The French Army 1978-2015 Assessment of 37 Years of

Transcription

‘Cahiers du RETEX’ contribute to analysis of the major issues of interest to
the French Army today and feed doctrine works.
They are cascaded in four complementary series:
Ils se déclinent en quatre collections complémentaires :
« Operations » collection
It gathers thematic summaries related to a theater of operations or a
warfighting function, as well as collections of tactical lessons in pocket format.
« Research » collection
It publishes historical and exploratory work aimed at illuminating a particular
area of force employment. These documents most often follow an academic
research methodology. Entrusted to reserve officers or students, they are
not official documents.
« Reports » collection
It publishes studies including those conducted from accounts of commanders
in operations using the technique of authorities’ interviews.
Cover photos:
Chad Op MANTA Sep-Oct 1983. Patrol in the Ati region 2nd RIMa
(Régiment d’Infanterie de Marine)
© Benoit DUFEUTRELLE/ECPAD
Mali Op SERVAL Feb 2013 VBCI dismounted squad from 3rd Plt,
1st Co 92nd RI observing GAO airport
© ADC Jean-Raphael DRAHI/armée de Terre
THE FRENCH ARMY 1978-2015
ASSESSMENT OF 37 YEARS
OF UNINTERRUPTED OPERATIONS
RETEX Handbooks – Operations – May 2015
3
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FRENCH ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
Under the direction of the French Army Staff, the Forces Employment Doctrine Center
(CDEF) is in charge of coordinating Army lessons learned (LL, RETEX).
The Lessons Learned developed in this casebook have been drawn straight from the LL
analysis performed by the CDEF based on the after-action reports and debriefs (CRFM).
The purpose of this casebook is to make LL elements available to leaders that may be
of direct use to the forces, together with the doctrine for unit tactical employment
currently in force.
It is crucial to forward all after-action reports to the CDEF, for analysis and for the
practical measures that follow, their broad dissemination in particular.
This casebook is available online on the CDEF website under the DREX tab – “cahier du
RETEX collection operations
This LL paper was developed by Colonel Pierre Esnault, Head of the CDEF Research and
LL department (DREX), under the supervision of Brigadier General, Jean Jacques Toutous,
Head of the CDEF.
Any remarks and suggestions regarding this document are welcome and can be submitted
to the CDEF DREX at the following address:
Colonel JEAND’HEUR : [email protected]
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
7
CHAPTER 1 – 1978-1991: A TWO SPEED ARMY FOCUSING
OPERATIONS ON AFRICA AND LEBANON
1.1. Army overview 9
9
1.1.1. Design - Organization 1.1.2 Preparation for Operations
11
11
1.1.3 Equipment
1.2 Operations overview
13
1.3 Major Lessons
15
1.3.1 Organization
15
1.3.2 Employment
16
1.3.3 Equipment
16
CHAPTER 2 – 1991-2015: A PROFESSIONAL ARMY ON FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
2.1 Phase 1: 1991-2007 - Stability operations with a professional Army
2.1.1 Army overview
21
23
2.1.1.1 Design - Organization
23
2.1.1.2 Preparation for Operations
24
2.1.1.3 Equipment
24
2.1.2 Operations overview
25
2.1.3 Major Lessons
29
2.1.3.1 Organization
29
2.1.3.2 Employment
30
2.1.3.3 Equipment
30
5
Chapitre I - 1978-1991 : les interventions centrées sur l’Afrique et le Liban d’une armée de terre à deux vitesses
2.2 Phase 2: 2007-2015 - Hardened operations with a seasoned Army 33
2.2.1 Army overview
35
35
35
2.2.1.3 Equipment
37
38
2.2.3 Major Lessons
39
39
2.2.3.2 Employment
40
2.2.3.3 Equipment
43
CONCLUSION
47
SUCCINCT BIBLIOGRAPHY
49
6
INTRODUCTION
S
ince 1978, the French Army has
been involved in almost 70 overseas
operations, for the most part in Africa.
1978 marked the beginning of operations
in Lebanon and renewed operations in Chad.
In spite of several organizational changes driven
by the strategic and economic environment,
combat operations have continued across a
wide variety of settings and courses of actions.
To accomplish its mission, the Army has
always relied on the fundamentals of air-land
maneuver, while making adjustments in all
areas to maximize efficiency.
During the same period, the Army intervened a
hundred times or more on the (French) national
territory, both on the mainland and in overseas
dependencies for internal security operations
(Op VIGIPIRATE, international summits and
major sporting or commemorative events),
aid to the civil community (natural or climatic
disasters), or aid to other government
agencies (coastal de-pollution, epidemic control,
miscellaneous logistic support).
1991 marked the end of the Soviet empire, the
first Gulf War and the beginning of the Balkan
conflict. It also acts as a watershed for this
period of continuous French operations, which
can now be divided into two phases:
-1978-1991: during the Cold War, French
forces comprised a mixture of conscripts
and professional soldiers (1972 Defense
White Paper). Land forces (FT) were deployed
in overseas operations, most of them being
national, in Africa and the Middle East. This
period led to analysis on the employment of
forces on the homeland for the purpose of
territorial defense (DOT). However, those
plans were never put into action.
- 1991-2015 1: Following the collapse of
communism, this period was marked
by a sudden and drastic overhaul of a
professionalized Army, following the collapse
of Soviet communism, the restructuring and
professionalization of the (French) Army and
three Defense White Papers (1994, 2008,
2013). In a context of continually falling
numbers of troops, the Army was deployed
in overseas operations, mostly multinational,
across the world. Meanwhile, there was
significant progress in the employment of
land forces on the national (French) territory.
This employment is now more practical, more
visible and, above all, more expected.
This document does not claim to be an
exhaustive study. What it does provide is an
overview of these 37 years of operations,
setting them in a general context of major
developments in defense and structural
changes to the Army, considering each of the
key phases of this period before focusing on
operations and the major lessons derived from
them.
1 Emerging western strategic debate identifies two slightly different phases for the period 1991-2015. During the period
1991-2002, known as ‘Transformation,’ land forces were adapted to become more expeditionary and to undertake peace
keeping missions, while relying more on strategic air to execute preemptive strikes; the period which started in 2002 is
known as the cycle of ‘Small Wars’. This is best characterized by the employment of land forces on counter insurgency
operations supported by air forces in the ground attack role. (cf. Christian MALIS, War and Strategy in the 21st Century,
Fayard, 2014, Chapter 3).
7
CHAPTER 1
1978-1991: A TWO SPEED ARMY
FOCUSING OPERATIONS
IN AFRICA AND LEBANON
A
s per the order of 7 January 1959,
the 1972 White Paper outlined the
three circles theory: national sanctuary
(home defense and deterrence),
protected European zone (main body), global
defense (prepositioned forces, overseas
territories, reaction forces).
It formalized the passage from the painful period
of decolonization to the modern era and set
out the key tenets of ‘strategic independence’
as postulated by General de Gaulle i.e. nuclear
deterrence and DOT (home defense) being
central to defense policy.
It distinguished between ‘maneuver in Europe’,
entrusted to the main body (1st Army and
the Tactical Air Force) and action ‘outside
of Europe’, which was the remit of overseas
and reaction forces (11th Parachute Division
and 9th Brigade which became the 9th Marine
Infantry Division in 1976).
Throughout this period, the defense budget
was unfavorably arbitrated and the Army was
directed to reduce its manpower by 10%,
prompting the resignation of the Army Chief of
Staff, General Delaunay in 1983.
1.1 Army overview
1.1.1 Design - Organization
The Army numbered 330,000 men and as
many reservists. It was mixed and was split
between two large operational entities:
• A mechanized corps, manned by conscripts
and concentrated for the most part in the
north east quarter of France (two Army
corps) and Germany, where an Army corps
including three armored divisions were
stationed, plus the French sector in Berlin
where two maneuver régiments (battalions)
were permanently positioned:
• A partially professional Rapid Reaction
Force (FAR)2 comprised largely of units
stationed in the west and the southern
half of the country. The FAR was set up in
1983, when Charles Hernu was the Minister
of Defense and General Imbot was Army
Chief of Staff. Other than a headquarters
and a logistic brigade, the FAR comprised
the 11th Parachute Division, 9th Marine
Infantry Division, 27th Alpine Division, 6th Light
Armor Division and the 4thAirmobile Division.
2 Often regarded as a tool for ‘African interventions’ the FAR was above all created to enable ‘fast, strong and deep’
engagements in the central European theatre, spearheaded by the 4th Airmobile Division. This modus operandi was tested
during the major French-German exercise ‘Moineau Hardi’ in 1987.
9
Chapter I - 1978-1991: A Two Speed Army Focusing Operations on Africa and Lebanon
The Army then had 95 régiments (battalions)
in the mechanized corps and 41 in the rapid
reaction force, making a total of 136 régiments,
on top of dozens of other units outside of
the divisional structure,3 plus 63 reserve
régiments frequently derived from regular units.
the other nuclear elements operated by
the armed forces, these assets were positioned
within the Army but their ultimate employment
was strictly a political decision.
The lay down of pre-positioned forces was as
follows:4
•
•
•
•
French forces stationed in Djibouti (FFSD).
French troops in Gabon (TFG).
French troops in Cape Verde (TFCV).
French troops stationed in Ivory Coast
(TFSCI).
 Sovereign base forces covering all French
overseas départements and territories
(DOM-TOM):
• Armed forces of the Antilles French
Guiana group – (FAGAG), in Martinique,
Guadeloupe and French Guiana.
• Armed forces in the southern Indian Ocean
zone (FAZSOI) in La Reunion and Mayotte
Island.
• Armed forces in French Polynesia (FAPF).
• Armed forces in New Caledonia (FANC).
Since France had not belonged to the NATO
integrated military command structure since
1966, it was planned for the Army to be
kept in reserve, for countering any attack on
the Alliance.
In anticipation of a major confrontation between
nuclear powers, the French Army was equipped
with the Pluton tactical nuclear missile; this
type of missile was re-named ‘pre strategic’
missiles in the late 80s. Consistent with
© armée de Terre
 presence forces in several African countries:
Pluton Missile on an AMX 30 chassis
In terms of organization, since the Lagarde5
reforms of 1977, operational and organic
chains of command were merged and taken on
by the same general officer at each level: Corps
and Military Region (RM), the territorial divisions
and forces divisions ( DMT). The support
services directorates were decentralized
to regional level. The Minister of Defense,
Mr Jean-Pierre Chevènement, put an end to
this architecture in 1991 with the Defense
Plan 2000 (Plan Armées 2000), replacing
the military regions with military defense districts
(CMD) and splitting up organic and operational
chains while allowing greater autonomy to
the various directorates.
Employment of forces was governed by
the regulations and doctrine developed
at their respective level by the studies cell
from the Army Staff and the 1 st Army.
These cells were responsible for validating
the work of the multidisciplinary ‘Regulations
3 Including numerous communication, logistic and support régiments organic to the Army corps (EOCA).
4 In 1989.
5 General Jean Lagarde was Chief of the Army Staff 1975-1980.
10
Chapter 1 - 1978-1991: A Two Speed Army Focusing Operations on Africa and Lebanon
Committees’. These were established as and
when required to write the requisite all arms
(TTA) employment rules, and always included
forces representatives. Broadly speaking,
the 1 st Army took charge of formation
regulations (TTA 900 series), while branch
inspectors were responsible for rules of
employment at régiment level. The inspectors
were supported by ‘permanent consultative
commissions’ for achieving this end. Finally,
doctrine at company level, and equipment
manuals for specific weapon systems were
developed by branch schools.
for any French unit was to be able to get out
of barracks quickly, i.e. to move within 6 hours
from its home station to its known deployment
areas, in order to escape the massive air strikes
anticipated and thus preserve combat power.
This imposed the requirement to always have at
least 50% of manpower present according to
a ‘readiness’ (DO) system. For units on standby,
training continued on weekends; Christmas
and New Year holidays are often spent at
the home stations. This posed few difficulties
with conscripts whose leave allocation was
limited anyway.6
Combat-seasoning at Montlouis CNEC
1.1.2 Preparation for Operations
The Army carried out fire and maneuver
training in national training camps and also in
the open countryside, as the network of home
stations provided good coverage of the national
territory. In Germany, French units were
practically always twinned with allied regiments
and took the opportunity to cooperate together
on some exercises.
After every two missions overseas, FAR units
took part in exercises of mechanized units to
adapt to mechanized combat in central Europe.
Régiments had all the equipment needed for
an all-assets engagement, as well as CBN
decontamination facilities. The priority mission
Combat-seasoning was achieved at a network
of commando training centers (CEC), which
units attended in succession. Other than
the National Commando Training Centre
(CNEC) at Montlouis, which trained instructors,
the CECs were located in Margival, Quelern,
Pont Saint Vincent, Givet, Les Rousses,
Penthièvre, as well as in Germany at Trèves,
Vieux Brisach, Kehl and Berlin. Overseas,
there were numerous centers catering for
specific environments: amphibious training in
New Caledonia, Antilles or Polynesia, jungle
training in Guiana or Gabon, tropical training
in La Reunion and Mayotte and desert training
in Djibouti. Obstacle courses were also
available in many garrisons, thus encouraging
decentralized combat-seasoning.
6 16 days leave a year for a national serviceman plus 10 extra days if you deployed in Germany or were the son of a farmer
and 4 days if you were preparing for a military course.
11
Marksmanship skills were taught according
to the ‘Montauban’ method. Emphasis was on
grouping the fall of shot of weapons including
those with a burst capability (MAT49 submachine gun and then the FAMAS). There
was a major development in the 80s when
the objective became a hit at the first shot.
Infantry shooting skills were further developed
in 1985 when the Infantry Operational
Shooting Centre (CEITO) was created at Larzac
Camp. Until then only armor7 and artillery had
standardized firing ranges and battleruns,
mainly on Canjuers Camp.
obstacle crossing, mobility/counter mobility
support, 8 RITA communications systems:
all were brought into service during the period
73-80. From 1982, AMX30B2 replaced
the 1967 AMX30 and was the first modern
French battle tank to integrate all the recent
developments in the area of mobility (gear
box, suspension) and firing, which was
now automated. Regarding transportation,
logistic vehicles (VTL) were also upgraded
and from 1989 TRM 10 000 replaced
heavy lift (EGP), semitrailers and a variety of
other trucks. The helicopter fleet, PUMA
(1969) and GAZELLE (1971) were already a
little outdated.
All mechanized corps training integrated CBN
in a contaminated environment.
Maintenance was cascaded in company level
workshops (2A- workshops), thus fostering a
culture of equipment husbandry. Units were
subjected to regular maintenance check-ups
by the formidable national technical inspection
teams (DIT) which became technical material
inspection teams during the 90s (DCTMat),
visiting units every 2 years (once during a
commanding officer’s tenure).
1.1.3 Equipment
Equipment was up to date, the Army having
introduced its second generation of major
equipment since WWII: FAMAS, HOT and
MILAN missiles, P4 rovers and GBC Berliet
trucks, armored VAB, AMX10P, AMX 10RC,
F1 and Tr F1 155mm artillery guns, Sapper
VAB
AMX 10 P
AMX10 RC
7 And by extension the infantry serving in tank companies in mechanized infantry régiments.
8 For example the Bac Gillois amphibious bridging rig (EFA), armored scissor bridge (PAA), multi task engineer tractor
(MPG), armored engineer tractor (EBG), obstacle creating system (MFRD), mine launching vehicle.
12
AuF1
1.2 Operations overview
The Army was engaged in around fifteen
operations, mostly in Africa, which provided the
first fire generation since decolonization.
Activities in France concentrated on internal
security missions. Attacks perpetrated on
French territory at the beginning of the 80s
triggered the emergence of anti-terrorism
policies, directed by the government from 1982.
The major operations of this period were
conducted in Lebanon and Chad, both theaters
having been active since 1978.9 This was also
the year when 2nd REP carried out a rapid
reaction intervention operation (Op BONITE
in ZAIRE), parachuting onto Kolwezi, Zaire to
rescue European nationals held hostage by
Katanga rebels.10
- in Lebanon, France quickly became one of the
principal troop contributing nations in the UN
Interim Force UNIFIL, set up in 1978. The
early 80s were memorable for Op DIODON,
the French participation in the multinational
security force in Beirut (FMSB 1982-84)
where 2,000 men deployed with heavy
weapons (including self-propelled artillery)
TrF1
EBG
trying to keep the peace in a context of fierce
urban fighting. The Israeli Army had occupied
the country (Op PEACE IN GALILEE) and was
opposed by Palestinian militias, and most
importantly infighting between Lebanese
militias (Phalangists, Amal, Druzes of Walid
Djoumblatt) further complicated things. The
civil war was supported by Syria’s Hafez-ElAssad, whose forces occupied the Bekaa
Plains. The situation took a serious turn for
the worse when on 23 Oct 1983, 251 US
marines and 58 French paras were killed in
a double attack against the Drakkar building.
The attack triggered the withdrawal of troops
by the two countries. The FMSB was then
‘relieved’ by a contingent of multinational
observers, to whom France made a
significant contribution and UNIFIL continued
its mission.
- Chad witnessed successive operations:
TACAUD (78-80), MANTA (83-84) and
EPERVIER (84-2014). During Op MANTA, the
Army protected Chadian territory from Libyan
incursions at the request of Chad’s President
Hissène Habré. The Libyan Army equipped
the National Liberation Army of ex-president
Goukouni Oueddei who opposed Hissène
Habré. 3,000 troops were committed: mainly
light infantry, armor and 30 helicopters.
9 As far as Chad was concerned it would be more accurate to describe the intervention as a return, as operations had
commenced there between 1968 and 1972.
10 In the same vein, a rapid reaction interventio‡n (Op BARRACUDA 1979-1981) took place in CAR to secure Bangui
after the fall of Bokassa.
13
Significant air assets were also committed:
10 Mirages and Jaguar jets (one of which
was shot down by Libya in January 1984),
26 tactical transport C 160s (equal to
the entire fleet remaining in service in 2015),
Atlantic 2s and American reinforcements
(intelligence, ground based air defense, fighter
aircraft).
This force fought against Chadian rebels
and Libyan mechanized units supported
by aircraft that bombed French positions
several times.
These operations still represent two of
the most important French deployments
since the Algerian war. The enemy was often
dissymmetric, sometimes conventional (Libyans
in Chad) or asymmetric (militias in Lebanon,
rebels in Chad). Fighting was intense and
caused significant casualties:11 158 deaths
in Lebanon, including 92 during Op DIODON
1983-1984 (i.e. more in 10 months than in
13 years in Afghanistan) and hundreds wounded.
158 soldiers were killed in Chad, amongst
whom the major losses occurred between
1984 and 1991.12
Op DIODON (1982-1984) Para in observation. in Beirut
11 Source: report by working group ‘Monument to overseas fatalities,’ led by General Thorette, Sept 2011. It should be
noted that since the report was published no further fatalities have been suffered by land forces in either Chad or
Lebanon.
12 Amongst the 158 deaths in each theatre, 127 were ‘morts pour la France’ in Lebanon and 93 in Chad.
14
Chad, 1983-84: Op MANTA
These are the two theaters in which the Army
was deployed practically continuously, for
the longest period.
The end of this period is notable for its regular
non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO/
RESEVAC): Op REQUIN in Gabon 1990,
Op NOROIT in Rwanda 1990,13 Op BERENICE
in Somalia and Op BAUMIER in Zaire in 1991.
While the most spectacular or tragic of these
events were well covered by the media, overall,
these operations did not receive the level of
the media attention devoted to events in
the 90s (Gulf, Somalia). During this period,
the Army had its first taste of modern judicial
investigations. In the spring of 1984, several
enlisted soldiers were killed following an
ammunition handling accident in Chad. This
incident prompted the first judicial investigation
on an overseas operation since decolonization.
On the homeland, following a wave of terrorist
attacks between February 1985 and
September 1986, which killed 17 and wounded
300,14 the Army reinforced the gendarmerie
on the borders (patrols) and within the capital.
Finally, in New Caledonia a quasi- insurrection
context necessitated military intervention at
the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1988,
with a period of intense activity between
1985 and 1986. Thereafter, 2-3 tactical
headquarters each with 2-3 companies were
deployed on six month rotations, the ORBAT
being manned by units, either professional
or not, coming from the rapid reaction force or
from the mechanized corps.
1.3 Major Lessons
1.3.1 Organization
Army organization was vertical (Army, corps,
division, régiment), and largely based on
the divisional system (Type 77 division then type
84). The autonomy of Divisional Commanders
was still significant, especially as all organic
authority was held at divisional level.
Although generally limited to the combat and
combat support branches (infantry, armor,
artillery, engineers) the combined arms
concept was a daily reality at divisional level
and often at regimental level too. Mechanized
infantry régiments (RIMeca) or units such
as 21st RIMa (between 1982 and 1984) or
5th RIAOM and the 13th DBLE in Djibouti were
good examples.
13 Op NOROIT continued until 2013, becoming a peacekeeping mission through the maintenance of an operational
assistance and deterrence force in support of the local authorities.
14 These attacks were committed by terrorists linked to Hezbollah, diverse Islamist movements or by the Action Direct
revolutionary group.
15
Most platoons and sometimes companies
were organized along the ‘rule of threes’15
in the early 80s. Judged as imperfect due to
their limitations in terms of maneuverability
and therefore freedom of action, this was
adapted to become the ‘rule of four’16 for most
tactical elements by the second half of the 80s.
1.3.2 Employment
The FAR developed and maintained a good
expeditionary and African culture. This period
is marked by:
In Africa, wheeled armor (AML 60, 90 and
then ERC90) provided the necessary degree
of mobility and subsequently easy deterrence.
Fielding the new AMX10 RC in Chad during Op
MANTA marked significant progress in terms
of mobility and firepower and was subsequently
quickly brought into service by armor régiments
de cavalerie.
Fielded in 1990, the TrF1 artillery gun quickly
equipped pre-positioned forces. Hawk ground
based air defense missiles were deployed in
Chad.
Independent Kanake leaders
Jean-Marie Djibaou and Eloi Machoro
and the FLNKS flag (Kanak and Socialist
National liberation front)
• The routine deployment of Operational
Assistance Detachments ( DAO ) or
instruction detachments (DAMI similar to
those deployed to Chad in the 60s).
• Non-Combatant Evacuations.
• Humanitarian assistance missions, e.g.
Op GODORIA in Djibouti 1991, supporting the
Djibouti Army in handling a surge of 30,000
Ethiopian refugees, or Op BIOFORCE 1992,
a mass meningitis vaccination mission in
the north west of the country.
1.3.3 Equipment
The Hawk system was used on 7 September
1987 to shoot down a Libyan Tupolev-22B a
few kilometers from where it would attempt
to bomb French military installations in
N’Djamena. To this day, this is the only occasion
since WWII when a French air defense system
has shot down an aircraft.
The first deployment to Lebanon in 1978
necessitated an off the shelf purchase of SIG
automatic assault rifles. This measure also
led to Famas being introduced into service
whose multipurpose capability improved squad
and platoon maneuver, simplified weapon
husbandry at squad level and optimized
marksmanship practice.
The VAB was routinely deployed and offered
the advantages of protection by its armor
plates and flexibility by its wheeled mobility.
15 Translator’s note: i.e. 3 rifle squads per platoon, etc.
16 Translator’s note: 4 squads per platoon, 4 platoons per coy, 4 companies per bn etc.
16
Bringing an end to this period, the Gulf War
in 1991 put into practice the ‘Air Land Battle’
doctrine developed by the US Army over
the previous decade. During Op Desert Storm,
the Army deployed a light armored division
which comprised various units. It joined
the coalition and was committed with all of its
components. It was reinforced with heavier
units, including a régiment of AMX30B2 tanks
and two helicopter régiments.
After a preparation period in their deployment
area, the Daguet Division executed a deep
armor raid on the west flank of the coalition.
It was a successful engagement and the most
important in terms of size for the French Army
since Algeria. However, it also demonstrated
the limitations of the Army model; due to
the political decision to only deploy professional
soldiers it had been very difficult to constitute
such a division.
The Daguet Division
was thus deployed
with 3,000 vehicles
and nearly 130 helicopters. Support
from the mechanized
corps meant it was
provided with the
best equipment.
The ORBAT included
10% of the Army’s
VAB fleet, half of its
ambulance VABs,
Kuwait May 1991 Op DAGUET AMX 10 RC
hot weather AMX
30B2s which were
all equipped with thermal imagery sights,
This was also the first operation where media
the latest TRF1 155mm artillery guns,
coverage was live and continuous. There was
the latest Mistral air defense posts and 80% of
a high number of journalists in the theater,
the AMX10RCs were upgraded to fire APFSDS.
embedded in pools within units. Each day,
Reactive adjustments did not stop there
they would receive situation updates from
and led to several improvements: decoys for
commanders that would then inform public
tanks, up-armored AMX10RCs, GPS, infrared
opinion worldwide.
jamming devices, sand filters and decoys for
Numerous observations would emerge from
helicopters. In addition, a mine-clearing tank
Op DAGUET, not least the move towards more
platoon was activated (mounted on AMX30
joint-ness, as demonstrated by the subsequent
chassis with KTM5 de-mining rollers urgently
establishment of the Joint Operations Centre
procured from former East Germany).
(COIA, today’s CPCO), Directorate of Military
Further demonstrating the magnitude of the
Intelligence ( DRM ), Special Operations
deployment, Operation Daguet represents the
Command (COS), Joint Operational Planning
large-scale deployment of French helicopters in
Headquarters (future Force and Training
a conventional conflict, in accordance with the
Headquarters EMIA-FE) and the Delegation of
doctrine of the airmobile division, pursuing their
Strategic Affairs (DAS).
own objectives and without overlapping the
This operation was also a trigger in terms of
troops on the ground. After Operation Daguet,
command organization: it was the first time
the airmobile division was transformed into a
that a theater operational command post
brigade, marking a return to more traditional
had been deployed at the same time and into
employment focused on providing fire support
the same space as the tactical CP, responsible
to troops in close combat.
17
for conducting divisional operations. This model
has tended to become the rule, although during
smaller operations, a shrinkage or even a
merging of the two levels of command occurs,
for example during Op SERVAL 2013-2014
in Mali, where one CP commanded operations
for practically all of the stabilization phase of
the operation.
Finally, the presidential decision to avoid
deploying conscripts to the Gulf marked a
turning point in how national service was
seen, foreshadowing the creation of an entirely
professional force.
Although the period 1978-1991 was fulfilling
in terms of African and Middle Eastern
deployments, the Army was operating at two
different speeds. The experience of the rapid
reaction forces was very different from that
of the mechanized corps dealing with a major
conventional threat.
When covered by the nuclear umbrella, this
force was not employed. However, within
known spaces, this force could still be deployed
on a limited basis. It would be replaced by
an employable Army that would become a
professionalized Army at the same time as
conflict returned to Europe and to Central Asia.
Op DESERT STORM, Daguet Division on flank protection to the west
(source Wikipédia)
18
19
Chapter I - 1978-1991: A Two Speed Army Focusing Operations on Africa and Lebanon
20
CHAPTER 2
Chapitre II - 1991-2015 : les opérations tous azimuts d’une armée de terre professionnelle
1991-2015:
A PROFESSIONALIZED ARMY;
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
T
he professionalization of the armed
forces got underway in 1997, in context
of defense reform and against a wider
backdrop of the end of the 1991 bloc
confrontation. At the same time, the armed
forces, and in particular the Army, were
faced with a series of new operations in
Croatia (1991), Bosnia (1992), Albania and
Djibouti (1997), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan
(2001), Ivory Coast (2002), Libya (2010),
Mali (2013) and CAR (2013). 17 Other
operations persisted, (Lebanon, Chad) while
the situation in Africa continued to require
numerous limited operations (emergency
deployments, security, protection and noncombatant evacuation operations).
Some of these operations were inspired by
a new concept, the ‘right of interference’ in
an humanitarian rationale, made popular in
the early 90s by Bernard Kouchner, one
of its most active theorists. Moreover,
the overwhelming majority of these operations
took place against a backdrop of intra state
conflicts or crises.
The Army reinforced its contribution to
homeland security through developments in
Op VIGIPIRATE, the fight against illegal gold
mining in Guiana (Op HARPIE ongoing since
2008) and multiple emergency missions
to relieve the population between 2009 and
2011, notably following hurricanes Klaus
and Xynthia, or flooding in Draguignan.
These 25 years of uninterrupted operations
always proved difficult and were often long
(operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Ivory Coast
and Afghanistan each lasted more than
10 years). This period is marked by two
main phases and the ultimate emergence of
a new combat-seasoned generation, in light
of a clear hardening in operations from 2008.
2.1 Phase 1: a professional
Army engaged
in stabilization operations
The 1994 White Paper emphasized France’s
role in international stability and, through
the prism of potential regional crises,
considered threats for the next 20 years.
Referring to ‘new vulnerabilities’ such as
terrorism, the White Paper also stated
that ‘Islamic fundamentalists represented
the most worrying threat.’ The paper
adjusted the balance between the deterrence
and action strategy, in favor of the latter
and also addressed the shortcomings of
the 1972 White Paper, namely the weak points
in intelligence, inadequate force projection
capabilities and interoperability deficiencies
with allies.
Six likely force employment scenarios were
identified:
• S1: regional conflict without endangering on
our vital interests;
17 Op SANGARIS replaced Op BOALI which started in 2002.
21
Chapter 2 - 1991-2015: A Professional Army on Full Spectrum Operations
• S2: regional conflict threatening vital national
interests;
• S3: threats to the national territorial integrity
outside the French mainland;
• S4: execution bilateral defense agreements;
• S5: peace support and international law
agreements;
• S6: major engagement following resurgence
of a threat in Europe.
Only scenarios S4 and S5 would be
implemented. The White Paper envisaged
a projectable land force of 130,000 (8 or
9 divisions with organic sustainment), manned
both by conscripts and professionals. However
this model was soon overtaken by events
when President Chirac opted for a fully
professional Army in 1996 (implemented
from 1997).
Apart from a situation where DOT
doctrine remained unchanged, homeland
protection became a key mission for
the armed forces, through a permanent
maritime and air safeguarding posture,
protection of the population, and in
exceptional circumstances (natural,
industrial or technological disasters),
reinforcing the security and emergency
systems deployed by the civil authorities.
2001. Despite a hint of a rise in 2002,
the defense budget fell to just 1.6% of the GDP
in 2008.
With the professionalization of the forces,
defense and the Army in particular (which
took on 15,000 men and women each
year for the following decade), became
the country’s number one recruiter. The first
recruiting campaigns stressed the Army as an
employer and as a good start to working life,
while highlighting the Army’s modernity and
technology (‘Army of excellence’). Once fully
professionalized, the Army put more emphasis
on the values and the specifics of being a soldier
(‘a trade, but much more than a trade’) as well
as the individual development opportunities
(‘become yourself’).
Recruitement campaign 1996
Without a real enemy, many thought
that NATO was on its way out. After a lot
of thought, however, and in the case of
consecutive crises NATO consolidated its
position as the sole military organization
capable of accumulating contributing
member and non-member countries to
build a force and to operate efficiently.
In terms of budget, as part of
the ‘peace dividend’, defense suffered
an 18% budgetary cut from 1991-
22
Recruitement campaign 1999-2001
2.1.1 Army Structure
In 1994, the Army comprised 240,000 men
(9 divisions), 43% of whom were professional
soldiers. In 2002, the Army was 100%
professional, numbering 136,000 men, of
whom 88,000 were deployable.
Given the falling number of troops, the Army
changed significantly in 1999, in particular
by dropping the divisional system in favor of
a return to a brigade ORBAT organized as
follows:
• 8 combined arms brigades (2 armored,
2 light armored, 2 mechanized, 1 parachute
and 1 mountain);
• 2 logistics brigades;
• 5 combat support brigades (intelligence,
airmobile, engineers, artillery, signals/
command support);
• Special Forces brigade;
• Franco German brigade.
The Army disbanded around 30 régiments,
especially those stationed in Germany, thus
progressively relinquishing an important Army
role from the past decades. In fact, until 1990,
French Forces in Germany (FFA) comprised
46,000 men and Trèves (13,000) was
the second largest garrison after Paris.
In 1993, French Forces Stationed in Germany
(FFSA) were reduced to 25,000 and by 1999
this had been further cut to 3,600 men, split
between 4 garrisons manned by French forces
and civil detachments in Germany (FFECSA).
The last French unit in Germany was the 110th
RI, Franco German Brigade, disbanded in 2014.
Its command system was based on four
deployable force headquarters ( EMFs
established between 1999 and 2000). Land
Force Command (CFAT) and the Land Logistics
Command (CFLT) were created in 1998 while
the French Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC-FR),
created in 2005, highlighted France’s will to
be a major player in NATO actor. Meanwhile,
European structures were not left behind.
The Franco German Brigade was created in
1989, and Eurocorps was set up in Strasbourg
in 1992 comprising France, Germany, Spain,
Belgium and Luxembourg. The European Rapid
Operational Force was in turn founded in 1995
and headquartered in Florence (Italy), bringing
together France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
Nonetheless, EUROFOR was dissolved in 2012
due to a lack of adequate commitment and its
members’ capability to upkeep it in a context
of pronounced military contractions in Europe.
In units manned by conscription, a scheme that
was coming to an end,18 long service volunteers
(VSL) were permitted to sign on for overseas
duties (AVAE), enabling them to take part
in short missions to French overseas territories
or in overseas operations. They were then
mostly deployed to the Balkans, Lebanon and
Somalia.
The Army was no longer equipped with
nuclear weapons and although the Hades
missile system had recently replaced the Pluton
(fielded in 1992), the last Hades launchers
were dismantled in 1997.
There was a resurgence in Homeland
operations, as missions became better defined
and focused:
• in 2005 the VIGIPIRATE system developed
significantly: the mission became permanent
and was upgraded to the red level. This
increased the role of the Army in the national
fight against terrorism (Op VIGIPIRATE,
PIRATOM, PIRATOX);
• participation in homeland (and access)
security through the protection of vital
interest points (PIV);
18 National service had already slipped from 12 to 10 months following the Joxe’s Law of January 1992, without any major
problems, whilst professionalization started in 1997 following the Presidential declaration of 1996.
23
• securing major national events (Summits of
heads of state such as G8 or G20, the 1998
football World Cup, anniversary of the D Day
landings etc.);
• emergency operations to relieve the population
(natural and technological disasters), fighting
environmental attacks (Op POLMAR) and
epidemics.
This period saw the establishment of,
among others, the Joint Territorial Defense
Organization (OTIAD) in 2000. This homeland
specific chain of command mirrored that of
the state crisis management apparatus.
In 2002, the Army developed the Proterre
concept. It was cascaded in all formations
to build generic companies capable of
accomplishing the 5 common Army tasks
( MICATs : surveillance; interdiction; hold;
cordon a point, district or sector; support).
With the demise of the 1st Army, responsibility
for doctrine fell to the Doctrine and Training
Command (CDE at Mercy le Metz formed
in 1993). In 1998, at its request, 3rd Army
Corps of Lille took responsibility for training.
Doctrine then became a capability pillar
structuring the Army, with the establishment
of the Army Doctrine and Higher Military
Education Command (CDES) before moving to
the Force Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF,
formed in 2004).
Training camps were modernized (automatic
target systems, hardened roads, easier
topography), and the first specialized centers
were introduced in Champagne e.g. Mailly
where the Command Posts Training Center
(CEPC 1994) and then the Combat Training
Centre (CENTAC 1996) were developed and
then quickly regrouped under the control of the
Force Preparation Center (CPF 1997).
Combat seasoning also evolved significantly.
While commando training centers were
gradually disbanded, two new mountain training
centers opened in Barcelonnette in 1990
(Mountain Combat Training Center CIECM)
and in Briançon in 1994 (National Mountain
Combat Seasoning Center CNAM).
Operational readiness was organized around
standardized pathways. It was based around
a 4-phase cycle (4-month periods). Brigades
were paired off as tours lasted 4-months.
The principle was simple: at any given time,
the 8 brigades were distributed across
the 4 phases of the cycle: deployments;
decentralized readiness training (in brigades);
stand-by during which partnering with schools
and homeland missions were accomplished
(in particular Op VIGIPIRATE); centralized
operations conditioning (MCO). Programming
the cycle was straightforward, although this did
not prevent units from being widely dispersed in
order to accomplish all of their missions.
Within the CDEF , doctrine now benefits
from the lessons learned process through a
dedicated division within the center. Moreover,
it is interesting to note that over the course
of 20 years, doctrine has been passed from
training to higher military education before
becoming a department in its own right directly
subordinate to the CEMAT (Army COS).
Marksmanship training evolved during
the 90s, towards the new IST-C method.
Shooting ranges were built to accommodate
new training modules, in particular short
distance shooting. The IED threat became
more precise, especially in Afghanistan, and
was integrated into pre deployment training
(the first IED courses were installed in Angers
in particular). This threat was also integrated
into French doctrine.
Land Forces Command ( CFAT ) and
the Land Logistics Command (CFLT) ensured
the operational readiness of land forces.
24
2.1.1.3 Equipment
Although the Leclerc tank had replaced
the AMX30 in armor, elsewhere, combat
vehicles were worn out and most were
© ADC Olivier DUBOIS
Afghanistan, May 2006 VBL of 1st RHP on the Sahmali Plain
the same age as their drivers. The VBL was
introduced to units as of 1990, providing
added value to recce missions and enabling
command teams (platoon leaders, company
commanders) to be protected.
These smaller vehicles enjoyed a number of
upgrades: optical sights were replaced by TI
and signals equipment featured the latest
4th generation frequency hopping technology.
Infantry weapons were modernized (FAMAS,
MINIMI light machine guns, individual grenade
launchers LGI, ERYX anti-tank missiles).
Battle space digitization was introduced and
the 6th Light Armored Brigade began trials in
2002.
Operations were concentrated principally
in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 19 the early days of
Afghanistan (Op PAMIR end of 2001),
the first part of Op LICORNE in the Republic
of Côte d’Ivoire (IVORY COAST end of 2002)
and the Balkans (UNPROFOR and then Op
SALAMANDRE in Croatia and Bosnia in 1992,
Op TRIDENT in KOSOVO in 1999, ESSENTIAL
HARVEST in 2001 and then Op CONCORDIA in
Macedonia ongoing since 2001).
For the most part, these missions involved
establishing and maintaining the peace,
on national deployments (IVORY COAST),
under the auspices of the UN (Lebanon,
Croatia, Bosnia), or NATO (conclusion of
19 The Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 2006 led to UN Resolution 1701, which authorized the reinforcement of UNIFIL
(UNIFIL2 increased to 15 000 men). France provided UNIFIL’s QRF comprising an AMX10P battalion (+). The QRF
was made up of a Leclerc tank squadron, an AuF1 artillery battery, a COBRA radar troop and a MISTRAL VSHORAD
air defense detachment. The major part of the French contribution was tracked armored vehicles. The Leclercs were
retained until 2010, the AMX10Ps were replaced in 2010 by VBCI and CAESAR replaced the AuF1 guns in early 2011
(which were also withdrawn in early 2012). The French contribution was reduced to 2 tactical companies in 2011,
concentrated around the Force Commander’s Reserve ((FCR replaced the QRF).
25
FAMAS Afghanistan 2010
©Jean-Raphaël DRAHI/Sirpa Terre
Grenade launcher Afghanistan 2009
© ADJ Dominique DHE /SIRPA Terre
Bosnia from summer 1995,20 Macedonia,
Kosovo and Afghanistan) or the EU
(ARTEMIS in 2003, EUFOR DRC in 2006,
EUFOR Chad in 2008). They could also take
the form of disarmament missions, such
as Op ESSENTIAL HARVEST in Macedonia
in 2011, where a NATO-led task force of
4 multinational battalions21 collected weapons
from the Albanian KLA/UCK that had been
willingly returned.
One operation could sometimes hide
another, as was the case with Op ORYX
in Somalia 1992-1993, where an initially
humanitarian mission soon required
courses of action for ensuring security
and for fighting against armed groups.
Violent events occurred in the provinces
as well as in the urban area of Mogadishu.
This was also the first time that the French
© Xavier PELLIZZARI/Ecpad
Elsewhere, emergency interventions were
also necessary (Op AZALEE in the Comoros in
1995, Op TURQUOISE in Rwanda in 1994
and Ops ALMANDIN I, II and III in CAR in
1996-97) to secure22 or evacuate our
nationals from Africa23 or Lebanon.
Afghanistan 2009, ERYX 2005
© SIRPA Terre
Army supported a UN peacekeeping force (Op
RESTORE HOPE UNOSOM) while deploying a
number of conscript volunteers.
In Asia, between the end of 1991 and 1993
the Army deployed 1,200 men to Cambodia
under UNTAC, 60% of whom were conscript
volunteers. The objectives of this peace support
mission were to monitor the withdrawal of
foreign forces, supervise the cease-fire, find
and secure weapon dumps and to provide mine
disposal training.24
Somalia November 1993: French foot patrol by the French brigade
from UNOSOM II based in Baidoa
20 Op SALAMANDRE corresponds to NATO’s operations JOINT ENDEAVOUR (IFOR 1995-96) and JOINT GUARD (SFOR
1996-2004).
21 Including a Franco/German/Spanish battalion, a Turkish/Italian battalion, and a Greek/Dutch/British battalion.
22 Op ORYX and UNOSOM in Somalia 1992-93, Op BUBALE, ALMANDIN and MINURCA in CAR 1997-1999, Op ARTEMIS
in DRC 2003, Op DORCA in Chad 2004 and EUFOR-DRC 2006.
23 Op ADDAX 1992 Angola, Op BAJOYER 1993 Zaire, Op AMARYLLIS 1994 Rwanda, Op MALEBO 1996 Congo, Ops
PELICAN I, II and III and Op ANTILOPE 1997 Congo, Op IROKO 1998-99 Guinea Bissau, Op MALACHITE 1998 and
Op OKOUME 1999 Congo, Op LICORNE 2002 Ivory Coast, Op PROVIDENCE 2003 Liberia, 2004 Ivory Coast following
the attack on Bouaké, Op BALISTE 2006 Lebanon, Op CHARI-BAGUIRMI 2008 Chad, Ivory Coast 2011 during
@the conclusion of the Ivorian crisis.
24 The original intention was to rebuild the country, a mission that would probably spread over twenty years.
26
Haiti 2004: OP Carbet: an infantryman (Marsouin)
from 33rd RIMa talking to the local population
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s declaration of
independence on 5 April 1992 was met by
the war triggered by the Yugoslavian Army.
Serbs, Croats and Bosnians met in violent
confrontations, rivalling in brutality, displacing
populations and perpetrating multiple abuses,
sometimes verging on policies of ethnic
cleansing.
In
April
1992,
the
UN
mandated
multinational
force
(UNPROFOR) initially numbered
10,000 men, including 2,200 French
soldiers. From July to September 1995,
UNPROFOR counted 37 nations and
45,000 men, including 7,100 French.
Five infantry battalions were deployed:
Sarajevo city (INFBAT4), at the airport
and the Igman route (INFBAT2), Mount
Igman (INFBAT5), and to the west of
the country, the Bihac pocket
(INFBAT3) and the Bosnian Croat
Krajina mountains (INFBAT1). A logistic
support battalion was positioned in
Zagreb-Pleso, supplying units countrywide via
the hazardous road network. An engineer
battalion was located in Kakanj, 30 kms to
the west of Sarajevo, whose principal objective
was to keep UNPROFOR’s convoy routes open.
An ALAT (Army aviation) detachment was
deployed to Split in Croatia.
Battalions fulfilled a difficult task of intervening
between the belligerents and thereby frequently
becoming the targets of attacks themselves.
During the 12 years of operations in Bosnia
between 1992 and 2004, 600 French soldiers
were injured and 56 were killed, 29 of whom
lost their lives in 1995 alone.
After 3 months of air strikes to force
the invading Serb Army to withdraw, a NATO
coalition of 35,000 men entered Kosovo on
9 June 1999 and took complete control within a
few days, marking the beginning of Op TRIDENT.
Five multinational KFOR (Kosovo Force)
brigades were deployed across the country.
The Multinational Brigade North was centered
on Mitrovica under French command, in
the most sensitive and only remaining widely
multi ethnic region where tensions had
crystallized. Under various subordinations,
according to the period, many different allied
nations joined the French Brigade during
the operation: Danes, Belgians, Greeks,
Moroccans, Emiratis, Czechs and Russians.
© © Xavier PELLIZZARI/Ecpad
© ADC Jean-Raphaël DRAHI
Sovereign base forces (French Caribbean
Islands/ Antilles -Guiana) were eventually
requested in Haiti to protect and assist
the affected population during Op CARBET in
2004. The most significant and the newest type
of Army operations from this period remain
those conducted in the Balkans, where conflict
had returned to Europe, and in the Republic of
Côte d’Ivoire.
Former Yugoslavia (summer 1995) INFBAT5 UNPROFOR
Rajalze village near Sarajevo
27
of thousands of people on either side of
the central Ibar Bridge, symbolic of the divide
between the two communities. However
combat operations were also conducted in
urban areas in order to reduce small pockets
of isolated resistance.
Ensuring security in the various enclaves of
the two communities was the other essential
aspect of the mission. These enclaves were
sources of extreme tension, and constantly
the targets of provocations, with sometimes
sudden attacks. In all cases the aim was to
intervene with the lowest level of violence
possible, in collaboration with the UN
Police (UNMIK Police); the daily partner of
the coalition. In 2003, KFOR initially downsized
to 17,500 men, then in 2006 brigades
became Task Forces, a new concept doing
away with ownership of stationing zones.
These Task Forces became Battle Groups
in 2009, at which point the situation
the situation was normalized, leading to
complete disengagement by 2014.
French Battalion KFOR, Kosovo, summer 1999
In Mitrovica, while a motorized French
battalion provided the Northern zone reserve,
a mechanized infantry battalion stationed on a
number of sites and patrolled the northern part
of the town, day and night, thereby merging
into the populace.
With 1,000 men to secure, a town of
12,000 inhabitants it was possible to ensure
a tight control and to provide levels of security
similar to that of a French town. Small
incidents were nonetheless often exploited and
manipulated by both parties, which, without
warning, could lead to major violent clashes,
particularly in 2000 and early 2001. Most
often these would occur during demonstrations
In IVORY COAST, a military uprising and ensuing
rebellion allowed the Patriotic Movement
for the Ivory Coast (MPCI) to take control of
the north in September 2002, cutting
the country in two. Pre-positioned forces in
Gabon, Senegal, Chad, Djibouti and 43rd BIMa
in Abidjan reinforced the Force LICORNE. At the
outset, 1,250 men were deployed in September
and the force reached 3,250 men manning
4 combined arms battalion TFs (GTIAs) by
early 2003. November 2004 marked a turning
point as Op DIGNITE conducted by government
forces degenerated into bombing the French
barracks in Bouaké, killing 9 soldiers and a
US expatriate. Urban combat and riots broke
out three days later, in front of the Ivoire
Hotel. These clashes led to the UN deciding
to deploy UNOCI to the Côte d’Ivoire thereby
enabling LICORNE to progressively reduce its
numbers.25
25 The 4000 man force Feb 2005 was reduced to 2400 and 2 GTIAS in Aug 2007. These 2 GTIAs were merged in early
2008. In summer 2009, after a restructuring exercise, 900 men remained in Camp de Port-Bouët.
28
Notwithstanding their difficult context and
duration, on the whole these three major
operations were successes, as evidenced
by the closure of each theater following a
UN backed transfer of power to the local
authorities in countries and areas that to this
day remain peaceful.
On the homeland, a network of Islamist
terrorists linked to the Algerian Islamic Armed
Group (GIA), killed 8 people and wounded more
than 200 in a wave of attacks between July and
October 1995.
This prompted the revision of the Plan
VIGIPIRATE (basic posture and reinforced
posture), that had been created in 1978.
The updated plan was fully put into action in
1995 and revised again in 2000, 2002, 2003
(alert levels yellow, orange, red and scarlet) and
2006. The Army contributed more than 80%
of the manpower and participated in every
reinforcement, for example during the World
Cup 1998, the Kosovo air strikes in April 1999,
the Millennium Bug in 2000, the 9/11 attacks
in New York in 2001, the beginning of the Iraq
war in 2003, the 60th anniversary of D Day
in Normandy in 2004, in London and Paris in
2005, and in the suburbs riots in 2005.
G.Gesquière © armée de terre
Over the course of more than
10 years and up until the arrest of
Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, Force
LICORNE conducted a large spectrum
of actions: monitoring the cease fire
across a vast area, interposition,
stabilization, area control, intervening
during stark periods of raised tension,
urban combat, supporting the electoral
process and UNOCI, protecting and
evacuating nationals. The operation
came to an end in early 2015, with
a French detachment in Ivory Coast
(EFCI) continuing to maintain a French
military footprint in the country.
Ivory Coast 2013: Op LICORNE
This was a low visibility commitment as it
was aiming to be discrete, but nonetheless,
the Army’s assistance was greatly sought
during Op STATERE,26 providing site security
for stockpiled francs and then euros during
the conversion process to the single European
currency in 2000-2001.
2.1.3 Major Lessons
These operations validated the bold use of
more modular organizations, while highlighting
the fragmentation of deployed units. Indeed,
it was not rare for a deployed battalion to be
manned by the contribution of fifty or even
one hundred Army units. By their number,
volume of committed troops and their variety,
overseas operations became a powerful driving
force in the professionalization of the Army.
Henceforth all units were deployable, including
for short duration tasks, in particular within
the decreasing pre-positioned forces system.
The KLA (UCK) disarmament operation in
Macedonia (Op ESSENTIAL HARVEST) propelled
the Army to view the brigade as the smallest
viable multinational formation.
26 1-2 platoons per regiment provided static site protection over a number of months.
29
2.1.3.2. Employment
Deployed units operated in interposition across
a very broad spectrum of tasks and courses
of action. During these stabilization operations,
peaks of violence were interspersed by long
periods of calm. The following courses of action
and developments were noteworthy:
 initial entry into Kosovo,
 emergence of civil military operations (ACM)
and a comprehensive approach gained from
experience,
 engagement in strongly multinational
operations (Balkans),
 learning crowd control in urban areas
(Kosovo, Ivory Coast),
 operations over extended areas (IVORY
COAST),
 buildup of expeditionary logistics (Afghanistan
and IVORY COAST),
 developing operations amongst civilians
(IVORY COAST, Kosovo, Afghanistan) and in
urban areas (Sarajevo, Mitrovica, Abidjan,
Kabul, Mogadishu),
 battle space digitization trials (NEB) (In IVORY
COAST with 6th BLB).27
During operations, legal factors became far
more important than had hitherto been the
case (ROE, LEGADs). The battlefield had become
non-linear and, increasingly, the reality of most
theaters was that there was no longer a front
line (nor a forward nor a rear area to mention).
Logistic convoys became the targets of more
attacks, mainly by IEDs.
A well identified enemy had been replaced
by paramilitary or civil adversaries, often
immersed in civilian populations. These were
in turn exploited to achieve the adversaries’
aims. When the adversary could not directly
oppose the Force, they would attempt to
destabilize and discredit it by using asymmetric
processes likely to influence the perception
of local and Western opinions. In Afghanistan
and the Balkans the religious dimension was
significant, even though it was not a stake in the
conflict. In the Balkans, the population (whether
it was manipulated or not) became a potential
adversary and so became the center of gravity
of operations.
As operations settled into the long term,
most of the time soldiers’ living conditions
improved considerably (emergence of a “Living
Standards on Operations” policy). Finally, as
working in a multinational environment requires
a grasp of operational English, leader training
is quickly adapting to this practice.
The most significant engagements from this
period provide us with specific lessons:
The UN environment in Bosnia and the
absence of clear political objectives
occasionally inhibited soldiers. Using fire
was made difficult by restrictive ROEs, a
consequence of an overly cautious approach
to these operations. The slightest common
ground was constantly sought, in a force that
was very multinational, although in which every
contributing nation acted independently of
each other. The lesser multinational units were
the exception. UN ethics and the diversity of
contingents prevented military intelligence
from being sufficiently efficient. Convoys were
generally too lightly escorted to force their way
through illegal vehicle checkpoints set up by
the belligerents and restricting UNPROFOR’s
movements. Occasionally, situations could take
a dangerous or humiliating turn for soldiers,
27 Refer to CDEF’s study, ‘Electrons in the Bush,’ 2007 and available on CDEF’s intraterre web site: (http://www.cdef.terre.
defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/Cahier_RETEX/Zones_Geo/electron_brousse.htm)
30
Armored UNPROFOR patrol in Sarajevo
as was the case during the hostage crisis
in Sarajevo in 1995, which was facilitated by
the fragmentation of units across a multitude
of often isolated positions. The retaking of
Verbanja at the end of May 1995 was symbolic;
afterwards the military response did take
the lead nonetheless, by forming the rapid
reaction force (FRR) in Bosnia in summer
1995. This forced the withdrawal of Serb
heavy weapons from the high ground around
Sarajevo. This event confirmed the relevance
of a controlled use of fire in resolving crises
and provided a foretaste of what was to
come in the 2000s, not least the combat
operations in Afghanistan.
The establishment of IFOR
(Implementation Force) in
1995 marked the transfer
of mission to NATO.
In this context, France took
command of the Multinational
Division South East (DMNSE),
deploying a divisional CP
and up to 2 brigade CPs.
This transfer enabled
the successful application of
the 1995 Daytona agreement
and a move towards installing
peace in the country.
In Kosovo troops particularly
had to master crowd
control techniques. Troops
had to coordinate with heterogeneous and
seldom responsive UN police, while meeting
the overriding need for absolute neutrality
and overcoming numerous complex national
caveats that clearly impeded combat
efficiency. By melting into the population, there
is no doubt that French units set up too many
small compounds. Their tasks were limited
but continuous, thereby enabling people to get
back to leading as normal a life as possible.
At the same time, these units were always
collecting intelligence that could anticipate
and defuse potentially violent flare ups.
The added value of the deterrent and
reassuring effect of the Leclerc tank deployed
for the first time and the AMX10P helped keep
violence to a minimum.
For some units, pre deployment preparations
included crowd control training in partnership
with the gendarmerie. This included an
introduction to individual protective equipment
and practice with non-lethal weapons that were
issued in theater and whose use emerged.
Op TRIDENT vindicated the Proterre concept.
Numerous companies that had deployed for
the first time found that the model worked well.
Moreover, this encouraged units from other
warfighting functions to set up companies in
compliance with this principle.
© ECPAD
© ECPAD
Kosovo 2000: crowd control on ‘Austerlitz Bridge’, Mitrovica
31
Op LICORNE in IVORY COAST was a break from
past engagements in Africa or more recently in
the Balkans as part of UN and NATO operations.
Clashes became significantly tougher as
the adversary became increasingly determined
and better armed.
Faced by armed groups
employing
course
of
actions close to guerrilla
methods, French soldiers
once again implemented
the fundamentals of ground
combat. As such, operations
required a high level of
autonomy and subsidiarity
even at the lowest command
level. They became proficient
at combining direct fire from
armored vehicles with attack
helicopters and mortars. On
several occasions, the use
of helicopters proved to be
the determining factor in
regaining the upper hand in
the most explosive situations.
Command architecture evolves during
the course of the operation, and for the most
sensitive period is based on a joint theater
HQ manned by an operational structure and
a brigade whose commander is the Force
Commander Deputy for Operations.
2.1.3.3 Equipment
The Army was still equipped with aging Cold
War era equipment, with the exception of
the Leclerc tank, whose first engagement had
been in Kosovo and then in Lebanon. Tracked
32
armor was still used (AMX10P in Lebanon,
Kosovo and Ivory Coast). Across the board,
VAB was the workhorse, although serving the
12.7mm machine gun from outside the turret
became problematic due to the omnipresent
threat of snipers, particularly in Sarajevo. These
operations in Sarajevo led to the development
of anti-sniping protection and remarkable
improvements in precision weaponry (better
optics, computers and the PGM 12.7mm
sniper rifle).
AuF1 artillery guns were deployed on Mount
Igman, Bosnia in 1995 and provided precision
fires. In Kosovo, and particularly in Mitrovica,
© Xavier Pellizzari Xavier/ECPAD
Overall, compounds neglected force protection
(PROFOR): first units took over cursory civilian
facilities in town centers, whose outsides were
not sufficiently protected. Then units moved
to camps that had well-protected perimeters
although whose disposition mirrored that
of homeland stations; inadequate during
operations.
AuF1 Mount Igman 1995 overlooking Sarajevo
the AMX10P proved its worth not least for its
ability to turn in the narrow streets of certain
areas. Its 20mm cannon was used for accurate
fire round by round into the openings of buildings
and houses. Traffic control units were briefly
equipped with the ULM light aircraft to maintain
surveillance of the main roads, indicating the
Army’s willingness to experiment and innovate.
In IVORY COAST, medium weight equipment
( VAB , AMX10RC) continued to provide
good service, but troops occasionally lacked
reduced lethality equipment (ALR), especially
when controlling large crowds that had been
manipulated, such as the Ivoire Hotel episode in
Abidjan 2004. Individual combatant protection
improved, especially in the realm of anti-ballistic
items (body armor and protective glasses).
2.2 Phase 2: 2007-2015
hardened operations with
a seasoned Army
The 2008 Defense White Paper accounted
for growing instability worldwide and recognized
that France was more directly vulnerable that
it had been 15 years beforehand. For the first
time, the paper set out a “national security and
defense strategy”, incorporating a spectrum
of possible crises and a new strategic function,
Anticipation Knowledge highlighted as a
priority. The strategic rapprochement with the
USA and the growth of the Taliban insurgency
justified a more aggressive posture for French
land forces in Afghanistan, where Op PAMIR
became the most significant operational
milestone for the French Army in 2008.
The operational land forces’ deployable
element was set at 88,000 men, according to
an operational contract which described four
engagement assumptions:
- H1: participation in crisis management
operations on the homeland with a force
of 10,000 men deployed under a notice of
some days;
- H2: participation in solving two medium-scale
crises outside Europe, including a 5,000
man reinforcement to the home defense
posture, two multinational operations one of
10,000 men under a 4-6 month notice and
another, under French command, of 7,000
men under a 2-3 month notice and a standby
force for emergency operations of 5,000
men (Guépard);
- H3: participation in a major regional conflict
where vital interests are at stake, deploying
alongside our allies under a six month nonrenewable notice with up to 30,000 men
and for a maximum of one year, a reinforced
home defense posture involving 10,000 men
and a standby force of 5,000 men (Guépard).
This assumes that 45,000 men are
available and would necessitate wholesale
disengagement from operations elsewhere.
This is the worst case scenario and justifies
the requirement for a deployable operational
land force of 88,000.
- H4 : the simultaneous management of
multiple crises, i.e. 4-5 operations with a
total of 10,000 men and a stand by force of
5,000 (Guépard). This represented the daily
reality for the Army during the validity period
of this Defense White Paper.
With the 2013 Defense White Paper, Africa as
a strategic priority was reaffirmed and events
quickly vindicated this view (Mali, CAR, Sahel–
Sahara Strip). The deployable operational land
force was reduced to 66,000 and forces’
operational contracts were revised according
to 3 force engagement scenarios (HE):
- HE1: standard operational situation (SOR).
This SOR is similar to H4 in the previous
White Paper i.e. it can be viewed as the
day-to-day experience of servicemen
throughout ongoing operations. It involves
manning the National Emergency Echelon
(ENU), re-building it if needed, maintaining
deterrence, protection and prevention
missions, as well as crisis management
crises in 2-3 theaters with 6-7,000 men;
- HE2 : Emergency National Protection
deployment ( HE-PROT ). In addition to
the above SOR, it covers a reinforcement
of homeland where the Army must be
able to deploy up to 10,000 soldiers,
the reinforcement of the permanent security
and deterrence posture.28
28 HE2 was enacted following the attacks in Paris Jan 2015.
33
- HE3: besides the missions accomplished
as part of HE-PROT , and with some
“sample” equipment centralization, the
major intervention assumption, HE-INTER
anticipates a coalition deployment within a
six month readiness period for an intensive
engagement of six months, with a strength of
two brigades, command and logistic support
elements (up to 21,000 men) in order to fulfil
“framework nation « obligations.
of Defense was compelled to significant
restructuring. The main part came from the
2009 decrees which affected the powers of
delegation of the Chief of the Defense Staff and
his Service Chiefs of Staff, saw the rise of the
General Secretariat for Administration (SGA),
and major joint directorates. The decrees
also introduced defense bases in a wholesale
reorganization of sustainment and territorial
structures. In this context, land regions were
removed, defense sustainment HQs (EMSD)
were established, while maintenance was
re-organized (SIMMT and SMITer).29
For the period of the White Paper, French
defense spending was maintained at 1.5% of
GDP (3.5% of military spending worldwide).
Defense restructuring led to massive cuts in
numbers. The subsequent human resources
management included, in particular, limited
promotions and departure incentives.
More generally, with the Public Policies Review
(RGPP 2007) that became the Public Action
Modernization (MAP 2012), the Department
A REALISTIC AND STRUCTURING OPERATIONAL CONTRACT FOR THE FRENCH ARMY
Overseas
Operations
(OPEX) Up to
7,000 soldiers
across
3 theaters of
operations
Presence forces
and sovereign
base forces
National
Emergency
Echelon
(Guépard)
4,300 troops
Permanent
Security Posture
(PPS)
Major Intervention
Engagement
Assumption
(HE-M-INTER)*
Emergency
National
Protection
deployment
(HE-U-PROT)
Standard Operational
Situation (SOR)
National
Territory
10,000 troops
Permanent
Security
Posture (PPS)
Reinforcement
Smaller joint operation (SJO)
Deployment
of 15,000-21,000 French
Army personnel as part of
a NATO operation (France:
framework nation)
Deterrence
Reinforcement
*In the scenario of a large-scale support the French Army can make adjustments
and share and pool resources to fulfil the contract.
[The operational contracts of the 2013 Defense White Paper (source: French Army HQ)]
29 Land Integrated Equipment Maintenance Structure and Land Industrial Maintenance Service.
34
2.2.1 Army Structure
2.2.1.1 Model - Organization
The Army was 101 régiments strong in 2008.
That year, it was further streamlined, losing
more than another 20 régiments, while
clustering brigades geographically and cutting
significant staff numbers from organic entities
(headquarters and schools). Such downsizing
meant that the Army had reached 78 régiments
and 100,000 men by 2014. At the same time,
Land Command (CFT) aggregated in 2008 the
roles of CFAT and CFLT in 2008, then in 2010,
the trades of the engineer, artillery and aviation
brigades as these were disbanded.
Training schools were regrouped in denser
centers and higher military education was
subject to numerous changes (differentiated
staff qualifications, removal of the Higher Staff
Course in 2014 and a lengthened land specific
module at the War College).
The CDEF was leading the doctrine function
and worked closely with the prospective
departments of Branch Schools, the Joint Centre
for Concepts Doctrine and Experimentation
(CICDE), international organizations (NATO, UN,
EU). Over the course of a decade, it delivered an
up to date corpus consistent with joint and Allied
doctrine and above all vindicated by operations.
The lessons learned approach was adapted by
implementing new, more responsive processes
to serve ongoing and potential operations.
Guépard new generation standby forces were
adjusted in line with recent operations and with
the new operational contract to fit into the joint
National Emergency Echelon (ENU), required
by the 2013 Defense White Paper.
2.2.1.2 Preparation
for Operations
From 2008, operations became harder. This
was symbolized by the Uzbeen ambush of
18-19 August 2008 in Afghanistan, which
killed 10 French soldiers and sent shock waves
through the Army. The need for continual
rationalization led to a comprehensive overview
of preparation for operations. Preparation
became more differentiated and each theater
had its own dedicated conditioning (MCP),
including reinforced training and certification
stages.
Pre deployment training moved from ‘readyto-wear’ to a ‘made to measure’ concept.
In practical terms, if MCP for Afghanistan took
6 months, Lebanon or Kosovo needed only 4
and troops preparing for short term sovereign
base operations needed somewhat less.
Moreover, from 2011, the length of harder
tours was extended to 6 months, while others,
along with short term missions within the
prepositioned forces system remained at 4
months.
Ambitious new policies were implemented for
the use of training areas to make the new pre
deployment training packages viable. In 2007,
training camps were categorized into three
levels, according to their capacity and the type
of units training there.
Level 3 was suitable for GTIA training in
Champagne (Mailly, Mourmelon, Suippes,
Sissonne) and Provence (Canjuers, Larzac).
Setting up MCP relied heavily on the specialized
centers, under the forces readiness centers
command of CCPF (Mailly le Camp) since
1997. Alongside the existing centers (CEPC,
CENTAC, CEITO, 1st Régiment de Chasseurs Canjuers, 17th Groupe d’Artillerie - Biscarosse)
there emerged some new specialist training
sites:
• Urban operations training center (CENZUB,
opened in 2006) one-of-a-kind in Europe for
its modernity, size and scope of training
opportunities, including firing in urban areas;
• The Operational Assistance Detachment
(DAO), under command of 1st Régiment
de Chasseurs - Canjuers where an Afghan
style FOB (similar to what units will find in
35
the theater) was built in 2009. All SGTIAs
spent 3 weeks at Canjuers at the end of
their MCP. DAO was reinforced by mentors
recently returned from operations who were
able to share their experiences while units
familiarized themselves with theater specific
equipment and procedures. They bolstered
their skills in countering IED and combat first
aid, before applying them in a one week long
integration exercise;
• The National Combined Arms Control
Committee ( CNCIA 2009) at Mailly,
evaluating level 4 (GTIA) CPs;
• The Brigade Training Centre (CEB 2006)
became the Combined Arms and Logistic
Sustainment Training Center in 2013
( CENTIAL ) in Mourmelon. It provided
brigades with the necessary operational
infrastructures for training in fire and
maneuver in Mourmelon and Suippes (DZ,
combat village, ranges for light infantry
weapons and up to 155mm cannons, VCPs).
CENTIAL also manages the Champagne area
training fleet of up to 300 vehicles, either
armored or not;
• The Mountain Combat Training Group (GAM
2009) in Modane.30 A policy governing all
training areas was implemented from 2014.
There were two pillars to generic operational
readiness:
 centralized training, based around the
specialist training centers and level 2
camps (la Courtine, Valdahon, western
training camps including Coetquidan and
Fontevraud and mountain centers)
 decentralized training, based around home
station facilities, including around 30
collective training areas (ECI) and level 1
camps (Bitche, Caylus and les Garrigues)
In terms of soldiers’ initial training, given
the strain on their recruitment and above
all the need to standardize basic training in
the forces, the Army created Initial Military
Training Centers (CFIM) and placed them
under brigades’ responsibility as of summer
2010.
Following infantry, the ISTC program became
a standard for marksmanship training and
combat-seasoning became an integral part of
all stages of preparation for operations.
Combat search and rescue training was
formalized in 2008, leading to a significant
improvement in land forces’ first aid skills.
Counter IED also saw major developments
in training, and saw the emergence of new
capabilities including specialist military search
techniques.
The AZUR (action in urban areas) policy
played a part in preparing forces for urban
operations, not only through the build-up of
CENZUB, but also due to the PERFOR and
BICUB training modules that were set up for
use in the collective training areas (ECIs) of
home stations.
In 2011 a 5-phase operational readiness
cycle was set up, which allowed time for units
to recover from operations and to mentor
those that were getting ready to deploy.
30 This center enables battle training in a mountain environment, whilst CNAM in Briançon, which had replaced CIECM
Barcelonnette in 2008, was disbanded in 2009.
36
THE 5-PHASE THEORETICAL CYCLE FOR LAND FORCES ACROSS 24 MONTHS
YEAR 1
Deployment
(PROJ)
(4-6 months)
YEAR A + 2
Recovery from
operations
(RCO)
(6 months)
Projection
Leave,
Mentoring
Individual training
(courses)
Preparation for
Operations 1
(PO2)
Preparation for
Operations 2
(PO2)
(decentralized)
(4-6 months)
(centralized)
(4-6 months)
Garrison
training up to
platoon level,
domestic
missions
Training spaces
(level 2)
Partnerships
Conditioning
(MCP)
(4-6 months)
+ partnership
periods and generic
preparation
Specialized training for operations
centers (level 3)
for MCP shorter
than 4 months
Alerts
The 5-phase operational readiness cycle
2.2.1.3 Equipment
Even though longstanding vehicles were still
being deployed in operations, a 3rd modernizing
wave (since 1945) of new heavy equipment
came into service: Tigre then Caiman
helicopters, VBCI armored infantry combat
vehicles, CAESAR 155mm high mobility
CAESAR (Afghanistan, Tagab, 2010)
(C)Didier GEFFROY/SIRPA Terre Image
artillery guns, the FELIN system, multipurpose
load carrying vehicles (PPT). Tactical UAVs,
SDTI 2005 and DRAC 2008 were upgraded
with new multiple sensors. Tactical liaisons
were improved through satellite links some of
them allowing communications while on the
move, such as the VAB VENUS.
VBCI (Afghanistan, Surobi, 2010)
(C) ADJ Arnaud KARAGHEZIAN
SIRPA Terre Image
Drone SDTI
37
Moreover, maintaining 90% equipment
availability for operations had an immediate and
considerable impact on units in metropolitan
France (where 25-75% was observed
depending on the fleet and the period, averaging
50%) and sometimes strongly affected those
performing decentralized training. Difficulties
with equipment conditioning (MCO) and the
pressure of overseas operations from 2008
led to the introduction of a fleet employment
and management policy (PEGP). This necessary
revolution completely broke with the deeply
ingrained practice of units keeping together
100% of the vehicle fleet needed for their
engagement. Under PEGP, a fleet was put
together for training (PE) directly available
at the large camps, and a further element
retained on stand-by (PA). Nonetheless, the
intense operational tempo was such that
efforts from maintenance teams were not as
fruitful as they needed to be. It was a struggle
to put together the managed fleet (PG), despite
it being the hub of the system. It left units with a
fleet of the (PSP), deemed by COs to be “simply
insufficient”.
© EMA/AdT
The Army confronted challenges on all of
its deployments. Across the board, the local
population is both at stake and is used as
leverage by all types of adversaries.
CAR Mar 15; checkpoint in Bambari market
38
In Afghanistan, Op PAMIR (2001-14) entered
a difficult combat phase, marking the return
to war and practice of counter–insurgency.
The enemy was well adapted to the terrain and
climate. They were pugnacious and used all
available courses of actions from asymmetric
warfare (ambush, harassment, hostage taking,
intense use of IEDs, action against populations).
In Libya (Mar-Oct 2011), while air strikes alone
did not cause the collapse of the Gaddafi regime,
helicopter attacks from the sea did prove
decisive. During Op HARMATTAN Army aviation
(ALAT) vindicated the aérocombat concept
by bringing a unique, valuable and remarkable
added value contribution to the coalition.
In the IVORY COAST, Op LICORNE (20022015) continued its security mission in support
of the ONUCI and of the Ivorian Army. French
forces also contributed to NEO operations in
2004 and 2011. Towards the conclusion of
the crisis (April 2011), LICORNE supported
local forces in urban combat operations in an
uncertain and sensitive context.
In Mali (Jan 2013 - Aug 2014), Op SERVAL
marked a return to deep operations in the air
land battle. SERVAL was universally applauded
as a tactical and logistical success. The enemy,
refusing confrontation in the open, preferred
to fight from their safe havens where they
sacrificed themselves and suffered heavy losses.
SERVAL then entered a year
of stabilization and successive
force restructurings without
ever letting up the pressure
on the enemy, despite their
continual build up through a
smart organization of their
various movements.
In CAR (from Dec 13) Force
SANGARIS imposed and
interposed in a complex,
volatile and hyper violent
situation. In less than
6 months, after securing the
capital Bangui and the major
road to Cameroon, SANGARIS had control of
the center of the country and was able to pass
the baton to the UN (MINUSCA) and EUFORCAR force, which although limited and difficult
to build up, managed to fit in the disposition.
personnel on a regular basis for security
operations (Op HARPIE from 2008 in Guiana,
major international sports or commemorative
events) or assistance to populations
(Hurricanes KLAUSS 2009, XYNTHIA 2010,
Draguignan floods 2011).
© AdT CCH Alexandre DUMOUTIER
Following the attacks at the
offices of the newspaper Charlie
Hebdo and the Jewish community
in Paris on 7-8 January 2015,
the ‘attack alert’ was triggered for
the first time and the armed forces
deployed more than 10,000 men
across metropolitan France in just
a few days, mostly from the Army,
in support of security forces. With
Op SENTINELLE, the contract set
out in the Defense White Paper
was fully implemented.
Paris Jan 2015: Op SENTINELLE 48th RT securing the metro (Nation station)
2.2.3 Major Lessons
From summer 2014, Op BARKHANE continued
its efforts in regionalization in the BSS (SahelSahara Strip) and the transfer of authority to
local forces and to the UN mission (MINUSMA),
while maintaining pressure on terrorist groups
through close coordination with Special Forces
and the air force.
In the fight against Daesh in Iraq, Op CHAMMAL
provided air support to the Iraqi air force from
September 2014. From early 2015, it included
Army limited commitment in security force
assistance to Iraqi ground forces.
In France, there were further developments
in VIGIPIRATE as the system was given an
overhaul in 2014. The most obvious change
was that it was simplified to just two alert
levels; ‘vigilance’ and ‘attack alert’. The Army
also deployed often significant capacities and
The Army, which was now completely
professional, provided 80% of the manpower
deployed for all operations. It relies on C2
structures that have been tried and tested and
that are of the right size. Brigades have proved
to be effective for combined arms integration.
As efficient tactical CPs, they bring together
numerous functions and new capabilities. These
capabilities may or may not have been held in
metropolitan France (counter IED, logistics, IT
and communication systems, influence/APEO.31
While GTIAs represented the standard tactical
unit at level 4, SGTIAs/company teams32
became increasingly capable of combined arms
operations. Experience in operations further
reinforced the Army’s decision to maintain an
asset fit for the whole spectrum of operations
with heavy, medium and light equipment.
31 APEO grouped together CIMIC, influence operations and strategic/operational communications.
32 GTIA and SGTIA.
39
how in security force assistance
(Op EPIDOTE and the OMLTs in
Afghanistan, EUTM in Mali or
Operational Liaison and Assistance
Detachments ( DLAO ) during
Op SERVAL and BARKHANE).33
© ADC Jean-Raphaël DRAHI
It has reinforced its expeditionary
culture and the capacity to set
partner forces in motion.
Moreover, this phase was
noteworthy for its numerous
adjustments, which were farreaching and introduced at short
notice:
Afghanistan 2013 Op EPIDOTE
2.2.3.2 Employment
When confronted with adversaries that
were increasingly determined and difficult to
distinguish, the Army stuck to its decisions, and
adjusted to harder and more diverse operations,
while still applying the basic principles of
combat and adapting its capacities.
The skills acquired in Afghanistan
(maneuver, combat-seasoning, first aid,
marksmanship) enabled the Army to react
well in Op HARMATTAN, SERVAL, SANGARIS,
and during crisis on the homeland and further
demonstrated the benefit of its pre-positioned
forces.
The Army confirmed the value of leaders’
training, which brought their tactical
imagination to the fore, as well as situational
intelligence as a readiness tool The Army will
continue with the buildup of aérocombat (Army
aviation combat operations).
The Army has demonstrated inherent flexibility
(constantly adapting to evolving operations,
frequent
retaskings, combined arms
operations at lower and lower levels) and know
-
Adoption and development of new
capabilities (multi sensor intelligence,
C-IED, influence/APEO, UAVs);
-
Reinforced interoperability at joint,
multinational, inter-agency, and in particular
with special forces levels, and in the areas
of intelligence and coordination in the
3rd (vertical) dimension;
-
Taking into account a comprehensive
approach (influence operations), the
growing influence of legal and media
factors on operations and cyberspace;
-
Improvement of casualty assistance
through an Army dedicated cell (CABAT)
and welfare support for bereaved families
(plan Hommage);
-
Establishment of a psychological support
cell for warfighters, including the
systematic use of decompression periods
before returning to France, to prevent the
consequences of hardened operations
exposing soldiers to abuses and extreme
violence.
33 Op EPIDOTE was the ANA training mission in Afghanistan, whilst OMLTs (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams)
advised and accompanied combat units. EUTM-Mali trained battalions of the new Malian Army; DLAOs accompanied
their deployments and coordinated ops with MINUSMA.
40
© G.Gesquière/armée de terre
Afghanistan Feb 2012: Task Force La Fayette
Digitization of the battle space (NEB) made a
slow debut on operations. Battalions deployed
with stripped down versions due to it being
impossible to equip whole units with digitized
kit, in particular when they were built with
pre-positioned forces which were not yet in
the digitized era. Thus the goal of deploying
a digitized combined arms brigade by 2009
was not achieved. However, the accumulated
experience gained from many deployments
allowed France to become one of the world’s
leading digitized armies and also paved the way
for the introduction of the SCORPION program
in the Army.
Last, the operational logistic chain found itself
under significant pressure to support and
resupply units often at considerable distances,
and to maintain sufficient equipment availability
(DTO) across all theaters.
By Theater of Operation:
In Afghanistan, Task Force LA FAYETTE (TFLF)
was perfectly integrated into a US Army
Division and provided an anchor of stability
through a comprehensive approach. GTIAs
experienced the return to war on a daily
basis in all their missions. They rediscovered
the full use of fires, the tough mountain
environment and campaign life in the FOBs.35
Psychological support for soldiers became
an increasing concern for the chain of
command, which introduced decompression
periods for troops returning to France.
89 French soldiers lost their lives during this
difficult operation and about 700 came home
wounded.
In Libya, the Helicopter Strike Group carried
out 40 raids, practically all at night, destroying
600 targets, or 40% of the French total, without
human or material loss, nor any collateral
damage. Army aviation ( ALAT ) employed
doctrine that had been honed in Afghanistan.
It was adapted for maritime operations in
close coordination with the assault ship (BPC),
and then developed close interoperability with
the navy.
In Mali, in coordination with special forces and
the air force, the SERVAL brigade regained
control of the areas occupied by terrorist armed
groups and then destroyed them in their safe
havens, employing deep operations conducted
34 Forward Operating Base.
41
simultaneously in two zones 500kms apart.
Conditions in Mali were particularly hard on
men and materiel, underscoring the desert’s
reputation as a logistician’s nightmare.
Once again, soldiers deployed under very
Spartan conditions37 were faced with daily
abuses and an unpredictable adversary.
© THB
During the stability phase from the end of 2013
and then in the Sahel-Sahara strip during
the transfer of mission to Op BARKHANE,
innovative ORBATs and courses of actions were
implemented: desert GTIA (GTD), aviation GTIA,
As its commanders often said, ‘SANGARIS
knows how to do everything, but it cannot do
everything.’ However, the force managed to
stabilize the situation in Bangui, while rapidly
expanding its action to the western and central
provinces.
Mali, Sep 2014: Op BARKHANE – GTD ouest
contingency GTIA, intelligence led 35
tracking ops and temporary advanced FOB
deployments(BOAT). 36 Again; helicopters
proved to be the key to success either in the
attack role or for lifting troops. Given the size of
the force and the vast areas they were
covering, only helicopters enabled them on
receipt of immediate use intelligence to act far
and quickly and to achieve the desired tactical
effect.
In the Central African Republic, limited troop
numbers (1,200 then 2,000) forced planners
to use consecutive phases, subject to logistic
and air lift constraints. GTIAs and SGTIAs were
continually task-reorganized.
CAR Aug 2014: Op SANGARIS. VBCI on patrol
The adversary was volatile, aggressive and more
than capable of handling his weapons. Troops
demonstrated exemplary courage and sangfroid thanks to their accumulated experience
and adequate pre-deployment training.
In metropolitan France, consistent with the
contract set out in the Defense White Paper,
some 10,000 soldiers including 400 reservists
were deployed in Paris and across the rest of
the country following the attacks in January
2015. Plan NEPTUNE, originally designed to
cope with the centennial flood of the Seine,
proved its utility on this occasion as units were
designated, rolled out and deployed smoothly
within a few days.
35 Using a variety of capabilities to react quickly to exploitable intelligence. These ops offered the best chance of tangible
results.
36 BOAT Base opérationelle avancée temporaire.
37 M’Poko Camp was built for the 400 men of Op BOALI. SANGARIS’ planned 1200 men became 2000 after the first few
weeks. Each day 100 000 people came to take refuge next to the camp. In a country without any viable infrastructure,
the sanitary conditions at the camp were appalling.
42
EMFs were deployed in Paris and in Marseille
as the tactical level operating center. They were
subordinated to the Joint Operational Centers
of Defense and Security, in the Paris area and in
the south (COIAZDS). The size and duration of
the deployment sometimes caused problems.
Pre-deployment training for operations
was interrupted by the need to provide and
to regularly rotate such large numbers of
troops. The White Paper had not foreseen an
indeterminate territorial deployment and the
Army was not large enough to perform all of its
mandated tasks concurrently. Static guarding
tasks do not make the most of professional
soldiers’ capabilities, who, despite their obvious
vulnerability, demonstrated remarkable control
of the use of force down to the lowest levels.
2.2.3.3 Equipment
Worn out old major equipment was still used
extensively. The VAB and AMX10RC were as
old as the Peugeot 504 and twice the age
of their drivers. These vehicles were already
12 years old when they were used in Daguet.
Wheeled vehicles (VAB, AMX10RC, VBL) were
still preferable to tracked ones.
© G. GESQUIERE/armée de terre
Op HARPIE in Guiana provided an excellent
laboratory for trialing platoon and squads
tactics. The destitute illegal gold washers,
the Garimpeiros, had nothing to lose and
would open fire without hesitation. Soldiers
deployed on long arduous tasks and jungle
patrols, conducive to combat-seasoning in
one of the most hostile environments, as well
as developing joint cooperation techniques
particularly with the Gendarmerie. To date,
three French soldiers have been killed in this
operation in contact with the Garimpeiros.
Op HARPIE : Guiana, quadbike recce
43
mobility, firepower and protection, and this
was proven in most theatres of operations. The
new DROPS logistic vehicle (PPT) was capable
of carrying heavy loads and recovering whilst
protecting its crew. Its introduction marked a
major step forward in front line logistic support
in the Sahel-Sahara Strip.
©Cch Alexandre DUMOUTIER / SIRPA Terre
Following a bold but deliberate decision
the new generation of equipment was
deployed immediately into theaters (Tigre and
Caiman helicopters, CAESAR 155mm gun,
VBCI armored infantry fighting vehicle, PVT light
armored vehicle, new DROPs logistic vehicles
(PPT)) and proved very satisfactory.
Tigre: Afghanistan, Nov 2012
Combat power increased notably thanks to
how this new equipment performed upon
entering service. A Tigre helicopter integrated
into an air-land maneuver often enabled the
unit to gain superiority over the enemy or
to locally reverse relative combat power;
its sideways looking sensors and fire power
could quickly prove decisive wherever it was
engaged. CAESAR demonstrated remarkable
tactical mobility over difficult ground and was
quick coming into action. Its accuracy and long
range provided combined arms commanders
with considerable freedom of action. VBCI
offered an excellent compromise between
Numerous avenues were pursued under
the title ‘reactive adaptation’ in order to
improve equipment performance. This
concept generated new ideas, off the shelf
buys and UORs, particularly in the area of
force protection and the IED threat: jammers,
anti IED and anti RPG enhancement kits for
20 AMX10RC, various ballistic reinforcement
kits for 300 trucks and logistic vehicles,38
32 armored upgrade kits for CAESAR cabins,
anti RPG grills and nets for VBCIs, acoustic
hostile fire indicators for VABs, tele-operated
turrets, VAB ULTIMA, mini robots for engineers,
GA 10 hostile mortar alarms, Margot cameras,
38 150 ‘Last Armor’ protection kits and armored windscreens for TRM 1000 trucks, 121 armored cabins for GBC trucks
at 22 armored Scania trucks.
44
Swarowski snipers’ scopes for the HK 417,
7.62mm Minimi, new generation body armor
and OB70 helmet supports.
or the Buffalo and Aravis counter IED route
opening vehicles, which were armored and
highly protected.
While the enemy was often very lightly
equipped and extremely mobile, soldiers and
their vehicles were becoming heavier and
had increasingly large silhouettes. Facilities
protection was improved thanks to very capable
anti intrusion detectors such as SYPROPE
(Perimeter protection system).
In France, SIC39 interoperability remained
a concern, as much for the forces (Joint
Operational Defense Zone HQs were equipped
with SIC-F at the operational level, but not the
military delegations in the départements in
charge of the tactical level) as for the interagency
level, where progress was being made, albeit
slowly. It did not provide a satisfactory degree
of interoperability with 10,000 troops on
the ground.
© G. GESQUIERE/armée de terre
Numerous other equipment improvements
were made to enhance warfighting capabilities,
such as the VAB VENUS’ mobile satellite link,
VBCI: Afghanistan Feb 2012
39 Translator’s note:a command level information system, reaching down to brigades
45
CONCLUSION
T
hroughout this period, operations
occurred in a wide variety of
environments (mountains, deserts,
tropical, coastal, landlocked, urban and
rural). The Army found ways of combining the
contribution of modern technology with the
fundamentals of ground combat.
- The concept of modularity has been taken too
far at the risk of destroying the coherence
of units that are being fragmented, and
depriving them of the ability to maneuver or
take the lead in operations. This expeditionary
Army has been just tailored to fit today’s
commitments;
Every possible capacity was used including
some assets that had had advanced
considerably in recent times (aérocombat/
aviation combat, UAVs, intelligence, airspace
management and coordination) while others
had just emerged (counter IED, influence
operations, cyber war). The Army was heavily
committed on the national territory.39
- Sustainment reforms, centralizing resource
management, have broken the link between
preparation and operational deployments,
making the regeneration of units and
equipment more difficult;
The Army also displayed budgetary efficiency.
While conflicts arose and were resolved on the
ground, the Army generated operational effect
at minimum cost; the most utilized but the
cheapest of all the three services. Providing
80% of deployed force elements for overseas
deployments, in 2014 this only represented
45% of the Department of Defense’s
manpower for just 28% of the Defense budget,
of which less than 20% was attributed to
equipment and barely 30% to payroll, made up
of around 72% of contract soldiers, more than
half of whom are committed to work in the
public service at the base index salary.40
Nonetheless recent deep restructuring
exercises have shaped an Army oriented
toward overseas operations. However there
remain a number of concerns:
- The disbandment and reorganization of
units, have damaged, over time, the Army’s
historic footprint in France, leaving behind
military ghost towns in desperate need of
redevelopment;
On the other hand, NCOs have gained
a remarkable degree of autonomy and
commanders have mastered numerous
new skills, (sometimes very specialized) in
the perpetually broadening area of
interoperability.
But vigilance is still required; this highly
experienced generation could quickly disappear,
due the accelerated departure of the old
school and the rapid arrival of young recruits.
The Army’s excellent pre deployment training
must be preserved at all costs, regardless of
the level of commitments.
39 VIGIPIRATE, HEPHAISTOS, HARPIE, natural catastrophes at home and overseas, securing large events, interventions
and emergency deployments such as SENTINELLE 2015.
40 Page 26 Army Report (GRAT) 2016.
47
Conclusion
This alone will guarantee tactical success in
the long term, wherever the Army deploys,
including on the national territory.41
During this 37-year period of uninterrupted
operations, the Army has been completely
restructured: personnel, equipment, doctrine,
training. It has also significantly widened its
scope of intervention. Wherever the Army has
been deployed, it has shown restraint in the face
of violence and has combined the best elements
of modern technology with the fundamental
principles of operations on and close to
the ground. Heavily committed overseas, the
Army has nonetheless never lost sight of the
fact that it exists to protect, first and foremost,
the national territory and the population of
France.
This period of uninterrupted operations has
provided an unprecedented opportunity
to accumulate knowledge and experience,
enabling the French Army to be at the forefront
of European forces today. The Army has,
however, paid a high price in casualties.
41 National Assembly Commission for Foreign Affairs report no 2777 20 May 2015 by Messrs Guy-Michel Chauveau and
Hervé Gaymard, ”Engagement and Diplomacy: which doctrine for French military interventions?” draws the conclusion:
concerning human capital, the system “lives off its reserves,” by spending the capital accumulated during decades of
quality training and the achievements of accumulated operational experience. This capital can be quickly exhausted: “the
short term benefits and added operational value must be compensated by a rebalancing of the level of activity, if not,
the military will quickly become impoverished”. There is a strong risk of having a “seasoned, rugged but impoverished
Army which does well against weaker adversaries and a system combining some nice niche capabilities but with many
deficiencies affecting the overall consistency.»
48
SUCCINCT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Defense White Papers 1972, 1994, 2007, 2013.
Army Report (GRAT) 2014
CDEF Studies (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/metier/retex/retex_intro.htm)
RETEX Handbooks
- Summary of Operations VOL 1(Europe/Middle East/Asia/Central America/Caribbean) 2006
- Summary of Operations VOL 2 (Africa) 2006
- Lessons from Op ARTEMIS DRC 2004 Restricted
- Lessons from Op LICORNE Ivory Coast 2004
- Lessons from Op CONCORDIA-ALTAIR in ARYM 2004
- Lessons from 60th Anniversary of the Liberation of Normandy 2005
- Four years of stabilization ops in the ‘Kingdom of Insolence’, lessons from Op PAMIR and
EPIDOTE 2006 Restricted
- Lessons from Op CARBET Haiti 2006 Restricted
- Electrons in the Bush, first observations of NEB 2007
- Lessons from Central Africa: Op EPERVIER and BOALI 2008
- Tactical flexibility, Kosovo 2008
- Op EUFOR Chad – CAR 2009 Restricted
- Lessons from Op SERVAL Mali (Jan – May 2013) 2013 Restricted
Research papers
- The Chad rebellion from 2005 to today - 2009 Restricted
- Order and security in Kosovo, land forces and the police 2008
- From UNPROFOR to IFOR – The French in Bosnia (1992-1996) 2006
- The Cedar tree and the Soldier – French military presence in Lebanon 1978-1984 - 2006
- Touareg rebellions in the Sahel 2013
- ORYX, a little known success story (1992-1994) 2013
Other CDEF Documents
- Land lessons learned from Op HARMATTAN (Libya)
(note 500039/DEF/CDEF/DREX/BEO/DR-SF 31 Jan 2012)
- Lessons from a decade of Army overseas operations (produced for Defense Department
Summer Universities July 2013)
- Reports and post mission accounts from all the operations listed above.
49
Directeur de la publication : Général de Division Antoine WINDECK
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PNIA : 821 753 81 53 –  : 01 44 42 81 53
Editeur rédactionnel : Capitaine Soraya AOUATI
Infographie : (Couverture) & schémas : Nanci FAUQUET/CDEF/COM
Crédits photos des illustrations non précisés dans la mise en page :
© armée de Terre - © ECPAD - © SIRPA Terre - © EMA/AdT
Maquettage : Christine VILLEY/CDEF /DAD/PUB
Traduction : Lieutenant-colonel Aleksandar STÉFANOVIC - Emma PHILIPS
Impression - routage : EDIACA – 76, rue de la Talaudière - BP 80 508 – 42007 ST-ÉTIENNE Cedex 01
Téléphone : 04 77 95 33 21 ou 04 77 95 33 25
Tirage : 1 650 exemplaires
Diffusion : CDEF /DAD/PUB Téléphone : 01 44 42 43 18
Dépôt légal : ISSN de la collection Cahier du RETEX 2427-7045
ISBN du volume - May 2015
Version impression 978 - 2 - 11 - 138916 - 8
Version électronique 978 - 2 - 11 -138917 - 5
La version électronique de ce document est en ligne sur les sites Intradef et Internet du CDEF
à l’adresse http://www.cdef.defense.gouv.fr.
51

The French Army 1978-2015 Assessment of 37 Years of

Transcription

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