MEGAPROJECT Project Environment

Transcription

THE MEGAPROJECT PORTFOLIO
Edited by
Prof Naomi Brookes and Sarah King
All rights, including translation are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission being obtained
ISBN 978-0-9576805-0-0
© University of Leeds, 2013
Foreword
Megaprojects, sometimes known as major projects or complex projects and services, are extremely large-scale investment
projects typically costing over €1 billion. Megaprojects include, oil and gas extraction and processing projects and transport
infrastructural projects and even cultural events such as the Olympics. Megaprojects are united by their extreme complexity
and by a long record of very poor delivery. Their inability to be designed appropriately and delivered on time and to budget
has profound implications not only for the construction organisations delivering them but also for the client organisations
commissioning them which are often governments spending public money.
The portfolio of cases brought together in this book have been provided by members of the MEGAPROJECT COST Action.
This is a trans-European research network dedicated to improving the design and delivery of megaprojects. The cases have
been complied using a standard template to make it much easier to facilitate cross-case learning. The authors of individual
cases are given at the start of each section and are very happy to be contacted if more information is required.
The MEGAPROJECT Action is now using these cases to draw out cross-sector lessons on how megaproject delivery
performance can be improved and is using highly innovative approaches to spot patterns of performance. We hope that the
wider research community will also be able to make good use of the rich empirical evidence contained in this
MEGAPROJECT Portfolio!
Professor Naomi Brookes
MEGAPROJECT COST Action Chair
This production of this portfolio has been generously supported by the COST
framework for European Cooperation in Science and Technology
Contents
Page
Section 1: Cross Sector Case Studies
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
High Tech Park, Sofia, Bulgaria…………………………………………………………….….………………
Industrial Zones Development Scheme, Bulgaria…………………………………………………...………
MOSE Venice Flood Protection, Venice, Italy………………………………………………………………..
Raciborz Reservoir, Silesia, Poland…………………………………………………………………………..
Vienna Hospital North, Austria………………………………………………………………………………...
5
13
22
47
51
Section 2: Energy Case Studies
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
Andasol Solar Power Station, Andalusia, Spain………………………………………………….................
Anholt Offshore Wind Farm, Djursland/Midtjylland, Denmark………………………………......................
Flamanville 3 Nuclear Power Plant, Manche, France………………………………………………….........
Greater Gabbard Offshore Wind Farm, Suffolk, UK………………………………………….......................
Hinkley Point Nuclear Power Plant, Somerset, UK…………………………………………………………..
LNG Re-gasification Plant, Rovigo, Italy.…………....................................................................................
Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant, Nitra, Slovakia……………………………………………………...……..
62
79
96
112
123
134
164
Section 3: Transport Case Studies
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
A2 Motorway, Nowy Tomysi, Poland………………………………………………………………………….
Athens Ring Road, Greece…………………………………………………………………………………….
Edinburgh Tram Network, Scotland, UK………………………………………………………………..........
HSR Madrid - Barcelona - Figueres, Spain.………………………………………………………………....
HSR Vigo - Oporto - Lisbon - Madrid, Portugal……………………………………………………..............
HSR Seville - Madrid, Spain…………………………………………………………………………………...
Norra Lanken, Stockholm, Sweden…………………………………………………………………………...
VMO Ring Road, Brno, Czech Republic………………………………………………………………….…..
195
205
215
235
255
274
290
307
SECTION 1
Cross Sector Case Studies
1.1 HIGH TECHNOLOGY PARK, SOFIA
Case compiled by: Milen Baltov
Contact details: [email protected]
Basic Project Information
Project Title
Design and Development of High-Technology Park Sofia
Location
Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia
Purpose
To provide increased investment opportunities and favourable science and business environment
in order to maximise direct foreign and domestic investments in high tech sectors and foster
economic development as part of Bulgaria‘s preparations for implementing EU cohesion policy
upon accession.
Scope
To improve the research, technology and innovation infrastructure, and establish efficient
conditions for attracting new high tech products, processes and services, thus increasing the
economic development potential.
Total Project Value
420 mil EUR
Project Status
First phase performed – land design and prefeasibility study
After changes in the OP Competitiveness this phase will be repeated
(i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,
operation, dismantling)
(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)
50 mil EUR from the EU funds – the Operative programme Competitiveness of the Bulgarian
Economy; 130 mil EUR as assets from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 20 mil EUR in form of
design and regulations by the Sofia municipality and some 220 mil EUR expected by the high tech
companies to enter the park in the form of the equipment and know-how to provide
Relevant Physical Dimensions
15 hectares of already performing as production and experimental activities plot in Sofia and some
3-4 additional appr .5 hectares plots in other cities in Bulgaria
Contractual Framework
(e.g. height, width, volume, length)
5
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (Internal)
Internal
Supply-Side
Stakeholder Category
Case-Study
Client
Ministry of Economy, Energy and Toursim
Financiers
OP ―Competitiveness‖, Sofia Municipality, Bourgas
Municipality, Private sector
Sponsors
European structural fund and national government
Client’s Customers
Client’s Owners
Other internal supply-side
categories
(please specify)
Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous
experiences of
stakeholders, skills,
influence on project)
Potential investors in high tech parks
Municipalities , Research and private sector
Category
Case-Study
Demand Side Principal Contractor
Municipality of Sofia, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
First Tier Contractors
Second Tier Consultants
Professional Services Providers
categories
(please specify)
Category
Case-Study
6
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (External)
External
Public
Case-Study
Comments
experiences of stakeholders,
skills, influence on project)
Regulatory Agencies
Local Government
National Government
Other internal supplyside categories
(please specify)
Municipalitiy of Sofia, Municipality of Bourgas etc.
Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism
Category
Case-study
Bulgarian SME Agency
Invest Bulgaria Agency
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Private Local residents
Population, industrial innovative and high tech companies which are
active in the region , local scientific and educational institutions
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Other External Private
stakeholders
(please specify)
Category
Case-study
7
MEGAPROJECT Project Management
Project Organisation
Client Project Team Size &
Structure
Contractor Project Team Size
and Structure
5 Key experts in the following fields: Business Planning and Management, Marketing, Civil construction or
Architecture, Finance, Business Management
Sub-Contractor Project Team
Involvement
Project Tools and Techniques
Please √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknown
□
Life-Cycle Costing Approaches □
Project Management Software
Stakeholder Involvement 
Relationship Management Tools 
Building Information Modelling (BIM)
□
Project Knowledge Management Tools
Lessons Learnt Transfers 
Team Building Tools 

Competency framework 
Other Tools and Techniques or More Information
8
Project Processes
Risk Management Processes
Present (describe below)  Not Present □ No Information □
Elaboration of mature technical documentation for the investment projects; Timely preparation of the
services tender dossiers; Delays in appointing the management teams and instability of management staff;
Inability of municipal authorities to cover the running costs of the industrial zones; Worsening of the local
economic environment and/or competitive position of the industrial zones with regard to other investment
opportunities.
HR Management Processes
Training needs assessment;
Development and organisation of a management training programme for the key staff at each technological
park; Identification of the legal entity models;
Procurement Management
Processes
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □
Integration Management
Processes
Scope Management Processes
SWOT analyses of more than 5 sites for technological park development;
Identification of the main activities for high technology infrastructure improvement and development of
R&D infrastructure; Set up of a comprehensive database for technological park site locations.
Time Management Processes
Cost Management Processes
Quality management Processes
Communications Management
Processes
Organisation of information days, promotional events, press conferences, etc.; publication of an
informational web-site on the services offered by the industrial zones; Elaboration of standard
presentations (for fairs) and a marketing plan with annual implementation programme for the industrial
zones promotion.
9
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance
Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right Project
Stakeholder or Stakeholder Grouping
Original Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these Aims
Preparation of a programme for developing technological parks in Bulgaria
Local authorities, NGOs, private entities
Investigation and development of management models for technological parks
Elaboration of business plans and marketing strategies for the technological parks
Local authorities (district and municipal)
Improvement of capacity at local level for promoting and attracting R&D investments
Local authorities, academic institutes and
universities
Training and appointment of competent operational teams
District Administrations
Identification of sites for further infrastructural development
Bulgarian Investment Agency
Building of a data-base of investments and appropriate industrial, research and
business locations
10
Legal and Regulatory Environment
Legal and Regulatory Project
Environment (regionally,
nationally and Europe wide)
Specific Legal and Regulatory
events impacting on the project
National strategy for science investigations,
Investment Promotion Act, National Strategy for Investment Promotion,
Law on Spatial Planning, Law on Environmental Protection, Law on State Property, Law on Municipal
Property, Law on local taxes
Draft Innovation Law
Political Environment
Political Project Environment
Specific Political Events
impacting on the project
Goals of the high tech and industrial development, conformity with existing policies of the government
related with the examined region;
Engagements of the terrestrial regulation at national and regional level focusing also on the potential smart
specialization in some economic sectors
Aiming to improve the competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy according the Governmental strategy
vision 2020
Sustainability
Comments on the relationship of
the project to issues of
sustainability
The technological parks investments and promotion: support economic restructuring in regions with lower
adaptability to the competitiveness of Bulgarian economy, dynamic market conditions; provide positive
social and demographic effects in long-term perspective by creating new attractive jobs, accessing to a
higher level of technology and reducing the disparities in the economic development of regions; enforce the
renovation of existing R&D infrastructure and/or creation of appropriate new one; attract further research
and high tech investments with perspective to higher value added production and services.
11
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline
TIME
Events and activities
relating to project
stakeholders
IX-XII,
2009
I-IV,
2010
V-VIII,
2010
IX-XII,
2010
I-IV,
2011
V-VIII,
2011
IX-XII,
2011
I-IV,
2012
V-VIII,
2012
IX-XII,
2012
M1 -4
M 5-8
M 9-12
M 13-16
M 17-20
M 21-24
M 25-28
M 29-32
M 33-36
M 37 - 40
Task 1 Site Management and stakeholders identification – month 4 to 35
Inception report– month 1 to 2
relating to project
management
Interim reports
every 6 months
Monthly Progress reports – from 1 to 36
Final report –month 40
relating to project
performance
relating to project
environment
Task 1 SWOT analyses, Preparation of the technical documentation (detailed design, feasibility
study, IRR/ ERR, EIA) – month 4 to 32
Task 2 Remedial
Actions Identification month 1 to 3
Task 3 Database, Marketing and Promotion Strategy – month 33- 40
12
1.2 INDUSTRIAL ZONES DEVELOPMENT, BULGARIA
Case compiled by: Milen Baltov
Project Title
Industrial Zones Development
Location
Republic of Bulgaria
Purpose
To provide increased investment opportunities and favourable business environment in order to
maximise direct foreign and domestic investments and foster economic development as part of
Bulgaria‘s preparations for implementing EU cohesion policy upon accession.
Scope
To improve the infrastructure of industrial zones, business parks and locations and establish
efficient conditions for attracting new investments, thus increasing the economic development
potential.
Total Project Value
1 200 mil EUR
Project Status (i.e.. initiation,
All the 25 single zones under the project have passed feasibility studies and design of the land and
infrastructure. 10 of them are with invested money for infrastructure and started accumulation of the
business units investments for direct production sites.
planning, construction, operation,
dismantling)
Consisting of two packages of EU funds air – 30 mil for design under Phare programme and 100
mil for infrastructure under the Operational Programme Regional Development and another 120 mil
EUR as infrastructure investments by the State company Industrial zones, 400 mil EUR the value of
the assets (allocated by the municipalities, the state and in few cases by companies). 700 mil EUR
are the indicated investments in business establishments inside only in the already established
zones.
Activities are to be implemented in approximately
40-50 industrial areas identified within the
the 28 districts on the territory of Bulgaria.
13
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification
(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)
Internal
Supply-Side Client
Case-Study
Comments
Municipalities; Local suppliers to big multinational
businesses, Local companies moving production out of living
areas of cities; SMEs to get suitable production sites
Financiers
EU Funds, mainly ERDF, State Company Industrial Zones;
PPP with municipalities
Sponsors
European commission and national government
Potential investors in Industrial zones
Client’s Owners
Municipalities
Other internal supply-side Category
Case-Study
categories
(please specify)
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works
Ministry of Economy and Energy
State Company Industrial Zones
PPPs with municipalities
Management consultancies
Space and infrastructure design consultancies
Professional Services
Management Consulting ICAP Bulgaria EAD
Providers
Case-Study
categories
Banks and investment funds
(please specify)
14
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification
(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)
Stakeholder Category Case-Study
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Ministry of economy, tourism
and energy
Comments (e.g. maturity, previous
experiences of stakeholders, skills,
Ministry of agriculture for
lands with changed purposes
Local Government
25 municipalities
National Government
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works
Investment Policy Directorate (Ministry of Economy and Energy)
Ministry of Finance
Other internal supply- Category
side categories
Bulgarian SME Agency
(please specify)
Invest Bulgaria Agency
National Association of the Municipalities in
the Republic of Bulgaria
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Case-study
Population, industrial companies which are active in the region ,
local educational institutions
In the cases when agriculture land is to be transferred to
industrial
In most cases the land is already with industrial purposes
Only in single cases as most of the zones are to cover sectors
that are not polluting
None
None
15
Structure
At the Ministry – 4 experts; At the municipalities total of 50 experts; At the State company Industrial
Zones – 3.
and Structure
For the Management Consultant 5 Key experts in the following fields: Business Planning and
Management, Marketing, Civil construction or Architecture, Finance, Business Management and 40
additional short term experts
Involvement
For the design consultants 7 key experts and more than 130 short term consultants
Life-Cycle Costing Approaches
Stakeholder Involvement


□
Relationship Management Tools
□
Lessons Learnt Transfers
□
Team Building Tools
□

□
Competency framework

16
Project Processes
Elaboration of mature technical documentation for the investment projects; Timely preparation of
the services tender dossiers; Delays in appointing the management teams and instability of
management staff; Inability of municipal authorities to cover the running costs of the industrial
zones; Worsening of the local economic environment and/or competitive position of the
industrial zones with regard to other investment opportunities.
Training needs assessment; Development and organisation of a management training
programme for the key staff at each industrial zone; Identification of the legal entity models;
Procurement Management Processes
Integration Management Processes
Processes
Organisation of information days, promotional events, press conferences, etc.; publication of an
informational web-site on the services offered by the industrial zones; Elaboration of standard
presentations (for fairs) and a marketing plan with annual implementation programme for the
industrial zones promotion.
17
Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right
Original Targets and changes to targets
Performance relating to time
By 2010 in 60% of the zones 30% of the plots to
be bought or rented by investors
All the previous (total 7) free trade zones to be
fast growing industrial parks by 2011
Actual Achievements Against Targets
Less than 20% of the plots in some 40% of the
zones are occupied at the beginning of 2012
None of the previous (total 7) free trade zones is
functioning on full scale and most of them still
generate only trade facilities revenues
18
Stakeholder or Stakeholder Grouping
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works;
Preparation of a programme for developing industrial zones in Bulgaria
Investigation and development of management models for industrial zones
Elaboration of business plans and marketing strategies for the industrial zones
Local authorities (district and municipal)
Improvement of capacity at local level for promoting and attracting investments
Local authorities, academic institutes and universities
Training and appointment of competent operational teams
District Administrations
Identification of sites for further infrastructural development
Bulgarian Investment Agency
Building of a data-base of investments and appropriate industrial and business
locations
19
Investment Promotion Act, National Strategy for Investment Promotion,
Law on Spatial Planning, Law on Environmental Protection, Law on State Property, Law on Municipal
Property, Law on local taxes
Draft Law on Industrial Zones
Goals of the industrial development, conformity with existing policies of the government related
with the examined region;
Engagements of the terrestrial regulation at national and regional level focusing also on the
potential specialization in some economic sectors
Aiming to improve the investment environment, the Bulgarian Parliament has adopted an
Investment Promotion Act in April 2004. This Act ensures equal treatment of foreign and domestic
investors and provides for both investment incentives and integrated administrative services in
shorter terms
20
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and (Phase project) Activities Timeline
TIME
relating to project
stakeholders
IX-XII,
2007
I-IV,
2008
V-VIII,
2008
IX-XII,
2008
I-IV,
2009
V-VIII,
2009
IX-XII,
2009
I-IV,
2010
V-VIII,
2010
IX-XII,
2010
M1 -4
M 5-8
M 9-12
M 13-16
M 17-20
M 21-24
M 25-28
M 29-32
M 33-36
M 37 - 40
Task 4 Site Management Training Programme – month 4 to 37
Inception report– month 1 to 2
relating to project
management
Interim reports
every 6 months
relating to project
performance
Task 1 SWOT analyses, Preparation of the technical documentation (detailed design, feasibility
study, IRR/ ERR, EIA) – month 4 to 32
Task 2 Remedial
Actions Identification month 1 to 3
relating to project
environment
Monthly Progress reports – from 1 to 36
Draft final report – month 33-35
Final report –month 36 to 37
Task 3 Database, Marketing and Promotion Strategy – month 4- 35
21
1.3 MOSE FLOOD PROTECTION, VENICE
Case compiled by: Corrado lo Storto
Project Title
MOSE project (Modulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico – in English, Experimental Electromechanical Module)
Location
City of Venice Lagoon, Italy
Purpose
To protect the city of Venice from floods
Scope
The project is an integrated defence system consisting of rows of mobile gates able to isolate the Venetian
lagoon from the Adriatic Sea when the tide reaches above an established level (110 cm) and up to a
maximum of 3 m.
Contractual
Framework
The project is managed by a concessionaire – the Consorzio Venezia Nuova (in English, The Consortium
New Venice) – in trust of the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport, Venice Water Authority. The CVN is
delegated by the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport (previously named Ministry of Public Works) to
design and execute the works to regulate tidal floods in accordance with the Special Law for Venice, L. 798/84
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
A total of 78 gates divided into 4 rows installed to protect 3 inlets. Specifically: 2 rows of 21 and 20 gates at
the Lido Treporti and San Nicolò inlet respectively, the widest connected by an artificial island; 1 row of 19
gates at the Malamocco inlet; and 1 row of 18 gates at the Chioggia inlet. Length of the single gate is 20m.
Total number of people working in the construction of the system is 3,000. Estimated number of people
working to manage the system is between 120 and 150
22
MOSE FLOOD PROTECTION, VENICE
23
MOSE FLOOD PROTECTION, VENICE
24
25
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 1
Stakeholder
Category
Supply-Side
Case-Study
Comments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences of
stakeholders, skills, influence on project)
Client
Consorzio Venezia Nuova (CVN)
Financiers
Sponsors
Equity joint venture Consortium specifically formed for this project.
CVN is responsible for studying, monitoring, planning,
experimenting and implementing measures delegated to the State
to safeguard Venice and the lagoon on behalf of the Ministry for
Infrastructure and Transport in accordance with the Special Law for
Venice (Law n. 798/84)
Public funds from Italian Government , European Investment Bank,
and European Commission
n/a
Client’s
Customers
The Italian Government through the Ministry for Infrastructure and
Transport – the Venice Water Authority
The Venice Water Authority is the local department of the Ministry
for Infrastructure and Transport with direct and primary
responsibility for the safeguard, security and hydraulic protection of
a large area falling within a number of North Italy regions (Veneto,
Friuli and Trentino Alto Adige)
Client’s Owners
At the start of the project: Impregilo (39.4%), Consorzio Italvenezia
(Società italiana per Condotte d‘acqua, Astaldi and Mantelli) (18.5%),
Grandi Lavori Fincosit-Mazzi (18.5%), San Marco – Consorzio
Costruttori Veneti (Co.Ed.Mar, Cantieri Costruzioni Cemento,
Grassetto Lavori, Impresa di Costruzioni Ing. E. Mantovani,
Intercantieri Vittadello, Sacaim, Cir, Consorzio Rialto, Consorzio
Lepanto) (13.875%), Consorzio Veneto Cooperativo (2.775%), Saipem
(2.5%), Società italiana per Condotte d‘acqua (2.5%), Società
Consortile Venezia Lavori (Impresa di Costruzioni Ing. E. Mantovani)
(1.85%), Consorzio Grandi Restauri Veneziani (0.1%)
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
Category
Case-Study
Public Research
Institution
The CNR (National Research Council) in 1980
launched a public contest to collect ideas for
Venice safeguard
26
Stakeholder
Category
Demand Side
(this case has a
large number of
main and
sub-contractors.
Here a sample of
them is reported)
Principal
Contractors
Case-Study
Thetis SpA was in charge of the study and research activity in the marine engineering
field in the concept stage of the project
experiences of stakeholders, skills, influence
on project)
This company was acquired by the Consorzio
Venezia Nuova few years ago. According to a
recent decision of the Consorzio Venezia Nuova
Board, Thetis will change its mission , focusing only
on the MOSE facilities maintenance
Cordioli Costruzioni Metalliche SpA was selected through a public tender
to
manufacture the first 23 retracting oscillating buoyancy flap gates and the metallic
caissons to be placed in the Lido-Treporti inlet. Each caisson has the following
dimensions: weight 300 tons, height 20m, thickness 3.60m.
Nuovi Cantieri di Chioggia SpA
Consorzio Maccaferri per il Progetto Venezia (Maccaferri Venice Project Consortium) –
Adanti SpA, Officine Maccaferri Group and Sarti SpA. The consortium has developed a
system for the production of a Ballasted Filter Mattress (BFM), a filter layer that would
guarantee the hydraulic performance required, heavy enough to keep the filter in
contact with the sea bed at all times and in all sea conditions.
FIP SpA was selected to design and manufacture the special large hinges to rotate
gates. The company took out a patent for the design of this model of hinge. The total
number of hinges assembled in the MOSE is156. The hinge is considered a critical
component of the system and the Committee ―No MOSE‖ required major assurances
related to reliability of this component.
First Tier
Contractors
Società Consortile MOSE Treporti (construction), Ing. E. Mantovani (second tier,
construction), Trentin Consulting srl (first tier, professional services), etc.
Professional
Services
Joint venture C. Lotti & Associati SpA and Thetis SpA
Providers
This joint venture is responsible for: a) works
management, b) support and control for works
realization, material quality control, c) works cost
management
PRINCIPIA was entrusted by the Municipality of Venice the task to test the reliability
and the feasibility of the hinge.
27
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification 1
Stakeholder
Category
Public Regulatory
Agencies
Case-Study
ISPRA (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale) was
identified as an independent institution (according to the European
Commission note # 13085, 15.07.2008). In particular, ISPRA validates and
control the environmental monitoring activities, evaluate environmental data
released, check if environmental targets are met.
European Commission. In April 1999, the European Parliament issued the
Resolution on the crisis situation in Venice. Calling on the Italian
The EC was favourable to project.
Government to decide by the end of the year on proceeding to the final
design phase of the project. In December 2005, after the claim of some
environmental movements, the European Commission started the
infringement procedure relative to the lagoon habitat pollution, because the
EC Environmental DG retained that the Italian Government had not planned
effective mitigation measures to preserve wild birds migration and habitat.
In 2008, the Venice Water Authority informed the EC Environment DG
about the mitigation measures adopted, thus making available financial
resources from the European Investment Banking (circa 750,000 euro)
TAR (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale) and Consiglio di Stato. In total 9
legal petitions have been lodged with the TAR and Consiglio di Stato, all
related to environmental issues. All claims have been rejected.
Favourable to project. Decision made on July 14, 2000
was particularly important. On the grounds of breaches of
procedure and substance, the Regional Administrative
Tribunal for the Veneto (TAR) issued a ruling annulling
the Dec. 1998 decree of negative environmental impact of
the Ministry of the Environment . The appeals against the
decree had been made by the Veneto Region, ASCOM
and fish farming companies. TAR also rejected all the
appeals made against the MOSE system by a number of
bodies including WWF, Italia Nostra, and Provincial
Authorities. On Dec. 20, 2004 the Sixth Division of the
Judicial State Council (Consiglio di Stato) has turned
down all the appeals filed by the Province, WWF and
Italia Nostra against the Veneto Regional Tribunal
sentence of May 22, 2004.
28
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
Public Local
Local Authority of Venice (Municipality of Venice)
Government
Comments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders, skills,
Favourable to project., but some concern about the construction of the facilities.
On Feb 22, 1999 the Venice Local Authority expressed its opinion on the
design, passing an extremely complex resolution inviting the Mayor to call for
―…the continuation of design work at the lagoon inlets‖. That happened after
the judgment of negative environmental compatibility of the design expressed
by the Ministry of the Environment EIA Commission.
The operations necessary to the construction of the prefabricated concrete
caissons that will be implanted on the reinforced seabed are presumed to be
detrimental to the construction site (the Pellestrina inlet)
Local Authority of Chioggia (Municipality of Chioggia)
Favourable to project. On Feb. 3, 1999, in a specific vote, the Chioggia Local
Authority expressed its opinion, considering it ―indispensable for the defence
process to continue in its entirety […] including defence against exceptional
high waters‖ and delegating the Mayor to call for ―…the continuation of design
work at the lagoon inlets‖
Regione Veneto (Regional Administration of Veneto).
Favourable to project. On Sept. 18, 1998 the full Veneto Regional Technical
Commission approved the design
The Provincial Authority of Venice
29
Stakeholder
Category
Public
Case-Study
National
The Ministry of the Environment
Government
The Ministry of the Cultural Heritage
Not favourable to the project design when it was released. On
Dec. 10, 1998 the Ministry of Environment EIA Commission
expressed a negative opinion as regards the environmental
compatibility of the design. Thus, on Dec. 24, 1998 the
Ministry of the Environment together with the Ministry of
Cultural Heritage expressed ―…as the situation stands at
present, a judgement of negative environmental compatibility
―, adding, however, that ―the design could be reviewed…‖
Favourable to project. On Dec. 10, 1998 the Ministry of
Cultural Heritage Central Office for the Environment and
Landscape expressed a positive opinion as regards the design
for mobile barriers, with certain provisions.
The Ministry of Public Works/The Ministry of Infrastructure and
Transport was the promoter of the MOSE project.
The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (the so called
―Comitatone‖) of all measures for the safeguard of Venice. It is the
body for policy, coordination and control of the objectives established
by the special legislation (see Art. 4 of Law no. 798/84). This
Committee was made up of representatives of the competent
authorities and institutions (Ministries of Infrastructure and Transport,
Environment and Territorial Protection, Cultural Heritage and
Activities, University Education and Scientific Research), the
Chairman of the Water Authority, the Chairman of the Veneto
Regional Authority, the mayors of Venice and Chioggia and TreportiCavallino Local Authority and two representatives of the other local
authorities along the lagoon boundary). It is chaired by the President
of the Council of Ministers. The secretary of the Committee is the
President of the Venice Water Authority.
30
Public
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
Other internal
supply-side
categories (please
specify)
Category
Case-study
University and
research institutions CORILA (Consorzio di Istituti Universitari e Enti di ricerca). The
Consortium was entrusted to monitor environmental impacts of
construction operations in the construction site
Independent
experts
Private
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
Comments (e.g. maturity,
previous experiences of
stakeholders, skills, influence on
project)
Commission of international experts. To produce the
Environmental Impact Assessment of the design for mobile
barriers, the water Authority and its concessionary called on the
collaboration of, among others, a panel of professors from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This panel of experts
followed the progress of studies and validated the results.
n/a
WWF, Italia Nostra, some minor environmental movements
Conservationists
n/a
Archaeologists
UNESCO
Other External
Private
stakeholders
(please specify)
Category
Case study
Tourists
Some political movements
ASCOM (association of Venetian Traders and Shopkeepers), fish
farming companies
31
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis 1
External Stakeholder
External Stakeholder’s Attitude
to this Project
External Stakeholder’s Influence on project
Impact of Project
on External
Stakeholder
WWF, Italia Nostra, and some minor
environmental movements
Not favourable
Attempt to stop project progress. Extension of decision-making time
No impact
European Commission, UNESCO
Very favourable
Stimulated project progress.
Some change required as to the construction site management to
take into account environmental issues.
None identified
Local Authority of Venice
As the project life-cycle has a long
time extension, the likelihood to have
changes in the political administration
of a body is great. It happened that
in the stage of the MOSE project
conceptualisation as a system of
mobile barriers it was well accepted
and
supported
by
the
local
administration. But, in late 2006, after
the change of the political council of
the City of Venice, the new political
administration opposed the MOSE
system, asking for the evaluation of a
number of solutions indicated as
alternatives.
The Council of Ministers of the Italian Government, after taking into
exam the requests from the local authorities and the results
presented in a report on project progress and the opinions of major
stakeholders (Ministry of the Environment, the Higher Council of
Public Works, Venice Water Authority , Ministry of Cultural Heritage,
Venice Port Authority, etc.), retained that no new elements have
emerged requiring the original project to be modified. However the
Committee for Policy , Coordination and Control unanimously
approved the agenda presented by the Venice Local Authority
confirming the need to guarantee the continuation of extraordinary
maintenance work in the lagoon towns and cities, dredging of
canals, raising of public paved areas and pollution abatement in the
lagoon through re-financing of the Special Law for Venice. In
addition, the following were guaranteed: scrupulous monitoring of
the effects of all measures being implemented in the lagoon,
updating of the morphological plan and rapid availability of all data
relating to the activities underway to safeguard the provincial capital
of Veneto.
None identified
Local Authority of Chioggia
See comment above
The Provincial Authority of Venice
See comment above
Regional Administration of Veneto
Favourable
32
External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this Project
The Ministry of the
Environment
Not favourable in the first stage of development.
Required further efforts and mitigation measures
The Ministry of Cultural
Heritage
Favourable
The Ministry of Public
Works/The Ministry of
Infrastructure and Transport
The Committee for Policy,
Coordination and Control
Impact of Project
on External
Stakeholder
The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control
considered various opinions expressed during the
extraordinary EIA of the design for mobile barriers at the
lagoon inlets. In a Resolution, the Committee unanimously
delegated the water Authority to undertake directly when
responsible, or to coordinate with others when needed a
series of interrelated in-depth studies to be completed by
Dec. 31, 1999. The Committee also called for the rapid
setting up of a specific Planning Office in collaboration with
the competent administrations in the hopes that this office
could be set up in time to enable it to participate in the
review of the general Plan of Interventions.
None identified
Very favourable. On Feb. 26, 1999 a general meeting of
the Higher Council of Public Works expressed its
opinion on the EIS of the mobile barriers design,
unanimously reconfirming its favourable opinion on the
design solution. The Higher Council is of the opinion
―…that, on the basis of technical and scientific
knowledge and the extensive studies completed and in
the light of the reconfirmed indissolubility of the
safeguarding measures, it can be stated that the only
way to defend the City of Venice from high waters is
by regulating the lagoon inlets by means of a system of
mobile gates; and that there are no therefore no
impediments to developing the final design of this
system, partly in order to introduce the improvements
and innovations deriving from the development of
science and technology during the last six years‖
Stimulated progress of project.
None identified
Very favourable
Stimulated progress of project.
None identified
33
Client Project Team Size & Structure
Contractor Project Team Size and
Structure
Involvement
Major role of Consorzio Venezia Nuova in the project management. CVN is a private body, a concessionary
entrusted with the task of coordination activities (feasibility study, EIS, executive design, public procurement, works
management monitoring, etc.), that acts for the public interest. It interfaces the granting Administration and the
executors of the safeguard measures (designers, consultant for special studies and experimentation, companies
carrying out works). CVN consists of large private Italian companies, consortia, cooperatives, and local firms.
CVN was delegated by the Ministry of Public Works to design and execute the works to regulate tidal floods on the
basis of Law no. 798/84 (Agreement no. 6479/85).
The collection of special laws and decrees (> 26) that have been issued by the Italian Parliament and by the Veneto Regional Administration provided the
operational and funding framework that enabled the progress of project.
Art. 4 of Law no. 798 of Nov. 29, 1984 set up the Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control of all measures for the safeguard of Venice, the so-called
―Comitatone‖, made up of representatives of the competent local and national authorities and institutions (Ministries of Infrastructure and Transport,
Environment and Territorial Protection, Cultural Heritage and Activities, University Education and Scientific Research, the Chairman of the Water Authority, the
Chairman of the Veneto Regional Authority, the mayors of Venice and Chioggia and Treporti-Cavallino Local Authority and two representatives of the other
local authorities along the lagoon boundary) and chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers. The secretary of the Committee is the President of the
Venice Water Authority. The Comitatone is the body for policy, coordination and control of the objectives established by the special legislation issued for
Venice and the lagoon.
The control system also included crossed audits and verifications implemented at different levels by a number of bodies: a) the High Council of Public Works
(Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport), the Venice Water Authority Technical Committee (The Venice Water Authority), the Venice Water Authority Panel of
Experts (The Venice Water Authority Safeguarding Dept.), and the Consorzio Venezia Nuova. The Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Cultural Heritage
and the Veneto Regional Administration have a role in the EIS implementation.
Programme Agreements are also an important operational tool that was introduced by Law no. 139/92 into safeguarding procedures. In the case of strictly
interconnected measures involving a number of different authorities and institutions, the programme agreement enabled the identification of a joint action plan,
integrating the measures to be carried out by the single different bodies and, if necessary, appointing a single implementing body. Irrespective of the
implementing body, responsibility for achieving the individual objectives remains with the legally responsible institution. It is assumed that coordinated and
unitary implementation of the various measures within a programme agreement might improve operational efficiency, optimise implementation times, reduce
costs and mitigate social costs. Thirteen agreements have been signed.
According to Art. 3 of Law 139/92, funds to implement works aimed at regulating tidal floods may be assigned after the audit and verification of an acceptable
progress of other interventions (measures aimed at slowing down degradation of the morphological structures caused by subsidence, eustasism and erosion
resulting from wave motion and wash, etc.) by the Comitatone.
34
Project Processes
Present (describe below) X Not Present □ No Information □
•Detailed and extensive investigation to identify effective solutions to solve the problem of high water
•Implementation of agreements among several bodies to improve coordination and procedural efficiency
•Involvement of international, independent experts to implement and validate EIS results
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information X
Processes
Public tender
Processes
Processes
35
Performance relating to
time
cost
Performance related to
specification
- the conceptualisation and the study in search for feasible solutions
that lead to the project began in 1975
- executive design approved and start of the works and the
construction site in 2003
- completion of works estimated at the end of 2010
- estimated completion of works at the end of 2015
(completion time was 2012 in 2008)
- test of the gates placed in the Treporti inlet in 2013
-planned cost of 2,3 billion €
-planned annual operating cost from 5 million € to 9 million €
- estimated cost to complete 4,678 billion € (5,5 billion
according to not official estimations)
- estimated annual operating cost from 12 million € to
18 million € (30 million € according to not official
estimations) (including maintenance)
- no. 4 mobile barriers being constructed at the lagoon inlets (2 at the
Lido inlet, 1 at Malamocco and 1 at Chioggia)
- no. 78 the total number of gates
- no. 1 lock for large shipping at the Malamocco inlet enabling port
activities to continue when the gates are in operation
- no. 3 small locks (2 at Chioggia and 1 at Lido-Treporti) to allow the
transit of fishing boats and other smaller vessels when the gates are
in operation
- 3 m the maximum tide which the gates can withstand
- 60 cm the increase in sea level the MOSE System has been
designed to cope with
- 9,850 m of rock-fill to complete the visible structures such as the
small craft harbours, jetty reinforcement and breakwaters
- 4,590 m of vertical wall required to complete the visible structure
such as locks and ―abutments‖ for the row of gates
- 597,000 squared metres of bed protection and underwater structures
required for completion
- no. 0 gates completed and placed
- 63% of the work already completed
- 3,000 people currently directly or indirectly employed
- 9,000 m of rock-fill already completed
- 4,100 m of vertical wall already completed
- 398,700 square metres of bed protection and
underwater structures already completed
36
Stakeholder
Achievement of these Aims
UNESCO, EC
To preserve cultural heritage in Venice and natural habitat in the Venice lagoon
As the project has not yet been completed
and infrastructure is not operating, the
stakeholder aim s are not achieved
National and local
Governments
To safeguard Venice, i.e. to guarantee the complete defence of all built-up areas in
the lagoon from high waters of all levels, including extreme events, the arrest and
reversal of deterioration processes of the lagoon basin, in the same time
guaranteeing port activity, water quality, and the safeguarding of lagoon morphology
Venice residents,
tourists,
shopkeepers
To solve the problem of high waters that has afflicted Venice and other towns and
villages in the lagoon since ancient times
37
Legal and Regulatory
Project Environment
(regionally, nationally
and Europe wide)
The legal and regulatory framework that is not strictly related to the project is:
- Law 349/86: Introduction of the Ministry of Environment and norms related to the environmental damage . This law introduced the
procedure to carry on the environmental impact study and the list of infrastructure works needing EIS
-Law 443/2001 – Legge Obiettivo: Delegation to the Government for strategic infrastructure and productive settlements and other
interventions for the re-launching of productive activities
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
impacting on the
project
Major legislative milestones:
-Law 171/73: ―The safeguarding of Venice and its lagoon is a matter of pre-eminent national interest‖
-Law 404/75: Protocol for publishing the international call for tender-competition for preservation of the hydrogeological equilibrium in
the Venice lagoon and the reduction of high waters in historic centres
-Vote no. 209 of 1982: Positive judgement by the Higher Council of Public Works to General feasibility Plan (the so called ―Progettone‖)
covering all the measures necessary to ―preserve the hydrogeological balance of the lagoon and mitigate high waters in the historic city
and town centers‖
-Law 798/84: Identification of a single body which takes responsibility for all activities (studies, experimentation, plans, and activities)
associated with physical defence and restoration of environmental balance. This law represents the legal basis for the delegation of
these activities to the Consorzio Venezia Nuova through private negotiations exempted from normal procedures
-Convention no. 6479/85: on the basis of Law 798/84, CVN is delegated by Ministry of Public Works to design and execute the works to
regulate tidal floods
-Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Decree of August 1, 1985: Declaration of considerable public interest concerning the ecosystem of the
Venice lagoon situated in the local authority areas of Venice, Jesolo, Musile di Piave, Quarto d‘Altino, Mira, Campagna Lupia, Chioggia
and Codevigo
-Regional Law – Veneto Region 27/1990: Regulations for the execution of the responsibilities assigned to the Region by Law 798/84
(this is only a selection of laws, decrees, and decree laws)
Economic Environment
Economic Project Environment
Late 2000 recessions and scarcity of funds.
Specific Economic Events impacting on the project
None identified
The last conservative government had a particular interest for the realization of large infrastructure investments.
Specific Political Events impacting on the
project
Any change occurred in the political government alliances and structure, both at the national and local level.
38
The "Progettone" is approved, with specific requirements, by the Higher Council of Public Works.
DESIGN & PROCUREMENT
The "Progettone", the first feasibility study and preliminary design to protect Venice from high water, is
drawn up and presented.
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS & ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION
International competition-call for tender issued by the Ministry of Public Works for the design and
construction of high water defenses. Five groups of companies take part. The tender is not awarded, but
five projects are used as a basis to draw up the so-called "Progettone".
1984
1975
The Special Law n. 171 declares the problem of
Venice to be "of priority national interest" and
identifies the physical unity and continuity of the
lagoon.
1981
November 4. Catastrophic sea storm measuring 194
cm on the Punta della Salute tide gauge. Venice and
other towns and villages in the lagoon are completely
submerged under a meter of water. Incalculable
damage. There is a clear awareness that the survival
of the city will never again be certain unless action is
taken to defend it.
1982
1966
EVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT
1973
TIME
EVENTS IN THE PROJECT
Law No 798 of 29 November redefines the general objectives of the measures for the safeguarding of
Venice. Art. 4 sets up the Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control of all measures, the so-called
"Comitatone", made up of representatives of the competent local and national authorities and institutions
and chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers.
39
1990
1989
TIME
November 17. The new conceptual design of the mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets to protect Venice
from high water is presented and then approved as part of a general plan of interventions to safeguard
Venice.
The conceptual design of mobile is approved by the Higher Council of Public Works.
October 18. The preliminary design is approved by the Higher Council of Public Works.
1992
1993
A Committee of Experts from leading international engineering companies appointed by Consorzio
Venezia Nuova, the Concessionary of the Venice Water Authority, give a positive opinion on the
preliminary design.
1995
November. The preliminary design for the mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets is approved by the Water
Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works.
1994
July. The preliminary design for the mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets is completed.
July 4. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (the "Comitatone"), considering the requests of Venice Local
Authority, pass a resolution calling for the preliminary design for the mobile barriers to be submitted to an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA), delegating the Water Authority (as the body proposing the plan) the task of producing an
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) and establishing a schedule. But the uniqueness of the Venice case also led to the
adoption of an "extraordinary" EIA procedure. The Committee, in fact, decided to flank the Ministry of the Environment EIA
Commission by a Panel of international experts. Members of the Panel are: Prof. Philippe Bourdeau (coordinator) IGEAT
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgio; Prof. Jean-Marie Martin, Environment Institute, Joint Research Centre,
European Commission Ispra, Italia ; Prof. Chang C. Mei, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA; Prof.
Ignazio Musu, Facoltà di Economia, Università di Ca‘ Foscari, Venezia, Italia; Prof. Pier Vellinga, Institute for Environmental
Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Olanda.
40
TIME
July 21. The commission of five international experts expresses a favourable opinion.
September 18. The Veneto Region Technical Commission expresses a favourable opinion on the design.
December 10. The Directorate General of the Ministry of Culture expresses a favourable opinion with certain reserves. On the
same day the Ministry of the Environment Environmental Impact Assessment Commission expresses a negative opinion on
the design.
December 24. The Minister of the Environment together with the Minister of the Cultural Heritage, considering the position of
the Ministry of the Environment EIA Commission, expressed, "as the situation stands at present, a judgment of negative
environmental compatibility", adding, however, that "the design could be reviewed..."
1999
February 3. In a specific Vote, the Chioggia Local Authority expresses its opinion, considering it "indispensable for the
defence process to continue in its entirety [...] including defence against exceptional high waters" and delegating the Mayor
to call for "...the continuation of design work at the lagoon inlets".
February. The Venice Local Authority expresses its opinion on the design, inviting the Mayor to call for "the continuation of
design work for mobile barriers at the lagoon Inlets".
February 26. A general meeting of the Higher Council of Public Works expressed its opinion on the EIS of the mobile
barriers, unanimously reconfirming its favourable opinion on the design solution.
1998
July 7. The Panel of international experts consign its Report to the President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of
Public Works and the Minister of the Environment. In its conclusions, the document states that the project is effective, does
not cause large scale impacts and has minimal and mitigable influence on the local scale. It also states that "the system of
mobile barriers" integrated with local defences, "responds adequately to current problems, while leaving options for the future
open". At the end of the Report, the Commission of experts indicated a number of specific provisions and additions.
2001
2000
March 8. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (Comitatone) considered the various opinions expressed
during the extraordinary EIA of the design for mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets. In a Resolution, the Committee
unanimously delegated the Water Authority to undertake directly when responsible, or to coordinate with others when
needed a series of interrelated in-depth studies to be completed by December 31.
July 12. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (Comitatone) considers the results of the development work
carried out and, in light of differences of opinion between the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of the Environment,
refers the decision regarding continuation of design work to the Council of Ministers.
July 14. On the grounds of breaches of procedure and substance, the Regional Administrative Tribunal for the Veneto (TAR)
issued a ruling annulling the December 1998 decree of negative environmental impact of the Minister of the Environment in
agreement with the Minister of the Cultural Heritage.
March 15. Meeting at Palazzo Chigi, in Rome, the Council of Ministers concludes the EIA procedure. Its Resolution calls for
work to begin on the definitive final design of the mobile high water protection barriers at the inlets. Specific provisions and
additions are also required, as the "dissipative capacity of the lagoon inlets channels to be increased".
December 6. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (Comitatone) expresses the opinion that design of the Mose
system should go ahead and that at the same time "measures aimed at increasing the dissipative capacity of the lagoon inlet
channels should be developed".
41
2001
TIME
December 18. The Venice Water Authority instructs its concessionary, the Consorzio Venezia Nuova, to draw up a plan of
activities resulting from the Comitatone resolution of 6 December 2001.
2003
September 30. The Consorzio Venezia Nuova consigns the final design for the whole Mose system, with adaptation of the
design for mobile barriers and introduction of the complementary structures and and the navigation lock at the Malamocco
inlet.
November 4. The Environmental Impact Assessment Commission of the Veneto Region approves the design for the
complementary breakwaters at the Malamocco and Chioggia inlets and the design for the navigation lock at the Malamocco
inlet; the design for the breakwater at the Lido inlet will be re-examined after being reviewed on the basis of given
observations.
November 8. The final design of the Mose system is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the
Higher Council of Public Works.
November 29. The CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) finances the first tranche of the Mose system
amounting to € 450 million.
February 25. Meeting in Rome, the Comitatone postpones conclusion of the decision-making process until the 3 April
meeting, allowing the local authorities of Venice and Chioggia more time to present their opinions on the final design for the
Mose system.
April 3. A unanimous resolution of the Comitatone give the go-ahead to executive design work and construction of the Mose
system, at the same time taking on board specific requests from Venice and Chioggia Local Authorities. These requests do
not, in fact, interfere with the structure of the system as defined in the final design and do not therefore represent a constraint
to its implementation.
April 15. The Water Authority Technical Committee approves the final design for the complementary breakwater at the
Chioggia inlet.
June 6. The Water Authority Technical Committee approves the "Plan of studies, designs and measures following the
decisions taken during the 3 April 2003 session of the Committee as per Art. 4 of Law no. 798/84".
2002
February 22. The programme is presented and approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher
Council of Public Works.
2004
October 17. The Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works, approves setting up
of a series of trial areas at the Lido inlet to verify the operational systems designed to consolidate the seabed near the rows
of gates.
January 20. The Safeguarding Commission expresses a favourable opinion on the final project of the Mose system.
January 30. The Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works, approves the design
for: the construction of the refuge haven at Lido – Treporti; the reinforcement of the Lido south jetty; the construction of the
navigation lock at the Malamocco inlet and the refuge haven at the Chioggia inlet.
February 13. The Plan Office is set up. Setting up of the Office was agreed on 6 December 2001 by the Comitatone. The
tasks of the Plan Office is to harmonise the plans of the individual authorities (State, Regional, Local) responsible for the
safeguarding activities and optimise the resources.
42
TIME
February 27. The final design for the work to construct the navigation lock at the Chioggia inlet is approved by the Water
Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works.
May 22. The Veneto Regional Tribunal rejects all the appeals made against the Mose system by a number of bodies
including the WWF, Italia Nostra and Venice Local and Provincial Authorities.
June 7. The provincial secretaries of the Italian trade unions C.G.I.L., C.I.S.L. and U.I.L. and the Consorzio Venezia Nuova
sign a Framework Agreement covering work already underway or planned for the near future as part of construction of the
mobile barriers at the inlets.
July 19. The final design for the first phase of the works for the reinforcement of the Forte San Pietro area, at the
Malamocco inlet, is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public
Works.
September 29. The CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) finances the second tranche of the Mose
system amounting to € 709 million.
November 4. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control meets in Rome. The agenda includes the progress of
work, in particular on the Mose system, the "eleven points" requested by Venice Local Authority and the one point
requested by Chioggia Local Authority. Transfer of a contribution for Venice, Chioggia and Cavallino Treporti local
authorities from funds financed by the CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) (arts. 80 L. 289/2002
and 23-quater D.L. 355/2003 conv. L. 47/2004).
2004
June 22. The final design for the first phase of the protection of the sea bed along the San Nicolò channel, at the Lido inlet,
is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works.
2005
December 20. The Sixth Division of the Judicial State Council has turned down all the appeals filed by the Province, Venice
Local Authority and a number of associations including the WWF and Italia Nostra against the Mose system and the
Veneto Regional Tribunal sentence of 22 May 2004.
January 28. the Regional Environmental Impact Assessment concluded with a favourable opinion on the environmental
compatibility of the project to set up sites at the Malamocco and Chioggia inlets to prefabricate the caissons for the mobile
gates and abutments.
April 29. In accordance with the Framework Agreement between the provincial secretaries of the Italian trade unions
C.G.I.L., C.I.S.L. and U.I.L. and the Consorzio Venezia Nuova signed in 2004, a round table is set up with the participation of
representatives of the trade unions and the consortium and procedures are established for communicating between the
individual groups of companies operating at the three lagoon inlets. The parties jointly agree to meet with the local authorities
to discuss the matter of accommodating the workforce employed in construction of the barriers.
May 20. The final design for the preparation of two new parallel cable pipelines across the inlet channel at the Chioggia inlet,
is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works. The cable
pipelines are being constructed using the remote controlled horizontal boring technique.
43
TIME
July 21. The Water Authority Technical Committee approves the final design for the following projects: at the Lido inlet,
designs for preparation of the work site at the south San Nicolò abutment (construction of wharfs for vessels to come
alongside, a logistics area in support of site activities and a temporary platform for storing materials, etc) and the second
phase of work to construct the intermediate island between the rows of gates (creation of a navigational channel to the rear of
the island to connect San Nicolò and Treporti when the inlets are closed and filling of the nucleus of the island with dredged
material); at the Malamocco inlet, designs for the navigation lock (civil engineering work for the door housing structures on the
sea and lagoon sides and for the guide structures) and preparation of the work site at the north abutment (construction of a
temporary platform for storing and selecting materials, wharfs for vessels to come alongside, a logistics area in support of site
activities, etc); at the Chioggia inlet, designs for construction of the north abutment (civil engineering for the wharf and hard
standing linking the barrier abutment and lock embankments) and construction of the lagoon side basin of the refuge haven
(construction of the breakwater on the channel side of the harbour, the inner bank of the north side of the harbour, dredging of
the inner basin, etc).
September 28. A meeting of the Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control took place in Rome. The Commitee
coordinates the activities to safeguard Venice and its lagoon. The Committee, chaired by the President of the Council of
Ministers Silvio Berlusconi, decided to continue the realization of the Mose system. The progress of the requests expressed by
the Municipalities of Venice and Chioggia (11 points) has been verified, and the technical controls will be considered by the
Plan Office. Furthermore, the financing of contributions to the State, Region and Municipalities has been requested.
CONSTRUCTION & OPERATION 17
2005
June 20. The Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, Pietro Lunardi, visited the work sites where construction of the tidal
regulation barriers at the lagoon inlets is underway. The Minister, together with the President of the Veneto Region Giancarlo
Galan, Deputy Mayor of Venice Michele Vianello and President of the Venice Water Authority Maria Giovanna Piva inspected
the work sites at the Lido, Malamocco and Chioggia inlets. He then went to the Arsenale where he met representatives of local
institutions and visited the dry docks in the historic dockyards of the Serenissima. During the meeting, the President of the
Venice Water Authority put forward a proposal to set aside part of the north area of the Venice Arsenale for management and
maintenance of the Mose system.
2006
March 29. The CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) finances the third installment of the Mose system
to regulate tidal floods amounting to 380 million euro.
July 20. A meeting of the Committee Coordination and Control (Comitatone) for the safeguarding of Venice and the lagoon,
chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers Romano Prodi, took place in Rome.
The Comitatone decided to enlarge the composition of the Committee to the Province of Venice and the Municipality of
Cavallino-Treporti. Besides, it confirmed the commitment to carry on the financing of the Mose system by the Cipe, and, at the
same time, to re-establish the financing of the Special Law for the other safeguarding measures. The possibility of transfer 50
million euro from 380 deliberated by the Cipe on March 20, 2006, to the others measures foreseen in the Special Law, has
been discussed.
With regard to the Mose system, the Committee decided to verify the proposals that the Municipality of Venice will arrive at the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers before July 31, 2006. The DICA (the Administration of the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers Department) will prepare the proceedings for the next meeting of the Committee. Until that date, the realization of
work at the lagoon inlets, will follow the foreseen programming.
44
TIME
2010
November 22. A meeting of the Committe of Coordination and Control for the safeguarding of Venice and the lagoon, chaired
by the President of the Council of Ministers Romano Prodi, took place in Rome. With regard to the defence of Venice from the
high water (Mose), which is under realization since 2003, the Committee decided to complete the Mose system work and the
morphological measures connected, giving assurance of financing, and complying with engagement and programme defined
by the agreement between the State and the concessionary Consorzio Venezia Nuova.
August 3. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) financed 243 million of euro for the Mose work.
January 31. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) financed 400 million of euro for the Mose
work.
2008
2007
2006
November 10. The Council of Ministers approves, by a majority of votes, the report on the Mose system drawn up by the
Minister for Infrastructure Antonio Di Pietro.
December 18. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) approved the financing of 800 million of
euro.
November 18. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) approved the financing of 230 million of euro.
45
REFERENCES
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1-http://www.consorziovenezianuova.com/corporate.htm
2-http://mediateca.consorziovenezianuova.com/
3-http://www.magisacque.it/ilmav.htm
4-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Documenti/uk/Accordi.htm
5-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Leggi/uk/decreti%20legge.htm
6-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Leggi/uk/leggi.htm
7-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp
8-http://www.salve.it/uk/soggetti/soggetti.htm
9-http://www.salve.it/uk/soluzioni/acque/mose_avanzamento.htm
10-http://www.salve.it/uk/soluzioni/acque/mose_studi.htm
11-N. Doni and R. Signorelli, ―Le Tecniche di Project management applicate al progetto Venezia‖, available in
http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp
12-M. Gentilomo and G. Cecconi, ―Flood protection system designed for Venice‖, available in http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp
13- P.A. Moro, ―Profilo del Consorzio Venezia Nuova‖, available in http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp
14- http://www.marinadiliogrando.eu/mose_sistem.html
15- http://www.salvemose.it/?area=2&menu=3&page=53
16- http://www.calcolostrutture.net/il-mose.html
17- Lucia Vergano, Georg Umgiesser and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, ―An Economic Assessment of the Impacts of the MOSE Barriers on Venice Port Activities‖,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Ca' Foscari University of Venice, 2010, http://www.bepress.com/feem/paper407
18-‖CASE HISTORY: MO.S.E. PROJECT, VENICE, ITALY‖, Ref: UK-IT/CH/EP027 — Rev:01, July 08, available in www.maccaferri.co.uk
19-http://www2.comune.venezia.it/mose-doc-prg/
20-A. Vitucci, “La visita nei cantieri del Mose: cassoni alti come grattacieli‖, April 2011, available in http://nuovavenezia.gelocal.it/cronaca/2011/04/29/news/lavisita-nei-cantieri-del-mose
21-http://www.drytech.ch/new/svbreferenzegenio06.php?lang=en
22-G. Dallaporta, ―Il MOSE: un progetto che nasce dal CNR‖, http://www.fi.cnr.it/r&f/n12/dallaporta.htm
23-http://www.ilvelino.it/articolo.php?idArticolo=1434671
24-http://www.italiamiga.com.br/noticias/artigos/prima_pietra_per_il_mose.htm
25-http://www.maccaferri.co.uk/PAGES00648.html
26-E. Della Frattina, ―Mose, l‘eterno incompiuto che costa molto e serve a poco‖, http://www.patrimoniosos.it/rsol.php?op=getarticle&id=85118
27-http://www.cooperativasanmartino.it/pagina.aspx?ID=2101
28-http://www.edilportale.com/news/2003/04/aziende/mose-impregilo-in-consorzio-venezia-nuova_3738_5.html
29-Consorzio Venezia Nuova and Magistrato alle Acque, ―Nuovi interventi per la salvaguardia di Venezia: studio di impatto ambientale, sintesi non tecnica‖, 2004.
46
1.4 RACIBORZ RESERVOIR, SILESIA
Case compiled by: .Anna Maksymiuk-Dziuban and Kazimierz Banasik
Contact details: [email protected] and [email protected]
Project Title
Flood protection project in Poland; ―Raciborz Reservoir‖
Location
On the Odra River in Silesia Province, southern Poland
Purpose
Racibórz Dolny flood control reservoir (polder) shall improve the flood control conditions
of the town of Racibórz and the Oder river valley (including the towns of Kędzierzyn Koźle
and Opole) and shall decrease flood hazard for the areas below (including the towns of
Brzeg, Oława and Wrocław). The Racibórz Dolny flood control reservoir will enable the
reduction of flood waves through the combined overflow and bottom outlets structure. The
effect of reducing flood waves by the reservoir will be significant and felt throughout the
Central Odra. Reduction will affect only the flood waves with peaks higher than permitted
flow rate of Q = 1,210 m3/s, determined in the environmental impact report for the section
of the Odra below Racibórz.
Scope
Object No. 1 Head dam with appurtenant structures.
Object No. 2 Left side dam with appurtenant structures.
Object No. 3 Right side dam with appurtenant structures.
Object No. 4 Reservoir operating back-up facilities.
Object No. 5 Reservoir bowl.
Total Project Value
1.337 bilion PLN (i.e. ca 330 000 000 Euro)
Project Status (i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,
In the process of obtaining building permits
(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc)
Relevant Physical Dimensions (e.g. height, width,
volume, length)
2% of total project value
The total length of dirt dams will be 21.8 km. Max. dam height will be 11.10 m. Water
volume with max. level will be 185.0 mln m3. Water surface area with max. level will be
24.5 km2
47
Stakeholder
Category
Internal
Supply-Side Client
Case-Study
Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders,
Regional Water Management Authority in Gliwice
Financiers
State budget, World Bank
Sponsors
This information is at the client
Client's Customers
Client's Owners
Other internal
Category
Case-Study
supply- side
categories
(please specify)
Design Hydroprojekt, contractor not yet
First Tier Contractors Not yet
Second Tier
Consultants
Professional
Services Providers
Other internal
supply- side
categories (please
specify)
Not yet
Not yet
Category
Case-Study
48
External
Public Regulatory Agencies
Local Government
National Government
Case-Study
categories (please
specify)
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
Conservationists
Archaeologists
stakeholders
(please specify)
Case-study
Category
Case study
49
The project was designed on the basis of a environmental decision issued by the Regional Director of
Environmental Protection in Katowice, Katowice, 7 September 2010
The environmental decision
Flooding in 1997 and 2010
50
1.5 VIENNA HOSPITAL NORTH
Case compiled by: Roland Gareis and Claudia Weninger
Project Title
Vienna Hospital North
Location
Vienna, Austria
Purpose
Establishment of a new central hospital in Vienna
Scope
Planning and establishing the hospital including the buildings, the organisation, the services, the
processes, the ICT infrastructure, etc.
Vienna Hospital Association establishes the new hospital. Funding by the Vienna Hospital
Association, municipality of Vienna and the EU
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
Plot size: 111.579 m²
Building area: 51.452 m²
Gross floor area: 214.910 m²
Healing Garden (Park): 46.709 m²
Building height/top edge height of the attic of the nursing wing: 38,10 m
Bed capacity: rd. 800
Construction costs: about 850 million €
51
Supply-Side
Case-Study
Client/Investor
Vienna Hospital Association
Financiers
Vienna Hospital Association (3) , municipality of Vienna, EU
Sponsors
Patients (and their families)
Client’s Owners
categories ( please
specify)
Demand Side Principal Contractors
Category
Case-Study
Users
Future employees
Construction companies
Architects, planners
Consultants
NA
Will cooperation in different service
areas
NA
NA
Providers
categories (please specify)
52
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Comments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences
of stakeholders, skills, influence on project)
Case-Study
Licensing authority,
municipality of Vienna
Local Government
Municipality of Vienna
National Government
Austria government
side categories
Other hospitals
(please specify)
MA 15, MA 40, MA 37 etc.
High inspection effort
Case-study
Semmelweis, Gersthof, Hietzing,
Otto-Wagner, Floridsdorf
Get new services or are closed
Inhabitants of the 21 district of Vienna
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
None apparent - offshore
Conservationists
None apparent – offshore
Archaeologists
n/a
Other External Private Category
stakeholders
Social organisation
(please specify)
Case-study
Red noses
53
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps
Contracts
investments ..
Hospital
Semmel-weis
Owns
100%
Vienna
Danube
Hospital
Hospital
Gersthof
Gives financial
support
Austrian
Railway
Operator
VHA… Vienna Hospital
Association
Municipality
of Vienna
Vienna
Public
Transport
Owns
100%
EU
Hospital
Hietzing
Gives financial
support
VHA
Gives licenses to
..
Other
license
agencies
(AGES)
Integrated in
planning
Hospital
Otto-Wagner
Different
religious
associations
Hospital
Floridsdorf
Future
employees
Key:
Contracts
With …
Social
Associations
Name of
Actor
- Project Actor
Consultants
Architect
Other
VAMED
PORR
Description of
relationship
Sub
contractor
- Project
Relationship
Contracts
With …
54
Structure
and Structure
Project Team of the Vienna Hospital Association: about 20 people
Architects, planners and consultants
Construction companies
Involvement
□
√
Stakeholder Involvement □
Team Building Tools □
Building Information Modelling (BIM) □
Project Knowledge Management Tools □
Competency framework □
□
√
□
Relationship Management Tools □
55
Project Processes
Risk Management Processes 29
Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information x
Processes
Green Procurement 5
Processes
Processes
56
The project started in 2007. The hospital will start
operations in 2015.
Performance relating to cost
Ok
No delay
specification
Stakeholder
Municipality of Vienna
Ok
Vienna Hospital Association
Ok
Stronger involvement in project team
57
Project Environment
and Europe wide)
The Vienna Hospital Association is responsible for all public hospitals in Vienna. It is a public organisation and
strongly connected to the municipality of Vienna. The VHA invests 2 million € per year in Viennese hospitals. The
organisation is also responsible for medicine and administrative staff but also for patients. The VHA is very
interested in sustainable development and developed the sustainability charter for the hospital north.
The hospital north is party founded by the European investment bank. Thus the project has to consider sustainable
development parts e.g. co² emission.
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
The sustainability charter was developed from the VHA in cooperation with the municipality of Vienna. In Vienna
different regulations e.g. green procurement exist. The projects needs to consider all local regulations.
The VHA reports to the municipality of Vienna.
None identified
As the hospital north is a public hospital all political parties are very interested in the
project.
Specific Political Events impacting on the project
None Identified
58
TIME
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Conceptualising & Planning
Implementation
Start
conceptualizing
Sustainability charter
developed
Architectural
competition
finished
Commissioning
Part 1
Financial agreement
between VHA and
European investment
bank
Contract (ground)
signed
Site preparation
Rough planning
finished
Green Public
Procurement
award winner
Detailed planning
finished
Implementation
started
EVENTS IN THE
ENVIRONMENT
Info centre on
site
established
Participation
workshops
performed
59
REFERENCES
1.
Vienna Hospital Association – Hospital North: http://www.wienkav.at/kav/khn-pm/ZeigeText.asp?ID=39187
2.
Sustainablity Charter: http://www.wienkav.at/kav/khn-pm/ZeigeText.asp?ID=39189
3.
Vienna Hospital Association http://www.wienkav.at/kav/
4.
Red-noses organization http://www.rednoses.eu/
5.
GPP case study http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/case_en.htm
SECTION 2
Energy Case Studies
2.1 ANDASOL SOLAR POWER STATION
Case compiled by: Giorgio Locatelli and Mauro Mancini
Project Title
CSP Andasol Solar Power Station (Concentrating Solar Power CSP)
Location
Andalusia, in the southern of Spain. The site of the facility is on the plateau Guadix in the province of Granada. Its name is
a combination of Andalusia and Sol (Sun in Spanish). Andasol is placed at 1100 m of altitude. This ground level and the
semi-arid climate allows to achieving one of the best solar direct irradiance resources in Spain. The site has exceptionally
high annual direct of 2200 kWh/m² per year.
62
Purpose
Deploy two CSP plant. Each plant has a gross electricity output of 50 MWe and produces around 175
GWh per year. Each plant saves some 150.000 tonnes of CO2 per year when compared with a modern
hard coal-fired power plant. The plants together provide electricity for approximately three thousand
people in southern Spain. They also contribute to Spain's peak electricity demand during summer
caused by the energy consumption of air-conditioning units
Scope
Design , procurement, Realization and connection to the electric grid of two concentrated solar power
plants. The CSP plants consist of three main parts: solar field with parabolic trough, storage tanks and
power generation.
Total Project Value
300 M€ each one (600 M€ total)
Project Status
Operations
EPC contract Lump Sum Turn Key
63
In each plant there are more than 600 parabolic trough collectors, distributed over a total surface area of about two square kilometres, each
of which measures 150 metres in length and 5,7 metres in width. These mirrors have a total surface area in excess of 500.000 square
metres.
The full thermal reservoir of heat allows to run the turbine for about 7,5 hours at full-load after sunset. (DLR, 2012). According to
(EstelaSolar, 2012) each solar field with its parabolic trough has an average efficiency during the time in transforming the solar radiation to
steam of 43%. According to (EIB, 2007) the plants have been designed for auxiliary firing with natural gas, which can be used as a back-up
and will account for up to 15% of the electricity generated, as permitted under the applicable Spanish legislation. The Andasol plants share
together the natural gas and water infrastructure. The Andasol plants together employ about 80 people as clerks, maintenance personnel,
thermal central technicians and operators
64
Internal - Demand Side
Stakeholder
Category
Company
Comments
Client
Andasol-1 Central
Termosolar Uno SA and
Andasol-2 Central
Termosolar Dos SA.
These Spanish companies created specifically to own and manage the plants. (Power Technology, 2012).
Financiers
European Investment Bank
(EIB), European
Commission, BNP Paribas,
Sabadell Bank Group,
WestLB and Dexia.
These four banks have shared the risk of this new energy project (BNEF, 2006). The European Investment Bank
(EIB) granted 60 million euro loan for each plant (EIB, 2006). Andasol 1 has been financed by the European
Commission with a grant of 5 million euro. (EC, 2007). The plants received the 80% of their financing for the
realization through borrowed capital by banks. (Solar Millennium, 2008/2009).
Sponsors
Solar Millennium Group.
Solar Millennium is a German company in the sector of solar thermal power plants. The group covers all business
sectors along the value chain from project development and financing to engineering and EPC contract of the
plants. It also holds stakes in the power plants companies. (Solar Millennium, 2012). In the year 2009/2010 the total
revenues of the group was 73,2 million euro. In 2010 Solar Millennium Group had about 300 employees. (Solar
Millennium, 2009/2010).
ACS Cobra, a subsidiary of
ACS Group
Solar Millennium, that was trying to develop the project, didn‘t have the financial capacity to realize the plants and
technical credibility with the Spanish authorities to create the proper legal framework. (ACS Cobra, 2010). So in
2003 Solar Millennium, agreeing by contract, convinced ACS Cobra to invest and play a crucial role in the
construction process and the realization of the two power plants. (CESI, 2005).
ACS Cobra is a subsidiary of the ACS group. Actividades de Construcción y Servicios, S.A. (ACS) is a Spanish
company dedicated to civil and engineering construction, all types services and telecommunications. The group has
a global presence, including developed countries in America and Europe and underdeveloped countries like India,
Brazil and China.. Listed on the stock exchange of Madrid, the company's shares form part of the IBEX 35 stock
market index. The group employs 138.500 people. The significant shareholders of ACS Group are: Corporacion
Financiera Alba SA 18,3%, Corporacion Financiera Alcor SA 13,9%, Inversiones Vesan SA 12,5%, Iberostar
Hoteles y Apartamentos SL 5,6%, Southeastern Asset Management 6,47%. The remaining of the shares, about
43%, is floating. There is not the presence of the Spanish State between the shareholders.
Endesa.
Endesa purchases electricity from Andasol 1 and 2 power plants (Solar Millennium, 2008).
Endesa is the Spain‘s largest utility. In Spain it generates, transports, distributes and supplies electricity, in nine
autonomous regions, to 11,8 million customers. Since the first quarter of 2009 Endesa is part of the Enel group.
(Endesa, 2012). With the electricity produced in this plant Endesa supplies approximately 300.000 people in
southern Spain (Power Technology, 2012).
Client’s
Customers
65
Internal - Demand Side
Stakeholder
Category
Company
Comments
Client’s
Owners
100% by ACS Cobra
The companies of Andasol 1 e 2 at the beginning was owned by ACS Cobra Group (75%) and Solar Millennium (25%).
(Power Technology, 2012).
In July 2009, immediately after the realization of the two plants, all the stakes in the power plants companies of Solar
Millennium were sold to ACS Cobra. (Solar Millennium, 2008/2009).
Principal
Contractor
ACS Cobra and Sener
Group
ACS Cobra and Sener Group set up two joint-ventures with 80% of stake of ACS Cobra and 20% of Sener. The jointventures set up were UTE CT Andasol-1 and UTE CT Andasol-2.
Sener Group, a Spanish company, develops engineering projects, production and construction activities and systems
integration. (Sener, 2012). Sener developed the basic engineering (the FEED) and then the detailed engineering for the
plants. For the realization of the plants the EPC contracts were Lump Sum Turn Key. (Sener, 2009). These companies,
UTE CT Andasol 1 and 2, were set up only to come to an end the realization of the plants.
First Tier
Contractors
Flagsol, a technology
subsidiary of Solar
Millennium.
It provided the engineering, planning, basic and detailed design, construction supervision and the control system for the
solar field of the two plants. (Solar Millennium, 2008).
Flagsol for the design of the solar field, has ever had any previous experience in the design of this kind of plants, being
the first CSP plant realized in Europe. (Power Technology, 2012).
Sener
It provided the engineering, basic and detailed design for the conventional power generation section (steam turbine,
electrical generator, condenser, boiler, feed-water heaters) (Solar Millennium, 2008) and the molten salt storage system
(Solar thermal group , 2010) of the two power plants.
Being of course the plants provided of a conventional steam cycle Sener has had previous experience in the design of
this part (Sener, 2012). Sener has ever had any previous experience in the design of molten salt storage system for
CSP plant, being the plant the first realized with this kind of system and technology (Power Technology, 2012).
ACS Cobra
The Spanish company, being a construction company, was primarily responsible for the construction work (civil and
mechanical) in the two construction sites. (Solar Millennium, 2008).
Being of course the plants provided of a conventional steam cycle ACS Cobra has had previous experience in the
realization of this part (Grupo ACS, 2012). ACS Cobra has ever had any previous experience in the realization of the
other two parts that compose the plant, solar field and storage system, being the first CSP plant in Europe and the first
realized with the molten salt storage system (Power Technology, 2012).
66
Stakeholder
Category
Company
Comments
Second Tier
Consultants
Schott Solar
and Solel Solar
Systems
They manufactured and supplied the absorption pipes for the two plants. (Power Info, 2012).
Flabeg Group
It manufactured and supplied the parabolic mirrors for the two plants. (Power Info, 2012).
ABB
It provided instrumentation and control systems for thermal storage tanks. It provided also instrumentation and electrical
equipment (transformers, switchgear, circuit breakers) for connection to the high voltage grid of the two power plants. (ABB,
2009).
Siemens
It manufactured, at the manufacturing site of Finspang in Sweden, and supplied the turbines SST-700 and the generators
SGen-100A-2P (Siemens, 2011). It provided also the instrumentation and control systems for the power block (DLR, 2009).
Sodes Grupo
It manufactured the boilers of the steam cycle of the plants (Sodes, 2012).
Foster Wheeler
It provided the feed-water heaters of the plants. These heaters are used to heat the feed-water using turbine steam
extractions to increase the thermal cycle efficiency and to help the Steam Generation System. (Foster Wheeler, 2012).
67
External
Public
Private
Stakeholder
Category
Name
Comments
Regulatory
Agencies
Red Eléctrica de Espana (REE).
Red Eléctrica is the manager of the transmission grid of the Spanish
electricity system. It ensures the continuity of the electricity supply,
maintaining the constant balance between generation and consumption
in Spain. (REE, 2012).
Local
Government
Province of Granada
It issued the declaration of public utility for Andasol 1 (Vlex, 2006) and
Andasol 2 (BOE, 2006).
National
Government
Ministry of Industry, Ministry of the
Environment.
The Ministry of Industry issued the authorization to realize the Andasol 1
(Vlex, 2006) and Andasol 2 (BOE, 2006). The Ministry of the
Environment issued the environmental impact assessment for Andasol 1
(Junta de Andalucia, 2005) and Andasol 2 (BOE, 2006).
Local residents
People resident near the plants.
No protests have been reported, being the plants environmentally
friendly.
The Andasol plants together employ about 80 people as clerks,
maintenance personnel, thermal central technicians and operators.
(Grupo ACS, 2012).
Local
Landowners
Farmers, represented by their
association UPA-Andalucia (Union of
small farmers).
Procedure of compulsory expropriation for public utility.
There have been protests, demonstrations and strikes. (UPA, 2008).
Environmentalists
Environmental groups.
No protests have been reported, being the plants environmentally
friendly.
Greenpeace praised the coming into operation of Andasol defining the
electricity produced ―climate-friendly‖ (Greenpeace, 2012).
68
Institutional and
private investors.
Floating
Own
Solar Millennium
AG
Sponsor
BNP Paribas, Sabadell
Bank, WestLB , Dexia,
European Investment Bank,
European Commission
Financiers
Owns
100%
ACS Cobra
ACS Group
tInstitutional and
private investors.
Floating
Own
Owns and
Sponsor
Andasol-1 Central Termosolar Uno SA
Andasol-2 Central Termosolar Dos SA
Sell
electricity
Endesa
Principal
Contractors
UTE CT Andasol 1
UTE CT Andasol 2
(ACS Cobra 80%, Sener 20%)
Engineering and Design
Solar Field:
Flagsol, a subsidiary of
Solar Millennium
Supplier
Absorber pipes:
Schott Solar and Solel
Solar Systems
Supplier
Parabolic mirrors:
Flabeg Group
Construction work
Engineering and Design
Storage system and Power
block:
Sener Grupo
ACS Cobra
Supplier
Storage control system,
equipments for the
connection to the grid:
ABB
Supplier
Turbines, Generators
and power block
control system:
Siemens
Supplier
Feed-water heaters:
Foster Wheeler
Boilers:
Sodes Grupo
69
MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis
External
Stakeholder
External Stakeholder’s
Attitude to this Project
Influence on project
Spanish
government
It was favourable at the
realization of the firsts CSP
plants in Europe in its
territory.
The various ministries
issued all the authorization
of competence. The
Spanish government with
the real decrees 2002 and
2004 gave a regulatory
framework regulating the
usage of this sector and
with the incentives allowed
the realization of the
plants. (Real Decreto,
2004) and (Real Decreto,
2002).
Local landowners
The CSP plants need large
land around the power
facility to put the solar
collectors. The landowners
of course didn‘t want to lose
their cultivated lands (UPA,
2008) and in addition
denounced the taking away
of the water, used in the
plants, necessary for
irrigation of the land (Ideal,
2006).
There was negotiation with
Andasol and
demonstrations to obtain a
satisfactory compensation
for their lost lands. (UPA,
2008).
Impact of Project on
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
(initiation, planning,
construction, operation,
dismantling)
Initiation and Planning
They were expropriated
of their lands to realize
the plants and share the
use of the water with the
plants. (UPA, 2008).
Initiation and Planning
70
time
cost
achieving
Into 2004 Milenio Solar had scheduled the construction start of the first plant
Andasol 1 at the beginning of 2005 so immediately after the take-over of
stakes of the two power plants companies by ACS Cobra. So the coming on
line of this plant should have to be in the first quarter of 2007. The work of
the second plant should have to start some month after the start
construction of Andasol 1. (Warmdebate, 2004). The constrain of the Royal
Decree of 2004, which limits the use of the natural gas, has forced
designers to modify the project and to utilize a thermal energy storage
system. This caused a delay of the realization start. When ACS Cobra
purchased at the beginning of 2005 most of the shares of the two power
plants companies the work didn‘t start immediately but it triggered a
modification of the whole management of the contract. The project has so
suffered a significant delay due to permit this process. (EC, 2006). There
was a delay of about one year and half.
The next year in May 2006 and December 2006, when there were the
financial closures of the plants, it has been possible to know the date of the
realization end of the two plants. According to the work scheduling Andasol
1 had to be connected to the grid and to come on line at the end of 2008
while Andasol 2 had to be connected to the grid and come on line in mid
2009. As explain before this two milestone was respected and Andasol 1
(Photofileit, 2012) and Andasol 2 (Solar Millennium, 2007/2008) came on
line on schedule. So the realization work of the two plants didn‘t report any
delay.
Years Of
estimation
Connection to the
grid
Respete
d
2004
Andasol 1:
1°quarter 2007
Andasol 2:
3°quarter 2007
No
2006
Andasol 1:
4° quarter 2008
Andasol 2:
2°quarter 2009
YEs
It hasn‘t been possible reported any variation of the cost during the
development of the mega project because the stakeholders involved didn‘t
release any information about the cost estimated before the financial
closure. However it has been possible to compare the cost of each CSP
plant of Andasol with the other CSP plant realized in the same period in
Spain. The investment of each Andasol plant has been in line with the other
plants and any relevant cost difference has been reported.
The Scope respected
specification
71
Stakeholder or
Stakeholder Grouping
Original Aims of Project Involvement and
Changes to these Aims
ACS Group
ACS decided to enter into the new market of the
concentrated solar thermal power to positioning
itself as one of the main players in all this sectors
and to increase the revenues and profit.
ACS has now completed the first set of plants with total
capacity of 350 MW (EstelaSolar, 2012). ACS Group is a
worldwide leader in the development of thermal solar
plants with thermal storage devices (Grupo ACS, 2012).
Solar Millennium
To realize the first CSP plants with its parabolic
trough technology.
To hold its position between the leaders of this
sector investing in research and development (cost
reduction and greater efficiency of the solar field)
for the next plants.
It realized other CSP plants with the parabolic trough
technology but in 2011 because of the crisis of this sector
and the Chinese firms concurrence it went bankrupt.
(DailyE, 2011).
Sener Group
Sener decided to enter into the new market of the
concentrated solar power plants to learn the knowhow and to positioning itself as one of the main
EPC players in this sector.
The fulfilling experience with Andasol‘s plants gave
Sener the opportunity to undertake other similar projects,
winning 15 contracts in only six years. (Sener, 2012).
72
Project Environment
and Europe wide)
The companies before to make investment decisions had to wait a regulatory framework regulating the usage of this area. The
projects, being a new technology and for the first time applied on large plants in Spain and Europe, were carried out conforming
to the directives of the law in order to obtain the necessary incentives.
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
impacting on the
project
According to (World future council, 2004) the regulation in special scheme for the electric energy produced by renewable
source was ratified in Spain for the first time in the Royal Decree n. 2818 in 1998 after the Electric Power Act 54/1997 that
introduced the liberalisation of the electric sector in Spain. This Decree set up a special scheme, economically different from
the ordinary scheme, and regulated the requirements and procedures able to recourse to the special scheme. This decree did
not provide any division between the subcategory of photovoltaic and the CSP technology in the group that use as primary
energy the sun.
According to (Envent, 2009) Spain was the first country to introduce a feed in tariff for the energy generated by CSP technology
through the Royal Decree n. 841 in 2002. This Royal Decree and the following defined the regulatory framework for the getting
of the incentives so they have influenced the design choices of the project.
According to (Real Decreto, 2002) the plants to receive the incentives has to be with maximum size of 50 MW. For this reason
the two Andasol power plants and all the CSP plant in Spain are projected and realized with size of 50 MW.
According to (Real Decreto, 2004) two years later in 2004 was issued a new the Royal Decree. It has been imposed a limit,
beyond to have a maximum size of 50 MW as defined in the previous Real Decreto, on the use of the natural gas or propane to
the plants to receive the incentives. These facilities may use auxiliary equipment who consume natural gas or propane only to
maintain the temperature of the accumulator of heat. The consumption of this fuel in annual calculation must be less than 12%
of production of electricity and only during periods of interruption of the production of electric energy if the plants sell electricity
with the option of fixed tariff for the entire scheduling. This percentage increases up to 15%, without temporal limitation, if the
plants sell electricity in open bidding market, that is through negotiation.
According to (CESI, 2005) this regulation is valid for the first 200 MW of CSP plants but because of the high number of request
of permitting come at the Ministries this limit was increased to 500 MW in 2005. The constraint of this decree, which limits the
usage of natural gas, has forced designers to replace the auxiliary gas boiler present in the U.S. CSP plants, with a thermal
energy storage system that allows the usage of the facility beyond the hours of sunshine. The solar field has been oversized to
charge the hot tank during the day. This heat is used during the cloudy days or during the evening or night. Because of the
great heat capacity, the storage has been realized with the technique of the two tanks molten salt.
This full thermal reservoir of heat allows to run the turbine for about 7,5 hours at full-load after sunset. (DLR, 2012).
73
Political Project
Environment
According to (EuroMetrex, 2009) the project was supported by the European Commission because of these reasons:
(1) It is a first-of-its-kind and utility-scale demonstration of the solar thermal technology, parabolic trough of the type
EuroTrough (developed in community projects) and thermal storage, developments.
(2)
The European Commission pushes for the realization in Europe of power plants that use renewable source to
reduce the CO2 emission for the next years in agreement with the climate-energy package.
This kind of projects has been strongly desired by the Spanish government. They are projects for the generation of
electricity by renewable sources, the sun, and they have been realized also in other parts of south of Spain. So
the project did not find any bureaucratic difficulty or problem to be realized. The most important authorizations
were the environmental impact assessment issued by the Spanish‘s Ministry of the Environment and the
permission for the construction of the plants issued by the Spanish‘s Ministry of Industry, all obtained between
2004 and 2006.
Specific Political
Events impacting
on the project
Both the national government of Aznar (1996 – 2004) and Zapatero (2004 – 2011) supported the usage of renewable
energy as well as the local governments.
The regulation in special scheme for the electric energy produced by renewable source was ratified in Spain for the
first time in the Royal Decree n. 2818 in 1998 after the Electric Power Act 54/1997 that introduced the liberalisation of
the electric sector in Spain. T
his Decree set up a special scheme, economically different from the ordinary scheme, and regulated the
requirements and procedures able to recourse to the special scheme. This decree did not provide any division
between the subcategory of photovoltaic and the CSP technology in the group that use as primary energy the sun.
According to (Real Decreto, 2002) the plants to receive the incentives has to be with maximum size of 50 MW. For
this reason the two Andasol power plants and all the CSP plant in Spain are projected and realized with size of 50
MW.
According to (Real Decreto, 2004) two years later in 2004 was issued a new the Royal Decree. It has been imposed
a limit, beyond to have a maximum size of 50 MW as defined in the previous Real Decreto, on the use of the natural
gas or propane to the plants to receive the incentives. These facilities may use auxiliary equipment who consume
natural gas or propane only to maintain the temperature of the accumulator of heat.
74
Because of their bad technological efficiency and their high costs, CSP plants are still not competitive
enough on the energetic market of the technology and need a framework of regulations that provide
specific support to encourage their development.
According to (Envent, 2009) in several states have been created mechanisms to encourage the
development of this technology mainly in the form of feed in tariff and investment tax credits.
Specific Economic Events
According to (Envent, 2009) Spain was the first country to introduce a feed in tariff for the energy
generated by CSP technology through the Royal Decree n. 841 in 2002. The feed in tariff corresponds to
market price + premium.
According to (Real Decreto, 2002) this decree introduced a feed in tariff of 0,12 euro/kWh.
According to (Titano, 2011) in the Royal Decree of 2004 the feed in tariff was increased. For the option of
fixed tariff it was provided 0,216 euro/kWh for the first 25 years from the coming into operation and then
0,17 euro/kWh for the remaining period. According to (World future council, 2004) for the option of sell in
open bidding market the premium was 0,187 euro/kWh plus the market price.
According to (Real Decreto, 2007) in 2007 was issued the Royal Decree that actually regulates the feed
in tariff. In this Royal Decree the feed in tariff was increased. For the option of fixed tariff, where the grid
demand is not considered, it was provided 0,269 euro/kWh for the first 25 years from the coming into
operation. For the remaining period was provided 0,215 euro/kWh. The tariffs grows at an annual rate
equal to the inflation rate decreased by 0,5%. For the option of sell in open bidding market, where the
grid demand is required and a fixed quantity of electricity is required, was fixed the lower limit = 0,25404
euro/kWh, the upper limit = 0,344 euro/kWh and the reference premium = 0,254 euro/kWh for the first 25
years and for the remaining period 0,203 euro/kWh.
75
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 1
23.12.1998
In 1999
31.05.2002
02.08.2002
Sep-03
12.03.2004
19.01.2005
Beginning 2005
In 2005
The two power
plants
companies,
Solar Millennium,
Andasol-1
as agreed in
Issued of the
Central
2003, sold the
environmental
Issued of the
Termosolar Uno
75% stake of
impact
authorization to
SA and
both plants
assessment for realize the power
Andasol-2
companies to
the two power plants, Andasol
Central
ACS Cobra and
plants. (Junta de 1 (Vlex, 2006) Termosolar Dos
held the
Andalucia, 2005) and Andasol 2
SA were
remaining 25%.
and
(BOE, 2006).
created. They
(Solar
(BOE, 2006).
are the owners
Millennium,
of the two plants.
2008).
(Solar
Millennium,
2008).
ACS Cobra,
agreeing by
contract with
Solar
Millennium,
committed to
play a crucial
role in the
realization of the
Andasol plants.
(CESI, 2005).
Events and
activities
relating to
project
stakeholders
30.09.2004
Events and
activities
relating to
project
management
Milenio Solar
was set up by
Solar Millenium
to carry out the
development
and the
negotiations
required for the
power plant
realization.
(Solar
Millennium,
2007/2008).
Events and
activities
relating to
project
performance
Events and
activities
relating to
project
environment
Issued of the
Royal Decree that
set up special
scheme for the
electricity
produced by
renewable source.
The EU ratified
the Kyoto
Protocol.
Issued of the
Royal Decree
about the
regulation of the
CSP plant.
Issued of the
Royal Decree
about the
regulation of the
CSP plant.
76
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2
In 2005
Events and
activities
relating to
project
stakeholders
Sener
developed
the basic
engineerin
g (the
FEED) and
Events and
then the
activities
detailed
relating to
engineerin
project
g for the
management
plants.
Events and
activities
relating to
project
performance
Events and
activities
relating to
project
environment
30.01.2006 Spring 2006 31.05.2006
Jun-06
Declaration
End of
of public Procedure of
utility for compulsory
the plant expropriatio
Andasol 1.
n for
Andasol 1.
03.11.2006
Dec-06
Dec-06
Feb-07
26.05.2007
Dec-08
Mar-09
Jun-09
Declaration
End of
of public Procedure of
utility for compulsory
the plant expropriatio
Andasol 2.
n for
Andasol 2.
The
company
has signed
the
financing
contracts
with the
banks and
the EPC
contract
with the
principal
contractor
for
Andasol 1.
Jul-09
Sep-09
All the
stakes in
the plants
companies
of Solar
Millennium
were sold
to ACS
Cobra.
The
company
has signed
the
financing
contracts
with the
banks and
the EPC
contract
with the
principal
contractor
for Andasol
2. (Solar
Millennium,
2006/2007).
Start of the
construction
work of CSP
plant
Andasol 1
Start of the
construction
work of the
CSP plant
Andasol 2
Andasol 1
was
completed
It was
connected
to the grid
and it
began the
operation
start-up
Andasol 1, after
the operation
start-up and the
commissioning
phase, started
the commercial
operation
Andasol 2
was
completed
. It was
connected
to the grid
and it
began the
operation
start-up
Andasol 2, after
the operation
start-up
and the
commissioning
phase, started
the commercial
operation.
Issued of
the Royal
Decree
about the
regulation
of the CSP
plant.
77
MEGAPROJECT Bottom-line (including LNG regasification)
The development of these two megaprojects has many points in common.
• In the concept phase a company deals with the national government. Such companies aim to obtain all the authorizations necessary to
realize the project.
• Before obtaining all the authorisations the sponsor companies, that these two cases analysed, did not have enough financial resources,
agreed with other companies, willing to share the risks, to take part in the realization of the projects.
• The companies that manage and own the terminal and the sub-power plants were set up at the end of the bureaucratic procedures.
• These ad hoc-companies include as major shareholders the large companies that took part in the realization of the project and as minor
shareholders the sponsors which initiated the project. After their creation these new ad hoc-companies are able to face the large financial
effort having as shareholders these large companies and their financial resources.
The international situation, the laws enacted by the national governments and their political behaviour have been fundamental for the real
realization of the work for these two kind of mega projects in the energy sector.
78
2.2 ANHOLT OFFSHORE WIND FARM
Case compiled by: .Prof L-F Pau, Copenhagen Business School © DONG, L-F Pau, and References (2012)
Contact Details: [email protected]
Project Title
Anholt offshore Wind Farm
Location
Between Djursland and Island of Anholt
Purpose
Produce 4,5 % of Denmark's electrical power ( 400 MW or consumption of approx. 400 000
households)
Scope
DONG Energy had acquired the license for utilizing the wind power for 25 years and is to
construct and operate the offshore wind farm
Total Project Value
The total investment in preliminary investigations, design and construction of the offshore wind
farm as well as an operation centre amounts to DKK 10 billion (1, 32 Billion Euros) ; life cycle
costs for concession duration are about 2,3 Billion Euros
Project Status
Construction
Fixed price by DONG Energy
88 km2 area within a total area of 144 km2 ; wind farm approx. 20 km long and 5 km wide with
111 wind turbines; nearest wind turbine from Grenaa is 20 km away; seabed and wind
conditions (W-SW) determined the location; rotor diameters 120 m; sea depth 15-19 m
79
Comments
Internal
Supply-Side Client
Financiers
Sponsors
Client’s Owners
Anholt Offshore Wind Farm
DONG has received a 240 MEuro loan from Nordic Investment Bank, and additional
credits.
A consortium consisting of Pension Danmark and PKA has entered into an agreement
with DONG Energy on purchasing on 25/3/2011 50 per cent of Anholt Offshore Wind
Farm for approximately DKK 6 million. However, DONG Energy is still responsible for
the construction of the wind farm and in charge of the operation of the wind farm .
Pension Danmark and PKA will pay the purchase price in four installments beginning at
the end of 2011, with the last installment due at the end of 2013. The installments
represent 14, 30, 31 and 25 per cent respectively of the purchase price. DONG Energy
commits to constructing the Anholt offshore wind farm at a fixed price and by a fixed
date. On 1 April 2014, Pension Danmark and PKA will take over responsibility for
operation and earnings in proportion to their respective interests. Until that date,
production will primarily accrue to DONG Energy.
DONG Energy has signed a 15-year contract with Pension Danmark and PKA on
operation and planned maintenance of the farm.
Anholt Offshore Wind Farm sells power to end power customers, via a power grid
company, and power supply utilities (some of which are shareholders of DONG Energy)
Anholt Offshore Wind Farm is jointly owned by DONG Energy (50%), Pension Danmark
(30%) and PKA (20%). DONG Energy owners : Danish State (76,49 %), SEAS-NVE
Holding AS (10, 88 %), SYD Energi AS (6,95 %), Others (5,68 %)
side categories
(please specify)
Case-Study
80
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification (II)
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of
Internal
Demand Side Principal Contractor DONG Energy is responsible for the construction and operation of the
offshore wind farm.
First Tier
Contractors
Siemens Wind Power (Brande, Aalborg) (wind turbines) : 111 wind
turbines @ 3,6 MW ; rotor diameter 120 m
The Danish transmission system operator, Energinet.dk, is responsible
for establishing an offshore substation, the export cable to shore and the
connection to the main high-voltage power grid on land
MT Hoejgaard AS (Soeborg) for the foundations; NEXANS Deutschland
(Monchengladbach, DE) for array cables; Siemens AS ( Ballerup) for
electrical substation equipment
Second Tier
Consultants
A2SEA (Fredericia) Wind turbine installation vessels ; Ballast Nedam
Professional
Equipment services (Nieuwegein, NL) for foundation installation vessel;
Services Providers Visser & Smit Marine (Sliedrecht, NL) for installation of array cables ;
GEO (Kgs. Lyngby) for geotechnical investigations ; Hvide Sandes
Skibsbyggeri (Hvide Sande) for two service vessels
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
Category
Case-Study
The intense installation period will involve
employees with very different qualifications. This
DONG Energy has chosen to use the Port of Grenaa
includes trained workmen and electricians,
during the construction phase but also for the following
maintenance of the offshore wind farm. Once the Anholt engineers, vessel crews, divers, QHSE
Offshore Wind Farm is in operation, the wind farm will be employees who all have to ensure efficient and
monitored, serviced and maintained from the base in the safe installation of the wind farm, but also
employees will be needed for servicing of the
Port of Grenaa where DONG Energy will set up an
installation activities
operations organization with about 50 people.
81
Case-Study
Comments
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Energistyrelsen (Energy regulator),
Miljoestyrelsen (Environmental regulator),
European Commission
Local Government
Norddjurs Municipality, Grenaa harbour : 1) DONG bought old
Customs house April 2011 as project office; 2) rebuild of two cold
stores into support building built before April 2012 by Aalsrode
Toemrerfirma
National Government
Danish Government
Other internal supplyside categories ( please
specify)
Category
Extensive experience with prior wind farms
High attention to wind energy
Case-study
82
Stakeholder
Category
External
Case-Study
Comments
Anholt island: a new sea cable will link the wind farm to the island and an replace the diesel
generated power supplying the island now
Local Landowners
Danish State (national seawaters)
Environmentalists
DONG Energy has asked external special advisers from the National Environmental Research
Institute and the international consulting and research organization DHI to carry out surveys of
both the spring and autumn migration in 2011 before commencing the construction of the offshore
wind farm.
In general, the surveys will be identical to the EIA surveys of migrating birds made in 2009 and will
include bird observations by means of radar on both Djursland and the island of Anholt, visual
observations and surveys from airplane.
Conservationists
Climate partnerships: A number of DONG Energy's climate partners contribute to the construction
of Anholt Offshore Wind Farm. Each partner contributes to the project by pledging to buy
renewable energy produced by the offshore wind farm. The basic idea behind a climate
partnership is that DONG Energy helps companies or organisations to make energy savings. Part
of the financial gain is then used for expediting a new renewable energy project in Denmark by
pledging to buy parts of the power production generated by a renewable energy plant.
Archaeologists
No relevant involvement
Other External
Private stakeholders
(please specify)
Category
Case study
Network of support to SME‘s (orders received by those 100 MDKK) : DJURS
Wind Power: was established based on a local initiative shortly after the
Folketing decided to construct the wind farm, and as overall player DONG Energy
has contributed to supporting the network between DJURS Wind Power and the
suppliers during the entire process. Today, DJURS Wind Power offers support to
all players through one common point of contact to all the member companies in
the network.
83
Parlament
Fishermen’
s assn
European
Commissio
n
Miljoestyre
lsen
MEGAPROJECT
Stakeholder
Relationship
Maps
Danish
Nature
agency
Energistyr
elsen
DONG
Energy
Siemens
Wind
Power
MT
Hoejgaard
Pension
Danmark
Anholt
island
Profession
al services
(boats, etc)
Nexans DE
ANHOLT
Offshore
Wind Farm
Grenaa
Harbour,
Norddjurs
Energinet.
dk
Key:
PKA
GrenaaAnholdt
Ferry
DJURS
Wind
Power
Climate
partnershi
ps
Local support
and
maintenance
services
Power
utilities
(SEAS, etc)
Name
of Actor
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
- Project Actor
- Project relationship
with a contractual basis
- Non-contractual project
relationship
Power
consumer
84
External
Stakeholder
Grenaa-Anholt
ferry (244 PAX)
Anholt Offshore Wind Farm is
constructed right between
Grenaa and the island of
Anholt. So far, the Anholt ferry
has used a direct route
between Grenaa and the island
of Anholt; however, for safety
reasons, it will be necessary to
redirect the ferry route south of
the wind farm.
Danish
Fishermen‘s
Association
Impact of Project on External
Stakeholder
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
construction,
operation,
dismantling)
Raised concerns in 2009
In order for the ferry to continue operating
according to schedule, it has been necessary to
increase speed and thus use extra fuel. An
agreement has been signed with the ferry
company Grenaa-Anholt Færgefart to
compensate for the extra fuel costs which the
construction of Anholt Offshore Wind Farm has
inflicted on the ferry company.
The agreement will be effective during the entire
lifetime of the wind farm, and compensation will
be paid annually. This ensures that travelers
can get to Anholt as usual.
Operation
DONG Energy has signed an agreement with
the Danish Fishermen's Association on
compensation for loss of earnings from fishing
in connection with the construction of Anholt
Offshore Wind Farm. The working area will be
cordoned off for unauthorized persons during
the construction, and there will be no fishing in
the area.
Construction, Operation,
Dismantling
On completion of the wind farm in 2013, net
fishing will be resumed, whereas trawling will
still be prohibited in the area. The agreement on
compensation will be effective during the entire
lifetime of the wind farm.
85
External
Stakeholder
External
Stakeholder’s
Influence on
project
Danish Nature
Agency
The geotechnical surveys
performed in connection with the
environmental impact
assessments pointed to the
presence 5000 stones (up to 30
tons) on the seabed. DONG
Energy's subsequent detailed
seabed surveys have documented
a considerable number of large
stones in large parts of the
seabed. Stones which have to be
removed for construction technical
reasons before commencing the
construction of the offshore wind
farm.
Danish Nature Agency has approved
in 2011 the plans for establishing
approximately 28 artificial reefs within
the 88km2 wind farm area. The
artificial reefs are placed where they
will create no nuisance for the
construction process.
Vestas and DONG Energy have
entered into cooperation on testing of
Vistas' new
V164-7.0 MW offshore wind turbine
at DONG Energy's demonstration
site in the
waters off Frederikshavn. Vestas will
be supplying a V164-7.0 MW turbine,
which
is a dedicated offshore wind turbine
designed specifically for the harsh
conditions at sea
Several 400 kg sea mines were
detected in the area and had to be
exploded by Navy Seals in 2010
Initiation, Construction
The stones will be re-laid, creating
various cavitation structures resulting
in a biological gain. The wind farm
will thus contribute to ensuring
optimum breeding and living
conditions for animals and plants
specially attached to reefs (hard soil
flora and fauna).
Vestas AS
Danish Marine
Phase of Project of Greatest
Interest
(initiation, planning, construction,
Problem solving
Future: Wind turbine evolution
Initiation
86
Structure
Anholt Offshore Wind farm : a Board ( 7 members), 5 coordinators and a secretariat
and Structure
DONG Project manager Claus Bøjle Møller ; approx. 60 people for operational tasks ; 5 persons
involved in HR, PR and liaison at headquarters
Involvement
Each of the 23 main sub-contractors have own project management; total employed staff 1000 persons;
permanent difficulties in recruiting some expert skills
□
X
X
□
□
Team Building Tools
□
X
□
X
Hydrographics, Seabed mapping, Geotechnical probing and analysis, Aerodynamics coupled to weather models, Fish migration
tools, Bird migration models , 3D Visualisation tools (landscape, buildings) , Competence build up workshops, etc.
87
Project Processes
Normal best practices, subject to inspections and random checks by Energistyrelsen
Environmental impact processes
-An environmental management system; including e.g., minimization of the risk of chemical and oil spills, will be
implemented in the construction and operation phases. Measures which are not directly connected to the wind
farm include e.g., devices for scaring sea mammals away during pile driving of the foundation piles and marking
of the working area in order to minimize the risk of ship collisions during the construction phase.
-The Danish transmission system operator, Energinet.dk, was assigned the responsibility of carrying out the
preliminary studies and preparing the EIA for the project. The EIA comprises the offshore wind farm including
array cables up to the substation connection. The statement must address: pile driving and noise affecting fish,
forceful fish migration effects, bird habitat, disturbances of seabed, visual impact, bird collisions
The complete statement and related technical background reports can be obtained from Energinet.dk or can be
downloaded from the Danish Energy Agency‘s website at www.ens.dk
Centralized expert skills HR management at DONG , Siemens Wind Power and NEXANS
Processes
As the pre-qualification databases Sellihca/Achilles (which is pre-notified in TED on a yearly basis by Achilles)
will often be used for procurements in the Anholt project. DONG Energy encourages potential suppliers to
register in this pre-qualification database. When using the pre-qualification database there will normally be no
call for tenders via TED. Because of DONG Energy's ownership, we have the opportunity to waive the
obligation to call for tenders by procuring via SKI-contracts
Not present , except at Siemens Wind Power
Not present
Very detailed time management by a coordinated systems across partners (smart business network)
Decentralized to each partner , all working on fixed price
Central with DONG Energy, decentralized by each main sub-contractor
Processes
DONG Energy , unless news vetted by it and distributed by partners
88
Original Targets and changes to
targets
Anholt to be commissioned by the end of 2013
(concession granted Summer 2010) ―an unofficial
world record from starting to plan to installing
monopiles‖, The Danish developer sees Anholt as
a test of how far it has got in terms of applying its
growing know-how in offshore projects and
streamlining installation, given the tight time frame
set out in its concession from the Danish
government
Monopiles are already being installed by Ballast Nedam‘s Svanen and the
transition pieces by the heavy-lift vessel Jumbo Javelin since Feb 2012 (1st
monopile put in 31/12/2011 18 months after formal concession) . A2SEA‘s
Sea Power will install the Siemens 3.6MW turbines for four to five months
from September 2012 , and Sea Worker will install turbines from December
2012 for four months. A2SEA‘s flagship Sea Installer, currently being
commissioned in China, will arrive at the site at the beginning of February
2013 — when Sea Power has carried out about 50 installations — and work
there for a further two months.
Fixed cost
1) An analysis of April 2011 prepared by the auditing and consultancy
company Deloitte on behalf of the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy
indicates the possibility of reducing prices for the construction and operation
of future offshore wind farms.
The analysis also concludes that the high transfer price for the construction of
Anholt Offshore Wind Farm is caused by the fact that the tender conditions
did not offer the tenderers sufficient flexibility. An example of this is the short
time frame and the strict penalties.
In addition, the invitation to tender coincided with a period in which the
production of wind turbines and foundations could not keep up with the
increasing demand for offshore wind farms, primarily from Germany and the
United Kingdom.
2) Main sub-contractor MT Hoejgaard (Civil engineering Div.) has in 2011
incurred big losses and high volume growth, with future related risks on
project and itself; same for AH Industries (wind mill towers and nacelles)
achieving specification
The wind farm site has areas with very difficult
seabed conditions, which at best will entail extra
installation costs, but it could also mean that some
of the proposed wind turbine locations have to be
abandoned
89
Stakeholder or Stakeholder
Grouping
Original Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these
Aims
Energitnet.dk (Power grid)
Power grid elements to be financed and installed by this party. The transformer
platform will increase voltage from 33 to 220 kV for transporting the alternating
current power 25 kilometers (16 mi) to land through a single 3-conductor cable
(diameter 26 cm/10 in) and a further 56 km (35 mi) to Trige (near Aarhus) where a
400 kV main power hub can distribute the power
Parlament and DONG Board
The governance scandal which emerged in March 2012 around ex-CEO Anders
Eldrup (dismissed) may eventually affect the project, as he wanted to double wind
farm investments and change the business model ; future projects may be more
affected than this one though as large pension fund ATP withdraws for now its
commitments
90
As a utilities company DONG Energy must abide by the Utilities Directive: ―Directive 2004/17/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors‖ in its procurement.
DONG Energy will procure within established framework agreements. If no relevant framework agreement
exists for a specific purchase, DONG Energy will procure by Contract Notices published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities (TED). DONG Energy also publishes its Contract Award Notices in
TED
-During construction of the offshore wind farm, considerations will be made to the potential adverse
environmental impacts identified in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in order to minimize these
as much as possible within the technical, financial and time-related framework of the project. This also
applies to the planning of activities in the construction phase
-As of 1 November 2011, the naval authorities have formally approved the area around Anholt Offshore
Wind Farm to be a 'restricted area at sea'. This means that as of 1 November 2011, navigation, anchoring,
fishing, diving and works at the seabed, which are not related to the construction of the wind farm, are
prohibited. All mariners have been notified of the restriction area through 'Efterretninger for Søfarende'
(Notice to mariners), EfS 40/1100 2011
Danish government has set a goal of 30% renewable energy in 2020
In February 2008, the Danish government and a number of the parties of the Folketinget reached consensus
on the Danish energy policy for the period of 2008-2011. As a consequence of the energy political agreement
and the following ‘Offshore wind farm action plan 2008‘, the parties behind the energy agreement decided
that an offshore wind farm should be erected in the waters between the island of Anholt and Djursland.
91
Economic Project
Environment
-DONG Energy is ensured a fixed payment of 105.1 ore/kWh (without price adjustments) for the first
20TWh (20,000,000,000kWh), which corresponds to approx. 12 years – depending on the wind. After
that period, the generated power is sold on market terms without any subsidies. As part of the tender
conditions, the wind farm must supply the first power by the end of 2012, and the complete wind farm
must be in operation by the end of 2013. Non-compliance of these dates is subject to penalties which
may amount to DKK 1 billion in total.
-Therefore, the entire wind firm must be in operation within three and a half years at the latest from
award of the license and consent to carry out preliminary investigations in the wind farm area.
-DONG Energy bears all economic risks in connection with the construction and operation of the
offshore wind farm, e.g. the price of wind turbines and foundations, uncertainty about the bearing
capacity of the seabed, and adverse weather conditions, which makes the work in the area difficult.
Furthermore, the actual wind conditions in the period are naturally uncertain.
-Third party assessment : In connection with the award of license to DONG Energy, Ernst & Young
prepared a third party assessment on behalf of the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy of DONG
Energy's tender price of DKK 105.1 ore/kWh. The assessment concluded: "We conclude that a fair
tender price for the first 20TWh is within the following interval: Anholt Offshore Wind Farm 99.3118.4ore/kWh , The analysis shows that DONG Energy's tender price of 105.1ore/kWh for the first
20TWh is considered a fair market price given the present market situation and tender conditions.―
-The Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy invited tenders for Anholt Offshore Wind Farm on 30 April
2009, and on 2 July 2010, the Danish Energy Agency announced that DONG Energy had been
awarded the license for construction and operation of the Anholt Offshore Wind Farm
-The Danish Energy Agency 28/11/2011 approved Pension Danmark and PKA as partners in the
concession agreement on construction and operation of the Anholt Offshore Wind Farm agreed in 2010
between DONG Energy and the Danish Energy Agency.
92
TIME
Feb 2008 Dec 2009
Dec 2010
June 2010:
award of
construction
project to DONG
relating to project
stakeholders
Dec 2011
March 2011:
PKA and
PensionDK
investments
relating to project
management
Geotechnical,
environmental
works
relating to project
performance
relating to project
environment
Consensus
in
Parlament
on energy
policy
Start
construction
works
Dec 2012 Dec 2013
First
commercial
power
March 2012: The stone
fisher vessels have almost
relocated the approximately
5,000 stones, which were
blocking the 111 wind
turbine positions and the
cable routes. The
relocation of the stones has
resulted in the
establishment of 30 new,
artificial reefs – all located
inside the wind farm area.
Furthermore, the laying of
stone pillows at a total of
42 wind turbine positions is
expected to be completed
at the beginning of March
2012. The stone pillow
prevents erosion around
the foundation pile and
must be laid before driving
the monopile into the
seabed.
End
construction
Entire wind
farm must be
commissioned
by the
end of 2013.
Otherwise
delays will
result in a
reduced tariff
income and a
penalty if all
turbines are not
connected to
the grid by 31
December
2013 at
the latest.
93
ADDITIONAL DATA SOURCES
•
http://www.dongenergy.com/anholt/EN/Pages/index.aspx
•
http://www.windandwater.dk/3-references.html
•
http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/wind/article299960.ece?WT.mc_id=rechargenews_rss
•
http://www.ens.dk/da- DK / UndergrundOgForsyning/
VedvarendeEnergi/Vindkraft/Havvindmoeller/Aktuelle_havmoelleprojekter/Udbudaf400MWmellemDjurslandogAnholt/Sider/Forside.
asp
•
Environmental assessment reports prior to concession : http://www.ens.dk/daDK/UndergrundOgForsyning/VedvarendeEnergi/Vindkraft/Havvindmoeller/Miljoepaavirkninger/Miljoeundersøgelser%20for%20spe
cifikke%20projekter/Sider/Forside.aspx
•
http://www.business.dk/green/dong-skandale-kan-skade-vindeventyr
•
Aarsrapport 2011, MT Hoejgaard
94
REFERENCES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
"Djursland Anholt"4C Offshore Limited. http://www.4coffshore.com/windfarms/djursland-anholt-denmark-dk13.html. Retrieved 2010-06-23.
Siemens - Offshore wind power projects
Anholt offshore wind farm (in Danish) Danish Energy Agency Accessed: 27 November 2010.
Backwell, Ben (May 1, 2009). "Denmark launches Anholt offshore wind farm tender"
http://www.rechargenews.com/business_area/finance/article177404.ece. Retrieved 2010-06-23.
"Anholt - tender of 400MW" Danish Energy Agency. http://www.ens.dk/en-US/supply/Renewable-energy/WindPower/offshore-WindPower/anholt_tender/Sider/Forside.aspx Retrieved 2010-06-23.
Bjartnes, Anders (June 22, 2010). "Dong gets green light for 400MW Anholt despite high prices"
http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/wind/article218455.ece. Retrieved 2010-06-23.
van Loon, Jeremy (June 22, 2010). "Siemens Wins 111 Offshore Wind-Turbine Order in Denmark From Dong Energy" Bloomberg L.P.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-22/siemens-wins-111-offshore-wind-turbine-order-in-denmark-from-dong-energy.html. Retrieved
2010-06-23.
Hanne, Windemuller. Anholt Offshore Wind Farm will be the largest in Denmark Danish Energy Agency, 2 July 2010. Accessed: 27
November 2010.
Kvarts, Thomas. About the seacable (in Danish) Energinet.dk. Accessed: 27 November 2010.
Kvarts, Thomas. About the landcable (in Danish) Energinet.dk. Accessed: 27 November 2010.
Damgaard, Poul. About the transformator platform (in Danish) Energinet.dk, 20 August 2010. Retrieved: 24 October 2010.
Gaardestrup, Rikke Bille. Connection of offshore wind farm Anholt Energinet.dk 30 November 2009. Retrieved: 24 October 2010.
"PensionDanmark and PKA to become co-owners of Denmark's largest offshore wind« . DONG Energy. 28 March 2011.
http://www.dongenergy.com/anholt/EN/News/anholt_nyheder/News/Pages/PensionDanmarkandPKAtobecomecoownersofDenmark%27slargestoffshorewindfarm.aspx. Retrieved 2011-03-30.
Pedersen, Lars Dalsgård. DONG sells half of Anholt wind farm. Energy Supply, 28 March 2011. Accessed: 10 December 2011.
Anholt Offshore Wind Farm Newsletter, January 2012. DONG Energy. January 2012.
http://www.dongenergy.com/anholt/EN/News/anholt_nyheder/News/Pages/AnholtOffshoreWindFarm-Newsletter-January2012.aspx.
Retrieved 16 January 2012.
"Today we start construction of Anholt Offshore Wind Farm(Press release) ". DONG Energy. 13 January 2012.
http://www.dongenergy.com/EN/Media/Newsroom/News/Pages/Today-westartconstructionofAnholtOffshoreWindFarm.aspx. Retrieved 16
January 2012.
Retrieved from "http://mediawiki.dp.teoma.com/wiki/Anholt_Offshore_Wind_Farm"
95
2.3 FLAMMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Project Title
FLAMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (FL3)
Location
Flamanville, Cotentin Peninsula
- Manche, France
Purpose
To build the First EPR Reactor in France. To incorporate the Lessons Learnt from the other EPR
(Olkiluoto 3) and demonstrate the constructability of this reactor
Scope
To build the EPR reactor, the ancillary services and connect it to the electrical grid
EDF is owner and Architect Engineer. It award contracts to other partner (Areva, Alstom, Bouygues…)
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
1650 MWe – 4500 MWth. When the project reaches its peak, more than 3000 employees will be working
on the site - 15 000 000 hours
96
FLAMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Nuclear Island
Conventional Island
97
FLAMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
98
Supply-Side
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
Client
EDF (Électricité de France) 87.5% - Enel 12.5%
Financiers
Flamanville 3 is being financed from the corporate resources of the
EDF and ENEL.
Demand Side Principal
Contractor
EDF is owner and Architectural engineer:
 Managing the project (quality, schedule, costs, risks, interfaces…)
 Fronting the French Nuclear Safety Authority (Responsible of the
Nuclear License)
 Deciding how contracts are to be shared out, placing and then
managing them
 Defining technical reference of the plant (general specifications
for equipment, for buildings, for the general operation…)
 Optimizing the ownership cost by including feedback from French
nuclear fleet in the design and operation
 Controlling suppliers‘ detailed studies and equipment
manufacturing quality
 Controlling on-site construction and commissioning tests
Internal
First Tier
Contractors
Comments
Alstom
Turbine Island
It is a large French multinational conglomerate. The company has
been awarded of a contract of 350 million Euros for all engineering,
procurement, construction and commissioning of the complete
turbine island
First time on EPR,
Experience in the
previous nuclear
program
BOUYGUES
Civil Work
French construction company is. In April 2006, Bouygues acquired
the French government‘s 21% stake in Alstom. At 30 June 2011,
Bouygues owned 30.74% of Alstom. (Bouygues, 2011).
Second time on
EPR, No Experience
in the previous
nuclear program
99
Stakeholder
Category
Internal
Demand Side
First Tier
Contractors
Second Tier
Consultants
Areva
Case-Study
Comments
Nuclear Island
AREVA SA is a French industrial group owned for more than 90%
by the French State (including the shares owned by the CEA). It is
divided into three main divisions which cover all the aspects of
generating electricity with nuclear technology. Areva NP is one of
these divisions.
AREVA NP: Is the architect engineering, reactors vendor and main
contractor for the nuclear island.
Second time on
EPR, Experience
in the previous
nuclear program
Contract management for Flamanville 3
1. 150 main contracts
2. The 20 biggest lots represent about 80 % of the construction
budget
3. Contracts for both equipment supply and erection on site
4. Competition for all the lots except for NSSS
5. At the end of 2009, more than 95 % of contracts were signed
100
Stakeholder
Category
External
Public Regulatory
Agencies
Local Government
ASN
(Autorité de
Sûreté
Nucléaire)
Case Study
Comments
ASN (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire) is the French authority responsible for
ensuring nuclear safety and radiation protection, in order to protect workers,
the public and the environment from risks associated with nuclear activities.
It has a long experience in managing the
operations but 15 years has passed
since it supervised the last construction
The Local Government has been involved mainly in the ―debat publique‖
National
Government
The government controls directly the Authority (ASN), the buyer/utility (EDF), and the most
important contractor (AREVA). It owns the CEA and the 85% of EDF shares. Moreover,
many other important contractors are French, among them: Alstom and Bouygues. France,
as stated by President Sarkozy, aims at becoming a leading exporter of atomic energy.
(The World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in France, 2011)
Environmentalist
Greenpeace and other environmental group fight against this project. They tried several
times to stop the project. In the 2011 EDF was fined 1.5 million euros (£1.3mn) for hiring a
private agency run by a former member of the French secret services to hack the
computers of the former head of campaigns for Greenpeace France, Yannick Jadot, in
2006. (The Telegraph, 2011)
The French Government is the entity
who owned the two most important
players (CEA and EDF) and it was the
one who decided to start with the nuclear
program since 1973.
101
Stakeholder Relationship Maps
FRENCH
STATE
Owns
Control
Owns
ANS
(autority)
Regulates
EDF
(Owner 87,5%, Architect
Engineering)
CEA
Owns
Owns
+
Contract
Contract
ENEL
(Owner 12,5%)
Owns
Owns
Flamanville 3
Project
AREVA SA
Owns
AREVA NP
(Nuclear Island)
ALSTOM
(Conventional
Island)
Owns
30%
BOUYGUES
(Civil Works)
102
Budget management
103
External
Stakeholder
Attitude to
this Project
Regulatory
Agencies
Independent
ASN gives its technical option on the acceptability of any civil nuclear installation. The
basic regulatory functions ascribed to it are: Licensing (assesses the licensing
application and make a decision in terms of technical acceptability), Inspecting
(likewise in other countries the regulatory body has the full power to inspect the
nuclear site, the manufacturing facilities or any other relevant site even without
notification), Regulating and Enforcing actions (using the license as vehicle, e.g.
suspension of license, or emitting civil sanctions.
Local
Government
Supportive
High. The local governments have the following powers: first they give their opinion
when a nuclear site is selected close to them. Second they are involved into the public
inquiry as stakeholder (the public inquiry complains all ―department‖ that are
overlapped by the circle area centered on the nuclear sit and having radios equal to
five kilometres plus every ―communes‖ included into the ―department‖ ). Furthermore a
person appointed by every local governments (―department‖ and ―communes‖) is
appointed to the local information committee (having the function of disseminate
information in the vicinity of the site).Every minor authorization concerning the local
government decision-making (for example during the licensing process) pass through
the local information committee.
Impact
High, ANS exist
beside the project
since it has to
control the other
French reactors
Medium. The FL3
project receive a
lot of attention
from the media
and this create a
pressure on the
politics
104
External
Stakeholder
External Stakeholder’s Influence on
project
National
Government
Supportive
Very High. Owns the major stakeholders
Medium. The FL3 project receive a lot of
attention from the media and this create a
pressure on the politics
Local Resident
Supportive
Medium/Low. They receive a lot of money
and incentives to accept the project
Medium. It create job positions and provides
founds to the local community. There are not
direct externalities on the local
Environmentalists
Against
Low. Beside some advertising campaign
and demonstrative actions there is not
more that they can do
Medium. To stop the construction of nuclear
reactors is one of the big ultimate goal of
many environmentalists like Greenpeace
Impact of Project on External Stakeholder
105
EDF started in 2006 to build the reactor at
Flamanville. Fl3 was expected to be connected in
2012. In July 2011 the new official forecast se
commercial operations in 2016 (EDF, 2011)
The project is 4 years behind schedule
Fl3 was expected to cost approx. 3.3 billion Euro
(2005) In July 2012 the new official forecasts are:
6 billion euros,
There is 2.7 billion of Euro of extra cost (81% of
project value)
Performance related to achieving
specification
The authority reported several time that the
quality was below what is required in the nuclear
industry
106
Stakeholder or
AREVA / EDF
There were 3 main aims for this project
a)
a)
b)
c)
To show that the EPR, after the bad experience in Olkiluoto
(OL3), can be built at a lower cost and the lessons from OL3
have been learned
To learn other lessons for the other EPR project
To provide a New reactor to substitute the aging French
Reactors
b)
c)
It seems that only few lessons
from OL3 have been implemented
in this project
The performance in the Chinese
reactors seems to confirm that
some lessons have been learned
This reactor will substitute the
aging French Reactors
Environmental group/
Greenpeace
To disturb the construction and possibly to stop the project
Some disturb actions but the project is
still going and the majority of the
population support it
Bouygues
To apply the lessons from OL3 and to gain experience
It seems going according to the plan
Alstom
To enter the EPR project delivery chain, to gain experience
It seems going according to the plan
107
Project Environment
and Europe wide)
The legal and regulatory framework is characterized to be "prescriptive based", shared into many legal fonts. As
result the framework is mostly rigid and complex. The highest level of prescriptiveness and complexity is reached
at regulatory level. A peculiar feature of the legal system is the division between three main quasi-independent
legal bodies associated to three typologies of nuclear installation: Basic Nuclear Installation (FL3 belongs to this
category), Installations classified for environmental protection purposes and Defence related installation.
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
The regulatory functions applied to all French Reactors are characterized to be highly crafted on a specific family
of reactors (N4). Since the French reactor standard has been replicated over decades the specific licensing
decision-making safety criteria were standardized on the same reactor. These criteria mostly complain with
deterministic safety criteria (indeed also the probabilistic one has being also crafted on the specific reactor
design).
The changing of reactor standard has posed a regulatory and licensing challenge to the regulatory body because
of the lack of practice in assessing different reactor technologies (differently to other oversee regulatory
institutions). At the same time, the developing organizations were not sufficiently experienced with this new
reactor design. Finally the linkage between oversee regulatory bodies (WENRA Western European Nuclear
Regulators' Association) contributed to the discover some safety weakness affecting the EPR (for example the
lack in separating the control system with respect the safety one is in conflict with the defence in depth concept:
this problem were also reported by the Finnish regulatory body and British one, respectively STUK and HSE).
The political environment was highly supportive. The French president N. Sarkozy is one of the most
important supporters of this project.
The Fukushima accident pointed out several lessons for the nuclear Industry. Among the other EDF may
study the development of mobile diesel generator back up units that could be moved to reactors where
power systems and back-up generators have failed
108
Economic Project
Environment
The nuclear profitability is undermined by the steady low cost of natural gas (the main competitor with the CCGT
plants) and the high cost of the commodities.
Specific Economic
Events impacting on
the project
109
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2006-2008
5/06
7/06
Events and
activities relating
to project
stakeholders
Events and
activities relating
to project
management
Events and
activities relating
to project
performance
EDF
decides to
proceed
with FL3
Site work
commenced.
Target
construction time
54 months,
construction cost
€3.3bn excluding
finance and fuel
1/07
4/07
NSSS
ordered
from
Areva NP
French
government
issues
construction
license
12/07
3/08
5/08
10/08
12/08
First
concrete
poured
ASN asks EDF to improve ASN requires EDF
ASN told
EDF
work in several areas
to stop concrete
Areva to
acknowledges
involving in particular
pouring on May 26
improve its
cost had
quality control and
(ban lifted June 17). oversight of
increased to
organization. Inspection
Problems ‗show
forgings after
€4bn due
had revealed several
insufficient
procedures
mainly to
problems in the civil
discipline on the
used by
inflation, and
construction work,
part of the licensee
Italian
technical &
including errors in
and insufficient
subcontractor
regulatory
installation of steel
project
Società della
changes.
reinforcing bar in the
organization‘.
Fucine were
Construction
concrete and
Welding anomalies found not to
schedule
"inconsistency" between
found in one of the
conform to
claimed still to
rebar blueprints and the
four bottom pieces
standards.
be achievable
concrete pouring plan.
of the steel liner of
organization for preparing
the containment
concrete pouring was
building
"insufficient,"
Events and
activities relating
to project
environment
110
01/10
07/10
relating to project
stakeholders
08/10
10/10
03/11
07/11
ASN asks EDF to modify
the architecture of the
non-safety
instrumentation and
control system
relating to project
management
relating to project
performance
relating to project
environment
Unions claim construction EDF confirms delay and
is at least 2 years behind announces expected costs
schedule
are €1.7bn over budget
Le Figaro reports a
further year delay
The new official forecasts
from EDF are: 6 billion
euros, about 90% over
budget, and commercial
operations in 2016
Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear
disaster
111
2.4 GREATER GABBARD OFFSHORE WIND FARM
Case compiled by: Naomi Brookes
Project Title
Greater Gabbard Wind Farm
Location
Off-shore of Suffolk, UK
Purpose
To produce electricity for the UK‘s National Grid from wind power
Scope
3,5
All off-shire power generation and on-shore substation with connections to the National Grid
Contractual
Framework2,3,4,5
Greater Gabbard Offshore Winds Ltd (GGOWL) is an equity joint venture (50% Scottish and Southern
Energy 50% RWE Innology). Fluor has a fixed price $1.8bn EPC contract for the Balance of Plant with
GGWOL. (N.B. The contractual framework has changed significantly during the lifetime of the project.)
Relevant Physical
Dimensions1,5
140 turbines, capacity of 500MW, expected output 1750 GWh/a, 23 km from land in a depth of water of 2.4 –
10m
112
Case-Study
stakeholders, skills, influence on
project)
Supply-Side
Client
Equity joint venture specifically
formed for this project
Greater Gabbard Offshore Winds Ltd (GGOWL)
Financiers
Sponsors
Client’s Owners
n/a
n/a
National Grid plc (through wholly owned subsidiary National Grid Energy Transmission plc) 17
At the start of the project: Airtricity & Fluor.
Currently: 50% Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) and 50% RWE npower Renewables
side categories
Off-shore Transmission
(please specify)
Owner (6,7)
Demand Side
(NB for this case
have details for
~100 contractors
and professional
service providers
only included a
sample here)
Principal Contractors
Case-Study
GET, (a consortium comprising Equitix, AMP Capital Investors and
Balfour Beatty Capital) £315M high voltage transmission link
OSTO Award
Organisations (6,7)
OFGEM (Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets) UK authority
established by Act of Parliament
Site-Owner
UK Crown Estates 9
Fluor is responsible for the EPC (engineer, procure and construct) of the Balance of Plant
(BOP)
Siemens providing 140 3.6MW turbines (awarded by?)
8
Highly formalised and global PM
processes and practices used
throughout the organisation
McNulty Offshore Construction of South Shields. McNulty will construct an offshore substation
to be housed within a platform 25km off the Suffolk coast, connecting to an onshore
substation at Sizewell (awarded by Siemens)
Subsea Protection Ltd. Concrete Fleximats (awarded by Fluor)
JDR Cables providing all underwater cabling (awarded by?)
Providers
Ramboll geotechnical surveying to GGWOL, METOC providing project control services to
SSE/GGWOL, KBR providing project management consultancy service to SSE
113
Public
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
Regulatory
Agencies
Off-shore
Transmission
Owner
Licence to
deposit
material on
seafloor
Local Government
Private
National
Government
Local residents
GET, (a consortium comprising Equitix, AMP Capital Investors and Balfour
Beatty Capital) £315M high voltage transmission link
DEFRA issues licence but confers with
Department for Transport (DfT), Ministry of Defence (MoD);
CEFAS for scientific advice on fisheries, benthos, sedimentary processes,
hydrodynamics and coastal processes;
English Nature (EN), Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) and Joint Nature
Conservation Committee (JNCC) for statutory advice on species and sites of
nature conservation importance e.g. Special Protection Areas SPA), Special
Areas of Conservation (SAC), (Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), Marine
Nature Reserves (MNR);
DEFRA Sea Fisheries Inspectorate;
Local Authority interests – for planning, amenity/leisure, environmental health;
Port Authorities;
The Crown Estate;
Environment Agency – for water quality, migratory fish, coastal processes;
Other interest groups and non-governmental organisations (NGO) e.g. National
Federation of Fishermen‘s Organisations, Royal Yachting Association etc.
N/A - offshore
UK Government
N/A - offshore
Local Landowners
N/A – offshore
Environmentalists
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth
Conservationists
None apparent - offshore
Archaeologists
N/A - offshore
Other External
Private
stakeholders
(please specify)
Category
Case-study
Private and non-human users of areas
English, Dutch and Belgian long beam fishing
trawlers, Commercial Shipping, Birds, Fish,
Marine Mammals
Favourable attitude to wind farms
Tourist Boards
Environmental Impact Assessment
produced by PSSC shows negligible or
even beneficiary effect on all of these
stakeholders
114
Numerous
external
stakeholders
OFGEM
Consults with
Scottish
and
Southern
Energy
RWE
Innology
Licences transmission
DEFRA
Owns 50%
Licences use of sea-bed
UK
Crown
Estates
Owns 50%
GGOWL
(client)
commissions
Leases the sea-bed
GET
Consortium
(OFTO)
Leases the sea-bed
Transfers on-going transmission rights
commissions
Supplies electricity to
Contracts with
National
Grid
Contracts with
SIEMENS
(turbine
provider)
Consultants,
(e.g. Technical
services, PR21 )
Contracts with
First tier
sub
contractors
Contracts with
2nd tier
sub
contractors
FLUOR
(EPC
Contractor)
Contracts with
Contracts with
Key:
First tier
sub
contractors
Name of
Actor
- Project Actor
Description of
relationship
- Project
Relationship
Contracts with
2nd tier
sub
contractors
115
to this Project
External Stakeholder’s Influence
on project
Stakeholder
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth
Highly Favourable 10, 12
Ability to Lobby Government
Organisations
Contributes to achieving their
overall aims
National Federation of
Fishermen‘s Organisations
Concerned about danger to
livelihood 11
Organisations specifically DEFRA in
response to application to deposit
items on sea-bed
Potentially substantively harmful
Tourism Boards
Worried about effects of tourism 12
General ability to lobby government
organisations
Slight
None identified
PSCC survey identifies this as
neutral or potentially beneficial
Marine Flora and Fauna
Royal Yachting Association
Concerned about navigational
safety and loss of cruising routes but
currently happy with levels of
consultation 13
General ability to Lobby Government
Organisations
Could lead to loss of some current
areas of recreational sailing
Natural England
Concerned about damage to habitats
but currently happy with levels of
consultations - 14
Organisations specifically DEFRA in
will consult with in connection with to
application to deposit items on seabed
Potentially makes it more difficult
for organisation to reach its
objectives of protecting England's
natural environments
Port Authorities
See this as a commercial opportunity
to provide industrial, technical and
logistical support - 15
Limited to on-shore facility support
Could provide areas of commercial
growth
116
Structure
and Structure
Complex picture of project team dispersed in Airtricity/SSE, RWE, Fluor and Siemens alongside
project management consultancies and changing throughout the lifecycle of the project. Plethora of
supply chain interactions.
Involvement
□
Stakeholder Involvement □
Team Building Tools □
□
□
SSE employs a ‗Large Capital Governance Framework‘ to insure that its projects are governed, developed , approved and executed in an effective manner. To
assist
in this, SSE has appointed KBR ( a leading EPC company) as a Project Management partner to help maintain the processes, systems and skills needed to
deliver large
capital projects 25
RWE is in the process of developing company wide approaches to project management systems and procedures
28
Fluor has well-established formal project management systems and procedures. These form part of the OSR ( operating system record) that prescribes all of the
Organisations‘ processes and practices in Fluor. The OSR dictates that everyone should develop operating systems implementation plans which need to get
signed off one of which looks at Project Management. OSRs get kept up-to-date by a subject manager who is responsible globally for their development. OSR are
available on-line and are an integral part of day-to-day operation against which people are audited.
Siemens has longstanding formal imitative in project management. In 2000, it introduced the PM@Siemens initiative and in 2009 had its project management
development programme accredited by the APM.
117
Project Processes
Airtricity/SSE considered that they had undertaken significant risk mitigation actions through:
•Detailed and extensive soil investigation
•Extensive site specific wind data
•Conservative array spacing to minimise array losses.
•Independent foundation design verification
•Early input from O&M group (particularly for access design)
•Use of proven technology backed up by service and warranty agreement.
They also considered that the joint development of the design with Fluor prior to contract award ensured that all subcontracts were fully transparent and the cost and value of wrap known and understood. They considered that the project
programme developed with adequate float (particularly vessels) and that the BOP wrap provided a hedge against key
large-scale offshore risks
Processes
See previous statement
Processes
Processes
118
specification
Original targets were for first power to be generated on
Q4 2009 ,42 turbines to be installed by Feb 2010 and a
further 98 by March 2011 which would also see the
completion of the project.
Oct 2010 – 30 turbines installed
Dec 2010 – 53 turbines installed
Oct 2011 – 115 turbines installed and 80% cables
installed
Changes:
Oct 2010 - completion estimated at the end of 2011
April 2011 – completion estimated in the summer of 2012
Oct 2011 – completion estimated at the end of 2012
First power achieved Dec 2010
Fixed price contract with Fluor for $1.8bn (April 2008)
Q4 2010 – Fluor make provisions for losses of £340M
500MW output with an average output of 1895 GWhs
Stakeholder
UK
Government
Greater Gabbard will contribute 5% of the UK's 2010 renewable energy target of 10%.
This target is raised to 20% by 2020 and 60% by 2050 22
Failure against 2010 target as not delivered on time. Unknown
success of future targets
Airtricity
To develop a portfolio of projects to make it an attractive acquisition target 23
Initial market capitalisation in 1997 was €625K sold for €2.2bn
to SSE and Eon in 2008.
RWE
Creating a diverse portfolio of energy generating resources 24
Should succeed as long as Gabbard meets generation targets
SSE
Creating an investment portfolio that delivers a significantly-enhanced asset base
(consistent with returns greater than the cost of capital), additional fuel for energy in the
form of renewables and additional cash flows and profits to support future dividend
growth. 25
Should succeed as long as Gabbard meets generation targets
Profit on contract
Earnings on contract considerably less than expected
Siemens
Fluor
119
Project Environment
and Europe wide)
The UK energy market is regulated by the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 26 and is responsible for the regulating monopolies in energy supply. It
also helps to secure UK‘s energy supplies by promoting competitive gas and electricity markets - and regulating them so that there is adequate investment in the
networks, and contributing to the drive to curb climate change and other work aimed at sustainable development.
Planning regulations for large projects deemed to be of national importance have been changed under the 2007 planning reform bill with a particular stance towards
easing the ability of nuclear and renewable power plant to get planning permission. The EU has no formal authority for spatial planning.
The European Commission Energy Directorate has an energy strategy "Energy 2020― which identifies the energy priorities for the period up to 2020, i.e. to reduce
energy consumption, implement the internal market, develop infrastructure, improve technology, protect consumers and reinforce the external dimension of energy
policy. These goals will be achieved through a series of legislative proposals.
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
impacting on the
project
Greater Gabbard Declared a Renewable Energy Zone (REZ) (The Renewable Energy Zone (Designation of Area) Order 2004, made under Section 84 of the Energy
Act 2004) in relation to the United Kingdom‘s rights under Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 for the economic exploitation and
exploration of its exclusive economic zone under the Convention for the Production of Energy from the Water, Currents and Winds (Article 56, UNCLOS).
In relation to consenting and related matters, the Energy Act has extended the Section 36 consenting regime under the Electricity Act 1989 to the REZ, enabled a
navigation extinguishment declaration to be made in relation to a Section 36 consent inside territorial waters, and provided a new regime for the declaration of safety
zones inside territorial waters and the REZ. Statutory Consents required for the proposed Greater Gabbard Offshore Wind Farm project are as follows
Section 36 Electricity Act 1989 (construction and operation of the wind turbines, offshore transformer stations and met masts;
granted by DTI)
Section 5 Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (installation of foundations of offshore structures, rock armouring, scour
protection etc; granted by DEFRA)
Section 34 Coast Protection Act 1949 (obstruction to navigation works; granted by DEFRA)
Section 36A Electricity Act 1989 (navigation extinguishment declaration; granted by DTI)
Section 95 Energy Act 2004 (Safety Zones; granted by DTI)
Section 57 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (planning permission for onshore sub-station and cables; granted by Suffolk
Coastal District Council)
Section 37 Electricity Act 1989 (overhead electric lines from sub-station to neighbouring existing 400 kV power line; granted by DTI)
Late 2000 recessions (beginning December 2007)
None identified
Growing interest in ‗green‘ politics as evidenced by the election of the UK‘s first Green MP in the 2010 election.
None Identified
120
TIME
2003
2004
2005
SITE IDENTIFICATION & DEVELOPMENT
2006
2007
2009
GGOWL signs
construction
agreement with
National Grid
GGOWL
created as a JV
by Fluor and
Airtricity
Crown Estates
awards site option
to GGOWL
17
2011
GGOWL
receives
generation
licence from
OFGEM
GGOWL granted
Section 36
planning
permission
GGOWL
signs
connection
agreement
with National
Grid 17
First Turbine
installed 19
Welding
SSE take
over
Airtricity
SSE
contracts with
Fluor for
$1.8bn to be
EPC for BOP
in return Fluor
sells SSE
50% GGWOL
for £40M
defects delay
monopile
installation20
SSE contracts
with Siemens
for turbines
SSE sell 50%
of GGWOL to
RWE for
£308M
EVENTS IN THE
ENVIRONMENT
2010
17
Crown Estates
open bidding for
Round 2 sites for
offshore wind
farms
2008
Passing of UK
Energy Act
enables creation of
REZ for Greater
Gabbard site
Bankruptcy of
Subocean,
the cablelaying
subcontractor
First Power
generated 19
Fluor make
$340M
reduction in
profits
provision due
to Greater
Gabbard
Fluor sues
GGWOL for
£300M over
monopile
quality 18
117 of 140
turbines
installed and
80% cables
installed 19
EU Directive gives
UK target to
generate 15% of
energy from
renewables
121
REFERENCES
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1- Case Study: European Offshore Wind Farms- A Survey to analyse Experiences and Lessons Learnt by Developers of Offshore Wind Farms from
www.offshore-power.net
2 - http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/310134/rwe-innogy/sites/wind-offshore/under-construction/the-proposal/
3 - http://www.fluor.com/projects/Pages/ProjectInfoPage.aspx?PrjID=64
4 - http://www.offshorewind.biz/2010/10/19/fluor-announces-that-cost-escalation-on-offshore-wind-project-will-impact-third-quarter-results-usa/
5- http://www.sse.com/GreaterGabbard/ProjectInformation/
6 - http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1805171/renewables-grid-competition-sparks-investor-gold-rush
7 - http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2074046/balfour-beatty-consortium-bags-gbp317m-gabbard-grid-link
8 - http://www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pr_cc/2007/09_sep/pg200709075_1463099.htm
9 - http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/energy/offshore-wind-energy/
10 - http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/media/press-releases/switch-on-for-uks-first-offshore-wind-farm
11- http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-humber-12354185
12 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/1261882.stm
13 - http://www.rya.org.uk/cruising/current-issues/Pages/Round3windzonesdevelopersstartscoping.aspx
14 - http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/about_us/news/2010/080110a.aspx
15 - http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/20715/comment-pna-ports-getting-ready-for-offshore-wind/
16 - GREATER GABBARD OFFSHORE WIND FARM NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY October 2005 published by PMSS
17 - Gabbard The World’s Largest Offshore Wind Farm In Construction. Presentation to IET Dublin -December 7th2010by Séamus Mc Cabe
18 - http://www.windpowermonthly.com/channel/environment/news/1096453/Greater-Gabbard-monopile-row-continues/
19 - http://www.4coffshore.com/windfarms/greater-gabbard-united-kingdom-uk05.html
20 - http://www.offshore247.com/news/art.aspx?Id=14850
21 - http://www.3gc.co.uk/communication.php?content_id=21044
22 - http://www.power-technology.com/projects/greatergabbardoffsho/
23 - http://www.businessandfinance.ie/index.jsp?p=643&n=329&a=2237
24 – http://www.theenergyevent.com/Energy11/uploads/1.Beckers.Volker.Insight.10.40.pdf
25 – SSE ANNUAL Report 2011
26 - http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/About%20us/Pages/AboutUsPage.aspx
27 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Late-2000s_recession
28 – Meeting held to discuss this in February 2011
29 – Presentation by Jim Smith Director Offshore Airtricity 2008
30 - http://www.s0larpower.net/subocean-goes-bankrupt-purchased-by-technip/
122
2.5 HINKLEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION
Case compiled by: Naomi Brookes
Project Title
Hinkley Point
Location
Somerset, United Kingdom
Purpose
To produce electricity for the UK‘s National Grid
Scope
Hincley Point C Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactors. All power generation and connections to the National Grid
Contractual Framework 1 2
Nuclear New Build Holding Company Limited an equity joint venture ( 20% Centrica 80% EDF) to
construct, operate and decommission 4 nuclear powerplants in the UK. EPCPM contract with AMEC.
Nuclear Steam Supply system to be provided by AREVA.
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
3200MWe
Status
In Planning to be completed 2020
123
HINKLEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION
124
Supply Side
Case-Study
Client
Nuclear New Build Holding Company Limited (NNBHC)
Equity joint venture specifically formed for this project
Financiers
n/a
Sponsors
Client’s Owners
n/a
National Grid plc (through wholly owned subsidiary
National Grid Energy Transmission plc) 17
80% EDF Energy
20% Centrica
side categories
other procurement
(please specify)
stakeholders
Demand Side
Principal Contractors
Case-Study
EDF Procurement, Paris
AMEC is responsible for the architectural engineering and
project management.
ARREVA is responsible for the provision of the nuclear
steam supply system.
Supply and Installation of BOP will be directly
procured by EDF Energy (60% cost)
Rolls-Royce is responsible for the turbine equipment 3
Kier & BAN Nuttall – earthwork construction services
Many still to be awarded
Providers
side categories
(please specify)
Case-Study
125
Public
Comments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders,
Regulatory Agencies
Office for Nuclear Regulation, (part of the Health and
Safety Executive)
Responsible under Nuclear Installation Act to provide a single site
licence for all activities relating to the site. Likely to become a
statutory corporation.
Design and Quality Standard Producers
(RCC & ASME)
French RCC – M/RCC-E
American - ASME Section 111
Infrastructure Planning Commission
Responsible for granting planning applications to strategic
infrastructure project as defined by the National Policy Statement
( will be changing very soon unde the new Localism Act)
Environment Agency
Involved in Generic design Assessment
OFGEM
Licences Energy producers
International Atomic Energy Authority
Set up a series of treaties and agreements to promote peaceful
use of nuclear energy
Local Government
Sedgemoor District Council, Somerset County Council
National Government Department of Energy and Climate Change
Office for Nuclear Development
Others
Private
Local residents
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Sedgemoor, Taunton Deane, West Somerset
Local Landowners
Local Business
Organisations
Environmentalists
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Other External
(please specify)
UK government department responsible for ‗smoothing the path‘
for nuclear development
A strategic Authority set up by UK Government to be responsible
for the disposal of all Nuclear Waste
Think it will have a positive impact on the area -4 ( House prices
will rise – 5, EDF energy community fund)
EDF spending money on mitigation for local landowners - 7
Somerset Chamber of Commerce
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Stop New Nuclear
Alliance 6
Severn Estuary Conservation group
n/a
Nuclear Industry Association
URENCO
Uranium fuel provider partially owned by UK Government
126
Environment
Agency
Office of
Nuclear
Regulation
Office for
Nuclear
Development
Assists in providing nuclear site licence
Provides nuclear site licence
EDF
Energy
Centrica
Provides planning consent
Owns 80%
Owns 20%
IPC
Licences transmission
OFGEM
NNBHC
(client)
Contracts with
Contracts with
Contracts with
Contracts with
ARREVA
Contracts with
AMEC
(EPC
PMContractor)
RollsRoyce
(turbine
provider)
First tier sub
contractors
(e.g. Kier)
Key:
Contracts with
Contracts with
2nd tier
sub
contractors
First tier
subcontra
ctors
First tier
subcontra
ctors
2nd tier
sub
contractors
National
Grid
Contracts with
2nd tier
sub
contractors
Name
of Actor
- Project Actor
Description of
relationship
- Project
Relationship
127
on project
Stakeholder
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth,
Stop Nuclear new Build Alliance
Highly Unfavourable
Organisations, civil disruption
Opposition to this type of project is
their raison d‘etre
Local residents and landowners
Concerned about risk but also
welcoming new jobs and potential
property boom
vote for local government and national
government
Potentially ( and v. remotely)
substantively harmful but in reality
may make significant improvement
to standards of living
Local Business Organisations ( e.g.
Somerset Chamber of Commerce
Very happy to see new business
opportunities but want to see
these available locally
(especially local )
if successful may increase growth
substantially
Nuclear Industry Association
Very favourable and supportive
None identified
PSCC survey identifies this as
neutral or potentially beneficial
URENCO
Happy for new business
General ability to Lobby Government
Organisations
More growth
Severn Estuary Conservation Group
worried about effect of
development on habitats
Organisations, civil disruption
could be beneficial if EDF provides
extra funding
128
Project Processes
See previous statement
Communications Management Processes
129
specification
Stakeholder
UK Government
Greater Gabbard will contribute 5% of the UK's 2010 renewable energy target of 10%. This target is
raised to 20% by 2020 and 60% by 2050 22
Failure against 2010 target as not delivered
on time. Unknown success of future targets
Airtricity
To develop a portfolio of projects to make it an attractive acquisition target 23
Initial market capitalisation in 1997 was
€625K sold for €2.2bn to SSE and Eon in
2008.
RWE
Creating a diverse portfolio of energy generating resources 24
Should succeed as long as Gabbard meets
generation targets
SSE
Creating an investment portfolio that delivers a significantly-enhanced asset base (consistent with
returns greater than the cost of capital), additional fuel for energy in the form of renewables and
additional cash flows and profits to support future dividend growth. 25
Should succeed as long as Gabbard meets
generation targets
Profit on contract
Earnings on contract considerably less than
expected
Siemens
Fluor
130
Project Environment
(regionally, nationally and
Europe wide)
The UK energy market is regulated by the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 26 and is responsible for the regulating
monopolies in energy supply. It also helps to secure UK‘s energy supplies by promoting competitive gas and electricity markets - and
regulating them so that there is adequate investment in the networks, and contributing to the drive to curb climate change and other work
aimed at sustainable development.
Planning regulations for large projects deemed to be of national importance have been changed under the 2007 planning reform bill with a
particular stance towards easing the ability of nuclear and renewable power plant to get planning permission. The EU has no formal
authority for spatial planning.
The European Commission Energy Directorate has an energy strategy "Energy 2020― which identifies the energy priorities for the period
up to 2020, i.e. to reduce energy consumption, implement the internal market, develop infrastructure, improve technology, protect
consumers and reinforce the external dimension of energy policy. These goals will be achieved through a series of legislative proposals.
All nuclear energy programmes take place under the auspices of the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy
Authority
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events impacting
on the project
Planning Act 2008 and Localism Act 2011
Energy Act 2008
Climate Change Act 2008
Nuclear Installation Act 1965
Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999
Nuclear Generating Stations ( Security) Regulations 1996
Radioactive Material(Road Transport Act) 1991
Radioactive Substances Act 1993
Late 2000 recessions (beginning December 2007)
Financial Collapse of British Energy in 2002
Growing interest in carbon emission reductions. EU Emissions Trading Schemes. Power plant reaching the end of its life in
the UK. Nuclear disasters ( Chernobyl, Fukushima)
2006 reversal in previous anti-nuclear energy policy by Labour government.
131
TIME
2004
2005
2006
2007
EVENTS IN THE
ENVIRONMENT
2003
2008
2009
British Energy
EDF
Owned Sites
successfully
selected by UK
acquires for
Government as British Energy
suitable for more for £12.5 bn
development
2010
EDF sells
20% of BE to
Centrica to
form NNB
2011
NNB applies
for
site licence
from HSE
at Hinkley
EDF awards
EPCPM
contract to
AMEC
Government
reverses its
viewpoint on
nuclear power
Introduction of
new planning act
132
REFERENCES
•
1 - http://www.edfenergy.com/about-us/about-edf-energy/our-structure/
•
2 - http://www.edfenergy.com/media-centre/press-news/AMEC-awarded-11-year-contract-with-EDF-for-new-UK-nuclear-powerstations.shtml
•
•
3 - http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1517/french-and-british-to-seal-nuclear-power-deal
4 - http://www.british-energy.com/article.php?article=418
•
5 - http://www.thisissomerset.co.uk/Hinkley-Point-staff-influx-Somerset-residents/story-14304950-detail/story.html
•
6 - http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/03/hinkley-point-protest-nuclear-power
•
7 - http://hinkleypoint.edfenergyconsultation.info/newsroom-faqs/press-releases/972
133
2.6 LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGO
Project Title
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal of Rovigo.
Location
15 Km far from the coast of Porto Levante, in the province of Rovigo, in the Adriatic sea. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).
Purpose
Scope
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
Regassify 8 billion m3 of gas per annum, about at the 10% of the Italian gas consumption.
Realization of the gravity base structure (GBS), all the facilities placed on the top of GBS, the mooring
dolphins, the off-shore and the on-shore (Porto Viro – Cavarzere – Minerbio) pipeline to connect the terminal
to the national gas distribution.
Two EPC contracts with Aker Kvaerner and Snamprogetti (now Saipem). About 1 billion of Euro
The GBS built with 90.000 cubic meters of concrete and 30.000 tons of steel, is long 180 m and high 47 m
and the most part is under the sea level.
The liquefied natural gas is stored in two LNG tanks, with capacity of 125.000 cubic meters everyone, placed
into the GBS structure.
A first pipeline of 76 cm diameter and 40 km long covers 15 Km of sea floor and then carries on for 25 Km
onshore.
From here the gas is carried by another pipeline (90 cm diameter and 84-km long) to a tie in point with the
national distribution network near Minerbio (BO). (Adriatic LNG, 2011).
134
LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGO
135
GBS
Structu
re
136
LNG CARRIER NEAR THE TERMINAL
137
1)GBS structure
2) LNG vaporizers ORV
3) Boil-off gas compressors
4) Boil-off recondenser
5) High-pressure pumps
6) Flare
7) Living quarters
8) Electric and instrumental system
9) Generators
10) Maintenance building
11) Helicopter platform
12) LNG unloading platform
13) Docking facilities
14) Bridges
15)Pipeline connection
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
Supply-Side
Case-Study
Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders, skills, influence on
project)
Client
Adriatic LNG
Owner and manager of the terminal and the pipeline up to Cavarzere station.
The company employs about 125 people. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).
Financiers
Edison, Qatar Petroleum
(QP), ExxonMobil (XOM),
Italian State.
Sponsors
Edison.
It obtained all the necessary authorizations for the realization of the terminal
.
Client’s
Customers
Edison 80%, BP 12,5%,
Others 8,5% (percentage of
the gas productions).
Edison is the holder of the right of allocation and so it has a contract ―take or
pay‖ with RasGas of 25 years of duration for the utilization of the 80% of the
gas processed in the terminal. (Quadrino, 2009) and (Delibera n. 91/02).
The remaining 20%, available for the other gas companies, has been assigned
according to the procedures defined by AEEG Authority. The 8,5% is processed
on demand. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).
Client’s Owners
ExxonMobil 70,7%, Qatar
Petroleum 22%, Edison 7,3%.
QP and XOM are involved together in other joint venture of LNG terminal. South Hook
LNG terminal in UK, Golden Pass LNG terminal in USA. (Qatar Petroleum, 2010).
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
RasGas
ExxonMobil and QP own also the company RasGas (ExxonMobil, 2010) that supply the
80% of the LNG for the terminal. (Quadrino, 2009).
Principal
Contractor
Aker Kvaerner for the LNG
terminal and Saipem for the
pipeline.
Aker Kvaerner is a global oil services company that provides engineering services,
technologies, product solutions for the oil and gas industry. It employs about 18500
people. (Aker Solutions, 2011).
Saipem is an Italian contractor in the field of infrastructure construction and
maintenance for the oil industry, with operations on five continents. It employs about
30000 people. (Saipem, 2012).
Internal
Stakeholder
Category
149
Demand Side
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
First Tier
Contractors
Acciona
Internal
Second Tier
Consultants
It built the GBS structure (Serina, 2012). It also undertook all of the ancillary installations for the base
camp, including 4500 square meters of offices and other facilities (Acciona, 2008).
Whessoe
It provided, with an EPC contract, the engineering and design for LNG tanks and subcontracted the
construction. It was responsible for the testing and commissioning of the tanks after their installation
into GBS. (Whessoe, 2010).
Dragados
It constructed the top side facilities, and was responsible to their installation and hook up on the GBS
structure. (Serina, 2012).
Ing. E. Mantovani
It built the Mooring Dolphins at the Arsenale shipyard in Venice (Italia Oggi, 2008) and was involved in
the pipeline construction (Penolazzi, 2006).
Max Streicher and
Saipem
pipeline construction.
Hyundai Heavy
Industries (HHI)
It manufactured and supplied the LNG tanks in six sections. (Hyundai Heavy Industries, 2006).
Siemens
Emtunga
Professional
Services
Providers
Comments
(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders, skills, influence on project)
It built the module of electric and instrumental system. (Serina, 2012).
It supplied the Living quarters module. (Serina, 2012).
Fagioli
It was responsible for the unload, the transport, the lifting and the positioning of the all modules and
top side facilities on the GBS structure. (Fagioli, 2011).
150
Public
External
Private
Case-Study
Comments
Regulatory Agencies
AEEG (Autorità per l‘Energia Elettrica AEEG has the functions of regulation and control
e il gas)
in the sectors of the electricity and gas
(determination of tariffs and the technical and
economic conditions of access and
interconnection to the networks). (AEEG, 2012).
Local Government
Regione Veneto, Regione Emilia
Romagna, Provincia di Rovigo,
Municipalities.
Both regions approved and was favourable to the
projects.
National Government
Ministero Sviluppo Economico,
Ministero dell‘Ambiente.
The Ministero dell‘Ambiente issued the VIA
decrees . The Ministero Sviluppo Economico
issued the permissions to construction.
Environmentalists
Committees environmentalist
Tried to stop the construction of the terminal.
151
Stakeholder Relationship Maps
Privates and
banks
Qatar State
owns
owns
ExxonMobil
Qatar
Petroleum
Owns
30%
Owns
70,7%
Owns
70%
Transalpina
di Energia
Owns
61,3%
RasLaffan
LNG
Owns
22%
Owns
7,3%
Others
Supplies
20%
Owns
19,4%
Owns
10%
Floating
Owns
9,3%
owns
Sell
80%
Sell
12,5%
Adriatic LNG
Termi nal + Pipeline
(Terminal-Cavarzere)
Supplies
80%
Gruppo
Tassara
EDF
Edison
RasGas
owns
Owns
50%
Sell
8,5%
BP
Edison Stoccaggio
Pipeline (CavarzereMinerbio)
Others
Contract
Contract
Contract
Aker Kvaerner
Terminal
Construction
Acciona
GBS
Construction
and installation
Dragados
Top side facilities
Supplier
Emtunga
Module of living
quarters
Supplier
Siemens
Module of
electric system
Saipem
Pipeline
Design and
construction
Whessoe
LNG tanks
Supplier
Hyundai Heavy
Indusries
LNG tanks
Construction
Construction
Ing. E. Mantovani
Mooring Dolphins
and Pipeline
Construction
Max Streicher
Pipeline
Foreign investors:
• Own the plant
• Supply the gas
• Sell the gas
152
External
External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this
Stakeholder
Project
Region of
Veneto
Region of
EmiliaRomagna
Province of
Rovigo
It was favourable to the realization of the
terminal and the pipeline in its territory.
(Regione Veneto, 2006).
In the VIA decree of 1999 for the terminal and in
2003 for the pipeline it obtained that it takes great
care of the environment and its restoration during
the construction of the terminal and pipeline.
(Decreto di VIA, 2003) and (Penolazzi, 2005).
It was favourable to the realization of the
pipeline in its territory. (Regione EmiliaRomagna, 2003).
In the VIA decree of 2003 for the pipeline it
obtained that it takes great care of the
environment and its restoration during the
construction of the pipeline. (Decreto di VIA,
2003).
It first appealed to the TAR of Lazio and then
The Province opposed to the terminal
turned to the State Council against the acts of
and the pipeline trying in any way, in the
authorization. It lost in both the judgements in
courtroom, to stop the project. (Chinaglia,
June 2005 and July 2006.
2006).
(TAR del Lazio, 2005) and (Consiglio di Stato,
2006).
Stakeholder
In February 2008 there was the
signing of the agreement
between AdriaticLng, Consvipo
and the Province of Rovigo that
put an end to the battles. This
agreement established a
environmental compensation for
the territory. (Consvipo, 2008).
153
External
Stakeholder
External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this
Project
project
Environmentalists
Since 1998 until the entry into operation
of the terminal there was the opposition of
the environmentalists and committees of
citizens against the terminal. (Stoppa,
2009).
the negative effects on the environment
risks of accident
any benefit on the employment plan and
stops the process of tourism
development.
The committee Basso-polesano recoursed
to the TAR of Lazio and then to the State
Council against the acts of authorization. It
lost in both the judgements in June 2005
and July 2006. (TAR Veneto, 2006).
In 2006, some environmental groups
including the Committee Basso-polesano
appealed to the TAR of Veneto against the
acts of authorization and the TAR of
Veneto dismissed this appeal on October
2006. (TAR Veneto, 2006).
Municipalities
In 2006 there was the agreement
between Edison and the municipalities for
the environment compensations. The
overall amount was 1,2 million euro. The
municipalities committed to facilitate the
execution of work, releasing permits not
included into urban conformity required
by Edison, and to renounce to legal
action. All the municipalities expressed
their agreement with resolution of their
councils. (Comune di Berra, 2006).
Stakeholder
In 2006 the municipalities crossed for the
section of pipeline Cavarzere -Minerbio
obtained by Edison the environmental
compensation for the constraints
burdening in their territories. The
municipalities of the on-shore pipeline
section of Porto Viro - Cavarzere (the
municipality of Porto Viro and Loreo) was
compensated, together with Consvipo, by
Adriatic LNG after the agreement of
20.02.2008. (Consvipo, 2008).
154
Years
Nov 2000
Nov 2003
Apr 2005
Apr 2007
Coming into operation
End 2004
End 2007
End 2008
End 2009 (respected)
•
In November 2000 the managers of the then-company Edison Gas (after Edison LNG and now Adriatic LNG) stated that the
investment was about 450 million of euro for the terminal. (Il Gazzettino - Cronache di Rovigo, 2000).
•
In the resolution of the CIPE of 2001 the investments was estimated in 455,98 million of euro. The next year with the second resolution
of CIPE the cost increased to 585,519 million of euro.
•
In the last resolution of CIPE in 2003 the cost of the terminal raised to 615,72 million of euro. (CIPE, 2001,2002,2003).
•
In 2004 the EPC contract awarded was of 900 millions of Dollars (ENR.com, 2008) and some months before was awarded the FEED
and the detailed design for about 70 million of Dollars (Aker Kvarner, 2004).
Size increased from 4 billions to 8 billions!
155
Stakeholder or
Province of Rovigo and
Environmentalist
Stop the project. (Chinaglia, 2006).
Lost their battle at the civil court
(Consiglio di Stato, 2006) the
project has been completed.
Region Veneto and EmiliaRomagna
They asked that the project was less invasive for the environment and
asked for the environmental monitoring plan during and after the
construction. (Decreto di VIA, 2003).
Their requests was accepted.
(Decreto di VIA, 2003).
Aker Kvaerner
Realise the first offshore LNG terminal in the world to get the knowhow for the next project in this sector.
It realized the terminal.
Edison
Enter in the new Italian market of the LNG and to have a good price
the gas for its customers.
80% of the gas processed sold to
Edison for 25 years. (Quadrino,
2009).
QP and ExxonMobil
Realize LNG terminal in the world to sold the LNG processed in their
liquefaction trains and so enter in the regasification business. Ensures
a presence in the whole LNG value chain from gas production through
liquefaction, shipping and LNG regasification. (RasGas, 2011).
The terminal came into operation.
The LNG arrive from their
liquefaction trains. (Qatar
Petroleum, 2010).
156
Project Environment
and Europe wide)
The environmental compensations to the municipality and local authorities crossed by the two sections of pipeline was
possible because of the law of August 23, 2004 article 1 paragraph 5 (Legge, 2004). In the first part of pipeline Porto Viro Cavarzere owned by Adriatic LNG with agreement signed in 2008 were compensated municipalities, the Park of Delta and
Consvipo (Consvipo, 2008). In the second part of pipeline from Cavarzere to Minerbio owned by Edison Stoccaggio with the
agreement of 2006 were compensated the remaining municipalities involved (Comune di Berra, 2006).
Another law impacting on the project was the Article 27, comma 2 of 12.12.2002 n. 273 and the subsequent deliberation n.
91/02 and n. 90/03 of AEEG (Autorità per l‘Energia Elettrica e il Gas) that acknowledged this law. The resolution 91/02 of the
AEEG established the condition to the priority access for the new LNG terminal in Italy. This is an important decision that
allows to the companies of the sector to have rules to make investment decisions. The main rules of this resolution establish
that is allocated the priority access to the companies that fund the construction of the new terminals in Italy. To this companies
is reserved the 80% of the terminal capacity for 20 years from the start-up of the plant. The tariffs is traded with the owner of
the plant. The tariffs must be communicated to the authority (AEEG) that publishes them. (Delibera n. 91/02).
On 23.05.2000 was enacted the legislative decree n.164/2000 about the liberalization of the internal market of natural gas in
Italy, crucial for the future construction of terminals by private companies. (Legge, 2000).
The liberalization of the gas market began at European level by Directive 98/30, then updated and replaced by 2003/55 that
pursued the objective of creating a single European market free and competitive. In Italy, the opening to the free competition
began with the legislative decree 164/2000. The Italian gas market since its inception has been characterized by vertically
integrated monopoly of ENI, with the exception of the distribution, where, although the leader was Italgas, a subsidiary of ENI,
the market shares have always been very fragmented. When the decree (164/2000) opened the market to competition, he did
so by focusing on Upstream chain, going to affect directly the existing monopoly. The monopoly of ENI was then hit by placing
a double cap. From 01.01.2002, in fact, no company could claim a share of gas supply in Italy (production + imports) over
75% of total consumption (excluding own consumption). This roof was reduced by 2% every year to get to the limit of 61% in
2009 and 2010. Furthermore, no company can sell to end users more than 50%. (AmbienteDiritto, 2004) and (Legge, 2000).
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
The declaration of public utility and urgency for the pipeline Porto Viro - Cavarzere - Minerbio , with legislative decree no.190
of 2002, of the works allows the realization and operation of strategic infrastructure for energy supply and all the activities
envisaged in the approved project. It is issued with the agreement State-Regions about the location. Local authorities provide
to the necessary safeguards for the areas involved and the related range of respect. The project will then have to obtain the
decree of environmental compatibility. So the main thing is that the local authority have not the power to stop the realization of
the project. (Legge, 2002).
157
•
•
•
In January 2006 and 2009 there was the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which also affected Europe and Italy since the gas
arriving from Russia passes for 80% through the Ukrainian territory to which Russia pays transit fees.
Economic Project
Environment
The Comitato interministeriale per la programmazione economica, CIPE, establishes the address to the national economic policy
and the general guidelines for the elaboration of the national economic program.
In Italy about 92.5% of gas consumption comes from foreign countries.
The construction of new LNG terminals is strategic choice and allows Italy to diversify its sources
Italy thus would decrease its heavy dependence on Russia.
The CIPE in 2001 (resolution no. 41 of 2001) with its resolution authorized the stipulation of the program contract between the
Ministero del Tesoro, and the then-company Edison Gas regarding the investment for the construction of an off-shore terminal.
The incentives were calculated based on the costs of industrial investment and industrial research activities.
158
Events and activities relating to
project stakeholders
Events and activities Events and activities
relating to project
relating to project
management
performance
Events and activities relating to project
environment
VIA decree for the Terminal with
regasification capacity of 4 billion m 3 per
Dec 1999
year after the favorable opinion of the
Region of Veneto (Decreto di VIA, 1999).
May 2000
The legislative decree n.164/2000 about the
liberalization of the internal market of natural gas
in Italy, crucial for the future construction of
terminals by private companies. (Legge, 2000).
Mar 2002
The declaration of public utility for the pipeline
Porto Viro - Cavarzere – Minerbio. (Penolazzi,
2005).
Dec 2002
The law n. 273, article 27, comma 2 (Articolo 27
comma 2) and the subsequent deliberation n.
91/02 and n. 90/03 of AEEG (Delibera n. 91/02).
Mar 2003
Region Veneto (Decreto di VIA, 2003)
and Region Emilia-Romagna (Regione
Emilia-Romagna, 2003) expressed
favourable opinion for the pipeline.
159
Events and activities relating to Events and activities relating Events and activities
project stakeholders
to project management
relating to project
performance
Oct 2003
project environment
VIA decree for the Pipeline. (Decreto di
VIA, 2003).
The CIPE issued a third and last resolution.
The decree established a contribution to
Edison LNG for the work amounted to 66,57
million of euro. (CIPE, 2001,2002,2003).
Nov 2003
QP and ExxonMobil agree to
Nov 2003 participate in the development of the
Terminal with Edison. (RasGas, 2011).
Summer
2004
Aker Kvaerner was awarded by a
EPC contract for the realization of
the terminal. (ENR.com, 2008).
Jul 2004
In July 2004 was awarded
Snamprogetti (now Saipem) for the
realization of the two section of
pipeline. (Edison Stoccaggio,
2012).
VIA decree for the increase of the
terminal regasification capacity from 4
Oct 2004
to 8 billion m3 per year. (Penolazzi,
2005).
May 2005
Set up of Adriatic LNG By Edison, QP
and ExxonMobil. (RasGas, 2005).
160
Events and activities relating Events and project
to project stakeholders
management
project environment
Construction start of the terminal at the dry
dock of Algeciras in Spain. (Adriatic LNG,
2011).
May 2005
Jun 2005
project performance
The Province of Rovigo (TAR del
Lazio, 2005) and the
Environmentalists (TAR Veneto,
2006) lost the cases at the Tar of
Lazio.
Sep 2005
Jan 2006
Construction start of the pipeline Terminal –
Cavarzere. (Penolazzi, 2006).
Crisis between Russia and Ukraine,
which also affected Europe and Italy
since the gas arriving from Russia passes
for 80% through the Ukrainian territory.
The European gas companies reported a
drop in pressure in the pipelines of its
national network.(Croce, 2011).
The Province of Rovigo (Consiglio di
Stato, 2006) and the
environmentalists (TAR Veneto,
Jul 2006
2006) lost the cases at the State
Council.
The municipalities of the section of
pipeline Cavarzere -Minerbio
obtained by Edison the
Aug 2006
environmental compensation.
(Comune di Berra, 2006).
161
Events and activities relating to project
stakeholders
Events and
project
management
project performance
relating to project
environment
Construction start of the Pipeline Cavarzere
– Minerbio. (Edison Stoccaggio, 2012).
Oct 2006
The municipalities of the pipeline section Porto
Feb 2008 Viro - Cavarzere was compensated, together with
Consvipo, by Adriatic LNG. (Consvipo, 2008).
Mar 2008
Construction end of the terminal at the dry
dock of Algeciras in Spain. (Fagioli, 2011).
Mar 2008
Construction end of the pipeline Cavarzere
– Minerbio. (Edison Stoccaggio, 2012).
May 2008
Probable construction end of the pipeline
Terminal – Cavarzere.
Sep 2008
The terminal arrived in the Adriatic Sea.
Then it was ballasted, connected to the
pipeline and there was the installation of the
mooring dolphins. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).
New Crisis between Russia and
Ukraine. There was a new stop
flow of gas to Europe. (Il
Giornale.it, 2009).
Jan 2009
Aug 2009
Started the commissioning with the mooring
of the first LNG carrier. (Esso, 2010).
Oct 2009
Inauguration of the terminal. (Esso, 2010).
162
MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events
•
Feasibility study: 1998
•
Project final approval: 2003
•
Start of GBS construction: 2005
•
Module installation engineering: from beginning 2005
•
LNG Tanks arrival on site: December 2006
•
LNG Tanks installation: January – May 2007
•
Modules installation: July2007 – May 2008
•
Basin flooding: 20th May 2008
•
GBS sail away: 30th August 2008
•
Sailing duration: 15days
•
GBS in final position on Adriatic sea bed:18th September 2008
163
2.7 UNITS 3 & 4 MOCHOVCE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Case Compiled By: Daniela Ńpirková and Koloman Ivanička
Contact Details: Institute of Management, Slovak University of Technology, Bratislava, Slovak Republic
Project Title
Completion of units 3 and 4 of Nuclear power plant (NPP) Mochovce
Location
Mochovce, Nitra self governing- region, Slovakia, Europe
Purpose
Meeting of the national demand for electricity, energy security and self-sufficiency in
Slovakia
Scope
The completion of the third and fourth unit of nuclear power plant Mochovce.
Total Project Value
EUR 2.775 bn estimated at November 2009, later estimation is EUR 3,7 bn
Project Status
Completion of 3 and 4 unit of Nuclear power plant (NPP) is under construction
Slovenské elektrárne (SE) are responsible for the construction. 34% of shares of SE
belongs to Fund of National property and 66 % to ENEL Produzione SpA. ENEL is the
main financier of the construction
Units 3 and 4 in Nuclear Power Plant Mochovce are under construction.
Completion of the unit 3 – 2014, unit 4 – 2015
164
Comments
Internal
Supply-Side Client
Financiers
Sponsors
Client’s Owners
Slovenské elektrárne, a.s.
Largest producer of energy in Slovakia
Private financing: Enel, financing the construction from
The experience of large European power operator
the cash flow of Slovenské elektrárne
n/a
SEPS (Slovenská elektrizačná a prenosová sústava) –
Slovak power grid operator
34% National property fund of the Slovak Republic
66% ENEL Produzione SpA. It is largest shareholders
in March 2011:
Ministry of the Economy and Finance of the Italian
Republic 31.24% of the shares,
Blackrock Inc., which owns 2.74% of the shares,
Natixis S.A., which 2.07% shares.
Take over of Slovenské elektrárne by ENEL
•
•
•
The takeover of Slovenske elektrarne by ENEL was motivated by acquiring in-house nuclear plant construction experience, which was missing to this
transnational company. Since it was not possible to buy only nuclear power plant Mochovce, ENEL agreed to buy 66% of the Slovak utility Slovenske
Elektrarne (SE) in February 2005 for € 840 m. The deal was completed in May 2006.
For this reason ENEL had also made the agreement with EDF on participation on costruction of NPP Flamanville in France. Enel hoped that this expertise
would be useful for building the first new nuclear unit in Italy, which should have started in 2013 with the perspective that 25% of Italy‘s electricity would
come from nuclear power by the year 2030.
The condition for takeover by ENEL of Slovak generation company, Slovenske Elektrarne was the commitment that ENEL would complete two partly-built
nuclear plants of Russian design (Mochovce 3 and 4).
165
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (Internal)
Internal
Case-Study
Comments
Architect Engineer: Slovenske elektrarne - Enel
Main Contractors:
Nuclear Island:
Ńkoda Jadrové strojírenství (ŃJS), Atomstrojexport, VUJE,
Enseco (Evaluation of reliability and operational efficiency in
the stages of commissioning, operation and
decommissioning of sources of energy and heat. Design of
electrical equipment), Inņinierske stavby Końice, PPA, Rolls
Royce
Conventional Island:
Enel (EPCM Contractor), Skoda Power, Brush, ZIPP
Main Instrumentation and Control:
Areva-Siemens
VUJE (Nuclear Power Plants Research Institute), JAVYS
(Nuclear and Decommissioning Company), SEPS (Slovak
Electricity Transmission System)
Second Tier Consultants Individual companies within Slovakia, Poland, Czech,
Hungary
Individual worldwide companies
Areva-Siemens, NPPM (Nuclear power plant maintenance)
Providers
166
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Local Government
National Government
Private
Local residents
Case-Study
Úrad jadrového dozoru Slovenskej republiky (Nuclear Regulatory
Authority of the Slovak Republic), URSO, MŅP (Ministry of Environment),
MH (Ministry of Economy), International atomic energy authority (IAEA),
Environment agency,International Atomic Energy Authority
Nitra Self - Governing Region, Levice district – Tlmače, Kalná nad Hronom,
Starý Tekov, Veľký Ďur, Malé Kozmálovce, Nový Tekov
Conservationists
Positive economic
impact in region
Slovakia, Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Russia
Individual residents, Levice, Tlmače, Kalná nad Hronom, Starý Tekov, Veľký
Ďur, Malé Kozmálovce, Nový Tekov
Possitive impact on the
area, unemployment
decrease
Individual landowners
The value of property
will increase
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
Comments
experiences of
Greenpeace, Environment agency
Greenpeace, State nature conservancy (Ńtátna ochrana prírody Slovenskej
republiky),
Archaeologists
The Monument office of SR, Local authorities
Greenfiield, impropable
to find somethink
167
168
project
Greenpeace, Environment
agencies, Austrian government
Highly Unfavourable
Ability to lobby at government
organizations, civil disruption, and also to
exert the pressure on banks in order to
provide the provision of credit line for the
project
Opposition to this type
of project is their raison
d‘etre
Local residents and landowners
Concerned about risk but also
welcoming new jobs and
potential property boom
Votes for local government and national
government-- Based on several surveys
of public opinion the completion of the
third and fourth unit is supported by more
than two thirds of Slovakia's population
(and more than 87% of the population in
the 10 km zone around the plant
Potentially ( and v.
remotely) substantively
harmful but in reality it
may make significant
improvement to
standards of living
Local Business Organisations
Very happy to see new
business opportunities but want
to see these available locally
(especially local)
if successful may
increase growth
substantially
Local goverment
Very favourable and supportive
None identified
Long term sustainability
in region
169
Nuclear power plants in Slovakia
In 1999, nuclear
reactors produced
47% of Slovakia´s
Electricity
170
MEGAPROJECT Project Processes
Completion of NPP Mochovce - units 3 and 4
Completion of the third and fourth unit of NPP Mochovce was planned in 2012 and 2013. This would be
the largest private investment in the history of the Slovak Republic. Performance of each unit will be a
440 MW. Slovenské elektrárne began with the completion of units 3 and 4 by formal opening of
construction works on November the third, 2008. In this process the German, Italian, French, and
Russian companies take part. Slovak power plants has contracted the suppliers for the completion of
the third and fourth unit of nuclear plant Mochovce totaling 2.63 bn euros. Closed contracts represents
more than 94% of total investment. Company Termostav - Mráz, Inc. with base in Końice will also
participate in completion and it will provide thermal isolation for third and 4 unit.
The transfer of the reactor pressure vessel of the fourth unit of nuclear power plant was realized at the
beginning of December 2011. The pressure vessel was finally deposited into the reactor pit, where it will
be operating. This is a key component of nuclear power plant, which is located in the active zone of the
reactor, the overall height is 14.1 meters and weighs over 215 tons. Pressure vessel for third unit was
mounted in 2010.
The construction of NPP Mochovce was funded by state resources until 1991. By the end of 1991,
about 19 billion of Czechoslovak crowns were invested into the project. In the early nineties, lack of
resources greatly influenced the construction of NPP Mochovce. The third and fourth units were
reported to be only 40% and 30% complete when work was halted on them at the beginning of Nineties.
The only way to continue the construction was searching for funds abroad. In September 1995, the
government approved a model of financing of units 1 and 2. It was agreed that the completion will be
carried out within the range of the original design and the original contractors. Contracts with suppliers
and credit institutions were signed in 1996 where the government agreed to take over loan guarantees
for the completion of Units 1 and 2.
171
COST MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
The reality and plans in 2008
Source: Chren, J.: Lessons learned from completion of nuclear power plant EMO 3,4 Case Study. Geneva, November 24, 2010.
172
In October 2004, the Italian national utility ENEL acquired a 66 percent stake in Slovenské elektrárne
(SE) and, as part of its bid, proposed to invest nearly €2 billion in new nuclear generating capacity.
In 2007 the feasibility study has been completed. The result was positive but the timescale to complete
NPP Mochovce 3 and 4 slipped. By 2007, the expected completion date was 2012 when the contracts
for completion were expected to be signed in mid-2008. Obtaining finance became a problem. In 2007,
a consortium of nine banks agreed to provide ENEL/SE with a €800m ‗revolving credit‘ facility over
seven years. However, in 2008, under pressure from Greenpeace, three banks, ING, Banca Intesa and
Erste Bank, refused to allow the credit facility to be used for the completion of Mochovce, then
projected to cost €1.7bn. ENEL/SE was forced to issue a statement that it would finance completion of
the plants from internally generated cash.
The process was further delayed in September 2008 by a Slovak government decision to require
ENEL/SE complete a new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). As the consequence of the delays,
some of the contractors has augmented their prices
The European Commission also became concerned in May 2008 that the designs were not adequately
safe. The Commission has expressed the concerns that the facility is not meeting the objectives of the
Euratom Treaty," provided the utility "bring(s) the design in line with the existing best practices"
including the protection against external attack. Based on such opinion, the new safety measures were
implemented.
Not long ago CWZ/JAVYS proposed to build another NPP unit at Bohunice site, expected to come online in 2020. As a result of that a surplus of base-load power might be available and this could force
down the price ENEL/SE would receive for the output of NPP Mochovce 3 and 4. Such situation would
mean the reduced profits or even losses for ENEL/SE
173
In Eighties the planned cost of construction of Units 3 and 4 represented EUR 1.3 bn. In 1992
construction works on the completion of Units 3 and 4 were stopped. One reason was the lack of
funds. The works on Units 3 and 4 were recommenced in 2007, which raised the costs to 3.4 billion
euros. At that time it was expected that the completion of Mochovce NPP - units 3 and 4 will be EUR
3 bn, where the equity financing would represent EUR 2.2 bn. And EUR 500 million will come from
foreign sources. Since the financial performance of the SE at that time was positive, the equity
financing seemed to be a good option. When ENEL took over SE the forecast completion date for the
reactors was 2011-12. ENEL was expected to finalize a feasibility study in April 2007 and then to take
a final decision whether or not it would invest in the units.
The stress tests in post-Fukushima period and the implementation of the results has caused another
delays and cost overruns in the project. The following changes were added to design of NPP:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Severe accident consequence mitigation;
Seismic reinforcement;
Enhancement of plant protection to area events (flooding, fire, etc);
Plant instrumentation and control and human machine interface;
Protection from high energy pipe breaks;
Minimization of radioactive wastes.
The management and verification of the design works are being performed by Slovenske elektrarne
through a dedicated Engineering Team which consists of specialists from NPP Mochovce 3-4, NPP
Mochovce 1-2, NPP Bohunice and from Enel SpA. For the technical activities, Slovenske elektrarne is
assisted by an international engineering consultant.
In order to ensure that the revision of basic design is performed by implementing the best applicable
safety practices, SE has also set up a Safety Board, composed by 6 leading national and international
experts in nuclear safety, which is aimed at providing guidelines as well advice on all subjects
concerning safety.
Such a large scale changes could not have impacted the substantial raising of the cost of completion
of units 3 and 4.
174
An important part of safe operation of NPP Mochovce is also practical training of operators of
nuclear power plant, especially in dealing with transient and emergency situations in a simulator.
It is a computer model that monitors the activity of NPP with a defined accuracy and in the real
time simulates the behavior of the equipment in a plant. Simulator allows to perform all work
activities during the training that can be controlled from nuclear power plant control room.
Supplier of representative full-scope simulator for the 3 and 4 units at NPP Mochovce is an
American company GSE Power Systems. Currently, the construction works of the simulator are
complete, titanium-zinc facade with thermo-isolation also with communication and landscaping.
The supply company will be responsible for the design and engineering, procurement,
manufacturing, factory testing, delivery to site, installation, startup and commissioning of a
complete hardware and software that is necessary to realize the operation of simulator of units 3
and 4 of NPP Mochovce.
Revision of the design after the stress tests:
In order to ensure that the revision of basic design is performed by implementing the best
applicable safety practices, SE has also set up a Safety Board, composed by 6 leading national
and international experts in nuclear safety, which is aimed at providing guidelines as well advice
on all subjects concerning safety.
Communications management
Processes
The Slovak government organizes presentations and visits to nuclear sites.
Public information material like brochures, newspapers and advertisements are widely distributed
to many people for maximum effect. Public meetings and hearings are organized for each nuclear
facility, and are considered very important, in particular for the citizens of cities and villages on
the route from the Treatment Centre to the Mochovce repository. Conferences and seminars
about nuclear issues happen once a year, and public opinion surveys showed that the population
is interested in getting more details about the repository. The authorities concluded that the
transfer of information plays an essential part in the establishment of public trust, but it is not
enough. Communication between the public and representatives of the waste management
organization is also vital for the success of the enterprise. The issue of compensation to host
communities can not be forgotten, and the research in many areas of risk acceptance has shown
that people are more willing to accept the risk if it is controllable.
175
Original Targets and
changes to targets
Completion of the unit 3 - 2014
The targets will not be achieved in time because of stress tests
and design changes
EUR 3 billion
The expenditures for completion will be substantially overun.
Some technology for completion was bought 20 years ago and
had to be conserved, guarded, and in some cases replaced,
which generated the additional costs. The new post-Fukushima
design changes will also demanf more financial sources
The specifications were changed many times during the last 20
years in order to meet the requirements of the safety and
technology progress. Status of completion as per the original
design: Civil part 70%, Mechanical part 30%, Electric and I&C
1%.
176
Stakeholder or
Municipalities that are not
in larger distance from
Mochovce than 20 km
They want to obtain the unchanged volume of compensation
Employment in region
A major factor for the regional development: completion of the first and
second unit of nuclear plant Mochovce, which meant influx of young people
- nuclear experts - in this region, which was initially strongly agricultural.
Construction of Mochovce brought about
number directly or indirectly
induced investments (e.g. new hospital in Levice, construction of new flats,
as well as all related services and infrastructure). Construction of the third
and fourth unit also means new job
opportunities for people from the
region, as well as from more distant parts of Slovakia or abroad.
So far EUR 1,71 million is
granted by SE every year
177
In 1992, all work on the third and fourth unit for lack of money stopped, and experts began to
preserve equipment. At that time the third and fourth units were reported to be only 40% and 30% complete.
Work started on first and second unit, however, continued albeit with interruptions. In 1995 the Slovak
government approved the financial model of financing of the first two units of Mochovce NPP.
The first reactor become fully operational in 1998. Two years later, the second unit was put into operation.
The gross output of each unit in 2008 was increased from the original 440 to 470 MW.
As a condition of accession into the European Union (2004) Slovakia was forced to deactivate two reactors at
the V-1 plant in Jaslovské Bohunice. The first reactor was shut down at the end of 2006, the second on the
last day of 2008. A provision in the accession treaty allowed for reactivation in case of emergency.
The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009 disrupted natural gas supplies and electricity generation. On
January 10, 2009 the Slovak government decided to urgently restart the reactor shut down just days
before. Eventually, the reactor was not started.
This is one of the most important projects, present and future. Project of the third and fourth unit of Mochovce
nuclear power plant is the largest private investment in the Slovak Republic since its creation. Slovak power
plants invested in the completion of construction approximately 3 billion EUR over five years. Already about
80% of contracts were signed with the Slovak and Czech companies.
In addition to the pulse for economic development at present, the completion of these units will contribute
significantly to the energy security of Slovakia in the future. Already the production of one unit covers about
12% of electricity consumption in Slovakia.
178
Nuclear energy is an important part of the energy package of Slovak Republic. The share of nuclear energy
on total energy consumption is around 35 %. Nuclear power plants have significant proportion of producing
the electricity. In 2007, 55 % of electricity was generated at nuclear power plants in Slovakia. After 1998 and
2000, when the first two units of the Mochovce were completed (EMO 1, 2), Slovakia has become selfsufficient in electricity production by 2006 and part of the strategic commodities exported. Change occurred
after the shutdown of unit V1 nuclear power plant in Jaslovské Bohunice (EBO V1) in 2006 and in 2008 Slovakia has again become an importer of electricity. Such a situation motivated the Slovak republic to
complete and launch units 3 and 4 in Mochovce (EMO 3.4), which should enable Slovakia to become again
self-sufficient in electricity production. All Slovak governments since 1989, considered the nuclear energy is
the most important part of the energy package and none of them did expect to fully replace nuclear energy
with other sources. Document Energy Security Strategy of Slovak Republic (ESS SR) is the current
framework document, which was approved by the Government on 15th October 2007 with the perspective to
2030. One of the key information at the beginning of ESS SR refers to the fact that the EU is unable to
guarantee the energy security of its members. Therefore in the competence of the Member States remains
setting energy policy and particularly the determination of the energy mix. The energy mix of EU 27 is
composed of 14.4% nuclear energy. Particular attention government pays to the nuclear energy. "Nuclear
Illustrative Program" is also part of the Energy Policy for Europe - which together with the European Council
and their Action Plan on energy policy became the basis for energy policy in the short - and medium term.
179
Political Environment:
(support for pro-nuclear technologies)
In all post-communist countries of Central Europe there is virtually no political opposition to
nuclear energy. If one can speak of political parties with antinuclear orientation in these
countries, then those are marginal formations scoring low in elections; in addition, if they gained
parliamentary seats, they did so, according to analysts, by articulating other themes. The
dominant political parties in these countries are pro-nuclear.
The general attitude towards nuclear energy in the countries studied was explored by
Eurobarometer in 2009. Eurobarometer asked whether the share of NPPs in the production of
electricity should change. Great support for increasing the share or maintaining it at the present
level was witnessed in all post-communist countries even after disaster in Fukushima.
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland are dominantly pro-nuclear, whereas neither in
Austria nor in Germany would find today a relevant political actor offering an alternative to the
moratorium on NPP construction.
Specific political events impacting
on the project
Rethinking construction of nuclear power plant strategy by ENEL
2012 was not ideal year for ENEL. The difficulties in Italaian markets followed by difficulties in
foreign markets. In December 2012 the Italian concern decided to withdraw from the project to
build a nuclear power plant unit number 3 "Flamanville" - the first in France to block the reactor
EPR. The announced to the public the reasons - the rising cost of nuclear power unit, and
unfortunate post Fukushima referendum in Italy.
Before the accident in Fukushima Berlusconi government was prepared to abolish the
Chernobyl legislative ban on nuclear power plant construction. In order to make this process
legitimate, the national italian referendum was organized. But the vote in Italy was held in June
2011, against the background of the events at Fukushima. The result meant the failure for the
supporters of nuclear energy, since for the abandonment of nuclear power plants voted 94.1%
who came to the polls.
180
Specific political events
(Austrian resentment of Slovak
nuclear power plant program)
Relations with Austria
For Austria the nuclear power euphoria was typical for Sixties. They had started construction of
nuclear power plant Zwenterdorf, which was expected to be completed in 1976. But during 1975 the
protest movement was developed and half of the population was against the operation of nuclear
power plants. The referendum in 1977 has forbidden commissioning Zwenterdorf plant. The disaster
at Three Miles Island in 1979 and Chernobyl catastrophe further strengthened anti-nuclear power
plant opposition in Austria. Moreover the nuclear power plant agenda enabled to join political forces
that were against the former premier minister Bruno Kreiski.
Currently support of nuclear power in Austria by the public is the lowest in the whole EU. Anti-nuclear
stance is also typical for Austrian parliament and government, while Parliament is in their views more
radical, more approaching to public attitude. (Pavlikova 2011).
In the section on foreign policy of Austria expressed concern over the "nuclear renaissance". Austria
will by all means protest against the presentation of nuclear energy as a safe and sustainable form of
energy and will strongly advocate for the proliferation - and the form of a multilateral system of
controlling access to nuclear fuel. Austrian politicians and media promote a strict anti-nuclear policy,
not only on its territory, but also in relation to other countries, especially neighbors and try to promote
anti-nuclear the concept at European Union level.
Before 1989, Austria had no real possibility to influence nuclear policy of states that were behind the
Iron Curtain, however the situation has changed later and Austria began to oppose very strongly the
development and operations of nuclear power plants in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, since
these facilities are located not far from the Austrian borders, and in the case of serious disaster it
would be impossible to protect the Austrian citizens.
181
Specific political events
(Austrian resentment of Slovak
nuclear power plant program)
Against the completion of Mochovce Austria stood out as very active at international level – she for
instance managed to unit the allocation of credit for completion of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in Nineties in 20th century. The Austrian anti-nuclear
power activists from Greenpeace and Global 2000 occupied the Slovak Embassy in Vienna in May
1998 and demanded all the technical documentation for NPP Mochovce. (Böck, Drábová, 2005)
The pressure from the activists was also focused on banks providing the credit for completion of
third and forth unit of EMO Mochovce, and I some cases they succeeded in way that the banks
refused to provide the credits for completion.
The 2011 crash of Fukushima plant in Japan has caused renewed growth anti-nuclear tendencies.
Austria at the end of March 2012 decided to undertake the action against Czech and Slovak
Republic in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It was part of new action plan adopted by
Austrian government in the document "International rethinking of nuclear power to renewable
energy and energy efficiency", which was approved on March 3, 2011 (Rehfus, 2011). The
program aims to promote the closure of nuclear power plants across the European Union, through
extensive campaigns and cooperation with other anti-nuclear oriented countries. For many years
the European authorities closely monitored the safety of the nuclear reactors in Czech and Slovak
Republics, as well as in other new European countries, which was quite fruitful approach leading to
many changes that had led to implementation of many safety measures. However European Union
has never shared the extreme opinions of Austrian politician to the development of the nuclear
power stations. So when Vienna provincial government sued Slovakia for the completion of third
and fourth EMO units in 2011, it did not succeed. (Viedeň neuspela..., 2011).
The Slovak-Austrian controversies regarding the operation of Nuclear power plant in Mochovce
are likely to continue in future, even though the safety standards were significantly augmented.
Otherwise there are no real problems among both countries, which have otherwise the friendly
relations; many Austrian companies operate in Slovakia, and the intensity of mutual advantageous
economic relations is growing.
182
In times of economic recession, this investment is a huge stimulus to the national economy. It also
indirectly involves several thousand people who provide infrastructure for the project, most of them
from Nitra region.
A recent study by BDO states that every euro invested in the completion of two units of Mochovce
creates Slovakia GNP growth of € 2.36. Nearly 10 years after completion of the first and second
units, the region renewed its industrial infrastructure. During the seven years of completion there
were created 9,400 direct, indirect and induced jobs. During the years of operation has to be new
blocks Mochovce directly employs about 960 people.
Nuclear type power plants belong to low carbon technologies (and in fact, greenhouse gas
emissions are running at close to zero), so the construction of two new nuclear units will
significantly contributes the fulfillment of the commitment of Slovakia to reduce CO2 emissions by
2020. Each reactor VVER 440 will save about 3.7 million tons of CO2 each year. Otherwise this
greenhouse gas will flow to air from coal-fired power plants.
Based on the document ESS SR, the final consumption of electricity represents about 20.7% share
of total energy consumption and until 2030 is expected to rise to 22.8%. This increase is consistent
with the expected growth of the economy, while reducing the energy consumption. In connection
with this fact it is quite a significant factor in the expected increase in energy prices. Production
costs of nuclear energy in comparison with coal and gas resources are less sensitive to price
changes. This is mainly so because in the world there is a sufficient number of uranium deposits
and it is possible to diversify the vendors.
183
183
From an economic point of view it is important to know that „that equivalent amount of heat
contained in coal is 7 to 8 times more expensive than nuclear fuel. Price of brown coal is 11 times
more expensive than nuclear energy and price of natural gas is 20 times more expensive than the
nuclear energy. The operation of nuclear power plant is therefore at least in economic terms more
favorable than production of electricity from brown coal or fossil fuels, although the initial
investment is much higher. The strategy also keeps in mind the possibility that the price of
uranium will grow dynamically in the future and the privileged position will be given to countries
that have this material.
In this case the government of Slovak Republic does not exclude the possibility of restart of mining
uranium in Jahodná localities, Huta Novoveská, Kluknava, Kálnica - Selec. With this policy is also
linked the necessity of amending the relevant laws and strategic documents, allowing for
maximum protection of the environment. Another rather significant fact is that the uranium is not
imported from politically unstable countries, and it is possible to buy and maintain stocks for a
longer period than in case of oil, or gas. All these factors speak in favor of using more nuclear
energy and to plan and build additional nuclear power plants from economic and political point of
view.
184
184
(Fukushima accident)
The challenges which nuclear safety and its governance face were highlighted in the accident at the
Fukushima reactors in Japan following the earthquake and the tsunami in March 2011.
Fukushima accident on March 2011 was a series of equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns and
releases of radioactive materials at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, following the Tōhoku
earthquake and tsunami. This event highlighted the challenges which nuclear safety and its
governance face. The lessons from the accident has shown that nuclear reactors must be protected
even against accidents, which have been assessed as highly improbable. The most important
reason Fukushima accident were the faulty design, insufficient backup systems, human error,
inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications.
The European Union reacted on Fukushima accident by ordering the comprehensive and
transparent risk and safety assessment ("stress tests") and to propose by the end of 2011 any
improvements that may be necessary Although based on the stress tests, national regulators
concluded that there are no technical reasons requiring the shutdown of any NPP in Europe,
nevertheles, practically all NPPs are expected to undergo safety improvements, as hundreds of
technical upgrade measures have been identified. These measures include additional mobile
equipment to prevent or mitigate severe accidents, the installation of hardened fixed equipment,
and the improvement of severe accident management, together with appropriate staff training
measures. The costs of additional safety improvements were estimated to be in the range of €30
million to €200 million per reactor unit in 2011.
Based on the necessity of realizing stress tests, implementing additional safety measures, ENEL
has substantially delayed the completion of third and fourth block of NPP, while demanding
additional EUR 800 million for the completion
185
185
(New Mochovce Reactors
Held Up by Budget Dispute)
The ENEL‘s Slovenske elektrarne requested for additional funding of NPP Mochovce from Slovak budget
raised the resentment from the Slovak government. The government declined the request for the second
time on May 28 2013 and ENEL threatened to stop the construction works. The missing agreement on
raising the budget may endanger the completion of the entire project, in which Czech companies are
taking part. The costs of completion of the units 3 and 4 have increased to EUR 3.8 bn from the originally
estimated EUR 3 bn. This would endanger jobs in the construction and cause a fall of tax revenues to the
state budget, SE said. The investment in the completion of the 3rd and 4th units of Mochovce represents
a significant contribution to the growth of the Slovak economy. The government would however like to
force Slovenské elektrárne to complete the project, under the threat of sanctions. The construction has
already been delayed.
Originally, the two units were to be completed in the course of last year and this year. According to
available information, they should complete in 2014 and 2015 at the earliest. According to Enel, the delay
has been caused partly by additional measures aimed at enhancing the plant‘s safety, which ensued
from stress tests. Owing to the delay of the launch of the two new reactors, the state loses dividends from
SE‘s profits. The third and fourth units could collect per year, according to the planned volume of
production at current prices, more than EUR 300 million. Part of this amount would be through dividends
could have been received also by the state budget.
The new production capacity in Mochovce will become the next great stabilizing element in our energy
system and it guarantees stable and secure supply of electricity.
Placing third and fourth unit of Mochovce into operation in 2014 and 2015 will replace fossil fuel burning
in the Central region of Slovakia. It is expected that this would reduce the volatility of electricity prices for
households and industry on the Slovak market.
186
186
Feasibility study
The feasibility study solves essential issues related to the feasibility of the completion of the third and fourth unit
project financing and the return of funds. Appropriately specified key contributions/benefits from the investor point
of view and analyzes in detail possible risks of the project. The technical part of the study analyzed focused on
current conditions on the electricity market within Slovakia and in the adjacent region, the current state of the SEMO34, the investments necessary for the completion, as well as the elementary technical and security solutions.
The feasibility study expected the completion date of NPP Mochovce 3 and 4 in 12/2008 and 12/2009.
Study presented by Deloitte&Touche in 2002 analyzed the completion as a project for independent power
producer (hereinafter IPP) i.e. like the most conservative variant in terms of their financial evaluation.
Based on the financial estimates and forecasts, which used wide range of tools and techniques of project
financing, Deloitte&Touche prepared financial model and financial forecast with below mentioned conclusions:
 Company SE MO34 as IPP can be successfully designed and financed as sole project;
 Company SE MO34 as IPP has sufficient cash flow, to fulfill their liabilities and cover operational costs;
 Cash flow of the company as IPP provides adequate assurance in respect to the debt service obligations
incurred from the financing agreements;
 In general, the company SE MO34 as IPP seems like a profit making company, whereby the return of equity
seems to be significantly higher than the average level in comparable projects within Europe;
 The internal rate of return (IRR) of the project is calculated around 18,61% for the whole life cycle of the project
/ 40 years.
187
187
Feasibility study
Positive aspects of completion:











Valid building permission
Utilization of constructed objects and side accommodations
Compensation for the decommissioning of energy capacity till 2010
Boost for whole economy in Slovakia
Utilization of experienced staff (the construction of the nuclear power station in Slovakia has started 50 years
ago and since that many experts with practical experiences have been developed)
Evaluation of financial expenses
Higher economic efficiency in long-term period compared to comparable resources
Employment and regional development
High level of usability of supplied components and equipment
High level of safety after the revision of former project
Optimization of completion costs, approximately EUR 1 mil./MW installed
Completion of the NPP Mochovce will have significant impact within the region:











Stabilizing economy and economic growth
New working opportunities, indirect impact on community development
Increase of tax revenues for municipalities
Housing development
Use of waste heat for community
Reduction of negative environmental impact and increase the efficiency and economy of the NPP Mochovce
operation
Company SE EMO 3&4 as Independent power producer - IPP can be successfully designed and financed as
sole project,
Company SE EMO 3&4 as IPP has sufficient cash flow, to fulfill their liabilities and cover operational costs,
Cash flow of the company as IPP provides adequate assurance in respect to the debt service obligations
incurred from the financing agreements,
In general, the company SE EMO 3&4 as IPP seems like a profit making company, whereby the return of
equity seems to be significantly higher than the average level in comparable projects within Europe,
The internal rate of return (IRR) of the project is calculated around 18.61% for the whole life cycle of the project
/ 40 years.
188
188
Sustainability
Comments on the relationship
of the project to issues of
sustainability
Completion of third and fourth unit of the nuclear power plant will be the largest private investment in
the history of Slovakia.
Slovenské elektrárne invests EUR 3 billion by 2013 in the construction of Mochovce NPP units 3 and
4.
Further investments were concluded with the modernization and power up-rate of existing units in
Bohunice NPP (EUR 0.5 billion) and Mochovce NPP power up-rate.
The Strategic Plan involves also full hydro automation and modernization of the existing hydro units,
introduction of biomass in the fleet of thermal power plants (Vojany and Nováky) and development of
renewables - mainly photovoltaic and small hydro power plants.
This completion is one of three nuclear power plant currently being built in EU
Third unit will be put into operation in 2014 and fourth unit in 2015
Each unit with performance 440MWe
Non nuclear part contractor: ENEL Ingegneria e Innovazione
Contractor of control and management system: Areva-Siemes
Up to 2/3 of work was carried by Slovak (local) companies
Communication strategy of the completion is based on transparency and therefore more than 2/3 of
Slovak population and more than 87% of the population in the 10km zone around the plant supports
the completion.
Land impact
NPP Mochovce covers an area of 301.99 ha, thereof built up area spread on 49.81 ha and the rest of
the area are other sites including 22.78 ha of woods.
Under operation of NPP Mochovce is also another 44.37 ha of land within 15 villages neighboring with
the NPP Mochovce whereby majority of this land is using for special purposes of the NPP. The
completion of NPP Mochovce -unit 3 & 4 does not create any additional land requirements.
189
Sustainability
Comments on the relationship of the
project to issues of sustainability
The share of electricity generated
from nucleus in Slovakia is 66%
Nuclear energy sector remains an
important and stable part of the
energy mix for Slovakia, the EU and
further extension of the nuclear
power generation will enable to reach
the commitment of Slovakia to
reduce „greenhouse" gases
emissions by at least 20% by 2020.
190
CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE OF UNITS 3 & 4 OF MOCHOVCE NPP
1980
1987
1992
1993
2000
Start of
construction
Halt of
construction
works
2002
2007
February 2, 2007
July15, 2008
August 14, 2008
Continuation and
planned
completion of the
project
Site permit
Building permit – start of construction
Halt of construction works
Start of preservation and protective works
Approval of the NPP Mochovce 3&4
Strategic preservation maintenance and protection plan by the Nuclear Regulatory
Authority (NRA)
Takeover of the supplies in the property of Slovenské Elektrárne
Realization of feasibility study
Slovenské elektrárne stakeholders announced the intention to complete the
construction of units 3&4
European Commission issues positive statement on NPP Mochovce - units 3&4
NRA approved NPP Mochovce 3&4 design modifications and prolonged the building
permit by Dec 31,2013
November 3, 2008
Inauguration of the re-start of construction works
2009
EIA process for NPP Mochovce 3&4 operation (public participation)
June 11, 2009
Signing of contracts with the main suppliers
April 30, 2010
Ministry of Environment issues its Final Statement on the EIA Report
September 5, 2010
Installation of unit 3 reactor pressure vessel
March, 2012
Realization of stress tests of NPP Mochovce units (that were not planned) as the
result of accident NPP Fukushima
Decision on delay of commissioning NPP Mochovce - units 3&4
2013-2014
Commissioning of NPP Mochovce - units 3&4 (the original date 2014 -2015)
2011
Source: Table elaborated based on SE, a. s., 2012
191
191
TIME
Events and
activities relating
to project
stakeholders
Change of
political
system
Split of
Czechoslovakia
Early site
permit
1987
Building
permit
start of
construction
2004
2006
Call for
privatization
tender
66% of SE
owned by
Enel
2007
1992
1993
2002
Halt of
construction
works
Start of
preservation
works
Takeover
of supplies
to SE
property
1989
1993
Revolution
2008
2007
Multi-contract (more than 100
contracts)
2009
SE European
SE
stakeholders
commission
Signing of
announced the
issues
contracts with
intention to
positive
the main
complete the
statement on
suppliers
construction of NPP units 3,4
units 3,4
Change of
political
system
1980
Events and
activities
relating to
project
environment
1993
1989
Events and
activities relating
to project
management
Events and
activities relating
to project
performance
1989
Emergence of
Slovak state
1998
Elections
2004
Slovakia in EU
2007
Final decision
on completion
2008
2014
Re-start of Commissioning
completion
of the NPP
works
Unit 3
2015
Commissioning
of the
NPP Mochovce
Unit 4
2011
Realization of
stress tests of
NPP Mochovce
as result of
accident NPP
Fukushima
192
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Savage, G. T., T. W. Nix, Whitehead and Blair, 1991. Strategies for assessing and managing organizational stakeholders. S. l. : Academy of
Management Executive.
Siemens to quit nuclear industry. BBC News Business 18. September 2011 Retrieved on 10 July 2012, URL:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business 14963575
Správa o vplyvoch na ņivotné prostredie pre 3. a 4. blok AE Mochovce. (Report on environmental impact) Published by Slovenské elektrárne,
member of ENEL group 2009
Ńtúdia hodnotenia vplyv na ņivotné prostredie pre 3. a 4. blok elektrárne Mochovce. (Study of environmental impact of Mochovce units 3 and 4)
(2007) Golder Associates 2007.
The Annual report of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic 2010, The National property fund of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava,
Slovakia, 2011
The History of Siemens – From Workshop to Global Player Retrieved on 1 June 2012, URL: http://www.siemens.com/about/en/history.htm
Viedeň neuspela so ņalobou proti dostavbe Mochoviec (Vienna did no suceed with the suit against the completion of Mochovce) (2011) TOPKY Sk.
Retrieved on 10 July 2012, URL: http://www.topky.sk/cl/10/1287835/Vieden-neuspela-so-zalobou-proti-dostavbe-Mochoviec
Martinovský, P., Mareń, M.:Political support for nuclear power in Central Europe. Nuclear Governance, Economy and Ecology, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2012
Lessons learned from completion of nuclear power plant EMO 3,4 Case Study. Geneva, November 24, 2010. Juraj Chren, Centrel Business
Development Manager. URL:
http://www.globalelectricity.org/upload/File/Projects/Geneva%20workshop%20(part%20of%20e8%20156)/07.2%20Juraj%20Chren%20%20Enel.pdf
193
SECTION 3
Transport Case Studies
3.1 A2 MOTORWAY, NOWY TOMYSI
Case compiled by: Agnieszka Łukasiewicz
Project Title
Motorway A2
Location
German/Polish border – Nowy Tomyśl
Purpose
connects Poland with the network of European motorways
Scope
Part of A2 motorway from Polish/German border to one of main Polish cities – Poznań
Part of Route E30 (Cork/IE – Omsk/Ru)
Part of TEN-T 2nd corridor
Total Project Value
1,300 mln €
Project Status
Operation
Fixed price
Relevant Physical Dimensions (e.g.
height, width, volume, length)
104.9 km, 6 interchanges,
35 passages for big and medium animals, 71 passages for small animals, protective
barriers for bats etc.
195
targets
time
Completion of the unit 3 – 2014,
The targets will not be achieved in time, because of stress tests
and design changes
cost
EUR 3 billion
The expenditures for completion will be substantially overun.
Some technology for completion was bought 20 years ago and
had to be conserved, guarded, and in some cases replaced,
which generated the additional costs. The new post-Fukushima
design changes will also demanf more financial sources
The specifications were changed many times during the last 20
years in order to meet the requirements of the safety and
technology progress. Status of completion as per the original
design: Civil part 70%, Mechanical part 30%, Electric and I&C
1%.
196
A2 MOTORWAY, NOWY TOMYSI
197
Comments
Internal
Supply-Side Client
Autostrada Wielkopolska II SA
Financiers
Subordinated Investment (388 mln €)
Commercial Loans (186 mln € BBVA S.A., Bank Pekao S.A.,
BRE Bank S.A., Caja Madrid, Calyon, Deutsche Bank AG,
Espirito Santo Investment, KfW IPEX-Bank GmbH, PKO BP,
Societe Generale, WestLB)
European Investment Bank (958 mln €)
Sponsors
Minister of Infrastructure
concessionaire, side of PPP aggreement
Client’s Owners
1. Kulczyk Holding S.A
2. Meridiam A2 West S a.r.l.
3. Strabag AG
4. KWM Investment GmbH
side categories
General Directorate for
National Roads and
(please specify)
Motorways
A2strada sp. z o.o.
First Tier Contractors Scott Wilson
Second Tier
AECOM
Consultants
Autostrada Eksploatacja SA
Providers
Case-Study
Central road administration
authority for issues related to the
national road system
Company owned by Kulczyk Holding SA and
Strabag AG
Engineer
Traffic and Revenue Study
an operating company acting subject to an
agreement with the Concessionaire,
Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A.
198
Case-Study
Comments
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
General Directorate for National Roads and
Motorways
Local Government
Wielkopolska County, Lubuskie County
National Government
Minister of Infrastrucuture
Minister of the Environment
(please specify)
Local Landowners
Category
Case-study
Private landowners
Environmentalists
NGO monitored all aspects of planning new route,
especially influence on Natura 2000 areas and
animal migration patterns
Pracownia na rzecz wszystkich istot
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Adama Mickiewicza University in Poznan
stakeholders
(please specify)
Category
Case-study
Drivers and passengers in general
199
Name
of
Actor
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
Key:
- Project Actor
relationship
200
External
Stakeholder
External
Stakeholder’s
Attitude to this
Project
Ministry of
Infrastructure
External
Stakeholder’s
Influence on
project
Stakeholder
Interest
(initiation, planning, construction,
Very high
Negotiations: Price of building 1km
(9.6 m. €),
Rates for users,
Other conditions
Initiation, operating
General Directorate for
National Roads and
Motorways
Favourable – mostly
depended on
government‘s decisions
High
Controling role of road
administration
All
Ministry of Environment
Concern about the effects
on environment,
especially Natura 2000
areas
Very high
High requirements of environment
protection (1/4 of the whole value of
the project was allocated on
environment protection)
Initiation, planning
European Commission
Favourable
High
Favourable – although sometimes
depended of governing party
UEFA
Very Favourable
Very high
Decision about Euro 2012 in Poland
and Ukraine. Acceleration of
decision making process about the
project.
Initiation
Local goverments
Favourable
Limited
Improving local flow of traffic
Pracownia na rzecz
wszystkich istot
Worried about
environment
High
Monitoring all aspects of influence
the project had on environment
Initiation, planning, construction
201
targets
Actual Achievements Against
Targets
The first plan was 2006 for finalising the
project. Legal changes and long lasting
negotiations caused 5 yrs delay.
After starting the construction process it
lasted 6 months less than planned.
6.1 m. per building 1 km
9.6 m. per building 1 km
There wasn‘t an issue of Natura 2000
areas. Need to change the whole
environmental protection specification.
All targets concerning natural
environment protection were achieved,
25% of the project‘s value was spent on
environment protection.
specification
Grouping
EC, Pracownia na rzecz wszystkich
istot (extremely important
environmental issues)
There wasn‘t an issue of Natura 2000 areas.
Need to change the whole environmental
protection specification.
All targets concerning natural environment
protection were achieved, 25% of the project‘s
value was spent on environment protection.
202
National (build law)
European (environment protection law)
Changing environmental regulations
The new requirements of banks financing the project on the environment during construction and operation
Obligation to make a Security Audit
Change of protected areas throughout the project (the creation of new and extension set)
To prepare reports for the Building Design
(a requirement of the European Commission and the banks financing the project)
Hostile attitude to the concession agreement from one of the governing parties
Elections
Increase in price of building materials
203
TIME
1993
relating to project
stakeholders
relating to project
management
relating to project
performance
relating to project
environment
1995
2000
2004
2009
2011
2012
Establishing comapny
winning concessioning
cometition (2 fragments of
A2 highway)
Negotiations about first
fragment of A2 highway
Realisation of first fragment
of A2 highway
Negotiations about second fragment of A2
highway
Realisation of second
fragment of A2 highway
Additional
Infrastructure
for launching
pre-emptive
204
3.2 ATHENS RING ROAD
Case compiled by: Dr. Athena Romboutsos
Project Title
Athens Ring Road
Location
Athens , Greece
Purpose
To develop the inner ring and integrate a full road network for fast and safe transport in the
entire Attika region, to provide connection from / to Athens International Airport , to connect the
Patras – Athens and Athens – Thessaloniki highways
Scope
65km Motorway
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP‘s)
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
65km urban motorway, 24 intercharges, 125 Overpasses/Underpasses, 38 railroad grade
seperated crossings, 12 pedestrian overpasses, 56 no of bored &cut & cover sections, 15,4 km
length of tunnels &cut & cover sections, Length of flood protection works, 3 lanes per direction
+ Emergency lane
205
Internal
Supply-Side
Demand-Side
Client
Case-Study
Greek State (Ministry of Environment, Physical Planning and Civil Works)
Financiers
Grant, E.U , EIB loan, EIF guarantees, Commercial loans and guarantees, Contractor
company Attiki Odos SA
Sponsors
Concession Company Attiki Odos SA
Client’s Owners
(please specify)
n/a
n/a
Principal Contractor
Category
Case-Study
Site Owner
Greek State
ATTIKI ODOS
CONSTRUCTION JOINT
VENTURE
construction company for the project
ATTIKES DIADROMES S.A.
company which has undertaken the operation and
maintenance
of Attica Tollway
The Greek Parliament
The Parliament has the legislative duties of the Greek
state. The concession contract and the EIA have been
ratified by the parliament as Laws of the Greek state.
Concession Company Attiki Odos SA is the company has undertaken the design,
construction, financing, operation and maintenance of the motorway
Equity joint venture specifically
formed for this project
Group of Companies Attiki Odos
Group Pella (First candidate temporary contractor)
Group CONCIF (Second candidate temporary contractor)
Second Tier Consultants n/a
Jacobs Gibb Ltd. and SGI – Trademco were appointed as the Independent Engineer
Providers
with their main duties being to supervise and monitor the works, provide certifications
of progress and quality control, approve engineering plans and approve the necessity
of any additional works required outside the concessioned object .
Halcrow Bank Tech. Advisor
206
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Case-Study
Comments
Traffic Police , Fire Brigade, Ambulance
Local Government
Thirty-three local, municipal and regional authorities in Attiki region
National Government
Greek Government
categories ( please specify)
Archaeology
Private
provide permits, authorizations and plans
that were essential for the planning and
progress of the works
Case-study
Approximately 200 specialist
archaeologists, conservators and
technicians worked on all aspects of
the project, in order to investigate,
detect, register and promote
elements of cultural heritage
Local residents
Attica Residents
Local Landowners
n/a
Environmentalists
The Environmental Terms for the ESSM section of Attiki Odos
The EIA of the Immitos Western Peripheral Motorway
Conservationists
Archaeologists
stakeholders (please
specify)
n/a
n/a
Category
Case study
Activists
I won‘t pay movement (appeared in
year 2009)
207
Name of
Actor
Description of
relationship
208
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps 1996
ACTOR
T.S.A
17.06%
ABAX S.A
ALTEA
T.S.A
8,47%
8,22%
ETETH S.A
ATTI-KAT T.S.A
9,82%
8,58%
J&P
(Hellas)
S.A
8,47%
TEGA
S.A.
4,91%
ELLAKTOR S.A
Concession contract
Greek state
8,47%
Attiki odos S.A
K.I
SARANTOPOY
LOS S.A
7,62%
9,82%
PANTEHNIK
I S.A.
ATTIKI ODOS
CONSTRUCTION J.V
Project
delivery
Key:
8,47%
Attikes
Diadromes
S.A
TEB S.A.
0,07%
EGIS
PROJECTS
S.A.
Name
of
Actor
Description of
relationship
- Project
Actor
- Project
Relationship
209
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps 2011
J.&P.
AVAX
S.A.Grou
p
ELLAKT
OR S.A
AKTOR
CONCESSI
ONS S.A
59.25%
stake
J.&P.
AVAX
S.A
ETETH
S.A.
9.82%,
stake
21.00
%
stake
ATE
BANK
S.A
9.88%
stake
Concessio
n contract
Greek
State
Attiki
odos S.A
EGIS
PROJEC
TS S.A
0.04%
stake
80%
stake
leading
Key:
20%
stake
ATTIKI ODOS
CONSTRUCTI
ON J.V
Attikes
Diadrome
s S.A
Name of
Actor
Description of
relationship
- Project Actor
- Project
Relationship
210
to this Project
on project
Greek Government
Archaeology
Attica Residents
The EIA of the Immitos
Western Peripheral Motorway
Thirty-three municipals
Activists
211
MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Attitude Analysis
Internal Stakeholder
Internal Stakeholder’s
Internal Stakeholder’s
Impact of Project on Internal
Stakeholder
Greek State
Concession Company Attiki Odos SA
ATTIKI ODOS CONSTRUCTION
JOINT VENTURE
ATTIKES DIADROMES S.A.
Halcrow Bank Tech. Advisor
Jacobs Gibb Ltd. and SGI –
Trademco
212
n/a
Structure
5000 employees
Involvement
n/a
Life-Cycle Costing Approaches X
Project Management Software X
□
□
□
Project Knowledge Management Tools X
Team Building Tools
□
□
□
213
Project Processes
214
targets
Construction completed 2003
Concession hand over 2004
Original Target cost approx. 1.2bn€
Project matched the Original Target cost
specification
215
Olympics Games
N/A
Olympics Games
Positive
Olympics Games
216
217
3.3 EDINBURGH TRAM NETWORK, SCOTLAND
Case compiled by: Prince Boateng
Project Title
EDINBURGH TRAM NETWORK PROJECT
Location
SCOTLAND, UK
Purpose
- To support the local economy by improving accessibility.
- To promote sustainability and reduce environmental damage caused by traffic.
- To reduce traffic congestion.
- To make the transport system safer and more secure.
- To promote social benefits.
Scope
The Tramline will be double track to:
- Connect Edinburgh Airport to the City Centre
- Link with development areas in North and West Edinburgh
The key contracts are as follows:
• Development Partnering and Operating Franchise Agreement (DPOFA);
• System Design Services (SDS);
• Joint Revenue Committee (JRC);
• Multi Utilities Diversion Framework Agreement (MUDFA);
• Infrastructure provider and maintenance (Infraco); and
• Vehicle supply and maintenance (Tramco).
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
Total length: 24 km in two phases
Phase 1a: 18.5km, is underdevelopment (Case study)
Phase 1b: 5.5 km, to be developed later
218
Internal
Supply-Side
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
The strategic goal of tie and its partners is: “To successfully deliver, by 2011, a world class
tram system in Edinburgh, the Capital of Scotland; safely - together - with commitment,
professionalism and expertise.”
Client
City of Edinburgh Council (CEC)
Financiers
Transport Scotland (TS) and City of Edinburgh Council (CEC)
Sponsors
Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (Tie) and Transport Edinburgh Limited (TEL)
Comments (e.g.
maturity, previous
experiences of
Client’s Customers UK Tram, Edinburgh Trams
Client’s Owners
Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (Tie), Transport Edinburgh Limited (TEL), Lothian Buses (LB)
Other internal
Category
supply-side
categories ( please Tram Project Board (TPB)
specify)
Council Audit Committee (PAC)
MPs/ Ministers
Demand Side Principal
Contractor
First Tier
Contractors
Case-Study
A formal sub-committee of TEL. Delegated authority to
monitor the delivery of the trams project
Project Audit
Parliamentary & political parties representatives
Bilfinger Berger Siemens (BBS) - Responsible for infrastructure construction (INFRACO).
Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles SA (CAF)- Responsible for tram vehicle construction
(TRAMCO).
Alfred McAlpine Infrastructure Services/Carillion-Responsible for utilities diversion work
Parsons Brinkerhoff/Halcrow - SDS provider to facilitate the early identification of utility diversion works,
land purchase requirements and traffic regulation requirements and the completion of design drawings.
Second Tier
Consultants
Faithful & Gould: Construction cost management consultants responsible for risk management
procedures .
Hg Consulting - Independent Certifier with a duty of care to CEC
Steer Davies Gleave (SDG) – Assessed economic costs and benefits of the Trams project in
December, 2007.
Professional
Services Providers
Transdev- was appointed as the tram operator in May 2004 to assist planning of an integrated service
network with TEL. Transdev was later cancelled in December 2009 as a cost saving measure.
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
Category
Case-Study
Financial, Commercial and Financial management - Reporting, control, audit, risk management,
insurance; and Contract management – Reporting, compliance, interface
Legal Committee (FCL)
with delivery, claims and variations.
219
Case-Study
Comments
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Local Government
National Government
Private
Local residents
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
Conservationists
Archaeologists
stakeholders
(please specify)
SEPA, Scottish Water, Parliament, Planning, Road & aviation
authority, Network rail, Historic Scotland, Building Standards
City of Edinburgh Council (CEC)
Scottish Government
Category
Case-study
CEC councillors & officials,
CEC representatives
Edinburgh residents (Randolph Crescent, Queen Street, Moray Feu, Blenheim,
Shandwick, Picardy , Leith Walk, Forth Ports etc..)
SEPA, Friends of the Earth Scotland; Sustainable Scotland Network; Lothian &
Edinburgh Environmental Partnership; Scottish Environment Link; Scottish
Natural Heritage (SNH). Scottish Executive‘s Countryside and Natural Heritage
Unit (CANHU).
Headland Archaeology (UK) Limited; City Council Archaeologists –Edinburgh,
Glasgow University Archaeological Research Division (GUARD)
Category
Case-study
B.A.A Edinburgh Airport; Henderson Global Investors (St.
James Centre); Forth Ports; Edinburgh Business Forum;
Essential Edinburgh; Federation of small businessesScotland; Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce; and
representatives of local communities impacted by the
Trams.
Key business and
other stakeholders
220
Funding Authority
Project Audit Committee
Transport Scotland (TS)
The Council
Group
(Key business & other
stakeholders)
Project Sponsor
City of Edinburgh Council
(Project director)
Joint Project Delivery
Group
The Council/TS/Elected Member Reps
Joint Project Forum
Strategic Direction &
Control
Council Chair
Senior responsible Officer
Council/Tie/TS/BB&S/CAF
/Tram Operator
Jointly Appointed
Independent Adjudicator
(Engineering Experts)
Employing Audit Scotland
Best value advanced
practices toolkits
Traffic Management (CEC)
Approvals
Design (Approvals/Consents/ Management)
Independent Certifier
Risk
Design
Consents
Programme
Contract Variation
Construction Progress Reporting
Valuation/Cost
Key:
BB & S
Land Acquisitions & compensation
Remedial Works
CAF
Tram Vehicle Delivery & Integration
Communications
Name of
Actor
Description of
relationship
Health & Safety/ The Railways & Other guided
Transport Systems Safety Regulation s
- Project Actor
- Project
Relationship
CONTRACTS
221
ORIGINAL TRAM PROJECT BOARD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
City of Edinburgh
Council
Director of City
Development
Transport Scotland
Director of Rail Delivery
Transport Edinburgh Ltd
Chair
Chief Executive
Tie
Executive Chair
Tram Project Board
Chaired by TEL Chair
Sub-Committee
Business planning,
integration and commercials
Sub-Committee
Design, procurement
and delivery
TEL Team
Planning, integration
and commercial
Tram Project Director
and team
Source: Audit Scotland
222
Stakeholder
B.A.A Edinburgh Airport
Positive
High
Low
Henderson Global Investors (St. James
Centre)
Positive
High
High
Forth Ports
Positive
High
Low
Edinburgh Business Forum
Positive
High
High
Essential Edinburgh
Positive
Low
High
Federation of small businesses- Scotland
Positive
Low
High
Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce
Positive
High
Low
Representatives of local communities
impacted by the Trams.
Positive
Low
High
223
Structure
350
and Structure
3000
Involvement
n/a
Team Building Tools
224
Project Processes
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ Short, medium and long term risk management strategies including
planning engagement, and co-ordination of risks were approaches used to achieve market commitments for deliverable
packages of work and to reach financial close to commence construction activities. The risk management deliverables include
the use of Project Risk Management Plan; Assumption Register; Project Risk Register; Risk Progress Report; Project Estimate
Reports ; risk workshops and one-to-one meetings with those responsible for mitigating project risks.
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The people strategy enshrined in the Human Resource (HR) plan
has underpinned the Project Management Plan of ETP. Tram Delivery team, resources and capability are used to manage the
process required for good project and cost control and undertake sufficient inspection of what is being delivered. This is to
provide assurance and confidence in the end product delivery and quality to ETP client and key stakeholders involved such as
TEL, CEC, TS and the Scottish Government.
Processes
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The procurement strategy applied to ETNP is entirely compatible
with the approach of a staggered implementation of the project Phases. The key contracts relating specifically to the Phase
under development are SDS, MUDFA, Infraco and Tramco. The contractual principles for each of these are the same with a
specific elements set for other phases of the project.
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ To ensure effective system integration management processes,
INFRACO – an implementation company was task to be responsible for construction , integration and maintenance of the tram
system. Lothian Buses, The principal bus operator in Edinburgh which is wholly owned by the public sector would facilitate tram /
bus integration and maximise the operational and service opportunities this presents.
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The Scope Management Procedure has been developed to address
the following workflows within the ETNP Workstream: Identification, Modelling & design, Approval & review of required
i) Traffic and Pedestrian Management, ii) MUDFA, iii) INFRACO, iv) TRAMCO, v) SDS, and vi) System integration .
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ Cost estimates are fully aligned to the Master Programme & are
developed to detailed workstream level, enabling the effective management of costs throughout the project lifecycle. These
project cost estimates were and continue to be reviewed at principle points of the project .and they form the baseline against
which the project manages expenditure
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The project adopted quality management system which conforms to
the principles and requirements of BS EN ISO 9001:2000 Quality Management Systems.
Processes
Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ A range of communication and media methodologies were used.
(Contact database; Bespoke presentations for briefings; Exhibition and banner stands; Construction Newsletters &Tram time
newsletter – wider community; Fact Sheets and Concertinas; Tram DVD; Tram branding; Tram models and simulations; and
Leaflets; One to one briefings with partners and key stakeholders; Q&As; Key Messages / statements; Key programme dates;
Working action plan and Stock photography)
225
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance (TIME)
Planned infrastructure construction programme
Year
Quarter number
2007
2
3
2008
4
1
2
3
2009
4
1
2
3
2010
4
1
2
3
2011
4
Newhaven to Foot of Leith Walk
Foot of Leith to St. Andrew Square
St. Andrew Square to Haymarket
Haymarket to Edinburgh Park
Station
Edinburgh Park station to Airport
Legend:
Utilities
Road and Tramworks
Overhead line equipment
226
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance (TIME)
Delivery against key milestones
2006
3 4
Year
quarter number
Business Case
planned
Actual
Design and Traffic
Regulation Orders
planned
Actual
Utilities
planned
Actual
TRAMCO
planned
Actual
INFRACO
planned
Actual
2007
2 3
1
4
1 2
1 2
1
3 4
3 4
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
5
Business Case
1
Approval of draft final business case by CEC
2
Confirmation of INFRACO tender prices to CEC
3
Approval of final business case by TPB
4
Approval of final business case by CEC
5
Design and TROs
3
2
2
2
2
4
5
23 4
23 4
1
1
Key Milestones
2008
2009
2010
2011
2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
4
3
3
3
5
4
45
6
7
8
45
Utilities
1
TRO process commences
2
Completion of construct. dwgs - Utilities diversion
3
Completion of planning drawing
4
Completion of detailed design const. dwgs
5
TRO process complete
Infraco
1
Award of Utilities diversion contract
1
Return of Stage 1 bid
2
Completion of pre-const. Period of utilities design contract
2
Completion of evaluation/negotiation of Stage 2 bid
3
Commencement of utility diversion works trial site
3
Recommendation of preferred bidder
4
Commencement of utility diversion works
4
Award of Infraco contract
5
Completion of utilities diversion works
5
Construction of track and tram depot commences
6
Depot completion
7
Commencement of test running
8
Delivery into revenue service
Tramco
1
Completion of initial evaluation/negotiation of bids
2
Recommendation of preferred bidder
3
Award of Tramco contract
4
Delivery of first tram
5
Delivery of all trams
227
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance. (TIME)
Delivery
against key milestones
Year 2006
Quarter number 3 4
2007
1
2
3
4
2008
1
2
3
2009
4
1
2
3
4
2010
1
2
3
2011
4
1
Business Case
Design and Traffic
Regulation order
Utilities
Tram construction
(Tramco)
Infrastructure
construction (Infraco)
Legend:
Plan
Actual
228
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance (COST)
Edinburgh tram network spend to the end of December 2010
300
Budget as at May 2008
Expenditure to end December 2010
250
£million
200
150
100
50
0
Infrastructure
construction
Tram
construction
Utilities
diversion
Design
Project
management
Land and
compensation
Contingency
229
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance. (COST)
Spend by type against budget
300
Actual Budget as at May 2008
Expenditure to end December 2010
Actual Spend to end December 2010
250
Projected spend to end
December 2010 at
financial close(May 2008)
£million
200
150
Total budget at
financial close
(May 2008)
Actual Spend to
end December
2010
100
50
0
Infrastructure
construction
Tram
Vehicles
Utilities
diversion
Design
Land and
compensation
Project
management
Contingency/
risk allowance
230
MEGAPROJECT Project Performance. (COST)
Planned and actual expenditure profiles
Cumulative spend to 31 March 2008
Spend during 2008/2009
Spend during 2009/2010
Planned spend during 2010/2011
Planned spend during 2011/2012
180
£ Million
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Projected spend as
at December 2007
Projected spend as
at May 2008
Projected spend as
at April 2009
Projected spend as
at April 2010
Projected spend as
at December 2010
231
Stakeholder or
Community and
Business
Facilitate communication to ensure local businesses and residents and other
affected parties are kept fully informed of the nature and timing of the works.
Achieved
Project Stakeholders
• Commit to a one-message approach, owned by all key partners and
stakeholders;
• Generate support and endorsement as required from key audiences: local
residents and businesses; commuters; political; media; travelling public;
community; special interest groups and visitors to Edinburgh; and
• Encourage a joined-up working approach between tie, CEC, LB and TEL.
Partially achieved
Project
Communication
•Implement a robust public information campaign during construction, and
throughout key stages such as utilities diversion; final business case
approval; contracts awarded for Tramco and Infraco; tram branding; final tram
route design; tram commissioning and driver training; new tram timetable and
tram operation by TEL; and ensure all tie and CEC management and
operational staff are kept up to date and are fully briefed as appropriate.
Partially achieved
Media and External
Relations
• Generate positive media coverage for the tram project, tie, CEC and TEL,
focusing on benefits for the travelling public and wider economy;
• Harness political and public support and media commentary; and
• Demonstrate competence and efficiency of delivery agent, promoter and
funders.
Partially achieved
232
ETNP is governed by the following Legal and Regulatory frameworks (regionally, nationally and Europe wide)
• Edinburgh Tram Acts
• New Roads and Street Works Act (NRSWA)
• Code of Construction Practice (Buildings, Roads, Bridges)
• The Road Traffic Regulation for the tram
• The Local Authorities' Traffic Orders (Procedure) (Scotland) Regulations 1999 as amended.
• Environmental Impact Assessment (Scotland) Regulations (covering: Traffic and Transport, Land Use,
Geology, Soils and Contaminated Land, Landscape and Visual Impacts, Ecology and Nature Conservation,
Water Quality, Cultural Heritage, Socio Economic Effects, Noise and Vibration, Air Quality) .
• Environmental Impact Assessment (EU) Regulations.
• Delays in obtaining temporary traffic regulation orders for construction - (Regional)
• Delays in obtaining consent – (Regional and National).
• Legislative/ Regulatory change -(Regional, National and Europe wide)
• Insufficient powers to acquire land.
The political project environment for ETNP varies in influence according to the number of political seats or
elected members within the City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) .
• Political opposition;
• Lack of political support;
• Lack of partner support;
• Political indecision.
• Project termination
233
Economic Project Environment for ETNP is based on the following economic benefits:
• Reduction of travel time.
• Economic efficiency.
• Employment development.
• Employment generation.
• Residential development
• Economic growth.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Incorrect project cost estimate
Incorrect project time estimate
Wage inflation
Changes in VAT
Global economic recession
Changes in taxation
Cost and delays due to utilities diversions
Changes in inflation as construction works proceed
234
3.4 HSR MADRID-BARCELONA-FIGUERES
Case compiled by: Rafaela Alfalla-Luque and Carmen Medina-López
Contact details: [email protected], [email protected]
Project Title
High-Speed Train in Spain: Madrid-Barcelona-French frontier (Figueres)
Location
Spain
Purpose
To joint two main cities in Spain through high speed train. Safe, punctual and comfortable means of
transport. To improve connections with France. The last stage is currently being worked on, the
Barcelona-Figueres section, which links with the Figueres-Perpignan section (which has been in
service since December 2010). 6
Scope
To improve the connection between cities. Integrated with Trans-European Transport Network
(TEN-T)
Total Project Value
Total investment of nearly 9 billion euro (Madrid-Barcelona) 6
Project Status (i.e.. initiation,
Finish date (Madrid-Barcelona): 02/2008
Expected finish date (Barcelona-Figueres): 2012
(Expected divergence 3 years)
planning, construction, operation,
dismantling)
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
Madrid-Barcelona: 6,611 million Euros (inaugurated on 20 February 2008
Barcelona-Figueres: 4,200 million de euros [22]
Line length: 664 km (Madrid-Barcelona)- 804 Km (M-B-Figueres)
Operating speed: The track is designed for speeds of up to 350 km/h in nearly 86% of the route,
although Renfe Operadora runs commercial services at 300 km/h.
International gauge, compatible signaling system, standard electrification
Minimum 7000 m radius bends on the general track
Ramps under 2.5% - Maximum 140 mm slope - Junctions suitable for 350 km/h 6
235
HSR MADRID-BARCELONA-FIGUERES
http://turismoytren.com/index.php/nuevo-mapa-de-la-alta-velocidad-en-espana/
236
HSR MADRID-BARCELONA-FIGUERES
ADVANTAGES OF THE LINE [51]
This line allows communication between the two most densely populated urban areas of Spain (Madrid and
Barcelona) and Zaragoza and other cities such as Guadalajara, Calatayud, Lleida and Tarragona.
This infrastructure also extends its benefits to other cities to connect:
In Madrid, the North-Northeast corridor (LAV Valladolid), South corridor (LAV Seville and Malaga) and runner
Levante (Valencia LAV).
* In Zaragoza with the high-speed and international gauge Zaragoza-Huesca
* In Camp de Tarragona and the Mediterranean Corridor.
* Also, thanks to the wide exchange facilities of Plasencia de Jalon, the benefits extend to La Rioja and
Navarre.
Another unique feature of this line is its design for mixed passenger and freight (including the Port of
Barcelona and the connection to France), which implies the possibility of establishing new services to or from
intermodal centers in France and other European countries.
In addition to a significant reduction in travel times, this modern infrastructure provides a number of benefits
including:
* Citizens have a more integrated rail infrastructure, safe and sustainable
* A significant increase in capacity and regularity of rail traffic resulting from the technical specifications and
design of the line.
* Significant increase comfort by establishing optimal conditions of rolling and drawing
* Increased security by incorporating advanced technologies in control systems of rail traffic
* Security is enhanced by the fencing on both sides of the track and the absence of level crossings
* Removing barriers and improving urban permeability and potential for development of cities
ONLINE FEATURES [51]
It extends over 804 kilometers from Madrid to Figueres.
The layout allows traffic at speeds up to 350 km / h in almost 86% of the course, although it commercially
exploits Renfe Operator to 300 km / h.
INFRASTRUCTURE [51]
The construction parameters applied were very demanding to allow the development of maximum speeds of
350 kilometers per hour in commercial service and ensure the interoperability of the infrastructure according
to EU rules:
* Tread international signaling system compatible, standard electrification
* Curves of minimum radius of 7000 m in the general pathway
* Ramps less than 2.5%
* Maximum depth 140 mm
* Deviations suitable for 350 km / h
The line has by-pass in Zaragoza, Lleida and Figueres so that not to penalize travel times of non-stop train
in those cities.
Furthermore, the Barcelona-Figueres section is designed for passenger traffic and also for the transport of
certain types of goods.
237
Stakeholder
Category
Internal
Supply-Side Client
Financiers
Sponsors
Client’s
Customers
Comments
Case-Study
RENFE OPERATOR is the national rail passenger operator and is a state-owned
company controlled by the ministry of public works (Ministerio de Fomento).
European Union. During the period 2000-2006 co-financing was provided as follows:
* By the Cohesion Fund which provided 3.3581 billion euro for the construction of
platforms on the Madrid-Barcelona section, as well as the supply and installation of
tracks on the Madrid-Vilafranca del Penedés section and power lines, signaling and
communications on the Madrid-Lerida section.
* By TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network) Funds which provided funding of 70.9
million euro for studies and projects as well as track-bed works on the Maçanet-Sils
section. 41
During the period 2007-2013 there will be co-financing:
*By TEN-T funds of 10.6 million euro for the implementation of the ERTMS (European
Rail Traffic Management System) on the Barcelona-Figueras section.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) collaborates in the funding of this project. 6
The total cost of this line is €10.5 billion, with EU Cohesion Policy contributions
amounting to about €3.4 billion. 41
Final customers: Tourists, professionals, passengers in general. General public
(passengers), freight operators
Client’s Owners In January 1, 2005 the RENFE Railway Sector law extinguish RENFE company. This
company was divided into two companies: 1) one that operates the trains called Renfe
Operator, and 2) one that manages the infrastructure called ADIF (Railway Infrastructure
Manager). RENFE Operator is a Public Enterprise under the control of the Ministry of
Development of Spain. It is heir to the legacy of RENFE (Spanish National Railways
Company), a company created in 1941. 8
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
Category
Infrastructure
Administrator
(ADIF)
Case-Study
ADIF is a separate state-owned organisation, is responsible for
development of the high-speed lines that are under construction 4
It manages (operation and maintenance) the railway infrastructure. [10, 4]
238
Stakeholder
Category
Internal
Demand- Principal
Side
Contractor
First Tier
Contractors
Case-Study
Siemens, Alsthom and CAF signed the agreement for the manufacture of the sixteen ICE-3
trains to be run through the high speed line (AVE) between Madrid and Barcelona. CAF and
Alstom took charge of about twenty-five percent of the manufacturing machining Siemens
train [25]
The trains are Germany's Siemens and the Spanish Talgo, signaling was awarded to
Ansaldo Italian and the Spanish Cobra and assistance technique (4% of the budget,
according to Renfe) to virtually all engineering firms in the country works. [26]
Acciona, OHL and Sacyr have been awarded the works of the entrance to the high speed
railway line (Ave) Madrid-Barcelona in the Catalan capital [29]
Dragados, Comsa y Acsa , the joint venture formed by Rubau, Copisa, FCC Construcción
and Ferrovial Agromán [32] Siemens and Talgo/Bombardier builds the train machine
ACS, Ferrovial, FCC, Sacyr Vallehermoso and OHL (construction firms) build the track [12]
HKL: The German multinational has been in the works of the AVE to contracting companies
leasing equipment different tonnage. It has also intervened in the emergency works carried
out between Bellvitge and Sants and repair of the tunnels [27]
Currently, Redalsa is going through the lanes and elastic fasteners for the route of the AVE
Madrid-Barcelona. [28]
Second Tier
Consultants
Professional
Services Providers
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
TYPSA information studies and projects as technical assistance and supervision of works
[39]
Category
Case-Study
Industrial producers of railway equipment [2]
Basalt suppliers: Up to five different quarries provided the basalt (Ophites of
Happy St., Stone and Derivatives SA, Quarries The Ponderosa, Quartzite of
Mediterranean and Bob Arno and Sons). [26]
239
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Local Government
National Government
categories ( please specify)
Private
Case-Study
Comments
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Development
Environment Agency from Madrid (Agencia de Medio Ambiente
– AMA- de la Comunidad de Madrid), Agencia Catalana del
Agua
Madrid, Aragon and Cataluña. Municipal authorities/town councils and the
Committees for Coordination and regional Development (CCDR)
Spanish government, MOPTC (Public Works, Transport and Communications),
MF (Ministry of Finance and the Public Administration) and MA (Ministry for the
environment)
Category
Case-study
Public landowners, Tourism board, Industry & service
associations, Cities with HST stations
Local residents
Local Associations
Local Landowners
Private landowners
Environmentalists
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, European Environment Agency
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Category
stakeholders (please specify) Other transport operators
Case study
Press & Media
Opinion makers, placement of news and opinion articles by
companies interested in the project
Political Opinion
240
Numerous
external
stakeholders
Numerous
external
stakeholders
Local
and regional
government
Spanish
government
Ministry of Environment,
Ministry of Development
Environment Agency
from Madrid (AMA)
Agencia Catalana del
Agua
Passengers
in general
(client‘s
customers)
ADIF /
GIF
RENFE
(client)
Private landowners
Greenpeace,
Friends of the Earth
Other transport
operators
TYPSA
Consultant
Cohesion
Fund and the
TEN-T
budget
Suppliers basalt: Ophites
of
Happy St., Stone and
Derivatives SA, Quarries
The Ponderosa,
Quartzite of
Mediterranean and Bob
Arno and Sons asalt
Contracts with
Contracts with
Contracts with
Contracts with
Contracts with
Contracts with
Acciona,
Sacyr,OHL,
Dragados,
Comsa y Acsa
Rubau,
Copisa,
FCC,
Ferrovial,
Vallehermoso
Contracts with
Contracts with
First tier
subcontra
ctors
Contracts with
2nd tier
sub
contractors
First tier
subcontra
ctors
Contracts with
2nd tier
sub
contractors
Ansaldo
And
Cobra
SIEMENS
(electrification
provider) and
Talgo
Contracts with
Contracts with
First tier
subcontra
ctors
First tier
subcontra
ctors
Contracts with Contracts with
2nd tier
sub
contractor
s
ALSTHOM
(Train
Machine
Provider)
CAF
CONSTRUCCIONES Y
AUXILIAR DE
FERROCARRILES
Contracts with
Contracts with
First tier
subcontra
ctors
Contracts with
Key:
Name
of Actor
HKL and
Redalsa
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
2nd tier
sub
contractors
2nd tier
sub
contractors
- Project Actor
with a contractual
basis
- Non-contractual
Project relationship
241
to this Project
External
Stakeholder’s
Influence on
project
Impact of Project on External Stakeholder
Interest (initiation, planning,
construction, operation, dismantling )
Tourism board
Highly Favourable . The HST has
an impact on travel distribution and
modal choice. Furthermore, the
high quality of transport can
generate new trips offered not from
additional modes. 11
General ability
to lobby
government
High. Contributes to achieving its overall aims
Operation
EU Commission
Highly Favourable . Contemplates
HST as a new form of European
integration 2
General ability
to lobby
government
Contributes to achieving its overall aims
Initiation, Planning, Construction
& Operation
Others transport
operators:
air transport (Iberia , …
and airports), on
conventional railways
and on road transport
(buses, cars and road
network) 2
Worried about effects
Limited
For air transport between Madrid and Barcelona the
introduction of the HRS reduced the airport traffic. The
route Madrid-Barcelona was in 2007 the world's busiest
passenger air route with 971 scheduled flights per week
(both directions). In order to compete with each other
RENFE has made, and Iberia will make, changes to their
fare structures, as well as changing services; Iberia plans
to use smaller planes which will leave as soon as full
Operation
Industry & services
Associations
Highly Favourable .
Commercial reasons 2
Medium
High
Operation
Greenpeace, Friends of
the Earth, Environment
agency (AMA); Spanish
Ministry of Environment;
Ability to Lobby
Government
Private landowners
Worried about the lost of the land
Limited
Lost of the land
Construction
cities with HST stations
Highly Favourable .
Medium
High
Construction & Operation
Barcelona cultural
associations
Limited
The construction committee of Barcelona's famed
Sagrada Familia church lobbied for a re-routing of the
tunnel - it passes within metres of the massive church's
foundations. It also passes equally near the UNESCOrecognized Casa Milà also designed by Antoni Gaudí
Construction and Operation
Environmental
organisations
Highly unfavourable
Substantively
harmful
Can limit the development of the process (presenting
successive complaints about negative impacts that the
project brings)
and Operation
and Operation
242
Structure
RENFE
Contractor Project Team
Size and Structure
Siemens, Alsthom, CAF, [25]
Talgo, Ansaldo [26]
Acciona,OHL, Sacyr, [29]
Dragados, Comsa y Acsa , the joint venture formed by Rubau, Copisa, FCC Construcción and Ferrovial
Agromán [32]
Involvement
HKL: The German multinational has been in the works of the AVE to contracting companies leasing equipment
different tonnage. It has also intervened in the emergency works carried out between Bellvitge and Sants and
repair of the tunnels [27]
Redalsa is going through the lanes and elastic fasteners for the route of the AVE Madrid-Barcelona. [28]
Firms of engineering, construction, manufacturing systems and trains
□
□
□
□
□
Team Building Tools
Other Tools and Techniques or More Information:
Renfe, as operator of the network, says it will be a model "completely innovative and participation in all phases of the process,
the aftercare of the product― [43]
especially
243
Project Processes
Department of Regulation and Control Integrated traffic management: in the high-speed lines also has advanced
traffic management on the integration platform Davinci, a specified and owned by ADIF, which can integrate
information from other systems related to rail traffic, such as the Remote Power, communications, passenger
information systems, remote control of sensors. This is an Intelligent Transportation System that features
incorporating the latest technologies. 45
The CRC concept integrates all the systems involved in the regulation of railway traffic, responding to the
demands of high speed. Thus, from these centers are regulated simultaneously signaling, electrification,
communications systems, traveler information and energy, among other things. Process integration is possible
through the DaVinci system, considered one of the world's most advanced in the regulation of railway traffic. This
system, intellectual property of ADIF, get an overview of all subsystems into which traffic management through a
single platform, which optimizes the process considerably. The CRC direct and coordinate the circulation in real
time, following a defined transportation plan, meeting the safety and punctuality rates required, and allowing
immediate response to any incidents 47
The main drawback of HST in corridors of low traffic density is its high cost. Infrastructure (generally not
compatible with freight transport) is more expensive than that required by conventional railways, and its use is
associated with decreasing average costs.
244
Start date: 1995
Estimated finish date (M-B-F): 2009
Finish date (Madrid-Barcelona): 02/2008
Expected finish date (Barcelona-Figueres): 2012
(Expected divergence 3 years)
It is estimated that the AVE MadridBarcelona will cost more than six billion
euros. One Km of this line will cost
7.362.398,28 euros (initial estimation). 34
Seen 2002 investment was expected in the
line of 7,800 million euros 34
Total investment of nearly 9 billion euro (Madrid-Barcelona) 6
(a divergence of 3 billion euros related to the initial estimated
cost).
Estimated number of passengers:
Renfe provides transport 6.1 million
passengers with this service in your first
year of operation (2008). This figure is
almost double the 3.3 million passengers in
2007 and earn about three million new
customers 35
Annual passenger traffic and year: 7 millions (2009)
There was much criticism during the construction of the
Madrid-Barcelona line. A highly critical report by the consulting
firm KPMG, commissioned by ADIF (Administrador de
Infraestructuras Ferroviarias) at the behest of the Ministry for
Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento) on 23 June 2004,
pointed to a lack of in-depth studies and over-hasty execution
of works as the most important reasons for the problems that
dogged construction of the AVE line. For example, during the
construction of the AVE tunnel near Barcelona, a number of
nearby buildings suffered minor damage from a large sinkhole
that appeared near a commuter rail station, damaging one of
its platforms.
Passengers: 2,337,913 (2008); 2.651.598 (2009); 2.574.920
(2010); 2.515.681 (2011) [10, 16, 12, 17]
245
Stakeholder or
Stakeholder
Grouping
Original Aims of Project
Involvement and
Tourism agency
Industry
government
Passenger traffic increase
The Madrid–Barcelona–French Frontier route is one of the most relevant land links with
Europe. It channels an important flow of tourists toward the south of Spain and
Levante. In addition, Catalonia and Aragon maintain significant commercial and cultural
relations with the French southern regions and its web economies are very
important. 24
City of Madrid
Madrid mobility
enhancements
Impact urban environment of the station, step by residential, increased activity,
congestion traffic, in a psychological effect for residents. increased mobility for residents
and host population, as we saw above, goes to the city in unacceptably high, for work
and to take steps, leisure, etc.. with the consequent economic impact 15
The challenge of a project of this type is:
- assert that rail transport is the safest;
- promote the use of clean transport, especially in short to medium distances 38
City of Barcelona
Barcelona mobility
enhancements
•Increased capacity and regularity.
•Significant increase comfort by establishing optimal conditions of rolling and drawing.
•Increased security by incorporating advanced technologies in control systems of rail
traffic.
•Removing barriers and improving urban permeability and potential for development of
cities.
•Citizens have a more integrated rail infrastructure, safe and sustainable, while guests
enjoy reduced journey times. 31
Locals and citizens
Benefits for citizens
Increase the overall efficiency of the rail system.
Ensuring the safety of rail transport.
Improve the structuring of the territory.
Promote social cohesion and sustainable development.
To promote the welfare of citizens and their quality of life 31
246
The Plan of Infrastructure and Transport of the Spanish Government 16
Nueva Ley del sector Ferroviario 39/2003 17 de noviembre
REAL DECRETO 2387/2004, de 30 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento del Sector
Ferroviario
Orden Ministerial FOM/898/2005 en la que se fijan las cuantías de los cánones ferroviarios
Orden Ministerial FOM/233/2006 para la homologación del material rodante ferroviario [30]
General Plan of Urban Development
Real Decreto 1302/86 on environmental impact assessments for public works [25]
Environment Agency (Agencia de Medio Ambiente-AMA): Effect on the river Manzares - deterioration of the
avifauna of the area - noise barriers to mitigate the effects of the passage of the train next to residential
areas [21] [25]- The work required to correct the environmental impact of Madrid-Seville line will cost about
4,000 million pesetas [23]
Archaeological prospection - average cost of 20,000 pesetas per hectare [24]7
Plan de Acción Regional del Transporte para el Mediterráneo (2010-2013) TYPSA leads the consortium of
consulting companies supporting the European Commission in implementing the Regional Action Plan for
Transport in the Mediterranean, acting as the main contract in the EuroMed Transport Project, the project of
regional cooperation in transport of the Union European neighbors to the south [40]
- Urban planning measures: regulations and incentives to reduce the possible barrier effects of the rail
system; new zoning of land uses to allow the location of new economic activities and create positive
synergies
- Management measures: the implementation of mobility policies to foster the coherent coordination of
internal and external passenger flows. 16
- interest to remove regional imbalances and improve communications in the country
None Identified
247
Economic Project
Environment
* Key factor of geographic integration.
* Contribution to the development of several of the Spanish regions.
* Strategic role in the development of a global metropolitan network in Spain.
* The benefit of the Barcelona-Madrid AVE is 970 million within 40 years, and 8,990 million taking into
account indirect factors, such as its impact on tourism and the territory. These 8,990 million would be 10.187
million if we add other intangible factors such as the country's political credibility, citizen appreciation and
reputational assets [36]
None identified
248
TIME
1988
1993
1995
1997
1999 2001
2003
2005 2007 2009 2011 2012
relating to project
stakeholders
relating to project
management
relating to project
performance
Cabinet
approval
Tender
Madrid-Saragossa-Lerida
Lerida-Camp de
Tarragona
2008
TarragonaBarcelona
Barcelona-Figueres
Opened the first
Spanish high speed
train: the AVE
Madrid-Sevilla (1992)
Spain joined the
CEE (1986)
relating to project
environment
[42]
http://fcmaf.es/cronologia.htm
The Popular Party
won the election
(1996)
Becomes effective
European single
currency (2002)
Absolute majority for
the Popular Party in
legislative elections
(2000)
Terrorist attack in Madrid
caused 191 victims and
over 1800 wounded (2004)
The government
declared a state of
alarm, for the first
time in democracy,
the crisis of air traffic
controllers (2010)
Economic crisis
The PSOE won the
elections (2004)
249
REFERENCES
1 - http://www.elsoto.org/ave.htm
2 - Rus G. and Inglada, V. (1997): "Cost-Benefit of the High-Speed Train in Spain". The Annals of Regional Science. Volume 31, Number 32,
175-188
3 - http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alta_Velocidad_Espa%C3%B1ola
4 - COMMISION FOR INTEGRATED TRANSPORT (2004) "Report on high-speed rail in the United Kingdom international comparisons.
Appendix F. Spain | [Informe sobre la alta velocidad en inglaterra comparaciones internacionales. Apendice F. España]" Revista de Obras
Publicas 151 (3444), pp. 7-16
5 - Rus, G. and Nombela, G. (2005):Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable? Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. Volume
41. Part I. January 2007, pp 3-23.
6http://www.adif.es/en_US/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa.
shtml
7 - De La Fuente, R.S.; Antín, M.G.; Tordesillas, J.M.C.; Capdepón, F.P.; Francés, J.M.U. (2006) "Analysis of the territorial consequences of the
HST (high speed train) in small cities: Ciudad Real and Puertollano | [Análisis de las consecuencias territoriales del AVE en ciudades
pequeñas: Ciudad Real y Puertollano]" Estudios Geograficos (260), pp. 199-229
8 - http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renfe_Operadora
9 - http://www.rodiokronsa.es/images/stories/inyecciones/pdf/fichas/06_consolidacion_zona_karstica_ave.pdf
10 - http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/FERROCARRILES/Estructura_ferr/
11 - http://www.ub.edu/gim/albalate_bel_EA.pdf
12 - http://www.europapress.es/economia/transportes-00343/noticia-economia-ave-ampl-empresas-espanolas-unen-marca-alta-velocidadespanola-entrar-eeuu-20090530142301.html
13 - http://www.ferropedia.es/wiki/Tr%C3%A1ficos_corredores_Andaluc%C3%ADa_Larga_Distancia
14 - http://upcommons.upc.edu/pfc/bitstream/2099.1/6281/11/10.pdf
15 - González Yanci, Ma.P.; Aguilera Arilla, Ma.J.; Borderías Uribeondo, Ma.P.; Santos Preciado, J.M. (2005) "Changes in the cities of de high
speed line Madrid-Seville since its establishment | [Cambios en las ciudades de la línea de alta velocidad Madrid-Sevilla desde su
implantación]" Cuadernos Geograficos (36 1), pp. 527-547
250
REFERENCES
16 - Bellet, C., Alonso, P., Casellas, A. (2010), "Transport infraestructure and territory. The structural effects of the high-speed train in Spain",
Boletin de la Asociacion de Geografos Espanoles (52), pp. 143-163+377-383
17 - López, E.; Monzón, A. (2010) "Integration of sustainability issues in strategic transportation planning: A multi-criteria model for the
assessment of transport infrastructure plans" Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering 25 (6), pp. 440-451
18 - Garmendia, M., Ureña, J.M., Coronado, J.M. (2011), "Long-distance trips in a sparsely populated region: The impact of high-speed
infrastructures", Journal of Transport Geography 19 (4), pp. 537-551
19 - High-Speed Rail Give Short -Haul Air a Run for the Money in Europe, With More Flexible Travel, Greater Comfort, Lower Environmental
Impact
20 - López, E.; Monzón, A. (2010) "Integration of sustainability issues in strategic transportation planning: A multi-criteria model for the
assessment of transport infrastructure plans" Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering 25 (6), pp. 440-451
21 - Ordaz, P. (1991)El hundimiento de tierras de Córdoba retrasará cuatro meses las obras del TAV. El país, 15/03/1991
22 - Adif. http://prensa.adif.es/ade/u08/GAP/Prensa.nsf/0/D32582D883AE053AC12573FE0043BB75/$file/LAV_Figueres2.pdf?OpenElement
23 - Rus et al. (2009): Economic Analysis of High Speed Rail in Europe. BBVA Foundation (5 chapters. Some of them analysis the impact of
Madrid-Barcelona line). http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/dat/inf_web_economic_analysis.pdf
24 - Coto-Millán, P.; Inglada, V.; Rey, B. (2007) "Effects of network economies in high-speed rail: The Spanish case" Annals of Regional
Science 41 (4), pp. 911-925.
25 - Expasión (2002) "Siemens firma con Alstom y CAF el acuerdo para el AVE Madrid-Barcelona" Expansión, 07/02/2002
26 - Carcar (2003) "Los plazos del AVE Madrid-Barcelona, un fracaso anunciado" El País, 05/03/2003
27 - HKL participa en la construcción del AVE en los tramos de Lleida-Tarragona-Barcelona" Interempresas 22/02/2008
28 - Redalsa: caminos de hierro para comunicar
29 - Actualidad24h: "Acciona, OHL y Sacyr se adjudican las obras de la entrada del Ave en Barcelona por 275,7 millones―
30 http://prensa.adif.es/ade/u08/GAP/Prensa.nsf/wV007B?SearchView&Start=1&Count=20&Query=FIELD+TipoDoc+=+InformesyDoc&SearchOrd
er=4&
251
REFERENCES
31 - Línea de Alta Velocidad Madrid-Barcelona-frontera francesa Sala de Prensa Adif
32 - http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/1C667F9D-E422-4CB9-86A5-39929D608D69/71015/10032903.pdf
33 - Muñoz-y-Martin (2002):"El Gobierno crea una tasa para financiar el AVE de Madrid a Barcelona desde 2003" El País, 02/10/2002
34 - http://www.elsoto.org/ave.htm
35 - Madridpress (2008): 12.000 viajeros utilizan el AVE Madrid-Barcelona en su primer día
36 - Preferente (2011) : "El AVE Madrid-Barcelona puede dar 250 millones anuales de beneficio a España" 30/11/2011
37 - Prados (1990): "Reducir el impacto ambiental del TAV entre Madrid y Barcelona costará entre 18 y 20 millones por kilómetro" El País 04/07/1990
38 - Inforegio: La línea de Alta Velocidad: Madrid-Barcelona-Frontera Francesa.
39 - http://www.typsa.com/2_2c_ferrocarriles.html
40 - http://www.typsa.com/_actualidad.html
41 - http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/country2009/es_en.pdf HST Madrid-Barcelona sponsors
42 - http://listas.20minutos.es/lista/cronologia-de-los-principales-acontecimientos-ocurridos-en-espana-tras-la-muerte-de-franco-1439/
43 - El País (1999)-Siemens, Talgo, Adztranz y Alstom ultiman sus ofertas para el concurso de alta velocidad por 117.000 millones 22/11/99
44 - RuizdelArbol (2005): "La auditoría revela que la línea AVE a Barcelona tiene graves deficiencias" Cinco Días 26/02/2005
45 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/infraestructuras/circulacion/circulacion.shtml
46 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/conoceradif/doc/7sistemas03.pdf
47 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/ocio_y_cultura/fichas_informativas/ficha_informativa_00038.shtml
48 - http://www.sener.es/EPORTAL_DOCS/GENERAL/SENERV2/DOC-cw4b4b0cc8680f0/ingenieriacivilenSENER.pdf.
49 - http://www.steerdaviesgleave.com/ouroffices/madrid/proyectos-claves
50 - http://www.sener.es/EPORTAL_DOCS/GENERAL/SENERV2/DOC-cw49c0b668d7a61/INNOVACION_CLAVE_ESTRATEGICA.pdf
51 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa.shtml
52 - http://www.spainbusiness.com/icex/cma/contentTypes/common/records/mostrarDocumento/?doc=4148975
53 - http://fcmaf.es/Ferrocarriles/050.htm
252
REFERENCES
General Information about High Speed Rail: institutions and reports
European Commission Mobility and Transport:
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/interoperability/high_speed_en.htm
Trans-European Networks (TEN)
http://ec.europa.eu/ten/index_en.html
European Commission Eurostat. Glossary:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:High-speed_rail
European Commission Eurostat. Passenger transport statistics:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Passenger_transport_statistics
European Commission Eurostat. General statistics:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/transport/data/main_tables
International Union of Railways (UIC). Rail and Sustainable Development
http://www.uic.org/etf/publication/publication-detail.php?code_pub=525
Spain. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE). Statistics:
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t10/a106/a2000/&file=pcaxis
Spain. Ministerio de Fomento. Statistics:
http://www.fomento.gob.es/BE/?nivel=2&orden=07000000
Spain. Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (ADIF):
http://prensa.adif.es
253
3.5 HSR VIGO - OPORTO - LISBON - MADRID
Case compiled by: João de Abreu e Silva and Marisa Pedro
Contact details: : [email protected] ; [email protected]
Project Title
The High-Speed Project in Portugal
Location
Portugal
Purpose
Building and operation of the High Speed Rail network for Portugal consist of 5 links:
•
Lisbon/Madrid: to strengthen the connection between the two capitals and increase multimodality in the
international connections
•
Lisbon/Oporto: to create a new rail connection between the two main cities of Portugal, and serve the
intermediate region (+- 70% of GDP and +-61% population)
•
Aveiro/Salamanca: to link Aveiro, Viseu and Mangualde by rail to Guarda and Spain.
They are included in Priority Project no.3 (―Southwest European High-speed Railway Line‖)
•
Oporto/Vigo: to strengthen the connections and multimodality between Oporto and Galiza (Spanish)
Included in Priority Project no.19 (―High-speed Railway Interoperability in the Iberian Peninsula‖).
•
Évora/Faro-Huelva: the latter depending on subsequent studies to be carried out
Scope
Integrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)
Total Project Value
About 8.3 billions € (1.4 B€ Oporto/Vigo, 4.5 B€ Lisbon/Oporto, 2.2 B€ Lisbon/Madrid)
Project Status (i.e.initiation, planning,
Project suspended
construction operation, dismantling)
Public Private Partnership (PPP)
• Designing, construction, financing and maintenance of the rail sub and superstructures (40 years)
• Designing, installation, financing and maintenance of the signals and telecom. (20 years).
• Lisbon station to be developed by REFER and Caia International Station to be developed jointly by Portugal and
Spain. Other rail stations are developed by PPP.
Operation: not yet totally defined
•The strategic role of regulation and network management resides with the State/REFER.
Lisbon/Madrid 640 km (203 km in Portugal), Oporto/Vigo 125 km (100 km in Portugal), Lisbon/Oporto 290 km
Aveiro/Salamanca 170 km in Portugal, Évora/Faro-Huelva 200 km: Under study (probably postponed)
254
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
High-speed network coverage
56% of municipalities
81% of the population
87% of the GDP
Development in railway market share
In 2003: 4%
In 2025: 26%
Socio-economic impact during construction
On GDP: 1.7%
On employment: 1.4% or a maximum of
92,000 jobs
Socio-economic impact during operation
On GDP: ~1.025%
Annual environmental savings
In 2010: EUR 69 million
In 2025: EUR 184 million
Source: Annual report and accounts from RAVE (2004)
(With conventional
component of TTT)
(With conventional component
between Évora and Caia)
Signalling and
Telecommunications Systems
255
Comments (e.g.maturity, previous
Internal
Case-Study
Client
REFER E.P.E (Formerly RAVE a subsidiary of REFER created
specifically for the implementation of the HSR project)
Financiers
European Union: Structural Funds (Cohesion Fund, Trans-European
Transport Networks) and the European Investment Bank (EIB).
Private investment and Portuguese State funding.
DGTREN (Directorate-General of Transports and Energy).
Operational Cash Flow
(Total investment: 8.3 Billions €)
Sponsors
Portuguese State, EU Grants: TEN, Cohesion Fund (QREN), EU
Priority Project nº16 (Sines/Madrid/Paris)
General public (passengers), freight operators
Client’s Owners
Portuguese State
Principal Contractor
Concessionaire ELOS – Ligações de Alta Velocidade consortium
(Caia-Poceirão; part of the link Lisbon-Madrid)
The project (PPP1) is suspended
due to the credit crisis
LGV-Engenharia e Construção de Linhas de Alta Velocidade, ACE
Contracted by ELOS
Supply-Side
Demand-Side
Second Tier Contractors
Providers
KPMG II – Consultores de Negócios S.A. (financial services) and
legal support from several companies, Epypsa, Sener and
Ferconsult, IN OUT GLOBAL, Steer Davies Gleave and VTM,
Deloitte, CEEETA, EUROESTUDIOS-COBA, TIS.pt, Biodesign,
GLOBALVIA, GRID, CONSULGAL, TYPSA, SENER, MUNICÍPIA,
Terraforma, SOCINOVA, CISED, A.T.KEARNEY, CEA/UCP,
FERBRITAS, GESTE Engineering, LNEC (National
Laboratory of Civil Engineering), …
Category
Case-Study
Consultants of RAVE/ REFER
256
Comments
experiences of
External
Case-Study
Regulatory Agencies
IMTT (institute charged with the regulation and coordination of inland transport)
Local Government
Municipal authorities/town councils and the Committees for Coordination and regional Development (CCDR)
National Government
MOPTC (Ministry of Transport), MF (Ministry of Finance and the Public Administration) and MA (Ministry for
Environment)
Public
Category
Case-study
Other internal supply-side APA (Portuguese Environmental Agency), INAG I.P. (Institute of Water), IGESPAR I.P. (The
Management Institute of Architectural and Archaeological Heritage) Estradas de Portugal EP
categories
(Portuguese Roads Authority), APL (Lisbon Port Authority), REN S.A. (National
( please specify)
Transmission Network), CP E.P.E (Portuguese Railways), IGF (General Inspectorate of
Finance), …
Local residents
Local Associations, residents associations
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
non-governmental organizations for environment (ENGOs) like Quercus, LPN and Urbe, etc
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Category
Casestudy
Universities and Technological Centres
Private
stakeholders
(please specify)
Professional associations : ADFER (Portuguese Association for the Development of Railway
Transport), OE (board of engineers), CIP (Confederation of Portuguese Industry), AEP
(Portuguese Business Association),
Press & Media
Opinion makers, placement of news and opinion articles by companies interested in the project
Political Opinion
257
In General
Portuguese
State
IMTT
regulatory
Numerous
external
stakeholders
Owns
60%
AEIEAVEP
Owns
40%
Try to Influence
Contracts with
Try to Influence
RAVE
Cooperates with
Municipal
authorities
REFER
Contracts with
business
model
Cooperates with
ADIF
(Spain)
Consultants
(Technical
services)
Key:
PPP1
CP and
Private
Operators
financial
services
legal support
ELOS
consortium
THR
consortium
Name
of Actor
Description of
relationship
KPMG II
(business
model)
Legal
Consultants
Description of
relationship
- Project Actor
relationship
258
(2002 – 2008)
Step 1 – Studies
RAVE
Environment
al
Assessment
Licensor
(APA)
Minister makes
decision
(Approve)
Environmental Evaluation
Process
Evaluation
and
Assessment
Consultancy
Preliminary Studies
Environmental Impact Studies
Review of EA /
Technical
assessment
Technical Viability Studies
Cost-Benefit Studies
Market Studies
Socio-economic Studies
Public Consultation
ONG‘s
Municipal authorities
Financial Studies
APL
Technical Studies
Local organizations
(...)
Key:
Name
of
Actor
- Project Actor
Local population
(…)
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
- Non-contractual
project relationship
259
Step 2 – Tendering
(2006 – 2010)
PPP1
Monitoring
Committee
Portuguese State
RAVE /
REFER
ELOS
consortium
launch of the
tender
First tier
subcontractors
LGV - ACE
JURI
Committee
Technical
support
RAVE
Support by
Departments
of the Ministry
MOPTC (Transport)
MF (Finance)
MA (Environment)
(...)
Proposal
Evaluation
Contracts with
2nd tier
subcontractors
PPP1 by
1. ELOS consortium
2. Altavia-Alentejo
3. Eurolinhas
4. Cintra Ferrovial
Key:
Final decision
(select a PPP)
ELOS consortium
Name
of
Actor
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
- Project Actor
relationship
260
Step 2 – Tendering (cont.)
Financial Consultancy
Financial services
(business model)
RAVE / REFER
(2007)
Financial services
(2005)
Consortium
FINANTIA Bank,
DEPFA Bank and
GOLDMAN SACHS
KPMG II Consultores
de Negócios, S.A
Other submitted bids in the tender procedure:
1. Deloitte
2. Efisa Bank
Key:
Name
of Actor
- Project Actor
Description of
relationship
basis
with a contractual
Description of
relationship
- Non-contractual
project relationship
261
Step 2 – Tendering (cont.)
Legal Consultancy
Law Firm
BARROCAS
SARMENTO
ROCHA
advisory
services
RAVE / REFER
PM
Preventive measures
(2003-2010)
(2003)
(2010)
(2007 - 2008)
(2007)
Law Firm
Jardim Sampaio,
Caldas &
Associados
PPP1
Lisbon/Madrid
+
PPP 5
Oporto/Vigo
+
PPP 6
Signalling and
Telecommunications
Systems
Law Firm
Tavares e Sousa,
Duarte A., Campos
e Carvalhinho
PPP
Acquisition of
Rolling Stock
PPP2
Lisbon/Poceirão
(TTT)
Law Firm
Miranda, Correia,
Amendoeira e
Associados
Key:
Law Firm
Flamínio Roza, Pinto
Duarte, Côrte Real &
Associados
Name
of
Actor
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
- Project Actor
relationship
262
Step 3 – Operation
Portuguese
State
RAVE / REFER
Operators
(without timeline)
Key:
provide service
Name of
Actor
General public
(passengers)
Freight
Operators
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
- Project Actor
relationship
263
External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this Project
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
ADFER (Portuguese
Association for the
Development of Railway
Transport)
In general there are positive opinions, even if in
some cases the opinions are negative - related
with project viability and corridor delimitation
When unfavorably opinion, may
cause delays
in issuing the studies.
Conception, Planning
and design
Environmental
organizations
(ex. LPN and Quercus)
Highly unfavourable:
For example: with the road component, the Tagus
river bridge will have more cars entering into the
city and it will increase environmental impacts.
However, there are a few positive opinions about
the project, once it may bring development.
Can limit the development
of the process (when
presenting successive
complaints about negative
impacts that the project brings)
Conception,
Planning, designing
and construction
CIP
(Business Confederation)
See this as a commercial opportunity to provide
industrial, technical and logistical support. Can
provide the grow up of the commercial/economic
areas, but on other hand there isn‘t the same
development for the freight.
They were important public stakeholders in the
decision processes leading to the location for the
new airport and TTT bridge.
Has provided support to
advocates of different project
configurations. They presented
an alternative proposal to
replace the Iberian gauge by a
European gauge on the
conventional rail network to
provide better interoperability
for freight. They had influenced
the alternatives of the corridor
delimitation.
Slight to moderate.
Possible business
opportunities for some
CIP Members
Conception and
Planning
OE
(board of engineers),
A little controversy among board members.
It is extremely appropriate
to hold a debate on this project.
Slight
All Phases
APA (Portuguese
Environmental Agency)
Positive opinion, in general. In some cases the
opinion is no-positive (related to corridor
delimitation).
Influence of the corridor
delimitation and the
configuration of the alternative
routes.
Municipal authorities
Some municipalities: favourable opinion and
interested in the project. Others: unfavourable
opinion regarding the corridor definition, which can
produce physic constrains within the territory
Important to support the
development of the process
Conception and
Planning
Moderate. To promote
the economic, social
and cultural aspects of
the cities.
Planning,
construction and
operation
264
Project Organisation (until 2007)
Structure
2004: REFER E.P. (RAVE 10, REFER 22, other 8) + THR (Project Manager 44)
Specialists in design companies (300 workers approx.)
and Structure
ELOS – Ligações de Alta Velocidade consortium (PPP1, Caia-Poceirão)
Involvement
(Project and construction: 1.4 billions €)
□
□
□
□
Lessons Learned Transfers
Team Building Tools
□
□
□
□
Trimble QUANTM Alignment Planning Solution simultaneously manages all environmental, cultural and community issues involved in planning
the corridors for the high speed rail project.
Relationship Management Tools: Intranet
Management Wage: GESVEN software
Several studies incorporated specifically life cycle cost approaches, and they are incorporated in the Business Model.
The project leadership was internalized by RAVE (2007).
The implementation of the SAP-ERP business management system, of which a functional analysis of the system already in place at REFER
had already been carried out and lead to the decision to roll it out to RAVE, and the implementation of a modern GIS (Geographic Information
System) application, which will serve to organise all the project‘s technical components.
265
Project Organisation (after 2007)
Structure
REFER EP.E (RAVE 51, 19 from REFER)
and Structure
ELOS – Ligações de Alta Velocidade consortium (PPP1, Caia-Poceirão)
Involvement
(Project and construction: 1.4 billions €)
□
□
□
□
Lessons Learned Transfers
Team Building Tools
□
□
□
□
Trimble QUANTM Alignment Planning Solution simultaneously manages all environmental, cultural and community issues involved in planning
the corridors for the high speed rail project.
Relationship Management Tools: Intranet
Management Wage: GESVEN software
Several studies incorporated specifically life cycle cost approaches, and they are incorporated in the Business Model.
The project leadership was internalized by RAVE (2007).
The implementation of the SAP-ERP business management system, of which a functional analysis of the system already in place at REFER
had already been carried out and lead to the decision to roll it out to RAVE, and the implementation of a modern GIS (Geographic Information
System) application, which will serve to organise all the project‘s technical components.
266
Project Processes
Present (describe below) □ Not Present □
No Information □
A database to record technical, financial and planning risks at the development, construction and validation phases of the project. It
was developed first by THR (TYCO Consortium, currently BRISA / HOLLAND RAILCONSUL) that used TYMS (management
software). After 2007 a different risk management business model was defined (PPP) and developed by RAVE/REFER.
Present (describe below) □
Not Present □
No Information □
The execution of the project‘s various specialities has been effected by means of external contracting in each technical area in order
to incorporate the latest technologies and benefit from the know-how acquired by contractors on similar projects.
Not Present □
No Information □
Collaborative Platform to manage procurement processes and tenders. The relation with the consultants was made in a project point
of view optic and not in client/supplier perspective
Not Present □
No Information □
―Global Integrated Management‖. i.e. The global management and co-ordination of the work carried out during all the phases and for
all the links, is performed by a permanent team from THR 2004-2007. After 2007 managed internally by RAVE
Not Present □
No Information □
RAVE publishes all relationships with third party organizations (service providers within the scope of the HSN project), in the
Company Report and Accounts.
Not Present □
No Information □
Planning and Control Department (PCD) which cumulatively monitored project with project managers, and periodically reported to top
management. Tasks - critical task identification, analysis of delays and their mitigation, risk assessment
Not Present □
No Information □
Database of unitary prices to allow uniformity of cost estimates. The database was built using benchmarks and incorporating price
variation and actualization
Not Present □
No Information □
Various activities was developed and implemented by RAVE/REFER with a view to ensuring, continuously, the effective
implementation of each supplier‘s Quality Management System in the preparation of the studies. The criteria used for monitoring and
measuring this effectiveness were the requirements contractually defined for the purpose and the applicable standards in force.
Processes
Not Present □
No Information □
Various initiatives were undertaken that have already resulted in a significant increase in awareness of environmental.
Public presentations of the project by members of the board of directors and senior staff took place throughout the process in different
seminars, forums and conferences in City Council and Parish Councils. Therefore, there was a continue engagement with local
populations.
Relations with the media have also been enhanced, and daily monitoring of media coverage of the high-speed project has been
undertaken.
267
time
cost
specification
Actual Achievements
Against Targets
2003:
Lisbon/Madrid - design and construction: 2006-2010. Start operations: 2010
Lisbon/Oporto - design and construction: 2006-2013. Start operations: 2014
Oporto/Vigo - design and construction: 2006-2009. Start operations: 2009
2008:
Lisbon/Madrid - design and construction: 2010-2013. Start operations: 2014
Lisbon/Oporto - design and construction: 2012-2015. Start operations: 2015
Oporto/Vigo - design and construction: 2011-2013. Start operations: 2013
2010/2011: Project being reframed new calendar to be defined
2012: Project suspended
2008: Tender for PPP1
2009: PPP1 Awarded
2011: PPP1 Reframed
2012: PPP1 Suspended
2003: Lisbon/Madrid: 1.6 billions €; Lisbon/Oporto: 3.6 billions €; Oporto/Vigo: 1.3 billions €
2008: Lisbon/Madrid: 2.6 billions €; Lisbon/Oporto: 4.5 billions €; Oporto/Vigo: 850 millions €
(1st. step)
2010: Lisbon/Madrid: 2.3 billions €; Lisbon/Oporto: 4.65 billions €; Oporto/Vigo: 1.3 billions €
2009: PPP1 Awarded
price (1,359 millions €)
Demand estimations
2003: Lisbon/Madrid: 5.3 M passengers ; Lisbon/Oporto: 13.5 M passengers; Oporto/Vigo:
2.1 M passengers (forecasts for 2025)
2008/2010: Lisbon/Madrid: 9.4 M passengers; Lisbon/Oporto: 12.2 M passengers;
Oporto/Vigo: 3.7 M passengers (forecasts for 2030)
Type of traffic
Oporto/Vigo (1h) and Lisbon/Madrid (2h45m): Passengers and freight
Lisbon/Oporto (1h15m): passengers
Source: Annual report and accounts from RAVE
268
Grouping
Portuguese State
(by pressure from public opinion)
The location of the airport changed from Ota to
Alcochete and HS also changed the routes
CIP (Business Confederation)
ADFER (Association for the
Development of Railway Transport)
Change from a rail bridge (TTT) to a road + rail
bridge (TTT).
City council of Lisbon
Influence of the corridor delimitation and the
configuration of the alternative routes
Organizations from the north / Galiza
(Atlantic axis)
Find the best way to access High
Speed to the new airport of Lisbon,
independently of its location
Timeline anticipation
APL (Lisbon Port Authority)
APA
(Portuguese Environmental Agency)
Influence of the corridor delimitation and the
configuration of the alternative routes
269
Project Environment
and Europe wide)
2000: RAVE was created
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
Throughout process: Standards and rules from REFER and IMTT
2001: AVEP (Alta Velocidade Espanha-Portugal) is a European Economic Interest Group created by Spain and
Portugal to study the ―linking of Spain and Portugal by a High-speed Rail Network‖. AVEP was owned by RAVE
and ADIF.
2003 - 2010: Different laws applied to Public Private Partnerships (PPP‘s).
2007 - 2010: several pieces of legislation where put forward to implement preventive measures (reservation of
corridors from incompatible land uses).
2008: Public Contract Code (Código dos Contratos Públicos - CCP): Decree-Law No. 18/2008 of 29 January
Political Project
Environment
Since 2007/ 2008 the main opposition party (presently in Government) opposed strongly to the project. The only
awarded PPP was reframed (possible reductions in the project configuration, eg. single track, stations postponed,
project speed reduction) and now is suspended.
Specific Political
Events impacting on
the project
2003: The Iberian Summit defines the 4 cross-border HSR connections
2004: The links Lisbon/Oporto, Lisbon/Madrid, Aveiro/Salamanca e Oporto/Vigo were included in the 30 prioritary
projects of TEN-T
2006: The Strategic Guidelines for the Railway Sector were presented
2007: change of location for the new Lisbon Airport
2004 and 2009: years of elections
2011: elections change of Government
270
Economic Project
Environment
2007: The project final business model is defined
• 5 PPPs for the design, construction, financing and maintenance of the rail sub and superstructures
• a PPP for design, promotion, financing and maintenance of the signaling and telecommunications systems
• Lisbon station to be developed directly by REFER and Caia International Station to be developed jointly by
Portugal and Spain
• Strategic functions concerning capacity allocation and circulation management will be handled by REFER
• On an operational level, the Portuguese state will go ahead with the acquisition of the rolling stock
2008: Availability of the Portuguese banks and EU Grants
2009: The TEN-T approved new financial support for TTT Oriente Station (5.4 million €)
2010/2011: Crisis and Troika
Specific
Economic Events
impacting on the
project
2001-2006: European funding associated with the priority projects within the TEN-T (Trans European Networks for
Transport) created by the European Commission and co-financed by DG TREN (EC Directorate-General for Energy and
Transport) through the MIP (Multi-Annual Indicative Programme)
2007: a regulation was published regarding the community support to be granted to the TEN-T project
(2007-2013 multi-year program), with an overall value of approximately 5.3 billion € .
Community financial support: 1.338 million € distributed in the following manner:
• 955 million € from the Portuguese State through the National Strategic Reference Framework (QREN) for the
2007-2013 timeframe (Cohesion Fund)
• 383 M€ from the European Commission‘s support framework for TEN-T project:
•191 M€ for the Évora/Mérida cross-border stretch.
•141 M€ for the Lima/Vigo Bridge cross-border tretch
•51 M€ for the Third Tagus Crossing.
Sovereign debt credit crisis of 2010
271
2000
Events and
activities
relating to
project
stakeholders
2001 2002
2003 2004 2005
Events and
activities
relating to
project
environment
2007
2008
2009
Studies (preliminary studies and environmental impact studies, technical viability studies, costCreation
of RAVE
benefit, market studies and socio-economic, ﬁnancial, and technical , … )
Creation of
the
EEIG-AVEP
Inclusion of
HSR axes in
the list of
the
30 TEN-T
Priority
Projects
Events and
activities
relating to
project
management
Events and
activities
relating to
project
performance
2006
TIME
2010 2011
Start of
feasibility
studies
Portuguese
/ Spanish
Summit:
Cross
border HSR
axes;
Run time
objetives
Location of
the Porto
HS Station
(Campanhã)
Start of the
Environmental
Impact
Assessment
Portuguese / Portuguese /
Spanish
Spanish
Summit:
Summit:
Lisbon/Madri International
d axis station on
Type of mixed
the
traffic and Elvas/Badajo
Completion
z border
date (2013)
year of
elections
Location of
the Lisbon
HS Station
(Oriente)
Granting of
383 million €
of
community
support to
the TEN-T
HSN Project
Presentation
of the
Business
Model
New Lisbon
airport
change of
location
Portuguese / Portugal, Spain
Beginning of
Spanish
Summit: and France was
the
signed an
Project
Procurement Location of the
Elvas/Badajoz
agreement to refurbishment
Process
Station
finish the HS
(PPP1
Axis in
Poceirão
The TEN-T
Southwest
/Caia)
approved new
Europe (P3)
financial
support for
TTT-Oriente
Station: 5.4
million €
CRISIS
year of
elections
Signing of
the contract
agreement
for the PPP1
Sovereign
debt credit
crisis
year of
elections
Change of
government
272
REFERENCES
• ADFER. (2006). O Projecto de Alta Velocidade Português, 7th National Conference [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from:
http://adfer.cp.pt/pages/congresso/Teses/A-2.pdf
• Annual report and accounts from RAVE (2004 – 2010)
• Meetings with RAVE / REFER
• News collected in different newspapers on the Internet
• RAVE / REFER. GONÇALVES, José Carlos and COELHO, Natália. (2006). Os Sistemas de Informação de Suporte ao
Projecto de Alta Velocidade Ferroviária [PowerPoint slides].
Retrieved from: http://tercud.ulusofona.pt/GeoForum/Ficheiros/20GeoForum.pdf
• RAVE / REFER. (2008). O Projecto de Alta Velocidade Português, [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from:
http://www.aiccopn.pt/upload/PPP_17_11/Carlos_Fernandes_Rave.pdf
• Studies by ATKEARNEY (2003/2004). [PowerPoint slides]
• http://www.refer.pt/MenuPrincipal/TransporteFerroviario/AltaVelocidade/Enquadramento.aspx
273
3.6 SEVILLE - MADRID
Case compiled by: Rafaela Alfalla-Luque and Carmen Medina-López
Project Title
High-Speed train in Spain: Seville-Madrid
Location
Spain
Purpose
To joint two main cities in Spain through high speed train. Safe, punctual and comfortable means of
transport. (Carried out between 1987 and 1993)
Scope
To improve the connection between cities. Integrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)
Total Project Value
In 1992 had cost 448,000 million pesetas (2,693 million euros)
Project Status
The construction of high-speed infrastructure in Spain was carried out between 1987 and 1993. The
Spanish high speed (AVE) began in April 1992 2
(i.e.. initiation, planning,
dismantling)
The Madrid-Seville AVE was initially budgeted (1988) to 262,000 million pesetas (1,575 million euros), but
in 1992 had cost 448,000 million pesetas (2,693 million euros) (a divergence of 71%). 1 [27]
Track costs are approximately 900 million pesetas (5,4 million euros) per kilometre (2,547,690,310.48€)
2
Relevant Physical
Dimensions
Line length: 471.8 km
Track gauge: 1435 mm
Minimum radius: Standard: 4000 m; Absolute: 3250 m
Electrification: 25 kV; 50 Hz
Operating speed: 300 km/h
Maximum incline: Standard: 12.5 ‰; Absolute: 13.25 ‰ 3
274
HSR SEVILLE-MADRID
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE [46]
Km of track (including secondary): 1011.7
Distance Madrid - Seville: 471,800 meters
Radius of curvature on the ground: 4,000 m. 3,200 and
2,300 Exceptionally, in Sierra Morena
Maximum slope: 12.5 mil
Maximum depth: 150 mm.
Platform Width: 13.3 m. (exceptionally 12.7m.)
Viaducts (L> 50 m.) 32 (total length 8,355 m.)
The two most important are, first built for the Royal City
variant turns out to be the longest of them all, that saves
a span of 930 meters, and the second corresponding to
the crossing of the river Tagus and Guadalmez, which
spans a distance of 800 meters with a height of stacks of
78 meters.
Tunnels 17 (total length 16.030m.)
The longer length extends along 2540 meters.
Electrical substations: 14
Detachment detection equipment: 208
Automatic driving km (CAT or LZB): 942
Gauge: UIC (1.435mm)
Electrification: 25kV 50Hz AC 1 x
Maximum speed: 300 km / h
Signage: ASFA200 and LZB.
Planned installation of ERTMS
Telecommunications: Train-Ground-based digital GSM-R
5 passenger stations.
Madrid Puerta de Atocha, Ciudad Real, Puertollano, Córdoba and Seville (Santa Justa).
Overtaking and parking stalls train (PAET): 11
Trivialization posts: 12
http://www.adif.es/es_ES/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_sevilla/madrid_sevilla.shtml
275
HSR SEVILLE-MADRID
existing lines of high-speed train
lines under construction
lines planned for 2020
This map reflects the existing high-speed lines, lines that are running and those planned for 2020 at the date of December 2010 [45]
http://www.spainbusiness.com/icex/cma/contentTypes/common/records/mostrarDocumento/?doc=4148975
276
Stakeholder
Category
Internal
Supply-Side Client
Financiers
Case-Study
Comments
RENFE is the national rail passenger operator and is a state-owned
company controlled by the ministry of public works (Ministerio de Fomento).
Has been encouraged and financially supported by the:
European Commission 5 ; co-financed by the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) with 267.3 million euro [6]; European Investment
Bank (EIB) 6
Spanish Government [5, 6, 9]
Regional governments [6] ; regional development funds 4
Sponsors
Client’s
Customers
Client’s Owners
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
Final customers: Tourists, professionals, passengers in general..
55% of customers of the Madrid-Sevilla are men, 63% are between 25 and
44 years of age, 72% have college degrees, 51% travel for work, 27% do so
for personal reasons, 68% are officers decision and 38% make more than a
trip to the fortnight. 7 General public (passengers), freight operators
In January 1, 2005 the RENFE Railway Sector law extinguish RENFE
company. This company was divided into two companies: 1) one that
operates the trains called Renfe Operator, and 2) one that manages the
infrastructure called ADIF (Railway Infrastructure Manager). RENFE
Operator is a Public Enterprise under the control of the Ministry of
Development of Spain. It is heir to the legacy of RENFE (Spanish National
Railways Company), a company created in 1941. 8 Spanish state
Category
Case-Study
Infrastructure
Administrator
(GIF- later
ADIF)
GIF/ADIF is a separate state-owned organisation, is
responsible for development of the high-speed lines that
are under construction 4 It manages (operation and
maintenance) the railway infrastructure. [10, 4]
277
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
Comments
Internal
Siemens was awarded the electrification of the line high-speed [29]
Alsthom Iberia (Maquinaria Terrestre y Marítima (MTM), Ateinsa and
Meinfesa) builds the train machine [29]
ACS, Ferrovial, FCC, Sacyr Vallehermoso and OHL (construction firms) build
the track [12]
First Tier
Contractors
Second Tier
Consultants
Freyssinet: Maintenance of the viaducts hyperstatic (G-1) of the Madrid-Sevilla
which included the treatment of batteries and repair and support inside the box
girder 40
TYPSA 41
Professional
RODIO CIMENTACIONES ESPECIALES, S.A.
Services Providers
(treats problems of the limestone under the platform of the road) [9]
Other internal
supply-side
categories
(please specify)
Category
Case-Study
Industrial producers of railway equipment [2]
278
Stakeholder
Category
External
Public
Case-Study
Comments
experiences of
Regulatory Agencies Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Development; Environment Agency from Madrid
(Agencia de Medio Ambiente – AMA- de la Comunidad de Madrid)
Local Government
Andalucía; Castilla - La Mancha and Madrid. Municipal authorities/town councils and the
Committees for Coordination and Regional Development (CCDR)
National
Government
Spanish government, MOPTC (Public Works, Transport and Communications), MF (Ministry of
Finance and the Public Administration) and MA (Ministry for the environment)
Other internal
supply-side
categories ( please
specify)
Category
Case-study
public landowners, Tourism board Industry & service
associations, Cities with HST stations
Local Associations
Local Landowners
Private landowners
Environmentalists
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, European Environment Agency
Conservationists
Archaeologists
Taller de Investigaciones Arqueólogas S.L.
Other External
Category
Other transport operators
(please specify)
Case study
Universities and Technological Centres
Press & Media
Opinion makers, placement of news and opinion articles by companies
interested in the project
Political Opinion
279
Numerous
external
stakeholders
Numerous
external
stakeholders
Local
and regional
government
Spanish
government
ADIF /
GIF
European Commission
Spanish Government
regional governments
regional development
funds
Ministry of Environment;
Ministry of Development;
Environment Agency from
Madrid (AMA)
Owns 100%
RENFE
(client)
TYPSA
Contracts with
Service providers
RODIO
CIMENTACIONES
ESPECIALES,
S.A….
Contracts with
ACS,
Ferrovial,
FCC, Sacyr
Vallehermoso
& OHL
Contracts with
First tier
subcontr
actors
Contracts with
2nd tier
subcontr
actors
Contracts with
Contracts with
SIEMENS
(electrification
provider)
Contracts with
First tier
subcontr
actors
Contracts with
2nd tier
subcontr
actors
Passengers
in general
(client‘s
customers)
ALSTHOM
(Train Machine
Provider)
Key:
Contracts with
First tier
subcontr
actors
Contracts with
2nd tier
subcontr
actors
Name
of
Actor
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
- Project Actor
relationship
280
External
Stakeholder’s
Influence on
project
Tourism board
Highly Favourable .
The HST has an impact on
travel distribution and modal
choice. Furthermore, the high
quality of transport can generate
new trips offered not from
additional modes. 11
General ability to
lobby government
High. Contributes to achieving its overall
aims
Operation
EU Commission
Highly Favourable .
contemplates HST as a new
form of European integration 2
General ability to
lobby government
Contributes to achieving its overall aims
Initiation, Planning,
Other transport operators:
air transport (Iberia and
airports), on conventional
railways and on road
transport (buses, cars and
road network) 2
Limited
For air transport between Madrid and Seville
the introduction of the HRS reduced a
demand downshift of 50%, diminishing the
load factor and flight frequency. The Seville
airport suffered a reduction of 25% in its
use, as Madrid-Seville represented 50% of
airport traffic. [30]
Operation
Industry & services
Associations
Highly Favourable .
Commercial reasons 2
Medium
High
Operation
Greenpeace, Friends of the
Earth, Environment agency
(AMA); Spanish Ministry of
Environment;
Ability to Lobby
Government
Effect on the river Manzares - deterioration
of the avifauna of the area - noise barriers to
mitigate the effects of the passage of the
train next to residential areas [21] [25].
Archaeological prospection [24]
Initiation, Planning,
Construction and Operation
Private landowners
Worried about the lost of the
land
Limited
Lost of the land
Construction
cities with HST stations
Highly Favourable .
Medium
High
Stakeholder
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
dismantling)
281
RENFE
Structure
Empresa Novi, AZVI
ACS, Ferrovial, FCC, Sacyr Vallehermoso and OHL 12
Involvement
Firms of engineering, construction, manufacturing systems and trains
□
□
□
□
□
Team Building Tools
□
□
□
□
282
Project Processes
Department of Regulation and Control Integrated traffic management: in the high-speed lines also has advanced
traffic management on the integration platform Davinci, a specified and owned by ADIF, which can integrate
information from other systems related to rail traffic, such as the Remote Power, communications, passenger
information systems, remote control of sensors. This is an Intelligent Transportation System that features
incorporating the latest technologies. 42
The CRC concept integrates all the systems involved in the regulation of railway traffic, responding to the demands of
high speed. Thus, from these centers are regulated simultaneously signaling, electrification, communications
systems, traveler information and energy, among other things. Process integration is possible through the DaVinci
system, considered one of the world's most advanced in the regulation of railway traffic. This system, intellectual
property of ADIF, get an overview of all subsystems into which traffic management through a single platform, which
optimizes the process considerably. The CRC direct and coordinate the circulation in real time, following a defined
transportation plan, meeting the safety and punctuality rates required, and allowing immediate response to any
incidents 44
The main drawback of HST in corridors of low traffic density is its high cost. Infrastructure (generally not compatible
with freight transport) is more expensive than that required by conventional railways, and its use is associated with
decreasing average costs. 2
Processes
283
Estimated project duration: 2 years
Real project duration 5 years (divergence 3 years)
The construction of high-speed infrastructure in
Spain was carried out between 1987 and 1993.
The Spanish high speed (AVE) began in April
1992 2
The Madrid-Seville HST (AVE) was initially
budgeted (1988) to 262,000 million pesetas
(1,575 million euros) 1
In 1992 had cost 448,000 million pesetas (2,693
million euros) (a divergence of 71%). 1
The work required to correct the environmental
impact of Madrid-Seville line cost about 4,000
million pesetas (24 million euros)[23][25]
Expected number of passengers in 1997: 4,3
millions (constantly increasing since 1992)
[37]
Renfe expected the first net benefits in
1998, but finally it had the first net benefit in
June 1997 (217 millions pesetas in June 97)
[37]
Actual passengers per year:
From April to December 1992 : 1.3 million travelers
AVE [37]
2,338,000 in 1993 13
3,5 millions in 1994 [37]
3,8 millions in 1995 [37]
4,000,000 in 1996 [37]
3,804,000 in 1999 13
4,202,000 in 2000 13
4,613,000 in 2001 13
3,397,000 in 2005 13
3,677,000 in 2006 13
3,571,000 in 2007 13
3,407,730 in 2008 13
3,061,000 in 2010 13
specification
284
Stakeholder or
Stakeholder
Grouping
Original Aims of Project
Involvement and Changes
to these Aims
Tourism board
Industry & Services
Associations
Passenger traffic increase
*Time savings [30]
*The benefit caused by the introduction of the HSR from the point of view of the
regional equilibrium is obvious, taking into account the peripheral situation of
Seville and Andalusia with respect to the centers of decisions and production of the
Spanish and European economy. [31]
*The AVE station plays a major attraction for populations located more than an
hour drive 14
City of Madrid
MADRID mobility
enhancements
*Impact urban environment of the station, step by residential, increased activity,
congestion traffic, in a psychological effect for residents 15
*Increased mobility for residents and host population with the consequent
economic impact 15
City of Seville
Seville mobility
enhancements
To improve performance of
Seville
*HST in Seville has ―stolen― the air transport for 63% of the market.
*Madrid has become a dynamic element of the outsourced economy.
*It has been responsible for reshaping the city, ending the plight of urban
bottlenecks and allowing to recover degradated areas and create new areas of
expansion [15]
* 21.9 millions travelers over more than 50 million passengers transported in total
in 2002 were traveling to Seville. 13.8 million of them spent the night in the city.
Travellers who do not sleep in the city have also an important impact (restaurats,
urban transports, shops .......). The operation of the AVE has become the
community of Madrid in the second national tourism market in Seville. The
increased accessibility of Seville has benefited the development of a greater
number of conferences in the city. [36]
285
Project Environment
(regionally, nationally and
Europe wide)
The Plan of Infrastructure and Transport of the Spanish Government 16
The European Union Treaty of Maastricht (1992) contains objectives for transport policy: security in transport, the
trains and the protection of the environment
White Paper on European Transport "rail infrastructure package― Directiva 2001/12/CE, Directiva 2001/13/CE,
Directiva 2001/14/CE [39]
Specific Legal and
Regulatory events
General Plan of Urban Development
Real Decreto 1302/86 on environmental impact assessments for public works [25]
Environment Agency (Agencia de Medio Ambiente-AMA): Effects on the river Manzares - deterioration of the
avifauna of the area - noise barriers to mitigate the effects of the passage of the train next to residential areas [21]
[25]
The work required to correct the environmental impact of Madrid-Seville line will cost about 4,000 million pesetas
[23]
Archaeological prospection- average cost of 20,000 pesetas per hectare [24]
Political Project
Environment
-Urban planning measures: regulations and incentives to reduce the possible barrier effects of the rail system;
new zoning of land uses to allow the location of new economic activities and create positive synergies
-Management measures: the implementation of mobility policies to foster the coherent coordination of internal and
external passenger flows. 16
-interest to remove regional imbalances and improve communications in the country
-Given its importance, soon became a terrorist target. Having suffered some attacks to varying degrees (one of the
most important was the attack of 11-M) [32]
- 1992 Universal Exposition in Seville
286
Economic Project
Environment
In the early 1990's developed countries were affected by an economic and financial crisis affecting inflation.
The effects of this crisis took longer to arrive in Spain, given the huge public spending that was done between
1990 and 1992 to prepare the country for major events like the 1992 Universal Exposition in Seville (including
large transport infrastructure of the Madrid-Sevilla HST)
-New demand which comes to constitute a new type of mobility in relation to work and university studies. Specially
in those urban centers that are located midway on the headwaters of the corridor cities, as is the case of Córdoba,
Ciudad Real and Puertollano. Increased journeys to work as a direct result of the high speed opens up new
markets [33]
Specific Economic
Events impacting on the
project
- 1992 Universal Exposition in Seville
287
TIME
1987
1988
1989
1990 1991
1992
1993
1995
2000
2011
Start Seville-Madrid line
relating to project
stakeholders
―Shuttle‖ Madrid-Ciudad Real-Puertollano
―Shuttle‖ Córdoba-Seville
relating to project
management
relating to project
performance
Spain joined the
CEE (1986)
relating to project
environment
Construction of high-speed train Seville-Madrid
Construction machines and train coach
Delivery machines
and train coach
1
(1) Sinking of land in Córdoba (20,000m3)
100 million pesetas (0,6 million euros) cost
of repairing the damaged section [21]
Becomes effective European
single currency (2002)
The Popular Party
wins the election
(1996)
Absolute majority for
the Popular Party in
legislative elections
(2000)
Terrorist attack in
Madrid caused 191
victims and over
1800 wounded
(2004)
The PSOE won the
elections (2004)
The government
declared a state
of alarm, for the
first time in
democracy, the
crisis of air traffic
controllers (2010)
288
REFERENCES
1- http://www.elsoto.org/ave.htm
2- Rus G. and Inglada, V. (1997): "Cost-Benefit of the High-Speed Train in Spain". The Annals of Regional Science. Volume 31, Number 32, 175188
3- http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alta_Velocidad_Espa%C3%B1ola
4- COMMISION FOR INTEGRATED TRANSPORT (2004) "Report on high-speed rail in the United Kingdom international comparisons. Appendix
F. Spain | [Informe sobre la alta velocidad en inglaterra comparaciones internacionales. Apendice F. España]" Revista de Obras Publicas 151
(3444), pp. 7-16
5- Rus, G. and Nombela, G. (2005):Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable? Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. Volume 41.
Part I. January 2007, pp 3-23.
6- http://www.adif.es/en_US/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_sevilla/madrid_sevilla.shtml
7- De La Fuente, R.S.; Antín, M.G.; Tordesillas, J.M.C.; Capdepón, F.P.; Francés, J.M.U. (2006) "Analysis of the territorial consequences of the
HST (high speed train) in small cities: Ciudad Real and Puertollano | [Análisis de las consecuencias territoriales del AVE en ciudades
pequeñas: Ciudad Real y Puertollano]" Estudios Geograficos (260), pp. 199-229
8- http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renfe_Operadora
9- http://www.rodiokronsa.es/images/stories/inyecciones/pdf/fichas/06_consolidacion_zona_karstica_ave.pdf
10- http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/FERROCARRILES/Estructura_ferr/
11- http://www.ub.edu/gim/albalate_bel_EA.pdf
12- http://www.europapress.es/economia/transportes-00343/noticia-economia-ave-ampl-empresas-espanolas-unen-marca-alta-velocidadespanola-entrar-eeuu-20090530142301.html
13- http://www.ferropedia.es/wiki/Tr%C3%A1ficos_corredores_Andaluc%C3%ADa_Larga_Distancia
14- http://upcommons.upc.edu/pfc/bitstream/2099.1/6281/11/10.pdf
15- González Yanci, Ma.P.; Aguilera Arilla, Ma.J.; Borderías Uribeondo, Ma.P.; Santos Preciado, J.M. (2005) "Changes in the cities of de high
speed line Madrid-Seville since its establishment | [Cambios en las ciudades de la línea de alta velocidad Madrid-Sevilla desde su
implantación]" Cuadernos Geograficos (36 1), pp. 527-547
289
3.7 NORRA LANKEN, STOCKHOLM
Case compiled by: Jonas Wennström
Project Title
Norra Länken (‖the Northern Link‖)
Location
Stockholm, Sweden. In the northern part of the city centre.
Purpose
The purpose of the project is to create a new link for the E20 motorway from the E4 motorway
―Essingeleden‖ in the north west to Värtan in the north east. This will improve the
accessibility for Lidingö and open up for new urban developments in ―Norra Djurgårdsstaden‖.
Norra Länken is also a prerequisite for the development of Hagastaden in the north western
areas. When finished, it will relieve the traffic load in the city centre [ME].
Scope
The project includes the original plan of ―Norra länken‖ with a connection only between
Norrtull-Värtan/Frescati and also an extension of the project to include the overdecking for
Hagastaden. The project consists of rock and concrete tunnels and traffic facilities in
connection to the tunnels.
Total Project Value
Norrtull – Värtan/Frescati: 10.5 billion SEK (~€ 1,2 billion)
Hagastaden: 5.6 billion SEK (~ € 640 million)
Project Status
Construction
Contractual Framework (e.g. fixed
price, cost-plus etc.)
In total around 40 contracts. Rock tunneling work have been mostly unit price contracts (UPC)
with fixed prices. The other contracts have been of DB character with UPC parts. Around
20 % of the total contract value is represented by incentive programmes.
The total length of the main tunnels will be 5 km of which 1 km was constructed twenty years
ago. In total there will be 11 km of road tunnels, of which 9 km is rock tunnels and 2 km is
concrete tunnels.
290
Internal
Supply-Side
Stakeholder
Category
Case-Study
Comments
(e.g. maturity,
previous experiences
of stakeholders, skills,
Client
Swedish Transport Administration (STA)
Financiers
Norrtull – Värtan/Frescati
75 %: the Swedish government via the STA.
25 %: Stockholm Municipality.
EU funding TEN-T subsidy: ~€ 56 million
[TENTNL]
Sponsors
EU: TEN-T subsidy, initial estimation~€56 million [TEN-T]
Hagastaden:
80 %: Stockholm Municipality.
20 %: STA
Client’s Customers The public and the road users (however, no fees to use the tunnels)
Client’s Owners
Demand-Side
Swedish Government, Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications
Principal Contractor Design: Sweco, Grontmij, WSP, Ramböll
First Tier
Contractors
Build: Svevia, Hochtief, Bilfinger Berger, Skanska, Züblin-Pihl, PEAB,
Veidekke, Oden and Bravida, Tunnelentreprenader AB
Second Tier
Consultants
Considering the number of first tier contractors, probably plenty
Tunneling,
installations, safety
etc.
291
External
Public
Regulatory Agencies
Local Government
National Government
Private
Local residents
Case-Study
•
•
Comments
experiences of
Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden
County Administrative Boards of Sweden
Stockholm Municipality and Solna Municipality
Swedish Government
Category
Case-study
In Albano, Roslagstull, Vasastan, Östermalm, Gärdet, Hjorthagen
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
•
•
•
―Förbundet för Ekoparken‖ is an association for the protection of the national city
park
Naturskyddsföreningen
Kungliga Djurgårdsförvaltningen
Conservationists
Archaeologists
stakeholders
(please specify)
No special archeological considerations
Category
Case-study
292
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps/Overview
Ministry
of
Finance
NGOs
Environmental
organisations
Swedish
government
Swedish
parliament
Supreme
Administrative
Court of
Sweden
EU
MEEC
Stockholm
Municipality
Finances € 56 m
Finances € 800 m
Public
County
Administrative
Boards of
Sweden
Finances € 300 m
Public participation
STA
(client)
Road
users
Contracts with
Construction contracts
Design contracts
Sweco
Ramböll
WSP
Sub-consultants
Grontmij
PEAB
Skanska
Svevia
Hochtief
Subcontractors
Veidekke
BilfingerBerger
ZüblinPihl
Bravida
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
relationship
Tunnelentre
prenad AB
293
MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps/Financing
Ministry
of
Finance
EU
TEN-T
Executive
Agency
Swedish
government
Tax
payers
Stockholm
Municipality
MEEC
Finances 75 % -> ~ € 860 million
Finances 25 % -> ~ € 300 million
€ 56 million
STA
(client)
Key:
name of
actor
Consultants
- Project Actor
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
relationship
Contractors
294
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
dismantling)
European Union
The European Union is
interested to establish a
trans-European
transport network to
increase competiveness
and employment within
Europe [EUTENT].
―Norra länken‖ is
anticipated to improve
intermodal link between
sea and land transport
[TENTNL].
Attitude: +
EU will contributed with
an estimated €56 million
or around 5 % of total,
projected, cost
[TENTNL].
Influence: +
When finished, the E20
motorway will improve
the accessibility in and
out of the Värtan
harbour for the ferry
line to/from Tallinn.
Impact: (+)
Initiation, planning,
construction
Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce
Has interest in its
member companies
interest and regional
growth. Positive to
improved infrastructure
to increase economic
growth.
Attitude: ++
The Camber had an
important role in the ring
road package,
‖Dennispaketet‖
[SChamber] [Glemdal]
Influence: +
The tunnel will improve
the road system and is
expected to increase
commerce for the
member companies
Impact: ++
Initiation
295
―Förbundet för
Ekoparken‖ (The
Association for
Ekoparken‖
Concerned of the urban
national park,
Nationalstadsparken.
Attitude: --
Appealed against
construction in 1997 and
2002. Won in court 1997
which halted the
construction ten years
and changed
construction method.
Influence: --
Environmental Activists.
Consist of several
subgroups, including for
example ‖Socialekologisk
aktion‖[Glemdal]
Opposed the whole ring
road project, including
―Norra länken‖.
Attitude: --
Several actions, covered
in national media, on
contractors during
preparation works before
the appeal in 1997
[Glemdal]. However,
probability mixed
receptions among the
public.
Influence: 0
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
dismantling)
Impact: -
Initiation, planning,
construction
-
296
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
dismantling)
Residents near
Valhallavägen
The tunnel will decrease
the traffic and
consequently lower
pollution on
Valhallavägen.
Attitude: ++
Influence: 0/+
Less pollution, decrease
in noise and risk for
dangerous goods
accidents will increase
property values.
Impact: ++
Initiation
Residents near Hjorthagen
(Djurgården-Lilla Värtans
Miljöskyddsförening)
Concerned about the
enviromental impact in
the area (noise, particles)
and generally of the
National City Park
Attitude: --
Influence: 0/-
The EIA projected
increased noise and
pollutans to residents
adjacent to the Värtan
connection
Motormännen (association
for automobile drivers)
Positive to the
construction of a ring road
for Stockholm.
Attitude: +
Limited
Influence: (0)
When finished the tunnel
will improve the network
for the road users
Impact: +
Initiation
297
Structure
In 2012 on average 56 full time employees belong to ‖Stora projekt‖ (big projects) division
Project leaders, construction leaders and support
and Structure
Around 1100 people at maximum in 2010 [IJE]
Around 800 people in 2012 [STAA]
Involvement
N/A
□No [IJE]
□Yes [IJE]
□ Yes [IJE]
□Yes[VV05] Relationship Management Tools □Yes [IJE] Team Building Tools □ No [IJE]
Building Information Modelling (BIM) □No [IJE]Project Knowledge Management Tools □ Yes [IJE]Competency framework □ Yes [IJE]
• In some of the design procurements , requirement of all drawings should be presented in 3D based on experiences from the
―Södra länken‖ project [3DP].
• Structured meetings every second month to control current achievements concerning time, cost and specification.
298
Project Processes
Yes, the software Exonaut Risk is used [IJE]
Yes, documentation of competency and plans for replacements [IJE]
Yes, the software Chaos desktop [IJE]
Yes, current project status presentations and project specifications [IJE]
No information
Yes, time planning software
Yes, Agresso invoice system [IJE]
All contracts include quality controls and project specifications concerning quality. Employees of STA
have participated during contractors quality assessments [IJE]
Yes, a communication plan in order to manage the public and media was established. Meetings a
couple of times of year with groups concerned of the national park to discuss how to minimize intrustions
etc. [IJE]
299
Performance
relating to time
If only the project in its current form is considered, the tunnels
between Norrtull and Värtan should be open for traffic in 2015
[STAFAQ]. Norrtull to Tomteboda is planned for 2015 and 2017.
Railway tunnel for Värtabanan in 2019 [STATN]. Procurements
of all contracts have been planned in[VV05] .
In current form, no major construction delays have
been reported. Some delays have been reported
in the early stages. However, in 2010 was the
project on, or ahead of schedule [IN10] . A
breakthrough of finishing a continuous tunnel was
accomplished in November 2011 [IN].
Procurement plans and written contracts have
been followed mostly[STAE].
Performance
relating to cost
Below are some of the cost estimations from different stages in
the planning process. However, it should be noted that during
the time specifications have been changed.
• 1991 – Idea study 4 billion SEK [PLU]
• 2002 – Pre-study 7 billion SEK [PLU]
• 2004 –Investigation 6,5 billion SEK [PLU]
• 2007 – Detailed design 11 billion SEK [PLU]
• 2009 – Construction 10,5 billion SEK [PLU]
• ―Norra stationsområdet ― added in 2010: +5,6 billion SEK
[STATN]
Until today limited overuns reported based on the
2009 cost estimation. The failed construction near
the Bellevue park before the plans were changed
after the legislature change, have been estimated
to cost > 300 million SEK [Source needed].
Shortage of labour and construction material led to
15 % more expensive contracts in the early
contracts. However, this lead to necessary
savings for later procurements.
Performance
related to achieving
Overdecking of the E4 motorway for the development of ―Norra
stationsområdet‖ was added in 2010. Included was also
widening of roads to add extra capacity and a tunnel for
Värtabanan.
Construction restarted in August 2006. Some
changes in insulation method in order to save
money. [SOURCE].
specification
300
Grouping
―Förbundet för Ekoparken‖
Environmentalists
Desired to prevent intrusions in the ‖Royal
National City Park‖ during construction.
The halting of the project in 1997 resulted in a
new plan with less intrusions in the park. STA
has constant meetings with the association.
Opposes the construction of the ring road around
Stockholm city centre.
‖Södra länken‖ is completed. Construction of
‖Norra Länken‖ has started and ‖Förbifart
Stockholm‖ is under planning.
301
2009 - Change in the Environmental Code regarding temporary works in National Parks
•
•
94-2006 Social democratic led government
2006- Center-right government
•
•
Several environmental organisation actions to stop the project during planning
‖Förnyelse i anläggningsbranschen‖ – Programme to promote innovations in the infrastructure
facility sectors. Especially the programme concerning rock works [IJE].
2007 -2008 – Economic boom
2008 - 2009 - Sweden affected by the global recession
2009 – present – Economic recovery in Sweden
•
During the economic boom contractors reported difficulties in finding labour. This resulted in higher
than expected bid prices [BIFörs]. During the recession the contract bids were lower [IJE]. However,
instead this led to higher costs for extra works (ÄTA)
302
TIME
Aug
Jan
1996
1997
Events before current development
60’s
1991
Events in
project
Start of rock
tunnel
construction
2007
2006
2009
2008
Current development
Design & Procure. planning
Initial planning & design
Ring road Completion of
discussions
Karlberg Norrtull
2005
Preparing works
Project halt
2010
2011
Extension of project
with‖Norra
stationsområdet‖
Breakthrough in
tunnel boring
Contracting
NL12 : PEAB
NL11 : Skanska
NL31 : Züblin
NL22 : Bilfinger-Berger
NL33 : Veidekke
NL34 : Veidekke
NL35 : Hochtief & Oden
NL51 : Hochtief & Oden
NL41 : PEAB
NL62 : Veidekke
NL52 : Skanska
NL66 : TE AB
NL67 : Bravida
NL68 : Bravida
NL69 : Läckeby
Events in
environment
N72 : Bravida
Political
acceptance
Appeal against project
rejected, full project
legally accepted
Hard to find labour
Change in the
‖Environmental Code‖
regarding temporary works
in National Parks
Economic recession
303
TIME
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2025
Planned opening
of Norrtull –
Värtan/Frescati
Events in
project
2012
Planned pening
of Hagastaden‘s
tunnels
Construction of
Hagastaden
begins
Events in
environment
Planned opening
of the railway
tunnels for
Värtabanan
Planned
construction start
of Förbifart
Stockholm
304
REFERENCES
•
[STAFAQ] Trafikverket: Frågor och svar. http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Fragor-och-svar/
•
[ME] Genomslaget klart - asfalteringen börjar http://www.me.se/Tidning/Branschnytt/20111/Nomvember/Genomslaget-klart--asfalteringen-borjar/
•
[IN] Genomslag för Norra Länken. Infrastrukturnyheter. http://www.infrastrukturnyheter.se/2011/12/genomslag-i-norra-l-nken
•
[3D] ‖Väg- och vattenbyggaren‖. Volume 4. 2006
•
[BIM] Trafikverket. Stefan Engdahl.
•
[VV05]. Norrtullsområdet. Vägverket. 2005.
•
[GA] Startklart för Norra länken, Svenska Dagbladet 6 april 2006
•
[BV09] Byggare kan börja gräva för Norra länken. 2009. http://www.byggvarlden.se/nyheter/byggprojekt/article87866.ece
•
[RA] The Road Act SFS 1971:948. http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/19710948.htm
•
[EC] The Environmental Code 1998:808
•
[STATN] http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Delprojekt-i-Norra-lanken/Tomteboda--Karlberg/
305
REFERENCES
•
[STAE] Entreprenader, tecknade kontrakt. http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Omprojektet/Entreprenader-Tecknade-kontrakt/
•
[STAA] http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Om-projektet/
•
[3DP] 3D-projektering – framtiden i vägbyggnadssektorn? . Rasmus Regnstrand. Master thesis. 2011.
•
[IN10] Snabbt driv i Norra länken. Infrastrukturnyheter. http://www.infrastrukturnyheter.se/2010/02/snabbt-driv-i-norra-lanken
•
[PLU] Peter Lundman. Cost Management of Underground Infrastructure Projects. Doctoral Thesis. 2011.
•
[BIFörs] Brist på byggare försenar Norra länken. http://www.byggindustrin.com/nyheter/brist-pa-byggare-forsenar-norralanken__604
•
[EUTENT] TEN-T / Transport infrastructure. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/index_en.htm
•
[TENTNL] Works for construction of the road section Norra Lanken. http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-t_projects/tent_projects_by_country/sweden/2007-se-12090-p.htm
•
[Glemdal] Michael Glemdal. Gubben på kullen. Jönköping International Business School. PhD Disseration. 2008.
306
3.8 VMO RING ROAD, BRNO
Case compiled by: Jana Korytárová, Vít Hromádka
Contact details: [email protected] [email protected]
Project Title
Big City Road Circuit Brno
Location
Brno, Czech Republic
Purpose
- protection of the town center before transport;
- converting all kinds of transport outside the center with maximum environmental protection;
- balanced connections between urban areas;
- pacification of local roads;
- diversion of long distance transit transfer (Vienna , Prague,Bratislava, Ostrava).
Scope
22, 7 km
Total Project Value
1 772 mil. EUR
Project Status
Project contents from 4 parties:
N-W Sector – planning (design), construction, operation
N-E Sector – planning, construction
S-E Sector – initiation, planning
S-W Sector - initiation
In the operation phase is approximately 20% and next 12% in construction.
(i.e.. initiation, planning,
dismantling)
Relevant Physical
Dimensions (e.g. height, width,
volume, length)
http://www.mestsky-okruh-brno.cz/
The project has during its project cycle several prices, expected price in initiation phase, estimated value of the
investor on the beginning of public procurement, next contract price and definitively price.
Contract price is fixed price, but over run costs are to 20%.
Difference between expected price and estimated value is 20–30% due to changes in legislation, inflation and
increase of prices of lands.
N-W sector: length 5,065 km, 4 interchange, 3 tunnels (1 of them for tram);
N-E sector: length 5,05 km, 7 interchange, 1 intersection, 2 tunnels, 1 flyover;
S-E sector: length 8,265 km, 12 interchange, 1 tunnel, 2 flyovers;
S-W sector: length 4,31 km, 4 interchange, 2 tunnels, 1 flyover;
307
VMO RING ROAD, BRNO
•
Idea of the realization prepared since 1947.
•
Real realization started in 1998 and the estimated finish of all the realization activities is 2030.
•
Long-term priority in the road network of the Czech Republic.
•
Whole route of BCRCB is the best solution from aspect of
– protection of environment
– population's living conditions
•
BCCB involves many expensive technical solutions including tunnels.
•
From economic, transport and administrative reasons it is not possible to build the big city circuit in one stage.
•
The whole route of the circuit is divided into individual sections, which partial opening allows use of all parts already constructed.
308
Map of BCCB
2015
2021
2026
2030
309
Internal
Supply-Side
Client
Financiers
Comments
Statutary City of Brno
Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic (RSD
CR) The Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic
(RSD CR) is a national contributory organization, founded by the
Ministry of Transport and Communications on January 1st,
1997. The organization fulfils the following main tasks in the
framework of its basic subject of activity: Management of
motorways and roads of the 1st class including components and
facilities of these communications according to §12 and a
subsequent Act No. 13/1997 Coll., concerning roads, as
amended, together with related rights and obligations and
related ground
Guarantees, maintenance and repairs of motorways and roads
of the 1st Class, including components and facilities of these
roads and acquisition of further assets necessary for
management of these assets
Sponsors
Inhabitants of Brna, transit traffic (Wienna-Prag, Prag – Brno Bratislava, Wienna – Brno -Ostrava )
Client’s Owners
side categories
(please specify)
Case-Study
310
Supply-Side
Case-Study
Design offices
Comments
Operator – Brněnské komunikace, a.s. ( Brno roads)
Statutory City of Brno, Brněnské komunikace, a.s. –
Supervision of the investor, management of roads in
the operation stage
Providers
Brněnské komunikace, a.s. – Supervision of the
investor, management of roads in the operation stage
Control system into the
tunnels for example
company Eltodo, a.s
Case-Study
311
External
Public
Case-Study
Regulatory Agencies
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Local Government
Statutory City of Brno
National Government
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Category
Case-study
Other internal supplyside categories ( please
specify)
Local Landowners
Environmentalists
Conservationists
Archaeologists
stakeholders (please
specify)
Comments
Private residents
Private Landowers
Category
Case-study
312
Name of
Actor
Description of
relationship
Description of
relationship
313
Phase of Project of
Greatest Interest
construction,
Ministry of Transport and
Communications
High requirements of
environmental protection
High investment cost
Planning (design) and
realisation phase
Local residents
(Civic Association)
High
Suspension of the
preparatory hearing
procedure, stop the
construction of in
progress.
Stopping and reopening
of construction reflects by
the cost overrun.
Planning, construction
phase
Local landowner
High
Speculative land
purchases, which are
made possible longdiscussed project
documentation in two
stages - DUR, DSP
Planning, construction
phase
314
ACT on town and country planning and building code (Building Act);
ACT on Public Contracts;
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Action Plan on Urban Mobility
Civic Association VMO Brno - stop discussing the project documentation, halting construction of
such tunnel 2 million CZK / day - objections VMO Brno civic association, which complained of
violations of noise limits.
315
316
REFERENCES
•
http://www.mestsky-okruh-brno.cz/
•
www.rsd.cz -The Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic (ŘSD)
•
http://www.bkom.cz/en - Brněnské komunikace, a.s. - company is mainly engaged in, and is certified to do, the following :civil
engineering projects (activities related to construction and reconstruction), and management and maintenance of roads.
•
http://www.brno.cz/sprava-mesta/magistrat-mesta-brna/usek-technicky/odbor-dopravy/ - Brno City Municipality/ deputy Mayor –
technical / Transportation
•
http://www.dalnice-silnice.cz/Brno/I-42.htm
•
http://www.stavebnictvi3000.cz/clanky/stavba-mimourovnove-krizovatky-hlinky-v-brne/
•
http://www.ita-aites.cz/files/tunel/1999/2/9.html
•
http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husovický_tunel
•
Planning and realization VMO – road I/42 – prezentation ŘSD ČR, June 2010
•
http://brno.idnes.cz/stavba-tunelu-v-brne-se-denne-prodrazi-o-dva-miliony-korun-p36-/brno-zpravy.aspx?c=A110218_1534473_brnozpravy_kol
317
Published by
SCHOOL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
University of Leeds
Copyright © University of Leeds

MEGAPROJECT Project Environment

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