NAA.003.0171 - Department of Defence

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NAA 003 0171
IIIIIIIIIU 1111I111~!11~111
,-
NAA.003.0172
SECRET
WEEKLY
ISSUEU
INTELLIGENCE
REPORT
I3Y THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISiON,
STAFF,
ADMIRALTY,
FRIDAY,
OCTQRER
NAVAL
4,194 0
PART I: NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Germany
Based on in/ormation received up to September 30, 1940.
:'lAIN U:-1ITS
l. The following is t.he latest dispositioll o[ German Main Units :~
Battleships : September Z:J Not located there SepKid
Bisl1UtTCk
tember 28.
Probably
doing trials in Baltic.
September 28 I n floating: dock.
Wilhelmshavcn
Tirpitz
Battle Cruisers:Kid
Gneisenau
Kiel
Scharnhorst
Pocket Baltlesh ips : Admiral Scheer.. vVilhelmshavcn
Seplemher 28
St:plember 28
In northern floating dock.
July 20
Not at
In southern floating dock.
Wilhelmshaven
August 2.
I{iel
September 28
In dry dock.
Wilhelmshavcn
Scph:muer 5
Prinz Eugen
IGel
Scptcm Ul;:r 23
Seydlilz
Bremen
September 11
Not at Vhlhelmshaven
September 9.
Not at Kid SelJtember
28.
Ready for trials.
Seplember 21
(~radcd
September 2L
Has not ueen located
since torpedoed by
H.M.S.SdmoJ!. Decem·
ber 1:1, 1939.
Graded R.2.
September 21
Graded R.2.
Lillzow
S·in. Cruisers
flipper
..
$-in. Cruisers:-
Niirnberg
Reported
at
Swinemundc.
Leipzig
Reported
at
Swillemunde.
Reported
al
Swinemunde.
Emden
I3.2
2. Aircraft from Bomber Command catried out attacks O~l Baule
cruisers Gnr;iSOLtUl. Schara/lOYst, and Pocket Battleship Liitzoi.v' at Kid
on nights of September 25 26 amI Seplember 26 27.
3. The fact that the Battle cruiser Scharnhorst has re-entered floating
dock may be due tu damage caused by these atlacks.
(C39'llQ-Ij
B
GERMAN AIR FORCE ACrTVrTY
4. The scale of operations by the German Air Force against Greal
Britain continued at the same intensily during the week September 22-28.
On most days there were at least one or two major attacks employing
from 100-300 aircraft principally directed against London and the S.E.
Counties, although determined attacks were also made by day at other
points, including Bristol and Southampton. Vcry numerous and dose
fighter escort has invariably been provided for enemy bombers, sometimes
in the proportion of 3 to 1. Regular daily losses have been inflicted by
our fighters, who OIl September 27 shot down no less than 131 cnemy
aircraft with a further 33 probably destroyed.
5. There has been a noticeable increase in the indiscriminate bombing
. of coastal towns, for the most part by single aircraft.
6. Meteorological flights have shown signs of increasing both in number
and effective distance during thc past few days, whereas reconnaissance
flights have been more confined to the coastal areas, since several enemy
aircaft on overland reconnaissance were intercepted and. shot down.
7. Attacks on convoys and isolated shipping continued, but on a
much rcduced scale. Nearly all these attacks were by single aircraft,
and high-level bombing was indulged in with very little effective result.
The long-range 4-engineJ enemy aircraft employed on meteorological
flights daily round Ireland continue to attack isolated shipping to the
North and North-West of Ireland.
8. Enemy air operations at night continue to he directed a.gainst
London as the principal target, and considerable damage has been done
during the week by ILE. bombs and by fires started by I.R.s. There
has heen quite extensive night bombing at other places in the country,
particularly the Merseyside area, vvhere much damage was donc. l\rfinelaying by enemy aircraft at night has also continucd at many points on
the East and South Coast.
U~BOATS
9. Once again U-boats concentrat.ed entirely in tIle North-vVestern
Approaches and Atlantic, no attacks on shipping being made this \veek
East of 9° \V. The numher operating remained approximately the same
at six, an(l it is thought that those which were relieved returned to
Lorient, where four arri-ved during t.he week, bringing the total up to len.
It \-vas later learned that, in addition to tho:-:;e ships reported last week
as having been torpedoed in convoy, the Dalcairn also suffered the
same fate.
] ust a£ler midnight OIl the 26th the Stratford ;,vas
torpedoed and sunk 85 miles \Vest by South of Bloody' Foreland and
lat.er the Ashantian was also lorpec1ocd, but she has reached a purt on
the Irish coast.
At 0800 the ::'Vfalina and later the Rhesus reported
being chased by U-boats and eS\:Jping.
10. Farther West, a (011\'0;' vvhich had been shadowed for over a ([a:y
was attacked from 1230 to 1430 on tJw 25t.h when 360 miles vVest of
AchilJ Head after its escort hcui left. at 0800, the 5ulairia and lIle
Eurymedo'n heing torpedoed and ::;unk and the S'OVtlC missed. At 0140/~0
the Corrientes in the samc can \'oy was also torpedoed further West.
2
11. At 0935/27 the Norwegian Asgad, probably a straggler, was sunk
90' North-Wesl of Bloody Foteland.
12. On the 28th, after dispersal of convoy, the Empire Ocelot was
torpedoed and sunk 480' West of Bloody Foreland at 1530.
13. During the period under reyiew H.M.~. Isis and Du.ncan attacked
contacts in the Faroes and H.M.S. La'u1'Imt1,c dropped depth charges on
an oil patch 105' North-East of Rockall.
14. H.M.S. Picotee attackcd a contact 95' "Vest of Bloody Foreland at
1020/26 and the trawler Lady Lilian 13/)' \Vest of Bloody Foreland at
1340/29, bul no definite results were obsei'verl.
15. Aircraft also dropped bombs 75' North-Vv'est of Bloody Foreland
at 0822/29, but no hits were claimed.
NO}{WAY
16. The Norwegian ship Vard has r2ached Pet:8.I?o Irom Oslo,
appare.nt]y the first to do so. She had t.o.. :all at Kn.s~tlaIlSand,.B~~gc.n
and Kukelles for control purposes and hug dre coast. lhe mastel SlollCd
an undertaking that he and the crew wou~d return t~ Norway and .obey
C;erman instructions. H~ saw no Sllhmannes or snrface craft statlOned
at Kirkenes.
17. A Finnish vessel was hoarded ~Y 8. German armed trawler] reO;"tHtly
cft Varoo anu another circled by aircraft. vVest of that port, out [Joth
were allowed to proc.eed to Petsamo.
18. It is nO'\'! evident that. the enemy is using two if not .fOUl: of the
Nl..lnv~giaiJ Sli.'I'PJ1'fJ chss torpeclc bOJt s.. The)~ have f~ur ot . thiS c~a.ss,
G."ll(~r 'Odin, Balder and Tor, whilst .S·!Ci,PJUW IS operatmg wrth Bntrsh
I~rcf.s'.
HOLLAND
19. The Dutch Rea Cross have ahout 16 trrt.wlers at sea. yhey are
painted white, fly the Dutch Ha.g a.nd have a Dutch crew,.but tHeX c:,rr y
a {~erlIlan sorgeon and telegraphISts. These may be u:-,eu to pICk up
German air pilots.
M!NES
20. Reports \vere l-c:ceivecl dnrillg night of the 17th/18th of tire
dropping -of a considerable ,-;,umber o(parachutc mines, 8, It. by 2. ft., over
the land. \I\/ool\lo,.';ch, Tonbridge and other areas were aftected.
21 CommanJ.er~in-Chief, Rosyth, reports that t.he enemy appear to
he l1~ing a new type of mine, <-·rpparently aetuate~ by the .move~:ne~nl .?f
ships' propeHors. Three explosions are reportecl m the Firth 01 Fortn.
None caused any damage.
pRO"TECTIVE S.MOKE
22. On on~ occ3.siol1 when three Blcnheims altacked a convoy of one
nwrchant vessel escorted by llve [-boats the merchant vessel threw out
a '\vhjte smoke screen.
3
(C392 10-1)
B 2.
11111111111111111111111111111111
NAA.003.0173
I
1IIIIIII.llilillll~~IIII~~
NAA,003.0174
I
PROJECTED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM
General situation on September 29, 1940, in German Occupied Territory facing the
United Kingdom and tendencies affecting a sea-borne expedition and raids.
. '
b' .
12 Various reports have been received suggestmg alternatlve 0 Jcctlves,
further preparation of special ships and the use of gas.
13 The Azores have been suggested as an .alternative objective. 3.:nd
~an steamshi s withdrawn from the Baltlc. are reported as havmg
i::'d their sides e~t and hinged Jor the rapid discharge of troops and
vehicles; they are also said to have been degaussed.
GENERAL SITUATION
NORWAY
1. Twelve German vessels each of about 2,500 tons, and said to be
well fitted out for troop transport, were reported as being i.n Oslo
harbour on September 20.
GERMANY,
11. Regrouping of barges has takcn place recently at Flushing and a
reduction at Ostend due to movements by canallnland.
DENMARK AND THE BALTIC
2. Air reconnaissance Oll September 28 showed the Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau in floating docks, and the Lutzow in dry dock, at IGel. Bismarck
is now believed to be carrying out trials in the Baltic.
3. The Europa and Bremen were still at Bremerhavcn on September 25 ~
on the same date three other liners, one large tanker and a destroyer were
present in port and four merchant vessels were off the port.
4. There were 30 small merchant ships in Borkum Roads on
September 28.
LOW COUNTRIES AND 'FRANCE
5. During the period since the last summary, weather has sometimes
prevented reconnaissances from being complete.
6. On September 22, 23, 24 and 25 the movements oj merchant ships
from ports in the Low Countries to the westward continued, and were
apparently on a much reduced scale.
7. On September 26 there appeared to be some decrease in the barges
at Flushing, Ostend and Calais. and a large increase in towing craft at
Calais. Or\. that day there was a movement of four vessels of 5,000 tons
to the N.E.. from Havre to Dunkirk, and movements to the westward
continued round the Cherbourg P~tlinsll]a.
8. Reconnaissance on the 27th showed that there were 10 U-boats at
Lorient, six of 700 tons and four of 500 tons. Lorient is conveniently
situated to servc as a base from which to operate V-hoats against our
trade or to cover the passage of an expedition across the Channel.
9. Reconnaissance on the same date carried out between Boulognc and
Cherhourg showed that, except for a decrease of shipping and barges at
Boulogne, there was no appreciable change in the dispositions of shipping
available in that area. The general irnpre:5sion is that barges are now
dispersed in practically all ports from Flushing to Le Havre. Mcrchant
shipping concentrations remain at Rotterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre and to
a lesser extent Cherhourg, Brest, Lorient and Nantes. The prcseI\.t
situation to the south of the latter place is not known.
- 10, The most lmponant assembly ports appear to he :
Rotterdam
Naval and merchant vessels and barges.
Antwerp
McrchaYll vessels and barges.
Dunkirk
Barges.
Calais ..
Barges.
Boulogne
Barges.
Le Havre
Naval and merchant vessels and barges.
Cherbourg
Naval vessels.
Brest
Naval vessels.
Lorient
Naval vesscIs.
4
14. The Germans are said to be making a form of sleeping gas to
overcome the coastal defence.
15. It has been reliably reported that glide~ p~actice is ,being ~ar:l~~1
out on several Gennan air force aerodrZtml~~ ll~~~~e~~:a~:m~~r units
arrangements have been made for some a 1 n . .'
. m
. th e.J
I 0'" ('ountries towards the end of thIS month.
to arnve
16. The German dive-bomber units havc still not been fe-employed
a <:rains t this co un try.
Y\
0
-'
"
17. It is reported that preparations for an
attac~ o~ ~ritai~ ~e:~
~ox~d~~~~s~'~ ;~~~c;:r~~n~~:~~~~ t:~:e~~~eof~o~~a;,li~Cacco~~::ce: ith
j
j
events and circuw-stances.
18 The concentration of shipping and barges remains substanti3:11y
unalte~ed, the:rcby 1?roviding the ~tra~sport ~~~~.~S~~·~ti{f~oa:~~~~~~~~
operatIOns agall1st thIS country or e s:'Y lere, ,
that the decision to lalillCh an expeditIOn has oeen taken.
POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTED INVASION IN FOG OR
.
WEATHER OF LOW VISIBILITY
. .
T 1
1
the Faeroes, .ce ane
. t th_e R
1. Invasion or raids agall1s
_ r )tlsh
- 1·5·1es,
or Ireland may start from : .,
(a1 Norway, across the northern part of the North Sea.
,.
art of
(b) The Baltic through the Skagcrrak and across the central p
GENERAL CONSIDEHATIONS
the North Sea.
.
lh
outhern
(c) The German, Dutch and Belglall ports across
e s
part oj the North Sea,
.
1
(d) The French Channel ports across t~le Enghsh Channe .
(e) 13iscayan perls (more probably agalllsl Ireland).
2 Over the areas through which the above expeditions wOllklpha~~btlo
OSSI y
pass. sea fogs bet wecn now ~nd tl le .e.I Id of the year
. are rare.
they might OCellI' on one day m twenty.
.
.
. i f
·ct
[me weather land fogs extendmg ~llt to sea for
I n a penO( 0 q III
'[1· ..
lccially the case m the narrow
four or fIve Illiles may occur.
llS IS eSf~.
..
. .·bil"
parts of thc Channel and towards the Dover Straits.. In ~hlS area V1Sl lty
may under these conditions bc very low from shore to s lOre.
S
\
\
\
\
3. II, therefore, the enemy tlrinks that foggy conditions would be an
advantage for a sea~bornc attl(1~,this country, the most favourable
area to select for" launching the attack would be the Dover Straits area,
and against our South-Eastern shores.
il;filitary-German military forces which can once make a landing in
foggy conditions may be expe~ted to make th~ atmost use of clever
ruses of dress and language, whlCh could be explOIted to great advan~age
in the confusion of fog, when we are likely to be hampered by questIOns
of idenrification and movement.
ADVANTAGES TO THE ENEMY OF FOGGY CONDITIONS
GENERAL CONCLUSION
4. Foggy conditions would hamper the operations of our surface
vessels. They would prevent the observers in our look-out stations
making finn reports as to the approach of the expedition, or what was
happening on the landing beaches. They would conceal enemy movements from the observation of Our off-shore patrols.
Further, if dense fog prevailed our air forces would be prevented from
carrying out attack or any reconnaissance. This would enable the enemy
to stage considerable diversions and confuse us as to where the major
attack was being stag-cd.
DISADVANTAGES TO THE ENEMY OF FOGGY CONDITIONS
5. The German technique in military attack has been to throw in
strong air forces, and exploit to the utmost local air superiorlty. Fog
will prevent the employment of their air force in this manner in support
of an attempted landing on beaches, or the selzurc of a nort. It will
still, however, be possible for the enemy to land air-Lorn"e troon:- and
parachutists and carry out an attack on communications in back areas
free from fog.
6. It has heen stated above that foggy conditions during October,
November ami December in the North Sea and English Channel are not
common. Therefore, if the enemy plan requires that there shaH be fog
before the expedition sails, it will probahly be necessary to be in it
stano-by condition for some time, and the element of surprise may be lost.
NAVIGATION AL
7. The sailing and navigation of an expedition in foggy condiI!OnS
presents practic.al difficulties. It is believed, however, that wireless aids
to navigation have been developed to a high pitch, and that it would
now he possible to direct landing craft to the selected points on our coast
mth a considerable degree of accuracy in foggy weather.
9. From the above it is considered that fog 01 the type likely to occur
in the North Sea and the English Channel during the coming weeks would
not be a deterrent to the launching of an invasion force, and might be
made use of to the advantage of the enemy.
RATE AT WHICH ENEMY VESSELS AND BARGES CAN
LEAVE PORT
L The following list shows the facilities at the various ports and the
number of locks available. An attempt has been made to assess ~he
rate at which vessels and barges could leave, governed by the capaCIty
of the locks.
2. It was estimated during the early part of the war that Antwerp
could be cleared in 12 hours. At that time its normaJ complement was
60--70 ships. Probably with Naval crews and careful berthing this time
could be reduced slightly.
3. Where ships do not have to pass through locks th?y. c~=mlcl leave
more quicklv. In almost all cases, however, there are hmltlng factors
such as narrOw channels. The Ostend cross-channel boats in rush periods
used to follow each other at ten minute intervals, and it is doubtful if
this could be much impr"oved upon, while big- ships would take longer.
4. At Cherbourg ships lie in the two roadsteads and so can leave
very quickly.
S. \Vith this exception it is considered that a rale of five or six ships
per hour represents the maximum. In almosl all potts barges and larger
vessels could move simultaneously.
Port.
Dclfayl
Helder
Y muiden -Amsterdam
CONCLUSIONS
8. Naval.- Navigational difficulties may be overcome by the use of
wireless directional aids. Fog conditions would hamper the attack by
our own forces and give the enemy an a~vantage.
Air.--Air operations on both sides in the area of attempted landing
would be hampered. The enemy may, however, now realise that his
air sllperiority is not in fact so great as he had hoped, and he may be
content to accept the lack of air su pport in foggy conditions which
hamper also our own air attack, and concentrate on the landing of airborne troops and parachutists, and attacking our communications in
back areas clear of fog.
6
Hook-Rotterdam
Flushing
Antwerp
Terncuzen
Exit Facilities.
No locks
One large lock, one small
One lock in N. sea canal
available.
Block ship can be passed by
10,000 ton ship at slack
waler.
No locks
Outer harbour, no locks
Inner harbolJr, one lock
River quays
Two large locks tn basins.
Two small locks fnr barges.
1 large lock, small locks for
barges.
Hate per hour.
Two ships or '20 barges.
Two large ships per hour or
four small, or 50 barges
from North Sea Canal.
~11111~~~I~\III~~11m
NAA.OO3.0175
River quays, no locks.
From basins six ships
per hour.
Alternatively
ahout 100 barges per
hour.
Two ships per hour, or
30 harges.
7
!11111[[~IIIIIII~m~l~
Port.
Exit Facilities.
Rate pel' koul'.
Canal blocked. Five ships
alongside mole, narrow
channel only remains unsilted.
Outer harbour no locks. From inner harbour fom'
Two locks to inner harships per hour, 15 barges
bour.
per hour.
Blocked. Barges can pass About 12 barges per hour.
between blockships. No
locks.
Outer harbour no locks. About eight harges per
Inner harbour one lock.
hour-from inner harbour.
Outer harbour, no lock~ "
About eight barges per
Inner harbour, one lock.
hour from inner harbour.
Blocked. Barges can leave
outer harbour.
Outer quays, no locks
About
six
per
hour.
Iuner basins, 2 locks.
Barges about 100 per
hour.
Outer roads. inner roads, no Ships can leave anchorages
locks.
very quickly.
Inner basins have locks.
No locks
Zeebrugge
Ostend
..
Dunkirk
Calais
Boulogne
Dieppe
Havre
Cherbourg
Brest
BARGE MOVEMENTS IN FLANDERS
AND LOW COUNTRY PORTS
SEPTEMBER 10-29
1. During Septemher the numbers of barges in Low rountrv alld
Flanders Ports which have been rcgu IarIy 0 b serve d were as shown
below :~
----,--Situation on
September
S eptember
September 10
10 to 17.
17 to 23
__.. __ I
I~~C~-l-
I
-
and 29.
--L~=-li
Local ---1
movements movements! movemeuts
from Port to fro,m Port to from Port to
Middelburg Mlddelburg i !\-riddclbllroCanal.
i
Canal. t>
Ca.nal.
Ostend
250 1 IDecrease
Decrease I Decrease [
· kilO
D un k I t
llcrease
No change \ Not known I
Flushing 150
,
II
I
120
Incrf'-3.se
Decrease
,I
Boulognc 90
Le Havre 34
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
,I
Calais
Total
794 !
. __i_
.__ _1_
Slight
decrease.
Decrease
Decrease
\
* Remarks.-Decrease probably accounted for
8
4:;
--I--~5-less.
'
I
i
I·
--~~ange
Se ptemh~r I Situation on
between
25 to 28. jSep tember29. September 10
'*
Remarks.
85
"' 1 6-~ less.
2.20
\ 110 more.
(not viewed I
sinceSept.20}1
II
140
I
230
'20 more.
140 more.
1 6 5 , 131 more.
1--88-5-,- --' --
by increase in approach canals.
NAA,003,0176
CONCf_USION
2. The total change in numbers may,
incomplete recOlmaissance.
In
part, be accounted for by
3. It is probable, therefore, that the total number of barges
Channel ports has Ilot been much increased'since September 10.
ill
the
4. The general tendency has been for barges to move from the Eastern
ports towards the West.
S. Recent decreases at Boulognc and Lc Havre since September 23
suggest that tliis movement Westward may be still continuing,
6. Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Antwerp; where large numbers of barges
are normal in peace time, have not been included in the above analysis.
There is no reason, thereIore, to alter the original estimate of 2,500 barges
availahle in the Ports of the Low Countries and Flanders.
GLIDER-BORNE TROOPS
1. The Germans in peace time built up a considerable glider organization. There are probably over t,OOO glider pilots iu Germany to-day,
and we know that the enemy used gliders, on a limited scale, to aid their
operations in Belgium.
2. Glider-borne troops have the advantage that they can land almost
anywhere and emcIgc from their aircraft in formed bodies of up to tcn,
with all their equipment.. A number of gliders can land dose together in
twilight or by moonlight. It is therefore necessary to be prepared to
deal with formed bodies of enemy up to 100 in number, fully equipped
and carrying automatic weapons. Such air-borne troops might attempt
to seize an aerodrome near to a port, in order to facilitate the landing of
troop-carrying aircraft. An attack in force, supported by heavy automatics and light guns, could then develop against the port, with the
intention of forming a bridge-head and landing place for tanks and heavy
units conveyed in ships of 500 tons and over.
3. To reach their objective gliders have to be towed to within a few
miles by powered aircraft. At a point dependent on the position of the
objective and the strength and direction of the wind, they can be Cdst
off to conunence their glide. The maximnm range of a troop-carrying
glider cast oH at 10,000 feet is about 20 miles in still air. The threat Lo
this country lies, therefore, in a coastal strip of approximately is -20 miles
in width. A glider-borne invasion is most vulnerable when the tows are
within reach of our fighter aircraft. It is only necessary to shoot down
the powered aircraft for the whole tow to he destroyed or lost at sea.
It is, therefore, fairly certain that a glider invasion will not occur in
daytime. Another weakness in this form of attack is that the speed of
approach is low. and it should be possjblc for the R.A.F. organization to
detect froUl this fact that it is a glider forcc coming to our shores. (Minclaying aircraft also fly slowly, but they are usually alone and flying low,)
9
S
\
GERMAN MILITARY MORALE
1. In recent v:reeks, and ema.nating from various quarters, rumour
has been so persistently bus>: WIth spreading reports regarding the low
~oT~le of t?C German troops In the occupied territories that from them
It IllIght be mferred that G~nnan military morale generally has underO"one
a drastic change during the last month. .
0
2. These reports _may be, a ttributed (i) to wishful thinking, (ii) to a
deliberate attempt to hoodwmk, or (ui) to motives the sincerity of which
cannot be doubted.
, 3. Dis~er;arding that. which is suspected of falling under categories
(1) and (11) above, the ll1fOrmatlOil at our disposal tends to show that
there arc go~~ grou~l(ls !or believing th,:,-t a certain weakening of discipline
and .morale IS maklllg ,Itself apparent In elements of the German Army,
part:cularly among .umts statIoned in Norway and the coastal sectors of
Belgmm and occupied France.
4. Reasons advanced include ; (i) The desire of older men to get home without having to face
another winter with the army.
(ii) The ?a~g~rs whic~l lie before soldiers in the proposed attempt
at ~nvasio~ of tl:iS country.. Fear of the water and a premonition
of unpendmg faIlure followmg all their recent successes.
(iii) Disquie~ing let~ers from home, i,pcluding references to effect of
our aIr bombmg.
(iv) In.Nor~hern Norway, the climate, which is said to he too rlgorous
m wmter.
(v) In Norw~y and F~ance,.the training exercises, including embarking
and dIse.mba~kmg Wlt~ small c.raft and fishing boats intended
for the ~nvaslOn o.f thIS country, swimming exercises and the
general Idea of bemg employed in an undertaking which does
not appeal and in lvhich casualties are bound to be very high.
5. Of these, the last i.tern would appear to be responsible more than
any other for such 10weIlng of morale as has heen brought to notice.
6. ~ig!IS .of this weakening of discipline and morale, and descriptions of
the discIplmary measures taken to co~nter it have formed the subject
of. rna.ny reports: These, however, wIth few e.xceptions, are not eyeWItness observ<;~lOns,. but accounts hased upon mforrnation obtained at
SeCOll? hand. 1. hey. mclude such. incidents· as mass desertions and open
rebe~lton, resultt~~ m the executlon of ~many soldiers. in Norway;
the
mutmy of troops lIl~a coastal ~ectcr of. France and theIr transport, handcuffe? ~ogethcr, to Germany; the findmg of the Lodies of a large number
of sUlcldes washed up on the coastS and floating OIl the rivers of Norway
and France, etc.
7. While there \v<;mld appear to be an eiemCI1t of truth undedvinothesc reports, madc. 1Il good faith, it is thought that all arc stories w'hich
lend themselves :_n.exagg:rat~on, and a careful exami~ation of all reports
forces us t~ tt~e as~umptlOn Lhat full adVdlJtage has, In most cases be€n
taken of thIS licence.
'
10
I
8. Concurrently with these adverse reports, othels, pointing to the
sustained high morale and standard of disciphnf' m the German Army.
continue to be received from sources believed to be reliable. To these
may be added the impressions obtained from the interrogation of recently
captured G.A.F. prisoners. These reports indicate t~at, while there
appears to be some dissatisfaction with such malters as rewards, pro~otion and the lack of training of personnel and, to a lesser degree, WIth
the higher strategy of those in authority, which is resulting in unnecessary
losses, morale generally, if not of the same high standard as was shown
three months ago, is still of a very high order.
~ .
'..,.•
.
CONCLUSION
9. There arc indications that a nnmber of factors have led to a certain
weakening of morale in elements of the Gennany Army, particularly
l1
among units stationed in Norway and the coastal sectors of France and
~
Belgium. It is not thought that the morale of the German Army, as a
whole, is likely to be ·afh:.dcd to any extent by isolated instances of
dissatisfaction among certain of its units. Dissatisfied clements will be
dealt with by Nazi methods which will ensure no spreading of discontent.
and they will be replaced by others whose fighting qualities and morale,
like that of the German AmlY generally, are still believed to be of a very
high order.
11111111
,1111111\\16
NAA.OO3.0177
Italy
Based on information received up to September 30
ENEMY SURFACE CRAFT
L Various reconnaissances were carried out daring the week.
2. On September 21, a reconnaissance of Benghazi betraycd the
presence of nine large merchant ships and six seaplanes.
3. On September 22 <l reconnaissance of the eastern coast of Sicily was
carried out: at Messina, OIlC destroyer and two merchant ships of 800 tons
were sighted
at Catania, one merchant vessel of 600-1,000 tons: at
Augusta, one Illerchant vessel of 3,000 tons and four of 800-1,000 tons:
at S-vracuse nil. One oiler of 6,000 tons was sighted IS miles south of
Cape Spartivcnto heading east at 10 knots.
..:/.. At Bardia, two ships, one of 30 ft. and one of 150 ft., both submerged,
vvere observed.
5. At Kismayu, an air reconnaissance by S.A.A.F. disclosed the presence
of one small and twelve large ships, one submarine submerging, and one
high-speed motor launch.
6. On September 26, a reconnaissance of Northern LiLya and Cj.rrenaica
by 113 Squadron indicated no movements between Maddalena and
Benghazi. In Benghazi, six ships 300 ft. long were sighted, three of
which are severely' damaged: there were also seven seaplanes in harbonr.
At Dcrna, one merchant ship 300 ft. long: at Bomba, six seaplanes and
at Tobruk one tanker. There were no movements between Derna and
Tobruk and no off-shore shipping hetween Benghazi and Sidi Barani.
11
l~~
7. On September 28, a reconnaissance of Taranto Harbour disclosed
the presence i:rtOuter Harbour, of two battleships, three 8-in. cruisers,
two 6-in. cruisers, eight destroyers and one floating dock. Inner Harbour:
five: 6-in. cruisers, 21 destroyers, three leaders and four or five small war
vessels, possibly M.T.Bs., and approxiniately 50 flying boats or float planes.
One old destroyer wa'5 located near Sicily and one destroyer; five large
and two small merchant vessels were seen entering Galipoli.
8. H. M.S. Osiris reported the sinking of an Italian destroyer of the
Curta/one class in position 037", Brindisi, 47 miles at 1630 G.M.T.,
September 22. Italian broadcast stated that this occurred in Ionian Sea,
preswnably to conceal from Italians the fact that submarines arc
penetrating into the Adriatic.
ENEMY AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY
Pori Sudan
9. On the night of September 21/22, one S.79 attacked Port Sndan;
target believed to be the railway bridge. Eight heavy bombs were
dropped; no damage, no casualties.
Aden
10. On September 24, one S.79 raided Aden at 0945. Three bombs were
dropped in the harbour, one ncar miss boom defence vessel. No damage,
no casualties.
Haifa
11. Eight thrce-engined enemy aircraft attacked Rutenberg Power
Station and Shenan Factory, both of which were damaged. Damage was
severe to battery charging plant, and signal and electric cables were cut.
One LP.C. tank was also fired.
Malruh
12. On the night 01 September 22/23, six waves totalling 35 enemy
bombers attacked Matruh. Bombs fell in the harbour and on the station:
two British soldiers were killed.
Malta
13. In an attack on Malta at 1132 on September 25, of eight fighters
which flew Over the Island, one was shot down on land by a fighter and
the pilot was killed: another was probably shot down and another
possibly damaged by A.A. nrc.
.
On September 26. an air raid took place from 1658 to 1721. Enemy
forces consistcd of two formations, one of six S.79's, escorted by 12 to
15 c.R. 42's, One c.R. 42 shot down and one probably shot down by
fighters. Two S.59's damaged by fighter and A.A. fire may not have
reached their base.
Damage at Luqa was as follows >Main store badly damaged, armoury damaged. Approximately
12 bombs fell on the aerodrome surface and runways, Holes now
filled up and aerodrome normal.
Halfar was also bombed. The side of one storage hangar was blown in.
No service casualtics or damage to civilian propcrty.
12
I
II
I
1
IIIIIIIII~~I~IIIII~III~~
Cyprus
NAA.003.0178
14 On September 22 at 0800, two enemy bombers attacked lighters
.side Pier Karavostasi. Fifteen bombs were dropped but t~lere were
alOfihg'ts
At 0850 same two aircraft machine-gunned contamers and
no 1 . '
I .
military billets: nO damage, no casua tIes.
SHIPS
15. It has been reported that there is no regular se!vice of Italian
shipping in the Adriatic but occaslOual Italian ships arnve at Yugoslav
ports for cargoes.
ITALIAN MERCHANT
16. The following movements have been reported:- .
Maya, tanker, arrived Varna from BatuITl wIth 5,000 tons
petroleum.
California, hospital ship of 13,000 tons, was due at Naples on
September 25 with 417 mvahds.
Balena, Pescespada and Sardella, the three trawlers whi?h have
been refuging at Horta, Azores, ~ince end. of June, left lucre on
September 20 and have all now arTlved at VlgO.
..
.
k
'
fl
t
d
.
ff
Maracaibo
on
September
3,
arnved
til
Denttce, tan CI, re oa e _. 0 ~
?
tow at Puerto Cabello on Scptember ....4.
Franca Fassio arrived at Barcelona on September 26 from Genoa.
I
r
\
)1
I
Enderta and Granatiere Padula, which sailed from Shanghai .undler
O"ust 5 are now both reported to be III t Ie
n Aub
1
]apanesecoourso
·'
k
t
J
01
I t ade' the formcr was sighted at Wa am3. .su, apan, 1
~~~te~ber '10, and the latter at Nagoya, Japan, on Septembcr 22.
17. A report has been reccived that Mussolini's yacht was damaged at
Fiume on September 22, as a result of sabotage.
ENEMY PORTS
Tobruk
I
18. On the night of Seplember 21/22, the Outer Breakwater ~a~~:~
by two bombs Oll. retarn journey of four Wellmgtons whIch ha bombing Benghazl.
At 1"'00 September 22 attacks were carried out.on the north foreshore
'J
" I.' . . 'I' bru'k Harbour
Nine Rlenheuus dropped bOIubs on
an on s uppmg In 0
. . .
1 l'
'~i· tt ~
buildings and the jetty and very near five ShIpS moored at t Ie a~ges JC y.
Ii
An Italian r.ommunique of Scptelnber 25 admits thai i wo ShlpS, one. of
which was c~pty, were hit and st<:tes also tt:at a number of dwellmg
houses and a civil and military hospltal were hlt.
On Sc tember 25, 27 Blenheims attac~ed T~bruk at about 1400. ~ine
BlenheiIKs of 113 Squadron registered d1fec~_hlts o,n b~rac~s and b~,l?-rgd
fire was started just north of the wharves. Nme of 211 qua ron 0 ame
dir~ct hits on buildings and i\LT., and nine of 55 SquadArlojn ~roPPfted tbombds
' t t a tl1e J' etty .
ancra re urne
which fell. across the town, from t I ie \i\es
from thesc operahons except Olle which forced landed at Qasaba.
13
\
r
Il
I
I
II
i
1
t
!
Assab
19. On September 25, one Blenheim of 39 Squadron carried Gut a
bombing reconnaissance of Assab Harbour and Macaaca Aerodrome.
Bombs fell around warehouses at the head of the large jetty.
On the same day, three Ulenheims of 8 Squadron attacked A.G.I.P.
semi-underground fuel installations in South Assab. The bombs fell in
the target area but results were not observed.
On September 27, the Indian wing carried out an attack on the Power
House at Macaaca Aerodrome: no direct hits, Some near misses.
I
!
j
CruiseI'>,8-in."1lg b it:
Duple.x
Full.
CalbI'Tt
Sufjrell
Duquesne
TOluvilte .•
eruber;;,6·iU.M arscil/.aise
Claire
La
Vl!UtuU1'
Va,.quelin
Cassard
Tilrtu
/MailIi-Erez8
LUm
.....-Bisun
GU/!pard
Vauban
Verdun
l'almy
Lynx
" Leopard
De~Lroy"rs
Teull /juri
Ri-clwti""
Casablauce'
Dakar
Septcwber 1;{
Scplt:mbrr ';;I
Crmdorcel .
il"ul"CllJisl'r<Slrul'bourg
DWlkerqui!
'\ircraft Carri,'r-·Bearn
.-\viatiull Transporl-·
COmmand/I"1 r"s/.
"'Le Ha:rdi .
y' F!euret
,.- ;\[ameluh
•-- Ep('e.
v Casque
v Lan.,quend
Fr(Jndlmr .
';' Forbin
i Foudroyant
~' Fou<:ut,n
"J Basqu.e
..f Horde/ai" .
v Br~lo.s
noulDnnais
, L'AdYnit
ImrnoLJiliud
Believed sunk.
Se v,",relv damagtd.
r1\ l::ldtlsh haud~
La British hands.
COl/rbd
'.
In('.oIllplet~
[lJ.lllaged. 1{(;p<1rt of ,aililJg ab,mL
SeptC'wuer 26 i5 \;.ncontlilm'(!.
C~r:'d as a trailliug ship.
Training ship.
At sea, proceeding northward to
Casablanca September 26_
-\.ugust 2,.1,
~.1,.u"ust 24 ..
prcss rl',port.
Badly dam-agee'!.
{TWO of these believed burnt out
::;eptember 26
and beached.
Toulon
Oran
•
~Dakar
Toulon
-,
..
0
August 24 ..
_
Toulon ..
Probably Toulon
probably Toulon
Dakar .
Probably Toulon
Dakar ..
..
Probably Toulo11
Probably Tuuloll
Touluu
Prohably 1'O\llon
Probably TGulull
Probably TouloD
August 24
.-\u?;Ust 24 ..
!wgust 8
August 24
August 8
.\llgust 24
August 24
August 24
August 24
.-\ugust 24
August 24
ProbablyTuulQn
August 201-
Probably Toulon
Probably Toulun
Probably Tonlon
probably Tuulon
Ale"andria
Probably
Da!,;;a~
':asablau(<!
Pas~ed Gih~alt<l.l
foulo[1 ..
..
..
i',')ssihly at C,nablallcJ. ..
Pa:;sed Gihraltar
.
\lex<ladrLa
Ca:;ablanca
_\lexalldria
,",('ported (1) hilve
b"'r 2~
S", e,ely ()ilma~C(l
~ail,-,rI
Sc-p((:w-
"" L'Alcyon
,-' I.e Fortltlle
.. U lHars
La Paluw
:'Ifartinq'_K'
Sunk.
Immobilized.
[n Britbll hands.
Sunk.
Sunk.
1'0111011
Casabl~nca
Press report.
Suuk.
~-\l1g11st 24
August 24
\ugust 24
.'\ugust 24
Sunk.
TUlle 2.'1
:·\ugust8
August I "
September 29
,\\lgust 1 ..
Pr€~~ rqY,)lt (douhtful).
Westbolllld.
Pre~~ report.
flrlieved iucumplete.
September lG £,loW.
IrllIll1)bilizcd.
Sunk.
June
:ro
lrmllubiliz.i'il.
Unknown.
Unknovln.
Unlu'-own.
Snnle
y
Tuuloll
Preo;s report.
In Britl5b. hands.
Ja~uar
Gh!u;al
Tigre
F'I,r;therc
Septnnber 27, 1910
Oran
Oran
_.
f.e Chel'ali~r Pa,al
DISPOSITION OF THE FLEET
lireldgne
Provenr.:
Paris
·
EperuierGufaut
:\iilan
Kersa~nl
,
·J
A.lbatro.~
France
.\le-,-andr],1
Toulull
TOlllon
;\Iartinque
GuadelQupe
,\lexandria
..
Far East (Saigun)
·
w-. rerJi=asq;,e
~ L' A ud=i!Ux
'. Le Matin ..
.! I.e Terrible
>" Le TriompMnl
L'Indamptahle
AigllJ
v
Lonili~,,~
.
(,,-al~ssonnU're
Contre-Torpilleurs-..". Volta
..
Berbera
22. On the night of September 21/22, bombs were' dropped on the
Military Headquarters; two hits were ,observed.
On September 25, a further aHack was made on the Military Area;
direct hits were observcd no opposition.
t
.. J
Jeanne d'Are
Dugua v-1'rouin
Lamotte·Picqud
primaugtlet
Zula
21. On the night of September 21/22, two Wellesleys of 14 Squadron
attacked quarters and aircraft at Zula: some hits on a building near the
coast started a firc. Fires were also started in a camp.
Battl",~hip~­
;i
Emile Bertin
Benghazi
20. During the night of September 21/22, four Wellingtons attacked
Benghazi HaJ"bour; one ship alongside the mole and several warehouses
were hit and one of the latter was set on fire.
The Outer Breakwater was also hit.
press report.
.
Should have arnved Casablanca
a w September 25.
rOn;'
these believed damaged.
t ber 26~
Report of sailing about S",pteDlS ep ern
ber 26 unconfirmed.
t\ugust 24 .. Prl'.ss report.
~~ugust 24 . _ Press rcport.
\llgust 24
. ·1na kar
Jean-de_-Vie~~ .
j
PrCsS report.
IIIlUlObilizcd.
Immobilired,
IDlillobilized.
Tuulon
Molllcalm
Gearges-Leygues
j
PresS report.
August 24
September -1.
September 4
August 24
fouloll
l'oulon
Touloll
Toulon
.--\Iexandria
Ale:ll:andria
.'\k.x.andria
i'rob~blyat Toulon
.-\lexalldtla
__Olt Vendr6
.-\t
VelHl[C~
July 12
July 12
IIilllJobilized.
Possibly at Casilblauca S"ptl'lTIbe! 13.
PussibJy at Ca;ablanea Septewber 13.
Sunk:.
15
S"p(emh"l
14
I1
111111111!11~IIII~il~r
NAA.003.0179
\
\
I
!11111111111111111111111~1111111111
NAA.OO3.0180
Dcstroycrs--COlltd
y' Cyclone .../' Simco
,,/ Tempile
:::- Tvphun
..
At Vendres on
July 12
Possibly at Oran
September 2
Tral1umt41:ne
Unknown.
Possibly
September 2.
Unknown.
In Briti~h hands.
Unknown.
Possibly
September 9.
..r
Trombe
V Mistral
V Tornade
......- Simoun
Toubu.
'//Bounasq~
V
at
Oran
at
GraIL
Sunk.
SllUk.
In British hands.
Drage
Duragan
Torpedo BoatsV Buuthier ..
.; La Bayo,,"..aise ._
,/ La p"Ur$u~vante ..
y' La Curtklibe
• L' I W:01nprise
. Brantebas
Batiste
.
/ RombW'de
/ La Mel!xmune
/ La Flore .•
J.4 PIJ11Wlt&
, L'lphige"lie
Notes.-
Possibly at Casahlanca.
I
II
In British hands.
UnknoWIl.
Unknown.
In British hands.
In British lIands.
Tn Briti~ hands.
Uilkno;vn.
UnknoWll.
In Briti~h hands.
In Bdtisb. hands.
y
North West Africa(1) Casablancs
Blown. up in dry dock at Brest.
Sunk.
!'ossibly at Casablanca September 13.
,I
j
Vnkuown.
(1) From a press report dated August ~ 0'0
.
..
.
destroyers and T.B.Ds. are at Toul~l;. Il5l ered rehable, 1t IS probable chat 12 of the" unkr.owll '"
(2) Three small destroyers namcs
k
(3) Four destroyers, name~ unkn un nnwn, we_~e seCn at Oran September 2.
Casablanca.
OWIl, passlO'lJ GlbraUar eastlxn.md, a.tL!., September 25, probably frelli
Submarille~-
Of a total 01 79 submal:"ioes '-c T~-ee. are jtnown to ha;e been sunk.
NIDeln Bntish hands or immobilized
>.' . About 16 are In N.W Africa port
. , b
e
ThiS leaves 36, of whic~ v~ry little il\f~;:~ti~no~tl:aff l~e1ielled to he ;t Toulon.
_
or based Oll~. Afrtcall ports before the Ann' t'
ab. Of these 23 were knowil to have been at
r.hree were r~fittmg at La Cis tat and La Se ne lS I.Ct.
Sn w~re last re\?<ll'ted at Brest (April 29). Y . (April 29).
Aud Dve may ~t1l1 be at Hdrut.
j
(2) Dakar
(3) Gabon
(4) At sea
Que battleship, Jean Bart, incomplet".
One 6-in. c~, Glvire, probably arrived Seotember 25.
possibly one contre-tOl:cpiikuJ:", Ep",vier 01" li-filan.
About four or five destroyers.
Two escort vessels, 1)' lberuilie and D'Entrecasleau.
Two minesweepers.
One submarine depot shi!l, Jutes Verne.
Twelve suhmarill":; are repu<led to have left CasablaIl.<::a September 23 for Dakar.
One battleship, Richelieu, dam.'lged; report 01 sailing ahout Septembpr 2G
unconfinned.
Two 6-in. eruiser<;, Afonlca/m, Geurges-Le.ygue.5. One believed damaged.
Three or four contre.tOi:pilloellrs, Le Fantasq'~e, L'Auda(;ieux, Le Malin and
possibly Epervier or Ivlalin. Two believed burnt out and veaehed.
Two de~troyers. One helie.v,'.d burnt out and beached.
possibly two submarines. Both belitoverl d<lmaged.
Twelve submarines are reDorted to have. sailed froID Casablanca for Dakar
September 23, and could bave arrived tb.ere September 213.
At Liureville-Two !iubmadne!i, Sidi-Ferruch and PIln.celd.
Olle escoTi ~e~el, BougainviUe.
One 6.in. enliser, Primu",guel, pwceeding northward to Casablanca September 26.
I
~
l
I'
r,"
I
N(lflh African Paris
No inforwation concerning these ports has been receivcd since the first week of July, but it is improhablt'
that they harbour warships oth<or than submarines aud various small craft.
Three swall destroyers were seen at Orall un Sevten::bcr 2.
Syria.
Beirut
North Ame,icaa"i1d West
(1) Martinique
Far Ea5't(1) Saigon
(2) At ~ea
I
\
I
Possibly as many as five submarines.
I
[nd~es-
One aircraft carrier, DJarn.
O"e 6-in. cruiser, Em~/.e HBrli".
(2) Guadeloupe
One 6·in. cruiser (tJ:"aining ~hjp). Jeanne
(3) St. Pierre Miquelon One escort vessel, Ville d' 1'5'.
r
f)'
Arc.
One 6-in. cruiser, Lamotte-piquet.
One escort vessel, Amiral CharneY, prQbably bounri for Saigon.
One escort vessel, DUUlllnt f)' UrJj~lle, sailed from NOUillea for Saigon September 25.
I
\
\
Subm<:l,iD€ Pareat Sbip-
Jules Vt:r11e
..
Casablanca
September 13
Escort. Vessels (Avisos-Coloniaux)La Grandiere
..
lJeautemp;'-Beauj,;e
D' [~enilk
Casablanc'l
A mimi Charne, ::
.. Rig,!:uJt de Genouilly
~ D' Enlrecastea"x; ..
Casablanca
SUlIorg-",:m de Brauo.
n""'-ont d' Uruille
0/
J:)ollgainiijUe
Eseort Vessd_
FW"d'ys
jUlle 2';
Believed
]Wle 25
Libreville
September 12
St. Pierre- /lIiqC1elon
July 11
EFFECTIVE MAIN UNITS
roylVI!
Oue battle cruiser Strasoo"r" Reported
h
.
Uue al'i.iltlon tran;port, COJ/i';;/.llndwlt Test,~O ave saIled September 22.
FOHr.S-u;I. crlll~ers, AIg&ie, Fad!, Colbert,
leix
Three6-!Ll.rTlUsers J.lIarseiltaile Ie -d .. j>
MaxlmuIT' of If! con'tre.tornill ". lUI e-henne, La Galissfmil're.
.'\bo\lt 16 <1estroyels.
!
eurs.
About 15 submarines.
Du
16
Unknown.
UflkuoV;7J..
Sunk.
U.S.S.R.
SUl"veying vessel.
n~tuming
\
BALTIC FLEET MANCEUVRES
to Saigon.
Iu Dritisll hands.
Left )Joum<::a September 25 fo!
Saigon
The following information regarding the Baltic Fleet rnanreuvres has
been obtained from a survey of the press. It seems probable that the
Baltic Fleet was at full strength for the autumn man<..euVTCS.
The Director of Training, Rear-Admiral RaU, attended the operations.
The manceuvres took place at some period during the first week 01
September, and were spread over a period of 3 4 days, It is stated that
the object of the exercises was to test lhe defences of lhe approaches 10
the ports and bases of the Soviet Union. The facl is stressed that th1s
year for the first time use was made of the wider spaces uf the Baltl-:-,
and ~t is t.herefore possible to conclllrl.e that operations were not confined
to t.he Kronstadt approaches but incluc1,ed the waters off t.he Estonian
and Latvian coasls. Attacking and defending sides made use of aviation
and submarines for both attacks and reconnaissances; mentioIl'is also
made of the laying of minehelds.
17
I
The c:ommissar for the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov,hoisted his l1ag
in·· the battleship October Revolution and was. present throughout ~he
operations, which he seemS to have conducted In person. A submanne
Irom the attacking side which had been ordered to penetrate into the
enemy's main base failed in its object. Admiral Kuznetsov thereupon
signalled the submarine to close his ~agship a~d repriTIlanded l~er
Coininanding Officer. On another OCCa'5lOU he noticed that battleships
were leaving harbour without having taken the necessary measure for
defences against mines (presumably paravanes). One Commanding
Officer disregarded the possibility of mines being laid by a submarine in
a certain area and accordingly found his ship mined and put out of action.
At daybreak on the final day the defending fieet was not dosed np at
action stations when the enemy was unexpectedly sighted. It is .'itated
that several Commanding Officers carried ont Some manceuvres quite
regardless of any considerations affecting the enemy. In this respect, a
Commanding Officer of a battleship continued to fight enemy battleships
on parallel courses and failed to turn away although it was obvious that
the enemy was superior in concentration- of gun power. On another
occasion a single destroyer found herself under fire from the secondary
armament of a battleship and attempted to escape under a smoke screen;
no one, including her Commanding Officer, could explain what this
particular destroyer was supposed to be doing.
H would appear that although these exercises must have beeH very
elementary, much ignorance was displayed by Commanding Officers.
This may be accounted for by t.he fact that the operations this year
were more realistic than in previous years, since they were carried out
over a very much larger area.
.
On the conclusion of the manceuvres the Balric Fleet anchored in
Tallinn Roads. On the same or the following aft.ernoon Admiral Kuznetsov
reviewed the fleet and in the evening a discussion on the exercises was
held at the Naval Institnte at Tallinn. It is stated that all Flag,
Commanding and Staff Officers attended and the chief part at this assembfy
was played by Admiral Kuznetsov, who delivered a very lengthy speech.
The following arc some of his points : " Reconnaissance must never be disregarded, and special vigilance
is required in morning twilight.
" It is essential that observation of the sea and air must be of an
all-round character. and not confined to areas before the beam.
"Capital ships jnsufficiently screened are liable to attack from
submarines and light forces. Similarly, such vessels when leaving·
harbour must be adequately protected against suhmarines, mines and
aircraft.
" Positions for attacking submarines were well chosen, but their
action areas were too much restricted, the initiative of their Captains
was hampered, and in consequence the rOle of these submarines became
a passi ve one.
IS
" The night actions I witnessed were entirely artificial.
" It must be remembered that the enemy will make eve:y endcav~ur
to conceal his approach, action once joined will bc.fought lll. very q"?lck
time, and alterations of course will b?t~ be rapId and WIde. NIght
action calls for the highest skill and tralIllIlg of personneL
" Individual ship efficiency must he attained in realistic and ,not
artificial conditions.
"Officers must make themselves acquainted with the navigational
features and dangers of the seas in which they work.
"The daylight action which I witne~sed was quite unrealistic and
aave me the impression of a battle havmg been fought for the sake of
b
a battle.
"Co-operation between the rlifferent ~rms was ~ad. In one J?articu]ar instance aviation was urgently require?, but wnen the formabons
eventually arrived the opportunity of attackmg the enemy had already
been lost.
"Staffs must prepare a correct appreciation an~ plan. before an
operation, and then do their best dUrIng battle to ImproVIse as ~est
they can. Ii is quite useless to attempt to formulate new plans dunng
the heat of an action."
From the foregoing it can be safely concluded tha~ operation~l ql1ahtie~
of Flag and Commanding Officers of the U.S.S.R. Navy are still at a 10\\
ebb. It seems probable that th~ more open se.a con~ltJOnS and the
larger number of high-speed vessels employed, mcludmg two modern
cruisers and at least 14 new destroyers, must have had a r~ther o:er~
whelming effect on the Flag and Commanding Officers, who. In pre~ous
years have been accustomed to rnanceuvres of the set pl~ce varIety
carried out in restricted waters. On the other hand: there IS no doubt
that Commanding Officers will become m?re. effiCl:nt ~lOW that LI:C
Commissar system has been discarded and dIsclplme 1S bemg once aga.l11
restored to the 1936-37 level. Admiral Kuzncts~v_ also referred to tnc
future expansiop of the tlcct, discipline and the lrawlllg of Petty Officers.
PACiFIC FLEET MANCEUVRES
The Soviet Fleet in the Pacific has just completed tadical ez.:erciscs
which appear to have lasted more than a week. They were earned out
in bad weather, according to the Red Fleet, the organ of the navy.
The plan on which the exercises were bas~d was that an invading force
was trying to land troops. The. uefcnd111g .forces, .however, pr~)VTe~
victorious and such troops as did succeed 111 landlllg wer~ qmckly
wiped ont. The paper says the exercises as a whc)le showed a high degree
of preparedness in defence on the part of all ranks.
19
I
1111111111111111111111111111111111111
NAA.003.0181
revised in the light of subsequent information) shows the num?er
of the various types of enemy aircraft brought down dunng
raids on this Kingdom during the past week: -
PART II: WEEKLY NAVAL NOTES
,.:- ----I
H.M.S. Erebus, with two Blenheim aircraft of Bomber
Command for spotting, carried out a long range bombardment of
CalaIs on the mght of September 29. The weather proved to be
unfavourable, however, and the operatIOn was discontinued after
seventeen rounds had been fired.
London. has continued to be the most frequented target for
bombmg operations during the week, but
Southampton and LIverpool were each attacked twice, and
Bnghton, Coventry, Portsmouth and Birmingham were all
attacked also. Outstandmg features of the week's enemy
operations were attacks by day on a considerable scale at Bristol
on September 25 and at Uxbridge on Septemher 30, the latter by
dIve-bombmg.
~ncmy mght
The following table prepared from the daily R.A.F. reports
(the lIgures ill whIch are provIsIonal and have iII some cases been
DD.17
Do.IB.
Do.215.-I·~-~.~~1 1'110.109. i Me. no.
:MdlO.! Unspeci-I Totals.
Jaguar.
fj~d.
I
-t--:-'-'-l ~-=-=-~~~r~3-il--_-~~~
Sep. 26 ':'I
_
_
_
_
_
_
13
4 10
5' 5 1 1
2 33 II
" 27 '18 6 :1 2 -- --. 7 2 11 2 \443 3
~ 147
1'l 1-----3
2 133 35
"28
3
::14
21
"'>9
I _. I I
I
I
1 - -I
I
5
3
::
30
7
3
I
1
2
2
4
2 25 20 I 7
41.
.
47 32
Oct.I----------113-,--1
51
Carrent Events
Attacks on the Dutch, Flemish and French Coast ports have
been mamtamed throughout th,; week on a large scale, and at
the same time attacks on long dIstance targets in Germany were
contmued. Operations were on the largest scale on the night of
?eptember 24-;25 when 85 aircraft attacked the coastal towns and
60 the mland German targets, and agam on September 27 and 28
w~en the numb,:rs were 45 and 61 respectively. A series of
alLacks wcre carned out dunng the week on the German warships
m Riel and It may be slgmficant m this connection that the
battle crmser Scharnhorst, which was known to have come out of
the floating dock and lam alongside has since re-entered the dock.
In addl!lon to these activities of the Bomber Command, Coastal
Command has also attacked the coastal targets, giving special
attentIOn to the more westerly ports, including Brest.
Ju.88.
i
I!
-It
,
II
-
----,,---
--
The first figure given in the table under a type indicates the
number destroyed: the second gives the number probably
bronght down. In addition to the above 117 enemy atrcraft
were damaged during week compared with 48 last week and
145 during the week ending September 17. Of those destroyed
or probably brought down A( A fire ashore account';d for 12: 5.
This shows a marked mcrease m the A( A score, whIch was 3: 1
last week.
In addition to its other activities the Coastal Command of the
R.A.F. provided air escort for convoys during the week as
follows: -on September 25, 28 and 29 for twenty-two each day;
on September 26 for seventeen; on Septemher 27 for fourteen;
on September 30 for nineteen and on October 1 for twenty or for
136 during the week compared with 129 last week. Thus during
September the number of escorts provided was 583 compared
with 642 in August, 475 in July and 346 in June.
Now that the figures for imports into thc United Kingdom for
August are available it appears that the effects, up to the end of
that month, of the increased efficacy of the German blockade
upon which its authors have been so insistent are less apparent
than would be expected from a restriction of shipping which thc
Germans like to describe as " lotal " and even "fly-proof."
It is true that during August the amounts of foodstuffs and
mineral oil which managed to "run" the German blockade
were less by 35,000 and 21,000 tons respectively than the average
reaching our ports during the previous eleven months. The
deficiency in the former, however, is more than accounted for by
the decrease in what may roughly be described as luxury foods
(other than cereals, meat, fresh fruit, vegetables, animal feeding
stuffs and sugar) and drink. There is, on the other hand, an
increase, over the eleven month average, of 14,000 tons of meat,
20
1111111',lii\illll~~IIIII~
NAA.OO3.0182
21
I
oi85,000 tons of grain and of 219,000 tons of iron are. Thus with
the Illerease of 245,000 tons in the imports of all classes of goods
other th,:,n foodstuffs the total amonnt of imports of aU sorts to
reach thIs country through the " total " blockade is 21,000 tons
n:ore than the average for the cleven previous months, yet during
mr:e of. those mon~hs the blockade was only partial-even in the
estimatIOn of the Germans.
German Raiders
From JliIaj1 to September 9 the total confirmed losses from
RaIder activItIes amounted to 16 ships of 108,718 tons, while
a further 10 slups of 50,604 tons are also presumed to have been
sunk <;r captured. The largest losses have been incurred in the
Atlantic, but recently the centre of adivity appears to have
shIfted to the Indian Ocean.
At the begi;llling of August there appear to have been five
raIders operatmg, but the numbers are now harder to estimate.
Smce the North Atlantic has been quiet for same time it is
possIble that one or more which were operating there have
returned to German or German occupied ports, but it is equally
possIble that they have proceeded South, avoiding sinking ships
In order not to betray theIr movements. One or possibly two are
stIll III the South Atlantic, whIle one or two arc in the Indian
Ocean and pOSSIbly one in the Pacific.
The raiders arc converted merchantmen and probably have a
number of charactenstIcs m common. They would appear to be
of between 7,000 and 9,000 tons, of the cargo liner type, with a
speed of at least 16 knots. They have a heavy armament of two
or more 5.5-m. and four or more 4-in. guns, as well as dual
purpose pom-poms and machine-guns. It is probable that at
least two torpedo tubes are mounted and a large number of mines
are known to have been carned III two vessels. It is reported that
111 one case a raldcr earned two aIrcraft, one fitted as a bomber'
and one British ship is known to have been bombed in the India~
Ocean. The guns are very well concealed, and outwardly the
raIders present a completely Innocent appearance, being
dlsgmsed as SwedIsh or other neutral vessels. In one instance
a raIder was reported to have a telescopic funnel and topmasts to
enable her to "hange her appearance, and in another a workshop
was permanently busy On board making disguises. The crews
are large, and apparently consist of regular naval officers and
ratmgs '. though It IS probable t~at some of them ha ve previously
servcd m the (,trman MercantIle Manne.
22
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~IIIII!II
NAA.003.0183
The raiders appear to have a long endurance, one, which is
believed to be still operating in the Indian Ocean, having left
Germany in March. Some, probably all, have had rendezv,?us
with supply ships, such as the German tanker Wtnnetou, whIch
left Las Palmas in May and arrived at Kobe at the end of
August, having spent much of that time in company with a
raider in the Indian and PaCIfic Oceans. H.M. shIps have made
searches for bases for raiders, but so far without success. It is,
however, unlikely that raiders rely solely on supply ships, and
it is possible that arrangements were made lor such bases and for
the snpply of information before the war by agents such as
Count Luckner, the well known raider Captain who is known to
have made an extensive cruise in the South Pacific and IndIan
Oceans just before the outbreak of hostilities. At least one raider
was very fully informed about the movements of a capture.
The tactics of the raiders appear to have been carefully thought
out and probably do not greatly vary. In some cases raiders
have been sighted at a considerable distance in the evening and
have then disappeared, approaching again during the night or on
the following morning to make their attack. They usually seem
to approach on a gradually converging course from ",head,. so
that identification is difficult, and It IS ImpOSSIble for thcn Vlctllns
to bring their gun to bear. Fire is opened without warning,
shrapnel and pom-poms being employed to disable the W IT gear
immediately and prevent the gun being manned. Shootmg
appears to be very accurate, though H.M.S. Alcantara reported
that during the course of her action, it deteriorated when the
raider was herself hit.
In the past, raiders seem to have concentrated on one area for
about a fortnight Or three weeks, spendll1g much of thelr tIme
drifting and only increasing speed when necessary to a void
suspicion or to close a victim. Activity is not, of course, solely
restricted to specified areas, bnt there does seem to be a tendency
for a raider to work on a parti'cu]ar trade route for some time
before disrtppearing to lie low for a period.
The Fate of the "Tropic Sea"
Mr. Dravik, Chief Officer of the unarmed Norwegian motor
ship Tropic Sea, 5,781 tons, which was bound from Sydney,
New South Wales [or Panama, with a crew of thirty-three including the Master and his wife and a cargo of 8,100 tons of wheat,
describes the capture of that ship by a German raider on June 18
and his subsequent adventures:We received our routeing instructions at Sydney and sailed
from there on June 8 for Panama. We proceeded at a speed of
10 knots. Nothing occurred nntil the morning of June 18 when
23
at 0700 ship's time I sighted a ship 2 points on the starboard hand
at a dIstance of about 15 miles. She looked like an ordinary
cargo shIp. She gradually drew closer until at 1030 S.T. We
were only four rnpes apart when, in position 28: 48 S.160.03.8 W. 200 :"Ilesfrom land, she hoisted the German flag
and at the same time sIgnalled by flag for us to stop and not to
use the wIreless.
~ was in the cha.rt-room at the time, and as I was also the
Wireless Operator m the Tropic Sea I thought it was better to
take no ehan:es, so I shut down the wireless. The Raider fired
two sh~ts :vhich fell all round ?ur ship and we therefore stopped
the engrnes. We put down a hfeboat, the enemy doing likewise,
and both boats met half-way; the Master, Second Officer and same
of the crew were m our boat and they went on board the Raider
whrJe the Germans pulled over and came on board our ship. They
at on,:e took charge of the ship's papers, log book, etc., and took
them back to the Raldyr. At 1900 that night, the 18th, I was
order~d to go .on board. for 14 day~, during which she went under
a vanety ,?f names whIch were pamted on a. canvas screen hung
ov"r the sIde to hIde the torpedo tubes. There was a Greek flag
show~ng when th~ Haxby was stopped and we saw the crew
palIlting an Amencan flag whIle we were on board.
We found the Master and crew of the Haxby already on
board the Raider and we were able to talk to them a little. We
were Jomed the next day by ": small tanker of about 7,000 tons
whIch brought supphes and 011 for the Raider and also for the
Troinc Sea. She had come from Las Palmas where she had been
[or about seven months. The tanker stayed with the Raider
all the time at sea, except for one or two days when the Raider
went off to search for other merchant ships, and then she
returned and we met the tanker again.
There was a double crew on board the tanker, about 50 or
60 men, who were all merchant seamen, not naval men. It is
dIfficult to say how many men were in the Raider, but I believe
th"re were about 350 soldiers and sailors altogether, all in
umform, their ages bemg. 25 ··30 years. There were two seaplanes
on the RaIder one of whIch was a bomber, but I do not know if
they were sent out whrJe we were on board, we did not hear the
franes workmg at any !lme.
TREATMENT ON BOARD
We were treated fairly well whilst on board the Raider
although we we:e kept below most of the time, only being allowed
up for about 40 ~mnutues each day. The Germans had taken
most of the supphes from the Tropic Sea, but we were only given
24
I
1:
i
I
\
t
German food which consisted of black bread, coffee and lard,
and meat once a day. We had fresh meat at the begmrung, but
later were given tinned meat. We had three meals a day. The
crew were not allowed to talk to us, but occasionally they spoke
to us in English, as apparently they could not speak Norwegran.
They were quite sure they would win the war; when we asked
why they had invaded Norway they would not answer at first,
but later said that our politics were agamst Germany. They told
uS that nothing would stop their uew tanks a:,d that they had
60,000 planes at the beginning of the war. They told us they
had lost most of their Fleet in the battle of Norway and had
mostly submarines left with two light cruisers and one heavy one.
This Raider had been converted from a merchant ship and I
think their maximum speed was about 16 knots. She had a very
light draught. She had two guns on the fore-deck,. A/.A guns
amidships and two heavy guns aft ,whIch were dIsguIsed by
collapsible boats and a small house. [here were also 4 torpedo
tubes along each side. The tanker was unarmed.
During the 14 days we were on board no religious service was
held on either of the two Sundays.
After this, on Tune 30, we were put back on board the
Tropic Sea together with 23 British prisoners from the H axby
including their Master: 17 of L'telr crew had been krlled when she
was shelled by the Raider, eight of them had besn wounded ,and
had been put in the hospital of the German ShIp, the Bo sun
having died later from his injuries. I thmk he had been hurt by
the propeller when leaving the ship, as they had been unable
to stop her.
The German prize crew consisted of the naval guard from the
Raider, a Captain and three officers of the Merchant Navy and
the remainder merchant seamen, makmg 27 Germans altogether.
The First Engineer was a submarine engineer of about .40, the
Second Engineer was from the Merchant Navy, but neIther of
them knew how to run the Tropic Sea and our own engrneers
were seut down to the engine-room. The bndge was under
German command. They had broken our WIreless set but had
put in another small set which was both transmItter and receIver,
and our movements were directed all the time through thiS set by
the Raider. (I was told this by the guards.) The set itself was
capable of operating over a range of 5,000Imles. The RaIder
received her orders from headquarters 111 Berlin although
she herself did not cmnmunicate by wireless with Ber~in. We had
becn told while on board her that they were transmItting a photograph of our ship to headquarters, but I did not actually see a
photograph.
25
111111111111111111111111111111111111
NAA.OO3.0184
The Master of, the H axby had told me that when they first went
THE SHIP SCUTTLED
We learnt that the Tropic Sea was ordered to make for
Bordeaux. We went down round Cape Horn, then 200 miles
east to the Falkland Islands, turned north until we were west
of the Azores and then in Latitude 46° steered east towards
Bordeaux.
At 0600 on September 3, when 200 miles from Bordeaux, the
German guard came down to tell us to get ready to leave the
ShiP' apparently, we learned later, they had sighted a submarine
five or SIX mJles away. We put on our lifebelts and came on
deck. The Germans lowered two lifeboats and we at once
realIzed that. something was wrong. . At 0800, in position
46.30 N.-ll. 30 W. a Bn1Jsh submanne came more or less
alongside. I sa,,:, her flashing to us to stop. At 0815 we were
ordered to the hfeboats, leavmg on board only the German
Captam, ChIef Engmeer and one of the guard, who put time
bombs m the engme-ro?m, m No. 4 hold, and 'tween decks,
Then they too left the ShiP, which blew up half an hour later.
The submarine had stayed by during this time, and when the
s,hlp .had gone the German Captain, who spoke very good
Enghsh, Was ordered to go on board the submarine. He soon
returned to hiS lIfeboat and the British crew of the Haxby were
taken on board the submarine and also our Master and his wife
from the TropiC Sea.
Three boats were left, one with the 27 Germans, another in
charge of our Second Officer with 21 men, and my boat with
ten of us. All three boats kept together and during the night of
September 3/4 we rowed about 50 miles. At 1630 on the 4th
we Sighted a seaplane which circled round us firing machine-guns
ll:to the water. They told us later that they were afraid the
(,ermans had g,:ns in their boat and wanted to show them that
they meant bUSIness. The weather was very fille and the sea
cah~. We could sec the red, whIte and blue sign on the wings of
tlle plane and the R.A.F: on the fuselage. I noticed that the
Ge.lman; threw away their umforms when they saw it was a
BntJsh plane.
The 'plane came down on to the water, I pulled over to it and
at first the pilot thought we were Germans.
However I
explamed that we were Norwegian and the 10 of us were taken' on
board. The other 21 of our crew wondered where we were going
and I was not able to let them know. We were landed by the
seaplane at Plymouth ,and I was ,:ery pleased to get a message
later that week from Corunna stating that the 21 men had beC'n
picked up by a Spanish trawler and taken to Spain. I do ~ot
know what happened to the Germans, but I am at the opinion
that they als,o were picked up by the same trawler and landed in
Spam as botn boats were toaether.
26
<co
~l1board the Raider, ill position some 500 miles east of Bermnda,
she had hundreds of mines on board. They went down to
Cape Town and laId 250 mmes, then across to Auckland, \
New Zealand, laying another 250, then t? All:stralJa where they
hj.id mines somewhere along the coast of New South Wales. From
.
there they had made for the position where the TropiC Sea had /
been captJlred.
/
GERMAN INFORMATION
The Germans w~re in constant wireless communication withlj
Australia. The day we left Sydney a German spy had heenJI
f,ound who had heen operating a wireless transmitter and receiver
from Sydney. It was only a small set, but very effective, and
I believe there was another of these small sets hem,;: opera ted
from just outside Sydney, but it had not yet been dlse,?vered.
I am sure they were III toueh With the RaIder as the Gernlan
Commander knew about the two warships in Sydney Harbonr,
and he knew exactly the route we were to take, the day we were
leaving Sydney, in fact all about liS.
I believe he also obtained a great deal of his information from
Japan, for he knew when weleft Yokohama and when we were
due to arnve at Sydney. ThiS mformation I have no doubt was
passed by our J ap~nese Agents to one of the five German ships
at pr:esent laId up III Y<:kohama harbour~ who are, T feel sure,
in wireless commumeation With the Rawer and other German
Agents in Australia. The German Comma;,der also had full
information about our Sister ShiP, the TropIC Slar, whICh IS under
charter by the Ministry of Food, but I understand she has arrived
safely at Philadelphia.
This German Raider left Stettin on March 10, went up to
Labrador, and has been out ever since.
German Merchant Shipping
\
The Weser, 9,179 tons, sailed from Manzanil1o, Mexico, at
2845 on September 25. She was intercepted and captured by
H.M.C.S. Prince Robert about 4! miles 'out, at 0005/26, and IS
being escorted to Esquimalt, B.C. She had on board .19,000
barrels of diesel oil fuel and 600 drums of lubncating 011
besides 2! tons of provisions.
The tanker Charlotte Schliemann, 7,747 tons, at Las Palmas,
has rigged a crow's nest on her foremast. She is at short notice
to sail.
27
i'II!,II,lllil\lllllm~II~~
NAA.003.0 185
The Regensburg, 8,068 tOlls, left Yokohama in a great hurry
p.m. September 27. She is believed to have had fresh provisions
for only five days on board.
The tanker Winnetou, 5,113 tons, which had been in company'
with a raider, had only five officers and eleven others of her crew
on board when she arrived at Kobe. The remainder of the
officers and crew are believed to be acting as prize crews.
NORTH-WESTERN AREA--continuea.
0045/26
0940/26
1020/26
lf06/26
0935/27
Enemy Submarine Activities
2103/27
1521/26
In the regional grouping of the following reports of submarines
or of ships attacked by them the following geographical
expressions are used:-
0822/29
(, N(irth-\Vestern Area"
0830/29
" Coa.st of Norway"
North of 55 ; 00 N., and \Vest of the Orlmeys and
Shetlands, and of 01 : 00 W.
The area East of 02
00 E., to the North of
57: 00 N., and E8--st of 01 : 00 \V., to the North
0161 : 00 N.
" North S.~a" ..
" '\':~,;t(;rn Area"
The area between that line and a line mnning
from Dover to Cape Gris Nez.
\Vest of that line as far as a line running from
the Lizard to Ushant.
\Vest of the Channel, South of 55
00 N., aEd
" Afcican Coas: "
North of 36 : 00 N.
Thco area South of 36: 00 N., and \Vest of TarlE::;;.,
" The Channel"
Straits of Gibraltar.
2350/28
1215/29
1340/29
59: 50 N. --07: 40 W" 100 m. 330
Btl It of L:·;\l'is.
58: ~o N.-- 11 : 00 W., 105 m. 060 0
Rockall.
1239;,25 I 53: 4~ N.- 211 : 10 W., 356 m. 267'
Achil! Head.
1117/25 I' 61 : S6 1\.-07 . 04 '.N., 7 m. YV. of
Heste., Faroes.
12,,5/25
61 44 N.-OB : 27 "V., 16 m. S.E.
of Hc-sto.
53: 58 N.-20: 10 W., 3S5 m. 270 0
1113/25
Achill HearL
53: 34 N .--20: 23 "V., 3G() HI. 266 0
1432/25
Achill Head.
I
0001/.2°l I' 54: 50 N.-l0 : 40 W., 85 m. 258"
0045/26 f
Bloody FOl-eland.
0140/26 ] 53: 20 N. -27: 18 W., 608 m. 266 0
Acllill Head.
54: 37 NI2: 17 W., 144 m. 256 0
0756/26
Bloody Foreland.
::::;:: I
I
I
I
28
British Ashantian
attacked.
Reported by H.M. ship.
k d
British Rhesus attac e .
Norwegian Asgerd
attacked.
Reported by H.M. ship.
British
limpire
Ocelot
attacked.
Dutch Kedoe attacked.
Reported by aircraft.
ft
Reported hy aircra .
it
Reported hy aircra .
Reported by AjS
o
0
1500/26
0820/29
0
Reported by H.M. ship.
·1'
I
raweL
NORTH SEA
1000/27
NORTH-WESTERN AREA
57 : 10 N.-l1 : 10 W., 155 m. 320"
Bloody Foreland.
0
54: 47 N.-l1 : 37 W., 115 ffi. 260
Bloody Foreland.
54: 55 N.-I 1 : 00 W., 95 m. 260"
Bloody FOleland.
55 : 38 M -13 08 W 172m, 280 0
Bloody Foreland.
(Position
dOllbt£lll.)
0
56: 35 N.--o9·. 10 W., 92 m. 340
Bloody Foreland.
0
58 : 11 N.---OS : 49 W., 20 m. 98
Stornoway.
54 : 55 N.-22: 06 W .. 480 m. 268"
Bloody Foreland.
54: 39 N. -24: 19 W .. 555 m. 267"
Bloody Foreland.
0
56: 08 N.--09 : 40 W., 75 m. 320
Bloody Foreland.
55 : 08 N .-...()9 : 48 \V., 50 m. 268 0
Bloody Foreland.
58: 37 N.--16; S3W., 122m. 301"
Rockall.
54: 45 N.-II : 08 W. 130 m. 257 0
Bloody Foreland.
lf35/30
Fa;:ocse .
Union Jack
attacked.
Reported by H.M. ship.
59; 47 N. 01: 29 \V., 8 m, 222
Sllmhurgh Head
0
53 . 48 N -00 32 E 15 m 061
SpuTn Point.
,,8: 27 N.--o2 : 40 W., 14 m. 108"
Noss Head.
0
57 : 36 N.--04 : 03 W.,
m. 039
Fort George.
8,
Reported hy aircraft.
Periscop:~ rcport.
Reported by aircraft.
POSSl ble IX~riscope reported
by F.O.r.C.,
Invergordoll
WESTERN AREA
Brihsh SUlalyia att<i,cked.
0
Reported hy H.l\L ship.
1231/24
Reported by H.M. shi p.
1050/28
British Sovac attacked.
1242129
British Eurynzedon
attacked.
UnknoWTl ship and Britidl
5"tratford attacked.
British Conicntes
attacked_
British Matina attacked.
1245/29
0817/1
4G : 56 .N. - 07 : 38 W., 137 Ill. 230
Ushant.
:l5 : 55 N.---08 : 15 W., 69 ill. 150"
Cap;~ St. Vincent.
46: 38 N.-IO : 00 W., 230 m. 24~l"
Ushan.t.
S2: 57 N.----04: 48 W., 13 m. N. of
Banlse y island.
52 N.-19 W., 385 lU. W. of
Valentia.
Keported by civil aircraft'
Reported by H.M. ship
Reported by civil aircraft.
Reported by civil aircraft..
British HighLand Patriot
8ttacked.
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~!IIIIIIII
NAA.OO3.0186
29
:::;' '"
!ll
...
I
,.,
'" 0
6S
I
I
I
I
-
*'""
--
~
--
4
1
(ti
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~
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i:l'"d
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-<
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-------_ _----.
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Ul
<0
p..
~
0'
0
""l
(t
~,.c(tl :3(tl
(tl
~Wtlt·iJ41
.,.,
:HO
1,199
1.612
1.613
2,375
68
951
4,042
7,523
6,905
'EtiSh.
190
167
14G
144
~
2.961
74
II
3.61,'
10
6
18
10
5
2
408
60
1
~
3,921
8
1
]
472
698
13
93
6
157
37
4
21
48
467
48
376
641
333
14
195
290
Neutral.]
I
88
255
46
395
104
176
184
397
730
700
20
Allied
'j'
~_-_ _ ~".'""""".......,....~"'..".'".:"!'l"'Y,1"~ <WI:):
I
Cf>
(j
H
Cf>
H
..,
,
~~7$;Q.tI!1~WX~,J}--"~
~~
~­
~~
0_
O~
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,c4\l
~=
»='
>
..,
Cf>
..,
H
H
H
278~' %36;
125
8
13
3
4
6
27
4
7
18
14
21
while in
convoy
to date.
byep.emY
action'
.. To t.,aA, lS,~_~
WI'
Allied 1 in
38,439
29
11
186
293
862
616
94
3.526
76
82
360
463
170
12
2,334
1.183
4.815
8.894
7,938
102
1,984
3,058
1.351
c~~~it~d
~i~~N.
w#p<
~
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__
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-I -_
16
I
I
8
17
39
10
90
4
8
7
3
121
115
184
188
9
14
__
' -II ~
__
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Neut"l.1
I
19
20
7
20
Allied.
2
11
]0
4
mr• . a
i~t~
-.
~
Numbers of ships convoyed.
1940.
I
1939-40. .
25-0ct. 2.
I
Sept. 3-·0ct. 2.
:{G
161
87
173
99
!I
u;'
;.~?"
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::: Cl"J'-Or-1"-0 ....:)-.~
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During the week under review 4 British ships \Vere reported lost by enemy action while in convoy.
pwportions of losses to the total number of ships convoyed are ,__British 1 in 294 ·34% ;
Neutral 1 in 560= .18%; Total 1 in 308= ,3'2%. Percentage of ships lost during the week is ·5%.
.,..--....,....:-..
-_._--,--
w
convoys not now running :North Foreland outwards
Gibraltar to Port Said
Port Said to Gibraltar
Kingston (J amaica) homewards
~orway outwards ..
:N orway homewards
Humber to Southend
Southend to Humber
Gdmsby to Tyne
Tyne to Grimsby
Clyde to Firth of Forth
Sydney N.S. homewards
Liverpool to N.W. Approaches
Channel convoys
lvlethiloutwards
Liverpool outwards
Orfordness to Firth of Forth
Firth of Forth to Orfordncss
Gibraltar outwards
Gibraltar homewards
Halifax homewards
Sierra Leoue homewards
Firth of Forth to Tyne
:~
--~~-~- ~ ~ -
CUf-rcnt Convoys
--
Convoy routes.
~
rn
0
;::r'
ot1lt:::""
J;i
(tl
[IJ
~_.::J8' ~
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~'''''Ao*'~''';~;5;,",,;c;'\$;h/iH('):J'M#'~:'~'''''''l~-,,~,'/_~'Hl,"''";"~'*""":_"""";;>;''-''A_~
g
~~
'_,:".~",,_ ~~"'"
~1.lllllllllllllllllllllllillllllll
I
Sinkings, Attacks and Minings
Losses during' week
September 23--29.
No. of
Ships.
8
I
43,191
1,706
4,291
11
49,188
2
Totals
September 29.
No. of
Ships.
Tonnage.
- - - ---British
Allied
Neutral
Total losses up to
Tonnage.
---
452
116
264
1,845,054
520,602
803,156
832
3,168,812
I
O~~~:r';~ringS are in
accordance with infonnation
T~ceived up to
1200 on
The Aska, 8,320 tons, under Government charter, which was
seton fire by aircraft in the North Channel on September 16 and
subsequently abandoned on the N. Irish Coast, is now considered
a constructive total loss. She was carrying British and VichyFrench troops and civilians fwm West Africa, and about
550 survivors were landed.
The Blairangus, 4,409 tons, and the Elmbank, 5,156 tons,
which were torpedoed on September 21 while homeward bound
in convoy about 330 miles S.W. of Rockall, are now presumed
to have been sunk. The Master and 27 of the crew of the
Blairangus, and 17 Europeans and 38 lascars from the Elmbanh
were picked up by the British Pikepool and landed at St. John's,
Newfoundland. The Master of the Elmbank was killed and the
third engineer is reported to have heen taken prisoner by the
submarine. The Dalcairn" 4,608 tons, sailing in the same
'convoy, is also reported to have sunk, and 42 survivors have
been picked up.
ALLIED
With the following belated reports the totals of the sinkin
gs
last week now amount to19 British ships of 131 857 tons
3 Allied ships of 13,006 tons, a~d
5 Neutral ships of 14,425 tons.
On September 16, the Dutch Stad Schiedam, 5,918 tons,
homeward bound with a cargo of sulphur, was sunk by an
explosion when two days out fwm Bermuda. Twelve survivors
have been landed at Baltimore and 20 of the crew arc missing.
NEUTRAL
The Faroese fishing hoat Union Jack, 81 tons, was sunk by
gunfire from a submarine on September 22 when about 100 miles
N.W. of the Butt of Lewis, and seven survivors have been landed
at Stornoway.
BELATED REPORTS
BRITISH
I over
due
, t The
th ' following
d . ,five British ships which have b
een ong
a
elr estmahons arc nDW presumed to have heer th . h'
of enerny [cuders : _
1
C VIC illS
I
Probable
d ate. _'_
i T()U--',
I
Name.
__.. _ nagc
2Is,.ientist
..
June
Ju 1y
Ju 1y
11
30
6,199
Czty 01'
7.'06
'j Bagdad
v
KemYNendine
7.769
Aug.
Aug.
20
27
lJy£tish
I
1
II'
Turuhina
I
't'
0001
IOn.
-
Losses during week
September 23~29.
S
Atlanti' C
' ..~
J n d'Hill 0 cean
N • ..:1.
'tlanle
"
h"
S"ptemher 29.
Fate of Crew.
I,,
..
.,
~
9691
I
6,901
S. of Madagascar
I
No. of
Ship:,.
Probably prisoners of "'a',
" ,
Probably prisoners of '''a',
" ,a
2.') reported landed at
port in o~cupied France.
Probably prisoners of war
Probably prisoners of war:
-----
The Crown Arun, 2,372 tons, which w;s - attacke-~suh­
manne on September 16 about 85 miles N W of R k II J.'
known to h
k Sh
'
. octDaHull
IS now
ave sun.
e was bound
from"
Montreal
with
a cargo of pIt props, and thirteen of the crew were saved
Submarine
Mine
Surface craft
Aircraft
CaptuTed "
Other causes and
cause unkno\.vn.
Tonnage.
5
29,400
1
2
13,236
8
43,191
555
1
32
Total losses up to
f
, . n t c 1 astnan Sea
Commander.
BRITISH LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION
--I-P
NAA,003,01BB
Totals
.
..
No. of
Ships.
193
107
39
85
4
24
452
Tonnage.
1,020.956
335,079
183.463
243,RQ5
15,628
4G,12:1
1,845,054
33
(C392'iO-I)
C
11111I11111111111111111111111111111
BRITISH SHIPPING LOSSES DURING WEEK ENDING
SEPTEMBER 29
Tonnage.
Name.
Date.
Sept. 24
Sept. 25
Sept. 26
Sept. 26
555
Continental Coaster
(in convoy).
Sulairia . .
8,043
Stratford ..
4,753
Corrientes
Sept. 27
Eurymedon
raider.
356 m. ,"V. of Achill Head.
Submarine.
10 m. E. of Rattray Head.
56 saved.
!
85 m. W .S. W. of Bloody
Foreland. Submarine.
5,759
Sept. 28
Dalveen
s,I93
-----
I
Submarine.
4QOm. W. of Ireland. Submarine.
22 m. N.N.E. of Kinnairds
Head. Aircraft.
2 killed,
remainder
62 saved,
29 missing.
33 saved.
31 saved.
I 12 missing.
--'-----
'-------'---
ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES DURING WEEK ENDING
SEPTEMBER 29
Date.
Nationality·l Name.
Tonnage.
Po,ition and Cau'c.
Name.
1 missing.
saved.
6,863 I 608 ID. w. of Achill Head.
Submarine.
6,223 366 ill. "V. of Achill Head.
Empire Ocelot
There is no further news of the following overdue ships:-
49 saved.
Aircraft.
Sept. 28
-_.
I
Fate of Crew'
(approximatel
figures onlY)'1
i- E.N.E. Of-c-r-om-er-.-S-ur-f-a-ec--'--s saved.
5,802
Port Denison
(in convoy).
Sept. 26
Position and Cause.
NAA.003.0189
was considerably overdue. The owners of the Greek Antonios
Chandris, 5,867 tons, which was reported to have been overd~e
at Montreal since September to, have now stated that the ShIp
was bound for Buenos Aires where she was due on September 28.
\ Fate of C,ew.
J\lloyviken
..
(Norwegian.)
Anglo-Saxon ..
(British.)
Benavon
(British.)
Albionic
(British.)
Filei/ell
..
..
(Norwegian tanker.)
Oostplem
..
..
I
Ton-! Knot,.
Date
Due.
--+---+---5,008
14
5,596
10
5,872
11
2,468
8
7.616
10
5.059
(Dutch.)
Neptunian
(British.)
To.
Front.
nagc.
5,
I
9
8
155
1
Sept. 7.
Table Bay .. \ Calcutta ..
Aug. 22.
Milford Haven Bahia Blanca Sept. 9.
Aug. 8.
Penang
..
Aug.28.
I
I
I Durban
Wabana (N.F.)\
Aug. 31.
Abadan
..
Aug. 5.
Methil
..
July 26.
Sydney (N.S.)
Aug. 25.
..
Sept. 14
Holyhead _.
Sept. 15
I Freetown ..
Buenos Aires
Liverpool ..
Sept. 14
Sept. 4.
I Sept.
11
The British Jose de Larrinaga, 5,303 tons, which left Sydney,
Nova Scotia., on August 25 in the SC.2 Convoy, was missed from
the convoy during the night of September 6/7 and has been
overdue at Newport since September 12.
l
-'--Sept. 27
Norwegian
Asgerd
Sept. 28
Dutch
Arizona
N.N.W. of the
Bloody Foreland. Submarine.
In the Firth of Forth.
Mine.
I 1,308 \ 9Zm.
398
3 saved
(injured),
5 missing.
I
The only neutral ship lost this week is the Spanish Monte
Moncayo, 4,291 tons, which was sunk by an Italian submarine
on September 28 about eight miles off Cagliari, and eight of the
crew are reported to have been killed.
\
I
i
Overdue Ships
I
The British Commander, 6,901 tons, is now presumed lost
(see" Belated reports" of sinkings) and the British King City,
4,744 tons, has been posted overdue by Lloyds.
It is now known that the British Beng/oe, 5,318 tons, whieh
left Durban on August 22, arrived at Singapore on September 15.
As her arrival had not been reported it was presumed that she
34
35
(C39'210-1)
C2
I
i'
I
PART IV: POLITICAL
Germany
The failure of intensified air attack to destroy the Royal Air
Force, the British aI1I1ament industry or British.morale may well
be having an effect on Hitler's easily exhausted patience. With
the approach of winter the prospects of invading Britain become
much less favourable, though the idea has not. been abandoned.
It may be thought necessary to provide diversions in order to try
and reconcile the German people to another winter of war. These
might conceivably take the form of an occupation of Switzerland,
of the reduction of Hungary and Roumania to a status like that
of Slovakia, or of strong practical support to the Italian offensive
.in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the meantime the GermanItalian-japanese pact has been sprung on the German public as
a special treat, and if public interest is not excited it will not be
for want of effort on the part of the German press, which declares
that the pact has dealt a heavy blow to "international warmongers," pushed all the other events of the war into the background, and" confounded" London.
Obviously if Hitler had thought that he could bring about a
British collapse in a few weeks he would not have needed to
arrange a pact that warns off the United States. Hitler is reported
to have become more and more bitterly anti-American and to
have said that Britain would have come to terms with him in
july had she not had the promise of American material aid. It
appears that the first movcs towards the new pact were made at
the beginning of August, which suggests that Hitler envisaged a
long war while still telling the German people that it would
be short.
German home propagand" has been dwelling much on thc
concept of Germany as a virile, revolutionary force in the world,
and of her mission and grcat and glorious fuhuc. Much continues to be heard of the new order in Emope, and that Germany
requires ideological as wen as economic unity is shown by attacks
on the Swiss and the Swedes for allowing the expression of
antiquated liberal ideas. Though efforts are made to convince
the German people that all is wen, and though their everyday
life is elaborately organized, there is plenty of evidence that they
are feeling the strain of the war.
.
36
An American journalist has returned to New York from
. G¢rmany and has been publishing a series of articles ~nder the
lieading "VICtOrIOUS Gennany: Land of Gloom.
Some
",,"tracts follow:" At the crest of the wave of German success, on June 28,
I arrived in Munich. Instead of celebrating, the people were
unmistakably sad and quiet. There were no cheers when the
troops passed by. When I expressed surprise. at this, one
German impatiently said, ' We celebrated once, III 1914.....:'
I found that the Nazis take it for granted that Germany.will
invade Russia in 1941, and also that hIgh offiCIals beheve
that war with the United States is inevitable. The most
surprising development in Germany is the de.ad l.istlessness
which is spreading like a plague and lllfectmg mcreasl?g
numbers with defeallsm. More than once Germans saId,
referring to Hitler's last speech, ' He's worried. You can
tell that by the way he spoke.' For the first time Germans
began to feel that Hitler has slipped up. Every day ?f
British resistance causes more Germans to say, 'It WIll
never be over. We shall have a terrible winter~no food or
heat, and bombing every night'."
From German sources, too, there arc signs of strain. Though
food rations have been slightly improved, the rationing of wool,
leather and soap is more severe. The Volkischer Beobachter, m
a would-be sprightly article addressed to women, says, "The
summer wooden shoe is dead, long live the autumn wooden
shoe!" Complaints have appeared in other .papers that many
women in war industries arc not takmg theIr duties senously,
and apprehension is expressed at the fact that the Ger;nan
business man IS becommg dIsgruntled WIth too much State
management and interference. There are allusions to labour and
transport difficulties .. There is a shortage of goods wagons on
the railways, and advertisements are appeanng m all German
papers stressing the need for correct lo:,dmg III order to aVOId
delays. At the sa.me time there are mdlcatlOns that the. aIr
attacks have slowed up both transport and production, espec~ally
in western and north-western GermaIlY. Substantial concesSIOns
have been made with regard to the payment of overtime to
workers and this suggests an attempt to prevent dIscontent, and
that defeatism is a real danger appears from a report that III
everv block of flats a uniformed official is to be installed, with
the Imposing title of " Morale Controller."
According to a Swedish report, Max Schmeling has been
injured during parachute exercises and will now be in hospital
for a long time. Down for the count once more; perhaps It was
I
clumsy footwork.
~1,1111111!111"11~~~lllr
NAA.003.0190
37
laws and ideals, Slovak gendarmes are compelled to seize these
" desertcrs " and surrender them to the German authontles. It
is said that they are usually sent back to the Reich in the care of
the Gestapo.
Czechoslovakia
The Customs union between the Reich and the Protectorate has
evidently been unwelcome to others besides the Czechs. A few
weeks ago about 80 Sudeten Germans who were leaders of
industry in the Protectorate signed a memorandum in which they
recalled Hitler's promise, made when he created the Protectorate,
to guarantee the autonomy of the Czech lands. They asked that
at least the industrial autonomy of the Protectorate should be left
unimpaired. They sent this memorandum directly to Hitler.
His answer was an order for the immediate arrest of all the
signatories.
The monetary union with the Protectorate will not directly
enrich the Germans, whose spoliation was virtually completed
whcn they seized the gold reserve and the available stocks of
foreign currency after their entry into PTague. The plan is part
of the economic subordination of conquered countries to the
present and future interests of Germany and the process of setting
up Dr. Funk's vaunted" new European order." The Germans
are apparently not interested in the skilful and highly organized
Czech manufacture of finished goods; Czechoslovakia, like
Poland, is destined by them to be merely a reservoir for agricultural products and raw materials.
Although after the collapse of France there were signs of proRussian sentiment in the Protectorate, the failure of the Germans
to keep to their time-table for the invasion of Britain and the
evidence that Britain is not yet beaten have caused a wave of proBritish sympathy, and there are indications that sabotage is
increasing. A detailed account has bcen received of the emptying
of a petrol train. The tank wagons were bored by special tools
almost under the cyes of the Gestapo and the train was pushed
to and fro on a bridge over a river until it was quitc empty, the
seals being left untouched. This sort of work is being directed
by the underground movement. Often, however, saboteurs act
spontaneously. A third kind of sabotage is practised by workmen who pretend to bc absolutely ignorant and who ask for
constant instruction in every small detail of their work.
Production in factories can be very mnch slowed down in this
way.
Accorqing to the Czechoslovak National Council of America,
scores of workers have been returning to Slovakia from the
labour camps in Germany to which they had been drafted.
They hoped to be bettcr off at horne, but the Nazis consider
running away from a lacbonr camp the same as military desertion;
and since" free, independent Slovakia" is ruled by German
38
.
Scandinavia
NORWAY
I
It seems that the State Council, as provisionally formed, waS
not entirely approved in Berlin, and on September 25.a new State
Council was appointed by Terboven, the RCiCh CorllIlllsssar III
Norway. It is composed of 15 members, 13 of whom are
dherents of Quisling's party, the NasJonal Samlmg; of these I?,
~ix werc members of Quisling's abortive Cabmet announced III
April, which helped the, mvaders.. The new Gov.ernmen~ does
not include a Pnme Milllster or a MUllster for I~ Orclgn AffaIrs, or
a Minister for Defence-which is not surpnsmg, for those offices
are only suihble in a free country. It '.5 pOSSIble, however, that
one of them is being kept open for Qmslmg, who has not been
included in the list.
The main significance of the setting up of the new n§gim~ is
that the Germans have not been able to make the NorwegIan
people willingly accept their rule. In an explanatory broadcast
speech Terb,?ven, who spoke in German, deelared that Germany's
good mtenhons had )Jeen mIsunderstood. He blamed t~e
Norwegians, and espeClally the Kmg and Government, for theIr
obstinacy, which had brought the country to Its pr~sent pht;;ht.
He threatened that unless the Norwegians altered theIr bchavlOur
worse might befall them. The threat was accompanied by.a show
of goodwill~an appeal for co-operatIOn, c?mradeshlp and
mutual respect, and an assert,l?n that the Germans. fell, no
If the NorwegIan nation, he
enmitv or desire for revenge.
conc1llded, " hopes for a free NorwCipan s~lutior: of the present
situation, there is only one way towm agam.the~~ freedom and
independence-the way of the Nas]onal Samhng.
Terboven's usc of the word "free" is, to say the least.
curious.
A few hours hefore his speech detachments of police
and German soldiers raided the premises of all political parties
except the Nasjonal Samling and ;closed them, leaving Q.uisling's
party the only one 111 the land. 1 he leaders of the Stortmg have
been placed under police supervISIon, and there arc reported to
have been arrests by the Gestapo among the most outspoken
critics of Quisling, and especially of Socialists and C01l1mUlllsts.
Ii IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~IIIIII~
NAA.003.0191
39
I
,
i
\
II
!
Independent newspapers have been suppressed, only German
films are to be shown in the cinemas, and" democratic thought"
and the" plutocratic system" will no longer be permitted.
The Swedish press is outspoken in its comments on the new
regime in Norway. Terboven's pronouncement is condemned
for its insolent tone and described as a death-blow to Norwegian
independence; the path which he offers to Norway leads
through " a hated and despised organization unable to mnster
more than 2.3 per cent. of the last poll." Norway now" formally
becomes a German province," and" the only sure result is that
the German move will meet with violent opposition " even from
circles which, disappointed by the unsuccessful English help in
April, have since tried to make the best of the situation by " loyal
co-operation" ,with
the
German occupying forces.
Norwegians, it is observed, say "Rather ten Germans than
one Quisling."
DENMARK
The seventieth birthday of King Christian, celebrated last
week, left no room for doubt of his popularity. The King is
regarded as a symbol of the nationalism of which Denmark has
been deprived. One of many anecdotes connected with his daily
ride through Copenhagen tells that a German who " could not
understand how the King dared go unguarded, was answered by
a Danish errand-boy-' It is all of us who look after him'."
There is also an anecdote to the effect that when the German
commander in Denmark expressed to Copenhagen's mayor his
admiration of Danish discipline, he was told in reply: " It is not
discipline but culture."
It is reported in Stockholm and Helsingfors that the Germans
intend shortly to put an end to the anomalous method of government in Denmark under which the Stauning Cabinet still holds
nominal power. The impending resignation of Hr. Stauning is
forecast, and rumour has been playing with the names of various
possible successors, notably Knud Hojgaard and Winding Kmse.
There are increasing indications that the German grip on
Denmark is being tightened in the political as well as the
economic sphere.
SWEDEN
It has been expected for some time that Germany would
attempt to coerce Sweden and Finland into withdrawing
recognition of the representatives of the exiled Norwegian
Government and into recognizing the new, Quislingite
administration. The Swedish Government have, however,
40
iJ,dicated to His Majesty's Minister and the Norwegian Minister
ill",t they will not recognize as a Government the new NorwegIan
state Council, including as it does thirteen commissars appointed
by Quisling with German approval.
Finland
On September 25 the Finni~h Governm~nt !ssued to the press,
without comment, the followmg eornrnumque: ~
.
The transport of German troops on leave and the transit
of German supplies are now taking place between Northern
Norway and Northern Finland, subject to certain conditions
and measures of control.
Finland has thus followed the example set by Swed?n in June
of yielding to Gerrr:an pressure m a m,anner that IS an open
HIS Majesty s Government have
breach of neutrahty.
accordingly made a vigorous protest to the Finnish Government.
France
In the draughty hotel< of a provincial town, with no central
heating, no documents and no hope, the Petain Government is
said to be developing an inferiority complex from the
Since
contemptuous appellation, "the men of Vichy."
Marshal petain failed to persuade the Germans to allow hIS
Cabinet to move to Paris, rumour has spoken of a projected move
to Lyons. Certainly, with the Government Departments divided
between several small towns in Central France, the work of
" making the French people prosperous, its civilization llourishing and its country lasting" (Marshal Petain's self-declared
task) must be difficult indeed. "Is it true," Radio Paris asked
caustically last week, " that in the Ministry of Labour there are
420 officials, regularly paid, who have not yet been allocated
jobs? that there are about 100 in the Ministry of Public Works
and rather more in the Ministry of Finance who, thongh on the
pay-roll, are not performing any duties? that many salaried
insurance inspectors have never carried out an inspection? "
It is clear that the Germans are doing aU they can to reduce
unoccupied France to economic chaos and at the same time to
occupy key points, such as naval bases and aerodromes, with
the object of facilitating an occupation of the entire country if
and when they decide upon it. Reports state that German
41
l
i
I
I!
military commissions are working at various points on the Fre~ch
Mediterranean coast, and that barracks at Marseilles are bemg
prepared for German troops. Meanwhile by thw:,~~g French
efforts at economic reconstruction and by reqmsltiomng foodsupplies and thus increasing the dange.r of severe. shortage,
Germany may be able to create a Situation which would
" justify" her in both military and economic intervention.
What the Petain Government has effected during the last few
weeks, apart from food-rationing and a "reprisal" raid on
Gibraltar, the Vichy newspapers do not reveal. The number of
these newspapers decreases almost day by day, as one after
another returns to Paris and to the more rigid eensorshlp of the
German occupation. In those that remain some conflict of
opinion is still possible. The Temps, semi-official in the last
ditch, urges the French people to submir with a good grace to
the suffering which an armistice, freely signed, must bnng, and
to co-operate with the occupying power to the greater glory of
France. Figaro, on the other hand, is indignant at the Riom
trials and unwilling even to condemn the British blockade.
" Certainly," writes Figaro, " we have something to learn from
our adversaries. But let us remember that if it is honourable
to recognize our mistakes, it is not honourable to abase ourselves.
It is not even profitable. The true way to recover some day
what we have lost is to remain jealously faithful to the only
thing of value left to us, our honour." Meanwhile to the list of
politicians arrested or "administratively interned" in connexion with the Riom trials have now been added four former
members of M. Blum's Popular Front Government and
M. Schrameck, the 73-year-old Radical-Socialist ex-Minister of
the Interior.
French press comment on the. Dakar incident is. various.
Depeche Marocaine expresses surpnse that Mr. Churchill should
have beeu led astray by ex-General de Gaulle, the real culprit.
N ouvelliste declares that all Vichy is " inveighing against the
British Prime Minister and sorry for the creature he has dragged
What opinion outside the press made of the
in his wake."
incident is obscure, though there is evidence that in some quarters
it raised hopes when its outcome was still undecided.
French Empire
The failure of the Free French and British expedition to Dakar
prodnced, as its first effect, a certain depression among the
supporters of General de Gaulle in the colonies still under the
control of Vichy. There appears to have been a diminution of
42
confidence in General de Gaulle in some places, but generally
the colonies which had already declared for Free France are
.t~ported to be enraged with the Vichy 9~}Vernment and to reg'!-rd
]).akar as merely an lllCldent.. OppOSition, officl:,l or ullofficial,
is believed to have senously Impeded the ne€;otiatlons between
·the Vichy representatives and the Italian anmshce comnUSSlOns
in Syria and Somaliland.
North Africa
TUNIS. It is reported that the French Government recently
rejected a demand by the Italian Government for a measure of
demobilization, but details have not been received.
MOROCCO. It is reported that civil officials and officers of the
armed forces who are suspected of de Gaulliste sympathies are
being dismissed.
British subjects are being illterned.
The
. Dakar incident has strengthened the Anglophobia ill naval
circles, but local supporters of General de Gaulle, though
disappointed, are believed not to have lost confidence in him.
West A fl'ica
NIGER COLONY. The Governor wirelessed to the GovernorGeneral at Dakar that Niger was indignant at the attack on Dakar
and would itself resist any attempt at aggression.
Equatorial Africa
CAMEROONS. The Governor telegraphed General de Gaulle
direct on September 25, saying that his territory was ready to
respond to the General's call. The population is reported to be
bewildered by the Dakar incident and judgment is suspended
because only enemy-controlled news is available. Disgust is
said tp have been expressed at the order to [Ire on the Free French
emissaries and intensification of anger against both Boisson and
the Vichy Government is also reported.
GABOON. The Governor is reported to have arrived at Dakar
on September 14 and to have interviewed BoissOIl. It is
suggested that the object of the visit was to endeavour to improve
the economic conditions in Gahoon, thereby depriving the Free
French movement of possible support.
I
~
Syria
The arrest of supporters of General de Gaulle is still continuing.
It is reported that feeling in French circles is as follows:(a) Sentiments of the small section who are wholeheartedly pro-British have been little affected by the arrests
and the Dakar affair, but they are at present disinclined
for de Caullis.tC activities.
!11111111111111I1111~illllll
NAA.OOS.019S
43
(b) Anti-British feelings of naval and some military
Italy
personnel have been intensified.
(c) Majority. of French who were f01'Illerly wavering seem
to have lbst faIth ill the de Gaulliste movement.
It ~as been suggested that the prospect of a successful coup in
Syna has receded md~fillitely and ~hat it is useless to try any
means other than continuatIon of discreet propaganda until the
effect of Dakar has blown over.
'~'~":';
East Africa
SOMALILAND.
His Majesty's Consul at jibuti received orders
that ~e must leave on account of the bombing of the town.
To thiS demand the Governor of Aden replied that while the
bombs may well have been dropped by the Italians it was
pOSSible that they had been droPP:d by us in mistake for Zeilah.
The Con~ul waS aske~. to IllvestIgate and in the event of the
bombs bemg found Br!tish to apologize and offer compensation.
The Governor was obliged to execute the order from Vichy that
the Consul should leave, but he was gratified by the Governor of
Aden's message and has suggested that after the Consul has
ldt, unoffiCIal talks should take place in order to review the local
situatIon and to clarify future relations.
It was reported on September 20 that instructions had been
received from the t<:r~neh Government not to proceed with the
execution of the military terms of the Armistice until further
orders.
MADAGASCAR AND REUNION.
According to one report the
population ,?f Reunion is heart-broken at the check at Dakar,
but all remalll falth!ul to General de Gaulle and to Great Britain.
An officer of the 1'rench Admiralty IS expected to arrive to
enforce sanctlOns agamst suspected adherents of Free France.
St. Piene and Miquelon
It has bpen reported that the French Administrator at St. Pierre
at present supports the Vichy Government, but it is thought that
he mlg:ht be prepared to co-operate with the Free French movement If he were supported by the inhabitants of the Island.
The less well-to-do portlons of the population and the majority
of seamen of the fishmg vessels are supporters of the
de Gaulhste movement; the war veterans are almost wholly for
Thc more well-to-do are supporters of
General de Gaulle.
Vichy, .because they fear for the stablhty of the franc iu the
Island m the even~ of a change-over to General de Gaulle and
because they hold illvestments in French bonds.
44
il,III.IIII!!IJlIII~lr~l~
NAA.OO3.0194
~
cJtseems that Italy's part in the Axis-japanese pact, like so
many parts which she has recently assumed, has been to sign,
'lillder Germany, on the dotted line. What her immediate profit
Is does not appear, except in so far as the friendship of japan
p'iay be expected, in I;'eneral terms, ~o hasten the collapse of the
'Allies. On a longer view the pact IS mtended to prepare the way
fora partition of the colonial empires of the Eastern Hemisphere
:l:IDong the three high contracting parties. Italy's share, to judge
from the wishful thinking of her publicists, will be the southern
.and eastern shores of what Mussolini has called, like his ancient
Roman ancestors, Mare Nostrum.
The Mediterranean is at present, in a sense which Mussolini
would be loth to admit, Italy's" living space." Apart from
East Africa, which is an incubus and from which she is virtually
cut off, she is confined within the borders of her sea so long as
the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal are closed to ber by
the superior naval and air forces of her enemy. Spanish collusion
might open one gate to her, but the signs are that neither Ci<l:no
nor Ribbentrop has yet succecded III buymg the assistance whICh
Suner would no doubt be willing, if he could, to sell. At the
otber end is what the Italian press has picturesquely called" the
second pillar of the British Empire," the Suez Canal-(the first
pillar is apparently London)-but between that and Graziani's
army lies a long, defended road through Egypt.
Italy's demands on Egypt have been represented by Federzoni,
President of the Italian Academy, as (1) an effective guarantee
for a free passage through the Canal; (2) resumption of protection for the Italian language and culture; and (3) co-operalion
in vital political and economic interests in the Sudan. The Italians
continue to insist in their propaganda that they are coming to
Egypt as libe~ators, that they would be most grieved if a single
Egyptian were to be hurt, and that now is the moment for Egypt
to realize her ambition (confined, be it noted incidentally, to a
few visionaries) to establish the Caliphate over the Mahometan
world. Of course, it is added, the position would alter If the
Egyptians were to oppose their own liberation from the British
yoke.
The Italian advance on the Canal has indeed begun, but it has
made no great headway up to the present. The possession of Sidi
Barrani means nothing except as a jumping-off ground-and a
piece of prestige dearly bought. A month of the second year of
the war has passed; it is nearly four months since Italy came in,
more than three since France dropped out. Italy has had ample
45
",
.'
time to mature ~er.plans: and yet her threat to Egypt has barely
begun to matenalIze. TIlls cannot be explained solely by the
heat, by the dlfficulty of water supplies, or even by Graziani's
tactI.cs. of accu:nulatmg stores at each step. While he is delaying
at Sidl Barram he IS offermg an extended line of communications
to harrying by British light troops; he must be aware that as the
weeks pass more and more British reinforcements can reach the
Mediterranean and more and more will the R.A.F. assert its
ascendancy.. Al?art from t~e weather, in no direction can Italy
claim .that tune IS o~ her side; so that there may well be some
force. m the suggestion that Mussolini is waiting to make quite
certam that Hitler can tully occupy the teeth of the British lion
before further attempting to twist its tail.
In Italj!, as in Germany, prop.aganda has recently dropped the
Biltz motIv and sOl;nded a warnmg that the war may be hard and
!ong. In Popolo d ltaila on September 25 Appelius declared that
It was not an easy war because" we are up against three positive
forces-the Royal Navy, plutocracy and intrigue." Its length,
~e said, could not be forecast, because that depends, not on the
mtellIgence or power of Great Britain-in that case it would have
been over already~but upon the pig-headedness of the British
ruling class. The article contained much more in the same vein
Its significance is merely that the Italian people, who were earlie~
encouraged to look forward to a speedy release, have now to be
accustome~ to the idea of long suffering. Another propagandist
volle-face III the last few days has been noticeable in the treatment
of Spain: the likelihood of prompt Spanish intervention in the
war, which was emphasized when Suner went to Berlin has been
'
explicitly discounted since he moved on to Rome.
Spain
Sen,?r SUfie,r.'s l?resence in B~rlir: has led to much speculation
and WIshful tnmkmg, but nothmg IS known officially of the outcO~1e of IllS talks WIth HItler and Ribbcntrop.
His visit
comclded, presumably by arrangement, with that of Count
Ciano and it is reported that the Spanish Minister of the Interior
and the Italian Foreign Minister had a long COnference together.
A statement issued by <luthoritative circles in Berlin said that
?enOrSllfi~T'Svisit offered an opportunity for def3iled discussions
In whIch Count CIano took part, and that the conversations were
conducted In a fnendly atmosphere and dealt in a satisfactory
manner WIth all problems of common interest to the three
countries. There can be little doubt that the common prohlem
of the moment must he some Mediterranean strategy for the
46
trying out of which Spain's help is required. Sefior Suner
It is expected th",t when he
>~~'fXrrns to Spam he Will be accompamed by Hlmmler, head of the
:~"l1left for M~nich and Rome.
t?c~$tapo.
,.JiGiermany is intensifying heF effor!s to bring Spain ~nto the
In Spain the str:u~gle IS co~tinumg between Suner and
llii;<party, wh~ would Jam the AxlS, and most of the Genera.1s
l);fll other Mlmsters, who are anxIOus at all costs to keep Spa~
tit of the war and give her a chance to recover from the CIVIl
oar and rebuild her economic life. Suner's followers are
dazzled by the idea that if t.hey come into the war now they WIll
immediately obtam possession of Gibraltar and part, If not all,
ofTrench Morocco as a reward for their help to G.ermany. The
other party, while also hopin,?, for some reeo!,lUtion of Spanish
aspirations, feels that these Will best be obtamed by remammg
neutral, at all events until they are able to see the results of the
attacks on Great Britain and Egypt. Some fear that should a
check be put on these attacks Germany will certainly try a
diversion in the Mediterranean. They ar~ anxIOus that t~ere
should be no disturbance of present conditions III North Afnca,
such as a move in favour of de Gaulle in French Mor?cco, which
would provide Germany ".'ith an excuse for marchmg thro,!g~
Spain to Morocco and pOSSibly Portugal. In some quarters It IS
feared that a coup d'etat with German mlhtary assistance may
have been planned in Berlin and Rome
get nd of
the Foreignl'ilinister and other opponents of Spamsh embrOIlment
in war.
w~t,
:0
U.S.S.R.
Moscow has so far been silent ahout the Germall-ItalianJapanese pact. While in the United States the pact is regarded
as anti-American and anti-British, in Tokyo there may well be
different ideas. Germany and Japan are only separated from
Russia by frontier posts, and in Japan, besides. dear memOfles
of large frontier battles in recent years, there IS strong resentment against Russian help to China. Although the pact contams
a phr:ase about t.'J.e maintenance of present relatIOns With RUSSia,
there is in fact nothing in it to suggest that It could not he of use
some day against her, and in spite of the existence of the Gcrmar:Soviet Pact the new agreement seems to revive the antiComintern bloc. According to the Gennan WIreless, polItIcal
47
1IIIIiIIIllllllllllllillilmII
NAA003.0195
I
•
Their ostensible mission is to arran~e for the repatriation of the
German <{Irmen and motonzed nmls
Il:a.ye arrived in order, it is said, to protect the oilfields. In fact,
iiil:ie:imany enjoys somet~ing like extra-territoriality in some
ji!vmanian towns, and It has more than once been suggested
fnirtthl s may be the result of a secret clause m the Vienna award.
'M'.Codreanu was lately reported to have said that he would
_t~ilier Roumania perished with the Axis than recovered with
Great Britain: his wish may yet be fulfilled.
circles in the Soviet Union were" of conrse " informed of the
signing of the pact, and they may have been told of it shortly
beforehand, but how much else they knew is uncertain.
While Russia continues to strengthen her defences she goes
ahead with her economic schemes, sometimes more grandly conceived than efficiently carried out. The first decade of planned
economy has made notable changes in the balance of productive
forces between Central and Southern European Russia, and
Russia east of the Urals to the Pacific. The basis has been firmly
laid for a new relation between these two natuml divisions of the
U.S.S.R. in which both, as far as possible, will develop their local
resources and build up industries accordingly, with the minimum
dependence on transport for supplies and raw materials. The
" new east" is still in construction and autarkv remains an
ideal. An analysis of the statistics of agriculture" and industry
in Siberia and the Far Eastern regions of the U.S.S.R. reveals
general progress varying in degree and tempo in different places,
but in the main rationally planned to ensure the best development
of local resources in the future; but a good deal of local bungling
accompanies the effort to reach a horizon of ambitious, if still
distant, achievement.
\!:m~s.sarabian Germans.
The Balkans
The Vienna award can scarcely be said to have settled for good
either racial or political problems in Hungary and Roumania.
There are still half a million Hungarians within the new
Roumanian frontier,. and many Hungarians feel that they have
not yet received theIr due III the way of territorial gains. The
Roumanian press has been giving accounts of Hungarian
atrocities in the ceded provinces of Transylvania, and according
to some reports these excesses have amounted to massacre. It is
possible that the Vienna award was framed with a view to
enabling the Germans to stir up racial trouble, or at least to take
fn.rther advantage of dissatisfactions that already existed: they
mIght use any disorders that had already occurred, or mif'ht
foment fresh ones, to jLtslify a German occupation of the ceded
area.
Roumania is in no position to resist either German domination
or Germany's gradual military penetration, of which there have
been nnmerous reports. At Galatz there are said to be 1,500
to 2,000 S.S. men, eqnipped with lorries, tanks and transport.
48
l
_, A number of British subjects have been arrested by the
Roumanians apparently all a charge of " intended sabotage,"
though evidence has not been produced. They are reported to
ha.ve been maltreated. This action, possibly promptcod by the
Germans, seems inconsistent with General Antonescn's supposed
wish to maintain correct relations with Britain, if only as a
symbol of the" independence" of Roumanian foreign policy.
The Roumanian authorities have been evasive and obstructive
bqth in granting British officials access to the prisoners and in
b,inging the latter to trial. Lord Halifax accordingly sent for the
Roumanian Charge d'Affaires, called for an explanation, and
protested against the manner in which these British subjects had
been treated.
The Axis campaign against Greece has not advanced beyond
the rangc of threats. Italy maintain;; her troop concentrations on
the Albanian border and her press and wireless bluster, but
Greek morale is stated to be good, and Greek military precautions
so fu taken arc considered to provide an efficicnt basis for a
speedy general mobilization should that become necessary. If
the position of Greece is precarious, that of Yugoslavia is even
less enviable. More isolated, subjected to extreme economic and
political pressure by the Axis, afraid of Italian ambitions in
particular, and with heavy Italian troop concentratlOI;s on her
frontier, she can do little more than hope for better times and
a British victory. Of the many concessions which her weak
position has forced her to make, the most remarkable is her
agreement to the creation of large barrack camps for the German
evacuees from Bessarabia in the immediate neighbourhood of
Belgrade. The chosen site of one is at Seman (Semlin) which has
an important strategical position covering the only bridg.el:ead
qver the river Save. It is also close to the Yugoslav JI!!Jmstry
of War and the main aerodrome of Belgrade. Yet the Yugoslav
Government profess no anxiety at these developments. The
future of Y ugoslavia is unlikely to be made easier by the presence
of the existing minority of half a million Germans in the northern
part of the country.
49
1
J
illlll\I,\IIII\III~~llil~
NAA.003.0196
<Orthodox Mohammedans are bound by the third rule of tJ::eir
;f~ith to answer the call of rhe Caliph tf? a holy war. The Cahph
ito.longer exists, but the call for aCTIon Issued by the Mul~ah
S$.hib of Bhutan, in Peshawar, has been taken up by. Arab chIefs
·.'Bgypt. In Palestine the Supreme Moslem Coun~il has Issued
l~rnanifesto expressing its" detestation of the abommable attack
~b.the mosque in Haifa and of the desecration of the cemetery
t)i re" In Egypt the Grand Senussi has also called for a !:oly
e . " I know the desert," he said. "I know the Itahans
~if~ot succeed in invading Egypt. But we must drive them
Turkey
There appears to be some hope of improvement in relations
between Turkey and the Soviet. For several weeks the two
Ambassadors were absent from their posts; but the appointment
of anew, less obviously Germanophil, Soviet Ambassador to
Anglora, together with the return to Moscow of the Turkish
Ambassador, is thought in Turkey to be a favourable sign. On
the other hand Sovict diplomatists have little influence on Soviet
policy, and the Turkish Government may merely be indulging in
the over-optimism which has often coloured its interpretation of
Soviet intentions. The principle that governs Turkish foreign
policy is simple. German pressure or aggression must be
resisted; Soviet pressure or aggression must be resisted; but to
oppose the combined forces of Russia and the Axis without the
cert'linty of strong support from the Allies would be temerarious
in the extreme.
Uncertainty whether the Soviet intends to combine with the
Axis against her inevitably affects Turkey's attitude towards
embroilment in the Balkans. The integrity of Greece is in theory
a vital Turkish intercst; and, with Russia standing aside, Turkey
might be expected to throw the weight of her diplomacy-and
even if necessary of her armed forces-into the defence of Greece.
Conversations have been taking place both in Angora and in
Athens, in which, though their nature has not been dIsclosed, the
Turkish Government may be presumed to have defined its
attitude. It is thought that Greece would welcome a clear statement of this attitude, if only as an aid in resisting the threats
which still, from time to time, are hurled at her by Italy.
Turkey's reluctance to eommit herself to stronger action at present
does not mean that she has discovered new grounds for hesitation.
She has never wavered in her determination to fight if her
interests are attacked, and she has, in fact, in recent weeks given
fresh assurances of this resolve.
Moslem Countries
Inflamed by Fascist attacks on their holy places, three separate
Arab leaders in Egypt, Palestine, and India have laid a curse on
Mussolini, and the movement to declare a holy war on Italy is
reported to be sweeping the Middle East. The leaders affected
are Said Idriss, head of the Senussi sect which was massacred and
driven from Libya: the Grand Mufti of Egypt; and the Emir
Abdullah of Transjordan.
50
O'ut.
11
Far East
i
I
I
Ililllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
NAA.003.0197
While evidence about happenings in Indo-China has been
obscure and conflicting, it is certain that the japanese have
.'. ined strategic concessions which they regard as great
~vantages. It is understood that they WIll occupy thr<:e aero~
dromos and that the right of passage through Indo-Chma has
been granted to a j ,,;panese force of a considerable size. .The
japanese press is jUbllant. Terntonal.amblTIons are disclaimed
and it is suggested that the steps whIch have been taken are
directed solely towards a termination of the " China incident."
At the same time economic gains are hoped for, a,!? one paper
frankly sees in the concessions not only the acqUIsItion of bases
well adapted for air attacks ou China and the l3urma Road but
also for threatfming Singapore. Some observers thmk that the
Japanese may. not immediately use their new, vantage-ground
for attacking China but may Erst attempt to set up puppet
Governments in Tongking and Cambodia.
The British and American Goverlllnenis both pointed out to the
Japanese Government that japan's action in Indo-China was not
consistent with her express deSire to mamtam the status quo
there, and they could not agr.ee with the japanese contenTIon that
the agreement WIth Indo-Chll1a was freely negotiated. ~ad the
Japanese Government not heen assllred of German conmvance,
if not encouragement, and had the VIchy Government not been
subject to German influence, the demands might not h,,:ve been
made or accepted so soon, hut, accordlIlg to reports, Germany
may have told japan that the future of both Indo-China and the
Dutch East Indies must be determined by Germany and Japan
together. It seems that japan will be expected to pay a price for
her present advantages in Tndo-China.
There had for some time been signs that the Japanese GovefIJment were contemplating a closer alignment with the Axis
Powers, and on September 27 a lO-year pact between Germany,
I
51
\t
,
JI •
Italy and Japan was signed in Berlin by Ribbentrop, Ciano and
the Japanese Ambassador. The preamble declares that the three
Governments have decided to co-operate in the " new order " in
Europe and.in " greater F;astern Asia," Japan is to recognize
the leadership of the AXIs In the establishment of a new order in
Europe and the Axis. are to recognize the similar leadership of
Japan m Eastern ASia. If one of the three contracting parties
should be attacked by a Power not at present involved in the
European war or the Sino-Japanese war, the others undertake
to pro~~de help." with all political, economic and military
means.
A speCIal clause asserts that the pact does not in any
way affect the pohhcal status which exists at present between
each of the contracting partIes and Soviet Russia.
Aft~r the pact had bee~ signed, a high-flown speech was made
by Rlbbentrop: H~, saId it was directed against an "international conspIracy, was based on a community of interests
between. three nations striving for the same social ideals, and
had as ~ts mam purpose to restore peace to the world as quickly
as lJOssl?le. Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, broadcastmg m Tokyo, saId that the conclusion of the pact did not
mean th";t Japan was to enter the European war at once, nor
that she mtended to challenge any Power without provocation.
Although, he said, It was the intention of the Japanese Government to fulfil Japan's" responsibilities" as leader of the new
order m Great"r Eastern Asia by peaceful means, circumstances
mIght anse WhICh would call for a " momentous decision." He
end.ed WIth a call for unity and endurance in order that the
nation might surmount the countless obstacles and difficulties
With WlllCh Its future is beset.
The. outsider whose intervention all three Powers have in
mmd IS of course th" United States. Before proceeding further
With a campaIgn whIch every day threatens American influence
more dIrectly, the Japanese have found it advisable to gain allies.
That thIS IS the real meamng of the pact is shown by the challengmg ton~ of the Japanese press towards the United States. That
nation IS n.ot easily mtnmdated but must reckon with the threat
that If she mtervenes in the Pacific, where her interests arc vitally
affected, she WIll fmd herself at war WIth Germany and Italy as
,;ell as Japan. What, It may be asked, does Japan obtain from
tne pact? .If she were to be involved in war with the United
State~ no dIrect help-eIther military, naval or economic-could
given her by Germany 8nd Italy,. who would themselves
Denefit In so far as Amencan assIstance to Britain was
prevented.
?e
52
/.ii;1l'he dutiful chorns of apl,'roval of the pact in the Japanese press
)'\:j');;,not accompanied by SIgnS of popular enthusIasJ!!. but t~e
, ., 'nese have lIttle reason to exult. The war 1Il Chma, now 1Il
Ilrth year. drags on interminably and everyday life in J al,'an
" "elong story of restrictions, rations, high prices, and scarClty.
;c,t:;l1;e 'Cost of living has risen by nearly 50 per cent. smce July 1937,
'~!J. there has been. a shortage of nce, the staple food: a
~ggestion is even bemg made that there should be one nceless
<f<:J;y a week. Clothes are noW .made of staple fibre, .whi<;h
huickly wears out; Illegal tradmg IS nfe; and an earnest slmpleilt,; campaign is raging. When the Japanese fall VIctims to a
c'rfl.ze they tend to rush to extremes. Umbrellas and permanent
~~ye~ have been declared unpatriotic, and" usherettes" in the
''cinemas have sworn off lipstick.
,"The Chinese Government are reported to have lodged a protest
'vith the French Ambassador in Chungking against the Franco]rtpanese agreement in Indo-China, and to have stated that the
Erench Government will be held responsible for, an.\:' losses and
damage incurred. The protest relterat~d Chwa s right to .take
measures in self-defence. WhIle the Government of Thailand
a,re still claiming sizable territorial concessions in I",do-Chma! the
'Viehy Government are only prepared to negotiate provlde.d
Thailand first ratIfies the non-aggreSSIOn pact, and then only 1Il
te/iard to some islets in the Mekong. A Thai "goodwill
itllssion " is at present in Tokyo, and there may be some danger
of an understanding being reached there at the expense of I ndoChina.
U.S.A.
I
I
I
,
Commenting on events in Indo-China the New YorhHeraldTribune said, " Japan is off on a career of completeiy nnmoral
opportunism which is bound to bring her into head-OIl collision
with the United States in a very short time." It was felt in some
quarters that the dispatch of a Note to Tokyo might be inadequate
as an expression of the gravity with which the. United States
Government view the future, and ill Congress VOICes were to be
heard urging that a full embargo on exports to Japan should be
imposed. On September 26 it was announced that the President
had declared a complete embargo as from October 15 on the
export of iron and steel scrap to all nations except those of the
Western Hemisphere and Great Britain. It also became known
that the American Government had agreed to buy tlnrty rmliIon
dollars' worth of tungsten from China, and that a loan of twentyfive million dollars is to be granted to China.
I
53
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NAA,003,0198
\
•
On September 27 the pact between Germany, Italy and Japan
was signed in Berlin, and it was universally assumed in the
United States that the signatory powers had as their main
purpose the intimidation of that country. There is not the
slightest sign that they are likely to succeed in that object. In
fact they have succeeded in immediately strengthening the
determination of the United States to proceed with the buildingup of her own defences and to continue to give all possible aid to
Britain, and to China as well. At a press conference the State
Secretary said that the new pact did not in the view of the United
States Government substantially alter a situation which has
existed for several years. The announcement of the alliance
merely made clear to aHa relationship which has long existed
in effect and to which the United States has repeatedly called
attention. That su~h an agreement was in process of conclusion
had been well known for some time and that fact had been fully
taken into account by the Government of the United States in the
determining of the country's policies. "The authors of the new
pact have miscalculated badly," remarked the New York Times,
" if they think it possible to confuse the American people about
the Importance to us of the successful defence of the British
Islands and the eventual victory of Britain. The overwhelming
mass of the American people have supported, now support, and
will continue to support our present policy of aiding Britain, for
the simple reason that they know how vital to our safety is the
defeat of Hitler's Germany." In some quarters the new pact
is regarded as an attempt to distract world attention from the
failure of the Blitzl<rieg against Britain, and to compensate the
German people for their disappointment.
The increasingly effective defence of England and the intensification of the British attacks in Germany and on German bases
and concentrations on the shores of France and the Low
Countries have increased confidence in Britain's prospects, and
this confidence is reflected in the steadiness of the American
business recovery and of th" markets. Mr. Welles, however,
in a speech that paid tribute to British h"roism and reiterated
the determination to give material aid to the British people,
said that th" United States must" prepare for all eventualities."
There arc now many Americans who realize that such
eventna.lities may mean war, and that before very long,
As an indication of the rapid and widespread change in public
opinion, a Gallup Poll has shown, for th" first time since the war
broke ont, that 52 per cent. of the voters are in favour of
extending all possible American aid to Britain " even at the risk
of getting into war." In the Middle West the percentage was
only 43, but in the South as high as 70. There is a perceptible
54
>i'r
'in the prospects of Mr. Willkie.
He certainly and
~~f:.i~dly expresses approval of a foreign.p,?licy which has the
;;~W!;kin .of public opini,?n, but this policy IS m the maIn th:,-t of
.·Jj.·.J.!J·"!~.".R·
.g
It , and while WillkJe laVIshes words the PreSIdent
J\!(P,' ..o.oseve
'ONe.rs .deeds.
Latin America
.•.•.
EI t '1 CAllcae of the Chamber of Deputies, after a
The
ec ora ~ 'D
.
J 1 h
dId
tin of the votes polled in the clechon last u y ,:ve ec are
Civila Camacho to be PreSIdent-Elect of MeXICO. Accord~ent~~he official figures, General CamachQ polled 2,.500,000 votes,
mg. t 150 000 for General Almazan. Both candidates clarmed
agalll S aft~r an election which was remarkable for Its bloodshed
VIcdtOry,
t'on General Almazan who is in the Umted S.tates IS
n conup 1 .
. U
.
C't
H
a oded to have set up his own Congress m mexICO I y.
IS
rep rture and continued absence from the country, howeve~,
~ep~ lost him many of his former supporters. Under the Conshav 't' o't unh'l December 1 that aIle or other-or both--of
tutlOn 1 IS n .
-the claimants WIll assume office.
'.'
.
A somewhat similar SItuatIOn has eXISTed. 1Il Panama Slnce
une Two days before the Presidential elections the OppOSItIOn
J ndidate Dr Alfaro, issued a mamfesto declanng that fall'
~fections ~ere impossible and requesting his sup~orters tOh~lfr~~n
from voting. He himself fled to the Canal Zone, w l e e
Panamanian Government exposed an alleg~d plot and adr~edstted
.
Opposition leaders.
The AdmmlstratIOn can I a e,
~~n~rias, elected unopposed, h~; since declared: .. I regard
n ideal democracy.
MeanwhIle Dr. Alfaro has
P anama a S ae " from a NazIfied
.'
h
dIctators
Ip' ' ' 'III th e USA
..,
sought re f u g .
..
th
h th . me
Dr Alfaro is believed to be above SUSpiCIOn, . aug
e sa
. t b said of all his supporters. The Presldent-clect, also,
canna e
.'
d G
h 1.
is re' arded in some quarters as totalitanan an
ermanop 1 ,
it is ~t least possible that before h,; assumes office on Oc.tober 21,
some effort may be made to set 111m "-SIde. Panama IS at best
a satellite of the United States, and the fact that the Umted ?tates
would not wish at present to see a Germanophll PresIde:>t m the
saddle may encourage opponents of Dr. Anas and of (,ermany
to attempt a coup d'etat.
'
.
Eight prominent Nazis have been arrested 111 Uruguay to stand
trial for subversive conspIracy. Among tliem are Fuhrmann,
the author of the plan for revolutlou recently u,,;covered by th~
investigation committee of the Chamb"r of Depullcs, an~IHolwI,
the reputed leader of the Gestapo m Uruguay. TillS .j)lan,
·
to the Public Prosecutor,
dealt WIth
the" mIlitaryt
accor dIng .
. '
. t
seizure of the country and ltS converSlOn 111 0 a
peasan
55
;;ern )
11111111111111111111111111111111
NAA.003.0199
colony." The leader of the whole organization was Dalldorf
the press attache at the Gennan Legation. Both he and th~
MIlllster took advantage of .their diplomatic status and privileges
to carryon the work of thIS Nazi organization, which regarded
Uruguay as a branch of the German National-Socialist
Workmen's Party.
British Empire
AUSTRALIA
The General Election which was held on September 21 was
a narrow, but none the less definite, victory" for the Prime
Mmlste:, Mr. MenzlCs. Ever since he became leader of
the Umted .AustralIa Party he has been subjected to harassing
personal cnt!clSm, sometllnes from his own supporters. Now
his conslltuency has returned him with a considerably increased
rnaJonly. In hIS electIOn campaign he has made only one
proIlllse-:-to subordmate everythiJ.1g to winning the war.
Mr. Curtm, the Labour Leader, IS asslllgle-minded as Mr. Menzies
m hI': w~sh to concentrate on the war efto:t,. but he has consistently
refuscdlhe lilvltahon of Mr. IvlenzIes to Jom the Umted Australia
a.nd County Parhes m a Nahonal Government.
Mr. M~'mzies has announced his intention of again trying to
form a Natwnal Government III which Labour will be included.
ThiS should be easier now that his own position has been so
clearly reaffirmed and that the official Lrtbour Party, as a
result of the elechon, has asserted its position against the smaller
~;abour g:·~ups., The Federal Labour Party is still the largest
.o>ngle paTly 111 .tne House and It IS III agreement with the Government so far as Its war alms are concerned.
PART V: SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Sea Power and the United States
A T!{[BUTE TO ADMIRAL MAHAN
_ On Septem(w· 27, the centenary of the birth of Admiral
Thumas i1:Iahan, the following address was delivered by RearAdm1.ral Robert L. Ghormley, United States Navy at the Roy l
Untted Service Institution.
'
a
As a Naval Officer of the United States of America I feel
deeply gr<~teful for the honour which you p:,y to the meu',ory of
Admlral Mahan on thiS one hundredth anmversary of his birth
56
.
j~iy~fipartiCUlarlY thoughtful and gracious of you to l'ause in the
//'prosecution of a war to render thiS tnbute to hiS memory.
,/
;~I()Uds of war blind fJ.le.n to many of the .common courtesies
;,'<i(rr1an to man. The stoll~:hty of bombed CIVIlians, me,:!, women
'ica:tia:Ohildren, the consummg flames which hck the skies above
',<:'l.1.\itches and hospitals, the deafelllng explOSIOns of bombs
-'i"berating through the streets of Clues-all of these generate
~ih:ihatred which might easily eclipse the finer emohons of the
of a nation in the throes of modern war. It IS heartemng,
ili~~cfore, to know that here you still take occasion to do homage
t ,'.' , " •• h American Naval Officer whom you acclaimed a half
c~nfury ago, when ~o-day new heroes are beingmade in England
",htl win your admiration and grahtude for theu stalwart achons
irithc defence of all that you hold dear.
This American did not fight for Engla,:d. He was n?t born
in England. But he was interested III England, and England
was interested in him. In the appreciation of sea powe.r our great
naval historian and you had a common bond. Admlral Mahan
did not give to yon and the world an entirely new concept of sea
power. For many years this nation had, by being strong on the
sea, protected and extended its bounds of Empire. He did not
discover previously unknown facts m history. What he did do
was to marshal in precise order those events which clearly
.demonstrated that sea power was the determining factor in ,the
-destinies of nations.
It has been said that the British are a bigoted race. It is a
matter of record that, in the recognition of the genius of Mahan,
you were not prejudiced by the fact that he w~s not an
Englishman. Without hesltahon you accepted him as an
authority on naval strategy. You were, m fact, among the first
to acclaim him. Oxford and Cambridge conferred honorary
degrees upon him before he received similar honours in his native
land. When he visited this country m command of the
U.S.S. Chicago during 1893-95, you accorded him a notable
reception. Nor was Admiral Mahan prejudicial in his estimate
of you. His writings abound in appreciation of the power of the
British Navv. He saw in Anglo-American naval supremacy the
greatest hope of peace. To the people of the United States he
pointed out that" in the horoscope of every nation there usually
is one other power, accordant relations with which are of pnmary
importance." That place in the horoscope of the United States
he assigned to England.
Admiral Mahan was a student of history during his entire naval
'Career. But it was not until they heard his leclures at the Naval
War College that, even his fellow officers recognized in the
inveterate student the signs of genius. None was more surprised
~1.11111111'lliililllll~II~II~1
NAA.003.0200
57
'I
...
than Mahan at the world-wide demand for his Ideas. His,
primary aim had been to drive home an appreciation of sea
powcrs' r6le as he had seen it, and to arouse in his fellow
officers, and. countrymen a proper intcrest in their maritime
re~ponslblht,es.. In the many volumes which came from his pen
thl~ ,?otivatmg Idea stands out. He urged them to weigh their
pohCles and then support a broad continuing naval programme
which would. guara~tee these policies, making annual adjustments as the mternational SituatIOn dictated.
To-day Mahan's dream in regard to the United States is coming
true. The Congress of the United States has authorized the
building of the greatest navy of all time, on the sea, over the sea,
and under the sea. It has not only authorized but has appropriated funds. with which to expeditiously proceed with constructlOn of th,s navy deemed necessary for national security in
both oceans. There are those who will contend that because of
!he time la(S betw~en the will to act and the action of a 'democracy,
It Will be Imposs,ble to accomplish this great task for years to
come. It is quite true that ships, planes and bases cannot be
leglSl.ated mto eXistence. They must be built, and their building
reqUlres time. But for those who arc sceptical the following
facts are noteworthy. On September 9 the Navy Department
as a result of advanced planmng, was able to allocate and award
contracts for 201 naval vessels at a cost of over three and a third
bil}ions of dollars. Two hundred were combatant ships (7 battleships, 8 aircraft carners, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers and
43 submarines). With the 358 combatant ships in service, and
the 130 already under construction, this makes a grand total of
(i88 Umted State~ combatant naval vessels built, building and to
be laid down wlthm the next SIX months. To expedite this
programme contracts totalling over thirty millions of dollars are
bemg awarded for expansIOn of private and naval establishments
charged with meeting the new ship and air constmction
programme. Three days after the 201 ships were allocated and
contracted for, plans were announced for a forty million dollar
plant expanSlOn pro(Sramme to produce heavy forgings and
armour plate:
It IS estnnated that the sh ip and aircraft
programme will take about [Ive years to complete. This means
that for the next five years an average of one warship will be
added to the Ulllted Stc,tes Navy every five days. Our naval
all' strength Will concurrently be increased to 15,000 planes and
chams of strategically located naval air bases in both oceans
are already under construction.
We naturally desire that these ships and planes be the best that
can be b11llt. We mtend to lllcorporate in them every possible
structural and SCientIfic advance developed in the laboratory of
58
Two Japanese Politicians
I.-PRINCE KONOE
Prince Fumimaro Konoe, now Prime Minister for the second
time, is 49 years of age. He comes of the highest .aristoc~a:y,
being descended from the Fujiwara family, which clanns a dlVllle
origin and which in the Middle Ages .governed. Japan III the
Emperor's name for about three centunes. Havmg been closely
connected with the Imperial dynasty by trad,hon and mtermarriage, families of Fujiwara Eneage share to some extent III Its
cdignity and prestige.
111\1\\li~ml\llllllll~
i,
NAA.003.0201
59
Fumimaro Konoe attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919
in the suite of Prince Saionji. He subsequently became prominent
in the politics of the House of Peers, of which he was a hereditary
member; he became President of the House in 1933. On
March 4, 1936, after the military mutiny in Tokyo which involved
the fall of the Okada Cabinet, the Emperor, on the recommendation of the " Elder Statesman" Prince Saionji, commanded
Konoe to form a new ministry, but he declined on the plea
of ill-health. As Saionji had seen Konoe before recommending
him, his refusal caused surrrise, and was attributed by welle
informed Japanese to a failure of nerve at the last moment.
Saionji subsequently recommended Hirota, who accepted the
task of forming a Cabinet, but only held office for ten months.
The Asahi declared that Saionji, in looking for a Prime Minister
in the critical days after the m 1ltiny, " sought a statesman who
holds a balance between Right and Left and has vigour, ability,
and vision." In other words, Konoe was chosen for the quality
which he has since displayed conspicuously in his political career,
his capacity for reconciling the most violently opposed factions
and interests and checking extremism without appearing to
resist it.
Konoe continued as President of the House of Peers until 1937.
Hirota resigned in January and was succeeded as Prime Minister
by General Hayashi. who fell in May; Konoe was then once
more approached by Prince Saionji, and this time he acccpted
office. He held power for a year and a half. The" China
Affair" broke out in his second month as Prime Minister, and
the Japanese captures of Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and
Hankow were accomplished during his tenure of office; he
formulated Japan's basic policy towards China in his declaration
of December 22, 1938, and thus linked his name with the
concept of " a new order in East Asia." His resignation on
January 4, 1939, docs not appear to have been due to any
external pressure but merely to a disinclination to go on.
An idea that Konoe was merely a dilettante in politics was
widespread in Japan after his resignation. But a retrospective
view suggests that his resignation was an acl of greed foresight.
By January, 1939, Ihe " China Affair" had reached a deadlock,
while the economic strain of the war was beginning to be felt.
The three succeeding Cabinets have each had to cope with baffling
economic problems at home, with little opportunity of success
abroad, and each in turn has become a target for popular
exasperation. Konoe, having withdrawn to the lofty elevation
of President of the Privy Council and strengthened his Court
connections, was able to avoid the inevitable unpopularity of
60
Prime Ministers during this period and to return to power at a
time when the German victories in Europe were glVmg Japan a
new freedom of action in her regional sphere.
Konoe uUdoubtedly possesses a very subtle mind and an ,!-cute
sense of political tactics. He has had unique success m gammg
the confidence of the Army and of the extreme IiatlOnahsts WIthout forfeiting that of Court and business circles. He appears to
have recognized that the young " Fascist" elements represent
the most active political forces in Japan at the present day, but
also tllat they are capable, if they remain as an opposition outside
the system of government, of letting loose an internal revolution
or dragging Japan into a disastrous major war; he therefore
seems to aim at assuming the leadership of these elements and
absorbing them into his authoritarian " new structure." This
new structure, in his own words, will "render possible the
powerful pursuance of any policy when necessity arises."
n.-MATSUOKA
In contrast to the high-born Konoe, the new Foreign Minister.
Yosuke Matsuoka, is a self-made man. He is eleven years older
than Konoe, having been born in 1880. In 1892 he went to t~c
United Sta.tes and graduated from the Oregon Law College m
1900. His American education has helped to give him the reputation of being a" live wire" and a hustler, forthright, outspoken,
and impatient of polite formalities. He is thus descnbed by
a Japanese journalist: "Of medium height, stocky, hiS black,
bristling hair clipped close to the scalp, Matsuoka has a mlhtary
bearing and appearance. Often he is gruff and short, but once
he warms hnnse1f up to hiS theme ,:"ords gush from hI~ mouth
like a torrent. He is more eloquent m pnvate conversatlOn than
in public speaking. though he is no mean orator on the platform.
Conversation with Matsuoka is apt to be a one-SIded affaIr.
Whether in Japanese or in English, he can out-talk almost
anybody. "
Matsuoka's career in the Japanese diplomatic service led to
his taking part, like Konoe, in the wo.rj<: of the Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference 111 1919. But Ins unruly
nature made his path difficult; one of hiS ForeIgn Office supenors
described him as an " untamable savage." In 1921 he left the
diplomati~ service to take up a directo.r~hip of the South
Manchuria Railway, in 1930 he entered pohtlCS, and was elected
to the House of Representatives. He was appointed Japanese
Chief Delegate to the League of Nations Assembly to argue
Japan's case with regard to Manchuna, and led the walk-out
from the Assembly after the adverse deCISIOn WIth the words:
it
We are not coming back."
IIIIIIIIII~II"II~I~II~
NAA.003.0202
61
...
!IIIIIIIIII~~I~IIIII~I~IIIIIIIII
NAA.OO3.0203
The experience at Geneva seems to have been a turning-point
in Matsuoka's career. He became ultra-nationalist and antidemocratic. He resigned from the Diet and launched a movement for the elimination of political parties, which he denounced
as an obstacle to national development. The political parties
were at that time too strong to be thus displaced, and Matsuoka
soon returneg to the South Manchuria Railway, of which he was
President from 1935 to 1939; by his campaign, however, he
identified himself with the movement which Ronoe was subsequently to lead.
Matsuoka has been described as "the most undiplomatic
diplomat to whom Japan has ever entrusted the conduct of her
foreign affairs." He himself has repeatedly said: " I hate
diplomacy and diplomats." This undiplomatic character is an
asset for his relations with the Army; the officers, who normally
have a profound dlStrust for the typical career-diplomats and
consider them to be lacking in true national spirit, are attracted
by the roughness and fervour of Matsuoka. If he had had things
his Own way, the Japanese might have allied themselves sooner
with the Axis, butthere is ~easo~ to SUppose that Ronoe skilfully
postponed the deCISIOn until he Judged the moment to be ripe.
PART VI:
MEMORANDA
SECUlUTY SITUATION BULLETIN No. 7
1. ARREST OF SUSPECTS. Defence Regnlation 18H has now
been amended so as to authorize the Secretary of State to order
the detention of any person as to whom he has reasonable cause
to believe that his recent actions, or any words recently spoken
or written by him expressing sympathy with the enemy, indicate
that he is likely to assist the enemy.
A similar amendment of Defence Regulation 18H enables the
Secretary of State to empower any Regional Commissioner to
detain any snch person temporarily until the formal approval of
the Secretary of State can be obtained.
It is understood that the intention is to briIlg these new provisions i11tO operation as SOon as otticial intimation is received of
an actual or immediately apprehended invasion and to extend
the powers to any area which is likely to be affected directly or
indirectly. I n the meantime local lists have been and are bOeing
prepared of persons considered to corne within the terms of these
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Regulations with a view to their immediate arrest on a given
signal. This procedure WIll enable effective action to be taken
in emergency against a number of people who have been under
suspicion but whose arrest could not be authonzed under the
previously existing lepslatJon.
2. DEFENCE AREAS. The whole of Great Britain has now been
declared a Defence Area for the purposes of Defence Regulation 16A. The effect is to enable RegIOnal CommISSIOners to
issue any local directions "for the purpose of meet~l,'g or hmdenng
any aetual or apprehended attack by the enemy, etc.
3. ALIENS PROTECTED AREAS. A new Area has been declared
embracing the whole of Devon and Cornwall and the greater rart
of Somerset. The same Order makes one or two m1l10r addluons
to existino- Areas. The coast of Britain from Flamborough Head
in Yorkshire to Worms Head in Glamorgan is now a senes of
contiauous Aliens Protected Areas. Other detached Areas
rema~n as previously notified.
4. INCREASED PENALTIES AND NEW OFFENCES. The penalties
for offences under certain Defence Regulations, notably communicating with persons in enemy terrilory (4A) and IlhClt
signalling (7), have been substantially 1I1creased.
A new Regulation, 39AA, provides a penalty up to 10 years
penal servitude for injuring or administering drugs to any person
who is or may be liable to be called up for servIce m the Armed
Forces, with intent to produce actual or a_pparent dlsabIhty
(whether the injuries or drugs are self-adm1l1lstered or not), or
for knowingly making any false statement as to the past or
present state of health of any such persoH.
.
Regulation IB imposes a penalty of death or penal servItude
for life for" forcing a safeguard" and Regulation 3sA lIn~lOses
a similar penalty for looting after enemy attack by aIr or
otherwise.
5. WAR ZONE COURTS. By the Defence (War Zone Courts)
Regulations, 1940, the Minister of Home Security is emp,?wered
to establish special courts of law" for the purpose of securmg the
trial and punishment of offenders in any places 111 England 111
which by reason of recent or ImmeclJately .apprehepded enemy
action the military situation is such that cnmmalJusllce cannot ~~
administered by the ordinary courts WIth suffiCient expedItIOn_
Similar Regulations have been made for Scotland.
The general effect is as follows:(a) The Regulations do not have effect in any area until the
Minister declares it to be a "War Zone," whIch WIll
presumably be done in the event of any serious interruption of commulllcahons by enemy action.
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.,
(b) The War Zone Courts will consist of a President, who
must be a High Court Judge or a person qualified to be
a Commissioner of Assize, and two other members to be
appointed by the President from a panel constituted by
a Secretary of State.
(c) The War Zone Courts will have power to deal with any
criminal offence and there will be no appeal unless the
sentence imposed is death or penal servitude for at least
seven years, in which case final appeal lies to a specially
constituted court of three persons who hold or have held
high judicial office.
(d) In War Zone Courts any officer of His Majesty's forces
may appear either for the prosecution or the defence, as
well as counselor solicitors.
(e) War Zone Courts may direct any given case to be tried
by an ordinary court but only after considering any representations made by an officer of His Majesty's forces as to
inconvenience likely to be caused thereby. After conviction and before sentence War Zone Courts must
consider any representations made by any such officer as
to the gravity of the offence having regard to the military
situation.
(f) Any person sentenced to death by a War Zone Court
will be shot as if after sentence by Court Martial, unless a
Secretary of State directs that the sentence can without
undue difficu!ly be carried Ollt by hanging in prison in the
ordinary way.
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