fire departmbnt of city of new york safety

FIRE DEPARTMBNTOF CITY OF NEW YORK
SAFETYAND INSPBCTIONSERVICESCOMMAND
INVESTIGATIVEREPORT
BROOKLYNBOX 22-3762
BEDFORDAVENUE
17OO
JANUARY3, 2OO8
CASENUMBERSB01/08
FATAL INJURY
LIEUTENANTJOHNH. MARTINSON
ENGINECOMPANY249
VOLUME I
THE INVESTIGATION
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VOLUMEI
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SUMMARY....................................o.........................................1
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II.
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THE INVESTIGATION............................o............................3
III. PHOTOGRAPHSAND DIAGRAMS...................................6
IV.
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FDNY OPERATIONS ........o...............r....................o...............
V.
FINDINGS.................................o..............o.o.oo....o.....................47
VI.
CAUSES..........................o........................................................56
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VII. RECOMMBNDATIONS........................................................57
V[I. CHRONOLOGICAL FIRE DEPARTMENT
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OPERATIONS....................o..................................................
IX. HANDIE.TALKIE RECORDERTRANSCRIPT...............76
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I.
SUMMARY
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On Thursday, January 3, 2008, at l9l4 hours, the New York City Fire Department's
Brooklyn Communications Office received a telephone alarm reporting a fire in apartment l4M
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at 1700 Bedford Avenue. Brooklyn Box 3162 was transmitted at 1915 hours. The initial
response was three Engine Companies, two Ladder Companies and one Battalion.
Engine
Company 249 andladderCompany 113 arrived at 1918 hours andproceededto the 14ft floor.
The Engine Company 249 Officer, Lieutenant John H. Martinson, requestedBattalion 38 to
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transmit a 10-75 signal after observing a heavy smoke condition in the 14th floor hallway.
Battalion 38 transmitteda lO-75 signal at l92l hours followed by a IO-77 signal at 1923hours.
Standard firefighting operations were initiated for a fire in a high-rise, fireproof, multiple
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dwelling.
The fire building was a 25 story, fireproof (Class 1), multiple dwelling that was part of a
seven building complex known as the Ebbets Field Apartments. The building complex was
constructedin 1962 and occupied one city block. The dimensionsof the building complex were
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450 feet by 637 feet. The fire originated in the bedroom of apartment 14M. The occupantsleft
the apartmentdoor open when they exited the apartment. The fire causedthe bedroom windows
to tail. These factors in conjunction with a northwest wind createda heavy smoke condition in
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the public hallway.
Lieutenant John H. Martinson of Engine Company 249 was found unconscious in
apartment 14M at 1943 hours. He was removed from the building and transported by Fire
Departmentof New York (FDNY) EmergencyMedical Service (EMS) to Kings County Hospital
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wherehe succumbedto his injuries.
The autopsy revealed that Lieutenant John Martinson's cause of death was smoke
inhalation and thermal burns. As a result of the investigation into this fatality, the Safety and
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Inspection ServicesCommand makesthe following recommendations:
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Strictly enforce proper Self ContainedBreathing Apparatus(SCBA) usage.
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All members should be aware of the location and well being of other team members,
including their Officer.
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Re-emphasizethe importanceof the proper use of the firefighting helmet chinstrap.
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Re-emphasize the need for Engine Companies to team up for the duration of the
operation.
5.
Continue to evaluatethe implementation of positive pressureventilation and use of wind
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control devices as initial operational tactics for fires in high-rise fireproof multiple
dwellings.
6.
Revise and issueFirefighting Procedures"Multiple Dwelling Fires", section6, ClassA
Fireproof Multiple Dwelling Fires as a separatevolume.
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Implement a fire safety education campaign to educatethe public on the importance of
closing the fire room door and not obstructing self-closing doors.
8.
The Command Channel and the Post Radio should be utilized at high-rise multiple
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dwelling fires whenevera I0-1'l signalhasbeentransmitted.
9.
Emphasize the importance of maintaining radio discipline during MAYDAYruRGENT
situations.
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Re-emphasizethat handie-talkietransmissionsshould be concise and direct. Handietalkie transmissionsshouldbe madeusing the unit designationand assignedposition.
11.
Train all membersto be proficient in roll call proceduresas per CommunicationsManual
Chapter9, Addendum2, "EmergencyRoll Call Procedures."
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Although the following did not have an impact on this incident, the Department should consider
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theserecommendationsto improve safety and efficiency at future operations:
12.
Hard copies of important information, such as numerous apartmentswith occupantsin
distress, should be sent via Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) in addition to notification on
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the Departmentradio.
13.
Emphasize the importance of reacting to a PersonalAlert Safety System (PASS) Alarm
signal sounding during operations.
14.
The CADS should reflect when a Division or Battalion is staffed by an Acting Chief.
15.
Ensure scissorstairs are properly labeled wheneverinspectingor operatingin buildings
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servicedby scissorstairs.
16.
Establish an educationand training program to presentunits in the field with the findings
and recommendationsfound in Fatal Fire Investigations.
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II.
THE INVESTIGATION
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On Thursday, January 3, 2008 at 1915 hours, Engine Company 249 respondedto a
structural fire at 1700 Bedford Avenue, the Ebbets Field Apartments, in the Borough of
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Brooklyn. While operating at Box 22-3162, Lieutenant John H. Martinson sustainedfatal
injuries.
Lieutenant John H. Martinson was appointed to the New York City Fire Department on
May 9, 1993. Lieutenant John H. Martinson was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant on
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December7,2002. He was assignedto Engine Company 249 on March 25,2006. He had been
on duty just over an hour beforerespondingto Box 3762.
Safety Battalion 1 was dispatchedto Box 3762 on the transmissionof a 10-17 signal at
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1924 hours. On arrival at 1940 hours, the Safety Battalion Chief was informed that a MAYDAY
had been transmitted for a member out of air and unaccountedfor. This MAYDAY was not for
Lieutenant John Martinson. At approximately 1948 hours, there was a transmissionreporting a
member in cardiac arrest. This member was later identified as Lieutenant John Martinson. The
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Safety Chief immediately notified the Safety and Inspection Services Command to special call
additional Safety Trained Chiefs to the scene.
Assistant Chief Allen S. Hay, Chief of Safety and Inspection Services Command,
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implementedAll Unit Circular 314 (AUC), "Incident Command and Safety Investigation." The
Chief of Safety ordered the activation of trained on and off duty Safety Chiefs and Safety
Techniciansto assistin the investigation.
The Safety Chiefs and Safety Technicians were formed into work groups and given
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specific assignments. These assignments included documenting the scene, interviewing
members, and collecting physical evidence. The following items, records, documents and
photographswere collected, examined and evaluatedduring the investigation:
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Interviews with memberswho operatedat the scene
2.
Interviews conductedby the Bureau of Fire Investigation
3.
FDNY Brooklyn Dispatcher recordingsand transcripts
4.
FDNY Battalion Handie-Talkie recordingsand transcripts
5.
FDNY Incident History printout
6.
EMS Dispatcherrecordings and transcripts
7.
Bureau of Fire Investigation report
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8.
NYC Department of Buildings (DOB) records for 1700 Bedford Avenue from DOB
website
9.
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner's Report
10.
Riding List (BF-4s) and duty rosters
11.
Official weatherreport
12.
Injury report (CD-72) for Lieutenant John Martinson
13.
New York Fire Incident Reporting System(NYFIRS) report
t4.
Administrative Unit Building InspectionRecords
15.
Mask RecordCards(SD-30)
16.
Photographsof the fire building, fire operations,and equipment
17,
Sketches,notes,and drawings made from the scene
18.
PersonalProtectiveEquipment (PPE) and tools recoveredat the scene
19.
Test results from handie-talkieradios
20.
Test resultsfrom Mask ServiceUnit (MSU), and Intertek,Inc., on SCBA 249-1,worn by
Lieutenant John Martinson
2t.
Engine Company249 lLadder Company 113 CompanyJournal
In addition,the following resourceswere used:
1.
FDNY Bureauof Communications
2.
FDNY Audio Visual Unit
3.
FDNY Mask ServiceUnit
4.
FDNY Bureau of Fire Investigation
5.
FDNY Bureauof Training
6.
FDNY Researchand Development
7.
FDNY Document Control Unit
8.
FDNY EmergencyMedical Services
9.
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
10.
New York City Departmentof Buildings
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New York City PoliceDepartment
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The Safety and Inspection Services Command maintained control of the fire apartment
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for approximately four days to conduct a thorough examination. Information from interviews
with the members, physical evidence, photographs, incident history printout, audiotapes,
knowledge and the experience of the Safety Investigation Team were used to complete the
investigation.
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As with any investigation of this magnitude and gravity, there may be inconsistenciesand
conflicting statementsamong members interviewed. It is the collective opinion of the Safety
Investigation Team that these inconsistencies are the result of differing perspectives,varying
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memories, and emotional factors. They do not result from any attempt to intentionally mislead,
distort or conceal facts.
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III. PHOTOGRAPHSAND DIAGRAMS
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Photo L
View from Exposure#L Sideof
EbbetsField Apartments
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Photo 2
Aerial View of EbbetsField Apartments
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Diagram L
Floor PIan of EbbetsField Apartments
Indicating Exposuresand Wind Direction
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Photo 3
View from Exposure#3 Side of
EbbetsField Apartments
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Photo 4
Exterior View of the Fire Apartment from Exposure#3
. DashedLines IndicateM Line Apartments
o The Four Living RoomWindowsof Apartment 14M Were
Intact Until Vented bv Members After the Fire Was Knocked
Down
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Photo 5A at Approximately
1935 hours
Photo 58 at Approximately
1936 hours
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Photo5C at Approximately
1937hours
Photo 5D at Approximately
L938hours
Photos5Ar 58, 5C,5D
Wind Impacted Fire ConditionsView from Exposure#3 Sideof Fire Building
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Photo 6
L3'hFloor Hallway Indicating Width of Hallway
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Diagram 2
Apartment 14M
Note: The Foyer Area Was ApproximatelyYr/zFeetx 5 Feet
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Diagram 3
Partial Floor Plan of L4thFloor Hallway
ApartmentsL, M, N, O, P, and R
Stairway Doors Labeled A, B and C
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Photo 7
EngineCompany249'sHoseline
Stretchedto the Fire Apartment - 14M
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Photo 8
12thFloor Hallway ShowingScissorStairwayDoor
in Relation to the L and M Apartment Lines
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Photo 9
View of the Living Room from EntranceDoor of the Fire Apartment
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Photo L0
Dining Area of Apartment 14M
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IV. FDNY OPERATIONS
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On Thursday, January 3, 2008 at l9l4 hours, the New York City Fire Department's
Brooklyn Communications Office received a telephonealarm reporting a fire in apartment 14M
at 1700 Bedford Avenue, the Ebbets Field Apartments. At 1915 hours Box 3762 was
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transmitted and the following units were assignedto respond:
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Engine Company 249
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LadderCompany113
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Engine Company280
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Ladder Company 132
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Engine Company234
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Battalion 38
Engine Company 234 was assignedon the initial alarm as per the Critical Information
DispatchSystem(CIDS). The CIDS information was as follows:
CLI- 4 LENGTHS HOSE
MD 25STY 2OOX15O
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NEEDED-STAIR A HAS STDP-OS&Y VALVE 16 FLAPTS A,B,E,F,N&O HAVE BALCONIES- LONG
DEADEND HALLS- MINRESP 32
On the evening of January3, 2008 at 1900 hours the National Weather Service at John F.
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Kennedy International Airport reported a temperatureof 18 degreesFahrenheit and wind from
the north-northwest at 15 miles per hour.
At the time of the fire, Brooklyn Poly-Tech University was conducting tests on the roof
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of Fire Department headquarters,9 MetroTech Center in Brooklyn. From 1.920hours to L945
hours they reported a temperatureof 18 degreesFahrenheit with an averagewind speedof 11
miles per hour from the northwest, with gusts up to 20 miles per hour.
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Photo 1L
EbbetsField Apartments
The Ebbets Field Apartments were a seven building complex arranged in an H shape.
The buildings were attached but were not interconnected. The complex contained a total of
I,32I apartments. The fire was located in 1700 Bedford Avenue, the center building of the
complex. The fire building was a 25 story multiple dwelling of Class I fireproof construction
consisting of steel, brick, concrete, gypsum board and plaster. This building contained 16
apartmentson each floor. There were six 2-bedroom apartments,six l-bedroom apartmentsand
four studio apartmentson each floor. The fire apartment (14M) was a one-bedroom apartment
on the 14thfloor. The building had four elevators that served all floors. Windows in the fire
apartmentwere doubled paned glass and faced west. The public hallway was in the shapeof a
cross, which measured 131 feet by 53 feet and was 4 feet wide except for the elevator lobby,
which was approximately 8Vzfeet wide. The distance from stairway A (attack stairway) to the
fire apartmentdoor was approximately 60 feet (SeeDiagram 3).
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Diagram 3
Floor Plan of CenterBuilding,t700 BedfordAvenue
All floors in the fire building were served by three stairways. The stairway doors were
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labeled A, B and C. Stairway A was a return type stairway that contained the only standpipe
riser in the building. The other two stairways were scissor type stairs. The scissor type stairs
were labeled incorrectly. The stairway door lettering of the scissor type stairs did not alternate
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from floor to floor properly (See Diagram 4). (THRoucHour rHIs REPoRTSTAIRwAYSB ANDc
ARE REFERREDTO AS THEY WERE LABELED ON THE DOOR TO EACH STAIRWAY AT THE TIME OF THE
FIRE.)
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4thfloor B
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2nd floor El a ..'
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ScissorStairslabeled
correctly
ScissorStairsas labeled
at 1700BedfordAvenue
Diagram4
ScissorStairs
The exposuresof the complex were designatedas follows:
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Exposure#1 Bedford Avenue
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Exposure#2 Sullivan Place
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Exposure#3 McKeever Place
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Exposure#4 Montgomery Street
The lobby entrance to 1700 Bedford Avenue was located on the concourselevel. The
concoursewas an areaone story above grade level from Bedford Avenue.
The Bureau of Fire Investigation determined the cause of the fire to be accidental. The
fire was started by a six-year-old child igniting combustible packaging material on the open
flame of the kitchen stove. The child took the flaming material into the bathroom where he tried
to extinguish the fire. He was unable to extinguish the fire and the bathroom rug ignited. The
child then brought the flaming material to the bedroom and placed it under the bed nearestthe
window (See Diagram 5). He left the bedroom and closed the door but did not tell his mother
what had occurred. The burning material ignited the bed. When the mother becameaware of the
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fire she attempted to extinguish the fire, but was unable to. The occupantsfled the apartment
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leaving the door partially opened. A piece of cloth used as a draft stop at the bottom of the door,
in combination with the carpeting in the room preventedthe door from self closing.
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30L8 1/2',
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Diagram 5
Apartment 14M
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INITIAL
OPERATIONS
The first units on the initial alarm arrived in two minutes and 4l seconds. All Engine
Companieson the initial alarm were staffed with five Firefighters. While responding,Battalion
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38 was notified by the Brooklyn Dispatcher of additional phone calls reporting smoke on the 14m
floor and in apartment 14A.
Engine Company 249 and Ladder Company 113 arrived at 1918 hours and proceededto
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the concourse level of 1700 Bedford Avenue.
When the Engine Company 249 Officer,
Lieutenant John Martinson, arrived in the lobby, he used Firemen Service to recall the elevators.
When the first elevator arrived in the lobby, the Engine Company 249 memberssmelled smoke.
Lieutenant John Martinson and the members of Engine Company 249, exclasive of the
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Chauffeur, entered that elevator. The members of Ladder Company 113, exclusive of the
Chauffeur, enteredthe lobby and conferred face-to-facewith the members of Engine Company
249. The Engine Company 249 members then took the first elevator to the 12thfloor. The
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Ladder Company 113 memberstook the secondelevatorto the 12rtfloor. The LadderCompany
113 OutsideVentilation Firefighter operatedthis elevatorin Firemen Servicefor the duration of
the fire.
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The 2"d due units, Engine Company 280 and Ladder Company I32, arcivedat 1700
Bedford Avenue at l9l9 hours. Squad Company 1 was at the quartersof Engine Company 280
and Ladder Company 132 when the Box was transmitted. Squad Company 1 was not part of the
initial responseassignment,but proceededin the direction of 1700 Bedford Avenue when the
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Brooklyn Dispatcher reported receiving additional phone calls for smoke on the 14fr floor.
Squad Company 1 arrived at ITOOBedford Avenue at approximately 1920 hours, just behind
Engine Company234 andBattalion 38.
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Lieutenant John Martinson and the membersof Engine Company 249 exited the elevator
on the 12thfloor. They then ascendedstairway A to the 13ft floor. Lieutenant John Martinson
placed the standpipekit on the 13thfloor by the standpipeoutlet and proceededto the 14thfloor.
The membersof Engine Company 249 preparcdto connect their four lengths of ZVz"hose to the
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13thfloor standpipeoutlet in stairway A. When Lieutenant John Martinson openedthe 14thfloor
stairway door he encountered a heavy smoke condition. Lieutenant John Martinson called
Battalion 38 at l92l:05, and transmitted via handie-talkie, "Yotr can give a 10-75; we've got a
heavy smoke condition on the l4h floor."
The Engine Company 249 Nozzle Firefighter verbally informed Lieutenant John
Martinson that the M apartmentwas three doors down on the left. Lieutenant John Martinson
acknowledged, donned the facepiece of his SCBA and entered the public hallway on the 14th
floor at approximately 1922 hours. (rHrs wes rHE LASTTrMELTEUTENANT
JoHNMARTTNSoN
wAS
SEENOR HEARDFROM,OTHERTHAN VIA HANDIE-TALKIE,UNTIL HE WAS FOUNDUNCONSCIOUS
IN
THE FrREAeARTMENT,TwENTy oNE MTNUTESLATERtt
1943 HouRS.)
The Ladder Company 113 Inside Team and Roof Firefighter heard Lieutenant John
Martinson transmit the 10-75 via handie-talkie after they exited the elevator on the 12ft floor.
The Battalion 38 Firefighter transmitted a 10-75 to the Brooklyn Dispatcher at 1921238.
On receipt of the IO-75 signal, the Brooklyn Dispatcher assigned the following units:
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SquadCompany 1 (alreadyat the sceneand operatingas orderedby Battalion 38)
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Engine Company 248
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Ladder Company 123 - Firefighter Assist and SearchTeam (FAST Unit).
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RescueCompany 2
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Battalion41
Division 15 was notified of the lO-75 and directed the Brooklyn Dispatcherto assign
Division 15 to the Box.
Battalion 38 called Lieutenant John Martinson via handie-talkie in order to verify the
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CIDS information on the responseticket and to determinethe attack stairway. Lieutenant John
Martinson replied, "10-4 Chief." Battalion 38 made a handie-talkie transmissionto all units that
the hallways are in the shapeof a crossand not a T (SeeDiagram 3).
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While on the concourselevel, prior to entering the building, the Ladder Company 132
Officer notified Battalion 38 via handie{alkie of a heavy wind condition. The Ladder Company
132 Inside Team and Outside Ventilation Firefighter then entered the lobby. At 1922 hours
Battalion 38 orderedLadder Company 132's Officer to check the compactorshaft for possible
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fire.
(rHp EBBETS FrELD AIARTMENTS HAD A HISToRv oF coMPACToR FIRES.)
The initial call reporteda fire in apartment14M. As the Ladder Company 113 Inside
Team passedthe 13thfloor, the Ladder Company 113 Officer orderedthe Ladder Company I 13
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Can Firefighter to check the 13thfloor for the M line of apartments.The Ladder Company 113
Officer recalled hearing that the fire apartmentwas one door down and to the left. There was a
heavy smoke condition when the Ladder Company 113 Inside Team arrived on the 14thfloor
landing. At approximately1923 hours, the Ladder Company 113 Inside Team donned their
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SCBA facepiecesand enteredthe public hallway.
Engine Company 249 members continued to connect their hoseline to the 13th floor
standpipeoutlet and flake out the hoseline in the 13thfloor public hallway. Engine Company 280
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members arrived on the 13thfloor at approximately 1923 hours and began assisting Engine
Company 249 wrth their hoseline. Engine Company 280 helped flake the hoseline in the public
hallway on the 13thfloor and up stairway A to the 14ft floor. The Engine Company280 Control
Firefighter flushed out the standpipeoutlet on the 12frfloor in preparationfor a secondhoseline.
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As Engine Company 234 made their way to the l2th floor, the Officer received a
transmissionvia handie-talkie from Battalion 38 to ensurethe first hoseline was in operation and
then to check the lavout of the floor below.
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At 1923 hours Battalion 38 transmitted a 10-77 to the Brooklyn Dispatcher and reported
stairway A as the attack stairway. The following units were dispatched:
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LadderCompany 105
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LadderCompany111
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Engine Company 2I9 - Certified First Responder-Defibrillator(CFR-D)
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Battalion 48
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Battalion 37 - Safety Officer
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Safety Battalion 1
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Field CommunicationsUnit
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RescueBattalion
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At 1924 hours, Engine Company 249's 2Vz" hosehne was connected to the standpipe
outlet on the 13thfloor. The hoseline was flaked out in the 13ft floor public hallway and up
stairway A to the 14thfloor stairway door. At l924zl2 Lieutenant John Martinson transmitted,
"249, charge the line in the..."
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(NUMERousMEMBERS
REeoRTED
HEARING
THrsrRANSMrssIoN
A5,"249, CHARGE
THELINEIN TIIE srAIRwAy.",) The Engine Company 249 Control Firefighter
acknowledgedthat the hoselinewas being charged.
After Engine Company249's hoselinewas chargedin the stairway,the Engine Company
280 Officer anticipated that there might be a need for a secondhoseline on the fire floor. He
directed a member of Engine Company 280 to start a secondhoseline. Two membersof Engine
Company 280 connected their hoseline to the 12thfloor standpipe outlet. Other members of
EngineCompany280 remainedwith the first hoseline.
The Ladder Company 113 Inside Team, after entering the 14thfloor public hallway,
proceeded left toward the hallway intersection. The Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry
Firefighter continued past the intersectionto the stairway door labeled B. The Ladder Company
113 Officer and Ladder Company 113 Can Firefighter made a left at the intersection and
continued down the short public hallway to apartments 14J and 14K (See Diagram 3). The
Ladder Company 113 Officer knocked on both apartment doors. A tenant in one of the
apartments answered the door, opening it only slightly.
The tenant informed the Ladder
Company 113 Officer that the M apartmentwas down the public hallway and to the left. They
proceededback to the intersection to search for the M apartment. The visibility in the public
hallway was zero and the heat condition was intensifying. The Ladder Company 113 Officer and
Ladder Company 113 Can Firefighter met up with the Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry
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Firefighter at the stairway door labeled B.
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(THs pRpCEDING EVENTS OCCURRED FROM
APPRoxMATv-v 1924 r o 1927HouRs.)
At approximately l924hoars the Ladder Company 113 Chauffeur took an elevator to the
12th floor with members of Ladder Company I32.
The Ladder Company 132 Outside
Ventilation Firefighter operated this elevator in Firemen Service. The Ladder Company 113
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Chauffeur then entered the stairway door labeled B to ascendto the roof. The Ladder Company
132 Officer was informed by a member of Engine Company 249 that members of Ladder
Company 113 were searchingto the left. The Ladder Company 132 Inside Team enteredthe 14th
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floor public hallway from stairway A and began to searchto the right.
The Squad Company I Inside Team arrived on the lzth floor at approximately
1924 hours and made their way up stairway A to the 14th floor.
The Squad Company 1
Chauffeur observedflaming debris at the concourselevel on the exposure#3 side of the building.
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WHICHHAD FALLEN
(-I.HNWVTSTIGATION
REVEALEDTHATTHEDEBRISWASAN AIR CONDITIONER
OFTHEFIREArAnrUnNr.)
FROMTHEBEDROOM
The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur observed fire venting out two windows on the l4th
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floor. He then entered the building carrying a Fire Window Blanket. The Squad Company 1
Chauffeur left the Fire Window Blanket in the lobby and took an elevator to the l2th floor.
After Engine Company 249's hoseline was charged, the Engine Company 249 Nozzle
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and Back-Up Firefighters preparedto advanceinto the public hallway. The smoke condition in
stairway A made it difficult to find the closed stairway door. When the stairway door was
located and opened, the Engine Company 249 Nozzle Firefighter was in a position behind the
door and was unable to enter the public hallway. In order to advancethe hoseline the Engine
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Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter took the nozzle and moved into the public hallway. (rnovt
THIS PoINT oN, ENGINECoMPANY 249 r.Icrc-UP FIREFIGHTEROPERATEDIN THE NOZZLEPOSITION
AND THE ENGINE CoMPANY 249 NozzTE FIREFIGHTEROPERATEDIN THE BACK-UP POSITION.
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THROUGHOUTTHIS REPORTBOTH MEMBERSARE REFERREDTO BY THEIR INITIALLY ASSIGNED
POSmONS.)
At 1925249 Lieutenant John Martinson transmitted via handie-talkie, "249 to Nozzle."
The Engine Company 249 Nozzle and249 Back-Up Firefighters were in the process of switching
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positionsand advancingthe charged2Vz"hoselineinto the public hallway and did not respond.
The EngineCompany249 ControlFirefightermadetwo attemptsto respondto LieutenantJohn
Martinson. These handie+alkietransmissionswere not acknowledgedby LieutenantJohn
o
Page27 of 88
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Martinson. At 1926227,Battalion 38 contactedLieutenant John Martinson via handie-talkie and
asked, "John, did we find the fire apartment yet?"
Lieutenant John Martinson replied,
"Negative." Battalion 38 informed LieutenantJohn Martinson that the M apartmentshould be to
o
the left of the stairway. Lieutenant John Martinson responded,"r0-4 chief.,,
At 1926 hours, Engine Company 234 was on the 13th floor assisting Engine
Company 249 with their hoseline. The following additional companiesarrived on the scene:
o
RescueCompany2
o
Ladder Company 123 - FAST Unit
.
Engine Company 248
o
Battalion41
o
o
At approximately 1927 hours the Engine Company 249 Back-lJp and Nozzle Firefighters
advancedthe charged zvz" hoseline to the intersection of the public hallway. The Engine
Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter called via handie-talkie for membersto lighten up on the line.
o
They were having difficulty advancingthe chargedhoseline. The Ladder Company 113 Inside
Team and the Engine Company 249 Back-Up and Nozzle Firefighters met at the intersection of
the public hallway.
The Ladder Company 113 Officer used the thermal imaging camera to locate the
o
direction of the fire apartment. The Ladder Company 113 Officer led the members down the
public hallway towards the fire apartment. The Ladder Company 113 Officer notified
Battalion 38 via handie-talkie that they were making their way down the public hallway but had
o
not found the fire apartment. The Engine Company 249 Chauffeur notified Lieutenant John
Martinson and Battalion 38 via handie-talkiethat the standpipesiamesewas now being supplied.
Battalion 38 acknowledgedthis transmission. Lieutenant John Martinson did not. (LTEUTENANT
JOHN MARTINSON,S LOCATION WAS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME.)
At 1927 hours Battalion 38 was on the Concourselevel and made a generalhandie-talkie
transmission to all units warning them of the wind condition. (rne ntvrsrlcATroN REVEALED
THAT THE FIRE INTENSITY VARIED DUE TO THE WIND CONDITIONS. AT TIMES FIRE WAS VENTING
OUT THE WINDOWS OF THE FIRE ROOM AND AT OTHER TIMES FIRE WAS BEING BLOWN INTO TTIE
APARTMENT. THE CONDITIONS IN THE PUBLIC HALLWAY ALSO VARIED. SOME MEMBERS REPORTED
A MODERATE HEAT CONDITION. OTHER MEMBERS REPORTED A SEVERE HEAT CONDITION.
Page28 of 88
THE
o
o
INVESTIGATION TEAM DETERMINED THIS TO BE A IryIND IMPACTED FIRE, AS OPPOSED TO A WIND
o
DRTVENFIRE.l)
The Squad Company 1 Roof Firefighter proceededup stairway A to the floor above the
fire. The Ladder Company 113 and Ladder Company 132 Inside Teamshad not yet locatedthe
fire apartment. At 1927:51the Squad Company I Officer tried to contact Engine Company 249
o
and tell them to hold up on bringing their hoseline down the public hallway until the fire
apartment was located. At 1927:58 the handie-talkie recordings indicate that Lieutenant John
Martinson's handie-talkie was keyed, however there was no recorded transmission. (rnB
o
INVESTIGATION TEAM BELIEVES LIEUTENANT JOHN MARTINSON WAS IN THE FIRE APARTMENT AND
WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESPOND TO THE TRANSMISSION FROM THE SQUAD COMPANY 1 OTNCNN.
THERE WERE OTHER HANDIE-TALKIE TRANSMISSIONS OCCURRING AT TIIIS TIME. IT IS NOT KNOWN
IF THESE TRANSMISSIONS PREVENTED LIEUTENANT JOHN MARTINSON FROM RESPONDING. OR
o
PREVENTED HIS TRANSMISSION FROM BEING HEARD OR RSCOROEO.)
At 1928 hours the Engine Company 234 Officer contactedhis membersvia handie-talkie
and directed them to bring the secondline to the 14ft floor. He then descendedto the 13thfloor
o
to try to identify the fire apartment. The Officer was unaware at this time that Engine
Company 280 had already startedstretchinga secondhoseline.
While advancing the hoseline, the Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter observed
o
fire rolling across the public hallway ceiling in the area between apartments L and M.
The
Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter opened the nozzle, knocked down the fire and
advancedthe hoseline toward the fire apartmentdoor. The Ladder Company 113 Inside Team
advancedto apartment 14M and found the door open approximately one to two feet. The Engine
o
Company 249 Back-Up and Nozzle Firefighters operatedthe hoseline from the public hallway
into the fire apartment.
At 1929:18the Ladder Company 113 Officer transmittedto Battalion 38 that they found
o
the fire apartment. Battalion 38 notified the Ladder Company 113 Officer that the fire was out
the windows on the 14thfloor in the rear of the building.
o
'
A wind driven fire implies a constant wind condition pressurizing the fire area. A wind impacted fire describesa
wind condition that does not constantly pressurizethe fire area. The variable wind conditions causethe heat, smoke
and fire to fluctuate in direction and intensity in the fire apartmentand public hallway.
o
Page29 of 88
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a
o
o
o
Diagram 6
Apartment L4 M
Note: Red Lines in the BedroomIndicatethe Fire Area.
(ovnn rHE NEXTSEVERAL
MINUTES,1929 ro 1931 nouns, TTTERE
wEREsEVERALATTEMrTsro
o
o
vERrFyrHE FIREAeARTMENT
onstcNetox.)
At 1930 hours, the Engine Company 234 Officer was in apartment 13K and transmitted
that the fire was in apartment 14K directly above him. At this time, the Squad Company 1
Chauffeur was in apartment 13L. He looked out the window and believed the fire was directly
above him in apartment 14L. Due to the conflicting reports about the location of the fire
apartment,the Squad Company 1 Chauffeur did not want to add to the confusion by reporting
this to Command.
At 1931 hours, the Squad Company 1 Roof Firefighter in apartment 15M, reported to
Command that the fire was right below him in apartment 14M. Command acknowledgedthis
transmission and indicated the fire location would still have to be verified due to the conflicting
reports he had received. (THE I\FoRMATIoN FRoMTHEseuAD coMpANy I noop FTREFTcHTER
PRovEDTo BERccuRere.)
Page30 of 88
o
a
The Ladder Company 132 Inside Team continuedto searchthe public hallway to the
O
right of stairway A.
The Ladder Company I32 Officer stated that the public hallway was
extremelv hot.
Some of the membersof Engine Company280 stood fast in stairwayA on the 13thfloor
with an unchargedhoseline while the other memberscontinued to assist with the first hoseline.
o
They were not sure if the secondhoseline would be required on the fire floor or the floor above.
Members of Engine Company 234 were dispersedbetweenthe 13thand 14thfloors in stairway A
assistingEngine Company 249 withthe first hoseline. Engine Company 248, the 4ft due Engine
o
Company, enteredan elevator in the lobby and proceededto the 12thfloor.
The LadderCompany 113 and 132 Chauffeursenteredthe stairwaydoor labeledB on the
12ft floor and ascendedto the roof. When they arrived on the roof, they found the bulkhead door
of the attack stairway, stairway A, already opened. There were approximately 10 civilians who
o
had self evacuatedto the roof. The bulkhead doors to the evacuationstairways,labeled B and C,
were closed. There was a heavy smoke condition in both the B and C stairways. The Ladder
Company 113 and 132 Chauffeursventedthe bulkheaddoorsof stairwayslabeledB and C.
o
Battalion 41 made his way up to the fire floor to assume command of fire floor
operations. Battalion 38 informed Battalion 4l vra handie-talkie of the identity of the units that
were operating in the building, and that he had orderedLadder Company I23, the FAST Unit, to
the 13thfloor. Battalion 41 arrived on the 14ft floor at approximately 1931 hours. He reported
o
from stairway A that the hoseline was advancing.
The FAST Unit, Ladder Company 123, had taken an elevator to the llth floor, then
ascendedstairway A to the 13thfloor. They familiarizedthemselves with the building layout and
o
apartmentlocationson the 13thfloor.
There was a heavy smoke condition on the 15ft floor. While searching this floor, the
Ladder Company 132 Roof Firefighter entered an open smoke filled apartment and found an
o
unsupervised nine year old girl. She was having difficulty breathing so he placed his SCBA
facepieceon her face and removed her from the apartment. He brought her down to the lobby
via an elevator from the 15thfloor.
At 1932 hours the Squad Company 1 Roof Firefighter reported to Command that fire
o
was threatening to extend to apartment 15M. He requesteda fire extinguisher or a hoseline be
brought to apartment 15M. The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur was in the public hallway at the
door to apartment 14L, which he believed was the fire apartment. Members operating on the fire
o
Page31 of88
a
floor and in the fire apartment were not able to determine and verify the fire apartment
designationdue to the severeconditions on the fire floor.
The Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter had been operating the nozzle from the
o
entrance to the fire apartment. The Ladder Company 113 Officer entered the fire apartment
followed by the Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter with the nozzle. There was no
visibility and a high heat condition.
The Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter was
a
directing the stream into the living room area. The Engine Company 249 Nozzle Firefighter
assistedon the hoselinejust outside the fire apartment. The Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry
and Can Firefighters were in the public hallway just outside the fire apartmentdoor. The Engine
Company 249 Control Firefighter was in the public hallway on the 14thfloor assistingwith the
o
hoseline advance. The Engine Company 249 Door Firefighter had lost his helmet in the public
hallway while advancingthe hoseline. He was unable to locate his helmet. His head was
exposedto the high heat and hot water forcing him to evacuateinto the stairway door labeled B
o
on the 14thfloor.
At 1933 hours Division 15 arrived on the scene and assumedcommand. Battalion 38
called Lieutenant John Martinson on the handie-talkie at 1933204. The Battalion Handie-Talkie
Recorder indicated that Lieutenant John Martinson's handie-talkie was keyed at 1933:09, but
there was no recorded transmission. (rHe twnsrIGATIoN TEAMBELIEVESLIEUTENANT
JoHN
MARTINSON WAS IN THE FIRE APARTMENT AND wAS ATTEMPTING To RESPOND To BATTALION 38.
THERE WERE OTHER HANDIE-TALKIE TRANSMISSIONS OCCURRING AT THIS TIME. IT IS NOT KNOWN
IF THESE TRANSMISSIONS PREVENTED LIEUTENANT JOHN MARTINSON FROM RESPONDING. OR
eREVENTED Hrs TRANSMISSIoN FRoM BErNG HEARD on nncoRoeo.)
At approximately1934 hours Ladder Companies105 and 111 were assignedto search
the floors above the fire due to multiple phone calls reporting smoke throughout the building.
The Ladder Company 132 Roof Firefighter arrived in the lobby with the civilian he removed
from the 15thfloor. Engine Company 219, the CFR-D Engine, was just entering the lobby and
treated the civilian. When EMS Unit 31C arrived in the lobby, the patient was transferred to
their care.
At 1934 hours the SquadCompany 1 Roof Firefighter was still in apartment 15M on the
floor above the fire. The fire causedthe outer panes of the windows to crack and flames were
visible at the air conditioner sleeve. He called Command a secondtime and requesteda hoseline
becausethe fire was threateningto extend to apartment15M.
Page32 of 88
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o
By approximately L934 hours the Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter had
o
advancedthe hoseline four to six feet inside the apartment. The Ladder Company 113 Officer
was located immediately to the right of the nozzle. The Ladder Company 113 Officer
repositionedto the left of nozzle. He realized the fire was to the left and ordered the hose stream
operated in that direction. The Engine Company 249 Nozzle Firefighter moved up on the
o
hoseline to a position about three feet inside the fire apartmentdoor. The Ladder Company 113
Forcible Entry Firefighter was just inside the apartmentdoor. The Ladder Company 113 Can
Firefighter was locatedjust outside the fire apartmentdoor (SeeDiagram 7).
o
The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur and Hook Firefighters were operating under the belief
that the fire was in apartment l4L. They were unawareof the fire conditions in apartment 14M.
Before forcing the door to apartment l4L they wanted the protection of a charged hoseline. The
Squad Company 1 Hook Firefighter went to apartment 14M to get Engine Company 249 to
o
reposition the hoselineto apartment l4L. This hoselinewas already operating in apartment 14M,
so he returnedto the L apartmentwithout the hoseline.
a
)
o
o
c
o
Page33 of 88
a
a
O
|lLllll
ilbll
JI
U-
o
o
o
O
O
O
O
O
L-rr5orrrcer
L-l13 Forcible
EntryFirefighter
a
L-l13CanFirefighter
E-24gBack-Up
Firefighter
E-24gNozzle
Firefighter
---)Arrows
indicate hoseline
Diagram 7
ApproximateLocationof Membersin Apartment 14M at 1935Hours.
At This Time LieutenantJohn Martinson'sLocation
Within the Apartment Was Unknown
Due to the size of the building, the multiple phone calls reporting smoke throughout the
building, and the report of possible fire extension to the floor above, Battalion 38 ordered the
transmissionof a 2ndalarm. The 2ndalarm was transmitted to the Brooklyn Dispatcher at 1935
hours. The following units were assigned:
Page34 of 88
a
o
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t
.
Engine Company 235
o
Engine Company 220
o
Engine Company 2I4
.
Engine Company 207 - Satellite 6
o
Rehabilitation and Care Unrt2
o
Tactical SupportUnit2
.
Engine Company 240
o
Battalion 57
At 1938 hours the following Ladder Companieswere manually selectedand assignedby
the Dispatcher:
o
(ounnvc
o
Ladder Company I57
o
Ladder Company I20
THE NEXT SEVERAL MINUTES NUMEROUS HANDIE-TALKIE TRANSMISSIONS WERE MADE.
TWO OF THESE HANDIE-TALKIE MESSAGES PERTAINED TO MEMBERS RUNNING OUT OF AIR. THERE
wERE ALSO VERBAL REPoRTS BY MEMBERS ON THE 14TH FLOOR OF A MEMBER RUNNING OUT OF
o
AIR.
BATTALToN 41 rnnNsvurrED
AN URGENT MESSAcE vrA HANDTE-TALKIE To BATTALToN 38
THAT A MEMBER WAS OUT AIR AND THAT HE DIRECTED RESCUE COMPANY 2 TO IOCETE THE
MEMBER.)
a
Battalion 38 transmitted to Engine Company 234, "Do you have the second line up on
fifteen?" Engine Company 234 Offtcer answered,"Negative." Battalion 38 was unaware that
Engine Company 280 had stretcheda second hoseline and Engine Company 234 was now
backing up Engine Company 249.
o
At 1935226the Ladder Company 113 Officer called the Ladder Company 113 Forcible
Entry Firefighter on the handie-talkieand asked,'(Are you OK?" The Ladder Company 113
Forcible Entry Firefighter transmitted, "YeAh, I'm running out of air, (unintelligible) up here."
a
The Ladder Company 113 Officer transmittedat 1935251,"773 to lrons and Can, back out
IS ALSo KNowN AS THE IRoNS
we're running out of ..." (t'ge FoRCIBLEENTRvFIREFIGHTER
FIREFIGHTER.)
At approximately 1936 hours, the Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry Firefighter was
a
just inside the fire apartment door when his air supply was depleted. As he exited the fire
apartment he removed his SCBA facepiece and yelled he was out of air. The smoke and heat
conditions in the public hallway were severe. The Ladder Company 113 Can Firefighter was just
a
Page35 of 88
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outside of the fire apartment and assistedthe Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry Firefighter
down the public hallway toward the stairway.
The Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter was unable to direct the stream onto the
a
main body of fire in the bedroom or advancein that direction. The immediate areainside the fire
apartment was now becoming extremely hot. The Engine Company 249 Back-lJp Firefighter
describedthe conditions in the fire apartmentas sudden waves of intense heat and bright white-
O
orange light coming from the bedroom fire area. The vibralert of the Engine Company 249
Back-Up Firefighter activated and the Ladder Company 113 Officer directed the Engine 249
Back-Up Firefighter to exit the fire apartment with him. The Ladder Company 113 Officer
started to leave and was hit in the face with the hose stream. The hose stream displaced his
o
facepieceand dislodged his helmet. He dropped the thermal imaging cameraand hand light and
moved behind the Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter to readjust his facepiece and put
his helmet back on. After the blast of heat subsided, the Engine Company 249 Back-IJp
o
Firefighter shut down the nozzle and turned to his right. He reported placing the nozzle against
the left shoulderof a member as he quickly exited the apartment. He was unable to identify this
membeT.
(NO UAUNER INTERVIEWED BY THE INVESTIGATION TEAM REPORTED RECEryING THE
NOZZLE. LIEUTENANT JOHN MARTINSON'S LOCATION WITHIN THE FIRE APARTMENT WAS UNKNOWN
ATTr-rrs
uvrn.)
As the EngineCompany249 Back-UpFirefighterand the LadderCompany113 Officer
rapidly exited the fire apartment, they each collided with the Engine Company 249 Nozzle
Firefighter. The Engine Company 249 Nozzle Firefighter reported one member striking him on
the right side and then another member striking him on the left side. He was knocked over and
pushedinto the public hallway with his helmet and SCBA facepiecebecomingdislodged. As the
Ladder Company 113 Officer exited the fire apartment he observed the nozzle in a closed
position on the floor. The Engine Company 249 Nozzle Firefighter moved to the area between
the fire apartmentdoor and the dead end of the public hallway betweenthe M and N apartments.
He adjusted his SCBA facepieceand helmet and began to exit toward the stairs. As he passed
the fire apartmentdoor he heard water flowing from the hoseline inside the apartmentbut was
unaware if anyone was in the apartment. His vibralert had activated,so he continued to exit by
following the hoselinetoward the stairway A.
Page36 of 88
a
o
o
t
o
o
I
o
a
a
o
o
-L-IT3 Officer
- L-l13 ForcibleEntry Firefighter
a
- L-Ll3 Can Firefighter
- E-249 Back-Up Firefighter
- E-249 Nozzle Firefighter
a
t
Diagram 8
14thFloor Hallway at 1937Hours
ApproximateLocationof L-113 InsideTeamand
E-249Back-Up and NozzleFirefighters
(orunn MEMBERSwERE IN THEeUBLICHALLwAv AT THISTIME BUT ARE Nor sHowN IN TnIs
oncnau.)
As the Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter exited toward stairway A, he collided
o
with other members in the public hallway. He was completely exhausted,lost his balance,and
fell several times as he followed the hoseline back to stairway A. The Ladder Company 113
Officer exited behind the Engine Company 249 Back-Up Firefighter.
o
Page37 of 88
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The Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry Firefighter was out of air and in distressin the
public hallway when the LadderCompany 113 Can Firefighter assistedhim throughthe stairway
door labeledB on the l4th floor. They descendedto the 13ft floor stairwaylanding. At 1937:28
o
the Ladder Company 113 Can Firefighter transmitted a requestvia handie-talkie for EMS on the
13ft floor. Members in the public hallway on the fire floor were unaware that the member who
was out of air had reachedthe safety of the 13thfloor. They were shouting through their donned
facepiecesabout a member who was out of air. These shouts were heard by Battalion 41 who
a
was in stairway A. At 1937:37 Battalion 41 transmitted a messagevia handie-talkieto Battalion
38, "1 got a guy screaming he's got no air. I just sent Rescue in to find him." At this time, the
high heat, heavy smoke and flue like conditions in the public hallway hampered operations
o
severely. Members in stairway A were not aware of who was exiting the fire floor via the other
stairways. This complicatedthe processof accountingfor members.
The Engine Company 249 Door Firefighter was unaware of the location of the other
I
membersof his unit. Without his helmet he re-enteredthe public hallway from the stairway door
labeled B on the 14thfloor to rejoin his unit. When he reachedthe fire apartmentdoor he heard
the hoselineoperatinginside. He was not able to discernif anyonewas operatingthe hoseline.
Due to the heat condition in the public hallway and the activation of his vibralert, he exited
a
toward stairway A.
Engine Company 219, the CFR-D Engine Company,arrived on the 13thfloor with their
CFR-D equipment and several folded lengths of 2Vz"hose. Engine Company 280 moved their
unchargedhoselineto the stairway door labeled B on the 13thfloor. Engine Company 234 stood
fast in stairway A awaiting ordersto relieve Engine Company249.
The Ladder Company 105 Inside Team continued to search stairway A from the 15ft
floor to the roof. The Ladder Company 105 Outside Team continued to searchthe evacuation
stairwaysfrom the 15thfloor to the roof. Ladder Company 111 begana searchof the 15s floor.
Ladder Company l23,the FAST Unit, assistedmembersexiting the fire floor.
Battalion 38 directed Engine Company 248 to stretch a hoseline to the 15thfloor. This
was in responseto the Squad Company 1 Roof Firefighter's report of fire threateningapartment
15M. Engine Company 248 membersbegan stretchinga hoselinefrom the llth floor standpipe
outlet up stairway A to the 13thfloor. The hoseline then crossed over to the stairway door
labeled C on the 13s floor and continued to the 15th floor.
Page38 of 88
Two members from Engine
a
t
Company 219 added three lengths of their hose and assistedEngine Company 248 with the
o
hoselinestretch.
At 1937 hours Division 15 contacted Battalion 4l via handie{alkie to determine the
location of the memberwho was running out of air. This transmissionwas not acknowledgedby
Battalion41.
o
The Squad Company 1 Hook Firefighter moved to apartment 14M for a secondtime to
get the hoseline. The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur completed forcible entry into apartment 14L.
When he discovered there was no fire in apartment 14L, the Squad Company 1 Chauffeur
a
proceededtoward apartment 14M to rejoin the Squad Company 1 Hook Firefighter.
At 1938:08 Lieutenant John Martinson transmitted, "249's oat of air, 249's out of air."
This transmission was given rapidly and was barely audible on the Battalion Handie-Talkie
Recorder.
o
There was noticeable distress in Lieutenant John Martinson's voice.
This
transmission was not heard or acknowledged by any member. It occurred in the midst of
numeroushandie{alkie transmissionsthat were of an urgent nature and focused on the member
of LadderCompany 113 who was known to be out of air and in needof assistance.(t-nureNaNr
a
JOHN MARTINSON HAD BEEN OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY SINCE 1922 TTOVPSWHEN HE ENTERED
THE PUBLIC HALLWAY.
HIS LOCATION WAS NOT KNOWN TO OPERATING MEMBERS UNTIL HE WAS
FOUND UNCONSCTOUSJUST TNSTDETHE FrRE APARTMENT AT 1943 HOURS.)
The Ladder Company 113 Officer exited the public hallway into stairway A. He was
a
unaware of the location of his Forcible Entry and Can Firefighters who had already exited the
public hallway via the stairway door labeled B on the 14thfloor. The Ladder Company 113
Officer called the Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry and Can Firefighters numeroustimes via
o
handie{alkie to come to the stairway.
At 1938:34 Battalion 41 who was in stairway A transmitted, "T13 Inside Team cotne on
out to the stairwell." There was no responseto this transmission. At 1938:52 Battalion 41
o
transmitted, "4T to 1I3 Inside Team. I want you outside the aparhnent." Ladder Company lL3
Officer answered, u70-4, I just made it to the stairway." (ruE errecK AND EVACUATIoN
STAIRWAYS WERE CONGESTED WITH MEMBERS. DUE TO MEMBERS EXITING THE FIRE FLOOR FROM
DIFFERENT STAIRWAYS THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF
o
Tr{E MEMBERS FROM LADDER COMPANY 113.)
At 1939 hours Division 15 attemptedto gain control of the handie-talkie traffic. He did
this in order to verifv if the member who was running out of air had been located. He
o
Page39 of 88
a
transmitted, "Cornmand, Command to all units. Hold yoar messages. Command to all anits,
hold your messages. Command to the 41. Do you have the guy who was running out of air?
Command to the 41. Do you have the guy that was ranning out of air K?" At the sametime
o
Battalion 41 and the Ladder Company 113 Officer were also trying to verify the same
information.
At 1940 hours Division 15 continuedhis efforts to contactBattalion 41 without success.
o
Battalion 41 transmitted, "All members stay off the radio. This is the 4I Battalion. 41 to II3
Irons."
The Ladder Company 113 Forcible Entry Firefighter transmitted, "IT3 Irons is OK in
the stairway." Ladder Company 113 Can Firefighter who had returned to the fire floor
transmitted, "773 Can, I'm OK. I'm doing a search of the hallway."
o
The Squad Company I Hook Firefighter returned to the fire apartment door and heard
water flowing.
He picked up the hoseline; the nozzle was open enough to cause it to start
whipping around. He pulled approximatelythree feet of hoseline toward him until he could hold
a
the nozzle. He briefly operatedthe nozzle from the fire apartmentdoorway into apartment 14M
and then shut down the nozzle. He started to bring the hoseline back to apartment 14L. The
Squad Company 1 Chauffeur met him about five feet from apartment 14M and told him that
there was no fire in apartment I4L. The Squad Company 1 Hook Firefighter felt a blast of heat
o
on his back and then turned the hoseline toward apartment 14M. The Squad Company 1
Chauffeur backed him up as he advancedthe nozzle back to the fire apartment and operatedthe
hoselinefrom the apartmentdoor.
At l94l
o
hours Battalion 41 contacted Division 15 and stated, "I got all members
accountedfor at this time. All membersof 113 Truck &re accountedfor."
Battalion 37, the Safety Officer, arrived on the 13thfloor and was advisedby membersof
Engine Company 249 that their Officer and Control Firefighter were still on the fire floor.
Battalion 37 attemptedto contact the Engine Company 249 Offrcer via handie-talkie at 1941243.
There was no recordedresponsefrom Lieutenant John Martinson.
The Engine Company 249 Control Firefighter was still in the public hallway assistingon
the hoseline between apartment I4L and the fire apartment. Many members passedhim in the
public hallway in both directions. He was unsure of their identity. The hoseline was bowed at
the end of the public hallway near apartment 14N. The Engine Company 249 Control Firefighter
followed the hoseline to the end of the public hallway. He heard a handie-talkie transmission
that Engine Company 249 was being relieved by Engine Company 234. His vibralert activated
Page40 of 88
,
I
and he began to exit the public hallway by following the hoseline. He exited into the stairway
a
door labeled B on the 14thfloor.
Engine Company 234 was assignedby Battalion 41 to relieve Engine Company 249 on
the hoseline. Engine Company 234 membersbegan to advance into the public hallway from
stairway A toward the fire apartment. As the Engine Company 249 Control Firefighter was
o
exiting the public hallway he passed the members of Engine Company 234 following the
hoseline toward the fire apartment.
The Squad Company I Chauffeur relieved the Squad Company I Hook Firefighter and
o
assumedcontrol of the nozzle. The Squad Company 1 Hook Firefighter was exhausted,low on
air and proceededto exit. The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur remained on the hoseline in the
doorway of the fire apartment with his back against the door jamb. From this position he was
able to direct the hose streamtoward the bedroom.
o
The Squad Company 1 Roof Firefighter had set up for a possible life saving rope rescue
while in the living room of apartment 15M. He was located directly above the fire apartmentand
could hear water hitting the living room windows of apartment 14M. These windows were still
o
intact; he could seewater from the hose streambeing forced out of the window jambs and the air
conditioner sleeve. At 1942 hours the Squad Company I Roof Firefighter gave direction to the
membersoperating the hoseline in the fire apartmentby transmitting, "Alright, whoever wasjust
operating that line you were in the right apartment. You got to go to the bedroom to your lefi,
t
right when lou cotne through the door."
Engine Company 248, with the assistanceof two members of Engine Company 219, the
CFR-D Unit, continued to stretch their hoselineto the 15thfloor. Engine Company 280 members
I
stood fast with a dry hoseline.
At l942zl9 Battalion 41 attempted to contact Lieutenant John Martinson via handietalkie, $47 to 249." At l942z2l Battalion 41 transmittedvia handie-talkie, "I got 234 coming in
o
to take over your line." There was no recordedresponseto either transmissionfrom Lieutenant
John Martinson.
Ladder Company 132 Officer, who had been searching the opposite end of the public
hallway advancedtoward the fire apartment.
o
Command contacted the Squad Company I Roof Firefighter in apartment l5M to
determine if fire had extended into that apartmentand if a hoseline was in position. The Squad
Company I Roof Firefighter respondedthat one pane of the double pane bedroom window in
o
Page41 of88
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apartment 15M was failing. Engine Company 248's hoselinewas still in the processof being
stretched.
The Squad Company I Chauffeur started advancing the nozzle into the fire apartment
a
when he noticed the reflective stripes of a bunker coat on the floor in front of him. Squad
Company 1 Chauffeur shut down the nozzle and at l943zl2 transmitted,"member down,,'
Lieutenant John Martinson was found approximatelythree feet inside the apartmentlying
o
on his right side with his head toward the kitchen and his feet toward the bedroom. Lieutenant
John Martinson was unconsciouswith his helmet and SCBA facepiece off. There was no air
escapingfrom his SCBA. The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur rolled Lieutenant John Martinson to
a supine position. Battalion 41 transmittedat 1943:18, "Is there a MAYDAY in there?" At
o
1943223Battalion 41 transmitted,"Did anyone gtve a MAYDAY?"
o
a
O
Red lines indicates fire area
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LieutenantJohn Martinson
SquadCompany1 Chauffeur
EngineCompany234 Back-Up
o
LadderCompany132Officer
Diagram 9
Location of Lieutenant John Martinson When Found in the Fire Apartment
Page42 of 88
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The Engine Company 234 Back-Up Firefighter followed the hoseline through the heavy
o
smoke condition into the fire apartment. He physically bumped into the Squad Company I
Chauffeur just after the "member down" messagewas transmitted. The Engine Company 234
Back-Up Firefighter began to assist with the removal of Lieutenant John Martinson from the
apartment.At 1943:31he transmitted,"MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, Engine 234 Back-Up
o
to Command, MAYDAY.
We got a member down."
(NoNn oF THEMEMBERS
INTERVIEwED
REPORTED BEING AWARE OF THE ACTIVATION OF LIEUTENANT JOHN MARTINSON'S PASS ALARM.
HOWEVER, TTIE BATTALION HANDIE-TALKIE RECORDINGS REVEALED A PASS ALARM SOUNDING IN
o
THE BACKGROUND DURING THIS MAYDAY TRANSMISSION.)
The Engine Company 234 Back-Up Firefighter moved to the other side of Lieutenant
John Martinson and grabbedhis legs. He noticed that Lieutenant John Martinson did not have a
helmet, SCBA facepiece or gloves on.
o
The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur and the Engine
Company 234 Back-Up Firefighter moved Lieutenant John Martinson to a seated position,
pivoted him so that his back was toward the apartmentdoorway and lowered his upper body out
of the door into the public hallway.
I
The Ladder Company 132 Officer was in the public hallway at the apartmentdoor when
he heard the Engine Company 234 Back-Up Firefighter give the MAYDAY transmission. The
Ladder Company I32 Offrcer assisted in removing Lieutenant John Martinson from the fire
apartment into the public hallway. There continued to be a high heat condition at the fire
t
apartment door. As Lieutenant John Martinson was being removed, the Engine Company 234
Back-Up Firefighter took control of the nozzle and protectedthe members removing Lieutenant
John Martinson by operating the hoseline in the fire apartment. The Ladder Company 123 Carr
I
and the SquadCompany I Forcible Entry Firefighters quickly moved to this location and assisted
with the removal of Lieutenant John Martinson.
Battalion 4l activatedthe FAST Unit, Ladder Company T23. The membersof Ladder
o
Company I23 had already moved to the 14thfloor and were assisting the distressedmembers.
Ladder Company 111 membersleft the 15thfloor and proceededto the 14thfloor when they
heardthe MAYDAY transmission.
At1944 hours the LadderCompany 113 Officer contactedthe Ladder Company 113 Can
c
Firefighter and asked if he gave a MAYDAY.
responded that he did not give a MAYDAY.
The Ladder Company 113 Can Firefighter
At 1944239 the Safety Officer, Battalion 37
transmitted to Command, "We're missing the Offtcer of 249..."
o
Pase43 of 88
(rHrs ts rHE FIRST
O
TRANSMISSION INDICATING THAT LIEUTENANTJOHN MARTINSON WAS UNACCOUNTED TON.) A fCW
secondslater Battalion 37 transmitted via handie-talkie that the Engine Company 249 Control
o
Firefighterwas also missing.
At approximately 1945 hours the Ladder Company I32 Officer, the Squad Company 1
Chauffeur, the Squad Company I Forcible Entry Firefighter and the Ladder Company 123 Can
Firefighter continued to work on the removal of Lieutenant John Martinson. Lieutenant John
a
Martinson's SCBA and bunker coat were loose which interfered with his removal. They
removed his SCBA and left it in the public hallway near the fire apartment. In the attempt to
carry Lieutenant John Martinson his bunker coat was unintentionally pulled off.
The Ladder Company 111 Officer and Forcible Entry Firefighter advanceddown the
o
public hallway and encountered the members working on the removal of Lieutenant John
Martinson. The Ladder Company I23 Can Firefighter grabbedLieutenant John Martinson's feet.
The Squad Company 1 Chauffeur and the Squad Company 1 Forcible Entry Firefighter had
o
Lieutenant John Martinson by the arms. They carried him face-down toward the stairway door
labeled B on the 14thfloor. Severalother membersassistedin the removal by clearing the public
hallway.
The Engine Company 234Back-Up Firefighter operatedthe hoseline during the removal
a
of Lieutenant John Martinson. He was unable to advancethe hoseline toward the bedroom fire
areaso he backed the hoseline out into the public hallway and closedthe apartmentdoor.
Lieutenant John Martinson was carried through the stairway door labeled B on the 14th
o
floor. The Squad Company 1 Officer made a rapid evaluationof LieutenantJohn Martinson's
condition and determined that he was unconsciousand not breathing. At l945t4l Battalion 37
transmitted,"MAYDAY is out on the B staircase on the 14h Jloor." Battalion 37 was unable to
identify the unconsciousmember.
o
At 1946:45 the SquadCompany 1 Officer transmitted,"Squad 1 to the 15. Unconscious
Firefighter coming down the stairs now, we need ALS on the l3th floor now." Division 15
replied, "Command 10-4, ALS is on the way up..."
Lieutenant John Martinson was moved to
a
the 13frfloor where Engine Company 219, the CFR-D Unit, was staged. The Engine Company
219 Control and Nozzle Firefighters immediately provided oxygen and started performing
patient assessmentas Paramedics from EMS Unit 3853 arrived on the 13fr floor.
EMS
Paramedicsperformed their initial assessmenton Lieutenant John Martinson and determinedthat
c
he was not breathing and had no pulse. The defibrillator could not be employed due to water
Page44 of 88
o
o
conditions in the public hallway. Lieutenant John Martinson was placed in the stokesbasket and
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chestcompressionswere initiated.
At 1948252the RescueBattalion transmitted, "One member is being worked on, in full
cardiac arrest on 73thfloor. EMS is with him now."
(Tun neNrITY oF THE uNCoNSCIous
MEMBER WAS NOT KNOWN TO MANY OF THE OPERATING MEMBERS.)
o
Lieutenant John Martinson, in the stokes basket, was moved to an elevator. Due to the
small dimensionsof the elevator, the stokesbasket had to be placed on an angle with one end of
it resting on the elevator wall. Chest compressionswere continued in the elevator en-routeto the
o
lobby. On arrival at the concourselevel at approximately 1952 hours, additional EMS members
and Firefighters assistedwith the care of Lieutenant John Martinson. Lieutenant John Martinson
was moved to an FDNY ambulancestagedon Bedford Avenue. Lieutenant John Martinson was
transportedto Kings County Hospital where he was pronounceddead at 2021 hours. The cause
o
of deathwas smoke inhalation and thermal burns.
While Lieutenant John Martinson was being taken out of the 14fr floor public hallway,
Engine Company 234 membersmaintained the fire apartmentdoor in the closed position. After
o
Lieutenant John Martinson was removed they opened the door and advanced into the fire
apartment.The Engine Company 234Nozzle Firefighter was now in control of the hoseline. The
Ladder Company 111 Inside Team, Rescue Company 2 Chauffeur, Roof, and Can Firefighters
were in the public hallway behind Engine Company 234. The membersfrom Ladder Company
o
111 and RescueCompany 2 enteredthe apartmentbehind Engine Company 234 and proceeded
to searchthe kitchen and living room.
Ladder Company 105 continued to searchthe floor above and assistedEngine Company
a
248 and SquadCompany 1 Roof in apartment 15M.
At 1947 hours the Engine Company 234 Nozzle Firefighter advanced the hoseline
toward the bedroom and directed the stream at the main body of fire. The Squad Company 1
o
Roof Firefighter transmitted a handie-talkie messageto Command from the apartmentabove the
fre, "...they're getting water on thefire now..." Ladder Company 11l and RescueCompany2
members continued their primary search of the fire apartment. Lieutenant John Martinson's
helmet was found behind the fire apartmentdoor by the RescueCompany 2 Can Firefighter.
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Division 15 requestedan additional FAST Unit to replace Ladder Company 123. At
1948 hours Ladder Company I22 was designatedthe additional FAST Unit.
a
Page45 of 88
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The use of the three stairways continued to add to the confusion. During the next several
minutes there were many handie-talkie transmissionsattempting to account for members. At
1949 hours and at 1951 hours Battalion 41 transmitted MAYDAY messagesin an artempr to
O
identify the missing member from Engine Company 249 (Lieutenant John Martinson).
Lieutenant John Martinson had already been removed. At l952z21-Battalion 38 transmitted via
handie-talkie that all members from Engine Company 249 were accountedfor. He also stated
O
that the Engine Company 249 Officer was under the care of EMS.
At approximately 1954 hours Car 13A arrived on the sceneand assumedcommand. At
1956 hours the Engine Company 234 Officer reported that the main body of fire in the fire
apartmenthad been extinguished. At lg57 hours Battalion 41 reported that the primary search
O
in the fire apartmentwas negative.
o
a
o
o
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Pase46 of 88
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o
V. FINDINGS
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1.
The Investigation Team was unable to account for Lieutenant John Martinson's actions
from the time he enteredthe public hallway on the 14ft floor at approximately 1922hours
immediately after his last transmissionat 1938 hours. When
until he lost consciousness
o
Lieutenant John Martinson was found unconscious in the fire apartment at 1943 hours
his:
I
o
o
Facepiecewas not on his face
o
Helmet was not on his head
o
Protectivehood was in a down position around his neck
o
Gloves were not on his hands
.
SCBA cylinder was depleted
The Investigation Team believes that Lieutenant John Martinson entered the fire
apartment to search prior to the flue like condition developing. He remained in the
apartment either trapped by these conditions or unaware of them. The kitchen, dining
o
area, and living room were not in the flue path and therefore not subject to the wind
intensified conditions. Lieutenant John Martinson remained in the apartmentuntil his air
supply was depleted. Then he removed his facepiece,made a handie-talkie transmission
and inhaled highly heated gases. These highly heated gasesclosed down his airway
t
which preventedhim from breathing causinghim to immediately lose consciousness.
2.
o
SCBA # 249-I worn by Lieutenant John Martinson was impounded by Safety Command
at the scene. This SCBA was a Scott 4.5 positive pressurebreathingapparatuswith a
CBRN EZ flow II regulator and a 45-minute cylinder. The facepiecebelongedto another
Officer assignedto Engine Company 249. MSU records indicate that both memberswere
fitted for the samesize facepiece.
o
This SCBA was testedon January 10, 2008 at MSU. The cylinder was empty at the time
of testing. The high pressurecoupling was found loose. The manual shut off switch was
in the off position. The HEADS-UP DISPLAY (HUD) wire was broken at the coupling.
o
The facepiecewas found with the nose cup right inhalation valve missing. The SCBA
and facepiecepassedScott Posicheck 3 testing at MSU. The HUD was not able to be
o
Page47 of 88
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tested due to the broken wire and therefore, considered "Failed" during the preliminary
visual inspection.
It is not known when the high pressurecoupling became loose or when the HUD wire
a
broke. The Investigation Team believes that the high pressurecoupling was not loose
when it was usedby LieutenantJohn Martinson. This conclusionis basedon the fact that
the SCBA lasted for approximately 17 minutes which would be unlikely if the high
o
pressurecoupling was loose during use. The 17 minute duration is estimatedfrom the
time Lieutenant John Martinson donned the SCBA facepiece to his handie-talkie
transmissionstatinghe was out of air. The SCBA, facepieceand cylinder were sent to
Intertek Testing Servicesfor independentanalysis. This independenttesting corroborated
a
the resultsobtainedat MSU.
On January3, 2008 at 1800hours this mask was inspectedas per roll call procedure. No
defects were noted. This inspection and the results are reflected in the 1800 hours
o
Company Journal entry made by Lieutenant John Martinson. The Investigation Team
concluded that Lieutenant John Martinson's SCBA. PASS. and End of Service Time
Indicators were all working properly while used at this fire.
a
a
J.
The Investigation Team examined the possibility that this may have been a wind driven
fire. The fire apartmentdoor remainedpartially open when the occupantsfled. Windows
in the bedroom of the fire apartment faced west and failed due to the heat prior to or
shortly after Fire Department arrival.
O
A northwest wind caused the products of
combustion to be driven through the fire apartment and into the public hallway. The
stairway doors were self closing which initially kept most of the smoke and heat in the
public hallway. The attack stairway bulkhead door was opened by civilians who fled to
I
the roof. The only element preventing a flue like situation at this point in the fire was the
closed attack stairway door on the 14fr floor. The advanceof the first hoseline into the
public hallway completed the path from the bedroom of the fire apartmentto the public
o
hallway into the attack stairs and to the attack stair bulkhead. This allowed the wind
gusts to intensify conditions at the apartmententranceand in the public hallway.
Members reported that conditions in the hallway varied from moderateheat to blistering
heat. Although the conditions in the hallway were severe at times, many effects that
a
would be expectedat a wind driven fire were not found at this fire:
Page48 of 88
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a
Numerous memberswere able to operatein the public hallway for the duration of
the fire
a
Plastic light fixtures and plastic covered wire raceways at the ceiling level were
intact in most of the public hallway
There was a lack of spalling in the public hallway
o
At times fire auto exposed the windows on the floor above cracking the outer
pane
The wind was not constant; at times it gusted and swirled throughout the H-shaped
o
conflgurationof the building. The fire at times was issuing out the windows with force.
At other times it was blowing into the windows. These facts led the Investigation Team
to conclude that this fire was impactedby the wind but not wind driven.
o
Note: The Departmentalong with Brooklyn Polytechnic University and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) is currently researching wind driven fires.
The
Departmentis currently conducting an ongoing pilot program, "'Wind Driven Fires" using
Positive PressureFans.Fire Window Blanketsand Hish-Rise Nozzles.
c
4.
Members did not recall hearing a PASS Alarm signal when Lieutenant John Martinson
was found. A review of the handie-talkie recordings indicates that a PASS Alarm was
soundingin the backgroundwhen the MAYDAY transmissionwas being made. PASS
o
Alarm signalsare cornmon occurrenceson the fireground and are sometimespurposely or
subconsciouslyignoredby members.
a
5.
The working and exit time of the SCBA dependson many factors. Cylinders rated to
provide 30,45 or 60 minutes do not provide this amount of time. The 45 minute rated
cylinders used at this fire lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes
o
6.
The first available elevator was used by Engine Company members only. The elevator
was small and only able to accommodatea maximum of five members. This prevented
the l't Engine Company and Ladder Company from complying with Firefighting
ProceduresMultiple Dwelling Fires section6.1.3F,which statesthat the elevatorshould
o
be sharedby both the Engine and Ladder Company members.
Page49 of 88
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7.
A Firemen Service elevator was brought to the fire floor and floor above during fire
operations. An elevator that serviced the fire floor was used during fire operations to
transport a civilian from the floor above the fire. These actions placed members and the
a
civilian in jeopardy.
8.
The l't and 2ndLadder Companiesoperatedelevatorsin Firemen Service for the duration
of the fire. A Firemen Service elevator was ordered to the 13mfloor to assist members
a
evacuating. This expeditedthe removal of LieutenantJohn Martinson.
9.
Some membersoperatedcontrary to Departmentpolices and procedures:
o
o
Members enteredan IDLH areato conduct a searchwithout being teamedup with
anothermember (All Unit Circular 329)
r
Members entered the smoke filled public hallway without a charged hoseline
o
(Firefighting ProceduresMultiple Dwelling Fires 6.2.1.A.2)
o
Some membersexiting the IDLH were not accompaniedto a safe areaby another
SCBA equippedmember(Training Bulletin SCBA 2.1.7, 3.6.2,All Unit Circular
220)
o
a
At least two members continued to operate in an IDLH atmosphereafter their
SCBA End of Service Indicators (HUD and vibralert) were activated. They
continued to operateuntil their cylinders were depleted
o
Two members removed their SCBA facepieces when their cylinders where
o
depleted instead of removing the regulator from the facepiece. The facepiece
with the regulator removed still provides physical protection to the member's face
o
and allows for rapid application of the FAST Pak regulator
o
A member shared his SCBA facepiece with a civilian during removal from the
floor above the fire. Facepiecesharing hampersthe search for an exit, increases
the exposureto airborne contaminantssuch as carbon monoxide, and depletesthe
limited air supply in less time, thus posing risk to both victim and rescuer
10.
The CFR-D Engine Company did not maintain unit integrity.
orderedby their Officer to assistanotherunit stretchinga hoseline.
o
Two members were
I
Page50 of 88
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,
a
11.
The 2nddue Engine Companyinitially assistedthe l't due Engine Company but did not
team up with them for the duration of the fire.
a
Some members of the 2"d Engine
Company stretched a second hoseline. According to Firefighting ProceduresMultiple
Dwelling Fires,the 3'd to arrive Engine is responsiblefor stretchingthe secondhoseline.
o
12.
There were delays and confusion accounting for membersoperating on the fire floor.
.
Officers must account for their members at all times. However. it was not
addressedin Department publications that Firefighters should also account for
their Officer
o
o
Roll call procedureswere not conducted in a timely fashion. Chief Officers were
unable to determinewhich memberswere reportedbeing out of air
o
a
The presence of the three stairways in conjunction with the heavy smoke
conditions added to the difficulty in accountability. Members operating in one
stairway were not aware of membersentering and exiting the other stairways
o
Members were not aware Lieutenant John Martinson was out of air; their focus
was drawn to anothermember known to be out of air and in need of assistance
o
o
There was difficulty in identifying Lieutenant John Martinson after he was
removed from the fire floor becausehe did not have on his helmet. bunker coat.
SCBA or Officer's shirt
o
13.
A member on the floor above the fire prepared for a life saving rope rescue. The life
saving rope was tied off to a substantial object and in position for deployment if
necessary.This member also gave clear and accuratereports from the apartment above
a
the fire.
t4.
After Lieutenant John Martinson was found, the Engine Company 234 Back-Up
Firefighter transmitted a clear and concise MAYDAY for a member down. He located
O
the nozzle and operatedthe hoseline to protect the members removing Lieutenant John
Martinson. After Lieutenant John Martinson was removed from the fire apartment the
Engine Company 234 Back-Up Firefighter backed the hoseline out of the apartmentand
o
closed the door. This improved the conditions in the hallway and allowed the other
members of Engine Company 234 to regroup and make an effective attack on the fire.
Page51 of88
I
Engine Company 234 remainedfocused on their extinguishment duties which expedited
the removal of Lieutenant John Martinson.
o
15.
After being discovered in apartment 14M Lieutenant John Martinson was quickly
removed from the IDLH. It took approximately four minutes to remove him from the fire
apartmentto the floor below. According to a December 2OO3Fire Engineering article,
"Rapid Intervention Isn't Rapid," by Steve Kreis, the averageremoval time of a downed
o
Firefighter is approximately 22 minutes.
Even with the rapid removal, the Medical Examiner stated that if Lieutenant John
Martinson had been intubated within one to two minutes after losing consciousness,he
o
still would have had significant complications and his survival would have been doubtful.
Nine minutes transpired from the time Lieutenant John Martinson lost consciousness
until he was removed to the 13thfloor. The Medical Examiner indicated this time frame
o
allowed no chancefor survival.
16.
During the fire operations at this incident, at least seven members reported that their
helmets were dislodged while operating. None of these members were wearing the
a
helmet chinstrap and their helmetswere completely dislodged.
I7.
Ventilation procedures at high-rise fireproof multiple dwelling fires need to be further
studied and evaluated. Fire Window Blankets may have had a positive effect on the
o
outcome of this fire. Fire Window Blankets were brought into the building but were not
in position to be deployed. At the time of the fire, Departmentproceduresdid not require
Fire Window Blankets to be brought abovethe fire at high-rise fires.
o
Note: The Department is currently conducting an ongoing pilot program, "Wind Driven
Fires" using PositivePressureFans,Fire Window Blanketsand High-RiseNozzles.
18.
The bulkhead door of the attack stairway was left open by civilians exiting to the roof.
I
This information was not relayed to the Incident Commanderby membersarriving at the
roof.
9.
Hoselines were stretched via the evacuation stairway. Once the attack stairway is
O
designated,all hoselinesshould be stretchedand operatedfrom this stairway.
Paee52 of 88
I
a
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20.
The in-line pressure gauge was placed on the standpipe outlet. It was not used to set
hoseline pressure or monitored during operations to ensure that proper pressure was
maintained.
o
2r.
Handie-talkie communicationsat the scenedid not give a clear and concise picture of fire
conditionsor the actionstakenby units.
o
Lieutenant
John
Martinson
failed
to
maintain
frequent
handie{alkie
communication with Command and other members operating. He did not make
o
an emergency notification until his air supply was depleted. Many Firefighters,
who are trapped, lost or out of air do not call for help in a timely manner. They
tend to try to resolve problems themselvesuntil it is too late to be rescuedwithout
o
seriousconsequences
o
Conditions that existed in the hallways, stairways, floor above and fire floor were
not communicated to Command. Knowledge of these conditions would have
given the Incident Commander better situational awareness and may have
o
prompted him to reevaluatehis strategyand tactics
o
The status of searcheson the fire floor and floors above were not communicated
to Command until later in the operation
o
o
The designationof the attack stairway was not transmitted on the handie-talkie to
units on the scene
o
Notification of the self evacuation of civilians to the roof and the additional
venting of the bulkhead doors by memberswere not communicatedto Command
a
o
First nameswere used by some membersin handie-talkie transmissionsinsteadof
unit designation with assignedpositions. Situational awarenesswill not be
conveyedto other memberswhen communications are conductedin this manner
o
o
A civilian was found and removed from the floor above without notifying
Command
o
22.
Many members operating at this fire were not equipped with an Emergency Alert Button
on the remote handie-talkie microphone.
Page53 of 88
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Note: All MX 3500 handie-talkieshave been equipped with an EmergencyAlert Button
on the remote microphone as of July 2008.
o
Members transmitting MAYDAY
or URGENT messagesdid not activate the
O
EmergencyAlert Button
o
Chief Officers attempting to gain control of the handie-talkienetwork did not use
the EmergencyAlert Button
23.
O
Progressreports were not transmitted to the Brooklyn Dispatcher in accordancewith the
CommunicationsManual.
24.
The incident duration times were not transmittedby the Brooklyn Dispatcheruntil late in
'
the operation.
25.
During critical stagesof the fire the Primary Tactical Channel becameoverwhelmed by
O
numeroustransmissions.
o
The Command Channel was not establisheduntil after the removal of Lieutenant
John Maninson
o
The Post Radio was not utilized until later in the operation
a
Note: Neither the Post Radio nor the Command Channel are required at operations in
high-rise fireproof multiple dwellings.
26.
Ladder Companies assignedon the 2"d alarm after a 10-17 signal are not automatically
O
selectedand dispatchedby the CADS. The Dispatchermust manually selectthese units.
This resultedin a delay of more than three minutes from the transmissionof the 2"d alarm
to the assignmentof the Ladder Companies. Although this had no impact on the outcome
of this incident this delav could be critical at future incidents.
27.
O
The Brooklyn Dispatcher notified Battalion 38 of phone calls from approximately 2O
apartmentsthroughout the building. Although no problems were reportedat this incident,
the potential for error is great when attempting to manually transcribe this amount of
O
information.
28.
The Battalion Handie-Talkie Recorder is a valuable investigative and educational tool.
Present technology only allows for a maximum of six handie{alkie identifiers to be
O
recordedfor eachrecordedsegment. Specific transmissionsare not definitively identified.
Page54 of 88
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29.
The early arrival of a Department photographergreatly assistedin the documentation of
unit operations and the subsequentinvestigation of this fire. The photographsprovided
o
time stampedpictures of interior and exterior operationsduring the fire.
30.
The Daily Chief Officer Scheduleat the start of the 6x9 tour was incorrect. This led the
1" arriving Battalion Chief to be unawarethat an Acting Battalion Chief (ABC) was the
I
All-Hands Chief.
31.
o
Stairways B and C were scissor type stairs. These stairways were mislabeled; the
stairway door labeling should have alternatedfrom floor to floor. The stairways should
be designated,not stairway doors. In this building, the stairway doors were labeled
vertically with the same letter above one another and did not reflect the proper stairway
a
designation.
o
o
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Page55 of 88
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VI. CAUSES
o
DIRECT CAUSES
1.
o
o
Smokeinhalationandthermalburns.
INDIRECT CAUSES
1.
Child playing with fire on kitchen stove.
)
Failure of occupantto fully close the apartmentdoor when exiting the apartment.
3.
Failure to team up with anothermember when entering an IDLH.
4.
Failure to leave the IDLH when the End of Service Time Indicators, HEADS-UP
DISPLAY (HUD) and vibralert activated.
BASIC CAUSES
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1.
Windsof 1l to 15milesperhourwith gustsup to 20 milesperhour.
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Page56 of 88
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
o
SncuoN A
1.
Proper SCBA usage must be strictly enforced. All Chief and Company Officers shall
take any and all measuresto ensure that the Department's SCBA policy (AUC 220) is
o
followed.
.
Leave the IDLH when the End of Service Time Indicators, (HUD and vibralert)
activate
o
a
e
Team up with other memberswhen entering, operatingin and leaving an IDLH
o
Prohibit facepiecesharing
o
Keeping the facepiece in place and removing the regulator when the SCBA air
supply has been exhaustedand the member is unable to exit the IDLH
2.
All members shall maintain an awarenessof other team membersduring operations. It is
inherent of the Company Officer's responsibility to be aware of the location and statusof
o
their members during fire operations. Members must also maintain awarenessof the
location and statusof their Officer.
o
a
J.
Re-emphasize the importance of the proper use of the firefighting helmet chin strap.
Failure to utilize the chin strap can result in serious consequenceswhich affects
operations as well as members' personal safety. When a helmet is lost or dislodged, the
member is at risk of serious injury and is no longer effective in conducting assigned
o
tasks. No member should enter or operatein an IDLH without a helmet.
4.
Re-emphasize the need for Engine Companies to team up for the duration of the
operation. This is needed for rapid placement of the hoseline, advancement of the
o
hoseline, and to ensurethat membersare readily available for relief.
5.
O
The Fire Department should continue to evaluatethe implementation of positive pressure
ventilation and the use of wind control devices as initial operational tactics for fires in
high-rise fireproof multiple dwellings.
Page57 of 88
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6.
Firefighting ProceduresMultiple Dwelling Fires, section 6, "Class A Fireproof Multiple
Dwelling Fires" shouldbe revisedand issuedas a separatevolume. A workgroup should
be formed to revise the document. The revision of this document should emphasizeand
o
expandon the following:
7.
o
Controlling the fire apartmentdoor
o
Control of ventilation by the Incident Commander
o
Strategiesand tacticsofventilation procedures
o
Elevator operations
o
Standpipeoperations
o
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A fire safety education campaign should be implemented to inform the public of the
importanceof closing the fire room door, as well as apartmentdoors, in caseof fire. The
fire safety education campaign should also emphasizethe importanceof not disabling or
a
obstructing the self closing devices on apartment doors. This information could be
provided to the public through the Fire Safety Education Unit as well as the FDNY public
website. The FDNY should encourageother public and private agencies,such as the
New York City Housing Authority and Con Edison, to participate in this fire safety
o
educationcampaign.
8.
Establish a Command Channel whenever a 10-77 signal is transmitted. This will
o
alleviate handie-talkie traffic on the Primary Tactical Channel and will improve overall
communications. The Post Radio should be utilized as soon as possibleto provide an
improved communicationslink betweenthe Command Post and the OperationsPost.
9.
o
Emphasizethe importance of maintaining radio discipline during MAYDAYruRGENT
situations. All handie-talkie transmissions should cease, except those related to the
MAYDAYruRGENT
10.
or critical information related to the fire.
a
Re-emphasizeto all members that handie-talkie transmissions should be concise and
direct. Transmissionsmust be made using unit designationand assignedposition, not the
member's name
Page58 of 88
c
!
11.
Train all members to be proficient in roll call proceduresas per CommunicationsManual
Chapter9, Addendum2,"Emergency Roll Call Procedures."
o
SncrroNB
Although the following did not have an impact on this incident, the Department should consider
o
theserecommendationsto improve safety and efficiency at future operations:
12,
The Dispatcher should relay important information such as numerous apartments with
occupantsin distressto the Incident Commander via the MDT as well as the Department
o
radio. The printed copy from the MDT will ensurethe accuracyof this information.
13.
Emphasize the importance of reacting to a PASS Alarm signal sounding during
operations. When a PASS Alarm is activated in the full cycle for ten seconds, the
o
member hearing the alarm should immediately notify the Incident Commander. An
immediate investigation of the alarm must be made to determinethe cause. The results of
the investigation must be transmitted to the Incident Commander as soon as possible.
o
PASS Alarm signals have become so common during routine operations on the
fireground that many members have a tendency not to hear them and/or disregard them.
Researchthe feasibility of developing other PASS Alarm signals such as using verbal
unit designations.
o
14.
The CADS should reflect when a Division or Battalion is staffed by an Acting Chief. For
example, the Acting Battalion Chief, Battalion 99, could be indicated on the response
o
ticket as ABC99 insteadof BC99.
15.
o
Ensure scissor stairs are properly labeled whenever inspecting or operating in buildings
serviced by scissor stairs. Mislabeled scissor stairs can cause confusion during fire
operations. This information should be relayed to the Incident Commander as soon as it
is discovered.
o
o
Detailed information on scissor stairs should be incorporated into Firefighting
P rocedures "Fireproof Multiple Dwellings"
Page59 of 88
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The labeling of scissor stairs should be included on the Multiple Dwelling
Building Inspection Form A-291and Inspection Guide 3 for Fireproof Multiple
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Dwellings
16.
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Corrective action must be taken wheneverscissorstairs are improperly labeled
o
Scissorstairsshouldbe includedin the CIDS information
Establisha training program to visit field units to review and discussthe findings and
o
recommendationsfound in Fatal Fire Investigations.
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Paee60 of 88
D
V[I. CHRONOLOGICALFIRE DBPARIN4ENT
I
o
(P)
Time taken from the Incident Historv Printout
(HT)
Handie-Talkie Recorder
(AV)
Time taken from Audio Video Tapes
(E)
Estimatedtime of events and interviews
o
1,9:L4Hours
o
1 9 : 1 4( P)
Office of the New York City Fire Department
The BrooklynCommunications
receiveda telephonecall reportinga fire in apartment14M on the 14'nfloor at 1700
BedfordAvenue.
19:15Hours
o
1 9 : 1 5( P )
Officetransmitted
Box3762. Thefollowingunitswere
TheBrooklynCommunications
-234,
L-l 13,L- 132andBC-38.
: E-249,E-280,E
dispatched
E-234acknowledged
via MDT.
via ATS.
E-280andL-132acknowledeed
o
L9:L6Hours
o
l 9 : 1 6( P )
via ATS.
E-249,L-l13 andB-38acknowledged
1 9 : 1 6( E )
to the reportedlocationfrom the quartersof E-280.
Sq-l proceeded
o
L9:L7Hours
1 9 : 1 7( AV )
DispatchernotifiedB-38 of a 2ndsourcereportingsmokeon the 14floor.
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19:18Hours
19:18(AV)
Dispatchernotified B-38 of an additionalcall reportingsmokein apartment14A.
Page61 of88
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1 9 : 1 8( P )
E-249andL-113transmitted
a 10-84via MDT.
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1 9 : 1 8( E )
Membersof E-249andL-I13 proceeded
to theconcourse
levelof 1700Bedford
Avenue.
o
19:19Hours
1 9 : 1 9( P)
E-280andL-132rransmifted
a 10-84via MDT.
1 9 : 1 9( E)
Membersof E-280 andL-I32 proceeded
to the concourselevel of 1700Bedford
Avenue.
a
o
19:20Hours
19:20(P)
B-38 and E-234 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
I9:2O(E)
SQ-l arrivedon the scene.(NOT ASSIGNED YET)
E-249 membersarrived in lobbv of 1700 Bedford Avenue and took the first elevatorto
the l2th floor.
L-113 membersarrivedin lobby of 1700Bedford Avenue and took the second
elevator to the 12mfloor.
E-249 membersexited the elevatoron the 12thfloor and proceededvia the A
stairwayto the 13thand 14thfloors.
l9z2l Hours
19:21(HT)
Lieutenant John Martinson transmitted to B-38 from the A stairway, "You can give a 1075; we've got a heavy smokecondition on the 14frfloor."
L-I32 Officer reporteda heavy wind condition to B-38, while he was on the concourse
level.
19:21(P)
B-38 transmitteda l0-75 on the Departmentradio.
The following units were assigned:Sq-l(alreadyon scene),E-248,L-123 (FAST Unit),
R-2 andB-41.
Page62 of 88
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19:21(E)
L-Il3Inside Team and Roof Firefighter exited the elevator on the 12ft floor and
proceededup the A stairwaY.
L-ll3 Outside Ventilation Firefighter remainedwith the elevator in Firemen Service.
Engine 249 membersbegan flaking out their lengths of hose on the 13'nfloor and
connecting to the 13* floor standpipeoutlet in the A stairway.
L-I3zlnside Team and Outside Ventilation Firefighter enteredthe lobby.
o
19:22 Hours
o
19:22 (P)
E-248,8-41,L-123, and R-2 acknowledgedvia MDT.
D-15 was assignedto incident from the quartersof E-332.
o
19:22 (HT)
B-38 called LieutenantJohn Martinson to verify the CIDS information and the attack
stairway.
LieutenantJohn Martinsonreplied,"10-4 Chief."
o
19:22 (E)
Lieutenant John Martinson donnedhis SCBA facepieceand enteredthe hallway on the
14thfloor.
L-113 Inside Team arrivedin the A stairwavbetweenthe 13ft and 14thfloors.
1.9:23Hours
o
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19:23(AV)
Battalion 38 transmitteda 10-17 to the Brooklyn Dispatcher and reportedthe A stairway
as the attack stairwav.
19:23 (E)
L-tI3Inside Team enteredthe l4th floor hallway from the A stairway and begantheir
searchto the left.
L-1 13 Roof Firefighter continued up the A stairway to the 15thfloor.
E-280 membersarrivedon 13mfloor and beganassistingE-249 with their hoseline.
E-280 Control Firefighter flushed out the standpipeoutlet on the 12'nfloor.
o
19:24 Hours
o
1924 (P)
The following units were dispatched:
L-105, L-111, BC-48,BC-37(SafetyOfficer),SB-1,FC-1,RB-l andE-219 (CFRD
Engine)
via ATS.
SB-1,L-105,RB-l E-21g,L-Ll1andFC-l acknowledged
via MDT'
B-37 acknowledged
Page63 of 88
e
19:24 (HT)
LieutenantJohn Martinsontransmitted,"charge the line in the ..."
Note: Members heard this transmissionas chargethe line in the stairway.
E-249 Control Firefighteranswered,"I0-4,I'm chargingthe line."
19:24 (E)
E-249's hoselinewas connectedto the standpipeoutlet on the 13thfloor and flaked
out in the 13thfloor hallway.
L-Il3 Officer and Can Firefighter turned left and proceededdown the deadend hallway
toapartmentsJ&K.
L-l13 Forcible Entry Firefighterproceededdown the hallway to the stairwaydoor
marked B.
L-l3zlnside Team enteredthe 14thfloor hallway from the A stair and began
searchingto the right.
L-Il3 Chauffeur proceededup the B stairway to the roof.
L-I32 OutsideVentilationFirefightermanneda secondelevatorand operatedit in
FiremenService.
Sq-1 Chauffeur saw flaming debris in the courtyard and fire out two windows on the 14th
floor.
Two membersof E-280 startedstretching a secondhoselinefrom the 12thfloor standpipe
outlet in the A stairway.
O
O
O
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L9:25Hours
19:25(HT)
LieutenantJohnMartinsoncalledhis NozzleFirefiehter. "249 to Nozzle."
19:25(AV)
B-38 transmittedpreliminaryreportto BrooklynDispatcher.
19:25(E)
Sq-1ForcibleEntryTeamenteredthe 14thfloor hallway.
E-249NozzleandBack-UpFirefightersswitchedpositionsandadvancedthehoseline
into the 14thfloor hallwav.
a
o
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19:26Hours
(P)
1,9:26
L-123,8-248andB-41transmitted
10-84via MDT.
19:26(HT)
B-38 askedLieutenantJohnMartinson,"Did we find the fire apartmentyet?"
LieutenantJohnMartinsonanswered,
"Negative."
BC-38directedLieutenantJohnMartinsonto the M apartment.
Lieutenant
JohnMartinsonanswered,
"10-4Chief."
E-249ControlFirefightermadetwo attemptsto answerLieutenantJohnMartinson'scall
to the NozzleFirefighter.(Therewasno responsefrom LieutenantJohnMartinson.)
Page64 of 88
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19:26(E)
E-234 membersarrived on the 13tnfloor and assistedE-249with their chargedhoseline.
R-2 arrived on the scene.
19:27 Hours
o
o
o
o
o
o
19:27 (P)
BC-48 reported not available due to operating at anotherBox.
D-15 acknowledeed18332RSEP.
19:27 (HT)
E-249 Back-Up Firefighter transmitted,"Lighten up on the first line."
E-249 ECC supplied water to the standpipesiameseand notifiedE-249 Officer and B-38.
B-38 acknowledgedthis transmission.(LieutenantJohn Martinsondid not acknowledge.)
L-113 Officer reported,"'We're making our way down the hallway now..."
B-38 asked,"Did we find the apartmentyet?"
L-113 Officer answered,"NegativeChief."
B-38 warnedunits aboutthe wind condition.
Sq- 1 Officer told E-249 to, "Hold up on bringing that line in. 132, 113 did not find the
fire apartmentyet."
19:21 (E)
BC-38 took a position on the concourselevel by the securityshack.
E-249's hoselinewas advancedto the hallway intersection.
Sq-1 Roof Firefightercontinuedup the A stairwayto the 15'hfloor.
19:28 Hours
19:28(P)
B-44 assignedto replaceB-48.
B-44 acknowledged.
L-105 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
19:28(HT)
E-234Officer directedhis membersto, "Get thatline up here. They still haven'tfound
it yet."
G
o
19:28(E)
E-249Back-UpandNozzleFirefightersadvancedthe hoselineto the L apartmentdoor.
L9:29Hours
19:29(P)
E-219transmitreda 10-84via MDT.
o
19:29(HT)
L-113 Officer reported,"We're in the apartment;we're looking for the fire."
B-38 reportedfire out the windows on the l4th floor.
o
19:29 (E)
L-l32Inside Team continued to searchthe right side of the 14thfloor hall.
E-249 advancedthe hose line to the M apartmentdoor.
19:30 Hours
o
19:30(HT)
E-234 Officer reported to all units from apartment 13K that the fire is in 14K.
B-41 reportedto the B-38 that he is making his way upstairs.
B-38 gavea run down to B-41 of units operatingin the building.
o
l9:30 (E)
Sq-1 ChauffeurenteredapartmentL on the 13thfloor. He looked out the window and
believed the fire was in the L apartmentdirectly above him.
E-280 stoodfast in the A stairwaywith a secondhoseline(Uncharged).
E-234 in stairwavA assistedE-249 with stretchof first hoseline.
o
19:31Hours
1 9 : 3 1( P )
L-l11 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
19:31(HT)
Sq-1 Roof Firefighter reportedto Command from apartment15M that the fire was right
below him in apartment 14M.
B-38 designatedB-41 as the fire floor Chief and notified B-41 thatL-123, the FAST
UNIT. was sent to the floor below the fire.
B-41 reportedthat, "We're startingto move now."
1 9 : 3 1( E )
L-132 Roof Firefighter removed a girl from the smoke condition in her apartmenton the
15ftfloor.
E-248 enteredthe elevator en-routeto 12thfloor.
L-113 Chauffeurascendedthe B stairwayto the roof.
L-I32 Chauffeur ascendedthe B stairwav to the roof.
19:32 Hours
19:32(HT)
L-105 reportedto B-38 that they were on the sceneat the concourselevel.
L-l11 reportedto B-38 that they were on the sceneen-routeto the concourselevel.
Sq-1 Roof Firefighter requesteda hoselineor a can in apartment15 M due to fire starting
to come thru an air conditioner sleeve.
Page66 of 88
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19:32(E)
E-249 membersadvancedtheir hoselineinto the door of the fire apartmentand operated
into the apartment.
E-249 Back-Up Firefighter operatedthe hoselineinto the living room area.
L-113 Officer operatedbehind theE-249 Back-Up Firefighter.
E-249 Nozzle Firefighter was on the hoselinejust outside the fire apartmentdoor.
L-ll3 Forcible Entry Firefighter and L-113 Can Firefighterwere in the public hallway
outside of the fire apartmentdoor.
E-249 Door Firefighter lost his helmet and exited the public hallway.
E-249 Control Firefighter assistedstretchingthe hoseline in the public hallway.
19:33 Hours
19:33(P)
D-15 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
a
a
a
19:33(HT)
o'Commandto Engine249."
B-38 called LieutenantJohn Martinson,
LieutenantJohn Martinson's Handie{alkie was keyed. (Therewas no recorded
transmissionon any Battalion Handie-Talkie Recorder.)
B-38 Firefighter reported to B-38 that they received multiple calls from apartments
throughout the building.
L-132 Roof Firefighter reportedthat he neededan ambulancein the lobby for the injured
girl he removed from the 15'nfloor.
19:33(E)
E-219 (CFR-D Engine) enteredthe lobby and treatedthe injured girl.
L-I23 arrived on 13tnfloor and stood fast.
L9:34 Hours
o
l9:34 (P)
B-37 transmitted10-84via MDT.
19:34(HT)
Sq-1 Roof Firefighter againrequesteda hoselinein apartment15 M.
o
o
19:34 (E)
E-249 Back-Up Firefighter operatedhoseline straight in about four to six feet into the
apartment.
L-1 13 Officer repositionedhimself to the left of the nozzle.
E-249 Nozzle Firefighter moved up on the hoselineto about three feet inside the fire
apartmentdoor.
L-l13 Forcible Entry Firefighter operatedjust inside the fire apartmentdoor.
L-ll3 Can Firefighter operatedjust outsidethe fire apartmentdoor.
B-38 assignedL-105 and L-l11 to work abovethe fire.
Page67 of 88
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19:35 Hours
19:35(P)
2"d alarmtransmittedby B-38.
The following unitswere assigned:E-235,8-zz0,E-2r4,8-207, st-6, RA-2, TS-2,E240 andB-57
B-44 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
FC-1 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
19:35(HT)
L-ll3 Officer called L-113 ForcibleEntry Firefighterand asked,"Are you OK?"
L-lI3 Forcible Entry Firefighter responded,"Yeah, I'm running out of air,
(unintelligible)up here."
L-II3 Officer transmitted,"Il3 to Irons and Can. Back out, we're running out of..."
19:35(E)
E-249 Back-Up Firefighter operatedhoselinetoward the bedroom fire area.
L-105 Inside Team startedsearchingthe A stairway from the floor aboveto the roof.
L-105 OutsideTeam startedsearchingthe B and C stairway from the floor aboveto the
roof.
Sq-1 Hook Firefighter went to the M apartmentto get the hoseline.
19:36 Hours
o
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o
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C
19:36(P)
TS-2,RA-2, E-214,824O,8-235,8-220,E-207and 5T-6 acknowledged
via ATS.
B-57 acknowledsedvia the MDT.
19:36(E)
L-l13 ForcibleEntry Firefighterran out of air at the apartmentdoor, removedhis SCBA
facepieceand called for help in the hallway.
L-II3 Can FirefighterassistedL-113 ForcibleEntry Firefighterto the B stairway.
L-113 Officer's helmet,SCBA facepiece,flashlight and camerawere dislodgedby the
hose stream.
E-249 Back-Up Firefighter, after shutting down the nozzle,quickly exited the fire
apartment.
L-Il3 Officer quickly exited the fire apartment.
E-249 Nozzle Firefighterwas knockedover by E-249 Back-Up Firefighterand L-1 13
Officer as they exited the apartment.
L-II3 Officer andB-249 Back-Up Firefighter exited via the public hallway.
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19:37 Hours
19:37(P)
B-57 designatedResourceUnit Leader.
B-48 was assisned.
Page68 of 88
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19:37(HT)
L-l 13 Forcible Entry and Can Firefighters were in the 13tnfloor stairway.
B-41 transmittedan URGENT messagefrom the A stairway, "I got a guy screaminghe's
got no air. I just sentRescuein to find him."
D-15 tried to verify from the B-41 the locationof the memberwho was running out of
air.
O
19:31(E)
E-248membersbeganstretchinga third hoselinefrom the 1l'h floor standpipeoutletto
o
a
apartment 15 M.
E-249 Back-Up Firefighter followed the hoselineout to the A stairway.
E-249 Nozzle Firefighter readjustedhis PPE at the end of the hallway then followed the
hoseline out to the A stairway.
E-249 Door Firefighter moved up on the hoselineto the fire apartmentdoor. His
vibralert activated and he startedto follow the hoselineout to the A stairway.
Sq-l Chauffeurforced the door to apartmentL on the l4s floor.
E-219,CFR-D Unit, arrived on the 13'nfloor.
E-234 was in the A stairwaybetweenthe 13thand 14thfloors.
E-280 continuedto standfast with an uncharsedhoseline.
19:38 Hours
a
I
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19:38(P)
MK-1, L-157 andL-120 were assigned.
L-l51 acknowledeedvia MDT.
19:38(HT)
LieutenantJohn Martinson transmitted.*249's out of air.249's out of air."
L-Il3 Officer called his Forcible Entry and Can Firefighters back to the stairway.
D-15 attemptedto contactthe B-41 a secondtime.
B-41 directedL-l13 Inside Team back to the stairway.
L-113 Officer answered,"IO-4,I just madeit to the stairway."
l 9 : 3 8( E )
E-249 Back-Up Firefighter exited the A stairway to the 13'nfloor.
19:39 Hours
19:39(P)
L-I20, MK-l acknowledgedvia ATS.
E-33 andHR-l assiened.
o
19:39(HT)
D-l5 attemptedto verify from B-41 if the memberrunning out of air was accountedfor.
D-15 told all units to hold up on their radio transmissions.
o
19:39(E)
L-105 Chauffeurarrivedat the roof level.
E-249 Nozzle Firefighter exited the A stairway to the 13thfloor.
o
19:40 Hours
19:40(HT)
D-15 continuedto try to contactB-41.
B-41 transmitted,"All membersstay off the radio. This is the 41 Battalion. 4l to lI3
Irons."
L- 113 ForcibleEntry Firefightertransmitted, "II3 Irons is OK in the stairway."
L-1 13 Can Firefightertransmitted,"113 Can, I'm OK. I'm doing a searchof the
hallway."
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19:40(E)
E-249 Door Firefighter exited the A stairway to the 13thfloor.
SQ-1 Hook Firefighter advancedto the fire apartmentdoor.
o
19:41Hours
19:41(P)
E-235,RB-1 andE-2L4transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
19:41(HT)
B-41 contactedD-15 and stated,"I got all membersaccountedfor at this time. All
membersof 113Truck are accountedfor."
D-15 transmitted,"Command, 10-4.How you doing as far as the line goesK?"
B-41 responded,o'Itah, hasn't hit the fire yet."
B-37 calledE-249 LieutenantJohn Martinson."Battalion 37 to Ensine 249."
19:41(E)
E-234 was assignedby the B-41 to relieveE-249 on the hoseline.
E-249 Control Firefighter followed the hoselinepast the fire apartmentto the end of the
hallway.
SQ-1 Chauffeur relieved SQ-1 Hook Firefighter and operatedthe nozzle from the door of
the fire apartment.
E-234 membersadvanceddown the hallway to fire apartment.
E-249 Control Firefighter, who was at the dead end of the hallway, followed the hoseline
out after his vibralert activated.
o
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1941(AV)
The Brooklyn CommunicationsOffice requesteda ProgressReport.
L9:42Hours
19:42(P)
E-24OandB-57transmitred
a 10-84via MDT.
Page70 of 88
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19:42 (HT)
B-41 called E-249 LieutenantJohn Martinson,"41 to249."
B-41 transmitted,"I got234 coming in to take over your line."
19:42 (E)
L-132 Officer advanceddown hallway to fire apartmentdoor.
t
L9:43 Hours
19:43(P)
L-157 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
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19:43(HT)
SQ- 1 Chauffeur transmitted, ". . .member down."
B-41 tried to ascertainif someonetransmitteda MAYDAY on the fire floor.
E-234 Back-Up Firefightertransmitted,"MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY. Engine
234 Back-Up to Command, MAYDAY. We got a member down."
19:43 (E)
SQ-l Chauffeur Firefighter while operating nozzle from the fire apartmentdoor noticed
the reflective stripes on Lieutenant John Martinson's bunker gear. He shut down the
nozzle and transmitted,". ..member down". He rolled Lieutenant John Martinson to the
supineposition. LieutenantJohn Martinsonwas unconscious.
E-234 Back-Up Firefighter followed the hoselineinto the fire apartmentand bumped into
SQ-1 Chauffeurjust as he found Lieutenant John Martinson. He transmitted a
MAYDAY and assistedin removing LieutenantJohn Martinson from the fire apartment.
L-132 Officer assistedin removing Lieutenant John Martinson from the fire apartment
into the hallwav.
19:44 Hours
o
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19:44(AY)
Brooklyn Dispatcherreported phone calls from approximately 2O apartments.
19:44 (HT)
L-l13 Officer contactedL-lI3 Can Firefighterand askedif he gave a MAYDAY.
L-II3 Can Firefighter responded,"Negative."
B-37 reported to Command that E-249 Officer and Control Firefighter were missing.
19:44 (E)
E-249 Control Firefighter exited the B door to the stairway to the 13thfloor.
E-234 Back-Up Firefighter picked up the nozzle and operatedinto the fire apartment.
SQ-1 Chauffeurand SQ-l Forcible Entry Firefighterhad LieutenantJohn Martinson's
arms. L-I23 Can Firefighter had Lieutenant John Martinson's feet.
L-132 Officer and other membershelped remove LieutenantJohn Martinson down the
hallway toward the B stairway.
Page71 of88
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19:45 Hours
19:45(P)
E-239 andB-207transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
a
19:45(HT)
B-37 reported,"...we have one downedFirefighterbeing removed."
19:45(E)
Lieutenant John Martinson was carried out of the 14 floor hallway into the B stairway
where his condition was evaluatedby the SQ-l Officer and other members. Lieutenant
John Matinson was not breathing.
L-132 Outside Ventilation Firefighter brought the elevator to the 13thfloor when he heard
the MAYDAY transmission.
R-2 Chauffeur and E-234 Officer helped clear the hallway for removal of
Lieutenant John Martinson.
E-234 Back-Up Firefighter backed out of the fire apartmentand closed the door.
L-111 Inside Team advanceddown the 14tnfloor hallway toward the fire apartmentand
encounteredmembersremovins Lieutenant John Martinson.
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1,9:46Hours
l9:46 (P)
L-lzO transmitted a 10-84 via MDT.
19:46(HT)
SQ-1 Officer transmitted,"IJnconsciousFirefightercoming down the stairsnow. We
needALS on the 13thfloor now."
19:46(E)
Lieutenant John Martinson was carried down the B stairway to the 13thfloor.
E-2I9 Control and Nozzle Firefighters began performing patient assessmenton
Lieutenant John Martinson.
EMS 3853 Paramedicsarrived on the 13ft floor and observedLieutenant John
being placed on the floor in elevator lobby.
L-105 InsideTeam continuedto searchon the 15ft floor.
E-234 membersreopenedfire apartmentdoor and advancedthe hoselineinto the fire
apartment.
L-111 InsideTeam advancedinto the fire apartmentbehindE-234 members.
R-2 Chauffeur and Can Firefighter also advancedinto the fire apartment.
1946(AV)
The Brooklyn CommunicationsOffice requesteda ProgressReport.
19:47 Hours
19:47(4tY)
D-15 requestedan additional Fast Unit.
Page72 of 88
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19:47 (P)
B-48 transmitteda 10-84via MDT.
L-I22 was assigned.
19:47 (HT)
SQ-1 Roof Firefighter reported from apartment 15M that water was on the fire now.
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19:47 (E)
E-234 membersadvancedtheir hoseline into the bedroom fire area.
L-l 11 Inside Team conductedprimary searchof the fire apartmentkitchen and living
room.
19:48 Hours
19:48G)
L-I22 designatedadditionalFast Unit.
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19:48(HT)
RB-l transmitted, "One member is being worked on, in full cardiac arrest on 13thfloor.
EMS is with him now."
19:48(E)
Lieutenant John Martinson was moved to a dry areaon the 13 floor, placed into a stokes
basketand treatedby EMS 3853 Paramedics.
E-248 arrived at apartment 15M with a dry hoseline.
E-234 Door Firefighter took over the nozzle position and continued to operatethe
hoselineinto bedroom fire area.
o
19:49 Hours
o
19:49(HT)
B-41 transmitted a MAYDAY for anothermissing member fromB-249.
19:49 (E)
Lieutenant John Martinson was placed in the elevator at an angle in a stokesbasket.
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19:51 Hours
19:51(HT)
B-41 transmitteda MAYDAY for a missingmemberfromE-249.
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1 9 : 5 1( E )
LieutenantJohnMartinsonwasin elevatoren-routeto the lobbv.
Page73 of 88
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19:52Hours
19:52(HT)
D-15transmitted,"4I,that'stheOfficerthat'sdownhere.It's theOfficer. I needa roll
call for the249."
B-38 transmitted,"This is Battalion38 for 249. All of their membersareaccountedfor
exceptfor the Officer who wentdownwith EMS."
19:52(E)
LieutenantJohnMartinsonwasremovedfrom the lobbv to theconcourse
level.
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Battalion44 transmitedto Commandthathe hasthe PostRadioon thefire floor and
requested
activationof the CommandChannel.
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o
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CommandChiefCar 13Aon scene.
LieutenantJohnMartinsonwasplacedin an ambulance.
a
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TheBrooklynCommunications
Office requesteda ProgressReport.
a
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E-234Officerreportedthat the mainbody of fire in the fire apartmenthasbeenknocked
down.
o
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B-41 reportedprimarysearches
in the fire apartmentarenegative.
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Car 13A transmitted Doubtful Will
Office.
Communications
Hold Progress Report to the Brooklyn
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Car 13A transmitted Probablv Will
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Hold
20:33Hours
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Box 22-3762 placedUnderControl.
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Progress Report to the Brooklyn
C
IE.TALKIE RE
RDER TRAN CRIPT
BROOKLYNBOX3762
01/03/08
PRIMARY TACTICAL CHANNEL
This transcript is a compilation of the five Battalion Handie-Talkie Recordersthat were
on the sceneduring this incident. It is a product of numeroushours of work in which the digital
audio was sloweddown, or spedup, to aid in revealingwhat was spoken. Listeningto audio
playback in a quiet, sterile environment differs greatly from the ambient noise that occurs at fire
operations. It should be rememberedthat at fire operations,some communicationstake place
without the use of the handie-talkie. Thesefacts should be taken into considerationwhile
listening to the audio and reading the transcript. The enclosedaudio copy was selectedfrom the
Battalion 38 Handie-TalkieRecorder.
19:20:39
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"...what did they say,fourteensomething?"
"38 to 113."
" 11 3 . "
"They also got a call from 14 Adam, apartment14 Adam."
"lo-4."
"249 to the 38."
"38."
"You can give a IO-75Chief, we've got a heavy smokecondition on the 14th
floor."
"Alright, 10-4John."
" l 3 2 t o t h e3 8 . "
"38."
"You've got a heavy wind condition Chief."
"OK Frank. Hey guys they got like, ah, the hallways up there, like a, ah, cross
shaped,not T shaped,it's crossshaped."
"249 Chauffeur to 280 Chauffeur. I'm over here."
"38 to 249,let me know, ah, what you're gonnause for the attackstairs. The
CIDS saysthe standpipesin the A stairway. Just verify that for me John."
" l O - 4C h i e f , . . . "
"What building is it? Anyone know?"
"The middle building, IJOO;'
"38,I32. Did anybodycheckthe compactorshaft Frank? Make sureit's not
that."
"...on the 1ttfloor..."
"38 to 234."
u234."
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"Bobby, just makesureyou get that first line in operation,then checkthe floor
below for the layout."
"Controlto249."
"249...water."
"249, chargethe line in the..."
"10-4,I'm chargingthe line."
*38,I32."
"38, 38 Alpha."
"38 Alpha."
"Danny, when the deputygetsin, tell him I'm up on the concourseup here. I'm
with the...upon top."
"Concourse,l0-4."
"38 to 249 Chauffeur;'
"249 Chauffeur."
"You hookedup to the siameseyet?"
"Just aboutChief. About ten seconds."
"OK, let me know when you chargeit up."
"38 to 113."
"249 to Nozzle."
"38 to 249."
"Control for the Nozzle man. Go ahead249."
"38 to 249."
"...9."
"John, did we find the fire apartmentyet?"
"Negative."
"Alright, 10-4. When you come out of the stairway the M apartment,the original
caller, the M apartmentshould be to your left coming out of the stairs."
"10-4, Chief."
"Control 249 for the Nozzle man."
"What's the addressof the building?"
"Seventeenhundred. It's the middle buildins."
"38 to 38 alpha."
"38 alpha."
"Danny as the companiescome in have them report up to the, ah, right by the
securityshackup herein the, ah, concourse."
"Lighten up on the first line."
"38 Alpha, I0-4."
"Chauffeurto 249 and 38. Your siameseis being supplied."
"OK, 10-4. And they're operatingon the 14thfloor brother."
"I0-4."
"38 to 113."
"113. We're makingour way down the hallwaynow, we're in fourteen..."
"Alright guys,did we find the apartmentyet?"
"NegativeChief."
"Alright. Justwatch yourselvesup there,it's pretty windy guys."
"249,hold up on bringing that line in. I32,113 did not find the fire apartment
vet."
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Lieutenant John Martinson's radio identi.fieris cantured b:t the Battalion HandieTalkie Recorder without an)t related audio
"...4 to Nozzle."
"Nozzle."
"Yeah, get that, get that line up here. They still haven't found it yet..."
"123 to Chauffeur."
"I23Chauffeur."
"Chauffeur."
"We're up here,ah, on the, ah, in the middle... middle platform."
"lO-4."
"38 Alphato 38."
"38."
"Ah, Dispatchersaid to check apartment 14 Adam again. 14 A."
"14 Adam, I0-4."
"All units, 14 Adam is going to be left of the, ah, the, ah elevator."
"Hey guys. 38 to the units on the fire floor. I got fire out a window. I got fire out
the window on the 14ft floor in the rear. In the rear. It should be to your left of
the stairway brothers. I got fire coming out the window pretty good."
"113 to Battalion.We're in the apartment,we're looking for ih" fi."."
"It's out the windows so, shouldn't haveany problemsfinding it."
"Squad 1 to the 38."
"Alright, Todd. The fire's on the back side of the building. Fire's out the
windows on the back side of the building."
"Alright. ...14 Adam."
"132 to 38."
"Battalion 38, go."
"Chief. is this closeto the corner?"
"It's closeright to the middle of the building. Right by the corner. In the back of
the building. Where the T meets."
"234to all units. The fire is in 14 K."
"38 to 234,it',s14 K Bobby?"
"Yeah,we got into 13 K, it's right aboveus."
"I32to234."
"4I to the 38."
"41, go ahead."
"Making my way upstairs."
"4I,I'm up in, ah, the concourse.Did you go in the building yet?"
"Yeah, I'm headingup."
te:30:3e
,r'"ti.if::,x},1ffiJ,:-"ilT
ii::i!;,'ff:li3T,T,ffiliffl,iT;3ii,.
Rescue2 is on the fire floor."
t
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"SquadRoof to Command."
"Commandto SquadRoof, go."
"Fire shouldbe in 14M."
"Yeah, I got a reportof 14 K, so we'll just haveto verify that."
"Gordy, where are ya?"
"SquadRoof to Command."
"Command,go."
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"I'm in 15 M, I got fire right below me. I'm at thosewindows right abovethe
fire."
"OK, Brother. Commandto Battalion 41."
"Go ahead38, I'm sorry, go aheadCommand."
"4I, yoLr'regonnabe the fire floor Chief and, ah, it shouldbe 14 K. 14 K, ah, 14
M, Mary. I'm sorry, 14 M, Mary. Shouldbe to the left of the stairs."
"Alright 10-4,they're startingto move now."
"Also be advised,I sentthe FAST truck up to the floor below the fire, Ladder
123."
"...where areyou?"
"105 to Command."
"Who's calling Command?"
"Ladder 105,we're on scene.How can we help you Chief?"
"105, just reportup to the concoursein the middle of the buildings here,alright?"
"Alright, we're 84 there."
"111 to Command,we're 84 also. We'Il reportup to the concourse."
"Brian, I'm down by the fire apartment."
"The apartment,it's two doors down from the stairs on your left."
"Mike. is it a left with a left?"
"f went up to the 15thfloor, I went out the door, I went to the left, two apartments
from the stairs."
"lo-4, Mike."
"I do and, ah, I could use a can or a line up here. I got fire starting to come
through an air conditioner vent right here."
"Commandto Engine249."
Lieutenant John Martinson's radio identifier is captured b:t the Battalion HandieTalkie Recorder without an:t related audio
"38 Alpha to 38."
" . . . 3 8 ,g o . "
"'We're checking...bringit back inside the, ah, hallway."
"Chief, I got a list of apartmentshere that are getting calls on. Couple on the 24'n
floor, 21't and the, ah, 14thfloor and all the 13th."
"Alright, write them down Danny and, ah, give them to the Aide. The 2nddue
Aide. Have him bring them up to me. I got 105 and I'm gonnasend 111 to work
with them abovethe fire."
"lO-4, they're on their way in."
"I needa bus, I needa bus down in the lobby."
"What do you got in the lobby?"
"113 Roof, I needa bus, I got a little girl."
"113...Command."
"SquadRoof to Command."
"Commandto, ah, Alpha, 38 to Alpha."
"38 Alpha, go."
"If we got EMS Danny, I needEMS up on the concourse. I got an injured child in
the lobby."
"Alright 10-4,I'm sendingthem up."
"SquadRoof to Command,we're gonnaneedto startout a secondline to 15 M."
*r13...0..."
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"Command to the SquadRoof."
"Squad Roof, go Command."
"That fire still coming out the windows?"
"Yes it is and, ah, windows are starting to give on the floor above. We need a can
or a line up here right away."
"38,38 Alpha."
"Hey SquadRoof...openthe bulkheadSquad..."
"38, 38 Alpha."
"15 M on that.I'm in 15 M."
"38 Alpha, go."
"Danny, transmit a 2noAlarm."
"lO-4."
"Commandto Engine234."
"113 to Irons."
"Commandto Engine234."
" 1 1 3t o . . . "
"113 Ironsto 113."
"Are vou OK?"
"Yeali, I'm running out of air, (unintelligible)up here.'o
"Commandto Engine234."
"234."
"Do you havethe secondline up on fifteen?"
"Negative."
"Command to Engine 234.Bob,where is your line?"
"...toCommand..."
"113 to Ironsand Can.back out. We're runninsout of air."
'oCommandto Engine234."
"Radigan, what floor are you on?"
"I'm in fifteen M."
"Very good."
"38 to Engine234."
"Commandto Engine 248."
"Command to Engine 248."
"Command to Engine 248."
"248."
"248, do you have a line with Engine 234?"
"We stretchedup the secondline with 234.If you needto, we can stretch a third
line."
"I needa line on the floor above,if you're not alreadythere.I needa line on the
19:36:54
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"...toCommand."
"11 1 to...on the 15frfloor, what apartmentare you in?"
"15 Mary on the floor above.15 Mary."
"Sean.where are vou?"
"Irons to 13."
"41 URGENT...38."
"Todd, are you in the apartmentyet?"
"...EMS up hereon fourteen,thirteen."
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,,4I tO
38. URGENT.''
"Go ahead41. Commandon."
"I got a guy screaminghe's got no air. I just sentRescuein to find him."
"What location is that?"
"We're at the stairway,direct us in."
"Commandto Battalion41. What location for the memberrunning out of air?"
"...truck, on the fire floor."
"You got l23,the Fasttruck, up on the floor below."
"I32 to Battalion..."
"249's out of air.249'sout of air."
"I32 to Rescue."
" 1 1 3I r o n st o 1 1 3 . "
"Go ahead.Come back to the. to the. ah. staircase."
"lo-4."
"Are youOK?"
o
a
a
"Yes. I needyou to the staircasewith the Can man."
"Commandto Engine219."
"113 inside teamcome on out to the stairwell."
"38 Alpha to 15 Alpha. Nicky."
"Commandto Battalion41."
"41to 113 insideteam.I want you outsidethe apartment."
"10-4.I just madeit to the stairway."
"Is any...Is anybodyaccountedfor? Is your other personaccountedfor?"
"Commandto Battalion41."
"Go aheadCommand."
"Did we get the guy that was running out of air?"
"Roof to I 13."
"The inside team, are you all accountedfor?"
"Roof to the 38."
"38, go."
"You have fire out one window on the McKeever streetside.14thfloor."
"I know that. We alreadyknow that. Thank you."
"Fourteen Mary."
"Command, Command to all units. Hold your messages.Command to all units.
Hold your messages.
Commandto the 41. Do you havethe guy running out of air.
Command to the 41. Do you have the guy that was running out of air, K?"
"113 Can to the Battalion."
"Commandto the Battalion41."
"Hey Todd, do you guys got the apartmentyet?"
"113 to Irons."
"113 to Irons."
"Irons."
"113 to hons."
"113 Irons is OK in the stairway."
"OK, where's your Can man?"
"Commandto Battalion41."
"All membersstayoff the radio.This is the 41 Battalion.4l to I 13 hons."
"113 Irons is OK in the stairwav."
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"OK, where is your Can man?"
"113 Can,I'm OK. I'm doing a searchof the hallway."
"Alright, what's your location,Can?"
"280 to Command."
"Rich, did you get the roof?"
"41to 113Can.What's your location?"
"l 13 Can, I'm right behind 249.It appearsto be the fire apartmentto the left of
the staircase."
"OK, stay where you are.One thirt, ah,4I to Command."
"Go ahead41, go in with your message41."
"I got all membersaccountedfor at this time. All membersof 113 Truck are
accountedfor."
o'Command10-4.How you doing as far
as the line goes,K?"
"It, ah, hasn't hit the fire yet."
"This is Squad Roof on the floor above. Are you guys in fifteen? Are you in
fourteen M yet? It's two doors down to your left, out of the stairs."
"Battalion37 to Engine249."
"4I to Command.I got234 taking over the line."
"Command 10-4.You relieved249?"
"Yeah...getthem all out now."
"Alright, whoever was just operatingthat line you were in the right apartment.
You got to go to the bedroom to your left. Right when you come through the
door."
"Go to your left, there's a bedroomover there.That's the room that's on fire."
"OV, get the elevatorto the 13thfloor."
"4I to 249."
"I got 234 coming in to take over your line."
"132 to Irons."
"Command to SquadRoof."
"When you go through the door. You got to make a left turn. Go down a short
hall, make a right turn. You'll be hitting the fire then."
"I32to Can."
"Command to SquadRoof."
"SquadRoof, go."
"How we doing on that floor above,in that 15tnfloor? Any extension?"
"No the, ah, one pane of the two pane windows is starting to fail. I closed the door
and backedout, ah, I'm in the adjoiningroom right now."
"Did they get your line in there yet?"
"But, ah, no extensionyet Chief."
"...get you a line in thereyet?"
"Command to SquadRoof. Do you have a line in there yet?"
"Member down. Member down."
"Teddy, hold up, Ted."
"I32 to Irons."
"234is going to takeover your line..."
"Is there a MAYDAY in there?"
"Did anyonegive a MAYDAY?"
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"MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY. Engine 234Back-Up to Command,
MAYDAY. We got a memberdown."
"I32to hons."
"Squad Roof to Command, I'm hearing a MAYDAY being transmittedfor a
downed member in the fire apartmentby 234Back-IJp."
"Get my FAST truck up here."
"Who gavethe MAYDAY?"
"Squad1...rightnow, I needpeopleto back...reportto..."
"...on the fire floor, make a left, go all the way down."
"113 to Can."
"Can."
"Did you give a MAYDAY?"
"Negative."
"Negative. 113Can man did not give a MAYDAY."
"Battalion 37 to Command."
"Go ahead37."
"248,I needa line up here."
"...9 and the Control man of Engine249."
"Commandto Battalion 37. Commandto 3J, come in with your messageagain."
"We're missingthe Officer of 249 ..."
"...fifteenMary..."
"The Officer of 249 and who else, K?"
"The Officer of 249 and the Control man of 249.We have units in there looking
for them right now."
"Alright, Commandto the 41."
"Commandto the 41."
o
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"...4r."
"Command to the 37."
"Do you have the FAST truck, do you have the FAST truck on the fire floor, K?"
"We got 111on the fire floor right now. We have one downedFirefighterbeing
removed."
"Command.l0-4."
"I32to Command."
"...in the fire apartment."
"Go with your MAYDAY."
"MAYDAY is out on the B staircaseon the l4th floor."
"Yeah, Commandto the 37. We havethe EMS coming up.EMS is coming up."
"10-4."
"Removing one member from the 14thfloor. I haven't been able to determine
which memberit is."
"r0-4."
"113 to Irons and Can. Come to the floor below."
"113 Ironsto 113.Whereareyou?"
"I'm in the attackstaircaseright now."
"Come to the staircasethen to the floor below, you and the Can man."
"I'm on the,on the..."
"Gary, you locked in there?"
"...hallway with the downedFirefighter.Hold on."
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"10-4."
'oS-man,back, ah, let's back out."
"Commandto Battalion 37. Commandto Battalion3'1."
" ...132."
"Commandto Battalion 37."
"Squad 1 to the 15. UnconsciousFirefightercoming down the stairsnow. We
needALS on the 13thfloor now."
"Command 10-4.They're on the way. They're going to the 13* floor."
"ALS is on the way up. ALS is on the way up."
"Commandto the CFR-D Engine. Commandto the CFR-D Engine."
"239 to Command,we're the CFR-D Engine."
"You up thereon the 13thfloor K?"
"We just pulled up Chief. We'll make our way up there."
"105 OV to 105Chauffeur."
"Commandto Engine 2I9."
"...OV I'm OK. I'm on the fire floor."
"SquadRoof to Command. They're gettingwater on the fire now. Water is on
the fire now."
"Tommy, areyou oK?"
"41to 249..."
"SquadRoof to Command."
"RescueBattalionto Command."
"Go."
"RescueChauffeur,RescueChauffeurto Command. We got water on the fire ..."
"Commandto Engine 219."
"4I to 249."
"Go 41."
"A1l your membersaccountedfor, except for the one member missing? The one
member taken out?"
"Commandto 4L. Do you still have a membermissing?"
"That's it Rescue. You're gettingit."
"Commandto Battalion 41. Do vou still have a membermissins?"
"4I to 249."
"l32to Irons, floor below."
"kons."
"111 Can, 111.Where areyou?"
o'RescueBattalion to Command."
"Go ahead,RescueBattalion."
"One memberbeing worked on, full cardiacarreston the 13thloor. EMS is with
him now."
"Alright 10-4. We got an elevatorworking?"
"I0-4. We're holding it for him right now."
"Commandto the 41. Commandto the 41. Do you have any membersmissing
still?"
*41to
Command. 4l to Command."
"4I Battalion to Command."
"...41."
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"MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY. 4I Battalionto Command."
"Come in with your MAYDAY,41."
"Go with the MAYDAY,4I."
"This is the 41 Battalion. I have 249 is still missingone member."
"Alright, Commandto the 41. Do you havethe FAST Unit operating,and
Rescue.K?"
"Coffect."
"Commandto the 41, do you know what memberof Engine249 is missing?"
"Alright, we're trying to figure it out."
"Commandto the 41, arethe other membersof the 249 all accountedfor, K?"
"41 to 249."
*4I to249;'
" ...113."
"All membersare accountedfor exceptfor the Officer who's beentakento the
hospital."
"113 to 249Back-Up;'
"SquadHook to Squad."
"We're just helping with the downed fireman. Where are you?"
"...Todd."
"Tommy D, whereareyou?"
".. . 10'nfloor, top of the stairs."
"4I to249."
"Squadto SquadRoof. Mike I want you down on the fire floor. I want you
directedup to ..."
"4I to249."
"41to theFAST Truck."
"...FAST..."
"Get in touch, get in touch with249 and let me know if they got all members
accountedfor."
"All membersare accountedfor."
"MAYDAY, MAYDAY. 41 Battalion. I'm in the fire apartmentoperatingwith
234.. .that missingmemberfrom 249."
" C a nt o . . . "
"...repeatthat John."
"...on the fire floor, come to the, come to the stairway."
" 1 1 3 I r o n st o 1 1 3 . "
"IL3."
"We're at the bottom of the stairson the 13thfloor."
"10-4."
"Commandto Battalion41. Commandto Battalion41."
"Battalion38 to..."
"...on the 13th."
"...proceed."
"41to Command."
needsa l\vll
Roll Call
for
tvr
"41, that's
J the
LUV Officer
Vrrlvvl
that's
Llr4!
o uvwlr
down lrvrv,
here,rLit'sJ the
Llrv
Officer.
vlrrwvl.
lI uvvs
v4tr
the
ruv
24g.r,
19:52:14
l9:52:I5
" ...3 J..."
"IO-4.4l to 249,everybodystayoff theradio,4L to 249."
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"This is Battalion 38 for 249. AII of their membersare accountedfor exceptfor
the Officer who went down with EMS."
"Command 10-4. Commandto, ah, the 38. Listen, I'm sendingup 157 and I20.
157 andl2O;'
"...come down stairs."
*lO-4;'
"37 to Battalion 38."
"41to Command."
" . ..41, go 41."
"Alright, they got water on the fire."
"...to Engine 249 Control."
"I don't have a completeroll call, ah, yet, but I think they got everybodyexcept
one member.The Officer was takenout unconscious."
"Battalion 38 saysthat they have all membersfrom249 accountedfor and the
Officer hasbeenremovedby EMS, K."
"38 to 37, go."
"Ah, could you give me confirmationthat the Control Man from 249 is, is
found?"
"All membersof 249 areaccountedfor."
ul}-4;'
"Hey Ronnie,are you, ah, down on the fire floor?"
"38 to ...41."
"Go ahead38."
"Alright, I'm on the floor below hereif you needrelief, you needcompaniesto
relieve."
"I'm just going to wait till it settlesdown, the fire's beenknockeddown."
"123 to OV, floor below forthwith."
"Trying to get a roll call."
"Battalion 44 to Command."
"Go 44."
"Battalion44 to Command."
"Go 44, Commandto 44, come in with your message."
"I have the Command Post Radio on the fire floor. switch over to the Command
Channel."
"113 to Command."
"OV to I32."
"We needthe elevatoron the floor below."
"Battalion 38 to Command."
"Hey Lieu, the elevatorsare f_ _ _ing up."
"4I to 38. hold on one second. 41 to Command."
"41to Command."
*4I to 38."
"38, go."
"Alright, I got no membersof 249 in the fire apartment. Can you go, can you find
out iflhey're all accountedfor. The Officer was takenout unconscious.That's
the only guy that, ah, we have a problem with right now."
"All membersof 249 areon the floor below. all accountedfor."
"Thank vou."
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"248 to 214."
"Battalion38 to Command."
"Go ahead38."
"Send me up two Enginesand two Trucks to the floor below for relief."
"You got I57,I20 on their way up. I'm gonnasendyou two Enginesright now."
"10-4. I'm sending249with their membersdown stairsright now. They're
on..."
"Command to the 38, Commandto the 38. You're gonnahave235,24O coming
up.235,240;'
"lO-4."
"113 to Can, whereare you?"
"113 Can, I'm on the fire floor landing."
'oCome
down stairsto the floor below, by the elevators."
"...toCommand."
"123 FAST Truck to Command."
"...4 to Command."
"113 to OV, come down to the floor below."
"234 to Command."
"234, go with your message234."
"Main body of fire is knockeddown in the fire apartment,...our guys, ah..."
"113...I'm coming to the floor below."
"Safety to Alpha."
*132 OY, floor below elevatorforthwith."
*IO-4,coming."
"Safetyto Alpha."
"Safety Battalionto Alpha."
"Yeah, Doc, do you have your phonewith you?"
"Yes."
"...what'sup?"
"I'm, ah, still on the floor above. I'm taking up someof my tools. Guys looking
for me down there?"
"Command to Battalion41."
"Mike."
"I23 to Chauffeur."
"Chauffeur."
"Where are you guys located?"
"'We're on the fire floor in front of the apartment."
"Alright, ah, stayright whereyou are."
"Command to Battalion41."
"Go aheadCommand."
"Are you still on the fire floor, K?"
"fn the fire apartmentoperatingwith 234,111. Primariesnegative."
"What's the statusof the fire, K? You got water on it?"
"Battalion 44 to Command."
"Go ahead44."
"We're trying to get the CommandChannelactivated.Have somebodydown
there get the Command Channelgoing so we can speak. I'm on the fire, I'm on
a
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the floor below...the companieshere with me. 113 is on their way down now, ah,
I'm trying to locate 113's Roof. He's not missing,he's on the floor above."
"113 Roof is downstairsin the lobby."
"OK, l0-4. That meansI13's out of the building. 249 shouldbe out as well."
"Command to Battalion 44. We got that Command Channeloperating, K."
"10-4."
"Battalion38..."
"Hey Frank, come down below. Andre, come down below."
"Who's calling the 44?"
"38 Battalion."
"Go ahead."
"Alright, I'm up on the fire floor here. I'm looking for the 41. II3,132,I told
them to get all their guys and go aheaddown. All the guys of 249 went down.
We're just going to try and sort out the companiesup here for relief, alright?"
*10-4. I have 157 and 120 on the floor below."
"OK, I know 235 and2l4 areavailabletoo."
"I also have someEnsinesdown here..."
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