Agriculture, population and economic development in China and

Rolf Peter Sieferle
Helga Breuninger (Eds.)
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Europe´s Special Course
A program of the Breuninger Stiftung
Volume 10
Stuttgart 2003
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A program of the Breuninger Stiftung GmbH, Stuttgart
Editors: Rolf Peter Sieferle, Helga Breuninger
The following volumes have been published (only in German except this volume).
Available from the Breuninger Stiftung (internet and adress see below):
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(in Englisch)
mit Beiträgen von: Martina Eglauer, Jürg Helbling, Raimund Kolb, Peter Perdue, Rolf Peter Sieferle
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Fridolin Krausmann, Heinz Schandl, Nils B. Schulz
© Breuninger Stiftung GmbH, Stuttgart 2003
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Content
Helga Breuninger: Preface.......................................................................................................5
Rolf Peter Sieferle
Why did industrialization start in Europe (and not in China)?...........................................7
The structure of agrarian civilizations ....................................................................................9
The industrial transformation ...............................................................................................16
Models of explanation ..........................................................................................................21
Single igniting factors...........................................................................................................30
Preliminary conclusion .........................................................................................................75
Bibliography .........................................................................................................................83
Jürg Helbling
Agriculture, population and state in China in comparison to Europe, 1500-1900 ...........90
I. Risk management, family types and development............................................................93
II. High-level equilibrium trap............................................................................................104
III. Discussion.....................................................................................................................151
IV. A provisional conclusion..............................................................................................157
V. References......................................................................................................................159
VI. Appendix ......................................................................................................................168
Raimund Kolb
About Figures and Aggregates: Some Arguments for a More Scrupulous Evaluation of
Quantitative Data in the History of Population and Agriculture in China (1644-1949) 200
Preliminary Remarks ..........................................................................................................200
Population Figures of Qing and Republican Times............................................................211
Microdemography...............................................................................................................221
Population Development and Natural Disasters .................................................................226
Figures on Cultivated Land in Qing and Republican China...............................................235
Concluding Remarks ..........................................................................................................241
Tables..................................................................................................................................244
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................264
Martina Eglauer
Family and Household in Late Imperial China .................................................................276
Chinese terms on family and household.............................................................................278
Chinese sources for demographic research: household registers and genealogies.............280
Family and household size .................................................................................................282
Marriage..............................................................................................................................286
Endogamy − Polygamy − Remarriage................................................................................293
Birth rate .............................................................................................................................296
Adoption .............................................................................................................................302
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................303
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................305
Peter C. Perdue
How Different was China? Or, Bringing the Army Back In: Coercion and Ecology in the
Comparative Sociology of Europe and China....................................................................311
Why the European Miracle? ...............................................................................................312
Energy Sources ...................................................................................................................314
State-Sponsored Development ...........................................................................................317
Why The End of Frontier Expansion Slowed the Dynamism of the Qing State ................323
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................329
Helga Breuninger
Preface
The Breuninger Stiftung GmbH is an independent, non-profit organization, founded in 1968
by the German entrepreneur Heinz Breuninger (1920-1980). The Foundation’s aim is the
advancement of knowledge and research in the fields of Medicine, Social Sciences, Culture
and Economics, using an interdisciplinary approach to tackle complex problems, in particular
those concerning world history and shaping the future.
Within this special focus on “world history” the Breuninger Stiftung concentrates on the
explanation of the causes and circumstances which led to the modern society. Particular
projects are sponsored which will explain how it came to be that beginning in Europe a
movement emerged in the last centuries that lead to the transformation of the earlier pattern of
agrarian civilizations. The goal of these projects is to consolidate different explanation
approaches and also to take a look at the European development “from the outside”.
To explain Europe’s special course toward industrialization that resulted in the making of
modern societiy we have to compare its historical features and development with that of other
civilizations. The most suitable object for this kind of comparison seems to be China, a
civilization that in the eighteenth century in many respects had gained a level equal to the
advanced regions of Europe.
In the summer of 2001, the Breuninger Stiftung organized a workshop on these topics on
Wasan Island, Ontario. The contributions in this volume were first presented on this workshop
and later expanded to longer manuscripts. I wish to thank all the participants in this workshop
who took part in an intensive and fruitful discussion: Jürg Helbling, Bernd Herrmann, Thomas
Höllmann, Raimund Kolb, John R. McNeill, Kurt Möser, Peter Perdue, Rolf Peter Sieferle
and Verena Winiwarter.
5
Rolf Peter Sieferle
Why did industrialization start in Europe (and not in China)?
Francis Bacon mentions in his Novum Organum, one of the programmatic texts of the
Scientific Revolution published in 1620, three major new inventions which had a tremendous
significance, but whose origins remained obscure:1 the printing press, gunpowder, and the
compass. They changed literary culture, warfare and navigation in a fundamental way, and
many other inventions followed. No political empire, no religious denomination, and no
astrological constellation, wrote Bacon, had a greater impact on the human fate than these
three mechanical inventions.
Today we know that these three alleged fundamental innovations of early modern Europe had
their origins in China. It is presumed that they had been imported to Europe in the late Middle
Ages, where they, however, were rapidly adapted and further improved. But if Bacon’s
opinion is right that they were the origin of many other innovations,2 why did "modern
society" develop in Europe and not in China?
Here we are confronted with a problem that occupies observers since they noticed that
something unusual happened in Europe that was dubbed "commercial society", "industrial
revolution" or "modernization". How can it be explained that one particular region in the
world left the several thousand year-old pattern of agrarian civilization with the consequence
that all the other civilizations had to follow this path willy-nilly?
There are two contrasting models of explanation for this process that may be called
orthogenetic evolutionism and contingency theory. Both have origins in the nineteenth
century, but as explicit explanations they were developed only in the early twentieth century.
The orthogenetic position goes back to eighteenth century theories of historical stages and to
nineteenth century social evolutionism, from Turgot, Ferguson or Smith to Spencer. It has a
universalistic stance and is based on a simple anthropological assumption:
people
permanently strive to better their material condition.3 As a consequence they gain knowledge
and competence and their dominion of nature becomes more and more efficient.
This
dynamic expresses itself in many respects, as technological progress, as increasing
knowledge, as economic growth, as a process of "civilization" or "modernization" of the
1
Francis Bacon, Novum Organum I, 129: „Quarum primordia, licet recentia, obscura et ingloria sunt“.
„...unde innumerae rerum mutationes sequutae sunt“, ibid.
3
E.g.: “I make two assumptions which I will in no way justify here: that mankind is restless and greedy for more
of the good things of life, and that essentially this is a quest for greater material rewards”. Mann 1977, 286.
2
7
world.
One basic element of orthogenetic evolutionism is its gradualism.
This is the
assumption that there are no leaps or breaks in history, no separate societal formations, but an
open and continuous progressive flow leading toward the future. This universalistic and
adaptive-materialistic anthropology denies the existence of special cultural patterns and relies
on the fiction of Homo oeconomicus, so that history can be understood as a unified
progressive and teleological process of humanity toward insight, control and wealth.
In the nineteenth century this orthogenetic position could ally with biological theories of
evolution that had orthogenetic implications as well.4 However, in the second half of the
twentieth century this was no longer possible because the prevailing neo-Darwinism shook off
all remains of teleology. As a consequence, the orthogenetic stance could no longer be based
on a general theory of evolution, including biological, cultural and social dimensions.
Stephen Sanderson, a strict social orthogeneticist, therefore postulates a principal difference
between biological and social evolution:
•
Biological evolution is divergent, leading to separate and differentiated species
(cladogenesis), while social evolution mainly is parallel and convergent.
•
Genetic variation is fortuitous, while cultural variation is directed and intentional (as
innovation or learning process). Here the "Darwinistic" character of biological evolution is
contrasted with the "Lamarckistic" character of social evolution.
•
The consequence of these assumptions is: “if we started biological evolution all over again
we would get very different results; however, if we started social evolution all over again
we would get very similar results (social evolution therefore has a predictive quality that is
lacking in biological evolution)” (Sanderson 1995, 7).
This is a bold assertion, even more as an experimental test is not possible. However it shows
that the core of the orthogenetic position is its Lamarckism of evolutionary feedback, where
evolution is understood as a learning process following the mode of trial and error. When
nature has unambiguous qualities, the positively fed back process of acquiring knowledge
about these qualities must lead to permanent and continuous improvement in adaptation, and
the logical end of this process is optimal adaptation.
This is the formal reason why
convergent social evolution can be expected (independent Neolithic evolution in different
regions of the world; similar structural patterns of agrarian civilizations; ease of technological
transfer between cultures; numerous parallel technological innovations in different
4
This is evident with Herbert Spencer, but holds for many nineteenth century social thinkers, including Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels. Cf. Lutz 1998.
8
civilizations). The final consequence of this process is the universal validity of "modern
society".5
The contrasting position to orthogenetic gradualism stresses the incidence of improbable
revolutionary breakthroughs. The major revolutions in world history like the transition to
agriculture or the start of industrialization are in this perspective not determined by their initial
preconditions. They are unexpected events emerging fortuitously in social areas that were not
necessarily unstable or prone to self-transformation.
The classical case of a contingency theory is Max Weber’s construction of a causal
relationship between protestant ethics and the ignition of capitalist accumulation.6
Some
1500 years after the Christian Religion came into existence, on the European continent a
multiplicity of reforming movements occurred. One of these led to Calvinism in Geneva,
which was exported to England. It was in England that, under specific social and political
conditions where Puritan sects could flourish, ethical dispositions developed which finally set
a process of capitalist innovation into motion.
If we consider how easily one of these
conditions might have lacked, it becomes clear how improbable this process was and under
how many circumstances it might have failed before it became self-sustained. So in the core
of contingency theory lies the assumption that the industrial transformation of agrarian
societies was “totally unpredictable and surprising” (Macfarlane 2000, 5).
Before we can deal with these models of explanation, the basic problem has to be sketched:
What is the nature of agrarian societies? Do they share common features? Was “growth” or
“innovation” ubiquitous or a rare exception? And finally: how probable or improbable was
the emergence of an industrial society?
The structure of agrarian civilizations
Our initial thesis is that the agrarian civilizations do in fact have something of a structure that
makes it possible to describe certain common traits of this mode of production in general
terms. In a way, there is an ideal agrarian civilization, as a general pattern that underlies all
really advanced agrarian societies.7 When we take a closer look, however, we notice that
there are lots of differences between particular civilizations. The fundamental reason for this
is that agrarian societies depend much more than other societies on specific environmental
5
This idea is further expanded by neo-universalistic anthropology, e.g. Brown 1991; Pinker 2002.
This argument can already be found in Werner Sombart’s "Der moderne Kapitalismus" (1902) where numerous
contingent factors are identified.
7
A concise overview can be found in Crone 1989.
6
9
conditions (nature of the soil, existence of suitable plants and animals, climate, transport
facilities, geomorphology, etc.). They are less able to substitute lacking conditions and to
modify or even create a favorable environment than industrial societies can do. In addition to
these constraints on adaptation comes the impact of autopoietic cultural processes as a result
of regionally limited recursive communication with the consequence that numerous
functionally equivalent solutions of similar problems emerge. As a combined result of both
tendencies the common pattern of agrarian civilizations is much abstracter than that of
industrial societies und perhaps even of hunter-gatherer-societies (whose nutritional spectrum
is much larger und more elastic than that of agrarian societies).
What is an agrarian civilization? First of all, it is an agrarian society and it shares this
property with the simple peasant society from which it has derived and which in a way
constitutes its basis. The peasant society lies below the agrarian civilization. It is the trunk
out of which it grows and it is the level to which it returns when the high culture collapses.
Such a course has happened time and again.8 The collapse of complex agrarian societies is in
a way a reduction to their core – the simple peasant society. On the contrary, a return to
hunter and gatherer societies can only be observed under very rare circumstances.
The agrarian civilizations have developed a series of specific features that distinguish them
from simple peasant societies. Most significant are the city (civitas, from which the term
civilization is derived), trade and industry (advanced division of labor), writing, metallurgy,
social stratification, religious institutions, government administration, large empires.
However, these features are based on the agrarian foundation, which defines the scope that
other areas of life possess ranging from the economy to politics and the military to everyday
life.
The form that the material interaction between societies and their physical environment takes
can be referred to as social metabolism.9 This metabolism, in other words the whole area of
production, consumption, technology and population, is ultimately determined by the
availability of energy. 10 The energy flow through society defines its material scope of action
and to a considerable extent its physical profile (its material structure and its effects on the
physical environment, respectively). In terms of world history there have been merely three
different social-metabolic regimes characterized by three forms of energy flow:
8
See Eisenstadt 1963; Tainter 1988; Yoffee/ Cowgill 1988.
Concerning the concept of social metabolism see the contributions in: Fischer-Kowalski (ed 1997).
10
For an energy explanation of history see Cottrell 1955; White 1959; Adams 1975; Sieferle 1982; 2001.
9
10
Annual per capita use of energy and material in different social-metabolic regimes11
Energy
basic metabolism
3,5 GJ
hunter-gatherers
10-20 GJ
Material
2-3 t
(factor of 3-5)
agrarian societies
60-80 GJ
4-5 t
(factor of 20)
industrial transformation
250 GJ
20-22 t
(factor of 80)
The per capita energy expenditure of the human population has increased from era to era
approximately by a factor of four to five in the course of the historical development. The
starting point is the metabolic basic expenditure of human beings which amounts to 10 MJ per
person per day. It characterizes Paleolithic societies before the use of fire. Our species Homo
sapiens, however, has always used fire so that the social-metabolic expenditure of hunter and
gatherer societies must have been two to threefold above the base of 10 MJ. In agrarian
societies it is about 200 MJ per person per day. In the USA the energy expenditure per person
per day amounts to about 1,000 MJ at present. This is a hundred-fold increase on the basic
expenditure. However, nobody actually believes that these figures can be reached by over six
billion people.12
The fundamental social-metabolic strategy of the agrarian mode of production is to control
solar energy flows, essentially on the basis of biotechnology. The energy radiated by the sun
is primarily absorbed and combined chemically by the photosynthesis of plants, secondarily
converted by animals and finally changed into a form useful to humans. The agrarian system
utilizes for this purpose above all living creatures that serve as nutrients, tools, building
material, energy converters and transportation means. For this purpose humans try to gain
11
Figures according to Simmons 1989, 379; Fischer-Kowalski / Haberl 1997, 70. Malanima (2001) calculates
only 22-30 GJ/py in agrarian societies, but he totally ignores industrial consumption (iron smelting, lime
burning, salt boiling etc.).
12
Fischer-Kowalski / Haberl (1997, 70) fix for members of hunter and gatherer societies an annual energy
demand of 10-20 GJ; in agrarian societies it is approx. 65 GJ and in an industrial society (Austria 1990) 233 GJ
per year, whereby the American numbers are much higher. Expressed in terms of days the energy expenditures
are 27, 180 and 620 MJ per person. Presumably Simmons underestimates the energy demand of agrarian
societies, but the trend is clearly upwards.
11
control over their vital functions as much as possible: Humans clear woods, cultivate fields,
sow and plant, irrigate and drain, burn down and grow, breed and destroy, reproduce and
protect those organisms they benefit from and battle against pests, weeds, vermin and
predators. So the basic strategy of agriculture is to destroy the original “natural” ecological
systems, especially the vegetation, and to cultivate and monopolize for their own beneficiaries
the space won in this way.
Thus the agrarian mode of production sets out on an irreversible path of colonizing nature (see
Fischer-Kowalski 1997). As an effect of this strategy more and more areas of the natural
environment are transformed into an “artificial” condition which makes them more fit for
specific human needs. This colonizing, however, does not only require initial work, but a
permanent effort is necessary to keep up artificial conditions in view of spontaneous
tendencies of nature to regain the colonized zones. Culture’s range of freedom is greatly
reduced by colonizing nature. To avoid material decline, societies living in highly colonized
worlds are forced to maintain these conditions with heavy and continuous labor inputs.
From the basic features of this solar-energetic regime several fundamental properties of the
agrarian society can be explained. First of all, it is energetically sustainable in principle
because there are simply no significant energy reserves that can be consumed. The most
important agriculturally useful plants, grain or rice, are annuals. In other words they contain
an energy supply resulting from the photosynthetic production of one year. Animals become
somewhat older, but hardly more than twenty years. Water and wind must be used at the very
moment they are available. The greatest energy stock that is available to agrarian societies is
the forest. A primeval forest can reach an age of over 300 years, but a regularly exploited
forest only has an average age of fifty to eighty years and that is the greatest possible energy
buffer available under sustainable conditions.
The first property of the agrarian solar energy system can be derived from these small
reserves: Humans intervene in flows because they cannot consume considerable stocks.
These flows are small, however, so that energy is basically scarce. Thus, when energy is
scarce then everything is scarce. For this reason agrarian societies are always earmarked by
shortage and poverty (see Wrigley 1992). The majority of people live at subsistence level and
famines occur regularly.
In addition to this, there is another basic feature: solar radiation reaches the earth distributed
over a large area. Therefore solar energy systems must cope with an initially low energy
density, i.e. they must concentrate energy to be able to utilize it. For this purpose extensive
12
efforts and investments are required.
considered.
This becomes most apparent when transport is
If transported products like wheat or wood are understood as energy carriers,
then it is obvious that the energy effort for transportation should not be any higher than the
energy content of the transported goods. On principle the energy harvest factor must be
positive including transportation expenditure, what means that the distances should not be too
long.13 Thus, the consequence is that agrarian societies are always scattered over a large
region. Greater concentrations of population or trades are an exception and can only be
maintained on the basis of specific geographical or political conditions.
An important consequence of this is the fact that for agrarian societies average values of
greater areas are irrelevant. This is also shown by the fact that they cannot develop any
tendency for homogenizing in terms of expanse.
In a way, agrarian societies form an
archipelago with relatively little exchange between the individual “islands of scarcity” so that
we always must reckon with great differences between individual regions with regards to
culture and style, but also with regards to the economy and technology.
Agriculture as a managed solar energy system is in principle one of negative feed-back: each
step into the direction of physical growth destroys the potential of further growth, so that the
agrarian economy necessarily approaches a natural limit sooner or later. There can be no
perpetual progress in the sense of "economic growth". On the other hand, the final limit to
growth is elastic, so that the level of wealth can always be pushed a bit higher and the
stationary state is reached asymptotically. This logic of the agrarian system was analyzed by
the classical political economists.14 What Mark Elvin15 called "high level equilibrium trap"
with respect to China was a common feature of all agrarian civilizations. This agrarian
negative feed-back loop was based on two structural features:
1. The law of diminishing marginal returns in agricultural production. This law, resulting
from the character of a solar energy system, has the character of a law of nature. It can be
temporarily suspended by technological advances, but it cannot be totally overcome.
2. The principle of population. Better subsistence chances tend to increase the number of
consumers with the consequence that an increase of per capita wealth is self-destructive.
This process, however, can be modified by human behavior such as birth control.
13
Bairoch (1993, 60) estimates that the price of wood duplicated by transport over land every 2-4 km, while over
water it was every 10-16 km.
14
Edward Wrigley has stressed this in several publications, e.g. Wrigley 1994.
15
The concept of high level equilibrium trap was jointly developed by Mark Elvin and Radha Sinha (personal
communication by Mark Elvin).
13
These conditions provide that agrarian societies did not experience continuous economic
growth, but moved from one oscillating state of equilibrium to another. They did have
technical innovations but no continuous process of innovation with a positive feed-back
developed. Hence the various “inventions” did not accumulate steadily and self-enhancing (as
was the case during the industrial transformation), but often remained single events that were
sometimes even forgotten again.
In general, the spread of technical and economic
innovations, which did take place sporadically, was hindered by the inherent shortage of
energy and material. Basically, the agrarian system tended to remain at a stationary state that
could find an equilibrium on different metabolic levels.
These properties were also true for the agrarian civilizations, although there were some
additional attributes. As complex civilizations they had some special characteristics like the
contrasts between town and country, lord and servant, many mechanical devices (sailing boat,
water mill), metallurgy and numerous cultural techniques (writing, calendar, astronomy,
calculation, theology, literature, arts, architecture, etc.). Nevertheless the majority of the
population remained peasants (80-90%) who lived scattered in various regions, and who had
only very superficial contact to the high culture system.
The socio-economic basis of the agrarian civilizations was the tributary appropriation of
surplus. This means that the producers (mainly peasants) had to regularly contribute a part of
their product as rent, tribute or tax of which a “ruling class” with its retinue of specialists and
servants was supported and provided for.
The result was a fortifying vertical social
differentiation, normally in the following categories: peasants, landlords (aristocracy),
warriors, priests (scholars), the court (rulers, bureaucrats), craftsmen, merchants. In addition
there was usually an underclass that could include up to 10% of the population earning their
livelihood as wage laborers, barterers, beggars or thieves.
Institutionally, the ruling system developed a “state”16 that could control its subjects by force,
but many agrarian empires also tended toward expansion. The subjection and annexation of
foreign territories is explained by the fact that the revenues of their rulers ultimately stem
from agriculture. Thus, the safest way to wealth and power lied in the acquisition of land and
of those who till it. An obvious method for doing such was by military conquest. This
expansion movement resulted time and again in the rise of empires which only in exceptional
cases continued to exist over a longer period of time.
16
It is controversial, if and in how far it is appropriate to use the term „state“ when referring to the ruling centers
of agrarian civilizations, or if we are actually dealing with a genuine European-modern phenomenon here. See
Reinhard 1999; Creveld 1999, in contrast to the Max Weber tradition cf. Breuer 1990.
14
A rich and dynamic agrarian society was finally either conquered by booty-seeking predators
or it took the path of conquest itself until its forces were exhausted. The former course was
taken by China, the latter one by Rome. Here lies the origin of an important political trap that
comes in addition to the economic limits. The disruption of production by predation increases
in the same measure as wealth grows.
This is a specifically political-military negative
feedback-loop, which leads to severe destruction of wealth and forms a further obstacle to
economic development in addition to declining marginal returns and a tendency toward
population growth.
When these energetic, demographic, and political limits are combined, the results are the
fundamental flaws of agrarian societies. Hunger, epidemics, war and exploitation put a heavy
strain on the economy as soon as tendencies toward growing wealth and dynamics become
visible. Agrarian societies are caught in a trap from which they normally cannot escape.
From this perspective industrialization was a highly improbable singularity blasting a pattern
that worked for almost 10,000 years.
These negative, restricting features of the agrarian regime that prevented longer periods of
economic growth, lasting for more than a couple of decades, can be summarized as follows:
1. The dependence on the life cycles of a small number of useful organisms had the
consequence that people were quite helplessly delivered to natural fluctuations. Frequent
crop failures, resulting in famines, can be understood as a temporary breakdown of the
agrarian strategy of biotechnology. This is as a secondary danger or loss of control in
respect to the intended dominion over nature. Theoretically, these problems could have
been solved by improved infrastructural technology like storage or transportation, but
these measures were usually impeded by the nature of the political system (being an
organization of predators). Subsistence was non-elastic. Predators strived to keep their
level of surplus even when harvests were bad, with the consequence that crop failures
often resulted in famines that might have been relieved by better distribution. However,
an agrarian welfare state is a rare exception – although not totally impossible as some
episodes (not only in Chinese history) demonstrate.
2. High population density lead to the spread of parasitic microorganisms. Epidemics, often
zoonoses, were an unavoidable consequence of the agrarian mode of production, because
they go together with sedentary life, high population density, and close contact with
animals. Epidemics were undesirable side-effects of the dominant biotechnology. There
may have existed a "learning curve" of the human immune system which increased
15
competence in coping with infectious disease, but this tendency was counteracted by
aggressive strategies of the microbes (Ewald 1994).
However, there also may have
existed a historical trend toward co-evolution and endemism, accompanied by better
hygienic measures (Le Roy Ladurie 1973, McNeill 1976).
3. Regular warfare was the consequence of private property and territoriality, which are both
necessarily connected with agriculture.17 Its major social result was the differentiation of
a class of predators, that is experts of violence who claim privileges and skim off
resources.
Their function may extend to more complex areas than just parasitic
exploitation. They may produce some social services, like organization of labor for
infrastructural purposes, peacekeeping, defense and the provision of a "high culture" that
is produced by them or at least favored by a sophisticated level of consumption.
The predator pattern seems to be closely related with the agrarian regime, but there was also a
path (developed in repeated attempts) to a formation called "commercial society" (in contrast
to “feudal” agrarian society) by Adam Smith. This is a society under the rule of law that
succeeds to overcome essential elements of the agrarian regime without totally leaving it. At
the margins of agrarian society some of its essential features can be moderated: provisions
are stabilized, diseases are alleviated by immunity and hygiene, war comes under civil control
and a calculable legal system is established. Here preconditions are developed which (in
retrospect) play an important role for the emergence of the industrial regime.
The industrial transformation
In this perspective, industrialization is a transitional phase into a new social-metabolic regime
that works on a different basis. The classical model of "industrial revolution" was developed
by Marx. In his view, European agricultural society was primarily a "feudal" society. This
was a formation of production and exploitation with a certain amount of structural stability in
which, however, forces were at work that undermined this order ("development of productive
forces"). The "industrial revolution" catapulted this society into a new order or societal
formation that Marx called "capitalist". "Revolution" thus transformed one structural entity
into another. This new structure can be analyzed as a system as well, as "capitalist mode of
production" or (in a different terminology) as "modern industrial society".18
17
Warfare can also be found in simple hunter-gatherer or horticultural societies, but it is less frequent there and
does not result in social stratification, cf. Keeley 1996.
18
On the concept of "industrial revolution" in economic history see the differentiated remarks in Landes 1999
16
The point of this kind of model is that two structures, each of which has its particular form,
are confronted; they form a systematic whole whose functional logic can be described
theoretically. This becomes clear in concepts that identify "economic growth" as a central
feature of the industrial society. According to authors like Kuznets, Gellner or Jones there
once was a pre-industrial society that did not know any growth (or only sporadically), while
industrial society is marked by steady and continuous economic growth, not only in
quantitative terms, so that a growing population can be sustained, but also as an increase in
per capita income and consumption.
It is important to notice that European societies have indeed experienced such a continuous
growth both in quantitative as in qualitative terms within the last approximately 200 years.
This is an indisputable empirical fact.19 But the question remains that if these are properties
of a system in balance or if we are still in the midst of a phase transition which lasts far longer
than theorists like Marx could imagine.
It can be easily demonstrated that physical economic growth with a considerable rate is not
possible over longer time periods.20 It lies in the nature of the exponential function that
practically infinite values are reached in finite time. The height of the growth rate is not
decisive at all unless it would be very small, but then it could not work as a controlling
parameter.
There is only quite a small time corridor for continuous growth with a
considerable rate. If this rate shall really be effective and perceptible by contemporaries, it
should not be lower than 1%. If it were larger than 3%, astronomical figures would be
reached within very short time (5% over 200 years results in a growth factor of more than
17,000). The conclusion is that the historical scope for real (physical) economic growth lies
between 1% and 3% over 200 to 300 years. This means that economic growth as we know it
today is limited to a rather short time period with the logical consequence that it cannot be the
characteristic of a longer lasting structured system. It is restricted to a phase transition which
transforms the economy into a state that must be stationary again, at least in physical terms
like population size, energy flow and material throughput.
In a world history perspective this indicates that we presently live in a unique situation whose
end may lie in a not too distant future of perhaps one or two centuries. In retrospect, this has
19
Maddison (1995) concludes that the economy of 16 industrial nations grew with an average rate of 2.5%
between 1820 and 1992.
20
Snooks (1994) calculates very low rates of economic “growth“ in England extending over a millennium, but of
course these growth rates of about 0.3% are much lower than annual fluctuations of (agricultural) production so
that they must have remained unnoticed by contemporary observers. In my opinion it does not make much sense
to talk about growth rates when we can not deal with regular or continuous phenomena but merely produce
statistical artefacts calculated between 2 or 3 data points.
17
some consequences. Periods of qualitative growth may have existed in the past for several
reasons. In these cases people not only experienced population growth, but even an increase
of per capita consumption of energy and material. This was possible under two conditions:
1. In a pioneer or frontier situation people can exploit a hitherto unused resource which
suddenly becomes available in superabundance and whose consumption feeds economic
growth. For example, this was the case when the Maori came to New Zealand about a
thousand years ago. They encountered a fauna of large birds unable to fly who had never
seen a mammal before, let alone a primate. The Maori had discovered a hunter’s paradise:
a huge amount of game without the instinct to run away and thus easy to prey on.
However, this bonanza did not last very long (although it may have been for several
generations). If there had been Maori economists they would have developed theories of
economic growth. At some time this episode came to an end and the Maori had to find
more sustainable methods to earn a living that were not based on the consumption of
exhaustible stocks.
2. Technological progress offers the opportunity not just to consume stocks more rapidly but
to tap into inexhaustible flows with a higher efficiency. This is an import strategy of
innovation in agrarian societies. When people succeed in cultivating new crops, in finding
new ways of rotation or in enhancing the part of plant biomass that is useful for human
purposes, there can be sustained growth. This economic growth based on technological
innovation, however, is always confronted with the problem of diminishing marginal
returns. A sustained path of economic growth would depend on a dynamic, in which (cost
neutral) technological efficiency can be increased faster than marginal returns decrease.
This would be a theoretical escape from the agricultural trap of stagnation, but there is no
historical case that this strategy has succeeded for a longer time. However, for shorter
periods of some decades or even two or three generations such a growth regime supported
by innovation was viable even in the agricultural past.
The period of industrial growth in the midst of which we are since the last 200 years is based
on a combination of these two strategies. The use of fossil energy initiated a typical pioneer
situation in which a large stock has been discovered that is consumed in a short time. In this
respect, there is no principal difference to the Maori strategy. But there is also the second
strategy: fossil energy sources can only be used because appropriate technology is available.
Without the steam engine and suitable smelting techniques for iron and a variety of other
technical processes and devices the sporadic use of fossil energy sources would not have
18
transformed into a fossil energy system. Arabs still would graze camels above petrol deposits
and people in Europe still would be hungry and freeze above huge carbon seams.
The secret of industrialization lies in the combination of both strategies that reinforce each
other and whose combination formed the new growth pattern. Industrial society not only
consumes stocks like the Maori, but in the course of this consumption it develops new
technologies so that a positive feed back loop between consumption and innovation emerges.
Industrial transformation is not just a short unique delirium in which natural stocks are
squandered; it is also an epoch of rapid and accelerating technological innovation. The
important point is that the physical foundation of technological innovation is the mobilization
of material fed by energy availability. Most technological inventions that may lead to higher
energy efficiency in the future would have been impossible under the conditions of severe
energy scarcity inherent in the agricultural mode of production.
This is the reason why industrialization is not just a bubble that will burst when fossil stocks
are exhausted (this was Jevon’s vision),21 with the consequence that people will have to return
to the state of poverty and immobility connected with the agrarian mode of production and to
a second solar energy system that will bear the gruel marks of predatory rent seeking again.
The heritage of the fossil age is not just empty deposits, but also a large amount of know-how
that might not have been acquired without this historical detour of squandering resources.
The following elements of this historical process can be summarized:
1. The physical core of the industrial transformation is a change of the social-metabolic
regime. In contrast to widespread theories of "modernization", this identifies a level of
description that is unequivocal. The nature of this transformation can be empirically
demonstrated in energetic and material terms (Krausmann 2001, Schandl / Schulz 2001,
Sieferle 2001).
2. When we look for the historical origin of this social-metabolic transformation we have to
concentrate on the emergence of the fossil energy system. It can be found in the
combination of the following processes (cf. Sieferle 1982/2001; Wrigley 1988):
-
The use of steam pumps in coal mining enabled the supply of fossil energy sources to
grow and stabilize since the first decades of the 18th century.
-
Melting and freshing of iron with coke built the technological-energetic fundament for
the growth of a "mineral" economy since the middle of the 18th century.
19
-
The construction of steam railways and steam boats emancipated transportation from
the restrictions of bio-converters since the early 19th century.
These three elements had to be present almost simultaneously so that the sporadic and local
use of fossil sources that is common in agrarian societies since ancient times22 could develop
into their permanent, growing and ubiquitous use and a fossil energy system could emerge. It
is evident that these three elements were closely related to each other. Steam pumps are a
precondition to increase coal production. Iron melting with coke depends on coal and air
pipes driven with steam. Steam engines consume coal and are built with iron. Coal, iron and
steam thus form a physical and technological unit in which none of the three may be lacking.
The technological and economic macro-inventions of the eighteenth century culminating in
the emergence of the fossil energy system were based on several mental and socio-political
preconditions as well:
•
In the mental respect, a scientific world view and an experimental style connected with
modern natural philosophy shifted innovation from tinkering to methodological
invention.23
•
In the socio-political respect, the predatory pattern dissolved with the transition to a
"commercial society". Its major features were the transformation of the state into a
service institution for civil society, providing property rights and the rule of law, the
consequence of which was the dominance of individual achievement (instead of status),
functional differentiation of society and social mobility. 24
The dissolution of the predatory pattern as a major tendency of European history in Early
Modern Times is a prerequisite to industrialization. It would, however, have finally failed if
the social-metabolic transformation would not have taken place. Without the transition to the
fossil energy regime, the highly developed commercial society would have soon ended in the
trap of a stationary state, as predicted by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo or
John Stuart Mill. In the social respect, nineteenth century "capitalism" and "pauperism" had
the ambiguous feature that the heritage of master and servant, of exploitation and luxury was
still visible, albeit transformed into an economic relationship. They finally lost their character
as differences of kind and became mere differences in degree. Finally they were substituted
21
In his book „The Coal Question“ (London 1865) Jevons predicted that the British fossile reserves would be
exhausted in litte more than one century.
22
Even in China, cf. Hartwell 1962, 1967. Pomeranz 2000 puts this into proportion.
23
This is stressed by Goldstone 2000, mainly based on Jacob 1997.
24
This is the point of Macfarlane 2000, following arguments developed by Ernest Gellner 1995.
20
by new differences like those between inclusion and exclusion that could no longer be
interpreted as a dialectical unity and a transfer "from below to above", but that is another
story.
Models of explanation
The non-orthogenetic school of explanation for this transformation starts with the
consideration that it was really a "riddle" (Macfarlane 2000) or "miracle" (Jones 1987) that
Europe could succeed in escaping the seemingly unavoidable agrarian trap. Let us first look
at Macfarlane’s explanation which is a typical case for a contingency position. He starts with
the consideration that somehow the constellation of economic, political and cultural features
must have changed in Europe, so that a centrifugal development could set in. The solution of
this problem may be found in structural disembedment. When political power, culture (viz.
religion) and economy are amalgamated into one solid complex, they have to change
simultaneously if a fundamental alteration shall take place. This, however, is extremely
improbable. But if these spheres are functionally differentiated, transformation is easier.
When the social importance of descent or status is weakened, other spheres can gain weight,
like technology, economy, individual achievement, or science.
The game of power may play an important role in this process. Agrarian civilizations seek to
centralize power and try to control independent elements. The economy is subordinated to
political power and ideas are controlled by church or state. When these endeavors are
successful and efficient control over society is established, transcending dynamics can be
prevented. Each innovation encounters a particular problem: It changes the rules of the game
while the game goes on, thus producing not only new winners but also losers. This is the
reason why any innovation will meet the resistance of those who gain from the status quo.
This resistance can be easily overcome in situations of danger and severe competition. Under
stable and peaceful conditions, however, the forces of immobility and inertia are strong, so
that innovation can be avoided with the consequence that the system petrifies.25 Therefore, if
the forces of competition were stronger in Europe than they were in China this might have
been an element favoring the transformation.
Following Montesquieu, Macfarlane notes a socio-political special development in Europe
which goes back to medieval feudalism and whose roots lie in ancient Germanic traditions.
The core of this special development was an individualistic, egalitarian disposition leading to
25
See the classical model by Olson 1965
21
a political system based on contractual relations and not so much on descent or status. This
resulted in a specific social and political balance system in which no power gained
supremacy. This pattern was particularly strong in England. The island successfully avoided
the feudal anarchy of the barons, developing a "centralized but not too centralized monarchy"
with the consequence, "that by the 13th century England was a wealthy, powerful, wellgoverned land, with a rapid growing technology, trade links, strong armies and booming
towns. ... It was basically, like the rest of Europe, a Germanic kingdom with an engrafting of a
more developed centralized feudalism" (Macfarlane 2000, 277).
Since the later Middle Ages, European development took divergent directions. The old
fruitful and creative feudal balance was heavily disturbed and tendencies toward despotism
developed that were common in most agrarian societies.
However, there were several
exceptions and foci of resistance: northern Italy, German territories, free town republics, and
above all England. In the eighteenth century despotism advanced. The "general crisis" of the
seventeenth century demonstrated that the dynamic world of medieval feudalism had entered
a negative feedback loop. Most of Europe was on the path to a high level equilibrium trap,
common to most advanced agrarian civilizations. Only two major exceptions remained in the
last decades of the seventeenth century: Holland and England. Holland, however, was too
small, had too few resources of its own and mainly concentrated on financial operations and
not so much on production. As there was always the military threat from England and France,
the costs of defense were relatively high. As a result, only England was spared despotism. "It
was a miracle, but it happened" (Macfarlane 2000, 281). Why?
•
All attempts to establish absolutism failed (John Lackland, Henry VIII, Charles I, James
II). The balance of estates remained stable and the king stood under the rule of law.
•
The (medieval) separation between state and church was preserved, while the church split
into numerous sects. As a consequence religion could become a private matter.
•
A sharp legal division of social estates did not prevail. Social mobility and the principle
of individual achievement were preserved so that social tensions were not severe.
•
The peripheral island situation favored this development. England was large enough to
develop a differentiated structure and to defend itself against invasion. It was close
enough to the continent to engage in trade (20 miles instead of Japan’s 200 miles).
22
•
The only military threat came from interior barbarians, the Scottish highlanders, but they
could be brought under control quite easily (1603, 1715, and 1745/46). Thus England had
low defense costs and was spared devastation by war (in contrast to Italy and Germany).
•
The secure island situation undermined the rulers’ claims for military armament (standing
army) and high taxation. A low demand for protection produced a low willingness for
civil obedience.
It was in early modern England that a unique development started. The normal case for
agrarian civilizations is that military adventures destroy wealth and create a heavy burden for
the economy. In England it was the opposite. Political power strengthened the economy and
it was in this context that the socio-political pattern of agrarian civilizations was punctuated
and finally overcome. In Macfarlane’s view it was the uniqueness of England that created
Europe’s special course.
A typical case for an advanced orthogenetic explanation is the later work of Eric Jones. In his
1981 book "The European Miracle"26 he followed the paradigm of contingency. Some years
later he radically changed his position. Instead of seeing the European development as a
miracle, in his book "Growth Recurring", published in 1988, he accepts the orthogenetic
model. Because Jones is not a naive orthogeneticist but knows the strength of the contrary
position it is worth while to take a closer look at his explanation. The starting point of his
revision is the idea that "growth" is not a singular phenomenon or a miracle, but the normal
case in history. In principle, there are two basic economic strategies: rent seeking or growth
by productivity increase. The latter strategy leads to a growth of the cake, while the former
strategy struggles for a larger share. Both are universal possibilities, with growth being
potentially a universal trait of history.
"The underlying tendency for growth has been hidden by the apparent economic
stagnation of most of history, but it was nevertheless there, so basic and restless a trait
that it may have been selected for in the evolution of our species" (Jones 1988, 1).
Economic growth is a natural tendency in history that materializes whenever its opposite
strategy, rent seeking, meets resistance. This was the case in several instances, not only in
modern Europe, but also in Song China or Tokugawa Japan.27 With regards to English
development, Jones repeats the 1980s standard objections against the older picture of a rapid
26
I use the 2nd edition of 1987
Jones seems to write under the impression of "deindustrialization" in the West, when Japan’s economy was
strong and the "Asian tigers" were seen as economic great powers of the future – visions that moved many
people in the 1980s.
27
23
"industrial revolution" (e.g. Crafts 1985): aggregated growth rates were relatively low, there
were hardly any sensational breakthroughs, and many matters remained unchanged (e.g. water
power in textile factories well into the nineteenth century). On the other hand, there were
many parallel innovation processes on the continent, so that one would have expected an
industrial revolution there had it not occurred in England earlier.
This was not a matter of "miracle" but quite normal. "Instead of thinking of growth as an
aberration, let us try thinking of it as the norm" (Jones 1988, 40). Agrarian civilizations
(which he calls "advanced societies" in contrast to "archaic societies") share certain common
features like a cosmological religion, literate ruling elite, a money system, loyalty towards a
"state", iron production, overseas navigation, agrarian surplus, and "a positive rate of growth,
however low". The search for single factors or causes for European industrialization must be
in vain, because growth is the normal case. He compares the contrast between orthogenesis
and contingency in world history with the contrast between evolution and creation in biology
– seemingly he took the word "miracle" literally. Anyway it seems to have escaped his notion
that even a neo-Darwinist gradualist like Richard Dawkins is not a teleological orthogeneticist
and that a critic of neo-Darwinism like Stephen Jay Gould stressing the role of chance in
evolution was not a creationist. Concerning biological theories, Jones remains deeply in the
nineteenth century and that also has negative consequences for his historical explanation.
His conclusion is weak. When growth is the normal case in history because people want to
better their condition and "delight in technical tinkering", the existence of non-growth needs a
special explanation, so that the focus of research shifts from igniting factors to impeding
factors. That was the approach of the older modernization theories. The world has an innate
tendency toward progress that in economic terms expresses itself as growth or "development",
so that in any cases where this tendency cannot be observed in reality we have to look for
specific obstacles. This shift of emphasis is not so sensational. If we normally don't find
growth in the real world, so that in the majority of cases what is expected does not happen,
empirical growth is insofar a singularity as the usual obstacles are absent. For the strategy of
explanation this does not make much difference compared with the contingency position. It is
just a matter of ideological idiosyncrasy which has the characteristic weakness that it claims
what is widespread and usual (namely non-growth) to be an exception, while that what is
seldom (namely growth) is declared to be the norm.
"Once we take the position that initiative was widespread, yet only occasionally
produced a whole growing economy, our interest ought to shift from hypothetical push
24
forces to whatever forces blocked growth, or (more identifiably) reversed it when it did
begin to sprout" (Jones 1988, 40).
These new push forces have the function to remove forces that block growth. With this shift
the orthogenetic position does not gain much except the problem to postulate universal
progressive tendencies.
The great historical example for qualitative growth and rising
standards of living in a non-European agrarian society is Song China. Since the tenth century
China experienced a progressive phase similar to that of thirteenth or eighteenth century
Europe. Jones sees the causes for this development in a change of institutional conditions:
monetary taxes instead of contributions in kind, easing of political control over the economy
and better transport conditions, especially canals. The government and the landlords do not
skim off the whole surplus but leave some for investment and capital accumulation.
The core question, however, is why this progressive phase fell flat again in Song China while
in Europe after the fourteenth century crisis a new upswing started that finally prepared the
conditions for the industrial transformation. Normally Mongol conquest is cited as the major
fortuitous and exogenous factor which brought the development to a halt. Are there further
reasons? Did the early Ming continue the Song pattern and came economic stagnation only
since the late fourteenth century? Were these endogenous factors?
To summarize the argument: the endeavor to better one’s condition is seen (not only since
Adam Smith) as a constant anthropological feature. Wealth is better than poverty and people
are talented and enterprising, so it can be expected that technological and economic
innovation occurs time and again with the result that productivity and living standards rise.
Unfortunately, this rarely happened in historical reality. What we can notice in the best case
is extensive growth, a combined growth of population and production, but hardly any rise in
average per capita income. In advanced agrarian civilizations the peasants’ material standard
of living is not higher than in the Neolithic and probably lower than in hunter and gatherer
societies. Progress in technology, wealth and civilization is almost exclusively a matter of the
ruling elites.
This being the fact, there must be powerful factors that check the "natural tendency" toward
"growth", and these factors must be so powerful that this tendency becomes reality not only
just in exceptional cases or just temporarily. This means that the absence of impeding factors
is seldom and needs a special explanation. For research strategies, however, not much has
changed by this shift of emphasis. While Sombart and Weber looked for factors that lead to
25
industrialization, Jones looks for factors that remove obstacles to industrialization.28 In both
cases these must be rare, fortuitous, improbable factors, but in one case they have a positive,
in the other case a negative character.
Here the orthogenetic and the contingency positions coincide. For structural reasons the
agrarian regime normally checks system transcending innovations. First, tendencies toward
innovation occur time and again, but their normal fate is failure. It is really a miracle when
the restricting system conditions of the agrarian regimes are overcome perpetually and this
happened only once in world history: the industrial transformation beginning in Europe.
The major problem for the orthogenetic position is the fact that industrialization was a unique
event starting in Europe. This does not mean in principle that industrialization must be based
on contingent preconditions; even in a strictly orthogenetic view it must be expected that
somewhere in the world the breakthrough to sustained intensive growth initially takes place
(or that the impeding obstacles are effectively removed for the first time). It was highly
improbable that this would occur simultaneously in different places, so the uniqueness of this
breakthrough does not falsify the orthogenetic model. However, the orthogenetic position
gains plausibility when it can demonstrate that several economic entities (societies, nations,
regions) took the path toward industrialization simultaneously. The common example of
Song China provides rather an argument for the transitory character of innovations in agrarian
societies. In the core of the process of industrialization lies positive feed back and selfenhancement that breaks any (social or physical) resistance. This could also mean that
obstacles are removed in a self-sustaining matter so that they do not emerge again and lead to
the quagmire of stagnation common to the agrarian regime.
Orthogeneticism has to
demonstrate that not just occasional and transitory innovation phases but also similar effects
of self-enhancing feedback loops can be shown to have existed outside Europe. A more
suitable object for this demonstration is not China, but Japan for the following reasons:
•
Undoubtedly, Japan is a leading industrial country of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, more precisely, it is the only really successful non-European (and non-neoEuropean) industrial country, maybe with the addition of South Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan.
28
“We need to identify the depressive factors acting at large, before looking to see how they were defeated in the
few triumphant cases” Jones 1988, 87.
26
•
Japan was historically not part of the European culture but during the critical
transformation phase (1750-1850) it was much more isolated from the processes taking
place in Europe than other agrarian civilizations (Russia, Ottoman Empire, India).
If it can be demonstrated that Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868) took an autonomous path toward
industrialization, this is a strong argument for the orthogenetic position.
The historical
coincidence of an industrial and technological self-enhancement on the antipodes, starting
simultaneously and under the condition of isolation, was the best possible corroboration of the
orthogenetic position. This is the reason why social evolutionists like Jones or Sanderson
concentrate so much on the case of Japan.
Jones even claims that a continuous economic "development" started in Japan not only earlier
than the Meiji Restoration, but even before the Tokugawa shogunate. This is demonstrated
through population figures. The population of Japan doubled from 5 million in the eleventh
century to 10 million about 1300 and rose to 18 million about 1600 (Jones 1988, 153).
Agrarian productions must have risen by a factor of three to four in five centuries. At a first
glance, this was nothing but extensive growth, but Jones assumes that material living
standards have risen, too, especially outside the agricultural sector (clerics, traders, warriors).
This is a pattern, however, that can be found in many agrarian civilizations and has to do with
successful surplus attraction. In any case, there must have been a considerable material
growth of the economy before the Tokugawa. Their successful union and pacification of the
islands finally brought several benign effects:
•
A united national market
•
A capital city (Edo/Kyoto) where demand for goods and services concentrated
•
Samurais settled in towns creating a demand for rice
•
The provincial aristocracy had to reside in the capital what concentrated demand
•
Peasant families worked in trades.
On the other hand, Japan’s isolation excluded the country from the technological and
economic arms race that took place in Europe and boosted industrialization. The social
position of merchants was weaker than in Europe. The end of civil wars provided an internal
peace, in sharp contrast to Europe up to the nineteenth century. There was an increase in
agricultural productivity with output doubling between 1600 and 1850 while population
growth was only 45%. There were agricultural innovations, new methods of rotation and new
27
crops (sugar cane, sweet potatoes, peanuts, maize).
However, there are indicators for
Malthusian limits in the late Tokugawa era and material standards of living began to stagnate.
Similar developments took place in Qing China as is shown by Helbling in this volume.
Wong (1997) demonstrated that even patterns of rural industry that in teleological manner are
often called "proto-industrialization" can be found in late imperial China (as well as in Japan).
This combination of market production and household organization seems to have been a
common feature of agrarian civilizations without any tendency toward transgressing this
regime’s boundaries. Following Goldstone (2000), a strong supporter of the contingency
position, the following objections against the claim that Japan showed an independent
tendency toward industrialization can be summarized.
•
Eighteenth century Japan reacted against the fuel shortage common in all agrarian
societies in a traditional way through better resource management: reforestation and fuel
saving. There was no transition to fossil energy carriers.
•
Japan had no decentralized political structure like in Europe, but a strong central
government.
•
In matters of world trade, Japan was isolated. There was no geographic expansion that
widened the horizon, no long distance trade, no elaborated instruments of finance and
insurance that go together with world trade. There were no trade wars that initiated an
arms race with the consequence of military, logistical, and fiscal sophistication.
•
There was no mass production of exportable goods (in contrast to China!). The only
commodity of interest on export markets was high quality steel for swords, but this was
extremely expensive and remained a matter of specialized crafts.
•
There was no scientific revolution, no mechanized world view, so no chance ever to build
scientific foundations for industrial innovation.
•
There was no indication that Japan would ever have invented the steam engine. At least,
there was no tinkering pressure in this direction, as was the case in late seventeenth and
early eighteenth century England.
As we can see, Japan lacked the essential factors connected with European industrialization. If
an autonomous industrialization should have happened in Japan, it would have followed quite
different technological, economic and mental trajectories. This, however, remains a matter of
28
mere speculation.29 The case of Russia, on the other hand, demonstrates that even the
existence of several of these conditions is not enough for sustained success. Industrialization
as it started in Europe remains a miracle calling for explanation.
The initial problem is that we can identify a common pattern of agrarian civilizations but that
this pattern has such a wide scope that several combinations of specific traits can be found
which go back to adaptation to environmental conditions or to specific autopoietic cultural
traditions. When the historically unique process of industrialization (and the emergence of
modern society connected with this basic process) has originated in Europe, it may have
something to do with peculiar traditional features of this civilization.
There is a widely held position that proposes quite an old age of specific European traditions
which led to modern (democratic, rational, individualistic, egalitarian) society. In this view,
Europe’s special course started a long time ago, even in prehistory. Clark and Piggott (1965),
for example, name the following features of long lasting continuity that reach back to the
neolithic Indo-European past:
•
nuclear family instead of enlarged family
•
low populations growth because of a late marriage age
•
stress on individuality instead of community
•
freedom instead of despotism
•
aggressive instead of peaceful mentality
•
high meat consumption instead of vegetarianism
•
high level of energy consumption
•
tendency toward mechanization
•
orientation on competition and achievement instead of harmony
Other authors stress the role of the ancient tradition, above all the Greek polis, which is seen
as the cradle of democracy where the specific European tradition of rational thought und
philosophy emerged (Meier and Veyne 1988).
Authors on the strain of social history
emphasize the bifurcation taken in the Middle Ages. They point to the pattern of extensive
agrarian production in the open field system (Mitterauer 2001, 2003), the tradition of
29
Goldstone (2000, 190) concludes that the case of Japan only demonstrates (like Korea or Taiwan) that “a
unified people under firm government direction determined to import and implement Western industrial
technology can do so in about four decades.”
29
individual freedom (Laslett 1988, Macfarlane 1978) or the connection between Christian
religion and technological innovation (White 1962, Gimpel 1980). All these authors share the
opinion that Europe’s peculiarity reaches back to the distant past.
Thus the process of
"modernization" has roots that are several hundred, if not thousand years old.
In this
perspective, there was always a fundamental difference between Europe and the other agrarian
civilization insofar as it showed an innate tendency toward innovation that its rivals lacked.
In opposition to this, there are not only orthogeneticists insisting on the universal nature of
progressive social evolution, but also partisans of the contingency position who locate the
decisive transformation in a very narrow time frame, depending on extremely specific
conditions. Goldstone (2000, 2002), for example, situates the historical rupture in early
eighteenth century England. Europe, China, and the Ottoman Empire showed no major
differences in early modern times and up to the end of the seventeenth century nothing new
happened. It was only after 1700 that fundamental breakthroughs occurred, in which peculiar
political, scientific-cultural and technological conditions in England converged. It is part of
this extreme fortuity position that the transformation appears to be neither a European nor a
British, but an English, if not a London matter. If this is so, however, the question remains
why the patterns of industrialization and “modern society”could easily spread all over Europe,
while they met severe resistance in most other agrarian civilizations of the world. To answer
this question, we have to deal with several conditions and traditions that are peculiar to
Europe.
Single igniting factors
Ecological conditions
The longest possible tradition is that of geographic-ecological conditions. Already in the
nineteenth century Henry Thomas Buckle (1857) assumed that the natural environment was
less prone to disaster in Europe than in Asia. In light of this fact, he saw the reason why
Europe could develop a stable technological-economic civilization in contrast to poverty and
disorder in Asia. In recent economic history it was mainly Eric Jones (1987) who stressed the
importance of different disaster levels in different geographical regions.
In his (pre-
orthogenetic) "European Miracle" he explained the origin of industrialization from different
levels of insecurity in Europe and Asia (mainly China) that provoked different coping
strategies resulting in different trajectories of social evolution.
30
As a first rough indicator for different environmental insecurity levels he takes the incidence
of (fatal) natural disasters, presumably because they are better documented and open to
quantification than minor risks. However, he knows that natural disasters share physical and
social-economic dimensions. Their importance changes with different forms of land use.
Most spectacular are earthquakes which are said to have resulted in the following casualty
figures:
Total casualty numbers from earthquakes during the last millennium (in millions)30
China
2,03
India
0,3
Europe
0,193
Middle East
0,217
Japan
0,280
In spite of all documentation problems and different population sizes earthquakes seem to
have been more severe in Asia than in Europe. Early Modern Europe’s population was about
20% of the Eurasian population, so that 600,000 of 3,000,000 casualties should be expected,31
but in reality it was less than one third of this figure. In addition to this, European earthquakes
were concentrated on southern Europe. In Italy between 464 BC and 1980 AD no less than
350 earthquakes are documented.
After the year 1300 there were between 207 and 225
earthquakes in Italy or on the average one every three years (Guidoboni 1994; Boschi 1995).
In Spain (Ladero Quesada 1999) and Greece (Papazachos/ Papazachou 1997) many
earthquakes also occurred, but the exact numbers for the Mediterranean are not known.
In contrast to this, northern Europe hardly experienced any earthquakes during the last
centuries. Basel was destroyed on the October 18, 1356 with about 300 casualties.32 Casualty
figures in other Central European regions are negligible: eight killed in Unterwalden (1601),
nineteen in Innsbruck (1689), and one in Aachen (1756). This compares to India: 2,000 in
30
After Latter (1968/69), Table 4. Latter only counts earthquakes that demanded at least 78,500 casualties (that
is the number of casualties between 1949 and 1969). In Europe, however, there was only one earthquake of this
magnitude (Messina 1908 with 83,000 casualties). The famous Lisbon earthquake of 1755 killed about 50,000
people, many of them by a tsunami. For earthquakes of a longer time ago such a limitation on large numbers
makes sense, because data are very unreliable. For natural disasters in China see Kolb in this volume.
31
According to Latter (1968/69, 362) the total casualty number from earthquakes during the last 1,000 years is 5
million. The number of 3 million only concerns the 16 largest disasters.
31
Bombay (1618), 3,000 in Cutch (1819), 1,000 in Cashmere (1828), 19,000 in the Kangra
Valley (1909). China’s figures are even higher: 80,000 in 1556; about 400,000 in 1662 and
1731; 5,000 in 1920.33
Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions cause not only casualties (like epidemics do), but they
destroy buildings, too. At a first glance this may not have played such an important role in
agrarian societies, but different types of agriculture should be taken into consideration. In
Europe a relatively extensive form of rain agriculture is dominant with comparably small
impact on the agrarian landscape. Fields and meadows are very elastic when confronted with
exogenous shocks (like earthquakes or the impact of warfare), and after a severe disturbance
production can continue within a short period of time. The situation is completely different
with irrigation agriculture or when rivers have to be dammed. When an earthquake destroys
dams, irrigation canals or aqueducts, it may take years until the damage is repaired. Chinese
agriculture had not only to expect earthquakes more frequently, but the damages on hydraulic
devices caused by them also led to a longer lasting disturbance of production and higher repair
costs.34 It may be very difficult to do something in the matter of prevention regarding
earthquakes which are sudden and unexpected events, although there are some construction
measures that can decrease damages. However, these measures lead to higher prevention
costs that can be regarded as insurance costs against unforeseen disasters.
Another environmental factor is climatic fluctuations. Already Buckle's comparison between
Europe and Asia regarded not so much spectacular earthquakes and volcano eruptions but
climatic extremes like droughts or inundations due to heavy rainfall that result in famines.
Jones also mainly refers to extreme climatic events acting as exogenous disturbances on
which societies have to react (Anderson / Jones 1988, 4). The basic assumption is that Asia
experiences larger climatic fluctuations than Europe with the result that there are more
climatic disasters like droughts, inundations and storms. If this were the case it would be
more difficult to achieve a regular average level in agricultural production.35 However, the
alleged significant difference of precipitation fluctuation levels between Asia and Europe has
been doubted with regard to recent data (Pryor 1985).
The more ecologically homogenous an agricultural region is the more important should be the
role of climatic fluctuations for the economy. The European environment is parceled in many
32
For Basel see Borst 1981
Figures after Herrmann 1936, 135f.
34
Similar problems existed at North West European coasts with storm tides and breaking dykes, cf. JakubowskyTiessen 1992.
35
Wang / Zhao 1981. The authors restrain from any general conclusions.
33
32
different small climate zones, so it is highly improbable that fluctuations simultaneously take
the same direction, as is the case on the Indian subcontinent or in China, where similar
climatic conditions prevail over large areas. Another effect is that there are different chances
to cope with disasters by transportation when the scope of the affected territories is different.
Hunger following crop failure is the combined result of uncontrollable natural factors and a
limited capability to portfolio building by long distance transport, for example.
There are numerous famines in the record of agrarian civilizations, but not much reliable data
concerning causes and numbers of casualties are available.36 China is supposed to have
experienced at least 1,818 severe famines due to draughts and inundations between 108 BC
and 1911 AD. This is on average one per year, although such problems occurred in different
provinces. In India spectacular incidents are also known. The famine in Bengal (1769/70)
killed 10 million people or one third of the total population. However, there were also
famines with comparable effects in Europe and they could also be caused by climatic
extremes.37 Crop failure happened quite often, and casualties could be considerable. In
Eastern Prussia about 250,000 people or about 41% of the total population died from hunger
in 1708/11. A famine in France killed 2 million people or 10% of the total populations in
1692/94. In Finland a quarter to a third of the population is supposed to have died in the
1696/97 famine. Braudel provides the following famine figures for France:
Number of famine years in France per century (Braudel 1974, 39)
century 10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
famines 10
26
2
14
7
13
11
16
Only general famines, not just local crop failures, are included in this list. In Europe hunger
only disappeared in the nineteenth century as a consequence of agrarian innovations including
new crops like the potato, higher yields resulting from new kinds of crop rotation and manure
techniques, combined with better transport conditions with railroads and shipping.38 It is
important, however, that we should not forget that the Irish Potato Famine of 1845/46 still
claimed several million casualties.
36
For Chinese data see Kolb in this volume. For Europe e.g. Abel 1978.
Cf. above all Pfister 1999; Glaser 2000.
38
See Abel 1978; Montanari 1993.
37
33
A fundamental problem is that famines are not only the result of climatic-ecological
fluctuations but have social and political aspects as well. Extreme climatic events are only
one factor, in addition to which social and economic coping strategies, mainly the
organization of storage, transport and distribution, must be taken into consideration. This is
the case with all agrarian civilizations beyond the threshold of a mere subsistence economy,
so that it is difficult to distinguish between crop failure and management failure. There were
considerable endeavors in eighteenth century European states to cope with famines (e.g.
Zimmermann 1997), but this was also the case in imperial China.
Epidemics are a further ecological factor. They can be regarded as typical secondary risks of
the agrarian mode of production, because they are favored by a high population density and a
close contact with animals that could lead to zoonoses. Epidemics are a catastrophic sideeffect of the basic agrarian strategy to control energy flows by the use of bio-converters. It is
not clear how high mortality rates due to infectious disease were in different regions and if
there really were significant differences between the Eurasian civilizations. The following
data for China can only give a rough impression:
Number of epidemics in China39
century
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
epidemics
5
11 8
7
7
8
9
4
8
2
7
8
9
27 28 21 18 32 33
Mortality caused by epidemics may not have been lower in Europe over longer periods of
time. Jones assumes that there was not so much an effective difference in absolute mortality
figures but in collateral damages of natural disasters. In contrast to earthquakes, famines
leave capital intact so that the disturbance of the economy is only transitory.40 Therefore, if
high mortality events in Europe were rather caused by epidemics than by natural disasters
devastating capital investment, this could be one reason why the economic process
experienced less exogenous disturbances than in Asia.
39
After the table in McNeill 1976, 269-276. An increase of numbers in the course of time may be the result of
better documentation.
40
Anderson / Jones, 1988, 7 call this the "neutron bomb effect" of epidemics as compared with earthquakes that
cause longer lasting damage.
34
Demography and family types
As we have seen, it is not so easy to identify different levels of environmental uncertainty in
Asia compared to Europe. Jones’ assumption may be true for big natural disasters, but it
becomes dubious for mortality resulting from famines (that contain political and social
elements) or epidemics. One indicator for different levels of natural dangers may be the
fluctuation of population size.
More volatile environmental conditions should express
themselves in a higher demographic volatility. Maybe the following chart can be interpreted
in this sense:
Population dynamics in China and Europe (in million)41
1400
1200
1000
800
Europe
China
600
400
200
0
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
The higher volatility of the Chinese as compared to the European population can be (at first
sight) interpreted as a direct effect of different levels of ecological uncertainty that is the result
of different mortality figures due to catastrophes. In addition to this, Jones and other authors
propose a second argument concerning different fertility levels. If environmental conditions
are not stable and calculable, it does not make much sense to venture much into investments
that depend on constant circumstances. In demographic respect this could mean that fewer
41
Data for China till 1980 after Zhao / Xie 1988, afterwards Official Census, 2000 (courtesy to Raimund Kolb);
for Europe Livi-Bacci 1997.
35
expenses are invested in one single child, but the total number of offspring is increased with
the expectation that one or the other child will survive. If, on the other side, environmental
and economic expectations are stable, fewer children are born and it is beneficial to put more
expenses into rearing and educating them. This is a basic assumption of the widespread
theory of demographic transition, which claims that the expectation of a low infant mortality
leads to a reduction of fertility.
From this theoretical model far reaching conclusions are derived. Jones claims that different
family patterns in Asia and Europe can be interpreted as adaptations to different
environmental fluctuation levels.
To make this plausible, two ideal family types are
distinguished that possess opposite traits: 42
1. In patrilineal enlarged families relatively large numbers of people are considered to be
closely related. In a big household it is always possible to feed an additional family member
because the correlation between resource availability and family size is rather loose. This
means that a higher rate of population growth is accepted, but investment in a particular
person is relatively low. This strategy can be seen as an adaptation to a higher level of
uncertainty (natural disasters, war), with the effect of enhancing this uncertainty and also of
provoking repeated Malthusian crises. In terms of risk theory, the enlarged family pattern is a
portfolio strategy under the conditions of high uncertainty. This strategy insures people in
several respects:
•
Against natural disasters, when direct material support is offered, e.g. a house is rebuilt
after a fire or food is provided after a crop failure. However, the success depends on the
assumption that most family members live in ecologically different regions so that they
are not simultaneously hit by the same natural event.
•
Against biographic disasters like disease or death, so that widows, orphans or invalids can
be supported.
•
Against political turbulences, so that "reinsurances" with possible powers are contracted
when different family members join different political factions – but this could be a
dimension that only plays a role with aristocratic families.
•
Against individual offenders who are threatened with collective revenge (vendetta), the
deterrent effect of which increases with the size and power of the family groups involved.
42
Hajnal 1965; Macfarlane 1978; Smith 1979; Goody 1983.
36
•
Individual career chances are opened by nepotism, which has the reciprocal effect that a
powerful family network can be built.
This stabilizing portfolio strategy, however, has its particular price. A successful family
member has to carry a heavy load. If he is rich, he has to support poor relatives. If he is
powerful, he has to protect them. If he is strong, he has to fight for them and to defend their
honor. Thus, he loses a large part of his autonomy and these are the insurance costs of this
strategy. This could have the consequence that social mobility runs into a pattern of stationary
fluctuation, so that any social trajectory is severely impeded. Success destroys its own
preconditions because it leads to a growing burden.
2. In opposition to the patrilineal enlarged family stands the nuclear family, consisting mainly
of parents and their offspring, and occasionally a few further dependent family members
(unmarried siblings, widowed grandparents). The basic principle of this nuclear family is that
with each marriage a new family is founded (and the couple does not join an already existing
family).
Marriage and legitimate procreation are thus connected with the founding (or
inheritance) of an independent household. From this principle the following traits can be
derived:
•
late marriage age (especially of the husband), because establishing a household depends
on economic independence from the parents;
•
neo-local residence of the married couple, hence higher geographic mobility;
•
a tendency toward a higher level of household income, because poor and dependent people
are not allowed to marry.
The nuclear family pattern has a number of implications that include trajectories rather
improbable within the context of enlarged families:
•
It produces a very close connection between resource availability and the number of
offspring because it is very sensible to situations of (expected) scarcity. This could have
the function that demographic dynamics are closer tied to the resource base than is the
case with other family types. Thus the nuclear family is demographically stabilizing.
•
When the contraction of marriage is connected with the foundation of an economically
independent household, a large part of the population must remain unmarried. Thus a
demographic reserve exists that can be mobilized in situations of increased mortality
(epidemics, war). This demographic regime is rather flexible.
37
•
When marriage depends on economic qualifications, individual qualities like parsimony,
industry, discipline and patience are rewarded. In this context only the husband is a fully
respected citizen, so that a social incentive for marriage exists. Thus the principle of
individual achievement is favored.
•
In the northwest European nuclear family there was a widespread habit that older children
join strange households as maids or servants in agriculture or as apprentices or
journeymen in the crafts. This meant that the husband was socially and geographically
mobile before he settled down as independent farmer or master. This pattern of temporary
serfdom favored social permeability and the journeymen’s travels led to a rapid technology
transfer.
•
The nuclear family had economic obligations only for its own members. They were not
obliged to provide for distantly related people. This meant that acquired wealth was not
immediately consumed by relatives and private accumulation became possible.
•
The backside of this was the fact that many people could become totally unrelated
(widows, orphans, old persons). They had to be supported by public institutions (church,
community, welfare state). Thus a contrast between the private (civil society) and the
public sphere (state, welfare institutions) came into being.
Jones and other authors draw far reaching conclusions from these ideal types which they apply
to the situation in Asia and Europe. In their view, the higher uncertainty level in Asia favored
the enlarged family pattern with the result that these societies were fixed on a trajectory
hampering the transition to individualism, personal initiative and achievement, rule of law,
market economy, and therefore industrialization. More stable and calculable environmental
conditions in Europe, on the other hand, favored a social trajectory that lead to the industrial
transformation. 43
The two different patterns of coping with risks can be summarized:
1. It is assumed that the Asian situation was characterized by high levels of uncertainty,
strong environmental fluctuations, socio-political anarchy and a permanent threat of
violence. Hence the great advantage of stable social networks that acted as insurance
against these risks and allowed to build calculable expectations within a strongly
fluctuating environment. When the membership in these networks was defined by descent
(and not by contract) this had the advantage of unambiguity. But the consequence was that
43
More explicitely Laslett 1988.
38
the type of "entrepreneurial individual" that marked the development in early modern
Europe could not succeed.
2. In Europe the level of environmental risks was lower, and public institutions regulating
conflict independent from social status like rule of law, legal certainty, equality before the
law developed (or never disappeared). In addition to this, public welfare institutions
existed. In this situation the benefit of family networks diminished while their costs
remained.
Now a strategy of individualization was awarded that enabled a closer
connection between individual labor and achievement. In this context the enlarged family
became too costly and too clumsy, so that an individual secession from these networks no
longer met social sanctions.
As a matter of fact, this is rather a rough distinction of ideal types that wishes to fix two
opposite tendencies. However, it might be the case that whenever environmental or social
conditions change, it is evolutionarily awarded to move into the direction of one of these
extremes. If security increases, steps into the direction of individuality and rule of law can be
taken, thus improving the security standard. This might be the way how a process of positive
feed back emerged, leading Europe starting from a lower level of environmental hazard
toward the path to industrialization and modern society.
From this perspective, the European transformation could be the result of an initial situation of
low environmental dangers and a higher reliability of institutions, functionally coupled with
the nuclear family. In this respect, the nuclear family could be seen as the result of fortuitous
conditions that only gained an adaptive function under changed circumstances.44
This
European predisposition could reach back far into the past: into the High Middle Ages,45 the
Early Middle Ages,46 if not to prehistory.47 In Asia a complementary development could have
happened, going back to older adaptations or to autopoietic cultural patterns that proved
totally adapted to the system conditions of the agrarian regime, but became an obstacle for the
industrial transformation.
The claimed differences between the European and the Asiatic, especially the Chinese family
patterns, stressed mainly by Jones, Laslett and Macfarlane, are strongly rejected by newer
44
Oesterdiekhoff 2002 demonstrates the complex implications of this pattern (cognatic descent, lack of ancestral
worship, women’s higher position, etc.).
45
Especially Mitterauer 1997; 2000.
46
E.g. Goody 1983.
47
Clark / Piggott 1965 see the historical origin of this pattern in the bronce age. If this is true, it must have been
a case of cultural autopoietic preadaptation.
39
empirical research.48 On one hand, this concerns the universal character of the nuclear family
pattern in northwestern Europe that is doubted regarding some empirical exceptions.
However, this objection does not destroy the general pattern. Much more important are
objections concerning the functional non-ambiguity of the "Asiatic" pattern. One argument
points to close similarities between the family patterns in Europe and Japan (McNeill 1996).
A more fundamental importance have the results of recent research on the Chinese family
demonstrating that the alleged connection between the patrilineal extended family and a
positive Malthusian demographic regime is nothing but a fairy tale.49
From this criticism, it does not necessarily follow that the differences between the nuclear
family pattern and the patrilineal enlarged family pattern could not have any consequences
leading to different social trajectories.
The possibility remains that neo-local residence,
temporary serfdom, late marriage age coupled with economic independence provoked a
behavior that was functionally connected with social and geographic mobility, personal
achievement, capital accumulation, and favored the industrial transformation. However, there
seems to be no direct relation to different levels of environmental uncertainty, so that the
adaptive explanation has failed.
The major result of these considerations is that the
confrontation between a Malthusian positive demographic regime in China and a preventive
demographic regime in Europe can be sustained no longer; neither is it viable to derive them
from different environmental conditions.
Agriculture
The industrial transformation was preceded by an agricultural revolution in Europe (especially
in the Netherlands and in England) that is supposed to be one of its preconditions (cf. Overton
1996, Allen 2000). It lies in the nature of agriculture as a controlled solar energy system that
there are always endeavors to increase productivity. The history of agricultural production is
a history of a permanent (albeit not continuous) rise of efficiency. This tendency belongs to
the principle of agriculture such that it does not necessarily transgress the limits of the
agricultural regime. On the other hand it is highly plausible that there could not have been an
industrial transformation had there not been previous increases in agricultural productivity
(Komlos 2000). It seems to be a classical matter of predisposition.
In agricultural production two different types of productivity increases can be distinguished.
The choice of either one leads to different trajectories that are hardly reversible:
48
49
Cf. the overview in Goody 2000. Eglauer and Helbling in this volume
Eglauer 2001. Empirical evidence for this in Lee / Wang 1999.
40
1. Rise of land productivity by means of increased labor input.
This strategy aims at
producing higher yields from a given area. In agrarian societies it can be expected that
this increase of efficiency goes together with an increase of efforts so that intensification
leads to a combination of rising land productivity and diminishing labor productivity, if
there are no simultaneous cost-neutral technological innovations. We can call this a path
of horticulturalization. In extreme cases the use of laboring animals (horses, oxen)
declines and the hoe replaces the plow.
2. Rise of labor productivity and mechanization. This strategy aims at lowering labor input
in tilling the land. This extension of production can be based on two different methods:
technological progress and increase of the cultivated area. The latter is hardly possible in
advanced agrarian societies that possess only minor land reserves. However, in a pioneer
situation when farmers acquire new land this can be an important strategy. This was the
case when America was colonized by European farmers.
An important feature of European agriculture is that its extensive character led to a trajectory
open to an increase of labor productivity by means of mechanization. This trajectory was
based on preconditions rooted in the distant past. In ancient times, European agriculture of
the Mediterranean was dominated by the cultivation of wheat and barley combined with olives
and vine. In Northern Europe rearing of livestock prevailed. During the European Middle
Ages an "agrarian revolution" (Mitterauer 2003) took place in northwestern Europe that had
its center in grain cultivation: rye for bread and oats for horse fodder. For this purpose a new
organization of agricultural production was developed since the sixth century AD – the threefield system, combined with the use of commons for pasture and wood provision.
In contrast to the Mediterranean and many other agricultural regions of the world, agriculture
in northwestern European relies on rainfall and not on artificial irrigation (the major problem
being too much water, not a lack of it). Humid summers allow the use of meadows to win
fodder with which livestock can be fed during the winter. In combination with pasture (waste
land, marginal land, fallow) an extensive kind of agriculture developed dedicating large areas
to the production of fodder to rear horses and cattle that could be used as mounts or draught
animals.
The heavy plow capable to cut moist soil developed in the early Middle Ages and was
widespread since the eleventh century. Its operation first demanded the use of 6-8 oxen or 2-4
horses and it was an expensive investment that could only be afforded by larger holders or
communities. This favored the development of forms of communal land cultivation and land
41
distribution such as the open field system. European agriculture was based on the use of
extensive areas which nourished draught animals. A tendency toward horticultural production
could not develop here with the exception of some highly specialized branches (viticulture,
vegetables, fruits etc.). There were, however, chances for mechanization.
The type of European agriculture that emerged in the early Middle Ages existed more than a
thousand years with only minor modifications. Grain producing Europe which combined the
three-field system, a widespread use of laboring animals, relatively low land productivity, and
a decentralized manorial system probably was one of the preconditions for the industrial
transformation. But this system was not necessarily self-transforming. The old agrarian
Europe formed a very stable system that only came to an end in the context of
industrialization, although there were elements of fundamental innovation in some regions
(Holland, England) that prepared this process.
There are also political aspects of European agriculture. The heavy plow demands strong
horses that have to be bred. When they exist, they form the fundament of a heavily armored
cavalry. The mounted knights of the European Middle Ages were the only military power
capable to resist invaders from Central Asia. This was one reason why Europe, in contrast to
China, India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Russia, etc., was not conquered and devastated
by the Mongols. In addition to this, the heavy cavalry horse with its high demand on land for
fodder (not just grass but oats) favored a decentralized distribution of military power. This
may be one root for European fragmentation, that is the absence of a "despotic" center. We
should not forget that this horse was the backbone for overland transportation with carts and
carriages as well. The transport revolution of the eighteenth century that resulted from this
tradition is undoubtedly one aspect of the industrial transformation.
The tradition of
mechanical bio-converters is a rather inert precondition that could not be imitated at will.
Finally there are implications that European agriculture had for technological innovation. To
bake bread rye has to be milled.
European weather conditions combined with a hilly
landscape and many streams provide enough running water to build mills that became
ubiquitous since the Middle Ages. The operation of numerous mills scattered all over the
country was a fundament for widespread technological tinkering from which rotation
technology developed since the Middle Ages. We should not forget that these "macroinventions" (Mokyr 1990) were almost completed in the late Middle Ages, and that not much
new happened between 1500 and 1750. Milling technology was part of the European agrarian
pattern and stabilized as this pattern was completed. The transformation since the eighteenth
42
century could base on this tradition, but eventually it had to create something new – the steam
engine.
As we saw, there were several features of European agriculture that favored industrialization
or at least did not build obstacles to it.
Some of these pre-adaptive features can be
summarized:
•
Grain production with the plow and other mechanical devices opens a path to
mechanization in agriculture.
•
Extensive agriculture with rather large reserve areas gives room to experimentation.
•
Horses are ubiquitous as draught animals for tillage and transport and as mounts for
decentralized military forces.
•
Milling of rye favors the spread of watermills over the countryside providing a wide scope
for mechanical tinkering.50
Let's take a short comparative look to China.51 In Southern China wet rice cultivation is
known since the 6th millennium BC, while in the North wheat and millet were cultivated.
Since the Han, wet rice cultivation supported by irrigation spread in regions that were devoted
to wheat and millet before. Wet rice is well adapted to a warm and moist climate with good
soils, where more than two harvests a year are possible. To achieve this, the seeds have to
germinate in special patches and are later transplanted to the field. This means that less space
is squandered where weed can grow. The young seedlings stand closely together and are only
transplanted when they need more space. This is an ingenious method to use scarce areas
more efficiently.
But this strategy has the price of very high labor intensity with sowing, transplanting,
weeding, spreading of manure (with human excrements) and maintaining the hydraulic
system. Thus population density can increase as do yields per land unit. This is the classical
case for horticultural production: while land productivity rises, labor productivity has a
tendency to fall. While in eighteenth century Europe about 0.5-1 t grain could be harvested
from one hectare, in China it was 3 tons of unhusked rice or 2.1 tons of husked rice. This
means that in China up to four persons could be fed from an area that was needed to feed one
person in Europe. The price for this success was a considerably higher labor input. This led
China to a different trajectory: the technological obstacles to mechanize wet rice cultivation
50
In China, water mills were used to de-husk rice and to produce flour for noodles, but it remains unclear how
wide milling technology was spread over the countryside.
43
are much higher than to mechanize grain production. There were almost no laboring animals
or agricultural machinery involved.
Thus, there was little incentive to technological
innovation – one aspect of Elvin's "high level equilibrium trap".
A similar tendency toward horticulturalization, however, can be observed in early modern
Europe. Kjaergaard (1994) demonstrates that in Denmark agricultural labor efforts have
considerably increased between 1500 and 1800, due to more labor intensive operations as
draining, marling or fertilizing land. The average workday became three to four hours longer
while there were one to two more workdays a week.
This was a consequence of the
Reformation, which abolished most church holidays. Their number dropped from fifty to
seven. In the fifteenth century people worked on average thirty-five to forty hours a week,
while about 1800 AD this number had increased to sixty hours. Between 1500 and 1800 the
Danish population doubled, as did total agrarian production, while labor input quadrupled.
This tendency could only be reversed as a consequence of agrarian mechanization in the
nineteenth century. But this case makes clear that European agriculture also faced a high
level equilibrium trap from which it could only escape by the change of the social-metabolic
regime.
Despotism and fragmentation
One widespread explanation of Europe's special course concentrates on political peculiarities,
above all "fragmentation": the absence of a despotic central power and the tradition of
political participation and self-rule (parliaments, free cities). This motif goes back to classical
antiquity. Already the Greek anti-Persian propaganda confronted the free polis with oriental
despotism. One major feature of the poleis was their multiplicity. They had the absence of a
political center combined with a cultural union (language, philosophy, Delphic oracle,
Olympic Games). This idea was continued in medieval Christianity, especially in the antiuniversalistic propaganda of peripheral powers like the French or English "reguli" against the
Holy Roman Empire.
This combination of fragmentation and freedom remained an
ideological element of the European orders of 1648 or 1815.
The idea that there is a specific anti-despotic, anti-centralistic European tradition is prominent
in many explanations of the industrial transformation (e.g. Baechler 1975, Hall 1985, Gellner
1995, Macfarlane 2000). The basic argument is that the absence of a political centre favored
the free interaction of forces which spontaneously produced modern democratic society.
51
See Helbling in this volume.
44
There is a special accent on the lack of a power center that might have had a negative
influence on the social and economic development.
Since the nineteenth century the traditional idea of oriental despotism was given a material
fundament. Marx put the "Asiatic Mode of Production" in one line with the European
“progressive social formations” slavery and feudalism.52 This model was later expanded to a
general theory of hydraulic society claiming that infrastructure maintenance by the Chinese
government (irrigation systems, dams) was the cause for its despotic character (Wittfogel
1931, 1957). Already Marx ascribed a fundamental historical immobility to the Asiatic Mode
of Production (in contrast to "Germanic" feudalism), so that its transformation into a modern
(capitalist) society could not be expected by internal development but only by external force.53
In this view, Asia was trapped in political and economic stagnation resulting from irrigation
agriculture.
In our context the question is if and how far fragmentation was a peculiar European
characteristic, what its fundaments were, and, more generally, which were the advantages or
disadvantages of centralization or decentralization in respect to the industrial transformation.
To begin with, agrarian civilizations always tend to develop into empires that periodically
collapse again (Tainter 1988, Yoffee/Cowgill 1988). Centralization and decentralization can
thus be seen as pulsing movements of agrarian states without any historical tendency. During
the gunpowder age all over Eurasia several new empires originated: Ming China (1369-1644)
and Qing China(1644-1911), the Ottoman Empire (1453-1923), the Russian Empire, that
finally conquered Central Asia (1480-1917), the Moghul Empire (1526-1707/1857), and
Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867). Only Europe remained fragmented in particular states that
expanded overseas and built colonial empires (Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, France, and
England).
After Charlemagne had failed to reconstruct the Roman Empire from the northwest, European
history was characterized by a struggle of smaller political units. The normal case of such a
situation in agrarian societies is that these units eliminate each other until there is one empire
left. In contrast to this development, Europe formed a balanced system of powers based on
the consensus that the emergence of hegemony is to be avoided. From anarchy to oligarchy,
but not further to despotism – this is Europe's peculiar political development (Baechler 1988,
43).
52
Marx, Grundrisse (ed. 1953)
“England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating – the annihilation of
old Asiatic society, and the laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia.” Marx 1853, 248.
53
45
From an evolutionary point of view, the European situation since early modern times is
characterized by a particular structure. The cultural unity of Christendom coexisted with
political fragmentation. None of the competing states ever succeeded in gaining supremacy so
that there was always considerable room to move between the states. The information flow
between political units could not be controlled although there were repeated attempts to do
this. Mobility of money, commodities, technological know-how, and qualified workers could
not be stopped. If political, religious or fiscal pressure was to high, capital and qualified
people migrated to more favorable places, with the consequence that all attempts at selfsufficient isolation ended in a disaster. Nothing could permanently be kept secret or under
effective government control.
Even large political catastrophes remained restricted to smaller regions. The CounterReformation could not suppress Protestantism while the devastations of Northern Italy, of the
Southern Netherlands, or of Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not
permanently disturb the economic process.
Political fragmentation increased Europe’s
resilience considerably and encompassing severe disturbances were extremely improbable in
this flexible system. This was a situation that favored the emergence and stabilization of
innovation. There were multiple niches where one could escape political pressure and
simultaneously it was possible to orient on a larger public, so that innovation did not suffocate
by accidental failure of communication.
Since early modern times Europe’s political situation was marked by a unique dualism of
centralization and decentralization. The picture of Europe as a political unit is chaotic.
Particular states and dominions are in heavy conflict and wars between European powers are
the normal case. On the other side, within the state boundaries there is a powerful tendency
toward pacification and the establishment of a stable and reliable rule of law. In the course of
time, the number of independent political units decreases. This trend accelerates in the
nineteenth century. Thus Europe combines the advantages and disadvantages of centralization
as well as of decentralization that can be sketched as follows.
Advantages and disadvantages of centralization
The major functional advantage of political centralization is the state monopoly in the use of
force. Feuds and latent civil wars are eliminated on a certain territory and an internal peace is
established. This means that barter and purchase may replace plunder and blackmail, regular
taxation takes the place of incalculable confiscation, the weak are protected from
encroachments of the strong and a rule of law can be established.
46
This pacification begins when the strongest belligerent party prevails and succeeds in
disarming its enemies as well as its subjects. A further step towards a legal order is taken
when the central power achieves competence in the administration of justice and public
administration.
The end result may be the destruction of social networks (clans, tribal
organizations), the weakening of communal self-government, and a tendency towards
individualization and atomization of the subjects. In the same measure as middling social
powers lose competence, the direct relationship between citizens and the state gains weight.
Economically this means that transaction and insurance costs fall (regular taxes instead of
irregular contribution), that life is more secure so that long term planning becomes viable and
the economic process wins stability. Long-distance traffic over land increases, buffers can be
diminished, investments are protected, the level of self-sufficiency can be lowered, and more
specialization and division of labor are favored with the result of a more differentiated
industrial structure (North / Thomas 1976).
The advanced agrarian monarchies attract growing parts of their subjects’ income to maintain
the military (standing army, navy) and the bureaucracy. As a side-effect demand for mass
produced commodities (weapons, uniforms) increases and the profit expectations of purveyors
to the court (mostly of luxury goods) stabilize. The court as a large place of consumption thus
offers opportunities for technological and product innovation, albeit mainly for trinkets.
Political centralization also has its disadvantages that arise from its very nature. Rulers
normally do not define themselves as "ministers of the state" and even less as suppliers of
services for the economy.
From their perspective, the economy has to serve political
purposes: to provide money, goods, technological devices, and people as recruits and labor
force. When the central state gains a monopoly in the use of force, civil war is ended and
internal peace is established, but there is no guaranty that this state of peace is not oppressive
in itself. The disarmed subjects may be delivered to arbitrary rule without a chance of
successful resistance.
Bureaucratization may establish a tendency towards a rational administration, but it may also
tend to petrify and to become parasitic. The economy which regulated by a bureaucratic state
develops inefficient monopolies whose main function is to stabilize the rent incomes of their
beneficiaries. Taxation may reach confiscatory levels paralyzing the economy.
Luxury
consumption of the court may lead to unproductive squandering of surplus. The end of civil
war may actually result in external wars that are equally, if not more, destructive.
47
Advantages and disadvantages of decentralization
Decentralization has advantages and disadvantages that are complementary to those of
centralization. Its major advantage is to avoid the disadvantage of too much centralization.
When no power exists that is able to control and regiment larger territories, petrification and
checks of innovation strongly connected with over-centralization are impossible by definition.
Thus the autonomy of scattered political and economic units (towns, monasteries, villas,
domains) that prevailed in Europe may have been a precondition for the formation of a market
economy (Mann 1986). Guilds usually were organized in a decentralized pattern. However
rigid their rules may have been in a particular town, they had almost no power over nearby
regions. Extensive negotiation resulting in larger unions could have brought a solution to this
problem, but this only worked in essentially vital matters such as military defense, but even
here urban leagues were notorious for their fragility and unreliability.
The advantage of decentralization is primarily negative in nature. It favors the existence of a
multiplicity of cultural settings and legal frames, thus enabling an evolutionary process in
which those solutions can prevail that are best adapted to existing circumstances. There is not
much scope for really dysfunctional idiosyncrasies, which are soon eliminated.
This
evolutionary process is propelled by the mobility between different units: the migration of
people, ideas, and commodities.
This holds for political matters as well. There is no chance for a unified political strategy
encompassing many independent states and large regions, because there are always single
states that leave the consensus as dissidents by taking their own path. The consequences of
this become clear when maritime expansion is compared in China and Europe. Between 1405
and 1433 China ventured a series of maritime expeditions that led its fleets to Java, Ceylon,
and East Africa. An intrigue at the Ming court brought this expansion to a halt and after 1480
long distance sea travels were forbidden. Columbus, on the other hand, failed in Genoa and
Portugal, but succeeded in Spain.
After 1500, there should have been numerous court
intrigues in Europe, from Italy via Portugal and Spain, to England and the Netherlands to stop
a further maritime expansion. This, of course, was virtually impossible. In 1493 Pope
Alexander VI sanctioned an agreement that distributed the New World between Spain and
Portugal. The French King Charles VIII commented on this "raya" with the sentence that
such a clause in Adam’s testament was unknown to him. In Japan the Tokugawa could
successfully suppress the use of firearms after they had gained power (Perrin 1982). In 1139,
the Second Lateran Council prohibited the use of cross-bows in Christian Europe, but for each
48
particular European prince it would have been suicidal to comply, so the prohibition remained
without any effect.
The functional disadvantages of decentralization are its tendency to anarchy, to civil war and
general insecurity. Highway robbery and arbitrary customs paralyze traffic and lower the
division of labor. They also increase transaction and insurance costs. An unstable and
unreliable administration, insecure taxation, multiple norms and laws hinder economic
integration. The same holds for a regionally differentiated money system that complicates
payment and produces extra costs for exchange.
In conclusion, the fundamental problem is that the weakness or absence of a central state can
lead to local self-sufficiency, anarchy and insecurity, but it gives the opportunity for
competition and self-government. A strong centralized state offers security and peace, but it
may paralyze the society by regimentation and over-taxation. Both tendencies can have
detrimental consequences – powerful and excessive political institutions as well as the lack of
those institutions.
Fatal for the economic process is an incalculably pulsating state as
described by Ibn Khaldun. It is weak and fragile but also destructive and parasitic. An
efficient despotism like in China, however, runs the danger of extending the rule of politics
over the economy, leaving little scope for individual achievement.
One peculiarity of Europe is its unique combination of centralization and decentralization.
Europe may not have "invented the state" as some authors claim (Creveld 1999, Reinhard
1999), but it developed a structure of internal order which at the same time left the fragmented
plurality of political units intact.
There are several different national paths in different
European regions that explain this plurality. England after the Norman Conquest was a highly
centralized monarchy with little autonomy (and allodium) for the aristocracy and the estates,
who later gained liberties from weak kings. The French state grew slowly and continuously
from a small center, and its kings had to make arrangements with a preexisting "civil society”
and they never gained total control, despite the program of absolutism. Estates, towns, and
parliaments kept large pieces of autonomy that were wrought from them in a long struggle for
power that was only concluded after the revolution. In Germany and Italy, and to a lesser
degree France, there were free, independent, self-governed towns, which were privileged by
relatively weak emperors as allies against territorial princes.
Such a highly fragmented political landscape was very difficult to conquer. In the normal
case, agricultural empires have a power center that controls its periphery by threat of force.
Conquest must aim at this center, and conquerors can succeed when they find allies among the
49
subdued periphery. If the center shows signs of weakness, the periphery changes sides and
the empire collapses like a card house. This happened again and again in Persia, China,
Mexico, Peru, India, etc. Europe never had such a center, and this was the reason why it was
extremely resilient against conquest. Even if the Turks had taken Vienna in 1683, resistance
would have been maintained in the other imperial territories, to say nothing about France, the
Netherlands or England.
When we look at the incidence of political fragmentation in a world history context, it
becomes clear that Europe is no exemption. Fragmentation can be found in Islamic territories
and a similar case is India after the death of Aurangzeb. Only in China do we find a
continuity of the typical "despotic" union of culture and state. In this respect, fragmented
Europe was not unique, and maybe it is the other way round: China is the classical case of an
agrarian civilization that is politically united over a very long period of time, with only short
interruptions in times of crisis. In this political respect, China is unique. But the point of this
interpretation is not fragmentation as such, but the duality of smaller centralized and highly
integrated "proto-national" political units (like France and England) and the multiplicity of
such units in a larger context, that became typical for Europe since the late Middle Ages.
Warfare
Starting with Francis Bacon, the invention of gunpowder is supposed to be a classical factor
for modern European development. This means that on the military sector there was a series
of key innovations leading to a military supremacy of European powers compared with other
civilizations.
Since Michael Roberts’ seminal work,54 technological, logistic, and
administrative-fiscal elements are distinguished in the process of the early modern "military
revolution". Its major elements are the substitution of weapons of close contact (sword, lance)
by weapons working at a distance (crossbow, musket), the shift from pitched battle to siege
warfare (canon, fortification), the development of a navy based on large ships-of-the-line
equipped with artillery, the enlargement of the armies by a factor 10 between 1500 and 1700
and finally the development of logistic, administrative, and fiscal methods to support, conduct
and finance these large bodies.
Gunpowder and siege artillery, like so many other devices, may have their origin in China, 55
but it was in Europe where their technological potential was efficiently developed and
54
Roberts 1955; cf. McNeill 1982; Parker 1988; for criticism Eltis 1995 and the contributions in: Rogers 1995.
The first pictures of siege artillery can found almost simultaneously in Europe (1326) and China (1332), so
that the origin of this invention remains unclear.
55
50
completed. In the military realm, the progressive character of the evolutionary "arms race" in
fragmented Europe becomes most evident.
Soon after its introduction, gunpowder was
rapidly improved, achieving a much higher expansion speed (due to more permeable
graining). Then a multiplicity of specialized weapons was invented: siege artillery, field
artillery, arquebuses, muskets, pistols, bombs, mines, precision arms, patrons, guns with cast,
drilled and rifled barrels, ship artillery with gates near the water line, fortifications, defense
with earth works etc. Already in the sixteenth century European powers were militarily far
advanced as compared to China, especially in naval warfare, even though there was no
military conflict between European powers and China earlier than the nineteenth century.
The most important matter of European military arms race since the late Middle Ages was the
fact that no single power ever prevailed in the long run with the effect that the system as a
whole developed rapidly under high evolutionary pressure. This is the reason why China’s
coarse firecrackers and clumsy siege canons were left behind in such a short time. The Turks,
too, took part in this development and gained military supremacy in the Eastern
Mediterranean (against Egypt, Syria, and Persia). A military innovation process was initiated
that was based on positive feedback not only in Europe, but also in the Middle East. The
important matter was the emergence of an evolutionary dynamic and not so much one of
single inventions. Inventions only gain weight when they are integrated into a dynamic
network like that which built up in early modern Europe.
William McNeill (1989) has shown that in early modern time all over Eurasia (with the
exception of Europe) "gunpowder empires" emerged: Ming China, Tokugawa Japan, Moghul
India, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire.
All these states succeeded in
monopolizing the possession of heavy siege artillery with the result that minor powers could
be disarmed. Gunpowder shifted power from fortification to siege thus favoring centralized,
well organized forces. On the other hand, this also had the consequence that most successful
empires checked any innovation that could have undermined this pattern and the gunpowder
empires soon became technologically conservative.
The European situation was different in that as no political power could gain supremacy. The
Habsburg emperors who tried to become hegemonic powers in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries failed when confronted with defensive coalitions, as did the French rulers in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The effect of this permanent struggle was a severe
competition between the powers from which none of them could escape and which led to the
annexation or marginalization of minor powers. The number of independent political units
51
diminished, but the remaining great powers built a new system of balance that proved
indestructible well into the twentieth century.
From the perspective of industrial transformation, early modern military innovation remained
within the pattern of the agrarian regime, but unfolded its potential in extreme measure.
Single elements of this military revolution can be found in other agrarian civilizations as well.
For example, drilled armies can be found more often than an eighteenth century perspective
often presumes.56 Firearms were widespread all over Eurasia. The advanced sea-going manof-war with ship artillery was a complex and unique European invention that did not find its
match anywhere outside Europe, but it did not transgress the boundaries of agrarian
civilizations.
The same holds for the advanced and extended fortifications that were
developed as a response to siege artillery by the continental powers.
The development of military technology in agrarian civilizations follows the common pattern
of innovation cascades, that is a change of rapid breakthroughs and balanced stagnation. This
holds for the evolution of fire-arms, for siege warfare, for the drilled standing army and even
for naval warfare with ship artillery.
The decisive breakthroughs all took place in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the following years a lot of micro-inventions57
and fine-tuning took place, but the dominant pattern was not overcome.
For technological reasons, the ship-of-the line had an upper limit of 2,000 tons that could not
be expanded as long as ships were built from wood (Davis 1962). Ships of this size already
existed in the sixteenth century. They were continuously improved until the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, especially with regards to their maneuvering capability, stability,
and armament, but this upper limit remained fixed. It was only in the middle of the nineteenth
century, when coke iron was cheap enough to construct ships with steel, that new dimension
of tonnage were reached.
Fire arms represent a similar case. The old founding technology was pushed to its limits in
the eighteenth century, but it was not possible to make guns with steel. This only succeeded
with advanced nineteenth century metallurgy based on coke and it was a precondition for
range and precision to be increased.
Some technological solutions remained almost stable
over longer periods of time, as the examples of field artillery or muskets demonstrate. In
England the musket with the nickname "Brown Bess", introduced in 1690, remained the
standard weapon of the infantry until 1840 with only minor alternations. The field gun with
56
Moritz von Nassau who introduced military drill into European armies followed the Roman example as
described by Vegetius, even adopting details as the use of the spade.
57
In the sense of Mokyr 1990
52
drilled barrel, developed in France about 1750, was used in all European armies until breechloaders with rifled barrels were introduced after 1850.
Only in the middle of the nineteenth century was this older pattern of "punctuated
equilibrium" replaced by a new pattern of exponential technological progress. Since then,
fundamental parameters of military equipment change within very short time: automatic
weapons, new explosives, motorization, artillery with recoiling devices, tanks, aircraft,
submarines, rockets, chemical and biological weapons, atomic bombs, satellites, electronic
warfare. Innovation cycles are shortened because it is possible to materialize any design.
Here it becomes clear that the agrarian pattern is broken. The critical transition for this lies in
the nineteenth century.
In retrospect, even in the perspective of military history the early modern age appears as a
stage of pre-adaptation. It is unconceivable that European supremacy could have succeeded
without military supremacy, but still the military remained within the scope of the agrarian
regime well into the nineteenth century.58 We could conjecture a counterfactual historical
development that would conclude the innovation process about 1750. There is no compelling
reason why this level of competence would not have been imitated by other agrarian
civilizations, because it was still within the scope of the ancien regime.
Which influence had warfare on the economic development? Agrarian societies only produce
a small surplus that is attracted by rent-seeking predators, and is easily consumed by war and
destruction. Irrigation devices must be constructed over a long time and can be rapidly
destroyed with long term negative effects, as we can learn from Mesopotamia after the
Mongol conquest. Here we have an important feature of the agrarian regime: the ongoing
zero-sum game about limited space and its distribution is usually played with violent means,
and the permanence of violent conflict enhances the zero-sum character of this game. This
points to the evolutionary trap agrarian societies are confronted with: the military costs of this
permanent tug-of-war for the distribution of scarce surplus increases scarcity with the result
that the tug-of-war becomes more severe.
Theoretically, there could be an escape from this prisoner’s dilemma if peace is established
and a positive feedback loop in the sense of "economic growth" can start. In a peaceful
situation production and surplus would increase, there could be more investment, productivity
could rise and the struggle for distribution could calm down – a peace dividend as proposed
58
Raudzens (2001) even maintains that European military supremacy was not decisive for colonial expansion.
53
by classical liberal pacifism.59 This is the reason why many authors ascribe to war an
impeding function for economic development.60
However, European history did not follow this path, but the transition to capitalist
industrialization and economic growth unfolded in the middle of severe and protracted wars.
One precondition of this (at least in the beginning in England, and later on also on the
continent) might have been that feuds and civil wars had come to an end, so that an internal
peace, guarantied by the state, was established. It seems that internal peace was much more
important for prosperity than peace between states. Since the seventeenth century, England
was practically in a permanent state of war, but this remained an overseas matter. The
country itself was almost untouched by warlike devastation since the Civil War.
The
emergence of the industrial transformation took place during a period of heavy international
wars, which evidently did not much damage to economic growth.
In the early twentieth century, Werner Sombart (1913) proposed that warfare even favored the
emergence of capitalism. He pointed to the large military expenses that created demand for
mass produced commodities that called manufactures into existence.
During war, full
employment prevailed because persons who were unemployed found work due to rising
demand.
Warfare promoted technological innovation and production, employment and
capital formation, and insofar it at least was no obstacle against industrialization (McNeill
1982, 190).
Were there major differences between the effects of warfare in Europe and China? Jones
(1987) claims that war killed more people in “Asia” than in Europe, but this is most uncertain
in the long run. The Chinese Empire repeatedly succeeded in establishing peace over longer
periods of time, punctuated by invasions claiming large numbers of victims (Mongols,
Manchu). In politically fragmented Europe, war was endemic since the Middle Ages. During
the millennium before a balanced order was established in the nineteenth century, there may
not have been one single year without war going on somewhere in Europe. However, Europe
(like Japan) was spared a large "barbaric invasion" during this time.
Jones claims that China lost 25 million people during the Manchu conquest in the 1660s, and
calculates this as 17% of the total population. He confronts this figure with only 2 million
casualties in Germany as a consequence of the Thirty Years War (Jones 1987, 36). But these
figures do not stand a closer look. In 1618, German population was 17 million, while in 1650
59
60
E.g. Richard Cobden
E.g. Nef 1950, Rostow 1960, Deane 1975
54
it had dropped to 10 million.61 This is a loss of more than 40%.62 Another example is the
Swedish campaigns in Poland (1655-1660) that destroyed 35% of the cities and 10% of the
villages, with a total population loss of 40%. In addition, the general language of "Asia"
surely does not make much sense in this context. After the Tokugawa shoguns had finished
civil war, Japan lived in peace for more than 250 years. Such a long term peace has never
happened in the history of Europe.
Information and communication
Part of the classical explanations for modern European development is the invention of the
printing press.63 The Gutenberg era, the epoch of the printed book, is synonymous for modern
times. Yet the question remains what exactly the function of this new mode of information
processing was, if it was a specific European matter, and if it helped to transcend the pattern
of agrarian civilizations.
Written records as such are as old as the agrarian civilizations and inseparably connected with
them. Information of all kinds, from book-keeping to Holy Scripts, is stored and handed
down over generations. China developed its own notation system at least 3,500 years ago
based on ideograms that developed into logograms. This method also prevailed in the Middle
East origins of scripture, and has peculiar advantages and disadvantages. Its major advantage
is that the written record is independent from speaker’s variations. The symbols can be
pronounced in different ways while meaning is conserved. Its major disadvantage is that
theoretically for each separate subject a separate sign has to be invented with the consequence
that the number of signs grows indefinitely. Even when phonetic and symbolic elements are
combined (as happened in Egypt and in China), in the end no one has command of the
complete system. This has consequences of its own: true knowledge of the notation system
becomes a privilege of scholars who need many years to get acquainted with the complexity
and multiplicity of signs. They tend to eagerly defend this knowledge, based on the command
of a difficult technical process, and no incentive to simplify the system can be expected from
them.
The core of the historical process that culminated in the early modern printing press (and
opened a trajectory towards electronic information processing) is the division of information
61
Figures from North 2000, 118.
Of course this is not necessarily all an effect of a rise of mortality, but declining fertility under the conditions
of war plays a role, too.
63
The fundamental role of bookprinting for modern European development is stressed in the seminal work of
Elizabeth Eisenstein (1979). See also Johns 1998.
62
55
into smallest parts. The precondition for any advanced data processing is digitalization, i.e.
information units are abstracted from any particular meaning. Meaning is only constituted by
a specific combination of elements that have no meaning of their own.
This is first achieved by alphabetic scripture that succeeds in putting down any amount of
content with very few signs. It was invented by the Phoenicians about 4,000 years ago and
finally spread over the Western world. Today, this step seems obvious, if not self-evident, but
it was an enormous achievement in abstraction, regarding that there is no straightforward
connection between phonemes and morphemes. Each person pronounces words in different
ways, and it took long time to standardize language phonetically – a process that probably was
favored and enhanced by the existence of an alphabetic scripture. But this also had far
reaching consequences for data transfer.
Mechanical multiplication of information is rather old, too. Its origins are coins (as means of
state propaganda) and stamps. Complicated systems based on logograms like the Chinese
invite to reproduce scripts with large stamps or woodcuts. In Korea texts were printed with
types made from porcelain more than 1000 years ago, and in China, too, movable characters
made from clay, wood and later from iron were used. However, the Chinese notation system
demanded 15,000 to 20,000 different characters, so that the advantages of printing were quite
limited.
The European fifteenth century printing press really was a macro-invention, a fundamental
breakthrough that would not have been possible in China. Printing with movable letters only
makes sense when there are very few different symbols. The Roman scripture has 26 letters.
A European font system can do with a minimum of 100 different letters, capitals, numbers and
special characters included. This is enough to print any text. Gutenberg, however, needed
more than 200 letters to print his Bible, because he used different fonts: Gothic, Latin and
italics. But even this number is not too big. This makes it plausible that on the base of a
notation system with several hundred or even thousand types the advantage of print is not
evident and it remains acquainted to woodcut or stamp printing. The invention and spread of
the printing press could only start an information revolution in connection with an alphabetic
scripture.
In addition to this, numbers should be regarded. In principle, for each natural number a
separate sign could be used and the Roman notation system was not far from that: I, V, X, L,
C, D, M – this series could have been continued indefinitely and led to confusing
combinations. It was almost impossible to calculate with this system, so the abacus was used
56
as a digital mechanical device, and only the result of the calculation was written down with
Roman letters. In a digital number system like that which Europe imported from India via the
Middle East in the Middle Ages, each number is expressed by two elements: a sign and its
relation to other signs. Within the decimal system this means that only ten different signs are
needed (zero indicating an empty space). With this method any number can be notated, it is
very easy to calculate and with a few additions (conventions indicating plus, minus, division,
equal, power etc.) the system can be expanded to enable any mathematical operation.
The digital "Arabic" number system is structurally equivalent to the alphabetic scripture.
Both share the principles of abstraction from meaning and of minimizing the number of signs,
enabled by combination rules. This is a fundamental economy of notation, an information
revolution that preceded the printing press and built its preconditions. A further consequence
was that information could be classified in a similar way. The alphabetical order of words in
dictionaries is devoid of meaning, but easy to handle (in contrast to thesauri trying to order
knowledge systematically).
The printing press is based not only on an older (scripture) and younger (numbers) tradition of
simple digital notation, but also on several specific technological preconditions:
•
The single types must have identical forms. This means that from one mater type a larger
number of letters had to be founded. This required advanced metallurgical methods. It is
no accident that Gutenberg was a goldsmith by training.
•
A cheap information carrier had to be available. As long as parchment was used, the real
bottleneck was the medium’s high costs. Only paper was so cheap that writing costs really
mattered, so that mechanization paid. The printing press surely would not have succeeded
had it still used parchment.64
•
Printing on paper requires an ink that sticks to the surface without tainting the backside.
This material had to be provided by "chemical" industry.
•
Finally, there is the complicated machinery of the printing press that was developed in the
context of a craft culture which had long experience with mechanical devices.
All these preconditions had to be present simultaneously and this is the reason why the
printing press is a singular and quite improbable macro-invention that did not take place
simultaneously in different regions. It had so many tremendous advantages that it rapidly
spread all over Europe. The printing press finally initiated a positive feedback between
64
As Gutenberg did for some of his printed bibles.
57
publication and experience, so that a trajectory of knowledge accumulation could form. It
contained the following elements:
•
The older knowledge fixed in manuscripts could always break off or disappear. The
printed book enlarged and steadied the communication of texts with the consequence that
the knowledge process stabilized and solidified.
•
When manuscripts were copied, mistakes accumulated with the consequence of shifting
content. Of course, there were also lots of errors in printed books, but they could be
corrected from edition to edition, so that texts became more stable and reliable. This
played a large role in reference books (dictionaries, mathematical or astronomical tables,
etc.).
•
The multiplicity of available texts enabled their comparison and favored a critical
mentality that resulted in philological methods of criticism. On the other hand, the
confrontation with many different texts produced information noise with the consequence
that dogmatic persuasions were shattered.
•
Printing allowed the combining of texts and illustrations that could be stereotyped. This
had important consequences for atlases, maps, astronomical, mathematical, physiological
and architectonic works.
•
Mechanically reproduced texts were cheaper than manuscripts, so that they could spread
into wider social strata. This favored alphabetization that was already made easier with a
digital notation system. Twenty-six characters can be learned in a shorter time than
several hundred or thousand characters.
•
Standardization of texts favored standardization of language.
This resulted in the
emergence of new national languages in Europe that had their origin in certain regional
dialects (Italian from Tuscany, German from Saxony, French from the Champagne, Dutch
from Frisia, etc.).
From our point of view, the most import consequence of the printing press was the emergence
of a positively fed back information flow. The recursion loops that information flows took,
enhanced and touched more and more people as well as more and more content.
The
probability that knowledge was isolated and vanished by accident, almost disappeared.
Intellectual innovation thus amplified and corroborated itself. A communication dynamics
was initiated that was exceptionally high as compared to the standards of other agrarian
civilizations. Similar processes of rapid self-enhancement of information flows had taken
58
place before in the traditional oral culture, albeit under special, geographically very limited
circumstances (like in Classical Athens). With the printing press all of Europe transformed
into one integrated communication system (of intellectual elites) where information from
different provenance could be combined.
Thus the level of information processing
accelerated in an unprecedented way. Knowledge production increased rapidly and it was not
necessarily accompanied by an as rapid process of falling back into oblivion, as was formerly
the case.
Perhaps the following generalization is possible.
The oral-manuscript culture has great
difficulties to transmit information in a reliable way and puts great efforts into the
conservation and reproduction of traditional knowledge. When information can be saved and
transmitted mechanically, the conservation, reproduction, and availability of information is no
longer a problem, so that efforts can concentrate on gaining new knowledge. Thus the
printing press culture can put an accent on intellectual innovation.
If information and communication played a role for the emergence of the industrial
transformation – and who could doubt that to be the case – the media revolution of the
printing press must be a key factor. Of course there were numerous elements of mechanical
information transmission in other agrarian civilizations as well, but none of them achieved the
importance of book printing. Gutenberg's invention is based on so many preconditions that
had to exist independently, that it is a singularity with far reaching consequences. The
historical emergence of a method that allowed digital information replication was quite
improbable.
Neither the (mathematically gifted) Greeks nor the (technologically gifted)
Romans came close to this, although they possessed the basic precondition: a digital notation
system.65
The consequence was that information processing gained new dimensions in
memory, availability, speed and interaction scope.
Anything could be combined with
anything else by experimentation. This started an exponential growth of knowledge that is
still ongoing. Here must be one source of the transformation, and maybe it is a decisive one.
It is characteristic for many processes that the conduct of a system changes with the number of
its components when a "critical mass" is attained. Then new properties can emerge and
continuous processes become discontinuous. In a communicating human society the number
of participants can change with help of the presence of information media. However, this may
be the case for several different media, not only for information, but also for physical
65
The same holds for the Islamic world. Although the Arabian script is digital, too, the Ottoman Empire adopted
book printing very reluctantly, which may have something to do with the calligraphic tradition of the Koran that
became an obstacle to mechanization.
59
transport or the allocation of resources (finance system). If these media change, a critical state
can be reached with the consequence that unexpected tendencies build up, one of which was
the industrial transformation. So the new information system, perhaps, was only a part of a
larger media revolution that encompassed transportation of goods and allocation of capital.
Science and technology
An older standard explanation regards the early modern "scientific revolution" as the ignition
of a series of technological innovations finally leading to the industrial revolution (e.g. Bernal
1954). This tradition puts great weight on the making of a new scientific world view since the
Renaissance, culminating in the seventeenth century “new science”. Its roots are mainly seen
in mathematization and controlled experiments.
In this view, Francis Bacon and René Descartes are the (positively or negatively valued)
heroes of a scientific breakthrough. A series of paradigmatic revolutions are observed in early
modern Europe: Copernicus's astronomical model, Galileo's mathematical mechanics, Boyle's
theory of gases, and finally Newton's unified mechanical theory. This rational science is
dominated by certain principles, among which are simplicity, mathematical modeling, and
subjective reproduction of experiments. They replace magic, analogies, and hermetic insights
that cannot be generalized and controlled by repeated and independent observation.
Intercultural studies on the history of science demonstrate that a tendency towards
"enlightened rationalism" and the development of "scientific methods" were not foreign to
other agrarian civilizations and did not transcend their fundamental principles. Since Joseph
Needham's encompassing research, numerous innovation processes in Song and Ming China
are known.
66
So the question remains if or how far the rationality of the European “new
science” was fundamentally different from Chinese thinking.
The philosopher of science Alistair Crombie has identified six different styles of thinking,
whose combination made the specific character of modern European science: "postulation",
"experimental", "historical modeling", "taxonomy", "probabilistic", and "historical derivation"
(Crombie 1994). Mark Elvin (2000) demonstrated in a recent paper that all of them except
probabilistic thinking were present in China, too.
European science somewhat dubious.
67
This makes the special character of
Elements of rational thought seem to have been a
common feature of agrarian societies if certain conditions are present, like cities, peace,
interested social strata, and intellectual freedom.
66
Needham 1954ff. Cf. Elvin 1973; 1984; 1988; Huff 1993
60
Another objection concerns the scientific character of the European "scientific revolution"
itself (Shapin 1996). Recent research has demonstrated that many assumptions remained
unfounded, that metaphysical speculation was inseparably interwoven with experiment and
deduction, and that there was a long continuity of prejudiced cultural plausibilities that
permeated scientific research. Many methods and results of early modern science were wrong
and unscientific according to present standards. So eighteenth century chemistry was not
scientific in our sense since it did not regard chemical transformations as molecular reactions
and there are numerous other similar cases. Here the "rationality" of European science is
fundamentally doubted, so that there is no fundamental difference between magic and science.
The role science is supposed to have played for technological development before
industrialization is contested as well. The basic assumption that early modern technology can
be regarded as applied science is put into question. If technological innovation did not result
from science, its origins are seen in the empirical trial and error endeavors of "semiliterate
tinkerers" (Musson / Robinson 1969). A systematic and methodical cooperation between
science and technology only occurred since the nineteenth century (Mokyr 1990). Thus, it is
more a result and not so much an origin of industrialization. In early modern Europe, there
was still a typical contrast between contemplative natural philosophy ("science") and practical
mechanics ("technology") with hardly any contact between these areas so that content and
results of scientific theories remained virtually irrelevant for the technological innovation
process.
In recent years this position is confronted with the idea that “new science” influenced
technology insofar as the virtuosi's world view and research style was adopted by mechanics
by ways of cultural influence (Jacob 1997). This holds mainly for the experimental method
based on keeping marginal conditions constant, dividing complex problems into smaller
pieces, and assuming constancy, simplicity, and coherence of natural phenomena. James
Watt, for instance, was a mechanic without an academic education, but in his work he
followed the example of contemporary experimental natural philosophy. He kept precise
record on his experiments, knew the importance of exact measurement and could distinguish
between cause and correlation. A sense for quantification and mathematics and the rejection
of obscure organic qualities had trickled down to social strata that were not acquainted with
the esoteric principles of natural philosophy. This means that it was more the style and
perhaps the methods of “new science” and not the results that influenced technological
67
Similar Linck 1999 for Ming China
61
innovation. This was mainly a matter of the eighteenth century and even then perhaps only in
England.
During the seventeenth century the socio-cultural meaning of natural philosophy changed. It
no longer remained a matter of few specialists but moved into the core of the intellectual
elite’s cultural identity. In England this transformation took place between 1680 and 1720.
The new scientific world view that achieved acceptance as an answer to the "crisis of
European thinking" (Paul Hazard) focused on "nature" that could be polemically opposed to
revelation and authority.
In the context of many heterodox positions (Socinianism,
Unitarianism, Deism, Pantheism, freemansonry, freethinking, even atheism, skepticism, and
anticlericalism) a new "enlightened" style of thinking emerged, which contains the ideological
elements "progress", "improvement of mankind", supremacy of "reason" as opposed to
"obscurantism" (that is revealed religion, belief, opinion, prejudice), freedom of thought,
freedom of speech, and finally freedom of scientific research.
In this intellectual climate a new social type emerged, the "literate gentleman" (Jacob 1997,
87) who read books and journals, attended clubs and debating societies, and adhered to a
liberal version of Christianity without much dogmatic rigidity. In social respects, they were
merchants and landed gentry, solicitors, physicians and tradesmen.
Their children were
educated rationally and their wives formed the new reading public for romance novels.
Science was part of their education. Jacob stresses the role of "industrial mentality" that
emerged in this cultural milieu which produced the entrepreneurs of the industrial revolution
after 1760.
This scientific culture shared by mechanics and merchants, gentry and
businessmen made the organization of partnerships easier, because a common language was
spoken.
As to technological innovation in a more narrow sense, its discontinuous, erratic character
must be stressed. There was no straightforward gradual "technological progress" over longer
periods of time. Neither can technological invention be simply understood as a response to
some challenge of scarcity.68
For technological innovation to occur, above all for
fundamental breakthroughs or new processes, multiple favoring conditions in society,
mentality, economy and politics must be present. The rare macro-inventions, however, are
completely fortuitous; they can not be predicted from initial circumstances.
About 1750, European technology was far ahead from the rest of the world, but it still
remained within the limits of the ancien regime.
68
As Boserup 1965 or Wilkinson 1973 claim
62
"It seems plausible that if European
technology had stopped dead in its tracks – as Islam‘s had about 1200, China‘s by 1450 and
Japan‘s had by 1600 – a global equilibrium would have settled in that would have left the
status quo intact, with few exogenetic forces to upset it“ (Mokyr 1990, 81). The European
modern times would have remained an exciting episode in the history of an agrarian
civilization comparable perhaps with classical Greece or Song China. Europe had virtually
exhausted the potentials that exist within the boundaries of the agrarian social-metabolic
regime. It had the choice between taking the path to a stationary balance typical for agrarian
civilizations or to disrupt the agrarian pattern altogether.
In this view, the explosive
innovation course that it took after 1750 and that transformed the agrarian regime was
unpredictable and a matter of mere chance.
In contrast to Europe, it was not until the fifteenth century that China's technological and
economic dynamics seems to have come to a halt. This calls for an explanation, if the
existence of dynamics is supposed to be self-evident, so that its lack or breakdown is a riddle.
If, on the other hand, European sustained dynamics is a singularity, only this needs a special
explanation. The Chinese case would be quite normal. This becomes only an interesting
problem if we observe different phases in the same system and if we can distinguish between
a dynamic China before 1400 AD and a stagnating China after this date. Then the question of
what has brought the transition from one state into the other rises. If, however, overall
"Chinese stagnation" is compared to "European dynamics" (one complex course of history
with another), any point in which China is different from Europe could be identified as
possible "cause". Many of such causes can be found in literature.69
•
Bad nutrition may have led to widespread deficiency disease and apathy. Rice contains
few proteins. Wet rice cultivation favors schistosomiasis leading to physical degradation.
•
Mental factors like prevailing ideas of harmony and balance may have obstructed
entrepreneurship.
•
No science and formal logic, no deduction from first principles, but mere empiricism
blocked the way to overcome mechanical tinkering.
•
The bureaucracy and the state suppressed technology and economic innovation from the
fear that order and harmony are disturbed by social mobility.
•
Government retreated from supporting technology and infrastructure. Before 1400 there
was massive state intervention in hydraulic devices, technology transfer and new methods
69
The following points can be found in Elvin 1973, 1988; Mokyr 1990; Landes 1998
63
of cultivation. Magistrates wrote books on technological matters. There were state iron
works.
The later Ming and the Qing are said to have retreated from supporting
technological innovation and even neglected measures and weights, market regulations,
upkeep of roads, police. But this remains an empirically contested matter.
•
Role of the elites. There was a chance for upward social mobility into the bureaucracy by
passing examinations.
The Confucian elites, however, were hardly interested in
technological and economic matters. This system led gifted people into unproductive
occupations with the effect of a fatal brain drain from the productive sector.70
•
Material resources were scarce and hence a mental disposition to frugality was so
widespread that daring innovation often initially leading to squandering material was not
ventured. Here scarcity was not so much a challenge leading to invention but a trap
leading to economizing stagnation.
•
The Chinese lacked a “flair for accuracy”, what Elvin (1988) illustrated with pictures
showing machinery.
•
At least since the Renaissance, Europeans indulged in fantastic technological projects,
while the Chinese remained pragmatic and sober. They lacked exuberant creativity – there
was no Chinese Leonardo.
•
The Chinese did not conceive machinery as applied geometry – but neither did European
mechanics before the nineteenth century.
As a matter of fact, it may have been a question of mentality, of a specific “techno-cultural
style” (Elvin 1988, 108) that had formed in China as a result of autonomous cultural
autopoiesis. This, however, is so vague a concept that it can hardly be seen how it can be put
into operation. The core problem is why so many inventions remained marginal, were
forgotten or got stuck in their infancy in China, while Europe refined and developed further
those technologies it had originally received from China.
This points to the difference
between self-enhancing positive feed-back and mere singular inventions, which is exactly the
fundamental difference between the logic of the agrarian regime and the logic of the industrial
transformation.
70
This mechanism is claimed to have existed in Catholic Europe, too, where a brain drain into priesthood and
monasteries took place.
64
Maritime expansion
One of the most important factors for the making of the "modern world" is supposed to be
European overseas expansion.
In this view, the "age of discoveries", above all the
incorporation of the Americas, but also including the exploration of a direct sea route from
Europe to India and East Asia around Africa started a new epoch in world history. For an
influential tradition of explanation that goes back to Lenin’s theory of imperialism and the
dependencia-theories of the 1960s and has found its classical expression in the work of
Immanual Wallerstein (1974-1989), capitalist development took place within an asymmetric
framework of European "centre" and colonial "periphery" from the start. In this perspective,
"development" and "underdevelopment" form a dialectical whole, so that the formula
"development of underdevelopment" makes sense.
Industrialization and wealth in the
European core region of the modern world system depend on resource transfer from colonial
areas. Thus colonization not merely impeded "industrial development" in other agrarian
civilization; it even led to an active de-industrialization in formerly further advanced societies
(Frank 1998).
Let us try to assess the importance of European maritime expansion within the framework of
agrarian civilizations.
71
About 1500 AD there were five large and independent agrarian
civilizations on the Eurasian continent: Europe, the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire,
India and China (plus maybe Japan). From these five civilizations, three were expansive in
early modern times: Europe (or, more exactly, the Western fringe of Europe, including
Portugal, Spain, France, England and the Netherlands, while the continental core remained
immobile) expanded over the ocean while the Turks and the Russians expanded over land.
India and China were conquered from Central Asia (Moghul 1526-1688 and Manchu 16211683, respectively), but Qing China reversed the direction of conquest in the late seventeenth
century and subjected large parts of Central Asia. To be the object or subject of conquest has
been an element of the agrarian experience for millennia.
From this comparative perspective, early modern European expansion was not so sensational
and far from being an exception. Its success was quite limited. The most important factor in
the long run was the discovery and annexation of America where the existing indigenous
civilizations rapidly collapsed, as has occurred on some islands like the Canaries (Crosby
1986). The other great Eurasian civilizations remained untouched. Before the nineteenth
71
Still a good read is McNeill 1963. For an encompassing overview see McNeill/McNeill 2003.
65
century, an effective colonization of the Middle East, Persia, or even India, to say nothing
about China or Japan, was beyond European imagination.
We should keep in mind that America (1492) and the sea route to India (1498) were
discovered almost simultaneously. Here something new in world history happened: the very
old Eurasian axis72 that connected the Mediterranean with the Far East was completed by a
new sea axis. The center of this new maritime empire was the Atlantic, and only with the
integration of America could world history proper get started. But we should not forget that
an effective European domination of the world only began in the nineteenth century when
China was touched, Japan was opened, India was subdued, Australia and New Zealand were
settled, and the “Dark Continent” was colonized.
When we consider Europe's situation on the Eurasian continent we notice that it is located at
the western fringe. The travel distance to America is shorter from Europe then from anywhere
else in Eurasia. Regarding the other Eurasian civilizations it is evident that India and the
Muslim states were locked in the Indian Ocean. The Ottoman Empire was caught in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Russia was a continental power with almost no access to the sea.
However, China and Japan shared a continental fringe position, so that theoretically they
could have expanded to America, too. But we should not forget that a sea voyage from Asia
to America put such high demand on navigation skills that the far advanced European sea
powers could solve this problem only in the eighteenth century. Prior to this, such a journey
was an adventure with insecure results. For example, the Spanish sent a silver fleet from Peru
to Manila only once a year and they had to rely on a very short time window. Travel from
Europe to America took four to six weeks in the seventeenth century. To cross the Pacific,
half a year was needed. The Polynesian expansion from South East Asia to South America
(or at least to Easter Island) hopped from island to island and had large problems traveling
east to west (Kirch 1984). This means that for mere geographical reasons an incorporation of
the New World into the Eurasian system could only begin from Europe.
The Russian expansion into Siberia as well as the Qing expansion into Central Asia took place
on the continent, with the latter leading to annexation, control, and even colonization of
Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet and Singkiang.
In contrast to the maritime empire of the
European powers large problems with integration and transport were posed that could hardly
be overcome with the traditional transport facilities.
72
The silk route led over land, navigation followed the coasts from the Persian Gulf via India to the Yellow Sea.
Cf. Abu-Lughod 1989.
66
It is a story going back to the nineteenth century that European powers profited from the
exploitation of America. This is discussed regarding the import of bullion and of material
resources and the emigration of European surplus population.73 The addition of the American
territory made large space available and calculated population density fell drastically. This
can be demonstrated with the following numbers, which compare the European and Chinese
development.
74
In contrast to Jones’s calculation the increase of Chinese territory in the
eighteenth century is included here.
Population density per km², 1500 and 1800
Year
India
China75
China + Anatolia Europe77
Central
Asia76
America Europe +
America
1500
23
23
-
8
14
2
3
1800
42
70
27
12
30
0,6
3,6
As we can see, Europe gained so much land that it possessed huge reserves for further
cultivation. Of course, much of this additional land like Alaska, large parts of Canada and the
American Middle West, the tropical rain forest in Middle and South America, arid land in the
Southern and Western parts of South America could not be used for agriculture at all.
However, agricultural use of the Central Asian territories gained by Qing China was also
limited. Thus the real or effective gain of land was much smaller than these rough figures
may suggest. To conclude, large fertile colonial territories did exist, but in the context of an
agrarian society they could not be properly used.
The land gained by European powers in early modern times was used for plantations that
produced for the world market, if it was used at all. Before the nineteenth century, colonial
imports from America were almost exclusively luxury goods (sugar, tobacco, rum, spices) of
no significance to the dietary budget of the masses. So Wallerstein’s thesis that the population
of Europe was already metabolically dependent in the early modern period on colonial
imports is not credible (Wallerstein 1974, 44). The only imported good that might have
played a role for human nutrition was sugar. Great Britain annually imported about 10,000
tons of sugar around 1700, but about 150,000 tons around 1800 (Braudel 1974, 157). The
73
Mainly Wallerstein 1974, but also Jones 1987
The idea for such a calculation goes back to Jones (1987, 232) and the authors cited there. My calculation
differs in several points.
75
"China" encompasses the 18 provinces of imperial China.
76
"Central Asia" is Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, Singkiang.
77
"Europe" is the territory West of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus.
74
67
British population (including Ireland) grew in this time period from approximately 9.3 million
to 16 million. Therefore, the per capita consumption of sugar rose in the course of the
eighteenth century from 1 kg to 10 kg. The caloric value of 1 kg sugar is 16 MJ, which is
equivalent to human energy requirements for a little more than one day. This means that the
role of sugar in the nutrition of the British population can still be ignored in the early
eighteenth century, and similar figures hold for France.
Around 1800 sugar imports
contributed 4% of the caloric needs of the British population. That is a considerable increase,
but it still does not mean that Britain depended on America in a metabolic sense.
After the collapse of the indigenous population, America provided huge "empty" space for
settlers, but this had no major effect on European populations for a while. Only in the
nineteenth century did America really become a land resource for European farmers. Only
then did considerable immigration start, large areas fit for cultivation became accessible in the
West, and food could be exported to Europe (grain from the United States and beef from
Argentina).
The cause for this delay is the transportation problem. Potential grain producing land in the
American west remained worthless for world market production before railroads were built.
The advantages of water transportation were also not so evident when large bulk had to be
carried over long distances. High sea navigation experienced tremendous innovations in early
modern times (stability, maneuvrability, sailing, armament), so that regular long distant trade
became possible. However, ship size could not be increased considerably. Already in the
sixteenth century Genoese ships had a capacity of up to 1,500 tons, and Venetian vessels of
1,000 tons transported cotton from Spain to the Middle East. Portuguese traders had up to
2,000 tons, and that remained the upper limit of British East India Men in the eighteenth
century. Even in early nineteenth century many ships had a capacity of only thirty to fifty
tons and the rule for freight-liners used in long-distance trade was 200 tons. This magnitude
only changed with the construction of iron ships. Only then did the large space of the
Americas and of Australia really become accessible for Europeans.
In physical terms the following fields of importance can be summarized:
•
American silver and gold to a large part found its way to Asia where it fed the money
system, while a considerable amount was finally put out of circulation.
•
The fertile regions in the United States and in Argentina only produced food for Europe
since the middle of the nineteenth century.
68
•
The use of American crops did not remain a European privilege, but spread rapidly all
over Eurasia. Already in the sixteenth century maize, potatoes, and peanuts can be found
in China, while maize (kukuruz) spread in Anatolia and on the Balkans, also in Italy
(polenta), but not north of the Alps. In Europe, the potato only gained importance since
the late eighteenth century.
Did the European maritime expansion play any role for the emergence of the industrial
transformation (O’Brien 1990)? Here we should focus on the early modern "Atlantic system",
the famous triangular trade. In Caribbean plantations luxury goods like sugar, rum or tobacco
were produced and transported to England or the Netherlands. From there iron tools or
weapons were exported to Western Africa and bartered against slaves that could be sold in the
Caribbean. Thus export markets for European industrial producers formed, and money could
be made with mass production and the sale of commodities.
Did these colonial markets develop into incentives for industrialization in Europe? This
remains a debated matter. We should not ignore the fact that European demand was an
incentive for mass production in China, too. The number of porcelain pieces exported from
China to Europe during the eighteenth century is estimated at about 100 million, and total
production must have been far higher.
78
However, this did not initiate a self-sustained
industrialization in China. As for Europe, Landes (1998) thinks that industrialization based on
coal, steam and coke iron smelting would also have started without the Atlantic trade, but who
knows for certain? Anyway, in the eighteenth century export markets were only a small
fragment of domestic markets.
An important argument against a decisive role of colonial imports for industrialization is the
fact that world trade was mainly determined by non-competitive goods well into the early
nineteenth century. The change of a particular productive factor thus did not affect production
conditions on other locations.79
In this sense, the economic world system was not yet
integrated. Until the start of the industrial revolution the colonial system was rather a late
phase of the traditional pattern of luxury imports than something fundamentally new. But the
amount of these imports and the spread of their consumption were unprecedented in world
history if we consider, for example, that the average sugar consumption of the Western
European populace was about one kilo a year. This was not much in nutritional terms, but it
was a tremendous ubiquity of luxury.
78
Ledderose 1995 gives further examples for mass production in China.
This argument is stressed by Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson (2000, 7): “The date for the big bang
theories of global economic history should be the 1820‘s, not the 1480‘s”.
79
69
The incorporation of the Americas into the European economy, however, had a large
prospective importance for the transformation. America enhanced the European pattern and
liberated it from the restrictions of agrarian civilizations. It offered enough space, resources,
and liberty, to take the path toward commercialization and industrialization without any
sensible limits. North America was a Europe without an aristocracy and without a rentseeking tradition, so that it could become the pioneer of an economic revolution. It possessed
all of Europe’s progressive elements, like individualism, separation of church and state, rule of
law, self-government, market economy, personal achievement, in combination with an
insulated position that saved the costs of permanent warfare, plus the advantages of the new,
large frontier territories and their virtually inexhaustible resources.
America thus could
become the experimental field of industrialization and finally its paragon. It is therefore hard
to imagine which course industrialization would have taken had America not existed.
Market institutions
In the Marxist tradition the question of the origins of industrialization is identical with the
question of "primitive" or "original accumulation of capital":80 the historical transition to a
capitalist mode of production. The core of Marx’s concept of capitalism is the identification
of specific productive relations that are marked by an antagonism between wage labor and
capital. By definition, capitalism exists if (and only if) the following conditions are fulfilled:
•
commodity production for the market with the aim of maximal profit;
•
private property of means of production;
•
free wage laborers;
•
transformation of surplus in capital, hence accumulation of capital.
Parallel to this systematic definition of capitalism there is a definition focusing on capitalism
as an epoch in world history.81 In this respect industrial capitalism is a dominant social
formation that succeeded the agrarian "feudalism".
When both definitions are brought
together, the problem arises that certain characteristics of the systematic definition can also be
found in agrarian civilizations. On the other hand, even in the era of capitalism many
important productive relations exist that have a non-capitalist character. For example, in
many capitalist industrial societies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were large
80
Marx 1867, chap. 24 deals with "Die ursprüngliche Akkumulation des Kapitals", "ursprünglich" meaning
"original". This term is often translated as "primitive".
81
This definition was developed by Sombart 1902 ("Der moderne Kapitalismus").
70
sectors with governmentally owned and planned production, not based on the principle of
maximization of profits. There repeatedly existed elements of forced labor, like slavery in the
colonies or in the United States, or compulsory service in the military or for civil purposes, in
addition to forced labor in times of war or in totalitarian regimes.
One consequence of these difficulties may be that the concept of capitalism does not
completely capture the essence of the transformation.
A socio-economic definition of
"capitalist productive relations" is not enough to identify the specific nature of the industrial
transformation. Elements of capitalism as a combination of commodity production, wage
labor and orientation toward profits are evidently inherent in the agrarian system, even if they
did not become dominant. On the other hand, there are many instances of non-capitalist
productive relations within the industrial context, as the twentieth century experience has
shown. Socialism and capitalism are both based on the fossil energetic social-metabolic
regime.
It can not be overlooked, however, that the industrial transformation led into new dimensions
of a market economy. In social terms, its fundament is the proletarianization of the majority
of the populace as predicted by Marx.
During the last 200 years, the social category
"employee" has become dominant. “Employees” are dependent workers with no property
reserves of their own who have to submit to the discipline of a business firm. This is in
contrast to traditional farmers or artisans who could organize their labor process
independently. This "employee" is free in the sense that he is not owned by somebody (like a
slave) and does not depend on fixed personal relations with a landlord (like a serf). He
accepts heteronomy only by voluntarily signing a contract that he can cancel again (which
may have the consequence that he changes his status from an employee to an unemployed
person).
Economically, the transformation epoch is without a doubt closely connected with an
emancipation of market relations, even if these were never completely realized. We may ask
what "market" means in this context, how far it inaugurated something new and how its
emancipation was functionally related to the beginning of the transformation.
The basic exchange pattern of agrarian civilizations is redistribution. 82 The state (or extraeconomic force) regularly intervenes into the economy by skimming off surplus. Many
economic relations are subjected to force. Economic behavior has always to expect plunder,
demand of tribute and blackmail. On the other hand, elements of a market do exist in agrarian
82
Here I follow Karl Polanyi’s (1944) terminology.
71
civilizations, and they emerge from the logic of exchange. Where there is division of labor
(as a precondition of regular surplus attraction), there must be barter and trade. Trade
automatically provokes the emergence of financial instruments like money and credit, even if
they are delivered to predatory action. Trade and robbery form a continuum: the weak are
preyed upon while the strong become partners in trade. But even pirates must finally change
their booty into money or other goods.
Money and credit emerge automatically, spontaneously and repeatedly. When regular barter
takes place, soon a "general equivalent" crystallizes. This is a good whose value relation to
other goods is well known. This may be a useful good like salt, but it should not be
perishable so that it can be stored. That is why the use of metals, especially precious metals,
becomes common. They persist, are easily stored, can be divided at will, have a small weight
in relation to their value and can easily be identified. When two goods are exchanged and
their value is regularly expresses in quantities of a third good, thus becoming comparable, a
price emerges and this third good becomes money.
When regular means of payment emerge, the act of exchange is parted into different
independent operations and a merchant can represent the reconnection. The migration of
commodities is now accompanied by a migration of money in the opposite direction. At the
end of this process commodities have changed places, while money has returned to its origin.
In regular far distance trade, however, it does not make much sense that each transport of
commodities is accompanied by a reciprocal transport of bullion. Here values are balanced
and only differences are paid in money. This is the origins of book-keeping.
The next logical step is to settle the accounts of more complex transactions by avoiding
altogether the expensive and dangerous transport of money. Now a purchase can be financed
with the expectation of a future sale. In this way, payment by money transfer, bills of
exchange, and credit originate. That means that these financial instruments are necessarily as
old as systematic and regular far distance trade.
Another origin of credit exists when commodities are ordered, e.g. when a purchaser wants to
buy a good from a tradesman who does not have it on stock. If this merchant regularly visits
markets where he can acquire this good, there are the following possibilities:
•
The merchant buys the commodity on a market with the aim to sell it later. In the
meantime he gives a credit to the purchaser and demands it back when he delivers the
commodity. In this case, the credit risk lies with the merchant.
72
•
The price is advanced by the purchaser to the merchant who buys the commodity on a
market. In this case, the credit risk is with the purchaser.
•
The purchaser gives a down payment to the merchant that is later offset with the payment.
In this case, the credit risk is shared.
To finance his purchase, the buyer may be obliged to take a credit from some money lender or
to mortgage his future product (e.g. his harvest) to a merchant. The merchant may not want to
run the risk of carrying large amounts of money with him, so that he deposits part of it with a
money lender.
The transportation of commodities is always a risky business, which is
threatened by robbers, taxmen, pirates, or shipwreck, so that it makes sense to build
commercial societies which share these risks. Thus a complex system of finance, banking,
and insurance emerges, whose origins are as old as the systematic exchange of commodities.
The physical exchange of money is soon substituted by a mere exchange of symbols, which
have no material value of their own.
Finally, it may be interesting for a merchant not just to buy commodities from certain
producers regularly, but even to support their production by the provision of raw material or
by giving them credit.
Here are the origins of the putting-out system, of dependent
employment, and finally of capitalist production, that can repeatedly be observed within the
context of commodity production. There is no systematic division between subsistence
production, commodity production, and capitalist production, and shifting transitions are
inherent in agrarian civilizations.
However, trade and finance depend on the trust that promises are kept, so that consensus and
belief are the prerequisites of contract and credit. These preconditions are not regularly met
in agrarian civilizations. There is no reliable state in which the keeping of promise or
fulfilling of a contract can be enforced by litigation. On the contrary, it is often wise not to
attract the state’s attention to the existence of private property and wealth that could invite to
confiscation. Already Adam Smith has insisted that justice, a regular rule of law, is a
fundament of the commercial society.83 The emancipation of the market is based on the
existence of a regular and reliable rule of law. Where these institutional preconditions lack,
the market economy remains an endangered and marginal matter. Merchants can support
each other by building companies and they can form minority networks in a diaspora with
strong cultural ties (like the Phoenicians in the ancient Mediterranean, Jews all over medieval
83
Smith 1759. North (1981) developed this idea in his concept of property rights.
73
Europe, Chinese in Southeast Asia), but they perpetually remain subject to the threat of
predatory violence.
One fundamental precondition for regular commodity production for the market is the
existence of security and order, a rule of law and peace. Whenever private property and
contracts are not legally accepted and enforced, exchange is paralyzed and enormous
transaction and insurance costs have to be paid with the result that trade does not pay any
more or is restricted to specific luxury goods. If the situation is completely lawless, there is
no trade, and instead only barter, plunder and blackmail.
In this respect, the state of the agrarian civilizations has an ambiguous function from the start.
It is based on extra-economic coercion, and works as an agent of war, exploitation, tribute,
and taxation. Simultaneously, even by its mere pacifying existence the state produces an
interaction space for the market. In principle, market and state have a strained relationship.
No market works without a legal order guaranteed by a state, but the state is also an
impediment for the market, because it intervenes, regulates, and tries to force contributions
out of it. This tension describes the problems of a transcending development. The state
protects the market only for fiscal reasons and has the final aim of mobilizing economic
resources for their more efficient redistribution. It protects the cow to get more milk.
Only the modern (civil or democratic) state becomes a complementary partner of the market
by providing security and even services for the economy like civil litigation or law
enforcement. A well established rule of law is a precondition for market emancipation. It has
to favor a mode of social synthesis that may finally transcend the principle of politics. The
civil state thus may destroy its own "political" precondition and lay the foundation for its
transformation into a mere service center for an economically integrated society (Creveld
1999).
The state of the agrarian civilizations favors trade if this promises income through taxes and
duties. However, princes are always inclined to increase their income by irregular means:
arbitrary contribution, confiscation, mandatory loans, state insolvency or bankruptcy,
devaluation of money or bonds, expulsion, judicial murder. These methods spread insecurity
and paralyze trade and finance. A major problem for rulers was to resist these temptations
that could prove self-destructive in the longer run. But if they succeeded in restraining
themselves, the result could be that they lost power in the long run, transforming themselves
into mere sheriffs of the economy. They begin with the endeavor to stabilize their revenue
flow, but ultimately the situation is reversed as the market gains power, the prince is subjected
74
under the law, he becomes the first minister of the state, and finally has to retire altogether.
This is the historical process in the course of which the market has emancipated, gained
power, and succeeded in subjecting politics to the economy.
In conclusion, we have the following evolutionary process from an institutional view. As
redistribution becomes more sophisticated, it becomes weaker and strengthens the market
principle as an unwanted side effect. Wherever political power retreats, the market spreads.
The market is a potential structure, closely connected with the principle of exchange, so that it
necessarily emerges again and again in agrarian civilizations. Its emancipation from the
tributary fetters, however, is historically contingent.
A unique and highly improbable
constellation had to exist that enabled this process: A state (or a multiplicity of states), which
is strong enough to provide order and forgoes the chance to use this power to extract
exuberant contributions. Such a political constellation may have been singular to Early
Modern Europe.
This unique development took place under several favorable conditions. Without a doubt,
Europe’s political fragmentation played a role because it prevented particular states from
becoming very powerful. Lacking a hegemonic power, massive disturbing interventions into
the economy were finally self-destructive. Capital, people, commodities, technology, and
information were mobile and migrated quite easily, while the political powers remained fixed
to the territories under their control. The new pattern combining the emancipation of a market
economy with the transformation of states into service centers for the society could only
emerge under the exceptional conditions of fragmentation and free information flow.
As soon as the market had gained some autonomy, a process of positive feed-back started
which spread over several functional areas and finally emancipated technological and
industrial innovations in a more narrow sense. The pattern of the modern state gained
immense substantive power during the course of industrialization to the point that no
competing political traditions could resist in the long run. Fortuitous preconditions thus
changed into stable systems conditions. This is a process that started only in Europe and was
copied by other civilizations with much resistance and under high tension. It does not seem as
if it were completed yet.
Preliminary conclusion
However unreliable the statistical data for late imperial China might be (as Raimund Kolb
demonstrates in this volume), current research provides the impression that the civilizational
75
level of China was about equal to that in eighteenth century Europe (Wong 1997, Pomeranz
2000, Helbling and Perdue in this volume). This may hold for material standards of living, for
civil administration and for transportation, while agrarian productivity even might have been
higher due to the multi-cropping system (favoured by climatic conditions). From an
“asiaphile” or “sinophile” orthogenetic perspective this might suggest that “Asia” was further
“advanced” than Europe (e.g. Frank 1998) with the consequence, that European-American
political and economic supremacy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries becomes a larger
riddle than it is anyway.
In this debate two contradictory paradigmatic positions can be distinguished: The first
position (going back to Marx’ theory of “original accumulation of capital”) proposes that
wealth leads to investment, so that the roots of industrialization are searched in previous
favouring conditions (e.g. Jones 1987). When it can be shown that Europe was richer than
China (due to better ecological conditions, the exploitation of colonies, an agrarian revolution
or less frictions by political or military disturbances) it becomes plausible that the next step
toward industrialization should take place here, where more means for investment were
available.
Critical objections against this position maintain that the conditions in China were not so bad
after all, even that the Chinese economy, at least the agrarian sector, was more efficient than
that in Europe. On the other hand, social and agrarian historians in the tradition of Wilhelm
Abel (1972, 1978) have long been stressing the fact that standards of living in Europe
declined prior to industrialization. Thus China seems to have been more prosperous than
Europe. But if this was the case, and if prosperity leads to technological and economic
progress, why did industrialization start in Europe and not in China?
The complementary position proposes that its is the challenge of scarcity which leads to
innovation as a response (e.g. Boserup 1965, Wilkinson 1973). In this perspective the scourge
of poverty induces technological and economic progress with the consequence, that it might
have been the more prosperous situation in China that prevented industrialization in this
country (because there was no need for it, cf. Helbling in this volume). Europe (or at least
England) was the region that was confronted with an imminent Malthusian crisis, and the path
to industrialization offered an escape from dooming pauperism.
This position coincides with a basic assumption of neoclassic economics, that rising costs
generally provoke innovation. This, however, is not the case in most agrarian societies, where
there is no guarantee that poverty leads to progress. Widespread poverty may also result in a
76
downward movement with little scope for innovation, but a tightening grip of predatory
landlords on available resources (e.g. Tainter 1988). So the impression remains that there was
no generalized connection between levels of scarcity and opportunities for innovation in
agrarian civilizations, but that the actual response to either depended on specific conditions.
Maybe we can reformulate this issue as follows: The mature agrarian civilizations of the
eighteenth century (including the Chinese empire and Europe) had not only achieved a
comparable level of social metabolism (energy and material flows), but even showed
tendencies to further improvement. These innovations, however, remained within the scope of
the agrarian regime with its strong tendency toward a stationary state (or a “high-level
equilibrium”, as Elvin put it). The fate of such agrarian innovations has been described by
Goldstone (2002) as a mere “efflorescence”, that is a relatively short phase of innovation soon
petering out at a new sustainable asymptotic level.
This pattern has only been broken once in history, and that is the core of the industrial
transformation in physical terms. In metabolic terms, industrialization is based on the
transition to a fossil energy regime that allows its resource base to switch from “organic” to
“mineral” material (Wrigley 1962, 1988). When we look for the ignition of this energetic
transformation, we have to deal with the British energy system of the eigtheenth century. This
is not so much a matter of coal use as such. Coal was used in Europe since Roman times, and
coal mining was an important feature of the Northern Song economy (Hartwell 1962, 1967).
But sporadic use of coal is not identical with the emergence of a fossil energy regime. For this
transition to happen, several basic technological problems had to be solved (cf. Sieferle 2001):
1. Coal mining had to be stabilized und put on a path of continuous growth. This was only
possible when one basic limiting feature of mining was overcome: The shafts had to be
drained from ground water. Of course, this is a requirement for any kind of mining, and
during the history of mining sophisticated technological solutions for pumping water have
been developed (especially in China as well as in early modern central European mining
districts). But all these technological devices demanded a huge input of energy, above all
with horse-gins. The high costs for these devices were not so much a problem when
precious metals were extracted (silver, tin, copper). But when an energy carrier as coal is
mined, it does not make sense to invest more energy into production than the product
contains. In the context of an agrarian regime, the energetic harvest factor had to be
positive in all kinds of extractive operations, so the limits for the use of horse power were
reached soon. The secular technological solution for this fundamental problem was the
77
Newcomen steam pump. It consumed a relatively large part of the mined coal, because
initially its thermodynamic efficiency was below 1%, but without this pump larger
amounts of coal would have remained (economically) inaccessible.
2. Mining devices (including steam pumps) as well as many other kinds of machinery need
large amounts of iron for their construction. In the context of the agrarian regime, iron
smelting was restricted by the huge demand of charcoal. In eighteenth century Europe, the
annual yield of about 50 ha coppice land was required to produce one ton of wrought iron.
The relative scarcity of land that was a common feature of the agrarian mode of
production thus set limits to the growth of the iron industry. The historical solution for this
problem was the development of iron production with the help of coal. This, however, was
an extremely complicated process that was initially mastered in Britain and took almost
one century until it was completed. The difficulties that had to be overcome in coking,
melting and freshing cannot be overestimated. This was a complex macro-invention that
was in no way historically determined and unavoidable, but was based on a series of
fortuitous technological breakthroughs that only happened once in history.
3. The formation of a heavy industry based on coal and iron required adequate transport
conditions to overcome the narrow location conditions of the agrarian regime. A first step,
building of canals, remained within the scope of the traditional regime, but soon a new
transport system based on the steam engine (railroads, steam ships) was developed. This
new transport systems combined the use of coal and iron and depended on new invented
mechanical devices.
In retrospect we can see that in the formation of the new energetic regime several independent
developments had to converge: coal mining with steam and iron, iron production with coal
and steam (air pipes replacing waterwheel-driven bellows), railroads based on iron, coal and
steam. All these elements had to be present almost simultaneously to form the foundation of a
new energy system, and this convergence of several technological innovations was totally
unpredictable from their initial conditions.
All this happened in Britain during the eighteenth century, and there is no indication that
anything of this kind could have happend anywhere else (neither on the European continent
nor in China). So the fundamental breakthrough was initially an English matter, and this
really was a “miracle”, a “riddle” or a fortuitous singularity. But this is not the whole story.
When we take a look to the greater European context, an explanatory dimension can be
reached. We may start with the assumption that the social-metabolic level of different mature
78
agrarian civilizations was quite similar. This can be empirically exemplified with different
European countries, and there is no reason to deny the possibility that (however unreliable the
data basis may be) the situation in China was not so far from that in these European countries.
Let us assume that about 1700 the social metabolism in England, Austria in the advanced
provinces of China was on a similar level. A comparison between Austria and England has
demonstrated that since the late eighteenth century Britain developed a new metabolic
dynamic that transcended this common pattern. In the middle of the nineteenth century there
was a large gap between the material conditions in Austria and in England, and we might
guess that Austria still was metabolically closer to Chinese conditions than to those prevailing
in Britain. During the next 150 years, however, this gap closed with a remarkable rapidity,
and today both countries are on a comparable physical level (cf. Krausmann/Schandl/Schulz
2003).
We may assume that in the eighteenth century the differences between the physical-energetic
conditions in Austria and England were not larger than those between Austria and China.
Since the early nineteenth century, however, England deviated rapidly as well from the
Austrian as from the Chinese level. In the twentieth century the English and Austrian
economies converged again, while China remained close to the original (agrarian) metabolic
level with the total result that the gap between “China” and “Europe” widened (although it
started to diminish again since the last decades).
This development suggests the following explanation: One agrarian civilization, namely
Austria (but this holds for virtually all European countries), had no severe problem to follow
the British example, because both shared common social and cultural features.
Industrialization, understood as the transformation of the social-metabolic regime, did start in
England, and nothing indicates that anything of that kind could have begun in Austria (or
anywhere else in Europe). The ignition of this transformation was an extremely improbable
matter, that could only take place under very specific and unpredictable circumstances which
presumably only existed in England. But other European societies shared so many conditions
with England that – albeit the original ignition did not take place in them – they could switch
to this new trajectory with some delay but without any severe problems. This, however, was
neither the case in China nor in the Ottoman Empire (but in Japan which succeeded to connect
to this pattern with surprisingly little resistance).
From this perspective, we are refered to “soft” issues of cultural traditions again, particularly
in two respects: First we have to identify the specific conditions that allowed the English
79
economy to transgress the boundaries of the agrarian ancien regime. It may be true that this
question can not be answered in principle, because it was the matter of a highly improbable
constellation for which any explanation is possible. Goldstone (2000), for example, sees the
origin of British industrialization in the political conditions after the Glorious Revolution that
favoured latitudinarism in the protestant orthodoxy, leading to the spread of a Newtonian
world-view and a rational style of thinking in the educated society which provoked a common
language of inventors and financial interest, and finally the penetration of elements of the
New Science (constancy of natural phenomena, systematic protocols of experiments, principle
of simplicity etc.) into social strata close to production and mechanical invention. In this
situation mechanics like Newcomen, Darby, Wilkinson and Watt laid the technological
foundations of the metabolic transformation – a highly contingent historical constellation in
which it is virtually impossible to distinguish between necessery and unnecessary elements. If
this really was a historical singularity in which several independent political, cultural and
social factors and processes came together, it seems to be impossible to reconstruct them in
another way than to tell the story just how it happened. This, of course, is not a theoretical
explanation but the narrative of an event.
The second question is, why so many regions in Europe succeded in following the British
example with only minor problems and little delay, and this question can be expanded to why
this new pattern could be accepted in some neo-European regions, that not only showed no
resistance but even acquired a vanguard position (USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia),
while other neo-European regions (South and Middle America) soon became stuck in a
quagmire of stagnation again. A further interesting case is Russia, that is close to Europe, has
intensive contact at least since the early eighteenth century, takes part in military competition,
tries repeatedly and with vigour to imitate the European path to modern industrial society –
and still has almost failed.
These parallel and counterfactual cases suggest that the successful spread of the new
industrial pattern cannot be just a fortuitous singularity whose origins lie in unidentifiable
fluctuations of original conditions. We have so many cases for a economic success in (neo-)
Europe, that they must have something to do with common cultural conditions that formed in
longer periods of time and are so inert that they even survived severe political and ideological
disturbances (as in Poland, e.g.).
Of course, industrialization is not identical with the transformation of the social-metabolic
regime, that is only its physical prerequisite. There are many more aspects and processes
80
involved that emerged quite independently from this transformation, like the factory system,
new social relations, the close connection between science and technology and many more.
Most of these processes might have been suffocated in a severe Malthusian or ecological
crises had there not been a transition to a new energy regime. But this does not mean that their
origin is necessarily connected with this energy transition.
In this paper I tried to identify some of the “soft” factors that might have played a role in the
making of the industrial transformation in Europe. It should be clear that none of these factors
can have acted "causally" in the sense that under any condition its presence must have led to
the dissolution of the agrarian regime. Their mere isolated existence is not sufficient to
destabilize the strong agrarian pattern. So it is no surprise that we can find one or another of
these factors in different historical or geographical situations without any observable system
transcending effect. It must have been the specific constellation of forces that could finally
have initiated the process of industrialization in Europe.
With a closer look it becomes evident, that for each of these factors there can be identified
"forerunners" or previous conditions, so that we could soon play the old game of
reconstructing long traditions again.
Perhaps we can use the biological concept of
preadaptation (or predisposition) to comprehend this matter. For some autopoietic reason
there may have originated certain cultural traits in the past that under changed conditions
gained an adaptive function they did not possess before. Thus the elements of cultural
tradition become important. Traditions are symbolic traits that formed during a bifurcation in
the past and stabilized thereafter without necessarily fulfilling an adaptive function. However,
when social complexity increases and the adaptive corridor narrows, these traditions are either
given up or they have to gain a specific function.
For the explanation of the industrial transformation this has the consequence that there may
have existed specific elements of an older European tradition which achieved a new function
during the formation phase of this transformation (1750-1850).
In retrospect this
predisposition seems to prepare the transformation, but we could imagine different
counterfactual courses of history in which the agrarian pattern might not have been overcome.
Single, if not all these elements of predisposition can be found in other civilizations, too,
albeit not in simultaneous combination. The result is that in the distant past or in different
cultural contexts we can find multiple factors which became decisive for the transformation,
but that does not mean that they would have gained such a function in any cases. They were
"causal" only in the sense of being crystallization germs.
81
The process of innovation usually follows an s-curve, whose origin is an unnoticeable
fluctuation of the status quo. Only in retrospect can we see that a new trajectory has formed
because the early phase of this s-curve lies within the normal fluctuation range of parameters.
In principle, this has the consequence that the beginning of an innovation curve can only be
identified after the fact. It is an important matter that a small localized distortion begins to
consolidate and to fortify prior to reaching the path of self-enhancement. Thus exponential
growth can start with the consequence being that its effects at some stage cannot be ignored
by observers. Finally, limiting forces become effective (resource depletion, environmental
restrictions) so that the curve reaches an asymptotic level. The interesting point, however, is
that the ignition of this process lies within normal fluctuations and this is necessarily very
hard to identify in retrospect.
82
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Jürg Helbling
Agriculture, population and state in China in comparison to Europe, 15001900
Various theories have been put forward to explain the diverging development of Europe and
China between 1500 and 1900. The decisive difference between the developments of these
two world regions was marked by the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Industrialization was
the transition from a mainly agricultural, solar energy based economy to an industrial, mineral
energy based economy starting at the end of the 18th century in England (Wrigley 1988,
Sieferle 1997 and this volume). An advanced solar energy based economy may display a
considerable degree of commercialization and specialization and can have growth of total
output and of output per capita, but, as some authors (such as Huang 1990 and Feuerwerker
1992) claim, declining labor productivity (but see Wong 1997 and Li 1998a). A mineral
energy based, industrial economy on the other hand is characterized by a massive growth of
output, especially in the industrial sector, and by an increasing capital stock (technology) per
labor unit and, hence, an increase in labor productivity (cp. Huang 1990:11; Feuerwerker
1992:764ff.; Wong 1997:17f., 27ff., 62f.; Li 1998a:164). Industrialization fostered not only
the economic but also the military-political supremacy of the west over the rest of the world
since the 19th century. Thus, the time period between 1700 and 1850 must be examined in
order to explain why the Industrial Revolution occurred in Europe but not in China1.
A great number of theories have been put forward proposing various explanations for the
divergent development of Europe and China (see Sieferle this volume for a summary).
Scholars in Chinese studies, too, have addressed these problems and have discussed them
quite controversially (cp. Huang versus Pomeranz 2002 for the latest debate). Two approaches
can be distinguished that try to explain why China developed later than Europe (see Riskin
1975, Feuerwerker 1990a). The technologist approach maintains that the growth potential of
traditional agriculture was exhausted and that overpopulation and a depletion of resources
hampered the industrial take-off. The distributionalist approach sees exploitation of the
peasant population, the corruption of state officials, the Confucian ideology, the family
structure or an inefficient state responsible for a the delayed development of the Chinese
1
This essay is an enlarged version of a paper given at the meeting of the study group ”Environmental history” on
Europe’s special course on Wasan Island. I thank all the participants, especially Rolf Peter Sieferle and Raimund
Kolb, for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank the Breuninger Stiftung for having sponsored the
meeting. I am also grateful to Tobias Haller, Nadja Ottiger, Hans-Peter Müller, Thomas Meyer, Hu Qiuhua and
the other participants in a research seminar for having commented on an earlier draft of this article.
90
economy. Thus, the industrialization of China was blocked or hampered either by a deficient
pre-industrial agriculture and technology or by a deficient pre-modern state, social structure
and culture.
In order to tackle the problem of delayed development of China as compared to Europe, after
all pre-industrial agriculture in Europe and in China has to be examined. I will focus on
comparing the pre-industrial agriculture in England and Wales, where the industrial take-off
took place and which had the most advanced agriculture in Europe, with the agriculture in the
most productive provinces of China (Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Guangdong, Jiangxi and
Jiangsu). At least three different relationships between pre-industrial agriculture and the
industrial take-off may be distinguished. According to the first position, the increase of
agricultural productivity – an ”agricultural revolution” – was both a precondition for and a
trigger of the Industrial Revolution. Agriculture supplied cheap labor and goods and
demanded manufactured inputs such as implements, machines and fertilizers (among many
Landes 1973, 1998, Bairoch 1963, 1985). According to the second position, it was a decline
of agricultural productivity, leading to rural poverty and a scarcity of subsistence goods (not
only food, but also timber and textile fibers) which made innovations necessary. These
innovations (use of fossil fuel and of steam engines) later turned out to have initiated an
industrial take-off. Later the growing industry supplied agriculture with industrial inputs and
attracted rural labor, which entailed an increase of labor productivity in the agricultural sector
(Wilkinson 1973). According to a third position, neither the efficiency nor the deficiency of
pre-industrial agriculture had an influence on the industrial take-off, which was induced by
other factors. Pre-industrial agricultural growth through an expansion of the cultivated area
and an increase of land productivity kept pace with population growth. Furthermore, efficient
markets and non-farm occupations of rural households contributed to prevent widespread
scarcity (Boserup 1972, 1983).
This essay does of course not solve the problem of the delayed development of China as
compared to Europe (for recent attempts see Wong 1997, Frank 1998, Pomeranz 2000, 2002,
Huang 2002 and others). It only aims at making a contribution to an answer by focussing on
agriculture and population. I will narrow my focus even further by concentrating on two
influential theories pursuing a Malthusian approach which have been put forward in order to
explain the delayed industrialization of China as compared with Europe. According to Eric
Jones (1987) the unequal frequency of environmental catastrophes caused different family
types in Europe and China. The nuclear family household in Europe and the extended family
household in China were responsible for a different reproductive patterns and different
91
predispositions for saving, investments and for technological innovation thus explaining
stagnation in China and economic progress in Europe2. Mark Elvin’s (1974) theory of the
”high level equilibrium trap” postulates a vicious circle between population growth,
intensification of production, population growth and declining labor productivity, reduction of
savings and investments, which result in stagnation and growing poverty in China3. Hence,
both Jones and Elvin are proponents of the technological approach assuming that the preindustrial economy in Europe was more productive and more effective, and that it had more
growth potential than in China. Because China was caught in a Malthusian trap of stagnation,
the Industrial Revolution occurred in Europe (i.e. in England) and not in China. We will deal
with Chinese agriculture until 1930 in order to test the Malthusian propositions.
By discussing these two theories I will mainly focus on population and agriculture in China
(or the most productive provinces of China) and compare them with Europe (especially with
England). I am fully aware of the fact that the empirical data on China (and on Europe), which
I use in this essay, are not too reliable. The methods are rather crude and not as sophisticated
as those used by others. The statistical data may pretend more precision and exactitude than
they actually have. The figures are often speculative and always conjectural, and even with
decimal places they only allow for statements such as ”may have been lower or higher than or
about the same as” and ”probably has increased or declined”. It is thus largely an exercise in
”qualitative statistics”. Some experts in China studies are very skeptical about using any kind
of statistics. These objections do sometimes veil their general dislike for generalization and
comparison and their preference for local history and for philology. However, it makes no
sense to postpone such generalizations – as provisional and approximate as they may be –
until we possess all the data, which will never happen. Unfortunately we have to work with
the data we have and cannot use the more accurate and more reliable ones, which we do not
have. We may nevertheless try to make reasonable “guesstimates” of trends and magnitudes
from the available data. After all, such generalizations open the way for new questions, for
refuting older attempts of generalizations and for reformulating old questions more precisely.
While the available data may not be good enough to present an alternative to the theories put
2
I am aware of the fact that Jones’ theory is more sophisticated. He also mentions the different institutional
framework in Europe and China as an additional explanation. According to him the European states began to
grant secure property rights to wealthy citizens on whose consent for tax increases they depended and, thus,
furthered the market system and the increase of wealth (see also Jones 1996 and North/Thomas 1973). By
contrast, the Chinese state was too weak to have positive effects, but strong enough to have negative ones, as
Wong (1997:14) puts it. However, I will not discuss this aspect of his theory.
3
Huang (1990, 2002) is arguing in a very similar way. In an involutionary process – as he coins it – growth of
total output and even per capita goes together with a declining labor productivity due to a low rate of capital per
labor unit. He also considers – and in contrast to Elvin – product, factor and credit markets in China as being
inefficient.
92
forward by Jones and Elvin, they may be sufficient to test the empirical plausibility of their
propositions.
The theories put forward by Jones and Elvin may be considered as Malthusian in the sense
that they maintain a specific relationship between population, resources and technology. Jones
tries to explain why positive checks (i.e. macrodemographic slumps) prevailed in China but
preventive checks (adaptive strategies by households) prevailed in Europe. In doing so, he
elucidates the economic consequences of both the ”expansive” and the ”adjusting”
reproductive strategy, already described by Malthus (1992:218, 1986:140ff., 475). Elvin has
argued that population growth and intensification of production in late imperial China lead to
resource depletion and average labor productivity declining to subsistence level. Both authors
maintain for China that population grew faster than food production (i.e. that productive
surplus was eaten up by population growth), that technological improvements only played a
minor role and that resource scarcity and population pressure could only be mitigated by
macro-demographic reductions. This theory, however, has been heavily contested in the last
few years as far too simplistic and empirically not always plausible. First, preventive check on
population growth, i.e. adjusting the number of children to available resources was also the
dominant reproductive strategy of Chinese households. Furthermore, positive checks did play
a far less important role as had been assumed. Second, the quantity of resources is not as
limited as maintained by Malthusian theory, and technological innovations may enhance
productivity and change the production function. Agricultural production can be intensified
under conditions of population pressure, urbanization and market incentives as Boserup
(1983:205,208; 1987:691, 697f.) and Netting (1993:276-282) have emphasized. The result of
this intensification of production may not only be an increase of land productivity but
sometimes even of labor productivity as well (cp. Boserup 1983:186). Thirdly, not just
economic factors, but also political factors (state and institutions) should be considered in
explaining the diverging development of Europe and China, as the distributionalist approach
claims (cp. Osterhammel 1995). Let us now turn to Jones’ theory first.
I. Risk management, family types and development
1.1 Jones’ theory
The theory put forward by Eric Jones (1987, 1991) basically consists of three elements:
1) Jones maintains that in China natural and social disasters (such as earthquakes, floods,
droughts, famines but also epidemics and wars) were more frequent and more massive than in
93
Europe. According to Jones, wars, epidemics and crop failure reduced ”human capital”
whereas earthquakes and floods, being more frequent in China than in Europe, mostly
affected ”material capital”. Through such disasters China lost not only more people (human
capital) but also far more material capital than Europe. This was because the complex
irrigation agriculture in China was more susceptible to such catastrophes than the relatively
simple but more resilient European agriculture (1991:42).
2) In order to cope with this higher level of environmental risks, the extended family
household (as an insurance community for the redistribution of food and exchange of labor)
prevailed in Asia, whereas in Europe the nuclear family household prevailed because there
was less need for risk avoidance. According to Jones, the difference between the Chinese
”extended family” and the European ”nuclear family” explains the divergent development of
China and Europe for the two family types had different consequences for production and
reproduction.
3) Members of nuclear family households, prevalent in Europe, could internalize the
production increase of their higher work effort. Because a nuclear family household had to
care for its own children, it adjusted their number to its income/wealth. Hence, a nuclear
family household provided incentives for increasing production and for controlling
reproduction through ”preventive checks”. Thus, it furthered an entrepreneurial spirit,
technological innovations and – in the end – industrialization. In ”Asia”, on the other hand,
nuclear families shared their products within the extended family household, so that even
”lazy families” were provided with food. Therefore, saving, investing and extra work by an
individual household did not payoff. Because the extended family household also cared for
the children, the reproductive strategy of nuclear families was expansive. Because both
production yields and reproduction costs were not internalized, there were no incentives for
production but high incentives for reproduction. As a consequence, production and industrial
development were hampered and the population growth was high.
This theory may be criticized on several grounds. In what follows I will discuss
environmental disasters, household strategies against risks and reproduction strategies.
1.2 Natural and social disasters
The main causes of an erratic increase in mortality rates in China were wars (invasions and
civil wars), crop failure and famines (following wars, locusts, floods and droughts) but also
94
epidemics (Perkins 1969:24f.; Chao 1986:28; Eastman 1988a:4; Mark 1998:328f.)4. However,
it is unclear whether such disasters were more frequent and severe in China than in Europe.
The data presented by Jones (1991:30ff., 37) are not very conclusive.
1.2.1 Floods, droughts and famines
Floods and droughts may have occurred more frequently in China (Gernet 1988:415ff.; Chao
1986:37f.; Eastman 1988a:4; Perkins 1969:23f.; Ho 1959, chap. 10). According to Chao
(1986:207) large floods increased in frequency by 2.5 cases per 20 years on average between
1470 and 1900, although according to Li Bozhong (1998b:453) there was a flood in Jiangnan
each 3.7 years during Ming, but only each 4 years during Qing times. The frequency of floods
and droughts could not be decreased despite big efforts in water control (cp. Wang/Zhao
1981; Perkins 1969:28; Mark 1998, chap. 10; Needham/Ronan 1995:199; Liu 1986:62f.).
However, contrary to Jones’ proposition of a high susceptibility of irrigation agriculture to
environmental crises, agricultural infrastructure could be repaired and fertility of arable land
be restored as quickly as the local population could recover. This could be observed after the
crises in the middle of the 17th and of the 19th century (cp. Perdue 1987:211-219; Will 1980;
Pomeranz 2000:42). According to several authors (Ho 1959, chap. 10; Chao 1986:31f.;
Lee/Wang 1999:35f., 45, 173) famines were not more frequent in China than in Europe. And
if they occured, they were the result of political and organizational failures rather than of
overpopulation (Gernet 1988:514f.; Lee/Wang 1999:36, 173). Famines – in China as in
Europe – often broke out after wars or epidemics. Malnutrition and hunger were just as
common in China and in Europe during both normal times and in times of crisis (Boserup
1987:697; Montanari 1993:119-208 and Ponting 1991:88, 105ff., 318ff. on Europe; Mallory
1930:94f.; Ho 1959:292-300 on China). Furthermore, famines seem to have had a far smaller
impact on mortality than epidemics and wars as even Jones (1991:39) admits (Li 1982:691;
Ho 1959:256; even Malthus 1798 cited in Lee/Campbell/Wang 2002:593f., 597).
1.2.2 Epidemics and wars
During the Ming and Qing times epidemics were an important mortality factor. In some areas
they reduced the affected population by 15% to 25% and more (Elvin 1973:310f.; Marks
1998:219; McNeill 1994:211, 269-276; Appendix II.2 and 3). However, it remains unclear
whether such epidemics were more frequent in China than in Europe. Europe, too, was
affected by various epidemics: plague until the 17th and smallpox until the 18th century;
4
Earthquakes have occured more often in China than in Europe. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica
(1998.4:323) they caused 1.030 mil. casualties in China between 1556 and 1915, but only 0.252 mil. in Europe,
95
cholera ravaged in the 19th century and typhus fever during the whole period (Vasold 1991,
chap. 5-8). Before 1750 the European population fluctuated more strongly due to crop failure,
famines and epidemics than the Chinese population (Myers 1980:26f.; Lee/Wang 1999:35,
173). Epidemics (and wars) are exogenous and not density-dependent as far as their
occurrence did not depend on resource pressure. Interestingly enough, the population decrease
(a loss of human capital), due to epidemics and wars, did not lead to an increase of output per
capita, but to a decrease due to the destruction of capital stocks instead, i.e. through the
neglect of fields, vineyards and orchards (Boserup 1987:699 for Europe; McNeill 1998:37;
Deng 1999:189 and Myers 1970:124 for China). During the Taping rebellion of 1853 to 1864
the population in Jiangnan was reduced by around 50%. However, agricultural production
(both land and labor productivity) did not increase (Li 1998:12,160), as predicted by
Malthusian theory, but declined.
According to Jones, war represented an even greater disaster than other catastrophes
(1991:39; see also Chao 1986:31). The population decline between 1850 and 1875 due to war
and famine is estimated at 30 to 50 (10 to 80) million (Ho 1959:247f.; Gernet 1988:469;
Perkins 1969:28f.; Appendix II.3). In Europe, however, wars appear to have been more
frequent than in China until the beginning of the 19th century, largely due to its system of
competing territorial states (on Europe cp. Beer 1981:24ff., 28ff., 45ff.; Wright 1942,I:656665, tables 31-41; Levy 1983:88-91). In the endemic wars in Europe, each state tried to
weaken its rivals and to become stronger at their expense. A large portion of the agricultural
surplus was spent on weapons and armies, especially after the ”gun powder revolution”
(McNeill 1982). Simultaneously armies pulled labor force out of the agricultural sector, and
war destroyed not only human but also material capital in huge quantities (Boserup
1987:698ff.; Myers 1970:124; Pomeranz 2000:42). In contrast to Europe, relative peace and
stability ruled in China – with the exception of invasions and insurrections between 1630 and
1660 – up to the end of the 18th century, but in the 19th century the Chinese state was faced
with several popular uprisings and wars against foreign invaders (Gernet 1988:299f., 353,
368, 399ff., 469; Wright 1942,I:594, tables 31-41).
It is difficult to see from these data that environmental and social risks have been more
frequent and more severe in China than in Europe. Let us now turn to Jones' conception of
household strategies aimed at coping with environmental risks.
thus a rate of 4:1 being much lower than assumed by Jones.
96
1.3 Household strategies against risk
It is important to distinguish between an environmental disaster and its consequences for a
population, because households, villages and the state pursue strategies to minimize risks and
to mitigate the adverse effects of environmental disasters.
1.3.1 Production strategies
Households are the most important economic units (for production and consumption) in
peasant societies; villages – with between 100 and 600 inhabitants the next larger unit –
consist of households endowed with different amounts of land and wealth5. Rural households
pursue several strategies, in order to produce enough food for their subsistence and for taxes
and rents as well as to cope with environmental risks (such as pests, crop failure, loss of labor
force and price fluctuation). These strategies include a production target above subsistence
level and household granaries, the diversification of crops and of field locations, additional
agricultural (animal husbandry) and non-agricultural activities (such as handicraft production
and wage labor) and the saving of income for times of penury. Households within a village
may cooperate, although this appears not to have been common both in China (Stover/Stover
1976; Netting 1993:240) and in Europe (cp. Popkin 1986). Wage labor, land renting, money
lending and selling products besides cooperation and mutual support between neighboring
households whether related by kinship relations or not were the most important relationships
between households in a village (Myers 1975:265-270). Furthermore, peasants refused to pay
rents – in China roughly one half of the agricultural output of a household – or reduced them
in times of crises. The landlords could not prevent them from doing so, as Chao (1986:190ff.),
Eastman (1988b:78) and Stover/Stover (1976:164) write. This can be interpreted as an
additional buffer against bad harvests. Minimax-strategies of peasant households in China –
as in other peasant societies – largely followed the slogan ”safety first” (Barlett 1980, Lipton
1968, 1982, Grigg 1982, chap. 7, Ellis 1988, Netting 1993). Peasant households allocated
their resources to activities where income gain might be highest, as Myers (1975:271;
1991:614) points out. They did not only aim at providing security and an adequate standard
of living, but also were strongly motivated to do better than their ancestors. Thus, hard work,
accumulation of wealth, relentless struggle to improve social status and economic welfare
were properties of a Chinese household (Myers 1975:271ff., 1991:617f.; Brandt 1989:20) as
well as a high propensity to save some cash for investments (Myers 1991:620f.)6.
5
Household is the smallest residence unit, family the smallest kinship unit.
The difference between autosubsistent, Chayanov peasants and profit maximizing, neoclassical peasants is not
as big as often assumed. In principle Chayanov peasants reduce production, whereas neoclassical peasants
6
97
1.3.2 Correlation of risks
It is important to distinguish between different kinds of risk. There are risks such as crop
failure and loss of labor force which do not affect all families to the same extent (noncorrelated risk). Hence, pooling the resources of the households of an extended family would
make sense, although production strategies of households can usually cope with these risks (in
combination with a limited cooperation between neighboring households). Cooperation
between the households of a village was possible whether they were related by kinship or not.
There were village associations for mutual assistance (labor, water buffaloes, ploughing), for
the management of the irrigation and water control system, for tax collection as well as credit
associations and others. Clan and village leaders were often instrumental in taking the
initiative in forming such associations. However, often the relations between the households
even related by kinship were market transactions (such as buying food, renting land, hiring
wage labor, taking a credit), as Myers (1975:265-270,274f.) points out. The risks which Jones
considers as being more frequent and more serious in China than in Europe, i.e. floods,
droughts, locusts or earthquakes, however, do affect all households in a village or even in a
region alike, and cooperation of households within extended families was useless. Under such
conditions, the regional dispersion of nuclear families made more sense than forming
extended family households. Nuclear families from an affected area could then take refuge
with their relatives living in another place not affected by penury or emigrate to a thinly
populated region and finding help from state officials or local gentry. Hence, extended family
households as units for risk reduction seem to be neither necessary nor profitable.
1.3.3 State and environmental risks
The Chinese state played an important role in coping with environmental risks. It massively
invested in infrastructure (dams and other water control systems, measures against locusts
etc.) in order to reduce the occurrence of droughts and floods and eventually also pursued
reforestation both for fuel and hydrology (McNeill 1998:37). Encouraging emigration and
colonizing new land, the promotion of new crops and new cropping techniques were long-
increase production with rising prices. Self-sufficient households have to increase production if the marginal
utility curve moves upward due to a growing preference for new goods, growing investments and increasing
consumer prices. They also produce the same amount of goods with less effort if the marginal disutility
(production costs) curve moves downward with the use of more efficient production technology, with an
increasing percentage of workers and growing market prices. They may also increase production at constant
costs in this case. The neoclassical households would behave the same way, although labor costs would be fully
accounted as wages in this case. Although Chayanov peasants do not account household labor at wage costs,
they may seasonally hire workers if real wages are lower than the marginal physical product or doing wage labor
if marginal physical product is lower than real wage (Harrison 1982, Calavan 1984, Ellis 1988).
98
term coping strategies by the state on behalf of the peasant population. The state also
contributed to mitigate the consequences of disasters once they had occurred: by means of
public granaries on all administrative levels, tax reductions, transport of grain from surplus
areas into deficit areas etc. (cp. Rawski 1998:121; Perkins 1969:173; Perdue 1987:18;
McNeill 1998:37; Marks 1998:435, 445)7. Annually up to 5% of the total rice production
were stored in public granaries (cp. Lee/Wang 1999:172; Deng 1999:181; Will/Wong 1991,
Appendix; Li 1982, Lee 1982, Bin Wong 1982). The effectiveness of this granary system also
depended on the political effectiveness of the state on the different administrative levels and
on the transport infrastructure (roads and rivers), neither of which was always in good
condition (Mallory 1930:94f.; Baker 1930; Fei 1946:8; Elvin 1974:303f.; Eastman
1988d:105f.) However, McNeill (1998:34ff.) states that the transport system of the two main
rivers, the grand canal as well as of the vast system of small rivers and canals, connecting a
wide range of ecological zones, allowed for the transport of bulky goods and for an efficient
market system. Although in the north of China land transport prevailed (Eastman
1888d:103ff.), the transport system in the whole of China was not matched by any other
transport system in the world. It contributed to the wealth and the resilience of the Chinese
state, which only became surpassed by the British Empire in the 19th century. Even Elvin
(1974:303ff.) refers to the efficiency of water transportation mentioning Adam Smith who
already observed the low transport prices and hence the lower prices for goods in China.
In contrast, European states mainly concentrated on collecting taxes (with the exception of
cities which opened granaries in times of crisis), although from the 18th century onwards they,
too, started to invest more in infrastructure such as melioration, transportation and
propagation of agricultural innovations. Famines resulting from floods, droughts and pests
may thus be explained by political and organizational problems rather than by overpopulation
(Lee/Wang 1999:36; McNeill 1998:37).
1.4 Reproductive strategies of households
The most important argument against Jones’ theory, however, is the fact, that also in China
the nuclear family household (or the stem family) was common. According to NeoMalthusian demographers, nuclear family households and preventive checks prevailed in
Europe, extended family households and positive checks in China (Haynal 1965, 1982,
Macfarlane 1978, 1986, 1987; Malthus 1986:109,236). The prevalence of the ”Asiatic
7
During the revolution of 1912, the contents of the public granaries were sold by state officials and have never
been restocked (Mallory 1930:95).
99
extended family” is a myth, as Goody (1990:114) and Hsu 1943 (in Stover/Stover 1976:157)
among others have demonstrated. This myth emerged because the elite family in China was
compared with the average family in Europe. However, preventive reproduction strategies
were also widely practiced by households in China, even though the marriage age was lower
than in Europe.
1.4.1 Size of households
Chinese households consisted of about 4.45 persons on average as an evaluation of data from
the 16th to the early 20th century shows, but somewhat higher after the beginning of the 18th
century when census methods improved (Ho 1959; Fei/Chang 1945, Fei 1939; Chao
1986:34ff., Appendix I.1). This average size is even lower than that in Europe (ø 4.8 in
England, cp. Laslett 1972:146; Segalen 1990:43) and Japan (ø 4.9, Nakane 1972, in Goody
1990:114). Even if the average household size in China may have been somewhat higher
(4.95 between 1728 and 1933), it is still true that it was not considerably higher than in
Europe. Furthermore, it should be stressed that household size does not primarily depend on
the man-land ratio, but rather on the
labor requirements of a farm of a given size(Li
1998a:135). This can be seen from an example of Jiangnan where household size did not
increase after the 50% reduction of the population in the middle of the 19th century (Li
1998a:140).
1.4.2 Reproductive strategies
All (peasant) households pursued certain reproductive strategies, in order to adjust the number
of their children to the available resources: by varying marriage age as in Europe or by
infanticide and birth spacing as in China. We learnt a lot about these strategies from the
publications by Lavely/Wong (1998), Lee/Wang (1999), Lee/Campbell/Wang (2002) and
others on the reproductive strategies of households in China. Two preventive strategies of
population control were prevalent in China: (female) infanticide and a low total marital
fertility rate (TMFR).
Female infanticide amounted to between 20% and 25%, and probably to as high as 50% of all
new-borns in peasant households in China (Lee/Wang 1999:51; Ho 1959:58-62), although the
practice was condemned by Confucian scholars and prosecuted by the state. The high sex
ratios point to high rates of female infanticide: 137 men per 100 women for all age categories,
186 men per 100 women for those under the age of 16 and 193 boys per 100 girls at the age of
100
one year between 1770 and 1934 (cp. Appendix I.2)8. Infanticide (female and male) varied
with economic conditions. Infanticide increased with increasing grain prices (as an indicator
of bad harvests)9. Infanticide was an important preventive check on population growth: a
female infanticide rate of 10% would reduce population growth by around 30% (Lee/Wang
1999:51, 110f.). Infanticide was not common in Europe (but cp. Russell 1948 and Langer
1972 in Wilkinson 1973:73f.; Dickemann 1979:350-358); however intentional neglect of
new-borns occurred and had the same effect, as Harris/Ross (1987:6, 15, 100) point out.
Even more important than infanticide were deliberate adjustments in marital fertility
(Lee/Campbell/Wang 2002:598ff.). Between 1550 and 1931 the average marriage age of
women in China was 16 to 19 years, therefore 5 to 10 years lower than in Europe (Lee/Wang
1999:65ff.). Nevertheless, the total fertility rate (TFR) was not higher than in Europe and the
total marital fertility rate (TMFR) was even lower than in Europe (Lee/Wang 1999:84f.;
Lee/Campbell/Wang 2002:595f., 603). According to these authors, a married woman in China
had given birth to less than 6 children on average, whereas in Europe a menopausal woman
had given birth to 7.5 to 9 children (Lee/Wang 1999:8, 86f.). This lower TMFR was due to a
late beginning and an early end of reproduction (i.e. a shorter reproduction period from the
first to the last child than in Europe) as well as to birth control (birth spacing of 33 months vs.
25 months, contraceptive measures and abortion). Therefore a woman in China had given
birth to 2-3 children less than an average woman in Europe (Lee/Wang 1999:88ff.). If
Chinese families with their low marriage age had reproduced with the same high TMFR as in
Europe, the population growth would have been around 50% higher than it actually was
(Lee/Wang 1999:107f., 194; Lee/Campbell/Wang 2002:602).
The infant mortality was about 50% (for children under 15) with the mortality of girls being
somewhat higher. Hence, adoption played an important role. About 10% of all sons and more
than 10% of all daughters-in-law were adopted (Lee/Wang 1999:8,107ff.). Interestingly
enough, the mortality of older men did not vary with the existence of sons or grandsons. Thus,
it could be argued that the provision for old people did not correspond to the Confucian ideal
of filial piety (Lee/Wang 1999:113). Generally, China had a higher standard of hygiene than
Europe: boiling of water, use of soap, taking baths, a relatively varied food-intake, smallpox
8
At the lower and middle Yangzi and in the southeast China about half of the newborn, above all girls, were
killed (Lee/Wang 1999:47,60). Among the peasants of Liaoning between 1774 and 1873 about one fifth to one
fourth of all female new-borns were killed. Not only female infanticide was practiced infanticide but also
mortality of girls between 0 and 5 years was higher than that of boys: 20% more girls than boys died (316:1000
or 266:1000), as Lee/Campbell (1997) show (Lee/Wang 1999:51). The decline of infanticide and infant mortality
in the late 19th century was responsible for the increase of female life expectancy (ibid.:52-56).
101
inoculation etc. (Lee/Wang 1999:45; Mote 1977:199; Pomeranz 2000:38). The birth rate in
China was generally lower than in Europe (Li Zhongqing 1994:3). Because the population
increased by a higher rate in China than in Europe between 1500 and 1750 (by ø 0.37% and ø
0.28%) and by a slightly lower rate between 1750 and 1850 (or by ø 0.46% or ø 0.53%), the
mortality rate in China must also have been lower than in Europe, given the lower birth rates
in China (Pomeranz 2000:38, 41).
Ironically, it was from the middle of the 18th century on the eve of the industrial take-off when
English population grew with increasing speed and it was then, when output per capita
decreased, although productivity per worker increased. It is true that these values also
declined in China between 1700 and 1800, but less so than in England, and they increased
again from 1800 until 1930 (cp. Appendix VIII.1 and 2). So it was in England where the
increase in production output was eaten up by population growth rather than in China.
1.4.3 Size and income of households
The effectiveness of preventive reproductive strategies in China can also be seen from the
correlation between household size and household income/wealth: rich families lived in
extended family households, whereas poor families lived in nuclear family households10.
Both in Europe and in China the size of households varied according to income or land
resources (cp. Herlihy 1998:59-66 on Europe).
Rich families could keep their sons after their marriage in the paternal household while poorer
families could not (cp. Goody 1990:98ff.; Lee/Wang 1999:64f, 80ff.; Freedman 1966:45;
Stover/Stover 1976:148-159; Faure 1989:90). Furthermore, in poorer families the mortality
(infanticide, infant and general mortality) was higher and the fertility (TMFR) lower than in
richer households (Croll 1987:122; Cohen 1976:65ff.; Goody 1990:99f.; Fei 1939:35; Wolf
1985b, Wolf/Hanley 1985:7; Coale 1985; Harrell 1985:108f.; Harris/Ross 1987:77f., 97ff.).
Richer households often joined up to form effective lineages that also managed common
property, while poorer families only possessed a common ancestor shrine (Goody 1990:77,
98, 104, 109). Even among the rich the redistribution of resources within the lineage was
9
Deng (1999:200f.) observes a high elasticity of Chinese population to a variation of agricultural output: a lower
output reduced the birth rate, an increasing output increased it.
10
Cp. among others Ho (1959:10ff., 17ff., 42, 56-62, 86), Goody (1990:98-109, 211), Freedman (1958:15, 27ff.),
Fried (1953:70f., 86), Fei (1939:33), Stover/Stover (1976:158f.), Chao (1986:247), Lee/Wang (1999:97),
Lee/Campbell (1997:180-183) and Appendix I.3). It was only in the second half of the 19th century that nuclear
family households became prevalent among the urban neo-gentry (see Stover/Stover 1976:158).
102
limited. For instance, the members of the same lineage were only accepted as tenants if there
were no alternatives (Myers 1975:274; Stover/Stover 1976:153f.)11.
1.5 The collectivization of agriculture
Although Jones’ proposition does not apply to Chinese demography until the middle of the
20th century, his proposition concerning the negative economic and reproductive effects of
”Asiatic extended families” – ironically – only became true between 1950 and 1978 when
Chinese agriculture had undergone a collectivization of Soviet style. The crucial production
units were no longer households, but teams, brigades and communes. The households
cooperated within these units which had the effect predicted by Jones for extended family
households: low production incentives (the household income did not depend on its work
effort) but high reproductive incentives (the costs of raising children being externalized by the
households). It was in the 1950s and 1960s when population grew by more than 2% per year
and pre-industrial agriculture was not longer able to meet the food requirements of the
Chinese population (Perkins 1969:78). It was only in 1979 when collectivization was replaced
by the ”household responsibility system” described by Netting as the reintroduction of the
traditional Chinese model, that population growth decreased and agricultural productivity
increased again. The agricultural output increased, because households could again internalize
the yields of their additional work effort and invest their savings in more efficient technology.
At the same time, the population growth decreased because the households had to internalize
the costs of raising children (Myers 1980:23ff.; Netting 1993:232f., 244-249; Perkins
1969:139; Lee/Wang 1999:27, 114ff.; Croll 1987:122).
The objections to Jones’ proposition may be summarized as follows. First, environmental
disasters were hardly more frequent in China than in Europe. Second, those disasters
considered by Jones as being more frequent in China (such as floods and earthquakes) were
correlated risks against which the formation of extended family households was not an
effective strategy. And third, the household size was not higher in China (but rather lower)
than in Europe.
Let us now turn to the second, more sophisticated theory of the ”high-level equilibrium trap”
by Mark Elvin. Elvin’s book (1974) was one of the few, which tried to transcend local and
regional studies and to present a comprehensive view of China’s economic history. Even if
11
On the other hand, landless families, who depended on wage income as laborers, had more children (Netting
1993:269ff.).
103
his main proposition can not be accepted, it was still an excellent endeavor, which has to be
pursued.
II. High-level equilibrium trap
2.1 Elvin’s theory
Mark Elvin asks why no industrial revolution took place in China, despite important
preconditions were given such as a well developed banking and manufactural sector, a highly
efficient market and transportation system, wealthy firms and capital in considerable
quantities (1974:286ff., 295ff.). Furthermore, the state did not hamper economic development
(ibid.:289-294) – contrary to Jones’ (1996) assumption –, and market transactions were quite
secure and regulated by legal contracts (ibid.:295ff., 300, cp. Eastman 1988d, Rowe 1990).
Elvin sees the main reason for the economic stagnation in pre-modern China in a lack of
technological progress (ibid.:298). However, even Elvin mentions several technological
innovations during Ming and Qing times and writes, ”Clearly, the term technological
stagnation is a misleadingly oversimple description of this period” (1974:298).
Elvin’s (1974) theory of a high-level equilibrium trap maintains that 1) the population grew
faster than the expansion of the cultivated area; this led to a decreasing land-man ratio, which
necessitates the intensification of production. 2) Labor input increased as did output per area
(land productivity), but because the former increased faster than the latter, the output per
person (or worker, hence labor productivity) decreased. 3) Growing labor input necessitated
higher birth rates (children as labor force) that led – as a consequence – to higher population
growth. 4) This, however, aggravated the scarcity of land even more, and as no free land was
available anymore, the production had to be intensified further. 5) This reduced income and
savings which in turn hampered investment in agriculture (land, draft animals, machines). The
decreasing demand for capital goods was paralleled by a decreasing supply of raw materials
because metal, timber and coal stocks became increasingly depleted and expensive. 6) This
also prevented the accumulation of capital needed for an industrial take-off, which could
absorb agricultural labor, supply agricultural input and increase labor productivity. The
consequences were a growing impoverishment of the population and a vicious cycle from
which there was no escape (Elvin 1974, chap. 17, see also Ho 1959:226 and Chao 1986:69)12.
12
According to Elvin, it was only when the Chinese domestic market was opened to the world market in the
middle of the 19th century that commerce and industry began to grow, especially in the port cities; and it was the
104
According to Elvin, a population grows and the production is intensified until the potential of
a pre-modern agriculture is reached (see graph in 1974:313). Elvin maintains that the growth
potential of Chinese agriculture was exhausted by the end of the 18th century (ibid.:306), but it
is not clear what Elvin means by ”exhausted”. It could be either that the output per capita
reached its peak and declined thereafter or that the output per capita reached subsistence
level13. The crucial values for the theory of the Malthusian trap are average and marginal
output per capita. According to Elvin, occasional relief occured only through positive checks
such as epidemics, wars and famines like those during the 19th century (1974:312ff.).
However, at the same time, markets were highly efficient as was the transportation system,
and merchant capital was available in considerable quantities (1974:286ff.). Because of the
efficiency of markets and transportation no scarcities emerged for a relatively long period of
time, and therefore there existed no pressure for technological innovation (ibid.:314). The
argument that scarcity leads to innovation and plenty prevents it, is remarkable because it
contradicts somehow Elvin’s own main argument that it was scarcity that prevented
innovation. I will come back to this later.
Huang has proposed a theory, which is similar to Elvin’s. Huang (1990:13, 145, 239,
1991:629f., 2002:514ff.) sees the agriculture in late imperial China caught in a process of
involution, which is characterized by diminishing labor productivity (output per working
time) although, according to him, total output and output per capita continued to increase.
Huang asserts that population pressure and land pressure had several consequences. First,
agricultural production had to be intensified, which increased total output and even output per
capita, but decreased labor productivity. Second, peasants increasingly turned to cash crops
(cotton) and handicraft production, which required substantially more labor than grain
production and had a much lower labor productivity. Third, the intensification of grain
production forced peasants to give up livestock, which not only prevented an increase in the
ratio of capital per labor but also an increase in animal manure for enhancing land
historic contribution of the modern West to ease and then to break the high-level equilibrium trap in which China
was caught and to promote rapid commercialization and industrial growth (ibid.:315, 319).
13
Elvin’s argumentation resembles the theory of the optimum population. The optimum population in an
agricultural system is reached, when the average output per capita becomes equal with the marginal output per
capita. If the population further increases, the average output per person begins to decline, and there is growing
underemployment, until output per capita reaches subsistence level, when overpopulation and growing
impoverishment are increasingly felt (cp. Grigg 1982:23f.). However, Elvin assumes that the production function
and the level of technology are held constant, which seems not to have been the case (cp. Deng 1993:199f.).
Grigg (1982:25-31) mentions alternative and more plausible modes of measuring overpopulation. These include
indicators such as increasing prices for agricultural products, a growing percentage of landless households,
unemployment and falling real wages, a slow introduction of technology, deterioration of food quality and intake
and mounting use of marginal land.
105
productivity. Fourth, farms became smaller thus hampering economies of scale. Fifth, an
excess of cheap labor was a strong disincentive for capital investments. Furthermore, and in
contrast to Elvin, Huang maintains that product, factor and credit markets were inefficient in
China, even in its most productive and commercialized regions (1990:130-133). Despite new
seeds, fertilizers and the introduction of mechanized irrigation in the Yangzi Delta between
1890 and 1937 and despite increasing wheat and cotton outputs, labor productivity decreased,
according to Huang (1990:239).
To be sure, I do not maintain that there were no growth limits in a pre-industrial agriculture
such as the ones suggested by Elvin and Huang. But, first, a Smithian economy (Wong
1997:29) like the Chinese with a highly efficient market had probably more growth potential
– through intensification, technological progress, land improvement, specialization and
commercialization – as Elvin and Huang thought, and it allowed total output and output per
capita and even labor productivity to grow further. Second, there was a balance of population
and resources in China considerably above subsistence level (Wong 1997:29). Third, the
growth potential of China’s pre-industrial agriculture was not exhausted until the middle of
the 20th century (Perkins 1969, Feuerwerker 1990, Deng 1999), and the limits of growth had
been probably reached in Europe earlier than in China. Fourth once an industrial economy is
established (and land reforms and other institutional change have taken place) the growth of
agricultural production will continue by increasingly using inputs from the industrial sector
(Lippit 1974, 1986).
The theory of the Malthusian trap can be criticized in various respects: in regard to the
mechanisms of the equilibrium trap and in regard to the empirical data. To present my
critique, I will divide the theory into its components: 1) population, 2) cultivated area, 3)
ecological conditions, 4) total output and land productivity, 5) intensification of production,
6) technological innovations, 7) labor productivity, 8) living standards, 9) reproductive
strategies and 10) non-agricultural household production. I should stress again the fact that
data on population and agriculture in pre-industrial societies are always questionable, but
unfortunately we do not have other more reliable data.
2.2 Demographic development
2.2.1 Population growth
The demographic development in pre-modern societies is difficult to estimate and the
estimates are always questionable (see Kolb in this volume). Estimates of the Chinese
106
population can be found in Ho (1959), Chao (1986:35-41), Eastman (1988a:4), Perkins
(1969:16), McEvedy/Jones (1978:171), Liu/Huang (1978:29f.), Zhao/Xie (1988) and in many
other sources (cp. Appendix II.1 and 2). The figures diverge: Chao and Zhao/ Xie give lower
figures (even lower than the official data) for the 16th, the 17th and the 18th century, whereas
McEvedy/Jones provide higher figures for the 19th century. However, all estimates show
about the same general trend of Chinese population development. According to a plausible
estimate the Chinese population increased from 103 million in 1500 to 340 million in 1800,
i.e. a factor 3.3 or a 0.4% per year, especially between 1700 and 1800 (Liu/Huang 1978:29f.,
cp. Appendix II.2). The European population rose from 81 million (1500) to 180 million
(1800), that is a factor 2.2 or 0.27% per year on average (McEvedy/Jones 1978:19)14. The
following table on population and growth rates tabulates the figures given by McEvedy/Jones
(1978) on Europe and by Liu/Huang (1978) on China (cp. Appendix II.4 and 5)15.
Table 1: Estimated population and growth rates in Europe and China compared
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
1950
Europe
m
China
m
81
88
100
105
120
163
203
276
408
549
103
146
160
123
138
260
340
412
400
580
Europe
China
% per year % per year
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1900
1900-1950
0.61
0.44
0.62
0.79
0.60
1.27
0.54
0.38
-0.06
0.75
1500-1750
1750-1850
1750-1900
1700-1850
0.28
0.53
0.61
0.56
0.37
0.46
0.29
0.73
The average growth rate of the Chinese population during the Ming and Qing dynasty was on
average 0.4% to 0.5% per year. It was only in the 1950s and 1960s that growth rate climbed to
2%, while the world population rose by 3% per year (Perkins 1969:24f., 77). A maximum
14
The European population, especially, increased in the middle of the 18th century. This growth was the result
not of a decreasing mortality rate (due to a better medical system), but of an increasing birth rate resulting from
an expansion of handicraft production. Handicraft production had raised the value of children as laborers, thus
making possible both economic independence of a family household at an earlier date and hence earlier marriage
(Slicher van Bath 1963:77, 97; Wrigley/Schofield 1981:417f.; Wilkinson 1973:74).
15
The numbers given by McEvedy/Jones (1978), Liu/Huang (1978), Perkins (1969), Eastman (1888a:4) and
Braudel (1990a:36) do not vary greatly. However they all diverge from Deng (1999:361f.) who claims an
incredible population increase from 27.36 mil. in 1734 to 208.10 mil. in 1766 which would amount to an annual
increase of 6.55%.
107
growth rate of 1.0% per year has probably never been exceeded in pre-modern China (Chao
1986:30; Myers 1980:7)16. The growth rate of Chinese population was not extraordinarily
high when compared to Europe (the tables in Appendix II.3, 4 and 5 also show this). The
Chinese population increased with an annual average rate of 0.73% between 1700 and 1850,
during which the population in Europe increased by 0.56%. Already between 1800 and 1850
as well as between 1850 and 1900 population growth was higher in Europe than in China.
However, between 1900 and 1950 the Chinese population grew at a slightly faster pace17.
In general, population growth is not necessarily negative as assumed by the Malthusian
theory. If a society is able to nourish its population, it cannot be called overpopulated. Only
the rapid decline of a population within a generation due to a density-depended factor such as
famines would be an indicator for overpopulation. There was a considerable population
growth in China as compared to Europe between 1700 and 1850. Thus, under the condition
that the population adapts to a variation of agricultural output with high elasticity, as it was
the case in China, population growth points to a superior capacity of Chinese agriculture to
feed its population, not to overpopulation. It was only when wars broke out or a natural
catastrophe occured destroying large quantities of resources, that a situation of overpopulation
in fact might have emerged (Deng 1999:180, 199f., 207ff.). As Boserup (1981:3; 1983:186f.)
has maintained population pressure may lead to emigration and ultimately to an
intensification of production and to technological progress. Intensification of production
raises not only the output per land unit, but may also increase the output per labor unit. One
reason for this is that only a higher population density makes investments in infrastructure
profitable, causes markets to develop and to increase in complexity and furthers the division
of labor and specialization, thus contributing to an increase of production and productivity
(we may speak of a ”demography of scale”). Therefore, the net effect of population growth
can in most cases be seen as positive18. On the other hand a decline of the population is
paralleled by a de-intensification of production. This can lead to a neglect of maintenance and
a decrease of investments in capital stocks (terracing, irrigating systems, reforestation, roads
and canals), and market exchange and trade will also shrink in volume. Furthermore, not only
16
The growth rate of 1.27% between 1700 and 1750 is exceptional and probably due to the territorial expansion
of the Qing state to the west and the north (Gernet 1988:403ff.).
17
However, in England, the most productive region in Europe, population annually grew by 0.03% between
1700 and 1750, but by 0.80% between 1750 and 1800 and even by 1.43% from 1800 to 1850 (Grigg 1982:187,
213, Schofield 1981:64, also Appendix VIII.1.1).
18
There are alternative modes of adjustment at a higher population: more grain instead of cattle (fields instead of
pastures), more tubers instead of grains, more trade and import of food as well as emigration and population
limitations.
108
the total production output but also labor productivity will decrease (Boserup 1987:98f.;
McNeill 1998:37; Li Bozhong 1998:12, 160; Deng 1999:200).
2.2.2 Geographical distribution of the population
The Chinese population was concentrated in areas, which were well suited for irrigation
agriculture in south and central China. Under the Ming dynasty there was mainly migration
from the densely populated Yangzi region back to the north, which had become more secure
after the military control of the borders. Migrants also headed for the thinly populated areas in
the southwest. Under the Qing the outer parts of China in the northeast and southwest were
settled (see Liu 1986:32-38; Lee 1978). Between 1700 and 1900 the population in less densely
populated areas increased by rates of 1%-2%, whereas the average growth of the Chinese
population was only at 0.5 to 1% (Lee/Wang 1999:116f., 195; Myers 1980:8). An estimate of
the population densities in the eight macro regions is found in Skinner (1977 in Myers
1980:11; Appendix II.6).
However, in order to test the Malthusian theory, population figures should be compared with
the cultivated areas and the land suitable for agriculture as well as with the total agricultural
output.
2.3 Cultivated land
2.3.1 Total cultivated area
The expansion of agricultural land was important in order to increase the total output. It has
been estimated that the agricultural land increased from 38 million ha around 1500 to 82
million ha around 1900 and to 111 million ha in 1957. Data are provided by Perkins (1969:16,
240), Chao (1986:87) and Heijdra (1998:452 (cp. Appendix III.1) as well as by Liu/Huang
(1978:29f.; cp. Appendix III.2, and Grigg (1974:88), cp. Appendix III.3). The following data
are taken from Liu/Huang:
Table 2: Estimated cultivated area and land-man-ratio
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
m ha
ha/p
38.67
39.07
44.67
40.00
53.93
60.00
0.38
0.27
0.28
0.33
0.39
0.23
1800
1850
1900
1910
1930
1957
109
m ha
ha/p
71.20
80.67
81.73
89.40
100.47
111.86
0.21
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.17
There was still unoccupied land in the 20th century in China (Buck 1937:169; Cressey 1930:3,
1934:95, 97, 1955:105). The north had been pacified and the frontiers secured against warlike
peoples from the steppes, and the state encouraged the colonization of these areas. Thus,
while the south was settled earlier, it was the north that received most migrants later. Whereas
the cultivated area in northern China increased from 16 million ha (1766) to 47.4 million ha
(1933), it only rose from 42.6 million to 47.4 million ha in the fertile regions in southern and
central China (Myers 1980:8). From the middle of the 19th century to 1957 the cultivated area
still increased by 40%, above all in Manchuria and Mongolia. However approx. 80% of this
land was of inferior quality (Perkins 1969:27). The distribution of agricultural land in
southern and northern regions fluctuated between 1400 and 1957 (Perkins 1969:18; cp.
Appendix III.4).
2.3.2 Cultivated area per person
A general trend showing a decreasing ratio of land per person can be observed: from 0.38 ha/p
in 1500 to 0.20 ha/p in 1900 and to 0.17 ha/p in 1957, as table 2 shows (see also Perkins
1969:16, 240; Chao 1986:87; Heijdra 1998:452; Liu/Huang 1978:29f.; Appendix III.1 and 2).
However, this general trend of a decreasing land/man ratio in China is not unique as the even
lower land/man ratio in Japan shows (cp. Appendix III.6).
A decreasing land-man-ratio is often considered as the main cause for a failed transition to a
more capital-intensive production and to a capitalist economy (see Huang 1990, 2002, Chao
1986, Elvin 1974). According to neo-Malthusian theory, population growth reduces the landman-ratio and – as the intensification of production cannot keep pace – to a decline of labor
productivity and of living standard19. However there are several arguments against this
proposition: 1) A declining land-man-ratio neither does entail a specific production function
nor does it imply a declining living standard. Technological improvements went on during
Ming and Qing times and changed the production function accordingly (Deng 1993, Kolb this
volume). Thus, it is a clear indicator of technological progress when a population grows and
the land-man-ratio decreases. On the other hand, population growth with a constant or an
increasing land-man-ratio points to land expansion and thus extensive growth (Deng
1999:188ff.). 2) The reduction of a population by famines, epidemics, wars and other positive
checks did not promote a more capital-intensive production, as predicted by Malthus. It is
19
Although there were some Malthusian voices in China during the 18th and 19th century such as Chu Lun-han,
Chu Yun-chin and Hung Liang-chi, there were also proponents of an anti-Malthusian approach as Pao Shih-chen
who defended a mercantilist theory in the early 19th century. According to him, the larger the population, the
greater the wealth of the state. He saw the main reason for a stagnating productivity in the agricultural sector not
in a high man-land-ratio but in the inability of the state (Elvin 1974:308f.).
110
rather a rapid population decline together with the destruction of productive resources such as
working animals, fields and infrastructure that may lead to a decline in production. 3) Even
the technological process in European agriculture until the middle of 19th century was not
labor saving, as Chao (1986:227) maintains, but rather land saving (Mokyr 1990:165) because
there was an excess work force (Deng 1999:190; Grigg 1982, 1992).
2.3.3 Quantity and quality of cultivated and cultivable land
Agricultural land of high quality (river valleys, plain, deltas and mountain basins) only
amounted to 15% of the total area of the 355.34 mil. ha in the agricultural heartland of
China’s 18 provinces. Soil fertility as well as the population density was higher in these areas
than in marginal regions (Cressey 1934:95, 97, 1955:105; Stover/Stover 1976:91,98; Myers
1980:11; Elvin 1974:305; cp. Appendix II.6 and III.5, and Grigg 1974:88, cp. Appendix
III.3). However, it cannot be deduced from higher population densities in the more fertile
areas that there was no unoccupied land available elsewhere.
The 28 provinces of China encompass 802.27 mil. ha. The ”agricultural area” (excluding
mountains, deserts and steppes) was about 309.78 mil. ha in 1915, only 83.64 mil. ha of
which were actually cultivated. This amounted only to 27% of the agricultural land, although
in the North China plain 66% and in the Yangzi plain 71% of the land was cultivated (Cressey
1930:3). According to other figures the cultivated area amounted to 92.94 mil. ha in 1914,
112.48 mil. ha in 1916/17 and 83.25 mil. ha in 1932 (Cressey 1934:95,97) and 94.04 mil. ha
in 1946 (Cressey 1955:105). According to Baker the agricultural land not cultivated amounted
to 280 mil. ha, a figure, which fits the data given by Cressey, but Buck (1937:169) considers
them as being highly exaggerated. According to him only 11% of the arable land was not
cultivated, and the cultivated area amounted to 87.96 mil. ha in the early 1930s, being 25% of
the total area of China (Buck 1937:167). With 11% of the arable land not being cultivated, the
total arable land would amount to 98.83 mil. ha. But according to a survey in 1992 the total
cultivable land was 144 mil. ha (communication by Kolb 2002). So even with a conservative
counting, there was still unused land in the 1930s and the 1940s, let alone the potential for
further intensification (Buck 1930:111-115). The agricultural land still expanded until the
1980s (Qu/Li 1994:45). The difference between cultivable (arable) and cultivated land may be
explained by the strong preference for irrigation agriculture (Stover/Stover 1976:97f.).
However, the cultivation of unused areas would have been possible by using other, more
extensive agricultural techniques (dry agriculture, cattle raising) and other crops (Buck
1933:1ff.; Perkins 1969:57-60). The introduction of new crops such as maize and sweet
111
potatoes in the 16th century was an important precondition for colonizing marginal regions
(Ho 1959:83-192; Mote 1977:203). However, it was only during the Qing time when the full
potential of these new crops was slowly realized (Stover/Stover 1976:114).
The high population density in fertile areas does not, therefore, point to a general scarcity of
agricultural land. The unequal population densities such as the direction of migration flows of
settlers can be explained in different ways. 1) The push-factors for migration may not have
been strong enough: The potential for increasing yields in high-density areas was not yet
exhausted and emigration on a large scale was not a profitable option (cp. later). As Boserup
(1981) maintains, land use is not decisively limited by soil fertility or other ecological
parameters, and the limits of carrying capacity can be pushed further up by new techniques of
intensification even in pre-industrial agriculture (Netting 1993:263)20. But also the pullfactors for migration were probably too weak. 2) Marginal areas at China’s border were
insecure for a long time and attacks by warlike peoples from the steppes and hill tribes in
frontier areas hampered immigration. After the state had established law and order in these
regions, immigration however soared (Lee/Wang 1999:116ff., 195; Eastman 1988a:10ff.;
Feuerwerker 1990:232f.; Hucker 1998:120f.). The state encouraged the colonization of thinly
populated regions by providing seed, work animals and agricultural implements and by
offering tax exemption (Hucker 1998:116; Eastman 1988a:12f.; Ho 1959:83-192; Spence
1977:263; Eastman 1988c:82). 3) Immigration was also hampered by the fact that marginal
areas were not integrated into a market system because of their poorly developed transport
infrastructure (Elvin 1974:304). However, this would have been an important pull-factor
because of the importance of rural handicraft production. Handicraft production (cloth and
yarn) depended on the access to markets (selling yarn and textiles, buying raw material and
consumer goods). A well functioning market system existed only where the population
density was high and the transportation system well-developed (Netting 1993:292f.)21.
2.4 Ecological conditions
Yet another factor should be addressed, which can also represent an important push-factor for
migration: ecological degradation. In southern China the cultivated area was expanded
through land reclamation at the expense of lakes, swamps and forests. The loss of these
20
This also holds true for European agriculture. As Slicher van Bath (1963:279ff.) shows, Dutch and English
farmers in the vicinity of cities had outstanding harvest rates for wheat of 1:17 and 1:20 in the 16th and 17th
century. He notes that these high yields were achieved on low fertility soils but with a high input of manure
(ibid.:259f.).
21
According to Fisk (1964:157) peasants also intensify their production, when they are more integrated into a
market system.
112
natural water reservoirs caused an increase in floods and droughts (Chao 1986:205f.). The
clearing of new land as a consequence of population growth had caused deforestation in
northern China at an even earlier date. The north became increasingly susceptible to droughts
and silting of rivers, which caused floods, erosion and desertification (Chao 1986:202f., see
above chap. 1.2.1). However, it is important to note that an overuse of land resources and its
consequences such as deforestation and erosion mainly occurred in the thinly populated hill
and border areas where extensive shifting cultivation was practiced (cp. Osborne 1998 on the
highlands of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi and Anhui). In the more populous core regions,
where intensive cultivation was practiced, hardly any such damage was caused. Although
these regions were also affected by the consequences of resource overuse in the marginal
areas, the impact was not always negative (fertilizing fields with loamy water and silt, cp.
Eastman 1988d:122f.; Netting 1993:237; Perdue 1987:20f.). When population density and
market integration (transportation system) increased, intensification of production with
investments in land (such as terracing, irrigation etc.) also paid-off in marginal areas (Netting
1993:237; Eastman 1988b:66). This, again, does not support the Malthusian view of things.
According to the Neo-Malthusian theory, the Chinese environment was heavily strained
which in turn strongly affected the economy and contributed to its decline. As previously
noted, the ecological conditions most probably worsened in China in the course of time.
However, the same was true for Europe. As a result of economic growth during the 16th and
again the 18th century large parts of Western Europe became deforested. In the economic core
areas of Europe timber stocks were more massively depleted than in comparable areas in
China, where the per capita supply of wood was higher than in Europe, if one believes
Pomeranz (2000:12f.). Massive erosions, dust storms and a decline in agricultural yields were
the indicators of an ecological crisis, leading even to a climatic change in Europe comparable
to the one in northern China today: a European monsoon with erratic precipitation which was
highly detrimental to dry land agriculture (Blaickie/Brookfield 1987:129-140; Pomeranz
2000:56)22. China had suffered dreadful erosions over the millennia – as Anderson (1988:133)
states –, but if it had been eroded at the pace in the American Midwest, it would have ceased
to produce food many centuries ago.
22
The forests in central Europe (but not in England) only began to recover in the first half of the 19th century
after the onset of the Industrial Revolution. And consequences of deforestation disappeared as the increased use
of coal had increased and substituted for forests. Furthermore, land intensive crops such as cotton (for hemp),
sugar, later grain, wood, meat, wool were imported, thus substituting for domestic arable land. Moreover new
crops such as potatoes were increasingly used that had far higher yields per ha than the traditional European
crops (Pomeranz 2000:57f.).
113
2.5 Crop yields in Chinese agriculture
Crop yields are crucial in order to evaluate the Malthusian theory on Chinese agriculture. I
will briefly mention some characteristics of Chinese agriculture, followed by a discussion of
total output and land productivity in Chinese agriculture.
2.5.1 Characteristics of Chinese agriculture
About 80% of average consumption (and production) consisted of grain: millet in the north,
rice in central and south China, wheat in all regions, but especially in the north (see map in
Buck 1937:25, 27). Various vegetables provided 15% of the food consumption and meat only
accounted for about 2-3%. Beans, especially soybeans were important sources of protein
(Eastman 1988b:62; Ho 1959, chap. 8; Mote 1977:200; Anderson 1988:125, 128f.).
During Ming and Qing times, high yielding wet rice cultivation prevailed in the south and the
center and wheat and millet production in the north, the portion of the latter growing faster
than that of the former during this time period (Elvin 1974:306; cp. Appendix III.4). In
northern China dry agriculture dominated, as it did in Europe. The crucial problem in the
northern dry regions was to regulate the large rivers in order to prevent floods and droughts.
This was largely done by the state. Iron ploughs and seed-drill machines were the most
important technology, which had already been in place since Han and Tang times (Bray
1984:101-108; Eastman 1988b:70). In the north wheat yielded 1.6 times more on irrigated
land than on non-irrigated, marginal land (Elvin 1974:307). In the wet rice areas in the center
and south of China the irrigation system (to control the flow of water to and from the fields)
was decisive. The irrigation systems were mostly local or regional, and they were built and
maintained by village communities or local lineages. The influx of loamy water, nitrogen
fixing blue algae, decaying plant material, watertight soils, protection from wind erosion and
excessive heat as well as the input of manure may explain why soil fertility was high and did
not decline but often even improved over the years and centuries (Grigg 1974:75ff., 82; Bray
1984:106f., 111; Stover/Stover 1976:100; Li 1998:9, 171). Hill areas were also used for
agriculture, but most often for extensive agriculture as already mentioned. Irrigated terraces
were built in the south. Dry terraces were common in the north but were increasingly irrigated
later (Bray 1984:125f.; Eastman 1988b:66).
There were only relatively few work animals (fields instead of pastures) in Chinese
agriculture. Only the richer families owned work animals, which performed tasks otherwise
done by people (pulling the plow, carrying loads and pumping water). However, rich farmers
and landlords lent their work animals to poorer households (Perkins 1969:57; Stover/Stover
114
1976:100). On the other hand, pigs and fowl (chickens, ducks), which did not compete with
humans for food, were quite numerous (Perkins 1969:71ff.). They not only served as food but
also for waste disposal, as suppliers of manure and to fight pests (ducks against locusts). In
rivers, irrigation canals, water reservoir, ponds and rice fields, fish and other aquatic animals
could be found in large quantities (Mote 1977:201; Anderson 1988:129).
2.5.2 Total output
The total output of Chinese agriculture in grain and tubers increased by factor 6 between 1400
and 1900 and from 1900 to 1957 once more by factor 1.5 (Perkins 1969:23-36). However the
output of the Chinese economy and agriculture fluctuated. Economically China was in an
expansive phase between 1500 and the 1820s, except from the period between 1630 and 1680.
After the 1820s, floods and droughts, a deflationary crisis, various rebellions and wars, which
caused destruction of property and loss of lives, and a weak state contributed to a general
decline of the economy. However, the agriculture recovered after 1860 but the great
depression, natural disasters and civil wars of the 1930s and 1940s again caused an economic
decline and widespread misery (Myers 1980:5f., 20ff.; Perkins 1969:29; Gernet 1988:331,
350, 362ff., 407, 469; Lee/Wang 1999:115)23. Rawski (1989:330f.) has estimated that
agricultural output grew by 1.4% to 1.7% (1% to 2%) per year between 1914/18 and 1931/36,
in the 1920s by about 1.5% or by about 1% on average between 1911 and 1957 (Perkins
1969:29).
These fluctuations of the total output can be seen from the data provided by Liu/Huang
(1978:31-34). They estimate the total output (in billions kcal) from the average yields/ha and
the cultivated area. Converted to million tons, the total output of Chinese agriculture increased
from 27.456 mil. t in 1500 to 103.252 mil. t in 1900 and 163.161 mil. t in 1957 (cp. Appendix
IV.1). Deng (1999:180) proposes another method of calculating the total agricultural output.
Considering the fact that the population adapts to a variation of agricultural output with high
elasticity and assuming that food intake per capita did not vary greatly over time, he
calculates the total agricultural output as the product of the consumption per person and the
total population. The daily consumption of an adult is estimated at 0.5 kg husked rice and that
of a child below 15 years at 0.25 kg. Since adults make up about two thirds of a population
and children one third, the daily consumption of one million people amounts to about 416
tons of grain or 151’840 tons in a year. As production figures are usually given in unhusked
grain, but consumption figures in husked grain, we have to adjust the consumption to
115
production figures, 1 kg of unhusked grain roughly corresponding to 0.86 kg of husked grain.
This makes about 180 kg of unhusked grain per person and year, which, multiplied by the
total population, gives an estimate of the minimum total output (cp. Appendix IV.2). Data
provided by Perkins (1969:17, 19) suggests a higher total output (cp. Appendix V.4 and 5).
Between 1400 and 1900 the increase of the total agricultural output was 45% due to an
intensification of the production (higher yields per ha) and 55% due to the expansion of the
cultivated area, as Perkins (1969:33) shows (Appendix IV.3).
2.5.3 Land productivity
Population growth and a declining land-man ratio necessitated an increase of output per unit
of land. Intensification means increasing yields per land unit either by higher labor input,
more capital inputs and/or new technologies (Netting 1993:262). The increase in land
productivity between the 14th and the early 20th century is uncontested, both of various grains
(such as rice, wheat and millet) as well as with regard to the output of ”total grains”
(including grains and tubers; Perkins 1969:13). Elvin doubts the numbers given by Perkins
(1969:17, 19; cp. Appendix V.4 and 5) without giving empirical evidence for his doubts.
Deng (1999:186, 361f., 1993:201ff.) suggests that land productivity may be computed by the
population subsisting of the land and the cultivated area feeding the population. Thus, the
higher man/land-ratio results in a higher land productivity, which was the case in China as the
declining land-man-ratio in Table 2 shows. The increase of land productivity can also be
shown more directly.
Rice, millet, wheat
The average land productivity in rice production slightly decreased from 3410 kg/ha in the
17th century, but rose again to 3105 kg/ha in the 18th century and to 4869 kg/ha in the 19th
century. It more than doubled from 2250 kg/ha (around 1400) to 4869 kg/ha (1899) as a result
of a massive intensification of production (cp. Appendix V.1). Rice yielded harvest rates
(harvest output to seed input) between 1:50 and 1:100 (Bray 1984:380, 476, 287). In some
areas two or even three harvests a year were possible or five harvests in two years. Even in
1932 rice yields in China were at 2724 kg/ha whereas the world production average was at
1614 kg/ha (Cressey 1934:100).
Millet also allowed for harvest rates of between 1:50 and 1:100; and while it yielded a lower
output per ha, it also required lower labor input than rice (Chao 1986:199f.; Bray 1984:287;
23
In the 1950s not only the population but also the economy began to grow rapidly. Between 1949 and 1977 the
agricultural sector increased by 4% per year (Myers 1980:22f.).
116
cp. Appendix V.2). Therefore, rice and tubers displaced millet as the population increased,
because higher yields per land and absorption of labor force became more important.
Wheat yielded harvest rates up to 1:20 during Ming and Qing times (Bray 1984:379, 476).
According to Yu (1980) output of wheat was at about 1314 kg/ha during this time period (cp.
Appendix V.2). In Europe, even in England, harvest rates of only 1:11.6 (1800-1820 and
1895-1914) were reached, in the rest of Europe even less than 1:6. During the alleged
agricultural revolution in Europe the harvest rates only doubled from 1:5 to 1:10 (Slicher van
Bath 1963:173-176; Grigg 1982:174f.; Turner/Beckett/Afton 2001:167, 218). Even according
to Elvin (1974:307f.) wheat yields per ha in 1920s were higher in China than in pre-industrial
Europe. Whereas in China in the 18th and 19th century 14 bushel wheat/acre were harvested, it
was only 9.5 bushel in France at the end of the 18th century. In China wheat production was at
1002 kg/ha (China) when the world average was at 941 kg/ha (Cressey 1934:100).
Total grain
Total agricultural output is commonly measured in ”total grain” including grains and tubers
(Perkins 1969:13) or as in other tables: all grains excluding tubers. The yields of total grain
per ha increased from 898 kg/ha in 1400, to 1676 kg/ha (1776), 2193 kg/ha (1851), and 2773
kg/ha in 1957 as Perkins (1969:19) shows (cp. Appendix V.4 and 5).
The data provided by Liu/Huang (1978:31-34) and Deng (1999:180) on the whole of China
also show an increase of average yields per ha (Appendix V.7 and 8). Note that Deng’s
figures represent estimates based on the minimal subsistence need of the Chinese population,
whereas Liu/Huang and Perkins extrapolate land productivity from reported yields/ha. The
figures given by Perkins (1969:17, 19) were higher than those provided by Liu/Huang but less
complete. I have estimated some of the missing data by assuming that Perkins’ data set shows
about the same fluctuation as that provided by Liu/Huang.
Table 3: Estimated land productivity
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
1910
1930
1957
Perkins
kg/ha
Liu/Huang
kg/ha
Deng
kg/ha
1463
1698
1792
2008
2088
2068
2130
2422
813
1096
1195
1284
1305
1293
1331
1463
461
780
860
919
881
851
860
1041
117
As we can see from these figures, there were times when land productivity declined, but all
the data point to the fact that there was no general trend toward declining yields per ha in
China, contrary to Elvin’s (1974:307f.) assertion. The figures given by Perkins (1969:19) also
show a considerable regional variation in yields. Table 4 presents data on yields per ha for the
whole of China (kg/ha 1 and kg/ha 2, according to two estimates by Perkins 1969:17, 19; see
Appendix V.4 and 5) as well as for the four most and the four least productive provinces. The
average land productivity in the four most productive provinces was roughly 1.7 times above
the average of the whole of China between 1776 and 1851. The average output per ha in the
four least productive provinces was about 2.1 times below the average of all provinces in this
time period (cp. Appendix V.6).
Table 4: Regional variation of land productivity
1776
1851
China
kg/ha (1) kg/ha (2)
most prod.
kg/ha
least prod.
kg/ha
1522
1822
2807
3614
773
970
1676
2193
Data on Jiangnan and Songjiang are computed from Li (1998:138ff., 151) and for 1930 from
Faure (1989:46, see also Lee 1998a:126, 1998b:481).
Table 5: Land productivity (rice and wheat) in Jiangnan and Songjiang
1550
1620
1820
1850
1930
Jiangnan
kg/ha
Songjiang
kg/ha
...
2322
...
3260
3660
2095
2619
4018
3801
3038
Land productivity in the four most productive provinces of China contrasted favorably with
land productivity in England and Wales. Between 1700 and 1850 the land productivity in
England and Wales, the most prosperous country in Europe, was at 1402 kg/ha on average,
whereas in the four most productive provinces of China it was at 2958 kg/ha, which is 2.1
times higher than in England and Wales. Whereas land productivity in the four most
productive provinces of China increased by factor 1.4 between 1700 and 1850, it rose by an
118
average factor of 1.9 in England and Wales, as table 6 shows (cp. Appendix VIII. 1.5 and
3.4)24.
Table 6: Land productivity in England and Wales and the four most productive
provinces in China compared25
England &
Wales
kg/ha
China 4
Ch4/
E&W
1700
1750
1800
1850
995
1182
1521
1908
2487
2887
3046
3413
2.5
2.4
2.0
1.8
Ø kg/ha
factor
1402
1.9
2958
1.4
2.1
England &
Wales
%
China 4
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
0.35
0.51
0.45
0.30
0.11
0.23
1700-1850
0.43
0.21
kg/ha
%
2.6 Intensification of production
The intensification of Chinese agriculture geared to increasing land productivity, included
new crops, multi-cropping, more irrigation, more manure and higher labor input.
2.6.1 New crops
Already in the 11th century new rice varieties with a shorter maturing time were introduced
from Vietnam. The reduction of maturing time from 180 days to 130 and later even to 100
days allowed the multi-cropping of rice (and wheat). Drought resistant varieties made possible
the expansion of rice cultivation in the north and into the hilly areas of the south (Eastman
1988a:7; Chao 1986:200; Perkins 1969:39f., 49ff.).
From the 16th century new crops introduced from South America played an increasingly
important role. The cultivation of sweet potato expanded in the hilly areas, in the 18th century
in the Yangzi-area and the coastal region of Shandong and in the 19th century even into the
northern plains where it pushed back and replaced millet, barley and sorghum. Sweet potato
yielded 7440 kg/ha in 1932, and yields were probably not lower in earlier times (Cressey
1934:100). Also maize (1200 kg/ha) and potatoes (5633 kg/ha) (as food for the poor or as pig
fodder) as well as peanuts (1868 kg/ha) played an important role (Cressey 1934:100; Simoons
24
Also the total output of grain was somewhat higher in China (increase factor of 2.2 between 1700 and 1850)
than in England and Wales, where it increased by a factor of 2 (Allen, Turner & Grigg; see Appendix VIII.1.5).
25
Data for England and Wales: Allen (1994), Grigg (1982), Turner/Beckett/Afton (2001); for China: Perkins
(1969).
119
1991:122-126; Ho 1959:83-192; Chao 1986:201; Eastman 1988a:7f.; Perkins 1969:48;
Stover/Stover 1976:114; Mote 1977:203, 263; Anderson 1988:96ff., 115).
2.6.2 Multi-cropping
As early as in the 12th century there was hardly any fallow land in China, a point Europe only
reached in the 18th and the 19th century after the much-celebrated ”agricultural revolution”.
Double cropping of rice was widely practiced from the 17th century onwards, especially in the
southeast (Guangdong, Fujian, Guangxi). In southern and central China, two rice harvests
were possible per year, or rice was rotated with wheat, as in the lower Yangzi region (Buck
1937:25, 27, 62-72, 82-86). In the north inter-cropping of wheat, cotton and beans was
common (Perkins 1969:41-56; Grigg 1974:86f.; Bray 1984:507)26. The multi-cropping index
(MCI) measures the number of harvests per field and year. The average MCI rose from 1.3 in
the late 17th century to 1.4 in the middle of the 19th century, and decreased again to 1.3 in the
1930s as more marginal land in the north was cultivated (Chao 1986:199, Appendix III.1).
2.6.3 Irrigation
Large river regulation systems – built and maintained by the state – prevailed in the north
(where erratic precipitation could cause floods), whereas in the south and center, regional
irrigating systems were built and maintained under the guidance of district officials, local
gentry or by village communities and local lineages. After wars and floods the damaged
irrigation infrastructure was quickly repaired (Perkins 1969:27, 60-68; Stover/Stover
1976:101, 171ff; Bray 1984:108ff.; Eastman 1988c:92ff.; Rawski 1998:121). Thus, the
contrast between the resilience of European agriculture and the susceptibility of Chinese
agriculture to environmental disasters as asserted by Jones seems to be exaggerated, to say the
least.
Water control systems were expanded (Needham/Ronin 1995:199) as was the irrigation
infrastructure. Between 1400 and 1900 the total irrigated area is estimated to have risen from
9.6 million ha to 23.3 million ha, whereby the main growth took place in the 16th century
(Perkins 1969:64). The irrigation technology (water wheels, contour cultivation etc.) was
further improved during the 16th century (Mokyr 1990:222f.; Bray 1984:458; Needham/Ronin
1995, see also Kolb, this volume), in contrast to the proposition of technological stagnation
after the 15th century, made by Elvin.
26
The use of late-ripening intermediate rice and early-ripening late rice was optimal, being a precondition for
double-cropping (Li Bozhong 1998a:122; 1998b:473ff.).
120
2.6.4 Manure
Manure was a decisive variable for the maintenance of soil fertility and increasing yields
(Bray 1984:289-298; Li 1998a:15, 46-50; Eastman 1988b:70). The example of China shows,
that the manure input does not depend on the number of domestic animals because human
excrements were also used as manure (for Europe cp. Slicher van Bath 1963:259f.). An
average peasant household in China produced about 7460 kg of animal and human manure
per ha in 1929/33. In the wheat region it amounted to 5857 kg/ha and in the rice region to
8757 kg/ha (Buck 1937:259)
27
. Since population grew about twice as rapidly as did the
cultivated acreage, the amount of human manure per land unit also doubled. The number of
draft animal and hogs, and thus the increase in animal manure roughly paralleled population
growth (Perkins 1969:71). If night soil is used as manure, parasites may spread in the fields,
causing anemia and intestinal diseases. However by fermenting the manure long enough,
these parasites were killed, and by boiling water and food the transmission of diseases could
be prevented. This method which was practiced since the Han times (cp. Bray 1984:290f.;
Eastman 1988b:70; Anderson 1988:125). Besides human and animal manure, lime, mud and
feathers and waste of all sorts were also used as manure. Since the 16th century beancake was
increasingly used as fertilizers (Perkins 1969:70f.)28.
2.6.5 Higher labor inputs
Yields per ha were also increased by higher labor inputs (more labor days per year),
especially for more careful dyke building, transplanting of rice seedlings and for weeding.
The transplanting of rice seedlings into the fields yielded higher outputs – especially through
higher harvest rates – than broadcasting (hand sowing) as it was practiced in Europe. It also
allowed for a more efficient use of land (Stover/Stover 1976:98f.). Furthermore, careful
planting facilitates weeding, which can raise yields by about 45% (Bray 1984:299; Grigg
1974:82). And new methods to fight pests also increased productivity (Elvin 1974:299;
Mokyr 1990:218; Bray 1984:381ff., 49ff., 476, 505f., 545).
27
According to a conservative estimate of manure content this equaled to 47.4 kg (37.2 and 55.6 kg) of nitrogen,
15 kg (11.7 and 17.5 kg) of potassium and 6.2 kg (4.9 and 7.3 kg) of phosphorus (King 1911:193ff.). One kilo of
manure per mou (i.e. one fifteenth of a ha) raised yields by around 15-20 kg (Grigg 1974:87; Perkins 1969:70ff.;
Mokyr 1990:209; Stover/Stover 1976:99; Eastman 1988b:68f.; Anderson 1988:99). One kilo of amoniumsulfate
(= 2 kg bean cake) yielded 6 kg extra rice or wheat. During the Qing: 40 jin (20 kg) bean-cake per mu (one
fifteenth of one ha) resulted in an increase of 80 jin (40 kg) of rice (Li Bozhong 1998b:475). For the history of a
hypothetical atom of nitrogen, cp. Anderson (1988:126f.).
28
In Jiangnan beancake became a labor saving innovation in the late 17th and 18th century as green manure was
more labor intensive, although it did not increase yields more than other manure. It was fairly expensive and was
mainly imported from Manchuria (Pomeranz 2002:582ff.).
121
There were only relatively few work animals, as mentioned above. However, the number of
work animals is hardly an indicator of productivity. Around 1750 dry land agriculture in
Shandong could sustain 155 persons per sq.km without food imports, whereas in Holland it
only sustained 62 person per sq.km with additional grain imports. Thus, even with a higher
number of work animals European agriculture was not more productive than the Chinese one
(Pomeranz 2000:33, 45).
To conclude, the economic potential of pre-industrial Chinese agriculture was not yet
exhausted even in the 1930s. Total output of Chinese agriculture grew parallel to population,
due to increase of the cultivated land area and land productivity (Appendix V.3). The
cultivated land was expanded, although at a lower pace than population grew. Furthermore,
the production was intensified (increasing land productivity) in order to cope with decreasing
land-man ratios by using better seed, expanding multi-cropping and irrigation, by higher input
of manure as well as by a more efficient use of labor. In the context of intensification we have
to discuss technological progress versus stagnation, a point raised by Elvin.
2.7 Technological innovation
The theory of the Malthusian trap makes the assertion that technological stagnation prevailed
in China since the 15th century. After various agricultural innovations had been made after all
during the Han (220 B.C. and 220 A.D.), Wei (221-580) as well as during the Song dynasty
(961-1279), technological development stagnated after the 14th century (Elvin 1974, chap. 17;
Chao 1986:194f.; Jones 1981:160; Liu 1986, chap. 3). According to Elvin this technological
stagnation is the crucial explanation for the Malthusian trap of growing population and
increasing resource scarcity in which pre-modern Chinese agriculture was caught (cp. the
graph in Elvin 1974:313)29. However, even Elvin mentions several technological innovations
during Ming and Qing times and he admits: ”Clearly, the term technological stagnation is a
misleadingly oversimple description of this period” (1974:298). And he concludes that the
discussion of agriculture, technology and population leading to a high-level equilibrium trap
is ”in some ways inconclusive” (Elvin 1974:312).
29
Similarly Huang (2002:507) sees the explanation of Chinese involution as the result of higher work inputs
(intensification) and a low rate of capital per labor unit (1990:13,143) and a low saving and investment rate
(ibid.:130ff.). According to Huang, total output and even output per capita (by 0.5% annually) were still growing
between 1910 and 1930, labor productivity was declining. However, it is doubtful whether the rate of capital to
labor unit was indeed lower in China than in Europe, considering the fact that irrigation agriculture required a
high capital asset with dry agriculture considerably less and handicraft the lowest capital asset (Pomeranz
2002:548). The farm capital consisting of houses, irrigation, working animals, farm implements, manure and
infrastructure was rather high and continued to grow (Riskin 1975:80; Pomeranz 2000:31ff. for China; Grigg
1982:189ff. for Europe).
122
Several reasons are given for this alleged technological stagnation. Some have attributed it to
an orthodox ossification of Confucianism being inimical to scientific progress and
technological innovations after the 14th century and especially during the Qing dynasty
(Goldstone 2000, but cp. Mokyr 1990:227ff.; Eastman 1988e:149; Wong 1997:15f. against
this view). However, even in Europe hardly any mechanical innovations were made in
agriculture between 1500 and 1750 and even until the 1830s. It was only after the first half of
the 19th century when technological innovations were systematically linked to industrial
production (Mokyr 1990:13, 57ff., 83). Before this time technological progress was largely a
process of ”trial and error" both in Europe and China (ibid.:229f.). Another argument points
to the alleged conservative attitude of Chinese peasants in order to explain technological
stagnation. However, Chinese peasants have been quite innovative and successful in adopting
new crops, experimenting with new seed combinations, taping new sources of manure and
improving irrigation technology as well as new techniques in rural textile production even
after the 15th century (Mokyr 1990:222f.; Perkins 1969:39f., 47, 59, even Elvin 1974:298ff.).
This data contradicts the proposition of a general hostility of Chinese peasants towards
innovation (Gernet 1988:361f., 376, 407f., 443). Elvin sees the reasons for the technological
stagnation not in cultural limitations, but rather in economic constraints. His economic
explanation of the technological stagnation in Chinese agriculture has a supply and a demand
aspect. On the supply side the scarcity of raw materials (such as wood and metals) and hence
high prices hampered the development and diffusion of agricultural technology (such as
machines and implements). On the demand side increasing poverty and declining savings
prevented peasant households from investing in
new technology and capital goods
(1974:298-302).
We have first to discuss whether there has been such as thing as technological stagnation after
the 15th century in the first place. To clarify the question we should make a distinction
between a technological innovation and its diffusion, which may be slow or quick (Grigg
1982, chap. 11). We should also make a distinction between mechanical (new implements
and machines), organizational and institutional (property rights and rent systems, new farming
methods and agriculturally relevant infrastructure) and biological innovations (new crops,
new seeds, new kinds of manure) (Liu 1986:57; Bray 196:3ff., 27, 115; Li 1998a:167ff.). Li
criticizes the “Western point of view” according to which only mechanical innovation seems
to matter.
In contrast to Elvin's proposition, technological progress went on during Ming and Qing times
(Deng 1993:201f.; Feuerwerker 1990:235f.; Kolb, this volume; even Elvin 1974:297ff.).
123
Chinese peasants were quite innovative and technological development did not stagnate after
the 15th century. Peasants adopted new crops from the Americas, tested new seed
combinations and used new kinds of manure, they improved irrigation technology and
cropping schedules and used new techniques in rural textile production (Mokyr 1990:222f.;
Perkins 1969:39f., 47, 59, 71; Bray 1984:458; Mote 1977:203; Perdue 1987:22; Li
1998b:466, 474f.; Pomeranz 2000:47). Numerous mechanical and organizational innovations
were made in trade and industry during Ming and Qing times (Gernet 1988:361f., 376, 407f.,
443). The policy of the Chinese state was physiocratic favoring agricultural production. State
officials published agricultural treatises (nongshu) and thus promoted the diffusion of
agricultural knowledge and new techniques (Deng 1993:126ff., 174ff.). These innovations
and their diffusion contributed to the increase of the agricultural production, as Deng
(ibid.:163, chap. 7) shows. It is true that these innovations were mainly, though not
exclusively, organizational and biological innovations enhancing mainly but not exclusively
land productivity.
Two reasons may have been responsible for the slowdown of mechanical innovations in
Chinese agriculture after the 15th century. The first reason is that the most important
mechanical innovations had already been made before the 15th century. Probably up to the
middle of the 19th century Chinese agriculture was equipped with more efficient implements
than its European counterpart. Therefore, no new agricultural implements had to be invented
anymore. Many farm implements, which Europe introduced in the 17th or 18th century or even
later, had already been invented and used in China long before. As early as the Han dynasty,
the iron turnplough, multi-tube seed-drill, the horse-shoe and ridger were used in the dry
agriculture of northern China (Bray 1984:565f., 577f., 580ff.), although it is not clear how
widely these implements were used. However, the mechanical development did not stagnate
even after the 15th century. Further mechanical innovations were made such as cheap and
effective wooden ploughs pulled by people (Chao 1986:194f.), the irrigation technology was
improved (Mokyr 1990:222f.; Perkins 1969:71) and new techniques of spinning in cellars
were developed (Pomeranz 2000:47; see Kolb for detailed information). A threshing machine
was introduced from Japan, which considerably reduced work. Already in the early Ming
time, water driven machines were available to husk rice and move hammers in paper
production, and also machines (driven by hydraulic or horse power) for spinning hemp
(Perkins 1969:57). However, these machines seem not to have been systematically used30.
30
The absence of new, labor saving machines in the agriculture played no central role in preventing the
industrialization of China, as Eastman (1988e:147) states, nor favoring it in Europe respectively.
124
A second reason for the slowdown of mechanical innovations in Chinese agriculture was the
fact that up to the Song time (12th century) labor force was scarcer than land and therefore
innovation aiming at an increase of labor productivity made sense. After the Song time,
however, land became increasingly scarce. Therefore, the intensification of land use and –
because of the poverty of peasants – the development of cheap tools became more important
than the use of expensive labor saving machines (Chao 1986:196f.)31. Even in Europe an
abundance of labor hampered the use of machines in agriculture for a long time. It was only
after rural labor became scarce and real wages increased from the 1850s onwards that
machines and other industrial implements (such as fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides) were
introduced in England and even later in the rest of Europe32. However, the use of these
implements was slow at first and only gained momentum towards the end of the 19th century
(in the USA somewhat earlier though for the same reasons), as Grigg (1982:78, 113ff., 119f.,
122f., 212; 1992:52-57) states33. Up to the middle of the 19th century hardly any labor saving
innovation took place. The 19th century was the age of steam power, which, however, had
hardly any impact on agriculture (Grigg 1982:131). During the 19th century the substitution of
oxen by horses, a process which already had begun in the 10th century, was completed
(ibid.:132). From the 1820s and 1830s years the growing industry began to produce better and
cheaper tools and machines such as horse drawn seed-drill and horse-shoe, but above all
sickles, scythes and iron plows. The use of horses instead of oxen as well as of better tools
raised the productivity of English agriculture (ibid.:134, 183, 190f.). The alleged ”agricultural
revolution” in Europe of the 18th century was not based on mechanical, but rather on
organizational and biological innovations such as the integration of agriculture and animal
husbandry, the production of fodder crops and stable feeding, the abolition of fallow,
convertible husbandry, intensive manuring and linear sowing (Grigg 1982:183, 211f.,
1992:8ff, chap. 5; Ponting 1991:243ff.; Overton 1989 in Li 1998:167) as well as on the
introduction of new crops (Netting 1993:274). The quantity and quality of manure input was
31
However, according to Li (1998a:24f., 185) labor became scarce in early and late Qing in Jiangnan, which was
a principal barrier to the spread of double cropping (see also Perkins 1969:57ff. on labor shortage in China of the
1930s). This would not have been possible, if overpopulation had existed.
32
In England and Wales rural population and agricultural labor force grew in absolute terms although slower
than the urban population until the 1850s, and it only began to decline from the 1850s onwards (Grigg 1982:42,
113, 108-116, 212f.). In Europe real wages decreased after 1750 and started to increase in the 1840s (ibid.:119,
191).
33
Industrially manufactured inputs, which increased labor productivity considerably, were only used in the
second half of the 19th century, although slowly at first, but at a faster pace after 1914 and after 1945. In the 19th
century the horse drawn harvester and tresher and in the 20th century tractors and combined harvesters were
introduced together with artificial fertilizers such as superphosphate after the 1880s, compound fertilizer,
containing a combination of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium in the 1930s. The veterinary provision of
livestock was improved and insecticides and herbicides were increasingly used after 1945 (Grigg 1982:124-129,
134, 157, 183, 190, 212).
125
increased (by rotating husbandry but also by better manure through imported oil cakes for
fodder as well as guano), new crops and better seed were used, and livestock breeding was
improved. Field drainage (with the help of pipes in the second half the 19th century) and the
use of marl and lime enhanced soil quality (Grigg 1982:190f.). Hence, the most important
innovations were land saving, rather than labor saving. It was land productivity that increased
but labor productivity hardly did (Bray 1984:584; Boserup 1983:200). Whereas land
productivity grew by factor 1.92 between 1700 and 1850 in England and Wales, labor
productivity only increased by factor 1.28 (cp. Appendix VIII.1.5). The new methods in
agriculture were very labor-intensive such as the production of fodder crops and potatoes,
caring for the cattle, increased quantity of manure, lime and marl as well as drainage and
flooding of meadows and fencing of the fields (Grigg 1982:183.211f.). Horse drawn seed-drill
and horseshoe were introduced slowly as well as was linear sowing, which however required
labor-intensive weeding (ibid.:126; for Denmark cp. Kjaergaard 1994, chap. 3 and 6)34.
Bray (1984:604,614f.) gives a third reason, which may explain mechanical stagnation of
Chinese agriculture. According to her, wet rice cultivation is not suitable for mechanization
because of the necessity of contour dyke building and irrigation of small fields (hence
horticulturalization). Yields can only be increased by higher labor input and more careful
work done by an experienced and highly motivated family labor force. It is true that
mechanization is more profitable in the more extensive dry land agriculture (as in northern
China and Europe and especially in America) than in the irrigation agriculture of south and
central China. However, as Buck (1933, 1937) has shown, motor pumps, hand tractors,
artificial fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides as well as heavy equipment for the construction
of irrigation infrastructure, water control systems and roads may lead and in fact led to an
increase in productivity in Chinese agriculture. Furthermore, stronger market integration and
an improvement of the transport infrastructure may lead to a more productive irrigation
agriculture in marginal regions as well (Netting 1993:252; Perkins 1969:57ff.). In the late
1950s and early 1960s agricultural machines (such as heavy plows, tractors, combined
harvesters etc.) were increasingly used in China. Although the output increased, agricultural
productivity decreased (Li 1998a:12, 160). After the middle of the 1960s, the input of
artificial fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides as well as the use of motor pumps led to a rise in
yields per ha. It was only after the implementation of the ”Household Responsibility System”
in 1979 that industrial technology better adapted for rice cultivation (developed in pre-war
34
Herbicides, which massively reduced weeding and increased labor productivity, were only available after the
Second World War (Grigg 1982:127).
126
Japan) – such as walking tractors, rice planters, rice reapers, new types of manure and
pesticides but also new techniques of raising and transplanting seedlings – led to a massive
increase not only in yields per ha but also in labor productivity on small fields (Li
1998a:175f.; Netting 1993:252; on Europe cp. Grigg 1992:8ff, chap. 5; Ponting 1991:243ff.).
Thus, it seems that Bray’s argument of ”horticulturalization”, a process of involution, which
prevents the use of machines in rice production, is not plausible either.
We may conclude that the proposition of a technological stagnation is not particularly
plausible. Mechanical innovations were made much earlier and efficient implements were
already in place. New methods of irrigation and cropping, biological innovations such as new
crops, new seeds and new sources of manure were tested and adopted. Thus, efficient
technology was available and used in China (cp. Grigg 1982:155 for Europe). It were neither
cultural nor ecological factors but the excess of labor force which limited the utilization of
labor saving machines. Of course there was poverty, which hampered investments in
expensive capital goods, but there was also poverty in Europe. The crucial point of
technological innovation is its capacity to increase not only land productivity but also output
per capita and labor productivity, which in turn contribute to an increase of savings and
capital needed for investments in agriculture and industrialization. Thus we have to turn to
labor productivity.
2.8 Output per capita and labor productivity
According to the theory of the ”high level equilibrium trap”, output per capita and labor
productivity in Chinese agriculture have decreased since the end of the 18th century by the
latest (Elvin 1974:319). This links up with the proposition of Boserup (1965), according to
whom a rise in land productivity goes together with decreasing labor productivity, a
proposition, however, for which she does not provide any empirical evidence but did modify
later (Boserup 1983:186, also Grigg 1978:78f.; Netting 1993:271). According to Huang
(1991:630) economic growth entails an increase of output (per capita, per household or per
society) and should be distinguished from economic development, which entails increasing
labor productivity through a rising ratio of capital per labor unit (Huang 1991:630; 2002:512).
Huang (1990:11) and Feuerwerker (1992:764ff.) concede that there may also be growth of
total output and of output per capita in a pre-industrial, agricultural economy with
commercialization. But according to them, economic growth in such a Smithian economy
goes together with declining labor productivity, whereas Li (1998a:165) and Wong (1997:19)
point out that even labor productivity may increase. Thus, labor productivity, i.e. an
127
increasing use of capital per unit of labor is the crucial variable. However, an agricultural
system with land scarcity and without imports of food as it was in the case of China does not
necessarily end up in a vicious circle of intensification, high population growth and
decreasing labor productivity because technology could be improved. In contrast to Elvin’s
proposition, technological progress went on during Ming and Qing times and productivity
increased (Deng 1993:199f.). The fact that population and man/land-ratio increased in China
is a clear indicator of technological progress and of a declining production function, whereas
population increase with constant or decreasing man-land-ratio would point to land
expansion, and hence, extensive growth (Deng 1999:188ff.).
Labor productivity can be measured in different ways: either in number of laborers or in labor
time spent (Lewis 1954 in Wong 1990:15; Grigg 1992:3; Li 1998a:134). Pomeranz (2000,
2002) and Huang (1990, 2002) refer to output per work unit per day (working time).
However, labor productivity in a pre-industrial agriculture is often measured (for lack of
better data) as total agricultural output divided by the number of agricultural workers per
year35. Huang (2002:512) has objected that the extension of working days per year is in fact
an indicator for involution36. It is true that the number of agricultural workers may decline
while labor time they spend increases. This happened both in China and in Europe of 18th and
19th century (Pomeranz 2002:557; Kjaergaard 1994, chap. 6; Buchheim 1994:49-54; Rawski
1979:115 in Lee/Wang 19999:175). But using the number of work days – as Huang proposes
– does not really capture the point, as peasants may be better off by accepting lower daily
returns but working more days (Wong 1990:16f.). The use of underused labor potential (more
working days in a year) entails an increase in efficiency indeed, hence of labor productivity
(both in China and in Europe). The absolute relevance of labor productivity had also been
questioned. As Pomeranz (2002:500f.) pointed out, in pre-industrial economies with
underemployment, finding new ways of employment and increasing output per capita was
probably more important than increasing labor productivity. Where food shortages were
common – as it was the case in China and in Europe – maximizing total output was more
important than just labor productivity. Therefore, more relevant than labor productivity is
35
Labor productivity may be increased by 1) larger fields with an constant number of workers, 2) constant field
size with fewer workers, 3) a constant amount of workers and field size, but by intensifying land use or 4) by
multi-cropping (Bray 1986:2f.).
36
Huang (1990:13,143) has maintained that output per capita increased while output per worker declined in
Jiangnan, which Myers (1991:620) finds an implausible argument. But Huang’s statement would be valid if
population grew slower than the agricultural working force. Population declined in Jiangnan between 1850 and
1920, but both output per capita and labor productivity increased (cp. Appendix VIII.3.1). The same is true for
the whole of China (see table 7), despite the fact that the population grew from 412 to 480 mil (Appendix
VIII.2.3).
128
total factor productivity (TFP) as the rate of growth of total output minus the rates of growth
of all inputs such as land, labor and capital37. But let us turn now to output per capita and
labor productivity.
2.8.1 Average output per person and per agricultural worker
According to Perkins (1969:14f., 29) output per capita of total grain fluctuated between 200
kg/person – the minimal per capita consumption – and 350 kg/person, which corresponds to
an average of 285 kg/person between 1400 and 1957. Perkins (1969:18f., 279, 302) assumes
that labor productivity has remained relatively stable or has even slightly increased in some
regions between 1650 and 1950, with the exception of the 19th century (Chao 1986:208, 217;
Lee/Wang 1999:30, 169; Myers 1980:5). The numbers given by Lee/Wang (1999:31) also
point to a steady increase of output per capita from 260 kg in 1929 to 285 kg in 1952. In
Appendix VI.1 estimates of the output per capita between 1400 and 1957 are given (cp. table
7 and Appendix VIII.2 for estimates based on data provided by Perkins and Liu/Huang).
These figures, however, only represent the total output divided by total population. Since
children, old people and adults, women and men do not consume the same quantities,
different consumption values result for adults after adjusting the values (Fei 1939:125). The
different population categories also have different working capacities, and not all members of
a household are working (for instance children and old people). Therefore, output per person
should not be confounded with output per worker. Non-agricultural population – urban
population and rural population not engaged in agriculture – as well as the faction of the
agricultural population being exclusively consumers should be subtracted from the total
population. The non-agricultural, urban population amounted to about 10% on average during
Ming and Qing times, thus a figure somewhat lower than the 13.5% assumed by Deng
(1999:182). Non-workers (i.e. exclusive consumers) in peasant households amounted to about
17.3% on average, between 15.8 and 18.6% (ibid.:184). Hence the rural labor force
represented about 74% of the total population. As about 25% of the rural labor force did not
work in agriculture but in the home production, the percentage of the agricultural labor force
is reduced to 59% of the total population (Deng 1999:185). The result is an average labor
productivity of around 320 kg/worker (see Appendix VI.2). This is a conservative estimate
and the real number may lie well at 50% agricultural workers per total population (one worker
per two consumers and 360 kg/w) or even below 50%. According to Li (1998a:23) the
37
There is a general trend that yield per acreage is maximized where land is scarce (as in Asian countries),
whereas yield per worker is maximized where labor is scarce (as in America). European countries being in
between these two extremes (cp. Grigg 1982:114ff.).
129
agricultural population amounted to 90% of the rural population and to 75% or 70% of total
population in Jiangnan between 1620 and 1850. The labor force of a household of five
persons consisted of husband and wife during the Ming times (2 of 5), whereas during Qing
women increasingly retired from agriculture and specialized on silk and cotton production.
Thus, the labor force per average household decreased to somewhat between 1 and 1.5
(ibid.:24, 185). At least for those highly productive regions the percentage of agricultural
workers declined roughly from 35% in 1620 to 20% of the total population in 1850 or from
40% to 23% of rural population (cp. Appendix VIII.3.4)38.
Elvin (1973, chap. 16) and Huang (1990, chap. 1) maintain that labor productivity declined in
densely populated areas such as the Lower Yangzi with the beginning of the 17th century (cp.
Li 1998a:133, 216)39. This of course corresponds to the Malthusian proposition of decreasing
labor productivity due to intensification or production, land shortage and overpopulation. In
table 7 I have computed the labor productivity for an agricultural working force of 40% (kg/w
1) and 25% (kg/w 2) of the Chinese population. The data for output per capita are provided by
Liu/Huang (1978:31-34) and by Perkins (1969:17,19) (cp. also Appendix VI.2 and 3).
Table 7: Estimated grain output per capita and per worker
Liu/Huang
kg/p
kg/w 1
kg/w 2
Perkins
kg/p
kg/w 1
kg/w 2
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
316
252
249
251
272
273
792
631
624
627
680
682
1267
1009
998
1002
1089
1092
1700
1750
1800
1850
1914
1930
571
391
376
402
434
447
1426
976
941
1004
1086
1118
2282
1562
1505
1606
1737
1789
267
-0.15
0.8
265
0.11
1.1
669
-0.16
0.8
663
0.11
1.1
1069
-0.16
0.8
1061
0.11
1.1
435
-0.23
0.7
428
0.14
1.1
1087
-0.23
0.7
1069
0.14
1.1
1739
-0.23
0.7
1711
0.14
1.1
1700-1850
%/year
factor
1850-1930
%/year
factor
38
During the Ming time 40’000 peasants produced enough food for 190’000 soldiers, which corresponds to a rate
of almost 1:6 (17% labor force). During Ming and Qing times, one peasant in the south produced enough food
for nine to ten adults (1:10), which would make a labor force of 9% (Deng 1999:186).
39
According to Huang (1990:13ff.) the agricultural potential in the Yangzi delta had already been exhausted by
the early Ming-times. The economic growth was achieved by a shift from rice agriculture to the production of
cotton and silk (including mulberry trees) as well as other handicraft production with a lower marginal physical
product of labor.
130
These figures are compatible with the statement made by Chao et al. (1995) according to
whom productivity per capita and worker declined in the late 18th and early 19th century, but
rose again in the late 19th and early 20th century. According to Rawski (1989:330f.)
agricultural output rose annually between 1.4% to 1.7% from 1914/18 to 1931/36, while
population grew by 0.8%. Thus, output per capita grew by 0.6% to 0.9% during this time
period (see also Brandt 1989:9, 108-119 for similar figures). According to the figures in table
7 the grain output only increased between 0.11% and 0.14%.
After the crisis in the middle of the 17th century, the Chinese economy recovered during the
18th century and until the 1820s labor productivity increased (Myers 1980:5). Perkins
(1969:26) estimates that the capita output may have slightly decreased between 1770 and
1850. According to Myers (1980:6), the agriculture recovered between 1860 and 1910 and so
did labor productivity. Between the First World War and the 1930s wheat and rice production
rose by 0.9% per year, whereas population only increased by 0.75% per year (Myers
1980:20). Between 1911 and 1957 the production could keep pace with the population
growth. It was only in the late 1950s and 1960s when the population began to grow steeply by
more than 2% that the agricultural production could no longer be increased accordingly within
the framework of pre-industrial agriculture (Perkins 1969:29, 78). Industrial inputs (such as
fertilizers and herbicides, new seeds, improved irrigation, new implements and machines etc.)
were increasingly used (Perkins 1969:29), so that both agricultural production and labor
productivity increased again (Lee/Wang 1999:31), despite of the fact that population began to
grow steeply during that time period (Netting 1993:251ff.; Myers 1980:22f.).
2.8.2 Regional differences
There are not only fluctuations in time but also regional differences in both labor productivity
and grain output per capita. Li Bozhong (1998a, chap. 8) has shown, that labor productivity
rose between 1700 and 1850 in the most densely populated regions of the Lower Yangzi. In
Jiangnan grain output (husked rice) per worker increased from 1121 kg/w in 1620 to 1518
kg/w or by 35%; in Songjiang (Jiangsu) it increased from 1359 in 1620 to 1958 kg/w in 1850
or by 44% (cp. table 8 and Appendix VIII.3.4). This data is corroborated by figures on the
increase of grain output (husked rice) per ha in Jiangnan: from 1687 kg/ha in the 17th century
to 2137 kg/ha in the 18th century (Perkins), from 2587 kg/ha during Ming to 3037 kg/ha
during Qing and from 2250 in 1620 to 2700 in 1820 (Li 1998b:481, 1998a:126). These
increases of land productivity by 26%, 17% or 20% went without a proportional increase of
labor input and, therefore, roughly correspond to the increase in labor productivity (Li
131
Bozhong 1998b:481ff., 1998a:126ff.)40. The increase of labor productivity in grain production
continued at least until the 1930s: in Jiangnan it grew by 25% between 1870 and 1930 and in
Songjiang by 10% (cp. Faure (1989:54; see Brandt 1989:131ff. for higher estimates for
Jiangsu and Guangdong). The involution assumed by Elvin and Huang is, therefore, not a
very plausible proposition (Li 1998b:484)41.
Table 8: Estimated output per capita and per worker in Jiangnan and Songjiang42
1550
1620
1820
1850
1930
Jiangnan
kg/p
kg/w
Songjiang
kg/p
kg/w
...
475
...
419
458
...
1121
...
1518
2290
725
435
537
392
557
1813
1359
2235
1958
2785
These figures are corroborated by data on labor productivity provided by Hu (1983 in Deng
1993:161). According to him, labor productivity was between 2200 and 2500 kg/w in
Southern China during Ming and Qing times. There are several reasons for this increase in
labor productivity in the most densely populated regions. 1) It was often not before the 18th
and the early 19th century when the most advanced cultivation techniques (such as multicropping and inter-cropping and improved irrigation techniques) were systematically used.
Higher capital inputs (improvements of irrigation, beancake manure, higher yielding seed
combinations etc.) increased the number of workdays per year. As output per ha increased
faster than labor input, output per worker and year did not decrease, but increase (Li
1998b:483). 2) Between the middle of the 16th century and 1850, the total amount of rice land
decreased in Jiangnan at the expense of land cultivated with mulberry trees and cotton. Land
and labor productivity in rice production, however, increased by using more manure,
practicing double-cropping of rice and wheat as well as by using low quality rice land for
cotton and mulberry trees (Li 1998a:10, 139ff.). Thus, there was a reduction of agricultural
land (for grain) without population decrease, for which the only explanation seems to be
technological progress (see also Deng 1999:190). This clearly shows that land as well as labor
40
As Deng (1999:190) observes, many labor saving innovations also reduced land per worker and thus were at
the same time land saving.
41
In the more productive regions, the increase of the agricultural output per capita was considerably higher than
the average of 0.6% to 0.9% per year. According to Rawski (1989:271) it amounted to an annual increase of
1.7% per capita in Manchuria and the lower Yangzi between 1924 and 1941. Agricultural output per capita grew
by between 0.9 and 1.3% annually from 1895 to 1935 in Jiangnan and Guangdong (Brandt 1989:133).
132
productivity may be increased not only by mechanical, but also by organizational and
biological innovations (Liu 1986:57; Bray 196:3ff., 27, 115; Li 1998a:168ff.). Mulberry trees
and cotton needed more work and manure than rice, but they also yielded higher output per ha
than rice on land not well suited for rice (Li 1998a:11, 132). The labor productivity of women
was higher in spinning, weaving and raising silkworms than in rice production. Therefore
their specialization on home production paid off (ibid.:12, 148ff.). Because the supply of
agricultural labor was thereby reduced, men were forced to intensify production on smaller
fields. The reduction of farm size, therefore, was the result of an intensification of production
and not of an increase of man-land ratio. The specialization of women in processing cotton
and silk and raising silkworms not only increased their productivity but also the labor
productivity of men, because their work input rose slower than rice output43. Hence, doublecropping of rice and wheat, an optimal household size and a more efficient division of labor
increased productivity of households in Jiangnan up to 1850 (Li 1998a:12, 152f., 155)44. A
process propelled by an increasing commercialization and specialization in an efficient market
system, a pre-industrial scenario well described by Adam Smith (cp. Wong 1997, Li
1998a:160-166; see Appendix VIII.3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).
Myers (1970:138,152) shows that in Shandong and Hebei yield per land unit increased
whereas land size per households decreased between 1910 and 1930 (see Table 9). This again
can not be explained otherwise than with an increase in yield per worker, i.e. of labor
productivity.
42
Data on Jiangnan and Songjiang are computed from Li (1998:138ff.,151) and Faure (1989:46, 49).
Before the above-mentioned division of labor between agriculture by men and textile production by women
perhaps 2 out of 5 persons constituting a household actually worked in agriculture. After the establishment of the
new division of labor only 1 or 1.2 persons worked in agriculture, thus increasing the labor productivity (for the
same or higher outputs; Li 1998a:22ff.). The output per worker may increase, while output per person remaining
equal or even declining (cp. Appendix VIII.3.4 on Jiangnan and Songjiang).
44
Thus, contrary to what Huang (1990) maintains, agricultural productivity did not stagnate with the expansion
of cottage industry. Land and labor productivity in rice production increased, even though the area cultivated
with rice and wheat decreased and so probably the total output did. At the same time household incomes
increased due to handicraft production as less efficiently used or underused household labor was invested in this
sector (cp. Appendix VIII.3.1). A regional specialization and division of labor emerged between the Lower
Yangzi (textile production) and the Middle Yangzi (rice production) (cp. Myers 1980, chap. 4) on the trade and
the effectiveness of the market).
43
133
Table 9: Estimated land productivity and ha per household in Shandong and Hebei
1910
1930
%
increase
factor
Shandong
wheat
kg/ha
sorghum
kg/ha
land
ha/hh
Hebei
wheat
kg/ha
land
ha/hh
584
884
823
1175
1.25
0.92
486
775
1.45
1.31
51
43
– 36
60
– 11
1.51
1.42
0.73
1.59
0.90
Whereas some provinces flourished with growing total output as well as rising output per
worker and per capita, other provinces most probably experienced a decrease in the late 19th
and early 20th century. This was especially the case in the marginal hill areas in the southwest
(Guizhou, Yunnan) and northwest (Shaanxi, Gansu), which also suffered from an ecological
deterioration resulting from extensive agriculture due to a low population density (Lee/Wang
1999:31; Netting 1993:237; Wong 1997:19,49; Osborne 1998). More regional and local
studies are, however, needed, to provide a more subtly differentiated picture of the
development of labor productivity.
2.8.3 Labor input and labor productivity
A decrease of labor productivity in the course of an increasing intensification of production
(land productivity) is – as we have seen – not imperative. It is true that intensification does
entail a higher workload. This is also the reason why production is not being intensified
unless the pressure to do so (because of population growth and/or resource scarcity) is
sufficiently high. However, increasing work input does not necessarily decrease output per
worker. The output per land unit can be raised by increasing either the capital input (such as
more and better irrigation techniques and new manure, new crops and higher yielding seed
combinations, more work animals, implements and machines) and/or by increasing the work
input (through the expansion of double-cropping, more weeding, more input of manure and
more careful dyke building). The change in labor productivity (output per worker per year)
must be determined empirically. Several studies have shown that labor productivity may in
fact increase with an intensification of production (Salehi-Isfahani 1987:879; Netting
1993:271; Deng 1999:190; Hunt 2000). The output per labor will increase if output per land
unit increases faster than labor input. Higher yielding crops, improved irrigating techniques
and higher manure input increase output per field, while the amount of labor for weeding and
dyke building remains about the same (Bray 1984:603). This was the case in the most densely
134
populated regions of China, as we have seen above. On the other hand, the use of plough and
draft animals (ox, horse) does not always increase labor productivity, as among others Pryor
(1985:729) and Netting (1993:272) have shown. This is because work input – especially the
costs for animal care and fodder production – often increases faster than the output per ha
(Pingali/Binswanger 1983:11; Netting 1993:273).
Europe
As we have already seen, even the ”agricultural revolution” in Europe was mainly based on
the introduction of new crops (vegetable, potatoes), on crop rotation, convertible husbandry,
stable feeding and fodder production and land reclamation (Sabean 1990:52ff.; Netting
1993:274; Kjaergaard 1994, chap. 3 and 4). This raised land productivity but labor
productivity hardly increased (Bray 1984:584; Boserup 1983:197f., 200; Overton 1996:6f.;
Clark 1991:454f.; Allen 1989:80; Thompson 1968:63-74 cited in Pomeranz 2002:554f.). Even
some of the innovations of the 19th century considerably increased labor input. For instance,
seeds were previously broadcasted (sown by hand), which not only wasted seeds, but also
hampered weeding. Later sowing was done more carefully and in a linear way, which –
together with caring for work animals – increased labor input for weeding considerably.
Despite increasing output per ha (higher harvest rates) output per labor unit did not increase
(Bray 1984:563; Mokyr 1990:58f.). At least land productivity increased more than labor
productivity in England and Wales (Grigg 1982, Allen 1994, Turner/Beckett/Afton 2001).
Whereas land productivity rose by factor 1.92, labor productivity only grew by factor 1.28
and cultivated grain acreage by factor 1.15 between 1700 and 1850 (cp. Appendix, VIII.1.5).
The growing utilization of labor saving machines in agriculture since the middle of the 19th
century only paid off when rural workers migrated to the industrial centers and real wages
began to rise. It was only after the industrial take-off – first in the USA and later in Europe –
that labor productivity began to increase (Grigg 1992:5, 47). It was the growing industrial
sector attracting rural labor, which forced agriculture to raise its labor productivity by using
more capital input. Furthermore, since the first half of the 19th century England (and Western
Europe) became increasingly dependent on imported agricultural products from Eastern
Europe and later from overseas (Grigg 1982;78, 1992:5, 8ff., 46-55; Wilkinson 1973:114;
Bray 1984:584f.; Ponting 1991:243ff.; Boserup 1983:203; Overton 1996:75ff.). But not only
food but also raw materials such as cotton, manure (guano) and wood had to be imported
(Pomeranz 2000:12, 19, 23f., 46, 57f., 68).
135
By using the data provided by Allen (1994), Grigg (1982) and Turner/Beckett/Afton (2001)
on the agriculture in England and Wales between 1700 and 1850 we may try to estimate labor
productivity (cp. Appendix VIII.1). According to Grigg (1982:188-191) hardly any increase
of labor productivity took place between 1700 and 1750. After 1750 total population as well
as the agricultural labor force increased and accordingly real wages decreased until the 1840s.
Thus according to him, labor productivity has decreased by 0.10% between 1700 and 1750,
but increased by 0.57% between 1750 and 1800 and by 0.18% between 1800 and 1850, which
corresponds to an average annual increase of 0.22% (factor 1.38) between 1700 and 1850 (cp.
Appendix VIII.1.2). According to Allen (1994) and Turner/Beckett/Afton (2001) labor
productivity increased by 0.32% between 1700 and 1750, decreased by 0.10% between 1750
and 1800 and increased again by 0.23% between 1800 and 1850. This corresponds to an
average annual increase of 0.15% (factor 1.25) between 1700 and 1850 (see also Overton
1996, Appendix VIII.3 and 4). This increase of labor productivity took place before the
introduction of labor saving inputs from the middle of the 19th century onwards. Probably
some land saving procedures (better farming methods, better farm implements and more
manure) also contributed to an increase of labor productivity (Deng 1999:190). Working days
per worker and year increased in England by about 20% between 1760 to 1830 (Pomeranz
2002:557; Buchheim 1994:50f.). Agricultural labor force grew by factor 1.62 between 1700
and 1850, and the length of a workday may have increased by about 20% or more between
1760 to 1830 (Pomeranz 2002:557)45. Whereas total grain output and land productivity
roughly grew by factor of 2, labor productivity only increased by factor of 1.25 in England &
Wales (cp. Appendix VIII.1.5). Thus, the statement by Boserup is still valid, that the
agricultural labor force increased until 1850, which made an intensification of the production
necessary, and that during the so-called ”agricultural revolution” labor productivity only
increased moderately and only gained momentum after the 1850s when industrial inputs were
increasingly used (cp. Grigg 1982:42f., 191).
Table 10 compares data on labor productivity provided by Allen, Grigg and
Turner/Beckett/Afton in England and Wales with data provided by Perkins and Liu/Huang on
the four most productive provinces in China with a grain producing labor force of 0.33% in
1700, 0.25% in 1750 and 0.20% in 1800 and 1850 of the total population (cp. Appendix
VIII.3.5). In the last three columns of table 10, the three different estimates of labor
45
In Denmark working time increased from 35-40 hours per week in 1500 to 60 hours in 1800 (Kjaergaard
1994:146-154).
136
productivity (kg/w 1, kg/w 2, kg/w 3) in the four most productive provinces are compared
with the labor productivity in England and Wales.
Table 10: Labor productivity in England and Wales and the four most productive
provinces in China compared
England & China 4 47 China 4 48
Wales 46
China 4 49
kg/w
kg/w 1
kg/w 2
kg/w 3
1700
1750
1800
1850
ø kg/w
factor
2227
2485
2563
2855
2533
1.3
1632
1715
2121
2130
1900
1.3
2910
2656
3199
3413
3044
1.2
2271
2186
2660
2771
2472
1.2
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1700-1850
%
0.22
0.06
0.22
0.17
%
0.10
0.43
0.01
0.18
%
-0.18
0.37
0.13
0.11
%
-0.08
0.39
0.08
0.13
Ch4/
E&W 1
Ch4/
E&W 2
Ch4/
E&W 3
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.8
1.3
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.0
The labor productivity may have increased by factor 1.3 (Allen, Grigg and
Turner/Beckett/Afton) in England and Wales between 1700 and 1850. This is at about the
same pace as in Chinese agriculture of the most productive regions. According to these data,
labor productivity in China was roughly the same as in England and Wales (see also
Pomeranz 2002:544). However, average labor productivity in the rest of European agriculture
was much lower than in England and Wales (Grigg 1982:103), but the same also holds true
for less productive areas in China. In the light of these data, the proposition of a general trend
to a declining output per worker (labor productivity) in Chinese agriculture is hardly
plausible.
2.9 Standards of living
The theory of the Malthusian trap predicts general poverty and impoverishment. Poverty and
misery were wide-spread in China as in other pre-modern societies and during the period of
46
Allen (1994), Grigg (1982), Turner/Beckett/Afton (2001)
Liu/Huang 1978
48
Perkins 1969
49
Liu/Huang 1978; Perkins 1969
47
137
early industrialization (Ho 1959:226; Elvin 1973, chap. 17; but see Lee/Wang 1999:19;
Mokyr 1990:225f.). The living standard of a largely agricultural population depends on the
total agricultural output, on technology, on population size and on the income distribution
(Deng 1999:204f.). The best proxy for the living standard is the grain output per capita
through agricultural production and through the marketed output of handicraft production
converted into grain, as grains were the most important food in 18th century Eurasia
(Pomeranz 2002:565).
The general standard of living was probably not lower in China than in Europe up to the
middle of the 19th century (Pomeranz 2000:35, 39; Robert Fortune 1847 in Lavely/Wong
1998:730; Deng 1999:204f.; Mokyr 1990:219). The agricultural output per capita in China
increased between 1870 and 1930: by 0.6% to 0.9% (Rawski 1989:330f.), by between 0.9 and
1.3% annually from 1895 to 1935 in Jiangnan and Guangdong (Brandt 1989:9, 133) and by
0.5% in Jiangnan between 1910 and 1930 even according to Huang (1990:13, 143). Although
the level of consumption varied according to class membership and depended on the general
state of the economy, it is questionable whether ordinary people had a lower living standard in
China than in Europe (Mote 1977:198ff.; Perkins 1969:15; Anderson 1988:96, 113-117).
Interestingly enough the living standard was especially high in the densely populated regions.
Since the 17th century more fish, meat and tofu was consumed, more tea and wine drunk and
more sugar consumed in the lower Yangzi region than anywhere else in China (Lee/Wang
1999:34, 39, 172, 175; Wong 1997:26ff.). According to Pomeranz (2000:49f.) the average
income per person was about the same but probably somewhat higher in China than in
Europe. Income seems to have been more equally distributed in China than in Europe. On the
other hand food prices seem to have been higher in Europe than in China (Pomeranz
2000:49ff., 2002:550f., 557, 565)50.
Involution (Huang) or Malthusian trap (Elvin) does entail a decline in real wages per day,
which has occured in China as well as in Europe. In Europe real wages decreased after 1750
and only began to increase from the 1840s onwards (Grigg 1982:191; Schofield 1981:80f.).
And it was only then, when real wages reached the same level as they had in 1430 (Abel
1980:136, 161, 191; Clark 1991:446; Mokyr 1988:69-92 on England). In China farm laborers‘
real wages declined after the 1730s and remained roughly constant until the 1820s (cp. Chao
1986:218ff.; Perkins 1969:299). I have not found data on real wages for the time between
50
On grain prices in China cp. Chao (1986:130), Perkins (1969:146, 128), Brandt 1989, Rawski 1989, Faure
1989 and Myers 1970; on Europe cp. Grigg (1982:55ff.; 1980:86), Wilkinson (1973:71f.) and Slicher van Bath
(1963:221-230).
138
1820 and 1900, but between 1901 and 1933 real wages increased in China (Rawski 1989:326;
Brandt 1989:107-122; Myers 1970:141-151). Perkins (1969:59f.) mentions a seasonal
shortage of agricultural labor in the 1930s and shows that an agricultural laborer’s cash wage
in the Yangzi rice/wheat region would have bought 1187 kg rice per year (Buck 1937:306)51.
According to Deng (1999:204f.) population increase may serve as an indicator for the
standard of living because the majority of the Chinese population consisted of landholding
peasants – land-owners or long-term tenants – and the households had a high population
elasticity to agricultural output. Therefore, the fertility of women increased with higher
income and more food available; in other words a higher living standard52. Therefore,
population growth would point to an increase, not to a decrease in the standard of living
(Deng 1999:207,209), and a comparison of population growth in pre-modern China and
Europe may indicate a different level of living standards. The following table shows that
China had a higher population growth rate from 1700 to 1800. Afterwards Europe’s
population grew faster. The tabulated numbers for Europe are the means calculated from
McEvedy/Jones (1978) and Birg (1996), but taken separately the two data sets show the same
trend (Appendix VII.1)53.
Table 11: Estimated population growth rates in Europe and China compared
Europe54
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1900
0.46
0.47
0.70
0.78
China55
Ä
Ä
Å
Å
1.27
0.54
0.38
-0.06
2.9.1 Grain consumption per capita
The population approach is only a rough approximation to living standards and we may
choose a more direct method to evaluate the Malthusian propositions made by Jones and
Elvin by using the grain output per capita as a proxy for living standard, since about 80% of
51
Increasing real wages may also be an indicator for a growing marginal value product of labor and, hence, of an
increasing labor productivity (Chao 1986:9, 217, 226; Brandt 1989:124-133).
52
Life expectancy is another proxy for living standard. According to Pomeranz (2000:35ff.) life expectancy was
on average the same as or even higher in China than in Europe (Lavely/Wong 1998:721f.; Lee/Wang 1999:35f.,
54f.).
53
Whereas between 1500 and 1800 Chinese population increased by factor 3.3 or by 0.4% per year, especially
between 1700 and 1800, the European population rose by factor 2.2 or by 0.27% per year on average (Liu/Huang
1978:29f.; McEvedy/Jones 1978:19).
54
McEvedy/Jones 1978; Berg 1996
139
the consumption consisted of grain, 15% of vegetables and 2-3% of meat (Eastman
1988b:62). The average grain output per capita between 1700 and 1930 is shown in Table 12:
Table 12: Estimated grain output per capita in China
Liu/Huang
kg/p
Perkins
kg/p
L/H&P
ø kg/p
316
252
249
251
272
273
571
391
376
402
434
447
443
321
313
326
353
360
-0.15
0.8
0.11
1.1
-0.06
0.9
-0.23
0.7
0.14
1.1
-0.11
0.8
-0.20
0.7
0.12
1.1
-0.09
0.8
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
1700-1850
factor
1850-1930
factor
1700-1930
factor
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1910
1910-1930
Liu/Huang
%
Perkins
%
L/H&P
%
-0.45
-0.02
0.02
0.13
0.02
-0.76
-0.07
0.13
0.13
0.15
-0.64
-0.05
0.09
0.13
0.10
According to these data, grain output per capita declined by factor 0.7 (-0.20%) between 1700
and 1850, especially between 1700 and 1750, but increased again by factor 1.1 (0.12%)
between 1850 and 1930. According to Rawski, agricultural output per capita in China grew by
0.6% to 0.9% between 1910 and 1930 (1989:330f.). This runs contrary to Elvin’s proposition
that output per capita declined after it reached its peak in the late 18th century. The average
output per capita increased from 326 kg/p in 1850 to 353 kg/p in 1910 and to 360 kg/p in
1930 in the whole of China. In the most productive provinces it increased from 555 kg/p in
1850 to 600 kg/p in 1910 and to 612 kg/p in 1930 (cp. Appendix VIII.3.5). These estimates on
grain output per capita are corroborated by figures on Jiangnan and Guangdong (cp. Appendix
VIII.3.4, see also Brandt 1989:131ff. on eastern and central China). This was still above the
minimal subsistence need of the assumed 180 or 220 kg per person. In any case, we are far
away from the output per capita reaching subsistence level, which according to Elvin (1974)
would be the ultimate indicator for overpopulation and impoverishment (Lee/Wang 1999:168;
Wong 1997:29).
During the middle of the 19th century the economic situation in China deteriorated as popular
uprisings and wars ravaged the country (Feuerwerker 1980:7), but improved again towards
55
Liu/Huang 1978
140
the end of the 19th century up to the 1930s. The agricultural total output continued to grow
and was able to feed a growing population, as we have seen. Commercialization and
specialization increased and more work was invested into handicraft production and wage
labor, which contributed to an overall increase of family incomes (Brandt 1989; Faure 1989;
Rawski 1989). After the end of Qing dynasty, water and pest control by the state almost broke
down and political security deteriorated during the warlord period (1912-1923) (Mallory
1930:94f.). Floods and droughts, pests and famines, banditism and wars reduced resources
and labor force, and peasants got increasingly into debt (Myers 1970:124; Eastman
1988c:91ff.). However, the consumption of clothes – taken as an indicator for the general
living standard – increased between 1870 and 1927. Agriculture and handicraft production
provided sufficient income for peasant households (Eastman 1988c:95, 97ff.). It was only
during the international economic crises in the beginning of the 1930s, when the output prices
decreased more than the input prices and the production of rural textile production declined,
that the living standard of peasant households deteriorated (Eastman 1988c:97; Faure
1989:202f.). Despite of these factors, production of food kept pace with a population growth.
It was only in the 1950s and 1960s, when population growth soared, that the pre-modern
Chinese agriculture could not produce enough food for its population any more (Perkins
1969:29ff.)56. Thus, it seems that the decline of the general living standard in the 1930s was
due to deterioration of international market conditions and of the domestic political situation
rather than to a decline in agricultural production. These facts obviously do not support the
thesis of the Malthusian trap (Eastman 1988c:96).
Thus, despite the deterioration of ecological conditions, population growth and a decreasing
land-man ratio, there seems to have been no general deterioration of the living standard,
except during times of political or politically induced crisis (wars, rebellions, neglect of public
works by a weakened state). An approximate calculation of average consumption is possible.
Let us assume that the constant size of an average household is about 4.5 persons (an old
person, a married couple and 1.5 children) with an aggregate consumption need of around
1000 kg (Fei 1939:125) or 800 kg (Deng 1999:180) of unhusked ”total grains” per year (also
Perkins 1969:300f.). The output per person is computed based on data provided by Perkins
(1969:17,19; cp. Appendix VI.2). A comparison of average yields per household with its
average subsistence (of 800 kg and 1000 kg) needs shows an increasing average surplus per
56
Compared to other countries, the output of grains and tubers per person in the year 1957 was still high:
between 270 and 290 kg/person in China, compared with 250 in Japan, 180 in India and 215 kg/person in
Pakistan (Perkins 1969:33ff.).
141
household (surplus 1 and surplus 2 according to the assumed subsistence need of 1000 kg or
800 kg per household) between 1700 and 1930.
Table 13: Estimated output and surplus per household
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
output 1
kg/p57
output 2
kg/p58
output 1 (P)
kg/hh
output 2 (L/H)
kg/hh
571
391
376
402
434
447
443
321
313
326
353
360
2568
1757
1693
1807
1954
2013
1995
1446
1407
1468
1589
1621
surplus 1
kg/hh (P)
kg/hh (L/H)
surplus 2
kg/hh (P)
kg/hh (L/H)
1568
757
693
807
954
1013
995
446
407
468
589
621
1768
957
893
1007
1154
1213
1195
646
607
668
789
821
As these figures show, the surplus per household decreased from 1700 to 1850 but increased
from 1850 to 1930 but there was always a surplus above subsistence level. If this calculation
is roughly plausible, it does not support the proposition of a Malthusian trap. These
“guesstimates” are corroborated by data on productivity per person provided by Liu/Huang
(1978) and Perkins (1969; cp. Appendix VI.2 and 3). I have assumed a constant consumption
level although the level of consumption varied over time and so did the composition of
crops59. I have also ignored the distribution of grain surplus between rural and urban
populations (rents and taxes) as well as regional differences (in productivity and
commercialization). And I have neither considered additional income through handicraft
production nor wage labor60. Thus, our comparison only gives a rough impression of the
57
Perkins 1969
Liu/Huang 1978; Perkins 1969
59
In the first half of the 20th century more maize and tubers and somewhat more wheat and rice were planted,
but less barley and sorghum (Kaoliang) (Perkins 1969:33ff.).
60
Rice imports were not very important, except in the coastal regions, which specialized on manufacture and
home production (Brandt 1989, Faure 1989, Rawski 1989). Towards the end of the 19th century rice imports
could only feed about 1 to 2 million out of 400 million people in China (Ho 1959:289ff.). China also exported
grain (Perkins 1969:130f.) For data on export and import of grain in England and Wales, cp. Grigg (1982:78),
Wilkinson (1973:114) and Overton (1996:75ff.).
58
142
economic potential of Chinese agriculture to feed its population, but it shows again that
output per person did not decrease to subsistence level.
These estimates of household
consumption in Table 13 are also corroborated by data on the average food intake by Chinese
households in 1929/33. According to Buck (1937:407, 419), “an average adult consumer unit”
in China’s agricultural sector had an average daily intake of 3295 kcal, 100 g protein, 27 mg
of iron and 0.44 g of calcium. Since the minimum intake is estimated at 2800 kcal, 70 g
protein, 15 mg of iron and 0.8 g of calcium, there was only a deficit in calcium (cp. Appendix
VII.4).
Yet another confirmation of our findings contradicting the theory of a Malthusian trap is
provided by Lippit (1974) and Riskin (1975) on the economic potential of Chinese
agriculture. One way to measure the economic potential of pre-industrial agriculture is to
estimate the potential surplus above mass consumption. The surplus mainly consists of rents,
interests and profits not invested, i.e. the worker and peasant total income subtracted from the
total current output. According to Lippit (1974:76) the total surplus amounted to 19% of the
NDP in 1933. Riskin (1975:69) objects that this estimate does not consider income claimed
by bandits and military units (which is almost impossible to estimate), by local officials as
surtaxes as well as output lost through rural underemployment and underutilization of land.
According to Riskin (ibid.:70) the potential surplus of Chinese agriculture amounted to 24.5%
of the NDP around 193061. The surplus from the industrial sector amounted to 12.3% of the
NDP. Thus, the total surplus of Chinese economy was at 36% of the NDP, to which (premodern) agriculture contributed about 2/3 and the industrial sector 1/3 (ibid.:74f.)62. This is
remarkable considering the relatively bad conditions such as floods, civil war, international
economic crisis and a weak state which prevailed in China at that time (Myers 1980:6, 19,
22f., Riskin 1975:81). These findings also contradict Elvin’s proposition that a lack of savings
and investments in Chinese economy let the output per capita fall to subsistence level63.
61
Luxury consumption contributed 16.9%, land tax 2.1% and underutilized land and labor 5.5% of NDP in 1933
(Riskin 1975:70). In the 18th and the early 19th century the surplus may have been even higher (Anderson
1988:115).
62
Net consumption expenditures claimed over 94% of net domestic expenditures in 1933 leaving less than 6%
for government consumption, communal services and investments. Net domestic investment was less than 2% of
net domestic expenditures (Riskin 1975:79). Farm output increased by 1% per year between 1911 and 1957
(Perkins 1969:29). Riskin assumes that it increased by 1.5% in the 1920s and that investments (in farm
equipment, supplies and livestock) amounted to about 1.8% of household income, i.e. 1.2% of the NDP (see also
Buck 1937:467). The output of the rural handicraft production increased by 1.1% per year between 1912 and
1931. Hence, a potential surplus over massproduction of 36% of the NDP was enough for the necessary
investments (Riskin 1975:80). For investment rates in the late 18th and the early 19th century in England cp.
Pierenkemper (1996:15f.).
63
Huang (1985:20) mentions that Elvin does acknowledge the existence of surplus (1973:285-316) but that his
graph (ibid.:313) is showing how output per capita falls to subsistence level and surplus is eaten up by a growing
population. According to Myers (1980:22f.), Chinese economy increased by 13% and the agricultural sector by
143
Although China was poor, it was not caught in a vicious circle of misery and poverty.
Compared to Meiji Japan the output per capita was certainly not lower in Chinese agriculture
(Riskin 1975:82).
Also a comparison of grain output per capita shows that the most productive regions of China
were not behind England and Wales. The population of England and Wales increased by the
factor 3.09, whereas the Chinese population increased by the factor 2.99 between 1700 and
1850. However, the total agricultural output increased during this time period by the factor 2
in England and Wales (according to Allen 1994; Turner/Beckett/Afton 2001; Grigg 1982) and
by the factor 2.2 in the most productive provinces of China. Hence, there was a decrease in
grain output per capita in England and Wales by the factor 0.67 on average and about the
same (0.74) in the most productive provinces of China. Whereas productivity per capita
increased in England and Wales during 1700 and 1750, but massively decreased between
1750 to 1850, it declined in China between 1700 and 1800, but increased between 1800 and
1850. The average grain output per person in the four most productive provinces in China
(597 kg/p) was 1.3 times higher than the average in England and Wales (476 kg/p) between
1700 and 1850 (cp. Appendix VIII. 3.5).
Table 14: Grain output per capita in England and Wales and the four most productive
provinces in China compared
1700
1750
1800
1850
1700-1850
%/year
factor
England &
Wales64
kg/p
China 465
499
573
495
335
754
546
532
555
1.5
1.0
1.1
1.7
476
-0.27
0.7
597
-0.20
0.7
1.3
England &
Wales66
% kg/p
China 467
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
0.28
-0.29
-0.78
-0.64
-0.05
0.08
1700-1850
-0.27
-0.20
Ch4/
E&W
kg/p
% kg/p
We may conclude from these figures that the average grain output per capita was higher in the
most productive provinces of China than in England and Wales and it increased in China
4% per year and capita between 1949 and 1977. These growth rates would not have been possible without
capital, which in turn points to a rather high saving rate in China (Myers 1991:620f.).
64
Allen 1994; Grigg 1982; Turner/Beckett/Afton 2001
65
Liu/Huang 1978; Perkins 1969
66
Allen 1994; Grigg 1982; Turner/Beckett/Afton 2001
67
Perkins 1969
144
between 1800 and 1850 and until 1930 whereas it decreased in England and Wales from 1750
to 1850.
It might be objected that grain output is not an appropriate proxy for comparing living
standards in China and Europe as the amount of meat and food other than meat was higher in
Europe than in China (cp. Huang 2002). However, the patterns of food intake in England and
China were quite similar, contrary to Huang’s assertion (2002:506ff.). Between 1787 and
1793 the average weekly intake of an English laborer was 4.1 kg bread and 0.2 kg potatoes,
0.14 kg meat, 43 g fat and 0.28 l milk per person and week. In caloric terms bread and
potatoes contributed 90% of all calories, but meat only 5%, milk 1.5% and fats 3.2%, in
addition to this 49 gr of protein were consumed on average68. This is comparable with
Chinese consumption patterns: 80% grains, 15% vegetables and 2-3% meat (cp. chap. 2.5.1).
For the 1930s figures are available for both England and Jiangnan. In England 1.7 kg bread
and 1.45 kg potatoes, 0.64 kg meat, 329 g fat and 1.6 l milk were consumed per person and
week. This amounted to 2540 kcal, 78 g protein, 96 g fats, 14 mg iron and 0.65 g calcium per
person and day (Oddy 1990:269,274). An “adult consumer unit” in a peasant household in
Jiangnan consumed 3486 kcal, 98 g protein, 23 mg iron and 0.42 g calcium (Buck
1937:407,419). The amounts of calories, protein and iron were higher in Jiangnan and in
China, though we have no figures for fat. Calcium intake was higher in Europe but still did
not reach the minimum. These figures are probably not fully comparable. However, they do
not support the Malthusian proposition on China.
2.9.2 Distribution of land
It may be objected that the above-mentioned figures on average consumption of average
households do not reflect the real distribution of land and hence do not invalidate the
proposition of growing impoverishment of a large part of the Chinese population. However, it
can be shown that while population and man-land-ratio increased, the unequal distribution of
land decreased (more owners and long-term tenants and less households without land), so the
above-mentioned average values tend to correspond to the actual land distribution (Chao
1986:168; Brandt 1989:138,147; Faure 1989:163). Several factors were responsible for this
decrease of unequal land distribution.
While population and commercialization (i.e. the production of cotton and silk, tobacco and
tea) increased, the marginal value of agricultural products and the household incomes also
68
Even in 1863 the figures were not very high: 4.9 kg of bread and 1.8 kg of potatoes, 0.41 kg of meat, 145 g of
fat and 0.88 l of milk per person and week. This amounted to 2600 kcal, 66 g protein, 60 g fats, 14.9 mg of iron
and 0.44 g of calcium (Oddy 1990:269, 274; cp. Appendix VII.3).
145
increased. Peasant households were able to buy small parcels of land or were forced less often
to sell their land due to debts (Chao 1986:106ff.)69. As big landowners incurred increasing
transaction costs by controlling both unfree and free labor, the long term leasing of small
parcels of land for a fixed rent was more profitable. In this way, not only control costs could
be reduced to a considerable extent, but also tenants were forced to intensify their production
on smaller plots (Chao 1986:125). At the same time, long time lease of land created a de facto
double ownership ”one field, two owners” (Eastman 1988b:77; Fei/Chang 1945:76). The
result was a reduction of unequal distribution of land (Chao 1986:139-145, 163ff., 184-191;
Netting 1993:243f.).
The trend towards land fragmentation and more equal land distribution was also furthered by
the predominant mode of land inheritance. Land was distributed to all sons according to the
mode of partible inheritance (homoyogenitur, Stover/Stover 1976:122). Rich peasants had
more land but also more children than poorer peasants, i.e. more sons among whom they had
to distribute their land. Therefore, sons of rich peasants became poorer (downward mobility)
whereas industrious sons of poor peasants could buy or lease more land (upward mobility)
(Huang 1985:78; Chao 1986:105; Netting 1993:244; Stover/Stover 1976:111)70. Thus, the
percentage of landless households (and of big land-owners) decreased and land became more
equally distributed, as poor peasant households could save money and afford to buy or rent
some additional land as well as due to the rule of partible inheritance of land. This again does
not support Elvin’s proposition of a growing impoverishment of the Chinese peasant
population. The distribution of land also has consequences for the reproductive behavior.
Hence we briefly have to come back to the reproductive strategies of households.
2.9.3 Reproductive strategies
It could be assumed – as the theory of the Malthusian trap does – that the value of children as
laborers increases with increasing intensification of production thus leading to higher birth
rates and to population growth. However, Boserup (1983:186, 1990:23f.) has pointed out that
labor-intensive land use in densely populated areas is no incentive for high fertility rates
(Netting 1993:27; Cleveland 1998). Households practicing labor-intensive agriculture on
scarce land, as in China, had to adjust their size to the available amount of land by female
69
Whereas land prices were stable between 1510 and 1750 they increased from 1750 onwards, except during the
middle of the 19th century. This price increase was due to an increased demand rather than to a reduced supply
of land (Chao 1986:129ff.).
70
In contrast to this, the system of primogeniture, prevailing in most parts of Europe and Japan, increased the
unequal distribution of land in each generation as well as the percentage of landless population (Chao 1986:109;
Wilkinson 1973:75, 80). The percentage of landless households increased since the 16th and 17th century in
England due to population increase and enclosures (Grigg 1982:206ff.).
146
infanticide and restriction of marital fertility (TMFR) (Netting 1993:86, 270, 315ff., see chap.
1.4). Thus, families with small or medium-sized farms had fewer children than households
with large farms. Landless households, on the other hand, had more children, since children
contributed to family income as wage laborers (Netting 1993:269ff.; Herlihy 1998:59-66 on
Europe; Netting 1993:96-99 on Japan)71. Thus, if extensive agriculture is practiced, the field
area (farm size) is expanded as the household grows in number. If, however, intensive
agriculture is practiced (and land is scarce), the size of a household must adjust to farm size.
This explains why in China poorer peasants had fewer children than richer farmers (cp. chap.
1.4 and Appendix I.3)72. Thus, the high elasticity of household size to income variations
prevented a decline of the living standard of households73. At the same time, non-agricultural
production of rural households (especially in the textile sector) generated additional income
and contributed to an improvement of the standard of living (Chao 1986:108).
2.9.4 Non-agricultural production of rural households
To compensate for a decrease of land per capita, the production had to be intensified by
raising yields per land. Another important household strategy was the expansion of nonagricultural activities, such as wage labor and handicraft production, which generated
additional income (as we have already seen in Jiangnan).
Since the time of the Han dynasty, but increasingly after the late 15th century markets
expanded and market cities emerged. At the same time handicraft production of rural
households increased, especially with regard to spinning and weaving of cotton and silk as
well as the cultivation of cotton and mulberry trees (Chao 1987:56; Elvin 1974:268; Eastman
1988e:142-147; Myers 1980:96f.; Wong 1997:21, 37f.). Rural handicraft production had
several advantages. 1) A hitherto under-employed household labor force (of women and
children) could be put to work with higher labor productivity74. 2) Handicraft production
required only low capital inputs, especially for spinning, which even poor farmers could
afford. 3) The work was less demanding and simpler than in rice cultivation and not
71
However, this is not corroborated by the numbers given by Fei (1939, cp. Appendix I.3).
Herlihy (1998:59ff.) points to the effectiveness of preventive checks, i.e. of households adjusting birth rates to
available land resources in Europe. A higher marriage age and birth control were reactions to increasing food
prices and decreasing rates of land per household (cp. Wilkinson 1973:73ff., Boserup 1987:697ff. and
Wrigley/Schofield 1981 on Europe, Lee/Wang 1999:51f. for China).
73
According to Elvin (1974) China had a problem of overpopulation, a position shared by Mallory (1930) and
others. However, it is difficult to understand why under such condition real wages increased, as they did between
1901 and 1933 (Rawski 1989:326; Brandt 1989:107-122; Myers 1970:141-151; Perkins 1969:299; Buck
1937:306).
74
There was hardly rural unemployment in Chinese agriculture, but rather seasonal underuse of labor force
(Boserup 1972:322f.). Perkins (1969:57ff.) mentions a shortage of agricultural labor in the 1930s. The potential
72
147
dependent on weather conditions (Li 1998:150). 4) It created an additional income for
consumption and the purchase of land. 5) By combining agriculture and handicraft
production, households could diversify their production, increase their income and reduce
risks (Netting 1993:238; Elvin 1974:275f., 283). In prosperous regions about 20 to 30% of the
output of peasant households was marketed during the Qing times; in the early 20th century it
was even 30 to 40%. According to Buck (1930:111) 54% of all crops were sold for cash in
China, 40% in North China and 60% in east central China (see also Chao 1986:57;
Feuerwerker 1990:234; Eastman 1988b:71, 1988d:102f., 1988e:141ff.; Rawski 1972:54f.;
Huang 1990:44ff., 78ff.; Bray 1986:135).
Huang (1990; 2002:510-520) maintains that the involutionary growth through intensification
of production was the result of growing overpopulation and increasing land pressure. The
Chinese households had to invest additional labor into silk and cotton production, which had a
lower marginal product of labor (labor productivity) than agriculture. Pomeranz (2002:546ff.)
questions these assertions on several grounds. First, he shows that the difference in
productivity in relation to land and to labor was not as great as asserted by Huang75. After
subtracting the rents from the output, 100 adult days of labor in the cotton complex (growing,
spinning and weaving of cotton) yielded about 588 kg of wheat equivalents or 5.9 kg per day
and adult consumer. This is considerably higher than what English agricultural laborers (3 kg)
or (rural and urban) weavers (between 4 and 5.5 kg) earned in England in the middle of the
18th century (Pomeranz 2002:550f.). Second, Pomeranz argues that marginal productivity of
labor in agriculture was always higher than in handicraft production. While marginal
productivity in agriculture declines with a fixed stock of land, marginal productivity (price) in
handicraft production remains about constant. If the marginal productivity in agriculture falls
to the marginal productivity in handicraft production, peasant producers will devote more
labor to handicraft production. If the price per cloth declines (as it was the case between 1750
and 1840), more labor will be invested into agriculture again. If households’ consumption
of seasonally underused labor of peasant households was tapped through off-season wage labor and nonagricultural production.
75
Pomeranz accepts that one mu of cotton land required twice as much labor than one mu of rice/wheat land,
thus 2:1 (Huang 2002:510). But one mu (one fifteenth of one ha) of cotton yielded 150 cash per day, one mu of
rice/wheat 260 cash per day. As a consequence the ratio decreased to 1.7:1 and with further adjusting the ratio
for the quality of labor (children instead of adult labor) to 1.3:1. Considering output not in relation to land but to
labor, it took 60 days for the growing, spinning and weaving of cotton to earn 2 shi of rice required to feed one
adult person, thus, 5.3 times longer than through rice/wheat production (Pomeranz 2002:547). This is a
considerably lower ratio than the ratio of 18:1 for rice and 27:1 for wheat stipulated by Huang. Since mainly old
people and children worked in the ”cotton complex”, the 180 work days should be reduced to 100 adult work
days, and the ratio further declines to 3:1. Furthermore, by taking into consideration the value added per labor
day, the ratio further declines to 2:1; i.e. a day labor in the cotton complex yielded 50% as much value added as
one in grain production (Pomeranz 2002:548).
148
targets were not met, handicraft production was going on with more total labor being invested
in both activities (Pomeranz 2002:549, 576f.)76. This intensification of labor can occur
without population pressure, as in Europe, where exposure to market opportunities and the
availability of new consumables were more important factors than enclosure and
proletarianization, overpopulation and land pressure (Overton 1996:133-192, 197-207;
Pomeranz 2002:552; Feuerwerker 1990:212). Third, the advantage of handicraft production is
a higher income per year in return for less average income per day, i.e. more work days per
year and household (Pomeranz 2002:550). Even if labor productivity in the cotton complex
may have been lower that in grain production, handicraft production has considerably
contributed to household income77. The cotton and cloth output per capita of the agricultural
population in Jiangnan increased from 90 kg/p in 1620 to 117 kg/p in 1850. At the same time
grain output per capita declined from 448 kg/p to 350 kg/p, but increased again between 1850
and 1930 to 458 kg/p (cp. Appendix VIII.3). I have no data on cotton and cloth output per
capita in the 1930s but all the data point to an increase of cotton production and handicraft
output of cloth (Perkins 1969:283; Brandt 1989:123, 135). According to Brandt (1989:72f.)
cash crop marketing rose from one half to two third of the annual output of peasant
households in Jiangnan and Guangdong between 1890 and 1930. The output of handicraft
production in China grew by 1.1% per year (Riskin 1975:80) or 1.4% per year (Rawski
1989:330) between 1912 and 1931 (see also Chao 1975:175). This amounts to an annual
increase per capita of 0.3 and 0.6% and to an annual increase of cloth consumption per capita
of 0.8% between 1871/80-1901/10 and of 0.7% between 1901/10 and 1931/36 (Brandt
1989:135; Eastman 1988c:85f.).
The peasant households produced textiles for both the Chinese and the world market where
subsistence farmers were highly competitive. Cotton and silk were mainly from domestic
production, but cotton was also imported from India (Elvin 1974:313f.). The factor, product
and credit markets in China were highly efficient, and certainly not less efficient than in
Europe (Myers 1980, chap. 4; 1991:614ff.; Wong 1990:12f.; 1992:605; but see Huang
1990:106-111 for an opposite view). Farmers bought and sold their products on regional
markets, and the putting out system (of merchants and home workers) which prevailed in
Europe hardly existed in China (Elvin 1974:286ff.; Feuerwerker 1990:234; Eastman
76
As subsistence farmers they had to continue production at all costs until the production target as required by
consumption was reached. However, as subsistence farmers they had a buffer in food production and could
flexibly adjust their supply of non-agricultural products to market demand (Elvin 1974:275f., 283).
77
Data on Jiangnan (Li Bozhong) shows that there was a decline of physical labor productivity in grain and
cotton from 1345 kg/w in 1620 to 1216 kg/w in 1850, although at the same time labor productivity in grain
production increased from 1121 kg/w to 1518 kg/w.
149
1988e:145). However, Chinese textile production (by peasant households) experienced a
sharp decrease in demand on the world market after 1830 (though less on the domestic
market). It lost its advantage facing stiff competition from the European textile industry.
Furthermore, long distance trade and transportation infrastructure suffered heavily during the
turmoil of mid 19th century, which also damaged the rural textile sector in China. On the other
hand domestic and international market and trade soared in England at the same time,
supported by its naval and military power (Pomeranz 2002:578). However, towards the end of
the 19th century Chinese handicraft production recovered. China now imported and processed
industrially produced yarn, whereas home made yarn production had previously been a
bottleneck of domestic textile production. The output of handicraft production grew by 1.1%
per year (Riskin 1975:80) or 1.4% per year (Rawski 1989:330) between 1912 and 1931 (cp.
Chao 1975:175; Eastman 1988c:85f.; Brandt 1989:135).
Agricultural output, handicraft production and wage labor increased between 1876 and 1930.
Rawski (1989:330f.) has estimated that agricultural output grew by between 1.4% and 1.7%,
whereas handicraft production increased by annually 1.4% between 1914/18 and 1931/36 (see
also Riskin 1975:80). With a potential surplus over mass production of about 30% of the NDP
there were enough means available for investments (Riskin 1975:80). As a consequence,
output and income per capita and, thus, the standard of living of Chinese households rose
until the worldwide economic crisis in the 1930s. An increase of output per capita of 0.4% to
0.9% (Rawski 1989:326, 330) in Chinese agriculture and handicraft production seems
plausible. Even Huang (1990:13,143) assumes an increase of 0.5% between 1910 and 1930
(see also Eastman 1988c:84ff., 88ff.; 1988e:143f.; Gernet 1988:488, 511; Brandt 1989:123)78.
This data – also corroborated by statements made by peasants themselves (Buck 1937:459f.;
Myers 1970:125, 208) – again does not support the thesis of the Malthusian trap.
In pre-industrial China an economy of Smithian type prevailed. It was characterized by a
growth of total and per capita output through specialization, intensification, extension of
market transactions and supported by a state investing in infrastructure (water control,
transport, risk management etc.) but also by technological progress (mechanical, biological
and organizational). There was a balance of population and resources in China far above
subsistence level (Wong 1997:29). The ”high-level equilibrium trap” in China describes, thus,
78
See also Brandt (1989:123, 125, 129, 135) on Central and Eastern China, Faure (1989:153, 157, 160f.) on
Guangdong and Jiangsu, Myers (1970:56f.) on Shandong and Hebei and Li Bozhong (1998) on Jiangnan and
Songjiang (see Appendix VIII.3.4).
150
a similar type of economy as in Europe known as ”industrious revolution” (DeVries), a highly
successful pre-industrial economy (Wong 1997:41f.).
III. Discussion
We may now draw some provisional conclusions, which may contribute to an explanation of
the diverging developmental paths of Europe and China.
As already mentioned, the data on China (and on Europe) that were used in this essay are
rather scanty. Without pressing the data too hard, they should, nevertheless, allow for
reasonable estimates of general trends. Furthermore, it is difficult to compare statistically
China with Europe, as there are not only considerable differences within China (Perkins
1969:19; Reynolds 1985:271) but also within Europe (cp. Slicher van Bath 1963:280; Grigg
1982:103, 166, 174f.). However, the data on Chinese agriculture may be good enough to
show that the high-level equilibrium trap is not a plausible explanation for the data presented
in this article.
3.1 Agriculture
As Wilkinson (1973) and Boserup (1972) have maintained that it is the scarcity of resources,
not plenty, which may lead to an intensification of production and to the implementation of
innovations, be they mechanical (new cultivation methods, new tools), biological (new crops,
new seeds, new kinds of manure) or organizational (property rights and rent system,
agricultural infrastructure). This was true for both China and Europe.
China had a highly efficient agriculture. Wet rice cultivation in southern and central China
was far more productive than dry field agriculture both in Europe and northern China (Li
1998:171). Even in dry land agriculture yields seemed to be higher in China than in Europe as
a comparison between Shandong and Holland in the 18th century shows (Pomeranz 2000:33,
45). Furthermore soil fertility remained equal or may have even increased in some areas over
time in Chinese irrigation agriculture but decreased in Europe (and in Chinese) dry land
agriculture (Bray 1984:107, 111, 125; Eastman 1988d:122f.; Li 1998a:171). The technology
used in European agriculture was not superior to its Chinese counterpart until the early 19th
century. This fact was also acknowledged by contemporaries such as the members of the
”Walsh society for the improvement of agriculture” and the French physiocrats, cited by
Pomeranz (2000:45). This translated into yields per ha in the four most productive provinces
in China that were about 2.1 times higher on average than in England and Wales, the most
prosperous country in Europe, between 1700 and 1850, although the growth rate was (by
151
factor 1.9 versus factor 1.4) higher in England and Wales than in China (see Table 6). Also
the increase of total output of grain was probably somewhat higher in China (increase factor
2.2 on average) than in England and Wales where it increased by a factor 2 (Allen 1994,
Turner/Beckett/Afton 2001, Grigg 1982; cp. Appendix VIII.3.5). Labor productivity in
China’s most productive provinces was roughly the same as in England and increased at about
the same rate as in England and Wales between 1700 and 1850. However, whereas the annual
increase was higher in England and Wales (0.22% versus –0.07%) from 1700 and 1750, it
was higher in China (0.53% versus 0.22%) from 1800 to 1850 (cp. Table 10), and average
labor productivity continued to grow until 1930 (VIII. 1 and 3). Grain output per capita was
on average 476 kg between 1700 and 1850 in England and Wales, whereas in China of the
four provinces it amounted to 597 kg. The annual average increase in output per capita was
about the same in England and Wales and in the four most productive provinces in China (cp.
Table 13; VIII. 1 and 3). However, productivity per capita increased again in China between
1850 and 1930 by 0.12% or factor 1.1 (see table 12, Appendix VIII.3.5). This was far above
the minimal subsistence need of the assumed 180 or 220 kg per person, and far away from the
output per capita reaching subsistence level, which according to Elvin (1974) would be an
indicator for overpopulation and impoverishment. The still unexhausted growth potential of
Chinese agriculture is also indicated by the potential surplus which amounted to almost 25%
of the NDP in 1933: two third of the total potential surplus of Chinese economy (Riskin 1975;
Lippit 1974). Hence, there was also enough investment capital for an industrial take-off in
China (for England cp. Pierenkemper 1996:15f.).
In pre-industrial Europe food (mostly grains and potatoes) accounted for about 80% of an
average household‘s total expenses and cloth for another 13%. It was only when income and
real wages began to increase from the 1840s onwards that animal products were increasingly
consumed (Grigg 1982:118-123). This was not very different from China (Pomeranz 2002),
but the Chinese agriculture could also supply fibers in sufficient quantities for its textile sector
whereas Europe became increasingly dependent on cotton imports to match the demand in the
middle of the 19th century (Pomeranz 2000:45). Both in China and in Europe handicraft
production by rural households played an important role. The extent of commercialization
(domestic and international trade) and the market integration of the rural textile production
were probably more advanced in China than in Europe: about 20 to 30% of the output of
peasant households was marketed during Qing time, in the early 20th century it was even 30%
to 40% (Eastman 1988e:141ff.). Furthermore, markets were highly efficient in China and also
handicraft production flourished, thus leading to a relatively high living standard (as
152
compared to Europe) (Wong 1997:17-22 on product and factor markets). Economic growth
was only interrupted by political or politically induced crises (such as war, rebellions, floods
and droughts), as Eastman (1988d:129) states (see also Myers 1980:91-118;). The question,
then, is why there was no industrial take-off in China.
According to Boserup (1983:197ff.; 1987:693) the industrial revolution in Europe was the
result of innovations in the proto-industrial sector as a reaction to both a scarcity of labor and
an energy crises. According to Pomeranz (2000:19) labor force and capital were available in
sufficient quantities, but land was scarce, because the energy crisis was largely due to a
shortage of land and to a zero-sum-game between fields, pastures and forests characterizing
the solar energy system (Sieferle 1997). Capital appears of not having been scarce, and all
agree that there was a shortage of energy. An increase of land productivity without a rise of
labor productivity and with the urban sector expanding and attracting rural labor force may
explain why labor force also became scarce. Wilkinson (1973, chap. 6) explains the industrial
revolution in England as a reaction to scarcities in different sectors of the economy. The
solution of scarcity in one sector produced scarcity in another where new technological
solutions had to be found in turn: coal mining instead of charcoal, steam-powered pumps to
empty coal pits instead of horse-powered kettle-buckets, increasing land productivity by new
labor intensive methods, higher yielding crops, import of crops and manure as well as of
cotton and timber (Pomeranz 2000:12, 19, 23f., 46, 57f., 68). Furthermore, the improvements
of the transportation system (canals, turnpike roads, etc.) became crucial. The most important
innovations were land saving, not labor saving (Buchheim 1994:49-54). This is consistent
with the fact that in a solar energy regime production is largely dependent on land, and
therefore substituting capital, labor and/or imports for land is crucial (Pomeranz 2000:49f.)79.
According to Wilkinson (1973) innovation in order to cope with scarcity may not only lead to
an intensification of production but also to a change of the mode of production, i.e. to the
transition of an aristocratic pre-industrial state to an industrial capitalist system. As I have
argued in this essay, it was only in the first half the 20th century when Chinese pre-industrial
agriculture reached its productive capacity, whereas the agricultural potential in Europe was
already exhausted in the 19th century or even earlier (Perkins 1969:29; Feuerwerker
79
Consequently, the workload increased during the Industrial Revolution, which made it essential to develop and
use more labor saving machinery (Wilkinson 1973:135; Buchheim 1994:50). The solution of this problem came
with the use of the rotational power of steam machines at the end of the 18th century. Steam powered railway
substituted for horses and pastureland in the middle of the 19th century. The rotational energy of steam engines
was also used in textile sector. The result of this process – being a combination of pressures and opportunities –
was steam engine and bituminous coal, which formed the basic technology of the Industrial Revolution
(Wilkinson 1973, chap. 6; Pierenkemper 1996:10-37).
153
1990:235ff.; Deng 1993:173). If these two propositions are accepted we may conclude that
Europe was forced at an earlier date than China to solve its resource scarcity problem by
innovations, which later turned out to have been the foundations of the industrial take off and
the establishment of a new mode of production80.
According to Boserup (1972) there are several conditions for an industrial take-off. First, an
increasing urbanization as well as a growth of the commercial and the manufactural sector
lead to a growing demand for agricultural products and labor force as well as to an increasing
supply of industrially made (or imported) inputs for agriculture. Second, a high elasticity of
peasant households to demand leads to an intensification and specialization of production in
order to satisfy a growing demand of the non-agricultural sector. And the relative and absolute
decrease of rural labor force as well as the higher capital and labor inputs leads to an increase
of labor productivity (1972:312f., 315f., 326). Secure land property rights and a welldeveloped transportation system are seen as additional conditions (ibid.:315f.; Grigg
1982:106). Probably, there was no agricultural revolution i.e. no capitalist transformation of
the Chinese agriculture not because of its backwardness but because the urban, industrial
sector did not grow fast enough, did not offer attractive wages for peasants and did not
produce enough industrial inputs for the agricultural sector. According to Myers (1970:293),
Chinese agriculture did not experience an industrial revolution because the industrial sector
was not dynamic enough. On the other hand – and perhaps more important – the conditions in
Chinese agriculture were not as bad as in the English counterpart: fewer landless households,
more landholding peasants (owners or long-term tenants), comparatively high productivity of
Chinese agriculture, relatively high incomes through agriculture and non-agricultural
household production (cp. Boserup 1972:315ff., 323 on French, Danish and Southeast Asian
versus English type of peasants).
This proposition is also corroborated by Deng (1999:202f.) according to whom underutilized
labor force in the agricultural sector always was a precondition for industrialization, but this
is, according to him, not sufficient to explain why there was no industrial takeoff in China.
The reason for it was that the Chinese peasants did not leave their land because opportunity
costs would have been high. This may be explained by the fact that peasants were landholding
80
There may have been other obstacles to industrialization. According to Pomeranz coal deposits and industrial
centers were far distant from each other in China, whereas in England the new industry was built up near
coalmines. However, as Jones (1998:93) has pointed out, the amount of available resources is (mainly) a
function of technology, of transportation and of imports (but see Pomeranz 2002:578ff.). But, as Pomeranz
(2002:580) states, it helped that coalmines were near and it helped that steam powered pumps were used in
England. As coal deposits were distant from Jiangnan, and transportation costs would have been very high, it had
to look for other means to solve its energy problems.
154
(owners or long-term tenants) and land was distributed more equally because of the rule of
equal inheritance and the fact that there were no enclosures (Feuerwerker 1990:237). The
opportunity for handicraft production and seasonal wage labor of household members made
agriculture attractive and contributed to its viability (Rawski 1989:299-321). The opportunity
costs to leave the land were, thus, much higher in China, i.e. the most productive provinces
than in Europe, i.e. in England where the primogeniture system prevailed, commons were
dismantled, enclosures had produced landless households (Grigg 1982:206-212) and
agriculture was less profitable for small peasant households (Chao 1986:109). It was only
after the process of industrialization had taken off that Europe outpaced China and later
marginalized it (Deng 1999:324ff.). According to Deng, until the middle of the 19th century
China was not only wealthier but also more powerful than Japan, where reforms were made
by the state and the transition towards a capitalist state and towards industrialization started.
Opportunity costs for such reforms and for industrialization were much higher in China than
in Japan because it was wealthier and more powerful. The Meiji Japan, in turn, had nothing to
loose and therefore a high incentive for reforms and modernization. The same constellation
prevailed in Europe between England on one side and Germany and France on the other but in
general between China and all Europe.
However, it is not sufficient, that such an economic transition (industrialization) is
economically necessary, it also must be politically possible. Therefore, political factors must
be taken into consideration (Perdue, this volume).
3.2 State
Europe consisted of a fragmented political system of independent states, which waged
internecine wars against each other for their survival up to the beginning of the 19th century.
Each one of them aimed at increasing its power and wealth in order to compete successfully
against rival states. Military competition and frequent wars propelled a process of military
innovations (in the artillery, the navy and in the organization of the army) during the 17th and
the 18th century (McNeill 1982). While the expenditures for the military soared, the economic
potential was lower in Europe than in China and the state was checked by other elite factions
(aristocracy and merchants in autonomous cities). China, on the other hand, represented a
uniform political system with a central state, focussing on the integration of its territory as
well as on welfare and prosperity of the peasant population. In China relative peace ruled
(with the exception of peasant uprisings, frontier wars and pirate attacks). The Chinese state
established internal peace and stabilized its borders in the Northwest, where peace ruled since
155
the middle of the 18th century. It could rely on a stronger economy and had more control of
the aristocracy and the merchants in the cities. The central state was stable and largely
unchallenged up to the 19th century, and the need for military armament was not as high as for
the European states (Perdue 1998:14, 21; Wong 1997). The comparatively low capacity of
European agriculture as well as the military competition in a multipolar political system
forced European states into commercial-military colonial expansion from the 16th century
onwards in order to tap the sources of wealth of the Orient in order to increase state revenues.
Increasing military power was a precondition of the European expansion, first in the Americas
in the 16th century and in Asia since the middle of the 18th century (Cipolla 1999, Frank
1998). The principal motive for this colonial expansion has always been economic
exploitation and the control of trade as well as the elimination of European competitors
abroad. Since the Chinese central state was not subjected to military competition, hardly any
technological and organizational progress took place within the military sector. Furthermore,
the Qing state militarily concentrated on its land army and on the central Asian frontier, but it
neglected the establishment of a navy and its deployment at the coast81. In contrast European
states built up colonial empires which contributed to the accumulation of capital (gold and
silver, commercial capital, state revenues), enhanced military capacity and technology (cp.
Tilly 1992, Cipolla 1999) and added agricultural land, thus substituting European land by
importing raw materials, food, fodder and manure as well as emigration (see Pomeranz 2000,
Jones 1991). Thus, whereas territorial expansion of the Chinese state came to a standstill and
external peace was established at about 1760 (Perdue, this volume), the military competition
between European states continued as their colonial expansion in Asia accelerated since the
middle of the 18th century (Sanderson 1995:192ff.).
Until the beginning of the 19th century China had been a super power of international trade,
which exported high-grade products (such as silk, cotton, porcelain, paper and tea). Up to that
time China displayed a positive balance of trade: about half of the 400 million silver dollars,
which came from south America to Europe between 1571 and 1821, went to China as
payment for imports (Gernet 1988:409; Eastman 1988d:129). It was only after the British
militarily forced the Chinese state to admit opium imports from India that the balance of trade
became increasingly negative for China. Although European powers did not colonize China,
they considerably weakened the Chinese state in numerous wars (starting with the first Opium
81
The Chinese had a powerful navy in earlier times, which the European fleets could not have matched. But the
Chinese state redirected its revenues to the building up of a land army at the beginning of the 15th century which
had to quell rebellions and had to face the increasing threat by warlike groups from the steppe at the northern
border (Gernet 1988:340f).
156
War). At the same time relative peace ruled in Europe during the 19th century when industrial
growth gained momentum. While European nation states became politically more efficient,
better legitimated and militarily more effective, the Chinese central state became territorially
over-stretched, politically inefficient and militarily weak. This contrasts with the 18th century
when China provided a more efficient administration than Europe. The Chinese state
experienced its most severe political and economic crises in the middle of the 19th century and
it could not prevent foreign powers (such as Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Japan)
from enforcing trade, duty and tax privileges by military means. The ruling elite increasingly
lost its legitimacy for being non-Chinese and having lost all wars against the foreigners
(Feuerwerker 1990:235f.). Whereas China heavily suffered from political uprisings and
economic crisis in the middle of the 19th century, political consolidation, industrialization and
expansion of trade gained momentum in Europe, especially in England (Pomeranz 2002:578).
The foreign powers supported the Chinese state to suppress the popular uprisings in the
middle of the 19th century, which caused large destruction and left the country in disarray.
The Chinese state lost its sovereignty and had to pay exorbitant reparations after numerous
lost wars against the invaders. After the end of this turmoil, especially after 1872, some
attempts at industrialization were made in the private sector. However, these were hampered
by a heavy taxing of the domestic trade, exorbitant reparation payments and the lack of capital
(Gernet 1988:474ff., 481, 501f.; Eastman 1988f). The foreign interventions thus damaged the
Chinese economy and in the end prevented the modernization of the state (Gernet 1988:474,
477). Thus, no modern national state (or smaller nation states) emerged in China, which was a
precondition of industrialization and modernization in Europe and later in Japan (Rowe
1990:261f.; Osterhammel 1995:160f., 169-173).
IV. A provisional conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction, the data I used is rather scanty and does not allow me to
answer positively the question of the delayed development of China as compared to Europe.
Nevertheless, we may draw two conclusions, as provisional as they might be. First, progress
in agriculture seems not to be a precondition to industrial take-off, rather the contrary is true.
It is agricultural stagnation, which makes industrial transition necessary and political
conditions made it possible. European agriculture had exhausted its growth potential long
before the Chinese. In China the land productivity was high and continued to increase, labor
productivity and per capita in pre-industrial agriculture were high as well and increased again
from 1800 onwards until 1930. Markets were highly efficient, handicraft production
157
flourished, as did both domestic and foreign trade. The balance of trade was highly positive
up to the beginning the 19th century. Second, the political crises of the middle the 19th century,
the impact of various interventions by foreign powers and the dramatic decrease in state
efficiency prevented the emergence of a modern nation state in China. Foreign interventions
damaged not only the economy (foreign trade, reparations, granting privileges, lack of capital)
and seriously hampered the industrialization, but also prevented the modernization of the
state, as it took place in Europe and later in Japan.
In terms of technologist and distributionalist positions I maintain that economy, i.e.
agriculture, was important. The problem, however, was not that China had a less efficient
agriculture than Europe, but a more efficient one, which contributed to a delayed
industrialization. Chinese similarities with all pre-modern societies such as exploitation of
peasants, corruption of state officials, the Confucian ideology and the Chinese family
organization were probably less important, but the inefficient state in China of the 19th and
20th century was also hampering the industrial development. But here again the efficient state
(with a low budget, a small number of officials supervising a huge territory and investments
in agriculture) as well as the peace, which ruled China until the beginning of the 19th century,
turned into disadvantages when confronted with foreign invasions and furthering capitalism.
158
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VI. Appendix
I.1. Average size of households in China
After the abolition of the ting system, which concentrated on counting only the male
members of households, the household census were improved by including female members.
Consequently, the average household size from 1720 onwards was somewhat higher than
they had been before.
ø size of
household
1502-1522
1522-1552
1522-1552
1522-1552
1522-1552
1505-1557
1512-1633
1541
1558
1593
1596
1601
1636
1636
District Ch’ang-shu
District Yin-hsien
District Feng-hua
District Ting-hai
District Hsiang-shan
District Wu-chiang
District Lien-chiang
District Chien-ning
District Lung-yen
District Fu-ning
District Fu-chou
District Shao-wu
District Ting-chou
District Yen-ping
1728-1750
1769-1838
1771
1773
1778
1784
1812
1928
1930
1933
1934
1935
1936
1938
1938
1938
1938
Chekiang, 8 villages
Prefecture Jiaxing
District Hsiao-shan
Prefecture Yung-ping
Province Chihli
Prefecture Hangzhou
All China, 12 provinces
All China
Village Taitou
All China
Village Ch’ao-chou
Village Kaihsienkung
All China
Village Luts’un
Village Yits’un
Village Yuts’un
Village Kiangts’un
1502-1938
N = 31
5.18
3.31
3.20
2.87
4.68
3.12
2.56
3.90
6.20
2.85
2.90
4.12
4.60
4.25
(Ho 1959: 17)
(Ho 1959: 18)
(Ho 1959: 18)
(Ho 1959: 18)
(Ho 1959: 18)
(Ho 1959: 19)
(Ho 1959:20)
(Rawski 1972:171)
(Rawski 1972:171)
(Rawski 1972:171)
(Rawski 1972:171)
(Rawski 1972:171)
(Rawski 1972:171)
(Rawski 1972:171)
4.70
5.23
4.50
5.50
4.77
4.65
5.33
5.26
4.80
5.29
5.27
4.00
5.58
5.70
4.40
5.00
4.10
(Wakefield 1998:50f.)
(Li Bozhong 1998:23)
(Ho 1959: 41)
(Ho 1959: 42)
(Ho 1959: 62)
(Li Bozhong 1998:23)
(Ho 1959: 56)
(Ho 1959: 86)
(Yang 1945:9)
(Ho 1959: 86)
(Freedman 1966:64f.)
(Fei 1939:29)
(Ho 1959: 86)
(Fei/Chang 1945:298)
(Fei/Chang 1945:298)
(Fei/Chang 1945:298)
(Fei/Chang 1945:298)
3.84
4.95
4.45
168
I.2 Sex ratios and female infanticide
Values are given in men per 100 women
1771
1773
1778-1833
1778
1774-1873
1870s
1870s
1870s
1872
1872
19th century
early 20th century
1929/31
1934
District Hsiao-shan
Prefecture Yung-ping
All China
Province Chihli
Liaoning
All China
Swatow
Swatow
Zhejiang, 1 Prefecture
Zhejiang, 1 Prefecture
Amoy
Lower Yangzi
All China
Kaihsienkang
ø 132, 128 (< 16)
ø 121, 115 (< 16)
ø 120 (101–154)
ø 119, 123 (< 16)
ø 135 (<1)
ø 200, 430 (< 6)
ø 124 (< 1)
ø 175 (< 11), 166 (< 1)
ø 125, 194 (< 16)
ø 194, 431 (< 16)
ø 148 –173 (< 1)
ø 375 (< 1)
ø 108
ø 113, 125 (< 16), 135 (<6)
average (N=9, 6, 5)
(Ho 1959:41)
(Ho 1959:42)
(Ho1959:58)
(Ho 1959:62)
(Lee/Wang 1999:51)
(Dickemann 1979:341)
(Dickemann 1979:341)
(Dickemann 1979:341)
(Ho 1959:68)
(Ho 1959:68)
(Dickemann 1979:341)
(Dickemann 1979:341)
(Buck 1956:376)
(Fei 1939:22)
ø 137, 186 (< 16), 193 (<1)
I.3 Household size and wealth
District Chi-hsi (Ho (1959:6)
class
number of households
1371
1376
ø size of households
1371
1376
officials, military
craftsmen
peasants
386
262
9074
7.5
6.4
4
547
285
9074
7
6.3
4
North- and Southchina 1929-33 (Buck 1956:368,370, cp. also Myers 1970:132f.)
Land property
1. fifth
2. fifth
3. fifth
4. fifth
5. fifth
ø size of households
north
south
China
7.92
6.07
5.13
4.57
3.98
7.31
5.76
5.02
4.52
3.96
6.8
5.49
4.93
4.48
3.94
Village Yutsun 1936 (Fei/Chang 1945:264)
class
rich peasants
middle peasants
poor peasants
landless
number of
households
ø size of
households
6
31
75
44
11.2
5.7
4.6
4.3
169
Village Wuxi 1941 (Faure 1989:90):
Size in mu
number of
households
ø size of
households
2
3
22
40
8
7.5
4.67
3.91
3.3
3.63
7.00 and more
5-00 – 6.99
3.00 – 4.99
1.00 – 2.99
0.99 or less
II.1 Estimated development of Chinese population according to various sources
Data is provided by Chao (1986:35-41), Eastman (1988a:4), Perkins (1969:16),
McEvedy/Jones (1978:171), Schran (1978:644) and Lee/Saito (in Lee/ Campbell/ Wang
2002:600).
Chao
™SRS
m
Perkins
™SRS
m
McEvedy/Jones
™SRS
m
Schran
™SRS
m
Lee/Saito
™SRS
m
1193
1391
1592
1657
1776
1800
1848
120
60
200
70
268
295
426
1086
1400
1600
1650
1770
1812
1850
1873
1893
1913
1933
1953
1957
108
65-80
120-200
100-150
270 (±25)
360 (±25)
430 (±25)
350 (±25)
385 (±25)
430 (±25)
500 (±25)
583 (±15)
647 (±15)
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
1870
1900
1920
1950
100
128
150
130
150
215
320
420
400
450
485
520
1600
1700
1800
1900
200
200
350
500
1850
1873
1893
1913
1933
430
420
453
491
550
170
Estimated development of Chinese population according to Zhao/Xie (1988)
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
™SRS
m
¨SRS
%
increase year
%
92
93
94
95
95
96
96
97
97
98
98
99
99
99
88
91
94
94
100
100
111
120
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.0
1.1
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
3.4
3.3
0.0
6.4
0.0
11.0
8.1
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
0.34
0.32
0.00
0.62
0.00
1.05
0.78
171
™SRS
m
¨SRS
%
increase year
%
129
159
183
205
238
283
308
299
361
380
400
418
436
370
388
367
380
400
405
440
468
7.5
23.3
15.1
12.0
16.1
18.9
8.8
-2.9
20.7
5.3
5.3
4.5
4.3
-15.1
4.9
-5.4
3.5
5.3
1.3
8.6
6.4
0.73
2.11
1.42
1.14
1.50
1.75
0.85
-0.30
1.90
0.51
0.51
0.44
0.42
-1.63
0.48
-0.55
0.35
0.51
0.12
0.83
0.62
II.2 Estimated development of Chinese population according to Liu/Huang (1978)
Liu/Huang (1978:29f.). Some figures have been corrected for exceedingly high growth rates
by Maddison (1998:169).
™SRS
m
¨SRS
%
pop year
%
corr.
m
103
124
133
139
144
146
151
155
162
162
160
153
145
138
130
123
152
148
126
144
138
149
154
20.4
7.3
4.5
3.6
1.4
3.4
2.6
4.5
0
-1.2
-4.4
-5.2
-4.8
-5.8
-5.4
23.6
-2.6
-14.9
14.3
-4.2
7.9
3.4
1.9
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.0
-0.1
-0.4
-0.5
-0.5
-0.6
-0.6
2.1
-0.3
-1.6
1.3
-0.4
0.8
0.3
117
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1957
135
156
177
™SRS
m
¨SRS
%
pop year
%
corr.
m
151
219
260
268
272
342
359
340
385
381
409
412
412
377
358
368
380
400
423
472
480
647
-1.9
45
18.7
3.1
1.5
25.7
5
-5.3
13.2
-1
7.3
0.7
0
-8.5
-5
2.8
3.3
5.3
5.8
11.6
3.6
11.97
–0.20
3.79
1.73
0.30
0.15
2.32
0.49
-0.54
1.25
-0.10
0.71
0.07
0.00
-0.88
-0.52
0.28
0.32
0.51
0.56
1.10
0.17
3.03
210
229
Major population losses due to political crisis
Population loss in % between pre-crisis and post-crises population
1590-1650
1660-1680
1850-1870
24%
18%
13%
172
274
290
306
323
341
360
II.3 Estimated demographic development in China (1800-1930)
Liu/Huang
Maddison
McEvedy/
Jones
Chao
1800
1850
340
412
341
412
320
420
295
426
299
436
%
0.38
0.38
0.55
0.74
0.76
1850
1870
412
358
420
400
430
350
430
420
436
388
-0.70
-0.24
-1.02
-0.12
-0.58
413
500
491
550
405
468
0.96
0.57
0.73
%
1910
1930
423
480
%
0.63
1900
1920
450
485
1910
1930
0.38
Perkins
Schran
Zhao/Xie
ø0.56
ø-0.53
ø0.65
II.4 Estimated demographic development of China, Europe and Great Britain
The date of the first three columns are taken from McEvedy/Jones (1978:171,19,49) on
Europe including European Russia. Those of the last two columns are from Liu/Huang
(1978:29f.) for China and from Livi-Bacci (1992:13) whose data on Europe do not include
Russia.
China 1
Europe 1
GB
China 2
Europe 2
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
100
150
150
215
450
81
100
120
180
390
5
6.25
9.25
16
42
103
160
138
340
400
67
89
95
146
295
1500-1600
1600-1700
1700-1800
1800-1900
0.41
0.00
0.36
0.74
0.21
0.18
0.41
0.78
0.22
0.39
0.55
0.97
0.44
-0.15
0.91
0.16
0.28
0.07
0.43
0.71
average
factor
0.38
4.5
0.39
4.8
0.53
8.4
0.34
4
0.37
4.4
173
II.5 Population growth in Europe and China
Birg (1996:51) on Europe and Liu/Huang (1978:29f.) on China
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
1950
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1900
1900-1950
Europe III
m
China II
m
120
163
203
276
408
549
%
0.61
0.44
0.62
0.79
0.60
138
260
340
412
400
580
%
1.27
0.54
0.38
-0.06
0.75
1700-1750
1700-1800
1700-1850
1700-1900
Europe
%
0.61
0.53
0.56
0.61
China
%
1.27
0.91
0.73
0.53
Population growth rate per year in Europe, China and Japan (Wilson 2001:30)
1500-1600
1600-1700
1700-1800
1800-1850
1850-1900
1900-1950
average
Europe
%
China
%
Japan
%
0.211
0.182
0.405
0.774
0.773
0.556
0.457
0.063
0.02
1.089
0.748
-0.187
0.688
0.391
0.258
0.276
-0.035
0.267
0.682
1.248
0.423
II.6 Population density in eight macro regions
(Skinner 1977 in Myers 1980:11)
Northchina (without Manchuria)
Northwestchina
Upper Yangzi
Middle Yangzi
Lower Yangzi
Southeastcoast (incl. Taiwan)
Yun-Kwei
Lingnan (incl. Hainan)
total
area
qkm
1843
m
p/sq.km
1893
m
p/sq.km
1953
m
p/sq.km
746‘470
771‘300
423‘950
699‘700
192‘740
226‘670
470‘900
424‘900
112
29
47
84
67
27
11
29
150
38
111
120
348
119
23
68
122
24
53
75
45
29
16
33
163
31
125
107
233
128
34
78
174
32
68
92
61
36
26
47
233
42
160
131
316
159
55
111
3'956‘300
406
103
397
100
536
135
174
III.1 Total cultivated area and land per person
Perkins (1969:16,240), Chao (1986:87) and Heijdra (1998:452). The multi-cropping index
(MCI) measures the number of harvests per field and year.
(Perkins)
1400
1600
1685
1766
1850
1873
1893
1913
1933
1953
1957
cultiv. land
m ha
ha/p
MCI
(Chao)
cultiv. land
m ha
ha/p
(Heijdra )
25 (±5)
33 (±15)
49 (±15)
63 (±15)
81(±15)
81(±3)
83 (±3)
91 (±3)
98 (±3)
112 (±2)
112 (±2)
0.34
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.19
0.23
0.21
0.20
0.19
0.19
0.17
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.3
1393
1581
1662
1784
1812
1887
34
53
38
59
63
77
0.58
0.26
0.52
0.22
0.21
0.18
0.28
0.21
0.20
1933
III.2 Total cultivated area, interval increase and land per person
(Liu/Huang 1978:29f.)
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
™SRS
m
™ODQG
m ha
¨ODQG
%
land/p
ha/p
103
124
133
139
144
146
151
155
162
162
160
153
145
138
130
123
152
148
126
144
138
149
154
38.667
39.200
38.000
37.667
38.333
39.067
40.133
44.667
44.600
44.667
44.667
43.667
42.800
41.867
40.867
40.000
51.000
51.800
47.933
53.667
53.933
57.400
63.333
1.38
-3.06
-0.88
1.77
1.91
2.73
11.30
-0.15
0.15
0.00
-2.24
-1.98
-2.18
-2.39
-2.12
27.50
1.57
-7.46
11.96
0.50
6.43
10.34
0.38
0.32
0.29
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.29
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.30
0.31
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.38
0.37
0.39
0.39
0.34
175
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1957
™SRS
m
™ODQG
m ha
¨ODQG
%
land/p
ha/p
151
219
260
268
272
342
359
340
385
381
409
412
412
377
358
368
380
400
423
472
480
647
60.667
59.400
60.000
61.667
63.333
65.867
68.600
71.200
74.000
74.133
73.533
77.867
80.667
82.467
80.133
78.200
82.333
81.733
89.400
95.133
100.467
111.867
-4.21
-2.09
1.01
2.78
2.70
4.00
4.15
3.79
3.93
0.18
-0.81
5.89
3.60
2.23
-2.83
-2.41
5.29
-0.73
9.38
6.41
5.61
4.20
0.40
0.27
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.19
0.19
0.21
0.19
0.19
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.21
0.22
0.20
0.21
0.20
0.21
0.17
III.3 Cultivated land and cultivated land per person in China and in the rice region
(Grigg 1974:88)
All China
cult. land
m ha
pop
m
p/sq.km
ha/p
1400
1600
1760/70
1873
1913
1933
25.25
22.53
63.42
81.60
91.78
98.98
70
160
270
350
430
500
277
477
425
428
468
505
0.36
0.21
0.23
0.23
0.21
0.19
Rice region
cult. land
m ha
pop
m
p/sq.km
ha/p
1400
1760/70
1873
1913
14.95
31.71
42.01
42.82
45
170
214
262
301
536
509
611
0.33
0.18
0.19
0.16
III.4 Geographical distribution of cultivated land in percentage of total cultivated area
(Perkins 1969:18)
Northeast
Northwest
North
Subtotal
East-Central
Southeast-Southwest
Subtotal
Total
1400
1770
1873
1913
1957
0
6
35
41
45
14
59
100
2
6
42
50
39
11
50
100
2
13
33
48
31
21
52
100
9
13
31
53
27
20
47
100
15
19
26
60
23
18
41
100
III.5 Population density per total area and per cultivated area and cultivated area per
person in 1928
(Cressey 1930:3)
Southwestern Tableland
Guangdong/Kwangsi
Highlands
Southeastern Coast
Central mountain Belt
Red basin of Sichuan
Yangzi Plain
Loess Highlands
North China Plain
Manchurian Plain
average
p/sq.km
p/sq.km
ha/p
61
111
1636
1365
0.06
0.07
163
113
227
350
82
253
35
155
1048
754
573
499
485
382
313
784
0.09
0.12
0.17
0.15
0.20
0.26
0.43
0.17
176
III.6 Cultivated land and cultivated land per person in Japan
(Grigg 1974:92f.).
1580
1600
1700
1800
1867
1877
1905
1920
1934
cult. land
sq.km
pop.
m
pop/sq.km
land/capita
ha/p
10‘100
14‘948
30‘300
30‘300
32‘320
41‘410
54'237
59'590
60‘600
18
25
25
27
35
47
55
68
856
825
825
835
845
866
922
1122
0.116
0.121
0.121
0.119
0.118
0.115
0.108
0.089
cult. land
sq.km
pop
rural
pop rural/
ha/p
land/capita
ha/p
41‘410
32
772
0.129
59'590
60‘600
37
37
620
610
0.161
0.163
IV.1 Estimated total output of total grain in Chinese agriculture
Total output in billion kcal (Liu/Huang 1978:31-34). Kcal are converted into m kg by using
2800 (1) and 2650 kcal (2) as equivalent for 1 kg.
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
™RXWSXW
billion kcal
™RXWSXW
m kg
™output (2)
m kg
72760
80974
83136
85197
88205
90356
93774
101041
104017
104897
105060
102357
99421
96654
93402
90556
114497
114816
102700
117101
115827
125060
134638
25986
28919
29691
30428
31502
32270
33491
36086
37149
37463
37521
36556
35508
34519
33358
32341
40892
41006
36679
41822
41367
44664
48085
27457
30556
31372
32150
33285
34097
35386
38129
39252
39584
39645
38625
37517
36473
35246
34172
43206
43327
38755
44189
43708
47192
50807
177
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1957
™RXWSXW
billion kcal
™RXWSXW
m kg
™output (2)
m kg
131485
157573
173808
180252
185403
213565
225136
224841
245713
246582
256483
266737
273602
266674
258104
260478
273619
281796
305358
335376
353369
432377
46959
56276
62074
64376
66215
76273
80406
80300
87755
88065
91601
95263
97715
95241
92180
93028
97721
100641
109056
119777
126203
154420
49617
59462
65588
68020
69963
80591
84957
84846
92722
93050
96786
100655
103246
100632
97398
98294
103252
106338
115229
126557
133347
163161
IV.2 Estimated total output of unhusked grain
Total output according to (Deng 1999:180). The minimal subsistence of an average person is
about 180 kg of unhusked grain. This is multiplied by population figures in order to get the
total output.
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
pop
m
™RXWSXW
m kg
103
124
133
139
144
146
151
155
162
162
160
153
145
138
130
18540
22320
23940
25020
25920
26280
27180
27900
29160
29160
28800
27540
26100
24840
23400
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
pop
m
™RXWSXW
m kg
123
152
148
126
144
138
149
154
151
219
260
268
272
342
359
22140
27360
26640
22680
25920
24840
26820
27720
27180
39420
46800
48240
48960
61560
64620
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1957
pop
m
™RXWSXW
m kg
340
385
381
409
412
412
377
358
368
380
400
423
472
480
647
61200
69300
68580
73620
74160
74160
67860
64440
66240
68400
72000
76140
84960
86400
116460
IV.3 Percentage contribution of increase of output/ha and increase in cultivated area to the
increase of total output of total grain
(Perkins 1969:33)
increase of output/ha
increase of cultivated
area
total
1400-1770
1770-1850
1914-1957
42%
58%
47%
53%
24-45%
76-55%
100%
100%
100%
178
V.1 Output of rice in different provinces
Data on paddy kg/ha according to Perkins (1969:21,315) and Bray (1984:508)
Province
East
Zhejiang
Jiangsu
Center
Jiangxi (North)
Jiangxi (™
Hunan
Hubei
Southeast
Guangdong
Guangdong (™
Kwangsi
Southwest
Sichuan
Yunnan
Fujian (Southeast)
Ø yield
Sung
9601279
Yuan
12801367
13681499
Ming
15001599
16001699
Ching
17001799
18001899
Republic
1957
3015
2445
3547
2602
-
3375
4500
3375
4125
3757
5137
3247
1912
-
-
3000
2160
1875
1867
3172
2407
2002
3172
3502
4162
3000
2572
3195
3877
-
-
2250
3840
3120
-
3630
3840
-
3652
3352
3285
9742
7777
-
6750
3412
3000
1335
*3600
2461
3074
2250
*5000
2810
2850
3410
2850
3105
1972
4869
4807
3352
3850
V.2 Output per ha of millet and wheat
Millet according to Chao (1986:209ff.) and Perkins (1969:267); wheat according to (Chao
1986:211f.) and Perkins (1969:267,276), for Ming/Qing see Yu 1980 (in Deng 1993:160).
millet
kg/ha
1130
1930
1952
780
1125
1170
wheat
kg/ha
1313
1930
1952
Ming/Qing
810
1013
825
1314
V.3 Output per ha of all grain (millet, wheat and rice)
Data according to Chao (1986:215) and Wu 1985 (in Deng 1993:161)
grain
kg/ha
1313
1952
Ming
Qing
1255
1785
2653
2696
ø 2494
ø 2646
179
V.4 Output per ha of ”total grain”
Perkins (1969:17)
kg/ha
1400
1600
1770
1850
1933
1957
1042
1680
1522
1822
1815
2070
V.5 Output per ha of ”total grain” in different provinces
Perkins (1969:19)
Northwest
North
East
Central
Southeast
Southwest
average
Shaanxi
Hebei
Shanxi
Shandong
Henan
Anhui
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Hubei
Henan
Jiangxi
Fujian
Guangdong
Guangxi
Yunnan
Guizhou
Sichuan
China
1400
kg/ha
1776
kg/ha
1851
kg/ha
1957
kg/ha
465
375
390
713
360
863
863
1500
1500
1200
1508
1530
668
728
–
–
803
638
780
1125
818
855
1725
2018
2715
1703
1553
2108
3563
2175
2775
2063
863
1013
938
900
1410
1223
1028
2355
3098
4298
3870
1613
3068
3188
2295
1013
2243
2550
2198
998
1283
1080
1448
2220
2453
3105
5055
3615
3638
3315
3315
3503
2370
2858
3180
3713
898
1676
2193
2773
180
V.6 Average output per ha in China’s four most productive and four least productive
provinces
The average output per ha in the 4 most productive and the 4 least productive areas in China
differed by factor 3.7 in 1776 and 1851 (most/least), the average yield per ha of all regions
being 1676 kg/ha or 2193 kg/ha respectively. The average yield per ha in the four most
productive provinces was roughly 1.7 times higher (above ø) and in the four least productive
provinces about 2.2 times lower (below ø) than the average land productivity in the whole of
China.
1776
1851
kg/ha
kg/ha
Fujian
Jiangxi
Zhejiang
Guangdong
3563
2775
2715
2175
Zhejiang
Hubei
Fujian
Jiangsu
4298
3870
3188
3098
ø kg/ha
above ø
2807
1.67
Henan
Shandong
Hebei
Shaanxi
855
818
780
638
ø kg/ha
below ø
773
2.17
970
2.26
™DYHUDJH
most/least
1676
3.63
2193
3.73
3614
1.65
Henan
Guangxi
Shaanxi
Hebei
181
1028
1013
938
900
V.7 Estimated land productivity according to Liu/Huang (1978)
Yields of ”total grain” in 1000 kcal/ha (Liu/Huang 1978:31-34). One kg of total grain
contains between 2800 (1), 2500 kcal (2) or 2650 kcal (3).
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
ø output/ha
1000 kcal
kg/ha 1
kg/ha 2
kg/ha 3
1881.7
2065.7
2187.8
2261.9
2301.0
2312.9
2336.6
2262.2
2332.2
2348.5
2352.1
2344.1
2323.0
2308.7
2285.6
2263.9
2245.0
2216.6
2142.6
2182.0
2147.6
2178.8
2125.9
672
738
781
808
822
826
835
808
833
839
840
837
830
825
816
809
802
792
765
779
767
778
759
753
826
875
905
920
925
935
905
933
939
941
938
929
924
914
906
898
887
857
873
859
872
850
712
782
828
856
871
876
885
856
883
889
890
887
879
874
865
857
850
839
811
826
813
825
805
182
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1957
ø output/ha
1000 kcal
kg/ha 1
kg/ha 2
kg/ha 3
2167.3
2652.8
2896.8
2923.0
2927.4
3242.4
3281.9
3157.9
3320.5
3326.1
3488.0
3425.6
3391.8
3233.7
3221.0
3330.9
3323.3
3447.8
3415.7
3525.3
3517.3
3865.1
774
947
1035
1044
1046
1158
1172
1128
1186
1188
1246
1223
1211
1155
1150
1190
1187
1231
1220
1259
1256
1380
867
1061
1159
1169
1171
1297
1313
1263
1328
1330
1395
1370
1357
1294
1288
1332
1329
1379
1366
1410
1407
1546
821
1004
1097
1107
1108
1228
1242
1196
1257
1259
1321
1297
1284
1224
1219
1261
1258
1305
1293
1335
1332
1463
V.8 Estimated land productivity according to Deng (1999)
Figures of total output are taken from Deng (1999:180), those for population and cultivated
land from Liu/Huang (1978:31-34).
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
pop
m
™RXWSXW
m kg
™ODQG
m ha
kg/ha
103
124
133
139
144
146
151
155
162
162
160
153
145
138
130
123
152
148
126
144
138
149
154
18540
22320
23940
25020
25920
26280
27180
27900
29160
29160
28800
27540
26100
24840
23400
22140
27360
26640
22680
25920
24840
26820
27720
38.667
39.200
38.000
37.667
38.333
39.067
40.133
44.667
44.600
44.667
44.667
43.667
42.800
41.867
40.867
40.000
51.000
51.800
47.933
53.667
53.933
57.400
63.333
480
569
630
664
676
673
677
625
654
653
645
631
610
593
573
554
537
514
473
483
461
467
438
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1957
pop
m
™RXWSXW
m kg
™ODQG
m ha
kg/ha
151
219
260
268
272
342
359
340
385
381
409
412
412
377
358
368
380
400
423
472
480
647
27180
39420
46800
48240
48960
61560
64620
61200
69300
68580
73620
74160
74160
67860
64440
66240
68400
72000
76140
84960
86400
116460
60.667
59.400
60.000
61.667
63.333
65.867
68.600
71.200
74.000
74.133
73.533
77.867
80.667
82.467
80.133
78.200
82.333
81.733
89.400
95.133
100.467
111.867
448
664
780
782
773
935
942
860
937
925
1001
952
919
823
804
847
831
881
852
893
860
1041
VI.1 Output of total grain per capita according to various sources
Output per kg according to Chao (1986:208), Perkins (1969:279,302) and Lee/Wang
(1999:31).
Chao
kg/p
Perkins
kg/p
Lee/Wan
g
11th cent.
1812
1882
1949/1952
367.5
303.5
257.0
235.5
1914/18
1931/37
1957
337.5
307.5
285.5
1929
1957
1978
1986
183
260.0
285.0
300.0
370.0
Estimates of rice and maize output per capita in several regions (for Li Bozhong cp.
Appendix VIII.3, Faure 1989:54).
grain per capita
kg/p
Songjiang 1550
Songjiang 1620
Songjiang 1820
Songjiang 1850
Songjiang 1920
Jiangnan 1620
Jiangnan 1850
Jiangsu (S) 1920/30
Jiangsu (N) 1920/30
Guangdong 1920/30
725
435
537
392
557
475
419
458
324
532
Li Bozhong (1998)
Li Bozhong (1998)
Li Bozhong (1998)
Li Bozhong (1998)
Faure (1989:54)
Li Bozhong (1998)
Li Bozhong (1998)
Faure (1989:54)
Faure (1989:54)
Faure (1989:54)
VI.2 Estimated output per capita according to Perkins (1969)
Based on data provided by Perkins (1969:19,279). The data on cultivated area (ha/p) are
taken from Liu/Huang (1978). The output per capita is computed as the product of the output
per land (kg/ha, see table 5) and land per capita (ha/p, see Appendix VIII.2).
Perkins
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
1910
1930
1957
kg/ha
ha/p
kg/p
1463
1698
1792
2008
2088
2068
2130
2422
0.39
0.23
0.21
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.17
571
391
376
402
418
434
447
412
184
VI.3 Agricultural output per capita according to Liu/Huang (1978)
Output in 1000 kcal and kg per capita (Liu/Huang 1978:31-34), whereby 2650 kcal equal 1
kg. Output per worker is twice or four times the output per person. Outputs per agricultural
worker are computed by assuming that they constituted about 50% (1) or 25% (2) of the total
population.
Note that the figures on labor productivity, by following this method, are conservative
because the agricultural population only represents roughly about three fourth of the total
population (minus urban population and minus rural population not engaged in agriculture.
The estimates on labor productivity would be higher if computed on the basis of total output
per agricultural worker.
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
ø output/p
1000 kcal
kg/p
kg/w 1
kg/w 2
706.40
653.01
625.08
612.93
612.53
618.88
621.02
651.88
642.08
647.51
656.62
669.00
685.67
700.39
718.48
736.23
753.27
775.78
815.08
813.20
839.33
839.33
874.27
267
246
236
231
231
234
234
246
242
244
248
253
259
264
271
278
284
293
308
307
317
317
330
533
493
472
463
462
467
469
492
485
489
496
505
518
529
542
556
569
586
615
614
634
634
660
1066
986
944
925
925
934
937
984
969
977
991
1010
1035
1057
1085
1111
1137
1171
1230
1228
1267
1267
1320
185
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1957
ø output/p
1000 kcal
kg/p
kg/w 1
kg/w 2
870.76
719.51
668.49
672.58
681.63
624.51
627.12
661.30
638.22
647.20
627.10
647.42
664.09
707.36
720.96
707.82
720.05
704.49
721.89
710.54
722.64
668.28
329
272
252
254
257
236
237
250
241
244
237
244
251
267
272
267
272
266
272
268
273
252
657
543
505
508
514
471
473
499
482
489
473
489
501
534
544
534
543
532
545
536
545
504
1314
1086
1009
1015
1029
943
947
998
963
977
947
977
1002
1068
1088
1068
1087
1063
1090
1073
1091
1009
VII.1 Population growth as a proxy for living standard in China and Europe
Population (in m) and annual population growth rates compared in Europe (McEvedy/Jones
1978 and Birg 1996) and in China (Liu/Huang 1978)
Europe (1)
McEvedy
m
Europe (2)
Birg
m
China
Liu/Huang
m
120
163
203
276
408
549
160
123
138
260
340
412
400
580
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
1950
100
105
120
140
180
265
390
515
1600-1650
1650-1700
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1900
1900-1950
%
0.10
0.27
0.31
0.50
0.78
0.78
0.56
0.61
0.44
0.62
0.78
0.60
%
-0.52
0.23
1.27
0.54
0.38
-0.06
0.75
1700-1750
1700-1800
1700-1850
1700-1900
0.31
0.41
0.53
0.59
0.61
0.53
0.56
0.61
1.27
0.91
0.73
0.53
%
VII.2 Population growth rates in England & Wales and the most productive provinces in
China
Population growth rates in the most productive provinces of China (MPP) and in England &
Wales (McEvedy/Jones 1978:43) (for unadjusted population figures on China cp. Perkins
1969:207,212).
Zhejiang
m
Hubei
m
Jiangxi
m
Fujian
m
Guangdong
m
Jiangsu
m
™SRS
m
11.9
19.3
27.3
30.1
18.3
19.2
22.0
7.5
14.8
28.8
33.8
19.7
21.8
27.3
8.4
16.8
23.6
24.5
17.7
17.7
16.5
7.6
11.2
15.9
20.1
13.7
13.9
13.1
6.4
14.8
21.4
28.4
26.7
30.8
34.0
20.9
28.8
39.3
44.3
28.4
33.7
34.9
62.7
105.7
156.3
181.2
124.5
137.1
147.8
MPP
%
1749-1819
1819-1851
1851-1893
1893-1933
1.26
0.46
-0.89
0.43
1746
1776
1819
1851
1893
1913
1933
England/Wales
%
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1900
0.09
0.87
1.34
1.22
186
%/year
1.76
0.91
0.46
-0.89
0.48
0.38
VII.3 Per capita consumption in England (1787-1937)
Data on consumption per capita per week and on intake of energy, protein as well as calcium
and iron per day in England between 1787/93 and 1937 are given by Oddy (1990:269,274).
The minimum energy intake is estimates at 2800 kcal (Oddy 1990:273f.; Buck (1937:407)
as well as a minimum intake of 80 g of protein (Oddy ibid.:273f.) or 70 g (Buck 1937:419).
Minimum intake of calcium is estimated at 0.8 g and of iron at 0.015 g (ibid:419).
1787/93
1796
1841
1863
1890
1900
1937
1787/93
1796
1841
1863
1890
1900
1937
bread
kg/week
potatoes
kg/week
sugar
g/week
fats
g/week
meat
kg/week
milk
l/ week
4.1
2.5
3.2
4.9
3.0
3.0
1.7
0.2
2.3
2.0
1.8
1.3
1.4
1.5
57
85
255
198
425
454
482
43
99
136
145
147
218
329
0.1
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.5
0.6
0.3
1.6
0.9
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.6
energy
kcal
protein
g
fat
g
carbohydrate
g
iron
mg
calcium
g
1990
2170
2300
2600
2240
2400
2540
49
62
62
66
65
65
78
31
43
51
60
70
71
96
380
382
399
450
342
375
343
8.4
11.7
13.1
14.9
11.1
12.1
13.7
0.25
0.47
0.39
0.44
0.35
0.46
0.65
VII.4 Per capita consumption in China (1929/1933)
The following table provides data on the consumption per adult male in peasant households
per day in China for 1929/33 by Buck (1937:407,419). For protein intake In China see also
Simoons (1991:327,363,476,477).
China
wheat region
rice region
Yangzi
energy
kcal
grain
%
protein
g
animal prot
%
iron
mg
calcium
g
3295
3186
3400
3486
83.1
82.2
83.9
85.9
100
108
91
98
4
2
6
4
27
33
21
23
0.44
0.50
0.38
0.42
VIII Comparing Europe (England) and China
A statistical comparison between China and Europe is not an essay task. There are not only
considerable differences within China but also within Europe (for Europe cp. Slicher van
Bath 1963:280, Wong 1997:16, Grigg 1980, 1982), and all data is highly questionable. I will
focus data on England & Wales, where the industrial take-off took place first and which was
the region with the most advanced agriculture within Europe. This data is then compared
with data on the agriculture in the whole of China and in the four most productive provinces
(Appendix V.6). The data cannot be pressed to hard, but may nevertheless give an
impression about the state of these two agricultural systems.
187
VIII.1 England and Wales
The data on England & Wales is provided mainly by Allen (1994), Turner/Beckett/Afton
(2001) and Grigg (1982). Other sources include Clark (1991), Campbell/Overton (1991),
Overton (1991, 1996) and Grigg (1980). The data is mostly on Suffolk, Norfolk and
Lincolnshire and as the following tables suggest, differ widely.
VIII.1.1 Urban and rural population in England and Wales
Data on total population, urban and rural population as well as on agricultural workers in
England and Wales are given by Grigg (1982:187,213) and Allen (1994:107); see also
Overton (1996:76,138) and (Schofield 1981:64).
™SRS
m
urban
m
urban/™
%
rural
m
rural/™
%
agr. worker
m
ag.w/™
%
1700
1750
1801
1851
5.8
5.9
8.8
17.9
1
1.5
3
9.7
0.17
0.25
0.34
0.54
4.8
4.4
5.8
8.2
0.83
0.75
0.66
0.46
1.3
1.4
1.7
2.1
0.22
0.23
0.19
0.12
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1700-1850
factor
%
0.03
0.80
1.43
0.75
3.09
%
0.81
1.40
2.37
1.53
9.70
%
-0.17
0.55
0.69
0.36
1.71
%
0.15
0.39
0.42
0.32
1.62
VIII.1.2 Cultivated area and yield in England and Wales according to Grigg (1982)
Grigg (1982:185ff.) provides the following data on total cultivated area and sown are
(without fallow land). He examines grain output per ha in England & Wales as well as for
Norfolk & Suffolk. In order to adjust acreage to grain production, the data on cultivated land
with and without fallow are taken from Allen (1994:112). Form this data on output per ha
the total output, the output per ha (including and excluding fallow land) as well as the output
per worker and per capita may be estimated. However Grigg does not specify yields of
different crops (especially grain) and the different percentages of total area sown with these
crops.
1700
1750
1800
1851
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1700-1850
factor
grain (+fall)
m ha
grain (-fall)
m ha
E&W
kg/ha
Norf/Suff
kg/ha
™RXWSXW
m kg
(+ fallow)
kg/ha
kg/w
kg/p
2.80
2.75
2.75
3.22
2.40
2.46
2.55
2.88
908
909
1412
1691
1008
1008
1345
2132
2180.83
2234.92
3598.67
4871.56
779
813
1309
1513
1678
1596
2117
2320
376
379
409
272
-0.04
0.00
0.32
0.09
1.15
0.05
0.07
0.25
0.12
1.20
0.00
0.88
0.36
0.42
1.86
0.00
0.58
0.93
0.50
2.12
0.05
0.96
0.61
0.54
2.23
0.09
0.96
0.29
0.44
1.94
-0.10
0.57
0.18
0.22
1.38
0.01
0.15
-0.81
-0.22
0.72
188
VIII.1.3 Cultivated area and yield in England and Wales according to Allen (1994) and
Turner (2001)
More detailed data on grain production in England and Wales is provided by Allen
(1994:104,112) and Turner/Beckett/Afton (2001:163f.; cp. also Clark 1991:215). Data on
cultivated land with and without fallow and the percentages of land sown with different
grains (wheat, rye, barley and oats) are provided by Allen (1994:112). Total grain output (m
kg) is calculated as the product of yield per ha for different grains weighted by the respective
percentages of land. (It has been assumed that one bushel of grain equals 35.238 liter or 60
English pounds or 27.2 kg, see Huang 2002:511.) Average land productivity (kg/ha) is
computed as the sum of output/ha of the different grains weighted by the respective
percentages of land for total land sown with grain with fallow (kg/ha 1) and without fallow
(kg/ha 2). Productivity per worker and per capita are computed as total output divided by
workers engaged in agriculture and total population according to the data given by Grigg
(192:187,213) and Allen (1994:107) (see above).
Allen
1700
1750
1800
1851
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1700-1850
factor
Turner
™FXOWLY
grain (-fallow)
™RXWSXW
m ha
grain
(+fallow)
m ha
m ha
m kg
kg/ha 1
kg/ha 2
kg/w
kg/p
2.80
2.75
2.75
3.22
2.40
2.46
2.55
2.88
2.16
2.28
2.44
2.88
2997.44
3601.28
4638.96
6483.12
1071
1310
1687
2013
1388
1580
1901
2251
2306
2668
2729
3087
517
610
527
362
-0.04
0.00
0.32
0.09
1.15
0.05
0.07
0.25
0.12
1.20
0.11
0.14
0.33
0.19
1.33
0.37
0.51
0.67
0.52
2.16
0.40
0.51
0.35
0.42
1.88
0.26
0.37
0.34
0.32
1.62
0.29
0.05
0.25
0.19
1.34
0.33
-0.29
-0.75
-0.24
0.70
™FXOWLY
grain
(+fallow)
m ha
grain (-fallow)
™RXWSXW
m ha
m kg
kg/ha 1
kg/ha 2
kg/w
kg/p
2.80
2.75
2.75
3.22
2.40
2.46
2.55
2.88
2.16
2.28
2.44
2.88
3507.71
4308.48
4834.53
6630.54
1007
1329
1465
2019
1309
1608
1656
2022
2698
3191
2844
3157
605
730
549
370
-0.04
0.00
0.32
0.09
1.15
0.05
0.07
0.25
0.12
1.20
0.11
0.14
0.33
0.19
1.33
0.41
0.23
0.63
0.43
1.89
0.56
0.20
0.64
0.47
2.01
0.41
0.06
0.40
0.29
1.54
0.34
-0.23
0.21
0.10
1.17
0.38
-0.57
-0.79
-0.33
0.61
m ha
1700
1750
1800
1851
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1700-1850
factor
189
VIII.1.4 Cultivated area and yield in England and Wales according to Overton (1996)
Overton (1991:302,303) provided data on output per land for wheat, rye, barley and oats in
Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincolnshire. Data on cultivated land population as well as percentage
of area per grain (see also Overton 1996:94-98) are taken from Grigg and Turner, as in the
tables above.
™FXOWLY
1700
1750
1800
1851
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1700-1850
factor
grain (-fallow)
™RXWSXW
m ha
grain
(+fallow)
m ha
m ha
m kg
kg/ha 1
kg/ha 2
kg/w
kg/p
2.80
2.75
2.75
3.22
2.40
2.46
2.55
2.88
2.16
2.28
2.44
2.88
2567.80
3570.40
4894.22
6387.17
917
1298
1780
2218
1189
1566
2006
2218
1975
2645
2879
3042
443
605
556
357
-0.04
0.00
0.32
0.09
1.15
0.05
0.07
0.25
0.12
1.20
0.11
0.14
0.33
0.19
1.33
0.66
0.63
0.53
0.61
2.49
0.70
0.63
0.44
0.59
2.42
0.55
0.50
0.20
0.42
1.87
0.59
0.17
0.11
0.29
1.54
0.63
-0.17
-0.88
-0.14
0.81
190
VIII.1.5 Cultivated area and yield in England and Wales (summary)
We may summarize the data provided by Allen (1994), Turner/Beckett/Afton (2001) and
Grigg (1982) on total output (m kg), land productivity (kg/ha), labor productivity (kg/w) and
output per capita (kg/p) for England and Wales.
™2XWSXW
m kg
(A)
m kg
(T)
m kg
(G)
m kg
(A&T)
m kg
(A&T&G)
2997.44
3601.28
4638.96
6483.12
3507.71
4308.48
4834.53
6630.54
2180.83
2234.92
3598.67
4871.56
3252.58
3954.88
4736.74
6556.83
2895.33
3381.56
4357.38
5995.08
2.16
0.52
1.89
0.43
2.23
0.54
2.02
2.07
Output/ha
kg/ha
(A)
kg/ha
(T)
kg/ha
(G)
kg/ha
(A&T)
kg/ha
(A,T&G)
1700
1750
1800
1850
1071
1310
1687
2013
1007
1329
1465
2019
908
909
1412
1691
1039
1319
1576
2016
995
1182
1521
1908
1700-1850
factor
%/year
1.88
0.42
1.64
0.47
1.86
0.42
1.94
1.92
Output/w
kg/w
(A)
kg/w
(T)
kg/w
(G)
kg/w
(A&T)
kg/w
(A,T&G)
1700
1750
1800
1850
2306
2668
2729
3087
2698
3191
2844
3157
1678
1596
2117
2320
2502
2930
2786
3122
2227
2485
2563
2855
1700-1850
factor
%/year
1.34
0.19
1.17
0.10
1.38
0.22
1.25
0.15
1.28
0.17
Output/p
kg/p
(A)
kg/p
(T)
kg/p
(G)
kg/p
(A&T)
kg/p
(A,T&G)
1700
1750
1800
1850
517
610
527
362
605
730
549
370
376
379
409
272
561
670
538
366
499
573
495
335
0.70
-0.24
0.61
-0.33
0.72
-0.22
0.65
-0.28
0.67
-0.27
1700
1750
1800
1850
1700-1850
factor
%/year
1700-1850
factor
%/year
%
(A&T)
%
(A&T&G)
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
0.39
0.36
0.65
0.31
0.51
0.64
1700-1850
0.47
0.49
kg/ha
(A&T)
kg/ha
(A,T&G)
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
0.48
0.36
0.49
0.35
0.51
0.45
1700-1850
0.44
0.43
kg/w
(A&T)
kg/w
(A,T&G)
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
0.32
-0.10
0.23
0.22
0.06
0.22
1700-1850
0.15
0.17
kg/p
(A&T)
kg/p
(A,T&G)
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
0.36
-0.44
-0.77
0.28
-0.29
-0.78
1700-1850
-0.28
-0.27
The total output more than doubled between 1700 and 1850. Land productivity also almost
doubled especially due to a reduction of fallow land (kg/ha1 minus kg/ha 2). Labor
191
productivity increased but significantly less than land productivity. The grain output per
capita decreased between 1700 and 1850.
VIII.1.6 Yields in different European countries (1850)
Agricultural productivity in Europe varied widely as the following table of wheat yields in
several European countries in 1850 shows (Grigg 1982:174f.). It also indicates that the
figures of Allen, Turner and Clark on yields per ha are probably too high. According to
Allen and Turner/Beckett/Afton the average wheat yield was about 1900 kg/ha in England
and Wales in 1850. The divergence might be explained by the difference between England
& Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom.
1850
kg/ha
1850
kg/ha
1850
kg/ha
Denmark
Belgium
Netherlands
Germany
1200
1050
1050
990
United Kingdom
Austria
France
Italy
990
770
700
670
Norway
Spain
Greece
Russia
570
460
460
450
VIII.1.7 Harvest rates in different European countries (1500-1820)
The differences in agricultural productivity within Europe can also be seen from the
following table, which shows harvest rates in different countries (Grigg 1992:34). Harvest
rates may be a proxy for differences in output per land unit and probably for output per
capita and per worker:
1500-1549
1550-1599
1600-1649
1650-1699
1700-1749
1750-1799
1800-1820
A England,
Holland
yield/seed
B France,
Italy, Spain
yield/seed
B/A
C Germany,
Scandinavia
yield/seed
C/A
D Russia
Easteurope
yield/seed
D/A
7.4
7.3
6.7
9.3
...
10.1
11.1
6.7
...
...
6.2
6.3
7
6.2
0.9
...
...
0.7
...
0.7
0.6
4
4.4
4.5
4.1
4.1
5.1
5.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.4
...
0.5
0.5
3.9
4.3
4
3.8
3.8
4.7
...
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.4
...
0.5
...
192
VIII.2 China
VIII.2.1 Population and agricultural output in China according to Liu/Huang (1978)
The figures on the development of the Chinese population, on cultivated area and on total
output are taken from Liu/Huang (1978). There are no figures on the agricultural labor force.
The relation between population and agricultural work force is held constant at 1/4.
pop
agri. work
™RXWSXW
m kg
kg/w
kg/p
m
™ODQG
m ha
kg/ha
m
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
138
260
340
412
411
480
35
65
85
103
103
120
53.93
60.00
71.20
80.67
92.20
100.50
43708
65588
84846
103246
115229
133347
813
1096
1195
1284
1293
1331
1264
1008
996
1004
1088
1092
316
252
249
251
272
273
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1910
1910-1930
%
1.27
0.54
0.38
0.00
0.78
%
0.21
0.34
0.25
0.22
0.43
%
0.82
0.52
0.39
0.18
0.73
%
0.60
0.17
0.14
0.01
0.14
%
-0.45
-0.02
0.02
0.13
0.02
%
-0.45
-0.02
0.02
0.13
0.02
1700-1850
factor
1850-1930
factor
1700-1930
factor
0.73
2.99
0.19
1.17
0.54
3.48
0.27
1.50
0.28
1.25
0.27
1.86
0.57
2.36
0.32
1.29
0.49
3.05
0.31
1.58
0.04
1.04
0.21
1.64
-0.15
0.79
0.11
1.09
-0.06
0.86
-0.15
0.79
0.11
1.09
-0.06
0.86
193
VIII.2.2 Population and agricultural output in China according to Perkins (1969)
The numbers for average yield per ha for the whole of China given by Liu/Huang (1978) are
lower than those given by Perkins (1969:19, Appendix V.6). By adjusting the data provided
by Perkins, the following figures for average yield per ha, for total output, output per worker
and person as well as the increase rates may be computed:
pop
agri. work
™RXWSXW
m kg
kg/w
kg/p
m
™ODQG
m ha
kg/ha
m
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
138
260
340
412
411
480
35
65
85
103
103
120
53.93
60.00
71.20
80.67
92.20
100.50
78904
101880
127590
161939
190670
214065
1463
1698
1792
2008
2068
2130
2282
1562
1505
1606
1737
1789
571
391
376
402
434
447
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1910
1910-1930
%
1.27
0.54
0.38
0.00
0.78
%
0.21
0.34
0.25
0.22
0.43
%
0.51
0.45
0.48
0.27
0.58
%
0.30
0.11
0.23
0.05
0.15
%
-0.76
-0.07
0.13
0.13
0.15
%
-0.76
-0.07
0.13
0.13
0.15
1700-1850
factor
1850-1930
factor
1700-1930
factor
0.73
2.99
0.19
1.17
0.54
3.48
0.27
1.50
0.28
1.25
0.27
1.86
0.48
2.05
0.35
1.32
0.43
2.71
0.21
1.37
0.07
1.06
0.16
1.46
-0.23
0.70
0.14
1.11
-0.11
0.78
-0.23
0.70
0.14
1.11
-0.11
0.78
VIII.2.3 Average agricultural yield in China (summary)
Average values from the data sets provided by Perkins (1969) and Liu/Huang (1978)
ø mil kg
ø kg/ha
ø kg/w
ø kg/p
61376
83820
106337
132758
154942
173915
1138
1397
1494
1646
1681
1731
1773
1285
1251
1305
1413
1441
443
321
313
326
353
360
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1910
1910-1930
%
0.63
0.48
0.44
0.26
0.58
%
0.41
0.13
0.19
0.03
0.15
%
-0.64
-0.05
0.09
0.13
0.10
%
-0.64
-0.05
0.09
0.13
0.10
1700-1850
factor
1850-1930
factor
1700-1930
factor
0.52
2.16
0.34
1.31
0.45
2.83
0.25
1.45
0.06
1.05
0.18
1.52
-0.20
0.74
0.12
1.10
-0.09
0.81
-0.20
0.74
0.12
1.10
-0.09
0.81
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
194
VIII.3 The most productive provinces of China
As we will focus on a comparison between England & Wales and the four most productive
regions of China between 1700 and 1850 (cp. Appendix V.6), we have to take the regional
variation of productivity into account. As we have seen the land productivity in these four
provinces was about 1.7 times the average of the whole of China. But the land productivity
in the four least productive provinces were 2.1 times lower than the average (cp. Appendix
V.6 and 7). In the following table the average data provided by Perkins and Liu/Huang is
multiplied by factor 1.7 to get estimates for the most productive provinces and divided by
2.1 for the least productive ones.
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
most prod
ø kg/ha
ø kg/w
ø kg/p
least prod
ø kg/ha
ø kg/w
ø kg/p
1935
2375
2539
2798
2857
2942
3014
2185
2126
2219
2401
2449
754
546
532
555
600
612
542
665
711
784
800
824
844
612
596
621
673
686
211
153
149
155
168
172
VIII.3.1 Population and agricultural output in Jiangnan (1620-1850)
The lower Yangzi region (Jiangnan) had specialized on rice/wheat as well as on cotton/silk
production. (Here, I have omitted silk and only considered cotton.) There was an efficient
rice trade between the lower and middle Yangzi region, from Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan
and Sichuan (Myers 1980:92ff.; Wong 1997:17,21). Population figures for Jiangnan are
provided by Li Bozhong (1998a:19-23). The number of agricultural worker is two-fifth (2
worker per household) of agricultural population during Ming time, but for 1850 it is 6 m
rather than 10 because women largely retired from agriculture and specialized on spinning
and weaving (ibid.:184). Figures on total acreage (ibid.:26f.,186), on multicropping index
(ibid.:33), on percentage of cultivated land planted with rice and wheat (ibid.:33), on
fertilizer used (ibid.:84) and on yields of rice, wheat and cotton per land unit (ibid.:125ff.)
are all taken from Li (1998a). (I have not included beans, rapeseed and silk.) I have
estimated cotton yields on the basis of data on output (pi) per household in Songjiang
converted in husked rice and multiplied by the number of households in Jiangnan
(ibid.:151).
All figures in rice are in husked rice, whereas the former tables are in paddy. Since one shi is
65 kg of husked rice and 75 kg of unhusked rice, the figures on Jiangnan and Songjiang have
to be multiplied by 1.15 in order to make them comparable to the former figures (in paddy
rice). For the conversion of Chinese into Western weights and measures, see Perkins
(1969:314) and Li Bozhong (1998a:xvii).
195
™SRS
1620
1850
1620
1850
1620
1850
1620
1850
1620
1850
1620
1850
rural pop
%
rural pop
agri work 1
agri work 2
m
agri pop
%
agri pop
m
m
m
m
20
36
85%
80%
17
29
10%
10%
15
26
6
10
6
6
ag work 1/
™SRS
ag work 1/
rural pop
ag work 1/
agri pop
agri work 2
™SRS
agri work 2
rural pop
agri work 2
agri pop
0.30
0.28
0.35
0.34
0.40
0.38
0.30
0.17
0.35
0.21
0.40
0.23
cultiv. land
m ha
MCI
rice
m ha
wheat
m ha
rice
kg/ha
wheat
kg/ha
2.90
2.79
1.4
1.7
2.72
2.51
0.81
1.37
2123
3012
1166
1124
™ULFH
m kg
™ZKHDW
m kg
™JUDLQ
m kg
ø grain
kg/ha
fertilizer
kg/ha
cotton
kg rice/hh
5779
7571
945
1535
6724
9106
2322
3260
1158
2060
449
587
™FRWWRQ
mio. kg rice
™JF
m kg rice
import rice
m kg
™JFL
m kg
kg/p 1
g,c/™SRS
kg/p 2
g,c/rural pop
1347
3052
8071
12159
0
1417
8071
16628
404
338
475
419
kg/p 3
g,c/agri pop
kg/p 4
g/rural pop
kg/p 5
g/agri pop
kg/w 1
g,c/ag work 1
kg/w 2
g/ag work 2
538
468
395
314
448
320
1345
1216
1121
1518
196
VIII.3.2 Agricultural output in Songjiang (1550-1850)
Figures on Songjiang are provided by Li Bozhong (1992:139ff.,151ff.). Data on spinning for
1620 and 1850 are estimates from working days not spent in agriculture (maximum working
days for men is 300 days, for women 200 days (Li 1998:152). The difference between gross
income and net income are estimated by the same rates as for 1550 and 1820.
1550
1620
1820
1850
1550
1620
1820
1850
1550
1620
1820
1850
ha/hh
rice & wheat
kg/ha
gross output
kg/hh
net output kg
–(cost & rent)
gross output
kg/p
net output
kg/p
1.61
0.97
0.62
0.56
2095
2619
4018
3801
3625
2175
2683
1958
1768
1059
1309
959
725
435
537
392
354
212
262
192
ag. worker
per hh
gross output
kg/w
net output
kg/w
day ag. work
kg/day 1
kg/day net
2
1.6
1.2
1
1813
1359
2235
1958
884
662
1091
959
375
270
217
197
9.7
8.1
12.4
9.9
4.7
3.9
6.0
4.9
spinning
days (m + f)
spinning
days (tot)
cotton
in kg rice
™QHWLQFRPH
kg rice/hh
net cons.
kg/hh/day
net cons.
kg/p
25 + 37
30 + 200
83 + 200
103 + 200
62
230
283
303
121
449
543
587
1888
1507
1852
1545
5.2
4.1
5.1
4.2
1.0
0.8
1.0
0.8
Yet another computation based on other figures provided by Li (1998a:125,213f.) yields
lower numbers but show the same trends: declining grain output per capita, but increased
imports of grain and cotton and silk production as well as increasing labor productivity in
grain production:
1620
1850
husked rice
m kg
cultiv land
m ha
output/land
kg/ha
output/™SRS
kg/p
output/agri work (g)
kg/w
5550
7725
2.83
2.69
1913
2813
278
215
925
1288
197
VIII.3.3 Agricultural output in Jiangnan and Songjiang (1920/1930)
Faure (1989:47,49,54) provides the following data on Jiangnan and Songjiang for 1920/30.
Two similar values for output per ha are computed (ibid.:47,54). Density of rural population
was at 5.4 per ha in 1930 (1989:49), which fits the 0.15 ha/p provided by Cressey for the
lower Yangzi region. The output per household (of 5 persons) is computed from output per
person (ibid.:54) and family size (1) and from output/ha and land per person (2: 0.15 ha/p or
3: 0.18 ha/p) (ibid.:49,54). Labor productivity is estimated from average output of a
household of 5 with 1 or 1.2 agricultural worker.
1920/30
™SRSPLO
™UXUDOSRS
™FXOWLY0KD
output kg/ha (rice)
output kg/ha (maize)
™RXWSXWKD
™RXWSXWKD
Jiangnan
Songjiang
28
24.2
4.476
2044
641
2684
2760
3
1.6
0.29
2437
600
3038
3041
output kg/hh 1
output kg/hh 2
output kg/hh 3
output/w 1
output/w 2
kg/p
ha/p
Jiangnan
Songjiang
2290
2070
2484
2281
1901
458
0.18 (0.15)
2785
2281
2737
2601
2167
557
0.20
According to Wen/Pimentel (1986:18) the combined annual output of rice and wheat per
land unity in Jiaxing in the 17th century was between 4700 and 5200 kg/ha. We may
summarize the data on kg/ha, kg/w and kg/p for Jiangnan and Songjiang.
VIII.3.4 Population and agricultural output in Jiangnan and Songjiang (summary)
1550
1620
1820
1850
1920/30
Jiangnan
kg/ha
Songjiang
kg/ha
Jiangnan
kg/p
Songjiang
kg/p
Jiangnan
kg/w
Songjiang
kg/w
...
2322
...
3260
2760
2095
2619
4018
3801
3041
...
475
...
419
458
725
435
537
392
557
...
1121
...
1518
1901
1813
1359
2235
1958
2167
The following table shows the development of total population (I), rural population (II) and
agricultural working force in Jiangnan (Li 1998a:19ff) and Faure (1989:47):
1620
1850
1920
I tot pop
m
II rural pop
m
III agri. worker
m
III of I
%
III of II
%
20
36
28
17
29
24
6
6
4.8
35
20
17
40
23
20
We can see from these data that the estimates for Jiangnan are compatible with the data on
the four most productive provinces of China provided by Liu/Huang (1978) and Perkins
(1969).
198
VIII.3.5 Agricultural productivity in China’s four most productive provinces compared with
England & Wales
The yields in the four most productive provinces are 1.7 times higher than the average
(Appendix VI.1). Output per ha fit data provided by Perkins. Output per capita is between
data sets computed from Liu/Huang and Perkins. The labor productivity in the whole of
China is computed with an average percentage of agricultural workers of 25% of the whole
population. The labor productivity in the four most productive provinces is computed on the
basis of output per capita and a decreasing percentage of agricultural worker from 1/3
(1700), 1/4 (1750 and 1800) and 1/5 (1850 onwards) (cp. Li 1998:184). Here we may rely on
the lower figures provided by Liu/Huang.
4 provinces
L/H
kg/ha
P
kg/ha
L/H & P
ø kg/ha
L/H
kg/p
P
kg/p
L/H & P
ø kg/p
L/H
kg/w
P
kg/w
L/H & P
ø kg/w
1700
1750
1800
1850
1910
1930
1382
1863
2032
2183
2198
2263
2487
2887
3046
3413
3516
3621
1935
2375
2539
2798
2857
2942
537
428
423
427
462
464
970
664
640
683
738
760
754
546
532
555
600
612
1612
1714
1693
2134
2312
2321
2910
2656
2559
3413
3691
3802
2261
2185
2126
2773
3002
3061
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
1850-1910
1910-1930
%
0.60
0.17
0.14
0.01
0.14
%
0.30
0.11
0.23
0.05
0.15
%
0.41
0.13
0.19
0.03
0.15
%
-0.45
-0.02
0.02
0.13
0.02
%
-0.76
-0.07
0.13
0.13
0.15
-0.64
-0.05
0.09
0.13
0.10
%
0.12
-0.02
0.46
0.13
0.02
%
-0.18
-0.07
0.58
0.13
0.15
%
-0.07
-0.05
0.53
0.13
0.10
1700-1850
factor
1850-1930
factor
1700-1930
factor
0.31
1.58
0.04
1.04
0.21
1.64
0.21
1.37
0.07
1.06
0.16
1.46
0.25
1.45
0.06
1.05
0.18
1.52
-0.15
0.79
0.11
1.09
-0.06
0.86
-0.23
0.70
0.14
1.11
-0.11
0.78
-0.20
0.74
0.12
1.10
-0.09
0.81
0.19
1.32
0.11
1.09
0.16
1.44
0.11
1.17
0.14
1.11
0.12
1.31
0.14
1.23
0.12
1.10
0.13
1.35
England/Wales
kg/ha
kg/p
kg/w
1700
1750
1800
1850
995
1182
1521
1908
499
573
495
335
2227
2485
2563
2855
1700-1750
1750-1800
1800-1850
%
0.35
0.51
0.45
%
0.28
-0.29
-0.78
%
0.22
0.06
0.22
1700-1850
factor
0.43
1.92
-0.27
0.67
0.17
1.28
199
Raimund Kolb
About Figures and Aggregates: Some Arguments for a More Scrupulous
Evaluation of Quantitative Data in the History of Population and
Agriculture in China (1644-1949)
This essay deals with some selected problems of historical statistics which I mentioned briefly in a lecture with
the theme “Natural Disasters, Population, and the Strategies to Combat Famine in Late Imperial China”
(September 2001, Wasan-Island/Ontario). The intention is to address primarily macro-historians who include
China in their intercultural comparative studies and thereby are dependent on publications in western languages.
I plead for greater historical factuality in statements regarding historical structures and for thorough textual
criticism concerning quantitative data. I will present some well-known and a few less familiar facts and
problems, which, in the end, can only represent a small selection of all those worth mentioning. Nevertheless,
due to their complexity, the individual points of discussion can only be outlined.
Preliminary Remarks
The field of World History and the study of Chinese history under comparative perspectives
have been booming since the 1980s, especially in the USA.1 In clear confrontation to the
concept of cultural relativism, there is broad consensus that the isolated study of cultures
ultimately produces circular explanations and that only comparison will reveal the particular.
The question why Great Britain and later continental Europe, but not, for instance China, were
first on the road to industrial revolution, is of special interest. It is important to consider the
prerequisites and stimuli that lead to this process and its catalytic agents. By way of
comparison, contrasting facts and generalizations, in the form of types of historical structures
and courses, should give us a closer understanding of this most complicated problem. Macrocomparative representations are governed by methods of historical social science and
therefore by structural orientation, system theory and statistics.
The typologies mentioned represent, at first view, attractive patterns of explanation, but
regarding their historiographical solidity they are exposed to a number of serious hazards: (1)
A high degree of generalization of large syntheses is hardly compatible with research into
sources (one of the basic principles of historiography) and without research into sources there
can be no sceptical reflection. Nobody will seriously contest that hypotheses, the more
elaborate the better, have to be confronted with the sources in order to generate productive
questions (cf. Rüsen 1997:51). However there is a tendency to simplification in comparisons,
as complex cultural patterns (trans-cultural dimensions) cannot be compared as a whole but
Rolf Peter Sieferle points out that “world history” is not to be confused with “history of the whole world in
which all regions are equal and are treated equally” (2001:47). Gale Stokes (2001) offers a synopsis of the
achievements in research so far. Yet world history has a long-standing tradition in Germany and other European
countries, going back to the eighteenth century, and especially highly esteemed during the first half of the 20th
century (Schulin 1979; Osterhammel 2001).
1
200
only under certain aspects. On the other hand, extrapolated parts of complex patterns are only
really comparable when analyzed and interpreted respectively in their context, which is the
only means to gain value-added knowledge. (2) The argumentative simplification of structureoriented explanations, the reduction of the complexity of the historical object of research, is
problematic as it may end in fruitless as well as trivial statements. Above all it may lead to an
overestimation of “the steering ability of social systems” (Haupt/Kocka 1996:18). Structureoriented historians tend to forget that people create the structures and that basically openness
and contingency prevail. Structures and processes are the objectification of human thought
and action; they do not condition human thought and action (cf. Mooser 1998:535).2 There
are no objective structures in social reality, no deterministic processes and no stringent
theories according to which people act (van Dülmen 2000:51), but there are structures and
theories as scientific concepts in the heads of historians (Suter 2001:183). (3) The idealization
of certain structures and developments, reduced to a few selected factors (e.g. British
industrialization), setting the standards in the investigation of national and regional cases,
poses a further problem. The simple measuring of distance between the declared prototype or
ideal-type and the cases in comparison “leads to theses on the supposed backwardness of the
one after the other” that are hardly of any use (Haupt/Kocka 1996:18-19).
Therefore, it is inevitable that quite a few well thought-through generalizing concepts that
have been verified many times, signalizing explanatory stability, suddenly reveal a lack of
historical referentiality when applied to a particular case.3 When does a complex model of
explanation, claiming to be universally applicable, cease to be so? Is the deviation from a
2 Presently a paradigmatic change is taking place within the historical social sciences based on a reevaluation of
the role of events and a de-objectification of structures (cf. Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft 19: Struktur
und Ereignis. Göttingen 2001). Events are recognized as results of “achievements of cultural creation” by the
actors involved, evoking a change in systems and structures (Suter/Hettling 2001:9,28).
3 When for instance, “[the] normal case in terms of the agrarian society was that technical innovations remained
singular events and went up in smoke without having any far-reaching consequences” (Sieferle 2001:48), China,
at least, marks an exception, even if one does not unreservedly share all the interpretations in Science and
Civilization in China by Joseph Needham and his colleagues. We can definitely observe processes of innovation
based on technological inventions that led to ameliorated utilization of the agrarian productive factors, although
admittedly at a slow pace. The thesis of the tension between the center and the periphery in agrarian empires
(ibid.:25) does not entirely do justice to the more or less cohesive role and importance of Chinese bureaucracy
and its ideology as well as the sub-bureaucratic institutions of self-government. Neither will the historian,
working in the fields of historical anthropology or historic popular culture, agree with the thesis “of a deep gap
between high culture and popular culture” (ibid.:26), which cannot stand up to closer scrutiny in the case of
China. This bipolarity is in any case unrealistic. The worlds of popular and traditional life are not closed systems.
They are in constant dialogue and dispute with the ways of life of the elites (see Bausinger 1985; Burke 1997;
Medick 2000). China’s elites, to a great extent, took part in popular culture and in everyday life as well as the
festivities and rituals of the locally-conditioned religion.
201
constitutive parameter sufficient to inactivate the model?
Is a historical model of
development, considered to be universal, falsified by a single or a few contrasting examples?4
Naturally, macro-causal historical comparisons can be viewed, as Haupt and Kocka have
done, as “indirect experiments” with the help of which “regularities specific to time and
space” can be confirmed (1996:13). If ideal-typical theories are to play a constructive role,
they must rely on data based on textual criticism and they should take into account the
complexity of the historic topic and its change in the course of time. Theories are unable to
represent the “historical reality”. Big history exposes the topic of research to the danger that
Procrustes “builds the beds” for the questions as well as for the interpretation of the facts. It
was especially J. K. Galbraith who pointed to “a disregard for inconvenient reality” in the
case of economic theories. Wherever facts don‘t submit to the theories, they are cast aside
(Cipolla 1988:53). The dictum of the “veto power of sources” (Koselleck) must be equally
valid for historical social science, world history etc. and their arguments.
One of the latent problems of historical comparisons, especially with regard to China, is the
anachronistic or anachronistic-fictional perspective. It is often supported by the conscious or
unconscious intention to establish compatibility with Europe where cultural patterns of
argumentative importance are concerned or even construct a technological and/or economic
advance. This Sinophile/ethno-centristic perspective is very popular among Sino-Historians
based in China or elsewhere. Two cases for exemplification: Francesca Bray writes of a socalled “Green Revolution” that was to have taken place in the southern half of China
(favoured economic areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian) during the 12th and 13th centuries
(1984:597ff). The scenario in these three provinces, reconstructed exclusively on the basis of
normative sources, is subject to generalization, lacking in comparative insights into premodern agrarian processes of innovation and the conditions of transport and communication
in China at that time and rather resembles an agrarian utopia.5 By comparison, the first
Can we claim the global development from the stage of food-gathering and hunting to that of tilling to be
realistic although we know that, for instance, the subsistence economy of North American Plain Indians
temporarily developed in the opposite direction after the assimilation of the horse? Doesn‘t it seem to be true that
the “physical environments [...] are generally exploited with the least possible expenditure, relative to the
available technical means in each case” (Rudolph/Tschohl 1977:280)? Chinese settlers, formerly sedentary
peasants, became swidden agriculturalists in the appropriate habitat (e.g. Yunnan) in late imperial times.
5 According to F. Bray “Master farmers” (nongshi) were omnipresent in the countryside, instructing “their peers
not only in new techniques [...] but also in the organization of mutual aid and so on”. They “channelled to the
ordinary peasants the information contained in the agricultural books newly commissioned or reprinted on
government order”. The Song government “offered financial incentives to its farmers to invest in improvements”
and “refrained from overtaxing”. It “set up numerous agricultural colonies where new, improved techniques
were put into practice”. It was crucial, said Bray, that after “some initial resistance to innovation [...] the rural
population, alive to the benefits of the new technology, were willing to experiment and improve on their own
4
202
“Green Revolution” in Europe dates from the period of 1870 to 1914 (van Zanden 1991).
Caution is perhaps advisable where the Chinese peasant in late traditional times is described
as a modern Homo oeconomicus and is equipped with “a capacity for hard work; ready
response to innovation; frugality; rational planning; an ability to calculate gain against loss”
(Myers 1970:294). A.V. Tschajanow (1923) had already pointed to the fact that the
expenditure of labor of Russia‘s small farmers was not in compliance with profit
maximization. He noted that expenditure drops and consumption increases as income rises.
Modern micro-historic studies confirm the “total exhaustion of marginal resources” in early
modern households of small farmers (Beck 1986; Sabean 1990; Rösener 1997:170-172;
Troßbach 1997:192-194). In other words, this is management beyond modern economic
calculation. Tschajanow spoke of “self-exploitation” in this context (1923:25ff). Of course the
links of peasant households to the market and its conditions played a modifying role. A large
part of the mass of tenants, half-owners and small farmers in China from the 17th century to
1949 was dependent on survival strategies that left no consideration of the investment factors
time and labor, especially beyond the agrarian favored regions.
Both Chinese historians, who are focused on brilliant performance, and western historians,
like Needham and his colleagues, refer to China‘s leading position in technology up to the
13th century in comparison to Europe. They point to impressive inventions but fail to show the
corresponding processes of innovation and their geographic as well as social expansion
throughout the country. Consequently, the question of whether a process of invention took
place at all and if it did, whether it was perhaps of only local significance remains
unanswered. In the agrarian handbook Wang Zhen nongshu (1313) for instance, we find a
water-powered spinning machine for the production of hemp yarn, which was allegedly
common throughout Northern China (Elvin 1973:195). Historiographic proof of its diffusion
has yet to come. Nevertheless, Elvin supposes that “[if] the line of advance which it
represented had been followed a little further then medieval China would have had a true
industrial revolution in the production of textiles over four hundred years before the West”
(ibid.:198). Moreover, the concomitance of the non-concomitant in technological
development remains unnoticed all too often, as for example, the simultaneity of shifting
cultivation, spade and plough culture.
The respectable motive not to consider the world from the standpoint of Europe‘s uniqueness,
which is popular among Sino-historians, is faced with a thesis not easy to refute: “[t]oday‘s
initiative”. Furthermore, “Peasants bred locally new and improved varieties of rice and other crops, some of
which travelled from hand to hand over vast distances [...].” (1984:598-600).
203
world was established in Europe, and if we want to understand it, we must study its European
roots” (Sieferle 2001:47). Pomeranz (2000), among others, went so far as to ascertain an
economic tie between Asia (China) and Europe in the 18th century, whereby he unfortunately
kept only the economically favored regions in view on both sides. In response to this bold
hypothesis, Vries rightly points to the fact that such a tie, should it ever have existed, must
comprise homogenous developing potentials. His assumption “that the Chinese economy had
already exhausted its entire potential to become as wealthy as it was in the eighteenth century,
while Britain‘s economy still had plenty of room to maneuver” (2001:3-4), is worth a further
discussion. How are we to explain that China and Europe, which are two quite different
worlds in the 19th century should have been so similar one hundred years earlier (cf. ibid.:7)?
The transformation from a solar-agrarian regime to a fossil-energy regime in England and a
little later in Continental Europe is considered to be the decisive trigger factor for Europe’s
Industrial Revolution, thereby overcoming the “energy limitations of the agrarian system”
(Sieferle 2001:15,31). Pomeranz shares this view and includes cotton as a further decisive
factor to be considered (2000:43ff). In his opinion, the economic availability of domestic coal
in England was superior to that in China where “the chances of such a revolution” were
therefore “much dimmer” (ibid.:65). His main arguments are: (1) Because of the large number
of natural disasters, orally transmitted knowledge of mining technology got lost between the
12th and 14th centuries and with it the significance of the mining industry. However, in Europe
“technological expertise” was decisive in the “coal breakthrough”. (2) The geographical
distribution of coal was unfavorable in China since the gravity point of economic activities
shifted to the South, where only 1.8% of the country‘s coal deposits are today, whereas 61.4%
of the deposits are expected to be located in the Shanxi Province and Inner Mongolia. (3)
From the mining places to the economic centers of the empire transport costs were high, so
the continued over-exploitation of the wood reserves seemed preferable. (4) Chinese miners,
working underground, had to deal less with problems of penetrating water than with the
imminent danger of firedamp (Pomeranz: spontaneous combustion). The techniques of
ventilation were relatively backward. (5) Most of the coal mines were of minor size and
shallow (ibid.:62-66).
Pomeranz worked out a general picture while remaining silent about the totally insufficient
information at his disposal. First of all, the deficient state of knowledge on the Chinese
mining industry in late imperial times, especially in western sinology, calls for deeper
research on a provincial and local level. But there is, nevertheless, enough material easily
available to get a more thorough understanding of this topic (see Ma Yunke 1932, MTFZS
204
1986, Qi/Shou 1990, and JJZL 1999). Many mining sites all over the country are well
described in monographs (cf. Yu/Zhu 1986; MTFZS 1986).
During the second half of the 17th century China’s coal was extracted in half of the total
amount of sub-prefectures and districts (zhou and xian), above all in the provinces of Zhili
(=Hebei), Shanxi, Shandong, Shaanxi, Hunan and Sichuan as well as in the Northeast
provinces (Fang Xing et al. 2000:730). The Emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong
(1662-1795) pursued a massive acceleration of the rate of production in coal mining. The first
edict on the extraction of coal for the whole country was issued in 1740 (MTFZS:111-137).
The intention was, among other things, to establish a key economic center in the province of
Hebei with its metropolis Peking. Peking‘s coal supply came from three surrounding regions,
of which Yuanping alone possessed more than 200 mines and produced an estimated amount
of 95 000 tons in 1763 (Fang Xing et al., ibid; MTFZS :115). Pomeranz’s argument that
Shanxi was the center of coal mining is anachronistic as it is based on modern prospecting.
During late imperial times (1368-1911) the province of Shandong was the biggest coal
producer in the country with fairly acceptable waterways (ibid:732; Qi/Zhong 1990:270-285).
Besides Shandong, the province of Hunan (Middle-Southern China) represents a center of
coal mining; there fifty of the seventy administrative units produced coal (ibid.:331-350). In
Southwestern China (Sichuan) more than half of the sub-prefectures and districts (80 of 130)
were coal producers during the 18th century. Inter-provincial transport and the price of coal
itself appeared to be relatively moderate in price. However, saltmaking and metallurgy, two
high-energy industries, were concentrated in the mining regions themselves (Fang Xing et al.
2000:735). Altogether, the argument of high transport costs, though generally correct where
long-distance transport is concerned, calls for a critical micro-historic examination of the
sources as the contrary is also documented on a local level for other provinces (ibid.:736-737;
MTKFS :175-181). We need to know more about the inter-provincial coal trade (ibid.:736ff).
Source materials show coal mining to be not only an alternative for the pauperized masses of
peasants to earn their living, but also a source for the creating of prosperity (Qi/Zhong 1990).
Chinese miners, as did their British colleagues, had to deal to a large degree with the drainage
of the mines and consequently disposed of the appropriate technological knowledge, as was
the case for the ventilation systems of the shafts (cf. MTFZS:200-206).6 Generally they did not
We should not forget that Chinese miners played a most important role in the development of the mining
industries in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, where not only their work morale but also their
innovative powers were very welcome and sought after. Chinese miners ran the gold, tin and coal mines on the
Outer Islands in the late 17th and 18th centuries (cf. Purcell 1952, chapter IV; Heidhues 1996). It would be a
mistake to draw conclusions from today‘s miserable conditions in Chinese mining to the historical situation
several hundred years ago.
6
205
have to dig very deep to reach the seams. The length of the adits could total more than one
kilometer and their depth more than a hundred meters (Fang Xing et al. 2000:740). It is
undoubtedly correct that most of the mines were rather small (8 to 10 persons), however there
is established proof of the existence of large mines with several hundred, even a thousand,
miners (Zhu Cishou 1988:839; Fang Xing et al. 2000:741; MTFZS :171).
A brief look into the primary sources on coal mining in China during the 18th century is
sufficient to raise doubts if we could find the key reason for the absence of an independent
industrialization in China in the backwardness of its mining and coal supply.
Comprehensive trans-cultural comparisons, as Osterhammel rightly noted, often reveal an
insufficient command of the current level of research (2001:35, n.101).7 This is the reason for
the perseverance of many an obsolete theory and explanation.
In Michael Mitterauer’s German-language essay “Rye, Rice, and Sugar Cane - three Agrarian
Revolutions of the Middle Ages in Comparison” (2001), he raises some very interesting
questions and theses. However, he persistently even failes to recognize the deficient level of
Western research on Chinese agricultural history and focuses largely on “tertiary” literature.8
The author is totally uncritical towards his sources and goes so far as to claim that fertilization
in wet-rice cultivation was mainly achieved through dissolved nutrients and blue-green algae
contained in the irrigation water (p.254). This contradicts not only the findings of modern
agrarian science, but hundreds of historic agrarian handbooks and texts are proof of the
immense importance of basic and additional fertilization of wet-rice fields. The soil fertility
was considered to be largely dependent on organic fertilizers (You Xiuliang 1995:172-182; Li
Bozhong 1998a:455-456). In obvious ignorance of agrarian processes of innovation,
especially in the case of China, the author moreover claims that according to an imperial edict
of the year 1012, the early-ripening Champa-rice was cultivated on a large scale in the
drainage region of the Yangzi valley, consequently resulting in an enormous boost in rice
production and the rise of the multiple cropping index (p.248). In reality the saturation point
of early-ripening rice cultivation in the classic rice regions was not reached before the middle
of the 19th century. During Song times (960-1279) and later, the combination of late-maturing
Nathan explained the scarceness of “successful comparative work” for China as follows: “One reason is
practical: good comparison requires extended conceptual and empirical study of both entities being compared,
which is time-consuming and difficult. The second reason is methodical: the failure to gain the benefits of both
approaches (= hermeneutic and positivistic traditions) by learning how to combine them in valid ways in
comparative studies” (1993:935).
8 With the exception of an essay by Francesca Bray, whose opus magnum in the series Chinese Science and
Civilization (Agriculture). Vol.VI:2 (Cambridge, 1984) remains unnoticed, not a single serious paper on Chinese
agrarian history is quoted.
7
206
rice and winter wheat dominated in the multiple cropping areas of the Lower-Yangzi region
(Li Genpan 2002:3-28). The early-ripening rice reaches the rice baskets of Hunan und Hubei
very late, namely in the eighteenth century (Ho 1959:169-176). As Kidata Hideto proved,
even at the beginning of the 19th century only a single harvest a year was brought in from
most of the wet-rice fields on the Jiangnan plain (Lower-Yangzi region; cfd. Li Bozhong
1998b:29). The multiple cropping index of China in the middle of the 19th century has been
estimated at 1.4 (Chao Kang 1986:199).9
In his excursus on Chinese mills, Mitterauer overlooks the only comprehensive western text
available on this topic, Joseph Needham’s pioneering book on Mechanical Engineering in
Science an Civilization in China (Vol. IV, Part 2, Cambridge 1974). So it comes as no
surprise that the relatively high standard of Chinese grain mills and their different driving
systems remain unnoticed. Evidently Mitterauer did not have information on the Chinese
nutritional habits and the importance of farinaceous products from wheat flour as well as the
processing forms of rice flour at his disposal. Thus he minimized the role of grain mills, from
which no “technological-industrial innovations” could be initiated (p.256). His claim that the
possibilities of reclamation of land through internal colonization had been more or less
exhausted in Song times (960-1279) is entirely opposed to the facts (p.259). Significant
reclamations of land through colonization took place in Sichuan (Vermeer 1998:270),
Guangdong and Fujian (Marks 1998:306-306; Buoye 2000:53ff) as well as in all further
forested hilly and mountainous regions of China during late imperial times (cf. Cao Shiji et al.
1997; Eastman 1988:8-12; Zhang Fang 1998; Osborne 1994; Luo/Shu 1995:47-52, 59-66).
The catalyst was the introduction of American food plants (mainly maize, sweet potatoes:
food of the poor; cf. Guo Songyi 1988). Furthermore, we should not forget the massive
colonizations in the Manchurian region in Northeast China during the 19th and the first
decades of the 20th centuries (Cao Shuji et al. 1997:489, 495-509; Lee/Champbell 1997;
Reardon-Anderson 2000).
The statement that “the dynamics of the Chinese agrarian revolution [...] [had] already
reached its climax during Song times and [was] followed by a phase of stagnation” (p.259)
The historiographic euphoria describing the spread of early-ripening rice (c. 90 days ripening time) and the
advantages of its double-cropping purposely overlooks the problems created thereby. For instance, in the
agriculturally favored Taihu region (Lower-Yangzi) a growing period of about 200 days left only a few days
between the harvest of the first and the transplantation of the second crop. Inclement weather could endanger the
success of the second harvest. Two harvests of un-husked early-ripening varieties in this region yielded 4.7/4.8
shi (c. 360/380 kg) per mu (one mu = c. 0.06 ha) during Qing times. The cultivation of late-ripening rice could
yield about 3.9 shi. Double cropping of rice means a substantial increase in the burden of work, not to speak of
the expensive additional fertilizer etc. The increased output of no more than 8-9 dou, did not seem to be lucrative
in the long run (Zhao/Liu/Wu et al. 1995:149-150).
9
207
contradicts the historical evidence. Apart from the fact that the use of the term “agrarian
revolution” is highly questionable in this context (see above), when speaking of “stagnation”
he stigmatizes the late imperial times, consistently ignoring the modern level of research on
Chinese agrarian history. We don‘t know very much about the diffusion of agrarian
knowledge and the standardization of agrarian-technological innovations, yet there is enough
evidence of significant inventions (cf. Table 1) and innovations in post-Song times, not to
speak of smaller cumulative ameliorations, to refute this thesis (Li Fengqi in NYLS 1995:216217, 270-272; Gang Deng 1993). Up to about 1800 we can observe a constant intensification
of crop cultivation through the rise of the multiple crop index, new fertilizers, the spread of
new food plants and the increase of yields per area unit (Zhao/Liu/Wu et al. 1995:46-65). The
slow decline of harvest yields beginning in Mid-Qing must be attributed to the over-use of the
soils, environmental degradation caused by massive deforestation (resulting in soil erosion,
aggradation of lakes, rising of river beds, etc.) and the growing impact of natural disasters
(ibid.:127-153).
The somewhat arrogant presentation of obsolete explanation paradigms under the pretext of
current research yields few results of substantial value. Goldstone calls for a self-evident truth
in demanding of historical comparisons that they consider the level of research in connection
with the dominating disputes (1991:54).10 It should not remain unmentioned that the level of
research of the history of China and other Asian countries is by no means adequately reflected
in the secondary literature in western languages. This is especially true for the pre-modern
history of the economy, agriculture and the environment. Where economic and agrarian
history are concerned, Western research deals almost exclusively with the favored regions
(above all the Lower-Yangzi drainage area and regions of Southern China in Guangdong und
Fujian). The Lower-Yangzi region is relatively rich in source material and therefore of special
interest to Chinese, Japanese, and Western historians. The results achieved by extrapolating
the conditions in the most advanced economic areas and generalizing for the whole of China
simulates compatibility with Europe, especially in economic and demographic respects. Vries,
criticizing this methodic faux pas11 , speaks not without irony of “a world of surprising
resemblances”(2001:3).12 Generalizing in this fashion means to deny the agro-ecological as
Therefore it is simply not enough for Vries (2000) to rest his economic theses on the 19th century, as he
himself admitted (p.23,n.120), exclusively on Ph. Richardson‘s Economic Change in China - c.1800-1950
(Cambridge 1999). This valuable but very brief synopsis (text: 104 pages) draws only on selected western
secondary literature in English.
11 We may call this a true “fallacy of the lonely fact” that is “the logical extension of a small sample, which
deserves to receive special condemnation” (cf. Fischer 1970:109).
12 But Vries himself is not immune against the seductive power of unreasonable generalization when, for
instance, he writes: “China‘s internal transport with its densely knit system of waterways probably was the most
10
208
well as economical and geographic-infrastructural diversity of the country and to ignore the
still deficient level of research for all the other, economically less favored regions. There is an
urgent need for further investigations into local history in order to do justice to Kracauer‘s
(1966) demand of a “history in its wealth” by a productive “interpenetration of macro- and
micro-history”. Macro-history offers orientation for micro-historians and macro-historians
examine the stringency of their generalizing arguments on the basis of micro-historic facts.
Historical social scientists and structure-oriented macro-historians expect explanations of
particular scientific value from their quantifying grip on the economic, social and
demographic topics of research.13 Statistical series and aggregates are produced to gain
insight into historical changes of the generative structure (Bevölkerungsweise) and the
demographic system of a population, agrarian and manufacturing productivity, size and
utilization
of
cultivated
land
and
other
natural
resources,
scope
of
nutrition
(Nahrungsspielraum), nutritional patterns, landowning conditions, economic cycles and other
topics. It goes without saying that historians, dealing with over-individual structures in
historic economies and societies, energy flows in ecological and socio-economic systems,
efficient in the world” (2001:4). Even in the key economic areas with their “efficient” waterways, the transport
system was considerably restricted or even suspended in the frequent times of drought (cf. Cheng Qiaoyi 1981:1278; GDZRZH 1961). Compared to river and canal shipping, the overland transport, absolutely predominant in
Northern China, has not yet been comprehensively described in any Western study. Carts, wheelbarrows, pack
animals and human carriers were the main means of transport, altogether they were time-consuming and about
five times more expensive than the water transport facilities (Feuerwerker 1980:44). Even under the most
favorable conditions of water transport, a trunk, worth a few taels in the second half of the 17th century, went up
in price to 100 or even 200 taels when shipped from Fujian in the South to Jiangnan in the Southeast. In the 18th
century the price for the same commodity was more than doubled (Li Bozhong 1994b). About three quarters of
the entire commerce in the 19th century consisted of “small-scale local trade” limited to the “local and
intermediate [...] level” (Feuerwerker 1980:41). Besides the transport costs, the fees of intermediaries and the
numerous internal custom duties increased the prices on the markets. The longer the distance covered, the more
fees had to be paid to local bullies at the custom stations. Field investigations during the years between 19291933 in 135 rural areas in North and South China, situated near cities and therefore infrastructurally privileged,
showed that human carriers with poles still dominated the transportation system at that time (Buck 1937:350;
Credner 1930/1975). Country roads, highways and waterways of all kinds were more or less neglected in late
imperial times. Their maintenance was the duty of district magistrates who were without any funds to draw on
for this expensive task. The last committed central government repairing and reconstructing cross-country roads
worked under the Mongolian rule (Eastman 1988:106). Dyer Ball notices in his handbook of China, “In the
North of China, where carts are used, the roads are worn below the surface and of the surrounding land, and in
the heavy rains form water-courses for the deluges that pour from the skies to escape by: when in this state they
have occasionally to be swum by travelers, and instances of wayfarers being drowned in the road are not
unknown” (1925:569). At the beginning of the 20th century, market prices as well as transport charges on rice
shipped on a junk from Anhui to nearby Shanghai, doubled the purchase price of the producer (Amano
1952/53:241ff; Feuerwerker 1980:41). In the 1930s the transport from Hangzhou (Lower-Yangzi region) to the
surrounding hilly land increased the price of rice by about 50%. In some regions of China the original price of a
commodity doubled over a distance of only eighty km (Tawney 1932:55-56). The available evidence makes it
easy to agree with Feuerwerker‘s statement: “Poorly developed transport continued to be a major shortcoming of
the Chinese economy throughout the Republican period. This is apparent at both the microscopic and
macroscopic levels„ (1983:91). Pomeranz emphasizes the bad road conditions and at the same time the “cheap
water-borne intra-regional transport” (2000:184-185). Vries borrowed this view without further doubts.
209
regulation systems and their transformation etc., keep an especially hungry eye on
quantitative data. It is quite evident that Sino-historians, drawing on historically transmitted
figures and aggregates, frequently avoid the necessary textual criticism, including questions
about the authenticity of the source14 , time and place of origin, motives of investigation,
modalities of the census and its recording, census techniques, processes of aggregation,
quality of information, and coherence with comparable data.
Occasionally, demographic historians point out the scarcity of their Chinese material and its
fragmented nature, but without any visible consequences in the presentation of their
arguments and theses.15 But also among economic Sino-historians, textual criticism is not
very popular, particularly when figures and aggregates are used to establish or support their
theories. For instance, officially standardized weights and measures are considered to be of
normative importance and a constitutive part of historic reality while the traditionally great
variety on the local and even official levels, lasting until the end of Republican times and even
far beyond that, is consequently ignored (see below).
Cipolla‘s thesis is worth a consideration: “The scientist‘s doubts about the available historical
statistics come from the sensitivity for the period and the society he is exploring. The culture
of the basically agrarian society of the past favoured a culture of approximation. Figures were
not precisely applied, but to outline a more general idea of abundance and want. That‘s where
the many quantifications without any basis come from” (1988:67).
Any reconstruction of the history of Chinese agriculture of late imperial times should, of
course, refer to the correlation between population size, extension of cultivated land and
agrarian productivity with regard to the local and regional conditions. Unfortunately it is
impossible to deal with all the problems regarding figures and aggregates in this context, a
modest potpourri will have to do for now. I shall concentrate on the Qing period (1644-1911),
Probably Le Roy Ladurie‘s dictum “il n‘est d‘histoire scientifique que de quantifiable” (1973:22) is somewhat
too extremist, even for many of the most ardent followers of the histoire sérielle. The history of economics,
grazing ground for the Cliometrians, is not fully congruent with quantitative history (Cipolla 1988:64-65).
14 We can distinguish as follows: (1) false sources with false content; (2) false sources with reliable content; (3)
genuine sources with false data and finally (4) genuine sources with reliable data (cf. Cipolla 1988:35).
15
Stevan Harrell, for instance, describes the problems of the demographic source material in the introduction to
his Chinese Historical Microdemography (1995), but all the following contributions generalize without any
restraint regarding the insufficiencies of the sources drawn upon. The attitude towards the sources among the
Chinese historical demographers is inconsistent as well. The most comprehensive reconstruction of the Chinese
population history written hitherto, edited by Ge Jianxiong, presents Cao Shuji as author of the demography of
the Qing period (1644-1911) in volume V. Cao draws exclusively on data in Local Gazetteers, which includes
more than 3000 titles or about two for every district. Of course, he is right in claiming that Ho (1959) didn‘t
make sufficient use of this kind of source and that his references could easily be falsified by other quotations
(2001:55). But Local Gazetteers as sources of demography are no less problematic than any other sources. Cao
mentions the dubiousness of many of the aggregates in his Gazetteers, yet he makes full use of them at the
exclusion of other sources.
13
210
because of its relevance for the discussion of “Europe‘s special course”16 and consider some
problems concerning the relatively large body of official statistics collected in Republican
times (1911-1949).
Population Figures of Qing and Republican Times
Stevan Harrell‘s remark that China‘s historical demography is still in its infancy (1995:1),
nourishes the hope for substantial new findings in this sub-discipline in the near future. His
view may be a little bit too optimistic. The different categories of demographic sources are
well known not only regarding their information value and their deficits but also regarding the
methodical means for the winning of relevant data. However, there is very little hope for the
extraction of representative samples of data from the sources in order to reconstruct macrodemographic and micro-demographic processes of pre-statistic China in a historicalscientifically convincing way.
Qing
The western level of research on the demography of late imperial and Republican China is
represented by a large number of studies, which draw on different material or emphasize
various kinds of sources according to the leading theory in question.17 Of course, population
history cannot be fully analyzed when detached from its conditioning cultural and
environmental factors. We will have to leave them aside in order to concentrate on
quantitative aspects only.
The data of Qing time demographic sources18 can be qualitatively grouped into four phases:19
We are aware of the possibility that “historical phenomena and structures of essentially homogenous
peculiarities can appear at different times” (Mommsen 1992:131). However, as far as we can see there is no
indication of any potentiality for a Chinese departure for industrialization in earlier centuries.
17 See for instance Bielenstein (1987), Chao Kang (1986), Durand (1960), Harrell (1987; 195/ed.: Harrell, Ebrey,
Tedford, Liu Ts‘ui-jung, Harrell/Pullum, Lee/Champbell/Anthony, Wang Lianmao), Ho (1959), Lee/Tan (1992),
Lee (1995), Liu Ts‘ui-jung (1985), Perkins (1969), Schran (1978), Skinner (1986), Taeuber/Wang (1960) and
Tedford (1986).
18
Prominent sources are the registers of the local baojia, the “Veritable Records„”(shilu), “Clear Registers” of
the Ministry of Revenue (hubu qingce), governmental handbooks like the Huangchao xu wenxiantongkao
(Continued Thorough Study of Documents of the Dynasty) or Guangxuchao Donghualu (Records of the
Guangxu-Era from within the Eastern Gate of the Palace), “Draft Standard History of the Qing” (Qingshigao),
c. 9000 titles of “Local Gazetteers” (difangzhi) as well as “Genealogies” (jiapu, zupu, zongpu etc.) and
“Epitaphs” (muzhi). For further information on these sources in western languages see Endymion Wilkinson
Chinese History - A Manual (Cambridge/Mass. 2000), Harrell ed. (1995), Harrell (1987), Ho (1959),
Taeuber/Wang (1960) and Cressey (1934; on Republican Times).
19 Except for phase I, which we have added, the other three phases are mentioned by Taeuber/Wang(1960),
Skinner (1986), and, with insignificant alterations, Ho (1959). Phases II and III are sometimes combined in
Chinese studies (see Jiang Tao 1990; Wang Yumin 1992; 1993).
16
211
Phase I
1644-1740
Tax-Population System
Phase II
1741-1780
Expanding System
Phase III
1780-1851
Mature System
Phase IV
1851-1911
Disintegrating System
The key data of the phases correspond to historical events, which caused a qualitative change
in the collection of data and consequently in their quality20. For us Phase III is of special
importance, because of the popularly held notion that the climax of census in pre-statistic
China was reached during these years. Let us take a brief look at the collecting, fixing and
transmitting of population figures at that time.
Phase III: 1780-1851
Collecting of Data
An imperial edict of the year 1741 called for a yearly population and granary census on all the
territorial levels of administration. Moreover it foresaw a census of the fiscal ding (fiscal
units; see below) every five years (Jiang Tao 1990:32; Ho 1959:37).21 The census was to be
based on the door placards of the local baojia22, which contain all the necessary information
In the years 1740/41 the central government started the first serious attempt to extend the baojia-system (first
mentioned in the second half of the 11th century) realiter (not only nominally) over the whole country. This
system was created in order for the state to install social and public order beneath the lowest administrative level,
the district level. It would probably be better to regard 1757 as a crucial year, since from then on the baojia
statutes (15 paragraphs) were in force. They provided a population census (including all ethnic minorities and
even outsiders as well as migrants and vagrants) on a regular basis (Jiang Tao 1990:35). The year 1780
supposedly marks the beginning of the most reliable figures since the census of the early Ming times in 13811382 and 1391 (Ho 1959:3). In 1774, while examining serial data of population figures, Emperor Qianlong
discovered dubious regularities in population growing rates in quite a few local administration units. He
concluded that the local officials tended to dismiss census as a mere formality (Wang Yumin 1992:186;
Taeuber/Wang 1960:409-410). In 1775, harsh sanctions were decreed and consequently led, within one year, to a
breathtaking “statistical” population growth of more than 40 million (Jiang Tao 1993:37; 47-48). Around 1780,
the census figures in the whole country began to lose their “erratic unevenness” (Taeuber/Wang 1960:408). The
next turning point was the Taiping-Rebellion (1851-1864), probably the greatest rebellion in Chinese history,
which devastated many regions in Middle and South China.
21 From the very beginning there were doubts about the practicability of this order, as it went far beyond the
capacity of the local administrations. At a conference of high officials, a tendency toward the adherence to the
traditional fiscal population census became apparent. This attitude remained deeply rooted in the mentality of
local officials during the following decades. On the other hand, no efforts were made to define the term hukou
(household and mouths = population), the decisive concept in the new census system. According to Ho Ping-ti, a
unique opportunity to establish a “census system” was lost (1959:37).
22 The baojia system consisted of groups of households (10 households = one pai, ten pai = one jia, ten jia =one
bao), each with its own leader, and ideally “cutting across natural village lines, so that local influence would
remain fragmented” (Fairbank 1978:29). Each household was registered by means of a door placard. The main
function of this institution was keeping the local order intact and registering the local population.
20
212
on the households. As self-reporting of the households had been established, inspections were
not considered to be necessary any longer (Jiang Tao 1993:47). It goes without saying that
only figures of highly varying quality could be gathered in this manner. The baojia leaders
acted (if they really acted at all) in close cooperation with the local officials and their “talons
and teeth”, the clerks and runners. All too often district magistrates, due to their insufficient
financial endowment, readily accepted bribes (cf. Park 1997). The reputation of their
underlings was still worse, and they were considered to be greedy predators (Reed 2000).23
As baojia leaders were expected to collect and report data without pay not all of them were
ready to cooperate fully. The first proposal for their compensation was made in 1928 (Skinner
1986:69, n.30). Liu Shiren specified the traditional tactics of the peasants in minimizing tax
obligations before and during the collection of fiscal data (1936:108-109; cf. Hsiao 1967:106107), reflecting the general suspicion of every kind of governmental census. Nobody could
ever really be sure that his data would not be used for fiscal purposes in the end. This was due
to the fact that a lot of fees, some of them quite illegal, had been imposed on the peasants in
addition to the regular tax and labor service. Of course, gentry, powerful clan-households and
local bullies were exempted from additional burdens. Since fixed quotas had to be fulfilled,
the deficits were distributed on the shoulders of the powerless rural dwellers.
It is widely agreed that the Taiping Rebellion, which started in 1851, caused a loss of power
on the part of the central state as well as the rapid disintegration of the baojia institution.
However, it would be misleading here to imply that this institution ever really worked well.
There is general consent that the system did not function consistently in the administrative
units in the years from 1741 to 1775 (Ho 1959:39-40).24 Until 1772 the fiscal character of the
census had not yet been overcome.
The obligation to adapt to the local power structures can be seen as one of the many
constitutive disadvantages of the baojia institution, as it certainly did not contribute to its
efficiency. Moreover, we know that in remote areas of many provinces (such as Yunnan,
Guizhou, Sichuan and Guangxi), especially where non-Han people lived (Jiang Tao 1993:57),
The reservations against the local magistrates and their helpers as well as the fear of them is manifested in
sayings like these: “While living, do not enter the gate of the Yamen; and when dead, do not enter hell” (sheng
bu ru guanmen, si bu ru diyu); “The large fowl does not eat small rice” (da ji bu shi si mi); or “To act as
magistrate in one generation [he should be punished for his deeds by] being a beggar in ten generations” (yidai
zuoguan shidai zu qier). Even an emperor (Qianlong) expressed his displeasure with his local officials by saying
“A flock of sheep (=the people) is delivered to the jackals and wolves [masking as] shepherds “(qun yang fu yu
chailangmu; cf. Chinese Repository 1848/July, pp.355-356).
24 The most comprehensive study on the history of the baojia institution written bei Wen Juntian (1936) draws
exclusively on normative sources. There is no way to reach any qualitative conclusion from this study.
23
213
the baojia were either not established or out of function from the beginning in spite of an
edict of 1757 (Li/Mo 1993:205). The willingness to cooperate on the side of the chieftains
was probably not highly developed. Likewise, the population size of the barely accessible
mountainous regions (the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei,
Shanxi and Sichuan), where masses of colonists from the North and Southeast of China
settled, could not be properly registered (Jiang Tao 1993:58). Even in more densely populated
regions where the institution worked best, women and children are underrepresented in the
registers.25 Under these conditions the quality of collected data depended on the motivation,
incorruptibility, and sense of duty of all persons involved. Where the baojia were not
established, collecting data was impossible; where they did not work well, the results were
affected accordingly. Unfortunately our sources don‘t offer any insight into the local
conditions during the collection of data and thus the figures are of highly local-relative
quality. Of course, the general “statistic” situation was of some importance. The commitment
of the emperors and their central administration through the imperial edicts and sanctions had
a certain influence on the motivation of local administrations, even if not on all of them. Time
and again the census procedure became nothing but a farce. Certain algorithms were used to
simulate the expected population growth. Transmitted from one administrative level to the
other, some of the aggregates reached the realm of fiction. No less frequently the census was
totally ignored over a period of time, clearly manifested in rapidly shrinking population sizes
or a long-term stability of the figures (Jiang Tao 1990:44-45).26
Women are for the most part not adequately documented and children rarely so. In some
provinces, for instance in Jiangsu from the beginning of the 19th century, often only the male
adult population was taken into consideration in the Local Gazetteers (baojia figures!).
Almost insoluble problems arise with the quantification of internal migration. This factor
further magnifies the obscurity of our figures. Besides officially ordered migration for
colonizing the uncultivated land in hilly and mountainous regions (Cao/Wu/Ge 1997),
countless uncontrolled migrations took place. Many of these also occured over long distances
Nevertheless, there are enough texts in relevant sources to prove the discrepancy between the normative claims
of the institution and its social reality (cf. Hsiao 1967:72-83).
25 For instance, the Xining district (Guangdong) supposedly reported 68,109 women and 128,683 men in 1828, a
ratio of 189:100; the Dongwan district (Guangdong) showed a ratio of 190:100 for the period from 1786-1796
and the Ruogao district (Jiangsu; 1775-1804) of 100:c.145 (Jiang Tao 1990:45).
26 The population of Sichuan oscillated “statistically” between 38.2 mill.(1840), 65.6 mill. (1880), 84.7 mill.
(1898), 52.8 mill. (1911) and 62.3 mill. in 1953 (Li Shiping 1987:181-182; Ho 1959:283, App. II). A striking
drop occurred between 1865 (53 mill.) and 1866 (44.7 mill.) as well as a sudden rise from 1869 (46.5 mill.) to
1870 (55.4 mill.). Only the incompleteness of the data can serve as an explanation. In the district of Luzhou
(Sichuan) the population in the year 1823 shows no change when compared to that of 1811, although the growth
there was estimated at c.40% (Jiang Tao 1990:44).
214
and often were either unnoticed by the officials or not adequately recorded (cf. Li Xingsheng
1996:612-623, 636-639; 1048-1126). These migrations not always resulted in a permanent
new residence but frequently in temporary stays, or even in permanent vagabondage. Apropos
– also in Europe of early modern time internal migrations are one of the weak points of
demographic research (Pfister 1994:104ff). Due to the concern for the internal social order,
more than 5570 migrations are officially reported in China just for the time between 1836 and
1911. Of these, 2332 of them took place during 1856 and 1865, the time of the great
rebellions (Chi Zihua 2001:37). The rural mobility during late imperial times must have been
considerable. But there was also a constant rural exodus of variable intensity.27 According to
the sources the number of long-term and seasonal vagrants increased dramatically during
Qing times. Natural disasters, famine and nutritional bottlenecks are etiologically dominant
(see below). Unfortunately it is almost impossible to know the sizes of city populations as our
main source of information, the Local Gazetteers, shows population figures not only for the
municipal area itself but also for the considerable agrarian surroundings which were
administratively attached to the city. In the case of district cities (e.g. Shanghai), figures
include the population of the whole district, not only of the city concerned and its immediate
surroundings (Zou Yiren 1980:2; Cao Shuji 2001:726ff; Johnson 1995:119). In a word – all of
the reconstructed sizes of city populations are more or less crude estimations, which are of
limited use for the serious study of historic urbanization.28 Above all, historic figures of small
market towns (Marktflecken), of special interest for the reconstruction of the urban past, are
Most of the migrations mentioned in Qing sources are not quantifiable. However, without the slightest doubt
we can assume massive population movements according to qualitative sources (cf. Lu Deyang 1997:86-91).
During the Qianlong era (1736-1795), the estimated share of migrants in the province of Sichuan totaled c. 60%
of the whole population, with most of them from Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong (Cao Shuji 1997:103ff). The
surroundings of Peking were populated by myriads of migrants during the Jiaqing era (1796-1820) as the
eyewitness Zhang Shiyuan described (JSWB j.35:884). This is, of course, a subjective judgment similar to Tang
Cenglie‘s estimate in the second half of the 19th century that the average amount of “floating population” in
each of the Chinese provinces was about two million (JSWXB j.34:5/2). This means about 44 mill. people in the
whole country or more than 10% of the total population were migratory. Li Xun estimated the number of
migrants at about ten percent of the total population already for the 15th century (cit. in Kolb 2002:298, n.23).
Eyewitnesses emphasize the omnipresence of vagrants in Chinese cities and market towns in the 18th and 19th
centuries (Zhi Zihua 2001:6ff; Kolb 2002:298ff).
28 W. T. Rowe, in his pioneering study on the city of Hankou (Hankow) stated a fact that is equally true for all
the other Chinese cities in late imperial times: “As might be expected, it is impossible to arrive at reliable
population figures for nineteenth-century Hankow. Not the least reason for this is the fact that the population was
subject to great seasonal fluctuations between periods of high and low market activity. Moreover, the mobility of
the inhabitants rendered contemporary Chinese (as well as western) census-taking machinery totally inadequate
to the task of compiling their numbers. Thus official figures in periodic baojia enrollments yield a population
size so understated that they have served more to mislead modern scholars than to enlighten them” (1984:38).
According to Rowe, relatively trustworthy figures are furnished by estimations of foreign missionaries and local
residents of a town (ibid.:40). However, his exemplifications are not convincing at all, showing quite disparate
numbers that differ by more than one million people (ibid.).
27
215
not sufficiently available to permit solid estimations, even for populations29 and commercial
activities in the economic key region of the Lower-Yangzi (Liu Shiji 1987:128-138). One
might infer from the paucity and vagueness of exploitable figures on the demography of late
imperial cities that the quantitative aspect is a thorny problem at best. Cao Shuji‘s painstaking
statistical efforts for a quantitative reconstruction of urban demography in Qing times
revealed a confusing result: there were more city dwellers in 1776 than in 1893 (2001:723830; 829). This is hard to believe indeed.30
A further problem of historical demography is the extent of massive overseas emigration,
beginning in the 1840s (Cao/Wu/Ge 19976:521ff). There are only very crude estimates
available. The figures for overseas Chinese in the year 1920 range between 8.8 and 13
million. The ban on emigration, justified by the concern over state security, and tacitly
ignored since the 1850s, was not lifted until 1893. Not all of the immigration countries deliver
sufficient historic figures to reconstruct indirectly the demography of emigration in late
imperial China before the late 19th century. But we know that emigration lowered the
population pressure in the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in the 19th century and led to
relative economic prosperity in their places of origin thanks to the constant remittances from
abroad (Ho 1959:167-168). The greatest number of contract workers, an estimated 1.28
million people, left late imperial China between 1851 and 1875 (Cao/Wu/Ge 1997:529).
Fixing of Figures
Until 1898 the baojia leaders were expected, nominally once a year, to collect the population
figures and to deliver them to the district administration (yamen), where they were gathered
and shaped into reports for transmission to the next administrative level, the subprefecture or
prefecture. At the same time the data were recorded in the Local Gazetteers. Additions had to
take place on every level of authority, obviously leading to arithmetical mistakes and
replication errors with corresponding effects of summation. Due to the indifference of the
yamen employees the data was treated with gross carelessness already at the lowest level.
With only a small movement of the brush, the pen-pusher (xuli) could evoke tremendous
The figures found in Gazetteers of small market towns of the Lower-Yangzi region refer almost exclusively to
households and not to individuals.
30 Chao Kang, in his chapter on “Urban Population” (1986:43-63) seems unimpressed by the shadiness of his
sources. He agrees with rather megalomaniac estimates of contemporaries and makes use of them to verify other
obscure figures. His reference to “the crude nature of the pre-Ch‘ing estimates” (ibid.:61) seems to be no more
than lip service, which is advanced to solidify his estimates on city populations in Qing times.
29
216
numerical changes. He could expect no reward nor did he have to fear punishment in case of
errors.31
Neither is there any indication of the examination of data as to their plausibility. Errors in
writing and copying were simply perpetuated (Skinner 1986:10-11).For instance, we don‘t
know of a single incident where the population report was returned from the prefecture to the
district level because it seemed dubious. All these sources of error account for the immense
number of obviously contradictory relations of households to population numbers as well as
of the ratio of male to female population.32
Transmission of Figures
The conveyance of district reports through all further levels of territorial administration
(subprefectures, prefectures, provinces) to the department responsible in the central
administration, offered countless opportunities for manipulation of data. The governors of the
provinces were the last authority before the figures were passed on to Peking. It was their
responsibility to disclose exaggerated numbers and punish the delinquents. We may assume
that even then local officials recommended themselves to their superiors by submitting
manipulated figures. There was little chance of detecting false data. On no level of
administration were the numbers subjected to critical questions. The Da-Qing yitongzhi
(General Description of the Empire of the Great Qing) from the year 1820 shows that the
figures on the level of the prefectures don‘t correspond to the sum of the figures from the
districts. Often data for certain districts are missing. Some prefectures probably list only a
little more than half of their population. According to Cao Shuji, all the numbers for districts
and prefectures that are higher than those of the census of 1953 are definitely false (2001:11).
Historians working with aggregates of the Qing shilu (Veritable Records of the Qing) and
other synoptic source material are given no information about the reasons for errors
Chao Xiaohong pointed to further sources of error for the data of population statistics in the historical material
taken from a Local Gazetteer of the province of Shaanxi from the year 1934. The confusion of figures
concerning population counts, households and years, the arbitrary rounding-off of numbers in both directions,
confusion of digits, wrong additions, false interpretation of the source material and false contextualization of
data (2000:80-86).
32
For the sake of brevity, here is just one example for each. The Zhaohua district (Sichuan) claimed a total count
of 69,258 households with 70,736 members in the year 1887. The Guan district accounted for 494,898
households with 971,158 members in the same year, whereas only 119,190 or 525,230, respectively, were noted
for the year 1982 (Skinner 1986:11-12). On the relationship between male and female figures see note 24.
Carelessness in the addition of numbers was ever-present. The Gazetteer of the Daning district (Sichuan) lists
37,712 men and 35,106 women for the year 1796 and a total sum of 68,223 - the correct number would be
72,823 (Daning Xianzhi 1885, j.3, shihuo-hukou). The Tongxiang district (Zhejiang) showed exactly the same
31
217
discerned.33 Consequently the sums in question would first have to be disaggregated, which
calls for an analysis of local material over a longer period of time. Here it is indispensable to
keep in mind the instability of the boundaries of administrative units (Zhang Youyi 1997:8) –
an exceedingly laborious task that is not always taken seriously, especially for the time before
1911.
Phases I, II, and IV
For Phase III (1780-1851), a tendency toward inflated figures and growth rates is assumed
(Ho 1959:36-46; Durand 1960:244).34 Nonetheless, this phase is generally considered to be
the most reliable of the four. Anyone dealing with population numbers in Phase I (16441740), is faced with the problem of having to convert censuses of households and taxable
adult males (tax units=ding) into general population sizes. This is done on the basis of an
assumed average household size that is then multiplied.35
Phase II is characterized by a particularly obvious incompleteness of population figures (Jiang
Tao 1990:30-31; Ho 1959:46; Li Shiping 1988:182). The “statistics” are dominated by
understated numbers. This is a phase of transition from the count of tax units to nominally
real, extensive population counts.
number of taxable men or fiscal entities for the years 1672 and 1703, namely 49,282 (Tongxiang xianzhi,
Shanghai 1997:197).
33
Beside the already mentioned increase in population of c.40 mill. from 1774 (221 mill.) to 1775 (264.5 mill.),
the often cited Qing shilu offers several other “statistical” inconsistencies in development. Between 1777 (270.8
mill.) to 1778 (242.6 mill.) the population decreased by c.27 mill., while it increased by c.33 mill. from 1778
(242.6 mill.) to 1779 (275 mill.). By 1794 the population had reached 313 mill., then decreased again in 1796 by
38 mill. to 275 mill. On the other hand, the population grew again from 1797 to 1798 by close to 20 mill. The
19th century offers further incongruities: Supposedly the population rose by c.17 mill. in the periods from 1817
(331.3 mill.) to 1818 (348.8 mill.) and from 1821 (355.5 mill.) to 1822 (372.4 mill.). A sharp decrease followed
from 1848 (426.7 mill.) to 1849 (412.9 mill.). The decline that took place from 1851 (431.8 mill.) to 1852 (379.1
mill.) is due to the Taiping Rebellion, according to the Xianfeng donghualu, and was even greater the following
year 1853 (318.2 mill.). In 1869 only 239 mill. Chinese were registered in the central population statistics (cf.
Yuan Zuliang 1994:22-32).
34
Skinner assumes the official number of 44.2 mill. for Sichuan to be exaggerated by a whole 16 mill. In 1953
four provinces (Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Hubei) show a drastic drop in population numbers by several
million each, compared to the year 1850 (1986:67-74). According to Li Shiping, the inflation of numbers began
during the Jiaqing era (1796-1820), which indeed seems likely. The “statistic” population count for the province
of Sichuan in 1898 was 84.7 mill., while it was decidedly lower in 1911 at 52.8 mill. and even in 1953 at 65.6
mill. (1988:183).
35
The consolidation of land, corveé and poll taxes was carried on during the first eighty years of Qing rule (Ho
1959: 34) and bore fruit step by step, though in some of the provinces not before the end of the dynasty (Zheng
Xuemeng 2000:596; 597, Table), thereby making the original ding (taxable male person over the age of 16 and
below 60 years) into a tax unit. Ten or more persons could be under the responsibility of a taxable ding.
Therefore the ding is not a suitable unit for demographic purposes (Fang Xing et al. 2000:180).
218
Phase IV (1851-1911) is considered as a demographic vacuum (Ho 1959:97).36 A distinct
climate change for the worse and the corresponding natural catastrophes and their
consequences as well as the great rebellions (Taiping, Nian, Muslims, Boxers) and the
political instability led to a complete collapse of the baojia system and therefore the
organizational basis for the census. It could happen that up to ten provinces were completely
ignored in the statewide “statistics”. As late as 1898 the census figures for seven provinces
were still missing (Jiang Tao 2000:117).37
Extraordinary caution is called for: “statistical” decline must not uncritically be regarded as an
indicator of population decrease, as one would be tempted to do under certain circumstances
(famines, rebellions etc.). Thus western estimations for the “unusual losses” of the years
between 1850 and 1913 amount to 32.65 mill. (Schran 1978:641). The figures from the
provinces are highly unreliable for Phase IV as they are incomplete, based on more or less
arbitrary estimations or occasionally increasing algorithmically. The immense inter-provincial
population movements seem to have gone largely undocumented. A look at Table 2 shows
how far estimations of experienced historians can diverge regarding population figures. The
source material from Phase IV is particularly unsuitable for the extracting of population
figures of significant value.38
Republican China
Beginning in 1859, Western statistics39 , especially from Germany, after 1894 via Japan40,
were introduced into China. At first this was just in Western dominated maritime customs
stations and later on, after the year 1907, step by step in Chinese ministries (Li/Mo 1993:219222). At the same time the advantages of the instruments of western scientific statistics were
Ho Ping-ti, said to have been a confessed Maoist (Zhou Guanghui), prolongs the phase to 1949. This is in line
with the historiography of the PR China, which disavows Republican times (1911-1949) in all aspects. Such
methods are quite in accordance with the traditional-dynastic customs in order to present the time after the
“liberation” in 1949 to its best advantage.
37 The population registers (minshuce) of the province of Hubei are a perfect example for the doubtfulness of the
figures from that period. In 1858 the census was resumed there. For that year a figure of 30.57 mill. was reported
or about 3.2 mill. less than before the Taiping Rebellion. Afterwards the population increased at a
“constant„”rate by c. 100,000 every year, until it had reached about 34.72 mill. in 1898 und thereby surpasses the
census of 1953 by 700,000 (Jiang Tao 2000:117-118).
38 Schran, who could not consult genuine Chinese material, assumes that “a substantial decline in China‘s
population from 1850 to 1873 and an accelerated growth from 1933 to 1953 are really quite impossible [...]
China‘s population must have been notably larger during the late 19th and early 20th century than is commonly
believed”. He suspects that the figures were 10-20 percent higher (1978:646).
39
The first lectures on statistics in Europe were held by Hermann Conring 1660 in Helmstedt (Germany). In the
second half of the 18th century the factor of movement became part of statistical considerations (Krüger
1998:59). Although the “statistical era” in Europe, beginning with the institutionalization of statistics, has a short
history, it was far ahead of the development in China.
40 In this year the neologism tongjixue (statistics) was introduced from Japan (Li/Mo 1993:227).
36
219
discussed in China. Because of this innovation process, western population historians are
inclined to attribute special qualities to the census of 1908/1911. Ho Ping-ti could prove that
during this status nascendi phase of statistics, the facilities for collecting figures were not yet
established sufficiently. The intention was to replace the baojia system by a statewide
network of police stations, but the realization of this ambitious venture dragged on. Where
there was a lack of “local defense units” (baoweituan), local bullies and gentry members had
to be persuaded to cooperate. In other words, there were many localities without any
institutional base for collecting data of any statistical value (1959:73-79). A look at the
provincial figures of the years 1916/1917 shows, for instance, cases of absolute parity of both
sexes as well as a hypertrophic (up to 64-fold) preponderance of males (Jiang Tao 1993:91).
Considerable efforts had been made by the state to establish a centrally controlled system of
statistics, but up to the end of Republican times (1949) with little success. The introduction of
the “Laws of Statistics” (tongjifa) in the year 1932 and the “Statutes of Population Census”
(hukou pucha tiaoli) nine years later did not lead to any decisive improvements. The census
modalities remained highly inconsistent (Li/Mo 1993:244; 300-301).
The complete failure of a national census between 1927 and 1934 led to the nominal
reinstitution of the baojia system in the whole country, but in fact it seems to have been
introduced only in some provinces along the Middle and Lower course of the Yangzi (Ho
1959:85). The irregularly collected figures are of highly varying quality. Nevertheless official
bureaus were busy “constructing” aggregates. The lack of data in provincial reports and their
faultiness provoked manipulations on the highest level of statistics. Estimations of statewide
population figures, made by the various relevant statistical institutions, differ considerably, in
one extreme case (1930) by more than 150 mill. (see Table 3).
Cressey characterized the Republican statistics as follows: ”Statistics of all kinds are
exasperatingly unreliable in China. No precise census enumeration has ever been taken, and
many of the published figures are based on such generalizations as the average consumption
of salt41 or other products, upon the circulation of mail matter, or upon estimates as to the
number and size of families” (1934:18). No one familiar with these problems will want to
contradict him in the case of higher aggregated population figures, representing summation
In Jiang Tao‘s opinion this method of estimation is not totally inefficient, provided it is used in a
supplementary way and that there is a clear idea of the average amount consumed per capita. In early Republican
times ten pounds (= 5 kg) were assumed to be a reliable figure per capita per annum. The result was an estimated
population size of 260 mill. By considering the tax-free salt for fishery and industry the figure amounted to 531.2
mill. (1993:96-99). Both of these figures are not at all corresponding to the officially held population figures (cf.
Table 3).
41
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effects of errors and manipulations. On the other hand, results above average may have been
achieved on the local level under favorable conditions. Comprehensive knowledge of the
survey modalities is indispensable for evaluation. Buck‘s survey (1930), which was based on
fieldwork in the years from 1927 to 1933, is regarded as one of the most reliable western
sources for statistics on agriculture and demography in Republican times, but this optimistic
attitude toward the material and samples presented is not fully acceptable. First of all, the
samples are not representative for the whole of China and not even for the localities in which
they were gathered, as a closer look proves (see below). The statistic crux of the period from
1911 to 1949 was the military issues, which included the Warlord era, the invasion of the
Japanese and the war against them (1937-1941) as well as the civil war from 1945 to 1949.
There was no way to achieve an effective centralization of the system of statistics and a
standardization of the surveys. Nevertheless, in the field of agriculture statistical efforts
sometimes bore edible fruit on local and even regional levels. This material is available in
local archives and, of course, in the National Archive No. II (Ye/Esherick 1996; Makino
2002).
Microdemography
The main task of historical microdemography is to analyze the generative components of
marriage, fertility and mortality in order to gain insights into the processes of population
developments.42 Population registers, genealogies, and, on a very limited scale, epitaphs are
the main Chinese sources of any use for this field of research.43 Genealogies, which were
mainly produced for ritual purposes, did not even follow their own individual rules of
composition (fanli) and left huge gaps (Harrall 1987:55,57).44
The female members of
lineages/clans are only partially considerd at best. Often we look for them in vain. The same
is true in the case of children, especially females. Males were generally enlisted from the age
An excellent synopsis of the western (American) level of research on microdemographic topics in late imperial
China has recently been submitted by Martina Eglauer (2001).
43 The Chinese sources are hardly comparable with the European ones regarding their topics and their quality of
information. In Europe, beginning in the 17th century, there were at least locally and regionally, official
demands on continuity in recording, comprehensiveness in description as well as internal consistency. Chinese
microdemography lacks material like church books and church registers with fairly accurate dates of
christenings, marriages and funerals. We should not forget that European political arithmeticians developed the
science of statistics from the 17th century onward, while officials in late imperial China, in spite of the long
tradition of collecting population and cultivation area data, never made any special attempt to reflect on statistics
in a way comparable to the West.
44
Johanna Meskill hit the nail squarely on the head when she wrote, “For the demographer, the genealogy may
hold more frustration than fulfillment. Many standard demographic questions cannot be answered from
genealogies” (1970:148). This includes, for instance, the family size, infant mortality, affined relations, marriage
strategies and adoptions (ibid.:148-150). From an historic-anthropological point of view we have to agree that
genealogies “make the reality look more uniform and conventional than it ever was” (ibid.:159).
42
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of twenty on. Prior to this age, they were listed only when they were already married and
fathers. Gao Songyi examined the unequal consideration of the sexes in approximately
seventy genealogies and discovered ratios of male to female, ranging from a moderate,
apparently realistic 104:100 up to 222:100, with an average ratio of 168:100 (1987:123,136).
Even males had not been registered in their entirety in genealogies (ibid.:129). Children who
died before the age of eight to ten do not appear in these sources. Unmarried childless males
who died before the age of twenty were not mentioned with an exact date of death (ibid.:126).
The average life expectancy of women was below that of men, due in part to health
disadvantages during the reproductive age (ibid.). Maybe the asymmetrical distribution of
resources in households was also of some importance. On the other hand, women resist
enduring nutritional crises more successfully than men, but malnourished women were
endangered during childbirth (Dirk 1980:24). According to Wong, the life expectancy of the
Chinese in the 18th and 19th centuries was about the same as in Europe (1997:26). In the case
of Daoyi, a settlement in the province of Liaoning, data (see below) suggest an average life
expectancy during the years of 1773 to 1853 of little over 30 for both men and women45 .
After the age of ten the life expectancy climbed enormously, namely to 43.3 years for men
and 35.8 years for women (Lee/Cameron/Anthony 1995:173-175). The household registers of
the Eight Banners are described as “the most extensive and detailed records of a Chinese
peasant population” (Lee/Cameron 1997:225), but the prevailing weaknesses of the sources
are considerable and raise questions about the credibility of the author‘s conclusions.46
Moreover, to generalize from a small deficit sample gathered beyond the Great Wall in
Northeast China would be methodically more than dubious. It is to be expected that the
multifaceted Chinese environment with a climatic range from aridity to tropical humidity,
offers highly varying life expectancies for its inhabitants.
From the foregoing remarks on the gaps of information in the sources, the reader may infer
that a search for data to establish birth rates could not lead to much success. However,
Lee/Campbell (1997:90-101), Li Zhongqing (1994:3) and, following them, Pomeranz
According to Wrigley/Schofield, the English country population, without considering infant mortality, had an
average life expectancy of 35 to 39 years, which increased to about 40 years by 1871 (1981:230; 708-713).
Between 1740 and 1800 Germans lived 35 to 38 years on average (Pfister 1994:43), but people in the
countryside became older than those in the cities, the “ville tombeaux” (Le Roy Ladurie).
46 The examined registers were used by the military and civilian administrations. Nevertheless, data on birth,
migration and death are missing. About a quarter of the sample had been lost (Lee/Cameron/Anthony 1995:164166; Lee/Campbell 1997:225-233; Cao Shuji 2001:854). Apropos - Chinese emperors, as we know, were
especially well-fed and medically well-tended, but sometimes living in an hazardous political environment,
reached an average age of only 45 (cf. Yuan Zulian 1994:101). However, scholar officials as Yuan discovered in
the official dynastic histories, lived to a ripe old age of 70.4 in Ming times (1368-1644) and 71.3 during the last
dynasty (ibid.:124).
45
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(2000:41; 2002:428), maintain a birth rate in China lower than that of Europe between 1550
and 1850. According to Wong, the Chinese birth rate was about two thirds of the European
(1997:23). But in view of the sources, namely the registers from Daoyi and in addition data
drawn from the genealogy of the emperor’s kinship group, two very small local samples, this
statement is more or less a sweeping one, which is based on the principle of the “fallacy of the
lonely fact”.
It is further assumed that Chinese families in late imperial times practiced family planning. In
this context Lee/Campbell, still squeezing out their Daoyi sample, ventured on the difficult
task of finding clues as to the average fertility. The result presented is amazing indeed. The
fertility in late imperial times was about two thirds of that of early modern Europe, because
family planning with “early stopping, late starting, and wide spacing” was practiced
(1997:92). It is to be suspected that the authors fell victim to the slogans of the birth control
campaigns that began in 1973 and transplanted them to the period under review.
Li Bozhong tried to prove that a variety of birth control measures (abortion, contraception,
sterilization and different pressing techniques) had already been applied between 1620 and
1850 in the key economic area of the Lower-Yangzi region in order to maintain the family‘s
prosperity (1994a:41-52). However, at least three major reservations remain: (1) Li could not
differentiate between cities and the countryside. (2) The primary source material consists
exclusively of novels which are evaluated without any textual criticism. (3) No
historiographic evidence has been brought forward regarding the popularity of the cited
practices among the population. Furthermore, it would be of some interest to know if all the
peasant families below the level of prosperity also practiced family planning as described.
Considering the marital fertility in late imperial China, there are some arguments, partially
based on traditional norms (1-4), which do not seem to be invalidated:
(1)
The family system (patrilineal system) “tolerated overpopulation” (Chao Kang
1986:9). This concerns mainly South and Southeast China, where this system dominated.
(2)
The dictate of an earliest possible marriage (Zhou Zuoshan 1997:62; Taeuber
1970:78; Eastman 1988:24ff; Jun/Ma 1998:88; Buck 1937:377) as well as the marriage of all
offspring, even if they were still economically dependent on their parents, was universally
approved in China (Eastman ibid.).47
Buck found out during his survey (1929-1933) that 81 % of the women marrying for the first time were under
the age of 20 and 13 % under the age of 15 (1937:381).
47
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(3)
After wedding, childbearing should happen as early as possible.48
(4)
There was a traditional obligation to produce many offspring (fanzi), especially male
(Chen Guyuan 1998:5ff). Sons had the duty to care for the continuation of the male ancestor
worship and for the welfare of their parents when they grew old. After death, a man gains
immortality through his sons and grandsons (Chen/Mu 1998:85). The prosperity of a family
and its social prestige is manifest in the number of its sons.49 Numerous traditional good
wishes and sayings reflect the omnipresence of this mentally deeply rooted social norm.50
(5)
The sale of wife and daughters (often to brothels or well-to-do households) belonged
to the instruments of survival of the male part of the family during life-threatening crises,
above all famines. This custom contributed negatively to the ratio of the sexes in disaster
areas.
(6)
All the many nutritional crises and famines (see below) must have had some impact on
the fertility of the women concerned.
(7)
Data on infant and child mortality doesn‘t exist before Republican times (1911-1949).
At that time the rate was between 15 and 16 percent while in some localities it was up to 20%
(Buck 1937:389). We may ask ourselves if there is any reason not to believe that these rates
were at least as high in earlier times. Far beyond the key economic areas the mortality rate
must have been distinctly higher and therefore the birthrate, too.
(8)
A much discussed question refers to infaticide (ninü), popular in rural China up to this
day. The drowning of female infants has mostly been considered in the context of familial
poverty (a.o. Fei Hsiao-t‘ung 1939:34; Osgood 1963:362). R. Bin Wong calls this custom a
kind of Malthusian “positive check”, which is manifested in “long birth intervals and skewed
In a field research carried out in the 1990s in Yuecun (Zhejiang), one of the results confirms this historic
attitude: “There is speculation about whether or not a woman who has been married for several months has yet
conceived child. If she has not become pregnant within a year of the wedding, rumors about her fertility run
through the village, putting her under extreme pressure” (Chen/Mu 1998:87). The authors’ conclusion is, “The
influence of socio-economic development is partial and limited in relation to the multi-level childbearing needs
of the farmers, and mainly reduces the need to have children for survival or social reasons”(ibid.:89). This
observation coincides with fieldwork from the years 1918 to 1930, in which no contraceptive measures at all
came to light, not even during family planning campaigns (Cao Shuji 2001:875).
49 Buck discovered that the “fertility of married women observed in China was very much greater than observed
in any Western countries considered” (1937:384). The difference of marital fertility was relatively insignificant
between the smallest and largest peasant households (5.11 to 5.87 children; ibid.:386).
50 For example: “Many sons and many grandsons!„ (duo zi duo sun); “Many sons, good luck” (duo zi duo fu);
“Multiplying offspring!” (zisun fanyan); “He who has sons will not be poor” (you zi wei wei qiong); “Brothers
are like hands and feet” (xiongdi ru shu zu) and “Rear sons for old age” (yang er fang lao).
48
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sex ratios” (1997:24).51 Pauperized peasant families practiced infanticide in order to grasp
another chance for rearing a further son. In any case, this was the parents’ usual explanation.
But poverty was surely not the only reason to indulge in this custom.52
According to
Li/Wang‘s estimate, about ten percent of the female offspring of the emperor‘s clan had been
drowned (2000:70). Other well-off lineages could have practiced infanticide, too. We don‘t
know enough to say anything more concrete about this social phenomenon. Further research
into sources, first of all the Local Gazetteers, is indispensable (cf. Ho 1959:58ff). While
writing about infanticide we must not forget the institution of foundling hospitals
(yuyingtang), which were popular since the middle of the 17th century in the prosperous
regions of South and Southeast China during late imperial times (Fuma Susumu 1986; Liang
Qizi 1997; Lum 1985). They were run with contributions from private philanthropists and
ideologically supported by moral handbooks (shanshu) as well as “Ledgers of Merit and
Demerit” (gongguoge), condemning the “evil custom” of infanticide and motivating its
readers by offering plus points for their moral account in the celestial world (Brokaw 1991).
The official attitude towards infanticide was very clear - from a moral point of view it was
strictly disapproved (a.o.T‘ien 1988:25ff). Some scholar officials regarded this custom as a
cause for the decline of the Chinese empire.53 Taken all in all, the present level of research is
far from permitting any quantitative statement on the phenomenon of infanticide in late
imperial times.
(9)
It can be assumed that the cult of women‘s chastity (Eglauer 2001:55ff), particularly
promoted during Qing times and locally widespread (T’ien 1988; Zurndorfer 1993:99) had a
certain unintentional demographic influence. This cult, the official honoring of a lifelong
widowhood, was based on the Confucianist orthodoxy and its concept of marital fidelity. In
Qing times, the forced remarriage of a widow by her parents or parents-in-law was strictly
forbidden by law. There were special charitable institutions for widows to keep them safe
from worldly temptations and molestations (Pao Tao 1991). At the same time the female
suicide at the death of a spouse or fiancé, likewise very popular, was periodically condemned
by the ruling elites (T‘ien 1988:126ff).
Li/Wang are bold in their conclusion, drawn from the Daoyi sample in Liaoning, in stating that infanticide had
been widely practiced in China and fail to provide enough evidence (2000:101). Ho Ding-ti also commits the
error of regarding the disproportion of the sexes as an indication of the existence of infanticide (1959:59-60).
52
The practice of infanticide offered, besides its family planning role and the opportunity for sex-selection, a
health advantage to the women - it was less dangerous than abortion and it gave the opportunity for eugenic
control (Cohen 1989:199).
53 See, for example, Gui Zhongfu‘s tractate Jie ninü wen (Warning against the Drowning of female infants) in
Chinese Repository. Vol. XVII, 1848, pp.11-16.
51
225
In view of the above mentioned arguments, admittedly of varying weight, it seems to be rather
daring to assume the practice of a statewide rational birth control in China before the rigid
campaigns of the 1970s.
The sources of Chinese microdemography, at least before Republican times (1911-1949) and
the first modern gathering of local data, in fact offer valuable material for structural,
functional and developmental history of clans and lineages as well as for the study of local
migration and emigration, prosopography and biographics, but they are highly deficient in
information on genuine microdemographic topics, the generative factors of the population and
their history. Even in the case of favored local samples, only rough estimates are possible.
Population Development and Natural Disasters
Historical population development in China is dominated by three concepts: (1) The concept
of acceleration and, periodically, explosion of population growth between 1700 and 1850, that
led to overpopulation in the end (Eastman 1988:5; Elvin 1973:304; Ray Huang 1997:224;
Rowe 2002:475; Lu/Teng 2000:781; Spence 1995:124). (2) The concept of moderate and
constant population growth with a yearly growth rate of far beneath one percent for the period
in question (a.o. Li/Wang 2000; Li Bozhong 1998:19-20; Hsü 1995:65). (3) The concept of a
restrained and varied population development as a result of the influence of catastrophes
(Malthusian “positive checks”; see Ho 1959.271ff; Cao Shuji 2001:831ff; Goody 1996:190191; moderately Malthusian arguments by R. Bin Wong 1997:22-26).
All three models are mainly based on demographic and agro-economic figures (size of
cultivated area, soil utilization, agrarian productivity, etc.) and in some cases an assemblage
of corroborating qualitative source material. Natural disasters and famines play a peripheral
role at best for population historians, with the exception of Ho (1959), and the evaluation of
their demographic relevance varies. The estimations themselves appear to be highly arbitrary,
as there seems to be little willingness to acknowledge the level of research in the discipline of
“disaster studies” (zaihaixue) within environmental history. So far, the level of research is
held predominantly by the Chinese.54 They can rely on a body of sources that is probably
unique in the world. Next to prominent archival representation, there are special handbooks
for the combat of disasters (jiuhuang; huangzheng), diaries with entries concerning the
weather, stele inscriptions, and chapters in Local Gazetteers, texts from nearly all kinds of
There are several Western studies that offer insights into this discipline also to non-sinologues among the
historians, such as Mallory (1926); Yao Shan-yu 1941, 1944; Ho 1959; Wang/Zhao 1991; Hinsch 1988; Will
1980; Fang Jin-qi 1992; Amelung 2000; Kolb 1996b.
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written sources. In the meantime, some parts of the extensive archive material have been
published.
The temporal continuity of the records is no guarantee for their qualitative continuity as
periods of sparse data are followed by periods rich in documentation. However, there is a
clear trend toward an increase in disaster reports since the 14th century (see below).
Natural disasters were considered to be a disturbance in the harmony between the universe
and the earth and a heavenly response to earthly misbehavior (above all by the local
administrations). Therefore the local magistrates and prefects preferred to wait and see if there
was any real need to report to their superiors. This could lead to a delay in granting relief
measures. Quite often local officials felt obliged to conceal a catastrophe from the higher
authorities (nizai; huizai) or at least to play down its impact although nominally heavy
sanctions awaited them for not reporting in time. On the other hand, some were motivated to
exaggerate the effects of a disaster (duobao; zhongbao) in order to make a personal profit
from the additional government relief, as for example the reduction or suspension of taxes.
We find an increase of false reports especially during the first half of the 17th century. Thanks
to the conviction of the emperors and the elites that natural disasters represent heavenly signs
of displeasure with the earthly state of affairs, China possesses a singular chronological
documentation thereof. In view of the imposing number of disasters, the moral behavior
obviously left something to be desired. Right up to the 1950s the peasant population in more
remote regions still regarded disasters (locust plagues) as heavenly punishment, which was
not to be fought but endured (Kolb 1996a:110-111).
Two dimensions have to be taken into account when the importance of disasters in the
historical discourse is estimated, namely (1) temporality: phase of impact, isolation, rescue
and remedy, and (2) spatiality: magnitude, zones of total impact, marginal impact, and
filtration (cf. Alexander 1993:21-26). We find information on both dimensions and their
constituents in the primary sources, whose abundance allows for extensive comparative
analysis as well as reciprocal complement. The archival reports contain the etiology of
events, their appearance, extent, effects, and often also the relief measures. Here and there we
find a correlation between different disasters, for instance droughts and locust plagues or
earthquakes and tsunamis.
Space played a more important role than time in the development from nutritional crises to
famines that often followed natural disasters. This was because the greater the space the more
difficult the solution of the transport problems (Will 1980:40), especially when dependent on
227
land transport or in the case of a total collapse of transport on inland waterways during longer
periods of drought (see above n.12).
First let us take a closer look at the frequency of natural disasters. The discourse of
catastrophes in the history of China is dominated by floods and droughts (atmospheric and
hydrological disasters), which, also during Qing times (1644-1911), make up about seventy to
eighty percent of all reports (Zhang/Song 1998:93-94, Table 2-12; Li Xiangjun 1995:15). For
many decades, historians deferred to Deng Yunte‘s classical study (1937) on the history of
disaster relief, which includes statistics assembled from the official twenty-four dynastic
histories. There is no question that the events they describe represented a very special
challenge for the central government. For Qing times these sources list a total of 192 floods
and 201 droughts (cf. Table 4). But these figures don‘t give us an adequate idea of the
prevailing frequency of disasters.55 Zhu Kezhen (cf. Zhang/Song 1998:88-89) arrived at
considerably higher numbers by occasionally including Local Gazetteers and listed 669 floods
and 328 droughts (cf. Table5). Chen Gaoli‘s further (but in no way complete!) analysis of
Local Gazetteers (1986) provided more elaborate results for the period from 1644 to 1913,
listing 1625 floods and 1901 droughts (cf. Table 6). So far, Li Xiangjun offers the most
complete corpus, which includes archive material56 of natural disaster reports during Qing
times. He determines a total of 16,384 floods and 9185 droughts for the period from 1611 to
1839, which were very unevenly distributed throughout the provinces. It is interesting to note
that the provinces of the economic key region of the Lower Yangzi area are prominently
represented (cf. Table 7 and 8). According to Chen Qiaoyi‘s research, 1062 floods and 553
droughts, all dated, occurred in the province of Zhejiang (today‘s boundaries) alone, whose
Northern half belongs to this region (1991).57
We cannot hope for an adequate survey of the natural disasters for the period from c.1850 to
1911, due to enormous losses in archive material (period of great rebellions). We may assume
Had Deng consulted the “Veritable Records” (shilu),which concentrate only on disasters of supra-regional
importance, just as the source of his preference does, he would have found 1159 floods and 613 droughts for the
period from 1644 to 1820 alone (cf. JJSZL, pp.693-706).
56
Only through the study of archive material, which is so far not a frequent custom, can we get an approximate
idea of the size and impact of the disasters in particular and in their sum. For the flood years (1736-1911) of
Qing times we have 3130 entries for the drainage area of the Yellow River alone, 4653 entries for the Huaihe
and 3805 for the Yangzi River (DASL I, II, III).
57 So far, a comprehensive analysis of the environmental degradation, natural disasters, and demography of the
history of the Lower Yangzi region, so often described by economic historians, is still missing. A first, if timid,
step was taken recently in a Chinese dissertation by Feng Xianliang with the title Ming-Qing Jiangnan diqu de
huangjingbiandong yu shehuikongzhi (Environmental Change and Social Control in the Jiangnan Region during
Ming and Qing times), published in Shanghai in 2002. However, the author argues strongly in favor of
harmonization, control, and development and deals with the historic disasters only on the basis of two
prefectures in Northern Zhejiang (Huzhou and Jiaxing). Cf. pp.167-234
55
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a decisive rise in natural disasters and a distinctive increase in epidemics58, above all the
plague, because China‘s macroclimate underwent a decline in temperature between 1840 and
1890. This was a phase with cold, moreover humid winters, especially in Southern China
(Hinsch 1988:155; Zhu Kezhen 1972:28; He Yaheng 1999:203, 206; Zhang Jianguang
1998:517-523). This period saw 19 floods of extraordinary dimensions, among them the onethousand-year flood of the Huanghe River in 1843, flooding about 2.1 mill. square kilometers
(Luo/Yue 1996:1-7;149-152). In addition, the course of the river was displaced to its Northern
bed from the mouth at the Yellow Sea south of the Shandong peninsula to the mouth at the Bo
Sea. Amelung rightly speaks of a “significant event in modern Chinese history” (2000:7).
Undoubtedly the greatest lethal catastrophe of the second half of the 19th century in China
was of social provenance – the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). We can only speculate on the
basis of the available sources, on the extent of depopulation as a result of its impact.59
For Republican times (1911-1949) a total of 7408 floods and 5935 droughts of greater or
smaller dimensions are documented (Xia Mingfang 2000:34), whereby the provinces of the
Middle and the Lower reaches of the Yangzi continued to take a slight lead over the drainage
are of the Yellow River (cf. Table 9). The first comprehensive reports on regions infested with
locusts in the gregarious stage of their development date from this period with up to 11
provinces or 265 districts affected (Kolb 1996b:51-52). The massive appearance of this insect
pest, ranking in third place after floods and droughts in historical sources, caused enormous
harvest losses and consequently famines, often accompanied by epidemics.60
An increase in the frequency of the appearance of floods and droughts in the sources during
the last dynasty is very apparent (Xia Mingfang 2000:30, 31; Chao Kang 1986:208). The
reasons are obvious: inclemency of climate, increased settling in high-risk areas and
accelerated environmental degradation are among the most important. Undoubtedly the rising
population density in high-risk areas affected the intensity of famines in those regions. There
The 193 epidemics (-243 till 1911) that McNeill mentions (1976:211) can only be regarded as the tip of the
iceberg and don‘t even include all of the mega-epidemics in Chinese history. They alone add up to at least 379
(Song Zhenghai 1992). According to the Qingshigao (Veritable Records), supra-regional epidemics were
reported every 2.3 years for the first half of the Qing dynasty (1644-1840) and every 1.4 years for the second
half (1840-1911; Zhang Jianguang 1998:421,515). These numbers would, of course, increase considerably with
an examination of the entire source material. For Republican times alone (1911-1949) 767 epidemics are on
record (Xia Mingfang 2000:34).
59 Contemporary Western observers estimated the number of casualties of the Taiping Rebellion at 20 to 30
million. Ho considers this estimate too low (1959:246-247). Cao Shuji, based on the figures in Local Gazetteers,
calculated 73.3 mill. deaths as a result of the war and the ensuing epidemics (2001:867).
60 Zao Ji lists a total of 1330 locust plagues for the period from the 12th century till the end of the 19th century,
128 of them for the 19th century (1986:15). In the province of Hebei alone, 144 locust invasions took place
between 1644 and 1911 and thirty-one during Republican times (Xia Mingfang 2000:371ff). On average, more
than ninety districts were affected by the fourteen greatest of these plagues (ibid.:37).
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are intrinsic inaccuracies in historic disaster chronologies. Lesser events became all the more
relevant, as the means of communicating information improved. For the period from 1644 to
1911 this factor cannot be considered statistically decisive. Instead, the state of the transport
system probably led to steadily worsening conditions in the transfer of information. A new
quality in the reporting of disasters was not achieved until Republican times.
There are Chinese Local Gazetteers which furnish a chronological outline of the extent of
historical disasters, usually with a list of the districts concerned. In regard to the hierarchical
grouping of events according to the degree of their impact, there is no agreement: the number
of administrative units as well as the amount of the population involved (deaths) are under
discussion (cf. Zhang/Song 1998:94ff). Beside quantitatively relevant data there are an
impressive number of qualifications in the elements of description. Among them are many
stereotype syntagms (ibid.:96-98). This leaves the historian a lot of room for interpretation.
Our main interest here is focused on the demographic effects of disasters in late imperial
times. The resulting casualties are thought to be the simplest and most reliable criterion for
the dimensions of a catastrophe. We know from studies in the empirical social sciences how
difficult it is for participants or spectators to judge the size of crowds. Victims generally tend
to exaggerate the effects of a catastrophe (Alexander 1995:571). The data from Chinese
sources, archives included, alternate between three forms of quantification: (1) precision that
must be considered fictional in view of the conditions of gathering figures (e.g. 11,875;
43,500), (2) figures that represent a very crude estimate of magnitude or indicate a large
crowd (100 000, 200 000 etc.) or (3) very inaccurate figures through the use of multipliers (ji
“some, several”, shu “several”). Furthermore, we find figures that play a special role in
mysticism (3, 8, 9, 36, 72, 300, 3000, 10 000 etc.). Percentages, mentioned in the sources, as
for instance 70-80 percent (shi zhi qi ba), are not to be taken literally either, as they only
suggest a large crowd. In trying to elicit a number of victims, we usually have to be content
with qualitative syntagms, as for instance “there were very many dead” (si zhi hen chong) or
“the dead lay in a thick mass” (siwang xiang zhong). Therefore, even a halfway realistic
estimate of the number of casualties from disasters in any given year of late imperial times is
absolutely impossible on account of the deficits of the source material.
The qualitative information on famine years, however, is of much greater value, as it reveals
the dimensions of human suffering. Famines have their “own internal chronology” (Arnold
1988:26). They generated in China as elsewhere, agonal behavior, pillage, gang formations
and uprisings once the stage of alarm had given way to that of resistance. Internal migration
230
usually set in at a relatively early point in the chronology. Moreover, the search for something
edible led to massive damage of the vegetation as all trees within reach were generally barked
and possibly stripped of their leaves and buds. Wide areas were left bare of their vegetation
cover and even all roots were dug up. Special chapters in the handbooks on agriculture
(nongshu) and botanical vademeca (survival guides) served to further the nearly total
exploitation of the edible plant kingdom.61 As mentioned above, further means of survival
were the sale of family members, women and daughters, as well as hunger cannibalism, if
conditions were bad enough.62
As in the case of natural disasters it is equally impossible to set up statistics of casualties on
account of famines, but we have an approximate idea of the frequency of their appearance.
Floods, droughts and locust plagues are documented as the prominent causes. Deng Yunte
discovered 405 famines in the twenty four dynastic histories, ninety of which occurred
between 1644 and 1911 (1937:55-56). Yuan Lin pointed out that in the province of Gansu, in
the Northwest of China, no less than 140 extreme nutritional crises took place between 1644
and 1949 (1994). In the Southern province of Guangdong, partly an economically favored
region, 126 years of regional famines occurred during this period (GDZRZH 1961:196-208).
Mallory‘s total figure of 1828 famines in Chinese history (1926:1; Nanking University) can
only refer to the worst of them.63
Without sufficient numbers of victims it is difficult to judge the influence of natural disasters
and famines on the demographic development. However, we can draw up a synopsis of those
great historic disasters for which we have figures. Even if we have only an approximate idea
of their dimensions, we have reason to assume that the resulting losses of life make up a good
part of the total mortality rate (Table 10).64 It is difficult to find a single year in China‘s
Zhou Dingwang‘s and Zhou Xianwang‘s handbook with the title Jiuhuang bencao (Famine Herbs), which was
written toward the end of the 14th century and describing 414 plants was widespread. Xu Guangqi incorporated
it in his Nongzheng quanshu (1639), one of the most important agrarian handbooks of pre-modern China.
62 The countless references to cannibalism (ren xiang shi = “the people ate one another”) have to be taken
seriously in view of a historiographically proven cannibalistic complex (cf. Höllmann 1998; Kolb 1996b). Zheng
Yi‘s book Hongsi jinianpai (Red Monument; Taibei 1993; abbreviated engl. version: Scarlet memories,
Boulder/Col. 1996) is revealing in this respect for the second half of the 20th century. Key Ray Chang‘s
Cannibalism in China (New Hampshire 1990) is interesting in its description of anthropophagous diversity but
totally inadequate in its study of sources and therefore to a large extent insufficient in its grasp of the “historical
reality” of the phenomenon of cannibalism in China. 51 years of massive famine cannibalism are documented for
the time from 1840 to 1949 alone, sometimes occurring in several provinces at the same time. Among other
things, the prices for human meat and numbers of cannibalized people are listed (Xia Mingfang 2000:404-412).
63 There were 89 famine crises in France in the period from the 11th to the 18th centuries, probably only the
supra-regional ones were recorded. Braudel assumes that hundreds of additional small, local crises took place
(1967:55). Florence experienced a total of 111 years of famine during the 316 years until 1767, possibly as the
result of the interruption of corn deliveries from Sicily (ibid.).
64 Mallory‘s China - Land of Famine (1926) is unsurpassed to this day as a standard work on the etiology and the
spread of hunger in China during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Retrospectively he concludes that “the
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history where famine did not prevail in at least one region. This includes the economically
favored regions.
Li/Cao consider epidemics to be an important mortality factor. A look at the situation in
Yunnan, where plague epidemics occurred repeatedly (1776-1820; 1856-1872; 1900), seems
to confirm this view. On the basis of deaths from the plague in twenty-two Local Gazetteers,
the authors arrive at mortality rates of up to 39.9% (2001:204-205). Even if these figures are
imprecise for the reasons mentioned, they nevertheless serve as an indication of the
demographic relevance.
We cannot verify if indeed 118.4 mill. can be declared victims of the disasters of all kinds for
the time between 1851 and 1908, as Cao Shuji claims, among them 95.5 mill. resulting
directly or indirectly from the impact of rebellions (2001:867). Other rough estimates are
equally possible. By including the figures of the Tables we calculated a total of 153.1 mill.
victims.
It will come as no surprise that China has produced an impressive historic welfare policy with
elaborate strategies for survival, subsistence and collective security. The duty to practice
social welfare was part of the patrimonial ruler’s and his officials’ conception of themselves.
This ideological obligation originated in the rational conviction that only a socially tranquil
population, living under economically acceptable conditions, would be able to pay taxes and
perform labor services. In the agrarian state of China with its predominantly physiocratic
economic policy, the welfare of the peasant population was therefore of primary importance.
Far more than 90% of the 222 887 armed uprisings documented for the time between 210
BCE to 1900 CE originated in the countryside and of that number at least 1440 were greater
peasant rebellions (Deng Geng 2000:7). Of 339 documented etiologies, 337 refer to natural
calamities as decisive triggers (Fang Jinji 1995). The instruments of combating famine were
at the peak of their integration, structuring and bureaucratization during the last dynasty. No
wonder the reconstruction of famine relief in western Sinology focused on the 18th century
(Will 1980) and the imposing granary system (Will/Wong 1991). But even during this century
the state was unable to keep the famine at bay (Will 1980:232).There is still a considerable
deficit in knowledge of the efficiency of the relief systems, since all the studies concerned are
heavily based on normative source material of administrative provenance and are thus
unsuited for a convincing approach to historical reality. The various systems consisted of
normal death rate may be said to contain a constant famine factor. Depleted vitality following years of want also
tends to increase the death rate” (p.1).
232
several components: the exorcism of evil (chunie), report of the district magistrate to the
superior authority in due time (baozai), thorough examination and evaluation of the impact
(kanzai), tax relief or tax remission (juanfu), poverty-ranking of the peasants (shenhu) and
handing out of relief certificates (zhenpiao), distribution of relief goods (fazhen), ambulant
immediate relief by distributing cereal gruel or porridge (zhenzhou) or relief by distributing
public work (gongzhen), grant of loans (jiehuo), promotion of commerce (tongshang),
collecting of vagrants (jiliuwang), general “harmonization” of the social tensions (anji)
through social welfare institutions (zhenji; fuxu), moral exhortations (jieyue) and finally a
resettlement policy (diaosu; cf.Li Xiangjun 1995:23-41; Will 1980). In prosperous regions,
even small market towns disposed of a distinguished spectrum of social welfare institutions
that were predominantly maintained by private contributions and approved by the state. Each
relief measure offered a lot of opportunities for fraud by the mostly unpaid volunteers. This
can also be verified in the case of the granary system (Will/Wong 1991). At no time was it
possible to establish a successful control system. The stocks were often misappropriated.
Furthermore I should mention the neglect of the granary buildings65 as well as the deliberately
low levels of stock quota. One of the favorite tactics of the time, which is still popular today,
was the temporary refill, before the inspections, with grain from neighbouring reserves (ibid.).
We should not forget that about 20 000 officials kept the state and local administration of the
Qing running66 (Fairbank 1978:12). The personnel were far too poorly educated for any
permanent monitoring of the granary system and other constituents of social welfare.
The construction and the management of the granaries were entirely dependent on the quality
of the local government and therefore subject to continuous historical change. Here too, a
corpus of selected examples is not suited to generalization. We are still waiting for an
exhaustive local study evaluating granary efficiency in late imperial China. We know from
archival material that the Qing state alone was able to intervene a total of 11 314 times on the
occasion of food crises in the period from 1644 to 1839, more than a hundred times in a single
province in one year’s time (Li Xianjun 1995:215-238). Altogether the funds for famine
relief are said to have amounted to about 450 million silver-tael in the period under review
(ibid.:63). That is about 13 times the tax yield of the prosperous year 1756. There were
For instance, in 1754, 28 of the 48 buildings of the “North-Granaries” (beicang) near Tianjin, the greatest
complex of tax grain in Northern China, were in such bad condition, that storage was no longer possible. In 1801
the entire complex was more or less in ruins. In 1808 it was provisionally restored with a donation of 8000
silver-tael. One year later rain again soaked in and caused heavy losses (Will/Wong 1991:133). What may the
condition of other, far less important, granaries have been?
66 Today the ratio is different - one cadre for every twenty-five people (cf. Becker 2000:302).
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enough successful relief operations in every part of the land to demonstrate their substantial
contribution to the mitigation of food crises.
However, a close look into the Local Gazetteer of any administrative unit shows that, in a
substantial number of cases, no relief action at all was started by the state. How should we
otherwise account for the frequency of documented famine and death? The value of
information gathered by analyzing extrapolated cases of famine relief in action is only of
limited use for the research on the efficiency of the famine relief system as a whole.
The collapse of the local and regional markets was one of the origins of famine and is
documented in the relevant sources by the listing of rapidly rising prices (see for
instance:GDZRZH 1961:197-208). Therefore, the promotion or reorganization of commerce
in the impact region belonged to the standard measures in combating famine. Furthermore,
transport was of utmost importance. We mentioned the partly deplorable situation of the
Chinese transport system and the high costs of transportation in late imperial times, especially
in the case of land traffic. Even regions with favorable hydro-geological conditions lost all
their advantages of transport in times of enduring drought. In any case, many rivers and canals
were only temporarily navigable in the course of a normal year. Poor communication was the
main reason for the nine to thirteen million dead during the famine of 1876-1879. In Northern
China of the 1920s, according to Mallory, “(r)elief cannot be brought [...] to a district beyond
fifty to one hundred miles from the source of supply if the grain is carried. In localities where
the roads are serviceable for wheelbarrows this distance can be increased two and one-half
times” (1926:29; 34). For this reason, “(r)esidents in one province may be dying from
starvation while adjoining provinces on either side are having excellent crops” (ibid.:35).
Without any doubt this observation also fully applies to the situation in late imperial times.
After some insight into the various kinds of historical data nobody will seriously doubt the
fact that natural disasters, famines, often accompanied by epidemics, influenced deeply the
course of the entire Chinese history. The omnipresence of these extreme events took a
constant toll on human life, thereby lowering the constant growth-rate. Anyone attempting to
extrapolate the death tolls from the general figures of the demographic development is
unfortunately confronted with the fact that most of the original population registers have been
lost and many of them are incomplete or simply heavily manipulated so that “statistic” losses
and losses of life are not clearly discernible. Migrations, a constant concomitant of famine, are
altogether out of reach of quantification. Yet we encounter “statistical” population figures on
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the provincial level of census indicating puzzling drops and recuperations (cf. Table 12) – a
point of departure for bold guesswork.
The question still remains if mega-disasters with hundreds of thousands, not to say millions,
of deaths can be regarded as demographic regulators. In Chao Kang‘s opinion, death tolls
directly or indirectly related to warfare could sharply reduce the population, but even the
Taiping Rebellion “caused merely a tiny ripple in the rising tide of Chinese population – a
ripple, moreover, completely incapable of functioning as a Malthusian positive check”
(1986:31, 32). Since population figures are highly untrustworthy, it proves difficult to
substantiate this statement. Maybe it is nonetheless of some interest that all available figures
on provinces concerned, especially on a local level, indicate heavy “statistical” losses (cf.
Table 12). Chao’s argument rests on the fast recuperation rate of a massive population. A
population of 400 million could have fully recovered from a loss of 25 million in about seven
years with a growth rate of only one percent (ibid.:32; cf. Table 13). Probably the “normal”
mortality rate during Qing times never allowed the annual growth rate to reach one percent.
Based on the deficient and, as we know, untrustworthy population figures, Li/Wang,
advocates of an exceptional population growth in the 18th century, state an average growthrate of 0.5% for the period from 1700 to 1950 (2000:86), which is, of course, not at all
impressive. By recurring to provincial figures from the 18th century (1767, 1771, 1776, 1780)
Lu/Teng worked out annual growth rates of -3.7 to 17.3%, half of which are settled below
0.7% (2000:833-834, table 40).
Figures on Cultivated Land in Qing and Republican China
In the search for arguments supporting the hypothesis of rapid population growth in Qing
times, population figures are hardly helpful. We have to screen the sources thoroughly. There
is an abundance of material of which imperial decrees, memorials from all echelons of central
and local administration as well as considerations of concerned scholars are only the most
prominent documents. It is especially worthwhile to consult the Local Gazetteers as they
provide most valuable data on the over-utilization of agro-ecological areas on account of
population growth (cf. Luo/Shu 1995:47ff; 59ff; Gao Songyi 1984:107ff). A lot of data, at
least on local and regional levels, points to a considerable transgression of the threshold value
of human carrying capacity, not only in agro-economically favored parts of the country, but
even in marginal and ecologically sensitive regions (LSZRDL 1982; Perdue 1987; Osborne
1991). Mark Elvin speculates on a turning point around 1850 (1989:754) when the Chinese
population reportedly totaled about 430 million, whereas according to Vermeer it is
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“generally accepted” that China (with supposedly 300 million) was already overpopulated
around 1800 (1998.268). Cao Shuji distinguishes, beginning with the 18th century, between
emigration and immigration regions and calls the former overpopulated (2001:865).67
The regional and local overexploitation of the agro-environments caused a rapidly growing
rate of degradation from the 18th century onward, increasing the impact magnitude of the
atmospheric and hydrological hazards, famines and epidemics, which, as already mentioned
above, absorbed year-by-year an oscillating number of percentage points of the population
growth rates. The statement that “[C]hinese death rates were probably lower than European
ones between 1550 and 1850” (Pomeranz 2002:428) is very bold indeed in view of the facts
mentioned above.
Of course, efforts have been made to gain some quantitative insight into the problem of
overpopulation in pre-modern time by reconstructing the ratio of agrarian land to population
as well as agrarian land to agricultural productivity. We know that the per capita acreage
shrank continuously from a roughly estimated 5.7 mu in the second half of the 16th century
to 4 mu in 1772, 2.80 mu in 1812 and finally 2.76 mu in 1949 (Wu Cunhao 1996:1114).68
A growing pressure of population on cultivable land is the self-suggesting conclusion drawn
from these figures. However, we should beware of any generalization for the whole of China
because this pressure has to be evaluated locally and regionally (cf. Tables 15 and 16).
Cultivated Area (1644-1911)
Of course, the enquiry into the reliability of the figures in the sources is again of foremost
importance. The figures cited in the relevant studies are usually either taken from one single
source or several sources, but merged into single figures by using an individually conditioned
probability factor. All these figures do not immediately mirror all the imponderables adhering
to them. First of all we perceive a surprising relative “statistical” stability of the cultivated
land area, which is in contradiction to the enormous reclamations of land documented in the
sources (cf. Table 17). As He Bingdi has shown, this stability corresponds to the stability of
In the early 1950s the optimal population size for China was at first considered to be 500 million (by Ma
Yinchu). Fang Rukang raised this to 700 million and finally one ended up at 950 million, a number surpassed at
the latest by 1978. However one may define the concept of “human carrying capacity” – Cohen (1996) supplies
eight prominent definitions and no less than 58 modifications – the concept has something to do with a
maximum population size that can be supported under sustainable conditions by an environment and its critical
resources over a long time. There can be no question that the Chinese people today live farther beyond the limits
of the human carrying capacity of their country as a whole than ever before in history. The vulnerability of the
environment has never been greater.
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the local figures (1995:77ff). This is not surprising because after 1657 no further statewide
surveys with the official zhang-measure (= c.3.20m) were carried out. One of the most
probable explanations for this phenomenon is the concealment of land reclamations (yinni or
yindi) in order to evade taxation. The Landsat/Medea photos from 1997 confirm the vividness
of this tradition. They show an increase of approximately 60 percent of agricultural land,
including gardens and fish ponds (Smil 1999:427). The greatest discrepancies were found in
hilly and mountainous country, not the high-yielding regions, but even there, “substantial
underreporting” was discovered (ibid.). In view of an average loss of about 500 000 ha of
agricultural land per year, which is “production capacity for at least 4 million people”
(ibid.:426), this statistical increase was most welcome. During late imperial times, yindi was
one of the many tactics of tax minimizing. The prospects were especially favorable in the
wake of social unrest and after a longer period of fallow, when re-cultivation and surveys took
place (Zhang Yan 1997:152). Of course, we can only guess at the extent of the areas
concealed from the authorities, but sporadic local surveys showed impressive figures in the
difference between the original entry in the land registers and the results of the re-survey,
indicating that probably more than half of the land was yindi.69
A certain amount of the agricultural land was exempt from taxes and therefore from
registration. This includes, for instance, land of low fertility in Henan, Sichuan, and Central
Shandong during the Daoguang period (1821-1850), barely accessible terrain in Guizhou and
Yunnan, sandy soil in Guangzhou as well as mountainous wasteland in the prefectures (fu) of
Gao, Lei and Lian and steep terrain along rivers and the seashore in Liaoning (ibid.). The
surroundings of temples etc., school land, charity land, as well as temporarily or permanently
reclaimed land (ibid.) were also tax exempt. It goes without saying, that taxes could also be
avoided by fraudulent declarations of land (Umwidmungen; cf. Hsiao 1967:106).
The surveys of agricultural land posed many problems and were conducted in a highly
irregular fashion. Many varying shapes of fields had to be considered. As there were not
nearly enough survey crews70, they proceeded by way of estimates that consequently led to a
considerable quota of errors. The best results were achieved when imperial survey troops
moved in, which was predominantly the case in economically favored regions with a high tax
Liang Fangzhong‘s figures deviate more or less. For the year 1724 he used ding (fiscal units) to calculate per
capita acreage (25 284 818 ding to 683 791 427 mu); consequently the ratio is very high: 27.04 mu/ding
(1980:393). The further figures for 1753 are 6.89, for 1766 at 3.53 and 1812 at 2.19.
69 In four dao (circuits) in the province of Sichuan, deviations from the entries in the “fish-scale registers” (landmeasurement register), varying between 49 and 88 percent, became apparent (Zhang Yan 1997:152-153).
70 These survey crews were made up of an overseer, surveyor, cartographer, roper, book keeper and a scribe
(Yang Yongjian in QJSWB j.31:682-683).
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performance. The expenditure of time for a survey was considerable. It took far more than a
year to cover one district. The costs had to be met by the local population. The old registers
were to serve as guidelines, but often they no longer existed (Zhang Yan 1997:155-156).
Because of the costs and the administrative expenditure, the landowners were frequently
called upon to take the surveys into their own hands. The official survey crews had orders to
conduct selective inspections. The authorities in charge were given a summary report.
According to Lu Shiyi (1611-1672), the corrupt Yamen employees and local bullies as well as
a high degree of deception among the landowners, were responsible for the difficulties in the
surveys of agricultural land (QJSWB j.31:767-768)71 . For financial reasons, many local
administrations had no registers at all (Zhang Yan 1997:159).72
The official area unit mu (240 square-paces = bu or gong = c.614.4 square meters) was by no
means standardized or even in practical use everywhere. In North and Northeast China, for
instance, the jiong was widespread, applied like a “Morgen” (area which can be worked by
one man in one day), but which could also cover locally varying amounts of mu (Fang Xing et
al. 2000:236-237). Where the basic measure chi (five chi = one bu) was concerned, there was
considerable local diversity even within the administrations, not to speak of popular culture
(Qiu Guangming et al. 2001:421ff; 434-435). Among the many regionally or locally typical
terms for fields and field measurements, there were also those that were determined by
productivity or the sowing rate.
Not only the units of measure but also the measuring tools and weights were in a state of
chaos. Even at the grassroots, the village level, variety and confusion prevailed. One “foot”
shows different lengths and correspondingly generated different field sizes (ibid.:237). The
great attempt to unify measures and weights in 1704 was in vain and so were all the other
efforts up to the early 1950s. During the first half of the 20th century, field surveys unveiled
an astonishing diversity. For instance, in 22 villages and their surroundings near the city of
Wuxi in the province of Jiangsu there were altogether 173 different mu-sizes and standards
discovered (Zhang Yan 1997:171-172).
Finally we have to mention the so-called “fiscal mu”, which was locally based on soil
assessment to establish a certain kind of fiscal justice: “Down to the twentieth century there
were usually two kinds of land registers, one containing the returns for actual mou and one the
The texts of the QJSWB were intended to aid officials in coping with administrative problems during the early
19th century.
72 Yao Wenran and his assistants (d. 1678) drew up a “fish-scale register” of more than twenty thousand pages at
a cost of over two thousand silver-tael (cf. QJSWB j.31:769). The cost was the highest possible annual salary
and budget of a district magistrate.
71
238
returns of fiscal mou”(Ho 1959:111). The rates of conversion were varied locally (cf. He
Bingdi 1997:92-99). Not all the sources mention these rates which could be manipulated in
many ways (Zhang Yan 1997:150).
Zhang Yan put it in a nutshell: “The figures regarding cultivated areas in Qing times are
complicated and unrealistic” (1997:151). It is almost unnecessary to point to the fact that not
even further micro-studies could ever enable an historian to reconstruct serious figures for the
provincial or even statewide agricultural productivity in late imperial China. The source
material is extremely incomplete, unclear in details and frequently contradictory. It cannot
seriously be included in the calculations of the nutritional situation of the population. The
same is of course true of considerations on the “human carrying capacity”.
Cultivated Area (1911-1949)
The main question is, if statistics during Republican times made enough progress to produce
figures regarding agricultural land, which can be used for quantitative analyses of the general
socio-economic conditions. The answer cannot turn out to our satisfaction. As we have shown
for the (population) census, the coordination of the different statistical institutions was lacking
and the results of all the surveys are incomplete and inexact (Li/Mo 1993:246-247; Brandt
1997:307, Faure 1989:48-52; Liu Yanwei 1999:205).
Around 1946, the state‘s statistical system consisted of c.1900 permanent organs on all levels
of administration, among them one in every ministry, and c.5000 employees (Li/Mo
1993:329). The credibility of agrarian statistics produced between 1912 and 1921 by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce (from 1913 on united:
nongshangbu) is considered to be problematic (Makino 2002:3). For the province of Jiangsu,
local survey material from the year 1921 can be drawn on for comparison (ibid,; Faure
1993:51).
Three more extensive surveys (dense surveys) were carried out by the statistical unit of the
Ministry of Justice (lifabu), one in the district of Jiangning in Jiangsu (1931), another
statewide relying on the postal system and a third together with the “Directorate of the Bureau
of Statistics” (zujichu tongjiju) in 25 of 28 provinces and 1781 of 1935 districts (Li/Mo
1993:248-249). Makino studied the material and his results are disappointing: “these statistics
suffer from the problem of cultivated area and under-reporting of production value by farmers
to avoid taxation” (2002:3). The figures for cultivated areas “are even lower than the
traditional ones on taxed land” (Ho 1959:125).
239
The results of Buck‘s survey from 1929 to 1933 in 22 provinces and 308 districts are
generally regarded as relatively reliable. The selection of the 16 786 peasant households for
interviews was up to his collaborators, students of the Nanking University, who were the
offspring of well-to-do families with the usual bias towards the rural population.
Consequently it came to “serious sampling errors” (Makino). The figures on agricultural land
had been drawn from “Monthly Reports on Statistics” (Tongji yuebao) of the “Directorate of
Statistics” of the Nanking government. Buck consulted the population figures of eight
provinces and the average figure of mu per head in eight selected regions for supplementation
and correction of his data (He Bingdi 1997:135). His aggregates are considerably understated,
as a comparison with the “Manual of the Extensive Report on Cultivated Area” (tudi
chengbao gangyao) of 1934 and the data of air surveys (beginning in 1932) show. The figures
of the “Manual...” are partly based on a self-reporting system, which had been introduced for
experimental reasons in some districts at that time. The deviations show an average of 124.7%
to 160.4% and in extreme cases, like that of the Tianmen district in Hubei, up to 583.8%
(ibid.:133.135; Ho 1959:Tables on pp.128,131,133).
According to Makino, the “Crop Reports” of the “National Agricultural Research Bureau” of
the period under review from 1931 to 1938, which were published between 1933 and 1939,
have to be regarded as the most useful agricultural statistics on a local level (2002:3).
However, a closer look indicates that district figures were incomplete and rounded off by
estimations; the same is true for provincial figures (Li/Mo 1993:249).
The inconsistency of the figures on provincial cultivated land speaks for itself: there are
abrupt leaps of more than 100 mill. mu (= c.6.7 mill. ha) in a period of twenty years and
phases of suspicious stability (Table 18). Cressey recognized the statistical dilemma of his
time: “All statistics in China need to be scrutinized with considerable care. Some are fairly
reliable,73 but too often they have been compiled without first-hand evidence, and with little
regard to accuracy and comprehensiveness” (1934:90).
Furthermore, we should not forget that more than 1000 different sizes of the basic measure
chi (feet) are documented for Republican times (Qiu Guangming et al. 2001:440ff) and in
reality this number could well be quite a bit higher. What has been true for the measuring of
lengths and areas can also be said about measures of weight and capacity. Neither late
imperial nor Republican administrations succeeded in unification and standardization. During
the first half of the 20th century, more than 500 capacity measures were reported, and there
240
were considerable differences in measures of nominally the same size (Qiu Guangming et al.
2001:440). This fact had, of course, some influence on the reports on agrarian productivity.
Concluding Remarks
The samples of figures on population and cultivated land area, which are available to
historians dealing with late imperial China, are more or less unsuited for drawing up serious
historic statistics. The data had only nominally been gathered throughout all the districts of
the entire country and there were no overall surveys in that time. The consequences of inertia
in the “survey teams” and bureaus of the officials as well as the many possibilities for
manipulation of data on every level of administration caused the intrinsic inaccuracy of the
figures. As late as Republican times, when modern statistics were gradually established on a
nationwide level, not a single overall survey could be carried out because of the political and
military inner conflicts and the struggle against the Japanese aggression. Even the most
refined historical-statistical methods will always result in quite a considerable amount of
guesswork. The varying figures and aggregates of the sources are reflected in a high degree of
arbitrariness in the literature on historical-quantitative topics of the period under review.
It might be quite useful to cast a look at the situation of statistics in today‘s China, in part
because traditional practices are still alive. Since the early 1950s statistics, per definitionem,
served the Communist Party propaganda. The Great Leap Forward and the famine from 1959
to 1962 (30 to 50 million deaths) marks the zenith of statistical madness. But even after the
Mao Era statistics gave rise to constant irritation. There are at least two kinds of figures: the
unpublished ones for internal use only and the published ones (cf. Shehui lanpishu “Blue
Book of the Society”; annually compiled). Inspections on the quality of statistical surveys and
their figures, carried out since the year 1985, officially unveiled more than 50 000 offences in
1989 and more than 75 000 in 1997 in one year‘s time (Cai Yongshun 2000:783). The actual
number must be considerably higher. Cadres on all five levels of state administration are
“over-reporting their achievements”, “underreporting their failures” and “making up
statistics”. To keep the fertility rate low, birth and child mortality rates were manipulated
(Merli 1998:784-785). It is furthermore a well-known fact that provinces notoriously overreport their GDP (Holz 2002:41). The untrustworthy aggregates presented are of little use for
serious statistics. According to Cai Yongshun, statistics have become “so egregious that
people do not even believe the statistics published in government-based newspapers”
Cressey points here to the figures of the “Statistical Bureau” of the central government, whose reliability seems
very doubtful to Makino (2002:3).
73
241
(ibid.:787). The local statistical bureaus at the grassroots-level are “too weak to demand
accurate reporting, and perhaps not qualified to make adjustments to the reported data
themselves” (Holz 2002:55). Fully in accordance with tradition, the bureau staff are
frequently contented with estimations (ibid.:41). Nevertheless, social scientists usually make
indiscriminate use of these “soft” data to present “hard” facts. The last census, accompanied
by propaganda noise, resulted in a total aggregate of 1.26 billion people (including Taiwan),
which has been corrected in the meantime by the Academy of Social Science in Bejing to
about 1.52 billion. people (c.f. Chengming 2001.9, p.24). Mysteriously, this correction has
still not been widely taken notice of.
In the ongoing debate about China‘s role in world history since early modern times and the
cardinal question, why China failed to modernize like the West, also figures and
quantifications beyond the topics we just discussed, are sometimes brought forward as
corroborating proof. They should not be taken too seriously before a careful evaluation of
their validity.74
Furthermore, the debate shows at least partially what Braembussche calls “a significant
limitation of comparative history in general”, namely “that it is usually based on secondary
sources, and there is a tendency simply to accept the interpretations given in the sources. Thus
comparative history is the interpretation of interpretation” (1989:22). In this way tertiary
literature comes into being. Historians who cannot verify statements by research in the
primary sources lack the insight into the historiographic poverty of some of the crucial
arguments in question. They simply have to accept them as they are presented by Sinohistorians.
The arguments of western-based historians who see no major differences in many aspects of
the economy, technology and infrastructure between Europe and China in 1800 or are even
Is it really true that China disposed of “13 percent forest cover and a sustainable fuel supply per year about
20% above probable minimum needs” around 1800 (Pomeranz 2002:435)? Doubts about the validity of this
statement are surely not unjustified. The level of research, especially in the fields of archaeobotany and historical
phytogeography, is totally insufficient in order to draw quantitative conclusions on a nationwide level. This is
probably why Nicholas K. Menzies (1994; 1996), the leading western scholar in this field, as well as most of his
Chinese colleagues, do not mention any figures regarding the forest cover percentage. The overwhelming
majority of sources on Chinese forest history during late imperial times (up to the middle of the 19th century)
lack any seriously quantifiable data. Furthermore, even quotes from Western literature should not be uncritically
accepted. We read, for instance, based on Clark (1991) that “British agricultural yields changed very little
between 1750 and 1850” (Pomeranz 2002:433). However, Clark proved a rise of yields from 18.9 to 25.8
bushels/acre for the period from 1650/1733 to 1850 (p.465-457). Kent G. Deng, supposedly following Buck,
wrote: “In China, according to Buck, as much as 25 percent of agricultural growth during the 1930s was
attributable to streamlining the traditional technology” (2000:15). But what Buck really wrote was: “Perhaps a
25 percent increase in total production by more intensive methods and by modern techniques would be a
conservative estimate of the possible increase economically, in China‘s agricultural production with the known
methods of agricultural production” (1937:203).
74
242
inclined to ascribe a certain superiority to China (for example, the water transport system)
“rested”, as Fischer would say, “upon a totally insufficient body of data which misrepresents
the composition of the object in question” (1970:104-105). To generalize the conditions from
two or three economically favored regions (Lower-Yangzi region, areas in Guangdong and
Fujian, and sometimes Hunan) is historiographically incorrect. The differences between the
environmental, economic and social conditions in the various provinces, prefectures and even
districts, were immense and they remain so, as is generally known, up to this day. We may
derive comfort from the fact that even for France and other European countries with fairly
good documentation,
agricultural dimensions on a nationwide level are not seriously
describable before about 1860 (Vilar 1973:185). Correspondingly, the generalization from
very few local samples on microdemographic topics as, for instance, mortality, life
expectancy or fertility rates, is not recommended.
There is a distinct tendency in the debate to ignore certain environmental parameters, such as
the historical disaster research. Kent G. Deng is right in pointing out that “to ignore disasters
[...] in dealing with China‘s economic past can thus be very misleading” (2000:7). Not even
the western level of research on environmental history (above all Perdue 1987; Osborne 1991,
Marks 1998, and Elvin/Liu ed. 1998) has been adequately considered yet.
Furthermore, there is a certain reluctance to accept the historiographic truism that historical
arguments cannot be based on normative sources alone. The information in these sources can
be far removed from “historical reality”. For instance, a decreed program cannot be simply
transplanted into the historical narrative without proving the time it took for it to become
established and the geographical extent of its realization. The description of agricultural
techniques in historical handbooks (nongshu) says nothing about their dissemination in the
country, which has to be proved by corroborating evidence in further sources (Local
Gazetteers, “Brush Notes” (biji), memoranda etc.). Statements about the uniformity of
measures and weights, calendars, census practices etc. etc. are idealistic and incongruent with
historical knowledge about China. The more or less chaotic situation regarding weights and
measures is an exorbitant challenge for any historian arguing with figures and aggregates.
There is still an immense need in the West for historical local and regional studies on China
beyond the economically favored regions in order to get a more balanced view on the topics
debated. Another desideratum is comprehensive research on Chinese overland transport in
general as well as river transport in the hydro-geographically second-rank provinces during
Ming and Qing times. The whole historical complex of mining, transportation and
243
consumption of coal calls for further studies. All these issues are of great importance for a
historical comparison of China with industrializing Europe.
Nevertheless, macro-comparison theories regarding China‘s history, in spite of their
occasionally sweeping statements, are of some heuristic value as long as they are not totally
based on arguments, which are insufficiently supported by primary source evidence. Their
role in showing the way for further research is most welcomed by local and regional
historians.
Tables
1. Major inventions in the history of Chinese agriculture
(According to their first appearance in the sources)
land use
+fertilizer
Zhou
Qin/Han
Sanguo
Jin
Nanbei
Sui/Tang
Wudai
Song
Yuan
Ming
Qing
12+2
8+8
1
1+5
1+3
1+1
1
8+5
7+2
7+10
8+4
irrigation
tools
cultivation
sericulture
9
14
2
13
12
1
7
2
11
6
16
1
14
2
13
9
1
5
7
2
4
22
3
7
5
5
12
8
6
11
10
9
2
6
3
8
2
3
4
Zhou: c.-1030 to -221; Qin/Han:-221 to 220; Sanguo: 220-280; Jin: 265-420; Nanbei: 420581; Sui/Tang:581-907; Wudai: 907-979; Song (906-1127/1279;
Yuan: 1271-1368; Ming: 1368-1644; Qing: 1644-1911
Source: Min Zongdian 1989
244
2. Population data
(Late Imperial China)
year
population (mil.)
1391
1393
71.6 (4); 69.9 (2) [ > 65 (1)]
93.0 (3); 70.5 (2)
1403
1404
1491
101.0 (3)
59.7 (2)
81.0 (2)
1502
1562
1566
1571
50.9 (9)
96.7 (2); 63.6 (9)
166.3 (3)
62.5 (9)
1600
1602
1644
1646
1650
1661
1679
1681
160 (8);
98.7 (2); 56.3 (9)
152.5 (4)
88.4 (2)
125 (8)
90.6 (3); 91.1 (2); 76.5 (6)
126.0 (4)
99.3 (3); 93.9 (2)
1701
1731
1741
1774
1775
1776
1788
1800
1834
1840
1850
1851
1868
1869
1874
1880
1890
122.3 (3); 100.6 (2)
167.0 (3); 129.7 (2);
183.67 (10); 185.3 (3); 159.6 (2); 143.4 (1)
221.0 (2)
264.5
311.5 (4); 274.4 (2); 268.2 (1,7,10); 267.3 (3)
294.85 (10)
295.2 (1, 3, 10); 299.9 (2);
401.00 (9, 10)
412.8 (1); 418.8 (2)
429.9 (1, 5)
436.1 (4); 432.89 (10)
384.0 (2); 257.9 (5)
239.0 (9)
358.9 (3); 396.4 (2)
364.5 (4)
380.6 (2)
1901
1910
1911
1936
1940
426.4 (3)
436.0 (4); 408.1 (6); 367.8 (5)
442.9 (3); 408.1 (9); 405.4 (2)
496.7 (3)
450.0 (2)
245
1949
1960
1962
1964
1969
1980
1990
2000
2001
545.4 (3); 541.7 (4)
706,83 (2)
684.4 (2)
739.0 (4); 717.2 (2)
821.0 (2)
1004.8 (2)
1160.0 (4)
1265.83 (official census)
> 1520.0 (Cheng Ming 2001.9)
Sources:
(1)
Ho Ping-ti 1959
[Official Population Data (1741-1851) - Appendix I]
(2)
Zhao Wenlin/Xie Shujun 1988
(3)
Lu Yu/Teng Zezhi 2000
(4)
Cao Shuji 2001
(5)
Liu Yanwei 1999.3:205-210
(6)
Wang Yumin 1992:178-191
(7)
Jiang Tao 1990:26-51
(8)
Perkins, Dwight H. 1969
(9)
Yuan Zuliang 1994
(10) Jiang Tao 1993
246
3. Selected population figures (1911-1949)
1912
1919
1917
1928
1929
1930
1931
1933
1936
1937
1940
1945
1946
1949
355 729 605
405 810 967
419 640 279
468 487 473
439 405 00
474 787 386
441 849 148
451 842 000
482 808 000
495 381 199
419 957 000
485 508 838
342 000 000
444 000 000
456 200 000
502 300 000
438 930 000
452 800 000
474 787 386
474 800 000
444 486 537
470 960 109
473 530 000
496 823 711
469 618 000
440 007 927
466 780 000
438 400 000
471 000 000
516 458 301
455 592 065
475 000 000
543 070 000
548 770 020
Home Office (National Census)
Chen Changheng in Yearbook of Chinese Economy 1934
Yearbook of the Home Office
Lu/Teng 2000:1003
Zhao/Xie 1988:543
Provincial Statistics (Yearbook of the Home Office)
Chen Changheng (ibid.)
Customs Report (Yearbook of Chinese Economy)
Report of Postal Authorities (cf. Wang Shida 1931)
Lu/Teng 2000:1016
Statistical Bureau od the GMD-Government
Report of the Post Office
W. F. Willcox (cf. Wang Shida 1931)
Knowledge of the World Yearbook
Estimation by Chen Changheng
Newest Atlas of China
Shewnbao Yearbook 1933
Statistics Monthly 1931.10
Home Office
Home Office
Synopsis of Chinese Population Statsitics
First Officicial Figures of the Home Office
Shenbao Yearbook 1935
Lu/Teng 2000:1038
Zhao/Xie 1988:543
Deng Xinwei 1984
Practical Peoples Yearbook 1941
Zhao/Xie 1988:543
Bureau of Statistics (cf. Deng Xinwei 1984)
Lu/Teng 2000:1038
Home Office (Department of Statistics): baojia-Records
General Situation During the Third Civil War (1983)
Yearbook of Chinese Popuilation (1985)
Bureau of Chinese Statistics: Ten Glorious Years (1959)
Source: Qiang Tao 1993:87-91; Lu/Teng 2000; Zhao/Xie 1988;
247
4. Figures for natural disasters 1
1. Droughts
Early:416; Song:183; Yuan:86; Ming:174; Qing:201; Republic:14
1074
2. Floods
Early: 361; Song:193; Yuan:92; Ming:196; Qing:192; Republic:24
1058
3. Locust infestations
Early:135; Song:90; Yuan:61; Ming:94; Qing:93; Republic:9
482
4. Hailstorms
Early:133; Song:101; Yuan:69; Ming:112; Qing:131; Republic:4
550
5. Damages caused by storms
Early:183; Song:93; Yuan:42; Ming:97; Qing:97; Republic:6
518
6. Earthquakes
Early:228; Song:77; Yuan:56; Ming:165; Qing:169; Republic:10
705
7. Frost
Early:135; Song:18; Yuan:28; Ming:16; Qing:74; Republic:2
203
8. Epidemics
Early:65; Song:32; Yuan:20; Ming:64; Qing:74; Republic:6
261
9. Famines
Early:76; Song:87; Yuan:59; Ming:93: Qing:90; Republic:2
407
________________________________________________________________
Total
5258
Source: Deng Yunte 1937: 1-61; 55-56
248
5. Figures for natural disasters 2
Floods(- 206 bis 1911)
Most affected provinces:
Western Han
6
Eastern Han
52
Jin/Six Dynasties
52
Tang
89
Wudai and
Northern Song
125
Southern Song
132
Yuan
112
Ming
112
Qing
669
______________________
Total
1349 (Deng Yunte 1058)
Henan
Zhili
Jiangsu
Shandong
Anhui
Zhejiang
Droughts (-206 bis 1911)
Most affected provinces
Western Han
29
Eastern Han
63
Jin/Six Dynasties
155
Tang
200
Wudai and
Northern Song
227
Southern Song
210
Yuan
153
Ming
304
Qing
328
______________________
Total
1669 (Deng Yunte 1074)
Henan
Zhili
Zhejiang
Jiangsu
Shanxi
Shaanxi
Huibei
Shandong
Anhui
Source: Zhu Kezhen cit. in Zhang/Song 1998:88-90
249
161
144
126
106
103
97
144
142
118
101
100
92
90
84
82
6. Figures for natural disasters 3
floods
droughts
others
total
Qin and Western Han
-246 bis 24
32
39
66
137
Eastern Han and Three Kingdoms
25 - 264
58
73
132
263
Jin
265-419
73
99
90
262
Southern and Northern Dynasties
420-588
83
109
32
224
Sui/Tang
589-906
212
162
102
476
Wudai
907-959
42
32
6
80
Song
960-1279
465
372
411
1248
Yuan
1279-1367
373
283
204
860
Ming
1368-1643
496
434
294
1224
Qing
1644-1843
699
885
631
2215
1844-1913
926
1016
766
2708
______________________________________________________________________
Total
3459
3504
2734
9697
Source: Chen Gaoli 1986
250
7. Figures for natural disasters 4a
(1644-1839)
Era
Shunzhi
1644-1661
Kangxi
1662-1722
Yongzheng
1723-1735
Qianlong
1736-1795
Jiaqing
1796-1820
Daoguang
1821-1850
Floods
Average of
prefectures/
districts
Droughts
Average of
prefectures/
districts
935
52
486
27
2658
44
2766
45
793
61
272
21
6027
100
3303
55
2605
104
1412
57
3366
177
946
50
Source: Li Xiangjun 1995:19
251
8. Provincial figures for natural disasters 4b
(1644-1839)
Province/Area
Floods
Provinz/Area
Jiangsu
2995
Zhili
2994
Shandong
2385
Anhui
2007
Hubei
1258
Henan
1103
Zhejiang
795
Gansu
588
Jiangxi
555
Shanxi
302
Hunan
287
Guangdong
264
Shaanxi
235
Dongbei
229
Fujian
145
Yunnan
87
Sichuan
83
Guangxi
45
Guizhou
27
_______________________
total
16 384
Droughts
Zhili
1725
Shandong
1358
Gansu
984
Zhejiang
730
Jiangxi
648
Shaanxi
585
Hubei
576
Henan
575
Jiangsu
566
Anhui
537
Shanxi
319
Hunan
250
Guangdong
96
Fujian
90
Dongbei
61
Guangxi
56
Sichuan
14
Guizhou
8
Yunnan
7
_____________________
total
9185
Source: Li Xiangjun 1995:214
Zhili = roughly Hebei
Dongbei = Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang
252
9. Natural disasters, Republican China
(1911-1949)
Yellow River
draining area
Flood
Drought
Insects
Hebei
Shandong
Henan
Shanxi
Shaanxi
Gansu
752
462
681
355
346
81
350
341
858
444
569
311
338
125
226
68
162
22
Draining area of
middle/lower reaches
of the Yangzi-River
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Jiangxi
Hubei
Hunan
272
394
430
464
454
772
142
129
350
229
442
417
167
63
168
119
101
121
Southwest China
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
502
112
131
834
154
51
6
1
1
South China
Guangxi
Guangdong
Fujian
249
459
176
174
36
60
21
1
Northeast China
Jilin,Liaoning,
Heilongjiang
316
44
___________________________________________________
total
7408
5935
1719
Source: Xia Mingfang 2000:34, Table 1-3; 37
253
10. Great disasters in Chinese history
(1644-1949)
Year
Disaster and Region
Death Toll
1696
1786
1810
[um] 1811
1846
1849
1857
1862
1876-78/79
1877
1879
1884-1886
1887
1888
1904
1911
1912
1913
1915
1919
1920
1920
1923
1923-25
Taifun/tsunami in Shanghai
Earthquake in Sichuan/Huding
Famine in China
(dito)
(dito)
(dito)
(dito)
Taifun/tsunami in Guangdong
Drought in Shandong, Henan und Hebei
Drought in Shanxi
extreme cold in Xinjiang
Epidemic disease in Yunnan (Kunming)
Flood in Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu
Famine in China
Drought in Sichuan/Chongqing
Flood in Jiangsu and Anhui
Flood in Zhejiang (Qingtian and Yunhe)
Flood in Zhejiang (Qingtian and Yongjia)
Flood in Guangdong
Epidemic disease (Pandemia)
Drought in Shandong, Henan and Shanxi
Earthquake in Ningxia (Haiyuan)
Flood in 12 Provinces
East-Yunnan/ cold and fmine
Drought and famine in Sichuan
Drought and famine in
Sichuan/Gansu/Shaanxi u.a.
Floods in Hubei, Hunan, Anhui
Variety of disasters
Flood in Jilin and Heilongjiang
Flood in Hubei and Hunan
Drought in Henan
Drought in Guangdong (Taishan)
Famine in Hunan
100 000
100 000
9 mil.
20 mil.
280 000
15 mil.
5 - 8 mil.
100 000
13 mil.
2.5 mil.
100 000
100 000
930 000
3.5 mil.
100 000
750 000 - 800 000
220 000
150 000
100 000
300 000
500 000
240 000-300 000
300 000
300 000
100 000 - 1.15 mil.
1929-32
1931
1931-36
1932
1935
1942-43
1943
1946
17.7 mil.
140 000
6.98 mil.
600 000
140 000
500 000 - 3 mil.
3 mil.
3 mil.
Sources: Zhang/Song 1998:180-181; Gao Wenxue 1999:513-520; Xia Mingfang 2000:395403
254
11. Frequency of natural disasters in China
Source: Li Xiangjun. Qingdai huangzheng yanjiu. Beijing 1995:113-214 contains 28 938
entries for catastrophes in the period from 1644 to 1839 and 11 314 cases of tax remissions
on account of major disasters.
Epidemics
Source 1: Chen Gaoyong 1940 cit. in W.H. McNeill. Plagues and Peoples. Harmondsworth
1976
183 epidemics from -243 to 1911
Source 2: Song Zhenghai. Zhongguo gudai zhongdaziran zaihai han yichang nianbiao zongyi.
Guangzhou 1992
379 serious epidemics (dayi) from -674 to 1911
371
dito
from - 1th century to 1911
Source 3: Zhang Jianguang. Sanqiannian yi qing. Nanchang 1998
Ming (1368-1644 = 276 years): 118 years of epidemics
Qing (1644-1911 = 267 years): 134 years of epidemics
Earthquakes
Source 1: Hoang, Pierre. Catalogue des Tremblements de Terre Signale en Chine. Shanghai
1910
3322 earthquakes occured from -1831 to 1896
Source 2: Gu Gongxu et al. Zhongguo dizhen mulu. Beijing 1983
(c. 15 000 citations of c.8-9000 earthquakes)
3187 strong earthquakes (M > 5) from -1831 to 1969
Floods
Source 1: Qingdai Huangheliuyu honglao danganshiliao. Beijing 1993
(Archive material: Huanghe drainage area)
Huanghe: 3130 entries to floods including water level indication for the period 1736 to 1911
(176 years);
flood-frequency for the provinces: 2 - 66 years
Source 2: Qingdai Huaiheliuyu honglao danganshiliao. Beijing 1988
255
(Archive material: Huaihe drainage area)
Huaihe: 4653 entries for the period 1736-1911 (170 years); frequency for the provinces: 1-121
years;
121 years of floods in the district of Fengyang
Source 3: Qingdai Changjiangliuyu xinanguoji heliu honglao danganshiliao. Beijing 1991
(Archive material: Changjiang drainage area including the upper course)
Yangzi: 3803 entries for 172 years (1736-1911); frequency for provinces 1-105 years
Source 4: Sichuan liangqiannian hongzai shiliao huibian. Beijing 1993
4150 entries for Sichuan province from -185 to 1949 (Changjiang, Changjiang
tributaries/upper course,Yalongjiang, Minjiang, Tuojiang, Jialing, Wujiang);
1806: beginning of water level indications
Source 5: Chao Kang. Man And Land in Chinese History - An Economic Analysis.
Stanford/Cal. 1986:208
“[...] frequency of major floods in the whole country increased by 2.5 occurrences every
twenty years“ in the past 500 years - a “statistical evidence of worsening ecological
conditions.“
(incomplete evidence!)
Source 6: Chen Qiaoyi. Zhejiang zaiyi jianzhi. Hangzhou 1981
742 years with floods between -494 and 1911 in the province of Zhejiang.
Death toll e.g. 1091: more than 500 000 in Hangzhou and 300 00 in Suzhou
Droughts
Source: Zhongguo jinwubainian han-lao fenbutuzhi. Beijing 1981
2504 major droughts in the whole country (1470-1909)
Yuan Lin. Xibei zaihuang shi. Lanzhou 1994 (Northwestern-China: Province of
Shaanxi)
351
years of drought (1368-1911); Ming: 162 (= 2 every 3 years) ; Qing: 189
Famines
Source 1: Mallory, Walter H. China Land of Famine. New York 1926:1; Wang/Zhao.
“Droughts and Floods in China, 1440-1979“. In: Climate and History:Studies in Past Climates
and their impact on Man. Wigley/Ingram/Farmer (eds.). Cambridge 1991:271-288
1828 famines in the whole country (period under review: -108 to 1911)
Source 2: Yuan Lin. Xibei zaihuangshi. Lanzhou 1994
256
(Northwestern-China : Province of Shaanxi)
378
years of famine from 1271 to 1949 (Yuan: 97; Ming: 141; Qing/Republic: 140)
Locust infestations
Source 1: Chen Jiaxiang. “Outbreaks of Locusts recorded in Chinese Literature“.
In: Zhejiang kunchong niankan 5. Yearbook 1935:188-241
796
infestations in the period from -707 to 1936 (619 from 960 to 1936 ( cf. Guo Fu et al.
Zhongguo feihuang shengwuxue. JiÕnan 1991:3);
Source 2: Zhongguo nongye baikequanshu - Kunchongjuan. Beijing 1980:74
> 800 infestations from the -8th century to 1949
Source 3: Zao Ji. “Lidai you guan huangzai jidai zhi fenxi“. In: Dongyafeihuang yanjiu
wenxianhuibian. Cangzhou 1986:15
1330 infestations (Period under review: - 2th century to the end of the 19th century);
provincial ranking: Hebei (299), Henan (264), Shandong (254), Jiangsu (226), Anhui
(159),
Zhejiang (112), others (16)
257
12. Demographic figures for the provinces Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei,
Hunan
(1851-1953, in 1000 persons)
1851
1852
1865
1898
1910
1911
1953
1851
1852
1865
1898
1910
1911
1953
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
44.719
44.494*
28.423
23.550*
26.580*
32.355
31.645*
47.497
30.270
30.176*
14.972
9.810*
16.860*
18.490
21.075*
22.825
37.386
37.650*
19.839
15.900*
15.210*
25.197
16.229*
30.588
16.210
20.211*
11.630
19.347
27.052*
10.457
12.500
13.144
Jiangxi
Hunan
Hubei
24.286
24.517*
12.656
24.489*
24.617*
14.961
24.147*
16.613
21.809
20.677*
20.850
20.996*
21.174*
23.070/26.320
21.147*
33.226
22.187
33.347*
17.581
31.809*
34.716*
22.077
34.716
27.453
Source: Cao Shuji 2001: 467, 489, 505, 508, 535, 552, 540; data (with the exception of
1953) totally drawn from local gazetteers; alternative figures with asterix: Zhao/Xie
1988:598-601
13. “Statistical” population growth in selected provinces
1851-1880, in 1000 persons
Sichuan
1851 29.465
1880 36.461
1851
1880
[1910
[1953
Guizhou
Hunan
Guangdong Zhili
8.974
10.254
21.809
22.512
23.859
26.447
27.055
31.587
Jilin*
Heilongjiang*
Liaoning*
Shandong
Xinjiang
1.238
2.569
5.477
18.545
0.370
0.775
1.663
11.897
2.582
4.090
10.696]
18.545]
35.585
38.978
1.363
1.392
Source: Cao Shuji 2001:691-701; 703-704; * immgration provinces
258
14. Algorithms of recuperation
George L.Cowgill 1974
Population growth
(thousandth/year)
Duplication of population in years
1
2
3
10 (= 1%)
700
350
240
70
Joel E. Cohen 1995:27
relative change per
year (percent)
0.1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
4
Estimated doubling time
693
138.6
69.3
46.2
34.7
27.7
23.1
17.3
259
15. Agricultural land and population in Chinese provinces
Sichuan
1753
1766
1784
1812
Hubei
1753
1766
1784
1812
Jiangsu
1753
1766
1784
1812
Fujian
1753
1812
Henan
1753
1812
Shandong
1753
1812
Cultivated area (mu)
Population
Per capita acreage (mu)
45 941 667
46 007 126
46 191 339
46 547 134
1 368 496
2 958 271
7 789 782
21 435 678
33.57
15.55
5.92
2.17
56 691 349
56 844 390
56 224 561
60 518 556
4 568 860
8 399 652
14 134 442
27 370 098
12.41
6.77
3.97
1.69
68 908 445
65 981 720
64 921 762
72 089 486
12 628 987
23 779 812
28 967 235
37 843 501
5.46
2.77
2.24
1.90
12 872 087
14 517 472
4 710 339
14 779 158
2.72
0.98
72 282 036
72 114 592
7 114 346
23 037 171
10.16
3.13
97 105 407
98 634 511
12 769 872
28 958 764
7.60
3.41
Source: Liang Fangzhong1980:394,396,398,400
Hanzhou
1735
1791
1811
Jingyan
1735
1795
JQ (1796
-1820)
(Sichuan; Hanzhou zhi 1812, j.6b, hukouzhi)
506 427
23 050
508 7531
79 217
508 753
89 592
(Sichuan; Jingyan zhi 1900, j.5)
190 492
12 257
dito
52 787
dito
65 024
Source: Gao Songyi 1984:124
260
21.97
6.42
5.68
15.54
3.64
2.92
16. Per capita acreage in Chinese provinces
(in mu)
Provinces and
territories
1946
1916-17
Suiyuan
Rehe (Jehol)
12.51
10.03
3.5
3.5
Chahaer
Heilongjiang
Jilin
Liaoning
Xinjiang
Shanxi
Ningxia
Qinghai
Gansu
Shaanxi
9.97
9.80
n.d.
n.d.
9.01
7.38
6.74
6.52
6.52
5.87
3.5
6.9
6.9
6.9
4.0
3.5
3.5
n.d.
3.6
3.0
Anhui
Hebei
Taiwan
Sichuan
Henan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Jiangsu
Hubei
Shandong
Zhejiang
Fujian
Jiangxi
Hunan
Guangxi
Guangdong
Xikang
Xizang
4.82
4.53
4.38
3.98
3.76
3.75
3.66
3.40
3.39
3.04
2.97
2.93
2.70
2.64
2.36
2.11
2.04
n.d.
5.0
3.5
n.d.
2.5
4.2
0.7
2.3
2.1
5.4
3.3
2.1
3.5
3.3
6.4
2.5
n.d.
n.d.
average per capita
5.32
3.4
[Enoe Etsuzo c. in Wu Hui 1985:199 - 1915:3.13
1812
4.85
22.61
3.95
1.62
3.01
1.21
2.65
2.17
3.13
0.52
1.67
1.90
2.21
3.41
1.77
2.05
1.69
1.23
1.67
2.19
1840:3.24]
Sources:
1946: Zhongguo jindai nongye shengchan ji maoyi tongji ziliao. Shanghai 1983:10;
1916-17: Chinese Economic Journal March 1928:181-213 (cf. Cressey 1934:95, Table VI)
1812: Liang Fangzhong 1980:400
261
17. Cultivated land area
Ming/Qing (Liang Fangzhong 1980)
Year
area (mu)
area (ha)
1393
1491
1502
1542
1578
850 762 368
622 805 881
422 805 889
436 082 500
701 397 628
52 516 195
38 444 807
26 009 128
26 918 672
43 296 149
1661
17.Jh. (1. Decade)
1724
1753
1766
1784
1812
1820
549 357 640
33 910 985
620 122 958
38 279 194
683 791 427
42 209 346
708 114 288
43 710 758
741 449 550
45 768 490
718 331 436
44 341 446
792 624 423
48 890 396
779 321 984
48 106 295
746 612 711
46 087 204
1887
849 946 244
52 465 817
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1916
1 384 973 701 (:15)
92 329 180 (Cressey 1934:90)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1949
97 881 (000) (official statistics)
111 830 (000) (W.Crook 1988)
1978
99 389 500 (ZGTJNL 1996:368)
1980
139.3 (LANDSAT)
1995
94 970 9(00) (ZGTJNL 1996:6)
1996
124 169 000 (ZGNYNL 1999:547: cultivable land)
1997
133 - 147 mil. ha (LANDSAT/MEDEA)
262
18. Official statistics of cultivated land in Republican China
(in 1000 mu)
PROVINCE
[1887]
1914
1934
Hebei
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Rehe (Jehol)
86 652
28 496
1 498
82
87 989
47 403
44 080
32 092
14 617
95 364
66 348
61 040
46 538
16 177
122 589
62 733
68 694
85 114
21 023
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
75 128
46 778
41 114
79 131
29 108
27 346
84 519
37 795
49 337
89 997
28 477
73 128
Shanxi
Shandong
Henan
56 609
125 941
71 685
46 525
*204 832
*368 794
55 836
102 030
104 168
62 421
124 454
110 091
Shaanxi
Gansu
Xinjiang
Ningxia
Qinghai
30 593
16 775
11 480
1 848
29 228
21 767
10 768
30 883
21 676
12 624
65 773
60 782
19 469
Jiangxi
Hubei
Hunan
24 551
59 220
34 731
16 977
*119 760
32 447
18 108
56 251
42 054
12 427
59 605
46 652
Sichuan
Guangxi
Guizhou
Yunnan
Xikang
46 417
8 993
2 765
9 319
*115 144
41 523
10 600
88 763
*76 899
21 206
25 009
97 958
36 230
27 511
33 915
6 633
Fujian
Taiwan
Guangdong
13 452
20 003
21 473
21 754
34 731
27 143
39 140
45 029
9 013
15 526
17 185
55 948
Chahaer (Inner Mongolia)
Suiyuan
1949
676
Sources: cf. Liu Yanwei 1999:207-208, Table 3; official deficiancy of data for 1934 in case
of Xinjiang (10 districts), Yunnan (4 districts), Heilongjiang (1 district), and Guizhou (1
district).
263
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Martina Eglauer
Family and Household in Late Imperial China
There are several aspects that need to be taken into consideration regarding the research
program known as Europe’s special course.1 While there can be no single cause to explain
Europe’s special course, we can first try to isolate one topic and analyze the common features
and differences between various cultural traditions in order to search for an explanation. One
casual aspect which may be involved in the transformation process from agrarian civilization
to industrial society deals with the family and household structures in Europe and China.
Whether or not family and household are of crucial importance for this transformation process
can be discussed by comparing and contrasting the two different cultures: European and
Chinese.
On the basis of existing quantitative results of statistical data of late Imperial China, the
following article aims to realize a qualitative interpretation of the given data. The quantitative
data of household registers, local gazetteers and genealogical records is taken mainly from the
studies of Lee, Campbell and Wang, Elvin, Liu, Harrell, Wolf and Wakefield. The data will
be analyzed to determine if the Chinese family and household system differs from or
corresponds to the European pattern.2 First, we are able to characterize a "Chinese" and a
"European" system by outlining the different and common features. Should it be possible to
describe two family and household systems of striking divergences, we could further ask how
much these patterns contribute to the aforementioned transformation process from an agrarian
society to an industrialized one.
The introduction of the various aspects of the Chinese family begins by briefly outlining the
commonly postulated features of the "Northwest European family system".3 According to
some sociological studies of Hajnal, Mitterauer, Cerman, Wall and Goody4 the Northwest
European family system can be characterized as follows: late age at marriage; high percentage
of unmarried; low birth rate due to late marriage; neolocality, which requires economic
independence; cognatic and bilateral structures; high position of women; and circulation of
servants. These features build an interrelating and interdepending complex.
1
See Sieferle 2001, 7.
Lee/Wang 1999; Lee/Campbell/Wang 1993, 1994, 1995; Elvin 1999; Liu 1978, 1981, 1985, 1995; Harrell
1985, 1987, 1995; Wolf 1980, 1984, 1985; Wakefield 1998.
3
The Scandinavian countries (including Iceland, but excluding Finland), the British Isles, the Low Countries, the
German speaking area, and northern France count as Northwest Europe. Hajnal 1982, 449.
4
Hajnal 1965, 1982; Mitterauer 1990; Cerman 1997; Wall 1997; and Goody 1986.
2
In contrast to the Northwest European family system there is, according to the study of
Hajnal, the "joint household system," which is utilized to characterize household formation of
patrilinear organized societies, which is dominated by extended, grand or joint families and
not by the nuclear family. This joint household system comprises two or more related married
couples and can be described as follows: early age at marriage; universal marriage; high birth
rates, which imply that marriage is unaffected by economic conditions; (viri)patrilocality;
patrilinear descent including ancestor worship and importance of male descendants; low
position of women; and no circulation of servants. These features also build an interdependent
and interrelating system. The following table contrasts these two household formation
systems in a simplified way:
Table 1: Comparison of two different household formation systems5
Northwest European Family System
Joint Household System
nuclear family
extended/joint/stem family
late marriage
early marriage
high percentage of unmarried
universal marriage
neolocality
patrilocality
low birth rate
high birth rate
bilateral kinship, cognatic structure
patrilinear descent (ancestor worship)
relative high position of women
relative low position of women
monogamy
concubinage/polygyny
remarriage
remarriage not possible
exogamy
endogamy, undividable inheritance
circulation of servants
no circulation of servants
wage-labor
subsistence farming
Two questions need to be raised before starting the comparative approach followed here: (1)
to what extent does the "Chinese family" correlate with the so-called "joint household
system"; and (2) are these presumed differences, if they can be confirmed, responsible for the
transformation process from the agrarian to the industrial civilization? The intention of this
study6 is therefore to summarize and analyze the existing data in this field in order to explain
5
6
This table has been compiled by the author according to Oesterdiekhoff 2000, 21−35 and 59.
See Eglauer 2001.
277
the "real" constellation of family and household system, age of marriage, percentages of
unmarried and birth rates in China rather than to explore the normative ideal, even if these
Confucian concepts are still present as guidelines for the human behavior.
Before we turn to discussing household and family size, marriage age, and birth rate in China
it is necessary to talk about the available (text) sources and terminology. What is a "family" or
a "household" in Chinese context? Do the Chinese terms correspond to our "Western"
understanding of "family"?
Chinese terms on family and household
In the following the "Chinese family" refers to the majority of Han-Chinese, which today
account for ninety-two percent of the total Chinese population. For these people "marriage"
and "family" are corresponding to social reality, even though for the minorities different
customs are valid. For the Han-Chinese marriage is the most meaningful event in their life.
To classify the different family systems and relative relations anthropological and sociological
researchers operate with diverse concepts. In the following, the definitions of Harrell7 as well
as Watson and Ebrey8 are used in the context of this discourse.
The nuclear or conjugal family consists of the parents and their unmarried children. The
concept of a nuclear family implies that the married couple has set up a new (independent)
household. Every household including other persons except parents and unmarried children is
defined as extended family.9 This extension can be vertical with more than two generations
living in the family, or horizontal with married brothers including their wives and children
living together. Stem family refers to an extension only in vertical direction, which than
includes grandparents, parents with their children, and so forth. However, there is never more
than one married couple in one generation. An extension in both the vertical and horizontal
directions is called joint family, meaning that there can be several married couples in one
generation. In the Chinese case there are often several married brothers with their children
living together in one household. If the parents of these brothers are still alive and sharing one
household with them, we call it grand family. When the brothers however live together
without their parents, they live in a frèrèche. The following figure represents the discussed
definitions in a simplified way:
7
8
Harrell 1995b, 217−220.
Ebrey/Watson 1986, 4−6.
278
Figure 1: Definitions of "family"10
nuclear family
stem family
family
vertical
extended
family
grand family
horizontal
joint family
frèrèche
Besides these family concepts in the Chinese context the terms "clan" and "lineage" will also
be discussed. Both terms refer to the patrilinear descent group, but in contrast to the
"lineages", the "clans" can no longer prove the continuing line without interruption. The clan
members describe themselves in terms of a common ancestor, but the genealogical proof is
missing. Watson describes how the lineages can demonstrate their common ancestry and
moreover refer to a corporate identity: "A lineage is a corporate group which celebrates ritual
unity and is based on demonstrated descent from a common ancestor."11
The Chinese terminology does not correspond to these descriptive terms, because not only is
it following different categories, but is also of a lack of consistent and compelling use. Since
the Han dynasty the Chinese governmental household registers have used the term hu to refer
to the Chinese household as a basic economic unit. In contrast to these political or economic
correlations, in theoretical discussions Chinese scholars have not been talking about hu, but
about jia, which implies the sense of the family as the smallest unit of the Chinese society.
The Chinese word jia means "family" as well as "household" and refers to a group of people −
the family − which forms an economic entity. The family members are living, consuming and
producing as one single unit. Thus, the Chinese family corresponds to the concept described
by Laslett as "co resident domestic group".12
9
Harrell 1995b, 218−219.
This figure has been composed by the author.
11
Watson 1982, 594; original italics.
12
Hammel/Laslett 1974, 76.
10
279
Besides hu and jia the Chinese scholars have also been using the terms zu and zong. Both
terms can be translated into "lineage" as well as "clan" because their usage is not consistent.
Zu relates to a concrete group of people, while zong can also refer to the abstract principle of
common ancestry. In the context of rituals the term zong was used, whereas concrete relations
concerning ancestry or relations between relatives were discussed as zu.13
Chinese sources for demographic research: household registers and genealogies
The earliest demographic records date from the Han period, around the year 2 A.D.14 Even
though China has a long tradition of demography, this data has to be dealt with carefully as it
is not only incomplete but can also be interpreted by different approaches. Apart from these
household registers genealogies have been compiled by Chinese lineages since the Song
dynasty.15 Like the household registers, the genealogical records were not compiled for
demographic purposes. Because of deficits such as unreliable or incomplete personal details,
missing dates, etc., this data has to be interpreted.
The household registers have been examined from the Han to the Tang dynasty by Bielenstein
and from the Tang to the Qing dynasty by Durand. Both of them assume that these household
records do not include just the tax-paying population, but also women, children, and old
people. At the same time non-Han-people, or specific groups as monks, nuns, women, small
children, and old or sick people are often not registered in these household records. Moreover,
the Chinese officials sometimes have voluntarily manipulated the records in order to commit
tax evasion.16 Ho assumes, contrary to Durand, that the household registers’ data of the Qing
period does not refer to single persons, but to "tax-paying units".17 He bases his thesis on the
fact that during Imperial China demography was aimed at the registration of the tax-payingunits. In 1740, Emperor Qianlong (1736−1795) decided to register every person in order to
guarantee that in times of emergency or need there would be enough food available for
everybody: "From now on the provincial officials should, in the eleventh month of each year,
send in detailed reports as to the changes in the members of households and mouths and the
amounts of grain stored in the government granaries within their respective jurisdiction."18
But this decreed registration has been proved to be difficult because of the number of people
13
Ebrey/Watson 1986, 8; Watson 1982, 592.
Bielenstein 1947, 125 and 1987, 7; Wilkinson 1998, 232; Durand 1960, 209; Zhao/Xie 1988, 25 and
592;Liang 1993, 4; Ge 1991, 32ff.
15
Ebrey 1986, 16−61.
16
Bielenstein 1947, 128−131 and 1987, 8 and 11; Durand 1960, 212−214.
17
Ho 1959, 35.
18
Ho 1959, 37.
14
280
who had no fixed abode, and because of many officials’ lack of interest in demography. The
most reliable data dates from 1776, just before the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion.19
Lee relies on the household registration records of the Qing imperial banner system. Lee,
Campbell and Wang analyzed the household registration data of Daoyi, a village north of
Shenyang in Liaoning Province from 1774 to 1873 in an attempt to examine the age of
marriage and fertility. In these records, however, women and children are also under
registered. This data has been updated every three years. Even if this village is situated in
Manchuria, Lee, Campbell and Wang assume that the majority of the people are of HanChinese origin. According to them the data of Liaoning represents the Chinese conditions,20
even though the results refer to a rural, non-prospering area, which is inhabited by Han and
non-Han people.
Genealogical records reveal more information about family structures than the household
registers, which offer some indications about the size of the family. Genealogies were not
compiled for demographic reasons but rather for ritual ones in order to record the births and
deaths of ancestors to whom lineage members owed worship obligations. During the Song
period families in the middle and lower Yangzi region began to organize themselves as
lineages. Therefore we primarily have genealogical records of this region, whereas
genealogies of Northern China appear for the first time only during the Qing dynasty.21
The main question seems to be to what extent genealogies can represent Chinese society.
According to Liu it is by no means only the upper class that is represented by the genealogies,
because the influential and powerful lineages also included poor or politically unimportant
people. Therefore the genealogies reflect the heterogeneous and complex Chinese society and
not exclusively the upper class.22 However, Telford assumes that genealogies do not reflect
the Chinese society in the whole, because only a relatively small number of people are
organized in lineages.23 As Lee and Wang suggest, genealogies seem to reflect more the upper
class than the lower class of society because richer lineages had a greater means to support the
recording of their genealogies.24 Ebrey concludes that depending on region and goal the
genealogies in some cases represent more the upper class while in other cases; people of all
19
Ho 1959, 37−38 and 97.
Lee/Campbell 1997, 6−7, notes 10, 11 and 16.
21
Telford 1986, 137−138.
22
Liu 1978, 851; 1981, 121 and 123; 1985, 18; see also Telford 1986, 134.
23
Telford 1992a, 20.
24
Lee/Wang 1999, 187, note 8; Wang 1988, 65.
20
281
social classes are represented.25 When analyzing the genealogical records it is important to
take into consideration that according to their aim or historical and social meaning the data
differs in amount and type. A special kind of genealogical source is the Qing imperial lineage,
which Lee, Campbell, and Wang26 analyzed. In contrast to other "ordinary" genealogies all
female descendants and all children, even when they died shortly after birth, are registered.
Not only can birth rate and infant mortality be examined, but also the proportional relations of
the sexes can be more precisely determined. Unfortunately, these imperial lineages were
updated only every ten years. Moreover the women’s dates of death were no longer registered
after the middle of the 18th century; thereafter only the male mortality can be definitely
determined.27
According to the patriarchal ritual rules the genealogical data is incomplete. In general,
genealogical records register birth and death dates of the male descendants who are older than
fifteen years of age. Most genealogies exclude children who die young (usually before the age
of about eighteen).28 Women who marry into the lineage were sometimes, but not always,
recorded. Correspondingly the data of daughters who married out and became members of
others lineages was rarely recorded and even if it was notated, it was not noted in detail.
Concubines were in general only registered when they gave birth to a son.29
Under these pre-conditions data which are important for determining family patterns such as
marrying age, birth rate, infant mortality or relation of the sexes can only be deduced
indirectly. All assumptions about age of marriage, birth and death rates of the population in
late Imperial China are based on reconstructed data on the basis of male descendants, who
have attained adulthood.30
Family and household size
According to the demographic studies31 concerning the household register, the average
household during the Han up to the Qing period numbers five to six persons. Ho explains the
difference between Hubei with 6.74 persons per household and Sichuan with only 3.97
25
Ebrey 1990, 213.
Lee/Campbell/Wang 1993; 1994; 1995.
27
Lee/Campbell/Wang 1993, 362−365, 367−369.
28
The age of a male descendant being considered as an adult varies from 15 to 20 years of age depending on the
different records. Harrell 1987, 55.
29
Liu 1985, 13, 16, 28, 45; Liu 1978, 851.
30
Harrell 1985, 84, 109; Liu 1985, 23; Harrell 1987, 57, 76−77.
31
Bielenstein 1947, 129−130; 1987, 7; Zhao/Xie 1988, 25, 87, 152ff., 234ff., 340ff., 377ff.; Liang 1993, 4−11.
26
282
persons per household by referring to the tradition of uniting households in Hubei on the one
hand and the phenomenon of migration in Sichuan on the other.32
Table 2: Households and population of fourteen provinces in 181233
Province
Households
Mouths
Hebei (Chili)
Shandong
Henan
Shanxi
Gansu
Zhejiang
Jiangxi
Hubei
Hunan
Sichuan
Fujian
Guangxi
Yunnan
Guizhou
Total
3 956 950
4 982 191
4 732 097
2 394 903
2 909 528
5 066 553
4 378 354
4 314 837
3 234 517
7 058 777
3 152 879
1 279 020
1 010 225
1 118 884
49 589 715
19 355 679
19 178 919
23 598 089
14 597 428
15 377 785
27 411 310
23 652 029
29 063 179
18 523 735
28 048 795
16 759 563
7 429 120
5 933 920
5 348 677
264 278 228
Average number of
mouths per household
4.89
5.86
4.99
6.10
5.28
5.41
5.40
6.74
5.73
3.97
5.32
5.81
5.87
4.78
5.33
Cartier suggests that the average of about 5.5 persons per household as an economic unit
represents a ("nuclear") family consisting of parents with their children.34 Even since the
organization of lineages in Yangzi area and South China have been established, the family or
household remained an independent economic unit.35
These results raise the question of whether the often declared Chinese five-generation-family
is only a myth. Referring to field researches of the 20th century Hsu assumes a close relation
of economic conditions and family size. Richer families succeed in holding the family
together and avoiding household division. Poorer families however divided their households
earlier and more regularly. The fact that the average number of persons per household being
5.5 does not alone totally undermine the "myth of the Chinese family size"; there have been
families with several generations living together, but the ordinary farmer lived in small
families.36 There are other studies which assume on the basis of field research data of the 20th
32
Ho 1959, 41, 55.
See Ho 1959, 55.
34
Cartier 1997, 250, 260−261, 263−264.
35
Cartier 1997, 278.
36
Hsu 1943, 555, 560−562.
33
283
century and household register data of the 18th and 19th century, that stem families or grand
families have been widespread in China.37 Thus, how can the low average family size be
explained?
Wolf, who relies primarily on the situation in Taiwan, describes the life in a grand family,
stem family or joint family as a transitional stage in one’s life. A person, for instance, might
be living in an extended family during its childhood and its old age, whereas during its middle
age after dividing the household it might be living in a nuclear family.38 Wolf’s assumption
corresponds to Hajnals thesis: the people outside Northern Europe lived in joint households at
least during one period in their life.39
In the following figures the life-cycle of men and women in China during the first half of the
20th century will be compared:
Figure 2: Proportion of Males in Elementary, Stem, and Grand Families40
37
Sa 1985, 288; Lee/Gjerde 1986, 93; Lee/Campbell 1997, 110; Lee 1984, 38, 39.
Wolf 1984, 38−39, 283, 288, 292−293.
39
Hajnal 1982, 451−452.
40
See Wolf 1984, 288.
38
284
Figure 3: Proportion of Females in Elementary, Stem, and Grand Families41
On the basis of genealogical reconstructions Liu, Harrell and Pullum confirm the phenomenon
of the extended family as a transitional stage in one’s life.42 Wakefield’s research on
household division documents in Qing China can give an explanation to this phenomenon:
early and regular household division. He demonstrates that sixty percent of household
divisions occur during the lifetime of the parents, whereas only thirty-four percent are carried
out after their death. The following table summarizes the proportion of single, nuclear, stem,
joint household and frèrèche in Sui'an County, Zhejiang Province.
41
42
See Wolf 1984, 292.
Liu 1995b, 121−140; Harrel/Pullum 1995, 141−162.
285
Table 3: Family Size and Type in Sui’an County, Zhejiang (1728−1750)43
Family Type
Number and Proportion
of the Families
single household 7
5%
nuclear family
60
43%
stem family
30
21%
joint family
21
15%
frèrèche
22
16%
total
140
100%
Family Members
Average Family
Size
652
4.7
According to Wakefield, these figures suggest that early and regular household division kept
families small. Household division in China meant equal share among sons. In contrast to the
ritual succession, where primogeniture was valid, property was divided equally among the
brothers since the Han dynasty.44 Household division was widespread, above all among
poorer families. Only rich families had the resources to avoid division and realize the ideal of
several generations living together under one roof.45
Comparing the average size of a Chinese family of 5.5 persons per household with the
household size in England in the 17th and 18th century of 4.75 persons, the difference is not
really striking. Only relying on quantitative figures cannot be very revealing as Mitterauer
mentions. The average household size can only indicate a tendency, but says nothing about
the constellation of a single family or household.46 The following qualitative approach based
on the assumed statistical data tries to compare marrying age, proportion of unmarried, and
birth rate to show the common and different traits between China and the West.
Marriage
Concerning the age of marriage, the different studies based on genealogical reconstruction
and household records state an early marrying age for both women and men in general. The
following table summarizes the results of various researches on this field.
43
This table has been composed by the author on the basis of the data given in Wakefield 1998, 50−51.
Wakefield 1998, 21−22.
45
Wakefield 1998, 42−43.
46
Mitterauer 1990, 158.
44
286
Table 4: Average age of marriage of women47
Average age of
marriage
region
period
sources (studies)
household registers
(Lee/Campbell 1997, 86 and 88)
Qing imperial genealogies
20.7
Beijing
1640−1900
(Lee/Campbell/Wang 1993, 374f.)
local gazetteers
17.55
Zunhua, Hebei
1645−1911
(Elvin 1999, 192, 194 and 197)
genealogical records
17
Xiaoshan, Zhejiang 1650−1850
(Liu 1985, 23 and 28)
17.6 (Shi-lineage Xiaoshan, Zhejiang
genealogical records
1600−1874
19.1 (Wu-lineage)
(Harrell/Pullum 1995, 146)
local gazetteers
19.24
Jiaxing, Zhejiang
1645−1911
(Elvin 1999, 192, 194 and 197)
local gazetteers
16.95
Guiyang, Guizhou 1645−1911
(Elvin 1999, 192, 194 and 197)
genealogical
records
18
Taiwan
17th−19th century
(Liu 1978, 852f. and 860f.)
18.3
Liaoning
1774−1840
The reconstructed marrying age of women lies between seventeen and twenty years old. As
the following table shows, the reconstructed average age of marriage of men is more
advanced than that of women, but with an average of twenty-one years it is still lower in
comparison to the European data as the following table summarizes:
47
This table has been composed by the author on the basis of the mentioned sources.
287
Table 5: Average age of marriage of men48
Average age of
marriage
region
period
20.8
Liaoning
1774−1840
20.9
Beijing
1700−1900
21.5
Tongcheng, Anhui
1520−1661
21.3
Xiaoshan, Zhejiang 1700−1844
20.9 (Shi-lineage)
22.4 (Wu-lineage)
Xiaoshan, Zhejiang 1600−1874
sources (studies)
household registers
(Lee/Campbell 1997, 86 and 88)
Qing imperial genealogies
(Lee/Wang 1999, 72)
genealogical records
(Telford 1992a, 28)
genealogical records
(Liu 1985, 22−25)
genealogical records
(Harrell/Pullum 1995, 146)
On the basis of this data one can assume that both Chinese women and Chinese men married
younger than their European counterparts in general. The hypothesis that in patrilinear
organized societies people marry at an early age can be confirmed by this. Another
characteristic of the so-called "joint household system" is the universal marriage, which
means that everybody, women as well as men, married at least once during her/his lifetime.
There were hardly any unmarried people in late Imperial China.
Lee and Wang analyzed on the basis of the Liaoning household registers the average female
marriage age and calculated the proportion of women, who never married. Furthermore they
compared the data of Liaoning with data of Northern European countries. The following
figure of Lee and Wang shows their results. By the age of twenty only ten percent of females
have not yet been married. In contrast to European females, almost all Liaoning women have
already been married in their mid thirties. In Europe thirty percent of the women have still
been unmarried at that same age.
48
This table has been composed by the author on the basis of the mentioned sources.
288
Figure 4: Share of never-married females, by age, selected countries, ca. 180049
Lee and Wang did not mention unmarried women, as for example nuns. It can be supposed,
that they are irrelevant from the statistical point of view with the possible exception that they
may have been married before becoming nuns. Elvin analyzed the data of the local gazetteers
in Guiyang, Zunhua and Jiaxing. As the following figure given by Elvin shows, he comes to
the same conclusion as Lee and Wang for Liaoning. Even though there are small differences
between the mentioned regions, at the age of twenty-nine, almost all women have been
married.
49
Lee/Wang 1999, 66. Lee and Wang used the data given in the following publications: Lee/Campbell 1997
(China); Hofsten/Lundstrom 1976 (Sweden); Statistik Sentralbyra 1980 (Norway); Hinde, 1985 (England);
Statens Bureau 1905 (Denmark).
289
Figure 5: Rise of the proportion of ever-married women in Guiyang (Kuei-yang),
Zunhua (Tsunhua) und Jiaxing (Chia-hsing)50
These results let us assume that universal marriage was widespread and "normal" for females
in China. However, the hypothesis of "universal marriage" refers to females as well as to
males. Where the data of men is taken into account, we get a different picture of the marriage
behavior of men. Corresponding to the data of females, Lee and Wang reconstructed the age
of marriage of men on the basis of the data of the household register’s data in Liaoning. The
results of the reconstructed age of marriage of men in Liaoning do not correspond to the data
of the females. Actually, the age of marriage of men in Liaoning obviously differs from the
50
Elvin 1999, 194.
290
one of Liaoning females. It corresponds rather to the European data. Between the 17th and the
19th century, ten to twenty percent of Chinese men did not marry. Even thirteen percent of
men of the imperial family did not marry. The following figure of Lee and Wang
demonstrates that in contrast to Europe (ten percent) more than fifty percent of Chinese males
at the age of twenty-two were married. At the same time, the proportion of unmarried men at
the age of forty-five was fifteen to twenty percent in China – as high as in Europe.
Figure 6: Share of never-married males, by age, selected countries, ca. 180051
51
Lee/Wang 1999, 69. Lee and Wang used the data given in the following publications: Lee/Campbell 1997
(China); Hofsten/Lundstrom 1976 (Sweden); Statistik Sentralbyra 1980 (Norway); Hinde, 1985 (England);
Statens Bureau 1905 (Denmark).
291
Even though we can conclude an early age of marriage for females as well as males, the
supposed universal marriage cannot be confirmed for men in China. The following table
summarizes the reconstructed proportion of unmarried men in different regions.
Table 6: Proportion of unmarried males in different regions52
unmarried men
region
period
10−15%
Liaoning
1774−1840
13%
Beijing
1640−1900
22%
Tongcheng, Anhui
1520−1661
0.5% (Shen)
1.5% (Xu)
Xiaoshan, Zhejiang
1650−1850
6.7%
Taiwan
18th century
sources
(percent)
household registers
(Lee/Wang 1999, 69)
Qing imperial genealogies
(Lee Wang 1999, 71)
genealogical records
(Telford 1995, 79)
genealogical records
(Liu 1985, 22)
genealogical records
(Liu 1978, 856)
The striking divergence between more than twenty percent and less than one percent of
unmarried men in one lineage can be explained by the difficulty of reconstructing the data.
The number of "real" unmarried men is hard to separate from the men who have no
descendants, had only daughters and those who died early before they reached the age of
marriage. There is neither any unambiguous data concerning the proportion of unmarried men
nor does there exist any clear hint to prove universal marriage of men in China. On the one
hand Lee and Wang explained this phenomenon through the shortage of females as a result of
female infanticide, concubinage and successive polygamy as a consequence of remarriage of
men. On the other hand, they assumed that marriage in China, as well as in Europe, was
highly dependent on economic conditions. Because marriage is expensive, some families,
which have not the necessary material resources, are forced to wait until they can afford to
arrange the wedding for their sons. Even though the Chinese just-married-couples did not
immediately establish a new household as in Europe, the family had to have the financial
resources to pay for the wedding, to feed the married wife and her descendants, and to have
the place for the bride and her future children to inhabit.
Thus, it is unquestionable that marriage in China as well as in Europe was dependent on
economic and material conditions. Of course, on the background of the ancestor worship,
292
universal marriage for both men and women was the ideal and the aspired life-form. In view
of the fact of the shortage of women, men without means hardly ever had a chance to get
married. Chinese society did offer various strategies for these men to marry anyway in case
the form of patrilocal marriage, the "major marriage"53, in which the bride moves into the
family of her husband, could not be realized.
Besides the major marriage, there were the minor marriage and the uxorilocal marriage as
possible marriage patterns for families living under poor conditions. In case of the minor
marriage, the future bride had already moved into the household of the chosen husband as a
child. She was be brought up by her parents-in-law and will first live together with her future
husband as a sister. Apart from the financial aspect, this kind of marriage has the advantage
that the often very difficult and repressive relationship between mother-in-law and daughterin-law develops more harmoniously. Furthermore, the relationship between the girl and her
future husband proves to be more complicated, when they became wife and husband. The
sexual attraction suffers under their sibling-like-relationship.54
In the case of an uxorilocal marriage the husband moves into the family of his future wife
after the wedding. This kind of marriage means a social degradation for the man, but it was
regarded as a lesser evil than not marrying at all. Men who were orphans and had no family or
very poor men chose this kind of marriage. Apart from these economic reasons, families that
had no male descendants tried for their daughters to find a husband willing to move into their
families. In some cases, political reasons could also have been a motivation for uxorilocal
marriages in order to build family alliances.55 In other situations, the need for male labor
motivated for the uxorilocal marriage.56 The existence of the uxorilocal marriage in China
undermines the hypothesis of a strict patrilinear descent and promotes the position of the wife
within the family.
Endogamy − Polygamy − Remarriage
Apart from family size, marrying age and proportion of unmarried in one society, endogamy,
polygamy and remarriage are further aspects to characterize marriage and family patterns. In
52
This table has been composed by the author on the basis of the mentioned sources.
Wolf categorized three kinds of marriage forms: major marriage, minor marriage and uxorilocal marriage, see
Wolf/Huang 1980.
54
Wolf/Huang 1980, 84−86, 89−91.
55
Hymes 1986, 112; Dennerline 1986, 170, 173, 176.
56
Wolf/Huang 1980, 216.
53
293
contrast to the supposed connection between joint household system and endogamic marriage
practice which some sociologists propose (see Table 1), the Chinese case cannot confirm this
assumption. Already during the Zhou dynasty, the chosen spouse had to have another family
name (xing) as a proof that the marriage partners are not of the same family.57 The Codex of
the Tang dynasty explicitly did not allow marriage within the first five mourning grades.58
The Ming and Qing laws followed this Tang rule so that the marriage between cousins with
different surnames within the five mourning grades was not allowed. In reality, however,
marriage between cousins with different surnames was rather popular despite the fact that it
ignored the law. Moreover, the "generation-rule" served to prevent marriage between aunt and
nephew or between uncle and niece.59 With the exogamy-rule, and the generation-rule, we
have two regulations against an endogamic practice.
In addition to the exogamy-rule, in China a man could marry only one woman at a time. Apart
from successive polygamy, which allowed a man to marry another woman after divorce or
death of the first wife, bigamy or polygamy were illegal.60 The custom of concubinage had
indeed a long tradition in China, but according to the law, a man could marry only one wife.
The marital relationships were clearly distinguished from the extramarital.61 The concubine’s
status was lower than that of the official wife’s. So the concubine’s move into her master’s
home was not combined with expensive marriage ceremonies. Contrary to the official wife,
the concubine was only mentioned in the genealogical records after she had given birth to a
son. In addition, her lower social status was symbolized by the rule that she had to serve her
master’s wife.62
In general, concubinage was a phenomenon of the upper class. Only men of rich families
could afford to support both a wife and concubines. Thus, concubines were status symbols for
these men. Between 1520 and 1661 in Tongcheng County Telford’s reconstructed percentage
of men with several women numbers 7.5 percent.63 There were concubines in eight percent in
the Xu-lineage in Wuchang, Hubei Province, but twenty-six percent64 in the Mai-lineage in
Xiangshan, Guangdong Province, 3.3 percent in the Shen-lineage in Xiaoshan County,
57
Ch'ü 1961, 91.
Johnson 1997, 162.
59
Ch'ü 1961, 94−95; Jones 1994, 128.
60
Ch'ü 1961, 123−124; Ebrey 1991, 7.
61
For the differentiation with regard to definition of monogamy and polygamy see Vajda 1985, 80−81 and
1981/82, 30−31.
62
Ch'ü 1961, 125; Waltner 1996, 72−73.
63
Telford 1992a, 27.
64
Liu 1995a, 105.
58
294
Zhejiang Province, and 1.5 percent in the Xu-lineage in the same region.65 Lee and Wang
noted that within the imperial Qing elite only ten percent of the males had several women.
Thus, we can assume that in the whole the percentage of men with concubinage remains less
than ten percent. The results of Liaoning demonstrate that only one or two percent of the
males of the ordinary rural population had more than one women at the same time.66
Apart from exogamy and monogamy as specific characteristics of the European marriage
system, remarriage counts as a third distinguishing feature. The Chinese data could possibly
question the first two aspects, exogamy and monogamy, as European phenomena. What about
remarriage?
As Liu’s analysis of the lineages, Shen and Xu showed that about thirteen percent of the men
did remarry and nine percent of these men even married a third time.67 We can conclude that
men, as far as they could afford it, tried to marry again after divorce or the death of the first
(or second) wife.
Up until the Song dynasty remarriage of females was quite usual. Starting with the Ming
dynasty and especially during the Qing dynasty the cult of chaste widows became popular and
widespread.68 The label "chaste widow" referred above all to young women, who became
widows before the age of thirty and remained chaste until the age of fifty.69 Female chastity −
idealized since the Song dynasty − was confirmed by social and juridical sanctions and led to
limitation of remarriage of widows.70 The chastity cult resulted in widows having the wish to
live as a virtuous woman. Furthermore, because of the patriarchal structure of Chinese
society, the widows often didn’t want to remarry at all. In the case of remarriage they would
not only loose the right to bring up their children, but would also loose their own property
rights, and their dowry. A chaste life guaranteed them their right of property and the
possibility of an independent life within the given social structure.71 Even though forced
remarriage on the basis of greed for profit was punished, the parents-in-law or even the own
parents of the widow often forced the young woman against her will to remarry. The affected
woman could still try to save her virtuous soul by committing suicide.72 However, young
65
Liu 1985, 20.
Lee/Wang 1999, 75−76.
67
Liu 1985, 20.
68
Linck 1986, 104; Ebrey 1990, 220; Mann 1987, 38. Concerning remarriage during Han dynasty see Dull 1978,
34. About the development of the cult of chaste widows during the late Ming dynasty see T’ien 1988.
69
Mann 1987, 40.
70
Mann 1987, 37.
71
Sommer 1996, 117; Ch'ü 1961, 104; T'ien 1988, 39; Elvin 1984, 147 note 165.
72
Sommer 2000, 171, 333−335; 1996, 119−120; T'ien 1988, 23−24, 34; Mann 1987, 47; Waltner 1981, 138.
66
295
widows living in impoverished conditions had to remarry due to financial reasons.73 The
analysis of the given sources demonstrates that the negative judgment of female remarriage
did not result in the wished behavior − the ideal of the "chaste widow". In comparison with
their male counterparts the widows seldom remarried. According to Liu, up to 1.67 percent of
women of Shen-lineage married again.74 Lee and Wang assume that about ten percent of
widows in Liaoning region remarried.75 Even though remarriage of widows was rather seldom
in comparison to remarriage of widowers, but was not impossible. Widowers generally
remarried if they could afford it. In contrast to their male counterparts, widows had to remarry
if there was nobody to support them (and their children). The normative ideal had to defer
again in face of the economic conditions of the persons involved.
Birth rate
In the European context, late marriage was interpreted as a strategy for reducing birth rates.76
In contrast to the assumed connection between early marriage and high birth rate, the Chinese
case surprises with relative moderate fertility. The total marital fertility rate (TMFR)77 in
Europe, with seven to ten children per women78 lies even higher than in China, where it was
about six children.79 Lee and Wang compared the Chinese data with the European figures.
The authors took into account their own reconstructed data of the household registers of
Liaoning and the imperial genealogical records as well as Liu’s and Telford’s analyses of
genealogical records of Jiangnan region and Anhui Province. Because of the missing data of
children who died early and the incomplete registration of female descendants in the
genealogical records, the birth rate had to be reconstructed on the basis of the number of the
surviving sons. Therefore, Harrell talks about "male-based fertility rate".80 The genealogical
records do not mention the date of marriage either, so that the starting point of the
reproduction period cannot be determined. The birth rate can be reconstructed on the basis of
the age of the parents and the birth rate of the surviving sons.81 Lee and Wang add twenty
percent for possible underenumeration, taking into account infants who died. The following
73
Waltner 1981, 136.
Liu 1985, 20−21.
75
Lee/Wang 1999, 72−73.
76
Oesterdiekhoff 2000, 5, 27, 51.
77
TMFR refers to the average birth rate of a married women between 15 and 49 years of age.
78
Wrigley/Davies/Oeppen/Schofield 1997, 450.
79
Compare the data in Lee/Wang 1999, 85, which summarizes various data in China.
80
Harrell 1987, 57, 75; see also Liu 1995a, 95; 1985, 16; 1981, 119.
81
Liu 1985, 29.
74
296
figure compares the European and Asian data and demonstrates the striking result that the
birth rate in Europe lies even higher than the one in China:
Figure 7: "Natural" age-specific marital fertility, East Asia and Europe, ca. 1600−180082
It is remarkable that this moderate birth rate in China is not only valid for monogamous men,
but also for men having concubines. In comparison with monogamous couples, men with
several women have proportionally less children. As Dardess demonstrates on the basis of
82
Lee/Wang 1999, 87. Lee and Wang used the data given in the following publications: Lee/Campbell 1997
(Liaoning, China); Flinn 1981 (European populations); Kito 1991 (Japan); Liu Ts’ui-jung 1992 (Jiangnan,
China); Telford 1992b (Anhui, China); Wolf 1985 (Taiwan). Lee and Wang give further information to the
figure: "The Beijing numbers are monogamous male age-specific fertility rates but should closely approximate
female age-specific fertility. The Anhui and Jiangnan figures are derived from counts of sons multiplied by 1.97.
In addition we inflated the Anhui, Jiangnan , and Japanese figures by 20 percent for possible underenumeration."
297
data of Taihe in Jiangxi Province, the average birth rate of women decreases with the number
of women a man takes into his household. The average number of children of a monogamous
man decreases according to Dardess from 4.15 down to 1.17 of a man with four women:
Table 7: Average number of children per woman, Taihe, 14th−17th century83
number of wives/ number of
concubines per
fathers
man
number of
children
average number of
children per woman
1
208
864
4.15
2
101
546
2.70
3
21
102
1.62
4
6
28
1.17
Further analyses of genealogical records confirm this tendency. The number of women with
whom one man lived did not crucially influence the average number of children living in one
household. Women sharing one man had fewer children on average.84 This was valid even for
the imperial lineage, as Lee and Wang show. Additionally the Qing imperial lineage had a
relative low fertility rate and the number of children per males with concubines was only
twenty to thirty percent higher, as the following figure of Lee and Wang demonstrates:
83
84
This table has been composed by the author on the basis of the data of Dardess 1996, 91.
Liu 1995b, 130.
298
Figure 8: Age pattern of fertility among monogamous and polygamous men, Qing
imperial lineage, 1700−184085
How can this low fertility rate be explained? Apart from the Malthusian interpretation of
positive checks in form of hunger, war, epidemics, or infanticide, Lee and Wang explain this
low birth rate, above all, by three kinds of preventive checks or demographic mechanisms:
late starting, early stopping, and long birth intervals.86
The reconstructed age at the birth of the first child on the basis of genealogical records show
that on average the Chinese couples had their first child at a later date after marriage than their
European counterparts. In Europe fourteen to sixteen months after marriage the first child was
already born, whereas in China the average interval between marriage and birth of the first
child was about thirty-seven months.87 The last figure is based on genealogical records of the
imperial lineage, but for rural Liaoning, Lee and Wang account for an even longer interval.88
A relative late starting point in having children has also been confirmed by Liu and Harrell.89
85
Lee/Wang 1999, 77.
Lee/Wang 1999, 88.
87
Lee/Campbell/Wang 1995, 389−390; Flinn 1981, 33.
88
Lee/Campbell 1997, 92−93.
89
Liu 1978, 852; 1995b, 121, 133; Harrell 1985, 104.
86
299
Lee and Wang explain this late start with having children by the ideal of sexual restraint in
China. Even though the birth of a son was essential for the continuation of the ancestor line,
the most important family relationship was between parents and child, and not between
husband and wife. As a consequence the sexual desires had to be subordinated to filial piety.
Moreover, the Chinese had the opinion that frequent sexual intercourse was risky for one’s
(especially men’s) health.90 Further there have been many taboo instructions, under which
circumstances it was not allowed to have sexual intercourse.91
As a second preventive check Lee and Wang mentioned "early stopping" with regards to
having children. In comparison to Europe, Chinese women were much younger, when they
gave birth to their last child. Women in rural Liaoning were on average 33.5 years old and
women of the imperial lineage between 33.8 and 34.1 years, when they gave birth to their last
child. Consequently, the reproduction period was reduced to only eleven years in China,
whereas in Europe, where the women gave birth to children up to the age of forty,92 it was
fifteen years.93
As a third preventive strategy Lee and Wang mentioned "long spacing": long intervals
between births. Compared with European birth intervals, which lie between twenty and thirty
months, the intervals in the case of the imperial lineage has been quite long with thirty-five up
to seventy months. In rural Liaoning, the average interval of 4.1 to 8.4 years between the
children’s birth had been definitely longer than in Europe.94 Lee and Wang assumed that
Chinese women tried to extend the interval between the births of their children by extended,
long-term breastfeeding.95
It is difficult to accurately determine the extent to which people in Imperial China had been
acquainted with means of contraception. There are indications that knowledge of
contraceptive methods existed,96 but if this knowledge was widespread and popular is hard to
say. It is obvious that people tried, above all, to regulate the birth rate for economic reasons.
As Harrell’s research of genealogical records of three lineages between 1550 and 1850 shows,
there is a direct connection between social status equating to economic resources and birth
rate. Men of rich lineage branches married earlier, took younger women for their wives and
90
Lee/Wang 1999, 90−91.
Riegel 1999, 137−139; van Gulik 1961, 132, 137−138, 284.
92
Wrigley/Davies/Oeppen/Schofield 1997, 507; Flinn 1981, 29.
93
Lee/Campbell 1997, 93; Lee/Campbell/Wang 1995, 390; Lee/Wang 1999, 89.
94
Lee/Campbell/Wang 1995, 391; Lee/Campbell 1997, 93−94; Flinn 1981,33; Wrigley et al. 1997, 508.
95
Lee/Wang 1999, 91.
96
Himes 1970, 108−111.
91
300
had concubines more often. Therefore the probability of having more children increased.97
Moreover both Liu and Lee showed that the number of children in times of needs decreased.
Female descendants especially had even less chances to survive during bad times.98
Even though there are some skeptical positions against Lee’s and Wang's thesis of preventive
checks in China, there is no striking argument against the fact of a moderate birth rate in
China.99 Infanticide as a positive check in Malthusian terms was undoubtedly widespread in
China for regulating the number of the planned children. With regard to the existential need of
male descendants to guarantee an uninterrupted ancestor line, female infants suffered under
this kind of postnatal birth control.100 In contrast to the sons who counted as provision for the
parent's old age, daughters were regarded as economic burden, because they normally were
supposed to leave their natal family and work for and give birth to grandchildren to her
parents-in-law. Presumably since Song time, female infanticide was usual. According to T'ien
it was widespread in Yangzi-region.101 Furthermore, the juridical inhibition and punishment in
the codices indicate that infanticide was a social problem the officials had to take legal action
against.102
As in the European case there are no reliable statistics in China which allow one to draw
conclusions from this data about infanticide rates.103 Because of the general underreporting of
females in registers and genealogical records, the proportion between male and female in
society can only be reconstructed or estimated. According to Ho in some regions there were
up to fifty percent more men than women.104 On the basis of the given proportion between
sons and daughters on the one hand, and the number of children in the families in rural
Liaoning on the other hand, Lee concludes female infanticide must have been a usual
postnatal practice to regulate sex and number of the children. The proportion of surviving
males in comparison to females was unnatural and definitely too high. Lee estimates that
twenty to twenty-five percent of female babies died by infanticide.105 In times of need boys
also could have become victims of infanticide.106
97
Harrell 1985, 103−108.
Liu 1981, 125−135; Lee/Campbell 1997, 96−101.
99
Coale 1985.
100
Lavely/Lee/Wang 1990, 817; Lee/Wang 1999, 84; Ho 1959, 58; Waltner 1995, 2000.
101
T’ien 1988, 26−27.
102
Lee, B. 1981, 164−168; T’ien 1988, 25; Dardess 1996, 81−83.
103
For the European case compare Flinn 1981, 46.
104
Ho 1959, 58−59.
105
Lee/Campbell/Tan 1992, 150ff., 167; Lee/Campbell 1997, 69.
106
Lee/Campbell/Tan 1992, 169, 172.
98
301
Genealogical records cannot give any hints concerning infant and child mortality, because
sons, who died at an early age, and daughters in general are not mentioned. The genealogical
records of the imperial lineages are an exceptional case, because they list all born children,
regardless of their sex and despite the fact that some of them died soon after birth. It is
striking that girls died within their first month three times more often than boys. In fact female
infanticide increases during the end of the 18th century, as the economic situation of the
imperial lineages deteriorated.107 This data led Lee, Campbell, and Wang to the conclusion
that even within the imperial lineage female infanticide was a regular practice to regulate sex
and number of children. Female infanticide was not limited to the poor people.108 By referring
to a report stated in a chronic of Fujian Province, T’ien confirms the phenomenon that female
infanticide was also practiced among wealthy people.109
The most customary method to kill the newborn baby was to throw it in a tub filled with cold
water. In Chinese this practice was called "bathing the baby". Indirect methods were even
more widespread like neglection, unhygienic care, and early weaning.110 During the late Qing
dynasty the government considered supporting the poor to avoid infanticide. Since the
beginning of the 18th century, the government established foundling homes in the lower
Yangzi region to save the doomed babies.111
Adoption
Only the male members of the family are legitimate for ancestor worship. To secure the
uninterrupted male line within a family, Chinese society has developed various strategies. The
most serious failure against filial piety was the lack of a son.112 If the couple has been
childless for several years or the wife has given birth only to daughters, then the husband
could take a concubine into his household. The sons of a concubine had equal rights to the
sons of the first wife, because it was the father and not the mother who was, above all,
important for determining the status of the descendant. Another strategy to receive a ritual
heir was adoption. The biological fatherhood was subordinated to the importance of
107
Lee/Campbell/Wang 1993, 365, 376−378, 381; 1994, 396, 400−403.
Lee/Campbell/Wang 1993, 381; 1994, 404−408.
109
T’ien 1988, 30.
110
Harrell 1995a, 7; Lee/Campbell 1997, 59; Wolf/Huang 1980, 139; Leutner 1989, 55.
111
Waltner 1995, 195; Leung 1995, 251, 271.
112
Mengzi 7.26/40/12.
108
302
continuing the male line. Thus, adoption was an essential strategy of family building in
China.113
Adoption was implemented according to specific regulations. The adopted son had to be
chosen within and corresponding to the five mourning grades, so the sons of the brothers were
favored. The prescribed orders of possible adopted sons must not be circumvented. The
common surname was an indispensable condition.114 If the head of the family remained
without a male descendant and ritual successor, the family or the widow had the right to
determine an heir. Additionally in this case, a brother’s son was the favored adoptive son. If
there was no possible adoptive son within the five mourning grades or even within a group of
the common surname, the people de facto adopted boys of the family of the female line. In
this way, the female line became more significant.115 Therefore adoption itself could
undermine the patrilinear system, because the guaranteed ancestor worship was more
important than the biological fatherhood. Descent and the origin of the ritual successor were
subordinated to the duty of the ancestor worship.116 In contrast to Europe, adoption in China
was mainly to secure the continuing ancestor line and not because of charity.
Conclusion
In summary, the average family size in China did not differ from the Northwest European
family system. The thesis of the predominant so-called "grand family" in households outside
Northwestern Europe has to be understood at least in quantitative regard.
Even though people in China married at an earlier age than in Europe − this fact applies to
women as well as men − their birth rate was surprisingly not higher. The Chinese developed
pre-natal and post-natal methods of birth control to regulate the number of children according
to their economic conditions. An obvious connection can be traced between the number of
children and financial resources in the corresponding families. Even men, who took
concubines into their households, did not have significantly more children in relation to the
number of wives. The more concubines one Chinese man had, the more the number of
children per women decreased.
113
Waltner 1990, 24.
Bodde 1967, 243; Watson 1975, 296; Mäding 1966, 24, 43−44, 73; Waltner 1984, 454.
115
Waltner 1990, 4, 11−12, 72−73, 94−95, 144−145, 147.
116
Waltner 1996, 76.
114
303
Regarding the situation of women in China, universal marriage was widespread and valid for
the investigated regions and sources. For men, however, the situation proved to be different.
Marriage as well as having children was dependent on economic conditions. If a family was
not able to pay for the wedding ceremonies and to feed one more mouth, their son had to stay
single or marry uxorilocally. Another possibility for impoverished families was the "minor
marriage": they took a little girl into their household, who would later become their son’s wife
after both were grown up.
Because of the uxorilocal marriage as a strategy for impoverished families to get their sons
married or for families with only daughters to continue their ancestor and family line,
patrilocality as a further characteristic of joint household systems was not universally valid. In
regard to family system models uxorilocal marriage undermines the strict patrilinear and viripatrilocal pattern.
Contrary to expectations according to the presented explanation models, exogamy as well as
monogamy have been a strict rule in Chinese marriage system. In this way the regulations and
traditions do not differ from the Northwest European family system. Exogamy in China
means that the spouses had to come from families bearing different surnames and should not
belong to relatives within the first five mourning grades. Even though holding concubines had
a long tradition in China and was tolerated, there was only one legal wife per husband. The
legal wife held not just a special legal position, but was also the only one who was allowed to
enjoy the traditional wedding ceremonies. Female remarriage does not fit to the joint family
system either, but there are indications that it was nevertheless possible in China. Again,
economic conditions can be responsible for this practice.
These mentioned characteristics of the Chinese marriage customs lead to the conclusion that
the "Chinese family" cannot be related to the joint household system without some
reservations. At the same time, the stated results regarding Chinese conditions question the
maintained existence of the Northwest European family system. The Chinese family pattern
also cannot be related to the described Northwest European system. From the Chinese point of
view, the main differences between China and Europe concern the relatively high marrying
age, high proportion of unmarried males and females, neolocality, and circulation of servants
in Europe. Practiced exogamy, monogamy, low birth rate, remarriage of women, uxorilocal
marriage, and household division modify the relation to the suggested joint household system.
This study was based on existing and available data on family and household structures in
China and took as a starting point prevailing theories on various family systems, especially
304
the characteristics of the Northwest European family system. Because of the failing
unambiguous assignment of the Chinese family to the joint household system, it is difficult to
tell whether the social structures, the family and household systems are of crucial importance
for the transformation process from agrarian civilization to industrial society.
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Peter C. Perdue
How Different was China? Or, Bringing the Army Back In: Coercion and
Ecology in the Comparative Sociology of Europe and China
The goal of this research project is to clarify why Western Europeans became the first people
to create an industrial society. A long tradition of scholarship has attacked this problem, but
this project aims to view it from a global and comparative approach, which includes
perspectives from outside Europe. I applaud this ambitious effort, and I hope to support their
objectives by adding some comments from my standpoint as a historian of late imperial
China. I shall summarize briefly some of the recent work on China that addresses these
questions, and add a few preliminary thoughts based on my own research on the expansion of
imperial China’s frontiers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I write in the spirit of a
constructive critique of the materials kindly sent to me by Prof. Sieferle which have been
published so far.
It appears that a central focus of the research on Western Europe from the beginning has been
the utilization of natural sources of energy, especially coal. Several scholars have also turned
their attention to questions of demography and family structure.1 These two themes have
become central to research on the social and economic history of imperial China, especially
the eighteenth century, and offer rich ground for comparison between the two societies.
My general approach can be summarized baldly in the form of several theses. Each of these
needs qualification, of course, but I put them here simply for the sake of simplicity:
1. Recent research on late imperial China has argued that in most measurable aspects of
technology, economic productivity and ecological pressure, there were no significant
differences between China and Western Europe up to around the year 1800.
2. Likewise, in quantitative demographic data and in family structure, many of China’s
social practices, as opposed to her ideals, showed marked similarities to Western Europe.
Chinese families did not breed heedlessly, producing a Malthusian situation of population
outrunning available resources, but rather limited fertility in response to local economic
opportunities.
3. No major cultural distinctions between China and Europe can be detected that had
unequivocally differential economic effects. Whether we look at attitudes toward
commercial activity, literacy, urbanization, or religious doctrines, for example, we can
1
Rolf Peter Sieferle, Der Europäische Sonderweg:Ursachen und Faktoren (Stuttgart, 2000)
311
find in both societies attitudes and institutions favoring and opposing economic growth
and technological change. Until 1800, there is no clear balance in favor of Europe
promoting economically meaningful activity.
4. In short, Marx, Malthus, Weber and many other social theorists have been wrong in
basing much of their explanations of capitalism on radical distinctions between East and
West. The fundamental flaw in these theories is their exclusive focus on internal factors
and exaggerated polarities of difference. Better explanations must accept evidence of
general comparability and rely more heavily on exogenous intervention and global
contexts.
5. A fuller explanation of the European difference after 1800 must incorporate the role of the
early modern state. Explanations that ignore politics will not suffice.
Why the European Miracle?
I will illustrate the points above first negatively, then positively. By sketching the evidence
for broad similarities between Chinese and European social structures, I argue that most
existing arguments based on sharp contrasts of East and West fail. Then, pointing more
speculatively to the role of state structures, I argue that the European system of competitive
states developing into global empires in the eighteenth century generated positive economic
and technological effects compared to the Chinese imperial experience. Until the mideighteenth century, China did face a comparably competitive state-building environment and
responded in ways similar to European states, but with the end of imperial expansion, the
dynamism ebbed out of her system.
On demography, Martina Eglauer has very ably summarized the conclusions of recent
research on late imperial China.2 Her argument relies heavily on the quantitative work of
James Lee, Cameron Campbell, Wang Feng, and others, which has given us the most reliable
information on Chinese family dynamics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3
Historians and anthropologists like Patricia Ebrey, Arthur Wolf, Kathryn Bernhardt, and
others have also provided valuable qualitative information. The main implication of their
work is that imperial China does not fit well into a binary contrast between a special
“Northwestern European” family pattern and a general “patrilinear” pattern for the rest of the
2
Martina Eglauer, Familie und Haushalt in China der späten Kaiserzeit (Stuttgart, 2001)
James Z. Lee and Cameron Campbell, Fate and Fortune in Rural China: Social Organization and Population
Behavior in Liaoning, 1774-1873 (Cambridge, 1997);James Z. Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity:
Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities (Cambridge, Mass., 1999) Reviewed by Peter C. Perdue in Journal
of Asian Studies 57.3 (Aug.1998), p.854-6; 59.2 (May 2000), p. 410-2.
3
312
world. Or to the extent that China does fit this pattern, it does not suffice to explain
differences in economic growth after the eighteenth century.4
Thus, for example, the contrast between “nuclear family” in Europe and “extended family” in
China is misleading, because the vast majority of families in peasant China were nuclear or
stem families, whose household size was about 5.5. Early and universal marriage did occur in
China, by contrast with late marriage and higher rates of non-married people in Europe, but
this difference did not produce large differences in population growth rates, because Chinese
families held down fertility within marriage. Total marital fertility in China was six compared
to 7.5 to 9 in Europe. Europe and China reached the same goal of demographic regulation by
different routes: Europeans by limiting opportunities for marriage, and thus controlling
legitimate births, Chinese by limiting opportunities for reproduction within marriage. How
Chinese achieved limited fertility within marriage remains a subject of debate: infanticide,
limited sexual relations, and herbal abortifacients, etc. may all have played a role.
China’s partible inheritance of land encouraged earlier family formation than European
impartible inheritance, because it allowed newly wed couples to set up a household with
landed property at a young age, but it still did not produce large extended families, except
among the very wealthy. Repeated divisions of the family property made new families poorer
than the older generation, and families adjusted their size to economic opportunities. There
were certainly significant regional differences, depending on the ability of families to increase
their land holdings. Regardless of inheritance customs, the underlying demographic dynamics
in both China and Europe were the same. Where there were opportunities to clear new land on
the frontiers, for example, new families migrated in search of land and increased their size.
Where land was scarce, they held down population growth, and many young men never got to
marry at all.
China had a number of special customs that served to loosen up the tight restrictions of her
demographic regime. Adoption allowed families without male heirs to bring in a young man
to carry on the paternal line, while offering opportunities to poor men to get a wife. The
“minor marriage” pattern, or “little daughter-in-law marriage”, along with uxorilocal
marriage, also gave more opportunities for marriage to poor families by relieving them of
dowry expenses. The net effect was to make nearly universal marriage possible, but not to
4
Eglauer, Table on p.9
313
increase population growth as a whole. Minor marriages had, on average, lower fertility than
orthodox ones, either because of sexual aversion, or economic constraints.5
Ever since Malthus, Western analysts have claimed that partible inheritance combined with
early and universal marriage would inevitably create a rapid birth rate in China, and that the
resulting pressure of population on resources could only be offset by the catastrophic checks
of high mortality. David Landes succinctly summarizes this European myth about China:
“Early, universal marriage, and lots of children. That takes food, and food in turn takes
people. Treadmill. This strategy went back thousands of years.” We now know that all but the
first three words of this statement are wrong.6
Thus, we cannot invoke arguments based on aggregate differences between China and Europe
in demographic measures or family institutions to explain the industrial breakthrough. Other
more localized, specific linkages between family structures and economy may work, but these
have yet to be spelled out. This is a negative result, but an important one.
In the light of recent research on China, the Industrial Revolution is not a deep, slow
evolution out of centuries of particular conditions unique to early modern Europe. It is a late,
rapid, unexpected outcome of a fortuitous combination of circumstances of the late eighteenth
century. Critics of this kind of argument often respond by insisting that such a major
transformation cannot be just an “accident”. They misunderstand the argument. We are not
claiming that Europe’s miracle is inexplicable; only that it cannot be explained either by longterm causes purportedly unique to Europe, or solely by internal characteristics of European
societies. In light of what we now know about imperial China, Japan, and India, among other
places, acceptable explanations must invoke a global perspective, and allow for a great deal of
short-term change.
Energy Sources
Yet the European miracle did occur. What were the important factors? Ken Pomeranz has
argued that global ecological contingencies played a determining role.
7
These included the
availability of coal supplies in northern England near to water transport, the British access to
the vast “ghost acreage” of the New World and the cotton supplies and domestic market of its
colony in India. These are all, in some sense, exogenous factors to the British social system.
5
Arthur P. Wolf and Chieh-shan Huang, Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845-1945 (Stanford, 1980)
David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor (New York 1998
). p.23
7
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy
(Princeton, 2000) Reviewed by Peter C. Perdue in H-World listserve (www.h-net.msu.edu/~world), August 2000
6
314
Imperial China had analogous, but by no means comparable, ecological features. China had
coal, but the largest deposits were located in the northwest, far from the textile industries and
canals of the lower Yangtze valley. China also had “colonies,” new territories conquered by
imperial expansion, but these, too, were in the interior of the Eurasian continent, without large
arable lands or dense populations. The empire actively promoted the settlement of these
regions, but they did not provide the raw materials or commodity demands comparable to
those of the settlers of the New World. Unlike arguments based on proto-industrialization,
demographic structures, or commercial culture, where the differences are not arguably large
enough to account for major economic change, here the differences in size of resources and
transport costs are very large, so likely to have large effects.
Before Pomeranz, Rolf Peter Sieferle and Anthony Wrigley had also made a systematic case
for the importance of energy supplies, particularly coal, in the Industrial Revolution.8 The
importance of coal is, in fact, an old argument, invoked ever since the Industrial Revolution
began. No one could miss the polluting effects of the “dark Satanic mills” on the shock cities
of northern England. Wrigley’s important contribution was to shift the focus of attention away
from issues of market organization back to the technological and ecological foundations of
industrialization. Wrigley certainly agreed that England had developed institutions that
favored highly commercialized economic relations in both rural and urban areas, but heavy
reliance on Adam Smith’s models of competitive market exchange obscured the fact that “the
world of the classical economists was a bounded world where the growth path traced out by a
successful economy might at best be asymptotic; it could never assume the exponential form
that became the hallmark of economies that had experienced an industrial revolution.”9
Debates over the nature of English “capitalism” in the neo-classical and Marxist traditions
foundered on the vagueness of definitions and the inability to agree on when capitalism
began. One group of definitions centered on commercial capitalism, or “Smithian dynamics;”
another focused on the use of “mineral stocks rather than from the annual flow of agricultural
production” and the tapping of “great stores of energy” instead of the limited supplies above
ground. Since China historians have found nearly all the essential elements of European
commercial capitalism in late imperial China from the sixteenth century forward, it seems
8
Rolf Peter Sieferle, Der Unterirdische Wald:Energiekrise und Industrielle Revolution (München, 1982); E.A.
Wrigley, Continuity, Chance, and Change: The character of the Industrial Revolution in England (Cambridge,
1988)
9
E.A. Wrigley, "The Limits to Growth: Malthus and the Classical Economists," in Population and Resources in
Western Intellectual Traditions, ed. Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter (Cambridge, 1989), p.34. Cited in
R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca, 1997).
p.50
315
fruitless to attribute industrialization to the rise of “capitalism” in Europe. As Wrigley puts it,
“the English economy was capitalist in both senses of the word, but the connection between
the two was initially casual rather than causal.”10
By looking at particular energy sources, however, we can specify more closely the appropriate
arenas of comparison between China and Europe. Pomeranz relies heavily on differences in
location and character of coal supplies to explain England’s successful breakthrough to
industrialism. Because English coal was found near the coast, and because pumping water out
of coal mines was a key obstacle to mining, the earliest, very inefficient steam engines only
became profitable when located near coal mines. England’s textile industry, at first heavily
reliant on water power, could transport coal from nearby when technology improved. More
than the rest of Europe, England both faced a growing shortage of timber, and had the ability
to transport coal by sea, giving it incentives to rely heavily on coal.11 Textile manufacturers
could also import their raw materials and export finished goods in quantity through the nearby
ports. In China, by contrast, the best coal deposits were found in the interior, hundreds of
miles from the coast, and the greatest obstacle to mining coal was gas, not water. China’s very
advanced textile industries, producing silk and cotton for millions of urban and rural
consumers, concentrated in the lower Yangtze valley, close to river and canal transport. But
textile manufacturers had no opportunity or incentive to bring coal from thousands of miles
away to mechanize their production. Hence textile production remained a handicraft activity,
done by peasants at home or in small workshops, instead of a concentrated factory production
method. Even so, real wages of Chinese textile workers were no lower than those of rural
textile workers in England.12
China historians thus find no significant differences in the organization of production between
the two societies in the pre-industrial age. Wong argues that “fundamentally similar dynamics
of economic expansion via the market took place across Eurasia, and … the development of
rural industry was also similar in important ways.”13 European industrialism as we know it in
10
Wrigley, Continuity, Chance, and Change. p.115
Sieferle, Der Unterirdische Wald. p.108-114. Cf Landes: “The early steam-engines were grossly inefficient,
delivering less than 1 per cent of the work represented by their thermal inputs. This was a far cry from the
performance of organic converters: both animals and man can deliver from 10 to 20 per cent of inputs,depending
on conditions. But neither man nor beast can eat coal. And since the supply of organic nourishment was and is
limited… it is this increment of fuel made available by the steam-engine, however wastefully used, that
counted….the early engines were general employed only where coal was extremely cheap – as in collieries; or in
mines too deep for other techniques, as in Cornwall; or in those occasional circumstances – the naval drydock at
Saint Petersburg for example – where cost was no object….coal at pithead was cheap or even a free good (many
boilers burned unsaleable slack).” David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus (1969). p.97, 100, 102
12
Pomeranz, Great Divergence. p.91
13
Wong, China Transformed. p.52
11
316
the late nineteenth century depended on the combination of three elements: “a market
economy driven by Smithian dynamics”, the “institutions of commercial capitalism”, and
“processes of technological change centered on an energy revolution.” Each of these three
elements were “logically independent” of each other, even though empirically they came
together in the late eighteenth century. China possessed the first two elements, but lacked the
third. The absence of the energy revolution was a result of geological contingency.14
I find this argument for near similarity between China and Europe in many aspects of social
and economic structure convincing. Pomeranz has effectively answered his critics who stress
the great differences between advanced regions of China and Europe.15 No one is arguing that
the lower Yangzi delta’s agrarian system and England’s were identical; clearly labor to land
ratios were higher in China than in England, and fixed capital investment in agriculture was
higher in England than in China. But there is no reason to assume that, simply because
England was the first industrial country, it had to be only path, the model that others must
follow. Only a fixed belief in a stereotyped version of “stages” theory, in which all societies
must pass through prescribed patterns in a specified order, can defend the proposition that the
traditional agrarian regime prevented the lower Yangzi valley from achieving sustained
economic growth.
In short, industrial growth does not have to be an outcome of a centuries-long accumulation of
the particular skills found in northwestern Europe; there are numerous paths to economic
modernity, and England followed only one of them. Certainly all industrializing societies
need vastly increased supplies of energy and raw materials, but they can obtain these from
many sources. The much higher costs of transporting coal in China to the coast compared to
Europe, and the different technological demands of mining [pumping out water vs. avoiding
gas explosions], meant that China in the late eighteenth century would not develop coal and
steam-based industry left to its own devices, but did not preclude China from industrializing
later on without creating an English-style agrarian system.
State-Sponsored Development
And yet, this argument ignores the important role of state power in mobilizing natural and
economic resources. Unless we include consideration of organized political power, we risk
14
Ibid. p.58
Philip C.C. Huang, "Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century Britain and China? A Review of
Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy,"
Journal of Asian Studies 61 (May, 2002) ; Kenneth Pomeranz, "Beyond the East-West Binary: Resituating
Development Paths in the Eighteenth-Century World," Journal of Asian Studies 61 (May, 2002)
15
317
offering excessively reductionist explanations. Even if two countries differ greatly in their
energy endowments, it does not necessarily follow that the most favorably endowed one will
advance more rapidly. Japan in the late nineteenth century industrialized very rapidly without
possessing very large resources in her home islands. (Japan, of course, like England, soon
acquired an empire in Taiwan and Korea in order to obtain these resources, including coal,
minerals, grain, and Lebensraum.) The actions of states, of voluntary and coerced human
activity, decisively affected the economic and technological development of societies, even in
the early modern period.
A strictly ecological focus omits a crucial question: why could China not make up for its lack
of convenient coal supplies through state action? The ecological thesis of industrialization
ultimately relies on a sophisticated form of environmental determinism, since it assumes that
the absence of a critical factor doomed the society to a long period of backwardness.
But since humans in general collectively strive to improve their economic situation as much
as possible, knowledge of technological advances diffused rapidly across Eurasia. Chinese
rulers of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries were well aware of European advances in
military technology, and sought to acquire new cannons and guns.. The Jesuits, the world’s
first global arms salesmen, were happy to accommodate them. Both the Ming armies and their
enemy Manchu armies used firearms extensively, as did the Japanese during the wars of
unification of the early seventeenth century. The eighteenth-century emperors dragged heavy
cannon thousands of kilometers into the steppe in pursuit of their Mongol enemies. Asians
learned of European military technology and quickly adapted it to their purposes.16
The Chinese state also had the capability to move bulk goods over long distances. Most of
China’s copper, which was the basic material for its currency, came from the distant
southwest province of Yunnan. Officials carefully tracked the shipment of copper from the
mines to the mints.17 Sometimes they used military escorts for official shipments; sometimes
they entrusted shipments to merchant contractors. Grain provisioning also required large-scale
long-distance transport in order to fill the “evernormal granaries” of the empire. These large
grain stores, held in each of China’s over 1500 counties, provided supplies to level price
fluctuations over the course of the year and to relieve major famines. Again, Qing officials
16
Joanna Waley-Cohen, "China and Western Technology in the Eighteenth Century," American Historical
Review 98 (December, 1993) ; Peter C. Perdue, "China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia,
1680-1760" (Cambridge, Mass., forthcoming)
17
See Helen Dunstan, " Safely supping with the devil: the Qing state and its merchant suppliers of copper,"
Late Imperial China 13 (Dec., 1992); Hans Ulrich Vogel, "Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800," Late
Imperial China 8 (December, 1987)
318
sometimes shipped grain themselves, under military control, and more often contracted with
merchants. There is no reason that the Qing state could not have shipped other bulk goods if it
chose to.18
Other states that knew of Western European advances did mobilize their mineral resources in
the eighteenth century. Peter the Great of Russia founded the Mining and Manufactories
College and the Commerce College in the 1720s to promote private industrial development
with government support. His Siberian Bureau established the first major iron industries in the
Ural mountains in 1701. These industries, located on top of rich mineral deposits, became the
primary nucleus of Russian industrial development under state control. Peter also set up state
enterprises which were transferred to private owners or created new companies which
received special favors. Anisimov, who criticizes Peter’s industrial policies for preventing the
emergence of a private capitalist class, nevertheless agrees that Peter created a “powerful
economic base, so essential for a developing nation.” 19
Russia’s agrarian base was much poorer, and its bureaucracy far more rudimentary, than
China’s. China had much more commercial capital, and its agriculture was not held back by
serfdom. The Russian example indicates that countries without convenient mineral supplies
could overcome their disadvantage through energetic state action. Russian industrialization, of
course, took a very different path from that of England. It was far more state-directed,
coercive, reliant on foreign experts, and directed primarily toward military needs. It was,
nevertheless, quite successful, and began quite early.
Thus I would argue that the imperial Chinese state had both the capacity and the experience to
transport bulk commodities over long distances, when it chose to do so. State support, either
through direct transport or by contracting with merchants, could overcome enormous barriers.
The primary commodities on which Qing officials focused were grain, salt, and copper,
because these were central to maintaining subsistence for the population and the stability of
the currency. Timber could also be transported long distances to build palaces, ships, and
forts. Qing officials also invested in the transportation infrastructure, by building new roads
and dredging rivers. Water conservancy policies aimed to achieve the classic goal of “two
birds with one stone” [yi ju liang de] by protecting farmers from flooding and ensuring
merchants smooth passage on waterways. The impact on the landscape of these state
supported activities was very large, but the Qing state was neither an “Oriental Despotism”
18
Pierre Étienne Will and R. Bin Wong et al., Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in China,
1650-1850 (Ann Arbor, 1991)
19
Evgenii V. Anisimov, The Reforms of Peter the Great (Armonk, N.Y., 1993). p.73, 171 quote p.183
319
that repressed all commerce, nor a “laissez-faire” regime taking a hands-off approach to trade.
Its officials intervened actively in the trade in some commodities, while leaving others alone.
Which commodities the state chose to manage depended heavily on the security interests of
the state and its attitude toward provisioning its people.
The general capabilities of the state to direct the flows of goods were probably higher in the
eighteenth century than in any previous period. The highly elaborated granary system, the
reconstructed Grand Canal, the land settlement policies on the frontiers all showed a definite
interventionist spirit. The new communication system from the province to the center, using
both routine and secret palace memorials, meant that officials at the center could keep in close
touch with provincial officials. They could also send out special inspectors to make sure that
central policies were implemented accurately. The Qing reporting system collected vast
amounts of data about the workings of the agrarian economy, including detailed reports on
prices, rainfall, grain holdings, and famine relief. Qing capabilities to manage the economy
were powerful enough that we might even call it a “developmental agrarian state.” It did not
direct resources toward industrialization, but it did encourage the fullest possible exploitation
of landed resources, including foodstuffs and minerals. William T. Rowe’s new biography of
the Qing official Chen Hongmou gives impressive examples of one official’s activist
approach to “managing the world” [jingshi].20 In his many posts around the empire, Chen
directed his energies toward increasing agrarian output, reducing the damage from famines,
repairing and expanding waterworks, and developing mining. He did not however, believe
that the state alone should undertake major economic activities; his preference was to allow
market forces to induce merchants to transport goods wherever possible. State regulation and
cooperation with merchants, however, was directed toward the common goal of improving the
people’s welfare while strengthening the resources of the state.
Another example of state activism in the eighteenth-century is seen in the activities of Lan
Dingyuan in Taiwan. Like Chen Hongmou, he promoted active state direction of economic
development, this time in a colonial environment.21 Lan vigorously promoted the immigration
of Han Chinese to the newly conquered island, so as to raise its agricultural output and
20
William T. Rowe, Saving the world: Chen Hongmou and elite consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China
(Stanford, 2001) Reviewed by Peter C. Perdue, China Quarterly, 172 (December 2002), 1096-7
21
John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford, 1993).
p.17, 138-42, 185-90. Reviewed by Peter C. Perdue in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 55.1 (June, 1995)
p.261-269. Emma Jinhua Teng, "Travel Writing and Colonial Collecting: Chinese Travel Accounts of Taiwan"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1997). Chapter 5.; Chen Qiukun, "From Aborigines to Landed
Proprietors: Taiwan Aboriginal Land Rights, 1690-1850," in Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain,
ed. Gail Hershatter et al. (Stanford, 1996),Chen Qiukun, Qingdai Taiwan Tuzhu Diquan: Guanliao, Handian yu
Anli sheren di Tudi Bianqian, 1700-1895 (Taibei, 1994)
320
provide grain exports for Fujian province. Taiwan did indeed become a major grain exporting
province in the eighteenth century under the combined impact of official encouragement and
mercantile contact.
In another great frontier region conquered in the eighteenth century, Xinjiang, Qing officials
likewise promoted large scale colonial settlement combined with agricultural and mining
development.22 Here, too, they expected extensive immigration of Han Chinese from the
interior to raise the productivity of agriculture while binding the region more closely to the
center. First military colonists cleared the land and searched for water supplies, while they
built roads to link the oases together. Then civilian colonists followed, supported by state
grants of tools, seed, cattle, and tax-free land grants. This policy of subsidizing civilian
immigration, another example of yi ju liang de, relieved population pressure on poor lands of
the interior while ensuring permanent control of the newly developed lands in the west.
Merchants came after the military and civilian settlers to provide for their needs, and a money
economy developed around the settlers and their towns. These examples show that the Qing
officials could carry out significant developmental policies in selected regions of the empire.
Yet despite these powerful capabilities, the Qing state was losing control of many aspects of
economic exchange by the end of the eighteenth century. Against many examples of
successful projects to relieve famine or settle new lands, we can place equally dramatic
evidence of corruption and local oppression. For local officials, the potential for abuse was
just as strong as the potential for beneficial action. Each was balanced depending on the
degree of superior official supervision and local political incentives. A powerful provincial
governor like Chen Hongmou could crack down on local laxness and abuse, but other
governors might be less determined, or less capable. Despite extensive controls, the enormous
paper flow of the bureaucracy by its very nature obstructed clear lines of communication and
control, leaving the way open for abuse. In 1781, for example, a provincial treasurer and his
cronies in the northwest province of Gansu took advantage of an innovation in famine relief
policy to line their own pockets. After considerable discussion, the state had decided to allow
local officials in this poor province to collect contributions in silver by local merchants in
exchange for examination degrees. The silver funds could then be used for famine relief.
Silver, unlike grain, did not rot in granaries, and it allowed flexible allocation in response to
the peasants’ needs. But silver was so fungible that few could resist the temptation to misuse
it. The provincial officials involved in this scheme diverted the silver contribution funds into
22
James A Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity,& Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864
(Stanford, 1998); Perdue, "China Marches West"
321
their own pockets, and took huge amounts of wealth with them when they left the province
for other posts. They were only discovered by accident, when the outbreak of a rebellion in
Gansu forced the new governor to investigate closely the provincial accounts. In this case, a
policy designed to have positive developmental effects by directing mercantile capital to a
poor frontier region only ended up recycling the silver back into the hands of greedy southern
officials.
I would argue that a key turning point in the effectiveness of the imperial bureaucracy
occurred around the middle of the eighteenth century, just as frontier expansion ended. The
end to military challenges on the frontier let much dynamism ebb out of the bureaucracy. Its
incentive to reform itself declined, and the will to control abuses slackened. There is,
therefore, a connection between the completion of frontier expansion in the northwest and
China’s numerous troubles with social order in the nineteenth century.
The Qing state was only sporadically, not comprehensively developmental. Many of its
projects were designed to ensure the security of poor regions, so that heavy attacks of famine
would not touch off revolts, and so that military forces could obtain subsistence from local
markets. Northwest China was an especially significant site of state intervention, because the
expanding Qing empire needed to send armies through the region, and gain supplies from it,
on their way to battle the Mongols farther west. The northwest, though poor, did generate
innovation in policies toward the economy. Chen Hongmou devised innovative methods of
agricultural production and mobilization for military needs when he served as governor of
Shaanxi, as did other provincial governors and governors-general.
The end of this expansion in the mid-eighteenth century, and the end of the frontier wars,
meant that both the incentives for innovation and the means of control slackened. Now there
was not such a crying need to press agrarian resources out of the poor peasantry, and
conversely, local abuse of the peasantry did not threaten to undermine the security of the
entire empire. Paradoxically, the great system of price stabilizing granaries expanded to its
greatest extent in the late eighteenth century, but the problems of corruption, peculation of
official funds, false reporting, and neglect of grain storage expanded along with it. In the
nineteenth century, despite some sporadic exceptions, these endemic weaknesses of the
granary system would undermine the entire effectiveness of famine relief, allowing severe
outbreaks of peasant revolt.
322
Why The End of Frontier Expansion Slowed the Dynamism of the Qing State
Many historians have argued that the competitive European state system established in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries generated the process of state building, military
mobilization, and commercial growth that fueled imperial expansion.23 They have also argued
that this feature of European state-building distinguishes the political economy of Europe
radically from China, which was an “agrarian empire” concerned with provisioning its people,
and not in aggrandizing its power against other states. R. Bin Wong, for example, finds
greater concern for the welfare of the peasant population in China than in Europe, but little
interest in mercantilist policies of increasing state revenue to support military competition.24
In this case, he diverges from his general case for similarities between China and Europe and
focuses on a large, long-standing difference.
By contrast, I would argue here too for plausible similarities between China and Europe
during the period of Qing frontier expansion. From the early seventeenth to the mideighteenth centuries, the Qing empire was also engaged in a competitive state building
process as it pushed its borders outward in a series of military campaigns. During this
expansionary period, the Qing rulers initiated administrative innovations that built an
increasingly centralized and coordinated bureaucracy which used mercantile and agrarian
resources actively for economic development to serve its security needs.
As examples of institutional innovation before the nineteenth century focused on economic
reform, we can cite the creation of the Grand Council, the central information gathering
mechanism of the empire, as a response to the demands for communication during the frontier
wars; the comprehensive mapping of the empire contracted to the Jesuits using new geodesic
technology from Europe; the debates in the 1730s and 1740s over how to use markets to
provide grain for the evernormal granaries; fiscal reforms under the Yongzheng emperor [r.
1722-35] that rationalized local tax collection; the development of a merchant trading system
under official guidance in the northwest in the early eighteenth century, which shows some
similarities to the European chartered trading companies; collaboration between officials and
merchants to promote commercial penetration of the northwest frontier; and active investment
in agricultural reclamation, including moving large populations and building an infrastructure
23
William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago
1982 ); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J., 1975)
24
Wong, China Transformed ; Wong, R. Bin. "The Search for European Differences and Domination in the
Early Modern World: A View from Asia." American Historical Review 107, no. 2 (2002): 447-469.
323
to support agrarian productivity.25 These were all creative changes that improved the ability of
the imperial state to manage flows of information, trade, and commodities in response to
pressures of harvests, populations, and security threats. In each case, the innovations came
from the demand of the frontier regions for security, and the needs of the military
commanders for adequate supplies. The contrast between an “agrarian empire” and a
“competitive state system” is too overdrawn, and too static, to capture this dynamic.
European industrialization, in England and even more so on the continent, also depended on a
dynamic generated by military competition. John Brewer points to the fiscal demands
generated by England’s numerous eighteenth-century wars, which led to the establishment of
a national debt. Ken Alder describes the important impact of military engineering in France in
constructing the basis of a standardized system of mass production.26 We may find it
uncomfortable to accept Werner Sombart’s argument that war is inseparable from capitalism,
but a good case can be made that these two state undertakings are causally, not just casually,
linked.27
Thus in their political economy, as well as in their ecology, China and Europe were following
parallel lines for a time in the early modern period. The delimitation of a fixed border with
Russia and the elimination of the Zunghar Mongol state in the mid-eighteenth century,
however, fundamentally changed the Chinese political economy of state building, while
Europeans continued to invest in their wars. David Kaiser, for example, has shown how
European rulers continually used interstate wars from the sixteenth through the twentieth
centuries to achieve their political goals of centralization, homogenization, and
simplification.28 Chinese rulers, in their own eyes, had finished their project by 1760.
Ironically, the balance began to shift just as the Qing project reached its zenith, bearing out
the prophecy from the Book of Changes: “When the sun is at its peak, it begins to set [ri
zhong ze ze].”29 China’s increasing ecological and political difficulties in the early nineteenth
century included floods and famine, peasant uprisings on the frontiers, opium smuggling, in
25
On the granary debate, see Helen Dunstan, "The autocratic heritage and China’s political future: a view from
the Qing," East Asian History 12 (1996); On frontier trade, Perdue, "China Marches West" ; Wang Xi and Lin
Yongkuang, Qingdai Xibei Minzu Maoyishi (Beijing, 1991). On the Grand Council, see Beatrice S. Bartlett,
Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch’ing China, 1723-1820 (Berkeley, 1991); On the
Yongzheng tax reforms, see Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate’s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in EighteenthCentury Ch’ing China (Berkeley, 1984)
26
Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton, N. J.,
1997); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1990 )
27
Werner Sombart, Krieg und Kapitalismus (New York, 1975 [1913])
28
David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge, 1990)
29
Cited in Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York, 1990 ). p.137
324
addition to foreign pressure for trade privileges culminating in the Opium War. The
bureaucracy still had its share of energetic officials, who looked back to Chen Hongmou as a
model, but they could not reverse the trend of decline. Wei Yuan, the great historian and
advocate of military reform, drew his inspiration for resistance to the West from the
eighteenth-century frontier wars of expansion, the “savage wars of peace” that had defined the
empire’s limits. If only the vigorous spirit of that time could be revived, he felt, China could
ward off the foreign threat. Thus even after its conclusion, the period of expansion inspired
visions of restoration and recovery of the empire’s former greatness.
A brief survey will indicate the significant impact of frontier expansion on political and
economic developments. There were two critical turning points in the relationship of the
imperial Chinese state to frontier defense in the early modern period: the “turn away from the
sea” in the 1430s-1440s which ended the ocean voyages of the Yongle era, and the decade
1750-1760, when the final defeat of the Zunghar Mongols by the Qing brought Central
Eurasia under Qing and Russian control. Over these three centuries, the imperial rulers
reoriented their primary targets of expansion away from the south coast toward the interior of
the Eurasian continent. In the sixteenth century, the Ming rulers established a defensive
barrier in the northwest, known as the Great Wall, but still conducted substantial trade on the
south coast, importing large quantities of Latin American silver to fuel their commercial
economy.
After the Manchus conquered Beijing in 1644, their armies moved south against the retreating
Ming state, then against the Three Feudatory generals of the Southwest from 1674-1681,
taking Taiwan and putting down local resistance in 1684. They then expanded to the
northwest against the Western Mongol leader Galdan [1690-1697], invaded Kokonor and
Tibet from 1720 to 1724, and completed the campaigns that conquered Xinjiang from 1756 to
1760. They had three essential problems to solve -- military, logistical, and diplomatic –
which had never been successfully solved by any previous Chinese dynasty. Militarily, they
gained Mongol allies who provided them with cavalry forces and large supplies of horses,
essential for warfare in the steppe. The Manchus established kinship connections with the
Mongols through systematic intermarriage policies in order to win them over, they captured a
Yuan dynasty seal from one Mongol Khan, giving them the right to claim legitimate descent
from Chinggis Khan’s empire, and they gave food supplies to starving refugee Mongols in
return for submission to Qing control.
325
The Qing overcame the logistical barrier by transporting large amounts of grain into Central
Eurasia to feed Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol forces for years at a time. This required a huge
mobilization, drawing on agrarian surpluses of the poor northwestern provinces, textiles from
the lower Yangzi, and transport vehicles, horses, donkeys, mules, and camels from all over
North China. At the same time, the evernormal granary system relieved shortages within the
empire that might impede this resource extraction project.
On the diplomatic front, the Qing not only won over most of the Mongol Khans, but also
negotiated a treaty with the Russians to delimit their border, and prevent the Russians from
supporting the Zunghar Mongol Khans, while they also intervened in the politics of the
Buddhist establishment in Tibet, Kokonor, and Inner Mongolia, sometimes by force, to gain
support from the religious hierarchy.
Meanwhile, the state neglected Southeast Asia, while European colonizers moved in. The
large civilian Chinese merchant colonies throughout Southeast Asia had to arrange for their
own protection without backing from the Qing state. Often they became the agents of
Portuguese, Dutch, and British colonial powers: tax collectors and local elites inserted
between Europeans and the native populations.30 They helped the penetration of European
colonialism, and they did not identify with the Chinese imperial state. They did, however,
frequently travel back to the imperial coast to conduct trade, get married, or to retire and be
buried there. The “overseas” Chinese were never completely cut off from their ancestral roots,
even though the state itself refused to take responsibility for them while they were abroad.
The result was a successful reorientation of the empire away from the coast, completing an
imperial project that had failed for centuries. The Qianlong emperor could boast that he had
achieved something that none of his predecessors could do: ending the millennial-long threat
from the Central Eurasian steppe. When he met Lord Macartney in 1793, and told him that the
empire “possess[ed] all things in prolific abundance and lack[ed] no product within his
borders,” he was not expressing a deep-seated Chinese sense of xenophobia, but boasting of a
very recent achievement. He was also not telling the complete truth. Before the mideighteenth century, China had lacked two essential products for her security and economy:
horses and silver. Now, with the defeat of the Mongols, horses were no longer a problem, but
the empire still needed silver.31
30
Philip A. Kuhn, The homeland : thinking about the history of Chinese overseas. (Canberra, 1997)
Robert B. Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative (Lanham, MD.,
2002). p.114; Waley-Cohen, "Western Technology,"
31
326
The docile Mongols and Kazakhs provided huge numbers of mounts from the steppe, while
the flourishing south coastal export trade generated the “great sucking sound” that drew in the
silver supplies of the world. China was at least equal, if not superior, to Europe, in many
measures of economic productivity, popular welfare, and social equality. The emperor was
indeed complacent, but he had not deluded himself about the state of the world.
But after 1760, some dynamism seems to have gone out of the system. The flexibility of the
empire, its ability to react to external shocks and take advantage of new opportunities, seemed
to have declined, so that while Japan could react rapidly to the appearance of Western
steamships in her harbor in 1854, Chinese officials could not mount a unified response to the
Opium War of 1839-1842. But the source of Chinese weakness, complacency, and rigidity,
like the Industrial Revolution itself, was late and recent, not deeply rooted in her traditional
culture.
My explanation of the decline of China and the rise of Europe in the nineteenth century is
based on contingent timing: the British happened to arrive on the South China coast with their
demands to expand the opium trade after the 1780s, just shortly after Qing troops had
achieved their great victories in the Northwest and welcomed back the last of the Mongols to
“return” to imperial control: the Torghuts, who left Russian service on the lower Volga and
arrived on the Qing frontier in 1776. Comparing the British to the Mongols they had just
defeated, the Qing could hardly see them as a serious threat. At the same time, domestic
tensions within the empire, especially exhaustion of cultivable land in frontier peripheries,
causing social unrest that demanded the attention of the state, made it unable to respond
quickly to the threat from the coast.
The Qing had learned a lot from its northwest experience, and attempted to apply the policies
that succeeded against the Mongols to its domestic and south coastal challenges. But strategies
designed for Central Eurasian wars were appropriate neither for the mountainous terrain of the
interior nor for warding off the sea nomads of the south. Aside from the timing, the kind of
military and diplomatic experience gained on the northwestern frontier generated inappropriate
responses for the new challenges on different terrain. It was thus a combination of logically
independent elements, casually but not causally connected, that brought down China’s last
dynasty.
The European Sonderweg, in Peter Sieferle’s words, resulted from a “highly improbable
constellation” of factors each of which in isolation would have been insufficient to create a
century of domination of the world. Likewise, none of the causes of the Industrial Revolution
327
and European imperial expansion could have taken effect independently of their global
repercussions. By examining China’s own Sonderweg during this period, especially the
interplay between economic development and frontier expansion, we can throw more light on
the evolution of Europe, and of the world in general.
328
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330
The Authors
Martina Eglauer studied sinology, anthropology and German language in Munich, Aarhus
(Denmark) and Chengdu (China). She obtained her Ph.D. in Sinology at the University of
Munich where she teaches Chinese culture and history. Her main fields of interest are Chinese
philosophy and social history. Her publications include books on the philosophers Zhang
Dongsun and Hu Shi and on family and household in late imperial China.
Jürg Helbling (1954) studied anthropology, philosophy and modern history at University of
Zurich, where he has obtained his Ph.D. in anthropology (1984) and his postdoctoral degree in
1990. Between 1985 and 1987 he has conducted a field research in the Philippines and
published a book on the economy and social structure of the Alangan-Mangyan of Mindoro.
His main fields of interest are ecology and economics (resource management, production
strategies, political economy, institutional and evolutionary economics), politics (war and
peace in tribal societies, civil wars, power and kinship relations), history of theories in
anthropology and the social sciences as well as environmental history. He is professor at the
Department of Anthropology at the University of Zurich and lecturer on environmental
history at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich.
Raimund Th. Kolb is professor of Sinology (History) at the University of Würzburg. His main
research interests in Chinese history pertain to agriculture and environment, the lower strata
of society and the urban underworlds in Late Imperial and Republican times. Kolb's
publications include a study of migratory locust plagues during Ming and Qing times and the
agriculture of Early China
Peter C. Perdue is T. T. and Wei Fong Chao Professor of Asian Civilizations and Professor of
History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He teaches courses on Chinese history
and civilization, Chinese social and economic history, the Silk Road, and historical
methodology. His publications include: Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan,
1500-1850 A.D., (Harvard University Press,1987); "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and
Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia”, published in Modern Asian Studies in
1996, and "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in
Early Modern Central Eurasia", International History Review, June, 1998.
He has lived in Japan, Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China for extended periods of
time, and recently spent time in Moscow doing archival research. He has traveled to China,
Russia, and Chinese Central Asia several times.
His current interests focus on environmental change, ethnicity, and the relationship between
long-term economic change and military conquest in the Chinese and Russian empires. His
forthcoming manuscript from Harvard University Press, entitled “China Marches West: The
Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, 1600 – 1800” combines these perspectives into an
integrated account of the Chinese and Russia conquest of Siberia and Central Eurasia in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Rolf Peter Sieferle studied history, political science and sociology in Heidelberg and
Konstanz. He finished his Ph.D in 1977 and his postdoctoral degree in 1984 and taught at the
Universities of Konstanz and Mannheim. Since 2000 he is professor of history at the
University of St. Gallen (Switzerland). His main fields of interest are environmental history,
world history and history of ideas and he has published several books on these subjects. Since
1995 he is responsible for the historical research activities of the Breuninger Stiftung,
focusing on the project“Europe’s special course”.
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