The Journal of Contemporary China Studies

Transcription

The Journal
of
Contemporary
China Studies
Vol. 4 / No. 2 2015
SPECIAL ISSUE: Taiwan's Politics and External Relations in the Post
Democratization Era
CONTENTS
Cross-Strait Relations under the Ma Ying-jeou administration:
From Economic to Political Dependence?
Yasuhiro MATSUDA 3
Policymaking in Taiwan’s Semi-Presidentialism: A Case Study
of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
Mitsutoyo MATSUMOTO
37
Ma Ying-jeou’s Doctoral Thesis and Its Impact on the JapanTaiwan Fisheries Negotiations
Yoshiyuki OGASAWARA 67
The Role of the KMT in the Ma Ying-Jeou Administration’s
Mainland Policy Making: A Case Study of the KMT-CPC Platform
Wei-Hsiu HUANG
93
The Development of Japan-China Relations in the Period
of Stability in Cross-Strait Relations
Akio TAKAHARA 119
Cross-Strait Relations under the
Ma Ying-jeou administration: From
Economic to Political Dependence?
Yasuhiro MATSUDA
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to outline the characteristics of Cross-Strait relations
under the Ma Ying-jeou administration between 2008 and the middle of 2015.
Ma Ying-jeou was first elected as the president of Taiwan in 2008 and was reelected in 2012. During these four years, he eased the tension between Mainland
China and Taiwan, which had heightened during the time of the Chen Shuibian administration; restored and institutionalized a semiofficial channel of
communications between Mainland China and Taiwan; and brokered various
successful agreements focusing on the economy and other practical areas. As
conclusion, this paper outlined the structural changes that have occurred in CrossStrait relations due to the policy shifts by the Ma Ying-jeou administration of
Taiwan. First, the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s conciliatory policies toward
China promoted the stabilization and institutionalization of Cross-Strait relations
through the manipulation of the definition of “one China.” Second, despite the
peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations that has taken place due to the
policy shifts of the Ma Ying-jeou administration and the Hu Jintao administration,
China has not compromised its core principles on sovereignty with regard to
Taiwan. Third, Taiwanese self-identity has grown due to increased social contact
between the peoples of Mainland China. Fourth, Ma Ying-jeou’s failure was that,
amid Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on China, he was too quick to
realize political accord with China. Economic changes inevitably cause political
changes, and economic dependence can create political dependence. The results
of the policy shifts of the Ma Ying-jeou administration had once made a summit
between Beijing and Taipei a possibility. But repercussion from Taiwanese society
is growing. Regardless of which party takes power in 2016, Cross-Strait relations
may set off on a different path.
Keywords
Cross-Strait relations, Taiwan, China, Ma Ying-jeou, interdependence
4
The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to outline the characteristics of Cross-Strait relations1
under the Ma Ying-jeou administration between 2008 and the middle of 2015.
Ma Ying-jeou was first elected as the president of Taiwan in 2008 and was reelected in 2012. During these four years, he eased the tension between Mainland
China and Taiwan, which had heightened during the time of the Chen Shuibian administration; restored and institutionalized a semiofficial channel of
communications between Mainland China and Taiwan; and brokered various
successful agreements focusing on the economy and other practical areas.
This paper will shed light on: the political factors that promoted the stabilization
of the overall relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan; the factors that
were and were not resolved by the stabilization of the relations; and the factors
that would play a role if the political relationship were to develop further. The
paper will first focus on the shifting of the political relationship between Mainland
China and Taiwan from relatively simple economic matters to more complicated
political agreements. Next, the paper will examine the changes in Taiwan’s
political and economic identity during the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s tenure.
Previous studies regarding Cross-Strait relations after the election of Ma Yingjeou include Rivalry’s Harmony (Duili de Hexie), which was written by experts
from both Mainland China and Taiwan and predicted that political disagreements
between the two sides would increase during Ma Ying-jeou’s second term.
Another study, Chances and Challenges of the Cross-Strait Relations (Liang’an
Guanxi de Jiyu yu Tiaozhan), was written by former Taiwanese high-level officials
who identify with either the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP). This study predicted similar disagreements.2 Lastly, a study written
by Shaw Chong-hai, China’s Taiwan Policy (Zhonggong dui Tai Zhengce),”
1
Cross-Strait relations, in a broad sense, refers to the relationship between the People’s
Republic of China and Taiwan. The public position of both authorities is that this relationship
is not between two countries; therefore, they use terms such as “Cross-Taiwan-Strait relations”
or abbreviate it as “Cross-Strait relations.” Additionally, since the Taiwanese authority does
not recognize PRC as a nation, it uses terms such as “Mainland China” or “Mainland” to refer
to the People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China never uses the
name that Taiwan claims, which is the “Republic of China”, but instead uses “Taiwan” or the
“Taiwanese authority” to refer to the government. This paper uses a mix of these names in addition to the conventional terms, “Mainland China” and “Taiwan,” or “Beijing” and “Taipei”
especially in the quotes.
2 Wu Chien-te et al., eds. Duili de Hexie: Kuayue Liang’an Guanxi Shenshuiqu.[Antagonistic
Harmony: Beyond the Deep Water Zone of the Cross-Strait Relations] Taipei: Li Ming Cultural
Enterprise Co., Ltd., 2012. Su Chi and Tong Chen-yuan, eds. Liang’an Guanxi de Jiyu yu
Tiaozhan [Chances and Challenges of the Cross-Strait Relations] Taipei: Wu-Nan Culture
Enterprise Co., Ltd., 2013.
Cross-Strait Relations under the Ma Ying-jeou administration
5
focused on China’s policies toward Taiwan.3 These studies outline the difficulties
in advancing the general political dialogue between Mainland China and Taiwan;
however, they do not clearly indicate which obstacles are most difficult to deal
with on a case-by-case basis. This paper will examine, from all sides, the issues
that the Cross-Strait relationship faces.
Chen Shui-bian won his second term by drawing on his own political capital
and by mobilizing Taiwanese nationalism; he also attempted to leave a political
legacy by phasing out the use of the terms “Zhonghua” and “Zhongguo” (China/
Chinese) in favor of “Taiwan.” (Taiwan)4 Ma Ying-jeou entered his second term
and began to face rapidly declining approval ratings. What choices have his
administration made during the remainder of his term? What were the chances
that Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping could move the political reconciliation between
Mainland China and Taiwan forward?
1. Progress of Policy between Mainland China and
Taiwan
1) Establishment of the KMT-CPC Platform
The official dialogues and exchanges between the Straits Exchange Foundation
(SEF) of Taiwan and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(ARATS) of Mainland China were halted in 1999, when the Taiwanese President
Lee Teng-hui advanced his “two-state theory.” Semiofficial communication would
not resume for nine years, until the end of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency in 2008.
During this time, Mainland China invited major leaders of the Taiwanese
opposition parties, like the KMT, People First Party (PFP), and “New Party,” to
Mainland China in an attempt to bring them over to China’s side. KMT Chairman
Lien Chan visited Mainland China between April 26 and May 3, 2005, and along
with Secretary of General of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Hu Jintao
released a “press communiqué” consisting of five points that outlined a plan for
the resumption of dialogue on equal footing.5 Subsequently, James Soong of the
3 Shaw Chong-hai, Zhonggong Duitai Zhengce: 1979-2013 [Beijing’s Taiwan Policy 19792013] Taipei: Tonsan Publications, Inc., 2013.
4 See the following reference for Cross-Strait relations during Chen Shui-bian’s administration.
Yasushiro Matsuda, “Kaizen no ‘Kikai’ wa Sonzai Shitaka?: Chutai Kankei no Kozo Henka”
[Were There Any Chances for Amelioration of the Relationship?: Structural Changes of the
Cross-Strait Relations] in Masahiro Wakabayashi, ed., Posuto Minshukaki no Taiwan Seiji:
Chin Suihen Seiken no Hachinen [Taiwan’s Politics in the Post-Democratization Era: Eight
Years of Chen Shui-bian Administration] Makuhari: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan
External Trade Organization, 2010.
5 “Zhongguogongchandang Zongshuji Hu Jintao yu Zhongguoguomindang Zhuxi Lian Zhan
6
PFP visited Beijing.
Chairman Lien Chan’s visit to China in 2005 was a turning point for the
relationship between the KMT and the CPC. Since then, both the KMT and the
CPC have built an exchange platform (Guo-Gong pingtai) and have continued to
hold regular talks. Since these developments, China’s policies that are specific and
advantageous to Taiwan have been formed not in a unilateral manner, but through
dialogues with both the Taiwanese authority and opposition parties such as the
KMT. These policies included some forms of preferential treatment (such as the
elimination of tariffs on Taiwanese fruits), regular operation of charter flights
between Mainland China and Taiwan, encouraging people in Mainland China to
visit Taiwan, the protection of Taiwanese investments in Chinese companies, and
agricultural cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan. China has also
started to announce parts of these policies at meetings with the KMT.6 China’s
increasing economic influence has become a major advantage in their political
dealings with Taiwan.
Prior to Lien Chan’s visit to China, the KMT was often critical of Chen Shuibian’s administration with regard to Mainland China despite the fact that their
policies were similar (for example, both promoted the Three Links policy). It was
even later revealed that Chen Shui-bian had also been negotiating with China
behind closed doors in an effort to institutionalize the relationship and economic
ties between Mainland China and Taiwan.
However, during Lien Chan’s visit to China, the KMT and the CPC officially
reconciled. Due to the “press communiqué” released by Lien Chan and Hu Jintao,
exchange platforms (meetings between the Honorary Chairman of the KMT
and the General Secretary of the CPC, and the Cross-Strait Economic and Trade
Forum, etc.) were established. These exchange platforms marked the practical
beginning of negotiations, and due to the increased cooperation of China, they
became places for Mainland China and Taiwan to announce policies advantageous
to the Taiwanese business community, such as the expansion of the importation
of Taiwanese goods. The campaign pledges of KMT presidential candidate
Ma Ying-jeou and his running mate Vincent Siew also strongly reflected the
matters discussed between the KMT and the CPC, such as the “1992 Consensus,
resumption of negotiations between the SEF and the ARATS, Cross-Straits
Common Market, Three Links, and direct flights.”7
Huitan Xinwen Gongbao” [Press Communiqué on Meeting between General Secretary of the
Communist Party of China Hu Jintao and Chairman of the Kuomindang Lien Chan] People’s
Daily, April 30, 2005.
6 Matsuda, “Kaizen no ‘Kikai’ wa Sonzai Shitaka?,” 254-255.
7 Kao Charng and Wang Cheng-Hsu, “Liang’an Guanxi de Huigu, Xin Qingshi yu Qianzhan”
[On Development of Cross-Strait Relations: Reviews and Future Perspectives] Prospect
Quarterly, 9.3 (July 2008): 180-183.
7
During the period in which the KMT was the opposition party, the KMT-CPC
Platform became the major communications channel between Mainland China
and Taiwan. The increased communication gave hope to people both within and
outside of Taiwan that if the KMT won back control of the Presidency, economic
relations with China would continue to develop.8
Since direct intergovernmental contact was restricted even after the KMT won
back control of the Presidency, the KMT-CPC Platform served to supplement
the dialogue framework between the SEF and the ARATS, who were restricted
from discussing agendas related to high politics. Meetings between Lien Chan
and Wu Poh-hsiung (who both served as the Honorary Chairman of the KMT)
and Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping (who both served/serves as the General Secretary of
the CPC) promoted the communication between the Chinese and the Taiwanese
authorities. In this regard, the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s communication
with Mainland China differed from the Lee Teng-hui administration, in which
there was only a semiofficial mechanism of communication between the SEF and
the ARATS. It also differed from the Chen Shui-bian administration’s informal
communication with China, during which even semiofficial communication
almost ceased. In comparison to both prior administrations, these communication
channels showed huge progress under Ma Ying-jeou.
2) The Stabilization of Cross-Strait Relations due to the Ma Ying-jeou
administrations’ Policy Changes
The fourth direct presidential election was held in Taiwan on March 22, 2008.
Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT candidate and former mayor of Taipei, beat the former
premier of the ruling DPP party, Frank Hsieh, by a large margin. This led to the
second changeover of governmental control in Taiwan’s history. Also on the ballot
were separate referendums for each party’s plan to return to the United Nations.
The DPP referendum advocated joining the UN as a new nation, and the KMT
referendum advocated a return to Taiwan’s former UN status. However, neither
referendum received enough votes to pass.
The departing President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) had spent his tenure
mobilizing Taiwanese identity within Taiwan, which heightened tensions with
China and even worsened relations with the United States.9 Furthermore, this
period coincided with a time when China was rising economically and militarily;
8
See the following detailed study by the people from the KMT on the KMT-CPC platform.
Chang Jung-kung, “Guo-Gong Pingtai de Xiankuang yu Zhanwang” [Present and Prospect for
the KMT-CPC Platform] in Su and Tong, Liang’an Guanxi de Jiyu yu Tiaozhan.
9 See, Matsuda, “Kaizen no ‘Kikai’ wa Sonzai Shitaka?” “‘Sairyo no Kankei’ kara ‘Sogo
Fushin’ e: Bei-Tai Kankei no Gekihen” [From ‘Best Relationship’ to ‘Mutual Distrust’] in
Wakabayashi, Posuto Minshukaki no Taiwan Seiji.
8
therefore, this clash with China resulted in an increasing burden for Taiwan. As a
result, the Taiwanese voters chose a leader who would break with the strategies
of Chen Shui-bian. The Ma Ying-jeou administration was born from the failure of
Chen Shui-bian’s strategy and the rise of China.
With Ma Ying-jeou’s election victory, the failure of the UN referendums, and
the arrest and imprisonment of Chen Shui-bian shortly after he stepped down
from the presidency, Chen Shui-bian’s political strategy of exciting Taiwanese
identity came to an end. Ma Ying-jeou endorsed the status quo with the slogan
“no unification, no independence, and no use of force (butong, budu, buwu).”
More than anything, the Ma Ying-jeou administration concluded that the source of
conflict with China during both the latter half of the Lee Teng-hui administration
and the entire Chen Shui-bian administration was how those administrations dealt
with the principle of “one China.” Therefore, the Ma Ying-jeou administration
looked to the so-called “1992 Consensus (jiuer gongshi)” to build a stable
relationship with China.
The archetype of “1992 Consensus” was born during verbal discussions
between the SEF and the ARATS during a 1992 meeting in Hong Kong. Though
it is referred to as a “consensus,” the details differ between the Chinese and
Taiwanese sides. The definition of the ARATS of China is that “both sides of
the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China principle through mutual efforts in
the process of pursuing national unification.” The SEF of Taiwan adds that
“the definition of the ‘one China’ principle may differ due to a difference
in understanding” and that “further statements will be made through verbal
announcements.” The definition of the Taiwan side is basically that they “agree to
disagree” with the consensus. While China does not take the same stance, it has
never expressly denied Taiwan’s interpretation. The two entities are thus in a state
of mutual non-recognition – China does not accept Taiwan’s interpretation, and
Taiwan does not accept China’s.10
The 1993 meeting in Singapore between Chairman Koo Chen-fu of the SEF
and President Wang Daohan of the ARATS took place because of this consensus,
though since the consensus could imply a silent approval of the Taiwanese
10
Bau Tsong-Ho, “Yige Chaoyue Lishi Juxian de Liang’an Guan: Yingxiang ‘Gezhi Zhengyi,
Zhuiqiu Shuangying’ de Xin Luxian” [A View on the Cross-Strait Relations beyond Historical
Restriction: Toward a New Policy Line of ‘Shelving Disputes and Seeking Win-win’] in Tsai
Chao-ming ed., Ma Zongtong Zhizheng Hou de Liang’an Xinju: Lun Liang’an Guanxi Xin
Luxiang [New Situation after President Ma Came to Power: On New Direction of the CrossStrait Relations] Taipei: Prospect Foundation, 2009: 190-194. Lee Ming, “Xin Zhengfu
Liang’an Waijiao Xiubing Zhengce zhi Linian yu Zuowei” [Philosophy and Practice of
Diplomatic Truce with the Mainland China under the New Government] in Lin Bih-Jaw, ed.,
Liang’an Waijiao Xiubing Xin Siwei [New Thinking on Foreign Policy over the Cross-Strait
Relations] Taipei: Prospect Foundation, 2009:26-29.
9
argument regarding the Republic of China, Beijing did not recognize the existence
of the consensus for a long time. However, after the reconciliation between the
KMT and the CPC in 2005, China realized that using the phrase “one China”
would lead to the development of Cross-Strait relations. Since then, China has not
explicitly disagreed even when Taiwan has argued that the “one China” is “the
Republic of China.” In other words, while the interpretations of the consensus
differ, the two sides agree that the consensus is about “one China” anyway.11
Furthermore, the KMT won a major victory in the Legislative Yuan election of
January 2008. This reduced the ability of the opposition party to act as a check on
the policies of the presidency, which made it possible for the Ma administration
to change their policy in a bold manner in favor of approaching China. Since
then, a series of policies have been enacted that furthered economic ties between
Mainland China and Taiwan, including the revival of regular meetings between
the SEF and the ARATS, regular operation of direct flights between Mainland
China and Taiwan, and the promotion of group tours from China.
At the same time, Ma Ying-jeou called on China to enact the so-called
“diplomatic truce (waijiao xiubing),” an act that would end a long-simmering
diplomatic war.12 Beijing and Taipei had long been competing for other countries
to recognize one government over another, or had tried to have the other expelled
from international organizations. Beijing has never officially responded to this
advance. Beijing’s stance is that Taiwan is not a nation to start with; therefore,
diplomacy itself does not exist. Also, even if China were to recognize the
diplomatic issues, China has always officially maintained that any “truce” ending
the diplomatic war would be contingent upon Taiwan stopping any activities that
could lead to Taiwan’s independence.13
In reality, compared to the past, China has recently been refraining from actions
that would further isolate Taiwan in the international community. During the Chen
Shui-bian administration, China had little incentive to change their policies in
light of what they viewed as “provocation” from his administration. Therefore, the
Ma Ying-jeou administration’s approach was welcomed by China and Cross-Strait
relations entered a relatively stable stage. The United States also welcomed these
changes.
11
Bau, “Yige Chaoyue Lishi Juxian de Liang’an Guan,”: 190-194.
Lee, “Xin Zhengfu Liang’an Waijiao Xiubing Zhengce zhi Linian yu Zuowei,” : 26-29.
Lin Cheng-Yi, “Taihai Liang’an Waijiao Xiubing: Kexingxing yu Juxianxing” [Diplomatic
Truce in the Cross-Strait Relations: Chances and Challenges] in Su and Tong, Liang’an Guanxi
de Jiyu yu Tiaozhan, :171-175.
12
13
10
3) A Shift in Engagement Policy toward Taiwan through “Hu Jintao’s Six
Points”
Until late 2008, China’s policy toward Taiwan had been to support the measures
of the KMT, a policy they were able to pursue due to their adversarial relationship
with the Chen Shui-bian administration and the clashes between Mainland China
and Taiwan that occurred during his time in office. However, after Ma Ying-jeou
was elected, a different policy toward Taiwan was needed than that of the period
when, for example, the “Anti-Secession Law” was used as a “hedge against a
Taiwan with which China is in conflict.”14 In other words, the issue was about how
to formulate an “engagement policy with a Taiwan with which we are in a friendly
relationship,” included such issues as how to advance political negotiations with
Taiwan, how to respond to Taiwan’s demand to increase its international activities,
and how to prevent Taiwan’s arms procurement from the United States without
endangering this new and fragile relationship.
At this turning point from an unfavorable situation to a favorable one, Hu
Jintao announced his “Hu’s Six Points (Hu liudian)”15 on New Year’s Eve of 2008,
which revealed policies for these new issues. The following three points are the
most important ones.
1) Establishing a closer mechanism for cross-strait economic cooperation is
conducive to making Taiwan’s economy more competitive and expanding
the arena for its development; conducive to promoting the common
development of the economies on both sides; and conducive to exploring
feasible approaches to the dovetailing of the common development of both
economies with the economic cooperation mechanism in the Asia-Pacific
region.
2) We understand our Taiwanese compatriots’ feelings on the issue of
participation in international activities and we pay particular attention to
solving relevant issues. For the two sides of the Strait, to avoid unnecessary
internal strife on external affairs is conducive to furthering the overall
interests of the Chinese nation. Further consultations can be conducted,
as needed, on the prospect of Taiwan’s people-to-people economic and
cultural interactions with other countries. Regarding the issue of Taiwan’s
14
15
Matsuda, “Kaizen no ‘Kikai’ wa Sonzai Shitaka?” , 237-259.
Hu Jintao, “Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits
Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese
Nation: Speech at the Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message
to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, January 1,
2009, accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Hu/201103/
t20110322_1794707.htm>.
11
participation in the activities of international organizations, fair and
reasonable arrangements can be effected through pragmatic consultation
between the two sides, provided that this does not create a situation of “two
Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
3) We hereby renew our appeal: On the basis of the one-China principle,
we should formally end the state of hostility across the Strait through
consultation, reach a peace accord, and build a framework for the peaceful
development of cross-Strait relations.
1) suggests that if Mainland China and Taiwan were to reach an economic
agreement, it would also be beneficial for Taiwan to enter the Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation mechanism (which includes the United States). 2) suggests
a positive response to the “diplomatic truce” which would mean an end to China’s
use of diplomatic aid as a way to convince other countries to not recognize
Taiwan. It also suggests that China is willing to recognize Taiwan’s activities
involving international organizations to some extent, with the assumption that
there will be no compromise regarding sovereignty. 3) states a strong intention to
reach a “peace accord” under the “one-China principle.”
4) A Shift in the Peaceful Development Strategy using “Hu Jintao’s
Six Points”
Hu’s Six Points” corresponded to the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s change in
policy. In fact, the Hu Jintao administration must have decided on these policies
around the beginning of the Ma Ying-jeou administration in 2008 and simply
announced them on New Year’s Eve. As a result of the policy changes of the
Hu Jintao administration, there have been tangible changes to the Cross-Strait
relationship and to Taiwan’s relations with other countries. Table 1 indicates
various agreements that have been reached between Beijing and Taipei. As a
point of principle of both Mainland China and Taiwan, these are not agreements
between countries but are instead agreements between the SEF and the ARATS,
to whom the power to negotiate these agreements has been delegated by each
government. The details of the agreements are not much different from the matters
necessary for regular bilateral agreements.
In the first and the second rounds of high-level meetings between the SEF and
the ARATS, they discussed and immediately implemented regular direct flights
between Mainland China and Taiwan, which both sides had been requesting. The
third or the fourth rounds of meetings focused on functional matters such as food
safety, air transport, sea transport, and epidemic prevention. Further high-level
meetings were held semiannually and more agreements were reached relatively
12
easily.
The reaching of the “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” (ECFA)
at the fifth meeting, in Chongqing in June 2010, marked a turning point in the
negotiations. Most of the agreements reached before the fourth meeting had been
in negotiations during the DPP administration, but the DPP had no involvement
with the ECFA. Since the negotiations were kept secret, there were concerns
about the ECFA not only among the members of the DPP but also across many
industries and societal organizations.
Meetings,
place, date
(1)
Beijing
June 2008
(2)
Taipei
Nov. 2008
(3)
Nanjing
April 2009
(4)
Taichung
Dec. 2009
Major agreements
Remarks
1) Minutes of talks on Cross-Strait
charter flights
2) Cross-Strait Agreement on
Mainland Tourists Traveling to
Taiwan
・Decided to commence
3) Cross-Strait Food Safety
Agreement
4) Cross-Strait Air Transport
Agreement
5) Cross-Strait Sea Transport
Agreement
6) Cross-Strait Postal Service
Agreement
charter flights on weekdays
starting December 2008
・This meeting marked the
visit of the Chairman of
the ARATS, Chen Yunlin,
to Taiwan to meet with
President Ma Ying-jeou
7) Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint
Crime-Fighting and Judicial
Mutual Assistance
8) Cross-Strait Financial
Cooperation Agreement
9) Supplementary Agreement on
Cross-Strait Air Transport
・Decided to significantly
ease regulations of Chinese
firms’ investment in Taiwan
regular flights starting
August 2009
passenger charter flights
on weekends starting July
2008
・Decided to ease restrictions
on Mainland Chinese tour
groups to visit Taiwan
・Agreed that Chairman of
the ARATS Chen Yunlin
should visit Taiwan
・Discussed tax cooperation
Cooperation of Agricultural
Product Quarantine and Inspection
11) Cross-Strait Agreement
on Cooperation in Respect
of Standards, Metrology,
Inspection and Accreditation
on Cooperation in Respect
of Fishing Crew Affairs
(5)
Chongqing
June 2010
13
13) Cross-Strait Economic
Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA)
Intellectual Property Rights
Protection and Cooperation
・Determined the Early
(6)
Taipei
Dec. 2010
Medical and Health Cooperation
・Gradually built consensus
(7)
Tianjin
Oct. 2011
16) Cross-Strait Nuclear Power
Safety Cooperation Agreement
* Joint Opinion of the SEF and
the ARATS on Advancing
Negotiations on the Cross-Strait
Investment Protection Agreement
* Joint Opinion of the SEF and the
ARATS on Strengthening CrossStrait Industrial Cooperation
・Established a cooperation
(8)
Taipei
Aug. 2012
17) Cross-Strait Investment
Protection and Promotion
Agreement
18) Cross-Strait Customs
Cooperation Agreement
* Consensus on the personal
freedom and safety guarantees
・Built consensus on personal
freedom and safety of
investors
・Exchanged views on the
establishment of reciprocal
offices
(9)
Taipei
March
2013
on Trade in Services
・The agreement includes
“preferential treatment” for
Taiwan
(10)
Nanjing
Feb. 2014
20) Cross-Strait Cooperation
Agreement on Meteorology
21) Cross-Strait Cooperation
Agreement on Seismological
Monitoring
Harvest Program
・No to opening Taiwan to
labor from the Mainland
・The ECFA includes
“preferential treatment”
for Taiwan
on the Cross-Strait
Investment Protection
Agreement
mechanism that would
alert each other regarding
nuclear power safety
following the March 2011
nuclear accident in Japan
・Issued a joint opinion on
investment protection and
promotion agreement
Table 1: Major agreements of the high-level meetings between the SEF and the ARATS
Source: “Dialogue and Negotiation,” Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan),
accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=5891&mp=3>.
Note: The first through the eighth rounds were talks between Chen Yunlin and Chiang Pinkung. The ninth round was between Chen Deming and Lin Join-sane. The circled numbers
indicate binding agreements. Joint opinions and consensuses that have a * symbol are
documents that indicate transitional agreements or issues in the process of reaching a formal
agreement. As for May 2015, agreement number 19, 20, and 21 are still under discussion in
the Legislative Yuan, so they are not effective yet.
14
The ECFA was originally known as the “Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement” (CECA). The negotiations on the agreement started early and were
expected to conclude in 2009. However, it was delayed by about a year.16 Though
agreement on the ECFA was eventually reached, delays have also been noticeable
in important policy areas such as investment protection, industrial cooperation,
and the freedom and safety of businesspeople and their families. In these areas,
the approach has shifted away from signing agreements all at once in favor of
enacting provisional agreements that eventually lead to a permanent agreement.
This proves that the difficulty of negotiations has increased.
Taiwan’s participation in the international community has also changed.17 An
example of this is that the Taiwanese team was able to participate in the August
2008 Beijing Olympics under their preferred team name. The Taiwanese team has
always been referred to in English as “Chinese Taipei,” but Mainland China and
Taiwan have different translations of that term. In Taiwan, the preferred translation
is “Zhonghua Taibei,” which carries the connotation of “Taipei of the Republic of
China.” Taiwan had competed under this name in the past and it had previously
been accepted by the International Olympic Committee (see Table 2).18 However,
the Chinese media prefers to translate the term as “Zhongguo Taibei,” which
carries the connotation of “Taipei of the People’s Republic of China.” In a reversal
of their prior opposition, China accepted Taiwan’s term at the Beijing Olympics.
Taiwan’s participation in the international community, in particular its
participation in multilateral organizations, has also been steadily expanding. An
example of this trend was the granting of Taiwan’s observer status (at the WHO
director general’s discretion) in May 2009 at the World Health Assembly (WHA),
which is the annual meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO). Similarly,
Taiwan’s participation was approved at the annual meeting of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in November 2013.
Furthermore, China has kept silent about these political developments and has
taken the approach of letting Taiwan participate in international activities without
gaining membership. In other words, China is cautiously refraining from setting
a “precedent” with these changes in Taiwan’s international relations. If anything,
some think that the example of how the name of Taiwan’s membership of the
South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) was changed forcibly without consent
to “Central Bank, Chinese Taipei” shows that in the event that Cross-Strait
16
Yoshio Nakagawa, Ba Eikyu to Chin Suihen: Taiwan no Doko 2003-2009.3 [Ma Ying-jeou
and Chen Shui-bian: Trend of Taiwan, 2003-March 2009] Tokyo: Meitoku Shuppan, 2010:
802-803, 816-817.
17 For more detailed discussions on Taiwan’s participation in international community, see,
Bonnie Glaser, Taiwan’s Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community,
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2013.
18 ibid., : 728, 735-736.
15
relations worsen, China is “saving” a means to prevent Taiwan’s participation in
the international organizations.19
Additionally, China has stopped trying to expand the number of countries
that recognize China over Taiwan. After Malawi and China started a diplomatic
relationship in December 2007, during the end of the Chen Shui-bian administration, Taiwan broke off its diplomatic relationship with Malawi the
following month. After that, the number of countries that recognized Taiwan did
not change for some time. But in November 2013, Gambia, one of the handful of
African countries that recognized Taiwan, broke off its diplomatic relationship due
to dissatisfaction with Taiwan’s economic aid.20
Time
Details
Jan. 2008
Break of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Malawi
Aug. 2008
Use of the name “Zhonghua Taibei” by the Taiwanese team at the Beijing
Olympics
May 2009
Participation of the Taiwanese delegate as an observer at the World Health
Assembly (WHA)
Aug. 2010
De facto Chinese approval of Taiwanese economic agreements with other
countries
July 2013
Formation of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic
Cooperation (ANZTEC) Sep. 2013
Participation of the Taiwanese representative at the annual meeting of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Nov. 2013
Formation of the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic
Partnership (ASTEP)
Nov. 2013
Break of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Gambia
Table 2: Changes in Taiwan’s participation in the international community (20082013)
Source: The author created the table using the following as a reference. Takayuki Takeuchi,
“Chugoku to no Kankei Kaizen to Taiwan no Kokusai Shakai e no Sanka” [Improvement
of Relations with China and International Participation of Taiwan] in Yoshiyuki Ogasawara
and Yukihito Sato eds., Ba Eikyu Saisen: 2012 Nen Taiwan Soto Senkyo no Kekka to Sono
Eikyo [Re-election of Ma Ying-jeou: Results and Impacts of Taiwanese Presidential Election
in 2012] Makuhari: Institute of Developing Economies, 2012: 97-101.
19
Takayuki Takeuchi, “Chugoku to no Kankei Kaizen to Taiwan no Kokusai Shakai e no
Sanka” [Taiwan’s Ameliorating Relations with China and International Participation] in
Yoshiyuki Ogasawara and Yukihito Sato, eds., Ba Eikyu Saisen: 2012 Nen Taiwan Soto Senkyo
no Kekka to Sono Eikyo [Re-election of Ma Ying-jeou: Results and Impacts of Taiwanese
Presidential Election in 2012] Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 2012, 97-101.
20 Rira Momma, “Kiki wo Mukaeta Taiwan no ‘Gaiko Kyuhei’: Taiwan no Doko 2013 Nen
11-12 Gatsu.” Toa (East Asia) No. 559 (Jan 2014): 60-61.
16
However, as of May 2015, China has not responded to Gambia’s request for
the normalization of diplomatic relations, leaving Gambia in an odd situation
where it has diplomatic relations neither with China nor Taiwan. This “delay”
in establishing a diplomatic relationship with Gambia could be viewed as a
considerate move by China, an attempt both to downplay the impression that
China is actively manipulating Taiwan’s current diplomatic situation and to
dissuade other countries from building their diplomatic relationships with China
by breaking off their diplomatic relationships with Taiwan.21
2. Changes in Taiwan’s Economic Relationship
and Political Awareness toward China
1) Increasing Economic Dependence upon China
The policy changes brought about by the Ma Ying-jeou administration regarding
Mainland China are the result of the rapid development of the Cross-Strait
economic relationship. Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001, China has rapidly expanded the scale of its international trade. As figure 1
indicates, Taiwan’s trade dependency on China has continued to rise sharply even
as China’s trade dependency on Taiwan has fallen. Moreover, this rapid change
took place during the Chen Shui-bian administration, despite his administration’s
tendency to be wary of China. In terms of trade relations, China’s sensitivity
toward Taiwan is gradually decreasing, whereas Taiwan’s sensitivity toward China
is growing.22
It is unlikely that Taiwan would impose economic sanctions on China.
Meanwhile, there is a possibility that China could hold economic interests
“hostage” and directly or indirectly sanction or threaten Taiwanese companies.23
If China were to impose economic sanctions on Taiwan, the cost to Taiwan of
finding other economic partners would be high; this indicates that Taiwan is
extremely vulnerable relative to China.24 If China’s economy continues to grow
at its current pace, there is a distinct possibility that China will ignore Taiwan’s
interests in the future and use its economic leverage to make political demands.
21
Beijing has declined offers of diplomatic recognition from Paraguay, Panama, and El
Salvador. Glaser, Taiwan’s Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community:
11-12.
22 Hsu Shu-min. Minganxing yu Cuiruoxing: Hulai Lilun Xia de Liang’an Guanxi [Sensitivity
and Vulnerability: Cross-Strait Relations under Interdependence Theory] Taipei: Shih-ying,
2005:29-33.
23 While it is not in the same category as a regular “economic sanction,” there was an incident
in which China made some sort of “threat” to a former Taiwanese business owner who supported the independence of Taiwan. Nakagawa. Ba Eikyu to Chin Suihen: 284-285.
24 Hsu. Minganxing yu Cuiruoxing, 29-33.
17
%
Figure 1 Mainland China and Taiwan’s interdependent relationship (1985-2011)
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), Cross-Strait Economic
Statistics Monthly, No. 229 (December 2011), March 2012, pp. 26-27, accessed on May
31, 2015, < http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=102136&ctNode=5934&mp=3&xq_
xCat=2012>.
Note: The figure has been created using the following source as a reference. This graph
only shows data through 2011, since after that date, Taiwan changed the way it gathers
these statistics.
In addition to trade, travel between the two parties has also been rapidly
increasing. China opened its doors to Taiwanese travelers first, but Taiwan’s
wariness led to many restrictions and a mostly one-way street of travel from
Taiwan to China (see figure 2). During the early 1990s, the number of travelers
from Taiwan to China exceeded one million annually. In 2000, it reached three
million, and in 2010 it exceeded five million. After 2009, when regular flights
between Mainland China and Taiwan were offered, round trips became convenient
and the number of repeat customers increased. The visitors to Mainland China
from Taiwan numbered approximately 5.37 million people in 2014.
Figure 2: Number of travelers between Mainland China and Taiwan (1998-2014)
Source: The author created this graph using the above-mentioned as a reference. “Zi
Kaifang Yilai Jiezhi 102 Nian 12 Yue Liang’an Jiaoliu Tongjibiao” [Statistics on CrossStrait Visits from 1988 to December 2013] Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China
(Taiwan), February 2014, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/
Data/49116553371.pdf>. “Zi Kaifang Yilai Jiezhi 103 Nian 12 Yue Liang’an Jiaoliu
Tongjibiao” [Statistics on Cross-Strait Visits from 2000 to December 2014] Mainland
Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), February 2015, accessed on May 31, 2015,
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/52131552971.pdf>.
18
Meanwhile, the number of visitors to Taiwan from Mainland China reached
approximately 3.95 million people in 2014. Considering that only 291,696
Chinese people visited Taiwan in 2008, before the ban on leisure travel was lifted,
the number of visitors has increased by about 13.5 times in six years. This increase
in traffic is due to the establishment of direct flights between Mainland China
and Taiwan, which had increased to 840 passenger flights per week by March 3,
2015.25 In Taiwan, industries related to tourism are rapidly becoming dependent
on Chinese visitors.
About a million Taiwanese people are estimated to be living in Mainland China.
Meanwhile, about 300,000 people from Mainland China reside permanently
in Taiwan as a spouse of a Taiwanese resident (94% of whom are women).26
Taiwan’s ban on accepting exchange students from Mainland China has also been
lifted. The combined effect of these changes is that there are rapidly increasing
opportunities for regular Taiwanese people to interact with visitors from Mainland
China in their day-to-day lives. Since Mainland China and Taiwan have similar
cultures and speak similar languages, it is natural that increased interaction would
bring the two peoples closer together.
Chinese tourists largely travel to Taiwan in groups, so if China were to
discourage travel to Taiwan based on some sort of “administrative guidance,” the
number of tourists to Taiwan would quickly fall. This would damage Taiwan’s
tourism and related industries, such as the hotel industry and restaurant business.
Unlike investments or trade, tourists have many other options for countries to visit
and China would suffer no great effect to their economy by discouraging travel to
Taiwan. In other words, China is not sensitive in this particular area of economic
relations and only Taiwan would suffer a loss if such unilateral action were to
come from China. By building these types of economic relationships, China
has been able to make Taiwan impose both tangible and intangible voluntary
restrictions on itself.
Growing tourism and business interactions accelerated the Cross-Strait
relationship. As a result, an increasing number of people feel that the pace at
which this relationship moves forward is getting fast. The survey that has run
for more than ten years clearly points to this pattern. As shown in figure 3, the
survey indicates that 30.6 to 48.1 percent of respondents consistently feel that the
25
“Liang’an Kongyun ji Haiyun Zhihang Kaifang Qingxing” [Present Situation of Cross-Strait
Direct Aviation and Maritime Transportation] Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China
(Taiwan), March 25, 2015, p. 2, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/
Data/54110213171.pdf>.
26 First and Second China and Mongolia Divisions, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. “Saikin
no Nittai Kankei to Taiwan Jyosei [Recent Japan-Taiwan Relations and the Taiwan Situation]”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2013, p. 8, accessed on December 30, 2013, <http://www.
mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taiwan/pdfs/kankei.pdf>.
19
pace of Cross-Strait exchanges is “just right.” In contrast, those who perceive it
to be “too fast” exceeded those who think that the pace is “too slow” for the first
time in the August 2008 survey. This solidified thereafter and has since become
stable. This change reflected the fact that Ma Ying-jeou, who campaigned on the
promotion of the Cross-Strait exchange, was elected president, replacing Chen
Shui-bian, who did not actively deepened ties with Mainland China. This survey
result may uncovered the deep suspicion on the part of many Taiwanese toward
the Mainland. The Ma administration’s policy to strengthen ties with Mainland
China paradoxically increased the number of Taiwanese who grew cautious about
the policy.
%
Figure 3 : The Pace of Cross-Strait Exchanges (2002-2015)
Source: “Minzhong dui Zhengfu Dalu Zhengce ji Liang’an Guanxi zhi Kanfa” [Public
Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations] Mainland Affairs Council Republic of China
(Taiwan), accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=6332
&CtUnit=3932&BaseDSD=7&mp=1>.
2) Taiwanese Self-identity and the Sovereignty Question
How has the identity of the Taiwanese people changed under these new
circumstances in which Mainland China and Taiwan have become closer?
According to figure 4, the percentage of people who have a strong Taiwanese
identity – who say, “I am Taiwanese and not Chinese” – has consistently increased
from 17.6% in 1992 to 60.4% in December 2014. Meanwhile, the percentage
of people who have a strong Chinese identity – who say, “I am Chinese and not
Taiwanese” – has decreased from 25.5% to 3.5% during the same period.
The decrease in Chinese identity is thought to signify the natural decline of
the Mainlanders (waishengren), the first generation of Mainland Chinese people
who immigrated to Taiwan. The percentage of people who identify themselves as
both Taiwanese and Chinese hovered around 40% until 2008. Since then, people
20
who dual-identify have been decreasing and some have started to identify as “not
Chinese,” pushing the ratio of Taiwanese identity up. Between 2008 and 2014,
during the Ma Ying-jeou administration, there has been a natural decline in the
number of people who strongly identify as Chinese and a notable increase in the
number of people who strongly identify as Taiwanese.
%
Figure 4 : The Distribution of Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan (1992-December
2014)
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Changes in the Taiwanese/
Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU
(1992-December 2014),” accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.
php?Sn=166 >.
However, an increase in Taiwanese identity does not necessarily mean an
increase in support for an independent Taiwan. As shown in figure 5, neither
the percentage of people who support “unification as soon as possible” nor the
percentage of people who support “independence as soon as possible” has ever
reached 10% between 1994 and December 2014. Currently, in December 2014,
the percentage of people who broadly support unification is 10.2%, and the
percentage of people who broadly support independence is 23.8%. Meanwhile,
58.8% of people support the status quo. Additionally, excluding people who
want to change the current situation as soon as possible, approximately 80% to
90% of people consistently prefer the status quo for the time being. Moreover,
the percentage of people who broadly support independence has only increased
from 23.1% in 2008 to 23.8% in December 2014, which clearly shows that
self-identifying as Taiwanese and supporting Taiwanese independence do not
necessarily correlate with one another.
21
Figure 5: Support Distribution of Status-Quo, Independence, and Unification in
Taiwan (1994 – December 2014)
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Changes in the UnificationIndependence Stance of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU
(1994-December 2014),” accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news
php?Sn=167>.
This disparity can be easily understood by the results of a public opinion poll
conducted by TVBS, a Taiwanese TV station. The poll only asked about two
choices, independence or unification, and excluded the status quo. The support
for independence was 55% in March 2007, but it reached 71% in October 2013
(see figure 6). TVBS also conducted a public opinion poll that included the status
quo as one of the possible responses, and in these results a majority of people
supported the status quo. These results were similar to those of a survey conducted
by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.
The first poll from TVBS fills in the gaps in the poll by the Election Study
Center, National Chengchi University. The TVBS poll does show that there is
a gap between identity and the sovereignty question in Taiwan, but it is also
possible to conclude that the Taiwanese people have a strong preference for
independence. The fact that this poll was conducted by TVBS, a TV station tinged
with strong anti-Taiwan independence views, reinforces this reading. The people
who support Taiwanese independence but chose status quo could fear the possible
ramifications on the Taiwanese economy by China’s use of force. Masahiro
Wakabayashi expressed this situation as “the dilemma in choosing between bread
and love.”27 This dilemma has become even more intractable since the beginning
27
Masahiro Wakabayashi, Taiwan no Seiji: Chukaminkoku Taiwanka no Sengoshi [Politics in
Taiwan: Post-War History of Localization of ROC] Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2008,
pp. 358-365.
22
of the Ma Ying-jeou administration as Taiwan’s economic dependence on China
has increased.
%
Figure 6: Support Distribution of two choices: independence or unification in Taiwan
(1994 – October 2013)
Source: The figure was created using the following as a reference. “Ma-Xi Hui yu
Guozu Rentong Mindiao” [Polls on Ma-Xi Meeting and National Identities] TVBS
Poll Center, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://home.tvbs.com.tw/static/FILE_DB/
PCH/201311/20131106112520608.pdf>.
To better understand the changes that have taken place under the Ma Yingjeou administration, a Taiwanese political scientist, Lin Chiung-chu, conducted
a follow-up survey from 2004 to 2008. The survey asked both about the identity
of the Taiwanese people and about the sovereignty question and analyzed the
relationship between the two.28 The results provide a key to understanding the
situation:
1) Compared to the sovereignty question, people’s identity remained relatively
stable.
2) People who identified as either Taiwanese or Chinese were more likely to
switch to having a dual identity, but people who started out identifying with
both were more likely to switch to identifying only as Taiwanese.
3) The identity of people who were highly educated was not likely to change,
but people with low-levels of education tended to change easily depending
on the state of Cross-Strait relations.
28
See, Lin Chiung-chu, “Wending yu Biandong: Taiwan Minzhong de ‘Taiwanren /
Zhongguoren’ Rentong yu Tongdu Lichang zhi Fenxi” [Change and Continuity: An Analysis
of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity and Position on the Cross-Strait Relations] Journal of Electoral
Studies, Vol.19, No.1, May 2012: 98-119.
23
4) The people who have visited Mainland China and / or lived there do not
easily change their identity either way due to their knowledge of Mainland
China.
5) Their identity determined how respondents answered the sovereignty
question.
What kind of causal relationship exists between the trend toward greater
Taiwanese self-identity and the changes that have occurred since the election of
Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 – for example, the easing of Cross-Strait relations and the
number of tourists from China to Taiwan dramatically increasing?
As Lin Chiung-chu’s research outlines, until 2008, the only Taiwanese people
who visited Mainland China were those transferred there by their companies, or
those who had a high level of income or education and could afford to travel to a
“foreign country.” However, it is possible that Taiwanese people from all social
classes, even those with low levels of education, have had more contact with
Chinese visitors in Taiwan as travel between the two has increased. For Taiwanese
people, this contact has highlighted the differences between them and the visitors
from Mainland China and “stirred” their Taiwanese identity. If the hypothesis
holds that people with experience with Mainland China have identities that are not
easily swayed, the trend toward increasing Taiwanese self-identity is irreversible.
3. Seeking the Development of Political Relations
1) Increasing Difficulty
As the “dilemma in choosing between prosperity and self-reliance” deepens, what
kinds of policies have the Ma Ying-jeou administration been implementing? As
the saying goes, “xianyi hounan (start with easier issues and move on to more
difficult ones),” and there are clear differences in difficulty among the issues
facing Cross-Strait relations. As previously mentioned, the policies favored by
both Mainland China and Taiwan that were relatively easy to implement were put
into place one after the other at the beginning of the Ma Ying-jeou administration.
The policies that remain are relatively difficult, and the political difficulty of
moving Cross-Strait relations forward has grown.
Table 3 outlines the details of these political difficulties. It organizes the
progress of Cross-Strait relations to this point and the political issues that impede
future progress of Cross-Strait relations. The political difficulty of these issues is
categorized into three levels: A, B, and C. Additionally, these issues are sorted into
three areas: Mainland China and Taiwan, Taiwan and other countries, and Taiwan
24
and international organizations. A: Items that are difficult for both sides and their internal authorities to agree on
because they relate to both Mainland China and Taiwan’s sovereignty principle.
B: Items which are in the interest of both Mainland China and Taiwan, but
on which there is disagreement within each side’s respective internal authorities
(consensus is made gradually in some cases).
C: Items that are relatively easy for internal authorities to reconcile, and to
which both Mainland China and Taiwan agree are in their interest or are in a
domain to which China can at least give silent approval.
As shown in the bottom-left corner of Table 3, the agreements limited to the
economic relations of Mainland China and Taiwan are relatively easy for both
sides to agree on. For example, both sides agree that Chinese purchasing groups
should be able to unilaterally purchase Taiwanese products in large quantities, just
as both sides agree that Chinese tourists should be able to make arrangements to
visit Taiwan.
However, Taiwanese economic agreements that include market liberalization
measures with China are more difficult to reconcile with Taiwanese internal
industrial policies. Similarly, it is difficult for China to agree to establish offices
with Taiwan each other, or to grant the staff of the Taiwanese office the right
to visit their “own citizens” who are detained, as those privileges are normally
limited to the staff of an embassy or consulate general. It would also mean a
drastic change in the duties of the Chinese police if they were required to notify
the Taiwanese office that their “own citizens” were detained.
Lastly, the most difficult agreements between Mainland China and Taiwan
are on issues related to both side’s sovereign status. In other words, they are
agreements such as independence, which would change the present situation of
Taiwan. As previously mentioned, the Taiwanese identity and latent support for
Taiwan’s independence are growing even under the Ma Ying-jeou administration.
As Taiwanese self-identity grows, the Ma Ying-jeou administration cannot ignore
public opinion and come up with a compromise with China on the subject of
sovereignty. Even a “peace accord” that could end the antagonistic situation would
be difficult for Taiwan to accept if it resulted in Taiwan’s legal status becoming
“part of China.” On the other hand, it is difficult for China to renounce the use of
force against Taiwan without positioning Taiwan as “part of China.”29
29
See the following on the difficulty of a peace accord between China and Taiwan. Wang
Kaochen, “Cong Taibei Guandian Kan Liang’an Heping Xieyi zhi Tuidong” [Promotion of
Peace Accord between Mainland China and Taiwan from Taipei’s Perspective] in Wu et al.
Duili de Hexie.
Difficulty
Level
Policies regarding only
Mainland China and
Taiwan
25
Policies regarding
Policies regarding a
Taiwan’s multilateral
bilateral relationship
relationship
between Taiwan and a
third country
・Formal entry into
・Changes in policies
international
of arms procurement
organizations
from the United
States
・Gain an observer
status in UN-related
・Formal contact of
organizations
high-level officials
・Bilateral economic
・Multilateral economic
agreements
agreements
・・Agreements on
changes in status quo
such as unification
A
・・Confidence-building
measures (CBMs)
・Peace Accord
・Establishment of
reciprocal offices
of the SEF and the
B
ARATS
・Tax agreements
・Agreement on Trade
in Services
・ECFA
・Purchasing activities ・Diplomatic truce
・Participation in
in Taiwan
multilateral NGOs
・Informal contact of
high-level officials
・Commencement of
・Participation
C
direct flights
in activities
of UN-related
・Acceptance of
organizations
Mainland tourists
Table 3: Levels of political difficulty regarding Cross-Strait relations and
Taiwan’s foreign affairs
Source: Created by the author.
One issue affecting not only Mainland China and Taiwan but also Taiwan’s
bilateral relationships with other countries is that though China has stopped
forcing countries to recognize them over Taiwan, they have also barely responded
in an official manner to the “diplomatic truce” that Ma Ying-jeou asked for. China
has therefore accommodated Taiwan’s claim as a matter of practice without
changing its sovereignty principle.
It is becoming easier for Taiwan to reach bilateral economic agreements with
other countries. For example, Taiwan reached a free trade agreement (FTA)
with Singapore. But Singapore already holds an FTA with China as well. When
Taiwan intends to reach an FTA with a country like Japan, which does not hold
an FTA with China, it is not clear what China would do in response. Likewise,
increasing the level of contact among high-ranking officials of Taiwan and another
country is acceptable as long as it is unofficial, but official contact remains
difficult. Additionally, the importation of arms from the United States faces
strong opposition from China, though it is usually the United States who takes
countermeasures in the face of Chinese criticism.30
30 See the following on United States’ arms export to Taiwan. Yasushiro Matsuda, “Ba Eikyu
Seikenka no Bei-Tai Kankei” [U.S.-Taiwan Relations under Ma Ying-jeou Administration] in
Ogasawara and Sato, Ba Eikyu Saisen.
26
Taiwan’s situation is similar with regard to multilateral relations. It is
not difficult for Taiwan to join non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or
international organizations in an unofficial manner, but China continues to
hinder Taiwan’s official participation in multilateral free-trade agreements or
international organizations.
2) Possibility of Progress on Political Relations
Though the development of Mainland China and Taiwan’s political relations
is one of the most difficult aspects of their relationship, both Mainland China and
Taiwan have begun to work on it. Just after his reelection in January 2012, Ma
Ying-jeou said, “I feel the weight of how history will assess me,” a statement
which raised questions.31 Just before Ma Ying-jeou’s second inaugural ceremony
in March 2012, KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung, on a visit to China, commented
purposefully on the “Cross-Strait relations” issue as “one country, two areas (yiguo
liangqu).” Later, in his inaugural speech on May 20, Ma Ying-jeou expanded the
phrase to be “one Republic of China (ROC), two areas (yige Zhonghuaminguo,
liangge diqu).” This was merely restating the situation based on the Constitution
of the Republic of China, an antagonistic rephrasing of China’s “one country, two
systems” slogan.
Meanwhile, at the 8th Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum held
in July 2012 in China, the Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin, attracted attention by
saying: “In order to improve political mutual trust, we must now maintain, protect,
and strengthen the framework of one China. The Cross-Straits are not unified,
yet China’s territory and sovereignty are not divided. The core of the one-China
framework is that Mainland China and Taiwan are part of one country and CrossStrait relations are not relations between two countries.”32
This “one-China framework” is a new expression that has emerged in CrossStrait relations. As the “1992 Consensus” proved, agreements between Mainland
China and Taiwan often hinge upon creating new words that bridge the gaps
between the different interpretations of the two entities. The phrase “one-China
31 “Ma Yingjiu: Weilai
4 Nian You Lishi Pingjia de Yali” [Ma Ying-jeou Says He Feels Pressure
of Historical Evaluation in Coming Four Years] China Review News. January 15, 2012, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://mag.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1019/8/0/8/101980850.html?
coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=101980850>.
32 Jia Qinglin, “Jia Qinglin Zai Dibajie Liang’an Jingmao Wenhua Luntan Kaimushi Shang de
Zhici” [Jia Qinglin’s Speech at the Opening of the Eighth Cross-Strait Economic Trade and
Culture Forum] The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, July
28, 2012, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2012-07/28/content_2194141.
htm>.
27
framework” is another such bridge. Although it was sporadically used in 2012,
it was not written in the political report of the 18 th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China held in November.
China has strongly pushed the “one-China framework” since Xi Jinping took
power. At a meeting between Xi Jinping and Lien Chan held in February 2013,
Lien Chan said, “Legal and institutional systems on both sides of the Strait have
implemented the one-China principle. Taiwan was originally a part of China, and
the Mainland is also a part of China. Therefore, cross-strait relations fall under the
‘one-China framework’ and do not constitute a relationship between countries.”33 It
is highly possible that these comments had been coordinated with China ahead of
time.
However, it is noteworthy that Taiwan’s comments on “one China” have started
to change. At a reception marking the 20th anniversary of the Koo-Wang talks in
April 2013, Ma Ying-jeou said, “We do not promote ‘two Chinas,’ ‘one China
and one Taiwan,’ or ‘the independence of Taiwan.”34 This is almost the same as
Beijing’s stance. At a meeting between Xi Jinping and Wu Po-hsiung in June of
the same year, Wu used the term, “one-China framework.”35 In July 2013, when
Ma Ying-jeou ascended to the post of KMT Chairman, he wrote in a telegram
to General Secretary Xi Jinping that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait will adhere
to the one-China principle” with regards to China’s definition of the “1992
Consensus.” His telegram left out the expanded Taiwanese definition that usually
follows that statement. It is likely that China also looks favorably upon Ma Yingjeou’s changes to the expression of “one China.”36
Moreover, in a National Day address in October 2013, Ma Ying-jeou said,
“Cross-Strait relations are not international relations,” which suggested that
Mainland China and Taiwan both belong to “one China.” In a public opinion poll
that TVBS conducted about this expression, 66% disagreed and 20% agreed. In
the same National Day address, Ma Ying-jeou said, “The people of both sides
of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese by ethnicity,” with which 44% disagreed
and 42% agreed in the same survey.37 Ma Ying-jeou is carefully changing his
33 “Xi
Jinping Huijian Lian Zhan Yixing Shi Xiwang Liang’an Tongbao Gongyuan ‘Zhongguo
Meng’” [Xi Jinping Says He has a Hope That Cross-Strait Compatriot Will Interpret ‘China’s
Dream’ When He Meets Lian Chan] People’s Daily (overseas edition), February 26, 2013.
34 “Gu-Wang Huitan 20 Nian: Ma Ti Liang’an Guanxi San Bu Tui” [The Twentieth Anniversary
of the Koo-Wang Meeting: Ma Says Three Nos on the Cross-Strait Relations] United Daily
News, April 30, 2013.
35 “Wu-Xi Hui: Wu Shoudu Ti Yizhong Jiagou” [Wu Poh-hsiung Says One China Framework
for the First Time] United Daily News, June 14, 2013.
36 “Lu She Tai Zhinang Zhou Zhihuai: Liang’an Shiwu Zhuguan Bumen Huitan Yinfa Xin
Bianju” [Taiwan Expert of Mainland China, Zhou Zhihuai Says Cross-Strait Working Level
Meetings Produce New Changes] United Daily News, December 17, 2013.
37 “Ma-Xi Hui yu Guozu Rentong Mindiao” [Polls on Ma-Xi Meeting and National Identities]
28
expressions regarding the discourse on “one China” to match that of China’s while
simultaneously assessing public opinion on the issue.
Ma Ying-jeou’s rhetorical shift on the principles of “one China” was done with
an eye toward a future visit to Beijing. In December 2013, Ma Ying-jeou told an
interviewer from the Yazhou Zhoukan (Asiaweek), a prominent Chinese magazine
from Hong Kong, that he would like to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit to be held sometime in November 2014.38 In the
past, no president of Taiwan has been allowed to attend the summit; instead,
Taiwan has been represented by other officials (like former vice-presidents).
It would be seen as a major “diplomatic victory” for an incumbent Taiwanese
president to attend meetings with the other major leaders of the Asia-Pacific
region, including the President of the United States. If the President of Taiwan
were to hold a “summit” with Xi Jinping and stage a historic reconciliation
between Mainland China and Taiwan at an international conference, it would be a
huge breakthrough for Taiwanese diplomacy.
It seemed that China sees the pivot of the Ma Ying-jeou administration as an
opportunity; therefore, it is preparing for a meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma
Ying-jeou. At the APEC summit in October 2013, Taiwan Affairs Office Minister
Zhang Zhijun (of the PRC) and Mainland Affairs Council Minister Wang Yu-chi (of
Taiwan) met and addressed one another using official government titles. This was
highly publicized in Taiwan. However, in China’s official statement, Wang Yuchi was referred to only as the “responsible official of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs
Council.” 39 The meeting was thus another opportunity for China to give the
impression to Taiwan that it is being flexible without compromising its principles.
In February and June 2014, Wang Yu-chi visited Nanjing in Mainland China
and Zhang Zhijun visited Taoyuan in Taiwan. They held ministerial meetings
and addressed one another using official government titles. This was confirmed
in official media in China, so it was perceived as one of the most prominent
breakthroughs in the history of the Cross-Strait relations.40 China finally began to
TVBS Poll Center accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://home.tvbs.com.tw/static/FILE_DB/
PCH/201311/20131106112520608.pdf>.
38 “Liang’an Gaofenghui Xuannian Ma Yingjiu Zhengqu APEC Huiwu Xi Jinping” [Ma Yingjeou Wants to Meet Xi Jinping at the APEC Summit Meeting] Yazhou Zhoukan (Asiaweek) Vol.
28, No. 1, January 5, 2014, p. 21.
39 “Liang’an Guanxi Zhongda Tupo: Wang-Zhang Hui Shouci Hucheng Guanzhixian” [A Big
Breakthrough of the Cross-Strait Relations: Wang and Zhang Call Official Titles Each Other
at the Meeting] United Daily News, October 7, 2013. “MAC Minister Wang and TAO Director
Zhang Address Each Other by Official Titles, Substantively Realizing “Mutual Non-Denial”
and Setting a Good Start for the Normalization of Official Interactions Across the Strait,” News
Release, Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), October 6, 2013, accessed on
May 31, 2015, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=106510&ctNode=6337&mp=3>.
40 However, in China’s official statement, Wang Yu-chi was referred to only as the “responsible
29
show its flexibility for making Cross-Strait summit meeting possible.
The China Review (Zhongguo Pinglun), a Hong Kong magazine that plays a
role in the advertisement and public relations of China’s policies toward Taiwan,
has also published a special segment arguing that the “one-China framework”
holds the key to the solution of the issues between Mainland China and Taiwan.41
Moreover, the possibility of a meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping
has broad support in Taiwan. A TVBS survey found that 54% approved and 32%
disapproved of the possibility of a meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping,
if considerations of place and official positions are not taken into account.42
3) Impact of “Sunflower Movement” and abortion of Ma-Xi Summit
Meeting
It is possible that the Ma Ying-jeou administration could step up the pace even
further. The administration has lost political capital within Taiwan since Ma Yingjeou was elected for his second term, and the president is in danger of becoming a
lame duck. The so-called “September’s political struggle (Jiuyue Zhengzheng)” of
September 201343 highlighted his vulnerability. The struggle was triggered by the
disclosure of wiretaps showing that the President of the Legislative Yuan, Wang
Jin-pyng, had pressured the Minister of Justice to drop individual legal cases. This
“influence-peddling” caused the Minister of Justice to resign, and the Prosecutor
General was also indicted for leaking investigative information, and resigned as
well. There is the additional possibility that Ma Ying-jeou could be prosecuted in
official of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council.” The meeting could be thus another opportunity for China to give the impression to Taiwan that it is being flexible without compromising its principles. “Guotaiban Xinwen Fabuhui Jilu (2013-10-16)” [Press Conference by
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, 16 October 2013] Taiwan Affairs Office,
State Council, October 16, 2013, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/
xwfbh/201310/t20131016_5042316.htm>. “Guotaiban Xinwen Fabuhui Jilu (2014-2-17)”
[Press Conference by Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, February 17, 2014]
Taiwan Affairs Office, State Council, October 16, 2013, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://
www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201402/t20140217_5686051.htm>. “Guotaiban Xinwen Fabuhui
Jilu (2014-6-11)” [Press Conference by Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, June
11, 2014] Taiwan Affairs Office, State Council, October 16, 2013, accessed on May 31, 2015,
<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201406/t20140611_6301692.htm>.
41 See, Zhongguo Pinglun (China Review), No. 192, December 2012. The title of the feature
is “‘Yi Zhong Kuangjia’ Nengfou Pojie Liang’an Zhengzhi Dingwei Nanti” [Will ‘One China
Framework’ Be Able to Solve the Cross-Strait Conundrum on Political Status of Taiwan?].
42 “Ma-Xi Hui yu Guozu Rentong Mindiao” [Polls on Ma-Xi Meeting and National Identities]
TVBS Poll Center, October 24-28, 2013, accessed on May 31, 2015, <http://home.tvbs.com.
tw/static/FILE_DB/PCH/201311/20131106112520608.pdf>.
43 Rira Momma, “Taiwan no Doko (From August to September, 2013): Kokuminto ga O
Kimpei Rippioincho no Toseki wo Hakudatsu, Tonai Koso ga Gekika ka” [KMT Expels the
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-pyng: Power Struggle in KMT Intensifies] Toa
(East Asia), No. 556, October 2013, pp. 50-52.
30
the future, after his term, regarding the leaking of investigative information.
%
Figure 7: Approval rating of President Ma Ying-jeou (June 2008 – May 2015)
Source: “Ma Yingjiu Zongtong Jiuren Qi Zhounian Manyidu Mindiao” [Approval Ratings
of President Ma Ying-jeou at the Seventh Anniversary of His Inauguration] TVBS Poll
Center, May 15, 2015, accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://home.tvbs.com.tw/static/FILE_
DB/PCH/201505/20150522181330713.pdf >.
Though the “September’s political struggle” initially raised questions about
Wang Jin-pyng’s influence peddling, it soon came to be regarded as an attempt by
Ma Ying-jeou to eliminate his main political opponent inside the KMT, Wang Jinpyng. This caused Ma Ying-jeou’s already-low approval ratings to worsen, and his
popularity shows no signs of rebounding (see figure 7). Ma Ying-jeou’s lame-duck
status lessens his power to influence Taiwan’s relationship with China, which
could lead to his acceptance of a meeting with Xi Jinping that is more beneficial
to China in the hopes that this historic reconciliation would sway the “assessment
of history.”
In fact, China also might have a reason to hasten the meeting between Xi
Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou. This is because there is a possibility that the opposition
party, the pro-independence DPP, might regain control of the administration at
the presidential election and the legislative elections in 2016. If this happens,
there would be no possibility for a top-level meeting between Mainland China
and Taiwan until at least 2020. Even if the KMT were to retain control of the
presidency, it is unlikely that Ma Ying-jeou’s successor would take politically
risky actions during his/her first term. Therefore, the earliest opportunity would
still be after 2020. If the Xi Jinping administration stays in power for two terms
(10 years), as is the precedent, he will leave office in 2022. The stabilization and
31
development of the current Cross-Strait relationship all took place under the Hu
Jintao administration, and the Xi Jinping administration has not made similar
gains. If Xi Jinping wanted to further develop the relationship with Taiwan, he
would not wait until 2020-2022, when he will himself be a lame duck. He would
instead aim to achieve results between 2014 and 2015 before facing reelection
in 2017. Additionally, if Ma Ying-jeou agrees to an initial summit, it will be
relatively easy for Ma’s successor to agree to future summits. Therefore, this
window of opportunity also applies to the Ma Ying-jeou administration.
However, opposition against Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services went
extreme and students and other citizens occupied the building of Legislative Yuan
for more than three weeks. This movement was positively named “Sunflower
Movement,” and supported by the public, opposition DPP and the President of
the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-pyng.44 Ma administration could not punish the
public who occupied the building since it was widely supported. This movement
was a response to Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on China, increasing
Cross-Strait contacts, growing Taiwanese identity, and growing trend of Ma
administration’s “political dependence” on Mainland China.
In June, Zhang Zhijun visited Taiwan for the first time and had the second
meeting with Wang Yu-chi. It is notable because this is the first time when the
minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office paid an official visit to Taiwan. Zhang’s trip
was originally scheduled earlier but had to be postponed due to the Sunflower
Movement. His meeting with Wang took place in Taoyuan instead of Taipei.
During the trip, Zhang was confronted with large-scale popular protests when
going around cities like New Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung.45
In August, Ma Ying-jeou received an invitation from China for a summit
meeting at the APEC to be held in Beijing. To be precise, the invitation letter
asked a representative, not Ma himself, to participate.46 The Ma administration’s
“one China framework” strategy yielded the concrete progress by bringing about
an official visit by a cabinet member from the Chinese Communist Party. This
event occurred despite the ongoing Post-Sunflower Movement that protested
against China. However, China did not take the protest well, which got in the way
of a potential summit between Ma and Xi Jinping.
This summit, if realized, would have been a major diplomatic breakthrough
44 Yoshiyuki Ogasawara, “Taiwan Gakusei Rippoin Senkyo Jiken ni tuite” [On Sunflower
Movement: Occupation Legislative Yuan in Taiwan] OGASAWARA Homepage, April 4, 2014,
accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://www.tufs.ac.jp/ts/personal/ogasawara/analysis/taiwanstudentsoccupation.html >.
45 “Weian Chubao Zhang Zhijun Congcong Li Tai” [Zhang Zhijun Rushes Back Home
Because of Security Problems] Liberty Times, June 29, 2014.
46 “APEC ‘Ma-Xihui’ Xingtong Poju” [Ma-Xi Meeting at APEC Virtually Ruins] United Daily
News, September 3, 2014.
32
for Taiwan as it was planned during the APEC where many heads of government,
such as the U.S. president and the Japanese prime minister, would assemble. But
the breakthrough was precisely what China sought to forestall. Prior to the APEC,
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council had announced that the leaders from
both sides of the Strait would not have to meet at an international conference.47
Knowing China’s intention, the Ma administration kept exploring an opportunity
for a meeting with Xi at the APEC.
The ruling KMT suffered a major blow in the local elections that took place,
immediately following the Beijing APEC meeting, on November 29, 2014. Out of
more than a thousand elected positions, including mayors of six major metropolitans and sixteen other mayors and governors, and members of regional legislative
offices, the opposing DPP overwhelmed the KMT on both popular votes and the
percent of votes gained. The KMT managed to secure only six positions of the
provincial and mayoral races.48 Although an independent candidate, Ko Wen-je,
won the mayor of Taipei, many voters who cast their votes for him were supporters for the DPP. In the aftermath, Ma Ying-jeou resigned from party leadership.
The conventional view on the 2014 local elections is that the Sunflower
Movement, a popular movement against the incumbent Ma administration, had
strong repercussions on the Taiwanese electorate. Yoshiyuki Ogasawara points out
that “[t]hough data showed the economy to be growing, relatively few sensed this
in their own lives; this was the key factor behind popular dissatisfaction…. During
the campaign, attention focused on the fact that Sean Lien is the eldest son of
Lien Chan, honorary chairman of the KMT, and has great wealth. This attention
was related to the increased wariness toward China that was promoted by the
“Sunflower Movement” earlier in the year. Sociologists in Taiwan had been
presenting the concept of the “Cross-Strait elite,” referring to those who are
profiting from deep involvement in the structure of political and economic ties
between Taiwan and China; for many people this was just an abstract notion, but
Sean Lien’s emergence gave an actual face to the concept.”49 KMT’s strong ties
with the Mainland China gave an extremely negative impact to the elections.
As a consequence, Ma administration’s policies to seek political exchanges,
especially an attempt and a failure of the summit meeting with Xi Jinping, were
too ambitious and untimely, thus did not respect the will of most of the voters.
47
“Guotaiban Xinwen Fabuhui Jilu (2013-10-16)” [Press Conference by Taiwan Affairs
Office of the State Council PRC, 16 October 2013] Taiwan Affairs Office, State Council,
October 16, 2013, accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201310/
t20131016_5042316.htm >.
48 “Kuomindang Dakuibai” [Disastrous Defeat of KMT] United Daily News, November 30,
2014.
49 Yoshiyuki Ogasawara, “Taiwanese Voters Say No to Ma Ying-jeou,” nippon.com, January
19, 2015, accessed on May 31, 2015, < http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00155/>.
33
The local elections gave a great impetus for the DPP’s comeback in 2016. The
Ma administration, while successfully stabilizing the relationship with Mainland
China, ironically failed to gain support for it from the Taiwanese electorate.
Conclusion
This paper outlined the structural changes that have occurred in Cross-Strait
relations due to the policy shifts by the Ma Ying-jeou administration of Taiwan.
First, the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s conciliatory policies toward China
promoted the stabilization and institutionalization of Cross-Strait relations through
the manipulation of the definition of “one China.” In the past, Mainland China
and Taiwan’s adversarial relationship inhibited any exchanges, dialogues, or
negotiations. Ma Ying-jeou’s clear opposition to Taiwanese independence, and
his embrace of the “1992 Consensus,” made such exchanges possible. This has
resulted in greater stability for domestic and international investors who engage in
economic activities in Taiwan.
Second, despite the peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations that has
taken place due to the policy shifts of the Ma Ying-jeou administration and the
Hu Jintao administration, China has not compromised its core principles on
sovereignty with regard to Taiwan. It is true that China has quietly toned down its
rhetoric on the issue of Taiwan’s independence, promoted the institutionalization
of Cross-Strait relations, and has even allowed Taiwan to gain greater traction in
the international community. However, these small compromises are all that China
has “given” to Taiwan under the “one-China principle.” Therefore, China has left
the door open to reversing course in the future and creating policies that are more
faithful to its principles.
Third, Taiwanese self-identity has grown due to increased social contact
between the peoples of Mainland China. This must have been an unexpected
development for Beijng. Beijing has been mostly successful in preventing
Taiwanese independence by increasing Taiwan’s economic dependency on
Mainland China, attempting to lay down a foundation for future unification.
Meanwhile, though Taiwan’s economic dependency on China has grown,
Taiwanese self-identity has actually strengthened. Therefore, despite these
developments in peaceful Cross-Strait relations, Mainland China and Taiwan
remain uneasy bedfellows and their relationship remains a delicate balancing act.
Fourth, Ma Ying-jeou’s failure was that, amid Taiwan’s growing economic
dependence on China, he was too quick to realize political accord with China.
The cross-Strait relations has still been one of hostility. In this political climate,
it was not surprising to see Taiwan’s economic dependence on China give rise
34
to greater political concerns among Taiwanese voters and Taiwanese political
identity. On this dimension, Ma’s policy distinguished itself from that of previous
leaders. Previous presidents such as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, who ran
a pro-Taiwan administration, would have slowed down the pace of accord with
China or adopted a policy that strengthened Taiwanese identity out of respect for
the Taiwanese electorate. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou took the risk of undertaking
policies that deepened Taiwan’s political dependence on China. The result is that
Taiwanese voters distanced themselves from him and China did not reciprocate
Ma’s policy.
Economic changes inevitably cause political changes, and economic
dependence can create political dependence. The results of the policy shifts
of the Ma Ying-jeou administration had once made a summit between Beijing
and Taipei a possibility. But repercussion from Taiwanese society is growing.
Meanwhile, China has begun to interact more with the DPP as they anticipate
a third change in the governing party of Taiwan. More and more major DPP
politicians are accepting China’s invitation to visit the country. When Chen Shuibian was running for president in 2000, he kept quiet on the issue of Taiwan’s
independence. China could be anticipating a similar situation during the election
of 2016. Regardless of which party takes power in 2016, Cross-Strait relations
may set off on a different path.
This paper is the updated English translation of the author’s article that was published
on Toyo bunka (an academic journal of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The
University of Tokyo) in March 2014.
About the Author
Yasuhiro MATSUDA is a professor of international politics at Institute for
Advanced Studies on Asia, the University of Tokyo. He received his Ph.D. in law
from Graduate School of Law at Keio University in Tokyo. He spent sixteen years
in the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan Defense Agency (later,
Ministry of Defense), as an assistant and a senior research fellow. He moved to
the Institute of Oriental Culture (later, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia) of
the University of Tokyo in 2008. He is specializing in political and diplomatic
history of Asia, politics and foreign relations in the PRC and Taiwan, the CrossStrait Relations, and Japan’s foreign and security policies. He was a member of
the Council on Security and Defense Capability in the New Era, the advisory
group of the Prime Minister in 2010. He is the winner of the seventh Yasuhiro
Nakasone Award of Excellence in 2011. He has published numerous books and
35
articles in Japanese, English and Chinese. His most recent publications in English
are “Engagement and Hedging: Japan’s Strategy toward China,” SAIS Review, vol.
XXXII, no. 2, Summer-Fall 2012, pp. 109-119 and “How to Understand China’s
assertiveness since 2009: Hypotheses and Policy Implications,” in Michael J.
Green and Zack Cooper eds., Strategic Japan: New Approaches to Foreign Policy
and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, pp. 7-33.
Address: Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, the University of Tokyo,
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033 Japan
Email: [email protected]
Policymaking in Taiwan’s SemiPresidentialism: A Case Study of the
Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA)
Mitsutoyo MATSUMOTO
Abstract
Under President Ma Ying-jeou, the government of the Republic of China (the
ROC, Taiwan) tried to improve the relations with the People’s Republic of
China (the PRC, mainland China). After the resumption of the cross-strait talks,
the exchange and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait that
were focused mainly on the economy quickly moved forward, and the crossstrait agreements, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA), were concluded in rapid succession. The ECFA is a de facto free trade
agreement (FTA) between the governments of the PRC (mainland China) and the
ROC (Taiwan). There are various studies on the ECFA, but most of them mainly
analyze the economic effects of the agreement, or consider its legal position.
However, little research from a political point of view has been conducted on
the ECFA. Then, this article discusses the features of Taiwan’s policymaking
processes under its semi-presidentialism by focusing on the policy processes of
the ECFA from the perspectives of congressional supervision of the cross-strait
agreements. This article clarifies and confirms the complexity of policymaking in
Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism.
Keywords
Taiwan, semi-presidentialism, policymaking, ECFA, congressional supervision,
the Legislative Yuan
Introduction
In Taiwan, the second change of government after democratization took place
in 2008. This meant not only the comeback of the Chinese Nationalist Party
(the Kuomintang, or the KMT), but also the return of a unified government for
38
the first time since the Lee Teng-hui administration. Under President Ma Yingjeou, who took office in May 2008, the government of the Republic of China (the
ROC, Taiwan) tried to improve the relations with the People’s Republic of China
(the PRC, mainland China). Once the long-halted dialogue with mainland China
resumed, the exchange and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait that were focused mainly on the economy quickly moved forward, the
China-Taiwan agreements (the cross-strait agreements), including the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), were concluded in rapid succession.
The ECFA is a de facto free trade agreement (FTA) between the governments
of the PRC (mainland China) and the ROC (Taiwan). The ECFA is a framework
for trade agreements with the purpose of reducing tariffs and commercial
barriers between the two sides. The “early harvest” program, the core of ECFA,
determined the list of goods or services which the phased tariff reduction should
be implemented.1
Among all of the cross-strait agreements, the ECFA has significant implications
not only in an economic sense, but also in a political sense as well. There was
much controversy in Taiwan over the ECFA, the ruling and opposition parties were
on the opposite sides the debate on the ECFA. The Ma Ying-jeou administration
promoted an early conclusion of the ECFA as a key element of its economic
policy to prevent the marginalization and isolation of the Taiwanese economy, as
well as to counteract the negative consequences of China’s free trade agreement
with ASEAN. On the other hand, opposition parties such as the Democratic
Progressive Party (the DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (the TSU) opposed
the signing of the ECFA over worries about its effect on domestic industries such
as agriculture and light industries, and concerns that it might lead to Taiwan being
annexed by China. Furthermore, there was a debate regarding congressional
supervision. After the resumption of the cross-strait talks, twelve agreements were
concluded by the end of 2009. These agreements had not completed review in the
Legislative Yuan, yet all were automatically to take effect, and this was called into
question2 The ECFA was signed on June 29, 2010. After the signing, the ECFA
was sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation. The ECFA was finally approved
by the Legislative Yuan on August 17, 2010, and went into effect on September
12, 2010.
There are various studies on the ECFA because of its significance and people’s
1
Phased tariff reduction began on January 1, 2011. The “early harvest” list of tariff concessions covers 539 Taiwanese products and 267 mainland Chinese goods. Mainland China would
also open markets in 11 service sectors such as banking, securities, insurance, hospitals and accounting, while Taiwan agreed to offer wider access in 9 areas, including banking and movies.
2 Shiou-duan Huang, “Jingwai xieding yu guohui jiandu” [Beyond the Border Agreement and
Congressional Supervision] Taiwan minzhu jikan [Taiwan Journal of Democracy], Vol. 7, No.
1 (March 2010): 148-150.
Policymaking in Taiwan’s Semi-predentialism
39
interest in the matter, but most of them mainly analyze the economic effects of the
agreement.3 Some have considered the ECFA’s legal position which is different
from the legal connotations of domestic laws or treaties with foreign countries.4
However, little research from a political point of view has been conducted on
the ECFA.5 Then, this article discusses the features of Taiwan’s policymaking
processes under its semi-presidentialism by focusing on the policy processes of
the ECFA from the perspectives of congressional supervision of the cross-strait
agreements.
1. Previous Studies and Analytical Perspectives
As far as I have investigated, only Lin Jih-wen examines the ECFA from a
policymaking viewpoint.6 He attempts to explain the variance in Ma’s policy
performance. Lin examines how policies are made in Taiwan’s semi-presidential
system modifying the veto player theory by George Tsebelis.7 Lin shows that
3 Studies strongly supporting the need of the ECFA include: Tain-jy Chen, ed., Buneng meiyou ECFA: donya quyu jingji zhenghe dui taiwan de tiaozhan [We Need ECFA: East Asian
Regional Economic Integration’s Challenge to Taiwan] (Taipei: Prospect Foundation, 2010).
Examples of those critical of the ECFA are: Quncehui (ed)[Taiwan Advocates (ed)], ECFA de
zhengjing zainan [The Political and Economic Disasters of ECFA ] (Taipei: Quncehui [Taiwan
Advocates], 2009); Rong-I Wu (ed), Jiegou ECFA: Taiwan de mingyun yu jihui [Dismantling
ECFA: Taiwan’s Desteny and Opportunity] (Taipei: Xintaiwan guoce zhiku [Taiwan Brain
Trust], 2010); Chih-cheng Lo, ed., ECFA dachongji: Taiwan de weiji yu tiaozhan [Deep Impact
of ECFA: Taiwan’s Danger and Challenge] (Taipei: Xintaiwan guoce zhiku [Taiwan Brain
Trust], 2010).
4 Tai Chuan Wang and Liu, Chia-Hua, “Liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi (ECFA) zhi xingshi jiagou yu shishi neirong” [A Formal Framework and Actual Content of the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) ] Yuedan faxue zazhi [The Taiwan Law
Review], No. 169 (June 2009): 186-199; dsChiu-miao Lin, “Liang’an qianding jingji hezuo
jiagou xieyi (ECFA) zhi guojifa shang dingwei yu guohui jiandu zhi yanjiu” [Cross-Strait
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement: Its Status in International Law and Domestic
Congressional Supervision] Faxue xinlun [Journal of New Perspectives on Law], No. 16
(November 2009): 117-151.
5 Other than Jih-wen Lin’s paper mentioned in this study, Hsu Szu-chien’s study (2011), which
used Robert Putnam’s two-level games model, is the only one that analyzed the ECFA negotiation process from a political point of view. (Szu-chien Hsu, “Advantages and Limitations of
President Ma’s Cross-Strait Negotiations: CECA/ECFA as an Example,” Si yu yan [Thought
and Words], Vol. 49, No.3 (September 2011): 55-94.
6 Jih-wen Lin, “A Veto Player Theory of Policymaking in Semipresidential Regimes: The
Case of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou Presidency,” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 11, no. 3
(September-December 2011): 407-435.
7 According to Tsebelis, veto players are individual or collective actors and the current status
of policies cannot be changed without their agreement. He states that nations’ success or failure in changing policies can be explained by three factors: 1) the number of veto players, 2)
the ideological distance between the veto players, and 3) the cohesive force within the veto
40
for semi-presidentialism, the agenda setter8 varies by the subtype and nature
of a policy. For the presidential-parliamentary system in which prime minister
represents the president rather than the parliament, the agenda setter is the
parliament if it can revise a bill. But the president sets the agenda if he controls
the ruling party and its legislators are not entitled to change a government policy.
And Lin proposes the following two hypotheses, with consideration given to
the distinctive features of Taiwan’s political system: when the legislature is
empowered to revise the government’s policy proposals, the government tends to
concede; when policymaking involves the two executive heads, legislative power
can generate inconsistency between the president and the premier. Lin further
demonstrates that these hypotheses are confirmed by case studies on Taiwan’s
policymaking in the Ma Ying-jeou presidency.
According to Lin, the legislators of the ruling party do not necessarily support
the president who serves as chairman of the party concurrently, and the policy
positions of the president does not always fit closely with that of the premier. This
is one of the characteristic of policymaking in Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism. The
ECFA is the case that the executive proposal was passed in the form in which it
was signed. Lin shows two reasons for why the final outcome is consistent with
the proposal: first, the legislative majority and the executive have congruent
preferences; second, some KMT legislators have an incentive to adjust the
proposal but are not allowed to do so.9 Lin further points out that since some
KMT politicians have personal interests in mainland China, if the legislators had
the power to revise the ECFA, then some items included in the “early harvest” list
were susceptible to adjustment. On the other hand, he says, the ECFA case shows
that the Legislative Yuan may become a rubber stamp if the content of a proposal
is not revisable.10
Lin succeeds in explaining the policymaking of Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism
logically and clearly by using the veto player theory. However, there are some
issues that still need to be examined. First, in Lin’s hypothesis, whether or not
the Legislative Yuan is entitled to revise executive proposals is an important
independent variable, and the ECFA case is treated as an example in which the
Legislative Yuan is not allowed to revise the proposal. However, in the case of
the ECFA, the biggest focus of executive-legislative disagreement was how the
players. (George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002): 19-63).
8 Actors who present “take it or leave it” proposals to the other veto players are called “agenda
setters”. The government in the parliamentary system and the parliament in the presidential
system are agenda setters (Ibid., 2-3).
9 Jih-wen Lin, op.cit., 415.
10 Ibid., 423-434.
41
Legislative Yuan should review the ECFA. Therefore, we need to discuss the case
that the Legislative Yuan is not entitled to revise the proposal as being a dependent
variable. Second, since Lin sees the Legislative Yuan as a collective actor, his
study does not quite illustrate the complicated relationship between the Speaker
of Legislative Yuan (Legislative Speaker) and legislators of the ruling party. In
fact, Wang Jin-pyng, the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, and the KMT legislators
did not speak with a unified voice concerning how the ECFA is reviewed,
and thus we cannot simply say that the Legislative Yuan was a rubber stamp.
Nevertheless, it is important for Lin to point out that for study of policymaking in
semi-presidentialism, we need to illustrate a triangular relationship between the
president, the premier, and the legislature, and also consider distinctive features of
Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism. A triangular perspective is particularly significant,
since existing studies on semi-presidentialism do underline its dual-executive
feature, namely the division of the administrative power between the president
and the premier, thus little analysis of the legislature was fully made.11
Therefore, this article examines policymaking process in Taiwan’s semipresidentialism, modifying a triangular perspective by considering the relationship
between the Speaker of Legislative Yuan and legislators (especially legislators
of the ruling party). First, we clarify the distinctive power structure of Taiwan’s
semi-presidentialism. Then, we attempt to identify the characteristics of the
policymaking in the Ma Ying-jeou presidency by analyzing bill deliberation.
Next, we focus on the case of the ECFA. How the Legislative Yuan should review
the agreement have been discussed in the context of congressional supervision.
So we first verify the nature of the cross-strait agreements, which are different
from domestic laws or treaties with other nations. Then we point out that the
government and the legislature may have a conflict in terms of congressional
supervision of the cross-strait agreements. Finally, we analyze the policy process
of the ECFA from the viewpoint of congressional supervision of the cross-strait
agreements.
2. Distinctive Features of Taiwan’s Semipresidentialism
1) Semi-presidentialism
Semi-presidentialism is a type of constitutional structure that is different from
presidentialism or a parliamentarism. Robert Elgie defines semi-presidentialism
as “the situation where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside
11
Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Semi-Presidential System: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority
Patterns,” French Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2005): 323-351.
42
a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament.” 12 The first
characteristic of semi-presidentialism is “dual democratic legitimacy.” Similar
to the presidential system, there are two elections: a presidential election and a
parliamentary election. The president and the parliament are elected in separate
elections, representing different voices of the people, and each has a different
democratic legitimacy. The second characteristic is the “dual executive”. In semipresidentialism, unlike the presidential system where the president monopolizes
the administrative power, the administrative authority is shared by two chief
executives: the president, who has autonomy from the parliament, and the premier,
who are dependent on the confidence of the parliamentary majority.13
Matthew S. Shugart shows two subtypes of semi-presidentialism based
on the relations of the two chief executives: the premier-presidential system
and the presidential-parliamentary system. The difference is whether or not
the president is empowered to dismiss the premier. In a premier-presidential
system, the president selects a premier who heads the cabinet but authority to
dismiss the cabinet rests with the parliamentary majority. That is, the president
cannot dismiss the premier. Therefore, once the premier and his cabinet are
appointed, the relationship between the president and the cabinet, which has the
parliament’s approval, becomes transactional. On the other hand, in a presidentialparliamentary system, the president can both select and dismiss the premier. The
cabinet is dually accountable to the president and the parliamentary majority, and
the relationship between the president and the cabinet becomes hierarchical.14
However, these features of semi-presidentialism are considered as ideal typical
terms. Similar to other types of constitutional structure, each country has its own
version of semi-presidentialism, and Taiwan is no exception. The next section will
examine the distinctive feature of Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism.
2) The President and the Premier
After the revision of the constitution in 1997, Taiwan can be classified as a semipresidential system.15 Besides the president, who is directly elected by the people
for four-year terms, there is the premier. How do they share the administrative
powers in such a system? According to the constitution (The Constitution of the
Republic of China, and the Additional Articles of The Constitution), the Executive
12
Robert Elgie, “The politics of Semi-Presidentialism,” in Robert Elgie, ed., SemiPresidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.13.
13 Masahiko Tatebayashi, Machidori, Satoshi and Soga, Kengo, Hikaku Seiji Seido Ron
[Comparative Political Institutions] (Tokyo: Yuikaku, 2008), 107.
14 Shugart, op cit..
15 Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan,” Yuko
Kasuya, ed., Presidents, Assemblies and Policy-Making in Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013.)
43
Yuan, the cabinet that is led by the premier, is the highest administrative organ of
the state (Article 53), and it is responsible to the Legislative Yuan, the parliament
(Article 57). There is no institutional mechanism where the president directly
controls the Executive Yuan. While the president may establish the National
Security Council and a subsidiary National Security Bureau as an advisory body
to determine major policies for national security (Article 2 of Additional Articles),
it is the premier who presides over the cabinet meeting that decides important
bills and budget/closing bills (Article 58). The president cannot participate in this
meeting.16 The president does not have veto power on bills that are passed in the
Legislative Yuan, and the president cannot exercise the authority to dissolve the
parliament, unless a no-confidence vote is passed against the premier (Article 2 of
Additional Articles).17
Meanwhile, the president is directly elected by the people. He is the Chief of
State, represents the Republic of China in foreign relations (Article 35), and has
supreme command of the army, navy, and air force of the country (Article 36).
The president has the constitutional authority to determine major policies for
national security. In this context, national security means matters related to critical
changes in national defense, foreign diplomacy, the cross-strait relations, and the
state (Article 2 of The National Security Council Organic Law). Based on these
regulations, it is understood that the president has the authority in national defense,
foreign diplomacy, and the cross-strait relations. Therefore, institutionally, the
“power sharing” between the president and the premier means that the premier is
the head of government, but the president has the authority in matters of national
defense, foreign diplomacy, and the cross-strait relations.
How is the actual performance between the president and the premier like
concerning the constitutional structure? The constitution clearly states that the
president may appoint the premier without the consent of the parliament (Article
3 of the Additional articles). On the other hand, there is no clear stipulation as
to whether or not the president can dismiss the premier.18 Therefore, based on
institutional design, the semi-presidentialism in Taiwan should be considered
a premier-presidential system.19 However, since the president can appoint the
16 Masahiro Wakabayashi, Taiwan no seiji: chukaminkoku taiwanka no seijishi [Politics in
Taiwan: The Political History of Taiwanization of the Republic of China] (Tokyo: University
of Tokyo Press, 2008), 238-239.
17 The president can dissolve the Legislative Yuan, after advising the Speaker of Legislative
Yuan, within 10 days after the passage of a no-confidence motion toward the premier.
18 Matsumoto, op. sit., 87 ; Jung-Hsiang Tsai and Chen, Hong-ming, “Zongtongguohuizhi
de yizhizhengfu yu xianzheng yunzuo: yi Ma Ying-jeou zongtong diyirerenqi weili” [Unified
Government and Constitutional Operation in President-Parliamentarism During the First Term
of President Ma, Ying-jeou in Taiwan] Dongwu zhengzhi xuebao [Soochow Journal of Political
Science], Vol. 30, No. 4 (January 2012): 145.
19 Matsumoto, op. sit., 87-88.
44
premier without the approval of the parliament, it is widely understood that the
premier is usually the president’s subordinate, and the president, who is directly
elected by people, is the de facto top leader.20 The president actually selects and
appoints his preferred person as the premier, so in fact, the premier cannot advance
his own opinion against the president’s will. This is the reality of the relationship
between these two leaders in Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism, which Chen Hongming describes as “the president-predominant semi-presidentialism.”21 Many
people in Taiwan believe the president to be the top leader of the country, since he
is directly elected by them.22 This is why all of the popularly-elected presidents
have tried to present themselves as strong presidents and why Ma Ying-jeou has
begun to strongly present himself as the de facto top leader after serving as the
KMT chairman23
In short, based on its institutional design, Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism should
be considered a premier-presidential system. However, despite this constitutional
structure, it has functioned as if it was a presidential-parliamentary system. 24
According to Shugart, the relationship between the president and the premier
becomes transactional in a premier-presidential system, but does hierarchical in
a presidential-parliamentary system. In Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism, there is
a hierarchical relationship between the president and the premier. This is shown
as the result of the actual performance of the constitutional structure, and is not
institutionally supported. The president lucks the constitutional powers to control
the premier. The president has to rely on informal techniques or non-constitutional
20
For example, the premier, Tang Fei, who served during the Chen Shui-bian administration,
stated such an understanding in his book（Fei Tang, Taibei heping zhi chun: gekui Tang Fei
140 tian quanjilu [The Spring of Peace in Taipei: Documentation of 140 days as the premier]
(Taipei: Tianxia wenhua [Commonwealth Publishing], 2011): 150-151.
21 Hong-ming Chen, “Banzongtongzhi zhi xia zongtong de faan tuidong yu lifa yingxiangli:
Ma Ying-jeou zongtong zhizheng shiqi de yanjiu” [The President’s Position Taking of Bills
and His Influence on Legislation under Semi-presidentialism: the Experience of President Ma
Ying-jeou] Dongwu zhengzhi xuebao [Soochow Journal of Political Science], Vol. 30, No. 4
(July 2012): 35-50.
22 Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Soto wo meguru riso to genjitsu: taiwan ni genzon suru minshushugi to shimin” [Ideal and Reality for the President: Democracy in Taiwan and its Civic], in
Toru Oga,ed., Hokuto Asia no Shimin Shakai: Toki to Chutai [Civil Society in Northeast Asia]
(Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2013,) : 49-82.
23 Tzu-chiao Su, “Taiwan xianzhengtizhi de bianqian guiji (1991-2010): lishizhidulun
de fenxi” [The Transition Course of Taiwan’s Constitutional System（1991-2010）: A
Perspective of Historical Institutionalis] in Yu-Chung Shen and Wu, Yu-shan, eds., Quanli zai
nali? Cong duoge jiaodu kan banzongtongzhi [Where is the power?: Semi-Presidentialism
Analyzed from Multi Perspective ](Taipei: Wunan chuban gongsi [Wunan Book], 2012): 329;
Tsai and Chen, op. cit., 145-151.
24 Constitutional law and political science scholars have differing opinions concerning whether
or not the state president can dismiss the premier; however, political science academics generally agree that Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism is a presidential-parliamentary system. Please
refer to: Matsumoto,“Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan,” 86-92.
45
mechanisms (such as the ruling party) to control the premier. Past popularlyelected presidents have chosen such methods to control or dismiss the premier,
although their specific means were different.25 The president has been able to exert
strong influence over the premier in a context of the hierarchical relationship,
not only in the fields in which he has constitutional authority, such as diplomacy,
national defense, and the cross-strait relations, but also in the government in
general.
3) The President and the Legislative Yuan
The Legislative Yuan, the parliament, has a different democratic legitimacy from
that of the president. French Fifth Republic is cited as one of the examples of a
semi-presidential system, and its president can dissolve the National Assembly.26
The president of Taiwan, however, cannot dissolve the Legislative Yuan, unless
a no-confidence motion against the premier is passed in the Legislative Yuan.
The legislative Yuan has in fact never approved a no-confidence measure.27 Even
if a no-confidence measure were passed, the change of government is not to
happen, because the constitutional structure of Taiwan is not a parliamentarism.
Taiwan’s legislators cannot concurrently hold government positions, such as the
premier or a member of the cabinet (Article 75), and are thus detached from the
policymaking process. Their career as legislators is all that they have, and often
their performance as legislators and their political careers are considered separate
from the government policy performance. Therefore, even if a unified government
is formed, the legislators of the ruling party will not necessarily support the
government’s policies if there are differences in policy preferences between the
government and the legislators of the ruling party.
Meanwhile, if the incumbent legislators do not approve a no-confidence
measure, they can complete their terms without risking dissolution of the
legislature. It would not be a rational choice for the legislators of the ruling
party, who are in the majority, to approve a no-confidence measure against the
premier because they in turn would then risk losing their seats. Even if a minority
opposing party submits a no-confidence measure toward the premier, there is no
chance that it will be passed, unless there is a rebellion by the legislators of the
ruling party. The Legislative Yuan does have authority to exercise a no-confidence
motion against the premier, but there is little possibility that the Legislative Yuan
25
26
Ibid., 86-92.
Article 12, Section 1 of the Constitution of France stipulates that the President of the
Republic may, after consulting with the prime minister and the presidents of the assemblies,
declare the national assembly dissolved. (Masanori Shiyake and Tsujimura, Miyoko, Shin
Kaisetsu Sekai Kenposhu Dai Ni Han [The New Handbook of the Constitutions in the World]
(Tokyo: Sanseido, 2010): 241.
27 Matsumoto, “Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan,” 86-92.
46
will actually exercise it.
If the Legislative Yuan does not pass a non-confidence motion against the
premier, it means that the president virtually does not have any real authority
to dissolve the Legislative Yuan. Moreover, Taiwan’s president does not have
veto power, he lacks institutional means to control the Legislative Yuan. If the
president tries to control the legislators of the ruling party, he must depend on
informal methods or non-constitutional mechanisms, the best example of which
is the ruling party. Past democratically-elected presidents had strong incentive to
serve the head of the ruling party concurrently because they wanted to control the
legislators of the party by directly enforcing the party discipline.28 The KMT has
tried to realize and exercise their policies by communicating them to the KMT
caucus in the Legislative Yuan through the KMT Central Policy Committee.
The director of the committee, who is directly connected to the chairman, serves
as a party whip in the KMT caucus. The KMT attempts to directly control
the legislators of the party by putting the caucus under the Central Policy
Committee.29
Furthermore, the relationship between the president, the Speaker of the
Legislative Yuan, and the legislators of the ruling party is important. The Speaker
of Legislative Yuan, who is the head of the parliament, has a different democratic
legitimacy from the president. According to the constitution, this is the only
position among the top of the five Yuans30 that the president has no authority
to nominate or appoint. The Speaker of the Legislative Yuan is elected by the
legislators, and must maintain the order of the Legislative Yuan and conduct
proceedings based on the fair and neutral principle (Article 3 of the Organic Law
of the Legislative Yuan). In principle, since an experienced legislator from the
majority party is elected as the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, in general, the
president and he belong to the same party under a unified government. However,
the president does not have any institutional means to control the Speaker of the
28
Lee Teng-hui also served as the chairman of the KMT after becoming the popularly-elected
president. Chen Shui-bian was not involved in DPP business when he was inaugurated as the
state president, but became the DPP chairman two years later. Similarly, Ma Ying-jeou was not
the KMT chairman, but later took the position while he was still the president.
29 Chau Yang, “Zhengdangluntihou lifayuan dangtuanzuzhi yunzuo zhi yanjiu: yi zhongguoguomindang weili” [The Operations of Party Organization within The Legislative Yuan
since 2000: The Case of the Kuomintang] (MA Dissertation, National Chengchi Univercity,
2008); 54-57.
30 The Constitution of the R.O.C. stipulates a separation of powers between the executive,
legislative, judicial, examination (e.g., conducting recruitment exams, and appointment and
management of government employees), and control (e.g., impeaching government employees, auditing accounting) branches. The presidents of the five Yuans are those of the Executive
Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan, all
of which have equal status.
47
Legislative Yuan, and this is why it is difficult for the president to deal with him.
Therefore, the president’s control over the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan
and the legislators of the ruling party depends on whether the president can
discipline them through the ruling party organizations or not, provided that a
unified government has been formed and the president is also the head of the
ruling party. In other words, this means that the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan
has no means to directly control the legislators of the ruling party. In the House
of Representatives in the U.S, under a unified government, the ruling party’s head
is the Speaker of the House, and he/she organizes the legislators of the party to
support the president. On the other hand, in Taiwan, the head of the ruling party is
the president, and the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan cannot directly enforce the
party discipline on the legislators of the ruling party. Therefore, the Speaker of the
Legislative Yuan and the legislators of the ruling party will not necessarily be able
to unite if their preferences are inconsistent with each other.
3. Policymaking in Taiwan’s Semi-presidentialism
1) Unified Government and Bill Deliberation
In this section, I consider the characteristics of policymaking under Taiwan’s
semi-presidentialism by examining bill deliberation during the Ma Ying-jeou
presidency, in light of the semi-presidential power structure discussed in the
previous section.31 First, I examine the case of the Lee Teng-hui administration,
which enjoyed a unified government under the president from the KMT, which
is the same situation as the Ma administration does.32 Table 1 is based on Sheng
Shing-yuan’s study,33 which analyzes the deliberations in the fourth Legislative
31
Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on the following literature: Mitsutoyo
Matsumoto, “Taiwan banzongtongzhi de zhidu sheji yu qiyunzuo: Ma Ying-jeou zhengfu de
gean fenxi” [The institutional design and its actual operation of Taiwan’s Semi-Presidentialism:
A Case Study of Ma Ying-jeou Administration] in Yasuhiro Matsuda, and Tsai, Zheng-jia,
eds., Taiwan minzhuhuaxia de liang’an guanxi yu tairiguanxi [The Cross-Strait Relations and
Taiwan-Japan Relations under Taiwan’s Democratization ](Taipei: Center for Modern Japan
Studies, National Chengchi University, 2013): 48-54.
32 The legislative seats of the KMT in the Legislative Yuan were 51.83% in the third
Legislative Yuan in December 1995 before Lee became the popularly-elected president, and
54.67% in the fourth Legislative Yuan in December 1998 after he became the president. It
reached 71.68% in the seventh Legislative Yuan in January 2008, before Ma became the
president.
33 Shing-yuan Sheng, “Lifajiguan yu xingzhengjiguan zai lifaguochengzhong de yingxiangli: yizhizhengfu yu fenlizhengfu de bijiao” [The Influence of the Legislative Branch and the
Executive Branch in the Process of Lawmaking: A Comparison of the Unified and Divided
48
Yuan (February 1999-January 2002). She divided all the bills in the unified
government period (the Lee administration) and the divided government period
(the Chen Shui-bian administration) by actors who submitted them (that is, the
Executive Yuan, the KMT and The DPP). Then she compared the approval rates
for each actor’s bills, and the average number of discussion days until approval
for each actor’s bills (Table 1).
Unified Government（Lee Tenghui Administration）
（February 1999-May 2000）
Divided Government（Chen
Shui-bian Administration）
（May 2000-January 2002）
Bill approval rate
(Number of
approved bills/
Number of
submitted bills)
Average
number of
days for
discussion
Bill approval rate
(Number of
approved bills/
Number of
submitted bills)
Average
number of
days for
discussion
Executive
Yuan
72.70% (221/304)
219
38.51% (181/470)
212
KMT
69.20% (164/237)
274
50.84% (181/356)
164
DPP
60.07% (182/303)
255
60.00% (129/215)
146
Others
70.67% (106/150)
290
48.15% (130/270)
160
Table 1: Bill approval rate and average number of days of discussion until approval of
bill in the fourth Legislative Yuan.
Source: Shing-yuan Sheng, “Lifajiguan yu xingzhengjiguan zai lifaguochengzhong de
yingxiangli: yizhizhengfu yu fenlizhengfu de bijiao” [The Influence of the Legislative
Branch and the Executive Branch in the Process of Lawmaking: A Comparison of the
Unified and Divided Governments] Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan [The Taiwanese Political
Science Review], Vol. 7, No. 2 (October 2003), p.86.
We can assume that the bills submitted by the Executive Yuan reflected the
policy objectives that the president wanted to promote. Table 1 shows that
the approval rate of the Executive Yuan’s bills was 72.70% during the unified
government period, surpassing that of the KMT’s bills (69.20%) and the DPP’s
bills (60.07%). While it took 219 days on average for Executive Yuan bills to be
approved, the KMT’s bills took 274 days on average, and the DPP’s 255 days on
average in the unified government period. Moreover, the Exective Yuan submitted
304 bills, which exceeded 237 bills submitted by the KMT. The number of
approved Executive Yuan bills so far was 221, as compared with 164 approved
bills submitted by the KMT. These numbers indicate that the deliberation and
passage of the Executive Yuan’s bills was prioritized, although bills from the
ruling party were allowed to a certain degree. Table 1 shows that during the Lee
administration, disagreements between the president and the Legislative Yuan did
not surface and the president’s policy issues became legislated smoothly.
Governments] Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan [The Taiwanese Political Science Review], Vol. 7, No.
2 (December 2003): 51-105.
49
Similarly, Table 2 examines bill deliberation in the Legislative Yuan during the
Ma administration. It covers the period from the inauguration of President Ma (May
20, 2008) to the closing of the seventh Legislative Yuan (January 20, 2012). Since
Ma also served as the KMT chairman starting in October 2009,34 we compare
the approval rates and the average number of discussion days until approval for
each actor’s bills before and after his inauguration as the KMT chairman. Before
Ma became the KMT chairman, the approval rate of the Executive Yuan’s bills
was 60.49%, which significantly exceeded that of the KMT’s bills (32.44%) or
the DPP’s bills (22.56%). Regarding the average number of days for discussion,
the Executive Yuan's bills took 121 days, as compared with 164 and 153 days,
repectively, for bill proposed by the KMT and DPP.
Before Ma became KMT Chairman After Ma became KMT Chairman
(May 20, 2008-October 16, 2009) (October 17, 2009-January 20, 2012)
Bill approval rate
(Number of
approved bills/
Number of
submitted bills)
Executive 60.49% (147/243)
Yuan
KMT
32.44% (230/709)
Average
number of
days for
discussion
Bill approval rate
(Number of
approved bills/
Number of
submitted bills)
Average
number of days
for discussion
121
51.19% (193/377)
228
164
22.43% (196/874)
346
DPP
22.56% (37/164)
153
26.65% (105/394)
266
Others
37.06% (63/170)
166
30.75% (103/335)
250
Table 2: Bill approval rate and average number of days of discussion until approval of
bill during the first term of the Ma Ying-jeou’s administration.
Source: Legislative Yuan Database (Proceeding System), at < http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/
ttsweb?@0:0:1:lgmempropg08@@0.673847770271478> (searched date: 9 April 2012).
The same trend continued after Ma became the KMT Chairman. The approval
rate of the Executive Yuan’s bills (51.19%) was higher than that of the KMT’s
bills (22.43%) and the DPP’s bills (26.65%). Regarding the average number
of days for discussion, the Executive Yuan’s bills took 228 days on average, as
compared with 346 and 266 days, respectively, for bills proposed by the KMT and
the DPP.
However, although the approval rate of the Executive Yuan’s bills (before Ma
became the KMT chairman: 60.49%; after: 51.19%) is higher than its rate during
Chen’s divided government period (38.51%), it is less than that of Lee’s unified
government (72.70%). Moreover, the number of submitted bills and the number
34
On July 26, 2009, when Chairman Wu Po-hsiung’s term was going to end, KMT chairman
election was held. Ma was the only candidate who ran in the election, and he won with 93.87%
of the vote. On October 17, Ma became the KMT chairman in the KMT’s 18th National
Congress.
50
of approved bills tell an interesting story. During the Ma administration, both in
the number of submissions and the number of passages, the KMT did significantly
better than the Executive Yuan. Before Ma became the KMT chairman, the
KMT submitted 709 bills, which greatly exceeded 243 bills submmitted by the
Executive Yuan. The number of approved KMT bills so far was 230, as compared
with 147 approved bills submitted by the Executive Yuan. This trend did not
change much after Ma became the chairman. The KMT submitted 874 bills and
196 of them passed, while the Executive Yuan submitted 377 bills and 193 passed.
These numbers show that Ma becoming the chairman of the ruling party did not
have any effect; the KMT legislators not only submitted many more bills than the
Executive Yuan did, but also actively approved their bills more than the Executive
Yuan’s bills using the KMT’s great seat share. This is in contrast to the state
during the Lee administration.
Chen Hong-ming analyzed bill deliberation during the Ma administration,
taking into consideration Ma’s motivations and attitude towards the bills. Chen
showed results similar to those mentioned above. Even if there was an important
bill which Ma showed a strong intention to pass, he could not necessarily make it
happen. Also, the deliberation results did not show any major changes even after
Ma became the KMT chairman.35
From these results, two things became clear. First, compared to the period of
the Lee administration, the KMT legislators became more autonomous during
the Ma administration. This probably led to weaker party discipline in the ruling
party. Secondly, the effect of the president also being the ruling party chairman
did not clearly demonstrate itself in the legislative process. In other words, this did
not establish Ma’s leadership in the KMT or strengthen his control over the KMT
legislators. While the unified government might work in Ma’s favor, it does not
mean that KMT legislators supported him unconditionally. In the end, bill passage
depended on the will of the legislators of the ruling party.
2) The Legislators of the Ruling Party and Policymaking
The KMT legislators became more autonomous, because in order for them to be
re-elected, it became more important to gain support from the public, especially
from their constituents. The first reason for this is the change of the candidate
nomination system of the KMT. During the Lee administration, each local KMT
35
Chen, op. cit., 35-50. Lee Feng-yu also showed similar results. Her study covers the first
through fifth term of the Seventh Legislative Yuan by examining the deliberation of government bills and legislators’ bills in each term (Feng-yu Lee, “Zongtong yu qi zhengdang de
guanxi: faguo yu taiwan de bijiao” [The Relationship between the President and His Party: A
Comparison between France and Taiwan] in Shiow-duan Huang et al., Dangzheng guanxi yu
guohui yunzuo [The Relationship between the Party and the Government and the Parliamentary
Operation] (Taipei: Wunan Chuban gongsi [Wunan Book], 2011): 206-207.
51
office was able to propose candidates to the party leaders, but the party leaders had
the right to make the final decision. However, after the KMT slipped from power
in 2000, the party began to include opinion polls into the candidate nomination
system as part of its party reform. Since the legislative election held in 2004, the
authorized candidates in the constituencies have been chosen based on the party
vote (30%) and public polls (70%).36
The second reason is electoral reform. After democratization, the electoral
system for legislative elections combined single non-transferable vote (SNTV)
with multimember districts and proportional representation for a while. Starting
in 2008, though, a mixed system of single member district and proportional
representation was introduced.37 Under presidentialism or semi-presidentialism,
the parliamentary election is rather seen as an election to choose members of
parliament purely as representatives of the constituency, and thus the weight of
the personal vote becomes relatively higher.38 Also, in a single-member district
system, in order to be re-elected, parliamentary members pay more attention to
constituency services, and in the parliament, they tend to be active in winning
gains for their constituencies39 Due to the long history of using SNTV under the
multimember district, an electoral system encouraging the personal vote, Taiwan’s
legislators have committed themselves to building and maintaining a personal
connection with their constituents. Such a campaign culture persists after the
electoral system was changed to a mix-member majoritarian system. In fact, the
personal vote has become even more critical in some constituencies because the
new system gives candidates the incentives to acquire support from nonpartisan
voters. 40 This is why public opinion and especially electoral constituents’
reactions became important for the legislators, whose priority is to be re-elected.
Therefore, the legislators of the ruling party were more interested in serving their
constituencies than in their party’s platform or policies. As a result, members who
belong to the same party may hold different issue positions.41
Taiwan’s legislators are detached from policymaking in the government and
thus their experience and political careers are often regarded as being separate
36
Yeh-Lih Wamg, Bijiao xuanju zhidu (Zuixinban) [Comparative Electoral Institutions: Sixth
edition] (Taipei: Wunan Chuban Gongsi [Wu-Nan Book], 2012): 149-160.
37 Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Shosenkyoku hireidaihyo heiritsusei niyoru gikai senkyo to daitoryo senkyo: taiwan, kankoku” [The Parliamentary Elections under Single-Member District and
Proportional Representation and the Presidential Elections: Taiwan and Korea] , in Masahiro
Iwasaki, ed., Senkyo to Minshu Shugi [Election and Democracy] (Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten,
2013): 241.
38 Tatebayashi, Machidori, and Soga, op. cit., 91.
39 Pippa Norris, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed
Systems,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 18, No.3 (July 1997): 308.
40 Lin, op. cit., 413.
41 Ibid.
52
from the government’s policy performance. Therefore, the legislators of the ruling
party lack motivation to actively support the government’s policy proposals. On
the other hand, Ma did not utilize his personnel shuffling authority and did not try
to befriend members of the ruling party by appointing them to the Office of the
President or the Executive Yuan. Rather, his personnel policy caused resentment
among them.42 Since approval rating for the Ma adimistration continued to decline
soon after the inauguration,43 the legislators of the ruling party might hesitated
to support the Executive Yuan’s bills, which reflected Ma’s will, in order to
differentiate themselves from the unpopular President Ma.
Furthermore, the party caucuses’ negotiation system has had an influence on
proceedings in the Legislative Yuan. In the party caucuses’ negotiation system,
the Speaker of Legislative Yuan, its Deputy Speaker, the leaders of each party
caucuses, and two representatives from each caucuses attend the negotiation.
Each representative has an equal voice regardless of the caucuses’ number of
legislative seats (Article 68 and 69 of The Act Governing the Legislative Yuan's
Powers).　The party caucuses’ negotiation were instituted to respect minority
opinion and improve efficiency in proceedings. However, this watered down the
committee system, and the party caucuses’ negotiation became a place where
under-the-table bargaining among a very small number of members was done. It
was criticized as closed-door politics, with many important bills being used for
political games in this “black box”. This gave the keys to pass bills to a small
number of people, including the Speaker of Legislative Yuan.44 The majority party
cannot make proceedings go as the party wishes, and some people point out that
party discipline is restrained by the party caucuse' ngegotiation .45
42
This refers to the case when Ma nominated members of the Control Yuan and asked for
approval from the Legislative Yuan. Some of his nominations were rejected, including the appointment of Shen Fu-hsiung, who used to be a DPP member.
43 According to a poll by the major cable station TVBS, “satisfaction rate” (similar to the approval rating) for Ma was 52% on April 29, 2008, right before his inauguration. The rate decreased to 41% on June 17, a month after the start of the administration. After the “88 Flood”
on August 2009, the administration’s delayed response in the relief effort and Ma’s judgment
were increasingly criticized. The poll on August 16 showed a decrease in the satisfaction rate to
16%. Until May 19, 2011, the third year of Ma’s administration, the rate was hovering around
30-40%, and the number of those who responded “not satisfied” continued to exceed the number who said “satisfied.”（ TVBS Poll Center, “Ma Ying-jeou zongtong jiuzhi zan zhounian”
[Public Opinion Survey on the Third Anniversary of the President Ma Ying-jeou] , at <http://
www1.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/PCH/201107/iracgo82xm.pdf> (searched date: 28 March 2012).
44 Yeh-Lih Wang, “dangtuan xieshang qineng bugai” [Why Does Not Party Caucuses’
Negotiations reform] National Policy Foundation Website, at <http://www.npf.org.tw/
post/1/3689> (searched date: 20 September 2014)；Yu-jen Chou, “Lifayuan yishi touminghua
zaixian shuguang ” [There is a Prospect of Enhancing the Transparency of the Legislative
Process Again] National Policy Foundation Website, at <http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/4570>
(searched date: 20 September 2014).
45 Lin, op. cit., 410.
53
Furthermore, the party caucuses’ negotiation system has led to an increase in
the Speaker’s power. This is because he has the authority to judge whether a bill
should be sent to the party caucuses’ negotiation or not, as well as the authority
to preside over the negotiation (Article 68 and 69 of The Act Governing the
Legislative Yuan’s Powers). The Speaker of the Legislative Yuan during the Ma
administration is Wang Jin-pyng. Wang is a major player in the pro-localization
faction of the KMT and has a large number of connections in both the ruling and
opposition parties. He is also known for being Ma’s biggest rival since the KMT
Chairman election in 2005. Under the pretense of conducting fair and neutral
proceedings, Wang was able to control Ma’s administration. Moreover, he was
involved in the party caucuses’ negotiation system from its inception as the
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, and was the person with the most knowledge
about this system.46 In fact, it is up to the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan to
handle bills. Ma and Wang’s power struggle might have had a significant influence
on bill deliberations, and Ma and the executive branch probably had to make some
compromises.
4．Policymaking of the ECFA
1) The Cross-Strait Agreements and the Legislative Yuan’s Authority
This section will analyze the policymaking process of the ECFA from the
viewpoint of the congressional supervision of the cross-strait agreements. First, we
will review the Legislative Yuan’s authority regarding the cross-strait agreements,
which have some unique features. According to the constitution, the Legislative
Yuan has the authority to vote on statutory or budgetary bills, as well as bills
concerning martial law, amnesties, declarations of war or peace, treaties, and other
vital affairs of the nation (Article 63). However, statutory and budgetary bills must
be voted on after the Third Reading, other bills may be voted on after only the
Second Reading (The Act Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power, Article 7) 47.
Therefore, we can find that in addition to having voting power towards bills and
budgets, the Legislative Yuan also has the approval authority of treaties.
However, as is well known, Taiwan has been put in a very unique position in
regards to foreign diplomacy.48 It cannot conclude any treaties with countries
46 When the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Powers was enacted on January 12, 1999,
the party caucuses’ negotiation system was instituted, and Wang Jin-pyng became the Speaker
of the Legislative Yuan on February 1.
47 In the Legislative Yuan, bills are deliberated and voted on over three Readings: the First,
Second, and Third Reading.
48 As of April 2015, Taiwan has diplomatic relations with only 22 countries.
54
having no diplomatic relations. Therefore, the governments in the countries
involved have to delegate authority to institutions or groups, and the authorized
institutions or groups are supposed to sign a written document, which is
alternative to a treaty. In this case, the word “an agreement” is used. According
to the constitutional interpretation in 1992 by the Justices of the Constitutional
Court (J. Y. Interpretation No. 329), “within the Constitution, 'treaty' means
an international agreement concluded between the R.O.C. and other nations or
international organizations whose title may apply to a treaty, convention or an
agreement. Its content involves important issues of the Nation or rights and duties
of the people and its legality is sustained. Such agreements, which employ the title
of 'treaty,' 'convention' or 'agreement' and have ratification clauses, should be sent
to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation. Other international agreements, except
those authorized by laws or pre-determined by the Legislative Yuan, should also
be sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation.” However, the reasoning for the
interpretation states that “agreements concluded between Taiwan and mainland
China are not international agreements to which this interpretation relates,” and
thus the question of whether or not the cross-strait agreements should be sent to
the Legislative Yuan for deliberation is not included in this interpretation. In short,
according to the interpretation, the cross-strait agreements are not “treaties” as
defined by the constitution, and the interpretation does not provide any insight
as to whether these agreements should be deliberated in the Legislative Yuan or
not.49
This point is stipulated in “Act Governing the Relations between the People
of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area”. The current
act clearly states: “the agreement referred to in this statute means any written
document involving the exercise of governmental powers or any matter of
political issues, and executed between the Taiwan area and the Mainland area;
any additional protocol, additional provision, protocol executed, agreed minutes,
annex, and any other attachment shall constitute an integral part of the agreement”
(Article 4-2, Section 3). Also, according to the act, those agreements whose
content requires any amendment to laws or any new legislation, must be submitted
through the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan for consideration within 30
days after the signing of the agreement. As for other agreements, they should
be submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval and to the Legislative Yuan for
record, with a confidential procedure if necessary (Article 5). This means that the
Legislative Yuan’s right to review is conditional.
49
J. Y. Interpretation No.329, Website of the Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial
Yuan, R.O.C., at <http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=329>
(searched date : 30 August 2014).
55
On the other hand, According to J. Y. Interpretation No.520,50 the Legislative
Yuan not only has a right to participate in the policymaking process of the national
important policy changes, but also has an obligation to hear the report, which the
Executive Yuan has to submit concerning the important policy changes.51
Hence, there is a discrepancy in whether the cross-strait agreements should
be sent to the Legislative Yuan or not between the executive branch and the
Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan insists that it is strictly necessary for the
Legislative Yuan to supervise the agreements signed by the government from the
perspective of congressional supervision. The cross-strait agreements are vital
policy to Taiwan, and if the Legislative Yuan has a right to participate in their
policy process, then congressional supervision should not be limited to what is
stipulated in the Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan
Area and the People of the Mainland China Areas. And, no specific deliberation
procedure is stipulated in the regulations. In fact, the Executive Yuan Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC)’s minister, Lai Shin-yuan, and Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)’s President Chiang Pin-kung attended the
meetings of the related committees in the Legislative Yuan and gave reports.
However, they mainly gave only matter-of-fact explanations of the progress, and
did not report much on the preliminary discussions that dealt with the content of
the negotiations.52 In addition, the cross-strait agreements, which were concluded
before the ECFA, had not completed review in the Legislative Yuan, yet all were
automatically to take effect.
In addition, a political conflict and power struggle between Ma and Wang
intertwined with the context of the institutional conflict over congressional
supervision. Ma tried to take the lead in policymaking that related to cross-strait
relations, which is the president’s exclusive responsibility. On the other hand,
under the banner of intensifying congressional supervision, Wang attempted to
expand the Legislative Yuan’s authority in policymaking related to the crossstrait agreements, as well attempting to increase his own power as the Speaker of
the Legislative Yuan. It was “the legalization of the cross-strait agreements,” that
Wang strongly insisted on with the aim of increasing congressional supervision of
the agreements. Realizing the legalization, Wang also aimed to control Ma and the
executive branch as the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan.
50
J. Y. Interpretation No.520 was shown after the Executive Yuan declared the suspension of
construction of a fourth nuclear power plant in October 2000.
51 J. Y. Interpretation No.520, Website of the Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial
Yuan, R.O.C., at <http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=520>
(searched date : 30 August 2014).
52 Da-Chi Liao and Lee, Cheng Hsun, “Gouhui jiandu liang’an shiwu: Huaquan xiutui huo
zhenqiangshidan” [Congressional Supervision over the Cross-Strait Affairs] Taiwan minzhu
jikan [Taiwan Democracy Quarterly], Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2010): 135.
56
2) Legalization of the Cross-Strait Agreements
Critical to the legalization of the cross-ctrait agreements were the passage of “the
Cross-Strait Agreement Transaction Act” and the formation of “the Legislative
Yuan’s Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group.” The former is a piece of
legislation that is a basis for legislative participation in the cross-strait negotiations
toward concluding agreements (“participation in advance”) and examination
and ratification procedures after the conclusion of an agreement (ex-post facto
examination). The latter is a placing of a working group in the Legislative Yuan.
The draft of the Cross-Strait Agreement Transaction Act was based on the draft
of a similar Act submitted by the then premier, Vincent Siew, to the Legislative
Yuan in May 1999. Compared to the current Act Governing Relations between
the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, this stipulated more strictly
and clearly the legislative authority to review the cross-strait agreements before
their signing (holding confidential meetings in advance with the Legislative
Yuan and relevant administrative organs, participation of the legislators in the
negotiations, etc.), their right to review the agreements after their signing, the
ratification process, and the content of agreements that require a resolution from
the Legislative Yuan.53 At the time, it was decided in the Legislative Yuan that the
Internal Administration Committee, the Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs
Committee, and the Organic Laws and Statutes Committee would review the draft
of the Cross-Strait Agreement Transaction Act, but deliberations were put on hold
after that.54
The Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group is a task force in the Legislative
Yuan that oversees policymaking and policy implementation in the area of crossstrait relations. It was established in November 2001 by a resolution from the
Legislative Yuan, after a joint submission by the KMT caucus and the People’s
First Party caucus and also the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union. In the first meeting
in December 2001, two bylaws pertaining to the group’s operation and role
were stipulated: “The Legislative Yuan’s Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group
Operation Points” and “The Legislative Yuan’s Cross-Strait Affairs Responding
Group Duties”.55 The formation of this task force was later cancelled, however,
53
The Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan yi’anguanxiwenshu [The Documents of Bills Presented to
The Legislative Yuan] (Taipei: The LegislativeYuan, The R.O.C., 15 March 1999): 1-6.
54 The Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan gongbao [The Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan, the
R.O.C.], Vol. 88, No.27, the first volume (March 1999): 3.
55 The Speaker of the Legislative Yuan is the chairman, and the vice president is the vicechairman. The other 23 members are sent from each party caucuses, except for one position for a legislator who does not belong to any caucuses. (Ching-fu Yang, “Lifayuan zai
liang’anguanxi juece de dingwei: lifayuan liang’anshiwu yinyingduice xiaozu zhi yanjiu” [The
Position of Legislative Yuan in the Decision Making on Cross-Strait Relations: The Research
of Legislative Yuan’s Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group], (MA Dissertation, National
Taiwan University, 2007): 116-117.
57
when the DPP refused to send their representatives.56
Of particular note is Section 1 in the Legislative Yuan’s Cross-Strait Affairs
Responding Group Duties. It says that according to the constitution and Article
8 of the National Security Council Organic Law, this group can, in order to deal
with cross-strait affairs, request the participation of and reports from the Secretary
General of the National Security Council and the Director-General of the National
Security Bureau, the ministers of related agencies of the Executive Yuan, and the
representatives of the relevant institutions or groups, including the ARATS. According to Article 8 of the National Security Council Organic Law, the National
Security Council and the National Security Bureau, which is attached to the National Security Council, shall be monitored by the Legislative Yuan. However,
there are different interpretations of the constitution in regards to how much supervise the Legislative Yuan can have over the National Security Council, which
directly belongs to the President. In fact, the Secretary General of the National
Security Council has refused to attend the related committees in the Legislative
Yuan, giving “championing the constitutional system” as his reason, except in
the cases of the National Security Council budget bill and bills that are directly
related to the Council.57 In short, if the Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group is
established by a resolution from the Legislative Yuan, then it has the legitimacy
to be able to ask important government staffs involved in the cross-strait policy,
such as the Secretary General of the National Security Council, to attend and give
reports. The Enactment of Cross-Strait Agreement Transaction Act and the formation of the Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group may become an obstacle for
the Ma administration, who wants the cross-strait agreements to continue to move
forward smoothly.
After the change of government in May 2008, China and Taiwan resumed
dialogue, Wang immediately began to push for the legalization of the cross-strait
agreements. In June, he had the staff in the Legislative Yuan prepare a draft of the
Cross-Strait Agreement Transaction Act and submitted it to President Ma.58 Wang
explained the necessity of the Act to the ARATS’s chairman, Chiang Pin-kung,59
and asked the MAC’s Lai Shin-yuan to have the Executive Yuan submit the draft
56
57
58
Ibid., 85-87.
Ibid., 88.
Wei-Jhu Huang, “To Avoid legislation supervision in signing ECFA, Ma plays the ‘two
no’strategy,” Ziyou Shibao [Liberty Times ](17 August 2010).
59 Zhongyangshe [Central News Agency], “Wang, Jin-Pyng: SEF-ARATS Agreement should
be sent to Legislative Yuan for future reference,” Zhongshidianzibao liang’an lianghui futan
Jiang-Chen hui zhuanji [Chinatimes Cross-Strait SEF-ARATS meeting restarts, the special
collection of JIANG-Chen meeting], at <http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/Beijingmeeting/
suggest/97061601.htm> (searched date: 28 August 2014).
58
immediately.60 When the DPP caucus requested the formation of the Legislative
Yuan’s Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group, Wang took a positive stance
toward its request and asked the KMT to create the group.61
Ma never showed any outright opposition against Wang’s constant appeal for
strengthening congressional supervision. However, in regards to establishing the
Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group, he expressed his opinion as the KMT
chairman that: 1) he would not oppose strengthening parliamentary mechanisms
for monitoring the cross-strait affairs, 2) any mechanism put in place by the
Legislative Yuan to oversee the cross-strait affairs must correspond to the
legislative system stipulated by the constitution and law, and 3) any monitoring
required transparency and must be open to the media, and confidential meetings
should be avoided as much as possible.62 The KMT caucus did not show any
inclination of following Wang. Rather, the leaders of the KMT caucus and
legislators gave negative comments, such as “the current mechanism is sufficient”,
“this might be an infringement of executive rights by legislative rights”, or “this is
a violation of the Internal Administration Committee’s authority.”63
In the end, the Executive Yuan did not submit the draft of the Cross-Strait
Agreement Transaction Act before the signing of the ECFA, and the CrossStrait Affairs Responding Group did not materialize due to lack of support from
the ruling party. Ma completely contained Wang’s argument for legalizing the
cross-strait agreements and pushed forward with negotiations with China, which
reached the signing of the EFCA. The biggest reason for Ma’s success was that he
was able to keep the KMT caucus in line and secure their support. However, why
did the KMT caucus not support enhancing congressional supervision, if it would
lead to an increase in the authority and power of the Legislative Yuan and the
individual legislators? This topic will be discussed later in this article.
3) Deliberations on the ECFA in the Legislative Yuan
On June 29, 2010, the ECFA was signed during the 5th round of SEF-ARATS
high-level talks in Chongqing. With this signing, the center stage of the battle over
the ECFA shifted to the Legislative Yuan, and the point of contention switched to
60
Bei-Lin Wang, and Ciou,Yan-Ling, “Wang, Jin-Pyng urge the Executive Yuan to send the
Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act to the Executive Yuan,” Ziyou Shibao [Liberty Times]
(25 February 2009).
61 Siao-Guang Yi, and Huang,Wei-Jhu, “Wang, Jin-Pyng proposes Cross-Strait council in the
Legislative Yuan but KMT caucus rejects,” Ziyou Shibao [Liberty Times](10 August 2008).
62 This was a statement in the KMT Central Standing Committee on February 10, 2010
(Yi-Ling Liou, “Lun liyuan yingfou chengli liang’an xiaozu” [A discussion of whether the
Legislative Yuan should establish the Cross-Strait Group] (23 February 2010), National Policy
Foundation Website, at <http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/7098> (searched date: 28 August 2013).
63 Ibid.
59
the issue of how the Legislative Yuan should review the ECFA.
Ma stressed that the ECFA was not a treaty, but it should be treated as a treaty
according to international practice. He thus insisted that it should be reviewed as a
package, stating that the Legislative Yuan could not change the articles, and could
only pass or not pass the EFCA as a whole. He showed his disagreement to the
opposition party (the DPP), which demanded that the ECFA should be reviewed
article by article in committees. Ma did not want to repeat what happened when
the ban on U.S. beef imports was lifted in 2009. When Taiwan reached an
agreement with the U.S. on this issue, some of the KMT legislators rebelled and
part of the agreement was torn up.64 The premier, Wu Den-yih, stated that the
ECFA was like a treaty, and stressed that the Legislative Yuan has the authority to
reject it but cannot modify the articles. As we can see, Ma and the Executive Yuan
agreed on reviewing the ECFA as a package. Furthermore, the KMT caucus also
went along with Ma on this issue. The KMT caucus firmly maintained that it was
not necessary to review the ECFA in the committees because they decided to send
the ECFA for the Second Reading, and not to review article by article.65
Wang Jin-pyng, the Speaker of Legislative Yuan, had his own view. Wang
quoted the J. Y. Interpretation No. 329 and remarked that the ECFA should be seen
as a cross-strait agreement rather than a treaty and its reviewing process should
naturally be different from that of a treaty.66 On top of that, since the Legislative
Yuan had never reviewed the ECFA before, and since there were no laws or
regulations to stipulate its deliberation process, he stressed that it was up to the
Legislative Yuan to decide how to deliberate the ECFA. He further insisted that
both the ruling and opposition parties must discuss and reach a consensus on the
issue, based on rule of law. Furthermore, in regards to Ma’s repeated argument for
reviewing the EFCA as a package, Wang reminded him that when Taiwan signed
FTAs with El Salvador and Honduras, the Legislative Yuan reviewed them article
by article.67 Wang also expressed the prospect that party caucuses’ negotiation
would not run smoothly,68 and he repeatedly made other statements to keep Ma
Takayuki Takeuchi, “Chugoku tono kankei kaizen to taiwan no kokusai shakai eno sanka”
[The Improvement of the Cross-Strait Relationship and Taiwan’s International Affairs] in
Yoshiyuki Ogasawara and Sato, Yukihito, eds., Ba Eikyu Saisen: 2012 nen Taiwan Soto Senkyo
no Kekka to Sono Eikyo [Ma Ying-jiou Reelected: The Result of Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential
Election and its Influence] (Institute of Developing Economies, 2010,) : 104.
65 Luo-Wei Chen, “ECFA arrived in Legislative Yuan. President Ma set the tone for treating
it as a treaty,” Lianhebao [The United Daily](30 June 2010), ; Guang-Yi Li, and Cheng,JiaWun, “Wang, Jin-Pyng: it’s an agreement not a treaty,” Lianhebao [The United Daily](30 June
2010).
66 Ibid.
67 Jia-Wun Cheng, and Lin,He-Ming, “DPP cooperate with Wang against Ma? Wang: ‘Pure
nonsense!’, ” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (3 Jury 2010).
68 Jia-Han Gao, and Wang,Bei-Lin “ECFA sent to the Legislative Yuan, Wang, Jin-Pyng: the
storm is coming’ ,” Ziyou Shibao [The Liberty Times] (2 Jury 2010).
64
60
and the Executive Yuan in check. Their feud was widely reported in the media,69
but the executive saw Wang’s contention as his personal opinion rather than a
jurisprudential argument, and remained quite intransigent.70
In the end, it was Wang who proposed a compromise. Party caucuses’
negotiation on the ECFA deliberations began on July 5th. During the 2nd
negotiation on July 6th, Wang presented a compromise proposal: the ECFA could
be discussed article by article but could not be revised when it was reviewed in
committee, and in the end, it was put to the vote as a package. Furthermore, he
stated that if both the ruling and opposition parties agreed, he would call an extra
session of the Legislative Yuan on July 8th, where they would review the ECFA
in the committees and then vote on its approval as a package. He also clarified
that it was his intention to pass the ECFA by July 30th at the latest.71 All party
caucuses discussed this proposal, but they could not agree on it even after days
of discussions. In the end, the last talks held on the morning of July 8th failed.
During the meeting that was held immediately after that, it was decided that they
would hold an extra session that afternoon and deliberate on the ECFA.
As soon as the extra session began, the KMT legislators who surrounded the
chair proposed to send directly for the Second Reading. The DPP legislators
strongly opposed and clashed violently with them. The floor was thrown
into disorder, and Wang declared that he sent the ECFA to Second Reading.
Immediately after this, Wang stressed that, based on the rules of order, he
approved the proposal, since he did not hear anyone voicing opposition to the
ruling party’s proposal.72 After that, during the second extra session on August
17th, the ECFA was put to the vote as a package, and was approved in the form in
which it was signed. Thus, two months after the ECFA was sent to the Legislative
Yuan, its deliberation in the Yuan was finally completed.
4) What Made the ECFA Approval Possible?
The ECFA went into effect on September 12, after deliberation in the Legislative
Yuan was completed on August 17. The ECFA was approved in the form in which
it was signed. This was possible since President Ma was able to gain support from
69
Jia-Wun Cheng, and Lin,He-Ming, op. cit.; Sin-Huei Lin, and Lin, Jheng-Jhong, “Ma-Wang
hot line Dispose the detonator of hearty cord,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (3 Jury 2010, 5
Jury 2010).
70 Lin, op. cit., 424.
71 Yan-Ling Ciou, Peng, Sian-Jyun, and Li,Sin-Fang, “Wang, Jin-Pyng proposes a compromised version yet the dilemma remains unsettled,” Ziyou Shibao [The Liberty Times] (7 Jury
2010), ; He-Ming Lin, Yang,Siang-Jyun, Chen,Luo-Wei, and Li,Guang-Yi, “Reviewing the
Blue’s compromised proposal, Green rejects,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (7 Jury 2010).
72 The interview group of parliament by United Daily, “Reiewing ECFA spills blood. Today
fight for proceeding to the Second Reading,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (9 June 2010) .
61
the KMT legislators. However, this cannot be explained just by the fact that a
unified government came into being or the fact that President Ma served also as
the head of the ruling party. If we take a general look at bill deliberation during
the Ma administration, Ma’s strong will or his serving also as the head of the party
did not attract unconditional support from the KMT legislators. The ruling party
favored the ECFA and supported Ma’s policy of reviewing all of the articles as a
package during deliberations, and this is why the ECFA was approved without any
changes from the original agreement.
Legislators have strong autonomy and value the will of the people. The
first reason that the legislators of the ruling party favored the ECFA and ended
up supporting reviewing it as a package was that the DPP made this issue an
ideological conflict. The DPP opposed to the ECFA because of economic and
political reasons. The former included concerns about negative impacts on
domestic industries such as agricultural products and light industries, and the
latter included concerns over possibly losing Taiwan’s sovereignty. Therefore,
the DPP repeatedly criticized the fact that President Ma approved of the “One
China” principle and trivialized Taiwan’s position and sovereignty. In this conflict
between the two major parties, the DPP’s strategy probably encouraged the
legislators of the ruling party to clarify their ideology. As a result, they declared
their support for the ECFA. Furthermore, when the DPP demanded article-byarticle reviewing, the KMT supported reviewing the ECFA as a package as a
counter to the DPP’s demands.
Secondly, the ECFA is an intrinsically complicated issue, and is quite the
opposite to the case of importation on US beef. The US beef issue involved food
safety; people could understand it easily and had a strong interest in the subject.
The argument was simplified to the issue of food safety only, thus leading to strong
public opposition. This further caused some members of the ruling party to rebel,
as they wanted to value the will of the people.73 On the other hand, in the case of
the ECFA, its comprehensive content had many parts that were difficult for people
to understand, and the interests involved in the agreement was very complicated.
Among those who supported President Ma’s effort in improving the cross-strait
relations, there were some people who anticipated that they would personally
benefit from the ECFA, and most importantly, there were the relatives of the KMT
leaders, including the legislators, who had personal interests in mainland China.74
Such factors related to the ECFA issue and the complex interests connected to it
decreased the possibility of a rebellion among the members of the ruling party,
and thus the agreement between China and Taiwan was not torn up.
73
74
Tsai and Chen, op. cit., 136-144.
Xiru Tian, “Ekefa? Zhengke ‘zaoshou qingdan’ de gongkai” [ECFA? Disclosing the “early
harvest list” of the Politicians], Caixun [Wealth Magazine], No. 343 (1 April 2010): 106-107.
62
Thirdly, the public turned in favor of the ECFA. According to a poll by TVBS,
the percentage of those who approved of the ECFA was 29% in March 2009,
and then reached 35% in March 2010 and 41% in May 2010. The percentage
of those who were opposed did not change much; it was 31% in March 2009,
32% in March 2010, and 34% in May 2010.75 In other words, those who initially
did not clearly state their opinions began to support the ECFA, and the number
of supporters eventually exceeded the number of those who were opposed.
This could explain why Ma was able to obtain uniform support from the KMT
legislators during the ECFA deliberations. This could also explain some of the
reasons why they did not support the legalization of the cross-strait agreements.
And, another key factor in the approval of the ECFA was Wang. Why did he
decide to present a compromise proposal that the ECFA was put to the vote as a
package in the end, even though his own view had been very different from that of
Ma? The author would like to present two possible hypotheses and then move on.
The first hypothesis is that this situation was the result of a compromise between
President Ma, or Chairman Ma to be precise, and Wang. The second hypothesis is
that Wang gave in to Ma’s pressure. Both hypotheses are related to Wang’s political future.
Wang was elected twice by proportional representation and served as speaker
of the Legislative Yuan. According to the KMT’s rules, running for the legislative
election by a proportional representation is limited to two times. Wang was not
going to be able to run in the next legislative election in January 2012 unless the
rule was changed. To remain the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, he had to be
elected in single-seat districts, but that was no longer an easy task for him. In
spring 2010, there was a rumor that the KMT leadership would not authorize him
as their candidate in districts. Wang did not make any moves, however, and the
KMT leaders did not make any statements regarding the issue either. After the
signing of the ECFA, though, when Ma and Wang’s feud was widely reported
in July, some in the media stated that there would no longer be a position as the
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan for Wang. In the midst of this, on Saturday, July
3rd, Wang declared that he would not run for re-election in his home district while
visiting his home Kaohsiung to give a speech to support another candidate.76 Three
days later, on Tuesday, July 6th, Wang announced the compromise proposal.
When looking at the timing of Wang’s statement that clarified his intentions,
if one interprets it as Wang’s urging Ma to express his opinion as the head of
75 TVBS
Poll Center, “ECFA gongmin toupiao” [Public Opinion Survey on the Referendum for
the ECFA] (31 May 2010), at http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/201006/
doshouldo-20100601201132.pdf (searched date: 25 September 2014).
76 Huei-Yuan Cin, Jhang,Li-Syun, Chen,Wun-Sin, and Lyu, Jhao-Long “Wang, Jin-Pyng won’t
run for the legislator, the end of speaker?” Zhongguo Shibao [The China Times] (4 Jury 2010).
63
the KMT, then the first hypothesis mentioned earlier is probably closer to what
actually happened. If not, the second hypothesis is possible. Although it is not
clear if it was a “reward” for receiving something from President (or Chairman)
Ma, or if it was a compromise to receive that something, Wang opened a path
for putting the ECFA to the vote as a package by presenting the compromise.
The ECFA was passed in the Legislative Yuan and went into effect, which could
be interpreted as a victory for Ma. On the other hand, the deliberations were
completed on August 17th and took much longer than even what Wang had
proposed (July 30), and thus delayed the date when the ECFA would go into
effect. This might mean that Wang fought back.
Conclusion
This article analyzed the policymaking process of the ECFA, and it clarified and
confirmed the complexity of policymaking in Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism. The
key here was how the legislators of the ruling party behaved, although we cannot
ignore the peculiarity of the cross-strait agreements. The reason why the ECFA
was approved as the signed original that was proposed by the government is due to
the preference consensus between the KMT legislators and the Ma administration.
On the other hand, various actors, who mutually interacted, were observed. This
is not explained by treating the Legislative Yuan as one collective actor. In the
Legislative Yuan, the preferences between the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and
the legislators of the ruling party were inconsistent with each other, and this might
mean that the latter’s individual interests won out over the collective interest of
expanding the parliament’s authority.
While a unified government was realized, policymaking was a complicated
process and there was the variance in policy performance during the Ma
administration. The first reason for this is that Taiwan’s government system
is semi-presidential and has its own unique features. In addition to semipresidentialism’s inherent characteristics, the president in Taiwan has to depend
on informal means to control the premier or the parliament in order to show
leadership and promote political goals because of his limited constitutional
authority. Since the president can exclusively appoint the premier, the president
tends to be predominant between the two. On the other hand, whether it is the
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan or other legislators, the easiest informal method
which the president can use to control the Legislative Yuan is party organizations.
This is the reason why the president in Taiwan is strongly motivated to also serve
as the head of the ruling party.
However, various “democratic” reforms that were promoted in Taiwan after
64
its democratization have made the legislators even more autonomous, which
is the second reason for the variance. Electoral reform has made personal vote
more important for a legislator’s re-election. With the party reform after the
change of government in 2000, party disciplines have become more difficult to
enforce on the legislators in the KMT during the Ma administration. As for the
Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, the effect of party discipline is largely limited
by the institutional factors, that is, he is the person in charge of operating a fair
and neutral parliament, and the president does not have authority to appoint him.
Besides, there have been a power struggle between Ma and Wang during Ma’s
administration. On top of that, the relationship between the Speaker of Legislative
Yuan and the legialators of the ruling party is complicated. The Speaker of
Legislative Yuan is not allowed to have a method to enforce party disciplines on
the legislators of the ruling party, since that is controlled by the president, who is
also the party chairman. Therefore, even under a unified government, the Speaker
of the Legislative Yuan cannot necessarily win over all the caucus of the ruling
party factions to his side.
In short, Ma’s policy performance was uneven, even under the preferable conditions of a unified government, because there were too few institutional methods
for the president to use on the various actors who were involved in policymaking, which is a characteristic of Taiwan’s political system. The president needs
more informal or nonconstitutional mechanism (such as the ruling party) because
he lacks formal or constitutional powers. To put it differently, the results of the
policymaking in Taiwan’s semi-presidentialism are deeply influenced by the various actors’ preferences and interests, and the strategies based on them about each
issue, because policymaking is closely related with informal factors. Political factors such as power struggles and each actor’s personality can also have a strong
effect on the results. As long as the root of various problems related to policymaking is the political system itself, it is difficult to predict policymaking on different
issues no matter who becomes the president or no matter which party takes over
the power, and the policy performance of the president and his administration cannot help but become unstable.
65
About the Author
Mitsutoyo MATSUMOTO is Professor of the Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society at Kyoto Women’s University. He received his PhD in political
science from Kobe University in 2001. He is the author of A Study of the KMT
Party-Owned Enterprises (2002 [in Japanese]). He has also written several articles and book chapters on democratization and democratic politics in Taiwan,
including “Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan” in Yuko Kasuya
(ed.), Presidents, Assemblies and Policy-Making in Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan). “Reorganizing the Plutocracy of Political Corruption” and “The
KMT’s Reform to Power: Ma Ying-jeou and His Election Strategy;” both appeared
in Masahiro Wakabayashi(ed.), Taiwanese Politics in the Post-democratization
Period: Eight Years of Chen Shui-bian Administration (2010 [in Japanese]).
Address: 35 Kitahiyoshi-cho, Imakumano, Higashiyama-ku, Kyoto 605-8501,
Japan, The Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society, Kyoto Women’s
University.
Ma Ying-jeou’s Doctoral Thesis and Its
Impact on the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries
Negotiations1
Yoshiyuki OGASAWARA
Abstract
The Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement in 2013 not only relates to fisheries
issues, but also includes sections on the overall relationship between Japan and
Taiwan; the complicated triangle relationship among Japan, China, and Taiwan;
and the stability of the East China Sea. Many people who had been following
the reports of Japan and Taiwan’s major media were surprised that Ma Ying-jeou
played a role in the conclusion of the Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations. Ma’s
desire to practice his doctoral thesis served as the driving force for the decision.
This paper will attempt to unravel one aspect of the Japan-Taiwan negotiations
by focusing on the ideas and political actions of the Taiwanese leader, Ma Yingjeou. Tracing Ma’s thinking back to his days at Harvard University reveals that
he has, at different times, seemed like two different people holding contradictory
positions. One Ma is a Chinese nationalist who participated in the baodiao (Defend
the Diaoyu Islands) movement when he was a student, and the other Ma is an
international law scholar who puts aside the sovereignty dispute and advocates
joint developments of marine resources, which became essence of the “East China
Sea Peace Initiative.” Examining both these viewpoints will help understand the
Ma administration’s true nature.
Keywords
Taiwanese politics, Ma Ying-jeou, Japan-Taiwan relations, Senkaku Islands
(Diaoyutai Islands), East China Sea Peace Initiative
1
This paper is the English translation of the author’s article that was published on Toyo bunka
(an academic journal of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo)
in March 2014. The first draft of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Japan
Association of Asian Studies (JAAS) on June 16, 2013. I would like to take this opportunity to
thank the chairman, debaters, and members of JAAS for their valuable comments. I would also
like to express my gratitude to the editors of Toyo bunka for their help in putting this paper
together.
68
Introduction
The dispute over the Senkaku Islands is often considered to be a conflict between
Japan and China,2 but Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China or ROC) also
lays claim to the islands.3 Prior administrations of Taiwan claimed sovereignty
over the Diaoyutai Islands (Taiwanese name for the Senkaku Islands) by sending
vessels to the waters around the islands, but avoided head-to-head confrontations
with Japan. However, soon after Ma Ying-jeou took office of the president in
Taiwan in 2008, a Taiwanese fishing boat sank after colliding with a Japan Coast
Guard patrol vessel in an incident known as the Lien Ho fishing boat incident.4
This resulted in temporary tensions between Japan and Taiwan. During the
incident, the Ma administration stepped up their rhetoric and began using the
Coast Guard Administration (Taiwan’s maritime law enforcement agency) to
escort the boats of the baodiao group, which are protest groups dedicated to
protecting the (as Taiwan refers to them) Diaoyutai Islands. These actions differed
greatly from the approaches of the previous Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian
administrations, and Japanese officials took note of these changes.
After a period of tension, the Ma administration proposed the “TaiwanJapan Special Partnership” and moved toward restoring and strengthening the
relationship between Japan and Taiwan.5 At the same time, the Ma administration
changed its policy to prevent the departure of the baodiao group’s protest boats
from Taiwan. Meanwhile, President Ma has maintained the status quo policy of
“no unification, no independence, and no use of force” with regards to China
– and has expanded Taiwan’s economic relationship with China to extract
economic benefits – he has also worked to strengthen the economic and unofficial
political relationship with the United States and Japan as a support to Taiwan’s
security. The relationship between Japan and Taiwan has developed smoothly
and agreements such as the Taiwan-Japan Investment Agreement and Open Skies
2
3
In this paper, unless otherwise noted, “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China.
In June 1971, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) issued a
statement claiming territorial rights. Six months later, in December 1971, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China issued a similar statement.
4 On June 10, 2008, the Taiwanese fishing boat “Lien Ho” collided with the Japan Coast Guard
patrol vessel “Koshiki” and sank near the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Protests
occurred in Taiwan and a protest boat of the baodiao group, escorted by vessels of the Taiwan
Coast Guard Administration, entered Japan’s territorial waters off of the Senkaku Islands. The
incident ended with Japan admitting its fault over the incident and providing compensation.
5 Madoka Fukuda, “Ba eikyu seiken no ‘Tainichi tokubetsu patonashippu’: Chutai wakai
no moto deno tainichi kankei suishin” [The Ma administration’s ‘Taiwan-Japan Special
Partnership’] Mondai to kenkyu [Issues and Studies] Volume 41 No. 4 (October/December
2012): 65-97.
Ma Ying-jeou’s Doctoral Thesis and Its Impact
69
Agreement have been accorded.6
However, the Japanese government’s decision to nationalize the Senkaku
Islands in 2012 put the relationship back on rocky terms. Soon after Tokyo
Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced his intentions to purchase the Senkaku
Islands, the Ma administration went on high alert. Once Japan’s policy on
nationalization became clear, the Ma administration criticized Japan severely
as much as China, and on September 25, 2012, dozens of Taiwanese fishing
boats protested at sea near the Senkaku Islands. On the other hand, President
Ma announced the “East China Sea Peace Initiative” (hereafter referred to as
the “Peace Initiative”) and called upon the countries concerned to affirm that
“sovereignty cannot be divided but natural resources can be shared” and to “shelve
controversies and settle disputes in a peaceful manner.” President Ma placed the
Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations as the first step of the “Peace Initiative” and
worked toward the conclusion on the fisheries negotiations that had been under
discussion for 17 years. On April 10, 2013, the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement
was signed.
The Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement not only relates to fisheries issues,
but also includes sections on the overall relationship between Japan and Taiwan;
the complicated triangle relationship among Japan, China, and Taiwan; and the
stability of the East China Sea. Many people who had been following the reports
of Japan and Taiwan’s major media were surprised that Ma Ying-jeou played a
role in the conclusion of the Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations.7 This paper
will attempt to unravel one aspect of the Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations by
focusing on the ideas and political actions of the Taiwanese leader, Ma Ying-jeou.
During his tenure, there have been many instances in which the President
has been able to exercise leadership in deciding foreign policies in Taiwan. And
with regards to the Senkaku Islands dispute, Ma Ying-jeou’s involvement was
especially significant. The points at issue in this paper are the following. The “Peace
Initiative” reflects Ma’s thinking on the ROC and the perception of Taiwan’s
current situation in international politics. Tracing Ma’s thinking back to his days
6
The official names are respectively, “Agreement between the Interchange Association
and Association of East Asian Relations for the Mutual Cooperation on the Liberalization,
Promotion and Protection of Investment” (entered into agreement on September 22, 2011), and
“Exchange of Letters on the Maintenance of Civil Aviation Business” (entered into agreement
on November 10, 2011). Since there are no diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan, it
is designated as an “agreement,” not as a “treaty.”
7 For example, Asahi Shimbun (Japan’s leading daily newspaper) published an article on
November 7, 2012 entitled “Difficulty in Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Negotiations, Taiwan Turning
to Sovereignty Claim.” Another report from Asahi Shimbun on January 25, 2013 stated that
“it seems as though the Ma administration has factored in that the fisheries negotiations with
Japan would become stagnant. While saying that he would protect the fishermen, in actuality
President Ma is more interested in the sovereignty issue than fishing rights.”
70
at Harvard University reveals that he has, at different times, seemed like two
different people holding contradictory positions. One Ma is a Chinese nationalist
who participated in the baodiao (Defend the Diaoyu Islands) movement when he
was a student, and the other Ma is an international law scholar who puts aside
the sovereignty dispute and advocates joint developments of marine resources
(Figure 1). Examining both these viewpoints will help understand the Ma
administration’s true nature. The Ma administration is often discussed from the
viewpoint of China-Taiwan relations, but this paper will present a portrait of the
Ma administration from the viewpoint of the Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations.
Chinese Nationalist Ma
 Participated in the baodiao movement
when he was a student and advocated
strong territorial nationalism
 Took critical attitudes toward Japan
 Praised protest activities by the Taiwanese fishing boats
International Law Scholar Ma
 advocated to shelve sovereignty
disputes and jointly develop marine
resources
 Sought cooperation with Japan
 Called for peaceful resolution
Figure 1: Two sides of Ma Ying-jeou.
Source: Created by the author.
1. Ma Ying-jeou and the baodiao movement
Ma Ying-jeou’s father, Ma Ho-ling, was born in Hunan, China in 1920. In
December 1941, during World War II, he joined the Kuomintang (KMT) and the
Youth Army. In the summer of 1949, during the Chinese Civil War, Ma Ho-ling
moved to Taiwan, but returned to mainland China in October of the same year. At
the beginning of 1950, he fled from Chongqing to Hong Kong.8 Ma Ying-jeou was
born in Hong Kong on July 13, 1950. Ma Ho-ling once again moved to Taiwan
with his family in October 1951 and after that, he worked as a mid-level official of
the KMT in Taiwan. Ma Ying-jeou’s registered permanet address is Hunan, he was
born in Hong Kong, and he has resided in Taiwan since he was one year old. Ma
Ho-ling’s strong anti-Japan, anti-communism, and anti-Taiwanese independence
sentiments seem to have influence on Ma Ying-jeou.
Ma Ying-jeou has been an eager activist for the KMT since he was a student.
Ma Ying-jeou joined the KMT in June 1968 when he graduated from Jianguo
8 Xian-de Xi, “Ma Ho-ling, Ma Ying-jeou fu zi yu ge ming shi jian yan jiu yuan” [Ma father
and son in the research institute of revolutionary practice] Zhuan ji wen xue [Biographical
Literature] 88.6 (2006): 9.
71
High School.9 During his time at National Taiwan University’s department of Law
(September 1968 to June 1972), Ma Ying-jeou served as the small group leader
of the KMT, and as the Secretary-General of the Student Council at National
Taiwan University. When he was in his third year of university, he was selected to
be a member of the Asia Pacific Student Leadership Program by the U. S. State
Department and visited about 20 universities across the United States in 70 days
from January to March 1971. This was when the baodiao movement by Chinese
students10 was rising in the United States, and Ma Ying-jeou just came across the
movement.11
The baodiao movement started in Taiwan a little later than in the United States.
On June 17, 1971, groups of students of National Taiwan University marched to
the American and Japanese embassies in Taipei and handed over a written protest
about the Senkaku Islands. Ma Ying-jeou was one of the leaders who led this
protest and allegedly yelled statements to the effect of, “Japan has no principles,
America talks nonsense.”12 On September 17, 1972, there were protests against
special envoy Etsusaburo Shiina, who was visiting Taiwan to explain the reasons
for the breaking off of relations between Japan and the ROC. Ma Ying-jeou – who
had by this time graduated from university – also participated in this protest and
threw eggs at the Taipei Songshan Airport. He joined protests at the beginning of
October too and burned Japanese products and allegedly shouted, “Down with
Japanese imperialism!”13
Later, Ma Ying-jeou was conscripted into the military service and worked at
the Naval Logistics Command in Zuoying. Two years later, in 1974, Ma won the
SunYat-sen scholarship offered by the KMT and left for the United States to study.
First, he received a master’s degree from New York University Law School (19741976) and then received his Doctor of Juridical Science from Harvard University
Law School (1976-1981).
While he studied in the United States, Ma Ying-jeou joined the Pan-American
Chinese Anti-Communist Patriotic Student Alliance (ACPA). The group’s
origin was the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (New York
Chapter), an early baodiao association started by Chinese overseas students in
North America. The manifesto of the New York Action Committee on December
22, 1970, stated “firm opposition to the revival of Japanese militarism,” “full
9
Ibid., 18.
This term includes students from Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China, overseas Chinese,
and overseas Chinese students living in the United States. In those days, there were few students from mainland China.
11 Yi-hao Zeng, Ma Ying-jeou qian zhuan [Preliminary Biography of Ma Ying-jeou] (Taipei:
Sitak Publishing, 1994): 102, 114.
12 Ibid, 115.
13 Ibid, 122.
10
72
protection of China’s14 sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands,” “opposition
to support by the American government to the Sato administration’s plot,”
and “refusal to any international joint development until the sovereignty
issue is resolved.”15 On January 30, 1971, the Action Committee organized a
demonstration of 2000 Taiwanese students in six major cities across the United
States. Shouting “Diaoyutai is Chinese territory,” the protestors marched in
opposition of the conference on the joint development of marine resources
between China, Japan, and South Korea that was held at the time, and demanded
the ROC government to stop at once. The Action Committee was aggressive and
criticized the Chiang Kai-shek administration for being too weak in protecting the
Diaoyutai Islands. During his time in the United States, Ma witnessed this activity.
However, the following demonstration across the United States on April 10
was sabotaged by the KMT. Furthermore, it exposed the internal rift between
supporters of both the KMT and the Communist Party of China, and the baodiao
movement died down. By June 17, when Japan and the United States signed the
Okinawa Reversion Agreement, only few protests were happening. The movement
shifted to opposition to the ROC’s expulsion from the United Nations that was
in progress at the time. On December 25, 1971, ACPA was established at the
initiative of the Overseas Affairs Department of the KMT with the remaining
students of the baodiao movement.
The activities of the ACPA shifted from the initial baodiao movement to
anti-communism and anti-Taiwanese independence. In December 1978, when
President Carter announced the normalization of diplomatic relations with the
People’s Republic of China, the ACPA organized a number of protests across the
United States. Ma Ying-jeou – who was a graduate student at the Harvard Law
School – joined debates, attended United States Congressional hearings, and
wrote for magazines and newspapers on the issue.16 The ACPA published several
student magazines across the United States. One of them was Free Chinese
Monthly (Boston tongxun), a monthly Chinese magazine published in Boston.
While studying abroad, Ma Ying-jeou acted as the editor-in-chief and main writer
for Free Chinese Monthly. In the magazine, he argued on topics that aligned with
the Overseas Affairs Department of the KMT, such as: protesting the United States
for breaking off the diplomatic relations with the ROC; criticizing the Communist
14 “China” in the paragraphs that introduce the early baodiao movement in the United States,
refers to both mainland China and Taiwan. In order to prevent conflict between the supporters
of the Republic of China and supporters of the People’s Republic of China, the baodiao movement did not clarify the term “China.”
15 ACPA. Ai meng bao diao: feng yun sui yue si shi nian [ACPA and baodiao: Stormy forty
years] (Storm and Stress Publishing Co., 2012): 29.
16 Ibid, 63.
73
Party of China; and arguing against the Kaohsiung Incident.17
The ACPA eventually became less of a priority for the Overseas Affairs
Department of the KMT and after 1984, it stopped its activities in the United
States. Meanwhile, students who returned to Taiwan from the United States
established the ACPA Friendship Association and continued the activity of the
ACPA. The ACPA Friendship Association shifted its focus from protest against
the United States to counter the “opposition movement” in Taiwan that was rising
at the time. The ACPA’s stance toward pro-democracy movement was that the
continued existence of the ROC was a top priority, and only after securing the
safety of the nation could it move on to democratization. The members of the
ACPA got jobs at universities, public administrations, and party organizations the
KMT, and rose through the ranks in a party-state.
In May 1990, a succeeding group to the ACPA, the Republic of China AntiCommunist Patriotic Alliance, was founded in Taipei. The key members were
those in the KMT opposed to Lee Teng-hui and who were known as the nonmainstream faction. They were opposed to the direct presidential election that Lee
Teng-hui led. Because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, anti-communism
was no longer an issue to be emphasized worldwide and an unofficial exchange
with mainland China began. The argument of the ACPA changed from anticommunism to peaceful unification of China. However, for the ACPA, the baodiao
continued to be a core principle. The Chinese Baodiao Association, founded on
November 9, 2008, became the leading group for the actual baodiao movement
– replacing the ACPA. This is an organization of groups and individuals who had
been involved in the baodiao movement across Taiwan, and unlike the idealistic
ACPA, it advocated practical actions.
The relationship between Ma Ying-jeou and the baodiao movement is complex.
When the Chinese Baodiao Association was founded, Ma Ying-jeou sent a
message saying “he zhong gong ji (joining hands in a concerted effort).” For the
40th anniversary of ACPA on December 25, 2011, Ma Ying-jeou sent a message
saying “bao diao shang wei cheng gong, tong zhi reng xu nu li (the baodiao endeavor is not yet a success, and we must carry on with our hard work)” (Figure
2). Furthermore, the Ma administration provided financial support to the Chinese
Baodiao Association. At the National Security Council on June 14, 2011, it was
decided that government sectors such as the Ministry of Education, Ministry of
the Interior, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs would appropriate NT$ 3.15 million
(approximately US$ 100,000) to the Chinese Baodiao Association and Shih
Hsin University for their advertisement and
17
Lin-song Peng, Ma Ying-jeou zhe ge ren [This is Ma Ying-jeou] (Grassroots Pub-lishing,
2007): 34.
74
civics education.18 At the same time, though,
the Ma administration has suppressed the
departure of the protest boats and protest
activities of the Chinese Baodiao Association.
The Secretary-General Huang Hsi-lin of the
Chinese Baodiao Association has repeatedly
criticized Ma Ying-jeou.19
Figure 2 : Message sent from Ma Ying-jeou to
the ACPA　(December 25, 2011)
Source: ACPA. Ai meng bao diao: feng yun sui
yue si shi nian (Storm and Stress Publishing
Co., 2012)
2. Ma Ying-jeou’s Doctoral Thesis
The Ma Ying-jeou who joined the baodiao movement when he was a student, and
joined the ACPA after returning from the United States, was a young, nationalist
Ma Ying-jeou. Meanwhile, when he completed graduate school, Ma Yingjeou was a reasonable international law scholar. In December 1980, at Harvard
University, Ma submitted his doctoral thesis (Figure 3), “Trouble Over Oily
Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundaries and Foreign Investments in the
East China Sea.”20 In March 1981, he received his Doctor of Juridical Science.
Since the topic of Ma’s doctoral thesis relates to the Diaoyutai Islands, many
18
Xiao-bo Wang, Ma Ying-jeou shi dai de li shi jian zheng [The testimony of the Ma Yingjeou period] (Strait Academic Publishing, 2011): 349.
19 In an interview with the Taiwan Tsushin (a Japanese magazine), the Secretary-General
Huang Hsi-lin revealed the specific methods by which the Ma administration stopped the departure of the protest boat. According to him, the Ma administration sent high officials from
the National Security Council and directly requested him not to depart. When the protest boat
departed unpersuaded, it found vessels of the Navy waiting outside the port to prevent the departure (On the movement of “Let’s Protect the Diaoyutai (Senkaku Islands),” Taiwan Tsushin
(Sep. 17, 2010) at <http://taitsu-news.com/front/bin/ptdetail.phtml?Part=th10091701&Categor
y=0>, searched date: 17 November 2013).
20 A Chinese version of the doctoral thesis is available in Taiwan (Ma Ying-jeou. Cong xin hai
yang fa lun Diaoyutai lie yu yu dong hai hua jie wen ti [The discussion of the boundary delimitation of the East China Sea from the viewpoint of the new Law of the Sea] (Cheng Chung
Bookstore, 1986). However, the translation is not a full version but an abridged version, meanwhile international case laws and interpretations after the doctoral thesis was written have been
added.
75
people think that the thesis reflects a strong territorial nationalism; however, that
is not the case.21
The thesis posits that the main issue of the East China Sea is the Sino-Japanese
dispute, and indeed Japan is its concern. However, Ma positions the argument
as being over the seabed boundary delimitation of the East China Sea from the
doctrine of international law and precedents, and not over the sovereignty of the
Diaoyutai Islands. Therefore, in his thesis he outlines the claims of the countries
concerned (the ROC, the PRC,22 and Japan) with regards to the sovereignty of the
Diaoyutai Islands. It is clear that Ma agrees with the ROC’s sovereignty argument
over the Diaoyutai Islands, but the structure of the thesis sets the territorial issue
aside.
Figure 3: Ma Ying-jeou’s doctoral thesis (520 pages total: 326 pages of main body,
with notes, figures, and references)
Source: Photographed by the author.
The most important part of the thesis is the discussion and the reasoning that
“…the territorial dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands and the seabed issue can
be and should be separated” (Ma 110 and 319). A brief summary of the thesis
is as follows. Case law precedents in international law categorize the effects
that islands can have as the base point for determining the continental shelf and
21
In 1998, when Ma ran for Taipei City Mayor, multiple biographies of Ma Ying-jeou were
published. The basis of these biographies was Yi-hao Zeng’s Ma Ying-jeou qian zhuan (Sitak
Publishing, 1994). Yi-hao Zeng wrote that “Ma’s doctoral thesis was completed under the
influence of the baodiao movement” (Yi-hao Zeng, op.cit., 124), but he did not introduce the
details of the thesis. It is possible that this sentence was continually used, which led to the
misinterpretation.
22 In his doctoral thesis, Ma Ying-jeou consistently used the official name “the People’s
Republic of China (PRC)” and not “Communist China.” Further, regarding the sovereignty of
the Diaoyutai, he wrote, “ROC’s stance,” “PRC’s stance,” and “Japan’s stance” in a parallel
structure. In regards to “China,” he used “the mainland and Taiwan” if he meant in a geographical sense. When talking politics, “China” means the Republic of China including mainland
China and Taiwan. Ma also used the phrase “both China (ROC and PRC)” in his doctoral thesis. In this paper, in order to clarify what is written in Ma Ying-jeou’s doctoral thesis, both the
Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are used.
76
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as “no effect,” “partial effect,” and “full effect.”
Precedent suggests that islands that have similar conditions as the Diaoyutai
should be classified as having “no effect.” Therefore, the Diaoyutai cannot be a
base point for determining the continental shelf or the EEZ.23 The thesis states
that the delimitations of maritime boundaries are not affected regardless of the
sovereignty belonging to any country of these three, the ROC, the PRC, or Japan.
Accordingly, it states that the territorial issue of the Diaoyutai is simply over
uninhabited islands and the surrounding 12 nautical miles.
Ma points out the reality that, “while territorial claims of the coastal countries
of the East China Sea may be extravagant, they are prudent in granting concessions for offshore oil resources” (56). This is because, fearing risk, oil
companies tend to avoid concessions that do not have a clear legal basis. In other
words, if the countries continue to dispute the territory, they are forced to be
reluctant to grant concessions for offshore oil resources. With the backdrop of the
oil crisis of the late 1970s, Ma was hopeful for a resolution. “In the Eighties, the
parties will be serious about seeking a settlement of these disputes to clear the way
for oil development” (70). Ma points out three obligations that the international
law system imposes on the countries concerned. The first obligation is to conduct
“meaningful” negotiations. The second obligation is to consider all the locally
relevant circumstances to reach an agreement on actual delimitation. The third
obligation is to resort to international adjudication in the absence of an agreement
(112). Therefore, it can be seen that the original form of the “East China Sea
Peace Initiative” originates in Ma Ying-jeou’s doctoral thesis.
Ma is extremely cautious with his use of words in the thesis and does not use
direct expressions such as “shelving territorial disputes.” While he assures that the
thesis focuses on various legal issues and not on political economy, he writes that
a clear understanding of the legal issues helps to facilitate political negotiations
(325). The language of the thesis is reserved, saying that the detachment of the
Diaoyutai dispute from the seabed controversy “at least makes the geographical
dimension of the present dispute more manageable, if not any easier” (111).
However, his purport is clear, as he writes that delimiting seabed boundaries in
accordance with the international law lays out the conditions of marine resource
development by major international companies, in other words, it decreases legal
risk. It is an interesting argument coming from a member of a group that claims
territorial nationalism.
Ma Ying-jeou’s doctoral thesis sheds light on his way of thinking, and the
following conclusions can be formed. Since Ma researched the delimitation of
23
This interpretation is in conflict with the Japanese government, which positions the Senkaku
Islands as the starting point of the EEZ.
77
seabed boundaries, he formed a greatly realistic idea of the maritime boundaries
between Japan and the ROC / the PRC, South Korea and the ROC / the PRC, and
the ROC and the PRC, and the possibility of resource development at the maritime
boundaries. He must have realized that there are issues that cannot be solved
by territorial nationalism or nationalism based on emotions. After vigorously
gathering delimitation cases around the world and legal precedents of the Law of
the Sea, Ma found cases that succeeded in delimiting areas. Examples of these
include the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Australia-Indonesia Maritime
Boundary. These cases showed that reaching an agreement was advantageous
to both sides. This research was the key factor in Ma’s development as an
international law scholar while still retaining his nationalist impulses.
Ma Ying-jeou also outlines specific suggestions for the delimitation of maritime
boundaries in his doctoral thesis. Ma extensively reviewed “locally relevant
circumstances” of the Law of the Sea and thinks that in the case of the East China
Sea, the division of the North and the South Regions along the 30 degrees N
parallel seems valid. For the North Region, the equidistance principle (the median
line) is suitable and for the South Region, he suggests his own idea with a focus
on the “proportionality principle.”24 Regarding the ROC and the PRC’s claim
that their continental shelf extends to the Okinawa Trough based on the natural
prolongation principle of the continental shelf, Ma concludes, after reviewing
related case laws and theories, that the Okinawa Trough should not be the only
important factor, but should instead be one of several factors. As for Japan’s claim
of the median line, Japan’s coastline is considerably shorter than China’s given the
Ryukyu Islands’ broken chain configuration with many intervening water gaps.
Therefore, in order to realize proportionality after delimitation, the “proportionality
principle” that takes into account factors such as the costal configurations and
length of the coastline should be incorporated.
Ma believes that his solutions reject the single-method or single-principle
approaches adopted by China and Japan. Thus, he suggests his own middle
approach by adjusting Japan’s median line using the “proportionality principle”
and adjusting the ROC and the PRC claim of the natural prolongation of the
continental shelf by pointing out that they focus too much on the Okinawa Trough
(215-218). As one reference, Ma calculated the length of the coastline of the South
24 The proportionality principle delimits the boundaries of the continental shelf by comprehensively considering the locally relevant circumstances of an area according to equitable
principles. This principle was also indicated in a ruling by the International Court of Justice on
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases of 1969 (Tadao Kuribayashi. “Haitateki keizai suiiki,
tairikudana no kyokaikakutei ni kansuru kokusaihori – higashi shinakai ni okeru nicchukan no
tairitsu wo megutte” [International law and principle on the delimitation of exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf] (The Journal of the Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University 2,
2006): 3.
78
Region along the 30 degrees N parallel of the East China Sea and came up with
a ratio of China 64 and Japan 36 (181). Ma’s hypothetical maritime boundaries
between Japan and China in the East China Sea suggested in his doctoral thesis,
using the calculated ratios, would be slightly closer to the Japanese coastline than
the midpoint of the boundaries currently claimed by China (the PRC) and Japan.
In other words, the boundary claimed by China that extends close to Japan’s
Southwest Islands and the Ryukyu Islands would move about a third of the
way back to the Chinese side. The Senkaku Islands would be located near Ma’s
hypothetical boundary.25
As Ma’s interest in the thesis was the delimitation of seabed boundaries, he
formed his arguments based on interpretations of international law scholars and
case laws of the international law that were mainstream at the time. Another thesis
relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was written in
2006 by Tadao Kuribayashi, a renowned scholar in Japan. This can be used to
compare up-to-date case laws and interpretations on the Law of the Sea with Ma
Ying-jeou’s arguments.
Kuribayashi writes that the natural prolongation principle of the continental
shelf is not a definitive argument and is gradually losing its relative importance
in international judicial precedents.26 Ma also includes this point in his thesis.
In regards to which general principle either the “equidistance principle” or
the “proportionality principle” should be recognized, Kuribayashi states, “the
theoretical differences of both parties have not yet been resolved.” However, he
writes that, “It is moving in the direction of drawing a provisional median line
and adjusting that provisional line taking locally relevant circumstances into
consideration to reach an equitable agreement.”27 This shows that the cases and
interpretations that focused on the “proportionality principle,” on which Ma Yingjeou’s thesis based on, gradually changed its course.
Anyway, Both Ma and Kuribayashi are in the same ballpark. The reason Ma
made adjustments to the “proportionality principle” that was advantageous to
China in his thesis is simply because he incorporated the trends of international
cases and interpretations. Rather than the logical layout that claims the Diaoyutai
as China’s inherent territory, Ma’s argument of the delimitation of seabed
boundaries in his doctoral thesis followed a logical structure that was completely
based on cases of international law and interpretations. This was reflected in
the “Peace Initiative.” It is necessary to take notice that it has a different logical
structure from that of China (the PRC). This is because China would not base its
25
Although Ma’s hypothetical boundary would ask China to compromise, but the Japanese
government could not easily accept it.
26 Tadao Kuribayashi, op. cit., 7.
27 Ibid, 11.
79
sovereignty argument on the cases and interpretations of foreign international law
scholars.
3. East China Sea Peace Initiative
President Ma announced the “East China Sea Peace Initiative” on August 6,
2012, well after it had become clear that the Noda administration was going to
nationalize the Senkaku Islands and the tension between Japan and China had
deepened. The five key aspects of the “Peace Initiative” are:
(1) Refrain from taking any antagonistic actions.
(2) Shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue.
(3) Observe international law and resolve disputes through peaceful means.
(4) Seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East China Sea.
(5) Establish a mechanism for cooperation on the exploring and developing
resources in the East China Sea.
On September 7, Ma announced implementation guidelines for the “Peace
Initiative” and proposed the following topics for dialogue.
(1) Fishing industry (emphasis by the author)
(2) Mining of seabed resources
(3) Marine science research and maritime environmental protection
(4) Maritime security
(5) East China Sea Code of Conduct
In order to stabilize the situation in the East China Sea, Ma proposed a plan to
start from three parallel tracks of bilateral dialogue (between Taiwan and Japan,
Taiwan and mainland China, and Japan and mainland China) to move to one track
of trilateral negotiations among Taiwan, Japan, and mainland China.
In reality, the “Peace Initiative” is not an unforeseen idea. I hear that Taiwan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been working on the plan for three years. A
statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 12, 2009 was the
foundation for the plan. In the statement, Taiwan claimed the rights to the
Diaoyutai Islands as well as their surrounding waters and their respective seabed
based on the natural prolongation principle of the continental shelf. Furthermore,
similar to Ma’s doctoral thesis, the statement said that the negotiations on
delimitating boundaries with the surrounding countries should be in accordance
with the “equitable principle.” Meanwhile, the statement declared that until said
agreement is made, “Together we should maintain regional peace and stable
development and substantively promote positive relations under the principle of
80
‘joint exploitation and resources-sharing.’”28
The “Peace Initiative” is by no means pure pacifism. President Ma proposed the
“Peace Initiative” with the aim of protecting Taiwan’s interests and strengthening
the ROC’s position while Japan and China are in conflict. Taiwan lies at the
intersection of the influence of the top three countries in the world by GDP – the
United States, China, and Japan. Thus, Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy is to subtly
secure interests from each of the three countries without angering the others.
However, if the territorial dispute were to move in a more intensified direction,
Taiwan would be caught in the middle. Ma’s fear of an escalating conflict between
Japan and China is real.
Ma has been passionate about the “Peace Initiative” from the start. In November
2012, Ma revealed in an interview for a weekly magazine Yazhou Zhoukan that
when he became active in the baodiao movement during his student years, he was
influenced by a lecture given by an international law Professor, Chiu Hungdah.
Professor Chiu said that, “Your passion is wonderful. But more important is to
study and understand the issues to come up with solutions.” Since then, Ma said
that he devoted himself to searching for solutions. “What I’m arguing now is
the argument I made when I wrote my thesis. That is we can resolve territorial
disputes by sharing resources.”29 The “Peace Initiative” was meant to put Ma’s
doctoral thesis into practice after 30 years absence.
The Japanese media coverage of the “Peace Initiative” was rather small and
reserved. Generally speaking, the Japanese media usually devotes little attention
to Taiwan, but at a time when so much public attention was focused on the
Senkaku Islands, the media’s handling of the “Peace Initiative” was questionable.
One of the reasons why the coverage was small was that because President Ma
had expressed strong remarks on the territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands,
and the language used against Japan was as harsh as China. Because of this, it
was difficult for editors of the media to evaluate at once how genuine the “Peace
Initiative” was and what it meant to the relationship between Japan and Taiwan.
28
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Declaration of the Republic
of China on the Outer Limits of Its Continental Shelf, 12 May 2009. at < http://www.mofa.gov.
tw/En/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&sms=5B9044CF1188EE23&s=1DE
6A7BA5C27CED3> (searched date: 17 November 2013). This statement from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs reiterated the natural prolongation principle of the continental shelf, and it
can be supposed that this was composed while being aware of the response to two events that
occurred in 2008, more specifically, to the Lien Ho incident between Japan and Taiwan and the
announcement of joint development of gas fields between Japan and China.
29 Full text of the interview is available on the Office of the President Homepage. Press
Release from the Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Ma
accepts interview with Ya zhou zhou kan,” (8 Nov. 2012), at < http://www.president.gov.tw/
Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=28514&rmid=514&word1=%e4%ba%9e%e6%b4%b2%e9%
80%b1%e5%88%8a&sd> (searched date: 17 November 2013).
81
The Japanese media seemed to be confounded by the two “faces” of Ma Yingjeou.
Ma Ying-jeou’s prior remarks on the territorial rights of the Senkaku Islands
were actually extremely strong. In his opening remarks at the Special Exhibit for
the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Ma said that
“Japan stole the Diaoyutai Islands” and added that “good bilateral relations were
one thing, but no concessions, not even an inch, could be made based on the cause
of a nation and sovereignty of the state.”30 Furthermore, after June 2012, when
the Japanese government made it clear that they were going to nationalize the
Senkaku Islands, the Ma administration, which had been preventing the baodiao
group from sailing toward the Senkaku Islands, allowed the departure of baodiao
boats. Therefore, the baodiao movement became more active as Taiwan’s baodiao
group sailed their protest boats and worked with Hong Kong’s baodiao group.
The way that the Japanese media reported on the words and actions of the
Ma administration made it seem that Taiwan shared China’s anti-Japan policy.
From early on, the Ma administration expressed that “Taiwan will not work with
China in the dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands.” However, there had always been
speculations that the Ma administration would move toward cooperation with
China.31
Furthermore, on September 11, 2012, when the Noda administration decided
to nationalize the Senkaku Islands, the Ma administration sent a strong message
of protest to Sumio Tarui, Japan’s representative to Taiwan at the Interchange
Association, stating that Japan had violated the territorial rights of the ROC.
The next day, on September 12, the Ma administration instructed Shen Ssu-tsun,
the ROC (Taiwan) representative to Japan, to return to Taiwan. Since Japan and
Taiwan do not hold diplomatic relations, this did not spark much controversy, but
it was a strong measure, similar to recalling an ambassador.
In a TV interview, Ma also praised the September 25 incident, in which
Taiwanese fishing boats protested at sea and the patrol vessels of Japan and
Taiwan fired water cannons at each other, saying, “It was an extremely peaceful
and rational action.”32 His words and actions remind us of the young, nationalistic
30 Press Release from the Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), “President
Ma attends press conference to mark opening of special exhibit for 75th anniversary of Marco
Polo Bridge Incident” (7 Jul. 2012), at <http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&
itemid=27658&rmid=514&word1=%e4%b8%83%e4%b8%83> (searched date: 17 November
2013).
31 For instance, Asahi Shimbun on July 27, 2012 reported that “In regards to the territorial
issue over the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands, a plan to cooperate with China is developing into a reality in Taiwan.” This article does not touch upon the East China Sea, but the
title “Plan for cooperation with China” suggests other ideas.
32 TVBS News (2 Oct. 2012), at <http://news.tvbs.com.tw/entry/32584> (searched date: 17
November 2013).
82
Ma. The two Ma Ying-jeous exist simultaneously.
4. Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement
The Japan-Taiwan Fisheries negotiations, which had been on hold for a long
time, resumed under these circumstances. An agreement was necessary on the
delimitation of the EEZ over which Japan and Taiwan had been disputing. As
seen in Figure 4, in addition to the boundaries of the two parties differing largely,
the handling of the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands had become such an
obstacle that even though they had held 16 rounds of negotiations since 1996, the
negotiations had been on hold since 2009.
Figure 4: Waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.
Created by the author.
Japan exercised strict control over Taiwanese fishing boats that entered Japan’s
EEZ in the absence of an agreement between Japan and Taiwan. However, it
did not control Chinese boats that entered Japan’s EEZ, since the Japan-China
Fisheries Agreement had created a designated zone in which each country only
had jurisdiction over its own boats. Taiwan felt that this was discriminatory and
many Taiwanese fishermen had complained about this matter. In order to answer
the demands of the fishermen and to emphasize the success of the negotiations
with Japan, the Ma administration needed the fisheries agreement. On the
other hand, the fisheries agreement meant that Japan would have to open some
fishing grounds to Taiwanese fishermen. Therefore, Japan was only half eager
to negotiate. There were high hopes for the resumption of negotiations on the
fisheries agreement with the improvement of Japan-Taiwan relations; however,
it seemed that the momentum was lost as a result of the large-scale protests by
83
Taiwanese fishing boats at sea.
However, both Japan and Taiwan showed positive signs for negotiations. In the
same TV interview on October 2 in which President Ma praised the Taiwanese
fishermen’s protests, he pointed out that sovereignty can never be compromised
but the dispute over sovereignty can be temporarily shelved in order to safeguard
Taiwanese fishermen’s fishing rights.33 Taiwan’s representative to Japan, Shen
Ssu-tsun – who had been temporarily recalled to Taiwan – returned to his post
in Tokyo. On October 5, 2012, the Japanese government sent out a message
by Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba showing positive view to President Ma’s
“Peace Initiative”. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the “Gemba
message” positively, too. This led to the first preparatory meeting in Tokyo on
November 30. The meeting was amicable, but both parties stuck to their principles
once again.
China, meanwhile, tried to use the intensification of the territorial dispute
to call for Taiwan to cooperate with them. 34 From Ma’s point of view, as the
territorial dispute had moved in a more intensified direction, he was unable to
be ambiguous with his policies in the way he had been able to be before. Japan’s
nationalization of the Senkaku Islands stimulated Ma’s nationalist side and he
showed a harsh attitude toward Japan. However, Taiwan’s cooperation with
China over the territorial dispute would lead to political dialogue between China
and Taiwan, peace negotiations, and military cooperation. As will be discussed
later, the continuation of the ROC is the most important matter for Ma Yingjeou, and it is safe to say that from the start, he could not choose to cooperate
with China. However, it was also true that Ma could not back down unless he
could win a significant political compromise from Japan. While having been
claiming sovereignty repeatedly, the Ma administration was smoothing the path to
negotiation by urging self-restraint to the Taiwanese fishermen.35 Ma was cleverly
33
Ibid.
On September 16, 2012 when the tension between Japan and China heightened over the
nationalization issue of the Senkaku Islands, the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang
Yi, called on Lien Chan and others, saying, “The compatriots across the Taiwan Straits stand
firmly together on the cause of the Chinese nation and in the efforts to overcome differences
between us, work together with one heart, and display to the rest of the world that we have a
common goal regardless of whether there is any contradiction in our various ideas,” at <http://
www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201209/t20120916_3086824.htm> (searched date: 17 November
2013). On September 12, 2012, the spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office Fan Liqing
also stated, “It is the unshakable duty and shared responsibility of compatriots across the strait
to safeguard China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and their affiliated islets, as well
as the interests of the entire Chinese nation,” at <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201209/
t20120912_3076877.htm> (searched date: 17 November 2013).
35 For instance, Taiwan Fisheries Agency drafted the regulation on the management of the
mackerel fishery. On October 30, 2012, the Agency held a meeting with the fishermen in Yilan
County and received agreement on the regulation to set up a closure period of mackerel fishery
34
84
employing his two “faces.”
Japan’s situation was positive for Ma. Since the 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision
Incident, a sense of caution toward China’s maritime advance spread in Japan.
Taiwan’s humanitarian aid after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on
March 11, 2011 brought renewed appreciation of Taiwan throughout the Japanese
society, including in the bureaucracy. It made little sense for the Japanese
government to give Taiwan the cold shoulder just because of their consideration
for China. After the Noda administration, carrying out longstanding “One China”
policy, removed the Taiwanese representative from the one-year 3.11 memorial
ceremony in March 2012, it received tremendous complaints, and Japan’s policies
toward Taiwan started to change. In April 2012, the ROC (Taiwan) Representative
to Japan, John Feng, was invited to the Emperor’s garden party for the first time.
As mentioned above, Foreign Minister Gemba sent a message to the people of
Taiwan in October 2012. The Japanese government usually makes announcements
to Taiwan in the name of the Interchange Association, legally a private institution.
This was the first time that the Foreign Minister, representing the Japanese
government, directly sent a message to Taiwan. This focus on Taiwan continued in
the Abe administration.
As a response to Japan’s change of government, in his 2013 New Year’s Day
address, President Ma mentioned that the fishing negotiations currently underway
between Taiwan and Japan “represent a decisive first step (in implementing the
“Peace Initiative”).” However, an incident soon derailed the talks. On January 24,
2013, a Taiwanese baodiao boat sailed toward the Senkaku Islands, and the Japan
Coast Guard vessels fired water cannons to prevent the boat from landing on the
islands. The departure of the protest boat was anticipated, but it was thought to be
in the spring when the weather would be calmer in the East China Sea. Thus, this
incident can be seen as sabotage against the Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations at
a critical stage.
The Ma administration sent four patrol vessels from the Coast Guard Administration to escort the protest boat heading for the Senkaku Islands. At the
same time, three Chinese patrol vessels that were sailing in the waters approached
the patrol vessels of Taiwan Coast Guard Administration as if they were there
as backups. Taiwan warned the Chinese vessels with a message displayed on an
electronic signboard and loudspeakers saying, “This water area is territory of the
Republic of China. Leave here immediately.”36 China’s three patrol vessels sailed
(“Taiwan ga hokui 24 do ihoku de saba kinryoki settei: nittai gyogyo kyogi e fuseki” [Taiwan
will impose self-restraint rule on the north of 24 degrees north latitude: A preparatory move for
Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations] Sankei Shimbun (November 4, 2012).
36 “Chugokusen: Taiwan kara keikoku” [Chinese vessels warned by Taiwan] Mainichi Shimbun
(January 26, 2013), “Wo xuan shi zhu quan: da lu leng chu li” [We announced sovereignty, the
85
away from the Taiwan vessels. This was the first time a Chinese public vessel had
come near a Taiwanese public vessel, and it revealed whether there is cooperation
over the Senkaku Islands between the two parties or not. The Taiwan Coast Guard
Administration’s swift warning showed that the Ma administration had decided on
its policy in advance.
It is thought that both Japan and the United States were concerned that the Ma
administration had not stopped the departure of the protest boat and both countries
delivered that message to Ma Ying-jeou. The Ma administration had been
considerate to Japan by providing information about departure of the protest boat
in advance, but domestically, while claiming sovereignty, it was difficult to stop
the actions of the protest boats. There was a possibility that the Ma administration
was going to be trapped in a tight corner.
Then, Ma Ying-jeou played a card: a statement by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was issued on February 8, 2013 (Figure 5). To summarize briefly, this
statement rejected the cooperation with China due to their differences in ideas
of peace as well as focus on the relationship with Japan and the United States.37
This revealed the intentions of the “Peace Initiative.” After this statement,
Prime Minister Abe also made a decision:38 he instructed officials to wrap up
negotiations with Taiwan on the fisheries agreement. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs fought off the resistance from the Fisheries Agency and submitted a bold
proposition in which Japan would open fishing grounds to Taiwanese fishing boats
within Japan’s EEZ south of 27 degrees north latitude and north of the Sakishima
Islands. On March 13, the second preparatory meeting was held in Tokyo. The
general framework of the agreement had been decided by then, but technical
details still needed to be discussed. Negotiations continued until the very end.
mainland stayed calm] China Times (January 25, 2013).
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), “Diaoyutai lie yu zhi zhu
quan sheng ming: zai Diaoyutai lie yu zheng duan, wo guo bu yu zhong guo da lu he zuo zhi
li chang” [The statement on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands: ROC will not cooperate
with mainland China] (February 8, 2013), at < http://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n
=AA60A1A7FEC4086B&sms=60ECE8A8F0DB165D&s=68C9A7761280E9E6 > (searched
date: 17 November 2013).
38 The following is a response by Prime Minister Abe to a question from a Diet member
Kazuya Maruyama of the Liberal Democratic Party at the Upper House Budget Committee
on April 23, 2013. “Taiwan is extremely friendly to Japan, and with regards to the Great East
Japan Earthquake… we received a huge financial aid from them… Settling on this fisheries
agreement, which is a thorn in our relationship with Taiwan, would be a huge step forward in
terms of the security environment in the Asia region… I understand that the agreement this
time was an historic one. Also, Taiwan announced that it would not cooperate with China over
the Senkaku Islands in February of this year before signing the agreement. I would like to state
that the agreement was settled in light of this information.” (The National Diet debate search
system, at <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>, searched date: 17 November 2013).
86
(1) The claims of both sides differ in legal grounds
(2) There are differences in opinion over how to resolve the dispute
(3) Mainland China has not recognized our sovereignty
(4) The negotiations for the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement are
being influenced by China’s intervention
(5) It is necessary to consider the balance of the East Asia Area and the
interests of the international community
Figure 5: Summary of the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Feb. 8,
2013.
Source: Created by the author using the statement as a basis.
Figure 6: Shinzo Abe meeting with President Ma Ying-jeou at the Office of the
President.
Left: October 31, 2010 Right: September 6, 2011.
Source: Office of the President Homepage (http://www.president.gov.tw)
During the negotiation process, personal trust between the heads of Japan and
Taiwan was built. If Japan had proposed a significant compromise and President
Ma had no intention of actually agreeing to the fisheries agreement, then Japan
would have revealed its bottom line for no reason and would have suffered a
great disadvantage. By contrast, if Prime Minister Abe had no intention to work
with President Ma after Taiwan released a statement saying, “no cooperation with
China over the territorial issue,” then Taiwan would have just angered China for
no gain and ended up in the worst situation. While both parties needed a positive
result from the negotiations, trust between the heads of Japan and Taiwan and their
decision was essential to reach an agreement. In regards to this, the fact that Prime
Minister Abe met with President Ma twice after his first step down and before his
comeback to the office had a positive influence (Figure 6).
A more important factor was that there were people on both sides who thought
that Japan-Taiwan relations were important and should not be harmed. These
voices influenced the pro-negotiation politicians in power on both sides to gain
87
momentum and curbed stubborn advocates for principle and skeptics. It is not
easy to conduct calm diplomatic negotiations in the midst of rising territorial
nationalism. There are strong voices that insist, “Do not budge an inch” on both
the Japanese and Taiwanese sides. Broad support from the citizens of both Japan
and Taiwan made it possible to overcome those influences. There are many
examples of this, but here I give a case from Japan. The Abe administration invited
Taiwan’s Representative to Japan, Shen Ssu-tsun, to the memorial ceremony
for the second anniversary of the 3.11 disaster. China protested this and China’s
Ambassador to Japan boycotted and did not attend the ceremony. On March 13,
2013, Prime Minister Abe wrote on his personal Facebook page that, “To express
our gratitude, we decided to invite Taiwan to offer a flower in tribute at the 3.11
memorial service (with other foreign representatives).” Japanese people responded
extremely positively to this post, which shows support for Abe’s decision.39
In the end, both Japan and Taiwan exerted the diplomatic wisdom of taking half
step back with each other while keeping their own positions, and the Japan-Taiwan
Fisheries Agreement was finally concluded. In the agreement, the zone over which
Japan and Taiwan are in dispute was decided to be a “designated zone” in which
each country only has jurisdiction over its own boats (Figure 7). In this zone, both
parties can only regulate their own fishermen and not the other’s. The rules of the
operation would be discussed later by establishing the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries
Committee. To briefly summarize, Taiwanese fishing boats would operate under
the guidelines of Taiwan’s fishing authority; therefore, they do not need to be
regulated by Japan’s authority anymore.
39 The number of “likes” on Shinzo Abe’s Facebook post reached 73,700. As of June 2013, this
was the highest number of “likes” since Prime Minister Abe started Facebook and it showed
how huge the interest was toward Taiwan’s support and the response by the Japanese government. Prime Minister Abe’s second highest number of “likes” was on a post written on May 5,
2013 about baseball players Shigeo Nagashima and Hideki Matsui receiving National Honor
Awards with 55,900 likes, and the third highest number of “likes” was on a post about Prime
Minister Abe jogging with 47,500 likes. Regarding politics, Prime Minister Abe’s Facebook
usually receive around 10,000-30,000 likes; for instance, a meeting with President Obama
received 32,700 likes and a meeting with President Putin received 23,800 likes (The number
of “likes” is as of June 1, 2013 and is rounded to the nearest 10). Subsequently, there was a
huge change in the number of “likes” on Prime Minister Abe’s Facebook page. His post from
Buenos Aires on September 8, 2013 reporting that Tokyo would host the 2020 Olympics received an unprecedented 174,000 likes.
88
Figure 7: Waters covered by the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement.
Created by the author.
The idea of a designated zone is not a new one, as it was adopted in both
the Fisheries Agreement between Japan and Korea and that between Japan
and China. However, reaching an agreement is valuable in the midst of rising
territorial nationalism. It is clear that the agreement is fragile; it does not touch the
surrounding 12 nautical miles territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands and leave
room for each side to insist on its position. Therefore, mutual trust is necessary
for the agreement to be implemented. “Private organizations” in both Japan and
Taiwan could also cripple the agreement; therefore, a very cautious handling is
needed on both sides.
5. Ma Ying-jeou and the Republic of China
China’s attempt to draw Taiwan into a joint cooperation did not succeed. As China
became aware of the possible agreement between Japan and Taiwan, it carried
out interference and warned both sides through related media, but it could not
prevent the agreement from moving forward. The DuoWei News, a Chinese news
website in North America, published an article on March 5 saying that “according
to sources in Beijing, the high-level officials of the Communist Party of China
are extremely dissatisfied by Taiwan’s refusal to cooperate with mainland China
on the issue of defending the Diaoyutai Islands… If this continues, Ma Yingjeou would become a sinner in history of the Chinese nation.”40 This expression,
40
“Shou mei ya li qi liang an bao diao, lu gao ceng ji bu man Ma Ying-jeou” [Pressed by US
and abandoned the cooperation on defending the Diaoyutai Islands: high-level officials of
China are extremely dissatisfied with Ma Ying-jeou] Duo Wei News (March 5, 2013) at <http://
89
“a sinner in history of the Chinese nation,” originated when China criticized Lee
Teng-hui in the People’s Daily at the time of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in
1995. The re-use of the expression shows the increasing dissatisfaction with Ma
within the Communist Party of China.
However, the reaction of the Chinese government after the conclusion of the
Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement was muted. China’s policymakers in charge
of Taiwan affairs may have been displeased in their hearts, but since China has
been positioning the line for “peaceful development of cross-strait relations”
as the achievement of the Hu Jintao era,41 China needs to continue the theatrics
that show friendly China-Taiwan relations. Ma decided to move forward with
the agreement because he saw through that China could not turn the table upside
down now.
It is possible to organize Ma’s line, after five years in office, as follows. (1)
Maintain the status-quo policy of “no unification, no independence.” (2) Expand
Taiwan’s economic relationship with China to extract economic benefits at the
same time strengthen the economic and unofficial political relationship with the
United States and Japan as a support to Taiwan’s security. (3) Try to secure a
space for the ROC (Taiwan) in the international community while being cautious
as not to stimulate China. Ma has expressly outlined on (1) but has left (2) and (3)
vague, thus he has pursued a diplomatic strategy that will gain benefits from the
United States, Japan and China. Ma’s ultimate aim is to strengthen the legitimacy
of the ROC within Taiwan and create a situation in which the Communist Party of
China, who officially states that the ROC is extinct, does not deny the existence of
the ROC. This is because Ma’s belief in the ROC runs so deep.
In Taiwan, the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries negotiations were thought to be
President Ma’s first step in the “Peace Initiative”, and the negotiations moved
within the basic framework of the “Peace Initiative”. It is not rare for a leader of
a nation to call for peaceful resolution. The significance of Ma’s proposal is that it
was brought out at the time the dispute over the Senkaku Islands was escalating.
There was skepticism over Ma’s proposal. Some thought that Ma’s intention
was to enter a political dialogue with China as the proposal includes dialogues
with China. However, the plan for trilateral dialogues among Taiwan, Japan, and
China can be seen as a ploy to make China acknowledge that the ROC is a party
taiwan.dwnews.com/news/2013-03-05/59153048.html> (searched date: 17 November 2013).
41 On August 31, 2010, at the Academic Symposium of the National Society of Taiwan
Studies, Zhou Zhihuai, the secretary-general of the National Society of Taiwan Studies, related
Hu Jintao’s idea of a harmonious society to the “peaceful development of the cross-strait relations” and emphasized its significance (Zhihuai Zhou, “Lun hai xia liang an guan xi de he xie
fa zhan” [On the harmonious development of the cross-strait relations] in Zhihuai Zhou, ed.,
Liang an guan xi: gong tong li yi yu he xie fa zhan [Cross-strait relations: Common interests
and harmonious development] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2010): 1-9.
90
concerned on the international stage that is the East China Sea. This is the reason
why China has been silent on Ma’s “Peace Initiative”.
As the president, Ma fully understood the situation Taiwan was in and worked
to derive the maximum benefit in the situation. While winning a concession from
Japan, Ma is planning to extract economic benefits from China continuously in
the future, too. It would also be a huge achievement for Ma if he receives some
sort of preferential treatment from the United States (for example, arms sale or
the conclusion of economic agreements). Ma is using the crisis of the dispute over
the Senkaku Islands and changing that into an opportunity, cleverly pursuing the
interests of the ROC (Taiwan).
Ma issued a statement that focused on the relationship with the United States
and Japan in a crucial stage during the fisheries negotiations. From the viewpoint
of the ROC, the Diaoyutai Islands issue can be traced back to the “unjust postwar handling by the United States and Japan.” Therefore, whenever this issue is
brought up, it leads to criticism against the United States and Japan. This is why
the experts who are most familiar with China and Taiwan’s logic on the territorial
rights of the Diaoyutai Islands speculated that Ma Ying-jeou would move toward
cooperation with China.42 In order to understand Ma’s actions, it is necessary to
look at his “two faces” simultaneously.
One reason for Ma’s focus on the United States and Japan can be found in
his doctoral thesis. In his paper, Ma was interested in whether the offshore oil
rights of the Taiwan would be protected in civil actions of various countries with
whom they had lost diplomatic relations. He analyzed the law and case laws of
civil suits in three countries where major international oil companies lie: the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. He studied what would happen if
China were to request an injunction of the oil drilling rights that Taiwan granted
to foreign companies and the ownership rights of oil that the Taiwan extracted.
His conclusion is that the country that would most definitely protect the interests
of Taiwan is the United States, which has the Taiwan Relations Act. Japan also
recognizes Taiwan’s standing in civil affairs; therefore, it would almost certainly
protect Taiwan’s interests. There is a great possibility that the United Kingdom
would also protect Taiwan’s interests, but there are enough uncertainties that it
cannot necessarily be relied upon. (Ma 229-266).
A graduate student Ma Ying-jeou, who had a strong interest in oil, found out
42
In regards to the territorial rights of the Diaoyutai Islands, both the Republic of China and
the People’s Republic of China claim in the same way as this: They discovered the islands during the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, the Japanese government integrating the Senkaku Islands as
unclaimed land and claiming as Japan’s territory meant that Japan “stole” the islands. It was
decided by the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations that the islands would be returned to China,
and so on.
91
after gathering materials and studying judicial precedents that the United States
and Japan were important cornerstones for Taiwan. There must have been a mental
conflict for the nationalistic Ma when he was to swallow this reality, and there
must be even now. But from the way of thinking that unfolds in his doctoral thesis,
it is clear that he would not come up with the idea of cooperation with China over
the Senkaku Islands issue. On the last page of his doctoral thesis, he writes the
following, “Cooperation between the two Chinese governments on seabed issues
vis-à-vis Japan will not come without overall rapprochement between them in a
much larger context” (326).
It can be perceived that the late 1970s’ decline of the baodiao movement to
which young Ma devoted himself was the setback of the ACPA movement. Young
activists of the ACPA strongly criticized Chiang Kai-shek’s weak attitude toward
the United States and Japan regarding the Diaoyutai Islands issue. However, a
close look at the situation revealed that the United States and Japan were the ones
that were supporting the ROC even as it was becoming increasingly isolated. To
an enthusiastic young Chinese man, the United States and Japan were countries
that devised conspiracies to undermine China’s interests.43 However, if the ROC
took the position to confront the United States and Japan, it would be a serious
disadvantage for the ROC. After all, Ma had to face Chiang Kai-shek’s struggle of
claiming the sovereignty of the ROC while maintaining a cooperative relationship
with the United States and Japan. The fact that Ma decided to write about the
delimitation of seabed boundaries and the issue of resource development rather
than on the examination of international law regarding the sovereignty of the
Diaoyutai Islands might have been his answer to this setback.
Taiwan shares values of democracy and freedom and has an extensive civil
exchange with Japan. Regardless of who the president is, Taiwan’s situation does
not allow for a definitive confrontation with Japan over territorial issues and the
president has to worry about a clash between Japan and China. Additionally,
Ma Ying-jeou holds a principle of legal solution as an international law scholar.
Signing an agreement that emphasizes that Taiwan does not plan to change the
status quo through the use of force draws a stark contrast between the ROC and
the PRC. It is possible that the emphasis on the values of the ROC and the practice
of Ma’s doctoral thesis served as the driving force for Ma’s decision to enter the
fisheries agreement. The process of the Japan-Taiwan fisheries negotiations shows
the contradictory nature of a KMT administration that refuses both unification and
independence of Taiwan, in a Republic of China that is becoming more Taiwanese
year by year. Ma Ying-jeou’s “two selves” will continue to co-exist.
43
Slogans such as “Defend Diaoyutai, defeat the international conspiracy” and “Destroy the
plot by the U.S. and Japan” were used in the demonstrations that were held in six major cities
across the United States on January 30, 1971 (ACPA, op.cit., 31).
92
About the Author
Yoshiyuki OGASAWARA is an associate professor of Taiwanese politics at Tokyo
University of Foreign Studies. He received his Ph.D. in 1986 from Hitotsubashi
University. He has been teaching at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies since
1991. His research interests include contemporary Taiwanese politics and
elections, and Taiwan-China relations. He has been observing the development of
Taiwanese politics for the past 20 years and has met many Taiwanese politicians
including President Ma Ying-jeou and Opposition leader Tsai Ing-wen. His recent
publications include Baeikyu Saisen [Re-election of Ma Ying-jeou: Presidential
Election in Taiwan in 2012] coedited with Yukihito Sato (Chiba: IDE-JETRO,
2012).
Address: Graduate School of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies,
3-11-1, Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo 183-8534, Japan.
The Role of the KMT in the Ma YingJeou Administration’s Mainland Policy
Making: A Case Study of the KMT-CPC
Platform
Wei-Hsiu HUANG
Abstract
This paper seeks to analyze the role of the Ruling Kuomintang in the DecisionMaking Process with regard to the Mainland Policy under the Ma Ying-Jeou
administration, using as an example the mechanism for engagement and dialogue
between the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC) known as the KMTCPC Platform. The opposition says that it represents “the party leading the
government,” or the “selling-out of Taiwan”. But through the case studies, we
can find that the KMT-CPC Platform is a channel via which the Ma administration
has interacted with the CPC in order to glean information on the inner workings
of the mainland and the intentions of the CPC Central Committee, which was
then used to guide policymaking. Moreover, the KMT has not been the central
player in policy decisions and the KMT leadership, which was has no mandate to
negotiate with the mainland, has served rather to enforce some of the mainland
policies created by the Ma administration and to serve as a messenger of Ma YingJeou. And all the criticisms about the KMT-CPC Platform was not the KMT-CPC
Platform but the lack of foresight and sufficient responses by those at the center of
Ma administration. In engaging with the CPC via the KMT-CPC Platform, whose
size and function have no comparable equivalent in any of the world’s other
political parties, Ma revealed deficiencies in his leadership.
Keywords
The Cross-Strait relation, Mainland Policy Decision-Making Process in Taiwan,
Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China, the KMT-CPC Platform, Ma YingJeou administration
Introduction
This paper seeks to analyze the role of the Ruling Kuomintang in the Decision-
94
Making Process with regard to the Mainland Policy under the Ma Ying-Jeou
administration, using as an example the mechanism for engagement and dialogue
between the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC) known as the KMTCPC Platform (Gúogòng Píngtái).1
Since the days of the Cold War, the cross-strait relations have been viewed as
a serious security concern for the East Asian region. However, since taking office
in 2008 as the Republic of China’s 12th president, the KMT’s Ma Ying-Jeou has
managed to improve relations with the mainland, leading in June 2010 to the
establishment of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a
framework for free cross-strait trade.2 Some cite improved cross-strait relations as
one factor behind Ma’s 2012 re-election.3
Ma’s ability in his first term to rapidly improve relations with the mainland and
conclude the ECFA as well as a multitude of other agreements is attributed by
some to the KMT’s efforts to enhance cross-strait trust and establish cross-strait
consensus via the KMT-CPC Platform when the KMT was not Taiwan’s ruling
party.4
The word “platform” originally referred to the flat structure found, for
1 While terms such as “China-Taiwan relations,” “China,” and “Taiwan” are used in Japan,
the Taiwanese government officially refers to China as “mainland China (“the Mainland”)
or “Communist China,” to its China policy as a “mainland policy”, and to the China-Taiwan
relationship as the “cross-strait relationship.” The use of these geographical and political terms
reflects the fact that Taiwan’s legal system does not treat China as a separate country. This
paper follows this convention, referring to China as the “mainland” and the China-Taiwan
relationship as the “cross-strait relationship.” All personal titles used in this paper were current
as of the time referred to.
2 Amako, Satoshi and Wei-hsiu Huang. “Taiwan Kaikyō ni okeru ‘Nagai Heiwa’ ni kan suru
Shiteki Kosatsu” [Historical Insights regarding the ‘Long Peace’ in the Taiwan Strait] in
Hokutō Ajia no“ Nagai Heiwa” – Naze Sensō wa Kaihi Sareta no ka? [Northeast Asia’s “Long
Peace:” How Has War Been Avoided?]. Ed. Chikako Ueki (Kawakatsu) and Miki Honda.
Keiso Shobo, 2012. pp. 168-195.
3 Ogasawara, Yoshiyuki and Yukito Sato, eds. Ba Eikyū Saisen: 2012-nen Taiwan Sōtō Senkyo
no Kekka to Sono Eikyō [The Re-election of Ma Ying-Jeou: 2012 Taiwanese Presidential
Election Results and their Implications]. IDE-JETRO, 2012. Huang Hwei-Chen, Cheng,
Yun-Peng, Shih-Chung Liu, Li-Wen Tung, and Kuo-Cheng Chang. “Sū Zhēnchāng Dānrèn
Mínjìndǎng Zhǔxí de Tiǎozhàn yǔ Yǐngxiǎng” [Su Tseng-chang Serving as DPP Chairman:
Challenges & Implications] in China Review, Sep. 2012: 73-84.
4 Chen Ming-tong. “Dāngqián Běijīng duì Tái Cèlüè Pōuxī” [An Analysis of Beijing’s
Current Tactics toward Taiwan] in Soochow Journal of Political Science Volume 27 2nd Term,
Jun. 2009. pp. 127-202; Matsuda, Yasuhiro. “Kaizen no ‘Kikai’ wa Sonzai Shita ka?: Chūtai Tairitsu no Kōzō Henka [Was There an Opportunity for Improvement?: The Structural
Evolution of the China-Taiwan Conflict] in Posuto Minshukaki no Taiwan Seiji: Chin Suihen Seiken no Hachi-nen [Taiwanese Politics after the Democratization Period: Eight
Years under Chen Shui-bian]. Wakabayashi, Masatake ed. IDE-JETRO, 2010. pp. 254-255;
Takeuchi, Takayuki Chūgoku to no Kankei Kaizen to Taiwan no Kokusai Shakai e no Sanka
[Improved Relations with China and Taiwan’s Participation in the International Community]
in Ogasawara and Sato. pp. 91-108; Liu Zhentao, Jiang Chengyan, and Wang Jianfen. Qiántú:
Zàilùn Liǎng’àn Jīngjį Guānxi. Beijing, Jiuzhou Press, 2012: 52-56.
The Role of the KMT in the Ma Ying-Jeou Administration’s Mainland Policy Making
95
example, in railway stations for passengers to board and alight their trains and in
warehouses for the loading and unloading of cargo from trucks and trailers. By
extension, the term has come to be used in a variety of contexts. In the IT industry,
“platform” is used to refer to the basic environment/settings (e.g., an operating
system, hardware) that enable a computer to run. Japanese government agencies
often use the word to refer to an organization or mechanism that connects multiple
government and private entities to facilitate the implementation of a project or
policy.5 It is likely in this sense that the KMT and CPC use the word, referring as
it does to the mechanism by which they pursue engagement with one another.
However, research to date has indicated that the role played by high-ranking
members of the party controlling the executive branch of government is minor. In
the realm of political theory, no systematic discussion has taken place regarding
the role of the ruling party in defining the security policy of a democratic state,
and the role of political parties in general is often held to be limited in nature.6
The process by which Taiwan has heretofore arrived at its mainland policy would
also seem to suggest that this is the case. During his time as president, Lee Tenghui also served as the chairman of the KMT, but he did not allow the party’s
Central Standing Committee to take the lead in the Taiwan’s mainland policy
decision making process. In the latter half of Lee’s time as president, the KMT’s
Central Committee Mainland Affairs Department (hereinafter, “Mainland Affairs
Department”) was home to the party’s staff responsible for mainland policy, but
it was involved in the decision-making process not via the party leadership, but
rather through the National Security Council (NSC), which is the central body
for coordinating and discussing security policy.7 President Chen Shui-bian of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) also drafted and coordinated mainland policy
via the NSC. However, even in the DPP with its list of prominent politicians and
notable factionalism, the party’s leadership, parliamentarians, and cliques played
only a limited role in the realm of mainland policy—namely that they followed
the directives of the president and the government.8
5
Daijirin, 3rd Edition. Sanseido, 2006. pp. 2,244-2,245. For usage by Japanese government
agencies, see the respective government agency/local body websites relating to “platforms.”
6 E.g., Norio Okazawa’s Seitō [Political Parties]. University of Tokyo Press, 1988. pp. 212215; Saotome, Ritsuko “Taigai Seisaku Kettei-ron no Saikentō” [Re-Examination of Foreign
Policy Formulation] in Kokusai Seiji [International Politics] Vol. 128, Oct. 2001: 103-106.
7 Wei-Hsiu Huang, Li Tou-ki Seikenki no Tairikuseisaku ketteikatei (1996-2000):
Soshikitekikettei to Dokudan no Soukoku [The Decision-Making Process under Lee Tenghui's Administration toward Mainland China, 1996-2000: Contradiction between Collectivism
and Dogmatism] (Okayama: UNIVERSITY EDUCATION PRESS Co.,Ltd. [published in
Japanese]).
8 The present author’s interviews with former DPP leadership staffer A (August 2012 in
Tokyo), Joseph Wu, Head of DPP Policy Group (December 2012 in Taipei), and Former DPP
leadership staffer B (September 2013 in Taipei). Wu served as Deputy Secretary General of the
Presidential Office in the Chen administration, head of the Executive Yuan’s Mainland Affairs
96
Assuming that it is via the KMT-CPC Platform that Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration engages with mainland China in the course of determining Taiwan’s
policy toward the mainland, what role the KMT plays in that process, how it
functions therein, and what degree of influence it exerts are all questions that
bear consideration. Such an examination should in turn shed some light on
how the Ma administration approaches policymaking as regards the mainland.
To date, however, very little research has examined how Taiwan devises its
mainland policy, let alone what role the KMT plays in that process. Chen Kongli,
director of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University attempted to
analyze the policymaking process of the Lee administration, focusing on the
“no haste, be patient” (jièjí yòngrěn) policy that the administration undertook to
regulate investment in mainland China by Taiwan’s major companies. However,
Chen concluded that by deciding policy via government bodies rather than his
political party, Lee Teng-hui had acted “outside the system” and “autocratically,”
notions that suggest a lack of objective understanding regarding how Taiwan’s
government works. 9 Yang Jui-Chun, a former expert member of the KMT’s
Central Committee, researched Cold War espionage efforts in which KMT entities
were involved and also traced the history of said entities and what changes they
underwent over time, including during the Ma administration. However, Yang’s
work takes only a cursory look at the post-Cold War period.10 The author of the
present paper looked at the role of the party when analyzing how mainland policy
was shaped under Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s first president elected by direct popular
vote, but was only able to touch on a few examples of significant involvement by
the party due to limited information and sources.11
The KMT-CPC Platform has been the subject of much discourse, but almost
none of that has analyzed the platform from the perspective of how the Ma
administration goes about defining its mainland policy, and the opinions of
various authors have been divided. For example, those affiliated with the DPP and
researchers with DPP leanings take a critical stance on the platform, saying that
it represents “the party leading the government,” which be used to criticize KMT
in the periods of KMT dictatorship, or the “selling-out of Taiwan”.12 By contrast,
Committee, and as Taiwan’s chief representative to the US.
9 Chen Kongli. “Táiwān Dāngjú de Juécè Xìtǒng yǔ Juécè Guóchéng” [The Policymaking
System and Process of the Taiwanese Authorities] in Taiwan Research Quarterly, 3rd quarter
1997, Oct. 1997: 1-10.
10 Ruichun Yang. Guótè Fēngyùn: Zhōngguó Guómíndǎng Dàlù Gōngzuò Mìdàng 1950-1990
[KMT Special Ops: The Secret Files on the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Mainland Operations
1950-1990], Taipei: DowTien Publishing, 2009: 19-78.
11 Huang.
12 E.g. Chen Ming-Tong work cited above; Táihǎi Liǎng’àn Guānxi yǔ Zhōngguó Guójì
Zhànlüè [Cross-Strait Relations and China’s International Strategy]. Ed. Joseph Wu. Taipei:
Taiwan Braintrust, 2011. National Taiwan University professor Chen Ming-tong served as
97
researchers with KMT leanings and mainland Chinese researchers take a positive
view of the platform, citing it as a channel for dialogue and engagement that
works to better cross-strait relations.13
In the following part, this paper will analyse the role the KMT plays in shaping
the mainland policy of Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration, focusing on the KMTCPC Platform. It will first examine how the KMT has been involved in Taiwan’s
mainland policymaking process based on existing research. It will then analyze
how the KMT-CPC Platform was formed and operated by the Ma administration.
1. Taiwan’s Mainland Policy Decision-making
Process & the KMT
1.1 Mainland policy decision-making process by the NSC: Lee Teng-hui’s
“NSC formula”
The author of the present paper previously analyzed the mechanism that was
developed under the administration of Lee Teng-hui for defining mainland policy
and the method by which that mechanism was operated. The following is an
overview thereof.14
(1) NUC-MAC-SEF Model
When Lee Teng-hui became the President, at least formally, Taiwan still developed
the national strategy with the national credo of “counterattack the Mainland,”
so there were not any authorities to specialize the Mainland policy making or
negotiate with Mainland. At the same time, The Three-Noes Policy (no contact,
no compromise and no negotiation) proposed by Chiang Ching-kuo in the 1980s
also caused the Taiwan government then to avoid direct contact with Mainland
officials. However, in the early days of the Lee Teng-hui administration,as
deputy chair and chair of the Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council. The co-writers of
Táihǎi Liǎng’àn Guānxi yǔ Zhōngguó Guójì Zhànlüè [Cross-Strait Relations and China’s
International Strategy] were mostly researchers who either served on the cabinet of or worked
as staffers for the Chen administration.
13 E.g., Pan Hsi-tang “Dìwǔjiè ‘Liǎng’àn Jīngmào Wénhuà Lùntán’ Píngxī” [Evaluation
and Analysis of the 5th Cross-Strait Economic, Trade & Culture Forum] in Zhǎnwàng yǔ
Tànsuǒ [Outlooks & Explorations] Vol. 7 8th term. Aug. 2009:1-6. Pan Hsi-tang, a professor
at Tamkang University is also a contracted researcher for the National Policy Foundation,
a KMT think tank. Zhu Weidong. “Xīn Xíngshì Xià Guógòng Jiāoliú Jīzhì de Dìngwèi yǔ
Zuòyòng” [The Positioning & Implications of the KMT-CPC Engagement Mechanism in the
New Landscape] in Táiwān Yánjiū [Taiwan Research]. 6th term 2008:10-13; Zhu Weidong
is the deputy director of the Taiwan Research institute under the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, a national think tank.
14 Huang.
98
cross-strait economic relations started to improve in the 80s, both Taiwan and
the Mainland needed to engage in negotiations and conversations concerning
certain practical issues. Therefore, Lee Teng-hui, based on the advice of the Vice
Secretary-General of the Presidential Office Cheyne Chiu, established the National
Unification Council (NUC), the MAC and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)
in 1990; the relations among the three sectors are illustrated in Figure 1.
The NUC is an advisory institution under the Presidential Office aimed at
consolidating the consensus among various domestic parties concerning Mainland
policies, and determining the strategic goals of Mainland policies. The NUC
formulated the Guidelines for National Unification (NUG), the guiding principle
of Mainland policy in 1991, and developed Taiwan’s definition of “the One China
Principle,” in which “One China means the Republic of China,” based on the
NUF. Although the Taiwan authorities ceased to exercise practical operation from
1992, its affiliated research council still played some role in policy research and
recommendations during the Lee Teng-hui administration. President Chen Shuibian formally announced to cause function of NUC and cause the application of
the NUG in 2006.
The policy in Taiwan about the negotiation between the SEF and its Mainland
counterpart, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS),
as well as the 1993 Wang-Koo summit between SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu
and ARATS Chairman Wang Dao-han in Singapore, were all promoted by the
“MAC→SEF” decision-making process. However, the framework encountered
the problem of ambiguous inter-organizational relations. Although the MAC
and SEF have an agency relationship in law, there was no direct or subordinate
relation between the two. As a result, there were several instances when the SEF
sought the autonomy of a private institution while the supervisory MAC wanted
to constrain the operations of the SEF, resulting in conflicts and confrontations
between the SEF Secretary-General and the chair of the MAC. Eventually, not
only the first and second SEF Secretary-General (Chen Chang-wen and Chen
Rong-jye), but also Chin-I Chiu, who advised the framework and transferred to
the SEF Secretary-General, resigned because of such conflicts.
Lee administration considered that the systematic and practical operational
issues existing in the framework for the Mainland policy decision-making process
should be solved through the coordination and integration in higher level. And
after winning the first ever direct presidential election, President Lee Teng-hui
needed to materialize his political views through the Executive Yuan. Therefore,
since Lee Teng-hui became the ninth term President in 1996, he started the NSCcentric coordination for Mainland policy decision-making.
99
NUC
MAC
SEF
（Presidential Office）
（Executive
（civilian agency）
Strategy
Yuan）
Implementation of the strategy
Tactics
and tactics
Figure 1: the Relations among the NUC, MAC, and SEF
Source: Li Tou-ki Seikenki no Tairikuseisaku ketteikatei (1996-2000-nen):
Soshikitekikettei to Dokudan no Soukoku, p. 67.
(2) NSC-driven mainland policymaking
Under the ROC constitution, the premier of the Executive Yuan is the head of
the executive branch of the government. However, during the Chinese Civil
War, Chiang Kai-shek expanded the authority of the president by enacting the
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion
(hereinafter, “Temporary Provisions”). The Temporary Provisions established the
NSC, which was delegated with the authority to engage in security-related policy
research, advising, coordination, and integration under the president. However,
under the administrations of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, no actual
laws were enacted to define how the NSC should operate, which led some to
claim it was an “unofficial policymaking body” used by the president.
The NSC was nevertheless able to act alone in coordinating with the Office of
the President and the Executive Yuan because Taiwan’s security policymaking
process had gaps not only in its vertical chain of command but also in horizontal
functions for coordination and debate. For this reason, Lee Teng-hui gave legal
legitimacy to the NSC via the ROC’s first series of constitutional revisions in
April 1991. The second amendment to the constitution states, “To determine
major policies for national security, the president may establish a national security
council and a subsidiary national security bureau. The organization of said organs
shall be stipulated by law.” This amendment thus clarifies the president’s authority
as the ultimate decision maker via the NSC of national security policy. The author
of the present paper has analyzed the model that Lee Teng-hui began using to run
the mainland policymaking process in 1996, referring to it as the “NSC formula,”
and conducted case studies relating to the formula in “The Decision-Making
Process under Lee Teng-hui's administration toward Mainland China, 1996-2000:
Contradiction between Collectivism and Dogmatism (in Japanese)”. The main
points about the “NSC formula” can be summarized as follows.
The High-level meeting was a cabinet level meeting convened by the NSC
Secretary-General, which involved ministers and staff from related fields for
discussions and coordination. Lee also participated in the High-level meeting
at times. The Vice-Minister meeting was generally convened once a week,
100
and chaired by deputy Secretary-General or advisor(s) of the NSC to carry out
more detailed discussions and coordination based on the outcomes of the Highlevel meeting. On the other hand, the Executive Yuan implemented the policies
based on the conclusions from the high-level and ministerial meetings. The
project meeting(s) were also chaired by the deputy Secretary-General(s) or
NSC advisor(s) of the NSC. This meeting(s) involved both internal and external
staffs and scholars for conducting policy studies, as well as providing policy
recommendations to the President. All of the meetings were convened by the order
of Lee Teng-hui, while all the conclusions drawn from these meetings also had to
be reported to Lee. The relations between Lee Teng-hui and relevant meetings are
shown in Figures 2 and 3. The “Go slow, be patient” policy, which was reviewing
the big enterprises' investment in the Mainland to safeguard economic security,
the “Koo-Wang Meeting” between Koo Chen-fu and Wang Dao-han in 1998, and
the “special state-to-state relationship” declaration, which President Lee Teng-hui
announcing that “[cross-strait] at least as special state-to-state ties” for clarifying
the cross-strait relation, and related management actions after Lee's declaration
were all the outcomes from this formula.
Figure 2: NSC Formula Process
Source: Ibid (p. 107).
101
a
d
Lee Teng-hui
b
c
Figure 3: Leadership and inter-meeting relations under the NSC formula.
Note: The arrows represent the directions and flow of policy decisions.
Letters a, b, c, and d represent the convener of each meeting, who may also serve as a
member in other meetings or as the convener for several meetings concurrently.
The number of meetings indicated in this figure is only for illustration and does not
represent the actual number of meetings.
Source: Ibid (p. 74).
1.2 The KMT’s role in the mainland policy decision-making process under
Lee Teng-hui
(((( Central Standing Committee
During the administrations of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Chin-kuo, the KMT
established control over organs of the national government by means of indirect
guidance administered via party organizations established in the central legislature
and in bodies of the executive branch. This relationship between the party and
the government was known as the “party-state” (dǎng-guó) system. Even once
the administration of Lee Teng-hui got underway, the president and other key
government figures continued to hold important roles in the KMT or to also
serve on the Central Standing Committee.15 As such, it is likely that the Central
Standing Committee played an oversight and coordination role as regards policy
toward mainland China.
15 Matsuda, Yasuhiro. Taiwan ni okeru Ittō Dokusai Taisei no Seiritsu [The Rise of Taiwan’s
One-Party Dictatorship]. Keio University Press, 2006:107-182; Wakabayashi, Masahiro
Taiwan no Seiji: Chūka Minkoku Taiwanka no Sengoshi [Taiwanese Politics: A Post-war
History of How the Republic of China Became Taiwan]. University of Tokyo Press, 2008. pp.
59-88.
102
However, the idea of the KMT negotiating via one of its party organizations
with the CPC is of dubious legitimacy in Taiwanese society. This is in part
because the “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” concepts
pursued under the regime of Deng Xiaoping included as a key component the
notion of a “third round of KMT-CPC cooperation,” premised on the preservation
of the KMT’s single-party rule of Taiwan under Chiang Ching-kuo.16 Inevitably,
the “party-state” system began to crumble as Taiwan democratized.17 In actuality,
prior to the release of the National Unification Guidelines, there were some
indications of an understanding within the Central Standing Committee (including
among factions opposed to Lee Teng-hui) that the KMT could not interfere in
the National Unification Guidelines, which represented an agreement between
all party factions. 18 Also, if the party were to become the primary driver of
mainland policy, the public may see that as a manifestation of the “party-state”
system or of “KMT-CPC cooperation.” As such, Lee Teng-hui apparently avoided
engaging in any coordination or discussion of mainland policy at the Central
Standing Committee for the entirety of his time in office.19 Based on this author’s
interviews with members of the staff of the Chen Shui-bian administration,
people affiliated with the DPP are so sensitive that staff members of leading KMT
politicians merely accompanying their bosses to NSC meetings suggests a lack
of distinction between the party and government, which is essentially what the
“party-state” system had represented.
(((( KMT leadership
During his administration, KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui tasked the secretarygeneral of the party’s Central Committee (hereinafter, party secretary-general)
with the management of the party, especially parliamentary matters and election
campaigning, but former foreign minister John Chang frequently received advice
from Lee on foreign policy. Chang reports, however, that such advice was strictly
“personal” in nature and that there was almost no organizational involvement in
mainland or foreign policy.20
Founded in 1988 and staffed by key figures from the KMT and the government,
16 Matsuda, Yasuhiro. Chūgoku no tai-Taiwan Seisaku: 1979-1987-nen [China’s Taiwan
Policy: 1979 and 1987] in Kokusai Seiji [International Politics] Vol. 112, 1996: 123-138.
17 Wakabayashi . 171-214.
18 Ming-I Wang. Bùquédìng de Hǎixiá: Dāng Zhōnghuá Mínguó Pèngshàng Zhōnghuá Rénmín
Gònghéguó [Uncertain Straits: When the ROC Comes Face to Face with the PRC]. Taipei:
China Times Publishing Co., 1993: 179-189.
19 The present author’s interview of Legislative Yuan member John Chiang (September 2008
in Taipei). Chiang, formerly surnamed Chang, was a child of former president Chiang Chingkuo born out of wedlock. He took his father’s surname of Chiang in 2005. References to this
individual at the time of the Lee Teng-hui administration use the name John Chang.
20 The present author’s interview of John Chiang.
103
the Mainland Affairs Guidance Group was designed to oversee the KMT’s
mainland affairs. The group was run by the Mainland Affairs Department, which
was scaled back after the start of the 1990s, rendering it incapable of running
the group much less executing on the conclusions reached at its meetings. 21
After 1996, the guidance group itself apparently all but ceased to function.22 The
result of this was likely a decline in the role that KMT party leadership played in
defining Taiwan’s mainland policy under the administration of Lee Teng-hui.
(((( Staff Department
The KMT staff that supported the Central Standing Committee and the party
leadership in formulating mainland policy was known as the Mainland Affairs
Department.
The Mainland Affairs Department, which was formed in 1972, was involved in
such special operations as launching underground organizations on the mainland,
political propaganda, and intelligence gathering and analysis. The committee’s
organizational scale, budget, and headcount were reduced gradually after
Chiang Ching-kuo came to head the government, and in around 1991 it ceased
in engaging in special operations on the mainland entirely, becoming instead a
support organization solely engaged in policy research and analysis.23
The Mainland Affairs Department began to attract attention in the latter half
of Lee Teng-hui’s time in office after Chang Jung-Kung became its DirectorGeneral. Chang had previously served as the head of mainland news and deputy
editor at Taiwan’s Central News Agency, and was also allegedly responsible for
undertaking the project to establish a secret conduit for dialogue and engagement
with the mainland during Lee’s presidency, in what the media dubbed as the “secret
emissary” initiative.24 However, Chang had already been involved in the mainland
policy making process, providing expertise via the NUC and the NSC. The “secret
emissary” initiative was also conducted under the guidance and direction of the
NSC rather than by the party leadership.25
After the DPP came into power in 2000, the Mainland Affairs Department went
from being an agency-level body to merely a part of the KMT’s policy committee
(an executive group responsible for coordinating party policy). But Chang Jung21
“Dàyámen Bǎi zhe Bú Yòng, Xiǎoguānfǔ Bú Luàn Yě Nán” [In Government, Inaction Above
Makes for Dysfunction Below] in The Journalist, Vol. 277, June 28 – July 4, 1992: 28-29.
22 Chi Su. Wēixiǎn Biānyuán: Cóng Liǎngguó-lùn dào Yībiān, Yīguó [At the Brink: From the
Two Countries Theory to One Side, One Country). Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing, 2003:
64.
23 Matsuda. 352-355; Yang. 19-78.
24 Huang. 58-59.
25 The present author’s interviews of Mainland Affairs Department director Chang Jung-Kung
(September 2006 in Taipei) and John Chiang.
104
Kung stayed on as the deputy executive officer of the policy committee, another
post he was already occupying. As of 2004, he also served as the chief of the
KMT’s Culture and Communications Committee, which handles the party’s public
relations. From 2008 to 2011, he became the party’s deputy secretary-general and
director-general of the Mainland Affairs Department, assuming responsibility for
representing the party leadership in the context of the KMT-CPC Platform. Kao
Huei, who held the director-general of the Mainland Affairs Department until
February 2014, did so while also serving as the National Development Institute
Director, an executive position in the party overseeing the training organization
for its leadership.26 As such, the Mainland Affairs Department fell to a lower tier
on the party’s organizational chart, but the role that it plays has supposedly gone
largely unchanged.
2.
Case Study: The KMT-CPC Platform
2.1 Creating the KMT-CPC Platform
(((( The KMT’s mainland policy from 2000 to 2004
Despite belonging to the strongly independence-oriented DPP, Chen Shuibian tried to distance himself from the image of a proponent of Taiwanese
independence by advocating a “new middle road” while on the campaign trail
for the 2000 presidential election and in his inaugural address. The mainland
nevertheless refused to engage with the Chen administration, and did not attempt
to resume the negotiations and dialogue between the SEF and ARATS that
had stalled in the latter half of the Lee administration or to ease its diplomatic
offensive aimed at isolating Taiwan from the international community. In the end,
Chen Shui-bian declared in August 2002 that Taiwan and China were separate
countries. While campaigning for the March 2004 presidential election, he also
promised to hold a referendum regarding whether Taiwan should try to join the
World Health Organization (WHO), to hold a separate referendum in 2006 on
a new constitution, and to enact a new constitution in 2008. These moves were
all part of a strategy to strengthen the Taiwanese identity or stir up Taiwanese
nationalism.27
26 Note that Kao Hui died from lung cancer on February 12, 2014. The Liberty Times, February
13, 2014.
27 Matsuda. “Kaizen no ‘Kikai’ wa Sonzai Shita ka?: Chū-tai Tairitsu no Kōzō Henka [Was
There an Opportunity for Improvement?: The Structural Evolution of the China-Taiwan
Conflict]. pp. 232-240.
105
This lack of consistency in Chen Shui-bian’s mainland policy between 2000
and 2004 met with criticism from the KMT. That said, the KMT itself did not
aggressively counter Chen’s statements with views of their own. This was because
the party felt that its chances of regaining power in the 2004 presidential election
were strong and that there was therefore no need to hastily issue aggressive talking
points of their own.28 Moreover, the question of whether or not contact with the
mainland should be further broadened was the cause of deep divisions between
the party’s internal factions, and there were apparently concerns within the party
that any drastic policy moves—including any involving engaging with the CPC—
could further deepen those divides.29As such, the KMT’s mainland policy was
rather subdued during the period.
(2) Catalyst for a change of course: The 2004 Legislative Yuan election
The KMT’s eventually made a proactive overture to the CPC in reaction to the
Chen administration’s mainland policy between the time of the March 2004
presidential election and the December 2004 Legislative Yuan election, in part
to also give the mainland the opportunity to respond to the course the Chen
administration had taken.
While Chen Shui-bian was re-elected president, he needed a DPP majority in
the 2004 Legislative Yuan election (hereinafter, “the 2004 legislative election”)
in order to ensure a firm hold on political leadership. For this reason, Chen
went on the offensive in the run-up to the 2004 legislative election, reiterating
the commitments he had made during the presidential campaign and otherwise
continuing to pursue a strategy aimed at invoking the Taiwanese identity and
Taiwanese nationalism.30
However, Chen is also believed to have secretly sent an emissary to the
mainland to request the mainland side to recommence cross-strait negotiations
with the Chen government on the grounds that a coalition comprising the DPP
and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (or TSU; said coalition hereinafter referred to as
the “Pan-Green Coalition”) was likely to win a majority in the 2004 legislative
election.31 When the Pan-Green Coalition failed to win a majority in the 2004
legislative election, Chen joined forces with a third party, the People’s First Party
(PFP), and sent party leader chairman James Soong to the mainland as an envoy
to explore options for improving the relationship.32 Some also suggest that the
28 The
present author’s interviews of Radio Taiwan International head Chang Jung-Kung and
Grand Hotel Taipei chairman Lee Chien-Jung (both in September 2012 in Taiwan).
29 The present author’s interview of Lee Chien-Jung.
30 Matsuda. 244-245.
31 The present author’s interview of Chang Jung-Kung.
32 Ogawasara, Yoshiyuki. Chūgoku no tai-Taiwan Seisaku no Tenkai [The Development
106
“Three Links” (post, trade, and transportation links) rapidly realized by the Ma
administration were in fact made possible by groundwork laid during behindthe-scenes negotiations between the Chen administration during its eight years in
power.33
Given the above, it would appear that the comments and actions of Chen Shuibian at this time were merely an effort to redeploy for the 2004 legislative election
the strategy he had used in the presidential election. It can also be surmised
that Chen was making these political moves to try and pressure the mainland to
recommence negotiations.
At the same time, the mainland feared that if Taiwanese independence
proponent Chen’s words and actions were to win him firm control over the
Taiwanese government, he might push Taiwan closer to legal independence,
with some even arguing that the mainland had to consider the option of adopting
hardline policies.34
Ultimately a coalition between the KMT, the PFP, and the New Party (hereinafter
referred to collectively as the “Pan-Blue Coalition”) won the election with a
majority of seats. The KMT, which had already feared that Chen’s comments
and actions and the mainland response to them could intensify cross-strait
conflict, took the victory as evidence that the electorate did not support Chen’s
mainland policies, and began changing tack, adopting the position that as the
dominant partner in the Pan-Blue Coalition, the KMT should take a leading role in
formulating Taiwan’s mainland policy.35
(3) Lien Chan’s mainland visit and the KMT-CPC Platform
Four days after the 2004 Legislative Elections, KMT chair Lien Chan gave
instructions at the Central Standing Committee to work towards the signing
of an agreement on cross-strait charter flights for the 2005 Chinese New Year
(hereinafter all such negotiations are referred to as “Chinese New Year charter
flight negotiations”, irrespective of year), and with this the KMT stepped up the
pace of engagement with the CPC. Discussions on an agreement for Chinese New
of China’s Taiwan Policy] in Bōchō suru Chūgoku no Taigai Kankei: Pakusu Shinika to
Shūhenkoku [China’s Ballooning Foreign Relations: Pax Sinica and China’s Neighbors].
Amako, Satoshi and Emi Mifune. Keisho Shobo, 2010: 205-206.
33 The present author’s interviews of Chang Jung-Kung, Chen Ming-tong, Joseph Wu, and
former Chen administration national security staff (September 2013 in Taipei), as well as of
Legislative Yuan member Mark Chen (September 2013 in Taipei).
34 The present author’s interview of Chang Jung-Kung; Ogasawara , 200.
35 “Juécè Nèimù (1): Guómíndǎng Fùzhǔxí Jiāng Bǐngkūn Shuǎituán Fǎngwèn Dàlù de
Qíngxíng jí Yìhán” [Behind the Scenes of Policymaking: The Nature and Implications of the
Mainland Visit by the Delegation Led by KMT Vice-chairman Chiang Pin-kung] on Chang
Jung-Kung’s blog <http://jkcjyc3911.pixnet.net/blog/post/10149214> retrieved on July 4,
2014; the present author’s interview of Lee Chien-Jung (September 2012 in Taipei).
107
Year charter flights to Beijing were held by Chang Jung-Kung in December 2004
and by a delegation led by policy committee executive officer Tseng Yung-chuan
in early January 2005.36 Until that time the mainland had not been enthusiastic
about charter flights, causing pessimism in the Chen administration about the
prospects for successfully concluding such talks. However, as of January 2, 2005,
the mainland adopted a more flexible stance, which led to an agreement on the
charter flights being successfully negotiated by the participating civil aviation
bodies, with government officials from both sides acting as advisors.37
It was at this point that the KMT decided to push for a visit to the mainland
by Lien Chan. When a delegation led by KMT vice-chairman Chiang Pin-kung
visited the mainland at the end of March, Jia Qinglin, Chair of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference and the second most senior member
of the CPC’s Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs after Hu Jintao, said that
he would welcome a visit to the mainland by Lien Chan in his capacity as KMT
chairman. When this was reported to him, Lien Chan replied that he would visit
the mainland at an appropriate time.38
However, Chiang Pin-kung’s visit to the mainland at the end of March was
criticized by the DPP as it took place after China had passed its Anti-Secession
Law, which includes a “non-peaceful means” clause in which China reserves the
right to exercise force in order to integrate Taiwan, and immediately after the
Chen administration had conducted a protest against said law on March 26.39
There were calls for Chiang to call his visit off from within the KMT as well.
However, Lien Chan made Chiang’s visit go ahead, saying that he wanted the
mainland to understand that there were political parties in Taiwan with policies
different from those of the DPP, so that the mainland would not have any excuse
to use “non-peaceful methods.”40
Lien Chan visited the mainland from April 26 – May 3, and met with Hu Jintao
on April 29 (hereinafter, the “2005 Lien-Hu talks”). The press communiqué
released after the Lien-Hu talks included a statement that the KMT and CPC
would put in place mechanisms for cross-strait engagement and dialogue to
36 “Shéi Shì Liǎng’àn Hépínggē: Lián Zhàn Shǒufǎng Dàlù Nèimù (Shàng) (2005.5.3)” [Who
Is the Taiwan Strait’s Dove of Peace?: Behind the Scenes of Lien Chan’s First Mainland Visit
(Part 1 of 2) (2005.5.3)] on Chang Jung-Kung’s blog <http://jkcjyc3911.pixnet.net/blog/
post/10149211> retrieved on July 4, 2014.
37 Matsuda. 244-245.
38 Lee Chien-jung. Jiědòng Liǎng’àn 20-nián: Liǎng’àn Shíshì Pínglùnjiā Lǐ Jiànróng
Dìyīshǒu Guānchá [Thawing Cross-Strait Relations after Two Decades: Firsthand Observations
from Cross-Strait Affairs Commentator Lee Chien-jung]. Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing,
2011: p. 160.
39 Chang, Chen. The Liberty Times, March 29, 2005: 112-121
40 Lee, 152. The present author’s interview of Chang Jung-Kung and Lee Chien-Jung.
108
facilitate cross-strait interaction. 41 The KMT-CPC Platform would be the
mechanism for achieving this interaction and dialogue.
2.2. The makeup of the KMT-CPC Platform
The KMT-CPC Platform was comprised of four mechanisms for dialogue and
engagement. The following is a summary thereof.42
(1) Leaders’ talks
This refers to talks between the heads of the KMT and the CPC. While it is not
a hard and fast rule that the talks must be held every year, since the KMT’s
return to power in 2008, these talks have gradually come to take a spot on the
annual calendar. They are overseen by the office of the party chairman or the
office of the honorary chairman attending in place of the chairman, the Culture
and Communications Committee, and the Mainland Affairs Department, with
support from the National Policy Foundation in its role as the party’s think
tank.
(2) KMT-CPC Trade and Economic Forum/Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and
Culture Forum (hereinafter, “the Trade and Economic Forum”)
This is a symposium for primarily KMT-affiliated politicians as well as
Taiwanese business leaders and academics to engage in exchange and
dialogue with their mainland counterparts. The event is run on the KMT side
by the Mainland Affairs Department with the support of the National Policy
Foundation. Since the holding of the first forum, the mainland has sent the
head of and other officials from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council
of the People (hereinafter, “the Taiwan Affairs Office”).43 This demonstrates
the mainland’s readiness to rapidly translate into policy the joint propositions
drafted by the Trade and Economic Forum. For its part, the KMT has
maintained that it is merely providing a forum to encourage interaction between
Taiwanese business people and academics and their mainland counterparts, and
that it was beyond the KMT’s control as to whether the Chen administration
would actually accept any given joint proposition.44
(3) Regional party association engagement
This refers to interaction between regional associations of the KMT and CPC.
41
42
Lee, 180-182.
The present author’s interviews of Chang Jung-Kung and KMT honorary chair Wu Pohsiung (September 2012, Taipei), as well as of Lee Chien-Jung.
43 “Shǒujiè Liǎng’àn Jīngmào Lùntán Dàibiǎo Míngdān” [First Cross-Strait Trade &
Economic Forum Representatives List], The People’s Daily Online, April 14, 2006 <http://
tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14810/4300563.html> retrieved on May 6, 2013.
44 The present author’s Interview of Chang Jung-Kung.
109
The KMT’s involvement is overseen by the party general secretary and
organizational development committee, which is responsible for regional
organizations.
(4) Mechanism for protection of Taiwanese commercial interests
While the mainland put in place various laws aimed at protecting Taiwanese
commercial interests, some felt that none were particularly effective given
China’s lack of rule of law.45 In an effort to win the support of Taiwan’s
business community, the KMT therefore put into place a mechanism for
protecting Taiwanese commercial interests whereby the Mainland Affairs
Department would lodge claims against the mainland on behalf of Taiwanese
businesses. The mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office responded by establishing a
new section called the Department of Complaints and Coordination.46
2.3 The Ma administration’s approach
Despite the KMT-CPC Platform being criticized by Pan-Green for being an
“alliance between the KMT and the CPC,” President Ma Ying-Jeou continued to
make use of the platform after assuming office. There were two reasons for this.
Firstly, by maintaining the KTM-CPC Platform, a channel that could be utilized
until leaders’ talks could be held with the CPC, it would be easier to obtain
information for use in policymaking, thereby providing significant benefits to Ma’s
administration.47 The second reason concerns considerations for the mainland’s
political system. The PRC is a totalitarian one-party state. For the KMT to sever
relations with the CPC the moment it gained power would have been an affront
to the CPC and could have impeded the administration’s pursuit of its mainland
policy.48
As such, the Ma administration maintained the KMT-CPC Platform. At the
same time, however, it shifted responsibility for the Trade and Economic Forum
and KMT-CPC leaders’ talks to the central government. The following is a
summary of the administration’s approach.49
45
Hsu Dong-hai. “Cóng Xīnguāng Sānyuè Shìjiàn Kàn Táishāng Dàlù Tóuzī Fēngxiǎn”
[Risks for Taiwanese Businesses Investing in the Mainland as Illustrated by the Shin Kong
Mitsukoshi Incident] in Zhǎnwàng yǔ Tànsuǒ [Outlooks & Explorations], Vol. 5 #10, Oct.
2007: 12-17. Tsai Hong-ming. “Bǎozhàng Táishāng Tózī, Shè Jīzhì Cài Gòu Lì” [Protecting
the Investments of Taiwanese Businesses, Only Establishing a Mechanism Will Suffice].
National Policy Foundation, October 7, 2010. <http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/8211> retrieved
on April 20, 2013.
47 The present author’s interview of Taipei Forum Secretary Su Chi (September 2012 in
Taipei).
49 The present author’s interviews of Chang Jung-Kung, Wu Po-Hsuiung, Lee Chien-Jung, and
Su Chi.
110
Because the SEF and ARATS resumed official negotiations and dialogue, the
SEF was now able with the government’s mandate to negotiate and engage in
dialogue with the mainland in order to protect Taiwan’s interests. This prompted
the KMT to abandon the aforementioned mechanism aimed at protecting
Taiwanese commercial interests.
While the Trade and Economic Forum was still overseen by the Mainland
Affairs Department with support from the National Policy Foundation, the KMT’s
return to power enabled it to involve the NSC in the coordination and discussions
that took place at the Trade and Economic Forum, with all final decisions resting
in the hands of Ma Ying-Jeou.50 Deputy KMT cabinet ministers also attended the
forum as guests and expert delegates.51 That said, the finer practicalities of the
discussions were delegated to party leadership, in order to uphold the protocol that
had been followed since the KMT were in opposition.
While the leaders’ talks remained overseen by the party chairman’s office, the
Culture and Communications Committee, and the Mainland Affairs Department,
the agendas for the talks were coordinated by the NSC, with Ma Ying-Jeou
having the final say. Wu Po-hsiung, who served as party chairman from 2007 to
2009, had been attending the leaders’ talks with the mandate of Ma Ying-Jeou,
but once Ma assumed the role of party chairman in 2009 in addition to his role
as president, Wu attended on behalf of Ma in the capacity of honorary chairman.
As such, the office of Honorary Chairman Wu came to take responsibility for
the oversight of the talks in place of the chairman’s office. However, Ma YingJeou and the NSC did not go over the speeches Wu Po-hsiung would make at the
leaders’ summit with a fine-tooth comb. Instead, Chang Jung-Kung or Culture and
Communications Committee head Lee Chien-jung would compile speeches based
on Ma’s instructions to Wu. Chang and Lee left KMT leadership, although they
continued to assist Wu on a voluntary basis at Wu’s request.
However, because MAC chief Lai Shin-Yuan never joined the KMT, her
involvement was not solicited in the KMT-CPC Platform despite her being the
minister responsible for mainland policy. It therefore appears that only KMT
officials are able to engage in the NSC-led negotiations and discussions connected
to the KMT-CPC Platform.
50 The present author’s interview of Chang Jung-Kung, and the National Policy Foundation
Vice President K.T. Tang (August 2014 in Taipei).
51 A mainland news site on Taiwan〈http://big5.batie.chinataiwan.org/〉and the National
Policy Foundation website〈http://www.npf.org.tw/〉were referred to (both on May 6, 2013)
for lists of attendees of the Cross-Strait Trade and Economic Forum from the time of the fourth
forum (the first held during the Ma administration) through the present.
111
2.4 Cases where the party was alleged to lead the government
(1) The Chinese translation of “Chinese Taipei” at the Beijing Olympics
Since the 1950s, Taiwan and mainland China have disputed which of them held
the legitimate right to represent “China” in the international community. Taiwan
gradually lost out to China, with the US-China détente and Taiwan’s departure
from the UN in the 1970s kicking off a period where Taiwan progressively lost
its status as China’s representative at UN-affiliate organizations and other major
international organizations, as well as its diplomatic ties with other countries.
Taiwan was forced to become flexible in order to maintain its engagement
with the international community. In the field of international sport, Taiwan
remained a member of the Olympic Committee as Chinese Taipei by a passed
at a 1979 International Olympic Committee meeting held in Nagoya, and
through negotiations by those on both sides of the strait at the 1989 Olympic
Committee session held in Hong Kong (the “Hong Kong talks”), it agreed
with mainland China that “Chinese Taipei” would be translated in all official
documents, statements, and announcements as “Zhōnghuá Táiběi,” where the
word “Zhōnghuá” invokes images primarily of the Chinese cultural sphere rather
than any political connotation.52 However, no debate was held on either occasion
regarding how the mainland media and mainland organizations other than the
Chinese Olympic Committee should translate “Chinese Taipei.” As such, even
after the Hong Kong talks, mainland media outlets continued to translate “Chinese
Taipei” as “Zhōnguó Táiběi,” where the word “Zhōngguó” more strongly implies
inclusion in the Chinese state.53
It was revealed immediately before the 2008 Beijing Olympics that some
Chinese-language promotional materials were translating Chinese Taipei as
“Zhōnguó Táiběi.”54 The Taiwan Affairs Office responded that both “Zhōnguó
Táiběi” and “Zhōnghuá Táiběi” were merely translations of “Chinese Taipei” and
that the consensus reached at the Hong Kong talks was not binding on any media
outlet or parties other than the Olympic Committees from the respective sides of
the strait, adding that mainland media outlets were merely using the expression
“Zhōnguó Táiběi” out of habit and had no intention to oppress Taiwan.55
The Ma administration decried the Taiwan Affairs Office statement and urged
the mainland to make the media use the translation “Zhōnguó Táibě.”56 Culture
and Communications Committee director Lee Chien-Jung used the KMT-CPC
52 Amako, Huang. 179-180.
53 Lee. 256-259.
54 The Liberty Times Net, July
55 Apple Daily, July 10, 2008.
56 Apple Daily, July 10, 2008.
11, 2008.
United Daily News, July 24, 2008.
112
Platform to engage the CPC in dialogue with the KMT. It was ultimately agreed
that state media such as Xinhua and China Central Television (CCTV) would refer
to the Taiwanese athletes as being from “Zhōnghuá Táibě.”57
The Liberty Times, which has Pan Green leanings, reported that Lee’s
conversation with the CPC was not approved in advance by the Office of the
President and that the matter had instead been reported after the fact to Ma YingJeou by Wu Po-hsiung.58 However, it is inconceivable that the party leadership
talked to the CPC without being directed to do so by Ma because of the way the
KMT-CPC platform operates. When the present author interviewed Lee ChienJung, he stated that the party is unable to engage in dialogue without the approval
of the government, implying that any dialogue would have been authorized in
advance by the government.59
(2) Taiwan’s participation in WHA with observer status
Even before becoming president in 2008, Ma Ying-Jeou called for a “Diplomatic
Truce,” that is a halt to the diplomatic hostilities described above.60 While the
Ma administration has not formally discussed the “Diplomatic Truce” with the
mainland via the SEF or ARATS, the KMT has articulated its position on this
issue to the mainland since its days in opposition. While the mainland has not
responded officially, the Ma administration has extolled the achievements of the
“Diplomatic Truce” using several cases. One of the most important benefits as
described by the Ma government is Taiwan’s ability to participate in the World
Health Organization’s annual general meeting (the World Health Assembly or
WHA) as an observer.61
However, it was reported in May 2011 that the WHO secretariat had sent a
57
58
Lee. 259-263.
The Liberty Times, July 28, 2008.
59 The present author’s interview of Grand Hotel Taipei chairman Lee Chien-Jung.
60 Ma Ying-Jeou. “Gǎigé, Hái Yào Gèng Kuài: Jiùrèn Mínguódǎng Zhǔxí Yīzhōunián Gǎnyán”
[Reform Requires Even More Speed: My Impressions After a Year as KMT Chairman]. United
Daily News, August 19, 2006.
61 Kwei-Bo HUANG. “Cóng ‘Línghé’ Zǒu Xiàng ‘Shuāngyíng:’ Wǒguó Huólù Wàijiāo de
Zhànlüè Zhǎnzhé” [From “Zero Sum” to “Win-Win:” Our Country’s Breakthrough Diplomatic
Strategy Shift] in Mǎ Zǒngtǒng Zhízhèng-hòu de Liǎng’àn Xīnjú: Lùn Liǎng’àn Guānxi Xīn
Lùxiàng [A New Phase in Cross-Straight Relations Under Ma: A New Way of Discussing
Cross-Strait Relations], Ed. Tsai Chao-Ming. Taipei: Prospect Foundation, 2009: 98-99.
“Wàijiāobù Zhèngwù Cìzhǎng Chénlǚxún yǔ Méitǐ Jìzhě Cháxù” [A Tea-time Chat between
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Shen Lyu-shun and Journalists]. ROC Ministry of
Foreign Affairs <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/official/Home/Detail/9a3839ea-89f7-45dc-88003b49754ffc40?arfid=d45c7a81-d84b-42ee-9225-3adf34303df5&opno=c194003d-5c5a-41958e9c-974101490af0>, retrieved on May 6, 2013. National Chengchi University associate
professor Huang Kwei-bo headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Research and Planning
Committee in the first term of the Ma Ying-Jeou administration.
113
confidential communication to its member countries in September 2010 saying
that Taiwan would be referred to as “Taiwan Province, China.”62 DPP Legislative
Yuan members stated, however, that the basis for the WHO secretariat’s actions
was a memorandum entered into between China’s Ministry of Health and the
WHO secretariat immediately after the 2005 Lien-Hu talks concerning Taiwan’s
participation in WHO activities as “Taiwan, China” (hereinafter, “the WHO
memorandum”), and accused the KMT of using the KMP-CPC Platform to sell
out Taiwan’s sovereignty.63
Ma Ying-Jeou held a press conference at the presidential office on May
10, 2011, criticizing the WHO and the mainland. He then telephoned Wu PoHsiung, who was visiting Beijing for KMT-CPC leaders’ talks slated for the
afternoon of the same day, to instruct him to inform the CPC Central Committee
of the Taiwanese position. 64 After Ma Ying-Jeou’s press conference, Wu PoHsiung asked Hu Jintao at the KMT-CPC leaders’ talks to be understanding of
Taiwan’s international activities.65 However, many were suspicious that the Ma
administration in fact already knew about the communiqué but had withheld it
from the public, and that the Ma administration only protested the matter because
the DPP blew the whistle.66
In an interview with the present author, Chang Jung-Kung said that the while
the KMT had kept the mainland informed of Taiwan’s WHO activities, the
KMT had not been involved in the signing of the WHO memorandum and had
merely been informed of the outcome.67 Chang said that the Chen Shui-bian
administration, despite protesting to the WHO over the use of “Taiwan, China,”
continued to be a WHO participant and did not stage a boycott.68
62 The Liberty Times, May 9, 2011.
63 “Zōngzhǔguó Móshì Bǎifēnbǎi Zhèngshí,
Shìwèi Móshì Jiù Shì Taiwan Provin…” [Vassal
State Model 100% Confirmed, WHA Model Means Taiwan Provin…]. Facebook page of
DDP Legislative Yuan members, May 9, 2011. <https://www.facebook.com/video/video.
php?v=217694851591872>, retrieved on May 6, 2013.
64 Ming-I Wang. “Běijīng Guānghuá-lù Jiǎ 9-hào: Zhùjīng Cǎifǎng Zhájì Jì” [Jia 9 Guanghua
Road, Beijing: The Notes of a Reporter Stationed in Beijing] Taipei: INK Literature, 2012:
112-116.
65 “1000510: Wú-Róngyù Zhǔxí yǔ Hú Zǒngshūjì Huìmiàn Xīnwéngǎo” [Press release
1000510: Meeting between Honorary Chairman Wu and General Secretary Hu]. KMT, May
11, 2011. <http://www.kmt.org.tw/page.aspx?id=32&aid=6028> retrieved on May 6, 2013.
66 “Mínzhǔ Jìnbù Dǎng Dì 14-jiè Dì 28-cì Zhōngchánghuì Xīnwéngǎo” [Press release: DPP
Standing Committee 14.28], DPP, May 11, 2011 <http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.
php?&sn=4910> retrieved on May 6, 2013; Liberty Times, May 14, 2011.
67 Lee p. 159; the present author’s interview with Chang Jung-Kung.
68 “1000511 (Lìyuàn Dǎngtuán Xīnwéngǎo) Mínjìndǎng Zhízhèngshí Zài Yěhòu Jiǎng
Kōnghuà” [1000511 (Legislative Yuan Members Press Release) DPP Mute when in Power,
Speaks in Empty Platitudes when in Opposition]. KMT, May 11, 2011 <http://www.kmt.org.
tw/page.aspx?id=32&aid=6018> retrieved on May 6, 2013. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Shen Lyu-shu, who provided the testimony, was stationed in Geneva between 2003 and 2008.
114
The mainland for its part did not restrict its channels for dialogue to the
KMT-CPC Platform, either. For example, immediately before Ma Ying-Jeou’s
inauguration as president, Su Chi held a discussion in Hong Kong with the
mainland regarding the “diplomatic ceasefire,” including as regarded the WHO.69
A research delegation led by Yang Jiemian, the younger brother of China’s foreign
minister Yang Jiechi and president of the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies, was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet with staff
from Taiwan’s Ma administration in early July 2008 and discuss international
activities by Taiwan in closed-doors sessions in which a government think tank
participated.70
However, the mainland has consistently claimed sovereignty over Taiwan since
1949, referring to Taiwan as “Taiwan, China” or “Taiwan Province, China,” so
the WHO memorandum and the confidential WHO communiqué should not have
come as surprises to the Ma administration, which only attempted to address these
issues after meeting with criticism from the opposition. Therefore, even putting
aside allegations of the KMT-CPC Platform representing a cozy alliance between
the two parties, this incident raised major questions about the judgment and issueresolution abilities of those at the center of the Ma administration.
(((( One country, Two Areas
When visiting Beijing on March 22, 2012, Wu Po-Hsiung said that he had told Hu
Jintao at their talks that in Taiwan’s mainland policy, the cross-strait relationship
would be defined as one of “one country, two areas.”71
This concept has its origins in comments Ma Ying-Jeou made in an interview
with Mexican newspaper El Sol de Mexico that referenced the “Taiwan area of
the Republic of China” and the notion that the “cross-strait relationship is not
a state-to-state relationship but a special relationship.”72 On September 3 the
Office of the President explained that Ma’s comments were enshrined in Article
11 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, which
stipulates that “[r] ights and obligations between the people of the Chinese
mainland area and those of the free area, and the disposition of other related
69
United Daily News, April 30, 2009.
70 Wang. 33-35.
71 “1010322 Wú-Róngyù
Zhǔxí yǔ Hú Zǒngshūjì Huìmiàn Xīnwéngǎo” [Press release 1010322:
Meeting between Honorary Chairman Wu and General Secretary Hu]. KMT, March 22, 2012
<http://www.kmt.org.tw/page.aspx?id=32&aid=6934> retrieved on May 6, 2013.
72 “Zǒngtǒng Jiēshòu Mòxīgē ‘Tàiyángbào’ Xì Jítuán Dǒngshìzhǎng Wǎisīgàizī (Mario
Vázquez Raña) Zhuānfǎng” [President Grants Exclusive Interview to Mario Vázquez Raña,
Director General of the Organización Editorial Meicana]. ROC Office of the President,
September 3, 2008. <http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=14151&rm
id=514&size=100> retrieved on 6 May 2013.
115
affairs may be specified by law,” and that the cross-strait relationship meant
the relationship between Taiwan, which is a free area, and the mainland. The
following day the Office of the President added that the law in question was the
Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland
Area.73 However, until the 2012 talks between Wu and Hu Jintao, Ma Ying-Jeou
had never used the phrase “one country, two areas”, and on March 23, the Office
of the President revised the statement to “one Republic of China, two regions,” on
the grounds that merely saying “one country” would be an oversimplification.74
At the March 28 KMT Central Standing Committee meeting, Ma Ying-Jeou
commented that as far as the Taiwanese side was concerned, the cross-strait
relationship had always been characterized as “one Republic of China, two areas,”
and in his May 20 address upon his inauguration for his second term as president,
Ma stated that, “for us, ‘one China’ naturally means the Republic of China,” and
again referenced the phrase “one Republic of China, two areas.”75
This met with Pan-Green criticism claiming that by using the phrase “one
country, two areas,” Ma could be construed as selling out Taiwanese sovereignty,
because to the international community “one China” meant the PRC. 76 In
addition, The Liberty Times claimed that Ma Ying-Jeou and Wu Po-hsiung did
not work well as a team, reporting that in discussions ahead of the Wu-Hu talks,
Ma had given Wu a document on which to base his comments, and that while
the document had included references to “one country, two areas,” Ma had been
unhappy with the undue emphasis Wu had placed on that section.77
It should be noted that the reference to “the Taiwan area of the Republic of
China” was made by Ma Ying-Jeou without any discussion or consultation with
the NSC. In an interview with the present author, Su Chi stated that Ma had
been personally responsible for passing the Act Governing Relations between
the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area in 1992 as deputy head of
the MAC, and knows the most about this formulations.78 However, then MAC
chairman and current leader of the Taiwan Solidarity Union Huang Kun-Huei
stated that at the time, the act was treated as a domestic law rather than one
that would apply to negotiations with the mainland. Huang criticized Ma for
intentionally misrepresenting the law as one dealing with the status of the cross73
United Daily News, September 4, 2008; The Liberty Times, September 5, 2008.
Apple Daily, March 24, 2012.
The Liberty Times, March 29, 2012. “Zhōnghuá Mínguó Dì-13-rèn Zǒngtǒng, Fùzǒngtǒng
Xuānshì Jiùzhí Diǎnlǐ” [Inauguration of the 13th ROC President, Vice President]. ROC Office
of the President, May 20, 2012 <http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid
=27200&rmid=514> retrieved on May 6, 2013.
76 The Liberty Times, 23 March 2012.
77 The Liberty Times, March 31, 2012; The Liberty Times, March 30, 2012.
78 The present author’s interview with Su Chi.
74
75
116
strait relationship.79 Chin-I Chiu also suggested that the definition of “one China”
used by the Taiwanese side included the concept of “a special state-to-state
relationship.”80 This demonstrates that even the politicians who were involved
in defining the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area
and the Mainland Area and the Taiwanese side’s “one China” formulation have
differing views regarding the concepts.
Because Ma did not coordinate or discuss with anyone before proclaiming
the “Taiwanese region of the Republic of China,” it is likely that the staff in his
administration had little choice but to make their comments in accordance with
Ma’s instructions and arguments. Wu Po-Hsiung, who was at the 2012 Wu-Hu
talks and Lee Chien-Jung who also attended the talks and is said to have written
Wu’s speech, told the present author that they were merely carrying out their
responsibilities in accordance with the government’s instructions, that they were
never in a position to misconstrue anything, and that they did not say anything
they were not authorized to say.81 If the phrase “one country, two areas” was
rephrased as “one Republic of China, two areas” on the grounds that the former
was overly abbreviated suggests that Ma Ying-Jeou and the NSC without adequate
prior consideration.
Conclusion
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. Firstly, the
role of the KMT-CPC Platform is clear. A review of case studies shows that the
KMT-CPC Platform is a channel via which the Ma administration has interacted
with the CPC in order to glean information on the inner workings of the mainland
and the intentions of the CPC Central Committee, which was then used to guide
policymaking. Moreover, the KMT has not been the central player in policy
decisions and the KMT leadership, which was has no mandate to negotiate with
the mainland, has served rather to enforce some of the mainland policies created
by the Ma administration and to serve as a messenger of Ma Ying-Jeou.
Secondly, the KMP-CPC Platform enabled the KMT leadership as a whole to
be more closely involved with the formulation of mainland policy. Unlike the
79
“Huáng Kūnhuī Pī Mǎ ‘Yīguó Liǎngqū:’ Wán Nòng Fǎlǜ Wénzì Yóuxì Qīpiàn Táiwārén,
Táilián Hūyù Wú Dūnyì xiàng Zhōngguó Lǐngdǎorén Shuō ‘Zhōnghuá Mínguó’” [Huang KunHuei Criticizes Ma’s “One Country, Two Regions:” Playing with Legal Words to Deceive
the Taiwanese, TSU Appeals to Wu Den-yih to Use “ROC” with China’s Leaders]. Taiwan
Solidarity Union, March 29, 2012 <http://www.tsu.org.tw/?post_type=news&p=510> retrieved
on on May 6, 2013.
80 Tzou Jing-Wen. Lǐ Dēnghuī Zhízhèng Gàobái Shílù [The True Account of Lee Teng-hui in
Power]. Taipei: INK Publishing, 2001: 184.
81 The author’s interview with Wu Po-hsiung and Lee Chien-Jung.
117
“secret envoys” of the Lee Teng-hui administration, the KMT-CPC Platform was
integrated into the NSC’s mainland policy formulation process, enabling the KMT
leadership to become involved in an organized manner in the policy formulation
process.
Thirdly, the KMT-CPC Platform by no means indicates that the KMT has
“led” the government. The KMT-CPC leaders’ talks and Trade and Economic
Forums held during the Ma administration were run by the party leadership
under the direction of the NSC. Even in those cases where the KMT was accused
of “selling Taiwan out,” the KMT was merely operating within the bounds of
mainland policy formulation process lead by Ma Ying-Jeou. While there was
criticism of the way that the Ma administration mobilized many party members
involved in administrative governmental duties to perform party duties, this was
no doubt due to this practice invoking memories amongst DPP members of KMT
totalitarianism.
The fourth point regards criticism of Ma Ying-Jeou’s leadership. Not just
in regard to mainland policy but in other areas as well, Ma Ying-Jeou is often
criticized for entrusting policy formulation to a select group of advisers known
as the “Ma Group” and not paying enough attention to coordination with those
in his administration, or to the related issues of staff appointments or relationship
management.82 All these criticisms of Ma cite issues with his ability to lead.
Even in the cases of Taiwan’s appellation in the WHO and the “one state, two
regions” comment, it was not the KMT-CPC Platform but the lack of foresight
and sufficient responses by those at the center of Ma administration that drew
criticism. Indeed, it is fair to say that in engaging with the CPC via the KMT-CPC
Platform, whose size and function have no comparable equivalent in any of the
world’s other political parties, Ma revealed deficiencies in his leadership.
Ma Ying-Jeou’s lack of leadership is often cited as the reason for his approval
rating falling below 20% in 2014, with just under three years remaining in his
presidential term. However, Ma Ying-Jeou’s leadership also appears to have been
adversely affected by the systemic dysfunction described above relating to the
formulation of security policy. I intend to further my analysis of such structural
issues in another paper.
(The study was also supported by the Torii Fellow grant from the Suntory Foundation.)
82 Hsia Chen, Kuo Chung-Lun, Wu Tien-Jung, eds. Wikileaks Taiwan 2006-2010. Taipei:
Reading Times, 2011; Wang. 35-43; United Daily News, November 4, 2012.
118
About the Author
Wei-Hsiu HUANG is the Guest Junior Researcher at Waseda Taiwan Research
Institute. He received his Ph.D. from Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
at Waseda University in Tokyo. He spent several years as Visiting Fellow at
Institute of Oriental Culture of the University of Tokyo (2010), and Adjunct
Researcher at Waseda Taiwan Research Institute (2010~2014). He is specializing
in Mainland Policy Decision-Making Process in Taiwan, Taiwan Policy DecisionMaking Process in China, politics and foreign relations in the PRC and Taiwan,
the Cross-Strait Relations, political and diplomatic history of Asia, politics and
foreign relations in the PRC and Taiwan, the Cross-Strait Relations, political
and diplomatic history of Asia, and Japan’s foreign and security policies about
Taiwan’s security. He is also the winner of the Sixth Japan Association for Taiwan
Studies Award of political and economic field in 2011. He is the author of Li-Touki
Seiken no Tairikuseisaku Ketteikatei (1996~2000): Soshikitekikettei to Dokudan
no Soukoku [The Decision-Making Process under Lee Teng-hui's Administration
toward Mainland China, 1996-2000 : Contradiction between Collectivism and
Dogmatism] (Okayama: UNIVERSITY EDUCATION PRESS Co.,Ltd., 2012) in
Japanese.
Address: Waseda Taiwan Research Institute, Waseda Universty, Room 325,NishiWaseda Bldg.3F, 1-21-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjyuku-ku, TOKYO 169-0051 JAPAN
E-Mail: [email protected]
The Development of Japan-China
Relations in the Period of Stability in
Cross-Strait Relations
Akio TAKAHARA
Abstract
Analyses of the developments in China’s Japan policy in the 21st century indicate
that it is in a dilemma. For the peace and prosperity that the CCP needs for its
legitimacy to rule, good relations and cooperation with the neighbors, especially
Japan, is useful and necessary. However, for the unity of the Party and the nation,
and for gathering people’s support for the Party and government, struggle with the
neighbors and especially with Japan proves useful and effective. China’s Japan
policy oscillates between these positions, depending on the situational factors
involving political and economic conditions and on the policy tendency of the
leadership. Most recently, while Xi Jinping has not abandoned the Japan-bashing
card in domestic politics, he has sent a signal to his people by meeting Abe twice
that it is high time they promoted political relations with Japan. He seems to be
more comfortable in signaling this because he has consolidated his power base,
but probably feeling more urgent since the decline in economic exchange with
Japan is exacerbating the economic downturn that could undermine the stability of
his regime.
Keyword
Japan-China relations, Cross-Strait relations,Intra-Party disagreements, antiJapanese demonstrations, China’s Dream
Introduction
Chinese people are often referred to as “a sheet of loose sand.” Chinese leaders
have always struggled with the issue of bundling them together in their attempts
to govern a modern nation. This is still true in mainland China, where the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has developed their organizational network throughout
120
the country and has built a stronger centralized system than the dynasties that
prospered in the past. Even so, unifying the Chinese people is still a challenge for
the leaders.
The leaders since Mao Zedong often used a particular method to unify the
nation, which involved setting up and developing various struggles. According
to the historian Qian Liqun, who taught at Peking University, Mao Zedong’s
basic policy was to set up conflicts, create class struggles, and maintain the
tension of the “Permanent Revolution.”1 In the post-Mao era, class struggles
were disapproved of. However, as one can see in the recent Bo Xilai trial and the
crackdown on party and military big guns such as Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou and
Ling Jihua by the Xi Jinping administration, China has consistently tightened its
domestic control through the Rectification Movement and anti-corruption drive.
China’s struggles have not only been among class enemies and political
enemies in the country but have also involved external targets. During the
Mao era, their target was at first their civil war opponent, the Chiang Kaishek administration that fled to Taiwan. Some believe that the 1958 shelling of
Kinmen, that is the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, was a display of backlash against
Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence policy with the U.S. and his proposal of
creating a China-Soviet combined fleet. However, another interpretation is that the
crisis was intended to inflame tensions with other countries, to mobilize people,
and to accelerate the Great Leap Forward.2 Furthermore, the timing of the crisis
matches that of Mao Zedong’s suggestion for the necessity of conflict with foreign
countries and his criticism on the policies of “Anti-Rash Advance” in the economy
and peaceful coexistence in diplomacy, suggested by Zhou Enlai and others.3
In the era of Deng Xiaoping, continuous revolution was disapproved, and
almost all the permanent, domestic enemies of the CCP government disappeared.
Deng Xiaoping proposed peaceful unification with Taiwan under the“One
Country, Two Systems”formula and shifted the target of external conflict from
Taiwan to Vietnam. Deng sent the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to invade
the Vietnamese territory at least twice, in 1979 and 1984. General Liu Yuan,
the Political Commissar of the People’s Liberation Army General Logistics
Department, in 2013 credited these wars with establishing a period of strategic
1 Sen Rigun (Qian Liqun), Mo Takuto to Chugoku [Mao Zedong and China] Translated by
Mikio Abe, Masahisa Suguki, Jiro Hane, and Tetsushi Maruyama (Tokyo: Seidosha, 2012),
233.
2 Isao Yamamoto, Chutai Kankeishi [History of China-Taiwan Relations] (Tokyo: Fujiwara
Shoten, 1999), 131.
3 Madoka Fukuda, Chugoku Gaiko to Taiwan---Hitotsu no Chugoku Gensoku no Kigen
[Chinese Diplomacy and Taiwan: the Origin of the Principle of One China] (Tokyo: Keio
Gijuku Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2013), 137.
The Development of Japan-China Relations in the Period of Stability
121
opportunity for peace and development.4 His opinion seems to be based on an
understanding of Deng Xiaoping’s motive for waging those wars, i.e. to garner
the support of the military and gain the upper hand in the intra-Party struggle first
with Hua Guofeng, and subsequently with the critics of reform and opening.
In 1994, CCP announced the completion of the transfer of power from Deng
Xiaoping’s generation to the third generation of the central leadership with Jiang
Zemin as its core. Then the new leadership came up with the conciliatory policy
towards Taiwan called “Jiang Eight Points”, but the Taiwanese President Lee
Teng-hui of the Nationalist Party (KMT) did not respond to it squarely. In the
following year, after Lee’s visit to the U.S. and the U.S.’s adoption of the East
Asia Strategy, Jiang switched over to a hardline policy towards Taiwan, going
as far as to conduct missile testing during Taiwan’s first public presidential
election in 1996. In particular, after Lee announced the “two states theory” in
1999 and Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the
President of Taiwan in 2000, Jiang launched a hardline struggle against Taiwan.
This included scathing personal attacks in the official media on Lee and Chen,
and intense competition for recognition as the legitimate China (i.e. vying for
countries with which to enter into diplomatic relations). This move was paralleled
by Jiang’s focusing on nationalism as the grounds for legitimacy of CCP’s rule,
especially after the revolutionary generation left the political arena.
Thus, looking back at China’s history, one can see the connection between
domestic politics and foreign and defense policies. That is, the political leaders
often waged a struggle against foreign countries or leaders to strengthen the unity
of the people in China and to turn the power struggle within the CCP to their
advantage. It used to be the case that they often chose Taiwan as the target of such
struggles.
However, in 2008, when KMT took power again in Taiwan and Ma Ying-jeou
presented a pro-China stance, China abruptly stopped criticizing Taiwan and the
Beijing-Taipei competition for legitimacy entered a “truce”. However, serious
disagreements in the CCP surfaced around the same time regarding issues such
as the country’s developmental pattern, evaluation of its current situation, and the
directions of future reform and foreign policy. Furthermore, the general public
was increasingly dissatisfied with power abuse and rampant graft and corruption
at the grassroots of society, the widening income gap, exacerbating environmental
pollution, and so on and so forth. It was against such a domestic backdrop that
China’s aggressive struggle with Japan started with the trawler collision incident
in 2010 and worsened after the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the
4
Yuan Liu, “Secure the Period of Strategic Opportunity, War is the Last Choice,” Huanqiu
Shibao [Global Times] (February 4, 2013). In this article, however, Lin Yuan mentioned two
wars fought by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and 1983. It is likely that he miswrote the later year.
122
Senkaku Islands in 2012 from a private owner.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how Japan was chosen as the main
target of China’s external struggle while Cross-Strait relations stabilized. Among
the various factors I will particularly focus on the linkage between China’s
domestic politics and its struggles against external targets. First, I will discuss
the connection between China’s domestic politics and its policy towards Japan
that was observed in the first term of the Hu Jintao Administration starting in
2002/2003. Next, I will review the disagreements within the CCP and increasing
social dissatisfaction and anxiety, which surfaced during the second term of
the administration starting in 2007/2008. Based on these exercises, I will look
into the nationalistic policies and tough Japan policies under the Xi Jinping
Administration, and the reasons why they were ameliorated in 2014. Finally,
based on the above analyses, I shall discuss how Japan should respond.
1. The Link between Domestic Politics and
Diplomacy during the First Period of the Hu Jintao
Administration
Hu Jintao became the General Secretary of CCP after Jiang Zemin, and that was
the first “peaceful” succession of power in the history of the Party. Under the
principle that the Party commands the gun, Hu should have become the Chairman
of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the same time. However, Jiang
clung on to the Chairmanship of the Commission for the next two years, while Hu
remained Vice-Chairman. This was institutionally an abnormal circumstance since
the Party General Secretary was a mere Vice-Chairman of CMC, which brought
confusion about who was at the helm. People mocked this situation, saying that
there were two Party Centers. In particular, since military affairs and diplomacy
are closely related, Jiang had a strong influence in the decision making process
of foreign policy for some time. This is how changes in foreign policy inevitably
became linked to changes in the power balance within the CCP.
1. Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin: Differences in Policy Tendencies
In 2002 Hu Jintao took the position of General Secretary immediately after the
16th National Congress of the CCP5. He then assumed the post of President at the
National People’s Congress in March 2003. Ten years before, in the 14th National
Congress in 1992, Jiang Zemin was reelected as the General Secretary, while Hu
5
Members of the Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee as well as the General Secretary
are elected at the 1st Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee, which is usually held
one day after the closing of the Party Congress.
123
Jintao was appointed by Deng Xiaoping as the youngest member of the Politburo
Standing Committee. In other words, Hu was given an apprenticeship period of
10 years to become heir. Probably thanks to the long years of preparation, once
Hu took the office as General Secretary, he was able to demonstrate his own style
both in domestic and foreign policies from a surprisingly early stage.
In terms of foreign policy, one should first note the change in the perception
of world affairs. Jiang Zemin had repeatedly said that the conflicts between
major countries intensified day by day. He declared he had to strengthen the
comprehensive national power so that China would not fall behind in the highly
competitive international environment. According to Jiang, comprehensive national
power consisted of four elements, i.e. the power of economy, military, science
and technology, and the cohesive power of the Chinese nation; it was necessary to
reinforce each one of the four elements. Here, the “Chinese nation” meant the Han
Chinese and the fifty-five so-called minority peoples combined together. Jiang had
insisted that it was vital for the nation to unify with stronger patriotism.
His understanding of world affairs and his policy tendency were clearly
demonstrated in the following episode. At the National Congress of the CCP,
which is held once in every five years, the General Secretary represents the central
committee and reports the results of the party activities of the past five years and
the activity plan for the next five years. Hu Jintao compiled the report for the 16th
National Congress in 2002, but Jiang Zemin reportedly asked Hu to make changes
and add some parts to the final draft of the report.6 His first point was to add a
separate section on national defense to stress its importance. His second point was
to call for solidarity of the party members by arousing risk awareness, namely,
by indicating that China was facing many serious challenges including intense
competition with other countries. As mentioned before, he gave the General
Secretary position to Hu Jintao but remained as the Chairman of the CMC for
another two years, saying that someone needs to be in charge and that he would
help Hu by staying in the position.7
In contrast, Hu Jintao’s policy was to propose the building of a Harmonious
Society and a Harmonious World. The first reason behind this was that he thought
the Chinese society was under strain. This resulted from the stress on investment
and economic development during Jiang Zemin’s days, although such a policy
did lead to a speedy growth in the country’s economy. The second reason is that
while more countries began to recognize China as a global power because of its
rapid economic development and increasing national power, they increasingly saw
6 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Ta Gaibian le Zhongguo: Jiang Zemin Zhuan [The Man who
Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin]（Shanghai: Shanghai Century
Publishing Group, 2005), 419.
7 Ibid., 436.
124
China as a threat or a potential threat. Containing such views was an important
motivation for Hu in stressing the need to develop a harmonious world.
Hu also called for China’s “peaceful rise.” The original phrase in Chinese was
heping jueqi ( 和平崛起 ), coined by one of the advisers, Zheng Bijian. This phrase
aimed to show both to the Chinese and to the outside world that China’s rise was
to be a peaceful one, notwithstanding its rapidness. However, after April 2004, Hu
stopped using this term, and went back to “peaceful development” ( 和平発展 ), a
term used by Deng Xiaoping. It is most likely that Jiang Zemin or his followers
opposed the term “peaceful rise,” arguing that it might end up adversely promoting the China threat theory. It is quite unusual to stop using a term that was once
used by top leaders, and this example gives one an impression that Hu had a hard
time in consolidating his control over policy making.
2. Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, Dismissal of Chen Liangyu, and
Shinzo Abe’s Visit to China
In September 2004, Jiang Zemin resigned from the position of Chairman of the
CMC, but even after that, Hu had difficulty taking the initiative in the decisionmaking process of foreign policy. In September 2005, Hu gave a speech regarding
the establishment of a Harmonious World at the UN General Assembly and
expressed this idea to the world, but no one in China chimed in it. It is customary
for the Chinese foreign minister to report the year’s foreign policy achievements
in a People’s Daily interview article at the end of each year; that year, however,
the term “Harmonious World” was ignored and not mentioned by Minister Li
Zhaoxing.8
This situation, however, clearly changed after the Central Foreign Affairs Work
Conference in August 2006. At the Conference, it was stressed that the whole
party and nation must be on common ground with the Party center’s judgment on
international affairs, and with its foreign policy line and strategic arrangements;
firmly carry through the Party center’s course of action and policy regarding
foreign affairs; and cooperate unitedly.9 We can construe from this expression that
this had not been the case in the past. After this conference’s success, Hu removed
Chen Liangyu, the Shanghai Party Committee Secretary, in September 2006 on
a charge of corruption. Chen was a politburo member well-connected to Jiang
Zemin; he had built his career in Shanghai and was regarded as a local leader
8 “Li Zhaoxing Receives People’s Daily Interview and Speaks on This Year’s Diplomatic
Achievements,” The Chinese Government Portal (December 20, 2005), at〈http://www.gov.
cn/zwhd/2005-12/20/content_132381.htm〉(searched date: January 8, 2014).
9 “Central Work Conference on External Affairs Held in Beijing, Hu Jintao Delivers
an Important Speech,” Xinhua Net (August 23, 2006), at〈http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2006-08/23/content_4999294.htm〉(searched date: January 8, 2014).
125
often opposing central policy.
In the following month, i.e. October 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
visited China. Abe and Hu agreed on building a Mutually Beneficial Relationship
Based on Common Strategic Interests. Abe, who had just taken office, had
never clearly stated that he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Even so, Hu
invited Abe to Beijing on the first day of the Plenary Meeting of the CCP Central
Committee. Thus, Hu demonstrated to the committee members how he practiced
omnidirectional diplomacy for the sake of development, just as he had expressed
in the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in August. It is most likely that
he was able to take risks and improve the relationship with Japan since China’s
domestic political situation had turned in his favor.
In a way, China’s policy towards Japan served as a barometer of the stability of
the Chinese administration. In other words, a Chinese government that adopted a
friendly policy towards Japan was stable. When the power base of the leader was
not very stable, the administration tended to take a hardline policy against Japan.
This suggested that a good relationship with Japan was an advantage to China’s
peace and development, but a struggle with Japan was conducive to strengthening
the centripetal force of the administration.
2. The Link between Domestic Politics and Foreign
Policy during the Second Period of the Hu Jintao
Administration
The first characteristic of the second period of the Hu Jintao administration, which
started in 2007/2008, was the surfacing of disagreements in the CCP on vital
issues. There were conflicting opinions in many areas such as economy, policy,
society and foreign affairs, and they involved questions important enough to
change the country’s future. Many of these issues were related to each other, and
gradually, a dichotomy of views emerged in the CCP. The second characteristic
was that many people in the country became increasingly dissatisfied with the
current societal situation and anxious about their future, even though China was
one of the first countries to get out of the global financial crisis. Such political and
social conditions interacted with the international environment and foreign policy,
thus creating the backdrop for China’s intense conflict against Japan, while CrossStrait relations stabilized.
126
1. Disagreements within the CCP
(1) Does the China Model Exist?
Among the various disagreements that surfaced, the issue regarding the China
model consisted of multiple factors. The China model, or the Beijing Consensus,
was originally proposed by foreigners as a counter-concept to the neo-liberal
American model and the Washington Consensus.10 Many Chinese began to pay
attention to this model particularly after the global financial crisis that followed
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
For those who believed that the China model did exist and was effective, the
potency of the American model was lost. They reckoned that the nationalization
of some automobile companies and banks, which were symbols of American
capitalism, indicated that America was turning into socialism and China turned
out to be victors. As for China’s current conditions, they perceived that the
country was in the best condition since the Opium War. The Chinese economy
had developed and people’s standard of living had generally improved. China’s
international status had never been higher, and now that China was at the center of
G20, the recession-plagued world was expecting China to pull and lead the global
economy. They believed that China’s success was due to the correctness of their
method of development, and insisted that the China model had become the model
for global development.
On the other hand, there were those who claimed that there was no China
model and that one should not trumpet it. The essence of the China model is
after all a market economy with strong government control. In other words, it
is a development dictatorship, if we use a concept that is more familiar to the
Japanese––and is not necessarily unique to China.11 Furthermore, China was still
in the process of reform, and thus it could not be a static model. They believed that
China had a mountain of issues beneath the surface of its thriving macroeconomic
success, and thus it was unworthy of being called a model.
The choice of whether or not to recognize the China model could influence
domestic reforms in many areas as well as foreign policy. This important debate
on the China model has yet to be settled.
(2) What Kind of Economic Reform should China Choose?
Naturally, the choice of whether or not to recognize the China model is directly
10
Stefan Halper, Peking Konsensasu---Chugoku Ryu ga Sekai o Ugokasu. [Beijing Consensus:
How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century] Translated by
Shigeto Sonoda and Tomoki Kamo. (Iwanami Shoten, 2011).
11 Susumu Takahashi, Kokusai Seijishi no Riron [Theories on the History of International
Politics] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008), 95, points out that it is debatable whether this concept can be applied to a country with a socialist system.
127
related to views on economic reform. If one believes that the China model is in
fact functioning, then there is no need to reform the current economic system with
strong governmental control. Also, the ultimate challenge for economic reform
is privatization of government-owned corporations, but there is opposition also
from those who strongly wish to adhere to the socialist ideology. Furthermore, it
is natural that those who have vested interests in the current oligopoly of stateowned enterprises in several important sectors of the national economy oppose
reform strongly.
On the other hand, there are many who recognize the limit of the current
growth method of increasing inputs. Based on this viewpoint, now that investment
efficiency is declining and the working-age population is decreasing, the Chinese
economy will end up in a gridlock sooner or later unless productivity is increased
through reform and innovation. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the
Hu Jintao administration, repeatedly called for reform of the oligopolistic system
from this standpoint.12
The disagreement between these two camps intensified in 2010. In 2010,
the government and media raised the issue of the expanding income gap and
criticized that the profits of the oligopolistic companies were too large and their
employees’ salaries were too high.13 In May 2011, the State Council issued an
official Opinion and argued that private capital should be introduced to the stateowned oligopolistic sectors, but hardly any action was taken. 14 In November
2011, they switched their strategy. The deputy-director of a bureau of the National
Development and Reform Commission, who was in charge of antimonopoly,
announced in an interview on a news program of the China Central Television
that her office would discuss the implementation of antimonopoly law, and that
they would start with the telecommunications industry.15 She pointed out that the
usage fee for broadband was too expensive and that the oligopolistic system was
problematic when it came to controlling the rise in prices.
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which is in charge of
the telecommunications industry, opposed this idea. The Xinhua News Agency
12 “Wen Jiabao Calls for Reform, Must Break Monopoly of State Owned Bank,” Chinese Net
of Voice of Germany (April 4, 2012) at〈www.dw.de/ 温家宝再呼改革　要打破国有銀行壟
断 /a-15858769〉(searched date: February 11, 2014).
13 “Four Large Imbalances in Income Distribution Brings About Economic and Social Risks,”
Xinhua Net (May 21, 2010) at〈http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-05/21/c_12127004.
htm〉(searched date: May 22, 2010).
14 “The State Council Some Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development
of Private Investment,” Chinese Government Portal (May 31, 2010) at〈www.gov.cn/
zwgk/2010-05/31/content_1605218.htm〉(searched date: February 11, 2014).
15 “DRC Conducting Anti-Monopoly Investigation at China Telecom and China Unicom,”
People’s Net (November 9, 2011), at〈http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/159296/16187929.
html〉(searched date: November 10, 2011).
128
intervened and issued a gag order, stating that this was a battle between the
gods, i.e. between the government agencies, and had nothing to do with the mass
consumers.16 On December 2, 2011, the China Telecom Corporation Limited
and the China Unicom, the country’s two major telecommunications companies,
simultaneously announced a statement saying that they would decrease prices and
requested that the investigation be halted in return.17
In the end, the antimonopoly law was not applied to the telecommunications
industry. Opposition to the reform was strong, and although the Third Plenum
of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP decided upon a comprehensive
deepening of reform in November 2013, the authorities were not able to dig into
reforming the state-owned enterprises and the distributional system. The policy
paper adopted at the Third Plenum emphasized that the relationship between the
government and the market was the core issue of economic reform. However, it
did not explain why they still had the same issues as in the 1980s, and how they
could remove the obstacles.
(3) How should China Move Forward with Political Reform?
The left wing, which consists of people that adhere to the socialist ideology, and
those with vested interests, are preventing the progress of economic reform. If so,
what is needed to accomplish economic reform is political reform that weakens
such forces, as Deng Xiaoping enunciated in 1986.
Since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, there has not been any remarkable
progress in political reform in China, except for the introduction of the democratic
election system in village committees. There used to be an argument for gradually
introducing the democratic election system to towns and villages as well as to
counties and cities, but the opposition was so strong that this has not yet been
realized. During the National People’s Congress in March 2011, Wu Bangguo,
then Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
and second in rank in the CCP, stated that questions regarding vital principles
such as the fundamental system of the nation should not be disturbed. He said
that, if disturbed, the nation may plunge into civil strife. 18 The fundamental
system most likely refers to the one-party rule commanded by the CCP and the
ownership system based mainly on public ownership, or the “basic economic
16 “Xinhua News Agency Calls the Investigation of Telecom and Unicom on Monopoly
‘Battle of the Deities’,” Phoenix Net (November 11, 2011), at〈news.ifeng.com/mainland/
detail_2011_11/1110597119_0.shtml〉(searched date: February 11, 2014).
17 “Telecom and Unicom Promise to Lower Broadband Fares,” Xinlang Net (December 3,
2011), at〈tech.sina.com.cn/t/2011-12-03/02256417346.shtml〉(searched date: February 11,
2014).
18 “Work Report of the Standing Committee of the NPC,” People’s Net (March 18, 2011), at
〈politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/14180013.html〉(searched date: February 11, 2014).
129
system” as the CCP calls it. Specifically, it does not allow multiple parties to take
turns and govern, nor does it allow pluralization of the guiding ideology. Wu
stated that there will be no separation of power, bicameralism, federal system, or
privatization; and thus categorically denied all reforms.
Wen Jiabao, on the other hand, repeatedly expressed positive opinions on
political reform. For example, at the regular Premier’s press conference held after
the closing of the National People’s Congress in March 2011, he revealed a series
of ideas that were quite different from Wu Bangguo’s.19 He said, for example,
“Political and economic reforms must be conducted in a coordinated manner.
The party and nation will be filled with energy and vitality only when reforms are
constantly implemented,” “Political reform is a guarantee for economic reform. If
there is no political reform, economic reform will not succeed, and any results that
have been obtained may be lost,” “To resolve people’s unhappiness and to realize
their wishes, we need to let them criticize and supervise the government,” and
“We must attain equality in income distribution, and not only gradually narrow
the income gap, but also resolve inequalities in the distribution of resources in
education and medicine, and let people share the fruit of reform and opening.” As
Prime Minister, i.e. the person in charge of the country’s economy, Wen Jiabao
fully understood people’s dissatisfaction and anxiety, and the urgency of political
reform. The situation was similar to the 1980s, when Premier Zhao Ziyang
promoted his version of political reform.20
(4) Do Universal Values Exist?
There were also arguments regarding whether or not universal values exist. They
were related to both the nationalism implied in the China model and the question
of political reform. A vital point of discussion was whether or not there was
universality in the concept of human rights. The CCP officially recognizes human
rights as a universal value, with the condition that China is still a developing
country and thus cannot realize everything at once. China has already ratified the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. During his official visit to
the U.S. in January 2011, Hu Jintao stated that there was universality in human
rights at the joint press conference with President Obama.21 Furthermore, during
19
“Premier Wen Jiabao Answers Reporters’ Questions, Japanese version,” Xueyi Net (May 27,
2011), at〈http://www.studyez.com/news/201105/27/46362.htm〉(searched date: January 8,
2014).
20 The reality is that Wen Jiabao’s words were not put into practice at all. Some criticized that
Wen was merely acting. Yu Jie, a Chinese writer who wrote a book about Wen entitled, China’s
Best Actor Wen Jiabao, was tortured and moved to the U.S.
21 “President Obama and Chairman Hu Jintao’s Remarks and Answers to the Reporters at the
Joint Press Conference,” USA Embassy Portal (January 19, 2011), at〈iipdigital.usembassy.
130
his visit to Japan in May 2008, he signed a new Joint Statement between Japan
and China, together with the then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. In the statement,
China agreed with Japan’s proposal and declared: “to engage in close cooperation
for the greater understanding and pursuit of basic and universal values that are
commonly accepted by the international community.”22
Surprisingly, however, agencies and high-ranking officials related to the
Propaganda Department of the CCP gradually made their position clear from
around 2008-2009 and argued that universal values do not exist. The Department
is in charge of ideology, education, and media. According to their arguments,
human rights are only Western values, but Westerners are calling them universal
values and imposing them on China, and accepting human rights will lead to
denying China. The head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences clearly
stated this, and the Ministry of Education and others published a number of
articles in CCP’s journals such as People’s Daily and Qiushi (Seeking Truth),
denying the universality.23 Colonel Liu Mingfu, a professor at the PLA National
Defense University, published a chauvinistic book entitled, China Dream. He
contended in the book that the era of China was coming and that it should expand
its military forces, surpass the United States and become a champion nation, and
that Chinese values would become dominant in the world.24
As for the abovementioned joint press conference of Hu Jintao and Obama,
the Xinhua News Agency reported that a press conference was held at the White
House and distributed pictures of the two leaders, but did not report on any details
of Hu’s statement. The contradiction between the words of the General Secretary
and the mainstream discourse of the Propaganda Department was a very serious
situation for the CCP. It revealed that there was a functional problem in the
Leninist principle of democratic centralism at the very center of the Party.
What should be noted here is that, in fact, exclusive nationalism was involved
in many debates regarding China’s internal issues, such as the China model,
reforms, and universal values. In June 2011, a banner was hung by the village
authorities in a suburban village in Xian with the aggressive statement: “The
gov/st/Chinese/texttrans/2011/01/20110119224507x0.9793294.html#axzz2t29vvnMJ〉
(searched date: February 11, 2014).
22 www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/0805_ks.html〉Accessed on February 11, 2014.
23 For example, Yuzhang Feng, “How to Understand the So-called ‘Universal Values’,” Renmin
Ribao [People’s Daily] (September 10, 2008)、Ministry of Education Deng Xiaoping Theory
and the Important Thought of the ‘Three Represents’ Research Center, “On Some Questions
Regarding ‘Universal Values’,” Qiushi Theory Net (July 1, 2009) at〈www.qstheory.cn/zl/
ztck/psjz/200907/t20090701_5000.htm〉(searched date: February 11, 2014).
24 Mingfu Liu, Zhongguo Meng: Hou Meiguo Shidai de Daguo Siwei yu Zhanlue Dingwei
[The Thinking and Strategic Position of Powers in the Post-American Era]（Beijing: China
Friendship Publishing Co., 2010).
131
Western Universalist Clique, Get Out Of China.”25 One might feel this is rather
brusque. However, we cannot but take note of the fact that such wording was
found at the grassroots of society. In general, one cannot deny that people’s
unhappiness with the current situation of the society intensified. How such
dissatisfaction and nationalism will intertwine or not will be an important point of
focus in investigating China’s external posture.
(5) How will China Maintain Social Stability?
In fact, one can also identify an element of nationalism in the debate within the
CCP on how to maintain social stability. Presently, the CCP is strongly concerned
about the society becoming unstable. If a riot occurs, they will have no choice
but to control it in a violent manner. On the other hand, some believe that they
should prevent violence in the first place by promoting reforms. This is more of
a progressive idea that involves utilizing the spontaneous development of social
groups among citizens and farmers and stabilizing the society by developing civil
society. According to Hu Jintao, various clashes of interests are occurring, and
therefore mechanisms for coordinating interests, expressing appeals, and also
assuring people’s rights and interests must be developed.26
We do not see any opposition against such un-refutable arguments, but there
are conservative opinions on specific methodology. In 2011, Zhou Benshun’s
article was published in Qiushi, an official organ of the CCP that is issued twice
a month. Zhou at that time was the Secretary General of the Central Politics and
Law Commission of the CCP, and later became the Party Secretary of Hebei
province.27 The Commission is a powerful organization in charge of the sectors
controlling public order, such as the police and legal departments. In the article,
Zhou labeled civil society as “a trap designed by the West for China.” One can see
another example of exclusive nationalism here, and it shows that China is highly
wary of Western conspiracy.28Also, one can say that the conservative forces are
adopting exclusive nationalism with a view to protecting their position, policies
25 Please refer to pictures taken by a blogger in Xian in June 2011 (June 19, 2011) at〈http://
www.inxian.com/20110619/27417#more-27417〉(searched date: January 8, 2014).
26 Jintao Hu, “Speech at the Special Study Group of Provincial and Ministerial Level Top
Cadres on Enhancing the Capabilities to Construct a Socialist Harmonious Society,” Xinhua
Net (June 26, 2005), at〈news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-06/26/content_3138887.htm〉
(searched date: February 11, 2014).
27 Benshun Zhou, “Proceed the Innovative Path of Social Management with Chinese
Characteristics,” Qiushi Theory Net (May 16, 2011), at〈http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk
/2011/2011010/201105/t20110513_80501.htm〉(searched date: January 8, 2014). He was
eventually dismissed from this post in 2015 on a charge of corruption.
28 After the Urumqi riot in July 2009, the author asked a leader of a think-tank of the Chinese
government in Beijing what he thought was the root cause of the riot. He answered that that
was a U.S. conspiracy.
132
and the current system, while marketization and economic development are
causing rapid changes in society.
(6) Will Hard-line Foreign Policy Continue?
What is deeply related to the question of nationalism is a tug-of-war between two
camps over foreign policy. On one hand, there are moderates or internationalists
who believe they should stick to Deng Xiaoping’s teaching in foreign policy:
to hide our capabilities and bide our time (“tao guang yang hui”). They think
that China is still a weak, developing country that has thrived in the existing
international order, and therefore they should value cooperative international
relations and the country’s image in the international society. They find it a big
problem that some military personnel have been repeatedly making aggressive
statements in the Chinese media since around 2008-09.
There are numerous examples of such statements. One said that the South
China Sea belongs to China, and that it has no international waters. Another stated
that China should start a small war in the South China Sea. Another said that
although the Indian navy is strong, China is superior in missiles and is therefore
able to attack all the nuclear power plants in India. Such aggressive comments
were brazenly displayed in the Chinese media. This was a surprising change. The
moderate camp believes that such extreme statements should not be made, as they
deteriorate China’s image.
However, more people have begun to believe that Deng Xiaoping’s teachings
to “hide our capabilities and bide our time” is now outdated. One reason is
that China’s national power has in fact increased and it is now recognized and
depended upon by the world to play the role of the locomotive of the global
economy. Furthermore, the hardliners or chauvinists, who believe in the realism of
intensifying power projection capabilities to protect China’s increasing overseas
interests, are increasing in number among diplomats and scholars in addition to
military personnel.
These two camps also disagree on the nine-dotted lines, resembling the
shape of a cow’s tongue, drawn on Chinese maps of the South China Sea. China
insists, though not very clearly and somewhat hesitantly, that it has historical
sovereign rights and jurisdictional authority within the dotted lines. 29 For
example, in May 2011, China cut the cable that Vietnam had laid for ocean floor
resource development. Vietnam contended that the development was within the
exclusive economic zone recognized by the UN Convention on the Law of the
29
In an explanation made in May 2009, it said “China has indisputable sovereignty over the
islands and their surrounding waters in the South China Sea, and it holds sovereign rights and
jurisdictional authority for the related waters, its ocean bottom, and the underground. Refer to
the map.” The map showed the nine-dotted lines.
133
Sea (UNCLOS). For China, however, this area is where they have historically
had sovereign rights. The loud voices in the Chinese media are those of strong
criticism against Vietnam and the Philippines, but internally there are reasonable
voices of the internationalists as well. They argue that by claiming rights over the
area within the dotted lines, China will infringe upon the rights of other countries
based on UNCLOS, which China itself also signed. There are some in China
who are pondering about a way to solve this contradiction and somehow find a
compromise, but they hesitate to discuss their thoughts in public in the current
atmosphere in China.
2. Dissatisfaction and Anxiety Regarding the Social Situation
There are two major spheres in Chinese politics. One is policy debate, bureaucratic
politics, or factional strife within the CCP, and the other is the relationship
between the CCP and society. Wu Bangguo mentioned the possibility of civil
strife because he understood and was aware of people’s increasing dissatisfaction
with the present social situation and anxiety about the future, shared by the poor
and the rich. The leaders of the CCP are afraid of the angry public.
(1) Dissatisfaction with the Current Situation
The income gap and proliferation of corruption are often cited as the reasons
for people’s unhappiness and anger in China. According to the research results
published by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in December
2012, China’s Gini coefficient in 2010 was 0.61.30 Then, in January 2013, the
National Bureau of Statistics published the country’s Gini coefficients from
2003, as if they were incited by this announcement.31 According to them, the
coefficient was 0.48 in 2010. A coefficient of 0.4 or more is supposed to indicate
a dangerous situation for a society’s stability, and in any case, it was shown that
China’s coefficient largely exceeded 0.4. As for the corruption issue, according to
the Supreme People’s Prosecutor’s Office, the number of civil servants who were
prosecuted for alleged bribery and corruption between January and November
2013 was 36,906.32
The income gap and corruption had been recognized as problems from an early
stage. Recently, the spread of nepotism has become another important social
issue. Of course, nepotism is not new in China. However, for a while after the
30
“Chugoku Katei no Jini Keisu 0.61 Shotoku Kakusa Shinkoku”. Jinmin Mo Japanese
version. December 11, 2012.〈http://j.people.com.cn/94475/8053174.html〉Accessed on
January 8, 2014.
31 Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (January 19, 2013), 4.
32 “Supreme Prosecutor’s Office: Thirty-six thousand nine hundred officials are charged and
searched on corruption in January to November 2013,” Xinhua net (January 5, 2014), at〈http://
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-01/05/c_118834521.htm〉(searched date: January 8, 2014).
134
Chinese economic reform had begun, almost anybody was able to become rich
and successful if they worked through toil and sweat. It did not matter where
they came from, and many people sought their own Chinese Dream. However,
recently, as the popular phrase “the second generation of the rich and the officials”
says, the tendency for rich people’s children to become rich and bureaucrats’
children to become bureaucrats has become widely acknowledged. Neither gift
tax nor inheritance tax is collected in China. Basically, in a world where power
means money, a system of succeeding wealth or status in the family has become
entrenched in the society.
Meanwhile, even graduates from elite universities have a difficult time finding
good jobs if they are from rural areas and have no connections in the city. They
have to leave the university dorm after graduation, so they usually live together
in cheap apartments in the suburbs while looking for good jobs. One Chinese
sociologist started to call them the “Ant tribe.”33 We may say that for the first time
a group of counter-elite is born in modern China.34
(2) Anxiety about the Future
It is also true that many people are concerned about the future, facing food
safety issues, deteriorating environmental pollution which drew attention
with the “PM2.5” issue, and the rapidly aging society, among other issues.
As a result, emigrating out of the country became popular, and there are more
people becoming religious to seek peace of mind. Many religions such as
Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and folk beliefs, have been increasing
their congregations. The number of Protestants is increasing especially fast,
and one report in 2009 estimated that it exceeded 100 million people, including
the underground or unofficial churches.35 Another estimate in 2013 showed
that the number of the Christians, including Catholics, reached more than 80
million people.36 Although the exact figure is unknown, there is no doubt that the
Christian population in China is quite large now. Most likely, they number no less
than the membership of CCP, which was approximately 87 million as of the end
of 2013.
33 Ren Shi (Lian Si), Arizoku- Kogakureki Waakiingu Pua tachi no Mure [Ant Tribe: A Crowd
of Working Poor with High Academic Careers] (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010).
34 This may just be the author’s impression, but judging from the Chinese students in Japan,
children from wealthy families in the large coastal cities are more approving about the status
quo, while those who are from rural areas tend to be disapproving.
35 “Impact of Christianity on China’s Democracy,” a report by Li Fan of the World and China
Institute at Keio University (July 18, 2009), at〈http://www.gongfa.com/html/gongfazhuanti/
xianzhengzhuanxing/20090807/519.html〉(searched date: March 2, 2014).
36 Chitose Sato, “Henyo suru Chugoku no Shukyo—Nijuisseiki ni okeru Kirisuto kyo no
Fukkatsu” [Religions Changing in China: Revival of Christianity in the 21st Century], Zenrin
[Good Neighborliness], (October 2013), 2.
135
The CCP’s policy at the moment does not always enforce strict regulations
on the underground churches. Karl Marx said that religion is the opium of the
people, suggesting that it makes them turn away from their unhappiness. The CCP
is probably allowing the illegal churches as long as they contribute to settling the
sentiments of the people. What they will do is unknown, however, if the number
of the congregation increases from 100 million to 200 or 400 million.
One important social problem related to this is the collapse of the moral system.
Here one should note that there is disagreement in the CCP about Confucianism.
In 2006, Hu Jintao proclaimed his Eight-Step Program, or the Eight Virtues and
Eight Shames. The Propaganda Department of the CCP recognized that this was
based on the traditional ideas and spirit of the Chinese people, such as Confucius’
moral theory centered on “benevolence (ren),” or Mencius and Xunzi’s ideas of
Honor and Disgrace.37 The Confucius Institute was established in 2004 as a place
to inform the world about Chinese culture. One of the concepts in the opening
ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics was Confucianism. In January 2011, a 9.5
meter-high statue of Confucius was built on Chang’an Avenue next to Tiananmen
Square. However, in April 2011, this large statue was abruptly removed without
any explanation. Mao Zedong, whose portrait is placed on Tiananmen, the Gate of
Heaven, continuously fought against Confucianism, and it is easy to imagine that
some in the CCP felt repulsed by its revival.
3. The Clash with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, 2010 and 2012
The rise of bullish discourse in China and its assertive action in the wake of
the World Financial Crisis first caused much friction with the Southeast Asian
nations and the United States in the South China Sea. In 2010, upon the decision
by ASEAN nations, the East Asian Summit decided to invite the US and Russia
to join the membership from the following year. The Obama Administration
announced its policy of pivot or rebalance to Asia, to which China took a twopronged approach. That is, first, to return to conciliatory diplomacy towards the
US with a proposal to establish a “New Model of Major Power Relations;” and
second, to heighten alert against containment. In the words of Liu Mingfu, “US is
a global tiger, Japan is an Asian wolf.”38
37
CCP Central Propaganda Department Bureau of Theory, Lilun Redian Mian dui Mian
(2006) [Face to Face with Hot Points in Theory 2006]（Beijing: Study Publishers and People’s
Publishers, 2006）, 89-90. The Eight Honors and Disgraces are as follows: 1）Love the
country; do it no harm, 2) Serve the people; never betray them, 3) Follow science; discard superstition, 4) Be diligent; not indolent, 5) Be united, help each other; make no gains at other's
expense, 6) Be honest and trustworthy; do not sacrifice ethics for profit, 7) Be disciplined and
law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless, and 8) Live plainly, work hard; do not wallow in luxuries
and pleasures.
38 John Garnaut, “Shun US ‘tiger’ and Japanese ‘wolf,’ Chinese colonel warns,” The Sydney
136
With Japan, two Chinese patrol boats of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA)
intruded into the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands in December 2008
for the first time with a view to claiming sovereignty. This reckless challenge
was most likely based on the 2006 regulation of SOA stipulating that they make
regular rounds to protect their maritime interests in the East China Sea. Earlier
in 2008, Hu Jintao had made a good visit to Japan in May that led to an epochmaking Sino-Japanese agreement in June on jointly developing the East China
Sea. However, nationalistic critique of the compromise sprang up in China, and
Hu was unable to implement the agreement.
With the rising tide of China’s maritime advancement, further friction with
its neighbors was imminent. Certainly there are various factors involved in this
development, including China’s strategic interest and the increased capabilities of
its maritime law enforcement agencies. An important domestic factor, however,
seemed to be the need to unite the people and the CCP. They were clearly visible
when China clashed with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 and
September 2012.
(1) Anti-Japanese Demonstration after the 2010 Senkaku Trawler Collision
Incident
The Senkaku trawler collision incident in September 2010 occurred when
disagreements within the party intensified as mentioned above and the CCP was
losing the centripetal force in society. In September 2010, a Chinese trawler that
had entered the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands rammed the Japanese
Coast Guard’s patrol boats twice. The Chinese skipper of the trawler was arrested
and kept under detention for obstructing official duties. When prosecution was
imminent, China took comprehensive countermeasures in political, economic, and
even cultural areas in order to have the skipper released.39 There were a number
of anti-Japanese demonstrations that turned violent, and many Chinese netizens
reckoned that there were plainclothes policemen involved in the demonstrations.40
In mid-October 2010, three weeks after the release of the skipper on September
24, short mail messages calling for participation in demonstrations were circulated
Morning Herald (January 22, 2013), at http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/
shun-us-tiger-and-japanese-wolf-chinese-colonel-warns-20130122-2d52d.html (searched date:
May 31, 2015).
39 For the background of the incident and an analysis of it, see Akio Takahara, “The Senkaku
Trawler Collision Incident, September 2010”, in Akikazu Hashimoto, Mike Mochizuki
and Kurayoshi Takara (eds), The Okinawa Question: Futenma, the US-Japan Alliance,
and Regional Security (Naha: Sigur Center for Asian Studies and Nansei Shoto Industrial
Advancement Center, 2013), 91-102.
40 For example, “Wangyou renwei zhonggong bianyi jingcha zuzhi fanri youxing” [Netizens
reckon CCP plainclothes police organized anti-Japanese demonstrations] (September 16,
2012), at〈http://www.canyu.org/n59505c6.aspx〉(searched date: May 30, 2015).
137
in some inland cities. Strangely, the phrases and designs in all of the messages
were almost identical for every city. Of course, the names of the cities and the
routes of the demonstrations differed, but other parts were almost exactly the same
(Figure 1).
Figure 1: A Call for an Anti-Japan Demonstration.
Source: Blog of Xian residents, http://www.inxian.com/20101016/15287.
Accessed on January 8, 2014
Judging from this invitation, it is highly likely that these demonstrations
were officially approved by the authorities. Since the same phrases were used
for various cities, one can assume that it was an organized attempt. In the note
section of this invitation, it says that “this event will be covered by the media,”
which indicates that the demonstration was approved officially or tacitly by the
authorities, thus telling the people that they can participate without any worries of
getting punished.41
One can therefore reasonably infer that the demonstrations were planned by the
authorities. Perhaps they were meant to be a safety valve for releasing people’s
resentment. Once lit, however, the fire of nationalism was hard to control. In Xian,
a part of the demonstration group did not agree to disband at the bell tower, which
was the ending point of the demonstration shown in Figure 1. They ran wild and
raided the Japanese Mizuno sports store nearby.
(2) Japan-China Conflict Regarding the Japanese Government’s Purchase of the
Senkaku Islands in 2012
Of the five Senkaku islands administered by Japan since 1895, one of them
41
Blog of a Xian resident (October, 16, 2010), at http://www.inxian.com/ 20101016/15287
(searched date: January 8, 2014). The description in this paragraph and next is based on the
live coverage of the demonstration.
138
had been owned by the Japanese government. In September 2012, the Japanese
government decided to purchase three out of the remaining four islands from
a private owner. In Beijing, there emerged two camps based on different
interpretations of this act.42 The hardliners saw this as Japan’s open provocation
vis-à-vis China and a challenge to its sovereignty. In contrast, the moderates
saw that the Japanese government purchased the islands to cool things down by
preventing the Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara from buying the islands and
wreaking havoc on the bilateral relations. A Chinese general stated in an interview
by People’s Net that he took the latter interpretation, and the director of the China
Institute of International Studies, which is affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the PRC, said to the effect that the transfer of ownership of the Senkaku
Islands within Japan had nothing to do with China’s claim of sovereignty.43
However, after Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping decided to take a hardline approach,
the Chinese media entered into a fierce confrontational mode against Japan and
created an atmosphere in which no one in China was able to express different
opinions in public any longer. The backdrop to the hardline policy taken by the
Chinese leadership was the 18th National Congress of the CCP scheduled in
November 2012. The purchase of the Islands was made when the power struggle
was at its height and thus no one dared to take a soft stand against Japan.
As we saw in the previous section, clashes of opinions in the CCP, which
provided a setting for China’s struggle with Japan in 2010 and 2012, were all
related to important issues that could affect China’s future. The debates were
interrelated; simply put, the pattern of the disagreements that emerges is one
between two opposing groups. On one side are the ideological conservatives or left
wingers, nationalists, and hardliners against other countries. On the other side are
reformists, internationalists, and moderates in terms of diplomacy. The two groups
are engaged in a tug-of-war. In other words, there is a close affinity between
conservatism and chauvinism on one side and reform and internationalism on the
other. In the second case of the clash over the Senkaku Islands in 2012, however,
there was an additional factor in domestic politics, namely, the question of power
struggle.
On the societal level, it seems there was already a socio-psychological environment for uncritically accepting the ferocious anti-Japanese campaigning
in the official media. In China, a battle of discourse is deemed important in
42
“Zhu Chenghu: Perhaps the Japanese Government ‘Nationalized’ Diaoyudao to Calm
Down the Situation,” People’s Net (September 5, 2012), at〈http://military.people.com.cn/
n/2012/0905/c1011-18927640.html〉(searched date: January 8, 2014).
43 Ibid.; “Experts: Nationalization by Japan Does not Mean China Loses Diaoyudao,” People’s
Net Japanese (September 12, 2012) at〈http://j.people.com.cn/94474/7946139.html〉(searched
date: January 8, 2014).
139
the struggles both inside and outside the country. Those who are dominating
the current Propaganda Department are the conservatives and nationalists.
Increasing dissatisfaction and anxiety among many Chinese people has become
a rich breeding ground for nationalism. As a result of the fierce anti-Japanese
propaganda since September 2012, the atmosphere in China no longer placed
much value on solving issues in a peaceful manner with mutual compromise and
international cooperation; at least not with Japan.
4. Domestic Factors in the Rapprochement with Japan under the Xi Jinping
Administration
The Xi Jinping Administration, born after the 18 th Party Congress in 2012,
decided to arouse nationalism as its governing method and came out with the
slogan, “China’s Dream of Realizing the Great Restoration of the Chinese
Nation.” The three Chinese characters for “China’s Dream”, Zhong Guo Meng
( 中国夢 ), are exactly the same as the title of Liu Mingfu’s aforementioned book.
The new administration continued with the anti-Japanese propaganda campaign,
and government vessels regularly intrude into the territorial waters, although less
frequently since October 2013. China is aiming to create a record of joint control
of the waters around the Senkaku Islands, and there is no change in its approach to
unilaterally changing the status quo through physical force.
Other countries were taken aback by China’s announcement of setting an
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in November
2013, which included demands to all airplanes flying across its ADIZ to present
their flight plans to the Chinese authorities and threatened that they would take
defensive measures if the aircraft did not comply.44 In the South China Sea,
Hainan province declared that from the beginning of 2014 foreign fishing vessels
must seek permission from them if they wanted to fish in designated areas.45 In
May 2014 there was the drilling of the seabed 17 nautical miles off the coast of
Paracel Islands by a Chinese oil rig protected by 80 vessels including a few naval
ships.46 In addition, China has been conducting a massive land reclamation project
around the reefs they control in the South China Sea, building air strips and other
44
Public announcement of the Ministry of Defense (November 23, 2013), at〈http://www.mod.
gov.cn/affair/2013-11/23/content_4476910.htm〉(searched date: May 31, 2015).
45 “Hainan Province Methods for Implementing the Fishery Law of the PRC,”
Hainan Ribao [Hainan Daily] (December 7, 2013), at〈http://www.hinews.cn/news/
system/2013/12/07/016278991.shtml〉(searched date: May 31, 2015).
46 Carl Thayer, “China’s Oil Rig Gambit: South China Sea Game-Changer?”, The Diplomat
(May 12, 2014), at〈http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-seagame-changer/〉(searched date: May 31, 2015). Aaccording to the US Defense Department,
China had reclaimed 17 times more land in the 20 months as of June 2015 than all other claimants combined (“China isle work focuses on building,” Reuters, Kyodo, in The Japan Times on
Sunday, August 23, 2015).
140
facilities on them.47
However, as far as its Japan policy was concerned, China started seeking
détente in 2014. Ministerial meetings gradually resumed from the spring of 2014,
first in multilateral settings and then moving to bilateral meetings in China. This
upgrading of meetings culminated in the Abe-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the
November APEC meeting hosted by Xi in Beijing. Before the meeting, China
used to demand that Japan acknowledge that there is a territorial dispute over
the Senkaku Islands and promise that Prime Minister Abe would not visit the
controversial Yasukuni Shrine again. A few days prior to the November 2014
Abe-Xi meeting, upon the request of the Chinese, diplomats cleverly crafted an
equivocal agreement that could be interpreted in different ways and cleared the red
carpet.48 In April 2015, when the state leaders gathered in Indonesia to celebrate
the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference (the Asia-Africa Conference),
Abe and Xi met for the second time and exchanged positive views about the
development in the bilateral relations in a more relaxed and amicable atmosphere.
What brought about this change of phase in Japan-China relations? There was
no basic change of position on the Japanese side: first, any change in the status quo
by physical force was unacceptable and as long as China continued its maritime
advancement Japan had no choice but to adopt some hedging measures; second,
the two sides should not let the questions of the Senkaku Islands and the Yasukuni
Shrine disrupt the entire relationship; and third, the two powers were responsible
to the region and the world for improving and developing their relations, and the
leaders should meet without any conditions. In fact it was always the Japanese
political heavy weights that visited China in an attempt to crack an opening in the
gridlock. Such visits included those by the Komei Party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi
in January 2013 and by the former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in July 2014.
Thus, this time it was primarily the Chinese side that changed its position and
sought for rapprochement.
The factors in China’s policy shift seem to have included the following.
First, there was increased tension in the military or security sphere. Two airmiss
incidents between military aircraft took place consecutively in May and June
2014. Once an accident occurred, it was highly likely that the conflict would
escalate rather badly. Xi Jinping wanted to avoid war no less than Shinzo Abe; in
addition to all the other reasons for this, he was in the midst of implementing a
47 See the website of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.〈http://thediplomat.
com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-game-changer/〉(searched date: May 31,
2015).
48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan “Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China
Relations” (November 7, 2014), at〈http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000150.
html〉(searched date: May 31, 2015).
141
most serious anti-corruption campaign in the military.
Second, China’s economic slowdown became a source of increasing concern
for the leadership. In addition to the serious fiscal debt that had emerged in many
localities, what was worrisome was the impact of the slowdown on social stability.
According to the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, there was resurgence of social contradictions in 2014, and “hot incidents
of social contradiction/conflict” that attracted nationwide attention amounted to
around 400 cases. Especially there was a large increase in labor strife.49
The Chinese leadership eventually recognized that the political confrontation
with Japan was affecting the economic aspect of the relationship. The amount
of Japanese investment in January-September 2014 decreased by 42.9 percent
compared to the previous year. Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng told a highlevel economic delegation from Japan in September that, “Cooling in politics
leading to a downturn in economics is something we do not want to see.”50
Third, internationally, China found it increasingly difficult to promote the New
Model of Major Power Relations with the United States. This was because the
strategic competition with the US was intensifying due to China’s continuous
maritime advancement and their different interpretation of the legality of military
actions in the Exclusive Economic Zones. There was also recognition that
the hardline policy against the neighbors including Japan, the Philippines and
Vietnam had not brought any benefit to China but rather, it had promoted a united
front against China in international fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or
the Shangri-La Dialogue. These contributed to China’s emphasis on its Silk Road
Initiative and neighborhood diplomacy, resulting in a “rebalance” to Japan.
Finally, in terms of domestic politics, rapprochement with Japan proceeded
while Xi Jinping consolidated his power base by making significant progress in
his anti-corruption campaign. That is, he expelled Xu Caihou, the former Vicechairman of the CMC from the Party at the end of June 2014, and a month later
formally announced that Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo
Standing Committee was under investigation. Zhou was eventually expelled from
the CCP in early December. It was widely rumored that Xu and Zhou supported
Bo Xilai, the disgraced former Party Secretary of Chongqing, in his struggle for
power and challenge to Xi Jinping.
Thus, an analysis of Xi Jinping’s adjustment in his Japan policy reveals that,
together with his concerns regarding the international environment, domestic
factors played an important role. It is not the case that he has abandoned the
49
Peilin Li et al. (eds), Shehui Lanpishu 2015 nian Zhongguo Shehui Xingshi Fenxi yu Yuce
[Blue Book of China’s Society : Society of China Analysis and Forecast (2015)] (Beijing:
Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2014), 13.
50 The Asahi Shimbun (September 24, 2014).
142
Japan card in domestic politics. For example, the official media are still rather
reproachful whenever they report on Prime Minister Abe’s remarks on history.
Nevertheless, Xi has sent a signal to his people by meeting Abe twice that it is
high time they promoted political relations with Japan. He seems to be more
comfortable in saying that because he has consolidated his power base, but
probably feeling more urgent since the decline in economic exchange with Japan
is exacerbating the economic downturn that could undermine the internal stability
of his regime.
5. Discussion: How should Japan Respond?
China’s Japan policy is in a dilemma. For the peace and prosperity that the CCP
needs for its legitimacy to rule, good relations and cooperation with the neighbors,
especially Japan, is useful and necessary. However, for the unity of the Party
and the nation, and for gathering people’s support for the Party and government,
struggle with the neighbors and especially with Japan proves useful and effective.
China’s Japan policy oscillates between these positions, depending on the
situational factors involving political and economic conditions and on the policy
tendency of the leadership.
What does the linkage between China’s domestic politics and diplomacy tell us
about desirable approaches that Japan should now take in developing the bilateral
relations? The bottom line of what’s happening around the Senkaku Islands in
recent years is that China, with its increased power, is unable to exercise restraint
and is attempting to change the status quo by physical force, partly because
of heightened nationalistic sentiments that the CCP needs in unifying their
fragmenting and unstable country.
First, Japan should not make any concessions under China’s physical pressure.
For one, if Japan lets China unilaterally change the status quo by coercion, it
inevitably will impact on the South China Sea where a similar situation exists. If
Japan gives in to pressure, it is likely that China will resort to forceful measures
in resolving various other international conflicts as well. But furthermore, if Japan
concedes, and for example acknowledges that a territorial dispute does exist
over the Senkaku Islands, it would be the hardliners in China that would sing in
triumph. They would be encouraged to become more aggressive, insisting they
just need to lean on their adversaries to have their way since they are now very
strong. In contrast, the position of the moderates, who insist on solving the issues
peacefully and in accordance with international norms, will become even weaker
within China. We must consider how we can support these moderates, who tend to
be internationalists and reformists, when handling this issue.
The only peaceful solution to the Senkaku Question is to let the International
143
Court of Justice make a judgment on the sovereignty issue. Koichiro Genba, the
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote in the New York Times and suggested
that China should take the case to the International Court of Justice, but China has
not responded to this.51
While dealing with the immediate issues, we also need to consider long-term
measures in dealing with the increase in China’s national power and maritime
capabilities. First, we cannot deny that hedging measures are needed for avoiding
a rapid shift in the balance of power, which could stimulate adventurism on the
Chinese side. Second, we should enhance interdependence by cooperating further
in areas such as the economy, science and technology and non-traditional security.
Neighboring nations including Japan will benefit from China’s stable development
in many ways. Thirdly, we should aim at sharing norms and information with the
Chinese people by promoting youth exchange, tourism and public diplomacy.
Thus, I would argue that realism, liberalism and constructivism must all be
mobilized in this endeavor to maintain peace and develop our relations with
China.
In the meantime, for the coexistence and co-prosperity of the East Asian
countries, it is important for all countries involved to confirm the principle of
solving issues according to rules and not by force. We also must make efforts to
include China in this process by a multilateral initiative and also by supporting
the reform-orientated internationalists within China. However, our analysis
suggests that, China will continue to have a difficult time in establishing stable
external relations until the CCP solves its legitimacy question and stops relying on
nationalistic sentiments.
51
Koichiro Genba, “Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads”, The New York Times (November
20, 2012).
144
About the Author
Akio TAKAHARA is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics at the Graduate
School of Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo. He received his DPhil
in 1988 from the University of Sussex, and later served as Visiting Scholar at
the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989-91), Japanese Embassy in
Beijing (1996-98), Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University
(2005-06), and School of International Studies, Peking University (2014-15).
Before joining UTokyo, he taught at J. F. Oberlin University (1991-95) and Rikkyo
University (1995-2005). He also served as Programme Officer of the Sasakawa
Peace Foundation (1988-89), Member of the Governing Body of the Institute of
Development Studies (1999-2003), President of the Japan Association for Asian
Studies (2009-11), and Secretary General of the New Japan-China Friendship 21st
Century Committee (2009-14). He currently serves as senior researcher of the
Tokyo Foundation, adjunct fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs,
and senior researcher of the Japan International Forum. His publications include
The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China, (Macmillan, 1992),
“A Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise and the East Asian Order,” in Robert
S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of
International Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp.21837, and “The Rise of China and Its Neighborhood Diplomacy: Implications for
Japanese Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.1,
No.1, 2012, pp.47-71.
Address: Graduate School of Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo, Hongo
7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan

The Journal of Contemporary China Studies

Transcription

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