Report

Transcription

Report

SOS
Social Overview Service
Udruženje za društvena dešavanja
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Reaches a Tipping
Point in 2016
Report title – Bosnia and Herzegovina Reaches a Tipping Point in 2016
Report N°3, June 2016
Page ii
Page iii
Contents
I.
BiH's Self-defying Politics................................................................................................. 9
A. BiH's new-old political realities ................................................................................ 11
B. Crisis Deepens as Parties Gear Up for 2016 Local Elections...................................13
1. All-out Political War in Republika Srpska ..........................................................14
2. Tug-of-war in the Federation .............................................................................. 15
C. Looking at the 2016 local elections and possible scenarios beyond .......................16
1. Political battles push RS towards the edge .........................................................16
2. Deepening divisions in the Federation .............................................................. 18
II.
EU's New Approach for BiH Needs New Ideas.............................................................. 18
1. The EU has weak leverage: ................................................................................. 20
2. The EU context has changed, dramatically, and for the
worse: ..............................................................................................20
3. Some BiH leaders have given up the EU: ........................................20
This report has been supported by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in
Sarajevo. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necesarilly
represent those of the Royal Norwegian Embassy.
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Introduction
“You have to understand that our children are waiting to see whether they will
be killed or whether they will be studying in BiH and the EU, and this truly depends on you, do not seek a culprit among others," one of Bosnia's most popular
actors, Enis Beslagic, said in his recent emotional address to the country's political elites.1
"Even serious people cannot agree on whether we are living horribly, desperately, catastrophically, hopelessly, or just poorly, brainwashed by this agony that
has been going on for the last two decades," the veteran Sarajevo journalist and
commentator Vlastimir Mijovic wrote in his Op Ed piece, entitled "Bosnia is dis2
appearing one drop at a time."
These and many other similar statements that can be heard in different parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH, reflect growing feelings of despair with the country's political, economic and social situation, which the vast majority of citizens,
regardless of their national, ethnic, religious or political background, share.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is as divided and polarized today as it was two decades
ago, or even more so. Much of the hope, positive orientation and great expectations that its citizens felt after the end of the 1992-5 war have now vanished.
Citizens watch silently, as Bosniak, Croat and Serb political elites continue to
pursue the same unitarist, autonomist and separatist goals as their predecessors. These parallel, conflicting drives have nothing to do with protection of the
national interests of the three ethnic groups, but are used to protect political
elites. However, these drives are being increasingly supported - or at least tolerated - by the majority of BiH's media, civil society, intellectuals and citizens
alike. Instead of looking for concessions and compromises, a polarized and divided local community now seem to be pushing their political representatives
to adopt even more radical positions. Instead of trying to change the system,
many seem determined to adapt to it.
Meanwhile, the country's economy, social protection system and public services
have been gradually eaten away by the metastasized political patronage system. High public spending in the administration as well as dwindling living
standards among the population have been maintained for years through external financing, such as remittances and commercial short and medium-term
borrowing. On the other hand, an unfriendly, expensive and corrupt business
environment as well as bad management and an excessive work force have
1
Speech at the ceremony organized by Croatian daily Vecernji List in Mostar, April 15,
2016.
2
Published by Focus online magazine on March 3.
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steadily undermined BiH's economic base, resulting in the demise of most of
the country's industrial giants. The unsustainability of Bosnia's economic model
and public spending became obvious in the course of 2016 as even increased
short-term borrowing proved insufficient to enable the regular payment of salaries, pensions, social benefits and other bills. These payments became more and
more delayed by the end of May as the country came face to face with a serious
liquidity crisis, which could only at least temporarily be resolved through a new
financial arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, IMF. IMF program, however, may offer only a brief reprieve but critical questions about
country’s uncertain economic perspective remain open.
Delayed salaries, pensions and social benefits, as well as new political quarrels
which accompanied the early start of pre-election campaigns ahead of the October local elections, have added to already heightened ethnic, political and social tensions. New political and social challenges that are expected in subsequent months could easily augment this volatile concoction and tip the country
towards even greater instability.
EU officials seem to ignore all this hardship and accumulating problems. The
picture portrayed in their statements seems almost to be of a different country.
In late October 2015, the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ambassador Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, said that the EU's 2015 progress
3
report for Bosnia and Herzegovina was "probably the best ever".
More recently, the EU's Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and
Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, during his latest visit to the BiH capital of Sarajevo, stressed that the country had made "great progress" in 2015
and now has to keep moving forward.4
"There is a reason for optimism... EU has rightfully noted in its annual report in
November 2015 that Bosnia and Herzegovina has returned to the reform path
...We salute improvements made so far, but it is still too early for these reforms
to make palpable difference in the lives of most of the citizens of BiH," wrote the
German and UK foreign Ministers, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Phillip Hammond, in their joint Op Ed published in the local media at the beginning of 2016.
This growing divergence in perceptions of the current situation between the local and international community by itself represents a relatively new and serious challenge, since it confuses and frustrates the local public, further weakens
EU authority and enables local politicians to keep avoiding difficult reforms and
decisions.
The Social Overview Service, SOS, has prepared this analytical report based on
in-depth research carried out in the last six months, which included relevant
documents and reports, surveys, focus group meetings and interviews with all
key local and international actors. This paper offers an unbiased analysis of the
3
"Wigemark hands over the best ever report to (Chairman of the BiH Council of Ministers Denis) Zvizdic," article published by Dnevni Avaz on November 10, 2015.
4
Hahn, press conference on March 21, 2016.
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current situation, key trends, possible scenarios as well as concrete recommendations for local and international decision-makers.
This is the first public analytical report prepared by the SOS, a BiH-based thinktank which was established on the foundations and methodology of the International Crisis Group, ICG, as well as local, regional and international contacts
established by the SOS's personnel through years of their work in the region.
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Page 9
Bosnia and Herzegovina Reaches a Tipping
Point in 2016
I.
BiH's Self-defying Politics
The first few months of 2016 have seen almost frantic attempts by leading Western diplomats to salvage the new EU initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (which is not that
new anymore) and break through endless obstructions erected by local politicians. Despite the optimistic statements that have occasionally come from local and international
officials about the country's progress on the EU path, by the beginning of June local
leaders had still failed to find solutions to any of the key issues that were supposed to
unlock Bosnia's EU accession process.
Fearing that this lack of progress would persuade EU institutions to officially kill the new
initiative for BiH and effectively disengage from the country for the time being, a group
of leading foreign diplomats and officials have launched one more round of talks behind
closed doors with local politicians at the end of April.5
These talks still continue and the prospects for a breakthrough remain slim. In fact, since
the end of 2014, when the EU has launched its new initiative, BiH politicians have managed to achieve only one goal previously agreed with the EU; after unexpectedly long
and difficult negotiations and only thanks to massive pressure from the EU, Bosnia's
leaders in late 2015 adopted the so-called reform action plan. While this development
was celebrated as a major breakthrough, many local and international experts pointed
out the fact that this document was merely a vague list of reforms, which the BiH elites
pledged to implement sometime in the future. In addition to the action plan, which was
adopted at the state level, each of the two entities' governments have over the past
year also adopted new labour laws, a difficult and unpopular move, considered to be
the basis for the continuation of the reform agenda. However, the new labour legislation was not a part of the EU agenda but rather a condition for the new IMF program
worth some 550 million euros, which was agreed in May 2016 and is expected to be approved by the IMF board in July.
The fact that BiH leaders have adopted new labour legislation, against strong opposition
from trade unions, while at the same time they failed to agree on less controversial issues from the list of EU-required reforms, shows that local politicians can deliver difficult reforms when they see concrete and direct benefits. This in turn corroborates what
5
Interviews with western diplomats, March-May 2016.
Page 10
many experts have been warning - that the EU, and therefore the EU accession process,
lack proper leverage, both in terms of so-called carrots and sticks.
Lack of EU leverage as well as an overall weakening of the EU’s authority was reflected
in the fact that all the efforts by top EU officials, including several meetings which EU's
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and the
EU's Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations,
Johannes Hahn, had with local leaders, failed to bring about any breakthrough on key
EU-related reforms.
Indeed, local political elites have turned negotiations on these issues into a mockery;

The mechanism for coordination of the country's EU accession process was adopted
at a non-existent state government session on January 26 and secretly published in
the Official Gazette on February 10, without the knowledge of most Bosnian Croat
and Serb officials. This process was rushed because the Bosnian Croat chairman of
Bosnia's presidency, Dragan Covic, wanted to win bragging rights (and pre-election
propaganda material) for submitting BiH's membership application at the meeting in
Brussels on February 17.6 EU officials tried to stop this and when the application was
eventually submitted, they welcomed it but made it clear that conditions had not
been met for it to be considered credible, and so Bosnia's state government, the
Council of Ministers, continued negotiating with Bosnian Croat and Serb officials on
further changes to the already adopted document.

Adaptation of BiH's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) regarding the
country's trade relations with Croatia - which need to be adjusted to accommodate
the fact that Croatia has in the meantime joined EU - has been hindered for months
by bad communication among EU, BiH Federation and Republika Srpska officials.
While the EU for a long time failed to properly explain why and how BiH's SAA needs
to be adjusted, Bosnia's two entities maintained divergent positions; the BiH Federation tried and eventually managed to persuade the EU to negotiate step-by-step adjustment of the SAA, but RS officials boycotted these negotiations from the beginning, insisting that this issue should be discussed at a later stage.

Publication of BiH's 2013 census results – which was effectively if not officially one of
the EU conditions - have been blocked by quarrels between Bosniak and Bosnian
Serb officials, who were fighting over the methodology that would determine who
merited the status of local resident. This issue, largely irrelevant to the EU's requirements for reliable statistics, remains hotly contested as it will determine
whether between 40,000 and 100,000 Bosniaks gain the status of resident and thus
be included in the census (and therefore in future elections). If the 2013 census results are not published by July 1st, or at least unless the legally-prescribed publication date is postponed, it will no longer be considered valid by the EU statistical
agency, EUROSTAT. This would deprive BiH of 50 million euros, which the EU earmarked for this project, and it would block country's path to EU until further notice.7
As the deadline approached, officials from the state, FBiH and RS statistical agencies
6
Interviews with several senior Western diplomats, January-April 2016.
Interview with a EU official, April 2016: "Without the published census results BiH would not
be able to answer the first question in the EU questionnaire: 'How many citizens do you have?'."
7
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threatened to publish parallel results in line with methodology preferred by their political masters. This outcome would render such results completely useless for BiH's
accession process, and symbolically show the extent of BiH's divisions.
Besides these two official issues, which have been agreed between BiH and EU officials
as preconditions for BiH to obtain the status of an EU candidate country in this or next
year – and the publication of the census results which is also critically important for
BiH’s EU path – local political elites have failed to make any significant progress on other
important issues, such as an agreement over the status of Mostar, which would allow
the holding of local elections in this town for the first time since 2008, or EU-led structural dialogue on judicial reforms, which has been bogged down and almost completely
diluted by political quarrels and personal incompetence.8
This standstill on Bosnia's path to EU should not be mistaken for a temporary glitch. Rather, it should be seen as a symptom of a serious illness, a complete breakdown of BiH's
political and government structures, which each day pushes the country closer to becoming a failed state.
Waning US and EU authority and strengthened Russian, Turkish and Arab influences in
BiH in recent years has revealed - or augmented - still conflicting strategic goals which
Bosniak, Croat and Serb leaders nurtured from the times before, during and immediately
after the war. Growing personal animosities and mistrust among the political elites, and
their still conflicting views on country's past and present, now block Bosnia's EU future.
Bosnia's EU perspective is further undermined by the EU's internal political, economic
and immigrant crisis. This situation enables local political leaders to still pay lip service
to the country's EU membership, but effectively do everything to delay or block it.9
The weakening of Bosnia's political and decision-making system is rooted in two decades during which the patronage system metastasized, reducing the quality of personnel appointed to key positions in the administration as well as the effectiveness of governance. Yet, the effective collapse of this system can be directly linked with developments that took place in the last two election cycles in 2010 and 2014.
A.
BiH's new-old political realities
A new chapter in the history of Bosnia's political system was opened during the previous
mandate (2010-2014), when all the main predominately Bosniak, Croat and Serb parties,
despite their differences, established three ethno-political blocs, which they claimed
was aimed at better protecting the interests of ethnic groups they were representing.
Yet, the real motivation behind this consolidation of the political scene was politicians'
attempts to avoid being blamed for an increasingly difficult economic and social situa-
8
Ibid.
In interviews with SOS, several local politicians have admitted that they do not believe that
Bosnia's EU membership is an option any more. In their opinion, both local political elites and
EU officials only pretend to be interested in BiH membership.
9
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tion and to divide responsibility for tough and unpopular reforms that were waiting on
the EU path.10
The polarization of BiH's political scene can be traced back to 200211, after the leading
multi-ethnic and civic Social Democratic Party, the SDP, lost the parliamentary elections
and caved in to internal power struggles. Since then, none of the parties - including
those that still declared themselves as multi-ethnic and civic-oriented - tried to contest
12
elections in all of the country and win over voters from all ethnic groups. Instead, most
political efforts became focused on winning dominance over one of the three ethnopolitical scenes, and then distributing positions of power reserved for that ethnic group.
Throughout this period, the Bosnian Croat and Serb political scenes remained reserved
exclusively for national parties that shared the same nationalist views, and fought each
other over who was better protector of that particular group. The Bosniak political scene on the surface appeared to be more pluralistic, but even there, self-declared multiethnic and civic parties shared the same strategic goals and ideologies as the Bosniak
national parties, and fought each other for the position of greatest Bosnian patriot. This
polarization of BiH's political scene entered a new phase in 2010, when the three ethnopolitical blocs were officially established.
These three blocs were short-lived and fell apart soon after they finalized negotiations
on formation of new governments and distribution of key positions. However, their establishment left irreversible consequences on the political scene as well as on BiH's general public. First, the fact that the SDP and a few other so-called civic parties joined Bosniak national parties to form the Bosniak ethno-political block additionally blurred already unclear differences between Bosniak and Bosnian identity. It was also used by
Bosnian Croat and Serb politicians as a justification for their claims that the Bosnian civic
option is only a disguised Bosniak patriotic and national option, and that these two options share the same interest of domination over Croats and Serbs in BiH. More generally, the establishment of these three blocs blurred ideological differences between political options and validated a public perception that all politicians and all political parties
behave in the same irresponsible and self-serving way. These views, combined with continued political quarrels, fuelled new frustrations, which eventually exploded in a series
10
SDP came out of the 2010 elections as the single strongest party in the country, having won
support from a majority of Bosniak voters who were disgruntled with the performance of the
main Bosniak national Party of Democratic Action, SDA. The SDP initially tried to establish the
state and Federation government without the main national Bosniak, Croat and Serb parties,
but when that failed, the SDP - still determined to remain in power - first established an alliance
with the SDA, and then cooperated with the Croat Democratic Union, HDZ, and the ruling Serb
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD, in ruling coalitions in the Federation and at
the state level.
11
Some would argue that BiH’s political scene was polarized already since 1991 or 1996 elections. However, there were obvious differences between national, or nationalist parties on one
side, and the SDP and few other smaller multi-ethnic, civic parties on the other side until the
SDP in the 2000 elections became the single strongest party in BiH and then by the next elections in 2002 lost 60 per cent of its electorate. In subsequent years SDP maintained much of its
multi-ethnic staff but gradually became party that relied mostly on Bosniak voters and populist
policies. By joining the Bosniak ethno-political block after the 2010 elections and by reinforcing
its Bosnian patriotic (also seen as Bosniak populist) positions, SDP effectively showed that ethnically-divided policies have no serious alternative in BiH. This notion was sealed by DF after
2014 elections.
12
SOS interviews with senior politicians
Page 13
of social protests in February 2014. The protests quickly died down as many citizens became appalled by the violence that followed the protests in several cities across the
country. The street democratic movement that was born from these protests - so called
"plenums" - also lost steam and eventually faded away due to internal differences as
well as the fact that these informal groups had no chain of command and deliberately
avoided any links with the opposition or NGO community.
Much of the 2010-2014 mandate was wasted on endless political quarrels, which
blocked reforms, and on futile attempts by senior EU and US officials to end the political
deadlock through changes to the BiH constitution. However, this initiative was soon hijacked by the Bosnian Croat leadership, which tried to use it for strengthening of their
position in the Federation. Yet, even when EU and US officials prepared and offered a
solution for the election of BiH presidency, which was supposed to nominally fix the
Sejdic-Finci13 requirement but was effectively meant to appease Bosnian Croats and
Croatia, HDZ leader Dragan Covic rejected this proposal.14 This move forced many Western diplomats to start doubting whether the HDZ wanted to resolve this issue at all, and
created an aversion to Covic, which persists in some diplomatic circles until today, but is
never publicly shown.15
The 2014 general elections brought further changes to the local political scene but their
fallout played out differently in BiH's two entities. While in Republika Srpska political
clashes intensified and led to an all-out political war, in the Federation, political tensions
between main Bosniak and Croat parties somewhat calmed down, at least temporarily.
With his strong focus on reforms and good technical cooperation with Republika Srpska
Premier and Minister of Economy Zeljka Cvijanovic and Zoran Tegeltija, the new Federation Prime MInister, Fadil Novalic, offered a brief glimpse of hope that the country's
years-long decline could be halted. These timid positive signals were welcomed and
then amplified by the EU, which was in the full swing of its "new" approach to BiH.
However, these hopes had mostly faded by March 2016, as all main political parties
started positioning themselves for the local elections scheduled for October.
B.
Crisis Deepens as Parties Gear Up for 2016 Local Elections
Renewed radical rhetoric and hard-line initiatives and ideas, which always accompany
BiH's election campaigns, brought new political tensions throughout the country. They,
in turn, have almost completely halted the reform process. As a result, by late May, BiH's EU path seemed to be fully blocked, with the political elites unable or unwilling to
find compromise solutions to key issues. To make the situation even worse, the country
was facing a looming liquidity crisis since the previous IMF funding had been blocked
since September 2014, and medium and long-term financing proved insufficient to sustain excessive public spending. As a result, salaries, pensions, social benefits and other
13
In December 2009 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), acting on two separate applications lodged by Dervo Sejdic, a Roma, and Jakob Finci, a Jew, against Bosnia and Herzegovina, ruled that parts of BiH constitution, earmarking certain posts to members of specific
ethnicity, violated the rights of minorities; the ECHR decision, applications 27996/06 and
34836/06. As a result, BiH had to adopt a new mechanism for the election of its Presidency and
House of Peoples
14
SOS interviews, diplomatic corps, 2014-2016.
15
Ibid.
Page 14
budget expenditures became more and more delayed in both entities. By the beginning
of May, BiH finally agreed in principle a new financial program with the IMF, which was
supposed to be approved in July. Payment of the first tranche was expected soon after
the approval, which experts hoped would somewhat alleviate country’s liquidity pressures. Implementation of this program, however, remained at risk especially due to potentially questionable political ownership after the elections, as well as possible negative social effects of the gradual fiscal consolidation, which was one of the key program
objectives. This situation demanded close attention and cooperation among the IMF,
the World Bank, EU and other key international actors in the next few years.
1.
All-out Political War in Republika Srpska
The situation was especially difficult in Republika Srpska, where the two main parties,
the ruling SNSD and the leading opposition Serbian Democratic Party, SDS, have been
faltering in recent years due to internal power struggles. The problem intensified after
the 2014 general elections, which showed the two blocs to be neck and neck. The SNSD
won the position of the RS president and managed to gather enough support in the RS
National Assembly to appoint an entity government. The SDS-led bloc won the Serbian
position on the state presidency and joined Bosniak and Croat parties in the ruling coalition at state level. This imbalanced situation created new tensions and then all-out political war, as both blocs tried desperately to extend their control to include both the entity and state level.
In this clash, the SNSD leadership relied strongly on its control over most of the RS media and used nationalist rhetoric and hard-line initiatives. In 2015, RS President Milorad
Dodik launched initiatives to hold two separate referendums that were designed to
challenge the authorities of the Office of the High Representative, OHR and state judiciary. He was eventually forced to suspend both initiatives, mostly because Serbian premier Aleksandar Vucic publicly withheld support. Yet, Dodik is expected to renew his initiative for a referendum on RS National Day 16 since he believes that the Serbian leadership will not oppose such a referendum if it only seeks to publicly support the National
Day of the entity without openly challenging state institutions. Dodik's idea is to hold
this referendum around or on election day, hoping that Serbian patriotic feelings will
add votes to his party in the elections.17
On the other side of the political front line, the SDS has started using its influence on the
State Investigation and Protection Agency, SIPA, which was reflected in an increased
number of investigations against Dodik and people close to him.18 In 2015 and 2016, SIPA investigated and then arrested officials from Pavlovic bank, which had provided
Dodik with a controversial loan with which he purchased a villa in Belgrade in 2007. Use
16
In November 2015 BiH's Constitutional Court ruled that the RS National day, January 9, was
unconstitutional since it discriminated against people of other ethnic and religious backgrounds. On January 9 1992, the then Bosnian Serb leadership declared an independent Serb
republic, which contributed to the beginning of the war in April that year. This date is also an
Orthodox religious holiday, the day of St Stephen, which was the main reason for the decision of
the Constitutional Court. However, the Bosnian Serb as well as Serbian leadership and population openly rejected this ruling and stated they would continue celebrating this date as the RS
National Day.
17
SOS interview, Bosnian Serb official, April 2016.
18
Ibid.
Page 15
of its connections in SIPA and the state prosecution hurt the SDS, however, which started losing public support as it became perceived as too close to Bosniaks to the Serbs’
liking. This also raised a major risk of an incident that could take place between SIPA and
the RS police, which was protecting Dodik. Relentless quarrels, political manoeuvres and
verbal duels between and within the two Bosnian Serb blocs have deepened the political, economic and social crisis in the country, and especially in the RS, and frustrated the
local RS population who have become deeply polarized and politicized. It also altered
the RS political scene, which in the past was divided between the western part of RS,
which rooted for the SNSD, and its eastern parts, which always favoured the SDS. Yet,
now the entire RS seems to be in political turmoil and both blocs fight for each and every municipality.
2.
Tug-of-war in the Federation
The situation in the Federation was marked by a series of ups and downs throughout
the last year. The debacle of the SDP in the 2014 elections and effective breakup of the
second-strongest leftist party, the Democratic Front of Zeljko Komsic, in the months after the elections, placed the leading Bosniak national party, the SDA, in a unique situation. Without a serious opposition from within the Bosniak political scene for the first
time in years, the SDA had a chance to start patching up relations with the HDZ and resolving some burning issues, such as the status of the southern town of Mostar. The political situation was further relaxed after the Alliance for a Better Future, SBB, after
lengthy negotiations, joined the SDA coalition in the Federation, where it replaced the
DF, which already started breaking up due to inconsistent politics and growing internal
animosities and disagreements.
In a situation where little mutual trust and liking is left in relations between the SDA,
HDZ and SNSD leaders, Bakir Izetbegovic, Dragan Covic and Milorad Dodik, the SBB's
joining of the ruling coalition was a good opportunity to bridge these differences and
open serious negotiations about reforms, since the SBB leader, Bosniak media and construction tycoon Fahrudin Radoncic, still has good relations with both Covic and Dodik.19
However, HDZ and SNSD officials maintained their hard-line positions and Izetbegovic amidst strong criticism from media close to SDP, DF and SBB - eventually failed to offer
Covic his proposal for a resolution of the Mostar and Sejdic-Finci issues.20 The HDZ added to the public humiliation of SDA by putting into parliamentary procedure a similar
modality for a resolution of Sejdic-Finci, which the SDA was planning to offer the HDZ.21
Meanwhile, the fragile political truce in the Federation suffered a new blow in January
2016 after SIPA arrested Radoncic, who was charged with obstructing justice regarding
an ongoing trial in Kosovo. Only hours after Radoncic's arrest, local media published full
transcripts of telephone conversations and messages which Radoncic had exchanged
19
SOS interviews with senior officials from SDA, HDZ, SNSD and SBB, March-April 2016.
The SDA was willing to offer the HDZ a similar model for the resolution of Sejdic-Finci,
which would effectively guarantee that the candidate supported by a majority of Bosnian Croat
voters would get elected to the presidency. In return, the SDA wanted to resolve the status of
Mostar in a way that would provide SDA with better administrative control of the eastern, predominately Bosniak part of the town, especially when it comes to the issuing of construction
permits, SOS interviews, SDA officials February-April 2016.
21
SOS interviews, SDA officials, April 2016.
20
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with his political allies, as well as Izetbegovic and other politicians, which was perceived
by general public as a clear indication that the arrest was politically motivated. In the
subsequent few months, Radoncic was released into house arrest, arrested and then
released again. This arrest renewed old, deep animosities between Radoncic and Izetbegovic, although Izetbegovic repeatedly claimed he was not behind the arrest and publicly advocated for his release. The SBB initially tried to block the decision-making process while Radoncic was in detention, but nevertheless it still remains in coalition with
the SDA.
C.
Looking at the 2016 local elections and possible scenarios beyond
BiH is entering the 2016 pre-election campaign with a broken political scene, fragmented civil society, paralyzed governance, and a looming liquidity crisis, which have all together amplified ethnic, political and social tensions among the population. At the same
time, political battles within and between key parties, are becoming increasingly brutal
as all political players struggle to secure their position in BiH's ever-shrinking political
and financial space. The beginning of pre-election campaigns means that until the October elections no new serious reforms can be expected. On the contrary, in a highly politicized and polarized society, one can expect more radical rhetoric, hard-line initiatives
and empty promises, which have in the past been the politicians' weapons of choice in
pre-election campaigns. The situation is especially volatile in Republika Srpska, where
the opposing blocs seem ready to utilize the security agencies and other institutions under their control in their political battles. In this situation, party rallies, or eventual police investigations can trigger incidents that could easily get out of control. The possible
holding of a referendum on the RS National Day - even with a less provocative question would likely increase ethnic tensions that were already brewing since last year.22
1.
Political battles push RS towards the edge
In Republika Srpska, the two opposing blocs have shifted their battles from the usual
political arena to the security agencies they control. As an answer to the potential threat
he sees coming from the SDS's links with SIPA and the state prosecution, RS president
Milorad Dodik has been strengthening the RS police, which is under his direct control.
Dodik's plan for the police was put in motion after the 2014 general elections when his
confidant, Dragan Lukac, became the RS minister of police. Lukac's first step was to establish complete control over the police force, which was done through appointing his
people to all the key positions. In 2015, Lukac issued a total of 7,287 decisions on personal deployment or transfers, as a result of which more than 90 per cent of the 8,000strong force was reshuffled.23 The RS police also hired an additional 500 policemen, exceeding the 8,000-limit set by the UN International Task Police Force, UNIPTF police reform immediately after the war.
22
In the first eight months of 2015, the OSCE in BiH recorded 196 ethnically-motivated incidents - a sharp rise from the 111 incidents recorded in the entire previous year, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN, "Mounting Security Risks Leave Bosnia Vulnerable" 13 November 2015.
23
RS police 2015 activity report,
Page 17
The next step, which came soon after the terrorist attack by apparent Islamic radicals on
Zvornik police station in April 2015, was establishment of a new unit - the Directorate
for the fight against terrorism and extremism, which is run by Lukac's confidant, Major
Goran Balaban, a former member of the Special Police Unit. This directorate has two
sub-units - the Anti-terrorism and extremism unit and the Unit for the Prevention and
analytics - whereby the latter was established to effectively become the RS's parallel intelligence agency. This unit is run by Predrag Ceranic, an RS intelligence operative who
was appointed an advisor to Lukac on the same day this unit was established (on April
15 2015).24
Another step in the complete overhaul of the RS police has been the publication of a
tender for the purchase of long-barrel weapons, which is supposed to provide the entire
RS police force with such weapons although the post-war UNIPTF police reform set a
limit that only ten per cent of police force can have assault weapons. The next step in RS
police overhaul will be the establishment of a 1,000-strong reserve police unit, which is
planned to be deployed along the demarcation line between the RS and the Federation.
While the RS currently lacks the funds for this move, in a relatively short period of time,
it could establish the initial reserve unit from retired police officers. 25 While all these
changes of the structure and form of the RS police are officially explained by Dodik's intention to better protect the RS from Islamic radical elements, it is clear that the overhauled and tightly controlled RS police could be used for other purposes, be it the protection of the RS leadership from SIPA, or in case Dodik at any moment in future decides
to move ahead with his separatist agenda.
Nevertheless, Dodik seems set to win in the upcoming local elections even without making some radical moves. Although the majority of the RS population perceive the SNSD
as deeply corrupt and ineffective, latest polls and research in the RS suggest that SDSled bloc has failed to persuade the population that they are very different or better. Despite a large percentage of indecisive voters, the SNSD seems to be heading towards another election victory, which would reinforce Dodik's increasingly unsteady position and
preserve the SNSD reign for at least few more years. On the other hand, if the SNSD loses the elections, or some of its local bastions, such as Banja Luka, this would intensify
calls within his own party for Dodik's replacement. The same goes for the SDS; good results in the elections would cement the leadership of SDS president Mladen Bosic at
least until the 2018 general elections, but poor results, or a loss of some of its traditional
bastions, such as Bijeljina or Doboj, could easily mean the beginning of the end of his
reign. Since both blocs see the 2016 local elections as their do-or-die moment, they will
be ready for desperate moves until the very last moment.
SNSD's victory in the October elections would most likely lead to the breakup of the
Bosnian Serb opposition bloc, the Alliance for Change, which has already been shaking
due to internal disagreements and differences. Breakup of the Alliance for Change
would then reopen the question about possible changes of the ruling coalition at the
state level. In this situation Dodik would most likely utilize his connections with Covic to
persuade SDA to accept this change, which would in turn put SDA and its president Izet-
24
25
SOS interviews with Bosnian Serb officials, March 2016.
Ibid.
Page 18
begovic in a difficult situation just as they start gearing up for the 2018 general elections.
2.
Deepening divisions in the Federation
Political situation in the Federation appears more civilized, but only on the surface.
There are new divisions within the main Bosniak SDA party, whose leader Bakir Izetbegovic, is facing growing opposition and criticism, as different SDA officials prepare to
challenge his rule at the next party congress planned for 2018. At the same time, tensions are growing between the SDA and SBB, which is currently the only somewhat serious challenger on the Bosniak political scene. Busy with its internal power struggles as
well as with attempts to keep the SBB at bay, the SDA leadership ignores the gradual
weakening of BiH and maintains tough negotiating positions while dealing with Bosnian
Croat and Serb leadership. While the SDA is expected to score good results in the upcoming elections, this has nothing to do with its popularity but is more a result of the
fading of the so-called civic parties. Nevertheless, the main part of political battles before, during and after the local elections can be expected to take place within the SDA,
which is likely to only further impair its capacity for strategic long-term thinking, which
is crucial if the SDA wants to keep BiH in one piece.
The HDZ, on the other hand, faces no political alternative or opposition on the Bosnian
Croat political scene and this situation is unlikely to change in the next few election
rounds. Like the other main parties, the HDZ has in recent years been cleansed of some
of the people who seemed to hold different ideas to Dragan Covic. Whether because of
weakened capacity, or strategic orientation, the HDZ is a hard bargainer while dealing
with the SDA, which is preventing the resolution of some of the key issues, such as Mostar, and is fuelling tensions between Bosniaks and Croats in the country.
II.
EU's New Approach for BiH Needs New Ideas
The EU's new approach for BiH is not working and needs a revision and new ideas. The
no-longer-so-new approach, which was suddenly introduced by the EU as of late 2014,26
has failed to bring about any concrete breakthrough. Even if, by some small chance,
some of the three outstanding issues are agreed on in the course of 2016, that should
not be mistaken for any serious breakthrough. The real work and real reforms have not
even started yet and it seems unlikely that they will under the current political system.
26
According to different EU and US officials the new EU initiative was launched quickly and
suddenly, not only to help resolve growing crisis in Bosnia at the time of the 2014 violent protests, but even more so to pre-empt a separate plan which US State Department was preparing
for the country. By early 2014 US officials and experts had prepared a document outlining new
constitutional changes, but EU officials managed to persuade them to wait with it until after
2014 elections. But, by early 2015, after the failure of the EU-facilitated negotiations on SejdicFinci constitutional reform, EU officials understood that local leaders are misusing talks on
constitutional reform to buy time, avoid economic and social reforms and keep their positions.
Just as the US was about to launch its own plan, the EU launched its initiative immediately after
the elections in Bosnia, interviews with different EU and US officials May 2013-January 2015.
Page 19
Given the deeply polarized local society and the absence of any political alternative or
other possible agents for change, it seems obvious that any serious progress - of lack of
it - will in the near future still depend on international engagement with BiH. This situation calls for a serious and urgent revision of the international approach to BiH. However, the need for such a revision has been effectively thwarted by the EU itself. In an attempt to promote reforms and encourage local leaders, EU officials have been overemphasizing local leaders' successes and downplaying their failures. One year later, what
started as a part of the EU’s tactics has become the purpose for itself for some EU officials. Increasingly divergent views between EU officials on one side, and the local population, experts and other Western diplomats on the other side, have created a schizophrenic situation, which is further weakening the EU’s authority, undermining the EU
perspective in the eyes of local population, blocking BiH's path to the EU and threatening to further destabilize the country.27
Many EU institutions and officials now display a significant lack of understanding - or will
to comprehend - BiH's deep structural problems. Instead, the EU keeps the focus on
economic and social reforms, apparently ignoring the fact that all these reforms are as
much political in nature - or even more so - than any average political, legal or constitutional reforms. EU officials seem to have forgotten that the reason why the new EU initiative for BiH placed the focus on economic and social reforms was not because these
reforms were easier - quite the contrary - but because economic and social reforms
were more important for the local population and it was easier to hold local politicians
responsible for them. Therefore, the new EU approach was supposed to include stronger political role of the EU to start putting pressure on political elites, yet that never happened. This way, the EU has managed to dilute its own initiative in the same way it diluted its previous efforts, which were focused on the Sejdic-Finci negotiations two years
ago.
While the EU initiative so far failed to bring a more concrete breakthrough, there is one
available positive example that shows how local politicians can deliver on extremely difficult reforms when they have right motivation. Throughout the last year, the International Monetary Fund, IMF, has been negotiating a new financial arrangement for BiH.
The country was without IMF financing since mid-2014, when local politicians refused to
undertake IMF-required difficult and unpopular reforms in the middle of their preelection campaigns. As the economic and social situation worsened, the need for IMF
money by early 2016 became critical in order to cover the widening budget deficit in
both entities.
In previous years, the IMF kept its conditions soft and disbursed its money on the basis
of promises of reforms, which local politicians abandoned as soon as the money was received. This time, the IMF negotiated hard and demanded concrete actions. It worked,
so in less than a year, both entities adopted new labour legislation despite tremendous
criticism from trade unions and the opposition. Furthermore, after months of dragging
their feet, RS leaders finally agreed to close down Banka Srpske, a bankrupt govern27
"This is crazy: the situation was never as bad as it is now, while at the same time it is being
presented (by EU) as greatest success ever," SOS interview with a senior BiH state official, May
2016.
Page 20
ment-owned bank which they had still tried to maintain, fearing a backlash from the opposition and the public in the midst of the campaign for the 2016 local elections.
The labour legislation and the closure of Banka Srpske have been far more difficult and
unpopular than any of the three conditions required by the EU. However, the element
which proved to be decisive in ensuring that local governments did what they needed to
do was a 550 million euro three-year program, which the IMF will finally approve in July.
A few conclusions can be drawn from the current blockade of the EU initiative for BiH as
well as from the successful negotiations of the IMF package.
1.
The EU has weak leverage:
The EU by itself was never a strong political actor in the Balkans, but was held in high
respect due to its funds, when those funds were available. Despite the fact that the EU
had built up its delegation in BiH to become one of the biggest EU offices in the world,
its political presence and strength remained weak. In the last few years EU officials from
both BiH and Brussels have failed to make serious impressions and have been mostly
disregarded by local political elites but also by a part of the diplomatic corps. In the absence of a stronger political role of the EU, some of the Western countries have tried to
reinforce EU engagement through their ambassadors and senior officials. While some of
these efforts brought short-term results, they too have indirectly undermined EU authority. In the meantime, available EU funds for BiH have decreased in recent years as
the EU stopped providing budget support - which is one of the things that local politicians care about - and focused on IPA technical pre-accession funds - which most politicians disregard. Therefore, while the EU powers in BiH never carried a big stick, they
have also over time lost most of their carrots and they have ended up relying on IMF
and World Bank funds.
2.
The EU context has changed, dramatically, and for the worse:
For decades, EU enlargement was based on the attraction of EU markets and funds, as
well as on the assumption that it was in the interests of all candidate countries to do
whatever it takes to join this exclusive club. While access to EU markets and funds remain crucial, the overall context of EU membership has changed drastically after a series
of political, economic and security crises and challenges in recent years. While EU membership still officially remains the main long-term goal, the strengthening of conservative movements across Europe and the weakening of the EU's political and technical capacity to address deep ethnic, political and other challenges in BiH and in the rest of the
Balkans, have increased uncertainties over the EU’s shape, form and integrity in the
near future.
3.
Some BiH leaders have given up the EU:
Already, a few years ago, some BiH politicians were admitting, albeit only in private, that
they have given up on country's EU membership. Some of them believe the EU has become too conservative and Christian-dominated and would never accept such a decentralized country with so many Muslim citizens as BiH, regardless of whether it fulfils all
the conditions or not. Others fear that the EU accession process would force BiH to deal
with its political elites, deprive them of their patronage system, personal benefits and
likely put them in jail, as in the case of Croatia’s former premier, Ivo Sanader. Few think
that either BiH, or EU, or both will cease to exist in the coming years, so why bother.
These politicians still in public pay lip service to the country's EU membership prospects,
Page 21
but in reality do nothing to make that happen. While the majority of BiH's politicians,
civil society and population remain oriented towards the EU, polls and interviews show
that their resolve is also slowly waning. In this situation, EU - as well as US - officials
need to urgently take into consideration the possible consequences of such negative
trends, especially in the light of the growing influences of other global and regional
powers, such as Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others.
Conclusions
Bosnia and Herzegovina has utterly lost its way in its transition from a post-conflict to a
modern, democratic society. Intricate, multi-dimensional political quarrels have been
growing for years, blocking the decision-making system, which is now unable to agree
on even the most necessary actions, decisions and reforms.
BiH's political and governance system has effectively collapsed, while the political patronage has metastasized to all public institutions and services. Most of the country's
governments, health, education, rule of law and other systems cannot provide even the
minimum services for the population.
Throughout this period, the political elites have been maintaining public spending and
buying social peace through increased commercial lending. But this unsustainable model
seems to be reaching its limits in the course of 2016, as commercial lending is now not
sufficient to fill budget deficits that are growing on almost all administrative levels.
The collapse of the so-called civic and multi-ethnic parties leaves the national parties
unchallenged for years to come, but growing differences, animosities and mistrust
among its leaders make its unclear whether and when this political system will be able
to establish a functioning governing system.
Political divisions and economic and social troubles have led to greater polarization of
local communities, whereas much of civil society, media, intellectuals or even ordinary
citizens remain lethargic, or try to adjust to the system instead of changing it. Without a
more pro-active and positive engagement of all segments of BiH society that would be
focused on compromises rather than narrow-minded ethnic interests, BiH has little
chance of surviving.
Even with the best of intentions, the EU has managed again to undermine its own initiative in BiH. As the situation in BiH continues to deteriorate, the EU and US need to determine whether it is more costly for them to ignore the deepening crisis and let it develop without control with all the possible consequences this may cause, or whether it is
cheaper to find new resolve to revive the existing EU initiative for BiH.
The current EU initiative has a good focus, but requires much stronger and more concrete efforts from both the EU and US.
Page 22
Recommendations
To resolve matters before they get out of hand
To BiH society
1. All segments of the BiH society - from political elites to media, intellectuals, civil society and citizens themselves should be reminded that a complex country like BiH
can survive and grow only through compromises, concessions and mutual respect
and acceptance of each others' values and interests. On the other hand, blind insistence on unilateral, inflexible and maximalist positions pushes the country towards deeper divisions and possible further destabilization.
2. All segments of BiH society - in cooperation with the international community should look into the ways to revive the local political scene, rebuild lost trust among
ethnic groups as well as among their political representatives, and reinforce local
ownership, responsibility and accountability over reform processes. This task should
comprise of a reform of Bosnia's political and electoral system, which has been seriously compromised in the previous years. As a part of that reform local and international actors should consider following changes28:
a) In cooperation with the international community the election system should be
overhauled to exclude and prevent political influences and election fraud that in
the past few election cycles proved to be a serious problem;
b) A reorganization of the election cycle in a way to group local and general elections in one year, but with at least six months apart, which would prevent the
general elections to influence the local ballot, but would still give local politicians
at least three years for reforms;
c) An increase of the election threshold to reduce the number of political parties in
the country;
d) Further changes to the election law, law on financing of political parties and
other legislation that would reinforce political accountability;
To the EU
1. The European Delegation and EUSR should reinforce their position in BiH and not
shy away from participating in the local political arena. They should also better coordinate the efforts of different EU, US and other Western institutions and member
countries, working with the OHR on defining political “red lines.” EU and US officials
should also be ready to “name, blame and shame” those who are found to be obstructing the EU accession process as well as to “handhold” local institutions and
help them through difficult technical reforms when their low capacity require so.
28
There recommendations regarding the possible overhaul of the election system should be understood only as broad ideas and general directions. This is one of the most important yet most
complicated issues in BiH's system, and as such it deserves special attention, a separate indepth analysis and broad public consultations. Therefore, this is one of the reforms to which the
international community should pay special attention and support it through its projects and
programs, but also include it as a part of future conditionality.
Page 23
2. EU institutions and member countries should strengthen their mechanisms and
make them more concrete, both in terms of "carrots" as well as "sticks." This should
include, but not be limited to:
e) First and foremost strengthening of their analytical capacities to better follow,
understand and react to local challenges;
f) Establishing of a much more concrete and immediate financial envelope that
would include budget support, major infrastructure and employment projects,
which would be directly linked with concrete reforms and actions;
g) Revisiting and strengthening of its capacities to follow local and regional trails of
money, and other available mechanisms and systems that can be used against
corruption and local and regional "spoilers."
h) Simplifying procedures and reviewing goals for projects earmarked for local media and civil society, aiming for deeper, longer-term changes;
To the US administration:
1. The absence of active, strategic American role in BiH since 2006 was one of the key
factors in BiH's decline. Therefore, strengthening of the US role is crucial for the
stabilization of BiH
a) For this to happen, the US needs to restore its credibility. This could be done
through a careful and strategic repositioning of appropriate political-diplomatic,
financial as well as PR efforts, by avoiding the use of strong words followed by
weak actions. A US role would be crucial in protecting the “red lines";
b) A key US role would be in supporting the "stick" side of mechanism and boosting
local security through stronger engagement of international police and intelligence agencies;
c) A US role would be especially beneficial in supporting key reforms, such as the
above-mentioned reform of the election system, as well as reforms of rule of
law, civil society and media. Yet, it would be crucial for the US to incorporate in
those programs lessons from its own past mistakes;
Sarajevo, BiH, June 2016

Report

Transcription

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