The Context of Mahan`s `Debatable Zone`

l
ABSTRACT
The Context of Mahan's
'Debatable Zone'
William D. Walters, Jr.
Professor
At the turn of the 19th century Ameri can naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan
(1840- 1914) developed a concept which
he called the "Debatable Zone" . This was
a wide arc stretching from Turkey to China
which Mahan argued was the key to future
world development. Mahan 's Debatable
Zone has become the best known Ameri can contribution to early geopolitical
thinking, and is often seen as one of the
roots of Mackinder's heartland theory.
However, Mahan 's ideas can be better understood in the context of popular writing
on Asia at the time . Although he had the
ear of key American political figures, they
often rejected Mahan's views on Asia.
Moreover, after developing the idea ofthe
Debatable Zone, Mahan immediately
abandoned the concept. This abandonment may have been because changing
events had ceased to make it useful in promoting his real interest, increased American naval strength .
KEY WORDS : Alfred T. Mahan, Debatable
Zone, geopolitics, Asia , Russia.
MAHAN AND HIS WRITING
Department of Geography and Geolog y
Illinois State Un iversity
Normal, Illinois 61 790-4400
84
One who ventures to deal with any aspect of the thinking of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) must do so with a certain
amount of trepidation . The literature on
Mahan's thinking is enormous and rapidly expanding . Moreover, as several au t horities have pointed out, Mahan's ideas,
especially his more journalistic efforts,
were strongly influenced by events at the
time of his writing . Mahan 's thinking
changed considerably over time. This is
particulary true of the years between
1900 and 1914, when Mahan the naval
historian was slowly, and perhaps reluctantly, giving way to Mahan the journalist.
In particular, great caution should be exercised when trying to reconstruct a unified world vision by mixing arguments
f rom his early and late writings . This
problem has been compounded because
after his death Mahan's writings from the
immediate World War One period were
paraphrased , or selectively quoted, and
used to warn Americans about the dangers of German and Japanese expansion .
Yet, there are compelling reasons for
revisiting Mahan's writings. Recent years
have seen an explosion of new writing on
geopolitics and, while the authors often
disagree with one another, there seems to
be a general consensus that the ideas of
those early twentieth century writers who
set out to find global spatial patterns in
historical events deserve to be reexam ined. Professional geographers have generally been critical of all such geopolitical
writers. Geariod O'Tuathail had recently
dismissed Mahan 's geopolitical writings
as superficial ' potboilers' and has condemned this and all similar work as " Cartesian perspectivalism ." Still, he finds
their work important enough to devote a
substantial portion of his book to discussing their shortcomings (O'Thuathail ,
1996, p. 37-43). Part of the reason for this
attention may be that beyond the narrow
realms of academic geography geopolical ideas have flourished . In 1997 Harvard
diplomatic historian John P. DeLanne
published The Russian Empire and the
World, 1700- 1917, an analysis of Russian
foreign policy which has as its stated goal
the creation of a "geopolitical model "
based , among others, on the works of
Mahan and Mackinder (DeLanne, 1997).
In the same year former American National Security Advisor Zvigniew Brezinski's The Grand Chessboard: American
Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives
which, although does not acknowledge
Mahan, is equally an explicit revival of
many of Mackinder's geopolitical ideas
(Brezinski, 1997). Many recent books and
articles had added to the flood ofthinking
on geopolitics (Agnew, 1998; Murphy,
1997; Robertson, 1996). Charles Clover
has recently called public attention to the
revival of geopolitical writing in Russia
and to its particular focus on Asia (Clover,
1999). Probably never before, even during the 1940s attacks on German theorists, has early geopolitical writing attracted so much scholarly attention .
Two areas of Mahan's thought have
passed into the cannon of political geography: his thoughts on the geographical
factors influencing naval power which
come from his 1890 and 1892 books on
the influence of seapower on history (Ma-
han, 1890 and 1892) and his 1900 ideas
about the Debatable Zone (Mahan, 1900a;
Mahan, 1900b; Mahan, 1900c). It is the
second ofthese ideas which is the subject
of this paper. In following Mahan 's thinking it must always be remembered that
Mahan was not a geographer who re garded what we would now call geopolitics as the end product of intellectual
analysis; he was a naval historian who
sought to use geography (much as he
used race) in an attempt to understand
worldwide patterns of sea power. Indeed,
there is no clean evidence in Mahan's
published correspondence or in numerous writings that he had read any of the
geographers whose names are today
most closely associated with geopolitics.
This Debatable Zone is of particular
interest to geographers, because it has
been seen as one of the possible roots of
Halford Mackinder's Heartland thesis
(Blouet, 1987, p. 116-122; Lowe, 1981,
p. 12- 13, p. 34-35, p. 43-48). In particular,
the thoughts which follow seek to view
the Debatable Zone in its proper turn-oft he-century intellectual and journalistic
context. It is important to remember that
the ideas published in book form as The
Problem of Asia were originally written
for popular journals ratherthan academic
publications. The context in which they
appeared is extremely important because
it is directly related to a broader intellectual question, " why after developing the
idea of the Debatable Zone in his two
1900 essays, and after receiving considerable praise for these ideas, did Mahan
show no further interest in the idea of the
Debatable Zone? "
THE ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM
OF ASIA
Alfred Thayer Mahan (Fig . 1) was a
product of his time and class . Most of his
life was spent in the company of professional military officers. He was born in
1840, the oldest of six children of West
Point engineering instructor Dennis Hart
Mahan. He graduated from the United
States Naval Academy at Annapolis in
1859. He then served intermittently at sea
and taught at the newly established Naval
War College. In 1890, he publ ished The
85
FIGURE 1. Alfred Thayer Mahan . Courtesy of United States Naval Institute.
Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660-1783 (Mahan, 1890). The book
brought him international fame, substantial income, and contact with important
political and literary figures. Since its
publication the work has been the subject
of intense and continuing scholarly debate and it remains mandatory reading
for anyone interested in sea power. By
1900, when Mahan introduced the concept of the Debatable Zone, he was re tired from the navy and devoting much of
his time to writing.
Mahan had close connections with a
number of important and powerful men,
particularly with northeastern Republi cans like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
from Massachusetts, and a dominant figure in American foreign policy. The most
salient fact of this foreign policy during
the years when Mahan was writing was
the increasing involvement of the United
States in world affairs and the rise of the
United States from a position of obscurity
to a force of world importance. In under-
86
standing his ideas, it is also important to
remember that Mahan was a child of the
Northeast, born in New York and living in
metropolitan New York City at the time
the concept of the Debatable Zone was
developed. The Northeast, which received the great bulk of contracts for new
naval construction, tended to look fa v orably on America's international involvement, while the American South and the
Interior remained more inward looking.
The journals in which Mahan published
were actively devoted to increased American overseas involvement. One author,
for example, has described the North
American Review, which published one
of Mahan's essays, as "Northeastern in
character" (Schluter, 1995, p. 113).
Still, great caution must be exercised
when trying to simp lify 19th century
American international politics. Whi le
Mahan's views, with one major exception
which will be discussed later, were generally those of well-educated, expansionminded Yankee elites and were far from
opinions traditionally held in the United
States. Mahan was a reformer and his
politics voiced strident demands for a
change in the status quo. When discussing British politics of this period John A.
Hutcheson has reminded us that "The
right was as dissatisfied with the status
quo as the left and had its own suggestions for dealing with it" (Hutchenson,
1989, preface XIV) . He further reminds us
that the British Right was as divided and
as complex as the British Left. Certainly
this is also true of the United States. Even
the big-navy pro-expansionist wing ofthe
American Republican party, with which
Mahan was strongly associated, was
strikingly divided. Beyond the general
principal a larger fleet and a more active
role in world politics, their disagreements
were profound. In spite of their amiable
relations, Mahan was frequently at odds
with even Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, and nowhere was this more evident
than on the question of Asia.
Mahan's idea of the Debatable Zone
appeared in an article with the title "The
Problem of Asia" which was published in
Harper's magazine in three parts, March,
April and May of 1900 (Mahan, 1900a). It
was followed by a shorter sequel, "The
Effect of Asiatic Conditions Upon World
Politics " which was published in North
American Review, in November 1900
(Mahan, 1900b). In the following year
these two articles were reprinted , together with a much shorter article "The
Merits of the Transvaal Dispute" which
had appeared in North American Review
in March 1900 and in a book called The
Problem of Asia (Mahan, 1900c). To avoid
confusion, and because the book is much
more accessible, all citations which follow are from the articles as published in
book form.
The excellence of Mahan's political
connections are illustrated by events at
the time as he was working on these two
articles. It was when Mahan was writing
these articles that he first met his longtime admirer, Theodore Roosevelt. The
correspondence between the two men
just before and after this meeting has
been published and it sheds light on their
relationship. On January 17, 1900, Roosevelt wrote to Mahan saying that his sister, Mrs. Douglas Robinson, was going to
ask Mahan to lunch at 1:00 at her home
at 422 Madison Avenue, in New York City.
"Do come!" wrote Roosevelt. "I shall be
so glad to see you." On March 12, 1901
Mahan responded to Roosevelt, "I hope
you may read-but don't ask to know
whether you do-my Problem of Asia. It
ought to be, and I intend it shall be, my
swan's [sic.] song on contemporary politics." Roosevelt replied, thanking him
cordially for the book, and remarking that
he knew most of the chapters, having
read them "as magazine artic les." (Turk,
1987, p. 130).
Indeed, Roosevelt had been impressed
by Mahan's thoughts on Asia . Rooseve lt
sent a letter to Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, who had once been an editor of
Harper's, and told Lodge that "Mahan has
a really noble article in Harper's Monthly "
(Lodge and Redmond, 1971 , p. 1:274).
However, it should also be noted, as John
Turk has demonstrated at length, that
Roosevelt's admiration for Mahan's writing did not mean that he agreed with all
of his ideas (Turk, 1987). The future president frequently took issue with Mahan's
arguments, and this was especially true
of some of Mahan 's ideas on Asia that
Roosevelt feared might distract readers
from more important areas closer to the
United States. Still, it is clear that Mahan
had the ear of important people and enjoyed what James Fetzer has called
"enormous public prestige" (Fetzer, 1994,
p. 11). Unlike the writings of many other
geopolitical writers, there is no doubt that
Mahan's ideas on the Debatable Zone
were read and actively considered by
men with the power to make foreign pol icy decisions.
THE DEBATABLE ZONE HYPOTHESIS
Why was it that Mahan had written
these two articles? In the preface to the
book version of Problem of Asia (Mahan ,
1900c) he addresses this question. He
tells readers that he has become convinced " The onward movement of the
world is largely determined, both in rate
and in direction, by geographical and
physical conditions." He goes on to explain, "Add to them racial characteristics
and we probably have the chief constituents of the raw material, which, under
varying impulses from within and with out, is gradually worked up into history"
(Mahan, 1900c, preface, V) . He wrote that
incidents may appear chaotic and may at
first perplex the inquirer butthey are governed by "determinative conditions." The
Problem of Asia had as one of its major
aims the selection and exposition ofthese
permanent features. Certainly, Mahan
makes it clear that he is trying to draw
lessons from history. However, he is also
attempting to write a predictive statement based on what he believes are reoccurring geographically based conditions.
The outlines of this predictive statement are straightforward. Mahan believed that extending across Asia , between 30 and 40° North Latitude, and
including, "the most decisive natural fea tures", [lay a] "debatable and debated
ground ." North and south ofthis zone political conditions were relatively, but not
absolutely, fixed. Within this zone there
was a kind of polarity; while the zone's
long axis extended east and west, movement in the zone was north and south . In
87
PACfFlC
OCEAN
fNDlAN
FIGURE 2. Mahan 's Debatable Zone (Source: Mahan, 1900a, p. 22)
contrast to settled conditions elsewhere
in the world, there " is assurance" that
there will continue to be movement along
this zone until an equilibrium is reached.
What Mahan called "forces of northward
and southward impulses" constituted the
primary dynamic of the Debatable Zone
and the zone was constantly "in a process
of change already initiated and still continuing." (Mahan, 1900c, p. 14).
Later works have published maps
showing Mahan 's Debatable Zone but
while these maps are generally an accurate reflection of Mahan's ideas, they do
not appear with the original text. The
Harper's article did include a general "Orographical " map of Asia showing many
of the places mentioned in the text (Mahan, 1900a, p. 759), but the zone per se
was not shown . Even this map was excluded from the book version of The
Problem of Asia (Mahan, 1900c). In so far
as can be determined, no map showing
Mahan 's Debatable Zone was published
until after his death.
88
THE CONTEXT OF MAHAN'S
DEBATABLE ZONE
Mahan wrote at the zenith of an impassioned epoch. To move from popular
considerations of race, power and territory in 1850 to similar considerations in
1900 is like moving from a Sunday television talk show into the center of a barroom brawl. The language is strident, the
rhetoric pugnacious, and the participants
repeatedly stress the need for urgent action . Violence occupies center stage and
the most repeated word is survival. The
journalistic world of 1900 is a place where
serious and talented scholars could, for
example, write without blushing of a
Saxon Race, a Teutonic Race, or a Slavic
Race. Writers could accept a matter of indisputable fact somehow these "races"
were inevitably and uncontrollably predestined, in various combinations, totake
part in a titanic struggle with each other
for domination of the world.
Mahan's Debatable Zone emerged in a
world of clinched journalistic fists. Many
readers of his prose accepted as "science " ideas like locational determinism
and the use of expanding boundaries as
proper indicators of unalterable national
intent. American Manifest Destiny; Social
Darwinism notions of human conflict
were only a small part of the journalistic
mix (Graebner 1968; Bannister 1979; Degler 1991). Racial determinism, especially
racial stereotypes about the supposed national characteristics of Tuton, Slav, and
Anglo -Saxon, were part of accepted journalistic practice. In English-language
press, these were supplemented by powerful anti-Russian sentiment. The use of
such explanations, especially as they relate to Asia, may either be seen as the
groupings of serious intellectuals trying
to confront problems of scientific prediction in a period when the tools for such
prediction were very crude; or their use
may be seen as the devices of propagandists intent primarily in advancing their
own national interests.
In his essays Mahan stresses three
ideas: the importance of Asia, the menace
of Russia, and the use of maps to make
predictive statements about future national behavior. Each of these ideas were
frequently found in journals where Ma han published . For several years Harper's
New Monthly Magazine had been trying
to increase interest in Asia . In the Novem ber, 1899 issue John Barrett, American
minister to Siam, wrote about "the principal of expansion" which he said had
dominated American life in the 19th century. He argued that in the new century
this principle must be extended across
the Pacific "where America 's opportuni ties for commerce and influence are unrivaled by those of any other nation" (Barrett, 1899, p. 917).
The menace of Russia to Asia was a
favorite Harper's theme. In 1898 Julian
Ralph warned the magazine's readers
that all intelligent Russians cherished the
belief that "sooner or later they are to absorb all Asia down to and including India ." (Ralph, 1898, 826). In the same issue
Archibald Colquhoun published an article
simply called "Siberia" in which he
pointed out the menace of Russia . The
following quote will give something of
the flavor of his thinking . He is discussing
the races of mankind . " Equally natural is
it that the types should not be mutually
sympathetic, and it is therefore suggestive of the homogeneousness of the Slav
people that the rough Cossack and his
gentler successor in spite of differences
amounting to almost antagonism should
be possessed body and soul with one
ideal-Russia mistress of the world ."
(Colquhourn, 1898, p. 285). Colquhoun
could also write of "successive eruptions
of central Asian populations have followed, some overflowing into the rich
plains of China, while others sweeping
north or south ofthe Caspian, poured into
Europe; "it will not do for the AngloSaxon to plead that he has no notice of
the jousts." (p. 292) . More of the same
rabidly anti-Russian rhetoric followed in
February, 1900, when Colquhoun published "Russia in Central Asia ." In North
American Review (Colquhoun, 1900),
which published "The Effect of Asiatic
Conditions Upon World Politics" the second Mahan article invoking the Debatable
Zone, had frequently published the ideas
of authors with similar views.
Charles Denby, Jr., Secretary of the
American legation in China wrote, " The
Anglo-Saxon stands on the shores of the
Pacific. He can not face back to Europe
across three thousand miles of continent.
The great barrier has become a high way. " (Denby, 1898, p. 32). The same
magazine asked a German army officer,
Lt. Colonel Rogalla von Bieberstein to
provide a quasi-technical assessment of
Russian chances should they launch a
land invasion of British India through central Asia. The article paid realistic attention to the question of logistics. It concluded that the issue of such an action
was in doubt, but it no doubt accomplished its goal of focusing attention on
the possibilities of a Russian invasion of
India (von Bieberstein, 1898). Even
stronger were the thoughts of Canadian
minister of Justice David Mills who mixed
unusually blatant racism with antiRussian propaganda in June 1898 article
called "Who Shall Rule, Saxon or Slav."
concluded that the whole Pacific Ocean
89
might "become a Russian lake, and her
eastern frontiers would rest upon the
western shores of North America. " (Mills,
1898, p. 737).
Mahan shared the common suspicion
of Russia. One of his British admirers and
correspondents was Leopold Maxse,
owner and editor of the National Review.
Maxse quoted Mahan on a number of occasions . (Hutcheson, 1889, p. 118-121).
Mahan-Maxse links are important because Maxse was a member of the "coefficients", a small political and economic
discussion group, which included, among
many other notables, Halford Mackinder.
However, while Maxse and Mahan
agreed on many things, their views did
differ sharply on what was at the crux of
Mahan's Debatable Zone theory-the su preme importance of Asia . In 1902 the
two exchanged letters on the Persian
Gulf. Maxse thought Germany was the
great danger and Mahan argued that, on
both spatial and racial grounds, Russia
was the more dangerous threat. Mahan
wrote that he had" a deep rooted distrust
of the Slav-especially under Czardomand a great faith in permanent conditions
such as Tutonism vs [sic.] Siavism ... "
(Hattendorf and Hattendorf, 1986; Mahan
to Maxse 7 March 1902).
More rarely, the journals published
pro-Russian sentiment, but the rhetoric is
in many ways remarkably similar to the
anti-Russian articles. Russia 's supporters,
like the others, tied their arguments to
race and to the logic of maps. In 1900,
North American Review printed "Great
Britain on the Warpath," (Holmstream
and Ookhtomsky, 1900). They argued that
British diplomacy and British military
power were part of a vast preconceived
scheme for world power. The authors
went on , 'Study the maps'! Such was the
advice tendered to his countrymen by
Lord Salisbury in one of his speeches.
'Study the maps,' will I say to the great
public in general, if you wish to form a
correct idea of the English designs. By
southern ways Great Britain is creeping
north, making the English pressure irresistible." (Holmstream and Ookhotomsky, 1900, p. 136). The authors accused
Britain of masterminding an anti-Russian
90
publicity campaign. Map study bolstered
the cases of many other turn-of-thecentury authors. The year after Mahan's,
"The Problem of Asia" appeared, Col quhoun's book Russia Against India, was
published (Colquhoun, 1901). Colquhoun,
like Mahan, was a contributor to Harper's
(Colquhoun, 1899b) and both in his antiRussian views and in his geographical determinism may have influenced Mahan's
writing . "When we take a birds-eye view
of the progress of Russia since the time
of Peter the Great, when we look at the
maps of Russia then and now-or even
maps of 60 years ago, we may not feel so
certain of security even in our own
times." (Colquhoun , 1899, p. iv-ix, p. 13) . Like Mahan at this time, he saw a
world where Slav and Latin would inevitably align themselves against Teuton
and Anglo Saxon. At the start of his
"China in Transformation" he quotes Victor Cousin, " Tell me the Geography of a
country and I will tell you its future "
(Colquhoun, 1899a, p. 3).
Mahan understood that maps could
easily make Russia seem a natural enemy. He writes that, "Upon a glance atthe
map one enormous fact immediately obtrudes itself upon the attention-the vast,
uninterrupted mass of the Russian Em pire .. . " (Mahan, 1900c, p. 24). Writers
complaining of Russian designs on Asia
had a long standing feature of British
journalism. However, this fear was always balanced by a good deal of writing
which ridiculed the notion of Russian descent from the north. Joseph Hume remarked in Parliament in 1836 that the
gentlemen in Whitehall and Downing
Street "had talked so much about Russia,
that they were afraid of the monster they
had created." (Graham, 1965, p. 89).
MAHAN'S PARTICULAR VIEW OF THE
RUSSIAN THREAT
It is not surprising, therefore, that Mahan should use the themes of the importance of Asia, the Russian threat, or that
he used maps as indicators of evidence
of national policy. What is interesting is
the curious twist which Mahan puts on
this thesis. To Mahan, the Russian threat
is not spatially uniform: "Russia, in obe-
dience to natural law and race instinct, is
working, geographically, to the southward in Asia, by both flanks, her centre
covered by the mountains of Afghanistan
and the deserts of Turkistan and Mongolia" (Mahan, 1900c, p. 26) . In other words,
the Indian part of the Debatable Zone
were presently stable. Mahan wrote that
Russia's push to the sea would most likely
be directed at the flanks of the Debatable
Zone "on the east by the Chinese seaboard; on the west in two directions, viz. ,
to the Persian Gulf by way of Persia, and
to the Mediterranean, from the Black Sea,
or through Asia Minor" (Mahan, 1900c,
p. 56). This was of course an extension of
Mahan 's land power vs. seapower conflict, " the land power will try to reach the
sea and to utilize it for its own ends, while
the sea power must obtain support on
land, through the motives it can bring to
bear on its inhabitants." (Mahan, 1900c,
p. 63). What stood in the way of Russian
expansion along both flanks of the zone
were the Teutonic nations-Germany,
Great Britain, along with the United
States.
Mahan did not just see the threat of
Russia as asymmetrical, stronger on the
flanks than in the center; he viewed the
southeastern flank as much more exposed than the southwestern flank. To
Mahan, the Near Eastern flank of the Debatable Zone was primarily the respon sibility of others, the British forces that
dominated the Mediterranean. Because
the Suez Canal offered a much more viable route to the Indian Ocean than did the
Persian Gulf, the British were in a strong
position to counter any Russian pressure
in the direction of Africa or the Persian
Gulf. It was the Chinese part of the Debatable Zone which was exposed and
which was likely to be threatened in the
near future . Mahan argued that Russia
would be most likely to move in the direction of China , " Thus here again by inevitable operation of a line of least resistance, we find on the eastern flank of the
debatable zone, as on the western , the
clustering of nationalities, the gathering
of eagles, around a central interest . . . "
(Mahan, 1900c, p. 120). Moreover, as Mahan mentioned in his Harper's essay and
expanded greatly in the North American
Review, the following November, the existence of the navigable Yangtze river increased the importance of China. "The
valley of the Yang-tze is clearly indicated
as the central scene of our general interest" (Mahan, 1900c, p. 176).
In other words, Mahan argues that
parts of the Debatable Zone, are unlikely
areas for near-term conflict. Mahan's thetorical strategy is to identify a threat, then
to focus that threat, and finally to suggest
the need for an American response to the
threat. The stable protected flanks of the
Debatable Zone serve to focus the threat.
There are other stable zones in the Mahanian world of 1900. Europe and North
America were such areas. "Within the
home dominions of the European and
American powers no marked territorial
changes are to be expected" (Mahan,
1900c, p. 131). Here, it is extremely important to separate what Mahan said in 1900
and what he wrote in later years when
commenting on the growing problems in
Europe. In many respects the argument
for unthreatened parts of the Debatable
Zone are the key to Mahan's thinking.
MAHAN ' S ABANDONMENT OF THE
DEBATABLE ZONE
One of the most interesting aspects of
Mahan 's Debatable Zone is the rapidity
with which he abandoned the idea. Between 1900 and his death in 1914 he
wrote frequently about world problems.
After 1900, these writings were increasingly focused on Europe. However, Mahan never attempted to place these European problems in the context of a
worldwide geopolitical scheme . Indeed,
after 1900 he never again mentioned Debatable Zone in his writings.
Why the sudden abandonment of the
naval writer's geographical stepchild?
The most likely explanation is that the Debatable Zone was never seen by Mahan
as more than an expedient tool, a lever to
be discarded when the afternoon's work
was done. Mahan's view was that of the
shark, and his interests were never really
focused on the tiger's world of interior
land masses. In 1gOO the Russian threat
to Asia must have seemed a useful way
91
to confront the American people with a
challenge which could be met with
greater naval strength . Because of the
overwhelming strength of the Royal
Navy, the world of 1900 was short of such
challenges. Therefore Mahan first raised
the Russian threat, and then minimized
that threat in all areas except China where
British naval strength was weakest. He
could then argue for a powerful American
presence on the western rim ofthe Pacific
and in the Yangtze valley. Mahan in 1900
needed a Russian threat, but he needed
that threat to be spatially concentrated.
Hence the Debatable Zone.
This also suggests why Mahan abandoned the idea of a Debatable Zone so
soon after its development. After the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) , Russian threats to China and the Near East
became much less credible. After 1900
there was also a great increase in Japanese and German naval strength and this
gave Mahan alternate journalistic demons which he could present to the
American people as reasons for a
stronger navy. This is not to suggest that
Mahan was disingenuous, or intellectu ally dishonest when he proposed the Debatable Zone. Nor does it mean that he
did not genuinely fear a Russian advance
in Asia. It does suggest that the Debatable
Zone hypothesis was never central to Mahan's thinking and that it lost what importance it once had because it could no
longer be used as a goad to drive American opinion in the direction of a more
powerful fleet.
Therefore, when trying to understand
Mahan's Debatable Zone, it is particularly
important that today's readers understand the context in which it was written.
It was not the product of a writer whose
primary interest was worldwide spatial
patterns, but the by-product of a generation of writers who saw maps as important tools of journalistic persuasion and
who were willing to find in maps expressions of long-term national intent. Mahan
used the inevitability of conflict in ways
that today make us uncomfortable and
race in ways which we today find unacceptable, but he used these ideas in ways
which would have seemed quite normal
92
to his readers. Our rejection of many of
Mahan 's techniques of analysis is, however, unrelated to the understanding of
the lasting influence of his thinking. Mahan made a case for the importance of
Asia and, thanks to his personal prestige,
was able to set that case before important
people. The fact that today Mahan's thinking remains the subject of vigorous scholarly discussion, suggests that the notion
of the Debatable Zone deserves to be
more clearly understood.
REFERENCES
Agnew, J . 1998. Geopolitics: Re-visioning
World Politics. Routledge, London and New
York.
Bannister, R. C. 1979. Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social
Thought.
Temple
University
Press:
Philadelphia .
Barrett, J . 1899. America in the Pacific and the
Far East. Harper's New Monthly Magazine.
XCIX: 917- 926.
Blouet, B. 1987. Halford Mackinder: A Biography. University of Texas Press, College
Station .
Brezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. Basic Books: New York.
Clover, C. 1999. Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland : the Reemergence of Geopolitics. Foreign Affairs, 27 (8) : 9-13 .
Colquhoun, A. R. 1899a. Siberia . Harper's New
Monthly Magazine XCIX: 950-958.
1899b. China in Transformation .
Harper's, New York and London.
- - 1900. Russia in Central Asia. Harper's
New Monthly Magazine. XCIX: 394-400.
- -1901 . Russia Against India. The Struggle
for Asia. Harper Brothers, New York and
London .
Degler, C. 1991. In Searth of Nature: The Decline and Renewal of Darwinism in American
Social Thought. Oxford : New York.
DeLanne, J. P. 1997. The Russian Empire and
the World, 1700- 1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. Oxford : New
York.
Denby, C. 1898. America's Opportunity in Asia.
North American Review. 166: 32- 39.
Fetzer, J . 1994. Alfred Thayer Mahan and East
Asia : An Evaluation : American Neptune 59 :
11- 17.
Graham, G. S. 1965. The Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Ascendance. University Press, Cambridge.
Grebner, N. A , ed . 1968. Manifest Destiny.
Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis.
Hattendorf, J. C. and L. C. Hattendorf, eds.
1986. A Bibliography of the Works of Alfred
Thayer Mahan. Naval War College, Newport,
RI.
Holmstream, V. and Prince Ookhtomsky (1900)
Great Britain on the Warpath . North American Review. 168: 34- 42 .
Hutcheson, J. A. 1989. Leopold Maxse and the
National Review, 1893-1914: Right Wing
Politics and Journalism in the Edwardian
Era. Garland, New York.
Lodge, H.C. and Redmond, C. F., eds. 1971 . Selections from the Correspondence of Theo dore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge.
de Capo: New York.
Lowe, J. T. 1981 . Geopolitics and War: Mackin der's Philosophy of Power. University Press
of America: Washington, DC.
Mahan, A T. (1890) The Influence of Sea Power
upon History 1660-1783. Little Brown,
Boston .
- - 1892. The Influence of Sea Power upon
History: The French Revolution and Empire.
Little Brown, Boston .
- 1900a. Th e Problem of Asia. Harper's
New Monthly Magazine DXCVII : (March),
536-547 ; (April) 747- 59; (May) 929- 941 .
- - 1900b. Effect of Asiatic Conditions Upon
World Politics. North American Review, 171 :
32- 39.
- - 1900c. The Problem of Asia and its Effect on International Policies. Little Brown :
Boston .
- 1975. The Letters and Papers of Alfred
Thayer Mahan. Ed. Robert Seager II and
Doris D. Maguire. Annapolis: Navy Institute
Press.
Mills, D. 1898. Which Shall Dominate Saxon or
Slav? North American Review 166: 729-739 .
Morris, A J. A. 1984. The Scaremongers: The
Advocacy of War and Re-armament 18961914. Routeledge & Kegan Paul : London .
Murphy, D. T. 1997. The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 19181933. Kent State University: Kent, Ohio.
O'Tuathail, G. 1996. Critical Geopolitics: The
Politics of Writing Global Space. University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapol is.
Ralph J. 1898. Awakened Russia. Harper's New
Monthly Magazine. XCIV: 817-836.
Robertson, J. M . 1996. Alfred Thayer Mahan
and the Geopolitics of Asia . Comparative
Strategy. 15:(4) : 353-366.
Schluter, R. C. 1995. Looking Outward for
America : An Ideological Criticism of the
Rhetoric of Capta in Alfred Thayer Mahan,
USN, in American Magazines ofthe eighteen
nineties Ph .D. Dissertation, Iowa.
Shulman, M. R. 1995. Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power 1882- 1893.
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis.
Sumida, J. T. 1997. Inventing Grand Strategy:
The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan
Considered. Johns Hopkins, Baltimore.
Turk, R. W. 1987. The Ambiguous Relationship:
Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Greenwood, New York; Westport, Connecticut; London .
Von Bieberstein, R. 1898. Could Russia Take
British India? North American Review 166:
324-341 .
93