STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA TECSC`S MEMORANDUM IN

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF DORCHESTER
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOR THE FIRST ruDICIAL CIRCUIT
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THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v
THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, ET AL.,
Defendants.
Case
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No.:
2013-CP-1 8-00013
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)
TECSC'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
TO JOIN ADDITIONAL
PARTIES
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Defendant The Episcopal Church in South Carolina ("TECSC") hereby submits this
memorandum in support of its motion to join additional parties.
I.
Introduction
The instant motion to join additional parties is timely and was explicitþ invited by the
Court in its order denying a prior motion for joinder. As the Court anticipated, discovery (which
is in its early stages, with written discovery still ongoing and depositions yet to be taken) has
allowed TECSC to begin to investigate the corporate records and other relevant facts to make
new and more specifrc allegations against a narrowly tailored list of additional parties
-
four
individuals who were the leaders of the scheme to take away the Diocese's assets and actually
carried out the fraudulent, wrongful, and ultra vires corporate acts upon which the named
Plaintiffs in this litigation so persistently rely. This is not another attempt to join all the current
purported directors and officers of the party corporations in their corporate capacities.
As detailed in the proposed pleading attached to the instant motion, the four named
individuals breached personal promises and fiduciary duties, acted under false corporate titles
I
without being duly elected, made numerous fraudulent representations, and manipulated the
Diocese's corporations and property interests outside the bounds of their authority, for example,
by improperþ amending the corporate charter, adopting new self serving bylaws, purporting to
quitclaim away the Diocese's property interests, filing false trademark applications, filing this
action in the name of the Diocese's corporations, and taking many other ultra vires acts.
Based on those allegations, the proposed pleading asserts numerous intentional torts and
personal causes of action for which there is clearly no corporate immunity.
The proposed pleading supports joinder under Rules 13(h), 19, and 20, SCRCP.
Under Rule 20, SCRCP, joinder is required to resolve this controversy as a whole and
avoid the expense and complication of multiple lawsuits. The ultra vires acts alleged in the
proposed pleading completely undermine the validity and effect of the purported corporate acts
that the Plaintiffs rely upon to support their claims, and in like manner, they form the basis
of
TECSC's defenses and counterclaims. The allegations against the proposed additional parties
are therefore common and inextricably related to this litigation.
Under Rule 19, SCRCP, joinder is mandatory because the proposed additional parties are
necessary and indispensable.
It will be necessary in this litigation for the Court to make
determinations as to whether various corporate acts carried out by the proposed additional parties
were indeedulnavires. Such determinations
will impair and impede the rights of TECSC
and
the proposed additional parties, if made in their absence. If the Court finds the corporate acts
of
the additional parties to be null and void because they were fraudulent, wrongful, and ultra vires,
TECSC would have to bring a separate action against them to obtain
liability
-
an obvious duplicative waste
a
judgment of personal
ofjudicial time and resources. Furthermore, such
determinations by this Court could estop the additional parties' from fully defending themselves
2
in that separate action. On the other hand, if the Court confirms the validity and effect of their
purported corporate acts, TECSC might be estopped from prosecuting its claims against them in
a separate action, despite having been prejudiced by their non-joinder as parties here.
Under either scenario
taken or ultra vires
-
i.e., whether this Court finds those corporate acts to be lawfully
- there is a distinct possibility
that, in a separate action, another court could
find otherwise and award relief that contradicts this Court's intent, such as removing the
proposed individual additional parties from corporate control.
Alternatively,
if the Court avoids making determinations as to whether
such acts were
ultravires, it will have failed to fully and finally resolve one of the core issues in this
case
-
who
should control the Diocese's corporations and assets. That core issue would live on in a separate
action by TECSC against the additional parties to invalidate and nullifr their fraudulent,
wrongful, and ultra vires corporate acts, as well as to judicially remove them from corporate
control. In such a separate action, the corporations would have to
indispensable parties, just as the additional parties are here.
be
joined as necessary and
In effect, the same parties will
continue to litigate the same essential dispute and this Court's efforts to resolve the situation
would have been in vain.
Indeed, the relief sought by TECSC in this litigation is co-dependent on the presence
of
both the Diocese's corporations and the proposed additional parties. A judgment for money
damages against the Plaintiffs would be tantamount to
contends that
a
judgment against itself, as TECSC
it is, in fact, the Diocese and the rightful controller of the corporate entities that
have been improperly named as Plaintiffs in this litigation. Likewise, declaratory or injunctive
relief must be rendered against the corporations andthe proposed additional parties - personally
-
as TECSC contends they are not true agents of the party corporations.
3
In sum, TECSC's
dispute is not with itself, but rather with the individuals that have misappropriated its identity,
purported to carry away its property, and filed this action in its name.
il.
The Instant Motion Is Timelv. Proner. And In Accord With The Court's Prior
Orders
At a hearing held on September 27,2013, and
as reflected
in the Order entered on
October I , 2013 , the Court denied a motionr to j oin a list of additional parties, but also ruled that
the defendants would be given another opportunity to move to join additional parties as
discovery progresses. Transcript of Record, September 27 ,2013 ("I have, however, and you
see
will
it in the order - and that's based on the allegations that are contained in the counterclaim at
this point. I have certainly left the door open that, as discovery progresses, if at that point the
defendant counter-claimants believe it is appropriate, I have left the door open at that point for
you to move yet again, but under the allegations as they appear at this point I do not believe it is
appropriate."); Order entered October 1,2013 at 6 ("Based on upon the information before the
Court at this time, joinder is improper."). Indeed, the Order explicitly stated that it was based on
the allegations in the pleadings before the Court "at that time." Id.
TECSC's pleading *atthattime" did not specifically name any additional parties or make
pafücularized allegations against them
-
because first, the Court had not yet approved their
I
Notably, in Plaintiffs' Opposition to TECSC's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Order denying the motion to join additional counterclaim defendants, Plaintiffs asserted:
"...this motion is premised on a motion TECSC did not make or join in. Therefore, TECSC has
no standing to make it." To the extent Plaintiffs may now choose to flip-flop and object to the
instant motion based on that Order's application to TECSC, the Court should take careful note of
the inconsistency of such an argument. To be clear, however, TECSC did indicate that it was
joining the motion in the body of the brief supporting the motion and the Court's Order denying
the motion was issued against "Defendants" (plural). TECSC therefore believes that it had the
right to file a motion for reconsideration.
4
joinder, and second, TECSC had not yet received the documents in discovery that revealed many
of their unlawful acts.
As the Court anticipated, discovery has allowed TECSC to develop the proposed
pleading attached to the instant motion, which is distinguishable from the pleadings considered
by the Court *atthattime."
The list of proposed additional parties to be added in the instant motion is shorter and
different in nature than the prior motion, which included a long list of purported currenl directors
and officers of the Diocese's corporations. TECSC's instant motion proposes to include only
four individuals who were the leaders of the unlawful scheme to take away the Diocese's assets
and individually carried out specific ultra vires corporate acts to accomplish their unlawful
objective; it is not another attempt to join all the current officers and directors of the
corporations.
The proposed pleading also explicitþ and specifically alleges personal, fraudulent,
wrongful, aîd ultravires
and committed in bad
acts that were
willful, wanton, intentional, reckless, grossly negligent,
faith. The instant motion, therefore, cannot be dismissed on the ground
that immunþ renders joinder of the additional parties
S.E.2d 155, 160-1, 362 S.C.
futile.
See
BlS,Iqc-y.
V/o¡thy, 608
319 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Nothing in the law shields Worthy from
direct liability in tort for his own actions
practices that he personally committed . .
.
.
. Additionally, Worthy is liable for unfair trade
Similarþ, the corporate veil does not protect V/orthy
from liability for his own actions.").
In further accord with the Court's prior orders, the instant motion was filed without
undue delay. TECSC has diligently been reviewing tens of thousands of documents produced by
the Plaintiffs. TECSC prepared the instant motion and proposed pleading against the four
5
additional parties as soon as
it practically could. In fact, discovery is still ongoing under the
Court's Scheduling Order, which specified that all oral depositions be completed by February 7,
2014. Moreover, as the Court assured the parties when the Scheduling Order was initially
set,
those dates would be extended if necessary. Based on the facts it has discovered from Plaintiffs'
production thus far, TECSC plans to depose upwards
deposition testimony develops, which
will
of
100 people depending on how the
necessitate an extension
of the February 7, 2014
deadline.
In sum,
as anticipated by the Court, the instant motion was timely filed early in the
discovery process and should not be denied based on any alleged delay that the Plaintiffs may
suggest
in opposition.
See Ea11qslqr
y. Smith & St99!ç Ëuldqlg Inc., 369 S.E.2d 156,159,295
S.C. 504, 50S (Ct. App. 1988) ("Delay in seeking leave to amend pleadings, regardless of the
length of the delay, will not ordinarily be held to bar an amendment in the absence of a finding
of
prejudice . . . . In addition to Forrester's delay in making application to amend, the City also
claims prejudice because
it will be required to frle additional pleadings, engage in additional
discovery, and incur additional costs. It also argues the amendment will prolong the litigation .
.
. . The fact the City will be 'obliged to go to some additional time and expense in order to answer
the amended complaint does not constitute such prejudice as will preclude the amendment."').
III.
Th,e
I]NtaatÀ4qtio¡ Aud lrqpased Pteadrqg luppa4Ja!4dqr Under Rules 13(h).
19,
and 20. SCRCP
Ð.
Lesal Standard For Rules t3thl- I 9- and 20. SCRCP
Rule 13(h), SCRCP, explicitly incorporates Rules 19 and 20, SCRCP, to allow
defendant to
join additional counterclaim defendants
as parties
to an action where at least
a
one
counterclaim is common to at least one of the plaintiffs and each of the additional counterclaim
defendants. "Courts are to interpret Rule 13 liberally consistent with the general objectives of
6
the Rule in order to 'avoid multiplicity of litigation, minimize the circuity of actions and foster
judicial economy." See Hoffman v- Wisner Classic Mfg. Çq- l!c., 927 F.Supp. 67,
74
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting 6 Charles Alan V/right, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practics aqdÈqççdure Civil 2d
$ 1a3a); AllTech Communications. LLC v- Brqlhe!!,
601
F.Supp.2d 1255,1260 (N.D. Okla. 2008) (quoting Federal Practice $ 1435) ("Rule l3(h) only
authorizes the court to join additional parties in order to adjudicate a counterclaim or cross claim
that already is before the court or one that is being asserted at the same time the addition of a
non-party is sought."); Rule 13(h), SCRCP, Comment ("Rules 13(a) through (Ð are the same as
the Federal Rules on counterclaims and cross-claims.").
Rule 20, SCRCP, for purposes of avoiding multiple lawsuits, liberally encourages the
permissive joinder of parties when claims against them involve one or more common questions
of law and fact. McGann v. Mungo, 340 S.E.2d 154,287 S.C. 561 (S.C.App. 1986) ("The new
rule allows several persons to join as plaintiffs in a single action
'if they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to
all these persons will arise in the action. S.C.R.CIV.P. 20(a)."); Rule 20, SCRCP, Note ("This
Rule 20(a) is substantially the same as the Federal Rule. This rule liberalizes joinder in State
practice.
It ovemrles
cases
like Hellaaqs y-Srailzq,24 5.C.39 (1885) which denied joinder to
upstream farmers damaged by defendant's dam, because their interests were not identical as to
damages required."); Saval v-
lt-!!d.
, 710 F .2d 1027 ,
103
I
(4th Cir. I 983) ("Further, the rule
should be construed in light of its purpose, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite
the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits."); qe€ e.g.. Çhq¡1 v,
Thprnpsqr!, 395 S.E.2d 731,735,302 S.C. 285, 291 (CL App. 1990) ("There is some evidence
7
these companies were set up by the Chans and utilized to channel sales away from Lisa Floral in
such a way as to deprive the Thompsons of sales commissions. Permissive joinder of these
companies was proper. Rule 20, SCRCP.").
Additionally, under Rule 20, SCRCP, "a plaintiff need not be interested in obtaining all
the relief demanded and judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to
their respective rights to relief." McGann, 340 S.E.2d at 158, 287 S.C. at 570 (internal citation
omitted).
Rule 19, SCRCP, mandates the joinder of parties who are "necessary." Ex
Govemment
necessary party
's Ins. Co 644 S.E.2d 699, 701,373 S.C. 132, 136-7 (2007). "A
is one whose rights must be ascertained and settled before the rights of the
parties to the action can be determined." Id. (quoting SLAtqa
S.E.2d 248,249
Parte
(1986). "It is mandatory that
a necessary
Necessary parties become "indispensable"
r-lþEaa, 289 S.C. 128,130,345
party be brought into the action." Id.
- meaning that the Court should not proceed
in their absence - if the Court cannot afford complete relief among those already parties, or their
interests might be impeded or impaired, or
if
the parties already in the suit are subjected to
substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations by reason of the absent party not
being joined. Rule 19, SCRCP; Stewart v. StatelQrop Pest Com'n, 414 S.E.2d
l2l, 125,307
S.C. 133, 139 (1992) ("In order to be an indispensable party, the action must (1) not afford
complete relief among those already parties, or (2) impair or impede the absent parties' ability to
protect its interest, or (3) leave parties already in the suit subject to substantial risk of incurring
multiple or inconsistent obligations by reason of the absent party not being joined.").
8
b.
Applþatiql af Ruþr 13(h), 19, ald 20, $ÇRÇP. To Thqlnstant l{oliaa aad
Prqpasad lþ4-di4g
Here, the proposed pleading includes causes of action against four additional parties for
breach offiduciary duty, breach ofcontract, breach ofcontract accompanied by a fraudulent act,
negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, fraud, constructive fraud, conversion,
fraudulent transfers under S.C. Code Ann. $ 27-3-10, et seq. and $ 27-23-70,judicial removal
of
directors under S.C. Code Ann. $ 33-31-810, judicial dissolution under S.C. Code Ann. $$ 3331-1430 and 1431, ultravires relief under S.C. Code Ar¡r. $ 33-31-304, piercing the corporate
veil, trademark infringement and false advertising under state and federal law, violation of $ 3331-180, civil conspiracy, and a declaratory judgment.
Several of these claims have also been asserted against at least one of the Plaintiffs as
counterclaims, thereby satisffing the simple requirement of Rule l3(h), SCRCP.
As to the application of Rule 20, SCRCP, the ulna vires acts alleged in the proposed
pleading completely undermine the validity and effect of the purported corporate acts that the
Plaintiffs rely upon to support their claims, and in like manner, they form the basis of TECSC's
defenses and counterclaims. The allegations against the proposed additional parties are therefore
common and inextricably related
to this litigation. Seç Rule 20,
SCRCP and Comment;
MqG¿!¡r,340 S.E.2d at 158,287 S.C. at570; Saval, 7l0F.2d at 1031; Çb4q,395 S.E.2d at735,
302 S.C.
at29l.
The proposed additional parties are also necessary and indispensable under Rule 19,
SCRCP.
It will be necessary in this litigation for the Court to make determinations
as
to whether
various corporate acts carried out by the proposed additional parties were indee d ultra vires
.
The
Plaintiffs' pleading alleges those corporate acts are valid, while TECSC's pleading alleges they
9
are null and
void. Both
sides seek declaratory judgments in their favor related to those corporate
acts, and many of the other claims and counterclaims are dependent thereon. See Rule 19,
SCRCP; Ex Parte Govemment Emlloyee's Ins. Çg-,644 S.E.2d at70I,373 S.C. at 136-7;
Slatton,289 S.C. at 130,345 S.E.2d at249; S1qwa4, 4145.8.2dat125,307 S.C.
Such determinations
will impair
and impede the rights
atl39.
of TECSC and the proposed
additional parties, if made in the proposed parties' absence. See Stewart, 474 S.E.2d at 125,307
S.C. at 139 ("In order to be an indispensable party, the action must . .
.
or (2) impair or impede
the absent parties' ability to protect its interest...").
If the Court finds the corporate
acts of the additional parties to be
null and void
because
they were fraudulent, wrongful, andultravires, TECSC would have to bring a separate action
against them to obtain a judgment of personal liability
-
an obvious duplicative waste
ofjudicial
time and resources. Furthermore, such determinations by this Court could estop the additional
parties' from fully defending themselves in that separate action. See Kunst y, Loree, 746 S.E.2d
360,362,404 S.C. 649,653 (Ct. App. 2013); Slayqly v. AMISUB qf Sqq& telaL4a-Iqq.,665
S.E.2d 222,228,379 S.C. 386, 398 (Ct. App. 2008).
On the other hand,
if
the Court confirms the validity and effect of their purported
corporate acts, TECSC might be estopped from fully prosecuting its claims against them in a
separate action, despite having been prejudiced by their non-joinder as parties and thus impaired
and impeded in presenting its case against them before this
Court.
See Kunst, 746 S.E.2d at 362,
404 S.C. at 653 ("Under South Carolina law, collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion,
prevents a pary from relitigating an issue that was decided in a previous action, regardless
of
whether the claims in the first and subsequent lawsuits are the same . . . While the traditional use
of collateral estoppel required mutuality of parties to bar relitigation, modem courts recognize
l0
the mutuality requirement is not necessary for the application of collateral estoppel where the
party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to previously litigate the
issues.") (citations omitted); Sngyçly, 665 S.E.2d at 228, 379 S.C. at 398 ("[N]on-mutual
collateral estoppel was coffectly applied, and Snavely was properly barred from relitigating these
same issues against Dr. Zellner.").
Under either scenario
taken or ultravires
-
i.e., whether or not this Court finds those acts to be lawfully
- there is a distinct possibility that, in a separate action, another court could
find otherwise and award relief that contradicts this Court's intent, such as removing
the
proposed individual additional parties from corporate control. Spç Stewart, 414 S.E.2d at 125,
307 S.C. at 139 ("In order to be an indispensable parly, the action must . . . or (3) leave parties
already in the suit subject to substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations by
reason of the absent party not being joined.").
Alternatively,
if
the Court avoids making determinations as to whether such acts were
ultra vires, it will have failed to fully and finally resolve one of the core issues in this case - who
should control the Diocese's corporations and assets. See SteWa¡!,414 S.E.2d at 125,307 S.C.
at 139 ("In order to be an indispensable party, the action must . . . (1) not afford complete relief
among those already parties, or . .
.").
That core issue would live on in a separate action by
TECSC against the additional parties to invalidate and nulliff their fraudulent, wrongful, and
ultra vires corporate acts, as well as to retake control of the corporations by judicial order that
would award corporate authority to individuals duly elected by TECSC.
In such a separate action, the corporations would have to be joined
as necessary and
indispensable parties, just as the additional parties are here. Sçç S.C. Code Ann. $ 33-31-810
(Judicial Removal of Directors) ("...the corporation must be made aparty defendant"); S.C.
l1
Code Ann. $$ 33-31-1430 and
Vires Relief). Hotz
l43l
(Judicial Dissolution); S.C. Code Ann. $ 33-31-304 (Ultra
v. lvlinyad, 403 S.E.2d 634, 638, 304 S.C. 225, 231 (S.C. 1991)
("...corporate defendant may be named in a shareholder's derivative suit as aparty defendant
even where no wrongdoing by the corporate entity is alleged"); Stewa_Ít, 414 S.E.2d at 125,307
S.C. at 139; see also Fairchild v. Keyes, 448 So.2d 292,294 (Miss. 1984)
("If the corporation ts
an indispensable party to a suit brought to protect its interest, then certainly
indispensable party to a suit brought to dissolve
it.
it
must be an
Although Keyes has termed his suit one for
specific performance, it was in effect a shareholders derivative action charging the directors
of
the corporation with an ultrq vires faihre to comply with decisions of the board of directors.");
WË]aqþLv. Qua¡lqrman,5l S.E. 426, 123 Ga.3l2 (Ga. 1905) ("Unfaithful ofhcials of
corporation are primarily liable to
a
it for their misconduct. But where they are in control, and
minority stockholders are unable to secure relief within the corporation, such stockholders may
usually maintain an equitable proceeding, and thus call the managing ofhcials to account for
fraud or acts which are ultra vires. To such a proceeding the corporation is a necessary party
defendant, in order that the result may bind it, and bar any future action which it might bring for
the same cause.").
In effect, if the Court avoids making determinations
as
to whether the corporate acts were
ultra vires, the same parties would continue to litigate the same essential dispute in a separate
action and this Court's efforts to resolve the core conflict would have been in vain. See Stewart,
414 S.E.zd at 125,307 S.C. at 139 ("In order to be an indispensable party, the action must . .
(l)
.
not afford complete relief among those already parties, or . . .").
Indeed, the relief sought
by TECSC is
co-dependent on the presence
Diocese's corporations and the proposed additional
t2
of both
parties. A judgment for money
the
damages
against the Plaintiffs would be tantamount to a judgment against itself, as TECSC contends that
it
is, in fact, the Diocese and the rightful controller of the corporate entities that have been
improperly named as Plaintiffs in this litigation. Likewise, in addition to the party corporations,
declaratory or injunctive relief must be rendered against the proposed additional parties
personally
- as TECSC contends they are not true agents of the parly corporations.
-
Rule 65(d),
SCRCP ("[Injunction] binding only upon the parties to the action, their off,rcers, agents, servants,
employees,
ffid
attomeys, and upon those persons
in active concert or participation
with
them..."). In sum, TECSC's dispute is not with itselt but rather with the individuals that
misappropriated its identity and purported to carry away its property. See Stewart, 414 S.E.2d at
725,307 S.C. at 139 ("In order to be an indispensable party, the action must . .
.
(1) not afford
complete relief among those already parties, or . . .").
For these reasons, the additional parties are necessary and indispensable, and moreover,
their joinder is strongly favored on grounds ofjudicial eff,rcacy, pursuant to Rules l3(h), 19, and
20, SCRCP.
WHEREFORE, the Court respectfully should grant TECSC's motion to join the
additional parties and serve its proposed pleading upon them.
[Signature page to follow]
l3
Dated: December 27,2073
Re
spectfully submitted,
l14"44rrt
.4/ f/-r.f -L/
Thomas S. Tisdale (S.C. Bar #: 005584)
Jason S. Smith (S.C. Bar #: 80700)
HELLMAN YATES & TISDALE, PA
King & Queen Building
145 King Street, Suite 102
Charleston, South Carolina 29407
Telephone: (843) 266-9099
Facsimile: (843) 266-91 88
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counselfor Defendant The Episcopal Church in
South Carolina
t4
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF DORCHESTER
THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v
THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, ET AL.,
)
)
)
)
)
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOR THE FIRST ruDICIAL CIRCUIT
Case
No.: 2013-CP-18-00013
)
)
)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
)
)
)
)
Defendants
)
)
This is to certiff that a copy of the foregoing, The Episcopal Church
in
South Carolina's
("TECSC") Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Join Additional Panies has been served upon the
following counsel of record by U.S. first-class mail and electronic mail as shown below this the 27th
day of December 2013.
AMANDA BAILEY, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE PANSH OF SAINT MICHAEL,
IN CHARLESTON, IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
V/omble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP
Post Office Box 999
Charleston, S.C.29402
(843)722-3400
SAUNDERS M. BRIDGES, JR., ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ST. JOHN'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF FLORENCE, S.C.
Aiken Bridges Elliott Tyler & Saleby
Post Office Drawer 1931
Florence, S.C. 29503
(843) 66e-8787
WILLIAM A BRYAN, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CHURCH OF THE RESURRECTION, SURFSIDE
Bryan &}Jazr
Post Office Box 14860
Surfside Beach, S.C. 29587
(843)238-3461
C. PIERCE CAMPBELL, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS ALL SAINTS PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, INC.; CHURCH OF THE
HOLY CROSS; AND ST. BARTHOLOMEWS EPISCOPAL CHURCH
Turner, Padget, Graham &Laney
Post Office Box 5478
Florence, S.C. 29501
(843) 662-e008
DAVID SPENCE COX, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA AND THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, LLP
Post Offrce Box 999
Charleston, S.C. 29402
(843)722-3400
THOMAS CHRISTIAN DAVIS, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CHRIST ST. PAUL'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH
Harvey & Battey, PA
1001 Craven Street
Beaufort, S.C.29901
(843) s24-3109
DAVID L. DEVANE, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FORPLAINTIFF THE CHURCH OF
ST.
LUKE AND
ST.,
PAUL, RADCLIFFBORO
N. Main Street
Summerville, S.C.29483
(843) 28s-7r00
110
BESS JONES DURANT, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CHURCH OF THE HOLY COMFORTER
Sowell Gray Stepp &Laffftte,LLC
Post Office Box 11449
Columbia, S.C.292ll
(803) e2e-1400
HARRY R. EASTERLING, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS ST. DAVID'S CHURCH
BENNETTSVILLE, INC.
Post Ofhce Drawer 655
Bennettsville, S.C. 29512-0655
(843) 47e-2878
2
AND ST. PAUL'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF
JOHN G. FRAMPTON, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE VESTRY AND WARDENS OF ST. PAUL'S CHURCH, SUMMERI4LLE
Chellis & Frampton
Post Office Box 430
Summerville, S.C.29483
(843) 871-776s
W. FOSTER GAILLARD, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, OF THE PANSH OF SAINT PHILIP,
IN CHARLESTON, IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP
Post Office Box 999
Charleston, S.C.29402
(843) 722-3400
EMILY R. GIFFORD,
ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE VESTRY AND CHURCH WARDENS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE
PARISH OF ST. MATTHETI.
Richardson, Plowden & Robinson, P.A.
1900 Bamwell Street
Columbia, 5.C.29201
(803) s76-3717
HENRIETTA U. GOLDING, ESQ.
IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA; SAINT LUKE'S CHURCH, HILTON HEAD; AND THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH
McNair Law Firm
Post Office Box 336
Myrtle Beach, S.C. 29578
(843) 444-t107
HENRY E. GRIMBALL, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE PANSH OF SAINT MICHAEL,
IN CHARLESTON, IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP
Post Office Box 999
Charleston, S.C.29402
(843) 722-3400
EDV/ARD P. GUERARD, JR., ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF VESTRY AND CHURCH-WARDENS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE
PANSH OF CHNST CHURCH
Post Oflrce
Box3l924
Charleston, S.C.29477
(843) 8s2-4s30
a
J
ROBERT R. HORGER, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CHURCH OF THE REDEEMER
Horger, Barnwell & Reid, LLP
P.O. Drawer 329
Orangeburg, S.C.29116
(803) s31-3000
OANA D. JOHNSON, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ST. ANDREWS CHURCH-MT. PLEASANT AND THE ST. ANDREWS CHURCHMT. PLEASANT LAND TRUST
George J. Kefalos, P.A.
464 State Street
Charleston, S.C.29401
(843) 722-66t2
GEORGE J. KEFALOS, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ST. ANDREWS CHURCH-MT PLEASANT AND THE ST. ANDKETTS CHURCHMT. PLEASANT LAND TRUST
George J. Kefalos, P.A.
464 State Street
Charleston, S.C.29401
(843) 722-6612
ALBERT A. LACOUR, III, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR OLD SAINT ANDREWS PARISH CHURCH
Clawson & Staubes
126 Seven Farms Drive, Suite 200
Charleston, S.C.29492
JAMES KENT LEHMAN, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF TNNITY CHURCH OF MYRTLE BEACH
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
Post Office Box 11070
Columbia, S.C.292ll
(803) 7ee-2000
E. HOPE LUMPKIN, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE VESTRY AND WARDENS OF ST. PAUL'S CHURCH, SUMMERVILLE
Shelbourne Law Firm
131 East Richardson Avenue
Summerville, S.C.29483
(843) 871-2210
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SUSAN PARDUE MACDONALD, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF TNNITY CHURCH OF MYRTLE BEACH
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
Post Office Box 3939
Myrtle Beach, S.C. 29578
(843) 448-3s00
FRANCIS MARION MACK, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE VESTRY AND CHURCH WARDENS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE
PANSH OF
ST.
MATTHEIY
Richardson, Plowden & Robinson, P.A.
1900 Bamwell Street
Columbia, 5.C.29201
(803) s76-3717
DAVID B. MARVEL, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PI-AINTIFF THE CHURCH OF ST. LUKE AND ST., PAUL, RADCLIFFBORO
Prenner Marvel, P.A.
636 King Street
Charleston, S.C.29403
(843) 722-72s0
I. KEITH MCCARTY, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CHNST ST. PAUL'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH
McCarty Law Firm, LLC
Post Office Box 30055
Charleston, S.C.29417
(843) 7e3-1272
STEVEN SMITH MCKENZIE, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS THE CHURCH
OF THE EPIPHANY (EPISCOPAL) AND ST.
MATTHIAS
EPISCOPAL CHURCH, INC.
Coffey, Chandler & Kent, P.A.
2 North Brook Street
Manning, 5.C.29102
(803) 43s-8847
LAWRENCE B. ORR, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
MATTHEWS CHURCH
ST.
JOHN'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF FLORENCE, S.C. AND SAINT
Orr Elmore & Ervin, LLC
Post Oflrce Box2527
Florence, S.C. 29503
(843) 667-6613
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HARRY A. OXNIER, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS CHRIST THE KING, WACCAMAW AND THE VESTRY AND CHURCH
WARDENS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE PARISH OF PNNCE GEORGE WINYAH
Oxner & Stacy
235 Church Street
Georgetown, S.C.29940
(843) s27-8020
G. MARK PHILLPS, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FORPLAINTIFF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE PARISH OF SAINT PHILIP,IN
CHARLESTON, IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
Post Office Box 1806
Charleston, S.C.29402
ANDREW S. PLATTE, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS THE CHURCH OF OURSAVIOUR OF THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA;
CHURCH OF THE CROSS, INC. AND CHURCH OF THE CROSS DECLARATION OF TRUST; THE
PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE PANSH OF SAINT MICHAEL, IN CHARLESTON, IN THE STATE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND SAINT MICHAEL,S CHURCH DECLARATION OF TRUST; THE PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE PANSH OF SAINT PHILIP, IN CHARLESTON, IN THE STATE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA; THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; ST.
DAVID,S CHURCH; THE VESTRY AND CHURCH WARDENS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE PARISH
OF ST. HELENA AND THE PANSH CHURCH OF ST. HELENA TRUST; THE I/ESTRY AND CHURCH
WAKDENS OF ST. JUDE'S CHURCH OF WALTERBORO; TNNIW EPISCOPAL CHURCH, EDISTO ISLAND;
AND VESTRY AND CHURCH WARDENS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE PARISH OF ST. JOHN'S
CHARLESTON COUNTY
Speights & Runyan
2015 Boundary Street, Suite 239
Beaufort, 5.C.29902
(803) 943-4444
C. ALAN RUNYAN, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTTFFS THE CHURCH OF OUR SAVIOUR OF THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA;
THE CHURCH OF ST. LUKE AND ST., PAUL, RADCLIFFBORO; CHURCH OF THE CROSS, INC. AND
CHURCH OF THE CROSS DECLARATION OF TRUST; THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE
PANSH OF SAINT MICHAEL, IN CHARLESTON, IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND SAINT
MICHAEL'S CHURCH DECLARATION OF TRUST; THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE PANSH
OF SAINT PHILIP, IN CHARLESTON,IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; ST. DAVID,S CHURCH; TNNIW EPISCOPAL CHURCH,
EDISTO ISLAND; THE VESTRY AND CHURCH WARDENS OF ST. JUDE,S CHURCH OF WALTERBORO; THE
VESTRYAND CHURCH WARDENS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE PARISH OF ST. HELENA AND
THE PANSH CHURCH OF ST. HELENA TRUST; AND VESTRY AND CHURCH WARDENS OF THE
EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE PARISH OF ST. JOHN'S CHARLESTON COUNTY
Speights & Runyan
2015 Boundary Street, Suite 239
Beaufort, 5.C.29902
(803) 943-4444
6
V/ILLIAM A. SCOTT, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF HOLY TRINITY EPISCOPAL CHURCH
Rogers, Townsend & Thomas, PC
775 St. Andrews Boulevard
Charleston, S.C.29407
(843) ss6-s6s6
PETER BRANDT SHELBOURNE, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF THE VESTRY AND WARDENS OF ST. PAUL'S CHURCH, SUMMERVILLE
Shelbourne Law Firm
l3l East Richardson Avenue
Summerville, S.C. 29483
(843) 87t-2210
ROBERT S. SHELTON, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ST. PAUL'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CONT4.AY
The Bellamy Law Firm
Post Office Box 357
Myrtle Beach, S.C. 29578
(843) 448-2400
ALLAN POE SLOAN, III, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF VESTRY AND CHURCH-WARDE¡TS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE
PANSH OF CHNST CHURCH
Pierce, Herns, Sloan & V/ilson, LLC
Post Office 8ox22437
Charleston, S.C.29413
(843) 722-7733
THORNWELL F. SOWELL, III, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CHURCH OF THE HOLY COMFORTER
Sowell Gray Stepp &Laffttte,LLC
Post Office Box 11449
Columbia, S.C.292ll
(803) e2e-7400
DANE J. SOWINSKI, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF HOLY TRINITY EPISCOPAL CHURCH
Rogers, Townsend & Thomas, PC
775 St. Andrews Blvd.
Charleston, S.C.29407
(843) ss6-s6s6
7
A. SPITZ, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ST. ANDREWS CHURCH-MT. PLEASANT AND THE
MT. PLEASANT LAND TRUST
ST.
ANDREWS CHURCH-
1134 Clearspring Drive
Charleston, S.C.29412
JOHN FURMAN WALL,
ilI,
ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CHURCH OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD
140 V/ando Reach Court
Mt. Pleasant, S.C. 29464
CHARLES H. \MLLIAMS, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA AND THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN SOUTH CAROLINA, A
SOUTH CAROLINA CORPORATE BODY
Williams & Williams
Post Office Box 1084
Orangeburg, S.C. 29116-1084
(803) s34-s218
JOHN B. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF TNNITY EPISCOPAL CHURCH, PINOPOLIS
Williams & Hulst, LLC
Post Office Box 1288
Moncks Corner, S.C. 29461
(843) 761-8232
JOSEPH C. $/ILSON IV, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF VESTRY AND CHURCH.WARD¿'¡'IS OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE
PARISH OF CHNST CHURCH
Pierce, Herns, Sloan & V/ilson, LLC
Post Office 8ox22437
Charleston, S.C.29413
(843) 722-7733
Ann Skipper
Paralegal to Thomas S. Tisdale, Jr., Esq.,
and Jason S. Smith, Esq.
HELLMAN YATES & TISDALE, PA
145 King Street, Suite 102
Charleston, South Carolina 29401
Telephone: (843) 266-9099
Facsimile: (843) 266-9188
asb @hellan¡ayate s. c gm
8