Al-Qaeda at the Crossroads
Transcription
Al-Qaeda at the Crossroads
UNDERSTANDING ISIS Dr. Shiraz Maher Structure of lecture 1. ISIS History & Context 2. What are they doing? 3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation 4. Women within ISIS 5. Potential threat to the West ISIS History: 2003 - 2010 2003 invasion of Iraq Al-Qaeda in Iraq created - Led by Abu Musab alZarqawi (2003 – June 2006) Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) created to unite jihadi Sunni tribes January 2006 MSC declares Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006 Abu Omar al-Baghdadi leads ISI (2006 – April 2010) Abu Ayub al-Masri is “military commander” and “minister for war” Abu Ayub al-Masri leads MSC. He also takes over AQI after Zarqawi death. ISIS History: 2010 - Present Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi takes over as leader of ISI August 2011 Abu Mohammed al-Golani authorised to enter Syria. Jabhat al-Nusrah created April 2013 Baghdadi announces JN is subordinate to him and announces ISIS June 2014 Announcement of the Caliphate AQ v ISIS: The battle for control - Zarqawi began process of recalibrating balance of power within al-Qaeda - Letters from Zawahiri to Zarqawi - Principle of “primacy through proximity.” - AQI heavily influenced by “the management of savagery” by Abu Bakr Naji. - Cleavages of power never properly defined. - Was AQ subordinate to MSC? - Who‟s authority did JN exist with – AQ or ISI? THE STRUGGLE FOR STRATEGIC CONTROL How does al-Qaeda survive into the future? - Al-Qaeda central inspired by Abu Musab as-Suri - AQI heavily influenced by “the management of savagery” by Abu Bakr Naji. MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY - Calls for a „scorched earth policy‟ - Raise the cost of participation against Islamic State - Asymmetry of fear - Beheadings strategy - Burning the Jordanian pilot, Muath Kasassbeh (and UAE withdrawal from the coalition). - “It behooves us to make them think a thousand times before attacking us” Understanding ISIS mindset - Abu Mohammed al-Adnani speech - Sees itself primarily as a state - Explains beheadings rationale too - Zawahiri subordinate to the state, not the other way around - Blames Zawahiri for not capitalising on other “Arab Spring” uprisings - Primacy from proximity triumphs - Zawahiri excluded from events - Battle for legitimacy ensues - Infighting - Religious claims: who are the khawarij? - “Al-Qaeda has always represented the „moderate‟ middle path” according to them in Ar-Risala (v.2) HOW DOES AL-QAEDA BEHAVE IN SYRIA TODAY? “Shariah is not just hudood. It is a complete System. The Quran contains 6200 verses, but only 6 are about hudood. The hadith are more than 10,000 but less than 10 relate to the hudood. The Prophet first taught the people, then he applied the hudood.” - Abu Firas, Shari’ of Jabhat al-Nusrah. KEY POINTS OF THE AQ SYRIA STRATEGY • Hudood can be suspended in times of calamity and instability. • Umar ibn al-Khattab suspended hudood during the famine in 640. • Sa’d bin Abi Waqqas suspended it during the battle of Qādisiyyah. AQ CLAIMS AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE • Not a proper state because it does not have bayah from Ahlul Hal Wal Aqd • Lacks known scholars (and those who support it are young/unknown e.g. Turki ben Ali) • Has failed to garner support from (jihadi) ulema • Islamic State are khawarij • Al-Qaeda can project itself as a more moderate movement. Destroying the “grey zone” ISLAMIC STATE CONTROL Structure of lecture 1. ISIS History & Context 2. What are they doing? 3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation 4. Women within ISIS 5. Potential threat to the West WHAT ARE THEY DOING? • Jihadists have learned the lessons of Iraq. – Letters sent to Mali. • Social welfare provision – Religious lessons – Distribution of food – Utilities – Guaranteeing food supplies A sophisticated insurgency A sophisticated insurgency Structure of lecture 1. ISIS History & Context 2. What are they doing? 3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation 4. Women within ISIS 5. Potential threat to the West ABILITY TO MOBILISE FOREIGN FIGHTERS WHO BECOMES A FOREIGN FIGHTER? • • • • Men; In their twenties; Of South-Asian ethnic origin (UK); With recent connections to higher education; and • With links to individuals or groups who have international connections. WHY DO THEY GO? • The good fight (earlier phases of the conflict) • The ‘ummah consciousness’ – An established idea • Ease of travel & entry – Particularly from Europe • They want to be part of the ‘Caliphate.’ • There was a lack of counter-narrative but this has changed now – Conflict seems less contentious than previous ones. • And they join ISIS because “tazkiya” easier to obtain WHAT DO THEY DO? BECOMING KILLERS What they really want! Structure of lecture 1. ISIS History & Context 2. What are they doing? 3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation 4. Women within ISIS 5. Potential threat to the West Female Foreign Fighters Trends • Average age of female fighter is 20. – This appears to be getting younger, with the youngest case recorded being 13 years old (French). • Diverse backgrounds (different ethnicities, nationalities, and socio-economic circumstances). Growing numbers of converts migrating. • Group migration – very common. We see clusters from UK, France, and Germany. Radicalisation narratives • Public discourse around women has been misleading and is filled with gender stereotypes. – Men are viewed as terrorists; women as ‘naïve’ or ‘brainwashed.’ – Denial of agency for these women. They are often highly intelligent, motivated, and ideological. • Feminist narratives – ‘Liberation’ from hyper-sexualised Western nations towards are more ‘traditional’ environment. Their Role • They do not fight – This can cause frustration – They often tweet, trying to inspire attacks at home. • To populate the land – Build and develop the Islamic State • To raise ‘cubs’ – The next generation of mujahideen ‘Cubs’ Structure of lecture 1. ISIS History & Context 2. What are they doing? 3. Foreign Fighter mobilisation 4. Women within ISIS 5. Potential threat to the West Part 5: Are they a threat? Assessing the threat level • Hegghammer study: 1 in 9 foreign fighters become terrorists. Jytte Klausen says 1 in 4. What this means: • A majority (75-90%) will NOT become terrorists. However: • Given the scale of mobilisation, there is still a threat. • Those that do become terrorists are going to be better terrorists: foreign fighter involvement makes terrorist plots more viable and lethal (Sageman, 2008; Klausen, 2010; Hegghammer, 2013) • Of those that do NOT become terrorists, some are traumatised and pose risks to society regardless of ideological motivation. WILL ISIS THREATEN THE WEST? • Narrative is becoming increasingly anti-Western in tone – Coalition bombing campaign has brought us firmly within their sights – But don’t overlook ‘Bosnia effect’ – blunting/distancing from Western society. • Repopulation of terrorist network – ‘The Afghan effect’ • Fighters don’t have psychological support. Threats to the West NOT ALL WILL COME BACK Thank you! Dr. Shiraz Maher [email protected] @ShirazMaher