3rd Counterintelligence Team - Marine Corps Counterintelligence

Transcription

February 2013
3rd
Counterintelligence Team
AKA
3rd Communications Integration Team
AKA
Tuan Ba Phan Tinh Bao My
Republic of Vietnam
I Corps
Da Nang
1967-1971
By Former SSgt. Thomas W. Dunn
DUNN
720
Do not distribute without approval of author or MCCIA.
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FOREWARD
This small part of History was determined by the brave U. S. Marines who served with
the 3rd Counterintelligence Team in Vietnam from 1967-1971. This documentary
includes information from oral accounts and supporting evidence found in Appendix A. I
want to thank all of the contributors of photographs, documents, fitness reports, and
personal accounts or any other documentation provided. I also want to thank those U. S.
Marines listed on page 78 who took the time to review and edit the document.
Christel, my wife, I love you and thank you for your help in editing this material and
your patience, especially when I worked nights.
This documentary is dedicated to those who fought for Freedom in Vietnam, especially
those who paid the ultimate sacrifice for the United States of America, including the
following friends listed by rank:
WO.
SSgt.
Sgt.
Pfc.
S. Godwin
R. Scott
D. McRae
G . Strong
KIA Vietnam
KIA Vietnam
KIA Vietnam
KIA Vietnam
1968 CAS/CIT/ Hue
1970 5th CIT/DaNang
1968 1st CIT/Phubai
1968 1st Marines
May they rest in Peace!
President Ronald Reagan said it best, “Most people wonder if they have completed the
destiny that they were put on earth for. U. S. Marines do not have that concern!”
Amen.
What I realize and regret today is that I could have accomplished a great deal more for
and in the Lord’s Name.
Former SSgt. Thomas W. Dunn
USMC 1963-73
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Table of Contents
I. MISSION .. ………………………………...
Page 4
II. FACILITIES …..…………………………
Page 6
III.
PERSONNEL/LOCATIONS …...................
Page 9
IV.
BACKGROUND……………………….....
Page 12
OPERATIONS 1967…..………………..…
Page 17
VI. WAR-TET Vietnam………………….…….
Page 18
V.
VII.
OPERATIONS
1968 …………………….
Page 20
VIII.
OPERATIONS
1969 …………………
Page 29
IX.
OPERATIONS
1970 ……………….....
Page 34
X.
OPERATIONS
1971 ………………… .
Page 57
CREDIT AIR/GROUND SUPPORT..........
Page 64
XI.
XII. CREDITS for SUB-TEAM and ASSETS ........ Page 66
XIII. TEAM AWARDS/CREDIT................................ Page 67
XIV. CONCLUSION................................................... Page 68
Appendix A. List of References
Appendix B. Members of 3rd CIT
Appendix C. VN Cross of Gallantry
Appendix D. Bronze Star Citation/V
Appendix E. Picture captured NVA medal
Appendix F. Grunts Get Credit for Sub-team C, 3rd CIT Work
Appendix G. Sex and Aerodynamics Operation by 3rd CIT/5thMar
Appendix H. Response to Appendix G. by Capt. Roos, 3rd CIT/68
Appendix I. Cam Sa/VC District III Operation Article May 2012
Appendix J. Email concerning 4 August 70 op above
Appendix K. Silver Star For 2/1 BN Cmdr, Col. Leftwich, Jr. same op.
Appendix l. Letter Bill McClenthian 2011
Appendix M. Letter Gary Nalley 2011
“Notes” Updates include Sub-team (1) or C. 27th Marines and 2/1 actions
1968-1971 that could be located. Spt Rpts
Any CIT noted actions with 7th Marines 3rd CIT TAOR. 1968-1970 Spt Rpts
Any noted CIT actions with 5th Marines 3rd CIT TAOR 1968-1971 SptRpts
Appendicies G through K were added.
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Picture of Capt. Roos, page 60 and 3rd CI Team members page 66 were added.
I. MISSION
The mission of the 3rd Counterintelligence Team (3rd CIT) during the Vietnam War
was a two edged sword. First, the 3rd CI Team provided intelligence to higher
Headquarters pertaining to any threats directed against American Forces and the
Republic of South Vietnam Units by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet
Cong (VC) Guerrilla Units. Secondly, its mission was to identify, locate and
neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in the shadow Government supported
by North Vietnam. This in later years was the primary task. Reference (1) pp.
(1-2)
Fig. 1 3rd CIT Plaque with Motto
(Provided by SSgt. Tom Dunn)
The Republic of South Vietnam was organized as Provinces, Districts, Cities, Villages,
and Hamlets. The North Vietnam’s Central Office of South VN (COSVN) and National
Liberation Front (NLF) placed autonomous VCI Cadre at Province, District, City,
Village and Hamlet levels to undermine the South VN Government’s effort to win the
hearts of the people.
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The CI Team conducted cordon and search operations aimed at blocking infiltration
routes, destroying food and weapons caches, denying the ability for rocket attacks, and
capturing and utilizing enemy sources. The Secret VC Infrastructure (VCI) Cadre in the
shadow governments were designated as targets by the 3rd CIT. The CIT also recruited
informants, and processed intelligence reports on NVA order of battle and VCI cadre.
The CIT supported American units against NVA ongoing operations. CI personnel
briefed all support units and higher HQs on NVA order of battle, unit locations, planned
operations and all CI Operational matters and initiated tactical raids and operations
against the NVA and VCI. Figure (2) is a captured Tax Receipt from the NLF, VCI Tax
Collector, to a villager. Reference (1) pp. (1-3) Some 3rd CIT operations included
participation by Vietnamese National and Special Branch Police who assisted in screening
and control of villagers.
Fig. 2 Captured VC Tax Receipt
Prior to 1968 CI Personnel were assigned to the various District Headquarters by the
Division G-2. Some of the Districts included Dien Ban, Hoa Vang, Hieu Duc, Dai Loc,
Duc Duc, Duy Xuyen and An Hoa. Reference (2) p. (2)
Fig. 3 Dai Loc (D) Headquarters, Quang Nam (P)
(Provided by Sgt. Stephen Shea)
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The CI Team personnel supporting the Phoenix Program assisted in defining the CI
Team role in Vietnam. In the Spring 1968, most all CI personnel attached to the
District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC’s) were moved back into
CI teams and Sub-teams to bring teams in line with the required staffing levels. At the
height of the Vietnam War, the USMC CI Team personnel reached nearly 285 men. In
comparison in Iraq and Afghanistan CI personnel exceeded 500 personnel. Reference (3)
Fig 4. Phoenix Logo - Name Changed after Program Identified in Media
II. FACILITIES
The 3rd CI Team was located on the Da Nang Airfield, about 300 yards inside the gate
from Dog-patch. The sign in front of the Headquarters read 3rd Communications
Integration Team. Notice the Jeeps had no ID in the yellow shields on them. CI
Personnel had prices on their heads anyway, and were not going to point ourselves out to
the VC. Even though it is possible that the the absence of ID was a clue also. The
Compound was L shaped.
Fig. 5 1st Building right Supply/Cell. Building left, Officers Qtrs.
(Provided by Capt. Charles Bushey)
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The bottom corner of the L included the Team Commander, Team Chief and Clerical
personnel offices. The short side of the L included the Club, and two buildings for
enlisted sleeping quarters. Nick named “Gums” because of chewing Beatle Nut!
Fig. 6 Red Eye Lounge (later Phantom Club). 1 tick=1Beer. “Gums”
behind the Bar was the house mouse. (Provided by Sgt. Steve Shea)
The shower was a hot item, just no hot water!
Fig. 7 3rd CIT Shower, Da Nang 1969
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The Staff CI Office was located at Division Headquarters. Staff CI was responsible for
the Kit Carson Scout Program and VIP Funds. The Kit Carson Scout Program provided
scouts for various units of 1st MarDiv, usually former VC.
Fig. 8 Staff CI Office
Building materials and entertainment liquids (booze) were hard to come by. Thanks to
the US Air Force next door, certain Team Chiefs (Dick Gordon and Jim Krudwig) took
care of the entertainment liquids. Some Big Brother friends also provided entertainment,
below are two CI Members with Bob Martin who worked for RMI Construction.
Fig. 9 SSgt. Tom Dunn, Mr. Bob Martin, and SSgt. Jim Van Atten
( Provided by SSgt. Tom Dunn)
SSgt. Bill Evans was assigned temporarily to the Team Headquarters (after being
wounded) as a “Scrounger” and was collecting VC artifacts, and WO. Bill
McClenithan had a locker full of 30 cal. Carbines to trade with the Air Force for
materials. They recruited the interpreter’s spouse to make VC flags that were placed
in a burn barrel of dirt and ashes and turned to give them that used look. The flags
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were traded for materials, wood, tin, booze and other needed items. Entrepreneurship at
it’s finest! Reference (4) p. (2)
SSgt. Ralph Jarvis and Sgt. Tom Dunn shared a hooch with the Interrogation and
Translation Team (ITT) at 27th Marines. The ITT were assigned responsibility for
interrogating regular force NVA POW’s. CI did the VC/VCI interrogations and prepared/
maintained VCS Blacklist. CI also interrogated POW’s for information relative to
knowledge of VC/VCI or if ITT was not available.
At any rate the quarters was too small and Sgt. Bill Roth came out to the compound on
loan and He and Sgt. Dunn were tasked by GySgt. Jack Latham to build a hooch for the
Sub-team at the 27th Marines. GySgt Latham said he didn’t want to see them until it
was finished. SSgt. Jarvis was believed to have been on RR. Based on the results of
that assignment, neither Sgt. Dunn nor Sgt. Roth decided to make a career in residential
construction, even though the hooch did not leak and served us well. Reference (5) p. (3)
III. PERSONNEL AND LOCATIONS
In 1967/68 the Team Commander was Capt. Jerry Bunting who returned to the U.S.
when Capt. Ken Werbinski (1968) replaced him. Capt. Bunting was highly respected
because of his support of the troops. Reference (2) p. (2) The Team consisted of
approximately 12 CI personnel not counting clerical help. Later teams consisted of 15
CI personnel not including clerical. Other Team Commanders who signed fitness
reports included Capt. Hassler (/69), Capt. Charles Bushey (1969/70), Capt. Phillip
Roos (1970/71), Capt. William Knipper (1970/71), Capt. Bruce Moulton and Capt. Russ
Schroyer (1971). Reference (6) pp. (1-26) Visitors from Teams up North were a
common occurrence.
Fig. 11 Lt. Pete Shea Brother visiting CI.
Fig. 12 Unk Sgt., SSgt. Ford, and
SSgt. Salmon.
(Provided by Sgt. Stephen Shea)
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Sub-team Alpha ( WO. Bill McClenithan, Sgt. Bill Evans, GySgt. Jack Latham, and the
interpreter SSgt. Swan) was located with the 1st Bn / 7t h Marines at Hill 10. WO.
McClenithan had commandeered Sgt. Stephen Shea’s 3/4 ton truck to mount a 50 Cal.
Machine Gun in the bed of the truck. When the 50 Cal. was fired, the wheels on the
truck actually bounced up and down. The truck bed ripped up and had to be reinforced
with 1/2 to 3/4 inch steel plates. Still bounced up and down though! Reference (2) p. (8)
Fig.13 Hill 10, Sub-team Alpha
(Picture courtesy of Marzone Website/Vilionis)
Sub-team Bravo (WO. Andy Anderson, Sgt. Stephen Shea and SSgt. Tran Van Be, the
VN Marine Interpreter) was located near Dai Loc( D) on Hill 37, in support of 3rd Bn/7th
Marines. Reference (2) p. (9)
Fig. 14 Hill 37, Sub-team Bravo
(Picture courtesy of Marzone Website/Vilionis)
Sub-team (1) or C was located with 27th Marines, 7th Marines , and later 1st Marines at
Cau Ha, and then at Marble Mountain, with 3rd Marine Amphibious Brigade (3rd MAB).
The mild mannered interpreter was SFC. Nguyen Ha, a VN Marine. SSgt. Ralph Jarvis,
never saying much at all, was a good Sub-team Commander. Sgt. Tom Dunn was in the
learning mode in early March 1968. Messrs. Thanh, Anh, and Thanh #2 were three
key sources of info for Sub-team (1) or C. Thanh was a former VC from the village
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about ½ mile from the compound. Anh was a former VC in the Dodge City area and
had relatives still living there. Thanh #2 was a new Hoi Chanh from VC District II, near
Hi Way One. 1st Marines took over this area in ‘May- June’ 1968. Reference (7)
Fig. 15 Cau Ha Combat Base / 2nd Battalion 1st Marines
(Picture courtesy of VWIP Website/ Vaughn)
Sub-team Delta, consisting of GySgt. Joe Fitzgerald, Sgt. Bill Roth and later Sgt. Bill
Evans, located at An Hoa Combat Base. Reference (5) p. (2)
Fig. 16 An Hoa Combat Base, Sub-team D
(Picture courtesy of Marzone Website /Vilionis )
Other members of the 3rd CI Team during 1968-1971 were Team Chiefs, MSgt. Bill
West (68) and MSgt Joe Fitzgerald (68), Team Chief, GySgt. Julian Martinez, later acting
Team Chief (68/69), SSgt. Bill Steen, SSgt. Jim Van Atten, and SSgt. J. Bowen.
GySgt. John Merk. MSgt. Dick Gordon (69/70) and MGySgt. Jim Krudwig (70-71)
were Team Chiefs. The 3rd Team had some of the most effective Team Chiefs during
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1969-71. GySgt. Bill Ledford was acting Team Chief, after MGySgt. Krudwig went on
emergency leave in April 1971. Reference (8)
Fig. 17 3RD CI Team Picture taken December 1970.
SSgt. T. Dunn (photo insert in the corner) on home leave Dec. 1970. Back Row Lt. D. McWhorter, MGySgt. J. Krudwig, Middle - SSgt. J. Van Atten, Clerk, Sgt.
G. Nalley, Clerk, Sgt. P. Smith- Front Row - Standing - WO. W. McClenithan,
MSgt. L. Lee, GySgt. B. Ledford, Sgt. D. Moen, WO. D. Braund, Front RowKneeling- Lt. T. Marino, SSgt. D. Jasinski, SSgt. H. Sprinkel, Capt. B. Knipper,
and Sgt. S. Lusk.
IV. BACKGROUND
Climate
Vietnam was hot in the summer, with temperatures exceeding 100+ degrees. The roads
were dusty and often had to be oiled, which made them very slick. It was cold during
the monsoon season at night especially when Marines on patrols were wet in the field.
The changing temperatures rose as the day unfolded. Monsoon season brought flooding
to all outlying areas of DaNang, up to 18ft. and 6 ft. above bridges, producing slick,
muddy, dangerous roads. The ever present booby traps were hazardous in both seasons
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and caused patrols to slow to a snail’s pace. Most patrols and operations occurred in the
morning when the troops were fresh and the weather cooler. Marines in the field built
“lean to” shelters on the side of hills to help the water drain off. References (8) and (29)
Fig. 18 Marine Quarters, “lean to” on side of hill.
(Provided by Marzone Website/Vilionis)
Fig. 19 Oiled Road
Fig. 20 Monsoon Floods
(CourtesyMarzone.MillerVWIP)
30 Nov 1970/ 5th Marines Monsoon flooding Dien Ban (D), Hoi An rising 3 inches per
hour. Nong Son 21 ft above normal. Hills Hills. 10, 37, 65, 17.5 Ft above normal.
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The VC traveled to the Mountains or higher ground during Monsoon season, and those
that remained paid a price. Helicopters and Marine patrols were known to shoot VCI
drying out in trees when their tunnels had flooded. The flooding made the ARVN and
U.S. patrols vulnerable to ambushes as they navigated the flooded paddies. Snakes and
other critters also posed a danger to patrols in the high water. Especially in the tunnels
where the VC would often place poisonous snakes, scorpions, and booby-traps at the
tunnel entrances. The “tunnel rats” equipment included a flashlight, a pistol, one or two
grenades, and sometimes ear plugs, (typically filters off cigarettes). Those tunnels were
complicated networks housing from 2 to 10,000 VC or NVA. In the dry season Subteam C liked to use helicopters for surprise on significant operations especially after
lunch when the VC were taking a rest in the tunnels and bunkers. Large scale tunnels as
below seldom flooded. NVA/VC and VC suspects were screened against Blacklist,
interrogated by CI, and placed in ARVN/US Military Detention Facilities. In fact, Capt.
Roos, 3rd CIT Commander, was chewed out by Div. G2 because Sub-team C was
sending all their prisoners to DNSS. This was done because of a quick turnaround and
many captured NVA/VC led Allied Forces to capture other VC/VNA, and to find tunnel
complexes, weapons and food caches. References (16) and (17)
Fig. 21
Underground NVA Tunnel Conference Room.
(Provided By Wikipedia Website)
Vietnamese People
The War with the VC had been going on since 1954. The Vietnamese were a humble,
friendly, outspoken people. Many Americans made a mistake by underestimating that
humility as weakness. Vietnam contended with the French and then the Americans. The
peasants not wanting war continued to work the fields with the shooting, artillery, booby
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traps, and bombs going off all around them. The peasants sided with the U.S. troops
during the day and had to take VC reeducation classes during the night. The “Invaders”
were the foreigners who were there to take their land. The VC grilled this into the
villagers during the years the war progressed.
The Vietnamese farmers worshipped Budda and were tied to their ancestors through
reincarnation. Each home had a family shrine, and the families did not want to leave their
lands and burial places. If a Vietnamese owned a hectare of land with one or two pigs,
they were considered wealthy. The Buddhist Monks had a monastery at the base of
Marble Mountain, with the U.S. Marines located on top of the Mountain. There were so
many caves in Marble Mountain that it looked like a bee hive. The VC/NVA had the
largest hidden Hospital in Quang Nam (P) inside the mountain! The VC often disguised
themselves as Monks when moving around Marble Mountain. The Buddhist Monks
ignored the VC/NVA and the U.S. Forces did not bother the Monks for religious
correctness. Reference (14)
Fig.22 Marble Mountain
Fig. 23 Shrine guarding the mouth of cave.
( Photos courtesy Vets with a Mission/Ward)
Food
Vietnamese in the cities ate pretty much the same food as most of us. They still ate the
traditional foods with a western flair to them. Saigon used to be called the Paris of the far
east. Hue and Saigon were the most interesting cities. The villagers ate mostly rice with
Nuoc Mam (fermented minnows), rubarb potatoes, greens, and only on special occasions
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Fish or Pork. They also ate Rats, Monkey, Snakes, and Dog. The VC/NVA ate the same
types of food. The U. S. Marines on operations ate “C” rations packaged in 1948. The
troops were thankful to have Tabasco or Red Devil Hot Sauce because each made the
“C” rations tolerable. When in the rear, they enjoyed normal mess hall food and on
special occasions Steak and Lobster. Marines ate whenever and whatever they could to
forego “C” rations, as below in Fig 24. They also turned the helmet over to cook chili or
boil rice or greens.
Fig. 24 Innovative Marine cooking steak on top of his helmet/grill.
(Provided by Marzone Website/Vilionis)
Enemy
The VCI were most likely from the same Provinces, Districts, Villages or Hamlets in
South Vietnam where they formed the shadow governments. Most had gone North
when the new Demilitarized Zone was established and sent back as Cadre once the War
started. They used propaganda, blackmail, and terrorism to maintain a strong hold on the
local populace.
The NVA was used to further the cause of the War. For large engagements against the
U.S. the VCI smuggled sappers (saboteurs) into cities as soldiers in stolen uniforms, and
guided the NVA through areas that were unfamiliar to them. The VCI smuggled weapons
in coffins, under cargo on trucks, and under their clothing. They carried messages in
their clothes, body parts, and under rice in baskets. Initially the VCI depended on young
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males and females as Guerrilla Units to protect the VC Cadre that traveled extremely
light, most of the time in black pajamas. The VC’s support dwindled after TET 1968
and through 1970. The NVA mainly traveled the trails. Discoveries of bunkers, caves,
and hidden encampments along the trails increased with elevation. References (9) and
(29)
Fig. 25 Young NVA Soldiers behind the lines.
(Picture Courtesy of Vets With a Mission/Ward/Leroy)
V. OPERATIONS 1967
In 1967, Sgt. Stephen Shea had been assigned to the Dai Loc District ( D) Headquarters,
District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). Sgt. Shea stated
that during one attack by the VC on the District Headquarters, his Thompson
Submachine Gun and MACV’s Team 30 Cal. Machine Gun were the only ones not to
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jam at least once. SSgt. Tran Be was with Sgt. Shea during his entire tour. SSgt. Be was
dedicated and was believed to have been awarded the Silver Star, before joining the 3rd
CI Team. Reference (2 ) pp. (3-4)
Fig. 26 SSgt. Tran Be, Interpreter
(Picture provided by Sgt. Steve Shea)
Before an attack on the District Headquarters in late 1967, Sgt. Stephen Shea provided
information, including how the R20 NVA Battalion would attack the Dai Loc (D)
Headquarters and the escape routes. He rated the information B-2 and was reprimanded
for it by 3rd Bn/7th Marines S-3. The S-3 asked how Sgt. Shea got the authority to assign
a B-2 rating, who replied, “From the Commandant, Sir.” The S-3 had worked with the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) before Vietnam and accepted the evaluation. He
strategically placed tanks, helicopters, and C-130’s for that evening. The attack took
place as stated and the VC used escape routes as expected. The VC were devastated by
ARVN and U.S. Marines over the next couple of months and during Operation Foster.
Per reports the ARVN caught the R20 NVA Battalion by surprise in the open, after which
the ARVN stacked the dead VC like cords of wood. Reference (1) p. (43) Reference
(2 ) pp. (3-6)
The CI Marines provided security during the September 1967 National Elections for the
Republic of Vietnam at all District headquarters. Reference (2) p. (4)
Sgt. Stephen Shea provided security for U. S. Senator Edward Kennedy during his visit
to Dai Loc District in 1967. Reference (2) p. (5)
VI. WAR - TET Vietnam 1968
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During TET 1968 the NVA/VC attacked Hoi Vang District, the Bridge leading up to
the District Headquarters, Da Nang Airfield and many other locations.
Fig. 27 Major battles TET 1968
(Courtesy VWIP/Vaughn)
All 3rd CIT personnel supported the U.S. and ARVN forces that hindered the NVA/VC
attacks and withdrawal from Hoa Vang (D), Da Nang and other locations. Figure (27)
Hundreds of NVA/VC were KIA or captured. After TET the NVA activity was
virtually nonexistent around Da Nang where various Units (31st and 36th NVA , R-20
BN and others) remained in tunnels in the Cau Ha, Dodge City, Go Noi Area, Arizona,
and Que Son Mountain areas licking their wounds from TET. The 1st Mar Div. Marine
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units severely damaged elements of the NVA during the withdrawal and mop up after
TET 68 and the fall Offensive.
After reviewing thousands of Journal Entries those mentioning CIT from 1st Marines,
27th Marines, 5th Marines and 7th Marines Spot Reports for 1968-1971 within the
DaNang Tactical Area of Operations have been added to this history.
VII.
OPERATIONS 1968
Per Sgt. Dunn throughout early 1968 the locations around Goi Noi Island (Dodge City),
Hills 10, 37, 55 , 65, Namo and Liberty Bridges, plus the Arizona Area were crawling
with NVA. Most engagements were with NVA or a mix of NVA/VC. A search of 5th
and 7th Marine Spot Report Journals entries for 1968-1969 contained few entries of CI
involvement. The entries noting CI are included. There were many more for 5th Marines
supported by Sub-team D at An Hoa and 1st Marines, Sub-team C at 2/1 in ‘1970/71.’
Early 1968 Sgt. Steve Shea was sent to Hill 65 to talk to Capt. Charles Robb at 3rd Bn, 7th
Marines. Capt. Robb’s Father in Law was President Johnson. Sgt. Shea relayed to
Capt. Robb that CI was trained in rudiments of VIP protection. The Captain told Sgt.
Shea, “ I’m a Commander of a Marine Infantry Company surrounded by a company of
Marines. Please inform Da Nang that I want to command my Company and be treated
like any other Marine Officer.” Sgt. Shea and Capt. Robb had a good natured laugh,
and Sgt. Shea said to be completely safe Capt. Robb would have to return to 8th and I,
Washington, D.C. Capt. Robb completed a successful tour. Reference (2) p. (8)
In 1968, after debriefing a Hoi Chanh, WO. Andy Anderson and Sgt. Steve Shea were
instrumental in identifying an NVA operations area and placing artillery and air strikes
directly on the VC Forces. Many large secondary explosions were heard.
Fig. 28 Vietnam Air Force Providing Airstrikes
(Photo courtesy VWIP/ Vaughn)
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Fig. 29 Sgt. Steve Shea on Hill 37 S-2 Shop in the old French Bunker
(Provided by Sgt. Steve Shea)
On 12 February 1968, a 3rd Bn/7th Mar patrol acting on information from CIT at
948632 Pho Son (H) where enemy had buried 122 rocket observed 5 NVA/VC fleeing
area. Engaged enemy and 2VC/NVA were KIA and 1 VC/NVC POW taken to Hill 10.
Captured 2 AK-47’s, 1 Pistol. 4 cartridge belts and 6 NVA packs and other items. 3/7
Sptrpt Feb 1968
On 21 February 1968, Sub-team D was on patrol in the area surrounding Hill 10, Hieu
Duc District. SSgt. Swan tripped a Booby Trap, which wounded him and Sgt. Bill
Evans. Sgt. Evans said the blast looked like an orange basket ball when he saw it
explode. SSgt. Swan was very loyal and would do anything for WO. McClenithan,
who took a slight wound to his forearm from the blast. Per WO. McClenithan, he had
feared Sgt. Evans wouldn’t make it. Sgt. Evans was medivacked to Japan and returned
3 months later. Reference (4) p. (1)
On 8 April 1968, Sub-team C, (StCmdr SSgt. Jarvis, Sgt. Dunn SFC Ha), 3rd CIT, and
Platoon from K company conducted a sweep in the vicinity of BT085675. They located
2 large tunnels and large dispensary and destroyed same. Captured 2 chicom claymores,
1AK 47, 1 1/2 lb. C-4, along with assorted small arms ammunition and bandages and
clothing. 27th Mar Spt Rpt APR 68.
0n 20 April 1968, after Interrogation of a captured VC Cadre, Tax Collector, by SubTeam 1 (C), (StCmdr, SSgt. Jarvis, Sgt. Dunn, and SFC. Ha) revealed he had distributed
money to villagers of Ha Dong (2) to buy rice for the VC forces. The amount was over
50,000 P and he stated the ARVN forces had already confiscated about 30,000 P. SubTeam 1,(C), and a patrol from Fox Co. took the VC prisoner to Ha Dong (V) and
recovered another 10.500P. Reference 27th Marines spot rpt for April 1968.
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Fig. 30 This was a VC Tax receipt to a villager 1967
(Provided by SSgt. Dunn)
On 31 May 1968, Sub-team 1(C), (StCmdr, SSgt. Jarvis, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha) acting on
information from confidential source captured 1 VCI Cadre, a member of the A-14 Unit.
Returned prisoner to POW compound for further interrogation. 27th Mar spot rpt May
1968.
On 4 June 1968, Sub-team 1(C), (StCmdr, SSgt Jarvis, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha and Assets)
established roadblocks at various coordinates within 27 Marines TAOR. The Team
detained 8 VC suspects listed on the CIT Blacklist. Detainees were taken to the POW
Compound for further screening and interrogation. Ref 27th Mar Spt rpt June 1968.
On 12 June 1968, Sub-team 1, (C), (StCmdr, SSgt. Jarvis, Sgt. Dunn SFC. Ha) conducted
an operation during which SSgt. Ralph Jarvis, Sub-team 1, and the Team Chief, GySgt
Bill West led a Marine patrol from 27th Marines into the Go Noi Island, Aka: Dodge City
Area. Two sources pointed out tunnels where VCI were located. Upon removing the
Tunnel In Box (cover), voices were heard. SSgt. Jarvis and interpreter told them to come
out or be blown up. They ignored the warning, so a grenade was thrown into the tunnel.
The only problem was, the grenade and two others came back out, and 4 VCI followed.
The ITT Officer, Capt. Marshall, had requested permission from SSgt. Jarvis to
accompany the Sub-team on the Operation. SFC. Ha and Capt. Marshall chased the
VC over a booby trap; Capt. Marshall tripped it and was killed. Two VC were KIA
and one escaped and one was captured. Source Anh was wounded and medivacked, and
the next day Sub-team members visited Anh at the Hospital. Reference (7) 27th Mar spt
rpt June 1968
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Fig. 31 Marines crossing open rice paddies to Dodge City.
(Provided by Marzone website/Minner)
During June 1968, Sub team A consisted of WO. Bill McClenithan, Sgt. Bill Roth and
Sgt. Bill Evans. For about three days Sub-team A had not heard from its interpreter
SSgt. Swan. He routinely rode his bike to work the same route each day. Subsequent
investigation by Sgt. Evans and Sgt. Roth revealed that villagers saw the VC snatch him
off his bike and escort him away. He was never heard from again. WO. McClenithan
stated that SSgt. Swan told him he was going home and not coming back. Perhaps the
truth will never be known. Reference (10)
One evening about 5 pm in June or July 1968, SSgt. Ralph Jarvis asked Sgt. Tom Dunn
to take Mr. Thanh #2 home. SFC. Nguyen Ha and Anh rode along with them. Mr. Thanh
#2 lived about 200 yards from Highway 1, about 75 yards on the backside of Tu Cau
Hamlet. Sgt. Dunn asked did he want us to accompany him the last 50-75 yards to the
house, but Mr. Thanh said no because he felt as there were ARVN troops stationed in
the Hamlet. For security reasons, Sgt. Dunn asked him to reconsider moving closer to
the U. S. Marine compound. Sub-team members departed the area at dusk. Reference
(7)
About 8 am the following morning, intelligence revealed that Mr. Thanh #2 had been
assassinated during the night by members of the 2nd VC District, Da Nang. Elements
of the Sub-team and U.S. Marine escorts went to Mr. Thanh’s home. The VC had also
killed his pregnant spouse. Mr. Thanh #2 had been decapitated and his head was hung
outside, with a note warning anyone against working with the Americans and South
Vietnamese Government. It was a mess. Mr. Thanh’s head was placed back inside the
house and the body was turned over to family for burial. Late morning SSgt. Ralph
Jarvis upset, drove to the 3rd CI Team Headquarters and reported the incident. It was a
sad day. Because of this incident, the VC HQ’s, District II, Da Nang, VCI was put on
CIT’s target list. SSgt. Jarvis became suspicious of Source Anh after the death of Mr.
Thanh #2. Reference (7)
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Fig. 32 A Tunnel Rat placing satchel charges inside the tunnel to destroy it.
(Photo courtesy of VWIP/ Byrd Archives.)
SSgt. Jarvis departed for the U.S. around the first part of July 1968. SSgt. Steen replaced
him as Sub-team Commander. Not much is remembered about SSgt. Steen except that he
was not at the Sub-team much at night and went to Team Headquarters a lot. He seemed
to be a good Marine but had a reputation of being rowdy when partying, like most of us
Marines.
On 26 August 1968, Sgt. Dunn interrogated a prisoner who said she knew where two VC
were hiding in tunnels. She explained to Mr. ANH where the tunnels were located and
Anh said he knew the exact location. The tunnel was located in the Dien Ban District,
Go Noi Island area, nicknamed Dodge City by Marines because it was wilder than the old
west town. SSgt. Steen had gone to Team Headquarters and returned about lunch and was
briefed on the information. A U.S. Marine patrol from 27th Marines was organized and
upon arriving at the tunnel, the in-box type cover was removed with a rope by the CI SubTeam. Movement was detected, and Sgt. Dunn and Mr. Anh talked in Vietnamese with
the NVA/VC in the tunnel. Determining they were NVA with one wounded, Sgt. Dunn
successfully negotiated a hospital visit if they gave up. Sgt. Dunn searched the tunnel
and obtained a K54 Pistol, an SKS Rifle and a VC Flag. The two NVA were wounded
and were medivacked to NSA. References (8) and (11), p. (1) See Figure (53) for an
NLF Flag. The pistol was later given to a Marine CI/ W.O. to take home as a war
souvenir. It was to be returned to Sgt. Dunn when the WO. passed away. A replacement
was found as it was never returned.
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Fig. 33 Captured NVA K54 Pistol
(Provided by Marzone Vilionis)
One of the captured was an NVA Officer, wounded in the leg by 1st Marines during
TET, and the other was a malnourished Sergeant, who had been assigned to stay with the
Warrant Officer. Information was garnered that 1st Bn/31st NVA Regiment) was
located in Dodge City during TET and was decimated thereafter. During the medivac,
SSgt. Steen accompanied both prisoners to the Hospital. Sgt. Tom Dunn took the
patrol back to the 27th Marines compound. Reference (11)
The story goes that upon interrogating the prisoners at the Hospital, SSgt. Bill Steen
developed actionable information concerning VC elements at another location. He
proceeded to the area with Amtracs/Tanks. Unfortunately, his Amtrac/Tank hit a mine,
and he had to be Medivacked. No one understood why SSgt. Steen did not include the
rest of the Sub-team for that operation. Sgt. Tom Dunn had to call Team Headquarters a
day and a half later in an attempt to locate SSgt. Steen, who they thought was still at the
Hospital. SSgt. Dunn to this day believes there was something flaky about SSgt. Steen’s
sudden disappearance. No record exists of the next day operation in CI or 2/1 files. Sgt.
Dunn was appointed Sub-team Commander on 27 August 1968 until he departed in
March 1969. Now for the rest of the story!
Fig. 34 Captured Certificate of Commendation for NVA
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The next day the women who told SSgt. Dunn and SFC. Ha where the tunnels were
located after a short follow up interrogation, found an old rusty nail in the sand in the
POW Compound and attempted to dig her throat out with it. She was medivacked to
NSA Hospital as a VC and recovered. She was remorseful because she talked. Women
most times during interrogation were more difficult to get to talk than men and are great
at lying and cover stories. Reference (6) Source Anh seemed to have disappeared after
that operation. Source Thanh continued to support the Sub-team. It was later learned
Anh joined the SVN Army and was later killed when an ARVN truck hit him on a bicycle
on his way home.
Around 29 August 1968, a Sapper Unit breeched the 2nd Bn/1st Marine compound at
Cau Ha and threw satchel charges under the hooches and command bunkers. SSgt. Bill
Roth, SSgt. Bill Evans and an ITT officer fought from bunkers near the gate of the
Compound. Approximately 15 NVA/VC were killed and several were captured. SSgt.
Roth gained an asset named Nhi, from the Thanh Thuy (V) near Tu Cau Bridge. SSgt.
Roth warned that Nhi was probably a VC sympathizer and needed watching. Nhi’s
father was a VC.
Sgt. Tom Dunn had been appointed Sub-team Commander, an Officer’s Billet 30 August
1968 located near the Leper Colony about 10 Miles south of Marble Mountain at Cau
Ha with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Reference (6). Sgt. Bill Roth and Sgt. Bill Evans
relocated to An Hoa with 5th Marines. Reference (5) p. (2), Appendix (L) Letter 2012
Approximately 2 days later, a moan was heard from under the Marine quarters about 25
feet from the Sub-team C hooch. The Sub-team along with Marines investigated. A VC
sapper was observed under the hooch, who had been waiting for a green flare to ignite
before throwing his satchel charge. He had not eaten in 3-4 days, and the Sapper
Battalion had smoked a large amount of Marijuana before the attack. The VC had
fallen asleep and never saw the green flare to start the attack. The VC was afraid to
come out later for fear of being killed or captured. After initial interrogation he was
turned over to Da Nang Special Sector MSgt. Quan for further interrogation. His unit
the T89th BN was located just out of the TAOR in the ROKMC area of operations.
Reference (8)
After 1968, TET Mop up, the remaining operations were mostly search and clear and CI
Operations targeting the VC Infrastructure. Reference (9) p. (62) Figure (35) was the
result of a search and clear operation in Dodge City September 1968, the VCs Fall
Offensive. The U.S. paid a heavy price in Vietnam for Freedom, never to be forgotten!
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Fig. 35 Memorial Service/ Dodge City Marines 2nd Bn, 7th Marines
(Photo courtesy of Marzone Webpage/Vilionis)
During September 1968, an abundance of intelligence was received that the R20 BN,
the 31st and 36th NVA Regiments in Dodge City and other NVA/VC units (Arizona
Area) were gearing up for a fall offensive and TET 1968. The VC conducted TET
Offensive (Jan), Summer Offensive (May/June) and a Fall Offensive (Sept.Oct.68).
There were so many operations and patrols you couldn’t keep up with them.
Unfortunately all CI After Action Reports were destroyed. Subsequent operations
including Meade River killed many more NVA/VC. Reference (29) p. (174)
On 12 September 1968, Sub-Team C (SSgt Dunn, ST Cmdr, SFC Ha) with a patrol from
E 2/1 and SVN National Police conducted a sweep of Ville at 095678. Villagers had
wired gates shut to slow search teams. Thirty five VN Nationals were screened by CIT
and NP personnel. There were 9 detained. A search of the Ville discovered numerous
explosives, ammunition, some notebooks, Commo wire and medical supplies. 2/1 spt
Sept Sept 1968
On 18 September 1968, 0400hrs, Company E, a squad of National Police, and Sub-team
C, 3rd CIT, (StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha) commenced a 4 day operation of cordon and
searches in the Riviera Sector of the TAOR. This involved three known VC hamlets, Tra
Ke, BT089670, Viem Dong, BT 095658, and Tra Lo BT 085683. CI Screened all three
villagers resulting in 13 VC suspects and 3 VC. 2/1 spt rpt 18 Sep 1968
On 20 September 1968, Echo upon sweeping village detained 50 villagers. Sub-Team C,
(St Cmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha), screened the detainees and 3 VC were detained. They
were returned to Bn compound for further interrogation. 2/1 Spt Rpt Sept 1968
On 24 September 1968, a source was delivered to Sub-team C by 3rd CI Team
Headquarters and the source was to lead Sub-team C, (StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha) and
2/1 to tunnels within the 2/1 TAOR. At 0530, 20 October 1968, while on patrol the
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source tried to escape. She was recaptured and a field interrogation commenced but
rather than talk, the VC stuck her tongue out and bit down on it. She was medivacked to
NSA hospital as a VC. 2/1 spt rpt Oct1968.
During September 1968, SSgt. Bill Roth, accompanied by his interpreter along with 5th
Marines, at An Hoa was assigned the task of recovering a U. S. Marine who had been
listed as MIA some 3 months earlier. The Marine had been buried and was recovered by
SSgt. Roth with help of sources. Years later, a friend visited the Vietnam Memorial in
Washington and brought MSgt. Bill Roth an etched paper with the Marine’s name on it,
Manley Glenn Walker. SSgt. Roth appreciated the gesture. Reference (5)
On 12 October 1968, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha) and Hotel Co. along
with National Police Field Forces conducted a cordon and sweep of Tra Khe (3). Two
Causalities were sustained while establishing cordon by booby trap. Twenty-eight
villagers were screened and 1 VC was returned to BN compound for further interrogation.
2/1 spt rpt Oct 1968
On 24 October1968, Sub-Team C, (StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha), along with prisoner led
patrol from Golf to a hidden tunnel. The tunnel had collapsed due to recent flooding of
the area in recent months. Further search revealed a buried body of a VC which was in
advanced stage of decomposition. The area showed signs of recent occupancy. 2/1 spt
rpt Oct 1968
On 26 October 1968, CI and patrol were checking out location (Viem Dong area) where
Sub-team C, (StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha) and source said VC were hiding. Upon
entering the area 3 VC were spotted and the patrol opened fire and the VC returned fire,
but then surrendered. One VC was captured and one KIA. A considerable amount of
weapons and equipment were captured. The VC KIA turned out to be a District level
Cadre and the captured female VC, a Nurse. The documents captured revealed 21 NVA
were KIA in the Viem Dong area by Marines on 23 Oct 1968. 2/1 SptRept Oct 1968
The Commander of 2/1 headlined his November Report with the following statement “A
detachment of 3rd CIT working with 2nd Battalion has captured the majority of the
Viet-Cong Infrastructure in the outlying villages. Interrogation has revealed that over
100 Viet-Cong have been killed in the vicinity of Viem Dong (BT095695) during the
past two months. CIT and ITT continued to update the blacklist utilizing the captured
documents and intelligence sources.” That is a compliment for Sub-team C, 3rd
Counterintelligence Team. Sub-team C was the detachment assigned to support 2nd BN/
1st Marines. This Sub-Team was responsible for preparing, maintaining and providing
the Blacklist for our TAOR and did so as necessary with little input from ITT. One thing
remains clear, our officers and troops do not know the difference from ITT and CIT
unless you remind them repeatedly. Upon reviewing the Spot Reports there were several
incident reports that were thought to be CIT Operations involving VC/VCI but they
could not be included because ITT was listed as the sub-team.
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On 22 November 1968, 0700 hrs, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha) with a 2/1
Fox patrol 078644 apprehended 4 VC suspects and returned to Bn POW compound for
further interrogation. 2/1 Spt Rpt Nov 1971
From Late November through December 1968, 1st Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines
and several other units conducted Operation Meade River. Sub-Team C, designated as a
Detachment consisting of Sgt. Tom Dunn, SFC. Nguyen Ha, and Team Headquarters,
GySgt. Julian Martinez, participated in the operation. As a result of our support the 3rd
CIT/Sub-Team C, Detachment, received the Presidential Unit Citation. Reference (8) The
Police Special Branch Chief, Da Nang (CIA Asset) assisted in interrogations. For reasons
unknown at the time he was unable to obtain actionable information and CI could not
understand why. Approximately 1200 VC/NVA were killed or captured during Meade
River. Over 1500 villagers were screened and 500 prisoners interrogated by the CI Subteam. Information gained and subsequent operations killed many more NVA/VC as a
result of those captured during this operation. Reference (29) p. (1)
Fig. 36 Bombing like this occurred prior to and during Meade River.
(Picture Courtesy VWIP / USAF Photo)
On 1 December 1968 during a Foxtrot 2/1 cordon and search operation patrol
apprehended one male vc and a female VC. The Village Chief confirmed male is liaison
for VC District HQs and female is member Daughters and Mothers association.
Detainees were brought to Sub-team C, 3rd CIT for interrogation at BN CP. Point here is
that the 2/1 Marines were already learning the value of CIT in their operations.
The 3rd CI Team supported operations Foster (Nov67), Citrus ( Dec 67), Nutcracker
(Jan 68), Rock (Mar 68), Jasper Square (Apr68), Allen Brook (May 68), Mameluke
Thrust (Jun68) and Meade River ( Nov-Dec 68) after a little preamble by Air Strikes
and Artillery Figure (36), Taylor Common ( Mar to Apr 69) and Task Force Yankee
Operations 1968-69. The 3rd CIT also supported operations with the 3rd MAB, 1st
Marines, 5th Marines, and 7th Marines during Imperial Lake and other operations during
1970/71. The VC and NVA Units were forced back to regroup. Because of ARVN
and U.S. intelligence operations, most VC guerrilla units became nonexistent. The VC
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were decimated during TET 68! They were also badly damaged during mop up and CI
neutralization operations in ‘1969/70’. The NVA Regular Units were forced to supply
the security for VC Cadre and in many instance “Officers” to replace killed or captured
VC Infrastructure Personalities. It took until 1971 to replenish the NVA and VC Cadre.
VIII. OPERATIONS 1969
On 15 January 1969, Sub-team C,(StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn and SFC. Ha) with previously
captured VC and unit from 2/1 set in cordon at 0530hrs. While sweeping area they came
under heavy small arms fire from NW. They returned fire with small arms, mortars,
tanks, and arty, and Cobra gunships. Resulted in 91 Bunkers destroyed, CI screened
1058 civilian, 18 VC/NVA KIA, 2 POW’s, 2 Choi Hoi’s, 1 detainee from Blacklist,
captured assorted 782n gear, 3 AK47, 2 SKS, 1 French Submachine gun, considerable
explosives and grenades. The 2 POW’s above later on 18 Jan 1969 led patrol to
additional weapons and 240 lbs of rice. 2/1 Spt Rpt Jan 1969.
On 16 January 1969, Sub-team C, (Sgt. Dunn, SFC Ha) and G 2/1 while sitting up cordon
and search received approximately 20 rounds of AK47 fire. After returning fire the Ville
was surrounded and a search will be conducted in AM. In the morning after sweeping
Ville at 064714, CIT detained 9 VCS on blacklist. Villiagers stated 9 more VC had been
in the ville the night before. 2/1 SptRpt Jan 1969
On 23 February 1969, the 2/1 BN where Sub-team C, (StCmdr, Sgt. Dunn, SFC. Ha),
HQ’s was located was taken under fire by approximately 70 VC using small arms, B-40
Rocket Launchers, and Bangalore torpedoes. The units at 2/1 returned fire killing 15 VC
and capturing 4 VC. Sub-team C occupied the perimeter near the POW Compound firing
at advancing VC and NVA trying to get through the wire. There were 13 Marines
wounded. 2/1 Spt Rpt Feb 1969.
Sgt. Dunn was married and left Vietnam for personal reasons (Dear John) 3 weeks before
his tour ended. March 69. He could tell his superiors did not like it, but allowed it. Sgt.
Dunn received no recognition during this tour even though he served in a much higher
billet than his rank, was learning the language and had considerable success. Sgt. Dunn
believed it was because he departed Vietnam early. The CO, HQ’s BN in so many words
indicated as much in their discussion about leaving early. Additionally, Staff Sergeant
Dunn believes the Team Commander and acting Team Chief at that time were the most
aloof and least effective individuals in Vietnam (late 68, early 69), and were the only
one’s who never visited their Sub-teams in the field during SSgt. Dunn’s 32 month tour.
SSgt. Dunn departed late March 69 but put in for orders back to Nam in August 1969 not
being able to repair his marriage. This was a blessing in disguise because he has been
married to his now soul-mate for going on 43 years. Reference Letter McClenithan 2011.
SSgt. Bill Roth was supposed to replace Sgt. Tom Dunn upon his departure for the U.S.
in March 1969. The dirt road leading to the compound was mined 2 or 3 times a month.
Many times CI traveled this road and met the Mine Sweep Team coming from the
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opposite direction. It was not a good feeling when the Truck behind you hit a mine and
blew up, as was the case with SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son and Ba and Dung. SSgt. Dunn,
SSgt. Evans, and SSgt. Roth referred to it as a “pucker factor.”
Fig. 37 2nd /1st Marines at Tu Cau Bridge.
(Photo courtesy VWIP/Lindgren)
SSgt. Bill Roth had done an excellent job during his tenure. He received the Navy
Achievement Medal/V for actions during Pipestone Canyon in 1969 for uncovering a
buried arms cache. Reference (5) For some unknown reason there were no documented
CI actions or operations found documented from 2/1 from March 1969 to September
1969, with the exception of the one where the cache was discovered.
In April 1969, the Ammunition Dump (ASP 1) located near Monkey Mountain caught on
fire as a result of burning grass. The 35,000 tons of ammunition, explosives, and fuel
caused havoc for miles. The Airfield was evacuated and closed for 24 hours. The 3rd
CIT Headquarters sustained damage while GySgt. Martinez, SSgt. Roth and others
stayed behind. Some of the blasts were so large the blast wave could be seen coming
across the sky from miles away. An Army unit that flew fixed winged aircraft was located
next to the 3rd CIT Hqtrs. During the explosions they evacuated their compound and
asked CI members to watch their facilities which included a small club. The blast
destroyed the club and caused the building to collapse. Members of CI obtained
numerous bottles of whisky which had been quote “damaged.” No one is quite sure
whatever happened to the bottles that were salvaged. Right!
On 6 May 1969, Sub-team from 3rd CIT with patrol 3/1 detained 3 females with Medical
Supplies BT917586. Transported VC to BN. 2/7 sptrpt May 1969
On 25 June 1969, 2nd Bn, 7th Mar, along with CIT after interrogation of Propaganda
Cadre captured on 16 June established a cordon at AT937727 to capture 5 VC living in
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the Village. During sweep found hamlet chief who had been assassinated during the night
by VC. Four VC were located and detained and returned to Bn CP. 2/7 rpt Jun 1969
SSgt. Tom Dunn returned to Vietnam 5 October 1969 and was assigned Sub-Team
Commander to rebuild Sub-team C (which should take months) located at 2/1. SSgt.
Nguyen Ha was replaced by SSgt. Nguyen Minh Son, as ARVN interpreter. SSgt. Son
was from North Vietnam originally and had been released from prison in South Vietnam
at the beginning of the war. He could speak English and had stolen supplies to make
cabinets. SSgt. Son loved South Vietnam. Sgt. Terry Shorts was another member of
the Sub-Team. Sgt. Shorts was a card shark and took a lot of money from the Sub-team.
Finally, no one would play with him. Reference (6)
Fig. 38
Mr. Ba and SSgt. Son at Marble Mountain
(Provided by SSgt Tom Dunn)
It was also determined that Nhi (Sgt. Bill Roth’s Asset) the Sub-team’s only inherited
source was indeed a VC. He lasted in Sub-team C for about a month. He was put in
prison for trying to kill the Village Chief of Thanh Thuy (V) while he raised the Flag.
Nhi had booby-trapped the flag pole. For some reason the booby trap did not trip the
explosive. Additionally, it was believed he had set up ambushes against patrols that Subteam C was part of on at least two occasions. Reference (13)
In October 1969, elements of 2nd Bn. 1st Marines were accused of killing and raping a
woman from Thanh Thuy (V) Dien Ban (D) by a villager. Sub-Team C, SSgt. Dunn, as
Sub-Team Commander, was tasked by 3rd CIT Headquarters to conduct an investigation
to determine the circumstances. Once it became questionable as to the Marines
involvement at all, SSgt. Dunn, asked the SVN Security Chief (Tuan) to assist in the
inquiry. Villagers led us to the grave and the Security Chief gave permission to unearth
the body, now about a week old. The woman was an intelligence source of the Security
Chief. It was determined the women had been buried sitting upright in a chair-like
position and there were signs of torture. That immediately cleared the Marines. This
was a sign of the VC that the women would never lie in peace and was known to be
working for the
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VN government. The VC had tried to blame the Marines for the death. The Security
Chief arrested the Villager who had started the story and found out her husband was a
VC. The body was turned over to the family. The case was written up and closed with a
happy ending for the Marines. That was the first incident in Vietnam where SSgt. Dunn
saw a body buried sitting upright. Little did SSgt. Dunn know that Ms. Mai, a source of
his, would suffer the same fate 2 years later.
Near the early end of October 1969, SSgt. Tom Dunn, as Sub-team Commander, added
Mr. Tuan, the Thanh Thuy (V) Security Chief, the Village Chief Mr. Thong, and Mr.
Phien, Hamlet Chief as assets of Sub-team C. Reference (5) p. (2) Mr. Tuan was about
5 feet tall and had more big freckles on his face than most Americans. The Village
Chief was a tall man dedicated to South Vietnam. The Sub-team (SSgt. Dunn and Sgt.
Son) was eating lunch one afternoon with the Security Chief and Village Chief with
10 to 15 villagers standing around observing. The menu was Jack Daniels (JD) straight
and meat and rice. SSgt. Dunn had just taken a drink of JD and a bite of meat when
someone said that it was the best dog he had eaten! It took SSgt. Dunn 5 minutes to
swallow his food because he could not let the Chiefs see that he had almost gotten sick
eating Dog. After at least 4 swigs of JD, SSgt. Dunn managed to save face and
continued eating! These Village officials turned out to be friends and valuable Assets.
SSgt. Tom Dunn cannot eat dog and drink JD to this day. Reference (8)
21 October 1969, 181st RF Company, 210330Hrs, was attacked by estimated Company
sized NVA/VC Unit. Company E, 2/1 with Sub-team C, (SSgt Dunn StCmdr, SSgt Son,
Sgt. Shorts ) dispatched as reaction force. Wounded PF’s evacuated to 2/1 aid station. At
0430 hrs CI at location reported that approximately 13VC/NVA entered New Life hamlet
wearing ARVN uniforms. VC/NVA had one 60MM mortar, one m-79 grenade launcher,
and one B-40 Rocket Launcher. Enemy took hamlet under fire killing one RF, wounding
2 others and 15 civilians. VC/NVA fled when reaction force was spotted. Force called in
artillery fire mission on retreating enemy. One VC/NVA KIA and medical evacuation of
personnel completed at 0550hrs. Other 2/1 units killed 7 VC fleeing area. 2/1 SptRpt Oct
70
On 28 November 1969, F-2-5 on Platoon size patrol with CIT, with a Chieu Hoi, pointed
out a refugee who was a prisoner of local VC. Chieu Hoi then led CI to a location where
2 SKS Rifles were hidden. Chieu Hoi and Refugee returned to CIT for further
questioning. 5th Mar SptRpt Nov
About that time Sgt. Terry Shorts added Wendy, a one armed women as an asset from
around Tu Cau (H) Bridge.
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Fig 39 Wendy near Tu Cau Bridge 1969
( Picture courtesy of VWIP/ Lindgren)
On 1 December 1969, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Messrs. Ba and
Dung, two new assets (recruited by SSgt. Dunn from Quang Da Special Sector)) provided
timely information on the location of VC hiding near BT088663. Upon entering the area
the unit spotted three armed individuals fleeing SW into a tree line. During the sweep
the unit found leaflets directed at the U.S. advocating support for the enemy and their
cause. Several bunkers were located and destroyed. 2/1 Spt rpt Dec 1969
Fig. 40 Messrs. Ba and Dung after an operation.
On the 9th and 23rd December 1969, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts,
SSgt Son, Messrs. Ba and Dung) were summoned to Tu Cau Bridge to to take pictures to
identify VC found floating in the river. This was an unpleasant task especially after the
bodies had been in the hot sun for several days. 2/1 sp rpts Dec 1969
On 12 December, 1969, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Ba/Dung) upon
returning from a patrol with a squad from 2nd Bn/1st Marines in search of tunnels, SSgt.
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Dunn after a brief firefight, stepped on a trip-wired 105 round (fishing line across the
trail). SSgt. Son may have hit it also. SSgt. Dunn told every one to freeze. SSgt. Nguyen
Son, Mr. Ba and Mr. Dung, assets from Da Nang Special Sector were with SSgt. Dunn.
Figure (40) The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Sergeant came up and saw a little
smoke in a bush on the right side of the trail. He investigated and told SSgt. Dunn and
Vietnamese to move back slowly. The EOD disabled a 105 round and 5 others daisychained along the trail. The rounds were placed in a sandpit and blown up. The EOD
Sgt. concluded that the fuse popped but not the round. The burnt fuse and tripwire were
last seen hanging in a mosquito net where SSgt. Dunn would see it first thing each
morning. CI History, 2/1 spt rpt 12 Dec 1969
Upon arriving back at the Compound, SSgt. Dunn briefed the S-2 Scouts and told
them not to come back the same way from their patrol scheduled for the next day.
Unbelievably, they didn’t listen and six to eight Marines were KIA/WIA! The S-2
Scouts had argued whether to come back the same way and they made the wrong choice.
A Texas friend of the Sub-team walked point, and the main thing that helped identify
him was his big silver and gold, Texas belt buckle. This terrible incident was repeated
several times in the AO. Reference (8)
On 21 December 1969, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Shorts,
Messrs. Ba and Dung) while supporting 2/1 in a cordon and search operation was notified
that 2 females had been detained by a squad of Marines who had seen them talking to 6
VC males who fled into a tree line upon spotting the Marines. The female denied talking
to the VC. Sub-team C upon checking the blacklist determined one female was married
to a local VC guerrilla in this area and and had a change of clothing which indicated she
was visiting her husband. CIT took both VC suspects to BN POW compound for further
interrogation. 2/1 spt rpt Dec 1969
On 22 December 1969, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts, SSgt. Son,
Messrs. Ba and Dung), upon returning from checking out a possible rocket cache with the
patrol received 60mm Mortar round and 60 to 70 rounds AK fire from 10-15 VC/NVA.
The patrol returned fire and requested AO assistance. The enemy broke contact and
withdrew south. The AO spotted a VC and fired 2 rockets. Checked area and found 110
lbs rice, 40 AK rounds, 1 uniform with misc documents and a diffused 105 round.
Detained 1 VC suspect for interrogation. 2/1 spt rpt Dec 1969
On 31 December 1969, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts, Messrs. Ba and
Dung) and CI source with S 2 Scouts proceeded to BT 066656 where the booby-traps
were supposedly located. Messrs. Ba and Dung located the 2 booby traps approximately
15 meters apart, rigged in foot traps with elastic trip wire. The booby traps were
disarmed and turned into S 2. Source was paid 1000VNS. 2/1 spt rpt 1969. CI History.
IX. OPERATIONS 1970
On 1-2 January 1970, personnel from 3rd Team (Capt. Charles Bushy and MSgt. Dick
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Gordon) and Sub-team B (Capt. Phillip Roos and GySgt. Arthur Singletary) assisted
by National Police Field Forces, provided support to 3rd Bn/26th Marines during a
cordon and search operation in Van Duong (H), Hoa Vinh (V), Hoa Vang (D).
Approximately 200 Vietnamese Nationals were screened against the Blacklist. Viet
Cong suspects (3) were apprehended and turned over to Hoa Vang (D) Headquarters.
Reference (15) p. (1)
On 2 January 1970, Sub-team C, (SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley and Boys) and
source led patrol 2/1 to BT065657 and recovered two booby-trapped M-26 grenades.
Both were foot traps with trip wires to top of hole to detonate. Destroyed by C4. 2/1 Spt
Rpt Jan 1970
Fig. 41 Villagers waiting to be screened by 3rd CIT personnel.
(Provided by Capt. Bushey
Fig. 42 Villagers being screened by 3rd CIT
(Provided by Capt. Bushey)
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On 3 January 1970, a female Assets of Sub-team C reported the location of two enemy
surprise-firing devices (SFD) about 500 meters from the Compound. Sub-team C
(StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts, SSgt. Son) supported by one squad from H/2nd Bn/1st
Marines, were guided by a source to the vicinity of Ngan Cau (H), Thanh Thuy (V), Dien
Ban (D). Two SFDs (Booby Traps) were found and destroyed in place. Reference (16) p.
(1) 2/1 sptrpt 1970
During December and January 1970, new female assets, Mrs. Ba and Ms. Mai were
added to Sub-team C by SSgt. Dunn.
Fig. 48
Ms. Ba (not real name) and Ms. Mai after an operation.
On 5 January 1970, Sub-Team C, (St Cmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts, SSgt. Son, Ba and
Dung) and the Security Chief of Thanh Thuy (V) Dien Ban (D) established a screening
point in the Vicinity of Tu Cau New Life Hamlet. A total of 150 residents were screened
against the available Blacklist. All persons screened were determined to be legal
residents of Tu Cau and had the proper identification. Reference (16) p. (1)
On 6 January 1970, personnel from Sub-team B (Capt. Phillip Roos, GySgt. Arthur
Singletary) along with National Police provided support to H/2nd Bn/26th Marines
during a cordon and search operation at Trung Kien (V), Loc Tu (V), Phu Loc(D). A
total of 22 Vietnamese Nationals were screened against a Blacklist. One female VC
suspect was detained and turned over to Phu Loc District Headquarters. Reference (16)
p. (1)
On 9 January 1970, Sub-team C (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts, SSgt. Son) supported
by a patrol from 2nd Bn /1st Marines, led by Sub-team Assets (Ba/Dung) from Quang Da,
Da Nang Special Sector, went to look for VC hiding in tunnels. Figure (39) The Assets
led the patrol to two secret tunnels near Thanh Minh (V), Dien Ban ( D). SSgt. Dunn
opened the tunnel with a rope and yelled in Vietnamese for the VC inside to surrender or
be killed. The interpreter SSgt. Son and SSgt. Dunn negotiated the surrender of two VC/
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NVA hiding in one tunnel and they were captured without resistance. One was a Plt Ldr
T89 Sapper BN and the other a VC. The VC was wounded and sent to NSA. The LT was
turned over to QDSS for further interrogation. A search of the tunnels produced 1⁄2 lb of
documents and small quantities of food and medical supplies. After Sub-team C
destroyed the tunnels, the prisoners were returned to 2nd Bn/1st Marines for medical
treatment, interrogation and disposition.. Reference (16) p. (2). 2/1 spt rpt 1970
Fig. 43 Before exposed/ Typical Hidden and Open. Tunnel. Usually an 18” Square.
(Courtesy Wikipedia Website)
On 10 January 1970, Sub-team C (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts, SSgt Son) supported
by two National Police, established a screening point at Ngan Cau New Life (H), Thanh
Thuy (V), Dien Ban (D). A total of 525 Vietnamese Nationals were screened against the
Blacklist. All persons screened had proper identification. Reference (16) p. (2)
On 10 January 1970, personnel from 3rd CI Team Headquarters (Capt. Charles Bushey,
MSgt. Dick Gordon) with Sub-team C ( SSgt. Tom Dunn, Sgt. Terry Shorts, SSgt.
Nguyen Son) supported by G Co. /2nd Bn/1st Marines, attempted to locate a cache of
122mm Rockets. Two sources accompanied the Patrol. Several delays were experienced
when one Surprise Firing Device (SFD) was accidentally detonated wounding two
members of the patrol. Six additional SFD’s were located and destroyed in place. Upon
reaching the boundary separating the USMC TAOR and the Republic of Korea Marine
Corps (ROKMC) TAOR, the sources indicated that the cache was 700 meters inside the
ROK TAOR. The operation was terminated because the suspected location was outside
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the Division Area Of Operations (AOR). Subsequent efforts to have sources lead the
Team to the rockets met with negative results. Reference (16) p. (2)
Fig. 44 Typical patrol with a source accompanying unit.
(Picture courtesy of VWIP/ lindgren)
On 12-16 January 1970, 3rd CI Team Headquarters personnel (Capt. Charles Bushey,
MSgt. Yogi Gordon) provided support to the Air Mobil Kingfisher operation. No VC/
NVA were spotted on the 12th. On 16 January 1970, the patrol was inserted by
helicopter into enemy territory to assault the enemy position. There were 7 enemy
KIA and 2 WIA/PW captured. Field interrogation revealed unit identification, but
developed nothing of immediate tactical value to the assault force. Considering the
results of this operation, it was recommended that ITT personnel be used for
subsequent operations, except where known Counterintelligence targets would be in the
Kingfisher area of operations. Reference (16) p. (4)
On 20 January 1970, two National Police Special Branch personnel were assigned by
the DaNang Special Branch Police Chief and Province Police Chief to the 3rd CIT for a
30-day trial period to render direct support to the Team to speed the conduct of operations
against the VCI. One support individual was located at Sub-team C. This relationship
was not as effective as planned. These National Police Special Branch personnel may
have been plants. Later (Oct 70) the Quang Nam Providence level Police/ Security
Chief, Dien Ban Security Chief, and DaNang Special Branch Police Chief were named by
a Source to be VC and verified as such in documents captured from Que Son Mountains
(Imperial Lake). Reference (16) p. (4)
On 21 January 1970, Sub-team C (SSgt. Tom Dunn, Sgt. Terry Shorts, and SSgt. Nguyen
Son) supported by one National Policeman established a screening point near Ngan Cau
(H), Thanh Thuy (V), Dien Ban (D). A total of 100 Vietnamese Nationals were
screened, All personnel screened had proper identification. Reference (16) p. (2)
On 21 January 1970, a coordinated USMC/ROKMC operation was conducted near
Phong Ho (H), Thanh Minh (V), Dien Ban (D). Information developed by 3rd CIT
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was coordinated with the Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) 2nd ROKMC
Brigade. An exploitation force, composed of personnel from the 3rd CIT HQs (Capt.
Charles Bushy and MSgt. Yogi Gordon) and ROK Marines entered the area from the
South. Sub-Team C (SSgt. Tom Dunn, SSgt. Nguyen Son and Assets Ba and Dung)
supported by one platoon from 2nd Bn/ 1st Marines established a blocking force from the
North. While enroute to the target area, an ROK Captain and his radio Operator
climbed on a small knoll for better communications and tripped a SFD that wounded
them both and Capt. Bushey. A large bunker was discovered and destroyed by the
exploitation force, and 2 VC were killed. One AK 47 Rifle was captured.
Fig. 45 VC Weapon of choice- Captured AK-47 Assault Rifle
(Provided by Marzone/
The blocking force to the North observed a VC entering a secret tunnel. The 2nd Bn/1st
Marines provided perimeter security. BT071639
Sub-Team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Messrs. Ba and Dung) surrounded the
tunnel and SSgt Dunn demanded the two VC to surrender in Vietnamese. Two VC exited
the tunnel entrance and surrendered. A further search of the tunnel by SSgt. Dunn turned
loud and aggressive but produced another VC and various items such as; one M-16 rifle,
two M-16 magazines with 36 rounds, four M-26 Grenades, three blasting caps, and
miscellaneous articles of clothing. After conducting an intensive field interrogation, one
of the captives revealed another secret tunnel that SSgt. Dunn searched but it was empty
and the tunnel was destroyed. Reference (16) pp. (2-3) 2/1 Spt Rpt Jan 1970
21 Jan 1970 DTG 211400H 2nd Bn Spot report: While moving in
Blocking position unit spotted 1 VC/NVA w/weapon running from
patrol. Unit gave Chase lost sight of VC with weapon. Spotted
another VC entering bunker. Unit drug two VC from the bunker and a
Tunnel Rat found another another VC/NVA during his search of the
bunker. Total 3 VC/NVA Captured.
The spot report goes on to list above weapons captured.
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Fig. 46 Typical Tunnel Complex.
(Provided by The Australian Involvement in Vietnam War Website/Marshall)
On 26 January 1970, information developed by the 3rd CIT was coordinated with the
MID, 2nd ROKMC Brigade to exploit targets near Phuong Nhut (H) , Thang Trong (V)
Dien Ban (D), in conjunction with a ROK operation in process. A District Level VCI
Hoi Chanh accompanied 3rd CIT Hqtrs. personnel (Capt. Charles Bushey and MSgt.
Dick Gordon) and MID personnel into the field to join 2nd Company, 1st Battalion,
2nd ROK Brigade. A total of 10 enemy personnel were captured from 3 secret tunnels.
Among those captured were a Company Commander, a platoon commander, a platoon
sergeant, two nurses, and 5 soldiers, with one enemy wounded during a firefight. A
total of 7 secret tunnels and 4 bunkers were destroyed. Four AK-47 rifles, one AK 50
rifle, one K-54 pistol, one B-40 rocket launcher, small arms ammunition, several hand
grenades, and CW radio documents were captured.
Team Chief MSgt. Dick Gordon had obtained intelligence provided by a District level
Hoi Chanh, who volunteered to accompany 3rd CIT to the Korean TAOR. The Hoi
Chanh's knowledge of the location of the secret tunnels made the operation a success.
The ROKMC S-2 and S-2 Chief accompanied 3rd CIT personnel on the operation.
Reference (15) p. (3) It was believed that Capt. Charles Bushey and MSgt. Gordon
enjoyed working in the field more than at Team Headquarters. Sub-Teams couldn’t have
asked for better support from this 3rd CIT Team Chief or Team Commander.
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Fig. 47 Surrounded by Koreans and captured VC are Capt. Charles Bushey with
the bandolier and MSgt. Yogi Gordon in the middle.
On 27 January 1970, members of Sub-team B (Capt.Phillip Roos, GySgt. Arthur
Singletary) and one National Policeman provided support to D/1st Bn/26th Marines
during a cordon and search operation at Goc Kha (H), Hoa Long (V), Hieu Duc (D). A
total of 40 Vietnamese Nationals were screened against the Team Blacklist. All
personnel screened had proper identification. Reference (16) p. (3)
On 28 January 1970, members of Sub-team B (Capt. Phillip Roos, GySgt. Arthur
Singletary) and one National Police Officer provided support to D/1st Bn/26th Marines
during a cordon and search operation at Duyen Son (H), Hoa Long (v), Hieu Duc (D).
A total of 56 Vietnamese Nationals were screened against the Blacklist. One female
VC suspect was detained and turned over to Hieu Duc District Headquarters. During
a search of the Hamlet, approximately 2 kilos of narcotics derivative (believed to be
Heroin) were discovered and destroyed. Reference (16) p. (3)
On 30 January 1970, a Source provided by Quang Da Special Zone led members of
Sub-team A (SSgt. R. Bowen, Sgt. Harvey Hudson), personnel from Korean Military
Intelligence Detachment, and 1st Company, 1st Battalion, and 2nd ROKMC Brigade to
one large bunker and 2 secret tunnels previously utilized by the District II, Da Nang, VC
Chief. The bunker and secret tunnels were searched and destroyed. There were no VC
discovered in the area. Reference (16) p. (3)
2 Feb 1970 B CO. 1/5 led to Stream Bed crossing by CIT, who searched it and recovered
1 AK 47. Other crossings will be searched. 3rd CIT. 5th Mar SptRpt 70
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On 4 February1970, personnel from Sub-Team A ( Capt. Bruce Moulton, GySgt. Arthur
Singletary, SSgt. Ron Bowen) provided support to G-2 personnel from 1st Bn/1st
Marines during the search of a suspected rocket cache in the vicinity of Yen Ne (H),
Hoa Thai (V), Hoa Vang (D). No rockets or enemy personnel were located.
Approximately 35 Vietnamese Nationals were screened against the Team Blacklist. All
had proper identification. Reference (17) p. (1)
On 5 February 1970, Sub-team B (Capt. Phillip Roos, GySgt. Mike Shortis, Sgt.
Harvey Hudson) accompanied by one Hoi Chanh and supported by a Headquarters
unit and one squad from I/3rd Bn/1Marines, conducted a search for a secret tunnel near
Bo Ban (H), Hoa Hung (V), Hieu Duc (D). The Hoi Chanh pointed out the secret
tunnel, which had recently been occupied. The tunnel was not destroyed and would be
subject to subsequent search and ambush by I/3/1. Reference (17) p. (1)
Figure (48) is the front of a free pass for VC to surrender and support SVN government.
After meeting certain criteria they were referred to as a Hoi Chanh.
Fig. 49 Safe conduct pass honored by all Allied Forces.
(Courtesy of VWIP/Vaughn)
On 5 February 1970, members of 3rd CIT Hqtrs. (Capt. Charles Bushey, MSgt. Dick
Gordon) and Sub-Team A (Capt. Bruce Moulton, GySgt. Arthur Singletary, SSgt. Jim
Bowen), accompanied by a National Police officer, one Hoi Chanh and one squad from
L/3rd Bn/1st Marines, conducted a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Giang
La (H), Ky Minh (V), Dien Ban (D). A total of 5 unoccupied secret tunnels and one
bunker were searched and destroyed. Approximately 20 lbs of rice were found and
destroyed. Reference (17) p. (1) Figure (49) is the back of Hoi Chanh pass.
On 5 February 1970, Sub-team C (StCmdr, SSgt. Tom Dunn, Sgt. Terry Shorts, SSgt.
Nguyen Son, Ba and Dung) provided support to elements of 2nd Bn/7th Marines, the
105th RF Company, the 151st PF. Co. and U.S. Advisors to Dien Ban (D) during a cordon
and search operation near Tu Cau (H), Thanh Thuy (V), Dien Ban (D). A total of 30
Vietnamese Nationals were screened against the Blacklist and moved into the GVN New
Life Hamlet. ARVN personnel detained 4 VC suspects. Later that day, WO. Thomas
Marino joined the Sub-team as Sub-team Commander. Reference (17) p. (2) 2/1 spt Rpt
Feb 1970
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On 11 February 1970, B-1-5 while on patrol with CIT discovered 1PRC Handset, 1prc 88
Receiver, 6 trip flares, 1RPG Launcher, 2AK-47’s, 1 AK-50 Rifle, 16 M-16 Magazines,
1X35MM camera, 400x7.62 rounds, 6 belts 7.62 Machine gun Ammo, 1 CS Grenade, 6
Green POP Up flares, 1 Red Pop up2 Spools Comm Wire, 1 Box Poloroid Film. 3rd CIT.
5th Mar Spt Rpt 70,
On 15 February 1970, B 1/5 while on patrol with CIT found 4 shape charges, 1 B.A.R, 1
AK-50, inside old bunker. CIT took weapons to AN Hoa Sqd took shaped charges back
to unit. 3rd CIT, 5th Mar Spt Rpt Feb 70
On 18 February 1970, Sub-team C (WO. Tom Marino, SSgt. Tom Dunn, Sgt. Terry
Shorts and SSgt. Nguyen Son) and one assigned National Police officer provided
support for H/ 2nd Bn/1st Marines and National Field Forces during a cordon and search
operation at Tan Lu (H), Hoa Hai (V), Hoa Vang (D). A total of 165 Vietnamese
Nationals were screened against a Blacklist. Three suspects were detained and later
released as innocent civilians. Reference (17) p. (2)
Fig. 50 SVN Popular Forces (PFs)
( Courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration)
On 19 February 1970, Sub-team A (Capt. Bruce Moulton, GySgt. Arthur Singletary, and
SSgt. R. Bowen) received a report from an official Source pertaining to 10 VC living in
Duc KY (H), Thanh Son (V), Dien Ban (D). At 2200 hrs, Sub-team A, one squad
from M/2nd /1st Marines, National Police, and Revolutionary Development Cadre
apprehended 11 Viet Cong suspects, four of whom were later confirmed as VCI. A VC
Village Chief, a VC Assistant Village Chief, a Village Women’s Association Leader and
an Assistant Women’s Association Leader were identified as VC. All detainees were
turned over to Dien Ban (D) Headquarters for interrogation and detention. Reference
(17) p. (2)
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On 20 February 1970, Sub-team C (WO.Tom Marino, SSgt Tom Dunn, SSgt. Nguyen
Son) and one assigned National Police officer provided support to H/2nd /1st Marines and
National Police Field Forces during a cordon and search operation at Xom Son Huy (H),
Hoa Long (V), Hoa Vang (D). A total of 225 Vietnamese Nationals were screened
against the Blacklist. Two suspects were detained and later released as innocent civilians.
Reference (17) Page (2)
On 21 February 1970, 1530 combined Unit 5th Mar/Regt-S-2/RF 369 and Sub-Team
Charlie, 3rd CIT (Lt. Marino. SSgt Dunn, SSgt Son, and two boys) continued across river
at 2110400H with 2 chieu Hoi’s to cordon and search area inhibited by VC/VCI living in
Caves and Bunkers, 1st Plt. C1/5 provided blocking force west of objective. Discovered
3 well constructed underground bunkers and captured 4 village level guerrillas and 2 VCI,
one on the Blacklist. Also captured 3 individual weapons, medical gear and other
munitions all pow’s were 20 o 25 years old. Bunkers destroyed. 5th Mar SptRpt Feb 70
On 21 February 1970, elements of Sub-Team D, along with one assigned National
Police officer, provided support to 3rd Bn/1st Marines and the 7/59th Regional Force
(RF) Company during a search and cordon operation in the vicinity of Ky Quang (V),
Dien Ban (D). A total of 30 Vietnamese Nationals were screened against the Blacklist.
All persons screened had proper identification. Reference (17) p. (2)
On 24 February 1970, information received from a Hoi Chanh disclosed that a
forward enemy command post consisting of several tunnels and bunkers, as well as
enemy troops, was probably located in the vicinity of Dien Xuan (V), Dien Ban (D).
A Kingfisher operation was initiated to neutralize the target. Before commencing the
Kingfisher, air strikes and 2 platoons from C/1st Bn/1st Marines supported by elements
of Sub-team A (Capt. Bruce Moulton, GySgt. Arthur Singletary, SSgt. J. Bowen) and the
Hoi Chanh were air lifted to the target area. Approximately 30 tunnels and caves were
found to have been destroyed by the preparatory fires. Another 10 tunnels and bunkers
were destroyed by the exploitation force. Reference (17) p. (3)
On 25 February 1970, Sub-team C ( StCmdr, WO. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts,
SSgt. Son) accompanied one platoon from the 134th Popular Forces (PF) Company, and
one PF Source to the vicinity of Tra Ky (H), Hoa Hai (V), Hoa Vang (D). The source
pointed out one secret tunnel containing one US Cartridge Belt, one notebook, and one jar
of salt tablets. After returning to the PF Company Headquarters, Quang Da Special
Zone provided another source who led a patrol consisting of Sub-team C and elements of
134th PF Company, 111th PF Company and Quang Da Intelligence personnel to the
vicinity of Tra Lo (H), Hoa Hai (V), Hoa Vang (D). The following items were
discovered in 3 feet of water in a finger lake: one Browning automatic rifle, one SKS
rifle, and one metal ammo box filled with documents. While recovering the above
items, two VC were observed swimming toward the East shore of the lake. They were
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taken under fire with unknown results. The ARVN were excellent fighters. Reference
(17) pp. (2-3)
Fig. 51 ARVN Troops in a firefight
(Photo courtesy of VWIP/Byrd)
On 1 Mar 1970 AT835455, A1/5 on patrol with CIT spotted 3 VC dressed in Black in a
hootch; Chieu Hoi was yelled to the VC and they started to run. No Weapons observed.
Unit initiated fire killing the 3 VC. Following items were found with VC, assorted
documents, 50 lbs tea, medical bag with medical equip./ supplies and assorted clothing.
CIT retained the Documents. 5th Mar SptRpt Mar 70
On 10 April 1970 Sub Team C, 3rd CIT (Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn Sgt. Shorts, Sgt. Son)
with 2 platoons from Company H and 1 from Echo established a cordon around Xom Son
Thuy (H). Sub-team C and Vietnamese assets will sweep the Hamlet at first light. At
0630 hrs a sweep was conducted and all civilians moved to a collection point and was
screened by CIT and 4 VCS were detained because their names appeared on the Blacklist.
VCS returned to BN POW compound for further interrogation. 2/1 sptrpt 1970
On 29 April 1070 Sub-team C, (Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn Sgt. Shorts and SSgt. Son) with a
squad of NPFF’s, and S-2 searched the area of BT060664. Thirty persons were screen
against the CIT Blacklist and 2 females 16 and 33 were detained and returned to BN CP
for further interrogation.
On 23 May 1970, 2/5 with rein Platoon from Duc Duc (D) conducted cordon and search
of Thon Don (1). Captured 1 AK 47 and 1 Sks Rifle. 90 VCS were screened by CIT and
ITT and detainees returned to BN for further questioning. 5th Mar SptRpt May70
About May 1970, Sub-team A (WO. Bill McClenithan, Sgt. Steve Lusk and Sgt. Bay)
proceeded to a location just southeast of Hoa Vang (D) along the river. Sub-team C
(SSgt Dunn/SSgt Son) captured a VC female commo liaison and accompanied Sub-team
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A to pinpoint a tunnel where a large sum of tax Money was hidden. While the Sub-teams
were occupied, the VC tried to escape by jumping into the river. By the time the Subteams got to the bank of the river, the VC female was halfway across. WO. McClenithan
fired M-79 rounds at the escaping VC. He was unable to see his interpreter at the edge
of the water, who was slightly hit by a piece of shrapnel from the M-79 rounds. The VC
was last seen slowly sinking to the bottom of the river, per the After Action Report.
WO. McClenithan was ribbed about being so hard on his interpreters for some time after
that. Someone told him he should not shoot his interpreter. WO. McClenithan in his
politically correct manner responded, “ He’s my damn interpreter and I’ll shoot him if I
want to.” Reference (18) Because WO. McClenithan was also tough on the VC
Cadre, he was included as the “Old Lt.” from American Intelligence in a captured
document listing people to be assassinated by the VC. WO. McClenithan was awarded
the Bronze Star/V. Reference (20) p. (1)
Fig. 52 Assassination request to kill WO. McClenithan, other CIT Members,
ARVN Officers and other Civilians.
In early 1970, Sub-team C (StCmdr, Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Shorts, SSgt. Son
and Assets) moved from Cau Ha (leper colony) to the 3rd Marine Amphibious Brigade
(MAB), 3rd Amtrac Bn Compound located at Marble Mountain. All future operations
for Sub-team C were conducted from this location.
Fig. 53 Troops celebrating dead NLF members with captured Flag. MM.
(Photo Courtesy of Vets With a Mission/Ward)
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In about April/May 1970 the Sub-team received word that Ba and Dung were going back
to the PF Co. they had been assigned to previously. A talk with SSgt. Son and the Boys
revealed they were not happy with the new Sub-team Commander. Who was “playing
games.” Actually he was trying to run our existing sources like he was taught in area
studies. SSgt. Son and SSgt. Dunn convinced them to stay, and they said ok, if MSgt.
Quan agreed. The next day SSgt. Dunn and SSgt Son went to talk to MSgt. Quan who
would talk to the CO of the PF Company. WO. Marino was told he had to go see the
CO to persuade him to let the boys remain with the team. The WO. “persuaded” the CO
to allow the boys remain with the Sub-team. The WO would never share his”private” talk
with the PF Cmdr but the Sub-team knew the PF Commander advised him on how to
handle sources in Vietnam. SSgt Dunn had a pep talk with SSgt. Son, Sgt. Shorts, Ba and
Dung and told them to give the WO a chance because we needed to get back to fighting
the war and finding VC because results had suffered from March to May. They agreed.
The WO was never told that we knew what had happened. The sources were back to
producing results by June 1970 and remained until May 1971 when SSgt. Dunn departed
Vietnam.
On 2 June 1970, 1340 hrs, as a result of intelligence developed and provided by female
source of Sub-Team C (StCmdr, Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, and SSgt Son) a pacifier
operation was conducted resulting in capturing a VC, Commo Liaison, Espionage
Section, III District, Da Nang. Upon interrogation by SSgt. Dunn and SSgt. Shorts, the
location of a VC ordnance cache was located. Sub-team C initiated an operation by way
of Amtracs with elements of the 2nd Bn/1st Marines. The detainee pinpointed where
57, 82 mm mortar rounds were buried. Sub-team C recovered the rounds and destroyed
one secret bunker. There were indications that this area may have been occupied by
members of the District III, Da Nang, after an old typewriter and a few sheets of
documents were found. Reference (21) p. (1). 2/1 spt rpt Jun1970.
Fig 54 Marines on Amtracs leaving 2/1 for Operation
(Photo courtesy of Marzone Website/Vilionis/Wilson)
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On 5 June 1970, 0800, AT830537, one platoon M 3/5 rein with company CP helolifted
from Hill 65 to cordon and search around Minh Tanh (3). While sitting up cordon KCS
with CP group spotted two VN males with weapons and black PJs running from Ville and
initiated fire missing both. Although element of surprise was compromised, cordon was
completed and patrol and CI Team searched the village. 17 VN were questioned resulting
in one detainee who provided the names of 3 VC living in Ville. 2 chicom grenades and
three boats were found during the search. 5th Mar SptRpt Jun70
On 12 June 1970, Sub-Team C, (SSgt. Dunn and SSgt. Son) with a Source, 106 Platoon
and Tanks, proceeded to the lakes (BT098642) in attempt to locate VC/ NVA hiding in the
area. The point man spotted 3VC/NVA and opened fire and rear elements flanked and
opened fire. Unit found 1 NVA KIA, and captured 1 POW who revealed a third wounded
NVA had been in the area. Upon departing the area a 500 lb. bomb was discovered and
blown in place. POW was determined to be from R-20 Bn. 2/1 sp rpt June 1970.
On 14 June 1970, 0600, M 2/5 cordon and search operation with CIT and ITT helolifted
from hill 65 to My Hiep (1). Force received small arms fire and a Marine tripped a booby
trap. 3 Marines WIA. 7 VC found in spider hole told to surrender and one refused and
shot at Marines, was killed then the 6 others surrendered. One VC KIA, captured was
District Finance officer, Corpsman, Nurse a VC Soldier and 2 NVA, Captured several
weapons and assorted gear. 5th Mar Spt Rpt Jun 70
On 17 June 1970, Sub-team C, (SSgt Dunn, Sgt., Shorts, SSgt Son) and a casual source
led CI and a squad from 106 Plt to 3 secret tunnels at BT078682. A search of the tunnels
resulted in the following; (2) NLF Flags (1) M-1 carbine, (1) SKS rifle, (3) Law’s, (1) 60
mm Mortar round, and (4) Claymore Mines, and considerable more ammunition and
explosives. SSgt. Dunn took one flag home when he departed which he donated to the
CI School in VA. Other Team Members had signed the Flag. 2/1 Spt Rpt June 1970
On 19 June 1970, Sub-team C (SSgt. Tom Dunn, SSgt. Nguyen Son) with a Source and
Team Hqs. (Capt. Phillip Roos and MGySgt. Jim Krudwig) with a squad from Echo, 2nd
Bn/1st Marines proceeded to Dien Ban (D) to locate VC Cadre reported in the area. SSgt.
Dunn was walking point and spotted 3 VC/NVA sitting and having lunch. The patrol was
stopped and Helicopter support was summoned to the back side of the village which was
bordered by a lake. Once air support was on location, approximately 15 VC/NVA started
to run and the patrol opened fire. A search of the village revealed nothing but a couple of
tunnels that SSgt. Dunn searched with following results: (1) M-16, (1) AK-47, (6) U.S.
Grenades and considerable other items. The Air Support continued firing as VC jumped
into the lake. The patrol upon searching the area found another AK-47. Two VCS were
detained by CI for further interrogation. The Village Chief, Ngan Cau (V ) reported the
next day that Phan Ti, a District level VC Security /Proselytizing Cadre was killed during
this action by the cobra gunship and the family claimed the body. CIT History/ 2/1 spt rpt
June 1970
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Fig. 55 Back side of Hoi Chanh Pass.
(Photo Courtesy VWIP)
On 30 June 1970 E&G 2/5 in cordon and search gathered 325 VN for screening by CIT,
ITT, and Propaganda Team while in cordon had 1 NVA walk up with hands in air. He said
he heard the broadcast and wanted to Chieu Hoi. He had been in the South since 1968, a
member of an NVA Transportation Unit and was in the Arizona Area to buy corn. He is
being questioned by CIT. There were 15 NVA KIA during operation. 5th Mar Spt Rpt
Jun70
On 21 July 1970 Sub-Team C, (Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son) and boys
with 2/1 participated in an operation with 2/1, and a platoon of tanks and 3 companies
2nd ROK Brigade encompassing an area from Tu Cau to ROK Border, to S. China Sea
then to Song Vinh Dion River. The results were eleven VC/NVA KIA, 2 VC wounded, 7
weapons captured and 8 VCS detained. Frag Order 006-70 July 1970
On 24 July 1970 1220H GF 2/5 AND I 3/5 with CIT Conducted cordon and search in My
Hiep Area detained 172 VN nationals for screening. Detained 1 female VCI, member
Mothers and Daughters Association. Operation resulted in 2 VC KIA, captured large
amounts of food, 2 lbs C-4, 1-M33 Grenade, 1 Chicom, 5th Mar sptrpt Jul70
On 24 June 1970, Sub-Team C (Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. ShortsSSgt. Son) with
source while on a sweep with G2/1 had source lead them to a secret tunnel at BT103652.
A search of the tunnel by CI produced (5) bottles medical gear filled with water, 1 AK-47
Mag. with 30 rounds, 60 xm-16 rounds, . All gear was destroyed.
The VC conducted a relentless campaign of terrorism against the civilian population,
especially those corroborating with Allied Forces. The VC and NVA were grenade
throwing enemy forces, supported by mortars and small arms fire. To combat those,
firearm readiness was essential to stay alive. SSgt. Tom Dunn carried a S&W, 6 shot
revolver that GySgt. Bill West had sold him when GySgt. West departed for the U.S. in
1968. SSgt. Dunn’s second M-16 also jammed most of the time with or without sand.
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Fig. 56 SSgt. Dunn Cleaning his M-16.
On 26 June 1970, Sub-team C, (Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son) while on joint
operation with Hotel 2/1 and 157th PF’s observed 3 VC. The PF’s took the VC under fire
resulting in 2 NVA/VC KIA and one NVA POW. SSgt. Dunn and SSgt. Son interrogated
the POW and found he was from the T-89th Sapper Unit. Since he was an NVA POW, he
was turned over to ITT for further interrogation.
On 26 July 1970 . Lt. Alan V. McDonald S-2 was replaced by 2nd Lt. G.G. Robinson.
Little did Lt. Robinson know what was in store for him within the next 3 or 4 days.
On about 29 July 1970, information was gathered and confirmed by SSgt. Dunn through
a female Source that the District III, Da Nang Headquarters was still located near the
area where the Mortar rounds were previously located in June. An operation was
conducted with 2 squads H&S Co., a section of tanks to confirmed the location of a
headquarters complex. The VC had heard the tanks coming and fled the area. The
bunkers searched with negative results but were left intact. 2/1 spt rpt summary Section
C(15) Jul 1970.
On 2 August 1970, SSgt. Dunn received new information confirming the VC were back
in the District Complex and were holding meetings. Lt. Marino, Sgt. Nalley, Ba, Dung
and SSgt. Son was sitting in the Hooch Kitchen area and SSgt. Dunn suggested a new
operation but that the element of surprise was the key to success and that the attack be
carried out at the VN rest period and everyone agreed a decoy airborne assault must be
used. SSgt. Dunn asked SSgt. Son didn’t he and the other Vietnamese take a rest in the
afternoon like siesta time for Mexicans. SSgt. Dunn had to explain siesta time and SSgt
Son said yes but more like 2-3 pm. Lt. Marino carried the plan to the BN S 3 operations
officer, Maj. Grinalds. Appendix (m) Letter Nalley 2011
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Sub-team C, (StCmdr, Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley and SSgt. Son, Ba/Dung)
along with the Source, and elements of 2nd Bn/1st Marines and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,
planned a pacifier operation. Reference (24) p. (1) Appendix (m) Letter 2012
Lt. Marino went to Team Headquarters, and tasked SSgt. Dunn to board a helicopter
and take pictures to pinpoint the target. The early morning weather was foggy and the
pictures were no good. About 2 pm, SSgt. Dunn left word by radio with the Team Clerk
at Team Headquarters that they could not get the pictures because of the weather. The
Clerk forgot to relay the message. Later that evening, 10:30 pm, Lt. Marino contacted
the Sub-team by radio, and was not happy because the target had not been photographed.
SSgt. Son, SSgt. Dunn and possibly Sgt. Nalley spent all night going over the maps and
all other information available, and further debriefed the Source.
Fig. 57 Helicopter loading up for an operation.
(Photo Courtesy of jalbum.net)
Lt. Marino, still upset that pictures of the target were unavailable returned the next
morning. The Clerk “ didn’t remember any message.” SSgt. Tom Dunn was about to
be busted, until SSgt. Son and Mr. Ba came forward to inform Lt. Marino of the actual
happenings to correct the Clerk’s recollection. SSgt. Dunn informed him that the target
had been pinpointed using the source, maps, past pictures and maps showing previous
tracks from military vehicles. SSgt. Dunn provided the exact coordinates to Lt Marino
who carried them to the operations Officer to use for the target of the operation.
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The 2/1 Bn, CO and S-3 with Lt Marino, briefed Col. P.X. Kelly, CO., 1st Mar.
Regiment, who briefed the G2, G3 and CG, 1st MarDiv. the day before and attended a
show at the “O” Club that night. Col. Kelly was also sent to brief the CO, 1st MAW.
The approval of an operation on such a short notice occurred because Sub-team C and
their Assets were so confident the Headquarters were still there and that the new
information was good.
On 4 August 1970, approximately 1 pm, one hour before the operation, SSgt. Dunn was
tasked to brief the operational elements of 2nd Bn/1st Marines on the target and
operational aspects and what to expect during the operation. This took place in the 2nd
Bn/1st Marines Officers/ SNCO Club. To avoid tripping booby traps in the area, the
troops were instructed to shoot to kill and not to chase the VC and were informed of new
information provided by the boys of Sub-team C about placement of booby traps.
Fig. 58 SSgt. Dunn’s K-54 Chinese Pistol
(Provided by SSgt. Dunn)
The Helicopter Assault kicked off about 2 pm. The Sub-Team members SSgt. Dunn,
Sgt. Nalley, and SSgt Son, and Ba and Dung, with disguised source, was in the second
helicopter with the Recon Squad and landed directly in the middle of the District III, Da
Nang, VC Infrastructure, Headquarters. Moderate small arms fire was taken during the
landing because of surprise. References (24) p. (1) And (25) p. (1) 2/1 spt rpt Aug 1970
The operation resulted in 15 VC/NVA killed, including the III District Da Nang, VC
District Chief, Lt.Col. Bon Thong, the Current Affairs Chief, and District Security Chief.
The VC Col. and Security Chief took the easy way out and shot themselves in the head
with pistols as the Assault Team moved in to capture them. A Doctor was wounded and
captured, along with 12 VC Cadre identified by the Source. Those captured VC then
provided information leading to subsequent operations and neutralizations, some listed
below. There were no friendly casualties. The VC/NVA were taken by total surprise and
this operation eliminated the leadership of VC District III, Da Nang, Headquarters.
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Some documents were found and retained and 8 weapons were captured. Engineers were
flown in on 7 Aug 1970 and destroyed bunkers. Lt. Tom Marino was in a good mood
that night. Reference (25) p. (1) This operation was written up in the Leather Neck
Magazine and mentioned in Reference (12) p. (168). There was also a 60 second clip
on the discovery channel.
Lt. Marino was on a different helicopter than the Sub-team and remained with the
Command Group or that is where we caught up with him after the firefights and searching
of bunkers and field interrogations were completed.
During the chaos of the above operation Sgt. Nalley and one other Marine took a VC
under fire and killed him. Not being sure which of their rounds killed him they are
probably still arguing today about who was responsible for the kill. This was Sgt.
Nalley’s indoctrination to CI Operations in Vietnam. The problem was; he thought all
others would be like this one. Article/Appendix G of May 2011. 2/1 SptRpt Aug1970
SSgt. Dunn while emerging from a bunker after searching it, observed the female source
wandering around alone because SSgt. Son and the two boys had left her. She was
disguised in fatigues, but scared. SSgt. Dunn told her to get behind him and follow,
staying close. As SSgt. Dunn looked up a VC came out of the bushes armed with an AK
47 running towards him and the Source. SSgt. Dunn raised his M-16 to fire and the thing
misfired. As he cleared the round the VC looked up, saw us, turned right and ran toward
the river. SSgt. Dunn and a helicopter took him under fire and he was history. SSgt. Dunn
and source then linked up with SSgt. Son and the boys. The Source was really letting
them have it in Vietnamese. Beatle-nut was flying everywhere! Even though she was
talking a mile a minute, SSgt. Dunn understood enough to know she was chewing them
out for leaving her behind, saying she could have been killed. SSgt. Dunn later cautioned
them about protecting their sources even during firefights.
Below are dead VC awaiting burial. The Vietnamese believe that if not given a proper
burial their souls would wander forever. When families could not bury their dead, U.S.
Marines often did. The VC wore only “Loin Cloths” or went naked during sapper attacks
to blend in with the local environment. War was not pretty nor fun.
Fig. 59 Bodies of dead VC to be buried by family.
(Courtesy of Marzone web-site/ Vilionis)
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On 21-22 August 1970, Sub-team C (Lt. Tom Marino, SSgt. Tom Dunn, Sgt. Nalley
and SSgt. Nguyen Son) SSgt. Dunn and Sgt. Nalley after debriefing a Hoi Chanh, who
provided the location of elements of the Headquarters, District II, Da Nang. The Subteam then initiated a pacifier operation in Thang Trung (V), Dien Ban (D) with subelements of 1st Marines and 1st Marine Air Wing personnel. Intensive small arms and
B-40 RPG rounds were taken during the landing. The results were 8 VC/NVA killed
in action, 2 VC wounded in action, and 25 were identified by a source as VC Cadre.
At least one was identified as a Provincial Level member of the VC Infrastructure,
who led to subsequent operations. (See Nov/Dec 1970/ Dist. II) A sweep of the area
resulted in the capture of three AK47s, one B-40 rocket launcher, and one rocket
round, numerous Chi Com Grenades, assorted small arms ammunition and medical
supplies, two lbs. of documents and assorted equipment and clothing. The successful
operation disrupted the VC District II, Headquarters and saved numerous lives of Fleet
Marine Force (FMF).
Fig. 60 7th Marines, exhibiting B-40 Rockets
(Provided courtesy Marzone/Vilionis)
On 17 Sept 1970, 1400 Hrs, Sub-team C (Lt Marino, SSgt Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son)
and source along with 2 squads from 106 Platoon and Helicopters continued to Viem
Dong, (H), Thanh, Thuy (v) where source had seen Luu CONG VC Guerrilla
Commander, who was known to provide security for Dang Thuy, VC Village Chief, three
days before. She would point out tunnel. One helicopter jumped the gun and arrived
prematurely and saw 3 groups of VC (20 to 30) on ground scattering in different
directions. Once on the ground, source pointed out 1 tunnel, 4 reinforced fighting holes,
and 5 mortar pits w/7 grenades. It was obvious the enemy was there minutes before the
unit arrival. Unit Destroyed 3 bunkers. 2/1 spot report Sept 1970
On 18 September 1970, 1700hrs, Sub-team C(Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt.
Son and Ba/Dung) with source led H2/1 to a secret tunnel. The tunnel was searched and
destroyed. Found 1 ammo can with documents and a section of a LAW. Detained 2
Female VCS and returned to BN CP. 2/1 SptRpt Sept 1970
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On 25 September 1970, 1240 H. C1/5 conducted a Pacifier operation of little
consequence to them at the time. Three inserts were the targets that day The 1st was Dry.
The second resulted in a family of VC surrendering to the Marines. It was the last insert
that turned into something unusual. A VC was killed and one was captured and
forwarded to ITT and would not talk and since he was a VC he was turned over to the 3rd
CIT. His Name was Nguyen Loi, one of the most important VCI captured in Quang Nam
Province. The rest of the story below 5 Oct 70! 1/5 spt rept Sept 70
During about September 1970, Messrs. Ba and Dung passed information that had paid
off greatly for Hill 55. Lt. Robinson, Bn S 2, 2/1, Sub-team C, Lt. Marino and SSgt.
Dunn drove to Hill 55 for a meeting with our counterparts.
Upon arriving they parked next to a 6-by truck which fortunately exploded after the three
of us visitors had safely entered the building. The jeep did not fare that well, it was
demolished during explosion and fire. Apparently the VC had attached a bomb to the
undercarriage of the truck, timer attached, hoping to kill Marines at Hill 55. Below SSgt.
Tom Dunn and Sgt. Gary Nalley tried to salvage parts from their jeep. See the yellow
unmarked shield with no ID. This picture in was on TV from USMC Archives.
Later after leaving Hill 55 for 2/1 Camp Lauer, in a replacement jeep past Liberty Bridge,
near Highway 1, they passed through a village with culverts along each side of the road
that they had noted before filled with trash. Someone noticed they had placed a blue piece
of plastic over one of the dumps. It had begun a light rain that day.
According to the book by Lt. Kellum, and CI remembering Ba and Dung’s lesson about
things hidden in plain view especially in trash, “The Lt’s had SSgt. Dunn check the trash
area.” SSgt. Dunn Leary of booby traps not finding a stick or other item to use as a
probe, took the whip antenna off the jeep radio, and lifted up the blue tarp. As he stirred
the trash the Staff Sergeant located a cache of M-26 Grenades, numerous Bouncing
Betties and Claymore Mines.
Fig. 61 Jeep blown up by grenade in 1970; no one was injured.
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A radio call was placed to the to the U.S. Army’s 80th Group which sent out an EOD
Team to disarm the explosives. A check of serial numbers revealed they came from the
“DaNang Barrier” a “friendly minefield” just north of Hill 55, used to block infiltration
routes for 122 Rocket and Sapper attacks against DaNang and surround areas. Ironically it
turned out to be a VC Explosives Supply Depot. The VC would enter the minefield,
disarm the explosives, take them store them. They would then reset them in areas
Marines frequented like trails, old houses where Marines patrolled, under vehicles, and
when Marines were in pursuit sucking them into minefields of their own making.
Reference 34. p.277
About 5 October 1970, Sub-team D received a prisoner captured on 25 September 1970
by 5th marines who turned out to be a A VC Commo Liaison Network Cadre, Espionage
Section, Quang Nam (P), Quang Da Special Zone. He was interrogated for at least a
month and would not talk. Sgt. Smith’s, 3rd CIT, debriefing of the prisoner, Mr. Loi
revealed considerable information including the fact that the Police Special Branch
Chief, Da Nang (CIA Asset) was a high level VC. This was the same Special Branch
Chief that didn’t provide interrogation results or information to SSgt Dunn during Meade
River in 1968. A Province Level Security Chief from Quang Nam Province (CIA
Asset) was also named as a VCI. This was the Police Chief that assigned National
Policeman to 3rd CIT. Based on the information and captured documents, these two and
many police and other VCI in Da Nang and Quang Nam (P) were identified and jailed.
The Province level Cadre, Mr. Loi did not break until he observed the Sub-team
watching an X rated movie. He had been in the mountains too long and was
enticed. He agreed to provide information to as long as he got to see the movies, his
wife got to visit and he was relocated. SSgt Son was the only Vietnamese trusted enough
to talk with Mr. Loi except CIT and CIA American, Mike C. A trailer load of pictures
and documents was placed in a secure building at 1st MarDiv. Late October 1970, Sgt.
Smith briefed the Commander, 1st Battalion 5th Marines on the existence and location
of the Quang Nam Special Sector (QNSS) VC Headquarters in the Que Son Mountains
and an operation was planned for early November. Reference (23) p. (22)
On 6 October 1970, 1300 hrs, Sub-team C, ( Lt. Marino, SSgt Dunn, Sgt., Nalley, SSgt.
Son, Ba/Dung) and 22 yr. old source led 1st plt /H2/1 and ROKMC to two tunnels at grids
BT 091662/101652. Caves were found and 1 M-26 grenade and all destroyed. 2/1 SptRpt
Oct1970
On 7 October 1970,1030 hrs, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley,
SSgt. Son.) and fire team from 106 Platoon were led by CI source to a booby-trap with 2
grenades and a 106 round. Items were removed and destroyed. 2/1 sptrpt Oct 1970
On 7 October 1970, Special Liaison Team investigated incident in Hoa Long (V) where
VC murdered 1 male suspected of working for CIT and in retaliation for a VC KIA on 5
Oct 1970.. Nothing of further significance was discovered except that the male did not
work for Sub-team C, 3rd CIT. 2/1 SptRpt Oct1970
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On 13 October 1970, Sub-team C, (StCmdr Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt.
Son) was led by source to a secret tunnel. BT 077664. The tunnel was searched and
contained the following items: 2 Ammo boxes with assorted clothing, assorted cooking
utensils, 2 grenades, M-26, 1ChiCom grenade, time-fuzes and other equipment. Items
turned into S-2. 2/1 SptRpt Oct 1970
On 17 October1970, Sub-team C, Lt. Marino, SSgt Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley, Ba/
Dung) and source led H2/1 to secret Tunnel in vicinity BT079665. Tunnel was L shaped
reinforced with bricks, lumber and tin, and 6x9’ long. Search of tunnel produced negative
results. Tunnel destroyed. 2/1 SptRpt Oct 1970
On 18 October 1970, Sub-team C, (Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt Son, Sgt. Nalley) and
boys along with G and H companies NP’s Army Broadcast, 2/1 Special Liaison conducted
cordon and search of Nui Kim Son. 1 male and 1 female VCS were detained. Unit found
31/2 sticks chicom plastic explosive which was destroyed. Detainees returned to Bn CP
for further interrogation. 2/1 SptRpt 1970
19 October 1970 1100 Hrs, Sub-team C, (Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley,
Ba/Dung) and a patrol from 2/1 with Bic Nam Village Chief proceeded to AT998623
where the Chief arrested 2 VC. Returned to BN CP for further interrogation by CIT. 2/1
SptRpt Oct 1970
For those who knew SSgt. Daniel Jasinski (Ski), Sgt. Smith shared this account. Mr.
Loi had provided SSgt. Ski information for an operation on which Sgt. Paul Smith did
not accompany him. SSgt. Jasinski said it would be very risky. SSgt. Jasinski jumped
15 feet from a helicopter through a thatched roof of a hooch. The results of the
operation are unknown, probably because SSgt. Jasinski scared them all to death.
On 23 October 1970, G 2/5 acting on information from CIT captured 1 VCI Penetration
Agent Age 20 with an M-16. He was forwarded to BN CIT for interrogation. 5th Mar
SptRpt Oct 70
On 24 October 1970 during a heliborne operation with H/2nd Bn/5th Marines in Que
Son Mountains, Sgt. Paul Smith injured his foot after jumping 25 feet from a helicopter.
He was the 13th Marine to jump. The problem was they were on the wrong mountain.
The helicopter returned and dropped them in the correct landing zone (LZ). Sgt.
Smith searched a vacated tunnel. On the way to the LZ the troops spotted a freshly dug
hole, determined to be a decaying VN male. Sgt. Smith started toward a flower similar
to a Black Eyed Susan and suddenly stopped, fearful of a mine or booby trap! He
backed up and never saw another “flower” in Vietnam. Reference (23) pp. (17-18)
On 5 November 1970, A and B Companies, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines were airlifted by
helicopter to the trail in Pagoda Valley. Sgt. Paul Smith, SSgt. Be, with Mr. Loi in
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support of 5th Marines continued up the trail to a large cubical rock about 17 feet tall.
The source revealed that this was their old headquarters and that the VC Regiment and an
NVA Regiment were just ahead.
Fig. 62 18 Ft. Cubical Rocks and blown Tunnel.
(Provided courtesy of Marzone /Vilionis)
The U. S. Marines continued up the trail, when suddenly a 50 cal. Machine Gun opened
fire and a grenade was thrown. SSgt. Tran Be was injured in the hand, and the Company
CO, Capt. Anthony Zinni, was shot across the back. Both were medivacked. Capt.
Zinni retired as a General in 2006.
The 5th Marine units dug in for a fight after calling for Fire Support from the U.S. Air
Force who conducted aggressive bombing raids, and a ship in the South China Sea
provided accurate shelling of the VC/NVA positions. Considering the S2’s direction,
Sgt.Paul Smith and Mr. Loi, (who was frightened and about to have a nervous condition)
were flown back to LZ Baldy. The remaining U.S. Marines cleaned up the area.
Fig 63 Battleship in South China Sea providing ground fire.
(Courtesy VWIP/Vaughn /Jewell )
One Marine was KIA and 6 were WIA. Approximately 100 VC/NVA were KIA. The
Marines killed 5 Cadre and captured 300 lbs. of Secret VCI/NVA documents and
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exposed photography of the enemy. Other documents included pictures and dossiers of
all undercover VC agents in and around Quang Nam Province. The operation was written
up in Stars and Stripes because a document was found from Madam Binh telling the
NVA/VC to ignore what was said at the Paris peace talks. It was simply for
consumption by the rest of the world, and the VC/NVA were to continue fighting toward a
victory! Reference (12) p. (167) and Reference (23) p. (22) Women holding
government and military rank was common at all levels of the NVA and the VC
Infrastructure. See Article at Appendix h and response to it Appendix I.
Fig. 64 NVA Female General
Fig. 65 VCI Cadre
(Photos courtesy Vets with a Mission/Ward)
Sometime in late October or early November 1970, Sub-Team C, (Lt Marino and SSgt.
Dunn, SSgt. Son) with Thanh Thuy Village and Security Chief in the jeep was crossing
Bridge at Nui Kim Son. It had just stopped raining. As standard operating procedure
once leaving bridge we sped up and noticed a women crossing the road from left to right
ahead of us. SSgt. Dunn driving veered to the left middle of the road. The woman
reached the right side of the road and a PRU Cadre said something to her and she turned
around and ran back across the road. There was a 12-15 foot drop-off on each side of the
road and SSgt Dunn veered to the left shoulder within a foot of going over. The women
ran into the mirror of the jeep on the right side which had not yet come to a stop and
almost landed in Lt. Marino’s lap. The women fell on the wet road and died on the spot.
SSgt. Son questioned the PRU as to what he said. He replied “ he asked her didn’t she see
the jeep coming? ” She turned and ran back without looking. The S-5 from 2/1 was
called and responded and the family was notified. The village officials and Pru told the
family it was her fault and the S-5 paid for the funeral. All was well except SSgt. Dunn
felt remorse. However, the rest of the story!
The female that was hit had been locked up by Sub-team C as a Commo-liaison for VC
on a previous occasion but released by District. The Village Chief still suspected her. At
the time of the accident the 3rd CI Team Commander, Capt. Roos, had been notified and
arrived at the BN Aid station and was told we had hit the girl with the jeep. The
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Corpsman was trying to resuscitate her and water was coming out of her lungs. The
TmCmdr looked at us and said we had better come up with a better story. He thought we
were lying and had water-boarded her. He was finally convinced of the truth by the S-5,
witnesses, and Corpsman. After that SSgt. Dunn was harassed about getting rid of VC
one way or the other.
On 4 Nov 1970, 10:30 Intell report from 3rd CIT /1450h / 1/5 Return of CIT Source Loi
to Division. The VC and NVA were calling out Loi’s name and saying they were going to
kill him. The Marines were in a firefight and he was panicking. Sent him to the rear.
5 Nov 1970 2120 BT 028430 1/5 found large cave Loi described to Marines, with 30 VN
ID cards, list of double agents, documents describing operating methods, 9 undeveloped
rolls of file, 9 mm pistol, Unit still searching area. 062115 hrs found 4 record bends
3x3x6, and one 3x4x15and another one 4x4x4 completely filled with records. 062000hrs
Items forwarded to BnCP along with a huge amount of other items.
After debriefing a Source on 10 November 1970, Bt 109462 a Sub-team including
WO. Don McWhorter and Sgt. Paul Smith learned there were NVA/VC conducting a
meeting on a certain beach. The Marine Units were standing down because of the
Marine Corps Birthday. The Sub-team obtained support from Army Helicopter units
that airlifted them to the target where small arms fire was overcome. The VC/NVA ran
into a Hamlet. Upon searching a family bunker, CI personnel located one VC who
refused their warning to come out. A grenade was thrown in, and the wounded VC was
medivacked after interrogation with no results. Abruptly the Sub-team was told they
had to terminate the operation because the helicopters were needed to transport Army
Nurses to the various Marine Corps Birthday Celebrations. Reference (23) p. (35)
5th Mar SptRpt Nov 1970
Fig. 66 Marine Troops in field didn’t have much of a celebration.
(Picture courtesy of Marzone/Vilinois)
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On 2 November 1970,1100hrs Sub-team C, (Lt Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt.
Son, Ba/Dung) with Co. G2/1 conducted cordon and search of Binh Ky (V). upon
screening villagers, 5 VCS were detained and returned to Bn. Frag order 39-70
On 15 November 1970, 2200 hrs, Messrs. Ba/Dung had reported a VC Political Meeting
was being held in An Tru (1) (H) BT878693. NAD Seals with Lt Marino, Ba and Dung
set up an ambush along waterway at the west side of Hamlet. G/2/1 entered the Hamlet
from the East to flush any VC out of the Hamlet. The VN Seals killed 5 VC in two
sampans from 10 Meters. The bodies and weapons were in 5 ft. of water. One wounded
VC was captured but died of wounds and 2 lbs of documents were captured, 1 M-26
grenade, and assorted clothing. NAD kept the documents and will provide a readout.
The wounded VC died because Dung, the boy 16 years old, was left “alone” to hang onto
an older and larger VC, in water, over their heads, and when the VC tried to drown the
boy, he shot the VC in the head. Sub-Team C was lucky it did not lose a valuable source.
SSgt. Dunn and Sgt. Nalley was not allowed on this operation because they were “too
tall.” 2/1 spt rpt 1970
On 22 November 1970, Sub-Team C ( Lt. Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley and SSgt.
Son) with team assets and elements of 2nd Bn 1st Marines conducted a heliborne raid
targeting the District II Da Nang Headquarters, VC Current Affairs Section. This
Operation was based on Information from debriefing source captured on previous
operation. The leader of this section was the notorious Major Kim, who had built the
entire Quang Nam (P) VCI Apparatus in the early 1960’s. The raid resulted in 10 VCI
killed and two NVA soldiers captured with their documents. The prisoners were a
Lieutenant and a Master Sergeant. The Lt. and his documents proved to be one of the
most important captives of the 1st Marine Division in Quang Nam (P).
On 25 November 1970,1300 hrs, Sub-team C, (Lt Marino, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt.
Son, Ba/Dung) with H23/1 conducted a cordon and search of An Tra BT076699. PF and
NPFF’s rounded up 128 villagers and CIT and ITT screened them detaining 2 VC
suspects. Found 2xM-79 HE rounds. 2/1 Spt Rpt Nov 1979.
On 7 December 1200hrs Sub-team C, Lt. Marino, SSgt Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley, Ba/
Dung) and a source along with 2/1, Engineers, ITT, Conducted a sweep at AT980608.
Approximately 80 villagers were screened, 10 were detained as VC suspects and source
pointed out 1 confirmed VC. 7 Bunkers and 3 tunnels were found and destroyed and
small quantity medical supplies were found and several enemy documents. SSgt. Dunn
departed the next morning on home leave for month of December. 2/1 SptRpt Dec 1970
In December 1970, Sub-team C (Lt. Marino, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son) and Assets based on
information from previous operation, conducted another helicopter assault with elements
of 1st Marines with the target being the Headquarters District II Da Nang, Security
Section, in Dien Ban District. The operation resulted in 19 VCI killed and the entire
District Security apparatus disrupted. SSgt. Dunn was on home leave. Reference (31)
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Capt. Roos commanded the most effective 3rd CI Team in its history in Vietnam and was
awarded the Legion of Merit/V. The 3rd Team performed so well that the CIA wrote a
Letter of Appreciation through the Ambassador to the Team. Additionally, MACV Saigon
sent an Army Colonel to the Team to interview CI Members to determine the secret of
their accomplishments. What the Colonel was told and what the truth was, well, may
have been worlds apart. The Tm Cmdr wasn’t about to give away the method of our
madness for success, so he relayed our modified Phoenix philosophy of identify, locate
and neutralize, coupled with Air Assaults. The gentleman in civilian clothes below is
Mike C. of the CIA. Capt. Roos is the gentleman with the plaque in his hand. Lt.
McWhorter is in the middle and SSgt. Dunn is behind Mike C. and Ba and Dung are
behind Capt. Moulton (half cut out) on the far left. Reference (80
Fig. 67. Capt. Roos Celebrating going home November 1970.
(Photo Provided by Capt. Roos.)
X. OPERATIONS 1971
January 1971, 3rd CIT received a classified Letter of Appreciation (Confidential), dated
Nov 1970, from the Office of Special Studies Group,(CIA), American Ambassador, thru III
MAF and the 1st Mar Div. The III MAF and 1st MarDiv letter thanked all members of the
3rd CI Team for their efforts in neutralizing the VCI. Reference (24) p.(1)
There were no noted CIT actions from 5th and 7th Marines during 1971.
On about January 15, 1971, Lt. Marino informed Sub-team C that he was being moved to
Team Headquarters to take care of a couple of special items for the Team Commander
before his departing for the United States in February. I believe we had also received
word that the 3rd CI Team would be deploying to Okinawa by June. SSgt. Dunn was
made Sub-team Commander once again on 5 January 1971. See Fitness Reports.
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On about January 27, 1971, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Tom Dunn, Sgt. Gary Nalley,
SSgt. Nguyen Son, Ba/Dung) collected and processed information concerning a Viet
Cong District haven site in Northeastern Dien Ban (D).
On 1 February 1971, 1330 hrs based on this hard intelligence, a Quick Reaction Force,
Heliborne Assault was conducted against the Site with SSgt. Dunn and his Sub-team and
a Source in the lead helicopter. A large volume of small arms fire was received and one
helicopter was drawn off Target and was shot down with the BN Commander aboard.
Everyone got out and were picked up safely and only minor injury to the pilot. The
operation resulted in 4 VC/ NVA killed. Additionally, 3 District Level VCI were captured
at the original Target area in three feet of water breathing through reeds. Approximately
15 VCI had escaped while rescuing the Bn Cmdr. The Bn Cmdr had told Sub-team C that
“he wanted us to put together an operation where they would get shot at” so CI obliged.
He never asked again. The operation would have been more successful had the Bn CO
stuck to the attack plan and not been drawn 150 yards off course by the VC District
security force. Forces left in place that evening killed 1 other VC. SSgt. Dunn thought
LtCol. Leftwich, was a better than average leader, but this new guy made him look like a
genius. Reference: BS/V Award write-up. 2/1 Spt Rpt Feb 1971
Fig. 68 Typical of Captured VC Cadre /26th Marines /Hill 55
( Picture courtesy of Marzone/Vilinois/Doman)
On 12 February 1971, A female source for Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt Dunn Sgt. Nalley,
SSgt. Son) in Nui Kim Son brought in (1) AK-47 Rifle. She stated that two villagers
buried the weapon just outside the village. Further debriefing is being conducted. 2/1Spt
rpt Feb 1971
On 23 February 1971, 0400 Sub-team C, (SSgt Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son, Ba/Dung)
received word several VCI were operating in Vicinity BT021681 during night hours. A
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cordon and search operation by CIT, S-2, S-5, ITT, G2/1 and HoaVang (D) officials
screened the villagers and 3VC suspects were detained by CI and 2 VCS were detained
by HoaVang (D) officials. 1 M-16,Zip Gun , 1 cross bow, 3 arrows, 1/2 lb. C4, 4-toepoppers, 2 M-26 grenades, numerous medical supplies and clothing were found. 2/1
SptRpt Feb 1971
On 24 February1971, 1935Hrs, Sub-team C, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son, Ba/
Dung) with source and 2/1 Special Liaison Tm, proceeded to BT067708 and captured 4
confirmed VC and returned to BN CP. 2/1 SptRpt Feb 1971
On 25 February 1971,1035H, Sub-team C, (SSgt Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son, Ba/Dung)
with S-2 Special Liaison Team proceeded with CIT to set up checkpoint at BT0727
leading into Nui Kim Son. Captured 1 confirmed VC Female 18 years old. Returned to
CP for further interrogation. 2/1 SptRpt Feb 1971
On 28 February 1971, Sub-team C(SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son, Ba/Dung) and the
Special Liaison Tm searched for 3 VC that had entered Nui Kim Son in an attempt to
capture a VN Female. The VC could not be located and CI asked Special Liaison Team to
place female under surveillance in the event they returned. An ambush will be set up and
she will be watched. 2/1 SptRpt Feb 1971
In March 1971, Sub-team D (SSgt. Daniel Jasinski, Sgt. Paul Smith) moved to Dai Loc
(D), LZ Baldy. The Kit Carson Scout Tran Bay who had been wounded in the Que Son
Mountains on a previous operation rejoined the Sub-team. Between March and April,
Mr. Sy, an Asset drove his scooter to Hill 37 to report that a large force of NVA would
attack Dai Loc (D) that night. The Sub-team counted 127 NVA and there were twice
that many more. Puff the Magic Dragon was called as the NVA were in the open. The
C-130 with 2x 30 cal. machine guns and 2x 40 mm grenade launchers pelted out enough
fire power that tracers looked like one single red line from air to targets. Sgt. Smith
was asked what it looked like after Puff was finished. His After Action Report (AA)
stated there were blood and guts all over the place. The General did not appreciate the
graphic description. Reference (23) p. (41)
Fig. 69 AC130 Gunship Puff the Magic Dragon
(Courtesy of VWIP/DOD)
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Fig. 70
Puff the Magic Dragon firing with 6 barrels
(Picture courtesy of VWIP)
Late March 1971, on his last operation, Sgt. Paul Smith received information about VCI
activity in the Happy Valley Area. The 5th Marine S-2 was briefed, and the 1st platoon
from E Company, 2nd Bn/5th Marines provided security for the Helicopter Assault. Sgt.
Smith was in the Light Observation Helicopter (LOCH) and dropped smoke on the
Target. This was a first for him and he was better on the ground which is where they put
him. They found a female Commo-Liaison between 12-15 years old, dressed in black
with a belt, a P-38 Pistol and ammunition, that had been killed by one of the Helicopter
Gunners. Upon arriving back at the Compound, the Company Commander asked Sgt.
Smith what he was doing there? He stated he just came in with the Platoon. The
Company Commander thought Sgt. Smith had been shot down in the helicopter and sent
the 2nd Platoon after his body. Sgt. Smith said he was happy to disappoint him.
On 2 March 1971, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son) and
Messrs. Ba and Dung and a new Hoi Chan accompanied by a patrol from 2/1 proceeded
to Tan Luu (V) and captured one VC Cadre pointed out by source. VC turned over to
Quang Da Special Branch for further interrogation. 2/1 Sptrpt 1971
On 4 March 1971, Sub-team C (SSgt. Tom Dunn as Sub-team Commander, SSgt.
Nguyen Son, and Assets Ba and Dung) coordinated with Da Nang Special Sector
(DNSS) for an operation in Son Thuy (H), Hoa Vang (D) to capture Sapper Cell
members working for VC, III District, Da Nang. Even though unsecured, SSgt. Dunn
volunteered to enter the Hamlet and captured a Sapper Cell Leader and an Assistant
Sapper Cell Leader. After interrogation of the VC, SSgt. Dunn coordinated with DNSS
and upon entering the Hamlet killed three VC and the Team captured 16 more VCI. Five
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weapons were captured along with 82-M79 rounds, explosives and a large quantity of
VC documents.
Reference (27)
Fig. 71 Personal VN Cross of Gallantry awarded by Mayor of Da Nang
On 4 March 1971, Sub-team C (StCmdr SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son) was notified
by 2/1 Special Liaison Team that three 3 VC males had entered the military dump at
BT091713 captured, interrogated and and assassinated a source that worked for Subteam C. Special Liaison pursued the 3 assassins but they got away. The Liaison Team
did spot a female VC known to be a VC whom they suspected of being an accomplish to
the assassination. They turned the VC over to Sub-team C for further interrogation.
Special Liaison Team #2 captured a male 15 years old running away from Nui Kim Son
and was spotted at the site of the assassination. He also was turned over to Sub-team C for
interrogation. 2/1 Spt rpt mar 1971
On 5 March 1971 Sub-team C, (StCmdr SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley) with source
and patrol from 2/1, BT 077707, apprehended a 21-28 year old male VC. SSgt. Dunn
and Sgt. Nalley interrogated the VC in the field and the VC admitted being the shooter in
the assassination of Ms. Mai, 3rd Cit Source, the day before. The VC was taken to CI for
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further interrogation and identified several other vc names and locations. Ms. Mai was
buried in sitting position, in sand, up to her head and honey was poured on her head and
ants let go. This was after cigarette burns were used on her face. The VC was then mad
at her and shot her in the head with a 45 Caliber pistol as a symbol “since she worked for
the Americans.” After further interrogation it was learned that Ms. Mai never told him
anything and had spit in his face. He had to kill her to save face. Ms. Mai is below
on the right. CI History 2/1 spt rpt 1971
Ms. Mai
Fig 72
On 6 March 1971 Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley and assets)
after further interrogation by SSgt. Dunn and Sgt. Nalley, the above prisoner led 2/1 S2
Scouts to BT 082709 and captured 2 VC males 18 years of age who were involved in the
assassination of the CIT Source. Sub-team C returned the VC to compound for
interrogation. 2/1 spt rpt 1Mar 1971
Approximately 2 hours after interrogation of two above VC, by SSgt Dunn and Sgt
Nalley, Sub-team C, and S2 Scouts proceeded to previous location and captured three VC,
16-18 years old pointed out by previous detainees. They had in their possession 72
xM-79 rounds, and three pounds of medical supplies. Returned to CI for further
interrogation. 2/1 Spt Rpt Mar 1971
On 08 March 1971, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son, and Ba/
Dung) upon interrogation by SSgt. Dunn and Sgt Nalley, with VC captured on 6 March
1971 and S 2 Scouts proceeded to BT084705. Sub-team C apprehended 4 VC males
16-17 years old identified by prisoner. Detainees returned with CI for Interrogation. 2/1
Spt rpt 8 Mar 1971
On 10 March 1971, 0600 hrs, Sub-team C, (StCmdrSSgt Dunn Sgt Nalley, SSgt Son, and
assets) and F Company conducted a cordon and search operation of Tan Luu (H)
(BT084703) with NPFF from Hoa Vang(D) Headquarters. VC approached cordon from
inside immediately, spotted the Marines and fled dropping a claymore, which was
recovered. A sweep and screening of people produced 3 male VC guerrillas and 1
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female, 16-18 years old captured by S 2 scouts and Sub-team C. The VC were taken to
BN POW Compound for further interrogation. 2/1 sptrpt 1971
Fig. 73 Village of Nui Kim Son/Marble Mountain
On 23 March 1971 Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt Son) and Messrs.
Ba and Dung along with Golf 2/1, S 2, S5, and Hoa Vang (D) Representatives effected a
cordon and search of BT021681 at 0400 hrs. A search of the area revealed 3 VC and
screening of civilians resulted in 3VC on the Blacklist sent to the BN POW Compound by
CIT and 2 VC/NVA sent to Hoa Vang (D) by District Police. (1) M-16 Zip gun, (1) Cross
Bow w/3 arrows, (2) maps, ammunition and explosives were found. 2/1 Spt Rpt 1971
On 24 March 1971, Sub-team C,( StCmdr,SSgt Dunn Sgt. Nalley, SSgt Son and assets)
with 2/1 Liaison Team based on information received from VC captured on previous day
proceeded to Nui Kim Son area and captured 4 confirmed VC cadre. 2/1 spt rpt 24 Mar
1971
On 25 March 1971, S 2. 2/1 Liaison Team, and Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt.
Nalley, and SSgt Son and assets) with one VC from previous operation captured one
confirmed Female, VC at checkpoint leading into Nui Kim Son. Processed to 2/1 Bn
POW Compound for interrogation. 2/1 spt rpt Mar 1971
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Fig. 74 SSgt. Dunn at bottom with back toward you looking backwards.
MSgt. E.E. Lee to Left sitting. Lt. Marino to right standing.
Left of E. Lee sitting is MSgt Leslie Lee. Sgt. D. Moen Center
standing.
To right of Moen is Lt. McWhorter.
SSgt. H. Sprinkle in middle sitting. Black Marine Lt. Robinson S2, 2/1.
On 25 March 1971, Sub-Team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley and
assets) with S 2 Scouts and sources previously captured and interrogated by SSgt. Dunn
and SSgt. Son continued to BT997697 and captured two confirmed VCI, 26-28 years old.
The prisoners were returned to 2/1 compound for further interrogation. 2/1 spt rpt Mar
71
On 26 March 1971, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son and Ba/
Dung) accompanied by S 2 Scouts and CI Source proceeded to vicinity BT074707 and
captured 1 VC male, 15-17 years old, pointed out by source as VC. Returned to
Compound for further interrogation.
On 30 March 1972 Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, Sgt. Nalley, SSgt. Son and Ba/
Dung)(V) upon interrogation by SSgt. Dunn and Sgt. Nalley with prisoner, VC squad
leader, captured on 25 Mar 1971, with Echo 2 proceeded to Nui Kim Son, where VC
identified 2 female VC, 17 and 19 years of age, and 1 male VC, 14 years of age. The
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Male, VC then led patrol to 2 Booby-traps with C-4, one trip-wired and one command
detonated. Both were blown in place. Prisoners were taken to to compound for further
interrogation. 2/1 spt rpt Mar 71.
On 31 March 1971, Sub-team C, (StCmdr, SSgt. Dunn, SSgt. Son, Sgt. Nalley and assets)
with H Company, Bn S2, 157th RF Co., Hoa Vang (D) Advisors and NPFF, conducted a
cordon and search operation of Yen Ne (1). During the Screening and search 7 VCS
were captured and 1 K-54 Chinese Pistol, as well as 10 lbs.of medical supplies were
destroyed. Detainees and Pistol were returned to CIT. 2/1 Spt Report 31 Mar 1971
Sub-team C moved into 3rd CI Team Headquarters sometime in April 1971 which was
located on DaNang Airfield. During the period October 1969 to May 1971 there were no
friendly serious casualties during any Sub-team C operations or patrols that SSgt. Dunn
can recall, especially as a result of CI planned operations. This in SSgt. Dunn’s opinion
was their greatest accomplishment while capturing and killing numerous NVA/VC. SSgt
Dunn departed for the United States in May 1971. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines also
departed in May 1971. The remaining members of the 3rd CI Team was taken to
Okinawa by Capt. Schoyer in July 1971.
XI. CREDITS FOR AIR/GROUND SUPPORT
As acclaimed by all CI Marines, the day to day Sacrifice and Heroism of the Helicopter
Pilots of the Marine Air Wing are to be heralded. Helicopters were used more than any
other means of transportation to targets except walking. Pilots were brave and
indispensable during the war. Helicopters dropped Marines in hostile Landing Zones
(LZs) under fire and medivacked the injured out of hot LZs. They cleared LZs with
rocket fire before landing to eliminate Booby Traps . They returned fire when RPG 40
Rockets were fired at them and the Marines they were unloading. Helicopter Pilots had
no place to hide on the ground, and risked their lives to pick up Marines and captured
wounded enemy alike. They flew missions to draw fire to locate enemy positions. These
heroes garnered a great deal of respect and appreciation. It is amazing that the 3rd CI
Team participated in over 350 combat operations most by helicopter, yet never received
recognition for these actions. It would be interesting to see how many pilots were
awarded medals from dropping us off in hot LZs. Reference (25). p. (3.)
Figure (75) is typical of their courage.
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Fig. 75 Helicopter loading Marines for an Operation.
(Picture courtesy of Marzone Website /Vilionis)
CIT personnel were accompanied by Fire-teams, Squads and Platoons up to Battalions
on most operations. They were U.S. Marines and that says it all. They fought on the
ground, face to face, hand to hand, whatever it took to support and protect, and to
capture and kill. Semper Fi to all Marines, then and now and forever.
Fig. 76 Firefight with enemy
(Picture courtesy of VWIP/Vaughn)
Another category deserving special mention, is the Medical Corpsman provided by
the U.S. Navy. Everyone that has served in a war zone understands the bravery,
dedication, and life saving actions that these men exhibited on every operation. Each
Corpsman that served in Vietnam deserves the recognition that is afforded a hero.
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When asked, one may find they were decorated for their valor. They were the
Marine’s best friend! They were in fact Marines!
Fig. 77 Corpsman applying a Compressed Bandage.
(Picture courtesy of VWIP)
XII. CREDIT FOR SUB-TEAM MEMBERS AND ASSETS
SSgt. Dunn’s opinion was that Lt. Marino was a good Sub-team Commander during his
10 months with the Sub-team but was pure “politician” with BN Officers. He, with a
little coercion, let us handle the operational aspects and he handled the BN politics. It
served him well in the end. SSgt. Dunn was assigned as Sub-team Commander in
October 1969 to build the sub-team as there was only one source left who turned out to be
a VC. SSgt. Dunn initiated liaison with District, Village and Hamlet Officials, and MSgt.
Quan at DNSS. SSgt. Dunn recruited these officials and the “boys” Ba and Dung from
QDSS and Sandy and Mai in Nov. and Jan. 1969. SSgt. Dunn added VC Ba in June
1970. Spot Reports and AA Reports confirm this. Sgt. Shorts was assigned and added
“Wendy” from around “TuCau” Bridge to the Sub-team about Jan 69. Sgt. Nalley was a
valuable and dedicated member of the Sub-team for 10 months and was a great aid to
SSgt. Dunn in interrogations, debriefs and working with the Vietnamese. SSgt. Dunn as
his second supported Lt. Marino from mid Feb 70 to Jan 71. SSgt. Dunn was Sub-team
Commander again in Jan 1971 to May 1971, and was very effective during that period.
Col. Leftwich got the Silver Star and Lt. Marino received the Bronze Star/V for the 4
August 1970 operation. The Grunts/Wingers got Bronze Stars and Cross of Gallantries,
Distinguished flying Crosses. See Appendix I, K, and L. The Team Commander Capt.
Roos received the LOM /V. The Division G2 got the LOM/V. SSgt. Tom Dunn and Sgt.
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Gary Nalley each received a Bronze Star/V, as an end of tour award. No knowledge of
others.
SSgt. Nguyen Son received the Navy Commendation Medal/V and He should have
received a Bronze Star/V. SSgt. Son’s abilities were accentuated by his bravery,
dedication, and loyalty. The Sub-team, as well as Team Headquarters, valued his
knowledge and friendship. There cannot be enough good things said about SSgt. Son.
He was a loyal friend.
Messrs. Ba and Dung were born and raised as VC. They operated in an area similar to
what became the Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility (TAOR) of the 2nd
Battalion, 1st Marines in 1969-1970. They were primarily commo liaison, lookouts, and
low level information gatherers. They were captured, interrogated and exploited by RVN
Officers with the Da Nang Special Sector. Ba and Dung were assigned and had lived with
Sub-team C from 1 December 1969 because of a close CI relationship between SSgt.
Dunn, SSgt. Son and MSgt. Quan of Da Nang Special Sector. They almost quit in April
or May 1971 but SSgt. Dunn and SSgt. Son and Msgt. Quan persuaded them to stay.
Their sources, knowledge of the terrain, their recognition of VC Cadre and methods of
operations proved to be of tremendous value to the Sub-team and 2nd Bn 1st Marines.
Both Ba and Dung claimed to be about 17 years old in 1971. Although they were a bit
wild, it was obvious that SSgt. Son could exercise very effective control over their
actions. There was a special relationship between SSgt. Son, Ba and Dung. One
weekend, SSgt. Dunn recalled Mr. Dung pulling a 45 Cal. Pistol on a Marine who had
been drinking. It took some talking for SSgt. Dunn to convince him to put the weapon
away. SSgt. Son had taken the same kind of corrective action with both assets on
numerous occasions (almost daily) as did Lt. Marino and Sgt. Nalley. They were a
handful but normally on small issues. Messrs. Ba and Dung were employed at check
points, during screening operations, and operated with Marines on a daily basis. Not
only did the grunts like them, but the S2/S3 and CO were appreciative of their activities.
Lt.Col. William Leftwitch was the CO in 1970 and he routinely made a point to engage
Ba, Dung, and Son in conversations, particularly about tactics and responses to tactics
by local VC elements. Ba and Dung were amazed that this popular and experienced
officer would want to exchange ideas with them. They thought he was a great
commander and would walk around the Compound just to talk with the Colonel. We
owed them a lot. It was said that Dung joined NAD Vietnamese Seals and was KIA. Mr.
Ba tired of war simply went home. It is hoped that he is still alive and well.
Ms. Mai, and Ms. Ba and all the other 3rd CIT Assets were also dedicated, brave and
trustworthy. CIT personnel prayed for their survival, accepting that some would perish.
Both deceased.
About June 1971, Assets of Sub-team C, Mr. Tuan, Thanh Thuy (V) Security Chief
and the Village Chief Thong, along with the Hamlet Chief Phien, rode their motorcycles
home everyday and just as they departed for DaNang they were ambushed and
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killed by five VC with AK 47’s. They were riding together on their motorcycles across
Tu Cau Bridge after U.S. Marines left.
Mr. Anh joined the RVN but was killed by a truck while riding home on his bicycle in
1970.
Mr. Thanh joined the RVN Army in 1970 and was never heard from again.
Ms. Wendy was threatened by VC and Sub-team C relocated her in 1970.
SSgt. Nguyen Son wrote a letter to SSgt. Tom Dunn about 6 months after the Marines
left. SSgt. Dunn wrote SSgt. Son back, but never heard from him again. It was found he
went to Guam and then Australia and is deceased.
SSgt. Daniel Jasinski and SSgt. Tom Dunn departed approximately 5 May 1971 by
United Airlines, and the remainder of the Team left June/ July 71 by ship to Okinawa.
XIII. TEAM AWARDS AND CREDIT TO ALL CI
PERSONNEL
Fig. 78 A sampling of some of the 3rd CIT Awards.
The 3rd CI Team personnel were highly effective during the Vietnam War, reflected in
small part by the number of awards received. Great dedication, courage, and valor were
demonstrated under extraordinary circumstances. The 3rd CIT traveled roads and trails
to conduct operations, to meet sources, for liaison with other agencies, many times
before the Mine sweeps were completed. Roads were dusty or oiled and slick in the
summer, and flooded and slick in the Monsoon Season. The CI Marines traveled
through enemy territory accompanied by 1 or 2 persons, usually Vietnamese. They were
involved in the majority of operations in the Vietnam War in one way or the other.
Countless operations were initiated by the Sub-teams and by 3rd CI Team Headquarters.
Deservedly the CI Team was decorated with numerous Unit awards.
Reference (28)
3rd Counterintelligence Team
PUC
8Mar65-31Oct66
SU 3rd MarDiv
PUC
10Oct66-15Sep67
SU 1st MarDiv
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75
MUC
MUC
NUC
PUC
NUC
MUC
MUC
XIV.
16 Sep67-30Nov70
30Mar-15Apr75
29Apr-13May75
20Nov-9 Dec68
7 Dec68-8Mar69
7-12 June69
14 Apr-22 May71
SU Cmdr 7th Fleet
SU Phib Evac Scty Force
DET Su 1st Mar Div (Meade River)
SU Task Force Yankee
SU 1st BN 5th Marines
SU 3rd MAB
CONCLUSION
Many of the 3rd CIT personnel as well as tactical commanders were serving their 2nd and
3rd tours in Vietnam during the 1969-1971 era. Obviously the result was a wealth of CI
and tactical leadership and experience. From 1967 to 1971, the 3rd CIT conducted
numerous large, medium and small scale operations. Throughout this period, 3rd CIT
personnel exhibited outstanding professional skill and clever, innovative, energetic
pursuit of a very elusive enemy. Many operations were non productive, and some were
highly successful during the last few years of the war because of valuable experience that
had been gained previously. Success breeds success and through the efforts of the 3rd
CIT personnel, major tactical units such as the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines became acutely
aware of the crucial role of counterintelligence in Vietnam Operations. This awareness in
turn inspired a performance by this Battalion beyond its more conventional capabilities.
The, S2, S3, and Bn Commander, and CI Sub-Team Commander was well rewarded for
their contributions, per Appendix I, and Reference 33. It was noted that other Sub-team
C members who participated in the 4 August 1970 Operation were not recognized for
their contributions to that operation.
The 1960-70’s were the days of the hippies, love-ins and Antiwar Protests in the United
States. Organizations such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Black
Panther Party (BPP), Movement for a Democratic Military (MDM), and the Vietnam
Vets Against the War (VVAW), flourished at the time. The U.S. Military was very
unpopular both in the United States and overseas. It was not uncommon for military to be
called names such as baby-killers, murderers, psychos and a few choice cuss words, not
to mention being spat on in airports and other public places. May our troops today never
suffer those indignities! The individuals of these units conducted themselves with
honor, dignity, character, spiritual faith and love of country expected of U.S. Marines.
Even though they played songs such as “I can’t get no Satisfaction! We gotta get outta
this place, if it’s the last thing we ever do!” on a boom box on any given day.
History has revealed the pullout of Americans from Vietnam in 1971 to 1973 was too
soon. America had defeated the enemy and with more concentrated bombing could have
brought the war to a favorable conclusion. Instead the Antiwar groups, and Antiwar
sentiment of the U.S. population influenced by the Media dictated that Allied Forces pull
out. Politicians made sure that happened when they cutoff funding for subsequent South
Vietnam efforts, insuring the North Vietnamese and VC would prevail.
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Reference (9) provides a good read, especially the following information from a Wall
Street interview with Col. Bui Tin. Reference (30) Col. Bui Tin was on the general staff
of the North Vietnamese Army and received the unconditional surrender of South
Vietnam on April 30, 1975. After the war he became disillusioned with the Norths'
handling of pre and post war NVA leaders and citizens of South Vietnam. He left
Vietnam in 1990 and lives in France.
Quote from Col. Bui Tin, “Our loses were staggering and a complete surprise. Giap
(General) later told me that TET had been a military defeat though we had gained
important political advantages when Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run for
reelection. The second and third waves in May and September were, in retrospect,
mistakes. Our forces in the South were nearly wiped out by all the fighting in 1968. It
took us until 1971 to reestablish our presence, but we had to use North Vietnamese troops
as local Guerrilla Units. If the American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon
in 1969, they could have punished us severely.
We suffered badly in 1969 and 1970 as it was. If Johnson had granted Westmoreland’s
requests to enter Laos and block the Ho Chi Minh trail, Hanoi could not have won the
war….it was the only way to bring sufficient military power to bear on the fighting in the
South. Building and maintaining the trail was a large effort involving tens of thousands
of soldiers, drivers, repair teams, medical stations, communications units…our operations
were never compromised by attacks on the trail. At times accurate B-52 strikes would
cause real damage, but we put so much in at the top of the trail that enough men and
weapons to prolong the war always came out the bottom…if all the bombing had been
concentrated at one time it would have hurt our efforts. But the bombing was expanded
in slow stages under Johnson and it didn’t worry us. We had plenty of time to prepare
alternate routes, and facilities. We always had stockpiles of rice ready to feed the people
for months if a harvest was damaged. The Soviets bought rice from Thailand for us.
Support for the war from our rear was completely secure while the American rear was
vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to the world news over the radio at
9AM to follow the growth of the Antiwar movement.
Visits to Hanoi by Jane Fonda, and former Attorney General Ramsy Clark and ministers
gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses. We were
elated when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese dress, said at a news conference that
she was ashamed of American actions in the war and would struggle along with us…those
people represented the conscience of America…part of it’s war making capability, and
we turning that power in our favor.” End Quote.
It is said that history repeats itself. Today it would be a catastrophe if these mistakes
were repeated in the Middle East. America must stay the course in the war against
terrorism, otherwise America will need to learn to live in fear similar to that in Israel.
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While one cannot at this level change our politicians, one can pass some words of wisdom
on so that a better job can be accomplished by Counterintelligence personnel.
Never lose faith in God. If one does not have it, get it! Pray often. Maintain Integrity.
Be honest with leaders and foreign personnel. Weed out those that cannot be trusted.
Work for God, not self. Give one’s best.
Work when others do not. When the enemy cannot be engaged, study the enemy, his
modes of operation, and the enemy’s area of operations as well as the friendly force’s
area of operations. Coordinate with other AO Intelligence personnel. Never ever trust
the enemy to abide by or honor a ceasefire or to act in a manner that the U.S. would
perceive as honorable.
Learn the basics of the Language. How can one tell if an interpreter is translating the
enemy’s answers truthfully during interrogations and friendly source meetings? Ask
questions known to be sensitive to the culture where the answers are known already.
One will soon determine if the interpreter or defector can be trusted. Surround one’s
self with people that can be trusted and are dedicated, especially defectors, local
personnel and sources. Know the enemy, foe and friendly.
Establish a good working and social relationship with other police, intelligence, military,
city, village officials and religious leaders. People do not want “take, take” and no Quid
Quo Pro. Recruit, Recruit, Recruit Sources.
Treat all with respect even the lower level civilians. They can provide valuable
intelligence and warnings. Help them in the villages or suburban areas. Respect their
culture even if one doesn’t agree with it. Do unto others as one would have them do in
return! Don’t roll over.
Officers give your enlisted Marines the credit they deserve, the medals they warrant and
thanks for their efforts. Our leaders did not always do that. They were self serving and
more worried about their promotions than taking care of the ones that were making sure
they stood out. Be fair.
Most of all, be brave, and safe. Keep the head down and live to fight another day. If the
enemy wants to die, U.S. Marines can see that they reach their goals. We can put God in
control, but he gave each of us a brain. “Do not forget to tie your Camel”. Semper Fi
to all.
This history was prepared from interviews and from documentation. The most
significant operations were included along with portions from Feb-Mar 1970 activity
reports, such as cordons and searches. Other documents referenced included fitness
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78
reports, articles, USMC History, awards and letters of appreciation and written and
verbal input from CIT personnel. More input from other Sub-teams and missing After
Action reports will be gratefully included.
Recommended changes to this History require approval after verification of accuracy
of the information and review of supporting documentation. The passage of time may
have dimmed some accounts and recollections. Every effort was made to be as
accurate as possible. Any errors or oversights are unintentional.
If any any credit was taken where credit was not due or misappropriated it was purely
unintentional and due to the lapse of time and correlation of events or incidents with
locations of sub-teams and personnel at the time.
No parts may be reproduced without prior written approval of the author.
Semper Fi,
Thomas W. Dunn
[email protected]
Cc. NMITC
Original Contributors/Reviewers: 2006
Chuck Bushey
Bill Evans
Yogi Gordon
John Guenther
Ralph Jarvis
Paul Smith
Tom Marino
Bill McClenithan
Bill Roth
Steve Shea
Jim Krudwig
Appendices:
A. List of References
B. Members of 3rd CIT
C. VN Cross of Gallantry
D. Bronze Star Citation
E. VN Picture W Captured NVA Medal.
F. Grunts Get Credit Article for Sub-Team C, 3rd CIT Work
G. Sex and Aerodynamics
H. Response To Appendix G by Capt. Roos. TmCmdr, 3rd CIT
I. Cam SA Caper District III OP Article May 2012
J. Personal Email /Pertaining to Appendix I
K.
Silver Star For 2/1 Battalion Cmdr Col. Leftwich, Jr.
L.
Letter McClenithan 2011
M.
Letter Nalley 2011
79
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APPENDIX A. List of References
1. MCCIA.Org, The Vietnam War 1960-1975, Section 9, CI History,
1988.
2. Steven P Shea, USMC Former Sgt., Personal Letter, 3rd CIT History
Input with 11 Page enclosure, 3 Fitness Reports, and Photographs. 14
Feb 2007.
3. Discussion with USMC Capt. M. Dubrule, NMITC of March 2007.
4. W. A. Evans, USMC MSgt., Retired, VN Information, 3 pages, 6 Mar
2007.
5. W. H. Roth, USMC MSgt, Retired, The Last Night, 4 pages, 6 March
2007.
6. T.W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Fitness Reports, 1968-1971, with
attached DD-214’s for 1968-1973, 30 Pages.
7. T. W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Interview by Phone with R. Jarvis,
USMC MSgt. Retired, Jarvis International, of 25 Feb 2007.
8. T.W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Memory, 3rd CIT 1968-1971.
9. Bui Tin, NVA Col. Retired, Following Ho Chi Minh Memories of a
North Vietnamese Colonel, University of Hawaii Press 1995.
10. T. W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Interviews by Phone with W.
McClenithan WO., USMC Retired, Aug 2006, and with W.A. Evans,
USMC MSgt. Retired, W. H. Roth, USMC Msgt. Retired, 6 March
2007.
11. G. R. Braun USMC Maj., War Trophy Registration, 15 May 1971.
12. G. A. Cosmas, T. P. Murray, USMC Lt.Col., U. S. Marines in
Vietnam, Vietnamization and Redeployment 1970-1971, USMC History
and Museum Division, Hqs. , USMC, Washington, D.C., 1986.
13. T. W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Interview by Phone with W. Roth,
USMC MSgt. Retired, 10 March 2007.
80d
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14. Le Ly Hayslip with Jay Wurts, When Heaven and Earth Changed Places,
1989, 2003, 1st Plume Printing 1990.
15. C. J. Bushey, USMC Capt., Retired, Email with attached Photographs,
Dated 5 August 2006.
16. C. J. Bushey, USMC Capt., Retired, 3rd CIT Team Activity Report, Jan
1970, dated 1 Feb 1970.
17. C. J. Bushey, USMC. Capt., Retired, 3rd CIT Team Activity Report, Feb
1970, dated 1 Mar 1970.
18. T. W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Personal Interview with W.
McClenithan, USMC WO. Retired, 28 August 2006.
19. T. W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Interview by Phone with R. Jarvis,
USMC MSgt., Retired, Jarvis International, 15 Mar 2007.
20. W. McClenithan, USMC WO., Retired, VC Document, 3rd CIT, 1
Page Dated 1970.
21. C. F. Widdecke, CG., 1st Mar Div, Letter of Appreciation to 3rd CIT,
dated 27 July 1970.
22. T. W. Dunn, USMC, Former SSgt., Interview by Phone with T.
Marino, USMC Col. Retired, September 2006.
23. P. Smith, USMC Former Sgt., Vietnam As I Remember It, 45 Pages,
2 February 2006.
24. K. B. Mc Cutcheon. USMC CG. III MAF, Letter of Appreciation to 3rd
CIT, Via CG., 1st Mar Div, 1 Page, dated 19 Aug 1970.
25. A.G. Smith, USMC Col. Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, 1st MarDiv,
Recommendation for Bronze Star, SSgt T.W. Dunn to CG, III MAF, 3
Pages, dated May 1971.
26. A. C. Smith Jr. USMC CG., 1st MarDiv, Letter of Appreciation to the
3rd CI Team, 1 Page, dated 30 August 1970.
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27. Nguyen N. Khoi, Mayor, Da Nang City, Award of Personal VN Cross
of Gallantry with Bronze Star, SSgt. T.W. Dunn dated 22 April 1971.
28. NAVMC 2922, MMMA, for 3rd CIT Unit Awards, dated 15 Jul 2005.
29. C. R. Smith, US Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Stand-down,
1969, Hqs. and Museum Division, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
1988.
30. Jim Peringer, USMC MSgt. Retired, Email Colonel Bui Tin, 27 July
2002
31. J.S. Grinalds, USMC, Maj.,S-3 2nd Bn, 1st Mar, Subj: T.H. Marino, 3rd
CIT, dated 14 January 1971.
32. T. W. Dunn, USMC Former SSgt., Emails Approving the use of
Copyright Protected Photographs. from Vietnam War Internet
Project, Marinezone, and Vets with a Mission.
33.Kellum, M.D. Lt. American Heroes, Grunts, Pilots, and “Doc’s” NavarroHill Publishing, 2011, Library of Congress 2010940532 pp. 276-277
82d
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84d
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Appendix D
Appendix E
85
85
SSgt Dunn
86d
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87
87
88d
88
89
89
90d
90
91
91
92d
92
93
93
94d
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95
95
96d
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97
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98d
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100d
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3rd Counterintelligence Team - Marine Corps Counterintelligence

Transcription

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