5/4/2003 NATION-BUILDING: LESSONS LEARNED
Transcription
5/4/2003 NATION-BUILDING: LESSONS LEARNED
~ It ()V /4', L. .~ I I I i 4 May 2003 MEMO TO: TO: Secretary TO: MEMO Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: FROM: Breme~ Ambassador Breme SUBJECT: Nation-Building: Nation-Building : ~learned SUBJECT: learned i 1 US efforts from the the US Saturday efforts at at Saturday I mentioned the new RAND paper on lessons learned from “nation building”. building". They studied seven cases from from the past half-century--Germany, half-century--Germany, Japan, Japan, "nation building". Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. The summary is attached. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. The summary is attached. Several key points bear on our our efforth Several efforts in Iraq. • coalition). substantial troop presence We succeeded when we had a very substantial presence (either (either US US or or coalition coalition). Ifin inIraq Iraq one one We took and inflicted more casualties when we we were were under-strength. under-strength. IfIrin capita we had in Bosnia, we we would of troops per capita in Bosnia, would need need about about sought the same ratio of 250,000 for 250,000 The Kosovo Kosovo model model would suggest suggest aa need need for for twice twice for at at least least two two years. years. The that many. many. Naturally, Naturally, this would include nowAmerican forces. this would include non-American non-American forces. forces. • Another major variable was the amount of external assistance per capita. capita. The external assistance The Kosovo Kosovo $19 billion over over two two years. years. model modei would yield the need for about about $19 decisive influence influence on on the the outcome. outcome. "It czn exert decisive iiifluence “It is nearly • Neighboring countries can impossible to put together a fragmented i1' its neighbors persist persist in in trying trying to to tear tear fragmented nation if it up." up.” • long time time eioes does not not guarantee guarantee success. success. Leaving early assures Staying aa long tioes success. failure. "No “No assures failure. failure. Staying sffort at democratization has taken hold in less than five years". years”. effort want to to bear bear these these points points While we are certainly not condemned to repeat history, we will want in mind work as: mind as as we we wark work through issues such as: ..0 The CENTCOM draw-down plan we touched on briefly Saturday; Saturday; • and Keeping a close eye on Iranian objectives and activities; and • The need to stress s1rt:ss to all concerned that this will be a long process. prcccss. proccss. e Attachment: Attachment: As As stated. stated. CC: CC: Paul Paul Wolfowitz, Wolfowitz, Doug Doug Feith, Feith, Ryan Henry Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS ~ U22336';/O, U2233L; /03 •a -1- -- 11 -- 1. 1.INRODUCTION INRODUCTIONAND 1. INRODUCTION ANDSIJNMARY SUMMARY This report contains the results the of a study on best of practices in This report contains the results of study on best best practices practices in in This report contains results aa study on nation nation building. building. to analyze U.S. and and The U.S. The purpose purpose of this this study study was was to analyze U.S. international military, political, political, and international international military, military, political, and economic economic activities activities in in postpostthe Second conflict situations situations since since the Second World War War to to determine determine key key conflict principles for for success success in in these these types types of of operations operations and and to to draw draw principles types of operations and to draw implications U.S. military U.S. military operations, operations, including including Iraq. Iraq. implications for for future future U.S. implications for future operations, including Iraq. This This report contains report this analysis, including the lessons report contains contains the the results results of of this this analysis, analysis, including including the the lessons lessons learned of these these operations, operations, and and then then applies applies these these lessons lessons to to learned from from each of operations, and then applies these lessons to the of Iraq.' Iraq.l the case case of Iraq.] RATIONALE RATIONALE FOR STUDY RATIONALE FOR STUDY STUDY During l990s During the the 1990s 1990s and and continuing continuing into into the the current current decade, decade, the the United United continuing into the current decade, the Uni ted States political, and and States has has invested invested significant significant amounts amounts of of military, military, political, political, and States economic economic capital capital into into operations operations conducted conducted in in the the aftermath aftermath of of conflict conflict conducted in the aftermath of conflict or civil civil unrest. unrest. or unrest. analyzed. analyzed. these post-conflict post-conflict operations operations have have been closely closely All these these operations Countless studies, Countless studies, studies, articles, articles, and and reports reports have have been been published Countless articles, of these on operations. on various various aspects aspects of these individual individual operations. operations. the most part, For For the the most most part, part, these these studies studies have have also also focused focused on on the the post-Cold post-Cold War War period. period. focused on the post-Cold War period. This is is the the This is the first effort of which which we we are are aware aware to to review review each each of of the the major major American effort of first to review each of the major American experiences in in nation exercises going to 1945, 1945, to compare nation building building exercises going back back to 1945, to compare experiences operations, to determine and contrast contrast the results of of these these various various operations, operations, to determine how how and contrast the results time, and and then lessons learned learned and and best best practices evolved evolved over time, lessons best practices then to to suggest suggest lessons time, how those those lessons lessons might might be be applied applied to to the the current current challenges challenges facing facing how those lessons to the facing American policymakers policymakers in in Iraq. Iraq. American in Iraq. The preponderance preponderance of this research research was was conducted conducted prior prior to to the the 1 The the of this March 19, 19, 2003 2003 commencement commencement of of Operation Operation Iraqi Iraqi Freedom, Freedom, but but the the project project March 19, 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the project of our our effert effort throughout throughout team was was focused focused on on the the near-term near-term implications implications of team effort the that end, end, this this study study served served as as the the point point of of the course course of of our our work. work. To that of our werk. end, this study served the departure RAND conference conference on nation building building and and the the future future of of Iraq Iraq departure for for aa RAND for on nation nation building and the future of Iraq was held held in in Arlington, Arlington, Virginia on on May 6-7, 6-7, 2003 2003 and and the the results results of of that Arlington, Virginia that was 6-7, conference were were factored factored into into the the final final version version of of this this study. study. A that that conference factored into the final version of this study. A attendees included in in Appendix Appendix A of of this this report. report. list of of conference conference attendees attendees is included list report. Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 1 - , • a XVll -- xvii SWNCC SWNCC State, Coordinating State, War and Navy Coordinating Conunittee Committee Committee TBD Thousand Barrels per per Day TMK T TMX Corps Kosovo Protection Corps UN UMANA UNAMA Uni ted Nations United Uni ted Nations Assistance Mission in United Afghanistan stan Afghani AfghaniStan UNHCR United Uni ted Nations Nations High for High Commissioner Commissioner for for Refugees Refugees UNITAF UN3LC UNJLC UNMIBH Force Unified Task Force Joint Logistics Logistics Center Logistics United Nations Joint United Uni ted Nations Mission Mission in in Bosnia Bosnia and Herzegovina Herzegovina UNMIK UNMIK Uni ted Nations Interim United Interim Administration in Kosovo Kosovo UNREA UNRRA United Nations Relief and and Rehabilitation Administration UNSCR Security Council United Nations Security Security Resolution USFORSOM UXO Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS Uni ted States United States Forces Forces Somalia Unexploded Ordnance - 22 --2- METHODOLOGY METHODOLOGY First developed working definition definition for nation building. First we we developed developed aaa working definition for for nation nation building. building. We We then identified identified ca ses for for research on that definition. then identified cases cases for research research based based on on that that definition. definition. Then Then we we established template for examining each of the cases. cases. of the the cases. established aaa template template for for examining examining each each of established Once we had Once we analyzed the individual cases, we made made cross-comparisons in areas analyzed the the individual individual cases, cases, we we made cross-comparisons cross-comparisons in in areas areas where where comparable statistics were available, for instance as regards the levels as regards regards the the levels levels comparable statistics statistics were were available, available, for for instance instance as of military and and police forces, of economic assistance of external external military police forces, forces, of of economic economic assistance assistance and and of of democratization and economic economic growth. democratization and economic growth. growth. Finally, we Finally, then turned turned to Iraq to Finally, we then then turned to to Iraq Iraq to to see lessons be applied there. see how how such such lessons lessons might might be be applied applied there. there. Various terms have been used used over over the past fifty-seven fifty-seven years to Various terms terms have have been over the the past fifty-seven years years to to describe the activities we are are seeking to analyze. describe the the activities activities we we are seeking seeking to to analyze. analyze. The The German German and Japanese operations were to as occupations. Japanese operations operations were were referred referred to to as as occupations. occupations. The The operations operations in in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and were were generally termed peacekeeping peacekeeping or or peace Somalia, Somalia, Haiti, Haiti, Bosnia Bosnia and were generally generally termed or peace peace enforcement. enforcement. The the U.S. administration administration has has preferred to use use the The current current D.S. terms stabilization and reconstruction reconstruction to refer to its its post conflict terms stabilization stabilization and reconstruction to to refer refer to to its post post conflict conflict operations in Afghanistan and and in in Iraq. operations in in Afghanistan in Iraq. Iraq. In these cases the intent all these these cases cases the the intent intent was was In all to to use use military military force force to underpin and in some cases to actually compel force to to underpin underpin and and in in some some cases cases to to actually actually compel compel aaa process of democratization. process of of democratization. democratization. Occupation, Occupation, enforcement, Occupation, peacekeeping, peacekeeping, peace peace enforcement, enforcement, stabilization and reconstruction reconstruction do do not fully fully capture this idea. stabilization and reconstruction do not not fully capture capture this this idea. idea. Neither does does the the term term nation nation building, building, but we believe it it comes comes closer closer to to the term nation building, but but we we believe believe it comes closer to encompassing encompassing the full full range of activities and objectives involved. of activities activities and and objectives objectives involved. involved. encompassing the the full range range of chose seven historical cases for this study:_Germany, Japan, We chose chose seven seven historical historical cases cases for for this this study: study: Germany, Germany, Japan, Japan, We P - Somalia, Haiti, Haiti, Bosnia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Somalia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan. These are are the the most most These important important instances instances in in which power has has been been used used to to instances in which American American military military power power has to underpin efforts at at democratization. democratization. We We did did not not include include the the American American underpin underpin efforts efforts at democratization. include the experience in the Philippines the societal colonial colonial experience experience in in the the Philippines Philippines because because the the societal societal transformation there attempted spanned several generations. transformation transformation there there attempted attempted spanned spanned several several generations. generations. We We did did not not include WWII occupation of Austria because we we feIt its lessons include the the post post WWII WWII occupation occupation of of Austria Austria because because we felt felt its its lessons lessons would largely largely parallel those of Germany and Japan. Japan. largely parallel parallel those those of of Germany Germany and Japan. We We did not not include include the Cold War War interventions interventions in in the the Dominican Dominican Republic, Republic, Lebanon, Lebanon, Grenada Grenada the interventions in the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada Panama because because these these were were shorter shorter lived lived and and more more limited in their and Panama these in their objectives. objectives. Once Once we we identified identified the the cases, cases, we we developed developed a structure for for examining examining identified the cases, aa structure for each. each. First, settlement First, of the the settlement settlement which which terminated terminated First, we we described described the the nature nature of the the conflict conflict in in question. question. in question. Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS We next next addressed addressed the the security, security, humanitarian, humanitarian, We the security, -3- -- 3 - adminis at adminis rative, rative, political, political, and and economic economic challenges challenges that that were were present at the out et. the out.et. We then then described described the roles that the United States and interna ional assumed during the intervention. international organizations assumed assumed during during the the intervention. intervention. interna ional organizations This This include for included discussion of the the military military mandate mandate for for the operation and and the the discussion of the operation type administration, any, the type of of civil civil administration, administration, if if any, any, that that would would be set set up in in the the type civil country country., We We next how each each operation operation developed developed overtime: over time: time: how how next examined examined how over the fragile; the secibrity environment stabilized stabilized or or grew grew more fragile; fragile; how how the the the sec the sec rity environment environment humanit rian situation evolved; how the civil administration interacted humanitcrian humanit nan situation situationevolved; evolved;how how the the civil civil administration administration interacted with th appointed appointed or or elected elected government; government; how the process process of democra ization developed and how reconstruction reconstruction progressed across across the the democratization country TO FRCM GEIMANY GE TO AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN FROH FROM Th post first post WWII WWII occupations occupations of Germany and Japan were America's first force in in the the aftermath of aa conflict conflict experierces with the the use use of of military force a comparatively rapid and fundamental fundamental societal societal to unde pin a transfo ations of that that ations with with the the objective of rendering any repetition of likely. The endeavors established established that that conflic conflicu less likely. The success of these endeavors democrasy was transferable; transferable; that societies societies could, could, under under certain cer ta in democra circumsuances, be compelled to to transform trans form themselves, themselves, and that that such such circums enduring. transfodmations could prove enduring. transfo These two operations set aa scandar. for post conflict conflict nation building that for post that has not since been been standar matched . matched. Fo Fo the next next forty forty years, years, from 1950 to 1990, the 1990, there were few few attempts attempts replicate to repl cate these these successes. to repl'cate these early early successes. successes. In world of of the Cold Cold In the bipolar world f a.edwith with the the threat threat of of nuclear nuclear destruction, destruction, American American policy policy War, fa faced War, the threat destruction, emphasied containment, emphasized quo. containment, deterrence and and maintenance maintenance of of the the status status quo. emphasi containment, deterrence quo. were made to to promote promote democratic democratic and and free market values, values, but but Efforts were Efforts to democratic free market values, but y without the compulsion, with the generally general the element of compulsion, compulsion, even with the most most recalciurant American military military power power tended tended to to be be employed recalcitrant recalci rant of of students. students. American to be employed they were, were, not not to improve them; to preserve preserve the the to keep to keep things things as as they were, them; to preserve the manage crises, crises, equilibrium, equilib ium, ium, not alter it; it; to manage crises, not not to to resolve resolve the the underlyng problems. underlying problems. Germany, Korea, Vietnam, China, Cyprus and Palestine underly'ng problems. Germany, Germany, Korea, Korea, Vietnam, Vietnam, China, China, Cyprus Cyprus and and Palestine Palestine international forces forces remained rernaine. divided. divided. American and international remaine divided. forces were were used used to to other divides, divides, not not to compel resolution of the maintaiq maintai these these and other divides, resolution of of the Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 44 ---4- disputes. underlying disputes. underlying disputes. American interventions in piaces like the Dominican American interventions interventions in in places places like like the the Dominican Dominican Republic, Lebanon, or Panama were intended to displace unfriendly Republic, Lebanon, Grenada Grenada or or Panama Panama were were intended intended to to displace displace unfriendly Republic, Lebanon, regimes reinstall friendly ones, rather than to about regimes and and reinstall friendly ones, ones, rather rather than than to to bring bring about about fundamental societal fundamental fundamental societal societal transformations. transformations. The created new problems for for the United Uni ted States States the Cold War created The end of of the created new new problems problems for the the United States _/ L Z ---~ and opened opened negsibil-ities. opened new p o s m ties and n~~Q§ßibjlLties. ~ Prominent rash of state failures. Prominent among among the the new new problems problems was was aaa rash rash of of state state failures. failures. the weak or or artificial states had been been propped propped up up During During the the Cold War many weak or artificial artificial states states had UP by by one (and in some case both) for geopolitical one side side or or the the other other (and (and in in some some case case by by both) both) for for geopolitical geopolitical reasons. reasons. For instance, instance, Somalia, Yugoslavia and had each each instance, Somalia, Somalia, Yugoslavia Yugoslavia and and Afghanistan Afghanistan had each been been regarded important pieces pieces on on the Cold War War chessboard. regarded as as important on the the Cold War chessboard. chessboard. had external support as result. had received received extensive extensive external external support support as as aaa result. result. Regimes there Regimes there there With the With the the disappearance the Soviet Union, disappearance of of the Soviet Union, Union, Moscow Moscow lost lost its its capability capability and and Washington its its geopolitical rational for sustaining such regimes. its geopolitical geopolitical rational rational for for sustaining sustaining such such regimes. regimes. Denied Denied support, such states disintegrated. such support, support, these these and other other states states disintegrated. disintegrated. 1989, aa balance balance of terror no longer impelled the United States States After balance of After 1989, 1989, a of terror terror no no longer longer impelled impelled the the United States the status quo. to quo. to preserve preserve the the status status quo. This that Washington was free to This meant meant that that Washington Washington was was free free to to ignore instability when it did not threaten American interests. interests. ignore regional regional instability instability when when it it did did not not threaten threaten American interests. the other, this freedom that the On On the the other, other, this freedom also also meant meant that that the the United United States States now now had the to actually resolve, rather than than to option unrivaled power option of of using its its unrivaled power to to actually actually resolve, resolve, rather rather than to simply international problems of of importance to it. simply manage manage or contain contain international international problems problems of importance importance to to it. it. ted States feIt able, From 1990 1990 onward chose, onward the the Uni United States has felt felt able, able, when it it chose, chose, to to police ceasefires restore quo but intervene tore the status but intervene not not simply simply to to police police ceasefires or res restore status quo to about the democratic transformation of conflicted societies, of conflicted conflictedsocieties, societies, to bring bring about about the the democratic democratic transformation transformation of Germany and much and Japan four earlier. much as as it it had those those of of Germany Germany Japan four four decades decades earlier. earlier. And after after 1989 Uni ted States able to secure international 1989 the the United States was was also also more more able able to to secure secure broad broad international international support for such when it chose to mount them. support for for such such efforts efforts when when it it chose chose to to mount mount them. them. The community also more The rest rest of the the international international community community also also became became more more interventionist. interventionist. interventionist. Of 54 operations the has mounted since since Of the the 54 5 4 peace peace operations operations the the UN UN has has mounted since 1945, (or 80%) have been been initiated since 1989. 1945, 1945, 41 41 (or (or nearly nearly 80%) 80%) have have been initiated initiated since since 1989. 1989. Fifteen Fifteen are are still underway. still underway. underway. Despite this this more international environment, the costs more supportive supportive international international environment, environment, the the costs costs and nation building remained remained high. Washington and risks risks associated associated with with nation nation building remained high. high. Washington Washington consequently embarked on on such endeavors lightly. It withdrew from from consequently has has not embarked on such such endeavors endeavors lightly. lightly. It It withdrew from Somalia in 1993 at the first serious resistance. Somalia in in 1993 1993 at at the the first first serious serious resistance. resistance. Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS It It opted out of opted out out of of -5- - 55 -- interna ional efforts to to stem stern genocide genoeide in in Rwanda Rwanda in in 1994. 1994. internauional Europea It resisted efforts to entangle entangle it it in in Balkan Balkan peace peace enforcement enforeement for for the the first first four rs of of Yugoslavia's Yugoslavia's violent violent breakup. breakup. four ye yers after intervening intervening in in Even after Bosnia, more years years seeking seeking aa non-military non-military solution solution to to Bosnia, it spent three more ethnic leaning in Kosovo. ethnic ileaning Ne ertheless, ertheless, despite despite this reticence, throughout the the 1990's 1990's~ despite this this reticence, reticence, throughout throughout the 1 9 9 0 ' s *each success intervention, from from Somalia Somalia to to Haiti Haiti to to Bosnia BosItia to success ve ve American led intervention, - _ _ ---_._- _ ~ Kosovo, in intent intent than than its its in scope and mmore o r~ eu ~ os u in in s intent than its Kosovo, proved proved wider wider in in scope scope and and more ambijus predece sor. In In Somalia Somalia the the original original objective objective was was purely purely humanitarian, humanitarian, predece sor. subsequ to democratization. democratization. subsequ ntly expanded to the objective objective was to to In Haiti the reinsta a preexisting preexisting regime. regime. In In Bosnia, Bosnia, it it was was to to create create a a reinsta 11 and renew a multiet multiet ic state. In Kosovo it it was was to to establish establish from from the the ground ground up up aa democra Ic ic polity. George WWBush Bush criticized criticized the the Clinton Clinton Administration Administration As a candidate, George for for thi t expansive agenda agenda of of nation nation building. building. As As President, President, he he adopted adopted aa more mo est est set set of of objectives objectives when when faced faced with aa comparable challenge in more mo objectives faced with a comparable comparable challenge challenge in Afghani Afghani tan. tan. toward toward Bush Administration's efforts to to reverse reverse the The The Bush Bush Administration's Administration's efforts efforts to reverse the trend trend ver more ambitious American led led nation nation building building ver larger larger and and more more ambitious ambitious American operati short lived, however. short lived, lived, however. however. operati ns has proved short In the United Dnited States States In Iraq Iraq the the United States task comparable comparable in in nature nature to to the the transformational transformational attempts attempts has tak n on a task the transformational attempts still u derway in Bosnia and scope to the earlier American American and Kosovo, Kosovo, and and in in scope seope to to the the earlier ocCupat ons of Germany Germany and and Japan. Japan. CROSS-C E TRENDS Fol lowing lowing the the seven seven individual individual country studies, studies, we sought sought studies. sought to to extract was broadly comparable across across the cases. t was broadly comparable comparable across the the cases. cases. data th;t Although each Although each case case was uni. e, we we attempted attempted find find areas where comparisons comparisons could prove prove useful. useful uni e, e. attempted find areas areas where comparisons could useful. partcu1ar, we In particular, we to quantify and and compare compare measures measures of we attempted attempted to to quantify of nation buildin. peacekeepingtroops, input, that is is to to say say peacekeeping-troops, police and and economic economic building input, input. peacekeeping-troops, police assista ce-and ceand output, assistaxe-and output,in in the form of democratic elections elections and economic economic output, in the the form form of of democratic elections and growth. growth. Mlitary Militaryforce forcelevels levels variedsignificantly significantlyacross across the cases. cases. force levelsvaried across the cases. They 1.6 million million U.S. forces in the European European Theater Theater of of from the the 1.6 ranged from ranged million U.S. D.S. forces forces in in the Operatons atthe the endof ofthe the SecondWorld World War War to to the the approximately approximately 14,000 14,000 Operationsat Operat'ons at the end theSecond 14,000 U.S. d international U.S. a international troops troops currently in Afghanistan. O.S. aard international troops currently eurrently in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS at gross Looking at --66 - numbers, however, does not allow for comparison across the numbers, numbers, however, however, does does not not allow allow for for useful useful comparison comparison across across the the cases cases because the the size size and and populations populations of of the the countries countries being being analyzed analyzed was was so so because and of the disparate. disparate. We We therefore therefore decided decided to to look look at at the the number number of of U.S. U.S. and and U.S. internationalmilitary military sojrperper thousand i n each each of of the the international military soldiers Der thousandinhabitnts_.i inhabiunts in international soldiers thousand inhabitants cases. cases. In addition, we important levels In it force l o o k at at how how force force levels In addition, addition, we thought thought it it important important to to look changed time. changed over over time. time. Figure S.l shows the troops per thousand Figure S.l shows the number number of of troops per thousand Figure S.l inhabitants for for each each of of the the cases cases at at the the outset outset of of the the intervention intervention and and inhabitants the at the intervention intervals over·time: overtime: at various various intervals intervals over'time: at Military Presence Over Over Time Time (soldiers per thousand inhabitants) Military Presence Time (soldiers (soldiers per thousand inhabitants) m r 1ol 30.00 30.00 IiIGermany Germany •UJapan Japan oD Somalia oD Haiti !O.OO 20.00 .8osnia Bosnia oD Koso\A? Kosoo • Afghanistan 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 YeO Year0 YearO Year2 Year 2 Year 5 Year5 Year 1) 1) Interventionover overtime time(year (yearO 0= =the intervention) Intervention the year year of of intervention) intervention) Intervention over time (year 0 the F'igure S.l:S.l: Military Presence Presence Over Time Over Time Figure Military As the the data data illustrates, illustrates, force force levels levels varied varied widely across across these these As illustrates, force levels . Bosnia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kosovo, and and particularly particularly Germany Germany started started with with Bosnia, Kosovo, and particularly Germany started with _ o p e. raw ~ military forces forces while while the the initial initial levels levels in in Japan, Japan, substantial numbers numbers of substantial of military military forces while the initial levels in Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Haiti, and and especially especially Afghanistan Afghanistan were were much much more more modest. modest. Somalia, Haiti, and especially Afghanistan were much more modest. Somalia, These These levels levels (with (with the the partial partial exception exception of of Germany) Germany) all all decreased decreased over over time, time, (with the partial exception of all decreased over time, but the differences differences across across the the cases cases had had but by by varying varying degrees. degrees. Overall, Overall, the varying degrees. Overall, across the cases had significant implications implications for for other other aspects aspects of of the the post-conflict post-conflict significant for other aspects of the post-conflict operation. operation. conducted Jmisimilar ssimilaranalysis inthese these seven seven We conducted conducted analysisonon extern ass;stance _ictancecein external in these seven cases. cases. Cumulative figures figures are are useful useful to some some degree, degree, but but to to assess assess the the Cumulative figures are useful to degree, to impact of assistance assistance on on individuals individuals in in post-conflict post-conflict situations, situations, it it true impact individuals situations, l o o k at at how how much assistance assistance was was provided on on a per capita capita to look is is important to aper Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS -7- -- 77 -- Figure 5.2 per capita assistance was provided S.2 captures how L e pperca w rovided Figure S.2 captures captures how how much muchrovided basis basis during the the first first two two years in in_ the various various cases cases (in (in2001 2001 to ea.h erson ea h1 person erson during during the first two years years i~ the the various cases (in 2001 toea U.5. ollars) U.S. U . S . iollars): illars):: External Assistance Capita in First First TwoT!aEsAfter Ye r External Assistanceper per Capita in First External Assistance Capita in T~r Tr Conflict Conflict (2001 Dollars) Dollars) (2001 $1 ,600 ,---~--'-------'------' -._--~.,,~.-'-'~'-~-'-----'--- -.-.---------...--~-.-, $1,600 $1,400 +---~~~----- $1,400 $1,200 +---~~--------, $1,200 $1 ,000 +------'----'---'-~-'-----'-$1,000 $800 - f - - . - - - - c . , . . , . - _ - - - _ - ' - - - ' $800 $600 + - - - - - - ' - - - - - ' - - - - ' - - - - - ' $600 $400 +-'--~-----~----' $400 $200 $200 +--rn;;;~--'-------$0 / ,,~ ro (Q Ojt;. Ojt;. ~ ~ ~~ ~~'lß ci [l)-~ )'l>-~ R>~ ~, KiÇ ~, ,,~ "q) ~ OjOS " .~'x--~ F f I ~" ~~ ~, !ö f0CS OjC?5 ~'l>- oCj <Q ~ ~ ~o 0 *-oCj ~~ R5 "q) rvCS ~~ ,'lß .~ ~ qj ~~ ~ S.2: Figure Figure S.2: S.2: Per Capita External Assistance Due varying populations, populations, comparable sums of money can can have drastically populations, comparable comparable sums sums of of money can have have drastically Due to t varying example, although different effects on of country. diffe mnt t effects on the residents residents of of aaa country. country. For For example, example, although far the most assistance assistance in terms ($12 Germany was granted granted by by far far the the most assistance in in monetary monetary terms terms ($12 ($12 Germa Germa r was the citizen came to only little over $200. billion), billi i ), ) , the the amount amount per per citizen citizen came came to to only only aaa little little over over $200. $200. Meanwhile total assistance, assistance, was Kosovo, terms of total was Kosovo, which which ranked ranked fourth fourth in in terms terms assistance, Meanw .le Kosovo, over $800 per resident. resident. over $800 $800 per resident. granted grant L over In economy, these In aa recovering recovering economy, economy, these discrepancies ancies are significant. are quite quite significant. significant. discr bancies INCLUSIONS CASE NCLUSIONS CASE CONCLUSIONS 1 set standards standards for for post-conflict The German and and Japanese Japanese occupations occupations set post-conflict lee German and Japanese occupations post-conflict transformation that have have not not since One of most rmation that most lrmation that have not since been equaled. equaled. One One of the the most trans important questions an nt questions such as this must to to address, therefore, .nt an inquiry inquiry such such as as this this must to address, address,therefore, therefore, impor - '.ntly while ’ ‘ ntly while all those those that why those two operations operations &urce- ------ -; iis s wh W~h~Yi:t~h~o.:s~e~t~w::o~o~p~e::r::.a~t~i.9o~n~sUlllJ:::cee~4-El'tr-l~H.l.i·aIln!tl12y~w~h~i 1 e all all tho se that tha t Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS - a8 --8- have come come after after have have fallen fallen short, short, to to one one degree degree or or another. another. come after have short, to one degree or another. The easiest easiest The answer is answer is is that Germany and and Japan Japan were were already already highly highly developed, developed, answer that Germany Japan already highly developed, economically advanced it economically advanced societies. societies. And this certainly certainly explains explains why why it economically societies. And this this certainly explains why it easier to to reconstruct reconstruct the the German German and and Japanese Japanese economies economies than than it it proved easier reconstruct the German and Japanese economies than it has to to fundamentally fundamentally reform reform those those underdeveloped underdeveloped economies economies in in our our other other has has reform those underdeveloped economies in our other five five case case studies. studies. five - is not not aaa sufficient sufficient answer, answer, however. however. Nation Nation building, building, as as Economics is sufficient answer, however. Nation building, as Economics we it, and more importantly, as those who launched the seven we have have defined defined it, it, and and more more importantly, importantly,as as those those who who launched launched the the seven seven interventions studied studied herein herein defined defined American American objectives, objectives, was was not not interventions interventions defined American objectives, was not primarily primarily about about working working economic, economic,but but rather rather political political transformations. transformations. working economic, but rather political transformations. democracy in in Latin America, Asia, and parts of Africa The The spread spread of of democracy in Latin Latin America, America, Asia, Asia, and and parts parts of of Africa Africa suggests that that this this is is not not uniquely uniquely an an artifact artifact of of Western Western culture culture or or of suggests uniquely an artifact of Western culture or of advanced industrial industrial economies: economies: that that democracy democracy can, can, indeed, indeed, take take root root in in advanced that democracy can, indeed, take root in circumstances neither obtains. obtains. No No post post conflict conflict program program of of circumstances where where neither neither obtains. No post conflict of "reconstruction" could “reconstruction” could turn turn Somalia, Somalia, Haiti Haiti or or Afghanistan Afghanistan into into thriving thriving "reconstruction" Somalia, or Afghanistan into thriving c; - centers of of prosperity. prosperity.But Butth~i~~ thfai1ux centers of prosperity. But th failurb of of American-led American-led interventions interventions to to centers Americ~~d interventions to -- install substantial substantial democracies democracies in in those those countries has has other other than than purely install democracies in those countries countries has other than purely economic economic explanations. explanations. /------ -- . All three three of those societies ar--d ed ethnic3y, sociothree of of those thosesocieties societies re(iided ethnicJy, socioAll ar~ided ethnic~y, socio...--------~------- __ _--------- --._---.._---.._--_ .. ”. and/or tribally tribally in in ways ways that Germany Germany and and Japan Japan were were not. not. So So So economically and/or in helps. But But again, again, it it is is not essential. essential. For For the the kind kind of of homogeneity helps. again, it is essential. the communal hatreds hatreds that mark Somalia, Somalia, Haiti and and Afghanistan are are even more even more more communal Somalia, in Bosnia and and Kosovo, Kosovo, where, where, nevertheless, nevertheless, the the process process of marked in Kosovo, where, nevertheless, the process of democratization has has made some some progress. democratization has made some progress. progress. What distinguish Kosovo, on the one hand, distinguish Germany, Germany, Japan, Bosnia and and Kosovo, Germany, Japan, Japan, Bosnia Kosovo, on on the the one one hand, hand, from Somalia, on the the other, other, are not their levels from Somalia, Somalia, Haiti Haiti Haiti and Afghanistan Afghanistan on other, are levels of of of Western culture, culture, of economic development, development, or of national homogeneity. Western culture, of of economic development, or or of of national national homogeneity. homogeneity. Rather what what distinguishes distinguishes these two groups, one where democratization democratization has Rather distinguishes these these two two groups, groups, one one where democratization has or of effQrt or is is taking hold, and the the other where it has not, is the level is taking taking hold, hold, and the other other where where it it has has not, not, is is the the level level of of effort effQrt the put into into their democratic transformations. transformations. the United united States States has has put into their their democratic transformations. Nation building, as this this study illustrates, is time and resource resource consuming building, building, as this study study illustrates, illustrates, is is aa a time time and resource consuming effort. States and its its allies have put put t effort. The United States effort. The States and its allies allies have t~y -- fiVe~)m~e troops and money money into into post post conflict conflict Kosovo Kosovo than thaninto intopost postCQDflict conf1t troops into Kosovo into and . t , Afghanistan. This higher level of input input accounts, at least in part, for Afghanistan. Afghanistan. higher level level of input accounts, accounts, at at least least in in part, part, for for This higher Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS - 9 -9- the her level level of in terms terms of of democratic democratic institutions institutions and the hi higher level of output output in in terms of democratic institutions growth. growth. econom:.c econom cc growth. In the while it it was shouldering all the burden of the late late 1940's, 1 9 4 0 ’ s , while while it was was shouldering shouldering all all the the burden burden of I transformation and most of that for West Germany, the United Japans Japans transformation transformation and and most most of of that that for for West West Germany, Germany, the the United States produced produced some same 50% of the world's GNP. GNP. By the the 1990's, States 5 0 % of of the the world's world’s GNP. By the 1990's, 1 9 9 O ’ s , when when nation nation some 50% buildi gg again building 22%. again came into vogue, that figure was down to around 22%. again came came into into vogue, vogue,that thatfigure figurewas was down downto toaround around22%. Intern Intern. tional tional burden burden sharing sharing had had become become commensurately commensurately more more important. important. Throughout the the 1990's 1990's the the United United States States wrestled wrestled with with the the problem problem of of how ac ieve ieve wider wider participation participation in in its its nation nation building building endeavors endeavors while while how eserving adequate adequate unity unity of of command. command. also p eserving In Somalia and Haiti, In Haiti, the the States experimented experimented with with sequential sequential arrangements arrangements by by which which it it United States organi ed, led, led, largely largely manned manned and and funded funded the the initial initial phase phase of of the the organi'ed, operaton operat"onitself, itself, but but then thenquickly quicklyturned turnedresponsibility responsibility over over to to aa more more broadl, representative representative (and (and more more widely widely funded) funded) United United Nations Nations force. force. efforts can efforts can not not be be deemed deemeda a succs.'j. sU~. In Bosnia the United United States States succeeded succeeded in in achieving achieving unity unity of of command command and and broad broad participation on the partic"pation the military military side side of of the the operation operation through through NATO, NATO, but but resistdd the the logic logic of of achieving achievinga a comparable comparable arrangement arrangement on on the the civil civil side. In Kosovo, Kosovo, the United States States achieved achieved unity unity of command and broad participation on both the the military military and and civil civil sides, sides, through through NATO NATO and and the the ectively. UN respectively. While the the military military and and civil civil aspects aspects of of that that operation operation remained under different management, dunder management, the the United United States States assured assured that that the the mandatessand and capabilities of UMMIK would would of the the two two entities, entities, KFOR and UMMIK gap opening opening between between them. them. overlap thereby preventing preventing aa gap one models proved proved entirely entirely satis etÖTy' rangements in in one of these these models however, do da seem to have provided provided th th "best amalgam of (IKosovo, , however, lead-. ship, ship, European European participation, participation, broad broad fin; cial bur.- merican sharingid and strong unity of command. Every Every international international official official in in Kosovo Kosovo works works one of of two two people, people, the the NATO NATO commander commander or or the the Special Special ultimately for one Representative of of the Secretary Secretary General. General. Neither Neither of of these these is is an an American, American, but b of its its credibility in and its its influence influence in in NATO NATO virtue of in the the region region and and the ON UN Security Council, Council, the United States States has has been been able able to to maintain maintain and leadershi a fully satisfactory satisfactory leaderj rr1p wh1 p'ying oJy 1E% of the the and fielding fielding only only 16% 16% of of the the peacekeeping peacekeeping troops. troops. reconstruction costs and Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 10 lo ---- 10 The efficacy efficacy of of the the Kosovo Kosovo model model for for managing aa large large scale scale peace peace The efficacy for scale operation depends depends very heavily upon upon the the ability ability of of the the United United States and and operation the Uni ted States States and to sttain stain common vision vision of of the the enterprises enterprises its principal principal allies allies to its allies to aa common ttain a of the the relevant relevant institutions, Cbjectives and to to then then shape shape response response of objectives ~bjectives and and to then shape response of the relevant institutions, institutions, NATO, the European European Union Union and and the the United United Nations, Nations, to those those principally NATO, the the Union and the United Nations, to to those principally NATO, agreed purposes. agreed purposes. agreed purposes. - the principal principal participants participants in aa nation nation building Where the participants in nation building exercise have such vision, the Kosovo model viable exercise have have such such aa common common vision, vision, the the Kosovojnodel Kosovo mo del offers offers aaa viable viable amalgam of sharing of command. of burden burden sharing sharing and and unity unity of of command. command. ia More recently, recently, ii~fghanfita~, Afghanis Gn', the theUnited States opted opted for for parallel parallel fghanisan, More recently, the United States States opted for parallel arrangements on on the the military military side, side, and even greater greater variety on the the civil. civil. arrangements on the side, and even even greater variety on on the civil. international force, force, with with no no US participation, participation, operates in in Kabul, Kabul, An international international force, no US US participation, operates operates in Kabul, An while mostly US US force operates everywhere else. while while aanational, a national, national, mostly US force force operates operates everywhere everywhere else. else. The has UN has has The UN responsibility for for promoting promoting political political transformation transformation while while individual individual responsibility for transformation while individual so). donors coordinate coordinate economic economic reconstruction reconstruction (or (ormore more often often fail fail to to do do so). coordinate economic reconstruction (or more often fail to do so). donors This since the a marginal improvement on This arrangement arrangement is is a marginal improvement on Somalia, Somalia, since since the separate separate US and international international forces forces are are at at least not operating operating in in the the same same US and international forces least not physical space, but represents clear regression regression from from what achieved space, represents aa clear what waS physical space, what was was achieved in Haiti, Haiti, Bosnia or, in in particular Kosovo. Haiti, Bosnia or, or, in particular Kosovo. Kosovo. in aspect in in which these these seven seven cases cases differ differ is is that that of of Another aspect ~. & rzw. were begun withclear cleardeparture departure deadlines deadlines which which were Some were were begun ben with Some clear departure deadlines adhered to--Haiti. Some began with with very short time horizons horizons saw horizons but adhered to--Haiti. to--Haiti. short time but saw those amended -- Germany, Germany, Japan, Japan, Somalia Somalia and Bosnia. those Germany, Somalia and Bosnia. Bosnia. some were were begun And some some were begun And without Kosovo and and Afghanistan. without any any expectation expectation of of an an early early exit exit -- Kosovo any expectation early exit Afghanistan. l! - The The record suggests suggests that that while while staying staying long long does does not not guarantee guarantee success, success, record suggests that staying long does not guarantee success, leaving leaving early early assures assures failure. failure. leaving early assures failure. To date, date, effort at at enforced enforced To no effort date, no - democratization has taken hold hold\in less than than five five years.\ years.\ democratization hold\n has taken in less less than five years. -.. And if if democratization democratization takes takes hold, hold, is is that the ultimate ultimate exit And hold, if takes is that the strategy? strategy? These case case studies studies suggest suggest not. not. These suggest not. forces left American have left American forces forces have clear and Haiti-but remain present present in in every every clear failures failures behind behind -- Somalia failures remain present in every Somalia and Haitibut remain successful successful or or still still pending pending case case -- Gerrnany, Germany, Japan, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo and and Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Bosnia, Kosovo successful or still case Afghanistan. Afghanistan. These interventions were motivated or These five five interventions interventions were were motivated motivated by by regional regional or global geopolitical geopolitical concerns. Democratization alone may not not fully fully address address global concerns. Democratization fully alone rnay such concerns. concerns. Germany and Japan Japan were disarmed and and consequently consequently required required such concerns. Gerrnany and were disarmed American help help in in providing providing for for their their external external security security long long after after they they American American help in for their long after they became reliable reliable democracies fully fully capable capable of of looking looking after after their their became reliable democracies dernocracies fully their own own Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS -- 11 11 -- intern inter 1i 1 affairs. affairs. Bosnia, Afghanistan also also may may well weIl require require Bosnia, Bosnia, Kosovo Kosovo and Afghanistan also require Americ (or perhaps, in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, European) European) Ameri nn of Bosnia and Kosovo, Kosovo, European) n (or (or perhaps, perhaps, in in the the case case of assist their external security long after after their their internal internal peace peaee assist nee assis nce nce with with their their external external security security long long after their internal peace is is est is es blished. blished. this help will take the the form form of of an an external Whether Whether this this help help will will take take the form of an external troop troop troop resenee, security guarantee, or external external leadership leadership in in resence, resence, an an external external security security guarantee, guarantee,or or external leadership forgin forgi. new seeurity arrangements remains to to be seen, but some new regional regional security security arrangements arrangements remains remains to be seen, seen, but some some - Amerie and or European seeurity eommitment is likely to continue continue long Amer ic n Americ n and and or or European European security security commitment commitment is is likely to to continue long ----_ after he is eom leted. after he demoeratie democratic democratic transformation transformation is is com.leted. completed. a f E 'he Japan Japan Indeed, and Indeed, Indeed, if Germany and any guide, the more thorough the democratic democratic transformation, transformation, the the re re any any guide, guide, the the more more thorough thorough the the democratic transformation, more d eply forged may be be the residual links. eply forged forged may be the the residual residual links. links. more d The record reeord suggests suggests that that The record suggests that in ones image creates ties of of affection as well weIl as as of aa nation nation in in ones ones image image creates creates ties ties of affection as as well as of build. bui idi g J long after the suceessful birth. depend ncy that that persist persist long long after after the the successful successful birth. birth. depenc ncy eonsiderations in mind, we came eame to to the the following following general general th these these considerations considerations in 1 th in mind, mind, we we came to the followinq qeneral W - to those associated assoeiated with specifie operations: operations: conclu concli ions Lons in in addition addition to to those those associated with specific specific operations: factors influence the ease diffieulty of of nation nation building building Many Many factors factors influence influence the the ease or or difficulty difficulty -demoeratie experienee, level of eeonomie development, development, - prior prior democratic democratic experience, experience, level level of economic economic development, national national homogeneity. homogeneity. homogeneity. Another important Another important determinant of of success, success, important determinant suceess, however, is the the level level of of effort, in time, men and and money, money, however, is however, is the level of effort, effort, in in time, time, men mo~ey, ' -4zzprnzess. -iuve~ted i iitedin L1it in lheprocess. pröeess. Multilateral nation ~ Multilatera~ nation building building is is more complex and and time time consuming is more complex complex unilateral. It is considerably less expensive for any than unilateral. unilateral. also considerably than is also eonsiderably for any one participant. participant. one Multilateral nation nation building can can produce more thoroughgoing Multilateral ean produce produee more thoroughgoing transformations and and greater greater regional regional reconciliation than transformations regional reconciliation reeonciliation than unilateral unilateral efforts. efforts. efforts. of command command and broad participation participation are are compatible compatible if the the Unity ot Unity of command and broad eompatjble if major participants share a common vision and and can can shape partieipants share a common common vision ean shape shape international international institutions institutions to their needs. needs. institutions to to their needs. Neighboring Neighboring states states can exert decisive decisive influence, for states can ean exert deeisive influence, influenee, for for better better or or I worse. worse. It together It is is near near impossible to put together together a a fragmented fragrnented it apart. apart. nation if if its its neighbors neighbors persist persist in in trying trying to to tear tear it nation apart. effort should should be be made made to to secure their support. Every effort to secure seeure their their support. support. Accountability for post injustices injustices can be be aa powerful component component Aecountability for for post injustiees can a powerful eomponent - democratization. It also of democratization. democratization. also tends, tends, however, to be among of tends, however, however, to among the the most most difficult and controversial aspects of any any nation-building nation-building diffieult controversial aspects aspeets of Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS J . .-- 12 12 - endeavor should, therefore, be attempted only if there endeavor and and should, should, therefore, therefore, be be attempted attempted only only if if there there is is aa to the the overall operation. operation. deep and long long term committeemen to deep term committeemen committeemen to the overall overall operation . n~ b~ilding.~seems ijseems - C'. There is is no quick quick route route to to nation nation building. building. Fiveyears)seems the the There route to nation • L minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy. minimum required required to to enforce enforce an an enduring enduring transition transition to to democracy. democracy. • Successful nation nation building building can can create create ties, ties, affection affection and and a Successful building can create ties, affection a long-term for external security long after the long-term dependence dependence for external external security security long long after after the the need dependence for for assistance assistance in in building democratic forms forms and and maintaining for in building democratic democratic forms and internal security is past. internal security security is is past. past. APPLYING THESE TSE LESSONS IRAQ APPLYING THESE LESSONS TO TO IRAQ IRAQ Finally, reviewing these experiences and seeking to draw the Finally, after reviewing reviewing these these experiences experiences and and seeking seeking to to draw draw the the Finally, after resultant lessons, lessons, this this study study suggests suggests how how these these best best practices practices might be be lessons, this study suggests these practices might might be resultant applied future operations, and, in pa~tjClllar to toIrag. applied to to future future operations, operations,and, and, in in patirìì1ar a p o Iraq. Iraq. the military phase of of the the war war against against Iraq Iraq went went better better Although the the military phase phase of the against Irag went than could could have hoped for for and and the the regime regime collapsed faster than than than have been been hoped for and the regime collapsed much much faster faster than has been left with with an an unenviable unenviable task in seeking seeking expected, the the U.S. many expected, expected, D.S. has been left left nation build to nation build in in Iraq. Iraq. to in Irag. The British British spent spent several several decades decades forging forging an an The of the the Ottoman Ottoman empire empire but but neither neither they nor nor Iraqi state state out out of remains remains of Iragi of the Ottoman empire neither they they nor their Iraqi Iraqi successors successors succeeded succeeded in in forging forging aareal a real real Iraqi Iraqi nation; nation; none none Iragi successors succeeded in forging Iragi nation; none their democratic, pluralist polity. really really tried tried to to build build aaa democratic, democratic,pluralist pluralist polity. polity. Nation buildina in Iraq Iraqfaces facesaaanumber numberof ofdeep-rooted deep-rootedchallenqes,. challenues. building in in Irag faces number of deep-rooted challenges. Nation buildinq Iraq has no no tradition tradition of of pluralist pluralist democracy; democracy; instead instead politics politics has has always always Iraq Irag tradition of pluralist democracy; instead politics has always been been about about authoritarian authoritarian rule rule and and the the settlement settlement of of disputes disputes by force. authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force. force. Although a sense of of Iraqi Iraqi national national identity identity does does exist, exist, this this does does not not aa sense Iragi national identity exist, this of identity identity along along ethnic, ethnic, geographic, geographic, tribal tribal or or override communal communal forms forms of forms of identity along ethnie, geographie, tribal override religious religious grounds. grounds. grounds. The majority m , majority of the the apopulation, population, the themKurds Kurds and and Shia, Shia, The of .., have no real real tradition tradition of of representation representation as as communities communities in in national Iraqi have representation as communities in Iragi politics but but will will now now have to be be brought brought into into the the polity. polity. but now have have to to brought into the polity. politics To make make To matters worse, worse, crimeand and banditry banditry are arestrongly stronglyrooted. rooted. worse, organized organized crime erime and are strongly rooted. matters Furthermore, the past decade decade of of sanctions sanctions and Saddam Hussein's Hussein's Furthermore, decade of sanctions Furthermore, the dictatorship have have denuded Iraq of of its its once once strong strong middle middle class, class, who who had had aa dictatorship denuded Iraq Irag of its once strong middle class, of aaa civil civil society. society. stake in in development development of stake of civil society. In addition addition to to these these particular Iraqi Iraqi problems, problems, the the country faces In Iragi problems, faces of aaa society society emerging emerging from from aaa long long period period of of the familiar familiar challenges challenges of familiar ehallenges of society emerging from long the Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS I -- 13 13 13 -- arian rule. rule. The The military, military, security security services services and totali.:arian rule. The military, security services and bureaucracy need totali arlan be :radically adically reformed reformed and purged. to be adically reformed and purged. purged. of human rights rights abuses. victim, victims of of human human rights abuses. abuses. to be aehieved for for Justice Justice needs needs to to be achieved achieved for The eeonomy needs a aa major to The economy economy needs major overhaul overhaul to to in the global market. make ii; competitive competitive in in the the global global market. market. make faced any attempt hese challenges achieve These challenges would would have have faced faced any any attempt attempt to aehieve achieve transfDrmation in Iraq. Iraq. rmation in in Iraq. transfermation Due to to the the diplomatic diplomatic circumstances circumstances of of the the to the diplomatie circumstanees of the Due the O.S. also has to cope cape with unsympathetic neighbors neighbors -- Iran, Iran, conf li t, the the U U.S. also has has to . S . also cope with unsympathetic unsympathetic neighbors Iran, conflizt, Turkey all all have an interest interest in in shaping shaping Iraqi Iraqi politics Syria Syria ;nd bnd Turkey Turkey all have an an interest in shaping Iraqi politics and and a smooth smooth transition. transition. At the international perhaps in in destabilising destabilising aa smooth transition. the international international perhap splits in the UN Security Security Council it much harder level, the pre-war pre-war splits splits in in the the UN Security Council Council make make it it much harder level, the D.S. the burden sharing models in Bosnia, for tthe U.S. U . S . to to adopt adopt the the burden burden sharing sharing models models adopted adopted in in Bosnia, Bosnia, Kosovo for and Af.hanistan. the same time, the the D.S. was unable to undertake preAfghanistan. At At the the same same time, time, the U.S. U.S. was was unable unable to to undertake undertake prepreand war pr-parations that would have have eased post-war post-war transition, transition, such as war preparations that that would have eased post-war transition, such such as as coordinating ating relief the UN organising coordi' ating humanitarian humanitarian relief relief with with the UN and NGOs, NGO5, organising international civil police police forces forces and establishing establishing an international forces and establishing an an international international inter ational civil polit' al authority to rebut rebut Arab suspicions of of American American imperialism. imperialism. political of American imperialism. authority to to rebut Arab suspicions suspicions polit ~ y Nonetheless, Nonetheless, Iraq Iraq does does have have some someadvantages advantages for for nation-builders. nation-builders. Iraq does have same advantages for nation-builders. \ - First, ha~ion-wjde administr~, is which atio ivil administra2, administ First, ivil which is is relatively relatively - * s- civil -&First, & ait it ha h atio -. - efficient. efficent. , This administration needs to to rebuilt but reconstructed This administration administration needs needs to be be rebuilt rebuilt but not not reconstructed reconstructed from -cratch. scratch. from This administration, administration, staffed mainly by Iraqis, Iraqis, reduce This administration, staffed staffed mainly Iraqis, will will reduce reduce the n:ed n international intervention intervention and facilitate security security for n$ed for direct direct international international intervention and facilitate facilitate security the velopment across across the the country. country. Second, Second, the the civil civil administration and and d;velopment Second, civil administration development across the country. and ~/)and d (5 - eanssthat that the the humanitarian issues that the humanitarian issues issues e tensive links with with UN UN ag agencies1ans links extensive C / t hthe ee :.::::.:.:::::.=..::...:::.--===-==.-.......:;:.:..:C-::::.a:::.::.:..:::..:;..:<:===:;.: shoul be soluble. soluble. shoulc. shoulu be Third, Iraq s oJuns ns that thecountry country will not Third, Iraq(s that the Ira ns that the countrywill will not not remai international aid in in the medium term. term. dependent on on international international aid in the the medium term. remairk dependent its most ambitious programme of nation-building As it it embarks embarks on on its its most most ambitious ambitious programme programme of of nation-building nation-building since 1945, 1945, D.S. learn important important lessons lessons from from the the case case studies studies 1945, the the U.S. U . S . must must learn learn important lessons from the case studies since exami ed in in this this report. report. in this report. examined examied posit ve ve outcome outcome in in Iraq. Iraq. outcome in Iraq. posit:-ve D.S. has has staked staked its The U.S. credibility on The U.S. has staked its credibility on aa This extensive commitment This will will require require an an extensive commitment of (financial, personnel personnel and diplomatic) over over aa long of ces (financial, resou (financial, and diplomatic) diplomatie) lang period of resou:rces The strategies, U.S. cannot cannot afford afford to to contemplate contemplate early early exit exit strateqies,. . nor time. The U.S. time.. Th~..:..-=c~a:::n:n=o-= time t=-.:s:..::t::.r:.;a::.;:t..::e""g<.;i;;.;e""s,,-,-,. .:nor .n:.:o:.;E.;. afford 'ob done. ob half afford to leave the the job half done. done. can iii: atford can 1 . questions for The for The real real questions questions for the d D.S. re not how soon it can leave leave but rather how how fast fast and and how how U.S. ;re subst ntially to share Iraqis and the rest rest of of the the world subst;ntially subs1 antially share power power with with Iraqis Iraqis and with with the the rest of the world Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS c ... -~ 14 --- 14 while retaining to oversee an enduring enduring transition transition to to enough itself itself to while retaining enough democracy. democracy. democracy. Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS ....... 15 --- 15 15 2. 2.GERMANY GERMANY i the bloodiest conflict in in European he Second World War was was the the bloodiest conflict conflict in European histor histor of soldiers and civilians were killed in in battle in . Millions of o f soldiers soldiers and civilians civilians were killed killed in battle or or in in . concen 'ration ration camps camps Germany. concen camps operated operated by Nazi ration Nazi Germany. Germany. In Germany 1945, Germany Gerrnany In May 1945, 1945, surren ered unconditionally to the the United States, the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, and surrensered unconditionally to surren to the United States, States, the Soviet Union, and Great dritain. ritain. The ~ritain. allies had to occupy Gerrnany The allies allies had already already decided decided to to occupy Germany Germany Great militaiily. milita ily. The United United States, States, Great Great Britain, Britain, and, and, it it was later decided, decided, Great Britain, and, it was later later decided, France would occupy occupy zones zones in in the the west the Soviets Soviets would occupy the the west while while the the Soviets would occupy occupy the east. The capital of Berlin Berlin was was also also partitioned arnong the the four four also partitioned among among the four occupy ng ng powers. powers. Common allied series allied policy was developed developed in in aa aseries of series of of policy was was developed in surnmit meetings, notably at at Casablanca Casablanca in ~n January January 1943, 1943, Yalta in in summit meetings, most notably Casablanca in January 1943, Yalta Yalta in Februa y 1945, 1945, and and at at Potsdam Potsdam in in August 1945. Februay August 1945. 1945. Casablanca, British Casablanca, At Casablanca, inister Winston Winston Churchill Churehill and Arneriean President President Franklin Franklin mister and american American President Franklin Prime Roosevlt lt had had decided deeided to to accept aceept only unconditional surrender surrender from from onlyunconditional unconditional surrender from German . This decision was reiterated This reiterated in subsequent meetings that erated in in subsequent subsequent meetings meetings that that Soviet leader leader Josef Josef Stalin. Stalin. Yalta deelaration called for includdd Soviet lin. The The Yalta Yalta declaration declaration called called for for surrender; the the destruction destruetion of Nazism; the the disarmarnent of uncond tional surrender; truction of of Nazism; Nazism; the disarmament disarmament of off war war criminals; eriminals; reparations; and an punishment of criminals; reparations; reparations; and and an an German ; the speedy punishrnent ; able to to sustain sustain the the German German people, but not capable of waging war. war. econom, able of waging war. an people, people, but not not capable capable of these politieal and economic economic The Po sdam agreement elaborated on on these these political political les and included agreements oeeupation areas, princisles the ts about about occupation occupation areas, areas, the dispos'tion borders, transfers, dispos.tion of of eastern German German borders, rders, population population transfers, transfers, and and the the nt of war criminals.2 criminals. 2 treat -nt CHALLE GES defeated by the the end of the war. ermany ermany was was utterly utterly defeated defeated by the end end of of the the war. war. The The last last years years war had damaged the state's state's physieal infrastructure, cases 's physical physical infrastructure, infrastructure, in in some some cases of th although later later analysis analysissfound found that the damage was not as severly, although sever foundthat that the the damage damage was was not not as as 3 exten ive as first thought. The eollapse as first first thought.3 thought.3 The more more immediate immediate problem problem was was the the collapse collapse 2 Polie Polic 3. 3. 3. The Department of State, Occupation of Germany: ofGeiinany: Germany: The United United States States Department Department of of State, State,Occupation Occupationof and 1945-46 Publication 2783 (Washington: GPO, 1947), p. and Progress 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 Publication Publication 2783 2783 (Washington: (Washington:GPO, GPO, 1947), 1947),p. p. Progress 1945-46 John Killick, Uni ted States States and European Reconstruetion: John Killick, Killick, The The United United States and and European European Reconstruction: Reconstruction: 194519451960; Press, Edinburgh, 1997, pp. 61, 88. 1960; Keele University University Press, Press, Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 1997, 1997,pp. pp. 61, 61,88. 88. Certified As Unclassified January 9 2009 IAW EO 12958, as amended Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS .,