Soccer professionals are players

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Professionals Play Minimax
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70, No. 2. (Apr., 2003), pp. 395-415.
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References
Experienced-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
Colin Camerer; Teck-Hua Ho
Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Jul., 1999), pp. 827-874.
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Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty
Kicks in Soccer
P.-A. Chiappori; S. Levitt; T. Groseclose
The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4. (Sep., 2002), pp. 1138-1151.
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Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with
Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Ido Erev; Alvin E. Roth
The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4. (Sep., 1998), pp. 848-881.
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Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zerosum Games
Barry O'Neill
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 84, No. 7.
(Apr. 1, 1987), pp. 2106-2109.
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Minimax Play at Wimbledon
Mark Walker; John Wooders
The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 5. (Dec., 2001), pp. 1521-1538.
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