January - FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Transcription

January 2006
Volume 75
Number 1
United States
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20535-0001
Robert S. Mueller III
Director
Features
Contributors’ opinions and statements
should not be considered an
endorsement by the FBI for any policy,
program, or service.
Super Bowl XXXIX
The attorney general has determined
that the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the
public business required by law. Use
of funds for printing this periodical has
been approved by the director of the
Office of Management and Budget.
The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
(ISSN-0014-5688) is published
monthly by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20535-0001. Periodicals postage paid
at Washington, D.C., and additional
mailing offices. Postmaster: Send
address changes to Editor, FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy,
Madison Building, Room 201,
Quantico, VA 22135.
By Jeffrey Westcott
International Special Events
By James A. McGee
Notes for the Occasional
Major Case Manager
By Gary Rothwell
Various law enforcement agencies came
together and effectively addressed the
challenges presented by the world’s
biggest show.
1
10
Understanding the expectations and
responsibilities of multiple agencies is
key to ensuring a safe and secure
special event.
20
Periodically, managers should review
basic investigative concepts to help
ensure more successful case resolutions
in their agencies.
25
Law enforcement employers must gain
familiarity with the FMLA and its
requirements.
Editor
John E. Ott
The Family and Medical
Leave Act
Associate Editors
Cynthia L. Lewis
David W. MacWha
Bunny S. Morris
By Richard G. Schott
Art Director
Denise Bennett Smith
Assistant Art Director
Stephanie L. Lowe
Departments
Staff Assistant
Cynthia H. McWhirt
This publication is produced by
members of the Law Enforcement
Communication Unit, Training and
Development Division.
Internet Address
[email protected]
6
Police Practice
Community Oriented
Public Safety
9
ViCAP Alert
Joel Patrick Courtney
19 Book Review
Crime Mapping
Cover Photo
© William S. Hurlburt
Send article submissions to Editor,
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
FBI Academy, Madison Building,
Room 201, Quantico, VA 22135.
ISSN 0014-5688
USPS 383-310
Super Bowl XXXIX
The Successful Response
of the FBI and Its Partners
By JEFFREY WESTCOTT
A
fter several gray, damp
days that had city
officials and host committee
members wringing their
hands, Sunday, February 6,
2005, dawned clear and bright
in Jacksonville. As the sun
rose over northeast Florida,
the curtain soon would come
up on the city’s performance
in the world’s biggest show—
Super Bowl XXXIX. In a few
short hours, attention would
shift from the parties and
celebrity sightings, away from
January 2006 / 1
the lingering questions about
whether Jacksonville had what
it needed to host the event, and
onto the game itself.
But, while the world waited
for the kickoff, another equally
important performance unfolded
backstage. The players in this
drama did not wear cleats and
helmets; in fact, many of them
had no unique uniforms. They
included the hundreds of professionals from the FBI and more
than 40 other law enforcement
and public safety agencies
charged with safeguarding the
security of the game and the
surrounding events. And, by the
time the smoke from the final
fireworks cleared and the last
of the weary fans caught their
flights out of town, the efforts
of these behind-the-scenes
heroes would prove a resounding success.
TEAMWORK
Building a Partnership
Representing the smallest
FBI field office ever to face the
responsibility for coordinating
counterterrorism efforts related
to such an event, agency personnel in Jacksonville knew a big
job lay ahead. Fortunately, some
personnel had gained pertinent
knowledge. Having visited San
Diego during the 2003 Super
Bowl, agents from Jacksonville
learned even more during their
trip for the 2004 game in Houston; they went to the FBI’s field
office and the city’s central
command post, observing the
joint law enforcement effort and
learning from everyone they
could. They left with some
important ideas and also a grasp
of the considerations presented
by the different circumstances
“
...the success of
Super Bowl XXXIX
can be measured as
much by what did
not happen as by
what did.
Special Agent Westcott serves with the
FBI’s Jacksonville, Florida, office.
2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
”
in Jacksonville. Clearly, they
faced a challenge and knew they
had to do more with less; the
FBI office in Houston devoted
about 40 special agents to prepare for Super Bowl XXXVIII,
more than the entire agent
complement in Jacksonville.
Personnel began contacting
counterparts at various FBI
offices and other agencies to
ensure coverage of all pertinent
areas. For instance, they coordinated maritime and airspace
security with the appropriate
organizations, helped establish
the intelligence and information
teams that would be on the
ground at the various Super
Bowl-related venues, and
worked with personnel at
outside agencies and FBI
Headquarters to handle other
security issues. Of course,
finding lodging for over 200
FBI personnel proved challenging as well.
Many agencies would
become partners, including,
of course, the Jacksonville
Sheriff’s Office (JSO). As the
lead agency with the primary
responsibility for overall event
security, JSO was on task from
the start. And, in the months
leading up to the game, more
than 150 attendees from dozens
of agencies would crowd into
the planning sessions at the
Fraternal Order of Police’s
banquet hall to strategize,
compare notes, and work out
details.
Working Together
Because the FBI’s mission
would overlap those of numerous other organizations, establishing liaison with key players
proved critical. As the special
agent in charge (SAC) of the
FBI’s Jacksonville office stated,
“Our mission was twofold.
First and foremost, we had the
responsibility to plan for—and
prevent—potential acts of
terrorism. Second, we had to
take the lead in collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating
any intelligence involving
potential threats to the security
of the Super Bowl and the city
of Jacksonville.” These responsibilities would cut across FBI
programs and functions and
would involve SWAT teams,
bomb technicians, maritime
and aviation operations, and
WMD specialists. To some
extent, other agencies shared
each of these functions and had
concurrent jurisdiction. This
presented no difficulties—the
FBI and its partners worked
together effectively.
One instance involved the
cruise ships that the Super Bowl
host committee had contracted
to provide the minimum number
of hotel rooms required by the
NFL. These ships presented
security challenges, including
the need to conduct underwater
hull searches for bombs and
other hazards. Working together, the FBI and the U.S.
Coast Guard got divers from the
Environmental Protection
Agency in Miami—which routinely handles inspections of
cruise ships and other international vessels—to handle the
job with some help from JSO.
Aviation security represented another area highlighting
interagency cooperation. A
committee chaired by FBI and
U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) personnel
decided to request a temporary
flight restriction zone with an
unprecedented 10-mile radius
around the stadium (zones in
previous Super Bowl cities
extended only 7 miles). Better
yet, after conferring with Transportation Security Administration officials in Washington,
D.C., the FBI obtained a 20mile-radius “positive control
airspace” designation, which
required pilots entering that
zone to contact air traffic
control and identify themselves.
The responsibility for implementing these restricted zones
fell to the Federal Aviation
Administration, and CBP
handled the coordination of all
federal law enforcement air
assets.
Another key partner, the
Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE)—the
state’s primary investigative
agency—already had a close
working relationship with the
Jacksonville FBI office through
their combined efforts in
counterterrorism. When it
became clear that neither the
city of Jacksonville nor the FBI
had adequate space to house a
multiagency command post,
FDLE offered its downtown
training center as a site. By the
time Super Bowl week arrived,
representatives from more than
30 agencies—everyone from
surrounding sheriff’s offices to
January 2006 / 3
firemen and Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)
personnel—had set up in the
joint operations center (JOC)
that FBI technicians had wired,
secured, and equipped with
high-tech telecommunications
and computer gear.
Using lessons learned from
past Super Bowls and working
within the constraints imposed
by both space and budget
concerns, law enforcement
personnel in Jacksonville
developed a unique command
structure. The city’s downtown
operations facility, renamed the
event operations center (EOC)
for the week, housed the heads
of the primary public safety
agencies—Jacksonville Fire and
Rescue, JSO, the U.S. Coast
Guard, and the FBI—and key
operations personnel from a
number of other city and state
organizations. The lower level
of the facility contained the
joint information center, where
public information officers and
media representatives from
JSO, the FBI, and several other
agencies fielded calls from the
media, ensuring a unified,
consistent message.
A mile to the north, at the
FDLE site, the JOC served as
the nerve center of the FBI’s
intelligence and counterterrorism mission. Out front sat “Big
Blue,” manned by a team from
the FBI’s Technical Response
Unit. Big Blue served as a
mobile facility affording the
requisite security for the physical handling of classified
documents, and it also provided
a backup platform for satellite
uplinks and secure communications in the event the systems
in place suffered a massive
failure.
Inside the JOC, agents,
analysts, and supervisors from
all major FBI components—
intelligence, investigations,
legal, information technology,
tactical, evidence, technical,
administrative, and media—
compared notes, staffed telephones, and worked closely
with representatives from the
more than 30 other agencies
sharing the space. In one corner,
a team from the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
busied itself by generating and
printing poster-sized photos and
graphics of the various Super
Bowl venues. The JOC had
more than 150 telephone extensions, a multitude of computer
workstations, and an electronic
projection screen that showed
an event board listing the status
of any security-related incidents. Several wide-screen
plasma televisions displayed
local and national news channels and—on Sunday night—
the game itself.
Next door to the JOC was
the Intelligence Operations
Center (IOC). Inside, analysts
from joint terrorism task force
agencies continued their work
from the past months: collecting
and analyzing intelligence and
making appropriate dissemination decisions. By the time
game day arrived, analysts had
performed more than 30,000
background checks—including
some 9,500 requested by the
Super Bowl host committee—
on volunteers, cruise ship
crews, port workers, and taxi
and limousine drivers. The
IOC analysts also processed
dozens of real-time checks on
data coming in from intelligence and information teams on
the street, which comprised 120
officers from eight different
agencies.
SUCCESS
The partnership’s efforts
proved a resounding success.
As Jacksonville’s SAC said,
“The level of cooperation was
incredible. Fortunately, we had
no major incidents, but even if
there had been, I am confident
we had the proper infrastructure
and lines of communication in
place to address them.”
Throughout the week,
agency heads held daily meetings at the downtown EOC
followed by press-availability
sessions. Stories that received
the most attention included a
nearly tragic boating accident in
which two JSO marine officers
sustained serious injuries and
the police pursuit of a stolen
limousine that ended in a fiery
crash.
Police easily handled the
expected increase of incidents
of disorderly conduct, pickpocketing, and prostitution,
and JSO detectives and U.S.
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agents teamed up
to make several arrests of
individuals selling counterfeit
tickets and souvenirs. The
Florida Highway Patrol played
a crucial role in assuring safe
passage on area highways and
over the many bridges of this
“river city.”
Bomb technicians from the
FBI, ATF, and several other
agencies responded to calls
concerning suspicious packages, and when a student pilot
strayed into restricted airspace
on Sunday morning, CBP pilots
quickly escorted him out of the
area and forced the student to
“
Overall, law
enforcement’s
coordinated response
to this event showed
what such a
cooperative effort
can accomplish.
”
land before questioning and
releasing him. SWAT,
HAZMAT, and evidence
response teams were able to
focus the bulk of their time
on training opportunities, and
crisis negotiators had little to
discuss except the relative
strengths of the Eagles and
Patriots.
The more than 3,000 members of the media did not have
much to report pertaining to
security and public safety,
despite the thorough coverage.
Crews from the national networks fanned out across the
city, capturing images of everything from U.S. Coast Guard
patrol boats to bomb-sniffing
dogs. Reporters from the national media shot footage at the
EOC during halftime of the
game and interviewed law
enforcement personnel as part
of a tour of the JOC.
The reports were almost
uniformly positive, and they
served to showcase the combined efforts of all agencies
involved. As Jacksonville’s
sheriff told reporters, “This
was the Pro Bowl of law
enforcement.”
CONCLUSION
Overall, law enforcement’s
coordinated response to this
event showed what such a
cooperative effort can accomplish. Fortunately, not many
people—except a few cynical
sportswriters—had much to
comment on but the area’s
hospitality, golf courses,
beaches, and natural beauty.
And, the combined response
to the few minor incidents that
did surface further proved the
success of the plan. As is
always the case in the behindthe-scenes world of intelligence and counterterrorism,
the success of Super Bowl
XXXIX can be measured as
much by what did not happen
as by what did.
January 2006 / 5
Police Practice
Community Oriented Public Safety
The Long Beach Experience
By Cynthia Renaud, M.A., and Anthony Batts, Ph.D.
A
s policing continues into the 21st century,
agencies worldwide plot uncharted
courses in their search to provide the enduring core
services expected of police organizations: reducing and preventing crime in communities. In this
regard, most departments now know the community oriented public safety (COPS) philosophy, a
concept that evolved out of the order maintenance
theory of the 1980s and community policing concepts of the 1990s.1 It relies upon partnerships and
communication between officers and citizens.
However, agencies in large urban areas—where,
perhaps, the police force can number 1,500 and the
citizens 500,000—find these relationships difficult to cultivate. This problem compounds itself
when the city has a high level of police activity
that keeps its officers in response mode. Patrol
officers in such areas continually address calls for
service and detectives handle exorbitantly high
case loads.
The city of Long Beach, California, serves as
an example. But, in spite of the obstacles, its police
department, in a quest to better customer service,
reduce crime, and improve quality of life, has been
successfully integrating the COPS philosophy at
all levels of the organization. COPS provides a
way for the Long Beach Police Department to
maximize resources through partnerships with
community residents and other stakeholders to
provide long-term problem solving, sustain neighborhoods, and reduce crime.
CHANGE
A recent survey of Long Beach residents identified what they thought about their police department, how safe they felt in their communities, and
what issues they considered most important. The
top six problems, in rank order, were 1) unkempt
neighborhoods, 2) drugs, 3) graffiti, 4) gangs,
5) shootings, and 6) prostitution.2 This ranking
illustrates the importance of quality-of-life issues
among communities. Further, it delineates the two
concepts of being and feeling safe. Consistent with
the broken windows theory,3 citizens reported
that an unkempt neighborhood with graffiti, trash
strewn throughout the streets, and residents who
do not take pride in their homes results in a feeling
that illicit activity is afoot. Officers who can galvanize those citizens into action and help them form a
community where they police their own qualityof-life issues have a measurable effect on the
neighborhood and its crime rate.
Even though for years the Long Beach Police
Department has focused efforts on community policing, these usually involved only a team of officers per patrol division who networked with
neighborhood stakeholders and formed important relationships with citizens. As the agency
continues to embrace the COPS philosophy, a
main focus is institutionalizing its practices at all
levels of the organization, as well as the city of
Long Beach and the city prosecutor’s office. By
doing so, the department will reap the most benefits possible from line-level ownership of issues
and collaborative problem solving among officers,
civilian employees, other city departments, the
city prosecutor’s office, citizens, and businesses.
The agency is accomplishing its move toward
departmentwide COPS practices through structural changes, training courses with all employees,
and a redirection of command staff focus to support efforts at the line level.
Structural Revisions
While any organization finds structural
changes painful, the Long Beach Police Department has benefitted from its recent modifications.
For instance, in recognizing the importance of
attacking specific community problems in a
multiprong approach, the city transferred its
nuisance abatement officer from a position in city
hall to one within the patrol bureau of the police
department. Bringing this position into the
agency’s chain of command affords a quicker
response to issues and a better ability to share
information with street officers. Another move has
involved decentralizing crime analysts from a
main office downtown. Now, they work directly
out of police divisions, helping officers review
crime trends in their assigned areas and examine
best practices for impacting those areas.
In addition, the Long Beach code enforcement
and city prosecutor’s offices have undergone organizational restructuring designed to emulate the
four geographic police patrol divisions. A team
of code enforcement personnel, including code enforcement inspectors and health inspectors, is assigned to each respective patrol division. The city
prosecutor’s office also has dedicated a deputy city
prosecutor to each division. Now, problems, such
as absentee landlords, vandalism, and drug sales,
are addressed through a team approach.
To address one of the main concerns for Long
Beach citizens—graffiti—the department’s Gang
Enforcement Section has dedicated two detectives
to investigate these crimes. And, the agency has
recently purchased computer software to track
graffiti throughout the city. This software will provide a better, more efficient way to establish a
comprehensive criminal case against vandals engaged in this activity. Further, it will provide the
city prosecutor, or district attorney in more serious
cases, with the evidence necessary to secure a
conviction in these incidents of vandalism.
Training Courses
The training courses, conducted with all department personnel, not only have involved an
explanation of the COPS philosophy but have devoted much time to working with specific tools for
problem solving (e.g., crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED)) and introducing
resources available to officers through other city
departments and community groups (e.g., agencies
with which to coordinate in addressing various
quality-of-life issues). Line-level decision making
is encouraged and officers are empowered to identify not only problems in their assigned areas but
solutions as well.
January 2006 / 7
During training, officers meet and interact with
certain key stakeholders in their areas. In this way,
communication is fostered and supported between
police and the community. Also, officers go out
into the field to see problem locations firsthand
and work together to find and implement possible
resolutions.
Command Staff Focus
The department continues to refocus its command staff to be more in alignment with COPS
philosophies. Commanders are encouraged to facilitate and support interdepartmental communication and cooperation. They, too, work with their
assigned crime analyst to understand crime trends
and hot-spot areas. And, they meet with citizens to
establish an open rapport. What administrators pay
attention to, so will the troops. At the senior executive level, deputy chiefs will structure questions at
crime statistics meetings so those answering must
display knowledge of rising issues and the longterm problem-solving techniques needed to deal
with them.
SUCCESS
The Long Beach Police Department has experienced success while using the COPS philosophy.
One good example entails an issue with the
Halbrite Bridge, which offers a pedestrian connection between Long Beach and a bordering city.
Technically, it is governed by three jurisdictions
and involves two different school districts, as children from Long Beach cross the bridge to attend
classes in another district. Unfortunately, criminals
also used it as a thoroughfare between the bordering city and Long Beach. Auto burglaries, graffiti,
and noise disturbances represented problems associated with this bridge. Residents of Long Beach
wanted it removed.
Patrol officers recognized this problem and
took personal ownership of it. They coordinated
with bordering municipalities, school districts,
and community members. Destruction of the
bridge proved a costly solution. Then, officers
implemented the CPTED concept. Metal gates
were constructed at both ends to block access during certain times of the day and all hours of the
night to prevent pedestrian traffic. Residents and
school staff agreed to be responsible for the opening and closing of the bridge gates. The communities and schools at both ends are pleased with the
results—the crimes and disturbances have substantially decreased.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement agencies continue to strive
toward excellence in their attempt to provide safe,
orderly environments for the citizens they serve. In
doing so, departments have begun to recognize the
importance of involving community stakeholders
in this process.
The community oriented public safety concept
has given the Long Beach Police Department a
means to provide improved service to its 500,000
residents. The diverse and multifaceted customer
base it serves needs to be part of the process that
brings this agency’s policing into the 21st century.
Creating partnerships between police, other city
departments, and citizens is the beginning of the
move toward community oriented governance and
shared ownership of issues by all those involved in
the process. The result can only be a better, safer
community in which to live, work, and play.
Endnotes
1
For additional information, see David Allender, “Community
Policing: Exploring the Philosophy,” FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, March 2004, 18-22.
2
Brenda Vogel, Allan Abrahamse, and Gregory Robinson,
“Long Beach Voices” (January 2004).
3
For additional information, see James Q. Wilson and
George L. Kelling, “The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows,” Atlantic Monthly 249 (March 1982): 29-38.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the help of Sergeant
Paul Gallo, Long Beach, California, Police Department, in the
preparation of this article.
Lieutenant Renaud is the director of the Long Beach, California,
Police Academy.
Dr. Batts is chief of the Long Beach, California, Police Department.
Joel Patrick Courtney
ViCAP Alert
attempted to rape a 22-year-old
college student described as a
white female, 5 feet 3 inches, 115
pounds, with blonde hair and
blue eyes. He forced the victim
into his vehicle (a red Honda
Civic) at knifepoint around 6:00
p.m. while she was walking
Various mug shots of Joel Courtney. The one on the left is from 1985 when
down the street. He tied her up
Courtney pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in Washington County. The one in
with her shoelaces, drove to a
the middle is 6 years later when Courtney was picked up again in Washparking lot, and sexually asington County. The one on the right is from Courtney’s arrest in New
saulted her. He is currently incarMexico on kidnapping and rape charges in November of 2004.
cerated, awaiting trial on these
charges.
Although Courtney grew up
oel Patrick Courtney currently is incarcer- in the Portland, Oregon, area, he has moved extenated in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The sively during his adult life. There is a high possibilFBI’s Violent Criminal Apprehension Program ity that he has assaulted other victims in the follow(ViCAP) Unit and the Corvallis, Oregon, Police ing areas: Albuquerque, New Mexico (7/1994-8/
Department are seeking information from all 1994, 8/1997, and 11/2000); Anchorage, Alaska
homicide, sex offender, and cold case units on (1989-1992); Beaverton, Oregon (1986-1992);
cases in which Joel Patrick Courtney may be Bernalillo, New Mexico (5/1995-8/1997); Cape
involved.
Canaveral, Florida (5/2001-3/2003); Cocoa Beach,
Courtney is a white male with a DOB of 6/02/ Florida (5/2001-9/2002); Grants, New Mexico
1966. He has a goatee, wears two earrings in each (9/1995); Pensacola, Florida (5/2001); Portland,
ear, and is the suspect in the abduction and possible Oregon (1980-1989, 1993, and 2004); and Rio
homicide of Brook Carol Wilberger of Corvallis, Rancho, New Mexico (6/1996-2004). In addiOregon. She was abducted while working outside tion, he is known to have traveled to Mexico via
of an apartment complex on the morning of 5/24/ Arizona.
2004 between 10:30 and 11:00. She was a 19-yearold college student, 5 feet 4 inches tall, 119 Alert to Law Enforcement
pounds, with blonde hair and blue eyes. She is
Law enforcement agencies should bring this
presumed dead.
information to the attention of all homicide, sex
The FBI is conducting an extensive investiga- offender, and cold case units regarding cases in
tion on Joel Courtney. It is believed that he is a which Joel Patrick Courtney may be involved.
serial sex offender and killer. The FBI has identi- Anyone having cases similar to the described
fied three additional victims that Courtney may modus operandi with the suspect’s DNA evidence
have sexually assaulted and killed within Oregon. should contact Crime Analyst Vicki McRoberts,
He is inclined to abduct white females, 15 to 25 Corvallis, Oregon, Police Department at 541years of age, with blonde hair and blue eyes, in an 766-6989 or Crime Analyst Ken Whitla of the
outside setting.
ViCAP Unit at 703-632-4254. The Corvallis
On 11/30/2004, Courtney was arrested in Al- Police Department maintains a DNA profile for
buquerque, New Mexico, after he abducted and the suspect.
J
January 2006 / 9
International Special Events
By JAMES A. MCGEE, M.S.
© James Tarasca
T
he Summer Olympic
Games ceremoniously
concluded on August
29, 2004, in the heart of Athens,
Greece. The culmination of the
event was celebrated as testimony to peace and world unity.
In retrospect, what factors were
employed to ensure a safe and
secure athletic contest? This
question requires a close examination of the measures taken
to address an international
special event.1 It also reveals
the necessity to begin security
preparations early, well before
the occurrence, allowing adequate time to address potential
training requirements, exercise
emergency response capabilities, and implement appropriate
corrective actions. Multiagency
and multinational cooperation,
coordination, and communication are critically important
pieces of the security equation.
The environment for terrorism changed dramatically
throughout the world after
Greece was awarded the 2004
Summer Olympic Games in
1997. In fact, the tragic events
of September 11, 2001, redefined the role and responsibilities of the U.S. government
(USG) when addressing special
events in foreign countries, and
the threat of terrorist attacks
against U.S. citizens and interests escalated. The risk of
deadly aggression during special events increased as the
capability of mass media improved, allowing live broadcasts
on a worldwide scale. Further,
an elevated tendency for terrorist groups to resort to acts of
violence and the continued
proliferation and accessibility
of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) contributed to the
threat as well.
Terrorist attacks extended
geographically during the
months leading up to the opening ceremonies for the 2004
Summer Olympic Games. The
escalation of tension due to the
war in Iraq and the bombings in
Istanbul, Turkey, and Madrid,
Spain, raised concerns in Athens. Under the direction of
the U.S. Department of State
(DOS), unprecedented security
measures were employed to
prevent a terrorist attack against
the Olympic Games.
Historically, the FBI fulfills a fundamental role during
USG involvement with special
events management, including
all of those potentially requiring federal assistance. The
FBI’s function in special events
is defined within numerous
statutes and presidential directives. These authorities, combined with the FBI’s responsibilities in combating terrorism,
provide the predication for FBI
commitment.
The Olympic Games represent the clearest example of a
special event given the international participation and broadbased viewing audience. Such a
scene provides the perfect stage
for a terrorist seeking global
recognition and a platform to
voice political demands. A less
obvious example of a special
event includes the trial of
Timothy McVey, accused and
convicted of the April 19, 1995,
bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah federal building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
Such a setting also represents
an active target for terrorist
attack by individuals sympathetic to antigovernment ideologies who seek an opportunity
for mass media recognition.
DOMESTIC
SPECIAL EVENTS
FBI involvement in special
events is generally within the
continental United States
(CONUS). Given the complexities associated with security
preparations and logistics, it is
important to understand the
protocols in place that provide
direction when addressing a
domestic special event before
examining the enhanced challenges associated with addressing international ones.
Each special event is evaluated in terms of size, threat,
significance, duration, location,
attendance, media coverage,
dignitaries, and viewing
audience. The FBI assigns a
special event readiness level
(SERL) to those that require
counterterrorism (CT) support.
The SERLs are divided into
four categories. SERL I events
require the full support of the
USG and significant predeployment of USG CT response
assets. The Olympic Games fall
within this category. Until the
2004 Olympics in Athens, this
designation applied to Olympic
Games occurring only within
the United States. The 2004
Summer Olympics demonstrated the need to expand this
designation to international
special events.
SERL II events are of lesser
magnitude but still require
augmentation of CT response
assets. Political conventions,
presidential inaugurations, and
economic summits fit within
this category.
“
Each special
event is evaluated in
terms of size, threat,
significance, duration,
location, attendance,
media coverage,
dignitaries, and
viewing audience.
”
Special Agent McGee serves in the FBI’s Jackson, Mississippi, office.
January 2006 / 11
SERL III and IV events
require minimal USG agency
support and, frequently, receive
adequate support by state and
local resources. Most special
events fall within one of these
two categories. Examples
include Super Bowls, highprofile trials, the Indianapolis
500, the Goodwill Games, and
World Trade Organization
conferences.
Presidential Decision
Directives (PDD) 39 and 62
designate the FBI as the lead
federal agency for crisis management and intelligence related
to terrorism during domestic
special events. Additional
authorities are delegated to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regarding consequence management
(the first response to a terrorist
incident and the follow-on
efforts to preserve life) and
coordination. The U.S. Secret
Service is designated the lead
agency for security design,
planning, and implementation.
PDD 62 further defines and
establishes a special event
category of national special
security events (NSSE), which
require enhanced federal planning and protection. The FBI
generally categorizes NSSEs as
SERL I or II. Further, PDD 62
promotes interagency cooperation and coordination in CT
planning and execution by
delegating a shared lead federal
agency designation among the
FBI, FEMA, and the U.S. Secret
Service. This assignment
reduces interagency confusion
regarding who is in charge and
promotes communication
between the agencies.
“
The Olympic
Games historically
have been an
attractive target
for terrorist
attack.
”
INTERNATIONAL
SPECIAL EVENTS
DOS is the designated lead
U.S. foreign affairs agency. The
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DSS) within DOS conducts
protective security overseas.
DSS security responsibilities
closely mirror the role of the
U.S. Secret Service in the
domestic arena.
The CIA is the designated
lead USG agency for collection
and dissemination of intelligence in the foreign environment. Similar to the role of the
FBI when addressing a domestic
special event, the CIA coordinates with various other intelligence agencies, as well as the
FBI.
During international special
events, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) fulfills the role
normally occupied by FEMA in
domestic ones. In addition to
consequence management,
DOD provides crisis response
capabilities. This differs from
the domestic environment
where DOD participation is
limited to areas of safety and
security. The statutory restriction referred to as posse comitatus prevents DOD from performing law enforcement CT
actions inside the United States.
Within CONUS, federal law
enforcement CT response is the
jurisdiction of the FBI. Within
the foreign environment, the
FBI has responsibility for
postcrisis terrorism investigations. This authority extends to
include the FBI’s role in terrorism prevention and precrisis
terrorism investigations that
possibly could dismantle a plot
focused on a foreign special
event. It also consists of the
FBI’s extensive CT, crisis
management and response,
and intelligence capabilities.
2004 SUMMER
OLYMPIC GAMES
For centuries, the city of
Athens has been the crossroad
between Europe and the Middle
East. Greece traditionally
embraces aspects of European
and Middle Eastern cultures
that, in many instances, find
their origins in ancient Greece.
FBI Capabilities
FBI Laboratory Division provides technical and scientific response and forensic
support to investigations involving hazardous materials, including WMD. In addition, it
offers the capability to disrupt explosive devices and perform forensic examination of
explosives in postblast situations. The Laboratory Division also renders expertise in
processing crime scenes.
Engineering Research Facility (ERF) supplies technical support for secure and
nonsecure communications, computer hardware and software, and feasibility assessments
for proposed command post sites.
Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) provides subject-matter expertise in CT
tactics, crisis management, hostage negotiation, logistics, and behavioral analysis.
FBI Headquarters offers language specialists, intelligence analysis, and activation of
the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) in support of the special event.
FBI Cyber Division evaluates emerging cyberthreats and performs forensic examination of digital evidence.
FBI Counterterrorism Division provides financial and administrative support.
Renowned as the birthplace of
democracy and philosophical
academia, Greece is home to a
proud people well aware of
their role in the development
of Western civilization and
world history.
The Olympic Games historically have been an attractive
target for terrorist attack. This
is best exemplified by the infamous hostage crisis during the
1974 Summer Olympics in
Munich, Germany, and the
Centennial Park bombing during the 1996 Summer Olympics
in Atlanta, Georgia. In the
shadow of the ancient Acropolis, unprecedented security
efforts were employed to ensure a safe and secure Olympic
Games. FBI preparations were
coordinated with the USG
interagency community, as
well as Greek authorities.
Ultimately, the FBI established
a fully operational command
post adjacent to the U.S. embassy in Athens and prestaged
crisis response assets at three
strategic locations prepared to
deploy, with the consent of
Greek authorities, in the event
of a terrorist act.
In the wake of September
11, 2001, and the war in Iraq,
the 2004 Summer Olympics
demonstrated the necessity for
a coordinated USG approach to
Olympic security. This coordination extended beyond the
participating USG agencies and
included representatives from
the international community,
security professionals from
corporate sponsors, and, most
important, authorities from the
host country, in this case
Greece.
The broad-based USG
security umbrella extends
beyond the traditional concerns
of physical security and protective services associated with
venue site security, transportation, and credentials. Security
concerns also include collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and proactive investigations concerning
credible and specific information relevant to the upcoming
event. During the Athens
January 2006 / 13
Olympics, the FBI routinely
reviewed volumes of information looking for any link or
indication that the Olympic
Games were mentioned as a
target for terrorist attack. An
FBI-generated intelligence
report, including information
potentially relevant to the
Olympic Games, was disseminated within the USG intelligence community on a quarterly
basis, escalating to monthly,
then weekly, and, finally, daily
during the event.
Operating in a foreign
environment requires host
nation authorization, which
extends to the number of anticipated USG personnel present
during the event. This covers
accreditation, diplomatic immunity, and appropriate legislation
that allow USG representatives
to function in the host nation.
Concept of Operations
The development of a
concise concept of operations
(CONOP) is critical in the early
stages of planning for a special
event. The CONOP must clearly
articulate a mission statement
consistent with the situation,
appropriate response authorities
(approved by the host nation),
and individual agency jurisdictions and capabilities. It should
identify available assets and
their capabilities, as well as an
execution time line and scheme
of operations, highlighting all
critical junctions leading up to
and through the special event.
An assessment of host nation
CT capabilities is mandatory,
includes varied stages of preparation, and should be conducted
several years prior to the special
event.
Training Phase
Training represents the
first initiative in assessing host
country CT capabilities. Specialized training, using subject
matter experts with real-world
“
Agencies must
consider these
sensitivities when
developing exercise
scenarios.
”
experience, proves invaluable.
Training can be conducted in
the host country or the United
States. In-country training
results in more personnel
available to attend the seminars,
but, on the other hand, training
within the United States provides host country representatives the opportunity to visit and
use state-of-the-art USG facilities. In addition, host country
representatives may be eligible
to attend one of the three International Law Enforcement
Academies (ILEA) located in
Budapest, Hungary; Bangkok,
Thailand; and Gabarone,
Botswana. Each ILEA provides
a variety of law enforcement
training to the international
community.
None of these training
options will adequately reach all
of the personnel who require
instruction. The train-the-trainer
concept is encouraged so host
country representatives can
return and extend the training to
personnel within their individual agencies. The FBI provides a wide array of training in
various law enforcement disciplines. Ranging from computer
crimes to terrorism crime scene
investigations, FBI subjectmatter experts assist with
training relevant to special
event preparedness. The training phase should end approximately 1 year prior to the
beginning of the event, which
allows emphasis on exercises,
the second phase of special
event preparedness.
Exercise Phase
Exercises constitute a
critical mechanism for testing
capabilities and can be conducted in a variety of formats,
which assist with focusing on
specific areas of preparedness
and response. In the foreign
environment, diplomacy is
needed to develop the coordination necessary to conduct
multiagency and multinational
exercises. Sensitivities exist
between agencies and even
more so between nations when
potential inadequacies or limited capabilities may be exposed. Agencies must consider
these sensitivities when developing exercise scenarios.
Ultimately, the host nation will
decide exercise parameters and
participants.
The table top exercise
(TTX) allows interagency
decision makers to meet in one
location and openly discuss the
variables and options available
in response to numerous scenarios. Many times, the TTX
may be the first time multiagency executives meet to
discuss a coordinated response
to a crisis, and it is an excellent
preliminary exercise, allowing
decision makers the opportunity
to test individual agency standard operating procedures and
memoranda of understanding
(MOUs) between each other
prior to the actual event.
The command post exercise
(CPX) tests command and
control and can be expanded
to evaluate all aspects of command, control, communication,
coordination, and information
and intelligence flow and dissemination (C4I). The ideal
setting for the CPX is inside
the event’s designated location
for the multiagency command
post. The FBI refers to this
location as the joint operations
center (JOC), and it includes
representatives from each
affected agency participating
in the special event. The JOC
includes multiagency decision
makers assigned to a command
group and prepared to make
coordinated critical decisions.
The large-scale field training exercise (FTX) validates all
aspects of crisis response and
consequence and crisis management. It requires a significant
commitment by participating
agencies to adequately test
© James Tarasca
relevant capabilities. Scenarios
closely portray an actual crisis,
and all elements of crisis response are activated and tested.
First responders are dispatched
to the incident, and medical
facilities exercise mass casualty
contingencies. Expertise in
handling a hazardous material
incident, an explosive device,
and a WMD are tested and
evaluated. Appropriate personnel staff command posts, and
lessons learned from previous
TTXs and CPXs assist decision
makers while they evaluate the
circumstances associated with
the FTX scenarios.
The need to conduct a dress
rehearsal proves fundamental to
special event preparations. A
smaller event that occurs prior
to the special event should be
identified. In this case, each
agency will implement the same
security preparations planned
for the upcoming major special
event. Command posts will be
staffed and response assets
prestaged in the same configuration anticipated during the
major event, which will allow
fine-tuning of protocols internally and between agencies.
Radio communications, emergency response routes, and
associated logistics can be
finalized in preparation for the
larger event. If a lesser event is
not available, an FTX will
provide the adequate setting.
The dress rehearsal serves as a
final opportunity to precisely
adjust CT capabilities prior to
the special event.
Although training and
exercises provide valuable
insights regarding host nation
CT capabilities, agencies must
ensure that the host nation is
not overly saturated with them.
During large multinational
events, the host nation will be
inundated with training and
exercise options from various
participating countries. The
organization of a multinational
working group can assist in
January 2006 / 15
FBI Mission Statement—2004 Summer Olympic Games
Under the direction of the FBI on-scene commander (OSC) and in direct coordination
with the U.S. ambassador to Greece, the FBI will perform crisis response and management
in the event of an act of terrorism. FBI participation will be incumbent upon appropriately
established legal authority, procedures, and coordination between the U.S. government
(USG) and the government of Greece (GOG). In the event of an act of terrorism that impacts
on the lives of U.S. citizens and U.S. interests, the FBI will assume jurisdictional lead
agency responsibility for crisis response and management concurrent and in coordination
with the GOG. The FBI OSC, upon notification of a terrorist incident in which the USG has
been requested to assist, will assume oversight of crisis management and investigative
responsibilities, determine a strategy for crisis mitigation, and marshal the appropriate FBI
resources as directed by the nature and circumstances of the terrorist incident.
developing a compendium of
proposed training and exercise
options for the host country.
Exercises should conclude at
least 6 months prior to the
beginning of the special event.
After the completion of all
training and exercises, the
original vulnerability and
threat assessments should be
updated and reflect improved
CT capabilities by the host
country.
Operational Phase
The operational phase is
the final step prior to the actual
event. Success during this phase
depends largely upon solid
relationships developed during
the training and exercise phases
between USG subject-matter
experts and their host country
counterparts. A secure partnership based upon mutual trust
with the host nation and a
combined objective to achieve
a safe and secure special event
proves paramount. Such a
partnership is best represented
by embedding USG subjectmatter experts with their counterparts from the host nation
during the special event time
frame. From a U.S. perspective,
this configuration of USG CT
assets provides first-response
capability to a crisis situation,
promotes a timely assessment
of the incident, and delivers CT
capabilities of the USG, if
requested. On the other hand,
from the host country’s perspective, this embedded capability
enhances on-scene expertise
and brings to bear potential
equipment previously unavailable. Such an embedded arrangement is solely dependent
upon the permission of the host
country.
Deployment of FBI resources to an overseas environment is an enormous task
requiring significant logistical
support. Securing airlift capabilities, in-country transportation, adequate lodging, communication frequencies, command
post locations, staging areas,
and country clearance for all
incoming personnel requires
a minimum of 3 years of preplanning before the special
event. The FBI is well suited
for this mission based upon
frequent international deployments in support of criminal
and terrorism investigations.
FBI resources available for
deployment provide diverse
capabilities with extensive
experience in the foreign environment. The FBI’s Laboratory,
Engineering Research Facility
(ERF), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), Headquarters (FBIHQ), Cyber Division, and various field offices
contribute to the resource
requests.
FBI field offices furnish
rapid deployment team (RDT)
assets to international special
events. The RDTs are predesignated, stand-alone, mobile
field offices capable of deploying to any location. Once in
place, the RDT can provide
adequate resources to augment
an ongoing investigation.
During the 2004 Summer
Olympics in Athens, the RDT
in Los Angeles deployed to
Greece, the first such deployment in a precrisis mode and
in support of an international
special event.
During the operational
phase, the CONOP evolves
into a concise operations order
(OPORD). Individual agency
orders should be compiled into
an overall USG response plan.
Each agency’s OPORD consists
of a statement describing the
situation and mission and an
execution time line highlighting all personnel movements, opening and closing
ceremonies, and any other
noteworthy occurrences during
the special event. The OPORD
also describes the administrative and logistical support
pertinent to the deployment,
including detailed information
regarding initial mobilization
of assets, staging elements,
response, and disengagement.
Additionally, the OPORD
provides a meticulous description of command, control, and
communication contingencies.
The OPORD is supported by
multiple annexes to include
relevant MOUs and a postinvestigation team plan that is
activated in the event of a crisis
to establish a forward command
post at the crisis site.
The FBI command post
generates daily situation reports.
Versions are available for
dissemination to other USG
agencies, as well as corporate
security directors. Any release
of data to the host nation or
other international partners
falls under the purview of the
CIA.
“
Special event
preparedness tests
all aspects of
counterterrorism
readiness.
”
After-Action Report
Following the culmination
of the special event, each
involved internal FBI entity
provides an after-action report
(AAR), a critical review of the
special event’s planning and
execution strategies. The AAR
acknowledges tactics that
worked and identifies procedures to be corrected or changed
for future special events. All
USG agencies with roles and
responsibilities in the special
event complete an AAR as well.
No amount of special event
preparedness can anticipate
every potential CT contingency.
Ultimately, something will
happen that tests the security of
the event. Fortunately, in Athens, the most serious disruption
involved the men’s marathon
when a spectator physically
accosted one of the race participants. These glitches in security
are inevitable, but the lessons
learned are an important part of
the final AAR.
CONCLUSION
Special event preparedness
tests all aspects of counterterrorism readiness. The ability
to identify, recognize, and
correct these vulnerabilities
while preparing for a special
event is of immeasurable longterm value. The complications
increase exponentially when
addressing an international
special event—both domestic
and international ones have
unique requirements and vulnerabilities. Host nation capabilities, combined with international relations and diplomacy,
are critical when assessing USG
involvement. During the 2004
Athens, Greece, the USG interagency partnership, international community, Greek government, and Hellenic society
came together and embraced the
January 2006 / 17
spirit of the Olympic Games.
All parties tirelessly pursued
this effort that, ultimately,
resulted in a safe and secure
Olympics. Future international
special events include the 2006
Winter Olympic Games in
Turin, Italy, and the 2008
Beijing, China. Numerous other
sporting events, such as World
Cup Soccer, also wait on the
horizon and surely will rise to
the level requiring international
participation.
The 2004 Summer Olympic
Games in Athens, Greece, concluded without incident. Hellenic dedication and determination to the development of a
viable Olympic security plan
proved fundamental to the success. This included a willingness to reveal existing Hellenic
government crisis response
capabilities to international
scrutiny and accept recommendations. Indicative of Hellenic
perseverance, the 2004 Summer
Olympic Games ultimately set a
new standard for future international special events.
Endnotes
1
The FBI defines a special event as “a
significant domestic or international event,
occurrence, circumstance, contest, activity,
or meeting, which by virtue of its profile
or status, represents an active target for
terrorist attack.”
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Book Review
Crime Mapping: New Tools for Law
Enforcement, Irvin B. Vann and G. David
Garson, Peter Lang Publishing Company,
New York, New York, 2003.
Geographic information systems (GIS),
commonly referred to as crime mapping, are
becoming indispensable crime-control tools
for law enforcement executives. With the advent of inexpensive desktop computers and
user-friendly mapping software, employing
crime maps as a way to evaluate intelligence
data, develop strategies, deploy personnel, and
monitor crime trends is crucial for effective
law enforcement.
Authors Irvin B. Vann and G. David
Garson have written a comprehensive, easyto-read guide on crime-mapping essentials.
They make several salient points about the
effectiveness of crime mapping and the ease
with which agencies can prepare crime maps.
The first two chapters introduce crime-mapping basics, common terminology, and the varieties of crime maps. The authors succinctly
explain how to build spatial databases and
interpret data output. Chapter 3 details how to
manage crime with GIS through specific types
of maps. Some of the examples include displaying drug-free school zones by creating
1,000-foot buffer zones, integrating problemoriented and community policing, and allocating resources.
Chapter 4 explains spatial models that
concentrate on specific situations, such as the
relationship between convenience store robberies and actual store locations. Another
example involves displaying burglary locations to known burglars’ residences. This
type of modeling is imperative to situational
crime prevention. The authors also describe
multivariate analysis, which constitutes the
most compelling part of the book. Because
crime often is linked to environmental and
demographic conditions, building a multivariate model allows crime analysts to examine the
relationship between specific crimes (e.g., auto
theft, homicide, robbery, and burglary) and
social, demographic, or environmental conditions (e.g., poverty, unemployment, the elderly, young adults 16 to 24, abandoned houses,
and vacant lots). Multivariate analysis represents the key to designing successful situational crime prevention programs because a
solution depends on a thorough analysis of the
precursors to the problem.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss how crime mapping influences decision making. This includes
a review of the SARA (Scanning, Analysis,
Response, and Assessment) model of problem
solving and New York City’s Compstat and
Philadelphia’s Crimestat processes, which
serve as two outstanding examples of how
crime mapping represents one part of a larger
crime-control process. The book concludes
with a discussion about social policy and how
crime maps may have unintended consequences, such as the right to privacy because
many police departments upload their maps to
the Internet for community use.
The book is replete with actual experiences
from various law enforcement organizations
throughout the country, including large and
small departments, municipal and county police agencies, and sheriff’s offices. It offers an
excellent reference section for additional reading and an appendix of law enforcement Web
sites with crime maps. The book is an excellent
supplement to any academy text or management course on crime-control strategies, community policing, situational crime prevention,
and problem solving.
Reviewed by
Captain Jon M. Shane
Newark, New Jersey, Police Department
January 2006 / 19
Notes for the Occasional
Major Case Manager
By GARY ROTHWELL, DPA
D
ay-to-day administrative responsibilities
consume the time of
most law enforcement managers, causing them to lose touch
with the tactical and strategic
aspects of criminal investigations. Many do not directly
respond to crime scenes and
seldom manage investigations.
Further, they may find that
previous supervisory training
rarely addressed such situations.
This holds especially true in the
© Mark C. Ide
thousands of agencies that only
occasionally encounter major
crimes.
To this end, a brief reacquaintance with basic investigative concepts will help managers react to these incidents with
increased confidence by knowing what to do initially, as well
as through familiarity with case
management practices that enhance opportunities for investigative success. To coordinate
investigations, managers can
use these fundamental approaches seldom addressed
in formal training and often
forgotten or overlooked in
actual operations. Measures
include initial-response organizational tasks and investigative
principles that can contribute
to a successful outcome.
ORGANIZATIONAL TASKS
Anecdotes and experience
appear to indicate that errors
happen more often at the outset
of criminal investigations than
at any other time. This dilemma
frequently occurs if investigators fail to ensure order at crime
scenes or neglect to create it in
their own approaches to investigations. Therefore, managers
should ensure that investigators
accomplish the following tasks
early in an investigation.
Secure the Crime Scene
Supervisors should anticipate that a scene is not protected
prior to their arrival, then take
measures to secure it as soon as
possible. This means clearing it
of unnecessary personnel and
identifying and interviewing all
individuals previously present
to determine whether they were
involved in or witnessed the
crime, as well as if and how
they may have contaminated or
altered the scene. This step
proves especially important
with emergency medical personnel, firefighters, and coroners; managers should ensure
that their personnel determine
not only what these first responders did while inside the
scene but also what they saw
that may have changed before
police arrival. Securing the
scene includes establishing a
perimeter, with uniformed
personnel if possible, to limit
entrance to and exit from the
area to authorized personnel
and keeping a record of those
persons who access it. When
establishing the perimeter,
managers should make sure it
is sufficiently comprehensive—
evidence often is missed because examined areas were
too constricted.
Deploy Sufficient
Personnel
Nearly all agencies face
lean budgets and limited staffs.
However, few things can slow
down an investigation as
quickly as assigning an insufficient number of personnel to
perform investigative tasks in
a timely manner. Managers
should ensure the allocation of
an adequate amount of officers
to simultaneously conduct
several investigative functions.
Generally, at least four should
cover scene security, evidence
processing, witness interviews,
and case supervision. The
location and complexity of
“
the crime scene, number of
witnesses, and other factors
can affect workforce requirements. Therefore, managers
should err on overstaffing,
relieving any unnecessary
personnel when needed, and
consider assistance from
other agencies if necessary.
Establish Command and
Investigative Structures
Managers should choose
an individual, not necessarily
an investigator, with sufficient authority to secure and
allocate personnel and resources to facilitate the
investigation and remain in
charge. Further, supervisors
immediately should assign a
lead investigator who serves
many purposes, such as
providing a conduit through
which investigative data is
Police managers
sometimes lose
sight of basic
concepts of
conducting major
investigations.
”
Special Agent Rothwell heads the Perry office
of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.
January 2006 / 21
assimilated and leads are assigned to appropriate personnel.
Information rapidly loses value
when no one views the big
picture and coordinates the
gathering of additional pieces of
the investigative puzzle. Managers should consider requesting assistance from on-site
clerical, media relations, and
other support personnel in
addition to investigators and
uniformed officers. The greatest
investigative structure, however, becomes ineffective without adequate means of documenting investigative actions—
especially in cases involving
multiple jurisdictions. Various
agencies employ countless
systems. In general, managers
should establish a predominant
manner of case reporting and
ensure that reports quickly are
completed and provided to the
lead investigator.
Establish a Command Post
A command post, a known
location to reliably contact
supervisory and lead investigative personnel, should be in
relative proximity to the major
scene of operations and have
sufficient resources, such as
telecommunications and clerical
support. Far too often, especially in rural areas, some
agencies do not establish a
command post, leaving investigators to operate, literally, on
the trunks of their cars. This
results in little cooperation
with or coordination from those
officers in charge of the case.
Further, a command post ensures that adequate and thorough communication occurs
between all personnel involved.
Determine What
Occurred Before
Investigators Arrive
Determining what happened
before law enforcement arrives
often proves easier in theory
than practice. But, securing the
“
The neighborhood
canvass constitutes
one of the most
productive
investigative tools.
”
crime scene through interviewing people present before their
arrival accomplishes most of
this task. Investigators should
take nothing for granted; managers must ensure that investigators interview those individuals whose jobs require them to
volunteer information, as well
as locate and question witnesses who departed the area.
Most important, investigators
need accurate knowledge of
“who did what” before police
involvement.
Conduct a Neighborhood
Canvass
The neighborhood canvass
constitutes one of the most
productive investigative tools.
Even the most calculated of
crimes cannot overcome the
free will of humans. When
crimes occur, somebody usually
saw something, and, often,
those witnesses only tell their
stories if asked. Managers
should ensure that investigators
conduct neighborhood canvasses, which rarely are too
large but frequently too constricted. The canvass should
extend far enough to encompass any reasonable expectation
of useful information from
witnesses, and investigators
should make as many attempts
as necessary to contact them.
Even after accomplishing
this task, managers should
consider recanvassing an area
because reluctant witnesses
may only speak out upon repeated questioning.
INVESTIGATIVE
PRINCIPLES
No comprehensive manual
exists for every investigative
contingency. However, managers can use certain established
principles to guide them in
successfully overseeing a case.
Be a Supervisor
Supervisors should let the
investigators investigate. Often,
with minimally established
investigative structures and
command posts or extremely
limited personnel, supervisors
personally become involved
in tasks, such as critical interviews and evidence searches.
In so doing, they lose their
managerial perspective, are
unable to see the case comprehensively, and become difficult
for subordinates to contact for
decisions. Supervisors should
slow down, remember their
roles as managers, and facilitate
the work of investigating officers rather than try to do their
jobs for them.
Start with Initial
Information
Many times, investigators
may jump to conclusions,
resulting in negative consequences when those initial
presumptions do not pan out.
Other times, they may not
know what happened or how
they should proceed. Managers
can avoid the former problem
and address the latter by acting
on initial information and proceeding outward in a logical
manner.
In most cases, the crime
scene can tell much about a
case. Forensic science capabilities improve daily, increasing
the quantity and quality of useful physical evidence. Often
within the scene, a victim, alive
or dead, can provide information that indicates motives,
opportunities, and identities
of those responsible. Investigators can glean such information,
commonly known as victimology, through time lines of
victims’ activities prior to the
crime, their interpersonal
relationships, and a myriad of
other aspects unique to them
that, consequently, are distinctive to the perpetrator. Further,
investigators should interview
anyone present prior to or
leads; investigators should
cover all viable ones. They
should not prematurely disregard witnesses, quickly dismissing their accounts as irrelevant
or limiting questions to “Did
you see what happened?”
Rather than asking a witness
if they saw anything, investigators should ask them what they
saw, noting witnesses who fail
to notice anything unusual.
© Mark C. Ide
Verify Everything
One of the most common
errors investigators make involves projecting themselves
as the perpetrator and rejecting
leads because they would not
act in a certain way in similar
circumstances. Countless
investigators have explained
away leads by stating, “The
suspect wouldn’t have done
that,” only to find out later that
the suspect did exactly that.
Investigators should not erroneously prejudge forensic evidence, particularly wounds or
weapons, and ignore conflicting
information because of preconceived assumptions about
causes of death or comparable
conclusions. While investigators must draw inferences from
preliminary observations, they
should avoid making ironclad
assumptions about the nature of
physical evidence until qualified
experts verify the opinions. In
addition, investigators should
authenticate witness information whenever possible without
during police involvement,
verifying their stories. These
initial witnesses frequently have
critical information, may be
involved in the crime themselves, and are difficult to
identify and locate once they
leave the scene.
Prioritize Leads
Personnel constraints and
sound judgment dictate that
investigators prioritize leads
and pursue those with the most
potential first. This does not
mean dismissing lower-order
January 2006 / 23
taking shortcuts; they should
follow any lead chain back to
its original source.
Do It Now
The passage of time diminishes the availability of both
physical evidence and individuals’ recall of information. For
example, if an investigator
delays checking a dumpster
until tomorrow morning, overnight sanitation crews may
empty it tonight, taking key
evidence. Investigators quickly
should pursue hunches. If a
witness “just isn’t right,” and
investigators want to search the
individual’s vehicle or home
for evidence, they should do
so, if legal means are available,
before any evidence can be
hidden or destroyed.
Recognize the Obvious
Television crime shows
and movie mysteries with
elaborate plot twists leave
viewers in suspense until a
surprise ending when investigators identify the suspect and
establish guilt. Such performances have conditioned
citizens; real criminal investigations rarely follow such a pattern. Most of the time, a perpetrator is identified early in an
investigation. Usually, only a
limited number of people have
both the motive and opportunity
to commit a certain offense,
thus, evidence tends to point
toward a particular suspect.
Unfortunately, many people
perceive criminal acts as more
complex than they really are.
English theologian William of
Occam recognized this human
tendency in medieval times and
put forth Occam’s Razor: “The
simplest of two or more competing theories is preferable,
and explanations for unknown
phenomena should first be
“
Nearly all
agencies face
lean budgets and
limited staffs.
”
attempted in terms of what is
already known.”1 This essentially means that the least
complicated explanation of an
event is usually the correct one.
Investigators should remember
this principle and not venture
into far-fetched theories until
more likely scenarios are examined and eliminated.
Avoid Tunnel Vision
Although Occam’s Razor
encourages one to look closely
at the simplest explanation
first, investigators must avoid
becoming myopic. It is tempting to fixate on a particular
theory of a case and ignore or
dismiss evidence and information contradictory to it. In fact,
the outset of an investigation
often is too early to theorize at
all. Instead, supervisors should
ensure that investigative bases
are covered while implementing fundamental concepts of
logic and common sense as a
guide.
CONCLUSION
Police managers sometimes lose sight of basic concepts of conducting major
investigations. By addressing
some fundamental elements of
an investigative response along
with a few principles to facilitate a successful case, supervisors can ensure more effective
results in their agencies. These
measures are not exhaustive
or comprehensive, nor do they
guarantee a solution to a crime.
Rather, they represent a framework for implementing inherent
managerial and investigative
skills that may provide occasional major case managers
with a bit of confidence when
they find themselves wondering what step they should
take next.
Endnotes
1
The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language, 4th ed., s.v.
“Occam’s razor.”
Legal Digest
© Digital Stock
The Family and Medical Leave Act
Impact on the Law Enforcement Employer
By RICHARD G. SCHOTT, J.D.
I
n 1993, Congress passed
and President Bill Clinton
signed into law the Family
and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).1 It was enacted to
address the concern that people
were sometimes losing their
jobs when they missed work
due to a serious illness or family
crisis. The law is undoubtedly
popular with the 50 million
employees who have used its
provisions during the past 12
years.2 Conversely, some employers view the legislation as
a strain on efficient day-to-day
operations of the workplace, a
burden on other workers who
must compensate for absent coworkers, and a vehicle of abuse
for some employees who
manipulate it for personal time.
There may be some reality in
each of these conflicting perceptions of the FMLA. This
article outlines the major provisions of the FMLA and illustrates how they impact the law
enforcement employer.
The FMLA entitles eligible
employees to a minimum of 12
weeks unpaid leave during any
12-month period because of
their own serious health condition; to care for certain family
members who have a serious
health condition; or because of
the birth of a child (and for the
care of the child), or the placement of a child for adoption or
foster care.3 As self-explanatory
as this language seems, disputes
often arise over the meaning
of certain terms used in the
FMLA. For example, who are
the eligible employees entitled
to benefits? What is a serious
health condition? For which
January 2006 / 25
family members can an employee take FMLA leave to
provide care? How must FMLA
leave be taken? The common
theme that emerges when
answering these questions is
that when it passed the FMLA,
Congress did not intend to
cause a hardship on employers
who could not afford to be
without employees for up to
3 months during a 1-year
period.
WHAT EMPLOYEES
ARE ELIGIBLE?
To balance the interests of
the employer in maintaining a
set workforce and the personal
situations of employees, there
are limitations on the eligibility
for FMLA leave. For employees
to invoke protection under the
FMLA, they must work for an
employer to whom the provisions of the act apply. There
usually is no guesswork
involved in this determination
for the law enforcement agency.
While a private employer only
is governed by the FMLA when
it is “engaged in commerce
[and] employs fifty or more
employees for each working
day during each of twenty or
more calendar workweeks in the
current or preceding calendar
year,”4 the FMLA applies to
all public agencies. A public
agency is defined as “the government of the United States;
the government of the state or
political subdivision of a state;
or an agency of the United
States, a state, or a political
subdivision of a state, or any
interstate governmental
agency.”5 The only exclusion
from the FMLA for a public
agency is if the employee
invoking the act is “employed
at a worksite at which [the]
employer employs less than
fifty employees if the total
“
…Congress
stipulated that
workers only become
eligible for FMLA
coverage after
being employed
for 1 year.
Special Agent Schott is a legal instructor at the FBI Academy.
”
number of employees employed
by that employer within 75
miles of that worksite is less
than fifty.”6 Because for this
calculation a state or political
subdivision of a state constitutes
a single public agency, and,
therefore, a single employer (for
example, a state, a county, a
city, or a town is a single
employer), this calculation
usually does not relieve even
the smallest law enforcement
agencies of compliance with the
FMLA. As a result, the crucial
factor determining whether a
law enforcement agency employee is entitled to FMLA
coverage is the status of the
individual employee.
Eligible employees are individuals who have been employed for at least 1 year by the
employer, and for at least 1,250
hours of service with such
employer during the previous
12-month period.7 In attempting
“to balance the demands of the
workplace with the needs of
families,”8 Congress stipulated
that workers only become
eligible for FMLA coverage
after being employed for 1 year.
Additionally, the 1,250 hoursof-service provision serves to
exclude part-time and seasonal
workers from FMLA coverage.
It would seem that determining
the number of hours worked by
someone would simply be a
matter of mathematics. However, calculating the number of
service hours expended for an
employer can be complicated.
Law enforcement employers
must consider factors, such as
time spent on leave, time spent
on call, and time spent training
when determining whether an
employee has worked the
requisite number of hours.
When Congress enacted the
FMLA, it directed courts to use
the “legal standards established
under section 207 of this title”9
to determine whether an employee had met the hours of
service requirement.10 The
Supreme Court long ago pronounced that work for purposes
of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) (and, by reference,
hours of service for the
FMLA)11 means “physical or
mental exertion (whether
burdensome or not) controlled
or required by the employer and
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer....”12 This definition
should be considered when
calculating whether leave,
being on call, and training
sessions constitute time spent
working for a law enforcement
employer.
Leave
Simply stated, neither paid
nor unpaid leave is included in
any calculation of hours of
service under the FMLA. In
Plumley v. Southern Container,
Inc,13 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit was presented with an FMLA eligibility dispute. The legal issue
resolved by the court was
whether an employee had met
the hours of service eligibility
requirement contained in the
FMLA. The court heeded the
standard of Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co.14 while delving
further into whether leave time
fit its criteria. The court relied
on the Black’s Law Dictionary
definitions of employment and
work in concluding that “only
those hours that an employer
suffers or permits an employee
to do work (that is, to exert
effort, either physically or
“
…the 1,250
hours-of-service
provision serves to
exclude part-time
and seasonal
workers from
FMLA coverage.
”
mentally) for which that employee has been hired and is
being paid by the employer can
be included as hours of service
within the meaning of the
FMLA.”15 While employees
are on leave, even if paid leave,
they are not exerting physical
or mental effort for their
employer.16
On Call
The nature of law enforcement often requires those
providing this essential public
service to be considered on
call. Agencies often have duty
officers/agents who act as a first
contact for periods of 12 hours,
24 hours, or even a week at a
time. Unless called to respond
to an actual incident, it is
unlikely that time spent on call
will be credited toward the
1,250 hours of service required
for FMLA entitlement. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that
whether an on-call employee is
working during this time “depends on the degree to which
the employee may use the time
for personal activities.”17 In
Birdwell v. City of Gadsden,18
this Supreme Court principle
was interpreted in the context
of law enforcement employment. In Birdwell, a group of
city police department detectives argued that they were
entitled to compensation pursuant to the FLSA19 for a week
that they spent on call. The
detectives were not required to
remain at the police station, but
they could not leave home
unless they provided a forwarding number or owned a beeper.
They testified that those who
did not own beepers could not
participate in outdoor activities, such as hunting or
fishing; that none of them could
leave town or go on vacation;
that they could not go on family
outings without taking two cars
because of the possibility of
being called to duty; and that
they could not drink alcohol
January 2006 / 27
during the entire time period.20
Despite the restrictions, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the detectives’ on-call time was not work
time.21 The Eleventh Circuit
panel reached this conclusion
based on an extensive review of
other circuit court decisions
applying the Supreme Court
test22 to a myriad of circumstances.23 It is obvious from this
review that unless a department
puts severe restrictions on
officers substantially interfering
with their personal lives, on call
time simply will not be included
in the computation of hours of
service for FMLA eligibility.
Training
The law enforcement occupation also requires recurrent
training for many of its personnel. For example, sworn officers
must maintain proficiency with
firearms during their careers
and, thus, attend training to do
so and also are expected to
attend seminars and in-services
to further hone their skills.
Likewise, support personnel
regularly attend conferences and
training sessions to keep current
in their areas of expertise.
Time spent by employees
training to maintain their proficiency or to do their job better
will count toward hours of
service to their employers.
The determination that time
spent training should be credited to the employee’s hours of
service is based on the conclusion that the employer accrues
the benefits of its employees’
training.24
WHAT IS A SERIOUS
HEALTH CONDITION?
Exactly what constitutes a
serious health condition can be
difficult to determine. While the
FMLA provides seemingly clear
standards,25 “[t]he inquiry is
necessarily extremely factuallyintensive and often requires
“
…neither paid nor
unpaid leave
is included in any
calculation of
hours of service
under the FMLA.
”
human resources personnel or
individual supervisors with no
medical training to make medical judgement calls about, for
example, whether an employee
is ‘incapacitated’ by an illness,
or whether the employee is
undergoing a ‘regimen of
continuing treatment.’”26 For
this reason, “the majority of
FMLA cases turn on the issue
of whether the employee or an
immediate family member was
suffering from a ‘serious health
condition.’”27
While the FMLA defines
the term serious health condition as an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental
condition that involves A) inpatient care in a hospital,
hospice, or residential medical
care facility, or B) continuing
treatment by a health care
provider,28 relevant federal
regulations provide much
greater detail in explaining
whether certain conditions
satisfy the statute’s definition.
For example, the phrase continuing treatment by a health
care provider is expounded
upon in the regulations. It can
include a period of incapacity
(i.e., inability to work, attend
school, or perform other regular
daily activities due to the
serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery
therefrom) of more than 3
consecutive calendar days.
Incapacity may be caused by a
chronic serious health condition. One such chronic serious
health condition is “one which
may cause episodic rather than
a continuing period of incapacity
(examples include asthma,
diabetes, and epilepsy).”29
Employers should note that
absences for such chronic
conditions qualify for FMLA
leave even though the employee
does not receive treatment from
a health care provider during the
absence and even if the absence
does not last more than 3 days.
This would apply to asthmatics
who may be unable to report to
work because of the onset of an
asthma attack or because their
health care provider has advised
them to stay home when the
pollen count exceeds a certain
level.30
Another serious health
condition involving continuing
treatment by a health care provider is described as a “period
of incapacity which is permanent or long-term due to a
condition for which treatment
may not be effective.”31 The
employee or family member
must be under the continuing
supervision of a health care
provider but not necessarily be
receiving active treatment.
Examples provided for this
type of condition include
Alzheimer’s, a severe stroke,
and the terminal stages of a
disease.32
Chemotherapy or radiation
treatments for cancer, physical
therapy to help with severe
arthritis, and dialysis to treat
kidney disease are considered
continuing treatment by a
health care provider because
they constitute “multiple
treatments…for a condition that
would likely result in a period
of incapacity of more than three
consecutive calendar days” if
the treatments were not performed.33 These types of treatments do not require an actual
absence of 3 consecutive days,
© Digital Stock
and, yet, they constitute the
continuing treatment aspect of
the definition for a serious
health condition.
The regulations also provide
guidance on conditions which
ordinarily will not satisfy the
FMLA definition of a serious
health condition. Physical, eye,
and dental examinations are
not considered treatment for
purposes of the act’s second
definition of a serious health
condition.34 Likewise, “[c]onditions for which cosmetic
treatments are administered
(such as most treatments for
acne or plastic surgery) are
not ‘serious health conditions’
unless inpatient hospital care is
required or unless complications develop.”35 Finally, unless
complications arise,36 a common cold, the flu, earaches, an
upset stomach, minor ulcers,
headaches other than migraine,
routine dental or orthodontia
problems, and periodontal
disease are additional examples
of conditions that are not considered serious health conditions that qualify a person for
FMLA leave.37
The regulations recognize
that substance abuse may be a
serious health condition, provided certain conditions are
met. The guidance points out,
however, that FMLA leave may
only be taken for treatment for
substance abuse by a health care
provider or by a provider of
health care services on referral
by a health care provider.
Absence from work because
of employees’ use of the substance, rather than for treatment,
does not qualify for FMLA
leave.38
Given the complicated
nature of the definitions within
the FMLA, it is incumbent upon
law enforcement employers to
consult medical professionals
January 2006 / 29
or legal counsel when confronting the issue of whether a
certain condition meets the
requirement of being a serious
health condition for FMLA
leave eligibility.
WHO IS A SPOUSE,
PARENT, AND SON
OR DAUGHTER?
The FMLA allows employees to take leave to care for
certain family members with a
serious health condition. Specifically, an employee is entitled
to leave to care for “the spouse,
or a son, daughter, or parent, of
the employee” with such a
condition.39 As self-explanatory
as these terms appear, the
FMLA and related federal
regulations provide guidance for
applying the definitions in
various contexts. The statute
simply defines spouse as “a
husband or wife, as the case
may be.”40 The corresponding
regulation goes further, finding
the term to mean “a husband or
wife as defined or recognized
under state law for purposes of
marriage in the State where the
employee resides, including
common law marriage in States
where it is recognized.”41
Making the determination
whether employees are entitled
to leave to care for their spouses
will require familiarity with the
employer’s respective state law
regarding marriage.
The term son or daughter is
defined in the FMLA as a
biological, adopted, or foster
child, a stepchild, a legal ward,
or a child of a person standing
in loco parentis, who is either
under 18 years of age, or 18
years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a
mental or physical disability.42
The corresponding regulation
provides parameters to gauge
whether the son or daughter is
incapable of self-care because
of a mental or physical disability.43 The regulation further
“
…it is unlikely that
time spent on call will
be credited toward the
1,250 hours of service
required for FMLA
entitlement.
”
instructs that a biological or
legal relationship is not required
for someone to be considered an
employee’s son or daughter
because “[p]ersons who are ‘in
loco parentis’ include those
with day-to-day responsibilities
to care for and financially
support a child.”44 This determination is necessarily governed
by the factual circumstances in
a given situation.
The term parent is set forth
in the FMLA to mean “the
biological parent of an employee or an individual who
stood in loco parentis to an
employee when the employee
was a son or daughter.”45 As
when the employee is the
person who is in loco parentis
for a child, there needs to be no
biological or legal relationship
between the employee and the
person who was in loco parentis
when the employee was a
child for the employee to now
use FMLA leave to care for
this parent.46 Conversely, the
term parent does not include
parental in-laws.47
HOW MUST FMLA
LEAVE BE TAKEN?
Because eligible employees
are entitled to up to 12 workweeks of leave in 1 year pursuant to the FMLA, agreement
between the employer and
employee over how best to take
the leave may be challenging to
reach. It is important for the
employer to know exactly what
the FMLA requires of the leave
when dealing with the requesting employee. First, FMLA
leave is not necessarily paid
leave. When Congress drafted
the FMLA, it was sensitive
to the potential hardship its
provisions would put on employers. Doing without an
employee for upwards of 3
months creates a void that must
be filled during the absence.
The statute sets out to “balance
the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families,”48 all
the while doing it “in a manner
that accommodates the legitimate interest of employers.”49
Toward that goal, the FMLA
does not require employers to
create additional paid leave for
an employee taking leave
pursuant to its provisions. The
employee may elect or the
employer may require that
accrued paid vacation leave,
personal leave, family leave, or
medical or sick leave be substituted for any part of the 12week period of leave guaranteed
by the FMLA.50 However, the
employer is not required to
provide paid sick leave or paid
medical leave in any situation in
which the employer does not
normally provide such paid
leave.51 In other words, while
the FMLA mandates time away
from work for certain situations,
it does not mandate that employers deviate from their leaveaccrual or leave-usage policies.
Employers also should be
aware that FMLA leave does
not always have to be taken all
at once. Rather, it may be taken
intermittently or on a reduced
leave schedule when certain
circumstances exist. Intermittent leave is taken in separate
blocks of time due to a single
qualifying reason. A reduced
leave schedule is when an
employee’s usual number of
working hours in a workweek,
or number of hours in a workday, are reduced.52
For FMLA leave to be taken
on an intermittent or reduced
leave schedule basis following
the birth or placement of a child
for adoption or foster care, the
employer must agree. The
employer’s agreement is not
required, however, when the
mother has a serious health
condition in connection with the
birth of the child or when the
newborn child has a serious
health condition.53
schedule must attempt to schedule their leave so as not to
disrupt the employer’s operations.”56 This type of planning
may be possible in some situations, such as when leave is to
be taken several days at a time
spread over 6 months for chemotherapy treatments; but not
possible in others, such as when
a pregnant employee takes
intermittent leave for periods
of severe morning sickness.57
© Digital Stock
CONCLUSION
For some employers, complying with the different requirements of the myriad of
employment laws may seem as
complicated as navigating a
minefield. Unlike their private
sector counterparts, public law
enforcement employers must
not only comply with both
federal and state statutory
guidelines but with Constitutional provisions as well. This
article has addressed some of
the more challenging aspects of
the Family and Medical Leave
Act. Reference to these provisions will help the employer
recognize what the FMLA
requires of it and, possibly more
important, when providing a
service linked directly to our
nation’s security, what the
FMLA does not require of it. In
determining this, it is worth
noting that Congress attempted
to craft the FMLA in a way that
would be satisfactory to both
employees and employers.
Intermittent or reduced
schedule leave is also available
to care for certain health conditions. Because there must be a
medical need to take leave in
this fashion, agreement of the
employer is not required.54
Rather, the standard enabling its
use is that the medical need
“can best be accommodated
through an intermittent or
reduced leave schedule.”55
Furthermore, “[e]mployees
needing intermittent FMLA
leave or leave on a reduced
January 2006 / 31
While nothing in the FMLA
prohibits employers from
providing more benefits than is
required, all employers to whom
the FMLA applies must comply
with its minimum mandates.
Endnotes
1
29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
2
Cindy Skrzycki, “Lobbyists Play Tug
of War Over Family Leave,” The Washington Post, April 26, 2005, p. E1.
3
29 U.S.C. § 2612.
4
29 U.S.C. § 2611.
5
29 U.S.C. § 203(x).
6
29 U.S.C. § 2611.
7
Id.
8
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)
9
29 U.S.C. § 207 is part of the FLSA
of 1938.
10
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(C).
11
Supra note 9.
12
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590,
598 (1944).
13
303 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2002).
14
Supra note 12.
15
Supra note 13 at 370.
16
Military leave could be considered a
caveat to the blanket exclusion of leave
time being included in the computation of
hours of service. The Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act (USERRA) of 1994 requires that
people reemployed under its provisions be
given credit for any months and hours of
service they would have been employed
but for the military service in determining
eligibility for FMLA leave. For an indepth discussion on the USERRA and its
effect on law enforcement employers, see
L. Baker, “Serving Their Country and
Their Communities,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 2005, 25-32.
17
Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970
F.2d 802 (11th Cir. 1992), citing
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
138 (1944).
18
Id.
19
Supra notes 9 and 11 (hours of
service for the FMLA determined by
FLSA’s work hours standard).
20
Supra note 17 at 808.
Id. at 810.
22
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., cited in note
17, supra.
23
For example, in Bright v. Houston
Northwest Medical Center Survivor, Inc.,
934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc),
the plaintiff was on-call during all off-duty
time, he could not become intoxicated,
was required to be reachable by beeper,
and was required to arrive at the hospital
within approximately 20 minutes of being
21
“
…all employers to
whom the FMLA
applies must comply
with its minimum
mandates.
”
called. Bright was bound by these
restrictions for 11 months, had no days
off, and took no vacations. While
acknowledging that these severe limitations made the plaintiff’s job undesirable
and perhaps oppressive, the en banc court
ruled the on-call time was not working
time under the FLSA.
24
See, e.g., Rich v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 921 F.Supp. 767 (N.D. Georgia
1996).
25
29 U.S.C. § 2611 defines the term
serious health condition as an illness,
injury, impairment, or physical or mental
condition that involves A) inpatient care in
a hospital, hospice, or residential medical
care facility, or B) continuing treatment
by a health care provider.
26
Stephanie L. Schaeffer, Causes of
Action Under the Family and Medical
Leave Act for Unlawful Termination, 14
Causes of Action Second Series 85 (2004),
at p. 34.
27
Id.
28
29 U.S.C. § 2611.
29
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(iii)(C).
30
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(e).
31
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(iv).
Id.
33
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(v).
34
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b).
35
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(c).
36
The U.S. Department of Labor issued
an Opinion Letter in 1996 clarifying that
the examples provided in 29 C.F.R. §
825.114(c) can constitute, under certain
circumstances, a serious health condition.
This followed federal court opinions
holding that certain illnesses are not
serious health conditions even when all
criteria listed in the regulations are met
because they were specifically excluded
from coverage. See, e.g., Brannon v.
OshKosh B’Gosh, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1028,
1036 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
37
Supra note 35.
38
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(d).
39
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
40
29 U.S.C. § 2611(13).
41
29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a).
42
29 U.S.C. § 2611(12).
43
29 C.F.R. §§ 825.113(c)(1) and
825.113(c)(2).
44
29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(3).
45
29 U.S.C. § 2611(7).
46
29 C.F.R. §§ 825.113(b) and
825.113(c)(3).
47
29 C.F.R. § 825.113(b).
48
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).
49
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3).
50
29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A) & (B).
51
29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(B).
52
29 C.F.R. § 825.203(a).
53
29 C.F.R. § 825.203(b).
54
29 C.F.R. § 825.203(c).
55
29 C.F.R. § 825.117.
56
Id.
57
29 C.F.R. § 825.203(c)(1).
32
Law enforcement officers of other than
federal jurisdiction who are interested
in this article should consult their legal
advisors. Some police procedures
ruled permissible under federal
constitutional law are of questionable
legality under state law or are not
permitted at all.
The Bulletin Notes
Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face each
challenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actions
warrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognize
those situations that transcend the normal rigors of the law enforcement profession.
Officer Holt
Officer Stivers
Officers Steven Holt and David Stivers of the
Lonoke, Arkansas, Police Department responded to a
fire at a 2-story residence. Upon arrival, they observed
heavy smoke pouring from the structure and determined that a male occupant remained trapped inside.
The officers immediately entered and searched intensely for the man before locating him and carrying
him to safety. Then, Officers Holt and Stivers helped
fire department personnel contain the blaze. The heroic
actions of these two officers saved this man’s life.
During a thunderstorm, Chief
Deputy Harry Meredith, Jr., Major
Kit Campbell, and Investigator
Royce Hamm from the Beaufort
County, North Carolina, Sheriff’s
Office responded to an emergency
call involving three swimmers
that were missing in a nearby
river. While navigating their boat
in high winds and driving rain,
Chief Deputy Meredith
Major Campbell
Investigator Hamm
the three officers raced for several
miles, relying on a compass and their knowledge of the river to stay in safe water, before
Investigator Hamm spotted a hand emerging from the water. Chief Deputy Meredith maneuvered
the boat as close to the victims as possible while the other two officers threw flotation devices to
the two men (sadly, the third victim drowned before the officers’ arrival), pulling one of them to
safety. The other man was exhausted, close to drowning, and unable to hold onto the rescue
device. Officers Hamm and Campbell reached into the water and pulled him into the boat. The
brave, selfless actions of these three officers saved the lives of these men.
U.S. Department of Justice
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535-0001
Periodicals
Postage and Fees Paid
ISSN 0014-5688
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300
Patch Call
The patch of the Price City, Utah, Police Department depicts the beautiful high-desert mesas
and formations surrounding the city. Also featured
is a representation of the state with a star indicating
the relative position of Price.
The patch of the Edgewood, Kentucky, Police
Department features a tree; a silver representation
of the state, signifying the high quality of Kentucky
living; and the sun, indicating the bright future of
Edgewood and its people. The banner at the top
represents the main road in the city with the
agency’s motto: “Here to Help.”

January - FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Transcription

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