Language Practices and Self Definition

Language Practices and Self Definition: The Case of Gender Identity Acquisition
Author(s): Spencer E. Cahill
Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 295-311
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
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AND
PRACTICES
LANGUAGE
SELF
DEFINITION:
THECASEOF
GENDERIDENTITY
ACQUISITION*
Spencer E.Cahill
SkidmoreCollege
This articleempiricallyexplorespossiblerelationshipsbetweenlanguagepractices
and the acquisitionof genderidentity.I proposea frameworkfor analyzingthe
languageof socialidentification
underlyingtheusageof identifyingcategoricalterms
and then use this frameworkto analyzesegmentsof interactionrecordedin two
preschools.Onthe basisof thisanalysis,I proposea distinctivelysociologicaltheory
of genderidentityacquisitionand suggestthat the proposedanalyticalframework
mayprovidethe basisfora moregeneralsociologicalpsychology.
Influencedby the thought of George Herbert Mead, a number of sociologists and social
psychologists have argued that verbal labeling has a profound influence on individuals'
definitions of self (e.g., Allport 1961, pp. 114-117; Foote 1951; Markey 1928; Strauss
1969). Yet, few (e.g., Denzin 1972;Hadden and Lester 1978) have systematicallystudied
possible relationships between language practices'and the bestowal, appropriationand
display of social identities. As a result, the promise of a sociological psychology which
Bergerand Luckmann(1966, p. 186)found in "thetheoreticalcore of the thought of Mead
and his school" has not been fully realized.The purpose of this article is to illustratethat
investigationof relationshipsbetween language practicesand self-definitioncan make an
important contribution to the development as a distinctivelysociological psychology. In
order to do so, possible relationshipsbetween language practicesand the bestowal and
appropriationof a particularidentity-gender-are empiricallyexplored.
Due to both its biographical timing and significance, the process of gender identity
acquisition is uniquely suited for this purpose. As John Money (1980, p. 33) has noted,
the acquisition of gender identity seems to occur during the same biographical period
that "native language is established," and some students of the gender development
process have suggested that this apparent association is more than coincidental (e.g.,
Constantinople 1979; Hartley 1964). Moreover, gender identification is an exemplary
*Direct all communications to Spencer E. Cahill, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, Social Work,
Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, New York 12866.
The Sociological Quarterly,Volume 27, Number 3, pages 295-311.
Copyright@1986 by JAI Press, Inc.
All rights of reproductionin any form reserved.
ISSN: 0038-0253
296
Vol.27/No. 3/1986
THESOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
instance, if not a prototype, of the social definition of self (Goffman 1977). In many
societies, including our own, gender identification lays down an understandingof what
one's ultimate nature ought to be and how and where that nature ought to be expressed
(Goffman 1979, p. 8). In these societies, by implication, the definition of self and others
as female or male and the evaluation of appearance and behavioral performances in
terms of socially accepted standards of femininity or masculinity are essential components of "self-regulatedparticipationin social encounters"(Goffman 1955,p. 44).2
In order to empiricallyexplore possible relationshipsbetween language practicesand
the acquisition of gender identity, I first introduce a framework for analyzing the
structureor "language"of social identificationunderlyingthe usage of identifyingverbal
labels like "mommy,""daddy,""baby,""girl,"and "boy."Second, I identifythe language
of social identification underlying young children's usage of such labels by analyzing
segments of interaction which were recorded during participant observation in two
preschools3or, in a few instances, borrowed from previouslypublishedstudies. Third, I
examine possible relationships between young children's language of social identification, their acquisition of gender identity, and the anatomical basis of sex identification.
In the course of this analysis, I propose a distinctively sociological theory of gender
identity acquisition and then briefly outline the more general sociological psychology
which this theory suggests.
LANGUAGESOF SOCIALIDENTIFICATION
Over thirty years ago, Nelson Foote (1951, p. 8) pointed out that "if the regularitiesin
human behaviorare organizedresponsesto situationswhich have been classifiedmore or
less in common by the actors in them, then names motivate behavior."Clearly, Foote's
proposal is consistent with BenjaminWhorf's(1956, p. 18) hypothesisthat we categorize,
typify, and respond to the environment"along lines laid down by our native language."
However, unlike Whorfs hypothesis, Foote's proposal implies that the relationship
between language practices and the organization of experience is reflexive rather than
unidirectional. That is, it suggests that language practices both influence and are
influenced by our typifications of and responses to the environment. Moreover, Foote
was specificallyconcerned with the ways in which we categorize, typify, and respond to
one another and ourselves. Indeed, he suggests that analysis of the "functionof language,
and especially of names ascribed to categories of people"(Foote 1951, p. 8), can provide
the basis for a distinctivelysociological psychology.
In analyzing the function of names ascribed to categories of people, it is importantto
recognize that these names are not simply terms for collectively referringto individuals
but also carry implications regardingtypical patterns of behavior. For example, we are
offering an implicit typification of an individual'sbehavior when we call him or her a
"child."By implication,the names we ascribeto categoriesof people provideus guidance
in anticipating and responding to one another's behavior. However, individuals must
employ a similar method and terms of social classification or identificationin order for
such names to provide a basis for predictableand intelligibleinteraction between them.
In other words, they must sharea similarsystem or "language"of social identification.
While languages of social identification may not possess all of the characteristicsof
spoken languages,there is a basic and importantsimilaritybetweenthe two. Both consist
LanguagePracticesand SelfDefinition:TheCaseof GenderIdentityAcquisition
297
of a vocabularyand a set of rules governing the combination and use of the constituent
terms of that vocabulary-a grammar. For example, the vocabulary of social identification which characterizesour own society consists of such identifyingcategoricalterms as
"male," "female," "Black," "White," "doctor," and "nurse," to name only a few.
Moreover, as Harvey Sacks (1966, p. 16) has demonstrated, our typical usage of such
identifying categorical terms indicates that we consider certain sets of these terms as
"going together," as forming a natural collection of alternative identifying categories.
These "naturalcollections of membershipcategories... plus whatever rules of application the use of the collection involves" Sacks (1966, p. 17) calls "membership
categorizationdevices."For example, the alternativeidentifyingcategoricalterms"male"
and "female" and the rules governing their application on the basis of individuals'
anatomical characteristicsand clothed appearanceconstitute a membershipcategorization device which we commonly call "sex." In other words, our typical usage of
identifyingcategoricalterms such as "male"and "female"is based upon what might best
be described as an underlying grammar of social identification. Thus, an adequate
analysis of the function of names ascribed to categories of people requiresspecification
of the grammarof social identification underlyingthe usage of these names. That is, the
collections into which these identifying categorical terms are grouped and the rules in
terms of which such alternativeidentifyingtermsare applied must be determined.
Moreover, as the sociolinguist M.A.K. Halliday (1978, p. 9) has observed, "it is the
most ordinary everyday uses of language... that serve to transmit... the essential
qualities of society and the nature of social being." If, therefore, the vocabulary and
grammar of social identification which characterizesa particularsociety influences its
members definitions of self, then they do so through the medium of ordinary everyday
interaction. That is why the following exploration of possible relationships between
language practices and gender identity acquisition is focused on the use of identifying
categoricalterms in the course of everydayinteractions.
PRACTICES
THELANGUAGEOF YOUNG CHILDREN'SIDENTIFICATION
Chronological records of individual children'sverbal behavior, so-called "diarystudies"
of language acquisition, indicate that "nurseryvariants"of parental kin terms such as
"mama"and "dada"are often the first recognizablewords which young childrenuse (see
Anglin 1977). Roman Jakobson (1959) has suggestedthat children'searly acquisition of
such terms is due to both caregivers'routine use of these terms when interactingwith
their infants and the phonetic structure of such words, its similarity to the "syllables"
which constitute infant babbling. According to Jakobson (1959, p. 538), caregivers"try
to adjust themselves to the verbal habits of their addresseesand to establish a common
code suitablefor both interlocutorsin a child-adultdialogue."
Whatever the reasons for children's early acquisition of terms like "mama" and
"dada," these terms provide young children with a rudimentaryvocabulary of social
identification. Evidence from a variety of sources indicates that while children initially
use terms like "mama"and "dada"in exclusive referenceto their parents,as if they were
proper names (see Anglin 1977),they soon begin to extend or generalizetheir use of these
terms. For example, when Jeanne Brooks-Gunn and Michael Lewis (1979) showed 36
children between 12 and 24 months of age photographs of their parents,adult strangers
Vol.27/No. 3/1986
THESOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
298
and peers, the verbal 15-month-olds employed only terms like "mama"and "dada"in
response to their parents'photographs while the 18-month-oldsemployed such terms in
responseto photographsof adult strangersas well. Moreover, Lois Bloom (1975) reports
that her daughter Allison's use of parental kin terms followed a similar pattern. Allison
began to use the terms "mama"and "dada"when she was around 12 months of age but
only to announce, greet, and summon her own mother and father. However, a few
months later she was using the term "mommy"to refer to other adult females and the
term "dada" to refer to other adult males. For example, the following interactional
fragments were recorded by Bloom (L) (1975, pp. 182-183) when Allison (A) was 19
months of age.
A:
L:
A:
L:
A:
L:
A:
L:
(pointing to someone off camera) Mommy
What
(pointing off camera) Mommy
That'sa lady
(hugging L but looking at photographer)Dada
Hmm?
(points toward photographer)Dada
That'sa man
As this evidence indicates, children typically begin to use parental kin terms as
identifyingcategoricallabels sometime between their first and second birthdays.4Indeed,
they not only use these terms to categoricallyidentify persons but sometimes use them to
categoricallyidentifyother animate objects as well.
Moreover, young children often use parental kin terms in concert, as if they formed a
natural collection of identifying categories. For example, the following interaction
occurred when 1 (0) brought a passing butterflyto the attention of a 24-month-old (S).
O:
S:
O:
S:
O:
S:
Look at the butterfly.There it goes.
A mommy one
That'sa mommy one?
Mommy one
How do you know it's a mommy one?
Mommy ones and daddy ones5
As this example illustrates,the identifyingcategories "mommy"and "daddy"appear to
be constituent identities of children's earliest membership categorization device, their
earliest collection of alternative identifying categories. Hence, young children's use of
parental kin terms is a logical place to begin an analysis of the relationship between
languagepracticesand the acquisitionof gender identity.
The "Family"Categorization Device
Brooks-Gunnand Lewis (1979, p. 1206) have proposed that "the social labels used by
children reflect both the categorization systems used to distinguishthe social world and
the units available for this task."This proposal suggests that children'searliest language
LanguagePracticesand SelfDefinition:TheCaseof GenderIdentityAcquisition
299
of social identification will be based upon the most fundamental dimensions of
membershipcategorizationin the society into which they are born. In our own society, as
Talcott Parsons(1942, p. 89, fn. 1)once noted, sex and age categorizationprovidethe main
links of "structuralcontinuity."That is, an individual'soccupation, position in the family
and a variety of other social networks depends upon his or her classificationin terms of
these fundamental dimensions of social identification. It is likely, therefore,that sex and
age are the first dimensions of identificatoryclassificationwhich young childrenlearn.
One of the most obvious and important media through which adults transmit the
underlyingrules of sex categorization to young children is sex-specific managed appearances. As a number of students of language acquisition have concluded (e.g., Anglin
1977: Bloom 1975; Nelson et al. 1978), perceptual similaritiesare the most important
determinatesof young children'scategoricalapplication of identifyingterms. Clearly,the
perceptual similarity of same-sexed and perceptual dissimilarity of differently sexed
individuals are heightened when the members of only one sex category routinely wear
dresses, cosmetics, certain types of jewelry, and elaborate hairstyles. In a sense, such
sex-specific appearance management perceptually directs young children's use of the
lexical units which constitute their rudimentary vocabulary of social identificationparentalkin terms like "mommy"and "daddy."
To the adult ear, of course, these terms are sex-specific. Consequently,adults respond
differently to children's use of terms like "mommy"and "daddy"depending on the sex
appropriatenessof the term'suse. This is most apparentwhen childrenuse these termsto
summon adults. For example, when I observed a female aide walk past a 24-month-old
on a preschool playground, the young girl called out: "Mommy."The aide responded:
"What'jadoin T---?"However, on another occasion when a 25-month-oldboy attempted
to summon a male teacher with "mommy"the teacherdid not respond. Comparison of
these two attempts at interactionalintiation suggests that children'ssuccess in summoning adults with either the term "mommy"or "daddy"is dependent on adults' evaluation
of the sex appropriatenessof that identifying label. Clearly, the combination of such
sex-specific responses to young children's use of parental kin terms and adults' sexspecific management of appearance promotes children'sacquisition of the grammar of
adults' sex identification practices.The result, according to researchevidence, is that by
children'ssecond birthdaytheir categoricalusage of parentalkin terms is highly accurate
in regardto sex (Thompson, 1975).
While children around two years of age use the terms "mommy" and "daddy"to
categorically identify adults and, in some cases, such nonhuman objects as butterflies,
they typically do not employ these terms to categorically identify their peers. The first
categorical label most young children use in referenceto their peers is the term "baby."
For example, I encountered a 3 1-month-old boy on a preschool playgroundwhile I was
carryinga smaller, less verbally skilled 27-month-old boy. The older boy responded by
pointing at the smaller boy and remarking:"Thebaby."On another occasion a preschool
aide (A) and I (O) observed a 31l-month-oldgirl (J) chasing another boy whose speech
was seldom understandable.
A: What'jadoin J-?
S: Get baby
A: (to O) They all call R-- the 'baby.'
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300
In general, as these two examples suggest, peers are labeled "baby"only if they are
considered less socially maturethan the speaker. While the criteriayoung childrenuse in
categorizingone anotheras "babies"or, implicitly,"not babies"vary, they seem to include
physicalsize, verbalskill, motor coordination,and whetheror not a child is in diapers.
Clearly,young children'suse of the terms "mommy"and "daddy"to refernot to peers
but to female and male adults, respectively, reflects the socially fundamental classificatory dimensions of sex and age. However, their use of the term "baby"to referto less
socially mature peers suggests that age categorizationis not based on chronological age,
per se, but on evaluations of what might best be termed relative "social age." In other
words, young children's use of their early vocabulary of social identification indicates
that they are evaluating the managed appearance of adults and the social skills of their
peers in terms of an underlying grammar of social identification. For young children,
therefore, the identifying categories of "mommy," "daddy," and "baby" and the
classificatorydimensions of sex and social maturityconstitute a tripartitecategorization
device which Sacks (1966, p. 25) once termed"family."
Children'suse of this membershipcategorization device is most apparent when they
are adopting and assigning "play identities." For example, the following interaction
occurred in the "house playing" area of a preschool. A 38-month-old boy (E) and
41-month-old girl (A) were seated at a table set with play dishes while a 39-month-old
girl (T) was seated on the floor near the table.
A:
E:
T:
A:
Hey Dad, the baby can't have any
No, she can't
(standingup) Bye Mom
Bye
On another occasion, I (0) encountereda 38-month-old(S) and a 36-month-old(M) girl
on a preschool playground.
S:
M:
S:
O:
S:
M:
I'ma giant
I'magiant
You'rea giant too
Okay
You be the daddy giant
Well be the baby giants
As these examples illustrate, the "family" categorization device often serves as the
organizingframeworkfor young children'scollectiveactivities.
Regardlessof the composition of a child's own family, he or she is routinely exposed
to families composed of "daddies,""mommies,"and "babies,"such as the family of bears
which Goldilocks encountersin the classic children'sstory. By implication,therefore,the
family is of crucial importance to childhood socialization not only as a concrete social
arrangement,as many have argued, but perhaps even more significantlyas a semantic
field.6 While the "family" categorization device may not be directly related to the
acquisition of gender identity, the generative grammar of categorical identification
underlyingits usage is.
LanguagePracticesand SelfDefinition:TheCaseof GenderIdentityAcquisition
301
The PeerCategorizationDevice
Sometime around their third birthday, most children also begin to use the terms
"boy,""girl,"and "baby"as alternativeidentifyingcategories. For example, a 28-monthold (S) who was sitting on my (0) lap initiated the following interactionwhen a teacher
came out of a preschool buildingcarryinga cryingchild.
S: (pointing) There baby
O: There'sa baby. Where?
S: (pointing) There
((The teacherwalks back inside the buildingwith the cryingchild.))
O: Are you a baby?
S: NO! GIRL!
Although this girl was using the terms "baby" and "girl" as alternative identifying
categories at an earlier age than many children do, her application of these categorical
identities was apparentlybased on an evaluation of relativesocial maturityimplicatedin
crying.
As previously noted, young children typically associate the identity of "baby"with
social immaturity.For example, when I asked two three-year-oldswho were crawlingon
the floor, throwing toys, and repeatingthe verbalization"ga-ga"what they were doing,
one of them responded: "We're babies." Indeed, the behaviors in which these two
children engaged are exemplary of the behaviors children exhibit when enacting the
identity of baby. They almost always crawl on hands and knees and mimic infant
babbling and crying. Young children apparentlyconsider these behaviors expressive of
"babiness."
Moreover, "baby"is a despised identity among childrenand one which they typically
resist.7 For example, a 39-month-old picked up a rattle in a preschool classroom and
remarked:"This is for babies." He then took the rattle around the room and separately
inquired of eight young children: "Are you a baby?" None of the eight responded
positively, and four responded with a loud "NO." Because "baby"is such a despised
identity among children, it often functions as a negative sanction. For example, I left a
group of children with whom I had been playing in order to comfort a sobbing casualty
of a playground accident. A 44-month-old member (T) of the group with whom I had
been playingwalked over to me (0).
T: Com'on. Let'splay gasman.
O: C--- hasjust been hurt. Ill play with you in a minute.
T: We think he'sa baby.8
Many adults also use the term "baby"to negatively sanction children. For example, in
their ethnography of child rearing in "OrchardTown, U.S.A.," John and Ann Fischer
(1963, p. 949) observed that parentsoften attempted to control their children'sbehavior
with "remarkslike 'only babies do that. You'renot a baby.'"
In contrast, adults typically associate the identities of "boy" and "girl"with social
maturity when interactingwith young children (see Sacks 1970, p. 223). For example,
adults often implicitlyequate these identitieswith maturitywhen encouragingchildrento
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THESOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY
attempt various tasks, as when a preschool teacher encouraged a 30-month-old girl to
pick up a chair: "A---, you can do it. You're a big girl." Adults also associate these
identitieswith maturitywhen refusingto assist children,as when a preschoolaide refused
a 29-month-old boy's request for help in climbing a playground structure:"No S---,
you're such a big boy." In addition, adults commonly associate behavioralstandards of
social maturity with sex identification in an attempt to control children'sbehavior, as
when a preschool aide lectured a 38-month-old girl who had struck another child:
"You'rea big girl. You don't need to hit." While a sex-neutralexpression such as "big
kid"could conceivablybe used in these ways, adults seldom do so.
In short, the language of social identification which adults employ when interacting
with young children conveys to them that "bigness"is associated with sex identification,
that social maturity is directly associated with "boyness"and "girlness."By implication,
therefore, adults' language practices serve to implicitly instructchildren that "boy"and
"girl"are alternative identities to that of "baby,"identifying categories from the same
membershipcategorizationdevice. It appears that as far as adults are concerned"babies"
do not mature into "big kids"but into "big girls"and "big boys." Clearly, this finding is
consistent with Goffman's(1979) suggestionthat our society is populated not by persons,
per se, but by sexed persons.
Moreover, due to children's exposure to such language practices, the identifying
categorical labels "boy" and "girl" become increasingly important to them. For
example, in research assessing the sex categorization abilities of young children,
Spencer Thompson (1975) gave children between 24 and 36 months of age six
photographs of male strangers,six of female strangers,and two of themselves. He then
instructed them "to put some boys in one box and some girls in another box"
(Thompson 1975, p. 343). His 24-month-old subjects were only around 50%accurate in
sorting both the strangers'and their own photographs into the sex appropriateboxes,
the 30-month-olds were 95% accurate in sorting the strangers'photographs but only
75% accurate in sorting their own photographs, while the 36-month-olds were 95%
accurate in sorting both the strangers'and their own photographs.9These findings seem
to suggest that although two-year-oldscan accuratelydiscriminatebetween "mommies"
and "daddies,"their own and their peers' sex identities are of little concern to them.
However, through continued exposure to the grammar of social identification underlying adults' language practices,they learn that their socially bestowed sex identity is of
considerablepracticalimportance.
As Norman Denzin (1971, p. 105) has noted, young children continually seek
recognition as "full-fledged persons," as persons who can manage their own affairs
without interference.Of course, being identifiedas a "baby"underminesa child's claim
to be such a person. Yet, in order to avoid being identified as a "baby,"children must
do more than merely refrain from providing behavioral support for such an identification. They must also claim an alternative identity that will clearly distinguish them
from "babies." The categorical identity which is socially available to them for that
purpose is a sex identity, either "big boy" or "big girl."Consequently,sometime around
their third birthdaychildren appropriatetheir socially bestowed sex identity as a means
of gaining recognition as full-fledged persons. For example, a 31-month-old justified
her refusal of my offer to assist her in obtaining a drink of water in these terms: "No
help. I big girl."
LanguagePracticesand SelfDefinition:TheCaseof GenderIdentityAcquisition
303
THEACQUISITION
IDENTITY
OFGENDER
However, as Foote (1951, p. 18) observed, "an identity is not absolutely given" but
requirescontinual, social validation. If, in other words, an individual is to subjectively
sustain a claim to a particularsocial identity, then he or she must elicit responses from
others which ratify that claim. In order to do so, the individual must announce that
identity to others, most typically through the management of his or her appearance
(Stone 1962),and behave in ways that others will recognizeas expressive of that identity
(Goffman 1959).To borrow from R.S. Perinbanayagan(1985, pp. 104-105), individuals
are entrusted with a particularsocial identity only if they appropriatea corresponding
behavioral "program." By implication, therefore, the acquisition of gender identity
involves more than the mereappropriationof a socially bestowed sex identity, more, that
is, than the mere labeling of self as "boy"or "girl"-male or female. It also involves the
acquisition of a willingnessto evaluate one's appearanceand behavioralperformancesin
terms of socially defined standards of "girlness" or "boyness"-of femininity or
masculinity(Goffman 1977,p. 304).
Acquiringa BehavioralCommitmentto Femininityor Masculinity
While the appropriationof a socially bestowed sex identity and the development of a
behavioralcommitment to the associated gender are analyticallydistinct, the acquisition
of these two components of gender identity is empirically intertwined. Soon after
children appropriatethe sex identifying label which others have bestowed upon them,
they begin to explore, through what Mead (1934, pp. 150-151) termed "role-taking,"the
vocabulary of social identification with which they are familiar. Yet, when young
childrenfirst begin to do so, they seem relativelyunconcernedwith the sex-appropriateness of the "play identities"which they adopt. For example, in the preschools in which I
observed, two to three-year-old boys often adopted the identity of "Supergirl"or
"Wonderwoman"and two to three-year-oldgirls that of "Superboy"or "Batman."In
contrast, the children between three and four years of age typicallyavoided adoption of
sex-inappropriate"playidentities"and resisted,often emphatically,others'assignmentof
such identities to them. For example, a 39-month-old boy (B) and a 47-month-old boy
(T) were in the "house playing" area of the preschool classroom when the following
interactionoccurred.
B: Ill be the dad. You be the mom.
T: NO! I'1 be the dad. You be the mom.
B: NOOO!
(extended pause)
B: Well both be dads, okay T--?
T: (nods his head up and down in the affirmative)
It appears, therefore, that children acquire a behavioral commitment to their socially
bestowed sex identity in the course of exploring the vocabulary of social identification
with which they are familiar.
As previously noted, young children sometimes announce and behaviorally express
identities which, in the eyes of others, contradict their socially bestowed sex identity.
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Others' responses to young children's behavioral expression of such sex-inappropriate
"play identities"may be primarily responsible for their increasing behavioral commitment to the confirmation of their socially bestowed sex identity. For example, a 38month-old boy (E) who was wearing a "dress-up"dress and high-heeled shoes walked
across a preschoolclassroom to wheretwo 40-month-old boys (S, T) were playing.
E: Fix me (pointing to the unfastenedzipper in the dress)
S: You'renot a girl
T: You'rea boy
S: Those are girl things
(E hurredlyslips out of the dress and kicks off the shoes.)
Indeed, children who attempt to adopt sex inappropriateplay identities risk identification as a "baby."For example, the following interactionbetweena 38-month-old boy (J)
and a 39-month-oldgirl (M) occurredon a preschoolplayground.
J: I'ma dad
M: I'ma dad
J: No you're not a dad. You'rea baby.
Through interactions such as these, children apparently learn that in order to gain
recognition as full-fledgedpersons they must avoid appearingand behaving in ways that
contradict, in the eyes of others, their socially bestowed sex identity. Because of
children's desire to be recognized as such persons, most children become increasingly
concerned with doing so.
While an examination of children's discovery and adoption of the behavioral
guidelineswhich aid them in confirmingtheir "girlness"or "boyness"is beyond the scope
of this paper, young children probably derive such guidance from a variety of sources.
Young children are typically surrounded by both real and imaginary persons (e.g.,
storybook and television characters) whose appearance and behavioral performances
reflect socially accepted standards of femininity and masculinity. As children become
increasinglyconcerned with behaviorallyconfirmingtheir socially bestowed sex identity,
it is likely that they adopt the sex categorically appropriate of these standards as
guidelines for evaluating their own appearanceand behavioralperformances.Of course,
there is some variationin the degreeto which childrendo so. For the most part, however,
children between four and five years of age appear more deeply committed to the
behavioral expression of femininity or masculinitythan many adults wish they were. In
other words, like Walter Mischel's(1966, p. 56) social learningtheory of gender identity
acquisition, the precedinganalysis of relationships between language practicesand the
acquisition of gender identity suggests that "the major differencesin the behaviorsof the
sexes reflectdifferencesin the kinds and levels of standardsadopted for self-reward."
However, the precedinganalysis suggests that children'sadoption of such sex-specific
standards for self-reward is a consequence of somewhat more than sex-differentiated
contingencies of reinforcement.Children are not passively molded by the environment
but interpretivelyorganize and respond to the environment along lines laid down by
their native language. More specifically, as children acquire their native language, they
LanguagePracticesand SelfDefinition:TheCaseof GenderIdentityAcquisition
305
begin to categorize, typify and respond to others in terms of a rudimentarylanguage of
social identification. Soon thereafter,moreover, they begin to behaviorallyexplore the
constituent vocabulary of this language of categorical identification. Due to others'
responsesto their exploration of differentidentities,this languageof social identification
then becomes, to borrow from Sandra Bem (1981, p. 355), "a prescriptiveschema or
guide, and self-esteem becomes its hostage." In short, the vocabulary and grammar of
social identification which is transmitted to children through the medium of language
practices plays a crucial part in children's acquisition of both components of gender
identity.
The usage of identifying categorical terms to which young children are routinely
exposed and others' sex-differentiatedresponses to children'sbehavioralexploration of
social identitiesaffords the young child only two alternativesocial identities:The identity
of "baby"and their socially bestowed sex identity.'0Clearly,the identity of "baby"is not
an acceptable alternativefor someone who seeks recognition as a full-fledgedperson. In
order to gain recognitionas such persons, therefore,childrenappropriatethe sex identity
others have bestowed upon them and attempt to behaviorally secure their claim to it.
From the point of view of the child, this sequential pattern of gender identityacquisition
can be summarizedas follows:
I do not want to be a baby, I can be a girl (boy), therefore I want to be a girl (boy),
thereforedoing things that make me a girl (boy) in others'eyes is rewarding.
In other words, the identifying categorical terms to which young children are subject
motivate them to both appropriate their socially bestowed sex identity and adopt sexspecific standards for self-reward. As Merleau-Ponty (1973, p. 54) once observed,
childrenare possessed by languageas much as they possess it.
Sex Identification,Anatomyand GenderIdentity
In the past, many students of gender identity acquisition simply assumed that males
and females are anatomically and unequivocally defined categories of persons. For
example, although anthropological evidence indicates that some societies have used the
principle of anatomical sex to generate three and sometimes four gender categories
(Martin and Voorhies 1975, pp. 84-107), some have gone as far as to imply that "the
social fact" of two genders which are isomorphic with anatomical sex is a cultural
universal(e.g., Chodorow 1978, p. 16). By implication, they also assumed that the bases
of sex and gender categorization were readily apparent to young children instead of
examining the processes which serve to intergenerationallytransmit such systems of
membershipcategorization.
For example, Freud (1925, 1931) argued that children's reactions to differences
between the external genitalia of males and females are crucial to their acquisition of
gender identity. According to Freud, children discover this anatomical difference
between the sexes when they are three to four years of age. As a result, the male child is
said to develop a fear of castration (Freud 1924, p. 272) and the female child "envy for
the penis" (Freud 1925, p. 190). Freud argued that these reactions to the external
appearanceof human genitalia move childrenfrom rivalrywith their same-sexed parent,
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the so-called "oedipal situation," to a defensive identification with that parent. Freud
implied that this defensive parental identification was synonymous with the acquisition
of gender identity. However, Freud never explains how it is that young children
immediately recognize differences in the external appearance of human genitalia as a
basis for a dimorphicclassificationof persons.
Although some recent revisions of Freud's psychosexual theory reversehis proposed
sequential pattern of gender identity acquisition, even these revisions fail to adequately
explain children's acquisition of sex identification practices. For example, Chodorow
(1978, p. 151) argues that "what occurs...during the oedipal period is a product
of...knowledge about gender... rather than the reverse." However, while she does
observe that "gender identity... is cognitively learned concomitantly with language"
(Chodrow 1975, p. 150), she does not examine this association or its apparent
implications regarding the underlying source of the knowledge which produces the
hypothesizedoedipal situation.
Moreover, Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmentaltheory of gender identity
acquisition also rests on the implicit assumption that anatomical differences between
males and females are immediatelyapparent to children. For example, Kohlberg(1966,
p. 82) argues that children'sunderstandingof sex and gender
... is rootedin the child'sconceptof physicalthings-the bodiesof himselfand of
others-concepts whichhe relatesin turnto a socialorderthatmakesfunctionaluse
of sex categoriesin quiteculturallyuniversalways.
He then deduces that children are incapable of understandingthat sex identificationis
life-long and, consequently, of acquiring a stable gender identity until they cognitively
matureinto what Piaget (1947) has termed "the stage of concrete operations."Only then
can they understandthat basic physical propertiessuch as anatomical sex are conserved
despite changes in context. However, what Kohlberg conveniently ignores is that the
growth of boys into men and of girls into women involves radical changes in bodily
structureand not, for the most part, conservationof basic physicalproperties.
What both Kohlberg'scognitive-developmentaland psychosexualaccounts of gender
identity acquisition overlook is that meaning is not intrinsic to physical things, even
human bodies. It is human responsesto physicalthings which imbue,themwith meaning.
As Mead (1938, p. 44) observed, physical things may "resist"human action, but they do
not determine human responses to them or, by implication, their meaning. Children's
conceptions of sex and gender are not derived, therefore,from unmediatedcontact with
brute, physical facts nor is their acquisition of a stable gender identity a product of
automatic cognitive or psychosexualreactionsto their own or others'bodies.
Of course, the configuration of persons'external genitalia is considered the "essential
insignia" (Garfinkel 1967, p. 117) of sex identification in most human societies, and
young children are often explicitly informed of this most fundamental method of sex
identification. In our own society, however, this method of sex identification is of little
utility for the young child. After all, members of this society typically do not announce
their sex identities by publicly displaying their naked genitalia but by mananging their
clothed appearance. Thus, even children who are aware of the genital basis of sex
identification seldom make use of this knowledge when sex categorically identifying
LanguagePracticesand SelfDefinition:TheCaseof GenderIdentityAcquisition
307
others. For example, when Thompson and Bentler (1971) asked four to six-year-olds
what was the most importantfactor in deciding whethera person was male or female the
majority indicated that it was the appearance of the external genitalia. However, when
these same subjects were asked to identify a number of unclothed dolls which varied in
regardto hairlength,body shape, and genital appearance,the factor which influencedthe
subjects' sex identifications the most was hairlength. Moreover, a variety of research
evidence indicates that children typically understand the life-long character of sex
identificationbefore they are aware of its genital basis (see McConaghy 1979).
By implication, therefore, children's understandingof sex identification and its lifelong character is not based upon their knowledge of physical things, per se, but upon
their knowledge of the languageof social identificationthat characterizesthe society into
which they are born. In our own society, for example, adults manage preschool age
children'sappearance so that it closely resembles, for the most part, that of their adult
sex categorical counterparts. Such sex-specific appearance management heightens the
perceptualsimilarity between adult and child incumbents of each sex category, thereby
underliningthe categoricalsimilarityof boys and men and of girls and women.
Moreover, language practices may also implicitly transmit an understandingof the
life-long character of sex identification to children. As Berger and Luckmann (1966,
p. 133) have proposed, our understandingsof social reality and of our place in it are
"subjectivelycrystallized"concurrently with the internalization of language. For example, because English third person pronouns are sex-specific, their use involves the
linguistictreatmentof boys and men as a single category of persons and the treatmentof
girls and women as another. Even though in our own society "boys"typically grow into
"men" while females tend to remain "girls" throughout their lives, the use of such
sex-specific pronouns may implicitly inform children of the grammaticalindependence
of sex and age categorization."
In short, an individual's gender identity is a socially constructed, bestowed, and
sustained categorical definition of self. Its source is the organizing terms, especially the
language of social identification, of the disciplined system of social interaction in which
he or she participates. In an important sense, therefore, gender identity is as much a
socially achieved identityas are those social identitiesto which it is often contrasted.
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICALSTUDYOF SELFDEFINITION
The precedinganalysis of gender identity acquisition illustratesthat specification of the
languages of social identification underlyingthe usage of identifying categorical terms
may provide the foundation for a distinctively sociological psychology. Like young
children, adults also attempt to claim positive social value for themselves,what Goffman
(1955) termed "face."As Goffman convincingly argued, they must do so if they are to
enlist others in the accomplishment of their practicalpurposes regardlessof what those
purposes might be. However, they must effectively claim face within the confines of the
social identities which the relevant language of social identification makes available to
them. Like young children who adopt sex-inappropriateplay identities, an individual
who behaviorally expresses what others consider an inappropriatesocial identity will
undermine his or her claim to positive social value. In other words, languages of social
identification determine the "small choice of faces" which are available to particular
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THESOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
individuals (Goffman 1955, p. 7). By implication, therefore, analyses of the vocabulary
and grammar of social identification underlying the usage of identifying categorical
terms may provide importantinsightsinto individuals'behaviorand self definitions.
Determination of the collections into which social identitiesare grouped and the rules
in terms of which these alternativeidentitiesare attributedto individualsis of particular
importance in this regard. Moreover, the bestowal and/or appropriation of a social
identity from a particularcollection may determine which identities are available to an
individual from other collections. As Everett Hughes (1945) suggested some years ago,
the social identities from a particularcollection of alternativesmay function as "master"
identitiesor, in Hughes'swords, "masterstatuses."For example, Kanter's(1977, pp. 230237) analysis of the "roleencapsulation"of female business executives suggeststhat their
sex identity limited them to the situated informal identities of "mother,""seductress,"
"pet," or "iron maiden." Clearly, all of these identities limited the female executives'
ability to effectivelyclaim positive social value through their work.
Of course, individuals can often choose from among a range of available social
identities. In such cases, it is likely that the individual will appropriateand behaviorally
express the available identity which will enable him or her to most effectively claim
positive social value. However, the individual may not select the most socially valued of
the available identities. Instead, that selection will depend on the individual'sevaluation
of how successfullyhe or she can behaviorallyconfirm each of the available alternatives.
In other words, attempting to behaviorallyconfirm a socially valued identity and failing
may seem more threatening to one's face and, consequently, self-esteem than simply
claiminga less valued and less behaviorallychallengingidentity.
Moreover, in most situations, individuals will have socially recognized claims to a
number of specific identities. For example, others may consideran individuala "female,"
a "doctor,"a "jazzfan," and a "wife."If that individual'sbehavioralexpression of one of
these identitiesbegins to underminehis or her face, then the individualis likely to employ
the strategy Goffman (1961) called "roledistance"but might more accuratelybe termed
"identitydistance."That is, the individual will switch from behaviorallyexpressing one
identity to behaviorally expressing another, thereby indicating that the previously
expressedidentitydid not providean exhaustivedefinition of his or her self.
In short, the practical necessity of claiming positive social value and the constraints
which languages of social identificationimpose on individuals'efforts to do so may have
a profound influence on both their definitions of self and their behavior. In a sense,
therefore, identifying categorical terms do motivate behavior. That is why systematic
study of language practicesis essential to the development of a distinctivelysociological
psychology. As the preceding analysis of gender identity acquisition suggests, it is
through language practices that the internal reality of the individual is linked to the
socially constructedrealityof a human community.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This is a revised version of a paper presentedat the 1985annual meetings of the Pacific
Sociological Association. More colleagues than I can individually acknowledge here
provided valuablecomments, suggestionsand criticismsin responseto earlierversions of
this paper. I am especially indebted to Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, Donileen Loseke,
LanguagePracticesand SelfDefinition:TheCaseof GenderIdentityAcquisition
309
Candace West, Don Zimmerman and the anonymous reviewers of The Sociological
Quarterly for their guidance and encouragement.
NOTES
1. In this context, the term "practice"refers to a socially typical and recurrent pattern of
behavior.
2. My usage of the terms sex, gender, and gender identity is based on Goffman's (1977,
pp. 301-306) explication of these concepts. Sex refersto identificatoryclassificationssuch as male
or female which are based upon the configuration of individuals'external genitalia or culturally
defined surrogates, what Kessler and McKenna (1978, pp. 153-155) call "cultural genitals."
Gender refers to associated evaluative classifications such as feminine or masculine which are
based upon cultural definitions of the assumed psychological and behavioral characteristicsof
sex identified persons. Gender identity refers to an individual'sdefinition of self in terms of both
sex-class and an associated gender.
3. The segments of interactions which are used as illustrative examples in this paper are
representativeof a much largercorpus of recorded interactions.Over an 18 month period, I spent
approximately 300 hours as a volunteer staff member in both a university-affiliated and a
parent-cooperativepreschool located in Southern California. In this capacity, I participatedin a
range of activities and was able to observe and record interactions in a variety of contexts. Given
that both audio and video recording would have limited my mobility and, consequently the
diversity of interactional contexts to which I would have access, interactions were recorded as
close to verbatim as possible in fieldnotes. Fieldnotes were taken while an interaction was
occurring if I was not a participant and immediately after it occurred if I was a participant.
Because the staffs of these preschools often took notes regardingthe children'sactivities, both the
children and staff members were accustomed to such a practice. The data on which this paper is
based consist of 200 segments of interaction from the larger corpus of recorded interactions in
which either sex-specific and/or age-specific identifyingterms were explicitly used.
4. The age estimates provided in this paper are not intended as predictions regardingthe age
at which children will exhibit certain behaviors. Instead, they are provided in order to indicate the
sequential pattern of the acquisition of social identification practices and of the consequent
acquisition of gender identity.
5. See Denzin (1971, p. 98) for a similar example of young children's categorical usage of
these terms.
6. The presence of both a male and female caregiverin a child's early social environment may
facilitate that child's learning of the sex-appropriateusage of terms like "mommy"and "daddy,"
but it is doubtful that the presence of both is necessaryfor such learningto occur. Unfortunately,
there has been no researchcomparing the usage of parental kin terms by children from single and
from two-parent households.
7. Young children sometimes identify themselves as a "baby"in an apparent attempt to elicit
the kind of treatmentfrom adults that infants typically receive. However, they seldom do so when
in the presenceof peers.
8. See Denzin (1971, p. 97) and Speier (1970, p. 202) for similar examples of young children's
usage of the term "baby."
9. Thompson (1975, p. 346) found no statistically significant correlation between children's
sex categorization abilities and a variety of parental background and attitude variables. These
results provide some indirect assurance regarding the generalizability of the findings reported
here.
10. Based on interviews with parents, Richard Green (1974) has reported that there were two
consistent differences between the early biographies of so-called "feminized"boys treated at the
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THESOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY
UCLA Gender Identity clinic and a matched sample of "masculine"boys. Unlike the masculine
boys, the feminized boys had been commonly misidentified and mislabeled as girls early in their
lives, and their caregivershad made few attempts to discourageso-called cross-dressing.
I1. By implication, comparison of the pattern and rate of gender identity acquisition among
children from different language communities could aid in further specifying the relationship
between language practices and the acquisition of gender identity. For example, comparison of
children who speak Turkish, in which no pronouns are sex-specific, who speak Hebrew, in which
both third and second person pronouns are sex-specific, and who speak English could provide an
empirical basis for assessing the relative importance of sex-specific pronouns in transmitting an
understandingof the life-long characterof sex identificationto young children.
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