Somalia and Eritrea UN Monitoring Group

S/2015/801
United Nations
Security Council
Distr.: General
19 October 2015
Original: English
Letter dated 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the
Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with
paragraph 47 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), I have the honour to
transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter,
together with the enclosed report, were brought to the attention of the members of
the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.
(Signed) Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea
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201015
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S/2015/801
Letter dated 22 September 2015 from the members of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair
of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
We have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Somalia of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in accordance with paragraph 47 of
Security Council resolution 2182 (2014).
(Signed) Christophe Trajber
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
(Signed) Nicholas Argeros
Finance expert
(Signed) Zeina Awad
Transport expert
(Signed) Jay Bahadur
Armed groups expert
(Signed) Bogdan Chetreanu
Finance expert
(Signed) Déirdre Clancy
Humanitarian expert
(Signed) James Smith
Regional expert
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Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia
Contents
Page
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
A.
Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
B.
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
A.
Spoiler politics and the capture of State resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
B.
Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
C.
Public financial management and misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
D.
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
E.
Piracy and kidnap for ransom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
A.
Denial of humanitarian access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
B.
Attacks on humanitarian workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35
C.
Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37
A.
Targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37
B.
Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and
forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
Arms embargo regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A.
VI.
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38
Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with the conditions of the partial
lifting of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
B.
Obligations of Member States and regional and international organizations . . . . . . . . . . .
40
C.
Standing exemptions from the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
D.
Documentation of captured weaponry and military equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
E.
Implementation of paragraphs 10 and 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
F.
Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
Violations of the ban on charcoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
A.
Production and export of charcoal in southern Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
B.
Maritime interdiction and vessel tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
C.
Falsified documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
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VII.
State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
VIII.
Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
IX.
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
A.
Threats to peace and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
B.
Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
C.
Arms embargo regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
D.
Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48
E.
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
F.
Violations of the ban on charcoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
G.
Sanctions list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
Annexes*
Somalia
1.
2.
3.
4.
Spoiler politics and the capture of State resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
1.1. Formation of Interim Galmudug Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
1.2. Bribery of Federal Members of Parliament** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59
Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60
2.1. Sale of fishing licences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61
2.2. The Al Amal and Poseidon, and the assault on the Auditor General . . . . . . . . . . . . .
72
2.3. Continuing privatization of Somalia’s maritime space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
84
2.4. Hijackings of the Iranian dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber by pirates linked to
Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
92
2.5. Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
Public financial management and misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
149
3.1. Somali National Army financial management and misappropriation** . . . . . . . . . . .
150
3.2. Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
151
3.3. Misappropriation of funds for Mogadishu port rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
164
3.4. Illegal agreement relating to the taxation of khat imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
177
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
184
4.1. Mogadishu hotel attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
185
4.2. Garissa University College attack** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
189
4.3. Failed January 2015 Al-Shabaab plot in Djibouti** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
202
__________________
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
** Annexes 1.2, 2.4, 3.1, 4.2.e, 4.3, 6.1.a, 6.2.b and 6.3.b have not been included in the present
document because they are strictly confidential.
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5.
6.
7.
8.
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4.4. Al-Shabaab and heroin trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
203
Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
205
5.1. Denial of humanitarian access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
206
5.2. Bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct access . . . . . . .
212
5.3. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
218
Violations of international law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
225
6.1. Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians** . . . . . . . . . . . .
226
6.2. The situation of the Wagosha/Bantu community in Al-Shabaab-held areas of
Lower and Middle Jubba** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
236
6.3. Commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians
in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, December 2013 -2015** . . . . . . . . .
241
6.4. Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed
conflict and forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
244
Arms embargo regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
249
7.1. Management of weapons, ammunition and military equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
250
7.2. Compliance with the exemption framework and with notification requirements
under the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
262
7.3. Federal Government of Somalia compliance with reporting requirements under the
arms embargo partial lift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
276
7.4. Military equipment captured during offensive operations by AMISOM and Federal
Government of Somalia security forces: implementation of paragraph 6 of
resolution 2182 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
283
7.5. Enhancing compliance: international assistance to the Federal Government of
Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
289
7.6. Implementation of, and recommendations related to, modifications of the arms
embargo stipulated in resolution 2182 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
293
Violations of the charcoal ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
299
8.1. Charcoal stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
300
8.2. Kismayo charcoal operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
314
8.3. MSV Raj Milan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
316
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Summary
Much has changed since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected
President of the Federal Government of Somalia late in 2012. Support from the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) enabled significant territorial gains to
be made against Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab). Three new
interim regional administrations have been established, leaving a new federal map of
Somalia almost complete. As new lines are drawn on the map, however, new
opportunities for clan, business and political networks to capture State resources
have emerged. The rush for these resources by spoiler networ ks is preventing the
development of an inclusive political arrangement, and threatens to undermine the
military gains made against Al-Shabaab. Capitalizing on these gains requires
Somalia’s political elite to prioritize the long-term goals of State-building over the
short-term capture of State resources. The failure to do so, as Somalia enters the next
phase of transition in 2016, presents a significant threat to the long -term peace,
security and stability of Somalia. A resurgent Al -Shabaab appears increasingly able
to exploit the failures of its opponents to consolidate control, establish local
administrations, provide security and build public trust.
Control over and access to Somalia’s land and water resources were contested
long before the collapse of the State in 1991. Al-Shabaab’s administrative rule over
much of southern and central Somalia, though ruthless, subdued many deeply rooted
intercommunal conflicts over land and water resources. Al -Shabaab’s loss of territory
in the face of military defeats, and the absence of viable alternative civilian
administrations in its place, have resulted in the re-emergence of intercommunal
conflicts in parts of southern and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab has leveraged this
conflict to its advantage. The prevalence of potentially deepening intercommunal
conflicts over land, water and other natural resources in the relatively more stable
regions of Somaliland and Puntland underlines the need for comprehensive
approaches to local-level resource-sharing agreements.
The 2012 Provisional Constitution and ongoing federalization process have
highlighted the urgent need for national resource-sharing agreements. The pursuit of
Somalia’s mineral and maritime wealth by private companies presents a significant
threat in a fragile environment. Managed effectively by responsible and effective
institutions, the nation’s resource wealth should contribute to the strengthening of
Somalia’s economy and to its prosperity. The Monitoring Group’s investigation into
Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd., which revealed that Somali Government officials
accepted payments from the company under the guise of a “capacity -building”
programme, has demonstrated that such institutions do not yet exist. The successful
implementation of genuine capacity-building programmes should be a prerequisite
for the development of the extractives sector in Somalia.
The rapid decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia since 2012 has been the
result of external efforts and measures. The reported involvement of known pirate
leaders in the recent capture of two Iranian fishing dhows serves as a reminder,
however, that the conditions on land that allowed the rise of piracy largely remain.
While the threat posed by piracy to merchant vessels remains low, the Monitoring
Group is concerned that illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign
vessels may re-establish the conflict dynamic with local fishing communities that
contributed to the rise of piracy a decade ago. The decline in piracy was followed by
a commensurate rise in external private interests seeking to exploit the fisheries
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sector and provide maritime security services. As domestic and international awareness
of Somalia’s maritime resources has grown, the lack of regulation and oversight in
the sector creates a new source of “rent” for federal and regional officials —
particularly through the sale of fishing licences — thereby fuelling corruption.
More broadly, corruption continues to undermine efforts to rebuild effective
institutions throughout Somalia. The fact that the outcome of important debates by
the highest decision-making body of the Federal Government of Somalia — the
House of the People — may be influenced through cash payments to its members
demonstrates the extent to which corruption impedes the fr agile process of Statebuilding. Commendable efforts have been made over the course of the mandate to
strengthen financial regulation and implement new instruments. While the
Monitoring Group is optimistic that this trend will continue, effectively address ing
the extent of misappropriation in Somalia requires systematic reform extending
beyond Somalia’s financial institutions. The lack of effective civilian oversight over
the budget of the Somali National Army has enabled opportunities for systemic
misappropriation, including of soldiers’ wages. The obvious security ramifications of
such misappropriation highlight the need for a comprehensive approach to
implementing reform. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s announcement on
9 September 2015 of sweeping financial reforms within the security sector is a
welcome first step in this process.
The ability of the security forces to defend the Somali people from Al -Shabaab
has been tested during this mandate. The successful elimination of several prominent
leaders appears to have done little to dent Al-Shabaab’s commitment and capacity to
destabilize the region. Al-Shabaab’s shift of tactics, including the return to
conventional attacks on military targets — both AMISOM and the Somali National
Army — is cause for deep concern, particularly given the cuts to the AMISOM
budget and ongoing challenges of Somali National Army troop payments. Al -Shabaab
maintains an ability to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit weaknesses in
the security and governance architecture. In the face of allied advances against the
towns and villages it holds, the group can withdraw, blockade essential supplies from
reaching the “liberated” populations, and simply wait until the security presence is
sufficiently weakened or demoralized before striking again. As military advances
continue, AMISOM, the Somali National Army and allied forces are stretched thin,
leaving their bases increasingly vulnerable to attack. The longer -term impact of the
major attacks on AMISOM troops, such as those in Leego (26 June 2015) and Janale
(1 September 2015), may not yet be fully appreciated.
Rather than weakening Al-Shabaab, the territorial displacement of the group
from major urban centres in Somalia has prompted its further spread into the broader
Horn of Africa region. North-eastern Kenya has witnessed an alarming surge in
attacks over the course of the mandate. Al-Shabaab continues to be able to employ
relatively simple tactics with devastating impact, as demonstrated in its attack on
Garissa University in April 2015. There is growing need for a regionally coordinated
approach to the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other fundamentalist militant outfits
throughout the Horn of Africa.
The partial lifting of the arms embargo introduced through Security Coun cil
resolution 2093 (2013) was prompted, inter alia, by the need to strengthen the
capacity of Somali domestic forces to confront the military threat posed by
Al-Shabaab. The Monitoring Group continues to receive reports that such forces
remain ill-equipped to do so. While the Group can now more effectively monitor the
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volume of military material entering Somalia legitimately, it remains unable to
accurately assess whether such military material is being distributed appropriately or,
indeed, how much is still required. In particular, the standard of reporting on the
composition, strength and structure of Federal Government security forces continues
to fall far short of the Council’s requirements. With the emergence of new regional
administrations, and an increasing number of both national and foreign security
forces present in Somalia, it is increasingly important to identify which security
forces are eligible to import military material under the Security Council’s arms
embargo, and which reporting obligations they consequently incur.
That all of the security forces present in Somalia are believed to have targeted
civilians — whether as a deliberate tactic of war, in service of political or economic
aims or through disproportionate use of force — further increases the need for more
transparent reporting. Politically, economically and culturally excluded communities
continue to experience disproportionate violations of international humanitarian law,
reflecting the deep-rooted stratification of Somali society. Al-Shabaab committed the
most egregious violations against civilian populations during the course of the
mandate — particularly with regard to the forced recruitment of children. At the
same time, the abuse of marginalized communities by anti-Al-Shabaab forces
provides an effective recruitment tool for the group and alienates those communities
from the emerging State. The largest displacements of people during the mandate
were caused by the forced eviction of huge numbers of internally displaced and poor
communities from urban centres in Somalia.
Humanitarian access remained extremely fragile, particularly as Al -Shabaab
blockaded key towns and supply routes. Efforts by competing authorities to co -opt
and extract benefits from humanitarian operations compromised not just the viability
of operations but also the ability to work safely across different zones of control. The
number of threats against and attacks on humanitarian workers rose, with 10
humanitarian workers being killed and 17 injured from January to July 2015 alone.
Reduced budgets, the rising costs of operations as a result of access constraints, the
need to mitigate heightened security and diversion risks all added to the pressure on
scarce resources.
The international trade in Somali charcoal continues although the political
economy on land has changed. Since the recovery of the port city of Barawe in
Lower Shabelle in October 2014, Al-Shabaab no longer controls any major export
sites. Following the arrest of various officials exporting charcoal immediately
following the capture of Barawe, the Monitoring Group believes that the trade in
Barawe has ceased. Although the trade continues further south, Al -Shabaab’s overall
share of income derived from it has been significantly reduced. Early in 2015, falling
revenues from charcoal prompted attempts by Al-Shabaab to actively obstruct and
deny profit from the trade to its opponents. Although support from Member States
and multinational naval partnerships has increased the visibility of the trade,
countermeasures employed by charcoal-exporting vessels to avoid identification and
tracking, combined with the continuing use of false documentation, have added to
the challenges of ensuring that Somali charcoal is not imported by Member States.
Engagement with the Federal Government of Somalia impro ved markedly
during the course of this mandate. The Monitoring Group received support with
some investigations from its two designated focal points for security and financial
matters. The Group looks forward to continuing and strengthening relations with t he
Government.
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I. Introduction
A.
Mandate
1.
The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is contained in
paragraph 46 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), adopted on 24 October
2014, and paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012). Additional tasks were assigned to
the Group under resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2142 (2014).
2.
Pursuant to paragraph 46 of resolution 2182 (2014) and paragraph 13 (l) of
resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group provided the Security Council,
through the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1 907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea, with a midterm briefing on 8 April 2015. The Group
also submitted monthly progress reports to the Committee throughout its mandate.
3.
In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group
travelled to Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. In Somalia,
members of the Group were able to undertake regular visits to Mogadishu, Hargeisa
and Garowe, and once to Kismayo.
4.
The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following
experts: Christophe Trajber (Coordinator), Nicholas Argeros (finance), Zeina Awad
(transport), Déirdre Clancy (humanitarian), James Smith (regional), Bogdan Chetreanu
(finance) and Jay Bahadur (armed groups).
B.
Methodology
5.
The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous
reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the mandate under
review. The Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports. The
methodology used for the present report is as follows:
(a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources,
where possible;
(b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of
events, where possible;
(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing
existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant
expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with
regard to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources;
(e) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary
evidence in support of the information collected.
6.
The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access
to those involved in violations by way of individuals with direct knowledge or who
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know people with direct knowledge about details of violations. On some occasions,
the Group was able to witness first-hand active violations.
7.
The Monitoring Group interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant
information, including government officials and representatives of diplomatic
missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. Members of the Group met
various government officials, including the President and ministers, and
representatives of security agencies. The Group also met or communicated with
officials from the Puntland and Somaliland administrations, representatives of
political and armed groups, defectors and members of business communities and
Somali civil society.
8.
In conformity with guidance provided by the Committee, the Monitoring
Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in
its final report. However, General Assembly resolutions on t he control and
limitation of documentation, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265,
necessitated the extensive use of annexes, preventing much of the substance from
being translated. In addition, regulations exclude the insertion of maps, phot ographs
and charts in the main report. The Group provided relevant material to the
Committee on an ongoing basis throughout its mandate.
9.
In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on information sensitivity,
classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6), the Monitoring Group has submitted
to the Committee, together with the present report, several strictly confidential
annexes containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper
functioning of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third
parties or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations. Those annexes will not
be issued as a document of the Security Council.
II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia
A.
Spoiler politics and the capture of State resources
10. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) continues to present a
severe threat to peace and security in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.
The resurgent threat posed by Al-Shabaab throughout the region, and the
re-emergence of intercommunal conflict in southern and central Somalia, however,
is increasingly tied to the inability of the Federal Government of Somalia, the
Federal Parliament of Somalia and the interim regional administrations to foster
reconciliation through inclusive and transparent political processes and effectively
address endemic corruption.
11. Significant territorial advances against Al-Shabaab by the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Somali National Army and other loosely
aligned forces since the end of the transition have not been matched by the
expansion of the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia or the interim
regional administrations to maintain security and offer an alternative form of
governance. Without this capacity to maintain security, deeply rooted
intercommunal conflicts are re-emerging. As Al-Shabaab cedes territory, the group
has continued to exploit the re-emergence of intercommunal conflict to recruit
among historically marginalized populations.
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12. For many among Somalia’s political and business elite, the capture and
securing of State resources in urban centres of power takes precedence over the
consolidation of an effective form of governance and the expansion of public
services. The current focus on short-term gains threatens the long-term success of a
fragile political process. Without greater commitment among Somalia’s power
brokers to the political process, progress made since the end of the transition may be
reversed, resulting in increased intercommunal conflict and creating a space for
militant fundamentalist outfits to continue to offer alternative paths to stability.
Federalization
13. The federalization process arguably represents the most significant political
development in southern and central Somalia since the collapse of the State in 1991.
Following more than two decades of collapse, implementing a federal system was
bound to be a formidable challenge, and one that would necessarily, and rightly,
prompt contestation. The capability of the individuals leading the process of
federalization and their commitment to the principles agreed upon following the end
of the transition were imperative if such contestation was to be effectively managed
and conflict minimized.
Interim Jubba Administration
14. In August 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia had little choice but to
accept the formation of the Interim Jubba Administration, whi ch claims authority
over Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba Regions under the leadership of Ahmed
“Madobe” (Mohamed Zubeyr/Ogaden/Darod). The neighbouring countries Kenya
and Ethiopia played a greater role in the process than the Federal Government of
Somalia, with Ethiopia hosting a conference of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development that resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement of September 2013, which
succeeded in opening lines of communication between the Interim Jubba
Administration and the Federal Government of Somalia. Marehan (Darod)
communities in the north of the aspiring federal member State, particularly in Gedo
Region, were largely excluded from its formation process and as such have largely
opposed the interim regional administration. As co mpetition for political dominance
continues between the Ogaden and Marehan clans, militarily weaker groups present
in the region — including the Digil and Mirifle clans, as well as Somali Bantu
communities — have effectively been sidelined from the process.
15. In May 2015 the Interim Jubba Administration established a Regional Assembly
of 75 representatives. Ahmed “Madobe’s” administration, which led the process, was
immediately accused of marginalizing the Digil and Mirifle clans by attempting to
appease the Marehan while maintaining Ogaden dominance. Federal Government of
Somalia Members of Parliament declared their opposition to the process by adopting a
vote of no confidence against the Regional Assembly, resulting in another fallout, this
time between administrations in Kismayo, Mogadishu, Baidoa and Garowe. 1 In
August 2015, two years after the Addis Ababa Agreement and in line with its terms,
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The Digil- and Mirifle-dominated Interim South-West Administration also voiced its opposition
to the marginalization of Digil and Mirifle clans in the Interim Jubba Administration Regional
Assembly while the administration of the Majeerteen (Darod)-dominated Puntland State of
Somalia accused the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Parliament of Somalia of
interfering in regional affairs.
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the Jubba Regional Assembly voted for the re-appointment of Ahmed “Madobe”.
Having secured another term, early in September 2015 Ahmed “Madobe” agreed to
review and reconstitute the Regional Assembly.
16. In August and September 2015, efforts were under way by an assortment of
allied forces with support from AMISOM to recover towns throughout the region
from the control of Al-Shabaab. In strategically important urban centres such as
Bardhere, following the removal of Al-Shabaab, competing forces have contested
administrative control. Further north, in Garbaharey, a day a fter apparently
reconciling differences with the local Marehan-dominated administration in Gedo
Region, on 8 August 2015 the Interim Jubba Administration fired the governor and
the local leader of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a, Mohamed Abdi Khalil, prompting
demonstrations and the imposition of a curfew by local contingents of the Ethiopian
National Defence Force.
Interim South-West Administration
17. The formation of the Interim South-West Administration in 2014 similarly
occurred without significant input from the Federal Government of Somalia. The
process was well under way before senior officials began to openly support particular
actors and parties, divided principally between those aiming to incorporate Bakool,
Bay and Lower Shabelle Regions, and those hoping to include Gedo, Middle Jubba
and Lower Jubba as well. With assistance from the Federal Government of Somalia,
supporters of the former option eventually emerged victorious under the leadership
of the former Finance Minister and Speaker of Parliame nt of the Transitional
Federal Government, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, in November 2014. Sharif Hassan
has been accused of nepotism in his fledgling administration, appointing his brother,
Mohamed Abdinur “Madeer” as his senior adviser, and his nephew, Moha med
Abdullahi Mursal, as “State Minister of Presidency”. 2
Interim Galmudug Administration
18. Having failed to lead the processes in Kismayo and Baidoa, the Federal
Government of Somalia played a far more active role in the establishment of the
Interim Galmudug Administration, which claims to incorporate Galgadud and
Mudug Regions. 3 In August 2014, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Federalism
established a technical committee and tasked it with selecting clan representatives to
participate in a reconciliation conference and State formation process, and later
selecting members of a Regional Assembly. The Group received multiple reports of
interference in the selection of the Chair of the technical committee by the two
leading political associations, Damul Jadiid and Ala Sheikh, with the former
securing the selection of its preferred candidate, Halimo Ismail Ibrahim “Yarey”.
The selection of the clan representatives and subsequently the members of the
Regional Assembly was similarly tarnished by allegations of interference by the
primary stakeholders in the process. 4
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3
4
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“Madeer” had served as “president” of the SW3 camp before handing over to his brother when a
settlement with SW6 was obtained and the Interim South -West Administration was established.
It remains unclear whether the Interim Galmudug Administration is claiming the north of Mudug
Region.
The Monitoring Group has reviewed documentation demonstrating the sidelining of particular
members of the technical committee in the selection of clan representatives and members of the
regional assembly.
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19. A militarily powerful faction of the local contingent of Ahl al -Sunna
wal-Jama‘a opposed the State formation process from the outset, claiming that the
group’s signatory on the initial Central Regions State Formation Agreement was not
the legitimate representative of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a. Conflict between Ahl
al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a and the Somali National Army erupted in and around the town
of Guriel in northern Galgadud Region late in 2014. The State formation process
subsequently continued without the involvement of Ahl al -Sunna wal-Jama‘a and, in
July 2014, following a process marred by allegations of vote buying and promises
of political appointments to rivals, resulted in the selecti on of Abdikarim Guled — a
key ally of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud — as president of the interim
regional administration. The debate over the northern extent of the aspiring Galmudug
federal member State has fuelled tensions with Puntland and threatened to re-ignite
conflict in one of Somalia’s most fragile regions. Moreover, as of September 2015, a
faction of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a remains in control of northern Galgadud,
including the interim regional administration’s declared capital, Dhusamareb . 5
20. Annex 1.1 provides details on the formation of the Interim Galmudug
Administration.
Federal Parliament votes for cash
21. Members of the House of the People of the Federal Parliament are tasked with
representing their constituencies, reviewing and challenging the work of the Federal
Government of Somalia, and reviewing and adopting legislation. The Federal
Parliament’s role in ensuring that progress in Somalia’s political development is
sustained is entirely dependent upon the integrity and indepen dence of its members.
The Monitoring Group has documented the extensive abuse of the voting privileges
of Members of the Federal Parliament. When important motions are tabled in
Parliament, particularly votes of no confidence against a sitting Prime Minist er,
significant numbers of Members of Parliament will sell their vote to the highest
bidder. The practice of “votes for cash” is so engrained that a network of brokers
has emerged since the end of the transition, tasked with purchasing the allegiance of
willing Members of Parliament and threatening those that refuse. Brokers will tend
to serve the interests of either President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud or his opponents.
More broadly, battles for influence are fought in Parliament between the two leading
political-religious associations: Damul Jadiid, aligned with the President, and Ala
Sheikh, in opposition.
22. Strictly confidential annex 1.2 provides details on the prevalence of bribery of
Members of Parliament.
Independent commissions
23. The independent commissions mandated by the 2012 Provisional Constitution
were designed to guide the process of federalization and support the consolidation
of post-transition political arrangements. If established promptly and according to
the principles of the Provisional Constitution, the commissions would have added
legitimacy to the political process following the end of the transition, and ensured a
smoother handover of authority to the next federal administration in 2016.
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The Galmudug model has now been adopted by the Federal Government of Somalia in the
creation of an interim regional administration incorporating Hiran and Middle Shabelle Regions.
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24. In three years, and over the course of six parliamentary sessions, Members of
Parliament have successfully established just four of the nine independent
commissions mandated by the 2012 Provisional Constitution. The Provisional
Constitution Review and Implementation Commission, consisting of five members,
was established in May 2014, almost 20 months into the Federal Government of
Somalia’s term. While it was initially praised for being broadly representative and
composed of competent individuals, the challenges of achieving its goals were
quickly made apparent. On 5 May 2015, the Commission’s Chair, Asha Gelle
Diriye, resigned from the Commission, citing a general lack of prioritization given
to the completion of the constitution and a lack of funding for the Commission. 6
25. The Boundaries and Federation Commission was finally established on 6 July
2015, two days after the establishment of the third interim regional administration in
Galmudug, as tensions between administrations in Adado and Garowe over the
northern border of the aspiring federal member State were mounting. The National
Independent Electoral Commission was established on the same day. Three weeks
later, a parliamentary committee announced that the Parliament and the Federal
Government of Somalia had agreed that general elections based on universal suffrage
would not be held in 2016, citing the “upsurge of violence” and “political turmoil”. 7
26. The limited efforts made by both the Federal Government and the Federal
Parliament of Somalia to establish and support these important independent bodies
suggest a lack of interest in instigating dialogue and listening to the views of the
Somali people, undermining the legitimacy of the current institutions and raising
concerns about the process by which the next federal government will be
established in 2016.
Conclusions
27. The Monitoring Group has previously warned of the potential threat to peace,
security and stability posed by “spoiler networks in Somalia” ( S/2013/413). The
Group has described how the attempts by the political and business elite to capture
State resources in the federalization process have either delayed or actively
obstructed reconciliation efforts. Instead of seeking to fill the void left by
Al-Shabaab following territorial victories against the group, efforts remain focused
on securing authority in urban centres. The failure of both the Federal Government
and the Federal Parliament of Somalia to establish much-needed institutions ahead
of the next transition phase in 2016 is also symptomatic of a system in which the
interests of the few override those of the many. A resurgent Al -Shabaab will exploit
any opportunities to recruit among populations abandoned by the federalization and
State-building process. Efforts to prevent the engagement of more stakeholders in
the ongoing political process in the run-up to the 2016 election are spoiling the
political process, and by doing so threaten both the fragile gains made in recent
years and the long-term peace, security and stability of Somalia.
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An unofficial translation of Asha Gelle Diriye’s resignation letter is held on file with the
Monitoring Group.
See Mohamed Sheikh Nor, “Somalia scraps plans to elect next President in popular vote”,
Bloomberg Business, 30 July 2015. Available from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-07-29/somalia-scraps-plans-to-elect-next-president-in-popular-ballot.
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B.
Natural resources
28. Conflict throughout the Somali region — particularly in southern and central
Somalia — has long revolved around access to fertile land and water resources.
Historically, such conflicts have tended to pit the dominant, traditionally pastoralist
and militarily stronger clans against weaker, often unarmed agriculturalist and
agro-pastoralist communities. The presence of a strong, if ruthless, administration
under Al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia largely subdued intercommunal
conflict over land and water resources. The removal of Al -Shabaab as a governing
authority in many regions has created a power vacuum, with neither the Federal
Government of Somalia nor the fledgling interim regional administrations
sufficiently able to fill it, or help to rebuild effective local administrations capable
of maintaining security. There has been a marked increase in intercommunal conflict
since the end of the transition in 2012, reminding both local and international actors
that the removal of Al-Shabaab alone is not a panacea for the peace and security of
Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region.
29. Concurrently, there has been a significant increase in international interest in
natural resources in Somalia. Private companies have been eager to announce the
demise of Al-Shabaab and thus the start of a new era of relative calm, in order to
usher in a new phase of exploitation of Somalia’s mineral and maritime resources. A
seismic option agreement signed with Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd. in August
2013 brought an end to two decades of force majeure conditions declared by oil
companies in southern and central Somalia. The contract signed with Somalia Fishguard Ltd. similarly marked the start of a renewed expansion in the fisheries
sector. The growth of interest in Somalia’s mineral and maritime resources has not
been matched by efforts to establish effective legislation for the management and
sharing of resource wealth with existing and future federal member States, raising
serious concerns over the prospects of a new phase of resource conflict in the Horn
of Africa.
Intercommunal conflict over land and water resources
30. In Somaliland, although it remained relatively unscathed by Al -Shabaab and
has secured a degree of stability since the mid-1990s, land disputes now represent
the leading cause of conflict. The Group recorded at least 45 incidents related to
land disputes between September 2014 and August 2015 in the territory claimed by
Somaliland. Land-related conflicts extend well beyond the troubled Sool and
Sanaag Regions, prompting the Somaliland authorities to implement a series of
measures to address the problem. The increasing trend of illegal enclosures on
common areas, prompted by growing appreciation of the commercial value of land,
indicates the potential problems that may be faced in southern and central Somalia
when current conflict patterns are overcome.
31. Sporadic inter-Majeerteen (Harti/Darod) clashes have continued in Puntland
over both urban and grazing land. In southern Mudug Region — now nominally
under the control of the Interim Galmudug Administration — tensions between
Marehan (Darod) and Haber Gedir (Hawiye) sub-clans over land ownership erupted
into conflict late in 2014 and again early in 2015 in and around the town of Saaxo
near the Ethiopian border. Land-related conflict in Middle Shabelle Region between
the dominant Abgaal (Hawiye) clan and minority Shidle (Bantu) communities
appear to have been superseded by intra-Abgaal clashes in 2015. Since the Group’s
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previous report (S/2014/726) intercommunal conflict in Lower Shabelle Region,
now nominally part of the Interim South-West Administration, has continued and
shows few signs of abating despite various reconciliation efforts. In Hiran, Hawadle
militia, supported by the Somali National Army, have launched fi erce attacks on the
villages of Kabxanley and Defow outside Belet Weyne in an attempt to permanently
displace the Surre farming community from their lands along the fertile banks of the
Shabelle River (see annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b) .
32. In Middle Juba — mostly still held by Al-Shabaab — inter-clan conflict
between Dhulbahante (Harti/Darod), Awliahan (Ogaden/Darod) and Sheikhal
(Hawiye) clans over pasturelands broke out early in 2015. Al -Shabaab attempts to
reconcile the competing groups in Bu’ale were ultimately unsuccessful, suggesting
its weakening grip on intercommunal relations in the area ahead of the “Juba
Corridor” offensive led by AMISOM and allied anti-Al-Shabaab forces. The Juba
Valley, like the lower reaches of the Shabelle River, has been the scene of fierce
contestation over land rights since before collapse of the Somali State in 1991. 8 The
Monitoring Group is concerned that, following the removal of Al -Shabaab from the
region, historically marginalized communities will suffer at the hand of militarily
stronger communities vying for fertile agricultural land for commercial exploitation
along the lower reaches of the Juba River.
The re-emergence of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
33. The Monitoring Group is indebted to Jorge Torrens of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations — who died near Hargeisa, Somaliland, on
29 April 2015 while carrying out his duty — for first bringing the renewed problem
of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Somalia to its attention.
34. At 3,300 km, the coastline of Somalia is the longest in continental Africa. The
country’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone hosts productive and largely
unexploited fishing grounds, containing both migrator y fish species, such as tuna,
and several demersal fish and crustacean species. Taking advantage of the limited
maritime surveillance capability of the Federal Government of Somalia, many
foreign vessels fish in Somali waters in contravention of internatio nal law and the
Federal Government of Somalia Fisheries Law, either without licences or with
forged documents, and without reporting data to any Somali authority. 9
35. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing represents a significant threat to
peace and security in Somalia. Illegal fishing is frequently cited as a contributing
factor in the emergence of piracy in Somalia as early as the mid -1990s, as foreign
vessels came into conflict with local fishermen, who in turn began to resort to
hijackings at sea. 10 The drastic surge in Somali piracy in 2007 led to a
corresponding decrease in foreign fishing vessels operating within Somalia’s
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9
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Catherine Besteman and Lee V. Cassanelli, eds., The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The
War Behind the War (London, Haan Publishing, 1996).
Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and others, “Report on presumed illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the exclusive economic zone of Somalia”, paper
presented at the 19th session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, held in Busan, Republic of
Korea, from 27 April to 1 May 2015, and drafted by the Food and Agriculture O rganization of
the United Nations (FAO) on behalf of the Federal Government of Somalia.
See, for example, Jay Bahadur, The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World (New York,
Pantheon Books, 2011).
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exclusive economic zone. 11 However, the sharp drop in pirate activity along the
coast of Somalia since 2012 has resulted in foreign fleets resuming fishing in the
Somali basin. 12 The previous dynamic of conflict between illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing vessels and local fishermen and militias has consequently
re-emerged, particularly in central Somalia.
36. In the case of the fishing dhow Aresh, the Galmudug Coast Guard arrested it
120 km north of Hobyo on 1 April 2015. 13 After their arrest, the crewmembers and a
captain acknowledged that they had been fishing illegally. Galmudug authorities
assessed the vessel a $100,000 fine which was paid and the vessel released by
16 April 2015. 14 On 23 April 2015 the Iranian-flagged dhow Al Momen was seized
off Qandala, Puntland, possibly by its own Somali security detachment, and
subsequently released without incident. On 13 May 2015, the Iranian dhow Sudis
experienced mechanical failure and ran aground near Mareg in central Somalia. T he
dhow’s 14 crewmembers were reportedly captured by Al -Shabaab; their fate
remains unknown at the time of writing. 15
37. The Monitoring Group is concerned that the return of foreign fleets to Somali
waters, fishing close to the shoreline and equipped with armed security detachments,
represents a threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia. Such practices
threaten to lead not only to conflict with local fishermen and concomitant loss of
life, but may also provoke a vigilante response from local c ommunities similar to
that which contributed to the rise of Somali piracy more than a decade ago.
Continuing privatization of Somalia’s maritime space
38. The Monitoring Group is concerned about the continuing prevalence of private
maritime security firms in Somalia entering partnerships with local authorities to
provide Coast Guard and/or policing services. In a number of cases, such private
security companies have also been tasked by local authorities with selling fishing
licences and managing Somalia’s marine resources, which constitutes, at a minimum,
a conflict of interest. One such company, Somalia Fishguard Ltd., was highlighted
in the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2014/726, annex 5.1). The Monitoring
Group notes with concern that Somalia’s past practice of entrusting private companies
with the dual role of selling fishing licences and managing maritime security posed
a threat to peace and stability. Such companies have privileged foreign clien ts, even
to the point of providing foreign fishing vessels with armed guards, again leading to
potential conflict with local fishermen and coastal communities.
39. During the mandate, two private companies — Somali Security Services Ltd.
and Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd. — have entered into agreements in Puntland
and Somaliland, respectively, to provide services relating to the fisheries sector.
These two contracts are discussed in annex 2.3.
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11
12
13
14
15
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Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and others, “Report on presumed illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the exclusive economic zone of Somalia”
(see footnote 10).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Monitoring Group interview with a FAO official in Nairobi, 21 May 2015.
Information from the European Union Naval Force, received by e -mail by the Monitoring Group,
28 May 2015.
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Potential corruption in the sale of fishing licences
40. In its report of 2014, the Monitoring Group continued to investigate acts of
corruption that undermined public institutions “through the diversion of national
financial flows”, while noting “the perpetuation of conventional patterns of
diversion by holders of public office and civil servants with access to national
resources or by gatekeepers of government offices” ( S/2014/726, para. 62). In this
light, the Group has identified the illicit sale of fishing licenc es to foreign clients as
an avenue for Federal Government of Somalia and other Somali officials to
misappropriate public resources.
41. The Group has found evidence of the sale of fishing licences, both by Federal
Government of Somalia and Puntland officials, conducted outside the revenuegathering apparatus of the State. For instance, since May 2015 the Federal
Government of Somalia Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources has been
issuing licences to Chinese longliners and routing the proceeds into a p rivate
ministerial bank account in Djibouti, 16 in contravention of the ministerial order of
February 2014 requiring all Federal Government of Somalia agencies to channel
revenues through the Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank of Somalia
(S/2014/726, para. 64). The Group supplied the details of this bank account to the
Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Finance on 18 July 2015. 17
42. The Group has obtained a draft agreement between the Federal Gover nment of
Somalia Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and Doggang Daping
Enterprises Group, a multinational fishing company based in Liaoning, China. The
agreement grants Doggang Daping a seven-year exclusive authorization to fish
within Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, and allows the company to bring its own
armed security on board its fishing vessels and in its future offices in Somalia,
which would likely constitute a violation of the arms embargo. The draft agreement
with the Doggang Daping Enterprises Group is set out in annex 2.1.e.
Fishing vessel Al Amal and the assault on the Federal Government of Somalia
Auditor General
43. On 15 January 2015, the Yemen-registered fishing carrier vessel Al Amal
entered Mogadishu port flying the Somali flag, reportedly in order to refuel. The
Auditor General of the Federal Government of Somalia, Nur Jimale Farah,
conducted an inspection of the Al Amal, and determined that it was fishing illegally.
Although Farah attempted to hold the vessel, it was relea sed on 15 January 2015
under suspicious circumstances and departed Mogadishu port.
44. In an event much publicized in local media, on 18 January 2015 the Auditor
General was prevented from entering his office at Villa Somalia and reportedly
assaulted by the compound’s guards. Farah told the Monitoring Group that he
believed his actions related to the Al Amal had brought on the attack, and that he
had since stopped investigating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing because
he feared for his safety. 18
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17
18
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Copies of Federal Government of Somalia licences issued by the Ministry and remittance slips
are presented in annex 2.1.b and c.
E-mail dated 18 July 2015 from the Monitoring Group to the Federal Government of Somalia
Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim.
Monitoring Group interview with Nur Farah in Nairobi, 21 March 2015.
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45. A complete account of the Al Amal’s activities, as well as the assault on the
Auditor General, is presented in annex 2.2.
The extractives sector
46. In its 2013 report (S/2013/413) the Group discussed the threat to peace and
security posed by the extractives sector in Somalia. The Group highlighted the risk
of corruption in the sector, drawing particular attention to the shortcomings of the
Somalia Petroleum Corporation and the Somali Petroleum Authority — two
independent bodies mandated by the Somali Government’s 2008 Petroleum Law but
yet to be established as viably functioning institutions. In its 2014 report, the Group
again highlighted the lack of transparency in the oil and ga s sector, drawing
particular attention to an exploration contract obtained by Soma Oil & Gas Holdings
Ltd. (Soma), a London-based extractives exploration company incorporated on
26 April 2013 and chaired by the former leader of the United Kingdom
Conservative Party, Michael Howard (S/2014/726, annex 5.1).
47. In May 2013, the then-Minister for National Resources, 19 Abdirizak Omar
Mohamed, stated that the Federal Government of Somalia “should wait until we
have the right laws in place” before entering into agreements with oil and gas
companies. 20 Three months later, on 6 August 2013, Soma signed a seismic option
agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Petroleum and
Mineral Resources, giving the company the right to conduct a seismic survey off
Somalia’s southern and central coast. The contract also gave the company the
subsequent right to exploit 12 offshore oil and gas blocks of its own choosing,
totalling 60,000 km 2 . The sudden announcement of the agreement came as a shock
to both the oil and gas industry and the Somalia diplomatic community. 21
Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.
48. On 28 July 2015, the Monitoring Group submitted a confidential
communication 22 to the Committee detailing how Soma’s activities in Somalia
constituted violations of paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011) and paragraph 2 (c)
of resolution 2060 (2012), by undermining Somali public institutions through
corruption. The communication described how beginning in June 2014 Soma has
made systematic payoffs to officials within the Federal Government of Somalia
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources — including the Director General,
Deputy Director General, and other senior civil servants — under the auspices of a
so-called “capacity-building agreement”.
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The Ministry of National Resources was split into four successor ministries in January 2014, one
of which was the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.
Katrina Manson, “Somalia: oil thrown on the fire”, The Financial Times, 13 May 2013.
Based on numerous Monitoring Group interviews with oil and gas experts, as well as diplomats
based in London and Nairobi. Soma’s brief six-month history as a company, the granting of a
dozen blocks to Soma without a prior licensing round, the fact that the Federal Government of
Somalia had received at least one superior offer by an oil major, and the Federal Government of
Somalia’s previous public commitment to refrain from signing oil and gas deals until viable
institutions were in place, were all cited to the Group as highly unusual features of the Soma deal.
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.31.
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49. The Group has determined that these “capacity-building” funds, which had
totalled $490,000 by 28 May 2015, 23 were likely part of a quid pro quo arrangement
designed to protect the seismic option agreement from the scrutiny o f the Financial
Governance Committee. Furthermore, officials on Soma’s payroll were directly
involved in subsequent negotiations over the draft production -sharing agreement
between Soma and the Ministry, representing a conflict of interest.
50. Under the capacity-building agreement, the company also made payments to a
Federal Government of Somalia presidential oil and gas adviser, Abdullahi Haider
Mohamed, who the company acknowledged had “represented the Federal
Government … in the negotiations around the seismic option agreement that was
signed in August 2013”. 24 Yet following the transmission of the Group’s
communication to the Committee, Soma issued a press release claiming that no
individual paid by the company “was, or is, in a position to influence th e decision to
grant any commercial agreements for the benefit of Soma”. 25 The company,
therefore, sought to mislead the Monitoring Group during its investigation, and
made inaccurate public statements relating to the capacity-building agreement once
the Group’s findings had become known.
51. The Monitoring Group’s full case study of Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.,
based largely on the material presented in the Group’s communication of 28 July
2015 to the Committee, appears in annex 2.5.
Circumvention of the Federal Government of Somalia Treasury Single Account
52. Like other ministries highlighted in the Group’s current report, the Ministry of
Petroleum and Mineral Resources has made routine attempts to undermine public
financial management in Somalia by channelling revenues outside the Treasury
Single Account at the Central Bank. For instance, the Director General, Farah Abdi
Hassan, directed Soma to transfer its “capacity-building” funds into a private account
held by the Ministry at the International Bank of Somalia (IBS), which Hassan
referred to in an e-mail to Soma as “more efficient than the central bank”. 26 Soma
elected instead to transfer the funds to the Ministry’s account at the Central Bank.
53. However, the Group has learned of at least one instance in which the Ministry
successfully diverted public revenues to its IBS account. On 16 May 2015, CGG —
a company responsible for paying royalties on the sale of Somalia’s seismic data to
the Federal Government of Somalia — transferred a $633,866.69 payment into the
Ministry’s IBS account (a confirmation certificate for the Ministry’s IBS account is
provided in annex 2.5.q).
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Soma also transferred $100,000 to the Ministry on 18 December 2014 to be used towards the
construction of a data room intended to store the data collected during Soma’s seismic survey. In
its communication dated 28 July 2015 to the Committee Chair, the Monitoring Group noted that
no progress had been made towards the construction of this data room, but had yet to determine
what had transpired with these funds. The Group has since obtained Central Bank of Somalia
records showing that by mid-March 2015 the funds were no longer in the Ministry’s bank account.
Letter dated 1 July 2015 from Soma to the Monitoring Group (S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4).
Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd., “Response to the United Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring
Group comments on capacity-building agreement”, 3 August 2015. Available from
www.somaoilandgas.com/response-to-united-nation/.
E-mail dated 29 June 2014 from Farah Abdi Hassan to Soma chief executive Robert Sheppard
and chief financial officer Philip Wolfe.
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54. Directing revenues around the Treasury Single Account — a centralized
account over which the Federal Government of Somalia M inistry of Finance has
oversight — has the effect of turning Federal Government of Somalia ministries into
rent-seeking institutions capable of being captured by individual members of the
Government, thereby fuelling corruption and conflict.
Absence of a resource-sharing framework
55. In its 2013 report (S/2013/413, para. 79), the Monitoring Group highlighted
the lack of “constitutional agreements” on resource-sharing between the Federal
Government of Somalia and Somalia’s regional administrations as a threat to peace
and security. The Group observed a “growing hostility” between the Federal
Government of Somalia and regional administrations that had signed oil and gas
deals independently of the Federal Government (ibid., para. 77). Despite the
continuing absence of a constitutional resource-sharing framework, both the Federal
Government of Somalia and the regional administrations continue to enter contract
discussions, and sign agreements, with international oil and gas companies. 27
56. Most recently, on 5 September 2015 the Federal Government of Somalia
signed an agreement with the Norwegian company Spectrum ASA, granting it the
right to conduct a seismic data survey encompassing 28,000 km 2 of offshore
territory in central and southern Somalia. On 1 September 2015, the Puntland
Petroleum Minerals Agency and the Houston-based ION Geophysical Corporation
similarly announced they had signed an agreement allowing the company to acquire
8,000 km 2 of seismic data “covering the entire Somalia Puntland offshore margin”. 28
Federal Government of Somalia licensing of oil blocks in Somaliland and Puntland
57. The Monitoring Group is seriously concerned that, in the current context of
peace and security, the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Petroleum and
Mineral Resources is attempting to recommence negotiations with the oil major
ConocoPhillips Co. over its pre-civil war concessions now located in Somaliland
and Puntland. 29 ConocoPhillips’ pre-1991 concession includes blocks spanning Sool
and Sanaag, two administrative regions that are actively disputed between Somaliland
and Puntland, as well as with the self-declared regional State of Khatumo.
58. The Group has seen an e-mail dated 25 August 2014 from the Director of
Exploration at the Ministry, Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein, 30 to Kay Larcom, a
manager at ConocoPhillips. The e-mail refers to a meeting held in Washington,
D.C., on 8 August 2014 involving the Ministry and Larcom, and assures her that the
Ministry is “determined” to work on “pre-1991 contracts in North and North-east
Somalia [emphasis added]”. The use of the term “North Somalia” to refer to
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International oil and gas companies with which the Federal Government of Somalia has
conducted recent discussions include: Allied Petroleum Corp., Amsas Consulting, BGP Inc.,
ConocoPhillips Co., Kilimanjaro Capital, Milio International, Mubadala Petroleum, New Age
Ltd., Royal Dutch Shell plc, Schlumberger Ltd., Spectrum Geo Ltd., and Total S.A.
Spectrum ASA, “Spectrum signs seismic data agreement to kick -start oil exploration offshore
Somalia”, press release, 7 September 2015. Available from http://www.spectrumgeo.com/wpcontent/uploads/FINAL-NEW-2015-09-07-Somalia-Data-Deal-Announced.pdf.
Like other oil majors, Conoco Inc. declared force majeure in 1991 and suspended operations in
Somalia. Conoco Inc. and Phillips Petroleum Co. merged in 2002 to form ConocoPhillips Co.
Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein was among the civil servants paid under Soma’s “capacity-building
agreement”. Hussein received $39,000 from Soma between May 2014 and April 2015.
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Somaliland, and “North-east Somalia” to refer to Puntland, reveals a worrying
disregard for Federal relations with regional bodies. The Ministry’s interaction with
ConocoPhillips also illustrates the Group’s concern that in the absence of a
resource-sharing agreement — clearly delineating the roles of the Federal
Government and the regional administrations when engaging with international oil
companies — Somalia’s untapped hydrocarbons wealth is likely only to fuel
political tension and conflict. Until such a constitutional arrangement is reached,
international oil companies — such as Soma — will continue to take advantage of
an environment lacking in strong institutions, striking favourable deals with
individual brokers in Government rather than independent contracting bodies.
59. In this context, the Monitoring Group will continue to urge the Security
Council to impose a moratorium on oil and gas agreements within Somalia, until
such time as the Federal Government of Somalia has established viable institutions
to regulate the sector, as stipulated in the country’s 2008 Petroleum Law.
C.
Public financial management and misappropriation
60. The Monitoring Group has noticed modest improvements in public financial
management. Ambitious initiatives have been introduced, but the implementation of
these initiatives remains slow. Disruption caused by the removal of two prime
ministers and their cabinets within the span of two years has delayed reform. The
apparent impunity enjoyed by those who have engaged in misappropriation of
public finances perpetuates a culture of corruption in Somali politics. 31
Budget
61. By the 2015 Budget Appropriation Act the Somali Government pledged to
“rely on [its] own resources”. Despite this ambitious declaration, the 2015 budget
prepared under the previous Minister of Finance, Hussein Abdi Halane, was heavily
dependent on pledges of budgetary support from various countries members of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). 32 The Monitoring Group has determined
that the under-delivery of external support left Somali National Army troops unpaid
for several months.
62. When forced to revise the budget in mid-2015 owing to the lack of delivery of
OIC member country pledges, a more realistic budget was prepared prompting
greater discipline in Government expenditure. The 2015 budgetary crisis also
prompted the formation of an interministerial budget strategy committee tasked with
the preparation of the 2016 federal budget. However, as the Federal Government of
Somalia enters a year of transition and pressures on public finances grow, adhering
to a prepared plan for revenue collection and government expenditure is likely to
become increasingly difficult.
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The Monitoring Group is not aware of charges successfully brought against any public official
for acts of misappropriation since the end of the transition in 2012.
The Monitoring Group was informed by a senior adviser to the President on 1 September 2015
that the Federal Government of Somalia had counted on pledges of $124 million from the Arab
League, $40 million from Turkey and $18 million from Qatar, none of which were delivered.
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Federal institutions and instruments
63. While the Monitoring Group notes that the Central Bank of Somali a has made
significant efforts to improve accountability and transp arency, it remains ineffective
as Somalia’s main financial regulatory and supervisory body. A significant
proportion of Government revenue continues to bypass the Treasury Single Account.
Funding allocated to government ministries, departments and agencies continues to
be withdrawn from the Central Bank in cash, with little to no accountability
thereafter. The multitude of hawala transfer companies remain unregulated by the
Central Bank, rendering remittance flows vulnerable to external fears about their
use in money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. 33 Out-dated financial
legislation from the 1960s remains in force but is poorly implemented. A draft bill
that would have regulated foreign investment in Somalia was withdrawn by the
Government in December 2014 after a second reading in Parliament. Draft
legislation to establish the Office of the Ombudsman was voted down by Parliament
in July 2013 and has not been revisited since. 34 The Public Procurement,
Concessions and Disposal Act was passed by the Cabinet of Ministers in May 2014
but at the time of writing still awaits approval by Parliament. At the time of writing,
legislation to establish the Anti-Corruption Commission had yet to be tabled.
64. The Financial Governance Committee was established in mid-2014 with an
oversight role in relation to State asset recovery and public concessions. The Security
Council in resolution 2182 (2014) encouraged the Federal Government of Somalia
to use the Committee effectively. While the Financial Governance Committe e has
proved to be a useful advisory body it has yet to demonstrate effective oversight. At
the time of writing, no discernible action had been taken on most of the contracts
reviewed in 2014. 35 Although compliance among government ministries,
departments and agencies with the Financial Governance Committee is improving,
some ministries have continued to bypass the Committee when negotiating
important public contracts. 36 In disingenuous attempts to demonstrate transparency,
public officials have made references to the Financial Governance Committee when
discussing agreements which have not in fact been reviewed by the Committee. 37
65. In November 2014, the Ministry of Finance officially launched the Somali
Financial Management Information System designed to register Government income
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34
35
36
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Following the Al-Shabaab attack on Garissa University in April 2015, the Government of Kenya
banned all hawala companies from transferring funds for almost three months.
The Office of the Ombudsman, mandated in the 2012 Provisional Constitution, was intended to
investigate complaints of abuse of power by public officials.
The Monitoring Group was informed by the Federal Government of Somalia Minister of F inance
in September 2015 that action on these contracts would be taken within two months.
Examples include the agreement between Proje Gozetim Muhendislik and the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry for import-export quality assurance; the agreement on the collection of
khat taxation between 2011 and June 2015; and the agreement between the Somali National
Army and the company providing rations to its troops (see strictly confidential annex 3.1).
A press release issued on 12 August 2015 by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources in
response to the Monitoring Group’s report on its “capacity-building agreement” refers to the
Financial Governance Committee as a demonstration of the Ministry’s commitment to
transparency. The Monitoring Group received confirmation from the Committee that the
“capacity-building agreement” had been neither reviewed by nor shared with it. The Monitoring
Group also believes that the threat of the outcome of the Financial Governance Committee’s
review of the original seismic option agreement was used in negotiations with Soma Oil & Gas
regarding its “capacity-building agreement”.
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and expenditure in real time. Implementation of the system within Government
ministries, departments and agencies is ongoing. If effectively utilized by
Government ministries, the system will represent an important development.
66. The re-engagement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after more than
25 years is also an important development for Somalia. The IMF Trust Fund for
Capacity Development is a welcome initiative given the pressing need for effective
capacity-building programmes, particularly in the institutions tasked with managing
the Federal Government’s finances and developing the extractive s sectors.
Misappropriation in the security sector 38
67. Few cases illustrate the threat posed by financial mismanagement and
misappropriation to peace, security and stability in Somalia more than corruption
within the Federal Government security institutions. The Somali National Army is
by far the largest security institution in Somalia. Effective management of its forces
and finances is vital if the territorial gains against Al-Shabaab are to be preserved
and if possible collapse of the State followi ng the departure of AMISOM forces at
some point in the future is to be prevented. Owing to severe budget limitations, the
Federal Government of Somalia has struggled to pay the salaries of Somali National
Army troops throughout 2015. 39
68. Evidence collected by the Monitoring Group demonstrates a lack of
understanding within and coordination between institutions of the Federal
Government of Somalia regarding its single greatest expense, the payment of the
Somali National Army. The current strength, structur e and composition of the army
also remain unclear. Evidence collected by the Group indicates that the army
hierarchy has systematically inflated the troop numbers in order to secure greater
funding for salaries and rations. Family and business ties between those responsible
for ensuring that the Somali National Army is provisioned, and the company
providing its dry food rations — amounting to upwards of $8 million each year —
also suggest a serious conflict of interest. The almost exclusive use of cash for
payments, distinct lack of accountability measures, and absence of any independent
oversight has left the army leadership free to exploit Government revenue at the
expense of its soldiers’ and citizens’ security.
69. The extent of misappropriation and impunity within the Somali National Army
has dented donor confidence in the Federal Government of Somalia, which has
acknowledged the gravity of the situation. The Group’s investigations into Somali
National Army misappropriation were supported by the National Security Adviser’s
Office, as well as the Ministry of Finance in August and September 2015. The
replacement of General Dahir Adan Elmi as the Chief of the Armed Forces on
3 September 2015 represented a positive step towards reform. The announcement by
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on 9 September 2015 committing the Federal
Government of Somalia to comprehensive reform within the security sector is an
encouraging and commendable development. 40
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For a comprehensive summary of misappropriation in the Somali National Army, see strictly
confidential annex 3.1.
As of July 2015, only January’s salary payroll had been distributed.
“The President: ‘We are committed to substantive security sector reform’”, Office of the Somali
President, press release, 9 September 2015.
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The Nairobi Embassy
70. Previous reports have detailed misappropriation within Somalia’s foreign
embassies (see, for example, S/2012/544, paras. 18-21 and S/2013/413, paras. 72-73).
The Monitoring Group is concerned by evidence of serious irregularities occurring
at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi, under former Ambassador Mohamed Ali Nur
“Americo”. 41 Between January 2014 and April 2015, the Embassy collected
$960,836 in fees for over 7,500 Somali passports and emergency tra vel
documents. 42 During the same period, only $486,258 was remitted to the Ministry of
the Interior account at the Central Bank in Mogadishu, leaving $474,578
unaccounted for. 43 The Group is also concerned about a donation of $1 million from
the Government of China in 2013, of which $479,314 was remitted to the Central
Bank, and the remaining $517,686 allegedly paid in legal fees to the Nairobi -based
law firm Ibrahim, Issack & Company (see annex 3.2).
71. According to a former Somali diplomat, 10 days prior to the Ambassador’s
departure from the Embassy, a team of information technology specialists were
called in to remove sensitive information from the office computers, while hard
copies of documentation were systematically destroyed. 44 The Monitoring Group is
encouraged by the decision of the new Somali Ambassador to Kenya, Jamal Hassan,
who took office on 4 August 2015, to conduct an independent audit of the
Embassy’s accounts and also to install tight financial discipline (see annex 3.2).
Mogadishu port rehabilitation funds
72. In 1993, United Nations peacekeepers assumed control over Mogadishu port in
order to ensure humanitarian access to Somalia. Peacekeeping forces of UNITAF
(United Task Force) managed the collection of port fees on behalf of the So mali
Government until 1995, when they turned the funds over to a trust fund managed by
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia and the World Food
Programme (WFP). In July 1997, the funds, totalling $1,003,930, were transferred
into a trust managed solely by UNDP Somalia, which the agency designated towards
a Mogadishu Port rehabilitation project.
73. On 17 March 2014, the then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf
Moallim Amin “Baadiyow”, requested that UNDP Somalia turn over the po rt funds
to the Ministry. After internal consultations, UNDP Somalia agreed to transfer the
funds on the condition that that they be routed through the Federal Government of
Somalia’s Treasury Single Account. 45
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43
44
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“Americo” was recalled to Mogadishu in April 2015, havin g served as Ambassador in Kenya
since 2004.
Applicants are required to pay a combined fee of $130 and K Sh 2,000 (approximately $20) into
accounts held at the branch of Transnational Bank in Nairobi.
The Nairobi Embassy is allocated $49,200 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs account at the
Central Bank every quarter to cover operational costs. According to the Minister of Finance any
other funds collected by embassies should be transferred to the Central Bank, in the Single
Treasury Account.
According to the former Somali diplomat, the team was called to run updates on the computers.
This process would comply with a Ministry of Finance directive of February 2014 which
required all Government revenue to be deposited in the Treasury Single Account at the Central
Bank of Somalia.
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74. In September 2014, UNDP Somalia transferred port rehabilitation funds,
which by this time amounted to over $1.8 million, with accrued interest. However,
instead of using the Treasury Single Account, as agreed, the funds were transferred
to a Mogadishu Port account at the Central Bank of Somalia ( CBS), account
No. 1035. From 13 to 20 September 2014, Amin authorized the withdrawal of
almost $1.7 million in cash from CBS account No. 1035 — almost the entirety of
the port rehabilitation funds.
75. The Monitoring Group has since obtained evidence suggesting that Amin and
the then-Director General of the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport, Abdullahi
Ali Nur, likely misappropriated the funds. 46 A detailed account of this
misappropriation of public financial resources is presented in annex 3.3.
Khat taxation
76. The Monitoring Group is concerned by the existence until June 2015 of an
illegal agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Somali company ADCO
governing the taxation of the narcotic substance khat. The agreement resulted in a
substantial shortfall in taxes collected by the Federal Government of Somalia on the
import of khat to Somalia, and thus can be interpreted as non -compliance with
paragraph 38 of resolution 2182 (2014), in which the Security Council called for
transparent and accountable public financial management, as well as for Federal
Government of Somalia revenue to be channelled through the national budget.
77. The Monitoring Group is encouraged by the decision of the Attorney General
of Somalia to investigate the illegal amendments and lowering of taxes around the
khat tariff regime (see annex 3.4).
D.
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
Current status
78. As noted in the Monitoring Group’s previous report, Harakaat al -Shabaab
al-Mujaahidiin remains a major threat to peace and security within Somalia, as well
as a major destabilizing force in the East Africa region ( S/2014/726, para. 10). As in
past years, the group continues to cede territory in the face of milita ry advances by
joint AMISOM-Somali National Army forces and their strategic partners, preferring
to retreat into the countryside and subsequently cut off supply routes to the
reclaimed areas. The group also continues its expansion as a transnational
organization, particularly focusing its terror operations against neighbouring Kenya.
79. Following the death of Al-Shabaab’s emir, Muktar Ali al-Zubayr (Ahmed
Godane) in a drone strike by the United States on 1 September 2014, Al -Shabaab
promptly selected as his successor Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah (a.k.a. Ahmed Diriye;
a.k.a. Mahad Omar Abdikarim), whom the Committee designated for targeted
sanctions on 24 September 2014. Abu Ubaidah was widely seen to have been a
compromise candidate, less autocratic than Godane and more acceptable to
relatively moderate elements of Al-Shabaab, allowing him to prevail over more
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Based on testimonies from former senior Ministry officials, the Governor of the Central Bank of
Somalia and a Somalia anti-corruption organization.
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obvious successors. 47 Abu Ubaidah has continued the trend of decentralizing
Al-Shabaab, empowering local leaders and commanders to operate independently,
even in the areas of revenue raising and administration. 48
80. The continuing use of lethal action by Member States has led to the
assassination of several of Al-Shabaab’s key leaders during the current mandate.
Most notable among those are the killings on 29 December 2014 and 31 January
2015 of Abdishakur Tahlil, an Amniyat operative, and Yusuf Dheeq “Ishmaaciil”,
described in the Monitoring Group’s previous report as Al -Shabaab’s chief Amniyat
in charge of external operations (S/2014/726, footnote 15). The Group has received
information that Dheeq’s killing was likely based on a mobile phone selector passed
on by Somaliland security services. 49 A third high-ranking member of Al-Shabaab,
Aden Garar, was killed in a drone strike on 13 March 2015. Garar had been linked
to the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi (“Badru Nairobi Operation”) on
21 September 2013 and, more recently, a failed terror plot in Addis Ababa in
October 2014. 50
81. However, as noted in the Monitoring Group’s previous report, those targeted
killings may have resulted in short-term gains but have not degraded or destroyed
Al-Shabaab’s operational capacity to carry out asymmetric attacks and, increasingly,
conventional assaults on military targets. A senior regional intelligence source told
the Monitoring Group that the ranks of Al-Shabaab’s virtually unknown “middle
management” were so numerous and ideologically committed that the group was
able to replace assassinated leaders with ease. 50
82. Al-Shabaab continues to carry out frequent complex attacks within
Mogadishu, typically employing a combination of vehicle -borne improvised
explosive devices followed by the deployment of suicide gunmen. During the
current mandate, Al-Shabaab has displayed a preference for targeting hotels,
especially those frequented by Federal Government of Somalia and foreign
government officials. The most notable of those hotel attacks include: Jazeera Hotel
(26 July 2015); 51 Makka al-Mukarama (27 March 2015); Central Hotel (20 February
2015); and SYL Hotel (22 January 2015). Annex 4.1 examines the targeting of
Mogadishu hotels by Al-Shabaab.
83. Al-Shabaab terror operatives, both within and outside Mogadishu, frequently
carry out their attacks while disguised in Somali National Army or other
government military uniforms. The Group believes the wide availability and low
cost of military uniforms, due partly to a lack of oversight of imports, to be an
underreported threat to peace and security in Somalia (see annex 7.1).
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49
50
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For instance, Mahad Mohamed Ali “Karate”, the hard-line commander of the Aminyaat,
Al-Shabaab’s internal security and counter -intelligence unit, was Godane’s most likely successor.
“Karate” has repeatedly challenged Abu Ubaidah’s leadership, openly engaging in skirmishes
with the new emir; for instance, on 19 May 2015 forces loyal to Abu Ubaidah clashed with
“Karate”’s supporters near Jilib, resulting in the deaths of eight fighters.
Matt Bryden, “The decline and fall of Al-Shabaab? Think again” (Sahan, 2015).
Monitoring Group interview with a senior regional intelligence official, 14 March 2015.
Information provided to the Monitoring Group by a regional intelligence source, 7 August 2015.
During the Jazeera hotel attack, Al-Shabaab employed the largest truck bomb in Somalia since
the bombing by the group on 4 October 2011 of a ministerial complex of the Transitional Federal
Government in Mogadishu, which killed more than 150 Somali students.
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84. The Federal Government of Somalia continues to point to defections of
Al-Shabaab members as evidence of the group’s diminishing appeal and
capabilities, in particular the high-level defection in January 2015 of Zakariye
Ahmed Ismail Hersi, Al-Shabaab’s putative head of military intelligence. The value
of actionable intelligence obtained from his debriefing is doubtful, however. The
Group believes that Hersi was sidelined within Al -Shabaab for a year prior to his
defection, and a senior Federal Government of Somalia intelligence official told the
Group that Hersi had provided only “outdated” and “background” information. 52
85. The Group has closely followed the prospect of an Al-Shabaab ideological or
operational realignment towards the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
Indeed, in February 2015 an “emissary” for ISIL, Hamil al -Bushra, publicly invited
Abu Ubaidah to declare Al-Shabaab’s loyalty to the organization. 53 There is some
evidence that Al-Shabaab is beginning to mimic ISIL tactics, perhaps with the aim
of competing for the media spotlight. For instance, a video released by Al -Shabaab’s
media wing in March 2015, depicting individuals being forced into the ocean prior
to being gunned down, bears disturbing resemblance to ISIL execution videos. 54
However, the Monitoring Group has not found evidence of operational or financial
links between ISIL and Al-Shabaab.
Tactics
86. On 19 July 2015, contingents of AMISOM, as well as Ethiopian National
Defence Force, Kenya Defence Forces and Somali National Army troops began the
latest phase in their military offensive against Al -Shabaab in Operation Jubba
Corridor. The allied forces scored immediate gains, capturing two major remaining
Al-Shabaab strongholds, Bardhere and Dinsor. Al-Shabaab did not directly
challenge the renewed offensive, preferring, as in the past, to tactically withdraw
into the countryside and subsequently cut off supply routes to the reclaimed areas.
87. The Monitoring Group notes with concern that those recaptured areas have
been reduced to isolated islands, with the threat of Al -Shabaab ambushes and
improvised explosive devices rendering resupply by road highly perilous (see
annex 5.1 for an account of humanitarian obstruction by Al -Shabaab). The supply
routes also continue to provide revenue to Al-Shabaab, as the group establishes
checkpoints to extract “tolls” from passing vehicles.
Attacks on military targets
88. Despite Al-Shabaab’s lack of military resistance to Operation Jubba Corridor,
the group has demonstrated a marked shift in its tactics, techniques and procedures
by resuming full-scale attacks on military targets, from which it has largely
abstained since withdrawing from Mogadishu in 2011.
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Monitoring Group interview in Mogadishu, 19 March 2015.
Hamil al-Bushra, “Somalia the land of Khilafah: message to our brothers in Somalia”,
24 February 2015. Available from https://somalianews.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/bushra.pdf.
See also Caroline Hellyer, “ISIL courts al-Shabab as al-Qaeda ties fade away”, Al Jazeera,
23 March 2015. Available from www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/isil-eyes-eastafrica-foments-division-150322130940108.html.
Jihadology, video entitled “In remembrance 2”, posted 24 March 2015. Available from
http://jihadology.net/2015/03/24/al-kataib-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from%E1%B8%A5arakat-al-shabab-al-mujahidin-in-remembrance-2 (accessed 11 September 2015).
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89. Al-Shabaab’s success in penetrating the heavily fortified Mogadishu
International Airport compound on 25 December 2014 had been foreshadowed in
the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2014/726, annex 1.3), which highlighted
Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of the Mogadishu International Airport. While eight
AMISOM soldiers, two civilians and a contractor were killed, casualties could have
been considerably higher had the attackers reached their primary target, the officers’
mess. The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence showing that a wide range of
forged identification badges facilitating access to the Mogadishu International
Airport can be purchased at Bakara Market for $20 to $40.
90. On 11 June 2015, more than 100 Al-Shabaab fighters ambushed an Ethiopian
National Defence Force convoy escorting civilian contractors to deliver supplies for
AMISOM from Mogadishu to Baidoa in the area of Jameeco, 90 km north -west of
Mogadishu. Following the Ethiopian National Defence Force ambush, Al -Shabaab
announced the existence of a special brigade tasked with attacking AMISOM forces,
dubbed the “Sheikh Abu Zubeyr” unit, in honour of its former emir. The Monitoring
Group presently considers that unit to be a propaganda -related, rather than
operationally active, military unit.
91. On 26 June 2015, following an initial breach of the perimeter by suicide
bombers, more than 100 Al-Shabaab fighters overran an AMISOM base in Leego,
resulting in the deaths of more than 50 Burundian soldiers. More recently, on
1 September 2015, Al-Shabaab militants carried out a similar assault on an AMISOM
base in Janale, on that occasion disabling a bridge before their assault in order to cut
off an avenue of retreat. 55 An accurate death toll of AMISOM soldiers has yet to be
established, although media sources have reported it to be in the dozens.
Sources of revenue
92. With taxes on charcoal production and movement declining as a source of
revenue for Al-Shabaab, the group has become increasingly reliant on other means
of raising funds. In particular, the group relies on the taxation (zakat) of farms in the
Jubba valley, one of the last remaining areas over which it maintains territorial
control. 56 Extortion of business owners, whether their businesses are large or small
and whether located in areas physically controlled by Al-Shabaab or not, also
constitutes a significant component of the group’s revenue. 57 Even in Mogadishu,
businesses continue to pay “taxes” to Al-Shabaab and not to the Federal
Government. 58
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56
57
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Feisal Omar and Abdi Sheikh, “Islamist militants attack African Union base in southern
Somalia”, Reuters, 1 September 2015. Available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/01/ussomalia-attack-idUSKCN0R12PT20150901.
A senior Federal Government of Somalia intelligence official told the Monitoring Group on
19 March 2015 that Al-Shabaab raised approximately $9.5 million from taxes on Jubba valley
farms in 2014. See annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b for more information on
violent extortion by Al-Shabaab.
Demands for protection money are frequently made by text message, and the payment in turn is
made through mobile money. An independent Somalia analyst based in the United States
commented in October 2014 that, in Kismayo, “even women selling tomatoes” pay protection
money to Al-Shabaab.
Hormuud Telecommunications is the only major company in Somalia that pays income taxes to
the Federal Government of Somalia.
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93. The strict tariff regime of the Government of Kenya encourages a vibrant
illicit trade in sugar and other basic foodstuffs imported duty -free through the port
of Kismayo. From Kismayo, sugar is transported into Kenya through multiple border
points, including the Dhobley-Liboi crossing. 59 Al-Shabaab mans checkpoints on all
roads out of Kismayo, with passing trucks charged a toll of about $1,000 each. 60
From the Dhobley-Liboi border crossing, much of the sugar passes through the
Dadaab refugee camps before making its way to the regional hub of Garissa, then
onward to wholesale markets in Nairobi. Once it has entered Kenya, much of the
sugar is purchased by local businesses and repackaged under their own brands.
94. In the Monitoring Group’s report issued in 2011, it was estimated that
Al-Shabaab generated between $400,000 and $800,000 in revenue off the sugar
trade (S/2011/433, annex 3.1). According to preliminary investigations conducted in
2015, the Monitoring Group estimates the figure to be substantially higher. As t he
centrality of revenue stream from charcoal declines, Al -Shabaab’s taxation of the
illicit sugar trade is gaining relevance. The connection between Al -Shabaab and
sugar smuggling came to the fore in Kenya during the Group’s current mandate.
Following Al-Shabaab’s attack at Garissa University College, the Government of
Kenya issued a confidential list of 30 individuals who the Government claimed were
“engaged in sugar smuggling” and whose accounts had accordingly been frozen (see
strictly confidential annex 4.2.e). The Kenyan security forces in turn launched a
crackdown on the sugar trade in the Dadaab refugee camps, and the Monitoring
Group has become aware of a “sugar unit” created within the Kenya National
Intelligence Service for that purpose; in mid -April 2015, the unit arrested six
mid-level smugglers in the Dadaab camps. 61 The Monitoring Group is continuing to
investigate Al-Shabaab’s revenue stream from the sugar trade.
95. The outbreak of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011, as well as
improved law enforcement measures along traditional heroin smuggling routes, has
prompted East Africa to take on new importance in heroin trafficking from
Afghanistan to Europe. 62 The Monitoring Group has become aware of a possible
connection between Al-Shabaab and the East Africa drug trade, through the
MV Amin Darya, a vessel carrying upward of 800 kg of heroin intercepted on
15 July 2014 by Kenyan authorities and subsequently destroyed as a public relations
exercise. Through information obtained from a regional security agency, the
Monitoring Group has established that the heroin traffickers on board MV Amin
Darya were in contact with a Dubai-based businessman with possible links to
Al-Shabaab. The case of the MV Amin Darya is presented in annex 4.4.
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61
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Other border crossing points include Dif and Kolbiyo.
Drazen Jorgic, “Kenya wages war on smugglers who fund Somali militants”, Reuters, 21 June
2015. Available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/21/us-kenya-security-somalia-insightidUSKBN0P105320150621. The roughly $1,000 toll was confirmed by the Monitoring Group’s
interviews on 18 and 19 June 2015 with individuals in Dadaab familiar with sugar smuggling. As
with charcoal shipments, truck drivers receive a receipt upon paying an Al-Shabaab toll, which
entitles them to pass through additional checkpoints without being subject to double taxation.
Ibid. The arrests of the smugglers were corroborated by the Monitoring Group’s interviews w ith a
regional intelligence source and with residents of Dadaab in June 2015. As a result of the Kenyan
crackdown, the price of a 50 kg sack of sugar rose to $44, an increase of roughly $10 from
normal levels.
“The smack track: East African States are being undermined by heroin smuggling”, The
Economist, 17 January 2015. Available from www.economist.com/news/middle-east-andafrica/21639560-east-african-states-are-being-undermined-heroin-smuggling-smack-track.
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Al-Shabaab Northeast
96. The Monitoring Group continues to follow with concern the Al -Shabaab
Northeast insurgency in the Galgala mountains, roughly 30 km south -west of
Bosaso, Puntland. In its previous report, the Monitoring Group noted “an increased
presence and movement” among Al-Shabaab Northeast militants (S/2014/726,
annex 1.4). As Al-Shabaab continues to cede territory in southern and central
Somalia, the Monitoring Group expects the intensity of the Galga la insurgency to
increase as fleeing militants head north, seeking to keep a line of communication
open to Yemen and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Consequently, the
Monitoring Group views with extreme concern the progressive deterioration of the
security environments in both Yemen and Puntland, which in the latter case has been
fuelled partly by continually delayed or absent salary payments to the security
forces. In particular, the sacking in February 2015 by the President of Puntland,
Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, of two senior security forces officials, including the head
of the Puntland Intelligence Service, has created an alarming rift between the
President and his security forces.
97. Early in October 2014, Puntland forces launched a renewed offensive in the
Galgala hills, supported by aerial reconnaissance from a Western Member State.
After initial gains, the offensive appears to have stalled. According to information
provided in October 2014 by a Puntland journalist on the ground, government forces
controlled only Galgala town and not the villages in the surrounding hills. 63 The
Monitoring Group has received unconfirmed but credible information that senior
Al-Shabaab leader Fuad Mohamed Khalaf “Shongole” was present in the Galgala
area in mid-March 2015 in order to “establish a new base” to carry out attacks in
Puntland. 64
Al-Shabaab as a regional threat
98. During the present mandate, Al-Shabaab has continued to morph into a
transnationally oriented terror organization. The group’s regional expansion reflects
Al-Shabaab’s principal regional aim, namely to carry out attacks on the home fronts
of AMISOM troop-contributing countries. Kenya, in particular, has proven to be
especially vulnerable, owing largely to the long and porous border that it shares
with Somalia. 65 Since June 2014, Al-Shabaab terror operations have claimed the
lives of more than 300 people in Kenya, greater than the number killed by the group
in Mogadishu over the same period.
99. Al-Shabaab has launched a series of deadly attacks on Kenyan soil during the
mandate. Within the span of 10 days, the group carried out two deadly attacks near
Mandera, massacring 28 bus passengers on 23 November 2013, followed by
36 quarry workers on 2 December. Al-Shabaab’s most significant attack in Kenya
took place on 2 April 2015, when five gunmen stormed the campus of Garissa
University College, located 150 km from the Kenya -Somalia border. After a standoff lasting most of the day, Kenyan special forces stormed the dormitory where the
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64
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This account was corroborated by a second Puntland journalist, also in October 2014.
Information provided by a senior regional intelligence official, 14 March 2015.
Three broadly independent Al-Shabaab groups operate along the Kenya -Somalia border, roughly
corresponding to Garissa, Mandera and Lamu counties in Kenya. The third of those, calling itself
the Jeysh Ayman brigade, is based in the Boni forest and has greatly intensified its operations
over the course of the Monitoring Group’s mandate.
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attackers had taken students hostage, but not before 148 people, mostly students,
had been killed. In the aftermath of the massacre, the Government of Kenya
announced the mastermind of the attack to be Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere”
(a.k.a. “Kuno”), a Garissa native and former Quranic teacher. 66 “Gamadheere” has
emerged not only as a leader responsible for cross -border attacks into Kenya but
also possibly as a key organizer in other regional plots involving networks in
Somaliland, Djibouti and Ethiopia. For instance, unconfirmed information provided
to the Monitoring Group suggests that “Gamadheere” acted as the coordinator of a
failed plot in January 2015 to attack Menelik Square in Djibouti, the area of the city
containing La Chaumière restaurant, which was the target of a successful Al-Shabaab
suicide bombing in May 2014 (see S/2014/726, strictly confidential annex 2.3).
100. An account of the Garissa University College terror attack is provided in
annex 4.2.
101. Annex 4.3 (strictly confidential) describes the failed Al-Shabaab plot of
January 2015 in Djibouti.
102. In a worrying trend, Al-Shabaab has begun to openly occupy Kenyan border
towns for extended periods. On 19 May 2015, Al-Shabaab militants entered two
villages in Garissa County, addressing villagers for several hours and warning them
not to support the Government of Kenya or Kenyan security services. 67 One week
later, militants entered Yumbis village, near the Dadaab refugee camps, and repeated
their message not to cooperate with Kenyan forces. 68
103. Despite the failure of the “Bole Rwanda cell” to launch an attack during the
World Cup qualifiers in Addis Ababa in 2013 (see S/2014/726, strictly confidential
annex 2.2), Al-Shabaab has continued efforts to strike at the Ethiopian capital. On
14 October 2014, the United States Embassy in Addis Ababa issued a warning of an
imminent Al-Shabaab plot targeting the central Bole area of the city. According to
information provided to the Monitoring Group, approximately 20 Al-Shabaab
operatives had been sent to Addis Ababa in three distinct groups to carry out the plot
but left Ethiopia after the warning from the United States; one of the groups was
killed attempting to re-enter Kenya. 69
E.
Piracy and kidnap for ransom
Overview
104. Since 2012, piracy in Somalia has declined precipitously. The last hijacking of
a high-value merchant vessel, the Greek-managed oil tanker MT Smyrni, dates to
May 2012. The sharp reduction in piracy since its peak in 2010 has been due
primarily to the deployment of private armed security teams on board commercial
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68
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The Monitoring Group is aware of only one substantive connection between “Gamadheere” and
the Garissa University attack; according to two regional security sources interviewed by the
Group, “Gamadheere” had been in contact by mobile phone with a campus security officer
suspected of having carried out surveillance for the attacking team.
Confidential intelligence report, 15 June 2015.
Ibid. Unconfirmed information based on testimony from villagers present suggests that
“Gamadheere” may have personally delivered the lecture.
Monitoring Group interview with regional intelligence official, 7 August 2015.
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vessels, the implementation of best management practices by the maritime industry
and the presence of international naval forces vessels in the region.
105. During the mandate, pirate activity remained at an ebb. The only two vessels
to be hijacked since the Group’s previous mandate were the Iranian fishing dhows
FV Siraj and FV Jaber, which were seized off the coast of central Somalia on
22 March 2015. The Monitoring Group has ascertained the individual responsible to
be Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”, a well-known pirate leader whose
activities have been described in detail in the Group’s previous two reports
(S/2013/413 and S/2014/726). A detailed account of the hijackings of the FV Siraj
and the FV Jaber is provided in annex 2.4 (strictly confidential).
106. The Group notes with disappointment that the Federal Government of Somalia
has yet to arrest and carry out prosecutions against pirate leaders, as the Group has
recommended in past reports. In particular, the Group is concerned that “Gafanje”
continues to carry out piracy operations with complete impunity, even seeming to
enjoy access to high-level Federal Government of Somalia politicians in Mogadishu
(see strictly confidential annex 2.4.b).
107. While the threat posed by piracy to merchant vessels remains low, the Group is
concerned that illegal fishing by foreign vessels, which frequently deploy private
armed security teams on board, may lead to the recreation of a dynamic of conflict
with local Somali communities that contributed to the rise of piracy a decade ago.
That threat is discussed in detail in the Group’s discussion of illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing and maritime security.
III. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
108. In paragraph 31 of its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council reiterated its
demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the
timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia. Although the humanitarian
footprint was felt in almost all 15 administrative regions of Somalia, the quality of
that access remained extremely fragile, particularly as a new anti -Al-Shabaab
offensive began in July 2015. 70 More broadly, the increase in the intensity and scale
of conflicts in Somalia, whether in terms of the number of actors involved, the
means and methods used or the strategies employed, affected all aspects of
humanitarian access, from the safety and security of humanitarian workers to the
ability to maintain the independence and neutrality of humanitarian action. On
31 August 2015, following the biannual Food Security and Nutrition Assessment for
Somalia of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, it was
announced that the number of people who faced a food crisis or emergency in
Somalia had increased by 17 per cent, from 731,000 to 855,000 in six months, two
thirds of whom were internally displaced persons. 71
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See, inter alia, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Somalia office, 2015
Humanitarian Response Plan Somalia midyear monitoring report (covering January to J une
2015). See also the latest NGO Safety Programme Somalia access map, 10 February 2015.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Somalia: critical food and nutrition
situation persists”, press release, 31 August 2015.
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A.
Denial of humanitarian access 72
109. The key challenges to humanitarian access identified by the Monitoring Group
in its previous report (S/2014/726) continued to impede humanitarian operations on
an even larger scale, necessitating more complex negotiation by humanitarian
partners. They included blockades on main supply routes and strategic towns b y
Al-Shabaab, obstructive “regulation” and taxation by federal and regional
government officials and the continued politicization of aid.
110. With access to essential supplies perceived as a vehicle for parties to the
conflict to assert authority, Al-Shabaab violently enforced blockades on both
humanitarian supplies and commercial trade, killing and arresting civilians and
destroying goods. Despite efforts to provide emergency humanitarian support by air
where possible, acute food insecurity pervaded in many areas. 73 In its own area of
authority, Al-Shabaab permitted only minimal humanitarian activities and severely
restricted the extent to which the population could seek assistance outside. 74 In the
context of the increased militarization and polarization o f the environment, there
was evidence of Al-Shabaab’s deepened suspicion of, and distance from, the
humanitarian community. In some areas this was reflected, inter alia, in efforts to
sideline local leadership and centralize control of humanitarian relatio nships
through the Amniyat, Al-Shabaab’s hard-line internal security apparatus, potentially
affecting both the security of humanitarian workers and the ability to negotiate
principled access.
111. In its previous report, the Monitoring Group described how the expansion of
the federal architecture had created new layers of bureaucratic impediments,
revenue seeking and outright diversion. Those impediments had complicated and
sometimes completely prevented humanitarian access (S/2014/726, para. 93).
During the current mandate, not only did those practices intensify, but the number
of authorities with which the humanitarian community was required to engage rose:
in addition to two new interim regional administrations, rival administrations
outside the formal federalization process attempted to assert administrative
legitimacy. 75 Efforts by competing authorities to co-opt and extract benefits from
humanitarian operations compromised not only the viability of operations , resulting
in the temporary closure of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but also the
ability to work safely across different zones of control. 76
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74
75
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Denial of humanitarian access blocks the free passage or timely delivery of humanitarian
assistance to persons in need, as well as includes deliberate attacks against humanitarian workers.
More than a year after the Al-Shabaab blockade began in March 2014 in Hudur and at a time
when the new phase of the Al-Shabaab offensive was under way, global acute malnutrition rates
were “very critical” at 32.7 per cent, with an “alarming threefold increase” in severe acute
malnutrition rates since June 2015. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2015 (issued on 20 August 2015).
See annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b.
In the context of impact on humanitarian access, they included the self -declared Khatumo State
in Sool and Sanaag and the Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jamaʽa-backed administration declared on 1 July
2015 in Dhusamareeb.
During 2014, the humanitarian community recorded 76 incidents related to administrative and
bureaucratic impediments and interference in operational modalities. By the end of the first
seven months of 2015, the number of incidents had already reached 51. Interviews with United
Nations and non-governmental organization sources, Nairobi, August 2015.
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112. The growing number of armed actors, both Somali and foreign, engaged in the
conflict against Al-Shabaab contributed to the consolidation of a security rather than
acceptance and negotiation approach to expanding humanitarian access. This made
challenging the politicization of aid and maintaining the principle of distinction
more complicated. Incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid by Somali and
international military forces and armed groups were reported. 77
113. See annex 5.1 for an overview of the main challenges to humanitarian access.
114. See annex 5.2 on the use of bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official
power to obstruct humanitarian access.
B.
Attacks on humanitarian workers
115. Against the backdrop of a more volatile and insecure context overall, threats
against and attacks on humanitarian workers rose during the current mandate.
Fourteen humanitarian aid workers were killed between January and August 2015
alone, with 80 security incidents related to humanitarian operations recorded in the
same period. 78
116. Al-Shabaab conducted a series of direct and indirect attacks on United Nations
agencies, including a horrific suicide attack on a United Nations Children’s Fund
staff bus in Garowe that killed six, including four United Nations staff, and injured
five others on 20 April 2015. 79 The attack in Garowe marked the culmination of
escalating rhetoric by Al-Shabaab against both the United Nations and international
organizations. 80 A few months later, Abu Ubaidah’s Eid message described the work
of “opening up secure corridors to allow the destructive international agencies and
organizations to spread their vices and immortality [sic] among the Muslim youth”
as “among the plots of the enemies of Allah”. 81 Even prior to the Garowe attack,
rising internal tensions and accompanying militarization in both Puntland and
Somaliland, coupled with the increased presence and activity of Al-Shabaab and
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79
80
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Although the Somalia Country-Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines for
Humanitarian Actors’ Engagement with AMISOM to govern relations on civil -military
coordination in Somalia were launched in November 2014, dissemination and implementation
were slow. There is currently no mechanism for the humanitarian community to promote
observance of the Guidelines beyond Federal Government of Somalia security forces and
AMISOM.
In contrast, during 2014, 75 violent incidents led to the death of 11 people and the abd uction and
arrest of more than 20 staff. Information provided by United Nations and non -governmental
organization sources in August and September 2015.
They included an attack on a United Nations convoy on 3 December 2014 outside the Mogadishu
International Airport and an attack on the Jazeera Palace Hotel, which killed 15, including
2 United Nations third-party contractors, as well as damaged the United Nations common
compound and the compounds of three non-governmental organizations.
As noted in document S/2014/726, a series of statements and attacks in 2013 and 2014 had also
clearly identified the United Nations (and humanitarian agencies more broadly) as legitimate
targets of the group. There is some indication that education activities may be considered a
particular target.
Eid greetings to the Muslim Ummah from the Mujahid Sheikh Abu Ubeydah Ahmad Omar. There
is some suggestion that Al-Shabaab may be particularly targeting education activities, based on a
number of developments, such as the organization’s statement of 20 December 2014 referring to
“an ideological war”, the attack on Garissa University on 2 April 2015 (see annex 4.2) and the
attack on the Ministry of Higher Education and Culture in Mogadishu on 14 April 2015.
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reports of hostile surveillance of United Nations installations, had led to perceptions
of greater insecurity for humanitarian operations in the north -east. 82
117. In addition to the scaling up of direct military operations in the second half of
2015, the vulnerability of humanitarian agencies was exacerbated by the need to
negotiate for access with a rising number of competing military and civilian
authorities. Incidents involving the use of force to disrupt humanitarian operations
or divert humanitarian inputs were recorded with respect to government forces,
forces associated with regional authorities, local militia and international forces.
C.
Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance
118. Diversion continues to be an intrinsic element of the humanitarian business
model in Somalia, conducted through a variety of mechanisms, including budget
manipulation, extortion, the manufacture of receipts and outright theft. The
Monitoring Group observed similar patterns and perpetrators of diversion to that
identified in its previous report, involving a spectrum of actors ranging from staff at
donor headquarters to local government officials, contractors and local NGOs.
Reflecting the trajectory described in that report, the overall amount of
humanitarian aid available continued to shrink against the backdrop of an estimated
3 million people still in need of essential humanitarian support in Somalia. 83 The
rising costs of humanitarian operations as a result of access restrictions and the need
to mitigate heightened security risks all added to the pressure on scarce resources.
119. As noted by the Monitoring Group in its previous report, the emergence of
new layers in the architecture of the federal State also multiplied the venues in
which, under a cloak of legitimacy, diversion could be practised ( S/2014/726,
annex 7.1). Those challenges became more acute in 2015 as both new regional State
entities and rival administrations emerging out of a highly contested federalization
process took cues from successful past revenue-seeking practice, with almost no
central oversight or assertion of control (see annex 5.2).
120. At the same time, aid was also vulnerable to not only theft but also misuse as a
political tool and in support of conflict. The Group received credible information
that some humanitarian actors abused humanitarian principles and misused
humanitarian inputs in the pursuit of clan domina nce, including through the use of
violence. In some communities, the allegiance of certain NGOs with particular
militia/Somali National Army units was an open secret in the humanitarian
community and indeed accepted as the price of access.
121. The inability of the humanitarian community to grapple with the pervasiveness
of aid misappropriation, which reached its high point during the famine of 2011,
facilitated the perpetuation of the system. Nevertheless, during the current mandate
the humanitarian community sustained the progress noted in 2014 by both
continuing to acknowledge the scale of diversion and enhancing risk management
and diversion response mechanisms. In January 2015, for example, an NGO focal
point was appointed to the Risk Management Unit of the United Nations country
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Challenges in the administration and management of the special protection units may increase
the vulnerability of humanitarian actors if not effectively handled.
Of the $853 million requested for the Common Humanitarian Fund in 2015, only 33 per cent had
been provided by the end of July 2015.
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team, permitting enhanced cooperation between the NGO and the United Nations
humanitarian communities. The deep-rooted fundamentals of the system that
perpetuate diversion, however, remain to be tackled.
122. See annex 5.3 for a more detailed overview of diversion and misappropriation
of humanitarian assistance, including measures to reduce diversion.
IV. Violations of international law involving the targeting
of civilians
123. With an increase in the number and variety of foreign and national forces, all
armed actors continued to target civilians, whether as a deliberate tactic of war or
through the disproportionate use of force. 84 Politically, economically and culturally
excluded communities continued to experience the majority of violations, which
reflects a deep-rooted stratification of Somali society, accentuated by the rush to
assert control over resources.
A.
Targeting of civilians
124. The number and complexity of armed actors in Somalia, some allied loosely
against Al-Shabaab, produced a profusion of command with varying control and
very little accountability, thus undermining the protection of civilians. 85 The almost
complete impunity enjoyed by those forces, save in the rare context of inter -clan
negotiations or a small number of prosecutions of Somali National Army and
AMISOM personnel, created a fertile ground for them to continue.
125. As both the fight against Al-Shabaab and the group’s grip on populations still
under its control intensified, violations against civilians rose, with both sides using
weapons and tactics that resulted in large civilian and military casualties. 86
Meanwhile, other non-State actors used armed violence to assert themselves within
the expanding federal architecture. Al-Shabaab used, and in turn was sometimes
leveraged by, those actors, for mutual benefit.
126. As described in document S/2014/726, the political and military leadership of
the federal system was also usurped to progress clan interests with the deployment
of Federal Government of Somalia security forces and assets in clan fighting.
Violence against civilians by the forces of the regional administrations, such as the
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Those responsible involved members of all parties to the conflicts, including Al -Shabaab and its
affiliates, AMISOM and its strategic partners, the Somali National Army, th e security forces of
the regional administrations and their allies, and clan militia.
Analysis produced by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project for the Monitoring
Group between January and July 2015, for example, indicates tha t the main perpetrators of
anti-civilian violence were “unidentified armed groups”. (The assessment does not capture events
in which civilians are injured as a result of conflict between two armed actors.) Draft conflict
analysis of Somalia, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, August 2015.
Although the absolute level of violent events against civilians declined in the first six months of
2015, following the commencement of a new anti-Al-Shabaab offensive, the month of July
witnessed a 50 per cent increase. Al-Shabaab was responsible for the greatest number of fatalities
caused by anti-civilian violence. Ibid.
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Interim Jubba Administration, in addition to other entities, such as Ahl al -Sunna
wal-Jamaʽa, in attempting to assert control over territory was also documented. 87
127. International forces both within and beyond the autho rized AMISOM troop
number also committed violence against civilians. With respect to AMISOM,
extrajudicial killings and killing of and injury to civilians in the context of response
to improvised explosive device and grenade attacks were reported. 88 Allegations of
killing, sexual and gender-based violence and other violations against civilians by
the Ethiopian Liyiu police were also received by the Group, in particular in Bay,
Bakol, Galgadud and Hiran.
128. See annex 6.1 for an overview of the commission o f violations of international
law involving the targeting of civilians.
129. See annex 6.1.a (strictly confidential) for information on the circumstances of
the arrest of members of the Salaax militia.
130. See annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b for details of violations of
international law and the situation of the Bantu/Wagosha community in areas of
Lower and Middle Jubba held by Al-Shabaab.
131. See annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b for details on attacks on
the villages of Kabxanley and Defow in Hiran.
B.
Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children
in armed conflict and forced displacement
132. Annex 6.4 contains short summaries of the main trends in the commission of
violations relating to these three areas of the mandate, in addition to addressing
developments in both practice and the legal framework that tend to prevent
violations and enhance compliance with the sanctions regime.
V. Arms embargo regime
A.
Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with the
conditions of the partial lifting of the arms embargo
133. The partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia, introduced in resolution
2093 (2013), was extended in resolution 2182 (2014) until 30 October 2015. It
exempted the Federal Government of Somalia from seeking case-by-case approval
from the Committee to import weapons for its security force. Under the terms of the
partial lifting of the arms embargo, the Federal Government of Somalia is required
to submit to the Committee advance notifications of the delivery of weapons or
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In February 2015, for example, civilians were killed and injured when Ahl al -Sunna wal-Jamaʽa
attacked and assumed control of Guriel from the Federal Government of Somalia. See, inter alia,
Human Rights Watch, “Dispatches: overlooking the cost to Somalia’s civilians”, 19 February 2015.
Available from www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/19/dispatches -overlooking-cost-somalias-civilians.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, although AMISOM was
reportedly involved in only 10 incidents of anti-civilian violence, the ratio of reported fatalities
to events was the highest of all forces. Draft conflict analysis of Somalia, Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data Project, August 2015.
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military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to government
security forces. In addition, the Federal Government of Somalia is obliged to submit
biannual reports to the Security Council detailing the structure of its security forces
and the infrastructure and procedures in place to ensure safe management and
distribution of weapons and military equipment. The Council has repeatedly
stressed that continuation of the partial lifting is contingent on the Government’s
implementation of those requirements (resolution 2182 (2014), sixteenth preambular
paragraph).
134. The Monitoring Group observed tangible progress with regard to the submission
of notifications and weapons and ammunition management due considerably to the
efforts and energy of the Office of the National Security Adviser. The quality,
quantity and timeliness of advance notifications improved steadily. Fulfilment of
post-delivery confirmation obligations, however, remained elusive. 89 The
commencement of the marking and registration of Federal Government of Somalia
imports and of weapons held by private security companies represented t he most
significant development. Significant gaps remain, however, in ensuring tracking of
weaponry and equipment, particularly after their initial distribution to the security
forces. In this regard, international assistance is greatly needed to initiate the
comprehensive weapons and ammunition manageme nt project developed by the
Federal Government of Somalia.
135. Reports of the Federal Government of Somalia pursuant to paragraph 9 of
resolution 2182 (2014) were transmitted on time. However, the Group is concerned
that, despite the efforts to outline the security structure of the Federal Government
of Somalia in its previous report, the Government has not provided a clear picture of
the composition and strength of security forces, including allied militia. In
particular, the Somali National Army leadership has systematically sought to inflate
the number of serving troops. 90
136. The partial lifting of the arms embargo was granted, inter alia, to help the
Federal Government of Somalia to develop and equip its security forces to confront
Al-Shabaab. Data collected from advance notifications to the Committee indicates
that Government security forces were expected to have received more than 17,500
weapons and almost 9 million rounds of ammunition since the partial lifting of the
arms embargo. 91 The Monitoring Group, however, continues to receive reports that
Federal Government of Somalia security forces remain ill -equipped to confront
Al-Shabaab effectively. The lack of information on the distribution of imported
weapons limits the Group’s ability to assess whether they are being used
appropriately and effectively.
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The Federal Government of Somalia has advised that the additional required post -delivery
confirmations and information, albeit not submitted on time, will be transmitted to the
Committee shortly after the finalization of the present report.
See strictly confidential annex 3.1.
That figure does not include the considerable number of weapons already held in Federal
Government of Somalia stock, circulating in Somalia or delivered outside the formal notification
procedure. Possession of a weapon, for example, is often a condition for recruitment to the
security services.
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B.
Obligations of Member States and regional and
international organizations
137. On a number of occasions, Member States and international organizations
providing support to security sector institutions not under the Federal Government
of Somalia have failed to appropriately notify the Committee of supplies of
weapons or military equipment and technical assistance or training pursuant to
paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013). In some instances, this can be attributed
to confusion regarding the scope of paragraph 11 (a), including to which security
actors and in respect of which materiel and assistance it applies. The development
of parallel regional security structures outside the command of the Federal
Government of Somalia requires careful consideration and greater Committee
oversight, and a more precise understanding of the scope of “Somali security sector
institutions” will need to evolve. 92
C.
Standing exemptions from the arms embargo
138. The Security Council granted several standing exemptions from the arms
embargo that apply to the supply of certain materiel to specific entities and for
particular purposes. 93 Although that system enables the smooth operation of
AMISOM, the European Union Training Mission in Somalia, the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), AMISOM “strategic partners” and others,
it also creates a blind spot in the Committee’s oversight of arms flows. Indications
that some of the armed forces involved in the most recent anti-Al-Shabaab offensive
did not operate fully under the AMISOM concept of operations heightens that
concern.
D.
Documentation of captured weaponry and military equipment
139. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), Federal
Government of Somalia security forces and AMISOM are required to document and
register all military equipment captured during offensive operations and to facilitate
inspection by the Group before its redistribution or destruction. The Federal
Government of Somalia provided the Group with information on four caches of
weapons and other military materiel seized and received training in the
identification and tracking of captured weaponry. Despite the issuance of directives
to sector commanders, AMISOM was unable to document and facilitate the transfer
of information on seizures and has requested further advice and assistance from the
Group. Effective implementation of paragraph 6 of the resolution will require the
Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM to agree on various responsibilities. 94
Troop-contributing countries should direct their AMISOM contingents to comply
with directives issued by force headquarters. The Council could consider expanding
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See paragraph 10 (h) of the guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work as
consolidated, revised and adopted by the Committee on 30 March 2010, 30 May 2013,
27 November 2013 and 25 March 2014.
For details, see annex 7.2.
This includes the documentation, registration, tracing and analysis of captured weapons and
other materiel as appropriate, a transfer procedure to the responsible entity, a framework for the
storage and disposal of the materiel retained or transferred, and a protocol for informing the
Monitoring Group of the seizure.
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such reporting to the variety of other forces engaged in the conflict with Al-Shabaab
in territories beyond the reach of AMISOM and Federal Government of Somalia
security forces.
E.
Implementation of paragraphs 10 and 15 of resolution 2182 (2014)
140. In paragraph 10 of resolution 2182 (2014), the Council requested the Federal
Government of Somalia and the Monitoring Group to work together to formulate a
proposal to provide for an exemption to the arms embargo for weapons on board
vessels engaged in commercial activity in Somali territorial waters and Somali
ports. During the mandate, the Federal Government of Somalia and the Group
shared preliminary views on the proposal and made submissions to the Council.
141. In paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), the Council authorized Member
States, under certain circumstances, to interdict vessels believed to be carrying
weapons and military equipment in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas.
The Monitoring Group was not informed of any arms-related interdictions during
the mandate.
F.
Violations of the arms embargo
142. Violations of the arms embargo continue to be committed in Somalia, whether
through the illegal sale or unauthorized distribution of weap ons from Federal
Government of Somalia stocks or through illegal imports. The environment for illegal
weapons flows has been exacerbated by the market created by the conflict in Yemen
and increased militarization in parts of Somalia over the course of the mandate.
143. Annex 7.1 provides an overview of developments relating to weapons and
ammunition management in Somalia, including as a condition of the partial lifting
of the arms embargo.
144. Annex 7.2 provides an assessment of compliance with notification obligations
by the Federal Government of Somalia, Member States and international
organizations under the arms embargo and the partial lifting thereof.
145. Annex 7.3 provides an analysis of compliance by the Federal Government of
Somalia with its reporting requirements under the partial lifting of the arms embargo.
146. Annex 7.4 details compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia and
AMISOM with obligations relating to captured weaponry and military equipment.
147. Annex 7.5 provides an assessment of the implementation of paragraphs 10 and
15 of resolution 2182 (2014).
148. Annex 7.6 provides details on international assistance to the Federal
Government of Somalia to enhance compliance.
VI. Violations of the ban on charcoal
149. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group has documented the continuing
export of charcoal from southern Somalia. The implementation of the ban, the
displacement of Al-Shabaab from export sites along the southern coast of Somalia
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from Barawe to Kamboni on the Kenyan border and the emergence of new political
and business arrangements in the region have all affected the political economy of
the trade. The cumulative effect has been an overall reduction in exports of charcoal
from southern Somalia and a decline in the revenue gained from the trade by
Al-Shabaab.
A.
Production and export of charcoal in southern Somalia
150. In the immediate aftermath of the recovery of Barawe, Lower Shabelle, from
Al-Shabaab early in October 2014, members of the caretaker administration,
together with the Somali National Army and the Uganda People ’s Defence Force
contingent of AMISOM, permitted the commencement of exports of charcoal
stockpiled in the city. Satellite imagery taken at the time shows the rapid depletion
of stocks and the presence of multiple dhows docked and awaiting cargo until late
November, when activity ceased. 95 On 23 November, local government and security
officials were arrested and taken to Mogadishu. Since late November, evidence
collected by the Group, including regularly updated satellite imagery and aerial
surveillance of the city’s port and stockpiles, suggests that charcoal trade in Barawe
and the surrounding area has stopped.
151. Production continues in the Lower and Middle Jubba regions, with the former
largely under the authority of the Interim Jubba Administration and the latter
remaining largely under the control of Al-Shabaab. Although the actors controlling
the trade and export in Kismayo remain largely unchanged since the Group ’s
previous report (see S/2014/726, annex 9.1), export procedures have changed. The
city’s central stockpile, situated adjacent to the road leading from the airport to the
centre of the city and in clear view of all visiting delegations to the city, is no longer
used. Satellite imagery suggests increasing use of the city’s southern stockpile and
dwindling use of its northern stockpile. 96 Charcoal is now rarely loaded onto vessels
at Kismayo port but instead loaded by hand at Alanley beach into small fishing
boats and then unloaded onto awaiting larger dhows in the bay area. 97 The process is
significantly less efficient but can be disrupted with immediate effect, leaving less
evidence of the trade. Satellite imagery suggests a significant expansion of export
operations from the town of Buur Gaabo, approximately 125 km south -west of
Kismayo, early in 2015, with considerable stockpiles and indeed cargo dhows still
present in September 2015. The Monitoring Group has not yet been able to confirm
who controls the trade and export in Buur Gaabo.
152. Al-Shabaab’s overall role in and revenue from the charcoal trade has reduced
since its loss of all export sites. 98 Businesses previously reported to have played a
prominent role in the export of charcoal and maintained ties with Al -Shabaab,
including Ali Naaji and Hassan Mohamed Yusuf “Awlibaax” ( see S/2014/726,
paras. 141-143), are reported to have maintained their dominance in the trade over
the course of the mandate. Evidence collected by the Monitoring Group, however,
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See annex 8.1 for satellite imagery of Barawe.
See annex 8.1 for satellite imagery of Kismayo.
See annex 8.2 for a map demonstrating loading procedures in Kismayo.
Al-Shabaab’s last foothold on the southern coastline in Kuday, approximately 100 km south -west
of Kismayo, was recovered by AMISOM troops in March 2015, after which all charcoal -related
activity is believed to have ceased.
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suggests that the ties between those controlling the trade in Kismayo and elements
of Al-Shabaab in Lower and Middle Jubba have been strained over the past year. In
January 2015, senior Al-Shabaab officials are reported to have called for the closure
of charcoal production sites in Lower and Middle Jubba. In the following months,
charcoal producers were arrested by the group, and many of those found carrying
charcoal along the major supply routes were executed and their vehicles burned
along with their cargo. During that period, suppliers were forced to use smaller
minibus-type vehicles and back roads to avoid detection by Al-Shabaab on the
major supply routes. Unconfirmed reports indicate that an agreement on the
distribution of taxation collected from charcoal at the export sites fell ap art when
Ahmed “Madobe” withheld Al-Shabaab’s shares of export proceeds early in 2015 in
preparation for the formation of the Jubba Regional Assembly in April and May
2015. The withholding of funds due to Al-Shabaab prompted the blockade on
charcoal to the city, which may also partly explain the significant expansion of
operations in Buur Gaabo. 99
153. While the Monitoring Group has received some support from the Federal
Government of Somalia in its investigations into the charcoal trade in southern
Somalia, no apparent efforts have been made by either the Interim Jubba
Administration or local contingents of AMISOM to implement or report on the ban,
supporting the Group’s assertion that both continue to be actively engaged in and
profiting from the trade.
B.
Maritime interdiction and vessel tracking
154. On 7 May 2014, the Committee issued implementation assistance notice No. 1,
which contained recommendations on interdiction of charcoal from Somalia
pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2036 (2012), 2060 (2012) and 2111 (2013).
In paragraph 15 of its resolution 2182 (2014), the Council authorized, for a period
of 12 months, Member States, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational
naval partnerships, to inspect vessels that they had reasonab le grounds to believe
were carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the ban. Uptake of action in
line with the proposed interdiction of vessels believed to carry charcoal was slow
but has, over the course of the mandate, resulted in a perceptible det errent effect in
the absence of any successful land-based approaches to the implementation of the
ban on charcoal. Intelligence shared by the Combined Maritime Forces with the
Monitoring Group led to the successful interception of the MSV Raj Milan (MMSI
419956307) at Port Rashid in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, with support from
United Arab Emirates authorities. 100 The issue of the disposal of seized charcoal, the
absence of legal follow-through, and the difficulties in identifying a State willing to
accept diverted ships have, however, hampered initial efforts to operationalize
maritime interdiction. Minimizing the interaction between the naval forces and the
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Obtaining reliable evidence on Al-Shabaab’s engagement in the charcoal trade in southern
Somalia has grown increasingly challenging over the course of the mandate. With limited access
to Kismayo and no access to the surrounding region, the Monitoring Group was largely reliant on
collecting testimonies from various local sources. Contrasting and conflicting reports provided
by local sources, often assumed to be either biased or politically motivated, made verification of
facts mostly untenable. The account of Al-Shabaab’s taxation ties to the Interim Jubba
Administration and continuing relations with the local business elite is based on multiple
corroborated testimonies.
See annex 8.3 for details on the interception of the MSV Raj Milan.
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vessels carrying charcoal remains critical for an effective impl ementation of the
charcoal ban.
155. The monitoring of vessels believed or known to be carrying charcoal has been
complicated by growing efforts to avoid detection. Decreasing use of automatic
identification system transmitters by the dhows carrying cargo to and from southern
Somalia renders it impossible to monitor the movements of most vessels using
dedicated tracking software. 101 The inability of both local sources on land and
intelligence sources at sea to identify vessel names suggests systematic attempts to
mask physical identifying features as well. Without that information, it is not
possible to intercept vessels known to be carrying charcoal from Somalia when they
reach their port of unloading.
C.
Falsified documentation
156. Upon arrival at Port Rashid, the MSV Raj Milan was found to be in possession
of documentation suggesting that its cargo had originated from the Comoros. The
prevalent use of falsified documents for charcoal cargo was detailed in the
Monitoring Group’s previous report (see S/2014/726, annex 9.4). With the growing
challenges to identifying vessels both on land and at sea and tracking vessels by
means of automatic identification system transmissions, during the current mandate
the Monitoring Group sought to verify the extent of falsified documentation by
cross-referencing Member State import and export data. 102
157. According to data shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab
Emirates, more than 142 million kg of charcoal were imported from Somalia in
2011 (96 per cent of total imports) and almost 122 million kg (79 per cent of total
imports) the following year, when the ban was imposed. 103 In 2013 and 2014 the
data show that no charcoal was imported from Somalia.
158. According to the same data, imports of charcoal from Kenya rose from
175,000 kg in 2012 to more than 80 million kg in 2013 and 12 million kg in 2014.
159. Imports of charcoal from the Comoros rose from zero in 2011, 2012 and 2013
to more than 12 million kg in 2014. The Monitoring Group req uested confirmation of
exports from the Comoros to the United Arab Emirates but did not receive a response.
160. Imports of charcoal from Djibouti rose from zero in 2011 to almost 13 million kg
in 2012, more than 22 million kg in 2013 and almost 41 millio n kg in 2014. The
Monitoring Group met with Djibouti port authorities on 21 May 2014 and was
informed categorically that charcoal was not exported from Djibouti to any countr y.
161. As identifying and tracking vessels transporting Somali charcoal grows
increasingly difficult, cooperation with Member States grows increasingly imperative.
The apparent endemic use of falsified documentation can be addressed only with
support from Member States, which will enable cross-referencing of export and
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The Monitoring Group noted the presence of multiple actively trading dhows docked at ports in
Dubai that had not transmitted automatic identification system signals since 2014.
Since 2014, the Monitoring Group has confirmed falsified documentation claiming impor ts of
charcoal of Somali origin from the Comoros, Djibouti and Kenya.
The ban came into effect with the adoption by the Council of resolution 2036 (2012) on
22 February 2012.
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import data and permit the Monitoring Group to investigate significant
discrepancies and the individuals and entities responsible for them.
VII. State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group
162. In the course of its mandate, the Monitoring Group received encouraging
support from the Federal Government of Somalia and representatives of its
institutions. The Group held regular and open discussions on a number of sensitive
issues with its two focal points, the National Security Adviser to the Preside nt of
Somalia, Abdirahman Sheik Issa, and the Minister of Finance, M ohamed Aden
Ibrahim. The Minister of the Interior and Federal Affairs, Abdirahman Mohamed
Hussein “Odowaa”, and the Central Bank Governor, Bashir Issa, also supported
investigations providing the Group with substantive and detailed responses to its
requests for information.
163. In its investigations with regard to the Al-Shabaab threat, the Group received
limited cooperation from the Government of Kenya and its security services. The
Monitoring Group hopes to strengthen these relations in its next mandate.
164. The Monitoring Group has limited interaction with the Somaliland authorities.
Contacts were established with the Director of Intelligence in the light of
investigations related to the Al-Shabaab threat. The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign
Affairs requested the Group’s cooperation and had e-mail exchanges with the Group
on the creation of an oil protection unit.
165. United Arab Emirates authorities responded to official corresponden ce on a
regular basis and facilitated the inspection of the MSV Raj Milan in Port Rashid.
However, repeated requests for import documentation, required to investigate the
extent of false documentation used in the charcoal trade, were ignored. The
conclusions and findings from the official investigation of United Arab Emirates
authorities into the MSV Raj Milan and its consignee have yet to be shared with the
Group.
166. The authorities of Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Republic of Tanzania have not responded to the Group ’s
official request for data on the importation of charcoal into their respective
territories, making it difficult for the Group to assess the import/export volumes of
charcoal transiting from Somalia to their countries and to identify patterns that
vessels carrying illegal Somali charcoal take advantage of to avoid identification
and tracking.
167. Following a visit to Muscat, the Omani authorities confirmed the continuation
of the blockade of the import of Somali charcoal into ports under its jurisdiction yet
have not responded to the Group’s official correspondence and did not provide the
Group with customs documentation as agreed upon during the visit.
168. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group benefited from positive cooperation
with humanitarian agencies and United Nations entities, within the boundaries of
their obligations of confidentiality to victims and the need to maintain the safety
and security of interlocutors.
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VIII. Sanctions list
169. On 11 December 2014, the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United
Nations submitted a request to delist Mohamed Sa’id (also known as Atom), who
had been listed on 12 April 2010 for engaging in acts that threaten the peace,
security or stability of Somalia. He had announced on 7 June 2014 that he was
leaving Al-Shabaab in an effort to escape Godane’s control over the group and had
surrendered to the Federal Government in Mogadishu. On 19 December 2014, the
Committee approved the delisting of Mohamed Sa’id “Atom” from the sanctions list.
170. Pursuant to paragraph 27 of resolution 2111 (2013) and paragraph 13 (g) of
resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group continues to refine and update
information on the draft list of those individuals and entities that engage in acts
described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2111 (2013).
IX. Recommendations
A.
Threats to peace and security
171. The Monitoring Group recommends:
(a) That the Security Council consider for targeted measures all individuals
attempting to exploit political, financial or military resources to manipulate or
undermine the federalization process and/or the forthcoming electoral process in
2016 for self-gain, along with their facilitators and active supporters;
(b) That, with regard to Somali public resources, the Security Council urge
the Federal Government of Somalia:
(i) To investigate and undertake prosecutions, where appropriate, of
individuals and entities found to have been engaged in the misappropriation of
financial resources in violation of the sanctions regime, where that conduct
also constitutes a violation of applicable national laws;
(ii) To share information generated by enquiries with the appropriate
investigative bodies in other Member States, where there are reasonable
grounds to believe that nationals of those States (or persons or entities with
sufficient connection to those jurisdictions) have participated in the
misappropriation of financial resources in Somalia;
(c) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the Somalia sanctions
regime, recognize illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels
within the country’s exclusive economic zone as a threat to peace and security in
Somalia and include such acts in the listing criteria for targeted measures;
(d) That the Security Council consider encouraging the Federal Government
of Somalia to strengthen its financial institutions by:
(i)
Enhancing the regulatory role of the Central Bank of Somalia;
(ii) Urging the Federal Parliament to expedite the legislative process
regarding the Public Procurement, Concession and Disposal Act;
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(e) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, impose a
moratorium on oil and gas agreements in Somalia until the Fede ral Government of
Somalia creates viable and independent licensing bodies, as stipulated in the 2008
Petroleum Law, and a constitutional resource-sharing framework between the
federal and regional authorities is in place;
(f) That the Security Council urge Member States to support the
comprehensive programme of security sector reform announced by the Office of the
President of the Federal Government of Somalia on 9 September 2015, ensuring
prompt delivery of financial and technical assistance to the secur ity sector on the
basis of strict adherence to the commitments undertaken in the announcement.
B.
Piracy
172. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council continue to
encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to identify, arrest and p rosecute all
individuals who, for the past decade, have been involved in organizing and
facilitating acts of piracy.
C.
Arms embargo regime
173. The Monitoring Group recommends:
(a) That the Security Council, in the context of its assessment of compliance
by the Federal Government of Somalia with the terms of the partial lifting of the
arms embargo:
(i) Urge the Federal Government of Somalia to improve compliance with its
reporting obligations to the Council, in particular the provision of full and
accurate information on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of
its security forces, including the status of regional and militia forces;
(ii) Request the Federal Government of Somalia, in the context of its
compliance with notification obligations to the Committee relating to import
of arms and ammunition, to improve the timeliness and content of post -delivery
and post-distribution confirmations to the Committee, recalling that such
communications may be submitted jointly if all relevant information is
available;
(iii) Require the Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of
international partners and within a fixed time frame, to conduct a baseline
inventory of military equipment, arms and ammunition in the possession of the
Federal Government of Somalia security forces, assessed against their
respective strength, needs and missions, in order to assist Member States in
providing more targeted assistance under the partial lifting of the arms
embargo, building on the development of the Guulwade and draft Heegan
plans, welcomed by the Council in its resolution 2232 (2015);
(iv) Request Member States on an immediate basis to support efforts of the
Federal Government of Somalia to establish a joint verification team, as
previously requested by the Council;
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(b) That the Security Council request Member States to assist the Federal
Government of Somalia in improving the management and monitoring of weapons
and ammunition flows to authorized personnel, including through urgent suppor t for
the development of a comprehensive weapons and ammunition management
strategy building on current practices and initiatives and setting out realistic short term priorities, including drawing on the extensive biometric registration of forces
being conducted by the United Nations and the weapons card system already in use;
(c) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the Somalia sanctions
regime, urge Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations
to ensure that they are in full compliance with paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111
(2013) when considering the provision of weapons, military equipment or technical
assistance or training intended solely for the purposes of helping to develop Somali
security sector institutions other than the security forces of the Federal Government;
(d) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the Somalia sanctions
regime, emphasize the need for AMISOM and the Somali National Army to fully
comply with their obligations under paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014) and that
it consider extending those obligations to all authorities in Somalia, in order to
ensure the comprehensive, transparent management and disposal of such materiel
and to facilitate tracing and analysis, which exposes Al-Shabaab operations and
supply channels;
(e) That the Security Council renew the authorization set out in paragraph 15
of resolution 2182 (2014) and request the Committee to issue an implementation
assistance notice that provides guidance to Member States on the framework for
conducting maritime interdiction of weapons and other materiel prohibited by the
arms embargo;
(f) That the Security Council, in the context of effective monitoring of
compliance with paragraph 10 (c) of resolution 2111 (2013) by the Monitoring
Group, request AMISOM and its strategic partners to clarify respective roles,
responsibilities and lines of command with respect to operations conducted under
the African Union strategic concept in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM.
D.
Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
174. The Monitoring Group recommends:
(a) That the Security Council request AMISOM and the humanitarian
community to continue to prioritize the full implementation of the Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines, including extending
the dissemination of their principles to other armed actors operating in Somalia;
(b) That the Security Council urge the Federal Government of Somalia,
AMISOM and its strategic partners, and all other armed actors operating in Somalia
to take steps to mitigate the impact on civilians of military operations, including
creating an enabling environment for humanitarian actors to deliver and ensuring
freedom of movement along supply routes;
(c) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, remind all
parties to the conflicts and all governing authorities in Somalia that the neutrality,
impartiality and independence of humanitarian action must be respected and
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ensured, including as a critical element of safeguarding the safety and security of
humanitarian personnel and operations, and, in this regard, that donors be
encouraged to increase the allocation of funds for principled humanitarian
assistance, detached from stabilization or State-building agendas.
E.
Violations of international humanitarian law involving the
targeting of civilians
175. The Monitoring Group recommends:
(a) That the Security Council request the Federal Government of Somalia to
both enhance and seek support for capacity to build civilian oversight of the Federal
Government of Somalia security forces, in addition to prioritizing the investigation
and prosecution of senior political and military leaders with command responsibility
for violations of international humanitarian law;
(b) That the Security Council request Member States to support enhanced
capacity for the UNSOM human rights section, in particular an increase in its
regional presence and ability to perform its responsibilities under th e United
Nations human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non -United
Nations security forces with regard to, inter alia, conducting risk assessments and
monitoring compliance as the number of forces receiving support and assistance
from United Nations entities expands;
(c) That the Security Council request the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights to work with the Federal Government of Somalia
and relevant United Nations agencies in mapping the most serious violations of
applicable international law committed by all parties to the conflicts in Somalia, a
necessary precursor to developing options for an appropriate and comprehensive
transitional justice strategy;
(d) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, emphasize
the obligation of all Member States to ensure that their forces adhere strictly to
international law in all operations conducted in Somalia, whether within or outside
the AMISOM concept of operations, including investigating and prosecuting
personnel who commit grave breaches of international humanitarian law;
(e) That the Security Council urgently request the Federal Government of
Somalia to implement national laws and policies relating to forced evictions,
including undertaking investigations and prosecutions of those who violate the law
in the course of such operations;
(f) That the Security Council request the African Union, AMISOM and
countries that contribute troops to AMISOM to:
(i) Encourage cooperation and engagement by all parties, in particular troop
contingents, with the recently established AMISOM Civilian Casualty
Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell, in order to ensure that the data and
analysis generated are integrated swiftly into operations and contribute to a
decrease in civilian casualties and injuries; consideration should also be given
to the establishment of a common fund to support compensation for civilian
casualties of AMISOM through the Cell;
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(ii) Ensure regular and transparent provision of detailed information by
troop-contributing countries on measures taken at the national level to
investigate, prosecute and punish military and civilian personnel responsible for
the commission of violations against civilians in the course of their deployment;
(iii) Immediately implement the recommendations of the African Union
independent investigation team established to investigate allegations of sexual
exploitation and abuse by AMISOM personnel.
F.
Violations of the ban on charcoal
176. The Monitoring Group recommends:
(a) That the Security Council request Member States to take action in
accordance with their national laws against shipping companies identified by the
Monitoring Group as using false documentation and to provide the Monitoring Group,
on a quarterly basis, with documentation related to import and export of charcoal;
(b) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, and in
furtherance of compliance with paragraphs 18 and 20 of resolution 2111 (2013),
request AMISOM and countries that contribute troops to AMISOM to take active
steps to support and assist the Somali authorities in preventing the export of
charcoal and, in this regard, to report to the Council on such actions six months
from the adoption of the new resolution;
(c) That the Security Council consider explicitly encouraging and
authorizing Member States to reroute vessels carrying Somali charcoal to the
Mogadishu port.
G.
Sanctions list
177. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Committee proceed without delay
to designate for targeted measures:
(a) Known pirates and their associates identified by the Monitoring Group or
Member States between 2009 and 2015;
(b) Individuals and entities responsible for the misappropriation of public
resources, including individuals and entities in the private sector;
(c) Individuals involved in the diversion of weapons from official
government stockpiles;
(d) Individuals and entities, including importers, exporters and transporters,
involved in the trading of Somali charcoal.
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Annex 1
Spoiler politics and the capture of state resources
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Annex 1.1: Formation of Interim Galmudug Administration
1. The formation of the Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA) started in earnest with the
Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference in January 2015. It concluded with the appointment
of Abdikarim Hussein Guled as President in July and the formation of a 24-member cabinet in late
August. As with the establishment the Interim Jubba Administration and the Interim South West State
Administration, losers in the process have cried foul and multiple allegations of interference have
emerged. The formation of the IGA demonstrates the manner in which multiple political and clan
networks competed to capture state resources, and in doing so instigated both new conflict and
threatened the re-emergence of old conflict. In 2016, the political stakes will be higher, as will the
overall threat posed to peace, security and stability in Somalia if greater efforts are not made by all
stakeholders to engage in the next transition process constructively.1
Attempts to manipulate the state formation process
2. The Damul Jadid political association close to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud invested
heavily – financially and politically – in the appointment of its member, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, as
President of the IGA.2 Indeed, other political associations and networks, including Ala Sheikh, are
also known to have attempted to buy support for their appointees throughout the state formation
process – from the allegiance of members of the technical committee to voting preferences of the 68
members of the Regional Assembly.3 None, however, had the comparative advantage that Abdikarim
Guled received from the outset.
3. The process of state formation between Galgadud Region and parts of Mudug Region was
initiated in July 2014. Representatives of the former Regional State of Galmudug, the Administration
of Himan and Heeb, and the Administration of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) were invited to attend
a meeting with representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). On 31 July the Central
Regions State Formation Agreement was signed by Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid” (President of
Galmudug State), Sheikh Ibraham Sheikh Hassan Gureye (representing ASWJ) and four FGS
ministerial representatives from the region. Minister of Interior Affairs and Federalism Abdullahi
Godah Barre served as Guarantor for the Agreement, and representatives of the European Union, the
United Nations Office for Somalia (UNSOM), and the African Union served as witnesses. Abdullahi
Mohamed Ali “Barleh” of the Himan and Heeb administration signed the Agreement a week later on
6 August 2014.4
__________________
1
Due to the sensitivity of the matter, all sources will remain anonymous.
Information obtained independently from senior diplomatic sources and from participants of the conference.
3
According to a source present at the technical committee training workshop, Ala Sheikh representatives
offered cash payments to technical committee members to support their preferred candidate, Ahmed
Moallim Fiqi.
4
According to a confidential source, “Barleh” agreed to sign once assured that the forthcoming state
formation conference would be held in the Himan and Heeb stronghold of Adado.
2
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4. Under the terms of the Agreement a 25-member technical committee “representing all the clans
that live in [the] regions” was to be established within 10 days of its signing. The process of creating
the administration was due to be completed within 60 days of the signing of the agreement, and to be
“guided and facilitated” by the FGS. The FGS was furthermore “responsible for ensuring the
implementation and success” of the agreement, and for preparing the “roles and responsibilities of the
technical committee”.5 On 26 August 2014, Abdullahi Godah Barre announced the appointment of
27 members to the technical committee.
5. Elements of ASWJ referred to as the Sufa group and led by Sheikh Abdirisaq Mohamed
Al Ashari, had opposed the Central Regions State Formation Agreement from the outset, claiming
that the group’s signatory, Sheikh Ibraham Sheikh Hassan Gureye, did not represent them. In October
2014 the Sufa group attempted to arrest the District Commissioner of Guriel town for supporting the
FGS-led state formation process. In November conflict erupted between Sufa fighters and the Somali
National Army (SNA) in the regional capital of Galgadud, Dhusamareb.
6. Throughout November and December 2014, the Sufa group of ASWJ consolidated its control
over Guriel town, as the SNA regained control of Dhusamareb. On 15 December SNA troops were
sent to recover Guriel as Sufa fighters retreated westwards towards Hiran Region, though intermittent
clashes between the two sides continued.
7. As SNA troops were advancing on Guriel in mid-December, members of the Technical
Committee were attending a training workshop in Mogadishu. Following completion of the training
workshop, on 17 December 2014 the committee elected Halimo Ismail Ibrahim “Yarey” to serve as
chair. In early January 2015 meetings were held in Guriel, with the involvement of members of the
technical committee, to ease the growing tensions.
8. On 25 January the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference commenced in Dhusamareb,
with approximately 400 elders from the two regions participating. As the conference continued
throughout February and into March, conflict between the SNA and Sufa group continued west of the
town. On 3 March the FGS Minister of Defence, General Abdulkadir Sheikh Dini visited Guriel in an
attempt to end the on-going conflict. As it grew increasingly obvious that the Sufa group would not
agree to the terms of a peace agreement, Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) AMISOM troops
arrived in the town to prop up the SNA and enforce a ceasefire.
9. On 25 March, a communiqué was disseminated announcing the end of the Galgadud and Mudug
Reconciliation Conference and the beginning of the State Formation Conference of Galgadud and
Mudug, with Dhusamareb continuing to host the delegates – despite assumptions among many, and
particularly Abdullahi “Barley”, that it would move to Adado town further north near the border with
__________________
5
Central Regions State Formation Agreement (Mudug and Galgadud),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SO_140730_CentralRegionFormation.pdf.
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Mudug Region. The total number of delegates was also increased to 510. Two weeks later, on 8 April,
after much political wrangling, President Hassan Sheikh announced that the State Formation
Conference would in fact be moving to Adado and would commence on 11 April, however
Dhusamareb was declared the provisional capital of the future federal member state.6
10. On 22 April 2015, as delegates for the State Formation Conference were still arriving, former
Minister of Defence and close ally to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Abdikarim Guled
announced his intention to run for presidency of the IGA.
11. Allegations that the chair of the technical committee, Halimo “Yarey”, was overstepping her
authority began to emerge in early May 2015 as the committee started to appoint members to a
Galmudug Regional Assembly.7 On 12 May, the Minister of Interior and Federal Affairs, Abdirahman
Mohamed Hussein “Odowaa” arrived in Adado to help address growing tensions among the
delegates, prompting “Qebdiid” to accuse the Minister of interfering in the process. On 16 May, the
Minister announced that matters with “Qebdiid” had been resolved, and that the conference would
soon continue.8
12. Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Shermarke arrived in Adado on 31 May to officially open the
second phase of the State Formation Conference when delegates would nominate MPs on behalf of
their sub-clans. A week later, on 7 June, the ASWJ Sufi group overran Dhusamareb, forcing SNA
troops to withdraw from the city. The next day they extended their control over nearby villages
establishing a defensive perimeter, and two days later peaceful demonstrations against the Adado state
formation process were held in the city.
13. On 18 June, after an Al-Shabaab attack on the conference facilities was thwarted by security
guards, the Constitution of Galmudug State was approved by the State Formation Conference
delegate. The Constitution claimed the incorporation of Galgadud Region and the whole of Mudug
__________________
6
While it may have served as an attempt to appease certain opponents, the President’s unilateral
declaration that Dhusamareb would serve as capital of the new regional administration demonstrated an
unconstitutional usurping of his role and responsibility in the process.
7
The Monitoring Group has also reviewed communication sent at the time by a participa nt in the process
to senior officials within both the FGS and UN alleging political interference in the selective process,
calling for a review of the process to date and for independent observers from the international
community to monitor the process moving forward. Halimo “Yarey” entered the political scene in 2012
when she co-chaired the Technical Selection Committee tasked with selecting the National Constituent
Assembly and the National Federal Parliament. Her swift appointment as chair of the Nationa l
Independent Electoral Commission soon after Abdikarim Guled won the Galmudug Presidency, and
indeed after it had been announced that general elections will not be possible 2016, has added to
speculation that senior government officials are attempting to use her to shape the design of a selection
process to strengthen their position in 2016.
8
On 20 May, the Galmudug Speaker of Parliament, Hassan Mohamud Hayl, publicly announced that
“Qebdiid” no longer served as president of the administration but was swi ftly hushed by other Galmudug
MPs.
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Region – including the northern districts claimed by Puntland – and confirmed Dhusamareb as the
future capital of the state, despite it being held by the ASWJ Sufa group at the time.
14. Claims to the northern districts of Mudug Region prompted an immediate reaction from the
Puntland administration in Garowe (see below). A press statement released by the office of President
Abdiweli Mohammed Ali “Gaas” is reported to have warned of future conflict with the Galmudug
administration if claims to northern Mudug were not withdrawn.9 Over the following few weeks a
series of demonstrations were held throughout Puntland opposing any attempts to threaten the state’s
territorial integrity.
15. Amid growing rhetoric against the process, on 20 June the Technical Committee released the list
of MPs that would serve in the Regional Assembly and elect the president of the IRA. Two days later
they were sworn in in at a ceremony held in Adado, and a week later they selected Ali Ga’al Asir to
serve as Speaker of the Regional Assembly. Presidential candidates were then invited to make formal
applications on 30 June. On 1 July, as ASWJ announced the appointment of Sheikh Mohamed Shakur
Ali Hassan as president of its rival state from Dhusamareb, a list of six candidates were announced in
Adado including Abdikarim Hussein Guled, Ahmed Abdisalan Adan, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and Abdi
Hassan Awale “Qebdiid”. On 4 July, following three rounds of voting Abdikarim Hussein Guled
secured the presidency. Guled’s political ally Mohmad Hashi Araby was subsequently appointed as
his vice president following a closely fought contest with Bashir Diriye Sharif.10
The northern borders of a Galmudug Federal Member State
16. The northern borders of a future Galmudug Federal Member State remain undefined. Twice the
FGS assured the Puntland authorities – in October 2014 and April 2015 – of its commitment not to
compromise the territorial integrity of Puntland which extends as far south as the city of Galkayco in
Galkayco District of Mudug Region. A clear dividing line in the city separates the Majeerteen
dominated north from Haber Gedir-dominated south. The extent of Puntland territory east and west of
Galkayco, however, is poorly demarcated and remains a potential flash point for conflict between the
two traditionally strongest clan families in Somalia, the Hawiye and Darod. Though the dividing line
is fluid, Puntland maintains de facto control of Jariban District, most of Galdogob District, and the
north of Galkacyo District in Mudug Region, leaving the south of Galkacyo District, most of Hobyo
District, and all of Harardhere District within Galmudug territory.
__________________
9
See, for example, “Puntland warns of ‘civil war’ over claims of its territory by Central region state
formation delegates”, Horseed Media, 18 June 2015. Available at
http://horseedmedia.net/2015/06/18/somalia-puntland-warns-of-civil-war-over-claims-of-its-territoriesby-central-region-state-formation-delegates/.
10
The Monitoring Group received reports from stakeholders present of large sums of cash – ranging from
USD 10,000 to USD 30,000 – being given to members of the Regional Assembly by all parties to the
process before the first round of votes for the presidency. According to the same sources, in subsequent
rounds, as candidates dropped out and alliances shifted, promises of political appointees – within both the
IGA and the FGS – were used to secure support.
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17. The 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement – signed by General Mohamed Farah Aideed representing
the United Somali Congress and Haber Gedir (Hawiye) communities in southern Mudug, and former
TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, representing the Somali Salvation Democratic Front at the time and
Majeerteen (Darod) communities in northern Mudug – introduced relative stability in the region
following several years of heavy inter-clan conflict. Though never fully implemented, the principles
of the peace agreement dividing the territory were, at least until the Galmudug State Formation
Conference, loosely adhered to. As the authors of a report on the Mudug Peace Agreement prepared
by the Puntland Development Research Center in 2006 state, “[i]n many respects, Mudug – and its
peace – are pivotal to the entire future of Somalia: as a vital crossroads for trade with the Somali
regions of Eastern Ethiopia; a commercial ‘meeting-point’ for the nation’s northern and southern
regions; and – perhaps most importantly – as a unique melting pot in which the Darod, Hawiye and
other clans meet and interact”.11
18. The apparent inclusion of all of Mudug Region in the initial approved Galmudug Constitution
threatens the relative stability that followed the signing of the Mudug Peace Agreement. Prime
Minister Omar Abdirashid ‘Sharmarke’ travelled to Garowe in July 2015 in an attempt to ease
tensions over the border but ultimately returned to Mogadishu having achieved little. The FGS and
Galmudug are now presented with a challenge which has serious implications for the peace, security
and stability of Somalia. By adhering to the general principles of the Mudug Peace Agreement,
splitting Mudug Region, they will likely prevent an outbreak of inter-communal conflict in the region.
They would, however, also defy the Provisional Constitution requirement that a federal member state
be formed of at least two contiguous regions as defined in 1991, and potentially invite multiple claims
for constitutional exceptions to be made in the state formation process. In the absence of a
Constitutional Court or indeed a fully functioning independent Boundaries and Federation
Commission, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has once again offered to
step in and mediate between Puntland and the Galmudug IRA. At the time of writing, there was little
evidence of progress being made to determine the northern border of a future Galmudug Federal
Member State.
Conflict with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
19. Prior to the signing of the Central Regions State Formation Agreement, ASWJ had contributed
significantly to relative security in the areas under its control, extending from the north east Hiran
Region across the northern parts of Galgadud Region. While the split within ASWJ may originally
have had more to do with Haber Gedir sub-clan politics than ideological positions, the FGS’ loss of a
key military ally and the emergence of a new, well-armed opposition group in central Somalia may
prove to have significant consequences for the region. ASWJ’s initiation of the parallel state
formation process, and the election of their own president 3 days before Abdikarim Guled won the
presidency of the Galmudug IRA, indicate an entrenchment of their position in the region.
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11
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20. Diverting the resources of the SNA and AMISOM to engage with a former ally, at a time when
both forces are already stretched thin attempting to hold ground recovered from Al-Shabaab and
continue offences against the group, represents a further grave threat to peace, security and stability in
the region.
21. The failure to mitigate conflict between ASWJ and the SNA early on in the process and to ensure
the interests of all influential stakeholders were at least nominally represented in it, compromises the
future legitimacy of the IGA unless significant political, and likely financial, capital is spent securing
full ASWJ buy-in. Media reports suggest that the administration was partially successful in achieving
this prior to the formation of the cabinet. Despite having recently lost the town of Abudwaq to IGA
forces, at the time of writing a militarily powerful faction of ASWJ that continues to oppose the IGA
maintained control of Dhusamareb, the agreed capital of a future Galmudug FMS and seat of
government for the IGA.
Link Natural Resources
22. As the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference was on-going, evidence obtained by the
Monitoring Group suggests that a private extractives company entered into an agreement with the
former Galmudug State under its president, Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid”. The deal is signed by the
former ‘Minister of Petroleum and Minerals of Galmudug State’, Hared Ali Hared, who now serves as
Deputy Speaker of the Galmudug Regional Assembly. The contract apparently awards the company
the right to export minerals, gas and oil. According to a presentation prepared by Link Natural
Resources, the company appears most interested in the “very high tonnage surficial Uranium
mineralization discovered in Galguduud region in late 60’s”.
23. According to the same presentation, the proposed concession area extends will into northern
Galkayo District, and thereby into territory claimed by the Puntland. In a telephone interview on
8 September 2015 the company’s CEO, Sam McKay informed the Monitoring Group that the
company had recently discussed the matter with representatives of both the IGA and the Puntland
authorities though he would not disclose who these discussions were held with.12
24. The contract also includes, “as a gesture of goodwill”, a commitment by Link National
Resources to assist “with financing the required security essential to provide a conclusive working
environment for both parties”, raising clear concerns with regards to the arms embargo.13
__________________
12
At the time of writing, the Monitoring Group is unable to assess the extent to which either the IGA or
Puntland Government are engaging with the company or indeed, givens its apparent lack of experience in
the extractives sector, its capacity to conduct exploration in the region. A version of the presentation is
available on a company website created in August 2015: htt p://link-natural-resources.com/
13
Link Natural Resources presentation held on file with the Monitoring Group.
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Summary
25. The formation of the IGA demonstrates the inherent risks to the peace, security and stability of
Somalia involved in the federalization process. In a contest fought by a complex array of political,
clan and business networks, the FGS lost a powerful allied militia and has potentially opened a new
front of conflict as a resurgent Al-Shabaab threatens to reverse territorial gains made against it. An
important though fragile peace agreement signed in 1993 between communities living in Mudug
Region is at risk of collapsing, which could result in inter-communal conflict spreading throughout
central Somalia, and would likely prompt the total withdrawal of Puntland from the federal project.
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Annex 1.2: Bribery of Federal MPs
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 
__________________

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The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
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Annex 2
Natural resources
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Annex 2.1: Sale of fishing licenses
1. On 25 July 2013, the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources entered into an agreement
authorising Somalia-FishGuard Ltd. to be the sole agent responsible for the sale of fishing licenses on
behalf of the FGS (see S/2014/726, annex 5.1), and granting the company a 49 per cent share of the
revenues generated. However, a 21 November 2014 letter1 from former Minister Mohamed Olow
Barrow to Somalia FishGuard criticised the terms of the deal and demanded they be renegotiated.
According to the current Director General of the Ministry, Ahmed Iman, the Somalia FishGuard
contract has been suspended.2 Subsequently, the Ministry has since begun selling fishing licenses
directly, largely to China-flagged longliners.
2. The Monitoring Group is concerned that the sale of licenses, especially without a federalregional resource sharing agreement in place, has the potential to fuel corruption and even conflict. As
one of the few FGS ministries capable of generating external revenue, the Monitoring Group is
concerned over the potential for that revenue stream to be diverted around the FGS’ public financial
management system and subsequently misappropriated by agents of the state.
Sale of licenses to Chinese longliners
3. Since March 2015, the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources has sold 11 licenses,
mostly to China-flagged longliners fishing for tuna and tuna-like species, generating more than
USD 180,000 in revenue (see annex 2.1.a for a chart of fishing licenses issued by the Ministry from
March to August 2015).
4. On 18 March 2015, the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Mohamed Aimoy, told the
Monitoring Group that the Ministry was not currently issuing licenses. 3 However on 17 March 2015
the Ministry had already issued its first license of the year, a two-month permit to the Belize-flagged
trawler Greko 2. Also in March 2015, the Ministry began selling licenses to the Chinese agent Simon
Chen, representing the Yu Shian Group, a multinational fishing agency and consultancy firm.
Commencing 23 March 2015, Chen purchased three-month licenses for three vessels owned the
Hangzhou-based company Zhejiang Ocean Family, a client of Yu Shian Group.
5. Revenues from the sale of these licenses were routed to a bank account in Djibouti in the name
of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources. A remittance slip dated 23 March 2015 (attached
__________________
1
On file with the Monitoring Group.
In an email to the SEMG on 21 August 2015, Ahmed Iman stated that the Somalia FishGuard Ltd.
contract was “not active”, citing Minister Barrow’s letter. However, after reviewing the Somalia
FishGuard contract, it is the SEMG’s view that the Ministry did n ot have sufficient grounds to
unilaterally suspend the contract.
3
SEMG round-table meeting with senior FGS officials at Villa Somalia, Mogadishu, 17 March 2015.
2
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in annex 2.1.b) shows one transfer of USD 40,100 into the Ministry’s Djibouti Dahabshiil account by
Yu Shian International Pty, as payment on behalf of Zhejiang Ocean Family for fishing licenses for
the Xin Shi Ji 37 and Xin Shi Ji 76 (see annex 2.1.c for a copy of the Xin Shi Ji 76’s license).
6. The Ministry’s use of a private bank account outside of Somalia constitutes a violation of a
February 2014 ministerial directive requiring all Government revenue to be deposited in the Treasury
Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank of Somalia.4 The Monitoring Group shared the details of
the Ministry’s Djibouti account with the FGS Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim, on
18 July 2015.
IUU fishing and subsequent license purchases by Chinese longliners
7. At the 19th Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) held in Busan, Republic of
Korea from 27 April to 1 May 2015, the FGS delegation presented a paper on IUU activities in the
Somali EEZ.5 The report highlighted illegal fishing by seven Chinese longliners, all bearing the name
Lu Qing Yuan Yu or Xin Shi Ji. The Chinese delegation at the conference expressed surprise that
Chinese longliners were operating within Somalia’s EEZ, and offered to contact the vessels to ask
them to leave the area.6 Later that same day, all the Chinese longliners fishing without licenses had
left Somalia’s EEZ.7
8. Following the Chinese Government’s crackdown on China-flagged vessels fishing illegally
within Somalia’s EEZ, the companies involved immediately sought to purchase licenses from the
FGS. A Taiwanese agent, Howard Tan, subsequently purchased fishing licenses from the Ministry for
seven China-flagged longliners in May 2015 on behalf of their parent company, Deepsea Fisheries
Management Ltd.: the Liao Yuan Yu 99, and the Lu Qing Yuan Yu 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, and 108.
Six of the seven vessels had been singled out for illegal fishing during the 19th Session of the IOTC.
The payments for these licenses were made to the Ministry’s Djibouti-based Dahabshiil bank account.
9. Director General Iman subsequently wrote to Howard Tan on 29 June 2015: Dear Howard, As
we discussed before please kindly ask the below named vessel owners to pay urgently the fined vessels
US Dollar $ 10,000 each for penalty charges according to their illegal fishing time period in Somalia
marine waters without license in accordance with Somali fisheries regulations.8 The email then lists
six fishing vessels, the Lu Qing Yuan Yu 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, and 108, assessing each a fine of
__________________
4
Ibid., paragraph 64.
Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and others, “ Report on presumed IUU fishing
activities in the EEZ of Somalia”, 27 April 2015. This paper, which was presented as the 19 th Session of
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) held in Busan, Republic of Korea from 27 April to 1 May
2015, was in actuality drafted by the FAO on behalf of the FGS.
6
A “Back to Office” report prepared by a participant of the conference, on file with the SEMG.
7
Ibid.
8
Email on file with the Monitoring Group.
5
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USD 10,000. An examination of the 2014 Fisheries Law, however, reveals no legislative basis for the
fines assessed by Iman.9 It appears that he was acting on his own discretion in assessing arbitrary
amounts to be paid by the company.
10. On 15 April 2015, another Taiwanese agent, Richard Tan, questioned Hussein Ahmed, a
Ministry official, concerning the propriety of making payments to a bank account in Djibouti: I note
that this bank account is maintained in Djibouti and not in Somalia. And potentially questions will be
raised as to why the account for the ministry is being maintained in Djibouti but not in Somalia. Iman
forwarded the message to Minister Aimoy, who sent back a response to Iman in the Somali language
on 18 April 2015: Mr. Director General, please convince these people of the reasons we’re using
Dahabshiil bank in Djibouti. Thank you (unofficial translation).10
11. The FGS Minister of Finance, Mohamed Ibrahim Aden, provided the Monitoring Group with a
statement for the Ministry of Fisheries Dahabshiil account from 3 February 2015 to 25 August 2015
(see annex 2.1.d). From 31 March to 24 May 2015, the statement shows five deposits in payment for
license fees from Deepsea Fisheries Management Ltd. and Yu Shian International Pty, totalling
roughly USD 180,000.
12. By 27 April 2015, the USD 180,000 in fishing license fees had been transferred in two
instalments from the Ministry’s Dahabshiil account into its account at the Central Bank of Somalia
(#80) – as opposed to the TSA, as should have been the procedure – and withdrawn shortly
thereafter.11 On 9 April 2015, the first instalment of USD 64,900 appeared in the Ministry of Fisheries
CBS account. The next day, a representative of the Ministry withdrew USD 63,950 in cash from the
CBS account. On 27 April 2015, the remaining USD 114,700 was transferred from the Dahabshiil
account to the CBS account. The following day, USD 113,000 was withdrawn in cash from the CBS
account in the name of an individual named Hussein Dhuubow. The Ministry informed the Central
Bank Governor that Dhuubow was a building contractor owed money for the refurbishment of the
Ministry’s headquarters in Mogadishu.12
13. As of this writing, the Monitoring Group had not yet been unable to verify the identity of
Hussein Dhuubow, or confirm that the fishing license funds had been utilised towards the Ministry
building in Mogadishu.
__________________
9
The 2014 FGS Fisheries Law stipulates fines for IUU fishing ranging from USD 1,100 -1,500 for boats with
a 31-60 horsepower engines, and from USD 1 million to USD 10 million for boats with 101 or greater
horsepower. Oddly, the legislation does not stipulate fines for boats with engines in the 61-100 horsepower
range.
10
Email on file with the Monitoring Group.
11
The Central Bank records provided to the SEMG by CBS Governor Bashir Issa on 8 September 2015.
12
Email from CBS Governor Bashir Issa to the SEMG, 9 September 2015.
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Doggang Daping Enterprises Group
14. The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of a draft agreement (provided in annex 2.1.e)
between the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and Doggang Daping Enterprises
Group, a fisheries company based out of Liaoning, China. The agreement demonstrates the Ministry’s
efforts to drastically expand the sale of fishing licenses, without regard for Somali national law or
regional agreements. The agreement is written in broken English and evidently without legal
oversight.
15. The draft agreement grants Doggang Daping a seven-year exclusive right to purchase licenses for
up to 50 trawlers or purse seiners, while prohibiting other companies of Chinese origin from engaging
in fishing activities in Somali waters. With a maximum license fee of USD 250,000 per fishing vessel
per year, the potential annual revenue to the Ministry amounts to USD 12.5 million. Given the
Ministry’s past practice, this revenue would most likely be diverted into the Ministry’s private
Dahabshiil bank account in Djibouti, thereby circumventing the FGS’ Treasury Single Account at the
Central Bank.
16. Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement stipulates that Doggang Daping “may bring its own security
with weapons on board [its fishing vessels]” as well as “inside…company offices”. This clause, in
essence, authorises the company to violate the Security Council’s arms embargo on Somalia.
17. Paragraph 3 of the draft agreement permits Doggang Daping to fish within six nautical miles
from shore, as well as trawl for demersal species such as octopus and scallops. The clause twice
violates the FGS’ own 2014 Fisheries Law, which requires foreign fishing vessels to remain at least
24 nautical miles from shore in order to avoid encroaching on local fishermen; the Law also prohibits
the practice of bottom trawling. In addition, the paragraph contravenes an April 2014 agreement
between the FGS and Puntland, Galmudug, and the IJA, which held that coastal demersal stocks were
to be managed at the regional, not federal, level.13
18. The draft agreement obligates Doggang Daping to pay the Ministry a USD 70,000 “royalty fee”
to be used towards “capacity building”. This provision draws parallels to the Monitoring Group’s
investigation into Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (see annex 2.5), which reveals how the term
“capacity building” was employed by the FGS Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources in order
to solicit bribes to ministerial and other FGS officials. However, the Monitoring Group has no
evidence that the “capacity building” clause in the Doggang Daping draft agreement was intended to
serve the same purpose.
__________________
13
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19. As of this writing, the draft agreement had not been signed by either the Ministry or Doggang
Daping. Director General Iman told the Monitoring Group that representatives of Doggang Daping
had met with the Ministry in Mogadishu in the hopes of obtaining a deep-sea fishing contract, but had
been rebuffed.14 However, a 7 August 2015 email from Director General Iman to Doggang Daping,
copying Minister Aimoy and other Ministry officials, indicates the Ministry’s eagerness to cement the
agreement: Dear Colleagues, Kindly see attached little pit (sic) amended the previous Fishing
Agreement Draft Between Somalia and China. Kindly also note that we are ready to final it (sic) as
soon as possible.15
__________________
14
15
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Email from Ahmed Mohamed Iman to the SEMG, 21 August 2015.
Email on file with the Monitoring Group.
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Annex 2.1.a: Chart of FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources licence sales from
March-August 2015
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Annex 2.1.b: Remittance advice form for license fees totalling USD 40,100 for the Xin Shi Ji 37
and Xin Shi Ji 76, paid by Yushian International Pty Ltd.
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Annex 2.1.c: Six-month fishing license for the Xin Shi Ji 76, sold by Director General Iman to
agent Simon Chen
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Annex 2.1.d: Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Dahabshiil bank statement from
3 February 2015 to 25 August 2015
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Annex 2.1.e: Draft agreement between the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
and Doggang Daping Enterprises Group
AGREEMENT
3) The Daping Group interesting to fish deep sea
with 6n/miles away of the fishing coastline
and such species may take: Octopus, Squid, Ribbon Fish, Yellow Croakers, Mussels,
Scallops and they using Trawlers and pursuingBETWEEN
vessels for fishing methods for their vessels.
The Government of Somalia has its rights and responsibilities for the marine and fisheries.
THE MINISTRY OF FISHERIES AND MARINE RESOURCES OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA AND DOGGANG DAPING ENTERPRISES GROUP
4) Starting operation will be 2years fishing and research trail Daping group will bring 10
FROM CHINA ON DEEP SEA FISHING AND FISHERIES COOPERATION.
vessels minimum and the second year Daping will use 12 vessels minimum including all
together fishing and research deep sea vessels to understand and getting knowledge for the
fishing assessment on Somali’s Indian Ocean fish species. The start of the third year
The group
Ministry
Fisheriestoand
Marine
Resources
of the Federal Government of Somalia and the
Daping
willofincreased
20-50
vessels
and beyond.
Doggang Daping Enterprises Group from China hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”
The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources as first part and Daping group as Second part.
Desiring to strengthen the existing friendly relation and cooperation between the Ministry of
andfishing
Marine
of group
the Federal
Government
Somalia
andvessels
the Doggang
5) TheFisheries
Ministry of
willResources
give Daping
the permission
of at of
least
30 to 50
Damping
from China
and their
which
will beEnterprises
operating Group
and fishing
the deep
sea people.
fish species in the Indian Ocean of
Somalia.
Considering their common interests and to promote deep sea fishing and foster technical
exploration and capacity building cooperation in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit.
6) Using the fishing nets (mash size) can be no more than 50mm or 5cm as known and
international
standard.
Recognizing
that trawler fishing cooperation would lead to common benefits on marine and
fisheries and economic development of the parties.
7) Fees of Fishing Permission, the Ministry of Fisheries of the Federal Somali Government
to the
prevailing
laws
regulations
in thewhatever
Somali republic.
can Pursuant
take its fee
license
monthly
orand
quarterly
or yearly
they need as usually in
agreements. According to the deep sea fishing, the company must pay the fishing fees
before providing the fishing authorization document without delay for each year and not
installment
the feesofrate
vessels
as follows:
1) Theand
Security
thefor
fishing
vessels
and the company's offices in the ground will be given
security-guard by the Somali Government, but the company will pay their allowance and
the agreed company may bring its own security with weapons on board which may support
inside of their company offices and the fishing vessels. The government of Somalia will
8) The Ministry
Somalia
and thetoCompany
the to the
secureoftheFishery
security- of
the company
the highestDamping
standardGroup
and if agreed
anythingthat
happens
company
thein
Somali
everything
to assist
the Company.
lowest fishing
prize
whichgovernment
stated the will
fee do
structure
for the
trawler
and purse seiners
license fee of the Ministry of Fisheries, such as:
2) The First Party shall provide the Second Party with the authorization of 7 years valid
exclusive agent and permission of fishing trawlers and purse seiners for China(any other
! Under 100 tones
US $ 75,000 per year
individuals or companies from China shall not be permitted to the engagement of any
!
101
250
tones
US $ocean
80,000
per year
fishing activities in the mentioned
neither
by trawlers nor by purse seiners, otherwise
!to251
350 toneParty). And
US $the
170,000
perpart
yearis not permitted for Tuna and Tuna like
agreed
the- Second
second
species.
! 351 - 500 tones
US $ 220,000 per year
! 500 tones & over
US $ 250,000 per year
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9) Daping Group will build fishing processing plant center in Mogadishu-Somalia after they
finish (the test period exploration which is 2 years).
10) Daping will donate fishing gears to the Somali local fisheries each year. The Daping group
will increase the capacity of the Somali fishermen for giving them training and also will
give lectures about marine recourses and how to protect the sea for the fishing ministry as a
good will return to the Somali people.
11) Dapping pays 70, 000 USD of royalty fee to the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine
Resources for support of the capacity building of the ministry and purchase some
requirement materials such as of vehicles and this money Daping group will make the
payment when they are buying the first fishing licenses from the fishing ministry.
12) In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized parties respective have signed
this Contract.
13) Done in Mogadishu, Somalia on this 25 day of August 2015 in two original copies in the
English Language, both text being equally authentic.
Signed by :
MINISTRY OF FISHERIES &
DOGGANG DAPPING
MARINE RESORCES
---------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
Date....................
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Annex 2.2: The Al Amal and Poseidon, and the assault on the Auditor General
20. Corruption involving the sale of fishing licenses threatens to undermine Somali public
institutions, including the Office of the Auditor General. In January 2015, the efforts of the Auditor
General, Nur Farah, to investigate the illegal fishing activities of a vessel that had entered Mogadishu
port, may have directly resulted in an assault on his person and subsequent threats against his life.
Background
21. On 9 January 2015, the fishing carrier vessel Al Amal entered Mogadishu port, flying the Somali
flag, in order to refuel (Al Amal’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) track from 9-15 January is
available in annex 2.2.e). From 3 to 5 January, the Al Amal’s sister ship, the trawler Poseidon, had
remained in close proximity to Mogadishu port, prior to proceeding towards Kismayo and
subsequently Mombasa (Poseidon’s AIS track is also available in annex 2.2.e).
22. AIS tracks show that since the beginning of 2015, the Al Amal and Poseidon have operated in
tandem, with the Poseidon engaged mostly in fishing activities and the Al Amal serving as a carrier
ship for storing the Poseidon’s catch.16 Both vessels are owned by the Yemeni-based Burum Seafood
Co. (for the Al Amal’s registration certificate, see annex 2.2.d). The Monitoring Group has yet to
identify the beneficial owners of Burum Seafood Co., however a Republic of Korea national, An
Hyun Soo, represents the company.17
Dubai licensing network
23. Upon entering Mogadishu harbour, the Al Amal was inspected by the Mogadishu port authority.
The ship’s crew produced a one-year Puntland fishing license that ostensibly authorised it to fish in
Somalia’s EEZ from 1 September 2014 until 1 September 2015. FGS officials subsequently contacted
the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, which responded with a letter (available in
annex 2.2.b) on 15 January 2015 to the FGS, declaring the license to be a forgery. The letter stated
that Puntland only issues licenses for 45-day periods, and requested that the FGS hold the vessel so
that Puntland authorities could take punitive action against it.
24. The agent listed on the license is “Cabdi Nuur”. “Cabdi Nuur”, also known as Abdinor, is based
in Bosaso and is a “point man” of a network supplying licenses to Korean fishing vessels.18
“According to An Hyun Soo, fishing licenses for five of his vessels were purchased from this Dubai
network, at prices ranging from USD 15,000 to USD 20,000 each.19
__________________
16
Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and others, “ Report on presumed IUU fishing
activities in the EEZ of Somalia”, 27 April 2015.
17
According to a Yemen fisheries official, An is responsible for the “fleet operation” of Burum Seafood Co.,
and also assists the Yemeni Government with “maritime consulting”. Email seen by the Monitoring Group,
25 August 2015.
18
Intelligence from a maritime source based in Mombasa, corroborated by An Hyun Soo.
19
SEMG phone interview with An Hyun Soo, 25 August 2015.
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25. Iranian fishing agents also appear to be purchasing licenses through this Dubai network. At the
19th Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) held in Busan, Republic of Korea from
27 April to 1 May 2015, the Iranian delegation claimed that Iranian fishing vessels were not engaged
in IUU fishing, but rather that the Iranian fishing fleet was purchasing Puntland licenses from an
agent in Dubai.20 The Iranian delegation provided no subsequent information regarding the identity of
this agent, despite follow-up inquiries by an individual present at the conference. However, An Hyun
Soo told the Monitoring Group that Iranian fishing agents regularly purchased licenses from a broker
named “Abdulkadir” in Dubai.21 As further corroboration, an Iranian gillnetter inspected in Salalah
port, Oman, from 8 to 9 March 2015 produced a Puntland license that had been modified and was
valid only until December 2013; however, the agent field was left blank (see annex 2.2.g for a copy of
this fake license).22 The Monitoring Group’s 2013 report also highlighted the use of forged documents
by Iranian fishing dhows, providing copies of four such licenses (see S/2013/413, annex 3.1).
26. The FGS Auditor General Nur Farah also conducted an inspection of the Al Amal in Mogadishu,
informing the SEMG that the vessel was holding 70 tonnes of catch in its hold.23 Farah concluded the
vessel had been fishing illegally and attempted to detain it. A 15 January 2015 text message, seen by
the Monitoring Group, from the FGS Director General of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine
Resources, Ahmed Iman, reveals that Iman also believed the Al Amal to be an “illegal fishing vessel”.
Despite of the Director General’s and Auditor General’s positions, and the documentary evidence that
Al Amal was not licensed to fish in Somalia’s EEZ, the vessel was released on 15 January 2015 and
left Mogadishu port the same day. An Hyun Soo told the Monitoring Group that that Mogadishu’s
port authority had asked for money in exchange for the vessel’s release, but did not confirm whether
any amount had been paid.24
27. Auditor General Farah stated in a subsequent media interview that the vessel had been freed after
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud sent a letter to the Banadir Regional Court.25 However, Farah also
claimed in the same interview that the FGS Attorney General, Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, had ordered the
vessel released. In an interview with the Monitoring Group, Farah recounted he had been “told by
‘upper management’ to let [the Al Amal] go”.26 The Attorney General, conversely, told the
Monitoring Group that the Al Amal had entered Mogadishu to buy fish from local markets, and that
the vessel possessed both a valid Puntland license and a “general trading license” issued by the FGS.27
__________________
20
A “Back to Office” Report prepared by a participant of the conference, on file with the SEMG.
Text message from An Hyun Soo to the SEMG, 27 August 2015.
22
Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and others, “ Report on presumed IUU fishing
activities in the EEZ of Somalia”, 27 April 2015.
23
SEMG interview with Nur Farah in Nairobi, 21 March 2015.
24
Text message from An to the SEMG, 25 August 2015.
25
Phone interview with Nur Farah by VOA Somali, 22 January 2015, availa ble from
https://somaliagenda.com/auditor-general-breaks-silence-illegal-fishing/.
26
SEMG interview with Nur Farah in Nairobi, 21 March 2015.
27
SEMG interview with Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir in Mogadishu, 11 June 2015.
21
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As noted above, the Monitoring Group has concluded that the Al Amal’s Puntland license was a
forgery, and the Group has not been able to confirm the existence of any additional licenses or permits
carried by the vessel.
28. The Monitoring Group contacted the Puntland Government in August and September 2015 to
request information on the issuing of forged fishing licenses, but did not receive a response.
Assault on the Auditor General
29. On 18 January 2015, three days after the release of the Al Amal, the Auditor General was
prevented from entering his office at Villa Somalia and was reportedly assaulted by the compound’s
guards. Farah told the Monitoring Group that the presidential guards repeatedly brought down a
checkpoint barrier on his vehicle, forcing him to take cover in the foot well.28 Farah also told the
Group that he believed his attempt to detain the Al Amal had brought on the attack, and that he had
since stopped investigating IUU fishing because he feared for his safety. 29 Farah also claimed in
interviews with local media that his life was in danger.30 The Group is not aware of subsequent threats
against Farah since January 2015.
The grounding of the Al Amal in Puntland
30. On 5 August 2015, the Al Amal experienced mechanical problems and ran aground off the coast
of Puntland near the former pirate base of Eyl (a photo of the grounded vessel is available in annex
2.2.h). The 34-member crew31 was subsequently rescued in an operation carried out by the Puntland
Marine Police Force (PMPF). The crew was transported to Garowe and the majority repatriated;
however the captain and the chief engineer were detained in Puntland, pending possible criminal
action against the vessel for illegal fishing and environmental damage.
31. The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of the Puntland fishing license the Al Amal was
carrying at the time it ran aground, reproduced in annex 2.2.c. Similar to the license produced by
Al Amal’s crew upon inspection at Mogadishu port, this document was forged, with the fields
containing the length of its validly, dates, and nationality of the vessel noticeably altered by computer.
The dates on the license purport it to be valid from 25 November 2014 to 25 November 2015;
however, the license is signed and stamped by former Puntland Minister of Fisheries Mohamed Farah
Adan, who had left his post by February 2014.
__________________
28
SEMG interview with Nur Farah in Nairobi, 21 March 2015.
Ibid.
30
Somali Agenda, “Auditor-General breaks silence over illegal fishing”, 23 January 2015. Available from
https://somaliagenda.com/auditor-general-breaks-silence-illegal-fishing/.
31
The Al Amal’s crew consisted of 14 Kenyans, 12 Indonesians, 6 Vietnamese, and 2 Yemenis.
29
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Private Armed Security Teams (PASTs)
32. According to the Al Amal’s crew manifest, on file with the Monitoring Group, the two Yemeni
crewmembers served on board as an armed security detail. Not only was their presence a violation of
the arms embargo on Somalia, such deployments have the potential to recreate the conditions that led
to the emergence of Somali piracy in 2007, by fomenting conflict between foreign fishing vessels and
local fishermen.
33. The deployment of PASTs on board Al Amal and Poseidon appears to have been standard
practice. After leaving the vicinity of Mogadisu port on 5 January 2015, the Poseidon arrived at
Kismayo on 6 February. According to An Hyun Soo the vessel then discharged a Somali private
security detachment before proceeding to Mombasa.32 This testimony is corroborated by other
information received by the Monitoring Group to the effect that both Poseidon and Al Amal have
routinely employed Somali-origin PASTs on board.33
__________________
32
Text message exchange between the SEMG and An Hyun Soo, 25 August 2015. The Poseidon was
detained in Mombasa on suspicion of IUU fishing and inspected. Before a more detailed i nspection could
be conducted the vessel was mysteriously released, following the intercession of a Republic of Korea
national, Kim Jong Kyu, acting on behalf of Burum Seafood Co. Kim, who claims to represent the
“Mombasa Shipping Agent Company Ltd”., travels on a Kenyan passport (#C031553). The Poseidon’s
license was inspected during its port call in Mombasa; annex 2.2.f shows that it had also been altered by
computer.
33
SEMG interview with FAO consultant Julien Million, 21 May 2015.
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Annex 2.2.a: Fake Puntland license obtained by FGS Auditor General Nur Farah during his
inspection of the Al Amal in Mogadishu port on 13 January 2015
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Annex 2.2.b: Letter from Puntland Government dated 15 January 2015, declaring the Al Amal’s
license to be forged
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Annex 2.2.c: Forged Puntland fishing license for Al Amal produced after the vessel ran aground
near Eyl, Puntland on 5 August 2015
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Annex 2.2.d: Yemeni registration certificate for Al Amal
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Annex 2.2.e: AIS tracks for the Poseidon and Al Amal, showing their proximity to Mogadishu
port from 3 January 2015 to 15 January 2015, when the Al Amal left Mogadishu
Poseidon - 03/01/2015 to 05/01/2015
2.03
lat
2.02
2.01
2.00
1.99
45.32
45.33
45.34
45.35
45.36
lon
Al-Amal - 09/01/2015 to 15/01/2015
2.050
lat
2.025
2.000
20150109
1.975
20150112
1.950
45.33
45.36
45.39
45.42
lon
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Annex 2.2.f: Puntland license for the Poseidon, the sister ship of the Al Amal, altered by
computer.
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Annex 2.2.g: Fake Puntland fishing license for an Iranian gillnetter inspected in Salalah from
8-9 March 2015.
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Annex 2.2.h: The Al Amal ran aground near Eyl, Puntland on 5 August 2015
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Annex 2.3: Continuing privatisation of Somalia’s maritime space
34. The Monitoring Group believes that the continuing privatisation of Somalia’s maritime space –
through empowering private companies to simultaneous manage marine resources, issue fishing
licenses, and provide security – represents a threat to peace and security as per paragraph 8 (a) of
resolution 1844 (2008). During the Group’s mandate, two companies, Somali Security Services Ltd.
(SSS Ltd.) and Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd. (ASR Ltd.), have been granted such rights in
Puntland and Somaliland, respectively.
Somali Security Services Ltd. (SSS Ltd.) in Puntland
35. On 23 March 2015, The Somali Security Services Ltd. (SSS Ltd.) entered into a nine-month
agreement with the Puntland Government to provide Coast Guard services. In exchange, the company
will receive 30 per cent of Government revenue obtained from fishing license sales and fines imposed
on arrested vessels. The contract also stipulates that the company’s marines will be drawn from the
ranks of the Puntland police force. A copy of the SSS Ltd. contract is provided in annex 2.3.a.
36. SSS Ltd. is headed by Abdiweli Ali Taar, a former taxi driver and sales clerk from Toronto,
Canada. Taar is a close personal associate of Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas”.
When the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) placed “Gaas” under house arrest in October 2012
in Bosaso,34 while “Gaas” was still an opposition politician, he was staying at Taar’s residence.35
37. Prior to founding SSS Ltd., Taar headed another private outfit, the Somali-Canadian Coast Guard
(SomCan), which served as Puntland’s Coast Guard from 2002-2005 and again from 2008-2009.
Even though SomCan was not authorised to sell fishing licenses, the company nonetheless sold
licenses to its own private clients, with Taar signing many of them personally. 36 In particular,
SomCan favoured one client – the Thai fishing company Sirichai – and stationed its marines on the
decks of Sirichai’s fishing vessels.37 SomCan’s practices led to conflicts with local fishermen,
contributing over time to the emergence of Somali piracy. SomCan’s first Coast Guard stint came to
an end when the company’s own marines hijacked a fishing vessel they had been tasked with
guarding, the Sirichainava 12, and demanded a USD 800,000 ransom.
__________________
34
“SOMALIA: Saracen trained forces surround the home of former Somali Prime Minister in Bosaso”,
Horseed Media, 17 January 2015. Available from http://horseedmedia.net/2012/10/31/somalia -saracentrained-forces-surround-the-home-of-former-somali-prime-minister-in-bosaso/.
35
SEMG interview in Nairobi with UNODC consultant John Steed, 19 August 2015. Steed visited
Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” during the period he was under house arrest.
36
Jay Bahadur, The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World (New York: Vintage Books, 2011).
37
Ibid.
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38. Following the disbanding of SomCan in 2005, some of the company’s former marines later
turned to piracy on a more permanent basis, using their skills in maritime navigation and boarding
operations to hijack foreign vessels.38 The ranks of Somali pirates were further swelled by ex-marines
trained by Hart Security, a UK company headed by a former SAS officer, Lord Richard Westbury,
which had previously operated a Coast Guard in Puntland from 1999-2002.
39. SSS Ltd. only began operations in April 2015, and it is not yet clear if the company will
experience the same unintended fallout that plagued the last two private Coast Guards in Puntland.
The fact that the Puntland authorities are supplying the marines on board SSS Ltd’.s vessels should
help mitigate the risk, since they are likely to serve the state rather than private interests. However, it
remains problematic that a for-profit company responsible for providing maritime security to a
regional authority should directly benefit from the sale of fishing licenses. As in the past, company
officials may succumb to the temptation of selling illicit licenses to international clients, fuelling the
cycle of corruption and conflict with local fishermen that helped prime the conditions for the
explosion of Somali piracy in 2007 and 2008.
Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd. in Somaliland
40. On 26 February 2015, Sir Tony Baldry, a former UK MP for Banbury, incorporated the company
Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd (ASR Ltd.) in the UK. In August 2015, the company signed a
contract in Somaliland authorising the company to sell fishing licenses. This contract was the
culmination of a series of attempts by Baldry to conduct business in Somalia stretching back to at
least 2012, when he was still a member of the UK House of Commons. Baldry served as an MP from
1983 to 2015, when he stood down to pursue his business interests.
Somaliland agreement
41. In an April 2015 interview, Baldry informed the Monitoring Group of his intention to conduct
business in Somaliland through the newly-incorporated ASR Ltd. Baldry stated that he was
embarking on a “Coast Guard-related” project aimed at protecting Somaliland’s fishing licensing
system.39 Baldry has since denied in multiple emails to the Monitoring Group that ASR Ltd. is
involved in any Coast Guard project, but rather in a scheme aimed at “improving fisheries
management” in Somaliland.40 Baldry further told the Group that he was the “only person persevering
in trying to help [the Somali people]”.41
__________________
38
Ibid.
SEMG interview with Tony Baldry in Oxford, 2 April 2015.
40
Email from Tony Baldry to the SEMG, 1 August 2015.
41
SEMG interview with Tony Baldry in Oxford, 2 April 2015.
39
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42. On 21 April 2015, Baldry’s business partner, Ian Fenwick, sent an email to Baldry and their
other partners, with an attached photo of Fenwick posing with four Somali individuals in Hargiesa
(this photo is attached in annex 2.3.b). The email read:
Deal signed by the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources on my left. Followed by
reception at the Presidential building with the Presidential Minister who welcomed me to
Hargeisa and invited me to become a Business Ambassador for Somaliand (sic).42
According to Baldry, this “deal” consisted of an MOU with the Somaliland Government “to help
enhance Somaliland’s sea fisheries”.43
43. On 4 August 2015, ASR Ltd. signed a formal contract with the Somaliland Government granting
the company the exclusive right to fish in Somaliland’s territorial coastal waters, as well to sell
licenses to third parties (see annex 2.3.c for a copy of the first page of this contract). In exchange, the
Somaliland Government received a signing bonus of USD 500, and will receive USD 2,000 annually
from ASR Ltd., plus 40 per cent of revenues from the sale of fishing licenses.
44. The Monitoring Group is highly concerned that that the granting of exclusive fishing rights to a
foreign company may cause resentment among local fishermen and coastal communities. As in other
regions of Somalia – particularly Puntland – such resentment has the potential to lead to the outbreak
of violence between foreign fishing crews and local residents, and even to acts of piracy.
__________________
42
43
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Email on file with the Monitoring Group.
Email from Tony Baldry to the SEMG, 1 August 2015.
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Annex 2.3.a: Copy of 23 March 2015 contract between Somali Security Services Ltd. and the
Puntland Government
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Annex 2.3.b: Ian Fenwick in Somaliland to sign the Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd. MOU
(second from right)
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Annex 2.3.c: First page of the 4 August 2015 contract between Anglo Somaliland Resources and
the Government of Somaliland
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Annex 2.4: Hijackings of the Iranian dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber by pirates linked to
Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 
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
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Annex 2.5: Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited
45. As a case study illustrating the need for the establishing of strong public institutions prior to the
development of Somalia’s extractives sector, the Monitoring Group has conducted an extensive
investigation into the operations of Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (Soma). Soma is an extractives
exploration company that secured a lucrative contract in August 2013 with the Federal Government of
Somalia (FGS) to conduct seismic surveying off the country’s southern and central coast. 44 The
contract awarded Soma the subsequent right to exploit 12 offshore oil and gas blocks (totalling 60,000
km2) of its own choosing.
46. The Group has obtained evidence45 demonstrating that Soma has been making regular payments
since June 2014 to civil servants in the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (the Ministry),
some of whom were instrumental in both securing the company’s initial contract, and negotiating
subsequent agreements. A “Capacity Building Agreement” was signed by Soma and the Ministry
mainly to channel these payments. The evidence collected by the Monitoring Group demonstrates that
this Capacity Building Agreement created a serious conflict of interest, in a number of cases
appearing to fund systematic payoffs to senior ministerial officials. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of
resolution 2002 (2011) and paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012)46, the Monitoring Group will
describe acts that undermine Somali public institutions through corruption and will demonstrate how:

The Capacity Building Agreement was likely part of a quid pro quo arrangement,
whereby the Ministry would protect Soma’s contract from the potential negative
consequences of a forthcoming review by the Financial Governance Committee
(FGC), a body chaired by the FGS Minister of Finance and tasked with reviewing
Government contracts;

as a possible further quid pro quo, Ministry officials arranged to extend the offshore
area in which Soma is permitted to conduct seismic surveying (“Evaluation Area”)
and later, at Soma’s behest, began to renegotiate the Production Sharing Agreement
(PSA) for the company’s future blocks – all while on Soma’s payroll;
__________________
44
Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited is a UK-registered company incorporated on 26 April 2013, and
chaired by Lord Michael Howard, former leader of the UK Conservative Party.
45
The Monitoring Group has obtained access to numerous original documents detailing agreements
between Soma and the FGS Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. The Group has also viewed
extensive electronic correspondence involving Soma and the Ministry, and has further corroborated its
investigations through numerous testimonies from present and former Ministry and other FGS officials,
oil and gas experts, legal experts, members of development agencies, members of the diplomatic
community, journalists, and others. Confidential electronic correspondence is cited below in italics.
46
In paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011), the Security Council expanded the scope of prohibited acts
that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia to include the misappropriation of public financial
resources. This is reiterated in paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012).
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
senior civil servants awarded themselves ‘salaries’ pursuant to spuriously drafted
contracts for positions they already held;

at least six officials on Soma’s ‘capacity building’ payroll simultaneously drew FGS
civil servant salaries;

Soma transferred the first instalment of ‘capacity building’ funds to the Ministry
before performing internal due diligence on the individuals who were to receive
salary payments. The company continued to transfer funds even once their identities
became known to the company and;

Soma paid close to half a million dollars to an ostensibly independent legal advisor
to the Ministry, J. Jay Park.
47. The Monitoring Group further describes how the misuse of ‘capacity building’ in the Soma
context fits within a broader pattern of misconduct and misappropriation at the Ministry. The
Monitoring Group has obtained evidence, for example, of the Ministry’s attempts to persuade at least
one other oil and gas company to pay ‘salaries’ to its staff. Ministry staff also diverted payments from
another company into a privately held ministerial bank account in contravention of FGS regulations –
and indeed attempted to have Soma direct its funding into this account.
48. The Monitoring Group’s findings reinforce the rationale for its previous calls for the
implementation of clear legal and policy frameworks governing the engagement of the extractives
industry in Somalia. In particular the FGS should be encouraged to apply its existing legislation,
especially the 2008 Petroleum Law, in the management of both current and future oil and gas
contracts. As required by this legislation, it is critical to establish an independent Somali Petroleum
Authority to serve as regulator for the industry. The Federal Parliament should also approve current,
future contracts and authorisations – including the draft Soma PSA currently under consideration by
the Ministry.
49. The Monitoring Group recognises the considerable potential of oil and gas discoveries in
Somalia and in Somali waters, but also the threat to peace, security and stability posed by an
unregulated extractives industry. The Group has previously highlighted both the risks of corruption in
the sector, and the “shortcomings” in transparency and capacity of Somalia’s petroleum institutions
(S/2013/413 and S/2014/726). The Group will, therefore, again recommend a moratorium on all PSAs
until the necessary arrangements and institutions are in place to manage the industry for the good of
the Somali people.
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Background to the Capacity Building Agreement 47
50. The circumstances and chronology of events surrounding the Capacity Building Agreement are
integral to an understanding of how an ostensibly positive arrangement for Somalia was in fact a
scheme concocted by the Ministry, with Soma’s acceptance, in the expectation of reciprocal benefits.
51. In a May 2013 interview, the former Minister for National Resources, 48 Abdirizak Omar
Mohamed, asserted that the FGS “should wait until we have the right laws in place” before entering
into agreements with oil and gas firms.49 Three months later, on 6 August 2013, the FGS signed a
Seismic Option Agreement (SOA) with Soma, in which the latter agreed to conduct a seismic survey
within an area to be confirmed in a later “Reconnaissance Authorisation” agreement. On 9 January
2014, with the “Evaluation Area” agreed, the FGS formally entered into a Reconnaissance
Authorisation agreement with Soma (see annex 2.5.a).
52. On 21 January 2014 Daud Mohamed Omar was appointed as FGS Minister of Petroleum and
Mineral Resources. Fewer than two weeks later, on 2 March 2014, the original SOA with Soma was
sent to the newly established Financial Governance Committee (FGC) for review.
53. On 5 March 2014 Soma made arrangements for Minister Omar, Farah Abdi Hassan, the Director
General of the Ministry, and Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed and J. Jay Park, advisors to the Ministry,
__________________
47
The inclusion of capacity building programmes in agreements between extractives companies and Governments
of developing countries is relatively common. Each oil major that has signed a deal in Somalia (Royal Dutch Shell,
Total S.A., Eni S.p.A., Chevron Corp., ConocoPhillips Co., and BP plc) offers local training and scholarship
programmes in the developing countries in which it operates. However, having consulted with several independent
experts, the SEMG has been unable to identify other cases where the regular payment of senior civil servants
responsible for managing deals with oil and gas firms has been labelled “capacity building”. Analogous payment
practices, however, have been the subject of criticism: Royal Dutch Shell, Elf Aquitaine, Norsk Hydro and, most
recently, Soco International, for example, have all been accused of impropriety with respect to the making of
regular hidden payments to local security and/or Government officials in order to protect company interests. See
Afua Hirsch and John Vidal, “Shell spending millions of dollars on security in Nigeria, leaked data shows”, The
Guardian, 19 August 2012. Available from http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2012/aug/19/shell-spending-security-nigeria-leak; Global Witness, “Elf trial throws spotlight on oil and
corruption”, 17 March 2003. Available from https://www.globalwitness.org/archive/elf-trial-throws-spotlight-oiland-corruption/; Global Witness, “Statoil Hydro's Libyan “corruption” scandal shows need for oil industry
disclosure laws”, 20 November 2008. Available from
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/14446/libya_oil_scandal_points_to_need_
for_new_laws.pdf; Global Witness, “Virunga: UK company bankrolled soldiers accused of bribery and violence in
quest for oil in Africa’s oldest national park”, 20 June 2015. Available from
https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/
democratic-republic-congo/soco-in-virunga/.
48
The Ministry of National Resources was subsequently split into four successor ministries in January 2014,
including the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.
49
Katrina Manson, “Somalia: Oil thrown on the fire”, The Financial Times, 13 May 2013. Available from
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/538e9550-b3e1-11e2-ace9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3fm1LvjAB.
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to stay at Nairobi’s Fairmont Hotel from 9-13 March 2014 in order to hold meetings with the
company (see annex 2.5.b for a photo of one of these meetings).
54. On 10 March 2014, Minister Omar signed a “First Amendment Agreement” to the 6 August
2013 SOA, which was subsequently transmitted to Soma on 22 March to be countersigned (see annex
2.5.c). The Agreement included a request for “capacity assistance in connection with the supporting
work of the Government in relation to the seismic survey…” In a letter dated 15 March 2014 and also
sent to Soma on 22 March, Minister Omar formally requested “that Soma provide financial support to
the Government”.
55. Specifically, Minister Omar requested support with:
a. rehabilitation of the Ministry’s offices in Mogadishu;
b. furnishing and equipping the Ministry’s office, including establishment of a data
room;
c. the hiring and contracting of qualified technical staff and expert consultants and
advisors, inside and outside of Somalia, including covering the costs of:
i. salary or consulting fees;
ii. benefits;
iii. accommodation allowance; and,
iv. business related travel;
d.
training programs for Ministry staff;
e.
Petroleum regime development programs focused on the following objectives:
i. harmonization of Somalia’s constitutional provisions governing petroleum and
minerals issues;
ii. development of petroleum policy, petroleum law, petroleum regulations, and
model host government contracts; and
iii. conferring and developing consensus with governments of regional member
states; and
f. Other areas as may be agreed in writing by Government and Soma (see annex 2.5.d
for a copy of this letter).
56. On 27 March 2014, the Director General of the Ministry, Farah Abdi Hassan, expressed
annoyance over delays in Soma’s response to the Ministry’s request for capacity assistance, declaring
in an email addressed to the Ministry’s legal advisor, Jay Park, that the Ministry would not stand for
Soma “questioning” or “delaying” the programme. He also warned that Soma’s contractual
agreements with the FGS, both past and prospective, would be subject to review if “assistance” were
not provided: “If the SOMA questions the assistance [to] the Ministry then so many things goes [sic]
to review, while the parliament is asking to ratify the SOA agreement”.
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57. On 17 April 2014, Director General Hassan wrote to two of Soma’s directors, CEO Robert
Sheppard and Hassan Khaire, informing them that the Natural Resources Subcommittee of the FGS
Parliament had requested a copy of the 6 August 2013 SOA for review. In the correspondence,
Hassan again suggested a link between the provision of ‘capacity building’ and the protection of the
Soma SOA from official review: “[w]hy don’t you sign the [First Amendment Agreement] and
return, because, I am sure it will protect the [SOA] agreement”. The very same day, Sheppard sent a
formal letter to Minister Omar confirming Soma’s desire to move ahead with the agreement:
Soma Oil & Gas understands your request for support in regards to capacity building at
the Ministry. In the next few days, I will be writing a separate letter to you outlining
how Soma Oil & Gas proposes to support the Ministry in this regard.
58. Three days later, on 20 April 2014, Soma followed through on its pledge, and a draft text of the
Capacity Building Agreement was sent to Director General Hassan for his review.
59. Three days after receipt of this draft agreement, the FGC “Confidential Assessment” of the Soma
SOA arrived at the Ministry. While specific improvements to the SOA were recommended –
alongside more general concerns raised regarding “contracting in the oil and gas sector as a whole” –
the FGC did not make recommendations that threatened the validity of the Soma deal.50
60. The Capacity Building Agreement (“the Agreement”) was signed by the Minister on 27 April
2014 and by Robert Sheppard on 15 May 2014 (see annex 2.5.e). In the Agreement Soma pledged to
cover the salary costs, up to USD 5,000 per month each, for a maximum of six “qualified technical
staff, consultants and advisors, inside and outside of Somalia” over a 12-month period (totalling
USD 360,000). Soma also committed to “pay the cost of office equipment, transportation, and other
working tools which shall not exceed lump sum of [USD 40,000]”. The Agreement therefore capped
the total capacity support to be provided by Soma, including salary payments, at USD 400,000. The
Agreement did not include, however, any provision for funding of training or petroleum regime
development programmes, as had also been requested in the Ministry’s letter of 15 March 2014.
61. Among the conditions of the Agreement was a requirement for the Ministry to submit monthly
written reports to Soma, providing the names, terms of reference, and employment contracts for each
proposed staff member. Critically, the Agreement prohibited the Ministry from contracting any
“connected person” within the framework of the programme. “Connected person” was defined as
“any person, company, other organisation or legal entity directly or indirectly controlled by any
__________________
50
Of the eight contracts and concessions the FGC had reviewed by January 2015, Soma’s was th e only
contract on which “no action” was taken. Others were “overtaken by events” (Simatech International),
“withdrawn as duplicative” (TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA), “restructured and allegedly
signed” (CGG/Robertson GeoSpec International), “consider ed for cancellation” (Somalia-FishGuard
Ltd.), “under investigation” (AMO Shipping Company Ltd.), or “under discussion” (Albayrak Turizm
Inşaat Ticaret A.Ş and Favori LLC). Quoted from the “FGC Reviews of Public Sector Contracts and
Concessions” report, 31 December 2014.
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member of the Government or who is otherwise directly or indirectly related to or connected to any
member of the Government”.
62. On 27 April 2015, Soma signed an extension of the Agreement with the Ministry, prolonging the
duration of the programme for an additional six months, from April to September 2015. 51 Under the
extension, Soma agreed to provide further “capacity support payments” of USD 30,000 per month,
equalling a total over six months of USD 180,000.
Payments
63. On 22 May 2014 Soma’s CFO, Philip Wolfe, sent the Director General a template invoice for the
Ministry to submit. The next day, a USD 70,000 invoice for the first instalment of the ‘capacity
building’ funds, signed by Director General Hassan and Deputy Director General Jabril Mohamoud
Geeddi – who both later received salaries themselves under the Agreement – was returned to Soma
(see annex 2.5.f).
64. Following receipt of the first instalment of the Soma funds in the Ministry’s Central Bank of
Somalia (CBS) account, Director General Hassan attempted to persuade Soma to circumvent the CBS
when making future transfers. Such an arrangement would be in flagrant violation of FGS Ministry of
Finance directives, which require that all FGS revenue be channelled through the Treasury Single
Account at the CBS. On 29 June 2014, Hassan emailed Soma CEO Robert Sheppard and CFO Philip
Wolfe explaining,
I am thinking to change the route or have an account from another bank. We realized
how things gets [sic] late if we didn’t get alternative way, there are number of private
companies which are easier to use and more efficient than the central bank.
65. Wolfe refused the Director General’s suggestion, informing him that Soma would continue to
route ‘capacity building’ monies to the CBS for purposes of transparency.
66. Soma transferred a total of USD 400,000 for the Capacity Building Agreement in three instalments
to the Ministry’s CBS account. The company also transferred an additional USD 90,000 instalment in
May 2015, the first payment pursuant to the extension of the Agreement on 27 April 2015:
1.
2.
3.
4.
USD 70,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 30 June 2014;
USD 150,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 17 August 2014;
USD 180,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 13 November 2014;
USD 90,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 28 May 2015. 52
__________________
51
Letter dated 24 July 2015 from Soma to the Monitoring Group, in response to the Group’s email queries of
16 July 2015.
52
Letter from Soma to the Monitoring Group, 24 July 2015.
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67. The Monitoring Group has obtained a ‘salary chart’ sent to the Ministry by Soma in March 2015.
This chart details the ‘capacity building’ payments Soma made (totalling USD 295,800) to
14 ministerial employees from March 2014 to the end of February 2015, with projections of future
payments continuing up to June 2015 (see annex 2.5.g).53 The 14 employees listed on the salary chart,
and the amounts they are listed as having received, are:
Name
Title(s)
Received from Soma
as of February 2015
Farah Abdi Hassan
-Director General
USD 36,000
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi
-Deputy Director General
Director of Administration &
Finance Department
-Senior Management Advisor
USD 36,000
Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi
-Permanent Secretary to the
Prime Minister
-Director of Planning &
Development Department
Senior Resource Economist
USD 33,000
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar
Hussein
-Director of Exploration
Department
-Senior Petroleum Geologist
USD 30,000
Hussein Ali Ahmed
-Managing Director of the
Somalia Petroleum Corporation
(SPC)
-Director of Oil Management
Department
-Senior Economic Advisor
USD 16,000
Yusuf Hassan Isack
-Head of Public Relations
-Media Expert
USD 24,000
Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed
-Media Coverage
-Reporter
-Public Relations
USD 16,000
Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa -International Relations
USD 16,000
__________________
53
While the salary chart lists payments dating back to March 2014, the first instalment of Soma’s
‘capacity building’ funds did not arrive at the Ministry until June 2014. Thus all chart payments prior to
June 2014 represent backdated amounts paid as ‘arrears’ to Ministry officials.
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Mohamed Yousuf Ali
-Director of Legal Affairs
Department
-Senior Legal Expert
USD 32,00054
Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad
-Senior Advisor
-Mineralogist
USD 32,00055
Leila Ali Ahmed
-Administration Assistant
USD 4,200
Dr. Abdullahi Haider
Mohamed
-Senior expert &Team Leader
-FGS Advisor on Oil & Gas
-Diplomat
USD 15,000
Abdirzak Hassan Awed
-Personal Assistant
USD 4,000
Farah Ahmed Isma’il
-Personal Assistant
USD 1,600
Double dipping
68. The Monitoring Group has been able to confirm, through information provided by the FGS
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources itself that at least six
Ministry officials paid by Soma under the Capacity Building Agreement concurrently drew civil
servant salaries from the FGS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Farah Abdi Hassan
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi
Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi
Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
Hussein Ali Ahmed
Leila Ali Ahmed 56
69. The Monitoring Group has been unable to find evidence that the Capacity Building Agreement
was reflected in the 2014 FGS national budget. When contacted by the Monitoring Group, the
Minister of Finance, H.E. Mohamed Aden, stated that he was unaware of a privately funded capacity
building programme in any FGS ministry, informing the SEMG that “[a]s far as I am aware there is
no private capacity injection programs. All capacity injection programs are through multitrust and/or
bilateral donors”.57 Soma did not directly respond to a question from the Monitoring Group as to
__________________
54
Mohamed Yousuf Ali claimed in correspondence with the SEMG that he only received a total of USD 4,000 of
the USD 32,000 earmarked for him.
55
Abdi Mohamed Siad similarly claimed in correspondence with the SEMG that he only received a total of
USD 4,000 of the USD 32,000 earmarked for him.
56
The Monitoring Group notes with appreciation the cooperation of the FGS Minister of Finance, H.E. Mohamed
Aden, in supplying this information.
57
Email to the SEMG from Minister Aden, 21 May 2015.
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whether the company had notified the Ministry for Finance about the Capacity Building Agreement,
stating only that “Soma signed the Capacity Building Agreements with the Ministry of Petroleum &
Mineral Resources”.58
Profiles of officials who received payments from Soma
70. The Monitoring Group has compiled profiles, below, of the officials who received payments
under Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. A number of these officials – including the Director
General of the Ministry, the Deputy Director General, and the Permanent Secretary to the FGS Prime
Minister – occupy positions in which they routinely take decisions directly bearing on the company’s
financial interests in Somalia. As such, their receiving payments from Soma represented a clear
conflict of interest.
71. In addition, three individuals listed on Soma’s salary chart have told the Monitoring Group that
they only received a fraction of the amount allocated to them on paper. One alleged recipient of
USD 28,000 in ‘missing’ payments has asserted that he does not recognise the signature on the
payslip receipt provided to him for inspection by the Monitoring Group. It is not yet clear to the
Group who signed for or received these monies.
Farah Abdi Hassan
Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
72. Farah Abdi Hassan was appointed Director General of the then-Ministry of National Resources
in July 2013, and has retained this position since its successor ministry, the Ministry of Petroleum and
Mineral Resources, was created in January 2014. As Director General, Hassan served as the
Ministry’s primary point of contact for Soma and other oil and gas firms, affording him a great deal of
influence. An April 2014 memo from Minister Omar, seen by the Monitoring Group, stipulated that
Hassan was to be “the lead contact and the focal point of the Ministry in all aspects of
communications”.59
73. Hassan was present for negotiations over the First Amendment Agreement in Nairobi in March
2014. In May 2014 Hassan co-signed, with Jabril Mahamoud Geeddi, the first invoice for the
programme. He then proceeded to sign a new contract for his existing position – formulated by
Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi (see below) and countersigned by Minister Omar – backdated to March 2014
(see annex 2.5.h).
__________________
58
59
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This memo was attached in a 13 April 2014 email from Mohamed Ali -nur Hagi to Farah Abdi Hassan.
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74. Hassan was paid USD 3,000 per month under the Capacity Building Agreement, and by
February 2015 had received a total of USD 36,000. According to the FGS Ministry of Finance,
Hassan also draws a civil servant monthly salary of USD 1,235. Over the course of one year,
therefore, Soma made monthly payments to the most senior civil servant in the Ministry equivalent to
almost triple his Government salary.
Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed
Senior expert & Team Leader
FGS Advisor on Oil and Gas
75. Between October 2014 and February 2015, Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed held the position of
“Senior expert & Team Leader” at the Ministry, and was paid a total of USD 15,000 through Soma’s
Capacity Building Agreement. Haider was due to receive an additional USD 9,000 up to April 2015.
76. The SEMG’s 2014 final report (S/2014/726) identified Haider as a special advisor to FGS
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and one of two “key architects” of the Soma deal.60 The SEMG’s
current investigation into Haider’s role corroborates this assessment. According to a former advisor to
the Ministry, negotiations over the Soma deal were conducted by Haider, Ministry legal advisor Jay
Park, and then-FGS petroleum minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed during the Somalia conference in
London in May 2013.61 In a 1 July 2015 letter to the SEMG, Soma acknowledged that Haider
“represented the Federal Government…in the negotiations around the Seismic Option Agreement that
was signed in August 2013”.62
77. Haider’s influence in the Ministry extended beyond the Soma portfolio: on 9 August 2013, three
days after the Soma SOA was signed, Patrick Molliere, a former oil executive and at the time an
advisor to the Ministry, received an email from the Ministry’s interlocutor at Royal Dutch Shell plc,
William Sevier: “Hope all is well. We have been advised to deal with Dr Haider wit [sic] cc to
Minister”.63
78. Since 2010, Haider has been referred to interchangeably as a presidential, ministerial, or
governmental advisor on oil and gas. A regional news service stated that Haider “has become de facto
__________________
60
See S/2014/726, annex 5.1. The 2014 report also links Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed to Musa Haji Mohamed
“Ganjab”, a former advisor to FGS President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud accused by the SEMG of ties to
Al-Shabaab and of the diversion of recovered overseas FGS assets. Haider served as Director General of
“Ganjab’s” joint Turkish-Somali company, “Turksom”, which was involved in a project to build and operate a fuel
distribution business in Mogadishu, as well as secure Turkish investments in Somalia.
61
23 September 2013 email from Patrick Molliere to an oil executive, provided to the SEMG by Molliere. Molliere
served as Special Advisor to the Government for Petroleum Affairs from October 2005 to August 2013, and was
instrumental in drafting the federal Petroleum Law of 2008.
62
S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4, 1 July 2015.
63
Email provided to the SEMG by Patrick Molliere.
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the privileged interlocutor for international oil organisations”.64 Haider’s LinkedIn profile currently
identifies him as a “Senior Adviser at Commission for Petroleum & Mineral Resources” and
previously as a “Senior Adviser, Oil and Gas” from 2010-2014.65 Indicative of his status within the
FGS, Haider carries a diplomatic passport, which lists his occupation as “Diplomat” (see annex 2.5.j
for a copy of Haider’s diplomatic passport).
79. As recently as April 2015, during an oil and gas conference – after his tenure as “Senior expert &
Team Leader” at the Ministry had come to an end – Haider was again being presented as a ‘senior
advisor’ to the FGS.66 At the conference, which took place in London from 27-28 April 2015, Haider
conducted side meetings with industry executives, at which the Minister was not present. 67
80. Prior to, during, and after the period when he received payments via the Soma Capacity Building
Agreement, Haider was in a position to exert significant influence on Government decisions directly
bearing on Soma’s business prospects in Somalia. In this context, his signing of a contract with the
Ministry to serve as “Senior expert & Team Leader” was merely a temporary re-hatting of his already
existing role, in order to facilitate his receiving payments from Soma.
Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi
Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister
Director of Planning & Development Dept / Senior Resource Economist
81. Prior to joining the Ministry in April 2014, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi served as Minister of
Planning for Galmudug regional authority. From April 2014 to February 2015, Hagi received a total
of USD 33,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. According to the salary chart Hagi was
also due an additional USD 3,000 for the month of March 2015.
82. Internal ministerial correspondence shows that Hagi drafted his own employment contract, which
subsequently became the template for each subsequent contract signed by payees of the Capacity
Building Agreement. Hagi also drafted the terms of reference for his own position, “Director of
Planning and Development Department & Senior Resource Economist”, as well as that of Dr.
Abdullahi Haider Mohamed (“Senior expert & Team Leader”).
83. Since at least 9 February 2015, Hagi has served as the Permanent Secretary to the FGS Prime
Minister, Omar Abdirashid Shermarke. However, Soma continued to pay Hagi once he had become
__________________
64
African Intelligence, No. 1381, 6 June 2014.
Available from https://www.linkedin.com/pub/abdullahi -haider/87/711/723. Accessed 24 July 2015.
66
James Ball and Harry Davis, “Where there is oil and gas there is Schlumberger”, The Guardian, 18 May 2015.
Available from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/18/where-there-is-oil-and-gas-there-isschlumberger.
67
Monitoring Group’s interviews with three journalists and an oil and gas analyst who were present at the April
conference, June 2015.
65
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the prime minister’s top staffer. Hagi confirmed to the SEMG in July 2015 that he had received
‘capacity building’ salary payments up to the end of February 2015; 68 Soma’s salary chart shows that
he was due to be paid up to the end of March.
84. Hagi has provided the Monitoring Group with a copy of a decree marking his appointment as
Permanent Secretary, dated 9 February 2015 and signed by Prime Minister Shermarke. 69 However, an
11 January 2015 email from Director General Hassan to seven other senior members of the Ministry
makes reference to “A-Mohamed Hagi, the PS of office of the Prime minister”. This reference
suggests that Hagi may have been serving unofficially as Prime Minister Shermarke’s Permanent
Secretary as early as the beginning of January, and was apparently regarded as such by other Ministry
officials.
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi
Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Director of Administration & Finance Department / Senior Management advisor
85. Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi has been employed at the Ministry since January 2013, originally
under the title of “Coordinator”. Geeddi’s employment contract, signed for the purposes of receiving a
Soma ‘capacity building’ salary, lists his position as “Director of Administration & Finance
Department & Senior Management advisor”. However, his curriculum vitae, as well as extensive
internal correspondence from the Ministry on file with the Monitoring Group, identifies him as the
Deputy Director General of the Ministry.
86. In an email dated 30 July 2014, Geeddi provided a description, in the third person, of his
function at the Ministry: “Mr. Geddi is responsible for the administration and finance sector, of the
Ministry, and he’s full time employee who earns a standard salary of grade A from the government
plus bonus… [emphasis added]”. In an interview with the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2014,
Director General Hassan confirmed that Geeddi was the primary official responsible for the financial
administration of the Ministry, including the management of the Capacity Building Agreement. As
such, Geeddi was responsible for withdrawing ‘capacity building’ funds from the Ministry’s CBS
account (see annex 2.5.k for a sample of withdrawal slips with Geeddi’s signature).
87. Geeddi is a close associate of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed. At the 2013 CWC Groupsponsored Somalia Oil and Gas Summit in London, held on 7 October 2013, Haider and Geeddi were
observed to be “leading the minister around”.70 Following the summit, a dinner took place at principal
Soma shareholder Basil Shiblaq’s London restaurant, Maroush, which both Geeddi and Haider
attended. Also present were Lord Michael Howard, the Chairman of Soma, Abdullahi Mohamed Ali
__________________
68
Email from Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi to the SEMG, 3 July 2015.
Email attachment from Hagi to the SEMG, 7 July 2015.
70
Monitoring Group’s interview with a source who was present at the October summit, 4 June 2015.
69
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‘Sanbololshe’, the FGS ambassador to the UK, petroleum minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Soma
CEO Robert Sheppard, CFO Philip Wolfe, Basil Shiblaq, Jay Park, as well as other individuals
intimately involved in the Soma deal.71
88. From March 2014 to February 2015, Geeddi received salary payments totalling USD 36,000, or
USD 3,000 per month, from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement. Over the same period, he also
received an FGS civil servant salary of USD 1,135 per month.
Hussein Ali Ahmed
Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation
Director of Oil Management Department / Senior Economic Advisor
89. Between July 2014 and February 2015, Hussein Ali Ahmed occupied the position of “Director of
Oil Management Department & Senior Economic Advisor” in the Ministry. Both prior to and during
his time on Soma’s payroll, Ahmed served as Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum
Corporation (SPC), the national oil company that he was instrumental in establishing in 2007.
90. Ahmed held a series of prominent positions prior to heading up the SPC; from 2004-2007, he
served as special advisor on oil and gas to former Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, and as
mayor of Mogadishu from 2001-2004. In 2007, Ahmed also headed the Somalia Petroleum Law
Team, which was responsible for drafting the 2008 Petroleum Law, legislation that still remains in
force.
91. Similar to other officials on Soma’s payroll, therefore, Ahmed has a lengthy history of oil and
gas postings in the Somali Government. While being paid by Soma as “Director of Oil Management
Department & Senior Economic Advisor” to the Ministry, he concurrently held the title of SPC
Managing Director, a position of influence with direct impact on Soma’s interests in Somalia.
92. Between July 2014 and February 2015, Ahmed received a total of USD 16,000 from Soma’s
Capacity Building Agreement. According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, as
well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Ahmed was to receive an additional USD 8,000 up
to June 2015. According to the FGS Ministry of Finance, Ahmed receives a civil servant salary of
USD 1,135 per month.
__________________
71
Monitoring Group’s interview with a source that was present at the dinner, 4 June 2015. The source provided the
SEMG with a photograph alleged to have been taken during the dinner.
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Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
Director of Exploration Department / Senior Petroleum Geologist
93. Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein joined the Ministry in May 2014. Hussein possesses a Master’s
of Science degree in Engineering Geology and Geotechnics, and his employment contract with the
Ministry lists his position as “Director of Exploration Department and Senior Petroleum Geologist”.
94. Hussein received USD 30,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement between May 2014
and February 2015. According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, he was due to be
paid an additional USD 6,000 up to April 2015.
95. In an interview with the Monitoring Group held on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan
confirmed that Hussein is a key member of a “negotiation team”, responsible for reaching an
agreement on production sharing with Soma (see discussion of the “Draft Production Sharing
Agreement (PSA)” below), a function he exercised whilst receiving payments from Soma.
96. An email dated 27 April 2015 from Hussein to various members of the Ministry provided an
outline of the agenda for the “Exploration Department”, of which he is the director. One of the agenda
items he listed, to be completed by September 2015, was “[e]valuating PSAs submitted by farm-out
partners of Soma Oil and Gas and signing them”.
Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa
Personal Assistant to the Minister
‘International Relations’
97. While Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa’s employment contract defines his role at the Ministry as
relating to “International Relations”, in correspondences dated October and December 2014 he is
referred to as the “personal assistant” to the Minister.
98. Between July 2014 and February 2015, Warfaa received a total of USD 16,000 through Soma’s
Capacity Building Agreement. According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, as
well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Warfaa was due an additional USD 8,000 up to
June 2015.
Leila Ali Ahmed
Administration Assistant
99. Leila Ali Ahmed was employed as an “Administration Assistant” under the Capacity Building
Agreement from July 2014 to February 2015, receiving a total of USD 4,200 according to the salary
chart. However, from 8 August 2014 onwards Ahmed concurrently drew an FGS civil servant salary
of USD 735 per month.
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Possible Ghost Workers
100. The Monitoring Group has identified four officials on Soma’s salary chart as possible ghost
workers. Three of these individuals claim to only have worked at the Ministry for a fraction of the
time indicated in the salary chart; the Group has been unable to confirm the very existence of a fourth.
Mohamed Yousuf Ali
Director of Legal Affairs Department / Senior Expert
101. Mohamed Yousuf Ali holds a Masters of Law degree, and his ‘capacity building’ employment
contract designates his position within the Ministry as “Director of legal affairs Department & Senior
expert”. From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart, Ali collected USD 32,000
from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
102. On 13 October 2014 Director General Hassan suspended Ali’s contract with the Ministry, citing
the latter’s inability to be present in Mogadishu due to personal reasons. Nonetheless, according to
Soma’s salary chart, Ali’s salary payments continued until February 2015, despite the fact that he had
not been physically present in Mogadishu since late August 2014.72
103. Ali informed the SEMG that he had only received one salary payment of USD 4,000 before the
suspension of his contract, and that the Ministry never paid him an additional two months’ salary
owing.73 If true, after July 2014 Ali became effectively a ghost worker at the Ministry, with the
remaining USD 28,000 owing in his contract collected by an unknown third party. The SEMG has yet
to determine who countersigned for Ali on his payslips, or where the funds subsequently ended up.
Abdi Mohamed Siad
Senior Advisor for the Ministry and Mineralogist
104. Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad is a senior lecturer at the University of the Western Cape in the
Republic of South Africa. He holds a PhD in Applied Geochemistry, making him the only technical
expert whose employment under the Capacity Building Agreement does not represent a conflict of
interest.
105. From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart, Siad collected USD 32,000
while serving in the position of “Senior Advisor for the Ministry and Mineralogist”. However, Siad
informed the Monitoring Group that he returned from Mogadishu to South Africa in August 2014, and
subsequently gave notice of his resignation to Minister Omar and Director General Hassan on
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72
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Email from Mohamed Yousuf Ali to the SEMG, 29 June 2015.
Email from Ali to the SEMG, 29 June 2015.
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14 October 2014.74 According to Siad, he was sent one month’s salary from Hassan in the amount of
USD 4,000, but received no subsequent payment.
106. The Monitoring Group sent Siad a ‘capacity building’ payslip dated 30 November 2014,
allegedly displaying his signature; Siad confirmed that the signature was not his. The SEMG has yet
to determine who forged Siad’s signature on his payslips, or who collected the USD 28,000 remaining
on his contract (see annex 2.5.l for a copy of this forged payslip).
Abdirizak Hassan Awed
Personal Assistant for the Ministry
107. From November 2014 to February 2015, Abdirizak Hassan Awed was employed under the
Capacity Building Agreement in the position of “Personal Assistant for the Ministry”, collecting a
total of USD 4,000. According to the salary chart, he was also slated to receive an additional
USD 2,000 from March to April 2015.
108. In an email in the Somali language, Awed informed the Monitoring Group that he had been
employed by the Ministry from November 2014-April 2015, but that the final two months of his
salary payments had been “embezzled”.75
Farah Ahmed Isma’il
Personal Assistant for the Director General’s Office
109. According, to the salary chart, Farah Ahmed Isma’il received USD 1,600 from November 2014
to February 2015 under the Capacity Building Agreement, and was due another USD 800 from
March-April 2015. As of 5 March 2015, the Ministry had not submitted Isma’il’s curriculum vitae,
employment contract, or passport copy to Soma, as required by Soma’s internal due diligence
mechanism (see “Due Diligence”, below). The Monitoring Group has found no communications from
or to Isma’il within the Ministry correspondence it has viewed. As a result, the Group has so far been
unable to substantiate Isma’il’s existence.
Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan Isack
110. The Monitoring Group continues to investigate the involvement of the two remaining officials on
Soma’s salary chart, Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan Isack.
__________________
74
Email from Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad to the SEMG, 9 July 2015. Siad also forwarded his 14 October 2014
resignation email to the Group.
75
Email from Abdirizak Hassan Awed to the SEMG, 13 July 2015.
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Due diligence
111. In order to perform internal due diligence on the individuals being paid under the Capacity
Building Agreement, Soma required the Ministry to provide a set of documents for each payee:
curriculum vitae, employment contracts, passport copies, and signed payslips. Soma began
transferring the ‘capacity building’ funds in June 2014, however, before it had received any of this
documentation.76 The Ministry began submitting the required documents in early August 2014,
definitively revealing to Soma the identities of senior officials being paid, if the company had not
already been aware.77
112. As of late as March 2015 – 11 months after the date of the Capacity Building Agreement –
Soma’s representative in Nairobi was still requesting the Ministry to deliver the remaining documents
the company had demanded.
113. The Monitoring Group has found no evidence demonstrating that Soma questioned the
Ministry’s choice of payees, despite the fact that the Capacity Building Agreement explicitly
prohibited the contracting of “connected persons” defined in the Agreement as “any person, company,
other organisation or legal entity directly or indirectly controlled by any member of the Government
or who is otherwise directly or indirectly related to or connected to any member of the Government”.
Instead, Soma proceeded to transfer the remaining ‘capacity building’ funds to the Ministry in two
further instalments, accepting the Ministry’s continued and absolute discretion in selecting the payees
without prior notification. In response to the Monitoring Group’s inquiries, Soma claimed that “no
connected persons ever received payment pursuant to Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement”, despite
being aware that both the Director General and Deputy Director General of the Ministry were on the
company’s payroll.78
114. Soma failed to provide the Monitoring Group with the names, positions, and other requested
details of the individuals who received salary payments from its Capacity Building Agreement. In its
response to the Monitoring Group’s direct request, Soma provided the following:
Soma Oil & Gas has put in place a robust Anti Bribery & Corruption Policy and
Procedures. On this basis we have reviewed the passports, curriculum vitae and
contracts of all the individuals who receive salary payments from the Ministry of
__________________
76
Correspondence between Soma and the Ministry dated June 2014 and seen by the Monitoring Group.
Farah Abdi Hassan and Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi, respectively the Director General and Deputy Director
General of the Ministry, were first to receive salaries from Capacity Building Agreement. According to Hassan,
Soma was aware that both individuals would be on the company’s payroll before the transfer of funds commenced.
SEMG interview with Hassan, 11 June 2015.
78
Letter dated 24 July 2015 from Soma to the Monitoring Group, in response to the Group’s email
queries of 16 July 2015.
77
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Petroleum & Mineral Resources under the Capacity Building Programme, as well as
reviewing the monthly payroll information. 79
Soma’s statements relating to the Capacity Building Agreement
115. Soma has acknowledged the existence of its Capacity Building Agreement on multiple
occasions. In a press release dated 24 September 2014, Soma announced that the programme “will see
the Company cover the salaries of a small number of experts, including geologists and geoscientists
for a one-year period”.80 Soma’s public relations firm, FTI Consulting Inc., further acknowledged the
existence of the programme and payments on 22 October 2014:
The $400,000 commitment from Soma will enable the Ministry to employ 12 qualified
geologists, geoscientists and other professionals for a one year period – these are
individuals who will be trained at internationally recognised institutions and are
committed to making a contribution to their own country’s development through the
opening up of the hydrocarbons industry. 81
116. Only three of the 14 ministerial officials paid by Soma possess advanced degrees in the fields of
geology or geoscience. One of these, Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein, was already on the FGS civil
servant payroll during the period he received a ‘salary’ from Soma. A second, Dr. Abdi Mohamed
Siad, held a position at the Ministry for barely a month before returning home (see “Abdi Mohamed
Siad”, above). The third, Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, was a presidential advisor.
117. In an email response dated 23 September 2014 to an inquiry about capacity building from The
Wall Street Journal, Director General Hassan wrote the following: “In April 2014, H.E. Minister
Daud Mohamed Omar signed a capacity building paper with Soma (see picture on Ministry website)82
- they will help us with some office equipment and some salaries of expert staff at the Ministry for one
year”. The text of Hassan’s response had been drafted by Soma CFO Philip Wolfe, following a
22 September 2014 email in which the former requested Wolfe’s assistance: “Pls consult what to
answer? I knew that they [The Wall Street Journal] have already some hints…”
118. In summary, Soma’s official representations of its Capacity Building Agreement to journalists
and the public are in stark contrast to the events described by and documentary evidence obtained by
the Monitoring Group. Instead of being an assistance package to facilitate hiring a limited number of
technical experts, Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement amounted in many cases to extra ‘salaries’
paid to top ministerial officials who had already been on the FGS payroll prior to the programme’s
launch.
__________________
79
S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4, 1 July 2015.
Available from http://somaoilandgas.com/news/12.
81
Written response to a journalist’s query.
82
The Monitoring Group was unable to locate this photo – or indeed any reference to Soma’s Capacity Building
Agreement – on the Ministry’s website (http://mopetmr.so/), accessed 24 July 2015.
80
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Agreement Amendments Following the Capacity Building Agreement
119. Shortly after the signing of the Capacity Building Agreement, the FGS and Soma began
negotiating a further territorial allowance for Soma’s seismic exploration, as well as a draft agreement
that would grant Soma a larger share of profits from potential production (“Evaluation Area
Extension” and “Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)”). The Monitoring Group has identified
these concessions to Soma as potential quid pro quos related to the Capacity Building Agreement.
Evaluation Area Extension
120. On 8 May 2014, the Minister signed a letter extending the offshore area available to Soma to
survey (Evaluation Area Extension).83 “In light of [Soma’s] progress, it is the desire of the Ministry
that the Evaluation Area…as agreed between the Ministry and Soma be expanded to include a larger
area. The Ministry hereby requests that Soma include within its exploration Program (as defined in
the SOA) a 2D seismic survey that extends to the JORA block as outlined in the attached map”. 84 The
letter ends: “Also, the JORA Block will become part of the area in respect of which Soma may serve a
Notice of Application for a Production Sharing Agreement pursuant to Article 2.2. of the SOA”.85
121. The timing of the signing of the Evaluation Area Extension suggests that it may have represented
a quid pro quo between the Ministry and Soma. The Minister signed the Evaluation Area Extension
on 8 May 2014, fewer than two weeks after agreeing the terms of the Soma Capacity Building
Agreement. A week later, on 15 May 2014, Soma countersigned the Capacity Building Agreement.
Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)
122. On 28 November 2014, Soma CEO Robert Sheppard addressed a letter (see annex 2.5.n) to the
Minister, stating Soma’s case for revising the production sharing terms. 86 The rationale presented by
Soma for renegotiating the PSA included the fact that “much of the basin is in deep or ultra deep
water”, the unproven nature of the reserves, and the collapsing global price of oil. The letter also set
forth Soma’s wish to also include explicit fiscal terms for gas in the revised PSA.87
123. Subsequently in December 2014 a draft PSA agreement was sent to the Ministry for approval.
The terms of this draft PSA have since been criticised for being highly unfavourable to the FGS,
__________________
83
See annex 2.5.m for a copy of this letter.
Ownership of the Jora block is currently subject to a maritime border dispute between the governments
of Kenya and Somalia.
85
The Ministry later offered production sharing rights for the Jora block to another company in exchange
for a similar ‘capacity building’ arrangement to Soma’s, Allied Petroleum (SO) Corp. (see “Pattern of
Corruption”, below).
86
The original PSA was set forth in an annex of the 6 August 2013 SOA.
87
The primary impetus for the revised PSA may have been that Soma’s seismic survey had revealed larger gas
deposits than previously expected. Interview with a Western embassy official based in Nairobi, 24 March 2015.
84
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particularly following the publication of a Bloomberg article that first revealed the parameters of the
proposed deal.88 In a copy of the draft PSA seen by the Monitoring Group, Soma’s share of revenue is
stipulated to be as high as 90 per cent in some cases. Furthermore, the draft PSA grants the company a
four-year royalty holiday for oil and gas found fewer than 1,000 metres below the sea’s surface, as
well as a decade-long moratorium on paying taxes to the FGS.
124. Three months prior to the Bloomberg article, the Ministry’s own legal advisor had cautioned
against signing the PSA. In an 8 February 2015 email to Ministry officials, the advisor wrote, “…as a
matter of urgency, I wish to let you know that I am not in favor of signing the new proposed PSA from
Soma. It is not in the best interest of Somalia and, if signed, it will destroy your careers as politicians,
and technocrats”.
125. Following publication of the Bloomberg article, the Ministry issued a statement in which it
denied having received any draft PSA from Soma, further announcing that “Somalia is not accepting
PSA deals at the moment”.89 However, in a meeting with the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2015,
Director General Hassan acknowledged that the Ministry had received the draft PSA from Soma,
though he denied having personally seen it. Hassan further claimed that negotiations on the PSA had
not yet begun, although he made reference to a “negotiation team”, to which Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar
Hussein belongs. Contrary to Hassan’s statements, internal Ministry correspondence seen by the
Monitoring Group shows that Hussein sent a copy of the draft PSA to Hassan on 29 January 2015.
Both Hassan and Hussein, as previously noted, have been paid ‘salaries’ by Soma.
126. Correspondence seen by the Monitoring Group shows that negotiations over the draft PSA with
Soma have been taking place since at least late April 2015. In an email dated 30 April 2015, Peter
Roberts, a lawyer representing the Ministry from the Houston-based firm Andrews Kurth LLP, wrote
to another Ministry representative:
Soma - we had a cordial meeting and we promised to send to their lawyers next week a
table of key issues and concerns regarding the PSA draft, with a view to discussing it
with their lawyers week commencing 11 May. Going well so far.
127. The current FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, told
the Monitoring Group in June 2015 that the Ministry would not sign any PSA before a resourcesharing framework had been established with Somalia’s regional authorities. He also told the
Monitoring Group that The African Legal Support Facility, a public international institution hosted by
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88
Ilya Gridneff, “Somalia May Pay 90% Oil Revenue to Explorer Under Draft Deal”, Bloomberg, 29 May 2015.
Available from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/somalia-may-pay-90-of-oil-revenue-toexplorer-under-draft-deal.
89
AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring, 31 May 2015. Available from http://somaliamediamonitoring.org/june-12015-morning-headlines/.
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the African Development Bank, was in the process of assigning a legal consultant to assist the
Ministry in developing a model PSA for Somalia.90
Data room
128. Negotiations with Soma have taken place in a context of fundamental disparity, in which only
one side, Soma, has access to the seismic survey data.91
129. Under the terms of the 6 August 2013 SOA, Soma was required to turn over the data obtained
from its offshore seismic survey to the FGS “within a reasonable time”. Although the survey was
completed by June 2014, the company has yet to fulfil this obligation. Soma has justified the delay by
referencing the lack of a data room at the Ministry, where the data may be stored properly.
130. A February 2015 internal confidential report,92 written by an independent legal advisor to the
Ministry and on file with the SEMG, demonstrates that Ministry officials were well aware of onesided nature of the PSA negotiation. “The Somali government”, the report concluded, “without any
knowledge of the data or its contents and conclusions, is negotiating in the blind”.
131. In a letter dated 17 October 2014, signed by Director General Hassan, Soma agreed to pay the
costs of “rebuilding and refurbishment of that part of the Ministry Building that will house the data
room in Mogadishu” up to a total of USD 100,000. The Ministry confirmed receipt of these funds into
its CBS account on 18 December 2014. In February 2015, Soma requested an update from the
Ministry on how the company’s funds had been disbursed. A 3 March 2015 letter to Soma, signed by
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi, reported that “the funds are still in the above mentioned account as we
have not yet began working on the project as the site for construction is currently occupied by
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)”.93
132. When interviewed by the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan
acknowledged that no further progress had been made towards establishing a data room on the
Ministry’s premises. Hassan further stated that he lacked “a concept of what kind of room we need for
data”. Hassan could not account for the USD 100,000 transferred by Soma and referred the SEMG to
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi. Geeddi has not responded to the Group’s request for an interview.
133. The Monitoring Group subsequently obtained records for the Ministry’s Central Bank account
(#1009) that demonstrate that the funds allocated for the data room had been withdrawn by the middle
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90
SEMG interview with H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, 29 June 2015.
A London-based oil and gas analyst interviewed by the Monitoring Group on 3 June 2015 referred to this state of
affairs as “unconscionable”.
92
Report on file with the Monitoring Group since 9 September 2015.
93
A copy of this letter is provided in annex 2.5.o.
91
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of March 2015. As there are no names corresponding to the withdrawal entries in the records, the
Group has been unable to determine who withdrew the funds or for what purpose.
Pattern of corruption
134. The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence suggesting that requests for ‘capacity building’
may form part of a pattern of corruption within the Ministry.
135. The Group has in its possession a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),94 dated 24 November
2014, between the Ministry and Allied Petroleum (SO) Corp., a Dubai-based petroleum exploration
company “supported by Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Funds and major US Banks”.95 Former
Minister Daud Mohamed Omar met with Allied Petroleum CEO Justin Dibb and COO Andrew
Robinson in Abu Dhabi on 5 May 2014. At that meeting, the company expressed its interest in
signing PSAs for four blocks in the Jora region, proximate to the Kenya-Somalia border. Before
agreeing to any PSA terms, Director General Hassan insisted that Allied Petroleum provide ‘capacity
building’ support to the Ministry.
136. Subsequent to that meeting, Hassan sent the text of a proposed MOU to Allied Petroleum. The
Allied Petroleum MOU bore many similarities to the Soma MOU, with a number of the same clauses.
For instance, the MOU stipulated that Allied Petroleum would pay the salaries of eight “consultants,
advisors, or employees engaged by the Ministry”, to a maximum of USD 5,000 each per month over a
24-month period. It also stipulated that Allied Petroleum was to pay for “the establishment of a data
room”, a project towards which Soma had already committed USD 100,000. The MOU also identified
an International Bank of Somalia (IBS) account to receive the ‘capacity building’ funds, thereby
bypassing the Central Bank (see annex 2.5.q for the details of the Ministry’s IBS account).
137. The terms of the MOU make it clear that the proposed Capacity Building Agreement was
intended to be a quid pro quo for the Ministry’s granting of offshore PSA rights to Allied Petroleum;
paragraph 11 states: “The Commencement Date of the MoU shall be the date, being 90 days following
signature of PSA’s covering Offshore Jor[a] A, B, C, D”. Per the terms of the Evaluation Area
Extension agreement with Soma, however, the Ministry had already granted exploration rights of the
entire Jora region to Soma on 8 May 2014.
138. Although Director General Hassan and CEO Justin Dibb signed the MOU with Allied Petroleum
on 24 November 2014, it appears that it was never implemented.
139. The Ministry also approached Royal Dutch Shell plc with demands for ‘capacity building’. In
multiple emails dating back to May 2014, Director General Hassan repeatedly reminded Shell of its
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94
95
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The Allied Petroleum MOU is attached in annex 2.5.p.
Quoted from Allied Petroleum’s company profile.
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capacity building obligations – including granting scholarships to Somali students – as stipulated in
the pre-civil war Somali Government’s 1988 Concession Agreement with Pecten Somalia Co.
(a subsidiary of Shell). In a 20 November 2014 email to Menno DeRuig, an Exploration Manager for
Shell covering Sub-Saharan Africa, Hassan wrote:
We repeatedly ask you issue [sic] a letter for sponsoring of university students, I don’t
[know] what is [sic] the difficulties you have and you didn’t come back to us… The
attached is [sic] the eligibility letters for some of the students so please you either
directly communicate to the university and ask to proceed convincing [sic] that you are
sponsoring or simply issue letter to sponsor to [sic] deal with them.
140. Attached to the email were admission letters from USCI University in Kuala Lumpur for four
Somali students: Abdirahman Farah Abdi, Asho Osman Abdi, Rakia Farah Abdi, and Salman Osman
Abdi. All four are children of Director General Hassan. Examination of email correspondence by the
SEMG has revealed that each student’s admission to USCI University had been arranged through the
intercession of Polaris Energy Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian oil company with which Hassan and other
members of the Ministry had held meetings in Kuala Lumpur in September 2014.
141. On 24 November 2014 DeRuig responded to Hassan with an extensive list of documentation
requirements, and also informed him that Shell would be unable to fund training programmes longer
than one year in duration. The Monitoring Group is unaware of any subsequent attempts by Hassan to
arrange for Shell to fund his children’s education.
Soma’s payments to an FGS legal advisor
142. The Monitoring Group has confirmed that Soma made payments to a long-standing FGS legal
advisor, the Canadian lawyer J. Jay Park, QC, between 3 June 2013 and 6 August 2013.
143. The FGS’ relationship with Park long pre-dated the existence of the Capacity Building
Agreement and the signature of the Soma SOA on 6 August 2013. Between 2007 and August 2012,
Park served as an oil and gas advisor for the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), during
which time he was a member of the Petroleum Law Team responsible for drafting the 2008
legislation. In early 2013, Park was implicated in a petroleum bribery scandal in Chad two years
earlier, where he had allegedly facilitated the transfer of USD 2 million to the wife of a diplomat. 96 In
April 2013, Park announced his retirement from his firm, Norton Rose Canada LLP. In June 2013 he
founded his own entity, Petroleum Regimes Advisory Ltd. (PRA), and continued as an official
advisor to the FGS, a role he exercised during the SOA negotiations with Soma. In its 2014 report
(S/2014/726), the Monitoring Group identified Jay Park, along with Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed,
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96
Jacquie McNish, Carrie Tait And Kelly Cryderman, “Bay Street law firms advised Griffiths on Chad deal”, The
Globe and Mail, 26 January 2013. Available from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industrynews/the-law-page/bay-street-law-firms-advised-griffiths-on-chad-deal/article7890162/.
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as a “key architect” of the Soma deal on the FGS’ side.97 In 2013, one of Soma’s own representatives
told an international consulting firm that Park had a role “to protect all interests” – both those of the
FGS and Soma – during the SOA negotiations.98
144. In a letter to the SEMG dated 1 July 2015, Soma acknowledged that it had paid Park’s fees
during the SOA negotiation process, despite the apparent conflict of interest doing so entailed:
It was of the utmost importance for Soma Oil & Gas and the Federal Government, that
both parties had independent legal advice during the negotiations. As the Federal
Government was unable to pay for this advice which transpired late in the negotiations,
the Federal Government asked if Soma would cover its legal expenses. The Company’s
board took extensive independent legal advice before proceeding to do so. 99
145. Park acknowledged that his firm PRA had received USD 494,564.85 from Soma, through the
then-Ministry of National Resources, for legal services rendered from 3 June 2013 to 6 August
2013.100 Park informed the SEMG that on 6 August 2013 – the same day the SOA was signed – thenMinister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed “issued a written direction to Soma to pay the fees associated
with our work for the FGS in relation to Soma”.101
146. Soma failed to provide a response to the Monitoring Group’s inquiry regarding the size of the
payment the company had made to Park.102 However, both Soma and Park confirmed that the
company had issued payment to PRA on 18 December 2014. 103 Between 6 August 2013 and
18 December 2014 Park continued to legally advise the Ministry on numerous matters, including the
Capacity Building Agreement. PRA remains on retainer with the Ministry as of 19 July 2015, though
Park told the Monitoring Group that the last legal request he had received from the Ministry was in
March 2015.104
147. Despite the fact that Park’s payment was contingent on the Ministry signing the SOA – Soma
had no reason to pay his fees otherwise – both Soma and Park have maintained that their arrangement
did not represent a conflict of interest.105 However, the February 2015 report by the Ministry’s legal
__________________
97
See S/2014/726, annex 5.1.
2013 interview with Adam Smith International for an early draft of its report titled “Needs Assessment for the
Extractives Industry in Somalia”.
99
S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.25/Add.4, 1 July 2015.
100
Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015.
101
Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015. Park’s account was confirmed by Soma in the
company’s 24 July 2015 letter to the Group.
102
Letter from Soma to the SEMG, 24 July 2015.
103
Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015; letter from Soma to the SEMG, 24 July 2015.
104
Letter from Jay Park to the SEMG, 19 July 2015.
105
Ibid.; “U.N. monitors accuse British oil firm of ‘payoffs’ to Somali officials”, Reuters, 4 August 2015.
Available from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/04/uk -un-somalia-somaidUKKCN0Q829Q20150804.
98
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advisor also flagged the issue of Park’s conflict of interest, and suggested that the FGS may not have
received “adequate and effective legal representation” during the SOA negotiations.106
Engagement with Soma and FGS officials
148. The Monitoring Group contacted each of the Ministry officials profiled above, informing them of
its investigations and that their names will appear in this communication to the Committee. As of
24 July 2015, Farah Abdi Hassan, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi, Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad, Abdirizak
Hassan Awed, Jay Park, and Mohamed Yousuf Ali had been interviewed by the Group.
149. In a June 2015 interview with the Monitoring Group, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, FGS Minister of
Petroleum and Mineral Resources, categorised Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement as furnishing
“basic support salaries for these individuals that we need at the Ministry, but cannot afford to
employ”. He also assured the Group that Soma had received no benefit, and would receive none in
future, as a result of payments the company had made to the Ministry. Minister Mukhtar further stated
that he would entertain “no discussion…that those who were paid had, or will have, any influence on
oil deals”.107
150. On 18 June 2015, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to Soma CEO Robert Sheppard, requesting
that the company provide information on a number of the matters discussed above. 108 Soma sent a
reply to the Monitoring Group on 1 July 2015 and another on 24 July in response to the Group’s
follow-up questions, much of the content of which has been cited in the preceding discussion.
Background: the oil and gas sector in Somalia
Oil and gas as a threat to peace and security
151. The SEMG discussed the threat to peace and security posed by the extractives sector in Somalia
in its report in 2013 (S/2013/413). The Group highlighted both the risks of corruption in the sector,
and the shortcomings in transparency and capacity of Somalia’s petroleum institutions: the Somalia
Petroleum Corporation and Somali Petroleum Authority. It therefore recommended “urgent
international support to the Somali Government to strengthen capacity within the SPA and to create
an independently managed cadastre of oil licences, which should be linked to a clear financial trail for
any signature fees collected during any licensing and re-licensing of oil acreage”.
__________________
106
Abdulhaliim Abdurahman, “Confidential Legal Assessment of Soma Oil And Gas’s SOA, PSA 1, and
Proposed new PSA”, 6 February 2015. This report is on file with the Monitoring Group.
107
SEMG interview with H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, 29 June 2015.
108
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.23, 18 June 2015.
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152. The Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/726) described the lack of transparency and failure
to obtain parliamentary approval prior to the awarding of the Soma contract.109 In the context of both
the Soma investigation and investigations into oil exploration and concessions elsewhere in Somalia,
the SEMG specifically recommended “that the Security Council consider deciding in a resolution to
request a moratorium on all oil licensing until a legal understanding is reached between the regional
and federal authorities in respect of ownership of natural resources in Somalia”.
153. In April 2014 Adam Smith International, an international consulting firm, produced a report
titled “Needs Assessment for the Extractives Industry in Somalia”, commissioned by the UK
Department for International Development. Though never published, the report offered similar
recommendations: the establishment of an Extractives Technical Advisory Panel consisting of
international and national experts, and the provision of long-term and significant technical support to
Somali institutions engaged in the extractives sector.
154. On Soma specifically, the report notes: “We received unverified information that some pre-1991
license holders had offered to share geological data with FGS but withdrew these offers when the
Soma Oil & Gas deal focusing on data acquisition was signed. Some have also offered capacity
building support, which has not yet been taken on by FGS”.110 Under a chapter dedicated to
transparency and accountability, the report continues: “The SOA between the Federal Government of
Somalia and UK Soma Oil & Gas awarded through direct negotiations has raised serious concerns
amongst stakeholders, including the industry, about the Government’s commitment to transparent and
fair management of its extractives sector”.
155. The FGC Reviews of Public Sector Contracts and Concessions reached a similar conclusion: “In
countries with no previous petroleum discoveries, the approach taken to exploration is similar to what
we now see in Somalia. Investors submit unsolicited applications to develop production blocks,
leading to direct negotiations. These generally lack transparency and accountability, and will usually
result in sub-optimal deals… Given these considerations, and the risks to the country of allowing an
expansion of ad hoc licensing, it would be prudent for the Federal Government to postpone direct
negotiations on PSAs until a new legal and fiscal framework for the sector has been established”.111
Internal regulation
156. The Somalia Petroleum Authority (SPA) was legally established by the 2008 Petroleum Law
(Article 19) to serve as the “competent regulatory authority to regulate Petroleum Operations”
replacing the function of the then-Ministry of National Resources’ internal Petroleum Regulatory
__________________
109
See S/2014/726, annex 5.1.
Adam Smith International, “Needs Assessment for the Development of Somalia's Extractive Industries”, April
2014.
111
“FGC Reviews of Public Sector Contracts and Concessions”, 8 January 2015.
110
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Affairs Department. The SPA was to be given the power to grant certain contractual concessions to
oil and gas firms, including Reconnaissance Authorisations, PSAs, and Surface Access
Authorisations. It was also mandated to investigate individuals who contravened the Law, and entities
contravening Authorisation conditions, independently of the Ministry.
157. The Petroleum Law directed the Somali Government to create the SPA once it was satisfied that
“the quantity of Petroleum Operations in Somalia [were] sufficient to justify the costs of establishing
[it]”. Despite significant interest from numerous oil and gas companies – including both oil majors
still holding rights to pre-Somali civil war force majeure blocks, and smaller exploration companies112
– the FGS has yet to establish the SPA. As a result, the Ministry of National Resources granted Soma
both the SOA and Reconnaissance Authorisation, as well as conducted negotiations on PSAs. Its
successor as of January 2014, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, has negotiated
subsequent arrangements.
158. Even in the absence of the SPA, the 2008 Petroleum Law requires the FGS under Article 44 to
make “regular publication of all material Petroleum-related payments by Authorised Persons to the
Government and all material revenues received by the Government from Authorised persons to a wide
audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner”.113 To date, the details
of payments made by Soma to the FGS have not been made public.
__________________
112
International oil and gas companies with which the FGS has conducted recent negotiations include: Allied
Petroleum (SO) Corp., Amsas, BGP Inc., Kilimanjaro Capital, Milio International, Mubadala Petroleum, New Age
Limited, Royal Dutch Shell plc, Schlumberger Limited, Spectrum Geo Ltd., and Total S.A.
113
The same article requires that “[a]ll material payments and revenues are to [be] reconciled by a credible,
independent administrator appointed by the Government, applying international auditing standards”.
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Annex 2.5.a: Soma Oil & Gas Offshore Evaluation Area
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Annex 2.5.b: Nairobi Fairmont Hotel Meeting Photograph
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Annex 2.5.c: First Amendment Agreement
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Annex 2.5.d: Capacity Building Support Request Letter
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Annex 2.5.e: Capacity Building Agreement
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Annex 2.5.f: Capacity Building Invoice
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Annex 2.5.g: Salary Chart
4
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33,000.00
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$
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$
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3,000.00
5
$
3,000.00
4
$
Contractor(Name
3,000.00
$
2,000.00
$
$
$
2,000.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
2,000.00
$
$
$
$
2,000.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
2,000.00
$
$
$
$
2,000.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
2,000.00
$
$
$
$
$
2,000.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
$
$
$
$
2,000.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
2,000.00
$
$
$
$
2,000.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
2,000.00
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
32,000.00
32,000.00
16,000.00
16,000.00
24,000.00
16,000.00
30,000.00
36,000.00
3,000.00
G
$
3,000.00
($360,000)
$
3,000.00
$
Ju
3,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
-
$
Ju
3,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
$
3,000.00
M
$
$
3,000.00
$
-
3,000.00
A
$
3,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
$
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3,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
b
Fe
$
($30,000)
3,000.00
$
Ja
3,000.00
($30,000)
$
3,000.00
D
$
($30,000)
3,000.00
$
N
3,000.00
($30,000)
$
3,000.00
O
$
($30,000)
3,000.00
$
p|
Se
3,000.00
($30,000)
$
3,000.00
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A
$
($30,000)
3,000.00
$
Ju
3,000.00
($30,000)
$
3,000.00
Ju
$
($30,000)
3,000.00
$
M
3,000.00
($30,000)
($30,000)
$
3,000.00
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A
3,000.00
$
($30,000)
Received Amount
$
$
|1
ar
M
Mr. Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi
3,000.00
3,000.00
$
4,000.00
3,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
4,000.00
$
Dr. Farah Abdi Hassan
$
2,000.00
$
Dr. Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi
2,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
3,000.00
$
4,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
4,000.00
3,000.00
$
2,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
3,000.00
$
4,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
4,000.00
3,000.00
$
2,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
3,000.00
$
4,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
4,000.00
3,000.00
$
2,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
3,000.00
$
4,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
4,000.00
3,000.00
$
2,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
3,000.00
$
4,000.00
$
$
2,000.00
4,000.00
3,000.00
$
2,000.00
$
$
Mr. Hussein Ali Ahmed
$
$
3,000.00
Mr. Yusuf Hassan Isack
$
4,000.00
$
Mr. Abdinor Mohamed ahmed
4,000.00
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed warfaa
$
$
700.00
$
4,200.00
295,800.00
1,600.00
4,000.00
$
3,000.00
700.00
1,000.00
$
$
700.00
$
$
3,000.00
700.00
1,000.00
$
$
700.00
$
15,000.00
3,000.00
$
1,000.00
$
$
1,000.00
$
$
3,000.00
$
1,000.00
400.00
$
$
$
400.00
3,000.00
$
1,000.00
$
$
400.00
$
$34,100
3,000.00
$
$
400.00
$
$
$
$
400.00
$34,100
$
$34,100
400.00
$34,100
$
$32,700
$
700.00
$29,700
$
$
$
$29,000
4,000.00
$29,000
4,000.00
$12,000
$
$12,000
$
$9,000
Mr. Mohamed yousuf Ali
$6,000
Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad
Mrs. Leila Ali Ahmed
Dr. abdullahi Haider Mohamed
Mr. Abdirzak Hassan Awed
Totals
Farah Ahmed Isma'il
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Annex 2.5.h: Farah Abdi Hassan contract
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Annex 2.5.i: First page of a letter from Royal Dutch Shell plc to Dr. Abdullahi Haider
Mohamed, a presidential advisor on Soma’s payroll
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Annex 2.5.j: Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed’s FGS Diplomatic Passport
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Annex 2.5.k: Central Bank Withdrawal Slips
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Annex 2.5.l: Forged Employee Payslip
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Annex 2.5.m: Evaluation Area Extension
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Annex 2.5.n: Letter on Revised Offshore PSA Fiscal Terms
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Annex 2.5.o: Data Room Letter
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Annex 2.5.p: Allied Petroleum Memorandum of Understanding
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The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (the “Ministry”) is
pleased with the progress of advancing the mutual interest of both
parties, under the expected PSA’s between the Ministry and Allied
Petroleum (SO) Corp (“Allied”) (collectively the “Parties”).
The Ministry hereby requests that Allied provide financial support to the
Ministry for capacity building, enhancing the core capability of the
Ministry and its functionality, in the following areas:
1. Hiring and contracting of qualified technical experts, consultants and
advisors from within Somalia and internationally. The support covers
the costs of:
a.
b.
c.
Salary or consulting fees;
Accommodation allowances; and
Business related travel.
2. According to the terms defined in this MoU, Allied agrees to pay
salaries for a maximum of eight (8) consultants, advisors or
employees engaged by the Ministry. Such salaries in each case will
not exceed US $5,000 per month for each person (“Capacity Support
Salaries”) over a 24-month period starting from the Commencement
Date of this MoU. Allied also agrees to pay the cost of office
equipment, transportation and other working tools deemed
appropriate and necessary which shall not exceed US $60,000 and
shall be paid at a time to be agreed between the Parties.
3. Therefore Allied agrees to pay a total aggregate amount in relation to
the Ministry’s request for this specified capacity support not
exceeding US $540,000 per year (the “Total Capacity Support Per
year”) in installments on dates to be agreed between the Parties to
the official account of the Ministry.
4. Allied intends to support the rehabilitation of the Ministry’s offices in
Mogadishu; this may include furnishing and equipping the Ministry’s
office, including the establishment of a Data Room. The Parties shall
agree the form and amount of support to be provided by Allied. Allied
has agreed to undertake a needs and viability assessment on a date
to be agreed between the Parties.
5. Allied shall make the payment of the Capacity Support Salaries,
pursuant to this MOU, to the designated official bank account of the
Ministry, on a date on each month to be agreed between the Parties.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Bank Name
Branch
Customer ID
Account Name
IBAN
International Bank of Somalia
Main Branch
0015001
Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources
So22012700015001301840010
6. The Ministry shall provide sufficient supporting information to allow
Allied to confirm the use of each payment made by Allied pursuant to
this MoU.
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7. The Ministry shall provide monthly written Financial reports to Allied
in relation to the Capacity Support Salaries. The reports shall provide
the following information to Allied in respect of the Capacity Support
Salaries:
a.
b.
c.
d.
The names of the proposed employees, consultants or advisors,
and the process followed by the Ministry in selecting such
persons;
The function, role and terms of reference for the position;
The duration of the appointment; and
A copy of the contract of employment for each such proposed
persons (whose salary costs are to be paid for by Allied.)
8. Each contract of services for each person as contemplated by this
MoU letter shall be on terms and conditions that are in all material
respects standard in relation to their role and status.
9. Following the completion of expenditure by the Ministry of the Total
Capacity Support paid by Allied, the Ministry shall confirm in writing
to Allied the usage of funds for such designated purpose.
10.
The Ministry confirms that they will comply with
relevant International Corrupt Practices laws, in the process of:
a.
b.
c.
all
Execution of this MoU;
Proper utilization of financial support by Allied and its
documentation; and
Hiring and contracting of local and international technical
experts, consultants and advisors.
11.
The Commencement Date of this MoU shall be the date, being 90
days following signature of PSA’s covering Offshore Jore A, B, C, and
D.
Please confirm your acknowledgement of the proposals set out in this
MoU by countersigning this side letter and returning it to us.
Yours sincerely
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Annex 2.5.q: Ministry’s International Bank of Somalia Account
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Annex 3
Public financial management and misappropriation
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Annex 3.1: SNA financial management and misappropriation
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 
__________________

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Annex 3.2: Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi
1. The flow of funds between the FGS and its embassies has been subject to allegations of
corruption and the misappropriation of some of those funds. The Monitoring Group revealed in
previous reports (S/2012/544, paragraphs 72 and 73 and S/2013/413, paragraphs 18-21) financial
irregularities concerning the production and issue of passports and the misuse of funds collected by
Somali Government missions overseas. The lack of transparency and accountability and the absence
of financial discipline continue to be an issue. Money collected from Somali nationals for passports or
other official documents is not always accounted for in full. In fact some Somali heads of mission
consider the revenues collected or the money disbursed by the FGS as their own personal reserve.
There are no standard procedures for the collection of fees for passports and other travel documents.
Due to the fact that Somali banks are not fully functional, the monies collected internationally are
transferred to Mogadishu through remittance companies (hawalas) or sometimes in cash.
Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi
2. The Monitoring Group has discovered serious irregularities concerning the management of
public financial resources at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi and has conducted an investigation into
funds collected by the embassy for passports and other travel documents for the period January 2014
to April 2015.
3. The former Somali Ambassador, Mohamed Ali Nur “Americo”, had been in office for more than
10 years and was the longest-serving diplomat in Kenya. He was recalled to Mogadishu in early April
2015. The newly nominated Jamal Hassan began his mandate on 4 August 2015 after the Government
of Kenya accepted his credentials. Sources informed the Monitoring Group that approximately
10 days prior to his recall Ambassador “Americo” brought a team of IT specialists into the Embassy,
allegedly to perform updates on the embassy’s computers. In fact, information was removed from the
computers and many documents were also destroyed.1
4. Every Somali national applying for a passport in Nairobi has to pay USD 130 and KES 2,000
(USD 19) (available in annex 3.2.a). The Ministry of Interior requires that USD 98 of the fee is
transferred to its Dahabshiil account in Mogadishu and USD 32 is kept by the embassy. That means
that, for each passport issued, the Nairobi embassy keeps USD 51, including the KES fee. For an
emergency travel document, the embassy charges USD 55.2 According to high-ranking FGS officials
interviewed by the Monitoring Group, all of the money collected by embassies for passports and
__________________
1
SEMG interviews with former Somali diplomat and sources close to the Somali Embassy in Nairobi,
15 April and 10 July 2015.
2
For this kind of document, the embassy retains the entire fee.
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travel documents should be transferred to the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank and
from there the FGS would disburse funds to its embassies according to their needs.3
5. Applicants for travel documents at the Nairobi Embassy deposit the relevant fees into two
accounts in the Nairobi branch of the Transnational Bank. 4 Over 7,500 Somali nationals applied for
travel documents during the timeframe of the investigation. The total amount collected in both
accounts for this timeframe was USD 960,836. Two remittance companies, Amal Express and
Dahabshiil, were used to transfer the funds to Somalia. The assessments of the Group are based on the
statements of the two accounts for the period mentioned above and the transfer receipts from the two
hawalas for the same period.
6. According to bank statements, cash withdrawals were made from the two designated deposit
accounts on a regular basis but the amount of money withdrawn was not consistent with the sums
transferred to Mogadishu. According to receipts from the two hawalas, the total amount transferred
between January 2014 and April 2015 to the Ministry of Interior’s Dahabshiil account in Mogadishu
was USD 486,258. That leads to a difference of USD 474,578. The receipts show that cash transfers
were made mainly by an individual named Mohamed Ahmed Anwar (see annex 3.2.b).5 The Group
learned that he was not even an employee of the Embassy but a friend of Ambassador “Americo”. In
some rare cases, the ambassador himself made transfers to Mogadishu.
7. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocates USD 49,200 for the operation of the Embassy in
Nairobi per quarter. For the period mentioned above, in addition to the USD 474,578 from travel
document fees that was not transferred to Mogadishu, the FGS allocated an additional USD 246,000
to the Embassy. This adds up to a total Embassy income of USD 720,578.
8. Ambassador “Americo” was recalled to Mogadishu on 2 April 2015. On 4 April, Anwar made
six cash withdrawals totalling USD 9,000. At the close of business on 4 April, the two embassy
__________________
3
SEMG interviews with Minister of Finance Mohamed Aden Ibrahim by telephone, 10 September 2015,
and Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam, Member of Parliament and former Minister of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation and Deputy Prime Minister by email, 12 September 2015. Ibrahim and Adam
confirmed to the SEMG that according to Somali legislation the money collected by embassies must be
transferred to the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank. Adam also confirmed that during
her mandate she gave instructions to all Somali foreign missions to transfer sums collected to the Central
Bank, but that very few complied.
4
At the Transnational Bank’s Nairobi branch, the Somali Embassy in Nairobi’s KES account number is
15555/500TCA00/1 and USD account number is 15555/500TCA01/17.
5
When contacted by SEMG, Mohamed Ahmed Anwar initially agreed on 9 September 2015 to a meeting,
from which he then withdrew on 10 September 2015, due to an unexpected trip outside Nairobi. He
confirmed by telephone on 10 September 2015 that he had never been an employee of the Embassy but is
a friend of Ambassador “Americo”, and was acting as his private accountant. He also denied knowing
anything about the way in which the Embassy’s money was spent a nd that his only job was to manage the
Embassy’s bank accounts.
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accounts were almost empty, with respective balances of only KES 534 [USD 5] and USD 400. This
means that the Somali Embassy in Nairobi spent USD 720,178 over 15 months. For comparison,
according to the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget, the Ministry of Health received
USD 793,032 for a period of 12 months, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs USD 760,116, the
Ministry of Youth and Sport USD 572,220.
9. The Monitoring Group corresponded with Ambassador “Americo” by telephone and email
between 7 September and 12 September 2015 while he was in London. When asked about the
passport money he stated he used it for
…assistance of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma, rent of vehicles for dignitaries, assistance to
Somalis accused of piracy in Mombasa, assistance of needy Somalis in Kenya, i.e. tickets,
school fees, hospital fees, etc. Function for the Embassy. Assist Somalis throughout Kenya
who needed assistance. Paid for school fees for students who got good grades for
encouragement. Held seminars for the youth in Eastleigh, Mombassa and other cities. Paid
hospital fees for mothers, elders and other Somalis who could not pay their hospital fees (sic).6
He also claimed that all these expenses were documented.
10. The Monitoring Group contacted the Somali Embassy in Nairobi to verify if the above expenses
were accounted for. Embassy officials who were in office when Ambassador “Americo” handed over
his duties informed the Monitoring Group that the former ambassador passed on no documents
whatsoever at his departure and that even the rent payments for the embassy building were
USD 6,000 in arrears. The Monitoring Group also understands that Ambassador “Americo”
personally handled the salaries of embassy employees and all expenses.
Chinese Government grant and confusion over legal payments
11. In addition, the Monitoring Group discovered that the Somali Embassy in Nairobi received a
USD 1 million grant in April 2013 from the Chinese Government intended for the FGS (see annex
3.2.c), and only transferred USD 479,314 to the Central Bank of Somalia. The remainder was
allegedly used to pay legal fees to Ibrahim, Issack & Company in Nairobi for a lawsuit concerning a
Somali Government property in the Kenyan capital. In the 1990s, the last Somali ambassador of the
Siad Barre regime sold the premises of the Somali Embassy in Nairobi to a local businessman. 7
Somali authorities challenged the sale at the Nairobi High Court and won the property back in 2013.
12. In a letter addressed to the Finance Minister of Somalia, dated 16 September 2013 (available in
annex 3.2.d), the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Deputy Prime
__________________
6
Email to SEMG from Ambassador “Americo”, 8 September 2015.
The sale included both the former embassy building and over 9,000 m 2 of premium real estate situated
in Lower Kabete, Westlands, Nairobi.
7
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Minister Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam claimed that Ambassador “Americo” had received the Chinese grant
into his own personal account and not into the account of the Embassy. Furthermore, in this letter,
Adam stated that Ambassador “Americo” allegedly paid USD 517,686 for legal fees to Ibrahim,
Issack & Company law firm in Nairobi. Adam also stated that Ambassador “Americo” got approval
for this expenditure from her deputy, Mohamed Nur Ga’al, then State Minister of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, while she was away on official business. She claimed
however that before leaving Mogadishu, she had appointed the Minister of Justice and Religious
Affairs to act on her behalf, not Ga’al. Adam also stated at the end of the letter that the law firm’s
original invoice for services rendered was only USD 250,000 and that USD 140,000 had been
allocated in 2011 for this purpose by then-Prime Minster Mohamed Abdulahi Mohamed “Farmaajo”.
13. Adam also noted that the law firm’s receipt for the payment received indicated the sum of KES
517,686 (USD 4,916) and not USD. The Monitoring Group verified Adam’s allegations and can
confirm that on 4 April 2011, then-Prime Minister “Farmaajo” wrote a letter (available in annex 3.2.e)
authorising the releasing of USD 140,000 to
…cover legal fees for solicitors incurred in connection with the recovery of Somali Embassy’s
assets in Kenya. Furthermore the aforementioned fund is additionally intended for other
expenses that are owed by the injured people that were flown from Mogadishu to hospitals in
Kenya. The money should be handed to Ambassador Mohamed Ali Nur.8
The money was released to the Embassy on 11 April 2011, where Ambassador “Americo” was
the receiving official (available in annex 3.2.f).
14. On 25 April 2013, the law firm Ibrahim, Issack & Company sent a letter to “Americo”
acknowledging receipt of payment for USD 517,686 for fees, costs and disbursements (available in
annex 3.2.g). However a receipt from the same law firm obtained by the Monitoring Group dated
23 April 2013 indicates that sum of KES 517,686 (USD 4,916) was received from the Somali
Embassy, as asserted by Adam (available in annex 3.2.h). The Group cannot confirm the exact
amount paid to the law firm, but the fact that a payment of over USD 500,000 is far too large for
services rendered in connection with such a lawsuit raises serious questions.9 The Monitoring Group
could not verify Adam’s claim that the law firm’s original invoice totalled only USD 250,000, but the
Group has obtained information from multiple sources that the Somali business community in Nairobi
also contributed substantially to the legal expenses relating to the retrieval of the former embassy
premises.10
__________________
8
Unofficial translation.
SEMG interviews with lawyers, accountants and real estate experts in Nairobi, May to August 2015.
10
SEMG interviews with former Somali diplomat and high-ranking FGS official in Nairobi, 15 April
2015 and 3 August 2015.
9
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15. The Monitoring Group contacted Ambassador “Americo” in order to give him the opportunity to
reply. Regarding the account into which the Chinese Government grant was transferred, Ambassador
“Americo” produced evidence that he had told the Chinese to transfer the funds an account opened at
Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) in the name of the Somali Embassy and not the usual Embassy
account at the Transnational Bank. Embassy officials confirmed the existence of the CBA bank
account and informed the Group that Ambassador “Americo” closed it just prior to his recall to
Mogadishu. Mohamed Ahmed Anwar also confirmed the existence of the CBA account and its
closure by Ambassador “Americo”. The existence of another Embassy account at different bank may
have created the confusion that led to the allegation that Ambassador “Americo” had used his
personal account to receive the Chinese funds.
16. Ambassador “Americo” denied having knowledge of the Somali business community in
Nairobi’s involvement in the payment of the legal fees for retrieval of the former embassy premises.
He also stated that, to his knowledge, the Transitional Federal Government only released USD 50,000
to cover these legal fees, during the time that Nur Hassan Hussein “Nur Adde” was Prime Minister. 11
Ambassador “Americo” stated that he does not recall the USD 140,000 allocated by Prime Minister
“Farmajo” in April 2013. The information regarding the USD 50,000 released by Prime Minister Nur
Hassan Hussein is new to the Group and raises further questions relating to this case.
17. Ambassador “Americo” also told the Group that the Auditor General, Nur Farah, who has looked
into the case of the Chinese Government grant has cleared him of all suspicions.12 However, in a
telephone interview with the Group on 11 September 2015, the Auditor General confirmed that while
an investigation into the Chinese grant is ongoing, no conclusions had been reached.
__________________
11
Nur Hassan Hussein was Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia from
November 2007 to February 2009.
12
All responses from Ambassador “Americo” relating to the former emb assy premises lawsuit and the
Chinese Government grant are sourced from SEMG interviews by telephone and email with “Americo”
between 7 to 12 September 2015.
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Annex 3.2.a: Receipts for passport fee payments at Somali Embassy in Nairobi
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Annex 3.2.b: Receipt for money transfer to Mogadishu by Mohamed Ahmed Anwar
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Annex 3.2.c: Acceptance certificate of USD 1 million grant to Somalia by Chinese
Government
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Annex 3.2.d: Letter to Minister of Finance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation
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Annex 3.2.e: Letter from Prime Minister “Farmaajo” approving the release of USD
140,000 for legal fees concerning the former embassy premises lawsuit in Nairobi
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Annex 3.2.f: Receipt showing the transfer of USD 140,000 to Ambassador “Americo” on
behalf of the Somali Embassy in Nairobi
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Annex 3.2.g: Letter of acknowledgement of payment from Ibrahim, Issack & Company
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Annex 3.2.h: Receipt from Ibrahim, Issack & Company for KES 517,686
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Annex 3.3: Misappropriation of funds for Mogadishu port rehabilitation
Background to the Mogadishu port rehabilitation project
18. In 1993, UNITAF peacekeeping troops took control of the operations of Mogadishu port on
behalf of the Government of Somalia, in order to ensure humanitarian access to the country.
Operation of the port was subsequently handed over to a joint civilian board composed of
representatives from UNOSOM II, UNDP, UNCTAD, and WFP. Revenues gathered from port tariffs
were in turn managed in trust by UNDP Somalia and WFP; in July 1997, the entirety of the funds,
USD 1,003,930, was transferred into a trust fund managed solely by UNDP Somalia. The fund
collected interest, and by January 2008 amounted to USD 1,355,066.
19. In September 2008, the Mogadishu Port Authorities manager of the then-Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), Abdi Gino, requested that the funds be repatriated to the TFG. 13 UNDP Somalia
ultimately declined to do so, on the grounds that the TFG was not yet an internationally recognised
Government.14 The funds therefore remained in the UNDP Somalia trust fund.
20. On UNDP Somalia’s website,15 this trust fund is formulated as a “Mogadishu Port Rehabilitation”
project that ran from 1 January 2005 until 31 December 2014 (see annex 3.3.a). However, while UNDP
Somalia attempted for a number of years to use the funds to purchase a fixed crane for Mogadishu port,
ultimately the money was never committed to any development programme.
21. On 17 March 2014, the then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf Moallim Amin
“Baadiyow”, sent a letter to the UNDP Somalia Country Director, George Conway (available in
annex 3.3.b). The letter demanded the immediate return of the Mogadishu port funds “to its rightful
owner, the Government of Somalia”, which Amin erroneously alleged had been “acquired without
authorization and unconditionally from the Mogadishu Port by WFP and transferred to UNDP”.
22. Conway held three meetings with Amin between April and July 2014, at which occasions Amin
was “very persistent” in his demands for the release of the funds.16 Recognising that the funds
belonged to the FGS and that UNDP was “duty-bound” to return them, Conway nonetheless insisted
that the funds be routed through the FGS’ Treasury Single Account (TSA) 17 and ultimately be put
__________________
13
Minutes from a meeting held in the UNDP Somalia Deputy Country Director’s office in Nairobi,
4 September 2008, on file with the Monitoring Group.
14
SEMG interview with UNDP Somalia Country Director George Conway in Nairobi, 4 September 2015.
15
Available from http://open.undp.org/#project/00041503, accessed 28 August 2015.
16
The meetings took place on 2 April, 11 May, and 13 July 2014 at the United Nations Common
Compound (UNCC) in Mogadishu. SEMG interview with UNDP Somalia Country Director George
Conway in Nairobi, 4 September 2015.
17
This process would be in compliance with a February 2014 Ministry of Finance directive requiring all
Government revenue to be deposited in the TSA.
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towards fulfilling the objectives laid out by the Ministry’s 2014 Work Plan, conditions to which Amin
agreed.18 By this point, the trust fund had grown to over USD 1.8 million with accrued interest.
23. Conway subsequently sought advice from a public financial management advisor working with
the FGS, who in a 14 July 2014 email, seen by the Monitoring Group, concurred that the funds should
be deposited in “the government treasury rather than the Mogadishu port account”, in order to avoid
their being “spent on anything else”.19 After receiving approval from UNDP senior management,
Conway issued a letter on 4 August 2014 (available in annex 3.3.c), agreeing to release the port funds
to the FGS. The letter restated the previously agreed conditions, namely that the funds would be
transferred to the TSA and subsequently be put towards the Ministry’s 2014 Work Plan, “through
Government public financial management systems and budget execution processes”.
24. In a 5 August 2014 email (reproduced in annex 3.3.d), Amin supplied Conway with bank details
for the transfer; contrary to their previous understanding, however, the email directed UNDP Somalia
to route the funds into a newly created Mogadishu International Port account at the Central Bank of
Somalia (CBS), #1035, rather than the TSA.
25. On 20 August 2014, a transfer of USD 859,616.10 from UNDP Somalia’s office in Nairobi
arrived in CBS account #1035. On 11 September 2014, a virtually identical sum of USD 859,616.09
from UNDP Somalia arrived in the account. After deductions of banking fees, the net amount
transferred from UNDP Somalia to the account totalled USD 1,693,443.71.20
Misappropriation of funds by former minister Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow”
26. On 27 August 2014, exactly a week following the first UNDP deposit, Minister Amin sent a
letter addressed to the Accountant General, Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, and other parties (see
annex 3.3.e). The letter contained instructions specifying that only the undersigned – namely, Amin
himself, as well as the Director General of the Ministry, Abdullahi Ali Nur – would be authorised to
withdraw funds from account #1035. The Central Bank and the Accountant General in turn approved
the request.
27. On 13 September 2014, a withdrawal of USD 600,000.00 was made from the account. On
20 September 2014 an additional USD 600,000.00 was withdrawn, and a final withdrawal of
USD 493,400.00 took place on 24 September. Taken together, the three withdrawals totalled
__________________
18
SEMG interview with UNDP Somalia Country Director George Conway in Nairobi, 4 September 2015.
Email on file with the Monitoring Group.
20
UNDP Somalia later transferred an additional USD 86,932.00 on 9 November 2014 to account #1035 in
order to compensate for a previous accounting error. This amount remains in the account as of 25 August
2015. With this final deposit, the aggregate amount after b anking fees transferred by UNDP Somalia into
account #1035 totalled USD 1,806,164.19.
19
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USD 1,693,400.00 – USD 43.71 short of the aggregate amount transferred up to that point by UNDP
Somalia.
28. According to the Central Bank Governor, Bashir Isse, all three withdrawals were made via
cheques issued to the Ministry’s accountant, Ali Abdirahman, by the joint signature of Minister Amin
and Director General Nur.21 Therefore, while Ali Abdirahman’s name appears beside withdrawal
entries in CBS records, the withdrawals themselves were authorised by Amin and Nur. Given the
absence of prior or subsequent transactions, Amin appears to have created this account for no other
purpose than to receive the UNDP funds, away from the knowledge and oversight of the FGS
Ministry of Finance. The Central Bank statement for account #1035 is available in annex 3.3.f.
29. In April 2015, a former senior official with the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport
approached the Monitoring Group claiming that Amin, with the cooperation of Nur, had
misappropriated almost USD 1.7 million of port rehabilitation funds.22 The official told the Group
that he had initially questioned Amin about how the money had been used, but backed off when he
realised that the former had withdrawn it for his own purposes.23 A Somalia anti-corruption
organisation corroborated this account of misappropriation by Amin and Nur, citing testimony they
obtained from another former senior Ministry official.24 The FGS Auditor General, Nur Farah, also
informed the Monitoring Group that investigating Amin and Nur’s alleged misappropriation of the
port funds was on his “to do list”, and he requested the Group’s assistance in furthering his inquiry.25
Missing office building
30. The Monitoring Group received information that the port funds had been earmarked within the
Ministry for the construction of an office building off Corso Somalia street in Mogadishu. 26 On
30 August 2015 the Group obtained a photograph of the building site, which depicts a mostly empty
lot containing a solitary kiosk. There is no evidence that development has begun on the site, despite
the funds having been withdrawn from the CBS almost one year prior. This photograph, as well as a
satellite image showing the location of the building site, is available in annex 3.3.g.
__________________
21
Email from Bashir Isse to the SEMG, 25 August 2015.
Interview in Nairobi between the SEMG and a former senior official at the Ministry of Ports and
Marine Transport, 14 April 2015.
23
Ibid.
24
Information provided to the SEMG on 8 June 2015 by a Somalia anti -corruption group.
25
Email from Nur Farah to the SEMG, 27 August 2015.
26
Information provided to the SEMG on 30 August 2015 by the Somalia anti -corruption group, again
citing information received from a former senior official within the Ministry of Ports and Marine
Transport.
22
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31. The Monitoring Group contacted Yusuf Moallim Amin multiple times to request an explanation
for the missing funds, but received no response. As of 6 September 2015 the Group had been unable
to contact the former Director General, Abdullahi Ali Nur.
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Annex 3.3.a: UNDP Somalia web page displaying the funds being held in trust for Mogadishu
port rehabilitation
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Annex 3.3.b: 17 March 2014 letter from Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” to UNDP Somalia
Country Director George Conway
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Annex 3.3.c: 4 August 2014 letter from UNDP Country Director George Conway to Yusuf
Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” agreeing to transfer the Mogadishu port funds
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Annex 3.3.d: Email from Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” supplying bank details to UNDP
Somalia Country Director George Conway
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Annex 3.3.e: Letter from then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf Moallim Amin
“Baadiyow” authorising himself and Director General Abdullahi Ali Nur to withdraw funds
from CBS account #1035
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Annex 3.3.f: Central Bank of Somalia statement for Mogadishu International Port account set
up by Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” (#1035)
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Annex 3.3.g: Photo of the empty building site intended for a Ministry of Ports and Marine
Transport office building
Figure 1 (below): Empty building site, 30 August 2015
Figure 2 (below): Location of building site (coordinates: 2°02’26.1” N 45°20’56.2” E)
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Annex 3.4: Illegal agreement relating to the taxation of khat imports
32. The Monitoring Group has uncovered the existence of an illegal agreement between the Somali
company ADCO and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for the collection of taxes on khat
imported from Kenya through Mogadishu International Airport (MIA). 27 The agreement should have
been submitted to the Financial Governance Committee (FGC) for review, but was not, so could be
classified as part of the phenomenon of “secret contracting” as described by the Monitoring Group in
a previous report (S/2014/726, paragraphs 66-69).
33. ADCO is the owner and operator of the K50 Airport, located 50 km west of Mogadishu, that was
used for flights for the capital when MIA was closed due to fighting. Until late 2010, K50 Airport
operated all flights transporting khat from Nairobi to Mogadishu. After Al-Shabaab took over the K50
Airport in October 2010, ADCO wrote to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and proposed
to move the site for the import of khat to MIA, where they would collect taxes on the imported khat
on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. The khat exporters syndicate – the Mira Umbrella Association
(MUA) – wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance nominating ADCO as their representative.28
34. At that time the Ministry of Finance was collecting USD 75,000 per month from import taxes on
khat arriving at K50. ADCO proposed to pay the Ministry a flat fee of USD 120,000 per month. An
agreement was signed between the Ministry of Finance and ADCO on 6 June 2011. The TFG
authorised the tariffs.
35. The agreement was renewed each year and the monthly fee paid by ADCO increased as follows:
USD 300,000 in 2012; USD 600,000 in 2013; USD 650,000 from March 2014; and USD 800,000
from September 2014 (available in annex 3.4.a). The fee increases were consistent with the increasing
number of flights and quantity of khat imported through MIA. On 14 May 2015, the Ministry of
Finance terminated the contract effective 15 June 2015 (see annex 3.4.b). From this point forward, the
Ministry of Finance began to collect the taxes directly. The figures provided by the Ministry of
Finance show that USD 401,080 was collected from 15 June to 1 July and USD 1,013,652 was
collected in the month of July, already a substantial increase over the previously agreed monthly flat
fee.
36. Following the cancellation of the ADCO contract, the MUA requested on 19 May 2015 to pay
the tax on khat imports directly into the Treasury Single Account (TSA) and the Ministry agreed. On
16 June 2015, the MUA wrote to the Ministry of Finance requesting to pay a flat fee during the
__________________
27
Khat (qat, qaat, ghat, chat, quaad, miraa) is a flowering plant native to the Horn of Africa. The binomial
name of the plant is Catha Edulis. It contains a monoamine alkaloid called cathinone, an amphetamine -like
stimulant. The World Health Organization classified it a drug of abuse in 1980. The production, sale and
consumption of khat is legal in most East African countries (Djibouti, Kenya , Ethiopia, Somalia), while it
is banned or considered a controlled substance in most others. Khat leaves are usually consumed while
they are still fresh, within 48 hours after harvest, before the most potent chemical – the cathinone –
decomposes.
28
The MUA is a union of khat exporters and comprises over 40 countries based in Kenya.
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fasting month of Ramadan due to low demand. They proposed paying USD 33,000 per day. On
24 June 2015, the Ministry of Finance agreed that the MUA pay USD 33,350 per day or
USD 1,000,000 per month (see annex 3.4.c). The agreement with MUA would have been much like
the one with ADCO, but for USD 1,000,000 per month instead of USD 800,000. According to the
Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim, there was no written contract and the agreement would
have only been in place for a limited period of time.29
37. On 25 June 2015, the Attorney General of Somalia issued a decision declaring that the Minister
of Finance’s order regarding the taxation of khat by way of a flat monthly fee is against a Council of
Ministers’ decision and Somali fiscal legislation, and therefore must be stopped (see annex 3.4.d). The
decision also stated:
The Attorney General’s Office will embark on an investigation as to why illegal
modifications/amendments and lowering of taxes were made with regards to the khat tariff
regime, bearing in mind that we are all aware of the financial difficulties the country is
facing.30
The Ministry of Finance complied fully with the decision and started collecting import taxes on
khat through the Customs Office.
38. Tax collection by a private company or entity which pays the government a flat fee and then is
permitted to keep the difference in revenues gathered is unacceptable according to international
standards. It is also illegal according to Somali fiscal legislation. The Customs Law No. 1, article 5
“Payment of Duties and Charges” states:
The obligation to pay customs duty shall include the obligation to pay when due any
duties or charges due upon the goods, the collection of which is a responsibility of the
customs authorities, and such payment shall be made before the goods leave the customs
area.31
39. The last tariff for the import of khat was set by the FGS at USD 2,000 per tonne. With an
average of 21 tonnes imported into Mogadishu per day, this equates to possible revenues of USD
42,000 in taxes (USD 1,260,000 per month or USD 15,120,000 per year). Therefore even at the
highest flat fee paid by ADCO of USD 800,000 per month (USD 9,600,000 per year 32) the FGS failed
to collect around USD 5,520,000 per year. In addition to the monthly flat fee paid to the FGS, ADCO
was paying an average of USD 100,000 per month to the local authorities of Benadir region.33
40. In addition to the average 21 tonnes per day of khat that are imported in Mogadishu, another 21
to 28 tonnes per day are directed to Belet Weine, Adado, Galkayo or other cities according to demand.
The Kenyan company Bluebird Aviation operates an average of six flights per day from Wilson
__________________
29
Email to the SEMG by the Minister of Finance, 9 September 2015.
Unofficial translation.
31
The Customs Law in Somalia dates to 31 March 1961, but remains the legislation actu ally in place.
32
This is the exact amount projected in the 2015 Budget for annual taxation on the import of khat.
33
SEMG interview with senior FGS official in Mogadishu, 3 June 2015, and confirmed by sources inside MIA.
30
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Airport in Nairobi to Somalia. Three of them land at Mogadishu International Airport and another
three in different regions, according to the current demand. Another company, Skyward Express,
operates one flight per day to Mogadishu. Kismayo is supplied separately with one daily flight. In
northern Somalia, khat is also imported from Ethiopia and Djibouti by road.
41. A conservative estimate suggests that on average a total of 70 tonnes of khat enters Somalia
daily. At an average market value of USD 15,000 per tonne, up to USD 1,050,000 worth of khat is
imported daily and USD 383,250,000 is imported annually. This makes it one of the most lucrative
businesses in the country. In terms of projected budgetary income, the import of khat comes in second
after telecommunications. According to the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget, the
telecommunications sector leads in terms of revenues generated at USD 13 million per year, followed
by the taxation of imported khat at USD 9.6 million per year. The value of potential revenues
generated from the taxation of imported khat amounts to three times more than import taxes on
petroleum (USD 3.1 million) and the taxation of money remittance companies (USD 3.6 million), and
four times more than taxes on the import of sugar (USD 2.2 million). The projected income from the
taxation of imported khat of USD 9.6 million is based solely on the ADCO contribution, which
represents less than one-third of the total khat imported to Somalia, so government revenues could
likely be much higher if properly administered.
42. In addition to the social and economic impacts of khat consumption, the issue of lost government
revenue is particularly concerning. At the latest FGS import tariff of USD 2,000 per tonne, and with
an estimated 25,550 tonnes of khat imported into Somalia per year, a total of over USD 51 million
should be collected. But in 2015, only USD 9.6 million of revenues from the taxation of khat imports
was forecast in the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget.
43. An improvement in tax collection on khat imports is possible. The Ministry of Finance take-over
of the tax collection on khat imports should increase the revenues by 40 to 50 per cent, to as much as
USD 14 to 15 million per year. An agreement with Somalia’s regional governments and with Bluebird
Aviation Company to collect taxes on all the khat flown into the country could again double
government revenues, as currently there is no accountability for tax collection on khat outside MIA,
or how that money is used.
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Annex 3.4.a: Final agreement between FGS and ADCO, September 2014
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Annex 3.4.b: Letter from FGS terminating ADCO contract, May 2015
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Annex 3.4.c: Letter from FGS agreeing payment terms by MUA, June 2015
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Annex 3.4.d: Letter from the Attorney General’s Office outlining the decision regarding
the taxation of khat imports
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Annex 4
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
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Annex 4.1: Mogadishu hotel attacks
1. In the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2014/726, annex 1.3), the Group noted
Al-Shabaab’s more frequent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and in particular the
“growing modification” in the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).
During the mandate, Al-Shabaab has continued to carry out frequent ‘complex’ terror attacks in
Mogadishu using VBIEDs. The group’s most typical Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) is
to use a VBIED to breach a perimeter, after which suicide gunmen or suicide bombers penetrate
through the breach towards an inner target. The preferred targets during this mandate have been
prominent Mogadishu hotels, often those at which Members of Parliament (MPs) or foreign
delegates habitually congregate. Four such attacks are profiled below.
2. In its last report, the Monitoring Group commented on the level of infiltration of the Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS) security forces by Al-Shabaab, and even indicated that the
Amniyat had “infiltrated the FGS at the highest levels” (S/2014/726, annex 1.3). In at least two
of the four cases profiled below, potential Al-Shabaab infiltration of the security forces, in
particular the police and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), appears to have
played a role in the attacks.
Jazeera Palace Hotel (26 July 2015)
3. On 26 July 2015, a lorry carrying a VBIED rammed the gate of the Jazeera Palace Hotel,
which housed both the Chinese Embassy in Mogadishu as well as other diplomatic missions. At
least 13 people were killed, including a Somali journalist. The attack was notable for being the
largest bomb employed in a terror attack in Somalia since 4 October 2011, when a suicide
bomber drove a VBIED into a Transitional Federal Government complex in Mogadishu, killing
100 people, mostly students queuing for Turkish scholarships. The size of the blast indicated an
explosives weight of roughly 400 kg of TNT or 2,000 kg of HME (homemade explosives).1
Annex 4.1.a displays two photographs of the lorry containing the VBIED, shortly prior to
detonation.
4. According to credible information,2 the lorry was able to access the point of detonation
because concrete barriers had been shifted the day before the attack. The reported rationale for
this movement of these barriers was to allow access to vehicles engaged in the eviction of
squatters from a neighbouring building.3 If so, it is possible that the attackers had received prior
information of the movement of the barriers from FGS security forces personnel involved with
shifting the barriers.
__________________
1
Estimate provided by an international agency and private security company on the ground in Mogadishu.
Provided by an FGS security agency.
3
Ibid.
2
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5. Additional credible information suggests that an FGS police commander as well as other
officers had been arrested over their possible collaboration with the attackers, again suggesting
potential Al-Shabaab infiltration of FGS security forces.
Makka Al-Mukarama Hotel (27 March 2015)
6. In a demonstration of the typical Al-Shabaab TTP discussed above, a VBIED detonated at
the gate of Makka Al-Mukarama Hotel, which lies on the road linking Villa Somalia to the
airport, on 27 March 2015. Five gunmen clad in Somali National Army (SNA) uniforms then
entered the compound, initiating a siege that ended only hours later, when NISA special forces
(Gashaan) stormed the building. At least 14 people were killed, including the FGS Ambassador
to Switzerland, Yusuf Mohamed Ismail “Bari-Bari”.
Central Hotel (20 February 2015)
7. In another example of the typical TTP, on 20 February 2015 a pre-deployed VBIED
exploded inside the compound of the Central Hotel, where FGS officials were engaged in Friday
prayers. Following the breach at the main gate, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber penetrated the
compound and blew himself up, according to police.4
8. At least 10 people were killed in the attack. The FGS Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamed
Omar Arte, was present at the hotel and was injured during the attack, while two MPs were
killed.5
9. Lul Ahmed Dahir, a Dutch national who worked at the hotel reception, is believed to have
facilitated the entry of the VBIED into the Central Hotel compound.
Figure 1 (below): Scene of the Central Hotel attack
__________________
4
Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Suicide attack targets Somali officials in hotel, kills 10 people”, Reuters,
20 February 2015.
5
One Western security source in Mogadishu suggested that Arte was the primary target of the attack.
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SYL Hotel (22 January 2015)
10. On 22 January 2015, a VBIED exploded at the gate of the SYL Hotel, located in the vicinity
of Villa Somalia. At the time of the attack a bilateral meeting between FGS officials and Turkish
delegates was taking place, one day before Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was due to
visit Mogadishu. At least two police officers were killed in the explosion, though no members of
the Turkish delegation were harmed.6
11. The Monitoring Group obtained a copy of a preliminary report, in the Somali language,
prepared by a national committee appointed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to investigate
the SYL attack. The report revealed that in the aftermath of the incident, police removed or
looted evidence from the scene, including the mobile phone used by one of the attackers. The
owner of the vehicle used in the attack, identified as a 2002 white Toyota Ipsum, was taken into
custody. In addition, the report concluded that,
… at least 30 minutes before the explosion, the police that were assigned to the strategic
venues that were essential to the security of the hotel and the guests had vacated their
positions (unofficial translation).
12. In early March 2015, 11 members of the security forces – including three Al-Shabaab
defectors working for NISA – were arrested in connection to the SYL attack.7 Both of these
events appear to indicate that infiltration by Al-Shabaab of the security forces, including NISA,
was a factor in the planning of the SYL attack. However, by 11 June 2015, according to FGS
Attorney General Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, all 11 suspects had been released.8
__________________
6
Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Bomb explodes near Turkish delegation in Somalia day before president’s
visit”, Reuters, 22 January 2015.
7
Information provided to the SEMG by a senior FGS intelligence official, 19 March 2015.
8
SEMG interview with Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir in Mogadishu, 11 June 2015.
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Annex 4.1.a: Lorry used to transport VBIED to the Jazeera Hotel, shortly before
the detonation
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Annex 4.2: Garissa University College attack
Overview
13. In the early morning hours of 2 April 2015, four Al-Shabaab gunmen9 stormed the campus
of Garissa University College in North-Eastern Kenya, roughly 150 km from the border with
Somalia. After killing at least a dozen students in an initial massacre, the militants herded others
into Elgon B, a dormitory for female students, and barricaded themselves within (see satellite
image in annex 4.2.f for the route taken by the attackers). The dormitory was strategically
located in the rear of the university’s campus and offered clear lines of sight across multiple
directions and approach vectors. Indeed, once the militants had entered the dormitory, one
gunman ascended to the second floor stairway, which he used as a sniper’s nest to fend off
Kenyan security forces personnel, as well as shoot at students sheltering in a neighbouring
dormitory across a field (a photo of this sniping position is provided in annex 4.2.d).
14. Kenyan security forces personnel were slow to arrive on the scene. The General Service
Unit’s (GSU) elite commando unit, RECCE Squad, eventually arrived from Nairobi in the late
afternoon and launched an assault on the dormitory, killing all four gunmen.10 By roughly 6 p.m.
the siege had ended. By that time the militants had executed over a hundred students holed up in
the dormitory. The aggregate death toll from the attack amounted to 148, marking the attack as
the deadliest on Kenyan soil since the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi.
15. Following the attack, the Kenyan Government quickly named the Al-Shabaab regional
leader Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere” (“long arms”) as its mastermind, and raised the
bounty on his capture (see annex 4.2.c for a photo of “Gamadheere”). “Gamadheere” had been
previously linked to two Garissa church attacks in 2012, as well as the more recent 22 November
2014 massacre of bus passengers near Mandera.
Timeline of the Garissa University Attack
Prior to attack
 Multiple security sources informed the Monitoring Group that the attackers were present
in Garissa 10-14 days prior to the attack, moving between residences in Garissa’s market
district (Bulo Mugdi).
__________________
9
The gunmen were armed with AK-47 assault rifles and grenades; while it was widely reported in the media
that they were equipped with suicide vests, the Monitoring Group has determined this not to be the case.
SEMG interviews with Garissa University College campus security officer, 17 June 2015, and regional
security source, 18 June 2015. However, one of the militants may have rigged a number of grenades to serve
as a makeshift suicide device.
10
Abdirahim Abdullahi, a law graduate and the son of a prominent Mandera official, was identified as one of
the gunmen killed in the attack.
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2 April 2015
05:30-06:30:
 Four attackers reach the main gate at Garissa University College in two Toyota Proboxes.
They shoot dead two unarmed guards manning the gate and injure two others. The
militants’ entry to the campus is facilitated by an unsecured pedestrian gate, which is
open to allow residents of the town to attend the campus mosque for Friday prayer;
 Two additional guards run into the campus mosque for cover and are unharmed;
 The attackers engage two policemen once inside the compound; the latter quickly retreat
following a brief exchange of fire;
 The gunmen proceed to a classroom being used as a Good Friday prayer centre, where
they shoot and kill between 12 and 18 students engaged in prayer or working on school
assignments;
 The attacks split into two teams, herding students towards the Elgon dormitories at the
South-Eastern end of the campus;
 Between 107 and 113 students are massacred in Elgon B dormitory, the majority within
an hour of the attackers entering the campus.
06:30-06:45:
 Police officers arrive at the university campus and begin to cordon off the scene.
07:00-07:30:
 Kenya Defence Force (KDF) special forces troops from the nearby Garissa barracks
arrive at the campus.
10:00:
 Mobile phone coverage to the surrounding area is switched off.
12:45:
 Al-Shabaab-linked media outlets announces a recent press conference held by
Al-Shabaab military spokesman Sheikh Abdulaziz Abu Muscab, in which the group
claims responsibility for the attack.
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14:00-15:00:
 GSU RECCE squad arrives in Garissa.
17:00-18:00:
 GSU RECCE squad storms the dormitory, bringing the siege to a close.
3 April 2015
 A survivor of the attack, Tanzania national Rashid Charles Mberesero, is found hiding in
Elgon B. Although he claims to be a student, he is implicated in the plot and arrested at
the scene.
Failure of security
16. At the time of the Al-Shabaab attack, Garissa University was protected by four police
officers and 12 unarmed private guards – five stationed by the main gate and seven by the rear of
the campus. A breach in the compound’s wall had been recently repaired at the insistence of the
university’s principal, Dr. Ahmed Osman Warfa.11 Warfa told the Monitoring Group that he was
aware that the campus’ security arrangements were inadequate, and that he had contacted local
authorities on numerous occasions but had “not been taken seriously by anyone”.12
17. The Monitoring Group has obtained copies off five letters sent by Warfa from December
2014 to March 2015 to various senior Kenyan officials, warning of a potential attack and
requesting security upgrades to the university campus. The first of these, a 4 December 2014
letter from Warfa to the Deputy County Commissioner for Garissa, requested the deployment of
additional police:
Following many incidences of terrorist attacks in many parts of northern Kenya which
has posed a great security threat to Garissa town and its environs, I write to request for
additional six police officers to help beef up security at the campus…In the view of the
above, some students are worrying and panicking about their security.13
18. In an 18 December 2014 letter to the local division police commander, Warfa requested the
creation of a police post at the university, as “a matter of urgency”. 14 A 9 January 2015 letter to
the Garissa County Commissioner – the presidential appointee responsible for coordinating
security countywide – described local insecurity causing students to “fear for their safety as they
__________________
11
SEMG interview with Ahmed Osman Warfa in Garissa, 17 June 2015.
Ibid.
13
Letter on file with the Monitoring Group.
14
Letter on file with the Monitoring Group.
12
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are returning from holidays”.15 The final letter from Warfa, dated 16 March 2015, just over two
weeks prior to the attack on the university, repeated his previously unheeded request for the
creation of a campus police post to the County Commissioner:
This [police post] will help enhance and beef up our security on campus. There are four
police officers currently deployed to the University College, as well as police patrols
around the college at night. I would appreciate if you take this as a matter of urgency and
consider our request. (This letter is reprinted in its entirety in annex 4.2.a).
Despite Warfa’s requests for assistance, no additional security measures were put in place by
local or national authorities.
Failure of communication
19. The success of Al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University College was more due to a failure
of communication than a lack of actionable intelligence. Since at least 25 March 2015,
intelligence warning of an imminent attack against an educational institution in Kenya had been
widely disseminated; the University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University, and the United States
International University – all institutions based in Nairobi – were on high alert. A note dated
25 March 2015 and posted around the campus of the University of Nairobi warned students and
staff that “intelligence reports indicate that the al-Shabaab terror group is planning retaliatory
attacks on…a major university”.16 In addition, Western embassies warned of an imminent attack
on an education institution in Kenya; however, it appears as if the Kenyan security forces did not
regard Garissa University as a primary target.17
20. On the evening of 31 March 2015, Warfa received an SMS alert from police advising of a
possible attack against four targets: Garissa Teachers Training College, NEP Technical Training
Institute, Garissa Medical Training College, and Garissa University College. Warfa told the
Monitoring Group that the SMS only advised recipients to “be alert” and was similar to others he
received on a regular basis.18 The generic nature of the message, said Warfa, led him to believe
that the threat was not credible, or at least not out of the ordinary.19
21. However, an SMS received by a senior Kenya police officer based in Wajir fewer than
12 hours prior to the attack (see annex 4.2.b) is evidence of the fact that more detailed
intelligence of the Garissa University plot existed immediately prior to its execution. The SMS
__________________
15
Letter on file with the Monitoring Group.
Elsa Buchanan, “Garissa University attack: Kenyan universities warned of pending al-Shabaab
‘retaliation’”, International Business Times, 2 April 2015. Available from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/garissauniversity-attack-kenyan-universities-warned-pending-al-shabaab-retaliation-1494711.
17
SEMG interviews with Kenyan intelligence officials and security analysts.
18
SEMG phone interview with Warfa, 31 August 2015.
19
Ibid.
16
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makes reference to Al-Shabaab operatives 30 km from the town, imminently poised to attack
either Garissa University or Garissa Teachers Training College. This message was not
transmitted to Warfa until over a month after the fact. Since Kenyan police evidently possessed
the intelligence, it is unclear why it was neither acted upon – for example, by heightening the
police presence in or near the university – nor transmitted to the administrators of the targeted
institutions. A regional security source summarised the problem when he told the Monitoring
Group that in the Kenyan security forces, there is a “disconnect between the collection of
intelligence and the use of intelligence”.20
22. This disconnect between the collection and actioning of intelligence was also a factor in the
failure to prevent the Westgate shopping mall attack (“Badru Nairobi Operation”) of
21 September 2013. In the run up to the incident, available intelligence indicators prior to the
attack were ignored or not passed on to the relevant security forces on the ground (see
S/2014/726, strictly confidential annex 2.1). In the case of the Garissa University attack,
conversely, the intelligence was both available and passed on to the local police; however, the
police failed to effectively transmit the information to relevant parties on the ground, or take
effective security measures of their own.
Failure of coordination
23. During the Westgate shopping mall attack (“Badru Nairobi Operation”), failure of
coordination between the Kenyan security forces was a defining factor in the response to the
attack. Both KDF and GSU units arrived at the scene, and confusion over the command and
control structure, as well as inter-agency rivalry, contributed to a botched response that allowed
the siege to drag out over three days. The lack of coordination also resulted in the GSU RECCE
squad commander being killed by friendly fire.
24. While the Kenyan security forces’ response to the Garissa University attack avoided the
command and control failings of the Westgate incident – the KDF cordoned off the area and duly
waited for the RECCE unit to arrive – the slow response of the local police, and the logistics of
transporting RECCE squad from Nairobi, were immediately identified for criticism. As the
police air wing in Nairobi was unavailable, the GSU RECCE squad travelled by a combination
of commercial airplane and road, despite the availability of KDF helicopters. It is unclear why
GSU did not request the use of KDF aerial assets, though inter-agency rivalries may have played
a role.21 As a result, it was ten hours before the RECCE squad was in position to launch an
assault against the militants’ position.
__________________
20
21
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Interview with the SEMG in Nairobi, 4 July 2015.
SEMG interview with a regional security source in Nairobi, 11 April 2015.
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Aftermath and Kenyan Government response
25. On 4 April 2015, Al-Shabaab released a statement blaming the Kenyan government for
“unspeakable atrocities against the Muslims of East Africa”, and further stated,
We will, by the permission of Allah, stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim
brothers until your government ceases its oppression and until all Muslim lands are
liberated from Kenyan occupation.
The message aligned with the stated aim of Al-Shabaab’s regional operations, which is to strike
on the home fronts of countries contributing troops to the AMISOM mission.
26. In the aftermath of the attack, the Kenyan Government offered a KES 20,000,000
(USD 190,000) reward for information leading to “Gamadheere’s” capture. The Monitoring
Group has been unable to establish a definitive link between “Gamadheere” and the attackers.
However, two regional security sources told the Group that “Gamadheere” had been in mobile
phone contact with a campus security officer who assisted the attackers by conducting
reconnaissance, and was found with photographs on his mobile phone in the aftermath of the
attack – probably intended for propaganda purposes.
27. In June 2015, five suspects were charged in Kenyan court with a combined 152 terrorism
offences, including the Tanzania national arrested at the scene, Rashid Charles Mberesero.
28. The Kenyan Government also published a list of 86 companies and individuals suspected to
be lending support to Al-Shabaab; these included a number of hawala transfer companies and
bus companies, as well as NGOs. Thirty of these names later appeared in a second, confidential
list on 25 April 2015 as participants in the illicit sugar trade, which is a known source of revenue
for Al-Shabaab (see strictly confidential annex 4.2.e for a copy of this list).
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Annex 4.2.a: Letter from Garissa University College principal Dr. Ahmed Osman Warfa to
the Garissa County Commissioner, requesting the creation of a police post
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Annex 4.2.b: Text message warning of an imminent attack against Garissa University
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Annex 4.2.c: Photo of Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere”, the suspected mastermind of
the Garissa College University attack
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Annex 4.2.d: Photographs of Garissa University campus
Figure 1 (below): Classroom used as Good Friday prayer centre, where four Al-Shabaab
gunmen killed between 12 and 18 students
Figure 2 (below): Elgon A dormitory
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Figure 3 (below): Second floor stairway used as a sniper nest by one of the militants
Figure 4 (below): Interior of Elgon B dormitory, where militants executed the majority of the
students held hostage within
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Annex 4.2.e: Confidential Kenyan Government list of 30 individuals implicated in sugar
smuggling
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
__________________

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Annex 4.2.f: Garissa University College campus, showing the route taken by the attackers
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Annex 4.3: Failed January 2015 Al-Shabaab plot in Djibouti
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
__________________

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The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.
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Annex 4.4: Al-Shabaab and heroin trafficking
29. The eruption of the Syria conflict in 2011, as well as improved law enforcement measures
along traditional heroin smuggling routes, has resulted in East Africa increasingly being used as
a route to traffic heroin from Afghanistan into Europe.22 Commentators have speculated that
Al-Shabaab earns revenue off the East Africa heroin trade, though no conclusive evidence has
yet been presented to support this claim.23
30. Pursuant to its investigations into the financing of Al-Shabaab, the Monitoring Group has
received credible information regarding the MV Amin Darya (IMO #8630784)24, a vessel
carrying as much as 800 kg of heroin intercepted on 15 July 2014 by Kenyan authorities and
subsequently destroyed.25 Nine foreign nationals were arrested in Kenya over the bust: six
Pakistanis, two Indians and an Iranian.26
31. The Group’s information indicates that the vessel stopped for 10 days off the coast of
Hobyo, in Central Somalia, prior to proceeding towards Kenya. During that time it took on
supplies as well as gunmen – possibly affiliated with Al-Shabaab – who later disembarked. A
businessman in Dubai, also possibly with links to Al-Shabaab, was in continual contact with the
traffickers.27 The Monitoring Group has ascertained the name of this businessman to be Javed
Ali. Ali was reportedly in continual contact with the arrested traffickers through the phone
selector 971 556 930 803, and he has been linked the email address [email protected] The
Monitoring Group attempted on multiple occasions, beginning in May 2015, to contact Javed Ali
through both his email address and mobile phone, but both appeared to be inactive. The Dubaibased company A. Ebrahimi & Partners29 appointed one of the suspects who was intended to
serve as the clearing agent in Mombasa for the seized vessel.30
__________________
22
“The Smack Track: East African states are being undermined by heroin smuggling”, The Economist,
17 January 2015. Available from http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21639560-eastafrican-states-are-being-undermined-heroin-smuggling-smack-track.
23
As one example, two researchers investigating East Africa ivory smuggling routes for an international
consultancy queried the SEMG about Al-Shabaab’s links to heroin trafficking during a 21 July 2015 meeting
in Nairobi.
24
The MV Amin Darya’s flag state is alternatively listed as Iran or Sierra Leone.
25
While most media reported the MV Amin Darya to be carrying between 300 and 400 kg of heroin, a source
with intimate knowledge of the case told the SEMG that the amount to be closer to 800 kg.
26
“Kenya charges 9 foreigners including two Indians over 377-kg heroin haul”, Reuters, 31 July 2014.
Available from http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/uk-kenya-drugs-idINKBN0G022M20140731.
27
Information provided to the Monitoring Group by a Kenyan security agency, 15 May 2015.
28
Ibid.
29
Name of company provided by regional security source. Open source maritime databases list the
shipowner of the MV Amin Darya as Ebrahim A.M. of Dubai.
30
Information provided to the Monitoring Group by a Kenyan security agency, 15 May 2015.
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32. The Monitoring Group sent official correspondence31 to the UAE on 5 August 2015
requesting detailed information concerning Javed Ali and A. Ebrahimi & Partners/Ebrahim A.M.
and their possible links to Al-Shabaab, but did not receive a response.
33. Although Al-Shabaab maintains a presence in Hobyo, it is not a major base of operations
for the group. It is therefore possible that the crew of the MV Amin Darya was involved in
smuggling of other goods into central Somalia, unconnected to Al-Shabaab. Over the course of
its mandate, the Monitoring Group has received numerous unconfirmed reports of Iran-flagged
vessels involved in the transport of weapons and fuel to central Somalia. 32 The Group also notes
that Javed Ali, the Dubai businessman in contact with the traffickers, bears an Iranian name.
34. The Group is continuing its investigation into Al-Shabaab’s possible links to heroin
trafficking.
__________________
31
S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.34.
The existence of an Iran-based fuel smuggling network into central Somalia was strongly advocated by a
regional intelligence source in a 6 August 2015 interview with the SEMG.
32
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Annex 5
Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
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Annex 5.1: Denial of humanitarian access1
1. This annex addresses both some of the most persistent and serious obstructions to
humanitarian access observed during the mandate.
Implications of Al-Shabaab territorial retreat and transfer of authority2
2. Access by civilian populations to essential goods and services continued to be a
battleground in the conflict between the FGS and its partners and Al-Shabaab.
3. Al-Shabaab actively obstructed access both inside and outside of its shrinking territory,
driven by both ideological and strategic objectives, conducting attacks on humanitarian workers
and operations but also on private entities providing basic necessities and services. 3 In areas
where it remained the predominant authority it ensured a hostile environment for humanitarian
operations, banning certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN)
agencies, restricting freedom of movement, and forcing the confinement of the civilian
population. In some instances, individuals and their families were punished for accessing
humanitarian assistance outside of Al-Shabaab controlled territory.4 In others, threats by
Al-Shabaab to prospective beneficiaries of assistance resulted in the postponement of
distributions.5
4. In many instances where it had officially ceded territory, Al-Shabaab continued to make its
presence felt, creating a climate of fear which dissuaded humanitarian operations. In Dinsor for
example, over a month after the official transfer of authority, in late August 2015 night time
incursions by Al-Shabaab and phone threats to residents made the situation very tense and
humanitarians reluctant to return.6
5. The most significant obstruction to both humanitarian and basic livelihood activities,
however, was Al-Shabaab’s violent enforcement of economic blockades on towns and key
access routes in Bakol, Hiran and Lower Shabelle, involving the killing of civilians and
livestock, and the burning of vehicles. In Walag village, for example, six civilians and their
donkeys were killed during one night alone on 31 May 2015, allegedly as punishment for
__________________
1
Denial of humanitarian access entails blocking the free passage or timely delivery of humanitarian assistance
to persons in need as well as the deliberate attacks against humanitarian workers.
2
Sourcing for some elements of this section is absent for security reasons.
3
See, for example, reports that Al-Shabaab fighters ambushed ENDF forces escorting a food aid convoy in
Luuq Jeelow on 7 January 2015. Email from reliable NGO source, 8 January 2015.
4
See annex 6.2a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b.
5
Specific instances were documented by the Monitoring Group.
6
See UN inter-agency assessment mission report, Dinsoor, Bay region, 18 August 2015 on file with the
Monitoring Group.
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transporting goods to Wajid town.7 The blockades against Buloburte8 and Hudur9 was also
strictly policed, although by July 2015 it was being reported that there was an improved range
and volume of food in the markets of the latter.10
6. Al-Shabaab blockades not only impacted movement of goods but also access to farmland
and agricultural labour opportunities in the hinterland, directly as a result of checkpoints and
restrictions of movement, but also indirectly, in terms of movement of fuel for farm machinery,
tools and seeds. A month after Dinsor changed authority, for example, Al-Shabaab continued to
impose a blockade and collect ‘taxation’, disrupting farming and other productive activities.11
These activities not only impacted their immediate target but had a cascade effect on security and
markets in other towns. The populations in the surrounding villages also greatly suffered.
Around Hudur, for example, not only were local farmers unable to sell their goods in the town,
they were also forced to continue paying taxes on produce which they could not sell.12
7. The presence of Al-Shabaab near access routes presented an even greater threat as the third
phase of the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive scaled up in early 2015. As main transport routes became
increasingly dangerous, both humanitarian and commercial contractors suspended operations,
particularly affecting Wajid and Hudur in Bakol.13 It was noted by a number of interlocutors that
the intensity of operations in Bakol, and the nature of the forces conducting them (many outside
of the AMISOM concept of operations) had particularly dissuaded contractors.
8. As a result, and notwithstanding enhanced efforts to provide air support, vulnerable
populations were exposed to acute food insecurity. 14 In Hudur in April 2015, one third of IDPs
were assessed as reliant on one meal a day.15 By July 2015, following the commencement of
Operation Jubba Valley, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates in Hudur, were “very critical”
at 32.7 per cent, with an “alarming three-fold increase” in Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM)
__________________
7
Email from reliable NGO source, 1 June 2015.
See, for example, a report that on 13 June 2015 Al-Shabaaab burned four donkey carts and the food they
were carrying and arrested six people in connection with the incident in Caag bashir in Bulo Burte district.
Email from reliable NGO source, 14 June 2015.
9
See, for example, the report that on 26 March 2015 Al-Shabaab beheaded two businessmen and arrested
three others in Doondardiir village south west of Hudur, allegedly for smuggling food to Hudur. Email from
reliable NGO source, 27 March 2015.
10
Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 7 July 2015.
11
Inter-agency assessment mission report, Dinsoor, Bay region, 18 August 2015, on file with the Monitoring
Group.
12
Inter-agency assessment mission report Mission Report, Hudur, Bakool region, 29 April 2015, on file with
the Monitoring Group.
13
Interview UN staff member, Nairobi, 7 July 2015. See also UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2015,
20 August 2015.
14
Since August 2014, a total of 2,650 metric tonnes of goods have been transported by humanitarian cargo
plane into southern and central Somalia. The low volume is due to the restricted airfield capacity of areas in
Somalia which need air access.
15
The primary cause of the food insecurity was the Al-Shabaab blockade. See Inter-agency Mission Report,
Hudur, Bakool Region, 29 April, 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group.
8
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rates between June and July.16 In Buloburte, six months after the change of authority, it was
assessed that an estimated 8900 people were in acute food insecurity Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or
Emergency (IPC phase 4) in the town.17 By July 2015 GAM rates were at almost 25 per cent,
although there had been a “significant improvement” in SAM levels from 21 per cent in June to
7.7 per cent between June in July, due to sustained humanitarian efforts.18 In Wajid in May 2015
it was reported that the price of food and essential items had doubled in two months.19 To
supplement World Food Program (WFP) air cargo the population had been depending on food
brought in by donkey cart and “human back” and sold at an unaffordable price for vulnerable
households.20 On 15 May 2015, two children reportedly died of malnutrition related conditions.
9. There was also evidence of small-scale attempts by pro-FGS forces to block the movement
of goods to Al-Shabaab areas. In one incident in December 2014 in Seynilow in Bakol, for
example, soldiers reportedly seized three trucks which were transporting commercial food to
Al-Shabaab held areas.21 In the wake of a series of large scale attacks on civilians in Eastern
Kenya the Kenyan authorities refused some NGOs permission to transfer humanitarian supplies
to southern and central Somalia across the border at Mandera. Health clinics ran out of essential
supplies and one closed as a result of the impasse.22 An airlift was eventually authorised.23
10. In resolution 2182 (2014) the Security Council described securing key supply routes as
“imperative” in view of the “deteriorating humanitarian situation” and called on AMISOM and
the SNA to give the “utmost priority” to the task.24 Resolution 2232 (2015) reiterated this call.25
Efforts were made in August and September to clear access routes in Bakol, Hiran and
Galgadud. In addition, AMISOM provided convoy protection for bilateral aid which alleviated
the pressure on some towns such as Buloburte.26
__________________
16
UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2015, 20 August, available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/150820_Somalia%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin_August
%20final.pdf.
17
See Inter-agency assessment mission report, Bulo Burto, Hiran region, 23 September 2014, on file with the
Monitoring Group. The town came under the control of FGS forces on 13 March 2015.
18
UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, July 2015, 20 August,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/150820_Somalia%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin_August
%20final.pdf.
19
See UN monitoring mission report, Waajid, Bakool region, 31 May 2015, on file with the Monitoring
Group.
20
See UN monitoring mission report, Waajid, Bakool region, 31 May 2015, on file with the Monitoring
Group.
21
Email, reliable NGO source, 17 December 2014.
22
Interview NGO staff member, Nairobi, 28 August 2015.
23
Email UN staff member, 6 September 2015.
24
Resolution 2232 (2015) at paragraph 29.
25
Resolution 2232 (2015) at paragraph 11.
26
Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 2 September 2015.
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11. In the context of the increasingly complex picture of armed activity in Somalia there is need
for effective implementation of the Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military
Coordination Guidelines, agreed at the end of 2014. Although there has been some progress,
support for training of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officers in the sectors is needed
alongside broader support for a more effective CIMIC component overall.27 At the same time, it
is vital that military or ‘securitisation’ strategies are not the only ones pursued. Space for
humanitarian actors and local communities to freely and independently engage in acceptance and
negotiation access strategies needs to be created: in some areas, for example, local authorities
were able to negotiate around blockades, albeit through the payment of checkpoint taxation.28 No
UN actors and increasingly few humanitarian actors negotiate access directly with Al-Shabaab.
Use of bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct access
12. In its 2014 report (S/2014/727), the Monitoring Group described how, with the
formalisation of new layers of federal architecture, the number of bureaucratic impediments and
revenue seeking efforts which complicated and sometimes prevented access had multiplied
significantly. During the mandate not only did those practices intensify, but with new entities
asserting legitimacy the number of authorities with which the humanitarian community was
forced to negotiate also rose. The operational capability of non-governmental humanitarian
organisations was particularly affected. Annex 5.2 provides an overview of the scope and impact
of these practices in the context of humanitarian obstruction.
Humanitarian principles and challenges of access
13. A number of senior UN and NGO staff expressed concern to the Monitoring Group that the
erosion of space for humanitarian operations to abide by humanitarian principles had particularly
endangered the quality and scope of humanitarian access to populations in need during this
mandate.
14. The Somalia Compact which was agreed between the FGS and international partners in
2013 firmly stated a commitment to “the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality,
impartiality and operational independence endorsed in General Assembly resolutions 46/182 and
58/114”.29 It further asserted that the government would not interfere with “humanitarian actors’
neutrality, impartiality and independence from political, economic and military processes”. Since
then there appears to have been a shift in the political optics. The High-Level Partnership Forum
draft documents produced in 2015, for example, emphasised that “services delivered by NGOs or
the private sector on behalf of the government will fall under a government-led framework
__________________
27
Phone interview with UN staff member, 30 August 2015.
Phone interview with UN staff member, 30 August 2015.
29
Federal Government of Somalia, The Somali Compact, text on file with Monitoring Group. The Somali
Compact was validated in September 2013 in Mogadishu.
28
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agreement”, intended to “increase the ownership and visibility of government in programme
design and delivery”.30 Other developments echoed this approach. Against a background of a
significant decrease in humanitarian funds, some donors have encouraged humanitarians to seek
support from development donors or donors with a political agenda for basic humanitarian
projects, such as hospital services.31
15. NGOs have expressed concern that unless carefully managed, this new framework,
including the proposed ‘branding’ of activities, could reinforce the politicisation of aid. As one
donor said, “change of authority is not an argument for action”. 32 In addition, especially in areas
where there is lack of clear FGS control, it could put humanitarian workers in danger.33 The rise
in threats to, and attacks on, humanitarian workers during 2015 reflects the fragility of the
environment: attacks on humanitarian workers came not just from Al-Shabaab but from other
parties to the conflict which made assumptions about the presence and acquiesce of NGOs with
Al-Shabaab’s former rule.34 Compounding the challenge are the increased numbers of armed
actors taking part in the conflicts and the range of military assets apparently available to
Al-Shabaab.35 This makes the need for humanitarian distancing more acute. As one senior NGO
staff member put it: “principles are also tools to allow you to work. The problem of bending the
neutrality principle in a conflict zone is that it will backfire”.36
16. More broadly NGO and UN humanitarian workers told the Monitoring Group that they
believed that the decision to integrate the political and humanitarian pillars of the UN mission in
Somalia at the beginning of 2014 had complicated already polarised interpretations of the
humanitarian role and may have both undermined access and increased the dangers faced by
humanitarian workers.37 Some cited the increase in abductions of local NGO staff on the ground
and statements by Al-Shabaab during 2014 which conflated humanitarian actors with the United
__________________
30
High-Level Partnership Forum, Draft document, Delivery and state building: concrete measures and way
forward, 2015.
31
For example, DEVCO as opposed to ECHO in the European system of donor support. The EU
Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) is
responsible for designing European international cooperation and development policy and delivering aid
throughout the world. See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/general_en. ECHO is the EU Humanitarian Aid and
Civil Protection Department. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/.
32
Interview with staff of donor, Nairobi, 20 January 2015.
33
Email from NGO staff member, 10 September 2014, reflecting the views of a group of NGOs.
34
There were arrests of NGO staff in formerly Al-Shabaab held areas by the newly occupying security
forces, on the grounds of collusion. Details on file with the Monitoring Group.
35
Interview UN staff member, 3 September 2014.
36
Interview with NGO staff member, Nairobi.
37
In Resolution 2093 (2013) at paragraph 20 the Security Council requested that “by 1st January 2014 the
post of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
(DSRSG/RC/HC) will have been established and structurally integrated into the new United Nations
Mission, which will operate alongside AMISOM”.
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Nations as “invaders” that “do bad things”.38 The Monitoring Group was not able, however, to
identify particular incidents where a heightened threat or attack was casually linked to the new
framework. Some agencies in fact reported by mid 2014 that staff on the ground had not seen
any change in the security climate which could be linked to integration.39
17. In August 2015 a year long review of the consequences of the UN integrated mission in
Somalia on humanitarian action and access to population in need was published by Action
Contre la Faim (ACF). While ACF agreed that that it was difficult to disaggregate the effects of
stabilization, integration and counter-terrorism policies, it did find that integration had resulted
in: “a decreased focus on the public defense and application of humanitarian principles; an
increased politicization and militarization of humanitarian aid and access strategies, with clear
consequences for the population in need and for the humanitarian personnel; [and] a
disappearance of attempts to gain access through acceptance and negotiation to rural areas of
South Central Somalia, where needs are among the highest”.40
__________________
38
See annex 7.1, S/2014/726. Prior to the United Nations decision to integrate its mission in January 2014,
17 NGOs providing humanitarian and development assistance in Somalia had written to the SRSG to express
that: “[g]iving the political mission authority over United Nations humanitarian and development actors
could create the perception (or reality) that assistance is provided based on political objectives rather than
need – providing an excuse to expel agencies and also increasing security risks to beneficiaries and staff”.
Letter to the SRSG, undated, signed by 17 NGOs providing humanitarian and development assistance in
Somalia. One INGO with some of the largest programs in Somalia withdrew its membership of the
Humanitarian County Team as a result of these concerns, as it rendered the United Nations humanitarian
wing, “no longer a neutral body”. Interview with INGO staff member, 18 July 2014, Nairobi.
39
Interview with INGO staff member, Nairobi,18 July 2014.
40
See ACF, Case study: Impact of UN integration on principled humanitarian action and access to population
in need in Somalia, August 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group.
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Annex 5.2: Bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct access
19. During the mandate the number of entities with which the humanitarian community was
forced to grapple with for access multiplied as two new interim regional administrations (IRAs)
came into being, alongside declarations of legitimacy and control by rival putative states
claiming the same territory.41 In 2014 for example, the United Nations (UN) recorded
76 incidents of interference by government authorities with humanitarian activities. 71 per cent
of these related to bureaucratic constraints with the other 29 per cent constituting direct
operational interference. By the end of the first seven months of 2015 the number of incidents
had already reached 51.42 This annex overviews some of the practices purportedly intended to
regulate humanitarian action which often had the effect of obstructing and preventing it, across
different layers of government. These practices not only immediately impacted operations but
also exposed humanitarian operations to the perception that they had been co-opted in support of
particular authorities.
The Federal level
20. There is still little coordination between Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) ministries
in terms of regulation and facilitation of humanitarian operations.43 Although the existence of
multiple interlocutors is not in itself problematic, the approach of these entities, including around
efforts to gather revenue, made it difficult for the humanitarian community to mount a
coordinated and consistent response. A number of times, for example, duty free goods were held
‘hostage’ at Mogadishu port and airport as Ministry of Finance officials refused to issue tax
exemptions. Meanwhile government officials from different Ministries attempted to extort
payments from both non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN entities on various official
pretexts.44 On one occasion vital humanitarian supplies used in the treatment of severe acute
malnutrition were held at port on the ground that employees at the importing NGO were not
paying tax, and that an employee list had not been provided. As an alternative, payment of
import tax on the goods was demanded by the Ministry for Finance. Eventually the supplies were
released upon the payment of a proportional percentage tax on the import. That these are not
isolated incidents but systematic was reinforced by the fact that an agent approached the
__________________
41
The declaration of a ‘state’ by ASWJ was accompanied by new directions to the humanitarian community;
there were also efforts by the authorities of ‘Khatumo state’ to impose administrative regulations in its areas
of control.
42
Email from UN staff member, 6 September 2016.
43
NGOs are obliged to negotiate with a variety of Ministries, such as the Ministry of Labor around employee
issues, with the Ministry of Finance for duty free import of humanitarian supplies and with line Ministries
around project implementation. As part of the effort to leverage humanitarian engagement in support of statebuilding, some donors are now requiring agencies to work with or agree memoranda of understanding with
Ministries relevant to their areas of input. In addition to concerns about maintenance of independence there
are also worries that additional revenue will be sought to support such engagements. Interview, NGO staff
members, Nairobi, 28 August 2015.
44
Interview with NGO expert 24 August 205; interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 6 September 2014.
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organization and offered to negotiate with the authorities to ensure that its next shipment would
be treated as tax exempt—for a fee.45
21. In mid 2015 the Ministry for Labour asked all NGOs working in Benadir to provide them
with a list of all staff declaring that each staff member would be required to pay a 20 USD fee for
an ID card from the Ministry.46 Not only did this raise safety and security questions for individual
staff, it also appeared to have no legal basis. A number of organisations which did not comply
received visits from the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Ministry of
Labour, asking them to provide staff lists or risk being closed. Those who questioned the scheme
were told that a draft law was been being developed which provided a framework for the
scheme, but that it had not yet been approved by Parliament.47
22. Although an NGO Bill is still in draft form, national organizational registration is required
through the Ministry of the Interior and Federalism upon the payment of fees of 1000 USD for
an international organisation and 500 USD for a local organisation. 48 The Ministry asserts that
federal level registration is all that is required, but, as discussed below, this is ignored at the
regional level. The attempt to appoint regional focal points to help manage the impact of
interaction between federal and regional regulation in August 2014 has had little effect.
Regional authorities
23. The replication of central government bureaucracy at the regional level resulted in the
replication and multiplication of practices related to the regulation and control of humanitarian
operations, some of which amounted to obstruction.
24. Echoing the approach of Somaliland and Puntland, the new IRAs also attempted to demand
payment of registration fees by humanitarian organisations.49 Instructions from the Interim Jubba
Administration (IJA) Ministry of Planning and International Relations and Humanitarian
Programs, for example, advise that payment of an annual fee of 1000 USD for an INGO and
500 USD for an NGO for registration—a sum equal to the federal requirement.50 If these
practices spread, an NGO intending to operate across the country could find itself forced to pay
__________________
45
Interview with NGO staff member, Nairobi, 28 August 2015.
Email from reliable NGO source, 10 September 2015; interview with NGO staff member, Nairobi,
28 August 2015.
47
Despite discussions there is no federal NGO law yet in place.
48
The certificate of registration received is valid for one year and costs 1000 USD for INGO and 500 USD
for an NGO. A variety of documents must constitute the application including proof of donor funds received,
curriculum vitae of national and international staff (in Somalia) and justification for the use of international
staff.
49
As noted in the Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/726) registration is also required in Puntland and
Somaliland.
50
It is not clear in practice whether if this fee is only being applied to newly registering organisations. Phone
interview, former government official, IJA administration, 29 August 2015.
46
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considerable fees in registration alone. There was also evidence that registration and taxation was
being demanded at local district levels throughout southern and central Somalia, and in
Puntland.51
25. Amidst competing authorities, the experience of NGOs operating under IJA claimed
territory was particularly confusing. Although a Non-governmental Organizations Coordination
Act (2015) was developed, different approaches to regulation both in Kismayo and in the
districts made adherence difficult.52 In Dhobley, for two days in March 2015, for example, field
activities by local NGOs had to be suspended when the local administration ordered that only
vehicles hired from it could be used. Five vehicles were subsequently impounded.53 In Luq in
Gedo, a 30 per cent tax demand was issued to local NGOs by the local District Commissioner in
August 2015 and three organisations were forced to temporarily suspend operations. 54 Although
in most of these situations the matter was ultimately resolved either through strong local
representations or support from the UN, it made for a very difficult environment.
26. The final form of regulation of humanitarian activity in the Interim South West
Administration (ISWA) was under discussion at time of writing. Although a letter from the
ISWA Ministry for Humanitarian and Disability Affairs on 12 April 2015 invited “all
humanitarian agencies [in] ISWA regions” to “come forward for registration between 14th and
30th April”,55 the authorities subsequently entered into dialogue with NGOs on how registration
will operate, including on the question of fees.56 How the registration question is managed will
also have implications for other issues such as work permits for foreign staff members and staff
taxation.
27. Although as noted in the Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/726) Somaliland
presented one of the least obstructive environments for humanitarian operations, increased
political and security instability provided the backdrop to some new challenges. 57 In terms of
bureaucratic constraints, efforts by local administrative entities to exert control on operation and
contracting were the main obstacles encountered.58 In both Somaliland and Puntland, issues
__________________
51
Email from NGO staff member, 10 September 2015; interview with senior INGO staff member, Nairobi,
25 February 2015.
52
See Non-governmental Organizations Coordination Act (2015), Jubbaland State of Somalia, No 1 of 2015.
Date of assent 14 April 2015.
53
Email from UN staff member, 18 March 2015. International and UN entities were not affected.
54
Interview with NGO staff member, Nairobi, 26 August 2015.
55
Letter on file with Monitoring Group.
56
Phone interview with NGO expert, 24 August 2015; Interview with NGO 28 August 2015. See, draft
registration certificate on file with the Monitoring Group.
57
There were also public statements and official discussions raising questions about “foreign workers” which
added to the pressure.
58
In late July 2015 for example it was reported that the Governor of Awdal had decreed that it was obligatory
for contracts such as for rental of vehicles etc., to be issued to local companies and that the local
administration must be present during the bidding process. Email from reliable NGO source, 27 July 2015.
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around the taxation of local UN staff saw the UN ultimately being constrained to share lists of its
national employees with local authorities in June 2015.
28. In Puntland the range of obstructive practices described by the Monitoring Group in its
2014 report (S/2014/727) continued to be experienced, including layers of registration at district
level. Nevertheless, both UN agencies and NGOs reported during the mandate that there was
greater willingness to discuss and negotiate these impediments. In terms of clarifying the
framework, an NGO Bill is under discussion and NGOs have been able to submit views on the
text.59 At the same time, efforts by the Government to direct the involvement of the Puntland
Tender Board in the award of contracts worth over 5000 USD are causing significant tension.60
The Government asserts that engagement is necessary to prevent corruption in the granting of
contracts. NGOs claim that involving the Tender Board is unlikely to have that effect. In
addition, it is unclear that a public procurement law, intended to govern the award of public
contracts, can apply to NGOs which are private entities. The UN has also been embroiled in this
issue. In January 2015 a letter to the UN from the Puntland Minister for Finance and Minister for
Planning and International Cooperation advised, inter alia, that income tax would be due from
rental properties and vehicles leased to or hired by the UN”.61 The letter also declared that “a
registration tax” would be levied on “vehicle hire contract by the UN before the contractual
amount is paid”. It also purported to order that “contracts awarded and funded by the UN” would
be required to pay “registration tax of 2.5% on total gross contract value”. The National Tender
Board of Puntland would also collect “a service charge of 0.5% on total gross contract value”.
Beyond ensuring that contractors present evidence of tax compliance, the humanitarian
community has attempted to resist involvement of the Tender Board. At the time of writing the
situation remained at a stalemate.62
29. Finally, although not constituting deliberate humanitarian obstruction, in the absence of
funding being found for construction of a parallel runway, the planned closure of Garowe airport
to facilitate a major renovation funded by the Government of Kuwait was expected to have a
huge impact on UN access from the beginning of October 2015.
Other authorities
30. It was not just the formally recognised IRAs and Al-Shabaab which attempted to use
administrative regulation and ‘taxation’ to leverage the resources of the humanitarian community
__________________
59
Phone interview UN staff member, Nairobi, 31 August 2015.
Letter to the humanitarian community from the Puntland Tender Board, dated 30 July 2015. The letter
referenced a Presidential Decree of 25 July 2015, in turn referring to Law No 11, the Puntland Public
Procurement Law. On file with the Monitoring Group.
61
Letter from the Minister for Finance and Minister for Planning and International Cooperation to the
Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, 17 January 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group.
62
Phone interview with UN staff member, Hargeisa, 10 September 2015.
60
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for their own purposes. On 22 March 2015, for example, after the take over of Guriel by Ahlu
Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ), the “Office of Humanitarian Assistant” of the Guriel District
Commissioner issued a statement entitled, “Conduct of International Organisations and Local
NGOs operating in Guriel”.63 Among the instructions given were that international and local
NGOs should “register from the local municipality office”, pay “registration fees” and obtain an
“acceptance letter”. Agencies were also purportedly required to submit “the number of staff,
number of houses and rented vehicles they are going to hire and all necessary needs”, in order
that, “the government fairly allocate the resources”. It is understood that the matter was resolved
locally. NGOs did not report that they acceded to the payment request, but did register. 64 In June
2015 with the declaration of a parallel state in Dhusamareb. ASWJ authorities also told the
humanitarian community that they were the new authority and called on them to register with
them.65
31. In Sool and Sanaag, political and ideologically grounded access impediments rooted in
contestation of authority remained a challenge. As noted in the Monitoring Group’s 2014 report
(S/2014/727) there was very little humanitarian access to the area, with UN standard operating
procedures preventing travel of UN staff and restricting the forms of aid which could be
transferred. In November 2014 approximately 300 tons of food aid donated from the Turkish
Government intended for Salax Dheer were diverted to Garowe in the wake of disagreement
between pro-Puntland politicians who had secured the delivery and the self-declared Khatumo
state administration.66 Against the background of intensifying armed engagement between the
parties, Khatumo officials increasingly attempted to control revenues in its areas of control
including those of the humanitarian community.67 A statement by the Minister of the Interior of
Khatumo state in March 2015, for example, warned that the administration “would not be
responsible for the security of agencies coming from Puntland or Somaliland and that NGOs
should contact the administration for their presence to be recorded”.68
32. As the number of regional entities increases, and both they and parallel authorities jockey
for control of power, resources and political legitimacy, humanitarian organisations will come
under greater pressure. In the short term, it is vital that the humanitarian community takes a
coordinated approach to challenging efforts by regional and local authorities to ‘regulate’ access
where such purported ‘regulation’ in fact amounts to co-option by extortion/diversion and
__________________
63
Office of Humanitarian Assistant of the Guriel District Commissioner, statement, “Conduct of International
Organisations and Local NGOs operating in Guriel”, on file with the Monitoring Group.
64
It is understood that the registration fee demanded was 200 USD.
65
Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 31 August 2015.
66
Email from reliable NGO source, 26 November 2014. Interview with senior member of Khatumo
community, London, 12 March 2015.
67
In April 2015, for example, Khatumo authorities in Buhodle issue a statement announcing the introduction
of new vehicle number plates and warning that vehicles without the new plates would be confiscated. Email
from reliable NGO source, 14 April 2015.
68
Email from reliable NGO source, 29 March 2015.
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obstruction of access. This should include agreement on ‘lines in the sand’. In the absence of
such collaboration, the ‘divide, threaten and control’ strategy of many entities, will continue to
suck scarce financial and human resources. In the longer term, coordinated authority over
humanitarian access throughout Somalia is needed through a transparent regulatory framework
which clarifies the requirements for operations and supports independent and impartial
humanitarian action.
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Annex 5.3: Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance
34. This annex details particular categories of perpetrator, and particular areas of diversion
which contributed to the obstruction of humanitarian assistance during the mandate.
Developments in the approaches taken by the humanitarian community to prevent and respond to
diversion and misappropriation are also described.
Al-Shabaab
35. In areas of its direct control Al-Shabaab continued to systematically divert humanitarian aid
through registration fees, “taxation” of projects and non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff,
and control of sub-contracting.69 As the Monitoring Group noted in its 2014 report (S/2014/276),
the contraction of Al-Shabaab territory during 2014 added to the difficulties faced by
humanitarian entities on the ground in resisting the practice. This pressure increased during
2015. Agencies operating in areas still fully controlled by Al-Shabaab were under greater
pressure to contribute to a resource-stretched campaign. In areas officially ‘recovered’ from
Al-Shabaab, the group continued to extort, facilitated by mobile money and other forms of
remittance services. The complexity and oscillations of authority noted in by the Monitoring
Group in 2014 (S/2014/276) as having emerged in recovered areas during 2013 and 2014 only
deepened during the current mandate. Al-Shabaab was adept at exploiting these security and
political vulnerabilities.
36. In some Al-Shabaab controlled areas there were indications that the Amniyat was
superseding local responsibility and authority to negotiate humanitarian space (including
management of taxation) and overruling previous agreements. If this indeed is a new
development it would further contribute to expanding the distance between humanitarian actors,
Al-Shabaab and communities on the ground. It may also constitute a new threat to the safety and
viability of humanitarian activities in Somalia.
37. Operating in areas directly, and sometimes, indirectly controlled by Al-Shabaab presented a
huge challenge to the humanitarian community not only programmatically, but also with respect
to risk management and donor accountability. Despite the ‘humanitarian carve out’ extended by
__________________
69
Due to the highly dangerous context for humanitarian operations in Al-Shabaab areas sourcing for this
section is not provided.
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the Security Council in paragraph 41 of resolution 2182 (2104), the impact of national and other
international sanctions regimes tended to undermine its effectiveness.70
Diversion by regional and local administrations
38. In its 2014 report (S/2014/727), the Monitoring Group described how the process of
federalisation had increased the layers of bureaucratic impediments which both complicated and
prevented access. Those holding power saw humanitarian streams of finance as a source of
income. In some areas demands for access to humanitarian resources—whether directly through
‘taxation’ or additional ‘registration’ of organisations, projects, or contracts, or indirectly,
through efforts to control tendering or gather information on staffing—made access negotiations
and operations more complex, and, in some cases, impossible.71 In Gedo, for example, and
during August 2015 alone, three local NGOs were forced to close temporarily as a result of
repeated unacceptable demands for taxation.72 The situation was particularly acute in areas newly
‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab authority. Annex 5.2 on bureaucratic constraints and misuse of
official authority offers a more detailed overview of these practices.
39. Regional authorities also attempted to misuse their authority to wield power over donor
decision-making on funding and grant making and derive a benefit from humanitarian inputs. In
one case documented by the Group, for example, it was implied strongly by the administration
that a funder would find operating in the state extremely difficult if funding was not granted to a
particular NGO with which a senior advisor to the administration had close connections.73
40. Regional administration and security officials also directly diverted humanitarian inputs. In
one case reported to the Monitoring Group local administration officials and regional security
forces threatened IDPs not to occupy shelters which had been constructed for them, later
__________________
70
Paragraph 41 reaffirmed that “until 30 October 2015 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance
programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not
apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely
delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized
agencies or programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General
Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or
multilaterally funded NGOs participating in the United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Somalia”. The
Security Council also reduced the burden of reporting on the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, requesting
only one report on “the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the
delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia” prior to the consideration of mandate renewal.
71
Interview with local NGO leader, Nairobi 17 December 2014. For more on bureaucratic constraints on
access see annex 5.2.
72
Interview with reliable NGO source, Nairobi, 26 August 2015.
73
Interview with former administration official, Nairobi, 7 July 2015. Misuse of humanitarian operations and
inputs, including through diversion for private gain has been previously documented by the Monitoring
Group in relation to this senior advisor.
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dismantling the structures and sharing out the materials.74 In another instance security force
personnel took control of wells dug for the community and demanded payment for access to
water. Evictions were also strategically arranged to take place just after inputs by humanitarian
agencies had rendered the land occupied by the IDPs more valuable. Local businessmen
connected with the administration then took possession.
Diversion of food aid, including emergency aid from bilateral donors
41. The arrival into Somalia’s ports of large amounts of food and non-food emergency aid from
bilateral donors created a ripe context for diversion. The Monitoring Group received a series of
allegations from credible sources that some of this aid was misappropriated at the point of entry
and either sold directly in the markets or exchanged in kind. Aid was used, for example, to pay
members of the Regional Assembly and officials in one interim regional administration (IRA). 75
Meanwhile, the FGS also began to investigate food aid diversion by Government officials,
particularly through the efforts of the Office of the Attorney General (AG). Seven people were
arrested further to the AG’s investigations into allegations of diversion of Turkish food aid in
Buloburte, including senior administration officials.76
42. The Monitoring Group received extensive documentation from the Ministry for Interior and
Federalism and from donor states on the delivery and distribution of emergency bilateral aid at
the end of the mandate. Investigations are ongoing. Meanwhile, in the light of its preliminary
findings, the Group urges bilateral donors to require greater levels of accountability from both
the Somali federal or regional entity responsible for receiving and distributing the aid, and the
implementing NGO. It would also be important for donors to consider providing support for the
process of distribution and monitoring. Donors frequently do not arrange for distribution costs or
other in-kind assistance to support distribution. Although lack of resources for distribution is not
the cause of aid diversion it can be considered an enabling factor.
Diversion and non-governmental organisations
43. As noted above diversion occurs at all points of the aid distribution cycle. During the last
three years diversion by local NGOs has been the main focus of a number of United Nations
(UN) investigative bodies.77 Similar patterns, scale and methodologies as those reported by the
Monitoring Group in 2014 (S/2014/726) continued to be identified in cases of systematic
diversion shared with the Monitoring Group this mandate.78 With respect to the latter these
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74
Email from former staff member of NGO, 31 August 2015. Full details of these incidents are on file with
the Monitoring Group but are not disclosed for reasons of the safety and security of interlocutors.
75
Interview with former official, Interim Juba Administration, location undisclosed, 20 June 2014.
76
Interview with FGS Attorney General, Nairobi, 2 July 2015.
77
See, for example, strictly confidential annex 7.6, S/2014/726 S/2014/727.
78
It should be noted that the majority of the cases under investigation relate to a similar time period.
Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 30 January 2015.
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include the manufacture of false documentation—whether through invention of false vendors or
collusion—false reporting and absence of implementation.
44. In terms of scale, in one project implemented by an international organisation, 100 per cent
of costs incurred were found to be unaccounted for or unsubstantiated; other projects saw a rate
of 80 per cent.79 Although local NGOs have tended to be the focus of investigations, this year
saw the beginning of a number of enquires into allegations of diversion or misappropriation
involving international NGOs.80 Separate to these findings the Group received a variety of
testimonies throughout the year from staff of local NGOs describing how routine diversion was
in some operations. One former staff member of a local NGO for example described how only
5 per cent of hygiene kits in a Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) project were given to the
intended beneficiaries and how other inputs were regularly redirected to the local security
forces.81
45. Jurisdictional tensions between accountability and investigative entities in the UN system
can impede investigations. Going forward there will be an increasingly small number of local
and international NGOs which enjoy support from the international community, resulting in
multiple entities funding the same NGO or private contractor. There is a need for a multi-agency
approach to investigations within the UN and greater openness to collaborating on enquires and
sharing findings. Although cross notification of investigations does occur at the moment there is
duplication in investigative activities which sometimes leads to interference with evidence and
greater opportunity for the target of the investigation to conceal information.
Links between conflict and the diversion or manipulation of humanitarian assistance
46. In resolution 2111 (2013) the Security Council condemned “any politicization of
humanitarian assistance, misuse or misappropriation” and called upon the UN and Member
States to “take all feasible steps to mitigate these […] practices in Somalia”. 82 A key
characteristic of Somalia’s humanitarian aid model, however, is that NGOs or particular
branches of INGOs or UN agencies are generally associated with—and viewed as a source of
income for—particular communities and clan networks. Allegations that aid inputs are used to
fund conflicts or political positions or campaigns go hand and hand with this reality.
47. Over the last two years, as areas have been ‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab control, clan
conflicts and political violence, frequently overlaid with involvement of government
administration and security entities, have escalated. Claims that the place and power of
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79
Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 20 August 2015; interview with UN staff member, Nairobi,
26 February 2015.
80
Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 14 August 2015.
81
Email from NGO staff member, 31 August 2015.
82
Resolution 2111 (2013) at paragraph 11.
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humanitarian organisations in local communities have been used and manipulated by parties to
these conflicts have increased. During the mandate the Monitoring Group received credible
information that humanitarian actors abused humanitarian principles and misused humanitarian
inputs in the pursuit of clan dominance, including through use of violence, in a number of places,
but in particular in Lower Shabelle and in Hiran.83 In some communities, the allegiance of
particular NGOs with particular militia/SNA units and direct funding of the latter operations
have been open secrets in the humanitarian community and indeed accepted as the price of
access in highly militarised and polarised contexts.84
48. At the same time, UN and other entities are increasingly asking questions about clan makeup and networks of current and potential partners.85 It may be that single clan affiliated
organizations are appropriate interlocutors in some circumstances. The majority of those
consulted by the Monitoring Group were of the view, however, that clan capture of an NGO’s
operations could be best mitigated by insisting on mixed clan management in NGOs.
49. Assessment of how power dynamics in a community, including clan and other socioeconomic dynamics, are engaged with and understood, prior to deciding to move forward with a
particular partner or input, should be more regularly conducted. In making such assessments,
however, it is essential that channels other than traditional interlocutors be considered. Powerful
and convincing gatekeepers can prevent even diligent humanitarian actors from fully
comprehending the context, especially in situations where victim and potential beneficiary
communities are severely marginalized, and often fearful. Efforts should be made therefore to
reach out to traditionally excluded communities to ensure their voices are heard and that they can
function as partners in humanitarian activity.86
50. Special capacity building efforts may need to be made in this regard. Communities which
have had historically very limited dialogue with the international community may find it difficult
to provide the ‘right’ inputs in the ‘right’ form, whether in terms of needs assessments or project
proposals. There will be significant resistance from those who currently control the Somali aid
__________________
83
Annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b describes some of the allegations received with respect to
the connection between access to, and the perceptions of access to, humanitarian assistance and the conduct
of attacks on on the Surre/Dir community in Hiran.
84
Specific and credible allegations were received during the current and previous mandate relating to the
misappropriation of inputs by clan aligned-NGOs in Lower Shabelle, Hiran and Jubbaland. Multiple
interviews with NGO, INGO and diplomatic staff, 2014 and 2015.
85
Interviews UN staff members, Nairobi and Somalia, throughout the mandate. Some in the humanitarian
community were reluctant to view partners – or even staff – as coming with a clan agenda which would
automatically impose on humanitarian operations.
86
The 100 % coalition is one important initiative in this regard. In September 2014 a group of representatives
self-described as the “Bajuni, Barawe, Banadiri, Bantu, and Nilot communities” joined together to create a
coalition to engage more effectively with the humanitarian and development community. In January 2015 the
Coalition members named itself, The 100% Coverage Coalition, rebuilding Somalia for Everyone,
Everywhere for Everybody.
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enterprise, similar to the dangers associated with challenging hegemonies in any area of Somali
business.87 Defying one of the foundations of—and in some case even the raison d’être for—
NGO operations in Somalia will be difficult. It is a long-term project involving sustained civic
education and inter-community dialogue.88
Measures to enhance compliance
51. The humanitarian aid community continued to pursue the positive steps identified by the
Monitoring Group in its 2014 report (S/2014/276) both with respect to acknowledging the scale
of diversion, and continuing to develop the effectiveness of risk management mechanisms.
52. Within the UN Country Team, the Risk Working Group facilitated exchange of information
and the development of common standards and procedures to mitigate risk and respond to
diversion.89 Reflecting previous Monitoring Group recommendations, in January 2015 an NGO
focal point was appointed to the UN Risk Management Unit (RMU), setting the stage for
enhanced cooperation and information sharing between UN entities and the NGO humanitarian
community. Among the other key developments since the Monitoring Group’s last report were:
(a)
agreement on standards on information collection (UN Minimum Information
Collection Standards);90
(b)
the adoption of a Common Working Agreement on Risk Management by the UN
Country Team;91
(c)
initiation of a Civil Servant and Ministry Payment Tracking system 92 and
increased use of the Contract Information Management System (CIMS) databases
with contracts of approximately USD 3.8 billion now recorded with information
on risk occurrences.
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87
The Monitoring Group has documented threats received by groups perceived as “minorities” who have
attempted to seek access to funding sources, including engaging with the UN humanitarian cluster system.
Interview references.
88
See, inter alia, interview with senior UN staff, Nairobi, 14 August 2015.
89
The Risk Working Group is a cross-agency risk management working group (RWG) was convened under
the Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator which was established in May 2014. It
comprises the Risk Management Unit (RMU) and Risk Focal Points from the United Nations Country Team
(UNCT).
90
The standards specify the information and documentation that each UN entity should collect from
prospective partners to inform the decision to engage (or not) with such partners.
91
The Agreement specifies the minimum investments that each UN entity operating in Somalia must make
into the collective risk management system: it covers commitments in the areas of information sharing, the
development of collective approaches/tools, and communication protocols with external partners. UN Risk
Management System in Somalia: Working Agreement, copy on file with the Monitoring Group.
92
This system allows the UN to record payment to individual civil servant and ministries in order to
determine duplication and diversion, and to monitor adherence to Somalia Civil Servant Salary Scale.
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53. More broadly there was enhanced, although uneven, collaboration between various UN
analytic units and across functions—political, security and programmatic—to share information
on persons of interest, context and networks.93 The RMU also convened a regular Multi Party
Risk Management Forum, which brought together the UN, the World Bank, donors and NGOs in
a strategic dialogue on issues such as fraud management, capacity assessments, and collective
solutions.
54. To some extent, more conscious engagement with the realities of diversion in Somalia and
improved risk management efforts are minimising losses. Against the background of an overall
diminishing aid budget, however, increasingly risk averse donors, coupled with increased
bureaucracy and administration, are creating unintended consequences whether in terms of costs
or program focus.94 In this regard, the Deputy Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator initiated a ‘structured dialogue’ with
international partners which attempted to parse out the ‘cost of delivery’ in Somalia. The
dialogue was designed “to bridge the gap between level of ambition and discourse” with respect
to the year of “delivery” and the levels of investment needed to achieve this, including in the
context of risk management.95
55. Finally, with increased focus on risk management, monitoring and due diligence, third party
monitors and external auditors have become an increasing part of the humanitarian aid
landscape, adding significantly to program costs.96 Although this new layer of accountability is
welcome, there is a danger that they in turn may be co-opted by the pervasive elements of the
system.97
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93
Keeping track of the network of individuals involved in diversion or other misuse of aid and who have the
skills and capacities to create and run NGOs with an ‘acceptable face’ for the international community but
who move between entities is important. When one NGO is suspended from partnership it is not unusual for
the same networks of control to reproduce under a new name. A mechanism for pooling and cross-referencing
connections and networks would be extremely helpful in understanding the context within which NGOs
emerge and retreat – and be invaluable in understanding risk.
94
Interview with NGO staff member, Nairobi, 28 January 2015.
95
Email from UN staff member, 9 September 2014.
96
Significant amounts of money are now being spent by UN agencies on the work of third party monitors
and special audits, sometimes with respect to the same entities or areas on the ground. Although some sharing
of information is occurring through the Risk Working Group a more formal mechanism for sharing
information– alongside a mechanism for cost sharing – could be considered.
97
The Monitoring Group is currently investigating a number of credible allegations in this regard.
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Annex 6
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians
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Annex 6.1 Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians1
1. This annex provides an overview of key areas of concern and investigations conducted by
the Monitoring Group with respect to responsibility for violations of international law involving
the targeting of civilians during the mandate.
Al-Shabaab
2. Although the two anti-Al-Shabaab offensives which got underway during the mandate
period significantly reduced the territory officially held by the group, they also forced a change
in tactics and operations both inside and outside of its areas of control. This had a significant
impact on civilians, intensifying trends identified by the Monitoring Group in 2014
(S/2014/726). Greater numbers of civilians were affected by Al-Shabaab direct attacks, including
across the border in Kenya where civilians have been the group’s primary targets. 2 One
assessment of available data shows that Al-Shabaab almost doubled its share of responsibility for
overall violence against civilians in 2014.3
3. Suicide attacks on civilian targets in urban areas, particularly hotels and public institutions,
resulted in significant causalities.4 Although the expected peak of annual violence by Al-Shabaab
during Ramadan did not occur, eleven civilians were killed at least 20 injured in Mogadishu
alone during the period.5 At the end of July 2015 Al-Shabaab again warned civilians to stay away
from Government and United Nations (UN) facilities and from hotels.6 Violence meted out by
Al-Shabaab in its policing of blockades on towns where there had been changes of authority saw
arrests, killings and destruction of property.7
4. In the context of the anti-Al-Shabaab military offensive AMISOM, the Somali National
Army (SNA) and its partners were often overstretched and forced to relinquish captured areas.
Al-Shabaab subsequently committed violent reprisals on the civilian population perceived to
have acquiesced in the transfer of power. In Qoryoley in Lower Shabelle, for example, the
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1
The Monitoring group is required, inter alia, to report on “violations of applicable international law in
Somalia involving the targeting of civilians including children and women in situations of armed conflict,
including killing and maiming, sexual and gender-based violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and
abduction and forced displacement” (Resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 43 (a)), in addition to those “being
political or military leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflicts in Somalia in violation of
applicable international law” (UN Resolution 2093 (2013) paragraph 43 (d)).
2
For more on Al-Shabaab’s attacks in Kenya see annex 4.2.
3
Analysis produced by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) for the Monitoring
Group, February 2015.
4
On 26 July 2015, for example, a truck laden with explosives detonated outside the Jazeera Palace Hotel,
killing fifteen people, including two UN third-party contractors, and injuring many more. The blast caused
structural damage to the hotel and nearby buildings, including three UN compounds. See annex 4.1 for more
details of this attack.
5
Email from UN staff member, 9 September 2015.
6
Statement by Sheikh Ali Mohamoud Rage aka Ali Dheere, 26 July 2015.
7
For more on Al-Shabaab blockades see annex 5.1.
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Monitoring Group received testimony of how the withdrawal of the AU Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) after four days of occupation, saw killings and torture of civilians, with bodies
“hung up on trees” as a warning to “collaborators”.8 Many fled the area.9 Similar incidents
occurred elsewhere, including in Hiran and Gedo.10
The situation in Al-Shabaab controlled areas
5. Al-Shabaab imposed violent punishments and severe restriction of rights on civilians still
residing it its areas of control. Extrajudicial killings, torture, detention—for purposes of extortion
and punishment—and denial of life-saving assistance were among the tactics deployed to both
maintain its grip on the population and generate resources for an intensified military campaign.
Execution of spies was a frequent practice.11 Annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b
describe commission of violations of international law by Al-Shabaab against members of the
Bantu/Wagosha community in the Juba Valley.
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) security forces
6. The conduct of extrajudicial executions were among the allegations received by the
Monitoring Group with respect to FGS security forces, against the background of huge
operational and command challenges, including non payments of salaries and stipends.12
7. As the Monitoring Group described in its 2014 report (S/2014/726), personnel of the SNA –
and sometimes the Somali Police Force (SPF), alongside assets of the security forces, including
vehicles, weapons and ammunition, were also deployed in attacks on civilian areas in pursuit of
clan agendas or resources. During the current mandate the Monitoring Group examined
allegations with respect to specific cases in Hiran and Lower Shabelle. Annex 6.3.a and strictly
confidential annex 6.3.b contain the Monitoring Group’s findings with respect to allegations of
the commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians in the
villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, between December 2013 and June 2015.
__________________
8
Telephone interview with Somali activist with family from the area who had spoken to residents, 17 August
2015. Dar Salaam and Mubarak were particularly affected.
9
Informal submission by the 100% coalition to the Monitoring Group, August 2015, providing details of
displacement of households in fourteen villages in the area. Some of the displaced went to the Badbaado 1
camp in Mogadishu and others to Ceel Jaale near Merka.
10
It was reported that at least 13 people were arrested in the wake of Ethiopian National Defence Forces
(ENDF)F/SNA pull out from areas around Halgan in Hiran in mid August 2015. See Shabelle News, Al
Shabaab details 13 people over coalition forces links, 18 August 2015 at. http://shabellenews.com/?p=12188;
Email from reliable NGO source, 19 August 2015.
11
On 4 September 2015, for example, four men were publically executed by firing squad in Bu’ale town in
Middle Juba, accused of spying for FGS forces. Four others were transferred to prison in Jilib. Email from
reliable NGO source, 5 September 2015.
12
See, for example, a report that on 18 August 2015 SNA soldiers executed an Al-Shabaab member known as
Kobyere some time after his capture from Kulunjerer in Wajid district. Email from reliable NGO source,
19 August 2015. For more on non-payment of SNA salaries see strictly confidential annex 3.1.
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Lower Shabelle
8. In some areas, the complexity of interaction and engagement between clan militia, the SNA
and Al-Shabaab both on the ground and in local perception created a highly uncertain
environment, including in terms of attribution of responsibility for violations. There was
evidence that Al Shabaab (both in itself, and in terms of the threat it represents) was leveraged,
and in turn was leveraged by, those progressing clan conflict for broader political and resource
goals. The Monitoring Group particularly examined two such incidents during the mandate.
9. In Lower Shabelle, for example, the Monitoring Group continues to investigate individual
responsibility for a series of attacks on civilians in Qoryoley district, in particular on the villages
of Buulo Sheikh, Hadoman and Farhano in early January, February and March 2015.13
Conducted by a combination of SNA personnel (with SNA assets), clan militia and elements of
Al-Shabaab, the attacks demonstrate the complexity of alliances and cross cutting interests
emerging between Somalia’s conflict parties at the local level. The violations unfolded against
the backdrop of an ongoing conflict between the Salaax militia and Hawiye (primarily Haber
Gedir, but also Hawadle and Murosade) militia in the area and the broader conflict with AlShabaab. The Salaax militia are a defensive militia created by the Bantu community and led by a
Bantu Digil-Mirifle/Dube, Shiekh Salaax.14
10. Credible information received by the Monitoring Group indicates that the attack of
3 January 2015 on Buulo Sheikh and Hadoman resulted in the extrajudicial killing of at least five
civilians, the rape of four women and the torture of three young men. Hostages were taken but
later released. Many civilians fled their homes. This pattern of conduct was repeated in the
subsequent attacks carried out later in January, February and March 2015. One of the
characteristics of these combined forces attacks was the taking of hostages and their transfer to
Al-Shabaab custody. One hostage captured in an attack on Hadoman village and handed over to
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13
Information on the attacks was gathered from NGO staff members, individuals with knowledge of the
conflict cycle in the region, and UN staff members between March and early September 2015. Interviews
with local elders in two villages particularly affected by the attacks were also conducted on 5 September
2015 on behalf of the Monitoring Group. Email from interlocutor of the Monitoring Group, 6 September
2015. The names of some of the victims named in this account are on file with the Monitoring Group.
14
The mission of the group is avowedly to defend Bantu communities of various clan allegiance (particular
Digil-Mirifle and Biomaal) which have disproportionately suffered in the context of historical and current
land-grabbing in the area and from attacks on civilians, primarily killings and sexual violence by Somali
security forces and Haber Gedir militia. In furtherance of these goals the militia has taken revenge on
particular individuals who it views as having violently expropriated land. It also conducted a series of attacks
aimed at undermining the viability of those farms which the community asserts were unjustly taken from
them: this has included threats to Bantu who chose to work on such farms. Information on the Salaax militia
was gleaned from multiple interviews with local NGO activists, government officials, and regional
intelligence sources, March to September 2015. Eleven members of the Salaax militia were arrested in May
2015 in unusual circumstances which confirm some of the complex alliances which are emerging the area,
complicating analysis of the violence and also, arguably, AMSIOM’s mission in relation to Al-Shabaab. See
Strictly Confidential annex 6.1.1 which describes the circumstances of the arrests.
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Al-Shabaab was subsequently beheaded. A large-scale hostage-taking incident confirmed from
different sources involved the kidnap of 30 Bantu community members from outside of a
mosque in Bandar village on 20 March 2015, and their transfer to Al-Shabaab’s Donburale
village base. Community outcry subsequently forced the release of 25 or 27 of the hostages. At
the time of writing, the fate of the remaining hostages is not known.15
11. The killing of then District Commissioner (DC) of Janale, Garad Ibrahim Sid Ali, in early
August, also occurred in unclear circumstances. A Biomaal Bantu recently returned from
diaspora, the DC was particularly renowned for his assistance to Biomaal and Bantu farmers in
the area, including with respect to resisting pressure to sell or relinquish land in the context of
ongoing inter-clan conflict in the area. The killing of the DC on 3 August 2015 at his home,
alongside his colleagues Abdule Barre and Hassan Abdille, was reported widely as attributable to
Al-Shabaab.16 The Monitoring Group’s enquiries, including in interviews with the DC’s family
and in accounts received of the circumstances of the killing itself, suggest that although the
particular individuals who carried out the attack were indeed affiliated with Al-Shabaab17, the
motivation related to the ongoing conflict over land ownership and control in the area. 18 As one
local activist described it: “Al-Shabaab did it, but he was stopping Hawiye businesses”.19
Interim Regional Administration forces
12. The Monitoring Group also received allegations against regional security forces outside the
control of the FGS. In this regard, the unlawful use of force attributed to the forces of the Interim
Jubaa administration (IJA), including detentions, unlawful killings and torture, were the most
frequently alleged. The most common allegation from clan representatives, non-governmental
organisation (NGO) staff members and members of the government was of assassinations of
members of particular clans not allied to the government structure (particularly Bantu,20 Adjuran
and Marehan), often disguised as Al-Shabaab killings.21
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15
Interview with expert with knowledge of conflict cycles in Lower Shabelle, Nairobi, 25 March 2015.
See, for example, Garowe on line, Janale District Commissioner killed in raid, 4 August 2015, available at
http://www.garoweonline.com/page/show/post/3283/somalia-janale-district-commissioner-killed-in-raid.
17
Names of some of the alleged attackers were provided to the Monitoring Group.
18
For more on the background to this context see annex 3.2, S/2014/726 on threats to peace and security in
Lower and Middle Shabelle.
19
Interview with Somali activist with knowledge of the area, Nairobi, 27 August 2015; interviews with
Somali NGO staff member, Nairobi, 6 September 2015; phone interview with members of the family of the
Commissioner, 6 September 2015.
20
The Bantu in addition suffered from killings from what appeared to be acts of casual racist violence. A
number of such incidents in 2014, including the killing of a shoeshine boy, were corroborated by members of
the Bantu community and witnesses from other clans. Members of the Bantu community also reported
killings at checkpoints. One account received by the Monitoring Group was of the killing of four brothers at
Jambalubi checkpoint at a date in early 2015. A fifth brother survived and went into hiding in Kismayo.
21
The Monitoring Group conducted interviews with witnesses to the finding of bodies, with NGO sources
and with members of the government, between June and September 2015. There was great fear of retaliation
expressed by all those interviewed so some details are deliberately vague to protect witnesses.
16
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13. As part of its preliminary investigations, the Monitoring Group was able to investigate and
corroborate information on the killing of Sheikh Nadir Sokorow in late June 2014. Sheikh
Nadir’s body was found dumped in a sack on the morning of 24 June 2014 at the site of the
Kismayo hospital, which at the time was under construction. His body bore 9 bullet wounds and
signs of torture. Credible testimony received by the Monitoring Group indicates that he had been
taken into custody the previous night from his father’s home by the then-Head of the Intelligence
Service. The arrest came further to an explosion in the Shangala District near the madrasa at
which Sheikh Nadir taught, and subsequent to the torture of one of his colleagues by security
forces. Information on five other cases which involved the death of individuals subsequent to
their arrest by security forces, including photographs of the deceased and testimony, are under
examination by the Monitoring Group.
International forces
14. A significant development during the mandate was the increasing scale of engagement—
both in terms of personnel numbers and means and methods deployed—of international forces in
Somalia, including forces which appeared to operate outside the AMISOM Concept of
Operations.22 Various entities operated in different combinations alongside SNA, clan militia,
and regional forces, including engaging in armed action which was not always connected with
the conflict against Al-Shabaab.23 A variety of credible allegations, including from eyewitnesses,
were brought to the attention of the Monitoring Group, particularly towards the end of the
investigative phase of the mandate when Operation Juba Corridor got underway. Nevertheless,
the preliminary findings of the Monitoring Group’s enquiries into the conduct and operation of
AMISOM troops and of the Liyiu police in a number of incidents are highlighted here.
AMISOM
15. July and August 2015 saw a major uptick in civilian casualties attributable to AMISOM. 24
Twenty-two people were killed by AMISOM in Merka in the last ten days of July 2015, coming
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22
Operation Juba corridor was launched by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia’s
National Armed Forces (SNAF) with parallel operations reportedly conducted by the Ethiopian National
Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). Disquiet within AMSIOM on this framework
became public on 17 August 2015 when the Commander of AMISOM Sector 4 Colonel Abdourahman Abdi
Dembel gave a radio interview claiming that some Ethiopian troops were not operating in direct cooperation
with AMISOM. See, There are Ethiopian forces that are not part of AMISOM troops and present in Somalia,
17 August 2015, www.hiiraanonlinenews.com. Although the claims were later denied by the Somali Minister
for Defence, a number of days afterwards the President of Somali Region of Ethiopia Abdi Illay made a
speech noting that the Liyiu police was operating inside the Somali border.
23
Multiple examples during July, August and September 2015 from UN and NGO sources.
24
Between January and June 2015 30 AMISOM violations were documented, primarily maiming and
abductions/detentions. The July figure of 22 is a major shift in both the scale and the pattern of violations.
Email, UN staff member, 11 September 2015.
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against the background of almost of a year of rising tensions and casualties.25 The events in
Merka were followed by the killing of five civilians by AMISOM personnel in Halgan in Hiran
on 8 August.26 In addition there were 13 reported civilians casualties suffered as a result of
Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) air strikes in July.27
16. AMISOM Boards of Enquiry were established to investigate the Merka and Halgan
incidents. It is understood that the Board of Enquiry for the 21 July 2015 killings had reported by
the time of finalisation of this report although the outcome is not known. Further, a joint
investigation into the events in Halgan and Merka was announced after a meeting between the
FGS Parliamentary Defence Committee and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the
African Union Commission (SRCC) and his Deputy. A delegation subsequently conducted a
visit to Merka.28 Meanwhile Human Rights Watch conducted its own investigation which
determined that six members of the Moalim Iidey family who were preparing for their daughter’s
wedding were deliberately shot inside the Iidey home by AMISOM soldiers.29 The Monitoring
Group spoke with members of the Bendadiri community and, via an interlocutor, with an Iidey
family member.30 The information they provided reflected UN and NGO accounts of the event,
including the allegation that two of those shot died from their injuries at the house subsequent to
the shooting as they were prevented from seeking medical assistance. A number of interlocutors,
including one eyewitness to the event, however, also mentioned that Somali security personnel
or militia were also present alongside the AMISOM unit at the time of the killings.
17. It is clear that the operational situation for AMISOM in Merka was, and is, extremely
difficult with a long-standing complex inter-clan conflict affecting the town and an isolated SNA
contingent co-located at the AMISOM base. Al-Shabaab has been able to carry out numerous
IED and grenade attacks on AMISOM in the town. At the same time retaliatory and
disproportionate responses to these attacks from AMISOM have resulted in death and injury of
civilians and ever-increasing isolation from the community.31 In this context, the escalated
gravity and the community impact of the recent incidents suggests that a Board of Enquiry – with
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25
On 21 July 15 people were reported killed in separate incidents in the Aw Balle, Jujuuma, and Rusiya
neighborhoods; on 31 July 7 people from one family were killed in one incident which occurred inside the
family home of six of those killed while wedding preparations were ongoing.
26
A security source of the Monitoring Group claimed that Liyiu police were also present during the incident,
alongside the AMISOM ENDF contingent. On 27 August 2015 there was a further report that ENDF/Liyiu
police had opened fire on a civilian mini bus in Gedo (Qoond Hood) and had killed at least four civilians but
the Monitoring Group was unable to get further information on the incident.
27
Email from UN staff member, 9 September 2015.
28
Email from UN staff member, 7 September 2015.
29
See Human Rights Watch, AU forces linked to wedding killings, 13 August 2015, available at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/13/somalia-au-forces-linked-wedding-killings.
30
Interview with Somali NGO staff member, Nairobi, 10 August 2015; interview with Benadiri elder,
Nairobi, 11 August 2015; Interview with Somali activist, Nairobi, 16 August 2015.
31
For example, a former source of the Monitoring Group, AY, was killed in the course of indirect fire from an
AMSIOM operation in Merka on 14 November 2014.
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its inherently restricted jurisdiction, capacity and ‘insider’ nature – may not be the most effective
mechanism to address the violence. In this regard it should be noted that the killings of the Iidey
family occurred less than a week after the Board of Enquiry for the first incident had visited
Merka in the course of its investigations.32 The Monitoring Group believes that consideration
must be given to a more independent and transparent mode of investigation and venue for
redress.
18. More broadly, there is also a need for AMISOM to examine the larger implications of the
situation in Merka in terms of its operations and disposition. In mid 2015 the AMISOM Civilian
Casualty Tracing, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) was finally established.33 It would be
important that troop contribution countries urgently scale up collaboration and information
sharing with the CCTARC in order that lessons learned from these and other incidents are
swiftly integrated into operations.
The Liyiu police
19. The Liyiu police, an Ethiopian paramilitary force based in Region 5 of Ethiopia, has been
increasingly active in Somalia. Allegations of serious violations have accompanied their
engagements, including with respect to killing, sexual violence and disappearances. 34 One source
of the Monitoring Group asserted that at least 4800 Liyiu police were operating in Bay and Bakol
alone by the end of August 2015.35 During July 2015, the UN received reports of civilian killings
in Bay (Buur Hakaba) and in Bakol (Tieflow) during July. In addition, as noted in annex 6.3.b
the Liyiu police were also alleged to have become involved in, or operated alongside, the
Surre/Hawdle conflict in Hiran in June 2015.
20. The Monitoring Group received a variety of allegations relating to the conduct of the Liyiu
police.36 The most serious related to a large-scale attack on villages, inter alia, in Galgadud on
the Somali/Ethiopia border where it was alleged that over 50 people were killed. The Monitoring
Group began an investigation into the attack and ascertained that the attack on the border
villages, in particular Garsaale and Laba Ceel, appears to have been launched in retaliation for a
large attack by hundreds of Haber Gedir militia from across the region on the Liyiu police in
which as many as 30 officers reportedly died. It was the culmination of an escalated conflict
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32
There are also indications that the same AMISOM commander may have presided over the two events.
See, inter alia, resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 3.
34
See, for example, a report on 24 March 2015 which claimed that a Liyiu police officer had been shot in
Abudwaaq allegedly in revenge for the dead man’s engagement in handing over detainees to intelligences
sources across the border. Email from reliable NGO source, 5 March 2015.
35
Interview with security source with knowledge of armed operations in the region, Nairobi, 7 September
2015. The same source claimed that a total of 17,000 members of the security forces of Ethiopia were present
in various forms in Somalia, including the authorized AMISOM contingent number.
36
See interview with government official, 16 August 2015. In addition to violence against civilians, there
were a number of reports of interference with humanitarian operations by the Liyiu police. See interview,
NGO staff member, 28 January 2015.
33
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between the Haber Gedir and the Liyiu police, which had initially erupted following a dispute
over access to a water point.37 Although the units and command of the Liyiu police involved have
been identified, the Monitoring Group is continuing to investigate the circumstances of the attack
and impact of the attack on civilians.38 The information available to the Monitoring Group
suggests that the number of people killed in the attack was been 30 and 40.
Torture, unlawful killing and kidnapping
21. Notwithstanding the 2011 commitment declaring a moratorium, there was a rise across
Somalia in the number of death penalty sentences passed, and executions carried out during the
mandate.39 In Somaliland, where no executions had been carried out for for a number of years,
six executions were conducted. Particularly in southern and central Somalia, the circumstances in
which some of these individuals in the military court system were tried, sentenced, and executed
cumulatively raised questions of compliance with customary international law relating to the
conduct of non-international armed conflict, and thus violations of the mandate. 40 These
included, inter alia, lack of effective access to legal representation, charge sheets and evidence,
and extensive reliance on confessions as the basis of convictions. In one case being followed
closely by the Monitoring Group the military court passed two death sentences for murder after a
trial which appeared to lack fundamental fairness. In all the circumstances of the arrest of the
accused, and in combination with the nature of the prosecution witnesses presented before the
court, it is likely that the case was hijacked by clan interests. 41 An appeal was allowed, however,
and the case is ongoing.
22. Further to its reporting in S/2014/726 the Monitoring Group continued to receive
allegations, although fewer in number, of the use of torture during interrogations by the security
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37
Interview with security expert with knowledge of the region, Nairobi, 17 June 2015 and 1 July 2015.
Credible reports suggest that the ENDF attempted to interpose themselves between the Liyiu police and
border but failed to stop the assault.
38
A number of victims of the attacks have been identified further to an interview with an NGO staff member
in Nairobi on 30 June 2015.
39
According to the UN by the end of August 2015 there had been 26 death penalty sentences passed
(Mogadishu 12; Puntland 11; Somaliland 3) in contrast with 22 for the whole of 2014. With respect to
executions in 2015 6 were conducted in Mogadishu and Baidoa further to sentences of the military court;
four in Puntland and 6 in Somaliland.
40
Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 15 January 2014; see also, Human Rights Watch, The Courts of
absolute power: Fair trial violations by Somalia’s military court, May 2014 at page 1.
41
Decisions of the court with respect to the imposition of the death penalty on file with the Monitoring
Group. See also interview with Somali activist, 15 August 2015. See strictly confidential annex 6.1.1 for
further information on this case.
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forces, particularly at Godka Jilicow.42 One case is currently under investigation. The Monitoring
Group also continued to receive credible allegations relating to the phenomenon of arrest,
detention and beating of individuals at secret locations by NISA officers as a form of extortion,
especially of those perceived as coming from the diaspora.43 The SPF was also reported to be
involved in this practice, however the conduct and ill treatment generally involved only unlawful
arrest and detention.
23. In February 2015 the Monitoring Group began to receive reports that an SNA paramilitary
unit referred to by communities as, “Alpha 4” was “systematically abducting and arresting
Barawani teen age boys and accusing them for being members of Al-Shabab, and demand money
of up to USD 500 per person for their release”.44 A Barawanese elder confirmed to the
Monitoring Group that between nine and ten incidents of abduction of young Barawanese men
residing in Barawe or in Mogadishu had been recorded by families of his acquaintance. 45 He
recounted how on one occasion in 2015 his nephew had visited Barawe from abroad and had
been abducted from his home by armed security officers in full-face masks. No reason for the
arrest was given.46 Further to his abduction—as is the practice which has allegedly developed
since the phenomenon began—the family contacted an “agent” in Mogadishu who made
arrangements for the young man’s elder brother to travel to Mogadishu and be given sight of the
“prisoner” where he was being held in an ordinary house in an area of Mogadishu. Payment
terms were agreed and upon the handover of 2000 USD cash to the armed “agent” the young
man was released immediately to his brother. Two other Barawanese elders contacted by the
Monitoring Group expressed the view that there was deliberate targeting of families who were
understood to have access to resources either directly or through supportive relatives abroad. The
young men who were abducted and later released reportedly told the elders that they were
questioned very simply at the time of arrest, transferred to Mogadishu and then simply held until
their release. No ill treatment was described. In no case of which the elders were aware were
individuals charged with any offence after their abduction; the extortion of payments was the
primary objective of the arrests. The Monitoring Group is continuing its investigation into this
phenomenon.
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42
Interview with Somali activist, London, 4 December 2014; Interview with senior INGO staff member,
Nairobi, 30 June 2015; On 31 August 2015 a statement by the Benadir Al-Shabaab Wali Sheikh Ali Jabel
claimed responsibility for the complex attack carried out on the same day on Godka Jilicow, claiming that
“Muslims have been tortured and punished there”; See also the report of the killing as a result of torture
further to interrogation of a man arrested in possession of IEDs accused of being an Al-Shabaab operative by
Somali security forces in Dollow in Gedo on 17 October 2014.Email from reliable NGO source with
knowledge of Dollow, 19 October 2014.
43
Interview with senior INGO staff member, Nairobi, 30 June 2015.
44
See, inter alia, email from UN staff member, 19 February 2015.
45
Interview with Barawanese elder, undisclosed location, 16 July 2015.
46
The date of the abduction is not provided here for security reasons. It was noted that in Mogadishu the
armed security officers were accompanied to the homes of those abducted by “local people”. It is not clear in
what capacity these civilians operated.
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Annex 6.1.a: Arrest of 11 members of the Salaax militia, 20 May 2015
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 6.2.a: The situation of the Bantu/Wagosha community in Al-Shabaab held areas of
Lower and Middle Juba
26. Since Al-Shabaab seized control of the Juba Valley members of the Bantu/Wagosha47
farming community who inhabit the riverine villages and key towns have become increasingly
subject to systematic violations of international law, including killing, maiming, torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of civilians, and sexual and gender-based
violence. The violations have increased in number and ferocity as pressure on resources and
territory from an ongoing offensive see Al-Shabaab prepare for a ‘final stand’.48
27. The range of persistent and serious violations experienced by the community as documented
by the Monitoring Group may constitute war crimes in non-international armed conflict and also
crimes against humanity, including with respect to the underlying acts of persecution, murder,
torture and sexual slavery.49 The nature and scale of the persecution and forced displacement of
the community, coupled with allegations of inward transfer of population to lands from which
the community has been displaced (yet to be investigated by the Monitoring Group) may also be
understood as ethnic cleansing.50
28. Members of the community interviewed perceived their current treatment by Al-Shabaab as
an escalation in a continuum of persecution by dominant groups and clans who have viewed the
Bantu as second class “adoons” (slaves). There is a long history of severe persecution of the
community, including, as well-documented, by Hawive and Darood militia in the wake of the
fall of Siyaad Bare regime. This led some of those interviewed to describe Al-Shabaab as the
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47
Although the terms Bantu/Jareer (hard hair) are not anthropologically accurate and have pejorative
implications they have been reclaimed by the community and are used here. Among other pejorative terms
used for the Bantu are Adoon (slave), Habash (servant), Ooji (from either Italian Oji “today” or Swahili Uji
“porriage”) Jereer (kinky hair), Sankadhudhi (broad nose). See note below for an account of the origin of the
community.
48
The majority of the violations documented by the Monitoring Group occurred in the context of extortion
and taxation land grabbing, repression of culture and language and punishment of Al-Shabaab decreed
‘offences’.
49
Articles 8(2)(c) and (e) of the ICC Statute describe war crimes in non-international armed conflicts. The
essence of crimes against humanity is an attack (whether armed or unarmed) directed against a civilian
population. Crimes against humanity comprise various “underlying acts” – such as murder, extermination,
deportation or forcible transfer of population, persecution, rape and other inhumane acts – which are
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”. See ICC
Statute, art. 7(1). Persecution as a crime against humanity is constituted by “the intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or
collectivity” committed in the context of an “widespread and systematic attack” on the civilian population.
(Art. 7(2)(g) Statute).
50
Ethnic cleansing is “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent
and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain
geographic areas”. See Part III, B Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UN
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994 (S/1994/674). Although ethnic cleansing is not a
crime as such, acts carried out in furtherance of a policy of ethnic cleansing may, in certain circumstances,
constitute crimes defined in articles 6 to 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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new face of a continuum of oppressors: Al-Shabaab was “the worst of the colonial entities”.51Yet
another called the collective experience of persecution and displacement as “genocide”.52
29. The Monitoring Group’s focus therefore not only highlights that this community is the
current target of systematic violations of the mandate. It is also intended to warn that it is
potentially vulnerable in the context of any change of authority. One elder described the situation
in Al-Shabaab-held areas as the latest episode in a “long term strategy” to “get rid of” the Bantu
from the Juba Valley.53 Grave concern was expressed that patterns of killing, extortion, forced
displacement and violent land-grabbing experienced under Al-Shabaab would continue if local
power elites were permitted to continue to assert control in a new ‘liberated’ framework. 54 It was
claimed that the senior leadership of Al-Shabaab in the region were from dominant clans and that
many had ongoing business and security relationships with clan, business and military/security
networks of the Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) and Kenyan and Ethiopian military
structures.55 Indeed as this report was being finalised in late August 2015 reports were being
received that Ethiopian and Somali security forces were removing Bantu farmers from their
lands around Bardhere (south towards Sakow) in order ostensibly to clear mines. Refusal to
leave was being met with beatings. Members of the community told Monitoring Group sources
that they were fearful that this clearing was in fact a land-grab. The Group was unable to
corroborate these reports, but they do reflect the level of fear of the community.56
30. With the community effectively held hostage and subject to forced recruitment by
Al-Shabaab, the anticipated military offensive was a major concern to all those interviewed with
family members in the area. In addition to the expected deaths of children who had been
conscripted, members of the community were fearful that the Bantu/Wagosha community more
broadly would be scapegoated and persecuted in the context of any transfer of power.57
Methodology
31. Over eighty individual and focus group interviews were conducted in person and on the
telephone with recent direct victims of violations allegedly committed during 2014 and 2105,
indirect victims, and with individuals in the diaspora with family members currently living in
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51
Interview with AJ, United States of America, 1 June 2015.
Interview with AA, United States of America, 30 May 2015.
53
Interview with Mursal Hayder, Head of Seattle Bantu, 30 May 2015.
54
Indeed one of the frequent suggestions was that the delay in the launch of the offensive to “liberate” the
Juba Valley was part of a strategy to ensure that both the community was displaced as much as possible from
its land and that those remaining could be easily dispossessed of their land and accused as collaborators with
Al-Shabaab.
55
The exclusion and marginalization experienced by the community in Kismayo exacerbated this perception.
In July a new Haber Gedir commander was appointed by Al-Shabaab in Lower and Middle Juba.
56
Email from Bantu activist in the US, 24 August 2015.
57
The period of time when the UN was in control in the region was cited by many as a period of protection
and safety.
52
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areas of the Juba Valley under the control of Al-Shabaab, including those with family members
who are low-ranking members of Al-Shabaab.58 The majority of testimonies were collected from
family members of victims and victims from rural communities and small villages outside the
big towns. Although the majority of those interviewed had left Somalia up to ten years
previously, some had been able to return to meet family members in Kenya or Kismayo more
recently.59 Other interviews were conducted with refugees who had fled villages in the Juba
Valley during the last twelve months. Journalists, UN and international non-governmental
organisation (NGO) and local NGO staff members, and academics were also consulted.
32. The testimonies contained in this report relate to events which allegedly unfolded in villages
between and around Jilib and Jamame in Middle and Lower Juba between 2013 and 2015. The
precise names of the places where the events occurred are not used in the report for reason of the
safety of those interviewed and their families. It was not possible to investigate and corroborate
individually the over one hundred incidents described. The main focus therefore was on
identifying case patterns both in terms of prohibited conduct and geography and corroborating
the information with reliable UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sources. Due to the
highly isolated nature of the community efforts were made to reflect as much as possible of the
individual experiences for the record.
33. The details of the findings of the Monitoring Group’s investigation are presented in strictly
confidential annex 6.2.b.
A note on the origins of the Bantu/Wagosha community
34. Although all histories of identity in Somalia are highly contested, Somali and international
academics consulted by the Monitoring Group suggest that there is consensus around the Bantu
community having two roots: the first is in indigenous communities who were the first
inhabitants of south and central Somalia along the Shabelle and Juba valley and elsewhere; the
other is in escaped slaves originally from Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique who fled to the
Juba Valley in the mid 1800s and settled along the river banks60 In their isolated forests and
farms of the Juba Valley these communities were able to maintain a homogeneous culture, with
distinct language and traditions. Those who did integrate closer to the Somali population either
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58
Interviews were conducted in Kenya, Somalia the United Kingdom, and the United States. Due to the
extreme fear expressed by the community, including in particular the threat of retaliatory attacks on family
members, names and places of interviews are indicated only by initials. Consistent fear and suspicion was
expressed not just of Al-Shabaab but of ‘Somalis’ whom the community were convinced still had the power
to control and disrupt their lives in exile. It is difficult to convey the depth of the fear which was observed,
including with respect to the safety and security of meeting rooms thousands of miles from the Juba Valley.
59
It was not possible to direct conduct interviews with individuals living in the area although some phone
interviews were conducted indirectly by Somali interlocutors.
60
The villages and towns in Bantu areas of Lower and Middle Juba with their Swahili based names reveal the
origin of these towns: Cha mama (became Jamame); Osman Moto (an original Shekih of the community).
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came directly under protection of other clans adopting a dual-identity, (as Biomaal/Jareer or
Digle/Jareer, for example) or maintained an evolved but separate identity, Mahaway, including
speaking the Maay Maay language. Both communities are collectively termed, “Wagosha” or the
“people of the forest”.
35. Bantu communities are often considered as second-class citizens and ‘not true Somali’
because of their ethnic difference.61 The continued marginalization and vulnerability of the
Wagosha community of the Juba Valley in their different alignments also allowed them to be
easily manipulated, divided, and controlled. As a result, tensions between the Zigua speaking
community and the Maay Maay speaking Bantu community are significant, including around
what is perceived as different levels of compromise and collusion with those which are viewed
as the dominant clans.
36. In a forthcoming academic article it is estimated that the population of Bantu in the Juba
Valley is between 851,206 and 1,571,302 or 6.9 per cent to 14.9 percent of the national
population.62 This is significantly greater than previously understood with implications for the
participation of the community in the federal process.
__________________
61
The level to which this exclusion has been absorbed is reflected in the fact the many in the community
refer to other Somalis as simply “Somalis”.
62
See, Dan Van Lehman and Risa Proehl, Population Estimates of Somali Bantu with East African Slave
Ancestry, draft 1 September, 2015, forthcoming, Journal of Somali Studies.
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Annex 6.2.b: The situation of the Wagosha/Bantu community in Al-Shabaab held areas of
Lower and Middle Juba
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 6.3.a: Commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of
civilians in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, December 2013 – 2015
39. Between 2013 and late 2104 a series of large scale attacks on Surre (Dir) farming villages
of Kabxanley and Defow in Hiran on the banks of the river Shabelle resulted in killing and
maiming of civilians, the commission of sexual and gender based violence and forced
displacement.63 The attacks were carried out by Hawadle (Hawiye) clan militia augmented and
constituted by personnel of the Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali Police Force (SPF),
and supported politically and financially by regional and national government leaders and
powerful members of the Hawadle clan.64
40. After the first attack on Kabxanely in December 2013 a Government enquiry found that the
fighting had caused huge losses in terms of death, injuries and the burning and destruction of the
whole village.65 Among the comprehensive recommendations of the delegation was that the
“government” would “take the responsibility [to pay] for the damages caused by the fighting
such as burned down houses and water pumps”. The agreement was never implemented. In the
wake of the attack a series of small clashes between respective militia continued with violence
against civilians committed by both sides.
41. On 15 July 2014, a second major attack by forces allied with the Hawadle began in the
village of Defow, another Surre village where many civilians displaced from Kabxanley had
taken refuge. Once again the village was destroyed and the population fled. Almost the entire
Surre civilian population in Kabxanley and Defow, estimated at over 12,000 people, were
displaced including across the border into Ethiopia. Eventually the Surre community regrouped
and with support of fighters and equipment from Surre clans in other parts of the country, and
others, led a series of counter attacks. The force ousted the Hawadle militia from primary control
of Kabxanley and Defow in a series of fierce battles between January and March 2015.
42. The Surre community have described the attacks on their villages as constituting a
“calculated plan spearheaded by the regional administration to takeover some of the best
commercial farmlands in Hiiraan and distribute among the Hawadle clan which dominates the
political affairs”.66 The Hawadle community, on the other hand, contend that the Surre had only
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63
The residents of Kabxanley are primarily the Surre/Fiqi Omar and those of Defow the Surre/Fiqi
Mohamed. The Surre is a Dir clan, with two branches, Abdalle and Qebeys, found in Mudug, Hiran, Gedo
and the Jubbas.
64
Some small scale support for the attacks was also initially provided by members of the Makane
community, also inhabitants of the Shabelle river area, and in some respects, rivals with the Surre farming
communities. It was alleged that humanitarian inputs were used to induce and secure their cooperation.
65
Copy on file with the Monitoring Group. Quotations in English from the resolution are informal
translations by an interlocutor of the Monitoring Group.
66
Written submission on behalf of the Surre community, June 2015; this statement is also reflective of the
views expressed by many of those interviewed.
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recently arrived in the area and had no entitlement to the land and its benefits. 67 Previous to the
attacks large numbers of Hawadle from other parts of Hiran were invited and supported to settle
in areas close to the two villages, induced by the promise of land. These settlements, referred to
as “villages created by force” or ‘tuulo soog’ by the Surre community, constituted militia
encampments and rear bases for the attacks.
43. In all of these circumstances, the phrase “ethnic cleansing” has been used to describe the
violence against, and displacement of, the Surre community.68 The complete impunity of the
military and political leaders who funded and planned and perpetrated the attacks on Kabxanely
and Defow not only created a human rights and humanitarian crisis, it has also permitted an
escalation in the intensity of the violence and the range of actors involved in the conflict.
External support to the Surre became inevitable. At the time of writing the two sides are in
military stalemate, peace talks are stalled, and the majority of the civilian population of
Kabxanley and Defow are still in exile. Meanwhile a state formation process is ostensibly
underway for Hiran and Middle Shabelle.
44. Due to the ongoing fragility of the context, with almost weekly engagements between the
parties, a full and detailed account of the attacks, the violations committed, the humanitarian
impact and a discussion of allegations relating to those militarily, financially and politically
responsible, is set out in strictly confidential annex 6.3.b.
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67
The Surre claim that they have been connected to Kabxanley and Defow for at least 500 years.
See, for example, interview with international non-governmental organisation (INGO) staff member with
knowledge of the situation in Hiran, Nairobi, 27 March 2015. Ethnic cleansing is “a purposeful policy
designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian
population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas”. See Part III, B Final Report of
the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May
1994 (S/1994/674).) Although ethnic cleansing is not a crime as such, acts carried out in furtherance of a
policy of ethnic cleansing may, in certain circumstances, constitute crimes defined in articles 6 to 8 of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
68
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Annex 6.3.b: Commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of
civilians in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, December 2013 – 2015
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
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Annex 6.4: Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), recruitment and use of children in
armed conflict and forced displacement
47. This annex contains summaries of the main trends in violations with respect to these three
areas of focus of the mandate including addressing developments in practices and the legal
framework which tend to prevent occurrence of such violations and enhance compliance with the
sanctions regime.
Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV)
48. Since S/2014/726 there has been little change in the pattern and scale of allegations of the
commission of SGBV. Armed actors remain the main perpetrators of the commission of rape by
a stranger. The right to remedy remains almost never fulfilled. Between January and December
2014, the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS) recorded 4,737
cases (50.9 per cent physical assault, 27.4 per cent rape, 9.5 per cent sexual assault, 7.1 per cent
denial of resources, opportunities and services, 3.4 per cent psychological abuse and 1.7 per cent
forced marriage). 84 per cent of the survivors were IDPs.69
49. In Al-Shabaab-held areas there were a range of violations documented by the Monitoring
Group, including forced marriage and a practice called ‘Dumaashhi’ involving the taking of new
brides by Al-Shabaab fighters, in particular in Lower and Middle Juba.70 Inter-clan conflict was
once again a context in which rape was used as a tool to punish and assert dominance with
specific allegations received by the Monitoring Group on the commission of SGBV by clan
militia in Lower Shabelle and Hiran.71
50. In the wake of allegations regarding the commission of SGBV by AMISOM personnel –
including by Human Rights Watch72 and the Monitoring Group73 – the summary findings and
recommendations of an Independent Investigation Team established to investigate allegations of
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by AMISOM personnel were published in April 2015.74 The
report determined that only two of the allegations were founded, including one case which had
been investigated and documented by the Monitoring Group in S/2014/726.75 Despite the
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69
The data is only from reported incidents to service providers directly working with GBV survivors. The
consolidated data is in no way representative of the total incidents or prevalence of GBV in Somalia. See
http://www.gbvims.com/what-is-gbvims/.
70
See annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b.
71
See, inter alia, annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b. ‘Clan militia’ in many cases were also
SNA personnel.
72
Human Rights Watch, “The Power These Men Have Over Us – Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African
Union Forces in Somalia”, 8 September 2014.
73
S/2014/726, strictly confidential annex 8.4. See also paragraphs 32 – 34, resolution 2182 (2014).
74
Press release, “The African Union releases the key finding and recommendations of the report of
investigations on sexual exploitation and abuse in Somalia”, 21 April 2015.
75
Although two troop contributing countries (TCCs) launched their own investigations relating to the
allegation, TCCs were very reluctant to share information with the team.
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Security Council urging AMISOM to implement the recommendations of the report, there has
been little change on the ground.76 Meanwhile the Monitoring Group received reports of the
commission of SGBV by international security forces operating outside of the AMISOM
framework.77
51. There were small steps forward in terms of improving the national framework of prevention
and redress for SGBV crimes. At the federal level the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
Attorney General initiated a new approach to prosecuting SGBV crimes, including with the
engagement of two female prosecutors.78 In Somaliland crimes increased support for prosecutors
and investigators resulted in increased prosecutions of SGBV. By late August 2015, Sexual
Offences Bills were under development—albeit at different stages—at the federal level, and
regionally in Somaliland, Puntland and the IJA. With the highest global incidence of female
genital mutilation (FGM), presentation of a bill to outlaw the practice to the Puntland parliament
and the development of a similar bill at the federal level, represented significant breakthroughs.
The National Action Plan for Sexual Violence in Conflict, presented at the June 2014 London
conference, however, still awaits implementation and funding.
52. Nevertheless, pursuing justice for SGBV crimes remained extremely difficult. Huge
obstacles are integral to the system, including in particular the conduct of officials charged with
receiving and investigating allegations. One severe illustration of this during the mandate
involved a young girl of fifteen who approached the FGS Criminal Investigation Division in
Mogadishu with an allegation of gang rape. She, her mother and a staff member of a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) accompanying her were insulted, interrogated, and finally
arrested, accused of inventing the claim.79
Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict
53. Against the background of an intensified campaign against Al-Shabaab, and as clan,
business and political networks positioned themselves to contest control of land and populations,
new cycles of conflict and militarization created an opportunity for increased child recruitment.80
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76
Preamble, resolution 2232 (2014).
Interview with security expert, Nairobi, 7 September 2015.
78
Meeting with staff of the Office of the Attorney General, 2 July 2015, Nairobi.
79
See, Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) and Somali Women Development Centre
(SDWC), Press release: “Mogadishu: student gang raped”, 1 July 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group.
80
The Report of the Secretary General on Children and armed conflict for 2014, 5 June 2015, (A/69/926–
S/2015/409) documented the recruitment and use of 819 children (779 boys, 40 girls) by Al-Shabaab (437),
national army and allied militia (197), Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (109) and other armed elements (76). It was
noted that these numbers should be understood against reduced capacity to access and verify reported
incidents. Three parties continued to be listed for 2014: Al-Shabaab (recruiting, killing and maiming), ASWJ
(recruiting) and the SNA (recruiting, and killing and maiming).
77
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54. The gravest violations were seen in Al-Shabaab held areas, including in Middle and Lower
Juba where the Monitoring Group documented an increase of child recruitment from early
2015.81 This included situations where whole villages were forced to render their children and
young men (or pay for an exemption) and where young boys ‘disappeared’ en masse from
Al-Shabaab madrasas.82 Across the border in Kenya the Monitoring Group received reports of
radicalisation and recruitment through madrasas in the refugee camps.83 Children were used both
in support functions and in direct operations, including incidents where explosive devices were
used.84
55. In the context of a rise in military activity in Sool and Sanaag reports were received of the
deployment of children as young as 10 or 12 in support of the armed forces of Somaliland.85
Children were also observed at checkpoints operated by other militia in the areas. Ahlu Sunna
wal Jama’a (ASWJ) was listed for the second year in the report of the Secretary-General on
children and armed conflict for child recruitment.86 More broadly the Secretary-General
expressed particular concern about “the ongoing recruitment and use of children by clan
militias”, with implications for joint operations by national forces and AMISOM, including with
respect to delegation of control for ‘recovered’ areas.87 197 incidents of child recruitment and use
by the SNA and allied militia were documented during 2014.88
56. Under the stewardship of the SNA Child Protection Unit, however, efforts continued to
prevent child recruitment to the SNA. A vetting process of prospective recruits conducted in
Kismayo in June, for example, saw the screening out of 36 children. As the numbers of those
defecting or being separated from armed groups rises, whether in the context of amnesty or
FGS/AMISOM operations, ensuring that such children are safely received and transferred to the
appropriate protective actors, and that recycling does not occur, is critical. 89 In January 2015
seven human rights monitors were trained and deployed in the context of Somalia’s “National
Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaging Combatants and Youth at Risk in
Somalia”.
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81
There were 451 verified incidents of child recruitment during the first six months of 2015, with Al-Shabaab
remaining the main perpetrator. Email, UN staff member, 10 September 2015.
82
See annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b.
83
Interview with refugee leaders, Nairobi, 31 October 2014.
84
Interview with explosives expert, Mogadishu 3 February 2015; email, security source, 23 May 2015.
85
Phone interview with Las Anod resident, 26 June 2015.
86
See A/69/926–S/2015/409, 5 June 2015.
87
A/69/926–S/2015/409, paragraph 147.
88
A/69/926–S/2015/409, paragraph 147. There were incidents in which children were used by AMISOM in
“support functions”. See also Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Children in armed
conflict, 5 June 2015, (A/69/926–S/2015/409), paragraph 147.
89
The Monitoring Group received credible information from a number of sources that children in one
reintegration centre were used for intelligence gathering activities.
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57. In December 2014, the FGS Parliament adopted a law ratifying the Convention on the
Rights of the Child which was signed by the President of Somalia on 20 January 2015.
Forced displacement90
58. There was little relief for over 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia. 91
During the mandate the largest displacements of people were caused not by conflict, but by
forced evictions of IDPs and urban poor by government and private actors.92
59. Almost 100,000 IDPs alone were pushed out of city settlements, victims of the rush to
invest in Somalia’s booming real estate sector, facilitated by an environment of corruption and
unregulated land speculation.93 The use of force in some of these eviction operations resulted in
death, injury and demolition of homes, generating additional violations of the mandate. In two
days in early March 2015, for example, security personnel forcibly evicted over 21,000 IDPs
from the Maslax and Aslubta areas of Kahda district, beating many, destroying shelters and
preventing the collection of personal belongings.94 There were serious protection and
humanitarian consequences. At the end of August 2015 over 42 per cent of the population of
Benadir were in the crisis or emergency phase of food insecurity. 95 The protection, peace and
security implications of forcing an estimated 100,000 vulnerable IDPs into the Afgoye
corridor—an area with increasing Al-Shabaab presence—appear not to have been considered.
Despite calls by the Security Council for “relevant national law” to govern the conduct of
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90
The Monitoring group is required, inter alia, to report on “violations of applicable international law in
Somalia involving the targeting of civilians including children and women in situations of armed conflict,
including [...] forced displacement”, Resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 43 (a).
91
As noted in S/2014/726 and throughout this report, victims of forced displacement and confinement were
more likely to be exposed to a variety of other violations of international law, including of attacks on
civilians, sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), forced recruitment and denial of access to humanitarian
aid.
92
The term “forced evictions” is defined as the permanent or temporary removal against their will of
individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the
provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection. See United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing
(article 11.1): forced evictions, 20 May 1997, E/1998/22.
93
Over 96,000 people, the vast majority of whom are IDPs were forcibly evicted from Mogadishu and other
major urban areas in Somalia such as Baidoa, Bosaso, and Kismayo between January and May 2015.
94
See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Somalia: Forced Evictions of Displaced People - Tens of
Thousands at Risk in Capital”, 20 April 2015. The Monitoring Group was also informed that two police
officers and a young girl were killed in the course of a forced eviction and demolition by Somali security
forces which met armed resistance. The incidents occurred at Jaale Siyaad Military academy in Mogadishu
on 27 May 2015. Email from NGO source, 28 May 2015.
95
FAO Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), FSNAU-FEWS NET Technical Release,
August 31, 2015. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of tools and procedures to
classify the severity of food insecurity using a five-phase scale.
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evictions, the adoption in October 2014 of a new national policy on internal displacement has
had little impact.96
60. Conflict related displacement continued to force waves of flight and return, as some areas
changed authority multiple times. Meanwhile populations suffered forced confinement in
Al-Shabaab territory.97 The new anti-Al-Shabaab offensive which began in July 2015 resulted in
the displacement of over 40,000 people in Bakool, Bay, Galgadud, Gedo, Hiran and Lower
Shabelle, often to towns already stretched by previous waves of displacement.98 In addition,
inter-clan and political conflicts—often intertwined with Al-Shabaab engagement—forced
communities to flee their homes in Lower Shabelle, Hiran, Sool and Sanaag.99
61. By 30 August 2015, 3510 refugees had returned from Kenya to Baidoa, Kismayo, Luq and
Benadir under a special pilot voluntary return program. On 29 July 2015 a meeting of the
Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees from Kenya agreed
that the “safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation” of Somali refugees would be “scaled up”.100
At the same time almost 26,000 Somalis, alongside almost 3000 Yemeni refugees, had returned
from Yemen where they held refugee status.101 Meanwhile a voluntary return program from
Ethiopia is under discussion. In the context of these large-scale returns, continuing cycles of
internal conflict and expected environmental phenomena such as El Niño, the number of those
internally displaced in Somalia is expected to climb. The design of comprehensive solutions
rather than tactical responses to immediate crisis is badly needed.102
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96
In resolution 2232 (2015) the Security Council expressed “concern at the increase in forced evictions of
internally displaced persons from public and private infrastructure in major towns in Somalia”. It stressed
that “any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks” (paragraph 30).
97
See annex 6.1.
98
Email from UN staff member, 9 September 2015.
99
Forced displacement of civilians may, in certain circumstances, constitute war crimes in non-international
armed conflict or crimes against humanity. See, inter alia, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
article 7 (1) (d) and (h) and article 8(2) (e) (viii).
100
See, Joint Communiqué Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees from
Kenya, 30 July 2015, Kenya (on file with the Monitoring Group). The Commission pledged to support
returns to any place in Somalia with a special focus on six districts identified for comprehensive return and
reintegration support: Mogadishu, Afgoye, Jowhar, Balad, Wanlaweyn and Belet Weyne.
101
As of 31 August 2015 there were 28, 887 people of concern who had register with UNHCR upon arrival
from Yemen: 25,802 Somali returnees; 2,872 Yemeni prima facie refugees and 213 third country nationals.
See Somalia Task Force on Yemen Situation, Weekly Inter-Agency Update # 35, 25 – 31 August 2015. The
authorities in Puntland and Somaliland have been at the forefront of the response. There have been no reports
of refoulement.
102
In November 2013 UNHCR launched a Global Initiative on Somali Refugees (GISR) with the aim of
“seeking ways to create and advance durable solutions for Somali refugees”.
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/527b8f7d6.html.
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Annex 7
Arms embargo regime
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Annex 7.1: Management of weapons, ammunition and military equipment
1. In resolution 2182 (2014) the Security Council recalled that “improved arms and ammunition
management in Somalia is a fundamental component of greater peace and stability for the region”. 1
When renewing the partial lifting of the arms embargo, the Council linked future renewal of the
provision with the Government’s reasonability “to ensure the safe and effective management, storage
and security of their stockpiles”.2
2. This annex examines a key area of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) weapons and
ammunition management (WAM) responsibility with respect to managing materiel controlled by its
own security forces: progress relating to registration, recording, distribution and accounting for
weapons and ammunition.3 The Monitoring Group also assessed progress in two other areas which
impact the overall environment of control of the use of arms and related materiel and have the
potential to impact peace and security: the management of FGS security force uniform stocks and
prevention of their unauthorised use; and the regulation and oversight of weapons held by private
individuals and entities. Compliance by the FGS and the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) with obligations to document captured military equipment pursuant to paragraph 6 of
resolution 2182 (2014) is addressed in annex 7.4.
Development of a comprehensive WAM system
3. In October 2014 the Council acknowledged that while there had been steps taken to establish
effective mechanisms for weapons and ammunition management, the appropriate structures were “not
functioning with the required level of efficiency nor at all levels of Government”.4 In response to this
criticism the FGS redoubled its efforts to establish a project to develop a comprehensive approach to
WAM management. The project was initiated during 2014 in collaboration with the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group (ROLSIG)
and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The project envisaged the creation of a framework of
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1
Preamble, Security Council resolution 2182 (2014).
Preamble and paragraphs 8 and 9, resolution 2182 (2014),
3
The two other pillars of effective WAM are the development of adequate storage infrastructure and
procedures for weapons and ammunition, including physical security and stockpile management and the
ability to identify and track those personnel authorised to be issued with weapons: FGS obligations with
respect to clarity on force structure are discussed in annex 7.3.
4
Resolution 2182 (2014) paragraph 4. The institutional architecture charged with the development of
effective weapons and ammunition management includes: the Arms and Ammunition Steering Committee
(AASC) which provides strategic guidance and is chaired by the National Security Adviser and composed
of representatives of the FGS, the UN, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the European
Union, bilateral partners, and non-governmental implementing partners; the Somalia Explosives
Management Authority (SEMA) responsible at the operational level for ensuring effective WAM
throughout the Somali security forces; and the Weapons and Am munition Management Technical
Working Group (WAM TWG) which is composed of: FGS representatives; UN entities; AMISOM, the
European Union and other bilateral partners and, NGOs.
2
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standards, systems, and procedures alongside the provision of equipment and conduct of basic
training, intended to ensure marking, record keeping, management, distribution and verification of
weapons, including small arms and ammunition in Somalia.5 It was also geared towards assisting the
FGS in its compliance with Security Council reporting and notification requirements. Despite a
number of requests to donors, including to Member states via the Committee, by 31 August 2015 the
project had not yet been funded.6
4. Notwithstanding the absence of funding for the project as a whole, some of the initiatives
comprised in the project plan were implemented. First, baseline surveys of arms and ammunition were
conducted and completed in three locations, Mogadishu, Baidoa and Beletweyne. 7 Second, in July
2015 and August 2015 UNSOM and UNMAS trained 25 personnel from all four FGS security forces
and the Office of the National Security Advisor (NSA) in the destruction of non-serviceable smallarms and light weapons.8 Weapons marking, registration and record keeping training by UNMAS and
the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region (RESCA) is also ongoing. Meanwhile
the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) began a consultation process to develop
national frameworks for WAM, in cooperation with the FGS and UN partners. 9 A small arms and
light weapons survey project by the Small Arms Survey is expected to report in November 2015.
5. Despite these concrete steps, major gaps in the overall Somali WAM framework—from lack of
clear standards and procedures to implementation capacity—continue to hamper the ability of the
FGS to comply with Security Council requirements under the partial lifting of the arms embargo. The
Monitoring Group urges Member States continue to support the development of a comprehensive
WAM framework, not least as the number of weapons under FGS control has increased since the
partial lifting of the arms embargo and will only further increase as support for the Gulwade plan gets
underway.10
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5
WAM Pilot project draft, 22 June 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group. Fo r a more in depth
discussion of international support to the FGS to build compliance capacity see annex 7.5
6
See, for example, letter dated 20 December 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United
Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee, S/AC.29/2014/COMM.124, transmitted to the
Committee as S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.130, 31 December 2014 (The delay in circulation was a result of the
Secretariat's attempts to reach out to competent Somali authorities for clarification on the intended
recipients.)
7
The findings of these baseline surveys were shared with the Security Council.
8
UNMAS newsletter, undated (July) on file with the Monitoring Group; 150 unserviceable weapons were
destroyed. One more weapons shears training is planned to be conducted in 2015 which will destroy the
remaining stocks of unserviceable weapons from the Police and NISA. Phone interview, UN staff
member, 1 September 2015.
9
See, inter alia, Towards a National Framework for Arms and Ammunition Management in the Federal
Republic of Somalia. Geneva: United Nations Institution for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR),
forthcoming (2015).
10
For a discussion of numbers of weapons and ammunition imported further to notification to the
Committee see annex 7.2.
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Procedures for registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons
6. The FGS has shown the greatest WAM progress in the area of weapons marking and registration.
In October 2014 the Security Council had expressed disappointment that a weapons marking and
registration process had not yet commenced, urging the FGS to implement the process “without
further delay”.11 By the end of July 2015 over 4600 weapons (both imports and existing weapons) in
service with, or allocated to, Somali National Army (SNA), National Intelligence and Security
Agency (NISA) and private security company personnel, had been marked and registered.
7. The first marking machine arrived at the Ministry of Internal Security (MIS) in August 2014. By
the 31 August 2015 1776 weapons had been marked at the MIS, 350 of which were weapons assigned
to NISA and the remainder part of a programme of marking and registering weapons held by private
security personnel entities. It is understood that preparation for the marking of weapons in service
with the Somali Police Force (SPF) is underway.12
8. Further to training in February 2015 conducted by UNMAS and UNSOM, in March a 12-man
SNA team began work at Halane Central Storage facility, marking AK47s and pistols using a second
marking machine donated by UNMAS. The Monitoring Group visited Halane armoury on 11 March
2015 and observed weapons marking in progress.13 Eventually managing to mark at a commendable
rate of 10 weapons per hour, the SNA team’s progress was later slowed by both the movement of
stockpiles and the distribution of unmarked weapons to personnel.14 The momentum was further
interrupted when seven members of the weapons marking team coming from marking weapons at
Villa Somalia found themselves in the vicinity of an attack on a vehicle in which two members of
Parliament were travelling and were arrested. Alongside many others who were in proximity to the
attack at the time, the team was swept up in the security response to the killing. It is understood that
the intervention of the President secured the release of the markers a number of days later. In the
aftermath of the arrests, SNA weapons marking stalled and only resumed in late June 2015, and then
sporadically. On 19 August 2015 weapons marking began again in earnest.
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11
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 5.
The marking machine was donated by the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region
(RESCA). As part of the handover RESCA carried out training of MIS personnel in marking and
registration procedures consistent with the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of
Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
(2004). The handover of the machine and training of personnel took place on 19 and 20 August 2014.
13
Approximately 2000 rifles were being stored at the site at the time alongside heavier weapons and
ammunition.
14
Due to the movement of stockpiles the team moved from the Halane armoury to Villa Somalia and
Gashandeega (Ministry of Defence) to mark unregistered weapons priory issued to units based there. This
approach also allowed the team to deliver instruction to personnel on weapons cleaning and safety
alongside marking effort.
12
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9. In late June 2015, upon the invitation of the FGS, a spot check on all of the categories of
weapons in stock at the facility found that every weapon examined had been registered in the correct
format and the appropriate record keeping completed.15 By the end of July 2015 the FGS told the
Monitoring Group that a total 2480 weapons had been marked at Halane and 406 weapons at Villa
Somalia.
10. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. At the time of writing, the MIS-based marking
machine was broken and was awaiting the arrival of spare parts. Registration of weapons had not yet
commenced for either the SPF or the custodial corps. Although newly imported weapons were being
marked at Halane armoury, registration of other weapons in service – the largest task – had only
begun in Mogadishu and then only for a small number of weapons at Villa Somalia.
11. Overall, therefore, despite significant efforts the pace and scope of weapons marking is
inadequate in the context of the scale of the task. The insufficient number of marking machines is the
primary impediment to the process. Provision of additional marking machines, particularly the mobile
types, along with spare parts, is critical. In late August 2015 three Schmidt-type marking machines –
appropriate for mobile use – finally arrived in Mogadishu.16 Although these will facilitate marking in
the sectors, vehicles and generators will also be required to get mobile units into the field. With the
appropriate support, the FGS intends to dedicate two of the newly arrived machines to mobile teams
with the third being shared between NISA and the SPF. The arrival of the new machines has also
created an opportunity for additional training of personnel in weapons marking and registration,
including for the first time, personnel from the SPF and Custodial Corps.17 The FGS has indicated that
at least four additional marking machines will be needed for the constitution of mobile teams which
will focus on the registration of weapons in service across the security services.
Record-keeping and tracking
12. The Council has placed considerable emphasis on the need for the FGS to show tangible progress
in weapons marking and registration.18 Marking and registration however are of little use without
effective record keeping, distribution and tracking and verification practices. Progress in these areas
was slow, with little change in the situation on the ground during this mandate. As a starting point the
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15
Phone interview with UN staff member, 31 August 2014.
Email from UN staff member, 31 August 2015. The machines were sourced by UNMAS and are
expected to be transferred to the NSA under a right of use agreement.
17
Email communication with UN staff member, 1 September 2015. It is understood that an additional
twelve personnel, two NISA four SPF, two Custodial Corps, one SNA and one civilian from the Office of
the NSA will be trained in weapons marking and registration between 13 and17 September 2015. A
second training is also planned for October.
18
In the light of the fact that most weapons will already have serial numbers upon import, and that it
consumes some of the best of the SNA’s human resources, this emphasis has been questioned by some
interlocutors. The FGS view marking as a critical component of tackling diversion of weaponry .
16
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formalisation of weapons flows practices at Halane armoury around weapons management through
the documentation of practice should be encouraged. This can then begin to be rolled out to the
sectors.
13. As this work gets underway there will also be a need to ‘join up’ different efforts. Coordination
between, common standards for, and integration of, various marking/registration/record-keeping
initiatives – such as the initiative conducted at the MIS for private security companies and personnel,
and at Halane – should be encouraged. It is understood that RECSA is planning to support the
development of centralised record-keeping software for all of the security forces, and that the FGS is
considering how best to adapt the system.19 There have also been discussions around how the system
of biometric registration of forces – currently being conducted by the UN Office of Project Services
(UNOPS) – might be linked to the nascent weapons card system.20
14. Lack of funding for both the comprehensive WAM management project noted above and for the
Joint Verification Team (JVT) has significantly hampered progress with respect to this area of FGS
compliance.21
Unlawful transfer and diversion of weapons from FGS government stocks22
15. The Security Council has prohibited the sale, transfer or use of weapons sold or supplied for the
development of the security forces of the FGS to or by any individual or entity not in the service of
the FGS security forces.23 Nevertheless since the partial lifting of the arms embargo, the Monitoring
Group has documented leakage of weapons and ammunition from Government stocks, most recently
in its 2014 report (S/2014/726). This has involved, inter alia, the identification of FGS notified
imports being offered for sale in illegal Mogadishu weapons markets; evidence that such weapons
have been deliberately supplied to clan militia; and the discovery of ‘unaccounted for’ weaponry and
ammunition during WAM surveys. The Monitoring Group continued to document such violations
during the current mandate.
16. In September 2014 a baseline survey on arms and ammunition conducted in Baidoa found that
31,415 rounds of ammunition (AK 47, PKM, DShK and SPU) supplied to Sector 3 during 2013 and
2014 were “unaccounted for”, in that there were neither records of their distribution nor any arms or
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19
Phone conversation with UN staff member, 1 September 2015.
As noted above, a weapons card system has been developed but appears only to have been rolled out
for private security personnel and civil servants authorised to bear arms .
21
See annex 7.5 for details on the development of the JVT.
22
Paragraph 8 resolution 20182 (2014) provides that, “weapons or military equipment sold or supplied
solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia may not be
resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the
Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia.
23
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 8.
20
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ammunition observed in the Sector 3 armoury at the time of the survey team’s visit. 24 The Head of
SNA logistics told the survey team that the ammunition had been distributed to SNA troops on the
front line, and that “a separate addendum to address the discrepancies [would] be sent after the
operation”. The FGS has, however, been unable to provide any additional information to the
Monitoring Group on the whereabouts of this ammunition.
17. In March 2015, further to a request from the Monitoring Group, NISA provided photographs of
three weapons described as having been used in the attack by Al-Shabaab on the Mogadishu
International Airport (MIA) AMISOM protected area on 25 December 2015 and seized in the
aftermath.25 Two of the weapons appeared to be new Type 56-2 Kalashnikov assault rifles. This
weapon type was the focus of the Monitoring Group’s 2014 investigation (S/2014/726) into leakage
from Government stocks of a large FGS weapons and ammunition purchase from Ethiopia.26
Photographic and testimonial evidence analysed by the Monitoring Group indicated that the new Type
56-2 rifles found in Mogadishu arms markets had come onto the market from SNA stockpiles and had
never been seen in the markets prior to the Ethiopian stock delivery in Mogadishu in September 2013.
Further the factory markings and sequence of serial numbers on the weapons found in two markets in
Mogadishu matched those also seen in FGS stocks at Halane. 27 Finally the Monitoring Group also
viewed an Al-Shabaab propaganda video which showed an Al-Shabaab fighter cleaning a brand new
Type 56-2 rifle.28 Although the Monitoring Group was unable to match the partially remaining serial
numbers on the two weapons captured in the aftermath of the MIA attack with the serial numbers of
the Ethiopia September 2013 shipment, in the light of the Monitoring Groups 2014 findings, and
further to a visual comparison of pictures of the weapons, it is highly likely that they come from the
same source (see annex 7.1.a).
18. In early September 2015 the Monitoring Group received reliable and credible information from
local sources on weapons sales at Bakara market. It was asserted that SNA personnel are among the
suppliers of these weapons. A table of the average prices observed is set out below.
__________________
24
See annex 9, report of the Federal Government of Somalia pursuan t to paragraph 9 of resolution 2142
(2014), 16 September 2015, /AC.29/2014/COMM.83 attaching, Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey Phase II: Baidoa, 8 September 2014.
25
The serial numbers of the two weapons seized had been partially removed; it was also likely that their
receiver covers had been replaced.
26
Annexes 6.1 and 6.2, S/2014/726.
27
Annex 6.2, S/2014/726 at paragraph 48.
28
Annex 6.2 (e), S/2014/726
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Weapons type
Price (USD)
Price of a round/rocket
(USD)
Dushka (Heavy Machine Gun)
25,000
6
RPG
700
300
PKM
12,000
1.5
AK 47 (original version)
1,500-1,800
1.5 (empty magazine: 30-40)
Makarov (pistol)
1,700
16 (empty magazine: 70)
Tokarev 33 (TT pistol)
1,100
5 (empty magazine : 35)
Grenade (F1)
80
n/a
19. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2182 (2014) even a temporary transfer of weapons supplied
to support FGS security forces to individuals “not in the service of the Security Forces” is
prohibited.29 Accurate monitoring of compliance with paragraph 8 is, however, complicated by the
ever-changing composition of the FGS security forces and its allied militia. First, SNA weapons and
ammunition stocks are sometimes shared with militia engaging in joint or allied military operations.
The evolution of regional forces allied with the emerging federal architecture which may operate on
behalf of the FGS, or in joint operations with the SNA, in advance of formal integration, further adds
to the complexity of the situation. Whether such forces can be understood as comprised within “FGS
security forces” is a critical question for purposes of application of the arms embargo. In this regard,
the scope of FGS reporting requirements in the context of the partial lift includes provision
information on “the structure, strength and composition (including the status of allied militia) of the
Security Forces of the FGS [emphasis added]”.30 Unfortunately this latter information is generally
missing from FGS reporting on force structure and composition.31
20. In order that the lawfulness of onward distribution of weapons by FGS security forces to allied
militia is correctly assessed it is vital that the FGS report periodically, and, ideally, as soon as there
are changes, on integration of militia and other forces into its structure. In the absence of such
notification onward distribution of weaponry imported under the partial lift to such forces should be
considered as unlawful. In addition, establishment of the JVT is an important initiative that will help
mitigate the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside of the security services of the FGS
including by providing greater capacity to trace and investigate leakage of weaponry.
__________________
29
Resolution 2142 (2014) at paragraph 8.
Resolution 2142 (2014) at paragraph 9(a).
31
See annex 7.3.
30
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Addressing the challenges of weapons held by private individuals and entities
21. Against the background of over 20 years of conflict and a culture in which use of force was an
accepted method of settlement of disputes, there remain an uncounted numbers of weapons in
circulation throughout Somalia. Registration and tracking of weapons held by private individuals and
entities in Somalia is therefore an important part of an effective WAM strategy. As a starting point,
the Small Arms Survey, funded by United Nations Development Program (UNDP), has planned an
eighteen month small arms and light weapons survey to generate baseline information on arms,
ammunition and armed violence in Somalia; the objective is to determine priorities, prioritize and
design programmes, and assess impact of interventions.32 In terms of the broader legal framework, a
revised public order law (originally dating from 1963), adopted by the Council of Ministers, is
currently under development, in addition to a Bill on Control of Firearms.33
22. One area of private ownership and use of weapons which is already beginning to be more
effectively managed and controlled is the operation of private security companies (PSCs). In 2014
further to the issue of a Ministerial directive, the MIS commenced a program of registration and
marking of weapons in use by PSCs, in line with a registration process for the companies themselves,
and a vetting procedure for their personnel conducted by the Criminal Investigation Division (CID).34
This process has been very effective with at least 600 weapons now registered and recorded as issued
to a specific vetted employee with a particular company identifier. Biometric chip weapons cards
have been created for all registered personnel. During 2014 24 companies completed the vetting
process and were registered with the Ministry, although it is understood that the registration of only
11 is current.
23. Despite these developments, the increase and evolution in the use of PSCs by private companies,
Member States, and even potentially the UN itself, give rise to a number of difficulties in terms of the
__________________
32
See, Small Arms Survey, presentation, “Somalia National Survey on Small Arms and Light Weapons”
22 June 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group. A small arms and light weapons survey generally s eeks
to determine “the extent of distribution and impact of small arms and light weapons; public and
stakeholder perceptions regarding small arms and light weapons, armed violence and related issues; and
the capacity to respond to the challenges posed by s mall arms and light weapons”. The findings of the
survey are intended to be presented in November 2016.
33
A Bill on Control and limitation of firearms was introduced by the Ministry of the National security to
the parliament in the last quarter of 2014 (Bill/No. 314, 6.9.2014) but returned to the ministry for review.
34
See Ministry of Interior and National Security, Draft Private Security Service Providers Regulations
2013, In Reference to Public Order Law No. 21of 26 August 1963 Part VI Articles 63, 64, 65 (regarding
private security companies); These companies have also been required to make undertakings relating to
monitoring and training of personnel and armoury management. The Monitoring Group understands that
in parallel with this process “PSC licences” have also been issued by other authorities such as the Benadir
Regional Government, Lower Shabelle Regional Government, the Interim South West Regional
Government and Lower Jubba Regional Government (Kismayo). It is not clear what standards are applied
for these latter registrations.
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application of the arms embargo.35 In Puntland and Somaliland PSCs are being granted licences to
operate including offshore in Somali territorial waters.36 Depending on the modalities – including
scale, how weapons and ammunition are procured, the manner in which personnel are deployed and
their framework of operation – these activities may constitute violations of the arms embargo or
threats to peace and security more broadly.37
Management and tracking of non-lethal military equipment: uniforms of the FGS
security services
24. Management and tracking of imported weapons and ammunition has understandably been the
focus of FGS efforts and international support. There are other aspects of FGS obligations with
respect to receipt and management of military equipment, however, which have critical peace and
security implications. The import and management of FGS security force uniforms constitutes one
area of concern.
25. Al-Shabaab continues to use uniforms in its attacks. During the current mandate, the Monitoring
Group confirmed that Al-Shabaab militants disguised themselves using SNA or other military
uniforms during at least five major terror attacks in Somalia.38 It is understood that concern about
misuse of uniforms is one of the reasons that AMISOM does not generally co-locate with the SNA.39
In addition, the Monitoring Group is aware that military uniforms are routinely employed in a
spectrum of crime in Somalia, in particular the establishment of illegal roadblocks, as well as
assassinations and armed robbery.
26. In October 2014 an illegal shipment of military materiel was seized by the FGS in Mogadishu
port. The majority of the shipment consisted of military clothing including 4,360 military boots 2,960
military uniforms; 3,600 military tea-shirts, 138 “camouflage”, 111 female veils and 24,328 meters of
military textile.40 Whether intended for sale generally for use in offensive operations by Al-Shabaab,
the scale of this shipment demonstrates the size of the market for military uniforms which exists.
Indeed uniforms are readily available in Mogadishu markets to those who wish to purchase them. The
Monitoring Group received corroborated information that Somali national army uniforms with the
__________________
35
Third party monitoring of humanitarian projects, for example, is conducted by companies which have a
private security division.
36
See annex 2.3 on the continued privatisation of Somalia’s maritime space.
37
With respect to armed PSC’s entering and operating in Somali territorial waters, the Council has
requested the FGS and the Monitoring Group to formulate an exemption proposal pursuant to paragraph
10 of resolution 2182 (2014). See annex 7.6 for a discuss ion of these developments.
38
Mogadishu International Airport (25 December 2014); regional presidential palace in Baidoa (12 March
2015); Makka Al-Mukarama Hotel (27 March 2015); FGS Ministry of Higher Education (14 April 2015);
and Hotel Weheliye (11 July 2015).
39
The misuse of AMISOM uniforms as a ruse in a potential attack has also been the subject of
intelligence threat information.
40
See discussion of this shipment at annex 7.4.
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Somali flag were available during August 2015 at the Bakara market at an average price of USD 30
and military boots at USD 15. It was also confirmed in early September 2015 that Somali and
Ugandan uniforms were being sold in Hamar Weyn district and at a dry-cleaners near the port at an
average price of USD 50 for old uniforms, and USD 100 for new uniforms.
27. As a condition of the partial lift of the arms embargo the Council requires the FGS to provide
advance notification on imports of non-lethal military equipment, including uniforms. Between
1 August 2014 and 31 August 2015 the FGS and Member States notified the Committee about the
prospective import of a large volume of military clothing including, for example, 9,742 military
uniforms, at least 20,958 rigid caps, 6,500 helmets, in addition to over 100,000 pieces of
underclothing and other uniform elements. The Monitoring Group also received uncorroborated
information that in addition to these notified donations a very large number of uniforms—as many as
30,000—may also have been donated without notification.
28. The FGS is obliged to report on the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration,
maintenance and distribution of such military equipment.41 The Committee, however, has received no
reporting on procedures for the receipt and management of uniforms. It is understood that uniform
distribution is controlled via the SNA Deputy Commissioner of Logistics from Villa Baidoa. 42 Police
uniforms are kept at the police academy storeroom prior to distribution.
29. With the growing number of actors – national, regional and international – involved in
Somalia’s proliferating conflicts control of uniforms distribution is essential. It is critical to
ensuring identifiable command and control, the creation of civic trust in government security
personnel and, not least, to holding those who have been given the right to use force
appropriately accountable for adhering to the principle of distinction. The Monitoring Gro up
understands that a new uniform tracking procedure is planned for the SPF. Similar initiatives
might be considered in terms of the SNA.
__________________
41
42
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Email from UN staff member, 30 August 2015.
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Annex 7.1.a: Two weapons used in the 25 December 2015 MIA attack, juxtaposed
with 56-2 rifle photographed on 20 April 2014 at KM5 market in Mogadishu
Figure 1 (below): Rifle used in the MIA attack, being stored at NISA CID
Figure 2 (below): Rifle used in the MIA attack, being stored at NISA CID
Figure 3 (below): 56-2 rifle photographed on 20 April 2014 at KM5 market in Mogadishu
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Annex 7.1.b: SEMG inspection of Halane armoury in Mogadishu, 18 March 2015
Figure 1 (below): Assault rifle being marked at Halane armoury
Figure 2 (below): Rifle with “SO XDS 2015” marking. “XDS” indicates that the rifle is
intended for use by the Somali National Army (SNA)
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Annex 7.2: Compliance with the exemption framework and with notification
requirements under the arms embargo
31. Under the arms embargo and partial lift, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Member
States and international, regional and sub-regional organisations, all have obligations to notify the
Committee when their responsibility is engaged by the transfer of military materiel or assistance to
Somalia. The Security Council has repeatedly emphasised the “fundamental importance of timely and
detailed notifications to the Committee”, including in the context of concerns relating to diversion of
arms and ammunition.43
32. This annex assesses the compliance of the FGS, Member States and international organisations
with both notification requirements and related responsibilities under the standing exemptions to the
arms embargo. The Group makes recommendations on where clarification and modification of these
obligations might generate greater compliance and ensure that the objectives of the arms embargo are
achieved.
Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with notification requirements under the
terms of the partial lift
33. Under the terms of the partial lift the FGS must notify the Committee, for its information only, at
least five days in advance of any deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of
assistance intended solely for the development of its security forces. 44 A detailed advance notification,
as well as two forms of post-delivery confirmations and notifications to the Committee, must be
made.45 Although the FGS retains the primary obligation to notify the Committee, Member States or
the international organisation which responsibilities are engaged by the delivery of the assistance,
__________________
43
Resolution 2182 at paragraph 2.
Resolution 2093 at paragraph 38. Resolution 2111 (2013) added a requirement that the “specific place
of delivery” of the material or assistance must be stipulated.
45
The current requirements are as follows: Advance notification: At least five days in advance of any
delivery of materiel or assistance a notification to the Committee which includes “details of the
manufacturer and supplier of the arms and ammunition, a description of the arms and ammunition
including the type, calibre and quantity, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information
concerning the intended destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces, or the intended place of
storage” must be submitted (paragraph 5 resolution 2142 (2014); Post delivery confirmation: No later than
30 days after the delivery of arms or ammunition, the FGS must submit to the Committee a written
confirmation of the completion of the delivery, including “the serial numbers for the arms and am munition
delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of
storage” (paragraph 6 resolution 2142 (2014)). Post distribution information: Within five days of the
distribution of imported arms or ammunition, the FGS must inform the Committee in writing of the
“destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or the place of storage” (paragraph 7 2142). See
also Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its work as consolidated, revised and adopted by the
Committee on 30 March 2010, 30 May 2013, 27 November 2013 and 25 March 2014, paragraph 10 (l), (m)
and (n).
44
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may also make the advance notification “in consultation” with the FGS.46 Post delivery reporting
remains the sole prerogative of the FGS.
34. The Council has emphasised that extension of the partial lift of the arms embargo is conditional,
inter alia, on FGS fulfilment of its notification requirements.47 The Monitoring Group reviewed
notifications relating to support for the FGS security forces received by the Committee between
1 August 2014 and 31 August 2015. As part of this review the Group shared a table of notifications
and analysis of gaps with the FGS National Security Advisor (NSA), providing an opportunity to his
Office to update the information and to consider making appropriate, albeit out of time, notifications
to the Committee.
35. Overall there was a significant improvement in the timeliness and comprehensiveness of
notifications, particularly with respect to advance notifications. The Monitoring Group believes that
ongoing challenges with respect to advance notifications are less a matter of willingness, than
capacity or inadequate sharing of information with the Office of NSA, whether by FGS security
forces internally, or by donors themselves.
36. The Committee received thirteen advance notifications from the FGS pursuant to paragraph 3 of
resolution 2142 (2014)48 in parallel with six notifications of the same shipments by Member States
pursuant to paragraph of 4 resolution 2142 (2014).49 Eleven advance notifications were made solely
by Member States or an international organisation pursuant to paragraph 4 resolution 2142 (2014).
The quality and timeliness of the FGS advance notifications improved: ten out of thirteen of the
advance notifications submitted by the FGS arrived within the correct time period and contained the
full information required by the resolutions.
37. The quality and timing of post-delivery confirmations and distribution information
notifications—for which FGS has sole responsibility in terms of notification to the Committee—was,
however, poor. There were 6 occasions on which post-delivery confirmations were required. Only
__________________
46
Resolution 2142 (2014) at paragraph 4.
See, inter alia, resolution 2182 (2104)”, any decision to continue or end the partial suspension of the
arms embargo on the FGS will be taken in the light of the thoroughness of the FGS’s implementation of
its requirements as set out in this and other relevant Security Council resolutions”, preamble.
48
In some cases, due to the timing, advance notifications lacked the necessary detail to fulfil Security
Council requirements. Some of these were rectified with subsequent notifications. Two advance
communications were received from the FGS with respect to o ne particular shipment, including very near
the time of scheduled delivery. In all these cases only one advance notification was counted. I n some cases
one single advance notification was received for multiple shipments.
49
Although this does not pose a problem in itself, in the context of scare resources at the Office of the
NSA it is recalled that the FGS does not need to notify where a Member State has already done so. It may
be that enhanced communication between Member states and the Office of the NSA w ill reduce the
burden and make clear when the FGS primary obligation to notify has been fulfilled “in the alternative”
by the Member State.
47
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arms and ammunition – and not other forms of military equipment, training or other assistance –
require notification to the Committee post-delivery. Only two such shipments, however, were the
subject of post-delivery confirmations by the FGS, both of which were received late, and one of
which related to material which had been notified as received prior to August 2014, but in respect of
which a complete post-delivery confirmation could not be made until October 2014.
38. In both of these cases issues with the engagement of the donor state were cited for the delay.
Although serial numbers – a requirement of post-delivery confirmations – were provided to the
Committee for both shipments, with respect to one, only partial lists could be offered as weapons
serial numbers had been removed prior to import. As a result, a marking exercise had to be
undertaken by the FGS before the conditions for a post-delivery notification could be met. The
Committee has not yet received the serial numbers for the remainder of the weapons. 50 In late August
2015, however, the Office of the NSA told the Group that the weapons had been marked and that the
numbers would shortly be communicated to the Committee. It was commendable, however, that some
of the information provided in FGS notifications communications went beyond what was required,
including, for example, listing the names of the personnel to whom each numbered weapon had been
issued. Finally, although described as post-delivery confirmations, these two communications to the
Committee contained sufficient categories of information—albeit only partially complete—to serve
the post distribution information requirement.
39. The three other post-delivery notifications received by the Committee from the FGS were not in
fact required as the deliveries did not involve arms or ammunition, but rather training, uniforms,
vehicles or other equipment.51 These confirmations included in some instances very detailed
information such as serial numbers of items and vehicle chassis numbers.
40. No post-delivery or post distribution confirmations or notifications, however, were received in
respect of the four other weapons and ammunition deliveries which were notified to the Committee
and intended to arrive between 1 August 2014 and 31 August 2015. The Monitoring Group had
observed some of these weapons in the Halane arms stores during its March visit. The FGS advised
the Group in late August 2015, however, that due to problems with an Ethiopian weapons shipment
there had been returns and subsequent re-stocking. Ethiopian sourced ammunition had already been
__________________
50
The FGS has undertaken in a letter to the Committee that the, “[r]emaining 157 unmarked assault rifles
which were assigned to NISA agents located in the periphery regions will be completed soon and reported
back to the Committee”, S/AC.29/2014/COMM.107, transmitted to the Committee, 24 October 2014,
S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.61/Add.
51
One of these post delivery notifications was in fact not required as it related to delivery of training and
not to arms and ammunition. In one case the FGS submitted two advance notifications, with the latter
providing details of an imminent shipment: but a post delivery notification did not fol low. It may be that
the latter was assumed, erroneously, to suffice.
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distributed. The Monitoring Group understands that further to finalising the marking a full account of
the arrival, return, and re-delivery of the Ethiopian weapons purchase will be made.
Summary table of notifications
Requirement
FGS
Member State/International Organisation
Advance Notifications
13
17 (6 in parallel to FGS notifications and 11
pursuant to paragraph 4 resolution 2142)
Post delivery
Confirmations
2 of 6 required
N/A
Post distribution
Information
2 of 6 required
N/A
Assistance to FGS security forces not notified to the Committee
41. The FGS did not notify to the Committee all assistance it received. It was publically reported in
May 2015, for example, that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had funded the construction of a
military training centre which was formally opened by the President in Hodan District in
Mogadishu.52 In August 2015 a tweet by the Ministry of Internal Security described a ceremony at
which the Japanese Government donated 56 military vehicles.53
Enhancing compliance
42. The current official procedure for import of weapons and ammunition and other forms of
military equipment or assistance involves:
(a)
import authorisation from the Ministry of Defence, in consultation with the Ministry of
Finance, under the overall authority of the President;
(b)
import of the materiel by the SNA (further to appropriate notifications to the Office of
the NSA for onward notifications to the Committee);
(c)
distribution to other security agencies, with notification to the Office of the NSA.
43. Halane armoury, located in the MIA protected area, is the designated repository and processing
depot for all imported arms and ammunition. This procedure is not always followed. In one instance
__________________
52
See, for example, Jowhar.com, Somali President opens National Army Training Camp built by UAE in
Mogadishu, available at http://www.jowhar.com/somali-president-opens-national-army-training-campbuilt-by-uae-in-mogadishu/.
53
Tweet from @MoIS_Somalia, 9 August 2015.
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during the reporting period, material was shipped and distributed to the Rapid Reaction Team of the
police, via the Police Commander of the Police Academy. Although the supplying state had notified
the Committee of the donation it is not clear what communication, if any, police personnel had with
the Office of the NSA.54 As noted by the Monitoring Group in its 2014 report (S/2014/726), the
timeliness and accuracy of notifications continues to be affected by the fact that individual security
forces sometimes liaise directly with donors.
44. With improved arms and ammunition management in Somalia considered “a fundamental
component of greater peace and stability for the region”, the Council has explicitly encouraged
Member States to assist the FGS in improving its compliance with the arms embargo and the system
of notifications to the Committee.55 As noted above a Member State may choose to make the advance
notification to the Committee “in consultation” with the FGS. 56 The Council has also recognised the
value of supplying states submitting post delivery information—similar to that which the FGS is
required to provide to the Committee in its 30 days post-delivery notification—“in cooperation with”
the FGS.57 Where such notifications were not made, the provision by Member States to the FGS of
complete—and translated—information on planned shipments made it easier for the Office of the
NSA to extract the correct details for making a formal notification for the Committee. Requests for
the generation by the FGS of official documents prior to shipment such as end user certificates, or the
conclusion of cooperation agreements as a framework for the transfer, also contributed to supporting
the FGS ability to fulfil its notification requirements.
45. Some Member States, however, neglected to appropriately consult with the FGS on donations.
Some sent shipments without prior notice, impeding timely FGS notification of deliveries and
rendering the supply in violation of the arms embargo. Others failed to provide sufficient
documentation to facilitate FGS compliance with advance notifications, or provided partial shipments,
second hand or faulty equipment, or unmarked weapons.
46. The primary obligation with respect to notification rests with the FGS.58 There are a number of
areas however were donor States might assist the FGS to put itself in a better position to fulfil its
obligations. The first would be to consider notifying the Office of the NSA of prospective assistance
to FGS security forces, notwithstanding parallel discussions or agreement with particular forces.
Indeed the Security Council, upon the request of the FGS, has already suggested to Member States
that “all deliveries of military equipment and notifications should be coordinated through the Office
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54
The obligation on supplying state is to notify the Committee “in consultation with” the FGS, but there
is no stipulation as to which entity it much consult.
55
Resolution 2182 (2014) at preamble and paragraph 2.
56
Resolution 2142 (2014) at paragraph 4.
57
Resolution 2142 (2014) at paragraph 6; this occurred in two instances during the mandate.
58
With the exception of certain restricted material pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2111 (2013).
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of the National Security Adviser”.59 Second, the FGS has indicated that it would be optimal if all
deliveries were addressed initially to the central Halane armoury for import delivery inspection, prior
to onward distribution to the appropriate force or unit. Third, where a Member State notifies the
Committee of an intended export to Somalia a copy should be provided to the Office of the NSA,
including to avoid FGS duplication of the procedure: in any event the resolutions require that any
notification by a Member State or an international organisation must be done “in consultation with”
the FGS.
Compliance by Member states and international, regional and sub-regional organisations with
notification obligations
47. Outside the context of the partial lift enjoyed by the FGS and its security forces, Member States
and international, regional and sub-regional organisations also have obligations to notify the
Committee. There are three categories of notification through which such obligations are fulfilled:60

requests for the Committee’s approval pursuant paragraph 7 of resolution 2111 (2013);

notifications for the Committee’s consideration pursuant to paragraph 11 (a) of
resolution 2111 (2013);

notifications for the Committee’s information pursuant to paragraph 10 (g) of
resolution 2111 (2013).
Requests for Committee’s approval
48. Under paragraph 7 of resolution 2111 (2013) certain types of military equipment destined for the
support of FGS security forces must be approved by the Committee in advance of their import. 61
Between 1 August 2014 and 31 August 2015 two such requests were submitted by Member States for
Committee’s consideration and were approved.
__________________
59
Security Council Presidential statement, 22 May 2014, S/PRST/2014/9.
For details on procedures and the scope of these requirements see Guidelines of the Committee for the
Conduct of its work as consolidated, revised and adopted by the Committee on 30 March 2010, 30 May
2013, 27 November 2013 and 25 March 2014 (hereafter, Committee Guidelines) at paragraph 10.
61
Detailed information must be provided in the notification, including: the type, quantity and technical
specification of weapons, ammunitions, military equipment and materiel to be delivered; the means of
transport to be used for the supply of the equipment; the proposed date of delivery; the specific place
of delivery in Somalia. A five-day non-objection approval process applies. See, Committee Guidelines,
paragraph 10 (d) and (e).
60
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Notifications for Committee’s consideration
49. Paragraph 11(a) resolution 2111 (2013) provides a modality for Member States and international
organisations to provide support to security entities not under the command of the FGS.62
In
paragraph 11(a) the Council decided that the arms embargo would not apply to “[s]upplies of
weapons or military equipment and technical assistance or training by Member States or international,
regional and sub-regional organizations intended solely for the purposes of helping develop Somali
security sector institutions”. Committee’s consideration under a five-day non-objection procedure
was, however, required. Between 1 August 2014 and 31 August 2015 only one notification for
Committee’s consideration was received from a Member state pursuant to paragraph 11(a). This
concerned provision of non-lethal assistance to the Puntland police force.63
50. International and sub-regional organisations have also provided support and assistance to “other
Somali security sector institutions” during the mandate. Between 1 August 2014 and 31 August 2015
two notifications for Committee’s consideration were made by international organisations, both in
relation to non-lethal support (training, spare parts for engines etc,).64 The Monitoring Group has,
however, documented a series of occasions on which assistance was not notified. It is clear that not all
UN bodies are aware of the range of circumstances in which notification to the Committee is required,
particular where the assistance is in the form of infrastructure construction and refurbishment, training
or provision of uniforms.
51. Similarly the Monitoring Group notes that assistance – both lethal and non-lethal – continues to
be sought and provided by Member states to “Somali security sector institutions” not under the
control of the FGS.
52. On 28 May 2015, for example, the FGS drew the Committee’s attention to a potentially unlawful
delivery of a significant volume of military equipment from the UAE to Kismayo and the Interim
Jubba Administration (IJA).65 Images seen by the Monitoring Group show the IJA President Ahmed
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62
The information submitted as part of the notification for consideration must include: the type and
technical specification of the equipment and/or technical assistance and training; the intended recipient
and end-user of the equipment and/or of the technical assistance and training; the means of transport to be
used for the supply of the equipment; the port of entry into Somalia. See Committee Guidelines
paragraph 10 (g) – (j) inclusive.
63
Two other notifications were made by international organizations for training and non -lethal equipment.
64
Not all communications to the Committee were timely or in the correct format. In one of these cases
although a communication was made to the Committee it was not made in the correct form and ultimately
was not circulated as a ‘notification for Committee’s consideration’ but as a general communication.
65
See FGS letter to the Committee 28 May 2015, S/AC.29/2015/COMM.33 (S/AC/29./2015/NOT E.34).
The FGS letter expressed regret that the Somalia government was not provided with “prior notification of
the delivery as specified in paragraph 5 of 2142 (2014)” and stated that it would “immediately request
Interim Jubba Administration and the Government of UAE to provide a comprehensive inventory listing of
the equipment delivered to IJA on May 25th”; the arrival of shipment was widely publicised.
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‘Madobe’ receiving the vehicles at Kismayo port on 25 May 2015, including RG-31 type armoured
mine-protected personnel carrier vehicles and Toyota pick-up trucks.66 The Committee had not
received any notification for its consideration of this shipment.67 The Monitoring Group has also
received credible reports of the import of small amounts of weaponry by other Interim Regional
Administrations.
53. Numerous sources have confirmed that Member State support has been extended to some of
Puntland’s security institutions such as, for example, the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF). The
President of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed ‘Gaas’ has openly called for support in the form of
military equipment from the international community in order to continue his forces fight against AlShabaab in the Galgala mountains.68 Somaliland has also announced plans to create an Oil Protection
Unit (OPU) to protect commercial oil operations; the OPU would be drawn from its police and
military forces, and trained and coordinated by a private security company in collaboration with
international oil companies.69
Notifications for Committee’s information
54. Member States and international organisations also have an obligation to notify “supplies of
non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use” under a ‘for
information’ procedure pursuant to paragraph 10 (g) of resolution 2111 (2013).70 Purely private
entities do not have standing to notify the Committee where their responsibilities are engaged by the
arms embargo. They can, however, violate the terms of the embargo if notification is not made in
connection with the proposed import by a Member State or appropriate international organisation.
Between 1 August 2014 and 31 August 2015, nine notifications for information pursuant to
paragraph 10 (g) were received from Member States and international organisations, primarily for the
__________________
66
Pictures of the reception of the shipment and the vehicles are attached in annexes 7.2 .a and 7.2.b.
Pictures from public domain and FGS letter to the Committee 28 May 2015, S/AC.29./2015/COMM.33.
67
The Monitoring Group wrote to the UAE on 10 August 2015 recalling its obligations relating to
notification and requesting additional information on the shipment but had not received a reply by the time
of reporting. See letter dated 10 August 2015 from the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group addressed to
the Permanent Representative of the UAE to the UN in connection with UAE support to Somali security
sector institutions, S/AC.29/2015/SEMG/OC.36, transmitted to the Committee 12 August 2015 via
S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.58.
68
See also “Priority Need of Puntland Defense Forces”, 12 March 2015, on file with the Monitoring
Group.
69
Further to concerns expressed by the Monitoring Group in its 2014 reporting (S/2014/727) Somaliland
authorities have been engaging with the Group on the process for seeking approval from the Secur ity
Council for the supply of assistance the Unit.
70
Para 10 (g) notifications must be submitted in writing to the Chair five days in advance by the Member
State, international, regional or sub-regional organisation supplying the equipment, and shall provide the
following information: (i) the type and technical specification of the equipment; the intended recipient and
end-user of the equipment; (ii) the humanitarian or protective use to which it will be put; (iii) the means of
transport to be used for the supply of the equipment; (iv) the port of entry into Somalia. See Committee
Guidelines, paragraphs 10(o) and (p).
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benefit of private entities, including NGOs engaged in humanitarian work, or companies operating in
the area of private security.
Improving compliance of Member States and international organisations with
notification obligations
55. The Security Council has stressed “the need for all Member states to respect and implement, in
accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, their obligations with respect to preventing
unauthorized deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia”.71 Nevertheless, as noted
above, on a number of occasions during the mandate, Member States and international organisations
failed to abide by the obligation to notify supplies of assistance and material to “Somali security
sector institutions” for Committee’s consideration pursuant to paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111
(2013). It is clear that there is considerable confusion about the scope of paragraph 11(a).72
56. First, there seems to be some uncertainty as to whether in addition to provision of lethal
assistance such as arms and ammunition, assistance in the form of building of infrastructure or
training or payment of security service salaries also requires approval from the Committee through a
five working day ‘non-objection procedure’. At a minimum there is a need for awareness raising on
the existence of the obligation to both notify and seek the Committee’s consideration of lethal and
non-lethal assistance to non-FGS “security sector institutions”. The Council might wish to recall and
reiterate that obligation in its next resolution addressing the arms embargo.
57. Second, there is also ambiguity surrounding the scope of the phrase “Somali security sector
institutions”, in particular in the context of the evolution of the federal architecture. Based on
Committee practice, paragraph 11(a) resolution 2111 (2013) is applicable in the context of support to
the security forces of Puntland and Somaliland. The Council has not, however, received notifications
for consideration with respect to receipt of support by other entities. Greater clarity is needed, for
example, on the applicability of paragraph 11(a) to the security forces of the Interim Regional
Administrations. Unfortunately, the Council has not been given an opportunity to make an
interpretative determination on this issue.
58. With claims to legitimacy by regional forces outside the FGS force structure, in addition to
declarations of statehood challenging the federal architecture, clarity on which entities can lawfully
receive supplies of materiel pursuant to paragraph 11(a) will be increasingly important. 73 The
Monitoring Group recommends that the Council encourage Member States to engage with the
__________________
71
Resolution 2182 (2014), preamble.
Conversations between Monitoring Group and staff of UN entities, diplomatic missions and
international non-governmental organisations during the mandate.
73
See discussion on the composition of FGS and allied forces in annex 7.3 including the recognition that
even after integration of the SNA certain regional forces will remain outside central FGS command. T he
picture is complex: currently some regional coastguards, outside those of Puntland and Somaliland,
operate outside FGS command.
72
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Committee and actively seek the Guidance of the Committee in specific instances when they propose
to support “Somali security sector institutions” outside those of the FGS.
59. One of the challenges to effective Committee oversight of the provision of military equipment
and other assistance to “Somali security sector institutions” under paragraph 11 (a) is that unlike with
respect to FGS security forces, there is no information provided to the Committee on their structure,
composition and assistance needs. The Committee might wish therefore to consider modifying the
range of information required when submitting a notification for Committee’s consideration as
stipulated in paragraph 10(h) of the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work. Such
information could include, for example, descriptions of structure of the concerned security entities
(including political and military command and control), disposition, scope of operations and an
overview of lethal and non-lethal equipment needs. Entities currently subject to potential exemption
under paragraph 11(a) have prepared similar assessments, albeit outside the context of notifications to
the Committee.
60. It is vital that the Committee has a genuine opportunity to exercise effective oversight and
control of weapons and assistance flows to “security sector institutions” outside FGS security forces:
not only does the “development” of a parallel security architecture outside that of the FGS itself raise
questions about long term peace and security, but the interaction of the operation and disposition of
such forces with the international effort to support “the security forces of the FGS”— the raison
d’être of the partial lift—must be considered.
Standing exemptions to the arms embargo
61. In addition to the exemption arrangements discussed above, the arms embargo contains a range
of standing exemptions which apply to the supply of certain materiel to specific entities and for
particular purposes.74 These standing exemptions primarily facilitate the smooth operation of
__________________
74
As resolution 2111 (2013) confirmed, the arms embargo does not apply to the supply of the following
materiel: supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of assistance, intended solely for the
support of or use by United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Somalia (UNSOM) (paragraph 10 (a)); supplies of weapons and military equi pment, technical training and
assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
(paragraph 10 (b)); supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of assistance intended
solely for the support of, or use by, AMISOM’s strategic partners, operating solely under the African
Union Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012 (or subsequent AU strategic concepts), and in cooperation and
coordination with AMISOM (paragraph 10 (c)); supplies of weapons and mil itary equipment, technical
training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the European Union Training Mission
(EUTM) in Somalia ((paragraph 10 (d)); supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military
helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and
humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only (paragraph 10
(f)). There is one additional exemption that requires a form of n otification to the Secretary General and
relates to entities “undertaking measures to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia” (paragraph 10 (e) resolution 2111 (2013).
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AMISOM, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, UNSOM, AMISOM’s
“strategic partners”, and humanitarian, media and development workers.
62. The Monitoring Group notes that during the mandate the number and scale of international and
Somali actors which are engaged in the third phase of the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive, has grown. One
question which has arisen in terms of understanding whether the supply of certain military equipment
into Somalia falls within the standing exemptions to the embargo relates to the understanding and
identification of the scope of “AMISOM’s strategic partners”. Paragraph (c) of resolution 2111 (2013)
provides for an exemption for material “intended solely for the support of, or use by, AMISOM’s
strategic partners, operating solely under the African Union Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012 (or
subsequent AU strategic concepts), and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM”.
63. There have been both public and internal discussions around the extent to which some Member
States forces’ have been engaged in military operations on Somali territory which have not been
conducted “solely under the African Union Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012 (or subsequent AU
strategic concepts), and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM”, in particular elements of the
Jubba Valley operation in July and August 2015.75 Although, as AMISOM troop contributing
countries were among those participating, cooperation at contingent level is assumed. Further it is
clear that, on the ground at the local level, SNA personnel are involved in joint operations with these
forces, alongside local and regional militia and other forces. The lack of clarity surrounding the
framework for, and command of, these operations, not only raises questions regarding violation of the
arms embargo, it also has implications for other areas of the sanctions regime.
64. Neither the Committee nor the FGS has any oversight over the volume or nature of the military
equipment imported into Somalia under the standing exemptions, including that distributed onwards
to other actors acting “in support of” operations. In contrast with the stringent weapons and
ammunition and equipment import and tracking obligations imposed on the FGS under the partial lift,
these provisions therefore potentially authorise wide distribution of limitless arms and ammunition. In
light of previous Monitoring Group reporting on the leakage of weapons from AMISOM stocks, for
example, this “blind-spot” in the Committee’s visibility on arms flows into Somalia is of concern to
the Monitoring Group.
65. In this context, the Security Council has specifically condemned the flow of weapons to “armed
groups which are not part of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia”, expressing
“serious concern at the destabilizing impact of such weapons”.76 In the short term, the strategy of
__________________
75
Discussions with individuals present at the AMISOM CONOPS review in Nairobi, August 2015; see,
also, statements by the Commander of the AMISOM’s Fourth Division Colonel Abdirahman Abdi Dhimbil
questioning whether some of the troops engaging in operations i n Hiran were operating under AMISOM
command, reported by www.hiiraanonlinenews.com, 17 August 2015.
76
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 14.
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engaging a variety of force multipliers in the conflict against Al-Shabaab, or providing support to
regional entities to enhance stability through a turbulent federalisation process, may be practical. In
the long term, however, it can encourage greater fragmentation of the emergent security sector and
sow the seeds of instability. For example, after the FGS planned process of demobilisation and
integration of forces under Federal command is completed, it is foreseen that the, “lawful regional
authority” may establish regional security forces under their control. 77 The current evolution and
legitimisation of regional forces allied with the emerging interim regional administrations – and their
receipt of support from the international community – is pre-empting this picture. In one SNA sector
the Monitoring Group was told that soldiers were ‘defecting’ to the regional darawish command –
which received international support – due to better pay and conditions.78
__________________
77
See, FGS, Strategic framework for the management of security forces and militia integration and
demobilisation, draft 1 February 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group.
78
Telephone interview with expert with knowledge of the security sector, 12 August 2015.
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Annex 7.2.a
Armoured vehicles received by the Interim Jubba Administration at Kismayo Port
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Annex 7.2.b
Photographs of armoured vehicles and pick-up trucks
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Annex 7.3: Federal Government of Somalia compliance with reporting
requirements under the arms embargo partial lift
66. With the partial lifting of the arms embargo in resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council
sought increased visibility on the composition, structure and weapons and equipment management
capacity of Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) security forces. 79 The FGS is required therefore to
report to the Security Council every six months on:
(a)
the structure, strength and composition (including the status of allied militia) of the
Security Forces of the FGS, including the names of current commanders, the locations
of the headquarters, and the status of militias;
(b)
the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and
distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces of the FGS, including details
of all available armouries and storerooms, their location, storage capacity, staffing
capacity, arms and ammunition management systems and status of use; and
(c)
the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and
storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the FGS, and on training needs in this
regard, including procedures for receipt, verification and recording of weapons imports
through any Federal Government controlled port of entry, procedures for the transport
of weapons and ammunition with the Security Forces of the Federal Government of
Somalia.80
67. FGS reporting requirements were designed, inter alia to improve transparency in the stockpiling,
accounting and distribution of weapons and ammunition of the Somali National Army (SNA) and to
allow Member States to target assistance to Somalia’s Security Forces in a more systematic and
informed manner.
68. In S/2014/726 the Monitoring Group noted that there had been some improvement over time
observed in the FGS first four reports, particularly as a result of support provided by the UN
Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and its international consultants.81 However, there continue
to be significant gaps in the information provided when assessed against Security Council
__________________
79
Resolution 2093 (2013 at paragraph 39. Resolution 2142 expanded on the level of detail required in
this reporting.
80
Resolution 2142 (2014) at paragraph 9.
81
Annex 6.1, paragraph 19, S/2014/726.
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requirements, both in terms of comprehensiveness and detail. This applies particularly to reporting on
the structure, strength and composition of the security forces of the FGS.82
69. The FGS’s 5th report was transmitted to the Committee on 18 September 2014. 83 In terms of
force structure and personnel the report recorded a number of minor developments such as changes in
the command of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Somali Police Force
(SPF) and the delivery of external training in Italy, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, and the United Arab
Emirates.84 FGS weapons and ammunition management was described as “progressing rapidly” with
the arrival and handover of a marking machine and the delivery of related training a significant
breakthrough.85 It was also reported that the Ministry of National Security had developed an
electronic weapon ID card and licensing system for all personnel registered to carry a weapon.86 With
respect to WAM physical infrastructure the report noted that in cooperation with the Mines Advisory
Group (MAG) construction had been completed on four armouries, with more planned. 87 Perhaps the
most significant development recorded was the conduct of arms and ammunition surveys in
Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Belet Weyne.88 The texts of the findings of two of the surveys (Baiodoa,
10 June 2014 and Belet Weyne, 8 September 2014) were reproduced in annexes 8 and 9 of the
reporting.89
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82
At the same time, the reporting does include a range of additional information, not strictly required by
the provisions of resolutions 2142 and 2182, which contributes to overall understanding of the challenges
facing, and potential needs of, FGS forces. A third report is due to be submitted by 30 September 2015.
83
S/AC.29/2014/COMM.83 dated 13 September, transmitted to the Secretariat on 16 September 2014.
84
Along with information that an SNA training directive was being developed it was also noted that a
Ministerial Guidance on the Defense Policy for the year 2014 – 2016, had been issued.
85
The report did note, however, that a second UNMAS procured marking machine had “not yet [been]
delivered”.
86
This system involved “providing an electronic card with a biochip for each weapon registered to a
bearer, who will be the sole individual registered to carry that particular weapon”. A database and a
mobile card reader facilitated tracking and verification.
87
Additional support needs were the focus of a 26 Aug ust 2014 meeting of the Weapons and Ammunition
Management (WAM) Technical Working Group where there was discussion and review of the technical
work plan on WAM physical security and stockpile management. Minutes of the meeting were attached in
annex 7 of the report.
88
As described in the report, “[t]he objective of the baseline survey is to assess arms depots and storage
facilities as well as associated logbooks of the SSF; review all relevant documents associated with the
receipt and distribution of arms and ammunition; quantify and identify the types of arms and ammunition
in the stockpiles of the SSF and also ascertain the destination of the imported arms and ammunition”. The
conduct of a “baseline” survey was a recommendation to the National Security Adv isor by the SecretaryGeneral in S/2014/243, although the scope and focus intended was considerably broader.
89
The Mogadishu baseline was completed on 3 May 2014 and shared with the Committee in the report of
the Federal Government of Somalia submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2142 (2014),
S/AC.2912014/COMM.53.
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70. The FGS submitted its 6th paragraph 9 report to the Committee on 30 March 2015.90 There
reportedly continued to be no “major changes” in the structure and strength of the security forces
since the previous September and June 2014 reports91 save new appointments and some minor
changes in the internal divisional arrangements at the SPF and NISA. 92 In terms of weapons marking,
registration and accountability, it was reported that UNSOM and UNMAS had trained 12 SNA
personnel in weapons registration, marking, and record keeping. With respect to captured weaponry,
item lists from three caches of weapons, ammunition and other equipment respectively seized in
Mogadishu, in Bulo marer, and at Mogadishu port, were provided, with reference to FGS obligations
under “paragraph 6”.93 Progress was also reported with respect to enhancement of WAM physical
infrastructure through the construction of 12 armouries (at unspecified locations) in Mogadishu and
pending construction of others.94
71. Both the September 2014 and March 2015 reporting contained updates on Al-Shabaab’s intent
and capacity with the former encompassing a review of the impact of operations Eagle and Indian
Ocean.95
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90
S/AC.29/2015/COMM.21 dated 30 March 2015.
The report in particular referred to annexes 4 to 7 of the FGS June reporting
(S/AC.29/2014/COMM.53) for SNA structure and function and to t he September 2014 reporting
(S/AC.2912014/COMM.53) for that of the Custodial Corps.
92
These include an enlargement of the structure and functions of the National Intelligence and Security
Agency to include five new units within the Intelligence Division – including a team dedicated to
counter-intelligence tasks and a team dedicated to regional analysis – as well as the expansion of the
Supply and Logistics Division to incorporate an Internal Security unit. The conduct of a variety of
training for security forces by international partners was also described, including on explosive and
weapons safety, the human rights due diligence policy, military leadership and various military
specialisations, and weapons identification and tracking training for NISA.
93
Paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 requires the FGS and AMISOM to “document and register all military
equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates,
including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition, photographing all
items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the SEMG of all military items before their
redistribution or destruction”. See discussion in annex 7.1.
94
The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had led this work in cooperation with the FGS and had also carried
out training for three storekeepers and one armoury manager.
95
An overview of meetings conducted by the SEMG with the FGS during its visit to Mogadishu between
17 and 19 March 2015, was also appended in annex 7 to the March reporting ( S/AC.29/2015/COMM.21).
91
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Assessment of FGS reporting96
Structure, strength and composition of forces97
72. Clarity on the composition of the security forces is instrumental in the implementation of the
arms embargo partial lift and exemption regime through identifying who is entitled to receive arms,
other assistance, and under what conditions. It is also the precondition for an effective weapons and
ammunition management (WAM) system. Although a detailed security forces organogram was
provided by the FGS–with minor updates since the last provision of a full organogram in June 2014—
there are a number of gaps which impede an accurate description of FGS security forces scope and
composition.
73. First, there are units of FGS forces, including those receiving international support, which are not
identified, or not identified with sufficient precision. These include the Mogadishu maritime police/
incipient Somali coastguard and specialist divisions of the National Intelligence and Security Agency
(NISA), the SNA, and the Somali Police Force (SPF). The former have received UN and bilateral
assistance, including some notified to the Committee. The latter have also received targeted support
and mentoring from AMISOM and Member States and are regularly mentioned in public media
reports. During the mandate, for example, support to the SPF Rapid Reaction Team, for example, was
notified to the Committee. The unit does not appear, however, in the latest police structure provided
to the Committee.
74. Second, FGS reporting continues to assert that there has been no change in the strength of forces
since June 2014. It is unlikely that there has been zero recruitment, particularly in the sectors. The
scale up in recruitment during the first phase of the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive offensive was well
documented—including in the FGS’s own reporting. Since then the second and third phases of the
offensive have gotten underway, alongside recovery of significant territory. The SEMG has received a
range of reports on ongoing SNA recruitment and training and weapons distribution. On 9 March
2015, for example, in Huduur the local authority and the SNA were reported to have distributed 270
AK47s for “newly trained” soldiers who were described as “the last batch of SNA soldiers trained in
the town for deployment in Bakol.98
75. The other cross-cutting area of force structure, strength and composition which requires greater
elaboration is the integration of militia and regional forces. In its March 2015 report, the FGS
__________________
96
As required by paragraph 12 of resolution 2142 (2014), the Monitoring Group provided feedback to the
FGS on its reporting during the mandate period, including to assist with its 30 September reporting.
97
Reporting on force structure, strength and composition by the FGS also included (required) descriptio n
of a range of training initiatives received or planned. Absent a baseline assessment of needs it is difficult
to assess progress against overall objectives/training plan.
98
Email from UN staff member, 11 March 2015.
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signalled the challenges of moving towards a more unified force structure, including the process of
integration of forces, which would “require significant resources and assistance”.99 The report did not,
however, provide any background of details of these plans which would permit the Committee to
examine any arms embargo implications. A snapshot of how the situation in the Interim Jubba
Administration (IJA) is described in the reporting juxtaposed with other sources, illustrates some of
the discrepancies. The latest force composition reported for the Middle and Lower Jubba-based Sector
43 of the SNA is “3,034”.100 Further in its March 2015 report the FGS noted that there were 2283
soldiers—described as “the forces in Kismayo”—who remained to be trained under the Human Rights
Due Diligence Policy. At the same time, information from the National Commission for the Integration
of the Somali Armed Forces (NIC) and other involved in the integration process indicated that there was
a target of 2880 personnel for integration into the SNA in territory of the IJA, with 50 per cent expected
to come from serving militia/IJA aligned forces and 50 per cent from non-aligned groups and new
recruits.101 On 27 July 2015 a swearing in ceremony took place for 1517 new SNA personnel from
Lower Jubba/Kismayo, attended by the Presidents of both the IJA and the FGS.
76. It is vital that the impact on FGS force structure and command of both ongoing and planned
integration is accurately described in future reporting. The FGS in the past provided relevant
information—including details of command, force strength and disposition—when elements of ASWJ
were integrated.102 In this regard, it would also be appropriate to note where forces, and/or particular
units, have been removed FGS command, whether due to realignment of political allegiance or
demobilisation. A significant program of demobilisation, for example, is planned under the auspices
of the NIC.103 The Monitoring Group recognises, of course, that there will tend to be a degree of
fluidity as the FGS reshapes its forces.
77. Finally the Security Council has asked the FGS to reflect on the status of “allied militias” as an
integral part of its reporting on the structure, strength and composition of its forces. 104 The SNA,
AMISOM, and other “strategic partners” rely on allied militia, in particular clan militia—including
through sharing weaponry and ammunition—in fighting Al-Shabaab.
__________________
99
S/AC.29/2015/COMM.21 at page 4.
Report of the Federal Government of Somalia pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2142 (2014),
S/AC.2912014/COMM.53.
101
See, inter alia, FGS, Strategic framework for the management of security forces and militia integration
and demobilisation, draft 1 February 2015, on file with the Monitoring Group.
102
See, Report of the Federal Government of Somalia pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2142 (2014),
S/AC.2912014/COMM.53.
103
See for example plans for the review and adjustment of existing SNA forces in the South Central
region to ensure multi-clan composition, National commission for the integration of the Somali Armed
Forces Presentation at the 22 July 2015, High Level Partnership Forum.
104
Para 9 resolution 2142 (2014) required the FGS to report biannually on, “the structure, strength and
composition (including the status of allied militia) [emphasis added] of the Security Forces of the FGS”.
100
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78. Clarity on the composition of armed forces is essential for determining compliance with the arms
embargo, not just for the FGS, but also for AMISOM, its “strategic partners” and Member States
assisting the FGS.105 The integration of SNA forces in Sector 43 in Kismayo, for example, was
preceded by a widely publicised military equipment delivery to Kismayo, including Casspir APCs,
armoured cars and pick up trucks, for which the Committee did not receive a notification. 106 It is
unclear whether this material was intended for the SNA integrated component of IJA forces or other
forces such as the IJA’s Ras Kamboni militia. The fact that the FGS was not advised of the shipment
indicates that it was likely intended for the later.107 AMISOM and bilateral partners are also providing
training, equipment and other support to various forces in Kismayo.
79. Strictly confidential annex 3.1 provides a comprehensive account on the SNA force structure in
relation to salary and ration distribution.
Infrastructure and procedures
80. While FGS provided updates efforts on progress in weapons marking and registration of imports
and with respect to steps to develop a comprehensive WAM system, reporting again fell short in
providing the full information required by the Council, particularly with respect to “procedures and
codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons […] including
procedures for receipt, verification and recording of weapons imports [..] and procedures for the
transport of weapons and ammunition”.108 Although the focus of the reporting has been on the
processing and registration of imports, what happens post is still unclear.
81. Reference was again made in reporting during this mandate to WAM procedures and codes of
conduct, as described in the FGS February 2014 reporting. Over a year and a half later, however, this
system is still understood to be more of an aspirational framework than a reflection of procedures
actually in place. Information on the development of a weapons card system, for example, was
encouraging, although no information was provided on the scope of its implementation. (The
Monitoring Group understands that the system is in use with respect to personnel of private security
companies and for civil servants who are authorised to bear arms.) While recognising that significant
work is being undertaken on putting in place new systems, descriptions of the current practice would
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105
It is also fundamental to understanding both political and military command responsibility affecting
the scope of Somalia and other Member state’s responsibilities under national and international law,
including with respect to the sanctions regime.
106
See discussion of this shipment in annex 7.2.
107
See FGS letter to the Committee 28 May 2015, S/AC.29./2015/COMM.33 (S/A C/29./2015/NOTE.34).
The FGS letter expressed regret that the Somalia government was not provided with “prior notification of
the delivery as specified in paragraph 5 of 2142 (2014)” and stated that it would “immediately request
Interim Jubba Administration and the Government of UAE to provide a comprehensive inventory listing
of the equipment delivered to IJA on May 25th”.
108
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 9(c).
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be helpful, including how weapons are distributed beyond Mogadishu and transported to and managed
in the sectors.
82. Although information on various infrastructure construction projects underway or completed was
provided in both the FGS September and March reports, comprehensive information on “storage
capacity, staffing capacity, arms and ammunition management systems and status of use” of each
currently available, and planned, armoury and storeroom as required by the Council was lacking. 109
The Committee would benefit an overview—as opposed to submission of isolated information on
various projects—which could be regularly and easily updated (perhaps in tabular format) as projects
complete and new needs are identified.110 Although there is an understandable focus on weapons and
ammunition storage in FGS reporting on infrastructure, the Committee also requires information on
the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of “military equipment”. Information
should be provided on measures taken to store/garage and ensure accountability for the distribution
and use of other military equipment subject to the arms embargo, such as, for example, combat
vehicles and uniforms.111
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109
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 9.
UNMAS maintains a database that brings together information from a range of partners on ongoing
and planned construction: this could constitute a starting point for the generation of such an overview.
111
See discussion on the need to improve management of military uniforms in annex 7.1.
110
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Annex 7.4: Military equipment captured during offensive operations by AMISOM
and FGS security forces: implementation of paragraph 6 resolution 2182 (2014)
83. With the escalation of joint operations against Al-Shabaab in 2014 and 2015, the question of
management of seized weapons and equipment became increasingly pertinent. In September 2014, the
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) told the Committee that it had seized two surface to air
missiles in Buulo Mareer on 31 Aug 2014; a Carl Gustave 84 mm High Explosive Anti-Tank round in
Mogadishu on 19 June 2014; and “caches of arms and ammunition” in the Hereryale (Warta Nabadda
District) of Mogadishu” on 7 August 2014.112 At the same time it was clear that all seized weaponry
was not being recorded, and that some was being recycled, and, in some cases, distributed onwards by
both FGS security forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
84. The lack of information on these seizures not only undermined the Committee’s capacity to
assess the evolving arms, ammunition and equipment needs of FGS forces it also hampered tracking
of unlawful equipment imports, possible leakage from Government stocks, and, potentially
developing analysis of Al-Shabaab operations and supply routes.113
Adoption of paragraph 6 resolution 2182 (2014)
85. In October 2014—further to recommendations from the Monitoring Group in S/2014/726114--the
Security Council decided that the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM would be required to
“document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course
of carrying out their mandates, including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or
ammunition, photographing all items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the
Monitoring Group of all military items before their redistribution or destruction”.115
86. Although resolution 2182 (2014) does not require the FGS or AMISOM to notify the Committee
of the captured materiel within a specified time period, the need for Monitoring Group access prior to
disposal requires agreement on procedures for handling and storage of such equipment by, and
between, FGS security forces and AMISOM, in addition to timely information sharing with the
Monitoring Group. In this regard, on 21 April 2015 the Chair of the Committee wrote to the FGS
National Security requesting details of efforts made by the SNA to meet the requirements of
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112
S/AC.29/2014/COMM.83 dated 13 September, transmitted to the Secretariat on 16 September 2014.
No information was provided, however, on the handling, storage or tracing of this weaponry. With respect
to the August 2014 seizure, no details were provided on the type of materiel captured.
113
The change in means and methods of warfare by anti-Al-Shabaab forces – such as for example the
increased use of air power – may influence a change in the type and sourcing of weaponry by Al Shabaab.
In early August 2015 for example a number of reports surfaced indicating that Al -Shabaab may have
taken possession of a Surface-To-Air Missile (SAM-7), imported via Yemen.
114
Paragraph 181 (d), S/2014/726.
115
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 6.
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paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014).116 The same request in respect of AMISOM forces was sent to
the African Union Special Representative for Somalia (SRCC).117
87. Although there was no FGS response to the Chair’s letter, at the end of March 2015 the FGS
provided information in its regular “paragraph 9” reporting on three incidents where weapons and
other materiel subject to the arms embargo had been seized, one of which operations had been
conducted jointly with AMISOM.118 The following information was provided by the FGS, referencing
its “paragraph 6” obligations:
88. On 15 August 2014 weapons, ammunition, and military equipment were recovered during a joint
search operation by NISA and AMISOM Sector 1 at the residence of Mr Ahmed Dai [Ahmed Hassan
Adow], former Madina District Commissioner in Mogadishu. The material – including weapons,
explosive materials, large bombs and IED components – was confiscated and recorded by an
AMISOM Sector 1 officer and later transferred to NISA, less some of the material which was noted as
taken by "NISA Col Coffi from SFC” (Annex 5 A);
89. On 28 October 2014 a joint SPF and NISA operation at Mogadishu port led to the seizure of
magnets (for IED attachment) and other military equipment and accessories. On 17 November the
container and goods were transferred to NISA. The inventory taken of the materiel included 1000
magnets, 2960 military uniforms, 4360 military boots; 3600 military t-shirts; 120 knives; 138
camouflage; 111 female veins; and 24,328 meters of military textile (Annex 5 B);
90. Although not described or referred to in the narrative reporting by the FGS, Annex 5 B also
included a list entitled “On November 11th and 15th, 2014 items seized in Buula Mareer and Janaale
districts”. The materiel consisted primarily of 93 solar engines of different sizes, solar powered
torches, fans, lamps, charging batteries, generators, invertors, irons and batteries. It was noted that the
materiel had been stored at NISA.
91. The current whereabouts of this materiel is unclear. Some is reportedly stored at the National
Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). The FGS asserts that the August 2014 materiel jointly
seized with AMSIOM was not in fact given to NISA – that only detainees were transferred to NISA
custody.
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116
Letter from the Chair of the Committee to the FGS National Security Adviser, 24 April 2015
(S/AC.29/2015/OC.10). The letter was dated 21 April 2015 but transmitted on 24 April 2015.
117
See letter from the Chair of the Committee addressed to His Excellency, Ambassador Maman Sambo
Sidikou, African Union Special Representative for Somalia (SRCC) and Head of AMISOM
(S/AC.29/201510C.8). The letter was dated 21 April 2015 but transmitted on 24 April 2015.
118
The information was included in a section of the FGS March paragraph 9 report headed “draft
legislation against possession of non-registered lethal weapons”. S/AC.29/2015/COMM.21 dated
30 March 2015.
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92. In March 2015, in response to a specific request from the Monitoring Group, NISA provided
photographs of three weapons allegedly used in the attack by Al-Shabaab on the Mogadishu
International Airport (MIA) on 25 December 2015 and seized in the aftermath.
Current practices in relation to captured weaponry and equipment
93. Contradictory information exists, however, on current AMISOM and FGS practices with respect
to handling of captured weaponry and equipment. It is understood that FGS expectation is that
weapons captured by AMISOM are transferred to NISA for storage, tracing and, ultimately, disposal.
This does not appear to be the AMISOM understanding.119 Neither do FGS security forces follow a
standard practice on captured weaponry or other materiel. In Mogadishu transfer of such materiel to
NISA or the police does occur.120 Fifteen NISA personnel in particular have been provided with
specialist training on weapons identification and tracking and a separate section of the NISA armoury
is allocated for captured weaponry.121 According to the FGS, NISA have processed, registered and
photographed some 35 captured weapons.
94. The President conducted an internal meeting on 19 May 2015 with heads of the security forces
and relevant parties to discuss management and accounting for captured weapons. In the sectors,
however, it is understood that weapons transfer to NISA or the police rarely happens, whether due to
operational necessity, or more probably, the deeply rooted tradition that captured weaponry is shared
as spoils with the successful fighters. Challenging these practices will require significant awareness
raising not just with respect to Security Council obligations but also on the value and potential impact
on the conflict of the identification and tracing of captured material in terms of generating greater
intelligence on sources of weaponry and tactics. In this regard the Monitoring Group received a
significant number of independent reports of weaponry and other materiel seized during the mandate
by the SNA and other FGS forces, none of which, other than that set out above, has been notified to
the Group.
95. AMISOM practices are also unclear. In mid June 2015 an AMISOM official told one interlocutor
of the Monitoring Group that although AMISOM had previously transferred captured weapons to
NISA it “no longer” did so. Another view reflected to the Monitoring Group was that there was a
requirement for AMISOM to report to the FGS on captured weaponry but not to transfer it to its
custody. AMISOM has not provided any information on captured weaponry or military equipment to
the Monitoring Group during the mandate. The Group is, however, aware that such seizures have been
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119
See discussion below.
On 17 August 2015, for example, a joint operation by AMISOM police and FGS security forces in the
Yaqshid/Sigale market neighbourhood of Mogadishu resulted in the recovery of pistols, electric
detonators and explosive powder. This material was reportedly transferred to the SNPF Criminal
Investigations Division. Email, UN from staff member, 17 August.
121
Phone interview, UN official with knowledge of the security sector, 25 August 2015.
120
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made, including in the context of joint AMISOM/FGS security forces operations as was the case at
the home of Ahmed Hassan Adow in August 2014 noted above.
96. In April 2015 the Monitoring Group met with Dr Maman S Sidikou, African Union (AU) Special
Representative for Somalia (SRCC) in Nairobi. During the discussion the team expressed concern
about the dearth of information available to the Monitoring Group on weapons captured by
AMISOM. By letter in late May 2015 the SRCC advised that operational and sector commanders had
been specifically advised of the sanctions documentation and inspection obligations and that “all
sectors” had been directed to “produce regular briefs on captured weapons” for forwarding to Force
Headquarters.122 It is understood that no such briefs have yet been received from the sectors.
According to the SRCC, the mission has faced a number of obstacles in compliance, including lack of
storage facilities in the sectors and guidance on “modalities”.
97. In late June 2015 AMISOM wrote to the Monitoring Group to reflect further on the challenges
encountered.123 These included: lack of common approach in the sectors to the implementing Security
Council requirements on captured weapons; lack of understanding of the circumstances in which
captured weapons may be handed over to the FGS (and the modalities for such hand-over) or
destroyed; and other unspecified “logistical challenges”. The mission requested that the Monitoring
Group provide a briefing for AMISOM operational commanders which would provide
“answers/solutions to the issues raised” on 3 July 2015, noting that the upcoming offensive was likely
to lead to additional seizure and capture of weapons. Unfortunately, due to the very short notice, the
SEMG was unable to take part in this session.
Improving implementation of paragraph 6 resolution 2182 (2014)
98. Effective implementation of paragraph 6 will require the FGS and AMISOM to agree on
responsibilities for documentation, registration, tracing and analysis of captured weapons and other
materiel as appropriate, a transfer procedure to the responsible entity, a framework for storage and
disposal of the materiel retained or transferred, and a protocol for informing the Monitoring Group of
the seizure. Both AMISOM and FGS would likely require development of Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) to operationalise any agreement.124 Arrangements for sharing the findings of the
analysis and tracing of the equipment subsequently conducted—whether by the FGS, the Monitoring
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122
Letter dated 30 May2015 from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union
Commission (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of AMISOM (S/AC.29/2015/COMM.36). The letter was a
response to enquires from the Chairperson of the Committee on efforts made by AMISOM to discharge its
obligations under paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014).
123
Email from the Office of the SRCC to the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group, 26 June 2015.
124
Clarification of AMISOM procedures and capacity to manage captured weaponry will also be
important in the context of plans for AMISOM engagement in the national integration and disarmament
process. The current strategic plan indicates that AMISOM is likely to be mandated to control
surrendered weapons, with UNMAS assisting on safe handling, registration and storage.
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Group, AMISOM or Member States—could help demonstrate the benefits of compliance for all
parties. Finally, the Monitoring Group recommends that troop contributing countries also be reminded
of their obligations and urged to direct their AMISOM contingents to comply with directives from
Force Headquarters on the documentation, storage and disposal of captured military materiel.
99. Training in weapons documentation, identification and tracking will be necessary for the various
entities charged with processing captured weapons. Conflict Armament Research conducted training
in 2015 for 15 NISA personnel in identification and tracing of arms and ammunition: for this training
to be operationalised, the provision of a weapons marking machine will be critical. Alongside this
training it is understood that a template for the recording and analysis of captured weaponry has been
developed.125
Captured weaponry and equipment and the role of “other Somali security sector institutions”
and bilateral partners
100. ‘Other Somali security sector institutions’ not under FGS command also seize weapons,
ammunition and equipment from armed actors, both within and outside the context of the conflict
with Al-Shabaab. In Puntland, for example, the PMPF has captured weapons and ammunition from
vessels engaging in illegal trade, such as illegal fishing, human trafficking, weapons and ammunition
smuggling.126 Engagement on land with Al-Shabaab by regional forces, such as those controlled by
the Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) and the Somaliland and Puntland authorities, also result in
seizures.127 With reports of illegal weapon flows from Yemen and the increasing concentration of
Al-Shabaab fighters in Somaliland and Puntland, incidents in these latter jurisdictions are expected to
rise. Operations by international forces operating bilaterally also reportedly result in weapons and
other military equipment seizures.128
101. It the light of the growing complexity of forces engaged in Somalia’s various conflicts, and the
continued capacity demonstrated by Al-Shabaab to procure ample and increasingly heavy weaponry,
the need for more systematic identification and tracing of weapons and materiel is acute. A centralised
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125
Introduction of such a template and its standardisation throughout FGS forces – and indeed more
broadly among the armed forces operating in Somalia – would permit swifter more effective tracing and
analysis of patterns but also facilitate sharing and cross -referencing of information.
126
Email from expert with knowledge of the security sector, 25 March 2015 .
127
See for example a report of the arrest of 5 suspected Al -Shabaab members in possession of an
unspecified quantity of explosives in Awbarkhadle (east of Hargeisa). Email from UN staff member,
12 July 2015. The Monitoring Group understands that there ha s been some discussion with donors around
capacity building in processing and tracing of captured weapons for “other security sector institutions” in
particular those in Puntland and Somaliland. The authorities there appear open to this support.
128
On 26 August 2015, for example, it was reported that fighting in Kulunjerer in Bakool between Al Shabaab and the SNA, engaging alongside the Ethiopian Liyu police had led to the capture of two PKM
and one RPG. Email, UN staff member, 28 August 2015.
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information flow on captured weapons would also assist the FGS with tracking and responding to
weapons diversion from its own stocks.
102. In this context the Committee may wish to consider a mechanism which would facilitate and
invite reporting on captured weaponry by non-FGS forces present in Somalia, whether Somali or
international, including through a modification of the scope of paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014).
The information collected by the Monitoring Group in this regard could also be shared, where
appropriate, with the FGS.
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Annex 7.5: Enhancing compliance: international assistance to the Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS)
103. The Security Council has recognised the need for the FGS to receive international assistance in
order to achieve progress in complying with the terms of the partial lift. In resolution 2142 (2014) the
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide options and recommendations on the
assistance needs of the FGS, specifically how FGS capacities “in the safe and transparent storage,
distribution and management of weapons and military equipment, including in monitoring and
verification” could be improved.129 Following a mission to Somalia in March 2014, the SecretaryGeneral presented the findings of his assessment on 3 April 2014130.
104. Among the Secretary-General’s key recommendations was the establishment of a joint
verification team (JVT) which would conduct independent monitoring of Government weapon and
ammunition stocks. The JVT would report to the Weapons and Ammunition Technical Working
Group (WATG) established under the authority of the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering
Committee (AAMSC) and onwards to the Committee, including via the Monitoring Group which sits
on the WATG. With a strong national capacity building component, the JVT was designed to
complement the work of, and coordinate with, the Monitoring Group, including due to the operational
constraints facing the latter.131 Finally it was also intended that the impact of the JVT would be to
assist in “mitigating the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside of the security services
of the FGS”.132
105. In its response to the Secretary-General’s report, the Security Council urged Member States to
“provide sufficient financial resources to support the prompt establishment of this team”.133 It also
appealed to Member States to prioritize the provision of other support and equipment to the FGS
which would (1) improve FGS compliance on reporting and notifications; (2) facilitate the conduct of
a baseline registration survey of the Somali Security Sector and (3) commence a weapons marking
and registration process (including to “inform future verification activities”).134
106. Although support since the Security Council’s call has scaled up, international assistance to the
FGS to achieve these priorities remains insufficient. Despite the very specific request by the Security
Council in May 2014 for assistance from the international community for the provision of at least five
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129
Resolution 2142 (2014) at paragraph 10(b).
S/2014/243.
131
See S/2014/243 and S/PRST/2014/9. Access to many sites is not possible for the group’s members due
to UN movement restrictions.
132
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 7.
133
S/PRST/2014/9.
134
S/PRST/2014/9.
130
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weapon marking machines, by mid August 2015 only two had been delivered.135 Other critical
initiatives which would support achieving the priorities identified by the Security Council’s remain
unfunded: three of these are discussed below.
Developing a comprehensive approach to WAM management
107. At the end of December 2014 the FGS wrote to the Committee to seek support from the UN
and Member States for a 12-month pilot project that would, inter alia, assist the FGS to136:

Develop and implement a national framework and standards in accordance with the
International Small Arms Control Standards ISACS and the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines (IATG);

Develop and implement safe and transparent procedures for the reception and distribution of
weapons and ammunition;

Establish a weapons and ammunition marking and registration system (newly imported as well
as old arsenals);

Conduct regular verification to ensure safety and transparency in the management and
distribution of weapons and ammunitions;

Support the FGS in preparing and submitting all necessary reports and notifications to the
UNSC.137
108. Three months later in March 2015 in the course of its paragraph 9 reporting, the FGS advised
the Committee that funding for the project had not yet been secured. 138 At the time of finalisation of
this report the project was still stalled.
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135
Three additional marking machines did reach Mogadishu by 31 August 2015 and were awaiting
conclusion of agreements for use with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) at time of finalisation of
this report.
136
Letter dated 20 December 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations
addressed to the Chair of the Committee, S/AC.29/2014/COMM.124, transmitted to the Committee as
S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.130, 31 December 2014 (The delay in circulation was a result of the Secretariat's
attempts to reach out to competent Somali authorities for clarification on the intended recipients).
137
The project was developed in collaboration with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
(UNSOM) Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group (ROLSIG) and UNMAS. The project envisaged the
retention of a consultancy team (120 days contract over a 12 month period) coordinated by UNMAS. In
addition, 2 local staff would be hired for 12 months to provide regular support follow up and mentorship
to the FGS WAM authorities.
138
S/AC.29/2015/COMM.21 dated 30 March 2015.
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The Office of the National Security Advisor
109. The Security Council has underlined the “urgent need” for support for the Office of the
National Security Advisor (NSA).139 It continues to operate without sufficient capacity support.
Assistance in kind has been provided by the UN, in particular by the UN Mission in Somalia
(UNSOM), the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) and the Security Council
Affairs Division (SCAD). This work has particularly centred on coordinating FGS reporting
obligations to the Security Council, including the development of templates and advice on
compliance. Nevertheless, despite demonstrated willingness by the NSA to improve compliance,
direct support for personnel and equipment is lacking. Without such support it will be difficult for the
NSA to function effectively against the background of an expanding folder of obligations.140
Progress in the establishment of the Joint Verification Team (JVT)
110. In October 2014 the Security Council reiterated its request to the FGS – with the support of
international partners – to “establish a joint verification team which would conduct routine
inspections of government security forces’ stockpiles, inventory records and the supply chain of
weapons” and provide its findings to the Committee.141 In March 2015 the FGS reported that there
had been little progress on the establishment of the team. It described “significant challenges”, noting
in particular the “lack of resources”, the “significant” security problems and the “mandate limitations
of international partners to access Somali Security Forces situated in the theatre of operations”. 142
Nevertheless the FGS reiterated its intention to finalise terms of reference for the JVT, in cooperation
with the Monitoring Group, emphasising the need for Member States to provide sufficient financial
resources. Three arms and ammunition baseline surveys conducted in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Belet
Weyne in the second half of 2014 were described as “a foundation” for the process. On 21 April 2015
the Chair of the Committee requested the Arms and Ammunition Standing Committee (AASC) to
provide information on progress towards establishing the JVT.143 At the time of writing, the AAMSC
has yet to respond. Although some progress was recorded in the June 2015 AASC meeting in terms of
the development of a concept note and the Terms of Reference for the team, the question of the
funding for the team was not clarified.
Despite these setbacks, the FGS was determined to move forward in fulfilling its obligations.
In late June 2015 it entered into discussions with Conflict Armament Research (CAR)— an
independent private consultancy which had offered its services pro bono—to begin the work in the
111.
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139
S/PRST/2014/9.
See annex 7.3.
141
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 7.
142
S/AC.29/2015/COMM.21 dated 30 March 2015.
143
Letter from the Chair of the Security Council Committee to Abdirahman Sheikh Issa, Chair of the
Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee and National Security Adviser, Office of the
President of the Federal Republic of Somalia in Mogadishu (S/AC.29/201S/OC.11).
140
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interim until an appropriate funding stream was identified. A Terms of Reference document for the
JVT was finally agreed between the FGS, UNSOM and CAR on 22 August 2015. Operating under the
overall authority of the AAMSC, the JVT will “conduct routine inspections of the FGS’ security
forces’ stockpiles, inventory records and the supply chain of weapons for the purposes of mitigating
the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside of the security services of the FGS”. 144 The
team will be composed of four FGS security officials and four international personnel from which
co-team leaders will be drawn.145 The JVT will submit quarterly reports to the AAMSC which
members—including the Monitoring Group—may submit queries or points of clarification. UNSOM
will provide the logistics support for the team. Funding for the sustainable operation of the team is
still awaited.
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144
See, Terms of Reference for the establishment of the Joint Verification Team of arms and ammunition,
on file with Monitoring Group.
145
See, Terms of Reference for the establishment of the Joint Verification Team of arms and ammunition,
on file with Monitoring Group.
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Annex 7.6 Implementation of, and recommendations related to, modifications of
the arms embargo stipulated in resolution 2182 (2014)
112. There have been two significant developments with respect to the scope of the arms embargo
since S/2014/727. First, in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), the Council acting under Chapter
VII authorised Member States, in certain circumstances, to conduct interdiction in Somali territorial
waters and on the high seas. Second, the Council requested the Monitoring Group and the Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS) to work together to present a proposal to provide for an exemption to
the arms embargo for weapons on board vessels engaged in commercial activity in Somali territorial
waters and in Somali ports.146 These developments respond to challenges surrounding enforcement of
the charcoal ban and arms embargo, and also reflect the need to adapt the regime to changing realities
on the ground. This annex assesses the implementation of the Council’s authorisation of interdiction
in resolution 2182 (2014) and describes the progress made in developing a proposal to provide for an
exemption for armed security on commercial vessels in certain circumstances.147
Interdiction on the high seas and territorial waters
113. In S/2014/727, against the background of ongoing violations of the arms embargo and charcoal
ban and the need for more effective enforcement measures, the Monitoring Group recommended that
the Security Council provide international maritime forces with the power to interdict vessels on the
high seas and within Somali territorial waters in certain circumstances. 148 The FGS had also written
requesting Council’s support in this regard.149
114. In response, the Council authorized Member States, for a period of twelve months, to inspect
vessels bound for Somalia where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel is, inter alia,
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146
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 10.
Paragraph 49 of Resolution 2182 (2014) requests the Monitoring Group to report on the
implementation of the authorization set out in paragraph 15 of the same resolution, as part of its regular
reporting to the Committee.
148
S/2014/727 paragraph 181.
149
Letter dated 10 October 2014 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Somali Republic to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council and copied to the Secretariat of the
Committee, enclosing a letter dated 8 October 2015 from the President of the FGS
(S/AC.29/2014/COMM.104). The letter requested “further assistance from the Council in authorising
existing international maritime forces to take measures at sea to prevent the export of charcoal from
Somalia and the delivery of weapons and military equipment into Somalia in violation of the arms
embargo”.
147
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carrying materiel in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia. 150 On 7 January 2015 the President of
Somalia wrote to the Secretary-General advising that it would be acceptable to the FGS for “selected
Member States who are member nations of Combined Maritime Forces [CMF]” to make such
inspections.151
115. Since then, discussions on operationalisation of the authorisation to interdict arms and military
equipment being carried in violation of the arms embargo have taken place in a number of fora,
including most intensively at CMF headquarters. The Monitoring Group alongside the FGS National
Security Advisor (NSA) and UN agencies, has contributed to these debates. Progress however has
been slow: no arms interdiction operation has yet been conducted. It is understood that among the
challenges is the question of how to interpret and apply certain provisions of the authorisation,
particularly with respect to dealing with individuals found on board interdicted vessels, and the
documentation and disposal of weaponry, including in the context of European Union legal
requirements.152 The situation with respect to arms interdiction contrasts with the situation regarding
maritime interdiction of charcoal also authorised in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014). Despite
ongoing discussion on options for charcoal disposal, one successful interdiction has been conducted
by international maritime forces and significant surveillance information has been shared with the
Monitoring Group by Member States participating in the effort.
116. The need for paragraph 15 to be operationalised and for arms interdiction to commence
remains acute. Further to a CMF meeting in August 2015 the FGS NSA wrote to the CMF
Commander, copied to the Chair of the Committee, urging the Commander to “encourage CMF to
begin the naval maritime interdiction process and the systematic monitoring of weapons particularly
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150
Paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014). The authorisation specifically provided that Member sates,
acting individually or collectively, in cooperation with the FGS, and further to appropriate notification to
the Secretary-General (and onwards by the Secretary-General to member States), could “take all
necessary measures commensurate with the circumstances” to inspect such vessels bound for Somalia on
the high seas and in Somali territorial waters (paragraph 15, resolution 2182). The high seas were the
defined as waters “off the coast of Somalia extending to and including the Arabian sea and Persian Gulf”.
The resolution also authorized the interdiction of vessels “carrying charcoal from Somali a in violation of
the charcoal ban”.
151
See letter from the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the Secretary General, 7 January
2015, JFS/XM/NUN6/SG/1/15. Selected Member states of the CMF include Australia, Bahrain, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Spain, Turkey, UAE, UK and the US. Following a letter dated 25 July 2015 from the National Security
Advisor to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the Command er of the Combined
Maritime Forces
copied to the Chair of the Committee, New Zealand was added to the list above.
152
The provisions governing the authorisation set out a detailed framework within which the power may
be operationalized including addressing issues such as the obligations of flag states, the need for the
conduct of inspections to accord with international humanitarian and human rights law, seizure and
disposal and the reporting requirements consonant on such inspections. See S/RES/2182 (2014)
paragraphs 15 – 22 inclusive.
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coming from Yemen to Somalia”.153 The letter particularly expressed concern regarding an “influx of
arms and ammunition” along the coast of Puntland and Somalia, noting that, “it is a growing security
concern that we may soon see surface to air missiles among other destructive weapons reaching
Somalia from Yemen”.
117. Illegal imports of weapons, explosives and other military equipment to Somalia, including via
maritime channels, continues to pose a serious threat to peace and security in Somalia. In the global
context of the Yemen crisis, and in particular as the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive escalates and
AMISOM and its strategic partners deploy new tactics and weaponry, sourcing of new and heavier
weaponry by Al-Shabaab is a likely countermeasure. Unconfirmed reports have already surfaced that
Al-Shabaab may be seeking, and even have obtained, Surface to Air Missiles just as military
helicopters are preparing to be deployed in support of AMISOM operations for the first time. 154 The
Group thus recommends that the interdiction authorisation in paragraph 15 resolution 2182 (2014) be
renewed for an additional twelve months and Member States be urged to offer the assistance of their
maritime forces.
118. In view of the ongoing implementation challenges, development of a specific implementation
assistance notice should be considered. In the interim the sharing of real time information with the
Monitoring Group on vessels which may be operating in violation of the arms embargo should be
encouraged.
Implementation of paragraph 10 of resolution 2182 (2014) on private maritime
security operations
119. The Gulf of Aden—including Somali territorial waters—is designated as a High Risk Area for
maritime piracy and armed robbery. As a result, a significant number of commercial trading vessels
entering Somalia’s territorial waters and calling at Somali ports are protected against possible piracy
attacks by privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP). The use of PCASP aboard
commercial vessels is consistent with international maritime security best practices in the Gulf of
Aden as a means to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. In resolution
2125 (2013) the Security Council in fact encouraged States to develop regulations for the use of
PCASP on board ships, aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia.155
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153
See letter dated 25 July 2015 (received by the Secretariat on 1 August 2015) from the National
Security Advisor to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the Commander of the Combined
Maritime Forces, which is copied to the Chair of the Committee, S/AC.29/2015/COMM.50. Transmitted
to the Committee, 5 August 2015, S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.56.
154
See, inter alia, paragraph 14 of resolution 2232 (2015).
155
Resolution 2125 (2103) at paragraph 26.
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120. Meanwhile, under the current provisions for arms embargo on Somalia, the carriage of
weapons by PCASP and their potential use in Somalia (whether in its territorial waters, at port or on
land) constitutes a breach of the arms embargo. As a result, owners, operators and security providers
of commercial vessels which enter Somali territory with PCASP on board are in breach of the arms
embargo. The resulting contradiction between protection and potential violation of the arms embargo
tends to undermine the safe management of commercial maritime traffic and may unduly hamper
legitimate economic activities.
121. In this context, and further to the Monitoring Group’s recommendation, in paragraph 10 of
resolution 2182 (2014), the Security Council requested the FGS and the Monitoring Group to work
together to formulate a proposal to provide for an exemption to the arms embargo for weapons on
board vessels engaged in commercial activity in Somali territorial waters and in Somali ports.156
122. On 25 February 2015 further to an exchange of views and written correspondence between the
Monitoring Group and the National Security Advisor, the Monitoring Group Coordinator wrote to the
Committee to update members on the state of the discussion that set out two options for the creation
of such an exemption.157 The first was to create a standing exemption involving a “for information”
notification only.158 The second involved stipulation of an advance request for approval procedure
permitting the Committee to review and approve exemption requests on a case-by-case basis.159 The
FGS later indicted that it had a preference for the granting of “permission on a case by case basis
rather than a blanket exemption”.160
123. With respect to both options it was emphasised that only temporary transit in Somali territorial
waters and at Somali ports would be permitted: the exemption would not apply to the disembarkation
of weapons or equipment from those vessels onto land. Only weapons and related security equipment
owned and operated by registered PCASPs and carried solely for maritime security purposes could
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156
Resolution 2182 (2014) at paragraph 10.
Letter dated 25 February 2015 from the Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group,
S/AC.29/2015/Monitoring Group/OC.4. In parallel with the Monitoring Group’s letter, the FGS NSA also
wrote to the Committee to advise that it required additional time to consult with various stakeholders,
including regional states, the International Maritime Organization and the Federal Parliament of Somalia.
It requested three months to more thoroughly consider the proposal. Letter dated 25 February 2015 from
the National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia, S/AC.29/2015/COMM.13, transmitted to the
Committee, S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.014.
158
Such an exemption would enter into force with the adoption of a Security Council resolution and
would not require any form of additional approval by the Committee. This option would permit the
Committee to maintain visibility on the movement of weapons into Somalia territorial waters with limited
administrative burden.
159
In order to help minimise the administrative burden on the Committee entailed by an approval process,
it was suggested aggregate request could be made, rather than for every individual vessel or movement.
The advantage of this option was greater exercise of control over the movement of weapons into
Somalia’s territorial water and ports.
160
S/AC.29/2015/COMM.21 dated 30 March 2015.
157
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benefit from the exemption. Detailed information on the weapons and equipment and on the vessel
upon which they are carried would be required.161 Finally the Monitoring Group suggested that the
FGS receive copies of the information provided to the Committee.162
Update on engagement
124. In the course of its mandate the Monitoring Group has had an opportunity to refine its thinking
on options for the proposal. This has involved analysis of both the evolving situation along the Somali
coastline and the development of coast guard and maritime capacities (albeit in their infancy) in areas
under FGS control and in the regions. The context includes the expansion of illegal fishing activities
and the potential for other forms of commercial activity in Somali waters such as seismic survey
operations etc., which may raise broader peace and security issues. The Group has also consulted with
PCASPs.163
125. The Monitoring Group therefore recommends that the following additional issues are taken
into account in the formulation of the exemption:

the need to restrict the scope of the exemption to protection activities in support of
lawful commercial activity;

a requirement for PCASPs to operate standard procedures relating to weapons carriage
both on sea and when berthing in Somali ports, including operation of a bonded store,

recognition of a right of inspection of the vessel by appropriate Somali authorities in
Somali territorial waters and in Somali ports, including inspection of the bonded store
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161
It was suggested that among the details required would be name of the vessel and IMO number;
voyage details (including estimated time of entering and departure from Somali territorial waters, and
ports to be visited); name and contact details of the captain of the vessel; full name, address of
registration and contact details of the contracted security provider; name and contact details of the
responsible director of the contracted security provider; names and passport details of the security guards
on board; flag State approval letter; number of weapons, type, serial numbers and end -user certificates;
protection and Indemnity 'statement' acknowledging use of armed guards on board of the vessel while
transiting Somali territorial waters and ports; valid Class certificate ensuring that the vessel is compliant
with Class regulations.
162
During consultations with the Committee on the Monitoring Group’s Octobe r 2014 report the FGS had
expressed concerns that “authorizing private maritime security companies, operating within our territorial
jurisdiction without our consent may negatively affect our sovereignty”. Statement made by the National
Security Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia during the informal consultations of
the Committee on 10 October 2014 (S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.111). The FGS announced also that it proposed
to conduct a “joint assessment of the implications of private maritime security forces, bearing in mind
that that the Federal Government of Somalia is developing its own Coast Guard to detect and control
illicit activities”. It indicated that the report would be submitted to the Security Council by June 2015.
163
See annex 2.3.
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and the need for information to be provided to the Somali authorities to facilitate such
inspection.
126. Finally, in terms of communication with the Committee, it is only member states which
obligations are engaged by the proposed PCASP activities, or international organisations, which can
make the notification or request for approval. As the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
operates a system of registration for PCASPs, consideration might be given to the development of a
capacity within the IMO to operate as a clearing house and point of submission of requests for
approval or notifications for information. This could reduce some of the administrative complications
entailed by required notifications to original from flag states and states of registration of the PCASP.
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Annex 8
Violations of the charcoal ban
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Annex 8.1: Charcoal Stockpiles1
Barawe Stockpile
1. Satellite imagery of the Barawe stockpiles demonstrates the movement of significant volumes of
charcoal in the immediate aftermath of the town’s recovery from Al-Shabaab in early October 2014
and the arrest of several local officials in late November 2014, following which stockpiles appear to
remain untouched. The aerial photograph taken in March 2015 – towards the end of the long dry
season when charcoal production is historically near its peak – shows no activity around the stockpile.
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Barawe charcoal stockpiles in March 20152
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Aerial photograph acquired with support from regional Naval forces.
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Kismayo southern stockpile
2. Satellite imagery of the Kismayo southern stockpile shows significant depletion of considerable
charcoal stocks in late 2014. By January 2015 stocks are replenished before gradually depleting again
over the course of 2015, supporting the assertion that elements of Al-Shabaab were actively
frustrating the trade from Kismayo in early 2015.
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Kismayo southern stockpile, 27 April 20153
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Image taken by the Monitoring Group.
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Buur Gaabo Stockpile
3. Satellite imagery shows the rapid expansion of the Buur Gaabo stockpile area and
activities between mid 2014 and early 2015. As of September 2015, Buur Gaabo retained
significant stockpiles, with a number of cargo vessels still present.
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Annex 8.2: Kismayo charcoal operations
Map of Kismayo charcoal stockpiles and loading areas
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Charcoal being loaded on vessels in Kismayo bay area4
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Photograph acquired with support from regional Naval forces.
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Annex 8.3: MSV Raj Milan
4. The MSV Raj Milan (MMSI 419956307), an Indian flagged dhow known to the Group
(S/2014/726, annex 9.2) left Kismayo Port in late February 2015 carrying 24,712 bags of Somali
charcoal. The Monitoring Group and international maritime forces jointly tracked her movements in
real time from 20 March until it reached Port Rashid in the United Arab Emirates in the afternoon of
23 March. Upon arrival at Port Rashid, and with support from UAE authorities, the Monitoring Group
was able to interview the captain, Mohamed Sadiq, and inspect the vessel. Despite documentation
indicating that the shipper of the cargo was a ‘Moon Transport & Services’ from the Union of
Comoros, the vessel’s captain confirmed that it had loaded charcoal at Buur Gaabo, approximately
125 km south-west of the port city of Kismayo.5 Once loaded at Buur Gaabo, the vessel stopped at
Kismayo Port to collect the shipping documentation, including a bill of lading and cargo manifest.
5. Though not disclosed to the Monitoring Group at Port Rashid, evidence later obtained by the
Group confirms that the captain also had in his possession original Somali documents, including a Bill
of Lading, Cargo Manifest and Port Clearance from Kismayo, all of which were stamped and signed
by the Kismayo Harbour Master. The original documentation lists the shipper as Yusuf Jamac
Mohamed of Kismayo Shipping Agency Ltd, and the consignee as Cabdi Shakur Sheikh Ibrahim.
This consignee was confirmed by UAE officials using the phone number listed in the falsified
documentation. Details of the consignee were shared with UAE authorities who committed to
conducting their own investigation into this individual, which they agreed to share with the
Monitoring Group. At the time of writing findings of the investigation had not been shared with the
Group.
6. On 10 June 2015 UAE authorities confirmed to the Monitoring Group that they had seized
MSV Raj Milan and they had confiscated the shipment for disposal. On the same day, the UAE
consulted with the Committee with regard to their consideration of disposing of the seized
charcoal through resale at a public auction; on 16 July 2015 the Committee agreed to the
proposed course of action
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5
Data collected on the vessel’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions confirmed that it
had docked off the coast of southern Somalia before sailing northwards to the United Arab Emirates.
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MSV Raj Milan prior to docking at Port Rashid, United Arab Emirates
Charcoal cargo on board the MSV Raj Milan
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Original cargo manifest
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Original port clearance
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Original bill of loading
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Falsified cargo manifest
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Falsified bill of lading
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