R. S. Mackenzie and the Kickapoos: The Raid into Mexico in 1873

Transcription

Journal of the Southwest
R. S. Mackenzie and the Kickapoos: The Raid into Mexico in 1873
Author(s): Ernest Wallace and Adrian S. Anderson
Source: Arizona and the West, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer, 1965), pp. 105-126
Published by: Journal of the Southwest
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R. S. MACKENZIE AND THE KICKAPOOS
THE RAID INTO
MEXICO IN 1873
by
ERNEST WALLACE
and
ADRIAN S. ANDERSON
Professor Wallace, of Texas Technological College, Lubbock, is the author of
several works on Texas and Indian history, and currently is completing a booklength study of Mackenzie's role in the Lone Star State. Mr. Anderson, a
doctoral candidate at the same institution, wrote a master's essay on Mackenzie's
border operations.
of the Civil War, the Texas frontierwas
With the termination
left virtuallywithoutmilitaryprotection.For some time the federalgovernmentwould neithersend troopsto the frontiernor permitthe Texans
to defend themselves from the steadily increasing Indian hostilities.
After a landslideof petitions, memorials,and angry letters to various
governmentofficials,the army in 1867 was orderedto establisha line
of posts acrossWest Texas. But this line of posts did not include the
Rio Grande bordercountry, where KickapooIndians, with the connivance of Mexican officials,made both life and propertyunsafe. To
halt this robberyand murder,Generalof the ArmyWilliam Tecumseh
Shermanin 1873 orderedColonel Ranald S. Mackenzie to lead the
Fourth Cavalry into Mexico and attack the Kickapoovillages. Mackenzie'sraid not only forcedthe Kickapoosto move to a reservationin
the United States,but also led to a revisionof Mexican borderpolicies
and broughtpeace to a troubledareafor severalyears.
The principaltargetof the Kickapoomaraudersfrom Mexico was
the areareferredto as the Upper Rio GrandeBorderRegion- an area
[105]
106
ARIZONAandthe WEST
bounded by a line running from Laredonortheastto central Atascosa
County, then northwestto Banderaand Edwardscounties, and southwest to Del Rio.1By 1870 the five westerncounties in this regioncontained 4,248 people and 90,770 head of cattle and horses.2It was too
sparselysettledfor defense - and too well stockedfor predatoryIndians
to ignore.The isolatedrancheswere easy prey for raiders,who during
the dark of the moon drove stolen animals to safety across the Rio
Grande.Between 1865 and 1873 these rustlersswept AtascosaCounty
clean of horses and cattle, and so thoroughlyterrorizedthe ranchers
that most of them fled to San Antonio for safety.
Mescaleroand Lipan Apacheswho had receivedasylum in Coahuila were engaged in this raiding,but most of the depredationswere
committed by Kickapoos.3First encountered by the French in the
seventeenthcenturyjust south of the GreatLakes,this tribe had gradually been forcedtowardthe Southwestby advancingAnglo-Americans.
In 1852, when the Kickapoosrelinquishedtitle to theirMissouridomain
in exchangefor a home on the MissouriRiver near Fort Leavenworth,
a partof the tribe,latercalledthe SouthernKickapoos,refusedto accept
this treatyand migratedsouthwardinto Oklahomaand Texas. By this
time, one band of eighty alreadyhad confederatedwith the Cherokees
in EastTexas, and in 1839 had fledto Mexicoto escapethe wrathof the
Texans. They had been welcomedas allies by the Mexicansin the wars
againstComancheand Kiowaraiders.
Other SouthernKickapoosliving in West Texas and presentwestern Oklahomamoved in 1861 to southernKansasto plunderConfederate Indian allies in Indian Territory.Angered by pressuresto stop
their raids,to enlist them in the federalarmy,and to get them to take
the White Man's Road, a group of malcontentsset out in December
of 1862 for Mexico. While encampedon the Little Concho, near the
1For depredationsalong the Rio Grande, see Report of the United States Commissionto
Texas, June 30, 1873, House Exec. Doc. 257, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Serial 1615, 13. Cited
hereafteras Commissionto Texas.
2Ninth Annual Census of the United States (3 vols., Washington, 1872), I, 64; III, 250-62.
3Reportsof the Committeeof
InvestigationSent in 1873 by the Mexican Governmentto the
Frontierof Texas (New York, 1875), 412-21. Hereaftercited as Mexican Reports.See also
A. M. Gibson, The Kickapoos:Lords of the Middle Border(U. of OklahomaPress, 1963),
for an excellent discussionof the Mexican Kickapoos.
The MACKENZIERAID
107
presenttown of San Angelo, the Kickapoosrepulsedan attackingConfederate patrol, killing sixteen men. Hurrying south across the Rio
Grande they found a warm welcome from their kinsmen who had
precededthem some years earlier.The Mexican government,highly
pleasedby the servicesof the Kickapoos,gave the new arrivalsa grant
of land in returnfor a pledge to defend the northernfrontieragainst
Comancheand Apacheraiders.4In the summerof 1864, the remaining
SouthernKickapoosin Indian Territoryand Texas, about seven hundred, decided to move to Mexico. Following a carefullyselected route
far west of the settlements,the band stopped at Dove Creek, a few
miles west of San Angelo, and duringa snowstormon January8, 1865,
they were attackedby about three hundred and sixty Texas militia
and Confederatetroops.Althoughthey soundlydefeatedthe whites, the
Kickapoosconsideredthe attacka declarationof war by the Texans.5
Settling in NacimientoCanyon, at the head of the SabinasRiver
near Santa Rosa, Coahuila, the arousedKickapoosstruckback at the
Texans with savage fury. Soon they discoveredthe economic possibilitiesof theirraidsand came to rely for a livelihoodon Texas plunder,
for which they found a readymarketin Santa Rosa and other nearby
towns, where merchantsand politicalofficialswere in connivancewith
them. The buyers, for a fee, would obtain forged transferdocuments
from customs officers,and Santa Rosa's officials even permittedthe
livestockbroughtin by the Kickapoosto be markedwith the city'sbrand.6
The ranchersin the despoiledarea appealedin vain to the state
and federal governmentsfor help. General Philip Henry Sheridan,
whosejurisdictionencompassedthe militaryforcesin Texas, discounted
the seriousnessof the bordersituationuntil Decemberof 1868, when
he acquiescedto the public demand and orderedthe reactivationof
Fort Duncan, on the Rio Grandeat Eagle Pass, and Fort Clark, forty
miles north of Duncan at Brackettville.But the combinedstrengthof
4Gibson, The Kickapoos,198-201.
5William C. Pool, "The Battle of Dove Creek/' Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LIII
(April, 1950), 367-85; Mexican Reports,412.
6William Schuchardt,U. S. CommercialAgent, PiedrasNegras, to W. Hunter, Acting Secretaryof State, July 15, December26, 1872, ConsularDespatches,PiedrasNegras, I, Records
of the Foreign Service Posts of the Departmentof State [FSDS], RG 84 (microfilmcopy in
SouthwestCollection,Texas TechnologicalCollege, Lubbock).
108
ARIZONAand the WEST
the two posts averaged seven companies or less - not enough troops
to protect the vast Upper Rio Grande Border Region.7
Besieged throughout 1870 and 1871 by a steady stream of appeals
for aid, and fearful that the Texans might take matters into their own
hands, the federal government finally took cognizance of the situation.
In 1870 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, learning that the victimized
settlers were threatening retaliation, requested permission of the Mexican government to send troops with the owners of stolen livestock across
the Rio Grande in pursuit of the marauders. But Minister of Foreign
Affairs Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, who had promoted a "new era'' of
good feeling between his country and the United States, replied that his
president did not have the power to grant the request, nor was the
Mexican Congress likely to approve it. Fish unofficially countered with
a threat that the United States might cross the border without authorization, but in the subsequent negotiations Mexico steadfastly refused
to alter its position.8
The Office of Indian Affairs, operating under President Grant's
Peace Policy, decided that it could solve the problem by persuading the
Kickapoosto return to the United States. Congress appropriated$25,000
for the effort, and Quaker Agent John Miles was sent to Santa Rosa in
April of 187 1 to negotiate. But the Kickapoos were not interested in
returning to the United States and local Mexican officials and private
citizens opposed the plan.9 The Mexicans claimed that the Kickapoos
were peaceful and aided them against the ferocious Comanches, who
regularly ravaged northern Mexico.10 The Americans countered with
7 See
Secretary of War reports for 1868-1873 in: HED I, 40 Cong., 3 Sess., Serial 1369,
706, 710; HED 1, 41 Cong., 2 Sess., Serial 1412, 170; HED 1, 41 Cong., 3 Sess., Serial
1446, 76; HED 1, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Serial 1503, 96; HED 1, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., Serial 1558,
108-109; HED 1, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Serial 1597, 41. To reduce the forays, the army in 1869
designated specific points on the Rio Grande for livestock to cross, but Indian raiders would
not cooperate and depredations continued. See Report of the Secretary of War, November
20, 1869, HED 1, 41 Cong., 2 Sess., 18.
8 Hamilton Fish,
Secretary of State, to Thomas H. Nelson (Minister to Mexico), December
12, 1870; Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada to Nelson, January 7, 1871; Manuel Aspiroz to Nelson,
April 20, 1871; Fish to Nelson, June 26, 1871; Ignacio Mariscal to Nelson, April 23, 1872,
in Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 25, 1878, House Report 701, 45 Cong.,
2 Sess., Serial 1824, 198-99, 200-201, 202, 204, 211, respectively.
9 Charles Delano,
Secretary of the Interior, to Fish, August 1, 1871, in ibid., 205.
10Mariscal to Fish,
January 14, 1874, Diplomatic Notes, Mexico City, XXIII, General
Records of the Department of State [SDR], RG 59 (microfilm copy in Southwest Collection,
Texas Technological College).
The MACKENZIERAID
109
the chargethat the Mexicanswere profitingfromthe Kickapooplunder.
William Schuchardt, the United States consul at Piedras Negras,
declaredthatthe Mexicansweretradingguns, ammunition,and supplies
for the stolen livestock.11Agent Miles*failure was assuredwhen he
could not makespecificguaranteesregardinga reservationand Mexican
officialsbegan distributing$5,000 in goods allegedly purchasedwith
moneyowed the tribefor borderdefense.On June 15 in the SantaRosa
courthouse,the chiefs met and politelydeclined to returnto the United
States.12
When it had financedthe effortto persuadethe Kickapoosto return
to the United States, Congress also had authorizeda commissionto
investigatethe bordersituation.Thomas P. Robb, RichardH. Savage,
and Thomas H. Osborn, appointedcommissionerson May 7, 1872,
traveledover the Rio Grande Borderregion for almost a year taking
testimony. Their findings, presented on June 31, 1873, contained
numerousabstractsdetailingbodily injury and loss of life, and charged
thatthe Mexicanpopulacein the vicinitywas giving aid and encouragement to the Indian marauders.The commissionrecommendedthat the
Kickapoosbe removedto a reservationin the United States.13At the
same time a Mexican commission investigating the border problem
concluded that Mexican authoritieshad taken every reasonableprecaution to restrainthe raids into Texas, and that the Kickapooswere
peaceful agriculturistsresiding a considerabledistance from the Rio
Grande.The Americanshad greatlyexaggeratedthe raids,they said,and
added that the Mexican settlementshad suffered more from Indians
from the United States. It was the Comanches,the Mexicansasserted,
not the Kickapoosand Apaches, who were carryingon most of the
raidingin Texas.14
11Schuchardt to B. J. Gautier, Vice Consul at Matamoros, May 6, 1871, in HR 701, 45
Cong., 2 Sess., 203-204.
12John D. Miles to Enoch Hoag, Lawrence, Kansas, July 13, 1871, in Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 15, 1871, HED 1, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Serial 1505,
608-12.
13Commission to Texas, 3, 15-27; Gibson, The Kickwpoos, 224. This report,
containing
1,090 depositions alleging losses of more than $48,000,000, concluded that in 1872 the
region had one-tenth as many livestock as in 1865.
14Mexican
Reports, 379, 382-83, 414. Some Kickapoos were peaceful farmers, but not
those near Remolino and Nacimiento.
110
ARIZONAandthe WEST
With the preliminaryreport of the American commissionand
increasingprotestsof the Texans,15the federalgovernmentfinally took
decisive action. President Grant in Januaryof 1873 announced that
the militaryforces along the borderwould be redistributed,and that
As a conseMexico would be held to strictaccount for depredations.16
quence, General William T. Sherman directed Colonel Ranald S.
Mackenzie,at Fort Concho, to concentratehis scatteredcompaniesof
the Fourth Cavalry at Fort Clark on the Rio Grande. In this order,
sent to GeneralC. C. Augur, a veteranIndian campaignerthen commanding the Departmentof Texas, Shermanstated: "In naming the
4th [Cavalry]for the Rio Grandethe Presidentis doubtlessinfluenced
by the fact that Col. Mackenzie is young and enterprising,and that
he will impartto his Regiment his own active character/'17
No betterman for handling the borderdifficultiesthan RanaldS.
Mackenziecould have been found. This officerhad been campaigning
against the Comanchesand Apaches in West Texas for the past two
years,and had brokenthe so-calledComancherotradebetween Comanche raidersand New Mexican traders.PresidentGrant had described
Mackenzieas the most promisingyoung officerin the armyat the end
of the Civil War, and his crack Fourth Cavalrywas rated the finest
mountedregimentin the service.
The issuance of the order moving Mackenzie and the Fourth
Cavalryto the borderindicatedthat Washington officialswere determined to end the deplorablesituationalong the Rio Grande- even at
the risk of involvement.The news of this vigorouspolicy produceda
rashof rumorsand speculation.The GalvestonDaily News concluded
that the Rio Grandewould soonbe the scene of "importantoperations."
A few days later the same paper publicized a rumor, allegedly from
Washington, that sixteen ships were being fitted out for use in the
movement of troops to the Rio Grande.18The Savannah (Georgia)
15The Galveston
Daily News (Texas) on December 15, 1872, declared there was "no shame
of the times so offensive ... as the unchecked and chronic spoliation of our population on
the Mexican border."
i«lbid., January 14, 25, 1873.
17W. T. Sherman to C. C.
Augur, February 5, 1873, in R. G. Carter, On the Border with
Mackenzie (New York: Antiquarian Press, 1961), 419; New York Herald, April 11, 1873,
in GalvestonDaily News, April 18, 1873.
18Galveston
Daily News, March 18, April 12, 1873.
Ranald Slidell
Mackenzie (1840-1889),
after a brilliant career in the
Civil War, became Colonel of the Fourth Cavalry in 1870. Promoted to Brigadier General in 1882, he died in a mental asylum seven years later of an incurable disease. The above photograph was taken about 1876 - National Archives.
Mackenzie's Route in 1873 - map information courtesy Adrian Anderson.
The MACKENZIERAID
11 1
Advertiserin late April even announced that 5,000 men, largely
Texans, were assemblingto invade Mexico under the leadershipof
ex-ConfederateGeneralJamesLongstreet!19
The rumorsand wild talkwere not altogetherthe productof imaginativejournalists.CongressmanW. S. Herndonof Texas called for the
annexationof partsof Tamaulipas,Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua,and Coahuila - peacefullyif possible,but by force if necessary- to providea
"firmline of defense"and "justcompensation"for the losses sustained
by the Texans along the Rio Grande.20General Sherman, however,
squelchedthe war talk by pointing out through the press: "Youcan't
makewaron Mexico with threeregimentsof cavalryand four of infantry"- which comprisedthe total strengthin Texas.21
Mackenzieleft Fort Concho on March 24 and proceededto San
Antonio to confer with his superiors.Fully aware of the diplomatic
dangersinvolved,Secretaryof War William W. Belknapand General
SheridanreachedSan Antonioon April 7 to makean on-the-spotassessment of the situation,and to insure the successof any plan that might
be adopted.Four days later Mackenzieand his distinguishedsuperiors
arrivedat Fort Clark and carefully inspected his command. Belknap
and Sheridan expressedgreat pleasure in what they saw, and that
evening Colonel Wesley Merritt, commandingthe departing Ninth
Regiment,honoredthe visiting dignitarieswith a colorful baile.22
During the next two days at Fort Clark, Belknap and Sheridan
were in secretcouncil with Mackenzie.Accordingto LieutenantRobert
G. Carter,temporarilyservingas regimentaladjutant,Sheridanbefore
leaving orderedMackenzie "to control and hold down the situation,
and to do it in yourown way. . . . When you begin, let it be a campaign
of annihilation,obliterationand completedestruction."To Mackenzie's
requestfor writtenorders,Sheridanrepliedwith his usual impatience:
"Damnthe orders!Damn the authority.. . . Yourauthorityand backing
shall be Gen. Grantand myself. With us behind you in whateveryou
19SavannahAdvertiser(Georgia), n. d., in GalvestonDaily News, April 25, 1873.
20CongressionalGlobe, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., XLVI (1873), pt. 3, Appendix, 9.
21Galveston Daily News, April 18, 1873; Report of the Secretaryof War, November 29,
1873, HED 1, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., 25.
22GalvestonDaily News, April 4, 8, 1873; Carter,Mackenzie, 421.
112
ARIZONAand the WEST
do to cleanup this situation,you can restassuredof the fullestsupport/'23
During the next month Mackenzieassiduouslypreparedfor what
he correctlysurmisedwould be one of the most daring, amazing,and
arduousexploits in the annals of Indian warfare.The companiesof
the FourthCavalrywere scatteredat nearbygrazingcamps to provide
more forage for the horses and to avoid arousing the suspicions of
Mexican spies at Brackettville.24
Although the men of the Fourthwere
tough, experienced,and possiblyunexcelled in discipline, Mackenzie
ordereddaily grueling drills and carbine practice. Every anticipated
field operation,mountedand dismounted,was thoroughlyworkedout.
While the trooperswere strenuouslyimprovingtheir tacticalskills and
endurance,Mackenziedevotedlong hours to studying maps and information providedby his scouts and nearby ranchers.Both officersand
men went abouttheirrigoroustrainingand carefulpreparationsentirely
ignorantof Mackenzie'splans that is, all except AdjutantCarter,in
whomMackenziehadconfidedafterextractinga pledgeof secrecy.Some
of the officersperhaps suspected that the unusual preparations,such
as sharpeningall sabresin the commandto a razoredge, portendeda
bordercrossing,but they never knew until the hour arrived.
Having gatheredinformationthat the renegadeKickapoos,along
with a few Lipanand Mescaleroallies, had villagesaboutsixty miles by
mule path in the interiorof Mexico, Mackenzie sent three scoutsIke Cox, the trustworthypost guide, and Green Van and Art McLain,
two half-breedrancherswho had sufferedheavy losses of livestockto determinethe strengthof the villages, and to find the best trailsby
which they couldbe reachedundetectedat night. Mackenzietold Carter
that when the scouts returned with the necessary information,he
intended to surpriseand destroythe villages. He felt there was ample
evidence that these Indians were most responsiblefor the raiding in
Texas.25
23Carter, Mackenzie, 422-24.
24lbid., 425, 428; Mackenzie to Departmental Headquarters, May 23, 1873, Letters Received,
2193-1873, Department of Texas [DT], RG 98. Cited hereafter as Mackenzie Report.
25Carter, Mackenzie, 424-28; Mariscal to Fish,
January 14, 1874, Diplomatic Notes, Mexico
City, XXIII, SDR; Schuchardt to Hunter, March 29, May 8, 1873, Consular Despatches,
Piedras Negras, II, FSDS; Schuchardt to San Antonio Excess, quoted in Commission to
Texas, 27.
The MACKENZIERAID
1 13
The scoutssoon madecontactwith the MuscogeeSeminolesliving
in a village near Nacimiento. These Indians were descendants of
Seminolesand theirformerNegro slaveswho had migratedto Coahuila
in 1850. The MuscogeeSeminoles,traditionallydislikedby the Kickapoos, welcomedan opportunityto inform on their arrogantneighbors.
With theirhelp Cox, Van, and McLainscoutedthe countrythoroughly,
preparedsketchmapsof trails,and collectedinformationaboutthe location and strengthof three Indian villages. These villages lay a short
distancewest of Remolino,a Mexican communityon the San Rodrigo
River, thirty-sixmiles west and slightly north of Piedras Negras.26
At eleven o'clockon the night of May 16, the threescoutsrodeinto
FortClark.They reportedto Mackenziethat Seminolespieshad brought
word that the entire warriorforce of the Kickapoovillage had ridden
off toward the west that morning, and that they would lead the
Americansto the Indian villages. Within a few minutes Mackenzie
had couriersspeeding to the cavalrycompanieson PiedrasPintos and
Elm creeks,bearingordersto reportfor field duty at the camp of John
A. Wilcox on the LasMorasthe next morning.CaptainClarenceMauck,
accompaniedby Cox, rodeimmediatelyto join his commandand to carry
the orderto Captain Eugene B. Beaumont.Mauck and Cox reached
their camp on the PiedrasPintos sometimeafter two a.m. By the light
of cracklingcampfires,the cavalrymenpacked,and an hour and a half
later the two companiesmarchedfor the designatedrendezvous,arriving about mid-morning.Shortly afterward,Mackenzie arrived from
FortClark,as did McLain, Van, eighteen Seminoles,and CompanyI.
LieutenantJohn LaphamBullis, a Civil War hero and veteranof six
years serviceon the Rio Grande frontier,came in from Fort Duncan
with sixteen additionalSeminole scouts. Company E reachedthe rendezvousbeforenoon, but CompanyM did not arriveuntil the impatient
Mackenziewas readyto start.27
26Carter, Mackenzie, 424; Gibson, The Kickapoos, 240; Mackenzie Report. The Seminole
Indians returned to the United States in the late 185O's, but the Muscogees remained in
Mexico. When the Kickapoos entered Mexico in 1865, they were settled at Nacimiento in the
five miles from the
region abandoned by the Seminoles. One Kickapoo village was only
and
stationed at Fort
as
enlisted
was
a
scouts,
1871
In
army
group
Muscogee
Muscogees.
Clark, Texas. Edward S. Wallace, 'The Mackenzie Raid," The Westerners' New York
Posse Brand Book, IV (1958), 75.
27Mackenzie Report. Tabular Statement of Expeditions and Scouts against Indians ... in
the Department of Texas during the year ending September 30, 1873, 5228-1873, DT.
Cited hereafter as Statement of Expeditions. Carter, Mackenzie, 428-29, 465.
1 14
ARIZONA and the WEST
Aboutone o'clockMackenzie'scolumn,consistingof threehundred
and sixty enlistedmen, seventeenofficers,twenty-fourscouts,and fourteen civilians,marchedfor the border.28
The coursewas southwestalong
the Las MorasCreek towardthe Rio Grande.For a springday the heat
beat down with terrificforce, and Mackenzie, to preservethe energies
of his men, had every officerand man in the commandfitted out with
wet sponges in their hats. Fortunately,there was no hurry as yet.
Mackenziedid not want to reachthe Rio Grande,twelve miles distant,
until the fading moments of twilight. Still not a captain knew his
destination.
Arrivingat the river crossing,eighteen miles above Fort Duncan
and about midwaybetween the mouth of the Las Morasand the town
of Quemado,Mackenziehaltedthe column and explainedthe objective
of the expedition.Theirs would be a physicallyexhaustingundertaking,
and the riskswould be great. In additionto the dangerof being killed
or wounded in attackingthe Indian villages, they faced the possibility,
if captured,of being hangedor riddledby bullets froma Mexican firing
squad.And there was the added possibilityof an ambush,either going
or coming from the villages, by irate Mexican citizens, or even by the
Mexican army.Althoughhe did not say so, Mackenziewas fully aware
that their failure might mean his court martialand dismissalfrom the
service- or mighteven lead to war.He concludedhis speechby admonishing the men to maintainthe utmostsilence.29
As darknesssettled aroundthem, the blue-coatedYankee raiders
splashedtheir horsesinto the swift, belly-deepwatersof the ford and
scrambledup the south bank of the river onto foreign soil. Heading
southwestalong mule trailsand cattle paths,they wound throughcanebrakesand dense chaparral,acrossrockyravines,and over dusty barren
stretchesto a point near Monclova,a village seven miles fromthe river.
Mackenzie,his adjutant,and the threescouts(Cox, Van, and McLain)
were in the lead, selectingthe trailsand setting the pace. Close behind
them rode a small escort of orderlies,followed by Lieutenant Bullis
and his mixed-bloodscouts, whose ebony faces reflectedhigh excite-
28
Apparently the eighteen Seminoles from Fort Clark, the sixteen Seminoles from Fort Duncan, and Bullis, Cox, McLain and Van comprised the thirty-eight scouts and civilians.
29Mackenzie Report. Post Medical Reports, Fort Duncan ... 1849 - October, 1883,
LXXXVI-LXXXVII, 316, DT. Hereafter cited as Fort Duncan Reports. See also Carter,
Mackenzie, 429, 432, 466.
The MACKENZIERAID
1 15
ment over the adventure.The cavalrymen,in columns of fours when
the topography would permit, came next, Captain Napoleon B.
McLaughlin'sCompanyI in front.30
Beyond Monclova Mackenzie'sexact route is not certain. But to
reachthe Kickapoovillageswithout detection,it was necessaryto travel
sixty miles from the Rio Grande, twenty-threemore than the airline
distance.The night was warm,the moon shone only dimly througha
haze, and the dust stirredby the rapidgait of the animalsmade it difficult for the sergeantsto keep the column closed up. LieutenantGeorge
A. Thurston'sheavily loaded pack mules refused to travelat the pace
set by the nervousand irritablecommander,who was confidentthat his
best chance of success depended upon a dawn attack. Some of the
captains,realizingthat the laggingpacktrainmight well endangertheir
safety, persuadedAdjutantCartershortlyafter midnightto go forward
and ask Mackenzie'spermissionto cut the packsloose from the mules.
Upon hearingabout the situation,Mackenzieexplodedwith a burstof
profanity,but, convincedthat the alternativeswere too risky,he ordered
a five minute halt, duringwhich the men were to fill their pocketswith
hardbread,and then cut the packsloose.Althoughtherewas no further
trouble,the delay caused by the pack mules preventeda dawn attack.
When daybreakcame, the expedition was still not in sight of the
Indian villages, and the rapid pace kept up mile after mile by the
commanderhad begun to tell on both men and mounts.
Upon reaching the San RodrigoRiver (near Remolino) shortly
before the sun appearedabove the horizon,Mackenzieordereda halt.
He allowedthe men and animalsto refreshthemselvesin the watersof
the little stream,and in the cool breezefloatingin from the Santa Rosa
Mountains,which could be seen to the west. Then all made readyfor
the chargeon the village. As a safety measure,Mackenziehad the men
fill their pockets with cartridges,rather than carry them in their
saddlebags,for a dismountedtroopermight be cut off from his horse.
Ignoringthe advice of the guides to divide his force and cut off
the Indianswho sought to escape to the mountains,Mackenzieat six
o'clockon May 18 cautiouslyled his men to the top of the slope. To
the west, strungout along the low, southbankof the San Rodrigo,were
30William R. Shafter,Fort Duncan, to Mackenzie,May 26, 1873; Mackenzieto Schuchardt,
May 28, 1873, LR, 2353-1873, DT; and Carter,Mackenzie,431, 437.
1 16
ARIZONAand the WEST
Indian huts and wickiups, grouped into three villages, averaging fifty
to sixty lodges. The largest was that of the Kickapoos, about a mile
away, and a quarter of a mile closer than that of the Lipans.31The slope
intervening between the blue-coated raiders and the Kickapoo village
was covered with clumps of prickly pear, Spanish bayonet, and mesquite,
but not enough to interfere with a cavalry charge. As soon as the
men moved into platoon position, Mackenzie ordered the fearless
McLaughlin and his Company I to lead the charge on the Kickapoo
village, and to follow the fleeing Indians. The remainder of the cavalry
was to charge by platoons, each delivering its fire by volley and afterwards wheeling out of the way of the next platoon, returning to the
rear to reload and charge again when its time came.
The cavalrymen hit the Kickapoolodges as suddenly and as destructively as a tornado. The surprised Indians, whose warriorshad left the
day before, scattered panic-stricken across irrigation ditches and fields
of corn and pumpkins, with McLaughlin's men in close pursuit. Taking
cover in ravines and ditches, the old men and women defended themselves with whatever weapons they had been able to lay their hands on.
When the rear companies struck the village, Mackenzie ordered them
to dismount and with torches to fire the reed and grass huts. The
crackling flames, the sharp crack of rifles, the thud of horses' hooves,
the yells of the cheering troopers,the hysterical screamsof Indian women
and children as they sought to escape all mingled to create an indescribable horror. Meanwhile, Adjutant Carter, with a detachment of Company A, rounded up sixty-five Indian horses, some still marked with
Texas brands. The captured ponies were divided among the hired guides
as a reward for gathering the information Mackenzie wanted.
The destruction was complete. The lodges of all three villages
were burned; at least nineteen Indians, by official count, were killed;
and forty women and children were captured. In addition, Costilietos,
an important Lipan chief, was caught with a lariatby one of the Seminole
scouts. No doubt, the count of Indian casualties would have been higher
had all the dead been discovered or the wounded flushed from their
hiding places. The Lipan and Mescalero bands escaped heavy loss by
fleeing westward to the Santa Rosa Mountains while the troops were
31Mackenzie Report;Carter,Mackenzie, 434-39.
The MACKENZIERAID
1 17
attackingthe Kickapoos.Mackenzie'slosses were negligible. Only one
trooperwas killed; a privatewas wounded seriouslyin the arm, and
anotherreceived a slight facial wound. Even the horses, which normally sufferedheavy casualtiesin a charge,faredwell; two were killed,
and two died of exhaustion.32
By one o'clockthe troopshad wateredtheir horsesand treatedthe
wounded, including the private whose arm had been amputatedby
SurgeonDonald Jackson.Then, with very little food and no sleep, the
Americansplaced their prisonerson horsesand began the long march
for the Texas side of the Rio Grande.From the battle site the raiders
followed the guides eastwardalong the San RodrigoRiverthroughthe
village of Remolino,whose inhabitantsshowed their displeasureat the
Yankeeintruders,but made no effort to stop them. Beyond Remolino,
a few miles west of the MescaleroApache
the routeled north-northeast,
west of the incoming route, to a
somewhat
of
and
village Zaragosa
crossingon the Rio Grandeat the mouthof SycamoreCreekand fifteen
miles below Del Rio.33
There was good reasonfor returningby a morewesternroute.The
area along it was sparselysettled, whereasthe region aroundZaragosa
andjust eastof the entryroutewas well populated.No doubtthe settlers
had discoveredthe presenceof the Yankeeinvaders,and had given the
alarm.Perhapsreinforcedby Mexican soldiers,they would be waiting
in ambush at some vantage point. Mackenzie well knew that any
stragglerwould be killed without mercy, and that the angry Indians
and Mexicanscould easily make an overpoweringassaulton his weary
cavalrymen.
As it neared the Rio Grande, the column no longer could move
rapidly.Summerwas officiallymorethan a month away,but the scorching heat, untemperedby any breeze,was almosttoo much for men and
beastsalreadyexhaustedby their strenuousfeat. The coming of night
broughtlittle relief. Only the fear of ambushand the proddingof alert,
veteranofficersenabledthe men to endurethe agonyof thatsecondnight
32Mackenzie
Report; Statement of Expeditions; Schuchardt to Hunter, June 3, 1873, Consular Despatches, Piedras Negras, II, FSDS; Carter, Mackenzie, 439-47; Wallace, "Mackenzie
Raid," New York Brandbook, IV, 73, passim; Mexican Reports, 425; Mariscal to Fish, January 14, 1874, Diplomatic Notes, Mexico City, XXIII, SDR.
33Mackenzie
Report; Carter, Mackenzie, 446-67; R. G. Carter, The Old Sergeant's Story
(New York, 1926), 73.
118
ARIZONAandthe WEST
- the third for some- without
sleep or rest. Many drowsedin their
saddlesor fell fast asleepat everymomentaryhalt. Late in the night the
Indian prisoners,heavily guardedin the rear,began in their sleep to
fall off their horsesand had to be lashed with lariatsto their saddles.
SeveraltimesLieutenantBullis'hardySeminoles,stealthilyhoveringon
the flanksand in the rear,rodein to reportthatgroupsof the enemywere
nearby."Itwas a long, long night/*AdjutantCarterrecalledmanyyears
later.
As the firstgreyof dawn appearedon the morningof May 19, the
blue-coatedraiders,following a trail that wound through patches of
mesquite,reachedthe Rio Grande.A nerve-rackingtime was required
to reach the opposite bank, for the troopershad to take the narrow,
elongatedford in single file. And it was with some difficultythat the
prisonersand wounded were transportedacross.Once on the Texas
side, Mackenziebivouackedthe commandto rest. DependableQuartermasterHenry W. Lawton,as previouslyarranged,soon came in with a
supply wagon loaded with rationsand forage.While a breakfastwas
being prepared,the dehydratedmen bathed in the cool watersof the
river.34
The crossinghadbeen madenone too soon.Duringthe day a crowd
of Mexicansand Indiansgatheredon the south side of the river,apparently intent upon attackingthe Americans- if a favorableopportunity
occurred.Mackenzie,however,did not permitthem the opportunity.He
made certainthat his horseswould not be stampeded,and he hid his
best sharpshooters,armed with seven-shot,fifty-caliberSpencer rifles
and SmithandWesson forty-fivecaliberrevolvers,in the dense chaparral
to cover the ford, which lay in full view and in rangeof the powerful
rifles.The riverwas too deep and too wide to be crossedelsewherein
that region. Mackenzie selected a camp site that could be defended
easily,and set up picketlines. Then he allowedthose not on duty to get
somebadlyneededsleep.Earlythe next morning,the commandleisurely
tookup a marchfor FortClark,whereit arrivedaboutnoon on May 2 1.35
The missionwas a daringdisplayof braveryand a remarkablefeat
of endurance.From the rendezvousat Captain Wilcox's camp on the
Las Morasto the returncrossingon the Rio Grande,the commandhad
34Carter,Mackenzie, 455-57, 466-67.
Mlbid., 456-57, 460 .
The MACKENZIERAID
1 19
traveledmore than one hundredand forty miles in thirty-eighthours,
and had destroyedthree Indian villages- all without sleep and with
only hardbreadfor nourishment.In his officialreportMackenziecommendedall his officersand men. He called specialattentionto Captain
McLaughlin,who with Mackenziehad led the charge;to Second LieutenantBullis, who with his Seminoleshad protectedthe flanksand rear
of the columnon the returnmarch;and to severalotherswho had shown
outstandingcourageand "unusualbravery."36
On May 20, when he receivednews by special courierthat the
expeditionwas backin Texas, MajorJ. K. Mizner,commandingat Fort
Clarkin Mackenzie'sabsence,telegrapheda brief preliminaryreportto
Two days later,GeneralSheridanat Chidepartmentalheadquarters.37
to Secretaryof War Belknapwith a
information
transmitted
the
cago
heartyendorsementof Mackenzie'sactions and an anxious admonition that "it is morethan probablethat Mackenziecrossedinto Mexico
and had his fight on that side of the Rio Grande.We must back him/'
On May 28 SheridanwiredBelknapa confirmationthatthe engagement
indeedhad taken placeon Mexicansoil, and defended Mackenziewith
the argumentthat "therecannotbe any validboundarywhen we pursue
Indianswho murderour people and carryaway our property."38
Mackenzie started his official report of the expedition through
channelson May 23, two daysafterhe returnedto FortClark.On June
4 Sheridantransmittedthe reportto Sherman in Washington, along
with a strong endorsementof Mackenzie'saction.39Although more
cautious and restrainedin his praise, Sherman indicated that unless
the Mexicansformallycomplainedtherewas no need for furtherinquiry
into the violation of Mexican sovereignty.Five weeks after the raid,
BelknapinformedMackenziethat he had been commendedby the War
Department for his action.40His superiors had rememberedtheir
promiseto give him their "fullestsupport."
36IHd., 465-67; Mackenzie Report. Besides Mackenzie, only Bullis received official recognition. On February 27, 1890, Lieutenant Bullis was breveted a captain for his bravery. See
Francis B. Heitman (comp.), Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army
(2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 261.
37J. K. Mizner to Dept. Hdqrs., May 20, 1873, LR, 2112-1873, DT.
38p. H. Sheridan to W. W.
Belknap, May 22, 28, 1873, LR, 2006 and 2092-1873, AGO.
39Endorsement of Sheridan to Sherman, June 4, 1873, on Mackenzie Report.
40Endorsements of Sherman to
Belknap, June 13, 1873, and of Belknap to Secretary of the
Interior, June 24, 1873, on Mackenzie Report.
120
ARIZONAand the WEST
When the newspapersrevealedthat Mackenzie'sraid had taken
place in Mexico, most observersreacted favorably. A Washington
correspondentreportedthat the news had createda great sensationin
that city, and that Mackenzie"will be famous hereafteras a bold and
fearlessgeneral,for the heartsof the people are turnedtowardshim/'41
Most Texans decidedlywere pleased.The statelegislaturereflectedthis
sentimentwhen on June 2 in a joint resolutionit officiallyextended"the
gratefulthanksof the peopleof our State ... to GeneralMcKenzie[sic]
and the officersand troopsunder his command,for their promptaction
and gallant conduct in inflictingwell meritedpunishmentupon these
scourgesof our frontier."42
A few comments, however, were not laudatory.Some persons
chargedthat the federalgovernmentwas tryingto precipitatea rupture
with Mexico. An observerin San Antonio reported,apparentlyinaccurately,that most citizens in that area felt that Mackenzie'sraid was
a deliberateattempton the partof the governmentto provokea war.43
This assertionwas far from the truth, for the administrationhad no
desirefor a conflict.Both Secretaryof State Fish and GeneralSheridan
simply were convincedthat the only way to stop the marauderswas to
punish them in theirown villages.In June SheridanassuredMackenzie
thatundersimilarcircumstanceshe couldstrikeagainacrossthe border.44
With no attemptto evade full responsibility,Colonel Mackenzie
defendedhis actionboth to his superiorsand to the Mexicanauthorities.
He assuredMexican officialsthat he was friendly and wished to cooperatein everyway to assuretranquilityand orderalong the border.Peace,
not war, he insisted,had been the objectiveof his invasion.Mackenzie
also explained that there were precedentsfor his crossingof the Rio
Grande. In 1869 three companiesof Mexican militia had attackeda
Lipan camp in Texas near the mouth of the Pecos, and had carried
41GalvestonDaily News, May 30, 1873.
42James P. Newcomb, Departmentof State (Texas), Austin, to Augur, June 2, 1873, LR,
2366-1873, DT.
4zNew York Times, June 10, 1873; Galveston Daily News, May 23 and 30, August 6 and
30, September3, 1873.
44Fish to Nelson, January16, 1873, in Messageof the President,December 1, 1873, HED I,
43 Cong., 1 Sess., Serial 1594, 643; Mackenzie to Dept. Hdqrs., June 12, 1873, LR, 26041873, DT.
The MACKENZIERAID
121
severalprisonersback to Mexico.45And in March of 1872 Mexican
troopsfleeing fromrebel attackshad sought sanctuaryin Fort Duncan,
and laterendeavoredto organizea force for the purposeof drivingthe
rebelsfrom PiedrasNegras.46Since these violationsof Americanterritoryhad been settledquietlybetween the two governments,Mackenzie
felt that his case shouldbe grantedsimilartreatment.
News of the raidarousedintenseexcitementand resentmentamong
Mexicancitizensalongthe border.Even beforeMackenziehad recrossed
the Rio Grande,the inhabitantsof PiedrasNegras, having been summoned by drumsand informedthat "six hundredgringos"were south
of the border,decided to expel the intruders.They dispatchedcouriers
to the nearby villages and to Saltillo for help. Fortunately,however,
United States Consul Schuchardtat Piedras Negras persuadedthe
crowdto disperseby explainingthat the "invaders"were regulartroops
of the United States Army, whose only purposeon Mexican soil was
to punish the Indiansthat had been raidingin Texas, and that Mexican
citizens would not be harmed.47The large number of Mexicans and
Indianswho gatherednearthe fordshortlyafterMackenziehad crossed
provokednothing moreharmfulthan a few insulting remarksand fired
a few ineffectualshots. But for severaldays afterward,there were wild
rumorsand exaggeratedreportsof imminent retaliatoryraids. Within
a few weeks, however, comparativecalm had settled over the apprehensive Mexican communities.
Despite the indignation and anger of Mexicans along the Rio
Grande,the governmentof that countryhad no desire to make Mackenzie'sraidan internationalissue. Afteran extraordinary
delay,officials
in MexicoCity presentedan officialprotest.IgnacioMariscal,the Mexican ministerin Washington, stated in June that because he had not
received an official account of the raid he had not demandedof the
United Statesany explanation.He expressedthe belief thatthe incident
^Mackenzie to Schuchardt, May 28, 1873, LR, 2353-1873, DT; Schuchardt to Hunter,
June 3, 1873, Consular Despatches, Piedras Negras, II, FSDS.
46
Augur to Division Headquarters, September 28, 1872, LR, 4099-1872, AGO; Francisco
Palacio (Mexican Minister) to Fish, March 27, April 22, 1872, Diplomatic Notes, Mexico
City, XXIII, SDR.
47Schuchardt to Mackenzie, May 19, 1873, LR, 2193-1873, AGO; Schuchardt to Hunter,
June 3, 1873, Consular Despatches, Piedras Negras, II, FSDS.
122
ARIZONAand the WEST
could be settledamicably.48
Finally,on January14, 1874, eight months
after the raid, he sent a note to Secretaryof State Fish stating that no
similaroffensiveagainstthe United Statesby Mexican troopshad been
or would be authorized,and that Mexico had cooperatedin effortsto
solve the borderproblem- including the attemptto removethe Kickapoos fromthat country.The note did declarethat, althoughhis government had postponedaction on the violationof its nationalityuntil the
excitementwas over, it could not allow Americantroopsto trespasson
its territoryagain because of possibleinternalrepercussions.The note
concluded by stating that the United States in the future could rely
With
upon Mexican supportin joint measuresagainstthe offenders.49
matter.
the
this mild protest andchangein attitude Mexicodropped
During the eight-monthinterval between Mackenzie'sraid and
MariscaFsnote of protest,depredationsalong the internationalborder
were almost nonexistent.To the Indians, complacentlyaccustomedto
the protectionof the boundary,Mackenzie'ssurpriseattackhad been
a rude shock. Some of the escapeesplanned to commitreprisals.Some
fearedanotherAmericanattackand dividedinto smallbands,scattering
to the mountainsin the interiorof Coahuila and Chihuahua;others,
mostly Potawatomiesand Kickapoos,decided that they should return
to the United States.
On May 18, the very day on which Mackenziedestroyedthe villages of the raiding Indians, agents of the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs were in Saltillo to seek the cooperationof Governor
VictorianoCepeda of Coahuila in settling the borderproblempeacefully. These agentswere Henry M. Atkinsonand ThomasG. Williams,
who had been appointedin March to make a new effort to effect the
Atkinson and Williams left Washington
removalof the Kick&poos.50
earlyin April,and aftera few days'layoverin San Antonioproceededto
Monterrey,where they met Mexican CommissionerAntonio Madero.
After a hospitable reception at Saltillo, GovernorCepeda appointed
Alfredo Monterohis personaldeputy to assist the Americans.Cepeda
48GalvestonDaily News, June 3, 1873; New York Times, June 2, 1873.
49Mariscalto Fish, January 14, 1874, Diplomatic Notes, Mexico City, XXIII, SDR.
50H. M. Atkinsonand T. G. Williams to EdwardP. Smith, Commissionerof Indian Affairs,
October8, 1873, in Reportof the Commissionerof Indian Affairs,November 1, 1873, RED
1, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Serial 1601, 537-39.
The MACKENZIERAID
123
then issued an appealto all citizensof his state to supportthe effortto
remove the Kickapoos,and the three commissionersjourneyednorth
to begin negotiations.51
Upon reachingSantaRosa,wherethey firstlearnedof Mackenzie's
raid, the American commissionerssent their congratulationsto the
colonel and expressedtheir belief that his success would aid them in
their mission.This optimisticnote inspiredMackenzieto inform General Augur at San Antonio that the commissionerswould succeed if
given adequatemilitarysupport.He said that if Mexican officialsor
citizensof Santa Rosaarrestedor interferedwith the commissioners,he
wanted permissionto go to their rescue with his entire regiment, as
well as a volunteerforceof Texans. He noted CommissionerMontero's
apparentdesire to cooperate,and promisedthe commissionersthat he
would not attackthe Indian villages again until their undertakingwas
completed.52
When the threecommissionersarrivedat the sceneof the raid,they
found the Indiansstill in hiding. The assurancesof Monterothat there
was no furtherdanger and the distributionof food by Atkinson and
Williams enticed the frightened,hungry Kickapoosto meet with the
commissioners.At the first session on June 1 at Santa Rosa, Atkinson
on behalf of his governmentinvited the Kickapoosto move to a new
home in the United States.The Mexicanofficialsurged the Indiansto
accept the offer. The Kickapoosdemanded, as a prerequisiteto any
negotiation,the returnof their wives and childrenwho had been capturedby Mackenzieand imprisonedat San Antonio.Atkinson,entirely
agreeable,persuadedthe Indians to send one of their chiefs with him
and Montero to San Antonio to plead with General Augur for their
release.53
At San Antonio,Atkinsonmetwith a sternrefusal.BothMackenzie
and Sheridanstrenuouslyobjectedto the idea. Sheridandeclaredthat
compliancewould only lead to otherdemands,adding: "The detention
of the women and children. . . would do more to bring the tribe back
51Gibson,The Kickapoos,245; GalvestonDaily News, May 4, 1873.
^Williams to Mackenzie,May 28, 1873, LR, 2532-1873, DT; Mackenzieto Dept. Hdqrs.,
June 6, 12, 1873, LR, 2332 and 2604-1873, DT.
53Atkinsonto CIA, June 1, 1873, July 9, 1874, in Gibson, The Kickapoos,246-47; Mackenzie Report.
124
ARIZONAand the WEST
The War
[to the United States] than half a dozen commissioners/'54
Atkinson
thereits
officers.
taken
the
stand
Departmentsupported
by
upon carriedhis case to Commissionerof Indian Affairs EdwardP.
Smith, assuringhim that the Mexican governmentand the Kickapoo
leaderswere sincere. Smith, in turn, appealedto PresidentGrant to
have the prisonerstransferredto the custody of the Bureauof Indian
Affairs, but Grant upheld the military.55A few days later, Sheridan
had all the prisoners- except Costilietos, who had escaped on June
24 - transferredby trainto FortGibson, Indian Territory,to get them
fartheraway fromthe borderand to a post with betterfacilities.56
Atkinsonhad failed in his effortsto get the prisonersreleased,but
he did not intend to abandonhis missionof persuadingthe Kickapoosto
returnto the United States.Rememberingthe concernof the tribesmen
overtheircaptivewomenand children,he becameconvincedthat Sheridan and Mackenzie were right- that the detention of the prisoners
would bring the tribe to terms.He made it clear to the Kickapoosthat
the prisonerswould be restoredto their families,but that the reunion
would not take place until the tribehad been removedto a reservation
in the United States. As a further inducement,Atkinson distributed
$8,000 worthof goodswhen he reachedSanta Rosa. He also promised
the Kickapoosa far greateramountof goodsshould they agreeto move,
and he made substantialcash paymentsto a numberof influentialmen
in returnfor their support.57
On July 11 a group of Kickapoosand their Potawatomiconfederates informed the commissionersthat they would accept the offer.
A few days later seventy-fiveKickapoosassembledin Zaragosa,while
The firstconothersof the tribestartedto a rendezvousat Remolino.58
tingent of three hundredand seventeenleft Santa Rosa on August 28
for theirnew home in the United States,accompaniedby Atkinsonand
Williams. Crossing the Rio Grande west of the mouth of the Pecos
Riverand travelingwest of the settlementsin Texas, they arrivedsafely
54Sheridanto Sherman,June 10, 1873, LR, 2320-1873, AGO.
55Atkinson and Williams to Smith, June 14, 1873; Smith to Delano, June 16, 1873; Delano
to Belknap,June 17, 1873; Belknapto Delano, June 23, 1873; all in LR, 2473-1873, AGO.
*«GalvestonDaily News, June 29, July 1, 1873.
57Atkinson to CIA,
July 9, 1874, in Gibson, The Kickapoos,250.
^Atkinson to Augur, July 12, 25, 1873, LR, 2942 and 3157-1873, DT.
The MACKENZIERAID
125
on December2, 1873, at FortSill, Indian Territory.Atkinsonreturned
to Mexico to continue negotiations,but he was able to persuadeonly
one hundred and fifteen more to join their kinsmen in the United
States.59
During the time these negotiationswere takingplace, Mackenzie's
continuedactivityno doubtsignificantlyinfluencedthe Indiansto view
favorablythe commissioners'terms. For ten days after returningfrom
his raid, Mackenziekept three companiesof troopspatrolingthe north
bank of the Rio Grande,and in June he deployed his cavalrymenat
strategicpoints to thwartany attemptat reprisaland furtherdepredations.Two companieswere stationedaboutfifty miles below Eagle Pass,
two were sent to PiedrasPintos Creek,one to San Felipe, two were sent
thirty-fivemiles east of FortDuncan, and four were kept at FortClark.
LieutenantBullis and his Seminole scouts remainedconstantlyin the
field, campingfirstat San Pedro Springsand later on Elm Creek near
Fort Clark.60But Mackenzie was not content merely with defensive
measures.By specialmessengerhe urgedGovernorCepedaof Coahuila
to cooperatein a joint campaignagainstthe main Kickapoovillage in
NacimientoCanyon.Sheridan,however,disapprovedthe venture,commenting that "Mackenziehas done very well/' but should leave diplomatic maneuveringto others.61
Determinedto put an end to the borderproblemwith or without
Mexicancooperation,Mackenzieon severaloccasionssent troopssouth
of the border. A detachment of forty cavalrymenunder Lieutenant
G. A. Thurstonon June 22 discovereda herd of stolen Texas cattle on
the south bank of the Rio Grande about forty-fivemiles below Fort
Duncan. Thurstonreportedthat the rustlersreturnedthe herd without
his having to crossthe river,but the newspaperaccountsclaimed that
the troopscrossedthe river,capturedthe thieves,and returnedwith the
herd.62Duringthe samemonthMackenzietwice sent his scoutsto search
for Lipan and Mescalerocampssouth of the border.He advisedAugur
^Galveston Daily News, September5, 1873; Gibson, The Kickapoos,252, 262-66.
60Mackenzie to Dept. Hdqrs., June 12, 1873, LR, 2604-1873; Fort Duncan Reports,
LXXXVI-LXXXVII, 320-21, DT.
61Endorsementof Sheridan to Sherman on Mackenzie to Dept. Hdqrs., June 6, 1873, LR,
2332-1873, DT.
62Statement of Expeditions;San Antonio Express, July 4, 1873; Galveston Daily News,
July 6, 1873.
126
ARIZONAand the WEST
that these villagesshouldbe attackedas soon as the commissionerswere
out of danger.As Mexicowas inclined to overlookMackenzie'sfirstraid
and was cooperatingwith the commissioners,Sheridanand Sherman
early in July orderedthe colonel not to send any more spies or troops
acrossthe river.63
The FourthCavalrycontinuedto scout the Upper Rio Grandefor
nearlya yearthereafterwithout againviolatingMexicanterritory.Mackenzie, suffering from an attack of rheumatism,in August took an
extendedleave and did not returnuntil Februaryof 1874.64In July of
thatyear,the impetuouscommanderled aboutone hundredcavalrymen
acrossthe rivereighty-fivemiles aboveFortDuncan to pursuea number
of rustlerswith stolen cattle. He followed their trail to within twentyfive miles of Zaragosa,where he gave up the chase when he discovered
that the thieves were Mexicansratherthan Indians.65This was the last
bordercrossinguntil the resurgenceof depredationsa few years later.
Within a monthafterhis last crossingin 1874, Mackenzieand the
FourthCavalrywere transferredto the northwesternfrontierof Texas
to participatein the final settlementof the Indianproblemin that area.
Although he had not entirely eliminatedthe depredations,Mackenzie
had succeededin bringingtemporarypeace and order.During the next
two years reportsconsistentlyverifiedthat "affairswere quiet" in the
Upper Rio GrandeBorderRegion.
63Endorsementsof Sheridan to Sherman on Mackenzie to Dept. Hdqrs., June 28, 1873,
LR, 2374-1873, DT.
^Mackenzie to Dept. Hdqrs., September 12, 1873, LR, 3810-1873, DT (filed with ACP
3827-1873); MilitaryServiceof Ranald S. Mackenzie,ACP, 1149-1884, AGO.
65Schuchardtto John W. Foster(Minister to Mexico), August 5, 1874, ConsularDespatches,
PiedrasNegras, II, FSDS.

R. S. Mackenzie and the Kickapoos: The Raid into Mexico in 1873

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