Strategic Surprise in the Ukraine Crisis

Swedish National Defence College
Strategic Surprise in
the Ukraine Crisis
Agendas, expectations and organizational
dynamics in the EU Eastern Partnership
until the annexation of Crimea 2014
Magnus Christiansson
Abstract
This thesis deals with the problem of how to understand and explain strategic surprise in
relation to the crisis in Ukraine 2013-2014. It describes the events that triggered surprise and
identifies the EU Vilnius Summit, the Maidan square massacre and the annexation of Crimea
as focus points. Using a theoretical framework based on surprise theory, the thesis examines
the agenda of the EU Eastern Partnership, the psychology of Foreign Ministers Carl Bildt and
Radek Sikorski before the identified focus points, and the organizational dynamics of the
European Council throughout the crisis. The conclusion is that the Eastern Partnership
agenda provided a toolbox with limited usability in a crisis, that the overconfidence of Bildt
and Sikorski meant they failed in turning registered warning signs into a rethinking of policy,
and that procrastination by the European Council led to a reactionary pattern that
contributed to recurring surprises.
Key words: Ukraine crisis, Eastern partnership, surprise theory, warning-response problem
1
Table of contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ 3
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4
Introducing the research problem ...................................................................................................... 4
Overview of the study ......................................................................................................................... 6
I.
Methodological considerations ...................................................................................................... 8
The limitations of studying an ongoing seminal event ....................................................................... 8
The Ukraine crisis as a case of strategic surprise .............................................................................. 12
A time of surprises: from Vilnius to Simferopol ............................................................................. 13
An aggregated and accumulated surprise .................................................................................... 18
Strategic surprise theory and the warning-response problem ......................................................... 20
Signals and noise, coping and relevant actors .............................................................................. 21
Operationalizing the analytical framework................................................................................... 24
II.
The Ukraine crisis from an Eastern Partnership perspective ...................................................... 29
The agenda-political cut: oblique strategy ........................................................................................ 30
“We will not accept new divining lines in Europe”: introducing the Eastern Partnership ............. 30
On the road to nowhere ................................................................................................................ 34
The psychological cut: interpretive ambiguity .................................................................................. 38
The visions for Vilnius .................................................................................................................... 39
The message from Maidan ............................................................................................................ 43
On the cliff of Crimea ..................................................................................................................... 45
The organizational cut: the power of the carrot ............................................................................... 47
Avoidance (European Council Summit 24-25 October 2013) ........................................................ 48
Procrastination (FAC 10 and 20 February 2014) ........................................................................... 49
Passive-aggressive procrastination (FAC 3 March and the extraordinary meeting 6 March 2014)
....................................................................................................................................................... 51
Response (FAC 17 March 2014) ..................................................................................................... 55
III.
Concluding analysis: Facets of a crisis ...................................................................................... 57
The Eastern Partnership in perspective ............................................................................................ 57
The policy entrepreneurs for Zwischeneuropa ................................................................................. 60
Final reflections: “Events, dear boy, events” .................................................................................... 62
References............................................................................................................................................. 63
2
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Jan Hallenberg of the Swedish National Defence College for
his advice and comments on the first draft of this thesis. Dr. Dan Hansén and Dr. Fredrik
Doeser gave me positive feed-back on a paper describing the main ideas for this work. Dr.
Jacob Westberg read a draft of the first two chapters and gave me many useful comments.
Mr. Keith Farr and Ms. Edessa Ünesi corrected many of my language errors. This thesis was
written during summer 2014, when I learned from Morrissey’s Autobiography, for the very
first time, the value of poetry in prose.
Finally, I would like to mention Dr. Hans Agné of the Department of Political Science,
Stockholm University. Without him, this thesis would never have been written.
Karlberg Palace
22 August 2014
3
Introduction
Introducing the research problem
At the Third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013, EU leaders
gathered to witness the signing of Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Areas (AAs/DCFTAs) with, among others, Ukraine. Ahead of the Summit Russia
declared that it was willing to impose trade sanctions, energy supply interruptions, and
security reprisals against states choosing to sign new agreements with the EU. The EU policy
aimed for a Ukrainian accession, but the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych
decided not to sign the association agreement at the Vilnius Summit.
On 18 February 2014 the police and security forces of Yanukovych clashed with violent and
war like result on Kiev’s Maidan square. The event was preceded by large scale protests and
dissent in Kiev. Many clear and visible signs of increased repression and authoritarianism in
Ukraine under Yanukovych had been available before the bloody events on Maidan square.
The EU policy aimed to prevent the Yanukovych regime from using violence.
On the 26 February Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a military drill in the Western
and Central military district, officially involving around 150.000 troops and heavy support
assets, close to the Ukrainian border. It was a snap exercise and Western leaders aimed to
stop Russia from intervening into Ukraine. On the 28 February Russia invaded the Crimean
peninsula, and took control over its strategic locations. On 18 March Russia signed a treaty
to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation.
From a policy perspective this sequence represents a series of Western foreign policy
failures. On neither of these occasions did Western leaders from the EU or the US achieve
their stated objectives. Yanukovych did not sign the AAs/DCFTAs, there was a violent clash at
the Maidan square and Russia did invade Ukraine. From a policy perspective this chain of
events has led to a crisis for the entire European security system, or as NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it: “Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is the most
serious crisis in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall.” 1 It is likely to have great
1
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World” Speech at the Brussels Forum 21 March 2014
(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108225.htm), accessed on 10 June 2014.
4
repercussions for the transatlantic security system for many years to come. Therefore, a
study that covers this process holds a great deal of strategic and political relevance.
From an analytical perspective the Ukraine crisis qualify as a case of strategic surprise. In the
following I show that Western political leaders were overwhelmed by the development and
tended to act in response to Russian actions rather than proactively. The main puzzle for this
thesis is how we should understand and explain this surprise. In the years before the Ukraine
crisis there were many explicit warnings about a possible Russian aggression. Already before
the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, the late Ron Asmus, who served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs under US President Bill Clinton, warned that: “Many
suspect that Crimea could be the next target if Moscow subjugates Georgia and then shifts
its sights to Ukraine.”2 Several senior scholars and analysts followed in these geopolitical
footsteps.3 In order to understand this puzzle, I will use the theories of strategic surprise and
the warning-response problem.
However, as much as the Ukraine crisis represents a strategic surprise, it also presents a
challenge for parts of the theories about strategic surprise. The theory relies heavily on
historical examples like Pearl Harbor, Yum Kippur and 9-11, which are related to individual
countries and situations that meant a step-level change from the status quo over the course
of a few hours. Though the Ukraine crisis certainly could be seen as part of “the era of
undeclared wars”4, as author Julian Critchley put it, it is also an example of an accumulated
and aggregated surprise. Not only can it be regarded as a recurring concern related to three
significant events, the surprise had a multinational dimension as well. It was a surprise for
individual governments in Europe and the US, but also for the collective efforts of the EU
2
Ron Asmus, “A War the West Must Stop” in The Washington Post 15 July 2008
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/14/AR2008071401845.html), accessed on
18 June 2014.
3
Examples include Stephen Blank of the American Foreign Policy Council and author Anne Applebaum. In
October 2013 Blank warned that Russia could “press for a fragmentation of Ukraine” and that it was delivering
arms to Sevastopol, see Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Ukrainian Hostage” in The Wall Street Journal 17 October
2013 (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304520704579125452524781122), accessed on
18 June 2014; Appelbaum warned in February 2014 about a Russian aggression: “In 2008 when the Russians
had a conflict with Georgia, they resolved the conflict by occupying a part of Georgia. And there have been
some hints that there could be military action in the Eastern part of the Ukraine, it could be in Crimea. That is
all possible.” on Swedish radio show Konflikt, 15 February 2014
(http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/324246?programid=1300), accessed on 16 February 2014.
4
th
Julian Critchley, Warning and Response. A Study of Surprise Attack in the 20 Century and an Analysis of its
Lessons for the Future (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1978). Perhaps Leo Trotsky’s expression “neither
war nor peace” is even more to the point.
5
Eastern partnership policy. As we will see, the accumulated and aggregated character of the
crisis is the reason why I single out the EU’s Eastern Partnership as the focal point for the
inquiry, in order to get a primary actor suitable for the scope of this thesis.
Thus, the research question is how we can understand and explain the accumulated and
aggregated strategic surprise experienced by the central actors of the EU’s Eastern
Partnership. It should be underlined that the outline and character of the study limits the
ability to generalize the results of the study. Further generalizing must be complemented
with comparative research on other cases.
Overview of the study
The inquiry is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces the method used to
answer the research question. I create an analytical framework in order to explain and
understand an outcome (strategic surprise). I define the Ukraine crisis more specifically and
motivate why it is a case of strategic surprise. This is crucial as the search for explanatory
factors is based on the claim that the outcome is known. An empirical overview of the events
makes it easier to identify relevant actors for the analysis, and I argue that an analytical
construction of the Ukraine crisis, based on focus points, deals with the methodological
problem connected with the study of an ongoing crisis. I identify five phases of the crisis,
separated by three focus points. The case is distinguished by the fact that it represents an
accumulated (chronologically) as well as aggregated (organizationally) surprise. This is why
the EU and its Eastern Partnership is identified as suitable for the study.
Finally, the first chapter presents and refines the theoretical factors that are used in the
analysis of the case. I briefly describe the main features of strategic surprise and warningresponse theory, and make a few modifications to the established theory, in order to
capture the special circumstances created by an accumulated and aggregated surprise. I reuse the notion of three explanatory cuts (agenda-political, psychological, and organizational)
to organize the explanatory factors, structure the case study and link different sets of
sources in the inquiry. I define and operationalize the relevant explanatory factors and
sketch a few empirical indicators and criteria in each cut, which relates to the Eastern
Partnership Summits, the expectations of foreign ministers Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski as
well as the deliberations and actions of the European Council.
6
The second chapter is an empirical analysis of the Ukraine crisis from an Eastern Partnership
perspective. This chapter has three parts, and they all tell the story about the Ukraine crisis
from different perspectives. The first cut deals with the agenda of the Eastern Partnership
(as part of the EU’s foreign relations agenda), before the Vilnius Summit. I describe and
analyze this process and find that shifting priorities, competition and possibly overcrowding
led to a compromise which indirectly led to de-securitization of the Eastern Partnership,
misguided expectations as well as limited options for policy.
The second cut covers the psychological factors that influenced the key actors Bildt and
Sikorski during the first three phases of the crisis. I deal with their expectations, assessments
and declarations on blogs, Twitter and interviews in the process leading up to the invasion of
Crimea. I analyze and relate these statements to psychological distortion factors that could
contribute to our understanding of the gap between expectations and outcome during the
crisis. In this cut I find that Bildt as well as Sikorski were overconfident of the existing policy
and remained ambiguous about the development.
The third empirical cut deals with the organizational perspective. It focuses on the
deliberations and actions of the European Council before and during the crisis. I describe the
relevant Council meetings and identify the main tendencies in the organizational dynamic
within the EU. The main conclusion is that the EU avoided the problems in the Eastern
Partnership before the Vilnius Summit and was unable to act proactively due to the German
elections and fixation on issues like Syria and immigration. Furthermore, the EU delayed the
decision to use sanctions because of internal differences and stakes in the crisis. The effect
of this procrastination was that the EU acted reactively throughout the crisis.
The third chapter synthesizes the conclusions of the thesis. I do this by relating the findings
of the three cuts to each other as well as the theoretical framework introduced in the first
chapter. This thesis makes three main points: the Eastern Partnership agenda featured a
limited toolbox which did not match the conflict, procrastination led to a reactionary pattern
that contributed to recurring surprises and the overconfidence of Bildt and Sikorski
regarding the EaP meant they failed in turning registered warning signs into a rethinking of
policy.
7
After this introduction of the thesis, I now turn to the methodological concerns and develop
an analytical framework for the Ukraine crisis.
I.
Methodological considerations
The function of this chapter is to create, in the words of Alexander George, an analytical
“framework for a discriminating analysis”5, that could be used for a single case study of the
Ukraine crisis. In order to do that, the following needs to be done: present the method for
how the research question will be answered; define the Ukraine crisis more specifically and
show that it really is a strategic surprise (an outcome); present and refine the theoretical
factors that are used in the inquiry, how they relate to the sources in the study, and how
they can be used to explain the outcome.
The limitations of studying an ongoing seminal event
To start an inquiry with a dramatic episode in history reminds us of Graham Allison and
Philip Zelikows much quoted study of the Cuban missile crisis. The very first sentence in their
book is about the relevance of the case: “The Cuban missile crisis stands as a seminal
event.”6 Thus, the case (Cuban missile crisis) is given by its strategic relevance, and the
puzzle concerns the different factors that could feed into an explanation of the outcome
(Soviet and US decisions). Allison and Zelikow base their study on three models for
explaining decision making in this seminal event.
In methodological terms Allison and Zelikow are “consuming” theory, to use an expression
used by a group of Swedish political scientists.7 It is sometimes difficult to distinguish this
method from the outright testing of theory. Theory testing is primarily about finding out
whether a specific theory can explain one or more cases that must be carefully motivated by
the scholar. The principal difference concerns the motive of the study. In theory
“consumption” the central methodological concern is the case; in theory testing the central
methodological concern is which theory that is to be tested. In other words, this thesis is not
5
Alexander L. George, “Warning and Response: Theory And Practice” in Yair Evron (ed.), International Violence:
Terrorism, Surprise and Control (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979), p. 12.
6
Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaning the Cuban Missile Crisis Second Edition (New
York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), p. 1. Allison was the author of the first edition. I refer to Allison and
Zelikow.
7
Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Gilljam, Henrik Oscarsson, Lena Wägnerud, Metodpraktikan. Konsten att studera
samhälle, individ och marknad Tredje upplagan (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2009), p. 42.
8
a theory testing, but a “consumption” of theoretically motivated factors that could be used
for understanding and explaining surprise in the Ukraine crisis.
Though Allison and Zelikow “consume” theory, they actually start their inquiry with the
observation that the dominating “rational actor model” for explanation is not entirely
satisfactory, and that it needs to “be supplemented by frames of reference that focus on the
governmental machine”8. In other words, the “consumption” of theory is not just a matter of
ordering a fixed menu, but could be something of a buffet dinner created by the scholar.
However, this selection of explanatory factors must be done in a careful and elaborated
process, especially as the term “the Ukraine crisis” must be constructed as well. The first
concern is that when one makes up a story to fit the described outcome, it is easy to adjust
data to get a certain pattern. Ultimately, one might create a convincing story of the
outcome, only to discover that the explanatory value for other cases might be limited. This is
the curse of a “single case theory”. To avoid a motley set of factors in the analysis, it is
important that factors brought into the analysis must be commensurable with each other,
i.e. not based on competing foundational assumptions.
An example of theory “consumption” similar to that of Allison and Zelikow is Charles Parker
and Eric Stern’s analysis of the 9-11 attacks 2001.9 Based on the premise that the events of
9-11 “should be regarded as a strategic surprise”10 Parker and Stern try to “understand more
systematically what went wrong”11, “seek to better understand what happened”12, and
understand “the responsiveness of the system to more generalized warnings”13. Like Allison
and Zelikow’s account of the Cuban missile crisis, their study features three cuts to explain a
seminal event. The same methodological tools are used in the twin study about the policy
failure associated with hurricane Katrina in the US14 This latter article examines the policy
failure to deal with a natural disaster in the US. Thus, the somewhat conventional wisdom
that “the Katrina disaster could have been prevented with more federal attention and earlier
8
Allison & Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p. 5.
Charles Parker & Eric K. Stern, “Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the
Origins of Strategic Surprise” in Foreign Policy Analysis (2005), p. 301-331.
10
Ibid., p. 301.
11
Ibid., p. 302.
12
Ibid., p. 303.
13
Ibid., p. 304.
14
Charles F. Parker, Erik K. Stern, Eric Paglia and Christer Brown, ”Preventable Catastrophe? The Hurricane
Katrina Disaster Revisited” in Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Vol. 17, No. 4, 4 December 2009.
9
9
action”15 proves to be misleading. It would certainly be tempting to examine why the West
failed in its foreign policy objectives in the Ukraine crisis and identify the factors that
prevented Western leaders from responding more adequately. However, unlike the analysis
of 9-11 and the Katrina disaster, this study will not elaborate on the issue of policy failure as
such. The reason is quite obvious: the Ukraine crisis is a two-sided and dynamic conflict, in
which we currently have very limited insight into the Russian side. Without relevant sources
for the Russian behavior it becomes impossible to determine failure, at least in a positivist
manner, as we simply cannot know exactly why objectives were not reached. Thus, it
becomes impossible to identify the causal mechanisms for a policy failure. Furthermore, our
interest is not counterfactual (“could there have been better preparations”).
Rather, the research question in this thesis is in line with what political scientist Alex Hybel
calls the “victim’s school” of thought on surprise.16 This means that we will try to take the
vantage point of some of the key European leaders and institutions in order to explain “the
causes of their failure to anticipate the initiation of hostilities.”17 Just like the studies of the
Cuban missile crisis, 9-11 and Katrina, we will have to supplement our study with
organizational as well as psychological factors in order to interpret the actions of the victim
during the course of the crisis. This is why explanation also requires understanding.
This thesis is bold only in one sense of the word: it attempts to write a history of the present.
As concluded, this means that it deals with a strategic event that is ongoing. Indeed, the
situation in Ukraine has mutated into a low-intensity war. That is why it is too early to
conclude whether the Ukraine crisis best could be studied as a critical juncture (an important
moment in history) or a formative moment (an important moment in history where
institutions are reshaped).18 This might seem contradictory to the fundamental assumption
behind the design of the inquiry, namely that we know the outcome of a process. I claim to
make a post mortem analysis, but do I have a corpse?
15
Ibid., p. 206.
Alex Roberto Hybel, The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict (Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Books,
1986), p. 3.
17
Ibid., p. 2.
18
For the distinctions between formative moment and critical juncture, see Bo Rothstein, “Explaining Swedish
Corporatism: The Formative Moment” Scandinavian Political Studies Vol. 15 – No. 3 1992.
16
10
However, from an epistemological perspective one could argue that it is a challenge to find
objective criteria to dissociate any political process. Rather, they seem to be constructed
either socially or analytically. An example of a socially constructed political process is an
election: the political system is constructed in electoral cycles, which makes it possible to
identify the beginning and end of a process. An example of an analytically constructed
political process is the Cuban missile crisis as described by Allison and Zelikow. In this case
the different stories of the crisis are shifting depending on the theoretical perspectives
employed. The content of the crisis is dependent on the employed analytical framework. The
only thing that unites the three explanatory cuts in Allison and Zelikow are the three known
decisions (the Soviet decision to base missiles on Cuba, the US blockade of Cuba, and the
Soviet withdrawal from Cuba). This means that it would be possible to analytically construct
the Ukraine crisis around a few known focus points. In turn this means that we have to
identify and motivate these points as well as relevant actors and institutions in the event.
Having done this, the factors we should use to make sense of the surprise must be identified
and motivated from the theoretical literature. Finally, the inquiry would then reconstruct the
deliberations or processes at these focus points, which could then be interpreted on the
basis of the theoretically motivated factors.
As noted in methodological literature, there are no limitations to the source material that
could be used in such reconstruction.19 The most common sources include diary notes,
memoirs, PM:s, protocols, directives, reports, white papers, as well as interviews. Basically
any source that could be used to track and interpret the reasons for strategic surprise could
be used. This is helpful, as the ongoing character of the process means that no academic
monographs on the subject seem to be available. As of summer 2014, three major research
reports are available, both concerned with policy recommendations and neither concerned
with strategic surprise.20
19
See for example Esaiasson, et al., Metodpraktikan, p. 145.
Granholm, Niklas, Johannes Malminen and Gudrun Persson (eds.), A Rude Awakening. Ramifications of
Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine (Stockholm: FOI, 2014); Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Lars Bangert Struwe,
Rune Hoffmann, Flemming Pradhan-Blach, Johannes Kidmose, Henrik Breitenbauch, Kristian Søby Kristensen,
Ann-Sofie Dahl, The Ukraine Crisis and the End of the Post-Cold War European Order: Options for NATO and the
EU (Centre for Military Studies: Copenhagen, 2014); Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen, Great Power Politics and the
Ukraine Crisis. NATO, EU and Russia after 2014 DIIS Report 2014:18.
20
11
A skeptical reader might suspect that the theoretical factors that explain surprise is expected
to be a part of the story about the Ukraine crisis, and that the inquiry will be less interesting.
However, the research question is actually a serious and difficult one. We could not expect
to find an open and frank discourse among surprised and overwhelmed senior politicians,
simply because it would be a sign of weakness and unpreparedness. To write the history of
Western surprise and find explanations for it even when it might not be openly admitted,
represents a genuine research task and the very rationale for the rest of this thesis. It should
be noted that the results must be tested in other cases (comparative research) in order to
find the specific weight of each explanatory factor, and also to test the validity to other
cases.
To summarize: this thesis is an example of a theory “consuming” study, where the outcome
is known and several factors must be used to explain the outcome. Thus, the next step in our
inquiry is to get a grip on the fundamental assumptions about strategic surprise in the
Ukraine crisis. A closer look at the selected case will allow us to clarify the relevant actors
and institutions that are to be examined. In methodological terms, this means to specify the
outcome. In turn, the description of the outcome highlights the relevant theoretical domains
for the inquiry.
The Ukraine crisis as a case of strategic surprise
It is time for our first visit to the empirical domains. The purpose is to define the Ukraine
crisis and make the case that some of its central Western actors and institutions were
subject to strategic surprise. I identify three focus points in the crisis, and from them I
distinguish four key phases that are separated by events that created surprise for European
and US leaders. Based on this analysis I identify the key actors and institutions related to
these four phases.
A surprise means that “an act or development has taken place contrary to our
expectations”21. It should be noted that it is impossible to use official and unclassified
material to have informed knowledge about the emotional status of Western political
leaders. However, it is possible to use the term surprise related to two circumstances: when
actors and institutions express a relatively large gap between expectation and outcome of a
21
Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack. The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press,
1988), p. 7.
12
political process or event, or when expressions of actors or institutions regarding two
political events are so incoherent that the assumptions about the first must have been
revised regarding the second. The crucial expectations are related to the actions of the
Yanukovych regime and Russia. Surprise becomes strategic when it affects actors and
institutions on a strategic level or scale.
A time of surprises: from Vilnius to Simferopol
As noted in the introduction the West (defined as the United States and the European
Union) failed to reach all or most of their stated objectives for Ukraine between summer
2013 until March 2014. In the EU case this policy failure is related to the partnership strategy
for the region, which was established in 2008-2009. At the Vilnius Summit in November
2013, Ukraine was expected to finalize years of negotiations and sign the Association
Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AAs/DCFTAs) with the EU. The
US case is more related to the “reset policy” that was launched by President Obama’s
administration in 2009, and later abandoned during summer and autumn 2013. In both
cases, arguably, the term “failure” could be related to a lack of results in the policy towards
Yanukovych and Putin.
As pointed out by many policy papers and commentaries during this period, the failures to
reach objectives were accompanied by a lack of understanding of what happened and an
inability see the crisis coming.22 For example, on the eve of the Russian military invasion of
Crimea 27-28 February 2014, Carnegie analysts Dimitri Trenin and Andrew Weiss concluded
that “the situation in Ukraine has already surprised many experienced observers.”23 A few
weeks later, following the Geneva negotiations between top officials John Kerry, Sergey
Lavrov, Andriy Deshchytsia and Lady Catherine Ashton on 17 April, the general view in
Western media was that it had resulted in a “surprise deal” between Russia and the West
over Ukraine.24 This represents an interesting shift in expectations: at the Vilnius Summit
22
To quote only one of a great many examples, John Robson of the Toronto Sun concluded that “Western
leaders seem to have been astoundingly unprepared”, John Robson, “Ukraine crisis surprised no one – and
everyone” Toronto Sun 5 March 2014 (http://www.torontosun.com/2014/03/05/ukraine-crisis-surprised-noone----and-everyone), accessed on 16 June 2014.
23
Dimitri Trenin & Andrew Weiss, ”Keep a lid on Crimea” (http://carnegie.ru/2014/02/27/keep-lid-oncrimea/h1yd), accessed on 1 March 2014.
24
See for example Roland Oliphant & Damien McElroy, “Russia and West reach surprise deal on Ukraine crisis”
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10774084/Russia-and-West-reach-surprisedeal-on-Ukraine-crisis.html), accessed on 18 April 2014.
13
escalation was surprising; at the Geneva negotiations de-escalation was surprising. Put
simply, after the Russian annexation of Crimea not many observers seemed to be surprised
by Russian aggression anymore. This motivates a closer look into the period between the
stalled negotiations between Ukraine and the EU to the Russian annexation of Crimea. This is
the period when we are likely to find surprised actors, and suitable focus points.
Indeed, when Yanukovych decided not to sign the AAs/DCFTAs, many Western leaders were
shocked, taken by surprise or failed to anticipate the event. Immediately after the decision
to stop the negotiations with the EU, on 21 November 2013, one of the leading architects of
the Eastern Partnership policy (EaP), Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt Twittered “Ukraine
government suddenly bows deeply to the Kremlin”25 in what he described as “Ukraine’s
black Thursday”26. It is fair to interpret this as a surprise as he described the Ukrainian
decision, in a Financial Times article the next day, as “a surprise U-turn”27.
But Bildt was far from alone. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, the other main architect
of the EaPs, first made the estimate in a speech in September 2013 that Ukraine was “on the
last lap”28 towards signing the AA, while after the Vilnius Summit he was reported to find it
“strange” that Ukraine expected economic development in its relationship with Russia.29
While the EU-commissioner for the EaPs Štefan Füle’s official reaction that Ukraine’s
decision was a “disappointment”30 is perhaps in line with expected rhetoric, the message in
25
Carl Bildt on Twitter 21 November 2013(https://Twitter.com/carlbildt/status/403521513342898176),
accessed on 1 December 2013.
26
Carl Bildt, ”Ukrainas svarta torsdag” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/ukrainas-svarta-torsdag/), accessed on 1 December 2013.
27
Carl Bildt, “Ukraine has postponed an opportunity to prosper” in Financial Times 22 November 2013.
28
Radek Sikorski, “The Vilnius Summit -- Creating Wider Europe?” speech at the Yalta Europe Strategy
Conference, September 2013. In an interview in the Spring of 2013 Sikorski even said that “geopolitically,
[Poland] are having the best time in 300 years”, Foreign Affairs, “The Polish Model. A conversation with Radek
Sikorski” Foreign Affairs May/June 2013 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/the-polishmodel), accessed on 5 June 2014.
29
Giancomo Manca, “Four Years of Partnership. Time for a balance sheet”,
(http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/962-four-years-of-partnership-time-for-a-balance-sheet),
accessed on 5 June 2014.
30
Štefan Füle, “Association agreements with Eastern Partners: Opening new doors to investment and trade”
Speech at the 2nd Eastern Partnership Business Forum in Vilnius, 28 November 2013
(http://www.eu2013.lt/en/news/statements/speech-by-stefan-fule-on-2nd-eastern-partnership-businessforumin-vilnius-association-agreements-with-eastern-partners-opening-new-doors-to-investment-and-trade),
accessed on 5 December 2013.
14
a private conversation from Chancellor Angela Merkel to Yanukovych that the EU “expected
more”, is an indicator of the unexpected outcome of the negotiation process.31
Just a day before Yanukovych decision to cancel the negotiations, the president of the EU
Parliament Martin Schulz stated that Russia was doing the same thing as the EU in Ukraine,
namely gaining influence.32 This rhetoric normalized Russian behavior, and the surprise
effect became clear when after the Vilnius Summit the Russian behavior of “external
pressure” was said to have led to a “deep disappointment” with Ukraine’s decision not to
sign the AAs/DCFTAs.33 A few weeks later Schulz own representative in the EU Parliament
monitoring mission to Ukraine, former Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, openly
admitted that “the West underestimated the Russian determination”.34 One Member of the
European Parliament remarked in early December 2013 that “the strong Russian influence in
Ukraine came as somewhat of a surprise to the EU and, as a consequence, resulted in what
you could call a shock as the EU was quite unprepared for this Ukrainian decision.”35 In short,
the Vilnius Summit had come as a “bitter surprise for Brussels”36 as analyst Tomislava
Penkova put it.
After Yanukovych’s decision not to pursue the EU track and the AAs/DCFTAs, there were
massive protests in Kiev. Already before the Vilnius Summit, on 24 November 2013, some
200.000 protestors gathered around Kiev’s Maidan square. These protests escalated and on
30 November-1 December there was a clash between police and protesters as well as an
occupation of Kiev City Hall. The official EU policy was to keep the offer of the AA open for
Yanukovych. Around this period there were signs that the evolving crisis started to get top
31
Ian Taylor & Oksana Grytsenko, ”Ukraine aligns with Moscow as EU Summit fails”
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/ukraine-yanukovych-moscow-eu-Summit), accessed on 1
December 2013.
32
RFE/RL, “EU’s Schulz Not Losing Hope For Ukraine, Yet” (http://www.rferl.org/content/schulz-yanukovychstrategy/25174242.html), accessed on 25 November 2013.
33
AFP, “EP president disappointed by Ukraine's, Armenia's refusal to sign association agreements with EU”
(http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/ep-president-deeply-disappointed-by-ukraines-armenias-refusalto-sign-association-agreements-with-eu-332538.html?flavour=mobile), accessed 5 December 2013.
34
Jan Puhl & Christian Neef, “'Brussels Was Naïve': Ex Polish Leader on Failed Ukraine Talks”
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-aleksander-kwasniewski-on-ukrainetalks-a-937964.html), accessed on 20 December 2014.
35
See for example Justina Vitkauskaite Bernard & Vira Ratsiborynska, The Vinius Summit’s geopolitical games:
Lessons learnt (http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/vilnius-Summit-geopolitical-game-analysis-532306),
accessed on 1 April 2014.
36
Tomislava Penkova, “Ukraine and the Vilnius Summit: Time for bitter-sweet illusions
(http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/ukraine-and-vilnius-Summit-time-bitter-sweet-illusions-9512),
accessed on 5 December 2013.
15
level attention also in the US. Following the police storming of the protestors on 9
December, Secretary of State John Kerry issued his first official remarks about the crisis, and
soon after Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland as well as Senator John McCain both
made visits to Kiev.37 On 19 December there were once more violent clashes with around 10
casualties between security forces and protestors in Kiev. On 25 January 2014 Yanukovych
made an offer to protest leaders Arseny Yatsenyuk and Vitaly Klitschko, with negative
response, to lead a government. After this, there were a few relatively calm weeks in Kiev. At
the EU-Russia Summit on 28 January EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso still
planned for a deeper partnership relation with Russia, to be signed at a June Summit in
Sochi.38
On 18 February following the clash between protestors and the security forces of the
Yanukovych regime, there was an international outrage and shock. It has been estimated
that over the following days between 70-100 protestors were killed. To many Western
leaders it was simply incomprehensible how a political leader of a European country could
use massive force on protesters.39 While it might be expected to find the UN Secretary
General among the “shocked”40, it is somewhat more interesting to notice the use of the
same word from Barroso in his official statement. 41 The bloody events triggered a
condemnation and diplomatic response from the EU in the form of a negotiation mission
consisting of the Foreign Ministers Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany), Laurent Fabius
37
John Kerry, “Statement on Events in Ukraine”
(http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218585.htm), accessed on 5 June 2014; CBS/Wire service,
“Top US official visits protesters in Kiev as Obama admin.ups pressure on Ukraine president Yanukovich”
(http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-victoria-nuland-wades-into-ukraine-turmoil-over-yanukovich/) accessed
on 5 June 2014;Guardian staff and agencies, “John McCain tells Ukraine protesters: 'We are here to support
your just cause'” (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/15/john-mccain-ukraine-protests-supportjust-cause), accessed on 5 June 2014. It is interesting to note that there were no questions or comments on
Ukraine at the President’s press conference before the Christmas holidays 2013, see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/20/press-conference-president, accessed on 5 June
2014.
38
European Union, Statement by President Barroso following the EU-Russia Summit
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-66_en.htm), accessed on 5 June 2014. It is worth noting that
NATO had prepared an ambitious cooperation plan with Russia for 2014, see NATO, “NATO-Russia Council
approves ambitious cooperation plan for 2014” (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_105502.htm),
accessed on 6 August 2014.
39
Valentina Pop & Walter Rettmann, “Ukraine violence catches EU by surprise”
(http://euobserver.com/foreign/123186), accessed on 5 June 2014.
40
UN, Use of violence in Ukraine “unacceptable” Secretary-General reiterates, expressing shock, grave concern
over escalation (https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sgsm15650.doc.htm), accessed on 1 April 2014.
41
See for example, European Union, Statement by President Barroso on Ukraine
(http://www.euinjapan.jp/en/media/news/news2014/20140219/180152/), accessed on 5 June 2014.
16
(France) and Sikorski (Poland). In turn, this paved way for an “Agreement on the Settlement
of Crisis in Ukraine” on the 21 February. This agreement aimed at a national unity
government, a return to Ukraine’s 2004 constitution, a presidential election before the end
of the year, an investigation of the violent acts led by the Council of Europe, and a promise
from the Ukrainian authorities not to impose a state of emergency. The signatories were, on
the one hand Yanukovych, on the other hand Yatsenyuk, Klitschko and opposition leader
Oleh Tyahnibok.42 At the time this was regarded by the negotiators as a compromise, but
just hours later Yanukovych left Ukraine and exiled into Russia. A few days after Sikorski
reflected upon the sequence in a CNN interview, and said that “what happened was
something really strange.”43
Just a few days after the departure of Yanukovych, Russia started its annexation of Crimea.
When masked soldiers without insignia appeared on the Crimean peninsula, there was
confusion in the Western camp. The Russian military operations run parallel to the creation
of political unrest in, among other places, the region’s capital Simferopol. Over the course of
a few days Russia was regarded as violating the UN charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the
Charter of Paris, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the Black Sea
basing agreement. As a recent study noted, in the Crimea operation, “the key element was
surprise” 44 . NATO diplomats even asked themselves if the event was possible. 45 The
operation triggered a swift response from the White House, and on 1 March Obama had a
90 minute phone call with his Russian colleague.46
In a radio interview on 1 March Carl Bildt, who during the crisis until then had visited Ukraine
more often than any other foreign minister in the EU, confessed his surprise over the
Russian behavior: “It has escalated very quickly. The Russian behavior has come to surprise
42
The Guardian, “Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine - full text”
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text),
accessed on 5 June 2014. The agreement was witnessed by Steinmeier, Fabius, Sikorski and Russian envoy
Vladimir Lukin.
43
CNN, Ukraine peace deal negotiator and foreign minister Radek Sikorski on Fareed Zakaria’s GPS
(http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/23/ukraine-peace-deal-negotiator-foreign-minister-of-polandradek-sikorski-on-fareed-zakaria-gps/), accessed on 6 August 2014.
44
Johan Norberg (ed.), Ulrik Franke & Fredrik Westerlund, “The Crimea Operation: Implications for Future
Russian Military Interventions” in Niklas Granholm, Johannes Malminen, Gudrun Persson (eds.), A Rude
Awakening. Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine (Stockholm: FOI, 2014), p. 44.
45
Annika Ström Melin, “Krisen stärker bandet mellan EU och Nato” in Dagens Nyheter 11 July 2014.
46
The White House, “A readout of President Obama’s phone call with President Putin”
(http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/statements/obama-call-03012014.html), accessed on 5 June 2014.
17
many, no doubt about that. I think there are few analysts, including myself I should add, who
had expected that Russia would have gone as far as it has done./…/It is surprising and deeply
worrying.”47 In an interview the next day on CBS “Face the Nation” John Kerry regarded the
annexation as a stunning act of aggression, not worthy of a G-8 country in the 21st century.48
At a press conference when Kerry was told that Putin denied the existence of Russian troops
in Crimea, he reacted with amazement (“He really denied there were troops in Crimea?”49).
After her telephone conversations with Putin, Angela Merkel made a similar conclusion that
the Russian leader lives “in another world”.50 A common policy position among Western
leaders was that it was not in anyone’s interest to split Ukraine.51
In a reflection a few weeks after the invasion of Crimea, Anders Fogh Rasmussen admitted
that the events represented a “geopolitical game changer”.52 A major study of the Ukraine
crisis concluded: “the Ukrainian crisis came as a surprise in terms of the depth and severity
of Russia’s objections to a growing EU influence in the common neighborhood.” 53 The
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey summed up the surreal
mood that seemed to dominate the Western leadership: “Russia’s actions remind us that the
world today remains unpredictable, complex and quite dangerous/…/The world will continue
to surprise us, often in unpleasant ways.”54
An aggregated and accumulated surprise
We can conclude that we have clear indications that Western leaders, in a broad and general
sense, were surprised by the events that developed into a crisis in Ukraine. The empirical
47
Carl Bildt on “Studio 1”, 1 March 2014 (http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/340252?programid=1637),
accessed on 2 March 2014.
48
US Department of State, Interview
(http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/03/20140302295200.html#axzz33ljZ8NgV),
accessed on 5 June 2014.
49
Embassy of the United States to Kiev, Remarks by Secretary at a Solo Press Availability in Kyiv
(http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/statements/solo-03042014.html), accessed on 5 June 2014.
50
Peter Baker, “Pressure Rising as Obama works to Rein in Russia”
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/world/europe/pressure-rising-as-obama-works-to-rein-inrussia.html?_r=2), accessed on 5 June 2014.
51
See for example Tara Brady & Amanda Williams, “US warns Russia it would be a 'grave mistake' to send its
military into Ukraine as its new leader says it wants to integrate with Europe”, Daily Mail 23 February 2014.
(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2565961/As-Ukrainian-parliament-names-new-acting-presidentcountry-finally-pulled-apart-bitter-divide-20-years-making.html).
52
Rasmussen, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World”.
53
Boesen Lindbo Larsen, Great Power Politics and the Ukraine Crisis., p. 8.
54
Cheryl Pellerin, “Hagel, Dempsey Outline US, Partner Approach to Ukraine
(http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121774), accessed on 5 June 2014.
18
account so far “demonstrates that governments, organizations, and individuals often fail to
detect or adequately adjust quickly enough to crucial changes in their external
environment”.55 Thus, so far we have established a chain of events that represent a known
outcome of a process. The first signs of surprise seem to have appeared when Yanukovych
decided to drop out of the negotiations with the EU on 21 November 2013, even if some
actors maintained some hope for Ukraine to sign the AAs/DCFTAs. The actors involved seem
primarily to have been European. It is also possible to detect a second cluster of amazement
following the Maidan massacre 18-20 February 2014. This event seems to have activated top
level attention also in the US. Finally, the sequence of annexation of Crimea in FebruaryMarch 2014 also triggered a wave of surprise among Western leaders. The chronology of the
crisis is illustrated below:
Figure 1: The chronology of the Ukraine crisis
This chronology provides us with three focus points for our inquiry. A closer look at the focus
points makes it possible to identify five analytical phases of the crisis. The first is the road to
the Vilnius Summit, the second is the Vilnius Summit and its aftermath, the third is the
Maidan square massacre, the fourth is the Crimean invasion and annexation and the fifth is
the ongoing development of the crisis, which is considered to be a phase after strategic
surprise. At none of these stages, in what developed into a strategic crisis, did Western
leaders seem to have comprehended which political, strategic and economic risks Vladimir
Putin and Viktor Yanukovych eventually were willing to take. It is interesting to note that the
phases include surprised actors over a period of several months. We can conclude that it is a
case of an accumulated surprise. This is of interest as it concerns the character of surprise.
Furthermore, these focus points have implications for the actors and institutions suitable for
the study. The first event that triggered surprise was related to an EU-partnership
negotiation process, which means that as surprise is the outcome to be understood and
explained, a suitable choice for a closer inquiry is the EU as an institution. As we have seen,
55
Parker et. al., “Preventable Catastrophe?”, p. 207.
19
this does not mean that only EU leaders were surprised, only that it is an institution that is
relevant for all three focus points that has been identified as surprising.
Thus, we must note that the Ukraine crisis is a case of aggregated surprise. The outcome
could not be reduced to one specific level of governance, as the EU features policy-making
and policy-shaping at member state level as well as supranational level. This makes it
aggregated in an organizational dimension. Furthermore, this empirical circumstance is
something of a challenge to surprise theory. Surprise theory is almost exclusively related to
single states, while the partnership policy of the EU is a result of foreign policy coordination
between several states. As we will see later on, this is not a challenge for the theoretical
claims as such, but rather the operationalization of indicators in a case that involves a
different political environment.
Thus, a methodological conclusion is to study the crisis on several analytical levels, as it
concerns the EU, and to include theoretical factors that could cover the whole sequence of
the first four phases of the crisis.56 In other words, reasons for surprise could be found in
history and on many levels of government. The final section of these methodological
considerations will be devoted to the theoretical aspects needed when studying an
aggregated as well as accumulated strategic surprise.
Strategic surprise theory and the warning-response problem
This far the thesis has established an outcome, based on an empirical account of official
confessions and mistaken assumptions. We must note that these accounts are indications
and not explanations of strategic surprise. This distinction is vital, as it would be next to a
tautology to contend that someone was surprised because of mistaken assumptions. The
final part of this chapter is dedicated to strategic surprise theory, the warning-response
problem, and how to use these concepts to understand and explain strategic surprise. In this
part I describe the main theoretical features and supplement them with factors that are
motivated by the specific circumstances in the Ukraine case.
56
As concluded in one of the major reports on the Ukraine crisis, the events in this sequence “demonstrated
that Russia and the EU were the main external actors affecting political developments in Ukraine.”, see Boesen
Lindbo Larsen, Great Power Politics and the Ukraine Crisis, p. 10.
20
Signals and noise, coping and relevant actors
The definition of strategic surprise used in the previous section is from the victim’s
perspective, and relies on a broad understanding of the concept: an act or development has
taken place contrary to the expectations of actors and/or institutions on a strategic level or
scale. The empirical indications of a surprise could either be outright admittance of surprise
or changing assumptions displayed by actors and institutions.57
Since the 1962 publication of one of the first systematic attempts to study strategic surprise,
Roberta Wohlstetter’s path-breaking book on Pearl Harbor58, one of the most common
perspectives has focused on the failure of the victim to utilize the warnings to prevent
surprise. Incoming information are either “signals” (accurate and relevant) or “noise”
(inaccurate and irrelevant), and the former seem to be vastly outnumbered by the latter.
Thus, an explanation of strategic surprise is guided towards the signals and why they were
not discovered before the surprising event.59 This is the core of the warning-response
problem.
The explanatory cuts, inspired by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, and expanded in the
studies on 9-11 and hurricane Katrina by Parker and Stern, provide a method of grouping
different explanations for why signals were not discovered and/or misinterpreted.60 The
theoretical meaning of a cut is related to a cluster of explanatory factors of a particular kind.
One cut is related to the agenda-setting (securitization and de-securitization related to the
EU’s Eastern Partnerships) that precedes a conflict. A second cut is based on cognitive
structures (receptivity failures) that constitute psychological explanations (related to
individual decision-makers). A third cut is based on the inner life of organizations (in this
case the European Council). The term “cut” is appropriate as the analysis in many cases is
likely to feature recurring episodes. The point is that it systematizes the explanatory factors,
even if they are inter-related and cross-disciplinary.
57
Abraham Ben-Zvi puts its very well: “strategic surprise stems from inadequate assumptions – explicit and
implicit”, see Abraham Ben-Zvi, “Surprise: Theoretical Aspects” in Evron (ed.), International Violence, p. 93.
58
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
59
Examples of this approach includes Michael Handels study of the Yom Kippur case, see Michael Handel,
Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems
(Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976). The notion of “signals” could be ontologically
challenged and modified. However, in this thesis the purpose is not to develop theory.
60
The article by Parker & Stern and Parker, et al. feature a comprehensive overview of the theoretical
literature, see Parker & Stern, “Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure?”; Parker, et al., ”Preventable
Catastrophe?”.
21
As pointed out by Ariel Levite, the assumption that there always have been warning signs is
not motivated in all cases.61 Furthermore, a failure to respond is not the same thing as a
surprise. According to this argument, one needs to distinguish between the warning problem
(the failure to make an adequate assessment of a situation) and the reaction problem (a
failure to implement successful actions to deal with a situation).62 As pointed out by
Alexander George we must keep apart “the logic of warning and the logic of response to
conflict.”63 This holds a methodological caution: the unfolding events may lay bare a lack of
proper preparations, but the unprepared is not the same as surprised. Thus, Levite’s
analytical model has two indicators and actions: cases with complacent actors (surprised but
not necessarily unprepared) and actors that have a threat perception (not surprised but not
necessarily ready).64 Political scientist Steve Chan, a fellow critic of strategic warning theory,
points out: the universe of successful warnings is largely unknown.65
A few complementary points should be added in relation to the accumulated character of
the Ukraine case. Compared to many classic cases of strategic surprise, the situation in
Ukraine has been drawn out and continuous, and it seems that that one surprise was
followed by additional surprises.66 As pointed out by Yaacov Vertzberger: “accumulated
misjudgments, misevaluations, wrong inferences and simple unawareness is likely to carry
over to the next stages…”.67 An explanatory framework in the Ukraine crisis must deal with
shocks along a sequence of four phases and this means that a black and white division
(surprised/not surprised) seems infertile.
61
Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprise (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 27-28.
This is also pointed out in Wilhelm Agrell, Förvarning och samhällshot (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2005), p. 80.
Richard Betts view that surprise is “being defined in terms of the defender’s unreadiness” found in Richard
Betts, Surprise attack (Washington: Brookings, 1982), p. 11, is an example of study where readiness is the key
issue. An example of a study that mix readiness and failed assumptions is the Katrina study, which holds that
surprise is a “lack of preparedness based on erroneous assumptions of whether, when, where, how and how,
severely he or she might be impacted by a negative or hazard event.”, Parker et. al., “Preventable
Catastrophe?”, p. 207.
63
Alexander L. George & Jane E. Hall, “The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive
Diplomacy” in Bruce W. Jentleson (ed.), Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized. Preventive Diplomacy in
the Post-Cold War World (Lanham & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 24.
64
Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, p. 150.
65
Steve Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning” The American
Political Science Review Vol. 73, No. 1 (March, 1979), p. 173.
66
In Parker et. al., “Preventable Catastrophe?”, p. 214, this is called ”second-order surprises”.
67
Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds. Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in
Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 8.
62
22
Thus, Ephraim Kam’s distinction between two forms of surprise, situational (“errors in
assumptions and predictions”) and fundamental (“abruptly exposing very basic conceptual
flaws”)68 seems more fruitful. We can note that the errors in assumptions at the time of the
Vilnius Summit and the Maidan massacre (phase two and three) were related to the actions
of Yanukovych vis-à-vis the EU and Russia, which would constitute a situational surprise. The
annexation of Crimea (phase four), on the other hand, exposed the fundamental flaw that
interdependency and liberal regimes would prevent Russia from military aggression, and this
would constitute a fundamental surprise. In other words, this modification concerns the
meaning of “surprise” in strategic surprise.
Vertzberger uses the term “coping” (“the process of consciously attempting to manage
complexity and uncertainty and striving for accurate anticipation and effective control of
outcomes in a milieu, characterized by actor-independence, where relations among actors
are mainly of the strategic-interaction type”69) to describe how actors deal with recurring
surprises. When coping is reactive it is “a response to an acute problem”, and when it is
proactive it attempts “to preempt anticipated future occurrences”.70 Reactive and proactive
coping could be used when analyzing the shift from situational to fundamental surprise.
Reactive coping is focused on the actor’s current assumptions, and could indicate that a
surprised actor is likely to be surprised again.
A few modifications must be made due to the aggregated character of the Ukraine case.
Levite notes that an “interesting problem with the operationalization of surprise is the
number of countries that may be involved in a strategic surprise.”71 The first country
(attacker) might attack a second country (immediate victim), which could trigger surprise in
a third country that might not even be bordering the country that was the immediate victim.
In order to deal with this challenge Levite suggests that “we must establish the fact that the
third country indeed had considerable values at stake in the victim country” 72. Not all
countries in the EU have considerable values at stake in the Eastern Partnerships (EaP). In
68
Kam, Surprise Attack, p. 8. We should note that this refinement of the concept is different from Klaus Knorr’s
“behavioural” and “technical” surprise, see Klaus Knorr, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case
of the Cuban Missiles” World Politics XVI, 3 (April 1964), p. 455-462.
69
Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p. 7.
70
Ibid., p. 7.
71
Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, p. 22.
72
Ibid., p. 22.
23
other words, this modification concerns the meaning of “strategic” in strategic surprise, as
we must refine it to mean something more than just a level of analysis. Though the EaP
policy has attracted the attention of many countries in the EU, the original proposal was
initiated in May 2008 by Sweden and Poland. Furthermore, the Swedish-Polish proposal
adopted by the European Council on 20 June 2008 was explicitly directed primarily towards
Ukraine.73 As often pointed out, this initiative was related to the strategic interest to set EU’s
Eastern neighbors apart from its Southern neighbors.74 As seen in the overview of the
Ukraine crisis, both countries had a high profile in all identified phases of the crisis. This
would make it fair to conclude that a closer study of Sweden and Poland as leading countries
for the EU’s EaP would qualify as relevant exponents for strategic surprise in a multilateral
setting.
This section could be summarized as follows. Explaining strategic surprise means to find out
why warning signals were not discovered and this could be done using an analytical
framework that involves agenda-political processes, psychological factors as well as
organizational dynamics. As the Ukraine crisis has been drawn out and continuous, there
must be a distinction between situational and fundamental surprise. Reactive and proactive
coping are concepts that could be used for studying recurring surprises related to the shift
from situational to fundamental surprises. As the EU’s EaP is not a strategic priority for all EU
countries, the two countries that launched this initiative, Sweden and Poland, could be
singled out as proper actors to study a sequence of strategic surprise. In the final section of
this chapter, we will turn to the issue of how to operationalize these explanatory cuts.
Operationalizing the analytical framework
The first cut concerns the agenda-political factors. This cut provides the background factors
for a strategic surprise. Before a crisis unfolds, there is a struggle for the control of the
political agenda, and the priorities of this agenda. The explanatory focus is on how the
73
The proposal is found in Annex 1 in Beata Wojna and Mateusz Gniazdowski, Eastern Partnership: the
Opening Report (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2009).
74
Katie Peters, Jan Rood and Grzegorz Gromadzki, The Eastern Partnership: Towards a New Era of Cooperation
between the EU and its Eastern Neighbours? Revised Overview Paper (The Hague: Clingendael, 2009), p. 5.
24
overcrowding, competition and the social process of (de)securitization result in misguided
strategic assumptions.75
The operationalization of this cut means to focus on the Swedish-Polish pet project, the EaP,
as part of the EU agenda. Thus, it would be limited to phase one in the crisis. A suitable
starting point could be the aftermath of the 2008 Georgian war, which was the same period
in which the EaP was established. If there are indications that the collective agenda-setting
has resulted in a common denominator that proves inadequate (a lack of security concerns
regarding the Eastern partnership in general and Russia in particular, as well as an
unproblematic view of the policy towards the governments of the EaP countries in general
and Ukraine in particular), we could identify the background factors for policy surprise.
A methodological challenge for a study of securitization and de-securitization is related to
the criteria for which actors that qualify as relevant securitizing actors, as well as criteria for
successful speech-acts. One way to deal with this problem is to study securitization and desecuritization from the “tail end”, i. e. the results of political deliberations. This makes the
First Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague 7 May 2009 and the Second Eastern Partnership
Summit 29-30 September 2011 of special interest, but also the European Council Summit on
24-25 October 2013. In a somewhat simplified way, these Summits represent the EaP
agenda before the Vilnius Summit. The applied method will describe the agenda of the EaP
Summits in 2009 and 2011, and use the existing EU research to interpret the agenda in order
to identify agenda-political disturbance factors.
The second cut of explanatory factors is psychological. These factors include insensitivity to
warnings, an overconfidence in the existing policy, denial of unpleasant facts, cognitive
overload among central decision makers, interpretive ambiguity, receptivity failure,
ethnomorphism (to attribute one’s own logic to someone else), reliance on misguided
analogies, the “cry wolf syndrome” (the psychological problem of balancing the risk of
complacency with the risk of crying out a warning every time there is a suspicion). In short
the explanatory focus could be described as psychological distortions that create a false
sense of security.
75
Inspired by Parker & Stern, “Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure?”, p. 317; Parker et. al., “Preventable
Catastrophe?”.
25
A suitable operationalization of the psychological perspective is to focus on the foreign
ministers Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski. Political scientist Lee Miles has used Michael
Mintroms concept “policy entrepreneurs” or “supranational policy entrepreneurs” to
capture the importance of key individuals in policy formation.76 Bildt and Sikorski are,
arguably, policy entrepreneurs on the European level. After 2008 Bildt and Sikorski have
been the pace-setters in the EU for the relations with the post-Soviet countries in the EaP.
There is a methodological interest in Bildt and Sikorski as they could provide us with
psychological clues to the policy failure in the Ukraine crisis. The psychology on the
individual level would arguably be most visible during the first, second and third phase of the
crisis, as these are the phases that precedes the surprising events. The psychological factors
could be identified in the expectations expressed by Bildt and Sikorski before the Vilnius
Summit, the Maidan massacre and the invasion of Crimea. If we could find indicators and
signs that Bildt and Sikorski made estimates of Ukraine and Russia that were mainly positive
regarding prospects for cooperation, that they dismissed warnings about a negative
development or that that they reflected on their own actions and policy positions as having
been naïve or overconfident, then we could identify psychological factors for surprise.
It would be desirable to make one or several interviews with Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski.
This would qualify as a “non-probability sampling” according to Oisín Tansey, as the aim is to
focus on “the most important political players who have participated in the political events
being studied.”77 The use of an interview with Bildt and Sikorski would be to establish what
they think and to reconstruct their deliberations over the Ukraine crisis.78 However, the
time-frame of this thesis has prohibited any interviews, and extremely busy officials like Bildt
and Sikorski are unlikely to have the necessary time (or make priorities!) for interviews. As
central actors they are indeed busy making history in the flow of ongoing events.
But it is certainly possible to use public statements as indicators. In the case of Bildt there is
a somewhat unique material on his blog “Alla dessa dagar”. Both Bildt and Sikorski are avid
76
Lee Miles, ”Political Entrepreneurship as Painful Choices: An Examination of Swedish (Post)-Neutrality
Security Policy”, presented at Utrikespolitisk analys: teorier, metoder och fall, workshop at Swedish Institute for
International affairs, 23-24 January 2014.
77
Oisín Tansey, ”Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling” PS: Political
Science and Politics 40(4), 2007, p. 765-772.
78
Ibid., p. 766.
26
Twitter users (in Bildt’s case even Twitter-centric), and they regularly re-tweet each other’s
tweets.79 These statements are primary sources for the psychological explanatory factors –
they are their public assessments as the crisis unfolded. This material, together with
interviews and speeches with and by Bildt and Sikorski, could be used in the psychological
cut. One important caveat of this cut is that it could provide us with a rather rhapsodic
picture, and ultimately this approach illustrates how these factors could be used, even if
they will not provide us with the full insight into the psyche of key individuals.
The final explanatory cut is organizational. According to this perspective, policy outcomes
are the end result of competing interests and preferences. These factors include avoidance
of sensitive issues, procrastination tendencies, a current events fixation, delays because of
negotiations, compartmentalization and distorted information sharing. The explanatory
focus is on how organizational complexity, fragmentation and rivalry become an obstacle for
adequate common expectations of a political situation.
The operationalization of this perspective focuses on the actions of the European Council in
relation to the EaP. The European Council could be regarded as coordination points where
the (inter)governmental factors could be observed. In the first phase of the crisis this would
include a special focus on the European Council Summit on 24-25 October 2013. The second,
third and fourth phase could focus on the input and coordination at the Council meetings
and Summits (the Foreign Affairs Council, FAC, 10 and 20 February 2014, the FAC and
extraordinary meeting 3 and 6 March 2014 and the FAC 17 March 2014). All four phases are
relevant as an analysis of proactive and reactive coping would include the time period before
as well as after the surprising events. If we could find indicators and signs that, due to lack of
common political will and interests, the organizational factors like avoidance, procrastination
and current events fixation contributed to a reactionary rather than proactive approach,
then we could identify factors that could explain the accumulated surprise sequence from
situational to fundamental surprise. The applied method will describe the decisions of the
Council meetings and Summits, and use the EU research to identify the relevant
79
The use of Twitter in diplomacy is regarded as important by both, see for example Carl Bildt, “Ännu en svart
dag i Kiev” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2014/01/), accessed on 6 August 2014, where
Bildt underlines that he “was very early on very clear on Twitter, and so was my Polish colleague Radek
Sikorski”, regarding the atrocities by Yanukovych.
27
organizational circumstances that might explain why warning signals were not
acknowledged or acted upon.
It should be noted that the theoretical factors that are most suitable are related to the field
of (inter)governmental politics rather than bureaucratic politics.80 The EU policy formation in
the Ukraine crisis is not likely to be a case where standard operating procedures (SOPs)
played an important part. For one thing, individual member states do not have bureaucratic
responsibilities within the EU: it is not the British that do the cooking, the Germans that have
the police and the Italians that take care of municipality services. In the EaP no actor
guarantees the integrity of the whole policy. Moreover, at the strategic level of an
organizational creature like the EU, we are likely to find that coordination, in most respects,
is uniquely measured for the crisis at hand. However, it might also be assumed that many of
the positions of the member states follow path dependencies, geopolitics, strategic cultures
or other recurring patterns.
Finally, the analytical framework of the thesis, and indeed this chapter, could be illustrated
in the following way:
80
For more about this distinction, see Parker & Stern, “Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure?”, p. 312.
28
Figure 2: The analytical framework
II.
The Ukraine crisis from an Eastern Partnership perspective
The function of this chapter is to fill the theoretical framework with empirical content and
analysis. In order to find out why warning signals were not noted I apply three cuts of the
Ukraine crisis. The first section is concerned with the agenda-political processes in the EU’s
EaP. In this section I describe the EaP as it was established at the Summits before the crisis. I
then analyze and identify signs of competition and de-securitization in this process. The main
agenda-related conclusion is related to the win-win logic of the agenda, which created limits
to the considered actions for the EU policy.
The second section deals with the psychological cut. I focus on foreign ministers Carl Bildt
and Radek Sikorski, and their expectations, assessments and declarations on blogs, Twitter
and interviews in the process leading up to the invasion of Crimea. The purpose of this
section is to describe Carl Bildt’s and Radek Sikorski’s view of Ukraine as a part of the EaP
process. I continuously analyze and relate these statements to psychological distortion
29
factors that could contribute to our understanding of the gap between expectations and
outcome during the crisis. I show that both Bildt and Sikorski were overconfident in the
existing policy, a denial of the potential impact of the warning signs, remained ambiguous
about the development, and relied on problematic historical analogies.
The third section deals with the organizational dynamics. This cut focuses on the
deliberations and actions of the European Council before and during the crisis. In this section
I describe the Council meetings and identify the main interests and positions of the member
states. The main conclusion related to the organizational dynamics is that the EU avoided
the problems in the EaP before the Vilnius Summit, and was unable to act proactively
because of the German elections and fixation on issues like Syria and immigration. During
the crisis the EU procrastinated over the decision to use sanctions due to internal differences
and stakes in the crisis.
The agenda-political cut: oblique strategy
The purpose of this section is to give an account of the political process leading to the Vilnius
Summit. The cut focuses on the Swedish-Polish initiative, Eastern Partnership (EaP), as part
of the EU’s foreign relations agenda. I describe what characterized the agenda at the EaP
Summits in Prague 2009 and Warsaw 2011. I then use the accounts by EU scholars to analyze
this process and find that competition based on differing interests, and possibly
overcrowding, led to shifting priorities of the EaP among the member states. As we will find
out, the operating principles of the EaP were based on a compromise among competing
agendas in the EU. Indirectly this led to a de-securitization of the post-Soviet space, and thus
misguided strategic assumptions, as well as limited options for situations which were not in
line with the adopted principles.
“We will not accept new divining lines in Europe”: introducing the Eastern Partnership
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 created a new European neighborhood that consisted of
several ex-Soviet republics. After this round of enlargement the EU created the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was a differentiated and bilateral way of dealing with
these (and other) countries. The organizing principle of the ENP is tailor-made action plans
30
for individual countries, wich in turn are based on the partner country’s aims related to the
acquis communitaire, and the principle of conditionality in the Copenhagen criteria81.
In 2008 the EU launched the Union of the Mediterranean (UfM), and the EaP was established
in May 2009, as a new layer of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Both these initiatives represented multilateral frameworks
that were designed to be complementary to the ENP, or indeed “legs” that required a
“balanced approach”. 82
Poland and Sweden initiated the EaP; the first proposal was presented for the foreign
ministers in May 2008 and eventually endorsed in March 2009. The design of the initiative
was a flexible and goal-oriented institutional set up, directed towards the key areas
migration, energy and free trade. As pointed out by Radek Sikorski in a speech in Warsaw in
October 2008, the Russo-Georgian war bolstered the efforts and firmed the resolve not to
abandon the Eastern partners.83 This resolve was expressed by the Commissioner for the
ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, in a debate in the EU Parliament on 1 September 2008: “This
policy indicates that we will not tolerate new dividing lines in Europe, and that such partners
as Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova can count on our support in maintaining their territorial
integrity and sovereignty.”84
The first Eastern Partnership Summit was held in Prague during the Czech presidency in
spring 2009.85 Though Swedish-Polish diplomacy might have avoided controversy among
other member states, the downside of this achievement was that there was a lack of top
attention to the Prague Summit: France was represented by Prime Minister Francois Fillon,
Spain by Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos and Italy by Minister of Welfare Maurizio
Sacconi. Angela Merkel was the only leader from a major EU member state to attend. The
81
The declaration from June 1993 that established the political, economic and legislative criteria for
membership in the EU.
82
Kerry Longhurst, ”Introducing the Eastern Partnerships – Implications for the European Neighbourhood
Policy”, in Kerry Longhurst (ed.), Forging a New European Ostpolitik – An Assessment of the Eastern
Partnerships (Warsaw: Collegium Civitas Press, 2009), p. 9.
83
Radek Sikorski, speech at Conference “EU Foreign Policy and the Quest for Leadership” in Warsaw, 23
October 2008.
84
EU Parliament, Debates, Monday 1 September 2008
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080901+ITEM020+DOC+XML+V0//EN), accessed on 23 June 2014.
85
European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May 2009
(http://www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=46526&down=yes), accessed on 23 June 2014.
31
strategic Leitmotif of the Summit was to promote reforms in the Eastern neighborhood,
instead of waiting for it. The relative down-grading of any membership perspective for the
partner countries might be explained by the lack of democratic progress in the region, and
the joint declaration from the Summit was basically mute on the subject of conflict
resolution (related to the frozen conflicts). At the time, Ukraine was considered to be “a
litmus test for prospects across the region.”86 It is interesting to note that Sweden did not
complete the negotiations for the association agreements (AA) with Ukraine during its
presidency during the latter part of 2009.
During 2010 Spain and Belgium held the EU presidencies and the EaP disappeared somewhat
from the limelight. It was the Polish presidency in 2011 that lifted the EaP to the top of the
EU agenda. The “Arab Spring” and the perceived lack of democratic principles towards many
states in the neighborhood triggered a revision of the ENP in May 2011, in which “deep and
sustainable democracy” became a core value on the agenda. 87 The revisions made in the
joint declaration “A new response to a changing neighbourhood” reinforced the rewarding
mechanism and emphasized a “more for more, and less for less” principle.88 Furthermore, to
avoid being stuck in dialogue with fading authoritarian regimes, the principle of “partnership
with society” was added with the purpose to reach out to civil society organizations.89 In this
process, analyst Kristi Raik concluded, “Ukraine is a test case of the EU’s ability to use
association agreements as a tool for democracy promotion.”90
The Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw91 was complicated by the agenda for “deep and
sustainable democracy”.92 Several countries, not least Belarus and Ukraine, had experienced
86
Longhurst, “Conclusions – What Prospects for the Eastern Partnerships?”, p. 84.
European Union, A New and Ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy (http://www.euun.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11088_en.htm), accessed 24 June 2014.
88
European Union, “A new response to a changing neighbourhood”
(http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/documents/communication_conjointe_mai_2011_en.
pdf), accessed on 24 June 2014.
89
Jacqueline Hale and Viorel Ursu, From Funder to Partner? Prospects for the European Neighbourhood Policy’s
Civil Society Facility Open Society Policy Brief
(http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/funder-partner-20111019.pdf), accessed on 24
June 2014.
90
Kristi Raik, Between Conditionality and Engagement. Revisiting the EU’s Democracy Promotion in the Eastern
Neighbourhood FIIA Briefing paper 80 April 2011.
91
European Commission, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Warsaw, 29-30 September 2011
(http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/warsaw_summit_dec
laration_en.pdf), accessed 24 June 2014.
87
32
deteriorating conditions for democracy and human rights. In Ukraine the former Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was undergoing what the EU called a political trial. In the spirit of
partnership with society, the Summit declaration stated the intention to “engage with all
strands of society beyond governments”.93 But early on, the Belarusian Prime Minister
Syarhey Martynau withdrew from the Summit unilaterally. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan refused to sign a declaration to condemn Belarus. 94 Furthermore,
even the Polish EU Ambassador Jan Tombinski admitted that it was difficult to give the EaP
top EU priority.95 Despite this, in mid-December 2011, after 21 negotiation rounds, Ukraine
finalized talks on the AA, but by then the EU added the Tymoshenko case as a condition for
full completion.96
The follow-up to the Warsaw Summit was “The Eastern Partnership Roadmap” launched in
May 2012.97 It featured a bilateral as well as multilateral agenda. The ambition was to take
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia over the last hurdles to sign the AAs at the Vilnius Summit in
2013. The roadmap itself was considered to be a tool to coordinate the efforts that were
launched at the previous two Summits. The EaP was a priority and a vital part of the agenda
during the Lithuanian presidency in 2013, including the Council Summit in October 2013.
The agenda of the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit98 was influenced by the interference
of Russia. In September 2013 Armenia decided to halt the AA negotiations.99 As noted by the
correspondent from The Telegraph: “Most EU leaders accused Russia of using threats and
92
Still, at the time it was common to regard Ukraine’s integration as the most likely outcome, see Amanda Paul
& Vasyl Belmega, The EU and Ukraine – Where to next? Policy Brief European Policy Center 21 September 2011,
p. 4. The authors conclude that “it seem unlikely that Ukraine will make a U-turn on deeper European
integration.”
93
European Commission, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, p. 2.
94
EurActive, Diplomatic fiasco mars Warsaw summit, (http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/diplomaticfiasco-mars-warsaw-su-news-508077), accessed on 24 June 2014.
95
Rikard Jozwiak, “’Tricky’ European Partnership Summit Kicks Off in Warsaw”
(http://www.rferl.org/content/warsaw_hosts_eu_partnership_summit/24343646.html), accessed on 24 June
2014.
96
EurActiv, EU-Ukraine Summit hangs in doubt (http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-ukraine-summithangs-doubt-news-509346), accessed on 24 June 2014. A diplomatic source notes that there are “confusing
signals” coming from Kyiv.
97
European Commission, Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the Autumn 2013 Summit (http://www.eapcsf.eu/en/resources/eap-documents/), accessed on 24 June 2014.
98
European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 29-30 November 2013
(http://static.eu2013.lt/uploads/documents/Programos_12/131129%20Vilnius%20Summit%20Declaration.pdf)
, accessed on 24 June 2014.
99
This was also considered to be “a surprise”, see Michael Emerson, Countdown to the Vilnius Summit: The EU’s
with Moldova and the Soth Caucasus (Brussels: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013), p.
10.
33
bullying to keep Ukraine in step with Moscow.”100 The EU was willing to compromise on one
of its benchmarks about “selective justice” in relation to the Tymoshenko case, but it
rejected Yanukovych’s proposal to have trilateral negotiations (EU-Ukraine-Russia). As
Barroso put it, “the times for limited sovereignty are over in Europe”.101
On the road to nowhere
As pointed out by many analysts, the main contributing factors for the EaP agenda include
energy security, the Russo-Georgian war, the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis 2009, and the
creation of the UfM.102 But the most central factor identified in EaP research is the
ambiguous relationship between partnership and enlargement. The formula for the EaP was
integration without membership, which meant that the partners were expected to do a lot,
while the rewards remained unclear. The EaP had an enlargement-based design, but without
a golden carrot at the end of the process. Thus, we could suspect that the role of the lacking
membership perspective, a finalité, might be a part of the Western policy failure in the
Ukraine crisis. However, in this thesis the scope is limited to the way it could have
contributed to strategic surprise.
As CEPS research fellow Hrant Kostanyan notes, the role of the EU “in this policy area is
limited to that of an agenda-setter” and its “performance in the Eastern Partnership should
therefore be evaluated against the backdrop of constraints imposed by the operational
environment in which the EU’s diplomatic service finds itself.”103 These constrains are
connected to the different strategic interests within the EU. In fact, the ENP and EaP operate
in a highly complex strategic environment. Stereotypically, the differing interests are related
to a soft versus a hard policy towards Russia. The core of the first category is Germany and
France, with member states in the South and West in support. The core of the second
category is Poland and the Baltic states, with Sweden, Czech Republic and Hungary in
support.
100
Andrew Marszal, ”EU will not accept Russian veto, says Barroso” in The Telegraph 29 November 2013
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10482680/EU-will-not-accept-Russian-vetosays-Barroso.html), accessed on 24 June 2014.
101
Ibid.
102
See for example Longhurst, ”Introducing the Eastern Partnerships – Implications for the European
Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 6.
103
Hrant Kostanyan, The EEAS and the Eastern Partnership: Let the blame game stop Center for European Policy
Studies (CEPS) Commentary 4 September 2012, p. 1.
34
Different strategic interests are mirrored in competing agendas within the EU. Many of the
different regional and inter-regional initiatives (like UfM, the Northern Dimension and the
Black Sea Synergy), have been created by members with a particular strategic interest in
mind. France launched the UfM. Bulgaria and Romania have had special interest in the Black
Sea Synergy. Sweden and Poland initiated the EaP. A key factor for implementation is often
which way Germany has tended to lean, and as analysts Andrey Makarychiev and Andrey
Deviatkov bluntly puts it: “Berlin is always hesitant to deeply engage with Russia’s
neighbours to avoid irritating Moscow and further alienating it from Europe.”104 As noted
already in 2009 “the implementation of EaP may well be affected by competition with other
regional groupings, and of course with the Union for the Mediterranean when it comes to
garnering support from member states and for funding.”105 And as concluded by EU-ISS
analysts Sabine Fischer and Erwan Lannon, the risks and opportunities of the “Arab Spring”
meant that “the competition between proponents of the Southern and the Eastern
dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy has resurfaced.”106 Among other things,
this triggered a fear in the EU Commission that the regional initiatives risked becoming
duplication of efforts.107
This is the strategic context in which the EU developed its “balanced approach” towards its
neighborhood. As Fischer and Lannon puts it, the EaP was “a compromise and differentiated
approach bridging the gap between Member States with diverging foreign policy
interests” 108 The sequence between the Summits in Prague 2009 and Warsaw 2011,
described above, could be interpreted in the following way:
“On the one hand, both Brussels and Berlin have to implicitly adjust the tempo and the depth of the EaP to
make it commensurate with the EU’s relations with Russia, which include the negotiations on a visa-free
104
Andrey Makarychiev & Andrey Deviatkov, “Eastern Partnership: Still a missing link in EU strategy?” CEPS
Commentary 13 January 2012, p. 1.
105
Longhurst, ”Introducing the Eastern Partnerships – Implications for the European Neighbourhood Policy”, p.
7.
106
Sabine Fischer and Erwan Lannon, “The ENP Strategic Review: the EU and its neighbourhood at a cross
roads” EU Institute for Strategic Studies Analysis May 2011, p. 1. Their analysis is based on response from some
20 EU experts.
107
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Perspectives of the European Neigbourhood Policy” Speech on Parliamentary
conference “European Neighbourhood Policy East”, Brussels 5 June 2008 (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_SPEECH-08-306_en.htm?locale=en) , accessed on 25 June 2014.
108
Fischer and Lannon, “The ENP Strategic Review: the EU and its neighbourhood at a cross roads”, p. 1.
35
regime, the Meseberg initiative, etc. On the other hand, Brussels has to accommodate the preferences of other
EU member states that are not willing to pursue a ‘Russia-first’ policy.”
109
This is not too unexpected. All EU policies are, to different extent, compromises. The agenda
of the Prague and Warsaw Summits may be described as “ambitious” by its proponents or
“over-ambitious” by its critics. As it turned out, it did not stand a chance to be fully
implemented. Yet, it is difficult to find indicators that the competing agendas in themselves
contributed to strategic surprise. Furthermore, it is somewhat unclear to what extent
overcrowding of the agenda contributed to misguided expectations. A group of EU experts
hints that competing agendas are inter-linked with an overfilled agenda, in which “the bigger
picture is lost because of deadlocks engendered by sectorial or national interests”110. A
reasonable conclusion is that it is difficult to assess whether the shifting attention to the EaP
in the EU could be explained more by competition (to be able to, but choose not to make it a
priority) or overcrowding (to have the interest but miss opportunities).
Nonetheless, different priorities might have been an indirect source for misguided
expectations. Foreign policy scholars Kristian Nielsen and Maili Vilson argue that the ENP and
EaP was “very much a result of different understandings and expectations among the EU
member states and this was reflected in the final policy design.”111 Thus, the actual content
of the compromise, expressed as the “balanced approach”, seems like a more likely
influencing factor. The “balanced approach” became an equilibrium point for the softliners
and hardliners on Russia, and simultaneously a limit for partnership initiatives. According to
Sikorski, the EaP was designed to strengthen the EU policies towards the states that could
eventually become members.112 As late as 5 November 2013, Carl Bildt still made references
to Article 49 of the Treaty of Rome, which he argued gave the partner countries a
109
Makarychiev & Deviatkov, “Eastern Partnership: Still a missing link in EU strategy?”, p. 2-3. The Meseberg
initiative was a declaration from June 2010 between Germany and Russia to create a common EU-Russian
conflict resolution mechanism.
110
Elvire Fabry & Chiara Rosselli, EU’s Neighbourhood as an Opportunity? Synthesis Jacques Delors Institute &
TGAE, 26 November 2012
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224429/evidence-notreeurope-neighbourhood.pdf), accessed on 24 June 2014, p. 1.
111
Quoted from Kristian L. Nielsen & Maili Vilson, Kristian L. Nielsen, Maili Vilson, “The Eastern Partnership:
Soft Power Strategy or Policy Failure?” paper prepared for the EURINT International Conference, ‘The EU as a
model of soft power in the Eastern Neighbourhood’, Iasi, Romania, 15th-17th of May 2013, p. 6; later published
as Kristian L. Nielsen, Maili Vilson, “The Eastern Partnership: Soft Power Strategy or Policy Failure?” European
Foreign Affairs Review, (2014) 19, Issue 2, pp. 243–262.
112
Longhurst, “Conclusions – What Prospects for the Eastern Partnerships?”, p. 86.
36
membership perspective.113 On the other hand, member states like France and Germany
supported the EaP but wanted to put a break on the prospects for enlargement. Norway (a
non-member with close ties to the EU) was a point of reference for the cautious, while the
optimists argued that “the process becomes unstoppable, much like the Balkan enlargement
process”. 114 Thus, we could conclude that while having competing agendas based on
differing interests and/or overcrowding, the competing camps shared the understanding of
the EaP as based on integration logic. Scholarly attention has been directed towards the
policy implications of this: that it led to unclear political leadership and missing political
guidelines.115 What needs to be underlined is the de-securitizing aspect of this equilibrium
point. As pointed out by International Relations scholar Kerry Longhurst, the EaP aspired to
put in place “a new EU Ostpolitik”.116 The term is telling, as its historical connotations lead to
a policy based on the premise of EU-Russian relations as mutually beneficial.
In other words, integration logic is win-win logic. The EaP “does not operate at the expenses
of anyone” as Ashton and Füle put it.117 The modus operandi of the EaP was positive
incentives and positive conditionality (“more for more”). This formula becomes problematic
when crisis and confrontation are added to the equation, perhaps even more so when
related to ambitious political aims. Makarychiev and Deviatkov made the reflection that “the
concept of ‘deep democracy’ appears to be premature and hasty in times when even
elementary democratic norms do not seem to be the evident guidelines for many ruling
elites in EaP capitals.”118 However, the equilibrium point within the EU gave little room for
other measures than positive conditionality. In practice it was difficult to use negative
conditionality against partner countries that were back-sliding. In fact, one might even
suggest that this limitation was described as a virtue, as in the words of President of the
European Council Herman van Rompuy: “Our biggest carrot is a way of life; our biggest stick:
113
RFE/RL, “On the EU and Ukraine: ‘Slightly Pessimistic’” (http://www.rferl.org/content/carl-bildt-interview/25159157.html), accessed on 26 June 2014.
114
Joanna Popielawska, “The Eastern Partnerships in Context of Other Regional Initiatives in the East” in Kerry
Longhurst (ed.), Forging a New European Ostpolitik – An Assessment of the Eastern Partnerships (Warsaw:
Collegium Civitas Press, 2009), p. 66.
115
See for example Makarychiev & Deviatkov, “Eastern Partnership: Still a missing link in EU strategy?”, p. 2.
116
Longhurst, “Conclusions – What Prospects for the Eastern Partnerships?”, p. 83.
117
Karin Böttger, “’‘Time to hit the Reset Button’: The Eastern Partnership After the Vilnius Summit and the
Role of Russia“’ TEPSA Policy Paper 19 March 2013, p. 2.
118
Makarychiev & Deviatkov, “Eastern Partnership: Still a missing link in EU strategy?”, p. 2.
37
a closed door.”119 Later in the Ukraine crisis Carl Bildt expressed his hesitation to use tough
sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea: “Every carrot for Kiev is a stick to
Moscow.”120 There appears to be a rather obvious agenda-related conclusion: if the only
stick you have is a carrot, then you are likely to stay with the carrots in a prolonged crisis. An
actor that only believes in the use of carrots is likely to have a greater gap to a policy that
might require sticks. As we will find out later in this thesis, this “power of the carrot” had
implications for the recurring sequence of surprise. In this way, the principle of
conditionality, as a product of compromises, contributed to a gap between expectations and
outcome of the partnership process, as the central stakeholders in the EU were fixed by an
agenda based on integration and win-win logic.
The psychological cut: interpretive ambiguity
The purpose of this section is to describe Carl Bildt’s and Radek Sikorski’s view of Ukraine as
a part of the EaP process. The cut focuses on Bildt’s and Sikorski’s own estimates, accounts
and declarations regarding the development in Ukraine. I describe both foreign ministers’
views through the first three phases of the crisis, as expressed mainly through blogging and
Twitter, but also interviews during the course of the crisis. I continuously analyze and relate
these statements to psychological distortion factors that could contribute to our
understanding of the gap between expectations and outcome. In this part, I find few
examples, especially after summer 2013, of insensitivity to warnings. While Bildt and Sikorski
noted the warning signs regarding Russian involvement and its impact on Yanukovych, both
were overconfident in the existing policy, denied the potential impact of the warnings signs
and remained ambiguous about the development. As we will find out, both Bildt and Sikorski
where guided by problematic historical analogies in the latter part of the crisis. While the
inquiry does not find any signs of “cry wolf syndrome”, this factor could not be excluded due
to limited perspective of this thesis.
119
European Council, Opening speech by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy at the Munich
Security Conference (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140883.pdf),
accessed on 25 June 2014.
120
RFE/RL, “Carl Bildt, Every Carrot To Kyiv Is A Stick To Moscow” (http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-carlbildt-interview/25306801.html), accessed on 26 June 2014.
38
The visions for Vilnius
One of the first warning signals regarding Russian assertiveness came during the 43rd Munich
conference on security policy in February 2007. In front of an audience of senior Western
officials, Vladimir Putin accused the US of being a reckless unipolar power, rejected the
rationale for the Kosovo campaign, deplored the NATO-enlargement, and warned about
establishing missile defence bases in Eastern Europe.121 This was an early signal. Though Carl
Bildt was surprised by the speech122, there are clear signs that he recognized it as a warning
sign. To Reuters he told that “we should take [Putin] at his word. This was the real Russia of
now and possibly in four or five years time it could go further in this direction”, and that
there was a need to be “hard-nosed and realistic”. 123 This is not to conclude that Bildt
regarded this new Russian policy as a game changer. The ongoing Russian re-armament and
military expansion was no cause for worries and he: “had not seen anything that changes the
fundamental security- and defence assessments or gives any kind of reason to redraw the
strategic maps.”124
Radek Sikorski assumed office as Foreign Minister in November 2007 and had to deal with
the tensions within NATO regarding the status of Georgia, which became the prelude to the
Russo-Georgian war in August the following year. The Russo-Georgian war was yet another
signal of Russian assertiveness. The response from Sikorski could be labelled the “Sikorski
doctrine”: that any further Russian aggression and subversion should be regarded as a
European security threat that required proportional response by the Atlantic community,
and a reemphasis of the Article V commitments. The main features of this “Russia first”
doctrine was presented in a speech at the Atlantic Council in November 2008. 125 It is
certainly clear that Sikorski did not have any illusions about the Russian policy: “Should the
121
Bob Watson, “Putin’s speech: back to the cold war?” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm),
accessed on 1 July 2014.
122
Carl Bildt, “Putin överraskar” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2007/02/page/4/),
accessed on 1 July 2014.
123
Helena Spongenberg, “Putin’s Speech Raises Alarms in EU” (http://www.businessweek.com/stories/200702-12/putin-speech-raises-alarms-in-eubusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice),
accessed on 1 July 2014.
124
Carl Bildt, ”En Ny Strategisk Karta?” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2007/02/page/3/),
accessed on 1 July 2014. The quote in Swedish: ”inte sett någonting som förändrar grundläggande säkerhetsoch försvarspolitiska bedömningar eller ger någon som helst anledning att rita om strategiska kartor.”
125
Atlantic Council, Transcript: Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski Talks to Council
(http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/news/transcripts/transcript-polish-foreign-minister-radoslaw-sikorski talksto-council), accessed on 1 July 2014.
39
Georgian scenario be emulated in Ukraine, we would have a large-scale European crisis. The
security of Europe would be shattered.”126 In a conversation, exposed by a secret cable on
Wikileaks, Sikorski elaborated on a Russian invasion of Crimea. But it is also worth noting,
that he did not regard this as a probable scenario.127
From his blog we know that Carl Bildt followed the developments in South Ossetia closely.
He condemned the Russian aggression and had a high profile in his rhetoric.128 Yet, very soon
after the hostilities, Bildt started to nuance his view of the situation: ”In the overall picture
there is reason to emphasize that we do not have any interest in canceling dialogue or
contacts [with the Russians]. Quite contrary.”129 As part of the Swedish delegation to Kiev on
a state visit in September 2008, he concluded that it was “clear that the Ukrainian
democracy gradually is consolidating”130, and that the economic progress was noticeable.
Already in October 2008 Bildt took part in a meeting on the regional cooperation in Northern
Europe, which among other things included a guided tour by Lavrov in the Jusupov-palace, in
St Petersburg.131 These are the indicators of a pragmatic policy, and its psychology is built
upon compartmentalization.
A similar attitude could be found on the Polish side. The US Ambassador to Warsaw, Victor
Ashe, concluded in a secret cable leaked by Wikileaks: “Convinced that the EU has greater
leverage with Moscow than do individual Member States, the Tusk Government has shed
the confrontational rhetoric of its predecessor and sought to build coalitions among EU
members”.132 Sikorski explained that while Russia at times could have conflicting interests
with Poland, it was still seen as a partner to cooperate with: “Our cooperation with Russia
126
Ibid.
Wikileaks, “Polish Foreign Minister Looks for Strategic Assurance”
(http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09WARSAW1164.html), accessed on 1 July 2014.
128
In fact, Bildt noted the Vladimir Putins hostile speech on Crimea in August 2008, see Carl Bildt, “Sochi mellan
Suchumi och Sevastopol” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2008/08/page/2/), accessed on
1 July 2014.
129
Carl Bildt, ”Hektiskt – med Ryssland i fokus” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2008/08/),
accessed on 1 July 2014. The quote in Swedish: ”I den samlade bilden finns anledning att betona att vi inte har
något intresse av att avbryta dialog eller kontakter. Snarast tvärt om.”
130
Carl Bildt, ”Blågult i Kiev” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2008/09/), accessed on 1 July
2014. The quote in Swedish: ” “tydligt att den ukrainska demokratin successivt hållet på att konsolideras”.
131
Carl Bildt, ”Dag och middag i St Petersburg” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2008/10/),
accessed on 1 July 2014.
132
Andrew Rettman, ”Polish Government deeply fearful of Russia, US cable shows”
(http://euobserver.com/news/31462), accessed on 1 July 2014. Indeed, this was the rationale behind the EaP.
It is interesting to note that Lavrov, already on 21 March 2009, argued that EaP created an EU zone of interest.
127
40
should be practical and depoliticized.”133 This, “pragmatic relationship” that was developed
over the years after the Russo-Georgian war, was not only rhetorical. Poland lifted its
objections to OECD entry for Russia, and it agreed to negotiate a new EU partnership and
cooperation agreement with Russia.
In Carl Bildt’s blog during 2011, the major concern was the risk of the development in
Belarus spilling over to Georgia and Moldova. Bildt was “uncertain” regarding the course of
Ukraine under Yanukovych, but he could not register any signs of success for the Kremlin’s
agenda towards Kiev.134 Sikorski, on the other hand, expressed more modest expectations
for the EU’s policy, especially related to countries that were back-sliding: ”When countries
don't want to get closer to the EU, like Belarus, clearly it doesn't work.”135
During 2012 Bildt seemed more concerned over the declining democracy in Ukraine,
something he summed up as “a year of disappointments”.136 Visiting the annual Yalta
conference in September, he concluded that there ”are talks about East and West, but I
expressed my concern that Ukraine is not moving at all, but is rather standing still.137 Though
Bildt noted that Russian gas prices were used for political pressure, he argued that the risk of
Ukraine joining Putins prioritized project the Eurasian customs union should not be
exaggerated. He used two arguments: if Ukraine were to join the customs union decisions
would be centralized in the Kremlin, and Western integration would be more valuable for
Ukraine.138 Just one day before joining the Yalta conference, he blogged enthusiastically
133
Radek Sikorski, Opening Remarks by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski at the Council on Foreign
Relations "Nato At 60" Symposium, 25 February 2009 (http://www.cfr.org/nato/opening-remarks-polishforeign-minister-radoslaw-sikorski-council-foreign-relations-nato-60-symposium/p18666), accessed on 1 July
2014.
134
Carl Bildt, ”Nyttigt, bra och viktigt i Jalta” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2011/09/),
accessed on 1 July 2014.
135
RFE/RL, “Full transcript: Interview of Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski”
(http://www.rferl.org/content/interview_poland_foreign_minister_radoslaw_sikorski/24221938.html),
accessed on 2 July 2014.
136
Carl Bildt, ”Ett besvikelsernas år” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2012/09/), accessed
on 2 July 2014.
137
Carl Bildt, ”Det inställda mötet” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2012/09/), accessed on
2 July 2014. The quote in Swedish: ”Det talades om Öst och om Väst, men jag uttryckte snarast oron för att
Ukraina inte rör sig alls utan snarare står still.”
138
Ibid.
41
from an official visit in Moscow, and described the relations with Russia as “good, with a
diligent exchange”139.
At his annual address in March 2013 Sikorski argued that Ukraine was “facing a genuine
dilemma”, but the punchline was that Poland was ready to grant Ukraine a “European
perspective” should it decide to go the EU path.140 The same idea, common on his Twitter
account, was reflected in a Chatham House speech later that spring, where he added that
the main concern was the process following a Ukrainian signature of the AA/DCFTA.141
At the annual Yalta conference in 2013 Bildt concluded that Russia was conducting
“economic warfare” towards Ukraine, and Sikorski Twittered that the he felt “that Europe’s
geopolitics is about to change”.142 Though both expected and had registered the warning
signs of continued Russian political pressure on Ukraine, they maintained that the parts for
an association agreement were in place. Bildt continued to argue about the necessity to
cooperate with Russia, and even after Armenia stalled its EU negotiations he maintained
that the EaP was a “strong instrument”.143
It was not until late October and November that there was a noticeable change of attitude
regarding the EaP and the expectations for Ukraine at the Vilnius Summit. Both Bildt and
Sikorski had noted the Russian pressure and this clearly affected their expectations
negatively of a deal with Ukraine.144 However, the key player of the game was considered to
139
Carl Bildt, ”Alltid spännande i Moskva” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2012/09/page/2/), accessed on 2 July 2014.
140
Radek Sikorski, Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Goals of Polish Foreign Policy in 2013 (Polish
MFA: Warsaw, 2013), p. 17.
141
Radek Sikorski, speech at the conference ”The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Are we really
serious?”, Chatham House, London, 9 May 2013.
142
Radek Sikorski on Twitter 20 September 2013
(https://Twitter.com/sikorskiradek/statuses/381274092932194304) accessed on August 5 2014; Carl Bildt,
”Hur blåser vindarna i Jalta?” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/09/19/hur-blaservindarna-over-jalta/), accessed on August 5 2014.
143
Carl Bildt, ”Samarbete i norr” on Alla dess dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/10/), accessed on
August 5 2014; Carl Bildt, “Viktig rundresa” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/10/),
accessed on August 5 2014.
144
Andrew Rettman, ”EU gives up hope on Ukraine deal at Vilnius summit”
(http://euobserver.com/foreign/122088), accessed on 6 August 2014; RFE/RL, ”On the EU and Ukraine: ’Slightly
Pessimistic’”; Carl Bildt, “Åter i Abu Dhabi” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/11/),
accessed on 6 August 2014; Carl Bildt, ”Vart drivs Ukraina egentligen?” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/11/), accessed on 6 August 2014. Note that Bildt on a Brookings panel
debate on “Ukraine’s black Thursday” argued that the priority of the policy should be about getting Ukraine to
make its mind up, see Brookings, The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: What to Expect at Vilnius 21
November 2013
42
be Yanukovych, and whether he would give in to Russian pressure or not. Furthermore,
there was no rethinking of the EaP as policy. At the Vilnius Summit Bildt blogged about the
“enthusiasm and energy” of the event.145
This is why it is fair to conclude that before the Vilnius Summit there was psychological
receptivity regarding the dangers. When Bildt noted a surprise U-turn of Ukraine, it referred
to the development after the summer 2013. At the time of the Vilnius Summit Bildt and
Sikorski were well aware of the influence that Russia exerted. Yet, there seem to have been
a fundamental denial of what this implied for the existing policy, and they never seem to
have revisited the fundamental assumptions of their pet project.
The message from Maidan
In December 2013 the Ukraine crisis was in full swing. The world started to take notice after
hundred thousand protestors gathered at Kiev’s Maidan square. Following violent clashes
between protestors and security forces, Bildt and Sikorski made a common statement of
condemnation.146 A few days later they both attended the OSCE Ministerial Council in Kiev.
Clearly, Sweden and Poland continued to have a high profile in the crisis, even if they
concluded that they refused to be “drawn into a meaningless bidding war over Ukraine’s
future.”147
Reporting back to the Swedish Parliament in December 2013 Bildt gave a somewhat
ambiguous account. On the one hand he compared Ukraine with Mexico’s relationship with
the US, in the sense that it should be able to have free-trade with both the EU as well as
Russia. At the same time Bildt realized that a Ukrainian membership in the Eurasian customs
union, proposed by Russia, would be incompatible with the AA/DCFTA.148
(http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/11/21%20eu%20vilnius/20131121_vilnius_eu_transcript.pd
f), accessed on 2 July 2014.
145
Carl Bildt, ”Entusiasm och energi i Vilnius” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/11/29/entusiasm-och-energi-i-vilnius/), accessed on 6 August 2014.
146
Polish Foreign Ministry, Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers Radek Sikorski and Carl Bildt of Poland and
Sweden
(http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/joint_statement_by_foreign_ministers_radek_sikorski_and_carl_bildt_of_po
land_and_sweden), accessed on 6 August 2014.
147
Ibid.
148
Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens stenografiska uppteckningar 2013/14:14
(http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/EU-namndens-stenografiskauppteckningar/Fredagen-den-13-december-2013_H10A14/), accessed on 6 August 2014.
43
The psychology of Bildt during this period was influenced by two tendencies: the obscure
future actions of Yanukovych (which was still regarded as the key player), and the idea of
intensified efforts to convince Russia that a closer relationship with the EU was beneficial for
all parties involved.149 As he concluded: “Everything is in the hands of Yanukovych”. 150 The
obscurity of the actions of the Ukrainian President meant that there was a risk of violence,
and in late December Bildt started to realize that, for the foreseeable future, Yanukovych
would probably not sign the AA.151
Sikorski had openly warned of a “bloody scenario in Ukraine”, especially before the Munich
Security Conference in late January 2014 and his discussions with Ukrainian Foreign Minister
Leonid Kozhara.152 But as the stalemate in Kiev dragged on, Sikorsky began to see the
potential for a compromise to break the deadlock. He openly advocated that the opposition
should accept the offer from the Ukrainian President to form a government, and he
dismissed the idea of sanctions against Yanukovych.153 Sikorski was influenced by the
historical analogy between the repression against the Maidan movement and the
suppression of rallies in Poland in the early 1980s.154 Using this analogy Sikorski urged the
protestors to compromise with Yanukovych: “What I tell them is to learn not only from our
successes, but also from our mistakes./…/Repeat our scenario of 1989 when we made a
deal, and not our scenario of 1981 when we the opposition overestimated our strength and
the government cracked down.”155 In 1989 the communists and the opposition had shared
149
Carl Bildt, ”Nog vecka mest i Stockholm” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/12/),
accessed on 6 August 2014; Carl Bildt, ”Grönt ljus för Serbien” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/12/), accessed on 6 August 2014; Carl Bildt, ”Fortfarande Ukraina i
centrum” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/12/), accessed on 6 August 2014;
Utrikesdepartementet, Tal av utrikesminister Carl Bildt vid Riga Cicero Awards, Riga, 9 januari, 2014
(http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/23/15/71/460f33ba.pdf).
150
Carl Bildt, ”Lätt snö i Berlin” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/12/), accessed on 6
August 2014.
151
Carl Bildt, ”Hastigt till politik i Monaco” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/12/),
accessed on 6 August 2014; Carl Bildt, ”Också bilateralt med EU och Monaco” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2013/12/), accessed on 6 August.
152
Deutsche Welle, ”Sikorski: ’Ukraine needs a compromise’” in Deutsche Welle 1 February 2014
(http://www.dw.de/sikorski-ukraine-needs-a-compromise/a-17402711), accessed on 6 August 2014.
153
Ibid.
154
Polish Foreign Ministry, “’Sikorski: We are monitoring the situation in Ukraine’”
(http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/they_wrote_about_us/sikorski__we_are_monitoring_the_situation_in_ukrai
ne__pap_18_02_2014;jsessionid=492EC04E87030BB847BC90365182B971.cmsap1p?printMode=true),
accessed on 6 August 2014.
155
Jan Cienski, “Poland’s Sikorski urges Ukraine protestors to seek compromise” in Financial Times 11 February
2014 (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7cf6218c-923f-11e3-8018-00144feab7de.html#axzz2yCP0Nqym),
accessed on 6 August 2014.
44
tasks in the Polish government. On a similar note, Bildt underlined the necessity of
Yanukovych reaching out to the opposition. 156 It is worth underlining that while it is
reasonable to conclude that the historical analogy between Poland in the 1980s and Ukraine
in 2014 added to the surprise, we might never know to what extent. As Yanukovych fled
after signing a compromise with the opposition, we will never know to what extent he might
have been a Jaruzelsky.
In mid-February the assessment of the situation became more frank. Bildt now openly stated
that the root of the crisis was Russian attempts to stop Ukraine from signing the AA, and he
argued that civil war could not be excluded.157 Still it is difficult to view this as a prophesy of
deep Russian military involvement in Ukraine. In late January Bildt had summarized on
Twitter the stakes in the Ukraine crisis in the following way: “It’s not about West losing
Ukraine. It’s about Ukraine losing its future.”158
On the cliff of Crimea
Following the Maidan massacre, Radek Sikorski became part of the trio of EU foreign
ministers sent to Kiev in order to find a peaceful solution. Sikorski had acted on his analogy
with Poland in the early 1980s, and warned the opposition that “if you don’t support this
[deal], you will have martial law, the army. You will all be dead.”159 Reflecting on the 21
February agreement a couple of days after its signing, Sikorski concluded that it had been
“superseded by events”160. He revealed that in the course of the collapse of the Yanukovych
regime, the Russians had started to appreciate the deal. 161 While the Russians had
156
Carl Bildt, ”Att möta världen i Östergötland” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2014/01/),
accessed on 6 August 2014.
157
Carl Bildt, ”Det bästa och sämsta i Tuzla” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2014/02/),
accessed on 6 August 2014; Carl Bildt, Swedish radio show Konflikt, 15 February 2014
(http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/324246?programid=1300), accessed on 16 February 2014.
158
Carl Bildt on Twitter 18 January (https://Twitter.com/carlbildt/status/424658858393739264), accessed on 6
August 2014.
159
Roland Oliphant & Hannah Strange, “Ukraine protest leaders warned: ‘Sign or you will all be dead’” in The
Telegraph 21 February 2014 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10654239/Polishforeign-minister-warns-Ukraine-protest-leaders-Sign-deal-or-you-will-all-die.html), accessed on 7 August 2014.
Sikorski Twittered that a compromise means that everyone gets less than 100 percent, see Radek Sikorski on
Twitter 21 February 2014 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-crisis-president-claimsdeal-with-opposition-after-77-killed-in-kiev), accessed on 7 August 2014.
160
CNN, Ukraine peace deal negotiator and foreign minister Radek Sikorski on Fareed Zakaria’s GPS.
161
It should be noted that the Russian envoy Vladimir Lukin never signed the 21 February agreement. Sikorski
believed that Yanukovych was persuaded by Putin to sign the agreement, see CNN, “Putin phone call convinced
Yanukovych to change attitude, says Polish foreign minister”
45
“overplayed their hand” 162 they could still “play the separatist card” 163 , but he also
underlined the importance of the new government in Kiev to “have a conversation with
Russia”164. The main psychological influence of these hectic days between the Maidan
massacre and the invasion of Crimea was that of uncertainty. In an interview on Polish
television Sikorski said that “we still have to see which way Ukraine will turn”165. The most
serious scenario, a split of Ukraine in pro-West and pro-Russia parts, was considered an
“imaginable catastrophe”.166 However, Sikorski’s greatest concern was the ability of the new
government to be inclusive.
The intensity of the crisis forced Carl Bildt to admit that his blogging and twittering would be
hampered.167 It is worth noting that Bildt recognized the distinct probability that the
Yanokovych regime would collapse.168 In an article published after the Maidan massacre
Bildt elaborated on the causes of the crisis:
“So, to be clear, it was the Kremlin’s pressure, and the Yanukovych administration’s vacillation, that produced
the current crisis. Had Yanukovych decided to stand up to Russian pressure, there is no doubt that Ukraine
would have faced difficulties. But, with an EU Association Agreement and the possibility of solid financial aid
and reform assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the Russian measures would not have been
sustainable.”
169
It is also worth noting that, alongside the ever present uncertainty, Bildt maintained a notion
that it was not in anybody’s interest to fragmentize and create chaos in Ukraine:
(http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/26/vladimir-putin-viktor-yanukovych-radoslaw-sikorski-ukrainepoland-russia/), accessed on 7 August 2014.
162
CNN, Ukraine peace deal negotiator and foreign minister Radek Sikorski on Fareed Zakaria’s GPS.
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid.
165
Polish Foreign Ministry, “Minister Radosław Sikorski on TVN24: Poland’s strength lies in its alliances, 25
February 2014”
(http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/they_wrote_about_us/minister_radoslaw_sikorski_ontvn24__poland_s_stre
ngth_lies_in_its_alliances__25_february_2014;jsessionid=07175D8A2D96470FC0E4A134DA9EE0E1.cmsap2p?p
rintMode=true), accessed on 7 August 2014.
166
EUbusiness, “Poland warns against ‘very dangerous game’ in Crimea”
(http://www.eubusiness.com/_zmi/plone/news-eu/ukraine-unrest.u3p), accessed on 7 August 2014.
167
Carl Bildt, ”En fruktansvärd dag i Kiev” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2014/02/),
accessed on 7 August 2014. Bildt was on an official visit to China 21-25 February 2014.
168
Ibid. However, Bildt thought that the 21 February agreement was a way to avoid collapse. See also Carl Bildt
on Twitter 26 February 2014 (https://Twitter.com/carlbildt/status/438836801524875264), accessed on 7
August 2014.
169
Carl Bildt, ”Europe’s Crisis in Ukraine” on Project Syndicate (http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/carl-bildt-places-the-blame-for-the-country-s-agony-squarely-on-russia), accessed
on 7 August 2014.
46
”If the agreement is not honored, Ukraine could well continue its descent into chaos and conflict, which would
be in no one’s interest./…/The Kremlin should have an interest in a stable and reforming neighbor that, like
other countries, is also seeking a close relationship with the EU.”
170
Even more interesting was the tendency to cling on to the interpretation of the situation as a
great opportunity for Ukraine. Bildt made a historical analogy to the fall of the Soviet Union
in 1991 and the Balkan conflicts.171 While the analogy certainly gives room for internal strife
in Ukraine, it did not point to a military inter-state aggression. On the eve of the invasion,
the 27 February 2014, Carl Bildt argued that the fall of the Yanukovych government
represented a “golden opportunity in Ukraine’s history”172. It might be that Bildt tried to use
a public channel for pep-talk to decision-makers in Kiev 173 , but a more plausible
interpretation is that he was somewhat more detached from the key events in this phase of
the crisis, compared to Sikorski. While Sikorski never seem to have doubted the Russian
option of using Russian minorities, Bildt seem to have believed that the crisis revolved
around an end-game for the Yanukovych regime.
The organizational cut: the power of the carrot
The purpose of this section is to provide an insight into the organizational dynamics of the
EU’s policy during the Ukraine crisis. The cut focuses on the deliberations and actions of the
European Council, from the Council Summit in October 2013 to the various meetings of the
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) until the annexation of Crimea. I describe the Council meetings
and analyze the main influences and positions of the member states. I find that the EU
avoided the sensitive subject of the EaP before the Vilnius Summit and it was not able to
have a proactive approach on Ukraine because of the German elections. Before the Vilnius
Summit issues like Syria and immigration were higher on the agenda. After the Maidan
massacre the EU dealt with the issue, but procrastinated in various forms due to internal
170
Ibid. See also Carl Bildt, ”Avtal i Kiev och samtal i Shanghai” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2014/02/); accessed on 7 August 2014; Carl Bildt, “Den historiska
omvandlingen i Ukraina” on Alla dessa dagar (http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2014/02/); accessed on 7 August.
171
Carl Bildt, “Den historiska omvandlingen i Ukraina” on Alla dessa dagar.
172
Carl Bildt, ”Både Kina och Ukraina i fokus i Tokyo” on Alla dessa dagar
(http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2014/02/), accessed on 7 August 2014; The major problem identified by Bildt
was the forming of a new Ukrainian government, and to deal with the economic challenges, see Carl Bildt on
”Gomorron, världen!”, 23 February 2014 (http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/328198?programid=438),
accessed on 7 August 2014.
173
Jacob Westberg pointed out the possibility that Bildt used a perlocuntionary speech act: he realized that
there were no golden opportunities, and that his blog post had the purpose of encouraging the Ukrainians.
47
divisions related to different stakes in the crisis. The effect of procrastination was that the
policy became explicitly responsive, while triggers for future actions of the Council remained
vague.
Avoidance (European Council Summit 24-25 October 2013)
The last stop before the Vilnius Summit on “The Eastern Partnership Roadmap” was the
Council Summit in Brussels 24-25 October 2013. A striking impression of the Council Summit
conclusions regarding the EaP is that they are next to non-existent. Out of 49 paragraphs
only one covered the EaP. This lonely paragraph was just a short reiteration of the
willingness to sign the AA/DCFTA, with the proviso of “tangible progress” 174 in line with the
Council conclusion from December 2012. The FAC of the 21 October had pointed out three
areas as crucial for the Vilnius Summit: electoral standards, selective justice (a polite term
for a fair treatment of Yulia Tymoshenko) and “implementing the reforms jointly agreed”.175
The FAC had mostly dealt with the situation in Syria.
Janis Emmanouilidis of the European Policy Center has summarized the Council Summit 2425 October as “a rather low profile summit”176 and “a summit of little substance”177. The
main topics for discussion were long term structural issues like economic growth and
banking union. However, the Council also fixed its gaze on a few hot topics: immigration
(following the Lampedusa catastrophe) and the electronic surveillance issue. The Council
was united behind a statement regarding the intelligence issues that had been exposed by
Edward Snowden. The statement was a call for France and Germany to seek bilateral talks
with the US in order to ascertain a non-spying pact.
The lack of attention to what Carl Bildt had described as Russian “economic warfare”
towards the EaP countries is noticeable. A few weeks before the Council Summit several
ideas on how to deal with the Russian pressure had been discussed in think-tank circles. In
174
European Union, European Council 24/25 October 2013. Conclusions
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/139197.pdf), accessed on 11
August 2013, p. 17.
175
European Union, Press Release. Foreign Affairs Council, 21 October 2013
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139093.pdf), accessed on 11
August 2014, p. 6.
176
Vieuws, EU Pre-Summit Insights – What’s on the table 24 & 25 October 2013? (http://www.vieuws.eu/euinstitutions/eu-pre-summit-insights-whats-on-the-table-on-24-25-october-2013/), accessed on 11 August 2014.
177
Janis Emmanouilidis, A summit of little substance (http://epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=3872),
accessed on 12 August 2014.
48
September Iana Dreyer and Nicu Popescu of the EU-ISS advocated for a “solidarity package”
for the EaP countries. 178 Their call for action included Council actions even before the AA
was signed.179 The ensuing lack of European Council action could not be explained by a
geopolitically fixed agenda: spying is not a regular subject on the agenda for the European
Council.
The crucial factor seems to have been organizational. The German elections were held at 22
September, and very little could be decided as long as Germany was still forming its
government. Even though Angela Merkel was very likely to continue to be Chancellor, one
might reflect on the issue of legitimacy for her to make major moves on the policy for Russia,
without even having formed a coalition. Merkel was not sworn in as Chancellor until 17
December, several weeks after the Vilnius Summit. The Council Summit on 19-20 December
had an open door policy for the inclusion of Ukraine in the AA/DCFTA, and stated that it was
ready to sign the agreement “as soon as Ukraine is ready”180.
Procrastination (FAC 10 and 20 February 2014)
The protests on the Maidan square triggered a more focused approach on Ukraine. Ukraine
was coupled with the term crisis (later to be followed by Crimea). There was now a distinct
European Council crisis response for Ukraine.181 The conclusions of the FAC on 10 February
featured a call to stop the violence and end the political crisis, a call for investigations on
violent acts and the idea of an “inclusive dialogue”.182 The EU identified its role to “assist the
178
Iana Dreyer & Nicu Popescu, “A solidarity package for the Eastern partners” EU-ISS Issue Alert September
2013 (http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_DCFTA.pdf), accessed on 11 August 2014. A somewhat
less ambitious call for “a strong information campaign” was made by Michael Emerson and Hrant Kostanyan,
see Michael Emerson & Hrant Kostanyan, “Putin’s grand design to destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership and
replace it with a disastrous neighbourhood policy of his own”, CEPS Commentary 13 September 2013
(http://www.eapcsf.eu/assets/files/Articles/ME%20&%20HK%20EU%20and%20the%20Eastern%20Partnership.pdf), accessed
on 11 August 2014, p. 3.
179
Dreyer & Popescu, “A solidarity package for the Eastern partners”, p. 2.
180
The Council 19-20 December focused on other issues, see European Union, European Council 19/20
December 2013. Conclusions
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf), accessed on 11
August 2014, p. 24.
181
The FAC of 20 January 2014 had mostly dealt with Iran and Syria. However, the council had condemned the
restrictions imposed on Ukrainian citizen’s fundamental rights, see European Union, Press release. Foreign
Affairs Council, 20 January 2014
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140673.pdf), accessed on 19
August 2014.
182
European Union, Council conclusions on Ukraine. 10 February 2014
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140960.pdf), accessed on 12
49
stakeholders”183 rather than provide a solidarity package. The idea of a counter-offer to the
Russian bid to Ukraine, let alone the notion of a “whip” (like sanctions), was not mentioned
in the conclusions.
After the Maidan square massacre there was an extraordinary FAC on 20 February.184
According to the EU the situation was a “grave crisis”.185 The conclusions called for an end to
violence, an urge to bring the responsible for the violence to justice, a commitment to
enhance people-to-people contacts and a call for constitutional reform. President
Yanukovych was identified as responsible for taking the first step in reconciliation, and the
EU maintained its policy to assist a dialogue between the parties in the conflict. The
extraordinary FAC 20 February resulted in an escalated rhetoric from the EU. The Council
decided to introduce sanctions, including asset freezes and selective visa bans for persons
suspected of being responsible for the violence. The Council agreed to “suspend export
licenses on equipment which might be used for internal repression”186. This was a political
commitment, but it was notoriously vague. The scale and the definitions of the sanctions
were not specified, neither in scope nor in time. The official conclusions called for justice,
but it simultaneously reiterated the EU’s willingness to negotiate with the primary suspect:
Yanukovych and his family. Furthermore, the EU mechanism for economic sanctions
stipulates further implementing legislation. Thus, the Council decision became a slow start of
a drafting process of potential targets, orchestrated by the member states’ Ambassadors in
Kiev.187
To use sanctions is to use a whip. But the decision of 20 February had none of the
characteristics of a whip: it did not stipulate who should be doing what under what timeframe and under the threat of which consequences. This vagueness might be related to the
ambition of Steinmeier, Fabius and Sikorski to play a constructive role in the negotiations
August 2014, see also European External Action Service, Catherine Ashton following the Foreign affairs Council,
10 February (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qH8h55ZSviw), accessed on 12 August 2014.
183
European Union, Council conclusions on Ukraine. 10 February 2014, p. 2.
184
European Union, Council conclusions on Ukraine. 20 February 2014
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141110.pdf), accessed on 12
August 2014.
185
Ibid., p. 2.
186
Ibid., p. 2.
187
Philip Oltermann & Paul Lewis, “EU foreign ministers agree sanctions against Ukrainian officials” The
Guardian 21 February 2014 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/ukraine-eu-foreign-ministersagree-sanctions-officials), accessed on 12 August 2014.
50
that led to the 21 February agreement. More importantly, concerning the factors that
contribute to a sequence of surprises, the decision effectively kicked the can down the road.
This was openly admitted. For example, the British Foreign Office communicated after the
decision to implement sanctions: “The scale of the implementation will depend on the
developments to come”.188 And then the grave crisis turned into a paradigm shift for the
entire security system in Europe.
Passive-aggressive procrastination (FAC 3 March and the extraordinary meeting 6 March
2014)
Following the fundamental surprise of Russia’s invasion of Crimea, on 3 March Catherine
Ashton decided to convene the second extraordinary FAC in less than two weeks. The
Council condemned the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, and the authorization to use the
Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. It called upon Russia to withdraw its forces to their
permanent stationing. The EU was engaged to promote “constructive dialogue with all
parties”189. Once again the EU decided to postpone any specification of sanctions with
reference to possible favorable Russian behavior in the future: “In the absence of deescalating steps by Russia, the EU shall decide about consequences for bilateral relations
between the EU and Russia”190. There was a promise to “swiftly work” on the adoption of
“restrictive measures” (the term targeted sanctions from 20 February was not used
anymore).191 The only concrete action was to suspend the preparations for the G8 Summit in
Sochi in June, and it was taken jointly with the US and the other G7 states.192 The Council
188
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign Secretary Says EU will impose sanctions on Ukraine
(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-says-eu-will-impose-sanctions-on-ukraine),
accessed on 12 August 2014. It is interesting to note that President Obama started to admit the Russian role in
the conflict on 20 February, see Dan Roberts, “Ukraine crisis: Obama attacks Putin over Russia’s role” The
Guardian 20 February 2014 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/ukraine-crisis-obama-attacksputin-over-russias-role), accessed on 12 August 2014.
189
European Union, Press Release. Main results of the Council. 3 March 2014
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141294.pdf), accessed on 12
August 2014, p. 6.
190
Ibid., p. 7. Poland had pushed for a tougher policy, see Peter Spiegel, ”EU and Ukraine: the leaked draft
communiqué” Financial Times Brussels blog 3 March 2014 (http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2014/03/03/euand-ukraine-the-leaked-draft-communique/), accessed on 14 August 2014.
191
Ibid., p. 7.
192
This happened despite stiff German resistance. Steinmeier is quoted saying that “diplomacy is not a sign of
weakness. It is more needed than ever”, Reuters, “G7 condemns Russia Ukraine move, halts G8 prep”
(http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/uk-ukraine-crisis-usa-g-idUKBREA2201C20140303), accessed on 12
August 2014; see also The White House, G-7 Leaders statement (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/03/02/g-7-leaders-statement), accessed on 14 August 2014.
51
conclusion also mentioned support for “an international assistance package” 193, a process
that was essentially controlled by the IMF mission to Ukraine.
This FAC was held on the first working day after the weekend invasion of Crimea, and it was
decided to remain seized to take rapid measures. Three days later President of the European
Council Herman van Rompuy convened the Heads of State or Government for an
extraordinary meeting. The Council symbolically welcomed Ukraine’s new transitional Prime
Minister Yatsenyuk to Brussels, strongly condemned Russia, committed to financial backing
of Ukraine 194 and declared intentions to adopt unilateral trade measures to support
Ukraine.195 The rhetoric had slightly changed and the EU now intended to engage in “a frank
and open dialogue” with Ukraine and Russia.196 To be able to do this, an EU contact group
was prepared.
The Council decided to have what van Rompuy called “a three-step approach.”197 The first
step, decided at the Council, was to suspend bilateral talks of various kinds198 with Russia.
The second step was “additional measures” (travel bans, asset freezes and cancellation of
the EU-Russia Summit) which would be decided “in the absence” of “results within a limited
timeframe” in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.199 The third step was “additional
and far reaching consequences for relations in a broad range of economic areas” 200 between
the EU and Russia.
The organizational dynamics at play were related to the risks for the central actors in the EU
to confront Russia. Germany’s energy dependence was reflected in Steinmeier’s position
193
European Union, Press Release. Main results of the Council. 3 March 2014, p. 7
The day before the Council meeting the Commission announced a €11 bn support package for Ukraine, see
European Commission, European Commission’s support to Ukraine Memo (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-14-159_en.htm), accessed on 13 August 2014.
195
European Union, Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, Brussels, 6 March 2014
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141372.pdf), accessed on 13
August 2014.
196
Ibid., p. 2.
197
European Union, Remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy following the
extraordinary meeting of Heads of state or Government on Ukraine
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141373.pdf), accessed on 13
August 2014, p. 2.
198
This included visa matters and a process that was called the New Agreement.
199
European Union, Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, Brussels, 6 March 2014, p. 2.
200
Ibid., p. 2.
194
52
that sanctions might add “fuel to the fire”.201 In fact, the same day as the Council meeting
with the Heads of State or Government, German Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel visited
Moscow to engage in German-Russian trade negotiations.
The day before the extraordinary Council meeting, the French-built helicopter carrier
Vladivostok, part of a €1.2bn arms trade deal between France and Russia, started its sea trial
on the coast of Saint-Nazaire.202 Before the Council meeting French President François
Hollande defended the deal: “We keep to the terms of the signed contracts. Right now we
have no plans to cancel them and we hope to avoid this.”203 Furthermore, at the Council
meeting France blocked the prospects for Ukrainian EU membership to be officially
mentioned.204
On the same day, 5 March, Kerry had a bilateral meeting with Lavrov in Paris, and there was
evidently still some hope to avoid sanctions. The anonymous commentator Charlemagne of
The Economist gave the following account of the dynamics of the extraordinary Council
meeting:
“Germany, in particular, was keen not to upset its question [sic!] for a diplomatic solution. At a preliminary
meeting of leaders from Britain, Germany, France, Poland and Italy, David Cameron, the British prime ministers
[sic!], had suggested specifying that future sanctions would include punitive measures in energy and finance, as
well as an arms embargo. But diplomats said it was ‘more than the market could bear’.”
205
However, despite this version in which Cameron played an active part, both the UK and
Cyprus had many financial incentives to procrastinate sanctions. On the eve of the Council
meeting British Foreign Secretary William Hague seem to have been more interested in
201
OpenEurope blog, “Will EU leaders agree on sanctions for Russia?”
(http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/will-eu-speak-clearly-and-with-one.html), accessed on 13
August 2013.
202
Defence Update, “Vladivostok – Mistral Class LHD Bound for Russia Begins Sea Trials in the Atlantic”
(http://defense-update.com/20140306_vladivostok_mistral.html), accessed on 13 August 2014.
203
See for example John Fund, ”France Talks Tough on Crimea While Arming Moscow” The Wall Street Journal
20 March 2014 (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303802104579449450062486042),
accessed on 13 August 2014.
204
Euractive, “France denies EU membership perspective for Ukraine” (http://www.euractiv.com/europeseast/france-denied-eu-membership-kyiv-news-534053), accessed on 13 August 2014.
205
Charlemagne, “Embracing Yats” The Economist 6 March 2014
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/03/eu-russia-and-ukraine), accessed on 13 August
2014.
53
bringing Russia to the same negotiation table as Ukraine: to focus on the arguments why
Russia should accept a diplomatic track with the new government in Kiev.206
For their part, countries like the Baltic states and, most notably, Poland pushed for a hard
line against Russia. Other member states like Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Czech Republic
had on the one hand a need to send a clear diplomatic message to Russia, while on the other
hand often having caveats against tough sanctions (because of Russian energy dependency).
Charlemagne’s account of the end result of the negotiations is interesting:
“Until the evening of March 5th, when foreign ministers were meeting in Paris to try to set up the contact
group, it seemed unlikely the Europeans would move so far [as the three-step approach]/…/Still, in the view of
Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, EU leaders in the end ‘did much more together than one could have
expected several hours ago.’ President François Hollande of France said a combination of factors changed the
mood and stiffened Europe’s resolve. One was the vote by the Crimean parliament for the peninsula to rejoin
th
Russia, to be sealed in a rush through a referendum on March 16 . Another was the refusal to allow a group of
international monitors to visit Crimea. A third was the action of pro-Russian mob that forced a UN special
envoy, Robert Serry, to seek refuge in a café in Crimea and eventually leave the region. Diplomats add several
more elements: the failure of the Paris talks to reach agreement on a contact group; the failure of talks in
Moscow between Mr Putin and Germany’s deputy chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel; and the announcement that
America was preparing to impose visa bans and asset freezes on those deemed responsible for the invasion of
Crimea.”
207
The output was that the vagueness of the punishing measures remained, and that makes it
problematic to regard EU’s approach to sanctions as distinct steps. But the interesting thing
to note in the official statement of 6 March is that the Council sent a passive-aggressive
message: the Ukraine crisis could only be solved by negotiations between Russia and
Ukraine, but one side should be punished if there were no results. This is to encourage
dialogue between two parties while warning one of them about penalty if there are no
positive developments. The role of the EU contact group in the crisis is curious: Russia was
condemned for its behavior, so the EU clearly aimed at biased facilitation which both parties
in the crisis were expected to accept in good faith.
206
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign Secretary sets out importance of diplomatic progress on
Ukraine (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-sets-out-importance-of-diplomaticprogress-on-ukraine), accessed on 13 August 2014.
207
Charlemagne, “Embracing Yats”.
54
Response (FAC 17 March 2014)
Following the EU Commission’s decision to support the international assistance package for
Ukraine, on 11 March the first part of this was implemented as tariff cuts on Ukrainian
exports to the EU.208 Over the next days Yatsenyuk made a visit to the US where he had
discussions with Obama and made an appearance at the UN Security Council (UNSC). At this
stage of the crisis there seems to have been a growing rift between the US and the EU
regarding further measures in response to the Russian aggression in Crimea. On 14 March
Kerry had yet another round of talks with Lavrov in London, in order to give Russia a chance
to avoid escalating measures. Though Kerry met with Cameron and Hague beforehand, the
lack of European presence signaled growing impatience with the slow European response.
An important episode in the intra-EU dynamics seems to have been the policy speech
delivered by Merkel at the German Bundestag on 13 March.209 Merkel painted a very dark
picture of the Russian actions during February and March, making the understatement that
“Russia has not proven to be a partner for stability in its neighbouring country” 210 and its
actions “undoubtedly represent a violation of fundamental principles”211. The Chancellor
clearly stated that “it is vital that we do not simply return to business as usual” 212,
committing herself to a policy where some kind of sanctions seemed almost inevitable.
Merkel then recalled the EU decision from 6 March regarding further measures against
Russia. The concluding message to the Bundestag was that the policy was built on talks,
assistance and sanctions, and after having tried the first two options she seemed ready to
accept some of the latter.
On the eve of the FAC two circumstances seem to have paved the way for a response: on 15
March Russia vetoed a resolution on Ukraine in the UNSC,213 and the referendum initiated
by pro-Russian secessionists in the Crimean Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) on 16 March. On
208
The annual value of this support was measured to €500 million., see European Commission, European
Commission proposes temporary tariff cuts for Ukrainian exports to the EU
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1039), accessed on 14 August 2014.
209
The German Federal Government, Policy Statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel on the Situation in
Ukraine 13 March 2014 (http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/__pr/P__Wash/2014/03/13-MerkelUkraine-Btag.html), accessed on 14 August 2014.
210
Ibid.
211
Ibid.
212
Ibid.
213
th
United Nations Security Council, 7138 Meeting 15 March 2014 S/PV.7138
(http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7138), accessed on 14 August 2014.
55
these two occasions Russia had either ignored the EU or refused to accept any responsibility
for the ongoing events in Crimea.
The conclusions of the FAC on 17 March once again condemned the Russian behavior and
the referendum in Crimea, called for Russian forces to withdraw to garrisons, supported an
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Crimea and an International Advisory Panel by the
Council of Europe.214 There were further declarations regarding economic support and
assistance in energy security.215 To deal with the remnants of the EaP, the EU decided to split
the AA into two parts: a political and an economic. The political part was to be signed at the
upcoming Council Summit on 21 March.
The major decision at the FAC of 17 March was to “introduce additional measures”, or in
other words get to the second “step”. Some 21 individuals were targeted with visa bans and
assets freezes.216 These individuals were either associated with the Russian-secessionist
take-over and later referendum on Crimea, Russian politicians or incriminated Russian
military officers. Poland had pushed for an even longer list, (possibly more in line with the US
sanction list that focused on Russian government officials, armed sector figures and Kremlin
cronies), but was stopped by, among others, Finland.217 Among the hard-liners in the
sanctions debate were Britain and the Baltic states. Hesitating member states included Italy,
Spain and Cyprus.218 An additional problem was the technical procedures to ensure that the
EU legislation would be accepted in a court of law.
However, it is interesting to note that the EU was still a foreign policy tool used in a
reactionary manner. To take but one of many examples, Hague explained the rationale of
the sanctions in the following way: “It is possible to add to these measures of course. This is
214
European Union, Council conclusions on Ukraine 17 March 2014
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141601.pdf), accessed on 14
August 2014.
215
Ibid.; see also European Union, Foreign Affairs Council – March 2014, Press conference, part 1
(http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/foreign-affairs-council-march-2014/press-conference-part1655196226929), accessed on 14 August 2014.
216
European Union, Council Regulations (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 (http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:078:0006:0015:EN:PDF), accessed on 14 August 2014.
217
Andrew Byrne, “EU’s response to Ukraine crisis highlights limits to power” Financial Times 8 May 2014
(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2dcb625c-d146-11e3-81e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3AMNmpzWJ), accessed
on 12 August 2014.
218
According to Charlemagne, “Putin untouched” The Economist 17 March
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/03/eu-and-russia-sanctions), accessed on 14 August
2014.
56
not a list that is set in stone for the future. It is possible to add other figures in the future,
depending on how Russia acts.”219 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the EU-Russia
Summit scheduled for June 2014 was not cancelled until the Council Summit 20-21 March.
III.
Concluding analysis: Facets of a crisis
This thesis has dealt with the research question how we can understand and explain the
accumulated and aggregated strategic surprise experienced by the central actors of the EU’s
Eastern Partnership. The function of this chapter is to synthesize the different conclusions of
the thesis. I do this by relating the findings of the three cuts to each other as well as the
theoretical framework introduced in the first chapter. The research points to three main
conclusions: the Eastern Partnership agenda featured a limited toolbox which did not match
the conflict, procrastination led to a reactionary pattern that contributed to recurring
surprises and the overconfidence of Bildt and Sikorski regarding the EaP meant that they
failed to reconsider policy in the face of shifting circumstances.
The Eastern Partnership in perspective
Two of the conclusions in this thesis are closely related: the agenda of the EaP was limited to
win-win logic (carrots), and when it was put to the test there was procrastination over the
use of sanctions (whips). The argument for these related conclusions is that a policy that has
sticks and carrots tends to prepare its designer for situations that also involve conflict, which
means that surprise becomes more unlikely. It is all about expectations: someone that
prepares for the worst is more likely to be unsurprised about a conflict than someone that
hopes for the best.
As the EaP was based on win-win situations, the EU ended up in a series of reactions to the
actions of the Yanukovych regime and Russia. The FAC before the Maidan massacre singled
out Ukraine as a country in crisis, the FAC after the Maidan massacre prepared the EU for
sanctions, at the first FAC after the invasion on Crimea the G8 Summit was cancelled but no
sanctions were activated, the extraordinary meeting on 6 March cancelled talks with Russia,
and the first assets freezes and visa bans were decided around a fortnight after the invasion
of Crimea. This is clearly “a response to an acute problem” in Verzberger’s words:
219
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Adoption of EU sanctions against individuals in Russia and Crimea
(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/adoption-of-eu-sanctions-against-individuals-in-russia-and-crimea),
accessed on 14 August 2014.
57
Figure 3: The EU reactions and the three-step approach
The organizational cut deals mostly with this obvious response problem, or what Levite
defines as a failure to implement successful actions to deal with a situation. Although there
was no “iron logic” to the EaP agenda, it seems to be impossible to play a successful tit-fortat game without a whip. However, the organizational dynamics do not point distinctly to
which member states that might have been complacent (surprised but not necessarily
unprepared) or which member states had a threat perception (not surprised but not
necessarily ready). This thesis can only point to a few rather known geopolitical clichés.
There is a major methodological challenge when the response problem is applied to an
aggregated case. Many of the EU member states have other strategic arenas they could use
for a response to the developments in Ukraine. This is quite obvious regarding the fourth
phase that also concerned NATO and the relevance of Article V. To what extent was the EU
58
secondary arena for the response?220 This caveat makes it difficult to pin-point the exact
impact of procrastination on strategic surprise.
An alternative strategy would have been proactive/escalatory measures, or in the words of
Vertzberger, attempts “to preempt anticipated future occurrences”. The theoretical point is
that a “reversed” sequence of sanctions would per definition have been something else than
procrastination, is likely to have evaded the EU “sleepwalking” into escalated conflict and is
likely to have avoided fundamental surprise. The EU would have taken the initiative and put
pressure on Moscow. This is not to say that such proactive policy automatically would have
been more successful, or even desirable. Above all we must keep in mind that tough actions
do not logically exclude strategic surprise, they only make them more unlikely.
As we concluded in the empirical chapter, the German elections were the ultimate show
stopper for proactive measures before the Vilnius Summit. This was true not only regarding
the EaP, but the Euro-crisis as well. In an analysis of the elections Ulrike Guérot of the
European Council on Foreign Relations argued that Germany regarded itself as “a role model
rather than a power with an obligation to lead.”221 This conclusion leads to an interesting
cross cut between the agenda and the dynamics of the EU related to the (de)securitization of
the EaP.
We should note that Radek Sikorski first tried to make the EaP as a joint venture with
Germany. There were solid geopolitical reasons for such initiative. When Sikorski was
Defence Minister he urged Merkel to review her energy security plans, as Poland was
concerned it would be a buffer state between Germany and Russia.222 Although Germany
had an interest in pursuing a “change through rapprochement”223 policy, Steinmeier was not
interested when he was approached by Sikorski in April 2008.224 It was after this that
220
For example, after the invasion of Crimea had started, Poland invoked Article IV in NATO and acted in the
Visegrád 4, see Andrew Rettman, “Nato reassures Poland, Baltic states on Russia threat”
(http://euobserver.com/defence/123350), accessed on 19 August 2014.
221
Ulrike Guérot, The German Election: What Europe Expects and What Germany Will Not Do ECFR Policy Brief
September 2013 (http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR88_THE_GERMAN_ELECTION_AW.pdf), accessed on 19
August 2014.
222
Ian Traynor, “Poland recalls Hitler-Stalin pact, amid fears over pipeline” in The Guardian 1 May 2006
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/01/eu.poland), accessed on 19 September 2014.
223
This idea, Wandel durch Annäherung, has its historical roots in the policy pursued by Egon Bahr and Willy
Brandt during the 1970s.
224
Cornelius Ochmann, The Future of the Eastern Partnership Seen from a German Perspective (Gütersloh:
Bertelsmann Stiftung, May 2010) (http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-758138C2-
59
Sikorski, the entrepreneur, turned to Sweden and Carl Bildt with the idea of an Eastern
partnership. It seems plausible to interpret the German green light for the EaP, although not
truly convinced about its merits, as a suitable alternative to the security vacuum that was
envisaged after the Russo-Georgian war 2008. Half-hearted support from Berlin did not give
any clear signal that the EU had an agenda to handle the effects of its association process
towards Eastern Europe.
Following the Maidan massacre the EU tried to respond. As Catherine Ashton was locked up
by nuclear negotiations with Iran, ironically it was the foreign ministers of the Weimar
triangle (France, Germany, Poland) who went to Kiev. This trio secured a deal between
Yanukovych and the opposition leaders that turned out to be obsolete the very moment it
was signed. Sikorski wanted to have an active Germany within EU structures, but basically
what he got was Angela Merkel’s telephone diplomacy. As it turned out, Berlin got dragged
into a conflict it absolutely wanted to avoid.
The policy entrepreneurs for Zwischeneuropa
The third main conclusion is that the two creators of the Eastern Partnership were
overconfident regarding the possibilities of their policy, and failed to rethink it as Russia
stepped up its pressure on Yanukovych. There is, however, a legitimate concern regarding
which psychological conclusions that could be drawn from studying blogs, Twitter and
interviews. The methodology allows identification of certain factors that seem important,
but the selected sources make it difficult to completely exclude these factors.225
Theoretically the psychological conclusion concerns the warning problem and how Bildt and
Sikorski were coping with uncertainty. The first thing to note is that there are very few
indications that they failed to register the warnings. Both noticed the warning signs and the
growing pressure on Yanukovych. This process was prolonged, which means that cognitive
overload seems unlikely. It seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that Bildt and Sikorski
were probably less affected by the situational surprise in the second phase after the Vilnius
Summit, than many others in EU circles. Similarly, it is difficult to find any indications of a
A87D7F15/bst/The_Future_of_the_Eastern_Partnership_Seen_from_a_German_Perspective.pdf), accessed on
19 August 2014, p. 3.
225
As pointed out by Jacob Westberg, in the first edition of Essence of Decision Graham Allison had fragmentary
sources of the Soviet decision making.
60
“cry wolf syndrome”: that Bildt or Sikorski hesitated to warn about what they regarded as
Russian provocations.
Robert Cooper once pointed out: “The most common method of misunderstanding
foreigners is to assume that they are similar to you”.226 If this describes ethnomorphism,
then the dynamic duo of the EaP were not practicing it. However, if in an interaction it
means “each believing that their negotiating partner was playing by the same rules as
them”227, the question of ethnomorphism becomes more complicated. There seem to have
been a fundamental denial of how the Russian behavior impacted the EaP. The central
assumption of the EaP was always that it would be possible to persuade Russia about its
merits or in worst case move on without Kremlin approval.
This is why there was overconfidence in the existing policy and an interpretive ambiguity
regarding the developments in Ukraine, which could be regarded as a receptivity failure. This
qualifies as an example of Vertzberger’s reactive coping, as they did not revisit the
fundamental assumptions of their policy. Rethinking policy in the light of changing
circumstances is crucial in order to avoid policy failure as well as strategic surprise. Albert
Einstein allegedly described this point: we cannot solve our problems with the same thinking
we used when we were creating them. During 2013 the policy window was closing for
Ukraine and many critics noticed the Russian pressure and the need to change Western
policy.228
Then there was the reliance on historical analogies during the crisis. Uncertainty might
trigger the use of analogies, as they guide decision-makers to various conclusions and
provide templates for further actions. The analogy of Poland in the 1980s and the fall of the
Soviet Union were problematic, as the development did not lead to a lasting deal between
the regime and a new Wałęsa, or the emergence of a new Yeltsin. Clearly Sikorski acted on
this analogy in his negotiations in Kiev, and it seems reasonable that it contributed to the
226
Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic
Books, 2003), p. 89.
227
Ibid., p. 95.
228
Two examples include Stefan Lehne, “Time to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy”
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/02/04/time-to-reset-european-neighborhood-policy ), accessed on 20 August
2014 and Ariel Cohen, “Obama and the G20 Summit: Time to Rethink U.S. – Russian Relations” Issue Brief
#4030 (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/08/obama-and-the-g20-summit-time-to-rethink-usrussian-relations), accessed on 20 August 2014.
61
surprises in the period between the Maidan massacre and the invasion of Crimea. However,
it is difficult to make an exact assessment of how much the analogy actually influenced Bildt
and Sikorski.
In the third phase of the conflict, the hectic days between the Maidan massacre and the
invasion of Crimea, there seem to be an emerging difference between the assessments of
Bildt and Sikorski. Carl Bildt is sometimes described as a “hawk” or “realist” in international
media.229 However it is interesting to note that Bildt held on to a liberal rhetoric while
Sikorski started to make references to card games (which implied winners and losers). It
might be that Bildt and Sikorski at the time were close in an EU perspective, but in relation
to each other Sikorski was definitely the hard-liner.
Final reflections: “Events, dear boy, events”
The EU Eastern Partnership was built on high hopes and wishful thinking. But as Sven Biscop
of the Egmont Institute has pointed out: a win-win situation requires that both sides
perceive a benefit.230 Thus, it seems plausible to assume that the EU was involved in a zerosum game over Eastern Europe from the day it adopted its policy. Despite the best of efforts:
if someone wants to drag you into a meaningless bidding, you are likely to either have to
quit or be forced to accept the meaninglessness. The Eurasian customs union was not a
parallel project but a counter-initiative. Indeed there were many warning signs that Putin
was gradually turning Catherine the Great’s aphorism “I have no way of defending my
borders but to extend them” into 21st Century practice. Frustration has many faces and they
have come up with a series of colorful descriptions of this EU failure: a low politics toolbox
on a high politics construction site; to show up with a baguette to a knife fight. 231
While it is often said that it is easy to be wise in hindsight, the specific meaning of this cliché
in relation to the Ukraine crisis is as elusive as ever. It is certainly tempting to reinterpret
modern history and the idea that “what happened in 1989 was not just the cessation [of] the
229
See for example Richard Milne, “Realist Carl Bildt helps Sweden punch above its weight” Financial Times 4
June 2014 (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dfe6f270-e268-11e3-89fd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Aw84o89a),
accessed on 20 August 2014.
230
Sven Biscop, Game of Zones. The Quest for Influence in Europe’s Neighbourhood Egmont Paper 67 June
2014, p. 4.
231
Jan Techau, “Europe’s five deadly sins on Ukraine” Carnegie Europe
(http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=54743), accessed on 18 August 2014; Walter Russel Meade,
“The Ukraine-EU Deal That Wasn’t” The American Interest (http://www.the-americaninterest.com/blog/2013/11/30/the-ukraine-eu-deal-that-wasnt/), accessed on 18 August 2014.
62
Cold War, but also the end of the balance-of-power system in Europe”.232 But in hindsight,
what was it that broke Ukraine: the idea that it could be Westernized, or the idea that Russia
under Putin had turned into a democracy? Show me your fool and I shall tell you which
scholars you cherish. In addition, the event is still on-going and what might have seemed like
a geopolitical slam dunk for Moscow until the Maidan massacre (four out of six partnership
countries in its fold), has again turned into an open affair. Perhaps Russia will settle for a
string of separatist entities (Abkhazia/South Ossetia, Transnistria and Crimea) in the front
line republics. The end of the affair will of course also affect the blame game about moral
responsibilities for the crisis.
When former UK Prime Minister Harold MacMillan allegedly used the phrase “events, dear
boy, events” in order to describe the greatest challenge for a government, he captured
something of the inevitability of crisis.233 Perhaps this sad conclusion is the best recipe for
not getting surprised in foreign policy. As MacMillan himself learned the hard way, this
insight is something quite separated from a successful policy.
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