September-October 2010 San Antonio Lawyer

Transcription

September-October 2010
The Chicken Game and the Art of Negotiation
Referral Fees
Judge Juanita Vasquez-Gardner
Have You Heard About Collaborative Law?
T E X A S
SAN ANTONIO
PERMIT 1001
PAID
US POSTAGE
PRST STD
6
Departments
Features
6
10
14
18
The Chicken Game and
the Art of Negotiation
By Charles D. (Charlie) Butts
Referral Fees
By Tom Crosley and Tim Torres
10
5
9
16
14
Judicial Profile
Judge Juanita Vasquez-Gardner
By Stephen Gordon
Have You Heard About
Collaborative Law?
By Kim M. Munsinger
20
President’s Page
Past Presidents at the
SABA Annual Luncheon
Hey, Man — I’m a Professional!
By Jack Pasqual
Book Review
Free The Market! Why Only
Government Can Keep the
Marketplace Competitive
Reviewed by Johnny Thomas
Federal Court Update
By Hon. Nancy Stein Nowak
and Nissa M. Dunn
18
On the Cover:
2010-2011 San Antonio Bar Association
President Justice Phylis J. Speedlin and
2010-2011 San Antonio Bar Foundation Chair Wade B. Shelton.
Photo courtesy of Hugh Leighton
McWilliams Photography.
San Antonio Lawyer is an official publication of the San Antonio Bar Association. Send address changes to the Bar Association address above. Views expressed in San Antonio Lawyer
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the San Antonio Bar Association. Publication of an advertisement does not imply endorsement of any product or
service. Contributions to San Antonio Lawyer are welcome, but the right is reserved to select materials to be published. Please send all correspondence to [email protected]. Copyright
©2010 San Antonio Bar Association. All rights reserved
San Antonio Lawyer
3
Lawyer
San Antonio
The San Antonio Bar Association
100 Dolorosa, San Antonio, Texas 78205
210.227.8822
Fax: 210.271.9614
Officers/Directors
President
Justice Phylis J. Speedlin
President-Elect
Gary W. Hutton
Vice President
Andrew L. Kerr
Secretary
Justice Rebecca Simmons
Treasurer
Tom g. Keyser
Immediate Past President
Carl Robin Teague
Directors
Robert J. Barrera
Robert “Rusty” Biechlin, Jr.
Priscilla D. Camacho
C. Lee Cusenbary
Sara E. Dysart
Annalyn G. Smith
Beth Squires
James M. “Marty” Truss
Mexican American
Bar Association
Dayla Sarai Pepi
San Antonio Bar
Foundation
Wade B. Shelton
San Antonio Young
Lawyers Association
Priscilla D. Camacho
State Bar
of Texas Directors
Allan K. DuBois
Victor H. Negrón Jr.
Bexar County Women’s
Bar Association
Christine E. Reinhard
Executive Director
Jimmy Allison
San Antonio Black
Lawyers Association
Sonja D. Sims
Editors
Editor in Chief
Hon. Barbara Nellermoe
Managing Editor
Kim Palmer
Articles Editor
Sara Murray
Departments Editor
Leslie Sara Hyman
Board of Editors
Hon. Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Chair
Pat H. Autry, Vice-Chair
Sherry M. Barnash
Donald S. Bayne
Barry H. Beer
Bridgett G. Braumbaugh
Charles Butts
Priscilla Camacho
Rudy Castillo
Gayla Corley
Paul Curl
Cristina Tijerina de Leon
Antoinette Delgado
Nancy L. Farrer
Stephen H. Gordon
Brian C. Hamilton
Per Hardy
Sam Houston
Paul Robert Killen
James H. Kizziar
Rob Loree
Ed Marvin
Amy McLin
Hugh McWilliams
Curt Moy
Steve Peirce
Donald R. Philbin
Rob Ramsey
James Rodriguez
Regina L. Stone-Harris
Brent Sykora
Katherine A. Tapley
Johnny Thomas
Elena Villasenor
Nationwide Publishing SA
1922 Great Ridge, San Antonio, TX 78248
(210) 381-7664
Publisher - Ron L. Hogue
[email protected]
Legal Media Production and Photography
● Video Depositions/Forensic Videography
● High-Speed Synchronization
● Mediation Settlement Brochures
Preserve Your Memories!
● Editing–Linear & Non Linear
Transfer VHS to DVD
● Videography/Photography
● MPEG-1/CD/DVD Conversion
$10 each with the mention of this ad
● Video Duplication
● Multi-Camera Video Shoots
● Court Playback
● Slides/Negatives/Prints
● Equipment Rental
● Available for Travel
210-410-0125
[email protected]
Proudly Serving Our Legal Community for Over 20 Years
Layout by Kim Palmer
Managing Editor, San Antonio Bar Association
San Antonio Lawyer
4
Back row, left to right: Carl Robin Teague (09-10), Mary Doggett (05-06), Justice Paul Green (91-92), Judge Larry Noll (92-93), Michael Black (00-01),
Bobby Allen (93-94), Bob Price (85-86) and Warren Weir (97-98)
Front row, seated left to right: Jack Hebdon (69-70), Jack Pasqual (86-87), Judge Fred Biery (87-88), Jenny Durbin (90-00) and Charlie Smith (76-77)
Back row, left to right: Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson (98-99), Jack Hebdon (69-70), Dan Naranjo (84-85), Justice Paul Green (91-92), Carl Robin Teague
(09-10), Charlie Butts (79-80), Michael Black (00-01), Bobby Allen (93-94), Judge Fred Shannon (88-89) and Bob Price (85-86)
Front row, seated left to right: Mary Doggett (05-06), Sue Hall (90-91), Jack Pasqual (86-87), Judge Fred Biery (87-88), Jenny Durbin (90-00) and Justice
Karen Angelini (04-05)
San Antonio Lawyer
5
President’s Page
Past Presidents of the San Antonio Bar Association
gather at the SABA Annual Luncheon
The
Chicken
Game
and the Art
of Negotiation
By Charles D. (Charlie) Butts
San Antonio Lawyer
T
hroughout my legal career I have studied the Chicken
Game. The Chicken Game is not really a game. It is
a form of negotiation. Years ago I silently observed
a game of chicken intensely played between a
prosecutor and a defense attorney. The prosecutor
had the upper hand, but the defense attorney had some cards
to play. The defendant had a viable defense. The charging
statute was ineptly drawn, ambiguous, and unduly broad.
The defendant had no criminal record. Two State’s witnesses
had been convicted of fraud. In my mind, a jury trial presented
a good chance for a “not guilty” verdict, or perhaps a hung
jury. After the prosecutor and defense attorney sparred back
and forth awhile, the defense attorney advised his client to
plead “guilty.” The defense attorney chickened-out too early.
That’s when I got the idea for this article. I hope the article will
stimulate your thinking when you play the Chicken Game.
What is the Chicken Game?1 There are different versions
of the Chicken Game, but in one well-known version, two
drivers drive from opposite directions toward one another
keeping the left wheels of their vehicles on the center white
line. The first to veer off the white line becomes the “Chicken”;
the other, the “Winner.” Tragically, there are instances where
neither driver veered away soon enough, resulting in the death
of both drivers. The movie Rebel Without a Cause illustrates this
tragic version of the Chicken Game.2 Two teenagers, James
Dean and another, raced stolen cars headlong toward a cliff
over the ocean. The one who stopped or bailed out first would
be dubbed Chicken. The one who bailed out last would be the
Winner. When Dean’s opponent at the last minute tried to bail
out, his coat sleeve caught in the door. Desperate efforts to
free himself failed, and he drove off the cliff to his death. Dean
was ultimately the Chicken, but his opponent, the Winner,
experienced a fatal victory.
Does the Chicken Game apply in business? You bet! The
Chicken Game applies to just about every form of negotiation:
labor strikes, proposed mergers, business acquisitions.
Consider as an example, the vigorous battle between Andrew
Carnegie and George Pullman to acquire and control the
railroad sleeping car industry in the 1860s. Carnegie founded
Carnegie Steel. Pullman invented the railroad sleeping car
— the “Pullman car.” Both men vied for the company at a
meeting in a New York hotel and happened to be walking up
some stairs side-by-side when inspiration struck Carnegie
like a bolt of lightning. Carnegie told Pullman that the two
of them were plain fools for continuing to butt heads and
suggested they join forces.3
Carnegie triumphantly stated in his autobiography that he
had stumbled upon a selling point, a weak spot, in Pullman’s
makeup — his ego. So when Pullman asked Carnegie what
they would call the company, Carnegie replied, “Pullman,
of course!” The success of the resulting merger illustrates an
important principle in playing the Chicken Game: know, and
take advantage of, your opponent’s weaknesses.
A personal story illustrates another important Chicken
Game principle. During the Great Depression, Mr. Ed, a friend
of my Dad, was in the retail furniture business and fell behind
in his payments to the bank. The bank’s president hounded
Mr. Ed for payment. The president finally gave Mr. Ed an
ultimatum: pay by noon the following day or face foreclosure.
Mr. Ed told the president that he could not pay. The president
6
responded, “Then, the bank will
foreclose on your note.” Mr. Ed grabbed
the keys to his store, slammed them
on the president’s desk, and replied,
“I’ll save you the trouble. Here’s the
%$#@**&& keys. Now, you are in the
furniture business!” With that, Mr.
Ed stomped out of the bank. Trailing
behind, the president pleaded with him
to re-consider. Mr. Ed finally relented,
“Well, all right but I need at least a 90day extension and may need even more
time.” The president conceded. Mr.
Ed won that Chicken Game because
he knew the bank did not want to be
in the furniture business. As the story
illustrates, what your opponent knows
or doesn’t know about your side can
turn the tide in your favor.
Does the Chicken Game apply
to international relations? History
provides many examples of international
Chicken Games. Consider the CubanRussian Missile Crisis during President
John F. Kennedy’s administration.
Russia had become a nuclear threat to
the United States resulting in a scary,
very real Chicken Game among the
United States, Russia, and its ally Cuba.
Had Russia not backed off, perish the
thought. During the Cold War the
term “brinkmanship”4 was coined, by
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
who advocated the policy against
the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles
explained that brinkmanship is the
ability to get to the brink of war, without
going to war. This point might be
reached through diplomatic maneuvers
by creating the impression that one is
willing to use extreme methods rather
than concede. During the Cold War, the
threat of nuclear force was often used
as such a deterrent. Fortunately, the
United States won that Chicken Game.
Recently, the Chicken Game played
out again between the United States and
Russia when the United States offered to
exchange ten Russian agents for Russia’s
release of four Russians (yes, Russians)
imprisoned in Russia for eleven years
for spying for the West. Initiated by
the United States, the agreement was
reached, and the ten Russian agents were
flown back to Russia just eleven days
after their arrests in the United States.
Thus, bringing a swift, successful end
to a Chicken Game evoking memories
of Cold War style bargaining, a/k/a
brinkmanship. Happily, the exchange
of prisoners underscores a new-era
relationship between Moscow and
Washington. But the game continues
today, as North Korea and Iran flex
potential nuclear muscles.
Does the Chicken Game apply
to the practice of law? Both civil and
criminal cases present opportunities
for the Chicken Game. Criminal
plea-bargaining provides a perfect
example. When a person is charged
with committing a criminal offense, the
prosecutor and defense counsel often
“dance back and forth” in an effort to
resolve a case without a formal trial. If
the defendant accepts the prosecutor’s
first offer, he loses the advantage
of a better offer. For example, if the
prosecutor offers to dismiss a firstdegree murder charge in exchange
for the defendant’s guilty plea, the
defendant loses any chance of acquittal,
but avoids the risk of the death penalty.
If the defendant refuses the offer, the
prosecutor must decide whether to
“sweeten” the plea offer, stand firm, or
try the case. In most cases, accepting
the first offer is unwise.
Why is it unwise to accept the
first offer? Many defense attorneys
fail to consider that most prosecutors
do not want to try a case. Prosecutors
have full caseloads and little to lose
by sweetening a plea offer. To obtain
the best offer for a client, a defense
attorney should investigate all of the
angles, find the holes in the State’s
case, and identify strong points of
defense. If the defense attorney wants
to win the Chicken Game, the attorney
must give the prosecutor something
worthy of a sweetened deal. A defense
attorney who approaches a prosecutor
with something solid, something real,
San Antonio Lawyer
7
will have a better chance of obtaining
a better deal for the client. If the
prosecutor offers a better deal, defense
counsel wins that Chicken Game.
Why do prosecutors offer better
deals? Large caseloads make it
impossible for any prosecutor’s office
to try every criminal case. Attempting
to try every case creates a backlog in
the courts. This fact alone motivates
both sides to resolve the case through
plea-bargaining. The public and the
news media often criticize the pleabargaining process as resulting in lesser
punishments, but there are cases in
which the plea-bargaining process results
in more severe punishment. Consider the
situation of a hypothetical district attorney
and the defendants he prosecutes.
Assume the district attorney must
resolve 100 cases per year with a budget of
$100,000. With only a $1,000 to spend on
investigating and prosecuting each case,
half of the defendants will be acquitted.
But if the district attorney can convince 90
defendants to accept a plea bargain, the
district attorney can focus his resources
on the 10 defendants who do not plead
guilty, spend $10,000 on each case, and
perhaps get a conviction rate of 90%.
Assume further that a defendant
probably faces a 90% chance of
conviction if he goes to trial and makes
his choice accordingly. He should reject
any proposed deal that is worse for him
than a 90% chance of conviction but may
well accept one that is less attractive
than a 50% chance of conviction,
leaving him worse off than he would be
in a world without plea- bargaining. All
defendants would be better off if none
of them accepted the district attorney’s
offer, but each is better off if they accept.
They are caught in a many-player
version of the Chicken Game.
Here’s how the Chicken Game can
play out in a criminal case. Consider the
following scenario. An elderly victim is
fatally shot. The murder weapon is not
found. A 60-year-old man with a prior
conviction for aggravated assault is
charged. There’s one eye witness — the
defendant’s girlfriend — Suzy Q — plus
some circumstantial evidence pointing
to the defendant. There is also a tape
recording of an argument between the
victim and the defendant in which the
victim threatens to kill the defendant
over a business transaction. Thirty days
later, Suzy Q states that the victim burst
into the defendant’s office, carrying a
.32 caliber pistol, and that the defendant
took a loaded .45 revolver from his desk
drawer and shot the victim.
After waiving arraignment, defense
counsel files various motions, including
motions to quash the indictment and
to suppress the tape recording. At the
pre-trial hearing defense counsel and
the prosecutor discuss the possibilities
of a guilty plea, reduction to a lesser
offense, dismissal of the indictment,
and a trial either before the court or
a jury. The prosecutor offers 25 years
“hard time.” Defense counsel says, “No
way.” The prosecutor reminds defense
counsel that Suzy Q provided a written
statement identifying the defendant as
the killer and stating that the defendant
owned a .45 revolver. Defense counsel
reminds the prosecutor that he was
not present when Suzy Q made
her statement and he has not crossexamined Suzy Q.
So, the Chicken Game begins!
Defense counsel demands a hearing on
his pre-trial motions. The prosecutor
threatens that all deals will be off if
the defendant pursues his motions
— in short, that the State will press
for life imprisonment. The prosecutor
reminds defense counsel about Suzy
Q’s incriminating statement and
insists Suzy Q would make a credible
witness. Defense counsel responds by
reminding the prosecutor about the
victim’s prior threats toward defendant
and that the victim was carrying a
loaded pistol when defendant shot
him. “That may be,” the prosecutor
says, “but Suzy Q said the victim never
pointed his weapon at the defendant.”
At that point, defense counsel demands
a hearing on his pretrial motions. The
prosecutor withdraws his prior offer.
Judge Penn, as expected, overrules the
motion to quash and all other pretrial
motions, and sets the case for jury
trial. The future looks bleak indeed for
the defendant. But the Chicken Game
is far from being over.
A jury of 8 men and 4 women is
seated. The indictment is read and the
defendant pleads “Not Guilty.” The State
puts on several witnesses, including the
medical examiner, homicide detectives,
and EMS personnel. The State introduces
the tape recording of the argument
between the defendant and the victim.
Judge Penn recesses for lunch. Hungry
members of the press, courtroom
spectators, and courthouse personnel
all wait to hear Suzy Q testify and
“drop the hammer” on the defendant.
After the noon recess, the prosecutor
dramatically announces, “The State
of Texas calls Miss Suzy Q as its next
witness.” At that point, the Chicken
Game comes to a screeching halt.
Defense counsel asks to approach
the bench to confer with Judge Penn
and the prosecutor in chambers. In
chambers, defense counsel files a
1. Be a close, careful, attentive listener. Do not do all of the talking.
2. Study the opponent’s facial expressions, eye movements, gestures, eyebrow
movements, blinks (whether occasional or rapid), and eye contact.
3. Watch for any coughing, comments like “to be honest,” “in all honesty,”
or “truthfully speaking.” Phrases like these may reveal possible
insincerity or deception.
4. Search for your opponent’s needs, frustrations, and idiosyncrasies.
5. If your opponent is a “talker,” encourage, pursue, listen, and closely observe.
6. Look for signs of ego, desire for self-esteem, subjection to flattery,
possible fears, and desire to be loved and respected. Take advantage of
those and any other signs of vulnerabilities.
7. Ascertain your opponent’s strengths and weaknesses.
8. Compare your own strengths and weaknesses to those of your opponent.
9. Don’t be overanxious. Keep an open mind, and don’t jump to a rash
conclusion.
10. Be honest to both your opponent and yourself.
11. Hang in there, persevere, and don’t “Chicken out.”
To read more about the art and science of negotiation, see the following references: MORTON DEUTSCH, RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE
DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES (1974); AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, & EVERYDAY
LIFE (1993); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (3d ed. 2003); WILLIAM POUNDSTONE,
PRISONER’S DILEMNA 197-201 (Doubleday NY 1992) available at www.heretical.com/games/chicken.html; Elmer Wiens, Operations ResearchGame Theory, www.egwald.ca/operationsresearch/chickengame.php (last visited July 26, 2010).
2
Chicken(game), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game) (follow “Rebel Without a Cause” hyperlink) (last visited July 26, 2010).
3
See George Pullman-Definition, www.wordiq.com/definition/George_Pullman; Andrew Carnegie-Definition, www.wordiq.com/definition/Andrew_Carnegie.
4
Brinkmanship, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/brinkmanship (last visited July 26, 2010); Korean Brinkmanship Risks Disaster, BRISBANE TIMES
(June 18, 2010), www.brisbanetimes.com.au/opinion/editorial/korean-brinkmanship-risks-disaster-20100617-yjpx.html.
5
TEX. R. EVID. 504; PAT PRIEST, TEXAS COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 5-4(b)(1) (1998). Under the husband/wife privilege, a person cannot be
compelled to testify against a spouse about communications between the couple during the marriage.
6
On the Internet, use a Google or Yahoo search for: “The Chicken Game.” The search will result in a surprisingly long list of useful and
interesting articles, books, and citations about the “Chicken Game.”
1
AND
San Antonio Lawyer
8
motion signed by both Suzy Q and the
defendant to prevent the district attorney
from calling Suzy Q as a witness. Why?
Because the defendant and Suzy Q were
married! Defense counsel presents a
certified copy of a marriage certificate
showing that the defendant and Suzy
Q were married before the victim
was shot. The defendant and Suzy Q
rely on the spousal privilege.”5 Judge
Penn grudgingly grants the motion,
preventing the shocked prosecutor
from calling Suzy Q to testify! No
eyewitness. Game over!
But the game could have played
out differently. What if the defendant
and Suzy Q had not been married?
The prosecutor obviously would have
had the upper hand, assuming Suzy Q
was available to testify. In that case the
defendant would have had to try to plea
bargain, provided the prosecutor was
willing. If the prosecutor was unwilling,
the defendant would have been in
trouble. However, if the defendant knew
that Suzy Q had departed for “parts
unknown” and possibly, probably, or
actually could not be found to testify,
Small, Jeff Ad
the ball would have switched
back to
defendant’s “court,” especially if the
prosecutor were unaware of Suzy Q’s
unavailability. These variables show that
the Chicken Game depends a lot upon
who knows what when negotiations
reach a critical stage.
Conclusion. The Chicken Game
is also played in civil cases as well.
Indeed, the game is played in all
sorts of dealings, too numerous to list
here. When engaging in the process
of negotiation, perhaps as a game of
Chicken, consider the suggestions
on page 8, as the game is and will
continue to be part of our lives. Those
interested in learning more about the
Chicken Game will find the citations
in the endnotes helpful.6
Charles D. (Charlie) Butts
is a former President
of the San Antonio Bar
Association (SABA) and the
2010 Recipient of SABA’s
Joe Frazier Brown Award
of Excellence. Mr. Butts
has been board certified in
criminal law since 1975
and has been listed in the Best Lawyers of America
(Criminal Law) since its first publication. He is
married to the Honorable Shirley W. Butts, Senior
Justice, Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio.
Hey, Man —
I’m a Professional!
The late District Judge Jim Barlow witnessed more than his share
of bizarre courtroom antics during his long and distinguished career.
“Judge Jim” always ran a tight ship, but that did not cause him to limit
a defendant’s right to be represented as the attorney chose. He told of
one particular incident that bears repeating — not only from the humor
aspect — but as a reminder that a jury makes its own decisions, regardless
of the shortcomings or tactics of counsel.
As Judge Jim told it, a local man was on trial for stealing meat. He had to
go to trial because he had a less-than-pristine criminal record. “One more guilty
verdict, and off he would go for life.” The local lawyer, long since deceased,
put his client on the stand, and the questioning went something like this:
Q. Now, Henry, this is not the first time you have been
in court, is it?
A. No, sir.
Q. And, as a matter of fact, you have been convicted of
theft and burglary?
11/26/07
7:00 PM
Page 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have also been convicted of running a threecard-monte game?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, Henry, did you steal this meat?
A. No, sir, I don’t do no small-time crime; it ain’t worth it.
The jury walked him! The foreman told Judge Barlow, after the
verdict, that they admired the man’s honesty.
— Faithfully recorded by Jack Pasqual.
Law Office of
Appeals Briefed/Argued
Error Preservation
Dispositive Motions
Original Proceedings
Jury Charges
Research
Civil Appeals
Litigation Support
Appellate Mediation
Flexible Arrangements
(Hourly, Contingency, Flat Fee)
Not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization
San Antonio Lawyer
9
Jeff Small
210.496.0611
[email protected]
f: 210.579.1399
Referral Fee$
By Tom Crosley and Tim Torres
W
hether you are a sole
practitioner or a partner
in a large law firm, it is
important to have a basic
understanding of the rules
governing referral fees. For example,
assume a potential client comes to you
looking for legal representation in her
personal injury claim against a negligent
truck driver. You decide to refer her to a
plaintiff’s PI lawyer at another firm.
Can you accept a contingent referral
fee from the handling attorney? What
legal and ethical obligations do you
have to the client? To your partners?
What are the potential conflicts of
interest? What must you do to protect
yourself from disciplinary action,
reduce your risk of liability for legal
malpractice, and ensure the fee sharing
agreement is enforceable?
Under Rule 1.04(f) of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct (“the Rule”), effective March
1, 2005, a division of fees between
lawyers not in the same firm must be
(1) “in proportion to the professional
services performed by each lawyer”
or (2) “made between lawyers who
assume joint responsibility for the
representation.”1 Also, the client must
consent “in writing to the terms of the
arrangement prior to the time of the
association or referral proposed.” The
client must consent to the identity of all
lawyers or firms participating in the fee
sharing agreement (“FSA”), whether
fees will be divided based on proportion
of services or joint responsibility, and
the share of the fee that each will receive,
or if based on proportion of services,
the basis on which the division will be
made. See also Rule 1.04(g) specifying
requirements for confirmation of the
fee sharing agreement and limiting
collection of fees not so confirmed to
reasonable value of legal services and
reasonable and necessary expenses
actually incurred on behalf of the client.
Finally, the aggregate fee cannot be
unconscionable under Rule 1.04(a).
In our hypothetical, if you want
to refer the client to a personal injury
lawyer at another firm for a portion of
the contingency fee, you are probably
not considering a division of fees “in
proportion to the professional services
performed by each lawyer.” But if you
are, Comment 12 to Rule 1.04 explains
that each lawyer must be “performing
substantial services on behalf of the client
with respect to the matter,” “services
San Antonio Lawyer
10
beyond those involved in initially
seeking to acquire and be engaged by
the client.” There must be a reasonable
correlation between the division of
services and the division of fees. But an
agreed division of fees should control if
each of you performs substantial services,
even though the division is not directly
proportional to actual work performed,
as long as you made a good faith effort
to set a division of fees proportional to
the services to be performed. Under
these circumstances, the courts should
not second guess your apportionment.
However, you directly represent the
client, with the entire consequences
attendant on legal representation.
JOINT RESPONSIBILITY
The alternative is to agree to
assume “joint responsibility” for the
representation. What does this mean?
Joint responsibility is less onerous in
Texas than it is in other jurisdictions.
Under ABA Model Rule 1.5 (e), “joint
responsibility for the representation
entails financial and ethical responsibility
for the representation as if the lawyers
were associated in a partnership.”2 In
states that have adopted the ABA Model
Rule (the majority), joint responsibility
means joint and several liability:
“financial and ethical responsibility
as if the lawyers were associated in a
partnership.” The referring attorney is
vicariously liable for legal malpractice
by the handling attorney.3
In Texas, Comment 12 to Rule 1.04
distinguishes the rule from its ABA
Model Rule counterpart. Broadly, joint
responsibility does not equal joint
control.4 It does not create joint and
several malpractice liability equal to that
of a partner. It requires no particular
legal services from the attorneys.
However, the referring attorney has
initial and continuing professional and
legal obligations to the client. Before
referring a case, you are obliged to ensure
adequate representation of the client
in the matter. This means conducting a
reasonable investigation into the client’s
matter and referring it to a lawyer whom
you reasonably believe is competent to
handle it. Also, you have the primary
responsibility for ensuring client
consent to the referral in keeping with
the requirements of the rule. You also
have a continuing obligation to ensure
adequate representation and attorneyclient communication. Adequate
communication does not mean you must
attend every client meeting (for example),
or even any meeting, or receive copies
of correspondence. However, you are
responsible for monitoring the matter
enough to ensure the client is reasonably
informed so as to be able to make informed
decisions regarding representation.
Cruse v. O’Quinn sheds light on
the meaning of joint responsibility.
Cruse involved a fee dispute between
attorneys over an FSA based on joint
responsibility. Cruse held that an
attorney disbarred before a settlement
or other final resolution of the case
cannot, as a matter of law, complete their
agreement to share joint responsibility,
and therefore cannot share in the
eventual contingency fee. This was so
even though there were no remaining
specific legal services assigned to the
then-disbarred attorney under the FSA.5
In effect, the agreement to assume joint
responsibility requires the existence of
an attorney-client relationship between
each attorney and the client, consistent
with the Rule’s abolition of fee sharing
based on pure referrals. In contrast,
the work required by an FSA based on
the proportion of professional services
to be performed might be completed
prior to disbarment, depending on how
the responsibilities are assigned in the
FSA, allowing the disbarred attorney to
collect a fee.6
Joint responsibility for the representation, and your continuing obligations
to the client, implicate a duty of loyalty
to the client. Because you continue to
represent the client, you have potential
conflicts arising from that representation.
At a minimum, it will complicate your
conflicts analysis. For example, suppose
you or your firm represents or previously
represented a corporation that is the
defendant in the referral client’s case.
Or imagine this situation: You or your
firm represents a criminal defendant
in a DUI case and the victim asks you
about bringing a civil suit against your
client. In either of these situations, you
may have a conflict if the matters are
substantially related. Even if you do not
have an impermissible conflict under
TDRPC 1.06 or 1.09, your firm may wish
to avoid even the appearance of a conflict
to keep the existing client happy.
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
Because the referring and handling
attorneys both represent the client, they
are both subject to malpractice liability.
Under the Texas Rule, the referring
See also Ethics Opinion 577, March 2007, which discusses hiring of lawyers who are not partners, shareholders or associates of the law firm and billing the
client at a different rate than that paid to the hired lawyer. The opinion first characterizes lawyers as “firm lawyers” and “non-firm lawyers.” “Firm lawyers”
include partners, shareholders and associates of the firm, as well as “other firm lawyers” – those who are reasonably considered to be in the firm based on
their relationship with the firm. The ethics opinion provides examples of objective factors which can be used to make the determination and provides some
examples of other firm lawyers, “those referred to as of counsel senior attorneys, contract lawyers, and part-time lawyers.” The opinion concludes that billing
for non-firm lawyers at different rates than the hiring firm pays (either more or less) constitutes fee sharing subject to rule 1.04(f). Billing at the actual rate paid
does not implicate the rule. See also Ethics Opinion 450, November 1987, concluding that requirements of TCPR DR 2-107(A) do not apply to fee sharing
with lawyer designated as “of counsel” to the firm and having a regular, continuing and substantial relationship with the law firm.
1
2
See Comment 7 to ABA Model Rule 1.5 (e).
For additional discussions of the meaning of joint responsibility in Texas and other states, see Hile, “How Not to Lose Your Referral Fee,” 24th
Annual Advanced Personal Injury Law Course, Chapter 32.1; Bosworth, Is the Model Rule Outdated? Texas Carries Referral Fee Responsibility into
the Limited Liability Era, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 509, 519-22 (2005); Arizona Bar Ethics Opinion 04-02 (2004); Comments to ABA Model Rule 1.5(e);
ABA Informal Op. 85-1514 (1985).
3
4
The New Rules: Frequently Asked Questions, 68 Tex. B. J. 311 (2005).
5
Cruse v. O’Quinn, 273 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
6
See also Texas Ethics Opinion 568, April 2006.
7
See Comment 14 to Rule 1.04. See also Hile, n.3, supra; Bosworth, n.3, supra, at 509.
8
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. ART. 6132b-4.04.
9
Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, 73 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2002).
10
See, e.g., Dardas v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, 194 S.W.3d 603, 613-617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
11
See Hile, n.3 supra.
San Antonio Lawyer
11
attorney and handling attorney are each
responsible for their own negligence. As
a referring attorney, you may be liable
for negligently referring the client to
an attorney not competent to handle
the matter or who is known by you to
be unethical. You may be liable for your
own negligence in ensuring adequate
attorney-client communications, for
example, if you have reason to know
that communication is inadequate
and you fail to take steps reasonably
necessary to correct it. You may also be
liable for negligence in the referral, for
negligently providing false or inadequate
information to the handling attorney so
as to prejudice the client’s case.
In addition to liability for your own
negligence, you may be vicariously liable
for the negligence of the handling attorney
— joint and several liability — but only if
one of three conditions occurs: (1) the joint
representation meets the legal standard
for a joint venture (unlikely for a single
referral based on joint representation,
but watch out for an ongoing agreement
to refer clients); (2) you are liable based
on your own negligence and your
negligence is determined to be more than
50% responsible for the client’s damages;
or (3) you acted in concert with another
person and violated specific provisions
of the Texas Penal Code with specific intent
to harm others.7
Dear Editor,
We are writing to thank you for featuring our recent asylum case in the San Antonio Lawyer magazine [Rudy Castillo, “Asylum and Angels,” May-June 2010]
and to give credit where credit is due. While we certainly are not the only attorneys in town to take on pro bono asylum cases, we agreed to be featured in
the magazine in the hope that other non-immigration attorneys would learn of
this way to volunteer their time in the interest of justice. It was not an easy task
but it was a tremendously humbling and rewarding experience.
The credit first goes to Thomas Sanders of our firm, Cox Smith, from whom
we got the idea to take on an asylum case. We had been looking for a volunteer opportunity and when we learned that Thomas had represented asylum
applicants, we knew that we had found it. Next, we extend our great thanks
to Jonathan Ryan, the executive director of San Antonio’s Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services. Jonathan and his organization introduced us to our client and walked us through the ins and outs
of asylum claims. We would certainly have been lost without him. Finally,
the article in San Antonio Lawyer mentions that we were assisted by “a volunteer translator.” This understates both the time required and the impact
of the translation that Yonas Keleta and Kahsai Kifle provided. While our
client spoke some English, it would have been impossible to prepare the
required detailed report of her mistreatment at the hands of the Eritrean
government without a translator; but she was wary of our suggestion of using an “official” translator. Messrs. Kelata and Kifle are part of the small but
close-knit Eritrean community of San Antonio. Our client was comfortable
speaking with them and through them, to us. They volunteered their significant time and emotion to someone they had never met but with whom
they were connected through a shared immigrant experience. They truly
taught us about kindness and generosity of talent and spirit.
- Leslie Hyman and Meagan Gillette
San Antonio Lawyer
12
DUTIES TO YOUR FIRM
What about your obligations to
your firm? Partners in a firm owe to
one another duties of loyalty and care,
along with obligations to discharge
those duties in good faith and in the best
interests of the partnership.8 This duty
includes refraining from competing with
the partnership. Even associates in a firm
have a fiduciary duty to their employer
not to accept a referral fee for referring
a case without their employer’s consent
when the referral opportunity belonged
to the firm.9 Also, the firm shares your
risk of malpractice liability in the referral
case. Finally, the firm must be informed
of the joint representation so that firm
conflicts may be avoided. Lawyers who
are restricted by their employer, by law, or
by contract from representing clients on
the side may be legally entitled to collect
a referral fee under the Rule; but doing so
might subject them to disciplinary action
(federal and state government lawyers)
or suits for breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, etc.
Furthermore, you may not be able
to collect your fee if the fee-sharing
agreement violates the Rule. Generally,
the TDRPC may be deemed by a court
to be an expression of public policy
such that a contract violating them is
unenforceable as against public policy.10
CLIENT CONSENT
A core requirement of the Rule is
the client’s consent in writing, prior to
the time of the referral and satisfying
enumerated disclosure requirements
— identity of attorneys splitting the fee,
whether based on proportionate services
or joint responsibility, and how the fee
will be split. As the referring attorney,
you have the primary responsibility for
ensuring compliance with the disclosure
requirements of the Rule. To enable
the client to give informed consent
to the referral, the client may need to
meet the proposed handling attorney
before consenting to the referral.11 The
requirement for written consent may be
satisfied in different ways, as suggested by
the form language on the Texas State Bar’s
website. For example, the writing may be
in a contract with the referring attorney,
in the handling attorney’s contract, or in
separate agreements. The form language
is a significant change from the referral
fee language seen in typical contingency
contracts. Referring and handling attorneys
should be familiar with this language. To
ensure that you are in compliance with the
client consent provisions of the Rule, the
safest bet is to adopt the form language.
Added twists arise in the context of
referrals to or from lawyers in other states.
The various lawyers may be bound by
different rules. You may need to be admitted
to practice in the other state, pro hac vice
or otherwise, to share joint responsibility
in the matter. You should understand the
corresponding rule in the states whose law
might apply to a malpractice lawsuit in
the case. You may be jointly and severally
liable for any malpractice by the handling
attorney. The fee-sharing agreement may
not be enforceable if it fails to satisfy the
rules in the other state. A “choice of law”
clause in the fee-sharing agreement may
be void or voidable as against public
policy in either or both states. Ensuring
that the handling attorney has malpractice
insurance that will indemnify you in the
event of his negligence is important under
these circumstances.
CONCLUSIONS
Returning to our hypothetical, you
may accept a contingent share of the
handling attorney’s fee provided you
comply with the requirements of Rule
1.04(f) — client consent in writing prior
to the time of the referral; identifying all
of the lawyers or firms that will share in
the fee; specifying whether the fee split
is based on proportion of professional
services or joint responsibility; and the
share of the fee that each will receive
or, if based on proportion of services,
the basis on which the division will be
made. And the aggregate fee must not
be unconscionable. We suggest using
or adapting the form language which
can be found on the Texas bar web site
(search the web for “Texas bar form
referral language”) as well as in the
Final Report and Recommendations of
the Referral Fee Task Force.
As for your legal and ethical
obligations to the client, you must conduct
a reasonable investigation of the client’s
claims. Identify someone you reasonably
believe is competent to handle the case.
Ensure client consent is obtained in
writing at the outset of the relationship.
Preferably, this consent will be included
in the contingency fee contract signed by
the client. Monitor the matter throughout
the representation to keep reasonably
informed of the matter. And ensure that
adequate representation and adequate
communication between the handling
lawyer and the client occurs.
As for your obligations to your
partners, inform your partners when you
agree to assume joint responsibility for
representation so that imputed conflicts
may be avoided. In the absence of conflicts,
refer the client and accept a referral fee on
behalf of the firm unless 1.) the firm passes
on the opportunity or 2.) the partnership
agreement alters these obligations. If you
leave the firm before final resolution of
the referral case, address pending referral
fees in the separation agreement.
As for potential conflicts, referring
the case to a handling attorney with a
fee-sharing agreement based on joint
responsibility creates ongoing obligations
to the client. That means you have a duty of
loyalty to the client. Because you directly
represent the client, you should conduct
your conflicts analysis accordingly. For
example, if the matters are substantially
related, would the representation of
either client be materially affected? If not,
can you obtain informed consent from
both clients? Do you have confidential
client information that would be valuable
to the referral client in her case against
your existing client?
If you are a referring attorney,
satisfying these requirements will
protect you from disciplinary action,
reduce your risk of liability, and ensure
that you will be able to collect your fee
from any eventual recovery.
Tom Crosley is board
certified in Personal Injury
Trial Law and Civil Trial
Law, and focuses his
practice on the litigation
and trial of personal injury
and wrongful death cases.
Mr. Crosley serves on the
board of the Texas Trial
Lawyers Association. He is a past president of the
San Antonio Trial Lawyers Association, and a former
director of the San Antonio Bar Association.
Tim Torres served 21 years
on active duty in the Air
Force, retiring in the rank
of lieutenant colonel in
2009. Mr. Torres received
his law degree with
honors from Saint Louis
University in 2000, and
was admitted to the State
Bar of Texas in November 2009. He is an
associate in the Crosley Law Firm, P.C.
San Antonio Lawyer
13
Judge VasquezGardner with
husband, Mike
Gardner, and
son, Christopher
Judge Juanita
Vasquez-Gardner
By Stephen Gordon
S
ince taking office in September
of 2000, Judge Juanita VasquezGardner has presided over the
399th Bexar County District
Court and is now in the middle
of her third term.
Judge Vasquez-Gardner was born
in Burley, Idaho. Her father, originally
from Laredo, Texas, met and married
her mother in Cotulla, Texas, after
her mother’s family emigrated from
Mexico in the 1950s in search of a better
life in the United States. Her parents
later moved to Idaho, where they
earned a living as migrant workers.
In the 1960s, Judge VasquezGardner’s father volunteered for the
National Guard and later served in
Vietnam as an infantryman. He was
stationed in Louisiana, Kentucky,
Washington, before returning to Idaho.
He continued his military service by
serving in Korea in the 1970s and was
stationed at Fort Sam Houston before
separating from the Army.
As a result, the Judge spent most
of her youth in San Antonio. Along
the way, she had two sisters to keep
her company — one younger and
one older — all about one year apart
in age. Her younger sister lives in
Houston and her older sister lives in
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Judge Vasquez-Gardner attended
Cole Junior-Senior High School,
which has such notable graduates as
basketball legend Shaquille O’Neil
and conservative politician Alan
Keys. She recalls a pretty stable and
happy childhood but was dealt a
severe and shocking blow in her
senior year, just a few months shy of
her high school graduation.
On March 7, 1981, the Judge’s
father died unexpectedly of a brain
aneurism at the age of 43. He had
previously been in excellent health,
with no sign of any illness. Feeling
a need to stay close to her family,
while at the same time continuing
her education, she decided to stay at
home and enroll in the University of
Texas at San Antonio (UTSA).
Initially, the Judge was unsure
what her field of study should be. She
decided to pursue an English degree;
however, it quickly became clear that
this was not the major for her as she did
not long to spend her days devoted to
Beowulf and Shakespeare. Soon after,
she turned her eye to a completely
different field — criminal justice.
When asked how she came to
pick this field of study, she recounts
some memories from childhood that
provide some obvious clues. As she
recalls, neither her mom nor dad
had originally had much of a formal
education. Later in his life, Judge
Vasquez-Gardner’s father obtained
his GED and went on to pursue some
college-level study, which included
San Antonio Lawyer
14
courses in criminal justice. The Judge
found some of her father’s criminal
law books quite compelling. Judge
Vasquez-Gardner enjoyed her time
at UTSA and found her professors
to be great teachers who treated the
students with genuine respect. The
classes she took reinforced her belief
that criminal justice was the right path
for her. Based on her choice of study,
she initially considered a career in
law enforcement; however, while at
UTSA, she took part at an internship
program at the Bexar County District
Attorney’s Office which proved to
be a pivotal point in her life. She
immediately fell in love with the job
and began thinking seriously about
attending law school and becoming a
prosecutor herself someday.
Initially, she was somewhat
intimidated about going to law school
and unsure whether she had the
credentials to be successful as a law
student. Later, after discussing the
LSAT with some of her classmates
and realizing the similarity of their
experiences to her own, she became
more confident. She figured that if they
were taking the LSAT and thought they
could score well enough to get into law
school, she probably could, too.
Although she had decided to take
the plunge and register for the LSAT,
she kept her plans somewhat secret.
Rather than sign up for the cost-
prohibitive study classes, she obtained
the study books from the bookstore
and went the self-study route. In the
meantime, she needed to find a job to
make ends meet and, through a friend,
landed a job in attorney Oliver Heard’s
office. She began in the data processing
department and made some contacts
that would prove very important later
in life. Her plan was to work there for
a year and save enough money to pay
her bills and take as many practice
LSATs as she could in her spare time.
Her hard work and self-study routine
paid off better than she had expected,
and she was accepted at all four law
schools to which she applied.
Judge Vasquez-Gardner attended
law school at the University of Texas
at Austin because of the low tuition
costs and its proximity to San Antonio.
She began in 1986 and describes the
experience as “a complete culture
shock” in terms of the size and scope
of the campus, the attitude of the
other students and professors, and the
highly competitive atmosphere, which
was quite a contrast to her experience
at UTSA. Nevertheless, she adapted
by focusing on the school’s positive
aspects. She fondly recalls being taught
Constitutional Law by then-professor,
Barbara Aldave, who would go on to
be Dean of St. Mary‘s Law School in the
1990s. She also made a few very good
friends at law school who would often
commiserate with her when times
Judge Vasquez-Gardner and Max
were hard. Chief
among these friends
was Melissa Barlow
Fischer, Bexar County
Criminal District Court
Administrator and
daughter of legendary
Judge James Barlow,
recently deceased.
Upon graduating
in 1989, Judge VasquezGardner returned
to San Antonio and
interviewed with
the Bexar County
DA’s office where,
after passing the
Bar, she worked
for the next eleven
years under Fred Rodriguez and, later,
Steve Hilbig and Susan Reed. As is
customary, she started in the intake
section and worked her way up through
the misdemeanor and felony sections.
Along the way, she handled cases of
every increasing complexity from
drugs crimes to violent crimes. During
her tenure in the DA’s office, Judge
Vasquez-Gardner gained experience
in virtually every section of the office,
except the appellate section.
In 2000, three new district courts
were created, and Judge VasquezGardner was appointed to the 399th by
Governor George W. Bush. Although
she was interested in the position, the
appointment came as a bit of a surprise
because the Judge
did not aggressively
lobby to obtain
it. Although she
discussed the idea
with Judge Sharon
MacRae,
who
encouraged her to
throw her hat into
the ring, Judge
Vasquez-Gardner
did not consider
herself as political
or well-connected
as some of the other
contenders. While
she ultimately won
the appointment,
her celebration was
short-lived as she
immediately found
herself in a contested
election just two
San Antonio Lawyer
15
Judge Vasquez-Gardner and Melissa
Barlow Fischer, Bexar County Criminal
District Court Administrator
months later.
After winning the election, Judge
Vasquez-Gardner immediately hit the
ground running and spent much of her
first year on the bench in jury trials.
During this time, she learned that, as a
judge, she must be ever watchful over
proceedings in her court, and multitasking is key. While this process is not
easy for those who, like the Judge, tend
toward perfectionism, she does her best
each day and realizes that the court
system is a place where the outcome
cannot always be controlled.
Comparing her time on the bench
with her time as prosecutor, the
Judge states that being a prosecutor
was easier in a number of ways. As
a prosecutor, her role was clearly
defined, and she was not required
to balance the interests of both sides.
Also, as a judge, she also finds it
more difficult to impose sentence on
defendants found guilty of serious
felonies than to simply prosecute
them. Finally, it is hard to shield
oneself from the pain and suffering of
a defendant’s family after imposing
a lengthy prison sentence.
On the other hand, there are
aspects of being a judge that are very
rewarding. Judge Vasquez-Gardner
has been approached on the street
by former defendants who, to her
surprise, thanked her for forcing
them into treatment or prison where
they got their lives back on track. She
has also received letters from those
defendants and, in one case, a rather
- continued on page 22 -
Book Review
Free The Market! Why Only Government
Can Keep the Marketplace Competitive
I
agreed to accept this assignment from the editorial
staff of San Antonio Lawyer because the subject seemed
interesting and timely during this period of the longest
and deepest recession and economic catastrophe since
the Great Depression. Like many, I continually wonder,
“What happened!?” I hear things from the experts like “the
enforcement mechanism in the economy failed to work.” No
kidding! The book Free The Market! Why Only Government Can
Keep the Marketplace Competitive, by Gary L. Reback, gave me
some idea of what the experts were talking about Mr. Reback
is a prominent antitrust attorney in the United States, best
known for his efforts in initiating the federal lawsuit against
Microsoft. He is named in the “100 Most Influential Lawyers
in America” list by the National Law Journal, the “Elite 100” by
Upside Magazine, the “Top 100” by MicroTimes, and “Lawyers of
the Year” by California Lawyer magazine. He has been profiled
in The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal,
and Wired magazine, to name a few. He is often quoted by major
media. Mr. Reback resides in Silicon Valley. He has represented
parties in many other major legal battles concerning Apple
Computers, IBM, Oracle, and AT&T.The book’s title implies a
more liberal or moderate approach to antitrust policy, and the
book bears that out. However, Reback opens the book with the
following quotation from conservative columnist George Will
on the collapse of Enron:
By Gary L. Reback
Publication by Portfolio/
Penguin Group USA
April 2009, 416 pages, no
photographs, $45.00
Reviewed by Johnny Thomas
“ ”
It will remind everyone — some conservatives
painfully — that a mature capitalist economy is a
government project. A properly functioning free
market system does not spring spontaneously
from society’s soil as dandelions spring from
suburban lawns.
This sort of back and forth within groups, liberal and conservative,
is persistent throughout the book.The author provides a concise
historical review of antitrust law, from its inception in the early
1900s, which I found enjoyable and informative, and lays the
foundation for the legal battles to follow over the next fifty years.
He then provides a diary of his major courtroom battles regarding
San Antonio Lawyer
16
Microsoft, Apple, IBM, Oracle, AT&T,
and others. He argues for measured
government interventions in the free
market to ensure competition, and
that competition is better served
through serious antitrust law, as
opposed to government regulations.
He also believes conservative changes
made over thirty years ago have gone
too far in overhauling United States
competition policy, with loosened
business rules applicable to everything
from selling products to the purchase
of computers. According to Reback,
such policies are more suited to the
manufacturing economy of the 1960s
and 1920s. Such policies, he argues,
are not only inapplicable in today’s
high-tech world, but also ineffective
and harmful. To the author, such
policies have slowed innovation,
hurt consumers, and entrenched
big business at the expense of the
entrepreneurs.
The author has spent his career
fighting to protect many hurt by
the actions of corporate giants, and
with that background, he is to a
great extent speaking for them. In his
introduction he reminds us that after
the credit markets and stock market
turmoil in 2008, the administration
planned to ask Congress for nearly
$1-trillion to stabilize the markets,
citing the misuse of complicated
financial instruments — “toxic assets”
— as the root cause of the problem. To
Mr. Reback, though, the root problem
that caused the U.S. economy to fail
was a “toxic philosophy,” over the
last thirty years, based on the belief
the markets could self-regulate with
minimal government supervision. He
is not surprised that this philosophy
did not work, and he contends that it
started to unravel before the financial
markets began to fall.
The author raises some concerns
that — although antitrust policies are
seriously enforced in other countries,
including the European Union, Japan,
and Korea — the United States has
been going in the reverse direction,
to the detriment of consumers. I was
surprised to learn that U.S. consumers
spend more for less high-speed
Internet due to lost competition. He
notes the average high-speed Internet
service in Japan is ten times faster
than the average high-speed Internet
per household in the U.S. and costs
one-half the price paid in the U.S.
Since the 2001 mergers in the Internet
industry, the U.S. has gone from fourth
to fifteenth in household adaption to
high-speed Internet service. According
to Mr. Reback and some political and
consumer groups, the U.S. is apparently
falling farther and farther behind, with
the resulting loss of millions of jobs —
all due to the lack of competition in the
U.S. over the last several years.
Mr. Reback states that he began to
write this book more than two years
ago, before it became fashionable
(again) to ask the government to
do more to protect the public. The
book has an abundance of historical
and empirical data and firsthand
information concerning the courtroom
battles, with cites to courtroom
records as backup. He does a good
job of explaining these data for the
non-specialist and general public, and
he tries to answer some of the major
questions facing us today:
• Can corporations compete too hard
for the public good?
• Does it help consumers for manufacturers to limit retail prices?
• At what point do intellectual property
rights hurt innovation?
stories referencing some very complex
litigation was a good read for any
trial lawyer familiar with the usual
trial tactics, discovery, and judicial
personality issues. I was surprised
by how much the antitrust policies
have changed from the 1970s to the
present. The continual onslaught
of daily mergers and acquisitions
in the business world is now a
little more understandable. As a
corporate executive explained in
the book, “You have to merge and
acquire your competition to remain
competitive.” I wonder if the general
public understands this new business
environment. The book is informative
and contributes to the debate, which the
author feels is now controlled by a small
group of economists, with the blessing
of the government and the courts.
Johnny W. Thomas is
an attorney working
in the general practice
of law since 1985.
He also serves on the
Trustee Panel for the
Bankruptcy
Court,
Western District of
Texas, San Antonio Division.
The book is well written and easy
to read and follow. The author makes
a valiant effort to outline complex
antitrust legal arguments in plain
English. Despite the effort, however, it
was still a chore for this reader to follow
the writing at times. The book evidences
the writer’s level of frustration due to
the United States Supreme Court’s
continual retrenchment from antitrust
precedent over the last thirty years
despite the economic data showing
that consumers are continually being
hurt by the lack of competition.
My overall impression of the
book was very good. I especially
enjoyed the historical review of
antitrust policy, especially concerning
President Theodore Roosevelt and
the trust busters. The courtroom
San Antonio Lawyer
17
Have You Heard About
Collaborative Law?
By Kim M. Munsinger
I
magine a divorce where the lawyers are barred from the courtroom,1 conduct cooperative joint
discovery, and must withdraw if a
settlement agreement isn’t reached.
Sounds unlikely, doesn’t it? Yet, more and
more of these nonadversarial divorces are
done every day in Texas and around the
world. It’s part of a growing movement
called collaborative law, and it’s changing
the way family lawyers practice.
The goal of collaborative law is to
get divorcing couples to settlement as
efficiently and with as little financial
and emotional damage as possible,
while still meeting their shared and
individual needs. By discovering what
the underlying interests of the parties
are — not just their demands — the parties and their lawyers can jointly craft a
settlement that optimizes the outcome.
Collaborative law is so different from
traditional, litigated divorces that the Texas
legislature created special statutes to support and encourage it.2 The collaborative
statutes in the Texas Family Code are essential to protect the lawyers and the process because the level of candor necessary
for success would be impossible — even
unethical — without them.3 Collaborative
law cases enjoy the same confidentiality
provisions as mediation, and a party is
entitled to judgment on a properly drafted
and executed collaborative agreement.
Although collaborative law is a
worldwide phenomenon, there are local
variations. The Texas model for collaborative divorce uses a four-member team
with a neutral financial professional and
a neutral mental health professional assisting the lawyers and the parties. The
parties and their collaborative team meet
in a series of informal sessions to clarify
the parties’ goals, collect information,
and develop a settlement. The financial
and mental health professionals serve as
neutral experts. They may express opinions, but they can’t choose sides.
Collaborative law’s three defining
principles
Collaborative law has three defining
principles that distinguish it from typical
divorce litigation. The most important
principle, and the most unusual, is that
the parties and their attorneys agree in advance in writing that they won’t take any
issue to court. This fundamental principle
is spelled out in the collaborative agreement the parties and their lawyers sign at
the beginning of the case. This principle is
essential because it prevents the lawyers
from using trial tactics, such as threatening “See you in court!” to force an agreement. Instead, there’s a formal commitment to negotiate in good faith, which
helps keep everyone on track, including
divorce litigators with good intentions,
but well-trained combat reflexes.
Collaborative law’s second defining
principle is that the process is transparent. Professional privileges still exist, but
everyone agrees to informally exchange
all relevant information and answer
even the most difficult questions including, for example, “Did you have an affair?” Everything the financial and mental health professionals do is transparent,
too, because they’re neutral.
Collaborative law’s third defining
principle is that agreements are reached
through “interest-based” negotiations
where everyone is involved in finding creative solutions. This is the style of negotiation popularized by the book Getting to Yes
by Roger Fisher and William Ury.4 Interestbased negotiation is the polar opposite of
positional bargaining, which is common
in litigated divorces. For example, in positional bargaining, one party might say, “I
want the house.” By contrast, an interestbased approach would look at the reason
behind wanting the house — say, a need
for financial security or a good neighborhood or school for the children. There may
be alternate ways to address the party’s
San Antonio Lawyer
18
interest that don’t involve awarding the
house and could even benefit both parties.
But isn’t interest-based negotiation a
weak, wimpy way to negotiate? The simple answer is no. Research shows that interest-based negotiations yield more than
traditional adversarial approaches for both
sides, as negotiation expert Guhan Subramanian, Professor of Law and Business at
Harvard, explained in his talk, “How to
Get the Most Marbles for Your Client,” at
the 2009 Advanced Family Law Course.5
Also, interest-based negotiation can result in surprising acts of generosity from
one party to another, as I’ve seen in my
own collaborative law practice.
What collaborative law is not
Collaborative law is a novel way
to resolve divorces, and a potent member of the alternative dispute resolution
toolkit, but there are several things it is
not. First, collaborative law isn’t bargain
basement divorce. A collaborative divorce can save money by avoiding costly
courtroom battles, aggressive discovery,
and duplication of experts, but it’s not
cheap. However, it is a good value when
you consider the custom-fitted outcomes
and goodwill among the parties that the
collaborative divorce process can yield.
Second, collaborative law isn’t mediation, which is a different flavor of alternative dispute resolution. In most mediations, a trained mediator meets with the
two attorneys and the parties to help them
resolve their differences and reach an
agreement. Mediation seldom takes more
than a day and often occurs at the end of
the litigation process as an alternative to
going to trial. In addition, mediation alone
rarely produces an optimum settlement,
while collaborative law often does.
However, mediation can be a useful
tool to resolve a collaborative case when
negotiations have stalled. San Antonio
family lawyer Ben Chappell successfully
mediated a collaborative case where the
lawyers and parties had collected the information on the family assets and liabilities, but emotions were just too volatile
to reach an agreement without help.
And third, collaborative law isn’t unstructured. “In collaborative sessions, we
don’t just sit around singing Kumbaya,”
Houston collaborative lawyer Norma
Trusch explains. “There is a clearly defined
structure with agendas and a roadmap to
resolution.” In addition, a collaborative
divorce settlement doesn’t simply fall
into everyone’s laps without effort. After
a challenging collaborative session, San
Antonio collaborative lawyer Jamie Patterson summed
it up: “‘Collaborative law’
doesn’t mean ‘easy.’”
hearings. The collaborative agreement is
confidential and need not be filed with the
court. Also, the final decree in a collaborative divorce can be drafted with minimal
statutory language, and a private, contractual divorce agreement, which will not be
filed with the court, can lay out the property division and other settlement details.
The collaborative divorce process can
also prevent destruction of relationships.
Nobody realistically expects divorced
couples to be buddies, but litigated divorces can leave everyone upset and bitter for years. It’s easy to see why this matters in families with children, but even
The traditional divorce vs.
the collaborative divorce
The collaborative law
process was designed to
avoid the negatives often associated with traditional litigated divorces. Among these
negatives are expensive formal discovery, limited communications between the
parties, battles of the experts,
lack of privacy, destruction of
relationships, inconvenience,
and lack of flexibility.
Collaborative law deals
with discovery, party communications, and experts in
the following ways. Rather
than engage in costly formal
discovery, documents are exchanged informally and are
often collected and compiled by the neutral
financial professional. Constructive communication between the parties is encouraged. Both parties need to agree to communicate with each other outside collaborative
sessions, and they can ask for help from the
mental health professional. This is in contrast with litigation, where communication
between the parties is typically discouraged. In a collaborative case, the experts
assist with the overall process or they can
be hired for a specific task, such as valuing
a family-owned business. There are never
battles of the experts in collaborative cases.
In contrast with a public, litigated
divorce, the collaborative law process offers total privacy. Collaborative sessions
are private, and there are no courtroom
couples without kids benefit from leaving
a divorce on speaking terms. Collaborative law’s closed-door conferences, lack
of courtroom theatrics, and the assistance
of the mental health professional all help
prevent the destruction of relationships.
Compared with litigated divorces,
collaborative law is convenient for everyone. The parties schedule the collaborative sessions for their mutual convenience, which is a major benefit to clients
who are busy professionals. The lawyers
and neutral experts also appreciate not
having to attend hearings at inconvenient times. Collaborative divorces are
even feasible for out-of-state parties who
must travel to collaborative sessions.
One of the best features of the collab-
San Antonio Lawyer
19
orative process is the flexibility allowed
in the final agreement. In a collaborative
case, the lawyers and parties have the
freedom to reach a settlement agreement
customized for their particular situation.
This might be consistent with the code,
or it might vary in some meaningful way
according to the case’s unique facts.
Should all divorces be collaborative?
To be fair, collaborative law isn’t
right for everyone. For example, in a divorce where power is wildly imbalanced
between the parties, such as a case with
domestic violence, a collaborative atmosphere is
impossible. Also, in a case
where there’s blatant, unapologetic dishonesty, informal discovery — even
with sworn statements —
would be unlikely to work.
Collaborative law is
appropriate for many people, but some may find a
collaborative divorce unacceptable because they’re so
traumatized from an emotionally abusive marriage.
San Antonio family lawyer
Jim Monnig recognizes the
value of collaborative law
and other alternative dispute resolution methods,
but feels that some cases
need to go to court. Monnig
says, “Sometimes, people
have really been mistreated
in a situation and suffered a
lot of damage to their feelings. They need a champion
to go down to the courthouse and stand up
for them. It means an awful lot to them.”
Another drawback for the collaborative divorce is that if the collaborative
process fails, the lawyers must withdraw and the parties need to hire litigation counsel. This can be inefficient, adds
expense, and can be upsetting to the parties. Fortunately, this rarely happens.
History and future of collaborative law
So, where did this notion of nonadversarial divorces come from and where
is it going? In a 1990 letter to Minnesota
Supreme Court Justice A.M. Keith, law-
- continued on page 21 -
Federal Court Update
By the Honorable Nancy
Stein Nowak and
Nissa M. Dunn
Judge Nowak’s summaries of significant decisions rendered by San
Antonio federal judges from 1998 to
the present are available for keyword
searching at Court Web found at
http://courtweb.pamd.uscourts.
gov/courtweb/. Full text images
of most of these orders can also be
accessed through Court Web.
judgment but financial statements
showed bank accounts and assets
located in New York.
Fraudulent Transfer
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Sheerin, SA-09CV-709-XR (Rodriguez, June 21, 2010)
Court granted plaintiff’s motion
for partial summary judgment
under the Texas Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act where
no genuine issue of material fact
existed that plaintiff’s claim arose
before
defendant/judgment
debtor transferred the property
in question, defendant made
the transfer without receiving
reasonably equivalent value, and
defendant was insolvent at the time
the transfer was made. Plaintiff also
presented evidence that the transfer
was made with fraudulent intent.
If you are aware of a Western District
of Texas order that you believe
would be of interest to the local bar
and should be summarized in this
column, please contact Nissa Dunn
by phone at 581-2073 or by email ADA; Civil Rights
at [email protected] Pena v. Bexar County, Texas, SA-08-CVwith the style and cause number 1016-XR (Rodriguez, June 21, 2010)
Court
granted
defendants’
of the case, and the entry date and
motion for summary judgment
docket number of the order.
on plaintiff’s claims under § 1983,
Employment Discrimination; First
Amendment Retaliation
Elizondo v. Fletcher Parks, SA-04-CA1025-FB (Biery, July 12, 2010)
Plaintiff, a public employee,
sued his employer, alleging that
he was retaliated against for
exercising his First Amendment
rights. Defendant was entitled
to summary judgment based on
qualified immunity on plaintiff’s
First Amendment retaliation claim
because plaintiff’s communications
were made pursuant to his official
duties, and were made internally
and at meetings set up by
plaintiff’s supervisors to discuss
his continued employment and a
temporary transfer.
Registration of Judgment
Lear Siegler Serv’s v. Ensil Int’l Corp., SA05-CV-679-XR (Rodriguez, June 23, 2010)
for leave to register judgment
in the Western District of New
York where defendant had not
posted a supersedeas bond and
plaintiff stated that defendant had
no assets in Texas to satisfy the
concluding that: (1) plaintiff’s
claims under § 1983 for violations
of Title II of the ADA are precluded
by the ADA’s comprehensive
enforcement scheme; (2) plaintiff
failed to raise a fact issue on his
Fourth Amendment excessive
force and false arrest claims
against individual defendants;
(3) plaintiff failed to show that
an official policy or custom
caused the alleged constitutional
violation; and (4) plaintiff’s
fourteenth amendment claims are
properly considered only under
the Fourth Amendment.
Notice of Right to Sue; Objections to
Report and Recommendation
Franco v. Bank of America, SA-08-CA-0475FB (Biery, rejecting recommendation of
Nowak, June 8, 2010)
Magistrate Judge recommended
that plaintiff’s claims were timebarred because he received his
notice of right to sue letter 92 days
before filing his lawsuit. Plaintiff’s
objections to the report and
recommendation were untimely,
but district court nevertheless
considered them and conducted a
San Antonio Lawyer
20
de novo review. Court found that
plaintiff’s objections, in which
he contended that he did not
receive the notice letter “until
days later,” together with post
mark indicating that notice had
been mailed on the date plaintiff
initially asserted he received
notice, were sufficient to refute
his earlier contrary testimony.
Venue
X Technologies, Inc. v. Marvin Test Systems,
Inc., SA-10-CV-319-XR (Rodriguez, June
7, 2010)
Court denied defendant’s motion
to dismiss or to transfer venue
where forum selection clause did
not cover plaintiff’s claims and
court concluded that transfer was
neither convenient for the parties
nor in the interest of justice.
Limitations; Causation
USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., et al.,
SA-07-CA-963-FB (Recommendation
of Mathy, March 18, 2010, accepted by
Biery, June 4, 2010)
Plaintiff sued defendants for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
related to patent applications for
personalized postage stamps.
Court accepted Magistrate Judge
recommendation that motion for
summary judgment based on
limitations be granted because
plaintiff failed to raise genuine
fact issue that the discovery rule
or fraudulent concealment tolls
extended limitations beyond
the four-year limitations period.
Court also accepted Magistrate
Judge recommendation granting
summary judgment because
plaintiff presented no evidence
that “but for” defendants’ failures
to disclose and misrepresentations,
plaintiff would have obtained
different counsel to prosecute the
patent applications and the PTO
would have accepted some claims
in the application.
Summary Judgment; Negligence
Hernandez v. Swift Transportation Co.,
Inc., SA-09-CV-855-XR (Rodriguez,
June 2, 2010)
for partial summary judgment
where evidence established that
defendant’s driver failed to keep
a proper lookout and was the
proximate cause of the accident
and plaintiff’s injuries.
Age and Disability Discrimination;
Hostile Work Environment; Retaliation
Garcia v. Potter, SA-09-CV-973 (Rodriguez,
May 18, 2010)
Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination
based on age and disability were
dismissed because plaintiff did not
plead adverse employment action.
Motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
hostile work environment and
retaliation claims was denied
based on plaintiff’s allegations
that he was subjected to multiple
route observations after filing a
discrimination claim, subjected to
daily verbal criticism, told to lift
more than his medical restrictions
allowed, and found unexplained
undelivered mail in his locker.
Costs
Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations,
San Antonio, Inc., SA-08-CV-305-XR
(Rodriguez, May 11, 2010)
Court granted defendants’ motion
for summary judgment and taxed
costs against plaintiff. Plaintiff
moved to set aside or to stay the
court’s order regarding costs
pending appeal. Court denied
the motion, concluding that it
had jurisdiction to review clerk’s
taxation of costs while appeal is
pending, and if judgment is reversed
on appeal, any costs awarded to
the previously prevailing party are
automatically vacated.
Nancy Stein Nowak is a
United States Magistrate
Judge for the Western District of Texas. Since 1986,
Judge Nowak has summarized significant decisions
of the local judiciary for
the Subpoena and the San
Antonio Lawyer.
Collaborative Law
- continued from page 19 yer Stu Webb said there’s “got to be a
better way” to resolve family law matters than the litigation model.6 In his
letter to Keith, Webb outlined the basic
collaborative model used today. Webb
wanted to see lawyers use their “analytical, reasoned ability to solve problems
and generate creative solutions and create a positive context for settlement.”7
Webb noted that “these attributes of
good lawyering are not utilized greatly
in the usual family law proceeding . . .
.”8 Most family lawyers would agree.
In 2001, the Texas Legislature enacted statutes specifically authorizing
collaborative law in divorces and other
family law matters. Texas was the first
state to pass such statutes. This year, the
State Bar of Texas added a new collaborative law section. There’s also a statewide organization, the Collaborative
Law Institute of Texas, for collaborative
lawyers and allied professionals.
Collaborative law has spread to
all fifty states and to Canada, England,
Ireland, and Australia. Lawyers in the
United States are working on a Uniform
Collaborative Law Act, which would
create a statutory framework that covers more than family law cases. There’s
also a growing international collaborative law group, the International Acad-
emy of Collaborative Professionals.
Resources and training
If you’re intrigued by this new concept and would like to know more about
collaborative law, or if you know someone
who’s seeking an alternative to a litigated
divorce, there are several websites with
up-to-date information on collaborative
law. Our local organization, the Collaborative Professionals Association of San
Antonio, has a website with information
and a list of members at www.collaborativeprofessionalsofsanantonio.com. We
meet for lunch on the second Friday of
every month, and you’re welcome to join
us. There’s a wealth of information on
the Collaborative Law Institute of Texas
website at www.collablawtexas.com,
including information on collaborative
law training for lawyers and the neutral
financial and mental health professionals
who assist with collaborative cases.
Kim M. Munsinger is a
partner at Munsinger
& Munsinger where
she practices family
law with an emphasis
on collaborative law
and mediation. www.
munsingerlaw.com
In a collaborative divorce, the only time a lawyer and client appear in the courtroom is to have the judge approve the agreement, make the legal pronouncements,
and sign the final decree and any associated orders.
1
The collaborative statutes cover more than divorce; there’s a second statute for
custody and visitation suits. Tex. Fam. Code § 6.603, Collaborative Law for dissolution of marriage (divorce); Tex. Fam. Code § 153.0072 Collaborative Law for suits
affecting the parent-child relationship (custody and visitation).
2
The American Bar Association has deemed collaborative law an ethical practice of
law. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 447 (2007).
3
Fisher, Roger, and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. New York: Penguin Books, 1983.
4
Subramanian, Guhan, “How to Get the Most Marbles for Your Client.” PowerPoint
presentation at Advanced Family Law Course, 3 August 2009. Dallas, Texas.
5
Nissa Dunn, of the Law
Offices of Nissa M. Dunn,
P.C., specializes and is
board certified in the area
of civil appellate law.
Stuart G. Webb, Minneapolis, Minn., to [the Honorable A.M. Keith, St. Paul, Minn.]
14 February 1990.
6
7
Id.
8
Id.
San Antonio Lawyer
21
Published by
NationWide Publishing SA
1922 Great Ridge • San Antonio, TX 78248
- continued from page 15 -
Publisher - Ron L. Hogue
[email protected]
For information on advertising in
the San Antonio Lawyer magazine
Call 210.381.7664
The San Antonio Lawyer is published bimonthly by Nationwide
Publishing SA, on behalf of the
San Antonio Bar Association. Reproduction in any manner of any
material, in whole or in part, is
prohibited without the express
written consent of the Editor in
Chief. Material contained herein
does not necessarily reflect the
opinion of the Publisher or its
staff. San Antonio Lawyer, the San
Antonio Bar Assocation and the
Publisher reserve the right to
edit all materials and assume no
responsibility for accuracy, errors
or omissions. San Antonio Lawyer
and the Publisher do not knowingly accept false or misleading
advertisements, false or misleading editorials and do not assume
any responsibility should such
editorials or advertising appear.
Advertisers’ Index
AMS/LFAM
Assn. of Atty. Mediators
KelMar
Lindemann Productions
Jack Martin & Assoc.
Jeff Small
Tower Life Building
Judge Juanita
Vasquez-Gardner
24
23
13
4
7
9
2
interesting set of drawings. Sometimes
she receives feedback from family
members of the defendants who have
thanked her for taking chances on
certain defendants and granting them
leniency in order to prove that they
can be good citizens. Sometimes they
prove her right and never return to
her court again; but, other times, they
let her down and later appear with
new charges against them.
The Judge willingly acknowledges
that no human being can ever be
expected to make
perfect decisions
in every case. She
credits her faith
with helping her
make the tough
decisions
and
giving her the
peace of mind that
the right outcome
will eventually be
reached in the end. Throughout her life
and time on the bench, she cites God as
her primary guiding force.
When asked what is the most
important quality of a judge, she
responds simply: “Listen carefully.
Treat everybody with respect, and
be patient.” She expects the same
courtesy from those who appear
before her. Showing up late without
a legitimate excuse or not letting the
Court know in advance is an obvious
sign of disrespect. She stresses the
importance of treating her staff
courteously, too, and vice-versa.
When asked about her most
memorable cases, one immediately
springs to mind. During trial, one
witness took the stand and described
how he held his father in his arms
while he died. Hearing this testimony
triggered memories of the Judge’s own
father’s death and how difficult it was
for her to not have been at his side when
he passed away. Despite the gravity of
the cases that come before her, Judge
San Antonio Lawyer
Vasquez-Gardner believes that it is
important, when possible, to maintain
an upbeat atmosphere in the courtroom.
A sense of humor can sometimes be a
big help in getting through those long,
grueling trial weeks.
Overall, the Judge is very impressed
with the Bexar County legal community.
From the prosecutor’s office to the
criminal defense bar to the staff working
behind the scenes, she has very positive
interactions. One of the only negative
aspects of our system cited by the Judge
is the role she has to
play in reviewing the
vouchers submitted
to her by the courtappointed attorneys.
While she understands
that tax dollars are
limited, she finds it
disturbing that the
judges are called
upon to reduce funds
for indigent defense. Another change in
the system the Judge favors is the idea
of non-partisan judicial elections.
On a personal level, the Judge
is married to Mike Gardner, with
whom she will soon celebrate their
20th wedding anniversary. They have
one son, Christopher, and one dog,
Max. When she is not on the bench,
the Judge’s number one priority is
simply spending time with her family.
She also likes to fit in some regular
workouts when her schedule permits.
As far as her plans for the future,
the Judge has this to say, “I’ll stay as
long as the voters let me.”
“Listen carefully.
Treat everybody
with respect,
and be patient.”
22
Stephen H. Gordon is a
sole practitioner in San
Antonio. His main areas
of practice are family law,
criminal law, personal
injury, and bankruptcy.
��
��
Committed to the mediation process, each of our member lawyers is devoted to the ethical practice of
law. Recommended by judges and their fellow attorneys, AAM mediators have conducted over 25,000
mediations since 1989. A model of responsible dispute resolution, as a group we have over 850 years
experience in the practice of law. With this much talent and experience, why consider any other
mediation source?
��
Dick Alcala
Emerson Banack, Jr.
Judith Reed Blakeway
Leslie Selig Byrd
Hope Camp
Ben R. Chappell
Robert C. Cowan
Michael Curry, Jr.
John H. Davis
Gerald T. Drought
Allan K. DuBois
Stephen R. Fogle
John J. Franco, Jr.
Otto S. Good
Sue M. Hall
B. Thomas Hallstead
Reese L. Harrison
A. Chris Heinrichs
James N. Higdon
Ronald Hornberger
Nan P. Hundere
Richard H. Ihfe
Gary W. Javore
Tom Joseph
Douglas D. Ketterman
Jerry D. King
Joel H. Klein
Daniel Y. Kruger
Daniel O. Kustoff
William H. Lemons
Dan A. Naranjo
B.F. “Biff” Pennypacker, III
Gale R. Peterson
Hon. Robert T. Pfeuffer
Donald R. Philbin, Jr.
Vick Putman
Charles R. Roberts
Wade B. Shelton
Bernard L. Shub
Charles L. Smith
Thomas J. Smith
Frank R. Southers
John J. Specia
David S. Stephenson
William R. Towns
��
Personal Injury
Construction
Securities
International
Employment & Labor
Insurance
Entertainment
Farm & Ranch
Appellate Law
Intellectual Property
Condemnation
Wills, Trusts & Estates
Real Estate
Professional Liability
Oil & Gas
Family Law
Title Insurance
Taxation
Bankruptcy
Consumer Law
Business/Commercial
Health Care
Civil Rights
Medical
�� contact the San Antonio Local Chapter:
Ron Hornberger
70 NE Loop 410, Suite 1100
San Antonio, Texas 78216
210-734-7092
[email protected]
Member Benefit From
The Easiest Way to Get Paid!
Trust
Accept credit card payments in a professional manner.
your transactions
to the only
merchant account
recommended by over
Increase business by accepting cards for retainers.
Increase cash flow and reduce collections.
Separate earned and unearned fees.
60
Reduce fees on credit card processing by 25%.
The process is simple. Begin accepting payments today.
Call 866.376.0950 or visit www.sabar.org/creditcards
bar associations!
Affiniscape Merchant Solutions is a registered ISO/MSP of Harris, N.A., Chicago, IL
TM
Credit Card Processing For Attorneys
866.376.0950

September-October 2010 San Antonio Lawyer

Transcription

Similar documents

Membership Application - Greater San Antonio Builders Association

328 Acres in San Antonio, Texas

¡VIVA SA RUN!

SITTERLE HOMES AT SETTLER`S RIDGE SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO

Legal Aid

¡Viva San Antonio!

Read more About SARA

Pageflex Persona [document: PRS0004274_00098]

Celadrin Tigerettes capture gold in San Antonio, Texas Games