european involvement in the arab-israeli conflict

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CHAILLOT PAPER
ISBN 978-92-9198-176-2
ISSN 1017-7566
QN-AA-10-124-EN-C
doi:10.2815/21669
European
Involvement in the
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Edited by Esra Bulut Aymat
Chaillot Papers | December 2010
Esra Bulut Aymat
The volume aspires to make a timely contribution to policy thinking by
focusing attention on a number of cross-cutting issues, challenges and
opportunities for the EU. Drawing on the expertise and distinct approaches
of researchers from across Europe, the volume combines discussion of
past and present EU policies, basic challenges for the EU, European
interests and lessons learned, with elaboration of policy implications and
recommendations.
European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
This Chaillot Paper examines European involvement in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. It focuses on the European Union’s involvement in the conflict,
with special, but not exclusive, attention to EU involvement in the IsraeliPalestinian dimension of the conflict. Three decades on from the landmark
1980 Venice Declaration of the then nine Member States of the European
Community, 2010 has seen new setbacks in efforts to resolve the conflict,
and negative trends that increasingly fuel doubts about the very possibility
of a two-state solution. This contrasts sharply with the optimistic objectives
of the latest US peace initiative and Palestinian Authority Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad’s plan for a Palestinian state, both of which envisage 2011 as a
key year for moving towards a two-state solution. These contrasts invite farreaching, honest and critical reflection on where European involvement in
the conflict has left the EU and its Member States, and how it has impacted
on peace prospects.
124
124
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CHAILLOT PAPERS
123
116
122
Jun 09
War crimes, conditionality
and EU integration in
the Western Balkans
Judy Batt, Vojin Dimitrijevic,
Florence Hartmann, Dejan Jovic,
Tija Memisevic and
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik;
edited by Judy Batt and
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik
Nov 10 L’UE et l’Afrique : les défis
de la cohérence
Damien Helly
Oct 10 Violence politique et paix
dans le monde arabe
Abdallah Saaf
121
Sep 10 China’s foreign policy debates
Zhu Liqun
120
Apr 10 Nuclear weapons after
The 2010 NPT review conference
Ian Anthony, Camille Grand,
Łukasz Kulesa, Christian Mölling,
Mark Smith; edited by Jean Pascal
Zanders
119
Nov 09 Back from the cold?
The EU and Belarus in 2009
Margarita M. Balmaceda,
Sabine Fischer, Grzegorz
Gromadzki, Andrei Liakhovich,
Astrid Sahm, Vitali Silitski and
Leonid Zlotnikov; edited by Sabine
Fischer
Oct 09
118
Global security in a
multipolar world
Feng Zhongping, Robert Hutchings,
Radha Kumar, Elizabeth
Sidiropoulos, Paulo Wrobel
and Andrei Zagorski;
edited by Luis Peral with an
introduction by Álvaro de Vasconcelos
117
Jul 09 EU security and defence.
Core documents 2008
Volume IX
compiled by Catherine Glière
(also published in French)
115
Avr 09 Maghreb : vaincre la peur
de la démocratie
Luís Martinez
114
Dec 08 Negotiating the final status
of Kosovo
Marc Weller
113
Nov 08 Towards a European
Defence Market
Erkki Aalto, Daniel Keohane,
Christian Mölling and
Sophie de Vaucorbeil;
edited by Daniel Keohane
112
Oct 08 EU security and defence.
Core documents 2007
Volume VIII
111
Sept 08 Bush’s legacy and America’s
next foreign policy
Marcin Zaborowski
110
Aug 08 Rethinking Iran:
From confrontation
to cooperation
Christoph Bertram
BOOKS
2010
Quelle défense européenne
en 2020 ?
Claude-France Arnould, Juha
Auvinen, Henri Bentégeat, Nicole
Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, F.
Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries,
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Stefano
Silvestri, Alexander Stubb, Nuno
Severiano Teixeira, Álvaro
de Vasconcelos, Alexander Weis et
Richard Wright;
Préface de Catherine Ashton
Sous la direction d’Álvaro de
Vasconcelos
2009
tHE oBAMA MOMENT –
eUROPEAN AND aMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
Alexandra Bell, John Bruton,
Tom Cargill, Joseph Cirincione,
James F. Dobbins, Nikolas Foster,
Daniel S. Hamilton, Bruce Jones,
Erik Jones, Ibrahim Kalin,
Andrew C. Kuchins, Michael
O Hanlon, Rouzbeh Parsi,
Glen Rangwala, Pawel Swieboda,
Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Alex Vines,
Marcin Zaborowski;
edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos
and Marcin Zaborowski
2009
European Security and Defence
Policy – The first 10 years
(1999-2009)
edited by Giovanni Grevi,
Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane
2009
What ambitions for European
Defence in 2020?
Claude-France Arnould,
Juha Auvinen, Henri Bentégeat,
Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth,
F. Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries,
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski,
Stefano Silvestri, Alexander Stubb,
Nuno Severiano Teixeira,
Álvaro de Vasconcelos,
Alexander Weis and
Richard Wright;
edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos;
preface by Javier Solana
European Involvement
in the Arab-Israeli
Conflict
Muriel Asseburg, Michael Bauer, Agnès Bertrand-Sanz, Esra Bulut Aymat,
Jeroen Gunning, Christian-Peter Hanelt, Rosemary Hollis, Daniel Möckli,
Michelle Pace, Nathalie Tocci
CHAILLOT Papers December 2010
124
Acknowledgements
The editor would like to thank all participants of two EU-MEPP Task
Force Meetings held at the EUISS, Paris, on 30 March 2009 and 2 July
2010 and an authors’ meeting held in July 2010 for their feedback on
papers and draft chapters that formed the basis of the volume. Thanks
in particular to Costanza Musu, Anne Le More and Rouzbeh Parsi for
detailed comments on draft chapters. Thanks also to Gearoid Cronin for
his editorial work, to Noelle Tomas for the formatting of the text, and to
Suzanne Lavender and Arsim Mulaku for their work on the annexes. Any
errors are the responsibility of the editor and authors.
European Union
Paris
Director: Álvaro de Vasconcelos
© EU Institute for Security Studies 2010. All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute
for Security Studies.
ISBN 978-92-9198-176-2
ISSN 1017-7566
QN-AA-10-124-EN-C
doi:10.2815/21669
Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and
printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur.
Graphic design by Hanno Ranck in collaboration with CL
Design (Paris).
Contents
Preface
7
Álvaro de Vasconcelos
1
2
3
4
Executive Summary
Chapter summaries
Policy recommendations
11
11
12
Examining European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict 15
Esra Bulut Aymat
Introduction
Does Europe matter? Between diplomatic dichotomies
An ever-involved EU?
Summary of chapters
Conclusion
15
17
19
22
24
29
The basic stakes and strategy of the EU and Member States
31
Rosemary Hollis
Introduction
European interests and stakes
Formal EU position on the conflict
Europe’s evolving role: a salutary tale
Policy constraints and limitations
Unpalatable options
Conclusion and policy implications
31
31
35
36
38
40
41
The conflict and the EU’s assistance to the Palestinians 43
Agnès Bertrand-Sanz
Introduction Historical background State-building in an emergency: the Fayyad plan
Necessary EU responses to roadblocks in the way of Palestinian Statehood Building matchstick houses in a storm:
EU aid and state-building efforts during occupation and blockade
Conclusion and policy implications 43
44
45
46
The conflict and EU-Israeli relations
55
47
51
Nathalie Tocci
Introduction
The political context: EU goals, interests and policies regarding Israel
55
55
Contents
5
6
7
8
EU policies towards Israel and implications for the conflict
57
62
The Middle East conflict, transatlantic ties and the Quartet
65
Daniel Möckli
Introduction
From conflict to limited cooperation
Obama playing an EU tune
The transatlantic agenda: difficult decisions ahead
Conclusion and policy implications 65
66
69
70
74
EU crisis management in the Arab-Israeli conflict
75
Muriel Asseburg
Introduction EU approaches and interests Fields and instruments of EU crisis management Conclusion and policy implications
75
75
76
83
The end of EU democracy promotion and of the two-state solution?
87
Michelle Pace
Introduction
Past and present policies
Basic challenges and European interests
Lessons learned
Conclusion and implications for current and future policy
87
88
92
93
95
The conflict and the question of engaging with Hamas
97
Jeroen Gunning
Introduction Brief history of (non-)engagement
A critique of the case against engagement
The case for engagement
A model for engagement?
Situating engagement
97
97
98
101
104
106
107
Contents
9
A
Regional approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role
of the European Union
109
Michael Bauer and Christian-Peter Hanelt
Introduction
The role of regional actors: dimensions and developments
Ownership and commitment: coordinating regional and
international efforts
Prospects and challenges for diplomacy by a multilateral actor
109
110
Annexes
List of supporting documents
About the authors
Abbreviations
119
119
123
127
113
115
117
Preface
Álvaro de Vasconcelos
In the last few weeks we have witnessed, yet again, the failure of USmediated negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. This means
that it is necessary, once again, to discuss the course of action that the
European Union should follow, in the present strained regional and
international circumstances, to attain its long-sought but elusive goal of
peace in the Middle East. This Chaillot Paper suggests a shift in emphasis
and priorities from a determined but not always consistently pursued
effort to create a Palestinian state to deliberate and sustained insistence
on Israeli and Palestinian respect for international and European law.
Helping bring about a Palestinian state living in peace and security
alongside Israel has been the common unifying goal underpinning
European efforts at resolving the Middle East conflict since 1980. The
inescapable conclusion is, however, that those efforts, however well
meaning, have largely failed, and that the chances for success are at
present perhaps slimmer than ever before. The authors of the chapters
that make up this volume are almost unanimous in pointing out that it
is pointless to embark on fresh attempts without analysing what exactly
made previous attempts abortive in the first place. Why have those most
closely involved in attempting to make good on the promise of helping
create a Palestinian state inherent in the Oslo-Madrid process – the
European Union, the United States and the Arab states – accumulated
nothing but an enormous amount of frustration and the sense that
they have so little to show for years and years of commitment? And the
question must furthermore be asked: for how many more years will
diplomatic engagement along the same lines continue to be deployed
in vain?
The essays in this volume inevitably point to the conclusion that the goal
sought by European diplomacy, for the time being at least, is not within
reach. The situation that has developed over recent years, as Esra Bulut
Aymat writes, ‘increasingly fuel doubts about the very possibility of a
two-state solution.’ This is obviously not merely a failure of EU policy,
but rather one in which all those who have been involved in the search
for a solution share some responsibility, to say nothing of course of
7
Israeli and Palestinian politicians. But persisting along paths that have
led straight to dead ends will merely spell increased frustration, and
make the end goal even more elusive.
The lack of meaningful progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
through the two-state solution, which has been a primary goal of the
EU, is a huge challenge to the credibility of the EU’s international
policy. It has an obvious negative security impact in that there is a
constant and impending risk of war in the Middle East, with a source
of acute tensions and radicalisation festering at the southern rim of
the Union. The EU’s Mediterranean policy has remained, in spite of
intense efforts to the contrary, largely hostage to the conflict, and its
objective of creating a multilateral framework for cooperation in the
Mediterranean including Israel as well as Arab states cannot be met.
The 2003 European Security Strategy states categorically that the
‘Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe’. Furthermore,
as long as it remains unresolved, ‘there will be little chance of dealing
with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must
remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it
is solved.’ There is indeed no single topic in the international agenda
that has mobilised greater and more continued European engagement,
including an inordinate amount of shuttle diplomacy on the part of all
its main leaders, and an active presence in the Middle East Quartet since
it was set up in 2002. Neither the commitment to the Quartet nor the
scrupulous support of US initiatives have brought any significant strides
towards the long-sought goal, however, nor prevented the collapse of
President Obama’s efforts to instigate direct talks in 2010.
The question today, inevitably, is what next? Could there be a way out
that has not been tried yet? Is there a policy line out there waiting to be
put to the test that could give a fresh chance to the two-state solution?
In the minds of those who contributed to this volume, some of the very
best European experts on the Middle East among them, there certainly
is, and its first steps involve fostering Palestinian reconciliation.
Bringing about Palestinian reconciliation cannot be achieved without
engaging with Hamas. This is a matter on which most authors concur, and
a point that Jeroen Gunning emphasises: as he puts it: ‘the international
community must find a way of working with Hamas – or give up on the
goal of achieving a two-state solution.’ With Hamas’s differences with
Fatah managed or mediated, a unified, representative and democratically
accountable Palestinian negotiating partner would be empowered to draw
on attractive bargaining chips, make crucial concessions and credible
commitments to their Israeli counterparts, significantly enhancing
peace prospects. There is no guarantee however against renewed failure
if an insistence on a gradual process systematically sidestepping the
8
Preface
main issues, and thus subject to the kind of indefinite procrastination
that has led all peace initiatives from Oslo to Obama to fall apart, is
maintained.
The second question on which a strong consensus emerges from this
volume is that the EU should place its own norms and rules, as well as
international law, at the heart of its policy as part of a multilateral strategy.
Agnès Bertrand-Sanz writes that the EU should adopt a comprehensive
strategy predicated on international law and human rights. Nathalie
Tocci notes that ‘the application of the law is not incompatible with
cooperation with Israel’ and that the EU should not view ‘the application
of the law as an undue “punishment”’ and contends that by putting
respect for the law at the heart of its relations with Israel the EU would
contribute to establish the conditions essential to achieve the two-state
solution. The EU should not only identify and denounce those aspects of
both Israeli and Palestinian behaviour that run counter to international
law, but Rosemary Hollis suggests it should go one step further and
‘impose penalties accordingly’.
In more than one respect, Palestine is a key test of the EU’s credibility
as a supporter of democratic reform. The refusal to recognise the
victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections in spite of the fact
they were indisputably declared as ‘free and fair’ by EU observers, has
doubtless eroded that credibility and contributed to the notion that
the EU would rather back authoritarian regimes than face the risk that
free elections return Islamist parties as those favoured by the people.
The fact that new elections in Palestine have been taken off the agenda
altogether has only contributed to spread this view. Michelle Pace puts
it forcefully: ‘Only a truly political reform agenda in the Middle East
can prevent the further de-democratisation of the region’ and, with
specific regard to Israel and Palestine, ‘the emergence of a single-state
outcome to the conflict accompanied by endemic violence.’ This is all
the more important since, in the very likely event that there will be no
Dayton-like arrangement for the Middle East, the two-state solution will
fade away at least for the time being and the EU will need ‘to consider
the other option on the table – a one-state solution.’
In his Cairo speech in June 2009, US President Obama extolled the
virtues of peaceful resistance, and its potential to prevail over violence.
‘Palestinians must abandon violence. Resistance through violence and
killing is wrong and does not succeed. For centuries, black people in
America suffered the lash of the whip as slaves and the humiliation of
segregation. But it was not violence that won full and equal rights. It
was a peaceful and determined insistence upon the ideals at the centre
of America's founding.’ The centrality of civic movements will become
more evident if the situation moves from one dominated by movements
9
who fight for a national state to one where the focus shifts to fundamental
rights and their protection under international law. The emergence of
civic movements which reject any form of violent resistance and various
kinds of grass-roots organisations with mixed Israeli and Palestinian
membership seems to be a step in this direction.
Whether a one- or a two-state solution looms on the horizon, the question
of civil rights will not evaporate, nor will the need for all parties to the
conflict to comply with international law. Whatever the circumstances,
adherence to a law, norms and fundamental rights approach seems to be
the best option for the EU and one that is vindicated by the arguments
put forward in this Chaillot Paper.
Paris, December 2010
10
Executive Summary
The Chaillot Paper examines European involvement in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. It focuses on European Union involvement in the conflict,
with special, but not exclusive, attention to EU involvement in the
Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the conflict. Three decades on from
the landmark 1980 Venice Declaration of the then nine Member States
of the European Community, 2010 has seen new setbacks in efforts to
resolve the conflict, and negative trends that increasingly fuel doubts
about the very possibility of a two-state solution. This contrasts sharply
against the optimistic objectives of the latest US peace initiative and
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s plan for a Palestinian
state, both of which envisage 2011 as a key year for moving towards
a two-state solution. These contrasts invite far-reaching, honest and
critical reflection on where European involvement in the conflict
has left the EU and its Member States, and how it has impacted on
peace prospects. Drawing on the expertise and distinct approaches of
researchers from across Europe, the volume combines discussion of
interests and lessons learned, with elaboration of policy implications
and recommendations.
Chapter summaries
Chapter One (Esra Bulut Aymat) introduces the overall contributions
and findings of the chapters, and provides chapter summaries. Overall,
the findings confirm the EU’s crucial relevance to the conflict, invite
fresh scrutiny of the key relationships between the EU and other parties
involved in the conflict, and caution against bending to multiple pressures
that result in the EU becoming more embedded in the conflict in a way
that does not serve basic European interests. Chapter Two (Rosemary
Hollis) outlines the basic stakes for the EU and Member States regarding
the conflict, and provides a historical overview of the EU’s formal
position on the matter and its evolving role since the 1990s. The author
argues that EU policy has been more about issuing declarations and
11
maintaining consensus within the transatlantic alliance than effective
conflict resolution. Chapter Three (Agnès Bertrand-Sanz) examines the
conflict and the EU’s assistance to the Palestinians. The author argues
that without a basic reorientation in EU aid strategies and a rethink of the
failed boycott of the Hamas administration in Gaza, current EU policy
can only further erode the prospects of a viable Palestinian state-building
enterprise. Chapter Four (Nathalie Tocci) examines the conflict and EUIsraeli bilateral relations. The author argues that the EU’s prioritisation
of cooperation with Israel has worked against prospects of a two-state
solution, and led the EU to compromise its adherence to its own norms
and laws. Chapter Five (Daniel Möckli) explores the interplay between
transatlantic ties, the Quartet and EU policies towards the conflict.
While transatlantic convergence over the conflict has reached an all-time
high since 2009, this has failed to translate into substantial progress on
the ground, prompting the need to address a number of issues on the
transatlantic agenda through more strategic and effective means.
Chapter Six (Muriel Asseburg) focuses on EU involvement in crisis
management and mediation in the Arab-Israeli arena. The author
argues that European presence on the ground has at best served to
freeze rather than settle the conflict, and that efforts should focus on
tackling trends that heighten the risk of renewed violence and destroy
prospects of a viable Palestinian state. Chapter Seven (Michelle Pace)
examines the interplay between the stalled state of democratisation efforts
in the region and a feared eclipse of a two-state solution. The author
argues that the EU is left with limited policy choices in both domains
in the absence of a clear strategy on the linkage between democracybuilding in the region and peaceful resolution of the conflict. Chapter
Eight (Jeroen Gunning) tackles the question of engaging Hamas. The
author argues that the realities of power balances and political trends
across the OPT and within the Hamas movement, coupled with tested
alternatives to the current non-engagement policy, make some form of EU
engagement, potentially with a Palestinian national unity government,
imperative. Chapter Nine (Michael Bauer and Christian-Peter Hanelt)
explores regional approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role
of the European Union. The authors propose that the EU should aim
to help link regional ownership to international support for promising
initiatives, most notably the Arab Peace Initiative.
Policy recommendations
As a multi-author volume, the Chaillot Paper does not have one set of
recommendations shared by all the authors, nor does it propose a single
route for future EU policy. Nevertheless, the vast majority of chapters
12
Executive Summary
converge in their assessment that the current priority lies in encouraging
and enabling intra-Palestinian reconciliation. The current EU and US
policy towards Hamas is unsustainable and counter-productive in this
respect, and some form of engagement with Hamas will be required
if progress is to be attained. The chapters offer a variety of concrete
proposals on how this might be achieved. The EU could work with the
US and Quartet partners to foster coordinated and creative thinking on
Palestinian reconciliation. Treating the Quartet principles as crucial goals
rather than preconditions, the EU could lead the way on encouraging
the formation of a Palestinian National Unity government committed
to maintaining a ceasefire, dealing with Israel on the basis of the 1967
borders and respecting previous agreements. The EU could help dismantle
the current incentive structure that makes a National Unity government
unattractive to the Palestinian factions, for example by spelling out the
rewards on offer to a potential new Palestinian unity government, or
by clarifying how it would deal with such an entity. While one author
advises the EU should leave mediation to others, another suggests the
EU could consider the option of acting as a mediator in Hamas-Fatah
unity talks, building on its long-standing direct and indirect interaction
with Palestinian factions.
Another theme that emerges from a number of chapters is the
recommendation that the EU place respect for international and European
law, and diligence in ensuring appropriate reactions and remedies to
violations of both, at the heart of its relations with Palestinians and
Israelis. This would include adapting current policy and practice
regarding Israeli settlements goods to comply with EU declarations and
legal obligations; and seeking reimbursement for additional costs to
EU-funded humanitarian relief incurred as a result of illegal practices
in the OPT. Other practical measures to deal with the particularly
problematic issue of settlement growth might include issuing a code of
conduct to discourage European investment in and cooperation with
settlement-based companies. In East Jerusalem, the EU and Member
States could tighten policies and practice to avoid de facto recognition
of the Israeli annexation.
At least twenty further suggestions for improving policy are presented
in the following chapters. These include recommendations for the EU
to:
• Prioritise bringing about an end to the Gaza blockade, working
on durable border arrangements and on ensuring that any further
changes to the current closure policies do not entrench a collective
punishment logic and isolation of the Gaza Strip from the West
Bank.
13
• Renew emphasis on conflict resolution efforts, and on removing
obstacles to the emergence of a Palestinian state, in order to improve
the effectiveness of EU assistance to the OPT and its CSDP missions
on the ground.
• Seek to clarify its role in Middle East diplomacy in coordination
with the US and other Quartet members, including the scope for
European unilateral measures on certain issues, such as settlements
and relations with Syria.
• Engage in more timely and consistent confidence-building, early
warning, monitoring and crisis mediation, in particular in the
most sensitive areas, including on the Lebanon-Israel border and
in Jerusalem.
• Prepare carefully for the different scenarios surrounding the PA
government’s August 2011 deadline for creating a Palestinian
state.
• Assess the sustainability and impact of its current aid policies in
the OPT.
• Develop a more comprehensive policy towards human rights and
democracy in its approach to the conflict, revising its democracy
support programmes to maximise impact on the ground.
• Explore playing a more proactive role vis-à-vis constructive regional
initiatives towards the conflict, helping link initiatives with regional
ownership to effective international support, most notably in the
case of the Arab Peace Initiative.
Overall, these recommendations address both those searching for bold
conflict resolution steps and those seeking to minimise the harm done
to peace prospects by current trends. This Chaillot Paper thus invites
both sceptics and enthusiasts to further explore the full array of policy
options and policy constraints that the EU faces with a more grounded
and ambitious, and perhaps more ‘European’, vision and purpose.
14
Chapter 1
Examining European
involvement in the
Arab-Israeli conflict
Esra Bulut Aymat
Introduction
conflict through an array of approaches. It focuses on European Union
(EU) involvement in the conflict, with special, but not exclusive, attention
on EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the conflict.
The volume aspires to make a timely contribution to policy thinking
by focusing attention on a number of cross-cutting issues, challenges
and opportunities for the EU.
2010 marks the passing of three decades since the 1980 Venice Declaration
of the then nine Member States of the European Community, considered
a milestone in the history of European involvement in the conflict.
Thirty years on, the perceived capacity of PLO leaders to represent
and deliver Palestinians in peace-making is undermined by sharp
intra-Palestinian political and physical divisions, while the viability of
a potential negotiated two state-centred solution, the stated preferred
outcome of the EU, is increasingly called into question by its foremost
advocates either in despair, tactical desperation or strategic reassessment.
While there have been more violent phases in the conflict, as well as more
chaotic and more polarised periods, an unprecedented combination of
Israeli and Palestinian political inertia, societal polarisation and physical
fragmentation has prompted serious discussion in unlikely quarters
about a one-state solution, and other alternatives.1
This stands out in stark contrast to the optimistic objectives of the
latest US peace initiative backed by the Quartet, as well as Palestinian
Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s plan for a Palestinian state,
both of which envisage 2011 as a key year for moving towards a twostate solution. Indeed, a wider range of contrasts have punctured and
defined the last two years of the conflict, from war and dire post-war
conditions in the Gaza Strip to the intensification of PA-Israeli security
1. For further discussion,
see the chapter by Michelle
Pace in this volume. On
alternatives to both a
two-state and one-state
solution, see for example
the ‘Parallel States Project’
at Lund University.
15
1
Examining European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict
cooperation in the West Bank, from diplomacy at the highest levels over
Israeli settlements to international civil society attempts to break the
embargo on the Gaza Strip, and from fears of an imminent regional
conflagration to uncertainty over the shifting, potentially irreversible
and volatile situation in Jerusalem.
These developments invite far-reaching reflection on where EU policies
towards the conflict have met or fallen short of objectives and expectations,
the actual effects of policy paths taken, and what might be usefully
attempted additionally or alternatively. The current volume stems
from the belief that sound policy thinking for the future must be
grounded in detailed, honest and critical examination of past and
present policy outcomes. With varying emphasis, the chapters combine
discussion of past and present EU policies, basic challenges, European
interests, and lessons learned, with elaboration of policy implications
and recommendations. Between them they address basic stakes, key
relationships, the transatlantic context, cross-cutting questions and
regional approaches. The annexes support these chapters with a list of
useful relevant documents. The volume does not constitute an exhaustive
account of EU policy towards the conflict as a number of topics have
been addressed at the expense of others given length limitations.2
2. For example, while a
number of chapters touch
on the topic, there is not a
specific chapter specifically
devoted to the conflict
and Euro-Mediterranean
relations; readers are instead
invited to consult a series
of papers published this
year on this topic by the
Institute: the Ten Papers for
2010 report series published
jointly by the EUISS, Paris
and IEMED, Barcelona.
3. ‘Lessons Learned and
Strategic Thinking after
the Gaza Crisis’, EUISS
EU-MEPP Task Force
Meeting, 30 March 2009,
EUISS, Paris; ‘Between
Pessimism and Optimism:
EU Policy Options across
Scenarios’ EUISS EU-MEPP
Task Force Meeting, 2 July
2010, EUISS, Paris and
an authors’ meeting, 1
July 2010, EUISS, Paris.
16
This Challiot Paper aspires to focus minds on distinct and shared
European interests, concerns and stakes regarding the conflict and its
non-resolution. The contributing authors hail from several European
countries and are drawn from across the realm of research, spanning
universities, think tanks and non-governmental organisations. Convening
European analysts to examine European policies carries several objectives.
It serves to expose policy-relevant insight and advice from broader
research projects being carried out by the authors’ think tanks, universities
and research networks. It seeks to further intra-European discussion
of EU policies, and draws on papers and draft chapters discussed at
three meetings held at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris in
2009-2010.3 The volume thus speaks first and foremost to Europeans,
but also to the conflicting parties and to other third parties, including
the US. Its primary target audience comprises policy-makers, as well
as the research and civil society communities that scrutinise, influence
and sometimes transcend, policy. It is also aimed at anyone seeking to
learn more about EU involvement in the conflict and efforts to resolve it.
It constitutes an invitation to further and broaden analysis, discussion
and policy adaptation.
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Does Europe matter?
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the policy debates over European
roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict is the discrepancy that characterises
different actors’ and institutions’ assessment of the basic relevance of
the EU and its Member States to the conflict. While many in outside
policy circles tend to think Europeans are largely irrelevant to the
contemporary course of the conflict, many policy-makers point to the
unique contributions the EU has made, while still others allege that
European policies are harming the chances of a sustainable negotiated
settlement. Awareness of the scope and precise nature of EU involvement
is generally vague beyond the doors of EU and Member State institutions
and missions. Navigating between such praise, criticism, derision and
unfamiliarity, we inevitably and frequently return to two basic questions.
Do European policies matter to the conflict and efforts to end it? And
does it matter how European policies matter?
The first major contribution of this volume is its focus on European
involvement first and foremost in terms of previous and existing policies,
and the various forms of impact (or lack thereof) these have had to date.
The overriding message that emerges from the chapters that follow is
that European involvement in the conflict does matter, and that more
attention to how it matters is essential. A multifaceted profile of a complex
player, not just payer, emerges from the analysis of various dimensions
of EU involvement. This complexity stems not only from the distinctive
workings and institutions of the EU and its Member States, particularly
baffling for outsiders, but also from the varied and diffuse effects that
European policies and action have had on the conflict.
Understanding European involvement in the conflict requires transcending
a conceptualisation of it as the sum of EU and Member State policies.
European policymakers have a tendency to evaluate and defend the
EU’s record in terms of a list of achievements administered by different
parts of the EU machinery rather than in terms of overall impact as a
distinct and unified actor. There are many reasons for this. Yet inventories
of EU policy instruments, projects and council conclusions can only
go so far when trying to better understand the relationship between
policies, strategies, tactics and interests. While numerous policies might
be assessed to have had limited impact in meeting stated objectives, it
is in the far-reaching, sometimes blatant, sometimes more convoluted,
and often unintended, consequences of EU involvement that a serious
assessment of impact must be traced.
Herein lies one possible explanation for the puzzling diversity in
assessments of the EU role: the different objectives and priorities of those
making them. Those more focused on identifying conflict resolution
17
1
opportunities tend to see the EU as a relatively inconsequential actor
with nevertheless useful funds and technical expertise. In contrast,
those who are more concerned with whether and how current trends
diminish peace prospects, appear to see a consequential role for the EU
as a prominent fund-provider, Quartet member, and self-proclaimed
partner of the PA and Israel. While policy-makers and analysts of the
former ilk encounter little EU-related material while sifting through
the peace-making debris for breakthrough-inducing or game-changing
material, the latter regularly encounter the imprint of EU bodies and
Member States when tracing apparent violations of the ‘do no harm’
principle of intervention.4 This discrepancy may also reflect a progressive
erosion of favourable conditions for a sustainable negotiated settlement
since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the tendency to downplay European
involvement, apart from sometimes being ascribable to unawareness
of the scope and specificities of EU involvement, may be reinforced by
thinking of impact primarily in terms of quasi-hegemonic capacities.
Yet something with more far-reaching implications for our understanding
of the conflict may be at stake. If, as Rosemary Hollis suggests in her
chapter, ‘European investment in containing the conflict and funding
the basic needs of the Palestinians is vital to the continuance of the
status quo’, then downplaying the EU role helps us overlook the immense
amount of economic, political, diplomatic and societal work and resources
that underpin the current configuration of the conflict, provided,
deliberately or not, by almost all actors involved. Most EU policies are
firmly at the heart, often median, of these dynamics, be it in terms of
EU direct aid to the PA in the West Bank, assistance to the population
of Gaza, vital support to the UNRWA serving 4.7 million registered
Palestinian refugees in the region, membership of the International
Quartet, associational relationships with the Palestinians and Israelis,
support to the Palestinian Civil Police, measured and mixed positions
in the UN, or extensive but cautious monitoring of the situation in
Jerusalem. Europeans may not define the current conflict landscape
and architecture, but for better or worse they constitute a key feature
and cornerstone.
4. See for example Michael
Keating, Anne Le More and
Robert Lowe (eds.), Aid,
Diplomacy and ‘Facts’ on the
Ground: The Case of Palestine
(London: Chatham House,
2005); Anne Le More,
International Assistance to
the Palestinians After Oslo:
Political Guilt, Wasted Money
(London: Routledge, 2008).
18
And yet discussion of the impact of EU policies on Israeli, Palestinian,
US and regional actors’ behaviour appears to be muffled and abbreviated
by the assessment that this role does not empower, but simply corners,
the EU, and that ultimately the decisions that count are made elsewhere.
In particular, existing internal discussion on whether current policies
are contributing to diminishing prospects of a negotiated two-state
solution seems undercut by ambivalence, or as Rosemary Hollis puts
it in her chapter, ‘a sense of powerlessness and fatalism’, regarding
European agency and impact. Some Israelis and Palestinians suggest
that the EU and/or Europeans could play a substantially altered role if
they wanted to. While some element of wishful thinking might be at
Esra Bulut Aymat
play, as well as some underestimation of intra-European constraints,
this pattern suggests that the conflicting parties are more aware of the
specific policy choices Europeans have made in the recent history of
the conflict than many Europeans are. Viewing the history of European
involvement as involving specific choices, decisions, calculations and
adjustments – both willing and unwilling; well-thought out and muddled
– rather than simply a gradual, almost natural, evolution, constitutes
an important first step towards rediscovering EU agency. Indeed while
EU council conclusions and declarations largely tell a story of steady
refinement, the story of how the EU has attempted to implement its
shared positions reveals more U-turns, inconsistencies, and internal
tension and disagreement.
Avoiding permanent or systemic policy drift requires greater awareness
of what position, both complex and contingent, the EU currently
finds itself in. The following chapters devote substantial space to
the historical decisions and dynamics that have resulted in the EU’s
current positions. Chapter two includes a broad historical overview of
European involvement in the conflict and the changing stakes for the
EU and Member States. Chapter three provides an introduction to the
evolution of EU assistance to the OPT, while chapter four situates its
arguments and recommendations in the context of the historical and
legal record of EU-Israeli relations. Chapter five outlines the historical
development of the transatlantic dimensions of EU involvement in
the conflict, while chapter six contextualises more recent EU crisis
management initiatives within a longer history of mediation efforts and
support for Palestinian institution building. Chapter seven places recent
dilemmas in the EU’s policies regarding democracy and the conflict in
the wider context of EU democracy promotion efforts. Chapter eight,
beyond a brief history of EU non-engagement with Hamas, unpacks
the various ways in which past and present policies have influenced
the movement. Finally, chapter nine includes a summary of both recent
and more long-standing regional initiatives, and their mixed results,
towards the conflict.
Between diplomatic dichotomies
The second broad contribution of the volume is its scrutiny of the key
relationships that the EU has with the conflicting parties and other
third parties to the conflict. Overall, the EU’s ability to use its policy
instruments to help the conflicting parties move closer to peace has
been hindered by an increasingly dichotomous view of the landscape
as comprising only partners and foes. While the objective should
remain to nurture cooperative approaches to peace, an over-reliance
on the metaphor of partnership has had at least two distorting and
19
1
counter-productive sets of results. The chapters point to policy paths
that transcend this dichotomy.
The first set of counter-productive results relate to the EU’s relationships
with its declared partners. Nathalie Tocci argues in her chapter that the
EU’s prioritisation of cooperation with Israel has not only trumped, but
also worked against, EU pursuit of a two-state solution. She outlines how
the EU has foregone using the potentially most effective means of influence
on Israel in its contractual and political relations. The EU has risked
distorting its own law and practice to accommodate illegal Israeli policies
because it has considered the pursuit of measures to ensure respect for
law as ‘punishments’ harmful to EU-Israeli cooperation. Furthermore,
the predominant framing of the EU’s transatlantic partnership role
as a supporting actor to the US is strained by limitations in the US
position and approach. The recent call for reflection on the fact that
‘three of the most significant Arab-Israeli breakthroughs occurred with
the US nowhere in sight’, and on why the US has been ‘so unfailingly
inept at launching successful initiatives’ has important implications for
European policy thinking.5 In his chapter, Daniel Möckli explores the
mixed record of EU efforts to influence US policy as an indirect way
of bringing European thinking into the management and resolution
of the conflict. He recommends shared strategising on urgent matters,
further thinking on the roles of the EU and Quartet in Middle East
diplomacy and renewed attention to the scope for certain unilateral
EU measures.
5. Robert Malley and Hussein
Agha, ‘How Not to Make
Peace in the Middle East’,
The New York Review of
Books, 15 January 2009.
6. Sharon Pardo and Joel
Peters, Uneasy Neighbours:
Israel and the European Union
(Plymouth: Lexington
Books, 2010), pp. 93-109.
20
This is not to say that we should abandon efforts to build meaningful
partnerships with the conflicting parties and third parties, nor that
Europeans should not devote more attention and resources to direct and
effective public diplomacy outlining the existing forms and foundations
of, and further potential for, partnership in a number of areas. In fact
more bold proposals regarding how the states of a two-state solution
might be integrated into the European Union as close partners require
further reflection. Ongoing thinking over potential European ‘deposits’
in areas such as security, refugees, Jerusalem and natural resources in
support of implementation of a negotiated two-state solution, might be
usefully supplemented by a more ambitious vision of how the two states
would be connected to the EU. The recent suggestion of a model of
‘Euro-Israeli Partnership’ should be explored,6 as should suggestions that
the most meaningful ‘guarantee’ within the context of implementation
of a peace deal would be the option of full EU membership for one or
both states. Yet the objective of meaningful partnerships should not
obscure the full array of choices the EU faces in interacting with all
the relevant actors in the conflict.
This brings us to a second set of drawbacks, related to EU non-engagement
of parties to the conflict. By integrating the heavily charged notion of
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partnership into our basic interaction with the parties, the stakes have
been raised too high. Almost all the authors converge in stressing that
the current EU and US policy towards Hamas is unsustainable and
counter-productive. The chapter by Jeroen Gunning lays out six reasons
why engagement with Hamas has become imperative, and points to
the Swiss experience as demonstrating the overall benefits of lessening
the stakes of engagement by engaging with all. Other authors point
to the far-reaching consequences of the current deadlocked policy.
Agnès Bertrand-Sanz points to the implications for the EU’s strategy of
supporting Palestinian state-building, while Muriel Asseburg points to
the impossibility of building an independent Palestinian judiciary and
a non-partisan security apparatus with democratic oversight amidst
the current divisions in the OPT. Michelle Pace reminds us of the farreaching consequences for the EU’s democracy-building agenda in the
region and beyond, while Daniel Möckli points to the limiting impact
on Quartet peace-making aspirations. Most of the chapters recommend
urgent prioritisation of encouraging and enabling policies towards
intra-Palestinian reconciliation, and in this context urge engagement
with the movement.
This would almost certainly require coordinating a more nuanced and
proactive approach with other third parties, most notably the US and
governments in the region. The final chapter in the volume draws our
attention to the largely untapped potential of greater linkage with regional
approaches in trying to resolve different aspects of the conflict. Michael
Bauer and Christian Hanelt elaborate on the importance of regional
ownership and international support for peace initiatives, and the still
largely unfulfilled potential of the Arab Peace Initiative.
The bottom line is that the EU does not share identical objectives with
any of the chief conflicting parties, but nor as a third party should it
expect or strive to. While there may be considerable overlap – most
notably within the context of the current Fayyad plan – between some
objectives of some Palestinians and Israelis and the EU, ultimately the
parties have conflicting objectives that require reconciliation, partly
through outside mediation, pressure and guarantees. The idea of propping
up at any expense a Palestinian partner with Euro-Atlantic objectives
is as problematic in itself as the idea of excluding Palestinians not
sharing these objectives from the peace dividend. Similarly, the EU is
right to engage with settler ministers in the current Israeli government.
Without a sufficiently inclusive approach to conflict resolution, the path
of negotiations and the end objective of a fair negotiated sustainable
settlement lose legitimacy and local ownership.
21
1
An ever-involved EU?
The third broad contribution of the volume is that it challenges the
temptation to think that the key to success, or the most acceptable fallback option, lies in simply doing and saying more. Several pressures
push policy thinking towards falling back on the dictum that more, if
not better, is at least a reasonable compromise – from EU assistance to
ministerial visits to the region. On the one hand, the current focus on
the establishment of the European External Action Service reminds us
of the ongoing construction work around the EU’s international role
and representation. As the EU attempts to establish itself as a ‘global
player’, concerns about respecting ‘do no harm principles’ of international
intervention interact with countervailing logics of budget maximisation,
inter-institutional competition, national rivalries and an eagerness to
project or represent ‘Europe’ on the international stage. On the other
hand, as laid out in Rosemary Hollis’ discussion of internal constraints
upon EU effectiveness, important differences (as well as noteworthy
convergence) persist among Member States and institutions regarding
the conflict. As another recent study details, while EU Middle East
policy shows ‘clear signs of convergence’, as a result of a certain degree
of compatibility between Member State preferences, the consolidation
of this convergence into a ‘truly collective policy’ has been hampered
by persistent differences.7
7. Costanza Musu, European
Union Policy Towards
the Arab-Israeli Peace
Process: The Quicksands
of Politics (Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke,
2010), pp. 101;173.
8. Interviews with European,
Palestinian and Israeli
officials, Jerusalem,
Ramallah, November
2008 and May 2010.
22
The twin logics of global power building and preservation of national
prerogatives, however defined, provide the fuel for policy but also
lead to many voices, multiple initiatives, parallel policies and at times
incoherent and contradictory responses to key developments. The
chapter by Muriel Asseburg, for example, charts the mixed impact on
EU crisis mediation efforts, which have been hampered by the rather
incoherent picture presented by the contradictory statements of EU
Member States, and on EU aspirations to play an active third-party role
in crisis management and security matters. This also bears out in what
is not covered in the chapters below. For example, while the volume
does not aspire to present an exhaustive account of EU involvement, it is
still striking that in the eight following chapters there is scarce mention
of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process.
Wider feedback on the role and record of the Special Representative
suggests that the EU is unready for a unified high-profile messenger
on the conflict.8
Further pressures emanating from the dynamics of the conflict present
a further basic and recurrent dilemma for the EU in its approach to, and
priorities regarding, the conflict. Israeli Defence Forces testing of EU
equipment donated to the Palestinian Civil Police serves as a pointed
reminder that almost everything the EU provides to the parties and
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peace efforts, from technical assistance to diplomatic interventions,
has potential dual use. While on the one hand, and at least in theory,
EU involvement helps prepare the path to peace, on the other hand it
helps contain the conflict at ‘tolerable’ levels. The EU’s existing role and
further potential in conflict containment has not been lost on the parties
who have invited or acquiesced to increasing European involvement
in specific dimensions of the conflict, most notably in the areas of aid
and security. The chapter by Agnès Bertrand-Sanz details the distorting
effects on EU aid policy, while Rosemary Hollis suggests that ‘it would
seem appropriate that the EU begin asking how long European taxpayers
will be prepared to shoulder the costs of continued occupation and
“containment” of violence in the absence of conflict resolution.’
But does current conflict containment come at the expense of conflict
resolution? In practice the EU’s interaction with the conflicting parties
may have had this effect. The desire, largely unmatched in capacity, to
influence the conflicting parties’ behaviour by initially complying with
and then (unsuccessfully) challenging their conflict strategies has lead the
EU into strategic impasse – from dealing with Hamas’s pre-election and
post-election strategies to coping with former Israeli PM Ariel Sharon’s
2005 unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip. The admirable
objective of pulling the parties towards crucial concessions by going
along with their plans in good faith, when not met with the capacity
to unleash pulling power, has left the EU in a position of participating
in polarising processes that appear to weaken prospects of a negotiated
settlement. Overall, focus on conflict resolution opportunities at the
expense of attention to the actual conflict dynamics and the role the
EU plays, appears to have increased disconnect between EU policy
outcomes and European interests. In the 1990s we learnt elsewhere of
the dangers of deploying peacekeepers in war zones where there was
no peace to keep; might the last decade have revealed the dangers of
investing post-peace deal levels of financial and technical assistance
into a conflict zone in the absence of a peace deal?
The area where the EU is most embedded is perhaps where the stakes are
the highest. Many of the chapters point to Palestinian reconciliation as an
urgent priority. The current situation in which the very involvement of the
EU in propping up the Palestinian Authority may greatly complicate the
pressing need for Palestinian reconciliation should encourage us to think
more openly about the assumed correlation between greater European
involvement and greater positive impact. At present it appears that the
kind of power-sharing or transitional arrangement that Palestinians
require in order to constitute a credible interlocutor for peace overall
requires a further rethink of how the EU supports the PA. It is worth
clarifying whether the choice is between generous European funding of
a Palestinian leadership that is unable to represent its people technically,
electorally or symbolically, or restructured, perhaps restricted, funding
23
1
to a Palestinian Authority which offers better hope of constituting a
credible and legitimate partner to the Israeli government in conflict
resolution. If so, more serious policy thinking should go in to exploring
the pros and cons of turning to the latter. Such a step would also
require renewed thinking regarding the potential role of other third
parties in this respect.
Summary of chapters
The chapter by Rosemary Hollis addresses the basic stakes and strategy
of the EU and Member States regarding the conflict. The EU has as much
to gain from conflict resolution as to fear if hostilities persist or escalate.
The author outlines the conflicting pressures, priorities and difficulties
Europeans face concerning the conflict, including a commitment to good
relations with both Israel and Arab states, the investment of substantial
European tax-derived funds in the OPT, membership of the Quartet,
involvement in security arrangements, contractual relations with all the
official parties to the conflict, concerns over wider European standing
and credibility, energy security considerations, and mounting divisions
among European citizens over the conflict. Pointing to the December
2009 Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process as a
culmination of a series of European statements over three decades, the
chapter outlines the EU’s formal position on the conflict before turning
to the EU’s evolving role since the 1990s. While leading on declaratory
policy, the EU has essentially deferred to the US when it comes to policy
implementation and been reduced to keeping the PA afloat in case a peace
process might be resumed, a strategy dealt a major blow by Hamas’s
electoral victory of 2006. The EU has been constrained by a lack of
leverage, the role of the US, and by divisions between Member States,
each influenced by various economic, transatlantic and history-related
calculations. The EU is left with an enduring set of convictions regarding
what a two-state solution would require without ‘a strategy for making
it happen’, particularly problematic as a solution would likely have to be
imposed. The chapter concludes that Europeans cannot walk away from
responsibilities, abandon international law or impose a solution alone.
The chapter suggests three paths out of paralysis. Individual Member
States could build on the joint EU position on the conflict by taking
the lead on certain issues. Member States could adopt policies which
better identify, and adhere to, EU rules that penalise both Israeli and
Palestinian violations of international law. Finally, in a bid to encourage
Palestinian unity, Member States could spell out the rewards that would
be forthcoming to a new Palestinian unity government.
The chapter by Agnès Bertrand-Sanz examines the conflict and the EU’s
assistance to the Palestinians. The author outlines European lead donor
24
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status vis-à-vis the OPT, and how this aid intervention has migrated
over the last decade towards direct budgetary support for the PA and
further relief and humanitarian assistance. The author reminds us that
ground-level involvement and contractual relations with Israelis and
Palestinians place the EU in a position of full shareholder, and charts
the implications from the perspective of international law. The chapter
examines EU support for PA Prime Minister Fayyad’s two-year de facto
state-building plan, the results of which are so far varied, not least
given the persistent division of the OPT between Fatah and Hamas de
facto governments. The divergence of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
difficult economic trends, and differing Israeli control across the OPT
have implications for donors. The EU has adapted its assistance to the
population of Gaza to the constraints of the blockade and its policy of
non-contact with Hamas. While this might have stabilised the situation,
it has downgraded EU capacity to promote Palestinian development and
self-determination, and pushed it towards a position of accommodating
collective punishment. The author argues that without a reorientation
of EU strategies and a rethink of the failed boycott of the Hamas
administration in Gaza, the EU’s current policy can only further erode
the prospects for any viable and contiguous state-building enterprise. The
chapter offers four sets of policy recommendations. Any initiative towards
Gaza and Hamas should be carefully calibrated to avoid entrenching
the current collectively punitive approach, ensure proper economic
recovery and advance Palestinian reconciliation. The EU should prepare
for different scenarios surrounding Fayyad’s August 2011 deadline for
creating a Palestinian state, prioritising intra-Palestinian reconciliation.
With mounting concerns over sustainability, the EU should reassess
its aid, directing it to conflict-ending purposes, conditioning it on the
removal of obstacles to a viable Palestinian state, and addressing the
needs of a fragmented trans-territorial young population. Finally, the
EU should exercise diligence in implementation of its policies and
react appropriately when violations of international law interfere with
or disrupt its own policy implementation.
In her chapter on the conflict and EU-Israeli relations, Nathalie Tocci
argues that the deepening of bilateral cooperation between the EU and
Israel, and the two-state solution, instead of being mutually reinforcing,
have seen the former working against the prospects of the latter. European
history-related, political and economic interests shape a goal of deepening
ties, but have seen the latter compartmentalised away from a solution to
the conflict, also held to be an integral element of security interests. The
chapter examines bilateral contractual relations, progressively upgraded
since the 1960s, as the most important source of potential EU influence
on Israel, in terms of political dialogue, conditionality and the law. In
practice, there has been an ‘inverse correlation’ between the political
effectiveness of, and EU reliance on, each method. Political dialogue, the
EU’s preferred means of influence, has been rather ineffective. The EU
25
1
has been reluctant to use positive ex ante conditionality by withholding
promised benefits in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
While there has been temporary and understated engagement in such
conditionality since the formal suspension of the EU-Israeli ‘upgrade’
process since 2009, the overall ‘business as usual’ nature of relations
has lessened its impact. While application of EU and international law
could see withdrawal of bilateral benefits due to Israeli violations, in
practice the EU has preferred constructive engagement with Israel,
as with other southern Mediterranean countries. In fact EU legal
obligations and the duty of non-recognition of violations of international
law may be undermined by certain aspects of current EU policy and
practice, the most well-known being treatment of settlement products.
The chapter recommends a basic rethink. The EU has tended to see
application of EU and international law as incompatible with its pursuit
of cooperation with Israel, leading to legal problems and a culture of
impunity. Instead the EU needs to recognise that rules and laws are
what make cooperation possible and that they should be seen as such
rather than as ‘punishment’, and as necessary, although not sufficient,
conditions for a two-state solution.
The chapter by Daniel Möckli examines the Middle East conflict,
transatlantic ties and the Quartet. The author explores how EU policy
towards the conflict has been affected by the fact that for many Member
States sound ties with Washington DC have been just as important,
or much more so, than Middle East peace. Charting three stages in
Euro-US relations regarding the conflict – divergent, complementary
and coordinated – the chapter examines the impact of the founding of
the Middle East Quartet, comprising the US, EU, UN and Russia, in
2002. While the Bush years saw the US subscribe to both a two-state
solution and institutionalised consultations with the EU and other
external actors, they were mostly lost years in terms of advancing peace.
Since the Obama administration took office in 2009, transatlantic
convergence over the conflict has reached an all-time high, but this has
failed to translate into substantial progress in concrete terms, not least
because of unfavourable trends on the ground. Furthermore, Möckli
points out, ‘if Obama has in many ways played a European tune in his
approach to the Arab-Israel conflict, he has largely done so without or
regardless of the EU orchestra.’ The author identifies six urgent issues
for the transatlantic agenda. More robust international meditation is
required today, although it is unclear what the US administration is
capable of, and what role the EU should seek in this respect given the
need for EU-wide approval of measures to punish non-compliance if
the EU is to play a robust monitoring role. If the context is not right for
peace talks, the focus should instead lie at this stage on intra-Palestinian
reconciliation, which requires a more pragmatic approach towards
Hamas. The EU and US should also clarify a strategy on Palestinian
statehood, a more credible stance on settlements in the West Bank
26
Esra Bulut Aymat
and East Jerusalem, and explore options for engaging Syria. All these
issues require further clarification of the role of the EU and Quartet in
Middle East diplomacy: while the time does not seem ripe for a major
unilateral EU diplomatic initiative it may be ripe for unilateral measures
on certain issues.
The chapter by Muriel Asseburg examines EU involvement in crisis
management and mediation in the Arab-Israeli arena. The chapter first
contextualises crisis management and mediation in the broad approach
of the EU to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wider diplomatic context,
charting the increased profile of the EU in these domains after the
failure of the US-mediated talks and the start of the second Intifada in
2000. The chapter examines four dimensions of European involvement.
First, European mediation efforts at the height of the second Intifada
achieved success (albeit to a limited degree) as did EU efforts to present
a political path out of the conflict that culminated in the 2003 Quartet
Roadmap. The EU proved to be more incoherent and ineffective during
the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war and the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza
War. Second, the launch of the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian
Territories (EUPOL COPPS) in January 2006 marked a new form of EU
involvement, although as a consequence of Hamas’s electoral victory the
same month substantial work only began in mid-2007, and then only in
the West Bank. The chapter overviews both the mission’s contributions
and the dangers inherent in its current approach. Third, the EU Border
Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) has been
on standby, with operations suspended, since Hamas’s Gaza takeover
in 2007. Its deployment and short-lived activities contain lessons for
EU aspirations to play an effective third party role. Finally, European
participation in a reinforced UN peacekeeping mission, UNIFIL II, in
Southern Lebanon has seen the mission become an ‘important stabilising
factor in a fragile environment’. The chapter dwells on the innovations
of the mission, its record so far, and inherent limitations to its role
in maintaining stability and achieving peace. The chapter concludes
with six sets of policy recommendations concerning the effectiveness
of CSDP deployments, confidence-building, early warning, mediation
and crisis prevention. To avoid the renewed outbreak of violence and
consolidation of impediments to peace, particular attention should be
devoted to helping bring an end to the Gaza blockade, the need for
Palestinian unity, Israeli settlements and settlement infrastructure, and
the situation in East Jerusalem.
Michelle Pace examines the interplay between the stalled state of
democratisation efforts in the region and a feared eclipse of a twostate solution. The author provides an overview of how democratic
principles and human rights feature in the EU’s relationships and
strategic outlook towards its Mediterranean neighbourhood. These
are situated within wider EU democracy promotion objectives that
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1
are based on an overall optimism towards liberal peace that is not
sufficiently flexible in the face of conflict, state-building and frustrated
national identities. They thus sit uneasily with the EU’s Middle East
conflict resolution objectives. The author illustrates the dilemmas and
resulting perceived double standards of this approach through focus
on Palestinian democratisation, in particular the EU’s behaviour before
and after the January 2006 legislative elections. The author argues that
the EU is caught up in the ‘politics of empty gestures’ where positions
are not backed up with real resistance to rollback of its objectives and
legal obligations. The EU’s relations with governments in the region
have complicated democratisation and peace-making efforts, as has
an approach that excludes key stakeholders. Last but not least, the EU
lacks an overall strategy towards the Middle East that satisfactorily
incorporates democracy. EU decision-makers themselves appear to
have extracted a number of lessons from their experience so far, from
reflection on the handling of the 2006 elections, to current policies
towards Hamas, to support for Palestinian and Israeli civil society. The
chapter concludes that in the absence of a clear strategy on the linkage
between democracy-building in the region and peaceful resolution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU is left with very few policy choices in
both domains. The author recommends that the EU pursue a policy of
convincing Israelis of the importance of a unified Palestinian interlocutor,
act as a reliable mediator in Hamas-Fatah talks, and revise its democratic
assistance and aid programmes.
The chapter by Jeroen Gunning examines the question of engaging
Hamas. After presenting a brief history of EU non-engagement since
Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory, the author outlines and critiques the
main arguments – legal, military, diplomatic and strategic – against
engagement of Hamas. He highlights problems with these arguments
and erroneous assumptions underpinning the current ‘West BankFirst’ policy. There are at least six reasons why engagement has become
imperative. Hamas is here to stay and is unlikely to fade away given what
it has so far survived. Well beyond a core constituency, it represents
the concerns of a substantial number of Palestinians. Current trends in
power balances suggest non-engagement is likely to further entrench
Hamas and empower its hardliners. The current situation looks likely
to deepen institutional divisions and autocratic trends across the OPT,
further damaging two-state solution prospects. Finally, the current
situation risks violent radicalisation within the Gaza Strip. Gunning turns
to the Swiss policy of maintaining contact with Hamas, and explores the
implications of such a stance for the EU. The Swiss experience illustrates
the option of lessening the stakes of engagement by engaging with all,
indicates Hamas’s willingness to explore compromise, suggests routes
to strengthening pragmatists within Hamas, and draws our attention
to the importance of ownership and internal power balances. The
‘model’ also suggests the limits and long-term nature of such a policy.
28
Esra Bulut Aymat
Hamas is determined not to follow the perceived tactical errors of
Fatah regarding compromise, and its pragmatists are wary of risks. The
author concludes that while engagement will raise many difficulties, it
is clearly a risk worth taking. Treating the Quartet principles as goals
rather than preconditions, the EU should encourage the formation of
a national unity government committed to maintaining a ceasefire, a
prisoner exchange including Gilad Shalit, dealing with Israel on the
basis on the 1967 borders and respecting previous agreements, and
engage Hamas members qua government officials. The EU should focus
on Hamas’ behaviour rather than its rhetoric in the light of the internal
power balances within the movement.
The chapter by Michael Bauer and Christian-Peter Hanelt explores
regional approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the
European Union. They argue that mutual responsiveness between
regional and US diplomacy should be a core objective of European policy.
The chapter examines the role of regional actors in the ‘conglomerate of
conflicts’ of the Middle East. To this end, it elaborates on the importance
of ownership and commitment considerations when coordinating
international and regional peace efforts, and explores implications in
terms of opportunities and challenges for EU diplomacy. The chapter
lays out various initiatives from the region, both those that have shaped
existing peace agreements between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, and more
recent initiatives with a mixed balance sheet in terms of sustainability
and success. Regional ownership and international support appear
key. The Arab Peace Initiative (API) stands out in both respects and in
terms of its scope. The chapter outlines its emergence, evolution and
continued relevance, its links to EU objectives and the mostly indirect
role the EU has played to date on the matter. We are reminded that the
API was reaffirmed by the Arab League in 2007 and sustained even after
the 2008-9 Gaza War, demonstrating a prevailing general consensus
that the concept of land for peace and a two-state solution is still valid.
The chapter recommends setting a primary objective of raising mutual
awareness among both the US and regional actors of their diplomatic
initiatives, with the API constituting a major point of reference in this
respect. It also suggests ways in which the EU would need to think
regionally about its potential role in facilitating implementation of any
comprehensive agreement and its different tracks.
Conclusion
The greatest challenge European policy-makers face when approaching
the conflict is the sheer quantity of unknowns. We do not know the
precise thinking that lies behind the current behaviour and rhetoric of
key individuals. We do not know when and where the next outbreak
29
1
of violence will be, nor its potential scope or scale. We do not know
whether current US efforts will produce an unexpected breakthrough any
time soon. We do not know how differing expectations and objectives
regarding the Fayyad plan will play out in 2011. It is unclear whether
and how a ‘West Bank First’ Strategy will be further consolidated,
unravel or be abandoned in the coming years. Uncertainty surrounds
the question of Palestinian power-sharing, elections and reconciliation,
and the life-span of the current Israeli government.
We do however have information on how the EU’s past and present
policies have fared. Greater attention to what has worked and what has
not worked may provide the EU with firmer foundations for renewed
thinking and action with regard to the conflict. This volume does not
specify a single route for future EU policy. Instead it examines the
foundations and debris, constructive contributions and false starts that
mark European involvement in the conflict, developing a diverse set
of recommendations. These recommendations are addressed to both
those searching for bold conflict resolution steps and those seeking to
minimise the harm done to peace prospects by current trends. In doing
so, the Chaillot Paper invites both sceptics and enthusiasts to further
explore the full array of policy options and constraints that the EU faces
with a more grounded and ambitious, and perhaps more ‘European’,
vision and purpose.
30
Chapter 2
The basic stakes and strategy
of the EU and Member States
Rosemary Hollis
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what is at stake for Europe
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, analyse the strategies so far adopted by
the European Union, draw lessons and review the options for future
action. A brief summary of European economic and security interests
in the Middle East will demonstrate that Europe has much to gain from
conflict resolution and much to fear if hostilities persist or escalate.
As discussed below, the EU became directly involved, in parallel with
the United States, in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) during the
1990s. However, that process collapsed in 2000 and subsequently the
attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) gave rise to the so-called ‘war on
terror’ that overtook other policy priorities. Since then, and with the
added complication of the Iraq crisis and invasion of 2003, the conflict
has become more intractable. In this context EU policy has been more
about issuing declarations and maintaining consensus within the
transatlantic alliance than effective conflict resolution. The chapter
concludes with an assessment of the unpalatable choices now facing
the Europeans in the face of a deteriorating situation on the ground
for which EU policies to date must bear some responsibility, but which
appears beyond the capacity of the EU to redress, with or without a
lead from Washington.
European interests and stakes
Israel and the Arab states are close neighbours of Europe, with whom
mutual recognition and cooperative relations have been established
and developed over decades. Latterly successive initiatives for closer
cooperation around the Mediterranean – the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – have signalled EU commitment to
an inclusive approach to regional relations that is not biased in favour
of either Israel or the Arabs.
31
2
However, if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists and Israel continues
and further consolidates its occupation of the Palestinian territories
(the West Bank and Gaza Strip), Arab governments will likely face
increased domestic pressure to make a stronger stand against Israel and,
by extension, its defenders and supporters in the West. For Europe,
such developments could mean facing conflicting demands to choose
sides.1 Arab strategies to resist ‘normalisation’ with Israel, pending
Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, have already spilled
over onto the agenda of the UfM and caused the postponement of the
summit scheduled for June this year.
The EU has also invested considerable sums of taxpayers’ money in
Palestinian institution-building and economic development in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. According to European Commission figures,
between 2000-09 the EU disbursed over €3.3 billion in aid to the
Palestinians.2 However, whereas in the 1990s most of that aid took the
form of development assistance, latterly the bulk of the funds has gone
to paying salaries and the running costs of the Palestinian Authority
(PA) in the West Bank.3
Since the mid-1990s European engagement in pursuit of a negotiated
solution to the conflict has grown to the extent that the EU could not
now walk away without significant costs to the fate of the Palestinians
and European relations with Israel.
1. See for example, House
of Lords, European Union
Committee, ‘The EU and
the Middle East Peace
Process’, 26th Report of
Session 2006-07, HL Paper
132-I, paragraph 86.
2. See: http://eeas.
europa.eu/occupied_
palestinian_territory/
ec_assistance/eu_support_
pa_2000_2009_en.pdf.
3. See chapter by Agnès
Bertrand-Sanz in this
volume, pp. 43-53
4. Muriel Asseburg, ‘The ESDP
Missions in the Palestinian
Territories (EUPOL COPPS,
EU BAM Rafah): Peace
through Security?’, in The
EU as a Strategic Actor in the
Realm of Security and Defence,
SWP Berlin, December 2009.
32
As a full member of the Quartet (that links the US, UN, EU and
Russia) the EU is bound into the most high-profile body coordinating
international efforts to achieve peace. Under the Quartet umbrella, the
EU played a leading role in developing the so-called Roadmap, launched
in 2003 and largely accepted by Israel and the Palestinians, but which
has remained unimplemented. Consequently, the EU is a player, not a
bystander, in the quest for peace.
Perhaps more crucially, the EU is the single largest donor (and lifeline)
to the PA, providing the funds required to pay salaries and run the
education, health and other services in the West Bank. Donations
from the EU and Member States to the UN Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) are essential to ensure that Palestinian refugees do not starve,
have shelter and get an education. UNRWA services between 1.6 and 2
million refugees living in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan; and at least half
a million in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, since the imposition
of the Israeli blockade (2007), UNRWA has been providing essential
humanitarian aid to 1 million Palestinians living there.
Europe, in conjunction with the United States, is also directly engaged in
transforming Palestinian security arrangements in the West Bank. The EU
Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)4 helps train,
Rosemary Hollis
equip and advise Palestinian police to keep law and order in Palestinian
population centres, and prevent breaches of the peace that might threaten
the PA or its policies toward Israel. The security situation has improved
as a result, but the sustainability of contemporary arrangements will
depend on whether these can deliver a more fundamental transformation
in Palestinian prospects. Meanwhile, even though the EU provides the
monitoring mission (EUBAM Rafah) to facilitate access and egress on the
Gaza-Egypt border crossing at Rafah, its operations have been suspended
since June 2007.
At the regional level, the EU has Partnership Agreements with all the
parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict: namely Israel, the PA, Lebanon and
Syria, as well as Egypt and Jordan. Under the rubric of the ENP, socalled Action Plans have been agreed and implemented with Israel, the
PA, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon and while these are designed to help
harmonise the economies of the partner states with the EU internal
market, progress is slow and rewards are limited, except in the case
of Israel, which is sufficiently technically advanced to benefit more
substantially from harmonisation. In terms of diplomacy, the EU and
Member States have long-standing and in many respects close relations
with Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, although tensions are
not uncommon and European political leverage is relatively limited.
Meanwhile, because European service personnel participate in key
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, including UNIFIL (South
Lebanon) and UNDOF (Golan Heights), they have a stake in the success
of these missions.
In sum, European investment in containing the conflict and funding
status quo. If the EU and Member States withdrew their personnel and
economic support there would most likely be a humanitarian crisis,
increased instability, lawlessness, disillusionment and generalised
conflict. Yet, while the status quo prevails, the occupation has also
continued along with settlement expansion in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, notwithstanding a temporary and partial freeze in 2009-10,
and Israel’s willingness to pursue negotiations is based on conditions
that the Palestinians are reluctant to meet.
It would therefore seem appropriate that the EU begin asking how
long European taxpayers will be prepared to shoulder the costs of
continued occupation and ‘containment’ of violence in the absence of
conflict resolution.
Europe’s standing and credibility depend upon adherence to the principles
of international law and defence of human rights. Yet Israel’s occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and annexation of East Jerusalem and
the Golan Heights are contrary to international law. Notwithstanding
33
2
successive pronouncements by the EU on the legal position, EU actions
do not make clear distinctions between dealings with Israel per se and
with Israeli enterprises and settlers in the Occupied Territories.5
At the broader regional level, Europeans depend on the Arabs, Iran and
Russia for the vast majority of their energy security. The Arab world
represents a lucrative market for European consumer goods, services,
produce and arms. By extension, European economic interests require
peace and stability in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf region
and Central Asia. Yet that peace and stability is undermined by the
continuance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Europe’s interests in and ties to the Middle East are so extensive and
significant that it does not have the option of turning a blind eye to
what happens there. In particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a source
of personal and passionate concern for many EU citizens and it is
becoming an increasingly divisive and disruptive cause célèbre within
European society.
5. See Natalie Tocci, ‘The
Conflict and EU-Israeli
Relations’, pp. 55-63 in
this volume. See also Shadi
Hamid and Amanda Kadlec,
‘Strategies for Engaging
Political Islam’, FESMiddle East Democracy
Project, January 2010.
6. As US State Department
official Dennis Ross noted
in 2002: ‘The Israeli
perception of a re-emergence
of anti-Semitism in Europe
is playing very very
negatively.’ BBC Current
Affairs, BBC Radio 4
Documentary, ‘Analysis:
The Expired Mandate’,
broadcast 1 August 2002.
7. As Olivier Roy discusses in
his book Globalized Islam:
The Search for a New Umma
(London: Hurst, 2002):
see for example p. 45.
8. Omar Barghouti, ‘Besieging
Israel’s Siege’, The Guardian,
12 August 2010.
9. See: http://www.zionismisrael.com/Israel_boycott.
htm; and http://desertpeace.
wordpress.com/2010/06/12/
extending-the-boycottagainst-israel/
34
European Jews cannot forget the lessons of the Holocaust and still fear
the potential for anti-Semitism to grow in Europe, especially in the face
of economic crisis and large-scale unemployment, when ethnocentrism
and xenophobia gain ground.6 The danger is that fear and prejudice in
Europe complicate European relations with the Middle East,7 where
Israel is still battling with Arabs and Muslims generally to achieve
acceptance as a Jewish state in the region. In the twenty-first century
the EU has become a mosaic of large and small Member States with
contrasting traditions and cultures. New migrants from all over the
world have enriched the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of the
whole union. Yet many are struggling to adjust and find their place in
the mix. Religion as a source of conflict as well as solace is a factor.
Thus conflict in ‘the Holy Land’ can have repercussions in Europe and
vice versa.8
The Palestinians are the solution as well as the problem. They represent
the frontline of Arab and Muslim opposition to Israel. Their cause has
also generated anti-Israeli boycott campaigns among trade unions,
student groups and others keen to champion the rights of a people
under occupation.9 The outcry and consternation that followed the
Israeli raid on the flotilla seeking to break the blockade of the Gaza
Strip in May 2010 demonstrated the potential for the conflict to divide
and inflame opinion in Europe. Yet there is no easy way to satisfy
Palestinian demands without exacerbating the fears of Israeli Jews and
their friends and supporters elsewhere.
Rosemary Hollis
Formal EU position on the conflict
The clearest statement of EU thinking on the requirements for a
comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict were laid out in
the ‘Conclusions of the Council of Ministers on the MEPP’ released on
8 December 2009.10 The core element in this statement (as in others
before it) is the call for ‘a two-state solution’ to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, with ‘the State of Israel and an independent, democratic,
contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace
and security’.
Beyond articulating these goals, the Council stated that the EU ‘will not
recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard
to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties’ and that, in the
interests of ‘genuine peace, a way must be found through negotiations to
resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states’. More
broadly, the Council noted that: ‘A comprehensive peace must include
a settlement between Israel and Syria and Lebanon.’
The Council document represents the culmination of a series of European
statements over several decades, commencing with the 1980 Venice
Declaration, in which the European Community broke new ground
by calling for the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO) in peace negotiations and recognised the right of Palestinians to
self-determination. When it was issued in 1980, the Venice Declaration
was dismissed by Israel and essentially ignored by the United States, yet
its core principles would later be adopted in the Oslo Accords signed
in Washington by the Israeli Government and the PLO in 1993.
Seventeen years on, in March 2010 a Joint Statement by the Quartet11
incorporated much of the essence of the EU Council’s December 2009
Conclusions. Thus the Europeans have effectively blazed a trail for all
the major international stakeholders in the MEPP. Yet herein lies the
rub, because while leading on declaratory policy, the EU has essentially
deferred to the United States when it comes to policy implementation.
The reasons for this date back several decades. It was the United States
which brokered the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in the 1970s. Washington
also took the lead in convening the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991
that, for the first time, brought all the conflicting parties to the table
and initiated multilateral as well as bilateral peace talks.
In the 1990s, the Americans took the principal role in mediating between
the Israelis and Palestinians for the duration of the so-called Oslo Process,
at the behest of the Norwegians who brokered the original deal. Europe
was expected to inject funds and technical support into Palestinian
state-building, while high diplomacy was managed by Washington.
10. Council of the European
Union, ‘Council Conclusions
on the Middle East Peace
Process’, 2985th Foreing
Affairs Council meeting,
Brussels, 8 December
2009. See: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/111829.pdf.
11. Middle East Quarter
Statement, Moscow,
14 March 2010. See:
http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsUpload/113436.pdf.
35
2
After the Oslo Process collapsed in the second Intifada, the EU did
act to help realise US President George Bush’s ‘vision’ of a two-state
solution through formulation of the Roadmap. However, when that
languished the EU lapsed into inertia, waiting for Washington to find a
new formula. This it eventually did, with the Annapolis initiative, with
limited results. Thus, when Obama came to power in 2009 promising
to make the peace process a priority, the Europeans were enthusiastic,
but preferred a supporting role to an independent one.
Europe’s evolving role: a salutary tale
In the 1990s the EU was able to pursue economic development of the
Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza, under the Oslo process,
in tandem with US leadership on negotiations. However, not only did
the process collapse, but Palestinian suicide bombings profoundly
undermined Israeli belief in the viability of a negotiated solution.
When the shock of 9/11 then transformed US policy priorities and the
‘war on terror’ took centre stage, attention turned first to Afghanistan
and then Iraq. Europe split over the legality and wisdom of the Iraq
invasion, losing internal cohesion and traction in Washington as a
result. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon argued that the
Palestinian leadership was part of the terrorist threat to the region and
beyond, and adopted a strategy to re-impose control on the Occupied
Territories that Washington proved unwilling or unable to alter.
Meanwhile, from 2002 to 2006 Iraq took centre stage and tensions
blighted relations between Washington and those Europeans who
opposed the Iraq invasion. In retrospect, the European quest for a
common foreign and security policy was fundamentally undermined
by differences over Iraq. On the Arab-Israeli front all the EU felt able
to do was try to keep the PA from total collapse, through injections of
cash, so that there would still be a Palestinian negotiating partner once
some sort of peace process could be resumed.
12. See for example: José María
Aznar, ‘Support Israel: if
it goes down, we all go
down’, The Times, 17 June
2010; Allegra Stratton,
‘West outmanoeuvred
by extremists – Blair’,
The Guardian, 7 October
2010; and Slavoj Žižek,
‘Liberal multiculturalism
masks an old barbarism
with a human face’, The
Guardian, 4 October 2010.
36
However, bomb plots and attacks inside Europe, attributable to al-Qaeda
sympathisers purporting to support the Palestinian cause among others
against ‘the West’, influenced the public mood. Since then some have
argued that resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would help to combat
the phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation, while others maintain that
the plight of the Palestinians is only an excuse for anti-Western violence
and ‘home grown’ terrorism.12
Within this broader context, when the Islamist movement Hamas won
a resounding victory over its Fatah rivals in the Palestinian legislative
elections of 2006, this dealt a major blow to the EU strategy of keeping
Rosemary Hollis
the PA in business. Having labelled Hamas a terrorist organisation, the
EU leadership balked at the prospect of funding a Hamas-run PA and
refused to have anything to do with Hamas officials. In retrospect,
it is clear that the EU missed an opportunity to push for Palestinian
unity.
In spring 2006 the EU joined the rest of the Quartet in enjoining Hamas
to adhere to a set of principles that included recognising Israel’s right
to exist, as well as renouncing violence and accepting all agreements
previously signed by the PLO and PA. In 2007 Hamas took over control
of the Gaza Strip by force, leaving Fatah to regroup behind an emergency
administration on the West Bank, with Salam Fayyad appointed Prime
Minister.
Meanwhile, war broke out between Israel and the Lebanese movement
Hezbollah, resulting in serious loss of life and damage to the infrastructure
in Lebanon and a hail of rocket fire into Israel that the armed forces
proved unable to staunch. The European response was divided, with
some calling urgently for a ceasefire, while others, notably British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, held out for a Hezbollah defeat that did not
materialise.
For over two years, Arab and tentative, isolated European attempts to
broker reconciliation between the Palestinian factions have been stymied
by Washington’s insistence that Hamas be isolated and eliminated from
the political stage through the blockade of Gaza instituted by the Israelis
and tacitly supported by Egypt and Fatah. In so far as the Europeans
believed this to be counterproductive, they failed to act accordingly.
Israel’s assault on Gaza in 2008-2009 resulted in the deaths of 1,300
Palestinians, many of them children, while the Israelis lost thirteen
soldiers in the operation they called ‘Cast Lead’. These chilling statistics
and the extent of the destruction in Gaza once more shocked public
and government opinion in Europe. Yet the blockade has persisted and
rebuilding has been prevented. The war did cause the EU to put plans
to upgrade Israel’s relations with the Union on hold, but did not derail
other aspects of Israel’s Partnership Agreement with the EU.
Since Barack Obama became US President in early 2009, the EU
has volunteered no new initiatives on conflict resolution. Obama’s
commitment to restart the peace process enabled the EU to defer to
Washington’s lead once more. When Obama’s administration ran up
against intransigence from the Israeli government of Binyamin Netanyahu,
the EU had no suggestions for overcoming the problems.
37
2
Policy constraints and limitations
EU lack of leverage and Washington’s willingness to take command
are not the only explanations for EU ineffectiveness. Europe is also
constrained by the fact that the Union is not a unified actor. Achieving
a common policy on any issue requires the harmonisation of twentyseven different positions, with the result that agreement is based on
the ‘lowest common denominator’. Each Member State is influenced by
various calculations to do with local and regional economic interests,
transatlantic relations, and history.
Germany faces particularly sensitive issues in addressing the ArabIsraeli conflict, which relate back to the Holocaust. As a consequence,
the Germans have fought shy of openly criticising Israel. Since falling
out with Washington over Iraq, under the leadership of Angela Merkel
Berlin has also sought to repair relations. As a result, adherence to US
leadership on the Middle East defines contemporary German policy on
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Britain and France were responsible for the carve-up of the Arab world
into separate states after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. France had
the League of Nations Mandate for Syria and made Lebanon a separate
state. This historical connection has left France with enduring ties to
both states, as manifest in periodic French interventions and initiatives
in relations between the two. The fêting of Syrian President Assad’s
participation in the launch of the UfM, the brainchild of President
Nicolas Sarkozy, was a case in point.
Britain held the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine from 1922
to 1948, wherein it facilitated the implementation of the Balfour
Declaration that endorsed the idea of a national homeland for the Jews
in Palestine.
While that may be ancient history as far as contemporary Britons are
concerned, in the Arab world the British are still held responsible for
presiding over the birth of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, the
lessons learned then still have relevance today. When Britain referred
the problem of Palestine to the United Nations in 1947, that body voted
for partition of the area into two states, one Jewish and one Arab.
Failing to reconcile the conflicting interests of the Jewish community or
Yishuv and the Arabs in and around Palestine, while also coming under
conflicting pressures from within Europe, at the United Nations and in
Washington, the British could not implement the UN call for partition
by force. So they withdrew and the outcome was determined by war.
38
Rosemary Hollis
Now Britain, like other European countries, is calling for a two-state
solution based on the 1948 armistice lines between Israel and the Arabs,
with statehood for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Yet
even though Israel and the PLO have accepted this formula in principle,
both know that the Palestinian refugee problem relates back to the earlier
war of 1948 and its resolution requires revisiting that era.
In other respects the facts on the ground do not augur well for a twostate solution by agreement. Israel’s formal commitment to this goal
is undermined by its settlement policy, including in and around East
Jerusalem. The capacity of the Palestinians to deliver on a peace deal
lacks credibility because of the divisions between Hamas and Fatah,
the West Bank and Gaza.
In the circumstances the Europeans have resorted to placing their hopes
in the state-building enterprise of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Yet his
is a top-down enterprise, funded by external aid and lacking grassroots
engagement and private sector economic development.13 The remit of
the PA only extends to so-called areas A and B in the West Bank, with
the remaining Area C (sixty percent) still under Israeli control and
home to Israeli settlers.
EU pronouncements on the illegality of the Jewish settlements are not
backed up by penalties for their continuance. The experience of the
Obama administration with its attempts to impose a settlement freeze
has no doubt tempered EU thinking about how to remedy this problem.
The Europeans appear loath to be more hardline than Washington.
Meanwhile, whereas in the 1990s the EU placed confidence in a
series of ‘soft-power’ initiatives for transforming relations around
the Mediterranean, as of 9/11 the agenda has changed. In the face of
threats posed to Western governments and society by terrorist groups
associated with extremist Islamist ideology, the EU has retrenched
on support for democratisation and economic integration around the
Mediterranean. Instead, closer security cooperation between European
and Arab governments has come at the expense of democratisation
in the south, and the more modest vision of the UfM has not only
supplanted the EMP, but has itself been crippled by spill-over from
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Overall, it is clear that Europeans face conflicting pressures and priorities
as well as difficulties in pursuing a more active collective approach to
conflict resolution. Meanwhile, the optimism that accompanied the
peace-building endeavour in the 1990s has given way to a sense of
powerlessness and fatalism. What endures is a set of convictions about
what a two-state solution would require, without a strategy for making
it happen.
13. See: Nathan J. Brown, ‘Are
Palestinians Building a
State?’, Carnegie Endowment
For International Peace,
1 July 2010. Available at:
http://carnegieendowment.
org/publications/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=41093.
39
2
Unpalatable options
Reviewing the policy pronouncements of the EU outlined above, it
becomes apparent that EU proposals seek to reconcile the national
aspirations of the Israelis and Palestinians through territorial compromise.
What is envisaged is logical in purely material terms but assumes that
the protagonists can be persuaded to give precedence to peace for its
own sake over commitment to their respective security requirements,
ideological or ideational positions and identities.
The religious nationalists in the forefront of those Israelis committed to
remaining in Jewish settlements in the West Bank will resist evacuation
to make way for a Palestinian state. For those Israelis who see the longterm security benefits of a two-state solution to the conflict, the prospect
of removing tens of thousands of settlers by force also poses problems.
Fearful that some members of the Israel Defence Force would revolt
rather than implement settlement evacuation, some Israelis would even
contemplate accepting the involvement of external forces.
Whether government and public support for such intervention would be
forthcoming in Europe or the United States is questionable. In any case,
what is contemplated, in terms of clearing out key settlements from the
West Bank, may portend increased conflict as opposed to peace.
On the Palestinian side, acceptance of a mini state on the West Bank
without the removal of at least some of the Jewish settlements would be
political suicide and would not make for a ‘viable’ state. Hamas would
then be in a position to rally to its cause all those who would lose out
in a territorial compromise, including the hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian refugees around the region.
In short, the formula for conflict resolution embodied in the EU’s official
pronouncements would satisfy some but not all Israelis and Palestinians.
It would have to be imposed, and the would-be compromisers in Israel
and Palestine could not do it by themselves. Yet neither the United
States nor the EU would welcome the prospect of fighting for peace
on their behalf.
Meanwhile, European investment in containing the conflict and funding
status quo. If Europe withdrew its personnel and economic support
there would be a humanitarian crisis, increased instability, lawlessness,
disillusionment and generalised conflict.
Consequently, for the EU the costs of withdrawing this assistance would
be greater than the potential benefits.
40
Rosemary Hollis
Europe cannot walk away from its existing responsibilities nor can
the EU abandon its adherence to international law and all that this
implies. Equally, Europe cannot alone impose a solution on the warring
parties. Here are three suggestions for ways to move beyond the present
paralysis.
First, while still adhering to the joint European position on the conflict,
individual EU Member States could go beyond this and take a lead that
others could be encouraged to follow. Thus, second, Member States
could adopt policies which more clearly identify those aspects of both
Israeli and Palestinian actions which run counter to international law
and impose penalties accordingly. Stricter adherence to the rules-oforigin requirements for imports, for example, could serve as the basis
for taxing or rejecting goods made by companies operating in Israeli
settlements. Third, in recognition that attempts to eliminate Hamas from
the picture have failed, EU Member States could do more to encourage
Palestinian unity. They could, for example, spell out the rewards that
would be forthcoming for a new unity government that would share
responsibility for delivering basic services and the rule of law in both
the West Bank and Gaza.
There is no guarantee that these steps would produce peace – but nor
will standing on the sidelines lamenting. The only alternative is to enter
the fray in a manner designed to give more credibility and substance
to Europe’s declared position.
41
Chapter 3
The conflict and the EU’s
assistance to the Palestinians
[The author would like to thank Majed Bamya, Andreas Indregard, Esra
Bulut and Anne Le More for their help and the useful comments that
they provided on earlier versions of this chapter. She would also like
to thank Arthur Neslen for his editorial help. The views expressed in
this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
views of APRODEV.]
Introduction
The EU has always been a strong supporter of Palestinian selfdetermination. Reflecting this, its financial involvement in the Peace
Process since the Oslo Agreement has been concentrated on advancing
the creation of a Palestinian state. At present, European assistance
supports the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) and the provision of humanitarian aid, as well
as the State-building project embodied by the Fayyad plan. However,
this aid has not been sufficient to overcome substantial impediments
to the realisation of a viable Palestinian state. While European aid has
clearly had positive effects on Palestinian living conditions, a paucity
of appropriate responses to illegal policies has resulted in a de facto
pattern of accommodation to them. This has been accentuated when
the EU’s own interests have been directly undermined. Moreover, the
division between Gaza and the West Bank continues to pose a challenge
to effective Palestinian self-determination upheld by the EU since the
early 1980s. The two territories are governed by mutually antagonistic
Palestinian factions and subject to different Israeli regimes of control.
European interventions have indirectly strengthened this territorial
separation. Without a reorientation of EU strategies and a rethink of the
failed boycott of the Hamas administration in Gaza, the EU’s current
policy can only further erode the prospects for the creation of a viable
and contiguous Palestinian state.
43
3
The conflict and the EU’s assistance to the Palestinians
Historical background
Thirty years ago, with the signing of the Venice Declaration, the European
Community (EC) became the first third party to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict to acknowledge that the Palestinian people were entitled to
exercise their right to self-determination and that the Palestinian problem
was ‘not simply one of refugees’.1 In 1986, the EU went further, enacting
a regulation that allowed products originating in the Occupied Territories
to be exported to the EC under the label ‘Made in the West Bank and
Gaza’. This measure concretely dissociated the Occupied Territories from
the State of Israel. After the signing of the Declaration of Principles in
September 1993, the EU increased its economic involvement in the Peace
Process by financially supporting the nascent Palestinian Authority. EU
assistance to the Palestinians has continued unabated since then.
1. ‘Declaration on the MiddleEast’, European Council,
Venice, 12-13 June 1980.
2. Anne le More, International
Assistance to the Palestinians
after Oslo: Political Guilt,
Wasted Money (London,
Routledge, 2008), pp. 88-9.
3. PEGASE (Mécanisme
palestino-européen de gestion
de l’aide socio-économique), is
a financial mechanism which
channels funds directed at
the Palestinian Authority to
an account controlled by the
Palestinian Prime Minister
and which bypasses Hamas
in the Gaza Strip. It was
created in December 2007 at
the Paris conference in order
to replace the Temporary
International Mechanism
which was established in
June 2006 after the victory
of Hamas at Palestinian
Legislative Council
elections in January 2006.
44
By providing an average €500 million per year, the EU and its Member
States became by far the biggest donors to the Palestinian Occupied
Territories. This remained the case even when the EU suspended its
direct aid to the Palestinian Authority in April 2006, three months after
Hamas’s victory in Legislative Council elections. However, especially
since the onset of the Second Intifada, the EU has gradually transformed
its aid intervention. Where it was once directed principally at the
construction of infrastructure and natural resources management
sector, EU aid migrated towards direct budgetary support for the PA
and more relief-oriented and humanitarian assistance, in response to
the worsening economic situation.2 Along with support for Palestinian
refugees through UNRWA, humanitarian aid and budgetary support
now comprise the three main tracks of the EU’s intervention.
In 2009, the EU’s financial commitment amounted to €590.5 million,
€272.1 million of which transited through the EU’s financial mechanism,
PEGASE,3 to reach an account controlled by the Palestinian Prime
Minister Salaam Fayyad, thereby bypassing Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
€178.97 million out of this €272.1 million were dedicated to paying the
salaries and pensions of PA civil servants and allowances to vulnerable
families in Gaza and the West Bank. The rest of the amount transiting
through PEGASE was ring-fenced for direct support to the private
sector (€22 million) and for buying the fuel necessary to run the Gaza
power plant (€39.63 million) and institution-building (€12 million)
and infrastructure development (€19.5 million). The bill for financial
assistance to UNRWA came in at €169.57 million, while humanitarian
aid projects through the ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian
Office) amounted to some €72 million, which covers food security
and cash for work projects, health-related projects, programmes in
the domain of civilian protection and mental health programmes for
children especially in Gaza. The EU’s overall financial contribution also
covers support for projects in East Jerusalem aimed at maintaining a
Palestinian presence in the city, CFSP missions (EUPOL COPPS and EU
BAM Rafah) and support for civil society. If one takes the contribution
to UNRWA out of the overall budget, in 2009, approximately 56 percent
of European aid went to Gaza, and the remainder to the West Bank
including Jerusalem. But this may change following an EU decision
in November 2009 to cease directly financing the electricity supply to
Gaza’s only power station.
State-building in an emergency: the
Fayyad plan
In 2007, when the EU resumed its direct aid to the PA following the
Fayyad government’s rise to power in the West Bank, the state-building
components of EU financial assistance were reactivated following an
18-month pause following the election of Hamas. Prime Minister
Salaam Fayyad’s plan, ‘Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State’,
unveiled in August 2009, gave the EU an opportunity to advance this
process.4 The plan quickly gained concrete EU support as evidenced
by financial assistance across a whole range of sectors, including water,
environment and energy projects, the judiciary, civilian defence and
modernisation of prisons. The EU’s direct assistance to the PA also
allowed the Authority to dip into its own revenues to pay for the
implementation of Fayyad’s vision.
The Fayyad plan is a two-year programme aimed at paving the way
for the de facto creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza within this time period. The plan interweaves ambitious national
objectives, such as achieving economic independence and bringing
equality and social justice to all citizens, with a detailed strategy for
institutional development. In practice, the plan is about creating a series
of ‘positive accomplished facts’, including infrastructure, conducive
to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Fayyad’s rationale is that
by showing goodwill towards international demands – in particular
regarding security – a non-violent national project for self-determination
can garner concrete international support.
The results of this strategy are so far varied and barely intelligible to
large sections of the Palestinian population On the one hand, Fayyad
advocates the boycott of settlement products and support for non-violent
resistance. On the other hand, he promotes security cooperation with
Israel – currently at unprecedented levels. Moreover, although his plan
refers to the creation of a Palestinian state ‘with full sovereignty over its
territory in the West Bank and Gaza […] [and] with East Jerusalem as
4. Palestinian National
Authority, ‘Ending the
Occupation, Establishing
the State’, Programme of the
Thirteenth Government,
August 2009.
45
3
its capital’5, a question mark hangs over the eventual legitimacy of the
PA’s efforts if the issue of the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah
has not been resolved by August 2011. This has led to serious criticisms
that the plan is aimed at eviscerating Hamas and providing a practical
buttress for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s ‘economic peace’ agenda
and ‘West Bank first’ policy promoted by the international donors,
who are key stakeholders in the political peace process. The Fayyad
administration’s lack of democratic legitimacy and the reluctance of the
present Israeli government to accept unilateral Palestinian decisions
also pose serious obstacles to the plan’s success.
Nonetheless, Fayyad supporters would argue that the plan represents an
important card which Palestinians can play in achieving their national
objectives. For them, it is an overt call to the major third parties to this
conflict, the US and Europeans, to tackle impediments to peace on the
ground and the imbalance of power between Israelis and Palestinians.
If the current talks fail, the realisation of a de facto Palestinian state
represents an alternative strategic offer that the international community
might find difficult to refuse. Thus in parallel with his actions on the
ground, Fayyad is seeking to develop a consensus around recognition
and support for a Security Council resolution that would amount to an
international endorsement for the creation of a Palestinian state.6
Necessary EU responses to roadblocks in
the way of Palestinian Statehood
5. Ibid., p. 6.
6. International Crisis Group,
‘Tipping point – Palestinians
and the search for a new
strategy’, Middle East Report
no. 95, 26 April 2010.
7. Nathalie Tocci, The EU and
Conflict Resolution: Promoting
Peace in the Backyard
(New York: Routledge,
2007), pp. 100-25.
46
For the EU, supporting the Fayyad Plan is an opportunity to demand
political progress from both sides, but it is unclear whether current
EU financial support for the Fayyad plan departs from the traditional
aid rationale, building institutions that could be useful when the time
comes. Apart from its financial support for institution building, the
EU’s backing for the Fayyad plan is not so very different to its support
for previous Palestinian reform plans. In other words, if the EU is
unequivocally supporting the ‘establishing a Palestinian state’ side of
the plan, questions can be raised about its attitude to the plan’s other
aspect: ‘ending the occupation’. Consistent support for the state-building
route would necessarily entail a strategy for surmounting obstacles to
its realisation. The EU regularly condemns violations of international
law that prevent the emergence of a viable Palestinian state, but experts
ask why the EU’s challenges to these have been so tepid. A dissonance
between EU statements and actions in the region has been created.7
Besides its declared commitment to human rights and international law,
the EU’s ground-level involvement and contractual relationships with
Israel and the Palestinians place it in the position of a full stakeholder.
As such it has an interest in the successful implementation of its regional
policies, with all that this implies about how it should proceed if faced with
unlawful impediments to it. According to H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins,
under international law, one would expect claims for exceptionality or
violations of international law to be followed by a reaction.8 Higgins
sees international law not just as a set of rules but also as a process of
ongoing interactions between different actors. International law relates
to competing claims formulated by these actors, be they assertions of
rights, promises, or the invocation of exceptional circumstances, i.e.,
claims which depart from international law. Unless actions that breach
international law are greeted with strong protest, a claim for exceptionality
can be perpetuated and become entrenched. This is not to say that a
violation of international law can become legal over time, but it does
mean that the passage of time can help create a legitimate claim when
the effects of the violation are irreversible on the ground. The necessity
for third parties to assert their claim becomes more important when
violations of international law impede the implementation of policy
instruments. It increases the importance of delivering a reaction.
Building matchstick houses in a storm:
EU aid and state-building efforts during
occupation and blockade
Since the split between Hamas and Fatah in June 2007, the West
Bank and Gaza have become subject to two different Israeli regimes of
control. Consequently, their economic situations have diverged and the
implementation of EU assistance has been affected accordingly.
Aid, economic restrictions and destruction
In order to advance its officially declared policy of ‘economic peace’, in
2009, Israel undertook several measures to ease movement restrictions in
the West Bank and to allow Palestinians living in Israel greater access to
the region’s markets. These steps, combined with a dramatic acceleration
in security cooperation between Israelis and the PA, improved the
West Bank’s economic outlook. Real GDP growth in the West Bank is
projected to have risen to 7 percent in 2009 from 5 percent in 2008.
However, this economic trend is unsustainable and strictly limited by
continued settlement construction.9 At present, Israel controls nearly
60 percent of the West Bank’s land through settlement buildings, and
associated infrastructure such as roads and the barrier wall. The PA’s
limited control over the West Bank obstructs the donor community –
8. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems
and Process: International Law
and How We Use It (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 1.
9. World Bank, ‘A Palestinian
State in Two Years:
Institutions for Economic
Revival’, Economic
Monitoring Report to the
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee,
22 September 2009, p. 8.
47
3
including the EU – from intervening in many socio-economic sectors.
Israel’s overall control also facilitates settlement activity, particularly
in East Jerusalem, creating a situation on the ground that diminishes
prospects for a compromise on the city’s status and threatens the chances
of creating a viable Palestinian state.
Moreover, West Bank Palestinian access to outside markets in Gaza, Israel
and elsewhere is still severely curtailed. Improved internal movement
and GDP growth cannot compensate for the consequent economic loss.
This situation is not new. The EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement
which came into force in 1997 had been intended to enhance trade
and economic cooperation but, soon after its conclusion, the European
Commission reported that Israeli-imposed restrictions on the Palestinian
economy and non-recognition of the EC-PLO Agreement were preventing
its implementation.10 More than thirteen years later, the agreement has
still not been implemented. In 2009, EU goods imported from the PA
amounted to €7 million. With total trade amounting to €71 million in
2008, the Palestinian Occupied Territories are by far the EU’s smallest
trading partner in the Mediterranean region.
The most substantial measures taken to facilitate Palestinian trade have
themselves been obliterated by military destruction or else severely
limited by restrictions. After Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, the EU
Border Assistance Mission (EU BAM) was sent to monitor and build PA
customs capacity at the Rafah border checkpoint between Egypt and
the Gaza Strip. The mission has been unable to operate since Rafah
was closed in June 2006, following the seizure of an Israeli soldier,
Gilad Shalit, by Palestinian militants aligned with Hamas. Equally,
Gaza’s EU-funded airport and seaport, which had been supposed to
offer independent access points to external trade, were both destroyed
by the Israeli army at the start of the second Intifada.
10. European Commission,
‘Commission
Communication on the
Implementation of the
Interim Agreement on
Trade and Trade-Related
Matters between the
European Community and
Israel’, Communication
of the Commission to the
Council and the European
Parliament, SEC (98) 695,
12 May 1998, pp. 12-4.
11. EuropAid, ‘Final report.
Damage assessment and
needs identification in the
Gaza Strip’, submitted by
EUNIDA, March 2009, p. 13.
48
Infrastructure financed by the European Union and its Member States that
has also been destroyed by Israel since 2000 amounts to €56.35 million
according to an estimate by EUNIDA, an association of cooperation and
development agencies. The damage suffered during Operation Cast Lead
(27 December 2008 – 18 January 18 2009) has been estimated at around
€12.35 million of this.11 The UN recently reached an agreement with
Israel on a compensation package of €10.5 million for UN buildings
destroyed by Israel during the Gaza war. But so far, the EU and its
Member States have declared no intention to claim damages for the
destruction of their infrastructure. They usually claim that these
facilities were given to the Palestinian Authority and so only the PA
has an interest in taking action.
Gaza: a bone too big to chew?
The Gaza Strip has experienced much harsher economic restrictions than
the West Bank, as a result of what recently-leaked Israeli government
documents suggest is a policy of ‘economic warfare’ aimed against the
ruling Hamas movement.12 Soon after Hamas took over the Gaza Strip
in June 2007, Israel enforced a blockade on all the Strip’s land and sea
borders. Until recently, imports from Israel stood at approximately 20
percent of pre-blockade figures, and a small range of food and hygiene
products constituted up to 90 percent of these. Exports from the Strip are
almost non-existent. In the short term, the situation suits both Hamas,
which has been consolidating its presence in Gaza, and Israel, which
has temporarily secured its borders with the Strip. The blockade has
effectively taken its 1.5 million inhabitants hostage and led to a serious
deterioration in the humanitarian situation since Operation Cast Lead.
All economic sectors have experienced a process of ‘de-development’.
Unemployment and aid dependency are increasing. Nearly 80 percent
of Gaza’s inhabitants now live on less than a dollar a day and depend
on international assistance. A black market economy has developed
around hundreds of tunnels dug under the Rafah border with Egypt.
These supply the Strip with agricultural and industrial goods upon
which Hamas imposes taxes.
On 31 May 2010, Israeli forces raided a Turkish vessel carrying activists, in
international waters, which was on its way to Gaza to deliver humanitarian
goods. Nine civilians were killed and numerous others injured. This
event propelled the unsustainable nature of the blockade back to the
top of the international agenda. Facing international pressure, the Israeli
government adopted some measures aimed at ‘easing’ the blockade by
changing its mechanism for restricting the entry of items into Gaza.
Instead of issuing a list of permissible items, it was announced that the
entry of consumer goods would now be generally allowed, except for
items prohibited for security reasons, such as cement and spare machine
parts. Dual-use construction materials for approved PA-authorised
projects under international supervision should however be enabled,
and operations at the existing land crossings – notably Kerem Shalom –
should be expanded. Nevertheless, a ban on the import of construction
material for the private sector, a ban on exports, and severe restrictions
on sea access and movement of people remain in place.13 The measures
do not represent a policy shift so much as a fine-tuning of Israel’s policy
of isolating Hamas and by extension the Gazan population.
In line with their December 2009 declaration, on 14 June 2010 EU
Foreign Ministers restated that ‘the continued policy of closure is
unacceptable and politically counterproductive’ and called for ‘an
immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the
flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from
12. Sheera Frenkel, ‘Israeli
document: Gaza blockade
isn’t about security’,
McClatchey Newspapers,
9 June 2010.
13. Prime Minister's Office
statement following the
Israeli Security Cabinet
meeting, 20 July 2010.
Available at: at http://www.
mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Communiques/2010/
Prime_Minister_Office_
statement_20-Jun-2010.htm.
49
3
Gaza’. They urged the EU High Representative to contribute concrete
and realistic options for the implementation of a mechanism based
on the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access ‘that would permit
the reconstruction of Gaza and the revival of its economy’ at the next
Foreign Affairs Council.14 This took place on 27 July but no concrete
measures came out of the meeting because of the difficulties involved
in agreeing measures that could offer 'added-value'. For the moment,
the status quo ante remains.
So far, the EU has adapted its humanitarian and financial assistance to
the people of Gaza to align with the heavy constraints imposed by the
blockade and its own policy of no contact with Hamas. Although the
EU’s contribution might have certainly helped stabilise the humanitarian
situation, both these constraints have adversely affected the EU’s capacity
to promote Palestinian development and self-determination, and have
placed the EU in a position of accommodation to what amounts to
collective punishment.
In Gaza, the EU contributes to the salaries of Palestinian teachers,
doctors, and nurses and PA officials who have not been working since
June 2007. In 2009, €22 million was allocated to the ‘Direct support
to private sector’ scheme which transits through PEGASE. These
funds were aimed at helping small businesses affected by Operation
Cast Lead to continue their activities, and thus reactivate some small
economic activity in Gaza. The European Commission is providing
humanitarian food supplies and related projects through ECHO. Even
if the current measures implemented by Israel help the EU to diversify
its humanitarian projects on the ground, these moves will not advance
long-term solutions.
14. Conclusions on Gaza,
Foreign Affairs Council,
Luxembourg, 14 June 2010.
15. See chapter by Jeroen
Gunning in this
volume, pp. 97-108.
16. Esra Bulut and Carolin
Goerzing, ‘The EU and the
Gaza Blockade: Dismantling
collective punishment;
reviving representative
peacemaking’, EUISS, Paris,
June 2010, p. 3. Available
at: www.iss.europa.eu.
50
Yet, the limited number of actions so far undertaken by the EU
in relation to Gaza illustrate the profound unease among Member
States about taking any measure that might be interpreted as giving
credit or recognition to the Hamas regime and thus undermine their
relationship with the United States and Israel, whose positions on the
recognition of Hamas remain strict. This approach has proven to be
counterproductive.15 It has left Hamas in control of a society which
has been progressively drained of alternative sources of economic
and political power. It has also deadlocked any possible negotiations
over a long-term ceasefire, the release of Gilad Shalit, and an end to
the blockade.16 If the Israeli measures do not amount to a lifting of
the blockade and if (official) international no-contact policy towards
Hamas is to be maintained, then the EU can only hope to ameliorate
the worst humanitarian symptoms of the Gazan imbroglio. It can do
nothing to revive Gaza’s economy or unpick the present gridlock in
the peace process.
Policy towards Gaza and Hamas
An initiative to help lift the blockade should be carefully thoughtthrough and implemented to avoid entrenching the logic of collective
punishment and ensure that a proper economic recovery can begin.
This will necessarily involve diplomatic persuasion and incentives to
allow exports out of Gaza, imports of construction materials for the
private sector into Gaza and the free movement of people, including
between Gaza and the West Bank. Equally, the EU should redefine its
engagement strategy with Hamas and pro-actively advance efforts for
Palestinian reconciliation. As Bulut and Goerzig argue, at the very least,
the EU could hint at how its relevant programmes might be revised in
the event of an intra-Palestinian sharing arrangement.17
Preparing for life after the Fayyad plan
Salaam Fayyad is sticking strongly to his August 2011 deadline for
creating a Palestinian state and the EU and its Member States must
prepare for the different potential scenarios that could follow. At
present, support for a UNSC resolution is not on the agenda and the
general consensus among EU Member States remains that a Palestinian
State should emerge from a negotiated process between Israel and the
Palestinians. However, this position may not be sustainable and the
EU should prepare a ‘Plan B’. By next year, the success or otherwise of
Fayyad’s strategy may be precipitating historic decisions in the PA, and
the wider Palestinian community. In the absence of reconciliation within
the Palestinian camp, a failure for Fayyad is likely to trigger a crisis
within the secular and nationalist Palestinian movements. A success may
well do the same for religious and resistance-based Palestinian forces.
Either way the EU has a stake in the outcome, because it will directly
impact on its relationships with the PA and aid efforts on the ground.
Efforts promoting Palestinian intra-reconciliation should therefore be
prioritised in order to reduce the risk of furthering divisions among
Palestinians, and further weakening the EU’s influence and credibility
in the region.
Aid reassessment
At the start of 2010, the head of the EC Technical Office in Jerusalem,
Christian Berger, declared that: ‘Support can only be sustained if there
is a clear indication that a Palestinian state will be established in the
foreseeable future … Sustaining such a high level of support for a long
period of time without reaching the goal will lead to questions, particularly
from our tax payers.’18 Indeed the situation is not sustainable and the
17. Ibid., p. 4.
18. ‘EU official to PA:
Financial support won’t
continue forever’, Haaretz,
19 January 2010.
51
3
EU cannot justify these expenditures indefinitely. The outcomes of, and
outlooks for, the EU’s aid efforts must therefore be assessed. Palestinian
dependence on European assistance is now so all-encompassing that it
is unrealistic for the EU to disengage from the Palestinian territories.
Aid should be used in a way to end the conflict rather than simply
accompany a process whereby the conflict is simply managed.19 If
EU support for Palestinian state-building is to continue, it should be
conditioned on the elimination of the obstacles to constructing a viable
a Palestinian state by all parties and stakeholders. This is the only way
to disengage from a power dynamic that renders the objectives of a
policy tool unattainable.
The EU is already financing several projects in East Jerusalem aimed
at maintaining a Palestinian presence there by reinforcing Palestinian
schools, hospitals and the legal resources available to individuals and
families facing expulsion. These projects are tailor-made to the situation
facing Palestinians in Jerusalem, but programmes following a similar
rationale could be developed in the West Bank. The EU could, for
instance, step up its efforts in the area of civilian protection and by
pushing for development projects in area C, which could for example
enable Palestinian farmers to work on their lands on the other side of
the wall by modifying the produce on these lands and thus sustain the
ability of the local population to keep their lands.
Finally, it should be noted that Palestinian self-determination is also
threatened by the fact that Palestinian communities are geographically
scattered and by the emergence of a new generation schooled in war
that is alienated from traditional Palestinian forms of political action.
The EU could work on building trans-territorial bridges between the
fragments of Palestinian society and developing programmes aimed
at enhancing human development in order to address the cultural,
psycho-social and educational needs of this generation.
Towards a rights-based approach
19. Anne Le More, ‘Between
pessimism and optimism:
EU policy options across
scenarios’, paper presented
at the EUISS Middle-East
Task Force, Paris, 2 July
2010. (Provided by the
courtesy of the author).
52
The EU alone cannot establish peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Nonetheless, third parties have a responsibility to bring conflicting
parties to an attitude of compliance with international law. It is not too
late for the EU to adopt a comprehensive strategy based on international
law and human rights. The EU’s deep involvement with Israel and the
Palestinians necessarily requires that it exercises due diligence in the
implementation of its policy towards Israel and the Palestinians and
reacts appropriately when violations of international law interfere with
or disrupt the implementation of its policy. Where such an approach is
lacking, the EU accommodates itself to the violations of international
law and indirectly facilitates their perpetuation. At the very least, such
an approach should entail for instance demands for compensation for
the destroyed infrastructure which was initially financed by the EU and
the demand for the reimbursement of all the additional cost relating to
the provision of humanitarian relief incurred as a result of the illegal
restrictions in the Occupied Territories. It should also be coupled with
efforts to maintain the principle that respect for international law,
human rights and humanitarian law is a central aspect of the IsraeliPalestinian issue.
53
Chapter 4
The conflict and EU-Israeli
relations
Nathalie Tocci
Introduction
Since the failure of the ill-fated Oslo peace process in 2000, the European
Union has conducted its bilateral relationship with Israel in pursuit of
two goals: a two-state solution in Israel and Palestine and the deepening
of cooperation between the EU and Israel. In theory, these two goals
could be mutually reinforcing. In practice however, not only the EU’s
prioritisation of cooperation with Israel has trumped its pursuit of a
two-state solution, but, more seriously, the pursuit of cooperation has
actively worked against the accomplishment of a two-state solution. By
pursuing this policy, the EU has compromised on its adherence to its
own norms and laws.
The political context: EU goals, interests
and policies regarding Israel
One of the EU’s main objectives vis-à-vis Israel is the deepening of bilateral
cooperation. The EU has expressly stated its commitment to establishing
a partnership with Israel which provides for close political and mutually
beneficial trade and investment relations, together with economic,
social, financial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation.1
The EU’s ambition in this regard is motivated by historical, political
and economic interests. Most importantly, European actors value the
development of cooperative ties with Israel in order to shed memories
of a past that represents the antithesis of the identity to which Europe
has aspired in the post-war period. The EU and specific Member States,
for evident historical reasons, are highly sensitive to Israel’s accusations
that some European countries are guilty of anti-Israeli bias, especially
given that such alleged bias is ascribed to deeply entrenched European
anti-Semitism. Israel’s diplomacy has been skilful in leveraging European
sensitivities to garner EU support for and soften EU criticism of Israel.
Beyond history, political interests also underpin Europe’s commitment
1. European Union, External
Relations, ‘Israel’. Available
at: http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/
israel/index_en.htm.
55
4
to cooperation with Israel. EU actors see in Israel a fellow member of ‘the
West’. This was the case in the Cold War era, in which political ideologies
separated the capitalist West from the Soviet or pro-Soviet East. It is all
the more so today, at a time in which civilisational prisms pitch the JudeoChristian ‘self’ against the Muslim ‘other.’ Lastly, the EU’s trade surplus
with Israel means that there are also important commercial reasons for
the development of deep and cooperative ties with Israel. As such, the
EU has been receptive to Israeli suggestions to separate ‘politics’ from
‘economics’, by compartmentalising the Arab-Israeli conflict from the
development of EU-Israel relations.2 Israel’s established, albeit partial,
democracy,3 its pro-Western outlook and its level of development have
further bolstered the case for compartmentalisation.
2. Mark Heller, ‘Israel-EU
Relations: The political
dimension’, Israeli-European
Policy Network, Meeting,
Berlin, 14 October 2004.
3. Partial democracy to the
extent that full democratic
rights and freedoms
are granted to Jewish
Israeli citizens and not to
Palestinian Israeli citizens
(not to mention Palestinians
living in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory).
4. Council of the EU,
‘Conclusions on the Middle
East Peace Process’, 2985th
Foreign Affairs Council
meeting, Brussels, 8
December 2009, para 1.
5. H R Catherine Ashton, ‘A
Commitment to Peace –
the European Union and
the Middle East,’ Speech
at the League of Arab
States, Cairo, 15 March
2010. See: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/113352.pdf.
6. European Council, ‘A
Secure Europe in a Better
World’, The European
Security Strategy, Brussels,
12 December 2003.
56
A second EU goal, which has been articulated in ever-greater detail since
the 1980 Venice Declaration, is that of a two-state solution, with the State
of Israel and an independent, democratic and viable State of Palestine
living side by side in peace and security.4 According to the EU, the State
of Palestine should comprise the West Bank, including East Jerusalem,
and the Gaza Strip, on the basis of the 1967 borders. Such a solution
would include Jerusalem as the shared capital of Israel and Palestine
and a ‘just solution’ of the refugee issue. Part and parcel of the two-state
solution is the importance of respecting human rights and international
humanitarian law (IHL). Hence, the EU’s repeated condemnations of
Palestinian suicide bombings and indiscriminate launch of rockets into
Israel, as well as of Israeli settlements, military incursions, extra-judicial
killings, restrictions on movement, house demolitions and evictions
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), the construction of a
separation barrier in the West Bank, and the closure of the Gaza Strip.
The Union has repeatedly affirmed that Israeli security and Palestinian
self-determination should be pursued exclusively within the confines
of international law. As EU High Representative Catherine Ashton has
declared: the EU supports ‘peace based on international law’.5 Beyond
vision, a two-state solution based on the respect for international law
is viewed by the EU as an integral element of its security interests. The
2003 EU Security Strategy defined a two-state solution as a ‘strategic
priority for Europe’.6 This is because the conflict is viewed as the mother
of many (albeit not all) ills in the Middle East, ranging from economic
stagnation and social unrest, which have unwanted spill-over effects
into Europe.
In order to contribute to the fulfilment of these two goals, the Union
has deployed policy instruments under two main headings. The first
heading is diplomatic, directly linked to the goal of a two-state solution
and primarily conducted in the context of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. The Union’s diplomatic role includes multilateral, bilateral
and transatlantic dimensions, such as the activities of the EU Special
Representative for the Middle East Peace Process since 1996, the EU’s
Nathalie Tocci
participation in the Middle East Quartet since 2002, individual Member
State initiatives on behalf of the EU,7 and transatlantic dialogue. The
second heading includes bilateral contractual ties with Israel and is
articulated mainly through what, up until the Lisbon Treaty, was known
as the Community pillar. EU-Israel contractual ties are primarily aimed
at fostering bilateral cooperation and are only indirectly related to the
conflict. Yet bilateral relations are in fact also highly pertinent to the
goal of pursuing a two-state solution in so far as they represent the most
important source of potential EU influence on Israel. It is to this aspect
of EU policy towards Israel that the rest of this chapter is devoted.
EU policies towards Israel and
implications for the conflict
In pursuit of the goal of deepening cooperation with Israel, the Union’s
contractual ties with Israel have been progressively upgraded since the
1960s. The EU-Israel Association Agreement, which entered into force
in 2000, is the main legal instrument of the bilateral relationship. The
Agreement is extensive and covers free trade in industrial and select
agricultural products, freedom of establishment, free movement of
capital, the harmonisation of regulatory frameworks as well as social
and cultural cooperation. The Agreement also establishes several
institutionalised forums for political dialogue: the Association Council,
the Association Committee and the Sub-Committee on Political Dialogue.
More recently, Israel has also signed additional EU agreements on
procurement, agriculture, scientific and technical cooperation, civil
aviation and the European Global Navigation Satellite System (Galileo).
It is currently negotiating participation in the European Police Office
(Europol). Finally, Israel is included in the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP), with its first Action Plan agreed in 2005. The Action
Plan for Israel is implemented and monitored under the framework of
the Association Agreement. Implementation of the EU-Israel Action
Plan has accelerated over the years, and the Plan has been awaiting an
‘upgrade’ since 2009.
EU-Israel contractual relations also hold the potential of influencing
Israeli conduct in the conflict, thus indirectly contributing to the EU
goal of a two-state solution based on respect for international law.
In principle, the EU can influence Israeli policies through political
dialogue, conditionality and law in the context of its bilateral relations.
Paradoxically, there has been an inverse correlation between the potential
effectiveness of these three methods of influence and the EU’s reliance
upon them.
7. A key case of a Member
State initiative conducted
on behalf of the EU was
France’s role during Israel’s
military offensive in the
Gaza Strip in December
2008-January 2009.
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s
activism began during the
French EU Presidency in
2008, but lasted up until and
after the Israel’s unilateral
ceasefire in January 2009,
working alongside the Czech
EU Presidency and EU
High Representative Javier
Solana, as well as Egypt and
Turkey’s mediation efforts.
57
4
EU-Israel political dialogue
8. The EU-Israel ‘upgrade’ does
foresee the establishment
of a human rights
subcommittee, alongside
a series of other upgrades
of political dialogue.
9. The ICJ’s Advisory
Opinion in July 2004 also
stated that: ‘all States are
under an obligation not
to recognise the illegal
situation resulting from the
construction of the Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem.
They are also under an
obligation not to render aid
or assistance in maintaining
the situation created by such
construction’ (para. 159).
10. EU-Israel Action Plan, 9
December 2004, pp. 3-4,
See: http://ec.europa.eu/
world/enp/pdf/action_plans/
israel_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.
11. General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC),
‘Strengthening of the EU’s
bilateral relations with its
Mediterranean partners’,
Annex: ‘Guidelines for
strengthening the political
dialogue structures with
Israel’, draft conclusions,
Brussels, 5 December 2008.
12. GAERC Press Release,
2915th meeting, Brussels,
8-9 December 2009, pp.
15-16. Palestinian Authority
(PA) Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad sent a letter in May
2008 complaining about
the proposed upgrade in
EU-Israel relations in view
of Israel’s conduct. Israel
retaliated by withholding
tax and duty payments
to the PA. Yet the French
Presidency, having secured
Israel’s participation in its
project – the Union for the
Mediterranean – decided to
proceed with the upgrade.
58
As in the case of other key neighbours, the European Union has privileged
political dialogue as a means to influence Israel. The institutional
forums for dialogue used by the EU to attempt to persuade Israel to alter
its conduct in the conflict include the Association Council, the SubCommittee on Political Dialogue, and, within it, the informal working
group on human rights. While being the EU’s preferred and most
frequently used means of influence, political dialogue has been rather
ineffective in swaying Israeli policies in the conflict. Moreover, despite
the Council’s proposal to replace the EU-Israel informal working group
on human rights with a subcommittee and the existence of equivalent
subcommittees with other EU neighbours, no such development has
taken place to date.8
EU-Israel cooperation under the ENP and
conditionality
The EU can also influence Israel through the use of positive ex ante
conditionality, by withholding promised benefits in the context of
the ENP. On the whole, the EU has been reluctant to engage in such
conditionality. Testimony to this reluctance is the fact that in December
2004 the Commission approved the Action Plan with Israel, rich
with benefits to which other neighbours could not aspire, only a few
months after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) condemned Israel’s
construction of the barrier in the West Bank.9 Within the Action Plan, the
two-state solution, human rights and international law featured only in
the context of political dialogue, in which the EU and Israel committed
to ‘facilitating efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict’ and ‘work[ing]
together to promote […] the respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law’.10 Moreover, despite Israel’s tightening grip on the
Gaza Strip and accelerating colonisation of the West Bank, the June
2008 EU-Israel Association Council declared its intention to upgrade
bilateral relations. The upgrade would entail strengthened political
dialogue and Israel’s participation in EU programmes and agencies,
integration into the single market, alignment with CFSP declarations
and démarches on an ad hoc basis, and participation in Common Security
and Defence Policy missions, as well as efforts by the EU to normalise
Israel’s role in UN bodies. Thereafter, the Council in December 2008
set out guidelines for strengthened political dialogue11 and declared its
intention to define the modalities of the upgrade by the spring of 2009.12
The strengthened political dialogue would include meetings at head of
state (i.e. summits), foreign minister and sectoral ministerial levels, as well
as ad hoc Israeli participation in the Political and Security Committee,
hearings of Israeli experts by Council working parties and committees,
strengthened inter-parliamentary dialogue, and informal exchanges on
strategic as well as human rights and anti-Semitism issues.
Nathalie Tocci
However, in response to the dramatic deterioration of the conflict as
a result of Israel’s military offensive on the Gaza Strip in December
2008-January 2009 and the Netanyahu government’s policies on
settlements and East Jerusalem in particular, the EU has temporarily
engaged in ex ante conditionality. Since 2009, the EU-Israel ‘upgrade’
process has been formally suspended. In 2008 in fact, the Council had
committed the Union to strengthening bilateral relations with Israel
upon an understanding of the parties’ ‘shared values’ of democracy,
human rights, the rule of law and IHL, and their ‘common interests
and objectives’ regarding the two-state solution. In December 2009,
the Council deemed ‘the situation on the ground’ as ‘not conducive
to the resumption of the upgrading process’.13 The formal freezing of
the upgrade process is temporary. Moreover, the EU has gone to great
lengths not to present the freeze as an act of conditionality, but rather
as a decision taken by mutual consent dictated by existing political
conditions.14 In fact, cooperation between the EU and Israel deepened
in 2009, as attested by the fact that the two signed a new agricultural
agreement in November 2009 and negotiated an agreement foreseeing
Israel’s participation in Europol. This ‘business as usual’ nature of
EU-Israel relations since 2009 has meant that the postponement of
the upgrade has not entirely restored the EU’s credibility, particularly
tarnished in the eyes of the Palestinian and the international human
rights community following the restoration of EU-Israel relations in
2003-2004 despite the aggravation of the conflict. Nonetheless, the
postponement of the upgrade has indicated that the Union has refrained
from entirely ‘compartmentalising’ the conflict from the development
of EU-Israel cooperation. By doing so the EU has not necessarily had
an impact on the conflict. But it has at least marginally restored the
self-inflicted reputational blow caused by its reaction to Operation Cast
Lead in Gaza.15
EU-Israel cooperation and the respect for European
and international law
A third channel of EU influence on Israel relies on the application
of European and international law. In principle, the EU could
withdraw benefits that have been granted to Israel in the context of
bilateral agreements in the event of a material breach thereof (ex post
conditionality). In practice, however, the Union has expressly stated
its preference for ‘constructive engagement’ with Israel, as with other
southern Mediterranean countries. The EU has never contemplated
the partial or total suspension of the Association Agreement (or any
other agreement) despite the grave human rights and international law
violations perpetrated by Israel. More so than in the case of ex ante
conditionality, the EU has persistently shied away using this channel of
influence, turning a blind eye to Israel’s behaviour or seeking politically
Staff Working Document,
Accompanying the
Communication from
the Commission to the
European Parliament and the
Council, ‘Taking stock of the
European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP)’, Implementation
of the European Neighbourhood
Policy in 2009: Progress
Report Israel, COM(2010)
207, 12 May 2010, p. 2.
14. Tovah Lazaroff, ‘Israel’s EU
upgrade to be put off again’,
Jerusalem Post, 13 May 2010.
15. Euro-Mediterranean
Human Rights Network,
Active but Acquiescent: The
EU’s Response to the Israeli
Military Offensive in the Gaza
Strip, May 2009. Available
at: http://www.emhrn.net.
59
4
non-confrontational deals to manage legal problems between itself
and Israel.
The legal basis to exert ex post conditionality is twofold. First and most
frequently cited, is Article 2, better known as the ‘human rights clause’,
which, alongside Article 79 (the ‘non-execution’ clause), entitles the EU
to partially or totally suspend the Association Agreement in the event of
a serious breach of human rights and democratic principles. The human
rights clause grants the EU a right, but not an obligation, to suspend
the agreement in the event of a breach of Article 2. Consequently, EU
actors have consistently refused to invoke ‘non-execution’ clauses to deal
with human rights non-compliance in the Mediterranean, including in
Israel and the OPT. The human rights clauses have been used rather as
a basis to engage in human rights political dialogues with the southern
neighbours.
16. Article 1 of the 4th Geneva
Convention prevents any
state or their nationals
from participating in, or
facilitating, any violation of
the Convention. Regarding
the implications for
Israel, see footnote 9.
17. Euro-Mediterranean Human
Rights Network, A Human
Rights Review on the EU
and Israel, Mainstreaming
or Selectively Extinguishing
Human Rights?, December
2005; Euro-Mediterranean
Human Rights Network,
Third Annual Review on
Human Rights in EU-Israel
Relations, Accommodating to
the ‘special’ case of Israel, June
2007. Available at http://
en.euromedrights.org/index.
php/publications/emhrn_
publications/index.1.html.
18. Official Journal of the
European Union, Judgment
of the Court (Fourth
Chamber) of 25 February
2010 (reference for a
preliminary ruling from the
Finanzgericht Hamburg –
Germany) – Brita GmbH v
Hauptzollamt HamburgHafen, 17 April 2010.
Available at: http://eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:20
10:100:0004:0005:EN:PDF.
60
Second and most important, are the EU’s legal obligations stemming from
European and international law. As far as EU law is concerned, Article 83
and Protocol 4 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement define the territory
lawfully covered by the Agreement: the State of Israel. Unlike Israel and
based on international law, the EU considers this territory to exclude the
land occupied in 1967. As far as international law is concerned, the EU
and its Member States have the duty of ‘non-recognition’: they cannot
recognise, aid or assist Israel’s violations of IHL.16 Hence, they must
refrain from granting benefits to and cooperating with Israeli actors and
actions in violation of IHL in the context of contractual relations. The
different understandings between the EU and Israel on the territorial
scope of EU-Israel cooperation and the EU’s legal obligations in the
framework of European and international law have led to a series of legal
problems across different policy areas, all of which can be traced back
to the same root: the EU’s tendency to accommodate Israeli policies that
contravene IHL, to the extent of risking breaching its own law. Three
examples illustrate this point.
The most well-known example is the dispute over the preferential export
of Israeli goods produced in settlements.17 As mentioned above, the
territorial scope of EU-Israel agreements is limited to the ‘territory of
the State of Israel’. As such and as reaffirmed by the European Court of
Justice in 2010, the EU cannot grant preferential treatment to products
wholly produced or substantially processed in Israeli settlements.18 Israel
however determines the origin of its exports in a manner that does not
distinguish between production carried out within its borders and in
the Occupied Territories, in accordance with its domestic legislation
and its differing interpretation of public international law. This has
resulted in the EU’s inability to prevent the preferential treatment of
settlement products exported by Israel under the Agreement. The EU
has recognised the need to rectify the situation. In February 2005 the
Nathalie Tocci
EU and Israel agreed on a ‘technical arrangement’, whereby Israel would
name the locality of production on the origin certificates of its products
and EU customs officers could reject unilaterally Israeli certificates of
origin. The EU acknowledges that the technical arrangement does not
represent a solution, but only a way to manage the problem. Practically,
the technical arrangement has enabled EU customs to refuse preferential
treatment to detected settlement exports. However, detected settlement
exports represent only a fraction of exports from settlements. The
technical arrangement also places the onus on Member State customs
services to detect such products and refuse to grant them preferential
treatment. Moreover, under the technical arrangement Israel continues
to apply the Agreement to the Occupied Territories and issue proofs of
origin accordingly. Israel has not been required by the EU to acknowledge
officially that products produced in settlements do not originate in Israel.
Until the EU considers it appropriate to launch an arbitration procedure,
its customs services will thus have to bear the burden of preventing
the preferential importation of settlement products without relying on
Israel’s correct issuance of proofs of origin and verification replies. In
order to ensure that the technical arrangement functions properly, this
entails inspecting each and every proof of origin, a highly burdensome
and costly practice particularly for large importing Member States. To
say nothing of the disrepute, this is the tangible price that the EU must
pay to rectify the deficiencies in the implementation of European law
that result from the accommodation of Israel’s policies in the context
of the Agreement.
Another example concerns the irregularities within EU-Israel cooperation
in the area of research and development. Israel has been associated to
the EU’s Framework Programmes for Research and Development since
1996. As in the case of trade, only legal entities within the State of Israel
are entitled to benefit from EU research funds. Yet Israeli entities within
the Occupied Territories, in accordance with Israel’s legislation, consider
themselves as eligible to participate in the Framework Programme. Under
the 5th and 6th Framework Programmes, several settlement companies
benefited from EU funds.19 Under the 7th Framework Programme the
Commission did attempt to rectify the situation, but it did not consider
and act upon the fact that entities that are legally established in the
territory of the State of Israel but are physically based in settlements
are also not eligible for EU funds.20 By November 2009, over 700 Israeli
research entities had been selected for funding under FP7.21 The EU is
unable to ascertain whether all are actually located within the territory
of the State of Israel.
A final example concerns Europol. The EU and Israel have drafted
an agreement foreseeing Israel’s cooperation with Europol, aimed at
combating international crime through the exchange of information and
contacts. A set of problems, echoing those of trade and research, affects
19. Euro-Mediterranean Human
Rights Network, A Human
Rights Review on the EU and
Israel, op. cit. in note 18;
Ibid., Third Annual Review
on Human Rights in EU-Israel
Relations, op. cit. in note 17.
20. ‘Suggested Amendments by
Aprodev to the “Regulation of
the European Parliament and
of the Council laying down
the rules for the participation
of undertakings, research
centres and universities in
actions under the Seventh
Framework Programme
and for the dissemination
of research results (20072013)”, August 2006.
21. European Commission,‘Staff
Working Document’, op.
cit. in note 13, p. 16.
61
4
the territorial scope of the agreement. The Israel National Police would
act as the ‘contact point’ for Europol. Yet the Police is headquartered
in East Jerusalem, placing Europol in contravention of its duty not to
recognise an act deriving from Israel’s unilateral annexation of East
Jerusalem. Likewise, Europol could not lawfully store information
obtained either by Israeli authorities operating in the territories that
it has illegally annexed (East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) or
from non-Israeli nationals transferred from the Occupied Territories
to detention centres in Israel. However, in all the agreements between
the EU and third states, the EU often explicitly relies on the third state
to implement the provisions of the agreement ‘in accordance with the
provisions of [its] domestic law’.22 If this agreement were to do likewise,
Europol would be unable to prevent itself from storing information
obtained by Israeli authorities operating in the Occupied Territories,
given that Israel itself does not distinguish between the Occupied
Territories and its internationally recognised territory.
In conducting bilateral relations with Israel, the EU has pursued two goals:
cooperation with Israel and a two-state solution based on international
law. These two goals need not be incompatible. Yet an analysis of EU
policies reveals that EU actors themselves have implicitly considered
them as such, in turn prioritising cooperation over a two-state solution.
The EU has privileged political dialogue as a means to influence Israel’s
actions in the conflict. Despite its ineffectiveness, this is primarily
because dialogue is itself a form of cooperation. Indeed, one of the most
valued aspects of the ‘upgrade’ of bilateral relations for Israel is precisely
a deepening of political dialogue between the EU and Israel.
Within the ENP, ex ante conditionality has rarely been used, leading at
times to the deepening of EU-Israel cooperation precisely as and when the
conflict deteriorated. Notwithstanding, the postponement of the ‘upgrade’
with Israel could be viewed as a form of ex ante conditionality, which has
restored some credibility to EU policies in the region following Operation
Cast Lead. However, the EU has emphasised the consensual dimension
of the postponement, repeatedly stating that it was not intended as a
‘punishment’ on Israel. Despite the formal postponement, EU-Israel
cooperation in practice has proceeded and deepened unhindered.
22. See for example Article 18,
Protocol 4 of the EU-Israel
Association Agreement.
62
Most seriously, the EU has tended to view the application of European
and international law that seeks to uphold its goal of a two-state
solution as incompatible with its pursuit of cooperation with Israel. In
other words, it has chosen to consider measures to ensure the respect
for law as ‘punishments’, which detract from EU-Israel cooperation.
Nathalie Tocci
The examples discussed above in the domains of trade, research and
police cooperation all exemplify how this has led to legal problems
in which the EU has risked the distortion of its own law and practice
to accommodate illegal Israeli policies. In doing so, the EU has also
signalled to Israel that the law is up for political bargaining, fostering
a culture of impunity in the context of the conflict.
Yet in fact, the application of the law is not incompatible with cooperation
with Israel. On the contrary, rules and laws are what make cooperation
between the EU and any third state, including Israel, possible. It is by
recognising and acting upon this reality – by rectifying the aforementioned
legal problems and inserting safeguard mechanisms to ensure that no
further irregularities arise in future spheres of EU-Israel cooperation –
rather than viewing the application of the law as an undue ‘punishment’,
that the EU could reconcile the two goals driving its bilateral ties to
Israel. By doing so the EU would not, alone, achieve the fulfilment of
a two-state solution. But it would contribute to establishing the rights
and law-based international conditions which are imperative for such
a solution to be accomplished.
63
Chapter 5
The Middle East conflict,
transatlantic ties and the
Quartet
Daniel Möckli
Introduction
The transatlantic relationship has traditionally represented a key
dimension of the EU approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although
the EU regards Middle East peace as a strategic priority, many Member
States consider sound ties to Washington just as important – or even
much more so. One major lesson the Europeans have learnt since the
1970s is that the pursuit of alternative policies that overtly challenge
US positions has proved counterproductive and undermined their own
cohesion. Together with the continuing difficulty of gaining recognition
as a relevant actor in Middle East diplomacy, this has prompted the EU
to seek to influence US policy as an indirect way of bringing European
thinking into the management and resolution of the conflict.
For the EU, becoming a member of the Middle East Quartet in 2002
alongside the US, Russia, and the UN was important in this regard, as
it has provided for institutionalised coordination with Washington on
the conflict. Yet, during the Bush presidency the balance sheet of the
Quartet was mixed at best. There was a common Quartet approach in
the form of the Roadmap that comprised important European positions.
However, the US also prompted the EU to take up policies that deviate
from previous European principles and that have done little to advance
peace. Moreover, during the Bush years, the EU was caught up in US
inaction or was asked to provide cover for what essentially constituted
US unilateral actions more than once.
The impact of the EU on Middle East diplomacy has not significantly
increased since the coming to power of US President Obama in 2009.
Nevertheless, there has been a period of unprecedented transatlantic
convergence concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict recently, as Obama’s
approach has actually been substantially in line with European thinking.
In the absence of sustainable progress towards a two-state solution,
65
5
difficult questions will however have to be addressed by the EU and the
US that potentially could both weaken European cohesion and cause
transatlantic strains. These questions comprise substantive issues as
well as the future roles of the EU and the Quartet.
From conflict to limited cooperation
European-US relations vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict have evolved in
three stages. During the Cold War, there were predominantly divergent
approaches, and a great deal of transatlantic tension. The 1990s were
marked by complementary approaches, with significantly less strain
on relations. Finally, since the launch of the Quartet in 2002, the idea
has been to pursue coordinated approaches, based on institutionalised
transatlantic cooperation, with varying degrees of success.1
Having consulted on the Arab-Israeli conflict ever since European
Political Cooperation was set up in 1970, the Europeans issued their first
substantive joint declaration in the context of the October War in 1973.
Greatly concerned about the US piecemeal (country-by-country and
issue-by-issue) approach to the search for peace, the then EC members
called for a comprehensive solution to be worked out under the auspices
of the UN and for Israel to ‘end the territorial occupation’.2 This resulted
in the biggest transatlantic clash over the Middle East conflict to this day,
with neither the US nor Israel approving of a European role in Middle
East diplomacy.
1. See Daniel Möckli and
Victor Mauer (eds.),
European-American Relations
and the Middle East: From Suez
to Iraq (London: Routledge,
2010). On transatlantic
relations and the Middle East
conflict, see also Costanza
Musu, European Union Policy
Towards the Arab-Israeli
Peace Process (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
2. Christopher Hill and
Karen E. Smith (eds.),
European Foreign Policy:
Key Documents (London:
Routledge, 2000), pp. 300ff.
3. Ibid., pp. 303ff.
66
With the exception of a brief moment of transatlantic convergence
in 1977, when President Carter embraced European positions on the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the period between 1974 and 1989 remained
marked by European-US disagreements as to how to advance peace.
These disagreements came to be epitomised by the two approaches of
‘Camp David’ and ‘Venice’. The US-sponsored bilateral peace deal of
1978/79 between Israel and Egypt reflected an incrementalist approach
that, in hindsight and despite rhetoric to the contrary, resulted in the
Palestinian issue being sidelined in US policy during much of the 1980s.
Conversely, the EC Venice Declaration of 1980 stressed the Palestinian
right of self-determination and made the case for associating the PLO
with the search for a comprehensive peace, calling Israeli settlements
in the Occupied Territories ‘a serious obstacle to the peace process’ and
‘illegal under international law’.3 Eager to avoid another transatlantic
clash, the Europeans took US concerns into account this time, watering
down their early Venice drafts significantly.
Transatlantic relations improved once efforts towards a peace process
were underway in the 1990s. US peace efforts that resulted in the Madrid
Daniel Möckli
Conference of 1991 were strongly supported by the Europeans, despite
the fact that the EC did not have a seat at the table. Both the EU and
the US also came to support the Oslo Accords of 1993, which had been
secretly worked out without their involvement. At this stage Europeans
came to subscribe to an implicit division of labour with the US. Leaving
diplomacy to Washington, they focused instead on regional cooperation,
economic peacebuilding, and Palestinian institution-building, with a
view to providing the structural conditions for sustainable peace.
Still, as the Oslo process gradually broke down towards the end of the
1990s, transatlantic disenchantment resurfaced. Considering the US
to be too lenient on Israel and too focused on facilitation rather than
robust mediation, many Europeans called once more for an EU seat at
the diplomatic table. Their claim seemed all the more justified given that
the EU had become the main donor of the peace process and since the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) allowed it to expand
its capacity as a diplomatic actor in the Middle East.
The Quartet and US post-9/11 priorities
With the founding of the Middle East Quartet in Madrid in 2002, the US
acknowledged that the EU had a role to play in Middle East diplomacy.
Bringing together the US Secretary of State, the Russian foreign minister,
the UN Secretary-General, and the EU (then represented by the High
Representative, the External Relations Commissioner and the rotating
presidency), the creation of this forum provided for institutionalised
EU-US consultations on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, albeit in a
broader international framework. However, as the Europeans soon
came to realise, the relevance of this platform for Washington has
varied greatly according to specific US needs. Overall, the Quartet has
represented much less of a shift in the EU role from ‘payer’ to ‘player’
than many initially hoped.4
A major success for the EU during the Bush presidency was the Roadmap
that the Quartet officially presented to Palestinian and Israeli leaders
in April 2003. The Roadmap endorsed many European positions, with
the EU and some of its Member States playing an important role in
drafting it. Procedurally, it gave the EU a major stake in Middle Eastern
diplomacy in that it tasked the Quartet with evaluating the performance
of the parties in terms of implementation.5
Yet, the Roadmap also reflected a major weakness of the Quartet.
Linking the EU with the State Department rather than the White
House, this forum provides no direct access to what has traditionally
been the most important US policymaking body concerning the ArabIsraeli conflict. With Bush supporting Israel’s robust policy against
the Palestinian militants as part of his own global ‘war against terror’,
4. On the Quartet during the
Bush period, see Costanza
Musu, ‘The Middle East
Quartet: A New Role for
Europe?’, in Möckli and
Mauer, op. cit. in note 1.
5. Muriel Asseburg, ‘The
EU and the Middle East
Conflict: Tackling the
Main Obstacle to EuroMediterranean Partnership’,
Mediterranean Politics vol. 8,
no. 2, 2003, pp. 174-93.
67
5
there was little presidential commitment to the Roadmap. Although the
Quartet ‘expressed concern’ in numerous declarations about the lack of
progress in implementing the Roadmap, the EU once more ended up
with a declaratory policy that had little impact on the ground.
As Bush was preoccupied with Iraq, there was little meaningful
Quartet activity for several years after 2003. In those cases where the
Bush administration did deal with the Palestinian issue, it often acted
unilaterally, using the Quartet selectively and primarily with a view
to getting multilateral backing for its own policies. Such was the case
with the appointment of Tony Blair as Quartet Representative in June
2007. Another example was the Annapolis process, launched a few
months later, with the US rather than the Quartet being tasked with
monitoring progress.
Moreover, during the Bush years, the US arguably managed to influence
EU policy more than see its own policies influenced by the Europeans.
The prime example in this regard concerns the Western response to the
surprise election victory of Hamas in 2006. As Washington and Brussels
turned the three Quartet ‘principles’6 for engagement into ‘conditions’,
the Europeans came to subscribe to a policy of isolating Hamas that
undermined their democracy-promotion agenda and marked a shift away
from their previous inclusive approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On
the comparable question of how to deal with the PLO in the 1980s, the
Europeans had opted for informal pragmatic contacts so as to try and
moderate the positions and behaviour of this organisation, whereas the
US had made dialogue conditional on the PLO’s transformation.
6. The three principles concern
Hamas commitment to
non-violence, recognition
of Israel, and acceptance
of previous agreements
and obligations, including
the Roadmap. See also the
chapter by Jeroen Gunning
in this volume, pp. 97-108.
7. Alvaro de Soto, ‘End of
Mission Report’, May
2007, published by the
Guardian at: image.guardian.
co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/
documents/2007/06/12/
DeSotoReport.pdf.
68
The EU shift on this matter in 2006 reflected a change in the character of
the Quartet, which was now promoting sanctions as much as negotiations.
Such change led to the resignation of the UN envoy of the Quartet, who
argued that the Quartet had become a ‘group of friends of the US’ and
that the format was more about managing transatlantic relations than
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.7 It also prompted Russia to go its
own way and talk to Hamas, which raised questions as to the cohesion
of the Quartet.
Although many European policy-makers may have been uneasy about
US policy on the Middle East conflict during the Bush presidency, they
largely refrained from challenging it. This was above all because the
Europeans were careful not to provoke another crisis with Washington
over the Middle East after the fall-out over Iraq in 2002/03 that had
done so much damage to intra-European cohesion as well as to EU-US
relations. Although the Bush administration nominally came to subscribe
to a two-state solution as well as institutionalised consultations with the
EU and other external actors, these were overall lost years in terms of
advancing peace, with transatlantic cooperation remaining limited.
Daniel Möckli
Obama playing an EU tune
Since the coming into office of the Obama administration in early 2009,
the degree of transatlantic convergence over the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict has reached an all-time high point.8 Obama has come to embrace
positions long held dear by the EU. The strong sense of transatlantic
consensus has failed to translate into sustainable progress on the ground,
however. Although the US is currently attributing higher priority to the
Arab-Israeli issue than often before, the local capacity for resolving the
conflict is distinctly limited, with the peace camp in Israel marginalised
and the Palestinians deeply divided. This raises difficult questions for
Washington as well as Brussels.
Not since Jimmy Carter has a US president invested so much in advancing
peace in the Middle East so early in his term. Declaring a resolution
of the Arab-Israeli conflict a vital national security interest for the US,
Obama has subscribed to the view held by many of his advisers and
some of his generals that this conflict foments anti-American sentiment,
weakens moderate regimes in the Arab world and makes it more
difficult for the US to advance its interests in the wider Middle East.9
This is very much in line with the EU, which regards the resolution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict as a precondition for solving other problems
in the Middle East.10
Obama’s efforts to shift US mediation to a less pro-Israel bias and a
more impartial position also correspond with European thinking.
Rarely has a US president expressed so much empathy for the plight of
the Palestinians as Obama did during his Cairo speech in June 2009.
Furthermore, not since the days of former Secretary of State James
Baker has the US made such far-reaching public demands of Israel, with
Obama’s repeated and insistent calls for a comprehensive settlement
freeze causing severe strains in the US-Israeli relationship.11
While critics accuse Obama of having wasted much time wrestling with
the government of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu over settlements,
the EU fully supported the Obama approach. In her own Cairo speech
in March 2010, EU High Representative Ashton called the settlements
illegal and argued that they constitute an obstacle to peace and make
a two-state solution impossible.12 Although Obama has declared the
settlements ‘illegitimate’ rather than ‘illegal’ and only managed to talk
Israel into a partial and temporary freeze, the EU was pleased to see
that he showed some persistence on the issue. There was a strong US
reaction to the Israeli housing announcement concerning East Jerusalem
during the visit of Vice President Biden in March 2010. Once the Obama
administration had succeeded in launching direct peace talks in early
September 2010, it also tried hard to talk Israel into a new temporary
8. Rosemary Hollis,
‘European Responses
to Obama’s Middle East
Policy’, FRIDE Policy Brief
no.38, February 2010.
9. See, for example, the
statement of General
Petraeus before the
Senate Armed Services
Committee, 16 March
2010. Available at: http://
armed-services.senate.gov/
statemnt/2010/03%20March/
Petraeus%2003-16-10.pdf.
10. European Council, ‘A
Secure Europe in a Better
World’, The European
12 December 2003.
11. Daniel Möckli, ‘US Foreign
Policy: New Approaches
and Old Problems in
Afghanistan and the Middle
East’, in Strategic Trends
2010: Key Developments
in Global Affairs (Zurich:
CSS, 2010). Available
at: www.sta.ethz.ch.
12. ‘A Commitment to Peace
– the European Union
and the Middle East’, 15
March 2010. Available at:
www.eeas.europa.eu.
69
5
settlement freeze to get these talks going, although it seemed to refrain
from applying pressure when Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to
comply. With regard to Jerusalem, the EU again goes further than the
US in explicitly declaring that Jerusalem should be the capital of both
states.13 Still, the EU could note that Obama has at least urged a halt
of any Israeli activity that may predetermine the issue of Palestine’s
future capital.
If Obama has in many ways played a European tune in his approach
to the Arab-Israeli conflict so far, it is worth noting that he has largely
done so without the EU orchestra. This is reflective of his larger foreign
policy, where Europe plays a very limited role. Indeed, Obama’s ‘EUtype’ positions on the conflict may not even have been influenced by
the Europeans. Be that as it may, the EU has still been right to support
his approach. In contrast to the Bush period, Quartet partners are now
regularly being informed by the US about its next steps. Moreover, the
EU is well aware that if anyone can achieve progress at this stage, it is
the US. Still, in view of the early breakdown of the direct peace talks
in the autumn of 2010 and the dire situation on the ground, there is a
need for deeper EU-US dialogue on how to proceed in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
The transatlantic agenda: difficult
decisions ahead
There are six major issues concerning Middle East diplomacy that the
US and the EU will have to address with some urgency: (i) the scope for
more robust mediation; (ii) Palestinian reconciliation and relations with
Hamas; (iii) the EU-US position on a potential Palestinian declaration
of statehood; (iv) the credibility of their policies on the settlement issue;
(v) relations with Syria, and (vi) the future roles of the EU and the
Quartet. Given the sensitivity of these issues, close EU-US consultation
and coordination is vital here, although this does not preclude some
unilateral European measures.
More robust mediation?
13. Council Conclusions on
the Middle East Peace
Process, 8 December 2009.
70
There is little doubt that the peace process can only be translated into
meaningful results today if there is more robust international mediation.
This may include an external peace plan identifying the major parameters
of compromise, as long advocated by some of Obama’s advisers. And it
certainly would entail close monitoring of how any deal is implemented,
coupled with the willingness to impose costs if agreed measures are not
undertaken. After admitting that he had overestimated the US capacity
Daniel Möckli
to persuade Israel and the Palestinians to pursue reconciliatory policies,
Obama will now have to balance domestic and strategic considerations
carefully in deciding how to proceed. Should he choose to go for more
pressure and conditionality, he is bound to face further tensions with
Israel – as well as growing criticism from within the US Congress.
Should he decide against such a strategy, progress towards peace will
become ever more unlikely, with more instability looming. Although
the pendulum has swung in direction of the latter scenario in the course
of 2010, Obama’s stance in 2011 remains to be seen.
As for the EU, High Representative Ashton has suggested that European
involvement in the search for peace could be stepped up by supporting
the parties in their negotiations, extending the package of assistance,
considering further political, financial and security guarantees, and
developing a closer partnership with the US and a reinvigorated Quartet.
With regard to this last point, Ashton has called for regular Quartet
meetings that ought to be ‘designed to support and monitor the peace
process’ and to ‘give impetus to frame strong terms of reference for
the negotiations to set benchmarks for progress, and assess Roadmap
compliance’.14
Significant though this offer of support may be, the EU will have to
be careful what it wishes for. For one thing, it is far from clear that
pushing parties into an agreement would bring peace any closer.
Furthermore, even if Obama chose to go down that road, there is no
consensus within the EU that a tougher line towards Israel would be
the right way forward. Robust mediation most likely would have to be
a unilateral US endeavour, supported perhaps by some EU Member
States. Alternatively, the price attached to non-compliance would have
to be so low to gain EU-wide approval that the approach might not be
robust enough to bring about sustainable results.
Palestinian reconciliation: rethinking Hamas policy
Domestic political constellations in the region and in the US provide
difficult ground for peace talks to succeed at this stage. While there is
a possibility that such talks may yet translate into a two-state solution
precisely because expectations are so low on all sides, the chances of
disruption and failure are high. In this case, Washington and Brussels
should think about focusing on Palestinian reconciliation before pushing
peace negotiations again. Doing both simultaneously may not be feasible.
A shift of priorities may become urgent as intra-Palestinian divisions
deepen. There is of course a risk that any unity government would
be dominated by Hamas. Still, with PA President Abbas and Fatah
weakened, and Palestinian institutions suffering from a legitimacy
deficit in the absence of elections, the potential of the current approach
of ‘negotiations first and reconciliation later’ appears limited.
14. ‘A Commitment to Peace’,
op. cit. in note 12.
71
5
Advocating reconciliation makes little sense without a more pragmatic
Western approach towards Hamas, however. The policy of isolating
Hamas has not only contributed to the Palestinian split, but it has also
strengthened the radical elements within the Islamist movement and
provided the basis for the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza. Although
the EU and the US asked Israel to ease its closure as early as 2008 and
have pushed the Netanyahu government to change its policy following
the deadly flotilla incident in May 2010,15 they have shied away from
rethinking their own Hamas approach so far. Expectations at the onset
of the Obama presidency that the US might move towards dialogue with
Hamas analogous to its policy change on Iran proved premature.
The fact is that without some sort of engagement with Hamas, neither
a sustained opening of border crossings in Gaza nor Palestinian
reconciliation nor durable progress towards a two-state solution seems
possible. Merely wishing that Hamas would disappear and calling
for the PA to be reinstated in Gaza will not suffice as a strategy. By
contrast, involving Hamas in dialogue may actually foster the group’s
moderation and eventually help to make it part of the solution.16 The
EU and the US should think about softening their conditions and
making Hamas’s recognition of Israel and of previous agreements a
condition for the successful completion of negotiations rather than for
starting talks. Although modifying the conditions does entail risks, it
also provides new opportunities – which is a major difference to the
policy pursued so far.17
A transatlantic position on Palestinian statehood
15. For the EU, see Council
Conclusions on Gaza,
14 June 2010; Bernard
Kouchner, Franco Frattini,
and Miguel Angel Moratinos,
‘Averting Another Gaza’, New
York Times, 10 June 2010.
16. For a more detailed
discussion, see the chapter
by Jeroen Gunning in
this volume, pp. 97-108.
See also Daniel Möckli,
‘Switzerland's Controversial
Middle East Policy’, CSS
Analysis in Security Policy
no. 35, June 2008.
17. Carolin Goerzig,
‘Engaging Hamas:
Rethinking the Quartet
Principles’, ISS Opinion,
March 2010. Available
at: www.iss.europa.eu
72
The third item on the transatlantic agenda concerns the two-year plan
of Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad of building the apparatus of a
Palestinian state by summer 2011, which has gained much support from
both the EU and the US. There has indeed been some improvement in
the services provided by the PA, especially as far as fiscal practices and
security in the West Bank are concerned. Yet, it would be misleading
to view the Fayyad Plan as merely a technical exercise. In the absence
of a political agreement on a two-state solution, it is conceivable that
Fayyad may unilaterally declare Palestinian statehood in 2011.
Such a move, which would likely be opposed by Israel and some elements
of the Palestinian polity, could split the EU and arouse transatlantic
controversy. While some Eastern European countries had already
recognised the Palestinian state prior to entering the EU, others are
pushing to do so now, with a third group sticking with the Oslo paradigm
of a negotiated settlement as the only way forward. If the transatlantic
and European disunity witnessed over the recent question of the
independence of Kosovo is to be avoided, the EU and the US would be
well advised to prepare for such a scenario before it materialises.
Daniel Möckli
Settlements: backing up statements with practice
Preserving and enhancing the capacity to influence local dynamics
should remain an EU-US priority. The credibility of the EU and the
US as peacemakers will depend to no little extent on their ability and
willingness both to defend their views on final status issues and to make
sure these issues remain resolvable. A prime test in this regard concerns
the settlement issue. The EU and the US will have to find an adequate
response if their calls for continuing the freeze have been ignored. In
addition, the EU should become stricter in practice in denying preferential
treatment to settlement products.18 Some have also made the case for
the EU to enhance its visibility in East Jerusalem. In the case of the
US, there have been suggestions that the Treasury ought to rethink its
policy of exempting donations to settlements from tax.
Engaging Syria
Beyond the issue of Palestine, Syria is the most pressing issue concerning
the Arab-Israeli conflict for the EU and the US to address. As a result of
Syria’s continuing involvement in Lebanese affairs and its close ties to
Iran, Brussels and Washington have pursued a policy of distance vis-à-vis
Damascus. The EU still has no Association Agreement with Syria. And
while Obama has intensified US diplomatic contacts with the Syrian
leadership, he has also decided to continue the US sanctions approach.
Yet, with other players such as Turkey, Qatar and Russia moving into the
vacuum, there is evidence of a new ‘axis of influence’ emerging around
Syria that is based on pragmatic commercial cooperation and a political
agenda that challenges key Western policies.19 If the US and the EU are
not to lose further geopolitical ground in the region, they will have to
consider ways of providing Syria with an alternative alignment option,
which would also have to include the prospect of peace with Israel.
The roles of the EU and the Quartet
With so many pressing substantive issues on the table, the question
arises which future roles the EU and the Quartet will have in Middle
East diplomacy. To start with the former, the time does not seem ripe
for any unilateral EU diplomatic initiatives. As long as Obama stays
engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU should focus on consulting
and coordinating with Washington and backing up US diplomacy.
There is certainly scope for unilateral EU measures in fields such as
its policy on settlements or its approach towards Syria. The EU should
also continue its efforts to strengthen Palestinian institutions and the
economy. But when it comes to diplomacy, the priority should be on
orchestrating common transatlantic positions, particularly on the issues
outlined above.
18. See the chapter by
Nathalie Tocci in this
volume, pp. 55-63.
19. Alastair Crook, ‘The
Shifting Sands of State Power
in the Middle East’, The
Washington Quarterly, vol.
33, no. 3, 2010, pp. 7–20.
73
5
As for the Quartet, where the EU has moved from triple to single
representation post-Lisbon, its relevance is unlikely to increase
significantly due to its heterogeneous membership. Still, not least
because of the legitimacy provided by the UN, it continues to have its
purpose, if mainly to place US initiatives on a multilateral foundation.
It cannot however make up for the lack of an EU-US coordination
scheme that would provide for regular and structured, rather than just
institutionalised, consultations.
Regarding the operational dimension of the Quartet, the performance
of Quartet Representative Tony Blair and his small team in facilitating
Palestinian economic development is subject to controversy. Critics argue
that Blair has achieved little and is overemphasising his own share in
the recent growth of the Palestinian economy. Those more favourable
towards Blair insist that he has done important work behind the scenes,
both in terms of improved movement and access and relating to Israel’s
easing the Gaza blockade. The fact is that there is a lack of transparency
concerning the work of the Quartet Representative, with the website of
Blair’s office being the only public source of information.20 If the Quartet
is serious about an operational role, a less personalised approach may
strengthen its credibility.
In the evolution of the EU as an actor in Middle East diplomacy, relations
with the US have been fundamental. They have constituted a red line
in the sense that the EU has come to acknowledge the infeasibility
of pursuing alternative strategies if these are seen in Washington as
undermining US interests. But transatlantic relations have also proven
to be a means for the EU to acquire a seat at the diplomatic table and
bring in its own ideas of how to advance peace.
20. http://www.tonyblairoffice.
org/quartet/.
21. Quoted in Daniel Möckli,
European Foreign Policy during
the Cold War (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2009), p. 233.
74
Although there has been remarkably little transatlantic friction on the
Arab-Israeli conflict since Obama moved into the White House, there
is need for a regular EU-US dialogue to complement present Quartet
activities. With the US stuck and new players rising in the region, it will
be vital for the EU and US to come up with a coordinated position and
creative thinking on delicate issues such as Palestinian reconciliation
or the scenario of a unilateral declaration on Palestinian statehood.
Convincing Washington of its usefulness may be a major challenge for
the EU, requiring above all significant progress in ensuring internal
cohesion. But, as Henry Kissinger already noted in the aftermath of
the October War, mediation in the Middle East is a ‘heart-breaking,
miserable, dirty business’21 – which is why Obama may well appreciate
more EU input in helping to find a viable path to peace.
Chapter 6
EU crisis management in the
Arab-Israeli conflict
Muriel Asseburg
Introduction
In recent years, the EU and its Member States have become involved in
crisis mediation and management in the Arab-Israeli arena. Above all,
they have deployed two CSDP missions to the Palestinian territories
and have strongly participated in an upgraded United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). They have also engaged in attempts at
conflict resolution, in particular as part of the Middle East Quartet.
In doing so, Europeans have accepted the US lead and toed its policy
line. While their mediation activities in the Arab-Israeli conflict have at
times helped to avert violent escalation, they have not assumed a role of
consistent early warning and crisis mediation to prevent the repeated
outbreak of violence and war. European presence on the ground has,
in the end, served to freeze – at most – rather than to settle the ArabIsraeli conflict. Europeans should aim to make their CSDP engagements
more effective and utilise existing channels for confidence building and
communication. Crisis prevention efforts should focus on addressing
developments that carry the danger of renewed violence or jeopardise
prospects of a viable Palestinian State, and therefore render a peaceful
settlement of the conflict impossible.
EU approaches and interests
The EU and its Member States support a comprehensive settlement of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in particular a two-state solution to its
Israeli-Palestinian dimension based on relevant UNSC resolutions, the
1991 Madrid Conference principles and the 2003 Quartet Roadmap.
Consequently, after Madrid Europeans started to actively support the
peace process, quickly becoming its main financial sponsor. With this
support they have aimed to build the nucleus of a Palestinian state and
provide the environment for a regional settlement. Europeans have viewed
their role as complementary to US-facilitated political negotiations. After
75
6
the early collapse of the multilateral track of the Madrid process, the
EU focused almost exclusively on the Israeli-Palestinian track.
It was only after the failure of the US-mediated Camp David talks and
the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 that the EU and
its Member States became more involved in conflict management.1 Two
CSDP missions in the Palestinian territories, European involvement
in the security sector in Lebanon and the OPT, and strong European
participation in the upgraded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) testify to this change. Europeans have also been involved in
crisis mediation efforts between Israel and the Palestinians, and among
Lebanese factions. In addition, the EU and its Member States have
engaged in conflict resolution attempts, above all, as part of the Middle
East Quartet. However, rather than trying to substantially influence and
alter the US approach to the region, Europeans have largely accepted
a subsidiary role.
European involvement in crisis management was prompted by a
deteriorating regional situation coupled with US President George W
Bush’s reluctance to engage in the peace process in his first term. It must
also be understood against the backdrop of EU ambitions to become a
global player and test new foreign policy and defence instruments. In
addition, there was broad consensus among Member States that they
wanted to raise the EU’s profile in the Middle East as an active player
with a presence on the ground. Last but not least, Europeans sought to
demonstrate to Israel that the EU was not biased towards Arab positions,
but willing and able to fulfil a constructive role in the peace process.
Europeans thus also aimed to overcome deep mistrust among Israeli
decision-makers and the Israeli public regarding European motivations
and perceived one-sidedness.
Fields and instruments of EU crisis
management
Mediation efforts and the search for a political
perspective
1. For a detailed analysis see
Muriel Asseburg, ‘European
Conflict Management in
the Middle East: Toward a
More Effective Approach’,
SWP Research Paper 4/2009,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik/Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace,
Berlin, February 2009.
76
Over the last decade, and mainly triggered by the confrontations of the
Second Intifada, the EU and its Member States have engaged repeatedly
in crisis mediation efforts. Often, individual Member State representatives
have taken the lead rather than the EU Special Envoy for the Middle
East Peace Process or the High Representative for the CFSP (now High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).
Out of the international limelight, Europeans successfully de-escalated
Muriel Asseburg
tensions in a number of instances. For example, European observers
secured local ceasefires between Gilo and Beit Jalla early in the Intifada;
German shuttle diplomacy between President Yasser Arafat and Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon after the June 2001 Dolphinarium bombing was
able to temporarily prevent further escalation; European mediators
facilitated a solution to the crisis of the Church of the Nativity in Spring
2002 involving the deportation of some Palestinian fighters to EU
countries and Cyprus; and Europeans engaged Palestinian groups in
a dialogue aiming at persuading them to cease violent attacks against
Israeli civilians.2 EU Member States also engaged in mediation and
conflict management activities on the Israel-Lebanon front.
The EU also got involved in the search for a political solution to the
conflict, driven by the European assessment that effective and durable
ceasefires required a political perspective rather than the Israeli-American
‘security first-approach’. In view of operationalising US President Bush’s
June 2002 vision for Middle East peace, EU foreign ministers agreed on
a three-phase plan for ending the conflict at their Helsingør meeting
in August 2002. This plan became the basis for the Quartet Roadmap
presented to the parties in spring 2003. Europeans thereby succeeded in
reengaging the US administration and in transforming their approach into
an international initiative – even if it lost some teeth in the process. The
EU was not successful, however, in securing sustained US engagement
after the early demise of the Roadmap.
In a sense, such efforts saw a re-run after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war
when Europeans pressed the US to engage in peace making and tried
to rally support among Arab states – pressure that saw the US President
initiate the (ultimately unsuccessful) Annapolis process. As during the
summer 2006 war, the EU did not cut a good figure either before or
during the Gaza War in December 2008-January 2009. Even though
the Israel-Hamas ceasefire had slowly eroded by November 2008, the
EU did not engage in crisis prevention efforts. Attempts by individual
EU Member State, in particular French, representatives and the High
Representative to mediate during the war were at times undermined by
statements from other Member State representatives and were ultimately
unsuccessful. In the end, it was Egypt that mediated a ceasefire. The EU
presented a rather disunited front3 and revealed itself to be incapable of
acting jointly to fill the diplomatic vacuum during the handover period
between US administrations. After the war and buoyed up by great
expectations, Europeans waited for new US President Barack Obama to
actively engage in the Middle East Peace Process and have since waited
for a green light to complement US efforts rather than pursue their own
political approaches.
Overall, while Europeans occasionally succeeded in their mediation,
they were only able to temporarily avert further escalations or resolve
2. For European mediation
efforts see Muriel Asseburg,
‘From Declarations to
Implementation? The Three
Dimensions of European
Policy towards the Conflict’,
in: Martin Ortega (ed.), ‘The
European Union and the
Crisis in the Middle East’,
Chaillot Paper no. 62, EUISS,
Paris, July 2003, pp. 11-26.
3. To give but one example:
while the French
Presidency on 27 December
2008 condemned the
disproportionate use of
force, the Israeli shelling
as well as rocket attacks
emanating from the
Gaza Strip, the German
Chancellor maintained that
responsibility lay clearly
and exclusively with Hamas;
Israel had the legitimate right
to protect its population
and territory. The Czech
Foreign Minister, after
taking over the EU’s rotating
presidency, issued statements
depicting the Israeli ground
offensive as a legitimate act
of self-defence just after the
French condemnation.
77
6
relatively minor – though not insignificant – problems. They were not
in a position to prevent the recurrence of violence, the demise of the
Oslo Process and the dramatic deterioration of the regional situation.
CSDP engagement 1: EUPOL COPPS
4. For more details on
the mandates, budget
and personnel of the
missions, challenges of
implementation, etc., see
Muriel Asseburg, ‘The ESDP
Missions in the Palestinian
Territories (EUPOL COPPS,
EUBAM Rafah): Peace
through Security?’, in
Muriel Asseburg and Ronja
Kempin (eds.), ‘The EU as a
Strategic Actor in the Realm
of Security and Defence?
A Systematic Assessment
of ESDP Missions and
Operations’, SWP Research
Paper 14/2009, Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik,
December 2009, pp. 84-99.
5. Of almost nineteen thousand
police employed by the PA
at the beginning of 2006
more than twelve thousand
were based in Gaza.
After the Hamas takeover
in mid-2007 Ramallah
ordered PA police in Gaza
to stop reporting for work
if they wished to continue
receiving their salaries.
The EU has continued to
fund the salaries of inactive
police officers in Gaza.
78
Since the 1993 Oslo Agreement the EU has provided considerable
technical and financial assistance to support the peace process and to
implement a two-state solution. Establishing Palestinian governance
structures has been one of Europe’s priorities. In recent years the EU
has increasingly turned its attention to the Palestinian security sector,
pursuing a twin-track approach of, first, rebuilding institutions and
capacities largely destroyed during the Second Intifada, and second,
enhancing the effectiveness of the security organs by reforming the
highly fragmented, opaque and unaccountable structures inherited
from the Arafat era. It is in this context that the EU decided in late
2005 to deploy a CSDP mission, the European Union Police Mission
for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), to support the civil
police with training measures, advice and equipment. Europeans –
cooperating closely with their American counterparts who engage in
training and equipping the more robust security forces – were (and
remain) especially concerned with enabling the Palestinian Authority
(PA) to fulfil its obligations under the 2003 Roadmap of restoring order
and fighting terrorism effectively.4
EUPOL COPPS was deployed in January 2006. However, it very quickly
found itself struggling with a radical change in circumstances following
the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 parliamentary elections and
its formation of a government in March. The European stance on Hamas
implied that the European police mission was unable to cooperate with
the subsequently Hamas-led interior ministry. Although it implemented
a number of smaller-scale activities with other partners (such as the
president’s office), EUPOL COPPS was unable to begin substantial work
until President Mahmud Abbas appointed a transitional government
in the West Bank in mid-June 2007 in reaction to Hamas’s seizure of
power in the Gaza Strip. The mission’s work has since been restricted
to the West Bank, thus excluding some two thirds of the civil police.5
To date, the mission has concentrated above all on training activities
and improvement of police and prosecution infrastructure.
On the one hand, EUPOL COPPS has undoubtedly made a contribution
to regenerating the PA security forces after the setbacks of the Second
Intifada and helped to make the PA security apparatus a more powerful
and efficient institution. In turn the security forces have succeeded in
re-establishing order in the cities of the West Bank, thus improving
the security of the Palestinian population. Progress has also been made
towards putting the PA in a position to meet its Roadmap obligations in
Muriel Asseburg
the field of security. Israel has increasingly come to appreciate the benefits
of building the PA’s capacities in the field of security. As a consequence
security cooperation between the PA and Israel resumed in 2008. Since
then Israel has gradually increased the freedom of movement of Palestinian
security forces, permitted deliveries of equipment, handed over West
Bank cities to PA control and reduced the presence of the Israeli army
there. In 2009 Israel also began dismantling select checkpoints in the
West Bank.6
On the other hand, the mission generated only minor progress in the
field of long-term structural reform both in relation to the civil police
and the legal and justice system. A comprehensive legal framework for
the security services, a police law and clear guidelines for police work
are all still lacking. Reform to make the security services and criminal
justice institutions not only more effective but also unified, legitimate,
democratically controlled and nonpartisan has not yet been initiated.
There is thus a real danger that the EU will contribute to establishing
an authoritarian and repressive security apparatus. In May 2008, the
EU decided to expand the mission’s rule-of-law activities. Concrete
measures have started only from mid-2009, so far concentrating on
equipment and infrastructure projects with little prospect of bringing
about tangible improvements regarding rule of law.
The security sector is also still a long way from having the Palestinian
‘ownership’ proclaimed by Europeans and Americans.7 Legitimacy is
undermined by a widespread perception in the Palestinian population
that the Palestinian security forces first and foremost serve Israeli
security interests. This impression is fed by the lack of progress in the
peace process and by ongoing Israeli army operations in the West Bank,
sometimes run jointly or concurrently with PA security operations.
Security forces have also come to be perceived as biased towards Fatah
in the intra-Palestinian conflict. This harms their reputation, especially
as an absolute majority of Palestinians want reconciliation between
Hamas and Fatah and see unification of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip as a top priority.8 In this regard, the US and EU have adversely
influenced the conflict environment through their ‘West Bank first’
approach that has deepened the divisions among Palestinians rather
than seeking to overcome them. In a situation where two illegitimate
governments face off, parliament is defunct, two different legal systems
are being consolidated and the security forces are perceived to be
taking sides in the power struggle, it is simply impossible to progress
towards an independent judiciary and to build a security apparatus that
meets international standards and is under democratic control, and is
nonpartisan, citizen-oriented and unified.9
6. Report of the Government of
Israel to the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee, ‘Supporting
Palestinian Capacity
Building: Israel’s Efforts in
Supporting the Palestinian
Economy, Security Reforms
and Civil Affairs’, Oslo,
7-8 June 2009, p. 17ff.
7. For details see Roland
Friedrich and Arnold
Luethold, ‘And They Came
In and Took Possession
of Reforms: Ownership
and Palestinian SSR’, in
Timothy Donais (ed.), Local
Ownership and Security Sector
Reform (Geneva, Geneva
Center for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces,
2008), pp. 191-213.
8. Palestinian Center for Policy
and Survey Research, ‘Poll
Nr. 35 Conducted between
4-6 March 2010’, press
release, 8 March 2010.
Available at http://www.
pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/
p35epressrelease.html.
9. European officials tend to
ignore this problem and
instead emphasise the
importance of an effective
police force for a future
Palestinian state. See for
example the article by then
Head of Mission Colin Smith,
‘High Noon for PA Civil
Police’, Haaretz, 20 June
2008. Available at http://
www.haaretz.com/printedition/opinion/high-noonfor-pa-civil-police-1.248167.
79
6
CSDP engagement 2: EUBAM Rafah
The 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip presented
the international community with enormous challenges. The Quartet
tried to ward off negative repercussions for the territorial integrity
of the OPT and turn the withdrawal into a first step towards ending
the occupation altogether. In this vein, its Special Envoy prepared the
November 2005 Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access
(AMA) including the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing. The latter
provided for regular opening of the Rafah border crossing between
Gaza and Egypt under the control of the PA, primarily for passage of
people. The EU’s role as a third party was to contribute to ensuring
that the border crossing functioned properly and regularly and to assist
confidence-building between Israel and the PA. To these ends the EU
Council decided in November 2005 to deploy the European Union
Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point.
The EU monitors were quickly deployed in November and initially able
to ensure regular opening of the border crossing. EUBAM helped to speed
up Palestinian controls through training; also, the crossing’s opening
hours were quickly extended. Cooperation initially proceeded smoothly
without major incidents. Even after the Hamas-led government took
office in March 2006 the crossing remained open with a Fatah-dominated
Presidential Guard presence. But Israel ordered the border closed after
the June 2006 kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Gaza-based
militias. Intensive military reprisal operations followed and an almost
complete blockade was imposed on Gaza. Although the EU tried in the
following months to restore regular opening, the crossing opened only
briefly for humanitarian and religious travel. After Hamas’s June 2007
seizure of power in the Gaza Strip, the entity was placed under an even
stricter blockade by Israel and EUBAM suspended operations.
Hopes after the 2008-09 Gaza War of a speedy resumption of 2005
arrangements and EU monitoring were quickly dashed. Hamas and
Israel could not agree on an exchange of prisoners to free Gilad Shalit,
Israel’s key precondition for lifting the blockade. Fatah and Hamas could
not consent on the return of the Presidential Guard to the crossing,
nor were Israel, Egypt, the PA and EU willing to open the crossing as
long as Hamas manned it. Consequently, notwithstanding exceptional
openings by Egypt, the border has remained closed since mid-June 2007.
Thus no significant post-war reconstruction has been possible – with
dramatic repercussions on economic, social and political conditions. In
the wake of the May 2010 flotilla affair and under international pressure,
the Israeli government decided to relax but ultimately maintain the
blockade.
80
Muriel Asseburg
In principle, sending a border mission to actively assist Israel in
withdrawing not only from Gaza but also from the Philadelphi Corridor
and Rafah border crossing made sense. This was the first time a border
crossing had been placed under Palestinian control, representing a
step towards statehood. However, it soon transpired that the decision
to open or close the crossing lay not with the PA or EU but with Israel
(and Egypt). This set-up put strict limits on the Palestinians’ control of
the crossing and on EUBAM Rafah’s ability to meet its prime objective.
In fact, it would only have been possible to override an Israeli order to
close the crossing if the PA (plus later the de facto government of Gaza),
the EU and Egypt all agreed to open it anyway.
Assuming a third party role corresponded with the EU’s interest to be,
and to be seen as, an active player, not just paymaster, in the Middle
East. But success has proved elusive as long as the EU is unwilling to
wield real political influence and self-imposed political constraints
leave it unable to communicate with all the local actors. Thus, the
mission functioned only as long as regional partners were prepared
to cooperate. It was also unable to exercise any conflict-preventing
influence. Concentrating solely on the border crossing at the expense of
effective border security left it unable to prevent the rearming of Hamas
and other militants. Moreover, failure to exert consistent international
pressure for implementation of other AMA provisions has harmed
the territorial integrity of the OPT, Gaza’s integration into the global
economy and Palestinians’ freedom of movement.
European participation in UNIFIL and efforts at
stabilising Lebanon
Europeans missed a chance to pacify the region when they did not
intensively engage in stabilisation and conflict resolution after the Israeli
(2000) and Syrian (2005) withdrawals from Lebanon. In a sense, the
2006 summer war served as a wake-up call, reminding Europeans of
the unsettled conflicts in the region and their violent potential. Only
then did Europeans assume responsibility, participating in a reinforced
UNIFIL. As a consequence, Member States also developed greater interest
in a political and security engagement that would shore up – and protect
– their military presence. Europeans have sought to support Lebanese
sovereignty, including the central government’s control over the state’s
territory and borders, and to strengthen governing institutions.
Europeans took the lead in an upgraded UNIFIL mission and provided its
‘European backbone.’ Since then, the international presence in Southern
Lebanon has been commanded by European generals, and between
some fifty and sixty percent of the international troops in southern
Lebanon have been Europeans – led by Italy, France and Spain. The
mission is based on Security Council resolution 1701, which stipulated
81
6
a ceasefire and mandated a significantly reinforced and more robust
international presence to supervise the cessation of violence, Israeli troop
withdrawal, and compliance with other ceasefire obligations, such as
an arms embargo against Lebanese non-state forces, chiefly Hezbollah.
However, an active, comprehensive disarmament of Hezbollah militias
was not foreseen.
For the first time in UN history, a maritime component has been
deployed: the so-called Maritime Task Force (MTF UNIFIL), staffed
by EU-Europeans (and Turkey) and tasked with monitoring Lebanon’s
territorial waters, securing the Lebanese coastline and preventing arms
smuggling. However, while MTF patrols the waters and hails and queries
ships, the rules of engagement leave boarding of suspicious ships,
confiscation of goods and arrests to the Lebanese navy and customs.
According to the July 2010 UNSG report, from the beginning of the
mission in October 2006 until late June 2010, some 30,500 vessels were
hailed and queried, over 700 vessels were identified as suspicious, but
subsequently all of them were cleared by Lebanese naval or customs
officials. European countries, Germany in particular, have also engaged
in capacity building for the Lebanese navy and coast guards.
MTF UNIFIL can be considered successful insofar as its presence was
essential to ending the Israeli naval siege after the 2006 war and in
re-establishing free trade over Lebanese seaways. But it has also been
rightly criticised as an ineffective tool in the wrong place as far as the
prevention of arms smuggling is concerned – as such activities typically
take place over land borders outside UNIFIL’s area of operations.
Nevertheless, the European naval presence has served as an important
buffer, significantly reducing the danger of renewed armed conflict in a
tense region. However, as troop contributions have declined, the MTF
is now working below required strength.10
10. A comprehensive 2009
evaluation of UNIFIL
pointed out that MTF troop
levels and assets must not
be further reduced so as not
to endanger implementation
of the MTF’s mandate. Cf.
United Nations, ‘Letter
dated 12 February 2010
from the Secretary-General
to the President of the
Security Council’, S/2010/86,
16 February 2010.
82
Overall, UNIFIL has become an important stabilising factor in a fragile
environment. The implementation of the 2006 ceasefire resolution has,
however, remained partial. On the one hand, the areas evacuated by
Israeli troops were secured by UNIFIL and turned over to the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) – with the latter returning to the southern part
of the country for the first time in almost 30 years. Hezbollah militias
have abandoned their positions along the Blue Line and stopped attacks
on Israeli territory. The massive international presence as well as
communication structures established by UNIFIL with the parties’
militaries (regular tripartite meetings) have contributed to generally
upholding the calm, despite numerous ceasefire violations.
On the other hand, the international presence has helped to freeze
rather than resolve the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. Except for the prisoner
issue, none of the underlying causes of the 2006 confrontation have
Muriel Asseburg
been effectively addressed. The issues of the Israeli-occupied Shebaa
Farms and Ghajar village remain unresolved.11 The state of Lebanese
border security has remained insufficient to prevent arms smuggling
and a rearmament of Hezbollah. The weapons embargo has thus not
been effectively enforced. Indeed, the danger of a renewed military
confrontation looms large, and an unintended violent escalation is
always on the cards, as was exemplified by the tree-cutting incident
on the Israeli-Lebanese border in August 2010 that left five dead. The
episode also illustrated, however, that UNIFIL was able to help prevent
further escalation.
EU crisis management interventions in the Arab-Israeli conflict have
at times helped to avert the escalation of violence or to exit difficult
situations. CSDP missions have contributed to temporarily ensuring
a regular opening of the Rafah border crossing and to supporting the
Palestinian civil police in the West Bank with positive security-related
and socio-economic effects. A strong European participation in UNIFIL
and its maritime component have helped maintain calm between Israel
and Lebanon after the 2006 war. However, despite their presence on
the ground, Europeans have not assumed a role of consistent early
warning and crisis mediation to prevent the repeated deterioration
into violence and war. Furthermore, Europeans have been reluctant
to engage more strongly in the peace process and tackle questions of
Palestinian unity. Thus, ultimately, their interventions have served
to freeze rather than settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and have barely
served the aim of Palestinian state and institution-building. To make
their engagement more effective and efficient, Europeans should focus
on the following:
Improving the effectiveness of CSDP deployments: Missions cannot
achieve their objectives unless they are accompanied by measures
designed to overcome the geographical and political division of the
OPT, restart the peace process and open up a credible perspective for
realising Palestinian independence. European conflict management
measures therefore need to be backed up much more strongly by conflict
resolution efforts.
Europeans should also ensure that their support of the civil police and
justice system are integrated into a legal framework – yet to be created
– and place greater emphasis on promoting Palestinian ownership of
security sector reform to strengthen its legitimacy.
11. In November 2010 Israel
signalled readiness to
withdraw from the Northern
part of Ghajar under certain
conditions and engaged
in talks with the UN on
concrete arrangements.
83
6
Confidence building, presence on the ground and peace talks: Given
the extremely tense situation in the region, Europeans should urgently
and much more consistently engage in confidence building, early
warning and crisis mediation through existing channels. For instance,
communication through the trilateral mechanism established by UNIFIL
will be key to averting renewed violence between Israel and Hezbollah,
which could easily escalate into a regional confrontation. EU Member
States should also abstain from further reducing their presence in
UNIFIL and UNIFIL MTF.
At the same time, a return to substantial peace talks on all tracks will
be essential to achieve long-term stabilisation of the region. Europeans
could offer to help resume the talks between Israel and Syria where
they left off in late 2008.
Last but not least, peace cannot be built as long as stark injustice,
massive human rights violations and breaches of international law
prevail. The EU should therefore see efforts to uphold international law
and end impunity for violations as conducive to peace building rather
than as a distraction.
Preventing renewed Israeli-Palestinian crisis and further fragmentation:
Europeans should focus urgently on addressing some of the current
trouble spots in the Israeli-Palestinian theatre in order to prevent the
renewed outbreak of violence and the consolidation of obstacles to a
peaceful settlement. Such efforts should, first and foremost, aim to
prevent a further fragmentation of the OPT that would, in the end,
render a viable Palestinian State with contiguous territory impossible.
In this vein, the EU and its Member States should focus on the Gaza
blockade, Palestinian unity, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories
and East Jerusalem.
Ending the Gaza blockade: The mere easing of the blockade will
suffice neither for economic activity to pick up nor to end the collective
punishment and isolation of the Gazan population. The EU has already
offered to resume its monitoring activities at Rafah. In addition, it should
offer to take on a role at the commodities’ crossings. However, progress
cannot be achieved without coordination with the Gaza government.
Therefore, Europeans, as the third party according to the 2005 AMA,
should be in contact not only with Israel and Egypt, but also with both
the Ramallah and the Gaza government to agree on durable border
arrangements. Only then will it also be possible to find ways and
means to put a permanent stop to arms smuggling through the tunnels
underneath the border.
Palestinian unity: Europeans should leave mediation efforts to others.
However, in order to prepare the ground, they should eliminate
84
Muriel Asseburg
European hurdles and try to convince the US to no longer block
Palestinian reconciliation – which would be in accordance with respective
Quartet statements. For Europeans that would imply figuring out (and
communicating to both the Ramallah and Gaza governments) how to
deal with a Palestinian government of national unity or an interim
body that would be supported by (and possibly include members of)
all relevant Palestinian factions.
Israeli settlements and settlement infrastructure in the Occupied
Territories: It is high time that Europeans align their handling of the
settlement question with their declared positions. This should include
coming up with a mechanism that would effectively prevent exports
emanating from Israeli settlements in occupied territories, including
East Jerusalem, from benefiting from preferential treatment under the
EU-Israel Association Agreement. In addition, a code of conduct for
European companies should be devised, requesting them not to invest
or operate in settlements or engage in joint ventures with settlementbased companies.
East Jerusalem: Given the potential of claims in and over East Jerusalem
to spark violence and block a peace deal, Europeans should closely
monitor all activities aimed at changing the status quo in East Jerusalem
and regularly inform the European Council, EU Member States and the
European Parliament. They should consistently abstain from meeting
Israeli officials in East Jerusalem and not cooperate with Israeli institutions
in East Jerusalem. They should instead systematically support Palestinian
state- and institution-building in East Jerusalem.
85
Chapter 7
The end of EU democracy
promotion and of the
two-state solution?
Michelle Pace
Introduction
Current EU reflection on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comes at a
time when Brussels is also preoccupied by the stalled state of the
democratisation process in the Middle East. Since the 1960s the EU
has been deploying a range of instruments, particularly economic
levers, for influencing the Arab-Israeli conflict and democratisation
in the region. However, both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
wider democratisation issue continue to pose dilemmas for, and prompt
contradictions in, EU policy. This chapter argues that the EU should
abandon the politics of empty gestures, address the adverse effects that
undemocratic regimes in the region have on the conflict, revisit the
overly narrow policy parameters of its conflict-resolution efforts and
develop an overall strategy towards the region that actively promotes
democracy through its own example. The chapter then outlines areas
where the EU can reassess policy in the light of lessons learned, in
particular regarding Palestinian democratisation and civil society. The
EU should urgently heed these lessons as the region currently appears
to be headed towards further ‘de-democratisation’ and a single state
outcome to the conflict.
In her recent book, Palestinian writer Ghada Karmi sheds light on the
demise of the two-state solution and argues for a single state for the two
peoples, Israelis and Palestinians.1 This solution, she insists, brings more
hope for a peaceful resolution to the Middle East conflict than a state
based on Jewish exclusivity next to an unviable Palestinian state under
Israel’s sole control. British journalist Jonathan Freedland claimed this
year that this one-state solution is no longer the preserve of idealists
and wishful thinkers, but has rather become the key argument of the
Israeli right, and that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is also
giving up on the two-state solution.2 Chris Patten, former European
Commissioner for External Relations, recently agreed that given the
1. Ghada Karmi, Married
to Another Man: Israel’s
Dilemma in Palestine (London:
Pluto Press, 2007).
2. Jonathan Freedland, ‘The
Israeli Right has a new vision
– Jews and Arabs sharing
one country’, The Guardian,
27 July 2010. Available
at: http://www.guardian.
co.uk/commentisfree/2010/
jul/27/israeli-right-visionjews-arabs-share.
87
7
‘facts on the ground today’, there is no alternative left but the one-state
solution.3
4. Amor Boubakri and
Susanne Lindahl, ‘The
European Union and
Challenges to Democracy
Building in the Arab World’.
Extract from Democracy
in Development. Global
Consultations on the EU’s
role in Democracy Building
(Stockholm: International
Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance, 2009).
Available at: http://www.
idea.int/resources/analysis/
eu_and_arab_world.cfm.
Consideration of alternative options to the two-state solution comes,
therefore, at a time when the EU is acutely concerned about the fragile
state of democratisation in the Middle East. Following the Swedish
Presidency of the European Union in 2009, the EU no longer talks about
democracy promotion across the globe, and in particular in the Middle
East, but of ‘democracy building’. This shift in the EU’s language is
mainly due to the fact that there is an ever increasing gap between the
EU’s positive intentions in this region on the one hand, among which
the resolution to the Middle East conflict is a priority, and diverse
Arab and Israeli perceptions of the EU’s ambitions in the Middle East,
on the other hand.4 With the persistence of authoritarian rule in the
Arab world, Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territory, and
conflicting European interests in the region, both conflict resolution
and democratisation appear at a standstill. Can the EU continue to be
involved in two policy areas where there appears to be no hope of any
positive development? Moreover, why is it that two seemingly benign
policy objectives, EU resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and democracy
promotion, pose such dilemmas and challenges, and often seem to be
in contradiction to one another?5 Are these two key EU policy areas
doomed to remain on a life-support machine?
5. Michelle Pace, ‘Paradoxes
and Contradictions in EU
democracy promotion in
the Mediterranean: the
limits on EU normative
power’, Democratization, vol.
16, no. 1, (Special Issue),
February 2009, pp. 39-58..
This chapter seeks to address these key questions by, first, briefly
sketching through the EU’s past and present policies in these domains
and, second, analysing the basic challenges the EU faces. It then critically
extracts lessons learnt from the EU’s experience in the region thus far,
concluding with policy implications.
3. Chris Patten, ‘To avert
disaster, stop isolating
Hamas’, The Financial Times,
28 July 2010. Available at:
http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/2bb24988-9a7a-11df87fd-00144feab49a.html.
6. These are bilateral
agreements between the
European Community
(and its Member States)
and Mediterranean partner
countries aiming to establish
political, economic and
social cooperation. All
parties agree to adhere to
democratic principles and
fundamental rights. .
7. See, for example, the
Council Decision on
the signing of a EuroMediterranean Association
Agreement with Algeria,
Brussels, 6786/02, AL 1,
12 April 2002.. All EuroMediterranean Association
Agreements can be found
at: http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/
external_relations/relations_
with_third_countries/
mediterranean_partner_
countries/r14104_en.htm.
88
Past and present policies
Since the early 1960s, when the European Community initialled bilateral
relations with its southern partners, preserving political, social and
economic security and stability in and around Europe have been the
key markers in European policy towards the Middle East. Bilateral
relations between the EU and its southern partners are, in the main,
managed through association agreements.6 Article 2 of each of these
agreements includes a clause in respect of ‘the democratic principles and
fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights’ which ‘inspire the domestic and international policies of
the Parties (the EU and the respective Mediterranean partner) and shall
constitute an essential element of (each) Agreement’.7 As Nathalie Tocci
argues in this volume, bilateral relations with the southern partners
are very relevant to the EU’s stated objective of pursuing a two-state
Michelle Pace
solution for the Middle East conflict since they represent the most valid
leverage for the EU vis-à-vis conflict parties. The EU has however, to date,
never evoked the suspension of any agreement with any Mediterranean
partner in the case of violations of human rights.
In 1995 the Euro-Mediterranean Conference was held in Barcelona,
during which the Barcelona Declaration was approved and the EuroMediterranean Partnership (EMP) established. This regional initiative
foresaw a political role for the EU and its partners in promoting political
values including good governance and democracy. The stalling of
the Middle East Peace Process has had a major impact on the EMP,
hindering progress in the political basket. Since its launch in 2008,
the revamped Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean has also
been hampered by the ongoing conflict. The lack of progress on the
Middle East Peace Process front has also been a major concern for the
Mediterranean Arab partners who perceive the EU as an ineffective,
unconvincing and inconsistent external actor. Mediterranean Arab
partners insist that the EU cannot push and preach for democratisation
in the Arab Mediterranean without simultaneously criticising Israel for
its continuing violation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory. Furthermore, Euro-Middle Eastern cooperation in the field
of anti-terrorism legislation has, since 9/11, intensified at the expense
of civic liberties.8 In effect, this new policy put all past EU efforts at
democratisation of the Middle East region on the back burner.
In its 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU reiterated its interest
in a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict and a democratised
Mediterranean neighbourhood, stating that ‘it is in the Union's interest
that countries on our borders are well governed. Our task is to promote
a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the European Union
and on the shores of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close
and cooperative relations. Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a
strategic priority. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing
with other problems in the Middle East’.9
In 2004, the EU developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),
based on deepening its bilateral relations with neighbouring states
including the Mediterranean Partners of the Barcelona Process. With
its Action Plans,10 the ENP is designed as a soft power instrument to
support partners in conflict resolution efforts as well as furthering
democratisation of their polities through ‘a privileged relationship,
building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and
human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles
and sustainable development)… [that] goes beyond existing relationships
to offer political association and deeper economic integration, increased
mobility and more people-to-people contacts. The level of ambition
8. See Tobias Schumacher,
‘From Paris with Love?
– Euro-Mediterranean
Dynamics in the Light of
French Ambitions’, The
GCC-EU Research Bulletin,
Gulf Research Center, Issue
no. 10, Dubai, May 2008.
Union, ‘A Secure Europe in
a Better World’, European
12 December 2003.
10. These are tailor-made
documents negotiated
between the EU and each
ENP partner, based on
each partner’s capacities
and needs as well as EU
and partner interests. Each
Action Plan outlines a broad
jointly-defined reform
agenda to be achieved in
3-5 years, and comprises
political dialogue, economic
and social cooperation
and development, trade
issues, justice and home
affairs and a people-topeople dimension.
89
7
of the relationship depends on the extent to which these values are
shared’.11
11. See: http://ec.europa.eu/
world/enp/policy_en.htm.
12. See the chapter by
Nathalie Tocci in this
volume, pp. 55-63.
13. Author’s interviews
with various officials
from the Council of
the European Union,
Brussels, March 2009.
14. Author’s interview with an
official from the Council
of the European Union,
Brussels, 23 March 2009.
15. The EU documentation
on democracy promotion
analysed by this author
from the 1990s to date
include European Parliament
debates, Council conclusions
and Commission reports.
For more information see:
www.eumena.bham.ac.uk
Union, Communication
from the Commission
to the Council and the
European Parliament, ‘The
European Union’s role in
promoting human rights
and democratisation in third
countries’, COM/2001/0252
final, Brussels 2001.
90
The deepening in the EU’s bilateral relations with Mediterranean Partners
has however been challenged by the EU’s involvement in a broad range
of policy areas. For example, in the case of EU-Israeli relations, the ENP
created, on the one hand, further opportunities for the deepening of
economic, scientific and research links while, on the other hand, the
ENP has led to further tensions in this relationship due to the EU’s
involvement in the MEPP.12 While the EU works on building closer
bilateral relations with Israel, the two are increasingly being separated
over peacemaking matters. More generally, although the EU has on some
occasions considered the use of conditionality vis-à-vis Israel, Israel
has never responded to EU pressures.13 The mainstream European
position remains that: ‘The EU’s policy is based on partnership and
cooperation, and not exclusion. It is the EU’s view that maintaining
relations with Israel is an important contribution to the Middle East
Peace Process and that suspending the Association Agreement, which
is the basis for EU-Israeli trade relations but also the basis for the EUIsrael political dialogue, would not make the Israeli authorities more
responsive to EU concerns at this time. It is also a well-known fact that
economic sanctions achieve rather little in this respect. Keeping the
lines of communication open and trying to convince our interlocutors
is hopefully the better way forward.’14
How do these policies fit into the EU’s wider democracy promotion
objectives? In the 1990s, EU Member States found an opportunity to
project the European Community’s role as a global actor. In the context
of the collapse of communist rule in Europe, the EU opted for the
promotion of democracy as another key foreign policy instrument in its
external relations. EU officials are fully aware that there is no working
definition of democracy in EU documents15: rather, the meaning of
democracy can be inferred from some policy documents where one can
find a mix of policy areas ranging from human rights to development
to democracy promotion to security to trade. There is thus no coherent
strategy or well-articulated policy in practice, bringing together the
various instruments at hand.
In 2001, the European Commission set out the strategic and funding
priorities of the EU in the area of democracy and human rights assistance
in The EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third
Countries.16 The EU’s approach to democracy promotion is marked not
by a military posture, but by a predisposition to promoting its values
through its interaction with and the socialisation of other actors – or,
in other words, through a partnership-based approach. The document
indirectly sent a message to the targets of the EU’s democracy promotion
efforts that the EU was somewhat different from the United States in
Michelle Pace
the manner in which it was proposing to encourage political reform in
other regions. In 2006, prompted by a US request to discuss democracy
promotion with the EU, an internal discussion ensued about the need to
define a more general strategy on democracy promotion. In the Council
Conclusions of November 2009 the objective of reaching a European
consensus on democracy by 2010 was highlighted as a key element.
The EU bases its democracy promotion agenda on an overall optimism
with regard to the liberal peace paradigm17 without creating the necessary
flexibility to make strategic adjustments in cases of pending statebuilding
projects, persisting conflict and frustrated national identities, all of
which are characteristics of the Middle East conflict.18 Moreover, the
EU’s other tracks for its involvement in the MEPP, such as its role within
the Quartet, have proven very weak.19 Furthermore, moving away from
its rhetoric and in practice, the EU seems to prioritise its trade and
economic interests with its southern neighbours over its claims for a
peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict and for democratisation
of the region. The EU’s preference for bilateral benchmarking appears
to be based on the assumption that improvement in each country will
produce improvement in the region.
The EU and Palestinian democratisation in practice
The Quartet’s 2003 Roadmap called for Palestinian democratisation among
other criteria but did not include any similar conditions for the Israelis,
such as in relation to Israel’s treatment of its Arab minority.20 In the eyes
of Arab Mediterranean partners this matters because the EU is perceived
as applying double standards in relation to Israel when it attempts to
meditate between the conflict parties. The EU is perceived as not putting
enough pressure on Israel to change its policy in this regard.
The Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006 severely tested the
Quartet’s commitment to Palestinian democratisation. In the run-up
to the elections, Gaza experienced inter-factional violence while splits
mounted within Fatah.21 This was mainly due to the vacuum created by
the death in November 2004 of Yasser Arafat, who had hitherto managed
to enforce a degree of unity between the different factions. There were
disagreements with Israel over voting rights of Palestinians in East
Jerusalem.22 Eventually, 6,000 Palestinians were allowed to vote in East
Jerusalem while the remaining 100,000 had to travel outside the city’s
boundaries to cast their vote.23 It soon became apparent that Hamas,
running under the name ‘Change and Reform’, had won 74 seats in the
132-seat chamber (56 percent of the seats), while Fatah came second place
with 36 percent of the seats. Palestinian polling expert Khalil Shikaki
concluded that Hamas’s extensive welfare networks and reputation for
discipline and integrity gained it support from voters frustrated at the
17. This paradigm, predicated
on a number of normative
assumptions regarding the
economic, political and
institutional prerequisites
necessary to achieve peace
in situations of conflict,
has been influential in
post-conflict state-building
operations since the early
1990s. It assumes that the
transformation required
to peace, democracy and
a market economy is a
self-strengthening process
leading to sustainable
development.
18. Natalia Mirimanova, ‘Civil
Society Building Peace in the
European Neighbourhood:
Towards a New Framework
for Joining Forces with
the EU.’ MICROCON
Policy Working Paper 10,
http://www.microconflict.
eu/publications/
PWP10_NM.pdf.
19. Michelle Pace, ‘The
Construction of EU
Normative Power’, Journal
of Common Market Studies,
vol. 45, no. 5, December
2007, pp. 1039-62.
20. As one Hamas official from
the movement’s political
wing stated: ‘Our model for
democracy is our closest
neighbour – Israel! If this
is how the international
community wants us to
behave, then we do not
want to become part of this
international community’.
Author’s interview, Gaza,
September 2007.
21. Author’s interview with
a PLO official, Ramallah,
September 2007..
22. The international
community views this area
as occupied territory. Israel
claims East Jerusalem as
part of its united capital.
23. Tim Youngs, ‘The Palestinian
Parliamentary Election and
the rise of Hamas’. Research
Paper 06/17, 15 March 2006,
London, House of Commons
Library, International Affairs
and Defence Section.
91
7
corruption and inefficiency of the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority
and the slow progress towards Palestinian statehood. 24
24. Although polling data
indicated the peace process
was the least important issue
for voters. Author’s interview
with Khalil Shikaki,
Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research,
Ramallah, September 2007.
‘Middle East Peace Process’,
Speech by Dr Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, European
Commissioner for External
Relations and European
Neighbourhood Policy,
European Parliament,
Strasbourg. 19 January
europa-eu-un.org/articles/
en/article_5579_en.htm.
26. EU Election Observation
Mission West Bank and
Gaza 2006, Statement of
Preliminary Conclusions
and Findings, 26 January
2006. See: http://europa.
eu.int/comm/external_
relations/human_rights/
eu_election_ass_observ/
westbank/legislative/
statement_260106.pdf.
27. Costanza Musu, European
Union Policy Towards The
Arab-Israeli Peace Process:
The Quicksands of Politics
(Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan, February 2010).
28. In 2005 for example, EU
governments allocated €10
million to the European
Commission-managed
European Initiative on
Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR) for
democracy-promotion
projects in the region. See
Richard Youngs, ‘Survey
of European democracy
promotion policies 20002006’, Fundación para las
Relaciones Internacionales
y el Diálogo Exterior, 2006.
29. Steven Everts, ‘How
Europe can help the
Middle East Peace Process’,
Center for European Reform
Bulletin, no. 28, February/
http://www.cer.org.uk/
articles/28_everts.html.
92
The EU had strongly supported the holding of democratic elections.
During a visit to the region before the elections, Dr. Benita FerreroWaldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and the European
Neighbourhood Policy, declared that there were three objectives for
her trip: (i) to lend support to democracy building in the run-up to the
Palestinian legislative elections; (ii) to underline the importance of EU
financial support; (iii) and to raise the visibility of a number of EU projects,
notably in Gaza.25 The EU sent a mission to observe these elections, which
declared the elections fair, free and transparent.26 However, following the
US and Israel’s requests, and in light of the EU’s earlier listing of Hamas
as a terrorist organisation, the EU suspended aid to the democratically
elected Hamas government. As Daniel Möckli argues in this volume,
(see pages 65-74) the EU’s stance of isolating Hamas further weakens
the EU’s democracy promotion rhetoric and backfires on its position of
inclusivity of all parties to the conflict. It also raises questions of double
standards when compared to the EU’s position vis-à-vis the PLO in the
1980s. Across Middle Eastern societies, this EU move against an elected
party and the events that have followed since, ushered in a complete loss
of credibility in EU discourse. Furthermore, the hostilities created on the
ground with a divided Palestinian Authority, an internationally supported
but very weak President Abbas of Fatah and an increasingly ostracised
but strong Hamas, overshadowed the proceedings of the international
peace conference held in Annapolis, Maryland, in November 2007.27
Basic challenges and European interests
As this brief overview illustrates, the EU disposes of a range of instruments,
particularly economic levers, for influencing the Arab-Israeli conflict
and democratisation in the Middle East. So why is it that two seemingly
benign policy objectives, EU resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and
democracy promotion, pose dilemmas and have prompted contradictory
policies?
Firstly and most basically, the EU is now lost in its own politics of empty
gestures. The EU remains the key paymaster of the Palestinian Authority
and of various projects aimed at democracy building in the Middle East,28
yet shows little resistance to rollback involving physical destruction of its
investments in this regard (e.g. the extensive destruction of EU-funded
infrastructure during the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza War).
Some analysts have argued that if the EU took a more forceful stance
in such matters, it could pave the way for improved conditions in the
region.29 A key policy step in this context, to which other contributors
Michelle Pace
in this volume allude, would be stricter practice in denying preferential
treatment to settlement products imported into the EU.
Secondly, the EU’s lobbying of friendly Arab governments has not
yielded any dividends either in the MEPP or in terms of bringing about
the democratic change the EU wishes for in the region. It is quite clear
that Egypt is very cautious when it comes to the implications of dealing
with Hamas for its regime’s relations with the Muslim Brotherhood,
a key opposition force on the Egyptian political landscape, and for
further political reform. The EU should therefore not interpret Cairo’s
mediation efforts uncritically. Europeans should seek to engage with
other mediators, such as Turkey, who have experiences to share when it
comes to dealing with the conflict parties in the Middle East conflict.
Thirdly, past EU policies have not been successful because the basic
policy parameters, in particular regarding the stakeholders to be included
in peace efforts, have not been seriously addressed. There are now
many calls for the EU to include Hamas in its mediation efforts for a
just resolution of the Middle East conflict. For the emergence of a truly
viable and democratic Palestinian state, the details of such a state have
to be thrashed out with all parties to the conflict.30
Fourthly and finally, the EU currently lacks an overall strategy towards
the Middle East which incorporates the active promotion of democracy
through its own example.31 Addressing this requires a clear strategy
of how to convince the US that the EU can play a constructive role in
mediation efforts and to reassure Arab partners that the EU is serious
about its role. One way for the EU to show it is serious is to have a robust
policy of criticising Arab governments for failing to live up to their
reform commitments. The EU should also create more opportunities
for democratic reformers from eastern and southern neighbouring
countries to come together and share experiences, including Islamists
where appropriate. The EU should also support civil society organisations
on the basis of projects focused on real reform and change rather than
organisations endorsed by Arab regimes.
Lessons learned
Has the EU drawn any lessons from its experience thus far in the
Middle East region? Following the January 2006 elections in Palestine,
EU officials acknowledge having learnt a number of lessons.32 One
Member of the European Parliament insisted that the EU should ask
what it has achieved by not engaging with Hamas while at the same time
continuing with its aid to the Palestinians.33 There is in fact informal
acknowledgement across EU institutions that a mistake was made in
30. See Ilan Greilsammer and
Joseph Weiler, Europe’s
Middle East Dilemma:
The Quest for a Unified
Stance, (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1987).
31. Various interviews
conducted by the author
in Brussels in the
European Parliament,
Council and Commission.
February-March 2009.
32. Author’s interviews with
various officials from
the EP, Commission
and Council, Brussels,
Februrary-March 2009.
33. Author’s interview
with an MEP, Brussels,
February 2009.
93
7
not recognising the results of the Palestinian elections in 2006, with
severe repercussions on the stalled Middle East Peace Process. As one
official put it: ‘We failed ... We’ve always put our cards on Abbas but he
is not one who enjoys popular support ... and we have locked ourselves
in a no man’s land vis-à-vis the Middle East conflict’.34
There is agreement across the main EU institutions that the EU needs
to become more pragmatic and flexible if it is to have any effective
role in the resolution of the Middle East conflict and any potential
for reinvigorating the democratisation process in Palestine. ‘There is
a recognition trickling in slowly that we cannot circumvent Hamas
indefinitely. Sooner or later we will have to talk with them ... There
have been lots of informal contacts with Hamas ... So in regard to this
specific situation, thinking is gradually changing ... Today we understand
more than before how crucial Palestinian reconciliation is to both the
democratisation process in Palestine as well as for the resolution of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Usually, we are very adaptable to new
situations’.35 EU officials acknowledge the lack of democratic legitimacy
of the Fatah administration in the West Bank.
34. Author’s interview with
a representative from the
Permanent Representation
Office of a Member State,
Brussels, April 2009.
35. Author’s interview with an
official from the Council
of the European Union,
Brussels, February 2009.
36. As both Fatah and Hamas
officials admitted to this
author during interviews
conducted in Jerusalem,
November 2009.
37. Author’s interviews
with various EU
Member States’ officials,
Brussels, March 2009.
94
In order to readdress its vision for a democratic and viable Palestinian state,
the EU has to face the challenges which impede a peaceful resolution to
the conflict by recognising the imbalance between not only the Israelis
and the Palestinians but also the different contexts in the West Bank,
Jerusalem and Gaza. The EU should take a closer look at Hamas’s reform
plans as well as those incorporated in the Fayyad plan. In this context it
is important for EU officials to recognise continuous talks between Fatah
and Hamas officials on these issues.36 It is high time that EU officials make
use of indirect talks with Hamas officials conducted by diverse Member
States’ representatives which have facilitated a better understanding of
the movement and its views on Palestinian reforms and the Middle East
Peace Process.37 Any short-term fixes such as the isolation of Hamas have
not worked, which points to the need for a long-term and sustainable
EU policy plan in the MEPP and democracy policy areas.
More broadly, most officials interviewed agree that they have not
sufficiently reflected on the implications of the EU’s efforts at promoting
liberal democracy in the Middle East primarily through encouraging
periodic elections – procedural democracy – as well as the consequences
of such a focus for the conflict.
Substantial EU support to Palestinian and Israeli civil society arguably
fosters a more grounded approach to democracy. Yet the EU’s focus on
a selective core of civil society groups has not shown much progress in
terms of political reforms on the ground, and demonstrated that there
is nothing inherent in civil society that attaches it to a democratising
project. Representatives of civil society in Israel and the Palestinian
Michelle Pace
Territories admit that once they learnt how to speak the EU’s language
and prepare funding applications accordingly, they have had no problem
in getting funding for ‘civil society projects’ from the EU. Thus, the EU
needs to reach out to grass-roots reformers by changing its funding
rules and regulations.38 EU officials, on the other hand, also admitted
that the funding procedure for democracy-related civil society projects
is very technical and bureaucratic and does not leave enough time for
EU officials to monitor exactly what EU funds are achieving through
the projects that are being financed.39
Conclusion and implications for current
and future policy
Without a clear strategy on the linkage between democracy building in
the Middle East and the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict,
the EU has very few choices left for future policies in these domains.
On the Palestinian reform front, EU actors have already acknowledged
that they missed a golden opportunity to encourage Palestinian unity
and should therefore prepare themselves for the eventual resuscitation
of such unity and should actively encourage it. The EU should also
convince Israel that a unified Palestinian body politic is the only way
forward for a just resolution to the conflict and for Israel’s security to
be guaranteed. This may require the EU to make some hard choices in
its enhanced relations with Israel, including with regard to the ‘golden
carrot’ of upgrading relations.
In order to further the capacity of Palestinians in delivering on the
peace front, the EU can act as a reliable mediator in Hamas-Fatah unity
talks by building on the lessons learnt via indirect talks between EU
Member States’ officials and representatives from both main political
factions. Its democracy assistance and aid programmes should also be
monitored and revised carefully to ensure that money goes to grassroots reformers who can make a real difference on the ground in the
Palestinian territories. Dealing with the usual suspects is no longer a
policy the EU can afford to follow in this regard. Unless the EU has a
clear strategy on how a two-state solution can come about, given the
realities on the ground, it may be hard pushed to consider the other
option on the table – a one-state solution. Only a truly political reform
agenda in the Middle East can prevent the further de-democratisation
of the region and the emergence of a single state outcome to the conflict
accompanied by endemic violence.
38. Richard Youngs, ‘Europe’s
flawed approach to Arab
democracy.’ London:
Centre for European
Reform, October 2006.
39. Author’s interviews with
civil society representatives
in Jerusalem, September
2007 and November
2009 and with EU official
from EuropeAid section
(EIDHR instruments and
implementation) of the
Commission, March 2009.
95
Chapter 8
The conflict and the question
of engaging with Hamas
Jeroen Gunning
Introduction
Ever since Hamas won the Palestinian legislative election of January
2006, the question of engagement has haunted the EU. Those in favour
argued that the EU had an obligation to honour the electoral process.
Those opposed held that Hamas was a proscribed ‘terrorist organisation’
and that engagement should be conditional on Hamas agreeing to the
three principles set by the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN):
(i) renunciation of violence; (ii) recognition of Israel; and (iii) acceptance
of previous agreements between Israel and the PLO.
In this chapter, the arguments for and against engagement are reviewed,
the effects of non-engagement highlighted, and the potential of engagement
examined by studying the case of Swiss interactions with Hamas. It
is argued here that, although engagement is fraught with difficulties,
non-engagement has not only failed to break the current impasse
but helped to make Hamas more entrenched and intransigent, while
inflicting suffering on thousands of ordinary Gazans and creating
two increasingly separate mini-states. The chapter concludes with
some reflections on what this means for EU policy, arguing that the
international community must find a way of working with Hamas – or
give up on the goal of achieving a two-state solution.
Brief history of (non-)engagement
When Hamas won the 2006 election, the EU responded, along with
the US and Israel, by boycotting the Hamas-led government. It refused
to recognise the new government, froze all its financial dealings with
the Palestinian Authority (PA) and suspended operational partnerships
such as EUPOL COPPS, its police reform mission, until Hamas agreed
to the Quartet’s three principles. It continued to provide humanitarian
assistance through third parties, such as the United Nations Works and
Relief Agency (UNRWA), and the Temporary International Mechanism
97
8
(TIM), established to bypass the PA. Member States also stepped up
support for Fatah, most dramatically, in the case of the UK, by following
the US in funding and arming President Mahmud Abbas’s Presidential
Guard.1
The establishment of a National Unity government in March 2007 did
not see a policy change, despite Hamas moving closer to the Quartet’s
principles. The EU, echoing the US, continued to demand full compliance
as a condition for aid resumption. However, it softened its position by
signalling that a change in behaviour, rather than rhetoric, might be
sufficient to resume aid.2 Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza hardened
the EU’s position and, together with the US and Israel, it adopted what
became known as the ‘West Bank First’ approach: full resumption of aid
and cooperation vis-à-vis the pro-Fatah Fayyad government in the West
Bank, coupled with an intensified boycott of the Haniyyeh government,
leading to a de facto blockade of the Gaza Strip.
1. ‘Israel allows guns across
border to support Fatah
leader against rivals’, The
Times, 29 December 2006.
2. Paul Morro, ‘International
Reaction to the Palestinian
Unity Government’,
CRS Report for Congress,
9 May 2007, p. 4.
3. Clara O’Donnell, ‘The EU,
Israel and Hamas’, CER
Working Paper, Centre for
European Reform (CER),
London, April 2008, p. 18.
4. ‘EU countries practice
“secret” diplomacy,
Hamas says’, EUObserver.
com, 14 September 2009.
Available at: http://
euobserver.com/9/28660.
5. ‘Gaza flotilla deaths:
the world reacts’, Times
Online, 31 May 2010.
Available at: http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/world/middle_east/
article7141083.ece.
6. ‘Louis Michel s‘en prend
au Hamas dans son fief de
Gaza’, AFP, 26 January 2009;
Maxime Verhagen, ‘Speech
at the Annual Meeting of the
American Jewish Committee’,
Washington D.C., 29
April 2010. Available at:
http://www.minbuza.
nl/en/News/Speeches_
and_Articles/2010/04/
Speech_at_the_Annual_
Meeting_of_the_American_
Jewish_Committe.
98
The EU’s non-engagement policy has not been without its critics. A
number of non-EU European countries, most prominently Norway,
Russia, Switzerland and Turkey, have experimented with engagement.
Senior EU officials have privately questioned non-engagement; the UK’s
foreign affairs committee and the Italian government publicly called
for engagement in 2007.3 In September 2009, Hamas claimed to have
regularly met with high-ranking officials from numerous EU countries,
and German mediators have assisted with indirect negotiations between
Hamas and Israel over the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit, taken hostage
by Hamas’s paramilitary wing, the Qassam Brigades, in 2006.4 Israel’s
and Egypt’s siege of Gaza, meanwhile, has been increasingly condemned
by the EU and its Member States following Israel’s devastating incursion
into Gaza in December 2008, and particularly in the wake of Israel’s
confrontation with a flotilla seeking to break Gaza’s blockade in May
2010.5
A critique of the case against
engagement
A number of arguments have been employed by EU officials and
supporters of non-engagement. One argument has been that Hamas is
on the list of proscribed ‘terrorist organisations’ and that it rules itself
out by engaging in terrorism, which is incompatible with European
values.6 Within the framework of the War on Terror, Hamas is proscribed
in EU countries. Engagement would thus be illegal. This argument is
often accompanied by the claim that Hamas is not a partner for peace
because of its ideological beliefs. In its more extreme forms, it is held
Jeroen Gunning
that Hamas is incapable of change, and that the more anti-Semitic and
intransigent statements and violence, rather than the more pragmatic
statements and ceasefires, reflect Hamas’s true intentions. This position,
which is more prevalent in the US and Israel than in the EU (with its
tradition of engaging ‘difficult partners’), is reinforced by the belief that
religiously-motivated groups engaged in terrorism are absolutist and
less likely to compromise and accept the international community’s
norms than a secular party.7
These are political arguments, rather than insurmountable obstacles.
Persuading Hamas to refrain from violence is crucial. But the decision
to proscribe it is a political one. Hamas is not alone in having targeted
or killed civilians and for significant periods it has refrained from
violence against Israel. Condemning violence without addressing its
causes is, moreover, counterproductive. There are numerous precedents
of governments engaging those formerly labelled ‘terrorist’, often before
violence has completely ceased.8 It is, furthermore, not illegal to meet
with members of proscribed organisations. Neither Hamas’s religious
orientation nor its resort to terrorist tactics has prevented it from being
pragmatic. It has demonstrated its ability to enforce ceasefires, has
not engaged in suicide tactics since 2005 and has moved towards the
Quartet’s principles. Its opposition to the peace process has increasingly
come to be expressed in secular nationalist, rather than religious terms,
and the Haniyyeh government has largely respected the secular basis
of the Palestinian system – notwithstanding constituencies pushing
for Islamisation.9
A second argument has been that engagement facilitates Hamas’s rearmament, particularly if it involves relaxing border controls. Israel
justified its continuing blockade on these grounds but, while the EU
agrees that Hamas should be prevented from re-arming, it has been
critical of the extent of the blockade, repeatedly calling an end to it (to
which Israel responded by easing the blockade).10 However, not only
has the blockade not prevented Hamas from re-arming itself,11 but there
are other ways to prevent re-armament. The Swiss government worked
with Hamas and Fatah to develop alternative mechanisms but progress
did not materialise in the absence of international support (although the
widespread criticism of the blockade following the Flotilla incident has
renewed interest in such a mechanism).12 The blockade has furthermore
been criticised for amounting to a policy of collective punishment in the
way it prevented entry of basic goods, such as medicine or the cement
needed for rebuilding buildings destroyed in Operation Cast Lead.13
A third argument has been that the promise of engagement is an important
lever to force Hamas to comply with the Quartet’s principles.14 Because
political validation and financial cooperation are goods that Hamas
desires, withholding them can be a means to pressure Hamas – as well
7. For a scholarly version
of this argument, see
Bruce Hoffman, Inside
Terrorism (New York:
Columbia University
Press, 2006), pp. 88-89.
8. Robert Ricigliano,
Choosing to Engage: Armed
groups and peace processes
(London: Conciliation
Resources, 2005).
9. Jeroen Gunning, Hamas
in Politics (London: Hurst,
2007); Yezid Sayigh, ‘Hamas
Rule in Gaza’, Middle East
Brief, no. 41 (Waltham, MA:
Crown Center for Middle
East Studies, Brandeis
University, March 2010).
10. ‘EU leaders commit to
deterring Hamas rearmament
in Gaza’, Haaretz, 19
January 2009; Catherine
Ashton, ‘Gaza’s misery
does not make Israel safer’,
The Times, 14 June 2010.
11. ‘Yadlin: ‘Hamas has
many 60-km range
missiles’’, The Jerusalem
Post, 4 November 2009.
12. Interview with Swiss
official, June 2010.
13. ‘Israel’s Gaza blockade
breaks law, says
International Red Cross’,
Haaretz, 14 June 2010.
14. ‘EU to send Solana to
Mideast to try to revive
peace effort’, Haaretz, 1
September 2006; ‘Blair firm
on boycott of Hamas’, The
Guardian, 6 June 2008.
99
8
as the general population (this latter argument is more prevalent in the
US and Israel). If the EU ends the boycott without Hamas changing
its position, particularly now, four years after instigating it, a key lever
will have been lost.
This is closely linked to a fourth argument: that engagement, far from
softening Hamas’s position, will further entrench it in its opposition
to Israel and the two-state solution. Engagement, on this reading, will
be interpreted as a reward for Hamas’s intransigence and its methods,
a sign of the international community’s lack of resolve, particularly
if offered with nothing in return (with potentially serious regional
implications).15
These arguments raise serious issues. Official meetings may well raise
Hamas’s international profile and, if instigated without reciprocity, are
likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness. But this argument supposes
that Hamas is a monolith and that all types of engagement necessarily
legitimise Hamas and its methods. Engagement and legitimisation do
not always coincide. When warring factions decide to meet, they neither
necessarily approve of each other’s behaviour nor inevitably confer
legitimacy. Engagement can be a means of conveying one’s disapproval
more forcefully – and at times more persuasively – and can help to
clarify why the other side behaves as it does.
15. Verhagen, ‘Speech at the
Annual Meeting of the
American Jewish Committee’,
op. cit. in note 6; ‘SWC to
European Union and Council
of Europe: “Bar Hamas
from Your Parliamentary
Assemblies”’, Letter (Paris:
Simon Wiesenthal Centre,
20 March 2006). Available
at: http://www.wiesenthal.
com/site/apps/nlnet/
content2.aspx?c=lsKWLb
PJLnF&b=4442247&ct=5
850589&printmode=1.
16. The author uses the terms
‘pragmatist’/‘hardliner’
as shorthand for shifting
graduations between
fluid factions.
100
Engagement, furthermore, does not straightforwardly enhance Hamas’s
legitimacy. Because of the West’s controversial legacy in the Middle
East, engagement is contentious for a significant section of Hamas’s
constituency, particularly when regarded as a sign of caving in to
Western pressure. In addition, Hamas already enjoys legitimacy, whether
through its electoral victory, its resistance record, or its charitable work.
The international boycott, meanwhile, has served to increase Hamas’s
legitimacy among many of these audiences. Engagement may, ironically,
reverse this process. Hamas, furthermore, is not a monolithic entity, and
engagement can be a means to strengthen the pragmatists and increase
incentives for non-violent cooperation.16 Non-engagement, conversely,
has served to strengthen Hamas’s hardliners and made Hamas, on
balance, more intransigent.
Finally, the ‘West Bank First’ policy is based on two erroneous
assumptions. First, Fatah is not self-evidently the best partner for
peace. It does not currently have sufficient coherence, strength or
legitimacy to implement a settlement. Its leadership is divided between
internationally fêted technocrats without grassroots support and local
cadres, and it is uncertain whether Fatah is able to translate its opinion
poll lead into an electoral victory, given its dismal performance in
the last election. Crucially, it lacks the legitimacy to implement an
inevitably controversial settlement. In polls, the Fayyad government’s
Jeroen Gunning
legitimacy ratings hover between 25-35 percent, often scoring less than
the Haniyyeh government (chart 1). Under Palestinian law, the Fayyad
government is illegal, since the Legislative Assembly did not approve
it. Only a legal government with a comfortable electoral majority will
be able to implement a settlement – and in the current constellation,
this means some form of National Unity government. A ‘Fatah-only’
policy is thus risky.
Second, the ‘West Bank First’ approach is based on the notion that
popular support for Hamas can be eroded through what amounts
to collective sanctions. However, three years into the boycott, the
Haniyyeh government’s satisfaction ratings are still over 40 percent
within Gaza – despite Gazans being acutely aware of the West Bank’s
relative prosperity (see chart 2). The Fayyad government, with all its
funds, enjoys the same satisfaction ratings.
The case for engagement
There are six reasons why engagement has become imperative. Some
of these are the direct result of non-engagement. First, Hamas is here
to stay. Having survived years of opposition, two Intifadas and an
extended international boycott, it is unlikely to fade away. It has a core
constituency of some 20 percent of the Palestinian electorate, won over
40 percent of the 2006 vote and continues to score around 30 percent
in opinion polls (see chart 1). It may have been pushed underground
in the West Bank but it still has a solid support base.
Second, Hamas represents the concerns of a significant part of the
Palestinian population, well beyond its core constituency. In 20092010, some 70 percent supported Hamas’s opposition to indirect
talks in the absence of an Israeli settlement freeze (including East
Jerusalem).17 Until recently, 50 percent supported Hamas’s position
that elections be postponed until Hamas and Fatah had resolved their
differences, while in August 2009, 44 percent agreed that Hamas should
not concede to Fatah’s demand to accept previous PLO agreements
with Israel.18 Fatah at times represents these concerns, for example,
when (briefly) insisting on a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem. But
too often it does not. Exclusion of Hamas on the ground that it is
ideologically opposed to Israel risks ignoring these concerns, with
serious repercussions for not just the democratic process but any
future political settlement.
17. Significantly, Hamas’s
criticism of the PLO’s
decision to start such talks
focused on Israeli settlement
building, not the principle
of talks itself . See ‘PLO
approves indirect Israel
talks’, Al-Jazeera.net, 9 May
2010. 2010. Available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/
news/middleeast/2010/05/2
01058123236735895.html.
18. Palestinian Center for
Survey and Policy Research
(PSR), Poll no. 33 (Ramallah,
August 2009). Available
at: http://www.pcpsr.org.
101
8
60%
50%
40%
Haniyyeh Government
Legitimacy (G)
30%
Fayyad Government
Legitimacy (WB)
20%
Support for Hamas
10%
Support for Fatah
Mar-10
Dec-09
Sep-09
Jun-09
Mar-09
Dec-08
Sep-08
Jun-08
Dec-07
Mar-08
Sep-07
Jun-07
Mar-07
0%
Chart 1. Government legitimacy ratings (within their own areas) and support for
Hamas and Fatah in case new elections are held (Source: PSR, Ramallah)
50%
45%
40%
Haniyyeh Government
Satisfaction (Gazans)
35%
30%
25%
Fayyad Government
Satisfaction (West
Bankers)
20%
15%
10%
Conditions in Gaza
regarded as good or
very good (Gazans)
5%
0%
09 -09 t-09 -09 -09 n-10 b-10 r-10
09
09
09
v
c
y- un- Jul- ugp
Ja
Oc
Fe
J
Ma
De
Se
No
A
Ma
Conditions in West
Bank regarded as good
or very good (Gazans)
Chart 2. Haniyyeh and Fayyad government ratings and Gazan perceptions of
conditions in Gaza and the West Bank (Source: PSR, Ramallah)
19. The author’s focus here
is primarily on Gaza.
20. Sayigh, op. cit. in note 9.
102
Third, continuation of non-engagement is likely to further entrench
Hamas and strengthen its hardliners.19 The blockade did not directly
weaken Hamas in Gaza, thanks to the extensive underground tunnel
network it commands and its success in streamlining local services,
despite the blockade.20 Instead, it enabled Hamas to rally people behind
an external threat and act in the role of (victimised) ‘saviour’, while
providing a ready excuse for any shortcomings. Fatah’s decision to
boycott all government sectors in the wake of the 2007 takeover
Jeroen Gunning
created a vacuum which Hamas has duly filled with loyalists.21 Hamas’s
military wing was strengthened by the arms race triggered by EU and
US support for Abbas’s Presidential Guard, which in turn triggered
Hamas’s ‘preventative coup’ of June 2007, further strengthening Hamas’s
military wing22 – a process which was facilitated by Iran, towards which
Hamas increasingly turned as a direct result of the boycott (despite
historical and continuing misgivings about Iranian support).23 The dire
economic situation, meanwhile, has meant that more Gazans are now
dependent on Hamas, through aid or salaries paid to civil servants,
than ever before.24
This changed internal power balance has made Hamas, in general, more
intransigent. On the one hand, the boycott has forced the pragmatists (in
Gaza and, eventually, in Damascus) to consider increasingly far-reaching
compromises in a bid to ease sanctions. From refusing to recognise the
PLO’s previous agreements, they came to promise to ‘respect’ them by
early 200725 – a formulation similar to that used by Ariel Sharon vis-à-vis
previous peace agreements.26 From allowing, even aiding, other groups
to attack Israel, they began to arrest those launching rockets (although
other factors played a part).27 From refusing to publicly discuss a twostate solution,28 they publicly, if grudgingly, endorsed such a solution.29
These shifts, while contested, were already underway before the boycott.
But the boycott arguably hastened this process.
On the other hand, the boycott undermined the argument with which the
pragmatists had persuaded the hardliners to enter the electoral process:
that downgrading the resistance was worth the increase in political
power offered by electoral participation. The contempt displayed by
Fatah and the international community towards the electoral outcome,
combined with the subsequent strengthening of Hamas’s military wing,
tipped the balance in favour of the hardliners who won significant gains
in Hamas’s 2008 internal elections.30 The international community’s
failure to respond to the formation of the National Unity government
in 2007 was a further blow to the pragmatists.
A fourth reason to re-engage is that continued non-engagement will
deepen the institutional divide between Gaza and the West Bank,
making a two-state solution even more intractable, and encouraging
autocratic trends in both territories. Hamas’s 2007 takeover severely
ruptured the unity of the two territories. But the boycott has exacerbated
this division. There are now effectively two judiciaries, two security
systems and two separate governments, with Hamas and Fatah virtually
unopposed in their respective domains. Both have committed human
rights abuses against rival activists and clamped down on each others’
institutional structures, shutting down dissenting media, and closing
down opponents’ charities.31 This rivalry has deep historical roots. But
the boycott has given both parties freer rein.
21. Ibid.
22. International Crisis
Group (ICG), ‘After Gaza’,
Middle East Report no.
68, 2 August 2007.
23. House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee
(HCFAC), ‘Global Security:
The Middle East’, Eighth
Report of Session 2006-07
(London: The Stationery
Office, 2007), p. 77.
24. International Crisis Group,
‘Gaza’s Unfinished Business’,
Middle East Report no. 85,
23 April 2009, pp. 8-9;
UNRWA, ‘Emergency
Operations in Gaza’, Interim
Progress Report (Gaza,
January-March 2009), p. 3.
25. International Crisis Group
(ICG), ‘After Mecca’, Middle
East Report no. 62, 28
February 2007, p. 18.
26. Nathalie Tocci, ‘What
Went Wrong? The Impact
of Western Policies towards
Hamas and Hizbollah’,
CEPS Policy Brief no.
135, July 2007, p. 3.
27. ‘Hamas arrests militants
after rocket fire’, Reuters,
10 July 2008; ‘Gaza
militant: Hamas stopping
rocket fire into Israel’,
Haaretz, 12 April 2010.
28. ‘Haniyeh Denies Two-State
Offer’, Arab News, 8 April
2008. See: http://archive.
arabnews.com/?page=4&
section=0&article=80429
&d=8&m=4&y=2006.
29. ‘Hamas renews offer
to end fight if Israel
withdraws’, Reuters, 30
May 2010. See: http://
www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE64T2AM20100530.
30. For discussion of hardliners’
gains (but ignoring boycott’s
impact), Matthew Levitt,
‘Hamas’s Ideological Crisis’,
Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology, vol. 9, November
2009, pp. 86-88.
31. Sayigh, op. cit. in note
9; Emanuel Schäublin,
‘The West Bank Zakat
Committees (1977–2009)
in the Local Context’,
CCDP Working Paper no.
5, Graduate Institute,
November 2009, p. 19.
103
8
Finally, the boycott has increased the possibility of violent radicalisation
within the Gaza Strip. The relationship between structural conditions
and violent radicalisation is complex and by no means deterministic.
Nevertheless, rising unemployment combined with a high youth ratio, a
sharp decrease in income and rising perceptions of inequality, particularly
if they overlap with ethnic divisions, can all be contributory factors,
especially if they combine with political factors, such as occupation,
repression and (a perceived) lack of non-violent political opportunities.32
The rise of Salafi-Jihadi groups challenging Hamas must be seen against
this context. While the blockade is the major culprit, non-engagement
has contributed to the situation, weakening the economy even before
the blockade began33 and rendering political options less credible.
A model for engagement?
32. Brynjar Lia, ‘Causes of
Terrorism: An Expanded
and Updated Review of
the Literature’, FFI-Report
2004/04307 (Kjeller, Norway:
Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment, 2004).
33. ‘Poverty in Palestine: the
human cost of the financial
boycott’, Oxfam Briefing
Note, Oxfam International,
Oxford, April 2007.
official, June 2010.
35. Address by Ambassador
Thomas Greminger,
Policy Briefing, Brussels,
28 May 2008.
36. Other factors, such as a
legal challenge by Gaza’s
female lawyers, played a
part (See ‘Hamas patrols
beaches in Gaza to enforce
conservative dress code’, The
Guardian, 18 October 2009).
37. Interviews with Swiss
officials (March 2009,
August 2009, June 2010).
104
The Swiss provide an interesting example of the possibilities of
engagement. Switzerland has been among the few European states to
maintain contact with Hamas, as part of its policy of engaging all parties
to a conflict. Through engagement it sought to develop a framework for
dialogue between Hamas and the West, to better understand Hamas’s
positions, and to provide a space for discussing practical issues.34 Of
particular interest is what Switzerland calls ‘dialogue through practice’,
engaging Hamas at a practical level to both probe what ‘threatening
terms’ mean in practice (examples could include ‘implementation of
Sharia or jihad until the Day of Judgement’) and to explore issues which
might have short-term practical solutions.35
The Swiss government has engaged Hamas on a number of practical
issues. It has worked with Hamas, and others, to further develop the
concept of ‘hudna’, or long-term ceasefire – which leaders such as Ahmad
Yassin and Ismail Abu Shannab had mooted as early as the 1990s – to
see whether this could constitute a basis for restarting the peace process.
It led numerous discussions on Gaza’s border management to develop
an alternative to the siege policy, to which all parties, Hamas, Fatah
and Israel, could agree. It has provided Hamas with copies of previous
agreements between Israel and the PLO as well as documents relating
to the Geneva Accord. Finally, it has made direct interventions on
particular policies, such as Hamas’s appropriation of UNRWA goods
in the wake of Operation Cast Lead, or the Chief Justice’s decree that all
female lawyers wear a hijab in court – in both instances contributing to
the policy being reversed.36 Switzerland has also regularly denounced
human rights violations, regarding for instance the death penalty,
political arrests, and the intimidations of NGOs.37
Jeroen Gunning
What can be learned from these examples? First, Switzerland deals with
the question of legitimisation by, on the one hand, lessening the status
of engagement by engaging all parties, rather than using it as a reward,
and on the other, by keeping their engagement out of the limelight,
something which Hamas has honoured for its own reasons.
Second, these examples show that Hamas is interested in cooperating
with Western governments to find a way out. It may be unwilling to
go as far as the EU or Israel would like. But it has shown willingness to
explore compromise – even while knowing that Israel and Fatah would
be briefed on any progress made. This interest was not limited to a few,
marginalised pragmatists but included a number of Hamas’s top political
leadership.38 Hamas, moreover, has heeded criticisms and alternative
suggestions. It returned the goods to UNRWA, revoked the hijab decree,
and removed links to the notorious forgery The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion from an affiliated website, when prompted.39 Engagement therefore
does not equal uncritical acceptance but offers an opportunity to expose
Hamas to alternative viewpoints – particularly important for Hamas’s
Gazan leadership, many of whom have not been outside Gaza.40
Third, engagement with the Swiss arguably strengthened the pragmatists
within Hamas by keeping the political option on the table, rewarding
pragmatism and, crucially, allowing Hamas leaders to be heard on
their own terms. However, the fact that those involved denied having
contributed to the process suggests that engagement was considered
problematic in the eyes of Hamas’s constituency.41
Finally, these examples underline the importance of ownership and
power. The hudna document and the various border discussions were
sidelined because they did not have the support of the US and various
key EU states. The hudna document’s value was further undermined by
Fatah exposing the talks prematurely. The Swiss acknowledge that more
Track 2 diplomacy should have been carried out to enable the document
to become jointly ‘owned’ by Fatah and Hamas (like the prisoners’
document in May 2006). A third factor was Hamas’s paramilitary wing.
Although Switzerland was careful to talk to Hamas leaders in both
Gaza and Damascus, it did not engage the military leadership, believing
this to be an internal issue for Hamas.42 Given the changed internal
power balance, this may have been a crucial oversight as without the
paramilitary wing’s consent, any compromise will be short-lived.
However, the Swiss emphasise this is a long-term process.43 Some of
the principles developed in the hudna document have been echoed in
subsequent statements by Hamas’s Damascus leadership. The Gaza border
discussions may yet bear fruit when the siege is lifted. Engagement is
also about building long-term relationships.44 Hamas heeded Swiss
critiques of its hijab policy arguably precisely because it had come to
38. Interview with Swiss official
(March 2009); ‘Palestinian
sources say UK involved
in drafting of Hamas
document’, BBC Monitoring
Middle East – Political,
25 December 2006.
39. Interviews with Swiss
officials (March 2009).
40. Ibid.
41. ‘Palestinian official says
unity government to meet
some Quartet conditions’,
BBC Monitoring Middle East
– Political, 14 March 2007.
official (June 2010).
43. Ibid.
44. Interview with Swiss official
(March 2009, June 2010).
105
8
value its Swiss interlocutors’ perspectives. Swiss interlocutors, meanwhile,
gained a deeper insight into the intentions of Hamas leaders through
prolonged contact.
Situating engagement
The Swiss model suggests that engagement could be a more constructive
way to persuade Hamas to alter its position than non-engagement which
locks Hamas into an echo chamber of like-mindedness. However,
even if the EU opts for engagement (which, as with the Swiss, is likely
to increase tensions with Israel, although there is a constituency for
engagement within Israel),45 there are limits to how far Hamas can be
moved – with serious implications for the EU’s conditions.
First, Hamas is determined not to become ‘Fatah II’. According to
Hamas’s reading, Fatah made the tactical error of renouncing violence
and recognising Israel before securing statehood. There are additional
ideological reasons for Hamas’s refusal to recognise Israel and renounce
violence. But there are indications that for the pragmatists these issues
may have become more tactical than ideological.46 In addition, Hamas
leaders do not want to be accused of having given up Palestinian rights
in return for power. Already, supporters have started to accuse them
of selling out, with some defecting to the Salafi-Jihadi camp. Hamas’s
pragmatists are therefore unlikely to agree to the Quartet’s principles
without solid guarantees of a state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Second, the pragmatists have to keep on the right side of the hardliners.
When ‘radical organisations’ become tactically more pragmatic, they
usually go through a stage of reaffirming their radical goals in order to
confirm their hardline credentials (resulting in mixed messages). If they
move too far, too fast, they risk being sidelined or worse. Commenting
on the demand to recognise Israel’s right to exist, a leading pragmatist
remarked: ‘If I did, I would end up like Michael Collins’ (referring to the
Irish Republican leader’s assassination following his acceptance of the partition
of Ireland in 1921).47 Judged by where Hamas started, the pragmatists have
come a considerable way. If they go further, they risk cutting themselves
off, and becoming like Fatah’s internationally fêted technocrats.
45. See ‘Why can we talk
to Hamas about Shalit,
but not peace?’, Haaretz,
26 November 2009.
official (June 2010).
47. ‘Hamas touts 10-year
ceasefire to break deadlock
over Israel’, The Guardian,
1 November 2006.
106
Third, the last four years have raised the prize of compromise. Having held
out for so long, Hamas has less incentive to make further compromises
without significant returns. The fact that previous dialogue, such as that
pioneered by the Swiss, has not resulted in change on the ground because
of obstructions elsewhere has made people warier, further raising the
bar. Moreover, not only have hardliners become stronger, but the number
of people who benefit from a continuation of the boycott (such as the
Jeroen Gunning
new class of tunnel entrepreneurs or Hamas’s paramilitary leadership
who would have to share power with Fatah) has increased.
Whether those who benefit from the conflict remain more powerful
than the pragmatists is dependent on the political opportunity structure.
The period when Hamas displayed most restraint and underwent the
most significant policy transformations coincided with the lead-up
to the 2006 legislative election, when the prospect of electoral gains
(coupled with relative military fatigue and a weakening of support from
Syria and Iran) gave pragmatists the upper hand, which in turn led
to Hamas actively wooing moderate voters and seeking international
recognition.48
Engagement will raise many difficulties. But given that non-engagement
has failed to break the current impasse, has further entrenched Hamas
while strengthening its hardliners, and made thousands of ordinary
Gazans suffer, engagement is a risk worth taking. Hamas is here to stay
and needs to be included for any political settlement to work. Fatah
is too weak to implement a peace deal. A continued boycott will only
serve to deepen the divide between Gaza and the West Bank and further
weaken the pragmatists. Some form of engagement is thus imperative
if the goal of a two-state solution is to be kept alive.
The Swiss experience suggests that engagement can play a part in
persuading Hamas to heed international norms, while ensuring that
Hamas’s concerns are taken into account as well as Israel’s and Fatah’s.
But, while single states such as Switzerland can play important bridging
functions, they cannot change the incentive structure sufficiently to
make compromise pay.
The Quartet’s principles, while crucial as goals, are counterproductive
as preconditions. Hamas’s pragmatists are not in a position to accept
them, without risking ostracisation and losing the grassroots support
that is essential to make any political settlement work. In their current
formulation they are regarded as one-sided demands for surrender, as
opposed to principles demanded of both sides (i.e. Israeli recognition
of a Palestinian state, renunciation of violence and full adherence to
previous agreements). Rather than insisting on full, one-sided compliance
and creating an incentive structure which makes a National Unity
government unattractive, the EU should lead the way by encouraging
the formation of a National Unity government which is committed to
maintaining a ceasefire (and the release of Shalit in return for a prisoner
exchange), dealing with Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders, respecting
48. Gunning, op. cit. in
note 9, pp. 220-40.
107
8
previous agreements, and, through this, engaging Hamas members
qua government officials. This will increase opportunities for mutual
learning while rewarding pragmatism, without necessarily rewarding
intransigence. Given the power balance within Hamas, it is crucial that
the EU focus on Hamas’s behaviour, rather than its rhetoric, which will
continue to oscillate between pragmatism and rejection.49
The cost of engagement may be to confer international legitimacy on
Hamas. But as the Swiss put it: the choice is either an internationally
stronger Hamas with the pragmatists in control, or an internationally
isolated but locally strong Hamas with the hardliners at the helm.50
49. House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee, op. cit.
in note 23, pp. 30-31.
official (March 2009).
108
Chapter 9
Regional approaches to the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the
role of the European Union
Introduction
Any progress on the Israeli-Arab conflict will depend on both regional
ownership and full US commitment. Accordingly, ensuring the mutual
responsiveness of US and regional diplomacy must be a core objective
of European policy. Moreover, Europe’s role is unlikely to be to change
the strategic calculation of the regional actors; instead, it is more likely
to play a key role as a facilitator of the negotiations and supporter of
the implementation. With the Arab Peace Initiative (API) there is a
proposal on the table that enjoys regional ownership, offers avenues to
addressing one of the most pressing regional security concerns within a
multilateral framework, and outlines the parameters of a comprehensive
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, intensive negotiations
between the conflicting parties and political efforts on all sides will be
necessary to establish the conditions for the API to materialise. This
will also require sophisticated and decisive diplomatic leadership from
the US with the support of the EU and the Quartet.
The failure of recent US and EU efforts to get the Arab states to underscore
their commitment to the API by making additional gestures towards
Israel does not belie the importance of this document. However, before
the API vision of a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict
can be implemented, progress must be achieved on the different tracks of
the conflict. European diplomatic efforts should build on proposals that
already exist in this context: they should support ongoing US efforts to
ensure that the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations yield a positive outcome.
Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s proposal to establish a viable
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza by the summer of 2011
might be another avenue to promote progress on the Israeli-Palestinian
track. A revival of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations and reconsideration of
the proposals to resolve the dispute over the Golan Heights formulated
109
9
Regional approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the European Union
in Track Two negotiations might be a point of departure for the IsraeliSyrian track.
The role of regional actors: dimensions
and developments
For over half a century the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a prominent
feature of international affairs, destabilising the Middle East and at
times having a direct impact on politics beyond the region. In fact, the
Middle East faces a conglomerate of conflicts, not only the Arab-Israeli
one with its three tracks – Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Lebanese and
Israeli-Syrian – but also intra-Palestinian and intra-Lebanese conflict.
There are rivalries between the Arab regional powers Egypt and Saudi
Arabia on the one hand and Iran with its regional ambitions on the other
hand. Iraq’s stability must still be consolidated and its future regional
role defined. Closely related is the still unanswered Kurdish question in
the region. Moreover, the US and the EU share concerns in the region
over Iran’s disputed nuclear and missile programmes.
Most Europeans tend to agree that the US is the only actor powerful
enough to change the strategic calculation of the regional actors and
push them towards resolving their disputes. Indeed, major achievements
in conflict resolution that have occurred historically must be ascribed
to the US: the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement after the Yom-Kippur
War, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace in 1979, the fact that the Madrid peace
conference took off in 1991 and prepared the ground for the Oslo accords
and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. These achievements
underscore the importance of US engagement for progress in the IsraeliArab conflict.1 The US’s crucial role was additionally highlighted by the
destabilising impact on the region that resulted from the diplomatic
absence of the US in the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict or
the American refusal to diplomatically engage with Iran during the
presidency of George W. Bush, whereby it sought a military solution
to regional problems, most notably with the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
1. On the US role, see in
particular Aaron Miller, The
Much Too Promised Land:
America’s Elusive Search
for Arab-Israeli Peace (New
York: Bantam Books, 2008)
and: Daniel Kurtzer and
Scott Lasensky, Negotiating
Arab-Israeli Peace. American
Leadership in the Middle East
(Washington: US Institute
for Peace Press, 2008).
110
Yet, during all these periods regional actors played a decisive yet
underestimated role, too. Israeli-Egyptian peace would never have been
possible without Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s historic visit to
Jerusalem in 1977, which not only helped give the negotiations under
US guidance new momentum, but was also an act of public diplomacy
to build the minimum of trust that was needed for the peace accord
eventually reached at Camp David in 1979. Moreover, the Israel-Jordan
Peace Treaty was also eventually achieved, concluded and reaffirmed
because the parties used the positive environment that was created
with the Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords to engage in direct
negotiations, complemented by important public diplomacy gestures
by Jordan’s King Hussein in 1997. Last but not least, in the case of the
Oslo Accords it was direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis,
with Norway as a facilitating mediator, that produced the results. More
recently, during the presidency of George W. Bush and the years of US
diplomatic absence in the Middle East, regional actors displayed a great
willingness to take diplomatic initiatives:2
At the peak of the violence during the second Intifada in 2002, following
an initiative of Saudi Arabia, the Arab League (AL) proposed the Arab
Peace Initiative (API), offering a comprehensive resolution of the ArabIsraeli conflict. In 2007 the AL reaffirmed its offer.
Turkey has sought a regional role in the Middle East and therefore
taken a very proactive stance towards its Southern and Eastern
neighbourhood.3 Ankara invested a lot of political and diplomatic effort
in its mediation between Israel and Syria that was, however, brought
to a sudden end with the start of the Gaza War between Hamas and
Israel in December 2008. In addition, Turkey has also been involved
in initiatives to address other regional challenges like the dispute
between Lebanon and Syria and concerning the stability of Iraq as
well as of Lebanon. Moreover, after the election of President Barack
Obama, Turkey also proposed to mediate between Iran and the US
and in cooperation with Brazil tried to broker a partial compromise
on the Iranian nuclear programme.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt took the regional lead to mediate in the conflict
between Hamas and Fatah in order to overcome the political and territorial
rift in the Palestinian camp and because they assume that reconciliation
between the two factions is a precondition for the sustainability of any
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.4 Moreover, both countries
are also concerned that the international isolation of Hamas has offered
their regional rival Iran an avenue to increase its influence on the ArabIsraeli conflict through support to Hamas.
A mediation effort by Saudi Arabia in 2007 resulted in the Mecca
Agreement and the establishment of a national unity government.
However, the agreement lacked US backing and subsequently broke
down, following which the conflict between Hamas and Fatah escalated,
ultimately resulting in Hamas taking power in the Gaza Strip by
force.
The growing Iranian influence in the Levant and fear of a spill-over
from Gaza to Egypt – as vividly demonstrated by the breach of the
Gaza-Egyptian border in January 2008 – prompted Egypt to proactively
seek to mediate Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and broker a truce between
2. For a more detailed
discussion of these
regional mediation efforts
see: Michael Bauer and
Julia-Kristina Ismar,
‘Regional problems –
regional solutions? Taking
stock of recent mediation
efforts in the Middle
East’, Policy Analysis no.
5, Center for Applied
Policy Research (C.A.P),
Munich, November 2008.
3. For the strategic rationale
of Turkey’s regional policy
see: Ahmet Davutoglu,
‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy
Vision. An Assessment of
2007’, Insight Turkey, vol.
10, no. 10, pp. 77-96.
4. For a discussion of Egyptian
and Saudi mediation efforts
see: Joseph Kostiner and
Chelsi Mueller, ‘Egyptian
and Saudi Intervention
in the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process (2006-09):
Local Powers Mediation
Compared’, in Uzi Rabi (ed.),
International Intervention
in Local Conflicts: Crisis
Management and Conflict
Resolution since the Cold
War (London: Tauris
Academic Studies, November
2010), pp. 201-221.
111
9
Hamas and Israel to end Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Neither initiative,
however, yielded sustainable results.
Qatar not only negotiated a ceasefire between the warring factions in
Lebanon, resulting in the Doha Agreement of May 2008, but also played
an important role in the reconciliation of Lebanon and Syria that led
to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries
the same year. Both initiatives also received substantial support from
within the region and from Europe.
Moreover, Qatar has made a sustained effort to mediate in Sudan’s
civil wars as it hosts talks between the Sudanese government and rebel
groups, and has tried to broker a ceasefire in Yemen’s Saada province,
between the government and the Houthi rebels.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries made an important
public diplomacy effort to reduce the tensions in the Arab-Iranian rivalry
when they invited Iran’s president Ahmadinejad to attend the GCC
summit in 2007; in a similar vein, Saudi Arabia invited Ahmadinejad
to visit Mecca for the hajj pilgrimage in the same year.
This array of initiatives emanating from the region shows that it is not
only the well-established regional powers Saudi Arabia and Egypt that
exercise soft power in regional affairs, but also increasingly new actors
such as Turkey and Qatar.
Compared to the high expectations the initiatives mentioned above have
often raised, they show only mixed results in terms of sustainability
and success. This is partly due to the fact that the initiators often lacked
the resources to actually follow through with their initiative and insist
on agreements that had been reached. For instance, this has become
apparent in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Qatar which are in a position
to bring the conflict parties to the negotiating table – not least because of
their vast financial resources – yet do not have the diplomatic manpower
and political capacities to supervise and enforce an agreement.5
5. See Kostiner and Mueller,
op. cit. in note 4. On Qatar
see also: Katja Niethammer
and Guido Steinberg, Katars
Nahostpolitik, SWP Aktuell
18,SWP, Berlin, 2009.
112
The failure of such initiatives, however, should not be unfairly ascribed
to their initiators alone, but also to the lack of international support
that they garnered. Given the complexity and interdependence of the
conflicts in the Middle East, a combination of regional ownership and
international support is needed to address them effectively. The successful
cases of regional conflict resolution such as the Israeli-Egyptian Camp
David accord, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty or the Doha Agreement
confirm this point.
Ownership and commitment: coordinating
regional and international efforts
Three aspects are of particular importance when discussing the role of
regional actors and initiatives for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict
and its three tracks. First, in the long run only regional actors can offer
Israel a compact for peace and security that goes beyond a ‘cold peace’
and offers it the prospects to become an accepted actor and neighbour
in the region, with avenues for regional cooperation and integration.
Second, regional actors are often perceived as legitimate mediators
who seem to be genuinely interested in resolving the conflicts that
have a direct impact on them; this is of course not to forget that their
involvement in conflict resolution efforts is not an end itself, but must
always be seen within the context of their broader domestic, regional
and international interests.6 Third, regional actors are usually very
well aware of the cultural, historical and by extension also political
complexities of the conflicts and possess unique access to the relevant
actors, which is often not the case for Western diplomats.
The Arab Peace Initiative
As a regional proposal to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict with all its
implications the Arab Peace Initiative (API) stands out. The API was
proposed by the Arab League (AL) in its 2002 Beirut Declaration, which
was based on an initiative by the then Saudi Crown-Prince Abdullah.
On the basis of the relevant UN resolutions, the API essentially offers
Israel a peace agreement with all Arab countries and normal relations
in exchange for a ‘full Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied
since 1967’ including the Golan Heights and Shebaa Farms; a ‘just
solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with UN
GA Resolution 194’; and Israeli ‘acceptance of the establishment of a
sovereign independent Palestinian state (…) in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.’7
Initially, the Saudi Crown Prince and other moderate Arab leaders like
the King of Jordan envisaged the API as offering Israel a ‘normalisation’
of its relations with the Arab states. Moreover, they had also proposed
to address the Palestinian refugee problem without a specific reference
to UNGA resolution 194 in order not to overload the document with a
debate about the ‘right of return’. However, Syria in particular and also
Lebanon had insisted on a wording that would be less forthcoming for
Israel and more explicit about the refugee problem, and Saudi Arabia
gave in to their demands in order to ensure the widest possible Arab
backing for the API.8
6. For a brief overview on
resources, interests and
strategies of regional actors,
see for instance Bauer and
Ismar, op. cit. in note 2,
pp. 10-9; on Qatar see
Niethammer and Steinberg,
op. cit. in note 5; and for a
rather critical assessment of
the interests of Egypt and
Saudi Arabia see Martin
Indyk, Innocent Abroad. An
intimate account of American
Peace Diplomacy in the Middle
East (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2009) pp. 50-9.
7. The Arab League’s Beirut
Declaration on the Saudi
Peace Initiative, 28 March
www.al-bab.com/arab/
docs/league/peace02.htm.
8. See Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,
‘Arabs vs. the Abdullah
Plan’, Middle East Quarterly,
Summer 2010, pp. 3-12.
113
9
Even though these intra-Arab disputes over concrete wording and
the absence of a number of heads of state at the adoption of the API
diminished the document’s eminence, the API nonetheless underscored
a shift in Arab states’ attitudes towards Israel.9 The Six Day War of 1967
was famously followed by the ‘three No’s’ – no peace with Israel, no
recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel – as stated in the
AL’s Khartoum Resolution the same year. In contrast, the API is the first
document to offer Israel a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, based on the concept of Land for Peace and with the backing
of all Arab countries and not just individual actors. Moreover, in June
2002, even the members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), including Iran and Turkey, endorsed the API. Hence, what was
put on the table was nothing less than a comprehensive deal to end
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The fact that the API was reaffirmed by the
AL in 2007 and sustained by the Arab states even after the 2008-2009
Gaza War demonstrates that among Arab states there is still a general
consensus that considers the concept of Land for Peace and a two-state
solution valid, with the API as the vehicle to reach this objective.
9. See Michaela Birk and
Ahmed Badawi, ‘Bedeutung
und Wandel der Arabischen
Friedensinitiative’, Aus
Politik und Zeitgeschichte
9/2010, pp. 36-7.
10. Yossi Alpher, ‘IsraelArab Peace: Israel and the
Regional Approach’, in:
Christian-Peter Hanelt
and Almut Möller (eds.),
Bound to Cooperate – Europe
and the Middle East II
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann
Stiftung, 2008) pp. 152-3.
11. Ibid., p. 153.
12. Ibid., pp. 162-3; see also
Kostiner and Mueller,
op. cit. in note 4.
114
Given that the API seemed to offer Israel exactly what it had wanted for
the last fifty years, namely peace with its Arab neighbours and a place in
the region, the Israeli side did not react as many would have expected.
In fact, between 2002 and 2007 there was no indication from the Israeli
government that it was seriously considering the API a valuable offer
to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.10 Several factors played a role here:
in 2002, against the background of the second Intifada, the Israeli
government regarded regional involvement as contrary to its interests.
Moreover, from the Israeli point of view the API’s political credibility
was weakened, as it neither received wide public backing in many Arab
countries, nor was it accompanied by major public diplomacy efforts on
the Arab side. Instead, it was suspected in Israel that the AL expected
the EU and US to exercise pressure on Israel to accept the proposal.11
The repeated reaffirmation of the API from the Arab League has actually
increased its credibility for Israel, but, as became clear in the run-up to
the 2007 re-offering of the API, there is still a lot of scepticism as to the
actual meaning of the API, especially with regard to the future of the
Palestinian refugees and the question of their right to return to Israel.
The foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan visiting Israel as delegates of
the AL to present the API publicly in 2007 could not overcome Israeli
qualms. There is still a need for additional gestures to reassure Israel
that the Arab side will actually deliver on its promises and encourage
Israel to make concessions, too.12 Moreover, in particular on the question
of Palestinian refugees, Israel expects the Arabs countries to contribute
to a regional solution.
For the European Union and its Member States the API fits very well
with their conception of how to address conflicts through multilateral
and regionally embedded approaches.13 Hence, the EU welcomed
the proposal of the API and has made the document a major point of
reference for its statements on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli
conflict.14 The API has also been embraced within the framework of the
Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean.15 Moreover,
the API has also become a point of reference for international efforts to
address the Arab-Israeli conflict as can be seen from its incorporation
into the so-called ‘Roadmap’ of the Middle East Quartet.
Prospects and challenges for diplomacy
by a multilateral actor
Apart from political declarations, the Europeans have mostly played
an indirect role in Middle Eastern conflicts. Concerning the IsraeliPalestinian track, they have engaged in humanitarian aid and institutionbuilding for the Palestinian National Authority (PA), financed people-topeople contacts between Israel and Palestine, and strengthened bilateral
relations with Israel. On the back of the Oslo Process, the EU sought to
develop a regional framework in which it could cooperate with Israelis,
Arabs and Turks. Therefore it launched the Barcelona Process and the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in November 1995. When
Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated consequently, joint projects in
the EMP were put on hold, too, and the EU as a multilateral external
actor exercised little leverage to overcome this deadlock.
Acknowledging the shortcomings of its past endeavours as well as
the importance of the US, the EU sought to get the administration of
George W. Bush re-engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict through the
Quartet. The EU was involved in the initiation of the Roadmap and
European pressure was one of the factors that eventually caused the US to
launch the Annapolis process. In particular the German EU presidency
successfully used the Quartet as a forum to coordinate international
efforts towards the Middle East. As the EU was more forthcoming
with regard to regional initiatives in general, this also influenced the
Quartet’s position. Moreover, the inauguration of the Union for the
Mediterranean (UfM) on 13 July 2008, which was explicitly presented
as a peace project too, offered Israel and Palestine as well as Syria and
Lebanon a forum to engage in public diplomacy. In particular France
played a very active role supporting the rapprochement between Syria
and Lebanon that followed.
The Europeans also became more active in other Middle Eastern conflicts:
since the US had refused to directly negotiate with Iran, an informal
coalition consisting of the UK, France and Germany exercised diplomatic
13. ‘A Secure Europe in a
Better World’, European
12 December 2003, p. 8.
Union, Brussels, 12 and
13 December 2003,
Presidency Conclusions,
Brussels, 5 February 2004
(5381/04), p. 17; Council
Conclusions on the Middle
East Peace Process, Brussels,
8 December 2009, p. 1
15. See, for instance, EuroMediterranean Partnership,
Euro-Mediterranean
Conference of Foreign
Ministers (Valencia,
22 and 23 April 2002),
Conclusions, Brussels,
24 April, 2002, (EUROMED 2/02), p. 4; Barcelona
Process: Union for the
Mediterranean Ministerial
Conference, Marseilles, 3-4
November 2008 (15187/08
[Press 314]), p. 3.
115
9
leadership in the negotiations with Tehran about the disputed Iranian
nuclear programme. The EU took common responsibility towards
Iraq by upgrading the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) under
negotiations into a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).
The EU states showed their strongest military commitment vis-à-vis
the region, however, as the main provider of troops for the UNIFIL II
mission in Lebanon.16
16. See chapter by Muriel
Asseburg in this
volume, pp. 75-85.
17. Patrick Müller, ‚Die EU, die
Hamas und die Krise im
israelisch-palästinensischen
Friedensprozess’, SWP
Studie S 8, SWP, Berlin,
March 2009, pp. 7-8.
Union, Council
Conclusions (6039/07),
February 2007, p. 15.
19. See Edward Burke, Ana
Echagüe and Richard
Youngs, ‘Why the European
Union needs a “broader
Middle East” policy’,
Working Paper 93, FRIDE,
Madrid, February 2010, p. 8.
20. See for instance the broader
discussion on EU-GCC
cooperation with regard to
regional security challenges
in: Michael Bauer and
Christian-Peter Hanelt,
‘Europe and the Gulf Region
– Towards a New Horizon’,
Discussion Paper of the
12th Kronberg Middle East
Talks, Riyadh/Gütersloh,
May 2009, pp. 14-21.
116
Hence, Europe’s Middle East involvement has clearly gained a higher
profile over the last decade. On the other hand, however, on many
of the occasions Europe’s limitations have come to the fore again.
UNIFIL II notwithstanding, the EU’s lack of hard security is limiting
its attractiveness and credibility for Israel as a partner to substantially
contribute to Israeli security. Moreover, the EU’s internal structure has
limited its political impact on the Middle East. Europe’s treaties and
negotiations with the regional actors would actually lead to faster and
more credible results if the EU did not appear to be disunited. The 27
are united with regard to grand strategy, but divided when it comes
to practical politics. The most glaring example is the conflict within
the EU that became apparent when the EU tried to find a position
on the Gaza War in 2008. Moreover, also on the question of how to
deal with Hamas after its victory in the Palestinian elections, the EU
was initially not able to find a unified approach and as a result had to
accept in the Quartet the US position of isolating Hamas.17 And even
though Europeans welcomed18 Saudi mediation between Hamas and
Fatah they failed to support the Mecca Agreement, representing a
‘missed opportunity’19 for the reconciliation of the Palestinian camp.
Moreover, in the actual negotiation process in Annapolis, Europeans
were diplomatically sidelined and although European negotiations with
Iran ensured that the situation did not deteriorate altogether by keeping
channels of communication open, they nonetheless failed to achieve
substantial results. And even with the upgraded framework of the UfM,
a summit meeting scheduled for June 2010 was postponed because of
lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track.
No doubt, some of the EU’s shortcomings can be overcome and the Treaty
of Lisbon will – once it is successfully implemented – strengthen the EU’s
foreign policy institutions. Moreover, international circumstances have
improved as the US administration under President Barack Obama is
clearly more willing to get diplomatically engaged in the region. However,
the EU’s foreign policy is a product of a multilateral process and hence,
the EU will always face some limitations in terms of its ‘actorness’.
Nonetheless, if the Europeans coordinate their activities with their
partners in the region20 and the proactive regional policy of US president
Obama, they can offer important diplomatic backing for a resolution
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular provide support for the
implementation phase of an agreement.
As has become clear in the analysis above, a major objective for European
involvement should be raising the mutual awareness of US and regional
actors about their respective diplomatic initiatives: any progress on the
Arab-Israeli conflict will depend on both regional ownership and sincerity
as well as full US commitment. As a long-standing, internationally and
– albeit to varying degrees – also regionally recognised proposal for a
comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the API represents
a major point of reference for this challenging diplomatic endeavour.
The API outlines a resolution for one of the central conflicts in the
Middle East; however, intensive negotiations on the different tracks of
the Arab-Israeli conflict will be necessary to establish the conditions
for this regional vision to be realised. Looking at Europe’s foreign
policy record in the region and taking into account its limitations as a
multilateral actor, the EU’s main contribution will be as a facilitating
mediator as well as in the implementation phase of an agreement. As
the US made great efforts to initiate negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians, the EU should aim to expand its role in these negotiations
in order to increase their prospects of success. In addition, the statebuilding plan of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad is another
promising approach as it seeks to demonstrate that Palestinian political
and institutional development can be reconciled with Israeli security
needs. And last but not least, past negotiations have provided for a
remarkable diplomatic foundation on which a revival of the SyrianIsraeli track could be built.
Only through substantial progress on these different tracks can the
conditions for a comprehensive approach be put in place. This would
then have to be an inclusive approach, open for all stakeholders to
participate, and at the same time requiring them to display the kind of
commitment to the peace process that is actually needed to reassure
all stakeholders.
Moreover, it is a conditio sine qua non for the results of negotiations
on the individual tracks and any comprehensive agreement to be
sustainable that they include clear definitions of the obligations of the
Israelis, Arabs and the international community, specific timeframes,
clear benchmarks and appropriate monitoring mechanisms. Europeans
can play an important role in the implementation process to support
the parties to fulfil their obligations, support regional confidence117
9
building, monitor the whole process and act as a facilitator when the
implementation of the agreement encounters unintended obstacles.
Since the territorial re-arrangements of an Arab-Israeli peace treaty
will also require international contribution to a consolidation of the
security relations between Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians,
the Europeans should also be willing to play a role here through a
contribution within the framework of the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) or through contributions of EU Member States.
EU missions such as EUBAM at the Egyptian-Gaza border or the
police-training mission EUPOL COPPS in the West Bank might serve
as examples here as well as EU Member States’ contributions to UN
forces in the region, such as on the Golan Heights or in south Lebanon.
Last but not least, projects such as the European Neighbourhood Policy
or the Union for the Mediterranean can develop their full potential as
frameworks for regional cooperation and development in the context
of a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
118
Annex:
A
Annexes
List of supporting documents1
This list contains a number of documents referred to in the Chaillot Paper. A wider selection of
relevant EU documents can be accessed via the EUISS EU Security and Defence: Core Documents
Series, published annually and available on the EUISS website at www.iss.europa.eu
Joint statement by the Governments of the EEC (6 November 1973)
Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East
http://www.ena.lu/joint_statement_governments_eec_november_1973-020002394.html
Venice European Council Declaration (13 June 1980)
http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf
Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (27-28 November
1995)
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf
Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement between the European Community
and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (July 1997)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21997A0716(01):EN:HTML
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the European Communities and
their Member States, and the State of Israel (June 2000)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:147:0003:0156:EN:PDF
Official translation of the Arab Peace Initiative, Arab League Beirut Summit (28 March
2002)
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/5a7229b652beb9c5c1256b8a005
4b62e
A Performance-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict by the Quartet (30 April 2003)
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2283_en.htm
A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy (December 2003)
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf
1. This Annex was compiled by Suzanne Lavender, Assistant to the Fellows, EUISS
119
A
Annex:
European Neighbourhood Policy EU/Israel Action Plan (April 2005)
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/israel_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
European Neighbourhood Policy EU/Palestinian Authority Action Plan (May 2005)
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/pa_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
Council Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories,
Council of the European Union (14 November 2005)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:300:0065:0069:EN:
PDF
Israel-Palestinian Authority Agreement on Movement and Access and Agreed Principles
for Rafah Crossing (15 November 2005)
http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87237.htm
Council Joint Action on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the
Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), Council of the European Union (12 December
2005)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:327:0028:0032:EN:P
DF
Quartet Statement, London (30 January 2006)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/88201.
pdf
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (11 August 2006)
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.
pdf?OpenElement
Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean (13 July 2008)
http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declaration_de_paris/
Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf
‘Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State’, Programme of the Thirteenth Government,
Palestinian National Authority, (August 2009)
http://www.mop-gov.ps/web_files/issues_file/090825%20Ending%20Occupation,%20
Establishing%20the%20State%20-%20Program%20of%20the%2013%20government.
pdf
Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, 2985th Foreign Affairs Council
meeting, Council of the European Union, Brussels (8 December 2009)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/111829.pdf
Quartet Statement, Moscow (19 March 2010)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/113436.
pdf
120
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Council conclusions on Gaza, 3023rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Council of the
European Union, Luxembourg (14 June 2010) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/115158.pdf
Middle East Quartet Statement (21 September 2010) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/116664.pdf
Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, 3058th Foreign Affairs Council
meeting, Council of the European Union, Brussels (13 December 2010) http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/foraff/118396.pdf
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Annex:
About the authors
A
About the authors
Muriel Asseburg is the head of the Middle East and Africa division of the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs in Berlin. She studied political science, international law and economics at Ludwig
Maximilians University in Munich where she obtained a Ph.D with a thesis on ‘Palestinian
State and Nation Building in the Interim Period’ in 2000. Previously, she worked as a
research associate at SWP from 1995-2000 and, in 2000-2001 she served as a programme
coordinator and deputy head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s office in Jerusalem. She
has published extensively on the Middle East conflict, German, European and US Middle
East policies, European civil and military deployments as well as questions of state building,
political reform and political Islam in the Arab world.
Michael Bauer is Research Fellow at the Research Group on European Affairs of the Center
for Applied Policy Research (CAP). The regional focus of his research is on Middle East
Politics with a special emphasis on the Gulf region. He heads the CAP project on Europe
and the Middle East. In addition, he works on various aspects of international security
policy and risk studies, in particular on the issues of counterterrorism and nuclear security.
Michael Bauer studied international politics in Munich and Aberystwyth (UK) and holds
a degree in educational science from the Munich School of Philosophy.
Agnès Bertrand-Sanz completed her Ph.D at the School of Oriental and African Studies
(University of London) in 2010. She wrote her dissertation within the ‘Sir Joseph Hotung
Program on Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the Middle-East’ on ‘The Role of the
European Union in the Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Issue: Towards an Engagement
Based on Respect for International Law and Human Rights.’ Since January 2009, she is
the Middle East policy officer for APRODEV, the association of Protestant, Anglican and
Orthodox European development organisations (including Christian Aid UK, Diakonia,
ICCO, Broet fur die Welt). She also teaches at the Lille Institute of Political Studies for its
joint Sciences Po Lille-Aston University MA programme.
Esra Bulut Aymat is a Research Fellow at the EUISS, where she works on politics and
conflict in, and EU policy towards, the Eastern Mediterranean. Her research interests
include conflict resolution, the politics of religion and nationalism, trans-state politics,
and Turkish foreign policy and politics. Prior to joining the Institute, she worked for
International Crisis Group in Brussels (2005-2008) and carried out research for the UNDP
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in Cyprus (2007). She held part-time research
and teaching positions at LSE (2000-2005) and was Assistant Editor of the journal Nations
and Nationalism (2001-2004). She holds an interdisciplinary Ph.D from the LSE Department
of Government, an M.Sc from LSE, and a BA from the University of Oxford.
Jeroen Gunning is Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies at the School of
Government and International Affairs, Durham University. His research focuses on the
interplay between Islamist social movements, democratisation, religion and violence in
123
A
Annex:
About the authors
the Middle East, with a particular emphasis on Hamas and Hezbollah, and has included
extensive fieldwork in the area. Dr. Gunning is one of the founders of the new field of
critical terrorism studies, co-editor of Critical Studies on Terrorism, and has acted as expert
consultant for numerous governmental and non-governmental organisations. His recent
publications include Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (Hurst/Columbia
University Press, 2007/8) and Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (Routledge,
2009; co-edited with Richard Jackson and Marie Breen Smyth).
Christian-Peter Hanelt is Senior Expert on ‘Europe and the Middle East’ in the ‘Europe’s
Future’ Programme at Bertelsmann Stiftung in Gütersloh, Germany. For more than a decade
he has managed the Stiftung’s Kronberg Middle East Talks. Christian-Peter Hanelt studied
political science, history and Arabic sciences in Kiel and Damascus. He holds an MA in
Political Science from Christian-Albrechts-Universität, Kiel, Germany. He worked as an
editor and reported for SAT.1 on developments after the Kuwait war and the beginning
of the Middle East Peace Process. Until 2004 he was also engaged in activities promoting
reading literacy in Egypt and in the education of journalists in Israel and the Palestinian
Territories. His areas of expertise are: the Israeli-Arab Conflict, EU-Gulf Relations (GCC),
Iraq and Iran, socio-political and economic development in the Arab world.
Rosemary Hollis is Professor of Middle East Policy Studies and Director of the Olive Tree
Scholarship Programme at City University London. Her research and publications focus
on international political and security issues in the Middle East, particularly European,
EU, UK and US relations with the region and the international dimensions of regional
conflicts. Prior to joining City University in 2008 Professor Hollis was Head of the Middle
East Programme (1995-2005), then Director of Research at Chatham House (the Royal
Institute of International Affairs). She has a Ph.D in Political Science from George Washington
University in Washington, DC, where she also taught for a number of years; an MA in War
Studies and a BA in History from the University of London, King’s College. Her new book
is: Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
Daniel Möckli is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center of Security Studies, ETH Zurich.
He specialises in Western strategies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, CFSP/CSDP, and Swiss
foreign and security policy. Recent publications include European-American Relations and
the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq (Routledge, 2010, with Victor Mauer), ‘US Foreign Policy:
New Approaches and Old Problems in Afghanistan and the Middle East’ (in Strategic Trends,
CSS 2010); European Foreign Policy during the Cold War (I.B. Tauris, 2009), and ‘Switzerland’s
Controversial Middle East Policy’, CSS Analysis in Security Policy no. 35 (2008).
Michelle Pace is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International
Studies, University of Birmingham, UK. From April 2007 until March 2009, she was
Principal Investigator (PI) on a two-year British Academy large research project on Arab
Mediterranean perceptions on democratisation and since February 2008 she has been
PI on a three-year ESRC First Grant Scheme large research project on Paradoxes and
Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion Efforts in the Middle East (www.eumena.
bham.ac.uk). She is the founder and convenor of the BISA working group on International
Mediterranean Studies as well as the research group on EU democracy promotion efforts
124
Annex:
About the authors
A
in the Middle East. Recent publications include (as editor) Europe, the USA and Political
Islam: Strategies for Engagement (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).
Nathalie Tocci is Director of the Area the EU and the Neighbourhood of the Istituto Affari
Internazionali, Rome and Associate Editor of The International Spectator. She received her
Ph.D in International Relations at the LSE in 2003 and has held previous research posts at
the Transatlantic Academy, Washington; the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels;
and the European University Institute, Florence. Her research interests include European
foreign policy, conflict resolution, the European neighbourhood, with a particular focus on
Turkey, Cyprus, the Mediterranean and the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Dr Tocci
was the winner of the 2008 Anna Lindh award for the study of European foreign policy.
125
Annex:
Abbreviations
A
Abbreviations
AL
AMA
API
CFSP
CSDP
EC
ECHO
EIDHR
EMP
ENP
ESDP
EUBAM Rafah
EUPOL COPPS
GAERC
GCC
GDP
ICJ
IHL
LAF
MEPP
MTF
NGO
OPT
PA
PLO
UfM
UNGA
UNIFIL
UNRWA
UNSC
UNSG
Arab League
Agreement on Movement and Access
Arab Peace Initiative
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Common Security and Defence Policy
European Community
European Community Humanitarian Office
European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
European Neighbourhood Policy
European Security and Defence Policy
European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
European Union Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian
Police Support
General Affairs and External Relations Council
Gulf Cooperation Council
Gross Domestic Product
International Court of Justice
International Humanitarian Law
Lebanese Armed Forces
Middle East Peace Process
Maritime Task Force
Non-governmental Organisation
Occupied Palestinian Territories
Palestinian Authority
Palestinian Liberation Organisation
Union for the Mediterranean
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Secretary General
127
In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) became an
autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council
Joint Action of 20 July 2001, modified by the Joint Action of 21 December 2006,
it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further
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as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels.
Chaillot Papers are monographs on topical questions written either by a member
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CHAILLOT PAPERS
123
116
122
Jun 09
War crimes, conditionality
and EU integration in
the Western Balkans
Judy Batt, Vojin Dimitrijevic,
Florence Hartmann, Dejan Jovic,
Tija Memisevic and
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik;
edited by Judy Batt and
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik
Nov 10 L’UE et l’Afrique : les défis
de la cohérence
Damien Helly
Oct 10 Violence politique et paix
dans le monde arabe
Abdallah Saaf
121
Sep 10 China’s foreign policy debates
Zhu Liqun
120
Apr 10 Nuclear weapons after
The 2010 NPT review conference
Ian Anthony, Camille Grand,
Łukasz Kulesa, Christian Mölling,
Mark Smith; edited by Jean Pascal
Zanders
119
Nov 09 Back from the cold?
The EU and Belarus in 2009
Margarita M. Balmaceda,
Sabine Fischer, Grzegorz
Gromadzki, Andrei Liakhovich,
Astrid Sahm, Vitali Silitski and
Leonid Zlotnikov; edited by Sabine
Fischer
Oct 09
118
Global security in a
multipolar world
Feng Zhongping, Robert Hutchings,
Radha Kumar, Elizabeth
Sidiropoulos, Paulo Wrobel
and Andrei Zagorski;
edited by Luis Peral with an
introduction by Álvaro de Vasconcelos
117
Jul 09 EU security and defence.
Core documents 2008
Volume IX
115
Avr 09 Maghreb : vaincre la peur
de la démocratie
Luís Martinez
114
Dec 08 Negotiating the final status
of Kosovo
Marc Weller
113
Nov 08 Towards a European
Defence Market
Erkki Aalto, Daniel Keohane,
Christian Mölling and
Sophie de Vaucorbeil;
edited by Daniel Keohane
112
Oct 08 EU security and defence.
Core documents 2007
Volume VIII
111
Sept 08 Bush’s legacy and America’s
next foreign policy
Marcin Zaborowski
110
Aug 08 Rethinking Iran:
From confrontation
to cooperation
Christoph Bertram
BOOKS
2010
Quelle défense européenne
en 2020 ?
Claude-France Arnould, Juha
Auvinen, Henri Bentégeat, Nicole
Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, F.
Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries,
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Stefano
Silvestri, Alexander Stubb, Nuno
Severiano Teixeira, Álvaro
de Vasconcelos, Alexander Weis et
Richard Wright;
Préface de Catherine Ashton
Sous la direction d’Álvaro de
Vasconcelos
2009
tHE oBAMA MOMENT –
eUROPEAN AND aMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
Alexandra Bell, John Bruton,
Tom Cargill, Joseph Cirincione,
James F. Dobbins, Nikolas Foster,
Daniel S. Hamilton, Bruce Jones,
Erik Jones, Ibrahim Kalin,
Andrew C. Kuchins, Michael
O Hanlon, Rouzbeh Parsi,
Glen Rangwala, Pawel Swieboda,
Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Alex Vines,
Marcin Zaborowski;
edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos
and Marcin Zaborowski
2009
European Security and Defence
Policy – The first 10 years
(1999-2009)
edited by Giovanni Grevi,
Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane
2009
What ambitions for European
Defence in 2020?
Claude-France Arnould,
Juha Auvinen, Henri Bentégeat,
Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth,
F. Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries,
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski,
Stefano Silvestri, Alexander Stubb,
Nuno Severiano Teixeira,
Álvaro de Vasconcelos,
Alexander Weis and
Richard Wright;
edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos;
preface by Javier Solana
published by
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CHAILLOT PAPER
ISBN 978-92-9198-176-2
ISSN 1017-7566
QN-AA-10-124-EN-C
doi:10.2815/21669
European
Involvement in the
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Chaillot Papers | December 2010
Esra Bulut Aymat
The volume aspires to make a timely contribution to policy thinking by
focusing attention on a number of cross-cutting issues, challenges and
opportunities for the EU. Drawing on the expertise and distinct approaches
of researchers from across Europe, the volume combines discussion of
interests and lessons learned, with elaboration of policy implications and
recommendations.
conflict. It focuses on the European Union’s involvement in the conflict,
with special, but not exclusive, attention to EU involvement in the IsraeliPalestinian dimension of the conflict. Three decades on from the landmark
1980 Venice Declaration of the then nine Member States of the European
Community, 2010 has seen new setbacks in efforts to resolve the conflict,
and negative trends that increasingly fuel doubts about the very possibility
of a two-state solution. This contrasts sharply with the optimistic objectives
of the latest US peace initiative and Palestinian Authority Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad’s plan for a Palestinian state, both of which envisage 2011 as a
key year for moving towards a two-state solution. These contrasts invite farreaching, honest and critical reflection on where European involvement in
the conflict has left the EU and its Member States, and how it has impacted
on peace prospects.
124
124

european involvement in the arab-israeli conflict

Transcription

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