Escalation of conflict about hydraulic fracking for

What the frack? Development of a controversy about hydraulic fracking for shale gas in
the Netherlands
Paper for IPA Conference 2013, 3 -5 July Vienna (DRAFT)
Panel: The dynamics of escalation in policy work
Author: Tamara Metze, Phd1.
[email protected]
Abstract
In 2009 Cuadrilla, a gas drilling company requested a permit for a test drilling for shale gas in
the community of Boxtel, the Netherlands. At that point Cuadrilla already received a
concession of the national government for drilling at several places. The local town council
negotiated the conditions under which this drilling would be acceptable to them – for
example in a designated area for industrial development and with financial compensation –
and indeed gave Cuadrilla the permission to start building a test drilling location. It was after
this permitting process, that local and national policy controversy over this issue developed.
In this paper, I will theoretically and empirically explore the development of this societal and
scientific controversy from an interpretative approach. I will study frame shifts in the debate.
In addition I will focus on the boundary work – the interpretation and rhetorical
demarcations of facts – that was part of the frame shifts. I will demonstrate how the framing
of the issue, and boundary work part of it, contributed to the emergence of this controversy,
and how that resulted in a temporary national moratorium on fracking for shale gas.
Introduction
“Unconventional is something like unpopular” (H.J. Duyverman, Cuadrilla Resources,
interview 10 April 2011)
1
I am very grateful to Leon van den Dool and especially Sabine van Zuydam who were part of the
studies in which we reconstructed the decision-making procedure and conducted a frame-analysis.
This research has partly been financed by the Rathenau Institute and partly been financed by the local
Audit Chamber in Boxtel.
1
Flames from the tab, groundwater pollution, water shortage, radio activity, earthquakes:
these are all worrisome images connected to hydraulic fracking (see figure 1) for the
extraction of shale gas. Shale gas sits in deep layers in the ground and can be produced by
horizontal drilling techniques and fracking of clay stone.
Figure 1: Hydraulic Fracking (source: U.S. Energy Information Administrative 3)
Despite the worries for the safety of the environment and people, shale gas is considered a
major “game changer” for the energy market in the Netherlands and elsewhere (Wall Street
Journal November 2 2009; Mäkinen 2010; Newell 2010). In the Netherlands it might be an
alternative for the natural gas “reservoir” in the North of the country that will run dry in the
coming 15 till 20 years.
The question in the current public controversy is, if shale gas is a much needed transition
fuel and a very welcome game-changer on the energy market on one hand, or if it is a
polluting practice that limits a transition to sustainable energy on the other hand. This
2
question cannot be answered objectively. There are too many scientific uncertainties and
too many interests at stake. Moreover, the technique for gas drilling is relatively new.
Hydraulic fracturing is different from conventional gas extraction as it combines hydraulic
pressures (water with specific chemicals) and horizontal drilling in layers of clay.
Conventional drilling usually is only vertical and does not need high pressures as natural gas
is relatively flee floating in sand layers. Therefore, and for other economic and political
reasons - drilling for gas is an acceptable technique in the Netherlands and elsewhere; but
the technique of fracking became controversial over the last couple of years.
Initially there were no signs that shale gas extraction would become controversial in the
Netherlands. In 2009 Cuadrilla Resources Ltd. (later on also referred to as Brabant
Resources), the drilling company, received an “exploration license” from the Ministry of
Economic Affairs2, and they applied for a local (zoning) license in the community of Boxtel.
This application procedure did not raise local protests, more than any other permitting
process would (interview group of civil servants 2012). These protests commenced only after
individual and local protesters organized themselves and informed local politicians. These in
their turn, contacted members of parliament and invited experts to inform them on
hydraulic fracturing, the amounts of gas expected to be extracted and possible risks for the
environment. As we will demonstrate below, over the last two years more local, regional and
national newspapers started to report on international studies that concluded that, for
example there might be a relation with ground water pollution (for example EPA in
December 2011); and that methane could be harmful and that there was a possible
relationship with earthquakes (c.f. Tyndall 2011). In addition, over the last couple of years
scientific uncertainty increased about the amount of shale gas that can be extracted (Herber
en De Jager, 2010).
Hence, over the last three years hydraulic fracturing has become a “contested technology”
(Schomberg 1995) that poses a “wicked” or “intractable” problems to decision makers (Rittel
2
At the time of the media-analysis this Ministry was called the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and
Innovation (in Dutch Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie EL&I). However, it now is back at being the
Ministry of Economic Affairs. Both names are being applied throughout this paper.
3
en Webber 1973; c.f. Hisschemöller en Hoppe 1995)3. Deciding on the permission of fracking
for shale gas is ‘wicked’ because there is an emerging societal controversy and there seems
to be an increase in the scientific uncertainties about the impacts on the environment. A
wicked problem is an unstructured problem that has not one clear problem definition
neither a solution, There is no definite description; there is no objective definition, and no
“stopping rule”. Moreover, solutions are not true or false but good or bad (not scientific but
political) and, as such, ‘wicked’ is not evil but rather its resistance to resolution (in a scientific
sense) (Rittel en Webber 1973, p.161-167; Hisschemöller en Hoppe 1995 p. 56).
In these cases of academic and societal uncertainties, decision making is difficult: how to
know what is true? Worried activists, local and national politicians, the ministry of Economic
Affairs, Agriculture and innovation (EAA&I), and also researchers acknowledge that the
information they receive is not always credible. Scientists can draw upon the scientific
methods and codes (see for example Merton CUDOS, Merton 1996) to judge the validity and
reliability of the research. They can rely on procedures to check the methods and verify the
outcomes; but these are not transparent and accessible to everyone. Moreover, scientists do
not agree on the risks for human health and the environment, and amount of shale gas
available (c.f. Schulz and Horsfield, 2009; Gény, 2010; Digiulio et al, 2011; Hughes 2011;
Howarth 2011; Howarth and Ingraffea 2011, Howarth et al 2012; Cathles et al 2012; Herber
and De Jager 2010). As soon as scientific knowledge enters the societal arena, other factors
than the transparency and academic procedures - codetermine the credibility of research:
the interpretation and presentation and practical implications are of greater importance 4.
The interpretive dimension of facts makes a difference. This means the way in which
scientific facts and information are made sense of by an audience (Dijstelbloem en Hagendijk
2011), but also the performative dimension, which means the way research results are
presented in a dramaturgical sense (Hajer 2009).
Wicked problems for decision makers and other policy actors not only cause a struggle over
the reliability and validity of facts but also about the interpretation and presentation of
3
In transition management also referred to as persistent problems (Schuitmaker 2013). It can be argued that decision makers
very often have to deal with these types of wicked problems as in decision making there are no “brute facts” ((Yanow, 2006)
Yanow, Interpretation and Method 2006, p. 35) but facts always need to be interpreted.
4
In Science and Technology Studies it is also argued and empirically demonstrated that interpretation
and presentation are of importance within the scientific arena.
4
these facts. Wicked problems do not only cause a struggle about the trustworthiness of the
scientific studies; but also about their credibility. All sorts of arguments will be used by
proponents and opponents to discredit facts: arguments about the applied scientific
methods, about the independence of the researcher, the research institute, and about the
possible conflicts or entanglement of interests, and the applicability of the knowledge – ‘this
might be true in the United States but in the Netherlands it is something completely
different’. Moreover, data and results – for example about the amount of shale gas available
- may be used by different actors in different contexts.
In our research into Dutch local and national decision making and reporting in newspapers
on shale gas, we studied critical moments in the Dutch debate. These were moments when a
shift occurred in the interpretation of facts and also the rules by which decisions were being
made were contested (Boltanski and Tehvenot 1999). These are moments, or better periods,
in which the framing5 of the problem shifts. In the shale gas debate, these include moments
at which the boundaries between science, politics and society shift: what is considered a fact
at first, can start to be considered as a political statement, and vice versa (Gieryn 1983;
Metze 2010). The credibility of facts is debated: at one moment a fact is a powerful scientific
argument can be considered an opinion at the next.
The organizing question in this paper is: what were frame shifts that occurred (on the facts)
in the Dutch debate on shale gas and how these contributed to the emergence of a societal
controversy?
1. Development of a controversy: frame shifts and boundary work
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, backed up by TNO (an technical expertise centre
linked to the Technical Unviersity of Delft), and in alliance with drilling companies, such as
Cuadrilla at first presented the possible extraction for shale gas as another form of natural
gas production (Interview Min ELI 2012, interview Cuadrilla 2012, interview TNO 2012). It
was only in the course of 2010 that a societal controversy developed and that cumulated in a
decision by the Minster of Economic Affairs, Maxime Verhagen, to commission an
independent research to study the risks of hydraulic fracturing (decision in October 2010)
5
A frame is a “structure of thought, of evidence of action, and hence of interests and values (Rein
1983: 96). Een frame geeft “a perspective from which […] a situation can be made sense of and acted
on” (Rein & Schön, 1993:146).
5
and a temporary moratorium on fracking. This moratorium is in place until the research
results are presented and debated.
In this paper we do not study a case of escalation of conflict, but it is a case in which a
societal conflict emerged, and scientific uncertainty became more apparent. It is the coming
of age of a political conflict, which consists of at least two elements: conflicting interests and
a battle over these interests (Van der Eijk 2001, p.22) . Conflict can be defined as a
“perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties current aspirations cannot be
achieved simultaneously” (Rubin, Pruitt, Kim 1994, p. 5). A whole paper can be written about
interests, values and needs that can conflict, in this paper we will define interests as the
“feelings about what is basically desirable” (Rubin et al, 1994 p.11). Interests as such are
closely linked to what people themselves consider (perceive) to be in their interest. This
might include needs and their underlying values. We refrain from defining or analyzing
‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ interests as some political scientists do. A difference lays, for
example, between research into interests that attempts to describe these objectively lies in
the word “perception” of interests. This perception can change in the course of time. In
addition this perception not only includes a concern about an actors’ own interests, but also
a concern for the interests, needs and values of the other (the rivalry). Rubin et al (1994)
discriminate two axes that lead to this matrix of four different perceptions of the conflict
and four related strategies to handle the conflict:
6
HIGH
yielding
problem solving
avoiding
(inaction/withdrawing)
contending
Concern
about
others
outcome
LOW
LOW
Concern about parties outcomes
HIGH
Figure 2: Four strategies in situations of conflict, source: Rubin et al 1994, p.30
The four strategies co-determine if a conflict emerges and if actors will engage in a ”battle”,
or if they will avoid conflict, will contend or yield, or engage in problem solving. An
interesting question then is: what affects the way a party includes a concern with the other
stakeholders? First of all, the interests that are at stake. Important interests produce high
and rigid aspirations (Rubin et al 1994, p. 33). A second determinant for the concern with
others is also the alternative available (BATNA in negotiation theory, see for example
Fischer and Ury 1981). If this is the only issue at stake and an actor perceives the outcome as
the one possible outcome, it will be harder to take into account the interests and
perceptions of others. Last but not least: the framing of the outcomes is important (Rubin et
al 1994, p33). When outcomes are framed positively, parties are more willing to make
concessions. When the costs of these concessions are made visible, parties will not easily
give up their position. Negative framing may produce more concerns about the outcomes,
than positive framing (Rubin et al 1994, p.33).
In our case, we focus on this framing element that codetermines how actors perceive a
conflict of interests. However, we focus on the framing of the issue at stake, and of the
7
problem. The focus is not so much on the framing of the outcomes of a negotiation,
although there is a strong link between the definition of the problem and the range of
possible solutions that actors involved can think of.
This type of framing of the problem is very important in policy making (Benford and Snow
2000, Rein and Schön 1993), and, especially in the case of a wicked problem. Not only for
agenda-setting or remaining on the political agenda, but also for the decisions being made. It
is framing in a broader sense: what is the meaning of the policy problem at the table. A
frame is a “structure of thought, of evidence of action, and hence of interests and values
(Rein 1983: 96). A frame gives “a perspective from which […] a situation can be made sense
of and acted on” (Rein & Schön, 1993:146). In our case of hydraulic fracking the controversy
emerged and scientific uncertainty contributed to that. This scientific uncertainty made it
more difficult for actors engaged in a controversy to assess the possible outcomes – and
therefore they started to battle over the definition of the problem. As in most policy
conflicts, and especially in cases of wicked problems –with a lot of uncertainty both
scientifically but also societally - the framing – of a problem in itself becomes a strategy.
Attempts to frame a policy issue in a specific way, codetermine the perception of interests
and codetermines the concern for the interests of others. This in its turn will codetermine
the strategies that involved actors will apply. Framing in this sense is a political act: it is
trying to influence how a problem is conceived of. Sometimes, issues are framed as such that
they do not turn into a controversy; and others might attempt to frame an issue in such a
way that it does lead to a policy conflict.
In the framing and reframing of wicked problems the role of scientific facts stands out. Due
to the uncertainty, decision makers often try to establish common factual ground, to be able
to decide on such a problem. We need to have the facts straight, more investigations are
needed are quite common strategies of decision makers to deal with these issues. Moreover,
opposing parties will attempt to convince others of their point of view and that what is in
their interests is also beneficial to others (for example economically, or safety). These framecontests (Kaplan 2008) are not only based on rhetoric or performance; but also on ‘facts’.
New facts can be very convincing and might alter the perception of a problem. Especially in
cases of scientific uncertainty there is room to start debating the facts, and to engage in
8
boundary – in the sense of trying to determine and argue what is a fact and what is an
opinion or politics (Gieryn 1983). Boundary work is the discursive demarcation of (elements
of) a scientific, societal, or policy practice from other practices to gain credibility for this
practice (c.f. Gieryn 1999; Halffman 2003; Metze 2010). This battle over the boundaries
between science, politics and society can be a strategy of actors to create room to introduce
new boundary crossing perceptions of a problem; or it can be a way to try to keep out other
interpretations and solutions (Metze 2010). In our analysis we paid special attention to this
element of boundary work on facts/policy in the analysis of frame shifts.
In this paper we study frame- shifts -reframing- of the issue of hydraulic fracking for shale
gas in the Netherlands. In our case we study what perspectives evolved on hydraulic fracking
for shale in the local community of Boxtel, the town council and the town board, but also in
Dutch government and in four national newspapers, one regional news paper and two local
newspapers. The overall question was how actors that could be effected by some form of
hydraulic fracking for shale gas framed the issue, and especially how they framed the
evidence, facts and academic reports on this issue. We attempted to establish how frameshifts in the debate influenced the emergence of a policy conflict and societal controversy.
2. Methods
In order to answer this research question and the sub-questions, we first reconstructed the
decision making process on shale gas both on a national level and for the local case of
Boxtel. Boxtel was the first Dutch local community that granted a permit for test drilling. This
reconstruction resulted in three time-lines (see figure 3 in appendix) and a description of the
process, is based on an analysis of policy documents, internet resources, 10 interviews, three
group interviews (one with three local civil servants: the judicial, PR and environmental civil
servant; one group interview with the alderman, the same PR and environmental servant;
one group interview with representatives from the local town council) and one sensemaking session with local town-council members and (former) aldermen.
In addition we performed a media analysis of four national newspapers (Trouw, De
Telegraaf, De Volkskrant and NRC), the regional newspaper (Het Brabants Dagblad) and two
local newspapers (De Meierij and Brabants Centrum). First, we mapped periods of media
9
attention for shale gas in 2011. Second, we checked how many times journalists – or the
people they interviewed- referred to research reports6. From this analysis we found peaks in
the media coverage. Third, we mapped how often the terms “risk” and “safety” were used
(see figure 4). Last but not least, we performed a qualitative analysis of the peaks. Based on
the news paper reports, policy documents and interviews, we established what frames (on
facts) were present in what period, if these were contesting frames, and we established
frame shifts. To establish this, we focused our qualitative analysis on the framing of facts in
the shale gas debate. We studied, first of all what was being said about reports, academic
research, and other forms of evidence in newspaper reports and in interviews. Second, we
looked for metaphoric use of language. What were metaphors being uttered in the
newspapers, policy documents and interviews? From these metaphors – and other
utterances - we identified storylines on the reports, facts and expertise on shale gas.
Storylines are a generative narrative that encapsulates a frame (or even a discursive
structure outside the text) (Hajer 1995; Hajer 2009). Third, we studied if these storylines of
different groups of actors were mutually exclusive to make sure that we identified different
frames. Last but not least, we attempted to establish what frame was dominant in a specific
time period and if new interpretations of the shale gas issue emerged and frame shifts
occurred. First, a reconstruction of the decision making process (see also the three timelines
in figure 3 in appendix).
3. Shale gas: the development of a controversy in the Netherlands
Recently, companies such as Shell, Caudrilla, Northern Petroleum Netherlands and
Vermillion Oil & Gas, have become interested in shale gas extraction (and other forms of
unconventional extraction of gas, like coal gasification and tight gas extraction) in Europe.
The production of shale gas is done in an “unconventional” way and is also called
unconventional gas. The gas is trapped in a shale deposit. In order to win the gas, one has to
drill into the ground to a depth of about 11,000 feet, and use a chemical fracturing fluid, in
order to extend and keep open the fractures in the stone that contains the gas.
In the United States, Canada, but also closer to home in Poland and Britain, new techniques
are being employed to extract the gas from a shale layer (clay stone, the less compact form
6
The search terms were “research”, “report”, “study” and “acad”.
10
of slate). In the United States, shale gas is seen as a “game changer”, as its production in a
short time supplied America with gas for the next 150 years, which makes the country less
dependent on others and other energy resources (IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010). In 2035,
the American shale gas reserves will take care of no less than 45% of its gas consumption.
(The American Geological Services estimates this percentage to be quite lower ref).
According to the International Energy Agency, shale gas, partly on account of the American
impulse, already contributes 15% of the total world gas production (IEA, World Energy
Outlook 2010; 2011). More than a third of the (global) increase of gas production, especially
in the US, comes from unconventional resources, like shale gas, coal gas and tight gas (IEA,
World Energy Outlook 2010; US Energy Administration 2012).
Also in the Netherlands, shale gas is considered a potential game changer. In 2030, half of
the need for gas can be anticipated by shale gas extraction (EIA en TNO). In 2011, The Energy
Council states in a letter to the Minister, that unconventional gas is a game changer because
it increases our natural gas reserves. This makes it possible to realize a larger European gas
market share and will provide “energy security” […] Last but not least, the energy council
argues, natural gas will be able to play a role in the “effective transition towards a
sustainable energy supply”. The council acknowledges that researchers discord about the
exact moment, but “undoubtedly we will be as good as out of gas supplies somewhere
between the next 10 or 20 years”. In this discussion, the council states that natural gas
extraction is better than coal, “partially, in order to realize lower CO2 emissions in the short
term as well” (Energy Council (letter), February 8, 2011; European Union, June, 2012).
Subsequently, data provided by the company Cuadrilla – data that are supported by a study
conducted by Royal Haskoning- demonstrate multiple “sweet spots” for shale gas extraction
in the Netherlands. An exploratory drilling on such a sweet spot would indicate more
precisely whether these types of drilling in the Netherlands would be lucrative.
3.1.
Reconstruction of decision making process
We will first present the reconstruction of the decision making process as this demonstrates
at what time local protests became more prominent in the discussions, what actors were
involved, and when this local protest led to a controversy at the national level. We divided
the reconstruction in 4 periods and we can pinpoint 4 frame shifts due which (the facts and
11
evidence on) fracking for shale gas was/were being interpreted differently and the dynamics
of decision making altered. In the section 4.2. we present the results of the qualitative
analysis of frame shifts (and boundary work part of that). We will first present the
reconstruction of the decision making procedure.
1. National exploration permit and local exploratory conversations
In 2009 Cuadrilla applied for an exploration permit at the Ministry of Economic Affairs (at the
time Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation). In order to receive this
exploration permit, Cuadrilla needed to submit a report on the technical aspects of the
drilling process, and on the economic viability of their business. The Ministry asked the
Dutch TNO for advice on drilling for shale gas in the Netherlands. Environmental aspects of
this drilling process are not included in this permitting process; these are covered by the
local permitting process and most of all applicable (according to the Ministry) when test
drilling results in the desire to indeed start shale gas production (interview Ministry 2012;
interview Alderman Boxtel 2012).
In October 2009 the ministry granted an exploration permit for test drilling on shale gas to
Cuadrilla for two areas: the province of North-Brabant and Flevoland (NoordOost Polder)7.
This concession meant that Cuadrilla was allowed to start exploring the presence of shale
gas in those provinces8. In the area of 2026 km2 for which this exploration permit was
granted, Cuadrilla was mostly interested in Boxtel en Haaren9 because they expected – what
they called – sweetspots – to be present: accessible, well located areas with probably good
access to shale layers.
At the 13th of March 2010, the alderman of Boxtel receives a letter of Caudrilla resources in
which they ask the town board to collaborate in a permitting process for test drilling.
Cuadrilla and the local community engaged in explorative conversations with the local
7
Staatscourant 2009, nr. 16.000
As part of this permitting process, the provinces were aske to give advice. The province of north Brabant did
not use this right to give advice.
9
In the exploratory stage, Cuadrilla also pinpointed the neighboring communities of Schijndel, Eersel en HeezeLeende as “sweetspot”. The latter two immediately were a second priority to Cuadrilla.
8
12
alderman (first this is Van Erp (CDA) and later on Van de Wiel (Combinatie95)10 to investigate
if Boxtel would be willing to grant a permit (omgevingsvergunning) and under what
conditions. On the 27th of April the whole town board (the aldermen) discuss the proposal
of Cuadrilla. They decide not to start a formal permitting procedure just yet. The board
members have a lot of question, concerning the location and the benefits for the local
community, and possible risks or damage to the environment (Gemeente Boxtel,
collegebesluit, 27 april 2010, 10.10.264; brief (gemeente) naar Cuadrilla op 29 april 2010).
To answer these questions the local town board organizes what they call a “policy” meeting
on the First of June 2010. Cuadrilla answers questions and possible locations are being
discussed. No decisions were being taken at this meeting as this is not the nature of a policy
meeting. After this meeting, the town board is still reluctant to start a permitting process as
they do not see the economic benefits, and the permitting process will be too demanding for
the civil servants. Cuadrilla negotiates about these issues and on the 17 th of august 2010 the
local board agrees to a permit for test drilling in an industrial area (Vorst). At the 25 th of
august is informed that the local town board in principle agrees with this activity in their
municipality. On the 30th of September Cuadrilla formally applies for a permit11.
2. The local permitting process
In the Dutch local permitting process for “omgevingsvergunning” (environmental permits)
there is a possibility for the local town council to decide that some of the permits do not
have to be accorded by the council. In those cases, the members of the town-board are in a
formal position to grant these permits. This is possible for “activities that are not at strained
terms with a good spatial planning and includes a motivation with a spatial component (the
former project-decision)”. In this case the local town council needs to declare that it has no
objections (verklaring van geen bedenkingen, artikel 6.5, eerste lid Besluit omgevingsrecht).
The town council has indicated more general categories to which this declaration applies.
10
Dhr. Van Erp was alderman on Financial affairs, public spaces and traffic. Dhr. Van de Wiel is alderman with a
responsibility for the environment, sustainability and housing (www.boxtel.nl).
11
At the 13th of april 2010 Brabant Resources formally took over the national exploration permit that had
been granted to Cuadrilla.
13
This application was part of one of those categories 12. It is common practice not to discuss
decisions on these types of permits in the local town council. Solely permits that deviate
from these categories need to be brought to the local town council. In all other instances the
town-board can decide. The town board does need to inform the local town council on all
decisions made with regards to these permits, and they need to apply a public hearing
procedure.
This is exactly what happened: early October 2010 the town board informed the town
council – in a letter – that this application was going to be granted. The local party leaders
had been informed informally on this decision – in a separate meeting. The procedure of the
public hearing was started: neighbors were being informed in an email13 and the alderman
informed representatives of local businesses, and especially the Rabobank (a Dutch bank)
with a data centre in the industrial area in which the test drilling was going to take place
(Nieuwsbrief Ladonk-Vorst-Lennisheuvel, nr. 1, 8 oktober 2010; brief College aan Raad, 8
oktober 2010). There were to information-meetings organized in November for neighbors
and council members which were not very well attended (Interview Wethouder en
gemeentesecretaris (groepsinterview gemeente) 2012, groepsinterview Raadsleden 2012).
A local permitting process includes the possibility of submitting “zienswijzen”, this entails
that the draft decision (ontwerpbesluit) is up for comments by the public (citizens, action
groups, and companies). Fourteen of these “zienswijzen” were submitted to the local
administrators, including one of the Rabobank. Most of these concerns were addressing
possible nuisances caused by drilling activities, such as traffic nuisance, odor nuisance,
spoiling the scenery, and concerns about seismographic activities (minor earthquakes), and
water contamination.
In this stage the local town council written questions to the town board. More concerns
about the environmental aspects. CDA questions about incidents in the USA. Combination95
12
In the Shale Gas Free Motion accepted unanimously by the local town council these categories are adjusted
but it is also noticed: article 6.5, second lid of the Decision zoning Law the declaration of no-objections can only
be denied in order to protect a good spatial planning (artikel 2.20a WABO).
13
Slightly earlier than planned for because in a local town meeting of the neighboring community Haaren
protesters had revealed that a permit for hydraulic test fracking was going to be granted in Boxtel.
14
worries about the green area around the test drilling location, and if the drilling station
won’t interfere with the ecological main structure (connected greens in the Netherlands).
The town board releases a permit on 11th of January. They are taking into account the public
hearing remarks, the questions posed by two political parties. It is an ordinary building
permit with a temporary exception on the zoning plan (“de tijdelijke ontheffing van het
bestemmingsplan (3.22 Wro)) This permit is given to Brabant Resources (Brief gemeente
Boxtel aan Brabant Resources 11 January 2011) and publically announced in the local
newspaper Brabants Centrum on the 13th of January 2011. The local government will build a
temporary road to the test drilling location and there will be a green area realized around it
(collegevoorstel 21 december 2010).
3. Going to court
Four groups of people that objected the permit in the earlier stage – and that had submitted
‘zienswijzen’ - were not content and reassured by the way the town board had included
their objections in the permit. These plaintiffs filed four law suits. Two of these were
withdrawn before they were actually handled by the court. The lawsuits of the Rabobank
and of a neighbor-family proceeded. The main objection in these lawsuits is that the permit
is issued for a temporary drilling activity, but that there were not enough guarantees that
this indeed would be a temporary activity. Moreover, it was argued that there was not
sufficient argumentation and evidence that ensured the spatial quality – more specifically
the safety, air quality, seismic activities, the quality of the soil and ground water and noise
nuisance. The argument was that the living environment would be ‘unreasonably’ damaged
(Uitspraak rechter, LJN BU1387). In October the court ruled that the permit was not valid as
it was indeed not guaranteed that this temporary permit was issued for a temporary activity.
In this period between the filing of a lawsuit and the ruling of the court, societal resistance
grew, Cuadrilla and the town board agreed to a lease of the ground in the industrial area,
and – as part of that agreement- Caudrilla paid 100.000 euro goodwill to compensate for the
fact that they would bring in industrial activities in an area that was designated for local and
sustainable industrial development.
4. Between issue of permit and ruling of court: Emerging of societal conflict
Citizens of the nearby municipality Haaren were the first to object drilling for shale gas in
their neighborhood. They united in “Shale Gas No”. This turmoil spread to Boxtel, and there
15
an action group was also founded, existing both of local residents worried about falling
house prices, and of residents who had moved to the Brabant countryside for its natural
surroundings, now anxious about soon having a gas plant as their window view. The action
groups were especially worried about the risks and environmental damage that the drilling
could bring. The activists received support from the provincial environmental federations,
and by people who have been engaged to coal in Drenthe, including a VU geologist,
professor Ko van Huissteden. Soon they received support from national political parties:
PvdA and Groen Links MP’s stepped into the breach, and the topic was taken up by
organizations on a national level, like Friends of the Earth and Green Peace. Also, an
important role was played by Ron Lodewijks, an investigative journalist at Brabants Dagblad,
who wrote a whole series of articles about the topic and by the Rabo-Bank a dutch bank with
a data-centre close to the sweet spot in Boxtel. This company feared earthquakes and
trembles to disturb their data-processing.
Moreover, a public hearing was organized by the parliament. This meant that they invited all
sorts of experts to inform the members of parliament (their committee) on the pro’s and
cons of shale gas). Initially the social upheaval did not cause a change in direction by the
Ministry and Municipality. They argued that test drilling is required to know more about the
potential and risks of hydraulic fracking in this particular place. The exploratory permit was
granted to Caudrilla and both the ministry, the town council of Boxtel and Cuadrilla saw no
reason to stop the preparatory activities for the test-drilling. However, a couple of month
later the municipality of Boxtel was being declared “shale gas free” by all political parties,
and the Ministry has commissioned an independent inquiry on the safety of man and the
environment during the detection and production of shale gas and coal gas in the
Netherlands. As we will see below, the Ministry altered its strategy from contending others
of the safety of drilling for shale gas to problem solving (and finding out if it is safe).
To conclude, the permitting process was concluded and two permits were issued before a
controversy emerged. The description above and the three timelines in the appendix demonstrate
that the starting point in decision making on shale gas was ‘business as usual’. The ordinary
permitting procedures were followed. Exploration permits have been issued at a national level and
one local permit at the local level. It was only then that upheaval emerged. How is that possible?
How did a turnaround occur in the strategies of local and national government, but also in the Dutch
16
newspapers and policy documents from “shale gas production is just like the regular gas production”,
to “shale gas extraction is unconventional and controversial”? We studied frame shifts and the role
of boundary work on facts in it.
3.2.
Four frame shifts in Dutch decision making on the Shale gas revolution
The media analysis is insightful in the development of the debate and the frame shifts or
reframing of the issue at stake. These frame shifts have contributed to the development of a
controversy. The media analysis not only demonstrates that it is quantifiable how often
reports on shale gas took place; the qualitative analysis demonstrates the evolvement of the
debate. First of all, this upheaval was also reflected in the amount of newspaper reporting.
17
Total amount of newspaper articles on
shale gas
20,00
15,00
10,00
Totaal aantal artikelen
schaliegas
5,00
0,00
Figure 4: Total of articles on shalegas in Trouw, NRC, Telegraaf en Volkskrant.
Our results indicate that in the period of January 2011 up to and including February 2012
(until the formation of the independent research agenda of the Ministry of EL&I), there was
clearly a period of media attention: in May and June 2011. Between August and November
2011, after some time of relative quietness, the topic came back again into the news
abundantly. In almost half of the coverage, there was talk about risks and safety of shale gas
production (see figure 5).
Figure 5: mentioning of risks or safety and a combination of risk and safety in the total of
articles on shalegas in Trouw, NRC, Telegraaf en Volkskrant (1 is feb 2011).
18
Four frame shifts
The qualitative analysis of these newspaper articles, the policy documents and interviews
demonstrates that four frame shifts occurred in this turbulent year (feb 2011 –feb 2012). As
we described above, there was a “starting frame” that was dominant. This frame was
uttered mostly by the Minstry of Economic Affairs, experts of TNO and Caudrilla. This
starting frame was contested in four steps that were critical moments in the debate. These
were moments at which the interpretation of the issue altered, and to some extend the
rules of decision making were being questioned.
At this point we would like to acknowledge that is difficult to determine when a frame is
dominant and when a shift occurs. However, from the qualitative analyses – methods
describe above – we established when new interpretations (of facts) entered the debate
that also altered the (dominant) framing of the policy issue of drilling for shale gas in the
Netherlands.
Frame 0: Business as usual and no risks
The dominant frame at the very early stages of Dutch decision making on shale gas - frame 0
- was that drilling for shale gas is nothing new. Civil servants of the ministry of economic
affairs, the Minister, the experts of TNO, Cuadrilla and the local town council and town
board in Boxtel were following normal procedures for exploration and zoning/planning
permits for gas drilling. They were the actors that all were convinced that Shale gas was a
new energy source that might be very profitable (for the Netherlands) and had minimal risks
for the environment. The governmental actors in alliance with experts form TNO and experts
that had been hired by Cuadrilla were convinced that there might be shale gas available in
the Netherlands and that fracking to extract it was ‘nothing new’ and with ‘minimal risks’
(interview Ministry of EL&I 2012, interview Cuadrilla 2012, interview TNO 2012; interview
Alderman 2012).
Frameshift 1: Brabant is not the United States
The first media peak in spring 2011 coincides with an increased local and national debate.
Newspaper report of incidents with groundwater contamination by chemicals. They quote
19
USA newspapers and refer to incidents of groundwater contamination and to the
environmental impact studies presented in American media: “Recently, a variety of studies
has been presented in the American media, for example by the EPA (the environmental
watchdog of the US government), that warn about the methods being used for drilling. In
addition, a study, published last week, shows drinking water near boreholes in Pennsylvania
and New York contains high concentrations of methane” (Trouw, May 19, 201114). In
addition other studies prove that there is methane detected in drinking water by Osborn et
al that published this in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences: “A group of
U.S. scientists indicates herein that drinking water sources within a distance of one kilometer
from a drilling spot contain high levels of methane. These levels are so high that there is a
danger of explosions” (NRC, May 12, 2011).
Moreover, the journalists quote local protestors from the communities Haaren and Boxtel.
These protesters point out that there is a great deal of differences between the United
States and Brabant. The US might be more well-equipped to have fracking activities in
contrast to the densily populated province of Brabant in the south of the Netherlands: “The
studies all indicate that drilling for shale gas is really bad for the environment”, says Willem
Jan Atsma, chairman of Shale Gas Free Haaren (Trouw, March 24, 2011). Besides, he argues,
this is “no place for drilling for shale gas. It distorts nature and we don’t know the effects
that all these chemicals can have on our drinking water. There is a large drinking water basin
nearby. We are not America. Brabant is densely populated. All studies prove that the drilling
is simply not safe: radioactive substances, chemicals or gas explosions; these are all
consequences of the shale gas drilling” (Trouw, March 24 2011).
Hence, in this first peak in the debate, mostly local protesters and some environmentalists
(and journalists that report) express doubts about safety, and they point out environmental
risks of fracking techniques. This doubt is mostly based on incidents and some two US
reports on methane and drinking water contamination. The Energy Council, the Dutch
Energy Company (EBN), Dutch experts on the geological structure of the Netherlands TNO,
14
In the same period of time Howarth et al 2011 published an article on the emissions of methane (that impact
the greenhouse warming) when drilling for shale gas in comparison to other energy sources, such as natural gas
or coal. This was contested by Hughes et al (2011) who claim that shale gas has less greenhouse emissions.
20
the Ministry of EL&I - the State Supervision of Mining (SodM) - respond to this news. They do
not refute that problems can arise, but their main argument is that these are all incidents.
Moreover, they argue that in the United States the circumstances regarding laws and
regulations, and the geological condition, are very different: “These problems (polluted
groundwater, TM) are known”, says Former de Haan of the Energy Council, who published
the report on unconventional gas last week. “But the Dutch environmental legislation really
differs from the American legislation. Our rules are adequate to prevent this kind of abuses
from occurring. Besides, the distance between the gas layer and the groundwater is much
larger, with several sealing layers between them” (VK February 2011).
In the media coverage in the spring of 2011 people against or at least with doubts about
fracking, report incidents and academic studies that demonstrate that hydraulic fracking is
unconventional and not without risks. They introduce new facts, they report incidents in the
US and they present a different frame to interpret hydraulic fracking for shale gas: in
Brabant it is not business as usual, it is risky. The ministry, TNO, Cuadrilla and the local
alderman point out that the Dutch legal system is different, and that the drilling practice is
different from the US. A discussion unfolds about the context of the drillings, in particular
about the geological context and about laws and regulations. The key point of the frame
shift is that Brabant cannot be compared with the United States on two fronts. First, the
environmental legislation in Europe is much stricter than in the US, and what happens in the
US is not possible in the Netherlands (interviews Cuadrilla 2012; interview TNO 2012,
interview Ministry ELI 2012).
Framing 2: With eyes wide open or green scare?
The second reframing emerges when it becomes evident that there is more contradicting
research on environmental impacts shale gas. This reframing of the issue – by journalists,
activists, and other stakeholders – takes place in the second peak of the media coverage. In
this peak, the controversy further develops. Local newspapers report about more and more
protest against shale gas, for example there is an anti- shale gas pick-nick and a petition
(Brabants Centrum, June 26, 2011, Brabants Centrum October 24 2011, Brabants Centrum
October 26 2011). The protest also becomes better organized. In October 2011, the protest-
21
group in Haaren ‘Schaliegasvrij Haaren’ got a sister in Boxtel (Meierij, January 18 2011,
Brabants Dagblad, January 19 2011).
This building up of resistance tandems with a decrease of the credibility of the data that
Cuadrilla presented, and a decline of believability of the research by TNO that was
commissioned by the Ministry. Both activists and scientists, question the data on safetyaspects and environment impact. Other experts now engage in the discussion as well. For
example, engineer Huub Vlerken from Boxtel, writes in a letter to the editor in the Brabants
Dagblad that “The impact of shale gas extraction and the risks for the environment are not
yet sufficiently identified. Instead of closing our eyes to this, it is better to face those risks,
and learn to deal with them as effectively as we can.” (BD June 29 2011). Likewise, the CDA
leader in the Haaren municipality, Jan Leijten, believes that there is a lack of information:
“First, there needs to be done solid research, for example a environmental-effect reporting.
One has to base something like this on facts, not on emotions” (BD June 24 2011). More
importantly, acknowledge scientists start to battle over the facts.
In this peak of media coverage but also in the increasing controversy, protesters do question
these reports because there are more reports in the Dutch media about American, Canadian
and British studies that empirically demonstrate risks associated with the drilling. For
example, researchers of Duke University found higher methane levels in the drinking water
near drilling wells. This research came on top of the earlier performed studies by, among
others, EPA (the environmental watchdog of the US government) (Volkskrant, May 11 2011;
NRC, May 12 2012; Trouw, May 19 2011). In addition, another alarming piece of news enters
the Netherlands, namely, that in Blackpool, England, in a short time two earthquakes have
been observed, that might be caused by the extraction of shale gas. In Blackpool, the drilling
is stopped en research is done on the causes of the earthquakes (Telegraaf, June 4 2011;
Volkskrant, June 3 2011; Brabants Centrum, May 31 2011).
However, a lot of these reports are contested and disputed. For example, researchers of
Carnegie Mellon University demonstrated that Howards analysis on Methane is “completely
incorrect” (De Telegraaf September 3 2011). Moreover, the knowledge of the condition of
the Dutch soil is still uncertain. This had consequences for the certainty about, first of all, the
22
amounts of shale gas available and accessible in the Netherlands. Experts disagree on the
volume of extractable gas resources. Herber and De Jager contest numbers that were being
produced by TNO and EBN (Trouw September 15 2011; Herber and De Jager 2010). On the
other hand, some media sources report that the expected gas reserves are being much
larger than expected previously (Meijerij June 17 2011)15. This uncertainty relates to the
question how much energy and financial revenues there is to be gained from fracking.
A second consequence of disagreement on the Dutch geological condition is that there is
disagreements of the impact of drilling on geological faults. This is relevant in two ways: the
possibility of contaminated drinking water and a chance of earth quakes. It depends on how
geological faults are running in the Dutch soil if the chances for contaminated drinking water
end earth quakes increases. According to one geologist, in the Netherlands the drilling will
be in deeper strata, and there is little chance of cracks that make it possible for chemicals to
enter the groundwater. In the Brabants Dagblad of May 26, Frank van Bergen of TNO states,
that “the chance is remote, that groundwater will be contaminated by shale gas drillings”.
Also, looking at the condition of the soil, there is a small chance of earthquakes. In a
background article in the Brabants Dagblad of June 3 2011, a TNO researcher is quoted. He
stated during a discussion meeting in Boxtel, that the chance of earthquakes in the
Netherlands by shale gas drillings is very small, and that there is no proof of a relation
between shale gas drilling and the earthquakes in Britain either. Other geologists are not
that certain (Interview van Huissteden, 2012). Breaking the shale layer produces, according
to some geologists, by definition ruptures of the shale layer that are influence on natural
faults. Moreover, there’s always a chance that polluted water will reach the groundwater. In
addition, Van Huissteden argues, Dutch soil is in any case more restless than in Britain, and
thence there is a higher risk of earthquakes (Interview Van Huissteden 2012, he now is a
member of the national protest group Schaliegas Vrij Nederland).
The scientific uncertainties become more prominent in this media peak, and two
interpretations of these uncertainties emerge: 1) they are nothing but “green scares” that
prevent technological innovations, or 2) these uncertainties should lead to more
15
In 2012 this is still uncertain, estimates of TNO and EBN are that there is about 200- 500 billion cubic meter
of gas (Zijp 2012).
23
cautiousness in decision making: we should keep our eyes wide open. An example of the
green scare interpretation can be found in the Telegraaf in which a journalist reports: “This
technological leap threatens to be blocked again by the usual green scare campaigns. Now
that the old pollution problems are solved (partially by ground breaking Dutch research),
green activists cling to studies like that by Robert Howard of Cornell University, who would
have demonstrated that with shale gas drillings there are released much more greenhouse
gases than for instance with mining (De Telegraaf September 3 2011). Consequently, in this
article, the scientific debate about methane is cited to be convincing about the extraction of
shale gas being useful and necessary, and by far not as polluting as is stated by the “green
scare campaigns”. Moreover, the author accuses activists of strategic behavior by stating
that “with the aid of such studies, one hopes to crush the debate on this promising new
source of energy” (De Telegraaf September 3 2011).
On the other hand, there is a group of, mostly environmental activists and provincial and
local governmental actors, that instead of interpreting the studies as a green scare, as they
were portrayed in De Telegraaf; the governing actors do not want to push the decision and
are willing to ‘keep their eyes open’ and they urge the national Minister to ‘put decision
making on hold’. The province of Brabant and the town council of Boxtel insist that the
Ministry of EAA&I and Cuadrilla will commission an independent research about the effects
of shale gas drilling on the environment (AD, May 27 2011; Volkskrant, May 26 2011; Meierij,
June 2 2011; Brabants Centrum, May 31 2011; Brabants Dagblad, May 11 2011). In June,
Cuadrilla answers this urgent request and hires Royal Haskoning and Oranjewoud to
translate the (positive) results of an investigation on their British drillings to the Dutch
situation. This study is to demonstrate the risks are limited. The Ministry does not directly
see the necessity of such an independent research, and believes in the first instance that
“the risks involved with such activities are covered in the Mining Law” (Verhagen in BD, June
9 2011). However, soon after that, the Ministry of EL&I also starts interpreting the
uncertainties – mostly about environmental impacts and risks - as a call to put decision
making on hold and keep the ‘eyes wide open’. A frame on environmental risks has gained
importance in the debate. The Ministry and other governmental actors can no longer
contend.
24
In this media peak, the debate on whether or not exploration and extraction of shale gas is
safe is less prominent. Coverings in the national, regional and local media especially concern
the hearing in the Parliament to better inform members of parliament about shale gas
production. Around this hearing, the call for an independent research – and as such for an
‘eyes wide open‘ frame is stronger and more consentient. There is an urge to apply the
precautionary principle (not in the judicial sense, but in common sense) : “Until there has
been an independent research, test drillings may not be done’, reads the unanimous
message of administrators and activists during the very crowded hearing on shale gas” (BD
September 15 2011). The rows are closing locally and provincially: “That is why our
standpoint is: ‘No shale gas, unless research demonstrates that no damage to people and
the environment is done, and that the social and economic need for shale gas is present.
Both are not yet demonstrated sufficiently”, is the standpoint of the Boxtel town council (BD
October 22 2011). The environmental risk frame has become more dominant in this stage of
the debate and more and more (governmental) actors are asking to be cautious. This call is
even stronger in the next stage.
Framing 3: Silver fleet (golden glory) or drop in the ocean?
In September 2011, the film GasLand is broadcasted on national television by the VPRO (VK
September 10 2011). This film has been on the internet since 2009 and had been
broadcasted by protesters at information meetings (for example in Boxtel by Schaliegas Vrij
Haaren). With an upcoming public hearing in the Dutch parliament, and a court ruling in Den
Bosch on the local zoning permit, media attention in autumn 2011 continued. Coverings in
the national, regional and local media especially concern the hearing in the Parliament to
better inform members of parliament about shale gas production.
Frames that developed in previous media peaks, continued to be present in the media
debate and elsewhere. However, there was an increase in debate about the volume of shale
gas that could be extracted, both among scientists and in the media16. This economic frame
16
In the US as well, there are uncertainties about this. The Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2010
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO 2010) says about this: “(T)he biggest questions are the size of the shale gas
resource base (which by most estimates is vast), the price level required to sustain its development, and
whether there are technical or environmental factors that might dampen its development”.
25
became more dominant in the (media) debate: the question was whether this will bring ‘the
silver fleet (golden glory)’ or is but a ‘drop in the ocean’. According to a German study,
published by European Parliament, shale gas extraction will, because of the limited reserves
in Europe, be a drop in the ocean in preventing energy shortage” (BD September 14 2011). It
is questioned if the costs of extracting shale gas will not be very high, and if “the limiting
rules, with thence higher drilling costs”, actually cause the shale gas not to be the promised
‘Golden Glory’ (BD September 14 2011). According to some experts and to Cuadrilla as well,
it is exactly these uncertainties about the volume of shale gas that make test drillings
required (see VK October 26 2011). The test drillings will be able to lift the uncertainties:
There is a great insecurity about the size of the gas fields, and about the effectiveness
of the drilling”. (..) “There is no other way to find this out than with a test drilling”
(geologist Van Bergen of TNO research centre in Trouw, September 15 2011).
The question is if costs of drilling for shale gas are not very high. It can be the limiting
rules and regulations that will make drilling costs go up, that may cause shale gas not
to be the ‘silver fleet’ 17 (BD 14 September 2011)
The question whether or not sufficient extractable gas recourses exist, and if the costs of the
extracting of this gas weighs against the benefits, is a shift from the debate over risks and
safety toward a debate about the utility and necessity of gas extraction. Up till now, the
environmental risks were proven to be more uncertain than was believed by governmental
actors and experts in previous stages. Now, the economic benefits have come under siege
too.
October 25 2011, the administrative judge in ‘s Hertogenbosch decided that test drillings for
shale gas in the municipality of Boxtel are not allowed to proceed (Meierij, October 25 2011;
Meierij October 26 2011 AD, October 26 2011). The argument is procedural: a temporary
17
“Ook is maar de vraag of de kosten van het winnen van schaliegas niet erg hoog zullen liggen, en juist de
‘beperkende regels met daardoor hogere boorkosten’ er voor zal zorgen dat schaliegas geen ‘zilvervloot’ is (BD
14 september 2011; Peakoil november 2011[1])
[1] http://www.peakoil.nl/2011/11/23/gegoochel-met-gas/
26
permit does not fit with the long term agreements between the municipality and the
Cuadrilla company.
Around the time of the public hearing in the parliament, and the court ruling, the call for an
independent research – and as such for an ‘eyes wide open‘ frame became stronger and
more consentient. There was an urge to apply the precautionary principle (not in the judicial
sense, but in common sense) by all sorts of actors, including local governments: “Until there
has been an independent research, test drillings may not be done’, reads the unanimous
message of administrators and activists during the very crowded hearing on shale gas” (BD
September 15 2011). The rows are closing locally and provincially: “That is why our
standpoint is: ‘No to shale gas, unless research demonstrates that no damage to people and
the environment is done, and that the social and economic need for shale gas is present.
Both are not yet demonstrated sufficiently”, is the standpoint of the Boxtel town council (BD
October 22 2011).
Under influence of the frame shift – from safe to ‘might be risky’ - Minister Verhagen
decided that the drillings should be put on hold. He commissioned an independent research
that was to maps the environmental risks of unconventional gas production: “The drilling for
shale gas will, for now, be kept in the fridge for a year. A real independent research will take
place first on all dangers of horizontal drilling with toxics and explosions”(BD November 2,
2011). Hence, the ministry altered its strategy from contending the idea that there might be
environmental risks to problem solving: trying to establish if there are risks.
Framing 4: ‘Utility and necessity’ (shale gas as a transition fuel?)
The Ministry announced that it was going to commission an independent research. Hence, in
this stage media-coverage mostly was about the procedure of how to get a good
independent research. First of all, the independence of TNO was under siege. Activists
claimed it is too close to the Ministry, and, even worse, to companies (Public Information
Meeting with the Boxtel town council, Februari 2012; interview Atsema; Van Huissteden). It
was out of the question that TNO would conduct the investigation. Indeed, they were not
the once who are currently conducting the study. It is Witteveen + Bos (and the
subcontracted Arcadis Nederland b.v. en Fugro-Ecoplan b.v.). Witteveen + Bos also
27
conducted a similar study for the European Commission (in this case W+B was subcontracted
by AEA).
Next to the questioning of the procedure of decision making, a fourth new framing of the
policy issue was covered in the media debate but also came up in the consultancy meetings
and in interviews: utility and necessity of shale gas. Environmental organizations, interest
groups and politicians want to include a “nut and noodzaak” (utility and necessity) of shale
gas part of the research agenda. This means that not only (technical) environmental risks
should be included in the decision making (on the issuing of a permit), but that should also
be investigated if the Netherlands need shale gas as a transition fuel to more sustainable
energy production; and if economic benefits weigh against environmental costs (short term
and long term). Some of the activists, represented by the Gelderse Milieufederatie, wrote a
letter that contained issues that should be on the research agenda on risks of shale gas and
coal bed methane extraction. They claimed, for example, that next to immediate
environmental risks; also short term and long term effects should be included in this
investigation; the costs of mitigation in case of incidents with shale gas drilling; the
estimated revenues; effects of unconventional gas drilling on other economic activities in
the area, for example on tourism, agriculture and on the housing market; effects on the
carbon footprint. They propose to work with alternative scenario’s for energy production,
for example thermo-warmth (Brief Gelderse Milieufederatie 7 November 2011).
In response, the Minister wrote that there will be a consultation round for which the
Milieufederatie will be invited, and also that ‘some of the aspects are too broad for the
investigation, which is meant to help the Minister – as a permitting authority - decide on this
issue and to help weigh risks and effects to mitigate those, in case necessary’ (Ministerie van
EL&I December 2011 Brief aan Gelderse Milieufederatie). The Ministry of Economic Affairs
first consulted all stakeholders to co-determine what research questions should be on the
agenda of the independent research, and what researcher could conduct the studies. Then
they installed a sounding board consisting of representatives of these stakeholder groups.
These together with the Ministry decided on the research agenda and on the experts to
conduct this investigation (Ministry of EL&I Final research agenda 2012; observation
consulting meeting feb 2012). The content of this letter was also reported in the local media:
28
“To minimize every appearance of entanglement of interests, this research should be let out
in contract on European level, based on a number of in advance formulated requirements on
experience, scientific integrity and independence”, writes the Gelderse Milieufederatie
(GMF) to Verhagen (BD November 8 2011).
Hence, the Ministry wants to limit the research to a study of environmental risks and safety
issues and refuses to “broaden [the study] to utility and necessity of this unconventional
energy production” (Brabants Dagblad, November 10 2011; Interview Ministerie EL&I;
interview Atsema; interview TNO; interview Van Huissteden 2012). As the Minister explains:
“This should be weighed by politics. This is not a case for a research agency. I only want to
know if this can be done safely.” (Minister Verhagen in Brabants Dagblad November 10
2011).
Here, Minister Verhagen clearly draws a line around what belongs to the domain of politics
and what to research18. Hence, the Ministry of Economic Affairs agrees that risks and safety
are indeed valid arguments to be precautious about hydraulic fracking for shale gas;
however, the question if there is enough shale gas that can be extracted should not be part
of the independent research because it belongs to the domain of policy making (Ministry of
EL&I Preliminary research agenda May 2012). Up till today, the discussion about the
independency of the researchers and the scope of the agenda is still unsolved.
4. Conclusions
In the Netherlands, hydraulic fracking for shale gas extraction became controversial over the
last couple of years. In this paper we reconstructed the Dutch decision making process, and
described how this policy conflict developed. This reconstruction was based on an analysis of
policy documents, interviews, group interviews and a media analysis. We distinguished four
periods in decision making: first there was the issuing of a national exploration permit;
second there was a stage of local permit issuing; third stakeholders involved went to court
(to contest the local permit); and fourth, societal conflict emerged. An interesting finding in
this reconstruction is that the first three stage demonstrated that the permitting process
18
Other research in STS demonstrates similar shortcomings of dominant models of scientific risk governance,
which marginalize alternative visions of, for example, rural livelihoods and sustainable food production (Kinchy
2012).
29
was ‘business as usual’ for governmental actors, the civil servants, and experts they hired.
The normal decision making and permitting procedures were being followed for gas
extraction. It was only after the national exploration permit and the local zoning/planning
permit were issued, that local protests became more severe and that a public hearing was
organized by the members of parliament and. It was only then, that governmental actors
together with experts on this issue, were being challenged.
From our reconstruction we derive that during the normal permitting process the ministry and this was being followed by the local town board and civil servants of Boxtel - were
contending the public, and especially protesters of the limited risks of fracking. They were
mostly sending out information that confirmed their ‘starting frame’ that there is “nothing
new” and there are limited risks that can be mitigated. However, in the course of time
(about a year) the Ministry moved to a strategy of problem-solving and announced an
independent research that included a collaborative agenda-setting process and the erection
of a sounding board. In the same year, the municipality of Boxtel moved from trying to
contend the public and protesters and following the Ministry and its information, to
contending the ministry and claiming an independent research was necessary. Moreover,
the town council declared the town of Boxtel ‘Shale gas Free’.
In the second part of this paper, we explained how this change in strategy was (made)
possible due to frame shifts. The public and governmental actors altered the way they
perceived this policy problem. The “starting” frame was that there were hardly any risks
involved in hydraulic fracking. This was nothing out of the ordinary in a gas land such as the
Netherlands. The arguments were that shale gas might bring this country more revenues and
keep the country independent of other gas resources such as Russia for a longer period of
time. Moreover, environmental risks were limited and manageable. This type of gas drilling
was nothing new, and applied before, as the drilling company argued (which was repeated
by the Ministry and others).
However, reporting of international, media coverage and pointing out of mostly US incidents
and environmental impact studies by activists contributed to the emergence of the societal
controversy and reporting of scientific uncertainties. Both internet footage such as Gasland
but also scientific studies demonstrated the environmental risks of these horizontal drilling
30
techniques (EPA dec 2011; Tyndall 2011). These incidents and the developing of other
scientific evidence of possible risks was picked up by the media and by activists. They caused
four frame shifts in the interpretation of the policy issue.
A first shift occurred when local activists, in alignment with local politicians, but also
environmental organizations and two Members of Parliament started to challenge the initial
frame of the Ministry, experts from TNO and of the local town board of Boxtel. These
protesters introduced an environmental risk frame, and claimed that Brabant is not the
United States. Based on incidents from the USA (including those reported in the internet
documentary Gasland) they claimed that there are risks. This environmental risk frame
became more dominant in second period due to the emergence of more scientific
controversy on environmental studies that demonstrated risks for the quality of ground
water and drinking water and the possibility of earth quakes. This lead to the question if
there should be a more cautious approach, or that these reports were just a “green scare”?
New facts on possible environmental damage were being interpreted in these two ways.
But, the ‘eyes wide open’ idea that governmental actors should be cautious become more
dominant. In the third stage, environmental risks were still part of the debate but emphasis
lay on the economic framing of the issue: the question became if the amount of shale gas to
be produced would be economically viable. This was due to a scientific controversy between
experts that questioned if there is enough shale gas in the Netherlands to have a lucrative
production (Herbert en De Jager, 2010). The linkage of the environmental risk frame to this
economic uncertainty frame – made it even harder for local and national decision makers to
contend others of limited risks.
In the last stage that we studied, the environmental risk frame – supported by the economic
uncertainty - had become dominant. The Ministry of Economic Affairs claimed that
environmental risks needed to be studied in order to make an informed decision on the
permits being granted to drilling companies. Therefore, an independent research was
commissioned. However, this caused protester to challenge the limitedness of the
environmental risk framing. They introduced a new frame: the environmental and economic
necessity framework. This frame questions the economic and environmental benefits in the
short and long term and if these are balanced. Can shale gas be a transition fuel to
sustainable energy or not? Next to a questioning of the independence of the researchers
31
that should conduct the independent study, this framing contests the scope of the research
agenda and claims that is too narrowly focused on environmental risks. It should include
economic costs and benefits and environmental costs and benefits in the long run.
The debate is not over yet. The results of the independent research will be presented soon
(July 2013). Probably the outcome will be that there are risks but that these can be
mitigated. But, this does not answer the question of necessity and desirability. Probably
there will be debate about the independence of the research and about the scope of the
agenda: it is not based on local data and it does not include studies of economic viability, nor
environmental and economic outlooks in the long term. However, the ministry as a
permitting authority formally does not need to take those questions into account. From the
standpoint that this is the function of the Ministry, those are indeed questions that need to
be dealt with through a political decision making procedure. Will the Ministry start
contending again, or engage in problem solving, remains the question. Local communities
are yielding at the moment.
This analysis demonstrates that a linkage of a study of strategies for dealing with conflict to a
frame analysis provides more information about the reasons why conflict develops, and why
specific strategies are being applied. The framing of the problem does not only determine
the solution, it does determine the strategies of decision makers, activists and others.
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(Dhr. Van de Wiel)
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38
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Brabants Dagblad 28 februari
Brabants Dagblad, 11 mei 2011
Brabants Dagblad 19 mei 2011
Brabants Dagblad 3 juni
Brabants Dagblad 9 juni 2011
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Brabants Dagblad, 8 november 2011
Brabants Dagblad 10 november 2011
39
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Meierij, 18 januari 2011,
Meierij, 2 juni 2011
Meijerij 17 juni 2011
Meierij, 25 oktober 2011;
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NRC 10 feb 2011 en
40
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Volkskrant 7 januari 2012
41
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