199511MSFHReportEthnicCleansing

ETHNIC CLEANSING AND
FORCED REPATRIATION IN
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
(CONFIDENTIAL REPORT)
November 1995
CO:-œiDENTIAL REPORT - "0T TO BE :\!ADE PUBLIC
Introduction
Ethnie cleansing in the Banja Luka area appears to have emered its last phase. After years of
violence and intimidation against the non-Scrb minority population in the area. wbich has been
tlescribed hy refugees as a living nightmare. the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and police. assisted
by paramilitary militia are 'sweeping up· the last of the remaining minorities. l
Since the start of the latest wave of ethnie cleansing on 14 August 1995, the situation of the
minority population in the Banja Luka area worsened daily. Although the cleansing process was
interrupted by NATO's bombing campaign and the subsequent int1ux of Scrb displaccd persans
from the North-West part of Bosnia-Hercegovina. it soon resumed with the help of autonomous
paramilitary forces who came to the BSA 's aid. This second phase was even more violent and
resulced in killings. rape, death threats and the disappearance of hundreds of men.
However. people of minority populations who safely reached Croatia and Central Bosnia soon
karned that they \vere still not safe. Severa! thousands of refugees and displaced persans were
soon resettled in the 'newly liberated areas' resulting from the joint Bosnian ŒiH) and Croatian
Army·s offensive. Sometimes, refugees would find themselves in towns only miles <nvay from
their fonner homes they had f1ed severa) days before. Evidence indicates that these resettlements
amount to forced repatriation.
With this report Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) wams to give an accouru of the events that
took place during the latest wave of etlmic deansing against the Croat and Iv1uslim minority
population. The report is bascd on writtcn reports and on testimonies of the minority population
received by MSF staff during the course of their rlief work in the :"Jorrh-\Vest part of BosniaHen.:egovina.
Background
Soon after the countries of the European U1ùon (EU) recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina in April
1992, the Banja Luka area and other parts in the Korrh of' Bosnia-Hen.:egovina became
notoriously known for massive etlmic cleansing campaigns conducted by the BSA against the
non-Serb population. The policy of ethnie cleansing, based on etlmic differences but inspired by
the wish for territorial expansion, outraged the world in August 1992 when the media showed
emaciared young men in World War II-style concentration camps. separated from the women
\\'hO served as sex slaves in special rape camps. It \Vas the world's first real confrontation with
ethnie cleansing in Bosnia-Hercegovina and it provoked strong condemnation b) the t nited
1 :\pan fr 1rn the: Mus!im and Crnat minnrity population which form tile largest minority ~ro ups soli pre>t!nt in the Banja
Luka area. til(; <lverall minurity population furthcr consists of Roma (gypsies). Sl<l\'eniam anù otlwr non-Serh groups.
'ùM' IDEI'<'TIAL REPORT - "\ OT TO Bi:: i\ 1:\D E Pt:llLI C
Nations (UN) Security Council. 2
Although massive international outrage eventually resulted in the closure of the camps,
systc:matic ~thnic cleansing continued throughout the war. Though the BSA is most identified
with the policy of ethnie cleansing, ali parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have
conducted this practice. Having learned from the public condemnation of ethnie cleansing by the
international community but also ti"om its impotence to provide real protection to the civilian
population against it, both the Bill and Croatian Army soon followcd the BSA 's example, which
in the end did s-ucceed with its intention of-gaining a more 'pure' Serbian territory ..L
Before the war. the Banja Luka area counted sorne 536,000 non-Serbs, mainly Croats and
Muslims. living alongside 625.000 Serbs. 4 In the beginning of August 1995, after more than
three years of ethnie cleansing, Jess than 10 % of the non-Serb population remained.
MSF has bad a drugs distribution programme (DDP) in the Banja Luka area for more tlmn two
years. with which it suppons Serb health structures (Dom Zdrav{ias) as weil as Muslim
(i'vferhamet) and Croat (Carita.\·) humanitarian organizations which provide health care for the
minority population who have no access to the regular health facilities. Both ~uslim and Croat
humanitarian organizations are completely dependent on international humanitarian organizations,
since their supplies from Zagreb have not bet:n aiJowed into Bosnia-Hercegovina since February
1995. Moreover, both Merhamt:t and Caritas have limited, if at ali. contact with their delegate
offices in towns around Banja Luka.
Apart from its DDP, MSF assisted during past and recent refugee intluxes from the former
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA) West (May 1995) and North and South (August 1995)
and during the population movement resulting from the joint BiH and Croatian Army's offensive
against Bosnian Serb-held territory South-West of Banja Luka.
On 11 and 17 August 1995, MSF managed to fly in two cargo airplanes ro Banja Luka with a
total of 60 tons of humanitarian relief goods. These were the first humanitarian flights since the
stan of the war. Unfortunately , they diù not result in a permanent air lift where also other
international humanitarian organizations in the area, like the International Committee of the Red
Cross <lCRC) and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees \ UNHCR),
could have hcnefitted from. After the second tlight, the permission for a third tlight with relief
~ SC
Res. 77 1 (1 9<:12).
' :\s Tono Eitel. Germun Ambassador with the U•. stated be fon: the adoption of Security Counc.ii Resoluti(ln 1019: 'Ethnie
clcansing is repre he n ~ive no matter who C<'nducts it and no matter what methods are used. With til i ~ in mmd we are concerned
by ethnie cleansing not only in Bosnia-Hcrcegovina hut also in Cmatia. ' Internauona1 Report. F. Yu;;oslai'Ùl: Resolution an
Hu man Ri;.;his Adopted. no. 158. 9 Novembcr 1995.
' E/CN .4:l996!3. 21 Apn1 1995 ,
2
t '0:-.'FIDE:>.~ rL\L IŒI'ORT- WJT
TO
HE \!AD E Pl HLIC
goods was c:mceiled, whcn the Bosnian Government could give no guaranree for the safety of
the tlight.
Ethnie Cleansing
The practice of dhnic cleansing is mostly associated with gross violations of human rights and
grave brcaches of international humanitarian law. 5 These violations comprise hoth violence
against the lives of the civilian (minority) population such as killings. disappcarances. torture,
rapc, (death) threats and forced tabnur /• as vîotence against their property, such as the blowing
up of bouses, the forceful evictions of minorities from their houscs and their subsequent forccft1l
displacement and deponation.
The lack ofprotection by local Serb authorities of tlze Croat and Muslim minority population is
illustrared by the case of the killing of an elderly A.fuslim couple in the lasr week (~t'August 1995.
The couple was kil!ed during a break-in in their house in Banja Luka. The woman, whu wus
disabled and therefore could 110t move, 1vas raped by rlze burg/er(.~) and subsequent/y stabbed
ro dearh. lier husband was beaten to deatlz. Allhough the Bosnian Serb police regisrered the case
ir failed to produce a reporr of rhe autopsy and has reponed(y not investigated the case junher.
The passive auitude ofthe police once again consolidated the atmosphere ofimpunity with which
!hese acrs of violence against individual minorities are committed.
After months or violence and intimidation. dhnic cleansing became an established practice and
violence was no longer needed in the proportions it was used before, although violence against
minorities did continue. 7 The terrnrs of the previous and ongoing violent · cleansing' had pro vcd
effective: most of the minority population expressed their wish' to leave.
As mentioncd above, the atmosphere ofterror, which caused these forced ·\'olunrary' departures
led to more 'formalized' fom1s of ethnie cleansing. with Jess physil:al violence. Whilc Lhey
appear kss harmfull they remain violations of both human rights and international humanit::J.rian
law. since its goal is similar to its violent counterpart: the forceful deportation of the minority
population from Bosnian Serb (occupied) territory.
' Many ot th.: crimes committed against the civilian population constimte _fravc brl!a chc:~ umler a nick 147 nf t'l:: ! 949
Genev:t Convention relative to the Protection f Civilian Pcrsons in ume ,,r \Var. Gra\c hrcJche~ :u e C\>nsidcred war cnmes
umitr .uticle 85C) u, the 19'77 PnJWCOI 1 ttJ the Geneva Conn~ lllHm > and umkr intcrn:nional cust '11l 31Y lilw . ln 11> re so luuons
:\/RES/4 71 121 (7 April 1993l and AI RES.'48.' 1 4~ (5 January !994 l <~nd !53 (7 February 19941 the UN General Asse mhty statc:d
'"that the :tblwrrent pül icy of "ethnie cleansing · was a form of g~nocide." St:c funhcr a i ~n : Hehinki w ,,L.:h. \\far Cn•IH'S i•1
Bosnia-1/ercegovma. 1992.
" Fm an ela lw rn tt: smdy '"' fore cd labour: Anll-Siavcry International. Forced Labm1r 111 Nvnhem llosnw. D~ c crnbcr 19'!4.
Sc~ · An1ne.::;t) lntcnlatiDn aL Bos~:ra -ilerl~ ~g01'tna: ''Yt:):l h:.:ve no place hert.'".. lbuscs in Bnsn1an Sc,·h-controllcri
Al lmk.;: tU R 63 ' 11 191. Jun~ 199•1 and th.: repon·s updaw Al Index: ~.U R 63115194. July 199.1.
1
3
rJr2u.r.
CO ' I'IDP.~TIAL REPORT • :\OTTO RE I\IADE l't""BLI C
The 'formalizcd' form of ethnie cleansing expressed itself both on a practical leve!, with the
organizing of commercial hus trips by the parties to the contlict. with which minorities from
different territories are exchanged. as on a legal level by the adoption of discriminatory laws for
minority populations. 3 In the shadow of ethnie violence, 'fom1alized cleansing' creeped in with
impunity. implicitly giving its blessing to the ongoing violence against minorities,
In Banja Luka a special commiltee issued papers on 'irrational uriliz.ation of housùzg' ro Serb
amzy members, with wlzich theyjorced che (main/y Muslim) legal occupants !0 leave tlzeir homes.
Otheram against minorirtes comprise firing persans beloning to a minorîty population from
their johs and the deniai of access to local llealth care strucwres. most/y as a result of being
unemployed. ~
MSF has al ways strongly condemned ethnie cleansing, because of the violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law resulting from it and because in most cases it is closely linked
to appalling humanitarian conditions. as this report will illustrate. MSF feels it is its dury to
report on these humanitarian conditions and its causes. when witnesscd by MSF staff membcrs
during the ir humanitarian relief work. Already in 1992, soon afrer the disco very of the
concentration camps, MSF criticized the disrespect and lack of protection by the BSA of the
rights of the civilian population. Recently MSF also criticized the llnited rations Protection
Force·s (UNPROFOR) inability to protect the civilian population of the designated safe area of
Srebrenica. \Vhich finally ended up as another success on the ever growing list of ethnie
cleansing. :u
The Final Wave of Ethnie Cleansing?
Following the Croatian Army's Operation Storm, the military offensive against the UNPAs
North and South (known as the Krajina) on the 4 August 1995, an estimated 160,000 Serb
refugees fled into Bosnia-Hercegovina, leaving less than 6,000 Krajina Serbs. Although most of
the Krajina refugees fied on to Serbia in the following days, some 25,000 settled in the Banja
Luka area. putting more pressure on the already fragile situation of the minority population.
The massive int1ux of refugees into the Banja Luka arca was soon followed by a new wave of
ethnie cleansing, which took place in t\VO main phases. The first phase comprised the period
from 14 August until around 20 September, in which ethnie cleansing took place as a relatively
~ New mumcipal regulation allow only çouplcs of the same ethnie origin w marry. W!wn !he couple is Serb. t!Je cerernony
m.:y uke place in the Banja Luka Mumcipality Grand Hall. Bosnian-Muslim couples .:an uni y marry in the office~ of the Seller
Local Territorial Community. Examplt: from: Humanitarian Law Center. Banja Luka : Bosmatl-Musliou FMced f rom Their
Home.1· ali(/ Mosqun Destroyer!. Spntlight Repoll no. 3. !\·tay 1993, On 21 Scptcmber 1995 , ;,fier the offensive on the UNP As
North and South. Croatia adopt;.:d th~ Law 011 1he Tempomry Requisition and Managemem of Pruperry. wt1ich in effttt prevented
rlle Se rb ret'ugee population from returning to the are a and r~claiming tilt: ir propeny.
'1
0
Spotlight n:port uo. 3, l'v1ay 1993
The cthmc deansrng nf Srebrenica falls outs:de the
~COilJ;
of this report and will thereture not
~e
funher dwelled
up<) ll.
< ONFII>E:-.ITI AL REPORT- i\OT TO RE l\ L\DE P BLIC
orderly proœss. although violent incidents against minorities continued to be rcportcd. 11
A Muslirn famiiy r~f six people was eJ..pelledfrom rlleir home in Banja Luka on 15 August. one
day after ethnie cleansing of the minority populations started. The fatlzer, a diabetic and in poor
hea/th condiTion, stared: "! was held ar gun point while my wife was heaten. " He claimed they
were (:TiCTed hy Se rb n;f1Jgees from Knin (Krajina). After Their eviction the jàmily H •eflt into
hiding at the house of Serb fi'iends in Banja Luka until 22 August, umi! this became too
dangerous. They then decided to go to the Transit Center to register for rhe transports to
Cmatia. They final/y ended up staying in the Transit Center jàr JO days before they could cross
inro Croatia.
The first phase can be dcscribed as 'formalised ethnie cleansing'. The second phase started
around 20 September. can be described as 'violent ethnie cleansing' and is characterized by
gross lm man rights Yiolations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law, after
autonomous paramilitary forces from Scrbia arrivccl in the Banja Luka arca to assist the BSA in
reconquering losr tcrritory in North-West Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The First Phase: Hope for a Safe Harbour
The firsr phase of the latest ethnie cleansing wave started on :\·fouday 14 August 1995. when the
first of the civilian minority population registered themselves at a Transit Center. a fonner
driving school. in Banja Luka city. After registration the people. each of them carrying as many
of their belongings as possible. were then transpm1ed in ovcrcrowded buses to the Sava river
crossing Srbac-Davor. 50 kilometers ~orth of Banja Luka, which fonns the border with Croatia.
On 20 August some 80 l\.1uslims 1\'ere refi-tsed 10 cross and sent back ro Banja Luka. An already
sooner than expected in his home l·vhere he returned with his wife
q(ter a long and useless trip to the river. l'Ize buses were tumed back after hours ofwaiting and
iris l·erv likeh that the !wrs!z conditions of the tramporr ·rrif?gered' his dearh sonner thon his
docrors t:xpected. AltJwugh a bu rial evemual/y could be arranged, r!ze demi num 's 1vzle 1ms
unable w auend !zer lzusband 's funeral. sin ce sire lwd to be on next day 's hus. On/y in a ft!w
cases ambulances and special buses were provided jiJr the sick and eider/y.
\'el)' sick man (rancer) died
After passing two military <.:heckpoints the buses arrived at the river where they "vere emptied
one by one and people were subsequently shipped across in four to six little boats. with a
capacity of some 20-30 people each. On the Croatian side they were awaited by 0JHCR. the
ICRC. members nf the European Conununity Task Force (ECTF) and the local police who
n~gistered them. A ft er th at they were ta ken to collective centers .
11
U r~ent Actio n.
Al lnd~:x: FUR 63121 .'95. 15 ..\ugtht 19')5
5
CO~FIDENri AJ.,
IŒPOH.T - NOT Tü BE MADE I' UBLI
In the tïrst days between 1,500-2.000 people a ùay were transported while the system seemed
to speed up da il y; at this speed the total minority population of the Banja Luka area wou id be
cleansed within two to three weeks. 11 After sorne days. however, ethnie clcansing stagnated
after the huge number of people crossing caused accommodation problems at the Croatian side
of the border. As a result. several buses with minorities were rerurned to the Transit Center in
Banja Luka where they would be temporarily accommodated.
The Transit Center, however, lacked every facility to do so: people had to spend the night in
ihe open on a square of concrete surrounded by a strip of grass, whicl1 was the former practice
ground of the driving school. Later also a neighbouring football field was used. The Transit
Center lacked shelter. water and sanitation facilities, had inadequate medical care and food was
not available. The instable weather, cold and with heavy showers, turned the football field into
a muddy mess and complicated the situation of the people in the Center even more. The Civil
Defense, which was in charge of the registration and transportation in the Transit Center, lacked
the authorization to improve these conditions and witnessed "the Transit Center turning into a
refugee camp. for which it is absolutely unsuitable", as one of them stated.
International humanitarian organizations were faced with a moral dilemma: ali strongly
condemned ethnie cleansing and did not want to facilitate its implementation, though faced wirh
cleteriorating humanitarian conditions and the Jack of willingness of the local authorities to take
up responsibility for the conditions in the Transit Center, another approach was needed . .fv1SF
continued to condemn ethnie cleansing but, since MSF was not in a position to stop it from
happening, it decided to monitor the humanitarian siruation and alleviate the worst suffering of
the minority population in order to prevent people in the worst health condition from dying.
Thcrcfore small amounts of humanitarian relief goods (babyfood, blankets. shelters) \Vere given
to the authorities to pressure them into action, while in cooperation with the ICRC and UNHCR
demanding that the local authorities take up their responsibility for the Transit Center and to
improve its conditions. After two weeks, two days before the Transit Center would close down.
the local commissioner for refugees finally took up responsibility and provided daily meals. By
then. a total of sorne 1. 000 people were present in the Transit Center, some of which had spem
up to tcn days in the open under extremely harsh conditions. where diarrhoea. lice and other
health problems had meanwhile increased on a daily basis.
After the first week , when al ready more than 12,000 minorities had crossed into Croatia. it
became clear that the Croatian authorities discriminated between the refugees crossing Ît5
11 St:c ANNEX 2. which coma ms a list with Ihe number of people crossing the Sava n vt:r each day . 1\lier 22 Scptètnher.
which in Ihis repon is Jescribed as the · ~econd phase '. access for mtcrnational humanitarian organizations h~came mor<: ;,nJ
mure resiricted and was in ~ome cases denied. ln particular to :ireas wherc the minority population W J S ex pelleJ. A~ .1 rcsulr.
t lt:ar infiJrmation on nurn bers of people bemg put on huses is n()t ava ilable.
6
CO:-;<HDENTL\L REPORT - ;.;oTTO RE MADE PUIILIC
borders, de.spite the Croatian·s Govenm1ent claim that ail Bosnian refugccs were welcome. 13
While Croats and people of mixed marriages wcre able to enter without too much difficulty,
buscs containing Muslims wcre repeatedly n:turned to the Banja Luka Transit Center. which was
tïlling up. ;4 Meanwhile. on 23 August registration and transportation of minorities also started
in places like Prijedor. Prnjavor, Sanki Most. Gradiska, Kotor Varos and Bosanski Novi. 15
Many Muslims of these towns also ended up in the Banja Luka Transit Center.
The 'Prnjavor-incident' illustrares the discrimination ofthe 11-fuslim minority population wlren on
19 August a convoy 4 nine buses wirh 430 Muslims and their luggage coming from Prnjavor
were rfji1sed lO cross the river and got stuck in Klasnice. On 18 August already 500 of the 3, 000
Muslirns living in Prnjavor crossed into C!·oatia. Due to confusion with respecr to the type of
rransporr and strier limitations on numbers ~~f people, severa! families got separated from each
mher. fr was on/y after hours of negoliations hy the 1CRC and UNHCR tlzat the Mus/ims were
allowed to cross the Sava river. The subsequent crossing lasted until 23.00 in the evening.
With hundreds of (mainly) Muslims ending up in the Transit Center coupled with deteriorating
humanilarian ~:onditions, tension in the Center was rising. 16 Despcrate Muslims who tried to
get on buses with Croats were taken off the buses. People were frightened thar they would be
expelled to Central Bosnia. dt!spite the refusai of the Bosnian Government to cooperate with the
ethnie cleansing. 17 But moreover the people were frustrated with the Jack of information
~:oncerning their fate.
On 14 August 1995, the day the wave of etlmic cleansing stal1ed, an agreement was signed
between the ICRC and the Vice-President of the self-proclaimed Repuhlic of Srpska. Profcssor
Nikola Koljevic. The agreement contained the Guide/ines Concerning the Organi-.ation of the
Voluntmy Depanure (~{People Wishing 10 Leave Banja Luka Area. and intended to provide rules
nf protection for the civilian population in accordance with imernational humanitarian law. 18
'' r:1~1 dtsc1immation b~ the Croat ian authonties bt:t\1 ~en Bosnicm Croats a no \ luslum '"'~ re' ·e ntly rn r:tinncu in ;h(:
1J~l si nki \Vntch report (~n· :l t1nd Poht:·cat Ntr:iu.· u; (,rna!uJ l'JI: du: f~ve of flariinme>n!t~ rv F.l c u ons. ]:-) (Jctobcr 1()'J5.
1
~ l' ~o pk
nî m rx~d rn~ rri<.gcs we1t- <.>n l; J !Jo·., _.d tn cross " hcn the î~t ller 11ns Cron t. l.utcr the cro;;;;in g
or mi,;ed mnlTÎil!'èS
.1bo stoppcd.
' Bosnnsk i ·ovi
IS
referrc.d
10
by the 8oo;anian Se1bs a«
ovi lirad.
A iot pf the people in th!:' Transit Celllcr had no hornes 10 n:turn w. s;ncc m many ca:-:c:s th e~ t: were oc cupied b)'
rr()lll the Kr:~jina :t11 er the minNl!ÎCS !cft ll> r Croa tia. ln so mt! c:ast:s minurities carne w Jhe T ~<ms it Ccntt.>r ~.ner bt:mg
frNn thcir homes hy fnn:e .
'6
rewgc ~ ~
<!~p elled
" Bosman Muslims consiuered Ceulral Bos nia ·un>ale· duc Jo the ongning figlitin g ar that time and the t·isk that ma ies of
;~ g.: \ .:ry likely wou id he torced to jo in the BiH.
Jraft
~ See AN. EX 3.
7
O~FIDE
TIAL REPORT -
~OTTO
BE \IA.DI:: P iBLI C
Hm.v ever, soon most of these rules were violated. Minorities were asked paymems up to 100
DM for their registration and subsequent transportation ('petrol expenses') by both Bosnian Serb
military as the local Red Cross. Moreover. the Bosnian Serh civilian authoritics failcd to protect
the minority population from ongoing violence.
A Muslim family from Gradisk{l, who already s!ayed in the Transit Center for severa/ davs
srared: "lVe !zad 10 pay ali of our money (50 Kuna. sorne 20 DM) at a collective poim in Srbac
where the buses were checked wlzen we were transported on 1 September. After paying these
lnrunicipa!it)' taus', an/le military awi!Oriries catted tt, we were not allowed to cross anJ 11·ere
returned to the Transit Center in Banja Luka. ''
In Prijedor the local Red Cross reportedly asked up to 70 DM for registration. which people
1vere ve1y \-villing to pay, since this was tlzeir ticket to tlze safe Croatia. Soon after their
reRistration, Jwwever, people IVe re reponedly systemarical/y expe/led from the ir homes. which
strongly indicates thal the registration lists were passed on to vthers. vVhen a woman cal!ed the
police after slze was el'icted from her house, the police lumg up the phone as soon as she wld
rh enz where sile lived. As a result of these events the minoriry population in Pr(jedor be came very
.fi"ightened of registration.
Howaer, not al! municipalities assisted in the ethnie c!eansing of their minority population, like
in Kotor Faros where the local Red Cross rejused to register the minorities of their toH'll.
,Veither did excesses take place against them.
On 11 September. the Transit Center in Banja Luka was closed down, after the last group of
minorities staying there left for Croatia. Already a week before the Civil Defense had stopped
registration of new minorities to avoid more people from co ming to the Center. Soon after
NATO's bombing campaign Operation Deliberare Force in the Banja Luka area as of 9
September, ali registra ti on and transportation v-.: as suspended until fmther notice. By th en
between 22.000-25.000 minorities had been expelled to Croatia.
The Second Phase: The Bitter Fruit of Impunity.
The ethnie cleansing process was interrupted by the massive influx of some 100.000 Bosnian
Serh displaced persons from Kljuc, Nlrkonjic Grad, Jajce and other to\vns in the North and West
of Bosnia-HercegoYina. who fled from their homes as a result of the joint offensive by BiH and
the Croatian Army. The annies used the military advantages created by NATO's bombing
campaign against Bosnian Serb artillery and communication lines to conquer sorne 4.000 km 2
of Bosnian Serb-held territory. In contrast with the Krajina refugees it was expected that most
of the displaced persons would not travel on to Serbia, but stay in the Banja Luka area. where
they came from. Moreover. since the emptying of the Banja Luka area of its civilian population
would increase the risk of more military attacks. the Bosnian Serb authorities blocked the
corridor near Brcko with which they effectively prevemed the Bosnian Serb displaced persons
8
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT - K()T TO BE i\IADE PUBLIC
from t1eeing on to Serbia.
When rhe confrontation tine advanced to Prijedor. Sanki Most and Banja Luka. the Bosnian Serb
stronghold in Northern Bosnia-Hercegovina, President Milosevic of Serhia threatened to send
in Serbian military to come to the Bosnian Scrb's aid. While he did nor carry out its threat. he
did allow autonomous paramilitary forces to <.:ross into Bosnia-Hercegovina and to join the BSA
in its defence against the BiH and Croatian Army's offensive.
As soon as the paramilitary forces. led by their notorious leader Zt:ljko Raznatovic (known as
· Arkan ·). ente red Bos ni an Serb-held terri tory, alam1ing reports on human rights abuses, su ch
as killings , disappearances and rape commitled with impunity against the civilian population,
staned. Thcse abuses strongly reminded of 1992 when Arkan also visited the Banja Luka arca
and. accompanied with atrocities, deansed towns of their minority population. The almost
completely devastated town of Kozarac. where Arkan's name is still written on the walls. is a
.·ilent \Vitness of this period and left little hope for the safety of the remaining rninority
population in the area.
Amnesty International reponed thar around 20 September, when the first allegations of
paramilitary forces being active in the region were repo11ed. a group of 1,241 people (most of
ihem Muslims) were expelled ji·om Doboj in Cemral Bosnia. They 1t:ere rold to garher in a
stadium from where they were subsequemly taken ro a rural area near Mount O::.ren. From he re
rhe people lt•ere told to H'alk to BiH-he/d territ01y. Refugees repo11ed that as a result several
people died of exhaustion and UNHCR reported physical sigm of ill-treatmenr. 19
On 21 Septembcr Arkan and his paramilitary forces were reported to have reachcd the town of
Sanki Most. where they Wl)Uid assist the BSA. 20 In the following days it would become clear
that the ethnie cleansing wave of 14 August had cntered its second phase and the paramilitary
forces would cnjoy the same impunity for their crimes as in 1992.
On 26 October. Under Secretmy-Ceneral Chinmava Gharekhan Ît!formed the SfCW"Zty Council
rhar Serb militias 1rere srill {Jel.fôrming mass execwions of Bosnian Muslims. In Bosamki Novi
abow IOO men were ki/led bv Arkan 's militia. In Sanki Most 120 11:'ere executed while another
120 went missing when the ,;,ilitia took 0\'er the toHm. 21
Fighting around Sanki ~1ost added tens of thousands of displaceJ people to the already
increasingly difficult humanitarian siruation in the Banja Luka area. ~v1SF estimates that around
1
''
Urgem Action. AI Index: EUR 63 i2..f l95. 12 Octnhcr 1495.
~ HHC \Vor!d N~l'-ç·
•1
21 Septcmber 1995.
lmerm:lionrtl R.:por1. Bosn:a. Sc rb
,1 rmc inc:.~·
(rmtimlc.
!Hl .
9
148. 26 Octobcr 19'!5
CO!\Fin E~~fiAL
REPORT- NOT TO BE IIIADE PLBLI C
26 October a total of 180,000 Serb refugees and displaced persons were present in the Banja
Luka area. Most of them have found accommodation in private homes. but some 10,000-15,000
will have to stay in 30 collective centers during the coming winter. Together with the local
authorities MSF is currently preparing these centers for the coming winter.
Whilt: access for international humanitarian organizations to areas with Serb refugees and
displaced people improved considerably since the last influx of displaced Serbs, access to the
minority populations became more and more difficult. Sorne towns would remain inaccessible
for days and after their 'reopening', they had been swept clean of their remaining minority
population. Repons indicated that paramilitary forces had taken over ethnie cleansing and were
working very hard to 'finish the job'.
Soon these allegations \Vere confirmed by alarming reports on human rights abuses by the BSA
and paramilitary forces. such as killings, rape, and the separation of hundreds of men from their
families. The men were forcibly drafted for working obligations or would disappear. Recent
testimonies of males of minority populations strongly indicate that detention centers. which were
used in 1992, were operational againY The male population of the Bosnian Serh displaced
pcrsons from Sanski Most and Kljuc in Nonh-West Bosnian-Hercegovina faced forceful drafting
into military serviœ, like in the Omarska collective center near Prijedor.
The families of the men 'vVho disappeared were subsequently expelled with buses to Zenica in
Central Bosnia. after paying up to 70 DM to get on the bus. From 6 until 9 October. a total of
some 4,000 minorities were expelled from Ljubia and Prijcdor. 23 According to UNHCR an
estimated 6,000-7,000 minorities had been expelled to Zenica since the beginning of October.
Muslim rejugees from Prijedor rep011ed thar the police made inventory lists of houses and the
number of people living in them, some 15 days before their transp011ation on 8 October. ft is
not clear if only houses of minorities were registered. According w the municipality the lists
were needed with respect ta the provision of shelter to Serb refugees from Bosanski Petrovac.
K(iuc and Sankt Jfost.
During the four days (~f tramponation in Prijedor from 6-9 October, people of minoriry
populations were given 30 minutes or less to pack their belongings, ,.vhile Serb refugees •vere
sometimes already moving in. Witnesses stated thar the police very systematicafly \·isited nery
lwuse. The minorities subsequemly /zad togo to the football stadium where they were registered
by the local Red Cross. In the beginning the local Red Cross charged ïO DM per person Tmtil
the deparrure procedure was sped up and people were pushed into the buses willwut paying.
2!
:\P. Escapee Describes Bosnia Camp. 2ô Octoher 1995 and Th e Guardian. Freed Mus!ims R<'port Massacre
Mo st. 2 t\ovemher 1995.
:; Sec abo: ICRC. Minorités .'v!usu!mmzes Expuiseey de Banja Lui.:a. 9 Ot:tober 1995.
10
111
Sanski
CO, FIDE. flAL REPORT- • OTTO BE 1ADE PCBLIC
The refugees who would be tramported on 8 October heard thar the previous trt·o buses of 6 and
7 October had arrived safely in Tesm~j. including ail the draji age males on board. Hmvever,
just before the refugees in the buses of 8 October were allowed to leave the bus near the border
1virlz Central Bosnia, policemen entered the buses and poùzted out men who were subsequemly
raken off rhe bus and were taken away. ft is said thar the group of 37 men included sorne boys
of 15 and 16 years of age. After the men were raken out, the rest of rlze refugees had to start
watkin!? the remaining .five to six kilometres towards the crossing point to Central Bosnia.
The refugees described these last kilometres as "a hel!". During their walk the refugees were
awaited by masked men in unfform. some ofwhich ..,vere identified as being police from Pr(jedor.
Or hers reporredly were men of Arkan 's paramilitary forces. Refugees had to pay al! the ir money
ro these men, under rhreat of being kiiled. Severa! refuge es reported t!zat they had knives put on
tlzeir throat or saw others being threatened in tllat l-vay. Some reported young women heing
dragged.from the raad and pushed into the bushes. Not long after -..vimesses heard screaming and
crying.
The same storics were also reported of the convoy which left Prijedor on Monday 9 October
when people had to ''cross or die'' at the Usora river. As a result severa! people in poor health
condition and elderly drowned when they were swept away by the CUITent. UNHCR confinned
similar stories and its office in Zen ica reportcd that no draft age males from Prijedor arrived.
At beginning of November sorne 2 ,000-3.000 men are still reported missing.
The civilian authorities of Banja Luka claimed to have no control over rhe situation and cannot
intervene since the paramilitary forces operate autonomously from any (higher) authority .
Neither can the ICRC and UNHCR intervene since they are refused access to the areas of
concern. 24 Confronted with these events, the Special Rapporteur' s expcctation of sorne months
before that a part of the minority population would not be cleansed but would remain for forced
labour purposes and for negotiated population ex changes , looked bleak. ès
Croatia and Bos nia) s :\'love
After Croatia · s offensive Operation Stonn on the UNPAs North and South in August 1995 ,
during which sorne 160.000 Krajina Serbs fied imo Bosnia-Hercegovina, only some 3,500
Krajina Serbs in the f01mer UNPA ~orth and about 2,000 in the fonner NPA South remained.
mainly elderly and disabled who \Vere not able to tlee for the offensive. These Serbs. which
form a minority, have been the victim of gross human rights violations before du ring and after
:<
As a rc~ ul!. the alrca<.ly vil1bted ag reement bc!ween ICRC a nd the civilian authorit!es became obsolcte.
;.; See footnote 4. para. 30.
11
C O~FIDENTIAL
REPORT - "\OTTO BE l\IADE PUBLIC
the offcnsive.~ 6
Whik the Cnxuian authorities rcmain passive in ù1cir protection of the remaining Scrb minority
population in the Krajina and the subsequent Jack of cooperation with human rights monitors .
they are very acti\'c in thcir policy with regard to revoking the refugee swtus of the Bosnian
refugèes on their territory. On 25 September, after the recent intlux of refugees from BosniaHerœgovina and the addition of the ' newly liberated areas · to Croatian and Bosnian tcrritorv.
the Croatian Office for Displaccd Persons and Rcfugccs (0DPR) 21 announced that the officialiy
accorded refügee status for Bosnîan refugees from at Ieast 20 towns în BOsnîa. încludîng ' newly
libcratcd areas· will be revoked and that soon repatriation of thcse people can commence. This
was l<Her confinned by Croatia's Ambassador to the UN at the 46th Session of UNHCR's
Executive Committce. though at the same time he stated that Croatia was aware that "it is yet
to establish full controluver the re-integrated territories and that the establishment of the civilian
authority has been slow and not without incidents. "28 Croarian media rcported that at !east
100,000 Bosnian refugecs will be affected hy this Government diœctive. 2 :~
ODPR's announcement outraged the United Nations Iligh Commissioner for Rd'ugees. Mrs
Sadako Ogata. who said that this ··could mean the forced return of tens of thousands of people
to an arca that is neither safe nur prepared to receive them. " The UJ\HCR stated that she
belicveJ that a large-scalc repatriation is premature and may be a violation of the 1951
Convention relating to thc Status of Refugces. to which Croatia is a pany. ' 0 Howevcr, on 11
and 13 September the Croatian Press agency Hina already reported thc relocation of some 600
Bosnian refugees to Bihac who were just expelled fonn the Ba~~ja Luka arca. According to
: 1. Th o u~h the situation (If the Serb mir.ority popu lation is ~irm!ar that nf the Croa r anJ Mu>lim mmtHit) pnpulati0n in
Bm-nian Serh-h:: ld t~nitory, th 1s >-iruati('ll falls oursiJ:: the scnpe ,,f this report. for more mh,rrn:uion sec: The UN SccrerarGenera!'s report 511995 /73 0 (23 August 1995) pursuent to SC Res. i009 (1995"1. whid1 imer aiia stresses "the need to pr lleC!
the rights nf the local St: rb Pnpulation". lntem:uion:.tl Report. Cromia: Russia war!ls SC Sw1enwn1 nn Re.fuif.ee.l. 110. !:!8. 29
Septemb:;r 1995. Imerrutional Re port. F. Yugu.,lavia: 5'C s end1 [/;anan Righrs lnjormartolr , rw. J..l2. 19 Octoher \99.'i.
lntcrnatium l Ro: pon. F 'fug os/m ia: SC Presidnu w /k ill A'nba.owdnri. no. I·B. 2 0 Octr·h er 19().'i and fo o l!lote 13.
: > ri.e OD PR otti ·ers part of the Cmatian &:cwo:rnm ent :md as ~u c h re sponsihle tor implemenrmg Crnü ua·;; policy issues
c once rnin~
refu gc L'S and
di~placctl
persons.
~6
Suwmt·m by Mr. Nen:n MaJey . Chaq; é D '·\tl:tir> A.!. pf 1he Perrn:111ent \1i ~;,ion pf th e Rqmbl ic <il C rn ruia !0 the
)}ittinns Office in Geneva. Forry-5ïxth StSSIOII r.(lhe. Exenaiw· Commirtcc cf t/le lfif)! Cm!I!IISSiùl lé'l''' Programmr. iS
Octnl•cr 1995.
lJu~itL'd
~'· Currl'ntly mme tilan 460.000 retübt:e~ and cii>pi a..: ~ d p~rs o n~ tnm1 flosnia-l-lerccgo vrna arc ;H; Ci'mmodated
"hich is ;,bout 10% of rh.: populatiPn in Crnatia .
111
Croatia.
'' lnle rml! nnal Rc,port. ( 'r oatù;.· U.I-,1/(' R Co •ict'!ncd m ·cr R<jug eli Din•ttn•e , :w. 12-1. :5 S:pteml:-.n 1995. Article 3-' c. (
1951 (.. ('> 11\'t n !lo n Rl'l:::.ting 10 the Sratus o l R tfupe ~s. th;; princ1pk of nvn-re/olllcme •ll. proh: b ih forc:.:d :epatrwriun: '''Jo
''ontr,;c ung Sune shall -:x pei! Vi' rcll!m ('n:fou1e.r' 't o! relilgçe in any m:mn.:r \\ hat50t'Yè[ tu th0 ft Ont t er~ ur !~rnr o rie~ .... he re hi;;
li!c' M !r,·cdnm ~.v n u l d l'e thrcatcned un <1 ·count of hi~ mee. r~Egi<.ln. nutionnlity. m~mber ~ h! p .,f d piH!icubr ,,_Jt;ial grcup ,,r
pnliticnl Ppinion. "
th~
12
CONPll>EI\TIAL REPORT - 1\0T TO BE MADE PUBLIC
ODPR "there was no uther way of accommodating the refugee s because ali transit and refugee
centers werc full. "
On 3 üctober the UN Security Cuuncil adopted a presidential statement also expressing its
concern about Croatia ' s ··v.:ithdrav,. al of refugee status from and the consequent ending of
assistance to many refugces from the Repuhlic of Bosnia and Hercegovina l ... ] . "31
Meanwhile , these concerns have not prevented the start of the forced rescttlemem of Bosnian
refugees. Until 19 October more than 3,000 Bosnian Croat and Muslim refugees from the Banja
Luka arca have been resettled in the 'newly liberatt!d areas' in North-West Bosnia-Hercegovina.
in particular Glamoc , Bihac. Velika Kladusa, Bosanski Petrovac , Kljuc and Sanki Most Y But
also the Bosnian authorities reportedly resettle Bosnian refugces in these towns. shortly after
their arrivai in Zenica.
A recent report by Helsinki Watch described similar ''forced repatriation of Bosnian men without
guaramees for their safety and. at times, discrimination between Bosnian Croats and I\1uslims
seeking refuge in Croaria [ .. . ]" in the pasr. 33
ln the mghr of 8 October some 460 Bosnian refugees who were expelled from PrUedor, arrived
in Donji Vakuf, Central Bosnia. After tlu·ee to four days tlzey were transp011ed to Kljuc. Se1·eral
rt:.fur.:ees did not want ro go ro Kljuc. bll! !zad no clwice since they had 110 jamily in Zenica or
Tra vnik 1vho cou/d accept them.
Places like Kljuc are œar the CUITent confrontation line . Ongoing fighting in Nonh-West BosniaHercegovina which continued during the first part of the forced resettlement poscd a direct threat
to the lives of the returnees. fvloreover, from the prcvious fighting in the rowns landmines may
have remaincd, posing an additional threat to the lives of the œturnees. Returning male Muslims
might also face being drafted for the Bill. Together. these factors give serious reason to doubt
whether any fondamental change of circumstances has taken place in these areas and strongly
indicate that the Bosnian rcfugees have forcibly heen repatriated.
" S/PRSTI1995 '·l'J
.: Set: !" ()!note 2 5, IR nP. 142
" See luNnute 13.
13
CO FlDENTIAL REPORT - :'-lOT TO BE \f.\ DE PUBLIC
Conclusions
Though the latest wave of ethnie cleansing against the minority population in the Banja Luka
area has ended , their nightmare is tàr from over. After having faced gross human rights
violations and violations of international humanitarian law pcrpetrared wirh impunity, thousands
of refugees who thought to have reached a safe haven in Croatia and Central Bosnia, again find
themselves in an insecure situation after having been forcibly repatriated by the Croatian and
Bosnian authorities to unsafe areas.
MSF strongly opposes ethnie cleansing and forced repatriation and therefore urges the following:
1.
The authorities in charge should ensurc that gross human rights violations and grave
breaches of international hurnanitarian law against the civilian minority population are
brought to a hait. The rights of the civilian minority population should be respected by
ail parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in accordance with the principles of
international human rights and hurnanitarian law;
The fate of the 2,000-3,000 missing men from the Banja Luka area should be
investigated and their whereabouts revealed. Possible detention camps for the dvilian
population should be closed immediately and its population unconditionally released:
3.
Ali perpetrators of gross human rights violations and grave breaches of international
humanitarian law should be brought to justice;
4.
The Bosnian-Serb authorities should grant immediate and unrestricted access to ali
humanitarian organizations to provide protection and assistance to the dvilian population
in need of such protection and assistance;
5.
The Croatian and Bosnian authorities should stop the forced repatriation of refugees from
Bosnia-Hercegovina to unsafe areas which forma direct threat to their lives. l'vloreover,
measure need to be taken to ensure the safety of the already rerurned Bosnian rcfugees:
6.
Refugees \.Vho have rccently been forced to return to 'the newly liberated areas' in
Bosnian-Hercegovina by the Bosnian and Croatian authorities, should be free to leave
these areas again if they wish to do so.
14
C ONFIDE~TI.\L
REPORT - r\OT TO BE i\IADE Pt;BLIC
M'NEX 1: Map of Bosnia-Hercegovina
-
Front li ne
on Oct 12 '95
Front li ne till
• • • July '95
0
Under Serb
control
Muslim/Croat
Federation-held 1 -.wt)l--~
"
Dubrovnik
50 miles
{
Source: Bulletin of the lnstitute for \Var and Peace, War Report. October 1995
15
CONFJD E~TI A L
REPORT - -.: OT TO BE \f ADE PUBLIC
ANNEX 2: Figures of Post-Krajina ethnie clcansing wave
August
14:
15 :
16:
17:
18:
19:
20 :
21:
22 :
23 :
24:
25:
26 :
27:
28:
29:
30:
31 :
Total:
Scptember
771
1.738
2,035
1,429
2,323
2,182
420
717
502
721
1' 121
no crossing
no crossing
no crossing
943
458
602
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
no crossing
no crossing
1128
1044
149
253
277
no crossing
no crossing
no crossing
755
no crossing
no crossing
no crossing
no crossing
no crossing
no crossing
no crossing
869
994
159
no crossing
Total:
5628
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
l'"'.
k.
500
16,462
Source: UNHCR
16
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT - 'IlOT TO BE :'\IADE PUBLIC
ANNEX 3: The ICRC agreement
GlJIDELL~S
CO:"'"CERNII\"G THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUNTARY
DEPARTURE OF PEOPLE WISHING TO LEAVE BAi\.JALUKA AREA
J,
Introduction
As a consequence of the various armed contlicts which broke out in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, of the deterioration of the security situation and the hardship put on their living
conditions. thousands of people helonging w minorities in the area of Banjaluka rt:quested the
right and expressed the wish to leave.
The authorities of the Republic of Srpska recently started establishing 'l:ollective protection
centres· in Banjaluka to ensure the safety of people belonging to such minorities and who had
previously been victims of huge pressure, harassmcnt. threatening and different abuses.
The objectives of the guidelines is to confüm and establish the rules and principles governing
the procedure of a decent and secure departure for the people wishing to leave Banjaluka arca
and to define the role of the International Commiuee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in this process.
2.
General Princip les
2.1. ~othing in the present guidelines shall be interpreted as diminishing or impairing the
obligations resulting from the international humanitarian law and from the differem agreements
on that matter concluded under ICRC auspices by the parties to the conflict in BosniaHercegovina.
2.2.
ln particular. the authorities of the Republic of Srpska contïrm their obligations to cnsure
safety. protection and respect of the mcmbers of different minorities who live on the territory
they control.
2.3. The authorities of the Rcpublic of Srpska will nor forcih.ly rransfer either ali or a pan of
the population of a given area under their control. nor submit them to such requirements.
conditions or pressure that the departure remains the only possible solution. On the other hand.
the authorities of the Republic of Srpska will not prevcnt the people who \'Oluntarily wish to
leave from doing so or putting any condition (administrati\'e, financial or othen to such a
departure. Ail necessary measures to facilirate the departures and transportation will be taken.
2.4. The authorities of the Republic of Srpska undertake not to let sign any J owment by a
person who is to be Icaving. including the document renouncing or transferring prope11y rights.
17
CONFIDENTB.L REPORT -
~OT
TO BE MADE PlffiLIC
asscts or claims, or renouncing the right to return home at a Iater stage if he/she wishes to do
so. In any case , such a document has no legal validity and does not in any way affect the rights
and obligations of the persan concerned.
2.5.
The unity of the family is a fundamental right. The persans who wish to leave will be
reunited with the members of their family who are under an obligation to military service or to
public work. Such members will also have the right to express their free will to leave and.
should they \:vish so. will be transported together with their family.
2.6.
Free \vill of the families and of the individuals who wish to leave will be expressed to
ICRC delegates during talks in private without witnesses.
2. 7.
When sorne member of a family which is ready to leave wishes to stay in Banjaluka and
in his home, the authorities of the Republic of Srpska will respect this wish and ensure his
security and respect of his belongings and rights of property.
2.8.
During ali the procedure of determining free will of departure, gathering and
transportation in the territory controlled by the Republic of Srpska authorities of the concerned
persans, the authorities of the Republic of Srpska assume the exclusive responsibility for the
security.
2.9.
The implication of the ICRC in the process and its working principles and procedures.
which are based on international humanitarian law and on its nature of neutra! and independent
intermediary , are outlined below. In particular, the ICRC will assume no responsibility which
is not explicitly mentioned.
2.10. The terms of these guidel ines will be put to the knowledge of the representatives of the
minorities living in Banj aluka area and to the international organisations concerned , such as the
UNHCR.
3.
Procedure and Plan of Action
3.1. The people wishing to Ieavc will be gi vcn the possibility to gather in ' collective
protecting centres'. while waiting for their ùeparture. The ICRC will have free and unimpeded
access to ali places where members of a minority stay, included to the se centres. in order to
conduct its activities . In particular, the JCRC will be able to assess that the pcrsons wishing to
leave benefit from adequate security conditions and protection and to provide them with ali
material and medical assistance needed.
3.2.
ICRC staff will conduct privatc interviews to check free will of the people who wish ro
leave.
18
COI"FmENTIAL REPORT - :\OTTO BE !ADE I'CBLIC
3.3.
Families whose ali members are not present will wait, under the same material and
security conditions, until the missing members be given the possibility to join them before
lc:aving.
3.4.
The ICRC should be able to establish the list of persons wishing to leave. These lists will
at !east contain the names , date of birth and last address of each numbcr of the same family.
The list will submittcd to the authority of the Republic of Srpska for immediate stamping. Such
stamped lists wilLgive the right to immediate departure without any additional condition.
3.5. The people wishing to leave will be granted cnough timc and the necessary facilities to
organise their departure and gather their helongings.
3.6.
The authorities of the Republic of Srpska will providc the logistical means, in particular
the means of transportation, for an organised transfer of these people in decent and secure
conditions and under an international supervision. If necessary, and when agreed upon, an
international aïd agency may also provide the requested assistance. The ICRC and/or the
UNHCR personnel and vehicles will be able to accornpany the convoys transponing these
persons.
Geneva. 13 August 1995
{This document was agreed upon by Prof Nikola Ko(jevic, the Vice-President of the Republic
of Srpska, on 14 August 1995. On the same day the expulsion of the minority population
commenred./
Source: ICRC
19
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MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES - BLGIUM
ARTSEN ZONDER OR.ENZEN • BELGIUM
FROM:
DESC ........
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A~ENriON
Sergio
MSF .F & NL.
Solo~onov,
du bureau msf en Italie me tait
~avoir
qu'un
oom.i.t6 itQliaJII dtoida nun •• l'l~t~Aa el~- Ù'L-.7l~.a-'".!.!.tL .5.1'--.!.T.._...,,':I ... ...J.-=>.~·l....
1Jiupu!$t;! il MSF u.n bateau et de l' ai·;le alimentaire qui pareirai t
d'Ancona
pour Dubrovnik avec couleur msf.
MSF assurerait la logistique de distribution.
J'~i ~révenu
zaareb Dour avis.
Il semble se confirmer des besoins au niveau vivres.
Serqio serait prit à accompagner ce bateau avec un ou des
logisticiens msf.
3e lui ai demandé de nous transmettre plus de détails (tonnage,
nature des produits).
Amitiés,
Alain Oevaux.
Bru>!Glles, le 10/10/91.
J ................
THIS MSG CONrAINS ........
PAGES lNCLUDED THIS ONE.
1\1EDECINS SANS FRONTIERES • BELGitiM :
_