ANA 3-19.11, Special Reaction Teams, English

ANA 3-19.11
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL ARMY
Military Police
Special Reaction Teams
February 2008
ANA 3-19.11
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ANA 3-19.11
Military Police
Special Reaction Teams
Contents
Page
PREFACE ……………………………………………………………………..
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Chapter 1 RESPONSIBILITIES, PRIORITIES, AND ORGANIZATION
Responsibilities ……………………………………………………………..
Priorities …………………………………………………………………….
Organization …………………………………………………………………
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Chapter 2 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Preplanning Process ………………………………………………………...
Planning Process ……………………………………………………………
Blueprints …………………………………………………………………..
Blueprint Information ………………………………………………………
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Chapter 3 MOVEMENT
Movement Fundamentals …………………………………………………..
Alternate Methods of Movement …………………………………………..
Barriers …………………………………………………………………….
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Chapter 4 BUILDING ENTRY
Entry Fundamentals ………………………………………………………..
Doors ……………………………………………………………………….
Methods of Entry …………………………………………………………..
Windows ……………………………………………………………………
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Chapter 5 BUILDING CLEARING
Principles …………………………………………………………………..
Basic Tactical Fundamentals ………………………………………………
Building-Clearing Tactical Fundamentals …………………………………
Threat ………………………………………………………………………
Planning Considerations for Clearing an Objective ……………………….
Clearing Techniques ……………………………………………………….
Room-Searching Techniques ………………………………………………
Stairways/Stairwells ……………………………………………………….
Hallways …………………………………………………………………..
Hallway Intersections ……………………………………………………..
Hallway Danger Areas …………………………………………………….
Doorway Layouts in Hallways ……………………………………………
Hides ………………………………………………………………………
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Chapter 6 MARKSMAN/OBSERVER TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Operational Briefing ……………………………………………………..
Movement ……………………………………………………………….
Forward-Operating Positions ……………………………………………
Observation ………………………………………………………………
Marksman and Observer Data Book …………………………………….
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Chapter 7 BREACHING
Manual and Mechanical Breaching ………………………………………
Ballistic Breaching ……………………………………………………….
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Chapter 8 WEAPON RETENTION
Long-Gun Retention ………………………………………………………
Pistol Retention ……………………………………………………………
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Chapter 9 THREAT AND OCCUPANT CONTROL
Search Team ……………………………………………………………….
Occupancy Control ………………………………………………………..
Search Principles ………………………………………………………….
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Chapter 10 TEAM-MEMBER RECOVERY
Recovery Team …………………………………………………………….
Hostage-Rescue Drill ……………………………………………………….
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Chapter 11 VEHICLE ASSAULT
Vehicle-Assault Team ………………………………………………………
Planning Considerations ……………………………………………………
Assault Methods ……………………………………………………………
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Chapter 12 ENTRY-TEAM MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING
Shooting Stance ……………………………………………………………
Weapon Positions …………………………………………………………..
Drawing From a Holster ……………………………………………………
Combat Reloading ………………………………………………………….
Engaging Multiple Targets …………………………………………………
Transition Drill …………………………………………………………….
Controlled Pair ……………………………………………………………..
Failure Drill ………………………………………………………………..
Night Marksmanship ………………………………………………………
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Chapter 13 MARKSMAN/OBSERVER MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING
Wind and Weather …………………………………………………………
Environmental Effects ……………………………………………………..
Moving Targets ……………………………………………………………
Synchronized Shooting ……………………………………………………
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Hostage Situation ………………………………………………………..
Tactical Neutralization ………………………………………………….
Psychological Aspects of Marksmanship ………………………………
Night Firing ……………………………………………………………..
Training Exercises ……………………………………………………….
Keep-in-Memory Games …………………………………………………
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Appendix A BARRIER PENETRATION
Planning Considerations ………………………………………………….
Types of Barriers …………………………………………………………
Building Construction and Design ……………………………………….
Plans …………………………….………………………………………..
Soft Barriers ………………………………………………………………
Medium Barriers .........................................................................................
Hard Barriers ..............................................................................................
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Appendix B BREACHER’S BRIEF
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Appendix C IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
AND BOOBY TRAPS
Improvised Explosive Devices ……………………………………………
Elements …….…………………………………………………………….
Actions on Contact ………………………………………………………...
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GLOSSARY ………………………………………………………………….
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Preface
ANA 3-19.11 is a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers may be responsible for training
and deploying military police (MP) special-reaction teams (SRTs). The doctrine for SRT
operations considers—
• The various types of special threat situations.
• The team’s makeup.
• Weapons and equipment.
• Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
• Marksmanship qualification tables for the various weapons of entry and
marksman/observer (M/O) teams. Harmony between entry, M/O, and area-security teams
is critical to ensure the unity of effort and a successful mission.
The primary audiences for ANA 3-19.11 are leaders of the MP company and the Corps
Provost Marshal who are responsible for training SRT and Marksman/Observer teams.
Examples and graphics are provided to illustrate principles and concepts, not to serve as
prescriptive responses to tactical situations. They serve only as a guide. This publication
provides units with the doctrinal foundation to train soldiers and leaders, guide tactical
planning, and develop standard operating procedures (SOP). The proponent for this
publication is ANATEC. Submit comments, recommendations and the rational for
improvement to this publication to;
Commander
ANATEC
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Preparations
The MP SRT is an elite MP organization that is tasked with force protection and control of
special threat situations. Part One consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 provides fundamental
information on the responsibilities and organization of the SRT, the threat-management force
(TMF), and the crisis-management organization (CMO). Chapter 2 provides planning
considerations for containing and neutralizing special threats.
Chapter 1
Responsibilities, Priorities, and Organization
As a tactical element that enhances force protection, an SRT is specially trained, armed, and
equipped to contain and neutralize special threats. It is prepared to operate across the
operational continuum. For deterrence to be effective, hostile individuals or groups must
understand that the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) will mobilize, deploy, fight, and win
under any circumstances. Therefore, if deterrence fails, an SRT is prepared to preserve
human life and restore normal activity to ANA installations and areas of operation (AOs).
This chapter discusses the responsibilities and organization of an SRT.
Responsibilities
1-1. An SRT must be a well-trained, disciplined team that meets the needs of the installation
commander. SRT training must be stressful, intense, and realistic. Safety, however, must not
be compromised to increase the level of realism. Effective training is the key for preparing
SRT members to conduct successful operations in a variety of environments, including
military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). Each training experience must build and
hone skills.
1-2. The success of an SRT depends on personnel being thoroughly trained in tactics and
having the ability to discriminate effectively between targets to minimize the loss of life and
collateral damage. No technique or safety equipment can prevent the errors made by an
unprepared or untrained team. (Training considerations are discussed in detail in Part Three.)
Corps Commands
1-3. Corp Commands must ensure that SRT capabilities exist to support each of their
subordinate installations. These teams must be equipped and trained to counter special threat
disruptions in their areas of responsibility.
1-4. To establish enhanced installation SRT capabilities, reciprocal and, or support
agreements between corps, installations, and, or local ANP authorities should be established
according to applicable laws and ANA regulations.
COMMANDERS
1-5. Commanders are responsible for the command and control (C2) of resources during all
disruptions within areas of military jurisdiction. They are also responsible for maintaining
law and order within their areas of jurisdiction. When major disruptions or special threats
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occur, including acts of terrorism, commanders must commit resources in a graduated
response to resolve the situation and restore law and order.
Special Threat Situations
1-6. An SRT is an integral part of force protection, and it is one of the installation
commander’s principal response forces in case of a major disruption or a special threat
situation. The employment of an SRT is an installation commander’s final show of force to
resolve a special threat. SRTs may be used to control the situations shown in Table 1-1, but
their use is not limited to these situations.
Table 1-1. Special Situations.
Precision and surgical Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).
Barricaded situations (criminal or mentally disturbed persons with, or without hostages.
Response force• For VIP Protection.
• To augment quick-reaction personnel.
• To support an assault with precision fire.
• For a raid.
Operations to combat terrorism with countersniper operations.
Civil disturbance operations (designated marksman).
Screening to• Maintain surveillance of key terrain, flank, or artillery.
• Gather intelligence.
• Overwatch security forces with precision direct fire weapons.
Threatened suicide incident.
High Risk Entry.
Apprehension of a dangerous suspect.
Drug Raid
Any mission where ROE prohibit collateral damage.
Search and Rescue Operations.
1-7. MP Commanders organize, equip, and train SRTs according to existing regulations. An
SRT is capable of providing enhanced police response to special threat situations in its areas
of responsibility, and it is composed of MP or other law-enforcement personnel. Specific
missions and response capabilities are determined by the threat and the availability of
resources.
Mission-Essential Task List
1-8. In preparing an SRT for certification, a mission-essential task list (METL) must be
established based on mission analysis and external directives. The analysis identifies the
specified and implied mission-essential tasks from the larger number of possible training
tasks contained in this manual, the unit’s standard operating procedures (SOP), and guidance
from the provost marshal office (PMO) and the installation commander. The METL must
focus on special threat situations that the team may encounter. This process concentrates the
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team’s training efforts on the most important collective training tasks required to neutralize
special threat situations identified in the METL. Mission-essential tasks may be critical
training tasks or operational activities required to accomplish the team’s ongoing mission.
1-9. Once an METL is established, the supporting standards and conditions for each task are
developed. The conditions and standards provide a clear statement of expected training
performance.
Condition Statement.
1-10. A task’s condition statement describes the field conditions under which the task will be
performed. The condition expands on the information in the task title by identifying when,
where, and why the soldier performs the task and what materials, personnel, and equipment
he must have. The condition statement outlines what the team/soldier will face, and it is
written in paragraph format and jobholder language. The following is a sample condition
statement:
Condition: Given a mass-casualty situation. After completing all preliminary activities, the
team moves to the objective and prepares to breach the entry point. Each team member is
wearing proper protective clothing and has his assigned weapon and ammunition. The
breacher is prepared to breach the entry point.
Standard Statement.
1-11. Individual performance is measured against the task standard. It describes the criteria
the task must meet in the field to accomplish the mission successfully. The task standard—
a. Describes the minimum acceptable level of performance.
b. Is used to measure task performance.
c. Must be—
(1) Objective, valid, and reliable.
(2) Usable, comprehensive, and discriminating.
(3) May include, but is not limited to—
(a) Accuracy and quantity.
(b) Speed and quality.
1-12. Like the condition statement, the standard statement is written in paragraph format and
jobholder language. The following is a sample standard statement:
Standard: Select a breaching site on the objective. Locate and mark all mines and trip wires
within a 1-meter-wide path without causing detonation.
PROVOST MARSHAL
1-13. The installation or corps provost marshal (PM) organizes, equips, trains, and maintains
the SRT. He is also the approving authority for its deployment.
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Priorities
1-14. Operational priorities apply in all special threat situations; and they must be taught,
planned, and given necessary command emphasis to ensure compliance and success.
Operational priorities are—
• Protecting lives.
• Securing the safe release of hostages.
• Isolating and containing an incident.
• Gathering information and intelligence.
• Protecting property and equipment.
• Preventing escape.
• Apprehending offenders.
• Stopping and, or eliminating a threat by precision direct fire and, or assault.
• Conducting an assault or an entry.
ORGANIZATION
1-15. To meet and control special threats, an SRT must be organized with the correct mix of
individuals. An SRT is part of the threat management force (TMF) and the crisis
management organization (CMO). The organization of an SRT and the selection of its
personnel are crucial to mission success. There are no absolutes for selecting SRT members;
however, there are organizational indicators, tests, and trends that help commanders identify
potential SRT members. Candidates for an SRT must be carefully screened. The rigorous
training program and the great personal risk in special situations require high motivation and
the ability to learn a variety of skills. Table 1-2 lists criteria for selecting SRT members from
the most qualified volunteers. It is critical that commanders monitor evaluation and selection
procedures.
Table 1-2. SRT Selection Guidelines.
Is a volunteer.
Has documentation of—
• One year service as an MP.
• Minimum one year retainability after selection.
Has written command approval.
Demonstrates the following:
• Maturity.
• Endurance.
• Integrity.
• Dedication.
• Discipline.
• Patience.
• Sound judgment.
• Functionability under stress.
• Emotional stability.
• Team player.
Has no record of punishment under the code of military justic during current enlistment.
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Table 1-2. SRT Selection Guidelines (continued).
Has the following skills:
• Expert with M16/M4 and M9 or other handgun pistol.
• Minimum score of 90 percent on APFT. An excellent APFT score, a high degree of
stamina, and solid athletic skills and abilities are pluses.
Is in good health.
Has been cleared by mental health.
Has no profiles.
Has good vision. Glasses present a liability; however, a candidate who wears glasses can be
selected if he is otherwise highly qualified.
Possesses the following:
• Combat and/or small-unit operational experience.
• Genuine concern for preserving life.
1-16. The applicant should go through the three-step selection process outlined in Table 1-3
before being appointed to an SRT. Mental and psychological evaluations should be
conducted by the behavioral-medicine division of a medical-treatment facility.
TABLE 1-3. Three-Step Selection Process
Phase
Step 1: Administrative
Step 2: Instructional
Step 3: Stress
Description
Background check
Physical exam
Mental exam
Personal history review
Interview
Administrative processing
Counseling
Learning-ability test
Common skill level of expertise
Physical conditioning
Terrain familiarization
1-17. The team leader’s interview should identify the candidate’s motivation for becoming an
SRT member and should examine his expectations concerning training. While the
commander should monitor all candidate selections, the team leader should make selections
to preserve consistency and rule out bias. Candidates should be rated on a scale and chosen
on their rating and the unit’s needs. The following rules apply when selecting SRT members:
• Do not apprise candidates of their standings.
• Do not select or consider non volunteers.
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• Do not select unqualified soldiers.
• Select only the best qualified.
COMMAND ELEMENT
1-18. The command element plays a critical role in training, supporting, and supervising.
Table 1-4 shows its responsibilities.
Table 1-4. Responsibilities of the Command Element
Member
Responsibilities
Provost Marshal (PM)
Is responsible for• Overall organization.
• Training.
• Equipment.
• Certification.
Acts as the TMF commander.
Directs the SRT.
SRT (Officer In Charge or Sergeant (E7 or
above)).
Obtains funding for• Training.
• Equipment.
• Temporary Duty Assignments.
Develops SRT training, including• Coordination.
• Supervision.
Evaluation.
• Maintenance of training records.
Develops the SRTs SOP.
Conducts quarterly evaluations.
Maintains a close working relationship with
local organizations and, or agencies.
Prepares AARs.
Reviews OPLANS
Reports directly to the• PM.
• Designated representative.
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TEAM POSITIONS
1-19. All positions are of equal importance. The team leader assigns positions as a situation
develops. Team positions and responsibilities are dictated by operational requirements, the
mission, and available personnel and equipment. All personnel must remain flexible and
capable of performing in any position.
1-20. An entry element, as a minimum, consists of five MPs designated by the commander to
be SRT. This element has the following positions: entry-team members, an SRT leader or
sergeant in charge, and forward security. Table 1-5, page 1-8, shows the responsibilities for
each position.
Table 1-5. Responsibilities of the Entry Element.
Member
Responsibilities
All
Conducts a recon and recommends primary
and alternate AAs.
Leads the entry element during approach.
Assists in 360 degree security role.
Provides clearing and, or cover as required.
Helps develop the OPORD.
Carries special equipment, such as ballistic
shield.
Employs pyrotechnics and nonlethal
munitions, if available.
Provides breaching capabilities.
SRT leader / SGT (E6)
Conducts• Training.
• Research.
• Equipment acquisition / requests.
• Administrative actions.
Supervises the• Entry Team.
• Marksman / Observer Team.
Accounts for• Weapons.
• Ammunition.
• Equipment.
Helps prepare the AAR.
Plans operations, leads SRT during
deployment and assumes the same
responsibilities as an entry team member.
Evaluates personnel and operations.
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Table 1-5. Responsibilities of the Entry Element (continued).
Member
Responsibilities
Forward Security (E5)
Provides continuous forward Level III-A
ballistic protection.
Provides primary ballistic protection for the
entry team.
Assumes an alternate security role as
required.
Provides cover during withdrawal.
Carries additional equipment as necessary.
1-21. Additional personnel are assigned to the entry team if resources allow. Table 1-6 shows
the responsibilities of additional team members.
Table 1-6. Responsibilities of Additional Entry Team Personnel.
Member
Responsibilities
Rear Security Guard (E5)
Acts as second in command.
Provides rear security during movement.
Carries a ballistic shield when necessary.
Assists the clearing team during a three-man,
room clearing technique.
Acts as a secondary breacher.
Nonlethal marksman (E4 to E5)
Is trained in• Hand to hand combat techniques.
• Deployment of nonlethal munitions.
Advises the team leader.
Provides security for ballistic shield man.
Assists the entry team during• Movement.
• Entry.
• Clearing operations.
Acts as an alternate ballistic shield man.
Employs pyrotechnics at the team leader’s
command.
MARKSMAN/OBSERVER
1-22. Marksman / Observers (M/O) are essential parts of all tactical operations whether the
mission is to isolate and contain a hostage situation, to extricate a barricaded criminal, or to
ensure that a threat does not escape during a drug raid. M/Os set the security overwatch and
provide real-time intelligence and reporting that is vital to the mission’s success. The safety
of the entry team relies on the ability of M/Os to position themselves correctly. Their
positions must allow coverage of the entry team at all times during the approach to the
objective. Their ability to select positions properly and provide cover fire is critically
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important, because they provide a psychological deterrent to the threat and a tactical edge to
the team.
1-23. The M/O cover element consists of two teams of ANA MPs designated by the
commander to be SRT members. Each team consists of one marksman and one equally
trained observer. A minimum of two teams are deployed for security during operations.
1-24. The responsibilities of a marksman demand higher standards than a traditional military
sniper. These standards require a hugely disproportionate amount of training time when
compared to time spent on site during a threat situation. Requiring that two equally trained
individuals occupy the M/O position ensures an effective operation and a detailed log.
Primary responsibilities of an M/O include—
• Moving into position without compromising the operation.
• Establishing positions that provide 360-degree security.
• Communicating with the command post (CP).
• Providing real-time intelligence to the CP.
• Establishing the range to target.
• Sectoring the objective.
• Delivering select fire on call.
• Providing cover fire if needed or requested by the recon or entry team.
• Providing a shot-initiated entry to neutralize a threat for the entry team.
• Providing cover fire if needed while evacuating non participants.
• Controlling the inner perimeter and containing the threat.
Observer Responsibilities
1-25. The observer supports the marksman throughout the situation by observing the threat
with binoculars or a spotting scope. His primary responsibility is to observe the effects of the
marksman’s gunfire on the threat. Specific duties include—
• Providing security for the marksman.
• Assisting the marksman in locating the threat.
• Relieving the marksman as necessary.
• Employing smoke or flares on the team leader’s command.
• Advising the CP of the team’s exact location and the range to target.
• Advising the CP if the position is high or low.
• Advising the CP of the team’s area of coverage.
• Ensuring that safety or the mission is not compromised for a better position.
• Advising the CP if any perimeter personnel are in the line of fire.
• Advising the CP of any pertinent movement or change in the objective or the threat.
• Recording events before, during, and after the incident for use as evidence and
information in the after-action review (AAR).
1-26. Additional duties include—
• Informing the marksman of any movement in the objective.
• Identifying threat priorities to the marksman and the CP.
• Identifying where the threat is located in the objective.
• Preparing sketches and range cards and announcing target indicators.
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• Operating the radio and assisting the marksman as needed.
• Relaying changes in orders or instructions from the CP.
• Ensuring that the M/O team is not silhouetted.
• Engaging fast-moving targets in the open.
• Advising the CP of the shot’s impact.
• Recording information about the shot in the M/O data book.
• Covering units as they withdraw from the area and requesting authentication before the
M/O team’s withdrawal from the area.
• Assisting the marksman in policing the position after resolution of the situation.
Marksman Responsibilities
1-27. The marksman’s primary responsibility is to provide cover fire for the perimeter, the
entry team, and other tactical personnel. Specific duties include—
• Serving as the eyes and ears of the command by maintaining surveillance on the subject
area from a fixed position.
• Selecting a position that covers entries and exits in the objective.
• Receiving the situation briefing.
• Coordinating logistical support.
• Writing an operation order (OPORD).
• Ensuring that equipment is on hand and ready to deploy.
• Covering threats leaving the objective.
• Providing intelligence-information reports (IIRs) to the CP.
• Deciding threat priorities.
• Adjusting the scope for range changes.
• Engaging the threat with selective fire to neutralize it (If not removed by fire, the threat
poses an imminent threat of death or serious injury).
• Providing cover for the entry team.
Alternate Marksman/Observer Team
1-28. If resources allow, an alternate M/O team should be added to an SRT as a maneuvering
team. This enhances the entry team’s security by employing non-lethal munitions and by
providing a maneuverable M/O team in an optimum position or angle for greater accuracy
during precision and suppressive fire. An alternate M/O team also allows inner perimeter
M/O teams to remain in position, thus enabling undetected 360-degree security on the
objective. Table 1-7, page 1-12, shows the responsibilities of an alternate M/O team.
Table 1-7. Responsibilities of the Alternate M/O Team
Member
Responsibilities
M/O Team Leader (E5)
Updates M/Os with current intelligence.
Supports M/O operational needs.
Controls area security teams.
Helps develop the OPORD.
Alternate M/O (E3)
Performs duties of the M/O.
Gathers intelligence from hostage negotiation
teams.
Prepares to maneuver on command.
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SUPPORT ELEMENT
1-29. A support element augments the SRT so that it may successfully meet mission
requirements. When possible, support-team personnel should be ANA MPs that are SRT
trained or familiarized with SRT tactics on a quarterly basis. This element consists of an
apprehension team, an area-security team, and a recorder/CP security as shown in Table 1-8.
Table 1-8. Responsibilities of the Support Element.
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS
THREAT-MANAGEMENT FORCE
1-31. The TMF is a tactical element drawn from installation resources that responds to major
disruptions and special threat situations on the installation. Elements of the TMF consist of
the following:
• SRT. The SRT provides an enhanced response that is capable of controlling special
threat situations. It must begin preliminary tactical planning to resolve the situation
during initial employment.
• Initial-response force. The initial-response force usually consists of on-duty, lawenforcement personnel. They isolate, contain, and evaluate incidents and provide initial
reports to the PM.
• Inner-perimeter security. The inner-perimeter security is initially set up by on-duty
MPs that secure the area and evacuate non participants. SRT M/O personnel,
augmented by area-security teams, normally relieve on-scene MP.
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• Outer-perimeter security. The outer-perimeter security is controlled by security
forces, normally MP that limits access to the incident site and affected areas. They
must also provide security for the rest of the installation.
• Hostage-negotiation team. The hostage negotiation team is composed of Criminal
Investigation Division (CID), military-police investigation (MPI), and military
intelligence (MI) personnel. They conduct negotiations for key decision makers.
• Investigative teams. Investigative teams are composed of CID, MPI, and MI
personnel. They conduct an ongoing investigation during a special threat situation and
complete the investigation after the situation is resolved.
Figure 1-1. Organizational Elements of SRT.
CRISIS-MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
1-32. The CMO establishes the chain of command during special threat situations to
guarantee the flow of information up and down the chain .
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Planning Considerations
Chapter 2
Planning Considerations
Once an SRT is organized and equipped, planning must take place for unexpected threat
situations. A certain level of preplanning improves the initial response to a special threat
situation. These plans should include the installation’s mission-essential areas and vulnerable
areas, such as headquarters (HQ) elements and communication sites. Other areas that must be
considered as potential threat locations are quarters, and commissaries. Blueprints, if
available-are essential elements of the preplanning and planning processes, and planners
should have access to blueprints for all buildings and areas that have been identified as
potential threat areas. This chapter discusses the preplanning process, the planning process
(once the situation has developed), and blueprints.
PREPLANNING PROCESS
2-1. Preplanning is conducted before a crisis occurs. It allows an SRT to react in an
emergency and successfully contain and neutralize a situation. The preplanning process
includes—
• Training members. There are three training elements that a commander should
concentrate on when training an SRT. These elements are referred to as the SRT
training triad. Training-time percentages are provided to assist commanders in
planning. An average of four hours per week of dedicated training is needed to
prepare an SRT properly. Specific training requirements are as follows:
Tactics. About 60 percent of training time should be dedicated to tactics.
Planning, movement, entry skills (breaching), and maneuvering within a
structure (building clearing) should be trained monthly. Weapons handling is
also an important part of tactics and should be developed during live-fire
weapons training.
Live-fire weapons. About 20 percent of training time should be dedicated to
live-fire weapons training. SRT members must have an opportunity to develop
conditioned responses when handling weapons. Emphasis must be placed on
accuracy; this is the most important element of weapons handling. Correctly
repeating weapons handling and concentrating on accuracy will develop the
second most important element of weapons handling—speed, which will
come with practice.
Conditioning. Physical and mental conditioning are important elements when
training an SRT, and about 20 percent of training time should be dedicated to
conditioning. Conditioning should be integrated into tactics and live-fire
weapons training. Team lifts and carries, extended movement to isolated
training objectives, and other physically and mentally challenging exercises
should be used to build endurance, flexibility, and speed within a team.
• Planning exercises with the CMO and the TMF.
• Developing an SOP.
• Gathering information from—
Blueprints.
Recons of mission-essential or vulnerable areas (MEVAs).
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•
•
Building security systems.
Potential threats.
Criminal and gang activity.
Ensuring that MEVAs are selected and approved by the command staff.
Understanding—
The military decision-making process (MDMP).
Combat power.
The dilemma.
MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
2-2. The MDMP is an established, proven analytical process. It is adapted from the analytical
approach to problem solving. The MDMP helps commanders develop estimates and plans.
The formal problem-solving process starts with mission receipt and produces an order, but
the analytical aspects of an MDMP continue at all levels during operations.
2-3. The MDMP has seven steps. Each step of the process begins with certain input that
builds upon the previous steps. Each step, in turn, has its own output that drives subsequent
steps. Errors committed early in the process will impact on later steps. The seven steps in the
MDMP are—
Step 1. Mission receipt.
Step 2. Mission analysis.
Step 3. Course-of-action (COA) development.
Step 4. COA analysis.
Step 5. COA comparison.
Step 6. COA approval.
Step 7. Order production.
2-4. The commander and each staff section deliver estimates continuously to provide
important input for the MDMP. The estimates are revised when important, new information
is received or when the situation changes significantly. Estimates are conducted to support
the planning process and during mission execution. Team leaders and planners must be
familiar with the MDMP and how it contributes to the success of the SRT mission. For an indepth discussion of the MDMP, refer to FM 101-5.
COMBAT POWER
2-5. Maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership create combat power—the ability to
fight. They are essential to the success of an SRT mission.
• Maneuver. It is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage.
• Firepower. It is the destructive force and is essential for defeating the threat’s ability
and will to fight.
• Protection. It conserves the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can
apply it at a decisive time and place.
• Leadership. It is the most essential element of combat power and consists of
competent, confident officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership.
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DILEMMA
2-6. A dilemma is often used to accomplish tactical objectives. The threat is placed in such a
predicament that no matter what it does, it can be exploited by the SRT. Depriving the threat
of space or time creates a tactical dilemma. A team can use crossfire, nonlethal weapons,
diversion, combined arms, or reduction to deprive a threat of space.
• Crossfire. This is perhaps the best known way of depriving the threat of space.
Crossfire deprives a threat of space by removing his ability to stay or move; there is
no safe place. This makes the threat vulnerable no matter what he does. Envelopment,
hammer, and anvil are tactics that place a threat in a crossfire.
• Nonlethal weapons. There is an array of nonlethal weapons available that deprive the
threat of his ability to occupy space.
• Diversion. This is a deceptive move that is used to position the threat more
advantageously for the SRT. The movement may reduce entry problems for the SRT,
help the SRT avoid detection, or place the threat in a position vulnerable to long-rifle
fire.
• Combined arms. The use of combined arms can deprive the threat of space. A
relatively high volume of pistol fire may force a threat to move and be exposed to
accurate long-rifle fire. A smoke grenade may obscure the movement of the SRT and
allow it to gain a position of tactical advantage over the threat. Fire and maneuver
also deprive the threat of space.
• Reduction. A dilemma can be created for the threat by reducing his amount of space.
This can be done by turning on lights and eliminating the threat’s ability to hide.
Smoke can be used to obscure the threat’s ability to see. Observing the threat’s
movement reduces his space and his ability to plan and move. Sting balls, chemical
irritants, or return fire may nullify a sniper’s fire.
2-7. Time is often referred to as initiative in an operation. This simply means the side that
causes the other to react has the initiative. An SRT can cause a dilemma for a threat by
depriving him of time/initiative through surprise, security, deceptive diversion, physiological
diversion, or tactics.
• Surprise. One way to deprive a threat of time is with surprise, which is one of the
principles that drive any tactical operation. Surprise deprives the threat of his ability
to react effectively to a new problem. An SRT may surprise a threat by approaching
from an unanticipated direction, attacking at an unexpected time, or attacking in an
unforeseen manner.
• Security. The threat must be unable to determine the SRT’s plan of action.
Operations security (OPSEC) is essential to mission success and must be practiced.
Security requires that plans are secret, approaches are surreptitious, and other relevant
aspects remain concealed. There can be no surprise without security.
• Deceptive diversion. This requires an SRT to make some form of movement in an
attempt to fool the threat, if only for a moment. A diversion does not need to be loud
or violent, just misleading.
• Physiological diversion. This diversion acts on one or more of the threat’s senses,
often affecting sight and hearing. An effective physiological diversion is the
flash/bang diversionary device.
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•
Tactics. Carefully selecting a tactic can deprive the threat of his ability to react. The
idea is to overwhelm the threat with a predicament that he is unable to comprehend,
thus slowing his reactions. M/O-initiated assaults and diversionary devices can be
used to deprive a threat of his ability to react.
OBSERVATION, ORIENTATION, DECISION, AND ACTION
2-8. The implied objective of every tactical operation is to gain and maintain the initiative.
This may be referred to as the tempo or speed of an operation. When an SRT has the
initiative and maintains the tempo, it has the ability to act and the threat can only react. The
side that fails to maintain the initiative is slower and will eventually fail.
2-9. A military leader theorized that the tempo and speed of an operation are nothing more
than a series of time-competitive cycles that he referred to as the observation, orientation,
decision, and action (OODA) loop.
• Observation. Each party in a conflict orients himself based on his position and the
adversary’s position.
• Orientation. Each party orients himself to the situation based on his observations.
This allows him to use observation as a basis for thought. Orientation is a synopsis or
summary of the previous observation.
• Decision. Each party makes a decision based on his orientation. This is a decision on
what his next COA will be, and it may control a situation in some cases.
• Action. Each party acts on his decision in an effort to change the situation. The party
assumes his decision will change the situation, so he observes again and begins the
OODA loop again.
2-10. The observation, orientation, decision and action (OODA) loop is repeated until the
operation is complete. If one side in a conflict can consistently go through the OODA loop, it
gains a tremendous advantage. It is important to understand that having the initiative does not
mean you have to be assaulting. Tempo is measured in relative terms. For example, a team
need not constantly operate at an extremely high tempo, only at a faster rate than its
opponent. The speed of the cycle is not as important as moving through it faster than the
threat.
PLANNING PROCESS
2-11. The planning process begins during the preplanning process. Once an SRT has been
alerted of a special threat situation, leaders and members further develop the preplans to fit
the situation much the same way that DOD develops war plans.
2-12. During the planning process, the team leader must be aware of the potential risks in
special threat situations. Careful planning minimizes collateral damage and risks to team
members and hostages. Table 2-1 illustrates a complicated planning procedure. Team leaders
must be aware that many of the steps will take place simultaneously.
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Table 2-1. Planning Process
SECTORING
2-13. Sectoring is a tool used for planning and controlling. It identifies an area or a structure
using number and letter designators. The sides, windows, doors, and rooms of the target or
the objective are identified to make target acquisition, approach, entry, and searching easier.
If numbers are used to designate exterior walls, use letters to designate rooms or areas on the
inside to reduce confusion. Always number, letter, or label in a clockwise direction. Table 22 explains how to sector the exterior of a building.
2-14. Sectoring is dividing and labeling a building so that a uniform, easily understood code
exists for identifying entry points, regardless of which side an entry or M/O member faces.
The location of M/O and entry members, in relation to the building and to each other, should
be established quickly and easily. Ensure that everyone understands the sectoring well
enough to apply it rapidly in a crisis. Practice the sectoring system on actual buildings within
your jurisdiction, and deal with difficult facilities by pre-sectoring them before an incident
develops.
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Table 2-2. Sectoring the Exterior of a Building
2-15. One system used to sector a building is the alphabetical/clockwise system. The primary
side of the building, or entrance side, is designated as Side A. Moving clockwise, the next
side of the building is Side B, and so on. Each side of a multifaceted building does not
require an individual designator if the covering M/O can see all corners and entry points. For
example, Side C opposite Side A may actually contain several differently angled exterior
walls.
2-16. The next step is to tag every possible entry and exit point with an alphanumeric
designator, following a clockwise pattern. The first floor is designated as No. 1, followed by
the alpha designator for the side of the building (such as A), and then followed by the number
assigned to the entry point. For example, the second window on Side A’s first floor is 1A2,
the next window is 1A3, and so on. Do not delineate between doors, windows, and large
vents.
2-17. When referring to an opening in a building, always start with the floor, followed by the
side, and then the opening. For example, the second floor, left side of the building, number
(No.) 3 window is designated as 2B3.
OPERATIONAL BOARD
2-18. The operational board is a centralized collection of information and resources for—
• Assisting leaders in planning and organizing.
• Keeping personnel informed.
• Increasing confidence within the team.
• Reducing stress.
• Reducing planning disruption.
2-19. Table 2-3 lists the topics that may be recorded on an operational board. All topics are
continuously updated throughout the operation, especially during the planning process.
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ANA 3-19.11
Table 2-3. Topics for an Operational Board.
Topic
Purposes
Situation Statement
Provides general statement of who, what,
where, when, why, and how (threat,
demands, deadlines).
Mission Statement
Provides the commander’s guidance and
intent.
Threat Information
Assists in identification and planning.
Hostage Information.
Assists identification and planning.
Potential hazards and countermeasures.
Reduces risk and facilitates success.
Weather Data.
Assists in planning.
Light Data.
Assists in planning.
Noise Data
Assists in planning.
Backward plan.
Assists in time management.
Medical evacuation plan.
Facilitates speed and builds confidence.
Minimizes casualties.
Reduces confusion and mistakes.
Increases preparedness.
Fire plan.
Reduces risks to property and personnel.
Diagram sectored with legend
Assists in planning and controlling.
Assault plan (primary, secondary,
Develops a strategy to win.
emergency).
Develops a complete understanding of duties
and responsibilities.
Objective photos (ground perspective, aerial Assists in developing assault plans, briefings,
perspective).
and understanding.
Reduces confusion.
Instills familiarity.
Topographical maps depicting information
Assists planning and controlling.
outlined in the area sketch.
Provides information for a map recon.
Area sketch showing locations ofAssists in developing assault plans and
briefings.
• Command Post (CP).
Reduces confusion.
• Objective indicating Side A.
Instills familiarity.
• Primary and alternate AAs.
• Primary and alternate rally points.
• Last covered-and-concealed position.
• Primary and alternate entry points.
• M/O positions.
• Support personnel positions.
• Checkpoints.
• Cache.
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FIVE-PARAGRAPH OPERATION ORDER
2-20. The five-paragraph OPORD is a guide as to who, what, when, where, and how the
mission will be accomplished. Table 2-4 shows the minimum information necessary for each
paragraph and who is responsible for its preparation. Each situation is different, so the
information in an OPORD will vary from the example.
Paragraph
Situation
Mission
Execution
Table 2-4. Five Paragraph OPORD Matrix
Purposes
Preparer
Details the circumstances
All team members must be
involving the mission.
prepared to receive the
Lists and describes subjects
situation briefing and pass on
and hostages.
details to other team
Gives date, time and
members.
location.
Lists any threats, demands,
and, or deadlines.
Lists known capabilities.
Details the law enforcement
response in terms of
perimeters and security.
States what the SRT must
All team members must be
accomplish.
prepared to receive the
Establishes the perimeter.
mission.
Formulates a plan to rescue
hostages and apprehend
threats.
Makes an inquiry as to the
use of force or ROE
(diversionary or deadly
force).
Conducts a recon.
Team Leader.
Selects the route to the
objective.
Determines the order or
march.
Plans tactics to be used on
approach, entry, and clearing.
Assigns tasks to team
members.
Plans actions to be taken
upon contact with hostages,
threats and explosives.
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Table 2-4. Five Paragraph OPORD Matrix (continued)
Service and Support
Assigns additional labor
Any Team Member.
needed (arrest teams, outerperimeter security).
Provides food and water.
Provides medical and
emergency support.
Provides equipment.
Command and Signal
Plans primary and alternate
Per SOP
means of communication.
Briefs the chain of command.
Assigns code words.
Assigns call signs.
Assigns frequency and, or
cryptographic codes.
BLUEPRINTS
2-21. A great source of intelligence for the objective is architectural drawings, specifications,
and building codes used to construct a building. Blueprints, a photographic reproduction of
an architectural or a mechanical plan, depict plumbing and electrical routes, attics,
basements, windows, and doorways. They help in the selection of breaching points and
equipment necessary to enter and clear an objective successfully. Official blueprints provide
teams with a scale drawing of the objective. A floor plan or a sketch can also be drawn using
information gathered from building occupants or informants.
2-22. There are several types of blueprints available for specific structures; they include the
following:
• Site or plot plan.
• Foundation plan.
• Elevation plan (exterior and interior).
• Structural floor plan. It provides general dimensions of the structure.
• Electrical plan. It provides wiring diagrams and electrical-outlet locations.
• Section plan. It provides a cross-sectional view of specific areas and details wall
thickness and construction.
• Detailed/scheduled plan. It lists window and door specifications and their location
within the structure, including fireplace and stairwell details.
• Joist-framing plan.
• Roof-framing plan.
2-23. When working with blueprints, SRT members must have a basic understanding of the
following terms and concepts used in the construction industry:
• Site/plot, floor, and foundation plans.
• Elevation.
• Section.
• Detail.
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ANA 3-19.11
•
•
•
•
•
Dimension.
Symbol and abbreviation.
Specification.
Modular construction.
Building code and standard.
SITE/PLOT, FLOOR, AND FOUNDATION PLANS
2-24. Site/plot plans are usually included in a complete set of architectural drawings. They
show the location of the structure on the building site (lot lines, outside lines of the building).
2-25. Floor plans show the size and outline of the building and a considerable amount of
other information, which typically includes—
• The location, size, and dimension lines of interior partitions, doors, windows, and
stairs.
• The location of plumbing fixtures, utility installations, and appliances.
2-26. Foundation plans are similar to floor plans and are often combined with basement
plans. Footings, if shown, are represented by a dotted line since it is assumed that the
basement floor is in place and that grade covers the footings on the outside.
ELEVATION
2-27. Elevations show the outside of a structure. They are scaled so that all elements appear
in true relationship to each other. Various elevations are typically keyed to the site by listing
them according to the direction they face. When stock plans are used, elevations are
designated by front, rear, left, and right sides. Information that may be secured from
elevation views are floor and grade levels, window and door heights, roof slopes, types of
materials used on wall surfaces and the roof, and foundation and footing lines that are below
grade.
SECTION
2-28. A section view shows a segment of a building as if the building were cut straight
through on a given plane. It provides a level of detail impossible to attain in most total views.
A drawing of a large or complicated structure may contain a number of section views to
show all construction details. Details included in a section view are footing and foundation
designs, sill and cornice characteristics, the size of framing lumber, types and kinds of
material used for sheathing of outside and inside wall surfaces, and the location of insulation.
DETAIL
2-29. A detail is typically an enlargement of an item or an aspect in a drawing that is
included to provide additional information. Elemental details can include—
• Foundation, footing, and porch construction.
• Roof trusses.
• Column fittings.
• Garage sills and fireplace sections.
• Cabinets, stairs, and interior partitions.
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DIMENSION
2-30. Dimensions showing the length, width, and height of objects are shown above and at or
near the center of a continuous line drawn between the points being measured.
SYMBOL AND ABBREVIATION
2-31. Since architectural plans are often drawn to a small scale, it is not always practical to
spell out the information that needs to be recorded on a drawing. To save space on drawings
and allow quick recognition, the building industry has a uniform group of symbols and
abbreviations (determined by locale) that represent—
• Various materials.
• Details, processes, and approved shortcuts (called conventional representations).
• Miscellaneous information to use in the place of unabbreviated text.
SPECIFICATION
2-32. Specifications stipulate the kind, quality and, sometimes, the quantity of materials and
workmanship required for construction. Specifications usually appear in a special table on a
drawing or on a separate sheet in a drawing package. They normally appear under headings
that include—
• General requirements, conditions, and information.
• Excavating and grading.
• Masonry and concrete.
• Sheet metal.
• Rough carpentry and roofing.
• Finish carpentry and millwork.
• Insulation, caulking, and glazing.
• Lath and plaster or drywall.
• Room finishes.
• Paint and paint finishes.
• Tile and electrical.
• Plumbing, heating, and air conditioning.
• Landscaping.
2-33. Under each of the headings, the content is usually divided into sections concerning the
scope of work, specifications of materials to be used, application methods and procedures,
and guarantees of quality and performance. Other items that may be included are information
and requirements for a building permit, contract payment, insurance, bonding, and changes to
the original plans.
BLUEPRINT INFORMATION
2-34. Team members and planners must be familiar with the information that a blueprint
provides, and they must be able to locate the information quickly. Whether using
professional blueprints or a sketched floor plan, there is certain information that the team
needs from a blueprint. Team members are looking for anything that may compromise the
team’s position. Some of these features will not be on the blueprint, but they are important
nonetheless. Team leaders and planners should consider the information contained in
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ANA 3-19.11
Table 2-5, and Table 2-6 when planning an assault. The information may be gleaned from
blueprints and other sources.
.
Table 2-5. Exterior Information
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Table 2-6. Interior Information.
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LIBRARY
2-35. Develop a highly organized, easily understood blueprint library that includes potential
threat locations (bank, quarters) and MEVAs (HQ elements, communication sites). The
library must have at least three large copies of each floor plan available for hasty, primary,
and secondary assault plans. There should be at least three small copies of blueprints
available for notes; these blueprints should be stored in a notebook and appropriately
classified. Official blueprints must be updated annually to keep them current.
2-36. Photos should be kept neatly cataloged with the blueprints. A master roster of all
photographs must be maintained and include—
• Interior and exterior shots.
• The ground and elevated perspective.
• The location and direction guide where the photo was taken.
2-37. A video library of MEVAs should be established, and videos should include outside
and inside footage of the building. This enhances preplanning and reduces the response time
in case of a special threat. Videos should be short and to the point to avoid wasting precious
planning time.
2-38. The following actions will improve the team’s library:
• Considering OPSEC.
• Safeguarding and properly storing information.
• Updating blueprints and videos annually.
2-39. Three-dimensional computer software is available to provide an enhanced, detailed
view of the objective’s floor plan. After the user installs the floor plan and dimensions, the
computer does the rest. The team is able to see the interior of a building, make decisions
about clearing, and rehearse the plan.
DIAGRAMMING
2-40. SRTs may not have blueprints immediately available on military installations.
Additionally, operations off the installation and wartime missions may hinder the
procurement of blueprints. When blueprints are unavailable, exterior features can help
determine the general layout of an objective. In addition, fire-evacuation plans posted near
fire extinguishers often depict complete floor plans for that particular floor. The following
items may be used to help determine floor plans from the exterior information:
• Roof vents.
• Windows.
• Doors.
• Landscaping.
• Multistory houses.
• Electronic anti-intrusion devices.
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Roof Vents
2-41. Roof vents help team members identify rooms and walls, determine the purpose for
each room, and determine the location of adjacent rooms. For instance, a stove vent is likely
to be located above the kitchen and stoves are usually located against a wall. By determining
that a roof vent is for a stove, the team has determined the location of the kitchen and one of
the interior walls. By knowing where the kitchen is, an adjacent room may be a dining room.
By compiling several rooms and walls, a profile can be formed that indicates, with some
degree of accuracy, what the interior floor plan looks like. Because of the variety of vents
available and the difficulty in describing them, consider obtaining a sales brochure from your
local lumber yard, contractor, or building center.
• Bathroom. This vent is normally made of 2-inch steel or polyvinylchloride (PVC)
pipe and does not have a cap. It usually sticks up about 30 cm from the roof. It is
often located on an exterior wall but may be anywhere on the roof. If a bathroom vent
is on a multistory house, look for another bathroom beneath it since it is quite
common to use the same vent pipe for more than one toilet in a multistory house.
• Chimney. A chimney often indicates a fireplace. In large houses, there may be a
fireplace in the master bedroom. A chimney with two flues suggests that there may be
two fireplaces or a fireplace and a furnace. A stucco or other type of fascia chimney
indicates a zero-tolerance fireplace, which does not need a concrete footing and can
be placed next to wood-frame walls.
Windows
2-42. Windows help team members diagram different areas of the house.
Team members assigned the task of diagramming a building must be familiar
with the various windows and the rooms they open into.
• Bedroom. Curtains in bedroom windows are often more elegant then in other parts of
the house. Bedroom windows are generally, the second largest windows in the house.
They are usually located near bathroom windows, which are the smallest windows in
the house. Lights in these rooms are often the first on in the morning and the last out
at night.
• Bathroom. The smallest, highest windows from the ground are often bathroom
windows. They regularly have translucent window glass but may have louvered
windows, frosted glass, or pull-type shades. Steam from showers frequently obscures
these windows.
• Living room. Because of their large size, living-room windows often allow a good
view of the interior, especially at night when interior lights are on. The following are
some indicators that may help planners identify living-room windows:
Usually the largest windows in the house.
Often face the street in older houses.
Often face the backyard in newer houses.
Often have lights on the longest during the evening hours.
• Kitchen. These are medium-size windows that are often smaller or the same size
as bedroom windows. They may be near the hot-water heater and are often higher
off the ground to clear cabinets.
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Doors
2-43. Look for the hinge pins on the door. Normally, if hinge pins are visible, the door opens
outward; if hinge pins are not visible, the door opens inward. If the door swings outward,
expect it to be an entrance into a small room or a closet; if the door swings inward, expect a
larger room with a closet or another room adjoining it. The major portion of the room will be
located on the latch side of the door. The light switch is located on the latch side, slightly
above the latch of an interior door.
2-44. Exterior, interior, and sliding-glass doors may be encountered by an SRT.
• Exterior. Exterior doors are classified as residential or commercial.
Residential doors are usually solid, 3.5 cm thick, and approximately 1
meter wide. They open inward, while the screen door opens outward.
Exterior doors open into living areas.
Commercial doors normally swing outward and may be equipped with
panic bars.
• Interior. Interior doors are usually 70-80 cm wide and have the following
characteristics:
An interior door normally swings into the room, against a wall.
A hallway door normally swings into the room, away from the hallway.
A closet door normally swings into the living area.
An interior garage door normally swings into the garage.
An interior door rarely swings into the center of a room, a hallway, or a
closet.
• Sliding glass. Sliding-glass doors usually exit a master bedroom, a dining room,
or a family room. A sliding-glass door exiting onto a small balcony on a second
floor indicates a master bedroom.
Landscaping
2-45. Team members can gain valuable information from studying the landscaping around a
building. They should pay particular attention to sidewalks, shrubs, dirt paths, worn areas,
fences, block walls, and gates.
• Sidewalks. A sidewalk is a good indicator that the main entrance is nearby. It
may be hidden by trees, an awning, or a patio.
• Shrubs. Plants and trees often affect SRT and threat avenues of approach (AAs).
Thorny plants or dense shrubs are often used to channel people in a certain way
and hinder window entry.
• Dirt paths and worn areas. The appearance of dirt paths or worn areas in a lawn
indicates heavy foot traffic. These paths may lead to rear entrances that are not
readily visible to observers, or they may lead to outbuildings.
• Fences and block walls. These structures may indicate that defensive
preparedness is underway. They may also indicate the level of commitment and
preparation of the threat.
• Gates. The most vulnerable part of a fence or a wall is the gate. The direction the
gate opens may be a good indicator of how to defeat it, and it also indicates the
traffic pattern. Watch for video cameras or other types of anti-intrusion devices
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guarding gates. If hinge pins are visible, the gate opens outward; if hinge pins are
not visible, the gate opens inward.
Multistory Houses
2-46. Multistory houses present unique problems because upper floors shield diagramming
clues. Normally, living areas are on lower floors and sleeping areas are on upper floors.
Surveillance indicates which lights stay on the longest. Bear in mind the following:
• The same rules apply to windows in a multistory house as in a single story house.
• A second-floor bathroom tends to be located above a first-floor bathroom.
• The stairway to the second floor tends to be in the living area rather than the
sleeping area.
• Closets are used as sound barriers so they tend to be located between bedrooms.
• A fireplace on the second floor indicates a family room or a master bedroom.
• The kitchen or the eating area is usually located on the first floor.
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Chapter 3
Movement
Before an SRT enters an objective, it must first arrive undetected. No aspect of tactical
employment is less understood or more sloppily practiced than team movement. Team
members have the same chance of suffering injury or death in this phase of the operation as
in any other phase.
MOVEMENT FUNDAMENTALS
3-1. Ideally, movement should be out of sight and sound of the threat. When preparing to
move to the objective—
• Ensure that all movement from the rally point to the objective is secure and swift.
• Be aware of the last available covered-and-concealed position.
• Ensure that the approach takes advantage of available objects, shadows, and terrain
features. When possible, move to the objective from a windowless side to eliminate
detection.
• Use diversion when necessary.
• Move under the cover of ambient noise.
• Avoid running and be aware of your foot position. During covert movement, move
only as fast as terrain and ground cover allow.
COVER AND CONCEALMENT
3-2. Selecting proper cover and concealment is critical during movement. Choose cover
based on the task to be performed, and use the cover to your advantage. Cover should allow
undetected movement through the area and provide protection from the threat.
3-3. Concealment is selected in advance by the recon team and briefed during the final
briefing. Always avoid being detected by the threat. To prevent the team from becoming a
target, blend into the surroundings. Consider the following factors:
• Shape and shadow.
• Silhouette.
• Surface and spacing.
• Location.
• Color and movement.
• Noise and smell.
ROUTE SELECTION
3-4. The team leader conducts a careful route analysis using the factors of observation, cover
and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA). The chosen
route should maintain the security of the force, ensure surprise, avoid enemy contact, and
allow speedy movement. A detailed route recon is made using maps, aerial photographs, and
reports from persons familiar with the area. The best avenues of approach are through
existing buildings, but subterranean access (storm drains, tunnels) should not be overlooked.
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Ideal times for approach are during reduced visibility (darkness, rain, snow, fog) or during
periods of reduced threat alertness, such as early morning.
INFILTRATION
3-5. Land infiltration is conducted using one of the following methods:
• Movement in small groups along one axis. All members of the force use the best
route. They are divided into several small groups that are harder to detect, are easier
to control, and do not compromise the total force if detected. The disadvantages of
this infiltration method are: (1) it may take too long to execute, (2) there must be an
assembly point or a linkup point, and (3) other groups may be ambushed if the lead
group is detected.
• Movement in one group. All members of the force use the same route. This is the
preferred method of movement. The advantages of this infiltration method are: (1) a
large force can fight its way out of danger easier than a small one, (2) there are no
reassembly or coordination problems between other elements, and (3) navigation is
easier. The disadvantages of this infiltration method are: (1) movement is easier for
the threat to detect and (2) the mission may be compromised if the force is detected.
• Movement in small groups along several routes at the same time. This method
avoids putting the entire team in danger because the force is less likely to be seen. It
forces the threat to react in many locations, and it is harder for the threat to determine
the team’s size or mission. The disadvantage to this method is that some groups
traveling over poorer routes may have problems with assembly, control, or support,
which could endanger the mission.
REHEARSALS
3-6. Before movement to the objective, the SRT rehearses—
• Executing the movement.
• Reacting to hostile fire.
• Maneuvering under fire (fire and movement).
• Crossing danger areas.
• Breaking contact.
• Making a temporary halt.
• Establishing a perimeter.
• Establishing a rally point.
• Acting upon consolidation.
• Using hand-and-arm signals.
• Reacting to flares and indirect fire.
MOVEMENT METHODS
3-7. SRTs move to the objective by foot, ground transportation, and/or air transportation. If
air or ground transportation is used, the team should rehearse loading and unloading with a
full combat load.
3-8. The file formation (Table 3-1) is the most common foot formation used by SRTs. It has
the following advantages and disadvantages:
• Advantages.
37
ANA 3-19.11
•
Is the easiest formation to use in close terrain (MOUT) or heavy vegetation.
Provides maximum control.
Provides minimum frontage.
Facilitates speed of movement.
Provides immediate fires to the flank.
Minimizes contact with booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Disadvantages.
Is less flexible than the wedge or diamond formation.
Makes it difficult for most team members to fire to the front or the rear.
Increases the likelihood of casualties from hostile fire, booby traps, and IEDs
at close intervals.
Step
1
2
3
Table 3-1. Execution of the File Formation.
Actions
The No. 1 man is the first in the file. Ideally, he leads the team along the
route selected during the recon and is responsible for forward security.
Remaining team members and weapons maintain cover, staggered
positions.
The team leader controls positions of and distances between team
members.
3-9. The intervals between team members and the speed of movement are based on the
terrain, the visibility, and other control factors. Spacing should vary according to these
factors or mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METTTC) as briefed by the team leader.
NOTE: Wedge, modified wedge, and diamond are also basic foot formations. See ANA
7-8 MTP for more information on movement techniques.
DANGER AREAS
3-10. A danger area is any place on a route where a team might be exposed to threat
observation and/or fire. If a team must cross a danger area, it does so with great caution and
as quickly as possible. When moving from the assembly area to the objective, the team may
encounter one or more danger areas that must be crossed. The following are some examples
of danger areas and their crossing procedures:
• Open areas. Conceal the team on the near side and observe the area. Send an element
across to clear the far side. When cleared, cross the rest of the team at the shortest
exposed distance and as quickly as possible.
• Roads and trails. Cross roads or trails at or near a bend, in a narrow spot, or on low
ground.
• Animals. Avoid animals, especially dogs that might reveal the presence of the team.
38
ANA 3-19.11
•
•
•
•
Threat positions. Pass on the downwind side if possible because the threat might
have scout dogs. Be alert for trip wires and warning devices.
Minefields. Bypass minefields, if possible, even if it requires changing the route by a
great distance.
Streams. Select a narrow spot in the stream that offers concealment on both banks.
Observe the far side carefully. Employ security on near and far sides for early
warnings. Clear the far side and then cross the stream rapidly and quietly.
Wire obstacles. Avoid wire obstacles because the threat covers them with
observation and fire.
3-11. Team crossings are conducted by maneuver and cover elements, which may consist of
2 to 20 team members depending on the mission. When planning crossings, consider METTTC, OCOKA, target acquisition, and immediate action if the threat is encountered. When a
team crosses a danger area independently or as the lead element of a larger force, it must—
• Designate rally points on near and far sides.
• Secure the near side (right flank, left flank, rear).
• Recon and secure the far side.
• Execute the crossing of the danger area.
3-12. The team leader decides how the team will cross based on the time available, the size
of the team, the size of the danger area, fields of fire into the area, and the amount of security
posted. A secured area must be large enough to allow full deployment of the team.
OBJECTIVE RALLY POINT
3-13. The objective rally point (ORP) is the final coordination point, and actions at the ORP
are shown in Table 3-2. When the team leaves the ORP, they are ready to fight.
Priority
1
2
3
4
5
6
Table 3-2. Actions at the ORP
Actions
Account for and prepare personnel, weapons, and equipment.
Verify that weapons are loaded and off safe.
Communicate with the TMF for final instructions and updates.
Communicate with the M/O for intelligence and cover. Make final
coordination with diversion teams.
Address last minute questions.
Confirm the emergency rally point.
Form the team in the proper order.
Request radio silence.
Move to the last covered and concealed position.
3-14. The last covered-and-concealed position is out of sight and sound of the objective.
Actions at this position are shown in Table 3-3.
39
ANA 3-19.11
Steps
1
2
3
4
5
Table 3-3. Actions at the last Covered and Concealed Position.
Actions
Account for personnel and equipment.
Request compromised authority.
Look and listen.
Make final crossing decisions.
Move to a secure position adjacent to the objective.
MOVEMENT ADJACENT TO THE OBJECTIVE
3-15. Movement outside the objective or any other area near the objective is best described as
a careful hurry. The speed of movement is based on METT-TC. Keep the following points in
mind:
• Avoid physical contact with any exterior surface of the objective. Leaning or resting
on an exterior surface can allow detection by the threat or cause personal injury.
• Be aware of your position. Stay as close to a wall as possible to reduce the possibility
of detection by the threat. The farther from a wall, the greater the chance of
compromise.
• Be prepared for a threat at any time, from any direction.
• Be prepared for booby traps, IEDs, animals, and other hazards.
• Position marksman/observers (M/Os) to provide maximum cover. Consider
positioning them to observe angles into windows that the entry team cannot cover.
• Do not stop adjacent to a building where a window is within 3 meters of your back
unless some type of immediate cover is provided by the entry team. A window that is
flush to the wall, within 3 meters of a team member’s position, offers the threat a
potential observation position.
• Keep your focus forward. M/Os or the area-security team cover the rear area.
• Ensure that the team stays together as much as possible.
• Avoid movement outside the objective. Move directly from the last covered-andconcealed position to the entry point to reduce the chance of compromise.
NOTE: Table 3-4 and Figure 3-1 illustrate the execution of a high/low movement technique.
It is the only movement technique that will be discussed in this manual.
3-16. If contact is made with the threat before reaching the entry point, immediate action
must be taken. Immediate action must be planned before the assault, and it is driven by
METT-TC. For example, in a hostage-rescue mission, the focus is on the safe release of the
hostage. Fighting through the threat may seem to be the obvious decision. However, if
surprise is lost and the threat engages with overwhelming firepower, a withdrawal may be the
only option. The SRT may choose from three possible actions.
• Advance/assault. Suppressive fire is laid down with M/O- and entry team weapons.
Diversion and concealment techniques (smoke, lighting) are initiated. The team
moves directly to the primary or secondary entry points as one or two elements using
bounding overwatch. They prepare further aggressive action on contact within the
objective.
40
ANA 3-19.11
Table 3-4. Execution of High/Low Movement Adjacent to the Objective.
Step
Actions
1
The team begins in a file formation with weapons ready. Stage the
ballistic shield, if used, in the No. 1 position. Ensure that the overwatch is
in position. Give “thumbs-up” signal from the front and initiate the ready
squeeze from the rear.
2
The No. 1 man signals for the high/low barricaded position by assuming
a kneeling position.
3
The high security signals the No. 1 man with a ready squeeze when he is
in position.
4
The No. 1 man executes a low barricade, and the barricaded rear security
simultaneously executes a high barricade.
5
6
7
NOTE: If a threat is detected, the team must decide whether to hold,
advance, or change routes based on METT-TC. The rear security
may be a support team member.
High security signals the No. 1 man to move if no threat is detected. All
team members move with the No. 1 man. The team moves along the side
of the building to a predetermined point.
Entry team members cover windows as they pass. It should not require
coverage beyond a 90 degree angle to the flank.
NOTE: If the threat is detected, the team conducts an immediate
action drill.
The team assumes the predetermined halt position. The last man may turn
to the rear and provide cover, while the overwatch moves to the team.
The overwatch joins the team by moving up to the side of the building in
the same manner as previous team members. When personnel are
available, the overwatch is left in position to reduce the chance of
compromise and provide additional security.
NOTE: The apprehension or are security team may be used as the
overwatch.
•
•
Withdraw. Cover fire, diversion, and concealment techniques are initiated if
necessary. Withdraw only if immediate advance or assault on the threat is impossible.
If the ability to move is lost, use reverse bounding overwatch to maneuver out of the
situation. A situation that might require withdrawal is a substantial number of the
team being wounded or killed. Upon withdrawing, recovery techniques are initiated
with movement to the prearranged rally point.
Seek cover. This is the least desired option during special threat situations. The team
finds cover and initiates suppressive fire, diversion, and concealment techniques. This
should be used as a temporary COA unless overwhelming threat fire is encountered.
The focus should always be to advance/assault or withdraw.
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ANA 3-19.11
Figure 3-1. Movement Adjacent to the Objective.
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GROUND VEHICLES
3-17. Depending on METT-TC and the location of the objective, ground vehicles may be the
best method of movement. Whether stacking inside a van or riding on top of a platform
vehicle, surprise, speed, and aggressive actions (SSA) must be maintained throughout the
movement. Vehicle selection is based on the type of mission.
• Covert mission. It requires a vehicle that blends into the surroundings, sometimes for
an extended period of time. For example, a moving van, a passenger van, or a large
crate on the back of a flatbed truck can be used.
• Overt mission. It allows a greater selection of vehicles. Carefully consider the size
and weight of the vehicle and the cargo requirements. The terrain will determine
movement constraints. For example, a high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle
(HMMWV) works well in most operations; however, it is difficult to maneuver in
urban environments.
3-18. When selecting a vehicle for movement, consider the following characteristics:
• Is large enough to hold personnel and equipment comfortably.
• Can be easily exited.
• Has minimal window exposure.
• Is in good working order.
• Can sustain small-arms fire and continue to operate.
• Is highly maneuverable (four-wheel drive).
• Has a non-slip floor and a step-down bumper.
• Provides ballistic protection.
PLATFORM VEHICLES
3-19. A platform vehicle provides immediate access to entry points above ground level.
Personnel may ride on the top, on running boards, in a secure rear position, inside, or
anywhere easy access to the top is available. The height of the vehicle or the attached ladder
allows easy access to entry points on second and third floors. Platform vehicles eliminate the
need to carry and set up ladders, increasing the team’s response time. During an assault,
position the vehicle with the top of the ladder wedged against the objective’s exterior wall or
ledge. Be careful not to damage, overextend, or collapse the ladder by over positioning.
Entry-team members simply move up the ladder to the entry point (see Figure 3-2).
WARNING
Carefully secure ladders to the vehicle to prevent horizontal or lateral shifting. Never
allow personnel to ride on the ladder while the vehicle is moving.
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ANA 3-19.11
Figure 3-2. SRT Entering an Objective from a Platform Vehicle.
3-20. An improvised platform can be made by placing a 6 meter steel ladder through the gun
turret of a HMMWV. Adjust the top angle of the ladder by sliding its base forward or
rearward on the floor of the vehicle, and secure the ladder to the vehicle with heavy-duty
chains and snap links (see Figure 3-3). Manufactured vehicle ladders are available through
commercial vendors, and steel ladders can be coordinated through fire departments.
Figure 3-3. Ladder secured to a platform vehicle.
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ANA 3-19.11
3-21. Vehicles must be prepared so that minimum obstacles are encountered and maximum
speed is gained during deployment. Basic preparation includes—
• Removing unnecessary equipment and passenger seats.
• Removing the rear cargo door on a HMMWV for easier access and ascent.
• Concealing the passenger/cargo area with tinting, curtains, spray paint, or cardboard.
• Installing non slip floor covering.
• Installing bench seats along the left and right walls.
• Installing hand rails/grips along the interior ceiling.
• Using improvised armor (body armor, ballistic blankets, ballistic shields) when
armored vehicles are unavailable or infeasible.
3-22. Personnel must be positioned in or on the vehicle in a way that allows smooth, safe
dismounts. Consider the following:
• Where is the weapon’s muzzle control (toward the floor or roof, depending on the
vehicle)?
• Who exits first (order of dismount)?
• Are ladders properly prepared?
• What equipment is necessary, and where is it being transported?
• What procedures will be used if a team member is injured during the dismount?
• What emergency actions will be taken in case of an accident?
• Have you rehearsed?
ALTERNATE METHODS OF MOVEMENT
3-23. There may be times when an SRT has to use alternate methods of movement to the
objective. Once at the objective, other methods may be required to gain entry.
HELICOPTERS
3-24. Helicopters are primarily used to move the SRT to an area near the objective, and they
must be augmented with exceptional diversion or cover fire. During the assault, non
threatening aircraft may be employed within sight of the threat in an attempt to divert
attention and mask the actual insertion of the SRT. Always assume that the team will be
compromised. Helicopters are a prime target and tend to attract attention in the form of
hostile fire. For these reasons, inserting the entry team by helicopter should be carefully
considered. The advantages of using a helicopter are speed, the ability to bypass unfriendly
areas, the reduction of the threat’s reaction time, and the element of surprise. The use of
helicopters also presents several significant disadvantages, such as aircraft availability,
aircraft vulnerability, and team vulnerability when descending from the aircraft.
RUSE
3-25. There are no special steps required when executing a ruse movement. It is normally
used when covert movement is necessary. A ruse can be used with all movement methods
to—
• Approach the objective in unfriendly areas when the risk of compromise exists.
45
ANA 3-19.11
•
Distract the threat or draw its attention away from the approach or entry point.
3-26. A ruse may also be used when entry points are barricaded or other types of entry are
infeasible. Use your imagination, and design the ruse so that it is natural to the environment.
The incorrect use of a ruse or diversion may alert the threat instead of divert it. Examples of a
ruse/diversion are—
• Maintenance workers in the area.
• A mock traffic stop or an accident with marked patrol response.
• Aircraft in the area.
• Explosions.
ASCENDING AND DESCENDING
3-27. The following ascending methods may be necessary during an assault. Do not assume
that structural features will provide an adequate means of ascending, so have an alternate
plan ready.
• Team lift.
• Ladder.
• Rope with a grappling hook.
• Rooftop to rooftop.
• Platform vehicle (see paragraph 3-19).
• Fast Rope Insertion and Extraction System (FRIES).
Team Lift
3-28. A team lift may be necessary to lift a team member from ground level to the entry
point, and it may be the most expeditious means available.
Ladder
3-29. Ladders are used by entry- and M/O-team members and are necessary during buildingclearing (BC) operations. They are lightweight, simple to use, readily available, and often the
best option when ascending or descending a structure. Various fixed and adjustable ladders
should be maintained by the SRT to increase BC options. Ladders must be camouflaged, and
noisy parts must be taped or removed. To ensure the mission’s success, consider the type of
soil and ground cover where the ladder will be used. A dedicated entry-team member (ladder
man) is responsible for securing the ladder to the structure during ascending or descending
operations. Two types of ladders are available to the SRT.
• Commercial. They are available in a variety of lengths, shapes, and configurations.
The types of commercial ladders include fixed length, extension, telescopic, and
folding; each has advantages and disadvantages. Ladders are made of steel,
aluminum, plastic, or wood. Teams should gather a wide assortment of ladders for BC
operations. The local fire department is a valuable resource when researching the
various types of ladders needed for the team.
• Improvised. They are only limited by the team’s imagination and the availability of
material. They can be made of PVC pipe, stacked milk crates, holes cut into a
plywood board, or rungs nailed between squared pieces of wood.
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ANA 3-19.11
3-30. The following are characteristics of a good ladder:
• Steel (when used with a platform vehicle).
• Lightweight (for easy carrying).
• Wide rungs (for stability and ease in climbing).
• Nonslip surface.
• Easy to use.
3-31. Consider the following when choosing a ladder:
• What is the greatest height the team may have to reach, based on the typical structure
in the team’s area of responsibility?
• Will two or three team members need to climb the ladder simultaneously?
• How far and over what terrain and obstacles will the ladder have to be carried?
• How many team members will be needed to transport, set up, and secure the
structure?
• What is the maximum weight each team member is able to carry?
Rope With a Grappling Hook
3-32. Although the concept of a toggle rope and a grappling hook is good, its practicality is
limited to the height of the objective, the weight of the equipment, the strength and, or
fatigue of entry-team members, the availability of a solid and secure anchor point, and the
noise level created when setting the hook and climbing the rope. A toggle rope is nothing
more than a rope with overhand knots placed every 30 centimeters to assist in climbing. The
grappling hook should be rated to carry loads heavier than the heaviest team member using it
and the equipment carried by him. A minimum of three biting hooks on the grappling hook
are required, but five are preferred. The grappling hook can be made or purchased, and there
are many designs available. Some are collapsible for carrying in a cargo pocket; however,
they are not designed to bear the weight of personnel. Projectile grappling hooks are
available on the commercial market.
Rooftop to Rooftop
3-33. The rooftop-to-rooftop movement method can be one of the simplest to ascend or
descend a structure. When considering it, closely examine the integrity of the rooftops that
must be crossed to reach the objective. Ensure that silhouette exposure of the team is limited.
3-34. The methods used to descend an objective are the same as those used to ascend. An
additional method of descent is rappelling. Traditional rappelling is used to descend a
structure for tactical and/or rescue missions. Although rarely used, rappelling should be
incorporated into the training schedule at least twice a year. Fast ropes can be used to
infiltrate on or near an objective, and it is much faster than traditional rappelling.
BARRIERS
3-35. Special threat missions normally follow a general sequence—infiltration, movement,
engagement, and withdrawal. From infiltration to withdrawal, the SRT will encounter a
variety of barriers that must be defeated before engaging the threat. A barrier is a structure
(fence, wall) that bars passage. It may also be something that hinders or restricts movement,
such as barbed-tape concertina (BTC), barbed-wire concertina (BWC), or a general-purpose,
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ANA 3-19.11
barbed-tape obstacle (GPBTO). See Appendix A for information pertaining to barrier
penetration.
3-36. Force is the action directed to defeat a barrier system with SSA. Stealth is the action
directed to defeat a barrier system by avoiding or inactivating the element in an attempt to
prevent detection. A combination of force and stealth is needed to defeat a barrier system.
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Chapter 4
Building Entry
The critical phases of BC operations are entering the primary entry point and entering
subsequent entry points. They are the first points of physical contact with the objective.
Whether using a deliberate or dynamic method, failure to penetrate the objective effectively
may result in mission failure. Careful planning and execution minimize the risks and dangers
associated with building entry and multiply the chance that the entry will succeed. Efforts to
contain, stabilize, and negotiate are critical to resolve the situation; assault is the last option.
For a detailed discussion about penetrating doors and windows, see Appendix A. Appendix B
contains a sample breacher’s brief, and Appendix G provides information on IEDs and booby
traps.
ENTRY FUNDAMENTALS
4-1. Plan to breach a primary and an alternate entry point. This increases the chance of
successful penetration and multiplies the effects of SSA. When entering at ground level with
a small clearing team, enter at the end of the building, not the middle. This limits possible
threats to the front. Entering the building in the middle causes the team to split up to clear
separate areas. When entering at ground level with a large clearing team, a middle assault
(working outward) may be the best option. When possible, enter at the top level to—
• Enhance the element of surprise.
• Maximize high-ground tactical angles.
• Decrease the possibility of encountering booby traps.
• Minimize team members’ physical stress by working with gravity.
• Drive the threat down and out of the objective.
4-2. A threat forced to the top of a building may become cornered, feel trapped, and cause
physical harm to hostages, SRT members, or himself out of desperation. When feasible, give
the threat the option of fight or flight. A threat forced to ground level may try to escape and
become vulnerable to SRT marksmen or be captured by inner-security personnel. When an
upper level assault is impossible, then consider assaulting from ground level or underneath
the ground.
Team members must—
• Avoid casting shadows. Shadows can alert the threat to the SRT’s presence.
• Avoid being silhouetted. Move away from fatal funnels and other backlit situations.
• Avoid entering an area without a ready weapon and handheld lights.
• Apply BC fundamentals at all times.
4-3. The fundamentals that apply to BC entry operations are—
• Be mentally prepared.
• Move without detection.
• Control the distance.
• Dominate the area.
• Eliminate the threat.
• Control the situation and personnel.
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ANA 3-19.11
•
•
•
•
Search the area.
Search apprehended, injured, and dead personnel.
Mark rooms.
Evacuate personnel and equipment.
PLANNING AND ENTRY CONSIDERATIONS
4-4. During the planning phase, SRT tactical planners must—
• Determine the number of personnel required for the mission.
• Determine the number, type, and size of rooms/areas to be cleared.
• Select the method of entry and clearing.
• Select clearing techniques (see Chapter 5 for further discussion).
4-5. When preparing to enter a building—
• Determine what entry points the threat anticipates the team to use.
• Determine the anticipated reaction by the threat to the entry.
• Consider what effect lighting or the lack of lighting has on the team.
• Be aware of the environment.
• Determine what equipment is necessary at the entry point to effect the breach.
ACTIONS OUTSIDE THE ENTRY POINT
4-6. Door positions and individual weapon positions are important. Entry team members
should stand as close to the entry point as possible and be ready to enter. The following
actions must be taken:
• Select a position.
• Determine the entry formation (stack or stage).
• Assume the position.
• Perform C2 procedures (countdown).
Select a Position
4-7. Team members select a position based on the characteristics of the entry point. They
must train to recognize the characteristics of various entry points immediately and set up to
provide maximum security and a smooth entry (the path of least resistance). Team members
set up on the door based on its characteristics. Hinged and swinging doors open inward or
outward (Figure 4-1).
• Inward-opening doors. Team members who are lined up on the hinged side have the
first view and the easiest access.
• Outward-opening doors. Team members position themselves on the doorknob side
to prevent having to deal with the door. Outward opening doors provide easy access
to typical locks and doorknobs, minimize obstacles, and maximize speed.
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Figure 4-1. Position Selection
Determine the Entry Formation
4-8. After selecting a position and before entering, the team stacks or stages at the entry point
(Figure 4-2). The intervals and the weapon orientation during stacking and staging may be
changed in response to nearby windows or other potential threat areas. The direction that the
door opens, the position of the door in relation to exterior and interior architectural
characteristics, and the available cover and concealment dictate which technique to use.
Figure 4-2. Entry Formation
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ANA 3-19.11
•
Stacking. Line up on the side that provides the least path of resistance. Table 4-1
shows stacking actions without the use of a ballistic shield. Any team member may be
in any position. If a shield is used, the No. 1 man carries it. Additional personnel
stage with similar actions.
Team Member
No. 1 Man
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
No. 2 Man.
No. 3 Man.
No. 4 Man.
No. 5 Man, if
used.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Table 4-1. Stacking Responsibilities
Actions
Is the first man positioned at the entry point.
Covers the entry point.
Signals when ready. May use one of two signals.
Gives thumbs up.
Raises and lowers his gun muzzle three times, while keeping the
stock to his shoulder.
Waits for the ready squeeze.
Indicates the direction of movement by hand and arm signals or
muzzle direction.
Closes in tight to the No. 1 Man.
Covers his area of responsibility or orients his weapon in the
direction of movement to ensure rapid area coverage (opposite of
No. 1 Man).
Signals the No. 3 man.
Waits for the ready squeeze.
Closes in tight with No. 2 Man.
Covers is area of responsibility or orients his weapon to the
opposite side of the No. 2 Man to expedite movement in the
opposite direction.
Signals the No. 4 Man.
Waits for the ready squeeze.
Closes in tight to No. 3 Man.
Covers is area of responsibility or orients his weapon to the
opposite side of the No. 3 Man to expedite movement in the
opposite direction.
Signals the No. 5 Man.
Waits for the ready squeeze.
Closes in tight to No. 4 Man.
Covers his area of responsibility or orients his weapon to the
opposite side of the No. 4 Man to expedite movement in the
opposite direction.
Initiates the ready squeeze to indicate team readiness and initiate
entry.
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•
Staging. All actions are identical to those for stacking, except the team is divided into
two elements that are positioned on each side of the entry point. The number of
personnel positioned left or right of the entry point is determined by—
The team’s size and needs.
The position of the entry point.
Cover and concealment issues.
Assume the Position
4-9. Keep in mind that a threat may come from any angle, and each team member must be
prepared to meet and defeat it. A simple thing such as foot or muzzle position may reveal
your location to the threat. Your body must be positioned correctly to avoid compromise and
facilitate SSA (Table 4-2). Make intelligent body-position decisions, always be aware of
angles, and avoid flagging.
Item
Head and Eyes
Shoulders
Weapon
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Feet
•
Stance
•
•
Body
•
•
Mind
•
•
Equipment
•
•
•
Table 4-2. Body Position Awareness
Actions
Align with threat and, or AO.
Keep your eyes on the entry point at all time.
Align with head and eyes, maximizing body armor protection.
KEEP OFF THE WALL.
Cover the entry point at the “close in ready” or “low ready”
position. The No. 2 Man may be at the high ready position.
Keep your finger off the trigger.
Direct the gun muzzle to indicate the direction of movement or
align it with the threat and, or AO.
Position your foot that is closest to the wall as close as possible to
the door opening to expedite entry. Trail with the other foot.
Ensure that your foot position facilitates SSA.
Keep your feet a comfortable distance apart and your knees
slightly bent.
Ensure that you have a stable base.
Keep your weight slightly forward, and maintain a crouched
position.
DO NOT get off balance.
Ask yourself the following questions:
Is this a safe entry point?
Is there sufficient manpower (2 men per room, 3 men per
threat)?
Will the team’s position be compromised? If so, create a
diversion or use another entry point.
Trust your senses (look, listen, smell, feel).
Minimize the amount of equipment to reduce noise/bulk.
Ensure you have proper weapons/equipment for entry.
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ANA 3-19.11
Perform Command and Control Procedures
4-10. After the entry-point preparation is complete and before entry, C2 is turned over to the
SRT officer in charge (OIC). He confirms the status of all SRT elements and begins a fivesecond countdown. The SRT OIC is then given control of the team’s synchronization
countdown. He states to the SRT elements, “I have control. Standby.” A short pause is given
between each transmission to allow SRT elements the opportunity to notify the team of any
gun-down situation (this would stop the countdown). Table 4-3 outlines the actions taken
during countdown.
Count
5
4
3
2
1
Table 4-3. Countdown Actions.
Actions
All SRT elements are prepared and standing by.
The M/O eliminates the threat.
Entry points are breached.
The secondary diversion is initiated (distraction devices).
The entry team assaults the objective.
DOORS
4-11. The door-entry techniques discussed in the following paragraphs may be applied to
interior and exterior doors. The characteristics, material, and mechanical makeup of a door
dictate the breaching method and the equipment used. Once an entry point is selected, the
team must gain a dominant position immediately. Team members must also be prepared for
the situation to change.
4-12. The team obtains and maintains 360-degree security, including items above (ceiling
tiles, windows, attics) and below (crawl spaces, trap doors). Security must be established
outside and inside the entry point. At least two team members must be used to gain access;
however, a 3- or 4-man team is preferred.
4-13. Stay on your feet and always be prepared to move. Avoid reaching across the entry
point because it often exposes the weakest portion of your body armor. Be aware that the
threat may have already decided to shoot the first person through the door. Your chances of a
successful entry are increased if you use your head and remember to shoot, move, and
communicate.
4-14. The entry point must be controlled at all times. Pin doors completely open upon entry,
and clear behind them before moving on. During deliberate operations, consider closing
exterior entry points to reduce ambient light, noise, and temperature changes.
DOOR-ENTRY TECHNIQUES
4-15. One of the following door-entry techniques must be executed before establishing a
dominant position: crisscross, buttonhook, combination, or limited penetration.
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Crisscross
4-16. When using the crisscross technique (Figure 4-3), a team member may be able to see
his dominant position from the opposite door jamb. When two team members use this
method, they must decide who will enter the room first, based on the room layout and which
side of the door is hinged.
Figure 4-3. Crisscross Entry
Buttonhook
4-17. With the buttonhook technique (Figure 4-4), the area of responsibility is not visible
until entry. This technique allows simultaneous entry of two men through a large door.
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Figure 4-4. Buttonhook Entry
Combination
4-18. A combination of buttonhook and crisscross techniques (Figure 4-5) is used to establish
a split-team entry technique. The No. 1 man may elect to move to a crisscross position based
on the perceived threat or obstacle, while the No. 2 man does the opposite. For example, if
the No. 1 man goes left, the No. 2 man goes right to effect a split-team entry. If a mistake is
made, team members fill the gap.
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Figure 4-5. Combination Entry
Limited Penetration
4-19. Limited penetration (Figure 4-6) is used to barricade at the entry point when—
• There is not enough room to execute a crisscross or buttonhook entry.
• There is no chance that team members will be confronted by a threat from the flanks
inside the entry point (pantry, closet, or similar area).
DOMINANT POSITIONS
4-20. There are three dominant positions—same side, split team, and opposing corners. They
are established upon exiting the fatal funnel and entering the uncleared area. When possible,
entry positions are selected during planning. Factors influencing the selection of dominant
positions include—
• The number of occupants.
• The size of the room.
• The amount of room clutter (furniture, debris).
• The presence of connecting rooms.
• The necessary fields of fire.
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Figure 4-6. Limited Penetration
4-21. Select the position that gives maximum security and allows coverage of sectors of fire
without having to know where other team members are positioned. Because there is no
margin for error in establishing dominant positions, team members must be highly trained to
become proficient.
4-22. Team members must feel confident about performing these tactics, so their feelings of
vulnerability must be addressed. The first reaction when confronted by danger is fight or
flight. Flight is an unacceptable reaction; team members must stand and fight. They protect
themselves first; then protect other team members, hostages, and innocent bystanders; and
finally, protect the threat. Feelings of vulnerability can be alleviated to a great extent by
understanding the following:
• Team members initially feel vulnerable from 360 degrees.
• Forward movement, clearing while moving, and protection from follow-on team
members reduces vulnerability to 180 degrees.
• Maneuvering along walls reduces vulnerability to 90 degrees.
• Clearing with a 2-man team reduces vulnerability to 45 degrees.
• Clearing with a 4-man team reduces vulnerability to 22.5 degrees.
Same Side
4-23. During same-side entry (Figure 4-7), team members initially position themselves on
the same side of the room. This may be necessary due to a small area that restricts movement
or the close proximity of adjoining rooms. This is the least preferred dominant position.
There is less angle coverage, and team members are a larger target for the threat to engage.
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Figure 4-7. Same Side Entry
Split Team
4-24. During split-team entry (Figure 4-8), team members initially position themselves on
opposite sides of the entry point, on the same wall. This is the preferred position because it
provides better angles and a greater view of the room. In addition—
• The threat is at a disadvantage because he must decide which targets to engage.
• Security and an effective shooting platform can be established quickly.
• The chance of team members exposing themselves to unseen areas and/or threats is
minimized.
Figure 4-8. Split-Team Entry
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Opposing Corners
4-25. During opposing-corners entry (Figure 4-9), team members execute entry and position
themselves in opposite corners of the room. This position—
• Provides a good view of tactical angles.
• Puts the threat at a disadvantage.
• Provides a good perspective of the room layout and eliminates dead space.
• Increases the chance of survivability if one team member activates an IED or a booby
trap.
• Requires more time for team members to get into position.
• Is very effective in small- to medium-size rooms.
Figure 4-9. Opposing-Corners Entry.
METHODS OF ENTRY
4-26. There are three different methods used to enter a building. They are deliberate,
dynamic, and ruse.
DELIBERATE ENTRY
4-27. The deliberate-entry method is used in friendly environments where the threat does not
have sympathizers in the area to alert or assist him. This method is also known as the stealth
or covert method. It is very effective when entering a large structure, particularly when the
location of hostages and threats is unknown and the size of the entry team is limited. All
movement is controlled—every step, all the time. The characteristics of the door determine
the entry equipment necessary (Table 4-4). Deliberate entries must be planned for well in
advance.
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Preparing a Door for Deliberate Entry
4-28. Once the team is in place outside the entry point, the breacher must prepare the door for
entry (Table 4-5, page 4-12). He must do this quickly and proficiently because the team is
vulnerable to gun fire from the threat if discovered.
Equipment
Door optic
viewer and, or
mirror
Door stop or
wedge
Tie off (rope)
Keys (if
available)
Flex cuffs
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Table 4-4. Tools for Deliberate Entry
Uses
To survey the room for a threat. The situation and circumstances dictate
its use.
To block the door and to prevent it from opening or closing.
To open the door from a distance, prevent it from opening or control it
after it is opened. It is slipped over a door know or a push bar.
To unlock a door. Use a master key when possible. It can be left in the
lock or retained for future use. This is the best entry tool.
To check for a secondary locking mechanism or a booby trap.
Table 4-5. Door Preparation for Deliberate Entry
Actions
Position team members in a stage or stack formation to adequately cover
all potential threat observation or engagement points surrounding the
entry point.
Prepare the breach point by• Holstering your weapon and preparing equipment.
• Moving the door.
• Inspecting the door for hazards (IEDs, booby-traps).
Call for diversion.
Check the door and the room if possibly by using an under-the-door
viewer. Maintain interior observation during the entire preparation
process.
Determine the swing of the door and install the primary control device to
prevent uncontrolled opening by the threat.
Prepare and install a secondary control device to assist in opening the
door.
Determine if the door is locked. Insert a key if needed and use a master
key when possible.
NOTE: carry only necessary keys and use silencing techniques when
multiple keys are carried.
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Step
8
Table 4-5. Door Preparation for Deliberate Entry (continued).
Actions
Unlock the door quietly, reposition control devices and open the door
about 1 centimeter.
NOTES:
9
10
11
12
1. Be aware that ambient light, noise, temperature, and pressure
changes will occur inside the objective immediately upon
opening the door.
2. Apply a lubricant to exterior hinges and locking mechanisms
before opening them to reduce noise.
Check for secondary locking mechanisms and booby traps. A flex cuff or
another narrow, flexible device will work.
Open the door about 2 inches and conduct a blind side recon of the area
Inside the entry point with under the door viewers when available.
Mirrors are awkward to use and are useless without a source of internal
light, but they may be helpful.
Recover necessary equipment.
Signal the team that door preparations are complete.
Immediate Threat
4-29. Expect to encounter an immediate threat upon entry into the objective. The first man
normally determines if an immediate threat exists, and he alerts the team if any potential
threat has been ignored. Team members must move to their dominant positions. The
engagement of the perceived immediate threat cannot slow the entry team. Do not change
plans in midstream. When outside the entry point, the No. 1 man indicates the direction of
movement. Every effort must be made to stick to the plan, even if an immediate threat is
encountered.
Door Entry
4-30. After door preparation is complete, the entry point is ready. Door-entry methods are the
same for exterior and interior doors whether using a deliberate or dynamic method of door
preparation. The breacher uses a prearranged signal to indicate that preparations are
complete. Team members must be positioned and prepared to enter as quickly and smoothly
as possible. A C2 countdown is requested.
4-31. Remember, the doorway is the anticipated entry point for those who may be waiting in
the room. If there is any indication that the team has been compromised, go to the alternate
entry point or execute a diversion in combination with a dynamic-entry technique. Move
quickly when entering to reduce the chance of being fired on, but move slow enough to fire
accurately. Upon entering the objective, each member must establish a dominant position,
observe and scan tactical angles, and establish overlapping sectors of fire. Doorways are
typically positioned as center, corner, or offset.
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4-32. Center-Door Entry. Responsibilities for each team member when executing a centerdoor entry (Figure 4-10) for a small to medium room are outlined in Table 4-6. The center of
the room is determined by the center of the wall opposite the entry point.
Figure 4-10. Center Door Entry
Table 4-6. Procedures for Center Door Entry.
Team Member
Actions
NOTE: Team members must penetrate deep enough into the room to clear the entire
sector and effectively dominate the room, but not so far as to expose themselves to
adjoining, uncleared areas.
No. 1 Man
• Enter the room after selecting the direction of movement.
• Engage the immediate threat.
• Keep uncleared areas of the room to your front.
• Establish a dominant position, clearing your corner and the
door.
• Stay at the first corner encountered to execute a split-team
entry, or move to the second corner to execute an opposing
corners entry (This should be pre-arranged). Shift your sector of
fire along the wall. As you move along the wall, collapse your
sector of fire back within 1 meter of the No. 2 Man.
• Direct your weapon and attention toward the necessary sector of
fire.
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Table 4-6. Procedures for Center Door Entry (continued).
Team Member
Actions
No. 2 man
• Enter the room immediately behind the No. 1 Man and move in
the opposite direction.
• Engage the immediate threat.
• Establish a dominant position, clearing your corner and the
door.
• Stay at the first corner encountered, or move to the second
corner if necessary (this should be signaled if the No. 1 man
cannot move to his second corner).
• Collapse your sector of fire back toward the No. 1 man (within
1 meter).
• Extend your sector of fire to within 1 meter of the No 1. man.
No. 3 man
• Enter the room behind the No. 3 man.
• Move in the opposite direction of the No. 3 man.
• Follow the path of the No. 2 man.
• Move far enough into the room to clear the fatal funnel.
• Establish a sector of fire between the No. 1 and No. 2 man,
toward the center of the room. You may take a flank security
position on the No. 1 man.
No. 4 man
No. 5 man, if used.
NOTE: If there are any living, wounded, or dead threats who are
not covered by fire, they become the No. 3 man’s responsibility.
• Enter the room behind the No. 3 man.
• Move in the opposite direction of the No. 3 man.
• Follow the path of the No. 2 man.
• Move far enough into the room to clear the fatal funnel.
• Establish a sector of fire between the No. 1 and 2 men, toward
the center of the room. You may take a flank security position
on the No 1 or No 2 man.
NOTE: This move causes the No. 3 and 4 men’s sector of fire to
overlap.
• Enter exterior breach points, large rooms, and hallways.
• Enter and move to a position out of the fatal funnel, center of
the left and right teams.
• Close the door (If conducting a deliberate entry).
• Maintain rear and, or forward security.
NOTE: If the No. 5 man carries a ballistic shield, he assumes the
No. 1 man’s position.
NOTE: Do not neglect any area of the room during the initial clearing.
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4-33. When the threat has been eliminated and control has been established, the team is ready
for the next action. The situation and the mission dictate if the team maintains security of the
objective, continues clearing, or evacuates. This technique is very effective on small to
medium rooms without connecting rooms. To avoid danger areas when connecting rooms are
present, team members must not penetrate deeply. During deliberate entry, the last man in
must close the door behind the team to eliminate ambient light, noise, and temperature
changes.
4-34. Corner- or Offset-Door Entry. Most rooms have doors that are in a corner or at an
offset. Corner doors occupy less floor space in a room than offset or center doors.
Responsibilities for each team member when executing corner- or offset-door entry (Figure
4-11) are outlined in Table 4-7.
4-35. Most room layouts contain center and corner doors. If you encounter a room that does
not fall in this category, you can still clear the room effectively if you follow the principles
and fundamentals of room clearing and the specific actions that have been described.
Figure 4-11. Corner- or Offset Door Entry
Table 4-7. Procedures for Corner- or Offset Door Entry.
Team Members
Actions
NOTE: Team members must penetrate deep enough into the room to clear the entire
sector and effectively dominate the room, but not far enough to expose themselves to
adjoining uncleared areas.
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Table 4-7. Procedures for Corner- or Offset Door Entry (continued).
Team Members
Actions
No. 1 man
• Select a direction of movement and enter the room.
• Move along the path of least resistance.
• Engage the immediate threat.
• Keep uncleared areas of the room to your front.
• Establish a dominant position, clearing your corner and the
door.
• Stay at the first corner encountered to execute a split-team
entry, or move to the second corner to execute an opposing
corners entry (This should be pre-arranged). Shift your sector
of fire along the wall and collapse your sector of fire while
moving to the second corner (executing an opposing corners
entry).
• Occupy the second corner as your final dominant position.
• Collapse your final sector of fire within 1 meter of the No. 2
man.
No. 2 man
• Enter the room immediately behind the No. 1 man.
• Move in the opposite direction of the No. 1 man.
• Engage the immediate threat.
• Move to your dominant position.
• Stay at the first corner encountered, or move to the second
corner if necessary (This should be signaled if the No. 1 man
cannot move to his second corner).
• Collapse your sector of fire within 1 meter of the No. 1 man.
Your dominant position is the corner opposite the one
occupied by the No. 1 man (opposing corner method).
No. 3 man
• Enter the room behind the No. 2 man.
• Move in the opposite direction of the No. 2 man.
• Follow the path of the No. 1 man.
• Establish a sector of fire between the No. 1 and No. 2 men,
toward the center of the room. You may take a flank security
position on the No. 1 man.
No. 4 man
NOTE: If there are any living, wounded, or dead threats who are
not covered by fire, they become the No. 3 man’s responsibility.
• Enter the room behind the No. 3 man.
• Move in the opposite direction of the No. 3 man.
• Follow the path of the No. 2 man.
• Establish a sector of fire between the No. 1 and No. 2 men,
toward the center of the room. You may take a flank security
position on the No. 1 or 2 man.
NOTE: This move causes No 3 and 4 men’s sector of fire to
overlap.
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Sectors of Fire
4-36. To make BC techniques work, each team member must know his sector of fire and
know how his sector overlaps and links with the sectors of other team members (Figure 412). Team members engage targets as they move to their dominant positions; they do not
move to their dominant positions and then engage targets. The engagements must not slow
the movement to dominant positions. Each clearing-team member has a designated sector of
fire (Table 4-8) that is unique to him initially, but it expands to overlap sectors of the other
team members.
Figure 4-12. Sectors of Fire.
Team Member
No. 1 and 2 men
No. 3 and 4 men
Table 4-8. Designated Sectors of Fire.
Actions
Be initially concerned with the area along the wall on either side of
the door or entry point. This area is the path of movement, and it is
the primary sector of fire. The alternate sector of fire is the wall that
you are moving toward, sweeping back to the far corner.
Start at the center of the wall, opposite the point of entry, and sweep
to the left if moving toward the left or to the right if moving toward
the right.
Stop within 1 meter of your respective team member (No. 1 or 2
man).
4-37. While team members move toward their dominant positions, they engage all targets in
their sectors. They must—
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ANA 3-19.11
•
•
•
•
Exercise fire control and discriminate between hostile and noncombatant occupants of
the room.
Fire without stopping-using reflexive firing techniques.
Move at a careful hurry.
Avoid rushing in with total disregard for obstacles.
Entering With a Ballistic Shield
4-38. When employing a ballistic shield, the previously mentioned techniques may be used.
Overall, tactics are the same as maneuvering without a shield. The only difference is that the
shield is placed forward of the team for ballistic protection. Entry with a shield can be
executed during deliberate or dynamic operations.
4-39. Any team member may carry a ballistic shield, and it can be handed over to another
team member if necessary. When possible, use forward and rear security. (The last team
member in the maneuvering formation is the rear security.) Never allow the forward security
to enter alone. The limited penetration dominant position is never used after the forward
security has executed entry.
4-40. Using 3-inch convex mirrors fastened to the inside surface (left and right) of the
ballistic shield enhances team communication between the forward security and following
team members. Other shield formations are shown and described in Figures 4-13, 4-14, and
4-15.
DYNAMIC ENTRY
Dynamic entry is virtually the same as deliberate entry. Its distinguishing characteristics are
speed and the method of breaching. A careful hurry best describes the speed of dynamic
entry. The use of various tools and techniques is often required to gain quick access into a
structure using field-expedient breaching. Dynamic entry may be used during any mission
that requires immediate access into the objective (barricade situations, raids). For a more
detailed discussion on dynamic-entry techniques, see Chapter 5.
RUSE ENTRY
4-41. Ruse entry is the use of a non threatening diversion to gain access to a structure or an
objective, such as a team member acting as a delivery or maintenance man. It is effective and
safe when well-planned and rehearsed. A ruse is not recommended in a barricaded hostage
situation, but it may work in a drug raid. The momentum of the clearing operation must be
maintained. Ruse personnel rejoin the team and continue actions until the mission is
complete.
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Figure 4-13. Single Shield Entry.
Step
1
2
3
4
Figure 4-14. Alternate Single Shield Entry.
Actions
The first team member enters with a shield.
The shield is carried forward of the entry point, far enough into the room to
allow remaining team members complete access.
Remaining team members establish dominant positions.
All team members establish and collapse sectors of fire.
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Figure 4-14. Alternate Single Shield Entry (continued).
Figure 4-15. Double Shield Entry.
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BREACHING
4-42. All SRT members are responsible for conducting deliberate and dynamic breaching
duties. Team members must be highly trained in the various breaching techniques. Improper
breaching denies access to the objective; prevents mission success; and may injure team
members, hostages, or threats. The mission of the breacher is to recognize, analyze, and
breach.
• Recognize. The breacher must identify potential entry points and danger areas.
• Analyze. The breacher must—
Determine which entry points are the best primary and alternate breach points.
Determine the best primary breaching method/technique to use for primary,
alternate, and unknown breach points.
Determine the best secondary breaching method/technique to use for primary,
alternate, and unknown breach points.
• Breach. Breaching provides a positive, safe entry for the SRT.
WINDOWS
4-43. Breaching and entering windows may be necessary if door entry cannot be made.
Detailed information concerning various types of windows, glass, and breaching methods can
be found in Appendix E and Chapter 5. Before conducting a window entry, consider the
following advantages and disadvantages:
• Advantages.
Is an alternate entry method.
May not be expected by the threat.
• Disadvantages.
Lack of speed.
Noise.
Awkward fatal funnel.
Increased risk of injury.
Complex procedure.
Equipment must be passed through the window.
4-44. Most windows require the use of ascending or descending techniques. Common
techniques include team lifts, improvised and commercial ladders, platform vehicles, and
rappelling. See Chapter 3 for further information about these techniques.
WINDOW-ENTRY TECHNIQUES
4-45. Although methods and techniques vary, previously outlined entry fundamentals and
considerations apply. The keys to success are training and rehearsal. The two methods of
window entry are deliberate and dynamic.
• Deliberate. Deliberate window-entry methods require an open or unsecured window,
or the team must be able to unlock the window from the outside. Interior window
coverings often make covert movement impossible. Entry should be made into the
window that is farthest from the threat. Alarms or stinging insects may interfere with
opening a window, or the window may be painted shut.
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•
Dynamic. The ability to breach/break windows during dynamic window entry is
critical. If a window cannot be safely reached or the glass/window frame cannot be
breached, dynamic window entry is not an option.
WINDOW SELECTION
4-46. The ideal window provides a simple, unobstructed entry into the objective. Look for
the following characteristics:
• Is located farthest from the threat’s position.
• Allows a minimum of two ladder teams to enter the same room (preferably, side by
side through the same window or two separate windows).
• Is open or unlocked.
• Is high enough for the tallest man to crouch comfortably while entering.
• Is wide enough for team members to enter without exposing their flanks or catching
their equipment on the window.
• Has sills that are near the ground or interior floor so that team members can step into
dominant positions easily.
• Has minimal obstructions (shades, drapes, tint, bars, mesh).
• Can be reached and breached easily.
• Has stable ground below for footing or ladder placement.
SAFETY
4-47. Team members must be prepared for broken glass and falls from ladders. Shards in the
window frame, on the ground, and on the floor increase the risk of injury during entry.
Teams should carry the minimum amount of equipment to accomplish the mission. Risks can
be reduced by using the proper equipment, which includes—
• Helmet. It offers protection from falling window frames and glass shards sticking out
of frames.
• Gloves. They may not stop glass from cutting your hands, but they help control
bleeding and aid in gripping a weapon.
• Ballistic eye protection, long sleeves, balaclava, and buttoned up collar. They
provide protection from flying glass during breaching.
• Ladders and other ascending equipment. They must be rated to hold three entryteam members and their equipment.
LADDER TEAMS
4-48. A window entry requires a 5-man team with two ladders (minimum). When two ladder
teams are used, they can protect and support each other. Their responsibilities are shown in
Table 4-9.
Team Member
No. 1 man
Table 4-9. Responsibilities of a Ladder Team.
Actions
Be first in line during movement.
Provide forward security for the team.
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Table 4-9. Responsibilities of a Ladder Team (continued).
No. 1 and 2 men
• Help carry and set up the ladder.
• Be the first team members up the ladder.
• Be responsible for Breaching the windows.
Establishing dominant positions.
Maintaining a foothold inside the objective while
remaining team members enter the objective.
No. 3 and 4 men
• Be responsible for Preparing the ladder (set height, implement noise
discipline measures).
Carrying, positioning, and anchoring the ladder.
Handing equipment to team members in the objective.
4-49. When climbing a ladder, team members must maintain their balance while positioning
their body to facilitate SSA. They must keep their body armor presented toward the
anticipated threat. The first team member through the window must be prepared to confront
the immediate threat. Table 4-10 describes the actions each entry-team member must take
after the breach point has been established.
4-50. There is more than one way to enter a window. Each team member has different
strengths and weakness; use what works best for you. Remember, keep your body armor
presented toward the threat, maintain balance, avoid crawling, and always be in control. If
you cannot enter a window using these simple methods, do not enter it.
Steps
1
2
3
4
5
6
Table 4-10. Actions During Window Entry
Actions
Consider placing a window pad on the sill if executing breaching
techniques.
Holster your weapon under the cover of another team member if
entering a window with a high sill.
NOTE: Holstering is not necessary when entering a window with a
low sill or where balance is easily maintained.
Position your feet on the ladder rungs so that the windowsill is at waist
level.
Position your hands on the left or right side of the windowsill (watch
for broken glass).
Step through the window opening with one foot, maintain a stable and
balanced position and step through with the other foot.
Insert your head through the window opening while sliding forward,
raise your head and present your body armor to the threat.
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ENTRY
4-51. Enter a window from the ground level if possible. A secure foot position is critical. If a
window assault is necessary at an upper level, using a platform vehicle is recommended (see
Chapter 3). When a platform vehicle is unavailable, position the ladder as described in Table
4-11, page 4-24, and illustrated in Figures 4-16 through 4-21, pages 4-25 and 4-26.
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Table 4-11. Positioning a Ladder for entry.
Actions
Two ladder teams approach, using building clearing (BC) principles of SSA.
They leave from the closest, last covered and concealed position possible and
move under cover of the M/O.
The order of march is as follows:
• No. 1 Man: Covers and assesses the entry point, with or without a
ballistic shield.
• No. 2 Man: Carries the first ladder and covers the No. 1 Man.
• No. 3 Man: Carries the first ladder (weapons are holstered and slung).
• No. 4 Man: Carries the second ladder and covers the No. 3 man.
• No. 5 Man: carries the second ladder (weapons are holstered and
slung).
The No. 1 man posts on the far side of the window, about one arms length
from where the ladder is to be anchored. He provides security toward entry
points (Figure 4-16).
M/O teams provide additional fire support.
The No. 2 and 4 men holster their weapons and help No. 3 and 5 men lift the
ladders into the upright position.
The No. 3 and 5 men• Set the ladder bases on stable surfaces.
• Set the tops of the ladders just below the windowsills.
• Apply pressure to the ladders to stabilize them against the exterior wall
and the ground.
The No. 2 and 4 men simultaneously draw their weapons and ascend the
ladders, while the No. 3 and 5 men anchor the ladders.
The team member with the best view into the room makes a quick assessment
of the entry points for a safe, accessible entry (Figure 4-17).
Both team members move into positions to provide cover in the window (sill
should be chest high).
The man with the best view provides cover while the other man holsters his
weapon and initiates a deliberate or dynamic entry.
The No. 4 Man assumes coverage.
The No. 2 Man Holsters his weapon, enters the room, and draws his weapon
(Figure 4-18).
NOTE: Tape or precut dowel can be used to hold window open.
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ANA 3-19.11
Step
9
10
11
12
Table 4-11. Positioning a Ladder for entry (continued).
Actions
The No. 4 Man enters after the No. 2 Man.
Team members on the ground decide which entry point provides the
smoothest, safest entry.
The No. 5 Man enters after the No. 4 Man.
NOTE: Figure 4-19 shows how the No. 5 Man moves from the anchor
position to the ladder.
The No. 1 Man enters after the No. 5 Man (Figure 4-21).
The No. 3 Man secures the ladder for the No. 1 Man.
The No. 3 Man hands the remaining equipment to the No. 1 Man.
The No. 3 Man enters the objective after all equipment is in place (Figure 422)..
Figure 4-16. Approach the Window.
Figure 4-17. Quick Assessment.
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Figure 4-18. No. 2 Man Enters.
Figure 4-19. No. 4 Man Enters.
Figure 4-20. No. 5 Man Enters (if used).
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Figure 4-21. No. 1 Man Enters
Figure 4-22. No. 3 Man Enters
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Chapter 5
Building Clearing
Conducting operations in an urban environment is one of the most difficult types of military
operations. Each building is a barrier or a target, and movement is constrained. When
entering a building, the sectors of fire will change from room to room, confusion will rise,
and the chance of fratricide will increase. The principles and fundamentals of movement,
entry, and clearing must be closely observed. SRT members must conduct BC operations
under hostile conditions. Knowing, rehearsing, and practicing the principles and
fundamentals of BC will prepare soldiers to accomplish the mission. BC operations demand
that soldiers understand and are able to apply tactics, shooting skills, and conditioning. This
chapter concentrates on BC TTP necessary to increase knowledge and decrease risk.
PRINCIPLES
5-1. Proper application of the following BC principles, known as SSA, allows an entry team
to conduct a BC operation:
• Surprise. Surprise is gained through extensive and thorough planning, rehearsing,
and combining of overt and covert actions. The element of surprise ensures that the
entry team has the advantage before room entry, and the goal is to catch the threat
unprepared. Surprise is achieved by deceiving, distracting, or startling the threat.
• Speed. Speed provides a measure of security, and it maximizes the advantages of
surprise. It is not defined by fast movement; it is defined by how fast the threat is
dominated and/or eliminated within the objective. Speed of movement is best
described as a careful hurry—team members move as fast as they can, but as slow as
necessary. They should not move faster than they can accurately engage targets in the
room.
• Aggressive action. Aggressive action is a sudden, explosive force that eliminates the
threat and/or threat options with the least chance of compromise or friendly
casualties. When coupled with speed, aggressive action enables the entry team to
multiply the effects of surprise. This prevents the threat from delivering a coordinated
or planned reaction. Mental and physical attitudes and actions affect how the threat
interprets the team’s aggressiveness. Complete SRT domination must be maintained
throughout a BC operation.
BASIC TACTICAL FUNDAMENTALS
5-2. Basic tactical fundamentals must be ingrained into each team member before BC
operations are attempted. When properly executed, these fundamentals decrease risks,
minimize death, and maximize safety. Team members must never enter a room alone, and the
team must always have a backup or alternate plan. These plans must be rehearsed with every
variable and every possible scenario imaginable. Basic tactical fundamentals include—
• Divert. This is a maneuver that draws or forces the threat’s attention away from the
team. It may disorient, confuse, or create panic.
• Shoot, move, and communicate. All members must maintain weapon discipline and
be fully trained on assigned weapons. Their movements must be instinctive and
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•
facilitate SSA. Communication must follow the SOP and be effective under a variety
of circumstances.
Train as you fight. Training should be as realistic as possible, but leaders should
never compromise safety for realism.
BUILDING-CLEARING TACTICAL FUNDAMENTALS
5-3. The tactical fundamentals of BC are—
• Be mentally prepared.
• Move without detection.
• Control the distance.
• Dominate the area.
• Eliminate the threat.
• Control the situation and personnel.
• Search the area.
• Search apprehended, injured, and dead personnel.
• Mark rooms.
• Evacuate personnel and equipment.
BE MENTALLY PREPARED
5-4. Be mentally prepared for the following physical changes your body will experience as a
result of the fight-or-flight response:
• Increased blood pressure, heart rate, and blood flow to major muscle groups.
• Decreased blood flow to extremities; this makes simple movements and dexterity
almost impossible.
• Visual difficulties in tracking. The ability to focus deteriorates, and the peripheral
field narrows.
5-5. Visualize success performing tasks under various challenging conditions. Fear is normal,
and everyone experiences it. However, do not let it overpower you. Channel it into anger or
aggression, and remain in control. Have confidence in yourself, and fight as you have been
trained.
MOVE WITHOUT DETECTION
5-6. To move without being detected—
• Move tactically and silently.
• Arrive undetected at entry points.
• Be in the correct order.
• Avoid unnecessary movement (foot shuffling, fidgeting).
• Carry minimal equipment to reduce noise and fatigue.
• Secure loose items.
• Assume proper positions, stay off walls, and keep your balance.
CONTROL THE DISTANCE
5-7. Avoid distances closer then 2 meters for a standing threat and 1 meter for a threat on the
ground. Distance allows increased reaction time; increased options for force, cover, and
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negotiation; and increased team members and weapons covering the threat. The lack of
reaction time is a result of the threat being too close. You must be concerned about weapon
retention and the options available. The threat may block the target acquisition of other team
members.
5-8. You can create distance by using obstacles (displace furniture, tie doors open, wedge
doors, set electronic alarms). You may also consider using—
• M/O capabilities (eyes on target, precision shooting).
• Under-the-door viewers or mirrors (blind-side recon techniques).
• Thermal or other night-vision devices (NVDs).
• Lights.
• Nonlethal actions.
DOMINATE THE AREA
5-9. An area is dominated when at least two members of the entry team move to points that
allow total control of the area with proper interlocking fields of fire. Occupying these points
overwhelms the threat (creates a dilemma) and provides different angles of fire to cover
potential dead space. To dominate the area, be aware of your position and surroundings and
scan the area to break tunnel vision. The key to success is to gain and maintain SSA.
ELIMINATE THE THREAT
5-10. The team must use accurate, discriminating fire to effectively eliminate the threat as
quickly as possible. This can be accomplished from their dominant positions or while moving
to their dominant positions. “The battle is not won with the first shot! It is won with the first
accurate shot.” While using minimum force as desired, team members use the following
criteria, known as SEE:
• See the threat.
• Evaluate the threat.
• Eliminate the threat if necessary.
CONTROL THE SITUATION AND PERSONNEL
5-11. The team must maintain total control of the situation and all personnel in the room. The
disorientation, confusion, and panic created in the mind of the threat during the dilemma
must be fully exploited. Always be ready to take charge and communicate clearly. Once
control is lost, it is not easily regained.
SEARCH THE AREA
5-12. A quick, complete search of the room is critical to determine the presence of a potential
threat. Search everything (doors, furniture) that may conceal a threat. The room search is
conducted by at least one 2-man team (one searches the room while the other covers him).
SEARCH APPREHENDED, INJURED, AND DEAD PERSONNEL
5-13. Apprehended, injured, and dead personnel must be searched to ensure that they no
longer pose a threat. Remove weapons on or near the body. Check for signs of life, and
provide medical attention to injured persons. The search is conducted by at least one 3-man
team (one searches the threat, one covers the threat, and one covers the room).
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ANA 3-19.11
MARK ROOMS
5-14. Mark each room as it is cleared. Use a simple, clearly recognizable mark according to
the team’s SOP.
EVACUATE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
5-15. If personnel or equipment recovery was the purpose of the clearing operation, they
should be evacuated from the area immediately. Account for all assigned personnel and
equipment. See the team’s SOP and/or the rules of engagement (ROE) for evacuation
procedures of the threat, wounded, and dead.
THREAT
5-16. The threat may shoot first. Research has shown that less than four shots are fired in
most police operations; and as a result, someone is dead or wounded. Assume the threat—
• Is close enough to touch you.
• Is willing to resist and has decided what the resistance will be.
• Is knowledgeable about the environment.
• Is goal-oriented and willing to die or kill you.
• Has a greater fear of imprisonment than death.
• Will continue to fight after suffering incapacitating wounds.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLEARING AN OBJECTIVE
5-17. During the planning phase, limit the threat’s options and determine—
• The number of personnel required.
• The number, type, and size of rooms/areas.
• Entry and clearing methods.
• Clearing techniques.
5-18. The start of any BC operation must begin with containing and controlling the area and
the threat. This can be accomplished by—
• Establishing an inner perimeter with M/Os and area-security teams.
• Establishing an outer perimeter to restrict movement in and around the inner
perimeter.
• Removing bystanders.
• Controlling and manipulating basic human needs (shelter, food, security).
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED
5-19. The number of personnel required for the mission is mandated by METT-TC. A
sufficient number of personnel are required to ensure success and deny the threat any chance
of escape or effective retaliation. Consider the following:
• The number of threats and their equipment capabilities (plan for three team members
per threat).
• The size, complexity, number, and type of structures, interior areas, and exterior
danger areas.
• The number and type of entry points.
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•
•
•
•
The location of threats, hostages, and innocent bystanders.
Necessary phase lines.
Tactical angles.
The apprehension and control of the threat.
5-20. In conjunction with previously discussed details, the number of personnel required to
perform the following functions establishes the team’s size:
• Assault/clearing. Personnel are responsible for clearing rooms/areas.
• Support. Personnel are responsible for forward and rear security. They provide
security and firepower for assault/clearing teams.
• C2. The team leader concentrates on C2 when possible. He makes decisions,
establishes priorities to isolate and control the threat within the objective, and
prevents reinforcement of the threat.
5-21. Each SRT member must be prepared to perform in any capacity during the course of
the operation, so members must remain flexible. Three or four team members per room is
recommended. Avoid more than four per room, when possible, because it can cause
confusion and unsafe fields of fire. A 2- man team is fully capable of rapid movement and is
effective when establishing dominant positions, but it is difficult for members to control the
situation when outnumbered by threats or hostages. A 2-man team also requires a follow-on
apprehension team.
NUMBER, TYPE, AND SIZE OF ROOMS/AREAS
5-22. Identify the number, type, and size of rooms/areas within the objective.
Any area the threat can use as a hiding place must be identified and cleared.
This includes—
• Living, sleeping, and work areas.
• Storage rooms, attics, sheds, basements, and crawl spaces.
• Stairways, stairwells, hallways, cabinets, and closets.
5-23. Use blueprints to identify potential hiding areas. To help plan and control the mission,
number the rooms in the order they will be cleared. Also, consider how the numbering plan
will be affected if the primary entry point has to be abandoned. Remember, keep the plan
simple.
5-24. The height, width, and length of the objective have a significant effect on clearing.
• Height. The height of a ceiling can vary from 6 to 30 feet or more depending on the
structure. A low ceiling may interfere with movement and equipment, and it enhances
the effect of an ambush by the threat. A high ceiling conceals danger areas (lofts,
balconies), and it often creates echoes and amplifies noises created by the entry team.
• Width and Length. These dimensions affect the team’s ability to move laterally and
horizontally. Large and small areas influence shooting, moving, and communicating.
Large areas increase the fatigue factor, the time, and the distance, thereby providing
more opportunity for softening. Because of fatigue during deliberate clearing, team
members may have to alternate responsibilities between forward security, clearing,
and rear security.
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ENTRY AND CLEARING METHODS
5-25. After perimeters have been established and the threat’s options have been limited,
determine the method of clearing.
• Deliberate. It is used when time and distance are not factors. The deliberate method
of clearing requires a high degree of mental and physical conditioning and training.
Every move is controlled, every tactical angle is covered, and all clearing is
systematic. This is the recommended clearing method when resources and/or
circumstances do not allow two team members per room/area.
• Dynamic. It is used when time and distance are factors. The dynamic method of
clearing requires the use of a large team. Unless special circumstances exist, complete
domination of the objective should be achieved as soon as possible. Personnel and
resources must be committed to secure the objective quickly. The complete protection
of hostages should be achieved within 30 seconds.
5-26. When selecting a clearing method, consider which method will increase the
preservation of life, which method will create the least risk, and what the consequences are if
the mission is delayed. Many missions require a combination of deliberate and dynamic
methods.
CLEARING TECHNIQUES
5-27. The team leader determines the clearing technique to be used for each situation. The
threat must feel that there is an opportunity for surrender (not to be confused with escape)
and that resistance is futile. The technique must also deprive the threat of space and provide
time for the SRT. The clearing techniques discussed in the following paragraphs can be
employed within most objectives, including multistory and multiple. Table 5-1 shows the
advantages and disadvantages of each clearing technique.
Table 5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Clearing Techniques.
Technique
Advantages
Disadvantages
Room by room
• Is easily controlled.
• Is time-consuming.
• Has low potential if killing
• Is mentally and physically
team members.
fatiguing.
• Requires minimal
personnel.
• Allows economy of forces
Flood
• Provides aggressive action.
• Has potential to kill fellow
team member.
• Affords rapid security of
the objective.
• Is labor intensive.
• Has reduced opportunity
for threat fortification and
arming.
• Allows threat apprehension
with minimum resistance.
• Preserves evidence.
Direct to threat
• Provides aggressive action.
• Bypasses unclear areas.
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•
•
Envelop
•
•
•
•
Hammer and Anvil
•
•
•
•
Affords rapid threat
security.
Has reduced opportunity
for threat fortification and
arming.
Provides SSA.
Has reduced opportunity
for threat fortification and
arming.
Limits contact with IEDs
and other hazards.
Provides multiple-barrier
penetration.
Controls a fleeing threat.
Provides SSA.
Confuses the threat.
Faces the threat with
multiple front.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Increases the opportunity
for threat from 360
degrees.
Cuts off support.
Has potential to kill fellow
team member.
Causes difficulty in
reaching windows.
Provides no immediate
coverage on windowless
interior areas.
Is labor intensive.
Has potential to kill fellow
team member.
Is labor intensive.
Table 5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Clearing Techniques (continued).
Technique
Advantages
Disadvantages
Split
• Requires minimal
• Allows limited
coordination.
communication upon the
division of the team.
• Affords rapid security of
the objective.
• Is easily controlled.
• Has low potential of killing
team member by friendly
fire.
Interior or open-air
• Reduces the threat’s
• Is time consuming.
ambush.
reaction time.
• Requires a high degree of
discipline and patience.
• Decreases the possibility of
compromise because the
• Has minimal contact with
threat is unaware of the
outside resources.
SRT’s presence.
• Decreases the chance of
encountering hazards.
Scout
• Is effect for teams with
• Causes fatigue and mental
insufficiently trained and
stress.
inexperienced team
• Is time consuming.
members.
•
Room by room. This technique (Figure 5-1) is used with a deliberate or dynamic
method. Members enter and clear the objective room by room, from one end to the
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other. This technique can be used with minimal personnel resources, and it is one of
the few options for small teams. This technique requires at least one 5-man team.
Figure 5-1. Room by Room Clearing Technique.
•
Flood. This technique (Figure 5-2) is used with a dynamic method. A large team of
two or three members per room enters the designated point and clears from one end to
the other.
Figure 5-2. Flood Clearing Technique.
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•
Direct to threat. This technique (Figure 5-3) is initiated by identifying the threat’s
location, moving immediately, and bypassing uncleared areas to contact the threat,
rescue hostages, or rescue team members. It should never be used to bypass danger
areas unless an extreme emergency exists.
•
Envelop. This technique (Figure 5-4) is used with a dynamic method and a large
area-security team of two team members per window. A large or small entry team
surrounds the objective. The area-security team moves into position outside the
objective, breaks and rakes windows, and establishes secure positions from the
exterior. After safe entry points are identified, team members enter through door or
window breach points and clear the structure.
Figure 5-3. Direct to Threat Clearing Technique.
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Figure 5-4. Envelop Clearing Technique.
•
Hammer and anvil. This technique (Figure 5-5) is used with a deliberate or dynamic
method. Two teams enter from opposite ends of a structure and clear toward the
center. This technique is effective in L-shaped and U-shaped objectives, and it forces
the threat to concentrate on more than one fighting front. It is a coordinated clearing
method that requires at least two 5-man teams.
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Figure 5-5. Hammer-and-Anvil Clearing Technique.
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•
Split. This technique (Figure 5-6) is used with a dynamic method. A large team
enters from a central entry point. They split into two separate clearing elements, and
both elements clear outward simultaneously. This is an effective technique when
clearing large, multistory structures. It is a coordinated clearing method that requires
at least two 5-man teams.
Figure 5-6. Split Clearing Technique.
•
Interior ambush. This technique (Figure 5-7) is used with a deliberate method. A
small team enters an objective quietly and waits for the threat to approach its position,
essentially establishing an ambush inside the objective. It requires at least one 5-man
team.
•
Open-air ambush. This technique (Figure 5-8) is used with a deliberate method. A
team establishes an ambush at a pre-selected site and waits for the threat to approach.
The ambush site is selected based on intelligence indicating the probability that the
threat will be present at a specific location. It requires at least one 5-man team.
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Figure 5-7. Interior Ambush Clearing Technique.
Figure 5-8. Open Air Ambush Clearing Technique.
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•
Scout. This technique (Figure 5-9) is used with a deliberate or dynamic method. It is
a variation of the room-by-room technique, and it is often referred to as the snake. A
3- or 4-man scout team clears all areas within the objective. A larger support team
provides immediate backup and support for threat control; provides rear security; and
covers uncleared, bypassed, and other areas as directed.
Figure 5-9. Scout Clearing Technique.
PHASE LINES
5-28. Plan phase lines inside the building. This is only done if control measures must be
implemented to reduce risks and coordinate clearing operations.
ENTRY TECHNIQUES AND SECTORS OF FIRE
5-29. Entry is the most critical point during clearing operations. Every doorway must be
taken seriously. The most likely threat of hostile fire will be at this point and time. Dominant
positions in a room are dictated by the location of the entry point in relation to the room.
Doors are identified as center, corner, or offset. If the configuration of the room is known
before entry, dominant positions can be preplanned. (See Chapter 4 for more information.)
5-30. When entering an unfamiliar room, the entry team must determine the type of room
(center, corner, offset) and correctly determine and occupy dominant positions. Members
establish immediate overlapping sectors of fire to cover all areas, and they call for support if
more personnel are needed. This is not an easy task; only proper training, techniques,
repetition, and rehearsal will develop proficiency.
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COMMUNICATION
5-31. Communication among team members is essential for mission success. Every team
member must be aware of the situation constantly. Develop an SOP, and ensure that only
essential communication takes place. The No. 1 man receives a ready squeeze from the No. 2
man, and the team enters. Do not talk or shout; just let your team know that you are still with
them. If you encounter or perceive a problem, let everyone know. Continue to call until
adequate manpower responds. Common verbal signals include—
• Status. This signal is given by the entry-team leader, and it requires a response by
team members of “Clear” or “Secure.”
• Clear. This signal indicates that the area has been cleared.
• Go. This is the signal to proceed.
• Covering. This signal indicates that the threat has been identified, is under control,
and is covered by adequate firepower.
• Secure. This signal indicates that a dominant position has been established, the room
is under control, but the room is not clear.
CLEARING TECHNIQUES
5-32. Various clearing techniques can be applied to rooms and areas within a structure. They
require little time and are very effective if properly executed. Apply fundamentals while
occupying dominant positions, collapsing sectors of fire, and overlapping areas of
responsibilities to ensure a quick, thorough operation.
ROOM-SEARCHING TECHNIQUES
5-33. Sector and side-by-side clearing techniques are used to clear a room. Once dominating
positions and overlapping sectors of fire have been established, determine how each room
will be searched. Regardless of the technique used to search the room, 1-man-cover and 1man-clear/search fundamentals must be used. Team members enter the room and maneuver
along walls, scanning sectors with their weapons until a target presents itself. A 3-man team
can clear a large room, but a 4-man team is recommended. The No. 1 man carries the ballistic
shield.
• Sector.
Figure 5-10 shows a 2-man technique for clearing a room by sectors.
Figure 5-11 shows a 4-man technique for clearing a room by sectors.
• Side-by-side.
Figure 5-12 shows a 2-man, side-by-side clearing technique. One man clears,
while the second man covers.
Figure 5-13 shows a 4-man, side-by-side clearing technique. It is an option
when a large room has to be cleared.
Figure 5-14 shows a 2-man team using the side-by-side technique to clear
adjoining rooms by sectors.
Figure 5-15 shows a 5-man team, with a ballistic shield, using the side-byside technique to clear adjoining rooms by sectors.
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Figure 5-10. 2-Man Team Clearing by Sectors.
Figure 5-11. 4 Man Team Clearing by Sectors.
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Figure 5-12. 2 Man Team Clearing Side by Side.
Figure 5-13. 4 Man Team Clearing Side by Side.
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Figure 5-14. 2 Man Team Clearing Adjoining Rooms by Sectors.
Figure 5-15. 5 Man Team with a Ballistic Shield Clearing Adjoining Rooms
By Sectors
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STAIRWAYS/STAIRWELLS
5-34. A stairway is a staircase or a flight or series of stairs and a supporting structure
connecting separate levels. A stairwell is a vertical shaft in a multistory building that a
staircase has been built around. Both structures are tactical disadvantages because they
constrict SRTs. The types and configurations are unlimited, so movement must be carefully
planned. Danger areas in and around stairways/stairwells are immeasurable. Never assume
that one stairway/stairwell is identical to another, even if the blueprints indicate that they are
built to the same specifications.
5-35. Movement in or on a stairway/stairwell is based on its construction and characteristics.
When preparing to clear a stairway/stairwell—
• Do not assume enfilade (rake with gunfire) and defilade (fortifications against
enfilade) in any stair movement.
• Use blind-side recon or softening techniques (infrared [IR] viewers, thermal imagery,
mirrors, existing cameras) when ascending or descending stairs.
• Consider eliminating lights.
• Walk along the side of the stairway/stairwell if possible, because the stairs are
supported there and they will make less noise.
• Apply slow foot pressure, and avoid squeaky stairs and floors.
• Take advantage of angles.
• Remember to communicate, coordinate, and cover.
Communicate every step (visual, voice, physical contact).
Coordinate every step to ensure minimum exposure and simultaneous
movement.
Cover between team members with every step, and maximize structural
advantages.
5-36. Using diversions to facilitate entry in a stairway/stairwell may be an option, depending
on the operation. Do not use fragmentation grenades while climbing stairs because they are
extremely dangerous. Check stairway/stairwell doors before entry (expect them to be locked)
to ensure that they allow the team to exit on any floor. Some fire-exit stairs only allow exit
from the ground floor. Avoid bunching in a stairway/stairwell; normally, no more than three
team members at any given location are required. During clearing, a 2-man scout team can
adequately clear and control most stairways/stairwells.
ASCENDING STAIRS
5-37. Ascending stairs places a team at a tactical disadvantage; however, the ascent is
necessary to accomplish the mission. When viewed from below, most stairways/stairwells
reveal nothing more than the bottom of landings and stairs. Careful movement is necessary.
Techniques for ascending stairs are outlined in Table 5-2; they are shown in Figure 5-16,
Figure 5-17, and Figure 5-18.
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Technique
Side by Side
(deliberate).
Table 5-2. Ascending a Stairway/Stairwell.
Actions
Two team members ascend together, side by side.
The team divides into two elements (scout/advance and follow on teams).
The scout team consists of two members.
• The No. 1 man climbs forward and covers the forward threat area
(landings, floor, lower stairs). He is positioned toward the center
of the stairs, slightly forward.
• The No. 2 man walks up the stairs backwards and covers the rear
threat area (balconies, railings, upper landings). He is positioned
on the outside wall.
NOTE: Your weapon should be in the shooting position and pointed
at the threat area as you ascend. Advance to the next step with one
foot and stabilize it, apply pressure, and then pull the trailing foot up
to the same level. Never cross your legs or feet over each other while
moving.
Tactical angles are maximized at every step.
The ballistic shield, if available is carried by the No. 2 man.
The follow on team provides cover and rear security.
Back to Back
(deliberate).
NOTE: Upon reaching each landing, follow on team members move
up and position themselves for rear security and cover. See Figures
5-16 and 5-17.
Two team members ascend, back to back (this is necessary in confined
areas).
Close contact is maintained between team members.
Tactical angles are maximized at every step.
The ballistic shield is carried by the No. 2 man or both men. The No. 2
man may lift the shield to provide overhead security if visibility and the
sector of fire permit.
NOTE: Upon reaching each landing, follow on team members move
up and position themselves for rear security and cover. See Figures
5-17 and 5-18.
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Figure 5-16. 2 Man Team Ascending a Stairway/Stairwell Side by Side.
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Figure 5-17. Sectors of Fire.
Figure 5-18. 2 Man Team Ascending a Stairway/Stairwell Back to Back.
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5-38. If a dynamic ascent is necessary, using a side-by-side or back-to-back method may be
impractical. A version of the file movement may be required. The speed of this movement
exposes team members to threat angles faster. The No. 1 and 2 men must be prepared to
encounter threats from above and forward at all times.
DESCENDING STAIRS
5-39. Buildings should be cleared from the top to the bottom so that team members can move
down stairs. Descending stairways/stairwells—
• Provides SSA and an improved tactical angle. This view shows the tops of stairs,
landings, doorways, and balconies, which are likely threat locations.
• Increases the chance of detecting booby traps.
• Minimizes physical stress.
• Gives the threat a flight option.
• Assists in driving the threat out.
5-40. Descending an open stairway/stairwell (grated stairs or landings, open or exposed rails)
can be more dangerous than ascending one. Explore all possible options before descending.
When descending—
• One man provides cover down the stairs.
• The scout team descends the stairs carefully until a secure or dominant position is
reached (similar to a back-to-back or side-by-side technique).
• Overwatch personnel move to cover the new position and repeat the descent to the
next landing if necessary.
• Team members use optics or mirrors to clear blind spots and areas beneath stairs.
HALLWAYS
5-41. Hallways are corridors or passageways that connect rooms within a structure. They
may be simple vestibules or large hallways that stretch several hundred feet. Their width
varies from very narrow to several yards. Hallways are advantageous to an SRT because they
control the threat’s access and movement. Hallways may be used to simply maneuver to
other areas and not actually be a part of the overall objective.
5-42. There are numerous hallway configurations, and their top-down appearance best
describes them. Common configurations include vestibule, straight, L-shaped, T-shaped, Ushaped, and combined. The threat will recognize hallways as AAs and anticipate the team’s
attempt to use them in gaining a dominant position. Consider securing hallways, but avoid
moving through them. Go through walls or use connecting doors when possible.
5-43. All hallways must be secured and cleared. SRT members must be able to approach,
evaluate, and maneuver in and around hallways correctly. This includes identifying and
taking proper actions at hallway and doorway configurations and in danger areas within a
hallway. The basic formations for moving in hallways are file, double file, serpentine, and
rolling T.
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FILE FORMATION
5-44. A file formation (Figure 5-19) can be used by a small or large team, with or without a
ballistic shield, in narrow hallways. The No. 1 man provides forward security. His sector of
fire includes a threat that appears from the front (the far end of the hallway and doorways
forward of the shield). Remaining team members follow in file formation directly behind the
No. 1 man. The No. 2 and 3 men cover the left and right sides of the No. 1 man. Their sectors
of fire include a threat that suddenly appears from a nearby doorway on either side of the
hallway. They cover the No. 1 man’s flanks. The last man provides rear security against a
threat that suddenly appears behind the clearing team. A file formation provides protection
for the team when a ballistic shield is used, but it also has disadvantages. It limits the field of
vision for the No. 2 and 3 men forward of the No. 1 man. It is also restrictive and slow when
teams are confronted with opposing doors; however, it may be the only option in very narrow
hallways.
Figure 5-19. File Formation
DOUBLE-FILE FORMATION
5-45. A double-file formation (Figure 5-20) is used by a small or large team, with or without
a ballistic shield, in hallways that are at least 5 feet wide. The No. 1 man provides forward
security with a ballistic shield. His sector of fire includes a threat that appears from the front
(the far end of the hallway and doorways forward of the shield). Remaining team members
form two files behind the shield, left and right of the No. 1 man. The No. 2 and 3 men lead
the files and provide left and right cover of the No. 1 man. Their sectors of fire include a
threat that suddenly appears from nearby doorways on their side of the hallway. They cover
the No. 1 man’s flanks from positions slightly behind him. The last man provides rear
security against a threat that suddenly appears from behind the clearing team. When
confronted with opposing doorways in a hallway, the No. 5 man may be responsible for
forward security (6-man team) if the No. 1 man decides to enter the room.
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Figure 5-20. Double File Formation
SERPENTINE FORMATION
5-46. The serpentine formation (Figure 5-21) is the same as the file formation, except the No.
2 and 3 men are not aligned directly behind the No. 1 man. The serpentine movement can be
used with or without a ballistic shield, which is carried by the No. 1 man. There is an
increased field of view and fire capability forward of the No. 1 man and an increased amount
of speed when the team must maneuver into opposing doorways. However, there is an
increased possibility that team members will be hit by fire from the threat.
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Figure 5-21. Serpentine Formation.
ROLLING-T FORMATION
5-47. The rolling-T formation (Figure 5-22) is used with or without a ballistic shield in wide
hallways. The No. 1 and 2 men move abreast and cover the sides of the hallway opposite
their positions. The No. 3 man covers the far end of the hallway from a position slightly
behind the No. 1 and 2 men and fires between them. The last man provides rear security.
Team members may position themselves behind the No. 1 and 2 men (double file) or the No.
3 man (single file).
Figure 5-22. Rolling “T” Formations.
HALLWAY INTERSECTIONS
5-48. There are three major types of hallway intersections—T-shaped, L-shaped, and cross.
Intersections should be approached cautiously because uncleared doorways may be in sight
during the approach. Ideally, when approaching these areas during clearing, dedicate a
clearing team to each direction the intersection breaks. If a dedicated team is unavailable, at
least one man, preferably two men, must guard the intersection that the clearing team elected
to temporarily bypass.
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T-SHAPED INTERSECTIONS
5-49. There are five ways to approach and clear a T-shaped intersection. They are shown in
Figures 5-23, 5-24, 5-25, 5-26 and 5-27.
Figure 5-23. “T” Shaped Intersection (1)
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Figure 5-24. “T” Shaped Intersection (2).
Figure 5-25. “T” Shaped Intersection (3).
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Figure 5-26. “T” Shaped Intersection (4).
Figure 5-27. “T” Shaped Intersection (5).
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L-SHAPED INTERSECTIONS
5-50. There are two ways to approach and clear an L-shaped intersection. They are shown in
Figures 5-28 and 5-29.
Figure 4-28. L-Shaped Intersection (1).
Figure 4-29. L-Shaped Intersection (2).
CROSS INTERSECTIONS
5-51. There are two ways to approach and clear a cross intersection. They are shown in
Figures 5-30 and 5-31.
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Figure 5-30. Cross Intersection (1).
Figure 5-31. Cross Intersection (2).
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HALLWAY DANGER AREAS
5-52. The threat may observe the team from another hallway, by direct sight, or through a
window. This is mostly encountered when clearing U-, T-, and L-shaped hallways. Although
hall closets and storage areas are normally small, they are capable of hiding a motivated
threat and should never be bypassed. Check all areas, including the—
• Closet (behind clothing), for hidden access to a hiding place.
• Floor, for access to a crawl space.
• Ceiling, for access to the attic.
• Stairway/stairwell access, which normally originates in hallways.
DOORWAY LAYOUTS IN HALLWAYS
5-53. The entry points of most rooms are located in a hallway. The position of rooms within
a structure is only limited by the desired architectural effects and the practical needs of the
occupants. The basic layout of doorway openings in hallways include—
• Opposing. Doors are directly across from each other.
• Offset/staggered. Doors alternate and are not positioned across from each other.
• Combination. A combination of opposing and staggered doors.
• One-sided. All doors are located on the same side.
• Side by side. Doors are closely adjacent to each other.
5-54. Figures 5-32, 5-33, 5-34, 5-35, 5-36, and 5-37 show staging positions in hallways for
various doorway layouts. The techniques may be implemented with or without a ballistic
shield. When using a ballistic shield in a situation such as shown in Figure 5-34, the No. 1
man carries the ballistic shield and may be positioned forward or to the flank of the No. 2
man. The double-file method (Figure 5-37) is preferred because it provides security on
doorways quicker and smoother than the file method (Figure 5-36).
Figure 5-32. Opposing Doors (Hinges in).
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Figure 5-33. Opposing Doors (Hinges out).
Figure 5-34. Staggered Doors with Ballistic Shield.
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Figure 5-35. Open, Opposing Doors from a Rolling-T Formation.
Figure 5-36. Open, Opposing Doors from a File Formation with a Ballistic Shield.
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Figure 5-37. Open, Staggered Doors from a Double File Formation with a Ballistic
Shield.
DROP CEILINGS
5-55. A drop ceiling is a false ceiling that is suspended from overhead construction by a
series of wires and ceiling-tile frames. It is impossible to safely place weight on a drop
ceiling. Also, there may be a few inches or several feet between the drop ceiling and the
permanent ceiling. The team must assume that a threat can drop from the ceiling and assault
the team. Clear the area below the drop ceiling, and then clear the area above the drop
ceiling.
5-56. Clearing methods used to search drop ceilings may require tearing down large sections
of the ceiling to expose hiding places. Use a long pole with hook to pull down tiles and
prevent a threat from locating the team’s position. The suspension wires of the ceiling may
have to be cut with wire cutters. Attic accesses and potential hiding places are often revealed
when clearing a drop ceiling.
CRAWL SPACES
5-57. Crawl spaces are located directly beneath the lowest floor of a house if a basement is
not present. This area often shares many of the same characteristics as an attic. Access to a
crawl space may be from inside and/or outside. Clearing is accomplished using the same
clearing methods as attic clearing (paragraph 5-58), except the team moves under the house.
HIDES
5-58. Hides are well-concealed hiding positions from which a threat or an M/O can observe
or fire without fear of detection. Military and law-enforcement M/O or sniper teams
commonly use hides. However, hides are also becoming popular with criminals to disguise
illegal activities.
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5-59. Threat hides can be used to cause devastating casualties. Some threats place aiming
points (tape) within the hide to cover entry and exit points and provide accurate fire without
direct observation. Attempt to identify potential hide locations within and around the
objective. When the threat selects a hide, he looks for a position with the following
advantages:
• Maximum concealment for extended periods.
• Maximum fields of fire.
• Cover (sandbags, concrete).
• Natural or man-made obstacles.
• Drainage, food, and shelter.
• Escape routes (tunnels, obstacles).
5-60. Expect hostile fire from a hide to come from—
• Halls or other fatal funnels.
• Crests of prominent terrain features.
• Areas located anywhere between the roof top or attic to below street level.
• Corners of buildings.
• Areas behind walls.
• Peaks of roofs.
• Windows, loopholes, and crawl spaces.
5-61. When engaging and advancing on a hide, it may be best to wait out a threat if innocent
people are involved. Observing activity in the hide may be impossible, and the ROE must be
considered. Otherwise, direct heavy fire into the hide in combination with an assault. When
preparing to clear a hide, use extreme caution and consider the following points:
• Assume the hide is booby-trapped.
• Avoid entry into obvious access points (consider breaching walls to create entry
points).
• Use blind-side recon and softening techniques first.
• Use explosive-ordnance disposal (EOD) after the area appears to be secure.
• Use distraction devices, if available.
• Use fragmentation, if necessary, depending on the ROE.
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Chapter 6
Marksman/Observer Tactical Operations
The M/O team is an essential part of a tactical operation—whether the mission is to isolate
and contain a hostage situation, capture a barricaded criminal, or ensure that a threat does not
escape during a drug illegal weapons raid. M/Os set the security overwatch and provide realtime intelligence and reporting that is vital to the mission’s success. They must provide
coverage during the entire approach to the objective, and their ability to select positions and
provide cover fire is critical to the entry team’s safety. M/Os provide a psychological
deterrent to the threat and a tactical edge to the team. This chapter covers the practical
aspects of M/O responsibilities from the operational briefing to the completion of the
mission.
OPERATIONAL BRIEFING
6-1. The SRT leader reveals the plans for resolving an incident during the operational
briefing. The M/O-team leader addresses several issues before departing for the forwardoperating position (FOP). They include—
• Moving to the threat area.
• Establishing an FOP.
• Beginning the observational phase of the operation.
• Using an M/O data book.
6-2. The primary considerations for the M/O team during the briefing are—
• The type of operation and/or situation.
• Observational objectives.
• Command and signal requirements.
• The timetable of operations.
DEPLOYMENT
6-3. M/Os are deployed as hasty, overwatch, or scout/observer.
• Hasty. M/Os respond to a crime in progress and have little time to plan or prepare.
They simply grab their gear and respond.
• Overwatch. M/Os provide perimeter security and cover the movements of SRT
elements as they approach and withdraw. Successful execution requires training and
practice with the SRT.
• Scout/observer. M/Os may have to locate the threat area or the objective by using
their optical advantage and field-craft skills. They may plot an approach for the
responding SRT, photograph the area, identify subjects, or gain real-time intelligence.
Surveillance and threat coverage may last for hours or even days.
OPERATIONAL BRIEFING
6-4. As a minimum, ensure that the items shown in Table 6-1 are covered during the
operational briefing.
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Table 6-1. Operational Briefing Requirements.
USE OF FORCE
6-5. An M/O’s use of precision fire requires very specific use-of-force parameters. M/Os
must be intimately acquainted with the use-of-force policy and the SOP. They must
understand what circumstances prompt a commander to authorize a cold shot (the first shot
fired by a marksman). It is recommended that the corps commander be the approving
authority for cold shots, and the SRT SOP should outline the proper procedures. A cold shot
can be authorized if a serious crime is about to be committed or has been committed or if
someone’s life must be preserved.
6-6. The use-of-force rules may change slightly from corps to corps. All agree, however, that
someone must be in imminent peril of death or serious injury before ANA law-enforcement
M/O teams can fire without prior approval. For example, if the marksman does not fire, he or
someone else may be killed or injured.
COMMAND AND SIGNAL
6-7. To maximize the effectiveness of a deployed M/O team, lines of communication (LOC)
must be established and maintained. There must be a primary and a secondary means of
communication. Secondary communication may include cellular telephones, commercial
telephone lines, field telephones, or radios. There should also be an authentication code with
a covert duress signal.
• A no-shot signal should never contain the words shoot, shot, or fire.
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•
A code word such as buster or red light works well, and the preferred signal is green
light, red light.
COMPROMISE AUTHORITY
6-8. Compromise authority is the point where the SRT entry-team leader assumes control
over the M/Os as the SRT moves into the inner perimeter en route to the entry point. The CP
controls everything to a certain point, and then the on-scene commander becomes the entryteam leader. A clearly established code must convey the transfer of C2 to the entry-team
leader.
MOVEMENT
6-9. M/Os must be deployed covertly—not as an intimidation technique, as a negotiation
tactic, or to grandstand for the media—but to avoid detection because detection means
compromise. If shots are not fired, the M/O team withdraws and is never detected by the
threat, bystanders, or the media.
6-10. M/Os are the first ones in and the last ones out. They cover the perimeter and the
approach and withdrawal of the SRT and supporting elements. M/Os must always assume
that they are under observation, and their movements must be slow and deliberate. Detection
means compromise, compromise means mission failure, and mission failure often means
death.
TACTICS
6-11. The tactics for proper stealth movement depend on the type of terrain; the location; and
the amount of available cover, concealment, and light. Team members should—
• Stay away from the threat’s position, especially directly in front of his field of view.
• Attempt to move to the oblique of the threat’s viewpoint; ideally, the right oblique.
Threats tend to spend less time searching the right oblique. In addition, people are
inclined to search from left to right, then quickly back to the left (just as they are
taught to read).
• Use urban and rural terrain to their advantage.
• Avoid overlooking difficult terrain, creek beds, and adjacent buildings.
• Move through, not around, buildings and houses because they provide noise and
visual concealment.
• Move as quietly as possible. Check watches, radios, beepers, uncovered metal
buckles, weapons, gear attachments, and pocket/vest contents for possible noise.
• Be cognizant of odors. Cigarette, cologne, and food odors can give away the M/O
team’s movement, especially in rural areas.
• Plan a primary and an alternate route to the objective. If the primary route is
obstructed or otherwise unusable, an alternate route must be available.
DIRECT AND INDIRECT DETECTION
6-12. Direct detection occurs when the threat sees the team moving to its position. Indirect
detection occurs when the team is compromised by sound, scent, flagging vegetation, rising
dust, or a visible drag path. The team should try to visualize its movement in advance. This
allows the team to avoid potentially noisy areas or loose ground, focuses attention on detail,
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and forces the team to slow down. The camouflage considerations shown in Table 6-2 will
lead to compromise if they are not properly addressed.
Table 6-2. Camouflage Considerations.
6-13. To avoid detection—
• Plan each movement carefully.
• Avoid the adrenaline urge to rush.
• Execute each movement with extreme caution.
• Move through depressions in the area.
• Avoid movement from light to shadow or vice versa.
• Use natural sounds or distractions to your advantage.
• Move during natural disturbances to mask your movement.
• Avoid animals. They will flag your position and approach by their reaction to your
presence.
• Stop often and check the team’s security.
ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE
6-14. Immediately upon arrival at the objective—
• Verify security.
Determine if movement compromised the team or alerted the threat to the
SRT’s presence.
Conceal the team’s position.
• Obtain target acquisition on the threat.
Begin constructing the FOP.
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•
Ready all weapons and optics.
Establish communication with the CP.
Notify the CP of your location.
Verify your mission status.
Receive an update of the mission timetable.
TARGET ACQUISITION
6-15. Target acquisition is the location of the threat and the sustainment of visual contact
through a weapon’s sight. On order of the command element or if SRT action is imminent,
the marksman begins visual coverage of the threat through his weapon’s sight and maintains
coverage until the mission is complete. The marksman must be ready for an instant response
on target. If the threat moves out of his field of coverage, he should signal for another M/O to
cover the threat.
6-16. When identifying threats within a sector of fire, assign them a priority based on the
specific mission as follows:
• Very high priority. Threat snipers with long-range rifles. They may be setting an
ambush or acting as counter-snipers to the SRT M/O.
• High priority. Armed threats near the SRT’s approach path or entry point and threats
hidden from SRT’s view but spotted by an M/O team.
• Low priority. Hostile, unarmed threats away from the SRT’s approach area.
6-17. The marksman covers the principle threat and is responsible for the third and fourth
threats in order of priority. The observer holds on the second threat and the third and fourth
threats, depending on the situation. The observer watches the sector of fire for new or
undetected threat, especially once the marksman has fired on the principle threat.
CHANGING POSITIONS
6-18. If the M/O team changes position, the marksman selects a new position while the
observer covers the threat area. The marksman then covers the threat while the observer
moves to the new position. This rule assumes that the marksman is the senior person on the
team or has the most experience in M/O tactics. When the marksman selects the team’s new
operational position, the team quickly regains the ballistic advantage of his high-powered,
optically sighted weapon. It also leaves the observer on active coverage for less time during
the move. The person who selects the new position must have his optically sighted weapon in
hand to ensure that the position adequately covers the threat.
FORWARD-OPERATING POSITIONS
6-19. There are two types of FOPs—urban and rural. They are discussed below.
URBAN
6-20. Use your imagination and ingenuity to set up an urban forward operating position
(UOP). It can be established anywhere that offers concealment of the team and coverage of
the threat. A UOP—
• Allows hard cover.
• Conceals noise.
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•
•
Creates artificial shadow and concealment.
Confuses the threat by deflecting sounds of gunfire off hard surfaces, making the
accurate detection of M/O positions more difficult.
Indoor
6-21. Indoor UOPs have the following advantages and disadvantages:
• • Advantages.
Protection from the elements.
Freer movement within the position; the position is out of the threat’s view.
This allows additional people to enter the position and allows the team to
improve its position, set up communication, and provide relief.
Control over the environment (lighting, back lighting, room temperature).
Noise dampening; the threat does not hear unintentional noises made by the
M/O team.
Possible access to secure communications.
Position improvement; use available material (desks, doors, file cabinets);
control back lighting with curtains, linens, or carpet; and bring additional
materials into the position if necessary.
• Disadvantages.
Limited coverage on the threat, depending on the range and the angle. Most
UOPs are fixed positions and use a firing/observing port, such as a window.
Time required for setup. The mission may escalate rapidly before
improvements can be made.
Inadequate material. The material needed to set up a stable firing/observing
platform may have to be carried in.
6-22. When setting up an indoor UOP—
• Ensure that the building is evacuated because threats may detect the M/O team’s
presence and fire on its position.
• Select the least prominent firing/observing port (doorways, windows, attic vents).
• Control back lighting by using drop cloths, tarps, or ponchos.
• Control access to the position, thus eliminating unintentional back lighting.
• Practice good light discipline to avoid changes in interior lighting.
• Beware of changes in the exterior lighting. Changes in the sun’s position can cause
the threat area to become obscured by reflections or glares.
• Modify positions at night if necessary. Consider the effect of automatic outside
lighting, and determine how it can be controlled to the team’s advantage.
6-23. Avoid flagging positions to the threat, and constantly re-assess positions.
• What can the threat see?
• Is the firing/observing port more or less prominent if the facility has multiple
windows facing the threat?
• How does the port appear to the threat?
• Is the team’s position flagged if the team alters the facility’s normal appearance?
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6-24. Alter window shades, blinds, or curtains to disguise the team’s firing or observing port.
For example, if window glass must be removed to allow adequate threat coverage, stretch
clear cellophane over the open area. The cellophane looks like glass from the threat’s vantage
point, and it will not substantially affect a round. If a wire window screen is removed or cut,
alter other screens to disguise the firing/observing port. A fine-mesh cloth can also be
stretched over the port to resemble a screen, and it will not substantially affect a round.
Outdoor
6-25. Outdoor UOPs have the following advantages and disadvantages:
• Advantages.
Observation and ballistic coverage over the entire threat area (indoor UOPs
are limited by their firing/observation ports).
Coverage of the SRT entry team during movement.
Mobility for the M/O team if it needs to change position or address a new
threat.
Ability to engage a moving target.
•
Disadvantages.
Exposure to the elements.
Position security.
Detection by the threat or bystanders who may give away the position.
Time and maneuvering required to reach the area,and set it up because of
fences, buildings, walls, and vehicles.
Difficulty maneuvering inside the inner perimeter.
6-26. Outdoor UOPs include elevated (rooftop), street (ground level), and vehicular.
• Elevated. An elevated position offers a superior observational advantage when
viewing a ground-level threat area. It also provides broad ballistic coverage of the
threat area. There are, however, disadvantages that must be considered. An elevated
position is usually unstable and difficult to set up, and it reduces the team’s flexibility
if it must change position. The risk of detection is always present, and relief teams
must use extra caution. Team members are constantly exposed to the elements.
• Street. A street position is flexible and can be set up rapidly. Hard cover may be
readily available to the team. Disadvantages include the lack of elevation in relation
to the threat, exposure to the elements, and decreased security for the team.
Movement to a new position requires a great deal of caution within the inner
perimeter to prevent detection by the threat.
• Vehicular. A vehicular position presents unique challenges and opportunities, and it
should be set up away from the threat area. It offers cover, concealment, protection
from the elements, and noise dampening. If a vehicular position is detected, however,
it becomes an overt tactic and the threat knows that a long gun is aimed on him. The
type of vehicle used may also alert the threat to the M/O’s deployment, so avoid
raising the threat’s suspicions when deploying vehicles.
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6-27. The M/O FOP setup is broken down into the following general responsibilities:
• Range the target. Determine if the proposed position is within the team’s ballistic
and optical capabilities and if it affords proper coverage of the threat. Ranging the
target can be done by using laser range finders, optical range finders, or visual
estimation methods.
• Ready the weapon platform. Construct or modify a stable firing/observing platform,
improve upon the platform as time allows, and establish a steady position that allows
a controlled, braced shot.
• Sector the area. Establish common reference points for the SRT, M/Os, and other
M/O teams working in the same area. Begin drawing a range card.
• Begin an observation log.
• Communicate with the command unit. Provide the location of covered and
uncovered areas. Provide and receive updated information on the threat situation.
6-28. FOPs should be undetected by the threat. Carefully plan the placement of FOPs,
because compromise means mission failure. FOPs should provide a stable, secure
firing/observing platform. If the optical and ballistic advantages of equipment cannot be
used, the position does not meet the mission requirements for threat coverage.
RURAL
6-29. Outdoor rural forward-operating positions (ROPs) require the careful use of
camouflage and concealment. The camouflage must match the terrain, the vegetation, and the
weather. Caution must be exercised during movement to avoid compromise. Ghillie suits
must be constructed for particular areas and seasons (commercial hunting camouflage is
usually geared toward a particular hunting season and the time of year).
6-30. ROPs require high field-craft skills. Map and compass skills are mandatory, and
updated topographical maps of the area are also helpful. Man-tracking skills and the ability to
read natural signs are essential when operating in a rural environment, and a professional
M/O knows the difference between animal and man-made signs. M/Os use natural cover,
concealment, sounds, weather disturbances, and terrain features to their advantage.
6-31. ROPs also require a stable, secure firing/observing platform and the ability to provide
optical and ballistic coverage. Materials used to construct a platform in a rural setting must
be natural and blend into the environment; boards or planks can be used if they are carefully
camouflaged. Anything artificial, including scents and colors, must be carefully considered.
In addition, animal reactions to unnatural objects must be projected.
6-32. Normally, ROPs are at ground level, but M/Os can gain a height advantage by using
the terrain. A hunter’s tree stand can be adapted for special situations, and it offers a stable
firing/observing platform. Tree stands are risky, however, because they do not provide cover,
mobility, or security. They may also compromise the team during a prolonged situation.
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OBSERVATION
6-33. At least half of the M/O’s mission is observation. Professional police observation is
proactive information gathering—not merely watching a threat or an area for developments,
but gathering specific data. Figure 6-1 shows three interlocking circles that represent
camouflage, concealment, observation, and marksmanship.
• The large, outer circle represents camouflage and concealment. It symbolizes how the
M/O team’s detection equals mission failure. If this was the only consideration, the
M/O team would not be in a position to observe or fire on a threat but it would be
perfectly concealed.
• The right circle represents observation. If this was the only consideration, the team
would be in the best location to make keen observations of the threat area, but it could
be easily detected by a threat. A good observer location might not be the most stable
firing position.
• The left circle represents marksmanship. The perfect firing position might not be the
ideal observation post, which could cause a team to be detected.
Figure 6-1. Marksman-Observer Elements.
PROACTIVE INFORMATION GATHERING
6-34. Proactive information gathering is looking for specific data that relates to the M/O’s
mission. There are four keys to proactive information gathering.
• Proper placement of the team. The team must place itself in a good location where
members can see their area of responsibility.
• Proper use of optics. The team must understand the proper use and advantages of a
spotting scope, a rifle scope, and handheld binoculars.
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•
•
Systematic scanning. The team must use a careful, slow pattern that systematically
covers the sector.
Communication. There must be excellent communication between the marksman
and the observer, and all discoveries must be communicated to the command element.
SIGNS OF THREATS
6-35. The first mission of the M/O team is to determine if the threat has been alerted to the
presence of the SRT or the M/O team. Signs of compromise include—
• Inside activity. Is the building occupied? Is there power to the building? Where are
the utilities connected to the building?
• Outside activity. Are there signs of traffic to and from the structure? Which entry
points are used the most and which are used the least?
OBSERVATION CHECKLIST
6-36. Including a checklist in the M/O data book helps SRT members check for everything
they need to know. Evidence of weapons or explosive devices must be immediately
communicated to the command element. Table 6-3 is a sample checklist, and it shows the
minimum information that should be included.
Table 6-3. Sample Observation Checklist.
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Table 6-3. Sample Observation Checklist (continued).
MARKSMAN/OBSERVER DATA BOOK
6-37. An M/O data book is just as important as a rifle. There are numerous commercial,
military, and police-sniper data books available; but most are adapted from infantry-sniper or
match-shooting range books. Commercial data books include range cards that are used for
range practice. Data cards can be printed on card stock and bound, be computer-generated
and placed in a loose-leaf binder, or be written and placed in a notebook. The following items
should be included in a data book for realistic training and live missions:
• Essential elements of information (EEI).
• Threat/victim identity and activity log.
• Sector sketch and ballistic set.
• Weapon and ammunition data card.
• Weather and light log.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION
6-38. The first card in the data book should be the EEI card. It contains information on the
specific incident or the training scenario. Critical EEI include—
• Date, time, and sector numbers.
• Call signs for the SRT, the command element, and M/Os.
• Situation details and mission notes (include the items shown in Table 6-1).
• Command and signal codes for no-shoot and guns-down situations (include cold-shot
authorization codes, withdrawal authentication codes, and compromise-authority
signals).
• Force parameters.
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THREAT/VICTIM IDENTITY AND ACTIVITY LOG
6-39. This card is used to identify, number, and prioritize threats, victims, and bystanders. It
is important because the M/O may be the only eyes on the scene. Obtaining the information
for the CP and the SRT helps the M/O identify the threat and complete the mission. The M/O
represents real-time intelligence for updates to the mission scenario. In the threat/victim
identity and activity log, the M/O—
• Assigns a numerical code to each individual within his sector (for example, master 1
is first threat, hotel 3 is third hostage).
• Records detailed physical descriptions (remember, clothing changes).
• Logs the activity of each subject. Copious notes should be taken on the activity of
each individual, such as their location at various times.
• Indicates patterns of activity, such as an armed threat who checks the perimeter every
20 minutes, a threat who goes outside to smoke, or a hostage that is moved from room
to room.
SECTOR SKETCH AND BALLISTIC SET
6-40. Complete a sector sketch and a ballistic set as follows:
• Sector sketch. Include terrain features, structures, and details on personnel. Update
the sketch as time allows. During a hasty mission, this may be a simple line drawing.
In a prolonged situation, a detailed sketch can help the relieving team to understand
the area. Range all items in the sketch and prioritize them. Identify who is responsible
for covering each item or target area. Estimate the height, slope, and angle of all
threats in relation to the M/O’s position.
• Ballistic set. Check rifle-scope adjustments after threats are ranged to determine the
ballistic settings to each threat. Calculate and annotate the compensation for each
threat. This allows the team to rapidly address multiple threats at different locations
and ranges.
NOTE: The ballistic set also applies to angle and slope changes.
WEAPON AND AMMUNITION DATA CARD
6-41. During range practice, every fired round must be recorded. In addition to recording the
rifle fired (by serial number), include the local weather conditions, the scope settings, the
ammunition (by type and lot number), and any other special conditions that existed on the
range when the round was fired. The card serves as a training record.
6-42. This type of copious record keeping serves several purposes. It creates a performance
database for the rifle, the scope, and the ammunition. It shows tendencies of the rifle and the
ammunition during various conditions, over a period of time. A marksman can estimate the
conditions, check the data book for similar conditions, and predict the performance of the
weapon system.
WEATHER AND LIGHT LOG
6-43. Notes on temperature, humidity, and wind are necessary for a successful mission
because weather can dramatically affect a fired round. Logging weather changes may help
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predict future weather changes, such as humidity increases, temperature drops, and shifts in
wind direction. It also helps keep the team focused and ready to implement countermeasures.
6-44. Making note of the light conditions, natural and artificial, on the scene and at the
M/O’s position is necessary to prevent mission failure. Indicate whether the operating
position will be exposed by a change in the sun’s angle, a change in artificial light, or shifting
shadows. Also include whether the team’s ability to observe and/or engage the threat will
change if the lighting and shadows change.
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Chapter 7
Breaching
Forced-entry options must be available during every situation. For example, if entry is
through a door, the locking mechanism must be overcome. Team members must have the
breaching skills necessary to defeat all obstacles between the assault team and the threat.
This chapter discusses the tools and techniques needed for manual, mechanical, and ballistic
breaching.
MANUAL AND MECHANICAL BREACHING
7-1. Deliberate entry is inappropriate or impossible at times, depending on the nature of the
mission or the target. If dynamic entry is used, manual and mechanical breaching should be
incorporated into plans as an alternate means of achieving entry. Doors, windows, walls,
roofs, floors, and vehicles can be breached by manual or mechanical means. The application
of these techniques is limited by the target’s hardness and the team’s load-carrying capacity
(each team member should carry some type of breaching tool).
BREACHING TOOLS
7-2. Most tools are heavy, bulky, and awkward to carry; and each tool has its own unique
means or technique for achieving target damage or entry. Using tools requires time on target
that may compromise the team’s mission, and a diversionary device should be employed
before entering an objective after a mechanical breach. Depending on the nature of the
obstacle, the breacher may use a sledgehammer, a hooligan tool, a battering ram, bolt cutters,
a crowbar, J-hook and T-bar window extractors, and fire-fighting equipment.
Sledgehammer
7-3. Two types of sledgehammers are recommended for breaching, and they are both doublefaced with a steel head. One weighs 4.5 kg and may have a 75 cm unbreakable, fiberglass
handle; the other one weighs approximately 1.10 kg and may have a 30 cm handle.
NOTE: The 1.10 kg sledgehammer should not be used to breach doors, but it can be
used in combination with other tools to help breach doors.
7-4. Sledgehammers are widely available, easy to use, and almost indestructible. However,
they are heavy and ineffective on outward-opening doors. Multiple hits are required with a
sledgehammer, so the time on target is increased.
7-5. To employ a sledgehammer, strike an inward-opening door directly above the doorknob.
Do not strike the doorknob because the throw mechanism can become stuck in the jamb and
delay entry. If the door has a doorknob and a dead bolt, strike the door between the two
mechanisms.
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Battering Ram
7-6. There are many types of battering rams available; they range from vehicle-mounted to
one-man systems. A typical one-man system weighs 15.75kg, is 75 cm long, and has an
impact of 6,300 kg of kinetic energy. A battering ram is easy to use and highly effective. It
can be employed against the hinge or lock side of an inward-opening door, and it is also
effective against a door with a drop bar or a dead bolt. However, a battering ram is heavy,
difficult to carry, and ineffective on fortified and steel doors.
7-7. When employing a battering ram—
• Ensure that the team is in position for proper backup.
• Determine the weakest part of the door (based on the number of hinges and the
number and type of locks).
• Avoid the fatal funnel.
• Position to the weak side of the door (one-man ram).
• Keep your eyes on the target.
• Plant your feet firmly on the floor, shoulder-width apart and in line with your body.
• Grip the battering ram’s handles naturally; do not squeeze them tightly.
7-8. Lock-Side Employment. The breacher—
• Selects a target area above or below the lock.
• Positions himself as described in paragraph 7-8.
• Begins a circular backswing, rotating his weight to the foot farthest from the target.
• Begins a forward swing, allowing the ram to climb naturally with momentum.
• Shifts his weight back to the foot closest to the target.
• Locks his elbows. (Centrifugal force holds the ram against his fingers.)
• Impacts the target with the ram’s full face.
• Follows through, continuing the swing until contact is complete.
• Repeats as necessary.
7-9. Hinge-Side Employment. The breacher—
• Selects a target area near the lowest hinge.
• Positions himself as described in paragraph 7-8.
• Swings the ram in a pendulum motion, about .5 m back.
• Locks his elbow that is closet to the target.
• Bends slightly at the waist, if necessary, to hit the target.
• Begins a forward, downward swing. (His balance is maintained with the swing’s
momentum, while centrifugal force pushes the ram into his hand).
• Impacts the target with the ram’s full face.
• Follows through, continuing the swing until contact is complete.
• Repeats as necessary.
7-10. The breacher should use full swings, not short strokes, and ram the door a maximum of
four times. The entry team should be ready to move to the secondary entry point after the
second unsuccessful ramming attempt.
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7-11. When the entry point is successfully breached, the breacher positions the ram where it
provides the greatest value to the team. It is rarely necessary for the breacher to carry the ram
into the objective. He should release the ram away from the entry point, being careful not to
injure team members. The ram can be used to prop open the door; however, this can create an
obstacle that delays the team.
Bolt Cutters
7-12. Bolt cutters are used to cut bolts, locks, chains, fences, and wire that may prevent entry.
The size of the bolt cutters is matched with the type and size of the item to be cut. Thick,
heavy items require more leverage and large bolt cutters; while small, thin items require less
leverage and small bolt cutters.
Crowbar
7-13. A crowbar is approximately 75 cm long and is used to pry objects. It has a gooseneck
and a claw on one end and a flat tip on the other end. A crowbar is lightweight, easy to carry,
indestructible, and effective against light to medium targets.
J-Hook and T-Bar Window Extractors
7-14. J-hook and T-bar window extractors (Figures 7-1 and 7-2) are made of hardened steel
and can be manufactured or bought commercially. They are attached to a vehicle with a chain
or a 1.26 cm steel cable and are used in pairs to pull off grates or window bars. Window
extractors are easy to use and require minimum time on target. However, the objective must
be approached with a vehicle (consider noise and size), which requires a maneuver area.
Figure 7-1. T Bar and Chain.
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Figure 7-2. T Bar and J Hook.
Expedient Breacher’s Kit
7-15. The designated Breacher of an SRT can develop his own kit from readily available
equipment off of the local economy. A Breacher’s Expedient Kit may contain the following
equipment that is useful to a breacher:
• Emergency escape ax. It is used to cut through thin sheet metal and light metal on
vehicle frames. It weighs 1.10 kg and has approximately a 30 cm handle. The ax head
has a steel, serrated edge on one end and a flat, hammer surface on the other end.
• Bolt cutters, 35 cm. They are used to cut bolts, locks, and chains.
• Hacksaw and three blades. It is used to cut metal, steel bars, and cables.
• Fuel-line plugs (three of wood and three of rubber). They are used to plug pipes or
hoses that might become ruptured during an accident.
• Rescue knife. It is used to cut seat belts and straps. It is a J-shaped tool that has two
razor blades in the cutting head.
• Lineman pliers. They are used to cut wire and grasp objects, eliminating the need to
carry two separate tools.
• Vice-grip pliers, 20 cm. They are used to hold and lock onto an object, allowing
hands-free mobility.
• Metal-cutting saw. It is used to cut light metal sheeting. It looks like a standard rip or
crosscut saw, but its teeth are smaller and set closer together.
• Screwdrivers (two cross tip and two flat tip). The sizes needed to fulfill most
requirements are No. 2 and 3 cross tip and No. 3 and 6 flat tip.
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•
•
Grappling hook with a 10 cm sling. It is used to pull items out of the way and is
often used in conjunction with a vehicle and a chain or a rope.
All-purpose saw. It is similar to a chain saw. The chain and bar are replaced with a
blade that is designed to cut metal, concrete, and wood. An all-purpose saw is
effective, but it is slow and cumbersome.
SAFETY
7-16. Safety requires everyone’s effort. It is not enough to teach safety rules; they must be
practiced and enforced. Poorly maintained tools and equipment can be very dangerous and
result in costly accidents during training and operations. The most widely used tools for
manual and mechanical breaching are hand tools and small power tools. Observe the
following guidelines when using tools:
• Wear appropriate personal-protective equipment (safety glasses, hearing protection,
body armor, a helmet, gloves).
• Remove jewelry.
• Select the appropriate tool for the job.
• Know and follow the manufacturer’s instructions.
• Inspect tools before use.
• Repair or replace damaged or broken tools.
• Do not modify tools.
• Use spark-resistant tools when working in a flammable environment.
• Avoid wearing loose clothing that may become entangled in tools.
• Keep unprotected, nonessential personnel out of the work area.
• Sharpen blades.
• Cover sharp edges and points until you are ready to use the tool.
• Ensure proper use and maintenance.
• Remember that metal bands, straps, locks, and cables separate rapidly when cut.
• Take proper steps and precautions to protect team members from flying metal.
• Do not cut bands, locks, or cables diagonally because it binds the tool’s jaws and they
may chip or break.
BALLISTIC BREACHING
7-17. Ballistic breaching should be planned as an alternate entry method. It does not provide
a positive means of entry; and fratricide (friendly fire casualties), noncombatant casualties,
and collateral damage may occur. In some situation, ballistic breaching may be necessary to
gain access to rooms within a structure. It is also advantageous when active or passive
countermeasures are used against entry-team members.
7-18. A shotgun is the primary ballistic breaching tool. An M16A1, M16A2, or an M4 should
be used only as a last resort under extreme circumstances.
ATTACKING A DOOR
7-19. Placement is critical, and certain points on a door must be targeted.
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•
•
•
Doorknob. Never target a doorknob. A round can bend the lock into the door frame,
which will bind the door in place and slow entry. It may also turn the doorknob into a
projectile. Use the muzzle standoff device as a reference instead of the sights.
Lock. Do not attack hardened steel surfaces, but choose a side of the door with
maximum visibility and minimum attachment points. When attacking a lock, place
the muzzle standoff device on the face of the door between the doorknob and the door
frame. Angle into the jamb to remove a portion of the frame on wood doors. If a
standoff is unavailable, position the muzzle 0 to 5 cm from the target. The angle of
the attack should be straight or at a 45-degree angle (Figures 7-3 and 7-4 and Figures
7-5 and 7-6). Once the lock is defeated, push the door open with your support hand
while maintaining proper body and weapon positions. Kick the door open as a last
resort. If a kick is necessary, aim the force of the kick near the lock since it is now the
weakest part of the door.
Hinges. Hinges are positive points of attack because there is less concern about
secondary locking devices, such as dead bolts or chain locks. Hinges may be hidden
from view by the door frame, so team members must know their approximate
location. The horizontal centerlines of hinges on most manufactured doors are 21.5 to
24 cm from the top of the door, at the center of the door, and 29 to 32 cm from the
bottom of the door. If the hinges are attacked, place the shotgun standoff device
directly on the surface of the door or 1 inch from the surface at a 45-degree angle.
One shot per hinge may weaken the door enough for entry, but two or three shots per
hinge may be necessary. The assault team is lined up on the opposite side of the door
from the hinges, which may slow their entry.
Figure 7-3. Angle of Attack
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Figure 7-4. Top View of Muzzle Angle on a Doorknob
Figure 7-5. Front View of a Locking Mechanism
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7-20. The first team member to encounter a locked door sounds off with “Breacher.” The
breacher moves to the door and waits for the signal to breach. The signal to breach is the
command “Breach” while thrusting a clenched fist downward. After the door is defeated, the
breacher steps aside and allows the entry team to enter the room. He assumes the last position
if he is a member of the assault team; otherwise, he remains on call for remaining doors. He
should reload when the action slows. If a rifle is used, strict coordination between entry team
members is critical.
AMMUNITION
7-21. The ammunition used, whether it is ammunition for a shotgun or rifle, has no effect on
the performance or the life of the weapon. All of the ammunition is capable of killing or
injuring individuals positioned on the opposite side of the door. Special ballistic ammunition
is designed to turn to powder on contact with the door. If doorknobs or locking mechanisms
are struck, however, they may become projectiles.
SAFETY
7-26. Table 7-3 shows the hazards associated with ballistic entry. It also outlines the actions
that should be taken to reduce the risks.
Table 7-1. Hazards of Ballistic Entry.
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Chapter 8
Weapon Retention
This chapter discusses the various techniques that team members can use to retain their
weapons (long gun and pistol) when a threat attempts to seize it. The primary means of
weapon retention, however, is a lethal backup.
LONG-GUN RETENTION
8-1. A long gun should be equipped with a sling to provide secure carrying and allow handsfree actions. A long gun without a sling may become a liability to the team and others
involved in a situation. If you must enter an objective with a long gun that does not have a
sling, avoid close proximity to the threat and keep both hands on your weapon. If you enter a
room and the threat grabs your gun, assume that he intends to harm you. If another team
member can obtain target acquisition, he should shoot to eliminate the threat.
FRONT-KICK METHOD
8-2. During clearing operations, both hands are usually on your primary weapon. If the threat
advances too close or is noncompliant when ordered back, bring your primary weapon to the
close-in-ready position. Deliver a front kick, step forward or backward depending on the
situation, and keep the kick below your waist to regain balance quickly.
PUSH-AND-PULL METHOD
8-3. Keep both hands on your weapon and control its direction. Push into the threat to place
him off balance, control the muzzle direction, and reverse momentum suddenly-pulling
backwards. The attacker should let go due to his loss of balance. Try to remain standing and
violently pull the stock into your body. If necessary to control distance, deliver a kick
immediately before or after contact. Cover the threat, select the target area, and shoot until
the threat is eliminated. Be aware that the threat may be wearing body armor with a trauma
plate (lead ricocheting off a trauma plate can injure the shooter). If the threat is wearing body
armor, well placed shots to the head will eliminate the threat.
STRIKE-AND-SHOOT METHOD
8-4. Strike the threat on the base of his chin with the palm of your support hand (palm heel
strike). Push your hand upward and fully extend your arm. The threat’s head will tilt back,
and his balance will carry him away from you. Try to remain standing and pull the weapon
into your body by the pistol grip if one is present (M16, M4) causing the sling to tighten and
the muzzle to point toward the threat. Consider the length of your arm compared to the length
of your gun. If your support arm is extended laterally to the front, the gun’s muzzle may have
to be angled downward. The muzzle may naturally aim low, but you must be aware of your
arm and hand positions before shooting. Direct the muzzle toward the threat’s groin, femoral
artery, or hip and fire until he is eliminated. Continue to push the threat away and withdraw
to a safe, controlled distance. This method may work best if the gun stock is tucked and
squeezed under your armpit (close-in ready position).
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REDIRECT-AND-SHOOT METHOD
8-5. A room filled with clutter may cause you to lose your balance during a struggle. If this
happens, redirect the momentum in a circular direction to either side, away from the wall.
Use the wall to regain your balance and to stun the threat with a violent impact/strike with
your fist, open palm heel strike, or weapon stock. Do not resist the motion; accelerate it,
which causes the threat to experience a whip-like effect. Once the distance is correct,
accelerate the threat’s momentum with a solid, front kick to increase the reactionary gap. If
another team member can obtain target (threat) acquisition, he should shoot to eliminate the
threat.
DROP-AND-SHOOT METHOD
8-6. If you fall to the ground, keep your firing hand on the pistol grip or stock handle. Break
the fall with your support hand by slapping the ground with the palm of your extended arm
before your body strikes the ground. While breaking the fall, kick the threat around his knees
or waist. This increases the distance and causes the sling to tighten. When the middle sling
keeper slides to the rear of the stock, the muzzle should be pointing at the threat. Do not let
the threat land on you; be prepared to kick him away, and fire until he is eliminated.
STEP-DRAW-SHOOT METHOD
8-7. Keep your support hand on the weapon and extend your arm. Kneel back while drawing
the pistol with your firing hand. Bring the pistol to the close-in ready position, shoot the
threat in the pelvis, and fire until he is eliminated. Be aware of where your hand is in relation
to the muzzle of your primary weapon so that you do not shoot yourself.
CLOCK METHOD
8-8. If the threat grabs the muzzle end of your weapon, maintain a firm grip on the weapon.
The rear of the weapon can be controlled better than the muzzle. Vigorously rotate the
muzzle in a full circle, much like following the hands of a .60 meter diameter clock. The
threat’s grip will be broken before the circle is complete. Immediately following the circular
motion, administer a kick or an open-hand strike to the threat’s face with your support hand.
Create distance and shoot if necessary.
WRIST-BREAKING J METHOD
8-9. If the threat grabs the muzzle end of your weapon, grab his hand and squeeze it tightly.
Twist his hand in a circular motion as described in the clock method above. His hand will
bend backward, and the barrel will cross his hand and wrist. His wrist will break if downward
pressure is applied, rendering him incapable of holding or controlling the muzzle of your
weapon.
8-10. The J pattern starts downward and circles to the outside of the threat’s grasping arm in
a quick, circular pattern to 12 o’clock. As the barrel reaches its place on the ulna bone, jerk
the muzzle straight downward to 6 o’clock. Shoot as the muzzle travels across the threat’s
body, and follow with a knee strike or a kick to increase the reactionary gap.
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J METHOD
8-11. The J method is performed like the wrist-breaking method above, except you keep both
hands on your weapon. You shoot through the retention motion or snatch the weapon away.
Follow with a knee strike or a kick to increase the reactionary gap. Remember, the higher the
kick, the more likely you are to lose your balance and deliver a slower kick.
NOTE: The reactionary gap is that distance between you and the advancing assailant or
attacker which allows you sufficient time to respond appropriately to the attacker’s
aggressive action. Generally, this distance is approximately 7-10 meters, depending on
the confidence, training and experience of the individual officer.
PISTOL RETENTION
8-12. Team members must keep in mind that these are last-resort methods. They are used
when a threat has surprised a team member and is attempting to grab the pistol from him.
Ideally, a team member does not let the threat get close enough to grab his weapon.
HOLSTER AND ALERT METHODS
8-13. All team members carry a pistol as their primary or backup weapon. The three basic
carrying positions are holstered, low ready, and close-in-ready. Table 8-1 shows the steps
necessary to retain your pistol in these positions. When a pistol is out of the holster, it is
usually carried in the low-ready or close-in-ready position. It is not actually covering anyone,
but it is ready if needed.
8-14. If suddenly confronted by an attacker, the first step is to get the attacker at least one and
a half (1 ½) to two (2) arm’s length away. The method used to create this distance is called
the “rock and block” or “checking” and it enables the shooter to create distance and draw his
weapon from the holster.
• If the attacker is unarmed and advancing on you, strike his upper chest, head, or face
with the palm of your hand (palm heel strike) to create distance; At the same time
shout, “GET BACK!”
• If the attacker is armed, bring your arm up to the high-block position to block his
blow or parry your weapon to re-direct his blow or thrust. Follow with a strike to his
upper chest or head.
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Table 8-1. Retaining Your Pistol
DISSOLVING METHOD
8-15. If your pistol is out of the holster and the threat grabs your pistol, grab the slide with
your support hand and do not let go. Shout, “Let Go!” as you vigorously attempt to break the
pistol free of the threats grip. Have a team member shoot to eliminate the threat.
CIRCLE-AND-COUNTER METHOD
8-16. If another team member is unavailable, head-butt the threat with your helmet and
perform the J method. If the struggle continues, shoot the threat with the first round in the
chamber and drop the magazine from the weapon or vice versa. Do not expect the weapon to
cycle, and do not expect the threat to give up. If this does not disengage the threat, stay close
to him. Do not let him point the muzzle at you, but press the weapon against his body with
yours.
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DROP-STRIPPING METHOD
8-16. You should fire on the threat if your weapon is loaded and ready. If your weapon is not
ready, stun the threat with a stomp to his instep (foot), a knee strike to his lower torso or
groin, or outer thigh; you can even place a kick to his leg. If this does not work, jerk your
weapon straight down the front of his body with the muzzle pointing up (body dynamics and
loss of balance will cause him to release your weapon).
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Chapter 9
Threat and Occupant Control
Threat and occupant control are perishable skills that must be practiced constantly to
maintain proficiency and “Complacency Kills!” The methods discussed in this chapter have
been developed to control persons that an SRT might encounter during clearing operations.
An SRT’s goal during a threat situation is to release hostages safely, apprehend the threat,
and avoid injuries to self and team members.
SEARCH TEAM
9-1. The most dangerous time during threat control is the initial contact; therefore, the
contact must be swift. Do not give the threat time to think or react, and distract the threat’s
attention when possible.
9-2. There are two types of threats. They are:
• Cooperative. The threat actively and willingly complies with instructions. Caution
must still be exercised.
• Uncooperative.
The threat cannot comply with instructions due to a language barrier or a
handicap.
The threat will not comply with instructions. If the threat will not comply with
instructions, assume that you are being set up for an ambush.
9-3. The search of living, wounded, and dead persons is conducted by a 2-man (minimum)
search team. To insure officer-team member safety, team members handcuff and search all
threats, hostages, and occupants—regardless of rank, sex, position, age, or physical
condition. Verbal commands must be short, clear, and distinct; avoid insults or angry
demeanor. The team is composed of a search man, a threat-cover man, and a room-cover man
(if necessary).
• Search man.
Issues verbal commands.
Conducts searches.
Handles radio communication.
Holsters his weapon before approaching a threat, and informs the cover men
that he is holstering his weapon.
Performs control and handcuffs threats.
Moves threats and hostages to safe areas and separates them.
Removes weapons and sensitive evidence from threats.
Disengages after threats are restrained.
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•
•
Controls and escorts threats out of the objective and/or coordinates with
apprehension teams.
Threat-cover man.
Provides cover for the search man.
Discourages escape and resistance.
Discourages hostile interference.
Alerts the search man to threats.
Resists distraction and maintains target acquisition or scanning.
Assesses threats constantly and expects the unexpected.
Delivers suppressive and precision fire if necessary.
Provides cover from unsearched areas.
Room-cover man (if necessary).
Provides cover for the search man.
Discourages hostile interference.
Alerts the search man to threats.
Resists distraction and maintains target acquisition or scanning.
Assesses threats constantly and expects the unexpected.
Delivers suppressive and precision fire if necessary.
Provides cover from unsearched areas.
OCCUPANCY CONTROL
9-4. Occupancy control consists of contact, counter, control, and cuff. They are known as the
four Cs.
CONTACT
9-5. At some point in the entry and clearing processes, team members make initial contact
with the threat, which requires an immediate, appropriate response. The following actions
may be necessary:
• Recognize the threat visually and assess the type of threat.
• Determine the level of force necessary to control the threat.
• Position the threat so that the team has maximum security.
• Challenge the threat (may include SSA).
• Let the threat know what you expect him to do.
• Obtain the best position possible before beginning the arrest process.
• Slow the engagement to provide maximum reaction time.
• Close the gap between the threat and the team.
• Maintain clear communication. Avoid profanity, slang words, and police jargon.
• Be aware that the threat may not speak Dari or English, or may be handicapped
(mute, deaf, blind). Do not be caught off guard by someone in a wheelchair or on
crutches; crutches may be used as an impact weapon-club or may conceal a knife or
firearm.
COUNTER
9-6. A team member’s reaction to the threat’s resistance should be based on a good working
knowledge of the force continuum or escalation of force. Use anything from a loud voice to
gunfire to counter an assault or resistance from the threat. Move to a dominating position to
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engage the threat. Engage SSA to put the threat in an off-balance, compromised position, and
close the gap to cuff him.
CONTROL
9-7. The team’s goal is to control the threat as quickly as possible with the lowest level of
force necessary. Control techniques must be swift and effective without causing the threat to
fight. However, some people who resist-may be under the influence of drugs, such as heroin
and resist the moment physical contact is made.
CUFF
9-8. A minimum of two team members cover and cuff the threat. If they believe the threat
will physically resist the cuffing process, they request a third team member. The rules for
cuffing are—
• Expect anything; there are no absolutes.
• Avoid injecting a weapon into the mechanics of cuffing.
• Do not try to cuff someone who is not under control.
• Search and secure.
9-9. To eliminate confusion and accelerate the cuffing process, one team member gives
commands, is in control, and applies the cuff. Other team members cover the threat while he
is being placed in the cuffing position (standing, kneeling, or prone). The cuffing position is
determined by the following factors:
• The distance of the reactionary gap.
• The environment (light, visibility, noise, hazardous material, threat level).
• The threat’s clothing or gloves, which may interfere with cuffing.
• Emotions (the intensity of the crisis may stimulate a particular state of mind).
• Channeling (the ability to manipulate the threat’s state of mind and behavior through
actions and communication).
• Support available.
SEARCH PRINCIPLES OF PEOPLE
9-10. A search is conducted on every threat, hostage, and occupant unless emergency
evacuation procedures are in effect. Keep in mind the following principles:
• Search in a clear, secure area when possible.
• Be ready to counter resistance or an assault by the threat.
• Employ the appropriate level of force immediately, based on the threat’s actions.
• Do not step over a body to conduct a search; go around and remain out of sight.
• Search the threat’s waistline 360 degrees for weapons. Search obvious and
inconspicuous areas. Inconspicuous areas (groin, armpits, chest, small of the back)
must be searched on men and women; however, do not linger in these areas.
• Maintain security.
• Brief threats, hostages, and occupants quickly on what to do and who to follow.
9-11. Bodies can be divided into sector for a more efficient search; for example, search from
head to toe or from side to side. The search man announces the items found by shouting,
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“Gun!” or “Knife!” and secures weapons and contraband. He separates occupants by gender
and then by living, injured, and dead; women and children remain together.
SEARCH PRINCIPLES OF ROOMS
9-12. Rooms in which occupants are contacted can contain many dangerous objects. These
can include knives, guns, explosives, or clubs or any item that can be used as a club.
Furniture can even be used aggressively against a team member. Weapons can be disguised
to look like toys to distract the SRT. Look into areas within arms reach or lunging distance of
those detained. Search• Under seat cushions.
• Under carpets and rugs.
• On top of book shelves or furniture.
• Within drawers and cabinets.
• Behind furniture
Figure 9-2. Not a toy-Real CZ 75
Figure 9-3. Not a toy-real AK-47
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Chapter 10
Team-Member Recovery
An SRT member may be thrust into a situation where he must recover and perform first aid
on a fellow team member. This chapter outlines team member recovery techniques.
RECOVERY TEAM
10-1. The SRT SOP should address recovery-team positions, the type of equipment used in
recoveries, and the type of vehicle available to remove a downed team member from an open
area. Recovery-team members must use their heads and never allow their emotions to
override the decision-making process.
10-2. Table 10-1 shows the elements of a recovery team and their responsibilities.
Table 10-1. Responsibilities of a Recovery Team.
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10-3. Recovery-team members—
• Evaluate tactical angles the threat has on the recovery team and the casualty.
• Use a vehicle to increase protection and speed if the threat has higher ground.
• Use cover fire.
• Negotiate, if possible, before attempting a rescue.
• Use cover and concealment.
• Cut off the threat’s AA to team and casualty positions.
• Should be unpredictable (go under structures and through walls and floors).
TRAINING
10-4. SRT training—
• Adheres to the SOP.
• Contains extraction and first-aid techniques.
• Includes practice in moving the heaviest team member a reasonable distance.
INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
10-5. Team members should consider wearing and carrying as much ballistic protection as
possible and discard unnecessary equipment to increase their mobility. The following
equipment may be helpful during recovery missions:
• Body armor with a Level III or IV plate.
• Ballistic shin guards.
• A ballistic shield.
• A Kevlar helmet and a face shield.
• A ballistic blanket (to cover, drag, or carry a casualty).
• Pressure dressing.
• Nylon tubing.
• A drag strap (found on some load-bearing vests [LBVs]).
• A grappling hook.
• A snap link and a 120-foot rope.
• A litter.
• A drag mat.
CONSIDERATIONS
10-6. A quick assessment must be carried out and a decision made to (1) immediately
extricate the wounded, treat life-threatening injuries, and move or (2) delay transportation
and movement. Answers to the following questions may speed the casualty’s rescue:
• What are the extent of his injuries?
• Is he conscious or unconscious?
• Is he able to move to cover on his own?
• Is he able to treat himself?
• Is medical evacuation needed?
• Is he dead?
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10-7. The recovery team should consider disarming the casualty. Members must determine
if—
• The casualty is disoriented or confused.
• The weapon could be used against the team because of the casualty’s disorientation
and confusion.
• The casualty can assist in the defense.
10-8. If the casualty requires first aid, the team must decide if the need to move outweighs
the need to administer emergency medical treatment for movement. This a life-or-death
decision.
10-9. A trained medical professional should be assigned to each recovery team. His primary
function is to provide medical assistance inside the objective and help develop confidence
within the team. During preplanning, he formulates a detailed plan for treating and
evacuating casualties. He should be selected, trained, and equipped like other team members.
Tactical Fundamentals
10-10. Team members use the following tactical fundamentals:
• Perform SSA.
• Conduct rehearsals.
• Shoot, move, and communicate.
• Keep the plan simple.
10-11. Diversion. The SRT determines what is available to divert the threat’s attention. It
uses—
• Suppressive fires to further protect innocent lives.
• Diversionary devices, smoke, ruse, or movement on the perimeter.
• Imagination.
10-12. Cover Fire. This is not blind, indiscriminate fire or full, automatic fire. Team
members lay cover fire as the casualty is extracted. A heavy concentration of focused fire
forces the threat into cover, and randomly timed fire keeps him there.
10-13. Movement. Movement should be definite, sharp, and purposeful. Team members
penetrate only far enough to recover the casualty.
10-14. Communication. There should be communication between elements. The driver and
the controller should have a hands-free communication system.
Influencing Factors
10-15. Training and practice make recovery techniques effective; however, the recovery
process itself may increase the severity of the casualty’s injuries. The following factors must
be considered:
• The bearer’s strength and endurance.
• The casualty’s weight.
• The type of injury.
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•
•
Obstacles encountered during movement.
The threat’s position and elevation.
RECOVERY TECHNIQUES
10-16. Recovery can be divided into two categories—manual and vehicle. Each category has
two techniques.
Manual Recovery
10-17. There are two types of manual recover—unassisted and assisted.
• Unassisted. Using minimal personnel to reduce the chance of increased casualties,
team members move the casualty to a safe area (See Figures 10-1 thru 10-4). Two
bearers move the casualty, and other team members provide ballistic protection.
• Assisted. This method requires fewer personnel to remove the casualty from a hostile
area, but a tool is required (winch, rope with snap links, skateboard, ballistic blanket,
poncho). The recovery element includes one bearer and two shield men, and other
team members operate equipment from a covered position.
Figure 10-1. Legend (1).
Figure 10-2. Recovering a Team member within a Structure (2).
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Figure 10-3. Recovering a Team member within a Structure (3).
Figure 10-4. Recovering a Team member within a Structure (4).
Vehicle Recovery
10-18. Vehicle recovery is usually used in open areas where forward maneuverability is
available and hostile fire is coming from an elevated area. A vehicle provides cover for the
recovery team and the casualty. Team members include a driver, a backup driver, two
bearers, and a cover man (optional).
10-19. Soft-Body Vehicle. When using a soft-body vehicle, such as a HMMWV, for a
recovery mission, consider the vehicle’s following characteristics:
• Low profile.
• Maximum engine-block coverage.
• Easy accessibility to the casualty entrance.
• Minimum window exposure.
• Good working order.
• Ability to sustain small-arms damage and continue to operate.
• High maneuverability.
• Four-wheel drive.
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10-20. Armored Vehicle. An armored security vehicle (ASV) is the best way to approach
and remove a casualty. Some have an easily accessible casualty entrance or an underneath
hatch. However, an ASV requires an experienced driver, is not readily available on all
installations, and is difficult to maneuver.
HOSTAGE-RESCUE DRILL
10-21. Hostage rescue is used to rescue a team member who has been overpowered and taken
hostage during a mission. When a team member is captured, he must be rescued immediately
because statistics show that police taken hostage have a high mortality rate. This technique is
reserved for rescuing trained SRT members only, and it should be addressed in the team’s
SOP.
10-22. A duress signal must be identified and known by all team members before
deployment. The code word is used only in emergencies because the team will take
immediate action.
10-23. The rescue team locates the room where the hostage is being held (Figure 10-5) and
dynamically enters the area. When possible, the rescue team uses a ballistic shield. The
shield carrier moves into the area first and angles toward the threat, and other team members
follow. The team executes a split-team entry. Members are on line, left and right of the
shield, and move rapidly toward the threat.
Figure 10-5. Hostage Rescue.
10-24. The idea is to establish as many angles on the threat as possible without creating a
cross-fire situation, and to eliminate the threat immediately without incurring injuries. The
drill can be initiated by the entry team, the hostage (captured team member), or the threat
(hostage taker).
• Team-initiated drill. Once an entry-team member determines that a shot can be
taken, he gives a prearranged signal. The code word to shoot can be anything, but
remember to keep it simple. The hostage sweeps or pushes the threat’s weapon away
while simultaneously dropping to the ground and leaving the threat exposed. Closing
entry team members engage the threat.
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•
•
Hostage-initiated drill. This is the same as the team-initiated drill, except the
hostage does not wait for a signal.
Threat-initiated drill. The threat initiates the drill if he points his weapon at the
hostage.
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Chapter 11
Vehicle Assault
Training, rehearsal, and organization are critical elements of a successful vehicle assault.
Teams must resist the pressure to assault without rehearsing or when it is tactically unsound
because such operations can injure team members and jeopardize the mission’s success. The
key to any high-risk operation is a well-organized plan that is implemented with SSA. When
the plan is properly executed, it minimizes the risks to everyone. The team’s tactics and
actions should be reflected in the SOP, and team members must be crossed-trained. This
chapter discusses the various elements necessary for a successful vehicle assault.
VEHICLE-ASSAULT TEAM
11-1. Table 11-1 shows the main elements of a vehicle assault team. The list does not include
fire, medical, EOD, and other support elements; but they should be a part of every operation,
especially medical.
Table 11-1. Vehicle Assault Team.
FUNDAMENTALS
11-2. Assault-team members use the following fundamentals:
• Perform SSA.
• Create diversion.
• Employ SEE.
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•
•
•
•
Move sharply, smoothly, and with direction.
Communicate with other team members.
Maintain mental preparedness.
Rehearse.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
11-4. A vehicle assault must be well-planned and rehearsed. Team leaders should bear in
mind the tactical considerations of a successful vehicle assault as outlined in Table 11-2.
Table 11-2. Tactical Considerations.
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VEHICLE PREPARATION
11-5. Special threat situations may arise. For example, a threat may request that a vehicle be
delivered to aid an escape or a drug exchange may require an undercover vehicle. When
possible, prepare the vehicle as follows to give the SRT a tactical advantage:
• Select a four-door sedan with large, clear windows (no tinting), a trunk lid, and
manual locks and windows.
• Remove mirrors or angle them for the team’s advantage.
• Adjust seats completely forward or back.
• Engage the emergency brake.
• Turn the air conditioner and the radio on to mask noise.
• Install a remote or mechanical kill/off switch.
• Disable interior locks.
• Adjust the heater, the horn, wipers, and the radio to operate when tactically
advantageous.
• Limit the fuel supply, and adjust the fuel gauge to indicate full.
• Turn the heater on during winter operations to reduce fogging and increase the assault
team’s visibility. Turn the heater off to reduce or eliminate the threat’s
APPROACH
11-6. Unless the vehicle is located adjacent to cover and concealment, which allows the SRT
to move into position without being detected, the following items must be considered before
conducting an approach:
• Distance to the vehicle. The least amount of time the team is in the open, the better;
therefore, keep the distance between the vehicle and the team to a minimum. If a
great amount of distance must be covered, the team should approach in another
vehicle.
• Direction of approach. The approach should be from the rear or the direction that
affords the least chance of detection.
• Concealment methods. The following concealment methods should be considered
when a team assaults a vehicle in an open area:
Smoke.
A helicopter that kicks up dust.
Floodlights or multiple distraction devices (during darkness).
• Distraction methods. A distraction is executed by the assault team or other
personnel, and it should be initiated simultaneously with the assault. When planning a
distraction, consider the situation, the mission, and ROE parameters. Use your
imagination, and consider employing—
A smoke grenade or flash bang tossed on the hood or forward of the vehicle
(it can be tossed inside the vehicle as a last resort).
A ruse or a mock confrontation.
A ramming vehicle.
ASSAULT METHODS
11-7. There are three methods used to assault a vehicle. They are blocking, U-shaped, and Lshaped.
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BLOCKING ASSAULT
11-8. Blocking is the best way to stop a vehicle, and there are two methods that can be used.
Inverted Y (Figures 11-1 and 11-2) and T-shaped (Figure 11-3).
Figure 11-1. Inverted “Y” Vehicle Stop.
Figure 11-2. Inverted “Y” with an SRT Follow up.
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Figure 11-3. T-Shaped Vehicle Stop.
11-9. Planners must decide whether to execute the movement in a built-up or open area. If
blocking is to take place in a built-up area, evacuate the occupants of the building. When
conducting a drug raid, use one vehicle to block the front of the threat’s vehicle and another
vehicle to block the rear to prevent movement.
L-SHAPED ASSAULT
11-10. An L-shaped assault (Figure 11-4 thru Figure 11-8) is the preferred method when the
team encounters a moving vehicle. This method reduces the chance of cross fire and requires
fewer team members. However, an L-shaped assault reduces flank security, decreases control
of a fleeing threat, and slows threat evacuation.
Figure 11-4. Steps of an L-Shaped Assault (1).
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Figure 11-5. Steps of an L-Shaped Assault (2).
Figure 11-6. Steps of an L-Shaped Assault (3).
Figure 11-7. Steps of an L-Shaped Assault (4).
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Figure 11-8. Steps of an L-Shaped Assault (5).
11-11. To execute an L-shaped assault, a 5- to 7-man assault team moves from its last
covered-and-concealed position, creates a diversion and, if necessary, initiates concealment
techniques. The team divides into two elements—left or right flank and rear security; they
arrive at the objective simultaneously. Left and right flanks have identical responsibilities.
Individual responsibilities are shown in Table 11-3; and ballistic-shield protection is
maintained as long as possible.
11-12. If any team member engages a threat, he must do so only at angles within his sector of
fire. When clearing the trunk or the cargo area, the ballistic shield moves to the rear of the
vehicle and provides security. One team member opens the trunk while positioned behind a
ballistic shield, and other team members maintain rear security.
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Table 11-3. Responsibilities for an L-Shaped Vehicle Assault.
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Chapter 12
Entry-Team Marksmanship Training
This chapter concentrates on the skills that an entry-team member needs to eliminate the
threat and survive building clearing operations.
SHOOTING STANCE
12-1. Speed and accuracy are both important, but accuracy is crucial. You must be as quick
as possible without sacrificing accuracy. The objective in a gunfight is to stop the threat; and
to accomplish this, you must have well placed rounds on the target. A critical factor is your
shooting stance because it is the platform for the weapon. You must have good balance, be
able to move in any direction easily and quickly, and be able to counter the recoil of the
weapon and keep it on target. Consider the following points:
• Feet. Place your feet about shoulder-width apart, point your toes directly at the target,
and ensure that your support foot is about 18 cm in front of your firing foot. If you are
right-handed, everything on your right is firing and everything on your left is support;
the opposite is true if you are left-handed.
• Knees. Flex your knees with slightly more weight on the balls of your feet than on
your heels (60%/40%). Squatting too much is tiring and detracts from your focus on
important fundamentals.
• Trunk. Square your trunk with the target. Lean slightly forward and maintain enough
tension in your abdomen to counter the recoil and keep your balance. Keep your
shoulders squared with the target.
• Head. Hold your head erect in a natural position or slightly tilted so that your cheek
contacts your firing shoulder. You must be able to look out over the weapon to search
for the threat.
• Arms.
Pistol. Straighten both arms and lock your elbows to form an isosceles (a
triangle with two equal sides) stance. A modified isosceles stance can be
formed by bending your support elbow, pushing with your firing hand, and
pulling with your support hand to create isometric tension in the weapon’s
grip.
Long gun. Keep your elbows in to increase stability (absorb more recoil with
less sight disturbance) and reduce the chance of hitting objects, such as door
jams, as you move about.
• Hands. Place the meaty portion of your firing hand behind the back strap. Offset your
support hand slightly forward so that the heel is flat against the support side of the
handgun. Grip with your support hand twice as much as your firing hand. Your firing
hand should grip the weapon with the same force as you would grip a hammer while
driving a nail. You should fire with two hands, if possible, but you may have to fire
one-handed. Therefore, practice firing with your support hand and your firing hand.
Pistol. Ensure that the heels of your hands come together evenly (isosceles or
modified isosceles), as they do when you are clapping hands.
Long gun. Position your hands on the fore grip and the pistol grip.
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GRIP
12-2. The shooting stance requires gross motor skills and large muscle groups, while the grip
requires fine motor skills and concentration. If shooting problems exist or develop, they are
usually caused by an inappropriate grip. Form the grip as follows:
• Make a V between your firing forefinger and thumb, and place your firing hand as
high on the back strap as possible.
• Place your trigger finger outside the trigger guard until you are ready to engage the
target.
• Wrap your other three fingers around the pistol grip. Your middle finger should
contact the trigger guard.
• Complete the grip by contacting your thumb with your middle finger on the opposite
side.
• Place your firing thumb over your support thumb and point them toward the target.
Do not squeeze with your thumbs.
• Hold the weapon firmly, but not so tight that your hands shake.
12-3. Specific instructions for a pistol and a long gun are—
• Pistol.
Ensure that the heel of your support hand is even with the heel of your firing
hand.
Curl your fingers around the pistol grip, over the top of your firing fingers. Your
forefinger should contact the trigger guard.
Rest your support thumb on top of your firing thumb.
• Long gun.
Ensure that your support palm supports the fore grip as it lies between the web of
your thumb and fingers. Use a forward pistol grip if possible.
Curl your fingers around the fore grip to help stabilize the weapon.
Pull the weapon into your shoulder.
12-4. Keep your trigger finger outside the trigger guard until you are ready to engage the
target. If the weapon has a de-cock lever, de-cock the weapon after engaging the target and
returning to the low-ready position.
SAFETY LEVER
12-5. The safety lever should be off during SRT operations. Always apply weapon-safety
rules.
LANYARDS
12-6. Consider the use of lanyards before beginning SRT operations. Lanyards can be used
for secondary weapons (pistols) during movement in or over water, but avoid using them for
primary weapons. Pistols issued for operational purposes need not be secured by a lanyard
except where specified by the SRT SOP. Constantly monitor the security of your weapon.
WEAPON POSITIONS
12-7. There are three weapon positions used by the SRT. They are low ready, close-in ready,
and firing.
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LOW READY
12-8. The low-ready position (Table 12-1) is used when contact is imminent and immediately
after engaging a target to scan for other threats. It can also be used when the threat’s exact
position is unknown and an unobstructed view of the threat area is required. Table 12-2
outlines the steps necessary to present a weapon from the low-ready position.
Table 12-1. Assuming a Low-Ready Position.
Table 12-2. Presenting from a Low-Ready Position.
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CLOSE-IN READY
12-9. The close-in-ready position (Table 12-3) is used for weapon retention when a threat
encounter is possible; for example, when entering a door or maneuvering around a corner.
Table 12-4 outlines the steps necessary to present a weapon from the close-in-ready position.
Table 12-3. Assuming a Close-In-Ready Position.
Table 12-4. Presenting from the Close-In-Ready Position.
DRAWING FROM A HOLSTER
12-10. Statistics show that the average pistol confrontation is over in about 3 1/2 seconds.
Although an SRT member normally has his pistol drawn during building clearing (BC)
operations, he must be able to remove his pistol from its holster quickly and smoothly. A
shooter who comes out of the holster smoothly, presents his weapon to the threat, and presses
off a shot as he completes the lock out will usually win the confrontation. If he is not smooth,
the faster he tries to draw, the more mistakes he will make—and mistakes kill.
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12-11. Holstering procedures are shown in Table 12-5, and presentation procedures are
shown in Table 12-6. They can be applied to hip, leg, thigh, shoulder, and chest holsters with
little modification.
Table 12-5. Pistol Holstering Procedures.
12-12. An M9 is normally carried by an SRT member as a backup weapon. It should be
carried in the holster with the magazine inserted, the slide forward on a loaded chamber, and
the safety on. The holster’s flap should be fastened. Holstering a loaded pistol requires the
strictest attention to safety. Concentrate on muzzle awareness and keeping your trigger finger
straight.
12-13. Bringing your pistol from the holster and firing two well-placed shots in 1 1/2 seconds
is not difficult, but it does take practice. Remember, it is not the person who presents his
weapon first that wins—it is the person who draws smoothly and fires the first accurate
round. Concentrate on a smooth flowing motion from the first repetition. You cannot attain
speed immediately; but it will come with time, practice, ability, and coordination.
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Table 12-6. Removing a Pistol from the Holster Procedures.
COMBAT RELOADING
12-14. During the confusion and stress of a fight, the act of reloading must be second nature
to every team member. Reloading procedures must be completely understood and practiced
at every opportunity, because hesitation and unfamiliarity are breeding grounds for mission
failure. The team must develop a consistent method for carrying magazines in ammunition
pouches.
12-15. When carrying ammunition for a shotgun or an M203, if they are available, the team
must be equally consistent. Rounds for these weapons come in a variety of loads that are
designed for specific jobs. When carrying shotgun and M203 (40-mm) ammunition, the loads
should be carried separately. The use of sidesaddles, butt socks, chest pouches, or leg
pouches is a necessity. Always face ammunition in the carrier with the projectile pointing
down.
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12-16. The shooter must keep track of the number of rounds fired. He must be acutely aware
of the recoil, the sound of cycling, and the appearance of his weapon in all conditions of
operation, including when it runs out of ammunition.
CHANGING MAGAZINES AND CHARGING THE WEAPON
12-17. You must be familiar with the procedures for reloading your assigned weapon. Reload
it before it is empty, leaving one round in the chamber to prevent being caught with an empty
weapon. By leaving a round in the chamber, time is not wasted releasing the slide or the bolt.
12-18. Keep a firm grip on the magazine, the ammunition, and the weapon to minimize the
risk of dropping items and to prevent other difficulties. Do not try to locate a dropped
magazine or round; retrieve another one from the pouch. When retrieving a magazine from
an ammunition pouch—
• Turn your hand so that your knuckles are toward your body and your palm is out.
• Place your index finger high on the front of the magazine when withdrawing it.
• Use your index finger to check for proper positioning of the first round and to guide
the magazine into the magazine well.
RELOADING PROCEDURES
12-19. Reloading is nothing more than a combination of loading and unloading. There are
three methods of combat reloading—rapid, tactical, and one-handed (emergency).
• Rapid. This method is used during a fire fight when lives are in danger. Table 12-7
describes rapid reloading procedures.
• Tactical. This method is used during a lull in the battle when time is available for the
shooter to retain the magazine for later use. Table 12-8 describes tactical reloading
procedures.
• One-handed. This method is used when the shooter cannot use both hands to reload.
For example, if he has suffered an arm injury or is carrying a ballistic shield. Tables
12-9 and 12-10 describes one-handed reloading procedures.
Table 12-7. Rapid Reloading Procedures.
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Table 12-8. Tactical Reloading Procedures.
Table 12-9. One-Hand Reloading Procedures.
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Table 12-10. One-Hand Reloading Procedures (continued).
SHOTGUN RAPID RELOADING PROCEDURES
12-20. The shotgun, if available, must be reloaded at every opportunity. The limited
capacity of the magazine tube makes it a marginal primary entry weapon, and it should be
reserved for deploying nonlethal or ballistic breaching loads. Several types of loads can be
fired from the shotgun, which lets the SRT accomplish diversified tasks during entry. The
reloading method shown in Table 12-11- allows the shooter to remove the round in the
chamber and alternate it with one needed to complete a particular task. For example, the
shooter may have to change the ballistic breaching load to a non-lethal load.
12-21. There are two methods of reloading alternate ammunition for a semiautomatic and
pump shotgun—direct chamber and magazine tube. The ammunition changeover is
conducted while the No. 2 man provides cover.
• Direct chamber. This method is used when alternating rounds in a pump or
semiautomatic shotgun (SEE Tables 12-12 and 12-13).
• Magazine tube. This method is used with a pump or semiautomatic shotgun (SEE
Tables 12-14).
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Table 12-11. Shotgun Reloading Procedures.
Table 12-12. Direct Chamber Shotgun Reloading Procedures.
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Table 12-13. Direct Chamber Shotgun Reloading Procedures (continued).
Table 12-14. Magazine Tube Reloading Procedures.
ENGAGING MULTIPLE TARGETS
12-22. As an SRT member, you may find yourself confronted by more than one opponent.
While the odds are against you, it is still possible to win if you know what to do without
hesitating. You must act quickly and adhere to the marksmanship fundamentals. The first
step is to assess the threat immediately (weapons, distance, cover available, armor,
intentions). There are two ways to engage multiple targets.
• Prioritizing. Place each threat in a priority sequence and engage them in succession
from the most to the least threatening. For example, the threat closest to you or the
threat that can do you the most harm is the highest priority. A man with a gun is a
higher priority than a man with a knife.
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•
Sequencing. Engage each target in sequence, left to right or vice versa. You will
normally start with the closest or most threatening target.
12-23. The keys to successfully engaging multiple threats and surviving are self-control,
maneuver, fast action, alternate engagement, and recoil.
• Self-control. Even though sequencing and prioritizing are the preferred methods for
engaging multiple targets, your motor reflexes will identify what they perceive as the
most threatening. They will lock in on that target and engage it, even though it may
not be the most threatening. Adhering to fundamental training is the most valuable
tool for maintaining self-control.
• Maneuver. A knife-wielding attacker right in front of you is just as deadly as a threat
with a gun. Try to increase the distance between you and the target.
• Fast action. The key to surviving multiple targets is to seek cover and start shooting
immediately. Even if you have not prioritized or sequenced the targets, start shooting.
Depending on the amount of training received, your reflexes will take over and
engage the targets as you have been taught. Do not waste precious seconds trying to
analyze the situation unless you do so from a covered position before the engagement.
• Alternate engagement. Another key to engaging multiple targets is to engage them
alternately until they are defeated. For example, do not shoot one target several times
before engaging others. Hit them all once or twice, and then go back and reengage
those who are still a threat.
• Recoil. Allow the weapon’s recoil to move from target to target instead of moving
your body from target to target. Remember to stop and lock onto each target. This
method takes practice, but it will build the speed necessary to engage multiple targets
rapidly.
TRANSITION DRILL
12-24. If your primary weapon is damaged or malfunctions, you must immediately present
your secondary weapon. Weapon transition is the transfer from the primary weapon to the
secondary weapon. The techniques, methods, and fundamentals for both weapons apply
when executing a transition drill. You must fire quickly and accurately with your primary
weapon, make a smooth transition to your secondary weapon, and fire quickly and accurately
with your secondary weapon. The last action is the most difficult, because there is a tendency
to rush the first couple of shots with the secondary weapon and not apply basic
marksmanship fundamentals.
12-25. Table 12-15 describes the process of transitioning from a long gun to a secondary
weapon. It is extremely important that the cover man acknowledge the shooter’s “Green”
with “Move” before the shooter stands up.
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Table 12-15. Transition Drill.
CONTROLLED PAIR
12-26. Firing a controlled pair from a pistol requires two rapidly fired, accurate rounds. They
increase the probability of a hit by about 40 percent, which increases the probability of
stopping the threat. The target’s threat and distance determine the speed necessary.
12-27. You must master slow-aimed fire and single-shot and double-action
shooting before moving to a controlled pair. The trigger pull is accelerated, but
not to the point where it becomes jerky. Preferably, your trigger finger never
loses contact with the trigger. Place both hits in a 4-inch area inside the kill
zone to maximize tissue damage, trauma, hydrostatic shock, and blood loss.
12-28. The methods of firing a controlled pair are double-tap and rapid-aimed fire.
• Double-tap fire. This method is used out to 7 meters where speed and concentration
on the sights are required. The weapon is brought into action quickly, and a flashfront sight is used for both rounds. The time between rounds is only long enough for
the weapon to settle on a second flash-front sight.
• Rapid-aimed fire. This method is used at ranges beyond 7 meters. The weapon is
brought into action quickly, and the sight alignment and the sight picture are used for
both shots.
12-29. To break the tunnel vision that develops after firing, immediately scan the area left,
right, above, and below the target. This is a critical time. Look for other threats, and do not
be preoccupied by the sight of a downed threat. In BC operations, a threat can be encountered
from any direction. The method used to encounter threats from any direction is called
“Traversing.” Most of these techniques can be applied to pistols and long guns.
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12-30. TRAVERSING 360°
a. Crouch Traverse 360°: In close combat, the enemy may be attacking from all sides. The
soldier may not have time to constantly change his position to adapt to new situations. The
purpose of the crouching or kneeling traverse 360° is to fire in any direction without
moving the feet. The firer remains in the crouch position with feet almost parallel to each
other. The following instructions are for a right-handed firer. The two-hand grip is used at
all times except for over the right shoulder. Turning will be natural on the balls of the feet.
(1) Over the left shoulder (see Figure 12-1): The upper body is turned to the left, the
weapon points to the left rear with the elbows of both arms bent. The left elbow will
naturally be bent more than the right elbow.
Figure 12-1.
Figure 12-2.
(2) Traversing to the left (see Figure 12-2 above): The upper body turns to the right,
and the right firing arm straightens out. The left arm will be slightly bent.
(3) Traversing to the front (see Figure 12-3): The upper body turns to the front as the
left arm straightens out. Both arms will be straight forward.
(4) Traversing to the right (see Figure 12-4): The upper body will turn to the right as
both elbows bend. The right elbow will naturally bend more than the left.
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Figure 12-3.
Figure 12-4.
(5) Traversing to the right rear (see Figure 12-5): The upper body continues to turn to
the right until it reaches a point that it cannot go further comfortably. Eventually the
left hand will have to release itself from the fist grip and the firer will be shooting to
the right rear with the right hand.
Figure 12-5.
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b. Kneeling Traverse 360°. The following instructions are for right-handed firers. The hands
are in a two-hand grip at all times. The unsupported kneeling position is used. The rear foot
must be positioned to the left of the front foot.
(1) Traversing to the left side (see Figure 12-6): The upper body turns to a comfortable
position toward the left. The weapon is aimed to the left. Both elbows are bent with the
left elbow naturally bent more than the right elbow.
Figure 12-6.
Figure 12-7.
(2) Traversing to the front (see Figure 12-7 above): The upper body is turned to the
front, and a standard unsupported kneeling position is assumed. The right firing arm is
straight, and the left elbow is slightly bent.
(3) Traversing to the right side (see Figure 12-8): The upper body turns to the right as
both arms straighten out.
(4) Traversing to the rear (see Figure 12-9): The upper body continues to turn to the
right as the left knee is turned to the right and placed on the ground. The right knee is
lifted off the ground and becomes the forward knee. The right arm is straight, while the
left arm is bent. The direction of the kneeling position has been reversed.
(5) Traversing to the new right side (see Figure 12-10): The upper body continues to
the right. Both elbows are straight until it reaches a point that it cannot comfortably to
further. Eventually, the left hand must be released from the fist grip, and the firer will
be firing to the right with the one-hand grip.
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Figure 12-8.
Figure 12-9.
Figure 12-10.
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c . Training Method. This method can be taught anywhere without a weapon by the firer
simulating a two-hand grip. The firer should be familiar with firing in all five directions.
FAILURE DRILL
12-31. A threat may not fall or discontinue the attack even after being shot in the chest twice
(controlled pair). If the attack is planned, he may be wearing soft body armor to absorb the
rounds or he may have taken drugs to mask the pain of injuries. If he is motivated to kill, his
adrenaline level alone can be enough to mask the pain.
12-32. There are numerous documented cases where a threat has been shot several times with
a variety of ammunition and continued to fight. Voluntary activity can persist 10 to 15
seconds after receiving lethal shots to the chest cavity. A failure drill followed by a
controlled pair should be executed to stop a mortally wounded aggressor who continues to be
a threat. Table 12-16 describes the failure-drill process, which should be practiced every time
an SRT is on the range.
Table 12-16. Failure Drill.
NIGHT MARKSMANSHIP
12-33. The most important criteria for night training is to train to the mission, not to the
team’s equipment. All the specialized equipment in the world cannot replace a well-trained,
skilled shooter. Every member of an SRT must become proficient in nighttime BC
operations. A comprehensive plan should detail the advantages provided by the team’s
equipment and specify when it is a hindrance to mission accomplishment. Remember, there
is no failsafe system that allows an individual to identify and engage a target in the dark.
NIGHT VISION AND INFRARED
12-34. The entry team may be equipped with night-vision goggles (NVG), an AN/PAQ-4
aiming light, or other IR devices. This equipment allows team members to move and assault
at night. They also retain the element of surprise because they are not using a white light that
can compromise them. Every opportunity to fire must be fully exploited when using NVDs.
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12-35. NVDs also have disadvantages. They require a great deal of familiarization and
training, and there is an increased risk of equipment failure. In addition, the loss of depth
perception and peripheral vision will slow team members. Some early model NVG are
subject to white out from a muzzle or a distraction-device flash.
12-36. The team should choose equipment that suits the mission and maximizes SSA. Once
the entry team reaches the breaching point, NVDs may be removed depending on the type of
clearing. Mission success depends on quickly identifying and engaging the threat.
WHITE LIGHT
12-37. White lights are usually used to identify targets, and they should be covered until
needed. They have the following advantages and disadvantages:
• Advantages.
Are readily available, inexpensive, and easily maintained.
Require minimal additional training.
Provide the fastest means of identifying targets and searching rooms.
Allow a shooter to use iron sights.
• Disadvantages.
Will compromise positions of team members and make them vulnerable to
undetected threats.
May be accidentally activated and compromise the mission.
NOTE: Depending on the type of NVDs, team members may not have to remove their
NVG when white light is used and they may not be vulnerable to white out.
ILLUMINATING THE TARGET
12-38. Use pistol tactical mounts when possible. If tactical mounts are unavailable, use small
handheld lights. To engage a target with a light, with or without an IR filter, illuminate the
target to identify it and silhouette the sights of the weapon on the illuminated portion. Line
up the sights, and engage the target. There are four basic pistol-and-flashlight methods that
will be covered.
• Harries.
• Ayoob.
• Chapman.
• Crossed wrist.
Harries Method
12-39. The Harries method is shown in Figure 12-11 . It uses a locking-type stability.
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Figure 12-11. The Harries Method.
Ayoob Method
12-40. The Ayoob method (Figure 12-12) is the most popular among isosceles shooters
because it employs a variation of that method. It is also the fastest and safest method.
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Figure 12-12. The Ayoob Method.
Chapman Method
12-41. The Chapman method (Figure 12-13) can be assumed quickly. It is best used with a
thin flashlight (one using AA batteries) that has an on/off switch on the side. The larger the
flashlight, the less stable the grip on the weapon and the flashlight is. The disadvantages of
this method include fatigue and the possibility of dropping the flashlight because it is held by
only two fingers.
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Figure 12-13. The Chapman Method.
Crossed-Wrist Method
12-42. The crossed-wrist method (Figure 12-14) is similar to the Harries method. However,
the light is held in your support hand with the palm up.
Flashlight on a Primary Weapon
12-43. This method is used when the weapon has a light source mounted on it. If the weapon
malfunctions, the light source can still be used. When using this method, support the weapon
at the light source with your support hand, while controlling the on/off switch with your
thumb and forefinger. Aim the light source and the primary weapon at the target, and fire the
secondary weapon (pistol) using the single-hand firing method.
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Figure 12-14. The Cross Wrist Method.
MOUNTING A FLASHLIGHT ON AN M4
12-44. All long guns, including an M4, should have a dedicated light system. If a commercial
light system is unavailable, you must improvise one. The simplest way to provide a white
light on an M4 is to mount a flashlight on it. Securely mount the flashlight to the hand
guards, on the side or underneath, with two 4-inch hose clamps. You can use flex cuffs or
duct tape if necessary; however, sustained firing will loosen the flashlight. Place the on/off
switch where it is easily accessible.
12-45. A wide or narrow flashlight beam can be used. A wide beam provides a larger light
path to follow and makes searching easier. A narrow beam enhances quick-kill capabilities at
close range. If the flashlight is mounted underneath the weapon, the point where the beam is
most concentrated is roughly the location of the round’s impact.
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SILHOUETTED-TARGET METHOD
12-46. It is unusual to encounter an environment of total darkness. Even at night, there is
normally enough ambient light to see an object 20 meters away, especially if it is moving. A
weapon’s sights, however, cannot be seen when held at eye level. Therefore, a shooter must
rely entirely on his stance and presentation to place the weapon on target.
12-47. Depending on stance alone, an experienced shooter should be able to consistently
draw and hit a 25 centimeter circle at 7 meters. For example, you are covering a stationary
target and want to confirm the sight-alignment picture. Rotate your torso and the weapon to
the left or right, moving to a more illuminated area. Check your position and the sights, and
rotate your torso back on line with the target. This is a pre-check for reflexive stance and
presentation; it is not normally done when covering a live threat.
12-48. If a target is in an illuminated area when the sights are placed on it, a textbook sight
alignment should be seen. For training, place a light on a target while the shooter is still in
the dark. Have the shooter obtain a sight picture on the target; the sight alignment should be
near perfect.
MUZZLE-FLASH METHOD
12-49. It is possible to engage short-range targets by using the muzzle flash from the first
shot to illuminate the front sight. This enables you to centralize your aim quickly and fire the
second shot. To use this method, concentrate hard on the target area and the top of the
weapon as you fire the first shot. Your eye is immediately drawn to the front sight when it is
illuminated by the muzzle flash. Make corrections in aim instantly before firing subsequent
shots. This method requires practice. You must fire with both eyes open and concentrate
intensely on the target area.
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Chapter 13
Marksman/Observer Sniper Team
The M/O sniper team is an essential element of the SRT, and it contributes to the team’s
success. It provides security overwatch, real-time intelligence, and precision fire. This
chapter provides M/O sniper teams with the information that is required to increase their
skills. Further training and mission planning information can be found in ANA 23-10, Sniper
Training Manual.
13-1. HASTY AND DETAILED SEARCHES
While observing a target area, the M/O sniper team alternately conducts two types of visual
searches: they are “hasty” and “detailed.”
13-2. A hasty search is the first phase of observing a target area. The M/O team conducts a
hasty search immediately after the team occupies the firing position. A hasty search consists
of quick glances with binoculars at specific points, terrain features, or other areas that could
conceal the enemy. The M/O views the area closest to the team’s position first since it could
pose the most immediate threat. The M/O then searches farther out until the entire target area
has been searched. When the observer sees or suspects a target, he uses an M144 observation
telescope (Figure 13-1) or other type of spotting scope, if available for a detailed view of the
target area. The telescope should not be used to search the area because its narrow field
of view would take much longer to cover an area; plus, its stronger magnification can cause
eye fatigue sooner than the binoculars.
Figure 13-1. M144 Spotting Scope
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13-3. After a hasty search has been completed, the observer then conducts a detailed search
of the area. A detailed search is a closer, more thorough search of the target area, using 180degree area or sweeps, 50 meters in depth, and overlapping each previous sweep at least 10
meters to ensure the entire area has been observed. Like the hasty search, the observer begins
by searching the area closest to the sniper team position.
13-4. This cycle of a hasty search followed by a detailed search should be repeated three or
four times. This allows the sniper team to become accustomed to the area; plus, the team will
look closer at various points with each consecutive pass over the area. After the initial
searches, the observer should view the area, using a combination of both hasty and detailed
searches. While the observer conducts the initial searches of the area, the sniper should
record prominent features, reference points, and distances on a range card. The team
members should alternate the task of observing the area about every 20 minutes.
13-5. ELEMENTS OF OBSERVATION
The four elements in the process of observation include awareness, understanding, recording,
and response. Each of these elements may be accomplished as a separate process or
accomplished at the same time.
a. Awareness. Awareness is being consciously attuned to a specific fact. A sniper team
must always be aware of the surroundings and take nothing for granted. The team also
considers certain elements that influence and distort awareness.
(1) An object’s size and shape can be misinterpreted if viewed incompletely or
inaccurately.
(2) Distractions degrade the quality of observations.
(3) Active participation or degree of interest can diminish toward the event.
(4) Physical abilities (five senses) have limitations.
(5) Environmental changes affect accuracy.
(6) Imagination may cause possible exaggerations or inaccuracy.
b. Understanding. Understanding is derived from education, training, practice, and
experience. It enhances the sniper team’s knowledge about what should be observed,
broadens its ability to view and consider all aspects, and aids in its evaluation of
information.
c. Recording. Recording is the ability to save and recall what was observed. Usually, the
M/O sniper team has mechanical aids, such as writing utensils, sniper data book, sketch
kits, tape recorders, and cameras, to support the recording of events; however, the most
accessible method is memory. The ability to record, retain, and recall depends on the
team’s mental capacity (and alertness) and ability to recognize what is essential to record.
Added factors that affect recording include;
(1) The amount of training and practice in observation.
(2) Skill gained through experience.
(3) Similarity of previous incidents.
(4) Time interval between observing and recording.
(5) The ability to understand or convey messages through oral or other
communications.
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d. Response. Response is the sniper team’s action toward information. It may be as simple
as recording events in a sniper data book, making a communications call, or firing a wellaimed shot.
13-6. TWILIGHT TECHNIQUES
Twilight induces a false sense of security, and the M/O sniper team must be extremely
cautious. The enemy is also prone to carelessness and more likely to expose himself at
twilight. During twilight, snipers should be alert to threat movement and threat observation
locations. If the M24 Sniper System is being used, the MK4, telescope reticle is still visible
and capable of accurate fire 30 minutes before morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and 30
minutes after end evening nautical twilight (EENT).
13-7. NIGHT TECHNIQUES
Without night vision devices, the sniper team must depend upon eyesight. Depending on the
target area, illumination may be present, such as the interior/exterior lighting of a building or
structure. Regardless of night brightness, the human eye cannot function at night with
daylight precision. For maximum effectiveness, the M/O sniper team must apply the
following principles of night vision:
a. Night Adaptation. The sniper team should wear sunglasses or red-lense goggles in
lighted areas before departing on a mission. After departure, the team makes a darkness
adaptation and listening halt for 30 minutes.
b. Off-Center Vision. In dim light, an object under direct focus blurs, appears to change,
and sometimes fades out entirely. However, when the eyes are focused at different points,
about 5 to 10 degrees away from an object, peripheral vision provides a true picture. This
allows the light-sensitive portion of the eye that is not used during the day, to be used.
c. Factors Affecting Night Vision. The sniper team has control over the following night
vision factors:
(1) Lack of vitamin A impairs night vision. However, an overdose of vitamin A will
not improve night vision capability.
(2) Colds, fatigue, narcotics, headaches, smoking, and alcohol reduce night vision.
(3) Exposure to bright light degrades night vision and requires a re adaptation to
darkness.
13-8. ILLUMINATION AIDS
The M/O sniper team may occasionally have artificial illumination for observing and firing.
Examples are artillery illumination fire, campfires, or lighted buildings.
a. Artillery Illumination Fire. The illuminating cartridge can provide 50,000 candlepower.
b. Campfires. Poorly disciplined enemy soldiers or insurgents may use campfires, or fires
may be created by battlefield damage. These opportunities give the sniper enough
illumination for aiming.
c. Lighted Buildings. The M/O team can use lighted buildings to eliminate occupants of the
building or personnel in the immediate area of the light source.
13-9.TARGET DETECTION AND SELECTION
Recording the specific information about the threat or threats and their location in the area
helps the M/O team to determine engage-able targets, especially when multiple people are
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present, such as possible hostages; It also provides factual information during the follow on
debrief when the operation or mission is completed. The M/O sniper team must prioritize the
greatest threat if none has been assigned thru pre-mission intelligence planning.
13-10. TARGET INDEXING
When indexing a target to the marksman sniper, the observer locates a prominent feature near
the target or describes the clothing the target is wearing. He indicates this feature and, or any
other information to the marksman to assist in finding the target. Information between team
members varies with the situation. The observer may sound like a forward observer (FO)
giving a call for fire to an fire direction center (FDC) depending on the condition of the
operational area and the total number of possible targets from which to choose.
a. Purpose. The M/O team indexes targets for the following reasons:
(1) Indiscriminate firing may needlessly kill or injure hostages or friendly personnel.
(2) Indiscriminate firing may alert a more dangerous and closer threat target(s).
(3) A system is needed to remember location if several threats are sighted at the same
time.
b. Considerations. The MP M/O team must consider the following factors when indexing
targets:
(1) Exposure times. Moving threats may expose themselves for only a short time.
The M/O team must note the point of disappearance of each threat, if possible, before
engagement. By doing so, the team may be able to take several targets under fire in
rapid succession.
(2) Number of threats. If several threats appear and disappear at the same time, the
point of disappearance of each is hard to determine; therefore, M/O teams concentrate
on the most important threat.
(3) Spacing/distance between targets. The greater the distance between the threats, the
harder it is to see their movement. In such cases, the team should locate and engage the
nearest threats.
(4) Evacuation of aiming points. Threats that disappear behind good aiming points are
easily recorded and remembered; threats with poor aiming points are easily lost.
Assuming that two such threats are of equal value and danger, the team should engage
the more dangerous threat first.
c. Determination of Location of Hidden Fires. When using the crack-thump method, the
team listens for the crack of the round and the thump of the weapon being fired. By using
this method, the marksman can obtain both a direction and a distance.
(1) Distance to firer. The time difference between the crack and the thump can be
converted into an approximate range. A one-second lapse between the two is about 600
meters with most calibers; a one-half-second lapse is about 300 meters.
(2) Location of firer. By observing in the direction of the thump and near the
predetermined range, the M/O team has a good chance of seeing the enemy’s muzzle
flash or blast from subsequent shots.
(3) Limitations. The crack-thump method has the following limitations:
(a) Isolating the crack and thump is difficult when many shots are being fired.
(b) Mountainous areas, tall buildings, and so forth cause echoes and make this
method ineffective.
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d. Shot-Hole Analysis. Locating two or more shot holes in trees, walls, dummy heads,
and so forth may make it possible to determine the direction of the shots. The team can
use the dummy-head pencil method and triangulate on the enemy sniper’s position.
However, this method only works if all shots come from the same position.
13-11. TARGET SELECTION
Target selection may be forced upon the sniper team. A target moving rapidly may be lost
while obtaining positive identification. The sniper team considers any enemy threatening its
position as a high-value target. When selecting key targets, the team must consider the
following factors:
a. Threat to SRT. The M/O team must consider the danger any threat presents to any
member of the SRT. Continued communications with the SRT is of the utmost
importance. The M/O must continually provide updated intelligence and information to
the SRT as it relates to the presence of any threat that is near the SRT.
b. Threat to the Sniper Team. The sniper team must consider the danger the target
presents. This can be an immediate threat, such as an enemy element walking upon its
position, or a future threat, such as enemy snipers or dog tracking teams.
c. Probability of First-Round Hit. The M/O team must determine the chances of hitting
the target with the first shot by considering the following:
• Distance to the threat.
• Direction and velocity of the wind.
• Visibility of the operational area that the threat occupies.
• Amount of the threat that is exposed.
• Amount of time the threat is exposed.
• Speed and direction of threat movement, i.e, running or walking.
d. Certainty of the Threat’s Identity. The M/O team must be reasonably certain that the
threat it is considering-is the primary target.
e. Target Effect on the Enemy/Threat. The M/O team must consider what effect the
elimination of the threat will have on any accomplices or the enemy’s fighting ability. It
must determine that the target is the one available target that will cause the greatest harm
to the enemy.
f. Enemy Reaction to Sniper Fire. The sniper team must consider what the enemy will
do once the shot has been fired. The team must be prepared for such actions as immediate
suppression by indirect fires and enemy sweeps of the area.
g. Effect on the Overall Mission. The sniper team must consider how the engagement
will affect the overall mission. The mission may be one of intelligence gathering for a
certain period. Firing will not only alert the enemy to a team’s presence, but it may also
terminate the mission if the team has to move from its position as a result of the
engagement.
13-12. KEY THREAT TARGETS
Key personnel targets can be identified by actions or mannerisms; they may appear to be
giving commands. If it involves enemy military personnel, the key target(s) may be identified
by positions within formations, by rank or insignias, and or by equipment being worn or
carried. Key targets can also include weapon systems and equipment. An example of key
targets follows:
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a. Snipers. Snipers are the number one target of a marksman/observer or sniper/observer
team. The enemy sniper not only poses a threat to friendly forces, but he is also the natural
enemy of the marksman/observe/sniper. The fleeting nature of a sniper is reason enough
to engage him because he may never be seen again.
b. Sentries: When working in urban areas, or involved in hostage rescue operations,
Sentries are a critical threat. They provide early warning to their accomplices that your
team is about to interdict their operation.
c. Scouts. Scouts are keen observers and provide valuable information about friendly
units. This plus their ability to control indirect fires make them dangerous on the
battlefield. Scouts must be eliminated.
d. Weapon Crews. Eliminating weapon crews reduces the amount of fire on SRT
members.
e. Communication Equipment. The right shot in the right place can completely ruin a
tactically valuable communication system.
13-13. RANGE ESTIMATION
A marksman/observer sniper team is required to accurately determine distance, to properly
adjust elevation on the sniper weapon system, and to prepare topographical sketches or range
cards. Because of this, the team has to be skilled in various range estimation techniques.
13-14. FACTORS AFFECTING RANGE ESTIMATION
Three factors affect range estimation: nature of the target, nature of the terrain, and light
conditions.
a. Nature of the Target.
(1) An object of regular outline, such as a house, appears closer than one of irregular
outline, such as a clump of trees.
(2) A target that contrasts with its background appears to be closer than it actually is.
(3) A partly exposed target appears more distant than it actually is.
b. Nature of the Terrain.
(1) As the observer’s eye follows the contour of the terrain, he tends to overestimate
distant targets.
(2) Observing over smooth terrain, such as sand, water, or snow, causes the observer to
underestimate distant targets.
(3) Looking downhill, the target appears farther away.
(4) Looking uphill, the target appears closer.
(5) Urban terrain provides dead space and obstacles, such as buildings, vehicles and
other obstacles on the street that limits observation; Distances will be much shorter and
easier to estimate.
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c. Light Conditions.
(1) The more clearly a target can be seen, the closer it appears.
(2) When the sun is behind the observer, the target appears to be closer.
(3) When the sun is behind the target, the target is more difficult to see and appears to
be farther away.
13-15. RANGE ESTIMATION METHODS
Marksman/Observer sniper teams use range estimation methods to determine distance
between their position and the target.
a. Paper-Strip Method. The paper-strip method (Figure 4-17) is useful when
determining longer distances (1,000 meters plus), however, you may find yourself
operating in an urban environment. When using this method, the sniper places the edge of
a strip of paper on the map and ensures it is long enough to reach between the two points.
Then he pencils in a tick mark on the paper at the team position and another at the distant
location. He places the paper on the map’s bar scale, located at the bottom center of the
map, and aligns the left tick mark with the 0 on the scale. Then he reads to the right to the
second mark and notes the corresponding distance represented between the two marks.
b. 100-Meter-Unit-of-Measure Method. To use this method, the sniper team must be
able to visualize a distance of 100 meters on the ground. For ranges up to 500 meters, the
team determines the number of 100-meter increments between the two objects it wishes to
measure. Beyond 500 meters, it must select a point halfway to the object and determine
the number of 100-meter increments to the halfway point, then double it to find the range
to the object.
c. Appearance-of-Object Method. This method is a means of determining range by the
size and other characteristic details of the object. To use the appearance-of-object method
with any degree of accuracy, the sniper team must be familiar with the characteristic
details of the objects as they appear at various ranges.
d. Bracketing Method. Using this method, the sniper team assumes that the target is no
more than X meters but no less than Y meters away. An average of X and Y will be the
estimate of the distance to the target.
e. Range-Card Method. The sniper team can also use a range card to quickly determine
ranges throughout the target area. Once a target is seen, the team determines where it is
located on the card and then reads the proper range to the target.
f. Mil-Relation Formula. The mil-relation formula is the preferred method of range
estimation. This method uses a mil-scale reticle located in the M19 binoculars (SEE
Figure 13-2), if they are available, or in the MK4 snipers cope.
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Figure 13-2. M19 Mil Scale Reticle.
The team must know the target size in centimeters or meters. Once the target size is
known, the team then compares the target size to the mil-scale reticle and uses the
following formula:
g. Combination Method. In a combat environment, perfect conditions rarely exist.
Therefore, only one method of range estimation may not be enough for the team’s specific
mission. Terrain with much dead space limits the accuracy of the 100-meter method. Poor
visibility limits the use of the appearance-of-object method. However, by using a
combination of two or more methods to determine an unknown range, an experienced
sniper team should arrive at an estimated range close to the true range.
WIND AND WEATHER
13-16. Weather conditions and the environment affect the shooter and the flight of a fired
round. To a highly trained marksman-sniper, the most common problem is wind.
WIND VELOCITY
13-17. To counter the effects of wind, you must accurately determine its overall power to
affect the round. Determine the wind velocity on target and at points in between to predict its
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effects accurately. The three basic methods used to determine wind velocity are range flag,
observation, and mirage.
Range-Flag Method
13-18. This method is used for training, and it teaches a shooter how to read the wind. Range
flags are usually up range to alert bystanders of live fire and downrange near the berm.
Sometimes, you can compare the difference in flag positions to determine the wind velocity.
13-19. The range-flag method is simple to use. First, determine the flag’s angle from the
flagpole, then divide it by 4 (4 is a constant). The result is the probable wind velocity in
miles/kilometers per hour. For example, you see a range flag blowing at a 60-degree angle
from the pole. Divide 60 by 4 to determine the approximate wind speed of 15 miles per hour
(15 x 1.6 = kilometers per hour) or 24 kilometers per hour.
Observation Method
13-20. This method helps a shooter determine the wind velocity at the firing position,
downrange, and on target. It is similar to the range-flag method. Begin by holding some
lightweight material (grass, leaves, paper) at shoulder level and then drop it. Point to the spot
where it lands, and estimate the angle between your body and where you are pointing. Divide
the angle by 4 to determine the approximate wind speed in kilometers per hour (same
procedure as in paragraph 13-19).
13-21. A marksman’s experience comes into play with any observational method. Watch
how varying wind conditions affect the environment. Pick out a tree or an object near the
threat’s position, and observe the effects of the wind on that object. Estimate the wind
compensation on target from your observations. Use the following guidelines to estimate
wind speed:
• If you can barely feel a breeze on your face, the wind speed is less than 5 kilometers
per hour.
• If you can feel a light breeze on your face, the wind speed is 5 to 8 kilometers per
hour.
• If tree leaves are constantly moving, tree limbs are swaying, and light ground debris
is blowing about, the wind speed is 8 to 15 kilometers per hour.
• If small trees are swaying, the wind is speed 15 to 24 kilometers per hour.
Mirage Method
13-22. A mirage is a reflection of heat through layers of air at different temperatures. The
mirage effect can help estimate the wind on target when you are using optics. Observing the
mirage’s movement through a spotting scope, a rifle scope, or good binoculars provides an
indication of wind velocity and direction. A mirage can obscure or distort the target on a very
hot or humid day, which can cause the round to impact off target. With no wind and a boiling
mirage totally obscuring the target, a round tends to hit high because the mirage will cause
the target to appear taller.
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ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
13-23. Temperature, light, air density, slope, and terrain (urban and rural) are all variables
that must be compensated for when computing changes from zero. The only reliable way to
determine how these conditions will affect your performance is to train and shoot under
different environmental conditions and log your observations in the M/O data book.
13-24. Temperature affects the shooter, the rifle, and the ammunition.
• Shooter. He is subject to eye fatigue, dehydration, mirage, and heat and cold injuries.
• Rifle. The barrel’s dark, non reflective color absorbs the ambient temperature,
causing the rifle to expand or contract and change the point of impact of the last zero.
• Ammunition. The hotter the ammunition, the greater the internal ballistic pressure,
which causes a change in zero. If ammunition cools down dramatically, it produces
less pressure and causes a change in zero.
13-25. To counter the effects of high temperature, keep the ammunition in a dry, shaded
place (in an insulated cooler, under a white towel) until it is needed. An increase of 6-7
degrees Celsius causes a round to hit higher than zero, so lower the sights 1 MOA.
13-26. To counter the effects of cold temperature, keep the ammunition under your clothes
and near your body until it is needed. A decrease of 6-7 degrees Celsisu causes a round to hit
lower than zero, so raise the sights 1 MOA.
13-27. The best way to compensate for varying temperatures is to—
• Delay loading the ammunition until it is needed.
• Practice in all temperatures.
• Record observations, specifically how your rifle and the ammunition behave under
varying temperatures.
LIGHT
13-28. Light affects how shooters see their sights and the target. Extreme light conditions
tend to affect the vertical impact of the round due to shooter error. There is no physical
relationship between the flight of a fired round and light.
13-29. Light affects some shooters more than others, and there is no universal compensation
for light. Shooters tend to shoot high on dull, cloudy days and low on bright, sunny days. The
effects of light are more keenly observed with iron-sighted weapons. Changes in light can
make the edges of a target and the front sight of an iron-sighted weapon more difficult to
define. Light also causes glare on the optics of scoped weapons, which results in poor
observational ability and threat coverage. However, even extreme light from the rear does not
usually affect a scope.
AIR DENSITY
13-30. Humidity and altitude affect the velocity of a fired round due to a change in air
density. As humidity or altitude increases, air density decreases, which raises the resistance
that a fired round must overcome in flight. This resistance causes the round to strike the
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target low. It is not a great problem for M/Os at 100 to 200 meters, but it is commonly
encountered by infantry snipers at longer ranges.
13-31. Make the following adjustments to compensate for air density:
• If there is a 20 percent increase in humidity above the zeroed conditions, elevate the
sights 1 MOA.
• If there is a 20 percent decrease in humidity below the zeroed conditions, lower the
sights 1 MOA.
• For every 455 to 610 meters of altitude, elevate the sights 1 MOA.
SLOPE
13-32. Gravity affects the flight of a round equally, whether it is going up or down. In both
situations, the round will strike high, so aim low. For example, at 90 meters, a 45-degree
angle causes a 7.62., 168-grain load, to strike about 2 centimeters high. At 180 meters, the
same angle causes the same round to strike about 7.5 to 8 centimeters high.
MOVING TARGETS
13-33. Engaging a moving target is one of the most difficult tasks. Sight alignment, sight
picture, and trigger control play essential roles in successfully engaging a moving target. At
close ranges, proper stance and natural point of aim are important factors. At long ranges (out
to 25 meters), strict adherence to all of the shooting fundamentals are paramount.
13-34. Depending on the direction of movement, improper trigger control (jerking,
anticipating) can cause you to pull the round in front of the target or push the round behind
the target. Lock your upper body, and swivel at your waist. Your upper body should move
the same way as a tank turret (the lower half remains stationary while the upper half moves).
You must continue tracking, follow through with the shot, and fire until the target is
neutralized.
13-35. The key to engaging a moving target is to engage it at the beginning or the end of a
run. At the beginning, the target has not reached full speed and it is easier to track and bring
down. If you know where the target is headed and it does not dive behind cover, waiting until
it slows down at the end of the run is also a good time to engage it. A moving target can be
engaged by tracking or ambushing.
AMBUSHING METHOD
13-36. To use the ambushing method, you must know where the target is coming from and
where the target is going. Obtain a good sight alignment and aim at a spot between the two
points. Press the trigger when the target reaches the spot where you are aiming. The target
appears in your sights for only a brief moment, so you have to make the shot at that time.
STATIONARY, BOBBING TARGET
13-37. A stationary, bobbing target appears briefly, such as a threat firing around a corner,
and it is the easiest moving target to engage. It can appear anywhere within a sector, such as
from behind a wall or a window. Position yourself in an area that affords good cover and an
excellent firing position. Train your sights on the sector, scan the sector constantly, and
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engage the target when it appears. Avoid the peek-out-and-shoot method. Once a good firing
position has been established, you should be able to shoot from the position without being
shot.
SYNCHRONIZED SHOOTING
13-38. In a multiple-threat situation, you may have to eliminate more than one threat. There
may be some cases where multiple M/O teams must engage a threat. Synchronized shooting
is the immediate incapacitation of one or multiple threats by more than one M/O team,
followed by the entry team’s immediate entry. It is a true test of judgment, accuracy, control,
and knowledge. The three elements necessary to conduct synchronized shooting operations
are the controller, the M/O teams, and the entry team.
13-39. The controller gives commands that control the synchronized firing of the cover
elements. He may be the entry-team leader, the SRT OIC, or a member of the cover element
who is not assigned to the M/O team. The controller’s responsibilities are outlined in Table
13-1.
Table 13-1. Controller’s Responsibilities.
13-40. If either M/O team loses its target and cannot fire an effective shot or if the entry team
experiences a problem, the leader announces “Gun down, gun down, gun down” during a
break in the controller’s radio commands. To reduce threat movement, the entry team
breaches after M/Os have fired.
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13-41. All SRT personnel use plain language as much as possible. Codes and code words
can become confusing in stressful situations, and they may cause misunderstandings or a
breakdown in the communication. Try to use simple language; for example—
• Activity: “Threat in scope or sector.”
• No activity: “Threat not in scope or sector.”
• No view: “No view inside.”
• Good guy down: “Hostage injured.”
• Team member down: “Team member injured.”
HOSTAGE SITUATION
13-42. There will come a time when an M/O must determine if a shot should be taken. The
determination is based on several factors—the range; the chance of hitting the exposed
target; the speed and direction of a moving target; and the danger to hostages, bystanders,
and other personnel.
13-43. Deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last
resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot be employed. There are many
circumstances where an SRT member must tactically resolve a serious incident. For
example—
• When preventing death or serious bodily injury (rape, armed robbery, aggravated
assault) to himself or someone else.
• When he or someone else is threatened with death.
• When directed by a lawful order.
NOTE: Verbal threats do not justify deadly force.
13-44. Deadly force is the only recourse for intent, combined with ability and opportunity.
When determining its use, consider the following elements:
• Ability. Does the threat have the ability to kill or seriously harm someone? Is he
armed with a firearm, a knife, or another deadly weapon?
• Opportunity. Does the threat have the opportunity to kill or seriously harm
someone? A threat with a knife at 10 meters does not have the same opportunity as a
threat with a firearm at 30 feet.
• Intent. Does the threat’s actions or words indicate that he intends to kill or seriously
harm someone? This is determined by the threat’s actions and the MO’s education,
training, and experience. If negotiations are unsuccessful and the situation has
deteriorated to the point that an SRT is deployed, you must conclude that the threat
has intent.
COLD SHOT
13-45. An M/O sniper team’s use of precision fire requires very specific use-of-force
parameters. You must be intimately acquainted with the use-of-force policy and the SRT
SOP. You must also understand what circumstances prompt a commander to authorize a cold
shot (the first shot fired by a marksman). A cold shot can be authorized if a serious crime is
about to be committed or has been committed, or if someone’s life must be preserved. It is
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recommended that the corps commander be designated as the approving authority for cold
shots, and the SRT SOP should outline the proper procedures.
13-46. The use-of-force rules may change slightly from corps to corps, or regions. All must
agree, however, that someone must be in imminent peril of death or serious injury before
ANA military police M/O teams can fire without prior approval. For example, if the
marksman does not fire, he or someone else may be killed or injured.
MOVEMENT
13-47. M/Os must be deployed covertly—not as an intimidation technique, as a negotiation
tactic, or to grandstand for the media—but to avoid detection because detection means
compromise. If shots are not fired, the M/O team withdraws and is never detected by the
threat, bystanders, or the media.
13-48. M/Os are the first ones in and the last ones out. They cover the perimeter and the
approach and withdrawal of the SRT and supporting elements. M/Os must always assume
that they are under observation, and their movements must be slow and deliberate. Detection
means compromise, compromise means mission failure, and mission failure often means
death.
TARGET ACQUISITION
13-49. Target acquisition is the location of a threat and the sustainment of visual contact
through a weapon’s sight. On order of the command element or if SRT action is imminent,
the marksman begins visual coverage of the threat through his weapon’s sight. He maintains
coverage until the mission is complete. The marksman sniper must be ready for an instant
response on target. If the threat moves out of his field of coverage, he should signal for
another M/O to cover the threat.
13-50. At the onset of an incident, the threat is often unavailable for immediate incapacitation
because he is watchful or may use a hostage as a shield. You must be positioned as close as
possible to the threat and use cover and concealment to your advantage. When possible, find
the high ground over the threat. The recommended range for a hostage-situation shooting is
less than 100 meters; it should never be more than 200 meters. Practice these ranges
routinely, and record the results of each practice session in the M/O sniper data book.
13-51. Multiple threats can complicate the effort to eliminate any threat. The best way to
eliminate all or most threats is by synchronized shooting followed by the entry team’s
immediate entry. The initial SSA may be enough to give the SRT the upper hand.
PROACTIVE INFORMATION GATHERING
13-52. Proactive information gathering is looking for specific data that relates to the M/O
team’s mission. There are four keys to proactive information gathering.
• Placement of the team. The team must place itself in a good location where
members can see their area of responsibility.
• Use of optics. The team must understand the proper use and advantages of a spotting
scope, a rifle scope, and handheld binoculars.
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•
•
Systematic scanning. The team must use a careful, slow pattern that systematically
covers the sector.
Communication. There must be excellent communication between the marksman
and the observer, and all discoveries must be communicated to the command element.
MARKSMAN/OBSERVER DATA BOOK
13-53. The M/O data book is as important as a rifle. There are numerous commercial,
military, and police-sniper data books available, but most are adapted from infantry-sniper or
match-shooting range books. Commercial data books include range cards that are used for
range practice. Data cards can be printed on card stock and bound, be computer-generated
and placed in a loose-leaf binder, or be written and placed in a notebook. The following items
should be included in the M/O data book for realistic training and live missions:
• EEI.
• Threat/victim identity and activity log.
• Range card and ballistic set.
• Weapon and ammunition data card.
• Weather and light log.
TACTICAL NEUTRALIZATION
13-54 When an M/O team is deployed into a hostile situation that may result in the use of
deadly force, members must know the ROE, when to fire, where to fire for immediate
incapacitation of the threat, and what type of ammunition produces the desired result.
COMPONENTS OF PROJECTILE WOUNDING
13-55. There are four basic components of projectile wounding—penetration, fragmentation,
and temporary and permanent cavities. They are not all related to incapacitation.
• Penetration. Penetration is the forced entry of a bullet into body tissue. It crushes or
pushes surrounding tissue outward to produce a permanent cavity.
• Fragmentation. The bullet fragments (breaks apart) as it enters the body. It forces
pieces of the bullet outward, further damaging surrounding tissue and producing a
permanent cavity. This effect does not occur with every bullet wound, and it is often
considered a secondary effect.
• Temporary cavity. A temporary cavity is created as the bullet penetrates body tissue.
It releases kinetic energy that temporarily produces a cavity.
• Permanent cavity. A permanent cavity is created after the bullet penetrates and
destroys body tissue.
PROJECTILE PLACEMENT
13-56. When ordered to fire, the only factor you can control is the round’s placement. A
well-placed round in the threat’s upper spinal cord or brain will result in incapacitation. Be
aware of the backstop and the ammunition’s penetration capabilities. Ensure that your shot
does not harm a hostage or someone else in its path.
13-57. If a major area of the brain is struck by a projectile of sufficient velocity and weight, it
results in immediate incapacitation. The three major areas of the brain are the—
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•
•
•
Medulla. The medulla connects the spinal cord to the middle brain. It is located
where the spinal column enters the skull.
Cerebellum. The cerebellum regulates the automatic rhythms of the heart and the
respiration. It is also the site of basic emotional responses, such as fear and anger. The
cerebellum is located at the lower back of the skull.
Cerebrum. The cerebrum partially covers the cerebellum. It is the center for intellect,
intelligence and the thought process. The activity in this portion of the brain is not
necessary to maintain life or basic body functions.
13-58. The human brain can store enough oxygen to maintain full body function for 15
seconds. If the round is well-placed, the threat will not have enough time to injure or kill a
hostage. A threat who is under the influence of drugs, afraid, or the sheer will to live may not
be incapacitated even if he is mortally wounded. The rush of adrenalin alone may keep a
mortally wounded threat functioning for a few seconds. Table 13-2, is a projectile-placement
chart. The body areas are listed in descending order of severity.
Table 13-2. Projectile Placement Chart.
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Table 13-2. Projectile Placement Chart (continued).
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MARKSMANSHIP
13-59. It is important that you understand how psychological forces can affect you. They
may be the sole reason for mission failure, so do not take them lightly. The following traits
are needed to provide an emotional balance and increase your effectiveness:
• Reliability. The quality or state of being reliable or dependable.
• Initiative. The power, ability, or instinct to begin and follow through energetically
with a plan or a task.
• Loyalty. Faithfulness to a person, a custom, or an ideal. Faithful in allegiance to
one’s government or homeland.
• Discipline. Training that produces moral or mental improvement.
• Maturity. The quality or state of being mature or fully developed.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MARKSMAN
13-60. When neutralizing a threat, you can be affected by anxiety, rationalization, insecurity,
morality, and remorse.
• Anxiety. Anxiety is uneasiness, distress about future uncertainties, an intense fear, or
dread lacking a clearly defined cause or a specific threat. This may not be a problem
early in the mission. After you are in position with an alert state of mind and as time
passes, you may become uncomfortable, fatigued, or frustrated. Your mind may begin
to wander, and you may start to think about completing the mission.
• Rationalization. Rationalization is devising self-satisfying, incorrect reasons for your
behavior. During long operations, especially after looking at the threat for some time,
you may begin to think of the threat, not as a target, but as a person who is not so
different from you.
• Insecurity. Insecurity is the lack of self-confidence in your ability to do a task. You
may start to have doubts about your weapon and your ability to complete the mission.
You begin to ask what-if-I-miss questions, especially if hostages are involved.
• Morality. Morals are the principles of right and wrong in relation to human action
and character. Your upbringing, morals, and religious beliefs may tell you that you
are about to commit murder. You may begin to wonder if there is a better way to
resolve the issue.
• Remorse. Remorse is the moral anguish and bitter regret arising from past misdeeds.
You may hesitate if you think you cannot handle the results of your shot. If you have
to shoot and the threat dies, you may experience a deep feeling of remorse. If you
dwell on the subject and wonder if you can do it again, it can affect the success of
future missions.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE THREAT
13-61. The following psychological aspects may affect the threat:
• Panic. Panic is the sudden overwhelming fear that produces irrational or hysterical
behavior. If the threat discovers the M/O team, he may panic. His actions during this
period are difficult to predict. He may use a hostage as a shield, or he may disappear
into a part of the building that the cover element cannot see.
• Anger. Anger is a strong feeling of displeasure and belligerence aroused by a real or
supposed wrong. The threat is confined to the building, and he worries about where
he can go in the building. He develops strong feelings toward the SRT because of his
confinement.
• He may decide to retaliate against a hostage and/or the SRT.
• Hopelessness. Hopelessness is a strong feeling of forlornness, dejection,
disconsolation, or futility. The threat may feel a sense of hopelessness to his fate. He
may have seen your rifle trained in his direction and decide that all is lost. He may
decide to kill a hostage and/or commit suicide. Hopelessness is the most dangerous
effect, and it can endanger the threat and the SRT.
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS
13-62. Post-traumatic stress is a single instance of overwhelming terror that alters the human
brain’s chemistry. It can make people more sensitive to an adrenaline surge, which is a major
factor in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The more intense the traumatic incident and
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the longer it lasts, the more likely it is to result in PTSD. Symptoms can last indefinitely,
disappear spontaneously, or be eliminated by psychotherapy. Some individuals who
experience traumatic events never develop PTSD, which has the following symptoms:
• Arousal. A heightened sense of danger, anger, or fear; sleep difficulties; or a loss of
control.
• Reexperience. Nightmares or flashbacks. Intrusive, unwanted thoughts and feelings
associated with the incident come whether or not you are reminded of the incident by
stimuli (object, person, sound).
• Avoidance. A physical avoidance of anything that symbolizes or resembles the
incident or any part of the incident. You may become emotionally numb, abuse drugs
or alcohol, have suicidal thoughts, destroy a relationship, avoid social intimacy,
alienate yourself, or become depressed.
13-63. If you experience PTSD, talk to a mental-health professional or a peer counselor about
the traumatic incident as soon as possible. Take the following actions to counteract the
symptoms of PTSD.
• Learn to relax and deactivate your sympathetic nervous-system reaction.
• Learn not to fight flashbacks and intrusive thoughts and feelings. Let go and cope
with the impact of the symptoms.
• Learn to gradually approach the source of the anxiety.
13-64. Stress-management training, a debriefing, and the buddy system can
help prevent PTSD.
• Stress-management training. Individuals can learn to manage stress and possibly
prevent PTSD symptoms from developing. An individual who is well-trained in stress
management knows in advance what to expect in a crisis. There are no guarantees
that the training will prevent PTSD; however, a well-trained leader can effectively
assess when a soldier might experience stress.
• Debriefing. An individual or group debriefing should take place immediately after a
traumatic incident. Team members can unload, get rid of the shock, and talk about the
experience with their peers.
• Buddy system. A marksman should buddy with someone who has learned how to
cope with trauma. His need to feel understood will be fulfilled if he relates to others
who have experienced similar trauma.
13-65. Individuals who have experienced PTSD and seek psychological assistance are often
stigmatized as being weak. This is a belief that must be changed. Shooting someone in the
line of duty is rated as No. 3 in the critical life-event scale for a police officer.
NIGHT FIRING
13-66. Criminal incidents take place around the clock, so commanders must ensure that
marksmen are trained and prepared to meet the threat under various and difficult conditions.
If a marksman is not prepared to make a shot under low-light conditions, the mission can fail.
13-67. Darkness provides the SRT and the threat with certain advantages. In some cases, it
allows the team to move closer to the threat than it could during daylight. NVDs increase
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your ability to move about without being detected. Use them to enhance your night vision
and gain an advantage over the threat. In low-light conditions, it may be difficult to
distinguish between a hostage and a threat. Use extreme care when identifying a target; if a
target cannot be properly identified, do not fire under any circumstances.
AMBIENT LIGHT
13-68. Lights in the surrounding area can be used to your advantage when you are moving
into position. Examples of ambient light include security lights, street lamps, campfires, and
flares (flare gun, mortar, artillery). If ambient light is used properly, it can mask the team’s
movement. When setting up in an area where there is backlighting, be aware of shadows that
may alert the threat to your presence. Do not silhouette yourself as you move into position or
while you are in position because it will also alert the threat.
HUMAN EYE
13-69. Cones and rods are cells in the human eye that allow you to
distinguish between colors, shapes, outlines, and contrasts.
• Cones. Cones allow you to distinguish between colors, particularly red and green,
and allow you to recognize shapes and contrasts. They are very active during periods
of high illumination.
• Rods. Rods produce a chemical called visual purple that allows the eye to adapt to
darkness. They enable you to distinguish between black, white, and shades of gray
and to identify the general outline of an object.
TARGET LOCATION
13-70. Night vision, off-center vision, and scanning are used to locate a target during
darkness and periods of low visibility.
• Night vision. It takes about 30 minutes for your eyes to adapt to the darkness enough
to distinguish objects in dim light. This is called night vision. Do not allow light to
enter your eyes during the adaptation period; if it does, the adaptation period starts
over. To hasten the night-vision process, close your strong eye while you are still in a
well lit area. This allows it to establish its night vision, and it can be opened after you
are in the dark. Wearing dark sunglasses or red-lens goggles that wrap around the side
of your head will also prepare your eyes for night vision.
• Off-center vision. This is the preferred method for observing targets at night. It is
performed by looking out the corner of your eye slightly beside, above, or below the
target image. By looking at the image 6 to 10 degrees off center, it will be formed on
your eye rods which allow you to see at night. Never look directly at an image during
darkness because it will be formed on your eye cones, which do not function in low
light.
• Scanning. Scanning enhances off-center vision. When you observe a target for more
than 4 seconds, the visual purple bleaches out the image and makes the target difficult
to see. Shifting your focus every few seconds will help you maintain a good image
without the bleaching effect.
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TRAINING EXERCISES
13-71. Training exercises give M/Os confidence in their ability to perform the mission
successfully. The exercises include stalking, range estimation, observation, hide construction,
and camouflage and concealment.
STALKING EXERCISE
13-72. The stalking exercise teaches a marksman to approach and occupy a firing position
without being observed. The area for a stalking range must be chosen carefully. Look for the
following features:
• The area does not require the marksman to low crawl the entire distance.
• The area has a variety of terrain, most of which is visible to the observer.
• The available cover decreases as the marksman approaches his position.
• The range is at least 500 meters long with natural or staked boundaries.
13-73. The location of the observer and the terrain should force the marksman to use the
ground properly. This enables the marksman to take chances early in the stalk and move
more cautiously as he closes in on his firing position.
Cadre
13-74. Two radio-equipped, trained observers scan the stalking area with binoculars. They
look for signs of the approaching marksman. Two radio equipped walkers are positioned
within the stalking area. When an observer sees the marksman, he calls a walker and directs
him to within 5 meters of the marksman’s position. The marksman is given immediate
feedback on what gave him away.
NOTE: Other marksmen waiting to run the exercise can watch from an observation
point (OP) so that they can learn from the actions of those on the course.
Conditions
13-75. The participants are briefed on the purpose of the exercise, range boundaries, time
limits, and standards. The marksman is given a map, an aerial photograph (if available), an
M24 with a bipod, ten rounds of blank ammunition, an M144 spotting scope, camouflage,
and M/O equipment.
Standards
13-76. The marksman must—
• Stalk to within 200 meters of two trained observers without being detected.
• Fire two blank rounds at the observers without being detected.
• Note his exact range, the wind velocity, and the windage applied to the M144 spotting
scope.
• Complete the mission within 4 hours.
13-77. A critique is conducted at the end of the exercise. It focuses on the main problem
areas and the procedures that the marksman did well.
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Procedures
13-78. When the marksman reaches his firing position, which is within 200 meters of the
observer, he fires a blank at the observer. This alerts the walker that the marksman is ready to
continue the exercise. If the marksman is detected by an observer, he is sent to the OP. The
walker moves to within 10 meters of the marksman. The observer searches for the marksman
in the 10- meter radius around the walker. If the marksman is undetected by the observer—
• The walker tells the marksman to chamber and fire his next blank round.
• The walker points in the direction of the marksman. The observer searches in detail
for anything that gives the marksman away.
• The walker places his hand on the marksman’s head, and the observer searches the
area in detail again.
• The marksman tells the walker which observer he fired at and what the observer is
doing. The observer waves his hat, scratches his face, or makes another gesture that
the marksman can identify through the M144 spotting scope.
RANGE-ESTIMATION EXERCISE
13-79. A range-estimation exercise teaches a marksman to judge distance accurately. The
stalking range cannot be used for this exercise; it must take place in a different area. The area
for an estimation range must be chosen carefully. Look for the following features:
The range is at least 500 meters long with natural or staked boundaries.
The area includes dead space and places where the marksman will be observing uphill and
downhill. Eight 6-foot, man-sized targets are available. Alternate objects should be selected
in case the original targets cannot be seen because of the weather or some other reason.
Conditions
13-80. The participants are briefed on the purpose of the exercise, reference points, time
limits, and standards. The marksman is given binoculars, rifle telescope aids, eight record
cards, and a review on the methods of judging distances and the causes of miscalculations.
Standards
13-81. The marksman must estimate—
• The distance to each target and write it on the target-record card.
• The distance to each target within 10 percent of the correct distance.
• The distance to each target within 3 minutes (24 minutes total).
• The distance to six of the eight targets correctly.
13-82. A critique is conducted at the end of the exercise. It focuses on the main problem
areas and the procedures that the marksman did well.
Procedures
13-83. The marksman is brought to the OP and shown the first target. He is allowed 3
minutes to estimate the range and write it on the target-record card. The sequence is repeated
until all targets have been estimated. The cards are collected, and the range sergeant
• Gives the correct range for each target.
• Points out in each case why the distance might have been miscalculated.
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•
Corrects all target-record cards and returns them to the marksman for his records.
OBSERVATION EXERCISE
13-84. An observation exercise teaches an observer to observe a threat and accurately record
and report the results of his observations. The observation range should be developed along
the same lines as an estimation range.
Conditions
13-85. The participants are briefed on the purpose of the exercise, reference points, time
limits, and standards. The observer is given an arc of about 1,800 mils, a panoramic sketch of
the arc, a pencil, binoculars, and an M144 or other type spotting scope, if available.
Standards
13-86. The observer must—
• Plot and label 9 of 12 objects correctly.
• Complete plotting and labeling within 40 minutes.
Procedures
13-87. The observer is placed in a prone position on the observation line and issued his
equipment. Twelve military objects are disguised on the range. They are placed so that they
are invisible to the naked eye, indistinguishable with binoculars, but recognizable with an
M144 spotting scope.
13-88. Any questions that the observer has about his arch, the sketch, or the equipment are
answered before time begins. The observer should spend 20 minutes on the first half of his
arc before observing the second half. He must plot and label the objects correctly on the
panoramic sketch. Each correctly plotted object is worth 1/2 point, and each correctly labeled
object is worth ½ point.
13-89. At the end of the exercise, the sketches are collected while the observer remains at his
point. The range sergeant points out each object that was not seen. The observer views each
object with binoculars and with a spotting scope. This helps him see why he failed to see the
object.
13-90. A critique is conducted at the end of the exercise. It focuses on the main problem
areas and the procedures that the observer did well.
HIDE-CONSTRUCTION EXERCISE
13-91. A hide-construction exercise teaches an M/O team how to build a hide and remain
undetected while being watched by a trained observer in an urban or field environment. A
hide is used to camouflage an M/O team that is not moving.
13-92. Any type of terrain is suitable for a hide-construction exercise, and there should be
several prospective spots to build a hide. The left, right, far, and near boundaries should be
easily and quickly identifiable by the M/O team.
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Cadre
13-93. A trained observer is given a radio, binoculars, and an M144 spotting scope. He scans
the range area for any sign of the M/O team’s hide. A radio equipped range NCO moves to
the hide at the observer’s direction. He relays messages from the observer to the M/O team
during the testing phase of the exercise.
NOTE: Other participants waiting to run the exercise can watch from an OP so that
they can learn from the actions of those on the course.
Conditions
13-94. Participants are briefed on the purpose of the exercise and range boundaries. They are
given an ax, a pick, a bayonet, a shovel, 20 sandbags, rations, water, a range card, a data
book, a pencil, paper, an M24 with a bipod, one round of blank ammunition, an M144
spotting scope, and M/O equipment.
Standards
13-95. The M/O team must—
• Complete the hide construction within 8 hours.
• Remain undetected in their hide at 25 meters.
• Fire one blank round toward the observer without revealing the muzzle flash or their
position.
• Complete the range card, the data book, and field sketches correctly.
• Record all actions by the observer.
Procedures
13-96. At the end of 8 hours, the range NCO (walker) checks the M/O team’s hide to ensure
that it is complete. An observer is placed 300 meters from the hide, and he starts observing
the hide area with binoculars and an M144 spotting scope. If the M/O team’s hide is detected
at any point during the observation process, the team fails. If the hide remains undetected—
• The observer moves to within 150 meters of the hide and begins his observation
again.
• The range NCO moves to within 10 feet of the hide.
• The observer requests the M/O team to fire their blank round in his direction. If the
observer fails to detect the muzzle flash, he is brought within 25 meters of the hide to
determine if it can be seen with the naked eye.
13-97. A critique is conducted at the end of the exercise. It focuses on the main problem
areas and the procedures that the M/O team did well.
CAMOUFLAGE-AND-CONCEALMENT EXERCISE
13-98. A camouflage-and-concealment exercise teaches a marksman how to select a final
firing position. When choosing an area for this exercise, the following conditions apply:
There is adequate space for one M/O team to work in the area without being crowded.
There is at least twice the number of potential positions as there are marksmen.
The boundaries must be easily distinguishable by the observer and the marksman.
The terrain is varied with each exercise.
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Cadre
13-99. A trained observer is given a radio and binoculars. He scans the area for any signs of
the hidden marksman. Two radio-equipped walkers are positioned in the exercise area. They
help the observer test the camouflage and concealment of the hidden marksman.
NOTE: Other participants waiting to run the exercise can watch from an OP so that
they can learn from the actions of those on the course.
Conditions
13-100. The participants are briefed on the purpose of the exercise, reference points, time
limits, and standards. The marksman is given an M24 with a bipod, one blank round, and
camouflage material.
Standards
13-101. The marksman must—
• Be concealed within 5 minutes.
• Conceal himself successfully within 200 meters of the observer.
• Fire a blank round at the observer without being detected.
• Have the correct elevation and windage on his sight.
• Remain undetected for at least 30 minutes.
Procedures
13-102. The observer turns his back and allows the marksman 5 minutes to move to a
position and conceal himself. Anytime a marksman is detected, he is sent to the OP. The
observer turns and begins his observation of the area. If the marksman is not detected within
30 minutes, the observer instructs a walker to move to within 10 meters of the marksman.
The observer searches for the marksman in the 10-meter radius around the walker. If the
marksman remains undetected—
• The marksman fires a blank round at the observer. The observer watches for a muzzle
flash, flying vegetation, or movement.
• The walker extends his arm in the marksman’s direction to indicate his position.
• The walker places his hand on the marksman’s head, and the observer searches again.
• The marksman states the elevation and windage on his sight and tells what the
observer is doing.
13-103. A critique is conducted at the end of the exercise. It focuses on the main problem
areas and the procedures that the marksman did well.
KEEP-IN-MEMORY GAMES
13-104. M/O operations involve more than hiding in the woods or an abandoned building,
spotting targets, communicating with the TMF, and engaging targets on command. An M/O
must observe vast areas and accurately record the information generated in his assigned area.
Because many situations occur suddenly and do not offer prolonged observation, an
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M/O must be trained to observe events for a short period of time and extract the maximum
amount of information. An M/O’s memory can be improved with keep-in-memory (KIM)
games.
13-105. A KIM game is a series of exercises that increase the M/O’s ability to perceive
reality and retain information. It can be conducted anywhere and is designed to exercise the
mind through overload. Additional elements are gradually added to increase confusion and
uncertainty. The ability to perceive reality often means penetrating the threat’s deception
measures. The threat’s deception measures may include misdirection, disguise, or exchange.
Just like knowing how a magic trick works, knowing how you are being deceived negates the
deception.
BASIC GAME
13-106. The equipment needed for the basic game includes a table, a cover (sheet or opaque
cloth), and an assortment of objects. Place ten objects randomly on the table; do not place
them in rows or any other order. Cover the objects with a sheet or opaque cloth. Before
beginning the game, brief participants on the following rules and the time limits for viewing
and recording:
• Talking is not allowed.
• Objects cannot be touched.
• Participants record only when told to do so.
13-107. Participants gather around the table. The cover is removed, and participants begin
viewing the objects. The cover is replaced when the time is up, and participants return to
their seats. Participants record their observations when told to do so and within the
designated time limit. To aid in retaining and recording, participants should note the—
• Location of each object on the table (sectored or oriented to another object).
• Designation and detailed description of each item (size, color, condition).
NOTE: Advancement in this game is measured by shortening the viewing and
recording time and lengthening the waiting time.
SAVELLI SHUFFLE
13-108. This game develops hand-and-eye coordination and the ability to make decisions
immediately. The equipment needed for the Savelli shuffle includes ten medium-sized yellow
rubber balls, ten small red rubber balls, and two cloth bags.
13-109. Two persons participate in this game. Place any number of yellow balls and a
smaller number of red balls into one bag. Leave the other bag empty. Give each participant a
bag.
13-110. Place the men 5 meters apart. The first man selects a ball from his bag, without
revealing its color, and tosses it to the second man. The second man tries to catch the red
balls with his right hand and the yellow balls with his left hand. He places the caught balls in
his bag. Players switch positions and resume play.
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NOTES:
1. Advancement in this game is measured by increasing the velocity of the balls and the
distance they are thrown.
2. The colors, sizes, and amounts of balls used can differ. This is only an example.
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Appendix A
Barrier Penetration
Threat missions normally follow a general sequence—infiltration, movement, engagement,
and withdrawal. From infiltration to withdrawal, the SRT encounters a variety of barriers that
must be defeated before engaging the threat. This appendix is intended to assist SRT
members in defeating barriers that are commonly encountered during threat situations.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
A-1. The five planning considerations for defeating a barrier are shown in Table A-1.
Table A-1. Planning Considerations.
TYPES OF BARRIERS
A-2. There are four categories of barriers that a breacher may encounter— military, LOC,
industrial, and civil. These are further divided into three classifications.
• Soft targets. They have not received any upgrades or enhancements. Most are
temporary, semi-fixed structures or light to medium vehicles. Examples are tents,
Quonset huts, automobiles, light trucks, small aircraft, and fences.
• Medium targets. They may be hard, but they are not usually hardened against the
shock produced by explosives. Most fixed structures and large or heavy vehicles are
in this class. Common construction materials for medium targets are concrete, cinder
block, brick, wood, sheet metal, plastic, and glass.
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•
Hard targets. They have been designed, built, reinforced, and bunkered (hardened)
to make them extremely resistant to the shock and other damaging effects produced
by explosives. Common types of hard targets include—
Bunkered (hardened) structures that are built with sandbags, earth, logs,
and/or lumber.
Reinforced structures that are built with concrete, block, brick, rebar, wire
mesh, and/or steel beams.
High-strength steel structures, such as vault doors.
A-3. Table A-2 shows typical barriers that may be encountered by SRTs.
Table A-2. Typical Barriers.
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
A-4. Success in any military operation depends largely on the breacher’s ability to identify
and analyze the minute details of targets and objectives. This is especially true in assault
breaching where general construction and design characteristics of buildings are analyzed for
essential vulnerabilities to one or more of the four breaching methods (explosive, thermal,
mechanical, and ballistic). A general knowledge of building construction and design and the
ability to read architectural plans or drawings are keys to successful breaching. Buildings are
typically classified by—
• Purpose.
Residential.
Commercial.
Government.
Military.
• Activity.
Manufacturing.
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•
Servicing.
Merchandising.
Construction/design type.
Mass.
Frame.
MASS CONSTRUCTION
A-5. Mass-constructed buildings are those in which the outside walls support the weight of
the building and its contents. Examples include commercial high-rises, apartments, hotels,
and embassies. Additional support, especially for wide buildings, is achieved through the use
of—
• Load-bearing interior walls.
• Pilasters (strong points) on exterior walls.
• Cast-iron interior columns.
• Arches or braces over windows and doors.
A-6. Mass-constructed buildings may be built by two methods—unit masonry and concrete.
• Unit masonry. This is a method of erecting a building from individual pieces, such as
stones, bricks, or blocks.
Stones are bound together with large amounts of mortar.
Bricks are man-made stones that are easy to handle. They are laid together
with mortar in patterns that mutually bind and brace each other for maximum
wall strength.
Blocks can be made from concrete, pumice (basalt), or clay. Block buildings
are normally one or two stories high.
•
Concrete. Concrete mass-constructed buildings take three major forms—poured in
place, tilt up, and box wall.
Poured-in-place buildings are made by pouring concrete into vertical and
horizontal forms to create walls and floors. Steel is often used for
reinforcement, and the walls have great load bearing strength. Poured-in-place
construction is commonly used for commercial buildings and factories.
Tilt-up construction consists of pouring concrete into forms that are laying on
a flat surface. After hardening, the form is tilted upright and braced in
position. Tilt-up construction is normally used for industrial storage areas.
Box-wall construction uses prefabricated, reinforced concrete panels that are
poured and formed at a location other than the actual building site. They are
transported to the building site and used as walls, ceilings, and floors. Boxwall construction is often used for apartments and hotels.
FRAME CONSTRUCTION
A-7. A skeleton of columns and beams support framed buildings, and they are usually taller
than frameless buildings. Exterior walls are not load-bearing and are referred to as heavyclad or light-clad. The two methods of frame construction are—
• Wooden post and lintel (post and beam) (old origin).
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•
Steel or reinforced concrete (modern origin).
Wooden Post and Lintel
A-8. This method uses vertical wooden posts and horizontal beams to construct a skeletal
framework that bears the weight of the building and its contents. The posts and beams are
usually erected before the walls and are heavy structural members that measure 10
centimeters (4 inches) or more in thickness. These buildings may be further categorized as
half-timbered, platform, or balloon framing. Platform and balloon framings are characterized
by small dimensioned framing members.
• Half-timbered framing. It is distinguished by the use of square, wooden timbers
with diagonal braces in the corners. This is an old method commonly found in barns,
houses, and apartment buildings.
• Platform framing. It is a method found in single and multistory construction and is
also called western framing. The first floor is built on top of the foundation walls as
though it were a platform. The floor provides a base on which wall sections are
assembled and raised into place. Wall sections and partitions support a platform for
the next floor. The process is repeated as necessary, and each floor is framed
separately.
• Balloon framing. It is distinguished by vertical framing members (studs) that are
continuous from the foundation to the rafter plate. Joists resting on a support that is
spiked to the studs support second level and higher floors. Balloon framing is
normally used in two-story structures, especially where masonry veneer or stucco is
used for the exterior wall finish.
Steel or Reinforced Concrete
A-9. The skeleton framework of this method is characterized by steel girders (I beams) or
concrete poured into the columns and beams around rebar. Buildings have thin, non-loadbearing exterior walls. Steel or reinforced concrete framing may be heavy or light clad.
• Heavy-clad construction. It provides common curtain walls generally consisting of
stones, bricks, or terra-cotta blocks. Wall thickness is uniform on all floors, and
windows are set at the same depth throughout. Heavy-clad buildings are usually older
buildings.
• Light-clad construction. It provides thin outer walls that consist of glass, aluminum,
decorative brick, or lightweight concrete. Light-clad buildings are modern in origin
and have large rooms on heavy flooring.
PLANS
A-10. Architectural drawings are great sources of target intelligence. Working-drawing
sheets bound together are called a set of plans or blueprints. A set of plans also includes
specification listings and lumber, material, and millwork lists. Although the specific details
of structures vary from one to another, a set of working drawings will normally include—
• A site or plot plan.
• A foundation plan (basement).
• A floor plan (main level, first floor).
• Elevations (front, rear, left, right).
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Interior elevations.
Wall or structural sections and details.
Fireplace details.
Stair details.
Schedules (windows, doors, room finishes).
A joist-framing plan.
A roof-framing plan.
Electrical, plumbing, and heating plans.
SOFT BARRIERS
A-11. A fence is a soft barrier that SRTs will encounter during movement. There are two
classes of fences—electric and none lectric. An electric chain link fence is uncommon,
because a large amount of energy is required to power it and it is easily grounded by
vegetation. Non electric fences are divided into four basic types—ornamental, boundary
(cattle fence), temporary, and perimeter. Do not consider an ornamental or a boundary fence
to be a physical barrier of any consequence.
TEMPORARY FENCE
A-12. Gloves, bolt cutters, pipes, and/or ladders are needed to defeat a temporary fence; the
time required is 3 to 18 seconds. Temporary fences are 2 to 3 meters high and have the
following characteristics:
• Wire (10-gauge mesh or 11-gauge chain link).
• Galvanized pipe (various sizes) set in concrete.
• L-shaped extension arms with three strands of barbed wire.
• Wood construction.
PERIMETER FENCE
A-13. Perimeter (security) fences are divided into three classifications.
• Class A, maximum security.
• Class B, medium security.
• Class C, minimum security.
A-14. Gloves, bolt cutters, pipes, and/or ladders are needed to defeat a perimeter fence; the
time required is 30 to 40 seconds. Perimeter fences are more than 2 meters high and have the
following characteristics:
• Corners and gates are braced as necessary.
• Fabric or mesh is clamped to the bottom rail or cable.
• Fabric or mesh is anchored in concrete.
• Rails and fence hardware are located on the inside of the fence.
• Vertical posts are anchored in concrete.
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PRIVACY FENCE (WOODEN)
A-15. Privacy fences are normally used between residences. They can be up to 2.5 meters
high.
BARBED-WIRE FENCE
A-16. Barbed wire is an enhancement for perimeter fences and comes in the following styles:
• Spool or line wire with two to four barbs, 3 to 6 inches apart.
• BWC with four barbs, 5 cm (2 inches) apart (a 90 centimeter (36-inch) diameter roll
contains 15.5 meters of BWC).
A-17. There are several ways to defeat barbed wire. They include—
• S-shaped hooks to pull it out of the way.
• Y-shaped stakes to prop it up and provide crawling space.
• A tarpaulin or a blanket thrown over the wire to form a path.
• A plank laid on top of the wire to crush it down and provide a path.
RAZOR TAPE
A-18. GPBTO, also known as razor tape, comes in three basic styles.
• Type I (black finish, military).
• Type II (stainless steel, 22 meters by 75 centimeters).
• Type III (single strand, 45 centimeter diameter roll).
A-19. When erected, Type II GPBTO forms a double spiral, one right-hand lead, and one
left-hand lead. This is the only difference between Type I and Type II.
MECHANICAL BREACHING OF A FENCE
A-20. Mechanical breaching of a fence may be done in three ways.
• Going over the fence; Accomplished by one of the methods shown in Table A-3. The
table also lists the advantages and disadvantages associated with each method.
• Going under the fence; Accomplished if the bottom edge of the fence is unanchored.
Table A-4 shows the methods used and their advantages and disadvantages.
• Going through the fence; Accomplished quickly and quietly by using wire cutters,
fencing pliers, or bolt cutters. To reduce noise, wrap a strip of cloth around the
portion being cut. Ensure that the cut in the fence is large enough to accommodate the
largest man on the team.
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Table A-3. Going over a fence.
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Table A-4. Going under a fence.
MEDIUM BARRIERS
A-21. Medium barriers are discussed in the following paragraphs. They consist of doors,
windows, structural walls, and so forth.
DOORS
A-22. Doors control access to the interior spaces of a building. They are normally weak links
in the overall structure; therefore, they are the breacher’s primary targets for entry. The type,
size, and location of a door is determined by—
• Access and security requirements.
• Weather resistance/insulation.
• Traffic pattern desired.
• Fire codes.
• Light, view, and ventilation.
• Anticipated usage.
• Durability.
• Desired visual and aesthetic appearance.
A-23. Doors are exterior or interior and are divided into four basic categories.
Swinging (hinged) (see Figure A-1).
• Sliding.
• Overhead.
• Revolving.
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Figure A-1. Door Components.
A-24. The standard dimensions for doors are—
a. Height (exterior and interior).
• Residential: 200 centimeters.
• Commercial: 210 centimeters.
b. Width.
• Exterior: 80 to 90 centimeters.
• Interior: 80 centimeters.
c. Thickness.
• Exterior: 4.5 centimeters.
• Interior: 3.25 centimeters..
• Storm and screen: 2.5 centimeters.
• Security: 5 centimeters.
A-25. Common door hardware includes—
• Hinges and hasps.
• Locking devices.
• Automatic openers.
• Hydraulic closures.
• Stops and holders.
• Weather stripping and thresholds.
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A-26. Security measures include—
• Locking knobs and handles.
• Dead bolts.
• Drop bars.
• Slide pins.
• Hasps and privacy locks.
A-27. Doors may be attached to a permanent foundation at six separate points. A breacher
must be able to locate and identify door hardware quickly to determine what the door
presents as a barrier. Consider how the door is secured, and decide which method should be
used to gain entry. This job can be more difficult if the door hardware is not visible. In such
cases, it is essential to know where typical door hardware is located.
Exterior Doors
A-28. Exterior doors control access to the inside of a building. They may have glass built into
the door face or other modifications that can impact on the door’s reaction to breaching
methods. Exterior doors provide—
• Security using locking mechanisms and a sturdy design.
• A weather tight seal against the elements.
• An insulation value the same as exterior walls.
Interior Doors
A-29. Interior doors provide passage, visual privacy, and sound control between internal
building spaces. Some interior doors also provide security.
Interior doors;
• Are lightweight and less substantially constructed than exterior doors.
• Have little insulation value.
• Provide minimal security with privacy locks, knobs, or handles.
Swinging (Hinged) Doors
A-30. Swinging (hinged) doors are the most common type encountered by breachers. They
are distinguished by a number of functional and material design features. They are designated
by the direction they open, sometimes referred to as determining the hand of the door. The
location of the door hinges determines this feature. Swinging doors are designated as—
• Right hand (RH) (hinges are on the right).
• Left hand (LH) (hinges are on the left).
• Inward opening (RH or LH).
• Outward (reverse [R]) opening (RH or LH). They are designated as RHR or LHR.
A-31. There are three types of swinging doors.
• Flush doors. They consist of a wood frame with relatively thin sheets of material
applied to both sides. Face panels (skins) are commonly made from 5 milimeters
plywood, hardboard, plastic laminate, or metal. Flush doors have a solid or hollow
core.
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•
•
Solid-core doors serve as entrance doors to hotels, motels, restaurants, and
other buildings where sturdy, secure doors are required.
Hollow-core doors are usually multi-pieced and cheaply constructed. They are
equipped with common privacy locks and knobs and are used as interior doors
in homes, offices, and warehouses. Hollow-core doors may be used as exterior
doors if they are constructed with waterproof adhesives. They provide less
thermal and sound insulation than a solid-core door and have a lower fireresistance rating.
Panel doors. They are made of stiles and rails with panels of plywood or hardboard.
Some may have a veneer over a lumber core. Many designs are formed by varying the
number, size, and shape of panels. Special effects are achieved by installing raised
panels and texture, and the edges are reduced to fit into the stiles and rails.
Batten doors. They are made of vertical boards (sheathing) nailed at right angles to
cross strips (ledgers). Batten doors are used primarily for economy in rough
construction and are usually built on site. Diagonal bracing is nailed and notched into
the ledgers, and tongue and-groove construction improves weatherproofing.
Security Doors
A-32. Security doors are generally characterized by—
• Elaborate grille and metal work.
• Single- and double-door units.
• 14-gauge frame.
• 5 centimeters thickness.
• Four or more steel hinges per door.
• Steel frame.
• High strength (locking systems are used with the door).
Filled Metal Doors
A-33. Filled metal doors are normally used as a service or side entrance to commercial
buildings and are characterized by—
• Sheet-metal surfaces on a wood frame with a foam filler.
• Two locks.
• Four hinges.
Metal Doors
A-34. Metal doors or security-type doors are characterized by—
• A metal frame with three or four hinges welded in place.
• Several high-security locks.
Glass Doors
A-35. Glass doors are metal- or wood-framed with tempered or thermal glass and have push
bars and handles. They are used as entrance doors to commercial buildings, offices, and
shops. A common glass door is a narrow style door. Narrow-style doors are used in new
construction and are also used as replacement doors in older buildings. They are
characterized by—
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•
•
•
Narrow rails of chromium that form the frame.
Plate glass.
A locking mechanism that—
Is housed in the vertical position when retracted.
Pivots up to the horizontal position when the door is locked.
Has about 4.25 centimeters of bolt projected into the opposite door or jamb.
Double Doors
A-36. Double doors are a combination of two doors of any type. They are on outward hinges
that swing together and meet in the middle. They use a sliding pin or a drop bar, and their
weak point is the center of both doors.
Roll-Up Doors
A-37. Roll-up doors are commonly known as garage or overhead doors. They—
• Have multi-sections with hinges between each section.
• Are attached to guide rails on a roller system.
• Are mechanically or manually opened.
• Can be used to protect storefronts or as a garage door.
Sliding Doors
A-38. Sliding doors can be made of wood, glass, and/or metal. They are used as exterior or
interior doors, and types include—
• Bypass.
• Pocket.
• Surface.
Revolving Doors
A-39. Revolving doors usually have a metal frame with tempered plate glass. They provide a
continuous weather seal while rotating. They are most often found at the entrances to malls,
hotels, and large industrial buildings.
WINDOWS
A-40. The primary functions of windows are to provide light, ventilation, and, or an outside
view. They also serve a decorative purpose. Windows should provide a weather tight seal
when closed, an insulating value, security, and condensation-free viewing. Basic window
components are shown in Figure A-2.
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Figure A-2. Basic Window Components
A-41. Windows are classified as one of three basic types—sliding, swinging, or fixed.
•
•
•
Sliding window. It consists of sashes that slide horizontally or vertically within a
frame. Sashes are held in the desired position by friction, fit, or counterbalancing
devices. Windows with more than one operating sash have staggered guide rails that
allow sashes to bypass one another when open and to create a watertight seal when
closed. The main elements of a sliding window are the frame and the sashes. The
window frame sits securely in a snug hole in the exterior wall and includes three
principal elements— head jamb, side jamb, and sill. These elements make a frame
that creates a weather-tight seal and allows smooth vertical or horizontal movement
of the sashes. The window sash supports and secures a single pane or multiple panes
of glass within the window frame. The sash is fitted with weather stripping and
provides security with a locking mechanism.
Swinging window. The sashes open and close by rotating around a vertical or
horizontal axis or hinge. Single- and double-operating sash designs can be found.
Fixed window. It does not open. It is often used in conjunction with movable sashes
in various types of windows. Fixed windows are used primarily for aesthetic
purposes.
Design Types
A-42. Window designs (Figure A-3) fall into eight common types, some of which are
described below. These designs include—
• Double hung.
• Awning and hopper.
• Casement.
• Projected.
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•
•
•
•
Sliding.
Jalousie.
Combination.
Security.
Figure A-3. Window Types.
A-43. Double Hung. A double-hung window is made of two sashes that slide up and down
in a window frame. The sashes are held in place by a friction fit against the frame or by
springs and balancing devices. They are used extensively in many types of construction
because they—
• Are simple to operate.
• Adapt easily to many architectural designs.
• Are relatively inexpensive to buy and install.
• Have screen and storm sashes installed on the outside of the window.
A-44. Awning and Hopper. Awning windows have one or more sashes that are hinged at
the top and swing out at the bottom. They are often combined with a fixed unit to provide
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ventilation. Several operating sashes can be stacked vertically so that they close on
themselves or on rails that separate the units. Awning windows use sliding, friction hinges
and crank or push-bar mechanisms for opening and closing. They are normally installed side
by side to form a ribbon effect.
A-45. Hopper windows are similar to awning windows, but they are hinged at the bottom and
open inward. They are operated by a lock-handle mechanism located in the top rail of the
sash.
A-46. Casement. A casement window has a sash that is hinged on the side and swings
outward. Installation usually consists of two or more units separated by mullions (fixed bars
or rails that form nonstructural divisions between window units). Casement windows have
crank or push-bar mechanisms similar to awning windows. Latches are used to close and
hold sashes tightly against weather stripping. They are often used in combination with fixed
units.
A-47. Jalousie. A jalousie window consists of a series of horizontal glass slats, similar to an
awning, that are held in place by a metal frame at each end. Levers attach the metal frames to
each other so that the slats operate together like a venetian blind. Jalousie windows provide
excellent ventilation, but limited weather tightness restricts their use in temperate climates.
A-48. Security. Security windows are designed to prevent entry to or exit from a building.
Many configurations are custom-made according to rigid specifications. The design and the
specific material used dictate the window’s strength. Security materials may or may not
provide light, ventilation, or a view. Security windows can be constructed from—
• Steel bars.
• Grilles.
• Wire mesh.
• Bulletproof glass/plastic.
• Other hardened material.
Construction Material
E-49. The most common materials found in window construction are steel, stainless steel,
aluminum, wood, glass, and plastic. Locking mechanisms are usually located where they
cannot be easily reached from the outside.
A-50. Glass. Glass is chemically inert, transparent, hard, and brittle. It provides a barrier
against the weather, but it does not provide significant security. The three basic types of glass
are sheet, float, and plate; hybrid or variations of glass include safety (laminated), wire, and
tempered.
• Sheet glass. It is a low-quality commercial glass that is never distortion-free. Its
thickness is approximately 2 centimeters.
• Float glass. It is better quality than sheet glass, and it has less distortion and surface
waviness. The term float refers to a manufacturing process. The thickness of float
glass is approximately .5 centimeters.
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•
•
•
•
Plate glass. It is virtually clear and provides undistorted vision. Its thickness ranges
from .25 to 2.5 centimeters thick, and the maximum pane size is approximately 3
meters by 23 meters.
Safety glass. It is a form of security glass, and it is used where it may be subject to
impact from objects. It is made of transparent plastic laminated between two or more
panes of sheet, float, or plate glass. Safety glass cracks, and shards cling to the plastic,
making penetration difficult.
Wire glass. It is primarily used in fire doors as required by building codes. It affords
some security, even when broken, since the shards are usually retained in the mesh. It
is approximately .60 centimeters thick and is fabricated with diamond, hexagon, or
square wire mesh embedded in the glass.
Tempered glass. It is specially treated to achieve a prescribed hardness. It is easily
penetrated and broken into gravel-size pieces with hand tools.
A-51. Nonbreakable and Bullet-Resistant Glass. Non-breakable and bullet-resistant glass
are considered hard barriers. Without the use of heavy tools or machinery, the entry team
must find an alternate route. Battering rams, hooligan tools, and sledgehammers have little or
no effect.
A-52. Transparent Plastic. Many plastic compounds have more impact resistance than
glass. Plastic is combustible and emits toxic fumes; therefore, its use is restricted by many
building codes.
A-53. Obstructions. Some windows have enhanced security features that increase resistance
to penetration. Other windows may have air conditioners or window fans installed that
present a breaching obstacle. Additional obstructions are grilles, mesh, screens, shutters,
curtains, and blinds. The types of obstructions are—
• Air conditioners. Air conditioners are normally used in conjunction with doublehung, sliding windows. The unit displaces the lower sash and makes the window an
undesirable breaching point and target.
• Window fans. Window fans consist of a framed-in electric motor and fins that are
located as close to the inside of an open window as possible. The presence of a
window fan makes a window an undesirable breaching point.
• Grilles. Grilles are designed with a grid of .60 to 1.25 centimeter welded bars that
envelop the window and are fastened to the structure to provide security.
• Mesh. Expanded steel mesh is welded to a frame or to the structure itself.
• Screens. Screens allow a glass sash to be opened for ventilation while still
maintaining a barrier to some exterior elements and insects. A standard screen is
made of stainless steel, bronze, or galvanized steel.
• Shutters. Shutters are fitted to homes and businesses in some geographical areas to
prevent damage from the weather. In the open position, there is no barrier to the
glass; when closed, they present a barrier to the glass. Shutters are usually made of
solid wood, but they can be made of light steel.
• Curtains and blinds. Most homes and businesses have curtains or blinds hanging on
the inside of the window. They may present a problem to the breacher as a physical
obstacle or a hindrance to entering the room. Curtains are normally made of
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lightweight cloth; and blinds are made of wood, plastic, or aluminum. They limit or
eliminate the passage of light and prevent or lessen visibility from the outside.
Window Manufacturing
A-54. Windows are manufactured by millworks in certain stock sizes, especially for
residential structures. When possible, consult architectural drawings for detailed information
on window sizes. Window details can normally be found in the window and door schedule,
but can also be determined from the elevation and sectional view. Other sources for window
dimensions are manufacturers’ catalogs and descriptive literature.
Methods Used to Penetrate Glass
A-55. Table A-1 outlines the various methods used to penetrate breakable-glass barriers when
a window is closed or locked.
Table A-5. Methods for breaking penetrable glass.
Methods Used to Penetrate Security Windows, Grilles, and Mesh
A-56. Table A-2 outlines the various methods used to penetrate security windows, grilles, and
mesh. These methods may also be applied to grilles and gates on doors.
STRUCTURAL WALLS
A-57. Walls may be load-bearing or non-load-bearing, exterior or interior, and constructed
from a multitude of available building materials. Factors in the design and construction of
walls include the following:
• Load-bearing strength.
• Foundation, floor, and roof integration.
• Door and window openings.
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•
•
•
•
•
Fire resistance.
Mechanical/waste-removal pipe.
Desired finish.
Sound/weather insulation.
Security.
Table A-2. Methods for penetrating Security Windows, Grills, and Mesh.
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A-58. Wall systems are divided into four basic types—wood stud, metal stud, wooden post
and beam, and masonry. Basic wall components are shown in Figure A-4.
Figure A-4. Wall Components.
Wood Stud
A-59. A wood-stud wall consists of a framed series of 5 by 10 centimeter or 5 by 15
centimeter lumber, depending on the support requirements. Gypsum sheeting (dry wall) is the
most common interior sheathing material used in building construction. Studs carry the load,
and wall sheathing helps resist lateral movement. Stud spacing is usually 40 or 60
centimeters, measured from center to center, and is determined by the sheathing material.
Insulation, vapor-barrier materials, and electrical and plumbing lines may be fitted inside a
stud wall.
Metal Stud
A-60. Steel or aluminum stud walls are used as load-bearing walls or non load bearing panels
within a steel or concrete structure. This system is similar to the wood-stud system in form
and configuration. Stud spacing is 30, 40, or 60 centimeters. The metal-stud system is used in
conjunction with light gauge metal roof and floor systems.
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Wooden Post and Beam
A-61. “Post-and-beam” framing uses larger and fewer structural members than stud framing.
The frame is primarily load-bearing with some parts left exposed for architectural or
aesthetic reasons. Non-load-bearing panels enclose space, give lateral support to the frame,
and act as weather barriers on exterior walls.
Masonry
A-62. Masonry walls depend on mass for their load-bearing capability. Lateral stability
depends on the height-to-width ratio of the wall, and finishes and insulation materials may be
applied to individual walls. Masonry walls have excellent fire-resistant characteristics. The
most common masonry materials are brick, concrete block, and stone.
• Brick. Brick walls are normally constructed in multiples of 10 centimeters with a
wall thickness of 10, 20, 30, or 40 inches. With mortar, the standard brick width is
roughly 10 centimeters. A residential building less than 10 meters high will normally
have a 20 centimeter thick brick wall. A 30 centimeter thick wall is recommended for
structures that are subject to high winds or earthquakes. The outside layer of brick is
typically backed up with a lesser grade of brick, concrete block, or hollow tiles. A
brick veneer (one brick thick) may also be built over wood framing. Common brick
types include firebrick (yellow and hardened), paving brick, used brick, and
manufactured used brick. Bricks are divided into three categories by grades of
hardness. They are;
Severe weathering (SW).
Moderate weathering (MW).
No weathering (NW).
• Concrete block. Concrete-block walls are most commonly built from blocks that are
18.75 by 18.75 by 38.75 centimeters. If they are laid in a single thickness, they will
produce an 20 centimeter thick wall. Concrete blocks are also available in 10, 25, and
30 centimeter widths.
• Stone. Stone walls built today for commercial and residential use are veneered (one
stone thick against a concrete block or reinforced concrete wall). In solid-stone walls,
the size and shape of the stone determines how it will be laid in the wall. Rough stone
is known as rubble, and cut stone is known as ashlar. The stone may be cut to shape
or left natural, and it may be neatly coursed or laid with no apparent coursing. Stones
in a wall must overlap so that joints are not directly above each other.
NOTE: The Fore-mentioned measurements are a general rule of thumb which is
dependent on geographical country locations.
SOLID-FENCE WALLS
A-63. These barriers are built of solid construction for security or defensive purposes, and an
SRT will encounter them primarily during movement. Solid fence walls come in a variety of
heights and widths and are made with the same construction factors and materials found in
structural walls. The top of the walls may be enhanced with BWC, BTC, broken glass,
spikes, or barbs to prevent scaling.
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ROOFS
A-64. Roof framing provides a base for attaching roofing materials. Although there is a wide
variation in roof shapes and combinations, most are classified as flat, shed, butterfly, gable,
gambrel, hip, or mansard.
• Flat. A flat roof is supported on joists that also carry the ceiling material. It may have
a slight slope to provide drainage.
• Shed. A shed roof is the simplest type of pitched (sloped) roof. It is sometimes called
a lean-to roof since it is often part of a larger structure. It is used in contemporary
designs where the ceiling is attached directly to the roof framing.
• Butterfly. A butterfly roof sheds water toward the middle. It is usually limited to
warmer climates because of its tendency to accumulate ice and snow.
• Gable. A gable roof is used extensively for residential construction. Two surfaces
slope from the centerline of the structure, forming gables on each end.
• Gambrel. A gambrel roof is a variation of the gable roof where each slope is broken,
usually near the center. It is used in two-story construction, and dormers (a projecting
structure, usually with windows) are often included. The advantage of a gambrel roof
is that more space is formed in the upper-level rooms. This roof is typical of colonial
American construction and architectural periods immediately following.
• Hip. A hip roof has four sloping sides. The line where the adjacent sides intersect is
called a hip. One advantage of the hip roof is that protective overhangs are formed
over the ends and the sidewalls.
• Mansard. A mansard roof is similar to a hip roof, except each of the four sides has a
double slope. The lower slope approaches the vertical, while the upper slope is more
or less flat. The advantage is that more space is formed in upper-level rooms.
Rafters and Trusses
A-65. Roofs are formed from a series of structural members called rafters. Trusses are the
frameworks designed to carry a load between two or more supports; they hold the roof and
ceiling surfaces in place.
A-66. Rafters and trusses must be made of structurally sound material (lumber or metal) and
assembled with carefully fitted joints. The principle used in roof design is based on the
rigidity of the triangle. Triangular shapes are built into the frame in such a way that stress on
the various parts is parallel to structure members. They rest on the exterior walls and span the
entire width of the structure.
Roof Materials
A-67. When a roof frame is complete, it is sheathed to provide a nailing base for the roof
covering. Sheathing materials add strength and rigidity to the structure. Standard sheathing
material includes plywood, shiplap, and common boards. Weatherproofing mineral paper or
plastic roofing material is then placed over the sheathing material. Material covering the
weatherproofing layer includes—
• Asphalt, wood, or mineral-fiber shingles.
• Slate.
• Tile.
• Galvanized-iron, aluminum, or copper sheeting.
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CEILINGS
A-68. A ceiling frame is the assembly just below the roof that carries the ceiling surface. On
lower levels, the floor joists carry the ceiling. Basic construction is similar to floor framing
except that lighter members are used, and header joists are not included around the outside.
The main framing members are joists, and their size is determined by the length of the span
and the spacing used. Spacing is normally 30 or 40 centimeters. Architectural plans and
building codes usually include specifications for ceiling requirements. Ceiling materials vary
widely, but may include—
• Plaster over lathing (narrow strips of wood).
• Gypsum wallboard.
• Tile and various veneers.
• Plywood and paint.
A-69. Suspended ceilings consist of suspended metal frameworks and various types of tile or
panels. They are installed to cover heating ducts and plumbing lines that interfere with the
application of a finished surface.
FLOORS
A-70. Framing and material finishing requirements for floors are comparable to those for
ceilings. Sturdier members and materials are used in floors for load-bearing purposes. Floor
joists rest on foundation walls and may be supported underneath by girders, beams, or a postand-column system. Foundation walls may enclose full basements or crawl spaces, and a
concrete slab foundation generally precludes normal breaching efforts. Floor sheathing is
placed over the joists, much like the sheathing on a roof. Floor sheathing can be plywood,
shiplap, or hardboard; and it can be covered with carpet, tile, or linoleum. Consult
architectural plans for material specifications, details, and floor plans.
BUILDING MATERIALS ENCOUNTERED
A-71. Breachers will encounter various building materials in the course of their work.
Therefore, it is helpful to know the materials’ distinctive properties of strength, stiffness,
density, and resistance to wear caused by physical or chemical action. These materials
include—
• Wood. The major determining factor of the wood’s strength is the manner in which
the wood is cut and placed in construction in relation to the direction of the grain. The
shear strength of the wood is greater across the grain than parallel to the grain, and
some wood is pressure treated to withstand the elements.
• Lumber. Lumber is cut directly from a tree and is classified by its dimensions.
Hardwood and softwood can be used. Lumber is used in light framing, structural
framing, and decking.
• Plywood. Plywood is available in exterior and interior grades depending on the
waterproofing characteristics of the bonding material. It is used for wall and roof
sheathing, sub flooring, and underlay. Plywood is a laminated panel made of wood
veneers. The veneers are laid at right angles to one another and bonded together under
high pressure with a water-resistant or waterproof adhesive. Plywood comes in 1 by 3
meter sheets that are 1,25 or 2 centimeters thick.
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•
•
•
•
Laminated timber. Laminated timber is a stress-rated structural member. It is made
of several layers of wood that are securely bonded with waterproof or water-resistant
adhesives. The timbers are factory made and are more dimensionally stable than solid
timber.
Steel. Steel is used for heavy and light structural framing. It is also used in a wide
range of building products such as windows, doors, hardware, and fasteners. Steel is
fastened together by welding or mechanical means. It may be heat-treated or altered
with additives to form alloys during the manufacturing process, which adds special
properties of strength, hardness, durability, corrosion resistance, or workability. Steel
is seen in the form of I beams, rebar, and plates. Two types are commonly
encountered.
Stainless steel. It is an alloy of steel, nickel, and chromium; and it is highly
resistant to corrosion, heat, and oxidation.
Chromium steel. It is very hard and corrosion-resistant.
Nonferrous metals. Nonferrous metals are metals other than iron or steel, and they
include—
Aluminum. It is a soft, strong, lightweight, workable metal that is corrosionresistant and light in color. It is widely used in sheet form as outer sheathing
on buildings and homes and in the manufacture of windows, doors, flashing,
reflective insulation, trim, and hardware.
Copper. It is used in construction where corrosion resistance, impact
resistance, or high conductivity is required. Copper is commonly used in sheet
form for roofing or flashing and is an excellent outdoor material due to its
resistance to saltwater and air corrosion.
Brass. It is an alloy of copper and zinc. It is commonly found in doors,
windows, hardware, fasteners, and plumbing.
Insulation. Insulation is used to keep interior spaces protected from exterior
elements. Fiberglass, rolled insulation is commonly used in walls and attics of homes.
Most commercial buildings have foam insulation that is sprayed into desired areas.
PENETRATION METHODS
A-72. Table A-3 shows the various methods of penetrating walls, roofs, ceilings, and floors.
MECHANICAL BREACHING
A-73. Mechanical breaching of a solid-fence wall is the same as breaching a fence
(paragraph A-11, “Soft Barriers”). It is accomplished with ladders, team lifts, or platform
vehicles. Use existing tunnels or build tunnels to go under a wall. Table A-4 shows the
advantages and disadvantages of each.
HARD BARRIERS
A-74. SRTs are not capable of penetrating a hard barrier without the support of combat units
(armor, infantry, engineers) or without using heavy weapons. Medium-barrier targets (doors,
windows) must be fully exploited on hard barrier targets and objectives.
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Table A-3. Penetration Methods.
Table A-4. Going under a wall.
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Appendix B
Breacher’s Brief
The sample Breacher’s Brief in is formatted to capture necessary information. It helps the
breacher make a sound decision on which method is best for breaching the obstacle. Once the
information is gathered and recorded, the breacher briefs the leadership on the options
selected. Following mission completion, the breacher completes the brief and provides input
to the AAR. The brief then becomes part of the record.
1. PRIMARY BREACH POINT.
a. Location (confirmed).
b. Type of obstacle to be breached.
(1) Door.
(a) Design.
(b) Material (wood, metal, glass).
(c) Knob side (right, left, push bar, NA).
(d) Locks (dead bolt, knob, handle with thumb latch).
(e) Construction (flush with wall, recessed).
(2) Window.
(a) Design.
(b) Size (height, width).
(c) Window frame (wood, metal, nylon).
(d) Obstacles (screen, shutters, bars, mesh).
(3) Other (wall, roof).
(a) Construction (wood, block).
(b) Surface (clapboard, shingle, brick, block, stone).
c. Method of breaching and employer.
(1) Slow and deliberate; employer.
(2) Battering ram; employer.
(3) Hooligan tool; employer.
(4) Jamb spreader; employer.
(5) Thermal; employer.
(6) Ballistic; employer.
(7) Other method(s); employer.
2. SECONDARY BREACH POINT.
a. Location (confirmed).
b. Type of obstacle to be breached.
(1) Door.
(a) Design.
(b) Material (wood, metal, glass).
(c) Knob side (right, left, push bar, NA).
(d) Locks (dead bolt, knob, handle with thumb latch).
(e) Construction (flush with wall, recessed).
(2) Window.
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(a) Design.
(b) Size (height, width).
(c) Window frame (wood, metal, nylon).
(d) Obstacles (screen, shutters, bars, mesh).
(3) Other (wall, roof).
(a) Construction (wood, block).
(b) Surface (clapboard, shingle, brick, block, stone).
c. Method of breaching and employer.
(1) Slow and deliberate; employer.
(2) Battering ram; employer.
(3) Hooligan tool; employer.
(4) Jamb spreader; employer.
(5) Thermal; employer.
(6) Ballistic; employer.
(7) Other method(s); employer.
3. LOCATION OF BREACHER.
a. Moving to objective.
b. At entry point.
c. During entry.
d. During assault.
4. ACTIONS AT LAST COVERED-AND-CONCEALED POSITION (EQUIPMENT
CHECK).
5. ACTIONS AT ENTRY.
a. Conduct visual check for threat (IED, booby trap).
b. Verify entry-point intelligence.
c. Employ breach.
6. EMERGENCY/ABORT OR ALTERNATE BREACH SIGNAL.
a. Abort: Face stack and use push-back, hand-and-arm signal.
b. Hurry up: Push arm up and down.
c. Confirm ready: Thumbs-up and ready squeeze.
d. Alternate breach: Move hand over head in circular motion and point.
e. IED/booby trap: Cut throat and point.
f. Mechanical breacher required: Verbal (be specific).
g. Ballistic protection required: Point violently to spot.
7. MISFIRE PROCEDURES.
8. COMPROMISE PROCEDURES.
9. BREACHER-CASUALTY PROCEDURES.
a. Assistant breacher assumes control.
b. Assistant breacher leaves primary breacher or determines medical-evacuation needs.
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10. ACTIONS ON CONTACT WITH IED OR BOOBY TRAP.
a. Stop radio communication.
b. Identify device.
c. Notify chain of command.
d. Coordinate with support elements.
e. Make decision to bypass. Choose alternate route if necessary.
f. Mark device if possible.
11. CONDITIONS OF BREACH (SMOKE, DEBRIS, FLASH, NOISE).
12. QUESTIONS.
13. BREACHER INSPECTION.
a. Conduct back brief.
b. Inspect gear and equipment.
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Appendix C
Improvised Explosive Devices and Booby Traps
The ability of entry-team members to recognize explosive or incendiary devices and take
proper action may mean the difference between death, property damage, and a successful
mission. Remember, the use of explosives is only limited by the threat’s imagination.
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
C-1. IEDs are used to cause property damage, bodily harm, or death. They are made from
materials that are readily available and can range from very simple and inexpensive to highly
sophisticated. Information and knowledge can be found in several places.
C-2. The materials necessary to build a bomb can be found and obtained from unexploded
ordinance. Explosives can be purchased either legally or illegally from explosive dealers or
black market. Many insurgents have the knowledge necessary to build and employ a bomb.
They may have been commercially trained, militarily trained or received their training as
members of an insurgent terrorist organization.
EXPLOSIVES
C-3. Explosives are divided into two categories—low and high—and both can kill or maim.
Low explosives burn with intense heat and light at about 400 meters per second. They push
through an object.
ELEMENTS
C-4. IEDs can be electric or non-electric and can also contain a delay.
• Electric. Materials needed to make an electric IED include—
An explosive.
A blasting cap.
A fuse.
A power source.
A delay.
• Non-electric. A non-electric IED is extremely simple to make; a cherry bomb is an
example. Materials needed include—
An explosive.
A blasting cap.
A fuse.
A flame to ignite the system.
• Delays. The following delays are often used with an IED:
Magnetic.
Sound.
Vibration.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
C-6. Booby traps and IEDs can be detected by contact or observation. When a threat prepares
an IED or a booby trap, he places it as an exposed device that is visible upon approach to the
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objective or as an unexposed device that is concealed from the team and the M/O. When an
IED or a booby trap is discovered—
• Cease radio communication.
• Identify the device.
• Notify the command.
• Coordinate with support elements.
• Make the decision to bypass. Use an alternate route if necessary.
• Attempt to bypass.
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Glossary
AA
AAR
angle of incidence
AO
AP
APFT
ASV
AT
attn
ballistic breaching
barrier
BC
BDU
bearer
blueprints
breacher
breaching
BTC
BWC
C
C2
C3
C4
cache
avenue of approach
after-action review
A method used to visually check around a corner for a threat
(also called cutting the pie). When approaching a corner where
a threat is suspected, move as far from the wall as space
permits. An entry-team member will hold the weapon in a low
ready, close-in-ready, or shooting position as he shuffles his
feet side to side in small slices, edging toward the corner and
gradually increasing his field of view until the threat area is
cleared to a point that reduces risk upon entry.
area of operation
antipersonnel
Army Physical Fitness Test.
armored security vehicle
antiterrorism
attention
An alternate means of gaining entry into a structure through
an existing opening with the use of shotgun or rifle
ammunition.
A structure (fence or wall) built to bar passage. It may also
hinder or restrict movement.
building clearing
battle-dress uniform
The individual responsible for physically moving a casualty to
a safe area for medical treatment. A team member performing
this task may be holstered for better hands-on recovery during
the operation.
A photographic reproduction of an architect’s plans or
mechanicals.
A team member or an on-call member assigned the duties of
breaching an objective. He carries a shotgun and specialized
ammunition used in ballistic breaching. He provides an
immediate, positive access to an objective through an
obstruction or barrier (door, window, wall).
Making a hole or gap in the objective to allow entry-team
access.
barbed-taped concertina
barbed-wire concertina
Celsius
command and control
command, control, and communication
composition 4 (plastic explosive)
A safe place for concealing equipment and other necessities.
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casualty
CID
CLP
CME
CMO
CMT
COA
cold shot
compromised authority
control the distance
controller
coordinated operations
COTS
cover element
CP
cutting the pie
deadly force
deliberate clearing
Anyone who is injured, is unable to help himself, and remains
in a position of possible further injury or death because of
hostile or friendly fire.
Criminal Investigation Division
cleaner, lubricant, and preservative
crisis-management exercise
crisis-management organization
crisis-management team
course of action
The first shot fired by a marksman. When a marksman must
take a cold shot, it is recommended that authorization be made
by the installation commander or a higher authority.
An instance where the SRT leader is granted total decision
making authority for SRT actions by the appropriate command
level. No further authorization is required by the command
element until mission completion. Decisions are based on the
SOP and the SRT’s training and experience. All SRT and
security assets come under the direct control of the team leader.
All SRT members are granted the authority to employ
immediate deadly force according to the commander’s
directive and established Corps SOP.
As a general rule, avoid closing any closer than 2 meters to a
threat who is not cooperating with verbal commands unless
some other level of force is being used.
The person responsible for controlling speed, direction, and
elevation of a recovery element.
The use of two or more entry teams positioned to assault (enter
and clear) an objective. These teams may be collocated or
separated, enter at the same point or at separate locations, and
execute entry simultaneously or delayed, depending on the
plan’s desired effect. All teams involved are capable of
operating independently.
commercial, off-the-shelf
An element that consists of trained M/O teams. The cover
element may be an entry-team member or a carefully selected
MP representative. The cover element is responsible for
providing suppressive fire on the hostile-element position,
gathering intelligence, and directing movement if necessary. If
vehicles are used for extraction, a cover element may be
assigned as part of the recovery team.
command post
See angle of incidence.
The physical force used against a person causing a substantial
risk of serious bodily harm or death.
A systematic method of clearing with the eventual goal of
controlling the objective.
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dilemma
distraction
diversion
MODIC
dominant position
driver
dynamic clearing
EEI
EMS
enemy
EOC
EOD
excessive force
fatal funnel
flagging
flank security
flash front sight
flash sight picture
A situation requiring a person to make a choice between
several equally undesirable alternatives.
The act or state of being distracted. Mental or emotional
confusion or disturbance.
A maneuver that draws the threat’s attention away from the
planned point of attack.
Minister of Defense identification code
A position that offers the best control of an area.
The individual responsible for operating a vehicle during
recovery.
Resembles the deliberate-clearing method but the goal is to
control the objective immediately.
essential elements of information
emergency-medical service
Any hostile person in the act of illegal activity surrounding
special threat situations. The enemy is the threat. Examples
range from a barricaded insurgent contained inside a military
building on an ANA installation; a terrorist located within the
area of responsibility of an MP combat support company
during wartime anywhere in the world.
emergency-operations center
explosive-ordnance disposal
The use of force greater than what is needed to gain the threat’s
compliance or control. It is also the use of force that is
reasonable at one time and unreasonable at another time.
Example; to continue striking a subject after he has been
handcuffed and taken into custody
Any entrance or constricted area, window, door, or breach
point that is the focal point of attention or the anticipated AA
that will draw fire to the entry team.
The unintentional alerting of the threat to the team’s presence
by extending a muzzle or a body part into an open area where
the threat may see it.
One team member searches and another provides protection,
offering little chance of side exposure to a threat.
As soon as the shooter’s front sight is on or near the center
mass of the target, he fires. Shots are fired in rapid succession,
pausing long enough between shots for the weapon to recover
back on the target. Proper grip and stance will naturally bring
sights back on target. Team-member movement, target
movement, range, and obstructions determine the time
required between shots.
Picking up the front sight as quickly as possible on the target.
The sight does not have to be perfect, but the shooter wants to
have some alignment of the front sight with the rear sight. The
concentration is on the front sight and the desired point of
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FOP
force
force and stealth
four Cs
FP
fratricide T
gr
GT
GUN
HC
hide
high barricade
HMMWV
hostage-negotiation team
HQ
hr
HTU
Hz
ID
IED
IIR
immediate threat
initial-response force
inner-perimeter security
impact. Shoot with both eyes open if possible; but if this is too
difficult, close one eye. The field of view is increased when
both eyes are open.
forward-operating position
The action directed to defeat a barrier system with overt,
aggressive activities.
The combined actions of force and stealth needed to defeat the
barrier system.
contact, counter, control, and cuff
force protection
The accidental killing of friendly forces by other friendly
forces during battle. Fratricide is avoided by doctrine, TTP, and
training.
grain(s)
ground test
Grab, undo, and neutralize. When the threat grabs the weapon,
so do you. Next, create a distraction by yelling, delivering a
sudden and painful strike, or shocking his senses in some way.
Finally, neutralize the threat.
high concentrate
A place of concealment that also provides cover.
A movement executed by the No. 2 man at and above eye
level. He leans out from his cover, exposing as little as
possible, lines up to the rear of the No. 1 man, locates the
threat, and gains target acquisition of threats above eye level
(such as the next level or on roofs).
high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle
This team is composed of CID, MPI, and MI personnel. They
conduct negotiations for key decision makers.
headquarters
hour(s)
handheld terminal unit
hertz
identification
improvised explosive device
intelligence-information report
Any threat who blocks the path to a team member’s dominant
position. This prevents or slows the establishment of security
and is so close it cannot be ignored.
The on-duty law-enforcement personnel. They isolate, contain,
and evaluate the incident and provide the initial report to the
provost marshal (PM).
The perimeter that is initially set up by an on-duty MP who
secures the area and evacuates non participants. An M/O team,
augmented by area-security teams, normally relieve the onscene MP.
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ANA 3-19.11
investigative team
IR
K
keep in memory (KIM)
kick
LBV
LH
LHR
LIN
LOC
long gun
long wall
LOS
low barricade
m
M/O
MDMP
method
METL
METT-TC
MEVA
MI
min
mm
MOA
MOS
MOUT
MP
MPI
This team is composed of CID, MPI, and MI personnel. It
conducts an ongoing investigation during a special threat
situation and completes the investigation after the situation is
resolved.
infrared
one thousand
KIM games are a series of exercises that increase an M/O’s
ability to perceive reality and retain information. They are
designed to exercise the mind through overload.
When armed with a submachine gun or a long gun, bring the
weapon to port, step forward, and point your knee to the target.
Kick with the ball of your foot, stepping forward or backward.
Tucking the gun stock under your armpit while kicking is
another effective weapon-control method. NOTE: Never high
kick because it places you off balance. Keep your finger
off the trigger when kicking.
load-bearing vest
left hand
left hand reverse
line item number
lines of communication
Any shoulder-fired weapon carried by an SRT member.
The longest distance from the entry point to the farthest joining
wall.
line of sight
A movement executed by the No. 1 man to cover threats at and
below eye level. He leans out from his cover, exposing as little
as possible, locates the threat, and gains target acquisition.
meter(s)
marksman/observer
military decision-making process
A plan or series of actions to accomplish a task. The common
methods during movement, entry, and clearing are deliberate
and dynamic.
mission-essential task list
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian
considerations
mission-essential or vulnerable area
military intelligence
minute(s)
millimeter(s)
minute of angle
military occupational specialty
military operations on urbanized terrain
military police
military-police investigation
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ANA 3-19.11
MRE
MSDS
MTP
MW
NA
NATO
No.
NSN
NVD
NVG
NW
objective
OCOKA
OIC
OODA
OP
OPCON
OPLAN
OPORD
OPSEC
ORP
outer-perimeter security
OVM
P
pam
PAO
phase line
PM
PMCS
PMO
procedures
PTSD
R
R/S
ready squeeze
meal, ready-to-eat
material safety data sheet
mission training plan
moderate weathering
not applicable
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
number
national stock number
night-vision device
night-vision goggles
no weathering
The physical object of the action taken (intended goal, purpose,
or target).
observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and
avenues of approach
officer in charge
observation, orientation, decision, and action
observation point
operational control
operation plan
operation order
operations security
objective rally point
Controlled by security forces, normally MP that limit access to
the incident site and effected areas. These forces must also
provide security to the rest of the installation.
operator’s vehicle maintenance
partially trained
pamphlet
public affairs officer
An imaginary line within the objective that is used to
coordinate and control the movement of team members or
coordinate clearing operations with other teams, thereby
reducing the possibility of fratricide.
provost marshal
preventive maintenance checks and services
provost marshal office
The standard and detailed COA that describes how to perform
a task.
post-traumatic stress disorder
reverse
reconnaissance/surveillance
A silent form of communication used by the entry team to
signal that they are ready. Team members signal they are ready
by squeezing the shoulder to their front. The signal travels
from the rear of the formation to the front.
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realistic targets
Any target having realistic features (photographed or painted)
and requiring threat evaluation.
recovery element
Team members assigned the task of recovering casualties.
RF
radio frequency
RH
right hand
RHR
right hand reverse
ROE
rules of engagement
ROP
rural forward-operating position
RS
retractable stock
S2
Intelligence Officer
SEE
See the threat, Evaluate the threat, and Eliminate the threat if
necessary.
shield man
The member responsible for providing ballistic-shield
protection from hostile fire. He may have a drawn weapon,
depending on the team’s position and the perceived threat.
Multiple shields can be used, depending on equipment
availability.
short wall
The shortest distance from the entry point to the nearest
joining wall.
SITREP
situation report
SJA
staff judge advocate
SM
soldier’s manual
softening
Visually clearing secondary threat areas (under beds, behind
doors, above cabinets, behind furniture) before moving to clear
primary areas. This may be accomplished inside or outside the
entry point of the primary area. Cutting the pie and using
thermal imagery, NVDs, or mirrors are examples of softening
techniques.
SOP
standard operating procedures
special-reaction team (SRT) Provides an enhanced response capable of controlling special
threat situations. The SRT must begin preliminary tactical
planning to resolve the situation during initial employment.
SPORS
A method used to identify and remedy a weapon stoppage or
malfunction.
SPOTREP
spot report
SSA
surprise, speed, and aggressive action
stack
A stationary formation used to minimize space and maximize
speed before entry or movement. It is similar to a file
movement; however, team members are stationary. This should
not be used as a movement technique. All team members are
located together on one side of the door within arm’s length.
stage
A stationary formation used to minimize space and maximize
speed of access and tactical angles. It is similar to a stack;
however, the team is split into two elements, and one element
is located on each side of the entry point.
stealth
The action directed to defeat the barrier system by avoiding or
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STP
strategy
SW
SWS
synchronized shooting
T
T
tactical angle
tactics
target
TBA
TDY
technique
TG
threat
thumbs-up
TM
TMF
trigger-finger indexing
TTP
TWS
U
UOP
USD
VIP
WO
inactivating the elements in an attempt to prevent detection.
soldiers training publication
The science or art of commanders as applied to the overall
planning and conduct of large-scale combat operations. A plan,
method, or series of maneuvers for obtaining security or
victory. Much broader than tactics.
severe weathering
Sniper Weapon System
The immediate incapacitation of a threat by more than one
M/O team, followed by immediate entry of the entry team.
threat
trained
A position of observation and fire.
The art and science of employing available means to defeat the
threat.
1. A geographical area, complex, or building planned for
capture (see objective). 2. The location of the threat. 3. The
aiming point of any weapon or weapon system. 4. The area
where the distraction device is employed.
to be announced
temporary duty
The method used by troops or commanders to perform
assigned missions and functions; specifically, the method of
employing equipment and personnel.
trainer’s guide
Anyone or anything regarded as a possible danger or menace (a
sniper on a rooftop, a barricaded gunman inside a doorway, an
IED).
A silent form of communication used by the entry team to
signal they are ready. Team members signal they are ready by
giving a thumbs-up with their support hand. The signal travels
from the front to the rear of the formation.
technical manual
threat-management force
The position of the trigger finger before firing the weapon. The
finger is straight, outside the trigger guard, and pointing in the
direction of the muzzle.
tactics, techniques, and procedures
thermal weapon sight
untrained
urban forward-operating position
unarmed self-defense
very important person
warning order
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