CALIFORNIA ECONOMIC UPDATE

Transcription

California Economic Update
Issue 41
A pril 2015
A nnual Subscription
The Year Begins
The year 2014 was disappointing. Price gains stalled and sales volume of single
family homes went down. Never before had California experienced those two
events with the charts we had to work beginning 2014.
1. Median Price of Existing Single Family Homes
$700,000
P: May-07
$594,530
$600,000
Feb-15:
Feb-14: $428,970
$406,460
$500,000
T: Feb-09
$245,230
-59% from
peak
$400,000
$300,000
Real Estate Radio Show
590AM
Saturdays from 6:00-6:30pm on
KTIE 590AM
FEATURES
$200,000
The Year Begins ............... 1
$100,000
Jan-15
Jul-14
Jan-14
Jul-13
Jan-13
Jul-12
Jan-12
Jul-11
Jan-11
Jul-10
Jan-10
Jul-09
Jan-09
Jul-08
Jan-08
Jul-07
Jan-07
Jul-06
Jan-06
Jul-05
Jan-05
$-
Source: California Association of Realtors.
California median price peaked in May of 2007 at around $600,000 and
bottomed February 2009 below $250,000. Since that bottom, California has
made some impressive gains, hitting $464,750 July 2014. Since that “peak” the
median price has declined to under $430,000. That’s about the same price
level we saw in July of 2013.
The next few months will be very interesting. We no longer will have the
luxury of getting to say prices are higher than they were a year ago. In the
short run, expect California to be year over year negative in price performance.
It will be interesting to see how that will be portrayed by the press and how
it will be perceived by the buying public. It could make people sit on the
sidelines and wait and I think that would be a big mistake.
We start the year 2015 with a positive set of charts.
Lending is About
to Change .......................... 6
New FICO
Score System is
on the Way ......................... 9
Executive Summary......... 14
Upcoming Events.............15
NEWSLETTER TEAM
Bruce Norris
Aaron Norris
Rich Durant, Graphic Design
Please forward all questions or comments
to [email protected].
TNG California Investor Quarterly – A pr 2015
2. California Affordability
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
2015
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
0%
Source: California Association of Realtors.
Affordability has moved up a tick to 31%. Historically, there’s very strong price movement as affordability
declines. These prices continue to rise until California’s affordability hits 17%. California affordability has
been hovering at or near 30% for about a year. That’s very unusual! Price gains are usually sufficient to force
that affordability number down. That didn’t happen in 2014 and we’ll have to see what happens as 2015
develops. We start the year 2015 with what I consider a very healthy affordability number of 31%. The only
way we don’t go up in price from here is that lending policies continue to choke sales volume.
This very positive affordability chart is also accompanied by a declining number of trustee sales.
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014E
NUMBERS
3. Trustee Sales – Southern California (7 counties)
Source: Real Estate Research Council of Southern California.
© The Norris Group 2015 (951) 780-5856 www.thenorrisgroup.com
2
This decline in trustee sales forces most sales to be “equity sales” instead of REO or short sales. In our past,
having over 90% equity sales is accompanied by a decline in inventory and an increase in price. Once we get
equity sales over 95% of all sales, prices pop and we eventually get to that magic number of 17% affordability.
While this chart is much improved, it still has a way to go. Trustee sales will continue to decline and that
should put more pressure on prices as “equity sellers” dominate the market.
4. Unsold Inventory Index of Existing Single Family Homes
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Jan-15
Jul-14
Jan-14
Jul-13
Jan-13
Jul-12
Jan-12
Jul-11
Jan-11
Jul-10
Jan-10
Jul-09
Jan-09
Jul-08
Jan-08
Jul-07
Jan-07
Jul-06
Jan-06
Jul-05
Jan-05
0
Source: California Association of Realtors
Inventory levels are at close to their highest levels for the past three years. If the mix of inventory was turning
toward a greater number of lender owned properties, this would be concerning. Since that is not the case, I
think these inventory levels reflect several things. First, there are a lot of sellers who are asking too high a
price. They have priced their property like it was 2006 and many of these listings are not going to get activity.
Second, since sales are down, inventory in months’ supply grows. The number of houses for sale isn’t so
much out of the norm as it is sales that are too low. Once again, when’s the last time we had very positive
affordability on its way down and a declining trustee sales charts met with a rise in inventory and lower sales?
The answer is never!
California Trust Deed Investing
•
9%-12% Return
•
60-70% LTV
•
1st Trust Deeds Only
•
•
No Pooling
Ideal for Retirement
Accounts (IRAs)
•
1-Year & 5-Year Term
•
Experienced Team
of Experts
w w w.TNGtrustdeeds.com * 951.780. 5856
C ali f o r nia D e p ar tm e nt o f R eal E s t ate, R eal E s t ate B ro ke r
B r u ce N o r r is Finan cial G ro up In c . , D BA T h e N o r r is G ro up
D R E Li ce ns e 01219 911
Call or visit our website
today for your
Free Book .
Come home to check instead of bills
3
5. Sales of Existing Family Homes
700,000
600,000
Feb-14:
359,600 Feb-15:
368,160
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
Jan-15
Jul-14
Jan-14
Jul-13
Jan-13
Jul-12
Jan-12
Jul-11
Jan-11
Jul-10
Jan-10
Jul-09
Jan-09
Jul-08
Jan-08
Jul-07
Jan-07
Jul-06
Jan-06
Jul-05
Jan-05
-
Despite all of these positive charts, volume of sales in February 2015 was pretty much on par with 2014. If
you look closely at the sales volume chart, it’s difficult to count on sales volume following a pattern. The
consensus is that sales will pick up in the spring and continue strong until the end of summer. If you look at
2009, did that happen? No. In 2010? Nope. In 2011? No again. 2012? Sorry, no again. In 2013? Well, sort of.
And in 2014, yes.
At these low levels of sales, it would seem like sales have nowhere to go but up. That will happen if we can
get an increase in the volume of sales to the first-time buyer.
6. First-Time Homebuyers
% First-Time Home Buyers
Long Run Average
50%
40%
28.1%
30%
30.5%
20%
10%
0%
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
4
The volume of sales in the years 2012-2104 were supported by sales to investors. Investors with lots of cash
often beat the first-time buyer to the punch. As a seller, if you get an all-cash offer, it sure beats arm wrestling
with lenders, appraisers and credit reports! Lots of would be, first-time buyers were forced to the sidelines
and just rented a house.
With inventory at higher levels and with sales to investors declining, the first-time buyer is likely to be one
of the bright spots for 2015. Usually, as prices increase, the first-time buyer percentage share of the sales
declines. That’s what usually happens. This time may prove to be very different. First, your first-time buyer
went through the great recession. This affected their income, their job stability and selection. It also saw them
stay at home and continue their education rather than work full time. Second, the Millennials put off getting
married. Without being married, many of these young adults put off owning in preference to the flexibility
renting gave them.
7. Millennial Malaise – Share of 18-to-34 year-olds that own homes
Source: Census Bureau
5
These young adults have to form a household eventually, right? I think 2015 will be the year we start to make
up for lost time.
8. Millennials Are Especially Active
By the looks of this chart, the Millennials are finally starting to search for a home to buy! Whether they can
get a loan or not is the question.
Lending Is About To Change
In the next 30 days and for the next few years, lending will undergo a gradual transformation. It has become
apparent that Dodd-Frank has gone too far. It has become apparent that the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) has overreached what was intended.
“It was intended to punish the bad guys, but instead it has punished the good
ones. It has spiraled out of control. I didn’t know it would have gone this far.
Now, no one can buy a home.”
– President Obama: Referring to Dodd-Frank and the CFPB
6
9. Homeownership Rates
70%
69%
68%
67%
66%
65%
64%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, October 2014.
Homeownership rates are back to the levels of 1997. I’m sure we’d all agree that lending policies should never
again return to the point that we create a huge pile of unsafe loans. However, it’s obvious to me the pendulum
has swung too far to the conservative side. In 2015, we are at the same percentage home ownership nationally
as we were in 1997. California had gone through a six-year price decline and now, at a 3¾% interest rate we’re
at that same percentage of homeownership? These new lending policies are saying “no” to far too many
people who would have traditionally been allowed in.
In a report just released by the Urban Institute entitled, The Impact of Tight Credit Standards on 2009-2013 Lending,
the conclusions were as follows:
1. Because of a combination of factors, approximately
4 million loans were not made between 2009-2013
that would have been made in 2001. The comparison
is important because 2001 was a pretty calm year
for real estate. If they had made the comparison to
2006, that would have been a problem. Not many
people are eager to get back to the lending habits of
2006, but we are eager to return to a more “normal”
market. Comparing the lending standard to 2001
paints a clear picture that lending has become so
restrictive, a normal market won’t exist unless
something changes.
2. Lender overlays are excessive. Because of the
confusion in what would trigger a “buy back”
provision of loan, the lenders restricted their
lending to “premium” files. FHA will loan to
“credit worthy borrowers” with FICO scores of
580 with 3.5% down and to FICO scores of 500
with 10% down!
HOUSING FINANC
E POLICY CENTER
BRIEF
The Impact of Tight Cred
it Standards
on 2009–13 Lending
Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu,
April 2015
and Taz George
Borrowers wit h anyt hing
less than prist ine credi
t have a hard t ime get
t ing a mort gage
t oday . Mort gage credi
t is much t ight er than
it was at t he peak of t he
housi ng bubble in
2005 and 2006, as is bot
h expect ed and appro
priat e. But credi t is also
signif icant ly
t ight er t han it was in 2001
, befor e t he housi ng crisis
. Today’s lenders are simpl
originat ing loans for borro
y not
wers wit h less t han perfe
ct credi t .
How exact ly does t his
t ight lending environment
affect borrow ers? Accor
additional 1.25 million
ding t o our estimates,
loans would have been
an
made in 2013 if the caut
than t he severe standa
ious standards of 2001,
rds of 2013, had been
rather
in
place.
Between 2009 and 2013,
loans grew from 0.50 million
t he number of “missi ng”
to 1.25 million annually,
for a total of more than
over t he five years.
4 million missing loans
African Ameri can and
Hispanic families have
been particularly affect
environment . In 2013,
ed by this t ight credit
the severe standards meant
lending t o African Ameri
was 50 and 38 percent
can and Hispanic borrow
less, respectively, than
ers
what
it was in 2001. In cont rast,
standards reduced lendin
the more severe
g t o whit e borrow ers by
about 31 percent and did
families at all.
not reduce lending to Asian
Why Is Credit So Tight?
The Housi ng Finance Policy
Cent er has writt en ext
ensively about the tight
factor s leading to restric
credit box, explor ing the
ted lending and quant ifying
how limited access has
become.
7
10. Distribution of FHA Borrower Credit Scores by Fiscal Year and Quarter
Credit Score Categories
Fiscal Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Quarter
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
Oct-Dec
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul-Sep
720+
8.9
9.5
14.7
18.5
20.5
24.3
29.6
33.3
33.5
33.9
34.9
34.8
37.0
37.7
35.3
33.1
32.9
33.9
33.2
30.9
29.9
29.2
26.9
23.6
20.1
19.1
17.4
17.0
680-719
8.9
9.7
13.0
15.8
17.2
18.9
21.2
22.1
22.5
22.8
22.6
22.6
23.2
24.1
23.8
23.8
23.9
23.9
24.2
25.3
26.0
26.6
27.4
27.7
27.3
26.6
26.4
26.0
620-679
31.0
31.7
35.7
37.7
37.5
36.9
38.1
37.7
38.5
38.4
38.4
38.3
36.0
35.0
37.5
39.2
39.3
38.8
39.5
41.1
41.6
41.9
43.9
46.7
50.1
51.1
52.5
52.5
580-619
24.1
23.4
21.1
19.3
18.6
15.5
8.4
4.9
4.0
3.5
2.7
3.0
2.5
2.2
2.6
3.3
3.2
2.8
2.5
2.3
2.1
1.8
1.5
1.6
2.2
2.8
3.3
4.1
Less than
579
23.4
22.4
13.1
7.1
5.2
3.4
1.5
1.0
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
Missing
3.8
3.3
2.4
1.6
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
Source: US Dept of HUD/FHA.
You would have to conclude by this chart that very few lenders feel comfortable going along with FHA’s
aggressive FICO score policy. According to this chart, the under 579 FICO score crowd has about a zero
chance of getting an FHA loan. In 2008, it was 23.4% of all of FHA’s business. I’m not suggesting that FHA
will go back to the standards of 2008. I am suggesting that you will soon see the 580-619 grow by 500% in
the next few years, back to the mid 20% instead of the 4% it is now.
3. Quote from, The Impact of Tight Credit Standards on 2009-2013 Lending.
“African American and Hispanic families have been particularly affected by this tight credit
environment. In 2013, the severe lender standards meant lending to African American and
Hispanic borrowers was down 50% and 38% respectively. In contrast, the more severe
standards reduced lending to white borrowers by 31% and did not reduce lending to Asian
families at all.”
Boy, doesn’t this tune sound familiar?
8
The kicker also comes in the fact that rents are going up, so the inability to get a loan is actually costing
people money! For about the next 18 months our country decides who the next president will be. I would
bet that the fall of homeownership and how to fix it will become a big topic.
Some of the Changes Are Here and about to Be Implemented
My favorite lender, Cary Pearce just sent me over a new program Provident Mortgage just rolled out.
With this program, FHA buyers can borrow up to 105% of the purchase price. There are programs to
finance both the down-payment and the closing costs…zero down is back!
New FICO Score System Is On Its Way!
“Lexis Nexis Risk Solutions and Equifax released the official details to the new
pilot program, potentially opening the door to help millions of borrowers
secure financing for a home.”
– April 2, 2015: Housingwire
“Working with Equifax and LexisNexis, we set out to help unbanked, underbanked and disadvantaged people gain equal access to the standard credit
products enjoyed by millions of Americans.”
– Jim Wehmann, Fico’s executive vice president for Scores
“If lenders and the government sponsored enterprises were to adopt alternative credit
scoring methods such as Fico 9 and Vantage Score 3.0, they could expand access to
mortgage credit without dramatically increasing risk in the housing market.”
– Chris Plychron, NAR President
“Newer credit score methods do not penalize those who may have
been late with occasional payments or have unsettled medical
debt.” – Mortgage Professional America
This is all sounding kind of familiar isn’t it?
9
There will be some who are all for lending to more people, but there will be a lot of disagreement
on the subject!
One of our problems is that the ink isn’t even dry on our rescue of the housing market. Fannie and Freddie
are still in conservatorship and there are still an awful lot of pending questions in the financing world. Some
of these questions likely to be asked are:
1. Are Fannie and Freddie still going to exist?
2. How are the programs working that modified all of those loans in default?
Highlights From the Foreclosure Prevention Report Fourth Quarter 2014
11. 60+ Days Delinquent Loans and Foreclosure Prevention Actions
Source: FHA (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac)
Since 2008, foreclosure prevention actions have been a part of our real estate landscape. These actions
peaked in 2010 and have gradually declined to a level not seen since 2009. The most common of these
actions is a loan modification.
May 5-7 or
July 21-23
DISTRESSED PROPERTY
BOOTCAMP
Three full days in our office in Riverside as Bruce Norris shares what it takes to be a successful
California real estate investor. Call Diana Barlet at 951-780-5856 for details.
10
12. Types of Modification
Since 2009, you can see the Enterprise’s Loan Modification morph with the sentiment of what’s next for
the housing market. Originally, lenders were much less likely to do all they could do to help. When this got
really bad, the lenders began to expand what they were willing to do. The dark blue category represents the
aggressive posture they took from 2011 to 2013. In those years lenders aggressively approved a “package”
of benefits for the over-encumbered borrower. That aggressiveness is on the decline now with almost 50%
of modifications simply extending the original loan.
13. Size of Payment Change
Source: FHA (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
11
Chart 13 shows the same aggressive pattern from 2010 to 2013. Large decreases in payments seemed to be
the main goal of those modifications. Many of the early modifications actually raised the payments! It didn’t
take long for the lenders to realize that was an unwise path to take. You can also see the trend changing
back to more conservative actions being taken by the lender. Payment decreases of over 30% are declining
and payment increases are on the rise again.
14. Foreclosure Prevention Activity: Home Forfeiture Actions
As you can see, both short sales and deeds-in-lieu are now steadily declining. This is continuing proof that
the market in getting healthier. You probably don’t remember this, but there was a time that Californians
never had heard of a short sale of an REO.
The fact that both of those terms are now completely understood by most homeowners is an amazing
transformation. We once “knew” that real estate would only go up. We then went through a phase where
we expected it would only go down. Now, we are healing from the wounds of losing equity and faith that
owning our own home was a wise decision.
One thing that could be concerning is that most of these loan mods have a graduated increase in payments.
Most of the loans did not receive debt forgiveness but forbearance. The amount of the forbearance was
basically just put at the back end of the loan and has to be paid off whenever the house is sold.
As payments increase, you could have a surge in defaults. However, most areas have experienced considerable
price gains, so the damage should be minimal in my opinion.
12
15. REO Inventory by State (Numbers in Thousands)
Enterprise REO inventory has declined steadily since 2010. Had they not chosen to go the loan modification
route, this chart would have been off the charts. Since its inception, there have been 3.4 million foreclosure
prevention actions taken. Many of those properties would have landed on this chart.
As you can see, California is just a bit player in the REO business at this point. At the peak, California
16. Serious Delinquency Rates of the Enterprises Single-Family Mortgages
was dealing with 30,000 Enterprise REOs per quarter. Now, it’s down to just 4,000 properties, a decline
of over 85%.
16. Serious Delinquency Rates of the Enterprises Single-Family Mortgages
13
Once again, California is one of the many “boring” states with less than a 2% delinquency rate. If you want
some excitement these days, you have to go to New York, New Jersey or Florida with over 6% delinquency!
While it looks like the worst is behind them, concern remains about the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Will they still be with us five years from now, and if so, what form will they take? Will they be out of
conservatorship and be private companies once again?
Below is an executive summary of a recent report by the FHFA (Federal Housing Finance Agency). It clearly
shows some concern going forward about the ability of the Enterprises to remain profitable in light of
processes already in place. It shows that much of their spectacular financial performance of 2013 came
from one-time events and that their regular income will gradually decline due to rules in place since the
conservatorship.
Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General
Executive Summary
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (collectively, the Enterprises) returned
to profitability in 2012 after successive years of losses. Their improved
financial performance is encouraging; however, their continued
profitability is not assured.
The mortgage industry is complex, cyclical, and sensitive to changes in
economic conditions, mortgage rates, house prices, and other factors.
The Enterprises have acknowledged in their public disclosures that
adverse market and other changes could lead to additional losses and
that their financial results are subject to significant variability from
period to period.
The Continued Profitability of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Is Not Assured
White Paper Report  WPR-2015-001  March 18, 2015
Notwithstanding the Enterprises’ recent positive financial results, they face challenges. For
example:
■■
The Enterprises must reduce the size of their retained investment portfolios over the next few
years pursuant to the terms of agreements with the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury)
and additional limits from FHFA. Declines in the size of these portfolios will reduce portfolio
earnings over the long term. These portfolios have been the Enterprises’ largest source of
earnings in the past.
■■
Core earnings from the Enterprises’ business segments—single-family guarantee, multifamily,
and investments—comprised only 40% of net income in 2013. Sixty percent of the Enterprises’
net income came from non-recurring tax-related items and large settlements of legal actions and
business disputes, which are not sustainable sources of revenue. Core earnings comprised 55%
of net income in 2014.
■■
The Enterprises are unable to accumulate a financial cushion to absorb future losses. Pursuant
to the terms of agreements with Treasury, the Enterprises are required to pay Treasury each
quarter a dividend equal to the excess of their net worth over an applicable capital reserve
amount. The applicable capital reserve amount decreases to zero by January 1, 2018.
14
■■
Stress test results released by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in April 2014
indicate that the Enterprises, under the worst scenario—a scenario generally akin to the
recent financial crisis—would require additional Treasury draws of either $84.4 billion or
$190 billion, depending on the treatment of deferred tax assets, through the end of the
stress test period, which is the fourth quarter of 2015.
■■
Absent Congressional action, or a change in FHFA’s current strategy, the conservatorships
will go on indefinitely. The Enterprises’ future status is beyond their control. At present,
it appears that Congressional action will be needed to define what role, if any, the
Enterprises play in the housing finance system.
Fannie Mae reports that it expects to remain profitable for the foreseeable future; however,
it acknowledges that a decrease in home prices or changes in interest rates, combined with
provisions of their agreements with Treasury that require the reduction of their retained asset
portfolios, could lead to losses. Thus, if these losses result in an Enterprise reporting a negative
net worth, that Enterprise would be obligated to draw on Treasury’s funding commitment.
FHFA Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepared this white paper to explain the many
challenges faced by the Enterprises that affect their profitability and to caution that the future
profitability of the Enterprises is not assured.
OIG cannot predict whether there is a reasonable possibility that these challenges and market
conditions will adversely affect the Enterprises in the near future and result in losses and
further draws on the Treasury.
This report was produced by Bruce McWilliams, Senior Investigative Evaluator; Jon Anders,
Program Analyst; Jacob Kennedy, Investigative Evaluator; and Desiree I-Ping Yang, Financial
Analyst. We appreciate the assistance of the officials from FHFA and the Enterprises in
completing this report.
– Kyle D. Roberts, Acting Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations
Office of Management and Budget
15
THE NORRIS GROUP CALENDAR
= tnG lIVe eVent
= specIAl A ll dAy trAInInG
May 3rd
2015 Women in DS Conference
Marriott Newport Beach Hotel & Spa
900 Newport Center Drive
Newport Beach, CA 92660
May 5th-7th
The Norris Group Property
Buying Boot Camp
The Norris Group
1845 Chicago Ave, Suite C
Riverside, CA 92507
May 6th
IVAOR Real Estate Market Update
Inland Valley Association of Realtors
3690 Elizabeth St
Riverside, CA 92506
May 14th
AOA “Million Dollar” Trade Show
& Landlording Conference 2015
Long Beach Convention Center
300 E. Ocean Blvd.
Long Beach, CA
May 21st
How to Make $100 Per Deal in 2015
Courtyard By Marriott Pasadena
180 N Fair Oaks Ave
Pasadena, CA, 91103
June 6th
Cutting Edge Financial Tactics Brunch
Avenue of the Arts
Wyndham Hotel
3350 Avenue of the Arts
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Jul 21st-23rd
The Norris Group Property
Buying Boot Camp
The Norris Group
1845 Chicago Ave, Suite C
Riverside, CA 92507
Oct 16th
I Survived Real Estate 2015
The Nixon Library
East Room
18001 Yorba Linda Blvd.
Yorba Linda, CA 92886
16
HARD MONEY LOANS
Fast, easy, and reliable funding for Southern California
real estate investors. Entities, trusts, and IRAs OK. Your
local money partner since 1997. We can close in as little as
5 business days!
California Broker BRE#01219911
FUNDING ALL OVER SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INCLUDING LOS ANGELES • SAN DIEGO • ORANGE • BAKERSFIELD • L ANCASTER • PALM SPRINGS •
RIVERSIDE • NORCO • SAN BERNARDINO • MORENO VALLEY • MIRA LOMA • HEMET • TEMECULA • LONG BEACH • CARLSBAD OXNARD • VENTURA
REDLANDS • CORONA • BURBANK • MENIFEE • HIGH DESERT • PALMDALE • APPLE VALLEY • AND MANY MORE
FOR
FOR
REHABBER/FLIP
PROGRAM
Term
1 YR
W
NE 9.9-11.5%*
Rate
FOR
FOR
SALE
RENT
RENT
REFINANCE/RENTAL
PROGRAM
RENTAL PURCHASE
PROGRAM
5 YR
5 YR
1 YR
9.9%
9.9%
12.9%*
SALE
BUILD TO FLIP
PROGRAM
Prepay
Penalty
None
1 YR
1 YR
None
Loan to
Value
65-70%
ARV
65-70%
LTV
65-70%
ARV
60% LTV
W
NEStarts at 2pts
Starts at 2pts
Starts at 2pts
Starts at 2pts
($2,500 Minimum)
($2,500 Minimum)
($2,500 Minimum)
($2,500 Minimum)
$1,095
$1,095
$1,095
$1,095
Appraisal
$375-$400
$375-$400
$375-$400
$375-$400
Building
Inspection
N/A
N/A
N/A
Managed by fund
control. Roughly
1% of loan.
Points
Fees
Notes
For build programs,
investor must own
lot free and clear
and have approved
construction plans
and permits.
* Loan rate assumes participation in direct deposit program. All loan programs subject to change.
www.thenorrisgroup.com/hardmoney or 951-780-5856

CALIFORNIA ECONOMIC UPDATE

Transcription

Similar documents

rampion headquarters

Norris brings experience to soccer net

STOKE CITY FC Carlo Nash - National Literacy Trust

Mortgage Services

FHA Update for REALTORS

Securities Lending

Stigmas Survive in the System

Ferguson Enterprises - Olaf Anderson Construction

Realtor Mar 09.p65 - Laguna Board of Realtors

Prelude 9x12 HS Cover