rF*o years ago, Pervez Musharraf, I *ho was then Pakistans

rF*o
yearsago, Pervez Musharraf,
I *ho was then Pakistans President
andfumychief, summonedhis most senior generals and two Forergn Ministry
officials to a seriesofmeetings at his miJ'itary office in Rawalpindi. There' they
rwiewed the progressof a secret,sensitive negotiation with India, known to its
participantsas "the back channel."For
ie,r.ralye"tt, specialenvoysfrom Pakistan and India had been holding talks
in hotel rooms in Bangkok, Dubai' and
London. Musharraf and Manmohan
Singh, the Prime Minister oflndia' had
encouragedthe negotiators to seekwhat
some involved called a "paradigm shiff'
in relationsbetween the two nations.
The agendaincluded a searchfor an
end to the long fight over Kashmir, a
contestthat is often describedbyWestern military analysts as a potential trigger for atomic war. (India first tested a
nuclear weapon in 1974, and Pakistan
did so in 1998.) Sinceachievingindependence,rn7947, India and Pakistan
-have
fought three wars and countless
skirmishes acrossKashmir's mountain
passes.The largest part of the territory
is occupied by India, and Pakistanishave long rallied around the cause of
liberating it. The rwo principal envoys-for Pakistan, a college classmate
of Musharraf's named Tari qAziz, and,
for India, a Russiaspecialistnamed Satinder Lambah-were developing what
diplomats refer to as a "non-paper" on
Kashmir, a text without namesor signatures which can serve as a deniable
but detailed basisfor a deal.
At the Rawalpindi meetings, Musharrafdrew his generalsinto a debate
about the fundamental definition of
Pakistads national security' "It was nolonger fashionable to think in some of
the old terms," Khurshid Kasuri, who
was then Foreign Minister, and who attended the sessions,recalled. "Pakistan
had become a nuclear Power. War was
no longer an option for either side."Kasuri said to the generalsthat onlyby diplomary could they achieve their goals
in Kashmir. He told them, he recalled,
"Put your hand here-on your heartand tell me that Kashmir will gain freedoni'without such a negoliation with
India.
The generals at the table accePted
this view, Kasuri said. They "trusted
in Srinagar uith theAssociationof Parent (
Musharraf" he continued' 'Their raison A Kashmiri man anestedprotesting
38
THE NEV YORKER,MARCH 2'2OO9
d'6tre is not permanent enmity with
India. Their raison d'6tre is Pakistan's
permanent security. And what is security? Safety ofour borders and our economic development."
By early 2007, the back-channel
talks on Kashmir had become "so advanced that we'd come to semicolonsr"
Kasuri recalled.A senior Indian official
who was involved agreed."It was hugeI think it would have changedthe basic
nat ur e of t he p ro b l e m ," h e to l d me .
'You would have then had the freedom
to remake Indo-Pakistani relations."
A z iz and La m b a h w e re n e g o r;a ri n g
the details for a visit to Pakistan by the
Indian Prime Minister during which,
they hoped, the principles underlying
the Kashmir agreementwould be announced and talks aimed at implementation would be inaugurated.One quarrel, over awaterwayknown asSir Creek,
would be formally settled.
Neither government) hovzever,had
done much to prepare its public for a
breakthrough. In the spring of 2007,
a military aide in Musharraf 's oflice contacteda seniorcivilian ollicial to askhow
politicians, the media, and the public
might react. "We think we're closeto
a deal," Musharraf's aide said, as this
official recalledit. "Do you thinkwe can
sell it?"
Regrettably,the time did not look
ripe, this offrcial recalled answering.In
earlyMarch, Musharaf had invoked his
near-dictatorial powers to fire the chief
justice of the country's highest court.
That decisionset ofrrock-tossing protests by lawyers and political activists.
The General s popularity seemedto be
eroding by the day; he had seizedpower
in a coup tn 1999, and had enjoyedpublic support for severalyears,but now
he was approaching "the point where
he couldn't sell himse[" the official remembers saying, never mind a surprise
peaceagreementwith India.
Kasuri was among the Musharraf
adviserswho felt that the Pakistanis
should postpone the summit-that they
"should not waste" the negotiated draft
agreements by revealing them when
Musharraf might not be able to forge
a national consensus.Even if it became
necessary
to hold offfor months oryears,
Kasuri believed,'\Me had done so much
work that it will not be lost."
Pakistan'sgovernment sent a mes+O
THE NE\/ YORKER,MARCH 2,2OO9
sageto India: Manmohan Singlis visit
should be delayed so that Musharraf
could regain his political balance.India,
too, was facing domestic complications,
in the form ofregional elections.In New
Deihi, the word in national-securitycircles had been that "any day we're going to have an agreementon Kashmir,"
Gurmeet Kanwal, a retired Indian briq-
pudiated Musharraf and his politica
allies.In August, 2008, Musharraf re
signedand retiredfrom public life.
Jn the slrty-oneyearsof their existenc
Ithe governments
oflndia andPakista
have periodically funded covert cam
paignsofguerrilla or terrorist violenceor
each other's soil; as a result, each nov
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Kashtnir hasprovedresistant to both Indian and Pakistani claimsta savereign$ there.
adier, recalled."But Musharraf lost his
constituencies."
Rather than recovering, the General slipped into a political death spiral.
Armed Islamist radicalstook control of
the Red Mosque, in Islamabad,and, in
July, Musharraf ordered a commando
raid to expel them. Sensing a political
opening, the countrys two most popular civilian politicians, Benazir Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf
had forced into exile, agitated to be allowed to return. By year'send, public
pressurehad forced Musharraf to give
u p hi s A rmy command. A sui ci de
bomber murdered Bhutto in a public
park just a month later. Her widower,
Asif Zardari,led their political party to
victory in an electionin which votersre-
holds unshakableassumotionsabout the
other'sprocliviryfor dir-tytricks. In Pakistan,for example,it is an articleoffaith
among many senior Army olficers that
India's foreign-intelligence service,the
ResearchandAnalysisWing, or R.A.W,
is providing guns and money to ethnic
Baluch and Pashtun groups that operatr
along the Afghan border, and who see
to separatefrom or overthrow the Pr
kistani government. Equally, in Indiar
cabinet and parliament, it is taken for
granted that the Pakistan Army leadership providesaid to jihadi groups so tha
they can carryout terrorist attackson In.
dian soil-the latest example being thr
band of ten young men who arrivedin ar
inflatable dinghy at Mumbar"s Badhwa
Park last November 26th.
TheMumbai attackerscanied G.p.S. Pakistan-based,Saudi-influenced
Isla- border, continue to say that there is
navigational equipment, a satellite tele- mist terrorist and guerrilla
force that
no evidencethat activei.S.I. personnel
phone, cell phones suitable for loca1
Kasf,mir.
A
decade
ago,
participated
in or knew in advanceabout
Mumbai networks, grenades, Kalash- lShtr
-.rtrtyin
Lashkar's
emir,HafizSaeed, announJed the Mumbai strike.
Yet critical evinikovs, and 9-millimetre pistols. which his intention to
destroy India: ,lMe will
dence,such asinterrogations conducted
they employed to kill a Lundred and not rest until the
whole [of] India is in Pakistan, is effectively under
I.S.I.
sixty-five people, including six Ameridissolvedinto Pakistan."After the MumcontroJ;agentsfrom the Federal Bureau
cans,during a three-day spreeofnihilisbai attack, Saeeddelivereda public ser- of Investigation,
which has iurisdiction
tic violence. More than most cells that mon in Lahore
in which helpoke ap- in the matter under U.S.
law, because
haveturned up in India in recentyears, prwingly of a new
"awakeningl' among American citizens were arnong
the victhe tenoristshad productionvaluesthat Indian Muslims,
and describJ his col tims, have been denied direct
accessto
seemedinspired by the September11th religionists as "second
to none in taking the Lashkar suspects.
attacks: they struck at multiple sites revenge."A satellite-telephone
.onu.r:
It's also t*.1hut Pakistaris governin the heart of India's financial disrict
sationbefweenone of thi Mumbai ter- ment hasitselfbeen
on the receivineend
and exploited live television and radio rorists and a supervisor
in Pakistan, inofjihadi aftacl$in the pastye*. .,ItI not
coverage.
tercepredindependentJyby the United as ifall this
stuffis external and going
Indian security servicesmanaged to States,alsopoints
to Lashkar'sinvolve_ into India," one official frorn
u Nard
intercept the aftackers'telephone-calls. ment in the raid.
government said. 'They don't have the
and discoveredthat theywere speaking
After many weeks of prevarication, capacityto defend
Islamabadand peshato handlersin Pakistan.The Indians asl Pakisrani officials
.on..d.d that the war. They're losing ground." Taliban-led
sembled a dossier, containing excelpts Mumbai attackers
appearto havecome insurgents today control large
swaths of
of these conversations, translated into
from their .ountry. pakistan has de- teritory in
Pakistan'snonh-west,where
English; which theypresented to pakitained and filed criminal chargesagainst they enforce
a brutal regime of Islamic
stan, the United States,and other gov- at least one senior
Lashkar comm-ander justice, and recendy signed a truce
with
ernments; one version tanto ahundred named in the Indian
dossier.But it re- the government in the Swat valley.
Thev
and eighteenpages.In one intercept, mains unclear
how far pakistan will so have mounted a bombing
campaign that
the.terroristsrejoicebecausetelevisi,on to dismantle
Lashkar. Since the eally has reached Islamabaj;
.o,o" ?f ,h.
anchorsare comparing their work to nineteen-nineties,
Pakistan'sprincipal bombs havebeenaimed at the Army
and
9/11.In rone and rhy.thm,the excerpts military-intelligence
service,Inter-Serthe I.S.I., suggestinga loss of control
su_ggesr
something of the banaliry of vicesIntelligence, or
I.S.I., has armed by the I.S.I. over its jihadi clients,
or
cell-phone-enabledmassmurder:
and funded Lashkar to foment upheaval a split within
the Pakistani secwity ser_
i n In d i a n -h e l d Kashmi r. A l i housh
CATLEn: Let me talk to Umar.
vices,or both
RrcEIVtn: Note a number. Number is
many of Pakistan'sgenerah
,..ulm
InJanuary, Prime Minister Sinsh re0043720880764.
"r.
or apglilcally religious, they have
sponmarked
that the Mumbai attackiould
CILTER:Whosenumber is this?
Rrctn'En: It is mine.The phoneis with me. soredjihadis as a low-cost means of
not have been carried out without ,,the
C , tLrrR:. . . Allah is he lpin gyou. . . . Tr yr o keeping India off balance.
support of some official aqenciesin pasettne placeon hre.
The historical ties berween Lashkar kistan." India neverthelesJreacted
RtcttvER: We have set fire in four rooms.
ro the
P eo plesh all ru n h elr ers k elr er and the Pakistanisecurityservicesarefor
attackwith relative restraint. Singh s gov_
. C , qr-LrR:
when they seeihe flames.Keepthrowing a
the most part undispured;one book that emment hasnot
ordereda maioimililarv
grenadeevery fifteen minutes br so. It riill
describesthem, published in 2005 and mobilization,
terrorize.
nor hasit launcled *y r.1
entitied "Between Mosque and MiliHere,talk to "Baba."
taliatory strikes againstPakistan. Were it
C , q tl en,(2):A lo t of po lice menand Nav y taly," was written by Huialn Haqqani,
not
for the back-channel talks, the re_
personnelhavecoveredthe entrrearea.B-e
who is currendy Pakistan'sAmbasiador sponsemight
not havebeenso measured:
brave!
to the United States.However, Briga_ Singh and at
least some of his civilian
dier Nazir Butt, a defenseattach6at Ihe counterparts
in Pakistan hope.to find
dossierleaveslittle doubt thar Embassyin Washington,
denied that theirwaybackrothe non-papir. But this
-l-h.
I the attackoriginatedin Pakistan:a his government had provided
lethal aid *r} b. possibleonly ifjihadis don,t promanusing a Pakistani passportpaid for to Lashkar or to
other violent groups. voke a war first.
the terrorists'phone services;their pis- "Pakistan only
extendedmoral and dlpMany Indian politicians and securify
tols were engraved with a
lomatic support to the Kashmiri strug- analysts continue
to call for miJitary a6'er'saddressin Peshawaf -urtrfa.turand numer- gle for self-determination," he said.
tion. Some predicted ro me rhat ;ddiousprovisionsrecoveredfrom a fishine "After 9/7l,Paltstan
withdrew all its tional jihadi attacks would take place
trawler that the group used to ..r.h
support for Kashmiri organizationsand, during India's
upcoming national elecMumbai from Karachi were made in as a consequence,
drew violent attacks tion, in May; if such strikes do
occur,
Pakistan.
on its military and national leadership." they said,it
would be difficult for Indias
More specifically, the Indian governAmerican officials, who rely uptn
democratic government to resist public
menCs
dossierconcludesthat the Mumthe I.S.L's cociperationin their cam- calls for retaliation.
For now, however.
bai attack was cocirdinated by Lashkarpaigns againstAl Qeda and the Talithe decisions_belong
to Singh, a sevenrye-Taiba,or the Army of the pure-a
ban along the Pakistan-Afqhanistan six-year-old
Cambridge-educatedeconTHE NEV YORKER,MARCH 2,2OO9
4I
omist who recently underwent heartblpass surgery.Singh'sdecision-making
appearsto be grounded in military realism; if India were to launch even selective sffikes, it would likely only deepen
Pakistan s internal turmoil and thus exacerbatethe terrorist threat faced by
India. Any Indian military action would
alsorisk an escalationthat could include
nuclear deployments-which may be
preciselywhat the jihadi leadershoped
to provoke. 'There is no militaryoption
here," Lalit Mansingh, a former Indian
Ambassadorin Washington, said.India
had to "isolate the terrorist elements"in
Pakistan, he said, not "ra77ythe nation
around them."
Negotiators involved in the secret
back channel regardedthe effort as politically ris\y and exceptionally ambitious-a potential turning point in history asone official put it, comparableto
the peaceforged between Germany and
France after the Second Wodd War.
At issue, they believgd, was not just a
setdement in Kashmir itself but an end
to their debilitating covert wars and,
eventually, their paranoiac mutual suspicions. They hoped to develop a new
regime offree trade and political cociperation in the region, from Central Asia to
Bangladesh.On January B, 2007, at the
height of this optimistic interval, Man-
mohan Singh remarked in public, "I
dream of a day, while retaining our respectivenational identities, one can have
breakfastin Amritsar, lunch in Lahore,
and dinner in Kabul."
These hopes, however quixotic, reflected a competition between two
schoolsofradical thought the millenarian terrorism ofjihadi groups and their
supporters; and the less well-known
search by sections of the Indian and
Pakistani 61itesfor a transformational
peace. For both groups, Kashmir is
symbolically and ideologically important. It is also, still, a territory ofgrinding, unfinished war.
Jndian paramilitarieshad placed SriInasar under an undeclaredcurfew
on ti-e morning this winter when I
sought to drive out of the city, which is
the summer capital of India's Jammu
and Kashmir state. I wanted to visit a
gravedigger in the northem sector ofthe
Kashmir Valley, about fifteen miles
from the heavily militarized de-facto
border between India and Pakistan
knovrmas the Line of Control.
Soldiers in overcoats and olive helmets huddled at checkpoints before open
fires;theywaved tree branchesor batons
to stop cars for inspection. The Indian
ffoops on occupationdutyin Kashmir-
I
Y ,5^o
"Ideally, I ruant a guy tubose eyesrDill ,uell up but rtho doesn't actually cry."
about five hundred thousand soldiersar
paramilitaries-rarely speak the Kas
miri dialect. Locals resent them, and th
retum the attitude. I was travelling wi
a Kashmiri journalist, Basharat Pe<
who is the author ofaforthcominsboc
"Curfewed Nights," a coming-of-a,
narrative set amid the regioris revolts a:
securitycrackdowns.Basharadspresscr
dentials had expired, but he had recen
completed a fellowship at Columb
University, and he had his library card;
difficult moments, we thrust it throul
the window and shouted "NewYorkl,"
if it tmmped all mles-and, each tim
the soldiers backed off and waved r
tfuough.
We passednorth, through rice pa<
dies and apple orchards-haunte<
looking rows of barren trees. On tl
horizon rosethe snowyridges of Himr
layan foothills. Convoys of roop can
ers, water haulers, military tow truck
and jeeps dogged the highway until v
turned down an embankment to the vi
lage of Chahal, a hamlet of perhaps
hundred tin-roofed houses among te
raced fields besidetheJhelum River.
Kashmiri villagers inhabit a politic
spaceconfined by roaming guerrillas c
one side-some ofthem local bor,s.son
foreign jihadis from Pakistan-and t
Indian troops on the other. At the top r
a hill, we found the residue of India
counter-insurgencycampaign: a ne
concreteschool and clinic, constructedt
India's government to appeasethe villap
ers, and beside it, encircled by barbe
wire, a field ofmuddydunes that held tl
unmarked gravesof about two hundre
young men whose unidentified bodie
had been delivered for burial by the In
dianArmy.
Just under a thousand graves con
taining the corpses of unknown youn
men have been discovered in Kashmi
so far by investigatorsfrom the Assoc
ation of Parents of Disappeared Per
sons, a small advocacy organizationit
Srinagar.Lastyear,a grenadewas tosse
at the house of the lawyer who advise
the group; he and his colleagueshav
expanded their field surveys nonethe
less.They believe that the bodies the
havefound areamong about eight thou
sandyoung men who have gone miss
ing during the latest round of Kashmir'
wars;theyhypothesizethat Indian secu
rity forces detained many of the victimr
I
i
lt
II
I
t
I
t
i
1n secretprisons, tortured them, and
shot them. Indian officials reiect these
allegations;they have estimated the
number of missing Kashmiri men at
about four thousand, and speculated
that they lefi for Pakistan for training so
tha-t
could fight againstlndia, only
{rey
to fhll in combat when they returned.
In a small stone house, I met Atta
Muhammad Khan, a slight man with a
trimmed white beard,who is the guardian of Chahal'stombs of unknowniebels.
His workbegan in the late spring of2002,
he told me, when a Kashmiri poli..-arrivedin the villagewith a ctrpse in a
tuck. The policemansaidthat the victim
was a Pakistani-supportedmfitant who
had beenshot deadin battle. 'They started
bodieseveryrendays,eight days,
!1ngng
fifteen days, at times twice in one day,"
Khan said.
Villages such as Chahal that are
knor,rmto contain such graveshave be*This
come magnets for Kashmiri families
tarnisheshis legacyasa great ltunter.',
who arelooking for missing sons.When
family members arrive bearing photographs or other scraps of evidence,
Khan will exhume bodies for them.
The gravedigger is himself a searcher; stan.The statusofa few territories proved
crimination, staged a mass revolt. The
his nephew, whom he raised, disap- difficult to adjudicare.One
was the for- I.S.I., which had used Islamist militias
pearedin2002.
mer princely state ofJammu and Kashthe anti-Soviet campaigns in
{u-rlng
The Kashmir problem has a text- mir, ruled by a Hindu maharaja
and Afghanistan, reacted opportunisiically,
book quality: a dispute of more than six Iargelyinhabited by poor
MusJim peas- by arming those Islamist factions of the
decades'duration, involving British co- ants. Under Britain s demographii
for- rebellion which sought to join Kashmir
lonial concessions,United l.Tationsres- mula, territories with
Muslim maiorities to Pakistan.
olutions, and a long record of formal
were supposedto go to Pakistan,Lut the
Initially, when Kashmiri Muslim
negotiations. But it is the character of maharajasignedan accession
aqreement boys from villages such as Chahal
the war within Kashmir-the torture
tojoin India. Ayear larer,Pakiitan tried sneakedacrossthe Line
of Control for
centers,the unmarked graves, and the to wrest away the territory
by sending ' weaponsand training, I.S.I. officers enremorselessviolence of the iihadisin a tribal guerrilla force, a qambit thai
couraged them to join a local Islamist
that better describesthe contours of ended in a military stalemate.
ln a sense, guerrilla group known as the HezbIndo-Pakistani enmity today. In one the war of guenilla infiltration
that pa- ul-Mujahideen, which was affiliated
sense,the recent back-channel talks. kistan initiate d in 1948 has
never ended. with the international networks of the
with their promiseof a cleansingpeace,
Ln7972, after their third formalwar.
Muslim Brotherhood. During the late
haveoffered each government a pith to India and Pakistanestablished
the Line nineties, however, Pakistan shifted
evaderesponsibiliry for the evisceration ofControl and deployed
artillery and much ofits support to Lashkar-e-Taiba,
of Kashmiri villaqes and families.
infantry along its length. On the Inwhich adheredto the Salafi strain oflsIndia and Pakiitan each claims sover- dian side lay most of Kashmir,
as well lamist thought prevalent in Saudi Araeigntyin Kashmir, but neither has found as the Hindu-majorigr region
ofJambia, and later to a jihadi group called
lway to control the land or its people. mu and the Buddhist-influenced region Jaish-e-Mohammed, or the Army of
Thesefailures are rooted in what was of Ladakh. On the Pakistani
side tav Mohammed. The membershipofthese
perhapsGreat Britairis greatestimperial
a sliver of land now known u, AraA second-wavegroups
came not from
crime,the partition ofits Indian domain, Kashmir and a Himalayan
region of Kashmir itself but from the puniab,
which ignited violence that claimed Muslim tribes known as the
Northern
P aki stan' smost popul ous provi nce,
abouta million lives.In 1947, the British Areas. For almost two decades,
a
relawhere
the sufferinq of f.ilo--Murfir.r,
government,bankrupted by the Second - tive calm prevailed,but in late
1989-inin Kashmir is routi-nelyexploited by reWorld War, hastily completed a plan to spired by the fall of the Berlin
Walland nationalisticpolitical parties.
lgorrt
dividethe subconiinentinto the newly Kashmiris on the Indian side,
who were Lashkar's volunteers collaborated with
independentnations of lndia and Pakil
fed up with riggedelectionsand iob dis- Hezb-ul-Mujahideen
cells, but they
THE NEV YORKER,MARCH 2,2OO9
+3
weren't fighting and dying in Kashmir
becausetheir families had ties to the disputed land; theywere there becausethey
believed that God had called them to
liberate the region's Muslims from
Hindu control.
At least fifty thousand people have
died in Kashmir's violence since 1989.
The pace of the killing has declined
in recentyears,but bombings and assassinations persist. Last August, on the
highwayjust aboveChahal, Indian paramilitaries shot and killed at least fifteen
unarmed protestersmarching toward
the Line of Control; the shooting
touched offyet more street protests.In
the satellite-television age, the suffering
of Kashmiri civfians hasnotbeenbroadcast as often or asvividly as that of Palestiniansor Lebanese,but on AlJazeera
and on Web sitesfrom Britain to Bangladeshthe war has been a major point
of grievance. The Indian government
has long resistedscrutiny of its humanrights record in Kashmir and deflects
blame for the violence onto Pakistan's
support for jihadi groups. Special laws
shield Indian security forces from accountability for deaths in custody, despite ample evidence that there have
been manyhundreds ofsuch cases.Even
Indias urban liberal 6lite remains in denial about its government's record oftorture and extrajudicial killing, Meenakshi
Ganguly, a seniorresearcherfor Human
Rights Watch, said. "In the history
books, Kashmir is going to be wherejustice completely failed the promises oflndian democrary," she said.
India's campaignto defeatthe jihadis
has, in some ways, become subtler and
more elfective. In 2002, the govemment
held an election in Kashmir, judged 1ocally asfair, which hred fence-sitting separatist Kashmiri politicians into greater
cocioerationwith New Delhi. Last winter, when I visited, India was conduding
a secondsuccessfi;lregional election, in
which Kashmiris turned out in record
numbers. One afternoon, on the eve of
the final round of voting, I visited the
gated home of Mrwaiz lJmer Farooq,
one of Kashmir'sbest-known nonviolent
separatistleaders.He had been placed
under house arrest, so we s-pokeby cell
phone asI sat outside his driveway.
Farooq s coalition, called the Hurriyat,haddecided to boycott the election,
a tactic that now looked like a mistake,
44
THE NEV YORKER,MARCH 2,2OO9
A STREET
I usedto be your favoritedrunk
Good for one more laugh
Then we both ran out of luck
And luckwas allwe had
You out on a uniform
To fight the CivilWar
I tried to join but no one liked
The sideI'm fighting for
Solet'sdrink to ruhenit's otter
And let'sdrink to ushenaDemeet
I'll bestandingon tbis corner
Wberethereusedto bea street
You left me with the dishes
And a babyin the bath
And you're tight with the militias
You wear their camouflage
I guessthat makesus equal
But I want to marchwith you
An extrain the sequel
To the old red-white-and-b1ue
Solet'sdrink to zphenit's orter
'!;,',:i;#,i':,71';;;#"'
Wherethere usedto be a street
since so many Kashmiris had chosento tention centers.Yet its over-all progres
participate. India has spent large sums has only clarified for Indian strategis
onjobsandinfrastructureprojects,grad- the ongoing failure to stop the I.S.l
from infiltrating jihadi guerrillas acros
ually convincing many war-weary civilians and politicians that they can regard the Line of Control.
One morning after my visit to Cha
regional electionsnot asa sourceof sovereign legitimacy for India but as a hal, I drove up a pine-tree-lined hi
above Srinagars Dal Lake, past a man
meansto control their local affairs.'\Me
are not in a position to addresspeople's icured golf course, to Raj Bhavan,
concerns about water, electricity, and whitewashed colonial-era estate. I ha
come to see N. N. Vohra, a white
jobs,"Farooq admitted.
Theback-channelnegotiationshave haired career civil servant who las
also helped to quell mainstream Kash- summer was appointed the governor c
miri separatism.At times secredyand at Jammu and Kashmir. Imperial historie
other iimes publicly, Musharraf and and biographies lined the bookshelve
in Vohra s office; an oil portrait of Mo
Singh eachbegandiscussionswith Hurriyat and other local groups about the handasK. Gandhi hung on the wall be
terms of an eventual setdement, draw- side his desk' The Governor told m
ing them in. "Musharrafwas someone that"whateverlslamabadmaysaytoth
who waswilling to think out of the box," world, and particul atly to America
Farooq continued. "It is not an insolu- leadership," he did not feel that Pak
stan had fully dealt with the I.S.I. an
ble situation."
As violencehas declined,the govern- its "vestedinterest in keeping this Kash
ment has closed the worst of its de- mir front alive."
I criedfor you this morning
And I'll cry for you again
But I'm not in chargeof sorrow
So pleasedon't askme when
I know the burden'shear,y
{s you bearit through the night
SomepeoplesayiCsempry
But that doesntmeaniCslight
Solet\ drink to u,thenit's or.ter
And /et'sdrink to when zpemeet
I'll bestandingon thisconter
Wterethereusedto bea street
It's going to be Septembernow
For manyyearsto come
Every heartadjusting
To that strict Septemberdrum
I seethe Ghost of Culture
With numberson his wrist
Salutesomenewconclusion
Which all ofus havemissed
So/et'sdrink ta zuhenit's over
And let'sdrink to zphenutemeet
I'l/ bestandingon tbiscorner
Wberethereusedto bea street
-Leonard
Vohra said that when he first arrived
asgovernor he received daily briefings
from intelligence officers about interro
_
gationreports,electronicintercepts,and
otherevidenceof I.S.I. activity along the
Line of control. He askedfor copiesof
the raw interc-ept-recordings
so he could
listen himself. What he heard, he said,
was controllers speakingto jihadi commanders inside Kashm ir for "twentyfive, thirty minutes" at a time. "And
they are very specific, very specific_-to
for this target. . . . They said, 'Task
99
No. 1: Eliminate the most senior leaders available.'And they mentioned
some-I won't mention the names.
And then, '8, go for the larger rallies of
thebig leaders-throw grenades,shoot,
bombs,I.E.D.s, whatever.' . . . And the
kinds of rewards that are mention-ed,
rewardsthat will be given-lifetime, if
you bump off a Grade A leader. If you
injure them, yo_uget three hundred
thousandrupees."
Cohen
Vohra had doubts about the pakistan
military's capaciqrfor change. ,,I was
very much hoping in the last"four years
that they at. ro* progressivelyseeing
-anJ
the great wisdom
the enormous
benefit of not spending all their resourceson buirding up thiir armies and
their armed forces"todeal with Indiaand to subvert and infiltrate," he said.
'There hasbeena thaw, obviously,quite
visibly. The levels of infiltration have
gone down. Bur they haven't given up.
And that's the worrying part.,''
A ft*dayslater, Iarrivedatwagah,
fLi"
the punjab, the primary od.ini
land border cro.ring b.;.en India and
Pakistan.A winter log had reducedvisibility to a few yardslFive dozen Tata
trucks loaded with potatoes and other
goods idled in a line facing pakistan.
The border compound has tle look of a
government prik; ,o*, of eucalyptus
trees drape manicured lawns. The In_
dian and Pakistani militaries cociperate
at the Wagah crossing.On mosi days,
rival honor guards march and drill on
adjoining paradegrounds; on Pakistan's
side, grandstands have been erected so
that spectatorscan enjoy the show,
which has grown into a kind of martial
batde of the bands, in which each side
strivesto excelin the performance categ_oriesof goor.-rt.pping and glaring.
Only very tall soldiers need apply for
duty at Wagah; each country seeksto
conjure the illusion that its Army is a legion ofgiants.
After four cups of tea, severalsignatures in clothbound ledgers, and some
subtle talk ofgratuities, rwo poners carried my bags on their heads to a metal
gate. A protocol offtcer waited inside
Pakistan; I had an appointment with
Nawaz Sharif, the former Pakistani
Prime Minister, who lived nearby, on a
family compound outsideLahore.
Squadsofpolice guard the Sharifestate, awalled expanseoforchards, wheat
fields, and pensfilledwith deer and peacocks. In the main house, the former
Prime Minister greeted me in a grand
receptionchamberflanked by mo lifesize stuffed lions, and decorated with
pink sofas,matching pink Oriental carpets, and gold-plated antelopefigr.rrines.
He is a rotund, clean-shavenman who,
remarkably, retains the youthfirl look of
a person unburdened by stress.
In 1999,1essthan ayear after he authorized Pakistarisnudear test, Sharifinitiated a precursor to the back-channel
tall<s.In Februaryof thatyear, Sharif invited Indias Prime Minister at the time.
Atal Behari Vajpayee,to attend a summit
in Lahore. The two governments signed
a memorandum of understanding; they
also commissioned secret,exploratory
talls by specialemissaries.Sharif designated an aide, Anwar Zahid, and Vaipayeenameda journalist,R. K. Mishra.
"It was basicallyon Kashmfu,"Sharif recalled. "In the early days,we were not really having any consensuson an1thing.
But the mere fact that the back channil
was establishedwas a big development.It
was doing someseriouswork."
At the time, Sharif shared power
uneasilywith Musharraf, whom he had
appointed as Chief of Army Staff.
Musharraf "found the Lahore summit
galling," as Strobe Talbott, who was
then the United States'Deputy SecreTHE NEV YORKER,MARCH 2,2OO9
alone, rarely carried a briefcase,and ofi
had to scribblehis notes on hotel stat
nery. Altogether, there were about t
betwc
dozen ofthese hotel sessions
2004 and early 2007, according to Pt
ole familiarwith them.
Kashmir.
The envoysworked on a numbet
During the next two Years'Musharterritorial disputes,
long-standing
raf deliveredIndia proof of his sincerity'
of Siachen,a he
problem
the
cluding
Guerrilla infiltrations into Indian-held
where Indian z
glacier
militarized
ily
territory declined; Pakistani artillery
at heig
skirmish
soldiers
Pakistani
units stopped their salvos on Indian
batter
feet'
thousand
twenfy
above
posts,which had been used as cover for
vr
positions
snowbound
othels
each
infiltrating jihadis. Indian olficials conset
Kashmir
a
But
shells.
artillery
cluded that Musharraf--whether by an
mentwould be the grand Prize.
iron hand or by building a consensusTo outsiders,it haslong seemed
had persuaded his senior generals to
that the Line of Control shoulc
vious
u...pt the potential benefits ofpeace
the international border
declared
negotiations.
and Pakistan-it's beer
India
tween
At the landmark meetings he confortY Years,and e
for
almost
vened at Rawalpindi, Musharraf talked place
its
own institutions
built
has
country
about how a Peacesettlement might
however, mad
Musharraf,
it.
hind
oroduce economic benefits that could
this woulc
that
start
the
from
clear
itrenqthen Pakistan-and its military'
equallY f
was
India
unacceptable;
The Army had a fifteen-Year develoPits I
renegotiate
never
it
would
that
ment plan; the generalsknew that the
'
The
Control.
of
Line
the
or
ders
plan would be difficult to pay for withArabia.
said,
has
Singh
impasse,
of
this
out
"I
very happylo
lndia's leadersinitially mistrusted out rapid growth. was
was on the to "make borders irrelevant," by all'
there
focus
much
how
see
of
author
the
Musharraf becausehe was
Army's officers"' ing for the free movement ofPeoPle
K*gl, but graduaLly,asMansingh, then economy among the
soods within an autonomous Kash
former Foreign
Indids Ambassadorto the United States, Khurshid Kasuri, the
For Pakistan, this formula m
ies-ton.
recalled, 'lMe found he was a man we Minister, recalled'
it included provisions for
if
work
Mahmud Durrani, a retired major
could talk to." After 2002' Indias econpotential enrichm
protection-and
Musharraf s Amomy began to grow more quicklY and generalwho was then
the PeoP
trade-of
free
ihrough
said that this
steadilythan at any time sinceindepen- bassadorin Washington'
Pakistan
name
whose
in
Kashmir,
a broader change
dence;the ranks of its middle-classcon- new attitude reflected
conflict.
the
on
carried
were asking'
sumers swelled; and it became possible in outlook. Commanders
The most recentversionof the r
supPort
my
economy
"Can
recalled,
he
their
for Indian strategiststo visualize
suPPortme? paper, drafted \n earlY 2007,laid
countly rising to become a great power me?Can my foreign PolicY
severalprinciples for a setdement
think of us?"
by the mid-twenty-first century. Orrl)l n What doesthe world
cording to peoPle who have seen
There was "the feeling that the world
catastrophic war with Pakistan---rcr Pahave to change," draft or have participated in the dis
kistads collapseinto chaos-would stand is changing and that we
sionsabout it. Kashmiris would be g
was then Kain the way of India's greatness.'\Mewere KhalidMahmood, who
recalled."It was not special rights to move and trade fi
convincedthesetwo countriesmust learn suris chief of staff,
who felt that on both sidesof the Line of Con
to live in accord-must,"Jaswant Singh' easy.There were people
Each of the former PrincelYstate's
a tl-turn."
who was then India's foreign minister, the President has made
tinct regionswould receivea measu
said.
refine the non-paper, Musharraf autonomy-details would be negotJ
In time, Musharrafs thinking about [1o
decl
I rel i ed i ntui ti vel y on hi s col l ege later. Providing that violence
India and Kashmir seemedto change,
withdra
graduallY
would
side
each
a tivil servant who
too. Late in 2003, splinter cells from friend Tanq Aziz,
troops from the region. At some P
federal
Pakistaris
in
career
his
made
had
asto
tried
Jaish-e-Mohammed twice
be ackn
tax department' a bridge enthusiast the Line of Control might
sassinatehim. "This is what turns him
asan ir
governments
byboth
of his colleagues edged
decisively,"Maleeha Lodhi, then Paki- who seemsto some
how
clear
not
It
is
border.
tobaccoand adren- national
stan'shiqh commissionerin London, re- to live precariouslyon
th'
border
final
a
on
commitment
a
ahne.And s Indian counterparts-J. N'
called. Just weeks afterward, Musharraf
or
make,
to
were
prePared
adviser, gotiators
met Vajpayee in Islamabad-andagreed Dixit, Singlis national-security
one
take;
all
it
would
long
Perso
joint statement:the followed by Satinder Lambah-worked
to an unprecedented
volved suggesteda time line of abor
typically
Indians
The
formally.
more
"not
permit
Pakistani President would
to the secrethotel to fifteen years.
any territory under Pakistan'scontrol to brousht note-takers
One of the most difficult issue
whet easAztz ttavelled
sessionsoverseas,
be used to support terrorism in any man-
tarv of State,put it in a memoir.In these
u.".r, M.rrharraf, "like so manY of
hit f.[o* officers . . . was a revanchist
on the issue of Kashmir." Musharraf
apparently decided to break uP the
oiace talks. He authorized a reckless
incursion of Army personnel disguised
as guerritlasinto a mountainous area
of Kashmir known as Kargil. A smallscalewar eruPted; at one Point, the
Clinton Administration believed that
Pakistan s fumy had taken stePsto mobilize its nuclear weaPons. Musharraf has said that he briefed Sharif on
the Kargil operation; Sharif denied
this. "I think the back channelwas making good progress,"he told me. "But
you see, it was sabotaged
.oo.t
"ft.a
by Mr. Musharraf-a misadventure
that was ill-advised, ill-executed,Poorly
olanned." A few months afterward,
Sharif tried to fire the General; Musharaf setzedpower and threw Sharif in
iail. After Prisident Clinton intervened,
"Sharif
was releasedinto exile in Saudi
46
THENEVYORKER,MARCH 2'2OO9
ner." The two leaders announced new
formal negotiations between their foreiqn miniitries, which were known as
the Composite Dialogue. Privately, they
re-started the back-channel talks on
volved a plan to establish ajoint body, now?"' the senior
official recalled. ,,As
madeup of local Kashmiri leaders,Inlong asMusharrafwas the chief had the
dians,and Pakistanis, to overseeissues uniform, I think
he had a valid answer.
that affectedpopulations on both sides He said,Yes, the
chief is doing this.,"
of the Line of Control, such as water
rights. Pakistan sought something close
s the peaceralks stalledand MuI
to shared governance, with the kash,[ Ishamafls powerwaned durinq the
miris taking a leading role; India, fear- first half of2008,
the I.S.I., or ,..iion,
ing a lossof sovereignry,wanted much of it, appeared to
be reenlisting jihadi
lesspower-sharing. The envoyswres- groups. OnJuly
7th, a suicide bomber
tled intensively over what language to rammed a car loaded
with explosives
use to describe the scope ofthis new into the gates of
India's E,mbassyin
body; rhe last draft rermed it a ..ioint Kabul, kiling fifry-four
people, tnciudmechanism."
ing the Indian defense atiach6. The
Manmohan Singh's government United Statesintercepted
communifeared that rtt...rro, P"kis'tani regimes cations between
active I.S.I. Dersonwould repudiate any Kashmir bargaln nel and the Taliban-aligned
network
forged byMusharraf, who had, uft.iall,
ofJalaluddin Haqqani, which is become to power in a coup. The Indians lieved by U.S. military
and intelligence
yer_enot sure that a provisional peace officials ro have carrild out the kabul
deal could be protected "from the men Fmbassyattack.
Haqqani has a long
of violence-on both sides,"the senior history of collaboration
and contact
Indian official who was involved recalled. with the I.S.I.; he
was also a paid client
And they wondered whether the pakio f th e C e ntral l ntel l i gence A gency
stanArmy had really embracedthe non- during the late
nineteen-eighties. On
paper framework or mereh saw the tallcs September4th, tess
than three weeks
as a ploy to buy time and win favor after Musharraf's
resignation as pain Washingon whjle continuing to sup- kistan's President,
KaJhmiri militant
port the jihadis. "I remember askins groups, including
Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Taiq Azn,'Is the Army on board?Righ1 appeared at alarge
open rally in Mu-
zaffarabad,the capital of pakistan-held
Kashmir; the Pakistan Army has a
hea',ypresencein this ciry, and it is unlikeJy that such an event could have
taken place without the LS.L's sanction. The rally seemeddesignedto send
a messageacrossthe Line of Control:
Musharraf is gone, but the Kashmir
war is alive.
'lMe askedthem specifically,,Howis
thls going on ifyou saythe Army's on
.all
board?"' the senior Indian official recalled. "They kept saying, 'Give us a
chance.We needi-e.-Y.i yes,the Ar" '
my's on board.''t
In October, Durrani, who was then
Pakistan's national-security adviser.
travelled to New Delhi and met with
members of India's National Security Advisory Board. Indian Army officers presented "some very nice colored
charts,"asDurrani pur it;documentinq
recent increasesin ceasefireviolationi
andjihadi infiltrations alonq the Line of
Conrrol. Durrani found thiharts.,a bit
one-sided,"but when he returned to Islamabad he sought explanations about
the violations from Pakistan Amy commanders.In January,Durrani was fired
after making public statements that
w%
ffiftffi&ktT
ffieffiww
tuK
ffi#$*$TY'
,,1".j'!#*-"*
:'11
-.-ffi
"The things that shouldbotherm.e/en'7-5/1svld I be uorcied?"
were seenin Pakistan as too accommodating oflndia.
The apparent revival of the I.S.I.'s
covert operations influenced the Singh
government's assessmentof who was
lik lr, t.roo.tsible for the Mumbai attack. "It appearsthere hasbeen a change
in poliry," V. P. Malik, a former Indian
Chief ofArmy Staff, who now headsan
influential securify-studies institute in
New Delhi, said. "They really have not
taken action against these outfits, their
leadersand their infrastructure."
Pakistan's new civilian President,
Asif Zardarr, had entered into his ovm
struggle with those in the Pakistani security serviceswho favor the jihadis and
covert war against lndia. Zardarl's Pakistan PeoplesParty hasfought the Army
for oower sincethe late nineteen-seventiesl neither institution fully trusts the
other, although they have sometimes
collaborated.(Some P.P.P. officials believe that the I.S.I. may have been involved in Benazir Bhutto's murder.)
Last May, Zatdari tried to assertcivilian
conffol over the I.S.I. byplacing it under
the authority of the Interior Ministry;
the Army rejectedthis order,andZardari backed down. In November, speaking extemporaneouslybyvideoat a conferencein New Delhi, Zardari declared
4B
THE NEV YORKER,MARCH 2,2OO9
that Pakistan might be willing to follow
a oolicv of "no first usd' of its nuclear
*iupo.r, a remarkable departure from
past Pakistan Army doctrine. Privately,
in discussionswith Indian officials,
Zardar\ affirmed his interest in picking
up the back-channelnegotiations.Some
Indian officials and analystsinterpreted
Mumbai as a kind ofwarning from the
I.S.I. to Zardan-"Zardaris Kargil," as
someIndiansput it, meaningthat itwas
a deliberateeffort by the PakistanArmy
to disrupt ZardarT'speace overtures.
SeveralPakistani and American officials
told me that Zardaiis now deeplyworried about his personalsecuriry.
regional headquartersof Jamaat'
'-l-th.
I ud-Dawa-the educational and
charitable or ganization that, depending
on howyou seeit, is either the parent of
or a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba-lies on
a flat stretch of agricultural land west of
Lahore, outside a village called Muridke. Barbed-wire fences surround a
campus of about seventy-five acres,
which contains an O\rnpic-size swimming pool, horse stables,offices,several
schools,dormitories, and a large whitewashed mosque. When I visited, a
smokyhaze had shroudedthe facilityin
a vellowish murk. The chief administra-
tor, Mohammed Abbas, who is a
known as Abu Ehsaan, greeted n
Abbas, who is thi4y-five years old, l
a substantialbelly and a four-inch bla
beard. He showed me inside, to a ci
peted room, where we sat cross-legg
on the floor, propped against cushio
The United StateslistedJamaat-u
Dawa-the name roughly translates
the Society of the Call to Islam-ar
foreign terrorist organization in 20(
on the ground that it was an alias I
Lashkar. After the Mumbai attack, t
United Nations Security Council fi
lowed suit, with tacit support from I
kistaris civilian government. Abbas tr
me that thesejudgments were mistak
and that Jamaat-ud-Dawa "is solel
rehef organization."
He explained that young men oft
joined the organrzairon as relief wot
ers,and were sent out for ayeat or m(
to areasthat had been struck by ear
ouakesor other disasters.These volu
teers might also reside at Muridl
where they can receive lodging, foc
and pocket money, he said. If they la
marry or move into administration, th
might qualify for a modest sala
Among the group's projects, he sa
'\MeVe set up an emergencycell for r
cidents on the G.T. Roadlthe prin
pal highway that traverses Pakista
"Peoole call us and we send the amb
lance to the scene.We alsowork in c
laborationwith the local district adm
istration. They're happywith our wo
They think we're honest-they knc
that if we pick up victims they will p
back all of theirvaluables when tfeya
releasedfrom the hospital."
As we spoke,severalfi.rll-beardedrn
spread a plastic mat atop the caqpe
and laid out a meal ofchicken biryani a
naan. Abbas excusedhimself briefly
answer his cell phonb; its ring tone \4
the sound of a frog croaking.
I askedAbbas if his organizatrcnh
come under pressurefrom the gove
ment of Pakistan since the Mumbail
tack. 'The police came the night theo
ganizaionwas banned, but the scho
and campuswere alreadyclosedbeca
ofvacations," he said. "It is not clear
whether the schoolswill be able to r
open. The hospital is functional, I
people are afraid. The number ofpatier
has declined becausepeople are afil
India may hit this Muridke complex.
T
"No doubt we ate afrid," he continued."Hundreds ofworkers havebeenarrested and shifted to unknown places.
Top leadershavebeenpJacedundei house
arrest.. . . If they come and they want to
arrest me, I am ready. But what is the
chargesheet?The U.S. should teli-the
U.N. should tell-what Jamaat-ud-Dawa
hasdone."
President Zardari announced that he
would ban Jamaat, as required by the
U.N. resolution. The Pakistani government plans to closeJamaat'sschoolsand
to place provincial administrators at
eachofthe charity's facilities to oversee
finances and personnel. However, Pakistan has a long record of implementing such crackdowns only partially, and
of releasingjihadi leadersafter relatively
short periods-an approachto counterterrorism that is referred to in India as
"catch and release."Pakistan banned
Lashkar in 2002, for example, but its
leader, Saeed, continued to preach
openly. Indian officials point out that
Jamaat'sWeb site continued to operate
long after Pakistan had declaredthe latest ban, and they claim that Lashkar
andJ atnaathave now reorganized themselvesunder various new names.
Abbas took me on a walk around the
campus.We chatted with a few young
men who said that they were students
at Jamaat'suniversity. Lashkar educatesthousandsannually in a Wahhabiinfluenced strain oflslam that, in addition to its political doctrine oftransnationaljihad, emphasizesausterepersonal
devotion. (Pakistan'straditional religiousculture has been influenced by the
venerationofearthly Sufi saints.)Evangehzingstudentsform the core oflashkar'smembership and its strength-1ike
Hezbollah, the young men in Jamaat
dormitories and "humanitarian" camos
can offer socialservicesand a vision of
ethicalgovernancein a country that enjoys a paucity of both.
Down a dirt road shadedby eucalyptus trees,we found Jamaat'shospital,
wherehalf a dozen villagers squatted on
thepavement,waiting for appointments.
Insidewe toured a ggrecological clinic
anda dentist's office-the fee schedule
postedon the wall indicated that a firll
dentalexam would cost about fifty cents.
A blue police truck had parked in
front ofthe headquartersbuilding by
thetime we returned. "This happened
all of a sudden,"Abbas said unhappily.
Had my presencebeen detected, and
the police been dispatchedto make a
show of their vigilance, or was this a
genuine inspection?We shook hands
and said our farewellsbeside the oolice
vehicle.On its side,stencilled;n trnglish in white block lerters, were the
words "Crime Forensic Laboratory."
A few minutes later, on the G.T.
Road, headedback to Lahore, I passed
some lJrdu-language graffiti painted
prominently in white on a brick wall.
"fJnder the banner of preaching and
jihad," the scrawl declared, "Lashkar's
caravanwill roll on."
war in Afghanistan, which Obama has
identified as one of his highest foreignpoliry priorities. Stability in Afghanistan
will be difficult to achieveunless Pakistan cociperatesmore wholeheartedlyin
American-led efforts to oacifv the Taliban. The I.S.I. built up the Taliban as a
national Afghan movement during the
nineteen-nineties, partly as a means to
prevent India from gaining influence in
Afghanistan. Pakistan'sgeneralsare unlikelyto dismande the Taliban leadership
ifthey continue to regardjihadi groupsas
a necessaryinstrument in an existential
struggle with India. "As far as the PakistanArmy is concerned,they think India
ir t{o.rg to weaken Pakistan," Muhamast
December,
during
an
appearance
mad Nasir Athtar, a retired three-star
T
"Meet the Press,"BarackObama general, said. 'They also think America
Lon
remarked, 'lMe carit continue to look at is working with India to denuclearize
Afghanistan in isolation. We have to see Pakistan."This mind-set, he added, "is
it as part ofa regional problem that in- very dangerousfor the future."
cludes Pakistan, includes India, indudes
The Mumbai attack took olace durKashmir, includes lran." The President ing the transirion berweenthe Bush
has appointed the veteran diplomat
and C)bama Administrations, and the
Richard Holbrooke asa specialrepresen- United Statesconcentrated its diDlotative for Pakistan andAfghanistan. The
matic effbrts on preventing any armed
public description of Holbrooke's re- conflict between India and Pakistan.
sponsibiJitieshas been carefi.rllyworded There were severaldose calls. Less than
to avoid expJicitmention ofKashmir, be- seventy-two hours after the attack began,
causeIndia's government has long re- someonepretending to be In&a's foreign
jected outsidemediation ofthat conflict, minister telephoned Zardari and threatbut, given his mission, Holbrooke will
enedwar; onlywhen former Secretaryof
inevitablybe drawn into quiet talls about State Condole ezzaRice intervened &d it
the achievementsand frustrations ofthe
become apparent that the call was a
back channel.
hoax. The callerhas not been identified;
The Indo-Pakistani eouation is criti- like the Mumbai strike itse[ the phony
cal, in any event, to the outcome of the threat mayhave been a deliberateprovo-
1
)
{t"'.*-,""":-
l*
'l'l'i'ri.
"
:*k;;ry'e
,g
*w
! {'4
:'ry-
*lq<
"It'sallyours."
Sh^n^hor-\
they crackeddown too hard
cation by jihadialigned conspirators. gether-is now," BrajeshMishra, a for- bacldasti'if
groups, Grenier said.
the
Kashmir
on
adviser,
national-security
Indian
mer
The danger of oPen war between
David Petraeus,t
fall,
General
Last
mind
mY
in
doubt
"I
no
have
me.
told
reIn&a and Pakistanhasnot passed.As
doc
in
counter-insurgency
specialist
is
forced
Army
Pakistan
the
unless
that
cently asDecember 26th, Pakistani intelUniter
the
to
head
was
promoted
trine,
jihadis
itwill
the
about
something
to
do
ligence officials concluded that Indian
StatesCentral Command, which over
walplanes were being positioned for an lead to a mllitary confrontatiori' with
seesAmerican military operarionsan(
he
said.
soon'
very
and
perhaps
India,
ur raid. The countrys nation?l-security
policies
in the Middie East, and in Ai
has
emPloYed
India
November,
Since
adviserat the time, Durrani, telephoned
and Pakistan. (India fallr
to
camPaign
shanistan
media
and
a
diplomatic
American officials in alarm. The next
inder the Pacific Command' therebr
day, Stephen Hadley' then the national- induce the international communitycomplicating efi-ortsto coordinate U.S
put
in
particular-to
States,
the
United
security adviser,tracked down Durrani
mjlitary liaisonsin the region.) Petraeu
to
Army
Pakistan
on
the
pressure
greater
on his cell phone while he was shopping
has organized a group ofabout two hun
and
jihadi
India
groups'
with
its
ties
break
in an Islamabad supermarket and told
dred government, academic, and mili
rein
closer
have
grown
States
the
United
him that there would be no raid.
tary specialiststo rethinku.S. strategyir
see
the
stili
officials
Indian
but
centvears.
During the Bush Administration,
his areaofresponsibility. Their studyha
excuses
to
accept
willtng
too
as
tar
U.S.
American and British officials monihighlighted the importance of changinl
'The
Pakistanis
s
generals.
Pakistan
from
tored the secret negotiations. British
the strategicoudook ofPakistani genet
Americans,"
the
to
play
able
have
been
officialscontributed a few ideasbasedon
als toward India, according to militar
Nary
Indian
retired
a
Bhaskar,
C.
Uday
their experiencewith the Good Friday
officers inrrolved in the review. AJreadl
"I
abandon
wouldnt
said.
commodore,
agreementin Northern Ireland, but neiPetraeushas started to expound his "bi1
the
probmake
only
would
them-that
ther they nor the Americans becamediidea ' about U. S. military strategy towali
rectly involved. Ultimately' any peace lem worse. . . . The Pakistan fumy wili
Pakistan: that the Pakistan Army mus
only
is
the
That
to
self-correct.
have
-settlementbetween India and Pakistan
be convinced that it facesno existentil
war."
of
total
way-short
suPPort in both
would have to
^ttr^ct if itwere seenas
threat from India but doesfacea revolu
comPlaints,
Indian
face
of
the
In
countries'padiaments;
tionary threat from jihadis within it
taken
sometimes
have
officials
American
a oroduct bf American or British medborders-and so should shift its empha
and
the
I'S.I'
toward
"One
posture
a
protective
dling, its prospectswould be dim.
sis from planning and equipping itsel
generals
Pakistan's
fu-y.
Pakistan
the
of the best piecesof advicewe gave the
India to eliminating home
forwarwith
both
at
adept
become
have
Pursuing
StateDepartmentwhen I wasin Delhijihadis.
grown
simultanewar
and
covert
talks
oeace
and I remember writing about four caAdmiral Mike Mullen became chair
bles on this subject-was to keep hands ously, and at telling American interlocof theJoint Chiefs of Staffin Oc
man
SepAfter
hear.
to
theywish
what
utors
off" AshleyTellis, a former political adand since then he has hd
tober,2007,
Bush
the
in
particular,
11th,
tember
viser in the U.S. Embassyin New Delhi,
with the Pakistan Ann
meetings
eight
the
to
challenge
didlitde
Administration
recalled. "We stayed away, and unless
Kayani, aswel1r
Ashfaq
General
chief
Bush's
poiicies.
Pakistan's
in
I
dualities
the Obama-ites chooseto changethis
with Gener
meetings
four
or
three
that
decided
advisers
counter-terrorism
doubt we will intervene. They've manappointed I
who
was
Pasha,
Ahmad
jihadi
posed
groups
Kashmir-focussed
aged quite well without us-they've
last autumt
I.S.I.
the
lead
to
Kayani
AdminThe
U.S.
to
the
threat
no
direct
endedup in a placewe'd like to seethem
in
the
back-chann
participated
Kayani
billion
to
ten
close
delivered
istration
end up." Direct negotiations,without
serving asMusharraf 's I.S,
mediators, had forced the two sides to dollars'worth of military aid to Pakistan, talls while
role, he endorsedthe prir
in
that
chief;
without
A1
fight
to
ostensibly
QLeda,
confront the hard issues,the senior InBoth Pakista
the
non-paper.
in
ciples
that
requiring
and
without
oversight
real
dian official told me. "tlltimately, we
a newstt
promised
have
commanders
Islamist
regional
with
break
I.S.I.
the
need to screwup our courageand do the
to
Pasha
In
"On
direction.
tegic
nothwas
there
Al
January,
Qeda,
deal, and anybody elsegetting involved groups.
ou
"We
distancing
are
Der
Spiegel,
theY
do
that
to
them
we
asked
ing
actually gives both of us a cmtch," the
wouldrit do," Bob Grenier, who was the selvesfrom conflict with India, bot
oltcial said. '!Ve grandstand."
He added, 'Itr
On the fundamental Problem of the C.I.A.'s station chief in Islamabaddur- now and in general."
but not con
ln
Pakistan,
be
crazy
may
for
As
recalled.
and2002,
jihadi
ine
2001
Pakistan Army's suPport for
knowfr
We
minds.
of
our
out
"There
oletelv
a
was
Lashkar,
as
such
grorrpt
groups,however,only the United States
Indir
not
is
our
enemy,
tirat
terror
well
of
ambivalence."
amount
tremendous
has the leverage,through its militaryheard
tl
he
has
that
me
told
Mullen
about
"concerned
seemed
leaders
I.S.I.
packages,to
and economic-assistance
in
Pasha
and
Kayan\
from
same
Privat
insist upon changes.Unless the PakiTheir shift in oudook "has been trar
stan Army makes a true break with its
formational," Mullen said. The Pal
jihadi clients-and comes ro regard
stanArmy is "certainly committed," al
thesegroups asa greaterthreat than InMullen said, "It's going to takt
yet,
dia-not even the most creativediploand it's an urgent, urgent sin
while,
mats in the region are likely to succeed.
lives are at stake."
tion,
where
"The time to act-to control the PakiAdministration hasir
The
Obama
stan A r m y and ge t th e c i v i l i a n s to 50
THE NEV YORKER,MARCH 2,2OO9
tiated a sixty-day review ofpoliry toward
Pakistan and Afghanistan; as it completesthat study the Administration will
haveto decide how much oatience with
the Pakistan Army it can afford. The
most dimcult challenge will be finding
the right blend of encouragement and
pressureto induce the Pakistan Army
and the I.S.I. to condude that an overarching and long-lasting regional peace
is in their interest. Not all American
oficials possesseven Mulleris qualified
optimism. "History shows that the Pakistanis will slow-roll us to death," a
seniorU.S. intelligence official told me,
referring to Pakistaris long record oftolerancefor jihadi groups. "The history is
so compelling-that the Pakistanis play
around and nothing ever changes."
and Singh may not find it
/adari
Z-leasy to return to the non-paper negotiatio.nson Kashmir any time soon,
eveniftheywish to. In Pakistan,civfian
political leaders might well reject the
earlier framework simply because the
discreditedMusharraf was behind it.
Even more daunting, the violent contest
for power and legitimary between Talibanmilitants and Pakistan'sgovernment
isin manywap a struggle over Pakistan's
national identi ty----and,particularly, over
whether the presentgovernmentis righteouslyIslamic enough. In the midst of
sucha contest,any agreementthat made
concessionsto India would be harder
than ever to sell to the Pakistani public.
"The military is completely on board at
the top levels-with a paradigm shift, to
seeIndia as an opporftrnity, to change
domestic attitudes," a senior Pakistani
officialtold me. However. he continued.
'The public mood is out of synch."The
mood within sectionsof the Army and
theI.S.I. may be out of slmchwith peace
negotiations as well; in early February,
the Kashmiri jihadi group Hezb-ulMujahideenhosted a pubJ-icconference
inMuzaffarabad, which Lashkar supponersattended.
In India, Manmohan Singh seems
determinedto seekredlectionoi o.u.."
and-stabiliryplatform. Last year,
tefore
Mumbai, Singh took stepsto reconnect
the back channel with Tariq Atrz, according to people famfiar with the diplomary.Singh was concerned,in particular,about whether Zardaiwould be
willingto continuethe talks andwhether
Pakistanwould stand bythe non-paper,
or insist on renegotiating.
Perve'zMusharraf anived in the United
Statesin January for a speakingtour. It
was not a particularly high-profile itineraV; he spoke first to the World Affairs
Council ofWestem Michigan, and later
at Stanford University and the World
Affairs Council of Philadelphia. On his
last evening in the country, he attended a
receptionhostedby the Middle East Institute, a public-policy group with headquartersin an Edwardian rowhouse near
Dupont Circle, in Washington, D.C.
Two men with crewcuts and earoieces
stood outside the door; a private security
guard with a metal detector checked the
guests.Severaldozen people sipped red
wine in a high-ceilinged room: former
American Ambassadorsto Pakistan,lobbyists, and representativesof some of the
defensecontractorswho did big business
in the Musharraf era, such as Lockheed
Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman. The guestofhonor tumed up about
five minutes late, in a black S.U.V. with
fl ashing emergenry lights.
Musharraf looked wel| in a tailored
dark suit and red tie. He circulated
among the crowd and engagedin small
talk about the weather, inflected with
nostalgia from his time in office-yes,
Michigan was very cold, but nothing
like the time he stepped onto an ailport
tamac in Kazakhstan, when the temperaturewas minus thirry-six degrees.I
askedhim about the almost-deal he had
made on Kashmir in2007.I said that I
had been surprised to discover how
closehis negotiators had been to drawing to an end one ofthe great territorial
conflicts ofthe age.
"Ive alwal'sbelieved in peacebetween
India and Pakistan," he replied. "But it
required boldnesson boih sides.. . .
What I find lacking sometimes is this
boldness-particularly on the Indian
side." He then reviewed a long negotiating sessionhe had had, many yearsbefore, with former Indian Prime Minister
Vajpayee,inwhich the pairhad tried and
failed to agreeon a particularjoint statement. As he recounted the incident, the
pitch ofMusharraf's voice rose slighdp
he seemedto be reliving his frustration.
He returned to the subject of the
2007 taJks."I wasn'tjust giving concessions-I was taking from India aswell,"
he said, a touch defensively. Then he
calmed. He fixed his gaze and added,"It
would have benefitted both India and
Pakistan."o
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