5/4/2003 NATION-BUILDING: LESSONS LEARNED

Transcription

5/4/2003 NATION-BUILDING: LESSONS LEARNED
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4 May 2003
MEMO TO:
TO: Secretary
TO:
MEMO
Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM:
FROM:
Breme~
Ambassador Breme
SUBJECT: Nation-Building:
Nation-Building : ~learned
SUBJECT:
learned
i
1
US efforts
from the
the US
Saturday
efforts at
at
Saturday I mentioned the new RAND paper on lessons learned from
“nation building”.
building". They studied seven cases from
from the past half-century--Germany,
half-century--Germany, Japan,
Japan,
"nation
building".
Somalia,
Haiti,
Bosnia,
Kosovo,
Afghanistan.
The
summary
is
attached.
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. The summary is attached.
Several key points bear on our
our efforth
Several
efforts in Iraq.
•
coalition).
substantial troop presence
We succeeded when we had a very substantial
presence (either
(either US
US or
or coalition
coalition).
Ifin
inIraq
Iraq one
one
We took and inflicted more casualties when we
we were
were under-strength.
under-strength. IfIrin
capita we had in
Bosnia, we
we would
of troops per capita
in Bosnia,
would need
need about
about
sought the same ratio of
250,000 for
250,000
The Kosovo
Kosovo model
model would suggest
suggest aa need
need for
for twice
twice
for at
at least
least two
two years.
years. The
that many.
many. Naturally,
Naturally, this
would include
nowAmerican
forces.
this would
include non-American
non-American forces.
forces.
•
Another major variable was the amount of external
assistance per capita.
capita. The
external assistance
The Kosovo
Kosovo
$19 billion over
over two
two years.
years.
model
modei would yield the need for about
about $19
decisive influence
influence on
on the
the outcome.
outcome. "It
czn exert decisive
iiifluence
“It is nearly
• Neighboring countries can
impossible to put together a fragmented
i1' its neighbors persist
persist in
in trying
trying to
to tear
tear
fragmented nation if
it up."
up.”
•
long time
time eioes
does not
not guarantee
guarantee success.
success. Leaving early assures
Staying aa long
tioes
success.
failure. "No
“No
assures failure.
failure.
Staying
sffort at democratization has taken hold in less than five years".
years”.
effort
want to
to bear
bear these
these points
points
While we are certainly not condemned to repeat history, we will want
in mind
work
as:
mind as
as we
we wark
work through issues such as:
..0 The CENTCOM draw-down plan we touched on briefly Saturday;
Saturday;
•
and
Keeping a close eye on Iranian objectives and activities; and
•
The need to stress
s1rt:ss to all concerned that this will be a long process.
prcccss.
proccss.
e
Attachment:
Attachment: As
As stated.
stated.
CC:
CC: Paul
Paul Wolfowitz,
Wolfowitz, Doug
Doug Feith,
Feith, Ryan Henry
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
~
U22336';/O,
U2233L; /03
•a
-1-
-- 11 --
1.
1.INRODUCTION
INRODUCTIONAND
1.
INRODUCTION
ANDSIJNMARY
SUMMARY
This report
contains
the results the
of a study
on best of
practices
in
This
report
contains
the
results
of
study
on best
best practices
practices in
in
This
report
contains
results
aa study
on
nation
nation building.
building.
to analyze
U.S. and
and
The
U.S.
The purpose
purpose of this
this study
study was
was to
analyze U.S.
international
military, political,
political, and
international
international military,
military,
political,
and economic
economic activities
activities in
in postpostthe Second
conflict situations
situations since
since the
Second World War
War to
to determine
determine key
key
conflict
principles for
for success
success in
in these
these types
types of
of operations
operations and
and to
to draw
draw
principles
types
of
operations
and
to
draw
implications
U.S. military
U.S.
military operations,
operations, including
including Iraq.
Iraq.
implications for
for future
future U.S.
implications
for
future
operations,
including
Iraq.
This
This
report
contains
report
this
analysis,
including
the
lessons
report contains
contains the
the results
results of
of this
this analysis,
analysis, including
including the
the lessons
lessons
learned
of these
these operations,
operations, and
and then
then applies
applies these
these lessons
lessons to
to
learned from
from each of
operations,
and
then
applies
these
lessons
to
the
of Iraq.'
Iraq.l
the case
case of
Iraq.]
RATIONALE
RATIONALE FOR
STUDY
RATIONALE
FOR STUDY
STUDY
During
l990s
During the
the 1990s
1990s and
and continuing
continuing into
into the
the current
current decade,
decade, the
the United
United
continuing
into
the
current
decade,
the
Uni
ted
States
political, and
and
States has
has invested
invested significant
significant amounts
amounts of
of military,
military, political,
political,
and
States
economic
economic capital
capital into
into operations
operations conducted
conducted in
in the
the aftermath
aftermath of
of conflict
conflict
conducted
in
the
aftermath
of
conflict
or civil
civil unrest.
unrest.
or
unrest.
analyzed.
analyzed.
these post-conflict
post-conflict operations
operations have
have been closely
closely
All these
these
operations
Countless
studies,
Countless studies,
studies, articles,
articles, and
and reports
reports have
have been
been published
Countless
articles,
of these
on
operations.
on various
various aspects
aspects of
these individual
individual operations.
operations.
the
most
part,
For
For the
the most
most part,
part,
these
these studies
studies have
have also
also focused
focused on
on the
the post-Cold
post-Cold War
War period.
period.
focused
on
the
post-Cold
War
period.
This is
is the
the
This
is
the
first effort
of which
which we
we are
are aware
aware to
to review
review each
each of
of the
the major
major American
effort of
first
to
review
each
of
the
major
American
experiences in
in nation
exercises going
to 1945,
1945,
to compare
nation building
building exercises
going back
back to
1945, to
compare
experiences
operations,
to determine
and contrast
contrast the
results of
of these
these various
various operations,
operations, to
determine how
how
and
contrast
the results
time, and
and then
lessons learned
learned and
and best
best
practices evolved
evolved over time,
lessons
best practices
then to
to suggest
suggest
lessons
time,
how those
those lessons
lessons might
might be
be applied
applied to
to the
the current
current challenges
challenges facing
facing
how
those
lessons
to
the
facing
American policymakers
policymakers in
in Iraq.
Iraq.
American
in
Iraq.
The preponderance
preponderance of
this research
research was
was conducted
conducted prior
prior to
to the
the
1 The
the
of this
March 19,
19, 2003
2003 commencement
commencement of
of Operation
Operation Iraqi
Iraqi Freedom,
Freedom, but
but the
the project
project
March
19,
2003
Operation
Iraqi
Freedom,
but
the
project
of our
our effert
effort throughout
throughout
team was
was focused
focused on
on the
the near-term
near-term implications
implications of
team
effort
the
that end,
end, this
this study
study served
served as
as the
the point
point of
of
the course
course of
of our
our work.
work. To that
of
our
werk.
end,
this
study
served
the
departure
RAND conference
conference on
nation building
building and
and the
the future
future of
of Iraq
Iraq
departure for
for aa RAND
for
on nation
nation
building
and
the
future
of
Iraq
was held
held in
in Arlington,
Arlington,
Virginia on
on May 6-7,
6-7, 2003
2003 and
and the
the results
results of
of
that
Arlington, Virginia
that was
6-7,
conference were
were factored
factored into
into the
the final
final version
version of
of this
this study.
study. A
that
that conference
factored
into
the
final
version
of
this
study.
A
attendees
included in
in Appendix
Appendix A of
of this
this report.
report.
list of
of conference
conference attendees
attendees is included
list
report.
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
1
- ,
•
a
XVll -- xvii
SWNCC
SWNCC
State,
Coordinating
State, War and Navy Coordinating
Conunittee
Committee
Committee
TBD
Thousand Barrels per
per Day
TMK
T
TMX
Corps
Kosovo Protection Corps
UN
UMANA
UNAMA
Uni ted Nations
United
Uni ted Nations Assistance Mission in
United
Afghanistan
stan
Afghani
AfghaniStan
UNHCR
United
Uni ted Nations
Nations High
for
High Commissioner
Commissioner for
for
Refugees
Refugees
UNITAF
UN3LC
UNJLC
UNMIBH
Force
Unified Task Force
Joint Logistics
Logistics Center
Logistics
United Nations Joint
United
Uni ted Nations Mission
Mission in
in Bosnia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Herzegovina
UNMIK
UNMIK
Uni ted Nations Interim
United
Interim Administration in
Kosovo
Kosovo
UNREA
UNRRA
United Nations Relief and
and Rehabilitation
Administration
UNSCR
Security Council
United Nations Security
Security
Resolution
USFORSOM
UXO
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Uni
ted States
United
States Forces
Forces Somalia
Unexploded Ordnance
- 22 --2-
METHODOLOGY
METHODOLOGY
First
developed
working definition
definition
for
nation
building.
First we
we developed
developed aaa working
definition for
for nation
nation building.
building.
We
We
then identified
identified
ca
ses for
for
research
on
that
definition.
then
identified cases
cases
for research
research based
based on
on that
that definition.
definition. Then
Then we
we
established
template
for
examining
each
of
the cases.
cases.
of the
the
cases.
established aaa template
template for
for examining
examining each
each of
established
Once
we had
Once we
analyzed
the
individual
cases,
we made
made
cross-comparisons
in
areas
analyzed the
the individual
individual cases,
cases, we
we
made cross-comparisons
cross-comparisons in
in areas
areas where
where
comparable
statistics
were
available,
for
instance
as
regards
the
levels
as regards
regards the
the levels
levels
comparable statistics
statistics were
were available,
available, for
for instance
instance as
of
military and
and police
forces,
of
economic
assistance
of external
external military
police forces,
forces, of
of economic
economic assistance
assistance and
and of
of
democratization
and economic
economic
growth.
democratization and
economic growth.
growth.
Finally, we
Finally,
then turned
turned
to
Iraq
to
Finally,
we then
then
turned to
to Iraq
Iraq to
to
see
lessons
be
applied
there.
see how
how such
such lessons
lessons might
might be
be applied
applied there.
there.
Various
terms
have
been used
used over
over
the
past fifty-seven
fifty-seven
years
to
Various terms
terms have
have been
over the
the past
fifty-seven years
years to
to
describe
the
activities
we are
are
seeking
to
analyze.
describe the
the activities
activities we
we
are seeking
seeking to
to analyze.
analyze.
The
The German
German and
Japanese
operations
were
to
as
occupations.
Japanese operations
operations were
were referred
referred to
to as
as occupations.
occupations.
The
The operations
operations in
in
Somalia,
Haiti,
Bosnia
and were
were
generally
termed peacekeeping
peacekeeping or
or
peace
Somalia,
Somalia, Haiti,
Haiti, Bosnia
Bosnia and
were generally
generally termed
or peace
peace
enforcement.
enforcement.
The
the
U.S. administration
administration has
has preferred to use
use the
The current
current D.S.
terms
stabilization
and reconstruction
reconstruction
to
refer
to its
its
post
conflict
terms stabilization
stabilization and
reconstruction to
to refer
refer to
to
its post
post conflict
conflict
operations
in
Afghanistan and
and in
in
Iraq.
operations in
in Afghanistan
in Iraq.
Iraq.
In
these
cases
the
intent
all these
these cases
cases the
the intent
intent was
was
In all
to
to use
use military
military force
force
to
underpin
and
in
some
cases
to
actually
compel
force to
to underpin
underpin and
and in
in some
some cases
cases to
to actually
actually compel
compel aaa
process
of
democratization.
process of
of democratization.
democratization.
Occupation,
Occupation,
enforcement,
Occupation, peacekeeping,
peacekeeping, peace
peace enforcement,
enforcement,
stabilization
and reconstruction
reconstruction do
do
not fully
fully
capture
this
idea.
stabilization and
reconstruction
do not
not
fully capture
capture this
this idea.
idea.
Neither
does
does the
the term
term nation
nation building,
building,
but
we
believe it
it comes
comes closer
closer to
to
the
term
nation
building, but
but we
we believe
believe
it
comes
closer
to
encompassing
encompassing
the full
full
range
of
activities
and
objectives
involved.
of activities
activities and
and objectives
objectives involved.
involved.
encompassing the
the
full range
range of
chose
seven
historical
cases
for
this
study:_Germany,
Japan,
We chose
chose seven
seven historical
historical cases
cases for
for this
this study:
study: Germany,
Germany, Japan,
Japan,
We
P
-
Somalia, Haiti,
Haiti, Bosnia,
Bosnia, Kosovo,
Kosovo, and
Afghanistan.
Somalia,
Somalia,
Haiti,
Bosnia,
Kosovo,
and Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.
These are
are the
the most
most
These
important
important instances
instances in
in which
power has
has been
been used
used to
to
instances
in
which American
American military
military power
power
has
to
underpin
efforts at
at democratization.
democratization. We
We did
did not
not include
include the
the American
American
underpin
underpin efforts
efforts
at
democratization.
include
the
experience
in
the
Philippines
the
societal
colonial
colonial experience
experience in
in the
the Philippines
Philippines because
because the
the societal
societal
transformation
there
attempted
spanned
several
generations.
transformation
transformation there
there attempted
attempted spanned
spanned several
several generations.
generations.
We
We did
did not
not
include
WWII
occupation
of
Austria
because we
we
feIt
its
lessons
include the
the post
post WWII
WWII occupation
occupation of
of Austria
Austria because
because
we felt
felt its
its lessons
lessons
would largely
largely
parallel
those
of
Germany
and Japan.
Japan.
largely parallel
parallel those
those of
of Germany
Germany and
Japan.
We
We did not
not include
include
the Cold War
War interventions
interventions in
in the
the Dominican
Dominican Republic,
Republic, Lebanon,
Lebanon, Grenada
Grenada
the
interventions
in
the
Dominican
Republic,
Lebanon,
Grenada
Panama because
because these
these were
were shorter
shorter lived
lived and
and more
more limited in
their
and Panama
these
in their
objectives.
objectives.
Once
Once we
we identified
identified the
the cases,
cases, we
we developed
developed a
structure for
for examining
examining
identified
the
cases,
aa structure
for
each.
each.
First,
settlement
First,
of the
the settlement
settlement which
which terminated
terminated
First, we
we described
described the
the nature
nature of
the
the conflict
conflict in
in question.
question.
in
question.
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
We next
next addressed
addressed the
the security,
security, humanitarian,
humanitarian,
We
the
security,
-3-
-- 3 -
adminis
at
adminis rative,
rative, political,
political, and
and economic
economic challenges
challenges that
that were
were present at
the
out et.
the out.et.
We then
then described
described the roles that the United States and
interna
ional
assumed
during
the
intervention.
international
organizations assumed
assumed during
during the
the intervention.
intervention.
interna
ional organizations
This
This
include
for
included discussion
of the
the military
military mandate
mandate for
for the
operation and
and the
the
discussion of
the operation
type
administration,
any,
the
type of
of civil
civil administration,
administration, if
if any,
any, that
that would
would be set
set up in
in the
the
type
civil
country
country., We
We next
how each
each operation
operation developed
developed overtime:
over time:
time: how
how
next examined
examined how
over
the
fragile;
the
secibrity
environment stabilized
stabilized or
or grew
grew more fragile;
fragile; how
how the
the
the sec
the
sec
rity environment
environment
humanit
rian
situation
evolved;
how
the
civil
administration
interacted
humanitcrian
humanit
nan situation
situationevolved;
evolved;how
how the
the civil
civil administration
administration interacted
with th
appointed
appointed or
or elected
elected government;
government; how the process
process of
democra
ization developed and how reconstruction
reconstruction progressed across
across the
the
democratization
country
TO
FRCM GEIMANY
GE
TO AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
FROH
FROM
Th
post
first
post WWII
WWII occupations
occupations of Germany and Japan were America's first
force in
in the
the aftermath of aa conflict
conflict
experierces with the
the use
use of
of military force
a comparatively rapid and fundamental
fundamental societal
societal
to unde pin a
transfo
ations
of that
that
ations with
with the
the objective of rendering any repetition of
likely. The
endeavors established
established that
that
conflic
conflicu less likely.
The success of these endeavors
democrasy was transferable;
transferable; that societies
societies could,
could, under
under certain
cer ta in
democra
circumsuances, be compelled to
to transform
trans form themselves,
themselves, and that
that such
such
circums
enduring.
transfodmations could prove enduring.
transfo
These two operations set aa
scandar. for
post conflict
conflict nation building that
for post
that has not since been
been
standar
matched .
matched.
Fo
Fo
the next
next forty
forty years,
years, from 1950 to 1990,
the
1990, there were few
few attempts
attempts
replicate
to repl
cate these
these
successes.
to
repl'cate
these early
early successes.
successes.
In
world of
of the Cold
Cold
In the bipolar world
f a.edwith
with the
the threat
threat of
of nuclear
nuclear destruction,
destruction, American
American policy
policy
War, fa
faced
War,
the
threat
destruction,
emphasied containment,
emphasized
quo.
containment,
deterrence and
and maintenance
maintenance of
of the
the status
status quo.
emphasi
containment, deterrence
quo.
were made to
to promote
promote democratic
democratic and
and free
market values,
values, but
but
Efforts were
Efforts
to
democratic
free market
values,
but
y without the
compulsion,
with the
generally
general
the element of compulsion,
compulsion, even with
the most
most
recalciurant
American military
military power
power tended
tended to
to be
be employed
recalcitrant
recalci
rant of
of students.
students. American
to
be
employed
they were,
were, not
not to improve them;
to preserve
preserve the
the
to keep
to
keep things
things as
as they
were,
them; to
preserve
the
manage crises,
crises,
equilibrium,
equilib ium,
ium, not alter it;
it; to manage
crises, not
not to
to resolve
resolve the
the
underlyng problems.
underlying
problems.
Germany,
Korea,
Vietnam,
China,
Cyprus
and
Palestine
underly'ng
problems. Germany,
Germany, Korea,
Korea, Vietnam,
Vietnam, China,
China, Cyprus
Cyprus and
and Palestine
Palestine
international forces
forces
remained
rernaine. divided.
divided. American and international
remaine
divided.
forces were
were used
used to
to
other divides,
divides, not
not to compel resolution
of the
maintaiq
maintai these
these and other
divides,
resolution of
of
the
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
44 ---4-
disputes.
underlying
disputes.
underlying disputes.
American
interventions
in
piaces
like
the
Dominican
American interventions
interventions in
in places
places like
like the
the Dominican
Dominican
Republic,
Lebanon,
or
Panama
were
intended
to
displace
unfriendly
Republic,
Lebanon, Grenada
Grenada or
or Panama
Panama were
were intended
intended to
to displace
displace unfriendly
Republic, Lebanon,
regimes
reinstall friendly
ones,
rather
than
to
about
regimes and
and reinstall
friendly ones,
ones, rather
rather than
than to
to bring
bring about
about
fundamental
societal
fundamental
fundamental societal
societal transformations.
transformations.
The
created
new
problems for
for
the United
Uni
ted States
States
the Cold War created
The end of
of the
created new
new problems
problems
for the
the
United
States
_/
L
Z
---~
and opened
opened
negsibil-ities.
opened
new
p o s m ties
and
n~~Q§ßibjlLties.
~
Prominent
rash
of
state
failures.
Prominent among
among the
the new
new problems
problems was
was aaa rash
rash of
of state
state failures.
failures.
the
weak or
or
artificial
states
had been
been propped
propped up
up
During
During the
the Cold War many weak
or artificial
artificial states
states had
UP by
by
one
(and
in
some
case
both)
for
geopolitical
one side
side or
or the
the other
other (and
(and in
in some
some case
case by
by both)
both) for
for geopolitical
geopolitical
reasons.
reasons.
For instance,
instance,
Somalia,
Yugoslavia
and
had each
each
instance, Somalia,
Somalia, Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia and
and Afghanistan
Afghanistan had
each been
been
regarded
important pieces
pieces on
on
the
Cold War
War
chessboard.
regarded as
as important
on the
the Cold
War chessboard.
chessboard.
had
external
support
as
result.
had received
received extensive
extensive external
external support
support as
as aaa result.
result.
Regimes
there
Regimes there
there
With
the
With the
the
disappearance
the Soviet
Union,
disappearance of
of the
Soviet Union,
Union, Moscow
Moscow lost
lost its
its capability
capability and
and
Washington its
its
geopolitical
rational
for
sustaining
such
regimes.
its geopolitical
geopolitical rational
rational for
for sustaining
sustaining such
such regimes.
regimes.
Denied
Denied
support,
such
states
disintegrated.
such support,
support, these
these and other
other states
states disintegrated.
disintegrated.
1989,
aa balance
balance
of
terror
no
longer
impelled
the
United States
States
After
balance of
After 1989,
1989, a
of terror
terror no
no longer
longer impelled
impelled the
the United
States
the
status
quo.
to
quo.
to preserve
preserve the
the status
status quo.
This
that
Washington
was
free
to
This meant
meant that
that Washington
Washington was
was free
free to
to
ignore
instability
when
it
did
not
threaten
American interests.
interests.
ignore regional
regional instability
instability when
when it
it did
did not
not threaten
threaten American
interests.
the
other,
this freedom
that
the
On
On the
the other,
other, this
freedom also
also meant
meant that
that the
the United
United States
States now
now had the
to
actually
resolve,
rather than
than
to
option
unrivaled power
option of
of using its
its unrivaled
power to
to actually
actually resolve,
resolve, rather
rather
than to
simply
international
problems of
of
importance
to
it.
simply manage
manage or contain
contain international
international problems
problems
of importance
importance to
to it.
it.
ted States
feIt
able,
From 1990
1990 onward
chose,
onward the
the Uni
United
States has felt
felt able,
able, when it
it chose,
chose, to
to
police ceasefires
restore
quo but
intervene
tore the status
but
intervene not
not simply
simply to
to police
police
ceasefires or res
restore
status quo
to
about
the
democratic
transformation
of
conflicted
societies,
of conflicted
conflictedsocieties,
societies,
to bring
bring about
about the
the democratic
democratic transformation
transformation of
Germany and
much
and Japan
four
earlier.
much as
as it
it had those
those of
of Germany
Germany
Japan four
four decades
decades earlier.
earlier. And after
after
1989
Uni ted States
able
to
secure
international
1989 the
the United
States was
was also
also more
more able
able to
to secure
secure broad
broad international
international
support
for
such
when
it
chose
to
mount
them.
support for
for such
such efforts
efforts when
when it
it chose
chose to
to mount
mount them.
them.
The
community
also
more
The rest
rest of the
the international
international community
community also
also became
became more
more
interventionist.
interventionist.
interventionist.
Of
54
operations
the
has
mounted since
since
Of the
the 54
5 4 peace
peace operations
operations the
the UN
UN has
has mounted
since
1945,
(or
80%)
have been
been
initiated
since
1989.
1945,
1945, 41
41 (or
(or nearly
nearly 80%)
80%) have
have
been initiated
initiated since
since 1989.
1989.
Fifteen
Fifteen are
are
still
underway.
still underway.
underway.
Despite this
this more
international
environment,
the
costs
more supportive
supportive international
international environment,
environment, the
the costs
costs
and
nation
building remained
remained
high.
Washington
and risks
risks associated
associated with
with nation
nation building
remained high.
high. Washington
Washington
consequently
embarked on
on
such
endeavors
lightly.
It
withdrew from
from
consequently has
has not embarked
on such
such endeavors
endeavors lightly.
lightly. It
It withdrew
from
Somalia
in
1993
at
the
first
serious
resistance.
Somalia in
in 1993
1993 at
at the
the first
first serious
serious resistance.
resistance.
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
It
It opted
out
of
opted out
out of
of
-5-
- 55 --
interna
ional efforts to
to stem
stern genocide
genoeide in
in Rwanda
Rwanda in
in 1994.
1994.
internauional
Europea
It resisted
efforts to entangle
entangle it
it in
in Balkan
Balkan peace
peace enforcement
enforeement for
for the
the first
first
four
rs of
of Yugoslavia's
Yugoslavia's violent
violent breakup.
breakup.
four ye
yers
after intervening
intervening in
in
Even after
Bosnia,
more years
years seeking
seeking aa non-military
non-military solution
solution to
to
Bosnia, it spent three more
ethnic
leaning in Kosovo.
ethnic ileaning
Ne ertheless,
ertheless, despite
despite
this
reticence,
throughout the
the 1990's
1990's~
despite this
this reticence,
reticence, throughout
throughout
the
1
9 9 0 ' s *each
success
intervention, from
from Somalia
Somalia to
to Haiti
Haiti to
to Bosnia
BosItia to
success ve
ve American led intervention,
- _ _ ---_._-
_ ~
Kosovo,
in intent
intent than
than its
its
in
scope
and
mmore
o r~
eu
~ os
u in
in
s
intent
than
its
Kosovo, proved
proved wider
wider in
in scope
scope and
and more
ambijus
predece
sor. In
In Somalia
Somalia the
the original
original objective
objective was
was purely
purely humanitarian,
humanitarian,
predece sor.
subsequ
to democratization.
democratization.
subsequ ntly expanded to
the objective
objective was to
to
In Haiti the
reinsta
a preexisting
preexisting regime.
regime. In
In Bosnia,
Bosnia, it
it was
was to
to create
create a
a
reinsta 11 and renew a
multiet
multiet
ic state.
In Kosovo it
it was
was to
to establish
establish from
from the
the ground
ground up
up aa
democra Ic
ic polity.
George WWBush
Bush criticized
criticized the
the Clinton
Clinton Administration
Administration
As a candidate, George
for
for thi
t
expansive agenda
agenda of
of nation
nation building.
building. As
As President,
President, he
he adopted
adopted aa
more
mo est
est set
set of
of objectives
objectives when
when faced
faced
with aa
comparable
challenge
in
more mo
objectives
faced with
a comparable
comparable challenge
challenge in
Afghani
Afghani tan.
tan.
toward
toward
Bush
Administration's
efforts to
to reverse
reverse the
The
The Bush
Bush Administration's
Administration's efforts
efforts
to
reverse
the trend
trend
ver
more
ambitious
American led
led nation
nation building
building
ver larger
larger and
and more
more ambitious
ambitious American
operati
short
lived,
however.
short lived,
lived, however.
however.
operati ns has proved short
In
the United
Dnited States
States
In Iraq
Iraq the
the
United
States
task comparable
comparable in
in nature
nature to
to the
the transformational
transformational attempts
attempts
has tak n on a task
the
transformational
attempts
still u derway in Bosnia and
scope
to
the
earlier American
American
and Kosovo,
Kosovo, and
and in
in scope
seope to
to the
the earlier
ocCupat ons of Germany
Germany and
and Japan.
Japan.
CROSS-C
E TRENDS
Fol lowing
lowing the
the seven
seven individual
individual country studies,
studies, we sought
sought
studies.
sought to
to extract
was broadly
comparable across
across
the
cases.
t was
broadly comparable
comparable
across the
the cases.
cases.
data th;t
Although each
Although
each case
case
was uni.
e, we
we attempted
attempted find
find
areas
where comparisons
comparisons
could prove
prove useful.
useful
uni e,
e.
attempted
find areas
areas where
comparisons could
useful.
partcu1ar, we
In particular,
we
to
quantify and
and compare
compare measures
measures of
we attempted
attempted to
to quantify
of nation
buildin.
peacekeepingtroops,
input, that is
is to
to say
say peacekeeping-troops,
police and
and economic
economic
building input,
input.
peacekeeping-troops, police
assista ce-and
ceand output,
assistaxe-and
output,in
in
the
form
of
democratic elections
elections
and economic
economic
output,
in the
the form
form of
of democratic
elections and
growth.
growth.
Mlitary
Militaryforce
forcelevels
levels
variedsignificantly
significantlyacross
across
the cases.
cases.
force
levelsvaried
across the
cases. They
1.6 million
million
U.S.
forces
in
the European
European Theater
Theater of
of
from the
the 1.6
ranged from
ranged
million U.S.
D.S. forces
forces in
in the
Operatons
atthe
the
endof
ofthe
the
SecondWorld
World War
War to
to the
the approximately
approximately 14,000
14,000
Operationsat
Operat'ons
at
the end
theSecond
14,000
U.S.
d international
U.S. a
international troops
troops
currently
in
Afghanistan.
O.S.
aard
international
troops currently
eurrently in
in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
at gross
Looking at
--66 -
numbers,
however,
does
not
allow
for
comparison
across
the
numbers,
numbers, however,
however, does
does not
not allow
allow for
for useful
useful comparison
comparison across
across the
the cases
cases
because the
the size
size and
and populations
populations of
of the
the countries
countries being
being analyzed
analyzed was
was so
so
because
and
of
the
disparate.
disparate. We
We therefore
therefore decided
decided to
to look
look at
at the
the number
number of
of U.S.
U.S. and
and
U.S.
internationalmilitary
military
sojrperper
thousand
i n each
each of
of the
the
international
military
soldiers
Der
thousandinhabitnts_.i
inhabiunts in
international
soldiers
thousand
inhabitants
cases.
cases.
In
addition, we
important
levels
In
it
force
l o o k at
at how
how force
force levels
In addition,
addition,
we thought
thought it
it important
important to
to look
changed
time.
changed over
over time.
time.
Figure
S.l
shows the
troops per
thousand
Figure
S.l shows
the number
number of
of troops
per thousand
Figure S.l
inhabitants for
for each
each of
of the
the cases
cases at
at the
the outset
outset of
of the
the intervention
intervention and
and
inhabitants
the
at
the
intervention
intervals over·time:
overtime:
at various
various intervals
intervals
over'time:
at
Military
Presence Over
Over Time
Time
(soldiers
per thousand
inhabitants)
Military Presence
Time (soldiers
(soldiers per
thousand inhabitants)
m
r
1ol
30.00
30.00
IiIGermany
Germany
•UJapan
Japan
oD Somalia
oD Haiti
!O.OO
20.00
.8osnia
Bosnia
oD Koso\A?
Kosoo
• Afghanistan
10.00
10.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
YeO
Year0
YearO
Year2
Year 2
Year 5
Year5
Year 1)
1)
Interventionover
overtime
time(year
(yearO
0=
=the
intervention)
Intervention
the year
year of
of intervention)
intervention)
Intervention
over
time
(year
0
the
F'igure S.l:S.l:
Military
Presence Presence
Over Time Over Time
Figure
Military
As the
the data
data illustrates,
illustrates, force
force levels
levels varied
varied widely across
across these
these
As
illustrates,
force
levels
. Bosnia,
Bosnia, Kosovo,
Kosovo, and
and particularly
particularly Germany
Germany started
started with
with
Bosnia,
Kosovo,
and
particularly
Germany
started
with
_ o p e.
raw
~
military forces
forces while
while the
the initial
initial levels
levels in
in Japan,
Japan,
substantial numbers
numbers of
substantial
of military
military
forces
while
the
initial
levels
in
Japan,
Somalia, Haiti,
Haiti, and
and especially
especially Afghanistan
Afghanistan were
were much
much more
more modest.
modest.
Somalia,
Haiti,
and
especially
Afghanistan
were
much
more
modest.
Somalia,
These
These
levels
levels (with
(with the
the partial
partial exception
exception of
of Germany)
Germany) all
all decreased
decreased over
over time,
time,
(with
the
partial
exception
of
all
decreased
over
time,
but
the differences
differences across
across the
the cases
cases had
had
but by
by varying
varying degrees.
degrees. Overall,
Overall, the
varying
degrees.
Overall,
across
the
cases
had
significant implications
implications for
for other
other aspects
aspects of
of the
the post-conflict
post-conflict
significant
for
other
aspects
of
the
post-conflict
operation.
operation.
conducted
Jmisimilar
ssimilaranalysis
inthese
these seven
seven
We conducted
conducted
analysisonon
extern ass;stance
_ictancecein
external
in
these
seven
cases.
cases.
Cumulative figures
figures are
are useful
useful
to some
some degree,
degree, but
but to
to assess
assess the
the
Cumulative
figures
are
useful to
degree,
to
impact of assistance
assistance on
on individuals
individuals in
in post-conflict
post-conflict situations,
situations, it
it
true impact
individuals
situations,
l o o k at
at how
how much assistance
assistance was
was provided on
on a
per capita
capita
to look
is
is important to
aper
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
-7-
-- 77 --
Figure 5.2
per
capita assistance was provided
S.2
captures
how
L
e
pperca
w rovided
Figure
S.2 captures
captures how
how much
muchrovided
basis
basis
during the
the first
first two
two
years in
in_
the various
various cases
cases (in
(in2001
2001
to
ea.h
erson
ea
h1 person
erson during
during
the
first
two years
years
i~ the
the
various
cases
(in
2001
toea
U.5.
ollars)
U.S.
U . S . iollars):
illars)::
External Assistance
Capita
in First
First
TwoT!aEsAfter
Ye r
External
Assistanceper
per
Capita
in First
External
Assistance
Capita
in
T~r
Tr
Conflict
Conflict
(2001 Dollars)
Dollars)
(2001
$1
,600 ,---~--'-------'------' -._--~.,,~.-'-'~'-~-'-----'--- -.-.---------...--~-.-,
$1,600
$1,400 +---~~~-----­
$1,400
$1,200 +---~~--------,­
$1,200
$1 ,000 +------'----'---'-~-'-----'-$1,000
$800 - f - - . - - - - c . , . . , . - _ - - - _ - ' - - - ' $800
$600 + - - - - - - ' - - - - - ' - - - - ' - - - - - '
$600
$400 +-'--~-----~----'­
$400
$200
$200 +--rn;;;~--'-------$0
/
,,~
ro
(Q
Ojt;.
Ojt;.
~
~
~~
~~'lß
ci
[l)-~
)'l>-~
R>~
~,
KiÇ
~,
,,~
"q)
~
OjOS
"
.~'x--~
F
f
I
~"
~~
~,
!ö
f0CS
OjC?5
~'l>-
oCj
<Q
~
~
~o
0
*-oCj
~~
R5
"q)
rvCS
~~
,'lß
.~
~
qj
~~
~
S.2:
Figure
Figure S.2:
S.2: Per Capita External Assistance
Due
varying populations,
populations,
comparable
sums
of
money can
can
have
drastically
populations, comparable
comparable sums
sums of
of money
can have
have drastically
Due to
t varying
example, although
different
effects on
of
country.
diffe
mnt
t effects
on the residents
residents of
of aaa country.
country. For
For example,
example,
although
far
the
most assistance
assistance
in
terms
($12
Germany
was granted
granted by
by far
far the
the most
assistance in
in monetary
monetary terms
terms ($12
($12
Germa
Germa r was
the
citizen
came
to
only
little
over
$200.
billion),
billi i ),
) , the
the amount
amount per
per citizen
citizen came
came to
to only
only aaa little
little over
over $200.
$200.
Meanwhile
total assistance,
assistance, was
Kosovo,
terms of total
was
Kosovo, which
which ranked
ranked fourth
fourth in
in terms
terms
assistance,
Meanw .le Kosovo,
over
$800
per resident.
resident.
over $800
$800 per
resident.
granted
grant L over
In
economy, these
In aa recovering
recovering economy,
economy,
these
discrepancies
ancies are
significant.
are quite
quite significant.
significant.
discr bancies
INCLUSIONS
CASE
NCLUSIONS
CASE CONCLUSIONS
1
set standards
standards for
for post-conflict
The
German and
and Japanese
Japanese occupations
occupations set
post-conflict
lee German
and
Japanese
occupations
post-conflict
transformation
that have
have not
not since
One of
most
rmation that
most
lrmation
that
have
not
since been equaled.
equaled. One
One
of the
the most
trans
important
questions an
nt questions
such
as
this
must to
to
address,
therefore,
.nt
an inquiry
inquiry such
such as
as this
this must
to address,
address,therefore,
therefore,
impor
-
'.ntly
while
’
‘ ntly while
all those
those
that
why those two operations
operations &urce- ------ -;
iis
s wh
W~h~Yi:t~h~o.:s~e~t~w::o~o~p~e::r::.a~t~i.9o~n~sUlllJ:::cee~4-El'tr-l~H.l.i·aIln!tl12y~w~h~i
1 e all
all
tho
se that
tha
t
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
- a8 --8-
have come
come after
after have
have fallen
fallen short,
short, to
to one
one degree
degree or
or another.
another.
come
after
have
short,
to
one
degree
or
another.
The easiest
easiest
The
answer
is
answer is
is that
Germany and
and Japan
Japan were
were already
already highly
highly developed,
developed,
answer
that Germany
Japan
already
highly
developed,
economically advanced
it
economically
advanced societies.
societies. And
this certainly
certainly explains
explains why
why it
economically
societies.
And this
this
certainly
explains
why
it
easier to
to reconstruct
reconstruct the
the German
German and
and Japanese
Japanese economies
economies than
than it
it
proved easier
reconstruct
the
German
and
Japanese
economies
than
it
has to
to fundamentally
fundamentally reform
reform those
those underdeveloped
underdeveloped economies
economies in
in our
our other
other
has
has
reform
those
underdeveloped
economies
in
our
other
five
five case
case studies.
studies.
five
-
is not
not aaa sufficient
sufficient answer,
answer, however.
however. Nation
Nation building,
building, as
as
Economics is
sufficient
answer,
however.
Nation
building,
as
Economics
we
it,
and
more
importantly,
as
those
who
launched
the
seven
we have
have defined
defined it,
it, and
and more
more importantly,
importantly,as
as those
those who
who launched
launched the
the seven
seven
interventions studied
studied herein
herein defined
defined American
American objectives,
objectives, was
was not
not
interventions
interventions
defined
American
objectives,
was
not
primarily
primarily about
about working
working economic,
economic,but
but rather
rather political
political transformations.
transformations.
working
economic,
but
rather
political
transformations.
democracy in
in
Latin
America,
Asia,
and
parts
of
Africa
The
The spread
spread of
of democracy
in Latin
Latin America,
America, Asia,
Asia, and
and parts
parts of
of Africa
Africa
suggests that
that this
this is
is not
not uniquely
uniquely an
an artifact
artifact of
of Western
Western culture
culture or
or of
suggests
uniquely
an
artifact
of
Western
culture
or
of
advanced industrial
industrial economies:
economies: that
that democracy
democracy can,
can, indeed,
indeed, take
take root
root in
in
advanced
that
democracy
can,
indeed,
take
root
in
circumstances
neither obtains.
obtains. No
No post
post conflict
conflict program
program of
of
circumstances where
where neither
neither
obtains.
No
post
conflict
of
"reconstruction" could
“reconstruction”
could turn
turn Somalia,
Somalia, Haiti
Haiti or
or Afghanistan
Afghanistan into
into thriving
thriving
"reconstruction"
Somalia,
or
Afghanistan
into
thriving
c;
-
centers of
of prosperity.
prosperity.But
Butth~i~~
thfai1ux
centers
of
prosperity.
But
th
failurb of
of American-led
American-led interventions
interventions to
to
centers
Americ~~d
interventions
to
--
install substantial
substantial democracies
democracies in
in those
those
countries has
has other
other than
than
purely
install
democracies
in
those countries
countries
has
other
than purely
economic
economic explanations.
explanations.
/------ -- .
All three
three
of
those
societies
ar--d
ed
ethnic3y,
sociothree of
of those
thosesocieties
societies
re(iided
ethnicJy, socioAll
ar~ided
ethnic~y,
socio...--------~-------
__ _---------
--._---.._---.._--_ .. ”.
and/or tribally
tribally in
in ways
ways that Germany
Germany and
and Japan
Japan were
were not.
not. So
So
So
economically and/or
in
helps. But
But again,
again, it
it is
is not essential.
essential. For
For the
the kind
kind of
of
homogeneity helps.
again,
it
is
essential.
the
communal hatreds
hatreds that mark Somalia,
Somalia, Haiti and
and Afghanistan are
are even
more
even more
more
communal
Somalia,
in Bosnia and
and Kosovo,
Kosovo, where,
where, nevertheless,
nevertheless, the
the process
process
of
marked in
Kosovo,
where,
nevertheless,
the
process of
democratization has
has
made some
some
progress.
democratization
has made
some progress.
progress.
What distinguish
Kosovo,
on
the
one
hand,
distinguish Germany,
Germany,
Japan,
Bosnia and
and Kosovo,
Germany, Japan,
Japan, Bosnia
Kosovo, on
on the
the one
one hand,
hand,
from
Somalia,
on the
the other,
other,
are not their levels
from Somalia,
Somalia, Haiti
Haiti
Haiti and Afghanistan
Afghanistan on
other, are
levels of
of
of
Western culture,
culture,
of
economic development,
development,
or
of
national
homogeneity.
Western
culture, of
of economic
development, or
or of
of national
national homogeneity.
homogeneity.
Rather what
what distinguishes
distinguishes
these
two
groups,
one
where democratization
democratization
has
Rather
distinguishes these
these two
two groups,
groups, one
one where
democratization has
or
of
effQrt
or is
is
taking
hold,
and the
the
other
where
it
has
not,
is
the
level
is taking
taking hold,
hold, and
the other
other where
where it
it has
has not,
not, is
is the
the level
level of
of effort
effQrt
the
put into
into
their
democratic transformations.
transformations.
the United
united States
States has
has put
into their
their democratic
transformations. Nation
building,
as this
this
study
illustrates,
is
time
and resource
resource
consuming
building,
building, as
this study
study illustrates,
illustrates, is
is aa
a time
time and
resource consuming
effort.
States
and its
its
allies
have put
put t
effort.
The United States
effort. The
States and
its allies
allies have
t~y
--
fiVe~)m~e
troops
and money
money into
into post
post conflict
conflict Kosovo
Kosovo than
thaninto
intopost
postCQDflict
conf1t
troops
into
Kosovo
into
and
. t
,
Afghanistan.
This
higher
level
of input
input
accounts,
at
least
in
part,
for
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.
higher level
level of
input accounts,
accounts, at
at least
least in
in part,
part, for
for
This higher
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
- 9 -9-
the
her level
level of
in terms
terms of
of democratic
democratic institutions
institutions and
the hi
higher
level
of output
output in
in
terms
of
democratic
institutions
growth.
growth.
econom:.c
econom
cc growth.
In the
while it
it
was
shouldering
all
the
burden
of
the late
late 1940's,
1 9 4 0 ’ s , while
while
it was
was shouldering
shouldering all
all the
the burden
burden of
I
transformation
and
most
of
that
for
West
Germany,
the
United
Japans
Japans transformation
transformation and
and most
most of
of that
that for
for West
West Germany,
Germany, the
the United
States produced
produced some
same
50%
of
the
world's GNP.
GNP.
By the
the
1990's,
States
5 0 % of
of the
the world's
world’s
GNP. By
the 1990's,
1 9 9 O ’ s , when
when nation
nation
some 50%
buildi
gg again
building
22%.
again
came
into
vogue,
that
figure
was
down
to
around
22%.
again came
came into
into vogue,
vogue,that
thatfigure
figurewas
was down
downto
toaround
around22%.
Intern
Intern. tional
tional burden
burden sharing
sharing had
had become
become commensurately
commensurately more
more important.
important.
Throughout the
the 1990's
1990's the
the United
United States
States wrestled
wrestled with
with the
the problem
problem of
of
how ac ieve
ieve wider
wider participation
participation in
in its
its nation
nation building
building endeavors
endeavors while
while
how
eserving adequate
adequate unity
unity of
of command.
command.
also p eserving
In Somalia and Haiti,
In
Haiti, the
the
States experimented
experimented with
with sequential
sequential arrangements
arrangements by
by which
which it
it
United States
organi ed, led,
led, largely
largely manned
manned and
and funded
funded the
the initial
initial phase
phase of
of the
the
organi'ed,
operaton
operat"onitself,
itself, but
but then
thenquickly
quicklyturned
turnedresponsibility
responsibility over
over to
to aa more
more
broadl, representative
representative (and
(and more
more widely
widely funded)
funded) United
United Nations
Nations force.
force.
efforts can
efforts
can not
not be
be deemed
deemeda a succs.'j.
sU~.
In Bosnia the
United
United States
States succeeded
succeeded in
in achieving
achieving unity
unity of
of command
command and
and broad
broad
participation on the
partic"pation
the military
military side
side of
of the
the operation
operation through
through NATO,
NATO, but
but
resistdd the
the logic
logic of
of achieving
achievinga a comparable
comparable arrangement
arrangement on
on the
the civil
civil
side.
In Kosovo,
Kosovo, the United States
States achieved
achieved unity
unity of command and broad
participation on both the
the military
military and
and civil
civil sides,
sides, through
through NATO
NATO and
and the
the
ectively.
UN respectively.
While the
the military
military and
and civil
civil aspects
aspects of
of that
that operation
operation
remained
under different management,
dunder
management, the
the United
United States
States assured
assured that
that the
the
mandatessand
and capabilities of
UMMIK would
would
of the
the two
two entities,
entities, KFOR and UMMIK
gap opening
opening between
between them.
them.
overlap thereby preventing
preventing aa gap
one
models proved
proved entirely
entirely satis etÖTy' rangements in
in
one of these
these models
however, do
da seem to have provided
provided th
th "best amalgam of
(IKosovo, , however,
lead-. ship,
ship, European
European participation,
participation, broad
broad fin; cial bur.-
merican
sharingid
and
strong unity of command. Every
Every international
international official
official in
in Kosovo
Kosovo works
works
one of
of two
two people,
people, the
the NATO
NATO commander
commander or
or the
the Special
Special
ultimately for one
Representative of
of the Secretary
Secretary General.
General. Neither
Neither of
of these
these is
is an
an American,
American,
but b
of its
its credibility in
and its
its influence
influence in
in NATO
NATO
virtue of
in the
the region
region and
and the ON
UN Security Council,
Council, the United States
States has
has been
been able
able to
to maintain
maintain
and
leadershi
a fully satisfactory
satisfactory
leaderj rr1p wh1
p'ying oJy 1E% of the
the
and fielding
fielding only
only 16%
16% of
of the
the peacekeeping
peacekeeping troops.
troops.
reconstruction costs and
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
10
lo ---- 10
The efficacy
efficacy of
of the
the Kosovo
Kosovo model
model for
for managing aa large
large scale
scale peace
peace
The
efficacy
for
scale
operation depends
depends very heavily upon
upon the
the ability
ability of
of the
the United
United
States and
and
operation
the
Uni
ted States
States
and
to sttain
stain
common vision
vision of
of the
the enterprises
enterprises
its principal
principal allies
allies to
its
allies
to
aa common
ttain a
of the
the relevant
relevant
institutions,
Cbjectives
and to
to then
then shape
shape response
response of
objectives
~bjectives and
and
to
then
shape
response
of
the
relevant institutions,
institutions,
NATO,
the European
European Union
Union and
and the
the United
United Nations,
Nations,
to those
those
principally
NATO, the
the
Union
and
the
United
Nations, to
to
those
principally NATO,
agreed
purposes.
agreed purposes.
agreed
purposes.
-
the principal
principal participants
participants
in aa nation
nation building
Where the
participants in
nation
building
exercise
have
such
vision,
the
Kosovo
model
viable
exercise have
have such
such aa common
common vision,
vision, the
the Kosovojnodel
Kosovo mo
del offers
offers aaa viable
viable
amalgam of
sharing
of
command.
of burden
burden sharing
sharing and
and unity
unity of
of command.
command.
ia
More recently,
recently, ii~fghanfita~,
Afghanis
Gn', the
theUnited
States opted
opted for
for parallel
parallel
fghanisan,
More
recently,
the
United States
States
opted
for
parallel
arrangements on
on the
the military
military side,
side, and
even greater
greater variety
on the
the civil.
civil.
arrangements
on
the
side,
and even
even
greater
variety on
on
the
civil.
international force,
force, with
with no
no
US participation,
participation,
operates in
in Kabul,
Kabul,
An international
international
force,
no US
US
participation, operates
operates
in
Kabul,
An
while
mostly US
US
force
operates
everywhere
else.
while
while aanational,
a national,
national, mostly
US force
force operates
operates everywhere
everywhere else.
else.
The
has
UN has
has
The UN
responsibility for
for promoting
promoting political
political transformation
transformation while
while individual
individual
responsibility
for
transformation
while
individual
so).
donors coordinate
coordinate economic
economic reconstruction
reconstruction (or
(ormore
more often
often fail
fail to
to do
do so).
coordinate
economic
reconstruction
(or
more
often
fail
to
do
so).
donors
This
since the
a marginal
improvement on
This arrangement
arrangement is
is a
marginal improvement
on Somalia,
Somalia, since
since
the separate
separate
US
and international
international forces
forces are
are at
at least
not operating
operating in
in the
the same
same
US and
international
forces
least not
physical
space, but represents
clear regression
regression from
from what
achieved
space,
represents aa clear
what
waS
physical space,
what was
was achieved
in Haiti,
Haiti, Bosnia
or, in
in particular
Kosovo.
Haiti,
Bosnia or,
or,
in
particular Kosovo.
Kosovo.
in
aspect in
in which these
these seven
seven cases
cases differ
differ is
is that
that of
of
Another aspect
~.
&
rzw.
were
begun
withclear
cleardeparture
departure deadlines
deadlines which
which were
Some were
were begun
ben with
Some
clear
departure
deadlines
adhered
to--Haiti. Some began with
with very short
time horizons
horizons
saw
horizons but
adhered to--Haiti.
to--Haiti.
short time
but saw
those amended -- Germany,
Germany, Japan,
Japan, Somalia
Somalia and
Bosnia.
those
Germany,
Somalia
and Bosnia.
Bosnia.
some were
were
begun
And some
some
were begun
And
without
Kosovo and
and Afghanistan.
without any
any expectation
expectation of
of an
an early
early exit
exit -- Kosovo
any
expectation
early
exit
Afghanistan.
l!
-
The
The
record suggests
suggests that
that while
while staying
staying long
long does
does not
not guarantee
guarantee success,
success,
record
suggests
that
staying
long
does
not
guarantee
success,
leaving
leaving early
early assures
assures failure.
failure.
leaving
early
assures
failure.
To date,
date,
effort at
at enforced
enforced
To
no effort
date, no
-
democratization has
taken hold
hold\in
less than
than five
five years.\
years.\
democratization
hold\n
has taken
in less
less
than
five
years.
-..
And if
if democratization
democratization takes
takes hold,
hold, is
is that
the ultimate
ultimate exit
And
hold,
if
takes
is
that the
strategy?
strategy?
These case
case studies
studies suggest
suggest not.
not.
These
suggest
not.
forces
left
American
have left
American forces
forces have
clear
and Haiti-but
remain present
present in
in every
every
clear failures
failures behind
behind -- Somalia
failures
remain
present
in
every
Somalia and
Haitibut remain
successful
successful or
or still
still pending
pending case
case -- Gerrnany,
Germany, Japan,
Japan,
Bosnia,
Kosovo and
and
Germany,
Japan, Bosnia,
Bosnia, Kosovo
successful
or
still
case
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. These
interventions
were
motivated
or
These five
five interventions
interventions were
were motivated
motivated by
by regional
regional or
global geopolitical
geopolitical concerns.
Democratization alone
may not
not fully
fully address
address
global
concerns. Democratization
fully
alone rnay
such concerns.
concerns. Germany
and Japan
Japan were
disarmed and
and consequently
consequently required
required
such
concerns.
Gerrnany and
were disarmed
American help
help in
in providing
providing for
for their
their external
external security
security long
long after
after they
they
American
American
help
in
for
their
long
after
they
became reliable
reliable
democracies fully
fully capable
capable of
of looking
looking after
after their
their
became
reliable democracies
dernocracies
fully
their own
own
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
-- 11
11 --
intern
inter 1i
1 affairs.
affairs.
Bosnia,
Afghanistan also
also may
may well
weIl require
require
Bosnia,
Bosnia, Kosovo
Kosovo and Afghanistan
also
require
Americ
(or
perhaps,
in
the
case
of
Bosnia and
Kosovo, European)
European)
Ameri nn
of Bosnia
and Kosovo,
Kosovo,
European)
n (or
(or perhaps,
perhaps, in
in the
the case
case of
assist
their
external
security
long after
after their
their internal
internal peace
peaee
assist nee
assis
nce
nce with
with their
their external
external security
security long
long
after
their
internal
peace
is
is est
is
es blished.
blished.
this
help
will
take the
the form
form of
of an
an external
Whether
Whether this
this help
help will
will take
take
the
form
of
an
external
troop
troop
troop
resenee,
security
guarantee,
or external
external leadership
leadership in
in
resence,
resence, an
an external
external security
security guarantee,
guarantee,or
or
external
leadership
forgin
forgi.
new
seeurity
arrangements
remains to
to be
seen, but
some
new regional
regional security
security arrangements
arrangements remains
remains
to
be seen,
seen,
but some
some
-
Amerie
and
or
European
seeurity
eommitment
is likely
to continue
continue long
Amer
ic n
Americ
n and
and or
or European
European security
security commitment
commitment is
is
likely to
to
continue
long
----_
after
he
is
eom
leted.
after
he demoeratie
democratic
democratic transformation
transformation is
is com.leted.
completed.
a
f E 'he
Japan
Japan
Indeed,
and
Indeed,
Indeed, if Germany and
any
guide,
the
more
thorough
the democratic
democratic transformation,
transformation, the
the
re
re any
any guide,
guide, the
the more
more thorough
thorough the
the
democratic
transformation,
more
d eply
forged
may be
be
the
residual
links.
eply forged
forged may
be the
the residual
residual links.
links.
more d
The record
reeord suggests
suggests that
that
The
record
suggests
that
in
ones
image
creates
ties of
of affection
as well
weIl as
as of
aa nation
nation in
in ones
ones image
image creates
creates ties
ties
of
affection as
as
well
as
of
build.
bui
idi g
J
long
after
the
suceessful
birth.
depend
ncy that
that persist
persist long
long after
after the
the successful
successful birth.
birth.
depenc ncy
eonsiderations
in
mind,
we came
eame to
to the
the following
following general
general
th these
these considerations
considerations in
1 th
in mind,
mind, we
we
came
to
the
followinq
qeneral
W
-
to
those associated
assoeiated with
specifie operations:
operations:
conclu
concli ions
Lons in
in addition
addition to
to those
those
associated
with specific
specific
operations:
factors
influence
the ease
diffieulty of
of nation
nation building
building
Many
Many factors
factors influence
influence the
the
ease or
or difficulty
difficulty
-demoeratie
experienee,
level of
eeonomie development,
development,
- prior
prior democratic
democratic experience,
experience, level
level
of economic
economic
development,
national
national homogeneity.
homogeneity.
homogeneity.
Another important
Another
important
determinant of
of success,
success,
important determinant
suceess,
however,
is the
the level
level of
of
effort,
in
time,
men and
and money,
money,
however, is
however,
is
the
level
of effort,
effort, in
in time,
time, men
mo~ey,
'
-4zzprnzess.
-iuve~ted
i
iitedin
L1it
in
lheprocess.
pröeess.
Multilateral nation
~ Multilatera~
nation building
building
is
is more
complex and
and time
time consuming
is
more complex
complex
unilateral. It is
considerably less expensive for
any
than unilateral.
unilateral.
also considerably
than
is also
eonsiderably
for any
one participant.
participant.
one
Multilateral nation
nation building can
can
produce
more thoroughgoing
Multilateral
ean produce
produee more
thoroughgoing
transformations and
and greater
greater regional
regional
reconciliation
than
transformations
regional reconciliation
reeonciliation than
unilateral
unilateral efforts.
efforts.
efforts.
of command
command and
broad participation
participation are
are compatible
compatible
if the
the
Unity ot
Unity
of
command
and broad
eompatjble if
major participants
share a
common
vision and
and can
can
shape
partieipants share
a common
common vision
ean shape
shape
international
international institutions
institutions
to
their needs.
needs.
institutions to
to their
needs.
Neighboring
Neighboring states
states
can
exert decisive
decisive
influence,
for
states can
ean exert
deeisive influence,
influenee, for
for better
better or
or
I
worse.
worse.
It
together
It is
is near
near impossible to put together
together a
a fragmented
fragrnented
it apart.
apart.
nation if
if its
its neighbors
neighbors persist
persist in
in trying
trying to
to tear
tear it
nation
apart.
effort should
should be
be made
made to
to
secure
their
support.
Every effort
to secure
seeure their
their support.
support.
Accountability
for
post injustices
injustices
can be
be aa
powerful component
component
Aecountability for
for post
injustiees can
a powerful
eomponent
-
democratization. It also
of democratization.
democratization.
also tends,
tends,
however,
to be among
of
tends, however,
however, to
among the
the most
most
difficult and controversial
aspects
of any
any nation-building
nation-building
diffieult
controversial aspects
aspeets of
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
J
. .-- 12
12 -
endeavor
should,
therefore,
be
attempted
only
if
there
endeavor and
and should,
should, therefore,
therefore, be
be attempted
attempted only
only if
if there
there is
is aa
to the
the
overall operation.
operation.
deep and long
long term
committeemen to
deep
term committeemen
committeemen
to
the overall
overall
operation
.
n~
b~ilding.~seems
ijseems
-
C'.
There is
is no quick
quick route
route to
to nation
nation building.
building. Fiveyears)seems the
the
There
route
to
nation
•
L
minimum
required
to
enforce
an
enduring
transition
to
democracy.
minimum required
required to
to enforce
enforce an
an enduring
enduring transition
transition to
to democracy.
democracy.
•
Successful nation
nation building
building can
can create
create ties,
ties, affection
affection and
and a
Successful
building
can
create
ties,
affection
a
long-term
for
external
security
long
after
the
long-term dependence
dependence
for external
external security
security long
long after
after the
the need
dependence for
for assistance
assistance in
in building
democratic forms
forms and
and maintaining
for
in
building democratic
democratic
forms
and
internal
security
is
past.
internal security
security is
is past.
past.
APPLYING
THESE
TSE LESSONS
IRAQ
APPLYING THESE
LESSONS TO
TO IRAQ
IRAQ
Finally,
reviewing
these
experiences
and
seeking
to
draw
the
Finally,
after reviewing
reviewing these
these experiences
experiences and
and seeking
seeking to
to draw
draw the
the
Finally, after
resultant lessons,
lessons, this
this study
study suggests
suggests how
how these
these best
best practices
practices
might be
be
lessons,
this
study
suggests
these
practices might
might
be
resultant
applied
future
operations,
and,
in
pa~tjClllar to
toIrag.
applied to
to future
future operations,
operations,and,
and, in
in patirìì1ar
a
p
o Iraq.
Iraq.
the military
phase of
of the
the war
war against
against Iraq
Iraq went
went better
better
Although the
the
military phase
phase
of
the
against
Irag
went
than could
could have
hoped for
for and
and the
the regime
regime collapsed
faster than
than
than
have been
been hoped
for
and
the
regime
collapsed much
much faster
faster
than
has been
left with
with an
an unenviable
unenviable task in seeking
seeking
expected, the
the U.S.
many expected,
expected,
D.S. has
been left
left
nation build
to nation
build in
in Iraq.
Iraq.
to
in
Irag.
The British
British spent
spent several
several decades
decades forging
forging an
an
The
of the
the Ottoman
Ottoman empire
empire but
but neither
neither
they nor
nor
Iraqi state
state out
out of remains
remains of
Iragi
of
the
Ottoman
empire
neither they
they
nor
their Iraqi
Iraqi successors
successors succeeded
succeeded in
in forging
forging aareal
a real
real Iraqi
Iraqi nation;
nation; none
none
Iragi
successors
succeeded
in
forging
Iragi
nation;
none
their
democratic,
pluralist
polity.
really
really tried
tried to
to build
build aaa democratic,
democratic,pluralist
pluralist polity.
polity.
Nation
buildina
in Iraq
Iraqfaces
facesaaanumber
numberof
ofdeep-rooted
deep-rootedchallenqes,.
challenues.
building in
in
Irag
faces
number
of
deep-rooted
challenges.
Nation buildinq
Iraq has no
no tradition
tradition of
of pluralist
pluralist democracy;
democracy; instead
instead politics
politics has
has always
always
Iraq
Irag
tradition
of
pluralist
democracy;
instead
politics
has
always
been
been about
about authoritarian
authoritarian rule
rule and
and the
the settlement
settlement of
of disputes
disputes by
force.
authoritarian
rule
and
the
settlement
of
disputes
by force.
force.
Although a
sense of
of Iraqi
Iraqi national
national identity
identity does
does exist,
exist, this
this does
does not
not
aa sense
Iragi
national
identity
exist,
this
of identity
identity along
along ethnic,
ethnic, geographic,
geographic, tribal
tribal or
or
override communal
communal forms
forms of
forms
of
identity
along
ethnie,
geographie,
tribal
override
religious
religious grounds.
grounds.
grounds.
The majority
m
,
majority
of the
the apopulation,
population, the
themKurds
Kurds and
and Shia,
Shia,
The
of
..,
have no real
real tradition
tradition of
of representation
representation as
as communities
communities in
in national Iraqi
have
representation
as
communities
in
Iragi
politics but
but will
will now
now
have
to be
be brought
brought into
into the
the polity.
polity.
but
now have
have to
to
brought
into
the
polity.
politics
To make
make
To
matters worse,
worse,
crimeand
and banditry
banditry are
arestrongly
stronglyrooted.
rooted.
worse, organized
organized crime
erime
and
are
strongly
rooted.
matters
Furthermore,
the past decade
decade of
of sanctions
sanctions and Saddam Hussein's
Hussein's
Furthermore,
decade
of
sanctions
Furthermore, the
dictatorship have
have denuded
Iraq of
of its
its once
once strong
strong middle
middle class,
class, who
who had
had aa
dictatorship
denuded Iraq
Irag
of
its
once
strong
middle
class,
of aaa civil
civil society.
society.
stake in
in development
development of
stake
of
civil
society.
In addition
addition to
to these
these particular Iraqi
Iraqi problems,
problems, the
the country faces
In
Iragi
problems,
faces
of aaa society
society emerging
emerging from
from aaa long
long period
period of
of
the familiar
familiar challenges
challenges of
familiar
ehallenges
of
society
emerging
from
long
the
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
I
-- 13
13
13 --
arian rule.
rule. The
The military,
military, security
security services
services and
totali.:arian
rule.
The
military,
security
services
and bureaucracy need
totali
arlan
be :radically
adically reformed
reformed and
purged.
to be
adically
reformed
and purged.
purged.
of
human rights
rights
abuses.
victim,
victims of
of human
human
rights abuses.
abuses.
to be
aehieved for
for
Justice
Justice needs
needs to
to
be achieved
achieved
for
The
eeonomy
needs a
aa major
to
The economy
economy needs
major overhaul
overhaul to
to
in
the
global
market.
make ii; competitive
competitive in
in the
the global
global market.
market.
make
faced
any
attempt
hese challenges
achieve
These
challenges would
would have
have faced
faced any
any attempt
attempt to aehieve
achieve
transfDrmation
in Iraq.
Iraq.
rmation in
in
Iraq.
transfermation
Due to
to the
the diplomatic
diplomatic circumstances
circumstances of
of the
the
to
the
diplomatie
circumstanees
of
the
Due
the
O.S.
also
has
to cope
cape with
unsympathetic neighbors
neighbors -- Iran,
Iran,
conf
li t, the
the U
U.S.
also has
has to
. S . also
cope
with unsympathetic
unsympathetic
neighbors
Iran,
conflizt,
Turkey all
all have
an interest
interest in
in shaping
shaping Iraqi
Iraqi politics
Syria
Syria ;nd
bnd Turkey
Turkey
all
have an
an
interest
in
shaping
Iraqi
politics and
and
a smooth
smooth transition.
transition. At the
international
perhaps in
in destabilising
destabilising aa
smooth
transition.
the international
international
perhap
splits
in
the
UN Security
Security
Council
it
much harder
level,
the pre-war
pre-war splits
splits in
in the
the UN
Security Council
Council make
make it
it much
harder
level, the
D.S.
the
burden
sharing
models
in
Bosnia,
for tthe U.S.
U . S . to
to adopt
adopt the
the burden
burden sharing
sharing models
models adopted
adopted in
in Bosnia,
Bosnia, Kosovo
for
and Af.hanistan.
the
same
time, the
the
D.S.
was
unable
to
undertake
preAfghanistan. At
At the
the same
same time,
time,
the U.S.
U.S. was
was unable
unable to
to undertake
undertake prepreand
war pr-parations
that
would have
have
eased post-war
post-war transition,
transition,
such
as
war
preparations that
that would
have eased
post-war
transition, such
such as
as
coordinating
ating
relief
the UN
organising
coordi'
ating humanitarian
humanitarian relief
relief with
with the
UN and NGOs,
NGO5, organising
international
civil police
police forces
forces
and establishing
establishing
an
international
forces and
establishing an
an international
international
inter
ational civil
polit' al authority
to rebut
rebut Arab
suspicions of
of American
American imperialism.
imperialism.
political
of
American
imperialism.
authority to
to
rebut
Arab suspicions
suspicions
polit
~
y
Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, Iraq
Iraq does
does have
have some
someadvantages
advantages for
for nation-builders.
nation-builders.
Iraq
does
have
same
advantages
for
nation-builders.
\ - First,
ha~ion-wjde
administr~,
is
which
atio
ivil administra2,
administ
First,
ivil
which is
is relatively
relatively
- * s- civil
-&First,
&
ait
it ha
h
atio -.
-
efficient.
efficent.
,
This
administration
needs to
to
rebuilt but
reconstructed
This administration
administration needs
needs
to be
be rebuilt
rebuilt
but not
not reconstructed
reconstructed
from -cratch.
scratch.
from
This administration,
administration,
staffed
mainly by Iraqis,
Iraqis,
reduce
This
administration, staffed
staffed mainly
Iraqis, will
will reduce
reduce
the n:ed
n
international intervention
intervention and
facilitate security
security
for
n$ed
for direct
direct international
international
intervention
and facilitate
facilitate
security
the
velopment across
across the
the country.
country. Second,
Second, the
the civil
civil
administration and
and d;velopment
Second,
civil administration
development
across
the
country.
and
~/)and
d
(5
-
eanssthat
that the
the humanitarian
issues
that
the
humanitarian issues
issues
e tensive
links with
with UN
UN ag
agencies1ans
links
extensive
C / t hthe
ee
:.::::.:.:::::.=..::...:::.--===-==.-.......:;:.:..:C-::::.a:::.::.:..:::..:;..:<:===:;.:
shoul
be soluble.
soluble.
shoulc.
shoulu be
Third, Iraq
s oJuns ns
that
thecountry
country
will
not
Third,
Iraq(s
that
the
Ira
ns
that
the
countrywill
will not
not
remai
international
aid in
in
the
medium term.
term.
dependent on
on international
international aid
in the
the medium
term.
remairk dependent
its
most
ambitious
programme
of
nation-building
As it
it embarks
embarks on
on its
its most
most ambitious
ambitious programme
programme of
of nation-building
nation-building
since 1945,
1945,
D.S.
learn important
important lessons
lessons from
from the
the case
case studies
studies
1945, the
the U.S.
U
. S . must
must learn
learn
important
lessons
from
the
case
studies
since
exami ed in
in this
this report.
report.
in
this
report.
examined
examied
posit ve
ve outcome
outcome in
in Iraq.
Iraq.
outcome
in
Iraq.
posit:-ve
D.S. has
has staked
staked its
The U.S.
credibility on
The
U.S.
has
staked
its credibility
on aa
This
extensive commitment
This will
will require
require an
an extensive
commitment of
(financial, personnel
personnel and
diplomatic) over
over aa long
of
ces (financial,
resou
(financial,
and diplomatic)
diplomatie)
lang period of
resou:rces
The
strategies,
U.S. cannot
cannot afford
afford to
to contemplate
contemplate early
early exit
exit
strateqies,. . nor
time.
The U.S.
time.. Th~..:..-=c~a:::n:n=o-=
time
t=-.:s:..::t::.r:.;a::.;:t..::e""g<.;i;;.;e""s,,-,-,.
.:nor
.n:.:o:.;E.;.
afford
'ob
done.
ob half
afford to leave the
the job
half done.
done.
can iii: atford
can
1
.
questions for
The
for
The real
real questions
questions
for the
d
D.S.
re not how soon it can leave
leave but rather how
how fast
fast and
and how
how
U.S. ;re
subst
ntially to share
Iraqis and
the rest
rest of
of the
the world
subst;ntially
subs1
antially
share power
power with
with Iraqis
Iraqis
and with
with the
the
rest
of
the
world
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
c
...
-~
14 --- 14
while retaining
to oversee an enduring
enduring transition
transition to
to
enough itself
itself to
while
retaining enough
democracy.
democracy.
democracy.
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
.......
15 --- 15
15
2.
2.GERMANY
GERMANY
i
the bloodiest
conflict in
in European
he Second World War was
was the
the
bloodiest conflict
conflict
in
European
histor
histor
of
soldiers and
civilians were
killed in
in battle
in
. Millions of
o
f soldiers
soldiers
and civilians
civilians
were killed
killed
in
battle or
or in
in
.
concen 'ration
ration camps
camps
Germany.
concen
camps operated
operated by Nazi
ration
Nazi Germany.
Germany.
In
Germany
1945, Germany
Gerrnany
In May 1945,
1945,
surren ered unconditionally
to the
the United
States, the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, and
surrensered
unconditionally to
surren
to
the
United States,
States,
the
Soviet
Union,
and
Great dritain.
ritain. The
~ritain.
allies had
to occupy
Gerrnany
The allies
allies
had already
already decided
decided to
to
occupy Germany
Germany
Great
militaiily.
milita ily.
The United
United States,
States, Great
Great Britain,
Britain, and,
and, it
it was
later decided,
decided,
Great
Britain,
and,
it
was later
later
decided,
France would occupy
occupy zones
zones in
in the
the west
the Soviets
Soviets would
occupy the
the
west while
while the
the
Soviets
would occupy
occupy
the
east.
The capital of Berlin
Berlin was
was also
also partitioned
arnong the
the four
four
also
partitioned among
among
the
four
occupy ng
ng powers.
powers.
Common allied
series
allied policy
was developed
developed in
in aa
aseries
of
series of
of
policy was
was
developed
in
surnmit meetings,
notably at
at Casablanca
Casablanca in
~n January
January 1943,
1943,
Yalta in
in
summit
meetings, most notably
Casablanca
in
January
1943, Yalta
Yalta
in
Februa y 1945,
1945, and
and at
at Potsdam
Potsdam in
in August
1945.
Februay
August 1945.
1945.
Casablanca, British
Casablanca,
At Casablanca,
inister Winston
Winston Churchill
Churehill and
Arneriean President
President Franklin
Franklin
mister
and american
American
President
Franklin
Prime
Roosevlt
lt had
had decided
deeided to
to accept
aceept only
unconditional surrender
surrender from
from
onlyunconditional
unconditional
surrender
from
German
.
This decision was reiterated
This
reiterated
in
subsequent
meetings
that
erated in
in subsequent
subsequent meetings
meetings that
that
Soviet leader
leader Josef
Josef Stalin.
Stalin.
Yalta
deelaration
called
for
includdd Soviet
lin. The
The Yalta
Yalta declaration
declaration called
called for
for
surrender; the
the destruction
destruetion
of
Nazism; the
the
disarmarnent
of
uncond tional surrender;
truction of
of Nazism;
Nazism;
the disarmament
disarmament of
off war
war criminals;
eriminals;
reparations;
and
an
punishment of
criminals; reparations;
reparations; and
and an
an
German ; the speedy punishrnent
;
able to
to sustain
sustain the
the German
German
people, but
not
capable
of
waging war.
war.
econom, able
of waging
war.
an people,
people,
but not
not capable
capable of
these
politieal and economic
economic
The Po sdam agreement elaborated on
on these
these political
political
les and included agreements
oeeupation
areas,
princisles
the
ts about
about occupation
occupation areas,
areas, the
dispos'tion
borders,
transfers,
dispos.tion of
of eastern German
German borders,
rders, population
population transfers,
transfers, and
and the
the
nt of war criminals.2
criminals. 2
treat -nt
CHALLE GES
defeated
by the
the
end
of
the
war.
ermany
ermany was
was utterly
utterly defeated
defeated by
the end
end of
of the
the war.
war.
The
The last
last years
years
war had damaged the state's
state's
physieal
infrastructure,
cases
's physical
physical infrastructure,
infrastructure, in
in some
some cases
of th
although later
later analysis
analysissfound
found
that
the
damage
was
not
as
severly, although
sever
foundthat
that the
the damage
damage was
was not
not as
as
3
exten ive as
first
thought.
The
eollapse
as first
first thought.3
thought.3
The more
more immediate
immediate problem
problem was
was the
the collapse
collapse
2
Polie
Polic
3.
3.
3.
The
Department
of
State,
Occupation
of
Germany:
ofGeiinany:
Germany:
The United
United States
States Department
Department of
of State,
State,Occupation
Occupationof
and
1945-46
Publication
2783
(Washington:
GPO,
1947),
p.
and Progress
1 9 4 5 - 4 6 Publication
Publication 2783
2783 (Washington:
(Washington:GPO,
GPO, 1947),
1947),p.
p.
Progress 1945-46
John
Killick,
Uni
ted States
States
and
European
Reconstruetion:
John Killick,
Killick, The
The United
United
States and
and European
European Reconstruction:
Reconstruction: 194519451960;
Press,
Edinburgh,
1997,
pp.
61,
88.
1960; Keele University
University Press,
Press, Edinburgh,
Edinburgh, 1997,
1997,pp.
pp. 61,
61,88.
88.
Certified As Unclassified
January 9 2009
IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
.,