Sorting out the sorites

LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE
VOLUME 26
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Göran Sundholm, Universiteit Leiden, The Netherlands
Bas van Fraassen, Princeton University, U.S.A.
Dov Gabbay, King’s College London, U.K.
Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University, U.S.A.
Karel Lambert, University of California, Irvine, U.S.A.
Graham Priest, University of Melbourne, Australia
Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki, Finland
Heinrich Wansing, Technical University Dresden, Germany
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Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science aims to reconsider the question of the
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Koji Tanaka • Francesco Berto
Edwin Mares • Francesco Paoli
Editors
Paraconsistency: Logic
and Applications
123
Editors
Koji Tanaka
Department of Philosophy
University of Auckland
Arts 2, 18 Symonds Street
Auckland
New Zealand
Francesco Berto
Department of Philosophy
University of Aberdeen
King’s College, High Street
Aberdeen
United Kingdom
Edwin Mares
Department of Philosophy
Victoria University of Wellington
Murphy 518, Kelburn Parade
Wellington
New Zealand
Francesco Paoli
Department of Education
University of Cagliari
Via Is Mirrionis 1
Cagliari
Italy
ISBN 978-94-007-4437-0
ISBN 978-94-007-4438-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York
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Contents
1
Paraconsistency: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Koji Tanaka, Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares,
and Francesco Paoli
Part I
2
1
Logic
Making Sense of Paraconsistent Logic: The Nature
of Logic, Classical Logic and Paraconsistent Logic .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Koji Tanaka
15
3
On Discourses Addressed by Infidel Logicians . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walter Carnielli and Marcelo E. Coniglio
27
4
Information, Negation, and Paraconsistency . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Edwin D. Mares
43
5
Noisy vs. Merely Equivocal Logics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Patrick Allo
57
6
Assertion, Denial and Non-classical Theories . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greg Restall
81
7
New Arguments for Adaptive Logics as Unifying Frame
for the Defeasible Handling of Inconsistency . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Diderik Batens
8
Consequence as Preservation: Some Refinements . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Bryson Brown
9
On Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski’s D2 -Consequence .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Marek Nasieniewski and Andrzej Pietruszczak
10 FDE: A Logic of Clutters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
R.E. Jennings and Y. Chen
vii
viii
Contents
11 A Paraconsistent and Substructural Conditional Logic .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Francesco Paoli
Part II
Applications
12 An Approach to Human-Level Commonsense Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Michael L. Anderson, Walid Gomaa, John Grant,
and Don Perlis
13 Distribution in the Logic of Meaning Containment
and in Quantum Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Ross T. Brady and Andrea Meinander
14 Wittgenstein on Incompleteness Makes Paraconsistent Sense. . . . . . . . . 257
Francesco Berto
15 Pluralism and “Bad” Mathematical Theories: Challenging
our Prejudices .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Michèle Friend
16 Arithmetic Starred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Chris Mortensen
17 Notes on Inconsistent Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Zach Weber
18 Sorting out the Sorites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
David Ripley
19 Are the Sorites and Liar Paradox of a Kind? . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Dominic Hyde
20 Vague Inclosures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Graham Priest
Index . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Chapter 18
Sorting out the Sorites
David Ripley
18.1 Introduction
Supervaluational theories of vagueness have achieved considerable popularity in
the past decades, as seen in e.g., Fine (1975) and Lewis (1970). This popularity
is only natural; supervaluations let us retain much of the power and simplicity of
classical logic, while avoiding the commitment to strict bivalence that strikes many
as implausible.
Like many non-classical logics, the supervaluationist system SP has a natural
dual, the subvaluationist system SB, explored in e.g., Hyde (1997) and Varzi
(2000).1 As is usual for such dual systems, the classical features of SP (typically
viewed as benefits) appear in SB in ‘mirror-image’ form, and the non-classical
features of SP (typically viewed as costs) also appear in SB in ‘mirror-image’ form.
Given this circumstance, it can be difficult to decide which of the two dual systems
is better suited for an approach to vagueness.2
The present paper starts from a consideration of these two approaches—the
supervaluational and the subvaluational—and argues that neither of them is wellpositioned to give a sensible logic for vague language. The first section presents the
1
Although there are many different ways of presenting a supervaluational system, I’ll ignore these
distinctions here; my remarks should be general enough to apply to them all, or at least all that
adopt the so-called ‘global’ account of consequence. (For discussion, see Varzi 2007.) Similarly
for subvaluational systems.
2
The situation is similar for approaches to the Liar paradox; for discussion, see e.g., Beall and
Ripley (2004) and Parsons (1984).
D. Ripley (!)
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville,
VIC, Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
K. Tanaka et al. (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, Logic, Epistemology,
and the Unity of Science 26, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7__18,
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
329
330
D. Ripley
systems SP and SB and argues against their usefulness. Even if we suppose that
the general picture of vague language they are often taken to embody is accurate,
we ought not arrive at systems like SP and SB. Instead, such a picture should lead us
to truth-functional systems like strong Kleene logic (K3 ) or its dual LP. The second
section presents these systems, and argues that supervaluationist and subvaluationist
understandings of language are better captured there; in particular, that a dialetheic
approach to vagueness based on the logic LP is a more sensible approach. The next
section goes on to consider the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness within an
LP-based approach, and the last section closes with a consideration of the sorites
argument itself.
18.2 S’valuations
Subvaluationists and supervaluationists offer identical pictures about how vague
language works; they differ solely in their theory of truth. Because their overall
theories are so similar, this section will often ignore the distinction between the
two; when that’s happening, I’ll refer to them all as s’valuationists. First I present the
shared portion of the s’valuationist view, then go on to lay out the difference between
subvaluational and supervaluational theories of truth, and offer some criticism of
both the subvaluationist and supervaluationist approaches.
18.2.1 The Shared Picture
It’s difficult to suppose that there really is a single last noonish second, or a single
oldest child, & c.3 Nonetheless, a classical picture of negation seems to commit us
to just that. After all, for each second, the law of excluded middle, A _ :A, tells us
it’s either noonish or not noonish, and the law of non-contradiction, :.A^:A/, tells
us it’s not both. Now, let’s start at noon (since noon is clearly noonish) and move
forward second by second. For a time, the seconds are all noonish, but the classical
picture seems to commit us to there being a second—just one second!—that tips the
scale over to non-noonishness.
Many have found it implausible to think that our language is pinned down that
precisely, and some of those who have found this implausible (e.g., Fine 1975)
have found refuge in an s’valuational picture. The key idea is this: we keep that
sharp borderline (classicality, as noted above, seems to require it), but we allow that
there are many different places it might be. The s’valuationists then take vagueness
to be something like ambiguity: there are many precise extensions that a vague
3
It’s not un-supposable, though; see e.g., Sorensen (2001) and Williamson (1994) for able defences
of such a position.
18 Sorting out the Sorites
331
predicate might have, and (in some sense) it has all of them.4 It’s important that this
‘might’ not be interpreted epistemically; the idea is not that one of these extensions
is the one, and we just don’t know which one it is. Rather, the idea is that each
potential extension is part of the meaning of the vague predicate. Call these potential
extensions ‘admissible precisifications’.
The phenomenon of vagueness involves a three-part structure somehow; on this
just about all theorists are agreed. Examples: for a vague predicate F , epistemicists
(e.g., Williamson 1994) consider (1) things that are known to be F , (2) things that
are known not to be F , and (3) things not known either to be F or not to be
F ; while standard fuzzy theorists (e.g., Machina 1972; Smith 2008) consider (1)
things that are absolutely F , or F to degree 1, (2) things that are absolutely not
F , or F to degree 0, and (3) things that are neither absolutely F nor absolutely
not F . S’valuationists also acknowledge this three-part structure: they talk of (1)
things that are F on every admissible precisification, (2) things that are not-F
on every admissible precisification, and (3) things that are F on some admissible
precisifications and not-F on others.
Consider ‘noonish’. It has many different precisifications, but there are some precisifications that are admissible and others that aren’t. (37a)–(38b) give four sample
precisifications; (37a) and (37b) are admissible precisifications for ‘noonish’, but
(38a) and (38b) aren’t:5
(37)
(38)
a. {x W x is between 11:40 and 12:20}
b. {x W x is between 11:45 and 12:30}
a. {x W x is between 4:00 and 4:30}
b. {x W x is between 11:40 and 11:44, or x is between 12:06 and 12:10, or
x is between 12:17 and 12:22}
There are at least a couple ways, then, for a precisification to go wrong, to be
inadmissible. Like (38a), it might simply be too far from where the vague range
is; or like (38b), it might fail to respect what are called penumbral connections.
12:22 might not be in every admissible precisification of ‘noonish’, but if it’s in a
4
NB: S’valuationists differ in the extent to which they take vagueness to be like ambiguity,
but they all take it to be like ambiguity in at least this minimal sense. Smith (2008) draws a
helpful distinction between supervaluationism and what Smith calls ‘plurivaluationism’. Although
both of these views have both travelled under the name ‘supervaluationism’, they are distinct.
Supervaluationism makes use of non-bivalent semantic machinery (for example, the machinery
in Fine 1975), while plurivaluationism makes do with purely classical models, insisting merely
that more than one of these models is the intended one. My discussion of supervaluationism here
is restricted to the view Smith calls supervaluationism.
5
At least in most normal contexts. Vague predicates seem particularly context-sensitive, although
they are not the only predicates that have been claimed to be (see e.g., Recanati 2004; Wilson
and Sperber 2002). For the purposes of this paper, I’ll assume a single fixed (non-wacky) context;
these are theories about what happens within that context. Some philosophers (e.g., Raffman 1994)
have held that taking proper account of context is itself sufficient to dissolve the problems around
vagueness. I disagree, but won’t address the issue here.
332
D. Ripley
certain admissible precisification, then 12:13 ought to be in that precisification too.
After all, 12:13 is more noonish than 12:22 is. Since this is a connection within the
penumbra of a single vague predicate, we can follow Fine (1975) in calling it an
internal penumbral connection.
Admissible precisifications also must respect external penumbral connections.
The key idea here is that the extensions of vague predicates sometimes depend on
each other. Consider the borderline between green and blue. It’s sometimes claimed
that something’s being green rules out its also being blue. If this is so, then no
admissible precisification will count a thing as both green and blue, even if some
admissible precisifications count it as green and others count it as blue. In order to
handle this phenomenon in general, it’s crucial that we count precisifications not as
precisifying one predicate at a time, but instead as precisifying multiple predicates
simultaneously. That way, they can give us the requisite sensitivity to penumbral
connections.
18.2.1.1 S’valuational Models
Now that we’ve got the core of the idea down, let’s see how it can be formally
modeled.6 An SV model M is a tuple hD; I; P i such that D, the domain, is a set of
objects; I is a function from terms in the language to members of D; and P is a set
of precisifications: functions from predicates to subsets of D.7
We then extend each precisification p 2 P to a valuation of the full language.
For an atomic sentence F a, a precisification p 2 P assigns F a the value 1 if
I.a/ 2 p.F /, 0 otherwise. This valuation of the atomics is extended to a valuation
of the full language (in ^, _, :, 8, 9) in the familiar classical way. In other words,
each precisification is a full classical valuation of the language, using truth values
from the set V0 D f1; 0g.
Then the model M assigns a value to a sentence simply by collecting into a
set the values assigned to the sentence by M ’s precisifications: M.A/ D fv 2
V0 W 9p 2 P .p.A/ D v/g. Thus, models assign values to sentences from the set
V1 D ff1g; f0g; f1; 0gg. Note that so far, these values are uninterpreted; they work
merely as a record of a sentence’s values across precisifications. M.A/ D f1g iff A
gets value 1 on every precisification in M ; M.A/ D f0g iff A gets value 0 on every
precisification in M ; and M.A/ D f1; 0g iff A gets value 1 on some precisifications
in M and 0 on others.
6
There are many ways to build s’valuational models. In particular, one might not want to have to
fully precisify the language in order to assign truth-values to just a few sentences. Nonetheless, the
approach to be presented here will display the logical behaviour of s’valuational approaches, and
it’s pretty simple to boot. So we can get the picture from this simple approach.
7
And from propositional variables directly to classical truth-values, if one wants bare propositional
variables in the language. Vague propositional variables can be accommodated in this way as well
as precise ones.
18 Sorting out the Sorites
333
18.2.2 Differences in Interpretation and Consequence
The s’valuationists agree on the interpretation of two of these values: {1} and {0}.
If M.A/ D f1g, then A is true on M . If M.A/ D f0g, then A is false on M . But the
subvaluationist and the supervaluationist differ over the interpretation of the third
value: {1,0}.
The supervaluationist (of the sort I’m interested in here) claims that a sentence
must be true on every precisification in order to be true simpliciter, and false on
every precisification in order to be false simpliciter. Since the value {1,0} records a
sentence’s taking value 1 on some precisifications and 0 on others, when M.A/ D
f1; 0g, A is neither true nor false on M for the supervaluationist.
The subvaluationist, on the other hand, claims that a sentence has only to be true
on some precisification to be true simpliciter, and false on some precisification in
order to be false simpliciter. So, when M.A/ D f1; 0g, the subvaluationist says that
A is both true and false on M .
Both define consequence in the usual way (via truth-preservation):
(39) ! ! " iff, for every model M , either ı is true on M for some ı 2 ", or #
fails to be true on M for some # 2 ! .8
Since the subvaluationist and the supervaluationist differ over which sentences are
true on a given model (at least if the model assigns {1,0} anywhere), this one
definition results in two different consequence relations; call them !SB (for the
subvaluationist) and !SP (for the supervaluationist).
18.2.2.1 !SB and !SP
One striking (and much-advertised) feature of these consequence relations is their
considerable classicality. For example (where !CL is the classical consequence
relation):
(40) !CL A iff !SB A iff !SP A
(41) A !CL iff A !SB iff A !SP
(40) tells us that these three logics have all the same logical truths, and (41) tells us
that they have all the same explosive sentences.9 What’s more, for any classically
8
Note that this is a multiple-conclusion consequence relation. One can recover a single-conclusion
consequence relation from this if one is so inclined, but for present purposes the symmetrical
treatment will be more revealing. See e.g., Restall (2005) for details, or Hyde (1997) for
application to s’valuations. See also Keefe (2000) for arguments against using multiple-conclusion
consequence, and Hyde (2010) for response.
9
Explosive sentences are sentences from which one can derive any conclusions at all, just as logical
truths are sentences that can be derived from any premises at all. It’s a bit sticky calling them
‘logical falsehoods’, as may be tempting, since some sentences (in SB at least) can be false without
334
D. Ripley
valid argument, there is a corresponding SB-valid or SP-valid argument:
(42) A1 ; : : : ; Ai !CL B1 ; : : : ; Bj iff A1 ^ : : : ^ Ai !SB B1 ; : : : ; Bj
(43) A1 ; : : : ; Ai !CL B1 ; : : : ; Bj iff A1 ; : : : ; Ai !SP B1 _ : : : _ Bj
Let’s reason through these a bit.10 Suppose A1 ; : : : ; Ai !CL B1 ; : : : ; Bj . Then,
since every precisification is classical, every precisification p (in every model) that
verifies all the As will also verify one of the Bs. Consider the same argument
subvaluationally; one might have all the premises true in some model (because each
is true on some precisification or other), without having all the premises true in the
same precisification; thus, there’s no guarantee that any of the Bs will be true on
any precisification at all. On the other hand, if one simply conjoins all the premises
into one big premise, then if it’s true in a model at all it guarantees the truth of all
the As on (at least) a single precisification, and so one of the Bs must be true on that
precisification, hence true in the model.
Similar reasoning applies in the supervaluational case. If all the As are true in
a model, then they’re all true on every precisification; nonetheless it might be that
none of the Bs is true on every precisification; all the classical validity guarantees is
that each precisification has some B or other true on it. But when we disjoin all the
Bs into one big conclusion, that disjunction must be true on every precisification,
so the argument is SP-valid.
Note that (42) and (43) guarantee that !SB matches !CL on single-premise
arguments, and that !SP matches !CL on single-conclusion arguments. It is apparent
that there is a close relationship between classical logic, subvaluational logic, and
supervaluational logic. What’s more, for every difference between SB and CL, there
is a dual difference between SP and CL, and vice versa. This duality continues as
we turn to the logical behaviour of the connectives:
(44)
a. A; B 6!SB A ^ B
b. A; :A 6!SB A ^ :A
(45)
a. A _ B 6!SP A; B
b. A _ :A 6!SP A; :A
(44a) and (44b) are dual to (45a) and (45b). It is often remarked about supervaluations that it’s odd to have a disjunction be true when neither of its disjuncts is,
but this oddity can’t be expressed via !SP in a single-conclusion format.11 Here, in
failing to be true. And I want to shy away from ‘contradiction’ here too, since I understand by that
a sentence of the form A ^ :A, and such a sentence will be explosive here but not in the eventual
target system.
10
Here I prove only the LTR directions, but both directions indeed hold; see Hyde (1997) for
details.
11
This, essentially, is Tappenden’s ‘objection from upper-case letters’ (Tappenden 1993). With
multiple conclusions, there’s no need for upper-case letters; the point can be made in any typeface
you like.
18 Sorting out the Sorites
335
a multiple-conclusion format, it becomes apparent that this oddity is an oddity in
the supervaluational consequence relation, not just in its semantics. And of course,
there is a parallel oddity involving conjunction for the subvaluationist.
Disjunction and conjunction can be seen as underwriting existential and universal
quantification, respectively, so it is no surprise that the oddities continue when it
comes to quantification. A sample:
(46)
(47)
a. F a; F b; 8x.x D a _ x D b/ 6!SB 8x.F x/
a. 9x.F x/; 8x.x D a _ x D b/ 6!SP F a; F b
The cause is as before: in the SB case there is no guarantee that the premises are
true on the same precisification, so they cannot interact to generate the conclusion;
while in the SP case there is no guarantee that the same one of the conclusions
is true on every precisification, so it may be that neither is true simpliciter. In the
supervaluational case, consequences for quantification have often been noted;12 but
of course they have their duals for the subvaluationist.
18.2.2.2 What to Say About Borderline Cases?
This formal picture gives rise to certain commitments about borderline cases.
(I assume here, and throughout, that every theorist is committed to all and only
those sentences they take to be true.) Assume that 12:23 is a borderline case of
‘noonish’. The subvaluationist and the supervaluationist agree in their acceptance
of (48a)–(48b), and in their rejection of (49a)–(49b):
(48)
a. 12:23 is either noonish or not noonish.
b. It’s not the case that 12:23 is both noonish and not noonish.
(49)
a. It’s not the case that 12:23 is either noonish or not noonish.
b. 12:23 is both noonish and not noonish.
On the other hand, they disagree about such sentences as (50a)–(50b):
(50)
a. 12:23 is noonish.
b. 12:23 is not noonish.
The subvaluationist accepts both of these sentences, despite her rejection of
their conjunction, (49b). On the other hand, the supervaluationist rejects them
both, despite her acceptance of their disjunction, (48a). So the odd behaviour of
conjunction and disjunction observed above isn’t simply a theoretical possibility;
these connectives misbehave every time there’s a borderline case of any vague
predicate.
12
For example, consider the sentence ‘There is a last noonish second’. It is true for the
supervaluationist, but there is no second x such that ‘x is the last noonish second’ is true for
the supervaluationist.
336
D. Ripley
A major challenge for either the subvaluationist or the supervaluationist is
to justify their deviant consequence relations, especially their behaviour around
conjunction and universal quantification (for the subvaluationist) or disjunction and
existential quantification (for the supervaluationist). At least prima facie, one would
think that a conjunction is true iff both its conjuncts are, or that a disjunction is
true iff one disjunct is, but the s’valuationists must claim that these appearances are
deceiving.
The trouble is generated by the lack of truth-functional conjunction and disjunction in these frameworks. Consider the subvaluational case. If A is true, and B is
true, we’d like to be able to say that A ^ B is true. In some cases we can, but
in other cases we can’t. The value of A ^ B depends upon more than just the
value of A and the value of B; it also matters how those values are related to
each other precisification to precisification. It’s this extra dependence that allows
s’valuational approaches to capture ‘penumbral connections’, as argued for in Fine
(1975). Unfortunately, it gets in the way of sensible conjunctions and disjunctions.
18.3 LP and K3
This trouble can be fixed as follows: we keep the s’valuationist picture for atomic
sentences, but then use familiar truth-functional machinery to assign values to
complex sentences. This will help us retain more familiar connectives, and allow
us to compute the values of conjunctions and disjunctions without worrying about
which particular conjuncts or disjuncts we use.
18.3.1 The Shared Picture
The informal picture, then, is as follows: to evaluate atomic sentences, we consider
all the ways in which the vague predicates within them can be precisified. For
compound sentences, we simply combine the values of atomic sentences in some
sensible way. But what sensible way? Remember, we’re going to end up with
three possible values for our atomic sentences—{1}, {0}, and {1,0}—so we
need sensible three-valued operations to interpret our connectives. Here are some
minimal desiderata for conjunction, disjunction, and negation:
(51) Conjunction:
a. A ^ B is true iff both A and B are true.
b. A ^ B is false iff either A is false or B is false.
(52) Disjunction:
a. A _ B is true iff either A is true or B is true.
b. A _ B is false iff both A and B are false.
18 Sorting out the Sorites
337
(53) Negation:
a. :A is true iff A is false.
b. :A is false iff A is true.
These desiderata alone rule out the s’valuationist options: as is pointed out in Varzi
(2000), SB violates the RTL directions of (51a) and (52b), while SP violates the
LTR directions of (51b) and (52a).
As before, we’ll have two options for interpreting {1,0}: we can take it to be
both true and false, like the subvaluationist, or we can take it to be neither true nor
false, like the supervaluationist. Since the above desiderata are phrased in terms of
truth and falsity, it might seem that we need to settle this question before we find
appropriate operations to interpret our connectives. It turns out, however, that the
same set of operations on values will satisfy the above desiderata whichever way
we interpret {1,0}.
18.3.1.1 LP/K3
These are the operations from either strong Kleene logic (which I’ll call K3 ; see
e.g., Kripke 1975) or Priest’s Logic of Paradox (which I’ll call LP; see e.g., Priest
1979). Consider the following lattice of truth values:
f1g
f1; 0g
f0g
Take ^ to be greatest lower bound, _ to be least upper bound, and : to reverse
order (it takes {1} to {0}, {0} to {1}, and {1,0} to itself). Note that these operations
satisfy (51a)–(53b); this is so whether {1,0} is interpreted as both true and false or
as neither true nor false. For example, consider (52a). Suppose we interpret {1,0}
LP-style, as both true and false. Then a disjunction is true (has value {1} or {1,0})
iff one of its disjuncts is: RTL holds because disjunction is an upper bound, and
LTR holds because disjunction is least upper bound. On the other hand, suppose
we interpret {1,0} K3 -style, as neither true nor false. Then a disjunction is true (has
value {1}) iff one of its disjuncts is: again, RTL because disjunction is an upper
bound and LTR because it’s least upper bound. Similar reasoning establishes all of
(51a)–(53b). So the LP/K3 connectives meet our desiderata.
338
D. Ripley
18.3.1.2 Differences in Interpretation and Consequence
There are still, then, two approaches being considered. One, the K3 approach,
interprets sentences that take the value {1,0} on a model as neither true nor false on
that model. The other, the LP approach, interprets these sentences as both true and
false on that model. This section will explore the consequences of such a difference.
As before, consequence for both approaches is defined as in (39) (repeated here
as (54)):
(54) ! ! " iff, for every model M , either ı is true on M for some ı 2 ", or #
fails to be true on M for some # 2 ! .
And as before, differences in interpretation of the value {1,0} result in differences
about ‘true’, and so different consequence relations (written here as !K3 and !LP ).
First, we should ensure that the connectives behave appropriately, as indeed they
do, in both K3 and LP:
(55)
(56)
a. A; B !LP A ^ B
b. A _ B !LP A; B
a. A; B !K3 A ^ B
b. A _ B !K3 A; B
As you’d expect given this, so do universal and existential quantification:
(57)
(58)
a. F a; F b; 8x.x D a _ x D b/ !LP 8x.F x/
b. 9x.F x/; 8x.x D a _ x D b/ !LP F a; F b
a. F a; F b; 8x.x D a _ x D b/ !K3 8x.F x/
b. 9x.F x/; 8x.x D a _ x D b/ !K3 F a; F b
Both consequence relations have other affinities with classical consequence, although neither is fully classical:
(59)
a. !CL A iff !LP A
b. A !CL iff A !K3
(60)
a. A; :A 6!LP B
b. :A; A _ B 6!LP B
(61)
a. A 6!K3 B; :B
b. A !
6 K3 A ^ B; :B
(59a) tells us that LP and classical logic have all the same logical truths, while (59b)
tells us that K3 and classical logic have all the same explosive sentences. (60) shows
us some of the non-classical features of !LP ; note that the failure of Explosion in
(60a) does not come about in the same way as in SB (by failing adjunction), since
adjunction is valid in LP, as recorded in (55a). (60b) points out the much-remarked
failure of Disjunctive Syllogism in LP. Dual to these non-classicalities are the nonclassicalities of K3 given in (61).
18 Sorting out the Sorites
339
18.3.2 Vagueness and Ambiguity
As we’ve seen, one clear reason to think that LP and K3 are better logics of
vagueness than SB and SP is the sheer sensibleness of their conjunction and
disjunction, which SB and SP lacked. LP and K3 thus allow us to give an s’valuationflavoured picture of vague predication that doesn’t interfere with a more standard
picture of connectives. But there’s another reason why at least some s’valuationists
should prefer the truth-functional approach recommended here, having to do with
ambiguity.
As we’ve seen, the s’valuational picture alleges at least some similarities between
vagueness and ambiguity: at a bare minimum, they both involve a one-many relation
between a word and its potential extensions. Some s’valuationists (e.g., Keefe 2000)
stop there, but others (e.g., Fine 1975 in places, Lewis 1982) go farther, claiming that
vagueness is actually a species of ambiguity. For these authors, there is an additional
question worth facing: what’s ambiguity like?
18.3.2.1 Non-uniform Disambiguation
Here’s one key feature of ambiguity: when an ambiguous word occurs twice in the
same sentence, it can be disambiguated in different ways across its occurrences.
For example, consider the word ‘plant’, which is ambiguous between (at least)
vegetation and factory. Now, consider the sentence (62):
(62) Jimmy ate a plant, but he didn’t eat a plant.
It’s clear that (62) has a non-contradictory reading; in fact, it has two, assuming
for the moment that ‘plant’ is only two-ways ambiguous. ‘Plant’ can take on a
different disambiguation at each of its occurrences, even when those occurrences
are in the same sentence. If this were not the case, if multiple occurrences of an
ambiguous word had to be disambiguated uniformly within a sentence, then the
standard method of resolving an apparent contradiction—by finding an ambiguity—
couldn’t work. But of course this method does work.
Now, suppose we wanted to build formal models for an ambiguous language.
They had better take this fact into account. But SB and SP cannot—they precisify
whole sentences at once, uniformly. Hence, SB and SP could not work as logics for
ambiguous language.13
LP and K3 , on the other hand, do not have this bad result. They deal with
each occurrence of an ambiguous predicate (each atomic sentence) separately, and
combine them truth-functionally. Thus, they avoid the bad consequences faced
by s’valuational pictures. In fact, it is LP that seems to be a superior logic of
13
Pace Fine (1975), which, in a footnote, proposes SP as a logic for ambiguous language. As noted
above, this would make it impossible to explain how one resolves a contradiction by finding an
ambiguity—a very bad result.
340
D. Ripley
ambiguous language. Here’s why: typically, for an ambiguous sentence to be true,
it’s not necessary that every disambiguation of it be true; it suffices that some
disambiguation is.14
Since it’s clear that LP and K3 (and LP in particular) are better logics of
ambiguity than SB and SP, those s’valuationists who take vagueness to be a species
of ambiguity have additional reason to adopt LP and K3 .
18.3.2.2 Asynchronous Precisification
For an s’valuationist who does not take vagueness to be a species of ambiguity,
the above argument applies little direct pressure to use LP or K3 , but it raises an
interesting issue dividing the truth-functional approaches from the s’valuational
approaches: when multiple vague predicates occur in the same sentence, how do
the various precisifications of one interact with the various precisifications of the
other?
Take the simplest case, where a single vague predicate occurs twice in one
sentence. What are the available precisifications of the whole sentence? Suppose
a model with n precisifications. On the s’valuational pictures, there will be n
precisifications for the whole sentence; while on a truth-functional picture there will
be n2 ; every possible combination of precisifications of the predicates is available.
This can be seen in the LP/K3 connectives; for example, where ^0 is classical
conjunction,
(63) M.A ^ B/ D fa ^0 b W a 2 M.A/; b 2 M.B/g
M.A/ and M.B/, recall, are sets of classical values. M.A ^ B/ is then obtained by
pulling a pair of classical values, one from M.A/ and one from M.B/, conjoining
these values, and repeating for every possible combination, then collecting all the
results into a set. In other words, on this picture, every precisification ‘sees’ every
other precisification in a compound sentence formed with ^; multiple predicates are
not precisified in lockstep. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for _.
18.3.3 What to Say About Borderline Cases?
So much for the logical machinery. What do these approaches say about borderline
cases of a vague predicate? Suppose again that 12:23 is a borderline case of
‘noonish’. Consider the following list of claims:
(64)
14
a. 12:23 is noonish.
b. 12:23 is not noonish.
Lewis (1982) argues for LP, in particular, as a logic of ambiguity, and mentions vagueness as one
sort of ambiguity.
18 Sorting out the Sorites
c.
d.
e.
f.
341
12:23 is both noonish and not noonish.
12:23 is neither noonish nor not noonish.
It’s not the case that 12:23 is both noonish and not noonish.
12:23 is either noonish or not noonish.
All of these are familiar things to claim about borderline cases, although a common
aversion to contradictions among philosophers means that some of them, like (64c),
are more likely to be heard outside the classroom than in it.15 All these claims
receive the value {1,0} in a model that takes 12:23 to be a borderline case of noonish.
The LP partisan, then, will hold all of these to be true, while the K3 partisan will
hold none of them to be true. Which interpretation of {1,0} is more plausible, then?
If we are to avoid attributing massive error to ordinary speakers (and ourselves, a
great deal of the time), the LP story is far superior. Accordingly, for the remainder
of the paper I’ll focus in on LP, setting K3 aside (although much of what follows
holds for K3 as well as LP).
18.4 Higher-Order Vagueness
Some objections to any dialetheic approach to vagueness are considered and ably
answered in Hyde and Colyvan (2008). But one objection not considered there might
seem to threaten any three-valued approach to vagueness, and in particular the LP
approach I’ve presented: the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness. This section
evaluates the LP approach’s response to the phenomenon, focusing first on the case
of second-order vagueness, and then generalizing the response to take in higher
orders as well.
18.4.1 Second-Order Vagueness
So far, we’ve seen a plausible semantics for vague predicates that depends crucially
on the notion of an ‘admissible precisification’. A vague atomic sentence is true
iff it’s true on some admissible precisification, false iff false on some admissible
precisification. But which precisifications are admissible? Consider ‘noonish’. Is
a precisification that draws the line at 12:01 admissible, or is it too early? It has
seemed to many theorists (as it seems to me) that ‘admissible’ in this use is itself
vague. Thus, we’ve run into something of the form of a revenge paradox: theoretical
machinery invoked to solve a puzzle works to solve the puzzle, but then the puzzle
reappears at the level of the new theoretical machinery.16
15
16
See Ripley (2011) for evidence that ordinary speakers agree with such claims as (64c) and (64d).
See e.g., Beall (2008) for a discussion of revenge.
342
D. Ripley
It would be poor form to offer an account of the vagueness of ‘admissible’ that
differs from the account offered of the vagueness of ‘noonish’. After all, vagueness
is vagueness, and similar problems demand similar solutions.17 So let’s see how the
account offered above applies to this particular case of vagueness.
What do we do when a precisification is borderline admissible—that is, both
admissible and not admissible? We consider various precisifications of ‘admissible’.
This will kick our models up a level, as it were. Models (call them level-2
models, in distinction from the earlier level-1 models) now determine not sets of
precisifications, but sets of sets of precisifications. That is, a level-2 model is a
tuple hD; I; P2 i, where D is again a domain of objects, I is again a function from
terms in the language to members of D, and P2 is a set whose members are sets of
precisifications.
Every individual precisification p works as before; it still assigns each atomic
sentence A a value p.A/ from the set V0 D f1; 0g. Every set of precisifications
assigns each atomic sentence a value
S as well: a set P1 of precisifications assigns
to an atomic A the value P1 .A/ D p2P1 fp.A/g. These values come from the set
V1 D }.V0 / ! ; D ff1g; f0g; f1; 0gg. That is, sets of precisifications work just like
level-1 models, as far as atomics are concerned; they simply collect into a set the
values assigned by the individual precisifications.
A level-2 model M D hD; I; P2 i
S
assigns to every atomic A a value M.A/ D P1 2P2 fP1 .A/g. It simply collects into a
set the values assigned to A by the sets of precisifications in P2 , so it assigns values
from the seven-membered set V2 D }.V1 / ! ; = {{{1}}, {{0}}, {{1,0}}, {{1},
{0}}, {{1}, {1,0}}, {{0}, {1,0}}, {{1}, {0}, {1,0}}}.
In applications to vagueness, presumably only five of these values will be needed.
Not much hangs on this fact in itself, but it will better show the machinery of
the theory if we take a moment to see why it’s likely to be so. Let’s look at
how level-2 models are to be interpreted. Take a model M D hD; I; P2 i. Each
member P1 of P2 is an admissible precisification of ‘admissible precisification’.
Some precisifications, those that are in any admissible precisification of ‘admissible
precisification’, will be in every such P1 . Others, those that are in no admissible
precisification of ‘admissible precisification’, will be in no such P1 . And still others,
those precisifications on the borderline of ‘admissible precisification’, will be in
some of the P1 s but not others.
Now let’s turn to ‘noonish’. 12:00 is in every admissible precisification of
‘noonish’, no matter how one precisifies ‘admissible precisification’; 12:23 is in
some admissible precisifications but not others, no matter how one precisifies
‘admissible precisification’18 ; and 20:00 is in no admissible precisifications of
‘noonish’, no matter how one precisifies ‘admissible precisification’. So far so
good—and so far, it all could have been captured with a level-1 model.
17
This is sometimes called the ‘principle of uniform solution’. For discussion, see e.g., Colyvan
(2008) and Priest (2002).
18
Again, assume a context where this is true.
18 Sorting out the Sorites
343
But there is more structure to map. Some moment between 12:00 and 12:23—
let’s say 12:10 for concreteness—is in every admissible precisification of ‘noonish’
on some admissible precisifications of ‘admissible precisification’, and in some
admissible precisifications of ‘noonish’ but not others on some admissible precisifications of ‘admissible precisification’. And some moment between 12:23 and
20:00—let’s say 12:34—is in no admissible precisification of ‘noonish’ on some
admissible precisifications of ‘admissible precisification’, and in some admissible
precisifications of ‘noonish’ but not others on some admissible precisifications of
‘admissible precisification’.
Here’s a (very toy)19 model mapping the above structure:
(65)
a. D = the set of times from 12:00 to 20:00
b. I = the usual map from time-names to times
c. P2 = {{{12:00–12:38},{12:00–12:15}},{{12:00–12:25},
{12:00–12:08}}}
Call this model M . Now let’s apply it to some atomic sentences: M.N 12:00) =
{{1}}, M.N 12:10) = {{1}, {1,0}}, M.N 12:23) = {{1,0}}, M.N 12:34) = {{1,0},
{0}}, and M.N 20:00) = {{0}}. One suspects that these five values are all one
needs of V2 for (at least most) vague predicates. In order for a sentence to take
the value {{1}, {0}, {1,0}} on a model, the model would have to be set up so that,
depending on the precisification of ‘admissible precisification’, the sentence could
be in all admissible precisifications or some but not others or none at all. It seems
unlikely that many predicates have admissible precisifications that work like this.
For a sentence to take the value {{1}, {0}} on a model, something even weirder
would have to happen: the model would have to make it so that, depending on the
precisification of ‘admissible precisification’, the sentence could be either true in all
admissible precisifications or false in all of them, but there could be no admissible
precisification of ‘admissible precisification’ that would allow the sentence to be
true on some admissible precisifications but not others. This too seems unlikely. So
I suspect that only five of the seven members of V2 are likely to be useful for vague
predicates, although (as mentioned above) not much hangs on this.20
There is of course the question of interpretation: which of these values counts
as true? Again, we should give the same answer here as in the case of first-order
vagueness, to avoid ad hoc-ery: a sentence is true iff it’s true on some admissible
precisification; and so it’s true iff it’s true on some admissible precisification, for
some admissible precisification of ‘admissible precisification’. That is, any sentence
whose value on a model has a 1 in it anywhere—any sentence whose value isn’t
{{0}}—is true on that model.
19
For simplicity, we look at only one predicate: N for ‘noonish’. This set is then a set of sets of
precisifications for ‘noonish’. Let {x–y} be the set of times between x and y inclusive.
20
Actually I don’t see that anything does.
344
D. Ripley
18.4.1.1 Connectives
So that’s how our atomics get their values. Of course, we need some way to assign
values to compound sentences as well, and the familiar LP operations (call them
^1 , _1 , and :1 ) won’t work—they’re defined only over V1 , but our atomics take
values from V2 . Fortunately, a simple tweak will work, getting us sensible level-2
operations ^2 , _2 , and :2 defined over V2 .
Recall one of our earlier observations about the LP connectives: in a conjunction,
every precisification of one conjunct sees every precisification of the other conjunct
(mutatis mutandis for disjunction). We can use this to define our level-2 connectives.
Consider the conjunction of two V2 values u and v. Remember, values from V2
are sets of values from V1 , and we already have well-behaved connectives over V1 .
To get one potential V1 value for the conjunction, we can pull a V1 value from u and
one from v, and conjoin them. If we do that in every possible way, and collect all the
results into a set, we get a V2 value appropriate to be that value of the conjunction.
More formally: u ^2 v D fu0 ^1 v0 W u0 2 u; v0 2 vg. The same idea will work for
disjunction—u _2 v D fu0 _1 v0 W u0 2 u; v0 2 vg—and negation—:2u D f:1 u0 W
u0 2 ug. So let’s simply adopt these as our level-2 connectives.
18.4.1.2 Consequence
Level-2 models now assign values to every sentence; first the atomics, via the sets of
sets of precisifications, and then to all sentences, via the level-2 connectives. What’s
more, we have a set D2 ! V2 of designated values—values that count as true. (Some
of them also count as false, of course.) This means that we’re in a position to define
level-2 consequence. We do it in the expected way: ! !2 " iff, for every level-2
model M , either M.ı/ 2 D2 for some ı 2 ", or M.# / 62 D2 for some # 2 ! .
So we have a full logic erected ‘up a level’ from LP, as it were. At first blush, this
might seem like not much of a response to the challenge of first-order vagueness.
After all, it seems that we simply abandoned the initial theory and adopted another.
That would hardly be a persuasive defence. But in fact that’s not quite what’s
happened; as it turns out, !2 D !LP .21 We haven’t actually abandoned the initial
theory—we’ve just offered an alternative semantics for it, one that fits the structure
of second-order vagueness quite naturally. What’s more, we haven’t had to invoke
any special machinery to do it. Simply re-applying the first-order theory to itself
yields this result.
18.4.2 Generalizing the Construction
Of course, the above construction only works for second-order vagueness, and there
is much more to higher-order vagueness than that. In particular, just as it was vague
21
For proof, see Priest (1984).
18 Sorting out the Sorites
345
which precisifications are admissible precisifications of ‘noonish’, it’s vague which
precisifications are admissible precisifications of ‘admissible precisification’. From
the above construction, of course, one can predict the reply: we’ll look at admissible
precisifications of ‘admissible precisification’ of ‘admissible precisification’, which
is of course itself vague, and so on and so on. Let’s lay out a general picture here.
Let an n-set of precisifications be defined as follows: a 0-set of precisifications
is just a precisification, and a .k C 1/-set of precisifications is a set of k-sets of
precisifications. Let sets Vn of values be defined as follows: V0 D f1; 0g, and VkC1 D
}.Vk / ! ;. A level-n model Mn is then a tuple hD; I; Pn i such that D is a domain
of objects, I is a function from terms to members of D, and Pn is an n-set of
precisifications. Consider an atomic sentence A. We build up its value Mn .A/ as
follows: in concert with I , every precisification p assigns A a value p.A/ from
V0 , and every .k C 1/-set PkC1 of precisifications assigns A a value PkC1 .A/ D
S
Pk 2PkC1 fPk .A/g from VkC1 . Mn .A/ is then just Pn .A/. For the level-1 and level2 cases, this is just the same as the above setup, but of course it extends much farther.
Which values count as true? By parallel reasoning to our earlier cases, any value
that contains a 1 at any depth. More precisely, we can define a hierarchy Dn of sets of
designated values as follows: D0 D f1g, and DkC1 D fv 2 VkC1 W 9u 2 v.u 2 Dk /g.
For the connectives: we define a hierarchy ^n ; _n ; :n of operations as follows:
^0 ; _0 ; and :0 are simply classical conjunction, disjunction, and negation. For
values ukC1 ; vkC1 2 VkC1 , ukC1 ^kC1 vkC1 = fuk ^k vk W uk 2 ukC1 ; vk 2 vkC1 g. That
is, the a conjunction of sets of values is the set of conjunctions of values from those
sets. Similarly for disjunction: ukC1 _kC1 vkC1 = fuk _k vk W uk 2 ukC1 ; vk 2 vkC1 g,
and for negation: :kC1 ukC1 = f:k uk W uk 2 ukC1 g. Again, this gives us just what
we had before in the case where n D 1 or 2, but extends much farther.
We are now in a position to define a hierarchy of consequence relations !n as
follows: ! !n " iff, for every n-level model Mn , either Mn .ı/ 2 Dn for some
ı 2 ", or Mn .# / 62 Dn for some # 2 ! . Of course, this simply extends our earlier
definition to the new level-n framework.
18.4.3 Good News
Just as in the case of second-order vagueness, this construction allows us to fully
map the structure of nth-order vagueness for any n. By collecting up (with a bit of
jiggering), we can come to an !-valued model that fully maps the structure of all
higher-order vagueness. What’s more, just as in the second-order case, we haven’t
affected our consequence relation at all; for every n " 1 (including !), !n D !1 .22
This shows us that, although we can fully map this structure, there is in fact no need
22
Proof and details can be found in Priest (1984). Note as well that the result can be iterated past
! into the transfinite; I don’t think that’ll be necessary here, since every new level is created to
address the vagueness of some finite predicate.
346
D. Ripley
to for logical purposes; the logic we define remains unchanged. We may as well
stick with the simple three-valued version. (Or any other version we like. I like the
three-valued version for its simplicity, but if there’s some reason to prefer another
version, then by all means.) It’s worth noting that the defender of K3 can make
precisely the same defence here.
18.5 Conclusion: The Sorites
We should close by examining the familiar paradox that arises from vague language:
the sorites. Here’s a sample, built on ‘noonish’ (still written N ):
1.
2.
3.
N 12:00
8x[(N x) ! (N.x + 0:00:01))]
N 20:00
Now, before we do any logic at all, we know a few things about this argument. We
know that the first premise is true, and that the conclusion is not. That leaves us just
a few options: we can deny the second premise, or we can deny that ! supports
modus ponens.23
Well, what is !, anyway? (This question is raised forcefully in Beall and
Colyvan (2001).) There are many possibilities. Each possibility creates a distinct
sorites argument. And, while we may think that the sorites argument must be solved
in a uniform way no matter which vague predicate it’s built on, we certainly should
not think that it must be solved in a uniform way no matter which binary connective
! it’s built on.
Some examples. (1) Suppose A ! B is just A ^ B. Then surely modus ponens
is valid for !; after all, B would follow from A ! B alone on this supposition.
But the second premise in the sorites is obviously not true, given this interpretation:
it simply claims that every moment, along with the moment one second later, is
noonish. That’s not at all plausible. So on this interpretation, the sorites is to be
answered by rejecting the second premise. (2) Suppose on the other hand that
A ! B is :.A ^ :A/. Then the second premise is clearly true, at least given
most theorists’ commitments about the law of non-contradiction (including the
commitments of the LP-based approach), but it just as clearly does not support
modus ponens. From A and :.A ^ :A/, we cannot conclude B.
23
Some have accepted the conclusion or rejected the first premise (e.g., Unger 1979), but to take
such a position seriously is to remove much of the sense of ‘noonish’. And to take it seriously for
every vague predicate would make it very hard indeed to talk truly at all. There are other more
radical approaches, too: we might reject transitivity of entailment (as in Zardini 2008 or Cobreros
et al. 2012), or universal instantiation (as in Kamp 1981). The LP-based solution offered here keeps
to the more conservative side of the street.
18 Sorting out the Sorites
347
Of course, A ^ B and :.A ^ :A/ are silly conditionals. But they make a point:
whatever our commitment to uniform solution, it does not hold when we vary the
key connective in the sorites argument. We are free to reject the second premise for
some readings of ! and deny modus ponens for others, and this does not make our
solution non-uniform in any way worth avoiding. We might both reject the premise
and deny modus ponens for some readings of !, for example if we read A ! B
simply as A. The one thing we cannot do is accept both the premise and the validity
of modus ponens, on any single reading of !.
LP as presented here includes at best a very weak conditional. Its material
conditional, defined as A ! B WD :.A ^ :B/, does not support modus ponens.24
Given the theory of vague predicates advanced here, the second premise of the
sorites is true if we read ! as !. So the present account doesn’t run into any trouble
on that version of the sorites. What’s more, as mentioned in Hyde (2001), the Stoics
sometimes used this form of the argument (the form using ‘for any moment, it’s
not the case both that moment is noonish and that one second later isn’t noonish’),
precisely to avoid debates about the proper analysis of conditionals. If we do the
same, no trouble ensues.
On the other hand, the most compelling versions of the sorites use the ‘if. . . then’
of natural language. ! isn’t a very promising candidate for an analysis of a naturallanguage conditional, in LP or out of it, because of the well-known paradoxes of
material implication (see e.g., Routley et al. 1982 for details). What is the right
analysis of natural-language conditionals is a vexed issue (to say the least!) and not
one I’ll tackle here, so this is not yet a response to the sorites built on ‘if. . . then’.
For now, we can see that the LP-based approach answers the material-conditional
version of the sorites handily.
What’s more, it embodies the picture of vague language underlying subvaluationist and supervaluationist motivations in a more natural way than SB and SP
themselves do. It also verifies much of our ordinary talk about borderline cases,
contradictory and otherwise, and provides a satisfying non-ad hoc account of
higher-order vagueness. In short, LP should be considered a serious contender in
the field of non-classical approaches to the phenomenon of vagueness.
Acknowledgements Research partially supported by the French government, Agence Nationale
de la Recherche, grant ANR-07-JCJC-0070, program “Cognitive Origins of Vagueness”, and by
the Spanish government, grant “Borderlineness and Tolerance” ref. FFI2010-16984, MICINN.
Many thanks as well to Jc Beall, Rachael Briggs, Mark Colyvan, Dominic Hyde, Joshua Knobe,
William Lycan, Ram Neta, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, Keith Simmons, Mandy Simons, and
Zach Weber, as well as audiences at the Fourth World Congress of Paraconsistency, the University
of Queensland, and Carnegie Mellon University for valuable discussion, insight, and support.
24
This is because modus ponens on ! is equivalent to disjunctive syllogism, which anyone who
takes contradictions seriously ought to reject. See Priest (1979) for discussion.
348
D. Ripley
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