadhim, a 22-year old Arab from
Ba'quba and a former soldier, and Hamza Latif Rasul, a 21-year-old
man from Arbil, were executed on the same day. According to
accounts received by Amnesty International, Hamza Latif Rasul took
10 minutes to die and Bara' 'Abdullah Kadhim some 15 minutes.
Changes had apparently been introduced to the facilities in the prison
to ensure speedy executions. Of the 31 prisoners sentenced to death
in Iraqi Kurdistan between 3/1992-8/1994, 26 of them were in custody
in 12/1994. [Five prisoners sentenced to death by the Sulaimaniya and
Duhok criminal courts escaped from prison at differed times. In
12/1994, after armed clashes broke out between KDP and PUK
forces, al-Mahatta Prison in Arbil was reportedly broken into and its
inmates fled. It was not known whether they included some of those
who had been sentenced to death by the Arbil Criminal Court.] Four
death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment upon review by
the Court of Cassation, while at least 14 others were upheld and are
pending ratification. The remaining sentences were still under review
by the court at the time of writing. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 28: Chapter Five: Human Rights Abuses
By The Political Parties: The Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuses.
[99H-11406] [19950228] Prime responsibility for human rights abuses
lies with the two parties holding the reins of power in Iraqi Kurdistan the KDP and PUK. Their effective control of large stretches of territory
(Bahdinan and Sulaimaniya respectively), the military means at their
disposal and their special security and intelligence apparatuses, have
enabled them to perpetrate abuses against each other's members as
well as against other perceived opponents. Their control of the
Kurdish administration's machinery has also meant the absence of
any authority which could hold them accountable for their actions. The
IMIK also bears responsibility for a significant share of the abuses,
particularly since 12/1993. The IMIK controls large stretches of
territory along the border with Iran, and has a sizeable fighting force
as well as intelligence and security apparatuses. Other political
parties have committed human rights abuses, namely the torture or
ill-treatment of detainees in their custody. These parties, some of
which have since been dissolved, include the KPDP, ICP, KSP-I,
KUP, KTP and PASOK. The KSP-I and Kurdish Revolutionary
Hizbullah are also believed to have been "involved in unlawful and
deliberate killings." The forces within KDP and PUK forces which
have committed human rights abuses are:
(a) the regular Pesh Merga forces: each party has a sizeable
armed force consisting of tens of thousands of Pesh Merga fighters.
When the Ministry for Pesh Merga Affairs was formed, each party
contributed an agreed number of fighters to form the unified forces
under the ministry's jurisdiction. However, the estimated 1200015000 fighters which each party put forward represented only a small
segment of its total fighting forces, and even these were not "unified. in
any real sense - they remained under the leadership of their
respective parties. While some of these forces are veteran Pesh
Merga fighters, they also include the Jash (Kurdish mercenaries) who
had fought alongside Iraqi Government forces against the Kurdish
opposition during the 1980s. After the uprising, many of them
remained in Iraqi Kurdistan and were gradually absorbed into the KDP
and PUK forces.
(b) the Special Brigades: two special brigades were formed in
1992 as part of the unified Pesh Merga forces. Each consisted of an
estimated 2000 fighters provided by the two parties, their primary role
being the personal protection of Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. In
theory the Special Brigades were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
for Pesh Merga Affairs. In reality they remained answerable only to
the two loaders. Additional Special Brigades were formed by the KDP
and PUK after the 12/1993 and 5/1994 clashes. These Special
Brigades have committed human rights abuses both during armed
conflict and in non-violent situations.
(c) the security and intelligence apparatuses: the KDP and PUK
each have security and intelligence apparatuses whose functions
include: gathering intelligence on the activities of Iraqi Government
agents and those of neighbouring countries in Iraqi Kurdistan;
gathering information on political parties and organizations in Iraqi
Kurdistan; preventing and combating infiltration of their respective
parties; and surveillance of individuals within their own parties as well
as members of other parties. These apparatuses also control the
unacknowledged prisons or places of detention maintained by each
party, and the interrogation of detainees held in such places.
The main apparatus within the KDP is known as Rekkbistini
Taybeti (al-Tanzim al-Khass; the Special Organization), also referred
to as Parastin ("protection"). The Parastin was set up by the KDP in
1968 to "protect the revolution", its creation coinciding with the seizure
of power in Iraq by the Ba'th Party. Primary responsibility for the
Parastin from the start lay with Mas'ud Barzani. The apparatus
By The Political Parties: xx. New York: Amnesty International,
February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11405] [19950228] A wide
range of gross human rights abuses perpetrated by the political
parties in Iraqi Kurdistan has been recorded by Amnesty International
since 1991. The abuses include detention of suspected political
opponents, among them possible prisoners of conscience; torture or
ill-treatment of political and common law detainees; executions after
summary "trials"; and unlawful and deliberate killings of unarmed
prisoners captured in battle, political opponents and demonstrators.
Torture and unlawful and deliberate killings were widely reported in
12/1993 when military clashes broke out between PUK and IMIK
forces. Such abuses reached a climax during and after 5/1994, when
widespread military clashes broke out between KDP and PUK forces,
with the IMIK forces also taking part in opposition to the PUK.
Amnesty International has raised many of the abuses highlighted in
this chapter with leaders of the relevant political parties and
administration officials. The responses have been, at best,
unsatisfactory. In some cases the political parties denied the
allegations made against them; in others, they expressed willingness
to cooperate with any official investigations and stressed that any of
their members found guilty of abuses would be brought to justice. In
the past three years several investigations have been set up into
specific incidents, either by the IKP when it possessed dc facto
authority or subsequently by the Kurdish administration. However, the
political parties have not cooperated with any of them. In fact, they
have blocked such investigations through direct or indirect means, or
have discontinued them for the sake of political expediency. Amnesty
International is not aware of a single case where the perpetrators of
any of the abuses referred to have been brought to justice. The failure
to do so has, in Amnesty International's view, contributed significantly
to the deterioration of the human rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. It
has enabled elements within the political parties to continue
perpetrating abuses with total impunity. Against this background, the
protestations of the political leaders and their frequently expressed
commitment to human rights remain unconvincing. [=]
77
continued to function until 1975, when the Algiers Accord between Iraq
and Iran led to the collapse of the Kurdish opposition movement. After
the 1991 uprising the apparatus was reconstituted and renamed, and
remains ultimately answerable to Masoud Barzani. lt is headed by
Karim Sinjari, a Central Committee member, but Nichirvan Idris
Barzani (Mastud Barzani's nephew), is believed to be the most
powerful figure within Rekkhistini Taybeti.
The principal apparatus within the PUK is Dezgay Zanyan
(Jihaz al-Ma'lumat; the Information Apparatus) which was
reconstitutedafter the 1991 uprising from the party's previously
exisiting security and intelligence machinery. It is headed by Qader
Hadi 'Ali, a Political Bureau member, although it is believed to be
effectively controlled by another Political Bureau member,
Newsherwan Mustafa Amin. Others with positions of responsibility
within both Rekkhistini Taybeti and Dezgay Zanyari are said to
include key officials in the Council of Ministers, several
parliamentarians, and senior personnel in the police and Asayish
forces. Some of these officials head the branches of their respective
apparatuses in the provinces of Duhok, Arbil, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk.
Both Rekkhistini Taybeti and Dezgay Zanyari are said to have
sections which carry out so-called "special operations", including
assassinations. [=]
parties within the IKF did not maintain separate prisons but did have
detention facilities at their main party headquarters and other bases:
the KSP-I in Rania as well as in Nalparez on the Penjwin Sayyid
Sadeq road; the ICP in Sheqlawa; PASOK initially in Qala Cholan and
then in Sulaimaniya; the KPDP initially in Rawandaz and then in Arbil;
the KTP initially in Sheqlawa and then in Arbil; the ADM in Merga Sur
and Khalifan; and the KUP in Rania. Among the political parties
outside the IKF, the IMIK was said to have various places ofdetention,
including in Shaqlawa, Halabia, Chwar Qurna and Diyana.
Given the difficulties in identifying and gaining access to
unacknowledged places of detention in Iraqi Kurdistan, many cases of
torture and other abuses only came to light in late 1992, following the
large-scale transfer of detainees from IKF prisons and those of the
political parties. A large proportion of detainees who were interviewed
testified that they had been tortured under interrogation while held by
one of the political parties or she IKF. Among them was a 17-year-old
youth from Koisanjaq [name withheld] who was arrested in 12/1991 on
charges of sodomy and held in IKF custody in Arbil. By 6/1992 he had
been sentenced to six years' imprisonment and transferred to alMahatta prison, where he told Amnesty International: "I was beaten
with cables and threatened with the bottle [a form of sexual torture]. I
stayed three days without food or drink. They threw cold water on me,
tied my hands behind my back and kicked me in the head and used
the falaga. They wanted me to confess and tortured me for one week.
Then I confessed... my cell had about 10 other people in it, and some
of them were also tortured. There was an Arab from al-Najaf who
became a Pesh Merga. He was accused of working for Iraqi
Intelligence and was very badly beaten."
In 12/1992 Amnesty International spoke to some of the 30-35
detainees who were being held at the Asayish prison in Sulaimaniya.
Most had been tranferred there from political party prisons after
having been held for several months in untried detention. Several
stated that they had been tortured during interrogation, including by the
KDP, PUK, PASOK and KPDP. They had been accused of a variety of
criminal offences. such as murder and theft, but said that no formal
charges had been brought against them and no legal procedures
followed.
In many of these cases, it was not possible for Amnesty
International independently to verify testimonies made by detainees,
particularly as regards claims of torture. In the majority of cases,
torture was said to have been inflicted during the initial period
following arrest. Their transfer to official prisons some months later
meant that most traces of such treatment were no longer visible.
However, the number and consistency of the testimonies suggested
that torture of detainees held by the political parties was widespread
and routine. The KHRO has received and recorded numerous
complaints of this kind. Those detainees who were referred to the
special courts established by the IKF were frequently convicted on the
basis of "confessions" extracted under torture. A judge who served on
the bench of one of the special courts told Amnesty International that
he had personally ordered that five detainees be beaten in order to
extract "confessions" from them. He said this was necessary to
obtain further "evidence" against the suspects in question. The use of
torture for this purpose was apparently discussed by the IKF's
Political Leadership Acting Body with regard to detainees accused of
serious offences and whose cases were being heard before the
Supreme Special Court for the Revolution in Shaqlawa. Two officials
on the Acting Body told Amnesty International that the difficulties
facing members of the court's bench in fully and effectively
investigating such offences had led in late 1991 to the sanctioning of
the use of torture by the Acting Body in certain circumstances.
Since the transfers in late 1992, leaders of the political parties
have stated that they no longer maintain prisons or other detention
By The Political Parties: Torture and Ill-Treatment. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11407] [19950228] Some prisons run by the political parties, including
in Khalifan, Arbil and Sheqlawa, operated in the name of the IKF which
possesseddefacto authority until mid-1992. Detainees held in IKF
prisons had some measure of protection as the judicial structure
established by the IKF involved the eventual referral of detainees to
the special courts. This meant that written records, albeit
rudimentary, were kept of detainees' names, dates of arrest and
charges against them. IKF prisons were also acknowledged places of
detention,to which on occasion representatives of the KHRO and
others were permitted access. In this way, the families of the
detainees were on the whole able to ascertain their whereabouts.
By contrast, detainees held in the custody of the political parties,
both those within the IKF and those outside it, were deprived of even
this minimal protection. They were held in unacknowledged places of
detention, outside the framework of any judicial process, and for the
most part without access to the outside world. Under such
circumstances, party officials denied holding detainees when their
families made inquiries. It also meant that detainees could be held
indefinitely, their fate dependent on the whim of the political party in
question. It created conditions in which the detainees' basic rights,
including the right not to be tortured or ill-treated, could be violated
with impunity.
The detention facilities used by political parties and groups
varied in size and nature. They ranged from several cells on the
premises of the political parties' bases holding a few detainees, to
separate, purpose-built detention centres, accomodating several
hundred detainees, some of which had been used as prisons by the
Iraqi Government. The KDP maintained a major prison in al-Qadesh
(Duhok Province), although it was ostensibly operating in the name of
the IKF. According to reliable sources, it held over 200 detainees in
early 1992. The KDP ran other detention centres during 1991 and 1992
in Zawita, Salahuddin and Shaqlawa. The PUK's major detention
facilities were in Sulaimaniya Province, including in Qala Cholan,
Bakrajo and Tanjaro, and held scores of detainees. The KDP and PUK
both continue to maintain some of these and other places of detention.
To Amnesty International's knowledge the smaller political
78
facilities, and that they no longer hold detainees. Amnesty
International's information suggests otherwise. The organization
believes that some political parties, notably the PUK and KDP,
continue to hold detainees, albeit in smaller numbers. Suchdetainees
are arrested outside the framework of laws which the political leaders
have pledged to uphold. They are arrested without a warrant issued by
an investigating judge, they are denied access to legal counsel and in
some cases to their families, and they may remain held indefinitely in
detention without trial. They may also be tortured. Some detainees
arrested by forces acting under the authority of a political party are
subsequently handed over to the police or Asayish, but this tends to be
the exception rather than the rule. Detainees held by the political
parties outside the IKF, notably the IMIK, are in an even more
precarious situation. To Amnesty International's knowledge, they
were never transferred to official prisons under the Ministry of
Interior's jurisdiction. The IMIK has continued to hold detainees while
denying that it has any places of detention.
In 12/1992 Masoud Barzani told Amnesty International that all
KDP prisons had been closed and their inmates transferred to the
official prisons. Several detainees said to be held thereafter by the
KDP were subsequently brought to the organization's attention.
Among them was 'Abd al-Aziz Waysi (born 1968 in the village of
Bani, Duhok Province). A member of PAK, he was first arrested by
KDP forces on 12 12/1991 with 25 others said to be affiliated to PAK
and the PICK, and then beld in Zawita. Twenty-three of them, all
Kurds from Turkey, were released eight days later; the other three,
among them 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi, were Iraqi Kurds and they
remained in detention. 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi was held without trial for
nine months and denied access to his family and defence counsel. He
was released on 7/15/1992, reportedly on the orders of Mas'ud
Barzani and on condition that he resides in Salahuddin where he was
to be kept under surveillance. He did so for two months, and then
obtained permission to visit his family in Duhok. Six days after his
arrival in Duhok, IKF forces attacked PKK forces stationed in the
border regions in Iraqi Kurdistan. An estimated 1400 PKK fighters and
their families were captured by IKF forces by 10/i992 and were later
transferred to Zale in Sulaimaniya Province. Among those captured
was 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi, who had reportedly made contact with the
PKK in Duhok. He was arrested by the KDP and returned to
Salahuddin.
During the following months his family knew nothing of his fate
or whereabouts despite repeated requests for information from KDP
officials in Salahuddin. Amnesty International raised his case with
Mas'ud Barzani in 10/1993 and requested access to him. Mas'ud
Barzani told the organization that 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi had joined the
PKK, assisted it in identifying the locations of four KDP centres, and
led a military operation in which several KDP members were killed.
Mas'ud Barzani said he had been rearrested at the end of 10/1992 and
handed over with other PKK detainees to the Asayish. [Of the
estimated 1400 PKK fighters and their families arrested at the time,
over 200 were held at the Asayish prison in Arbil for several months
and later released.] Mas'ud Barzani denied that 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi
was being held in KDP custody or that his family had mad~ inquiries
about him. The following day Amnesty International checked with the
Arbil Asayish Directorate and found that 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi had not
been transferred there. He was not to be found in Asayish custody in
Duhok either. The organization later learned that his family had been
allowed to visit him that month and that he was being held in detention
facility at Mas'ud Barzani's headquarters in Seri Resh (a short
distance from Salahuddin). 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi was released in
7/1994. According to information received, his mother had just been to
Seri Resh to visit him again, and while returning to Arbil she was
involved in a car accident and died. Mas'ud Barzani reportedly
authorized 'Abd al-'Aziz Waysi's release in order to attend to her
funeral rites. It was not clear whether he had been released only for
the mourning period. KDP officials later told Amnesty International
that he had not been rearrested, but this could not be confirmed.
Another PAK member held by the KDP in 10/1993 was Mahdi
Saleh Rashid (also known as Mahdi 'Arif Saleh). He had also been
held since 10/1992 following the defeat of PKK forces. He had
reportedly given himself up following an agreement between the IKF
and PKK. He was being held at the KDP's First Liq (Branch) in
Duhok, where Amnesty International requested access to him.
Officials there said that the request could not be granted without
authorizationfrom senior officials. When authorization was sought
from the office of Fadel Mirani (known as Fadel Mutni), the KDP's
representative in Bahdinan at the time, Amnesty International was told
that Mahdi Saleh Rashid was not being held at the First Liq after all;
he had been "transferred elsewhere". Amnesty International raised the
mattes with Mas'ud Barzani, who said he knew nothing about the case
but would make inquiries. The organization learned that Mahdi Saleh
Rashid was later transferred from the First Liq to the Asayish prison
in Duhok, where he was visited by friends. At the time of writing,
Amnesty International had no further information on his case.
A more recent case is that of a PUK Pesh Merga [name
withheld] who was arrested by the KDP in Salahuddin on 5/5/1994. He
was held in unacknowledged places of detention in the town for nearly
four months. According to his testimony and those of fellow inmates,
he was tortured shortly after his arrest. For the first three days he was
held with other detainees at a detention centre located near the KDP's
Political Bureau premises, and then moved to a different location.
Representatives of the ICRC were apparently informed of his case by
other detainees on 6/2/1994 but, to Amnesty International's knowledge,
did not gain access to him. He was being held in the custody of the
KDP's security apparatus, Rekkhistini Taybeti. Amnesty International
was granted access to him on 7/25/1994. Karim Sinjari, head of the
security apparatus, told the organization that the detainee was being
held as a suspected member of an assassination squad directed by a
senior member of the Council of Ministers [a PUK official, name
withheld] and that he had been involved in the assassination of KDP
members. The detainee told Amnesty International that he had been
interrogated about the killing of two KDP members and the attempted
killing of another, but denied any involvement or membership in any
assassination squad. He stated that he was being held in isolation at a
secret location, which he indicated was a hotel in Salahuddin, and that
he had not seen anyone except his captors and interrogators since
being transferred there. He showed Amnesty International marks on
his legs which he said had been caused by torture, and said: "On the
first day of my arrest I was beaten with the butt of a Kalashnikov rifle
and severely whipped with a hosepipe and belt. Later I was hit on the
back of my neck with a cement block. They tied something tightly
around my neck and then beat me." The PUK official rejected the
accusations made against both himself and the detainee, who was
eventually released uncharged on 9/3/1994.
Jalal Talabani also gave Amnesty International assurances that
PUK prisons had been closed and their inmates transferred to official
prisons. The organization was given access in 12/1992 to Bakrajo
detention centre near Sulaimaniya, and saw four detainees, all Iranian
nationals, who were said to be the only ones held there. All other
inmate. were reported to have been taken to police or Asayish
prisons. Officials said that Bakrajo would be closed within days.
Information obtained since suggests that both Bakrajo as well as other
places of detention under PUK control continue to be used, albeit on a
smaller scale. When Amnesty International visited Bakrajo in 7/1994,
it was shown five detainees who were said to be members of the
PUK's Pesh Merga forces. Several had reportedly committed military
79
offences and one was accused of murder. Officials at Bakrajo said
they were being held there on the orders of the Minister for Pesh
Merga Affairs.
Several former detainees have testified that they were held in
unacknowledged places of detention by the PUK in 1991 and 1992,
notably in Qala Cholan. They include members of political parties or
groups, including the IMIK and Rewti Comunist. Jalal Talabani has
repeatedly denied the existence of a prison in Qala Cholan and told
Amnesty International that he could "search the area" if it wished. The
organization declined, despite receiving details of the prison's
reported location and interior. The only detainees said by Jalal
Talabani to have been held in Qala Cholan were Iraqi army POWs
who had been captured by, or surrendered to. PUK forces during the
March 1981 uprising. He said that all were later released under ICRC
auspices. According to information received by Amnesty International,
the PUK also held detainees in Shaqlawa. Among them was said to be
Tawfiq Nuri 'Abd al-Rahman, formerly a PASOK member who was
allegedly abducted by the PUK in Sulaimaniya on 12/12/1992. The
bodies of two other men who were with him at the time were allegedly
found in the streets the following day. Tawfiq Nuri 'Abd al-Rahman's
family unsuccessfully sought information from PUK officials on
several occasions. His fate and whereabouts remain unknown, and
Amnesty International fears that he may have been killed in custody.
More recent testimonies by former detainees indicate that Qala
Cholan prison was used to hold KDP and IMIK fighters captured
during the 5/1994 clashes, as was Bakrajo detention centre (see
below). One former detainee, an IMIK member said to have been
arrested by the PUK shortly before these clashes, testified to Amnesty
International: "I was held in Qala Cholan for two months. For one
month I did not see daylight and they used to cut off the electricity...
There were about 30 people there, and they would take three or four
people out at a time Some of them did not come back... We were
beaten with cables and rifle butts, and we were kicked and
punched...Another method of torture was to tell us that an order for our
execution had been issued, or that they would force us to drink
poisoned yoghurt...We were beaten during interrogation. Onedetainee
told me that they covered his head with a blanket and repeatedly
banged it against a wall... There was a woman held in the prison...
She was pregnant when they arrested her and then she had a
miscarriage... I stayed there two months, but there was a person there
who had been held there for one year and seven months. He was an
Arab from Baghdad called [name withheld]... accused of espionage..."
Others believed to have been held more recently in Qala Cholan
are four detainees arrested in Sulaimaniya in connection with the
events of 6/13/1994 in the city. They were detained there for over one
month and then taken to the Asayish prison in Sulaimaniya, where
Amnesty International interviewed two of them. Several of the IMIK's
leaders told Amnesty International in 2/1994 that outside the context of
the 12/1993 clashes, they had held no detainees and had no prisons or
other detention facilities. The organization raised the case of a
detainee who had been in IMIK custody and released only two months
earlier. Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim, a 28-year-old clothes vendor
from Arbil, was arrested on 3/20/1993 and held for nine months in
untried detention at the IMIK's base in Arbil. He was cut off from the
outside world and tortured while held in a dark underground cell. He
was freed on 12/28/1993 when PUK forces took control of the base.
Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim, who is affiliated to the PUK, told
Amnesty International: "I was in the basement. There was no
investigation committee, they just used to come in to interrogate us.
They tortured me a lot by beating me... it continued for about forty
days an-- then they burned my skin... They used to beat me with
cables and tie my hands from behind and suspend me while my feet
were tied. They beat me while I was suspended... One day they
slapped me twenty times and told me 'We are twenty and we will beat
you. If you can bear it, it means you are innocent, and if you cannot
bear it, it means that you are an atheist'. They beat me and I lost
consciousness... About forty days after my arrest... they came to me
and took off my shirt. They poured kerosene on me and set it alight.
Then they poured water on me and put out the fire. There were three
or four of them. I suffered greatly, and after the fire was put out they
left me. I was in great pain and asked for help, and they told me I must
die... They took me out [of the basement] in July and they used to
make me carry stones on my back... My mother used to come to
plead with them and I could hear her voice. I shouted several times
but she did not hear my cries... " Having denied holding any detainees,
the IMIK then conceded that Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim had been
detained but that his was the only case. 'Abd al-Qader Brayati,
military spokesperson for the IMIK at the time, also denied that
Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim had been tortured. He told Amnesty
International that the burns had been caused by the detainee
accidentally knocking over a kerosene lamp, a claim rejected by the
victim. Amnesty International subsequently sought the opinion of a
forensic pathologist on photographs of his burns it had taken some
eight months after infliction. His comments were: "The check clearly
shows extensive keloid scarring... which extends across the middle
abdomen over the umbilicus and bilaterally under both nipples,
together with scattered patches elsewhere. This a typical late result of
burns... The distribution in the midline and symmetrically on both
sides of the chest indicate deliberate application at specific sites, thus
virtually ruling out accidents... "
Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim was in fact not the only detainee
held by the IMIK at its base in Arbil. When he was freed in 12/1993,
five other detainees were with him. Among them was 'Adel Ismatil, a
17-year-old youth from Arbil. He testified that he had been held there
for three months, having been arrested after a fight with an IMIK
member: "They beat me severely so that I could not move my bands
or fingers ... They did not allow me to go to the toilet... The weather
was very cold and I had nothing to protect me. I tore up my tracksuit
and made it into socks to keep warm. I didn't see my parents for three
months. I used to shiver from the cold..."
In 7/1994 Amnesty International raised the cases of five people
said to have been arrested by the IMIK and whose fate and
whereabouts remain unknown. The organization was concerned that
they may have been tortured or killed in custody. All were members
or former members of the IMIK, four of whom are believed to have
been arrested in 1991. According to information submitted to the
organization, they are:
(1) Bahzad Amin Haidar; born 1971 in Diyana, single. He was
arrested in Arbil by IMIK members on 3/10/1991 during the mass
uprising and initially held at the Awqaf Directorate in the city which
was under IMIK control. He was later transferred to Rania and then to
a prison in Diyana. Bahzad Amin Haidar had joined the IMIK in 1988
but subsequently renounced his affiliation. In late 1993 he was said to
have been held at the IMIK's headquarters in Betwata."
(2) Fakher Astad Nader: born 1968 in Shaqlawa, married with
one child. He went missing on 8/6/1991 in the Diyana region, where
he had gone to obtain authorization from the IMIK to travel to Iran for
commercial putposes. On the way he was reportedly stopped by IMIK
members driving a Landcruiser, who took him with them. Fakher
Astad Nader joined the IMIK in 1987, working clandestinely in Arbil. A
year later he joined the armed opposition in the mountainous border
regions. In 1988 he was held for six months by the PUK and then
returned to his family in Arbil. After the 3/1991 uprising he rejoined the
IMIK. He and others allegedly received warnings from the IMIK
leadership that any member leaving the party or divulging its secrets
would be arrested. There were unconfirmed reports that after he went
80
missing he was seen in IMIK custody at Kawlukan garrison in the
Diyana region.
(3) Maghdid Astad Mustafa: born 1966 in Sheqlawa, married
with four children. He went missing on 8/6/1991 in the Diyana region
while on his way to Iran. His car was reportedly seen near the lMIK
base in Diyana. Maghdid As'ad Mustafa had been an IMIK member
for several years, but had left the party and joined the PUK. He had
reportedly been warned not to divulge information on the IMIK and
pressurized hto rejoining.
(4) Muhsin Hassan Ibrahim: he deserted from military service
in 1987 and fled to Iran, where he joined the IMIK. In 1989 in was
arrested by Iraqi security forces in Rania while carrying out a
clandestine activity for the IMIK. After almost seven months in
detention he was released as a result of an amnesty and returned to
military service. When Kurdish forces seized control of the major
cities during the 3/1991 uprising, Muhsin Hassan Ibrahim made
contact with the IMIK at the Waqf (Religious Endowment) Directorate
in Arbil. There, he was arrested and accused of betraying the IMIK
and revealing information about its organizations in 1989. In mid-1992
he was being held at an IMIK prison in Rawanduz military garrison
near Kawlukan, where his family was able to visit him. Shortly
afterwards, he was transferred to another place of detention at the
IMIK's base in Hawara Barza (Sulaimaniya Province), where he was
reportedly put on trial. IMIK officials told Amnesty International in
7/1994 that they had no knowledge of these cases but undertook to
investigate them and inform the organization of their findings. By
1/1995 no response had been received. [=]
custody took place during the armed clashes of 12/1993 and 5/1994.
These are discussed separately later in this chapter. One major
incident, however, took place on 710/7/1991, prior to the withdrawal of
Iraqi Government forces from the region. Two days earlier, the Iraqi
armed forces had indiscriminately attacked civilians in the towns of
Kifri, Kalar and 'Arbat, and then in Sulaimaniya, using helicopter
gunships and heavy artillery. Several hundred people, most of them
civilians, were reported to have been killed or wounded. In an
apparent act of retaliation, an estimated 60 unarmed Iraqi soldiers
who had earlier surrendered to Kurdish forces in Sulaimaniya were
shot dead. A correspondent of Reuters news agency, who stated that
he had witnessed the killings, said: "Six were shot without warning
together as they knelt in the dirt with their hands in the air. Several
others were killed individually. A large group, estimated to number
more than 50, were mowed down by automatic weapons fired at close
range inside a building where they had surrendered." [Reuters
despatch of 10/8/1991.]
Both Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani publicly condemned the
killings at the time. They announced that an inquiry would be set up
and declared that those responsible would be brought to justice. On 18
October Amnesty International appealed to Masoud Barzani, as head
of the IKF, to call for an end to such practices and asked to be
informed of the findings of the inquiry. In 12/1991 Masoud Barzani
informed the organization that although at preliminary investigation
had been conducted by the IKF committee in Sulaimaniya, it had been
agreed on 15 December that a new commission of inquiry
representing the IKF Political leadership would be set up: "... having
made an initial inquiry to identify the fighters who were present at the
scene, the new commission is authorized to see the due process of
law take its place. A court hearing [will] take place [in] the second half
of 1/1992, to bring all culprits to justice... The outcome of the inquiry
and hearing [will] be made public..."
An invitation was extended to Amnesty International to observe
the proceedings. Amnesty International declined but requested details
of the investigation's procedures and the steps taken against the
alleged perpetrators; results of the commission of inquiry; details of
the composition, terms of reference and procedures of the
commission; and details of the composition of the court before which
the accused were due to appear, the procedures it would follow and
the penal law to be applied. The organization sought assurances that
the defendants be granted full rights of defence and, if convicted, of
appeal to a higher court. It also urged, in the event of conviction, that
none be sentenced to death or executed. No response was received.
In fact, the findings of the commission of inquiry were not made
public nor was a trial held. In 5/1992 Amnesty International obtained a
copy of an internal report prepared by members of the commission of
inquiry, dated 1/26/1992. The report gave details of the progress of the
investigation and identified 14 Pesh Merga said to be suspected of the
killings. Seven of them were said to be affiliated to the PUK and six to
the KSP-I. [The KSP=I at that time was led by Rasul Mamand.] The
commission members proposed that the 14 suspects be summoned
by the IKP Political Leadership for questioning by the commission. To
Amnesty International's knowledge, the suspects were held in custody
for a period but by 5/1992 all had been released in accordance with an
IKF decision not to pursue the investigation. None of the perpetrators
has since been brought to justice. During the 1991 uprising, tens of
thousands of Iraqi army personnel were captured by or surrendered to
Kurdish opposition forces. The majority were disarmed and allowed
to return to government-controlled areas. Several thousand, however,
mainly officers and other senior army personnel, were detained by
Kurdish political parties for several months. Most were subsequently
released under the auspices of the ICRC, while others were released
by the IKF in exchange for money following appeals from their
By The Political Parties: Unlawful and Deliberate Killings. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11408] [19950228] Hundreds of people have been unlawfully and
deliberately killed in Iraqi Kurdistan since the region fell under Kurdish
control. Many others have survived attempted assassinations. It has
not been possible for Amnesty International to investigate all cases
broughtto its attention, particularly where no political motive was
apparent or where the alleged perpetrators were neither linked to any
of the political parties or organizations in the region nor acting on their
behalf. These include numerous revenge killings and murders during
robberies. However, responsibility clearly lies with the forces of the
political parties in incidents involving the killing of unarmed prisoners.
Scores of combatants captured during military clashes are reported to
have been deliberately killed, either immediately after surrender or
later after being taken into custody. Other killings have been
perpetrated outside the context of any armed clashes. These include
the killing of unarmed civilian demonstrators and the assassination of
political activists. Most allegations implicate three political parties -the PUK, KDP and IMIK. The organization raised its concerns with the
parties' loaders and, in several cases, with the party officials who
were allegedly directly responsible for the killings. Their responses
consisted as a rule of outright denials. While internal investigations
have been set up into a number of incidents involving unlawful and
deliberate killings, these have been largely cosmetic and to date have
not resulted in the perpetrators being brought to justice. [=]
By The Political Parties: Unlawful and Deliberate Killings: The Killing
of Combatants After Surrender. New York: Amnesty International,
February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11409] [19950228] Most
incidents involving the killing of combatants after surrender or in
81
families. However, the fate and whereabouts of a small number of
Iraqi soldiers remains unknown. In 5/1992 Amnesty International
received from Kurdish sources the names of 37 soldiers who went
missing in March or between July and 10/1991 and who remain
unaccounted for. The organization has also received allegations
suggesting that scores of Iraqi soldiers were executed in secret while
in the custody of Kurdish forces. Some of these allegations were
made by former detainees who were held in the same places of
detention as the soldiers, including in PUK custody in Qala Cholan.
One former detainee, a member of Rewti Comunist held in Qala
Cholan in early 4/1991, testified that dozens of soldiers were executed
in the detention centre. He stated that he did not witness the
executions but that he subsequently saw the bodies of some victims in
the courtyard of the detention centre. In 5/1992 Jalal Talabani told
Amnesty International that all Iraqi soldiers who were in PUK custody
had been handed over to the ICRC. It was not possible for Amnesty
International to independently verify either account. [=]
Ministers] went to the governorate building to involve the local
authorities in controlling the security situation in the city. There, a
group of hostile armed youth attacked them with threatening behaviour
and damaged their cars. The bodyguards of the officials - the Deputy
Minister for Pesh Merga Affairs and the Commander of the Unifed
Pesh Merga Army in Sulaimaniya - fired shots in the air to disperse
the agitators... in the chaotic situation that ensued, three people were
injured by firearms."
In 2/1994 Amnesty International talked to KDP and KSP-I
representatives as well as eye-witnesses in Sulaimaniya. The new
information did not support the original reports it had received
regarding the circumstances in which four civilians were said to have
died. Testimony obtained from a variety of people was consistent in
suggesting that the deaths had occurred during armed clashes
between the two sides. In other respects, however, the accounts of
events differed from that presented by the KDP - specifically in
relation to the incidents which took place both outside the Governorate
building and the KDP's Fourth Liq in the city. In both cases, the
accounts suggested that the demonstrators had not been armed, and
that shots fired by KDP guards did wound several civilians. Amnesty
International discussed its concerns about this incident with the Prime
Minister, Kosrat Rasul 'Ali. It sought information about the findings of
the investigation initiated by the Council of Ministers and which
involved the Ministers of Interior and Pesh Merga Affairs. The Prime
Minister told the organization that while an official investigation was
ongoing, it was unlikely to be effective or yield results due to the
political sensitivities between the KDP and PUK. No findings, if any
were arrived at, were communicated to the organization. With regard
to KSP-I detainees arrested by the DP in both Arbil and Sulaimaniya
in 12/1993, Amnesty International established that all were released
within two weeks. None had been handed over to police or Asayish
jurisdiction while in detention, despite Masoud Barzani's statement in
his letter to Amnesty International that all action taken by KDP forces
against the KSP-I had been "fully authorized by the administration's
top officials...".
(2) A funeral procession of several thousand people was held in
Sulaimaniya on 6/13/1994 for 'Uthman Qader Munawwar, a KlDP
military commander killed four days earlier during clashes with the
PUK in Penjwin. Shooting broke out before the funeral procession was
over, and dozens of people were killed or injured. The PUK
announced that 14 people had been killed and 46 others wounded; the
KDP initially said 51 had been killed but later published the names of
only 22. Among those frilled and whose names were submitted to
AmnestyInternational by their families were: Aras Qader Ahmad,
Jamal 'Aziz Hilanat, Bahruz Ahmad 'Abdullah, Qaraman Mahmud
Saleh, Sardar Mahmud Matruf and Muhammad Karim Sufi Ahmad. In
7/1994, Amnesty International interviewed 29 men and women who
had taken part in the procession. Some had been injured, while others
had been with relatives who were killed. Several had also assisted in
carrying the dead and injured to hospitals. According to their accounts,
as the peaceful procession approached the Kawa roundabout, close to
the hospital, KDP's former Fourth Liq, the shooting started. Most of
the shooting was reportedly carried out by PUK forces stationed on
the roof of the Fourth Liq as well as from other nearby buildings. A
number of people were killed and others injured, among them several
who were carrying 'Uthman Qader Munawwar's coffin. The coffin
was then taken away to the cemetery for burial. PUK forces stationed
on rooftops, as well as members of the PUK Special Brigades
deployed in the streets, were said to have continued firing at random
into the crowd, injuring a number of people who we.e carrying the
wounded. Eye-witnesses at Sulaimaniya's Emergency Hospital
described seeing scores of dead and wounded there. Amnesty
International received numerous allegations that some of the injured
By The Political Parties: Unlawful and Deliberate Killings: The Killing
of Civilian Demonstrators. New York: Amnesty International,
February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11410] [19950228] Over the
past three years there have been several incidents involving the killing
or wounding of unarmed civilian demonstrators by the forces of one or
other of the political parties. Below are details of three such incidents:
(1) Clashes broke out in 12/1993 between KDP and KSP-I forces
in Arbil and Sulaimaniya against a background of rising tensions
between the readerships of the two parties. On 10 December KSP-I
forces under Muhammad Haji Mahmud's authority attacked and took
control of the headquarters of the Unified Pesh Merga forces' 24th
Brigade in Sulaimaniya, taking weaponry and other military
equipment. The following day KDP forces took control of two KSP-I
bases in Arbil and arrested 11 people. On 13 December KDP forces
attacked KSP-I bases in Sulaimaniya and in the ensuing clashes
several civilians were killed and others injured. An estimated 15
KSP-I members were arrested after KDP forces took control of the
bases. On the same day several hundred apparently unarmed and
peaceful civilians demonstrated in Sulaimaniya against the inter-party
fighting. According to information received by Amnesty International at
the time, attempts by KDP forces to disperse the demonstrators
resulted in shots being fired, killing four people and injuring over 60
others. On 22 December Amnesty International sent a communication
to Masoud Barzani requesting information about the incident, including
the findings of any investigadon into the idenffty of the perpetrators,
and about all KSP-I members in KDP custody. The following day
Mas'ud Barzani replied that Amnesty Internaffonal's information was
"misrepresentedand distorted by the sources of the reports". His
letter stated: "On 13 December, when two offices of the group [the
KSP-I were controlled in Sulaimaniya city, a number of civilians were
hurt in the crossfire. Yet the armed group bears most of the
responsibility for the civilian casualties due to its use of mortar shells
in the city... A demonstration was organized with the backing and
support of... the PUK to agitate people against the KDP and take
advantage of the situation for party interest objectives. Attempts to
discourage city officials, who are mainly from the PUK, from
organizing the demonstration failed. The demonstration, attended by a
few hundred, marched to the KDP office in Sulaimaniya [the KDP's
Fourth Liq], and when some agitators tried to attack the party property,
shots were fired by the guards overhead to discourage them and
nobody was hurt. I absolutely deny the allegation that the KDP shot at
peaceful demonstrators. The figure of four people killed and 60 others
injured is unfounded... KDP officials [representing the Council of
82
were denied adequate medical treatment at the hospital by senior
doctors sympathetic to the PUK, and that several had died as a result.
These allegations could not be independently verified. PUK officials
denied that their forces had deliberately fred into the crowd. They
stated that the procession had not been peaceful and that the
participants were hostile, chanting anti-PUK slogans. The Governor of
Sulaimaniya, Salar 'Aziz (a PUK official), told Amnesty International
that some of those in the crowd had been armed with hand grenades
and Kalashnikov rifles hidden under their clothes, and that their true
intent had been to take control of the Fourth Liq. He stated that PUK
forces had acted in self-defence when they opened fire, and that four of
them had been injured after a hand grenade was thrown in their
direction.
Amnesty International asked to meet these four men, but none
was made available. PUK officials later told the organization that only
one PUK Pesh Merga had been wounded; the other three were said to
be civilians affiliated to the PUK who were in the crowd and had been
injured. Amnesty International asked to meet with them too, but again
none was made available. PUK officials then informed Amnesty
International that it could have access to four detainees who were
being held in Asayish custody in Sulaimaniya. All were accused of
being agents of the Iraqi Government's intelligence service charged
with carrying out acts of sabotage in Iraqi Kurdistan, and of having
planned and triggered the clashes during the funeral procession. They
were said to have confessed to the charges. Amnesty International
interviewed two of the four detainees, including the main suspect in
the case, Qassem Karim Ahmad (known as Qassem Darayi). The
organization also discussed their wes with the invesdgating judge
responsible for Asayish affairs in Sulaimaniya. The organization
learned that Qassem Darayi, who is affiliated to the KDP, had been
arrested on the night of 6/13/1994 and held for over one month in PUK
custody at an unacknowledged place of detention. He was interrogated
by PUK officials while being denied access to his family, a defence
lawyer and an investigating judge. the PUK then announced that
Qassem Darayi had "confessed" to the charges against him, and
broadcast extracts from his "confession" on television. He was then
transferred to Asayish custody on 18 July, three days before Amnesty
International interviewed him. On that day, he was brought before an
investigating judge for the first time. His statement was taken down by
the investigating judge in the presence of one of the PUK officials who
had interrogated him. When Amnesty International saw him at the
Asayish prison, his physical condition was frail and hisappearance
strongly suggested that he had been tortured. The following day
Amnesty International raised his case with the Prime Minister, Kosrat
Rasul 'Ali. The organization requested that Qassem Darayi and his
codefendants be transferred to Arbil where they might stand a better
chance of receiving a fair trial, and that they be medically examined
by an independent doctor. The Prime Minister agreed to both
requests. It was not known, at the time of writing, whether these
requests had in fact been met.
Following the events of 13 June, scores of people who had taken
part in the funeral procession were rounded up from their homes by
the PUK. Among them were people who had been identified from
photographstaken by the KDP of the procession and which were
published in the party's newspapers. Most were held for short periods
and then released. A number of them told Amnesty International in
July 1994 that they had left their homes in Sulaimaniya for fear of
further reprisals. The KDP accused the PUK of carrying out an
"appalling massacre of innocent civilian mourners", while the PUK
charged that the KDP "was intent on using the funeral to destabilize
the situation in the city [and that] large numbers of KDP gunmen were
shipped into [Sulaimaniya], taking advantage of recent cease-fire
measures..." Both parties called for independent judicial investigations
into the incident, but no such investigation was subsequently carried
out.
(3) A demonstration organized by the Kurdistan Workers
Federation (Fidrasyoni Krekaran le Kurdistan/Federaliyyat al-Ummal
fi Kurdistan) [The Kurdistan Workers Federation is composed of
several associations representing workers employed in construction,
textiles and cement enterprises, as well as some private sector
workers and the unemployed.] was held in Sulamaniya on 9/1/1994.
Several hundred people were said to have participated in protest
against a decision by the Governor of Sulaimaniya to knock down
makeshift shelters which had been erected illegally in the city. The
majority of people living in these shelters were Kurds from Kirkuk
who had been forcibly expelled from their homes by the Iraqi
Government. The demonstrators had gathered in front of the
Governorate building, demanding that the decision be rescinded until
the people concerned had been rehoused. According to accounts of
9/1994 received by Amnesty International from two participants, PUK
forces fired into the crowd in an attempt to disperse them. Bakr 'Ali, a
representative of the Union of the Unemployed and one of the
organizers of the demonstration, was wounded and then allegedly
pursued and shot dead by members of the PUK's Special Brigades. A
PUK representative told Amnesty International in 10/1994 that after
scuffles had broken out outside the Governorate building, a guard
stationed there opened fire, killing one person. He rejected claims that
Special Brigade forces had been present during the demonstration or
that anyone had been deliberately killed. He added that the guard, said
to be a member of the civilian police, was under arrest pending an
investigation. At the time of writing, Amnesty International had not
received details of its findings. [=]
By The Political Parties: Unlawful and Deliberate Killings:
Assassinations. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995.
MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11411] [19950228] Scores of people have been
assassinated in Iraqi Kurdistan since the region fell under Kurdish
control. .Many such killings have been attributed to agents of both the
Iraqi and Iranian governments operating in the region. Others,
however, were said to have been carried out by forces or individuals
working under the authority of some of the political parties in Iraqi
Kurdistan. These parties are principally the PUK, KDP and IMIK, all of
which have denied that their forces have perpetuated such crimes.
The victims include political activists, men of religion and members
of the legal and other professions. Amnesty International has also
received information on a number of women who were said to have
been assassinated on the grounds of allegedly having provided
several favours, whether under duress or otherwise, to members of
the Iraqi intelligence service. There were allegations of political party
involvement in some of these killings but Amnesty International was
unable to obtain further information on these cases. In other cases, it
was difficult to determine whether the killings were politically
motivated. Among such victims was Ahmad Janbaz, a lawyer and
member of the Iraqi National Turkman Party who was shot dead with
his son Mustafa in Arbil on 6/15/1994. Some victims were said to
have been killed by political party forces but for personal or financial
reasons, while others appear to have been killed for political
considerations.Those listed below are a sample of the scores of
cases brought to Amnesty International's attention which appeared to
have been politically motivated.
(1) Mustafa 'Ali al-Barzanji: a Sunni Muslim religious cleric who
in early 1992 published a book in Arbil under the title "The Words of
God." In it he claimed that he was a prophet (the "awaited Imam") and
that his book contained messages he had received through divine
83
inspiration. His dismembered body was found near the Maternity
Hospital in Arbil on 9/13/1992. In 12/1992, the Ministry of Interior told
Amnesty International that arrest warrants had been issued for three
IMIK members suspected of having carried out the killing, among
them was said to be a member of the IMIK's Political Bureau. The
Ministry said, however, that it had not been possible to apprehend
them.
(2) 'Aziz Muhammad Khoshnaw: born 1932 in Sulaimaniya,
married with three children, assistant general director of the
Sulaimaniya cigarette factory. He was shot dead by armed assailants
on 4/7/1993 as he left his home in Sulaimaniya. His body was
reportedly riddled with over 30 bullets. No suspects were
subsequently apprehended.
(3) Ra'uf Kamel 'Aqrawi: born 1952 in 'Aqra (Duhok Province),
married with three children. He was the main spokesperson for
Tekoshin. Following five months in detention without trial in Arbil in
late 1992 (see Chapter 4), he began publishing a newspaper, Regay
Rendjderan, as the main organ of Tekoshin. He was shot dead by
armed assailants on 5/25/1993 as he was returning to his home in
Duhok. No suspects were subsequently apprehended. Shortly before
he died, Ra'uf Kamel 'Aqrawi had published an article in Regay
Rendjderan critical of the KOP and PUK's "50-50 policy".
(4) Francis Yusuf Shabo: born 1951 in Mangesh (Duhok
Province), married with four children. An Assyrian Christian of the
Chaldean sect, he was an active member of the ADM. He became a
member of parliament after the May 1992 elections and was a
member of the National Assembly's Economic Committee. He was
also responsible for dealing with complaints submitted by Assyrian
Christians regarding disputed villages in Babdinan from which they
had been forcibly evicted by the Iraqi Government and subsequently
resettled by Kurds. He was shot dead by armed assailants on
5/31/1993 as he approached his home in Duhok. No suspects were
(5) Lazar Milcho Hanna (known as Abu Nasir): an Assyrian
Christian born 1933 in Mangesh, married. He was a member of the
ICP's Central Committee for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and was also
a member of a three-person committee responsible for the IKF's
financial affairs. He was shot dead by armed assailants on 6/14/1993
near his home in Duhok. No suspects were subsequently
apprehended.
(6) Tahsin 'Ali Nayef: born 1956 in Duhok, married with five
children. He was an investigating judge in the town of Zakho, and was
responsible for issuing arrest warrants and bringing legal proceedings
against a number of people believed to have been involved in the
drugs trade in the Bahdinan region. He had reportedly refused to
respond to pleas for the release of some of them. He was shot dead
by armed assailants on 17/17/1993 at his home in Zakho, in the
presence of his wife and children. A suspect affiliated to the PUK was
arrested shortly after but was subsequently released (see below).
(7) Soran 'Uthman Hama Saleh: born in Sulaimaniya, he was
affiliated to the ICP and was a member of its local committee in the
ciq. He was killed by armed assailants in Sulairnaniya on 7/22/1993
and was allegedly tortured prior to his death. No suspects were
subseguently apprehended.
(8) Qais Muhammad Ahmad (known as Renas): born 1959 in
Arbil, married with two children. A political activist since 1974, he
was elected to the KTP's Central Committee in 4/1992 and was
transferred to Duhok, becoming the party's representative in
Bahdinan. He was shot dead on 7/29/1993 at the KTP's base in Duhok,
in the presence of his wife, by KDP forces, scores of whom had
surrounded the base prior to the killing. Similar attacks on KTP bases
in nearby Zakho and Sumail were said to have been carried out the
same day. Several KDP members were arrested after the killing (see
below).
(9) Mulla 'Abd al-Rahman Qader Yunis: born 1933 in Arbil. He
was head of the Union of Religious Scholars. He was shot dead in
Arbil on 8/5/1993 as he left the premises of the Union of Religious
Scholars. Two men in a taxi drew up behind him and shot him at
close range with a gun fitted with a silencer. Several people were
reportedly summoned for interrogation by the Ministry of Interior
which opened an investigation into the incident, but to date no one has
been convicted of the crime. Mulla 'Abd al-Rahman was said to be
close to the KDP althoup not affiliated. He was said to have criticized
in his sermons the IMIK's interpretation of Islam and the use of
religion for political ends.
(10) Nazhir 'Umar 'Ali (known as Aram): born 1964 in Sumail
(Duholc Province), single. He was a leading member of Rewti
Comunist and the IWCP, and helped produce the IWCP's newspaper,
Bo Peshewe. He was also a spokesperson for the Union of the
Unemployed in Kurdistan. On 8/28/1993 he left his home in Sumail,
apparently to join friends, but never returned. His body was found
three days later on the outskirts of Sumail: he was said to have been
shot in the head and chest and his body burned. No suspects were
subsequently apprehended. His family accused the ICDP of having
had him killed through its members attached to the Duhok Asayish
Directorate. Nazhir 'Umar 'Ali, according to his family and
colleagues,hadbeen summoned on at least two occasions in the
months prior to his death by Asayish personnel, who reportedly
attempted to pressurize him into abandoning his activities and
renouncing his political affiliation (see below).
(11) 'Ali 'Abdullah Boskani: born 1933 in Sulaimaniya, married
with children. A wealthy businessman, he was affiliated to the ICP for
many years although he reportedly had left the party some time before
his death. He was shot dead on 8/29/1993 in a busy street in
Sulaimaniya by armed assailants. No suspects were subsequently
apprehended (see below).
(12) Adam Zrar 'Uthman: born 1973 in a village near Arbil,
single. A student of industrial studies, he was reportedly associated
with the IMIK. He was abducted by four armed men in a crowded
marketplace in Arbil on 2/12/1994. His body was found Iying in the
streets of Arbil flve days later; it showed numerous gunshot wounds
and his right arm had been partially severed. Amnesty International
was not able to substantiate allegations it had received that PUK
forces had carried out the killing.
(13) Muhammad Rahim 'Abdullah (known as Khala Haji): born
1947 in Sulaimaniya, married with nine children. A former member of
the KDP, he joined the KSP-I in 1979 and was elected to its Central
Committee in 5/1981. He remained with the KSP-I when it was
reconstituted under the leadership of Muhammad Haji Mahmud in
10/1993. He was gunned town in Sulaimaniya on 3/11/1994 by armed
assailants and died in hospital several hours later. No suspects were
(14) Fu'ad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Chalabi: a senior member of the
Muslim Brotherhood, a group which operates under the name of the
Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgertay Islami Kurdistanlal-Wahda alIslamiyya al-Kurdistaniyya). He was shot dead in Arbil on 10/6/1994.
(15) Mulla 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Qader: Deputy Head of the
Union of Religious Scholars and preacher at the 'Umar bin al-Khattab
mosque in Arbil. On 11/26/1994 he was attacked by an assailant
armed with an axe and later tied in hospital.
(16) Nuri Isma'il Nanakali: a lawyer and active PUK cadre who
serves as president of the Arbil Sector Court and the Supreme
Kurdistan Court in 1991. He was shot dead together with a companion
in the streets of Arbil on 11/27/1994.
No effective or meaningful investigations into these and other
killings have been carried out to date. All the above victims were
84
killed after the Kurdish administration was established. In most of
these cases, the Council of Ministers set up committees, headed by
investigating or court judges, to gather and examine the evidence.
None have so far resulted in any convictions.
Amnesty International has received numerous allegations
attributing these killings to special forces within the KDP, PUK and
IMIK. The security apparatus of the KDP, Rekkhistini Taybeti, and that
of the PUK, Dergay Zanyori, are said to have units akin to
assassination squads, whose members receive orders from senior
party officials. There is also widespread conviction that such unlawful
and deliberate killings could not have been perpetrated without the
knowledge, consent or acquiescence of the leaders of these two
parties, to whom the security and intelligence apparatuses are
ultimately responsible. The names of individuals alleged to be
members of assassination squads within the KDP and PUK have
been submitted to Amnesty International, including by officials of both
parties who supplied information about the other's security and
intelligence activities. Some of this information was supported by
documents which each party said it had seized from the other's bases
during the 5/1994 clashes. While the authenticity of these documents
could not be independently verified by Amnesty International, some of
the details were consistent with information received from other
sources. Similarly, the authenticity of documents said by the PUK to
have been seized from IMIK bases during the 12/1993 clashes could
not be independently verified, but some of their contents were equally
consistent with information from other sources. The documents did
not identify individual IMIK members involved in killings, but there
were details of extensive surveillance operations of named
individuals, as well as references to killings and attempted killings by
the IMIK. The PUK subsequently published extracts from some of
these documents in their newspapers. The IMIK responded by stating
that the PUK had forged the documents.
In 10/1993 Amnesty International met officials from the
Ministries of Justice and Interior to obtain information regarding the
official investigations into some of the above mentioned killings. Both
ministries said that separate investigations had been set up into the
Sulaimaniya and Duhok killings. Amnesty International met the
President of the Duhok Criminal Court, who was heading the
investigation in that province. He said that the committee enjoyed the
same powers as investigating judges, and that the families of the
victims ant others had been summoned and their testimonies
recorded. He said that two suspects were being held pending further
inquiries. He also informed Amnesty International that he was no
longer responsible for the matter, as the investigation was being
transferred to Arbil. The families of the victims whom Amnesty
International met, both in Duhok and Sulaimaniya, confirmed that they
had been summoned but some complained that the suspected
perpetrators had not been called for questioning. They said that they
did not expect the investigations to yield any results. Some believed
that the real perpetrators would not be brought to justice since they
were protected by their respective political parties. Amnesty
International shares that conviction. In Arbil, the Minister of Justice
told Amnesty International that the investigations had been transferred
there for the sake of effectiveness, since progress had been slow.
Another member of the Council of Ministers told the organization
privately that in Duhok, "pressure" had been applied to the
investigation committee such that it could not proceed. A new
committee was to be set up in Arbil to investigate both the Duhok and
Sulaimaniya killings as well as those which subsequently took place
in Arbil. In the event, no such committee was formed and, to Amnesty
International's knowledge, responsibility for the whole matter now
rests with one investigating judge whose progress, understandably,
has been slow.
Even in the one incident where the alleged killers were identified
andapprehended,the case has been fraught with difficulties. Qais
Muhammad Ahmad (Renal), a member of the KTP Central
Committee, was assassinated in front of eye-witnesses, and three
members of the KDP's First Liq in Duhok were named as his killers.
Two of them were arrested shortly after; the third suspect was said to
have been injured during the incident and was hospitalized. However,
he remained at liberty for several months and was only apprehended
following pressure and intervention by the KTP leadership. By July
1994, one year after the killing, the case had not gone to trial. The
three suspects were transferred from Duhok to Arbil and were being
held at al-Mahatta prison On 97/9/1994, four days before Qais
Muhammad Ahmad's wife was due to identify them as her husband's
killers, the third suspect was removed from prison. He was
reportedly taken by people claiming to represent the Salahuddhn
police force who said that the suspect was wanted there for
questioning. This transfer apparently took place without the knowledge
or consent of the investigating judge responsible for the case, and the
suspect's whereabouts could not be confirmed. On 25 July the
Minister of Interior told Amnesty International that a committee
composed of three officers had been set up to investigate the incident
and that Amnesty International would be informed of its findings. The
same day Mas'ud Barzani told the organization that he had no
knowledge of the incident but would make inquiries. At the time of
writing, Amnesty International had not received any information
concerning the outcome of these investigations.
In 10/1993 Amnesty International raised some of the killings
highlighted in this report with Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, and
in 2/1994 other cases were raised with Shaikh 'Uthman 'Abd al-'Aziz
and several IMIK leaders. Mas'ud Barzani said that the KDP was
opposed to political assassinations. He said he had proposed a
special committee to investigate the killings and that if it proved the
involvement of any KDP members, they would be brought to justice.
He acknowledged that politically motivated assassinations had taken
place but said these were largely the result of personal feuds.
Regarding the killings in Duhok province, Mas'ud Barzani said that
both he and Fadel Mirani (the KDP's representative in Bahdinan), had
advised the victims' families to initiate legal proceedings against any
KDP official against whom they had evidence. The cases raised with
Masoud Barzani, apart from that of Qais Muhammad Ahmad,
included: Fransis Yusuf Shabo, Ra'uf Kamel 'Aqrawi, Lazar Mikho
Hanna (Abu Nasir) and Nazhir 'Umar 'Ali (Aram). In the first three
cases, the organization had received the names of people said to be
linked to the KDP's First Liq who were allegedly responsible for the
killings.
Amnesty International expressed its scepticism to Masoud
Barzani about the families' ability to produce hard evidence of KDP
compliciq, about their willingness to initiate legal proceedings, and
about the effectiveness of the official investigations. The organization
said that the lrillings themselves deterred the victims' families,
eyewitnesses, other informants and members of the judiciary from
taking any measures for fear of meeting the same fate. At the same
time, some families did hold the KDP. responsible for the killings and
had asked Amnesty International to convey this to thi party's leader.
Among them were the parents of Nazhir 'Umar 'Ali. Masoud Barzani
said he did not "even know the family". However, he undertook to visit
Duhok agaid and to meet the families concerned. Amnesty
International subsequently learned that such a visit did take place and
among the families visited was that of Nazhir 'Umar 'Ali However, as
one has since been apprehended and brought to justice for his death or
thif of the other victims named. In February 1994 Masoud Barzani told
Amnesty International that the KDP had evidence of Iraqi Government
complicity in the killing of Fransis Yusuf Shabo, and that the alleged
85
perpetrators were in Mosul. the organization requested the evidence
but did not receive it. In June 1994 a public statement by Amnesty
International on the human rights situation in Iraqi Kurdistan referred
to political killings by the KDP. The KDP responded by issuing a
public statement and sending a letter to the organization's Secretary
General. The following is an extract from that letter" "As to the killing
of rival political activists, there may be some circumstantial evidence
that some murder cases have taken place in the KDP stronghold of
Babdinan region (Duhok province), yet to link these cases to the party
itself is inaccurate These assassinations have taken place not only in
Bahdinan, but in other Kurdish provinces of Erbil and Sulaimaniya as
well. But to single out the KDP and directly hold it responsible is unfair
judgement. We have looked into the 3-5 cases... and we believe the
killings grew out of old, personal feuds. We do condemn political
killings and their perpetrators and we welcome any further inquity into
the case."
Amnesty International's concerns regarding political killings
were also put to PUK leader Jalal Talabani in 10/1993. The specific
cases raised, which had been attributed to the PUK, were those of
'Aziz Muhammad Koshnaw and 'Ali 'Abdullah Boskani. Jalal Talabani
expressed the PUK's readiness to cooperate with official
investigations into these and other killings. He added that the PUK had
also initiated its own "internal investigation" into these two killings,
and that anyone found responsible would be brought to justice.
Amnesty International does not know if such an investigation was ever
conducted and, if so, it has not been provided with its findings. What is
known is that no one has been brought to justice for these two killings.
In early 1994 the PUK published extracts from a document said to
have been among those seized from IMIK bases during the 12/1993
clashes. The document referred to several attempts by the IMIK to
assassinate 'Ali 'Abdullah Boskani, a claim which the IMIK then
refuted. Another case in which the PUK was said to have been
implicated is that of Tahsin 'Ali Nayif, the investigating judge who was
killed in Zakho. Shortly after the incident a PUK member was
apprehendedonsuspicion of involvement. He was initially held in
police custody, but was later handed over to the Ministry for Pesh
Merga Affairs on the grounds that he was a military man (he was a
deputy battalion commander based in Duhok), and was held on the
Ministry's premises in Arbil. The Minister for Pesh Merga Affairs,
Jabbar Farman, told Amnesty International in 10/1993 that he had
requested the setting up of an ad hoc military court to put the suspect
on trial, arguing that he should not be tried before a civilian court. This
did not happen, however. Complaints were subsequently made to the
Ministry of Justice that the suspect was not in detention and had been
seen walking freely on the Ministry's premises. The Minister of
Justice took up the matter with Jabbar Fannan in a letter dated
11/10/1993. However, the suspect was released uncharged. The PUK
has denied involvement in killing Tahsin 'Ali Nayef, and some of its
officials accused the KDP of having perpetrated the crime and of
seeking to implicate the PUK in the Duhok killings. The KDP refuted
this claim. Amnesty International has not been able to obtain further
information about other killings attributed to the PUK, among them that
of Soran 'Uthman Hama Saleh. In 2/1994 Amnesty International
raised with Shaikh 'Uthman 'Abd al-'Aziz its concerns regarding
killings attributed to the IMIK, specifically the cases of Mustafa 'Ali alBarzanji and Mulla 'Abd al-Rahrnan Qader Yunis. Shaith 'Uthman and
other officials present said that "such acts are against Islam and are
not perpetrated by the Movement". With regard to Mustafa 'Ali alBarzanji, Shaikh 'Uthrnan said that he had deemed him to be "insane"
and his book to be "blasphemous" but that the IMIK was not
responsible for killing him and had condemned the act. He denied
IMIK responsibility for the killing of Mulla 'Abd al-Rahman Qader
Yunis, adding that he had personally issued a statement deploring the
crime. He also denied that the IMIK had threatened or intimidated
other religious clerics. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 34: Chapter Five: Human Rights The
Events of 12/1993. New York: Amnesty International, February 28,
1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11412] [19950228] Armed clashes broke
out in the third week of 12/1993 between PUK and IMIK forces against
a background of mounting tension between the two parties. Initially the
clashes were confined to the Kifri region (Kirkuk province), but they
spread rapidly to cities and towns in Kirkuk, Sulaimaniya and Arbil
provinces, and lasted some two weeks. By the end of December,
IMIK forces had suffered a heavy military defeat and were forced to
retreat to their strongholds in the border regions. Both the PUK and
IMIK reportedly sustained heavy casualties although the number of
combatants killed or wounded could not be reliably verified. Civilian
casualties were also said to have been high, particularly after the
conflict spread to Arbil and SulaimanIya. It is almost certain, however,
that the number of combatants and civilians killed or injured during the
two-week period ran into several hundred, perhaps as many in 500.
Homes and public places, including mosques, were destroyed in the
major cities and towns, in large part due to the heavy weaponry used.
Serious human rights abuses were committed by both sides during
and after the clashes. Hundreds of combatants as well as civilians
were taken prisoner, the vast majority of them by the PUK. Both
parties issued public statements accusing the other of having sparked
off the conflict and of committing abuses. These included torture of
detainees, unlawful and deliberate killings of prisoners after surrender
and, in some cases, mutilation. The IMIK also charged the PUK with
conducting widespread arrests of suspected IMIK members or
supporters both during and after the clashes. To Amnesty
International's knowledge, the only other political party in Iraqi
Kurdistan which took part in the conflict was the Kurdistan
Communist Party, whose forces were said to have fought alongside
the PUK in the Kalar region. On 12/23/1993 Amnesty International sent
communications to the PUK's leader and the IMIK's Spiritual Guide,
expressing its concern about the numerous alleged abuses and
appealingfor their end. The organization sought verification of the
allegations, requested details of all those taken prisoner, and urged
that they be handed to the Kurdish administration authorities. Amnesty
International also wrote to the Prime Minister, Kosrat Rasul 'Ali,
urging that the Council of Ministers initiate prompt, thorough and
impartial investigations into all reported abuses and to bring to justice
those found responsible in accordance with international norms. The
organization urged the Council of Ministers to take immediate steps to
transfer all detainees held by the PUK and IMIK into the custody of the
Kurdish administration, to ensure that they be protected from torture
or ill-treatment and to promptly release all those who are not to be
charged with a recognizable criminal offence. No response was
received to any of Amnesty International's communications. In 2/1994,
during a visit to Iraqi Kurdistan, Amnesty International interviewed
several of the small number of IMIK members and supporters still
being held by the PUK (the majority had been released the previous
month) as well as former detainees held by both sides. Testimony
was obtained from torture victims and staff at several hospitals,
where autopsy reports were examined. The families and friends of
some victims of alleged unlawful and deliberate killings, as well as
eye-witnesses, were also interviewed. Amnesty International raised
its concerns with representatives of the PUK and IMIK and with
officials of the Council of Ministers. [=]
86
Events of 12/1993: Background To The Human Rights Abuses. New
York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11413] [19950228] On 12/16/1993 an IMIK member was apprehended
by PUK armed fighters in the town of Kifri (Kirkuk province). Ihsan
Jabbar Ibrahim, imam of a mosque in the town and a teacher of
English at Kifri Secondary School, wu held at the local PUK base for
two days and then released after intervention by senior IMIK officials.
Two days earlier, according to accounts received, clashes had taken
place between an IMIK and a PUK member in the town, which
resulted in the latter being shot and injured. On 18 December, prior to
Ihsan Jabbar Ibrahim's release, the IMIK announced it had abducted
two PUK members to use as leverage to secure his release.
Relatives of the two men retaliated by attacking a car belonging to the
IMIK, resulting in the death of four people and the injury of others. In
the interim, efforts were made by senior officials from both sides to
contain the situation. Between 16 and 19 December, joint PUK-IMIK
committees were set up to normalise relations and bring the clashes
under control. Agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners
held by each party, among other things. However, on 17 December,
PUK fighters reportedly ambushed six IMIK members on the outskirts
of Kifri, killing four of them. Four days later the body of a PUK
member, Azad Karim Samin, was found in the streets of Kifri (see
below); he was among 11 PUK detainees who were held at an IMIK
base in the town, ten of whom were released on 19 November.
On 19 December, the funeral of Hiwa Ranisyi, one of the four
IMIK members killed on 17 December near Kifri, was held in his
home town of Rania. Several hundred people reportedly took part in
the funeral procession, including women and children. Shooting
started as the participants passed in front of the PUK's main base.
The IMIK later stated that PUK fighters stationed at the base had fired
the first shots, killing one IMIK fighter and injuring another. The PUK
denied this, adding that there were numerous armed IMIK fighters
among the crowd and that their intentions were not peaceful. In the
event, IMIK fighters attacked the PUK base, killing five PUK cadres
(see below). Between 12-18 other cadres were captured, according to
the PUK, while the IMIK announced it had taken 57 prisoners.
Following the events in Rania, the situation escalated markedly. The
PUKannounced that on 19 December Kamaran Ahmad, deputy
commander of one of its battalions, was assassinated by the IMIK in
Koisanjaq, and that an anti-IMIK demonstration in Halabja was
dispersed when IMIK fighters shot at the crowd, killing one civilian
and injuring another. In the ensuing days, armed clashes spread to a
number of towns in Kirkuk, Sulaimaniya and Arbil provinces. PUK
forces launched attacks on IMIK bases in Rawanduz, Shaqlawa, Harir
and Diyana on 21 December. In turn, IMIK forces attacked PUK bases
in Qala Diza, Hadi Awa and Chwar Qurna, and temporarily cut off the
Arbil-Sulaimaniya road at Halbat Sultan.
A cease-fire agreement signed by both sides on 25 December
did not prove binding. Armed clashes continued in a number of places
including Koisanjaq, Halabja, Kifri and Kalar, and spread to the cities
of Arbil and Sulaimaniya. The following day PUK forces took control
of Betwata, the IMIK's main headquarters, capturing several of its
senior officials who were in the vicinity at the time. Among them was
Shaikh 'Uthman 'Abd al-'Aziz who was taken to Arbil by Jabbar
Farman, the Minister for Pesh Merga Affairs and field commander of
the PUK forces during the conflict. From there, he was escorted to
Salahuddin where he and other senior IMIK officials remained under
the protection of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). [The INC, a
coalition of most of the major Kurdish and Arab opposition parties in
Iraq, was established in 6/1992 in Vienna. It was renamed the Unified
Iraqi National Congress at a conference held in Salahuddin in 11/1992,
when severer other opposition groups joined it. It has a three member
Presidential Council: Said Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum (representing
the Shi'a Muslim opposition), General Hassan al-Naqib (representing
the Sunni Mwlim opposition) and Masud al-Barzani (representing the
Kurdish opposition). The head of its 30-member Executive Council is
Ahmad al-Chalabi.]
None of those detained by either side during the conflict was held
in acknowledged places of detention under the Kurdish
administration's jurisdiction. For the most part, detainees were held in
cells or makeshift places in the respective parties' bases and centres.
Some IMIK bases captured by the PUK were also used as temporary
places of detention. Detainees in PUK custody who were interviewed
by Amnesty International said that they were permitted family visits
during the latter part of their detention, while those held in IMIK
custody said they had been denied such access. The circumstances
in which detainees in both PUK and IMIK custody were held, and the
absence of any judicial supervision of their cases, made them highly
vulnerable to abuse. Allegations of torture, deaths in custody and
unlawful and deliberate killings were rife.
Scores of people were also arrested outside the context of
armed conflict. Most of these arrests were carried out by the PUK,
particularly in the aftermath of the defeat of IMIK forces. Those
arrested included civilians who were suspected of having taken up
arms and participated in the clashes, and those who were known or
suspected supporters of the IMIK.
In 2/1993, Amnesty International received from the PUK lists of
detainees held by the party during the conflict and in its aftermath.
According to these lists, over 900 people with known or suspected
connections with the IMIK had been arrested by, or surrendered to, the
PUK between 12/21/1993-1/10/1994. In some lists, the detainees are
described as combatants, while in others there was no indication as to
whether they were combatants or civilians. The largest group, 442 in
total, appears to have been arrested and held in the Sulaimaniya
region, with a further 269 held in the Arbil region. The remainder were
listed as having been held in Derbendikhan, Kifri, Kalar and Smud.
The lists also suggest that some detainees were released shortly after
their arrest and interrogation. Most, however, were apparently held for
several days or weeks and then released in batches between the last
week of 12/1993 and the third week of 2/1994.
Upon requesting access to those still detained in 2/1994,
AmnestyInternational was initially told by PUK officials that none
remained in detention. They subsequently acknowledged that a small
number were still being held and granted the organization access to
22 of them. Five were being held at the PUK's Political Bureau
headquarters in Arbil, 13 at a former IMIK base In Sulaimaniya and
four others at the PUK's Second Meibend (Centre) in Derbendikhan.
Amnesty International was also informed that a small number of
detainees were still held in Kalar and was offered access to them. It
was not possible for the organization to assess the veracity of the
information provided by the PUK, although it was evident that the large
majority of detainees had in fact been released. However, the
relatives and friends of some detainees who were said to have been
released told Amnesty International that they had no knowledge of
their fate or whereabouts. Moreover, in several cases the names of
individuals who had been held in PUK custody for a period and who
were subsequently found dead did not appear on the lists provided by
the PUK. Details regarding PUK combatants and members held by
the IMIK were more difficult to obtain. Statements issued by the IMIK
during the conflict made only brief references to the numbers of
people taken prisoner or released. In a statement dated 12/20/1993, 57
people were said to have been captured in Rania, but a statement
issued one week later gave the number as 75. A further statement
dated 1/7/1994 announced that the IMIK had released over 100
detainees, who were said to include senior PUK officials and 65
87
others who had been arrested in Rania. A further 20 detainees were
also said to have been released in Halabja on 2 January. In early
February 1994 the IMIK told Amnesty International that all such
detainees had been released. This assertion was contradicted by the
PUK, which announced that four of its members who were held by the
IMIK in areas close to the border with Iran were only released in the
second week of February in Khormal. Amnesty International did not
have the opportunity to interview them, however.
Following its investigation into the 12/1993 events Amnesty
International concluded that serious human rights abuses were
committed by both PUK and IMIK forces. It was not possible to follow
up all allegations of human rights abuses, and those on which
information was received are too numerous to be adequately
addressed here. These include torture testimonies submitted by
former detainees held by both sides; in several of these cases,
supporting medical evidence was obtained. This report focuses on
one area of concern: the unlawful and deliberate killing of combatants
after surrender and of others arrested outside the context of armed
conflict. [=]
is fired from a distance and only the bullet causes entrance damage..."
On the case of another of the 18 victims: "The disruption of the
face and the large wound on the right side of the neck indicates a
gunshot wound which has probably smashed the upper spine, lower
jaw and possibly interior skeletal strectures in the face and the base of
uhe skull. The wound is very large and this suggests a contact wound,
possibly not at right angles to the skin, but tangentially which has
extended the wound upwards... This is likely to be a very close range
or contact wound from a rifled weapon..."
Amnesty International was also given the names of 11 PUK
combatants attached to the Second Melbend who were allegedly
responsible for the death of the 18 men. In another incident, eight IMIK
combatants were allegedly killed after surrender on 27 December
after PUK forces took control of the IMIK's headquarters at Betwata.
[Seven of the eight men were identified as: Mulla Sharif Hussein
Mustafa; Mulla Wirya Kirhkuki; Nabi Mina Hassan; Ahmed Babakr
Ahmad; Dana Muhammad; 'Ali Hussein; and Barzan Koyi (the body of
the late was apparently not found subsequently).] Nine IMIK fighters
were said to have been ambushed by PUK forces on Makok
mountains near Betwata as they sought to escape. PUK forces
allegedly disarmed them, tied them up and shot them. One of the nine,
Hassan Babakr Ahmad, sunived. He identified four PUK military
commanders who were said to be present at the time. He testified:
"They took us to [name withheld], so he ordered that our hands be tied
from the back. Then he said to us: 'you took part in the battles at
Chwar Qurna and we will execute you'... He ordered his troops to
disperse far away and kept about 20 of his supporters... They took us
to a place about 100 metres away from the main road. Suddenly all
their Pesh Merga started firing at us with different weapons and we all
fell quickly to the ground. They thought we were dead... I knew I had
been hit with a bullet [but] I didn't die..."
The families of two of those killed, Mulla Sharif Hussun Mustafa
ant Nabi Mina Hassan, told Amnesty International that when they
collected the bodies, they saw marks on the wrists where they had
been tied, and that the index finger of the right hand of both men had
been severed. The body of Nabi Mina Husan was also said to bear
knife wounts and his right arm severed. In 2/1994 the Minister for
Pesh Merga Affairs told Amnesty International that PUK forces had
not ambushed any IMIK fighters, and had been heading for the Bazyan
region to fetch the IMIK's Spiritual Guide. On the way, they had
encountered the nine IMIK fighters and a battle ensued in which some
PUK Pesh Merga were wounded and the nine Idlled. He added that he
was not present turing the battle, but had heard shooting and by the
time he arrived on the scene, the IMIK fighters had already died.
Amnesty International also received the names and details of
scores of other members or supporters of the IMIK who were
allegedly killed by PUK forces after arrest outside the context of
armed conflict. It was not possible to investigate many of these cases
or to establish the circumstances surrounding the deaths. Below are
two sample cases:
(1) Ahmad As'ad Isma'il: born 1972 in Arbil, owner of a
recording studio. He was arrested on 24 December together with his
brother-in-law and a friend after PUK fighters surrounded his sister's
home in the Zanyari district of Arbil. His family inquired about him at
the PUK's Third Melbend but obtained no information. Three days
later two of the detainees were released but the whereabouts of
Ahmad As'ad Isma'il remained unknown. All three had apparently
been taken to the PUK's Political Bureau headquarters in the city but
he had been separated from them. The family was then apparently
told by the PUK that Ahmad As'ad Ismatil was at al-Jumhuri Hospitat,
then at Rizgari Hospital, then at the Third Melbend, then at the
Political Bureau. His fate remained unknown until 1/2/1994, when bis
body was found in the streets of Arbil. According to two witnesses, the
Events of 12/1993: Unlawful and Deliberate Killings By PUK Forces.
[99H-11414] [19950228] Amnesty International has received the
names and details of scores of people who were said to have been
deliberately and arbitrarily killed by PUK forces in 12/1993-1/1994.
The victims include combatants killed after surrender, targeted
individuals arrested outside the context of armed conflict ant
subsequently killed, and injured combatants who were reportedly
deprived of medical treatment or bagged out of hospitals and shot. In a
number of cases, the bodies of the victims were allegedly mutilated.
Many of the allegations could not be substantiated. In some cases,
however, information obtained strongly suggested that unlawful and
deliberate killings had been perpetrated. Such information includes
consistent eye-witness and other testimony and forensic evidence.
One incident involved the reported deliberate killing of 18 IMIK
combatants after surrender near Kitri on 28 December. According to
information received, the group was among many combatants who
had begun to withdraw from their bases followlag the defeat of IMIK
forces at Betwata two days earlier. Tne 18 combatants were said to
have been pursued by PUK forces and then surrendered to them.
Their bodies were recovered the following day by residents of Kitri.
the PUK told Amnesty International that the 18 men had been killed in
battle. [The 18 men killed were Nazem Muhammad Tawfiq; Jalal 'Ali
Qader; Sherzed 'Ali Qnder; Hushem Muhummnad Kakamand;
Ibrahim Muhammad Kakamant; Nawzed Muhammad Khan; Luqman
Muhammad Amin; Sabah Jusem Husan; 'Umar Padel; Hassan Riftat
Hussain; Muhummad Rahim; Sanun Muid; Goran Haidar Rustum;
'Abbas Mahmud; 'Adnan Hakim Taher; 'Adel 'Uthman Rasul; Aygub
Chemchemali; and Kamaran Zarayani.] However, a number of people
from Kilri who said they had seen the bodies told the organization that
the gunshot wounds appeared to have been inflicted at close range,
suggesting that the victims had been killed after surrender.
Photographs of some of the victims' bodies appear to support these
statements. The following are extracts from comments made by a
forensic pathologist who examined these photographs: On the case of
Kamaran Zarayani, one of the victims: "The appearances are
suggestive of a close gunshot wound, possibly contact, which has
disrupted the tissues on the left side of the head. When a weapon is
placed very close to the skin or actually pressed against it, the
discharge of gas usually lacerates the tissue in a very irregular
fashion, often star-shaped, as opposed to the neater hole when a gun
88
victim's body had five gunshot wounds and his left arm had been
severed. They stated that the victim's stomach gave the appearance
of having been crushed with a heavy object. His name did not appear
on any lists given to Amnesty International by the PUK of IMIK
detainees arrested in the Arbil region.
(2) Bestun 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abdullah: born 1971 in Koisanjaq, a
student of geography at Salahuddin University. On 26 December he
left his home in Arbil after being told that PUK forces intended to
arrest those living there. He hid and the following day headed for
Koisanjaq with 11 others, but encountered a PUK patrol before
reaching the town. six from the group reportedly fled while the
remaining six, among them Bestun 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abdullah, were
captured. According to accounts received, they were blindfolded, lined
up and shot. None of them was said to be carrying weapons. Bestun
'Abd al-Rahman 'Abdullah's body reportedly had two gunshot wounds,
one in the eye and the other in the stomach.
Amnesty International also received allegations that some IMIK
combatants were deliberately killed by PUK forces after being
dragged out of hospitals. The names of several alleged victims in
Arbil were given to Amnesty International but there was no opportunity
to investigate these and similar cases. However, numerous people in
Arbil, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk provinces testified that on the whole,
injured IMIK combatants were treated privately in homes rather than
in hospitals for fear of being killed or captured. As a result, some were
said to have died because of lack of adequate treatment. In other
cases, PUK forces were said to have taken control of hospitals to
prevent the injured being brought there. For example, two employees
at Kalar Hospital told Amnesty International that PUK forces were
stationed around the building and on the roof for several days to
prevent the injured from the IMIK from being brought there. [=]
Iran), were: Abu Bakr Madid Karim, head of the PUK's Khormal
Komite; Bakhtiar Ahmad; Kamal Ahmad Hamad Amin; Sherwan
Muhyiddin Ahrnad; Saheb Jatfa' Muhammad; and Jalal Babala Mairuf.
A seventh person captured, detained and killed with them, Fairuz
Rahman Hama Sa'id, was a KDP Pesh Merga. The bodies of all
seven were allegedly mutilated by having their ears cut off. Amnesty
International could not substantiate these allegations, although it did
receive from the PUK film footage showing a number of bodies which
had clearly been mutilated. The victims, who were unidentified, were
said to be PUK combatants killed by IMIK forces. These claims were
rejected by the IMIK.
In another incident, seven PUK combatants were captured by
IMIK forces following an attack on their unit near the village of
Sosakan (a border region in Sulaimaniya Province) on the night of 28
December. Ten other PUK combatants with them reportedly fled.
Five of those captured were said to have been shot dead that night:
Sharif 'Ali Bakr (aged 16), Lawran Rahman Walukhan (aged 17),
Mustafa Ahmad, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Qader Muhammad and
Hussain 'Ali Hama. One of the two detainees who survived, 'Umar
Haji Hussain, told Amnesty International: "When we had spent all the
ammunition we had, they surrounded us on the hill and captured us.
Then they blindfolded us, tied our hands from behind and took us
inside... and shot dead five of the prisoners..."
The family of one of the victims, Sharif 'Ali Bakr, told Amnesty
International that his body bore gunshot wounds in the head and limbs
as well as bayonet wounds in the neck and back. His face was said to
have been mutilated. An autopsy was performed on 30 December at a
Sulaimaniya hospital, which said the victim's external injuries
included a stab wound in the skull and mutilation of the face. The
family of another victim, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Qader Muhammad,
also testified that his body bore gunshot wounds and bayonet wounds
in the face and stomach. 'Umar Haji Hussain testified that after the
five victims had been killed, both he and his codetainee, 'Abdullah
Hadi 'Umar, were taken the following morning to a border region
inside Iranian territory (in the district of Paveh). He stated that upon
arrival, they were blindfolded and their hands tied, and that they were
punched, beaten with rifle butts and threatened with execution. Their
subsequent release was apparently in exchange for the release of nine
IMIK detainees by the PUK. [=]
Events of 12/1993: Unlawful and Deliberate Killings By IMIK Forces.
[99H-11415] [19950228] The IMIK was also said to have committed
unlawful and deliberate killings during the 12/1993 clashes. The body
of Azad Karim Samin, a PUK member who had been held in IMIK
custody until 19 December, was found in the streets of Kifri two days
later. He had reportedly been battered to death and his body was
wrapped in a large cloth with the words "There is no God but Allah"
written on it. The IMIK denied responsibility for his death. Eye-witness
testimony and other information obtained regarding the events in
Rania on 19 December (see above) suggested that the five PUK
cadres who died that day were killed by IMIK fighters outside the
immediate context of armed clashes. IMIK officials had told Amnesty
Internationalthat they had died as a result of an exchange of fire
between the two sides. The five victims were: Muhammad Sultan, 'Ali
Mam Qader, Salman Fakhri, Bakhtiar Muhanunad Majid and Mustafa
Hassan. The first to be killed was said to be Muhammad Sultan, who
emerged from the base and was apparently attempting to calm the
situation down. However, the testimonies obtained by Amnesty
International did not support later statements issued by the PUK which
accused the IMIK of refusing initially to hand over the bodies of the five
men to their families, of dragging the bodies through the streets of
Rania, and declaring the five men to be "sinners" so they could not be
buried in a Muslim cemetery. Six PUK combatants were allegedly
shot dead after surrendering to IMIK forces in Khormal (Sulaimaniya
Province) in the third week of December. According to accounts
received, they were taken prisoner at the PUK's Komite (local
committee) building in the town and detained there. One of them was
reportedly injured. The six men, who were said to have been killed on
25 or 26 December in the Hawraman region (close to the border with
Events of 5/1994. New York: Amnesty International, February 28,
1995.MDE14/01/95.[99H-11416][19950228] Widespread military
clashes erupted in Iraqi Kurdistan on 5/1/1994 between the armed
forces of the KDP, PUK and IMIK. They continued intensely
throughout the month, and while there were intermittent clashes in
June and July, they were relatively contained. In August clashes
erupted again until the end of the month when a ceasefire was agreed
and observed. Widespread and gross human rights abuses were
committed by all sides during the conflict and in its aftermath, and
hundreds of prisoners were captured. Combatants were killed after
surrender or capture and others were tortured while in custody.
Civilians not involved in the clashes were arbitrarily arrested on the
basis of their political affiliation, held in unacknowledged places of
detention and tortured. The clashes caused upheaval in the lives of
hundredsof innocent civilians who were either forced out of their
homes or fled. Many people died - civilians and combatants - largely
because of the use of heavy artillery and other weapons in the major
cities. Amnesty International could not obtain a reliable number of
casualties, although estimates ranged from 600 to over 2000 dead. On
1 June Amnesty International publicly called on leaders of the political
parties involved in the conflict to "stop deliberately killing and
89
mutilating prisoners in their custody, and abducting, killing and
torturing civilians based on their political ties". The organization had
received the names and some details of 51 KDP members allegedly
executed by the PUK after arrest between 2 and 23 May in eight
locations, and 49 PUK members allegedly executed by the KDP after
arrest between 4 and 28 May in five locations. In one of the latter
incidents, IMIK forces were reported to have carried out some killings
alongside the KDP. Some of the alleged victims on both sides were
said to have been tortured prior to execution or their bodies
subsequently mutilated. Numerous civilians were also reported to
have fallen victim to arbitrary arrest, torture or deliberate killings. No
response was received from either the PUK or IMIK as intermittent
clashes continued. The KDP, however, issued a press release on
6/3/1994 responding to Amnesty International's statement and sent a
letter to the organization's Secretary General. The letter stated: "The
PUK allegation, as repeated in Amnesty's press release, that the KDP
killed 49 PUK party members is completely unfounded. We
emphatically deny any frilling of PUK prisoners by our forces between
4 and 28 May or during the whole course of the latest tragic and selfdestructive events. The allegation is an absolute fabrication by the
PUK and it is passed to AI solely to counterbalance the killing of 51
KDP prisoners. The names and details of our victims have been
published before sending them to AI. The PUK has not published or
raised the case of their alleged names. Executing prisoners goes
against a long-standing KDP tradition. It has been our policy since the
1960s to strictly observe the Geneva conventions pertaining to the
treatment of prisoners of war and civilians."
The PUK had in fact submitted to Amnesty International the
names of 39 of its members who were said to have been killed after
capture; the names of 10 others were received from other sources in
Iraqi Kurdistan. In its letter the KDP said that while "it must take
exception to several allegations made against it, it nevertheless
welcomed the organization's 'attention to the problem and its
statement' and invited Amnesty International "to send a fact-finding
mission to investigate the case and all other abuses raised in [its
statement]".
Amnesty International visited the region in 7/1994 for three
weeks to investigate a range of human rights abuses reported since 1
May. During the visit, none of the senior PUK officials with whom the
organization met addressed the general allegations made in Amnesty
International's 1 June statement. They did respond to specific cases
raised with them during the visit, references to which arc made
below. IMIK officials, on the other hand, strongly objected to
allegations of human rights abuses attributed to their forces, in
particular the killing of prisoners which they stated was contrary to
Islamic principles upheld by the Islamic Movement.. They said they
intended to issue a statement refuting allegations made by Amnesty
Internationalagainst the IMIK, which the organization undertook to
make public in any report it published on Iraqi Kurdistan. At the time of
writing, no such statement had been received. [=]
military commander, 'Ali Hasso Mirkhan, who claimed ownership of
a piece of land in the district. He arrived with some 20 Pesh Merga,
and after efforts by local officials to settle the dispute peacefully had
failed, firing broke out and continued into the following day. Two PUK
military commanders were killed in separate incidents during these
clashes. Attacks by PUK forces on the local KDP base resulted in 'Ali
Hasso Mirkhan and one other from his group being killed in the
exchange of fue, while 19 other KDP Pesh Merga were taken
prisoner. All were then allegedly executed. Clashes between the two
sides spread on 2 May to the town of Rania, from where PUK
reinforcements had been dispatched to Qala Diza. PUK forces
succeeded in taking control of the KDP's Eleventh Liq in Rania and
arrested a number of party officials and combatants. Two of them
were allegedly shot dead shortly after arrest. By that evening tensions
had spread to both parties' strongholds in Sulaimaniya and Duhok. In
the city of Sulaimaniya, PUK forces took control of the KDP's Fourth
Liq and other offices and over 90 KDP members were later arrested.
Among them were 14 senior KDP officials, including Qader Qader,
Deputy Minister for Pesh Merga Affairs. Similarly, KDP forces took
control of PUK bases in Duhok, Zakho and 'Amadiyya, arresting those
inside. By the end of the first week of May, armed clashes had spread
to a number of towns, including Derbendikhan, Chemchemal,
Halabja, Khorrnal, Biyara, Kifri, Kalar, Salahuddin, Sheqlawa and
'Aqra. There were numerous reports of the killing of prisoners by both
sides, including on S May when six PUK combatants were allegedly
killed after capture by KDP forces in Salahuddin and 16 KDP
detainees were allegedly killed by PUK forces in Halabja. Three other
PUK detainees were allegedly killed by KDP forces in the 'Aqra area
on 7 May and at least eight others after capture by joint KDP/IMIK
forces in Khormal on 4 May and later.
Armed clashes erupted elsewhere during the second week of
May: KDP forces took control of PUK bases in Diyana, Khalifan and
Harir, while in Sayyid Sadeq, Hawraman, Penjwin and Halabja PUK
forces clashed with the joint forces of the KDP and IMIK. PUK and
IMIK forces also clashed in Tawela, Biyara and Khormal. On 17 May
armed clashes erupted in the Haj Omran area and the following day in
Koisanjaq. Four PUK combatants captured near Haj Omran by joint
forces in Koisanjaq were allegedly frilled on 19 May (see below). By
29 May the armed clashes had spread to the city of Arbil and lasted
some three days. While the city had not witnessed significant fighting
until then, forces of both the KDP and PUK were already present
there, occupying a number of public buildings. On 3 May, PUK forces
had taken control of the National Assembly building, ousting the
guards stationed there and positioning themselves around and on the
roof of the building. They also control, 5/1994 took control of the
Maternity and al-Jumhuri hospitals, while KDP forces were stationed
at Rizgari Hospital. Other public buildings were also occupied.
The principal negotiating role throughout the conflict was played
by the INC, which was responsible for bringing senior KDP, IMIK and
PUK officials round the table on a number of occasions. Under its
auspices, several agreements were reached on the withdrawal of
forces, on effecting an immediate cease-fire and on exchanges of
prisoners. These agreements were frequently flouted, but the INC did
succeed in diffusing tensions in some instances, thereby preventing
further escalation of the conflict. By consent of all sides, the INC also
assumed responsibility for deploying neutral forces under its control
to strategic locations and checkpoints previously controlled by either
PUK or KDP forces.
One of the first agreements negotiated by the INC on 8 May
involved establishing a Committee for the Exchange of Prisoners
(Lajnat Tabadul al-Asra) through which many prisoners were
subsequently exchanged. The committee was in hampered by its lack
of powers of enforcement and dependence on the cooperation of the
KurdistanSince 1991: Part 39: Chapter Five: Human Rights: The
Events of 5/1994: Background To The Human Rights Abuses. New
York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11417] [19950228] No attempt is made here to trace exhaustively the
sequence of events of 1 May and the following months, nor is there an
assessment of where responsibility lies in both igniting and prolonging
the conflict. Amnesty International has focused on establishing the
facts about those human rights abuses falling within its mandate,
identifying their perpetrators and putting pressure on the Kurdish
leadership to bring those responsible to justice. The land dispute
which sparked off clashes in Qala Diza on l May involved a KDP
90
conflicting parties to gain access to detainees and ensure their actual
release. A number of former detainees later told Amnesty
International that they had been hidden from the committee's
members or had not been handed over to them as agreed.
Nevertheless, Amnesty International believes that the INC's efforts
were critical in at least identifying the names and whereabouts of
many detainees, and may have been instrumental in preventing
further deliberate killings at the height of the conflict. Representatives
of the ICRC present in Iraqi Kurdistan were also granted access to
detainees. Considerable efforts at mediation were also made by
political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan which had remained neutral. Chief
among these were the Kurdistan Communist Party, KTP and the
ADM, whose forces also assisted in other ways. In Arbil, for example,
joint KTP/KCP forces were stationed at al-Mahatta Prison to prevent
inmates from escaping: from the outset, the vast majority of police
and Asayish personnel who were affliated to either the KDP and PUK
had joined the forces of their respective parties as combatants. In
Sulaimaniya, the KCP bases were used as "neutral ground" for the
exchange of prisoners. Both the Council of Ministers and the National
Assembly were paralysed by the conflict; the National Assembly did
not meet as a body between 3 May and 2 July.
On several occasions civilians demonstrated in Arbil and
Sulaimaniya against the inter-party conflict, calling for an immediate
end to the fighting. During one such demonstration in Arbil on 7 May,
two civilians (Khaled Khalil Hama Amin and Hamid Hassan) were
killed and several others injured as shots were fired into the crowd.
Responsibility for this incident has not been established: the KDP
accused the PUK, while the PUK said that the demonstration "came
under fire from an unknown car". Between 24 and 27 May over 200
women marched from Sulaimaniya to Arbil calling for an end to the
fighting. In both cities, committees were formed by professionals
which appealed for peace. Armed clashes continued intermittently
during June and July in a number of areas, albeit on a much reduced
scale and were quickly contained. However, relations between the
two sides remained tense and widespread arrests of known or
suspected members of each party by the opposing side continued,
many of whom were tortured in custody. Unarmed civilians taking
part in a funeral procession in the city of Sulaimaniya on 13 June were
also killed as PUK forces fired into the crowd.
On 12 August armed clashes broke out again in Qala Diza, and
in Shaqlawa in the ensuing days. The town of Qala Diza, under PUK
control at the time, came under heavy bombardment from areas
controlled by KDP and IMIK forces. Most casualties were civilians.
The clashes reached a climax between 23 and 26 August during
which heavy artillery was used by both sides. According to INC
sources, an estimated 600 people, both civilians and combatants,
were killed during these three days of fighting. Fierce clashes also
broke out in 'Arbat, Sayyid Sadeq and Halabja between 26 and 28
August, involving all three sides. According to information received,
joint KDP/IMIK forces attacking PUK positions on the outskirts of
Halabia succeeded in encircling a large number of the party's
combatants on the shores of Derbendikhan lake, cutting them off from
the main road. While many surrendered to the KDP and IMIK, scores
of others attempted to escape by swimming into the lake and were
said to have drowned. On 29 August, Masoud Barzani and Jalal
Talabani attended a special session of the National Assembly, during
which they made pledges to honour prior agreements concluded by
their respective parties. Less than 48 hours later, clashes had broken
out again north of Arbil, allegedly instigated by PUK forces.
The range of human rights abuses committed between 5-8/1994
are too numerous to be adequately addressed here. This report
consequently focuses on two areas of concern: torture and ill-
treatment of detainees and unlawful and deliberate killings of
combatants after surrender. Several sample cases of torture are
highlighted from among those on which medical evidence was
obtained by Amnesty International and when the findings are
supported by expert forensic opinion. The cases of alleged unlawful
and deliberate killing of unarmed prisoners described below include
the major incidents said to have taken place. In these cases, no
forensicevidence was obtained by or made available to Amnesty
International, and it was not possible for the organization to examine
the remains of the alleged victims during its visit to Iraqi Kurdistan in
7/1994. The details set out below are based on testimonies from eyewitnesses, former detainees, relatives of the victims, party officials
and others. All the cases warrant thorough and impartial investigation
at the highest level. Leaders or representatives of the KDP, PUK and
IMIK with whom Amnesty International raised its concerns in this
regard denied that their forces had killed unarmed prisoners. The sole
exception was Jalal Talabani, who acknowledged to Amnesty
International that PUK forces had committed such crimes in two
separate incidents in Rania and Koisanjaq. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 40: Chapter Five: Human Rights: Human
Rights Abuses By PUK Forces: (a) Torture and Ill-Treatment of
Detainees. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995.
MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11418] [19950228] Scores of former detainees
held in PUK custody - both combatants and civilians - told Amnesty
International that they had been tortured or otherwise ill-treated while
in custody. The majority were known or suspected members or
supporters of the KDP. In 15 cases, Amnesty International obtained
solid evidence to support the claims of torture: eight victims
interviewed, examined and photographed by Amnesty International
still bore scars, and in seven other cases the organization obtained
photographic evidence. An examination of the photographic evidence
by a forensic pathologist concluded that the injuries sustained in each
of the 15 cases were consistent with the allegations made by the
victims. Below are four sample cases:
(1) Haji Taqiddin Muhammad Amin: born 1951 in 'Aqra (Duhok
Province), married with eight children, a KDP cadre. He was arrested
on 6/28/1994 in Arbil by several armed men from the PUK. He had
come to Arbil from 'Aqra to deliver letters on behalf of the KDP. The
armed men identified him by name and told him to get into their
vehicle: "When I asked what for, they didn't reply but hit me in the
chest and face with a rifle. They blindfolded me very tightly and forced
me to lie down in their Landcruiser. My hands were tied too. They
insulted and humiliated me, and asked me about the killing of
someone from the PUK. I replied that I had nothing to do with it and
that I had resigned from the KDP. They said 'we will only believe you
if you curse Masoud Barzani'. I was taken to a place under PUK
control. I was still blindfolded so I didn't know where I was. When I
refused to curse the KDP, one of them said 'Bring the hosepipe'. I
thought he was going to beat me but he used it to tie my legs to the
Landcruiser. They dragged me along the ground and said 'Curse'. I
refused so he kicked me in the back of my head, and blood flowed
from my left ear and nose. They dragged me again and said 'We will
kill you'. After about three hours I was released as a result of
interventions made on my behalf...."
(2) Jalil Hamad Sur 'Umar: born 1968 in Sulaimaniya, married
with one child, a graduate from a technological institute and a former
boxing champion. He was arrested on 6/26/1994 in Sulaimaniya by
three armed men from the PUK: "They blindfolded me and tied my
hands and feet in front of everyone and pushed me in their car... They
took me to Bakrajo. Six or seven of them beat me with cables and
weapons, then they put me in a solitary cell. Half an hour later I was
91
tortured again. They wouldn't let me say anything, they beat me
everywhere. Twice they applied electricity to my tongue. Then they hit
my head six or seven times against the wall till I lost consciousness.
When I opened my eyes again I was back in the cell. They told me
'Join us and curse Barzani and we will release you'... I was released
after my brother-in-law paid them money. I was held there from 9.30
in the morning till 4.00 in the afternoon. If I had stayed the night they
would have executed me, that is what they told me..."
(3) Ali Mahdi Saleh: born 1944 in Khaniqin, married with 10
children, a driver and former KDP Pesh Merga. He was arrested on
6/4/1994 at a PUK checkpoint in Sayyid Sadeq (Sulaimaniya
Province). He had been on a minibus heading for Halabja: "At Sayyid
Sadeq we stopped at the checipoint. I was wearing a yellow shirt and
they told me 'You are from the KDP'. They took away all the men in
the Coaster [minibus] and left the women. They took us to the Ninth
Melbend in Sharazur. When we entered they blindfolded us and the
head of the Melbend told us to sit down... I was beaten with cables and
a wooden stick and a hosepipe. Before the beating they told me 'You
are from the KDP' and I replied that I had been in the past... They said
'Say that you art from the KDP' and I refused... In the end I said it..
After three or four days they transferred me to 'Arbat to the former
KDP base there which they had converted into a prison... There I was
put in a communal cell. There were between 50-70 prisoners in two
communal cells, most of them from the KDP and a few were from the
[Islamic] Movement. I didn't see the others being tortured but I saw
them after they returned to the cell following the torture. There was a
young boy there, 15 or 16 years old. His left hand had been broken
twice from the beatings. They sent him to a doctor who put his hand in
plaster. When he came back they put him in another room. He was
from Chemchemal... They hid him from the Committee for the
Exchange of Prisoners... Then they released him... I was released in a
prisoner exchange on 12 June at the Communist Party base [in
Sulaimaniya]..."
(4) Daraghayi [full name withheld]: a trader born in Sulaimaniya
in 1960. On 7/12/1994 in 'Ain Kawa, he was accosted by six armed
men who forced him into a nearby house. He stated that the letters
'PUK' were on his assailants' Kalashnikov rifles. He was tortured
after various documents were found in his possession which
apparently linked him to the KDP. He told Amnesty International: "....
he began to hit me [and] the other Pesh Mergas hit me with the butts of
their Kalashnikovs. The beating intensified and I was kicked and
punched... While they were hitting me I saw two large paintings on the
wall. One of them was a portrait of the martyr Aram and the other was
of 'Ali 'Askari. [Shaswar Jalal (known as Aram) was a well-known
political figure within the PUK; he was killed in 1977 by Kurdish
agents of the Iraqi Government. 'Ali 'Askari was a senior PUK
military commander who was executed by the KDP in 1978.] Then I
knew that I was in PUK hands... I heard the person interrogating me
tell the others to bring a hosepipe... He bent it in half and began to hit
me. I fell in a corner. There, he beat me without stopping. . . In the
garden he continued beating me with the hosepipe. When he beat me
he was drinking 'Araq [alcoholic drink]. After each glass he beat me...
I think he drank about one and a half bottles... He beat me in the
garden until four or five in the morning... Around midnight I sensed that
the neighbours had heard my screams but no one intervened. The
house was located in a residential area, close to the UN. When he
became tired of beating me he insulted me..."
Local residents in 'Ain Kawa apparently heard his screams and
informed staff of one of the UN agencies, who in turn informed
Amnesty International. By that time, however, he had been released
and was receiving treatment at Rizgari Hospital in Arbil. Amnesty
International interviewed him several days later and photographed his
injuries. The forensic pathologist commented that .... the Injuries are
very recent and some of the beating was severe in intensity, causing
extensivehaemorrhage into the tissues, the overall appearance of
prolonged, repeated severe whipping with objects of varying width."
[=]
Rights Abuses By PUK Forces: (b) Unlawful and Deliberate Killings.
[99H-11419] [19950228] (1) Qala Diza. 2 May: Nineteen KDP
combatants were said to have been killed by PUK forces following
their arrest on 2 May. As noted earlier, clashes had broken out
between forces affiliated to the PUK and KDP forces led by 'Ali Hasso
Mirkhan after the failure to settle a ]and dispute. According to accounts
received by Amnesty International, PUK forces attacked the KDP's
Nawche (local committee) building in the town, where 'Ali Hasso
Mirkhan and other Pesh Merga had taken refuge. Following the attack,
the KDP forces retreated to an area outside the town known as Gurdi
Husni, where a battle ensued and two KDP combatants, including 'Ali
Hasso Mirkhan, were killed. Nineteen others were captured and,
according to eye-witnesses, were brought back to Qala Diza and held
at the PUK's Komite building. [Among them were: Hamad 'Abdullah
Saleh; Amir 'Abdullah Salch; Khano Majid Wali; Amir Muhyiddin
Lashkaryani; and Fakhri Hamad Ibrahim Khan.] A 24 year-old man
from Rania testified: "That evening they brought out five of the
detainees, drove them to Gurdi Husni and executed them. Then five
others, and then the rest, in groups. It was about seven o'clock in the
evening. I didn't witness the killings but people in the town could hear
shots being fired. The bodies were brought by local people in Qala
Diza. Some of mem had their hands cut off and the eyes of others had
been gouged out... The body of 'Ali Hasso had been burned and they
had dragged it through the streets of Qala Diza." The bodies were
reportedly taken to Rania and from there to Merga Sur for burial. A
KDP Pesh Merga testified that he had assisted in the burial of the
bodies, ant told Amnesty International: "'Ali Hasso's face and chest
were burned and his teeth wrenched out... There were traces of rope
marks around his neck... and other injuries suggesting he had been
dragged on the ground on his back and buttocks... The bodies of Amir
and Hamad 'Abdullah [two brothers who were among those killed] had
been dismembered. I put their remains in plastic bags and buried
them... The stomach of Khorshid Ahmad [another of those killed] had
been slit open and his legs, hands and arms had been cut... but not
dismembered Amir Muhyiddin Lashkaryani [another victim] had one
bullet wound in his back. His face had been mutilated with a bayonet
and his eyes gouged out..."
(2) Rania. 2 Mav: That day PUK forces attacked and took control
of KDP bases in the town, including the premises of the party's
Eleventh Liq and the Nawche. Among those arrested at the Liq and
killed shortly thereafter were Ahmad Saleh Beg, head of the KDP's
Nawohe in Rania, and Azad Muhammad Qader, a Pesh Merga. Both
were said to have been shot dead in front of eyewitnesses. One
witness, an 18-year-old student from Rania, told Amnesty
International: "I was standing in front of the Liq. There was little
resistance and within a few minutes [PUK forces] had entered the
building. Ten minutes later they brought out Ahmad Saleh Beg and
Azad [Muhammad Qader]. Azad was a simple Pash Merga. He was
wearing yellow. Two of them shot him dead in front of the door. They
were ... [names withheld] from Rania. Ahmad Saleh Beg was taken to
the home of [the head of PUK's Eighth Melben] which is almost facing
the Liq. Five minutes later he was brought out of the house and taken
round to the back. There were many people around. They hit him with
the butts of their rifles... and then shot him. The people were afraid and
some were crying. Even supporters of the PUK were against it...
92
Three of them had hit him with their weapons and he fell into a pool of
dirty water on the ground. He was shouting: 'Don't kill me... What do
you want?" The bodies of the two men were left there until they were
collected by their families. PUK officials in Rania told Amnesty
International in 7/1994 that the KDP's Eleventh Liq had not been
attacked by PUK forces but by local people from the town, among
them supporters, friends and relatives of a PUK military commander
killed in Qala Diza earlier that tay. The officials denied that any KDP
member had been killed after capture. Jalal Talabani, however,
admitted that the victims had died in such circumstances and that
PUK forces were responsible for their death.
(3) Koisanjaq. 18 and 19 May: Armed clashes broke out in the
town of Koisanjaq on 18 May, during which PUK forces attacked and
took control of the KDP's Nawche building. An estimated 50-60 KDP
members, the majority of them Pesh Merga, emerged from the
Nawahe and surrendered to the PUK. However, one of them, Jamal
Hama Saleh, remained inside as he had been wounded. Several of the
KDP members who surrendered later told Amnesty International that
they had appealed to PUK officials to release him. Among them was a
Nawohe official, who said: "I intervened on Jamal's behalf with the
head of the PUK Komite, asking for his release as he was injured.
They agreed, but about 10 minutes later we heard shots being fired.
The PUK later took his body to the al-Jum'a mosque". Jamal Hama
Saleh's family told Amnesty International that he had gone to
Koisanjaq that day, was caught up in the fighting and took refuge at the
Nawche after being wounded. He was said to have received some
medical treatment by a KDP doctor shortly before the surrender. The
doctor told Amnesty International: "I treated Jamal when he arrived at
the Nawohe. He was injures in his upper legs and penis, and lost two
fingers. He couldn't move his legs.."
Five other KDP detainees were killed by the PUK the following
day. They were: Sherwan 'Abd al-Rahman Karim, a Pesh Merga;
Hawez Hassan Risha; Halgurd 'Uthman (known as Mam Yahya) and
his two brothers, Karokh and Asos. All five had been among the KDP
members who had surrendered after PUK forces took control of the
Nawche. They were held in Koisanjaq for one night, and on 19 May
were made to board a Coaster together with 15 guards from the PUK,
ostensibly to transfer them to a place of detention in Sulaimaniya. On
the Koisanjaq-Sulaimaniya road, near Haibat Sultan, the five
detainees were shot dead by their guards and their bodies left by the
roadside. That evening, PUK forces buried them in a pit on a nearby
hillside. They were subsequently recovered by their families and
brought back to Koisanjaq for burial. A brother of Sherwan 'Abd alRahman Karim testified to Amnesty International: "Sherwan and
Hawez were taken to the PUK's Komite after their arrest and the other
three were held somewhere else. We later learned that Sherwan had
been threatened with death by [a senior PUK official, name withheld].
Knowing he was to be killed, Sherwan asked to see his mother and
his eldest son raged three]. They went to see Sherwan's wife and
asked for the boy, saying his father wanted to see him. They took him
away for 24 hours and did not return him to his mother until after
Sherwan was executed. On the afternoon of that day [19 May]
someone told us that they were to be executed... So I took my car and
headed for Salahuddin. There, I spoke to Sami 'Abd al-Rahman, who
informed Ahmad al-Chalabi and Kak Mastud. Both of them spoke to
Kosrat by telephone. [Sami 'Abd al-Rahman, member of the KDP's
Political Bureau; Ahmed al-Chalabi, head of the INC's Executive
Committee; Masoud al-Barzani, KDP leader; and Kosrat Rasul Ali,
Prime Minister.] Kosrat promised that they would not be executed.
The following day, at 4.30 in the afternoon, I arrived back in Koye
[Koisanjaq] and went to my home. I was told they had already been
executed... People had heard the sound of gun shots coming from the
Haibat Sultan area... Some firemen from Koye went that evening to
put out a fire in a wheatfield and they saw the five bodies on the side of
the road, but they did not dare take them. That night some PUK Pesh
Merga removed the bodies. The following morning we went to the
place where the executions took place... There were traces of blood
on the ground... I found Sherwan's pen and recognized his shoes
which had been left there. Later, we were informed that the five bodies
were buried a short distance away. We went there and found the
bodies. They were covered with a blanket which itself was covered
with soil. The families of the others had come too. We took the bodies
back with us to a mosque in Koyl and removed their clothes. Each of
them had at best 30 bullet wounds... some had rope marks on their
wrists, others were still tied with rope..."
A close relative of Halgurd 'Uthman and his two brothers told
Amnesty International: "After the Newche had fallen, the PUK told
Mam Yahya that he could go home... But they came to see him later
that evening. They asked him to join the PUK or face imprisonment in
Sulaimaniya. He replied that he was ready to go to Sulaimaniya. Then
theybrought Asos and told him he was to go with his brother to
Sulaimaniya... Then they brought Karokh, who used to be a PUK
member. They aslced him to pin again but he said he wanted to go
with his brothers. All three were unarmed... I saw their bodies later.
They had been shot at close range and each had about 30-40 bullet
wounds in the head and chest. Their brains had been blown out of their
heads..."
Amnesty International received the names of four senior PUK
officials who were said to have been in Koisanjaq on 18 and 19 May
and to have been present when the five detainees boarded the
Coaster. The decision to execute them were allegedly taken by one or
more of these officials, two of whom are members of the PUK's
Political Bureau. However, PUK officials maintained that the five
detainees had been armed with a hand grenade, and that after
attempting to overpower the guards in the Coaster, they were shot
dead. One PUK official in Koisanjaq told Amnesty International that
after the incident, a decision was taken not to return the bodies to the
town "for fear of exacerbating the situation". The official said that it
was decided to bury the bodies elsewhere, temporarily, until the
situation had calmed town. He stated that he had personally chosen
the location for their burial, and showed Amnesty International the pit.
Jalal Talabani subsequently acknowledged to Amnesty International
that the detainees had been shot dead while unarmed.
(4) Halabja, 4-5 May: Eleven people were reportedly arrested
and deliberately killed on 5 May shortly after PUK forces entered
Halabja. Most of the victims were said to have been suspected
members or supporters of the KDP and, in one or two cases, IMIK.
The victims were allegedly arrested in their homes or on the streets
of Halabja by the PUK's Pesh Merga and Special Brigades forces on
4 or 5 May. Their bodies were recovered in the ensuing days: they
had been dumped in various locations on the outskirts of the town.
Their families testified that the condition of the bodies suggested that
large amounts of blood had been taken from them before they were
shot, and that this had been carried out at Halabia al-Shahida Hospital.
However, it was not possible to verify this claim. The 11 people killed,
who included three minors, were:
(5) Fariq Tawfiq 'All: born in Halabja on 6/6/1982. His body was
found on 6 May near the village of Hassan Awa.
(6) Keylcawas Muhammad Ramadan: a farmer born in Halabia
in 1957; married with four children. His body was found in a field on
the outskirts of Halabja on 6 May.
(7) Kamal 'Abduliah Nader: born in the village of Nijla in the
district of Halabja in 1969; married with four children. His body was
found near Zamaqe resettlement camp on 5 May.
(8) Soran Ma'ruf 'Abd al-Rahman: a student born in Halabia in
93
1970. His body was found near Bakrawa on 6 May.
(9) Faisal Ghaffur Muhammad and Nawzaid Ghaffur
Muhammad: Two brothers born in Halabja in 1973 and 1977
respectively. Their bodies were found in a field near the village of
Zamaqe on 7 May.
(10) Futad Jamil: a secondary school student from Halabja aged
about 15. His body was found in a nearby ffeld on 7 May.
(11) Baqi Qader Rashid: born in Halabja in 1963; married with
four children. His body was found near Zamaqe resettlement camp in
the second week of May.
(12) Nateq 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karim: a student born in Halabja in
1971. He was arrested with his three brothers and taken to the PllK's
Melbend in the town. There, Nateq 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karim was
separated from the others and his body was found several days later
near Zamaqe resettlement camp.
(13) Siddiq Taqi 'Abd al-Rahrnan: born in Halabja in 1968. His
body was found near Bakrawa on 6 May.
(14) Saifuddin Ahrnad Muhammad: born in Halabja in 1954. His
body was found on the outskirts of Halabja several days after his
arrest. [=]
(3) Jawad Taher: he was arrested at his home in Hdabia on 14
June by IMIK armed men. He testified: "They told me they wanted to
talk to me for five minutes and then they would let me go. But they
held me for two days and I was subjected to severe and harsh torture.
They tortured me badly using a military belt, they kicked me and beat
me with the butts of their rifles... the reason for my arrest was that my
relatives and family are with the PUK, like my uncle, and they beat
me because of them. I am not with the PUK."
(4) Barham Kamal Shahzaman: a non-commissioned officer
with the police in Sarchinar, Sulaimaniya. He was accosted by armed
men of the KDP in Arbil on 6 July at a health centre. He stated: "There
were several armed men from the KDP. They had with them a yellow
flag and a photograph of Mas'ud Barzani. They asked me for my
identity card so I gave them my police identity card. They said they
wanted my membership card and I said I didn't have one. They
searched me and found my gun and my PUK identity card. They took
me to the Second Liq... and there they began beating me severely.
They also took my car..." [=]
Rights Abuses By KDP and IMIK Forces: (b) Unlawful and Deliberate
Killings. New York: Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE
14/01/95. [99H-11421] [19950228] (1) Khormal. 4 May: Armed
clashes broke out in and around the town of Khormal on 4 May
between PUK forces and the joint forces of the KDP and IMIK.
According to accounts received, the clashes lasted several hours and
resulted in the death of a number of PUK combatants and the capture
of others. Those taken prisoner fell into two groups. The first had
reportedly come under armed attack at the PUK's Komite in Khormal
and were forced to withdraw outside the town where they were
captured by IMIK forces. Two of them testified in 7/1994 that the IMIK
killed two of their fellow detainees soon after arrest. One of them, a
member of the Hawraman Komite of the PUK, testified: "After four
hours of fighting, we retreated from Khormal towards the village of
Takya. Before getting there we fell into an ambush set up by the
Islamists. We were 25 Pesh Merga... They said we would come to no
harm. As we had been dispersed, one of our Pesh Merga hid in the
little river of Zala. He stood up and put up his hands in surrender but
they immediately killed him. His name was 'Ali and he was 23 or 24
years old. They took us to one of their bases in the village of Yalan Pe.
Before getting there, they killed one of our Pesh Merga called 'Umar,
who had been wounded in the battles. He was in the back of the car.
Several times he had cried out that he was in pain. He had been
wounded in his leg.."
According to their accounts, the detainees were then taken from
Yalan Pe to an IMIK base in Wishianaw, where they were held in a
cave for 44 days. None was tortured, but all said they were kept
blindfolded for the first 10 days and then brought out of the cave to
carry out work. During this period, three of the detainees were
allegedly executed. A 31-year-old Pesh Merga from Khormal, who
was among those held in the cave, told Amnesty International: "About
a week after we arrived here, they took away Falah Isma'il and 'Amer
'Azk Ghulam; both are from Garmian. It was about 2 o'clock in the
morning. They called out their names and took them out of the cave.
We didn't hear anything more about them. A few days later they took
out Jalil Ramadan Sa'id, who has been a Pesh Merga for a long time,
in the same manner. It was about 8 o'clock in the evening... The three
bodies were later found in the vicinity of Yalan Pe, a village near
Khormal".
The remaining 20 detainees were eventually released on 16
June in an exchange of prisoners organized by the INC. Several of
them told Amnesty International that some 10 days before their
Rights Abuses By KDP and IMIK Forces: (a) Torture and IllTreatment of Detainees. New York: Amnesty International, February
28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H-11420] [19950228] Some of the former
detainees from the PUK interviewed by Amnesty International in
7/1994 stated that they had been tortured or otherwise ill-treated while
in KDP or IMIK custody. Only a few cases, however, still had visible
physical evidence to support their claims at the time they were
interviewed. The organization did obtain photographic evidence to
support claims of torture in 12 other cases, and where the clearly
visible scars on the victims' bodies were found to in consistent with
the allegations made. The following are four sample cases:
(1) Qader Hadi Karim: a PUK combatant from Sulaimaniya who
was captured with other combatants by joint forces of the KDP and
IMIK in the Khormal region on 6 June. He stated that upon capture,
some KDP members were about to shoot them when an IMIK
combatant prevented any killings: "After they tortured me my strength
gave way because of the severity of the beatings. Then they
transferred me to Khormal and there I was subjected again to severe
torture until the evening. On the night of 11 June they took me out of
the detention centre after having spent two nights there, and during that
time the torture had become less severe. I was the first one to be
called out of the detention centre. They did not say they were going to
torture me - they said they were going to execute me. They asked me
to divulge information before the execution was carried out."
(2) 'Adnan 'Abd al-Qader: an artist born in 1971 in Kalar. He was
arrested by anned men of the KDP in Arbil at the Medea Hall on 13
June and held for several hours. He testified: "I had gone to the Hall to
make some enquiries but I found no one there except a KDP patrol... I
was alone when they arrested me. They asked me to show them my
identity card and I gave it to them. As I was walking away they called
me back, and when I returned they searched me and found the identity
card of the PUK's Second Melbend... I didn't know the people who
arrested me. You cannot imagine what the situation was like... They
knew nothing except violence. There were 12 armed men. They used
all kind of methods during the torture. They used their hands and
cables and anything else that they found. They didn't want anything
from me. It was only because they had found a PUK identity card on
me and that I belonged to the other side... After they arrested me they
took me to the KDP's Second Liq... and then to [another prison near]
Salahuddin University..."
94
release, IMIK officials had told them that ICRC representatives would
be coming to see them, and that consequently the conditions in which
they were being held were improved. They were allegedly told to say
that they had been held in tents, not in a cave. When the ICRC
representatives arrived on 14 June, however, they were apparently
not given access to the detainees, being told that they had already
been released.
The second group of PUK combatants captured on 4 May had
surrendered to KDP and IMIK forces after a battle around the fortress
of Khormal. One of them, a Pesh Merga aged 40 from Penjwin, told
Amnesty International: "After we had run out of ammunition, we
surrendered. When they came they treated us badly. They shot dead
in front of us three people - my brother Karim Muhammad Rahman,
aged 24, my cousin Mahmud Muhammad Karim, aged between 25
and 27, and one of my relatives, Jamal Faraj, aged 30. All three had
been disarmed. We had been 18 people in all, and after the three
executions, 15 of us were left. They divided us into two groups. We
were nine taken by the KDP and the other six went to the Islamists.
This took place in the fortress. We nine were taken out of the fortress.
Later the KDP Pesh Merga told us that the Islamists had tied the
hands of the six prisoners and started hitting them with blocks and
stones and then executed them..."
According to another PUK detainee, a Pesh Merga from Penjwin
aged27, the first three executions were also carried out by IMIK
forces. He told Amnesty International that the IMIK wanted to execute
them all, but were prevented from doing so by the commander of the
KDP Khormal forces. Until their release, the detainees were held in
KDP bases in several areas, including Biyara, Daremar and Karajel.
(2) Salahuddin. 5 May: Armed clashes broke out on 5 May after
KDP forces attacked the PUK's Komite in Salahuddin. the clashes
lasted several hours, with KDP forces tarring control of the Komite
and arresting some of the PUK combatants inside. The PUK later
published the names of six of their combatants who were allegedly
killed after surrender. Several PUK Pesh Merga who were in the
Komite at the time told Amnesty International that the KDP had
initiated the clashes despite assurances from senior party officials
that no attack on the Komite would take place. They said that there
were 29 PUK Pesh Merga inside the building who sought to defend
themselves against a large KDP force. According to their accounts,
five of their fighters were killed during the clashes, seven others killed
after surrender (five of them having been wounded), and the
remaining 17 arrested and taken into custody. The five who were
wounded and then allegedly killed were identified as: Rizgar Wasman
Khadr, Khadr Rahman, Mukhlis Ghaffur Hussain, Ahmad Qader
Mahmud and Hiwa Sulaiman 'Abdullah. Two others, Muhsin
Muhammad Mawlud and Farhan Mustafa Hamad, were allegedly
taken into the grounds of the Komite building, tied to an electricity
pylon and shot dead. One of the Pesh Merga interviewed said he had
not witnessed the killings but that he had seen the two men surrender
and a few minutes later he heard the sound of gunshots. In addition to
the PUK combatants, a secondary school student aged about 15 was
also killed in the incident. Bahzad Muhammad Muhammad's father
told Amnesty International that he went to the Komite late that
afternoon, after the fighting had ended, and found his son's body
riddled with bullets. The Pesh Merga alleged that Bahzad
Muhammmad Muhammad had been killed after capture, along with
the seven combatants mentioned above. The boy's father stated that
he and others had gathered five of the bodies, including the two who
were tied to the electricity pylons, and had taken them to the Mulla
Hamza mosque. KDP officials rejected these allegations, stating that
all the deaths had occurred during the exchange of fire. They also
stated that the attack on the Komite was not unprovoked, and had been
in response to a hand grenade being thrown at a group of their armed
men. It was not possible for Amnesty International to independently
verify either the PUK or KDP account of events.
(3) Bardarash and 'Aqra, 7 May: Three PUK combatants were
said to have been frilled after arrest following armed clashes in 'Aqra
on 5 and 6 May: Rif'at 'Abdullah (known as Ribaz), a military
commander; and two Pesh Merga, Salam Saleh and Farhad Harnad
Amin. KDP forces took control of the PUK's Merbend in 'Aqra on 6
May and a number of officials and Pesh Merga were arrested. Three
PUK combatants who were involved in the clashes told Amnesty
International that Rebaz and several others evaded capture and sought
refuge in Girdasel, an area inhabited by the pro-PUK Harki tribe.
There, they were joined by other PUK Pesh Merga and went to the
nearby village of Mam Dawda. The following day they attempted to go
to Arbil. One of them, a 44-year-old Pesh Merga from Arbil, told
Amnesty International: "We were 28 in all... We sent six Pesh Merga
to contact someone from another village to show us the way. They
were arrested soon after they had set off... We dispersed in the wheat
field. We didn't know that we were almost surrounded. I, with seven
others, was separated from Rebaz and the rest. Then firing began
from all directions. They arrested us... and took us to the village of
Dala Re on the river, facing the village of Ifraz. Most of the [KDP]
Pesh Merga there belonged to the clans. We were afraid... We thought
they wanted to frill us... I wanted them to take us to the KDP Liq as
soon as possible, as there were officials there with whom we could
talk... A little while later, they brought Ribaz and Isma'il, my brother.
They had been arrested. Rebaz was wounded in the foot... At about 10
or 11 the next morning, 7 May, several armed men came and said
they were taking Ribaz for treatment... I said 'No, You are going to frill
him'. I said 'We will come with him'. They pushed me away and took
Ribaz, dragging him along on the ground and treading on his wound.
They put him in a car... He was executed in a place about 200 metres
away from where we were..." The circumstances in which the two
other PUK detainees, Salem Saleh and Farhad Hamad Amin, were
killed are not known to Amnesty International. Those held in Dala Re,
as well as six others held in the village of Dara Tu, were taken back to
'Aqra. Five days later they were released in a prisoner exchange
organized by the INC. KDP officials denied that Ribaz had been killed
by their forces after capture. They stated that he had resisted arrest
and was killed in the exchange of fire. However, they apparently
refused to hand over his body to his family, who told Amnesty
International that they were not allowed to see it. Rebaz, Salem Saleh
and Farhad Hamad Amin were buried on the outskirts of 'Aqra.
(4) Haj Omran, 17 May: Hassan Kwestani, a senior PUK official
and head of the PUK's Fourth Melbend, was allegedly killed after
capture in the Ha; Omran region on 17 May. The PUK stated that he
and the Pesh Merga accompanying him were ambushed by the joint
forces of the KDP, IMIK and Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah. He
was said to have been wounded, captured and then executed. The
PUK also stated that Hassan Kwestani's body was subsequently
mutilated, photographed and filmed, and then buried close to the area
where he had been killed. A PUK military commander who was
among those ambushed told Amnesty International the' Hassan
Kwestani had been directed by the PUK's Political Bureau to go to the
Haj Omran region in order to consolidate PUK control there. On the
road between Haj Omran and Choman they were ambushed by the
KDP, IMIK, Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah and a number of Iranian
Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards). The military commander testified
that Hassan Kwestani had been accompanied by four civilians and 24
Pesh Merga, who were overpowered after a brief skirmish. He stated
that three among them had been killed during the clashes, eight had
fled, four had been captured and then killed, and the others had been
taken prisoner. Those allegedly killed after capture, in addition to
Hassan Kwestani, were identified as Mahmud Alunad 'Abdullah, his
95
brother, Yusuf Ibrahim Khadr, his cousin; and Mina Ahmad Isma'il.
Hassan Kwestani was said to have been wounded in the hand before
being captured. KDP officials denied that Hassan Kwestani and the
others were killed after capture, stating that they had died during a
battle south of Haj Omran. On the other hand, 'Abd al-Qader Brayati, a
senior IMIK military commander, told Amnesty International that
Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah forces were responsible for killing
Hassan Kwestani in the ambush. He stated that the IMIK had
photographs and video footage showing his body lying against his car
with numerous bullet wounds. He undertook to provide copies of the
photographs and film but did not do so. Hassan Kwestani's body was
not returned to his family and he was said to have been buried in the
Haj Omran region. Amnesty International was unable to obtain further
corroborating evidence about the incident. [=]
state functions, Amnesty International believes that they are bound by
the provisions of international human rights treaties which Iraq has
ratified, namely the ICCPR, and should conform to other international
human rights standards. The Kurdish authorities have, both in public
statements and through legislation passed by the National Assembly,repeatedly committed themselves to upholding those human rights
standards set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
international human rights treaties and covenants. These standards
prohibit any derogation from fundamental rights and guarantees,
including the right to life and the prohibition against torture, even in
emergencies. To translate these principles into practice requires a
resolute and public commitment to the protection of human rights at
the highest political level, prompt and effective investigations, and
sanctions when abuses are committed, coupled with rigorous training
and control of the armed and security forces. Amnesty International
submits the following recommendations to the Council of Ministers
and leaders of the political parties. If implemented, these measures
could help to reduce human rights abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan and would
demonstrate a genuine commitment to the promotion of international
human rights standards and their effective implementation. [=]
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 44: Conclusions and Recommendations.
[99H-11422] [19950228] If human rights abuses are to be prevented in
the future, effective steps must be taken now to address their causes.
The chief responsibility for action rests with the Council of Ministers
and with the leaders of the political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. In this
report, Amnesty International has sought to highlight some of the
structures, policies and behaviour which lie behind human rights
abuses in the region. Two principal factors stand out: the impunity
enjoyed by the political parties' armed and special forces which has
meant that perpetrators of abuses have not been brought to justice;
and the active undermining of the judiciary and trek of respect for its
independencebythe political parties. The main political parties in
Iraqi Kurdistan have not only ignored, but have also encouraged,
human rights abuses by the forces under their authority as a means of
settling political differences. In allowing the use of illegal methods,
they have intensified the spiral of political violence which has
characterized the region for more than a year. The Kurdish leadership
has failed to ensure that the Pesh Merga forces and the security and
special forces, whether operating in the name of the Council of
Ministers or individual political parties, act within the rule of law.
These forces continue to arrest people arbitrarily and to torture
detainees. They continue to kill civilians. They have killed combatants
and others after capture, surrender or after such combatants have
been incapacitated by wounds. All such acts violate international
humanitarian law, in particular as recognized in common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Despite evidence of the
responsibility of these forces for widespread human rights abuses, not
one single individual has been brought to justice. The failure to
implement human rights safeguards effectively, to tackle continuing
problems of impunity or to bring under control their forces raises
serious questions about the Kurdish leadership's political will to end
human rights abuses. Victims of human rights abuses, their relatives
and society at large all have a vital interest in the truth about past
abuses and in the clarification of unresolved human rights crimes.
Furthermore, bringing the perpetrators to justice is not only important
for the individual case; it also sends a clear message that human
rights abuses will not be tolerated and that those responsible will be
held accountable. A new approach is required by the Kurdish
leadership if it is to succeed in breaking the self-perpetuating cycle of
violence and in building institutions based on mutual respect and
protection of fundamental human rights. The political and
administrative authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan have declared the region
under their control to be an integral part of the State of Iraq. They tool:
over existing state structures, including the courts, and have largely
continued to apply existing Iraqi legislation. In continuing to carry out
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 45: Conclusions and Recommendations:
Recommendations to the Council of Ministers. New York: Amnesty
[19950228] (1) Conduct thorough, prompt and impartial investigations
into any reported incidents of unlawful and deliberate killings, torture
or other human rights abuses committed by officials of the Kurdish
administration or the political parties (including those cited in this
report). They should be conducted by a body which is independent of
those allegedly responsible and has the necessary power and
resources to carry out this task; such investigations should satisfy the
same strict standards applicable to investigations of extrajudicial
executions by states. The methods and findings of these investigations
should be made public.
(2) Make special efforts to protect the security of relatives,
witnesses, lawyers and others assisting with investigations of human
rights abuses.
(3) Bring to justice law enforcement personnel and members of
the political parties' forces responsible for unlawful and deliberate
killings, torture or other human rights abuses. All investigations and
trials should be held before ordinary criminal courts in accordance
with international standards for fair trial. There should be no
amnesties or other similar measures which have the effect of
preventing the emergence of the truth and subsequent accountability
before the law.
(4) Take steps to ensure that investigations establish chain-ofcommand responsibility for human rights abuses; anyone suspected
of having ordered, committed or covered up human rights abuses
should be brought to justice.
(5) Prohibit explicitly all unlawful and deliberate killings and
torture, and ensure that any such abuses are recognized as criminal
offences and are punishable by penalties which take into account the
gravity of the crime. Such penalties should be consistent with
international standards and exclude the death penalty and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment.
(6) Take effective steps to ensure that the prohibition of unlawful
and deliberate killings is reflected in the training of all personnel
involved in the arrest and custody of detainees and of all personnel
authorized to use lethal force, and in the instructions issued to them.
Such personnel should be instructed that they have the right and duty
to refuse to obey any order to participate in a deliberate killing, and
that an order from a superior officer or a public authority must never
96
be invoked as a justification for taking part in such a killing.
(7) Establish clear guidelines regarding the use of lethal force by
the police as well as the armed and security forces carrying out law
enforcement functions in accordance with the UN Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the
UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials; ensure that
effective steps are taken to implement these guidelines.
(8) Take effective steps to ensure that law enforcement
personnel cooperate with investigations and that members of the
judiciary investigating human rights abuses are given adequate
resources and protection.
(9) Provide fair and adequate compensation to the victims of
human rights abuses and their families.
(10) Ensure that all detainees are held only in officially
recognized places of detention, and that accurate information about the
arrest, detention and whereabouts of any person is made available
promptly to relatives, lawyers, doctors and the courts.
(11) Ensure that all detainees are brought before a judicial
authority without delay after being taken into custody, as required by
Iraqi legislation, and that relatives, doctors and lawyers have prompt
and regular access to them; and take steps to establish regular,
independent, unannounced and unrestricted visits of inspection to all
places of detention.
(12) Ensure that all detainees have the right to have the legality
of their detention promptly determined by a judge and to be released if
that detention is unlawful.
(13) Take all necessary steps to ensure that statements made
as a result of torture or other ill-treatment cannot be admitted as
evidence during any proceedings.
(14) Establish and maintain local and central public registers of
all detainees, in accordance with international instruments such as
Rule 7 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners and Principle 12 of the UN Body of Principles on the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, to be updated on a frequent and regular basis and
made available on request to relatives, Ministry of Justice officials,
judges, lawyers and representatives of human rights organizations.
(15) Ensure that members of the judiciary and human rights
defenders receive the full protection of the law so that they can carry
out their vital work; all instances of human rights abuses directed
against such persons must be fully investigated and the perpetrators
brought to justice.
(16) Commute all outstanding death sentences to lesser
penalties, including death sentences passed by special courts; refrain
from imposing death sentences under existing legislation and from
passing any new legislation extending the scope of this punishment.
[=]
with detainees or others at risk of abuses, pending the outcome of
human rights investigations.
(3) Disband "assassination squads" and other forces operating
outside the political parties' chain-of-command but with their support
or acquiescence; make explicit that members of such groups who
have perpetrated unlawful and deliberate killings will be brought to
justice.
(4) Ensure that all detainees captured during armed conflict are
treated humanely and protected from torture or execution in
accordance with international humanitarian law, including common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
(5) Put an immediate end to all forms of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by forces under the
authority of the political parties.
(6) To improve protection from torture and killings, transfer all
criminal and political suspects currently in the custody of the political
parties to the jurisdiction of the Kurdish administration's courts for a
prompt judicial determination of their legal status. If the courts
determine that they should be detained, they should be held only in
officially recognized prisons under the jurisdiction of the Council of
Ministers.
(7) As a further step to protect such detainees, close all prisons
and other detention facilities under the jurisdiction of the political
parties and ensure that no one is held in secret detention.
[There is no (8) in the original document.]
(9) Take immediate steps to end threats and intimidation against
human rights defenders, lawyers and members of the judiciary, and
put an end to all political interference in the administration of justice;
make explicit that all incidents involving the unlawful and deliberate
killing of lawyers and members of the judiciary, including those cited
in this report, will be promptly, thoroughly and impartiallyinvestigated
and the perpetrators brought to justice.
(10) Ensure that forces under the authority of the political parties
fully cooperate with investigations by the Council of Ministers into
human rights abuses, including those cited in this report. [=]
10170. Amnesty International. Kuwait: Five Years Of Impunity:
Human Rights Concerns Since The Withdrawal Of Iraqi Forces: Part
01: Summary. London: Amnesty International, February 1996. [98H08431] [19960201] Since the end of the Iraqi occupation in 2/1991,
Kuwait has embarked on a series of political and human rights
reforms. Parliament has been reconstituted, a committee has been
established to look into complaints of human rights violations, and
steps have been taken towards the ratification of several international
human rights treaties. However, the government has failed to address
many human rights violations relating to the period of Martial Law
immediately after the occupation. These include the detention of
prisoners of conscience; torture and ill-treatment; unresolved
extrajudicial executions and "disappearances"; manifestly unfair
trials; and the increased scope of the death penalty. Although the
human rights situation has now improved considerably, the
fundamental rights, usually of foreign nationals and stateless persons
continue to be violated. Amnesty International has investigated cases
of extrajudicial executions, "disappearances" and torture in Kuwait
and has followed the trials of political prisoners and prisoners of
conscience. The organization has sought clemency for prisoners on
death row. It has repeatedly urged the Kuwaiti authorities to
investigate fully all human rights violations and has raised with them
its concerns about the unfairness of trials in the Martial Law Court and
the State Security Court. However, the Kuwaiti authorities have made
little effort to investigate human rights violations, particularly those
relating to the Martial Law period, or to bring those responsible to
justice, and have failed to address the substance of Amnesty
Kurdistan Since 1991: Part 46: Conclusions and Recommendations:
Recommendations to the Kurdish Political Parties. New York:
Amnesty International, February 28, 1995. MDE 14/01/95. [99H11424] [19950228] (1) Put an immediate end to the killing of
combatants after surrender or capture by forces under the authority of
the political parties and any other unlawful and deliberate killing; make
explicit that individuals who ha e violated international humanitarian
law will be brought to justice in proceedings which satisfy
international standards before courts which are competent, impartial
and independent.
(2) Take immediate steps to remove members of the political
parties' forces known or suspected of being implicated in unlawful and
deliberate killings, torture or other human rights abuses from any
position of authority and from all duties in which they have contact
97
International's concerns or to respond to requests for information.
Amnesty International is calling on the Kuwaiti authorities to
investigate and redress all outstanding cases of human rights
violations and to take steps to ensure the full protection of the human
rights of everyone in Kuwait. This document, written in 12/1995,
outlines Amnesty International's main concerns in Kuwait and
includes a number of recommendations to the Kuwaiti Government.
[=]
special court, before its dissolution on 6/26/1991. Trials before this
court were manifestly unfair. All the cases before the Martial Law
Court which had not been tried, possibly more than 450, were
transferred to another special court, the State Security Court.
AmnestyInternational had longstanding concerns about unfair bids
before this court prior to the Iraqi occupation.
In 9/1991, following the introduction of procedural amendments,
at least 150 defendants were released. Amnesty International
welcomed these amendments but publicized the continuing violations
of the right to fair trial at every stage of the court's proceedings. The
State Security Court tried cases, mostly of alleged "collaborators",
between 4/1992-9/1995. Over 160 people, including prisoners of
conscience, are believed to be serving sentences after conviction in
unfair trials before these two courts. [In addition to raising its concerns
with the Kuwaiti authorities, Amnesty International has expressed its
concern about Kuwaiti nationals who were transferred from Kuwait to
Iraq by Iraqi forces during the occupation of Kuwait. In 9/1993
Amnesty International published a report naming 140 Kuwaitis and
third-country nationals who were believed to be held in secret
detention in Iraq and urged the Iraqi Government to clarify the fate of
these individuals (see Iraq: Secret detention of Kuwaitis and thirdcountry nationals, Al Index: MDE 14/05/93). Early in 1995 the Ministry
of Justice of Kuwait provided Amnesty International with 625 names of
Kuwaiti and other nationals believed to be still in Iraq. According to
press reports in late 1995, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) has said that 609 of these cases were awaiting
clarification. The Iraqi Government also has a continuing obligation to
investigate vigorously these "disappearances", to release all
prisoners of conscience, to bring to justice those responsible for
violations of human rights, to compensate the victims or their
families, and to provide rehabilitation to victims of torture.] [=]
02: Introduction. London: Amnesty International, February 1996. [98H08432] [19960201] Since the end of the Iraqi occupation in 2/1991,
Kuwait has embarked on a series of political and human rights
reforms. Parliament has been reconstituted, a committee has been
established to look into complaints of human rights violations, and
steps have been taken towards the ratification of several international
human rights treaties. However, the government has failed to address
many human rights violations relating to the period of Martial Law
immediately after the occupation. These include the detention of
prisoners of conscience; torture and ill-treatment; unresolved
extrajudicial executions and "disappearances"; manifestly unfair
trials; and the increased scope of the death penalty. Although the
human rights situation has now improved considerably, the
fundamental rights, usually of foreign nationals and stateless people
continue to be violated.
Amnesty International has investigated cases of extrajudicial
executions, "disappearances" and torture in Kuwait and has followed
the trials of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. The
organization has sought clemency for prisoners on death row. It has
repeatedly urged the Kuwaiti authorities to investigate fully all human
rights violations and has raised with them its concerns about the
unfairness of trials in the Martial Law Court and the State Security
Court. However, the Kuwaiti authorities have made lime effort to
investigate human rights violations, particularly those relating to the
Martial Law period, or to bring those responsible to justice, and have
failed to address the substance of Amnesty International's concerns or
to respond to requests for information. Amnesty International is calling
on the Kuwaiti authorities to investigate and redress all outstanding
cases of human rights violations and to take steps to ensure the full
protection of the human rights of everyone in Kuwait. This document,
written in 12/1995, outlines Amnesty International's main concerns in
Kuwait and includes a number of recommendations to the Kuwaiti
Government. [=]
04: Positive Developments. London: Amnesty International, February
1996. [98H-08434] [19960201] On 10/5/1992 elections were held for
the 50-seat National Assembly (parliament) which had been
dissolved in 1986 by the Amir of Kuwait. A parliamentary Committee
for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR) (Lajnat al-difa' 'an huquq
al-insan) was created, which has the power to investigate complaints
from members of the public and to make non-binding
recommendations to the authorities. The work of the CDHR has
reportedly led to improvements in some prison conditions. In 4/1995,
according to newspaper reports, the Minister of the Interior agreed to
the CDHR's proposal to establish a permanent working group in his
Ministry to look into complaints received by the committee. In
addition, human rights sections have been set up in the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Justice.
The Kuwaiti Government has also taken steps towards ratifying
a number of international human rights treaties. Kuwait acceded to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide on 3/7/1995. In 7/1995 the Council of Ministers announced
that it had approved draft laws relating to Kuwait's accession to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. These draft laws were then
reportedly sent to the Amir, before being submitted to the National
Assembly for approval. On 8/1/1995 the National Assembly approved
a bill abolishing the State Security Court and transferring all cases to
ordinary criminal courts. The bill was later ratified by the Amir and
entered into force in mid-9/1995.
Amnesty International welcomed the abolition of the State
03: Background: The Martial Law Period and Its Consequences.
London: Amnesty International, February 1996. [98H-08433]
[19960201] In 2/1991 the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad alSabah, declared a three-month period of Martial Law following the
withdrawal of Iraqi forces, which was subsequently extended until
6/26/1991. During the Martial Law period, Kuwaiti Government forces
and armed civilians, often acting with the knowledge or acquiescence
of government officials, carried out a campaign of arbitrary arrests,
torture and extrajudicial executions of individuals suspected of
"collaboration" with Iraqi forces. Many of those detained
"disappeared" and their whereabouts remain unknown. The victims
were mainly non-Kuwaitis, including Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians
and members of the bidun community (stateless Arabs). Close to
1000 people were arbitrarily detained and of these at least 70
"disappeared" between 2-6/1991. The cases of 164 alleged
"collaborators" were tried by the Martial Law Court, a temporary
98
Security Court and urged the Government of Kuwait to set up a
judicial review of the cases of all political prisoners sentenced after
manifestly unfair trials by the Martial Law Court and the State
Security Court. However, no such judicial review is under way.
Despite these positive steps, in the same period the Kuwaiti
authorities have taken measures against freedom of expression.
Censorship of newspapers was lifted in 1992, but since then several
journalists have reportedly been arrested and detained briefly in
connection with offences under the press law, including writing and
publishing articles critical of government policies and officials. Most
were later fined. The authorities have also curtailed the activities of
non-governmental organizations in Kuwait. In 8/1993 the Council of
Ministers issued a decree ordering the dissolution of all unlicensed
organizations, including one of the country's leading human rights
groups, al-Jami'a al-Kuwaitiyya lil-difa' 'an Dahaya al-Harb, the
Kuwaiti Association to Defend War Victims (KADWV). The decree
effectively ignored a resolution adopted by the National Assembly in
12/1992, calling for non-governmental groups working on behalf of
Kuwaitis missing in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict to be legalized.
The Hostages & Missing Committee (Lalnat al-raha' in walmafqudin), a seven-member parliamentary committee responsible
for following up cases of Kuwaitis held in Iraq, condemned the
government's decision to close down these organizations. Its
members resigned in protest at the National Assembly's failure to
support their efforts to have the government's decision overturned. As
a result of the decree, and after fruitless efforts to obtain government
registration, the KADWV had to vacate its premises in 10/1994.
Unlicensed organizations may face difficulty in carrying out their
work, and the authorities have sometimes banned public meetings,
including those concerned with human rights. [=]
and his brother Jalal; 'Adnan Hakawati; and Muhammad 'Adnan
Barakat. Unconfirmed reports suggest they may have been held with
'Isam al-'Udwani in the Talha Deportation Centre in early 1992.
Samer George Habib 'Azar, Tha'er Jum'ah Jibril and Bilal Mahdawi
were all reported to have been tortured during detention.
In 12/1995 Amnesty International received details of the
"disappearance" of Mazen Sharif al-'Azawi, an Iraqi national aged 34.
He was reportedly arrested on 3/7/1991 from his home in al-Salmiyya
by a group of men in civilian clothes, one of whom identified himself
as an officer in the security forces. Mazen al-'Azawi was reportedly
held for about a week in Salwa police station, after which he was
taken to Biyan police station, where he was reportedly seen with blood
on his face by detainees who were later released. Since then,
unconfirmed reports have suggested that he was held in the Military
prison and later in the State Security prison. His family, who have
now left Kuwait, have never received any official information about his
fate.
The "disappeared" whose cases Amnesty International has
already documented include; George Victor Salsa, a Palestinian with
Jordanian nationality. A bank officer from al-Salmiyya, he was
arrested at his home by two State Security policemen on 5/9/1991 and
subsequently "disappeared". In 1/1992 the organization received
information that he was being held incommunicado at Kuwait Central
Prison. Later reports suggest that he was held for a time with 'Isam
al-'Udwani. He was later allegedly tortured and held in Kuwait
Military Hospital. Also among the "disappeared" are in 1991. 'Awatif
Qasim Muhammad 'All al-Maliki, a young Iraqi woman who was last
seen at the end of 2/1991; and Khalid Rashid Muhammad Agha-Mir,
an Iraqi Kurd born in Kuwait, who worked as a cashier at al-Salem
Gynecological Hospital before his arrest in 4/1/1991 by soldiers and
armed civilians. He was reportedly seen at al-Salmiyya police station
and was subsequently moved to an unknown destination. While some
of the people listed as "disappeared" may have been brought to trial,
fled or been expelled from Kuwait, Amnesty International is concerned
that others may have died in custody or may have been extrajudicially
executed. This fear is heightened by the outcome of some cases
where "disappearances" were resolved. For example, Muhammad
Shawkat Yusuf, a Palestinian student, was arrested on 5/19/1991 by
armed Kuwaiti civilians. He was later killed, possibly in al-Nugra
police station where he was taken. On 5/23/1991 his body was
reportedly taken to the al-Sabah hospital mortuary On 5/25/1991 his
body, with the eyes gouged out and with a bullet hole in the cheek, was
found on a rubbish dump in al-Jabiriyya. A 13-year-old Palestinian
boy, 'Iyad Aqrabawi, was found dead in the street in al-Khaldiyya on or
about 3/10/1991. He had "disappeared" after being arrested with three
other young men at the Sabhan petrol station at the beginning of
3/1991. Armed Kuwaiti civilians were said to have controlled the
petrol stations at the time. [=]
05: Human Rights Violations Since the End of the Occupation:
Disappearances and Extrajudicial Executions. London: Amnesty
International, February 1996. [98H-08435] [19960201] The campaign
of arbitrary arrests, torture and extrajudicial killings by Kuwaiti
Government forces and armed civilians -- often acting with the
knowledge or acquiescence of government officials -during the
Martial Law period was directed in the main at Palestinians,
Jordanian and Iraqi nationals, and members of the bidun community.
Many of those who were arrested subsequently "disappeared" in
custody and their.fate and whereabouts remain unknown. In 1992
Amnesty International documented the cases of 62 non-Kuwait)
nationals who "disappeared" in custody between 2-6/1991. However,
the true number of those who "disappeared" will probably never be
known. The Kuwaiti authorities have made little effort to investigate
human rights violations in the aftermath of the Iraqi withdrawal, and
the only way to obtain information about the "disappeared" is to
contact their families, many of whom have moved to other countries.
Reports of other "disappearances" from this period have
continued to reach Amnesty International. For example, in 1995 the
organizationreceived details of eight people who "disappeared" in
1991. 'Isam Muhammad Saleh al-'Udwani, a Palestinian with Syrian
nationality, was arrested on 5/8/1991 by at least three members of the
Kuwaiti security forces. His family has not seen him since or been
able to obtain any official information about him, although at various
times unconfirmed reports have suggested he was held in the State
Security Prison in the Civil Defence Building, Talha Deportation
Centre and Kuwait Central Prison. Six Palestinians with Jordanian
nationality also 'Isam Muhammad Saleh al-'Udwani a "disappeared''.
They are Samer George Habib Palmtinian with Syrian nationality,
who "disappeared" in 1991.'Azar, Thater Jum'ah Jibril; Bilal Mahdawi
Disappearances and Extrajudicial Executions: Investigations Into
Disappearances and Extrajudicial Executions. London: Amnesty
International,February 1996. [98H-08436] [19960201] The Kuwaiti
authorities, while repeatedly giving assurances that extrajudicial
executions and "disappearances" during the Martial Law period were
being investigated, have failed to conduct adequate investigations to
resolve these cases. Amnesty International knows of only one case
where an alleged perpetrator of an extrajudicial execution was brought
to justice. A Kuwaiti police investigator was convicted of the murder in
3/1991 of a Lebanese man and his son, and of the attempted murder of
his daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in 12/1993,
99
which was reportedly reduced to 15 years' imprisonment in June
1994 because of "mitigating circumstances". In 3-4/1991, an Amnesty
International delegation visiting Kuwait examined the burial records at
al-Rigga cemetery, which showed that scores of unidentified bodies
had been buried since 2/26/1991. The bodies were simply listed as
"unknown". Unless a full investigation is carried out, including the
exhumation of mass graves, the fate of many of the "disappeared"
may never be known.
Where investigations have been carried out, they do not appear
to have fulfilled the requirements of independence and thoroughness,
as set out by Internationally recognized standards, such as the UN
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions. For example, Amnesty
International has repeatedly sought information on the case of George
Victor Salsa (see above) and for details about any investigation
carried out into his fate. In 1/1994 the Kuwaiti Minister of Information,
Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, stated that a thorough investigation had been
conducted into the "disappearance" of George Victor Salsa The
Minister invited Amnesty International to inspect the relevant official
documents and records. In 2/1994 Amnesty International welcomed
this offer and requested information on the following issues: who
conducted the investigation; whom did the investigators interview;
which places of detention, prisons and hospitals were visited and on
what dates; and what references to George Victor Salsa were found in
the prison or hospital records. Amnesty International has not received
any reply. The lack of response casts serious doubts on the adequacy
of the investigation procedures.
In a letter to the Belgian Section of Amnesty International in
5/1994, the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Belgium took issue with the
organization's criticism of the Kuwaiti Government's approach to
human rights violations after the occupation, pointing out that two
Kuwaiti officials had been brought to justice for violations during that
period. In its response in 9/1994, Amnesty International said that in
1991 it had sought details of all those tried for human rights violations,
but had never received any details from the Kuwaiti authorities. The
organization also said that "[g]iven the hundreds of reports of
violations during the Martial Law period, including torture, the failure
to publish a single report of any investigations of these reports of
violations and the figure of two convictions for these crimes suggests
that the Kuwaiti authorities are not taking their obligations to
investigate reports of violations and to bring to justice those
responsible seriously". Amnesty International also pointed out in its
response that, despite repeated requests for the information, the
Kuwaiti authorities had never provided the organization with a
complete list of those convicted by the State Security Court. Such
information could help to clarify the fate of some of those who
reportedly "disappeared".
The Kuwaiti Government has a continuing obligation to
investigate all reports of "disappearance" and extrajudicial executions,
to bring to justice anyone found responsible, and to compensate the
families of victims of extrajudicial executions. Investigation into
"disappearances" and extrajudicial executions should be independent
and impartial and consistent with Internationally recognized standards
such as the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance; the UN Principles for the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Execution, and Amnesty International's own Commission of Inquiry
Standards. To comply with these principles and with its own 14-point
program for the prevention of "disappearances", Amnesty
International believes that effective investigations of these cases
require as a minimum the examination of all hospital records during
the Martial Law period and of records of all police stations, prisons
and places where people were detained. Relevant medical records
should be made available to those concerned. The Kuwaiti authorities
should provide copies of the investigation reports, including details of
any cases in which officials have been the subject of disciplinary
procedures or been referred to the Public Prosecutor. Death
certificates should be issued to families where "disappeared"
individuals are found to have died. [=]
07: Human Rights Violations Since the End of the Occupation: Torture
and Ill-Treatment. London: Amnesty International, February 1996.
[98H-08437] [19960201] Reports of torture were common during the
Martial Law period and some victims appear to have died in custody
as a result. For example, Khalil Salim Bahhur, a Palestinian head
teacher with Jordanian nationality, died in al-'Addan hospital after his
arrest on 4/1/1991. He had been kept in incommunicado detention for
at least 10 days. His body allegedly had multiple stab wounds and his
ears and nose were said to have been cut off. In 10/1991 Amnesty
International submitted to the Kuwaiti authorities the names of 11
people alleged to have died in custody as a result of torture, or to have
been extrajudicially executed. The communication remains without
response. Many of those detained during the Martial Law period have
alleged that they were tortured. For example, Usama Suhail Hwsein,
a Palestinian prisoner of conscience currently held in Kuwait Central
Prison, was said to have been tortured during incommunicado,
detention, including repeated beatings, electric shocks and cigarette
burns. He was allegedly threatened with further ill-treatment if he
mentioned the torture during his trial before the Martial Law Court in
6/1991. He was sentenced to death, later commuted to life
imprisonment, for working for the Iraqi newspaper al-Nida'. Reports
of torture and ill-treatment have declined considerably since the end of
the Martial Law period. However, occasional reports have been
received by Amnesty International. For example, a Sudanese man,
Ahmad al-Mubarak, alleged he was tortured during interrogation in a
police station in 1/1992.
In 5/1992 a Sri Lankan national, Colompurage Asoka
Pathmakumara, died on his way to a hospital, apparently after being
tortured at Jlaib al-Shuyukh police station. Also in 1992, Hisham teen
Sultana, an airline steward of dual British and Tunisian nationality,
was reportedly tortured in July while held for over two weeks at
Messila civil defence centre. After his release, he said that he had
been beaten repeatedly on the chest and stomach and burned with
cigarettes while in custody, and had been denied access to consular
officials, a representative of his airline and a lawyer. In 1993 the body
of a young Iraqi national, Ma'add Zahir, was found near the Iraqi
border, reportedly with head injuries and signs of torture on his body.
He had reportedly been abducted by Kuwaiti police with three
companions, who were also said to have been tortured. The three
others were apparently resumed to Iraq after three days. The Kuwaiti
police reportedly denied involvement in this case. Amnesty
International has repeatedly called on the Kuwaiti authorities to
investigate allegations of torture and to bring anyone found responsible
for torture or ill-treatment to justice. [=]
08: Human Rights Violations Since the End of the Occupation: Torture
and Ill-Treatment: Investigations of Torture. London: Amnesty
International, February 1996. [98H-08438] [19960201] Allegations of
torture and ill-treatment during the Martial Law period remain, almost
without exception, uninvestigated. [Amnesty International is aware of
only one prosecution for violations of the rights of detainees leading to
a conviction. On 12/1/1993 the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United
100
States of America informed Amnesty International that not long ago a
state security officer was stripped of his rank and sentenced to prison
for the death of a defendant while in custody, but provided no further
information about the case.] Many defendants in trials before the
Martial Law Court and the State Security Court alleged that they were
tortured and often had injuries consistent with their claims.
Investigations into these claims were frequently cursory and
defendants were often convicted on the basis of confessions which
they said had been extracted under torture. [Article 12 of the Torture
Declaration prohibits the use as evidence of any statement
established to have been made as a result of torture or ill-treatment.]
Even where complaints of torture during State Security Law trials
were sent to a government doctor for examination, these
examinations often took place more than a year after the alleged
torture, so signs of torture would have been extremely difficult to
detect in many cases. Qualified independent experts were not invited
to examine defendants and independent observers were not present
during examinations. In the absence of independent experts or
observers watching the government doctors, it is difficult to assess
the quality of the examinations.
For example, in the trial of 11 Palestinians of Jordanian
nationality charged with belonging to the military wing of Jabhat alTahrir al- 'Arabiyya, the Arab Liberation Front, some of the defendants
said in a State Security Court hearing in 5/1992 that they had been
beaten and that their "confessions" were the result of torture.
Muhammad 'All Ahmad Dalfallah and his brother Buil 'All Ahmad
Dalfallah showed the court burns and scars. The court sent all the
defendants to the Idarat al-Adilla al-ana'iyya, Criminal Investigation
Department in the Ministry of the Interior, for an investigation of their
injuries. According to the court summary, the Chief Forensic Doctor
of the Criminal Investigation Department said in his testimony to the
State Security Court on 7/5/1992 that with the exception of one person,
all of the injuries were slight and their date was difficult to determine.
He said they could have been self-inflicted or caused by friends of the
deceased. Instead of placing the burden of proof on the prosecution to
show that the "confessions" were voluntary, the State Security Court
concluded that the "injuries were not proved to have been caused by
beatings" and could not have led to confessions. According to one of
the lawyers, a medical report on one of the defendants, indicating that
he had injuries which could have been inflicted in custody, was not
discussed by the court.
Since Martial Law, there have been occasional reports of
torturers being brought to justice. However, this has usually only been
after repeated complaints and publicity about the alleged torture or illtreatment.
After Amnesty International sought information about the
circumstances of the death of Colompurage Asoka Pathmakumara,
the Ministry of Justice replied in 12/1992 that his interrogators had
said that he had jumped from the top floor of the police station, and that
a forensic doctor had testified that his death resulted from injuries
sustainable from a fall from a height. The response added that the
inquiry had found that Colompurage Asoka Pathmakumara had been
beaten "lightly" during his interrogation in connection with a theft, and
that his body had bruises on the upper arms and feet consistent with
such a beating, but that these injuries were not connected to the cause
of death. According to the Ministry of Justice, seven policemen were
charged with torturing Colompurage Asoka Pathmakumara in order to
force him to confess.
Amnesty International welcomed this step and sought details of
the names of those arrested and the precise charges against them. It
also sought a copy of the forensic doctor's report on the death and his
testimony to the Public Prosecutor. No response to this request has
beenreceived. [According to reports in 1993, three police officers
were convicted of the murder of a Sri Lankan in 1/1993, and were
each sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labor.] A
detective was also reportedly arrested in 1994 in connection with the
torture of Ahmad al-Mubarak in 1/1992, and charged with aggravated
assault. The detective was reported to have previously been convicted
of torture, but had not served his sentence. Amnesty International
sought details of the investigation and the outcome of the case. No
response had been received by the time of writing, nor had any
response been received concerning any of the other allegations of
torture or ill-treatment raised with the Kuwaiti authorities. Amnesty
International is deeply concerned at the failure of the Kuwaiti
authorities to provide information regarding action taken on
complaints of torture both during and after the Martial Law period.
Proper investigation of torture requires a careful and thorough
investigation in accordance with accepted medical practice. The
methods and detailed findings of investigations should be made public.
The failure of the Kuwaiti authorities to provide Amnesty International
with any such reponse increases fears that the authorities may be
permitting human rights violations to be committed with impunity. In
addition, victims of torture or their families should be able to seek
redress and compensation. [=]
09: Human Rights Violations Since the End of the Occupation: Unfair
Trials. London: Amnesty International, February 1996. [98H-08439]
[19960201] Amnesty International has serious concerns about the
fairness of trials that occurred before the Martial Law Court and the
State Security Court. These were both special courts. The State
Security Court had been established under Law 26 of 1969 to try state
security offences. The Martial Law Court was created as a temporary
replacement for ordinary courts, as well as that of the State Security
Court. The Martial Law Court was dissolved on 6/26/1991 and the
State Security Court took over the trials of hundreds of defendants
accused of "collaboration" and other crimes. The State Security Court
was itself abolished in 9/1995 (Law No. 55 of 1995), and all the cases
before it were transferred to ordinary courts. This was reduced on
appeal to two-year suspended sentences after the payment of "blood
money" to the family. Amnesty International has sought clarification
as to whether these convictions relate to the same case. Many of
those convicted after unfair trials by the Martial Law Court and the
State Security Court are still serving lengthy prison sentences. They
include prisoners of conscience and at least eight political prisoners
still on death row. [=]
10: Human Rights Violations Since the End of the Occupation: Unfair
Trials: Flaws in Trials Before the Martial Law Court and State
Security Court. London: Amnesty International, February 1996. [98H08440] [19960201] Trials before the Martial Law Court and the State
Security Court did not meet International standards for fair trial,
including Article 14 of the ICCPR which reflects universally accepted
minimum standards for fair trial. Neither court satisfied international
requirements that criminal courts be independent and impartial. They
violated the prohibition on displacing the jurisdiction of ordinary courts
by the creation of special tribunals which do not use established legal
procedures. The crimes with which defendants were charged were
based on legal provisions which are vague. Defendants were not
informed at the time of arrest of the charges against them or of their
rights. Defendants were denied family visits and non-Kuwaiti
detainees were not given access to a consular representative. During
101
the Martial Law period in particular, lawyers were often not permitted
to see their clients, nor did they have access to the files and
documents needed to prepare their defence. In addition, the failure of
the Martial Law Court to issue judgments or explanations of its
decisions [Article 14(1) of the ICCPR requires that "any judgement
rendered in a criminal case... shall be made public."] in all but a
handful of cases makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine to
what extent the court relied on "secret sources", hearsay evidence
and evidence which was not shown to the defendants or their lawyers.
The courts also failed to investigate thoroughly claims of torture, even
when the defendants showed scars that were consistent with the
methods of torture they described. Many detainees said that they
"confessed" after torture and ill-treatment, and a large proportion of
them were subsequently convicted. Many detainees may have been
reluctant to make complaints to the prosecutor fearing further torture
and ill-treatment when returned to detention. Those convicted by the
Martial Law Court and the State Security Court are still denied the
fundamental right to appeal against their conviction and sentence to a
higher court, as recognized by Article 14 (5) of the ICCPR, even
though both courts have now been abolished.
Martial Law Court decisions are subject only to a limited review
by a panel of judicial counsellors. Since the Martial Law Court rarely
produced written judgments explaining the reasons for the verdicts
and sentences, it is unclear how the reviewing panels were able to
carry out the reviews. The reviews were held in camera, apparently
without defendants or their lawyers being present, and the panel could
only make non-binding recommendations to the Crown Prince who,
as the Martial Law Governor, could reduce, confirm or even increase
the sentence. [This violates the ban on revision of court decisions in
Principle 4 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary.]
Defendantsconvicted by the State Security Court are also
denied the full right to appeal. The amendments of 9/1991 granted
those convicted by the State Security Court a limited right to review,
which was restricted to a review of legal errors by cessation. Kuwaiti
lawyers, however, have said the right to appeal against judgments of
the State Security Court was, in practice, interpreted very narrowly.
The flaws in the Martial Law Court trials are illustrated by the trial of
24 employees of the newspaper al-Nida'. Shortly after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 8/1990, the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Qabas was
closed down by the Iraqi authorities and was replaced by al-Nida',
which was the only newspaper allowed to be published during the
occupation. The 24 employees of the newspaper were charged with
"collaborating" with Iraqi occupation forces. The trial took place in one
day on 6/2/1991. Defendants were denied the right to cross-examine
the key prosecution witness, a "secret source" who never appeared in
the courtroom. Defendants and their lawyers did not always have an
opportunity to examine documentary evidence before it was shown to
the judge and they were questioned about it. Many ofthese defendants
are reported to have been tortured while under investigation." Six of
the24defendants were sentenced to death, 10 were sentenced to
prison terms and eight were acquitted. The death sentences were
subsequently commuted to prison terms by the Crown Prince.
Amnesty International considers the 15 people still held to be
prisoners of conscience and is calling for their immediate and
unconditional release.
In cases before the State Security Court lawyers generally had
access to files before trials and could re-examine witnesses who had
testified in the hearing before the prosecutor, but many violations of
the right to a fair trial which had occurred in the Martial Law Court
continued. Flaws in State Security Court trials are illustrated by the
case of I 1 Palestinians of Jordanian nationality. 'Imad al-Din Mahmud
Nimr, Muhammad 'All Ahmad Daifallah, BasD 'All Ahmad Dalfallah,
Akram Shaker Ahmad, Al-Muttaz Billah Muhammad Saleh, Muntadr
Muhammad Saleh, Hussain Rashed Huuain, Mutayyed Yassir
Huuain, Iynd Muhammad 'Issa, Bassem Hassan Muhammad and a
minor, Hussam Muhammad Rashed, were all sccused of belonging
to Jabhat alTahrir al-'Arabiyya, the military wing of the Arab
Liberation Front, and assisting the Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait.
They were also charged with illegal possession and use of weapons
and with receiving salaries from Iraq during the occupation. In this
trial the court permitted the investigator to give testimony based on
"secret sources". Pieces of evidence were withheld from the
defendants and their lawyers. Defendants were not always warned of
their right to remain silent before being questioned by the court and at
least one defendant was questioned after his lawyers had left the
room. During a hearing on 5/4/1992 the defendants said that they had
been beaten and that their "confessions" were the result of torture.
Hussam Muhammad Rashed was sentenced by the State Security
Court to four years' imprisonment and the other 10 were all sentenced
to death. On 6/6/1994 the Court of Cassation reduced the death
sentences against the 10 men to prison. 'Imad al-Din Mahmud Nimr
was sentenced to life imprisonment and the death sentences against
the other nine were reduced to 15 years' imprisonment.
The flaws in judicial procedures were not limited to trials of
people alleged to have "collaborated" awing the Iraqi occupation.
Eleven Iraqis and three Kuwaitis appeared before the State Security
Court on 6/5/1993, charged with participation in an alleged Iraqi
Government plot to assassinate the former United States (US)
President, George Bush, owing his visit to Kuwait in 4/1993. The
defendants were not allowed access to lawyers before the trial. The
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty was seriously
jeopardized by statements made by Kuwait's Public Prosecutor at a
press conference on 5/16/1993. He stated that the defendants were
"criminals who allied with the devil and conspired with him to try to
assault Kuwait's honored guest ... [and that] investigations proved
without doubt that it was the Iraqi intelligence service which moved
this rotten group of accused persons to execute the plans of the evil
Iraqi regime...". In addition, statements made by the US Government
justifying an air strike on Baghdad on 6/26/1993 on the grounds that
there existed "compelling evidence" of an Iraqi intelligence
assassination plot, and the subsequent statement of the Kuwaiti
authorities welcoming the air strike, further underlined thedefendants'
presumption of innocence. On 6/4/1994 the State Security Court
sentenced six of the accused -- five Iraqis and one Kuwaiti -- to death.
On 3/20/1995 the Court of Cassation upheld the death sentences on
two of the convicted, Ra'ad 'Abd al-Emir 'Abbud al-Asadi and Wdi
'Abd al-Had) 'Abd al-Hassan alGhazali, both Iraqi nationals. The
Court of Cassation reduced the death sentences of the Iraqis Salem
Nasser Subalh Rumi al-Shummari and Bandar 'Ujail Jaber alShummari to life imprisonment while another Iraqi, 'Adel Ismatil 'Issa
al-'Utaibi, had his sentence reduced to 15 years' imprisonment. In the
case of the Kuwaiti national, Badr Jiyad Thamer Mutlaq al-Shummari,
the Court of Cassation overturned the conviction of attempted
assassination but upheld a sentence of five years' imprisonment for
smuggling alcohol.
Amnesty International delegates visited Kuwait several times in
1991 and 1992 to observe trials of alleged "collaborators" before the
Martial Law Court and the State Security Court. They concluded that
the trials were manifestly unfair. Since 1991, Amnesty International
has repeatedly asked for detailed information regarding the trials,
verdicts and sentences passed by the Martial Law Court and the State
Security Court. Such information has, however, not been provided by
the Kuwaiti authorities who have consistently denied that the trials
were unfair. They said that trials were held in public and that
international organizations and international and local media were
102
allowed to follow the proceedings. However, such openness is not in
itself a guarantee that all the rights of defendants were respected or
that all proceedings were conducted in accordance with international
standards on fair bias. [=]
11: Human Rights Violations Since the End of the Occupation: The
Use of the Death Penalty. London: Amnesty International, February
1996. [98H-08441] [19960201] Executions were resumed in 1993 after
a period of three years during which there were no judicial executions.
Death sentences were passed on some of the defendants convicted
for state security crimes in unfair trials before the Martial Law Court
and the State Security Court, thereby denying the rights laid down in
Paragraph 5 of the UN Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the
rights of those facing the death penalty. The death penalty is also
imposed by ordinary courts. In 5/1993 'Abd al-Rahman Hassen Khafi,
an Iraqi national' was executed after his death sentence had been
upheld by the Court of Cassation and ratified by the Amir. He had
been convicted after an unfair trial of membership of the Arab
Liberation Front, and of killing a Kuwaiti border guard. Kamal Matar, a
member of the bidun community, was executed in 12/1993 following
his conviction for murder in an ordinary court. Executions continued in
1994:Muhammad 'All Qulalb al-Rashidi was hanged on 7 8/1994
following his conviction for leading a gang-rape of a 10-year-old
Egyptian girl. Three executions were reported in 1995. Muhammad
Nalib, a Filipino national, was executed in April following a conviction
for murder. Ahmad al-'Azmi was hanged in July after his conviction
for murder. He had stormed into a wedding and shot dead the
bridegroom and one other person. In September Muhammad Rifa', a
Turkish national, was executed. He had been convicted of murdering
a woman he had hoped to marry.
Several people are at the moment on death row. They include
six men convicted by the State Security Court in 1992 and 1993:
Muhsin Shawkat Taher Hussain, Jassem Hassan Sabhan, 'Abd alKhalid Mankhi Naji, 'Abd al-Wahed Hamid 'Abd al-Shah, Amj ad
Ibrahim Hamad al-Shi khaiti and 'Abd al-Salem 'Abd d-Karim Sat ud,
all Iraqi nationals, were convicted as "collaborators" and are now
believed to be awaiting a review of their sentences by the Court of
Cassation. Several others have been sentenced to death in absentia.
Finally, Ra'ad 'Abd d-Emir 'Abbud al-Asadi and Wali 'Abd al-Had)
'Abd al-Hassan al-Ghazali were sentenced to death in the trial of
those accused of taking part in the assassination plot against George
Bush. Their death sentences were upheld by the Court of Cassation in
3/1995. Before execution the sentences have to be ratified by the Amir.
At least five people convicted of crimes before ordinary courts
are also believed to be on death row. In 12/1993 a man identified in
press reports as "S.J." was sentenced to death for breaking into a
woman's house and threatening to kill her. An unnamed Kuwaiti man
was reportedly sentenced to death in 9/1994 for murdering his wife. In
10/1995 the Court of Appeals reportedly confirmed the death sentence
passed on a Kuwaiti man accused of killing a Syrian woman. In
12/1995 three Egyptian nationals, one in absentia, were sentenced to
death for murdering their Kuwaiti employer. After review by the Court
of Appeal, death sentences in ordinary criminal cases are referred to
the Court of Cassation before being sent to the Amir for ratification.
While recognizing the seriousness of crimes such as murder and
rape, Amnesty International opposes the death penalty unconditionally
as a violation of the right to life and the right not to be subjected to
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment as proclaimed in Articles 3
and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When death
sentences are imposed after unfair trials where the risk of error is
obvious, such as those before the State Security Court and the Martial
Law Court, the enforcement of such an irrevocable penalty is totally
unacceptable.
On 4/25/1995 the National Assembly approved amendments of
the Law on the Combat of Drugs (No. 74 of 1983). The amendments
widen the application of the death penalty with respect to several
drug-related crimes. Amnesty International has expressed its regret
to the Kuwaiti authorities over the expansion of the scope of the death
penalty, particularly as the death penalty has not been shown to have
any special deterrent effect against drug trafficking. The UN Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
recently stated: "In view of the irreparability of loss of life, the
impossibility of remedying judicial errors and, indeed, the wellfounded doubts expressed by a wide range of experts in criminology,
sociology, psychology, etc. as to the deterrent effect of capital
punishment, the Special Rapporteur once again calls on the
Governments of all countries where the death penalty still exists to
review this situation and make every effort towards its abolition." [UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61, p. 118.] [=]
Expulsion of People Without Due Process. London: Amnesty
International, February 1996. [98H-08442] [19960201] International
law prohibits states from sending people to any country where they
would be at risk of serious human rights violations. Such expulsion
contravenes the Internationally recognized principle of nonrefoulement, which is binding on all states. After the end of the Iraqi
occupation,the Kuwaiti authorities reportedly expelled hundreds of
people, mostly Iraqis, Palestinians and members of the bidun
community, from Kuwait. Many were sent to Iraq. Many of the
expulsions, particularly during the Martial Law period, were said to
have been summary, with individuals denied their rights to legal
representation, to seek asylum or to appeal againSt rejection of
asylum claims. After 6/1991, people were said to be permitted
interviews with ICRC delegates to determine whether or not they
were willing to be sent to Iraq. Amnesty International appealed to the
Kuwaiti Government to halt the forcible expulsion to Iraq of Iraqis and
others at risk of serious human rights violations there, and to establish
fair and impartial procedures to identify those at risk. After 1991, there
were few reports of forcible expulsions. However, in 7/1995 reports
were received that a large group of Iraqi nationals (between 150-200)
was arrested and summarily deported by the Kuwaiti authorities,
possibly to Iran, without being given any access to an asylum
determination procedure. There was apparently no examination of
their claims and representatives of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) were denied access to the group.
Amnesty International sought clarification from the Kuwaiti
Government in 8/1995 about these reports, but had not received a
response by the time of writing. The organization remains concerned
that Kuwait may have breached International standards which require
that asylum seekers be provided with access to a full and fair asylum
procedure, by which people in need of protection can be identified so
that they are not returned to countries where they would be at risk of
human rights violations. Amnesty International also urged the Kuwaiti
Government to cooperate fully with the UNHCR on all refugee
protection matters. In addition, over 600 people are said to bedetained
in places such as the Talha Deportation Centre under deportation
orders. Deportation orders in Kuwait are usually issued
administratively and are rarely subject to any kind of judicial review.
Many of those held are members of the bidun community and some
are believed to have been held for several years. They include people
who were acquitted by the State Security Court and who have been
103
detained since their acquittal. For example, Huwddi Khalaf al-'Udwani
Muharib, a bidun bom in Kuwait and who served in the Kuwaiti armed
forces before the Iraqi occupation, has been held in Talha since his
acquittal on charges of "collaboration" by the State Security Court on
6/30/1993.AmnestyInternational fears that at least some of the
detainees held under deportation orders are detained for political
reasons, such as their suspected or perceived support for Iraqi forces
during the occupation. Any such people would be prisoners of
conscience who should be released.
In 11/1992 there were reports that detainees in the Talha
Deportation Centre, a converted school lacking basic facilities, where
detainees were held in overcrowded conditions, had been tortured or
ill-treated. Members of the CDHR have visited the detention centre.
One member, an opposition member of parliament, reportedly said of
the centre in 6/1995 that "we want to get rid of that black spot in the
white robe of human rights". [Arab Times, 6/8/1995.] [=]
should be reviewed so that the crimes are narrowly and precisely
defined to give clear notice of what conduct is prohibited.
(5.8) Ensure that all detainees are always given prompt, regular
and confidential access to lawyers at all stages of the proceedings. All
detainees should be brought without delay before a judge empowered
to assess the legality and necessity of their detention, and should be
provided with access to a doctor of their choice, if necessary.
(5.9) Review legislation regarding the death penalty. Now that
almost half the countries in the world have abolished the death
penalty, Kuwait should consider reducing the number of offences
punishable by death and act towards its abolition.
(5.10) Ratify human rights treaties. Kuwait should expedite its
steps to ratify human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocols, and
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. [=]
13: Recommendations. London: Amnesty International, February
1996. [98H-08443] [19960201] Amnesty International recognizes that
the Kuwaiti Government has taken some steps to improve the human
rights situation in Kuwait. However, it believes that the
implementation of the following recommendations will help close the
door on the human rights violations committed in the period after the
Iraqi occupation and establish Kuwait's commitment to the protection
and promotion of human rights in the future.
(5.1) Carry out immediate and thorough investigations into all
cases of extrajudicial executions and "disappearances". The
investigations should be carried out by a body which is independent of
those allegedly responsible and has the necessary powers and
resources to carry out the investigation. The investigation reports
should be made public and should include information regarding the
locations in which each person was detained, the dates of detention
and the medical records of any examination or treatment the detainee
received. If the "disappeared" person died, the family should receive a
death certificate, as well as autopsy and inquest reports where
available. Anyone found responsible for "disappearances" or
extrajudicial executions should be brought to justice, and the families
of victims compensated.
(5.2) Investigate promptly and impartially all reports of torture
and ill-treatment. The methods and results of the investigations should
be made public. All those responsible for human rights violations
should be brought to justice. Victims of torture should be given fair and
adequate compensation, and access to full rehabilitation.
"Confessions" obtained as a result of torture should be excluded as
evidence before the courts.
(5.3) Release all prisoners of conscience immediately and
unconditionally.
(5.4) Retry all other people convicted by the Martial Law Court
and the State Security Court. The trials before both courts were
manifestly unfair and, therefore, all defendants convicted by them
should be retried by ordinary criminal courts in accordance with
International fair trial standards.
(5.5) Commute all death sentences. Amnesty International also
appeals to the Amir to exercise clemency in all cases.
(5.6) Provide effective protection for asylum-seekers. The
authorities should follow full and fair asylum procedures which would
effectively ensure that no one is expelled to a country where they
would be at risk of human rights violations such as imprisonment as
prisoners of conscience, torture, execution or "disappearance".
(5.7) Amend legislation to be consistent with international
standards. In particular, legislation concerning state security crimes
10183. Amnesty International. Press Release: Freedom of
Information. London: Amnesty International, June 1992. [94H-12821]
[19920601] [In countries around the world, journalists attempting to
exposehuman rights violations have themselves become victims.
Some have been killed outright. Others have been silenced by threats,
harrassment and imprisonment. Writers, novelists and poets whose
work is deemed critical of the authorities also risk detention,
imprisonment, torture and, in some cases, death. Some of these
journalists and writers are prisoners of conscience, jailed because of
their professional activities or for exercising their right to freedom of
expression.] On 7/8/1991, Luis Antonio Morales Ortega, a journalist
well known for his investigations into human rights abuses in his
native Peru, announced via Radio Wari, a local radio station, that he
had received death threats from the Anti-Terrorist Liberation
Command, a paramilitary group believed linked to the security forces.
Just five days later, two men in a passing car shot Luis Morales dead
as he tried to escape into the house of a relative in the city of
Huamanga in Aycucho department. During the previous month the
Anti-Terrorist Liberation Command had threatened staff at Radio
Wari and forced them to broadcast death threats against two other
journalists who had accused the security forces of committing human
rights violations in Ayacucho. The text of the threats included the
following: "We tell this rat, delinquent, terrorist, disguised as a
journalist, this bloody dog Magno Sosa Rojas... that he will die like a
beheaded dog... we are following his steps very closely, his days are
numbered..." Since 1982, when Ayacucho was first placed under
military control, at least 15 journalists have been killed by the security
forces or groups linked with them. Journalists in other parts of Peru
are also at risk. In 8/1991 the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Command
issued death threats against Jorge Chaves Morales, a journalist with
'La Republica', a Lima daily newspaper which has given extensive
coverage to human rights issues. In Colombo, Sri Lanka, in the early
hours of 2/18/1990, Richard de Zoysa, a journalist, broadcaster and
actor, was dragged from his home by six armed men, some of whom
were reportedly wearing police uniforms. The following day his naked
body was washed up on a nearby beach. An autopsy found that
Richard de Zoysa died instantly from gunshots through the neck and
the head fired at close range. The Sri Lankan and international press
has speculated about the possible reasons for the abduction and
murder of Richard de Zoysa. His killing may have been linked to the
"disappearance" in 1/1990 of Lakshman Perera, who had produced a
play written by Richard de Zoysa called "Me Kauda? Mokada
Koranne?" ("Who is he? What is he doing?"), a phrase used to
describe President Ranasinghe Premadasa during the presidential
elections in 12/1988. Other reports suggest Richard de Zoysa was
killed in retaliation for his news reports on the human rights situation
104
in Sri Lanka. In 6/1990 Richard de Zoysa's mother, Dr Manorani
Saravanamuttu, and Batty Weerakoon, the lawyer appearing on her
behalf at the magisterial inquiry into the abduction of her son, received
death threats warning them to stop pursuing the case. Dr
Saravanamuttu, who had witnessed her son's kidnapping, had named
a senior Superintendent of Police as one of the abductors. The
magisterial inquiry was discontinued on 8/30/1990, and no action has
been taken against the police officer allegedly involved. Foreign and
national journalists in Guatemala continue to receive threats,
apparently from members of the security forces or those acting with
their acquiescence. Some have fled the country. Others have been
openly attacked. Byron Barrera Ortiz, a Guatemalan journalist, was
shot by two men on a motorcycle while driving his car in Guatemala
City in 10/1990. His wife, Refugio Araceli Villanueva, also in the car,
was killed instantly.
Shortly after the attack, Byron Barrera and his two children went
to live abroad. Byron Barrera later stated that his life was saved only
because he was wearing a bullet-proof vest. He said that he had been
followed by two men on a motorcycle the day before the attack, an
incident he reported to the authorities who promised to investigate.
Byron Barrera had returned to Guatemala in 1985 after several years
in exile. He was the director of the Central American News Agency,
and vice-president of the Guatemalan Journalists Association. Byron
Barrera had been the editor of the weekly newspaper, La Epoca, until
6/1988 when the newspaper's offices were fire-bombed, reportedly by
members of the security forces. The newspaper, which had published
many articles critical of the government, never reopened. In an open
letter in 11/1990, Byron Barrera stated that "Guatemala continues to
be a land for no one, a land of impunity, death and desolation". He
added, "I have had to explain the truth to my children; the people of
their country who are conspicuous for the ideas of freedom are
assassinated." On 8/10/1991, Byron Barrera returned to Guatemala to
present evidence in the Fifth Court of Penal Justice in Amatitlan,
Department of Guatemala, which was investigating the case. At a
news cconference he declared that he believed members of the
armed forces were involved in the attempt on his life. Guatemalan
journalists were anonymously warned not to continue publishing
information on the Barrera case. In 8/1991, Juan Carlos Ruiz, Hugo
Garcia and Silvino Velasquez received anonymous threatening
telephonecalls, warning them to stop reporting on well-publicized
casesconcerning the alleged involvement of military personnel in
human rights violations, including the attack on Byron Barrera. The
Prosecution's Office of the Public Ministry which was investigating
the cases reportedly received similar threats. Two lawyers hired by
Byron Barrera were also threatened and have since withdrawn from
the case. According to Byron Barrera, the authorities have shown little
determination to proceed with the investigation into the attempt on his
life and the killing of his wife despite evidence implicating members of
the armed forces. Some countries bring criminal charges against
those who publish real or implied criticism of the authorities. Such
chargesinclude "showing contempt", "spreading false information"
and "sedition". Two journalists in Cameroon were convicted in 1/1991
of publishing an article critical of the government in Le Messager, a
Douala newspaper. . In 12/1990 the Cameroon government had
introduced laws which tightened press censorship. The legislation
enables the government to seize or ban newspapers "in case of
conflict with the principles of public policy". On a number of occasions
in early 1991 the authorities seized copies of Le Messager. One such
confiscation followed the publication in April of the names of all those
convicted or held in administrative detention in connection with a 1984
coup attempt. The article described poor prison conditions and named
the prisoners who had died in detention since 1984. In September the
authorities banned Le Messager and four other newspapers. In South
Korea, Chang Ui-gyun, a publisher specializing on books on ancient
Korean history, is serving an eight-year prison sentence under the
National Security Law. In 1982 his publishing licence was withdrawn
after he published a book of poetry which was critical of the
government. Chang Ui-gyun then spent two years in Japan where he
studied ancient Korean history at Kyoto University. While there he is
said to have discussed North Korea's proposals for the reunification of
the Korean peninsula. In 5/1986 he organized a meeting on Korean
unification, where a song which he had written on the subject was
performed. Shortly after his return to South Korea in 1987, Chang Uigyun was arrested and charged on several counts under the National
Security Law, including that of transmitting state secrets. He denied
all charges of espionage but was convicted by the court and jailed.
Amnesty International believes that Chang Ui-gyun is detained for his
peaceful political views and activities and that the charges of
espionage against him have not been substantiated.
In Rwanda at last 30 people accused of offences related to
freedom of expression and association were triedbetween 3-10/1990.
Further arrests and trials of journalists occued in 1991. Although
many newspapers have begun publication over the past two years, the
government has been unwilling to tolerate open criticism of
government officials or practices. Rwabukwisi Vincent, the editor of
Kanguka newspaper, was arrested in 7/1990 and charged with
"endangering the security of the state", apparently because he had
travelled to the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, and met Rwandese exiles,
including the former King of Rwanda. The State Security Court twice
failed to convict him due to lack of evidence. But in 10/1990, after
Uganda-based Rwandese exiles attacked Rwanda's northern border,
the same court sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment, apparently
without hearing any new evidence. In 5/1991 Rwabuksiwi Vincent was
released by order of the Supreme Court, pending a new trial. A month
later he was one of four journalists arrested for publishing articles
critical of the authorities. Rabuksiwi Vincent was charged with
endangering the security of the state, apparently because the
authorities said what he had written for publication expressed support
for the rebels. He was released in 9/1991 but the charges against him
reportedly were not dropped. It is not clear whether or not he will be
brought to trial.
Amnesty International continues to be concerned by the Iranian
government'sendorsement of threats against the life of Salman
Rushdie, the British author of "The Satanic Verses". In 2/1989
Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious edict) stating that the
book was blasphemous and that it was the duty of Muslims
everywhere to put the novelist to death. Amnesty International was not
aware of any direct attempt by agents of the Iranian government to kill
Salman Rushdie, but the repeated endorsement of Ayatollah
Khomeini's edict by Iranian authorities indicates that they would
condone his extrajudicial execution. Amnesty International has
repeatedly called on the Iranian authorities to withdraw their support
for any threat to Salmon Rushdie's life. Kenyan writers and journalists
have been imprisoned for advocating multi- party democracy. Gitobu
Imanyara, editor of the Nairobi Law Monthly, was arrested on
3/1/1991, and charged with publishing a seditious publication. In the
February edition of the magazine he had published a manifesto of a
new opposition political party and an editorial criticizing the
government for tribalism. In April Gitobu Imanyara collapsed from a
severe migraine headache at the Nairobi Law Courts, where he was
awaiting a ruling on an application for bail. He was returned to prison
and held in a cell with no bed, mattress or other furniture. Although
later admitted to hospital, he was kept chained and under armed
guard. He was released on 5/28/1991, and the sedition charges
against him were dropped. Gitobu Imanyara received the Golden Pen
of Freedom award from the International Federation of Newspaper
105
Publishers in early 1991. Following his release, he resumed his work
at the Nairobi Law Monthly, despite continuing police harassment.
Edward Oyugi, a writer and Professor of Educational Psychology at
Kenyatta University, was sentenced on 7/11/1991, with three others to
seven years' imprisonment for holding a "seditious" meeting. He has
been a consultant with the office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the World Council of Churches and
has written books and articles on philosophy, sociology and
psychology. Edward Oyugi and the three others had been arrested one
year earlier following public debate on the issue of multi-party
democracy in Kenya which led to widespread unrest in July 1990.
Amnesty International expressed concern about the fairness of their
trial and, in particular, that no steps were taken during the trial to
investigate the prisoners allegations that they had been tortured. No
evidence was brought by the prosecution that the four had discussed
or planned violence against the government. The sedition laws in
Kenya have frequently been used to jail government opponents.
Edward Oyugi was released on bail on 2/14/1992, along with the three
others pending their appeal to the High Court later that year. In 1990
the Vietnamese authorities arrested several critics of the government
- including journalists and writers - beginning a crackdown on
intellectuals and dissenters which continued into 1991. Duong Thu
Huong, a prominent Vietnamese writer and dramatist, was arrested in
4/1991, reportedly for trying to send "sensitive documents" out of the
country, and held wihout trial until 11/1991. The author of many
novels, poems, articles and plays, Duong Thu Huong has emerged as
one of the most significant writers in post-war Vietnam. A former
member of the Communist Party of Vietnam, she has since become
one of its sharpest critics. In Saudi Arabia, Salih al-'Azzaz, a
prominent writer and journalist, was arrested in 11/1990, reportedly
while taking photographs of a demonstration.
He was reportedly arrested on suspicion of being one of the
organizers of the demonstration, in which dozens of Saudi women
drove cars in convoy through the streets of Riyadh in protest against
the country's prohibition of women drivers. At the time of his arrest,
Salih al-'Azzaz was editor-in-chief of the magazine of the Saudi
Arabian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Amnesty International
considered him to be a prisoner of conscience, detained because of
his involvement with a peaceful demonstration. He was released in
March 1991, after four months of detention. In many countries
journalists sympathetic to prohibited political parties or organizations,
or working for publications aligned with them, have also been
subjected to human rights violations. Marwan Hamawi is one of a
group of Syrians arrested in the mid-1970's on suspicion of having
links with the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th Party. At the time of his arrest
in 3/1975, he was the director of SANA, the Syrian news agency. He
was detained without charge or trial in al-Mezze Military Prison. 'Abd
al-Karim Qutaifan, a playwright and actor, was also detained without
charge or trial in Syria. He was arrested in 7/1983 on suspicion of
being a member of the Party for Communist Action (PCA), a
prohibited political party. Members of the PCA have frequently been
imprisoned and tortured because of their opposition to the
government, their demands for more democratic freedom and for the
release of all political prisoners. Marwan Hamawi and 'Abd al-Karim
Qutaifan, both of whom had been adopted by Amnesty International as
prisoners of conscience, were released along with more than 1000
political prisoners in 12/1991. Hamadi Jebali, editor of the Tunisian
weekly al-Fajr (Dawn), was sentenced by the military court in Tunis
in 1/1991 to one year in prison for publishing an article calling on the
abolition of military courts in Tunisia. Mohammed Nouri, the author of
the article, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Both men
were charged with "defamation of a judicial institution". Although
Mohammed Nouri's sentence has expired he remains in prison,
apparently under investigation for new charges.
Al-Fajr, now banned, was the organ of an Islamic organization,
al-Nahda, which does not have official recognition from the state.
Members, sympathizers and suspected sympathizers of al-Nahda
have recently been targeted for arrest, detention and torture. Dozens
of writers and journalists were detained without charge or trial in
Sudan after a military government, backed by the National Islamic
Front, seized power from the elected civilian government of Sadiq alMahdi in 6/1989. They were imprisoned because of their peaceful
opposition to the military government. Most were released after a
general amnesty for political prisoners was announced in 4/1991.
Arop Madut Arop, head of the Information Center at the Sudan Council
of Churches, was arrested in 3/1990 after requesting a visa to attend a
Church Service Development meeting in Germany. He was held
without charge or trial until 5/1991. Under the government of Sadiq alMahdi, Arop Madut Arop was the editor of the English language
weekly newspaper, Heritage, until it was ordered closed by officials in
1988. Heritage had called for an end to the conflict in southern Sudan
between the government and the armed opposition Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) and had published a long interview given to
Arop Madut Arop by the SPLA leader, John Garang. Shortly after the
6/1989 coup, the first part of the interview was reprinted in an Arabic
language newspaper. Publication of the second part of the interview
was stopped. Arop Madut Arop's arrest is thought to have been related
to the goverment's disapproval of the article. Journalists in Turkey are
frequently targeted for abuse while pursuing there professional
activities. In 9/1991 the Turkish Press Council reported that during the
first eight months of the year 44 journalists had been physically
assaulted, in most cases by state employees, including police
officers.
Amnesty International has received numerous reports of
journalists being tortured in police custody in Turkey. In 3/1991 eight
journalists working for the weekly political review, Century, were
arrested in Ankara and charged with membership of the Kurdistan
Workers Party, an illegal organization. While detained they were
blindfolded and interrogated about their sources for articles they had
written about the Kurdish conflict in the southeast of Turkey. Some
were tortured; one said he was stripped naked, suspended by the
wrists, and given electric shocks. The main charges against the eight
were soon dropped but they continue to stand trial for alleged
possession of firearms which they say they obtained for their personal
protection after receiving anonymous death threats. Journalists and
writers working in countries where governments face civil unrest
have been particular targets for the authorities. In Kuwait Osamah
Suhail Hussain, a Palestinian, was sentenced to death by the Martial
Law Court in mid-6/1991, after an unfair trial which did not conform to
international standards. Osamah Suhail Hussain and 23 others were
accused of "collaboration with the Iraqi authorities" because they
continued to work for the newspaper, al-Nida', during the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait. A Kuwaiti newspaper, al-Qabas, was taken over
by the Iraqi authorities and renamed al-Nida' shortly after the Iraqi
invasion in 1990. It was the only newspaper allowed to publish during
the occupation. At the trial the identity of the chief prosecution
witnesses was concealed and the defence was not allowed to crossexamine them. Trial documents presented to the court were not made
available to the defendents or to their lawyers. Osamah Suhail
Hussain was reportedly tortured with electric shocks, beatings and
cigarette burns. On 6/26/1991, his sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment. The rights to freedom of expression, freedom of
association and freedom of belief are enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR has been ratified in
106
many of the countries in which journalists have been the victims of
human rights violations. Governments which deny civil and political
rights to journalists flout international law and often flout their own
constitutions. The struggle for human rights depends to a large extent
on the free flow of information and on the courage and commitment of
journalists and writers. Those who become victims of human rights
violations because of their efforts to expose violations by governments
deserve the full support of the international human rights movement.
[=]
10184. Amnesty International. Press Release: Getting Away With
Murder: Amnesty International Report 1992. London: Amnesty
International, August 1992. [94H-12628] [19920801] The Amnesty
International Report 1992, published in July, documents a year of
human suffering and injustice in 142 countries worldwide.
governments continue to turn a blind eye to gross human rights
violations,
including
torture,
extrajudicial
executions,
"disappearances" and arbitrary detention. The phenomenon of
impunity - exemption from punishment - fuels this recurring pattern of
abuses. As long as governments allow or encourage their forces to
act with contempt for human rights, as long as the agents of
repression believe they can kidnap, torture and murder without fear of
discovery or punishment, the cycle of violence will never be broken.
Dramatic political changes in various regions of the world have
pushed the human rights issue into greater prominence in
international relations than ever before. A record of human rights
violations has become an increasingly acute embarrassment, not only
at the United Nations but also in other relations between states. In
1991 the Commomwealth Heads of Government Meeting, the
General Assembly of the Organization of American Heads of
States,the Organization of African Unity, the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe and the Francophone Summit all
increased their scrutiny of human rights. The European Community
and other donors declared they would take human rights records into
account when allocating aid. Countries whose rulers did not even pay
lip service to human rights a decade ago are now advocating respect
for these fundamental rights.
Some are bringing their laws into line with international human
rights standards or at least have promised to do so. Many have
established new institutions to promote and protect human rights. In
some cases, this reflects a new government's genuine commitment.
But for others it is simply an opportunity to present an acceptable face
in the political arena of the "new world order". And in some of the
countries where human rights have been most brutally violated there
is not even a pretence of accountability. Since the end of the Gulf War,
troops in Iraq have massacred thousands of Kurds and Shi'a. These
are only the latest atrocities in a long history of massive human rights
violations. In Myanmar (Burma), the military rulers have turned the
country into a "secret state of terror" in a ruthless crackdown on those
who dare oppose them. In China, widespread human rights violations
continued in the aftermath of the suppresion of pro-democracy
protests in 1989; millions of people were believed to be in
administrative detention without charge in 1991. Hundreds, possibly
thousands, of prisoners of conscience were held in China and
thousands of people were executed, usually following the most
perfunctory of trials. But in today's world, gross violations
increasingly take place under elected governments with explicit
human rights commitments. The gulf between commitments and
practice can only be bridged if all unresolved human rights abuses are
properly investigated and the guilty brought to justice. Victims, their
relatives and society at large have a vital interest in knowing the truth.
Bringing the guilty to justice also sends a clear message that
violations of human rights will not be tolerated and that those who
commit them will be fully accountable. When the police and security
forces are allowed to commit crimes with impunity, contempt for the
rule of law flourishes and the violence continues. In Sri Lanka, tens of
thousands of people were unlawfully killed or "disappeared" at the
hands of government forces between 1987-1990 in a campaign of
counter-terror against a Sinhalese armed opposition group. Since
armed conflict with the seperatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) resumed in the northeast of the country in 1990, government
troops have caused the "disappearances" or deaths of thousands
more civilians, including babies and elderly villagers. Those
responsible have not ben brought to justice. The LTTE has also
commited gross human rights abuses, including the torture and public
execution of prisoners. In Peru over 4000 people are estimated to
have "disappeared" and hundreds more have been summarily killed
by the security forces since 1983. Massacres by soldiers have often
followed armed attacks by opposition groups, including the Partido
Comunista del Peru (Sendero Luminoso), Communist Party of Peru
(Shining Path), whose rebellion has been marked by brutal atrocities
against civilians. Yet members of Peru's armed forces have acted
with total impunity. A few police officers have been tried and
sentenced for violations committed during counter-insurgency
operations. But Peruvian military courts have conspicuously failed to
investigate violations or convict armed forces personnel accused of
human rights crimes. In some countries violations are carried out by
paramilitary groups or so-called "death squads" which operate with
official approval. In the Philippines, for example, the government's
counter-insurgency strategy has involved semi-official armed groups
described as "vigilantes" collaborating closely with the official
security forces.
Although repeatedly implicated in grave human rights violations,
their activities have not been curbed. In other countries governments
claim to be powerless to control paramilitary groups and refuse to
accept responsibility for bringing their responsibility to an end. In
Colombia, paramilitary organizations have carried out thousands of
political killings and hundreds of "disappearances". These "death
squads" have been described by the Colombian authorities as groups
of right-wing extremists acting outside state control. But judicial
investigations have uncovered compelling evidence that many
paramilitary groups were made up of or supported by members of the
Colombian forces. Similarly, in South Africa, a growing body of
evidence has linked "hit squads" responsible for political killings with
covert police and military operations. Hundreds of people have also
been killed by members of the Inkatha Freedom Party with the active
collusion of the police. Governments and branches of the security
forces sometimes deflect national and international criticism by
announcing an investigation into alleged abuses. Sometimes the
announcements are made in good faith, but the investigations
inexplicably stall. In other cases, announcing investigations simply
serves as a shield for official inactivity and a barrier against
uncovering the truth. Both military and civil authorities in Uganda have
announced inquiries into reported extrajudicial execution by soldiers.
So far these have only prolonged the army's ability to act with
impunity; by 6/1992 none of the inquiries had reached any
conclusions. In mid-1991, Amnesty International was told that an
inquiry started after killings in late 1988 was being relaunched, but it
had not made public any findings by 5/1992. Even when investigations
are carried out and judicial proceedings started, the institutions
responsible for the administration of justice are frequently weak and
ineffcient, or susceptible to pressure from other branches of
government or the security forces. Prosecutors or judges have
sometimes behaved with outstanding courage, only to be forced into
exile when their governments proved unwilling or unable to protect
them from the threats of the accused - usually members of their own
107
security forces. In Guatemala, even in those rare instances when the
government has announced arrests and criminal proceedings in
cases of human rights abuse, punishment commensurate with the
crime is rarely meted out. In 1991, for instance, two police officers
found guilty of killing a 13-year-old boy were given three-year
suspended sentences and released on bail pending appeal.
Official investigations of abuses by Israeli forces in the Occupied
Territories since the beginning of the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in
1986 seem to be inadequate and rarely result in prosecutions. Those
found guilty have received punishments which did not reflect the
severity of the offences committed. Justice is sometimes subverted
by administrative measures, such as transferring cases to special
tribunals. Typically, as in Colombia, Guatemala and Peru, these are
military tribunals which are unlikely to make strenuous efforts to
pursue prosecutions against fellow officers in human rights cases.
Often the accused are acquitted - sometimes even promoted. When in
exceptional cases convictions are secured, the punishment rarely
bears any relation to the crime. The failure of state institutions to
protecthuman rights discourages victims and their relatives from
using important domestic remedies, such as habeas corpus. The fear
of reprisals can make such remedies useless. In Sri Lanka, for
example, relatives of the "disappeared" who have made inquiries with
government officials have subsequently received death threats, and
lawyers and witnesses who testified before the courts have been
killed. Witnesses and complainants in human rights related cases in
Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and the Philippines have faced the same
fate. Some steps were taken in 1991 to break long-established
patterns of security forces committing violations with impunity. In El
Salvador, a colonel was convicted in 1991 for the 1989 murder of six
Jesuit priests and two university staff. This was the first time a senior
ranking military officer had been convicted of human rights violations,
and was partly the result of enormous international and domestic
pressure. Unfortunately, many cases in El Salvador did not receive
such international attention, and the perpetrators remain at large. As
part of the peace agreements ending the county's civil war, a Truth
Commission was set up to investigate certain past human rights
abuses. However, it was feared that an amnesty law passed prior to
the Commission's establishment might jeopardize its work. Amnesty
laws which prevent investigations or halt prosecutions and trial
undermine the search for truth and justice. Some governments
responsible for human rights violations, anticipating their loss of
power, have preempted investigations by proclaiming amnesties.
Successor governments have been placed under tremendous
pressure to uphold such measures, or to concede them where they
did not already exist. Even in Argentina, where political and military
leaders were once held to account for human rights violations, the
political retreat from full accountability has been swift. In 1985, five of
the military commanders who formed the juntas which ruled
Argentina between 1976-1983 were convicted of human rights crimes
during the "dirty war" against "subversion". The Argentine
government's national commission on the "disappeared", in its 1984
report Nunca Mas (Never Again), exposed the truth about past
impunity, estimating that over 9000 people had been abducted,
tortured and "disappeared" during the "dirty war".
Yet the five military commanders were pardoned by President
Carlos Menem in 12/1990, and amnesty laws put a "Punto Final" (Full
Stop) to further prosecutions and gave immunity to those who acted
under orders. In Chile, 1991 saw the publication of the report of the
National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. Although it
documented the massive scale of human rights violations under the
previous military government, it did not guarantee criminal
investigations into those abuses. In fact, the Chilean courts continued
to apply an amnesty law which had been passed by the former
military government to close investigations into cases of human rights
violations which occured before 1978. A law came into force in
Honduras in 1991 granting a broad and unconditional amnesty for
certain political crimes. While 13 political prisoners were released as
a result, the amnesty law also covered killings, torture and unlawful
arrests committed by police and military personnel. In a number of
African countries, governments have granted immunity from
prosecution to former government and security officials in order to
bring about rapid political settlements. In Benin and Congo, the overall
effect of letting particular individuals act with impunity has been to
avoid a close examination of the systems which allowed them to
commit human rights violations, and to postpone reforms. Former
President Matthieu Kerekou of Benin was the highest placed official in
an African country to be formally granted immunity from prosecution
in 1991. Elsewhere in Africa the progress of investigations, even after
governments have changed, has sometimes been so slow that
governments have abandoned their initial commitment to bring human
rights violators to justice. Undoubtedly, the task of collecting evidence
which can be presented to a court often appears daunting. Many of
those with immediate experience of past abuses are dead, or, having
fled abroad, are still unwilling to return and risk reprisals. Material
evidence has frequently been destroyed - documents burned and
bodies buried in secret graves. It is therefore vital that information is
presented in a public forum, such as public inquiry or trial, otherwise
the pressure not to proceed to a trial is enormous. In Ethiopia, six
months after the downfall of Mengistu Haile-Mariam's government,
officials were being detained but no moves had been made to bring
them to court. The new leaders of Chad initiated investigations into
extensive killings and torture of prisoners under the previous
government of President Hissan Habre, but their reports of new
"disappearances" and extrajudicial executions from 10/1991. In
Eastern and Central Europe controversy raged about the
accountability of those associated - even through Communist Party
membership alone - with the former governments. Similar debates
over accountability occured in Germany in the aftermath of unification.
Meanwhile the Cambodian peace settlement failed to include
provisions to bring to justice those responsible for the massive human
rights violations of the past. Countries which have not undergone
dramatic political changes also have to face up to the past in order to
improve the future. Torture, for instance, is endemic in many
countries with relatively mature and sophisticated judicial systems. In
1991 Amnesty International drew attention to 10 years of torture in
Egypt. Although civil courts had granted scores of compensation
claims from torture victims, in only one political case had security,
police or prison officials been put on trial on torture charges, and all
were acquitted.
Torture has been prevalent in the police stations of Turkey for
even longer, but official obstruction and special provisions which
protect torturers mean that few complaints result in prosecution. Even
when prosecutions are opened into cases of death in custody, they are
often on charges such as unintentional killing. In India, the judiciary
has taken some remarkable initiatives to protect human rights, yet
torture remains routine throughout this vast country; at least 455
people have been tortured to death since 1985. Very few of those
responsible for torture are ever prosecuted and convictions are
extremely rare. Usually police officers are simply suspended during
investigations, then reinstated. Some have even been promoted.
Torture is also widespread in Mexico, where torturers are likewise
rarely held accountable for their crimes. The debate over
accountability in Eastern Europe has underlined the importance of
guaranteeing fundamental human rights to everyone, including those
accused of human rights violations. Over the years Amnesty
International has monitored the trials of many of those it had
108
previously blamed for human rights violations. Even when people
have been fairly convicted of human rights crimes, if they were
sentenced to death Amnesty International appealed for those
sentences to be commuted. Governments willing to put an end to the
violations committed by those charged with the protection of law and
order must fulfil certain fundamental responsibilities. First, there
should be throrough investigations into all allegations of human rights
violations; to determine individual and collective responsibility and to
provide a full account of the truth to the victims, their relatives and
society. Investigations must be undertaken by impartial institutions independent of the security forces - which must be granted the
necessary authority and resources for their task. The results of the
investigations should be made public.
When human rights violations have become endemic in a
society, investigations of individual cases may not be enough. A public
commission of inquiry should investigate the entire pattern of abuses
and the reasons behind them. It should examine the agencies
responsible and propose changes to laws, institutions, administrative
proceduresand practices, training and accountability of personnel.
Second, those responsible for human rights violations must be
brought to justice. They must be held to account even if they are
officials of a past or current government and regardless of whether
they are members of the security forces or of semi-official
paramilitary groups. Those accused of human rights crimes should
be tried, and their trials should conclude with a clear verdict of guilt or
innocence. Amnesty International takes no position on what sentence
should be passed, provided that the death penalty is not imposed.
However, the systematic imposition of penalties that bear little
relationship to the gravity of the offences brings the judicial process
into disrepute and does not serve to deter further violations. Respect
for the rule of law cannot be promoted unless all trials are conducted
in full comformity with internationally recognized standards. Third,
amnesty laws which prevent the emergence of truth and
accountability before the law are not acceptable. This applies whether
the law is passed by those responsible for the violations or by
successor governments. The interests of national reconciliation after
a period of violence may be served by pardons after conviction.
AmnestyInternational takes no position on this practice; it simply
insists that the truth is revealed and the judicial practice completed.
Allowing government agents to get away with murder and other gross
human rights violations - whether through official complicity or failure
to punish the guilty - breeds contempt for fundamental rights. Only by
ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice can governments
send the clear message that human rights violations will not be
permitted to continue. In 1991 the rhetoric of human rights reached
unprecedented heights in world affairs; in how many countries will
this lead to a reversal of the vicious spiral of torture, killings and
"disappearances" committed with impunity? [=]
10185. Amnesty International. Press Release: Governments Playing
With People's Lives: Amnesty International's Annual Report Details
Abuses In 161 Countries. London: Amnesty International, July 8, 1993.
[94H-12627] [19930708] "Governments continue to put politics before
people's lives," Amnesty International said today as it released its
1993 annual report in the wake of the first United Nations World
Conference on human rights for 25 years. "The World Conference
has restated the human rights principles of the past, instead of those
dealing with the violations of today and the threats of the future," said
Amnesty International. "The real yardstick of the World Conference
will be action, not words. What are governments now going to do to
stop the torture, the 'disappearances' and the killings?
When we compare the fine speeches and final document with
the damning evidence of political repression in this report it is clear
that governments have yet to prove that the World Conference will
make a difference to the lives of people around the world." The
AmnestyInternational 1993 annual report reveals that during 1992
prisoners of conscience were held in at least 62 countries; over 110
governments used torture in their prisons or police stations; and
political killings were used by the state in 45 countries to exterminate
opponents and "troublemakers". In Africa, despite continuing moves
towards multi-party democracy, human rights violations persisted on
an appalling scale with thousands of defenceless men, women and
children brutally killed by government forces. Angola, Chad, Sierra
Leone, Sudan and Zaire were among 14 countries where unarmed
civilians were killed outright by soldiers or "disappeared" in their
custody. In Somalia a complete breakdown of any semblance of
national government allowed atrocities on a massive scale by various
political groups. In South Africa, 1992 saw the continuance of a pattern
of covert involvement by the security forces in the many politically
motivated killings in the country. Not only governments were
responsible for human rights abuses - in several countries, including
Angola and Sudan, opposition groups also committed deliberate and
arbitrary killings and torture. 1992 was an appalling year for human
rights in Europe. The war in Bosnia- Herzegovina led to horrific
abuses. All sides in the conflict were responsible, but the majority of
victims were Muslims and the main perpetrators were local Serbian
armed forces. Armed conflict also led to human rights violations in
little publicized wars in Azerbaydzhan, Tadzhikistan and other parts of
the former Soviet Union. "In numerous other European countries,
human rights saw setbacks rather than improvements," said Amnesty
International. There was an increase in reports of ill- treatment at the
hands of the police and security forces - in some cases raciallymotivated - in countries including Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, Romania and Spain. In Turkey, torture continued to be a
very serious problem and the year also saw an upsurge in killings by
the security forces in the mainly Kurdish southeast. Among Amnesty
International's concerns in the United Kingdom was the revelation of
evidence of collusion between Loyalist paramilitary groups and
security forces in Northern Ireland. Human rights abuses were also
committed by armed political groups in some countries in the region,
including Turkey, Spain and the United Kingdom. Amnesty
International had serious concerns about refugee protection in many
countries in Europe, exacerbated by agreements affecting asylumseekers adopted by the European Community in 1992. In Asia there
was little sign of any improvement in human rights, with widespread
political killings, "disappearances", torture, detention of prisoners of
conscience, unfair trials and use of the death penalty. In countries
such as Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia and East Timor and Sri
Lanka, political killings were part of an enduring pattern of repression.
In Cambodia high hopes for a UN-brokered peace settlement faltered
as politically- motivated killings escalated in the run-up to elections. In
India too, hundreds of political activists were extrajudicially executed
and scores more "disappeared" in conflict zones.
Throughout India, torture was rife. In China, hundreds of
prisoners of conscience were held and at least 1000 people executed:
the true figure is probably higher but will never be known. In at least
eight Asian countries, particularly India and Sri Lanka, human rights
abuses were committed by armed opposition groups as well as
governments. Serious human rights violations, including systematic
torture, were committed by government agents throughout the Middle
East during 1992. Thousands of people were detained without charge
or trial in virtually every country in the region during the year, many of
them held under state of emergency laws. The death penalty was
widely used, particularly in Iran, where at least 330 people - including
dozens of political prisoners - were executed. Hundreds of detainees
"disappeared" in Iraq and killings of Shi'a Muslims in the southern
109
marshes region claimed an unknown number of lives. New
information emerged about some 100000 Kurds, most of whom had
"disappeared" from custody since 1988. At least 120 Palestinians
were shot dead by Israeli forces and in December, 415 Palestinians
were deported to south Lebanon after an Israeli policeman was taken
hostage and killed by the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas.
Both government forces and armed opposition groups were also
responsible for grave abuses in other countries, including Algeria and
Egypt. Many governments in the Americas still failed to make any
serious attempt to bring those responsible for violations to justice, and
government agents continued to commit crimes with impunity during
1992. Gross human rights violations, including political killings and
"disappearances", continued and torture and ill- treatment by police
and military personnel was endemic. Thousands of people were killed
by armed forces, paramilitary groups or semi-official "death squads"
in Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Guatemala. In Haiti, at least 100 people
were killed in circumstances suggesting they had been extrajudicially
executed:thousands of Haitian asylum- seekers were forcibly
returned to Haiti by the USA without a hearing. Thirty-one people
were executed in the USA during the year - the highest number since
executions were resumed in 1977. Indigenous peoples continued to be
the target of human rights violations, including killings, in a number of
countries in the region, including Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and
Colombia. Armed opposition groups were also responsible for
serious abuses, notably in Colombia and Peru, where the population
found itself "caught between two fires". [=]
10186. Amnesty International. Press Release: Turkey: Amnesty
International Urgently Appeals To New Turkish Prime Minister And
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) To Prevent Further Human Rights
Abuses In Southeast Turkey. London: Amnesty International, June 5,
1993. [94H-12646] [19930605] A new Prime Minister of Turkey will
be appointed on 14 June. On 6/11/1993 Amnesty International sent the
following message to the Turkish government and to the leadership of
the PKK following a declaration by the PKK on 8 June that they were to
lift the unilateral cease-fire originally declared in March this year:
"Although Amnesty International takes no position on armed conflicts
as such, it is clear that the continuing armed clashes in southeast
Turkey since 1984 have provided a context for grave and widespread
human rights abuses by both sides. Amnesty International has
documented and clearly condemned the practice of torture and
extrajudicial execution by government forces, and the killing of
prisoners and civilians by the PKK. "Amnesty International has noted
that since the PKK's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire there has
been a significant reduction, though by no means a complete halt, in
human rights abuses by both sides. This, we note, was warmly
welcomed by both the media and the general public throughout
Turkey. For its part, Amnesty International, believing that both sides in
the conflict were sincere in wishing an end to the misery which the
fighting brought about, was encouraged to hope that this new
development was the first step on a path which would finally halt
torture, killings and other abuses. "However, at the very time that the
government was expected to enact a number of confidence building
measures, including lifting the state of emergency currently in force in
southeast Turkey, this optimism was thrown into doubt by the killing
of 33 prisoners by the PKK in Bingl on 24 May - an act condemned by
Amnesty International. Subsequent intense military activity resulted in
the PKK's announcement on 8 June that their unilateral ceasefire was
at an end. Although Amnesty International believes that the PKK and
the Turkish government are reluctant to accept the return to persistent
and widespread human rights abuses which renewal of the conflict
would inevitably bring, we fear that both sides are being drawn
unwillingly by the course of events back into a human rights crisis.
These tragic consequences can only be avoided if both sides pull back
from the brink and take steps to ensure the protection of human rights
and basic humanitarian standards. "It is for this reason that Amnesty
International is appealing today to the Turkish Government, and to the
leadership of the PKK, asking that every effort should be made now to
prevent further pain, injury and loss of life which will certainly be paid
by civilians as the price of such a conflict. In making this appeal we
ask that both sides remember the hundreds of women, children,
civilians and prisoners who have already died at the hands of both
sides in the conflict since 1984." [=]
10187. Amnesty International. Press Release: Turkey: Former
Prisoner Says Thanks. London: Amnesty International, May 1991.
[94H-12767] [19910501] On 12/1991, Mehdi Zana, a former Kurdish
prisoner of conscience who had been held in Turkey, visited AI's
InternationalSecretariat, where he met staff and members of
Amnesty International and other organizations who had campaigned
on his behalf. "I came here to convey my thanks to all Amnesty
International members", he said. "I believe that without the pressure
and support of your organization and similar organizations throughout
the world, I would not be alive today". Zana, the former mayor of
Diyarbakir, was arrested shortly after the military coup in 1980. Tried
on a variety of charges, he was sentenced to more than 42 years'
imprisonment. Amnesty International believes that Zana was
imprisoned because of his position in Kurdish society and his support
of the rights of Kurds to have a seperate cultural identity. His
sentences were subsequently reduced and he was released on
4/13/1991. [=]
10188. Amnesty International. Press Release: Turkey: Human
Rights Situation Deteriorates. London: Amnesty International, N.D.
[1993] [94H-12761] [19930101] The Turkish government has
completely failed to live up to its widely- publicized commitment to
improve Turkey's human rights record. In fact, the human rights
situation in the country appears to be deteriorating rapidly, with
continued widespread reports of torture and an unprecedented volume
of allegations of extrajudicial executions. In an election speech in
10/1991, Suleyman Demirel, now Prime Minister, confirmed that
torture in police custody was a serious problem and promised that
under his administration "the walls of all police stations will be made
of glass." But by 9/1992 his government had taken no steps to
safeguard detainees in police custody. An unsatisfactory package of
draft legislation, which still failed to meet international standards, was
announced in 4/1992 as a solution to the problem of torture, but on
Aug. 26 this was withdrawn. Meanwhile, almost anyone arrested
continues to be at risk of torture or ill-treatment. There were at least
nine deaths in custody during the first eight months of 1992. Moreover,
reports of extrajudicial executions have increased dramatically. In
1991 more than 50 people, mainly villagers, were taken from their
homes and shot, apparently by members of the regular security
forces. Since 11/1991 the killings have continued but the methods
have changed. More than a hundred Kurdish men, among them
journalists and local politicians, have been shot to death in Southeast
Turkey by unknown gunmen. Many of the victims had previously been
detained, tortured or threatened by the police, and there is growing
evidence to suggest that the security forces are protecting or inciting
the assassins. In spite of AI's repeated appeals for the establishment
of commissions of inquiry, as laid down in the United Nations
Principles on the Effective Prevention of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and
Summary Executions, the government has failed to establish such
commissions or any form of public inquiry. Amnesty International has
also repeatedly expressed concern to the Turkish government about a
succession of incidents in southeast Turkey in which civilians,
110
including women, young children and elderly people, have been killed,
apparently by security forces firing indiscriminately during
demonstrations, or in retaliation for attacks by the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK). More than 120 civilians have died during such incidents,
most recently in Sirnak, where at least 15 civilians, including five
children, were killed in August, allegedly by security forces who fired
on civilian districts with tanks and small arms after a PKK attack in
which at least one of the security forces was killed. Amnesty
International has recommended that the incident be the subject of an
independent inquiry and that the findings be made public. [=]
10189. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human
Rights Under Attack: Part 3: Women and Conflict. New York:
Amnesty International, August 1995. [97H-20062] [19950801] The
mutilated body of Asrar Qabandi was dumped outside her family's
home in Kuwait by Iraqi soldiers. She had been interrogated for weeks
about her work for the Kuwaiti resistance and tortured in front of her
father. She was just one of many women who suffered almost every
known human rights violation during the Gulf conflict of 1990 to 1991,
a conflict which still dominates many women's lives as they struggle
to cope without their husbands or search for missing relatives.
Hundreds of unarmed civilians, including women, were deliberately
killed in Kuwait when Iraqi troops invaded the country. Children were
shot in the head at close range by Iraqi soldiers and their bodies
dumped outside their houses for their mothers to find. Many women
were sexually abused; in particular, foreign domestic servants were
raped by Iraqi soldiers. Hundreds of Kuwaitis and other nationals who
were transferred to Iraq during the occupation remain unaccounted
for. Some are believed to be still held, but there are fears that others
died as a result of torture or were executed. Among those still missing
are Wasmiyya Fahd Shuwaireb al'Ajmi, now aged 33, and her
mother, Bakhita Muhammad Slaih al-'Ajmi, both Kuwaiti nationals.
They were last seen at their home by relatives on 8/2/1990. Also
missing is Samira 'Abd al-Ghaffar Mansur Matrafi, owner of a small
business, who was seized at a check-point in Kuwait City by Iraqi
soldiers in 11/1990. She was 27 years old. Her mother, who has
campaigned tirelessly for her release, has had to rely on scraps of
information about her daughter's fate. First she was said to be in a
Kuwaiti jail. Then she was reported to have been moved to Iraq. Then
a Lebanese man said he had seen her on a prison bus in Baghdad in
1992. Since then her mother has heard nothing and the Iraqi
authorities have refused to respond to appeals for information.
The end of the Iraqi occupation did not end the suffering for many
women in Kuwait. The returning Kuwaiti authorities and armed
Kuwaiti civilians exacted a terrible revenge on many civilians,
particularly Palestinians, Iraqis and Sudanese living in Kuwait. Scores
of people were slaughtered and women were among the 1,000 or so
who were arbitrarily detained, some of whom subsequently faced
manifestly unfair trials. Among several defendants sentenced after an
unfair trial that lasted just one day was Ibtisam Berto Sulaiman alDakhil, a 35-year-old Kuwaiti journalist. She was sentenced to death,
later commuted to life imprisonment, for alleged "collaboration" with
the occupying Iraqi forces. She was charged with 23 other women and
men in connection with her work for the newspaper al-Nida'. All said
they had been forced to work for the paper after being threatened by
Iraqi soldiers: the newspaper they had previously worked for, alQabas' was closed down by the Iraqi authorities shortly after the
invasion and replaced by al-Nido'—the only newspaper allowed to
publish during the occupation. Another woman tried in the same case,
Wafa' Wasfi Ahmad, a 23-year-old Jordanian secretary, was
sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Both women are prisoners of
conscience. Fatima Ramez Tafla remains behind bars in Kuwait
Central Prison despite a government review of her case which should
have led to her release. Her nightmare began in 1991 when she was
charged with "collaboration" with Iraqi forces, including "deliberately
assisting the Iraqi enemy by indicating that her husband was a
member of the Kuwaiti resistance". Her husband had been executed
by Iraqi forces in 9/1990. The case against her was brought by her
father in-law when Fatima Tafla was preparing to leave Kuwait with
her young son, shortly after the Iraqi withdrawal. She was interviewed
by the Deputy Attorney General and initially released on the grounds
that there was no evidence against her. Nevertheless, her case was
referred to the Martial Law Court and on 6/13/1991 she was sentenced
to death. When all death sentences were reviewed by three
Counsellors appointed by the Martial Law Governor, they
unanimously agreed that her sentence had no legal grounds owing to a
lack of any substantial evidence against her. They recommended that
her sentence be suspended. Despite this, her conviction was not
overturned and her death sentence was reduced to 10 years in prison.
In total, there are still 14 women political prisoners in Kuwaiti jails,
including six prisoners of conscience, serving sentences ranging from
10 years to life imprisonment for "collaboration".
In Iraq, too, the aftermath of the war did not mean the end of
widespread human rights violations. In 3/1991 women suffered in
hugenumbers as government forces violently suppressed popular
uprisings by Kurds in northern Iraq and by Shi'a Muslim Arabs in the
south. Tens of thousands of families were forced to abandon their
homes to escape the terror, many in the south fleeing to the
marshlands. Since then, government forces have repeatedly attacked
the marshes, assaulting and killing many women, men and children in
the villages. In one incident in 5/1992 helicopter gunships attacked a
wedding ceremony in the village of al-Agir in the al-'Amara marshes,
killing the bridegroom as well as children. There was no military
target in the area. An eye-witness recalled: "The aeroplanes came
and hit at us... The celebration turned into mourning." The repression
has not stopped. In 9/1993 scores of unarmed civilian women and
men were reported to have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed
during a bombardment of the Abu Zargi and 'Elwi marshes northwest
of Basra. Others "disappeared" after arrest, or were tortured and later
executed.
Even before the 1991 Gulf war, women in Iraq had suffered
abuses on a massive scale during decades of ceaseless repression
by the government. Several hundred thousand women, men and
children "disappeared" during the 1980s as the authorities clamped
down on any sign of resistance. The victims included people from a
wide variety of groups—Kurds, Arabs, Turcomans and Assyrians;
Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, and Christians—as well as members of
prohibited political parties and their families, military personnel and
disaffected members of the ruling elite. The most notorious example
of mass extermination was the killing of an estimated 5000 civilians
by chemical weapons in the Kurdish town of Halabja in 3/1988. There
have been other Halabja-style massacres. In fact, in August and
September that year, as a result of a particularly intense wave of
attacks on Kurdish communities, including with chemical weapons,
over 50000 Kurds fled to southern Turkey. Many women have
described how rape and sexual abuse have been used as a weapon of
terror by Iraqi security forces during operations against the Kurds. A
Kurdish woman, a member of the Iraqi Communist Party Pesh
Merga, explained what happened to her in the late 1980s: "They
snatched me off the street. I put up a fight against the security police,
but they hit me on the head with a pistol butt and I passed out... One
method used by Iraqi jails epitomizes their barbarity. And that is
rape... No matter how much I'd heard about it, nothing prepared me
for the actual experience. It lives on inside me. I still bleed a lot. It was
done not by just one man, but by a group of them."
111
Around the world millions of women are the forgotten victims of
armed conflicts inside their countries. As both government forces and
armed opposition groups resort to campaigns of terror in pursuit of
their aims, women are taken hostage, raped and murdered. Whatever
the reasons for the conflict and whoever is responsible for the human
rights abuses, the result is that the lives of women and their families
are devastated.
In Sudan, thousands of women have been extrajudicially
executed,made to "disappear", imprisoned, tortured and raped by
government forces. Most of the violations have been committed in the
context of the fierce fighting between government forces and the
armed opposition movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA), in the war zones in the south and in the Nuba mountains. In
the Nuba mountains government troops have abducted, murdered and
raped thousands of women and children in attacks on villages during
military operations to forcibly resettle civilians in so-called peace
villages. A former security official who witnessed assaults on Nuba
villages in 7-8/1992 described the government's tactics when clearing
villages: "...ground troops entered the villages, shooting
indiscriminately and killing hundreds of civilians... Many women were
raped by the soldiers... The people were loaded on to trucks each of
which could transport about 80 persons. Many had to walk to Kadugli
under army guard. The dead bodies were left behind as prey for the
animals." Because of the shame attached to rape, few of the victims
have talked openly about their experiences. One who did, a woman
from the Moro Hills who was raped by soldiers in Kadugli in 10/1992,
said: "I was taken on the way home by .soldiers and tied down. I
was... taken to the barracks. I refused them... Once I was tied up they
did a lot of things to me." Women have met a similar fate in northern
Bahr al-Ghazal, particularly when troops have been driving people
away from the railway line linking north and south Sudan. Women and
girls have been abducted by members of the Popular Defence Force
(PDF), a government-created militia, during such operations; some
have been taken as concubines or sold into domestic slavery. Among
those still missing is Apiu Majok, aged 12, who was abducted in 1993.
Women have also suffered gross abuses as a result of fighting
between armed opposition groups. For example, in 10-11/1991 many
women were killed, raped or abducted when SPLA-Nasir forces
briefly took over land controlled by SPLA-Mainstream in Upper Nile.
In 3/1993 SPLA-Mainstream troops attacked the village of Pagau in
retaliation; 32 women were lined up and shot in the head. Their only
"crime" was to be of Nuer origin and therefore suspected of loyalty to
the SPLA-Nasir faction.
In Algeria over 40000 people are reported to have been killed
since conflict erupted in early 1992. While many of them died in
armed clashes, thousands of civilians are reported to have been
extrajudicially executed by the security forces or deliberately killed by
armed groups defining themselves as Islamic groups. The violence
erupted following the cancellation of the second round of multi-party
elections after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had made major
gains in the first round, and since 2/1992 a state of emergency has
been imposed. The conflict between government forces and armed
groups continues to claim an increasing number of civilian lives;
during 1994 and early 1995 the number of violent attacks on unarmed
civilians by both sides escalated. More than 300 civilian women are
reported to have been killed by armed groups since the beginning of
1992. Civilian women are also reported to have been killed and
injured by the security forces during raids and at check-points. Tens
of thousands of women have been widowed as a result of killings by
the security forces and by armed groups; others continue to search for
their relatives who "disappeared" after arrest. The conflict in Algeria
has again seen the use of rape as a weapon of terror. Because of
trauma and the social stigma associated with this form of torture,
women are often reluctant to report rapes. In Algeria, this reluctance,
combined with the absence of independent human fights monitors, has
made it difficult to assess the true scale of the problem. However,
reports of abductions and rape by groups of armed men, particularly
in rural areas, have been increasing. Some women are reported to
have been held prisoner and used as forced domestic labour. The
victims and their families are often threatened with further abuse if
they speak of their experiences. Many have fled their homes fearing
further attack; some have been ostracized by their families. Algerian
women have also been the victims of widespread campaigns of terror
by armed groups calling themselves "Islamic groups". Professional
groups—such as teachers, journalists, magistrates and civil
servants—have been targeted, as have students and relatives of the
security forces. Death threats have been posted up in public places
and sent to individuals' homes. The sources of the threats are not
always clear; the effect, however, is. They have created a climate of
fear in which many women are terrorized. Rachida Hammadi, a 32year-old journalist working for the national television station, and her
36-year-old sister, Hourria, were shot by gunmen on 3/21/1995 on
their way to work in Algiers. Hourria was killed on the spot and
Rachida died from the wounds some weeks later. Rachida Hammadi
was one of 40 joumalists killod since 5/1993 in attacks reported to
have been carried out by armed groups calling themselves "Islamic
groups".
Groups defining themselves as Islamic groups have
increasingly abused women in Algeria for not covering their hair, for
going to beaches or for travelling on public transport because male
and female passengers are not segregated. Katia Bengana, a 17-yearold student, was shot dead in Blida in 2/1994, reportedly after
receiving threats that she would be killed if she did not wear the hijab
(Islamic veil). After her death an anti-Islamist group, the Organization
of Young Free Algerians, issued a statement saying that for every
woman not wearing the veil who was attacked, they would kill 20
veiled women. Soon after, on 29 March, two young women students
wearing the veil were shot dead at a bus stop near their school.
Armed groups defining themselves as Islamic groups have also
threatened women working in the public sector with death if they do
not give up their jobs. Among those believed to have been killed by
such groups wore three women teachers, including Khadija Assa,
who were killed in 2/1995. Nabila Diahnine, an architect and leading
feminist, was shot and killed on 2/15/1995 in the centre of Tizi-Ouzou.
She was a member of the Berber Cultural Movement and president of
a feminist organization. She had been due to go to France to take part
in events organized to celebrate International Women's Day on 8
March. The political leadership of the FIS outside Algeria have stated
that they respect women's fights, including the fight of women not to
wear the hijab. However, until recently they had failed to condemn
threats made by armed groups defining themselves as Islamic groups
against women for not wearing the veil or for behaving in ways they
consider un-Islamic. The FIS has claimed that these threats are made
by those who are seeking to discredit Islamist groups. However,
armed Islamist groups have not themselves denied these attacks and
threats against women.
Several of the other conflicts which have dominated the region in
recent years have had grim consequences for women. In the IsraeliOccupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, scores of
Palestinian women and children were killed by Israeli soldiers during
the Palestinian intifada (uprising) [sic] which began in 1987. Many of
these were shot dead in the numerous incidents in which soldiers
have used excessive force in response to protests by Palestinians.
Some died as a result of misuse of tear-gas. Many were killed when
they were simply going about their everyday lives.
One such victim was Najah Abu Dalal. She was in her courtyard
112
chatting to a relative on 4/21/1993 when she suddenly fell to the
ground. She had been shot through the left eye, apparently by a soldier
stationed on a nearby rooftop. Five days later she died. The Israeli
authorities have yet to mount an adequate investigation into her death.
Among the Palestinian girls who have been killed was 11-yearold Rana Abu Tuyur. On 12/19/1992 she was sent out by her mother to
buy milk as a long curfew had just been lifted. She came across
soldiers who were trying to stop a group of stone-throwing youths who
were some 500 metres away. She was on the other side of the road to
the soldiers, between 50-100 metres away. Witnesses say the
soldiers were firing at anyone who tried to cross the road and one of
the soldiers fired and hit Rana Abu Tuyur in the chest. She died before
reaching hospital. An official investigation found that two soldiers had
deviated from the rules of engagement, but found no connection
between the shots fired and Rana Abu Tuyur's death. However,
details of the methods and results of this investigation have not been
made public, contrary to international standards.
Women have suffered other human rights violations at the hands
of the Israeli authorities during the intifada. For example, many have
been made homeless since mid-1992 as a result of a policy of house
destruction. Typically, houses in which the Israeli authorities believe
suspects may be hiding are surrounded and their inhabitants ordered
out and held in nearby houses. The houses are then attacked with
heavy fire, including machine-gun fire, grenades and anti-tank
missiles. Afterwards, soldiers enter the houses, fifing at any place
where survivors may have been hiding. In many cases, soldiers blow
up the houses with explosives, suggesting that one of the aims, if not
the main aim of these operations, is to impose a form of collective
punishmenton the occupants. In one such operation in Hebron in
3/1994, a pregnant woman was killed in disputed circumstances.
The Israeli authorities denied that these operations were a form
of collective punishment, claiming that they were designed to protect
their forces from surprise attacks by people inside the houses. They
also denied that houses were blown up after soldiers had entered
them. However, the authorities have never clarified evidence provided
by military experts that the houses were indeed blown up from the
inside.
The Israeli authorities have also destroyed the houses of
Palestinians who have participated in attacks against Israelis,
rendering their families homeless. In November 1994 the house of the
family of Salah 'Abd al-Rahim Nazzal, who was responsible for a bus
bomb in Tel Aviv which killed 23 people, including himself, was
demolished after the family's appeal to the High Court of Justice
against the demolition order had been rejected. Such collective
punishment violates fundamental principles of international law.
Women have also suffered at the hands of Palestinian armed
opposition groups. Unarmed civilian women have been deliberately
and arbitrarily killed by such groups. Many attacks in recent years
have been carried out by the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas,
which continues to oppose the peace process. For example, in 4/1994,
four women, two girls and a man were killed by a suicide car bomber.
Hamas described the attack as "legitimate retaliation" for the killing of
Palestinians by an Israeli settler in Hebron two months earlier. In
10/1994 women were among 23 people killed in a suicide bomb attack
on a bus in the centre of Tel Aviv carried out by Hamas.
The wider Arab-Israeli conflict has also threatened the physical
integrity of many other civilians, including women and children. In
7/1993 a week long confrontation in south Lebanon and northern Israel
between Israeli forces and Hizbullah, a Lebanese armed group
fighting against Israel's continuing occupation of a strip of south
Lebanon, led to thousands of civilians in both countries having to flee
their homes for safety. Israeli forces carried out a widespread
bombardment of villages and Palestinian refugee camps in south
Lebanon. Israeli officials stated that the bombardment was
deliberately aimed at forcing the civilian population to flee the area and
at putting pressure on the Lebanese Government to prevent Hizbullah
from carrying out attacks against Israel. Radio broadcasts warned
village residents to leave or risk death. Over 200,000 people fled
northwards, and over 130 people, including civilians, were killed.
During the same period, Hizbullah launched over 270 Katyusha
rockets against northern Israel and the "security zone", killing two
civilians and forcing tens of thousands of others to leave their homes
to seek safety. Deliberate targeting of civilians by anyone can never
be justified.
In Morocco, the government has used a system of secret
detention to punish its political opponents, particularly supporters of
the pro-independence movement in Western Sahara. Several hundred
women, men and children from the south of Morocco and the Western
Sahara have "disappeared" since 1975. They wore reportedly
arrested by Moroccan security forces and later imprisoned in secret
jails. In several cases, whole families "disappeared". Almost all the
victims were suspected of sympathizing with the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, more generally known
as the Polisario Front. For example, five women were arrested by
Moroccan security forces on 3/3/1985 during a wave of arrests in
Laayoune. Among them was 40-year-old Salka ment Najem ould
Omar Lahsen. Police came to her house in the moming, broke down
the door and arrested her on suspicion of distributing leaflets in
support of the Polisario Front. She has never been seen again. Her
children were left to fend for themselves. Magboula ment Bouchraya
ould Mohamed Yahdih "disappeared" four years earlier. Security
officers raided her house in Laayoune in the middle of the night in
1/1981. They searched the premises but found nothing. Nevertheless,
they took Magboula ment Bouchraya away in a police van. For two
months her family was able to take food and clean clothes to her in
Laayoune prison. Then they were suddenly forbidden to do so,
although no reason was given. They have heard nothing of Magboula
ment Bouchraya since then. In 1991 more than 300 women and men
who had "disappeared" for up to 16 years wore released during a
worldwide campaign against human rights violations in Morocco.
Nevertheless, hundreds of people reported to have "disappeared"
since the 1960s remain unaccounted for. The government denies any
knowledge of them, just as it had for years denied knowledge of the
300-plus "disappeared" who were released in 1991. [=]
10190. Amnesty International. Women in the Middle East: Human
Rights Under Attack: Part 4: Women Activists. New York: Amnesty
International, August 1995. [97H-20063] [19950801] In the Gulf state of
Bahrain, women have increasingly been participating in "prodemocracy" demonstrations, calling on the government to reconvene
the National Assembly, which was dissolved by Amiri decree in 1975,
and to respect the country's 1973 Constitution. They have also been
protesting against the heavy-handed response of the authorities and
demanding the release of political detainees. As a result, they are
finding out what the inside of Bahrain's jails look like and some have
reportedly been beaten or otherwise ill-treated by security officials.
One woman, who joined a protest by women outside the Ministry of
Justice building in 2/1995, described how the protesters were treated
that day: 'We were about 20 women coiling for our relatives to be
released. The whole area was surrounded by police. They ordered us
to leave the area but we refused. I was beaten and carried by six
policemen and forced into a jeep, but I managed to jump out again.
One woman had her clothes torn and her chest was exposed. Another
woman was pregnant. They humiliated and insulted us." Some
Bahraini women have been singled out for arrest either because of
their activities or because they are related to male activists. Zahra
113
Salman Hilal and a 12-year-old girl, Ayat 'Abd al-Jabber Salman,
were rounded up in mass arrests in early 4/1995 and taken to the
Juveniles Prison in Madinat 'Issa. A few days later Zahra Salman
Hilal went on hunger strike to demand the right to see her husband,
who had been detained since 1/1995. She remained in prison without
charge or trial until 29 May. Ayat 'Abd al-Jabber Salman was
released in mid-April. On 6 April Fatima 'Ashur Singais and her
daughter Malika were arrested in a dawn raid on their home in alSanabes. Fatima 'Ashur Singais was released within a few days, but
Malika remains held without charge, apparently in order to force her
brother to give himself up. On 9 April Nazi Karimi, a student of
languages at the University of Bahrain, was summoned for
interrogation with her husband in connection with the "prodemocracy" protests. He was released the same day, but she
remained held without charge or trial until 10 May. For 18 days she
was held in solitary confinement and denied access to her family,
lawyers and medical treatment. She had reportedly been put under
pressure to sign a "confession" saying that she had taken part in
recent protests. She reportedly went on hunger-strike after her arrest,
resulting in significant weight loss and illness. The authorities had
also reportedly threatened to forcibly exile her and the rest of her
family from Bahrain.
Whole families have been persecuted in this unprecedented
upsurge of protest in Bahrain, during which at least 12 people have
been shot dead by the security forces during demonstrations and 1300
detained. On 1 April 1995 security forces surrounded the home of
Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir Mansur al-Jamri, a prominent Shi'a Muslim
religious scholar and member of the former National Assembly, in the
village of Bani Jamra. He and 18 members of his family were placed
under house arrest without charge, including his wife, Zahra Yusuf,
three daughters, three sons and other young children. All were denied
access to the outside world and had their telephone lines
disconnected. On 15 April Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir al-Jamri was
transferred to an undisclosed location. There was no information on
his fate or whereabouts until 9 May, when he was taken to al-Qal'a
Prison in al-Manama. There, one of his daughters, 'Afaf, was brought
to see him, allegedly in order to tell him that he would be sentenced to
a long term of imprisonment. While in the prison, 'Afaf al-Jamri was
reportedly beaten by women police officers. She was taken into
custody herself later that day and remained held at a detention facility
in Madinat 'Issa until her release on 5 June. She is 31 years old and
has two young children. Her father, Sheikh al-Jamri, remains held
without charge or trial.
In Tunisia in the past few years, hundreds of women have been
detained without charge or trial, harassed and ill-treated. Scores of
them have been tortured, sexually abused and threatened with rape in
the Ministry of the Interior and in police stations. Dozens have been
detained as prisoners of conscience for peacefully exercising their
right to freedom of expression, association and assembly, and many
have been imprisoned after unfair trials. Some of the women cited in
this report cannot be named for fear of further endangering their wellbeing and that of their families. Most have been targeted because of
suspected links with al-Nahda, an unauthorized Islamist movement.
However, other political activists have also been subjected to human
rights violations.
A woman who was five months pregnant was arrested at her
home in Gabes on 11/6/1992 and accused of carrying out political
activities on behalf of the Tunisian Workers' Communist Party
(PCOT). She says that while she was in incommunicado detention in
Gabes police station, she was partially undressed, beaten with sticks
and threatened with rape and further violence if she did not talk about
her political activities. One of the policemen reportedly told her: 'We'll
bring out what you have in your womb." She was forced to sign a
police statement without knowing its contents. The next day she felt ill
and seemed in danger of miscarrying, and was released. A few days
later she was rearrested and interrogated while lying on the floor as
she was too ill to stand up. On 11/18/1992 she was tried and
sentenced to four months imprisonment for belonging to an
unauthorized organization and collecting money without permission.
Her lawyer requested a medical examination and an investigation into
her allegations of ill-treatment, but these were denied. Although she
was granted bail pending appeal, she continued to be detained until
1/11/1993, when the appeal took place. Her sentence was upheld, but
she was released the following day by presidential pardon. No
investigation was carried out by the authorities into the allegations of
ill-treatment and those who ill-treated her were not brought to justice.
Women activists in Iraqi Kurdistan have continued to suffer
gross violations of their rights since the area came under the control
of Kurdish political parties in 10/1991. Some have been detained
without charge or trial and subjected to torture and ill-treatment.
During a demonstration in the city of Arbil in 8/1992 against the
Turkish military bombardment of a Kurdish town in southeastern
Turkey, Kurdish security forces shot into the peaceful crowd to
disperse the protesters. Among the dead was the six-year-old
daughter of Laila 'All Musa, who was herself held as a political
prisoner. In prison, she told Amnesty International: 'When the shooting
started I was immediately hit. Then my daughter Kurdistan was killed
as a bullet shot through her head... After the shooting they arrested a
group of us and took us inside the Asayish [security forces] building.
They tortured me for about one and a half hours in one of the offices.
They beat me on the bullet wound and on my back with a hosepipe."
Another woman, Payman Sulaiman Hamid, who was also
arrested after the demonstration, told Amnesty International: "They
tied my hands behind my back and then suspended me from a height
against the wall. I was beaten with a hosepipe. The torture lasted for
about one and a half hours. I fainted three times and each time they
poured water on me to revive me. They burned me with cigarettes on
my legs [scars on her legs were still visible at the time of the
interview]. All the time I was blindfolded. Then they threatened to
assault me sexually in front of my husband." These two women, along
with two other female and nine male detainees arrested at the same
time, began a hunger-strike on 211/29/1992 demanding access to their
families and a meeting with the investigating judge. This was granted
on 12/1/1992 and on 1/11/1993 all were released without having been
brought before a court. None of the security personnel involved in
either the killing of the demonstrators or the torture of detainees has
been brought to justice. None of the victims of torture or the families of
those killed has been compensated.
In Iran, women who have peacefully opposed the government
since the 1979 revolution have faced severe penalties. Several have
beenheld as possible prisoners of conscience for many years in
connection with their alleged activities for organizations such as the
Tudeh Party and People's Fedaiyan Organization of Iran. Those
suspected of political opposition in Iran are routinely tortured and illtreated during interrogation. In 1988 thousands of political prisoners,
many of whom were already serving prison sentences, were
summarily executed. The mother of one of the victims wrote to
Amnesty International; her experience mirrors that of many others.
Her daughter was arrested in 1982 for alleged possession of leaflets
issued by the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and
tried by an Islamic Revolutionary Court. For six years the mother
was able to visit her daughter regularly in Evin Prison in Tehran. In
8/1988 the visits were suddenly stopped. In 11/1988 she was informed
that her daughter had been executed. She has never been told where
her daughter's body is buried. To this day the authorities have failed to
account for the thousands killed in 1988. One former female prisoner
114
told Amnesty International: "We were aware of the massacre of the
men prisoners [in 1988 and 1989] and assumed that the Mojahedin
women prisoners had also been executed. We discussed this among
ourselves... We could not see the future clearly. We thought at that
time that we were in a world of death. There was no contact with the
world of the living."
Women political activists in Syria have also been jailed for their
peaceful opposition to the government. Doha 'Ashur al-'Askari, for
instance, has been in prison since mid-1993. Her trial was still in
progress at the end of 1994, but there has been no news of her since.
She was arrested for suspected membership of the Party for
Communist Action; she had been living in hiding since 1986 when she
found out she was wanted by the authorities. Her daughter Kamilya
has known nothing but prison life; she was born in Duma Women's
Prison in Damascus a few months after her mother was detained.
In Egypt, women have been detained without charge for peaceful
protests. On 3/24/1995 Warda Mahmoud and Nawwara Nagm,
students at Cairo University and 'Ain Shams University respectively,
were among dozens of people arrested after they had peacefully
protested against Israel's participation in the International Trade Fair
being held in Cairo. The two women were held at al-Qanatir alKhayria Prison until 3 April, when they were released without charge.
The Israeli authorities have jailed women suspected of opposing
the Israeli occupation of West Bank and the Gaza Strip or of being
members of illegal organizations. Some of them have been ill-treated.
'Abir al-Wahaydi, a 23-year-old engineering student at Bir Zeit
University on the occupied West Bank, was arrested in 6/1992 on
suspicion of being involved with activities organized by Fateh, the
main faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and of
planning to kill an Israeli settler. She was taken for interrogation to the
General Security Service wing in Ramallah, where there are
reportedly no separate facilities for women. Three days later she was
transferred to Moscobiyyah detention centre in Jerusalem. She
testified in a written affidavit: "...I was taken to Moscobiyyah for
interrogation. They took me out to the courtyard on Friday after five
days of no sleep with a sock on my head and my hands handcuffed.
Above me there was a loudspeaker and it was very cold. I felt as if I
would collapse from the sound coming out of the loud.speaker... The
interrogation lasted for 14 days without letting me see a lawyer." Her
interrogators repeatedly threatened her. She testified that they told her
she would go mad and that they would kill her, and that "the cell of
Hazem 'Id and Mustafa 'Akkawi [detainees who had died in custody]
still existed". She said they also threatened to rape her, detain her
parents and young sister, and destroy her parents' home. After 17
days she was brought before a judge, having been forced to sign a
statement that she alleged she had not read. For 52 days she was kept
in solitary confinement and then transferred to Hasharon Prison. In
4/1994 she was sentenced to 17 years and four months'
imprisonment. Two days after she was sentenced the Israeli
authorities demolished her house. Her mother recounted: "They came
in the morning... and said we should empty the house of all the people.
They said someone who was wanted was in the house. We swore
there was no one. They locked us into a room at our neighbor's... they
started hitting the kids. At 12.30 they brought anti-tank rockets and
started shooting the house with more than 16 rockets... The house
was new. We'd saved for it for 26 years and only lived in it for 27
days. My daughter had never lived in it." The Israeli authorities told
Amnesty International that they had investigated 'Abir al-Wahaydi's
allegations of ill-treatment and found them to be false. They also said
that when questioned about her treatment, she denied having any
complaint. However, in the military court system in the Occupied
Territories detainees are subjected to numerous improper pressures
to plead guilty and enter a plea bargain. Defendants are reluctant to
ask for an exclusion of their confessions if they were obtained under
duress as their allegations of torture or ill-treatment are almost
impossible to prove, and, if an application for such a ruling is
unsuccessful, they are likely to receive substantially longer
sentences.
Palestinian women have also reportedly suffered human rights
violations in the areas under the jurisdiction of the newly established
Palestinian Authority. Several have alleged that they were ill-treated in
custody by Palestinian police officers. The new authorities have failed
to conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into their
complaints.
In south Lebanon, at least seven women remain locked up in the
Khiam detention centre, which was set up in 1985 by the South
Lebanon Army (SLA) with Israel's assistance and supervision. They
are detained outside any legal framework and for years they had no
access to the outside world; family visits were resumed in 1/1995
after a gap of eight years. All are believed to be Lebanese citizens;
some are suspected of belonging to armed organizations opposing
Israel and the SLA inside Lebanon, others may have been arrested to
put pressure on their relatives. Among those held in Khiam is Suha
Fawwaz Beshara, accused of trying to assassinate the commander of
the SLA in 11/1988. She is reported to have been kept in solitary
confinement almost continuously since her detention in late 1988. Like
the other detainees in Khiam, she has never been charged or tried.
Many detainees in Khiam have been tortured or ill-treated. Methods
commonly reported include beatings all over the body, sometimes
with an electric cable; electric shocks, often applied to the nipple; and
threats, including of rape and sexual abuse.
In other parts of Lebanon, women activists have been gunned
down while peacefully demonstrating or detained and ill-treated. In
9/1993 women were among nine people shot dead when the security
forces opened fire on a peaceful demonstration protesting against the
peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. The authorities have
never revealed the results of the investigation they said they had
opened into these killings. In 9/1994, three women—Huda Yamin, Lina
Ghurayeband Muna Shkayban— were detained and charged with
security offences before a military court for distributing leaflets
opposing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. All were allegedly tortured
or ill-treated while held in the Ministry of Defence and may have been
prisoners of conscience. Amnesty International is not aware of any
investigation into the allegations of torture or ill-treatment. The three
women were released on bail in 10/1994.
Other women in the region have had their basic human rights
violated for exercising their rights as trade unionists to peaceful
association and expression. In Morocco, for example, Khadija
Benameur was sentenced to a year in prison in 3/1995 for joining her
fellow workers in a peaceful sit-in at her workplace in Sidi Slimane.
They had been on strike since 2/21/1995 and the sit-in was staged to
call for Moroccan labour laws and Internationally recognized labour
rights to be respected. In the course of the protest, police arrested
Khadija Benameur, the Secretary General of her factory's branch of
the Moroccan Labour Union, and five others. Three of them, including
Khadija Benameur, were charged under Article 288 of the Moroccan
Penal Code, which allows for the imprisonment of people who
organize or participate in a concerted withdrawal of labour. All three
alleged they were ill-treated in police custody; they reportedly still
bore marks of bruising on their faces and hands when they appeared
in court. Khadija Benameur was also found guilty of offending the
person of the King. She was reportedly accused of having said that her
employer should be saluted rather than the King. She denied the
charge. On 27 April Khadija Benameur was released on bail pending
an appeal, which was due to be heard on 5/30/1995, but was
postponed. [=]
115
10191. Amos, John W., II; Darius, Robert G. [editor]; Amos, John W.,
II [editor]; Magnus, Ralph H. [editor]. Gulf Security Into the 1980s:
Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions: Part 4: The Iran-Iraq War:
Conflict, Linkage and Spillover in the Middle East. Hoover
International Studies, Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984.
pp. 49-81. [96H-05402] [19840101] The Iran-Iraq War is merely an
escalation of the longstanding conflict between the two countries over
the territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab. During the decades of
this conflict, both sides have sought to gain support by the Kurdish,
Arab and Shiites minorities across the border. The Iraqi attack on
9/22/1980 was a response to a growing perception that Iran was
working to destabilize Iraq; Iraq hoped its attack would gain support
among a broad range of other Arab states. Long afraid of
encirclement, for Saddam Hussein the threat by Iran to close the Iraqi
access to the Gulf was the final threat that led to the war. At the same
time, (1) the large Shiite population posed a revolutionary meance,
both through the Iranian-backed Dawa (itself based on the
husseiniyyah netowrk of Shiite study centers) and the smaller Syria
backed network in the Shiite community and even in the Iraqi Baath
party, and (2) the Kurdish Peshmerga guerrilla movement continued
to fight the annual cycle of military incursions by the Iraqi army. The
Iraqi Communist Party, active in both Shiite and Kurdish areas, posed
a lesser threat (even with its linkages with Syria, the PLO, Iranian
Communists, and the Libyans). These growing problems of
encirclement and internal problems led the Iraqi regime to respond to
Iranian revolutionary energy with a strategy for a sharp limited
warfare: the inadequacies of the Iraqi military led instead to a war of
attrition.
One result of this conflict was a regional rapproachment
between Marxist and Islamic revolutionaries: Baghdad expelled the
Popular Democratic Front (PDF) and PFLP for their role in training
Khomeini supporters; these groups had also forced ties with the Iraqi
Communist Party. In 2/1982, communist parties from Iraq, Iran, North
Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, with Shiite groups in the Peninsula
(coordinated under the National Democratic Forces in the Arabian
Peninsula & Gulf), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
(PFLO) and the Islamic Republican Party from Iran: these groups
combined under the Front for the Liberation of the Gulf, which has ties
with the shadowy Islamic Liberation Army, and the Palestinian
Revenge Force founded after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982;
as well as the Islamic Liberation Movement of Iraq, Islamic Alliance
for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Moroccan National Revolutionary
Front, Islamic Revolutionary Organization of the Arabian Peninsula,
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, and Islamic Organization
for the Liberation of Oman. These movements represent a
fundamentalspillover of the Iran-Iraq War that threatens all GCC
states. Similarly, the Syria-Libya linkage to Iran expanded the scope
of the Iran-Iraq War to include Chad, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia
and Morocco; as well as South Yemen and Ethiopia. [Magnus teaches
at the Naval Postgraduate School and is executive director of
Americares for Afghans; Darius is researcher at the Strategic Studies
Institute; Amos teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School] [These
papers were first presented at a MESA Conference panel in 1981.]
[TXT]
10192. Amr, Wafa. "Reporters Find Death, Destruction In Kirkuk-And Irqai Army In Control", in Arizona Daily Star, April 1, 1991. p. A3.
[91H-18766] [19910401] Western reporters were taken on a tour of
Kirkuk by Iraqi government officials after the Kurdish guerrillas were
forced from the town. Local people claimed hundreds were executed
by the refugees, including 500 seen by reporters. Local people stated
that the guerrillas systematically executed Baath Party members. The
Kurdish forces are now at least 30 miles from the city.
10193. Anonymous. "'Saddam Should Hang: Barbara Bush Calls
Iraqi Leader a War Criminal", in Tucson Citizen, April 16, 1991. p. A3.
Barbara Bush called for war crimes trials and then the hanging of
Saddam Hussein. She stated she would he happy to see him die and
compared him with the war criminals executed after WWII. She
stated she was awed by George Bush's performance during the
Persian Gulf War. She stated that Lee Atwater had nothing to
apologize for, and certainly nothing to apologize for in connection with
his production of the Willie Horton advertisements. She noted praying
frequently, and argued that son Neil Bush was innocent of any wrong
doing. She also stated that she was pained by suffering of the Kurds.
10194. Anonymous. "10 PKK Militants Killed", in Turkish Press
Review. Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 3, 1996. Turkish security forces
have killed 10 militants of the PKK terrorist organization in separate
clashes in the southeast of the country, security officials said
yesterday. The militants were killed in the provinces of Diyarbakir,
Bingol, Mardin and Sirnak, the regional governor's office said in a
statement. [Hurriyet] [=]
10195. Anonymous. "100 Kurds Treated For Cholera; Three Die
[cholera has been reported in refugee areas along the Turkish
border]", in Tucson Citizen, May 3, 1991. p. A10.
10196. Anonymous. "10000 Turk Troops Attack Kurds in Iraq
[Turkey states it may also send troopps into Syria to fight Kurds; chief
of the general staff, Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu states Turkey is in
'undeclared war with Syria']", in Seattle Times, October 4, 1998. p.
A10. [TXT]
10197. Anonymous. "11 PKK Terrorists Killed", in Turkish Press
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 20, 1997. During current
operations in the southeast Anatolia region 11 PKK terrorists have
been killed and seven members of the Hizbullah terrorist organization
had been arrested. According to the regional state of emergency
governorship there have been heavy clashes between PKK terrorists
and Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Union (IKDP) peshmerges in
Northern Iraq, and the PKK organization has had heavy losses.
[Cumhuriyet/Sabah] [=]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 13, 1997. During current
operations in Beytulssebap, Sirnak, 13 PKK terrorists and one
security official were killed. Meanwhile, the radio Voice of the Iraqi
Kurdistan Democratic Party (IKDP) announced that 150 Iraqi Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (IPUK) peshmerges had been killed in fighting in
northern Iraq and that 500 others had been wounded. [Cumhuriyet] [=]
10199. Anonymous. "13 People Killed In A PKK Attack", in Turkish
Press Review. Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 14, 1997. Three soldiers and 10
village guards were killed yesterday in a PKK attack staged in
Semdinli, Hakkari. Eleven other members of the security forces were
wounded in the attack. At the same time, two soldiers died hitting a
mine laid down by PKK terrorists in Yuksekova, Hakkari. Security
forces have initiated operations backed by Super Kobra helicopters
against the terrorists in the southeastern provinces of Diyarbakir and
116
Bingol. [Milliyet] [=]
10200. Anonymous. "14 Kurdish Nationalists Quit Coation
Governmentin Turkey", in Seattle Times, March 31, 1992. p. A8.
[TXT]
10201. Anonymous. "15 Terrorists Killed", in Turkish Press Review.
Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, November 10, 1997. During operations conducted in
and around Beytussebap near Sirnak, 15 PKK terrorists have been
killed. A group of terrorists attacked villagers who were returning
from working in a forest near Dogan township of Pervari, Siirt, killing
six and wounding three. Military sources later announced that
operations were continuing to seize the terrorists. [Cumhuriyet] [=]
10202. Anonymous. "15000 Turkish Troops Enter Iraq, Hunt Kurdish
Rebels [accompanied by 2000 pro-government Village Guards]", in
Seattle Times, April 7, 1999. p. A14. [TXT]
10203. Anonymous. "15000 Turks Cross To Iraq [army columns
with 100 armored vehicles march into northern Iraq to attack
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) forces]", in New York Times,
September 25, 1997. p. A4. [TXT]
10204. Anonymous. "20 Villagers Killed in Raids By Kurds, Anatolia
News Agency Says [Turkish news agency reports that Kurds rebels
staged attacks on villages of Akyurek and Ormancik]", in Seattle
Times, January 23, 1994. p. A20. [TXT]
10205. Anonymous. "200 Die in Fighting Between Rival Kurdish
Groups in Iraq [intense fighting in Erbil has driven many residents to
nearby Ain-Kawa; UN has suspended relief aid due to the fighting;
similar clashes took place in 5/1994 between Kurdistan Democratic
Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan forces]", in Seattle Times,
December 28, 1994. p. A7.
10206. Anonymous. "2000 US Troops Work On Iraqi Camps [the
State Department estimates 500 Kurdish refugees per day are dying]",
in New York Times, April 23, 1991. p. A6. [TXT]
10207. Anonymous. "23 Terrorists Killed", in Turkish Press Review.
Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, July 4, 1997. In clashes in southeastern Anatolia
between the security forces and the outlawed PKK terrorist
organization, two terrorists have been killed. Two other terorists have
been captured, and six have surrendered to the security forces.
[Sabah] [=]
10208. Anonymous. "27 Separatists Killed In The Southeast", in
Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press and Information,
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 15, 1997. Security forces
killed 27 separatists from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK) in an operation in Sirnak province near the village of
Beytulsebapin southeast, the Anatolia news agency reported. The
Emergency Rule Governor's Office said that during the operations,
one soldier from the security forces was killed in the line of duty while
another six were injured. Meanwhile, one terrorist was captured in
Batman and three others surrendered to the security forces. [All
papers] [=]
10209. Anonymous. "296 PKK Terrorists Killed Over The Last Three
Months", in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press and
Information, Turkey, April 2, 1998. By the end of military operations in
the southeast region of Turkey in the first three months of 1998, 296
PKK terrorists have been killed. According to security forces officials,
recently there have been serious divisions in the PKK organization.
The cross-border operations have extensively damaged the logistic
support system of the PKK. [Cumhuriyet] [=]
10210. Anonymous. "35000 Turkish Troops [cross into Iraq in largest
offensive to date against Kurdish guerrillas; US approved operation;
EU expressed alarm]", in Economist, March 25, 1995. p. 6. [TXT]
10211. Anonymous. "40 Terrorists Killed in Southeast", in Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 10, 1997. Security forces have killed
40 terrorists from the out-lawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) over
the last four days in several clashes in the southeastern part of
Turkey. The Emergency Rule Regional Governor's office said on
Wednesday in a statement that the clashes took place in the eastern
provinces of Van and Bitlis, and the southestern provinces of Hakkari,
Sirnak, Diyarbakir, Mardin and Tunceli. Operations are still underway
to capture terrorists in the region, officials said. [Sabah/Hurriyet] [=]
10212. Anonymous. "44 Kurdish Guerrillas Killed in Massive Air,
Land Attack [massive attack follows report that the Kurdistan Workers
Party broke its unilateral ceasefire]", in Seattle Times, May 31, 1993.
p. A4. [TXT]
10213. Anonymous. "5 Terrorists Killed By Terrorists", in Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 6, 1997. Terrorists from the
outlawed PKK organization attacked gendarmerie unit on Friday near
Catak, Van, the Anatolia news agency reported. During the clashes
between the PKK terrorists and security members, five Turkish
soldiers were killed, seven more were injured and two PKK members
were killed. [=]
10214. Anonymous. "50 Rebel Kurds Killed In Clash With Turkish
Troops [in fighting in Diyarbaqkir]", in Seattle Times, September 15,
1995. p. A22. [TXT]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 8, 1997. It was reported that
since the begining of the "Twilight Operation" conducted by the
Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Iraq, 538 PKK terrorists were
killed. Military sources said that the operation has been sucessfully
continuing as it planned. [Cumhuriyet-Sabah] [=]
10216. Anonymous. "6 Militants Captured", in Turkish Press
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2, 1997. During operations against
PKK militants planning to carry out terrorist activities, 5 terrorists
have been captured in the Amanos and Toros mountains. Ammunition
and documents have also been seized. One PKK militant was killed
during the operation. [Sabah] [=]
10217. Anonymous. "65 Kurd Rebels Killed in Clashes, Turks Say
[fighting in Van, Hakkari and Bingol provinces]", in Arizona Republic,
June 24, 1997. p. A8. [TXT]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 24, 1997. In clashes in southeastern
Turkey between Turkish security forces and PKK terrorists, 65
117
terrorists have been killed during the last two days. According to
official figures, so far more than 3000 separatists have been put out of
action by the Turkish Armed Forces in an operation code named
"Hammer". Tons of ammunition and food in addition to various
weapons have also been seized. [Milliyet] [=]
10219. Anonymous. "80000 At German Rally Call On Turkey to Free
Kurd Leader [Bonn rally calls for release of Ocalan]", in Seattle
Times, April 18, 1999. p. A17. [TXT]
10220. Anonymous. "82 Reported Dead in Battle Fought By Turks
and Kurds [attack by 300 Kurds on Turkish outpost starts battle in
Semdinli, Diyarbakir]", in New York Times, September 20, 1992. p.
A5. [TXT]
10221. Anonymous. "A Grim Prospect" in The Proliferation of
Chemical Warfare: The Holocaust at Halabja. People For A Just
Peace, PO Box 32425, Washington, DC 20007. September 1988. p.
14. Includes two photographs of dead. A study by the United States
Defense Department in the Spring of 1984 revealed that at least 14 to
16 countries possessed chemical arsenals at the time. This was
about 10 more than had been previously estimated. Chemical
weapons are weapons of mass destruction and mass annihilation.
They are fairly cheap, quite effective, and increasingly available.
"Experts believe that any small nation capable of building a pesticide,
petrochemical or detergent plant could adapt the facility to
manufacture mustard gas or one of the virulently potent nerve gases
invented by Nazi Germany."Iraq is believed by western intelligence
agencies to have one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons,
including both poison and nerve gas. Previous to Iraq's widespread
use of chemical warfare, violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
banning the use of such weapons have not exceeded a handful of
incidents. Even those incidents have often remained unconfirmed
allegations. Never has the world witnessed the deployment of these
weapons of mass destructionon such a large scale since 1925.
Presently, with the precedent set by Iraq, the world faces the danger of
even more appalling incidents of the use of chemical weapons. Not
having fully come to grips with the idea of living under the constant
threat of a nuclear holocaust, the specter of Halabja is breakin new
ground in a dreadful prospectus for the people of the world.
Undoubtedly, the lack of a firm global initiative to stop the
spread of chemical weapons has been Iraq's number one
encouragement to continue their deployment. In light of the carnage at
Halabja, it is evident that the danger is far greater than a minor
regional conflict.
"Still, the biggest thing to do is the toughest thing: to restore the
international norm against any use of poisen gas, " writes Ken
Adelman. "This means hitting any user, especially a flagrant one such
as Iraq, hard. It means orchestrating a universal choorus of
condemnation,calling a special UN. (resolution) to blast such
behavior, breaking off friendly relations. It means, in short, labeling
the users for what they are: international criminals." [=]
10222. Anonymous. "A Modern Pompeii, Part 1" in The Proliferation
of Chemical Warfare: The Holocaust at Halabja. People For A Just
Peace, PO Box 32425, Washington, DC 20007. September 1988. p. 4.
Includesphotographof dead. The town of Halabja; home to over
70000 ethnic Kurds; is situated in northeast Iraq. The Kurds have long
been in rebellion against the current regime in Iraq. When the Iragi
army was routed from the region in a joint Kurdish-Iranian drive, it
was the ill-fated civilian residents of Halabja who found themselves at
the receiving end of Iraqi fury.
Although the town had escaped the bulk of the fighting which took
place in its surrounding mountains, it received a bitter blow in the
aftermath. At 5:30 PM on Thrusday, March 17, 1988, only a few hours
after the town had fallen to Kurdish and Iranian forces, Iraqi bombers
carried out an air raid on the residential areas of Halabja, followed by
similar incursions on several nearby townships and villages including
Khormal.
The next morning, however, Halabja was to be the site of one of
the most hideous crimes committed against humanity in the past 40
years. A middle-aged man who lived on the outskirts of Halabja was
quoted in the Toronto Star by Patrick Worsnip of the Reuter News
Agency: "The Iranians came and we welcomed them. Then, about
noontime (on Friday, March 18, 1988), the (Iraqi) bombardment
came. Everybody was killed. I saw a cloud. I saw gas."
Partly to drive the Iranians out and partly to set an example for
other Kurdish foes of the Iraqi regime, inb more than 20 bombing raids
on the 18th of March, 1988, a squadron of Iraqi bombers dropped
dozens of cluster bombs as well as numerous 100-liter-canister and
other types of bombsd containing deadly cyanide, nerve gas, and other
toxic agents in the very haart of the residential areas of Halabja. A
few minutes before the raids began, an Iraqi artillery barrage had
forced the residents out of their homes to where they would be most
vulnerable to the instantaneous effects of the poisonous gases. [=]
That Friday afternoon, the magnitude of this crime became more
evident. "Ruined and deserted-an open grave," described Norman
Kirkham of the Londan Daily Telegraph. "Bodies lie in the dirt streets
or sprawled in rooms and courtyards of the deserted houses,
preserved at the moment of death in a modern Middle East version of
the disaster which struck Pompeii."
Scenes such as the corpses of 20 women and children who
were hastily preparing to leave with a van-before the chemical
bombardment deprived them of this opportunity-are harrowing
reminders of the depths of this man-made debacle. Women, children,
and the elderly formed the bulk of the over 5000 killed and 7000
chemically injured at Halabja. Animals, vegetation, soil, groundwater,
everthing was affected. Wrties David Hirt, the Middle East
correspondent of the Guardian (London): "It is hard to conceive of any
explanation for the chemical bombardment of Halabja other than the
one which Iranians and Kurds offer-revenge..."
Western correspondents visited the area following the chemcial
attacks and interviewed many of the residents and Kurdish fighters
from Halabja. Their accounts give the picture of a genocidal mass
executionofunprecedented proportions, rivaled perhaps only by
Hitler's death camps in World War II. In fact, the US State
Department recently confirmed Irag's use of hydrogen cyanide, a
rapid asphxiant of the type used in Nazi gas chambers.
Chemical weapons were used on a large scale for the first time
during the First World War. Dichloroethyl sulfide, discovered in the
early part of the 19th century was nicknamed 'mustard gas' by the
British soldiers who first encountered it as a weapon in 1917.
Winston Churchill dubbed it 'hellish poison.' Mustard gas acts as a
blistering agent that devours the flesh. As well as progressively
affecting the lungs and skin, mustard gas also impairs the bone
marrow functions. It often means a lingering and painful death.
Introduced in the war by the Germans, it was employed routinely and
devastatingly by all sides during World War I. In a particularly large
scale use, the Germans virtually wiped out the Belgian city of Ypres in
1917. The deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq in Halbja is
believed to be the single biggest use of the lethal gases since Ypres.
[=]
118
Includes photograph of dead. Nearly 100000 people perished by
chemical warfare in World War I. So great was the resultant human
suffering that the belligerent sides joined in 1925 in signing the Geneva
Protocol, banning forever the use of chemical warfare "justly
condemned by the gereral opinion of the civilized world." Iraqis also a
signatory to the 1925 Protocol.
Later reaffirmation of the ban, extending it to the production and
storage of chemical weapons was asserted in the 1972 Geneva
Convention and later in the United States resolution No. 37/98. There
are currently negotiations underway in Geneva on a new international
agreement that would call for the destruction of all existing stockpiles
of chemical weapons.
Violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocal have been miraculously
few and far between until Iraq's large-scale deployment of such
weapons. Gruesome memories of World War I prevented even
Hitler from actively deploying chemical weapons on a large scale and
in combat even though the Germans had developed the still deadlier
'nerve gas.' In fact, the only allegations of the use of the banned
weapons since the treaty and before Iraq's use have been leveled
against the French in Morocco, the Italians in Ethiopia, and the
Japansese in China, all during the 1930's. Later, the Egyptians in
Yemen in 1963, the Laotians in internal strife, and the Vietnamese in
Kampuchea, both in 1975, and finally the Russians in the ongoing was
in Afghanistan, were accused of having used chemical weapons. The
scale and magnitude of these alleged deployments were limited to
small amounts and often they were not corroborated. [=]
10225. Anonymous. "Abdullah Ocalan In Southern Cyprus", in
Turkey, March 12, 1998. It is reported that leader of the PKK terrorist
organization, Abdullah Ocalan, went to Southern Cyprus from Syria
via Lebanon two weeks ago and met with head of the Southern Cyprus
Kurdistan Solidarity Organization, Lazaros Mavros. Some
parliamentarians from the PASOK party, which is in power in Greece,
and from other parties, also attended the meeting. Officials from US
intelligence agencies, who prefer not to reveal their names, have
noted that officials from Greek intelligence units also participated in
the meeting between Abdullah Ocalan and the Southern CyprusKurdistan organization. [Sabah] [=]
10226. Anonymous. "Abdullah Ocalan Says Cease-Fire Call Will Be
Basis fo defense [called for cease-fire in 1998]", in Seattle Times,
March 18, 1999. p. A12. [TXT]
10227. Anonymous. "Abdullah Ocalan Warned That His Followers
Will Unleash a 'Terror Machine' If a Special Turkish Court Sentences
Him to hang", in Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1999. p. A1. [TXT]
10228. Anonymous. "Abdullah Ocalan's Lawyers [object to making
him attend his trial in a soundproof glass box]", in Wall Street, May
25, 1999. p. A1. [TXT]
10229. Anonymous. "Aerial Hunt For Saddam Hussein Frustrating
[systemaic bombing of Hussein's command posts have failed to kill
him; Kurdish guerrilla sources report destruction of Enieshkey and
Serseng palaces in Amadaya, and Sare Rush palace in Erbil]", in
Tucson Citizen, March 28, 1991. pp. A1, A2.
10230. Anonymous. "After Flight, Iraqi Kurds Languish in Turkey
[60000 refugees prohibited from travel, working or setting up schools
for their 16000 children; Kurds grateful for asylum from Iraqi chemical
attacks, but seek end to 'temporary' conditions: theyr perceive no
future; Turkey has spent $35 million on the refugees]", in Christian
Science Monitor, August 25, 1989. p. 6.
10231. Anonymous. "Aid Project Director Killed [Vincent Tollet was
killed outside of a Kurdish enclave by an unknown gunman; he was
director of an aid project which provided artificial limbs to war victims
in northern Iraq", in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 28,
1993. p. 6. [TXT]
10232. Anonymous. "Aid Project Director Killed [Vincent Tollet was
killed outside of a Kurdish enclave by an unknown gunman; he was
director of an aid project which provided artificial limbs to war victims
in northern Iraq]", in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 28,
1993. p. 6. [TXT]
10233. Anonymous. "Aid Workers Attacked [UN relief operations in
northern Iraq have sustained a systematic bombing campaign]", in
Seattle Times, July 29, 1992. p. A2. [TXT]
10234. Anonymous. "Air Force Investigator: Drop Charges In Iraq
Copter Deaths [Air Force pilot was charged in shoot down of two
Black Hawk helicopters]", in Seattle Times, November 22, 1994. p.
A4. [TXT]
10235. Anonymous. "Allied Troops", in Wall Street Journal, October
11, 1991. p. A1. [TXT] The last Allied troops in southeastern Turkey
will be withdrawn. They were stationed there to protect the Kurds in
northern Iraq, a mission that has now ended. [TXT]
10236. Anonymous. "Alone Among German Hospitals, Berlin Center
Treats the Victims of State-Sponsored Torture", in The Week in
Germany, September 15, 1995. p. 6. The end of the Cold War may be
seen to have ushered in a new era for much of Europe, but it had little
effect on political violence and repressive governments in other parts
of the world, nor did it end the torture that is often an integral part of
such governments. Given the persistence of torture, the doctors and
counselors at Berlin's Treatment Center for Torture Victims
(Behandlungszentrum fur Folteropfer) maintain, the time has come
for the care of torture survivors to be recognized as a distinct
therapeutic specialty. The Treatment Center, located in a part of a
Berlin hospital, was opened in early 1992 by a doctors' group
established two years earlier by the Berlin Medical Association
(Artzekammer Berlin) and with the support of the German Red
Cross. Part of the motivation behind the initiative, the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung notes, was the desire to come to terms with the
German medical profession's complicity with the Nazi regime and
widespread reluctance to treat concentration camp survivors after the
war. The only facility of its sort in Germany, the Treatment Center
pursues a multidimensional approach to helping torture victims.
Internistsand psychiatrists work together with physical therapists,
social workers and a variety of medical specialists in tending to the
particular needs of the patients. The Treatment Center had 201
patients last year, roughly half of them new admittances and half
continuing cases from the previous year. The largest contingent (59)
were Kurds from Turkey and Iraq. There were also comparatively
large groups of Bosnians (29), Palestinians (19) and Iranians (13).
Eleven of the Treatment Center's patients were former prisoners in
the German Democratic Republic who, center administrators say,
were still suffering the effects of prolonged solitry confinement, sleep
deprivation and regular late-night interrogations. 40% of the patients
119
are asylum-seekers awaiting decisions on their asylum applications;
the uncertainty of their status frequently complicates their treatment.
At present, 70 individuals are on the Treatment Center's waiting list.
Funding for the Treatment Center comes from Germany's Federal
Ministry of Family, the Elderly, Women and Youth, the Red Cross,
the UN and the European Union, as well as donations from
individuals. Money is tight and the Treatment Center is hoping for
contributions to meet its operating expenses.
Just as important as contributions, however, would be the
establishment of an endowed professorship in the treatment of torture
victims so that doctors and therapists could be trained in the particular
difficulties of this area. Professorships already exist in France, Great
Britain, and the US. [=]
10237. Anonymous. "Ambassador Kandemir Presents Two Lectures
at UVA", in Turkish Times, February 1, 1998. p. 1. Turkish
Ambassador Nuzhet Kandemir addressed University of Virginia
students and faculty on 1/20/1998 delivering a lecture titled "Defining
NATO for the 21st Century: a Turkish Perspective" and also spoke at
the Darden Business School on Turkish Economy Prepares for the
21st Century and Beyond. Explaining Turkey's perspective on the
NATO enlargement process, the Ambassador outlined the top
security priorities on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. The
Ambassador noted that although they are NATO allies, Greece and
Turkey still had a serious problem in communicating on a number of
bilateral issues that need to be discussed. He said that it is imperative
for the two countries to enter into a meaningful dialogue to settle these
issues. "In this connection, Turkey offered Greece a historic proposal
in March of 1996 to settle all outstanding bilateral issues in a
comprehensive manner. Greece, however, rejected this," the
Ambassador pointed out. Criticizing the frequent verbal attacks
against Turkey by Greek politicians, including Foreign Minister
Pangalos, Kandemir stated that cheap political posturing intended for
domestic consumption do not help to achieve peace in the Aegean.
Amb. Kandemir also briefed the audience about Turkey's relations
with the Caucasus and the Middle East. He strongly criticized Syria
for using "terrorism as a weapon and negotiating tool in the conduct of
its foreign policy," and said that Syrian-supported PKK terrorism has
cost Turkey thousands of lives and caused a huge economic and
social burden in Turkey's southeast. About relations with Iraq, Amb.
Kandemir reminded the audience that the overall losses suffered by
Turkey in enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq now stand at almost 35
billion dollars. Noting that Iran was important for Turkey as a neighbor
directly connecting Turkey to Central Asia, Amb. Kandemir told the
audience that Turkey and Iran must find ways of peaceful co-existing
without interfering in each other's domestic affairs. After outlining
Turkey's foreign policy issues and a brief history of the transformation
of NATO throughout the years, Amb. Kandemir stressed that Turkey
has no opposition in principle to the NATO enlargement process.
"Turkey does not regard the expansion process as an end in itself," he
noted and said that Turkey particularly supported candidacies of
Romania and Bulgaria. Kandemir also added that a special
relationship should be fostered between NATO and Russia within the
new European Security and Defense architecture. "However, this
does not mean that Russia should have a free hand in re-establishing
any spheres of influence in the countries which it describes as its
"near abroad," the Ambassador said. "A key concept in building a new
Europe is the notion of integration," the Ambassador stressed and
drew attention to the broad congruence between the enlargement
process of NATO and the EU. "The expansion of NATO cannot be
separated from the enlargement process of the EU and its defense
arm, the WEU. Being a full member of NATO and an associate
member of the EU and the WEU, Turkey should be accorded full
membership in the latter organizations as well," the Ambassador
concluded.
Darden Business School: Addressing the Darden Business
School, Amb. Kandemir presented an overview of Turkey's current
economic and investment climate as well as the growing
opportunities for regional economic partnerships and trade.
Describing Turkey as an "economic giant waiting to be awakened,
Ambassador stated that high inflation, inefficient state-owned
enterprises and an ineffective tax system were the main obstacles in
achieving Turkey's full economic potential. He also added that the
current government in Turkey was taking the necessary steps to
implement a bold plan of action in combating these shortcomings.
Emphasizing that the economic overhaul in Turkey is real and
substantial, the Ambassador noted that enormous possibilities for
investing in Turkey was trying to modernize its telecommunication,
healthcare, agricultural and energy sectors and said that they strongly
encouraged US investment in the energy sector. Kandemir also
pointed out that Turkey spearheaded many regional economic
programs including the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the
Economic Cooperation Organization and briefed the audience about
its economic relations with Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East,
the US and the EU. Kandemir also examined the reasons for EU's
rejection of Turkey in the enlargement process and that according to
some observers, the EU rejected Turkey's membership on
economical grounds to which he responded that "it is highly ironic that
the rejected country....has the 17th largest economy in the world. Our
imports are projected to reach 60 billion dollars by the year 2000.
Turkey is listed as one of the ten 'Big Emerging Markets' by the US
Commerce Department. We have a GNP of nearly 200 billion dollars.
We are the second largest market in Europe after Germany," he
stated and asked, "If Turkey is so economically unfit for membership
in the EU, how is it that Turkish-EU Customs Union can be so
beneficial to the European Union?" [=]
10238. Anonymous. "Americans Still Held Hostage, But Few Know
of Cases; The Loved Ones of US Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad in
the 1990s Have a Big Complaint: few People Seem To Care Now
That Most Cases Are Not Political in Nature", in Seattle Times, June
7, 1996. p. A3. Americans citizens are held by Colombian guerrillas
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) (taking New Tribes
Mission missionaries working with the Kuna Indians in Panama), by
the National Liberation Army (Colombia), Al-Faran (Kashmir, India),
New Peoples Army (Philippines), the Abu Sayyaf Group
(Philippines), and the Kurdistan Workers Party (Turkey). For the
Clinton Administration, the 'prime option' is to ignore the problem and
hope that there is not much publicity. [TXT]
10239. Anonymous. "Angry Kurds Wage a Day of Rage", in Daily
World (Aberdeen), June 25, 1993. p. A11. Waves of coordinated
attacks across Europe have left one Kurd dead and dozens under
arrest. Police fear the Kurdish secessionist war against Turkey could
spread to Germany. On 6/24/1993, there were coordinated bombings
against Turkish targets in six nations. The most violent attack was in
Bern, Switzerland, where one Kurd was killed and seven people
wounded in a shootout: Turks inside the Embassy fired on Kurdish
protesters outside. In Munich, 13 Kurds who seized the Turkish
Embassy surrendered: the dissidents could face deportation to
Turkey. Germany may ban violent Kurdish groups. Other attacks and
protests were staged in Denmark, Switzerland and UK and included
rock throwing at banks and travel agencies, and protests at
embassies. [TXT]
10240. Anonymous. "Ankara Angry Over Greek Call for Anti-Turkish
120
Bloc", in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press and
Information, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 3, 1996. Highly
controversial remarks by Greek Defence Minister Gerassimos
Arsenis that Athens should cooperate with all of Turkey's neighbours
for what in effect would amount to an anti-Turkish bloc have elicited
angry reactions from Ankara. Despite these remarks, Foreign
Minister Emre Gonensay told Parliament on Tuesday that Turkey
was still expecting a positive response from Athens to its recently
announced peace initiative aimed at Greece. "We retain our hope that
a new era can be opened in our relations" Gonensay told deputies
when presenting his ministry's budget proposal to the Parliamentary
Planning and Budget Commission. Replying to a question regarding
Syria, Gonensay said: "We hope Syria will show a political will that
would lead to the ending of a confidence crisis caused by its own
attitude", and accused Syria of ignoring its international obligations to
counter terrorism. "The support given to the terrorism of the outlawed
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) by Syria prevents good neighbourly
relations between Syria and Turkey" Gonensay said. "Neither do
Syria's baseless claims that its water rights are usurped by Turkey
and its efforts to bring this non-existent problem to the international
platform help to resolve the problem". Gonensay accused Syria of
using terrorism as a way to get its way on the Euphrates water
question.
Turkish Defence Minister Oltan Sungurlu, responding to a claim
by Arsenis that landing rights had been secured from Syria for Greek
fighter jets, characterized this claim on Tuesday as "very serious".
Recalling that Greece was also a NATO member, Sungurlu
suggested this prevented Athens from such military accords with
non-NATO members. "I hope that this remains just a claim. Greece
has nothing to gain by increasing the tension in the Aegean crisis"
Sungurlu said. He was talking the reporters on his return from Tirana,
Albania, where he attended a meeting of Balkan defence ministers -from which Athens stayed away.
A written statement from the Turkish Foreign Ministry on
Monday referred to Arsenis' remarks, in which the Greek minister
had also claimed that "Kemalism" was expansionist by nature, and
call for efforts to ensure that it was defeated from "within". "(Arsenis)
has rejected dialogue which is the initial means of trying to solve
international disputes" the Foreign Ministry statement said. It added
that the remarks by Arsenis and his assistant Nikkos Kouris would
make the settlement of disputes between the two countries "more
difficult". It also said that the remarks about Kardak, which were out of
keeping with the US-mediated decision by the two sides to return to
the "status quo ante" concerning the islet, represented "new examples
of irresponsibility" on the part of Athens. "As it turned out a Greek
citizen landed on the Kardak islet on 3/31/1996 immediately after
these remarks (in the Greek parliament) and stayed there for a while,
leading to a formal protest on our part" the statement said. "We invite
Greece once again to refrain from such statements and to respond
positively to the broad proposals for a settlement put forward by
Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz on 3/24/1996" it added.
Meanwhile, Turkish Ambassador to Athens Umit Pamir met
with Greek Foreign Minister Teodoros Pangalos yesterday. During
the 45-minute meeting held at the invitation of Pangalos, Ambassador
Pamir furnished information to Pangalos on Turkish Prime Minister
Mesut Yilmaz's view and approach regarding the solution of TurkishGreek disputes and the future of relations between the two countries.
Pamir also visited Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis last Tuesday
for the same reason. [Milliyet-Cumhuriyet-Sabah] [=]
10241. Anonymous. "Ankara Files Demarche Over Observer Story",
in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press and
Information, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 30, 1997.
Turkey has demanded an explanation from Greece over a news
report by the leading British daily "Observer" saying Athens sheltered
and trained Kurdish separatists in Greece, a claim long-repeated by
Ankara.
Ankara summoned Greek Ambassador Dimitrios Nezeretis to
the Foreign Ministry on Monday for an explanation concerning the
Observer's detailed article. Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Omer Akbel told reporters at the weekly press conference on
Monday, referring to the report in the Observer's Sunday edition that
Turkey took the article seriously as there was a background of alleged
support for PKK terrorists activities emanating from Greece.
[Milliyet-Hurriyet] [=]
10242. Anonymous. "Ankara To Rome: Cooperate On Immigration
Flood", in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press and
Information, Turkey, January 5, 1998. As the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds'
so-called "flight of hope" to Europe continues to stir international
reaction, Ankara is criticizing some Western European countries for
sympathizing with terrorist activities while showing sensitivity
towards the immigration problem. The illegal immigration problem
was referred to in a letter addressed to Italian Foreign Minister
Lamberto Dini by his Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem, responding to
Dini's message on the issue sent on sensitivity, Cem proposed to
Dini a joint and active approach towards the problem of illegal
immigration in his letter.
Cem said: "The current problem is a blatant case of illegal
trafficking in human beings, an extremely serious form of organized
crime. Illegal immigration has always been a source of concern for
Turkey. We have consistently sought multilateral cooperation against
all forms of organized crime and international terrorism. We have
drawn our attention to their interrelation, to the funding of terrorism by
organized crime, like the organization of illegal migrations and to
crime networks established in Western Europe under various guises.
This is largely due to false analysis or to miscalculation prevailing in
some Western European countries. Their policies meant in practice a
tolerance for terror-related activities. These acts were, in principle,
aimed at Turkey and were not considered as a danger to the host
country". [All papers] [=]
10243. Anonymous. "Anti-Immigrant Party Scores in Germany", in
Seattle Times, April 27, 1998. p. A8. Saxony-Anhalt has seen a
breakthrough by the German Peoples Union, which rose from near
zero to 13% of the vote. Neither Helmut Kohl's Free Democratic
Party or the Green Party won the 5% of the voted to qualify for
representation in the state legislature. The Union was funded by
Bavarian publisher Gerhard Frey. Much of the support for the party
comes from resentment of the 9 million foreigners in Germany
(mainly Turks and Kurds) who are seen as a drain on the welfare
system. [TXT]
10244. Anonymous. "Anti-PKK Operation In Bodrum", in Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 3, 1997. Security forces in the
region around the popular holiday resort of Bodrum have been
carrying out operations against the PKK terrorist organization.
Reports say that weapons and ammunition have been seized by the
security forces. Supporters of the PKK have reportedly been taken to
Diyabakir for questioning. [Sabah] [=]
10245. Anonymous. "Anti-Regime Iranian Kurd Leader Slain
[gunmen in Vienna assassinate Abdul Rahman Qassemlou, and his
deputies Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar and Fadel Mala Mahmound Rasoul
121
of pro-Iraq Democratic Party of Kurdistan; Qassemlou was reportedly
holding talks with Iran]", in Los Angeles Times, July 15, 1989. p. A9.
10246. Anonymous. "Anti-Saddam Kurdish Faction Closing In On
City held By Foes [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan on edge of Erbil]", in
Seattle Times, October 16, 1996. p. A12. [TXT]
10247. Anonymous. "Appeal for Enlistment in the Algerian Liberation
Army", in Iraqi Review-Weekly English Supplement to Ittihad AlShaab, April 30, 1960. p. 3. The editorial board of Ittihad al-Shaab
published the following appeal urging Iraqi citizens to enlist in the
Algerian Liberation Army:
To the dear Iraqi patriots, whether Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans or
other minorities; whether workers, peasants, artisans or intellectuals,
regardless of political leanings or creed.
Not long ago the Algerian Government declared readiness to
welcome volunteers to enroll in the Liberation Army now heroically
engaged in fighting for the liberation of Algeria from the slavery of
French imperialism aided and supported by the Fascist mercenaries
from West Germany together with other NATO countries led by the
US.
The Algerian Liberation Army has manifested great
determination to liberate its homeland. Through six years of
sanguinary struggle, during which Algeria was turned into a volcano
erupting on the imperialist invaders, the Algerian Liberation Army,
undaunted by the loss of hundreds of thousands of martyrs, earned the
praise and support of all forces of liberty and peace in the Arab
countries and the entire world.
This glorious national struggle waged by the Algerian Liberation
Army rendered a great service to Arab countries either fighting for
liberation or for maintaining and preserving independence and,
consequently, to all peoples opposed to imperialism and war.
The question of Algerian Liberation is inseparably linked with our
own national question in Iraq; the two issues are nothing but a part of a
still larger issue, i.e., that of liberating the entirety of the Arab people
from the yoke of imperialism and its agents in order to open the road
to further development, progress and prosperity.
The Iraq people of all classes, nationalities and political leanings
and creeds is unanimously agreed on backing the Algerian
Revolution, Liberation Army and provisional government; that is why
they welcomed and will continue to welcome any step or measures
taken by the national government, headed by Abdul Karim Qassim, to
serve this end.
The joint Algerian-Iraqi communique coming in the wake of the
negotiations with the Algerian delegation headed by the brave fighter,
Belqasim, came as a good response to the desire and will of the Iraqi
people to support morally the Algerian Revolution.
The masses of our people are now called upon to undertake a
new task towards struggling Algeria; that is to respond to the
declaration made by the Algerian government by hastening to enlist in
the Algerian Liberation Army and fighting in its ranks particularly
those citizens who are already trained or have the technical
qualifications. These are asked to put their services at the disposal of
the Algerian government and its permanent representative in the Iraqi
Republic.
Victory is for the heroic Algerian Liberation Army. Long live
Algeria, a free and independent republic. Long live the Glorious Arab
People. [=]
10248. Anonymous. "Arab, African Refugees Wash Ashore in
Waves", in Seattle Times, July 2, 1998. p. A12. More than 350 Kurds
and North Africans landed in Italy yesterday, including 184 Turkish
Kurds at Riace and 160 North Africans in Sicily: one Tunisian man
died off Sicily. Warm weather is expediting the flow of refugees
across the sea, while tough immigration rules force them to return to
theirhomelands. The Italian Foreign Minister called ambassadors
from Morocco and Tunisia to express concern. On Monday, a boat
was found drifting with 111 Arabs and Africans from as far as
Rwanda, and including people from Lebanon, Iraq, and Sudan, Liberia
and Congo. A Ukrainian freighter found two refugees from the ship on
a raft seeking landfall on Cyprus. [TXT]
10249. Anonymous. "Armenian Research Center", in Society for the
Study of Caucasia Newsletter, April 1977. p. 2. The Armenian
Research Center is located on the campus of the University of
Michigan-Dearborn. It has a small but significant research library for
Armenian Studies, including history, literature, religion, art and
architecture, as well as Russia, Eastern European, Transcaucasian,
Turkish, and Kurdish materials. The library is catalogued in a
computer database, consisting of 36901 records (which include
important bvooks and articles located in other collections). The ARC
collection includes 3807 books, 21501 newspaper, journal, and
manuscript articles (in vertical files accessible through thedatabase);
as well as many other kinds of material including personal archives.
Researchers are welcome to use the facilities. Tel: (313)-593-5181;
fax: (313) 593-5219. Internet: Papazian(a)umich.edu Web:
http://www.umd.umich.edu/dept/armenian [=]
10250. Anonymous. "Army Wants Government To Take 'Urgent
Action' In Southeast", in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General
of Press and Information, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
November 18, 1997. General Staff officials are urging the government
to take immediate economic and social measures as a follow-up to
the victory won by the military against the PKK terrorist organization
in Turkey's southeastern region. They emphasized that terrorism has
been brought to an end in the eastern and southeastern regions by the
resolute struggle of the security forces. Yesterday, Maj. Gen. Bekir
Ugurlu briefed a group of Turkey's leading journalists in the eastern
city of Van, invited by the military to tour the region and observe the
situation in the Southeast. [All papers] [=]
10251. Anonymous. "Arrest of Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan Sparks
Protest", in Financial Times, February 17, 1999. p. 1. Kurdish
activists staged violent protests in 20 European cities after the capture
of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, after a four-month search for political
asylum. Ocalan was captured in Nairobi after spending 13 days in the
Greek ambassador's residence as a "humanitarian gesture": the
circumstances of his capture in Kenya remain obscure. After reports
of his capture, Kurdish protesters demonstrated at and seized several
of embassies and consulates of Greece and Kenya. There were
Kurdish demonstrations in at least ten cities in Germany. In London, a
Kurdish woman set herself alight as 100 demonstrators occupied the
Greek embassy. In Turkey, celebrated the capture of Ocalan, PM
Bulent Ecevit stated: "We vowed we would get him wherever he was
in the world. We have carried out our promise." Without being
accused of any role in the capture of Ocalan, Israeli officials stated:
"Israel wishes to make it absolutely clear that it was not involved in
any way in this matter." [TXT]
10252. Anonymous. "Arslan: "Village Guard System Will Remain",
in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press and
Information, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 17, 1997.
Emergency Rule Regional Governor Aydin Arslan said on Thursday
that the village guard system would remain even if the emergency
rule was lifted. He said so far more than one thousand village guards
had lost their lives in the clashes between the sucurity forces and the
122
outlawed PKK terror organization. He noted that the village guard
system was regulated according to the Law on Villages and that it was
not a system affiliated to the Law on Emergency Rule. [Sabah] [=]
10253. Anonymous. "Article 23, ", in Extracts From The Program of
the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq, As Published By The KDP
Information Department, June 1973. Articles 23: 'We struggle to (a)
guarantee the the rights of Kurdish student and in order to wipe out
illiracy and to give anationalist and democratic content while fighting
reactionary, fascist and racist tendencies (b) revitalize Kurdish
history, literature and art and to enrich them with the humanist
elements from other cultures and to protect and preserve historic
sites in Kurdistan and to build museums for them (c) to develop the
University of Sulaimaniya, protect its independence and to turn it into
acenter for academic research and for the revitalization of the kurdish
national culture (d) emphasize the teaching of Kurdish language,
history, culture during all stages of education, promote the teaching of
Kurdish throughout Iraq, establish a Kurdish academy of science,
apress and publishing house,and separate radio and television station
in Kurdistan, (e) make primary school education compulsory for both
sexes, open night schools for workers, farmers and others, and to
increase the number of libraries, laboratories and literary clubs in
order to raise the cultural and educational standards of the people, (f)
promote Kurdish art and culture and to use their potentials to serve
humanity in general and the objectives and interests of the Kurdish
people in particular, and to encourage the literary and artistic
movement by increasing the number of assistantships and
scholarships, the building of theatres and opening of clubs, (g)
guaranteethe rights of teachers in Kurdistan and to raise their
standard in various aspects of their profession. [=]
10254. Anonymous. "Articles 3, 6-8", in Extracts From The Program
of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq, As Published By The KDP
Information Department, June 1973. Article 3: 'We struggle for
freedom and for the implementation of the March 11th Agreement in
both letter and spirit and to enable the people of Kuistan to achieve
autonomy and to protect, consolidate and develop that autonomy in
Kurdistan and within the Iraqi Republic.'
Article 6: 'We struggle for the sake of establishing a popularly,
elected revolutionary and democratic form of governmen. We also
struggle to achieve far-reaching social and economic changes within
all aspects of of the society aand to guarantee for all the citizens the
freedom of worship, belief, press, and political association.
Article 7: 'We struggle (a) for the strengthening of brotherly
relations between the Arab and Kurdish nations, (b) for the
consolidation of brotherhood among the arabs, the Kurds and the
minorities within Iraq and for the strengthening of national unity, (c) for
the strengthening of bonds of friendship between our Kurdish people
and all peoples of the world.
Article 8: (a) We struggle for peace in the world and for the
lessening of international tensions and we are guided by the principles
of the united nations, the Bandong Conference resolutins,the principles
of peaceful co-existence, peaceful solutions of international
disputes,the banning of nuclear weapons and tests on them, (b) we
pursue a nationalist anti imperialist policy and we strive to strengthen
friendly relations with all peoples of the world based upon the principle
of mutual benefit and the support of national liberation movements
waged by people for the sake of independence and the right of selfdetermination. [=]
10255. Anonymous. "Articles 9, 12, 16-17 and 22", in Extracts From
The Program of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq, As Published
By The KDP Information Department, June 1973. Article 9: 'We
endeavour to strengthen bonds of friendship and cooperation between
our party and all other Iraqi parties and organizatons which believe in
the justice of the Kurdish question and whitch support the common
struggle of our party and the other democratic organizations in all
parts of of Kurdistan. we also endeavour to strengthen ties of
friendship with the democratic parties and organizations throughout
the world.'
Article 12: 'We struggle to develop our national economy and to
raise the standard of living of the people of by following the principle of
comprehensive economic and social plannin, taking into cosideration
the human and natural resources of the land and hoping to available
thebasic needs for developement and encouraging both the public and
private sectors of the economy while insuring the leading role of the
former .
Article 16: 'We support the new land reform law No. 37 of 1970
in the hope of that all farmers of Kurdistan will be able to own some
land and so that feudalism in Kurdistan be uprooted....
Article 17: 'We believe in the regulating of domestic and foriegn
trade while assisting and stimulating the business community, all this
will be taking into consideration the interests of both public and private
sectors based upon the national interests of the country and on the
principle of combating monopoly and price speculati. we also believe
in establishing commercial ties with other countries based upon the
principle of reciprocity and the encouragement of exports and the
limiting of imports to the basic and necessary commodities
Article 22: 'We support women's political, economic, social and
cultural rights and we work to see the the necessary law passed
which will guarantee rights of women prior, during and after childbirth
as well as the rights of mothers and children. [=]
10256. Anonymous. "As We Go to Press: CIA Plot Behind the US
Bombing of Iraq", in Revolutionary Worker (RCP), September 15,
1996. p. 3. Several days after the US cruise missile attack in Iraq, it
was revealed that Saddam Hussein's attack on the Kurdish city of
Erbil had profoundly disrupted a long-standing CIA plot in Iraq to
overthrow Hussein. The CIA plot was reported on 9/7/1996 by the
New York Times which talked to "senior administration officials." The
US accused Hussein of aggression to justify the missile attack. But
now it is revealed that it was the US itself that had developed Erbil as
a staging area for its aggressive plots! The Iraqi occupation of Erbil
was then used as US justification for the cruise missile attack on Iraq.
Erbil was reportedly the headquarters of the so-called National
Congress - known as a CIA instrument for intrigue within the internal
affairs of Iraq. The National Congress has been an "umbrella group"
for mutually hostile Iraqi political forces tied to US interests. Another
US-funded organization based in Jordan, the Iraqi National Accord,
was assigned to recruit potential US agents within the Iraqi military.
The Times revealed that President Clinton had expanded these covert
operations in 1/1996 by "signing a secret order directing the CIA to
provide weapons, organize some military training and install some
intelligencegatheringequipment for the factious groups seeking to
unseat Mr. Hussein." At the heart of this project was the US plot to
encourage a military coup against Hussein to install a more reliably
pro-US regime - while keeping the core of the oppressive Iraqi
military and state in command and working for US imperialist
interests. It is a plan for eliminating Hussein without giving an opening
for the masses of people to rise up in a fight for their own antiimperialist interests. With the Iraqi military occupation of Erbil, major
components of this CIA operation appear to have been destroyed. Iraqi
forces reportedly seized computer records of this CIA operation getting information on the "entire infrastructure" of the National
Congress. The US agents on the ground there in southern Kurdistan
reportedly fled and left behind their paid networks to be rounded up.
123
The Iraqi secret police reportedly rounded up 1500 people remaining
in the Erbil area after Iraqi army units pulled out. According to the
Times there are two other glaring signs of the failure of US plots.
First, the operations stepped up by Clinton have failed to attract
significant military defectors from the Iraqi army. Second, it was
Massoud Barzani, a member of the three-member presidential
council of the "Iraqi National Congress," who openly urged Saddam
Hussein to occupy Erbil. The US has been carrying out typical
imperialist tactics. Frustrated by the failures of their CIA plots and
intrigues, the US resorted to the direct military track against Hussein
- pounding Iraq with a new round of cruise missile attacks, hoping to
soften up the Iraqi military for future US plots and intrigues. [=]
10257. Anonymous. "Assassination Attempt Against Bush in Kuwait",
in Crossfire, May 10, 1993. Rep. Henry Hyde noted that while the
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is irrelevant, that the US should reemphasize its efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein since the US has
interests there. He did reject assassination as an explicit US policy.
Laurie Mylroie, 'Fellow in Arab Politics' at Washington Institute for
Near East Policy [note: the founding of the institute by AIPAC, the
Israel lobby, and its financing by Israel was concealed], called for
assassination of Hussein because he is a 'vengeful' sponsor of 'state
terrorism' including assassination; and called for arming the Kurds by
the CIA in a march on Baghdad (that she later admitted could not win
militarily but which would weaken Iraq). She endorsed the partition of
Iraq into ethnic enclaves. She stated that the US should create all the
pre-conditions for Hussein's assassination, and then allow a
surrogate to do the actual execution, so that the US could deny any
role in the murder. She went on to note that a CIA backed coup by the
Iraqi National Congress would allow the US to create a 'friendly' oil
rich state under complete US control. She advanced an arcane
conspiracy theory that an Iraqi used mind control on 'Arab losers'
(she engaged in several outbursts attacking the people accused in the
bombing as stupid so as to support her murky conspiracy theory) to
commit the World Trade Center Bombing. Michael Kinsley called for
the assassination of Saddam Hussein and stated that 'all Americans'
wanted the destruction of the Iraqi government.
10258. Anonymous. "Assyrians", in Bol'shaya Sovetskaya
Entsiklopediya, Vol. 3, 1950. pp. 263-264. Assyrians are described as
a people whose language belongs to the Semitic language group and
who are Nestorian Christians. Prior to WWI they lived in northern
Persia, Turkey, and part of the Caucasus, occupying themselves with
agriculture and animal husbandry or trading in towns in a small way.
Theynumbered 500000. In WWI British agents instigated hostility
between them and their neighbors, Kurds and Turks, and brought
about a rising in the course of which half of the Assyrians were killed.
The survivors were removed by the British army to Iraq where they
were used as an armed force against the Arab national movement. A
minority escaped to the USSR. In 1939 they numbered 30000.
Whereas formerly most were illiterate, their cultural and educational
level is now rising. The old Nestorian alphabet has been replaced by
an alphabet based on Russian. [From: "Part V: Iraq: 1945-1954", in
A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies: An Analysis and
Bibliography. New York: June 1959. p. 7.] [=]
10259. Anonymous. "Asylum Applications Up in 9/1996, Down for
the Year to Date", in Week in Germany, October 18, 1996. p. 2. The
number of individuals who petitioned for political asylum in Germany
jumped by roughly 1200 from 8/1996 to 9/1996, the Federal Ministry of
the interior announced on 10/14/1996. In all, Germany received 10742
asylum applications last month. The largest numbers of applications
were received from citizens of the Republic of Yugoslavia (1925),
Turkey (1924) and Iraq (approximately 1200). Federal Minister of the
Interior Manfred Kanther (CDU) said that the high numbers of
asylum-seekers from the Yugoslav successor states was particularly
worrisome. He also reported that Germany had received 86000
asylum applications from 1/1996 through 9/1996, 6.3% fewer than
during the same period of 1995. [=]
10260. Anonymous. "Athens Supporting PKK Terror", in Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 1, 1996.
Turkish security
organizations have furnished the government with a report which
claims that Greece is providing training facilities for PKK terrorists.
The reports says that the Greek government views the PKK
favourably, and allows its members to train for violence against
Turkey in camps attached to isolated farms and premises throughout
Greece.
The report adds that Greek government agents visit the camps
to educate the terrorists in bombs and explosives. Later, leader of the
PKK, Abdullah Ocalan is sent reports on the progress of his trainee
terrorists. [Milliyet] [=]
10261. Anonymous. "Athens-PKK Relation On The Agenda Of
NATO", in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press and
Information, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 9, 1997.
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said in a press conference on
Wednesday that Greece and PKK relation had been taken into the
agenda of NATO. Recalling that the Greek support for the separatist
terror organization, PKK, had been issued in the European press with
evidences, Cem said Turkish Foreign Ministry decided to voice
Athens and PKK relation at NATO circles and that Turkey's
permanent representative to NATO extended Turkey's written
statement to the General Secretary of NATO.
Cem noted that at the statement it was stressed that NATO had
the responsibility to protect the stability and territorial integrity of its
member countries. [Milliyet-Hurriyet] [=]
10262. Anonymous. "Austrian Support for Turkey", in Turkish Press
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 6, 1997. Now in Austria after
his successes over the weekend at the Crete summit meeting of
Balkan country leaders, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz is continuing
his talks with leading European figures.
Yesterday Yilmaz spoke with Austrian Head of State Thomas
Klestil and other top officials who confirmed their support for Turkey's
full membership in the European Union (EU). Klestil noted that the EU
"should keep an open mind on Turkey's membership." Klestil also
said that Austria wanted to see Turkey attend the conference on the
future of new candidate countries.
But again, Austrian leaders made the point that Turkey has also
got to get into position for EU membership by improving its track
record in various vital areas. Mesut Yilmaz also stressed that other
issues involving the so-called "Kurdish question" would be resolved
before the turn of the century. [Milliyet] [=]
10263. Anonymous. "Azerbaijan Nears More United States Deals
[Chevron Corp., Exxon Corp., Mobil Corp. in talks with state owned
Socar; sixteen firms have signed five deals for development of
Caspian Sea oil worth $18 billion]", in Wall Street Journal, June 24,
1997. pp. A18. [TXT]
10264. Anonymous. "Baghdad Agrees to Help Kurds Harvest120000
Tons of Wheat Under US Pressure [agreement was reached between
Iraq and the Kurds in talks in Baghdad]", in Wall Street Journal, June
124
14, 1991. p. A1. [TXT]
10265. Anonymous. "Balkan Leaders Agree To Fight Crime", in
Turkey, April 17, 1998. Balkan neighbours Turkey, Romania and
Bulgaria signed an agreement yesterday for jointly combatting
terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking and
human and arms smuggling, as well as other major crimes. The
agreement was signed by the presidents of the three countries after a
meeting in Turkey's Mediterranean port of Antalya, in which each
side's foreign and interior ministers also participated. The general
content of the agreement includes intensive judicial and technical
cooperation between the police organizations of the signatory
countries. Diplomats participating in the meeting said that the
agreement was a major blow to the PKK terrorist organization, which
has recently been expending efforts to establish itself in Bulgaria and
Romania. In another significant move, the three parties agreed to
establish a free trade zone between themselves. Turkey and Romania
have already established such an area. With the completion of a
bilateral free trade agreement with Bulgaria, the trilateral free trade
zone is expected to be realized in the years between 2000-2005, and
negotiations on the issue are expected to begin before the end of 1998.
[All papers] [=]
10266. Anonymous. "Baybasin Brothers To Be Tried In The UK", in
Turkey, March 30, 1998. Two brothers of Huseyin Baybasin, alleged
drug gang leader who is thought to have good contacts with the
Kurdish Med-TV and the Kurdish Parliament in-exile, are being tried
by Magistrate Court in the UK. Abdullah Baybasin and Sirin Baybasin
who were arrested together with Mehmet Cetin on Friday in London,
as part of coordinated police operations against "organized crime" in
Europe, were charged on Saturday with possession of firearms and
drug-related crimes. [All papers] [=]
10267. Anonymous. "Beirut [pro-Iranian Iraq Kurds announced the
kidnapping of Italian engineers in northern Iraq]", in Investors Daily,
October 13, 1987. p. 1. [TXT
10268. Anonymous. "Bilican: 'Giant Strides Made Against PKK
Separatists'", in Turkish Press Review. Directorate General of Press
and Information, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 17, 1997.
Emergency Rule Region Governor Necati Bilican said on Wednesday
that the Turkish government had taken giant steps in its struggle
against separatist terrorism in the Southeast, adding that since the
beginning of 1997, 4783 terrorists from the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) had been killed by security forces.
Governors from the provinces where the emergency rule region
is being implemented gathered in the eastern town of Van to discuss
measures against the separatist PKK, and to seek ways to create jobs
in the region. [Milliyet] [=]
10269. Anonymous. "Blair, "Turkey Is A Natural Part Of Europe"", in
Turkey, January 9, 1998. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in
london on Thursday that the Britain presidency would apply every
diplomatic means to improve relations between Turkey and the
European Union (EU) in the coming six months. Speaking together
with Jacques Sanders, president of the European Commission, at a
press conference organized after the first EU Commission meeting in
London. Blair said it was vital both for Turkey and the EU to maintain
the good relations.
Meanwhile, Santer also said the text agreed to in Luxembourg
regarding Turkey had a great significance since it was the first time
15 member-states had agreed on conditions for Turkey to join the EU.
Regarding the issue of Kurdish immigration Europe, both Blair
and Santer said cooperation was vital for all illegal immigration to be
prevented. [Milliyet] [=]
10270. Anonymous. "Bomb Explosion In Hakkari", in Turkish Press
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 20, 1997. One person was killed
and 15 were injured as a result of a bomb explosion in Hakkari's town
of Yuksekova. A car parked between the police station and the post
office exploded. Police officials say the bomb was placed by the
separatist PKK organization. Strick security measures have been
initiated in the town to prevent further similar incidents. [All papers] [=]
10271. Anonymous. "Bomb Injures 9 At Turkish Tourist Site [bomb
explodes at ancient cistern site in Istanbul; no group claims
responsibility, but police suspect Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)]", in
New York Times, April 11, 1998. p. A6. [TXT]
10272. Anonymous. "Bomb Spurs Fears of More Kurd Violence", in
Seattle Times, March 21, 1999. p. A17. A man believed to be a
Kurdish rebel detonated a suicide bomb killing himself and two police
in Diyarbakir. Police tried to stop the man as he approached a police
station in that city. In Sirnak province, police foiled an attack by a
woman with two grenades strapped to her wrist. Police fear Kurdish
violence during Nowruz celebrations: in Berlin, Stuttgart and other
German cities there were large Kurdish gatherings without violence.
In Austria, thousands of Kurds marched demanding the release of
Ocalan, In Istanbul, police raids detained more than 30 people and the
Peoples Democracy Party offices and pro-Kurdish centers in the city.
[TXT]
10273. Anonymous. "Bombs Found on Trucks Carrying Food to Iraqi
Kurds [on 11/29/92 six trucks were damaged by bombs after food was
delivered to Iraqi Kurds]", in Seattle Times, December 8, 1992. p. A6.
[TXT]
10274. Anonymous. "Bonn Backs Eu Membership For Turkey", in
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 1, 1997. German leaders
extended conditional support yesterday to Turkey's bid to become a
member of the European Union (EU). Chancellor Helmut Kohl and
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told Turkish Prime Minister Mesut
Yilmaz, on an official visit to Germany, that Bonn backs eventual
membership for Turkey in the EU but first expects Ankara to make
progress in resolving key domestic and foreign policy problems.
"Kohl declared that he supported the goal of later Turkish
membership in the EU" said Kohl's spokesman Peter Hausmann in a
statement after a meeting between Yilmaz and Kohl. "In doing so, Kohl
assumes that Turkey will follow calls by the EU to make its own
contribution toward reaching this goal" said the statement which
stressed that Kohl firmly viewed Turkey as a part of Europe. Yilmaz
told reporters he was very satisfied with his talks in Bonn and that he
was convinced the 15-nation EU would agree at its December
Luxembourg summit to intensify contacts aimed at Turkish
membership. "This is a turning point in our relations with the EU" he
said. Yilmaz said his government was fully aware of the "partly
justified" international criticism of Turkey and said Ankara was
working to resolve problem areas. He said that Ankara would
continue its fight against the PKK terrorist organization.
Aside from talks on EU membership, bilateral economic issues
were another focus of the visit and Yilmaz met German business
125
leaders in Bonn. Germany is Turkey's biggest trade partner in the
world. Turkey and Germany signed an agreement for the
establishment of a university in Istanbul, which will teach all its
courses in German. The agreement was signed by German Foreign
Ministry Undersecretary Peter Hartmann and Turkish Ambassador
Volkan Vural, in the presence of Yilmaz and Kohl. Yilmaz also met
with Christian Social Union Parliamentary Group Chairman Michael
Glos at the Turkish Embassy yesterday. [All papers] [=]
10275. Anonymous. "Bonn Calls for Stop to MED TV", in Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2, 1996. The German government
wants to see an end to Kurdish MED TV satellite broadcasts. MED
TV broadcasts from a station in London, although there have been
reports that the British government has had the stationed closed down.
MED TV has reportedly set up an operation in Switzerland. The Bonn
government has shown itself to be against the channel which is known
to support the PKK.
Bonn officials said yesterday that with the support of other
countries, "we can achieve concrete results" in this matter. Germany
has been in touch with Britain about the issue which Turkey is also
following closely. [All papers] [=]
10276. Anonymous. "Bonn Cuts Off Military Aid to Turkey" , in The
Week In Germany, March 27, 1992. The Bonn government stopped
all military aid to Turkey on Thursday (3/26), reacting to Ankara's
refusal to clarify whether weapons recieved from Germany have been
used in attacks by the Turkish military against Kurdish civilians.
Government Spokesperson Dieter Vogel said that Bonn had "first
indications" of the use of German weapons against Kurds; if this
should prove true, it would be "a clear violation" of the agreements
made between Turkey and Germany on the use of the weapons. The
agreements specify that the weaponry may be used only in the case of
an attack on Turkey by a non-NATO state. "As long as these
questions have not been completely and satisfactorily answered, the
federal government will not supply any military material to Turkey,"
the spokesperson declared.
Ankara has received DM 5.5 billion in military aid from
Germany since the 1960's. Support from Bonn amounted to DM 1.84
billion in 1991; for the years 1992-94, Turkey was to have received a
total of DM 212 million. In addition, Turkey has received material aid
in the last years with a value of DM 2.2 billion, particularly in
connection with the Gulf war. This included surplus material from the
Federal Armed Forces such as tanks, air defense weaponry, and
munitions, as well as weaponry from the army of the former German
Democratic Republic. [=]
10277. Anonymous. "Bonn Plans Expulsion of Foreigners Who
Commit Crimes", in Week in Germany, April 5, 1996. pp. 1-2. Amid
threats of anti-German political violence, Bonn has begun preparing
legal measures to facilitate the expulsion of foreigners who break the
law at demonstrations and otherwise. Leaders of the governing
coalition parties (Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social
Union, Free Democratic Party) met on 3/26/1996 to discuss
sharpening the laws pertaining to Germany's foreign residents
following a series of demonstrations by Kurds last month that turned
violent and resulted in injuries to several dozen police officers (cf.
TWIG 3/22/1996, p. 1). CDU General Secretary Hintze and Guido
Westerwelle, his FDP counterpart, told reporters after the meeting
that the coalition parties were broadly in agreement that it should be
easier for German authorities to deport foreigners who violate
German law, but they also indicated that the parties' views on the
specifics differed. The CDU and CSU want to be able to deport
foreign demonstrators - such as Kurds demonstrating for the
independence of their homeland - who can "clearly" be shown to have
seriously disturbed the peace (schwerer Landfriedensbruch) without
first having to secure a criminal conviction. The FDP rejects doing
away with requiring a criminal conviction as a prerequisite for
expulsion on the grounds that it would violate the principle of the rule
of law. This disagreement notwithstanding, the coalition parties expect
to have a legislative proposal ready for cabinet approval in a matter of
weeks. The coalition also seeks to sharpen the law regarding
expulsion of foreigners who have committed crimes of a non-political
nature. If the planned changes are approved, a foreigner who is
convicted of any crime and sentenced to a prison term of three years
or longer will be expelled from the country. Current laws allow
expulsion if the sentence is five years or longer.
Shortly after the coalition parties announced these plans,
Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK),
told major German publication that his organization, which was
banned in Germany two and a half years ago, would take revenge for
German government actions against it. In an interview with the
Munich-based Suddeutsche Zeitung, Ocalan, in exile in Lebanon,
threatened a massive terror campaign against Germany and
suggested German tourists in Turkey could be targets. He elaborated
further in an interview with the weekly Die Zeit, holding out the
possibility of bomb attacks in Germany itself. Declaring that such
attempts at intimidation will not succeed, Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel called Ocalan's threats "absolutely intolerable." Kinkel can
claim a personal as well as a professional interest in the possibility of
a PKK terror campaign: a Cologne daily reported on 4/2/1996 that PKK
supporters had made death threats against the German foreign
minister and Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The Foreign Ministry
confirmed that a threat on Kinkel's life had been received but declined
to provide details. Two days after the report appeared, the National
Kurdistan Liberation Front (ERNK), the military arm of the PKK,
announced through the Kurdistan Information Center in Cologne that it
had not made death threats against Kohl or Kinkel. The PKK, it said,
has no need for "such cheap methods." [=]
10278. Anonymous. "Border Violence Jolts Germans; Four Customs
Agents Die in Checkpoint Gunfire", in Arizona Republic, February 11,
1998. p. A13. Fatal shootings on two German borders, with Poland (at
Goerlitz) and Switzerland (at Konstanz), shocked German, which is
struggling against illegal immigration (especially Kurds) and
smuggling (arms and drugs) on an unprecedented scale. The killings
on the Swiss border involved an Italian national, smuggling Israeli
weapons into Germany. The killing on the Polish border involved a
man from Kazakhstan, and the cause was unclear. [TXT]
10279. Anonymous. "Briefs: Turkey: Bus Stop Bomb Kills 8 [8 Kurds
killed in Batman, southeast Turkey in Kurdish region.]", in Arizona
Daily Star, May 26, 1995. p. A8. [TXT]
10280. Anonymous. "Britain: Kurd Television Station Closed [UK
orders Med TV be closed down, condemning it as a mouthpiece for
Kurdish separatists]", in New York Times, March 23, 1999. p. A12.
[TXT]
10281. Anonymous. "Britian Sends Iraq Charity Work Money", in
Tucson Citizen, December 31, 1991. p. A5. The Ministry for
Overseas Development will send $1.8 million to Iraq for emergency
relief for Kurdish and Shiite minorities. [TXT]
10282. Anonymous. "British Daily Reveals Evidence Linking PKK to
126
Other Terrorist Organizations: Fugitive PKK Member Confesses to
Observer that Greeks Shelter PKK and Provide Missiles: Part 1", in
Turkish Times, October 15, 1997. p. 1. Observer, one of the most
reputable British dailies, gave an extensive coverage [9/28/1997] to the
relations of one of the world's most dangerous bombers, confessing
from a secret hideout in Greece. Seydo Hazar, a German resident
and a PKK member on the run, told Observer that he and his group
were protected by the Greek Marxist Revolutionary Organization 17th
November and financed by elements close to Greek Security
services in their terrorist attacks on European tourists in Turkey.
While the Greek government refutes these claims, western
intelligence agencies are taking these allegations seriously, Observer
writes. Hazar, who said he is disgusted by PKK's targeting of
civilians, has offered to trade his information for sanctuary and new
life. According to the information provided by Hazar, the PKK is
planning to use chemical explosives and poison against civilians. The
fugitive bomb maker also claims that PKK has links with the 17th
November terror group, German neo-Nazis, the Palestinian Hamas
organization and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, pointing out the
collaborationbetweentheinternational terrorist groups. Hazar also
claims that Stinger missiles, manufactured under license in Greece,
were provided to PKK which were then sold by PKK to the Tamil
Tigers and subsequently used to shoot down military transport planes
over Sri Lanka.
The allegation that Athens has been turning a blind eye to PKK
terrorists who are using its territory for training is not something new.
One of the most striking cases of Greek involvement in the PKK's
activities in Turkey came during 1994 and early in this year. Police in
Istanbul and Izmir detained PKK members who were getting ready to
attack tourist resorts. It became clear that these terrorists had been
trained as urban guerrillas in Greece in a camp near Athens. Also,
following a bomb attack in Istanbul's famous Covered Bazaar where
several people were killed, three people were arrested and
questioned. Sakine Donmez, Atilla Kaya, and Abdurrahman Yoruk
confessedthat they received training in Greece on how to handle
explosives. PKK militants said that they had gone from Athens to
Syria to take part in terrorist operations against Turkey. [=]
Observer that Greeks Shelter PKK and Provide Missiles: Part 2:
Hazar on the Run", in Turkish Times, October 15, 1997. pp. 1-2.
Seydo Hazar, 30, provided detailed descriptions of about 12 powerful
bombs disguised in consumer goods products such as nesquick
boxes, video cassettes and ketchup containers. He also identified a
PKK safe house in the Greek village of Drosia, where he left behind a
large cache of explosives including TNT and Amonal, as well as
chemical and biological agents. According to the article, Hazar's
involvement with the PKK began 18 months ago, however, his sister
Meryem is one of the most known members of the PKK group based
in Damascus. He was persuaded to leave Germany to go to Athens
by an inner elite within the PKK, known as the "home office" (ulke
burosu in Turkish). Hazar told the Observer that he was taken to a
training camp operated by a Greek named Dimitri and his partner
Martha in a farm near Triada. Hazar noted that the Greek authorities
were training and equipping Kurdish terrorists for missions in Turkey.
"The Greeks are afraid of the Turkish army and would like to see it
bogged down in a long war of attrition with the Kurds," he told
Observer. According to Hazar, his controllers planned to use his
explosives on civilians particularly in the Mediterranean beaches. The
most lethal device in preparation was sarin, a deadly nerve agent
used in the Tokyo Subway in 1995, intended to be used at the Anitkabir
mausoleum of Ataturk. Hazar first came under suspicion from his
PKK group when one of his bombs exploded earlier than planned
killing the woman who was planting it in Bodrum in 7/1997. A few
weeks later, when another bomb he made failed to explode, he was
accused of being a saboteur and threatened with execution. Managing
to escape from the PKK, Hazar believes that he is being hunted by two
deadly enemies other than PKK: ultra-nationalist 17th November
Greek terrorists and the Greek Secret Service, the GYP which was
allegedly waging a secret war against Turkey by supporting Kurdish
terrorists with their bomb-making and weapons training. Hazar told
the Observer that a retired Greek naval officer pays all the Kurds'
expenses in Greece. [=]
Does Greece Support State Terrorism", in Turkish Times, October
15, 1997. p. 2. Acting upon the information provided by the Observer,
the Greek government stated that "an immediate and thorough
justification to substantiate the allegations." The fact that Greek
authorities have never came up with any leads to catch any member
of the 17th November organization in the last 22 years, raises the
question about the Greek government's sincerity in its fight against
terrorism. Similar allegations about PKK training camps in Greece
resulted in a formal demarche by the then US Ambassador to Greece
Thomas Niles. The newly appointed US Ambassador to Athens
Nicholas Burns put the fight against terrorism on the top of his agenda
during the confirmation hearings before the Congress. Reaffirming
US determination against terrorism, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright also reportedly raised the question of Greece's support for
PKK during her recent visit to Athens. If the allegations that Greek
authorities are helping the PKK and providing them with Stinger
missiles, then Athens could be included among the state sponsors of
terrorism, being subject to economic and diplomatic sanctions. [=]
Observer's Call to Beat Terrorism", in Turkish Times, October 15,
1997. p. 2. Evaluating Hazar's story, the Observer noted that the
close links among terrorist groups and the terrorist threat to civilians
are alarming. The paper continued as follows: "National rivalries have
no place in the joint fight against terrorists. This lesson has to be
learnedabove all in Greece, where a faction-riven secret service
seems to bear some responsibility for exposing citizens to PKK
terrorists - its rivalry with Turkey persuading wilder fringes of its
secret services to sponsor the cell on the principle that my enemy's
enemy is my friend. Our evidence shows its assurances to the US
that these activities would stop are not seen as credible. The US has
threatened sanctions if Greece does not fulfill its responsibilities. Now
Greece's European Union and NATO partners must reinforce the
message." [=]
10286. Anonymous. "British ITC Suspends Pro-PKK MED-TV: Part
1", in Turkish Times, April 1, 1999. p. 1. Turks were relieved to learn
on 3/23/1999 that MED-TV, the PKK's unofficial television station
broadcasting out of Belgium and England with frequent exhortations of
revenge against the Turkish state, has been suspended for 21 days by
British Independent Television Commission (ITC). The station was
also slapped with a penalty of 90000 British pounds. ITC told the
station that it is entitled to make representations within 21 days. At the
end of that period, the ITC must decide whether or not to revoke
MED-TV's license for good. In the past, the PKK chieftain Abdullah
Ocalan participated in the station's talk-show programs through
127
telephone link and encouraged his followers to commit acts of
terrorism against Turkish targets. Ocalan, who is caught by a Turkish
security team in Kenya on 2/16/1999, is awaiting trial on the Marmara
island of Imrali. Sukru Sina Gurel, the State Minister and Government
Spokesman said "the ITC will ask for a defense from MED TV. If their
defense is found inadequate, MED TV broadcasts will be banned
permanently." Gurel stated that in its broadcasts MED TV gives
orders for terrorist acts. He said it should be closed not for only 21
days but permanently. [=]
2: Akarcali Takes Credit", in Turkish Times, April 1, 1999. pp. 1-2.
Bulent Akarcali, the Chairman of the Turkish Democracy Foundation
(TDV) and a Motherland Party (ANAP) deputy from Istanbul that
Turkey should follow the issue of the closure of the MED-TV, the
television channel of the terrorist PKK organization, not only
diplomatically but also from the legal aspect. Issuing a written
statement, Akarcali recalled that the TDV, had launched several
initiatives for the closure of MED-TV, adding that one of those
initiatives had come to fruition at the Independent Television
Commission (ITC) in Britain. Akarcali pointed out that the ITC
responded to that initiative. Akarcali said: "Besides, Britain also
agreed in 1998 that there were new problems with the programs of
MED-TV and the ITC warned that it can rescind the broadcast
license. However, there is a need for a specific period to rescind the
broadcast license of MED-TV could be rescinded by 5/1999." [=]
3: Minister Aktas: 'We'll Dry Out the Swamp'", in Turkish Times,
April 1, 1999. p. 2. Addressing a statement during his visit to Van
during election campaign of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Ziya
Aktas, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, recalled that for
many years MED-TV has been advocating terrorism and separatism.
Stating that the terrorist chief Ocalan had been captured and terrorism
had been hampered, Aktas said: "We are determined. We will dry the
swamp. Nobody can split Turkey. Everybody in this country will live
in friendship." [=]
4: Belgian Campaign Against MED-TV", in Turkish Times, April 1,
1999. p. 2. The residents of Denderleeuw county near Brussels in
Belgium have started a campaign to close the studios of MED-TV, the
broadcasting organ of the terrorist PKK organization, as reported by
the Anatolian News Agency. Denderleeuw residents have reportedly
said that they were making efforts and carrying out a campaign to
send away the PKK supporters from their county. They stated that idle
young girls and children were walking around the studios, and that
they had seen strangers strolling the streets at night causing suspicion
and uneasiness among the population. They said the supporters of the
terrorist organization created serious security problems and staged
several political activities, stressing that they are adamant on the
closure of MED-TV studios. [=]
10290. Anonymous. "British Marines Clash With Iraqi Troops; 2000
Kurds Riot in Zakhu [2000 Kurds attacked Iraqi police until US troops
intervened to protect the Iraqi police]", in Los Angeles Times, May 14,
1991. p. A8.
10291. Anonymous. "Bruce Fein Joins ATAA as Adjunct Scholar:
Part 1", in Turkish Times, April 15, 1999. p. 1. Bruce Fein, a
Harvard-educated attorney, a well known Washington Times
columnist and TV commentator who appears frequently on CNN, has
joined ATAA as an Adjunct Scholar to research Turkish-American
relations. "We take great delight and pride for a seminal thinker and
writer like Mr. Fein to join our organization in this capacity," said
ATAA Pres. Tolga Cubukcu. "I'm sure his pen will present an
enriched panorama of Turkish-US relations to our membership from
a perspective seasoned wit his experience as an attorney and media
veteran." [=]
Part 2: Solid Background", in Turkish Times, April 15, 1999. pp. 1-2.
Mr. Fein summarized his background to Turkish Times as follows: "I
graduated with honors from Harvard Law School in 1972, and then
toiled in the vineyards of the US Department of Justice for 10 years
culminating in service as Associate Deputy Attorney General.
Thereafter, I served as General Counsel to the Federal
Communications Commission specializing in broadcasting and
telecommunications law, and as Research Director to the
Congressional Joint Iran-contra committee. For the past 15 years, I
have engaged in the private practice of international and constitutional
law, and have advised more than a dozen foreign countries on
constitutional and political reform. I have concurrently written a
weekly column for the Commentary Section of The Washington
Times. My motto is awaken with the enthusiasm and energy of a
bugle and retire with the dulcet melodies of flutes and harps." How did
he become interested in Turkish issues, we asked Mr. Fein. It was
clear that the way Ataturk turned Turkey around with his courageous
reforms made quite an impression on this ardent student of history. "I
have studied the evolution of political developments in countless
countries in a quest to discover universal truths regarding democratic
dispensations.The Republic of Turkey was intellectually arresting
because of Ataturk's jump start into Western democratic laws,
customs, and practices without the convulsions of the French
Revolution. Moreover, my intellectual passions were aroused by the
egregious falsehoods and worse in Western renditions of the Ottoman
Empire and Turkey, which may have reached its ugly pinnacle in
Cyprus. I am profoundly and sleeplessly committed to discovering
and speaking truth in all matters, especially in international relations
where missteps are frequently antechambers of calamity. Nothing is
so dangerous in this world as ignorance in action." [=]
Part 3: ATAA's Role", in Turkish Times, April 15, 1999. p. 2. Fein
evaluated ATAA's role as follows: "The ATAA performs yeoman's
service in seeking to correct the virtual daily onslaught of tendentious,
false, or misleading statements and media reporting on Turkey. I am
especially impressed by ATAA's unfailing resistance to propaganda
and willingness to acknowledge Turkey's shortcomings. It is a lofty
standard which Turkey's detractors generally scorn." [=]
Part 4: Turkish-US Relations", in Turkish Times, April 15, 1999. p. 2.
"The US should encourage Turkey's steps towards a stainless
democracy and renounce human rights criticisms founded on an
ignorance of the terrorism and internal security threats that are
obstructing those steps," Fein said. "Such pointed but ill-conceived
denigration of the Government of Turkey embolden PKK fanatics and
their aides and abettors to further extremism in hopes of a response
that will trigger US sanctions. If US executive branch and legislative
officials knew more US history they would see that measures Turkey
has taken to quell terrorism and fight unconstitutional challenges to
secularism are virtual carbon copies of what the US has done in
comparable circumstances. The US should also button its ears to the
Greek lobby and openly acknowledge that international law, morality,
and facts are all on the side of the Turkey and Turkish Cypriots on the
128
island of Cyprus." [=]
Part 5: Anti-Turkish Ethnic Lobbies", in Turkish Times, April 15, 1999.
p. 2. On the influence of anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies on American
policy making process, Fein said, "Their influence is bothpronounced
and mischievous. They successfully peddle falsehoods about Turkey
in the corridors of power and the media that are regularly
unchallenged. The buyers are too uninformed to know of the shoddy
merchandise and too uninterested to make an independent
examination since their Turkish constituency is characteristically tiny.
Further, the ATAA and other sources of information lack the
resources and access to discredit the mountains of anti-Turkish
propaganda.The consequence predisposes policy makers and the
American public to believe the worst about Turkey. Enlightened
bilateral relations are thus problematic." [=]
10296. Anonymous. "Bush Administration Is Planning To Resume
Lending To Iraqis [Bush to lift embargoes on basis of national interest;
Congress had voted to suspend $200 million in Export-Import Bank
credits after chemical weapon attacks on the Kurdish minority]", in
Investor's Daily, December 26, 1989. p. 25. [TXT]
10297. Anonymous . “Business and Politics in Post-Erbakan
Turkey”, in Turkish Times, December 15, 1997. p. 13. [99H-16411]
[19971215] Policy Watch Washington Institute for Near East Policy:
On 11/19/1997, Muharrem Kayhan, Chairman of the Turkish
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association addressed the
Washington Institute’s Policy Forum regarding prospects for political
and economic development in Turkey. The emergence of Refah: The
mood in post-Erbakan Turkey is one of calm after a storm. For a
comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s problems, a critical, nonideological assessment of the pro-Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party is
needed. Despite its existence since 1969, Refah truly emerged as a
political force only in 1995. Receiving some 21% of the popular vote,
Refah went beyond its natural constituency due to the failures of past
secular governments. The lack of movement on the issues of
democratization, economic reform, and human rights allowed Refah
to become an alternative to the center-right and center-left parties in
Turkey. Refah’s success cannot be attributed solely to discontent.
However, the victory of 1995 was less an ideological Islamist victory
than a statement against a system that seemed incapable of producing
a political center to respond to the broad consensus of the country.
Corruption, lack of political reform, and the unequal distribution of
wealth also raised in many minds questions about the nature of
Turkish identity. As a result, many found solace within “a mystifying
Islamic Identity.” Reflections on Refah: There are a number of
conclusions to be drawn from Refah’s year in government. (1) The
Islamist movement in Turkey will not disappear; in fact, it will thrive if
there is no drastic change in the country. (2) Refah proved to be more
a traditional political party than a committed Islamist movement. It
followed the established system of populism and patronage and
favored its supporters in the distribution of government resources. (3)
The secular public grew increasingly restless as Refah constantly
misread the needs of the country. (4) Refah’s main weakness was not
its ideology, but its incompetence and lack of preparation for running
Turkey. (5) The revelation of various scandals and unholy alliances
tarnished Refah’s reputation as a corruption-free party. (6) Refah
lacked commitment to democracy or secularism. (7) The perspective
of Refah concerning international relations proved dangerous for
Turkey’s interests and for the larger Western system of which Turkey
is a part. (8) Due to political fragmentation, no party or civilian
institution effectively challenged Refah. (9) The role of the Turkish
military as defenders of secularism has been “accentuated” as a
result of the Refah government. The Turkish Armed Forces used their
institutional and constitutional powers with the support of business,
trade unions, and a substantial part of the Turkish people to help oust
the Refah government. The Turkish political system showed its
resilience and inherent stability simply by surviving.
Economic Outlook: The current secular government must
succeed if its leaders want a successful political future. For that
reason, it dropped its initial plan for early elections and act out to
develop “a sensible, tough and credible” economic program that will
take “at least a couple of years” to show positive results. To combat
high inflation, the government has unveiled a program calling for
financial sector reform to reduce inflation and for reduction of public
sector debt through reform of the social security and tax systems.
Turkey has had a strong economy despite years of mismanagement
and high inflation. However, the country’s full potential will never be
realized until economic rationality prevails in policy-making, including
the introduction of much needed structural reforms long neglected by
weak politicians. The economy’s fundamental strength has been
shown by its experience with customs union with the EU, which
began in 1996. The initial result of the customs union was a $5 billion
increase in the trade deficit with the EU. Yet, the wave of bankruptcies
predicted by many never happened. Statistics from this year suggest
a rise in exports and a diminishing trade deficit with the EU. One
weak point is the lack of foreign investment, which can be attributed to
the absence of political and economic stability. This is another reason
why a successful performance by the present government is so
important. TUSIAD will support the government as long as it shows
political courage and delivers on its promises. Turkey and the EU:
The outside world, particularly the EU also should help facilitate the
new secular government’s work. The mid-December meeting of the
EU Council of Ministers will make important decisions on Turkey’s
future relationship with Europe. If there is no “perspective” offered to
the Turkish people on eventual membership in the EU, it will be
difficult for the government to rebound from the political fallout. Such
an omission by the EU could play into the Islamists’ hands and
strengthen those that question whether Turkey should integrate into
the global market. The EU erred in its decision to become involved in
the Cyprus dispute. Linking Turkey’s membership to a resolution of
the Cyprus conflict backfired by almost destroying a “growing sense”
among the Turkish people that it was time to move to a resolution of
the Cyprus issue. Recent events in Iraq remind the Western world of
Turkey’s importance as a strategic ally. The US appreciates, more
than does Europe, Turkey’s strategic importance and understands the
possible negative outcomes should Turkey be denied acceptance into
Europe or if the economic system is not modernized to sustain a
dynamic market economy. TUSIAD wants Turkey to be a European
country. As a supporter of continued democratization and an opponent
of human rights abuse, TUSIAD believes a prosperous and
democratic Turkey will keep the Islamist challenge at bay, would offer
its citizens a better life, and would be an asset to the Western world
and the global economy. Energy and Iran: Turkey imports 90% of its
fuel. Although Turkey is interested in being a hub for pipelines
carrying energy resources from the Caucasus and Central Asia, it
also needs this energy for its own consumption. Turkey is sensitive to
the US position concerning the proposed Turkmenistan-Iran natural
gas pipeline. The bottom line remains that Turkey badly needs these
resources. Turkey is open to all alternatives and will evaluate them as
they become available according to political and economic
circumstances. Kurds: The situation in the Kurdish populated Turkish
southeast has seen a marked improvement in the past four years,
though significant military operations against separatists groups in the
region continue. The best answer to the region’s problems is
129
investment, and the Turkish government and the private sector have
invested a considerable amount of money in the area. The
government also offers incentives to private investment in the area.
TUSIAD, as part of the private sector, encourages investment in the
southeast. However, the Kurdish issue still has not been addressed in
its dimensions. [=]
10298. Anonymous. "Business Shorts: Turkish Deputy Chairman to
Control European TV Channels", in Turkish Times, April 1, 1999. p. 3.
Sebnem Bilget was elected to the Deputy Chairmanship of the
Permanent Committee of the European Transborder Television
Charter for two years. Birget is currently the Director of the
International Relations Department of the Higher Board of Radio &
Television (RTUK), working hard to suspend MED-TV broadcasts.
[=]
10299. Anonymous. "Business: Short Takes: $84 Billion Lost to
Terror", in Turkish Times, July 1, 1998. p. 3. Emergency Rule
Governor, Aydin Arslan said that Turkey had lost $84 billion during 14
years in the fight against terrorism. He added: "Besides the loss of
life, terrorism has caused great economic damage in the southeast
regions. It has blocked economic development and investment.
According to 1997 surveys there has been a 70% decrease in terrorist
activities in the region, which means that terror is now under control."
[=]
10300. Anonymous. "CIA and the United States Role in the Perisan
Gulf War, Part 3", in CIA Off Campus. First Annual Update. March
12, 1991. Third, on the same day Assistant Secretary of State Kelly
killed a planned Voice of America broadcast that would have warned
Iraq that the U.S. was "strongly commited" to the defense if its friends
in the Gulf, which included Kuwait.
Fourth, Assistant Secretary Kelly, two days before the invasion,
again testified publicly before "Congesss to the effect that the U.S. had
no commitment to defend Kuwait. According tor Senator Boren, who
heads the Senate Intelligence Committee and press reports, the "CIA
had predicted the invasion some four days before it happened."
Fifth, Saddam Hussein was the perfect sacrificial lamb. He had
used chemical weapons on Iran and the Kurds. He might have been
within two to five years from possessing nuclear weapons. He had an
army of one million strong that upset the power balance in the Middle
East. He aspired to leadership of the Arab world against Israel, and he
threatened all the so called moderate, ie., feudal regimes. With
Kuwait's oil he would control 20% of the world's reserves.
Why would the U.S. seek a world crisis? To know the full story
of how Agee answers this question you will have to read the article,
order his video taped speech or bring him to your city to speak.
Meanwhile here are some hints: cover up the S&L scandal, prevent
cuts in the military budget and reap the largest arms sale in history,
avoid the peace dividend, rally people around the flag, divert attention
away from the domestic crisis and the oppression of our people,
cripple our international competitors, blackmail the royal dictatorships
with our military might (they have

Volume I - Reference Corporation

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