Social Classes and the Origin of the Modern State

Social Classes and the Origin of the Modern State: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1930
Author(s): Emelio Betances
Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 3, The Dominican Republic: Social Change
and Political Stagnation (Summer, 1995), pp. 20-40
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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Social Classes and theOriginoftheModernState
TheDominicanRepublic,1844-1930
by
EmelioBetances
established
in theCaribbeanand Central
Social and politicalstructures
continue
tohavean impacton thecurrent
Americaintheearly20thcentury
oftheregion.Yethistorical
ofthe
case studiesoftheformation
development
region'smodernstatehavebeenrare.Moststudieshaveassessedeconomic
and generalpoliticaldevelopment.
that
structures
This studycomplements
tradition
analysisof the
by providingan in-depthhistorico-sociological
formative
yearsof theDominicancapitaliststate.It surveysthesocioecoof theDominicandominant
blocs in themid-19thcentury
nomicstructure
andexaminestheformation
ofthebourgeoisie
andthestatein relationto a
of the
combination
of worldevents,includingthe Spanishreoccupation
country
(1861-1865),theTen Years' Warin Cuba (1868-1878),and U.S.
weakness
expansionintotheCaribbeanbasin.It suggeststhatthestructural
blocscreatedthehistorical
circumstances
forcontinued
ofthelocaldominant
oftheTrujillodictatorship
in 1930.
intrusion
andtheemergence
foreign
has overemphasized
theroleofexternal
factors
Standardhistoriography
ofCaribbeannation-states.
Ittreats
theCaribbeanpeople
inthedevelopment
andignorestheroleoflocalclassstruggle
inthe
as "peoplewithout
history"
obscuresratherthanenunfoldinghistoricalprocess.This interpretation
of the dialecticbetweenexternaland internal
hancesour understanding
This studyoffers
a
influences
on theformation
of Caribbeannation-states.
betweenexternal
theimportance
oftheinterplay
thatrecognizes
perspective
factors.
andinternal
theresearchof Ortiz(1975),
In contrast
to thestandard
historiography,
Muto (1976), Calder(1984), Sang (1989), and othersprovidesexcellent
of theinternal
descriptions
politicalprocessesin theDominicanRepublic
between1844and 1930,butitfailstodescribethesocialforcesthatbrought
studies
is anassociateprofessor
ofsociologyandLatinAmerican
EmelioBetances,a Dominican,
Caribbean
articlesonstateformation
andcontemporary
atGettysburg
College.He haspublished
andPolitica:TeoriayAccion.
CaribeContemporaneo,
politicsinLatinAmerican
Perspectives,
His Stateand Societyin theDominicanRepublic(1995) is beingpublishedbyWestviewPress
Series.
as partoftheLatinAmericanPerspectives
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue86,Vol.22 No. 3, Summer1995 20-40
? 1995LatinAmerican
Perspectives
20
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
21
aboutsocial changeand theconsolidation
of politicalpower.It discusses
politicalpowerbut ignoresits class nature.This articlefocuseson the
transformation
ofclassforcesinrelation
totheoriginsofthemodernstate.
Two schoolsof thought
have attempted
to explaintheDominicanclass
JuanBosch represents
a school thatclaims thattherewas no
structure.
inthe19thandearly20thcentury.
bourgeoisie
He arguesthattheU.S. military
of 1916-1924"laidtheabsolutely
government
necessaryandindispensable
materialbasis to developa bourgeoisclass in theDominicanRepublic"
(Bosch,1982:214-226).Although,
he argues,no suchclass formed,
itwas
thatRafaelTrujillowas able to consolidatepolitical
uponthisfoundation
forthebourgeoisie.Interestingly,
powerand becomea substitute
Bosch
maintains
thattherewasonlyoneclass,thepetty
bourgeoisie,
subdivided
into
fivestrata:high,medium,low,lowerpoor,andlowerverypoor.The sugar
of thelatterthirdof the 19thcentury
were"sugarislands"or
plantations
fromHaitiand theLesserAntilles.
enclaves;thelaborforcewas imported
The politicalstrugglesof thecountryoccurredas struggles
betweenthe
different
strataofthesameclass or withthevestigesof a landedoligarchy.
attacked
foritsfunctionalism
anditsfailure
Thisapproachhas beenrightly
to recognizethebourgeoisiethatin factexisted(JimenesGrullon,1980;
Cassa',1986).
and sociologistswhoconThe otherschoolis represented
byhistorians
a structurally
siderthemerchants
heterogeneous
bourgeoisiein thatthey
receivedtheirprofitsin surplusgeneratedby capitalistand precapitalist
relations
ofproduction.
Lozano(1976),Gomez(1977),Baez Evertsz(1978),
Vilas (1979), Oviedo and Catrain(1981), Cassa (1982), Brea (1983), and
thisheterogeneous
andcomplexgrouping
the
othershavearguedthatwithin
was themostimportant
determinant.
Wherethisgroup
capitalisttendency
perceivesa strongtendencytowardcapitalism,Boin and SerulleRamia
(1979) and JimenesGrullon(1980) see a full-blown
capitalisteconomy.
do notsystematically
Thesesocialscientists,
however,
analyzetherelationshipbetweenclass andpoliticalpower.
betweenthe political
This investigation
perceivesa clear distinction
regimeandthestate.A politicalregimeis definedas the"formalrulesthat
executiveto
linkthemainpoliticalinstitutions
totheexecutive,
(legislature
andparty
tothemall),as wellas theissuesofthepolitical
thejudiciary,
system
the
natureofthetiesbetweencitizensandrulers."In highlyabstract
terms,
"notionof staterefersto thebasic alliance,thebasic 'pactof domination,'
strata"
overthesubordinate
theirdominance
andthenormswhichguarantee
(Cardoso,1979: 38). In thewordsof Oscar Oszlak,"thestateis a social
ofsocialdomination
a politicalmediumthrough
whicha system
relationship,
22
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
originsof thestateand
is articulated"
(1981: 5). Focusingon thehistorical
betweenstate
notonthepoliticalregime,
thisstudyexaminestherelationship
totheoriginsofthemodern
andclass-the shapingofclassforcesinrelation
Dominicanstate.
In contrastto theEuropeandebateon the capitaliststate,whichhas
betweenclass and statewithinthe imperial
consideredthe relationship
thisstudyattempts
to integrate
theinternational
dimension
ofclass
centers,
andto showhowtheyhelpto shapethe
relations
intolocal socialstructures
Stateformation
of the statein the periphery.
in the
formand functions
occursin the historicalframework
of an expandingcapitalist
periphery
to organizean exporteconomy.
system,whichneedsa local nation-state
and
oflocal class structures
Foreigncapitalandcreditbecomecomponents
onstatepower.However,whenlocalpolitiexercisedirectpoliticalpressure
on a
arenotresponsive
to theneedsof capitalaccumulation
cal structures
of
politicalrestructuring
worldscale,imperialist
powersforcethenecessary
statesoften
basin,wherethecapitalist
states.Thisis thecase intheCaribbean
capitalinvestdevelopedonstructures
largelyimposedfromoutsidethrough
andfinally
intervention.
military
ment,financial
control,
a notion
This studyemploysthenotionof an embryonic
bourgeoisie,
thattheconceptof class struggleprecedesthe
based on the assumption
ofa full-blown
bourgeoisclass.It is possibleto arguethatthe
development
Itsstructural
weaknessinhibited
its
existedbutonlyinembryo.
bourgeoisie
of
abilityto organizea modernstatethatcouldrespondto theimperatives
and local capitalaccumulation.
This weaknessprompted
the
international
in 1916andtheestablishment
ofa military
that
U.S. occupation
government
localpoliticalpower.
organizedandcentralized
STATE AND CLASS FORMATION
in theDominicanRepublicwas largelydetermined
Stateformation
bya
Alstructures.
economyandweaksocioeconomic
regionalized
precapitalist
its
is
a
rather
Dominican
small
historically
country,
thoughthe
Republic
has
to
the
varied
from
mid-19th
structure
century
region region.By
agrarian
on communallandswerethemain
cattleraisingand subsistence
farming
activitiesin theeasternportionof thecountry.
Duringthecolonialperiod,
the
had developed
tied
to
colonial
hateros(ranchers),
bureaucracy,
closely
aneconomicandsocialelite.IntheCibao(the
intocaudilloswhoconstituted
cacao andcoffeebecamethe
northern
region),tobaccoand,toa lesserextent,
to
theCibao gaverise
linked
Europeanmarkets,
principal
products.
Closely
commercialand agrarianbourgeoisiewhichby thelate
to an embryonic
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
23
In thesouthern
challenging
thepoweroftheranchers.
1850swas seriously
theeconomy.A groupof
mahogany
exportssupported
partof thecountry,
hademerged
andattimesallieditself
priortoindependence
timber
merchants
elementof
withtherangers.
Thusregionalism
was an important
politically
Dominicanpoliticalstruggles.
was proclaimed
in 1844,thelocal bourWhenDominicanindependence
andthusunableto organizea liberalbourgeois
geoisiewas stillembryonic
saw theirbusinessdeclineas
timber
merchants
state.In themid-19thcentury
andreplanting
was ignored.
hadbeen
Ranchers
theforests
becameexhausted
(1791-1804),
in economicdeclinesincethetimeof theHaitianRevolution
forDominicanmeat.The increasing
economicproswhichcutoffa market
and merchants
threatened
thesegroups.
perityof theCibao-basedfarmers
(Trinitarian
SociedadLa Trinitaria
strengthened
theemerging
Thisprosperity
and declaredthe
Society),whichhelpedto developa senseof nationalism
exporters
independence
oftheDominicanRepublic.Thehaterosandtimber
withthenationalist
Trinitarios
to get
wereannexationist.
Theycollaborated
fromHaiti only so thattheycould annexthe
Dominicanindependence
wouldbe better
countryto Spain,believingthattheireconomicinterests
witheachother,
however,
undera foreign
power.In theirstruggles
protected
and nationalists
developedallianceswithlocal and
both annexationists
class character
oftheir
theunderlying
resident
merchants,
revealing
foreign
politicalstruggles.
Duringtheperiodbetween1844 and 1880 theDominicansocial and
The Trinitarios
andthe
remained
economicstructures
largelyundeveloped.
oftheCibao hopedtocreatea
bourgeoisie
emerging
agrarianandmerchant
liberal democracy.However,Pedro Santana and BuenaventuraBaez,
dominated
Dominican
caudillosfromtheEast and theSouthrespectively,
politicalforceswitha commongoal:
politics.Thesetwomenled different
to a foreign
Spain,France,theUnited
power,whether
annexingthecountry
States,orEngland.
MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND STATE FORMATION
was thestrongest
branchofthe
themilitary
Earlyon in itsdevelopment,
ofthecaudillosobstructed
leadership
evolvingDominicanstate.Themilitary
of theliberalstateand lefta legacyof authoritarianism
thedevelopment
to
whoseeffects
persist.ThewaragainstHaiti(1844-1856)also contributed
withincivilsocietyand theDotendencies
of militaristic
thedevelopment
theDominicanarmyhad consistedof a small
minicanstate.Historically,
in timesof crisis.
numberof regulartroopssupplemented
by volunteers
24
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Santana,theleadingcaudilloduringtheFirstRepublic(1844-1861),organized thesetroopsinto an armythatunderhis commandacquiredthe
ofa national
characteristics
dominated
fromabove."Theregular
organization
ofeighttotenthousand
armyconsisted
men.... In a moment
ofunexpected
... couldimmediately
invasion,theGovernment
sendoneortworegiments
to reinforce
thebordersof theSouthwithout
leavingthecapitalunarmed"
(Hoetink,1982:95). The caudillos,ofcourse,strictly
controlled
thisarmy,
whichshouldnotbe thought
ofas a modernregulararmy.
Althoughthearmyhad officers
and privates,
it was a politico-military
organizationthatbasicallyrespondedto one chief,Santana.When the
Haitiansinvadedin 1849,President
ManuelJimenes
calleduponSantanato
use his prestigeand authority
to preventtheHaitiansfromcrossingthe
borders.
Againin 1858,whentheCibao merchants
werefighting
President
B'aez, theyrequestedSantana'smilitary
assistance.Everyoneknewthat
ofpeonsandpeasantswouldfollowSantana's
hundreds
andeventhousands
orders.
Insum,a modern
regular
armydidnotexist,butvariousgroupswould
leaderwhentherewas a threat
offoreign
followa military
invasion.Forthe
thesegroupsseemedto respondto a
periodoftheFirstRepublic,however,
"national"militaryleadership.At Santana'srequest,Spain annexedthe
DominicanRepublicin 1861,butSpanishruleprovedshort-lived.
Economic
didnotimprove;
onthecontrary,
theSpanishauthorities
conditions
subjected
and leviednew taxes on boththe
Dominicansto manynew regulations
Dominicansservingin theSpanisharmy
foreignand thelocal population.
a rebellion
werediscriminated
combinedto engender
against.Thesefactors
ofDominicansagainstSpanishrule,bringing
itto an endin
bythemajority
1865(Bosch,1984:279-280).
oftheRepublic'spoliticalinstitutions
Theprospects
forthedevelopment
did notchangewithSpain'swithdrawal.
Now,however,theleadershad a
social background.
Whereasin theFirstRepublicthedominant
different
or merchants,
aftertheWarof
politicalfigureshad beeneitherlandowners
Restoration
leadersfromthelowerstrataof thesocietymovedupwardin
ofmilitary
service.A largenumber
officers
cameto
societythrough
military
liveoffthestate'sincome;in 1865therewereat least100 generals(Cassa',
towardmili1982:22). Thisdevelopment
strengthened
existingtendencies
thatthearmywas no longera hierarchical
tarismwiththedifference
"orgato one man.Hoetinksuggeststhata de factorestrucnization"responsible
Thearmyacquired
theWarofRestoration.
ofthearmytookplaceafter
turing
of a marketplace,
the characteristics
breakingup intosmall groupsthat
tooffer
theirservicesinthepoliticalarena(Hoetink,1982:96).
competed
forstatepowerin orderto establishan
Severalpoliticalforcesstruggled
Those in powerused thestate'sincometo
economicbase forthemselves.
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
25
increasetheirownwealth(a feature
stillapparent
today).In 1859and 1865,
Cibao-basednationalist
politicalelitesattempted
tointroduce
majorreforms
toexpandthepoliticalregime,
buttheseefforts
failedbecausethenationalists
lackedthepowerbasethattheirconstitutional
projectsrequired.
Onlyunder
UlisesHeureaux(1886-1899)dida viablebureaucracy
andrelative"national
unity"emerge.FromIndependence
to Heureaux'sdictatorship,
no governmentprovedcapableofundertaking
anysignificant
publicworksorexpandingthestateapparatus.
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND CLASS FORMATION
Small-scalesugarproduction
hadexistedintheDominicanRepublicsince
the16thcentury.
Large-scaleproduction
beganonlyin themid-1870s.Two
distinctive
agrarian
in
systems
developed:sizablecapitalist
sugarplantations
the Southand agricultural
forexportin the
petty-commodity
production
northern
Cibao Valley.The lack of connection
betweenthesetwosystems
theunevendevelopment
ofDominicansocietyandconditioned
promoted
the
of politicalpower.The Cibao, whichhad briefly
organization
becomethe
economicandpoliticalregion,gavewayoncemoreto theSouth,
strongest
wherepoliticalpowerhad traditionally
rested.The Cibao's smalltobacco,
coffee,and cacao farmswereno matchfortheSouth'sgrowingcapitalist
enterprises.
A combination
of worldeventsfacilitated
theearlydevelopment
of a
TheseeventsincludedtheTenYears'WarinCuba (1868-1878),
bourgeoisie.
whichdisrupted
on thatisland,theFranco-Prussian
War
sugarproduction
inFranceandGermany,
andthe
(1870),whichreducedsugarbeetproduction
thesugarplantations
ofLouU.S. CivilWar(1861-1865),whichdestroyed
isiana.
DuringtheTenYears'War,morethan100,000Cubanslefttheisland,and
nearly3,000ofthemwentto theDominicanRepublic.Sincemanyofthese
werepoliticaldissidents,
a number
ofthemlaterreturned
toCuba
immigrants
fortheUnitedStates.However,a significant
number
or leftthecountry
know-how
andcapitaltoinvestin sugar
stayed,andtheyhadbothtechnical
and commerce.In fact,thesecapitalists,
production
along withItalians,
PuertoRicans,andNorth
constituted
thenucleusofthe
Germans,
Americans,
Dominicansugarindustry.
ofthesugar
Two important
periodscan be observedin thedevelopment
inthetransition
Thefirst,
from1874to 1916,is theperiodoftakeoff
industry.
that
of large-scalecapitalistplantations
to capitalismwiththeemergence
in thesoutheast
structures
brokewithpreexisting
agricultural
(Cassa',1974;
26
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Lozano, 1976; Gomez,1977;BaiezEvertsz,1978;Hoetink,1982).In these
yearsan indigenous
businessclassslowlyemerged.
Thesecondperiod,from
1907to 1925,saw largeconglomerates
assumecontrolofsugarproduction
andcommerce,
thusincorporating
partoftheDominicaneconomyintothe
international
capitalistsystemcontrolled
byNorthAmericancorporations.
Sugarplantations
brought
a significant
expansionoftheforcesofproduction
(railroads,industry,
communications,
new towns).The firstmodernmills
developedafter1874,and by 1882 therewere34 cane plantations.
Sugar
exportssteadilyincreased
from6,361metric
tonsin 1880to 17,613in 1885
and22,138in 1890(BaiezEvertsz,1986:212).
Although
sugarexportsfromtheDominicanRepublicrosesteadily,
two
crises,largelydetermined
byforeign
factors,
affected
theindustry
inthelate
19thcentury.
Acollapseofpricesin1881wastheresultof
therapid
expansion
of sugarproduction
duringseveralyearsoffavorablepricesand theabundanceofcheaperEuropeanbeetsugar.Worldwide
cane sugaroutputgrew,
forexample,from2,140,000tonsin 1876to 3,538,000tonsjust twoyears
later.Moreover,in thelatteryear,production
of all typesof sugarreached
5,123,000tons.Duringtheperiodfrom1881 to 1889,thirteen
of themost
important
earlymills,mostoftheminAzua,Samana,PuertoPlata,andSanto
Domingo,closeddown.Millsvaluedinthehundreds
ofthousands
ofdollars
sold fora pittance(Ortiz,1975: 348-352). The second crisishit in the
mid-1890s.Variousfactors,
theformation
including
of trusts
in theUnited
States,combinedtoholdpricesdown.A recordcropofEuropeanbeetsugar
in 1894producedsome6.6 milliontonsincomparison
withonly3.4 million
tonsthepreviousyear,causinga newglutin themarketand a consequent
declineinprices(Ortiz,1975:356). Theworldcrisis,however,
didnotcause
a recessionin thenew industry.
In spiteof a downturn,
whichoccasioned
andclosures,on thewholetheindustry
bankruptcies
an expanexperienced
sion (Lozano, 1976: 106). Insufficient
and capital,the main
technology
featuresof the initialyearsof the industry,
gave way to moremodern
andcentralized
technology
organization.
ofworldmarket
Despitethenegativeeffects
fluctuations
on theDominican sugarindustry,
theagrariantransformations
of the late 19thcentury
theemergence
of a neweliteof sugarplanters
brought
that,alongwiththe
an emerging
merchants,
constituted
Dominicanbourgeoisie.Many of the
pioneersof theDominicansugarindustry
and were
stayedin thecountry
Some marriedintothe
rapidlyassimilatedintothecreolesocial structure.
local familiesandreinvested
theirprofits
in thelocal economy.
prominent
JuanBautistaVicini,an Italian,forexample,started
his sugarbusinessin
1882 andbecameone ofthemostsuccessful
in thecountry.
One
capitalists
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
27
maincreditors,
ofthegovernment's
hemarried
intoa Dominicanfamily,
and
fromthisunionemergeda line of prominent
citizens.One of themwas
BautistaViciniBurgos,president
from1922to 1924.
Sugarplantersdevelopedan alliancewiththe Heureauxdictatorship.
Heureauxgaveconcessions
tobothsugarplanters
andmerchants
inexchange
forcreditandpoliticalsupport.
WilliamL. Bass, a NorthAmericansugar
a groupof plantersthatpressured
producer,
represented
Heureauxto give
He also advisedthegovernment
themduty-free
on howtopromote
exports.
of thesugarindustry
in thecountry
thedevelopment
(Sang, 1989: 53-55).
Bass's groupreceivedconcessionsfromthegovernment
to establishsugar
mills,import
machinery
duty-free,
buildinfrastructure,
andprovidepublic
services.It helpedsustainHeureaux'sdictatorship
becauseit earnedhigh
interest
on thecreditit extendedto thegovernment.
Thus,therelationship
betweenHeureauxandthesugarplanters
gavetheemerging
Dominicanstate
a classcharacter.
thepioneersof theDominican
DespiteHeureaux'scontinuedsupport,
did notsurvivetheexpansionof U.S. sugargiantsintothe
sugarindustry
ofthecentury
CaribbeanandtheDominicanRepublicattheturn
(Del Castillo
offoreign
andCordero,1982:96-99).The effect
was that
capitalhegemony
neverformed
a national
theU.S. sugar
thesugarplanters
bourgeoisie;
instead,
elbowedthemout of the market.While some engagedin
corporations
import-export
activities,othersjoined traditional
politicalelitesin their
searchforpoliticalpower.It is worthnoting,however,thatas theelites
thestatebecametheirmainsourceofrevenueandthus
becamemarginalized
ofstruggle
thattheirvariousfractions
theterrain
soughttocontrol.
NONSUGAR EXPORT AGRICULTURE
Attheturnofthe20thcentury,
was basedon
nonsugar
exportagriculture
of tobacco,cacao, and
Traditional
petty-commodity
production.
producers
thatis to say, a class of
coffeeremainedan agrarianpettybourgeoisie,
unableto accumulate
small-scalefarmers
enoughcapitalto investin largescaleproduction.
of Dominicancommerwas characteristic
Petty-commodity
production
the19thandtheearly
cial exportagriculture
(outsideof sugar)throughout
For example,untilthe1870s tobaccohad been thefastest20thcentury.
combinedto
butvariousfactors
growingsectoroftheDominicaneconomy,
slow downitsexpansion.First,farmsgrewtobaccoin a rather
unsophististrucleaf.Second,thedecentralized
catedwaythatproduceda low-quality
28
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
tureoftobaccocultivation
madeitimpossible
forproducers
toestablish
direct
relationswithmerchants.
Middlemenor corredores
exercisedsubstantial
controlovertheproducers
becausetheyprovidedcredit.Third,inthe1870s
Dominicantobaccohad to competewithan oversupply
of Brazilianand
DutchEastIndiantobaccointheworldmarket.
MichielBaudnotesthat"the
price of Dominicantobaccoper quintal(forty-six
kilograms)fell from
andtwenty
Dominicanpesosin 1849toninepesosin 1872
betweenfourteen
andto fourpesosin the1880s"(Baud, 1987: 136-138).The crisisfacedby
Dominicantobaccoaffected
merchants
as well. Accordingto Baud, the
number
ofcommercial
housesinSantiagodecreasedfrom25 in 1879to6 in
1884.
Thecrisisinthetobaccotradeledmanyproducers
toshift
tocacao.Cacao
production
increasedin the1880s and 1890s.Cacao producersbenefited
fromgoodpricesintheinternational
market,
improving
transportation
facilitosugar,duty-free
intotheUnitedStates.Notonly
ties,and,incontrast
entry
and significantly
buttheycomdid cacao exportsincreaseprogressively
withsugarin termsofvalue.In 1906 thecountry
received
paredfavorably
US$2,262,912forcacao exportsandUS$2,392,406forsugar.Thoughthis
happenedonlyonce,itis worthnotingthatin 1908cacao surpassedsugarin
withUS$3,092,429forsugar.After
value,reaching
US$4,269,047compared
1913,however,
sugarbecamethemaincropbyanycriterion.
increaseincacaoexports
after1910,internal
structural
Despitea sustained
andinternational
a transition
from
impediments
competition
prevented
pettytolarge-scale
Dominicanfarmcommodity
production
capitalist
production.
ers couldnottakeadvantageof good pricesin theinternational
marketto
and after1910 theyhad to competewithcheaper
improveproduction,
thisbehavior
producefromBrazilandtheGoldCoast.PaulMutoattributes
to thefactthatthosewithmoneyto investdid notgrowcacao: "Cacao
who did nothave
growingremainedtheprovinceof Dominicanfarmers
access to largeamountsofcapitalandotherDominicansfailedto investin
no greatdecline;itsimplyceased
thecrop.Forthemostpart,cacao suffered
wasnegligible"
toexpand.... Inthepostwar
period,expansion
(Muto,1976:
51).
was stilla majorlimitation.
In addition,transportation
Awayfromrail
ofmudtrails,
whichmadehaulingcostly."To transport
lines,roadsconsisted
a quintalofcacao fromthetownofYamasadownto SantoDomingo(about
costone dollar.The samequintalcouldthenbe sentfrom
100 kilometers)
anyportintheDominicanRepublictoNewYorkfor24 cents"(Bray,1983:
65-66).Thus,thebottleneck
represented
bypoorcommunication,
monthly
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
29
interest
ratesof 2-6 percent,and international
marketcompetition
partly
neverbecamean agrarian
explainwhylocal cacao farmers
bourgeoisie.
A similarsituation
existedwithcoffee.Likethatofcacao,coffeecultivationwas basedon petty-commodity
production
(Del CastilloandCordero,
smallproducers
1982: 100). The relatively
ofcoffeelackedthetechnology
to exporttheirproduce.Moreover,
andmeansoftransportation
difficulties
as wellas transportation
withcreditandfinancing
precluded
expansioneven
whenworldpriceswerehigh.Thesestructural
impediments
prevented
their
frompetty-commodity
transition
tolarge-scale
production
capitalist
agricultheformation
tureand,onceagain,inhibited
ofan agrarian
bourgeoisie
that
thedevelopment
ofa moderncapitalist
couldhavefostered
state.
of the development
Investigation
of the sugarindustry
and the main
traditional
agricultural
exportsectorsat theturnofthe20thcentury
reveals
of the Dominicaneconomyintothe international
thatthe incorporation
a continued
market
notonlypromoted
capitalist
system
ofthe
regionalization
butalso obstructed
thedevelopment
ofa national
socialstructure
bourgeoisie
Thesenewdevelopments
introduced
basedonsugarplanting.
into
capitalism
ofa nationalgovernment.
butblockedtheconsolidation
thecountry
LOCAL AND FOREIGN RESIDENT MERCHANTS
another
fundamental
oftheDominican
Merchants
comprised
component
In thesecondhalfofthe19thcentury
a local
socialandeconomicstructure.
merchant
fraction
evolvedinassociation
andforeign
resident
withthepolitical elitesand thestate.The incorporation
of Dominicanfinancesintothe
of an
international
bankingsystem,however,inhibitedthe development
classofmerchants.
Atbesttheycouldstakeouta subordinate
role
indigenous
intheimport-export
tradeguaranteed
thembytheoperation
oftariff
mechanisms.Merchants'marginalrole in the main economicactivitiesof the
nationalpoliticsin thefaceof
country
hamperedtheirabilityto influence
andcustomshouses.
growingU.S. controlofDominicanfinances
beforeand
Thewareffort
againstHaiti(1844-1856)andpoliticalstability
increasein
aftertheWarofRestoration
(1863-1865)gaveriseto a constant
mainsource
thegovernment's
thepublicdebt.Customshouses
represented
ran
of
ahead receipts,and
of revenue.Government
expenditures
usually
to
therefore
leadershadtoborrowfrommerchants buyweaponsandfinance
fromtheincreasMerchants
jobs fortheirpoliticalsupporters.
reapedprofits
debt.
inggovernment
30
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Governments
operatedwithmoneyborrowed
fromEuropeanmerchants
establishedin thenorthern
portof PuertoPlata and in thecapital,Santo
Domingo.Forexample,Rothschild
andCohenestablished
anofficeinSanto
in
the
Domingo
1830s,and after1944 theytookcareof thegovernment's
customsandfinances
during
Baez's administrations.
Themerchants
financed
thegovernment
bothindirectly,
bypayingthecustomsdutiesfortheimports
and exportsthatformedthemostimportant
sourceof stateincome,and
The government
directly,
byadvancingcreditto thegovernment.
repaidthe
fromimport-export
loansin theformof exemptions
duties(Hoetink,1982:
69). In 1865 thegovernment
createda systemofjuntas or compafii(as
de
madeup oflocalandforeign
resident
credito(creditassociations)
merchants
who lentmoneyto the government
whenit was in financialneed. The
tocollectinterest
government
repaidtheseloansbyallowingthemerchants
andamortization
atthecustomshouses.
Dominicanpoliticalleaderssoughttoformalize
thefinancial
connections
betweenmerchants
andthestate.Gregorio
leaderduring
Luperon,a military
thegrowth
theWarofRestoration,
ofcreditassociations,
further
promoted
The considerablesumsthatleadingmerthisrelationship.
strengthening
further
illustrate
therelationship
chantslentto theHeureauxdictatorship
CosmeBatlle
betweenthemandthestate.In 1884thegovernment
granted
he imported.
In 1893 thegovernment
50 percentof dutieson theproducts
sumstoBatlleandJuanBautistaVicini(Sang,1989:39-75).
owedsignificant
took partin the credit
A sizable groupof foreignand local merchants
associationsandbecameverycloselyassociatedwiththegovernment.
This
grouphadeconomicreasonstoopposelargeloansfromEuropeancreditors.
intellectual
FedericoHenriquezy
Speakingon theirbehalf,theprominent
as opposedtoforeign
debt.Whena loan
Carvajalarguedinfavorofinternal
fromthe Westendorp
Companyof Hollandwas beingpursuedin 1888,
citizenssigned
"GeneralLuperonandmorethantwohundred
distinguished
theWestendorp
a letterof protestto Congressdenouncing
negotiations"
(Baez Evertsz,1978:31).
local andforeign
merchants
Since Independence,
resident
had benefited
on government
loans.Since 1882 Heureauxhad
by charging
highinterest
a settlement
withtheholdersof a 420-poundloan
beentrying
to negotiate
and Companyof Londonextendedto the Baez
fromEdwardHartmont
in 1869.The nintharticleofthecontract
that"all
administration
stipulated
theresourcesof thestateof SantoDomingo,itscustomshouses,
rents,and
forregularpayments
andamortization"
aregivenas guarantee
dominiums,
andCompanyhadmadea first
1953:241-245).Hartmont
(Herrera,
payment
of 38,095 poundsbut thendiscontinued
to the Dominicangovernment
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
31
paymentsand insteadauthorized
Peter,Lawson and Son of London on
May 1, 1869,to issuea loanfortheamountof757,700nominalpounds.It
failedto communicate
thesechangesto theDominicangovernment,
which
waiteduntilJuly30, 1870,to cancelthe"unfortunate
contract"
(Herrera,
1953:247). Baez wasnegotiating
theannexation
ofthecountry
bytheUnited
Statesat the timeand may have been unawareof the consequencesof
actions.No Dominicangovernment
Hartmont's
managedto arrangeany
EuropeanloanuntiltheHartmont
affair
was resolved.
The Westendorp
loan,amounting
to 770,000nominalpounds,was intendedtopayoffnotonlytheHartmont
loanbutall domesticdebts.Accordingto thecontract,
theDominicangovernment
was to pay a yearlysumof
55,646poundsaccording
toanagreed-upon
schemeofamortization.
Westendorpand Companywould administer
thecustomshouses,
and in case of
conflict
therewouldbebinding
mediation
bytheDutchgovernment
(Herrera,
withWestendorp
1953:293-305).Thecontract
reducedtheinfluence
oflocal
and foreignresidentmerchants
and sugarplantersovergovernment
loans.
Althoughtheycontinuedto be important
playersin thepoliticalprocess,
merchantsbecame increasingly
as NorthAmericanconmarginalized
cernscametoexercisecontrol
overDominicancustomshouses
andfinances
in the 1890s.In 1893 theWestendorp
itsrightsand
Companytransferred
to theNew Jersey-based
San DomingoImprovement
obligations
Company.
HeureauxandtheSan DomingoImprovement
Companydevelopeda unique
fromwhichtheyobtainedmutualbenefits
relationship
andonethatresulted
inan unprecedented
increaseinthecountry's
debt.In March8, 1900,
foreign
the Gaceta Oficialde SantoDomingoreported
thattheforeigndebtwas
$21,111,528.93in U.S. gold. It also stipulated
thattheinternaldebtwas
US$2,845,550.44ingoldandUS$10,126,628.00insilver.Together,
external
and internaldebtsamountedto US$29,020,393.73.These are astronomical figuresif we recallthatin 1888 theinternal
and externaldebtswere
US$5,500,000andUS$4,122,750.40,
respectively
(Dominguez,1992).
Thesehugedebtsthrew
Heureaux'sregimeintoa deepcrisis.His longtime
associatessoughtto distancethemselves
fromhim,whiletheforcesrepretheembryonic
from
the
senting
Cibaoregionand
bourgeoisie
once-powerful
thealienatedpoliticalelitesfromSantoDomingoplottedto bringthegovernment
down.In 1898 JuanI. Jimenes,
a powerfulmerchant
fromthe
northern
cityof MonteCristi,becamea nationalheroby attempting
to
Heureaux.A yearlaterHoracioVasquezandRamonCaceresof
overthrow
theCibao succeededin assassinating
him.Politicalinstability
andthenearfollowed.
collapseofthegovernment
32
LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES
THE MODERN STATE AND THE U.S. SEMIPROTECTORATE
TheHeureauxdictatorship
expressed
nationalpoliticalplanstodevelopa
strongnation-state.
This initialattempt
failedpartlybecauseof thecontraof theDominicanstateintotheinternational
dictoryintegration
capitalist
systemandthesocioeconomic
weaknessof thebourgeoisie
thatsupported
Heureaux.Heureaux'sfailuresled toincreasedU.S. intrusion
inDominican
politicalandeconomicaffairs.
The Dominican state began to intervenein the economy during
Heureaux'sdictatorship,
theinterests
articulating
of a newlyemerging
nationalbourgeoisiebased on sugarplantersand merchants.
Heureaux,well
awareofthispoliticalalliance,soughtEuropeanandNorthAmerican
credit
in orderto maintainrelativepoliticalautonomy
fromtheplantersand the
merchants.
creditafforded
Initially,
foreign
Heureauxa degreeofautonomy
fromlocalpowergroups,butitsubordinated
thestatetoforeign
creditors
by
Heureauxexpandedthe armed
increasingthe foreigndebt.Nonetheless,
forcesand used thenewmeansof transport
and communications
to move
a degree
troopsaroundtheisland.Thegovernment
bureaucracy
experienced
and theDominicanstatebeganto intervene
in societyto
of development,
bringabouteconomicgrowthand createa favorableclimateforcapitalist
In thissense,Heureaux'sdictatorship
a firststep
development.
represented
towarddevelopinga modernnationalcapitaliststate.The new mode of
of theDominicanstateintotheinternational
integration
capitalistsystem,
toonemanbutaccountwhichdemandeda statethatwasnotjustresponsive
able to its local and foreigncreditors,
delayedthisstart.The political
the
incapacityof Heureaux'sregimeto live up to thesenew expectations,
of theresidualnationalbourgeoisie,
and Heureaux'sinflationary
struggles
intoa crisisthatendedwithHeureaux'sassassipoliciesled thedictatorship
ledbyRamonCaceresable
nationinJuly1899.Notuntil1906wasa fraction
toconsolidatepower.
andmerchants
hadbeenvastlyweakened,
By thistimethesugarplanters
ofDominicancustomshouses.
andtheUnitedStateshadfullcontrol
Caceres
continuedto organizeand concentrate
politicalpower,butthispowerno
andbankshad
tonational
interests.
U.S. sugarcorporations
longerresponded
Thelocalbourgeoisie
andmerchants.
resident
replacedforeign
sugarplanters
TheU.S. governwas alienatedfromtheeconomicandpoliticalmainstream.
mentbackedCacereswhenhe undertook
projectsthatfavoredpayingthe
theprosperity
ofU.S.
thatunderwrote
debtorcreatedinfrastructure
foreign
and
reduction
sugarconcerns.Increasesin Dominicantraditional
exports,
ofstrict
andexternal
ofinternal
consolidation
debts,andtheimplementation
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
33
methodsforcollectingcustomsdutiesallowedCaceresto providepolitical
organized
control
acrossthenation'sterritory,
He expandedmilitary
stability.
caudillos,passed
constabulary
separatefromthetraditional
a professional
a
relations,and implemented
laws to developmoderncapitalistproperty
publicworkssystem.
in 1907,
Debtsdealtthefinalanddecisivemortalblowto themerchants
to consolidateall
Convention
withthesigningoftheDominican-American
Dollar Diplomacyis associatedwithPresident
William
debts.Historically,
HowardTaft,but it was PresidentTheodoreRooseveltwho initiatedthe
intheCaribbean.In
NorthAmericanbankinginterests
policythatpromoted
JacobHollanderas hisspecialrepresentative
1905,RooseveltsentProfessor
theconfidential
The
report,
to theDominicanRepublic.Hollanderprepared
hispolicytoward
DebtofSantoDomingo,thatRooseveltusedin designing
on Foreign
theDominicanRepublic.Speakingto a U.S. SenateCommittee
Relations(1907: 1 and 17),Hollanderstated:
inthesensethat
arevaliddebts,
publicdebtsinthe
I donotthink
anyofthem
bedonewith
must
them....
United
States
are,something
are,butsuchas they
But
in thefinancial
pastof SantoDomingo.
Thereis littlethatis credible
andwecannotgo
claims,
wearenowconfronted
byrecognized
this,
granting
havebeen
ofthings.
Thesedebtshavebeencreated,
backtothebeginning
andhavebeenin largepartsecured
byan
acknowledged
bytheRepublic,
toforeign
ofcustomhouses
government.
assignment
and
plantodeal withDominicanexternal
Hollanderproposedan adjustment
of debts,reducingthemfrom
internal
debts.He suggesteda consolidation
heproposedthatthegovernUS$32,000,000toUS$17,000,000.In addition,
menttakea US$20,000,000loan fromKuhn,Loeb and Companyof New
(Hollander,1907:291-292).
bytheU.S. government
Yorkguaranteed
whereby
signeda convention
governments
In 1907theU.S. andDominican
the loan thatHollanderhad proposed.In
the formerwould underwrite
oftheUnitedStateswouldappointa generalreceiver
thepresident
addition,
"suchprotection
as it
ofDominicancustomsandgivehimandhisassistants
of theirduties."Clearly,the
mayfindto be requisitefortheperformance
of theUnitedStates,
DominicanRepublichad becomea semiprotectorate
as military
intervention
to
couldeasilybe interpreted
because"protection"
Article3 statedthat"untiltheDominican
Furthermore,
U.S. interests.
protect
Republichas paidthewholeamountofthebondsofthedebtitspublicdebt
betweentheDominican
shallnotbe increasedexceptbypreviousagreement
ofState,1910:307-310).
andtheUnitedStates"(U.S. Department
Government
a
theconvention
established
debtarrangements,
Unlikepreviousforeign
theUnitedStateswouldcontroltheRepublic's
whereby
specialrelationship
34
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
finances.Thesenew arrangements
endedtherolethatmerchants
had been
playing.Theynowhadtolimittheiractivities
totheimport-export
trade,an
area tightly
controlledby U.S., German,British,and Spanishsuppliers.
Again,likethepioneersofthesugarindustry,
themerchants
had suffered
a
setbackthathad immenseimplications
forthedevelopment
of a national
bourgeoisie.A nationalbourgeoisclass based on plantersand merchants
movedbacktowardanembryonic
stage.Thestatebecamea semiprotectorate
of theUnitedStatesand no longergave themfreeaccess to government
largesse.Clearly,Caceres reorganizedand centralizedthe state,but he
theclassthatwasnecessary
undermined
forittobe national.
Obviously,
these
circumstances
considerable
generated
politicalresentment
bothwithinand
offact,hisassassination
in 1911
outsideofCaceres'sowngroup.As a matter
was theresultof theexclusionof local politicalelitesfromgovernment
patronage
jobs andpayoffs.
AfterCaceres's assassination,
the implementation
of the DominicanIn themidstof greatpolitical
AmericanConvention
becameproblematic.
instability,
the UnitedStatesimposedirresistible
demandson the local
of Americansto
politicalelites.It repeatedly
requestedthe appointment
overseeDominicanfinancesand military
matters.
The administration
of
PresidentWoodrowWilson (1913-1919) became convincedthatit was
favorableto U.S. interests
impossibleto consolidatea stronggovernment
withanyof thelocal politicalfactionsand in 1916 establisheda military
to completethetasksinitiated
government
byCaceres.
Themilitary
ruledthecountry
from1916to 1924,andduring
government
whichestablished
itstenureitsoughtto developa publicworksprogram,
a
whichhad a
"national"road network;
organizea "national"constabulary,
which
monopolyof organizedpoweroverthewholesociety;erecta tariff,
restructured
and weakenedtheeconomicbase of
thenation'sdependency
local elites;legalizethelandtitlesheldbysugarandtimber
companies;and
theexecutiveordersofthemilitary
as a condition
for
legitimize
government
withdrawal(Calder, 1984; Hoepelmanand Senior,1973; Welles, 1928;
Lozano, 1976).
did nothavethe
The politicaleconomyoftheU.S. military
government
socialclasses.Themilitary
sameimpactoneachofthedifferent
government
landtitlesheldbyU.S. sugarconcernsandhelpedto
legalizedquestionable
butfoundnomoneytohelpsmall
surveythelandsheldbyU.S. corporations
local industry
It destroyed
whoopposedthesurveys.
Dominicanfarmers
by
the nation'sdependencybut helped to
thatrestructured
erectingtariffs
merchant
classthatbecamethenucleusofa weak
developan import-export
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
35
Dominicanbourgeoisie.Clearly,althoughthe U.S. militarygovernment
claimedto rule"in thenameof theDominicanpeople,"its politicaland
economicpolicyhada classcharacter.
Like Caceres'sregime,thenewstate
thatemerged
outofthemilitary
occupation
responded
onlytoa limited
extent
tonational
politicalandeconomicinterests.
Thenewstatewasintegrated
into
theU.S. sphereof influence
and,as such,had to respondto U.S. political,
intheCaribbeanbasin.
interests
economic,andmilitary
Thenational
politicalresponsetothemilitary
government
was a complex
one. At first,
local politicaleliteswithtiesto theimport-export
merchants
wereexcludedfromthepoliticalprocess,butin spiteofthistheygavetheir
support
tothemilitary
government.
Nationalist
groupsexpressedopposition
butwereunabletoexertsignificant
onthenewgovernment
politicalpressure
The nationalists
wereurban-based
becauseofthemilitary
repression.
pettyelements
thatunderCacereshadbeenexcluded
bourgeoisandmiddle-class
fromgovernment
largesse.In theEast,peasantshadbeenfighting
evictions
by sugarcompaniessincethe 1890s,and theseevictionsweresteppedup
never
duringtheoccupation.The popularurbanandthepeasantresistance
becauseofgovernment
established
anypoliticallinkswitheachother,
partly
Thenationalists
repression.
lookedonthepeasantsas banditsandwouldhave
neveropeneda politicalspaceuntil
todo withthem.Thenationalists
nothing
in theEast
1919,whenWorldWarI was overandtheguerrilla
insurgency
hadheatedup.ThentheStateDepartment
begantoobserveDominicanaffairs
moreclosely.
The eventualU.S. withdrawal
resulted
fromstrongdomesticopposition
to Wilson'sforeignpolicyand Dominicanresistancebolsteredby Latin
In hisfamousFourteen
in 1919atthe
Americansolidarity.
Points,presented
in Paris,Wilsonhad proclaimedtherightto selfVersaillesConference
of the smallEuropeanstates,and yethe had orderedthe
determination
notedby
military
occupationof theDominicanRepublic-a factgleefully
his Republicanopponent,
WarrenG. Harding.This new politicalclimate
to presstheirdemandsforthe
made itpossibleforDominicannationalists
In fact,theStateDepartment,
which
withdrawal
ofthemilitary
government.
to Dominicanaffairsbecauseof thewar in
had paid onlyscantattention
U.S. policytowardthe
Europe,begantobecomemoreinvolvedindirecting
DominicanRepublic,whichhad previouslybeen handledby the Navy
Department.
as theUnionNacionalDominicana
Whilethenationalist
groupsorganized
of the
thetotalwithdrawal
(DominicanNationalUnion)weredemanding
ties
the
elites
with
to
thetraditional
military
government,
political
import-
36
LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES
exportmerchants
werereadytocollaborate
withthemilitary
government
by
to consulting
acceptingappointments
committees.
Undertheleadershipof
AmericoLugo and Fabio Fiallo,thenationalists
rejectedthevariousU.S.
plansto validatetheactionsof themilitary
government.
The conservative
factionof thetraditional
politicalelite seized the opportunity
to offera
negotiatedsolutionto the impasseby recommending
the creationof a
civiliangovernment.
The UnitedStatesacceptedthisproposal
provisional
SumnerWellesas specialcommissioner
andappointed
toleadthetransition
fromforeign
to local civilianrule.Duringthetwo-year
military
periodthe
provisionalgovernmentorganizedelections,which General Horacio
Vdsquezwonin 1924.Shortly
thereafter,
Vdsquezconveneda newlyelected
NationalCongresstolegalizeall theactionsofthemilitary
government
and
recognizeU.S. controlofDominicancustomsandfinance(Knight,1928).
The politicaleconomyofthemilitary
further
weakenedthe
government
economicbasis of theagro-industrial
fraction
ofthelocal elitethrough
a
tariff
thatmadeit impossibleforlocal industry
to competewithimported
Inaddition,
American
manufactured
themilitary
North
products.
government
thecoerciveapparatusofthestate,turning
it intoa sphereof
strengthened
inDominicanhistory.
Thenewlycreatedconstabupowerwithout
precedent
controlofthenationalterritory.
laryhadeffective
military
elitessoon emerged.An
Conflictsbetweenthepoliticaland military
in nationalpoliticswas
of themilitary
fortheparticipation
opportunity
in 1930.The president
providedby Vdsquez'scampaignforreelection
had
thepresidential
termfortwoyears,and
alreadylostpopularity
byextending
elitealready
a new and effective
oppositionsoon developed.The military
seemedto have a nationalleader,Rafael L. Trujillo.Trujillohad been
in 1919 as a secondlieutenant
to the constabulary
and rapidly
admitted
ascendedtotheupperranks.He becameVdsquez'sprotegeandby 1930was
chiefoftheconstabulary,
whichhadbeentransformed
from
theunquestioned
is that
intoanarmy.
Whatis noteworthy,
a police-type
organization
however,
caudillowithsufficient
he was a nationalmilitary
powerto preventthe
ofregionalcaudillismo.
reemergence
local military
of theU.S. military
Priorto thewithdrawal
government,
tousethestateas a vehicleforaccumuhadnothadtheopportunity
officers
but
thema tasteofeconomicopportunity,
latingwealth.Vasquezhadoffered
lostits support,
the
theywantedrealeconomicpower.As thegovernment
mustbe
led byTrujillo,seizedpowerin 1930.Itsrapidascendancy
military,
andthearmy'sdirect
examinedintermsofboththeinternal
politicalstruggle
to theUnitedStates.Thereis no doubtthattheworldcapitalist
relationship
crisisthathadbeentakingplaceinthe
theinternal
crisisof 1930conditioned
Betances/CLASSES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE
37
andthatitfavoredTrujillo'sascentto power.Although
country
documents
indicatethattheUnitedStatesofficially
manifested
disfavorofTrujillo,in
thedictator
practiceitprotected
through
a moratorium
on thegovernment's
whichhecouldhaveneverstabilizedhisregime.Once
foreign
debt,without
inpower,Trujillomadeithisfirst
tasktoeliminate
all opposition.
His regime
lastedfrom1930to 1961 and succeededin subordinating
all socialclasses
andgroupstohispoliticalandeconomicpower.
CONCLUSION
Dominicanstatewasnotsimplya product
Themodern
oftheU.S. military
of 1916-1924buta logicalresultofsocioeconomic
occupation
andpolitical
Therelationship
betweennational
processesdatingto themid-19th
century.
inDominicanpolitical
andongoingforeign
interventions
politicalstruggles
andeconomiclifeis thekeyto an understanding
oftheearlystagesofstate
formation.
The actionsofUlisesHeureaux(1886-1899)andRamonCaceres(1906fortheformation
of the modernstate.
1911) had profoundimplications
thedictatorship
ofHeureauxarticulated
thepoliticalandeconomic
Initially,
interests
ofan emerging
nationalbourgeoisie
basedin sugarproduction
and
commerce.This politicalallianceallowedHeureauxto startdevelopinga
nation-state
thatcouldprovidea favorable
climateforcapitalaccumustrong
ofthesugarindustry
lation.Subsequentmonopolization
byU.S. capitalists
thecollapse of the
and continuedrelianceon foreigncreditprecipitated
dictatorship.
national
BythetimeRamonCacerestookpower,theembryonic
bourgeoisie nurtured
excludedfromthemainstream
byHeureauxhadbeenvirtually
of theeconomy.The U.S. government
controlled
Dominicanfinancesand
toorganizeandcentralize
customshouses.
statepower,but
Cacerescontinued
he hardlyrepresented
nationalinterests.
His regimehelpedto turnthe
Dominicanstateintoa U.S. semiprotectorate,
neocolonialties
establishing
was simplya
thatpersisttoday.In fact,the U.S. military
government
ofthisstate-building
continuation
process.
tendsto presentRafaelTrujilloas a
Whereasstandardhistoriography
thisstudysuggeststhathis regimewas the
productof U.S. imperialism,
productof a socioeconomic
processwith19th-century
origins.Dominican
societywas regionally
divided,andthedominant
regionaleliteswereweak
merUndertheU.S. military
and fragmented.
government,
import-export
theireconomiccondition
butremained
tooweaktoexercise
chantsimproved
38
LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES
meaningful
politicalinfluence
on thestate.Sugar,themostdynamicsector
of theeconomy,was controlled
by U.S. corporations,
and thetraditional
exportsectorshad beenunableto overcomethestructural
impediments
of
inadequatecredit,
insufficient
meansofcommunication,
andlackofcapital.
The structural
weaknessofcivilsocietycontributed
to theemergence
ofan
authoritarian
regime.TheU.S. military
occupation
strengthened
theexisting
authoritarian
tendencies
within
civilsocietyandthestate.
Finally,
thefindings
ofthisstudysupport
thevalidity
ofa classperspective
in explaining
in termsofthedialecticbetweeninternal
stateformation
and
externalfactors.Theydemonstrate
thata class analysisshedslighton the
state-building
processbyfocusing
ontherelationships
betweeneconomyand
politics.Adoptionof thehistorico-sociological
approachemployedin this
studyandin studiesof otherCaribbeanandCentralAmericancases would
enhanceourunderstanding
oftheprocessofstateformation
intheregion.
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