study guide - BISMUN Conference 2016

BISMUN 2016
The Counter-Terrorism Committee
Study Guide
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Welcoming Message
Introduction to the Committee
Introduction to the Topic
Basic Definitions
Historical Background
Aspects of the Issue
6a. Funding
i. Oil
ii. Drugs
iii. Taxation- Extortion and Bank robberies
iv. Kidnapping- Human Trafficking
6b. Military and Recruitment
i. Military Equipment
ii. Recruitment - Use of Cyber Means
7. Actions and measures taken by United Nations and Counter-Terrorism Committee
8. Conclusion
9. Points to be addressed
10. Bibliography - Further Sources
1. Welcoming Message
Dear Delegates,
We officially welcome you as Members of one of the most challenging and complicated
Committees that could be simulated, the Counter- Terrorism Committee. Our goal is to discuss as
experts and find concrete solutions, suggest effective, well-rounded and up-to-date proposals for
a resolution on the issue of the expansion of the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Daesh and Islamic State of Iraq and ashSham).
As the Presidency, we have three goals. First of all, we shall provide you all the necessary
information and data, which will assist you in your difficult task; thus, the following study guide,
which you have on your hands, is a useful document with all the main points, arguments and
information you may need to analyze, conceptualize and understand the topic. Secondly, we are
engaged to create a friendly, warm, academic environment for our debate, which will be the
cornerstone for a productive and effective dialogue between you, with our assistance, whenever
it is needed. Last, but not least, we shall ensure that everything will go as planned, inspire
spontaneous inspirations that lead to innovative ideas, as a means of creativity combined with
entertainment.
To sum up, we wholeheartedly welcome you to Bucharest International Student Model United
Nations 2016 (BISMUN) and to the Counter- Terrorism Committee. We promise you a unique,
once- in-a-lifetime experience and we wish you are prepared for the time of your life. We advise
you to be well-prepared, to have researched thoroughly on our Topic of discussion and... Brace
yourselves, BISMUN is coming.
Amicably,
Christoforos-Dimitrios Zafeiris
Evdoxia Papastefanidi
2. Introduction to the Committee
The Counter-Terrorism Committee was established by the Security Council Resolution 1373,
which was adopted by the Security Council in September 28th 2001. The establishment of such a
Committee crystalized the efforts of the United Nations to set a general framework for tackling
terrorism and international terrorist acts and attacks, following the events of 11th September
2001 in New York. The CTC was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Chapter and declares
that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security. With the UN Security Council
Resolution 1535 (2004), the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate was
established
to
assist
the
Committee.
The CTC Executive Directorate has as its main scope to assist the Committee in its policymaking decisions, when the Committee was primarily called to criminalize financing of
terrorism, tackle safe havens and freeze any funds related to terrorist organizations, promote
cooperation with governments and organizations, criminalize active and passive assistance and
implement effective border policy decisions. The CTC Executive Directorate is divided into two
branches: the Assessment and Technical Assistance Office (ATAO) and the Administrative and
Information Office (AIO).1
3. Introduction to the Topic
Today the fight against ISIS has been prioritized as the most crucial and, at the same time,
controversial issue to the global political agenda. Representing the “new age” of terrorism, ISIS
has managed to achieve the main ideal target pursued by a plethora of terrorist organizations: the
establishment of an Islamic State, governed by the Sharia law, based on the principles of Islamic
fundamentalism and inspired by Sunni-Wahhabism ideology. Although the group has adopted
tactics of indiscriminate violence, it has accomplished to function positively and effectively as
regards to governance. ISIS has a well-organized state apparatus, it acquires military equipment,
1
Counter-Terrorism Committee Ex ecutive Directorate, The Role of the Counter -Terrorism Committee and
its Executive Directorate in the International Counter-Terrorism Effort, www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/
it controls territories, it recruits and trains fighters as they are soldiers more than they are
terrorists and, in some cases, it enjoys the support of the Sunni community.
In order for the global community to disrupt the extremists’ vision and prevent their further
expansion, plenty of counter- terrorism measures must be taken into consideration. The
suppression of the financing of terrorism, actions to combat human, oil and drug trafficking and
the advocacy of human rights and human dignity, have to be the key negotiation elements for an
effective framework to fight ISIS. As the Secretary- General Ban Ki- moon at the Leader’s
Summit on Counter Violent extremism stated a coordinated and unified response is needed to
eliminate terrorism, to deny “safe haven” and to restore peace and security in the broaden region.
4. Definitions
There is no consensus within the international community on the definition of terrorism. Due to
the lack of a unified understanding of the term and the deadlocked long negotiations of how to
define the threat, there is an ambiguity which makes UN efforts to combat terrorism highly
unlike. However, we can come across with some common characteristics in the International law
and in several Security Council Resolutions. For instance, par. 3 of the Security Council
Resolution 1566 explains terrorist acts as those (1) “committed with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages”. (2) “with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in
the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act,
which (3) constitute offences within the scope of an as defined in the international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism”. 2
In an attempt to unite all member states to combat terrorism under a common definition of the
term, former Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a definition: “Any action constitutes
terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non- combatants
with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international
organization to do or abstain from doing any act”. 3 He further explained his “principled,
comprehensive strategy”, which has to be the State’s common approach on the issue, based on
2
UNSC. 2004. Security Council A cts Unanimously to Adopt Resolution Strongly Condemning Terrorism as one of
most Serious Threats to Peace. United Nations: Press Release. [Online]. 8 October 2004. [Accessed 30 January
2016]. Available from: http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8214.doc.htm
3
Kofi Annan. 2005. Secretary- General Kofi Annan Launches Global Strategy Against Terro rism in Madrid . United
Nations: Press Release. [Online]. 10 March 2005. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
http://www.un.org/pr ess/en/2005/sg2095.doc.htm
the “five Ds”; “Dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their
goals; Deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks; Deter States from supporting
terrorists; Develop State capacity to prevent terrorism; Defend human rights in the struggle
against terrorism”.
However, all these approaches are based more on general characteristics and personal beliefs
rather than comprehensive and unanimously accepted legal frameworks. Most of the UNSC
Resolutions are referring to such common characteristics on their perambulatory clauses. Still
though, the lack of definition ultimately leaves it up to each UN member to decide whether or
not an organization is a terrorist one. The main reason for s uch an ambiguity, when it comes to
explicitly defining terrorism, is the inclusion/exclusion of armed struggle for liberation and as a
means of enjoyment of their right of self-determination4 . With the General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/49/60, the United Nations reached a consensus on measures to eliminate terrorism,
described in a general matter some elements of terrorism: it is unjustifiable and criminal, a
possible jeopardy of friendly relations between States, a grave violation of UN Charter
principles, a threat to international peace and security, it is intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public. 5
4
Humanri ghts voices .org,. "UN 101 - There Is No UN Defini tion Of Terrorism". N.p., 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2016.
5
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 49/60 Meas ures to eliminate international terrorism,
A/RES/49/60.
Threat/Breach of Peace, Acts of Aggression, International Peace and Security:
After the adoption of the UN Charter, there have been many discussions on the ways we can
define and interpret Article 39 6 . Discussions have started from the classic notion of inter-state
threat of threat to national security, with the threat or use of force. With Resolutions 1373 and
1540, the Security Council has made clear that international terrorism is also a phenomenon,
which could be a threat to international peace and security. Another connection made was with
the notion of human security, which is defined in the 1994 UN Development Programme, where
seven elements were included: economic, health, environmental, food, community, political and
physical harm. 7 To sum up, we argue that these terms must be strictly defined, as this will cause
difficulties on the work of the related UN Bodies. These terms must be translated and interpreted
in a case by basis 8 , even though there are risks of exploitation for (geo) political purposes.
5. Historical Background
It could be argued that ISIS was founded in 1991 by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Al Zarqa wi
started to be radicalized as a prisoner accused for drug possession and sexual assault and released
in 1991 in an amnesty arrangement having, already, espoused the Salafi ideology. 9 By sending
hatred messages from inside jail and being well-known for his extremist ideology, Zarqawi
caught the attention of Osama Bin Laden. After two attempts by Bin Laden to recruit Zarqawi to
join Al Qaeda and despite the ideological differences between the two men, Bin Laden provided
Zarqawi approximately 3000 Salafi terrorists to train them in Tawhid Wal’ Jihad camp
6
The Securi ty Council s hall determine the exis tence of any threa t to the pea ce, brea ch of the pea ce, or a ct of
aggression and shall ma ke recommendations, or decide wha t measures shall be taken in a ccorda nce wi th Arti cles 41 and 42, to
maintain or res tore interna tional peace and securi ty.
7
Human Development Report, 1994, pp. 24-25,
http://hdr.undp.org/si tes/defaul t/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nos tats .pdf
8
For example, if a stri ct defini tion of sta te -to-s tate threat was adopted, how would i t be possible to a ct on internal
ci vil conflicts , or a ct to maintain and elimina te epidemi c diseases, such as HIV/AIDS or Ebola?
9
Mapping Mili tant Organi za tions , The Islamic State. [Online]. 2002. [Accessed 24 November 2015]. Available from:
http://web.s tanford.edu/group/mappingmili tants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1
(Monotheism in Jihad) in Herat, Afghanistan. 10 For the next five years, Zarqawi plots and
conducts terrorist attacks with the support of Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden as well as the
Taliban and Mullah Omar, even though his group Jama’ at al- Tawhid wa’ al- jihad was not an
Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization. 11
He spent time in Syria, Iran and Lebanon trying to recruit new fighters and to create an
efficient network equal to Al Qaeda’s. He fought aside Al Qaeda and Taliban men in
Afghanistan against the American forces after 9/11 invasion but he wounded and fled to Iran to
join Anshar al- Sharia 12 . His membership to the Kurdish jihadist group caught the attention of the
US and he was accused of acting as a mediator between Al Qaeda and Santam Hussein. Despite
the differences between Zarqawi and Bin Laden, in 2004, Zarqawi declared bayah 13 to Bin
Laden and a new terrorist organization was created, named Tanzim Qaedat al Jihad fi Bilad al
Rafidayn, or Al Qaeda in Tigris and Euphrates, or as it is known in the West, Al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI). 14
The AQI (and ISIS afterwords) pursues a “Grand Strategy” 15 : the establishment of an Islamic
state which would be governed under the Sharia Law, based on the Prophet’s word and without
any western, or any other external, influence. A state ruled by the Islamic law, supporting the
principles of Islamic fundamentalism, are inspired by Sunni Wahhabism, since those
characteristics are considered the only functional for a well- governed Islamic state to be based
on. This aim is very common within terrorist organizations despite their possible differences, as
far as the means or the violence they use are concerned.
10
ibid.
11
Stern, J. & Berger, J.M. ISIS: The State of Terror. London: William Collins, 2015.
12
ibid.
13
An oa th of allegiance from a leader to leader instead of an organiza tion to orga niza tion level . see Ba ya h. The Oxford
Dictionary of Islam. [Online di ctiona ry]. Oxford Uni versi ty Press. 2004.
14
15
Stern, J. & Berger, J.M. ISIS: The State of Terror. London: William Collins, 2015.
The term was introduced by: Habeck, M.R. Jihadis t Stra tegies in the Wa r on Terrorism. In: Pery, M., Negrin, H.E. ed.
The Theory a nd Pra cti ce of Islami c Terrorism. New York: Palgra ve ma cmillan, 2008 pp. 69-79.
It is worth noting that the main difference between the two leaders can be explained by the
“Method of Mohhamad” in which there is a distinction between the potential enemies: “near- far”
enemy, “greater- lesser” unbeliever and “apostates- unbelievers”16 . Zarqawi’s ideological
approach has been categorized in the last group of enemies-targets by considering as apostates
the Shii Muslims whereas Bin Laden’s approach has been categorized in the second group of
enemies- targets by considering as greater unbelievers the West and its allies. Since the
beginning of the affiliation the different strategy was pursued by each leader created an adverse
coexistence between the two sides. On the one hand, Osama Bin Landen shared a vision for a
“Pan- Islamic” and not for a “Pan- Arabic” State, a state based on the common religion,
supporting a multinational entity, without national or sectarian discrimination 17 .On the other
hand, Zarqawi espoused a “genocidal rhetoric followed by genocidal behavior” by considering
Shi’ism “the looming danger, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion” 18 .The latter
tactic was condemned by Al Qaeda and, albeit Zarqawi reaffirmed his bayah to Bin Laden and
obeyed to change some of his tactics, the impact of a possible Zarqawi resignation of the AQI
leadership was unpredictable 19 .
In June 2006, a US air strike north of Baghdad, backed by Iraqi intelligence, killed Al Zarqawi
and other insurgent leaders 20 . However, the Bush administration correctly predicts that the
sectarian extremism violence will continue to flourish in Iraq because of the strong ideological
impact Zarqawi left behind 21 . Indeed, before his death, Zarqawi had made some structural
changes within his organization by recruiting and incorporating other jihadi groups 22 . Soon after
his death, the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) declared the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq
16
ibid.
17
Guna ra tna , R. Inside Al Qaeda: the Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia Uni versi ty Press. 2003.
18
Weiss, M. & Hassan, H. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts , 2015. pp.28-29.
19
Uni ted Sta tes . Congress . House. Permanent Select Commi ttee on Intelligence. Al Qaeda : the many fa ces of an Islamic
extremist threat: report of the U.S. House Permanent Commi ttee on Intelligence, approved June 2006, together with additi onal
and minori ty views , submi tted September, 2006. United Sta tes : 2006.
20
Kni ckmeyer, E. & Finer, J., Insurgent Leader Al- Zarqawi killed in Iraq, The Washington Pos t, [Online]. 2006. [Accessed
26 November 2015]. Available from: http://www.washingtonpos t.com/wpdyn/content/a rti cle/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html
21
Bush, G. Statement on the Death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, [Online]. 2006. [Accessed 26 November 2015]. Available
from: http://www.presidential rhetori c.com/speeches /06.08.06.html
22
Hosken, A. Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State, London: Oneworld, 2015: p.83.
(ISI) while the Zarqawi’s successor as leader of AQI, Abu Hamza al Mujahir, pledged bayah to
ISI leader, Abu Omar al Baghdadi 23 . The ISI head remained in charge for the next four years and
despite the fact that his profile information is limited, he is well known due to the massacres
committed in his name: the use of women with Down’s syndrome as suicide bombers and the
second- deadliest terrorist attack in history, the Yazidi bombing in 2007 24 - killing 500 and
injured 350 25 . The “Prince of the Faithful” structured ISIS as it is today by establishing an
effective domestic administration introducing ministries and the Sharia court and instead of
pledging bayah to Bin Laden, as Zarqawi did in the past, he demanded baya h from others to
indicate the uniqueness and complexity of his organization 26 .
On 18 April 2010, during an Iraqi and US operation, Abu Omar Al Bagdadi surrounded by
special forces and having realized that he lost the fight, decided to detonate his suicide belt and
commit suicide in a safe house near to Tikrit, Saddam Houssein’s hometown 27 . The American
authorities believed at that time that they achieved to demoralize, weaken and disrupt the
organization’s plots and structure by assassinating main leaders hip figures 28 . However, soon
after the death of the ISI leader, in May 2010, the most enigmatic and determined figure was
declared as the new leader of the group: Abu Bakr al- Qurayshi al- Husseini al- Baghdadi who
managed to take his group from the point o f extinction to “becoming the deadliest terrorist
organization of the twenty- first century”29 . In 2003, the group became known as the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) due to its leader’s attempt to merge his group with Al- Nousra
Front, the Al- Qaeda’s offshoot in Syria 30 . Zawahiri, who had succeeded the slain Osama bin
Laden to the leadership of Al- Qaeda, acted as a mediator between the two organizations by
23
Stern, J. & Berger, J.M. ISIS: The State of Terror. London: William Collins, 2015: p.26.
24
Hosken, A. Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State, London: Oneworld, 2015: p.85.
25
The Sydney Morning Herald. Yazidi Bombing is Iraq’s deadliest. [Online]. 2007. [Accessed 26 November 2015].
Available from: http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/ya zidi -bombing-is -i raqs-deadliest/2007/08/16/1186857683441.html
26
Hosken, A. Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State, London: Oneworl d, 2015: p.91.
27
BBC, Senior Iraqi Al-Qaeda leaders ‘killed’. [Online].2010. [Accessed 28 November 2015]. Available from:
http://news .bbc.co.uk/1/hi /world/middle_eas t/8630213.s tm
28
Hosken, A. Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State, London: Oneworld, 2015: p.118.
29
ibid. p.120
30
BBC, Profile: Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi. [Online]. 2015. [Accessed 7 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news /world-middle-east-27801676
supporting and protecting his affiliation and both by condemning the Abu Bakr’s initiative to
claim territories in Syria and abolishing the Abu Bakr’s shiny new ISIS 31 .
The “Invisible sheikh”32 is said to keep a low profile even among his own armed supporters,
who amount to an estimated 7,000 fighters 33 according to the Guardian while the CIA reports
more than 31,000 fighters 34 . However he is very well- known for his tactician and military
leadership skills as it can be explained due to his territorial victories in Iraq and Syria. Under his
leadership, ISIS has managed to conquer the city of Faluja in January 2014 and six months later
they took also Mosul, the second biggest city in Iraq, and Tikrit under their control. By seizing
such strategically important cities, ISIS’s territorial claims vary from the one third of Syria and
one third of Iraq, “a land mass that is the size of Britain”35 , to thirty- five thousand square miles
of land which is an area the size of Jordan 36 . Both territorial examples were given in 2014 before
the US response to the crisis by assembling a coalition of countries to fight the group by
launching air strikes on ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. In December 2015, the Obama
administration announces that “So far, ISIL has lost 40 percent of the populated areas it once
controlled in Iraq (...) and has lost thousands of square miles of territory it once controlled in
Syria”37 .
Regardless, though, the size of the so-called Caliphate, IS have achieved two goals which make
the West efforts to eliminate the extremist group even harder. On the one hand, a well- structured
31
Hosken, A. Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State, London: Oneworl d, 2015: p.165.
32
Sabin, L. Abu Bakr Al- Ba ghdadi profile: The mys teri ous leader of ISIS- and why he is called the “invisible Sheikh”.
INDEPENDENT. [Online]. 10 November 2014. [Accessed 8 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news /worl d/middle-east/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-profile-the-mys terious-leader-of-isis-and-whyhe-is-called-the-invisible-sheikh-9849413.html
33
Beaumont, P. Abu Ba kr al - Baghdadi : the ISIS Chief wi th the Ambi tion to Overtake al- Qaida. The Guardian. [Online].
12 June 2014. [Accessed 8 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.thegua rdian.com/world/2014/jun/12/baghdadi-abuba kr-i raq-isis-mosul-jihad
34
BBC, Islamic State fighter estimate triples- CIA. [Online]. 2014. [Accessed 14 December 2015]. Available from :
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news /world-middle-east-29169914
35
Al Ara bi ya News, ISIS Controls an area the size of Britain: Syria Expert. [Online]. 28 November 2014. [Accessed 14
December 2015]. Available from: http://english.ala rabi ya .net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/28/ISIS-controls -an-a rea -the-sizeof-Bri tain-Syria-expert.html
36
Pa cker, G., The Common Enemy. The New Yorker. [Online]. 25 Augus t 2014. [Accessed 14 December 2015]. Available
from: http://www.newyorker.com/ma gazine/2014/08/25/the-common-enemy
37
Pa rkinson, J., US-Led Coalition Hitting ISIS ‘Ha rder tha n Ever’, Obama sa ys . ABC News. [Online]. 14 December 2015.
[Accessed 15 December 2015]. Available from: http://abcnews .go.com/Politi cs /us-led-coali tion-hi tting-isis-ha rderobama/s tory?i d=35753628
administration has been established, transforming the terrorist group into an actual “state” 38 . This
governance structure has raised questions about the short and long- term viability of IS and the
appropriate response of the global community. On the other hand, and most importantly, is the
public acceptance and support that IS enjoys by the Sunni community. A very indicative
example is the Mosul siege when Iraqi forces of approximately 1 million men, including 15
military divisions, lost the city by 6.000 IS fighters 39 . The ultimate precondition for IS success
was the support of the Sunni community after realizing that IS domination would be the solution
to the Iraqi- sectarian policy they deal with for years 40 . The most crucial political change took
place in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003, the Debaathification procedure, transformed the
domestic situation and lead to the destabilization of the country. Under the Coalition Provisional
Authority, approximately 40,000 public sector employees and military officials affiliated with
Saddam Hussein’s political party, removed from their positions 41 .Because of this policy, the one
third of the Iraqi population had, directly or indirectly, been affected 42 . This lead to the
radicalization of many of them by joining extremist groups or by joining the ranks of the Iraqi
resistance movement 43 . Considering the impact of this policy and also the fact that the former
prime minister of the state, Nouri Al Maliki failed to strike a balance between the different sects
and minorities and he continued to discriminate against the Sunni population, it could be argued
that the latter preferred to be governed by IS even though they do not all agree with the use of
violence 44 .
38
For a detailed anal ysis see: Al - Ta mimi , A.,The Evolution in Islamic State Administra ti on: The Documenta ry Evidence.
Terrorism Research Initiative. [Online]. 2015. 9(4). [Accessed 15 De cember 2015]. Available from:
http://www.terrorismanal ys ts.com/pt/index.php/pot/a rti cle/view/447/html
39
Cockburn, P., The Jihadis Return, ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising. New York:OR Books LLC, 2014.
40
ibid.
41
Za fi rov, M., The Crisis in Iraq: Was the rise of ISIL a surprise?. AlJazeera. [Online]. 25 December 2014. [Accessed 16
December 2015]. Available from: http://www.alja zeera.com/indepth/opini on/2014/12/crisis-i raq-was-rise-isil-surp2014122592114375688.html
42
i bid.
43
ibid.
44
Cockburn, P., The Jihadis Return, ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising. New York:OR Books LLC, 2014.
6. Aspects of the Issue
The terrorist organization under analysis, ISIS, is said that it follows the ‘Three Stages of
Revolutionary Warfare’ as stated by Mao. More specifically, the first stage is the “Strategic
Defense” where space is given for time, the second stage is the “Strategic Stalemate”, where the
movement gains military, political and social power, and the third stage, the “Strategic Offense”,
where the movement implements transformative actions to establish its conventional power
(which can be compared to the power of the enemy).
6.a. Funding
Compared to other terrorist organizations ISIS poses a different financial challenge. Al Qaeda,
for instance, was economically depended on “deep- pocket” donations 45 while Hezbollah is a
paradigm of state sponsored terrorism as it can be seen due to its close relation with Iran 46 . The
group has managed to be the richest terrorist organization globally when in late 2008 and early
2009 its budget rose approximately from $1 million per month to $3 million per day in 2014 47 . A
striking fact about ISIS is that is “heavily diversified” which means that in case of shutting down
one of the funding resources, the group can alternate the resource and still generate revenue 48 .
Thus, it is easily understood that ISIS funding resources vary: selling of oil, drugs, electricity,
antiquities, establishing a taxation system, perpetrating extortion or kidnapping for ransom,
human trafficking, receiving donations, selling of looted property, robbery of banks, are some of
the group’s funding resources.
45
Burke J. 2014. Al-Qaeda: the true story of radical Islam. New York; London: I.B. Tauris. p.89.
46
For an anal ysis on the crea tion of Hezbollah see: Dash, A., Hezbollah - Who created it, why it was created, how it was
created_ 1-3. [Online]. 2012. [Accessed 17 December 2015]. Available from:
https ://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdPM5jhdIuo
47
Swa nson, A. 12 Wa ys ISIS gets funding. World Economi c Forum. [Online]. 23 November 2015. [Accessed 17
December 2015]. Available from: https ://agenda.weforum.org/2015/11/12-wa ys -isis-getsfunding/?utm_content=buffer3bd14&utm_medium=social &utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
48
ibid.
6.a.i. Oil
Iraq’s oil reserves are believed to be the world’s fifth largest proven oil reserves, estimated
approximately 140 billion barrels 49 consisting the 42.9% of the country’s GDP in 2003 50 . ISIS
has managed to siege oil fields and oil refineries in Iraq and Syria generating vast amount of
money every day. Indicatively, ISIS possess two main oil operations: the one is located in Deir
Ezzor in Syria, where they produce around 40,000 barrels per day 51 and the second one is the
Ajil and Allas fields in Iraq from where they earned around $450 million in 10 months they
controlled the fields 52 . The Financial Action Task Force reports that even though ISIS lacks of
expertise and equipment in oil extraction, they manage to produce 50.000 barrels of petroleum
per day53 . The product is being allocated in three different uses: a. for export, b. for selling to the
local population, c. to fulfill its own needs 54 . As regards to export, the group uses smugglers and
middlemen to sale the illicit oil to nearby areas including other neighboring countries, Syria’s
rebel- held north and the Syrian regime 55 . There is also evidence that the group provides to the
Assad regime other services such as electricity due to the ISIS control to the key dams and gas
fields 56 . Exploiting the regime’s inability to import oil, the approximately 10 million people
living in ISIS territories and need oil for everyday use and by illegally selling the product for
42% to 74% below the market value in countries with high demand, their profit reaches the 1$ to
49
US Energy Informa tion Administra tion. [no da te]. International Energy Statistics. [Online]. [Accessed 20 December
2015]. Available from: http://www.eia .gov/cfapps /ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&ai d=6
50
The World Bank. [no da te]. Data: Oil rents (% of GDP). [Online]. [Accessed 20 December 2015]. Available from:
http://da ta .worldba nk.org/indi ca tor/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS
51
Masi, A. Turkey, Russia,Iraq and Syria : The Bla ck Ma rket Oil Tra de that’s Fueling ISIS and Di viding the Terroris t
Group’s Opponents. International Business Times. [Online]. 12 September 2015. [Accessed 22 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.ibtimes .com/turkey-russia-i raq-s yria-bla ck-ma rket-oil-trade-tha ts -fueling-isis-di viding-terroris t-2217476
52
Solomon, E., Cha zan, G., Jones , S. ISIS Inc: how oil fuels the jihadi terrorists . Financial Times [Online]. 14 October
2015. [Accessed 22 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b8234932-719b-11e5-ad6df4ed76f0900a .html #a xzz3v5trCIM9
53
FATF. Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamiq State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). [Online]. 2015. [Accessed 20
December 2015]. Available from: http://www.fa tf-ga fi.org/media/fa tf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terroris torganisati on-ISIL.pdf
54
ibid.
55
i bid.
56
Malm, S.,. How ISIS is funded by bla ck- market oil trading, illegal drugs and internet ca fes. The Daily Mail. [Online]. 22
Februa ry 2015. [Accessed 20 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.dail ymail.co.uk/news/a rti cle-2964028/oil-drugsinternet-ISIS-funded.html
2$ million per day57 . Fortunately, they do not control any modern operating oil refinery, albeit
they attempted in the past, instead they owned small, mobile refineries of less than 500 barrels
per day of petroleum products 58 . Moreover, due to the lack of infrastructure, personnel and
secure oil supply the group cannot produce to the 100% of their existing capacity 59 . The need for
skilled personnel is such that al Bagdadi announced in a recording that the Islamic State needs to
recruit trained people such as engineers, experienced workers, managers and trainers to provide
their expertise 60 .
The coalitions on the battlefield are dealing with two paramount challenges: firstly, how to
counter the illegal oil trafficking- and therefore the main financing route of the terrorist groupwithout destabilizing, at the same time, the life of innocent people living in these territories.
Secondly how to disrupt the illegal export to neighboring countries without risking their in
between alliances. The second challenge applies to the Turkish case: When Adam Szubin, a U.S.
Treasury Department official, announces that “Some is coming across the border into Turkey”61
and Jonathan Schanzer, VP of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argues
“When oil is being bought on the Turkish border it’s highly unlike ly that it will be sold anywhere
else but Turkey”62 .
57
Sa tti . B., Funding Terroris ts , the Rise of ISIS. Security Intelligence. [Online]. 10 Octomber 2014. [Accessed 20
December 2015]. Available from: https ://securi tyintelligence.com/funding-terrorists -the-rise-of-isis/
58
Humud, E.C., Pi rog, R.,Rosen, L., Islamic State Financing and US Policy Approaches. Congressional Resea rch Servi ce.
[Online]. 10 April 2015. [Accessed 20 December 2015]. Available from: https ://www.fas.org/s gp/crs /terror/R43980.pdf
59
i bid.
60
Swanson, A., 12 Wa ys ISIS gets funding. World Economic Forum. [Online]. 23 November 2015. [Accessed 20
December 2015]. Available from: https ://a genda .weforum.org/2015/11/12-wa ys-isis-getsfunding/?utm_content=buffer3bd14&utm_medium=social &utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
61
Fa ulconbri dge, G. & Saul , J. Islamic State oil is going to Assad, some to Turkey, U.S. Offi cial sa ys. Reuters. [Online]. 10
December 2015. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.reuters .com/a rti cle/us -mideas t-crisis-s yria-usa-oilidUSKBN0TT2O120151210
62
Masi, A. Turkey, Russia,Iraq and Syria : The Bla ck Ma rket Oil Tra de that’s Fueling ISIS and Di viding the Terroris t
Group’s Opponents. International Business Times. [Online]. 12 September 2015. [Accessed 22 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.ibtimes .com/turkey-russia-i raq-s yria-bla ck-ma rket-oil-trade-tha ts -fueling-isis-di viding-terroris t-2217476
6.a.ii Drugs
Antonio Costa, former head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, argues that financing of
Terrorism and business of drug trafficking are commonly interrelated terms since almost every
terrorist group generates revenue by selling or producing drugs or by providing security to
smugglers 63 . According to the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) it is estimated that
ISIS generates more than $1 billion annually from drug sales within its ter ritory and abroad 64 . By
selling heroin and opium in Europe, the estimated amount of money reaches the $50 billion in
total for the terrorists, making drug money one of the most essential profit generators for the
group 65 . There is also evidence that organizations in North Africa, affiliated with ISIS, provide
security to smugglers to cross former caravan routes by gaining millions in return 66 . What is also
widely known about drugs production and trafficking perpetrated by ISIS is Captagon- an
amphetamine mostly consumed in the region which generates millions of dollars for the group 67 .
In October 2015, Lebanese airport authorities found two tons of these pills loaded to a Saudi’s
royal family member’s private plane 68 ; an incident which creates a state of uncertainty among
those fighting ISIS.
63
Cos ta , A., Terroris ts to be judged by the Internati onal Cri minal La w?. European Union Delegation to the United
Nations. [Online]. 17 Ma rch 2005. [Accessed 19 December 2015]. Available from: http://euun.europa .eu/a rti cles/en/a rti cle_4504_en.htm
64
RT. High Finance: ISIS generates up to $1 bn annually from trafficking Afghan heroin. [Online]. 6 Ma rch 2015.
[Accessed 19 December 2015]. Available from: https ://www.rt.com/news/238369-isis-drug-money-traffi cking/
65
i bid.
66
Porter, T., Cocaine Fundind ISIS: Drug Smuggling Profits Islamic State - Linked Jihadis ts in North Afri ca . International
Bussiness Times. [Online]. 20 November 2014. [Accessed 19 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.ibtimes .co.uk/cocaine-funding-isis-drug-smuggling-profi ts-islami c-s ta te-linked-jihadists-north-a fri ca-1475824
67
Henley J., Ca ptagon: the amphetamine fuelling Syria’s ci vil wa r. The Guardian. [Online]. 13 Janua ry 2014. [Accessed
19 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.thegua rdian.com/worl d/shortcuts /2014/jan/13/capta gon-amphetamines yria-wa r-middle-east
68
Sa via no, R., The Role of Drug Traffi cking and Money Laundering in Fi ghting ISIS. The New York Times . [Online]. 23
November 2015. [Accessed 19 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.nyti mes .com/roomfordebate/2015/11/20/draining-isis-coffers/the-role-of-drug-traffi cking-and-money-launderingin-fi ghting-isis
6.a. iii. Taxation- Extortion and Bank robberies
As it has already been mentioned, ISIS has been transformed from a militia- terrorist group to a
proto- state, a Caliphate which intend to function as a welfare state. To achieve that, the group
has “laid down a blueprint for a viable self- funding Islamic state” by establishing a sophisticated
taxation system equal to those of states 69 . The spectrum of tax payers varies: from
telecommunication companies which owned towers in ISIS territory, to local businessmen and
Christians. In detail, Raqqa’s Credit Bank is authorized to collect the taxes. The shop owners
must pay $20 every two months for services such as electricity, security guarantee and water 70 .
Some locals claim that they receive a receipt with the official logo stamped and also that the
money they pay is less than they used to pay under Assad’s governance 71 . Moreover, there is a
10% income tax, the “cleaning tax” of approximately 5,000 Syrian pounds ($228) paid by each
merchant entering their territories and there are fines and fees for those do not obey the Sharia
rules such as alcohol consumption, possession of college textbooks and traffic violations 72 .
The Christian minority is also forced to pay the Jizya tax in return for protection and as far as
they pay the tax they will be allowed to maintain their customs including drinking alcohol or
eating pork without, however, doing so in public 73 . An also profitable tax is zakat, which has its
roots in Prophet’s days: the wealthier Muslims has to give away the 2.5% of their income for a
holy cause 74 . The US- based Rand Corporation think-tank estimates that from extorted money
69
Thorndi ke, J., How ISIS is using Ta xes to Build a Terroris t Sta te. Forbes. [Online]. 18 August 2014. [Accessed 23
December 2015]. Available from: http://www.forbes .com/sites/ta xanal ys ts/2014/08/18/how-isis-is-using-ta xes-to-build-a terrorist-s ta te/
70
Hubba rd, B., Li fe i n a jihadist Capi tal : Order wi th the Da rker Si de. The New York Times. [Online]. 23 Jul y 2014.
[Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.nyti mes .com/2014/07/24/world/middleeast/islami c-s ta te-controlsraqqa-s yria .html?hp&a ction=cli ck&pgtype=Homepage&version=LedeSum&module=fi rst-column-region&region=topnews &WT.na v=top-news &_r=1
71
ibid.
72
Engel, P., ISIS has found a huge moneyma king method that’s impervious to sanctions and air raids . Business Insider.
[Online]. 2 December 2015. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.businessinsider.de/isis-ta xa tionextortion-s ys tem-2015-12?r=US&IR=T
73
Spencer, R., Mili tant Islamist group in Syria orders Chris tians to pa y protecti on ta x. The Telegraph. [Online]. 27
Februa ry 2014. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.telegra ph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/s yria /10666257/Militant-Islamist-group-in-Syria -orders -Christians to-pa y-protection-ta x.html
74
Solomon, E. & Jones , S., ISIS Inc: Loot and ta xes keep jihadi economy churning. The Financial Times. [Online]. 14
December 2015. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.ft.com/intl /cms /s/2/aee89a 00-9ff1-11e5-beba5e33e2b79e46.html #a xzz3v5trCIM9
ISIS earned $875 million before June 2014 75 . It is fact that the more territory they conquer, the
more money they accumulate by pursuing taxation and extortion tactics.
Except the fact that the group demands 10% of each cash withdrawal from banks within their
territory76 they are the perpetrators of the Mosul’s Central bank robbery with an estimated profit
of $400 million in cash and a large amount of gold bullion 77 . The Financial Action Task Force
has warned that some branches in ISIS region “may maintain links to the international financial
system” since there are 20 financial institutions still operating within ISIS borders 78 .
6.a. iv. Kidnapping- Human Trafficking
The method of kidnapping for ransom and the organized crime in general are traditional useful
tools for terrorist organizations to generate revenue. As regards to kidnapping, ISIS is known to
take hostages and ask for ransom in return and despite the fact that many states has refused to
pay the ransom, some others does, generating for the group approximately $35 to $45 million
profit 79 . Specifically the US while follows a non-payment strategy allows to the families of the
victims to pay the ransom without prosecuting them and at the same time the US authorities will
play a mediator role to secure the safe return of the hostages 80 . This approach is similar to the
75
ibid.
76
Cohen, S.D. Rema rks of Under Secreta ry for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Da vid S. Cohen a t The Ca rnegie
Endowment For International Pea ce, “Attacking ISIL’s Financial Founda tion. U.S Department of the Treasury. [Online]. 23
December 2014. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: https ://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press releases/Pages /jl 2672.aspx
77
Da ra gahi , B. Bigges t bank robbery tha t ‘never happened ‘- $400m ISIS heist. Financial Times. [Online]. 17 Jul y 2014.
[Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.ft.com/intl /cms /s/0/0378d4f4-0c28-11e4-908000144feabdc0.html#a xzz3v5trCIM9
78
Levi tt, M. Sophis tica ted Finances Tha t Could Trip Up ISIS. The Washington Institute. [Online]. 22 November 2015.
[Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.washingtoni nsti tute .org/policy-a nalysis/view/sophis ti catedfi nances-that-could-tri p-up-isis
79
Uni ted Nations Securi ty Council . Report S/2014/770: Sixteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions
Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014) concerning Al- Qaeda and associated individuals and entities
(29 October 2014). [Online]. 2014. [Accessed 25 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.un.org/ga/sea rch/view_doc.asp?s ymbol =S/2014/770
80
Dunham, W. & Rampton, R. US will not prosecute fa milies for pa ying hosta ge ransom. Reuters. [Online]. 23 June
2015. [Accessed 25 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.reuters .com/a rti cle/us -usa-securi ty-hos tagesidUSKBN0P31Q720150623
European one and to some wealthy Arab families as well, who do negotiate with terrorists by
granted $20 million only in 2014 for ISIS 81 .
However, members of ISIS do not discriminate over the hostages; international or local ones.
According to Amnesty International, hundreds of Yezidi girls, aged less than 15, become victims
of sexual slavery and many of them have been “sold” to the sexual slavery market 82 known as
“Sabaya Market”83 . In the same schema of human trafficking, ISIS generates revenue also by
exploiting the illegal immigration caused by the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean region.
According to the Center for Financial Crime and Security Studies, there is evidence that even
though ISIS does not perpetrate smuggling itself, it employs a tax to those who do as a boost of
their economy84 . The profit by smuggling activity in Libya only had risen from $8 million to $20
million in 2010 to $255 million to $323 million in 2014 strengthening the economies of terrorist
organizations including ISIS 85 .
6bi. Military Equipment
As it was aforementioned, ISIS was affiliated with Al-Qaeda for a couple of years. During this
period, the group gained access to sources and mediators, which provided them with weapons
and arms necessary for their operations. At that stage of its existence, the leader has created a
network of fighters and members powerful enough to promote car bombings and suicide
bombings. Also, since the civil conflict started in Syria (which falls into the same period of the
Arab Spring), ISIS has attempted to control this territory as well. ISIS, through organized attacks
to places and the headquarters of rebel groups in Syria, steals personal belongings, resources, but
81
CNN Money. How ISIS makes its millions. [Online]. 1 April 2015. [Accessed 25 December 2015]. Available from:
https ://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0QVRUxALZIs
82
Amnes ty International. Yezidi women and girls face horrowing sexual violence. [Online]. 23 December 2014.
[Accessed 25 December 2015]. Available from: https ://www.a mnes ty.org/en/lates t/news/2014/12/i raq-yezidi-women-andgi rls -fa ce-ha rrowing-sexual-violence/
83
For a thorough a ccount of Saba ya Ma rket see Callima chi , R. ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape. The New York Times .
[Online]. 13 Augus t 2015. [Accessed 25 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.nyti mes .com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshri nes-a-theology-of-rape.html
84
Crowcroft, O. ISIS: People tra fi cking, smuggling and puni ti ve ta xes boos t Islami c Sta te economy. International
Business Times. [Online]. 16 June 2015. Available from: http://www.ibti mes.co.uk/isis-people-tra fficking-smuggling-puni ti veta xes-boos t-islamic-sta te-economy-1506473
85
Ibid.
more importantly arms and weaponry. These attacks may, also, lead to the surrender of rebel,
anti-governmental groups, which declare commitment to the work of ISIS.
Also, ISIS by taking over large cities in Iraq and Syria (such as Mosul) 86 , and giving control of
them to former members of the Iraqi governments has managed to take control of weaponry
stations and a significant amount of arms, but also establish a “stable state”, with “ministers” and
leaders in each area. The influence it has gained in the area was unpredictable the army that IS
has managed to create is similar to a nation state’s army, as its members go through practice,
constant training and learn to live with a weapon on their arms.
A main threat, which exists and still have not been tackled properly, is the possibility of ISIS’
holding elements and tools which can be used for the creations of weapons of mass destruction.
Briefly explaining the historical background, the first use of nuclear power for violent purposes
is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, during the Second World War. The
development of the nuclear and radioactive technology is mainly based on their use for medical
purposes and the advancement of medical treatments. However, as it is profound, every humanmade structure and element can be used positively (medical purposes) and negatively (war,
terrorism).
On the one hand, it is very easy to track and monitor any use or attempt of using nuclear
technology and power. Under the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there are five
Member-States that are recognized of holding relevant technology: the United States of America,
the United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China. Alongside
with these five Member-States, Pakistan, India and DPRK have run nuclear tests, but these three
countries are not Members of the aforementioned Treaty. 87 Also, it is important to mention that
there are five more countries that host nuclear weapons and twenty-three countries that are in
alliances with the countries that hold nuclear weapons. 88
Over the last years, there is a fear that terrorist organiza tions will obtain more and more
radioactive materials. That is, because in contrast with nuclear power and materials, radioactive
materials are poorly guarded and easier to be found and extracted. After the 9/11 incident, there
86
http://eng.medintelligence.org/global-news /isis-takes -over-s yrian-town-in-homs-provi nce/
http://www.thegua rdian.com/world/2014/jun/10/i raq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-militants-seize-control -mosul
87
There is also an interna tional dis cussion for the possibility of nuclea r power exi stence i n Is rael , whi ch is not a
Member-Sta te of the NPT, and as such it is not obliged to go through an extensi ve resea rch and conduct. For more i nforma tion,
you ma y read: Bell, J. Bowyer. “Israel 's Nuclea r Option”. Middle East Journal 26.4 (1972): 379–388. Web...
88
"ICAN | Interna tional Ca mpaign To Abolish Nuclea r Weapons". N.p., 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2016.
is an escalating interest on the actions of individuals and non-state actors, which attempt to
obtain radioactive materials with malicious purposes. 89
One of the main incidents related to the ISIS’ operations took place in 2014. The terrorist
organization took control of 40 kilograms of uranium compounds, which were used for research
at the University of Mosul. The government of Iraq called for assistance, and since then the
government of the USA is in constant cooperation with the Iraqi government to track and recover
radioactive materials that could be used harmfully in case they get obtained by ISIS, or any other
terrorist organization. 90 Also, a smuggler of radioactive materials was arrested in his efforts to
distribute these materials to ISIS’ related members, which raised concerns on the origins of ISIS’
affiliations and assisting regions. 91
Here, we will briefly write the related Treaties and Agreements that exist on the use,
proliferation, production, development, threat of use and stockpiling of nuclear, radioactive,
chemical, biological weapons, as it is important to realize and conceptualize the existing legal
framework.
Biological Weapons Treaties:
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) 92 : it forbids the development,
production, stockpiling, or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons, and promotes the
eliminations of existing weapons, production material and means of stockpiling and delivery.
89
For more informa tion, you ma y resea rch the cases of two Bri tish nati onals: Dhi ren Ba rot and Salahuddin Amin.
90
Reuters,. “Exclusi ve: Iraq Tells U.N. Tha t ‘Terroris t Groups ’ Sei zed Nuclea r Ma terials”. N.p. 2016, Web, 3 Jan, 2016.
91
Gilsinan, Ka thy. "Why Moldova Ma y Be The Sca ries t Country On Ea rth". The Atlantic. N.p., 2015. Web. 3 Jan. 2016.
92
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction. [Online]. 1972, BTWC. Opened for signa ture 10 April 1972. Entered into Force 26 Ma rch
1975. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.opbw.org/convention/documents/btwctext.pdf
Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gasses, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 93 , usually referred as Geneva Protocol, which forbids the
use of gases, asphyxiating, poisonous or other, during times of war.
Che mical Weapons:
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) 94 .
India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons 95 , a bilateral agreement which promotes the
prohibition of such weapons in the two parties of the Agreement.
Conventional Weapons:
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 96 , which obliges Member-States that are Parties of the Treaty to
regulate ammunition or munitions fired, launched or delivered by conventional arms, and
regulate the import/export of such parts that may be used to create such conventional arms.
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Safety:
Convention on Nuclear Safety97 , an instrument that obliges Member-States to create and follow a
regulatory framework, in case they have nuclear insta llations, such as nuclear power plants.
93
1925 Geneva Protocol. [Online]. 1972. Opened for signature 17 June 1925. Entered into Force 8 Februa ry 1928. [Accessed 30
Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.un.org/disa rma ment/WMD/Bio/1925Geneva Protocol.shtml
94
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction. [Online].1993. CWC. Open for signa ture 13 Janua ry 1993. Entered into Force 29 April 1997. [Accessed 30 Janua ry
2016]. Available from: http://www.s ta te.gov/t/a vc/trty/127917.htm
95
India- Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons. [Online]. 1992. Opened for signa ture 19 Augus t 1992. Opened into Force
28 October 1997. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.nti.org/trea ties -and-regi mes/india-pakistanagreement-on-chemi cal-weapons/
96
Arms Trade Treaty. [Online]. 2013. ATT. Opened for si gna ture 28 Ma rch 2013.Entered into Force 24 December 2014.
[Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_text_(As_adopted_by_the_GA) E.pdf
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) 98 , which is the only, for the
time being, legally binding agreement for the protection of peaceful use of nuclear materials.
India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement, Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Lahore Declaration, Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT) 99 , Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New
START) 100 , which are all bilateral agreements regulating the possible use and maintenance of
such nuclear weapons, between two Parties.
Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 101 , which remains to be entered into force
since three States haven't signed it and five haven't ratified it.
International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 102 , Treaty Banning
Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty –
PTBT) 103 , Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 104 , which cover a broad
97
Convention on Nuclear Safety. [Online]. 1994. CNS. Opened for signa ture 20 September 1994. Entered into Force 24 October
1996. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: https ://www.iaea.org/publica tions /documents/trea ties/convention-nuclea rsafety
98
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. [Online]. 1979. Opened for signa ture 26 October 1979. Entered
into Force 8 Februa ry 1987. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from:
https ://www.iaea.org/Publica tions /Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html
99
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. [Online]. 2002. SORT. Opened for signa ture 24 Ma y 2002. Entry into Force 1 June 2003.
[Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.nti .org/trea ties-and-regimes/s tra tegic-offensi ve-reducti ons-trea tysort/
100
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. [Online]. 2010. New START. Opened for signa ture 8 April 2010. Entered into Force 5
Februa ry 2011. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.s ta te.gov/documents/organi za tion/140035.pdf
101
Comprehensive Nuclear- Test- Ban Treaty. [Online]. 1996. CTBT. Opened for signa ture 24 September 1996. It ha ve not
entered i nto force. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.nti .org/trea ties-and-regi mes/comprehensi venuclear-tes t-ban-treaty-ctbt/
102
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism . [Online]. 2005. Opened for signa ture 13 April
2005. Entry i nto force 7 Jul y 2007. [Accessed 30 Ja nua ry 2016]. Available from:
http://www.un.org/en/s c/ctc/docs /conventions /Conv13.pdf
103
Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. [Online]. 1963. PTBT. Opened for
signa ture 5 Augus t 1963. Entered into Force 10 October 1963. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclea r/pdf/Pa rtial _Ban_Trea ty.pdf
104
Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. [Online]. 1968. NPT. Opened for signa ture 12 June 1968. Entered i nto Force 5
Ma rch 1970. [Accessed 30 Janua ry 2016]. Available from: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclea r/NPTtext.s html
range of acts, requirements, aims to limit and suppress the proliferation, use, maintenance of
nuclear tests.
Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) 105 , which was proposed, by France, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Russian Federation and China, to prohibit the development
of such weapons, the testing and production of nuclear weapons and their transfer, use and/or
threat of use by all parties (still under discussion).
At the time being, the only intergovernmental organ, with the mandate and jurisdiction to
provide suggestions and solutions to nuclear weapons, and WMD generally, is the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 106 . IAEA is an intergovernmental forum of scientific, technical
cooperation, created in 1957, and approved by 81 States in 1956. Over the last years, the main
task of the Agency was the cooperation with Member-States to prevent the acquisition and use of
such materials by terrorist organizations and address the issue effectively.
The Agency has provided a valuable insight with monitored and verified researches in Iran and
DPRK and its resolutions are a useful tool for the regulatory frameworks of these issues. Under
the NPT, the Agency is authorized to monitor and regulate the use and the transfer of such
materials, safeguarding and creating a protection system. It has established international
standards and approaches for safety and security, such as the “Basic Safety Standards for
Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources” 107 and the “Code
of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” 108 .
105
NTI: Building a Safer World. no date . Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). [Online]. [Accessed 30 Ja nua ry 2016].
Available from: http://www.nti .org/trea ties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclea r-weapons-conventi on-nwc/
106
Iaea .org,. "Interna tional Atomi c Energy Agency | Atoms For Peace". N.p., 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2016.
107
Ilo.org,. "Internati onal Basic Sa fety Standa rds For Protection Against Ioni zing Radiati on And For The Safety Of
Ra diation Sources. IAEA Safety Series No. 115". N.p., 1996. Web. 3 Jan. 2016.
108
Www-ns .iaea.org,. "Code Of Conduct On Safety And Securi ty Of Sources ". N.p., 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2016.
6bii. Recruitment and Use of Cyber Means
An important aspect of the IS’s policy and ways it operates is the effective use of social media
and the so-called “dark web”. Dark web, according to Natalia Grivas, is a hidden network of
websites and the user needs special “tools” to access it. It is considered as a thriving market,
where illegal activities take place from a variety of actors, such as the community of hacking,
which assists on hacking services with paid services or instructions. Also, it provides the chance
to buy arms, weapons, drugs and crime activities, such as “assassins to hire”. To be able to use
the hidden tools of the dark web, users have to download a specific type; that has led to the
automatic identification of any users who download it. 109
The main medium that ISIS uses to succeed its main goals, such as recruitment, funding and
promotion of its actions, is Twitter. More exactly, ISIS through Twitter accounts, which share
the views, ideas and actions of the terrorist organization, has managed to create a hard-to-detect
promotion network. The majority of the accounts, enabled to be geographically detected, were
found in the area of Syria and Iraq, and countries were ISIS has obtained some sort of support,
such as Tunisia, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. 110 Also, the majority of the accounts were in Arabic
(almost ¾ of the accounts), 18% were in English and 6% in French; this may lead to accurate
results on the locations of fighters and countries of recruitment, but, unfortunately, France is one
of the leading countries, in total numbers, which sends foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria. 111
Another use of the Internet and technology is in revenge for actions taken against the spread of
ISIS. For instance, few months ago a worrying phenomenon happened, which escalated the war
between ISIS and its enemies, namely the USA. A division of ISIS, which is involved in the
cyber warfare and events, managed to hack encrypted files and publish names and personal
109
Gri vas N., Da rk Web and ISIS, Mediterranean Center for Strategic Analysis and Intelligence, [Date Accessed 16
December 2015] Available from: http://eng.medintelligence.org/resea rch/da rk -web-and-isis/
110
Burger J.M. and Morgan J., The ISIS Twi tter Census : Defining and Des cribing the popula tion of ISIS supporters on
Twi tter, The Brookings Project on the U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, ANALYSIS PAPER, Ma rch 2015, 20. [Date Accessed
17 December 2015], Available from: http://www.brookings .edu/~/media/research/files/papers /2015/03/isis -twitter-censusberger-morgan/isis_twi tter_census _berger_morgan.pdf
111
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Foreign Fighter in Ira q and Syria : Where do they come from. [Online]. 201.
[Accessed 17 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.rferl .org/contentinfographics /foreign-fighters-s yria -i raq-is -isis-isilinfographi c/26584940.html
details of CIA, FBI and NSA officials. This event happened after the death of a British extremist
and it was an act of revenge. 112
7. Actions/measures taken by the United Nations - Counter-Terrorism Committee
Geneva Protocol, 1925
UNSCR 1373 (2001)
UNSCR 1377 (2001)
UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004)
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)
UN Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (1994)
General Assembly resolution 60/288 (2006) Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a
Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy
UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (2006), (2010), (2014)
UNSCR 2161 (2014) Threats to International Peace and Security caused by Terrorist Acts.
UNSCR 2170 (2014) Condemning Gross, Wide Spread Abuse of Human Rights by extremist
groups in Iraq, Syria
UNSCR 2199 (2015) Condemning Trade with Al Qaeda Associated Groups and further Targeted
Sanctions
UNSCR 2235 (2015) Establishing Mechanisms to Identify Perpetrators Using Chemical
Weapons in Syria
UNSCR 2249 (2015) Determining ISIS as Unprecedented Threat
112
Mediterra nean Center for Stra tegi c Anal ysis and Intelligence. [Da te Accessed 16 December 2015], Available from
:http://eng.medintelligence.org/global -news /isis-cyber-calipha te-ha cks-54000-twi tter-accounts-and-posts -phone-numbers -ofheads -of-the-cia -and-fbi/
UNSCR 2214 (2015) Extending UN presence easing Arms Embargo to Counter- Terrorism
Threat
UNSCR 2253 (2015) Expanding Sanctions Framework to Include ISIL
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear Security Summits (2010, 2012, 2014)
The 2002 G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
The 2004 Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
8. Conclusion
The so- called Islamic state has been a long term goal for almost every Islamic terrorist
organization and the actual establishment of such a state is more plausible than ever. The group
poses both a threat to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, always affected of
disputes and instability, and a threat to the global community by spreading propaganda as we ll as
fear. Being a unique case, ISIS needs to be examined and further treated as a totally different
group compared to Al- Qaeda. However, that does not necessarily mean that the existing
Counter-Terrorism tools are not efficient enough. Specifically, the Countering the Financing of
Terrorism (CFT) initiatives need to be undertaken in combination to a counter global terrorism
strategy. The financial aspect is important but intelligence sharing, law enforcement, occasional
military actions, in detailed illustration of the consequences of terrorism remain primary means
to counter terrorism. To disrupt the group’s plans, both short and long- term strategies are
needed. Among them, enhanced international cooperation to avoid state sponsored terrorism
phenomenon, information sharing as regards to intelligence, selective efforts to address the real
causes of terrorism and so on.
9. Points to be addressed
 Which should be a long and short term agenda targeting the elimination of ISIS?
 What are the steps the international community has to take to prevent a possible
territorial expansion?
 Given the analysis, how a comprehensive approach to counter the financing of
ISIS should be structured?
 What conclusions are drawn by the historical background of ISIS’ emerge and what
lessons can the international community take from the appearance of such phenomena?
 Which could be the main measures to create and/or reform the legislative framework on
nuclear, radioactive, biological, chemical materials and weapons to eliminate their
exploitation
by
terrorist
organizations?
 Which could be the role of regional organizations, such as the African Union, Arab
League, European Union, Shanghai Economic Cooperation, to assist in the prevention of
ISIS’
expansion
and
possible
future
attacks?
10. Further Sources- Bibliography
·
Al Arabiya English
·
Al Jazeera
∙
American Journal of International Law
·
Amnesty International
·
BBC News
·
Brookings Institution- Center for Middle East Policy
·
CNN
·
Daily Telegraph
∙
European Journal of International Law
·
Foreign Policy
·
Guardian
·
Hurriyet daily news
·
Independent
·
International Crisis Group
·
Middle East Eye
·
Middle East Institute
·
Middle East Monitor
·
Middle East Online
·
New York Times
·
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
·
OHCHR- Human Rights Programme for the Middle East and Northern Africa Region
·
Securitycouncilreport.org
·
UN News Center
∙
UN Office on Drugs and Crime
·
United States Institute of Peace
·
Washington Post
1925 Geneva Protocol. [Online]. 1972. Opened for signature 17 June 1925. Entered into Force 8 February
1928.
[Accessed
30
January
2016].
Available
from:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/1925GenevaProtocol.shtml
Al Arabiya News, ISIS Controls an area the size of Britain: Syria Expert. [Online]. 28 November 2014.
[Accessed 14 December 2015]. Available from: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middleeast/2014/11/28/ISIS-controls-an-area-the-size-of-Britain-Syria-expert.html
Al- Tamimi, A., The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence. Terrorism
Research Initiative. [Online]. 2015. 9(4). [Accessed 15 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/447/html
Amnesty International. Yezidi women and girls face horrowing sexual violence. [Online]. 23 December
2014.
[Accessed
25
December
2015].
Available
from:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/iraq-yezidi-women-and-girls-face-harrowing-sexualviolence/
Arms Trade Treaty. [Online]. 2013. ATT. Opened for signature 28 March 2013.Entered into Force 24
December
2014.
[Accessed
30
January
2016].
Available
from:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_text_(As_adopted_by_the_GA)-E.pdf
Article 1, Montevideo Contention on the Rights and Duties of
http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897
States,
1933
Bayah. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. [Online dictionary]. Oxford University Press. 2004.
BBC, Islamic State fighter estimate triples- CIA. [Online]. 2014. [Accessed 14 December 2015].
Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29169914
BBC, Profile: Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi. [Online]. 2015. [Accessed 7 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27801676
BBC, Senior Iraqi Al-Qaeda leaders ‘killed’. [Online].2010. [Accessed 28 November 2015]. Available
from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8630213.stm
Beaumont, P. Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi: the ISIS Chief with the Ambition to Overtake al- Qaida. The
Guardian. [Online]. 12 June 2014. [Accessed 8 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/baghdadi-abu-bakr-iraq-isis-mosul-jihad
Burger J.M. and Morgan J., The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the population of ISIS
supporters on Twitter, The Brookings Project on the U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, ANALYSIS
PAPER, March 2015, 20. [Date Accessed 17 December 2015], Available from:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-bergermorgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf
Burke J. 2014. Al-Qaeda: the true story of radical Islam. New York; London: I.B. Tauris. p.89.
Bush, G. Statement on the Death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, [Online]. 2006. [Accessed 26 November
2015]. Available from: http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.08.06.html
Callimachi, R. ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape. The New York Times. [Online]. 13 August 2015.
[Accessed
25
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html
CNN Money. How ISIS makes its millions. [Online]. 1 April 2015. [Accessed 25 December 2015].
Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0QVRUxALZIs
Cockburn, P., The Jihadis Return, ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising. New York:OR Books LLC, 2014.
Cohen, S.D. Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen at The
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, “Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation. U.S Department
of the Treasury. [Online]. 23 December 2014. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from:
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2672.aspx
Comprehensive Nuclear- Test- Ban Treaty. [Online]. 1996. CTBT. Opened for signature 24 September
1996. It have not entered into force. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/
Convention on Nuclear Safety. [Online]. 1994. CNS. Opened for signature 20 September 1994. Entered
into Force 24 October 1996. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/convention-nuclear-safety
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. [Online]. 1979. Opened for signature 26
October 1979. Entered into Force 8 February 1987. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Ba cteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. [Online]. 1972, BTWC. Opened for signature
10 April 1972. Entered into Force 26 March 1975. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
http://www.opbw.org/convention/documents/btwctext.pdf
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction. [Online].1993. CWC. Open for signature 13 January 1993. Entered
into
Force
29
April
1997.
[Accessed
30
January
2016].
Available
from:
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/127917.htm
Costa, A., Terrorists to be judged by the International Criminal Law?. European Union Delegation to the
United Nations. [Online]. 17 March 2005. [Accessed 19 December 2015]. Available from: http://euun.europa.eu/articles/en/article_4504_en.htm
Crowcroft, O. ISIS: People traficking, smuggling and punitive taxes boost Islamic State economy.
International Business Times. [Online]. 16 June 2015. Available from: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isispeople-trafficking-smuggling-punitive-taxes-boost-islamic-state-economy-1506473
Daragahi, B. Biggest bank robbery that ‘never happened ‘- $400m ISIS heist. Financial Times. [Online].
17 July 2014. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0378d4f40c28-11e4-9080-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3v5trCIM9
Dash, A., Hezbollah - Who created it, why it was created, how it was created_ 1-3. [Online]. 2012.
[Accessed 17 December 2015]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdPM5jhdIuo
Dunham, W. & Rampton, R. US will not prosecute families for paying hostage ransom. Reuters. [Online].
23 June 2015. [Accessed 25 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usasecurity-hostages-idUSKBN0P31Q720150623
Engel, P., ISIS has found a huge moneymaking method that’s impervious to sanctions and air raids.
Business Insider. [Online]. 2 December 2015. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.businessinsider.de/isis-taxation-extortion-system-2015-12?r=US&IR=T
FATF. Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). [Online].
2015.
[Accessed
20
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf
Faulconbridge, G. & Saul, J. Islamic State oil is going to Assad, some to Turkey, U.S. Official says.
Reuters. [Online]. 10 December 2015. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-oil-idUSKBN0TT2O120151210
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Definitions of Terrorism in the US Code. [Online]. no date. [Accessed 22
November 2015]. Available from: https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition
Grivas N., Dark Web and ISIS, Mediterranean Center for Strategic Analysis and Intelligence, [Date
Accessed 16 December 2015] Available from: http://eng.medintelligence.org/research/dark-web-and-isis/
Gunaratna, R. Inside Al Qaeda: the Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press.
2003.
Habeck, M.R. Jihadist Strategies in the War on Terrorism. In: Pery, M., Negrin, H.E. ed. The Theory and
Practice of Islamic Terrorism. New York: Palgrave macmillan, 2008 pp. 69-79.
Henley J., Captagon: the amphetamine fuelling Syria’s civil war. The Guardian. [Online]. 13 January
2014.
[Accessed
19
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/jan/13/captagon-amphetamine-syria-war-middle-east
Hosken, A. Empire of Fear: Inside the Islamic State, London: Oneworld, 2015: p.83.
Hubbard, B., Life in a jihadist Capital: Order with the Darker Side. The New York Times. [Online]. 23
July
2014.
[Accessed
23
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/world/middleeast/islamic-state-controls-raqqasyria.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=LedeSum&module=first-columnregion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1
Human
Development
Report,
1994,
pp.
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf
24-25,
Humud, E.C., Pirog, R.,Rosen, L., Islamic State Financing and US Policy Approaches. Congressional
Research Service. [Online]. 10 April 2015. [Accessed 20 December 2015]. Available from:
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R43980.pdf
India- Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons. [Online]. 1992. Opened for signature 19 August 1992.
Opened into Force 28 October 1997. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/india-pakistan-agreement-on-chemical-weapons/
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. [Online]. 2005. Opened for
signature 13 April 2005. Entry into force 7 July 2007. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv13.pdf
Knickmeyer, E. & Finer, J., Insurgent Leader Al- Zarqawi killed in Iraq, The Washington Post, [Online].
2006. [Accessed 26 November 2015]. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html
Levitt, M. Sophisticated Finances That Could Trip Up ISIS. The Washington Institute. [Online]. 22
November
2015.
[Accessed
23
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sophisticated-finances-that-could-trip-up-isis
Malm, S.,. How ISIS is funded by black- market oil trading, illegal drugs and internet cafes. The Daily
Mail. [Online]. 22 February 2015. [Accessed 20 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2964028/oil-drugs-internet-ISIS-funded.html
Mapping Militant Organizations, The Islamic State. [Online]. 2002. [Accessed 24 November 2015].
Available from: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1
Masi, A. Turkey, Russia,Iraq and Syria: The Black Market Oil Trade that’s Fueling ISIS and Dividing the
Terrorist Group’s Opponents. International Business Times. [Online]. 12 September 2015. [Accessed 22
December 2015]. Available from: http://www.ibtimes.com/turkey-russia-iraq-syria-black-market-oiltrade-thats-fueling-isis-dividing-terrorist-2217476
Mediterranean Center for Strategic Analysis and Intelligence. [Date Accessed 16 December 2015],
Available from :http://eng.medintelligence.org/global-news/isis-cyber-caliphate-hacks-54000-twitteraccounts-and-posts-phone-numbers-of-heads-of-the-cia-and-fbi/
Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. [Online]. 1968. NPT. Opened for signature 12 June 1968.
Entered into Force 5 March 1970. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml
NTI: Building a Safer World. no date. Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). [Online].
[Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from: http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclearweapons-convention-nwc/
Packer, G., The Common Enemy. The New Yorker. [Online]. 25 August 2014. [Accessed 14 December
2015]. Available from: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/25/the-common-enemy
Parkinson, J., US-Led Coalition Hitting ISIS ‘Harder than Ever’, Obama says. ABC News. [Online]. 14
December 2015. [Accessed 15 December 2015]. Available from: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-ledcoalition-hitting-isis-harder-obama/story?id=35753628
Porter, T., Cocaine Fundind ISIS: Drug Smuggling Profits Islamic State- Linked Jihadists in North
Africa. International Bussiness Times. [Online]. 20 November 2014. [Accessed 19 December 2015].
Available from: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cocaine-funding-isis-drug-smuggling-profits-islamic-statelinked-jihadists-north-africa-1475824
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Foreign Fighter in Iraq and Syria: Where do they come from. [Online].
201. [Accessed 17 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreignfighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html
RT. High Finance: ISIS generates up to $1 bn annually from trafficking Afghan heroin. [Online]. 6 March
2015. [Accessed 19 December 2015]. Available from: https://www.rt.com/news/238369-isis-drug-moneytrafficking/
Sabin, L. Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi profile: The mysterious leader of ISIS- and why he is called the
“invisible Sheikh”. INDEPENDENT. [Online]. 10 November 2014. [Accessed 8 December 2015].
Available from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-profile-themysterious-leader-of-isis-and-why-he-is-called-the-invisible-sheikh-9849413.html
Satti. B., Funding Terrorists, the Rise of ISIS. Security Intelligence. [Online]. 10 Octomber 2014.
[Accessed 20 December 2015]. Available from: https://securityintelligence.com/funding-terrorists-therise-of-isis/
Saviano, R., The Role of Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering in Fighting ISIS. The New York
Times. [Online]. 23 November 2015. [Accessed 19 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/11/20/draining-isis-coffers/the-role-of-drug-traffickingand-money-laundering-in-fighting-isis
Solomon, E. & Jones, S., ISIS Inc: Loot and taxes keep jihadi economy churning. The Financial Times.
[Online]. 14
December 2015. [Accessed 23 December 2015]. Available from:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/aee89a00-9ff1-11e5-beba-5e33e2b79e46.html#axzz3v5trCIM9
Solomon, E., Chazan, G., Jones, S. ISIS Inc: how oil fuels the jihadi terrorists. Financial Times [Online].
14 October 2015. [Accessed 22 December 2015]. Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b8234932719b-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a.html#axzz3v5trCIM9
Spencer, R., Militant Islamist group in Syria orders Christians to pay protection tax. The Telegraph.
[Online].
27
February
2014.
[Accessed
23
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10666257/Militant-Islamist-group-inSyria-orders-Christians-to-pay-protection-tax.html
Stern, J. & Berger, J.M. ISIS: The State of Terror. London: William Collins, 2015.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. [Online]. 2010. New START. Opened for signature 8 April 2010.
Entered into Force 5 February 2011. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. [Online]. 2002. SORT. Opened for signature 24 May 2002. Entry
into Force 1 June 2003. [Accessed 30 January 2016]. Available from: http://www.nti.org/treaties-andregimes/strategic-offensive-reductions-treaty-sort/
Swanson, A. 12 Ways ISIS gets funding. World Economic Forum. [Online]. 23 November 2015.
[Accessed 17 December 2015]. Available from: https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/11/12-ways-isis-getsfunding/?utm_content=buffer3bd14&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=
buffer
The National Archives, Terrorism Act 2000. [Online]. no date. [Accessed 22 November 2015]. Available
from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents
The Sydney Morning Herald. Yazidi Bombing is Iraq’s deadliest. [Online]. 2007. [Accessed 26
November 2015]. Available from: http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/yazidi-bombing-is-iraqsdeadliest/2007/08/16/1186857683441.html
The World Bank. [no date]. Data: Oil rents (% of GDP). [Online]. [Accessed 20 December 2015].
Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS
Thorndike, J., How ISIS is using Taxes to Build a Terrorist State. Forbes. [Online]. 18 August 2014.
[Accessed
23
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/08/18/how-isis-is-using-taxes-to-build-a-terrorist-state/
Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. [Online]. 1963.
PTBT. Opened for signature 5 August 1963. Entered into Force 10 October 1963. [Accessed 30 January
2016]. Available from: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/Partial_Ban_Treaty.pdf
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism. [Online]. no date. [Accessed 22 November
2015]. Available from: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm
United Nations Security Council. Report S/2014/770: Sixteenth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014) concerning Al- Qaeda and
associated individuals and entities (29 October 2014). [Online]. 2014. [Accessed 25 December 2015].
Available from: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/770
United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Al Qaeda: the many faces
of an Islamic extremist threat: report of the U.S. House Permanent Committee on Intelligence, approved
June 2006, together with additional and minority views, submitted September, 2006. United States: 2006.
US Energy Information Administration. [no date]. International Energy Statistics. [Online]. [Accessed 20
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6
Weiss, M. & Hassan, H. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts, 2015. pp.28-29.
Zafirov, M., The Crisis in Iraq: Was the rise of ISIL a surprise?. AlJazeera. [Online]. 25 December 2014.
[Accessed
16
December
2015].
Available
from:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/crisis-iraq-was-rise-isil-surp2014122592114375688.html