Allied Interoperability Handbook - Combined Joint Operations from

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Allied Interoperability Handbook
CJOS COE
Handbook
1
10/21/2011
The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of
Excellence (CJOS COE) was established in 2006 to provide a
focal point for Joint Maritime Expeditionary Operations expertise
for allied nations. With 13 nations represented, CJOS COE is the
only Centre of Excellence in the United States and is one of 16
accredited Centers worldwide, representing a collective wealth of
international experience and expertise.
2
Combined Joint Operations from the Sea
Centre of Excellence
Allied Interoperability Handbook
A Tool to Enhance and Measure
Interoperability
Among NATO Allied/Coalitions and US Navy
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
5
HOW TO USE GUIDE
8
PART I - COALITION INTEGRATION INTO US NAVY EXERCISES
11
ANNEX 1: PRE- DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST
31
ANNEX 2: USFFC SUBORDINATE COMMANDS
33
ANNEX 3: CSG/ESG COMPOSITION
34
ANNEX 4: FRTP-TRAINING INITIATIVE
35
ANNEX 5: LOGISTICS GUIDE
36
ANNEX 6: COMMUNICATIONS GUIDE
48
PART II - INTEROPERABILITY HANDBOOK
54
ANNEX 1: COALITION INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY RESULTS
58
ANNEX 2: INTEROPERABILITY CHECKLIST
63
ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
80
ANNEX 4: LESSONS LEARNED DATA BASE
83
ANNEX 5: INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
141
PART III – INTEROPERABILITY METRICS-EVALUATING
ALLIED/COALITION USN INTEROPERABILITY
160
ANNEX 1: PREPAREDENESS ASSESSMENT SHEETS
173
ANNEX 2: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SHEETS
210
ANNEX 3: LESSONS LEARNED ASSESSMENT SHEETS
215
4
PREFACE
1.
"No matter how large or small your navy or coast guard may be, we all
face similar internal constraints like shrinking budgets, aging equipment, and
populations that may not be attracted to military service. Our level of cooperation
and coordination must intensify in order to adapt to our shared challenges and
constraints. We have no choice in this matter, because I am convinced that
nobody - no nation today - can go it alone, especially in the maritime domain.”
(USN CNO ADMIRAL Michael Mullen 17th International Sea Power Symposium,
21 Sept. 2005, Newport, R.I.)
2.
This quote reveals clearly that we need navies to work together efficiently
in order to fulfill Joint missions. This can only be achieved through effective
interoperability.
3.
The Coalition arena is a challenging environment in which to operate. The
sometimes ad hoc manner in which Nations come together makes standardizing
doctrine, policy, or operating procedures difficult.
As a result the most
burdensome challenge facing Coalitions is interoperability. This can encompass
a plethora of incompatibility issues - doctrine, policy, tactics, language, culture,
automated weapons and information systems... the list continues. Complicating
these issues are politically sensitive matters such as those that preclude one
Nation from working or sharing information directly with another Nation, or
sensitive material handling and releasability concerns.
4.
Lack of interoperability permeates all levels of Command and Control. It
can slow the speed of Command and detract from building unity of effort and
purpose.
Working outside a common operating environment can lead to
misunderstanding of missions, missed opportunity for decisive military action, or
in extremis “blue on blue” engagement.
5.
Based on the above it was decided that Naval Interoperability would
become one of the core tasks of The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea
5
Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Program of Work (POW). Thus the Centre
was tasked by the Steering Committee (SC) to develop the following documents:
a.
The Coalition Playbook. Its purpose was to provide guidance and
advice regarding the integration of Allied/Coalition ships into USN
sponsored exercises by discussing, in an easy to use guide format, the
following topics:
i.
The role of CJOS COE and USN Commands (US Fleet
Forces Command – Commander Strike Force Fleet Atlantic, etc.).
b.
ii.
The general scheme of maneuver.
iii.
The exercise events (Initial Planning Conference etc.).
iv.
The planning process.
v.
The use of Multilateral Agreements.
vi.
Carrier Air Ops Specifics and Amphibious Training Specifics
vii.
Information exchange in the USN.
viii.
Financial issues and deployment checklists.
The Allied Interoperability Handbook. Its purpose was to be used by
NATO
Allied/Coalition
Navies
to
overcome
the
most
common
interoperability problems. In that framework CJOS COE formed a working
group aimed at studying interoperability between NATO Allied/Coalition
ships involved in exercises taking place off the east coast of the United
States. Over the past year, that group conducted surveys and interviews
with personnel from Allied/Coalition ships as well as USN ships.
The
surveys and interviews revealed several interoperability challenges and
concerns. Based on the aforementioned research CJOS COE developed
the Handbook that included the following documentation:
i.
An “Interoperability Survey Questionnaire,” used as the
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primary tool to uncover any interoperability issues.
ii.
An “Interoperability Lessons Learned database” which listed
the Lessons Learned from the surveys and interviews conducted on
board the Coalition/Allied ships.
iii
An “Interoperability Survey Results paper” that incorporated
those areas noted as successful or noted in need of further
attention and could be used as a benchmark for future operations
among Allied Navies.
iv.
An “Interoperability Checklist” which was the distillate of all
the above documents and was to be considered as a user friendly
interoperability guide that approached interoperability issues from a
functional area perspective (planning, operations, communications,
etc.).
c..
The “Interoperability Metrics” which was a tool used to further
enhance and promote the interoperability, and a tool establishing best
practices in the interoperability arena. CJOS COE created a system
measuring
Interoperability
and
the
effectiveness
of
the
Allied
Interoperability Handbook. The tool was dealing with the “Evaluation of
Allied/Coalition USN Interoperability” that outlined how CJOS COE would
formalize efforts to continue improving the “Allied Interoperability
Handbook” by assessing the following three aspects:
i.
Adherence to the Checklist – It measured how well CJOS
COE, the visiting ships, the host navy, and USN Strike Groups
followed the checklist for each visiting ship. This was a measure of
preparedness; it quantified efforts made to address known
interoperability challenges.
ii.
Demonstrated
Interoperability
–
It
evaluated
the
interoperability of visiting ships with their host Strike Groups during
execution. Clear, objective standards were applied to evaluate how
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early in an event the interoperability challenges were initially
overcome, as well as recording how well interoperability efforts were
maintained throughout the exercise.
These were measures of
effectiveness of the units.
iii.
Lessons Learned Again – It analyzed interoperability LL from
each
ship to identify reoccurring issues and determined which
could be prevented through adherence to the checklist. This was
another measure of effectiveness of the units but it also provided
feedback on the effectiveness of the checklist.
6.
Finally, to further facilitate the cooperation and collaboration among NATO
Allied/Coalition ships and USN ships, it was decided to merge the 3 different
interoperability products ( the Common Playbook, the Interoperability Handbook,
and the Interoperability Metrics) into one document under the name “ALLIED
INTEROPERABILITY HANDBOOK” that will eventually become the ultimate
guide and tool for interoperability on the East Coast.
How to Use Guide
7.
The following 10 steps are provided to make the handbook more user-
friendly:
Step 1: Study the Coalition Playbook in order to understand how USN works
and plans. (PART 1 of this Handbook).
Step 2: Follow the Pre-deployment checklist (ANNEX 1).
Step 3: Study the USFFC SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (ANNEX 2) and Carrier
Strike Group /Expeditionary Strike Group Composition (ANNEX 3) and follow the
training program (ANNEX 4).
Step 4:
Study the Interoperability Handbook (PART 2) which contains the
Coalition Interoperability Survey results (ANNEX 1) which can create the first
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impression on what are the areas that need further attention in terms of
Interoperability.
Step 5: Follow the Interoperability Checklist (ANNEX 2) and Schedule of Events
(ANNEX 3) that will guide you safely in your preparations and to aid you in
avoiding interoperability issues.
Step 6:
Study and take into consideration the Lessons Learned Data Base
(ANNEX 4).
Step 7: Study and disseminate the Survey Questionnaire to the appropriate
personnel (ANNEX 5) in order to be completed during the collaboration
to
ensure all major interoperability issues are easily captured.
Step 8:
Study the Evaluation Interoperability paper (PART 3) which clearly
defines what has to be done so interoperability can be measured.
Step 9: Fill out the “Other Entities Commands Preparedness Sheet” prior to the
start of an interoperability exercise. (ANNEX 1).
Step 10: Fill out the “Lessons Learned/Identified Assessment Sheet” (ANNEX 3)
accordingly.
Conclusion
8.
Many different projects addressed the issue of interoperability in the past.
In their efforts they managed to reduce some interoperability issues but
unfortunately other problems came up or some of the previous remained and the
past Lessons Learned were sometimes forgotten on the shelves.
9.
CJOS COE proposes a new tool, the “Allied Interoperability Handbook”, a
user friendly tool and a living document continuously updated through real life
surveys and interviews.
9
10.
CJOS COE believes that this handbook will facilitate interoperability
between Coalition forces. The “Allied Interoperability Handbook” will be there for
use by any Navy, at any time.
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PART I
COALITION ELEMENT INTEGRATION
INTO US NAVY EXERCISES
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
11
COALITION ELEMENT INTEGRATION INTO US NAVY EXERCISES
References:
A.
U.S. National Maritime Strategy
B.
CJOS COE MOU – I & E relationships
C.
USFF Commander’s guidance
D.
USFF Fleet Training Continuum
Introduction
1.
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance and advice regarding
the integration of NATO and other allied units into US Navy (USN) sponsored
exercises. Since its establishment in 2006, the Combined Joint Operations from
the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) has played a major role in providing
scheduling and planning support to NATO and allied maritime forces intending to
participate in various USN sponsored exercises (either live or synthetic training
events). CJOS COE, in concert with Commander, US Fleet Forces (CUSFF) and
Commander Strike Force Training Atlantic (CSTFL) are prepared to support the
full spectrum of maritime operations. This would include supporting single ship
and aircraft operations; Joint Maritime Expeditionary Operations at the Task
Group/Task Force or Battle Group level; and augmenting a Combined/Joint
Maritime staff requirement for a Component Commander. For example, recent
training events have included the participation of individual platforms from
multiple nations and staff participation from United Kingdom Maritime Forces,
(UKMARFOR),
Strike
NATO
Forces
(SFN),
French
Maritime
Forces
(FRMARFOR), and Standing Naval NATO Forces. This publication will help the
Fleet Planner to understand the variety of training that can be provided for a wide
spectrum of forces and serve as a guide to navigate the scheduling and planning
processes.
Potential participants are highly encouraged to request training
assistance and exercise planning support from the Norfolk based team (i.e.
CJOS COE, CSTFL) CJOS COE, CUSFF and CSTFL will help shape a plan that
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best meets deployment schedules and addresses training objectives. The team
possesses in-depth knowledge and experience in helping allied nations to fully
integrate with US forces and achieve training objectives from combined
operations.
2.
CJOS COE and CUSFF will provide a continuous dialogue with Fleet
schedules about the various training opportunities that are being planned for the
Atlantic coast of the United States. This information can be obtained from the
CJOS COE NATO Secret Wide Area Network (NSWAN) website. The main
objective of this website is to inform, educate and facilitate the integration of the
participating non-U.S. group or units by identifying training opportunities well in
advance of a supporting nation’s planning requirements. At your request, CJOS
COE will help to connect your Fleet planning staff with their appropriate
counterparts in the various U.S. Fleet Headquarters. Acceptance and feasibility
of Allied integration remains the exclusive purview of CUSFF or higher U.S.
authority’s decision when warranted.
Note: Any information contained in this document is meant to inform Allies on the
complexities of organizing combined training and staffing exercise support
requests through the US Armed Forces based in the continental US. Nothing in
this document will supplant the actual rules and laws currently in effect within the
US Armed Forces concerning bi-national agreements regarding US. cooperation
with foreign nations. Commander US Fleet Forces reserves the right to accept or
refuse training support to any unit from any country at any time as a result of
national security issues or higher priority national training requirements. It is
strongly recommended that any exercise support request be submitted as early
as possible to CUSFF scheduling staff for consideration and development of
available support.
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Role of CJOS COE
3.
The Director of CJOS COE is also the US Fleet Forces Commander, of
Joint and Fleet Operations.
CJOS COE was established and accredited by
NATO to enhance the interoperability of Allied Maritime Forces. The CJOS COE
is privileged to have direct access to US. Fleet commands assigned a specific
role in training maritime forces. CJOS COE has built up extensive knowledge of
the training resources and synergies that can be achieved through an
experienced cadre of NATO fleet experts.
Commander U.S. Fleet Forces - Role and Responsibility in Training
4.
Commander US. Fleet Forces is responsible to man, train, equip, and
certify Carrier Strike Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups and independently
deploying units and aircraft.
CUSFF forces follow a defined training and
certification process. This training program provides a logical and efficient path
which is designed to ensure each unit or group will achieve the appropriate level
of certification ranging from Major Combat Operations Ready to tailored training
packages based upon specific mission requirements.
CUSFF will publish a
quarterly scheduling message which will describe training events for its Fleet
Units and designated Command staff in accordance with US. strategic military
objectives. This message is regularly sent to NATO and other Allied Maritime
Headquarters and is intended to represent a formal invitation to forces willing to
participate in those training events.
Commander Strike Force Training Atlantic (CSFTL) - Fleet Training,
Evaluation, and Certification
5.
Principal among the US Navy’s training organizations is CSFTL (located in
Norfolk, VA), the executive agent for CUSFF, responsible for integrated training
and certification of all deploying maritime forces.
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CSFTL is responsible for
scheduling, preparing, planning and executing most of the classroom, live and
synthetic training events. They also provide mentorship to the training audience
during execution and collect performance measures to evaluate progression
toward final certification requirements.
Tactical Training Group Atlantic (TTGL) - Classroom & Collective Fleet
Synthetic Training
6.
The Tactical Training Group Atlantic located in Dam Neck, VA conducts
classroom and fleet synthetic training (FST) events. Initially introduced ten years
ago as an experimental capability, FST events have reached a high level of
technological fidelity and interoperability such that these events are now an
integral step in the overall certification continuum of US maritime forces. FST
events are open to coalition forces and in fact rely upon Allied participation.
However, the technical requirements to enable assets to communicate and
participate require modest capital investment and can present a lengthy
integration process.
CSFTL is charged with assessing technological issues,
including the training of technical and operational support teams. Establishing a
synthetic training interoperability event normally requires one to two years of
planning especially if this would be initial training for the unit involved.
Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGL) - Collective
Training Expeditionary Warfare (Amphibious)
7.
EWGTL is located in Little Creek, Joint Expeditionary Base, Virginia and
supports classroom and fleet synthetic training events in concert with TTGL.
They specifically provide specialized support to Amphibious Response Group
(ARG) (Navy) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Marine Corps) training.
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General Scheme of Maneuver
8.
When deciding to deploy abroad to participate in US training events a
participating national military headquarters must provide a clear intention of your
Fleet’s training objectives and also include the desired level of readiness
certification.
This information will allow US Fleet Training organizations to
facilitate scheduling of appropriate resources and establish the required levels of
interaction with US Forces in order to accomplish the targeted aims. Additionally,
strategic level headquarters must prepare the requisite diplomatic clearances
well in advance to help identify the lines of authority to coordinate future staff
visits and port/airport visits. Any training event is an excellent opportunity for
nations to validate or improve the interoperability of their own forces with the US
naval and/or joint counterparts.
However, in deploying either single units or
many elements making up a Task Group, nations must also consider the mutual
benefit that their forces can contribute to support US training objectives. This is a
critical aspect of Fleet planning and training which if overlooked diminishes the
opportunity for gaining higher level approval of your exercise support request by
the US training audience.
Determining the Right Training Event for Your Deploying Forces
9.
Amongst the training events described in the next paragraphs, and based
on the calendar of events published by CUSFF in its quarterly message, the
invited nations may choose an exercise or series of exercises that best fits their
training objectives. Once a decision has been taken regarding the size/type of
military contingent to be committed to training, the requesting nation must
forward an official intention to participate via signal :
TO: COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA and COMSTRKFORTRALANT to
begin the process.
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Identification of Participating Maritime Forces
10.
The Intention to Participate message should specify the precise
composition of the forces including air, surface and subsurface assets. Each
confirmed unit will be expected to forward an OPSTAT UNIT as early as possible
in the planning process in order to confirm operational capabilities and readiness
status forecasted for the actual period of deployment. Normally the Intention to
Participate must be received a minimum of six months in advance of the
schedule exercise. Optimally, this message should be conveyed approximately
one year in advance in order to maximize US resource effort in support of the
participating nation’s training objectives.
Early communication will enable
CUSFF to designate and/or allocate the right command element and balance
resources to support and maximize a mutually beneficial training enterprise.
Coordinating Authorities
11.
Nations who request training support and participation in US exercises at
single unit level shall seek approval through US Fleet Forces Command. If the
participating Nation desires to deploy additional forces apart from the naval
component (army, air force or marines) the process may take a considerably
longer time to plan and coordinate due to external requests to other services,
seeking their agreement to participate.
12.
If the deployed forces are numerous, entail joint expeditionary operations
covering a wide spectrum of activities, or the deployment is of such unusual
nature that it might require coordination of specialized US resources; the
requesting Nation will be asked to forward an official letter between CNO
equivalents, indicating the scope of participation and desired objectives.
Additional time for the CNO staff to provide a response can be anticipated. If time
is critical, nations who have accredited Military and/or Naval Attaché’s resident
17
within their Embassy in the U.S. are advised to contact them at the earliest
opportunity so that they may help facilitate and expedite the request.
Defining Training Objectives
13.
The initial Intention to Participate message should detail as much
information as possible regarding training requirements and readiness standards
to be achieved. Nations are expected to initiate dialogue with CUSFF and/or
CSFTL scheduling counterparts in order to amplify the training objectives and
respond to questions which will help clarify the Nation’s training desires.
Reference to the U.S. Universal Naval Task List provides an expeditious means
for foreign planners to articulate national training standards into terminology that
is more readily identified by their U.S. counterparts. CJOS COE personnel can
help facilitate the interpretation of the participating maritime training objectives to
ensure they align with U.S. training process and procedures.
Training Events - Scheduling Conference
14.
Scheduling conferences are chaired by USFF and are held in early
September, December, February and May each year. The conferences are held
at Norfolk or Little Creek JAB and a scheduling signal/message is produced at
the conclusion of the meetings. Participating nations are welcome to attend.
When it is not feasible or possible for national reps to attend, CJOS COE NATO
staff officers can represent the interests of the respective sponsoring nations and
other Allies when requested.
Nations are invited to attend scheduling
conferences and will be provided with information regarding potential exercise
dates, participants and general scheme of maneuver.
Warfare Commander’s Conference
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15.
The Warfare Commander’s Conference (WCC) is a two week classroom
and tabletop session that marks the beginning of integrated training for the strike
group or independent deployer. A variety of presentations are offered covering
composite warfare commander procedures, current deployed operations, lessons
learned/best
practices,
NATO/SFN
(by
CJOS
COE
on
demand)
and
capabilities/limitations briefs on a variety of maritime, joint and coalition forces.
Seminars are conducted to begin development of the group’s preplanned
responses and specific tactics, techniques and procedures they will employ
based upon their Commander’s guidance. Tabletop games are conducted to
begin the integration of the warfare commanders and their capabilities into a
single strike group.
Most importantly, this is when relationships are first
developed between leaders and their staffs of the group and the individual
platforms and squadrons. Whichever live or synthetic event the allied participant
intends to take part, it is highly encouraged that key members of that platform
(Commanding officer, Executive officer, Operations officers and planners) take
part in the WCC to fully integrate themselves within the strike group’s plans and
organization at this early stage.
Group Sail
16.
The Group Sail is the first opportunity for a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or
AN Amphibious Raid Group/Marine Expeditionary Group (ARG/MEU) to sail
together at the start of a training program. The Group Sail entails a very basiclevel training period at sea and is not ideally suited for integrating foreign units.
The Schedule of Events (SOE) is deliberately kept focused on unit skill sets in
order to afford ships’ Commanding Officers the opportunity to maximize their
internal training requirements and align their watch and station bills. Group sails
do afford foreign ships an opportunity to work out issues in their communication
networks, including Link 11/16 connectivity. While focused at the Commanding
Officer, Group Sail training is open to allied participation.
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Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX or C2X) and Joint Task
Force Exercise (JTFEX)
17.
C2X is a 28 day live exercise at sea, with the final days dedicated to a
multi-threat free play Battle Problem scenario, now called JTFEX. The first three
weeks of this period are a stepped series of scenario driven events which guides
the deploying staff, warfare commanders and units through the certification
process integrating activities across all warfare areas.
Foreign units are
welcome and encouraged to integrate in all or part of this exercise activity. Allied
training objectives are well accommodated in the scenario and participation as a
warfare area commander is available if requests are submitted early in the
scheduling and planning process. This is critical because USN units have very
strict requirements in achieving specific Warfare Commanders’ Certifications (Air
Defense Commander, Sea Combat Commander, etc). Foreign ships and Task
Group (TG) staffs should remain cognizant that your request for exercising a
specific warfare commander duty must be balanced with the US exercise goals
and objectives. One or two battle problems are played out at the end of this
training period which significantly raises the level of complexity for training but
proves to be a rewarding experience in challenging the finely honed skills of all
participants.
Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) (bi-annual event)
18.
The traditional form of JTFEX is a live exercise (LIVEX) at sea.
It is
scenario driven and mainly focuses on testing the operational planning skills of a
Joint Task Force (JTF) or higher headquarters in conjunction with the embarked
TG staff. The principle training audiences focus remains on the CSG and/or
ARG staff.
Generally unit level training requirements while considered in
exercise planning will necessarily be subordinated to tactical and operational
level staff training objective. This training event is well suited to units who have
completed an extensive work-up or refresher prior to deploying for the exercise.
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The traditional form JTFEX provides a unique opportunity for U.S. and Allied
partners to conduct coalition style operations within a complex joint environment
at sea while facing dynamic multiple threats and a variety of mission tasking (e.g.
Boardings, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, Search And Rescue etc.).
JTFEX involves more players with the potential to compete for resources in an
operationally constrained environment or the opportunity to work one Fleet staff
against another in a RED on BLUE scenario. Potential opportunities exist for
Allied commanders to fill command roles such as CFMCC, Expeditionary Strike
Force Commander and warfare area commander roles.
Fleet Synthetic Training (FST)
19.
The FST enterprise is undergoing rapid technological development that
has seen an unprecedented level of fidelity that simulates “at sea” conditions
while remaining pier side across a wide spectrum of platforms within a wide
variety of operational scenarios. FST provides operators, platforms and tactical
staffs with controlled computer simulation in real time. Since it is a very flexible
and technologically powerful system, the US Navy is now using this capability to
certify its Strike Groups before deployment in order to better utilize precious
training time at sea, conserve resources and simulate the latest combat
conditions in theater before Strike Groups actually deploy to their forward
operating areas. These exercises cover a broad range of complexity, spanning
training at the unit level to full spectrum combat operations at the Joint
Expeditionary Task Force level.
Any allied military participation requires
extensive technical commitment and involves long protracted period of time to
integrate equipment and conduct training of simulation support personnel and
individual operators. Many NATO commands have elected to participate on a
case by case basis.
20.
An all encompassing training program will involve the effective integration
of live events and synthetic training events which are logically sequenced in
21
order to provide more levels of increasing complexity. This is referred to as the
Fleet Training Response Plan which is covered in detail in ANNEX 4.
Note: All the training events described above make use of a notional theater of
operations which is entitled “Treasure Coast”. The political-military scenario is
played out around a fictional group of island states which lie off of the eastern
seaboard of the United States of America. The scenario is unclassified. Digital
and paper chart overlays are available to plot the disposition of forces and force
navigation of water space around the islands such that ships and aircraft are
operating in assigned Operational Areas to conduct live firings or deploy boats or
arrays.
A tailored scenario will be developed for all participants to ensure
operational continuity is maintained throughout the duration of the exercise.
Planning Process
21.
It is recommended that at least one senior officer be designated as the
participating Nation primary Point of Contact (POC). This officer will be the main
pillar of his Nation’s core planning team and must be available to travel to all the
conferences at their various locations where his/her expertise is needed. This
officer must be the primary point of contact for CJOS COE, CSFTL and should
be empowered with decision making authority regarding force commitments, and
exercise employment in order to meet mutual training objectives.
22.
The following activities delineate the principles of the exercise planning
process:
a.
Follow the CUSFF scheduled activity changes and identify the right
training event for the envisioned forces to be deployed.
b.
As soon as possible, inform CUSFF and CJOS COE of your
Nation’s intention to participate, for JTFEX participation.
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c.
Designate an official Point of Contact, assemble your planning
team and then make arrangements to attend the CSFTL planning process
including the Concept Development Conference (CDC), Initial Planning
Conference (IPC), MPC Planning Conference (MPC), and Final Planning
Conference (FPC).
d.
At the IPC: Make contact with the officer in charge at CSFTL and
complete the following items: (1) provide your training objectives to the
appropriate planning syndicate; (2) start examining C4I requirements and
specific allied crypto/keymat requirements; conduct aviation/ship platform
compatibility checks (refer to HOSTAC).
e.
At the MPC: confirm your participating forces and finalize training
objectives for each, identify deployment dates and sail plans, identify
support requirements, discuss exchange of Liaison Officers (LNO’s),
obtain
“Treasure
Coast”
scenario
materials
(paper/digital
charts,
geopolitical background notes and scenario updates).
f.
Two months prior to deployment: ensure official diplomatic and visit
clearance requests have been sent to your respective Defense
Departments and Embassy authorities to coordinate for port visits or
airport service for the unit’s deployment (Provide your initial LOGREQ to
the naval station, and berthing requirements at least one month in
advance of your port visit with any updates not less than 72 hours in
advance). All personnel who will be based ashore must receive approval
on the Foreign Visit Clearance Request.
h.
In the final month prior to arrival confirm the dates of visit, location
and names of Navy LNOs.
i.
In the final weeks of preparation and/or at Pre-Sail Conference
confirm all kinematic data, confirm Rendezvous points, conduct face-toface briefings between Operation Officers, air crews, boarding teams, well
23
deck personnel, Replenishment at sea deck teams, Naval Boarding Party
teams, etc.
23.
A designated CJOS COE staff officer can assist your nation in gathering
all exercise information and assisting your team at the conferences. Since CJOS
COE is co-located with CUSFF and close to CSFTL, TTGL and other USN
commands CJOS COE staff officers can investigate and clarify any issues with
the relevant desk officer upon your request. At a mutually agreeable point, CJOS
COE will withdraw from planning support in order to redirect its efforts onto other
Allied requirements. If required, CJOS COE can still assist during the exercise
as a relay ashore (Reach back) or in participating as a member of the Evaluation
Team at sea or alongside with CSFTL staff.
Bi-lateral or Multi-lateral Agreements
24.
If participation in a major exercise is requested, such as JTFEX, or if
specialized assets are brought to the exercise which possess unique operational
capabilities, a formal bilateral or multilateral agreement between nation’s Fleet
commanders would be beneficial in order to address the exceptional aspects of
the cooperation.
25.
As examples, the US and the U.K. signed an agreement in 2008 for HMS
ILLUSTRIOUS’ participation in a major amphibious exercise where US V-22
OSPREY aircraft were authorized to land on a Royal Navy ship. The same year,
France and the U.S. signed an agreement covering the integration of the French
Rafale Fighters and E2-C into the Carrier Air Wing 8 for JTFEX 08-4.
Establishing bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements facilitates the requisite data
information regarding operational employment limitations, liability, review
established international cooperation agreements and all documents and
processes that would allow nations to safely employ and support unique
operations. It also serves to delineate shared responsibilities, define how the
parties involved will support each other, identify additional material support,
24
including payments for target services, platforms, etc. These agreements should
also list all those references which will be required in an emergency situation to
resolve any unexpected issue. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
is one of the major references that should be used to address such activities. Any
agreed deviation to the NATO SOFA for the framework of the designated activity
shall be for instance mentioned in the bi/multi-lateral agreement.
26.
Copies of past agreements can be obtained from Judge’s office in USFFC.
No official template exists but the text in former Memorandums of Understanding
(MOU’s) or Memorandums of Agreement (MOA’s) are useful in helping your
nation to prepare these instruments in advance of an exercise.
It will take
several months to prepare such an agreement since both nations need time in
their own chain of command to circulate this document and obtain operational
and legal approval prior signing. The agreement would ideally be signed at least
one month ahead of the deployment to US territory.
Carrier Air Operations Specifics
27.
Fixed wing aircraft carrier air operations involve catapult launching and tail
hook recoveries which are highly specialized capabilities that require high safety
standards reflected in highly trained professional skill sets and extensive
technical preparation.
28.
If your nation desires an opportunity to fly carrier configured aircraft from a
US CVN deck, it is mandatory to initiate the discussions with COMNAVAIRLANT
staff at least 18 months in advance to research safety and operational
compatibility issues.
29.
Platform airworthiness and aircrew training standards must be verified in
advance since the national assets will be deployed in a foreign environment. Any
issue concerning any aspects of material condition, handling gear, refueling
requirements (air, gas, oil, and any other fluids), power supply, air conditioning,
25
servicing, etc, that is the object of pre-flight and post-flight maintenance
operations must be fully addressed in order to resolve problems.
30.
Personal training qualifications and experience levels must be thoroughly
discussed, from a technical and operational point of view.
The discussions
should cover Landing Signal Officers’ (LSO) responsibilities, individual pilot’s
qualifications and training, deck and in-flight procedures, language proficiency,
flight deck personnel location and responsibility, preflight briefings and flight
preparation, etc. As an example of this process, in 2008 a U.S. detachment of
LSOs visited the French Carrier Aircraft Group and attended a Landing program
session ashore in France a few months before their deployment. The US/French
team verified the compatibility of the training requirements and the level
proficiency of the pilots.
31.
In all cases, US Navy regulations will define the prerequisite number of
day and night traps. Sufficient time must be allocated to the foreign pilot to
acclimatize to his new surroundings and to become familiar with US operational
procedures before moving to the carrier.
Most importantly, emergency
procedures must be reviewed, trained and rehearsed prior the execution of any
flight to or from the carrier. All foreign pilots/aircraft will be required to conduct
initial ground and flight training at NAS Oceana before transitioning to carrier
operations.
32.
It is likely that the Carrier Air wing Commander (CAG) assigned to the
CSG will be the hosting command for the deployed squadron.
As soon as
possible, the foreign CAG commander should liaise with his US counterpart to
discuss the integration of foreign squadrons.
Amphibious Training – USMC Specifics
33.
Amphibious training represents an advanced level of cooperation since it
comprises at least three major stakeholders: the US Navy, the US Marine Corps
26
and the foreign navy unit. In addition another foreign armed service could be
involved (Army, Air Force or Marine Corps).
These exercises will require
extensive preparation time due to the number of parties involved.
34.
The nature of those operations involves significant risk to personnel and
material, which adds greater complexity to organizing an effective training plan.
The use of aircraft and sea based landing assets invokes a greater spectrum of
training and safety standards that foreign military personnel must comply with
and necessitates the full cooperation of the participating forces.
The
embarkation of foreign troops must consider all aspects of their deployment,
including
issues
associated
with
accommodation,
food,
security
and
communication concerns.
35.
On initiating contact with CUSFF, it is highly recommended that both
nations’ senior leadership in all participating service branches meet together to
agree on the general scheme of maneuver and designate authorities to
subordinate commanders to plan and execute the exercise.
The planning
process remains similar to the one described above, with the addition of the US
Marine Corps and additional specialized planning teams as appropriate.
Information Exchange
36.
The information exchange issues are critical factors to the success of the
interoperability between the different service elements of the participating
nations. Each nation is accustomed to employing its own national procedures.
NATO procedures and doctrine are not always utilized during the US Navy
exercises.
All documentation needed for the planning and the execution of
exercises must be available to all parties. The US Navy usually uses the Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) for their routine activity. A coalition
network (NSWAN, etc) must be formally designated as the main Communication
Integration System (CIS) in use for the exercise. All Allied Key Materials and
27
crypto requirements must be requested months in advance due to lengthy staff
processes.
37.
The ARG/CSG staff is responsible to provide all requisite documentation
to the participating units in the appropriate format. The drafting of all exercise
orders, pre-ex messages, Operational Orders (OPORDERs), directives and
guidance must be approved by a Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) in advance to
avoid late delivery to the foreign units. It is highly recommended that all the
messages are caveat with “REL NATO or REL NATION X.” This is an important
point that is frequently missed in coalition exercises and must be addressed in a
disciplined manner to promote the effective integration of coalition units. CSFTL
has established improved protocols to ensure participating Nations and US Strike
Groups consider all aspects of force integration in their operational planning and
decision cycles.
38.
The employment of LNOs will play a very significant role in coordination as
this person will foster personal relationships that form the catalyst in developing
clear mutual understanding of the critical planning issues.
LNO’s act as an
effective conduit of time sensitive information if alternate pathways are not
available. LNO’s are essential in the early stages of planning an event and help
to augment the usual military command relationships once they have been
established.
Financial Issues
39.
The invited nation is responsible to cover service support expenses of its
deployed units. On arrival in the US, all expenses including the cost of living,
accommodation and other maintenance operations will be the responsibility of
the participating nation and not the host nation.
28
40.
During US Fleet scheduled exercise, provided the coalition unit uses the
same infrastructure or resource services as a participating US Navy units, there
will be no requirement for payment or cost sharing. However, if any resource or
service is provided for the express benefit of the participating nation (without US
Navy participation) the costs for deployment of those services will be recovered
from the participating nation. The provision of fuel and other common fluids are
covered under existing agreements and are reimbursable on a case by case
basis. Any expendable materials like gunnery or missile targets/drones will have
to be paid by the consuming nation.
41.
Allied ships may employ a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract to seek
dedicated service support. These requests must be drafted at least one year in
advance and funded. Each Embassy will hold a list of FMS cases open for
specific use. The Defense/Naval Attaché must always be involved in such a
process.
The Judge Advocate General (JAG) and the USFF N413 and N7
Directorates (Logistics) have extensive knowledge and experience in this
process and will provide assistance and guidance to nations that seek their
support. It is also convenient to try to list in the agreement, if applicable, the
principles for the covering of the cost of most of the envisioned/foreseeable
services.
29
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST (It should be noted that the
schedules of activity will vary from that which was planned due to other
operational imperatives, foul weather, re-tasking of participants, etc.)
ANNEX 2: USFFC SUBORDINATE COMMANDS
30
ANNEX 1: PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECK LIST
TIME
EVENT
Year prior
Identify training
CUSFF SKED MSG
-
Before IPC
REMARK
opportunities
Connect with CJOS COE and with CUSFF N7,
CSFTL N5,
-
Address any outstanding characteristics of the
deployment.
-
Attend IPC,
-
Connect with CSFTL lead planner,
9 months
-
Define forces: volume and basic training
prior
objectives,
-
Evaluate with CJOS COE
the relevance of the
training event
Address specific issues, create dedicated
timeline.
If required due to
-
Forward Letter of Intention to Participate
outstanding issues or
aspects
-
Attend MPC,
-
Confirm the units designation,
-
Refine participation ambitions (duties or task
6 months
asked) and training expectations,
prior
-
Connect with US hosting staff,
-
Investigate locations of LNOs or personnel
deployment,
4 months
prior
Investigate payment issues.
JAG CUSFF, nation’s
Draft the agreement
reps.
31
2 months
prior
-
Attend FPC,
-
Issue Foreign Visit Request and diplomatic
clearance with the Embassy,
-
Investigate customs issues for material brought
to the US,
-
Agreement signed by both parties and
endorsed.
-
1 month prior
Connect with Department of HDS to discuss
personnel entering US,
Norfolk International not
-
Forward initial LOGREQ,
fitted for massive arrival.
-
Obtain diplomatic and official Visit,
See local airfield
managers for assistance
- Clearance Request for Personnel based ashore.
One week
-
Attend Pre-Sail Conference,
prior
-
Update LOGREQ for Port Visit ,
STARTEX
TACON transfer
ENDEX
Hot wash-up
Norfolk Port Visit preferred
Often at sea
No need to return to
Redeploy
LNOs return home and Force re-deploys
Norfolk unless needed for
logistic issues
32
ANNEX 2: USFFC TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION
DEPUTY COMMANDER FORCE FLEET AND
JOINT OPS -CTF 20
CTF


Over 90,000 Sailors and Marines
4 Carrier Strike Groups -5 Amphibious Ready Groups-3 Marine Expeditionary Units
33
Global Force Management – Maritime Force Packages
UNCLAS
UNCLAS
Ready Fleet … Global Reach
United States Fleet Forces
34
4k
JTF-HQ
MHQ-MOC
(JMETL)
JTFEX
Sustainment Phase
Strike
Group
CDR &
Staff
Warfare
CDR &
Staff
Unit
UNCLAS
FST – O
CERTEX
FST – J / F
Sustainment
FST -S
JTFEX – Joint Task Force Exercise
C2X
CERTEX – ESG-MEU Certification
MISSIONIN ESSENTIAL TASK LIST
TACTICAL
OPERATIONAL
Live, Virtual, Synthetic Training
Strike Group Model
AIRWING
TRAINING
Integrated
GCT
Phase
RUT
RUT – Realistic Urban Training
GCT – Group Commander Training
FST–GC
R2P2 – Rapid Response Planning Workshop
IAC
IAC – Integrate ASW Course
R2P2
FST – Fleet Synthetic Training
– U (Unit)
– WC (Warfare Commander)
-- GC (Group Commander)
-- J/F/S (Joint / Force / Sustainment)
FST -WC
WCC
ULT
Phase
C2X – Composite Unit Exercise
TSTA / FEP
ESGINT / Group Sail
WCC- Warfare Commanders Conference
TSTA– Tailored Ship Training Assessment
FEP – Final Evaluation Period
FST -U
TRAINING EVENT COMPLEXITY
Schoolhouse
Inport/Synthetic
Live
UNCLAS
USMC
Ready Fleet … Global Reach
United States Fleet Forces
35
11
1.
Foreign ships scheduled to visit an East Coast port will be assigned a
“sister” US ship at least one month prior to their arrival in the 2 nd Fleet AOR.
2.
The US sister ship will act as a liaison and intermediary for any port visit
issues or concerns. Any questions regarding the assignment of a partner ship is
Mr. John Costello, [email protected], (757) 836-4043.
3.
See the attached for any requirements/POCs for specific services.
Foreign ships can also contact their US Husbanding Agent to schedule any
required services. Contact Mr. Tony Nance, [email protected], (757) 4441527 at Port Operations for any issues or questions regarding required services.
Refueling
4.
The visiting foreign naval ship needs to coordinate with US Navy Host
Ship POC, and the contracted Ship’s Agent, to schedule fuel:
a.
The Host Ship needs to transmit a Fueling Request Message.
b.
The Host Ship will assist the visiting Foreign Naval Ship with
arrangements of refueling:
5.
c.
Draft DD Form 1149 for the fuel.
d.
Contact Craney Island Defense Energy Support Center (DESC):
Speak with Ms. Beth Prevatte (757) 483-2569, to obtain accounting data
under the Fuel Exchange Agreement.
6.
Speak with Ms. Kim Steward (757) 322-9045, to schedule date/time/
type/quantity.
7.
The Host Ship will contact and schedule the NAVSTA Norfolk Fire
Marshall (757) 444-2324.
36
8.
The Host Ship POC needs to be present at the commencement of the
fueling evolution to sign for the fuel.
Oil Containment Boom
9.
The Ship’s Agent arranges for Oil Containment Boom to be deployed
around the ship prior to commencement of fueling evolution.
10.
Contact NAVFAC MIDLANT: Speak to Mr. Paul Milbourn (757) 341-0800;
e-mail: [email protected]
11.
Request Job Order Number, for Oil Containment Boom.
12.
Provide funding for the Job Order Number.
13.
The Ship’s Agent or NAVFAC MIDLANT then needs to call Environmental
Service Desk (757) 341-0412.
14.
Schedule Oil Containment Boom deployment or recovery.
Oil Analysis
15.
Ship POC, to contact the Navy Oil Analysis Program (NOAP), Bldg. V-61, (757)
445-8818.
Maintenance/Repair Support
16.
If beyond the scope of husbanding support, US Navy Host Ship POC will
contact Port Ops for assistance with obtaining maintenance/repair support
approval from CNO via USFF. CJOS COE may also provide a Foreign Officer (if
available) to support with foreign embassy coordination. Contact POCs:
37
a.
Port Operations Foreign Type Desk – Tony Nance, (W) (757) 444-
1527, [email protected]
b.
U. S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND (N43) - LCDR Robert
Blackwell,
(W)
(757)
836-4102,
(C)
(757)
650-5173,
[email protected]
c.
NORFOLK Naval Shipyard (C1220) - Andrew (Andy) Estock (W)
(757) 443-2650 ext 4209, [email protected]
Pier Side Services
17.
Any issues or questions relating to pier side hotel services, such as shore
power, potable water, sewage, oily water / waste oil, cranes or man-lifts, etc.,
need to be addressed to the Waterfront Support personnel.
18.
For Potable Water, Shore Power, Sewage Connection, Oily Water / Waste
Oil, Steam, etc. contact:
NAVFAC MIDLANT Utilities Coordinator, Mr. Paul
Milbourn (757) 341- 0800, [email protected].
19.
For pier side Dumpsters, Oil Booms, Forklifts, Vehicle Rentals and etc.
contact: NAVFAC MIDLANT Logistics Support, Speak with Mr. Richard Seeloff
(757) 341-0803, [email protected].
20.
Pyatt
Cranes / JLG’s / Lifts contact: NAVFAC MIDLANT, Speak with Mr. Marvin
or
Mr.
Alex
Holms,
(757)
341-1772,
[email protected]
/
[email protected]. An (E-7 or above) from the Host Ship must sign for the
JLG. The Host Ship must provide a qualified operator.
NOTE: Funding must be in place PRIOR to scheduling the Crane / JLG / Lift.
The ship or ship agent will be responsible for funding the crane.
21.
Customer Service: Contact NAVFAC MIDLANT Customer Service Rep.
Speak with Mr. Dickie Clement or Mr. Dan Smith (757) 341-0804.
38
NOTE: Unless your country currently has an exchange program, your ship, ship’s
agent or embassy will be responsible for all pier side service costs.
NOTE: For additional information, Please refer to the NAVFAC MIDLANT Ship
Support Office Pamphlet.
Other Services
22.
Any issues or questions relating to barges, brows, brow stands, mooring
lines etc., need to be addressed to the Dock Master personnel
23.
.Main Point of Contact: BMC Itro Duncan, (757) 444-3158 (office), (757)
438-3479 (cell); e-mail: [email protected].
24.
Port Operations Harbor Master: CWO3 Johnnie Pettaway, (757) 445-4426
(office), (757) 438-3848 (cell); e-mail: [email protected].
25.
Naval Station Norfolk Port Operations Officer in Charge: CDR Jose Sein,
(757) 444-0492 (office), (757) 560-2927 (cell) e-mail: [email protected].
26.
David
Naval Station Norfolk Deputy Port Operations Officer in Charge: LCDR
Walker,
(757)
444-7118
(office),
(757)
438-3398
(cell);
e-mail: [email protected].
27.
Naval Station Norfolk Port Operations Duty Officer: 24 hour duty contact:
(757) 438-3839,
28.
Port Operations Tower: VHF: CH 13/14/16
29.
Port Control (757) 444-2351 / 1709
Pierside Flight Operations
39
30.
Ship POC, for a Flight Operations Request message to be transmitted to
NAVSTA Norfolk Port Operations (NAVSTA NORFOLK VA).
31.
The Host Ship needs to transmit a Flight Operations Request Message.
32.
Port Operations will de-conflict the request, then request permission from
the Naval Station Norfolk Commanding Officer.
33.
Once permission is granted, Port Operations will coordinate with
Chambers Field.
34.
Once approval is granted from all required entities, Port Operations will
send a Flight Operations Request Reply back to the Host Ship.
35.
Prior to Lifting Off, aircraft needs to contact Chambers Field UHF 379.15.
Diving Operations
36.
Ship POC, for a Diving Request message to be transmitted to NAVSTA Norfolk
Port Operations (NAVSTA NORFOLK VA).
37.
The Host Ship needs to transmit a Dive Request Message.
38.
Port Operations will de-conflict the request and send a Dive Request
Reply back to the Host Ship.
39.
Diving Operations will ONLY be approved for the 0700 – 1800 time frame.
NOTE: No diving is approved for after 1800 due to Sonar Ops from 1800 – 0600.
Decompression Chambers:
NOTE: Decompression Chambers rotate duty every month.
40
40.
NAVSTA Norfolk: Code 760 NNSY Divers; (757) 444-6502; Supervisor:
(757) 373-6008
41.
Little Creek: MUDSU 2: (757) 462-8801; Supervisor: (757) 434-5951
Small Boat Operations
42.
Ship POC, for a Small Boat Operations Request message to be transmitted to
NAVSTA Norfolk Port Operations (NAVSTA NORFOLK VA).
43.
The Host Ship needs to transmit a Small Boat Operations Request
Message.
44.
Port Operations will de-conflict the request and send a Small Boat
Operations Request Reply back to the Host Ship.
Morale –Welfare
45.
Any questions relating recreation, local sporting events or amusement
parks need to be addressed to the on base Morale, Welfare and Recreation staff.
MWR Director: Mr. Alain Berry, (757) 445-8949 (office), (757) 438-3747 (cell) email: [email protected].
NOTE: For additional information, Please refer to the Discover Magazine
provided by the MWR representative.
46.
Naval Ship / Base Tours or Command Visit. Any requests or questions
relating to tours of any US Naval Ship, Naval Station Norfolk, or Official
Command Visit, need to be addressed to the Public Affairs Office staff. Public
Affairs Officer: Ms. Terri Davis, (757) 322-2576 (office), (757) 438-4245 (cell) email: [email protected].
41
47.
Naval Exchange: The Navy Exchange hours of operation M – Sat: 0900-
2100, Sun 0900-2000. Foreign Military Members need only their Active Duty
Military Identification card to enter and purchase items. For any questions call
(757) 440-2200. For any questions regarding providing a shuttle to and from the
exchange, please contact the Operations Service Manager: Ms. Brenda Dell –
(757) 440-1051; e-mail [email protected]
Security
48.
Any issues or questions relating security or law enforcement need to be
addressed to the on base police force.
a.
Police Emergency:
(757) 444-3333.
b.
Sewells Point Police Precinct (on-base).
c.
Waterfront Security Operations.
e.
Main Number, (757) 445-6577 / 6606.
f.
MACS Paul Montayne, (757) 322-2550.
g.
Security Officer LT Jeffery Eidenberger (757) 322-2500 / 2570.
h.
Physical Security & Antiterrorism Officer.MACS Paul Montayne.
(757) 322-2550. e-mail : [email protected].
49.
Hazardous Materials disposal needs to be coordinated through the Host
Ship POC and the Ship’s Agent. Host Ship needs to prepare a DD Form 13481A, for each HAZMAT item to be transferred. Contact NAVSTA HAZMAT office:
(757)
445-0905,
x-3012,
speak
with
[email protected].
NOTE: Refer to HAZMAT Disposal Guide.
42
Ms.
Mary
Stuck,
e-mail:
NOTE: Do not put everything in a tri-wall container.
Customs and Border Protection
50.
Any customs, Immigration or Agricultural issues need to be addressed to
Customs and Border Protection Host Ship needs to contact CBP Scheduling,
speak with duty officer, (757) 533-4218 / 4228, fax (757) 441-6267. Provide all
required information:
a.
What is your homeport?
b.
When did you leave your homeport?
c.
What was your last port of call?
d.
When was your last inport?
e.
How long have your been out to sea since your last inport?
f.
What is your next port of call?
g.
How many persons currently onboard?
h.
How many military?
i.
How many civilian?
j.
Will any persons be embarking your ship?
k.
Will any persons be disembarking your ship?
l.
Full Name.
m.
Military or Civilian.
n.
Rank or Position.
o.
U.S. or Foreign Citizen.
43
p.
Visa / Passport Number.
q.
Birth Date.
r.
Will they be staying stateside or flying back home to a foreign
country?
Medical Services
51.
Any medical issues or questions need to be addressed to the appropriate
medical services personnel.
52.
53.
Sewells Point Branch Medical Clinic
a.
Emergency
(757) 444-3333 or 911
b.
Information Tree
(757) 953.9000
c.
Quarterdeck
(757) 953-9020
(M-F after 1500)
d.
Acute Care
(757) 953-8760 / 8761
(M-F 0700-1900)
e.
Admin
(757) 9538883 / 8884
(0800-1600)
f.
Optometry
(757) 953-8996
g.
Pharmacy
(757) 953-8832 / 6337
(M-F 0700-1900)
h.
Dental
(757) 953-8526
(M-F 0700-1500)
i.
Immunizations
(757) 953-8717
(M-F 0715-1445)
j.
Radiology
(757) 953-8767
(M-F 0700-1530)
Portsmouth Naval Medical Center
a.
Emergency Room
(757) 953-1365
b.
Quarterdeck
(757) 953-5000 x-3 (for various clinics)
44
c.
54.
Pharmacy
(757) 953-0258
Sentara Norfolk General Hospital
a.
Emergency Room
(757) 388-3551
b.
Main Number
(757) 388-3000
c.
Nightingale Helo
(757) 388-2500
Decompression Chambers:
NOTE: Decompression Chambers rotate duty every month.
55.
NAVSTA Norfolk: Code 760 NNSY Divers, (757) 444-6502; Supervisor:
(757) 373-6008
56.
Little Creek: MODSU 2: (757) 462-8801 Supervisor: (757) 434-5951
45
SENTARA NORFOLK GENERAL HOSPITAL
46
PORTSMOUTH NAVAL HOSPITAL
47
1.
Coalition maritime information exchange is a complex environment with technical
solutions time consuming and costly to install. Additionally there exists a growing gap between
the US and Allied countries in terms of current capability and future areas of technical
development and investment. In the current global economic climate more must be done to
understand and make best use of existing capabilities. The table in the end of This ANNEX
lists information exchange requirements and considerations for planning purposes. The table
is not exhaustive and has been kept deliberately generic in order to fit with the overall
document classification.
2.
Dissemination.
Careful consideration should be given to the means by which
Communications, Documents and Orders are disseminated throughout the Coalition. It may
be advisable or even necessary to disseminate an individual Communication, Document or
Order via several means to ensure receipt by all participants.
Furthermore it may be
necessary to employ relay or rebroadcast to overcome equipment incompatibility or range
issues. Additionally primary and secondary means should be identified and secondary means
tested regularly to ensure operational. Examples:
a.
The Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) will produce the
Air TRAFFIC Order (ATO) on a daily basis detailing air activity for the following
72 hours. In order to ensure
receipt
by
all
Coalition
participants
it
maybe
necessary to disseminate via the chosen
Coalition Collaboration tool and Formal
Message Traffic in addition to posting to the
Coalition Portal.
b.
Executive Command sent via Chat to be backed-up by Formal Message Traffic.
Whilst Coalition Nations will generally act on Executive Commands received via Chat,
many require the same command via Formal Message Traffic for accountability and
archive purposes.
c.
Coalition Nations have not committed the same scale of investment to SatCom
as the US, but have retained and continue to invest in HF capability. This will result in
limited Coalition UHF SatCom voice availability requiring some voice transmissions to
be relayed or rebroadcast via other means.
48
d.
Virtually all Nations use voice as primary. With Chat used as primary a voice
circuit should be in place as secondary means. The voice circuit should be tested
regularly to ensure continually operational and available instantaneously in the event of
a Chat outage.
3.
Restoration Priority. A clear and concise Restoration Priority Plan should be compiled
and briefed by the lead N6 and understood by all Coalition participants. This will ensure that in
the event of a catastrophic communication outage all Coalition Nations work to restore
systems/circuits in the agreed order of priority to restore C2 in a swift and controlled manner.
The Restoration Priority Plan should also detail system and circuit priorities when operating in
a satellite bandwidth denied or degraded environment, including the use of SNR.
4.
Coalition Communications Capability Matrix (C3M). A detailed C3M will aid both
operators and planners in understanding the communications capabilities and limitations of the
Coalition. The matrix should be compiled centrally by the lead N6; disseminated and briefed
throughout the Coalition. An accurate matrix will inform the development of an effective and
efficient C2 structure in addition to establishing expectation management. The matrix should
be compiled in advance, once Coalition participants confirmed, and used to identify common
communication dissemination paths, primary and secondary, and aid the compilation of the
Restoration Priority Plan.
5.
Publications and Procedures. Aside from the technical aspect, interoperability can be
greatly enhanced by the use of familiar tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) derived
from common publications and procedures. Whilst all Nations will inevitably have their own
variation on this theme, when operating as a Coalition NATO publications and procedures
should be employed as common to all.
49
Ser
01
IER
Non-secure
voice LOS
(Radio)
Onboard
Ship to Ship
Ship to Shore
Ship to Aircraft
Cross Agency
Medium
HF
VHF
UHF
Considerations
Language barriers
Procedural differences
Frequency
management/allocat
ion
Equipment
compatibility
Equipment capabilities
02
Secure voice
LOS (Radio)
Ship to Ship
Ship to Shore
Ship to Aircraft
Cross Agency
HF
VHF
UHF
03
Non-secure
voice BLOS
(Radio)
Ship to Ship
Ship to Shore
Ship to Aircraft
Cross Agency
HF
UHF
UHF
SatCom
04
Secure voice
BLOS (Radio)
Ship to Ship
Ship to Shore
Ship to Aircraft
Cross Agency
HF
UHF
UHF
SatCom
Crypto
Language barriers
Frequency
management/allocat
ion
Equipment
compatibility
Language barriers
Frequency
management/allocat
ion
DAMA, Non-DAMA
Equipment
compatibility
Crypto
Language barriers
Frequency
management/allocat
ion
DAMA, Non-DAMA
05
Non-secure
telephony
Alongside
Littoral
Land line
GSM
Satellite
VoIP
Conference capability
Cost effectiveness
P2P or via National
Operator
50
Remarks
Onboard safety,
damage
control
Maritime safety
(IMM)
(MMSI)
Aviation safety
SAR
Boat safety
STUFT
coordination
Port operations
HADR
C2
Reporting
Fires
Aviation
coordination
Amphibious
operations
Logistics
Administration
Maritime safety
Aviation safety
STUFT
coordination
C2
Reporting
Fires
Aviation
coordination
Amphibious
operations
Logistics
Administration
Maritime safety
(MMSI)
Port operations
HADR
Ser
IER
Underway
Medium
HF phone
patching
Considerations
06
Secure
telephony
Alongside
Littoral
Underway
Broadcast
Land line
GSM
Satellite
VoIP
08
Unclassified
email and
attachments
Ship to Ship
Ship to Shore
Cross Agency
Internet
Crypto
Conference capability
Cost effectiveness
P2P or via National
Operator
Equipment
compatibility
Bandwidth
Releasable
Availability
Bandwidth
Priority
09
Classified email
and
attachments
Ship to Ship
Ship to Shore
Cross Agency
10
Secure HF email
STANAG 5066
11
Unclassified
publishing/data
exchange
07
VLF
HF
UHF
HF
Internet
System must be
available to all
Coalition
Training requirement
Coalition installation
timeline
Coalition account
creation timeline
Use of Gateways
National capabilities
Equipment
compatibility
Crypto
Releasable
Portal hosting
Applications
51
Remarks
Welfare
Logistics
Administration
STUFT
coordination
Range
extension
Experimentation
support
C2
C2
Reporting
Administration
Welfare
HADR
Administration
Logistics
STUFT
coordination
Port operations
Experimentation
support
Coalition
collaboration
C2
Logistics
Administration
Satellite denied
or restricted
environment
Welfare
HADR
Administration
Logistics
Port operations
Ser
12
IER
Classified
publishing/data
exchange
Medium
13
Portal
CAS
SharePoint
14
Unclassified Web
Browsing
Internet
15
Classified Web
Browsing
16
Chat
17
Formal Message
Traffic
ACP 127
Communicatio
ns Instructions
Tape Relay
Procedures
Non-secure Real
time/near real
time track data
exchange
Secure Real
time/near real
time track data
exchange
18
19
20
Receive, transmit
and display
Military
Message
Handling
Systems
(MMHS)
Considerations
System must be
available to all
Coalition
Portal hosting
Applications
Gateways
Hosting
Structure
Management
Replication
Bandwidth
System must be
available to all
Coalition
Nations requiring
executive
commands to be
backed-up via
Formal Message
OPTASK Chat
Cross domain Chat
Number of Chat rooms
NATO Classifications
AIS
Nations policy for
transmission of AIS
Link
Re-trans capability to
accommodate
nations without dual
Link capabilities
Link
Re-trans capability to
accommodate
52
Remarks
Coalition
collaboration
Research
News and
weather
HADR
Welfare
Research
C2
Reporting
Logistics
Executive
commands
Logistics
Administration
Welfare
STUFT
coordination
Ser
21
IER
secure nonreal time track
data
COP
RMP
RAP
Non-secure VTC
Conference
Point-to-point
22
Secure VTC
Conference
Point-to-point
23
FMV Receive
24
SNR
Medium
Aviation
mounted
UAV
mounted
HF
UHF
Considerations
nations without dual
Link capabilities
OPTASK COP
COP Manager
Crypto
National bridge (serial
to IP conversion)
P2P
Available bandwidth
Equipment
compatibility
National bridge (serial
to IP conversion)
P2P
Crypto
Available bandwidth
Equipment
compatibility
Equipment
compatibility
Crypto
National capabilities
Equipment
compatibility
Crypto
53
Remarks
HADR
Briefing
C2
Briefing
SA
PART II
INTEROPERABILITY HANDBOOK
54
IDENTIFYING INTEROPERABILITY PROBLEMS
1.
In order to overcome the most common interoperability problems when
planning to interact with each other and especially when interacting with USN
ships on the Eastern seaboard of the United States CJOS COE formed a working
group aiming to study interoperability. As already addressed in the preface, over
the past year, that group has conducted surveys and interviews with personnel
from Allied/Coalition ships as well USN ships. The surveys and interviews have
revealed several interoperability challenges and concerns; based on the
aforementioned research CJOS COE developed the “Interoperability Handbook”
comprised by the following documentation:
a.
An “Interoperability Survey Questionnaire” which is used as the tool
to reveal the main areas of possible Interoperability concerns. This aims
to be the main tool to uncover any hidden interoperability issues;
b.
An “Interoperability Lessons Learned data base” which lists the
Lessons Learned from the surveys and interviews conducted on board the
Coalition/Allied ships;
c.
An “Interoperability Survey Results paper” that incorporates those
areas noted to be successful or noted to need attention and can be used
as a benchmark for future operations among Allied Navies;
d..
An “Interoperability Checklist” which is the distillate of all the above
documents and is to be considered as a user friendly interoperability guide
that approaches interoperability issues from a functional area perspective
(planning, operations, communications, etc.).
e.
An “Interoperability Schedule Of Events” which is a general
schedule on the cooperation.
55
2.
As previously stated to further enhance and promote the above mentioned
products, and in order to establish best practices in the interoperability arena,
CJOS COE uploaded the latest version of those products in CJOS COE websites
encouraging nations to review and forward those documents to those ships
designated to participate in US exercises and operations.
How It Works
3.
Each NATO Allied / Coalition ship that has programmed a cooperation
with USN on the East Coast will receive through CJOS COE the aforementioned
4 documents which are included in the “Interoperability Handbook”. In that way
the ship’s staff has the opportunity and the time for the following:
a.
Study the Lessons Identified/learned from previous cooperations
(through the LL database).
b.
Study the main results from the surveys conducted in previous
ships.
c.
Be prepared for the cooperation with USN by using the detailed
“Interoperability checklist”.
d.
Be prepared to further facilitate CJOS COE Interoperability work by
filling (during the cooperation the “Survey Questionnaire” and by following
the “Interoperability Schedule Of Events”).
4.
Finally but maybe the most important part is the “Interview” on board the
ship. Follow-on One-on-One interviews with selected personnel: Senior leaders
(Ship CO, Operations officer, Marine Liaison, etc.). In-person or Teleconference
as well as follow-on Group interviews with watch officers, and functional areas
(examples:
Air
operations,
Logistics,
Networks, KMO, PAO, Legal/ROE).
56
Intelligence,
Communications
and
ANNEXES
ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY LESSONS LEARNED
57
SEPTEMBER 2010
“Revision 1”
1.
A team from the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of
Excellence (CJOS COE) conducted surveys and interviews on board coalition
ships which revealed several interoperability challenges and concerns; most
were minor in nature and mitigated expeditiously.
The information gathered
provides an indication that interoperability, while generally good, may be
declining in some specific areas resulting in needed attention. Opportunities for
improvement in efficiencies and effectiveness have been identified but it is
important to note that there were no failures in execution of operations or mission
accomplishment.
Areas Of Success
2.
Advanced Parties and Liaison Naval Officers (LNOs): Continue to use
advance parties/surveys (logistics personnel were very successful as a result of
advance coordination with NAVSUPP) and robust participation at planning
conferences. Continue to expand the use of LNOs as much as resources will
allow.
In particular, for communication systems, ship visits, workups, and
personnel exchanges reap immediate and lasting interoperability results.
3.
Participation:
Continue, and increase, the delegation of warfare
commander roles, unit missions, and staff responsibilities to coalition units and
staffs through robust communication of training objectives at planning
conferences.
4.
Communications:
Chat was both efficient and effective. CENTRIX
(Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System), while not a
panacea, was generally regarded as an excellent capability for communicating,
and gathering information and knowledge.
58
Extensive employment of Foreign
Disclosure Officers (FDOs) on both ship and ashore assisted greatly in the
dissemination of information; continue to address the use of FDOs early in the
planning process.
Areas Of Attention
5.
Communications: Voice circuits (to include HF) should be used more
extensively for Command and Control. CENTRIXS should be the primary
classified network, and an adequate number of terminals must be installed on
each ship; wider access to these coalition systems must be established by
increasing user accounts. SIPRnet (Secure Internet Protocol Router) should be
viewed as an alternate US only network. Senior communications planners need
to understand the capability and limitations of all coalition units, and construct
comms plans accordingly. Effort should be invested to ensure communications
plans are a result of early collaboration, detailed planning, disseminated as well
in advance of operations, and as many units as possible receive timely
information. It often took 2-3 days from leaving port for all communications to be
fully functional. Ensure embarked units (Ex: Marines) receive the same level of
involvement in establishing communications plans.
6.
Common terminology, references, and procedures: There were minor
misunderstandings due to lack of common terms. NATO publications should be
used as much as possible to prevent misunderstandings and provide common
references. The medical community surveyed had no interoperability issues, one
reason being they follow NATO publications exclusively. Some references to
important exercise documents and orders were kept on national networks and
not posted to coalition websites.
7.
Command and Control (C2):
Military cultural differences have an
adverse impact on interoperability across the C2 spectrum. These differences
must be explored, discussed, and detailed agreements on common C2 principles
promulgated. Exercise orders (specifically TABORDS and OPTASKS) must be
59
distributed well in advance of scenario commencement to allow coalition partners
the time for in depth review and understanding of the content of orders. The
distribution and handling of formal orders requires coalition agreement on
method of delivery; whether it is chat, email, website postings, radio messages,
or voice.
8.
Execution:
Watch Officer training on coalition operations, and
publications could be better. It often took 2-3 days into an exercise before all the
warfare commanders and watch officers were “on the same page”.
Specific Near Term Recommendations
9.
Build an informal terminology cross reference, a small project of this type
is underway.
10.
Create a chronological checklist of actions to be taken to enhance
operability in the preparation and planning phase of an exercise.
11.
Create a functional roles based list that matches the national names/titles
of watch standing positions to their generic roles.
Ex: TAO (Tactical Action
Officer) (US) to PWO (Principal Warfare Officer) (UK).
12.
A point paper on how to approach a common ground on the dissemination
of formal orders within Task Groups (TG to TG).
Significant Long Term Recommendations
13.
Exchange Communication specialist LNOs (at the junior enlisted level)
and execute communications checks prior to sailing. If communications checks
60
cannot be executed prior to sailing, conduct them as soon as practical.
Establish focused communications systems work-up periods.
14.
All coalition units must agree to and invest in the communications plans
(secure and unsecure) to ensure seamless and timely information.
Specific
attention should be paid to the limitations of all units. This may involve moving
from IP based Command & Control (chat/email) to Voice Comms and record
message traffic.
15.
Discuss Watch Officer experience and knowledge level expectations
during Final Planning Conference, and conduct dialogue between command
teams.
On-watch personnel will be at various levels of knowledge and
experience, it is important for the more experienced watch standers to know who
the less experienced watch standers are and what roles they fulfill.
Use an
unguarded net (or chat) to talk openly and perform command de-confliction, as
well as enhance knowledge transfer.
16.
Issue C2 guidance in Operational Order (OPORD) that is not covered in,
or is an exception to, standards in reference material (such as NATO
publications). Need more time to work out the processes of passing information
and “formal orders”. Coalition participants must agree to methods of distributing
“formal orders” and what constitutes a “formal order”.
Obtain a common
terminology book and use it. Areas to focus on: Planning horizons, timeliness of
postings to websites, mission type, Tactical Control (TACON), Operational
Control (OPCON), Situation Report (SITREP), Battle Rhythm, etc.
17.
Determine a methodology to eliminate or reduce conflicts between
planning (and execution) orders, especially Operational Tasks (OPTASKS); the
coalition experienced conflicts between OPTASK ID CRIT, OPTASK ASUW, and
OPTASK AAW. Establish version controls.
61
18.
Investigate the opportunity for US NAVSUP to participate along with UK in
the adoption of the NATO Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS) system
as an interoperability initiative.
62
Line #
1.
Syndicate
Plans
EVENT
Review possession/
access/reception of/to all
related/appropriate
publications/documents.
Review lessons learned data base
from recent operations or
exercises
REMARK / RATIONALE
Utilize LNO’s on order to receive documentation. Request those
missing from Higher/Foreign appropriate authorities in
accordance with National procedures. Ensure documents are
releasable to all coalition.
Database may not be releasable. Utilize Foreign Disclosure Officer
to determine releasability of lessons learned.
2.
Plans
3.
Plans
Determine Superior’s guidance and
intent
This may require a one on one briefing from the Commander to
subordinates in order to clear any language or cultural barriers
4.
Plans
Conduct Mission Analysis
5.
Plans
Refine participation ambitions
(duties or task asked) and
training expectations.
When possible, utilize an integrated combined planning team to
ensure effective mission analysis in order to accurately identify
tasks, limitations, COG analysis, risk assessment, and to
develop Commander’s intent and guidance for the combined
force. Language and culture will play a considerable role in
correctly interpreting and transmitting guidance for combined
forces.
This will ensure exercise or operations participants understand the
limitations of each navy with regards to training level,
certifications, etc.
6.
Plans
Develop and brief C2 structure and
provide reference doctrinal
reference material (e.g. CWC
Manual). Promulgate clear
directives on C2 structure in
OPORD. Briefings should
include graphic depictions of
geographic or functional
divisions of responsibility.
Provide all commanders a briefing on C2 structure to include
planned changes, geographic boundaries, mission
responsibilities, alternate commanders, and supporting
communications structure. Brief SUPSIT doctrine as required.
63
7.
Plans
Generate mission or training
timeline to include any limitations
8.
Plans
Agree, in concept, on the common
set of tactics, techniques, and
procedures publications used for
all participants.
A training or operational timeline will ensure the coalition is
operating within its constraints and will ensure expectations are
understood by all participants.
In most cases this should be the NATO publication set.
Agreement at this time provides time for the training audience to
become familiar with NATO publications.
Interoperability could be enhanced by using common terms, or
providing a tool that relates one term to another.
9.
Plans
Command and Control Authorities
and dissemination of orders.
- Agree on command and control
authority.
- Document agreed to rules for
disseminating orders.
10.
Plans
11.
Plans
Investigate pre-existing OPTASKs
and OPORDs for use during
combined operations or
exercises. Commands such as
TTGL may be able to provide
samples of pre-existing plans
documents that can be adopted
and utilized for a given exercise.
BPT to develop and issue
releasable OPTASKs and direct
whether issued OPTASKs
superseded previous OPTASKs
Coalition participants must agree to methods of distributing formal
orders and what constitutes a formal order. This must be
documented in OPGENs, OPTASKs, and OPORDERs. In the
absence of documented procedures specific to the exercise,
coalition partners should use NATO standards. Orders will be
mis-understood, unrecognized, or late due to no prescribed upon
or agreed to rules for disseminating orders. Official orders, such
as OPTASKs, Intentions messages, serial event messages, etc.
should be sent via record message traffic as opposed to email.
Contents may be coordinated by email but messages are the
official order. Real time changes of course can me made by
voice or chat communications
Using standing OPTASK and OPORDs that are releasable to
participating nations will reduce planning and work load for
planners. Pre-existing OPTASKs and OPORDs can be modified
to suit the mission, available forces and the desires of the TF/TG
commander.
Operators need to have common OPTASKS in which to work from.
It needs to be made clear which OPTASKs will be relevant for a
given exercise.
64
12.
Plans
Discuss limitations with regards to
operational tempo.
Some navies have the manning and training to operate on a rapid
training tempo while others do not. It’s important to frankly
discuss what a realistic training tempo is in order to establish
expectations and to ensure effective training.
13.
Plans
Consider exercise design that
simultaneously challenges
multiple warfare areas
Depending on the level of expertise and training requirements, it is
important to design exercises that realistically reflect the
challenges the participating coalition may face during actual
operations.
14.
Plans
Integrate opportunities to share
warfare responsibilities between
all participating nations
15.
Plans
Identify standardized wording and
numbering of ROE information
A disseminated ROE matrix with common or standardized
terminology will prevent confusion with regards to implementing
ROE.
16.
Plans
Promulgate ROE Matrix by country
in order for watch standers to
understand constraints and
restraints with regards to
national policy
Each nation will have different authorities. Operations must take
advantage of the differing national rules in order to achieve the
mission. It’s important for each unit to understand what missions
and tasks each of the participating coalition units may conduct.
For example, some nations need master’s consent before
boarding, while others do not.
17.
Plans
Include within the Battle Rhythm
when serial event TABORDS are
due. Ideally TABORDs should
be released NLT than 72 hours
prior to the event. Identify and
adhere to where TABORDS will
be posted on IP Networks (e.g.
CENTRIX).
Releasing TABORDS in accordance with an established battle
rhythm will ensure participants have adequate time to review and
plan for serial event. The TABORD are not always received in
standard NATO format as expected, thus making it difficult to
extract relevant information and ensure that all necessary details
are passed prior to a serial
Building into the plan opportunities for coalition units to assume
warfare commander responsibilities will ensure training
opportunities are equitable and will improve interoperability in the
long term.
65
18.
Plans
Establish integrated battle rhythm.
Provide time for lower echelon
units to provide feedback on
higher echelon plans.
19.
Plans
20.
Plans
Use training requirements and
objectives to build a plan that
rotates warfare commander
duties to as many units as
possible, while providing time for
each unit to become proficient,
and exercise interoperability.
Brief details for exercise area
restrictions to include ranges, air
space and sea space
restrictions, environmental
requirements, etc.
21.
Plans
Conduct face to face meetings and
capability briefs outside of the
scheduled planning conferences.
Conduct site visits with air
operations, communications,
logistics, surface warfare, etc.
22.
Plans
Verify Pre-exercise messages are
received and understood by all
coalition participants.
To ensure effective planning and execution, an effective battle
rhythm that considers coalition requirements must be
established, promulgated, and adhered to in order to ensure
continuity of operations.
Continue to provide more and greater responsibilities to multiple
nations and units. Especially warfare commander roles (AAWC)
and Force commander roles (like ESF).
Brief on use of exercise area. Reserve areas for events (such as
helo operations). Address Risk aversion. Clear differences in
Waterspace Management, environmental compliance and
submarine safety procedures.
Pre-exercise time in Norfolk, VA, provided an extremely valuable
opportunity for ships officers and specialists to visit host nation.
Discussion includes maneuvering in close company, Plane
Guard duties, appreciation of CVN considerations and concerns,
escort duty with CVN operations, tactical employment
discussions with DESRON Air Ops, battle rhythm, and
requirements from the staff for flying bids, maintenance cycles,
etc. . . A pre exercise comms brief is very helpful to meet key
players face to face and discuss aspects that may cause
concern.
Releasability issues may result in late or no release of pre exercise
messages. Ensure addressing of messages include all coalition
staffs and units. Refrain from labeling documents as NOFORN.
Exercise and CTG/CTF staffs must understand how to disseminate
information that is as freely releasable as possible (i.e.: Rel
CMFC). Use NATO formats as often as possible to enhance
releasability.
66
23.
Plans
Use document labeling to ensure
widest dissemination
Establish releasability guidelines and ensure coalition players are
included in release groups. Refrain from using NOFORN
labeling.
24.
Plans
LNOS
Liaison Officers should be assigned at least two weeks prior to the
Exercise. Both the quantity and quality (expertise) of coalition
participants is the basis for the detailed interaction required.
LNOS have to make planning decisions, the command structure
they are embedded within is crucial. LNOs must be paired with
a designated and corresponding ship POC.
25.
Intel
In order to protect information, all participants must understand and
adhere to foreign disclosure requirements.
26.
Intel
Brief and describe foreign
disclosure requirements and
guidelines
Coordinate Intelligence Preparation
of the Battle space with coalition
partners.
27.
Intel
Designate clear authority on red
data base management
In order to ensure the Common Operational Picture is accurate with
regards to red tracks, clear lines of authority must be
promulgated for data base management responsibilities.
28.
Intel
Designate the information system
to use for intelligence products
and information sharing.
Maritime coalition operations
should incorporate accessible
means of allowing data to be
transferred between units.
Information system must be identified early in the planning process
to allow time for acquisition, installation, training, and testing.
Clearly identify and send all parties chat room names,
passwords, and location of information. All chat rooms should
be setup and defined prior to deployment/exercise.
29.
Intel
Coalition partners must have an understanding of the intelligence
requirements for the commander. Additionally, each partner
must be made familiar with the geography and characteristics of
the Area of Operations, Assessment of the Enemy.
Discuss, where possible,
intelligence gathering
capabilities and limitations.
Intel analyst must be able to understand coalition capabilities in
order to best exploit intelligence gather capabilities, which will
avoid gaps and redundancies in intelligence collection
67
Develop matrix of unit Intel
gathering capabilities
Designate and disseminate the
commander’s Priority
Intelligence Requirements.
Discuss Request for Information
submission procedures
All units must understand the commander’s intelligence priorities.
30.
Intel
31.
Intel
Develop Enemy COAs with
coalition partner input
Differing cultures and experiences will enlighten the understanding
of the enemy and their potential actions.
32.
Ops
Conduct ship and aircraft capability
review. Participants/units provide
capabilities, especially new or
unique ones. (OPSTAT UNIT or
equivalent signals should be
utilized).
Examples: New systems, like VDS. Standoff weapons like Exocet.
Information should include current material status of weapons,
sensor, propulsion, RHIBs, and helos, and impact on operations
and particular warfare areas. All OPS hands must be able to
understand coalition capabilities in order to best exploit them and
will lead in avoidance of gaps and redundancies in operations.
33.
Ops
BPT conduct survey of amphibious
ships for compatibility of various
landing craft.
34.
Ops
A survey of landing craft and vehicles must be completed to
determine the level of interoperability of amphibious units (e.g.
can a US LCAC fit into a UK Amphib or vice versa).
Identify communications
terminology and acronym
reference
All units must be familiar and practice with common
communications terminology. A single code word reference
book should be identified to avoid voice communications
confusion.
68
35.
Ops
Conduct warfare commander and
watch stander discussion on
differences in National policy,
ROE, and safety to ensure all
participants have an equal
understanding of limitations,
rules, safety etc.
Masters Consent Boarding is one example of national policy
differences, and required an understanding between units of
interoperability differences.
36.
Ops
Establish communications doctrine
for Voice and Chat circuits.
Publish doctrine within OPTASK
Comms and OPTASK Chat
Operators need to understand what circuits will be used for the
issuance of formal tactical orders. The tactical situation will
dictate whether voice or chat will be the primary C2 medium.
Additionally, the purpose of the circuit must be determined,
whether it is to be administrative in nature, complimentary to
voice communications or operationally and tactically directive.
Maneuvering coalition ships is conducted exclusively over Fleet
Tac UHF, in some exercises, a combination of Fleet Tac, VHF
BTB and CENTRIX chat with no particular method given primacy
and on occasion conflicting orders arising from each circuit.
37.
Ops
Develop and provide a
roles/responsibility matrix that
relates the name/title of each
watch stander on the C2 nets to
a common role.
Example: TAO(US) to PWO(UK)
Need to issue good C2 guidance in OPORD, or (better) use
standards in reference material.
69
38.
39.
Ops
Ops
Agree on tactical references that
will be used for operations. The
objective here is to create a list
of the primary National,
Coalition, and NATO
publications used so that each
participant has time to access
reference documents that are
not on their national systems, or
request hardcopies from other
nations.
OCE needs to direct use of appropriate tactical pubs and where
there will be exceptions.
Interoperability problems can be caused due to important reference
documents available, or over-classified.
For some coalition units, chat is not a primary means of
communication, and so the use of chat as a means for order
dissemination should be clear from the beginning
Brief C2 and Communications
procedures.
If chat is to be used as primary form of communications, then all
participants must agree on the decision to do so, and voice
circuits must be constantly tested as backup when chat is
inoperative.
Virtually all nations use voice as primary communications.
40.
Ops
Reinforce command and control
communications doctrine.
41.
Ops
42.
Ops
Communications and watch
stander limitations must be
briefed to rationalize
expectations.
If required, brief and discuss NSFS
fire control procedures and
doctrine. Identify common
resources for NSFS doctrine and
terminology.
Example: For SITREPS, Use NATO prescribed TABORD format,
informative as a stand-alone documents, and deliver via
message traffic and CENTRIXS at 72 hr point.
Official orders, such as OPTASKs, Intentions messages, serial
event messages, etc. must be sent via record message traffic as
opposed to email. Contents may be coordinated by email but
messages are the official order. Real time changes of course
can me made by voice or chat communications.
Some units may have limited communications and available watch
standers, therefore, operations must be planned around these
limitations.
Each participating unit may have differing procedures for the
conduct of NSFS. In order to ensure safe NSFS events, each
unit should agree on the appropriate references, procedures,
and terminology.
70
43.
Ops
Each OPTASK should identify the
appropriate C2 circuit for tactical
execution and controller of that
circuit. Brief participants.
Discuss “safe to train” requirements
44.
Ops
45.
Ops
Discuss cultural treatment of
command and organization.
- Come to terms in areas such
as: Planning horizons, the
objective of unit reports (should
a SITREP be a status report, or
should it provide a tactical
assessment and intentions?).
46.
Ops
47.
Ops
Where voice circuits are limited,
consider assigning a single
frequency for overall tactical C2.
Confirm the units designations,
call-signs, etc.
48.
Ops
Provide information on how
Warfare Commander’s Roles are
being performed.
Briefing control of voice circuits will ensure voice radio discipline.
Need to understand differences in tactics in general as well as new
systems, perhaps via briefings ahead of the exercise. Especially
differences in Gunnery safety rules should be clear and
understandable.
Nations differ in their expectations for unit actions when situations
present themselves. Two examples: An expectation that when a
unit is assigned to a SAU for an ASW mission, it is not
necessary to issue a change in TACON for the unit to the
ASWC, when in fact, it is a good practice to issue an order for
clarity. Orders changing TACON or OPCON for a unit: What
format should they take, and what dissemination process should
be used? Only through knowing of differences can
interoperability issues be mitigated. In some cases the
differences cannot be solved, which is acceptable as long as
they are identified.
Communications and watch stander limitations of other units must
be understood to ensure effective and continuous C2.
Familiarize operators with call-sign conventions and unit warfare
designations (e.g. AW, AX).
All units must be aware of differences and limitations when warfare
commander functions are hosted in a staff, versus the typical
method of hosting within a ship’s operations center. Most
coalition ships are not aware that a warfare commander can be
hosted in a staff, there will be difficulty receiving/sending
information, because a staff based warfare commander is not
fully focused on the tactical situation.
71
49.
Ops
Timely issue of Commander’s daily
intentions message (DIMs)
Ensure that DIMS messages are issued in a timely manner.
Releasability procedures, unduly lengthy review cycles, and
improper routing and message handling can easily delay the
DIMS from getting to the right audience quickly. Send DIMS by
fastest means possible, typically email.
50.
Ops
Receipt of Orders: message traffic
must be free of delays and reach
all participants.
Ensure proper handling or
dissemination of messages
Record message traffic “filters" (human and electronic) may hinder
interoperability.
Record message traffic may suffer because of: 1) No-one (or very
few) is reviewing message traffic for relevance. 2) Messages not
being forwarded 3) Information in messages was not finding its
way into the relevant information 4) Routing indicators is not up
to date.
51.
Ops
Avoid Non NATO terminology
52.
Ops
Use of NATO terminology should be ensured. Example: “Suspect
identity” is used in NATO but some other nations don’t use it,
and can cause confusion when communication contacts
intentions.
LNOS can play a crucial role helping monitoring email traffic from
coalition ships. And can help keep host watch officers informed.
53.
Ops
(Data Link)
Discuss and Identify Force COP
Manager
Identify COP management experience and link systems integration
capabilities
54.
Ops (Data
Link)
Discuss and Identify FOTC
Identify FOTC management experience and link systems
integration capabilities
55.
Ops (Data
Link)
Discuss and Identify FTC
56.
Ops (Data
Link)
Ops
(Data Link)
Brief and promulgate link
Architecture
Determine primary data link for the
Common Operational Picture,
Promulgate to operators to ensue familiarity
57.
Create a strong relationship
between LNOs and Operations
watch officers
There is a need to broadcast the Common Operational Picture to
as many units as possible, while maximizing the capabilities of
72
keeping in mind capabilities and
limitations of participating units.
BPT to exchange data link
LNOs.
Establish, brief, and disseminate
OPTASK ID matrix and
symbology doctrine
the best equipped units. Additionally, there is a need to prevent
cluttered pictures where multiple data line broadcasts are
pushed simultaneously.
58.
Ops
(Data Link)
All units must use the same ID doctrine for their data links to avoid
confusion of track IDs. Based on varying degrees of link
capabilities, common ground must be found on symbology and
ID criteria to ensure a Common Operational Picture. Changes to
existing unit ID criteria must be determined early enough for
units to train to new ID criteria.
59.
Ops
(Data Link)
Determine Force Track Quality for
each unit
60.
Ops
(Data Link)
Provide clear direction on crypto in
use, and frequency shifts.
61.
Air Ops
Conduct HOSTAC review
Ensures HOSTAC up to date information is available to aviation
planners
62.
Air Ops
Schedule in port flight deck
inspection
Permits HAC opportunity to determine caps/lims of helicopter flight
decks to support flight operations planning
63.
Air Ops
Identify appropriate aviation
publications and references
Ensures all aviation capable units will have appropriate references
and time to absorb and apply contents
64.
Air Ops
Identify primary network for ATO
production (e.g. TBMCS)
Some units will not have access to TBMCS as it resides on SIPR.
Therefore, a common network must be identified to support ATO
production
Predetermined force track quality will reduce dual tracking in the
Common Operational Picture
The OTAD can be problematic at times when the shoreside
originator becomes confused over the time difference and which
day’s crypto is required. The Link 11 Data frequency might
change without being promulgated on the voice net or CENTRIX.
The Link SITREP should be released hourly and not when there
are changes.
73
65.
Air Ops
Planning and coordination of Helo
Flying Ops.
66.
Air Ops
Consider using standard NATO
format (such as the ICC
application) for ATO
67.
Air Ops
68.
Sub Ops
69.
Sub Ops
70.
Info Ops
71.
Info Ops
Sharing of C2 duties requires
detailed and easily understood
comms architecture for Air
Operations.
Develop Waterspace Management
Plan and designate
SUBOPAUTH
Promulgate submarine safety
procedures
Daily DOTAH/FEEDER should be employed The lack of ready
access to the DOTAH/ATO and other aviation planning
information means that the majority of communication with USN
is carried out via email. The usual battle rhythm employed within
a NATO TG is submitting a daily DOTAH feeder and receiving a
DOTAH with the next 72Hr.
A standard format for the ATO for all NATO Carrier Groups (ICC)
should be used. NATO use of ICC software in previous
exercises with coalition assets has proved invaluable; the
software is available and has been proven even if the Strike
Wing’s Daily Air Plan may have be received as well as a
planning aid.
The key issue precluding the execution of these duties is the timely
and effective distribution of material and appropriate security
classification between coalition units. Sharing of ADC and
Redcrown duties require consistent and robust communications
architecture for the Task Group.
Ensure all players are familiar with submarine operating areas
Ensure all players are familiar with submarine safety procedures
BPT develop common terminology
and doctrine for the conduct of
strategic communications.
Promulgate and brief IO command
and control arrangements and
Common terminology will ensure a synchronized information
operations plan and will support effective execution.
To avoid confusion on IO C2 structure, each unit must be briefed
on what the roles and responsibilities there are for IO operations.
74
authorities and responsibilities in
the OPTASK IO.
Key personnel must be identified and POC information
disseminated (e.g. email address, voice net, IP network.)
72.
Info Ops
Identify Theater IO Organizations
73.
Info Ops
74.
Info Ops
Identify theater IO goals and
objectives
Establish Force IO/IW Policy,
including restricted frequencies,
EMCON, and media policies.
75.
Logistics
76.
Logistics
77.
Logistics
Review unit capabilities and
limitations in order to identify
logistics infrastructure /
engineering compatibility
Fuel planners and logistics planners must refuel and other logistics
systems (e.g. fuel line connections, pressure limitations, fuel and
oil types, etc) are compatible for all participating units. Early
identification of incompatibility is needed to ensure solutions are
available before commencement of the exercise.
78.
Logistics
Investigate locations of LNOs,
Forward Logistics Operating
Teams and/or personnel
deployment
Location of forward logistics LNOs is critical to the success of
operations
79.
Logistics
Replenishment Procedures
Use of standard RAS signal formats in accordance with ATP 16
and OPTASK RAS should be ensured.
80.
Logistics
Understand shore power
connection differences
The weight of the cables and the position of the shore connection
boxes may preclude the use of shore power. In effect, heavy
three-core cables are used in the US that does not have the
flexibility of the single-core cables used in the coalition units.
Coalition units must be prepared. Some coalition vessels supply
440v whereas US shore power is nearer 480v.
Determine logistics report
requirements such as the daily
OPREP 5 report.
Identify logistics LNOs and Forward
Logistics team personnel.
Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO chain of
command
Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO objectives
Ensure all IO planners are familiar with force IO policies.
In order to conduct effective logistics planning, a common logistics
format and reporting procedure must be identified.
Logistics LNOs are critical to ensure personnel, parts, and supplies
are available to the TG.
75
81.
Logistics
Establish expeditious invoicing of
Services
Mechanism not in place to provide timely invoices to foreign ships
for payment of services prior to departing.
82.
Logistics
Approval to obtain repair services
from US shipyards
83.
Comms
Identify primary command and
control information network (e.g.
CENTRIX). Avoid using
SIPRnet which coalition ships can
not access.
OPNAV regulations require OPNAV approval in order for Navy
shipyards to provide repair services to foreign ships. Upon
approval, the repair services are only provided on a not to
interfere basis with US ship commitments.
USFF N4, in coordination with Port OPS and the N43 community
developed a process where Port Ops would request blanket
approval for the shipyards to provide repair services to foreign
ships prior to their arrival. This was done for some coalition units
but it appears that the Mayport shipyard is not aware that this
approval can be obtained.
A survey must be completed to determine which network can serve
the most units. This will become the primary C2 network. Once
identified all interaction should be completed on the primary
network to avoid confusion and redundancy. If the focus of
information flow and posting is on a national network, such as
SIPRnet, Late and incomplete information, will end up posted on
CENTRIXS
84.
Comms
A large amount of effort can be
spent in achieving effective
CENTRIX interoperability
CENTRIX can be a single point of
failure for coalition
interoperability and whenever
connection with the server is
lost, interoperability levels
plummet.
Define which enclave will be used. Program Staff assistance to
engineer the required frequencies and permissions. Data
exchange from SIPR to CENTRIX is onerous. Ensure that
websites are set up correctly to allow for posting of such
documents. Emailing large documents takes a long time and
frequently causes the files to become corrupt or crash the
system. All in all, this process requires an inordinate amount of
effort by the LNOs and Ship’s Staff.
76
85.
Comms
Identify appropriate crypto
requirements and availability.
Brief crypto roll over and loading
procedures. Identify potential
technical incompatibilities
between various modems and
crypto terminals. Brief and
publish crypto terminal settings.
Participants must ensure that compatible crypto is available in a
timely manner. Additionally, all crypto users must be
synchronized with roll over and loading times. Crypto material
should be checked thoroughly well in advance. Planning should
consider coalition availability.
86.
Comms
Identify realistic requirements for
information systems to include
number of required PCs,
printers, etc. Identify space
requirements and develop
installation plan.
Survey operational commanders for information systems
requirements. Units may require advance notice to begin
installing unique network systems (e.g. CENTRIX). Additionally,
units and staffs will have to develop a comprehensive location
plan for PCs and printers to ensure appropriate people have
access to required information systems and that those systems
are located such that they adequately support operations and
planning. Where possible, co-locate new systems using CPU
switches, with existing systems in order to not disrupt normal
office space arrangement and seating of personnel
87.
Comms
Identify information systems
account registration
requirements.
88.
Comms
89.
Comms
90.
Comms
Personnel that need new information systems accounts normally
must register in a timely manner to ensure availability of
accounts.
Provide information systems
training to appropriate personnel
to include login and passwords
Ensure adequate chat rooms are
available to support operations
Develop and disseminate list that
includes chat room names and
passwords via OPTASK chat
In order to ensure familiarity with newly acquired information
systems, personnel must be provided with passwords and
information systems training.
Survey warfare commanders to determine chat room requirements
Ensure all participants have access to required chat rooms.
77
91.
Comms
Provide comms LNOs between
combined forces
92.
Comms
Develop communications capability
MATRIX and brief operators and
comms caps/lims for each unit.
93.
Comms
It’s important to work out communications problems in port before
units begin exercising in order to maximize training at sea.
94.
Comms
If possible, conduct pre-exercise
communications circuit testing,
to include operators at their
watch stations 3 days prior to
commex.
Use NATO crypto
95.
Comms
HAVEQUICK utilization.
Define settings to be used and HOPRATE. USN has been able to
use training settings with this HOPRATE and therefore opted not
to use war settings during C2X. Coalition units are expected to
use a different HOPRATE. It has been observed the use of
different HOPRATEs and training cryptographic material put
coalition units at a disadvantage as software limitations do not
allow for training cryptographic material to be used
96.
Comms
Message Handling System
exploitation
Comms plan should address amongst others and the exploitation of
MHS.
97.
Comms
Degrees of Confidentiality
Restricted is not used by USN.
98.
Comms
Use of Maneuvering circuits must
be well managed.
99.
Medical
Identify medical planning doctrine
and procedures to be used
during exercises.
Identify and BPT exchange LNOs
for all areas.
100.
All
Comms LNOs will ensure continuity of communications throughout
the exercise by providing an immediate POC that address
comms issues
Operators and planners need to understand communications
capabilities and limitations of other units in order to develop an
effective command and control structure. It will also establish
expectations between participating units.
Using NATO Crypto will potentially eliminate issues that would
arise if the coalition uses crypto provided by the host nation.
Maneuvering nets should be clarified on order to avoid
interoperability issues. Furthermore NATO signaling methods
should be applied.
Medical emergency plans must be compatible to ensure rapid
response for injured or sick personnel.
The more robust of an LNO plan there is the better likelihood of
being able to rapidly resolve conflicts in tactics, doctrine,
78
communications, and logistics. LNO engagement cannot be
overemphasized. It is the only method by which Coalition units
will realize the complexity of the exercise. Coalition ships must
provide detailed requirements during planning.
101.
All
102.
All
103.
104.
a
All
All
Ensure that all OPTASKs, OPGEN,
TABORDS or other planning or
directive messages reference
only those documents that are
releasable to action and info
address.
Identify Planning Conference
Participants
Units cannot reference a document they do not have access to,
thus, their ability to execute assigned tasks may be inhibited.
The standard format table in AXP 2C for signal formatting could
be used to save confusion in signal orders
Staff planners (CSG, ATG, etc.) from all participants should attend
critical planning conferences. These attendees should be
consistent through all planning conference, and the exercise,
personnel should not be rotating to a new command in the next 8
months.
C4 (command, control
communications, computers)
architecture design must receive
primary focus during planning
conferences.
Releasability of orders and
information.
Exercise planners, and CTG/CTF
staffs must create, review, and
label orders and other
information for maximum
release.
C4 architecture should be thoroughly checked and reviewed prior
to the exercise; coalition must understand how to attain visibility
to higher level (CFMCC, CJTF) comms and info management
and flow. Experts in C4 must attend all planning phases.
Verify which units will be on certain enclaves. OPTASK Comms
must encompass networks, command, control, and information
management. Coalition terminals must be manned.
Procedures for maximum releasability must be addressed early in
the planning process, and used continuously during the exercise.
Examples of documents that must not be labeled NOFORN:
OPTASK Comms, planning conference presentations, OPORDER
6000, Pre-exercise workups (FST-GC) information. Use NATO
formatted orders.
79
ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS (SoE)
TIME
Action
EVENT
REMARKS
Prior to IPC
CJOS LNO
Obtain Ship’s schedule and
Plan of Intended
Movement (PIM)
Keep CJOS COE Deputy Director
informed.
CJOS LNO and
CJOS
Interoperability
Team Leader
(TL)
Provide Interoperability
survey and checklist
package to ship(s).
CJOS TL
Compare Ship’s schedule
with USFFC (N7, N3) and
CSFTL exercise
schedule.
Need to understand if Ship is coming
“late in the game” or is integrated
starting with IPC.
CJOS LNO
Ensure Ship participation in
IPC
Ensure participants have reviewed
Interoperability checklist
CJOS TL
Identify primary reference for
acronyms and
terminology
CJOS is developing references to
cross-match terminology.
CJOS TL
Be prepared to publish
common terminology and
acronym list
And/Or
Prior to Ship
Leaving
Homeport
IPC
Post IPC
Prior to
MPC/FPC
MPC/FPC
Ensure the “Exercise
Playbook” is provided to
Ship from CSFTL.
Communicate with CO and OPS,
address any questions. Consider
issuing a formal message through
USFFC N3 or N7.
A acronym & terminology list will
provide operators a quick reference
to avoid communications confusion
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Follow up with IPC
Participant(s)
Receive feedback on usefulness of
checklist.
CJOS LNO
Ensure Ship participation in
MPC/FPC
CJOS TL
Ensure CSFTL has sent
CSG/ESG staffs are the planners, and
issue the OPORDS and OPTASKS.
80
and surveys to Host
Nation (US) Ships/Staffs.
Post
MPC/FPC
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Prior to
PSC/WCC
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
PSC /WCC
Events
Schedule Face to Face
meeting with Ship. Inform
CJOS chain of command,
including Deputy.
checklist.
Keep CSFTL informed, as well.
CJOS TL
Create Draft Mission Order
(objectives) for Ship
Engagement.
Provides Draft Objectives for Ship’s
review. Sets expectations for
schedule, participation and
products.
Coalition Ship
Provide feedback on Mission
Order.
If required, depends on complexity of
the ship visit, such as a 2 day atsea interview evolution.
CJOS TL
Coordinate USFFC PAO
coverage
Inform PAO, possible coverage of
Face-Face meeting
CJOS TL
Welcome package
Assemble welcome package for FaceFace: CJOS brochures, mementos
for CO…
CJOS TL
Ensure Ship’s personnel
have copies of the
Survey.
Same for Host Nation (US) Ships and
staffs; liaison with CSFTL
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Conduct meeting, report
back to CJOS COE
Deputy Director.
Post PSC
Execution
Follow up with MPC/FPC
Participant(s)
Releasability and NATO standards
must be considered.
None Identified
Coalition
Participants
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Complete Surveys
This includes identified US Ships and
Staffs. These surveys will be used a
guide during the interview process.
a) Confirm schedule for Follow-on One-on-One interviews with
follow-on visits,
selected personnel: Senior leaders
teleconferences, and
(Ship CO, Operations officer, Marine
interviews.
Liaison, etc.). Follow-on Group
b) Resend Mission
interviews with watch officers, and
Order to Ship CO/XO,
functional areas (examples: Air
with plan on splitting
operations, Logistics, Intelligence,
interviews into
81
groups.
Coalition
Participants
Post
Execution
Communications and Networks, KMO,
PAO, Legal/ROE).
Forward completed Surveys
to CJOS.
CJOS TL
Conduct Follow-on visits,
teleconferences, and
interviews.
Inform PAO, CJOS COE Deputy
Director.
CJOS TL, Team
members for
Operations, Air,
Logistics, C2,
Comms.
a) Team members
review surveys.
b) Team members split
into groups.
c) Use completed
surveys or blank
surveys to guide
interviews.
Update Lessons Identified
“database”,
Interoperability Checklist.
One-on-One interviews with selected
personnel. Group interviews with
watch officers, and functional
areas.
CJOS TL
Provide after-action report
If required.
CJOS TL
Conduct meeting with
CSFTL, USFFC N7
If required.
CJOS TL
CSFTL:
COMMANDER, STRIKE FORCE TRAINING ATLANTIC
FPC:
FINAL PLANNING CONFERENCE
IPC:
INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE
LNO:
LIAISON OFFICER
MPC:
MAIN PLANNING CONFERENCE
PAO:
PUBLIC AFAIRS OFFICER
PSC:
PRE-SAIL CONFERENCE
TL:
TEAM LEADER (FOR INTEROPERABIL; ITY PROJECT)
WCC:
WARFARE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
82
ANNEX 4: INTEROPERABILITY LESSONS LEARNED DATA BASE
1
Area
Title
Observation
Discussion
Air
Helicopter
Flying
Operatio
ns
No major helicopter
flying issues
came up. Minor
issues were with
common
terminology and
landing
procedures.
Nothing was
unsafe, and after
working through
exercises,
comfort levels
were increased.
UK Sea King helicopters offer a
great source of information
which is not common
knowledge to the US forces.
They have a good capability
with LTIDS and Link-16
which isn't fully utilized within
the NATO battle group/ATG.
83
Conclusion
Interoperability
among aircrews is
almost a nonissue. Procedures
set up through
normal chains
have been
embraced and
used. Would be
good to have UK
Sea King operate
more tactically with
US/coalition forces
in order to
decrease common
terminology and
landing
procedures
interoperability
problems.
Recommendation
Ensure there are updated
publications readily
available to all
participating countries.
Provide NATO aviation
elements briefing and
publications on CV ops
(i.e. CV NATOPs brief).
Get as familiar as
possible with flight decks
etc. prior to exercise.
Use common terminology
when operating. Have a
common terminology
publication to identify
missions. Have countries
share unclassified
mission publications.
One example would be
the SAR TACAID. This
would be beneficial if an
actual SAR scenario took
place with a multinational search. Send
UK Sea King personnel
to participate in Air Wing
training at NSAWC.
2
Air
Helicopter
Flying
Operatio
ns
Planning and
Coordination of
sorties was
hampered by
lack of
information.
The lack of ready access to the The NATO procedure
DOTAH/ATO and other
of submitting Daily
aviation planning information
DOTAH /FEEDER
that was passed out to the
wasn't employed.
Battle Group meant that the
majority of communication
with DESRON Air Ops and
HEC had to be carried out
via email. The usual battle
rhythm employed within a
NATO TG of submitting a
daily DOTAH feeder and
receiving a DOTAH with the
next 72Hr Intend fly was not
employed. It was
understood that the required
information was promulgated
via CENTRIX/SIPRNET
WebPages that we were
unable to access.
84
The use of NATO DOTAH
/FEEDER procedure
should be discussed prior
to each exercise.
3
Air
Aviation
Comms,
SIPR
Key observation
points were in
the area of
communications.
The US tended
not to use signal
message and
relied mainly on
SIPR
transmissions
which are not
always readily
available to
coalition forces.
Reference
material was not
always readily
available.
Overall in the planning phases,
there were no critical
interoperability issues, but
everything could be much
easier if SIPR was easier to
get, or the US used other
modes of communication as
their primary means.
85
No major
interoperability
issues were noted.
Things could only
work smoother if
other forces had
the same system
to work from.
Make it easier to get SIPR
to the other forces.
4
Air
HOSTAC
HOSTAC misinformation
5
Air
TBMCS
US seems to only
use a TBMCS
system and not
the ICC system
when producing
the ATO. This
causes extra
work and could
cause
miscommunicati
on in the long
run.
HOSTAC states that US DDG
could land a Merlin, after
SQN 814 reps visited, it was
determined that ship's flight
deck was short by at least 1
foot and by more than 1
degree in incline
Formal
documentation
may be dated or
incorrect.
Good practice identified
here was a site survey to
validate documentation.
Get a better NATO-wide
chat system.
86
6
Air
7
Air
8
Air
Air
Terminol
ogy
All terminology was
not standard.
Using one term
for a mission in
the US is not the
same in the UK.
Get a common terminology
book and use it.
Corporate knowledge is
working, but could cause
an issue later.
Mode IV
Crypto
Mode IV was not
loaded correctly
on some aircraft
All aviation units need to
ensure availability and
commonality of Mode IV
crypto. All aviation units
must be certain of the
rules regarding Mode IV
usage and it should be
outlined in the ATO/ACO
ATO
Information sharing
was pure due to
luck of use of a
NATO ICC
standard format
for ATO thus
disabling units of
charring out the
RED CROWN
function.
NATO use of ICC software in
previous exercises with
coalition assets has proved
invaluable; the software is
available and has been
proven (JOINT
WARRIOR/OP
MARINER/AURIGA etc.)
even if the Strike Wing’s
Daily Air Plan may have be
received as well as a
planning aid.
87
A standard format for
the ATO for all
NATO Carrier
Groups (ICC)
should be used.
Use of standard format of
ATO is strongly
recommended in order to
avoid any loss of
information or inability of
units to carry out the
function of REDCROWN
9
Air
Planning
Pre-exercise
meetings highly
successful.
Liaison by the Ship’s Flight and
the FCs on board with the
squadrons at Norfolk Naval
Base prior to exercise start
was invaluable. USN was
happy to provide up to date
Charts, Publications and
Procedures for the exercise
areas. Lynx Flight –
88
The ability to conduct
face to face
capability briefs
and tactical
employment
discussions with
DESRON Air Ops
prior to the start of
the exercise
proved invaluable.
During these
meetings, the
battle rhythm was
discussed and the
requirements from
the staff for flying
bids, maintenance
cycles, etc.
Without these
briefings and
contact details it
would have proved
almost impossible
to integrate and
operate effectively
as part of the
exercise.
It is recommended that any
non-US nation joining the
exercise in the future has
these face to face
briefings serialized in the
programmed prior to the
start of the exercise.
10
Comms
GRIFFEN
SIPR Rel needs to
be Griffen
enabled for full
access to Email
and Chat.
Griffin is an extremely useful
tool, but takes a lot longer to
set up than the recommend
10 days to establish a fully
functioning griffin account
amongst all the gateways.
SIPR Rel allows capital
units connectivity between
US SIPR users whose
accounts are not griffin
enabled.
To interoperate with
US personnel who
do not have griffin
obtaining Griffin
enabled UK SIPR
Rel would greatly
reduce time
required to cross
the "air gap".
Because of long
lead time for
account creation
and activation,
process must start
well in advance of
the exercise
Obtain griffin enabled
CSD/CSS accounts at
the early stages of
planning. Teach
GRIFFEN at TTGL during
workups. Any
USN/USAF/USMC
person requiring
interaction with UK units
via secure email should
get their SIPR accounts
griffin enabled. FDO
process is lengthy and
must be started early for
GRIFFEN users
11
Comms
CENTRIX
KM / IM
Difficult to find and
exchange
information.
Information exchange was at
times difficult to find on
CENTRIX and usually was
sent via e-mail and then
dispersed to required parties.
Passwords to chat rooms
were difficult to receive at
times and had to be sent via
a third party oftentimes.
CENTRIX chat was
confusing and took awhile to
get a hang of.
Maritime coalition
operations, should
incorporate
accessible means
of allowing data to
be transferred
amongst units.
Clearly identify and send all
parties chat room names,
passwords, and location
of information. All chat
rooms should be setup
and defined prior to
deployment/exercise.
89
12
Comms
CENTRIX
systems
The proper mix,
configuration and
accesses of the
IP networks is
critical to
operational
success.
Units were able to exchange
data via CENTRIX easily. A
challenge with CENTRIX
was the monitoring of
chat…some units did not
have enough terminals for
frequent monitoring of chat.
Some units had limited seats
and monitoring was done by
the CSG staff vice ships
company. The number of
CENTRIX and NSWAN
computers were limited and
inhibited effective planning
and coordination CENTRIX
to US units is a system
comprised of 3 different
enclaves (CNFC, NDITS,
etc..) used at different times
and for UK units CENTRIX is
an all-in-one system
comprised of all enclaves.
Once that was established it
became easy to facilitate the
use of CENTRIX.
90
Interoperability will
be enhanced using
a robust suite of
systems that
support CENTRIX.
CENTRIX was a
great tool for
communicating
between units, but
required great
coordination and
understanding
between units.
CENTRIX needs to be the
classified network of
choice during Alliance or
Coalition operations
/exercises. Increase the
number of CENTRIX and
NSWAN computers
available to staffs and
units. If possible, route
CENTRIX and NSWAN to
the required existing
computers using CPU
switch boxes for more
efficiency
13
Comms
CENTRIX
systems
A large amount of
effort was
expended in
achieving
effective
CENTRIX
interoperability
Whilst it was expected to
conduct the C2X as a
coalition exercise on the
GCTF enclave, it became
apparent that the CNFC
enclave was to be used.
Coalition units needed
CSFTL Staff assistance to
engineer the required
frequencies and
permissions. The use of
CNFC precluded some
coalition ships from
interacting over the main C2
net for the exercise. Whilst
briefed extensively during
the Pre-Ex briefs that
CENTRIX would be the
primary means of C2, the
majority of signals and briefs
were produced on SIPR and
data exchange from SIPR to
CENTRIX proved onerous.
Often, the websites were not
set up correctly to allow for
posting of such documents.
Emailing large documents
took a long time and
frequently caused the files to
become corrupt or crash the
system. All in all, this
91
CENTRIX was the
single point of
failure for coalition
interoperability and
whenever
connection with
the server was
lost,
interoperability
levels decreased
significantly.
Clearly identify the proper
CENTRIX enclave to be
used from all coalition
and US forces and clarify
the rules of using its full
potential in order to
achieve the highest and
continuous degree of
cooperation
process required an
inordinate amount of effort
by the LNOs and Ship’s
Staff.
92
14
Comms
Kick
procedur
es
US units not carrying out Kick
procedures on voice circuits.
This was carried out on
SIPRnet and CENTRIX.
Carry out Kick procedure
IAW APP 1C. (NATO
CONF)
15
Comms
Capabilitie
s and
Limitatio
ns
Too many fighting circuits were
allocated I/E DD/FF
equipment limitations. Using
secure/non-secure voice
circuits at times posed
problems if there were
limitations on the availability
of cryptographic equipment.
Some circuits did not have
the ability to be used both in
plain and cipher. Each unit
had specific Caps/Lims on
cryptographic equipment.
Units compiling signal must
have a better
understanding of other
units capabilities and
limitations
93
16
Comms
COP
(Neutral
tracks)
Unable to use
neutral track
designation
This caused problems when
both TG came together.
Neutral which is in APP7
was not authorized to be
used by the KEARSARGE in
their OPTASK ID CRIT
however UK units used
neutral in their OPTASK
AAW and their OPTASK
ASUW. Surface neutral
tracks transmitted from UK
units were received by US
units as Suspect.
94
ID CRIT caused
problems between
US/UK units as
each TG had
different ID CRIT
contained within
their OPTASK’s.
Interoperability
suffered slightly
because neutral
track designations
could not be used
in some cases.
17
Comms
COP (Dual
Tracks)
18
Comms
COMM
Plans
Dual Tracks
OPTASK and
TABORD issues.
Some unit failed to extract
important information for
signals which lead to major
duel tracking issues. Either
some units didn't want to in
house there tracks, and/or at
times couldn't reach units on
voice comms to pass to a
unit that there dueling tracks.
However when units were
redirected by the FTC the
issues was resolved. (Track
Quality settings) .
The main issue was
the tactical picture,
dueling of tracks
and trying to
coordinate to
reduce the issue
was a constant hit.
US OPTASK Comms, lay out is
different from NATOs and
the naming of circuits is
different. OPTASK ID supp
from KEARSARGE
contained references to US
navy wide OTL which UK
units do not hold. The
TABORD were not always
received in standard NATO
format as would have been
expected, thus making it
difficult to extract the
relevant information and
ensure that all necessary
details had been passed
Non US units must
be sent relevant
references prior to
issue of exercise
signals. The
standard format
table in AXP 2C
for signal
formatting could
be used to save
confusion in signal
orders
95
NATO format and
publication must be used
when operating with
coalition units.
prior to a serial.
19
Comms
COMM
Plans
Lack of visibility of
the OPTASK
COMMS until the
day before
starting the
exercise caused
the majority of
interoperability
problems.
It was later discovered that the
OPTASK COMMS was not
passed to coalition units at
first as it was not releasable
to non-US units
Interoperability was
affected by the
difficulties in
dissemination of
OPTASK COMMS.
20
Comms
COMM
Plans
USKAT crypto on
secure circuits is
an issue.
When the OPTASK COMMS is
re-written using NATO crypto
it eliminates USKAT issues.
Interoperability is
hampered by the
use of NON NATO
Crypto material.
96
Releasability should always
be addressed when
operating with coalition
units.
Use of NATO Crypto
material when coalition
forces cooperate with
USN.
21
Comms
COMM
Plans
HAVEQUICK
(HQII) remained
an issue
throughout the
exercise as USN
used a specific
HOPRATE which
coalition units
can only utilize
with war settings.
USN was able to use training
settings with this HOPRATE
and therefore opted not to
use war settings during C2X.
Coalition units expected to
use a different HOPRATE
which was used in previous
coalition Ops. Prior
information indicated that it
would be possible to
establish and maintain an
agile capability with USN
thought-out the exercise.
However, the use of different
hop rate and training
cryptographic material put
coalition units at a
disadvantage as software
limitations do not allow for
training cryptographic
material to be used
97
Different HQ settings
hampers the
effective use of the
devices amongst
coalition units.
HQ settings should be
arranged in the planning
process taking into
consideration coalition
limitations.
22
Comms
Track
Coordin
ation
23
Comms
Lack of
Underst
anding
Coordination to
reduce dual
tracks was
difficult
General lack of
knowledge and
understanding of
terminology,
procedures, and
capabilities.
Some units did not want to inhouse their tracks. At times
we couldn't reach units on
voice comms to pass to a
unit that they had dual
tracks. There were issues
with data loops and the
tactical picture. Most units
were up on multiple links
with the same units, causing
looping, and the picture to be
cluttered and disorganized.
Initial communications were
hindered/difficult due to: (1)
Lack of
knowledge/understanding of
communications
messages/publications/termi
nology; (2) Lack of
understanding of
communications procedures;
(3) Lack of knowledge of
units' capabilities and
limitations. Interoperability
difficulties were only a factor
with one communications
circuit. Each unit had to
modify settings on their
different communications
equipment in order to
communicate with one
98
A general
understanding of
the
Communication
capabilities and
operating
procedures would
have helped. It is
difficult to work
with foreign navies
due to different
equipment,
procedures, and
mission
effectiveness.
All communicator's should
attend a pre-planning
conference and conduct
a ship visit. This would
give all communicator's
an opportunity to t/shoot
and identify any issues
and clear up any
misunderstandings.
another. All settings did not
equally apply to all units.
24
Comms
Planning
and
Coordin
ation
A coalition ship was
not included in
several Pre-Ex
signal messages
Optask Comms, can depict the
amount of thought spent on
interoperability with non-US
units. The use of US only
key mat causes concern.
ATO/OPTASK COMMS
amends/WASEX/CTTGEX/C
ard of the Day/PRE-EX
signal message were not
received until a week of the
exercise had taken place.
Again, it came to light that
the issue was to do with
releasability rights for these
signals: it was not until the
seriousness of the situation
was appreciated at higher
levels, that efforts were
made to resolve the matter
(assisted primarily by the
work done by the LNOs ).
There was no preexercise
communications
brief. This would
have been helpful
to meet key
players face to
face and discuss
aspects that may
cause concern.
Releasability due
to incorrect
classification as
NOFORN.
25
Comms
Net owner
/
controlle
r
Not clear who was
in control of
some nets. Nets
can get too busy.
Due to limited equipment on
some coalition units, some
nets will become busy and
even overloaded with
information.
Interoperability
suffers when
communications
nets are
overloaded
99
Pre exercise comms brief is
crucial for the
interoperability of the
force.
Logistics/Fuels planners
need to brought into the
planning process at the
earliest possible stage to
address these
compatibility items.
26
Comms
Data Links
Difficulty in
forwarding Link
16 COP to Link
11 ships.
Difficulty in maintaining the
Link16 picture, and then
forward to Link 11 only
capable ships. No LNO from
other nation available at
beginning of exercise. Not
all units were always on the
same page. Units were not
always keeping all other
participants informed when
changing link structure. It
was sometimes unclear what
OPTASK were using.
Sometimes there was
information coming from
multiple OPTASKS that we
were using for link structure.
100
Units were not
always keeping all
participants
informed when
changing link
structure. The
OPTASK in use
was sometimes in
question.
More tactical planning and
communication would
mitigate this issue.
Forceful back up from
Force Track Coordinator
on maintaining the
picture. Use LNO/SME
cross-deck to address
issues early.
27
Comms
Data Links
28
Comms
Comms
procedur
es
Difficulty with Link
11 and Link 16
The OTAD was problematic at
times when the shore side
originator became confused
over the time difference and
what day’s crypto was
required. At times crypto
was corrupt and had to be
re-transmitted (2 hours later)
incurring a loss of situational
awareness on Link 16. The
Link 11 Data frequency
would change without being
promulgated on the voice net
or CENTRIX: this was highly
frustrating as operators
would proceed to trouble
shoot equipment. At regular
intervals, operators would
cycle through all Link data
frequencies on the chirp
sounder to find the Data net
in use. The Link sitrep was
only released on CENTRIX
hourly and not when there
were changes.
Link coordination
issues can hamper
significantly
interoperability.
LINK procedures should be
always address early
enough in pursuit of the
best LINK exploitation in
coalition ops.
UK and US TAOs
used different
procedures when
monitoring
Command Nets
causing loss of
UK procedure was for the TAO
to switch between warfare
nets depending on the
scenario, whereas US units
would stay up a "common"
war fighting net. This would
Inability to maintain
voice comms on
all warfare circuits
may have been a
result of reduced
manning. This will
Establish as doctrine the
requirement to maintain
voice comms on ALL war
fighting nets, or, as an
alternative establish a
warfare "common" net to
101
voice
communications
29
Comms
Air Assets
not on
primary
"fighting
net"
ASW air assets not
on fighting
circuit" (ASWC
control net).
Some air assets
were on a landlaunch control
frequency,
exclusively.
30
Comms
Communic
ations
workups
It took 3-5 days
once ships were
at sea, to be able
to communicate.
ATO not fully
integrated for
cause temporary loss of
voice comms
Some units were not following
OPTASK COMMS or ATO
SPINS. Some units not
following NATO procedures
for air control. Units were
only communicating on
frequencies NOT in the
OPTASK COMMS, and
should have been on the
ASW control net. During
ASW serials, Air assets
(MPA, Rotary Wing) were
controlled on separate circuit
to surface units, and not
formally organized into an Air
SAU. Air control and contact
reporting were occurring on
the same ASWC net.
Even after ships had
established good comms
prior, after going into port
and returning to sea for
operations, it would take 3
days to become
102
have to be verified.
ensure continuous voice
comms.
No interoperability
between some air
units and
remainder of ASW
action units. Lack
of adherence to
C2 and Comms
procedures. Lack
of understanding
of air control nets
in use.
More robust Air control and
Comm plan. Detailed
instructions, such as:
Contact reporting and
mission orders on ASWC
net, with a separate net
for air control (safety,
exercise, etc). Aircraft
must cover BOTH nets.
Interoperability would
be enhanced if
communications
were fully operable
once the ships
Face to face briefings and
understanding need to
occur in advance of
exercise. Conduct a
Comms-Focused
workup/certification
first few days.
31
Comms
Timeliness
of
postings
to
Website
s
SITREPS often
took 8 hoursto
be available on
CENTRIXS.
DIMS, as
provided on chat
or message
traffic was often
came much later
than the posting
to CENTRIXS.
32
Comms
Red
Databas
e
manage
ment
There lacked clear
lines of
responsibility for
red force track
management
within the TG
interoperable. Could have
been due to maintenance
periods in port. Links (11,16,
etc.) did not experience this
problem.
leave port.
period.
KSG C2X US elements posting
of info during the preexercise was slow to
materialize, with SIPR being
the first website used to
publish info. Once
publishing on CNFC was
carried out it worked well and
timely.
Designate clear authority on
who is responsible for red
track database
management
103
33
Comms
C4
Architect
ure
34
Comms
Crypto
C4 (command,
control
communications,
computers)
architecture was
poorly designed
and
communicated.
Information flow
was poor for the
first 4 days of the
exercise.
All ships did not have a good
understanding of the C4
architecture. Some units
were on GCTF while others
were on CSMTF enclaves.
OPTASK Comms was RF
based, did not encompass
networks, command, control,
and information
management. GCTF
terminals on some ships
were not used, or were
unmanned. Only information
flow between some coalition
ships was the "DESRON
staff" - no visibility to higher
level communications.
C4 architecture did
not receive
primary
importance during
all planning
phases, resulting
in interoperability
problems.
Experts in C4 must attend
all planning phases.
Coalition ships had
incorrect Crypto
Coalition ships believed that
host nation provided Crypto.
Unable to
communicate
securely for
several days, while
correct crypto was
obtained.
Must have clear
communications on use
of crypto during planning
process.
104
35
Comms
SIPRnet
36
Comms
Exploitatio
n of
MHS
37
Comms
Degrees of
Confide
ntiality
38
Comms
Capabilitie
s&
limitation
s of
Coalition
units
into
consider
ation
Coalition units
unable to watch
all needed
comms nets
39
Culture
Differences
in
Some units used
shorter planning
Coalition ships
unable to access
SIPRnet
SIPRnet was used extensively,
but coalition ships could not
access. Late and incomplete
information, was posted on
CENTRIX.
Poor information flow
hindered
interoperability
Must use CENTRIX (or
other enclave) more
extensively.
USN ships do not
monitor MHS
Although discussed prior to the
exercise it was never
followed by USN.
Comms plan should
address amongst
others and the
exploitation of
MHS.
Exploitation of MHS should
always be addressed
during planning
conferences.
USN doesn't use
RES.
-
-
Coalition units must know
that USN doesn’t use
RES degree of
confidentiality.
Caps and Lim,
should always
taken into
consideration
There was some frustration in
using the daily intentions
105
Planning conferences
should include a cap.
Presentation as well as
the OPORDER
Planning
Horizons
40
Culture
Command
and
Control
horizons than
others.
Misunderstandings
between warfare
commander
roles
message (DIMS) for
changing plans. The DIMS
typically looked out only 3
days; 5 to 7 days would have
been appropriate.
Coalition units tend to be more
multi-roled and focused on
composite warfare; serials
that targeted training in one
particular warfare sphere
sometimes lacked the multidimensional warfare aspects
that the number of OPFOR
assets could have provided.
106
It is important to
cross-map C2
organizations
(CSC vs. nonCWC) and reach
agreement early.
41
Culture
Culture
and
differenc
es
Culture of different
militaries cause
interoperability
issues.
Nations differ in their
expectations for unit actions
when situations present
themselves. Two examples:
An expectation that when a
unit is assigned to a SAU for
an ASW mission, it is not
necessary to issue a change
in TACON for the unit to the
ASWC, when in fact, it is a
good practice to issue an
order for clarity. Requests for
information (ex: SITREP)
from a unit through the units
command chain were met
with some questioning, when
it is typically best practice to
follow and inform the chain
of command. Orders
changing Knowledge of the
difference between TACON
or OPCON can mitigate
interoperability issues. In
some cases the differences
cannot be solved, which is
acceptable as long as they
are identified.
107
There can be some
significant
differences that
need to mitigated
prior to starting
operations that
involve cultural
treatment of
command and
organization.
Need to issue good C2
guidance in OPORD, or
(better) use standards in
reference material. Need
more time to work out the
processes on working
together.
42
Culture
Serial start
times
Some units would
not start actions
until exactly at
the designated
serial start time,
instead of 30-60
minutes earlier.
43
Culture
Boarding
and
Personn
el
Control
differenc
es
US can perform
Masters consent
Boarding, and
"personnel under
control", whereas
other Nations
cannot.
When units were not task
organized until just before
serial start time, there was a
potential for loss of coalition
training time
Masters Consent Boarding is
one example of national
policy differences, and
required an understanding
between units of
interoperability differences
108
Interoperability was
only slightly
affected, the only
issue was that
some units were
expecting to start
early while other
did not, and some
time and
efficiencies were
lost.
Not an
Interoperability
issue, but an
example of how it
is important to be
knowledgeable of,
and consider
National policy
differences to plan
certain evolutions.
44
Culture
Technolog
y
Progres
sion
Technology in the
non-military
organizations is
often better than
in the military,
especially in
regards to IP
networks
45
Culture
IO C2
Confusion existed
on who was the
information ops
lead for the TG
was and what
the roles and
missions were.
Appropriate
Networks, like
GRIFFEN, need
to be available to
support planning
requirements
Determine a publish clear
IO C2 guidelines via an
OPTASK IO
109
46
Culture
Chat
Learning curve for
Chat.
For some coalition units, chat is
not a primary means of
communication, and there
was some misunderstandings that could
have been avoided with
clearer communication.
47
Culture
Warfare
Comma
nder
Coalition not used
to warfare
commander
being a staff
function
The ASWC was hosted in the
CTF staff, as opposed to a
ship. Coalition ships had
difficulty receiving/sending
information, as the staff was
not fully focused on the
tactical situation. Conversely,
the AAWC/AADC was
hosted by a ship, and there
were no interoperability
issues.
110
Establish a C2, or "overall
coordination" chat room
to work out misunderstandings.
All units must be
aware of
differences and
limitations when
warfare
commander
functions are
hosted in a staff.
48
Logistics
Logistics
Referen
ces
Restricted access
to the US Navy
Logistics
publications and
information
systems limited
seamless
exchange of
information.
The UK Group Logistics
Commander (GLC) could not
access the NAVSUP
information system. C2F N4
and USS BARRY Supply
Officer provided a work
around point of contact.
Sharing of
information and
access to logistics
library systems
could enhance the
interoperability
planning tools.
49
Logistics
Logistic
reporting
,
Comms,
and
docume
ntation
NATO Logistics
daily
sustainment
reporting system
(LOGSITREP)
provides limited
information.
At pre-deployment planning it
was very clear that there
were different support
arrangements for each
participant. The CSG GLC
needed a report that tracked
these differences and status.
The OPREP 5 (US tool) was
used for this purpose.
The use of the
OPREP 5 report
provided a
comprehensive
tracking tool for
the many different
coalition
sustainment
needs. This gives
the CSG
Commander
mission
assessment and
risk management
info.
111
Coordinate with NAVSUP
an agreement/MOU to
allow NATO partners
access to the NAVSUP
library and information
systems.
Early pre-deployment
discussions concerning
Logistics/Sustainment
reporting systems. Long
term recommend NATO
review of the
LOGSITREP reporting
systems to increase
capabilities.
50
Logistics
Logistics
LNO/FO
T
Use of LNOs and
Forward
Operating
Teams (FOT)
were invaluable
tools for logistics
interoperability.
The UK use of LNO and
Forward deployed small
teams in Norfolk contributed
to early planning
coordination and exercise
operations efficiency. The
FOT expedited medical RFI
for cold storage during the
exercise.
51
Logistics
Logistics
Comms
Logistics
communication
needs were
addressed early
in the planning
meetings.
Pre-deployment logistics
meetings established SOP
contact by
NIPR(US)/NavyStar(UK)
non-secure systems
compatible systems.
Secondary comms by voice.
Secure comms would not be
possible due to limited
availability and lack of
experience by staff.
112
Require the early
participation of Logistics
LNOs and Forward
Operating Teams in the
planning process and
during the exercise.
Logistics has very
limited needs for
secure networks
but the need will
most likely expand
during real world
events.
Support communications
lessons learned and
recommendations.
52
Logistics
Eng
Systems
The AURIGA staff
Maritime
Engineer
(ME)planned and
exercised a
"Battle Damage
Repair" livex with
ships in the
CSG.
This mini-exercise included US
and UK ships and crews to
test interoperability response
to a damaged ship requiring
repair crews and parts from
other PN ships.
53
Logistics
NATO
Logistics
systems
R&D
UK Maritime War
College is
studying the
NATO Logistic
Functional Area
Services
"LOGFAS"
system. Using
the CSG HMS
Ark Royal for
testing.
This system appears to have
several database systems
paralleling US logistics
systems; Database tracking,
common operating picture,
visibility movement and
resource optimization.
113
The HMS Ark Royal
ME will be
releasing a report
and its
demonstrated
interoperability
lessons learned.
This type of exercise should
be considered in the predeployment planning.
There maybe an opportunity
for the US NAVSUP to
participate in this effort.
Providing input and
experience in NATO
systems that can be used
in future exercises.
54
Logistics
Replenish
ment
Procedu
res
Fuel was twice received
successfully from USNS
including at night. Email
communication was
frequent and effective, and
use of standard RAS signal
formats indicated the use of
common messages.
Discrepancy between USNS
RAS stations in ATP16D and
her OPTASK RAS. Distance
line measured in feet rather
than meters specified in
ATP16D and in use by
COALITION ships. VHF was
primary comms whereas
coalition uses either flashing
light or flag hoists, but this
was pre-warned in the
OPTASK RAS as a result of
manpower constraints in
USNS. Lights/shapes were
invoked by USNS as
coalition ship was ordered to
approach, whereas coalition
unit hoists these once
messenger line passed.
114
RAS procedures should be
clarified in the planning
process.
55
Logistics
56
Logistics Payment of
services
Shore
Power
Compati
bility
US shore power has been used
by RN vessels on previous
visits even though the
voltage is higher than that
used on board. RN vessels
supply 440v whereas US
shore power is nearer
480v. Due to the reasons at
L3.5 shore power was not
connected and therefore the
ship remained powered by
her own Diesel Generators.
Mechanism not in
place to provide
timely invoices to
foreign ships for
payment of
services prior to
departing.
NANSEN received fuel from
both ARCTIC and
KANAWHA and services
from NAVSTAs Norfolk and
Mayport. She only received
invoices from the ARCTIC.
115
This makes it difficult
closing out the
books from a
budget perspective
if the invoices are
not received prior
to the end of the
financial/calendar
year.
C2F amend its process to
coordinate with services
providers to provide
invoices upon providing
services.
57
Logistics Approval to
obtain
repair
services
from US
shipyard
58
Medical
Medical
Doctrine
While in port
Mayport,
NANSEN was
not able to use
US shipyard
repair services
due to a US
requirement to
obtain prior
approval from
OPNAV.
OPNAV regulations require
OPNAV approval in order for
Navy shipyards to provide
repair services to foreign
ships. Upon approval, the
repair services are only
provided on a not to interfere
basis with US ship
commitments.
C2F N4, in
coordination with
Port OPS and the
N43 community
developed a
process where
Port Ops would
request blanket
approval for the
shipyards to
provide repair
services to foreign
ships prior to their
arrival. This was
done for the
DARING and the
NANSEN
however, it would
appear that the
Mayport shipyard
was not aware that
this approval was
obtained.
Amend the process to
ensure that all shipyard
activities are copied on
the request and approval
from OPNAV.
Additionally, provide a
copy of the approval
message to the US Host
Ship that is assigned to
the foreign ship.
The medical
emergency plans
and procedures
were based on
NATO standards
and fully
understood by all
UK and US maritime medical
personnel have been using
NATO standards for many
years and interoperability
issues are minor terminology
and civilian coordination.
NATO Medical
continues to
review and
improve their
standards and
interoperability
with great
Use the medical
inoperability as a model
for future planning.
116
participants.
success.
59
Medical
Medical
Supply
and
Services
The fuel line fittings
for UK ships
have a single
headed hose
and US used
double.
60
Orders
Distribution
of formal
orders
Some units not
comfortable with
power point
slides, email,
website posts,
and chat as
methods to issue
orders. Orders
provided via
formal (radio)
message traffic
have been the
standard in he
past.
No common understanding of
what constitutes formal
orders. Ambiguity exists in
the understanding of a
formal order. Should chat
directions be used as a
formal order? NATO has
standard procedures and
formats for orders, some
units did not follow these
standards. Power point
briefs were used a few times
as formal direction or orders.
61
Orders
OPTASKs
Uncertainty in
which OPTASKS
were in effect.
OPTASKs were
not generated
early enough to
There was confusion on
occasion when it was
unknown what OPTASKS
were in use.
117
Review NATO
technical
standards for
fueling.
Logistics/Fuels planners
need to be brought into
the planning process at
the earliest possible
stage to address these
compatibility items.
Some orders were
mis-understood,
unrecognized, or
late due to no
prescribed upon or
agreed to rules for
disseminating
orders.
Interoperability
within the C2
structure was
affected.
Coalition participants must
agree to methods of
distributing formal orders
and what constitutes a
formal order. This must
be documented in
OPGENs, OPTASKs,
OPORDERs. In the
absence of documented
procedures specific to the
exercise, coalition
partners should use
NATO standards. Power
point slides should never
be used for orders or
formal direction.
Generate OPTASK early
enough into the planning
process to ensure units
have an opportunity to
practice new procedures
enable units to
review and
adjust
62
Orders
NOFORN
orders
and
informati
on
Orders, messages,
and
presentations
were issued as
NOFORN,
preventing timely
information to
coalition
participants.
OPTASK Comms revisions
were not releasable to
coalition partners.
Presenters at planning
conferences used mostly
NOFORN presentations.
OPORDER 6000 was not
releasable. Pre-exercise
workups (FST-GC) had vital
information that was not
releasable. NATO formatted
orders were used
infrequently.
Exercise planners,
and CTG/CTF
staffs did not
create, review, and
label orders and
other information
for maximum
release.
Interoperability
was hindered due
to lack of
information.
63
Orders
DIMS
Daily Intentions
Messages
(DIMS) worked
"just OK" for
interoperability.
The DIMS format and content
were useful to coalition ships
in understanding tasking,
and for planning. However,
these messages were not
issued in a timely manner to
coalition.
Messages must be
issued (posted) on
coalition networks
in a more timely
manner.
64
Orders
Receipt of
Orders
Appeared there
was no proper
handling or
dissemination of
messages from
some coalition
Record message traffic from
some coalition ships had
several issues: 1) No-one (or
very few) was reviewing
message traffic for
relevance, 2) messages
Record message
traffic "filters"
(human and
electronic)
hindered
interoperability.
118
Exercise and CTG/CTF
staffs must understand
how to disseminate
information that is as
freely releasable as
possible (i.e.: Rel CMFC).
Use NATO formats as
often as possible to
enhance releasability.
ships.
were not being forwarded, 3)
information in messages was
not finding its way into the
relevant information
channels (C2), 4) Routing
indicators were not up to
date.
65
Orders
Overlappin
g ways
of order
dissemin
ation .
There were issues
in receiving
orders via chat
and email, VHF,
UHF, CENTRIX,
even through
presentations.
Tasking and orders came via
"bits and pieces" when using
Chat as a primary medium
for tasking. Tasking
sometimes came embedded
in presentations provided via
email or posted. Orders
detailing how the force would
counter the threat in each
environment were more
prescriptive than expected.
Lack of discipline in
issuing orders via
chat or
presentations
hinders
interoperability.
The use of
prescriptive orders
instead of formal
preplanned
responses
increases reaction
time.
Consolidated messages in
NATO format should be
used to follow-up on
information provided via
other means. The use of
NATO preplanned
responses is imperative.
66
Participa
tion
Planning,
LNOs
Staffs integrated
with exercise
planners well in
advance. Staffs
were backbriefed and kept
up to date on
scenario
changes. Staff
N5 had good
Planning conferences, for the
most part enough people
were sent to cover all
syndicates. MPC, FPC, Presail are most important.
Continuity is very important,
in many cases not the same
people were attending all the
conferences.
LNOs are extremely
valuable, must be
knowledgeable
and active; but, do
not use LNOs as a
primary conduit or
briefer, should only
assist. Assign
more LNOs, and
Continue robust use of
LNOs, and attendance at
planning conferences.
Additionally, set up a
compulsory port visit for
watch officer's to
collaborate, and talk shop
just prior to the exercise.
The ships need to send a
representative to the pre-
119
contacts from
planning
conferences, ad
a good list of goto experts, as a
result of
participation in
early planning
cycles.
67
Participa
tion
Battle
Rhythm
For the most part,
the battle rhythm
worked well. In a
few cases, plans
were changed at
CTF level
without feedback
to CTG level.
earlier.
Example: DIMs assigned a unit
to MSO duties, instead of FP
duties, as planned at CTG
level. Cause: Lack of
feedback events in the Battle
Rhythm between CTG and
CTF or ESF. Otherwise the
matching of lower level battle
rhythm with HHQ worked
well, and is extremely
important for interoperability.
Telecoms and VTCs were
very valuable, especially for
setting up exercises and
serials.
120
sail conference.
Recommend more cross
decking: sailor from each
ship rides another units
ship to see how other unit
operate.
68
Participa
tion
Participatio
n
Almost entirely,
participation was
good. Some
exceptions: Time
for ESF play,
RCCE
contributions,
ROE work, Battle
damage,
surface-tosurface
engagement.
Full RCCE capabilities from
coalition not used. Coalition
play as ESF (expanded
Strike Force) commander
should have lasted longer (3
days more) to get maximum
training and work on
interoperability. A clear air
tasking organization should
have been set up earlier.
Watch standers and staff
were expecting more tactical
interaction and serials to
explore actions such as
Battle damage response,
ROE adjustments, and
surface to surface
engagements. Coalition
partners were not involved in
the estimate phase of the
planning process,
interoperability will be
enhanced with their
additional input.
121
Increased Delegation
of duties to other
units helps them
learn the
challenges of
interoperability.
69
Participa
tion
Interopera
bility
Coalition units were
ready and
capable to
provide the
Force Enabling
duties of
REDCROWN,
DCA/CAP
control, ADC and
RMP/RAP duties
(T45 primary aim
of the exercise)
when working
with the CSG
from the very
first day if
interoperability
issues had been
resolved.
The key issue precluding the
execution of these duties
was the timely and effective
distribution of material and
appropriate security
classification between the
USN and coalition units; the
former struggled to release
signals to the latter. If
coalition units had received
access to e-mail this would
have been of major benefit
for a more seamless and
less time consuming manner
of transferring necessary
data for REDCROWN, ATO,
CONOPS, PRE-EX
information
122
70
Participa
tion
Responsibi
lity,
Involve
ment,
participa
tion, and
Value
Personnel and
Units were highly
satisfied with
duties assigned
and involvement.
Strike Group planners were
integrated with exercise
planners well in advance.
Personnel were back-briefed
on the scenario and kept up
to date on changes. ASWC,
FP commander, MIO
commander, and ASUWC
duties were distributed
extensively to many different
units. The OCE "bent over
backwards" in an effort to
satisfy coalition training
requirements and objectives.
The role of AAWC should
have been transferred to
more than 1 or 2 units.
Responsibilities of Expanded
Strike Force (ESF)
commander should have
been scheduled for an
additional 72 hours to
maximize training and
interoperability availability.
123
Coalition units were
able to plug into
US exercises and
provide value,
positive
contributions
flowed in both
directions,
benefitting the
exercise as a
whole and each
individual unit and
staff. A significant
amount of
interoperability and
understanding was
demonstrated.
Delegating
responsibilities to
other units helped
them experience
and overcome
interoperability
problems.
Continue to provide more
and greater
responsibilities to multiple
nations and units.
Especially warfare
commander roles
(AAWC), and Force
commander roles (ESF).
71
Participa
tion
shared
responsi
bilities
Warfare
commander
responsibilities
were distributed
well throughout
units, but could
have been even
better.
Sharing warfare commander
responsibilities around the
TG allowed most of the units
to take charge of other
nation assets, thus
increasing interoperability.
Swapping duties such as
AAWC allowed increased
interoperability with units
learning from different
warfare kinds of approach.
Sharing of ADC and
Redcrown duties highlighted
again the importance of
having a consistent and
robust communications
architecture for the Task
Group.
124
72
Participa
tion
Procedure
s
73
Planning
Draft
Releasa
ble
OPORD
s/OPTA
SK
Consistent use of
standard NATO
procedures
would have
aided coalition
interoperability
including the use
of the Standard
Order Table to
format Pre-Ex
Messages
KSG ESG was
required to
develop a
parallel but
releasable
OPORD and
OPTASK to
accommodate
UK warships
Having a standing releasable
OPORD/OPTASKs for
NATO and CMFC would
alleviate requirement for
each CSG/ESG to develop
all new OPORDS/OPTASKs
for training and operations
125
TTGL and CSFTL
can have standing
releasable
OPORDS and
OPTASKs for
training and
operations that
can be provided to
each ESG and
CSG for
modification as
required
TTGL and CSFTL develop
standing
OPORDS/OPTASKs that
are REL NATO and REL
CMFC. The standing
OPORD must remain
flexible enough for the
CSG ESG CDR to adjust
based on preference,
mission, and assigned
assets
74
Planning
Event
Tempo
US units need more
time in between
events in order
to implement
required safety,
risk
management,
and mission
briefings.
The exercise event tempo did
not allow time for units to
properly debrief the
preceding event, in order to
capture lessons learned, and
to prepare for the next event
with the required mission
and risk management briefs.
Mission briefs and
debriefs are
integral to effective
training as they
permit ships crews
time to prepare for
the next event and
to absorb and
reapply lessons
learned.
Additionally, event
risk management
briefs help mitigate
hazards to forces
and mission.
Build in sufficient time
between events to enable
US units to properly
prepare for follow on
events.
75
Planning
Event
Design
NATO needs to
train to events
that task multiple
warfare areas
simultaneously
Today's threats will likely
present themselves in
several mediums
simultaneously such as both
combined surface and air
attacks.
Training events that
test multiple
warfare areas
simultaneously are
more realistic to
today's potential
threats
Build events that test
simultaneously
76
Planning
Focus of
US
Training
US ESG was going
through a
certification
Establish expectations with
allies with regard to the
training requirements with
126
process and its
attention was
focused on
ensuring its
success. In that
regard, US focus
on integration
with coalition
partners
received less
attention than it
deserved.
77
Planning
78
Planning
79
Planning
Geographi
c
boundari
es and
warfare
comman
der
duties
Event
Design
Pre-
the US and the limits that
this imposes on coalition
training.
Confusion existed
on the
geographic
boundaries that
separated
warfare
commander
duties
NATO needs to
train to events
that task multiple
warfare areas
simultaneously
Crucial for early
Develop and distribute
graphic depictions of
warfare commander
boundaries and
responsibilities along with
the corresponding C2
arrangements to include
assigned
communications circuits
Today's threats will likely
present themselves in
several mediums
simultaneously such as both
combined surface and air
attacks.
Pre-exercise time in Norfolk,
127
Training events that
test multiple
warfare areas
simultaneously are
more realistic to
today's potential
threats
Build events that test
simultaneously
Pre-exercise visits on
Exercise
Meeting
solving of
interoperability
issues.
VA, provided an extremely
valuable opportunity for
coalition Navigators and
OOW to visit USN ships and
discuss maneuvering in
close company with her,
including for Plane Guard
duties. This enabled full
appreciation of CVN
considerations and
concerns.
80
Planning
LNOs
Advance party
coordination for
Air Operations
was successful
Coalition units sent several
experts to host nation air
wing and squadron
commands, resulting in
seamless air operations.
81
Planning
LNOs
Not enough
participants
provided by
coalition in
conferences.
Both the quantity and quality
(expertise) provided by
coalition participants did not
provide the level of detailed
interaction required.
Coalition ships did not
128
board ships should be
deemed essential for
escorts not familiar with
CVN operations.
Robust engagement
proved worth the
time and effort.
LNO engagement cannot be
overemphasized.
Coalition units did not
realize the complexity of
the exercise.
provide detailed
requirements during
planning, or the
requirements were not
voiced firmly enough.
82
Planning
Written
plan for
solutions
to
address
ed
problem
s
83
Planning
Synthetic
Training
attendan
ce
Participation of
coalition
personnel is
crucial
Non participation of coalition
personnel probably
increased interoperability
problems.
Participation is vital
as interoperability
issues can be
identified early
enough.
Attendance of Synthetic
training is vital for the
exercise.
84
Planning
POC for
LNOS
LNOS had no POC
onboard ENT
A POC dedicated for LNOS
would make their lives
easier.
Address POC for
LNOS on board
USN ships
To be addressed to CSFTL
85
Planning
Releasabili
ty of
OPORDER was not
released to
What are the main concerns
Investigate the issue
OPORDER should be
releasable to coalition
Although
Norwegian
representatives
addressed
specific issues
during the
planning
conferences no
written plan
addressing
issues was
generated.
Releasability, communications
publications and many other
issues were raised and
promises given that would be
solved until the start of the
exercise.
129
A plan ahead that will
initiate solutions and
accountability is essential
as a result of any
planning conference.
OPORD
ER 6000
coalition ships
not to release it?
How can we change the
structure of it for courtesy
purposes
86
Planning
Structure
of
Warfare
Comma
nder
conferen
ce
Coalition
participants had
to attend part of
it due to national
restrictions
87
Planning
PREEXERCI
SE
CONFE
RENCE
S
Certain aspects
were not briefed
during planning
conferences like
use of CENTRIX
or signal release
restrictions
88
Planning
LNOS
LNOS have to
make planning
decisions thus
thorough
understanding of
the command
structure they
are embedded
within is crucial.
units .(At least the
essential parts of it )
A new structure
needed
Planning conferences
structure should be
tailored to facilitate the
attendance ofcoalition
units representatives.
LNOS should have
background and
experience as well as the
authority to make
planning decision.
130
89
Restricti
ons
90
Restricti
ons
Course of
Fire
Charts
New
systems
not used
to full
extent
Some units do not
use paper charts
for course of fire.
4 ships conducted IMPASS
range course of fire. During
that event, it was discovered
that one county's procedures
for NSFS were different, did
not use paper charts for their
course of fire. Units were
able to exchange that
information to make a very
successful event during the
Onslow Bay course of fire.
VDS sonar could
have been used
more robustly.
Perceived safety
issues. French
SSN exocet
capabilities not
understood, and
affected exercise
play.
New systems, and their
Concept of employment
were not understood well
enough to create (or relax)
op-area rules for robust
tasking. New systems
coming to an exercise can
have a profound effect on
exercise play, this can be
both a positive and negative
training experience. The
131
Good pre-planning will
identify differences.
Units were unable to
exercise full
interoperability of
some systems and
tactics due to lack
of understanding.
Need to understand
differences in tactics in
general as well as new
systems, perhaps via
briefings ahead of the
exercise.
HMS Ark Royal deployed
with Sea King AEW aircraft
that could have considerably
expanded the TGs C4ISR
capability. Unfortunately this
capability was not integrated
into the TG operating plans
91
Restricti
ons
TSC play
and
Scenario
play
conflicts
TSC play at the
same time
prevented some
scenario play,
and the ability to
exercise reacting
and responding
to the scenario
threat.
92
Restricti
ons
Landing
craft
interoper
ability
Swapping landing
craft between
NATO
amphibious
ships is inhibited
by lack of
technical
information
needed to
ensure
TSC serials at times conflicted
with exercise scenario
planning and response
Helo's have a NATO guide
book that provides the
required information to
enable helos to operate
safely between various
NATO ships.
132
Develop a NATO technical
guide book for
amphibious craft in order
to ensure interoperability
of landing craft
compatibility
93
Terminol
ogy
NATO
Pubs
need
update
NATO publications
are major
combat
operations
focused and task
group focused.
Many operations
are now
conducted by
independent
units
Need a common language for
"influence operations" and/or
Strategic communication, for
joint and coalition operations.
133
94
Terminol
ogy
Common
Terminol
ogy
Terms between
nations require a
common
reference. It
appears that
doctrine and
TTPs are not as
closely followed
as in the past.
C2 structures
were not fully
understood.
Would like to have a common
dictionary/thesaurus that is
easy to use. (TAO vs. PWO,
CIC vs. Operations center,
etc.). Some units did not
seem to read the OPORD,
OPGENs, OPTASKS, or
NATO publications. Names
of control circuits were
provided in OPTASK
comms, but some units did
not use the correct terms for
these circuits. The "target
allocation message" was not
understood as "take these
targets out". Differences on
AAWC circuit with sitreps
and assessment frequency.
Would help to know the right
person to talk to, by
referencing their role to their
title.
134
Knowledge of
documentation
was lacking,
causing
interoperability
issues.
Interoperability
could be enhanced
by using common
terms, or providing
a tool that relates
one term to
another.
Watch officer must read up
on exercise documents.
Recommend that warfare
syndicate breakout
meetings be scheduled
during each pre-exercise
conference as well as
LNOs embedded on
ships. Face-to-face
briefings: earlier, the
better. Interoperability
can be enhanced by
providing enough time
prior to exercises or
operations to understand
differences, and then to
practice linkage in a
deliberate manner.
95
Terminol
ogy
Voice and National differences
Chat
in procedures for
Reportin
reports
g
hampered
differenc
interoperability.
es
Air Defense voice and contact
reporting procedures were
different from what US ships
are accustomed to.
Attempted to work out the
different details when
personnel cross deck to get
further insight and guidance
on the proper procedure.
The cross deck did not seem
to help in this matter as there
was still a gray area of the
information that was being
reported.
135
Standards of NATO
voice reporting
and use of ATP 1
VOL II enhanced
the ability to
operate with
NATO units.
Most ACP publications are
great references and
provide a standard for
interoperability. The
standards can be
implemented, but must
be understood by all
parties involved before it
can be used successfully
96
Terminol
ogy
Reference
s not
available
Exercise OPGENs,
OPTASKS, etc.
referenced
documents
unavailable to
coalition, as they
were stored on
national
networks.
TACNOTES that
detailed SUPSIT
requirements
were not
available. Some
information is
over-classified.
SITREP templates were not
made available due to
security concerns. Difficult to
decode and understand
SITREP messages from
other units. Format and
details for SUPSITS not
available. The LAC (a TLAM
role) does not have access
on UK ships to information
on a TLAM operation [this is
a UK issue to be solved thru
MOD]
Interoperability
problems were
caused because
important
reference
documents were
not available, or
over-classified.
97
Terminol
ogy
Use of
NATO
publicati
ons
NATO standard
code words and
duty numbers
were not
understood by
some operators
NATO procedures not always
well understood. Some units
were not familiar with APP11 (AAWC, ASUWC). NATO
format not used for ROE,
Serials (TABORD), etc. Lack
of experience in NATO terms
and procedures was evident.
Typically, would use NATO
pubs (EXTACs) for
supported and supporting
requirements. Positive
comment: Changes in OCS
NATO publications
were not
referenced as
often as
necessary,
resulting in
misunderstanding
in terms and
procedures. Need
to delve into NATO
pubs earlier and
often.
136
Establish a list of all
references that will be
used during the exercise
and operation during the
planning cycle.
OCE needs to direct that
use of NATO pubs is a
priority, and where there
will be exceptions.
Decide at planning
conferences. One
particular item that
helped, was having an
officer with strong NATO
experience, who can
mentor other officers.
allowed all units to
experience NATO signal
writing, allowing less
experienced officers to gain
knowledge. It was hard for
personnel to find information
in NATO pubs due to
unfamiliarity.
98
Terminol
ogy
99
Watch
Office
r
ROE
Warfare
comman
der
SITREP
S.
US SROE
numbering and
wording are
different from
NATO ROE
Too reliant on chat
rooms to pass
SITREPS.
SITREPS were
passed at a set
time (ex: on the
hour) rather than
as the tactical
situation
changed.
SITREPS were
too lengthy.
US ROE writers should
endeavor to use NATO
ROE organization and
numbering as much as
possible
SITREPS tended to be very
long (included Link data, and
other duplicative data).
SITREPS were not in NATO
format. SITREP format of
1,2,3,…. With no explanation
of what 1,2,3 meant made
interpretation difficult.
137
Message traffic and
CENTRIX chat
seemed to be the
main area of focus
when something of
great importance
needed to be
passed
Suggest NATO-based
format for SITREPs:
"Situation-AssessmentIntentions".
100
Watch
Office
r
Warfare
comman
der
respons
es too
scripted
Warfare reactions
seemed very
procedural with
some units slow
to react to
emergent
threats.
Ships heavily reliant on
Warfare commander orders
before carrying out routine
procedures (streaming
arrays, joining sectors,
radiate sonar, etc.). Could be
due to lack of experience of
Warfare coordinators.
Seemed that ships would not
follow tactical orders unless
CO was pre-briefed. Also,
concerns on burning fuel to
shift stations may have been
a limitation. Units appeared
to be sticking to rigid
adherence to timelines and
move station or patrol areas
following orders released
well in advance. During
operational phase, fluid
changes and scheme of
maneuver seemed to cause
confusion and angst,
especially if involving higher
speeds and fuel burn.
Aircraft checking into Green
Crown was acknowledged
as "sweet/sweet", even
though IIF was off, because
the a/c was expected as part
of the script.
138
101
Watch
Office
r
102
Watch
Office
r
Limited
watch
officer
respons
es to
orders
and
question
s
SITREPS
Questions to other
units would just
be answered
"roger" (chat or
voice), with no
answer attached.
May be due to interoperability
issue in understanding the
question and terminology.
Rather than query, there
seemed to be a tendency to
answer roger. Perhaps a fear
that the watch officer would
look unknowledgeable.
Watch offers also had a
tendency to answer "roger,
standby", and then not follow
with an answer or action.
Units appeared reticent in
asking questions due to
perceived risk of placing their
units into disrepute, or with
an apprehension of
monitoring staff or observers.
Some SITREPS
provided only a
summary of past
events and
current status.
SITREPS can be of greater use
if they include an analysis
("so what") of the situation.
Some warfare commanders
were not providing robust
assessments, they were
providing mostly status
reports, with no assessment
and intentions.
139
Recommend all nations
become more familiar
with each others training
levels and procedures at
the unit level. What is
different between watch
stations? What is
different between CIC
and the Ops Room?
What are the bridge
requirements/expectation
s for OOW/DIVTACS?
103
Watch
officer
BW
officers
duties
BW officers didn't
monitor email
traffic 24H.
LNOs had to play the role of
alerting the BWO for
incoming email by coalition
units
140
In any case BWO should be
monitor email traffic
especially when comms
issues have been arise
due to interoperability
problems
Command-Level Discussion Topics (CDRE, CO,…)
S-1
S-2
S-3
S-4
S-5
S-6
Answer
In which areas do you experience the main
interoperability issues arising? Examples:
Decision-Making, Planning, Force Execution.
How do these issues affect the operations and
C2 of the combined TG?
How did lack of interoperability hinder meaningful
contributions by coalition partners? Do you
have ideas to propose for mitigating
interoperability issues?
Any comments on the importance of early liaison
with participating nations for equipment fits (cost
can be a key issue)? Ex: The value of liaison
officers, both ways.
Any comments on the importance/value of
promulgating an agreed command battle rhythm
(including when Commanders should provide
direction and guidance to subordinates)? Also,
ensuring it matches your higher HQ battle
rhythm.
What National rules (Safety, ROE, policy) are a
major hindrance to interoperability?
What issues are enduring, and never seem to be
solved?
What issues are new, and need fresh corrective
strategies?
Does the current state of personal interaction and
development of working relationships fall short
in identifying and solving interoperability issues?
How so?
141
S-7
S-8
S-9
What significant interoperability issues arise from
inability to access information? Where have we
fallen short in communicating and exchanging
information?
Describe any media issues caused by differing
multinational agendas. Visitors - Have you had
too many?
Do you think the value of maritime forces (in senior
leader's eyes) has been fully exploited?
142
Documentation - Questions for all CSG staff
Answer
members
D-1
Which documentation do you use as a
reference?
D-2
Do you have easy access to the reference
documentation? If not what are the
reasons?
D-3
Are your national procedures different? Are
there any contradictions with your national
procedures? What are the reasons for that
contradiction/difference (eg. Operational,
doctrinal, legal etc.)?
D-4
Do you have access to foreign/NATO Standing
OPTASKs? Is there significant divergence in
operational procedures/standards? If yes
describe the areas and the reasons.
D-5
Are the TABORD (serial orders) promulgated
and received on time? Are the instructions
accurate, and reflect balance of operational
standards/procedures? Are they explicit
enough? What are the specific points/areas
for improvement?
D-6
Do you need more time to analyze and develop
internal preps to meet objectives of the
US
NATIONAL
143
NATO
?
TABORD and if yes why?
D-7
What are the main issues/problems with
documentation (ROE, COMPLANS, etc.)?
144
Planning phase - Questions for Exercise planning
team
P-1
Are you using NATO Bi-sc exercise directive 753? For non NATO what document are you
using?
P-2
Were you able to send the adequate number of
qualified personnel to the different conferences?
If not how did you address the likely issues of
interoperability?
P-3
How were conflicting issues resolved during the
conference solved? Did your planning team
acquiesce to host nation standards, was there a
compromise or did your team withdraw national
participation from contentious serials?
IPC
145
MPC
FPC
PSC
Answer
All Participants to answer the questions in this section
G-1
Did you feel like you were involved at the right
level in the Exercise? If not, was this due to a
lack of interoperability? How so? Example:
Were you integrated into the warfare areas,
planning, and operations? Did you and your
organization provide value or not? Could you
have provided value? What could be done to
increase your value to training and the
exercise?
G-2
Provide examples of tactical difficulties or
operational friction experienced. Which of
these do you consider to be due to a lack of
Interoperability and why. Provide any proposed
solutions.
146
G-3
What conflicts and issues occurred due to
interoperability problems? Please consider the
following:
Staff interoperability, personal interaction, mutual
understanding of TTPs, establishing and
meeting training requirements, inability to
participate or conduct a serial due to conflicting
national process or doctrine, decision-making,
planning, force execution, lack of common
terminology, restrictive or ambiguous safety
rules, conflicting safety rules, ROE,differences
in national policies and procedures, differing
multinational agendas, early liaison with
participating nations for equipment fits,
exchange of LNOs, communication with LNOs,
battle rhythm, fire (gunnery) chain of
commands, the exercise construct, nonstandard targets, non-standardized emergency
procedure during situations of proximity (RAS,
towing, personnel transfer), .
**Provide potential solutions or mitigating factors
to the issues you describe.
G-4
Describe some significant interoperability
problems that prevented the sharing of
information, or limited command and control, or
reduced knowledge management. This could
be due to technologies, procedures, and
access restrictions. Provide any potential
solutions.
147
G-5
Shared responsibilities: How does the sharing of
responsibilities address (reveal and mitigate)
the challenges of interoperability? Provide
some examples. Some areas to consider:
ASW responsibilities, OCS (Officer Conducting
Serial), AADC, etc.
G-6
Do you know of standards (NATO or otherwise)
that enable coalition interoperability? Can you
implement these standards? Why not?
148
Aviation (For the Air Wing, Air Department, Staff, and
Pilots)
A-1
Answer
What conflicts and issues occurred due to
interoperability problems? Please consider
the following:
Air publications (example: HOSTAC),
interoperability to deploy foreign aircraft,
platform interoperability, facilities for flight
planning, different aircraft approaches,
personnel transfer (day, night), uncommon
terminology, vertical replenishment
(VERTREP), Search and Rescue (SAR)
procedures, common safety issues, refueling.
**Please provide potential solutions or mitigating
factors to the issues you describe.
149
Data Networks – CENTRIXS &
CSD/Griffin
C1.1
Answer
What interoperability
challenges have you
encountered with the
use of CENTRIX?
Consider: adequate
number of
workstations, location,
permanent vice fitted
for this deployment,
what enclaves are
available(e.g. CMFC,
CMFP, etc), does it
satisfy your IER for
interoperability with
US units, preference
for an alternate
network (e.g.
NSWAN), are US
elements posting to
CENTRIX in a timely
manner?
Recommendations to
enhance CENTRIX
information exchange?
150
C1.2
How familiar is the Staff
on the use of
CENTRIX
applications?
C1.3
What interoperability
challenges have you
encountered with the
use of CSD & Griffin?
Consider: adequate
number of
workstations, location,
permanent vice fitted
for this deployment,
was CSD used by US
LNOs to email SIPR
users, was CSD
utilized by UK Staff to
email US SIPR users,
was Griffin utilized by
UK Staff to email
RNCSS to SIPR and
vice versa?
Email
Email(
(Mail
Web
server)?
serv
er)?
Chat?
Persistent
Chat?
Recommendations to
enhance CSD and
Griffin information
exchange.
151
CAS
Web
(user)
?
CAS Web
(admin)
?
C2PC
(COP)
?
Other?
Other?
Miscellaneous
C3.1
What additional C4I
interoperability
challenges have you
had. Consider: impact
of the US preference to
conduct C2 via chat and
web portals, use and
availability of OPTASKs,
provision of CIS circuits
& effectiveness of the
IM plan, use of voice
circuits (sufficient
/successful and nonsecure/ secure),
availability of C2 circuits
normally used on your
navy’s deployment?
C3.2
What was your FDO
process? How did it
facilitate or hinder
interoperability?
C3.3
Did you know who in the
US to speak to for Link
16, TACAN, distribution
of the COP and
SATCOM/DAMA? Who
has the POC, was the
Answer
Link 16
TACAN
COP
SATCOM/DAMA
152
use successful?
C3.4
What CIS Lessons
Learned have you
noted?
153
Planning phase – C5I Syndicate
C2.1
How many people have attended planning
conferences?
C2.2
What was their expertise and was it sufficient
to cover all the issues? Would you send
more or different SME?
C2.3
Were your training requirements taken into
account?
C2.4
Were the issues raised previous conferences
solved?
IPC
154
MPC
FPC
PSC
Logistics/Engineering/Environmental
L1
Answer
What National/US/NATO rules (Safety,
ROE, policy) are a major hindrance
to interoperability?
What issues are enduring, and never
seem to be solved?
L2
What issues are new, and need fresh
corrective strategies?
Does the current state of personal
interaction and development of
working relationships fall short in
identifying and solving
interoperability issues? How so?
Example questions below.
L2.1
Are you able to coordinate your US
logistics requirements thru Standing
Operating Procedures (SOP) and/or
Liaison Officers (LNO) ?
L2.2
Do you use your host ship to assist in
coordinating your logistics support
requirements?
L2.3
Are you familiar with and using the
Fleet Industrial and Supply Center
(FISC) & Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) to support requirements that
ship’s agent can not meet?
155
L2.4
Are you familiar with the processes by
which logistics supplies and services
are requested through the US if your
ship’s agent/chandler can not meet
your requirements?
L2.5
Have you established communications
with the Medical planners in the
numbered Fleet where you are
operating at? Have you
synchronized your medical
emergency plans with the facilities
ashore in conducting patient transfer
from sea?
L3
What significant interoperability issues
arise from inability to access
information? Where have we fallen
short in communicating and
exchanging information?
Example questions below.
L3.1
Does your country have a reciprocal
health care agreement with the US?
If not, be advised that all medical
expenses incurred by your personnel
has to be paid for upon discharge by
the originating ship/unit.
156
L3.2
Are the aviation and marine fuels/oils
used by the US compatible with your
engineering and aviation systems?
Are you able to provide compatible
fuel types?
L3.3
Does the Logistics Requirement
(LOGREQ) process meet your
support requirements?
L3.4
Are your replenishment at sea (RAS)
procedures compatible with the US
procedures?
L3.5
Are your hoses, couplings, fittings,
and/or adapters compatible with the
US fittings required to bring on fuel,
water, electricity?
L3.6
Is your power generation/distribution
system compatible with the US shore
power system or do you have to “aux
steam” in port to generate electricity?
L3.7
Are you able to communicate needs
through CENTRIX, voice
communications, Internet or other
National systems? Does every
country require different
communication system?
157
L3.8
Provide examples where you are
unable to participate or conduct a
serial because you have conflicting
or different national process or
doctrine (EX: boarding exercise).
L4
Discuss operability
conflicts/solutions/mitigation
examples below and add any others.
Example questions below:
L4.1
Do you have a funding mechanism
either through your Defense
Attaché/Embassy or other agency
that is compatible with the US
funding mechanism requirements?
Does your country have logistics
related agreements with the US ( i.e.
Acquisition Cross Servicing
Agreement (ACSA) or Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) that enables
you to exchange/obtain support
with/from the US?
L4.2
Are you able to use direct
Contracting/Acquisition to meet your
support needs?
L4.3
What safety regulations/environmental
standards impede exercise support?
158
L5
Describe issues introduced when
dealing with other NATO partners
(other than US) during an exercise.
Third and fourth party logistics
support issues.
159
PART III
INTEROPERABILITY METRICS
EVALUATING ALLIED/COALITION –USN INTEROPERABILITY
160
Background
1.
Now that we have gone deeply into Interoperability having in place the
Coalition Playbook (PART I) and the Interoperability Handbook (PART II) the
next step is to determine whether they improve interoperability and, if so, in what
ways.
Purpose
2.
The purpose of this part is to outline our efforts to answer the following
points. It should also formulate efforts to continue to improve the previous parts
(particularly the Interoperability Checklist).
Here are the three aspects of
interoperability that we will assess:
a.
Adherence to the Checklist – Measure how well the CJOS COE,
the visiting ships, and the hosting navy, USN Strike Groups follow the
checklist for each visiting ship. This is a measure of preparedness; it
quantifies efforts made to address known interoperability challenges.
b.
Demonstrated Interoperability – Evaluate the interoperability of
visiting ships with their host Strike Groups during execution.
Clear,
objective standards are applied to evaluate how early in an event the
interoperability challenges are initially overcome, as well as recording how
well interoperability efforts were maintained throughout the exercise.
These are measures of effectiveness for the units.
c.
Lessons Learned Again – Analyze interoperability LL from each
ship to identify the repeat issues and determine which should be
prevented through adherence to the checklist. This is another measure of
effectiveness for the units but it also provides feedback on the
effectiveness of the checklist.
161
Methodology
3.
Adherence to the Checklist, Demonstrated Interoperability, and Lessons
Learned again must be measured separately.
But applying a common
framework will enhance each of them by enabling cross-correlation. To evaluate
the checklist, it will be critical to know what efforts were made to follow those
recommendations.
If we don’t know whether a ship followed a particular
recommendation then it will be impossible to determine whether it was of value.
Efforts to follow the checklist are “inputs” into the process that should output
interoperability. Recording which checklist items were completed (and when,
relative to the exercise timeline) will form the key measures of performance
(MOPs) in the larger assessment framework.
4.
Adherence to the Checklist (Measure of Preparedness) – There are over
one hundred checklist items and often multiple items related to a single topic so it
is important to group them by topic. Establishing a set of interoperability topics
based on the checklist items and using it to organize the results of the
performance and LL evaluations will allow us to tie the process “inputs” to the
“outputs.”
5.
How to: divide the existing checklist into two sections – items for CJOS to
complete and items for the visiting ship and the hosting Strike Group. Ask each
party to record completion (Y/N) of each checklist item. Request comments for
items not completed (there may be many legitimate reasons). These metrics are
scored as percent “Yes” in each checklist topic area using the checklist to record
the data.
162
CJOS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
TIME
Line #
1. Prior to IPC
Action
CJOS LNO
2.
And/Or
3.
Prior to Ship Leaving
Homeport
Item Completed?
Yes
No
EVENT
REMARKS
Obtain Ship’s schedule Keep CJOS COE Deputy Director
and Plan of Intended
informed.
Movement (PIM)
CJOS LNO
Provide Interoperability
and CJOS
survey and checklist
Interoperabilit package to ship(s).
y Team
Leader (TL)
issuing a formal message through C2F
N3 or N7.
Ensure the “Coalition
Playbook” is provided
to Ship from CSFTL.
Totals
29
Yes
No
Percent Completed (X<=1)
X
X is the final result
CJOS Preparedness Assessment Sheet (example)
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS INFO OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Line #
EVENT
Items Completed?
Yes
No
REMARK / RATIONALE
INFOPS 1 BPT develop common terminology
and doctrine for the conduct of
strategic communications.
Common terminology will ensure a
synchronized information operations plan
and will support effective execution.
INFOPS 2 Promulgate and brief IO command
and control arrangements and
authorities and responsibilities in the
OPTASK IO.
To avoid confusion on IO C2 structure,
each unit must be briefed on what the roles
and responsibities there are for IO
operations. Key personnel must be
identified and POC information
disseminated (e.g. email address, voice
net, IP network.)
INFOPS 3 Identify Theater IO Organizations
Ensure all IO planners are familiar with
theater IO chain of command
INFOPS 4 Identify theater IO goals and
objectives
theater IO objectives
INFOPS 5 Establish Force IO/IW Policy,
including restricted frequencies,
EMCON, and media policies.
force IO policies.
Totals
5
Yes
No
Percent Completed
163
Y7
M ISSION AREA
PLANS
INTEL
OPS
LINL
AIR OPS
SUB OPS
INFO OPS
LOG-MED
COMMS
GENERAL
SCORE
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y5
Y6
Y7
Y8
Y9
Y10
Overall Average =
Y
Y is the final result
Other Entities/Commands Preparedness Assessment Sheet (example)
6.
The final metrics will be two scores:
a.
An X score as a percentage of items CJOS COE prepared (e.g.
X=80%=0.8 which means that CJOS COE was able to comply with the 80% of
the CJOS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET).
b.
A Y score as a percentage of items that other entities and Commands
prepared (to include coalition /allied ships and USN Commands.e.g. Y=60%=0.6
which means that Coalition /Allied Ship and probably USN Commands were able
to
comply
with
the
60%
of
the
OTHER
ENTITIES/COMMANDS
PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET). In that series of sheets we assume
equal weight for each assessment area i.e. INTEL, OPS, COMMS etc. thus Y will
be the average of the partial percentages Y1, Y2… Y10.
7.
Demonstrated
Interoperability (Measures
of
Effectiveness)
–
The
demonstrated interoperability evaluation (should be focused on metrics tied
directly to successful cooperation).
Individual metrics are categorized using
mission-focused labels but are also tied to the checklist topic areas. This will
164
provide data for a post-exercise analysis of how well the checklist prepared the
ship for the exercise being evaluated.
8.
How to: An assessor that USN will provide should be tasked with
evaluating interoperability using two performance evaluation guides provided
separately. Figures representing the data sheets are included in the last section
(Table 1 and Table 2). Table 1 is used to evaluate timing-based metrics of when
interoperability was initially demonstrated. Table 2 is used to evaluate how well
interoperability was maintained through the course of continued execution.
Tables 1 and 2 can be used independently; the data in Table 2 are more
resource intensive to collect. When assessors are not provided we can rely on
the coalition /allied ship to assess the Time based metrics (Table 1).
TIME-BASED EVALUATION SHEET
1st
Demonstrated
Prior to Fast
Cruise
1.00
Time-based
metrics for
initial capability
1st
1st
Never
Demonstrated Demonstrated demonstr
During Fast
During live
ated
Cruise
Exercise
0.75
0.25
0.00
National
Interests
ROE - Discuss implications and roles
E.g. 2/3=.75=Zt1
National Policy (regional objectives,
etc. beyond ROE) implications
IO (PAO) coordination
Doctrine
C2 Construct (CWC roles)
Orders propogation
Unit reports (use, format, frequency)
COMM pathways and priorities
E.g. 2.75/4=.69=Zt2
THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE
Table1
165
Zt
THE AVERAGE OF Zt1,..., Zt5
CONTINUED EXECUTION EVALUATION SHEET
Continued
execution
metrics during
exercise
# of Opportunities or
# of Operating Hours
desired
# of times interop
considered or # of
hours functional
(interoperable)
3
2
% Interoperable
National
Interests
E.g. 2/3=.75=Zc1
Doctrine
Orders propogation
Unit reports (use, format,
frequency)
E.g. /4=.69=Zc2
THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE Zc THE AVERAGE OF Zc1,..., Zc5
Table 2
9.
The final metric will be two scores:
a.
A Zt score that is the average of scores in the topic areas table 1 is
evaluating.
Since this sheet is more quantitative the score represents when
interoperability was initially demonstrated. The higher the score the earlier
interoperability was achieved on average.
b.
A Zc score that is the average of scores in the topic areas table 2 is
evaluating. Since that sheet is more qualitative the score represents how
well interoperability was maintained. The higher the score the better
interoperability was maintained. It must be emphasized that the common
5 topic areas that are represented in both tables are correlated with the
Other Entities/Commands Preparedness Assessment sheets. Thus it is
very easy in the analysis process to identify what went wrong in the
preparation and what we should change in the checklist in order to avoid
166
interoperability problems in the same area in the future. Correlation of
each area with the checklist items is given in the enclosed items.
10.
Lessons Learned Again – Post event, the lessons identified by the visiting
ship and their host Strike Group should be compared to the CJOS LL database.
If checklist recommendations on a particular subject were followed and the issue
still arose, then the associated checklist items may require revision. But if all
three assessment efforts are built around a common framework—a common set
of interoperability focus areas—then we should be more readily able to isolate
the strengths and weaknesses of the checklist.
11.
How to: After Lessons Learned are submitted, they should be organized
around the same set of interoperability topics as the checklist and the
performance evaluation.
They should then be compared with items in the
existing LL database to determine whether these items are “repeat offenders.”
The data should be collected using a tool similar to the Lessons Learned
Assessment Sheet included in the last section (Table 3).
167
INFO OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A
B
C
Was an issue but Was an issue and Was not an issue
were prepared
were not
prepared
LL #1
LL #2
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
D
Did not
experience
situation
Lack of use of
common
terminilogy and
doctrine for info
ops.
Command and
control
arrangements
/authorities
/responsibilities
were not clear due
to lack of OPTASK
IO or poor data in
it.
IO orgs in the
theatre were not
identified.
IO goals abd
objectives were
not clear.
Force IO policy
was poorly
established.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
A+B+C+D=NUMBER OF ALL LL
Sum (SumTotal As+SumTotal Cs)/Sum(SumTotal As+SumTotal Bs+SumTotal Cs)=L<=1
L is the final result.
Table 3
12.
The final metric will be a score L that is the percentage of items for which
(the ship was prepared + items that were not problematic) divided by (the total
number of items presented in the exercise)—a perfect score is 100%, meaning
that there were no repeat LL.
168
13.
After evaluating these three aspects of interoperability we hope to tie
performance and LL back to the checklist.
If a ship follows all/most
recommendation related to a particular topic, performs well in that topic during
execution, and repeats no LL in this area, then we have initial evidence that
following those particular checklist recommendations may be helpful. If checklist
items are not followed and/or the performance is not good in a particular area,
further analysis may provide insight and the potential need to revise the checklist.
14.
We should be able to do this by determining what fraction of checklist
items from each topic were followed correctly and then compare those statistics
with performance scores and LL reported in that area.
Overview of Metrics
15.
Measure of Preparedness
COALITION SHIP
COMPLETES
PREP.
ASSESSMENT
SHEET
CJOS COE
COMPLETES
PREP.
ASSESSMENT
SHEET
STRIKE GROUP STAFF
COMPLETES PREP.
ASSESSMENT SHEET
Ysco
re
X-score
Ysco
re
Y-score
169
16.
Performance Evaluation
USN ASSESOR OR SHIP
COMPLETES TIME
BASED EVAL.
SHEET
USN ASSESOR
COMPLETES
CONTINUED
EXECUTION EVAL.
SHEET
Zt-score
17.
Zc-score
Lessons Learned Repeats
SHIP COMPLETES
LESSONS LEARNED
ASSESSMENT
SHEET
L-score
18.
Final Report/Result
170
19.
The scores shown above are the basis for future comparisons and
assessments. By analyzing the after action reports and the coalition/allied ship’s
survey as well as the new LL reported by the ship and by including any
explanatory variables noted by the ship or observers we can evaluate in which
areas performance suggests that following the checklist may have been
beneficial and which areas may need revision. This report will be submitted with
recommendations from the interoperability team regarding any actions they will
take.
This evaluation should be objective and the standards outlined in this
document should be followed where possible.
When an exception seems
necessary or prudent, a brief comment explaining the deviation and the
motivation for it will be added.
Summary
20.
The tools presented in this guide should be useful for evaluating the
overall interoperability of partner ships working with the US Navy. It should also
provide useful information to the CJOS COE for improving its interoperability
checklist. Any questions should be directed to the POCs below.
21.
POCs:
CDR Themistoklis Papadimitriou (CJOS COE, Hellenic Navy) – 757.443.9850
x47132 [email protected]
Dr. Charles Nickerson (USFFC Fleet Analyst) – 757.443.9850 x47313
[email protected]
171
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEETS
ANNEX 2: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SHEETS (WITH CORRELATION
OF EACH AREA WITH CHECKLIST ITEMS)
ANNEX 3: LESSONS LEARNED / IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEETS
172
ANNEX 1: PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Line #
1.
TIME
Prior to IPC
2.
And/Or
3.
Prior to Ship
Leaving
Homeport
4.
CJOS
Action
CJOS LNO
CJOS LNO and
CJOS
Interoperability
Team Leader
(TL)
Item Completed?
EVENT
Obtain Ship’s
schedule and Plan
of Intended
Movement (PIM)
REMARKS
Keep CJOS COE Deputy Director
informed.
Provide
Interoperability
survey and
checklist package
to ship(s).
issuing a formal message
through USFFC N3 or N7.
Ensure the “Coalition
Playbook” is
provided to Ship
from CSFTL.
CJOS TL
Compare Ship’s
schedule with
USFFC (N7, N3)
and CSFTL
exercise schedule.
173
Need to understand if Ship is
coming “late in the game” or is
integrated starting with IPC.
Yes
No
5.
CJOS LNO
6.
CJOS TL
Identify primary
problems.
CJOS TL
Be prepared to give
solutions if any.
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Follow up with IPC
Participant(s)
IPC
7.
8.
Post IPC
9.
Prior to
MPC/FPC
10.
11.
MPC/FPC
Post
MPC/FPC
CJOS LNO
CJOS TL
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Ensure Ship
participation in IPC
Ensure Ship
participation in
MPC/FPC
Ensure CSFTL has
sent
Interoperability
checklist and
surveys to Host
Nation (US)
Ships/Staffs.
Follow up with
MPC/FPC
Participant(s)
174
checklist.
CSG/ESG staffs are the planners,
and issue the OPORDS and
OPTASKS. Releasability and
NATO standards must be
considered.
checklist.
12.
Prior to
PSC/WCC
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Schedule Face to
Face meeting with
Ship. Inform CJOS
chain of command,
including Deputy.
Keep CSFTL informed, as well.
Provides Draft Objectives for Ship’s
review. Sets expectations for
schedule, participation and
products.
13.
CJOS TL
Create Draft Mission
Order (objectives)
for Ship
Engagement.
14.
Coalition Ship
Provide feedback on
Mission Order.
15.
CJOS TL
Coordinate USFFC
PAO coverage
Inform PAO, possible coverage of
Face-Face meeting
16.
CJOS TL
Welcome package
Assemble welcome package for
Face-Face: CJOS brochures,
mementos for CO.
175
17.
PSC /WCC
Events
18.
19.
20.
Execution
CJOS TL
Ensure Ships
personnel have
copies of the
Survey.
Same for Host Nation (US) Ships
and staffs; liaison with CSFTL
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
Conduct meeting,
report back to
CJOS COE
Deputy Director.
Coalition
Participants
Complete Surveys
This includes identified US Ships
and Staffs. These surveys will be
used a guide during the interview
process.
a) Confirm schedule
for follow-on visits,
teleconferences,
and interviews.
Follow-on One-on-One interviews
with selected personnel: Senior
leaders (Ship CO, Operations
officer, Marine Liaison, etc.).
Follow-on Group interviews with
watch officers, and functional
areas (examples: Air operations,
Logistics, Intelligence,
Communications and Networks,
KMO, PAO, Legal/ROE).
CJOS LNO and
CJOS TL
176
21.
b) Resend Mission
Order to Ship CO,
plan on splitting
interviews into
groups.
22.
23.
24.
Post
Execution
Coalition
Participants
Forward completed
Surveys to CJOS.
CJOS TL
Conduct Follow-on
visits,
teleconferences,
and interviews.
a) Team members
review surveys.
CJOS TL, Team
members for
Operations, Air,
Logistics, C2,
Comms.
25.
b) Team members
split into groups.
26.
c) Use completed
surveys or blank
surveys to guide
interviews.
177
Inform PAO, CJOS COE Deputy.
One-on-One interviews with
selected personnel. Group
interviews with watch officers,
and functional areas.
27.
CJOS TL
28.
CJOS TL
29.
CJOS TL
Update Lessons
Identified
“database”,
Interoperability
Checklist.
Provide after-action
report
Conduct meeting with
CSFTL, USFFC.
If required.
If required.
Totals
29
Yes
No
Percent Completed (X<=1)
X is the final result
178
X
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS PLANS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Item Completed?
Line #
EVENT
Review possession/ access/reception
of/to all related/appropriate
publications/documents.
REMARK / RATIONALE
Utilize LNO’s on order to receive documentation.
Request those missing from Higher/Foreign
appropriate authorities in accordance with
National procedures. Ensure documents are
releasable to all coalition.
PLAN 2.
Review lessons learned data base from
recent operations or exercises
Database may not be releasable. Utilize Foreign
Disclosure Officer to determine releasability of
lessons learned.
PLAN 3.
Determine Superior’s guidance and intent
This may require a one on one briefing from the
Commander to subordinates in order to clear
any language or cultural barriers.
PLAN 4.
Conduct Mission Analysis
PLAN 1.
When possible, utilize an integrated combined
planning team to ensure effective mission
analysis in order to accurately identify tasks,
limitations, COG analysis, risk assessment, and
to develop Commander’s intent and guidance for
the combined force. Language and culture will
play a considerable role in correctly interpreting
and transmitting guidance for combined forces.
179
Yes
No
PLAN 5.
Refine participation ambitions (duties or
task asked) and training expectations.
This will ensure exercise or operations participants
understand the limitations of each navy with
regards to training level, certifications, etc.
PLAN 6.
Develop and brief C2 structure and
provide reference doctrinal reference
material (e.g. CWC Manual).
Promulgate clear directives on C2
structure in OPORD. Briefings should
include graphic depictions of
geographic or functional divisions of
responsibility.
Provide all commanders a briefing on C2 structure
to include planned changes, geographic
boundaries, mission responsibilities, alternate
commanders, and supporting communications
structure. Brief SUPSIT doctrine as required.
PLAN 7.
Generate mission or training timeline to
include any limitations
A training or operational timeline will ensure the
coalition is operating within its constraints and
will ensure expectations are understood by all
participants.
PLAN 8.
Agree, in concept, on the common set of
tactics, techniques, and procedures
publications used for all participants.
In most cases this should be the NATO publication
set. Agreement at this time provides time for the
training audience to become familiar with NATO
publications. Interoperability could be enhanced
by using common terms, or providing a tool that
relates one term to another.
180
PLAN 9.
Command and Control Authorities and
dissemination of orders. - Agree on
command and control authority.
- Document agreed to rules for
disseminating orders.
Coalition participants must agree to methods of
distributing formal orders and what constitutes a
formal order. This must be documented in
OPGENs, OPTASKs, and OPORDERs. In the
absence of documented procedures specific to
the exercise, coalition partners should use
NATO standards. Orders will be misunderstood,
unrecognized, or late due to no prescribed upon
or agreed to rules for disseminating orders.
Official orders, such as OPTASKs, Intentions
messages, serial event messages, etc. should
be sent via record message traffic as opposed to
email. Contents may be coordinated by email
but messages are the official order. Real time
changes of course can me made by voice or
chat communications
PLAN 10.
Investigate pre-existing OPTASKs and
OPORDs for use during combined
operations or exercises. Commands
such as TTGL may be able to provide
samples of pre-existing plans
documents that can be adopted and
utilized for a given exercise.
Using standing OPTASK and OPORDs that are
releasable to participating nations will reduce
planning and work load for planners. Preexisting OPTASKs and OPORDs can be
modified to suit the mission, available forces and
the desires of the TF/TG commander.
181
PLAN 11.
BPT to develop and issue releasable
OPTASKs and direct whether issued
OPTASKs superseded previous
OPTASKs
Operators need to have common OPTASKS in
which to work from. It needs to be made clear
which OPTASKs will be relevant for a given
exercise.
PLAN 12.
Discuss limitations with regards to
operational tempo.
Some navies have the manning and training to
operate on a rapid training tempo while others
do not. It’s important to frankly discuss what a
realistic training tempo is in order to establish
expectations and to ensure effective training.
PLAN 13.
Consider exercise design that
simultaneously challenges multiple
warfare areas.
Depending on the level of expertise and training
requirements, it is important to design exercises
that realistically reflect the challenges the
participating coalition may face during actual
operations.
PLAN 14.
Integrate opportunities to share warfare
responsibilities between all
participating nations.
Building into the plan opportunities for coalition
units to assume warfare commander
responsibilities will ensure training opportunities
are equitable and will improve interoperability in
the long term.
PLAN 15.
Identify standardized wording and
numbering of ROE information.
A disseminated ROE matrix with common or
standardized terminology will prevent confusion
with regards to implementing ROE.
182
PLAN 16.
Promulgate ROE Matrix by country in
order for watch standers to understand
constraints and restraints with regards
to national policy.
Each nation will have different authorities.
Operations must take advantage of the differing
national rules in order to achieve the mission.
It’s important for each unit to understand what
missions and tasks each of the participating
coalition units may conduct. For example, some
nations need master’s consent before boarding,
while others do not.
PLAN 17.
Include within the Battle Rhythm when
serial event TABORDS are due.
Ideally TABORDs should be released
NLT than 72 hours prior to the event.
Identify and adhere to where
TABORDS will be posted on IP
Networks (e.g. CENTRIX).
Releasing TABORDS in accordance with an
established battle rhythm will ensure participants
have adequate time to review and plan for serial
event. The TABORD are not always received in
standard NATO format as expected, thus
making it difficult to extract relevant information
and ensure that all necessary details are passed
prior to a serial
PLAN 18.
Establish integrated battle rhythm.
Provide time for lower echelon units to
provide feedback on higher echelon
plans.
To ensure effective planning and execution, an
effective battle rhythm that considers coalition
requirements must be established, promulgated,
and adhered to in order to ensure continuity of
operations.
183
PLAN 19.
Use training requirements and objectives
to build a plan that rotates warfare
commander duties to as many units as
possible, while providing time for each
unit to become proficient, and exercise
interoperability.
Continue to provide more and greater
responsibilities to multiple nations and units.
Especially warfare commander roles (AAWC)
and Force commander roles (like ESF).
PLAN 20.
Brief details for exercise area restrictions
to include ranges, air space and sea
space restrictions, environmental
requirements, etc.
Brief on use of exercise area. Reserve areas for
events (such as helo operations). Address Risk
aversion. Clear differences in Waterspace
Management, environmental compliance and
submarine safety procedures.
184
PLAN 21.
Conduct face to face meetings and
capability briefs outside of the
scheduled planning conferences.
Conduct site visits with air operations,
communications, logistics, surface
warfare, etc.
Pre-exercise time in Norfolk, VA, provided an
extremely valuable opportunity for ships officers
and specialists to visit host nation. Discussion
includes maneuvering in close company, Plane
Guard duties, appreciation of CVN
considerations and concerns, escort duty with
CVN operations, tactical employment
discussions with DESRON Air Ops, battle
rhythm, and requirements from the staff for flying
bids, maintenance cycles, etc. . .A pre exercise
comms brief is very helpful to meet key players
face to face and discuss aspects that may cause
concern.
PLAN 22.
Verify Pre-exercise messages are
received and understood by all
coalition participants.
Releasability issues may result in late or no
release of pre-exercise messages. Ensure
addressing of messages include all coalition
staffs and units. Refrain from labeling
documents as NOFORN.
PLAN 23.
Use NATO format in order to achieve
releasability.
Exercise and CTG/CTF staffs must understand
how to disseminate information that is as freely
releasable as possible (i.e.: Rel CMFC). Use
NATO formats as often as possible to enhance
releasability.
185
PLAN 24.
Use document labeling to ensure widest
dissemination.
Establish releasability guidelines and ensure
coalition players are included in release groups.
Refrain from using NOFORN labeling.
PLAN 25.
LNOS
Liaison Officers should be assigned at least two
weeks prior to the Exercise. Both the quantity
and quality (expertise) of coalition participants is
the basis for the detailed interaction required.
LNOS have to make planning decisions, the
command structure they are embedded within is
crucial. LNOs must be paired with a designated
and corresponding ship POC.
Totals
24
Yes
No
Percent Completed
186
Y1
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS INTEL PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Item Completed?
Line #
INTEL 1
EVENT
Brief and describe foreign disclosure
requirements and guidelines
REMARK / RATIONALE
In order to protect information, all participants must
understand and adhere to foreign disclosure
requirements.
Coalition partners must have an understanding of the
intelligence requirements for the commander.
Additionally, each partner must be made familiar with
the geography and characteristics of the Area of
Operations, Assessment of the Enemy.
INTEL 2
Coordinate Intelligence Preparation of
the Battle space with coalition
partners.
INTEL 3
Designate clear authority on red data
base management.
In order to ensure the Common Operational Picture is
accurate with regards to red tracks, clear lines of
authority must be promulgated for data base
management responsibilities.
INTEL 4
Designate the information system to
use for intelligence products and
information sharing. Maritime
coalition operations should
incorporate accessible means of
allowing data to be transferred
between units.
Information system must be identified early in the
planning process to allow time for acquisition,
installation, training, and testing. Clearly identify and
send all parties chat room names, passwords, and
location of information. All chat rooms should be setup
and defined prior to deployment/exercise.
INTEL 5
Discuss, where possible, intelligence
gathering capabilities and
limitations. Develop matrix of unit
Intel gathering capabilities
Intel analyst must be able to understand coalition
capabilities in order to best exploit intelligence gather
capabilities, which will avoid gaps and redundancies in
intelligence collection.
187
Yes
No
INTEL 6
INTEL 7
Designate and disseminate the
commander’s Priority Intelligence
Requirements. Discuss Request for
Information submission procedures,
Develop Enemy COAs with coalition
partner input,
All units must understand the commander’s intelligence
priorities.
Differing cultures and experiences will enlighten the
understanding of the enemy and their potential actions.
Totals
7
Yes
No
Percent Completed
188
Y2
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Line #
OPS 1
EVENT
Conduct ship and aircraft capability
review. Participants/units provide
capabilities, especially new or
unique ones. (OPSTAT UNIT or
equivalent signals should be
utilized).
OPS 2
BPT conduct survey of amphibious
ships for compatibility of various
landing craft.
OPS 3
Identify communications terminology
and acronym reference.
OPS 4
Conduct warfare commander and
watch stander discussion on
differences in National policy, ROE,
and safety to ensure all participants
have an equal understanding of
limitations, rules, safety etc.
REMARK / RATIONALE
Examples: New systems, like VDS.
Standoff weapons like Exocet.
Information should include current
material status of weapons, sensor,
propulsion, RHIBs, and helos, and
impact on operations and particular
warfare areas. All OPS hands must
be able to understand coalition
capabilities in order to best exploit
them and will lead in avoidance of
gaps and redundancies in
operations.
A survey of landing craft and vehicles
must be completed to determine the
level of interoperability of amphibious
units (e.g. can a US LCAC fit into a
UK Amphib or vice versa).
All units must be familiar and practice
with common communications
terminology. A single code word
reference book should be identified
to avoid voice communications
confusion
Masters Consent Boarding is one
example of national policy
differences, and required an
understanding between units of
interoperability differences.
189
Items Completed?
Yes
No
OPS 5
Establish communications doctrine for
Voice and Chat circuits. Publish
doctrine within OPTASK Comms
and OPTASK Chat.
OPS 6
Develop and provide a
roles/responsibility matrix that
relates the name/title of each watch
stander on the C2 nets to a
common role.
Agree on tactical references that will
be used for operations. The
objective here is to create a list of
the primary National, Coalition, and
NATO publications used so that
each participant has time to access
reference documents that are not
on their national systems, or
request hardcopies from other
nations.
OPS 7
Operators need to understand what
circuits will be used for the issuance
of formal tactical orders. The
tactical situation will dictate whether
voice or chat will be the primary C2
medium. Additionally, the purpose of
the circuit must be determined,
whether it is to be administrative in
nature, complimentary to voice
communications or operationally and
tactically directive. Maneuvering
coalition ships is conducted
exclusively over Fleet Tac UHF, in
some exercises, a combination of
Fleet Tac, VHF BTB and CENTRIX
chat with no particular method given
primacy and on occasion conflicting
orders arising from each circuit.
Example: TAO(US) to PWO(UK). Need
to issue good C2 guidance in
OPORD, or (better) use standards in
reference material.
OCE needs to direct use of appropriate
tactical pubs and where there will be
exceptions. Interoperability problems
can be caused due to important
reference documents available, or
over-classified. For some coalition
units, chat is not a primary means of
communication, and so the use of
chat as a means for order
dissemination should be clear from
the beginning
190
OPS 8
Brief C2 and Communications
procedures.
OPS 9
Reinforce command and control
communications doctrine.
OPS 10
Communications and watch stander
limitations must be briefed to
rationalize expectations.
OPS 11
If required, brief and discuss NSFS
fire control procedures and
doctrine. Identify common
resources for NSFS doctrine and
terminology.
OPS 12
Each OPTASK should identify the
appropriate C2 circuit for tactical
execution and controller of that
circuit. Brief participants.
If chat is to be used as primary form of
communications, then all participants
must agree on the decision to do so,
and voice circuits must be constantly
tested as backup when chat is
inoperative. Virtually all nations use
voice as primary communications.
Example: For SITREPS, Use NATO
prescribed TABORD format,
informative as a stand-alone
documents, and deliver via message
traffic and CENTRIX at 72 hr point.
Official orders, such as OPTASKs,
Intentions messages, serial event
messages, etc. must be sent via
record message traffic as opposed to
email. Contents may be coordinated
by email but messages are the
official order. Real time changes of
course can me made by voice or
chat communications.
Some units may have limited
communications and available watch
standers, therefore, operations must
be planned around these limitations.
Each participating unit may have
differing procedures for the conduct
of NSFS. In order to ensure safe
NSFS events, each unit should agree
on the appropriate references,
procedures, and terminology.
Briefing control of voice circuits will
ensure voice radio discipline.
191
OPS 13
Discuss “safe to train” requirements.
OPS 14
Discuss cultural treatment of
command and organization. Come
to terms in areas such as: Planning
horizons, the objective of unit
reports (should a SITREP be a
status report, or should it provide a
tactical assessment and
intentions?).
OPS 15
Where voice circuits are limited,
consider assigning a single
frequency for overall tactical C2.
OPS 16
Confirm the units designations, call
signs, etc.
Need to understand differences in
tactics in general as well as new
systems, perhaps via briefings ahead
of the exercise. Especially
differences in Gunnery safety rules
should be clear and understandable.
Nations differ in their expectations for
unit actions when situations present
themselves. Two examples: An
expectation that when a unit is
assigned to a SAU for an ASW
mission, it is not necessary to issue a
change in TACON for the unit to the
ASWC, when in fact, it is a good
practice to issue an order for clarity.
Orders changing TACON or OPCON
for a unit: What format should they
take, and what dissemination
process should be used? Only
through knowing of differences can
interoperability issues be mitigated.
In some cases the differences cannot
be solved, which is acceptable as
long as they are identified.
Communications and watch stander
limitations of other units must be
understood to ensure effective and
continuous C2.
Familiarize operators with call-sign
conventions and unit warfare
designations (e.g. AW, AX).
192
OPS 17
Provide information on how Warfare
Commander’s Roles are being
performed.
OPS 18
Timely issue of Commander’s daily
intentions message (DIMs).
OPS 19
Receipt of Orders: message traffic
must be free of delays and reach
all participants. Ensure proper
handling or dissemination of
messages
All units must be aware of differences
and limitations when warfare
commander functions are hosted in a
staff, versus the typical method of
hosting within a ship’s operations
center. Most coalition ships are not
aware that a warfare commander can
be hosted in a staff, there will be
difficulty receiving/sending
information, because a staff based
warfare commander is not fully
focused on the tactical situation.
Ensure that DIMS messages are issued
in a timely manner. Releasability
procedures, unduly lengthy review
cycles, and improper routing and
message handling can easily delay
the DIMS from getting to the right
audience quickly. Send DIMS by
fastest means possible, typically
email.
Record message traffic “filters" (human
and electronic) may hinder
interoperability. Record message
traffic may suffer because of: 1) Noone (or very few) is reviewing
message traffic for relevance, 2)
Messages not being forwarded, 3)
Information in messages was not
finding its way into the relevant
information, 4) Routing indicators is
not up to date.
193
OPS 20
Avoid Non NATO terminology.
Use of NATO terminology should be
ensured. Example: “Suspect
identity” is used in NATO but some
other nations don’t use it, and can
cause confusion when
communication contacts intentions.
OPS 21
Create a strong relationship between
LNOs and Operations watch
officers.
LNOS can play a crucial role helping
monitoring email traffic from coalition
ships. And can help keep host watch
officers informed.
Totals
21
Yes
No
Percent Completed
194
Y3
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS DATA LINK PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Line #
DLINK 1
EVENT
Discuss and Identify Force COP
Manager
REMARK / RATIONALE
Identify COP management experience and link systems
DLINK 2
Discuss and Identify FOTC
DLINK 3
Brief and promulgate link
Architecture
Determine primary data link for the
Common Operational Picture,
keeping in mind capabilities and
limitations of participating units.
BPT to exchange data link
LNOs.
Promulgate to operators to ensue familiarity
DLINK 4
There is a need to broadcast the Common Operational
Picture to as many units as possible, while maximizing
the capabilities of the best equipped units. Additionally,
there is a need to prevent cluttered pictures where
multiple data line broadcasts are pushed simultaneously.
DLINK 5
Establish, brief, and disseminate
OPTASK ID matrix and
symbology doctrine.
All units must use the same ID doctrine for their data links
to avoid confusion of track IDs. Based on varying
degrees of link capabilities, common ground must be
found on symbology and ID criteria to ensure a Common
Operational Picture. Changes to existing unit ID criteria
must be determined early enough for units to train to new
ID criteria.
DLINK 6
Determine Force Track Quality for
each unit.
Predetermined force track quality will reduce dual tracking
in the Common Operational Picture.
195
Items Completed?
Yes
No
DLINK 7
Provide clear direction on crypto in
use, and frequency shifts.
The OTAD can be problematic at times when the shoreside
originator becomes confused over the time difference
and which day’s crypto is required. The Link 11 Data
frequency might change without being promulgated on
the voice net or CENTRIX. The Link SITREP should be
released hourly and not when there are changes.
Totals
8
Yes
No
Percent Completed
196
Y4
OTHER ENTITIES / COMMANDS AIR OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Items Completed?
Line #
AIR 1
EVENT
Conduct HOSTAC review.
AIR 2
Schedule in port flight deck
inspection.
AIR 3
Identify appropriate aviation
publications and
references.
Identify primary network for
ATO production (e.g.
TBMCS).
AIR 4
AIR 5
Planning and coordination of
Helo Flying Ops.
AIR 6
Consider using standard
NATO format (such as the
ICC application) for ATO.
REMARK / RATIONALE
Ensures HOSTAC has up to date information is available to
aviation planners.
Permits HAC opportunity to determine caps/lims of
helicopter flight decks to support flight operations
planning.
Ensures all aviation capable units will have appropriate
references and time to absorb and apply contents.
Some units will not have access to TBMCS as it resides on
SIPR. Therefore, a common network must be identified
to support ATO production.
Daily DOTAH/FEEDER should be employed The lack of
ready access to the DOTAH/ATO and other aviation
planning information means that the majority of
communication with USN is carried out via email. The
usual battle rhythm employed within a NATO TG is
submitting a daily DOTAH feeder and receiving a
DOTAH with the next 72Hr.
A standard format for the ATO for all NATO Carrier Groups
(ICC) should be used. NATO use of ICC software in
previous exercises with coalition assets has proved
invaluable; the software is available and has been
proven even if the Strike Wing’s Daily Air Plan may
have be received as well as a planning aid.
197
Yes
No
AIR 7
Sharing of C2 duties requires
detailed and easily
understood comms
architecture for Air
Operations.
The key issue precluding the execution of these duties is
the timely and effective distribution of material and
appropriate security classification between coalition
units. Sharing of ADC and Redcrown duties require
consistent and robust communications architecture for
the Task Group.
Totals
7
Yes
No
Percent Completed
198
Y5
OTHER ENTITIES / COMMANDS SUB OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Items Completed?
Line #
SUB 1
SUB 2
EVENT
Develop Waterspace
Management Plan and
designate SUBOPAUTH.
Promulgate submarine safety
procedures.
REMARK / RATIONALE
Ensure all players are familiar with submarine
operating areas.
Yes
No
Ensure all players are familiar with submarine safety
procedures.
Totals
2
Yes
No
Percent Completed
199
Y6
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS INFO OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Items Completed?
Line #
INFOPS 1
EVENT
BPT develop common terminology and
doctrine for the conduct of strategic
communications.
REMARK / RATIONALE
Common terminology will ensure a synchronized
information operations plan and will support
effective execution.
INFOPS 2
Promulgate and brief IO command and
control arrangements and authorities
and responsibilities in the OPTASK IO.
To avoid confusion on IO C2 structure, each unit
must be briefed on what the roles and
responsibilities there are for IO operations. Key
personnel must be identified and POC
information disseminated (e.g. email address,
voice net, IP network.)
INFOPS 3
Identify Theater IO Organizations.
Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO
chain of command.
INFOPS 4
Identify theater IO goals and objectives.
Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO
objectives.
INFOPS 5
Establish Force IO/IW Policy, including
restricted frequencies, EMCON, and
media policies.
Ensure all IO planners are familiar with force IO
policies.
Yes
Totals
5
Yes
No
Percent Completed
200
No
Y7
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS LOG. PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Items Completed?
Line #
LOG 1
EVENT
Determine logistics report requirements
such as the daily OPREP 5 report.
LOG 2
Identify logistics LNOs and Forward
Logistics team personnel.
LOG 3
Review unit capabilities and limitations in
order to identify logistics infrastructure /
engineering compatibility.
Fuel planners and logistics planners must refuel and
other logistics systems (e.g. fuel line connections,
pressure limitations, fuel and oil types, etc) are
compatible for all participating units. Early
identification of incompatibility is needed to ensure
solutions are available before commencement of
the exercise.
LOG 4
Investigate locations of LNOs, forward
Logistics Operating Teams and/or
personnel deployment.
Replenishment Procedures.
Location of forward logistics LNOs is critical to the
success of operations.
LOG 5
REMARK / RATIONALE
In order to conduct effective logistics planning, a
common logistics format and reporting procedure
must be identified.
Logistics LNOs are critical to ensure personnel, parts,
and supplies are available to the TG.
Use of standard RAS signal formats in accordance
with ATP 16 and OPTASK RAS should be ensured.
201
Yes
No
LOG 6
Understand shore power connection
differences.
The weight of the cables and the position of the shore
connection boxes may preclude the use of shore
power. In effect, heavy three-core cables are used
in the US that does not have the flexibility of the
single-core cables used in the coalition
units. Coalition units must be prepared. Some
coalition vessels supply 440v whereas US shore
power is nearer 480v.
LOG 7
Establish expeditious invoicing of
Services.
LOG 8
Approval to obtain repair services from US
shipyards.
Mechanism not in place to provide timely invoices to
foreign ships for payment of services prior to
departing.
OPNAV regulations require OPNAV approval in order
for Navy shipyards to provide repair services to
foreign ships. Upon approval, the repair services
are only provided on a not to interfere basis with
US ship commitments. C2F N4, in coordination
with Port OPS and the N43 community developed
a process where Port Ops would request blanket
approval for the shipyards to provide repair
services to foreign ships prior to their arrival. This
was done for some coalition units but it appears
that the Mayport shipyard is not aware that this
approval can be obtained.
LOG 9
Identify medical planning doctrine and
procedures to be used during exercises.
Medical emergency plans must be compatible to
ensure rapid response for injured or sick personnel.
Totals
9
Yes
No
Percent Completed
202
Y8
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS COMMS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Line #
COMMS 1
EVENT
Identify primary command and control
information network (e.g.
CENTRIX). Avoid using SIPRnet
which coalition ships can not
access.
REMARK / RATIONALE
A survey must be completed to determine which network
can serve the most units. This will become the
primary C2 network. Once identified all interaction
should be completed on the primary network to avoid
confusion and redundancy. If the focus of information
flow and posting is on a national network, such as
SIPRnet, late and incomplete information, will end up
posted on CENTRIX.
COMMS 2
A large amount of effort can be spent
in achieving effective CENTRIX
interoperability. CENTRIX can be
a single point of failure for coalition
interoperability and whenever
connection with the server is lost,
interoperability levels plummet.
Define which enclave will be used. Program Staff
assistance to engineer the required frequencies and
permissions. Data exchange from SIPR to CENTRIX
is onerous. Ensure that websites are set up correctly
to allow for posting of such documents. Emailing
large documents takes a long time and frequently
causes the files to become corrupt or crash the
system. All in all, this process requires an inordinate
amount of effort by the LNOs and Ship’s Staff.
COMMS 3
Identify appropriate crypto
requirements and availability. Brief
crypto roll over and loading
procedures. Identify potential
technical incompatibilities between
various modems and crypto
terminals. Brief and publish crypto
terminal settings.
Participants must ensure that compatible crypto is
available in a timely manner. Additionally, all crypto
users must be synchronized with roll over and loading
times. Crypto material should be checked thoroughly
well in advance. Planning should consider coalition
availability.
203
Item Completed?
NO
YES
COMMS 4
Identify realistic requirements for
information systems to include
number of required PCs, printers,
etc. Identify space requirements
and develop installation plan.
Survey operational commanders for information systems
requirements. Units may require advance notice to
begin installing unique network systems (e.g.
CENTRIX). Additionally, units and staffs will have to
develop a comprehensive location plan for PCs and
printers to ensure appropriate people have access to
required information systems and that those systems
are located such that they adequately support
operations and planning. Where possible, collocate
new systems using CPU switches, with existing
systems in order to not disrupt normal office space
arrangement and seating of personnel
Personnel that need new information systems accounts
normally must register in a timely manner to ensure
availability of accounts.
COMMS 5
Identify information systems account
registration requirements.
COMMS 6
Provide information systems training
to appropriate personnel to include
login and passwords.
COMMS 7
Ensure adequate chat rooms are
available to support operations.
Survey warfare commanders to determine chat room
requirements.
COMMS 8
Develop and disseminate list that
includes chat room names and
passwords via OPTASK chat.
Ensure all participants have access to required chat
rooms.
COMMS 9
Provide comms LNOs between
combined forces.
Comms LNOs will ensure continuity of communications
throughout the exercise by providing an immediate
POC that address comms issues.
In order to ensure familiarity with newly acquired
information systems, personnel must be provided with
passwords and information systems training.
204
COMMS 10
Develop communications capability
MATRIX and brief operators and
comms caps/lims for each unit.
COMMS 11
If possible, conduct pre-exercise
communications circuit testing, to
include operators at their watch
stations 3 days prior to commex.
Operators and planners need to understand
communications capabilities and limitations of other
units in order to develop an effective command and
control structure. It will also establish expectations
between participating units.
It’s important to work out communications problems in
port before units begin exercising in order to maximize
training at sea.
COMMS 12
Use NATO crypto.
Using NATO Crypto will potentially eliminate issues that
would arise if the coalition uses crypto provided by the
host nation.
COMMS 13
HAVEQUICK utilization.
COMMS 14
Message Handling System
exploitation.
Define settings to be used and hop rate. USN has been
able to use training settings with this HOPRATE and
therefore opted not to use war settings during C2X.
Coalition units are expected to use a different
HOPRATE It has been observed the use of different
hop rate and training cryptographic material put
coalition units at a disadvantage as software
limitations do not allow for training cryptographic
material to be used
Comms plan should address amongst others and the
exploitation of MHS.
COMMS 15
Degrees of Confidentiality.
Restricted is not used by USN.
COMMS 16
Use of Maneuvering circuits must be
well managed.
Maneuvering nets should be clarified on order to avoid
interoperability issues. Furthermore NATO signaling
methods should be applied.
205
Totals
16
Yes
No
Y9
Percent Completed
206
OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS GENERAL PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET
Items Completed?
Line #
GEN 1.
GEN 2.
GEN 3.
EVENT
Identify and BPT exchange LNOs for all
areas.
REMARK / RATIONALE
The more robust of an LNO plan there is the better
likelihood of being able to rapidly resolve conflicts in
tactics, doctrine, communications, and logistics. LNO
engagement cannot be overemphasized. It is the
only method by which Coalition units will realize the
complexity of the exercise. Coalition ships must
provide detailed requirements during planning.
Ensure that all OPTASKs, OPGEN,
TABORDS or other planning or
directive messages reference only
those documents that are releasable
to action and info addressees.
Units cannot reference a document they do not have
access to, thus, their ability to execute assigned
tasks may be inhibited. The standard format table in
AXP 2C for signal formatting could be used to save
confusion in signal orders.
Identify Planning Conference
Participants.
Staff planners (CSG, ATG, etc.) from all participants
should attend critical planning conferences. These
attendees should be consistent through all planning
conference, and the exercise, personnel should not
be rotating to a new command in the next 8 months.
Verify which units will be on certain enclaves.
OPTASK Comms must encompass networks,
command, control, and information management.
Coalition terminals must be manned.
207
Yes
No
GEN 4.
C4 (command, control communications,
computers) architecture design must
receive primary focus during planning
conferences.
C4 architecture should be thoroughly checked and
reviewed prior to the exercise; coalition must
understand how to attain visibility to higher level
(CFMCC, CJTF) comms and info management and
flow. Experts in C4 must attend all planning phases.
GEN 5.
Releasability of orders and information.
Exercise planners, and CTG/CTF
staffs must create, review, and label
orders and other information for
maximum release.
Procedures for maximum releasability must be
addressed early in the planning process, and used
continuously during the exercise. Examples of
documents that must not be labeled NOFORN:
OPTASK Comms, planning conference
presentations, OPORDER 6000, Pre-exercise
workups (FST-GC) information. Use NATO
formatted orders.
Totals
5
Yes
No
Percent Completed
208
Y10
MISSION AREA
SCORE
PLANS
Y1
INTEL
Y2
OPS
Y3
LINL
Y4
AIR OPS
Y5
SUB OPS
Y6
INFO OPS
Y7
LOG-MED
Y8
COMMS
Y9
GENERAL
Y10
Overall Average =
Y is the final result
209
Y
ANNEX 2: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SHEETS (WITH CORRELATION OF EACH AREA WITH CHECKLIST ITEMS)
TIME-BASED EVALUATION SHEET
Time-based metrics for initial
capability
1st
Demonstrat
ed Prior to
Fast Cruise
1.00
1st
Demonstrat
ed During
Fast Cruise
0.75
1st
Demonstrat
ed During
live
Exercise
0.25
Never
demonstrat
ed
0.00
National
Interests
ROE - Discuss
implications and
roles
National Policy
(regional
objectives, etc.
beyond ROE)
implications
IO (PAO)
coordination
E.g. 2/3=.75=Zt1
Doctrine
C2 Construct (CWC
roles)
Orders propogation
Unit reports (use,
format, frequency)
COMM pathways
and priorities
E.g. 2.75/4=.69=Zt2
210
Tactics,
Techniqu
es, and
Procedur
es
Waterspace (surface
and
subsurface)/airsp
ace management
procedures
Force employment
(including NSFS
and helos)
Intel sharing
(methods &
expectations)
Capabilities and
limitations
(comms, fires,
aviation support,
intel collection,
etc.)
ATO/HOSTAC
generation
Replenishment and
logistics
Vocabulary
E.g 6/9=.67=Zt3
EW tools &
procedures
(deconfliction)
IO
Technical
E.g 1.75/2=.875=Zt4
Voice, Data, Email
circuits
211
SA tools (LINK, etc.),
CAS and network
tools
Equipment
RAS
hoses/connectors
Aviation
Requirements
Amphibious
requirements
E.g 2/3=.67=Zt5
THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE Zt AVERAGE OF Zt1,..., Zt5
212
CONTINUED EXECUTION EVALUATION SHEET
Continued
execution
metrics during
exercise
# of Opportunities or
# of Operating Hours
desired
# of times interop
considered or # of
hours functional
(interoperable)
3
2
% Interoperable
National
Interests
E.g. 2/3=.75=Zc1
Doctrine
Orders propogation
Unit reports (use, format,
frequency)
E.g. /4=.69=Zc2
Tactics,
Techniques,
and Procedures
Waterspace (surface and
subsurface)/airspace management
procedures
Force employment (including NSFS
and helos)
intel sharing (methods &
expectations)
E.g /9=.67=Zc3
capabilities and limitations (comms,
fires, aviation support, intel
collection, etc.)
ATO/HOSTAC generation
Replenishment and logistics
Vocabulary
EW tools & procedures
(deconfliction)
IO
Technical
Voice, Data, Email circuits
SA tools (LINK, etc.), CAS and
network tools
eg. A 7 days
exercise is 7*24
eg functinal only
the 5 days 5*24
E.g 5*24/7*24=.71=Zc4
Equipment
RAS hoses/connectors
E.g 2/3=.67=Zc5
Aviation Requirements
Amphibious requirements
THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE Zc THE AVERAGE OF Zc1,..., Zc5
213
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ITEMS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH CHECKLIST
NATIONAL INTERESTS
DOCTRINE
Orders propogation
Unit reports (use, format, frequency)
CHECKLIST ITEMS
SUB OPS/OPS4/PLAN15/PLAN16
PLAN3/PLAN4/PLAN5/PLAN9/OPS4
CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION
/LNOS/INFO5/OPS21/INTEL1/PLANS2/PLAN24
PLAN22/PLAN23/OPS5/OPS8/INTEL6/OPS14/PLA
N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/PLAN14/PLAN19/ALL
4/AIR5/AIR7/OPS6/OPS14/OPS15/OPS17/PLAN6/
PLAN12/PLAN13
N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/ALL5/COMMS16/AIR
5/OPS5/OPS9/OPS18/OPS19/PLAN1/PLAN18
N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/ALL2/INFO1/AIR3/OP
S3/OPS7/OPS14/OPS19/PLAN18
N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/ALL3/COMM5/COM
M11/COMM9/COMM8/COMM7/COMM1/LINK/OP
S12/INTEL1
TTPS
Waterspace (surface and
subsurface)/airspace management
SUB1/SUB2/AIR5/PLAN8/PLAN13/PLAN20
procedures
Force employment (including NSFS and SUB1/SUB2/AIR3/AIR5/OPS11/PLAN7/PLAN13/PL
helos)
AN17/PLAN20
intel sharing (methods &
ALL2/ALL1/COMM15/PLAN8
expectations)
capabilities and limitations (comms,
PLAN7/PLAN8/PLAN12/PLAN13/PLAN21/COMM1
fires, aviation support, intel collection, 0/LOG3/LOG1/SUB1/SUB2/OPS1/OPS4/OPS10/OP
etc.)
S13/INTEL1/INTEL5
ATO/HOSTAC generation
AIR1/AIR4/AIR5
Replenishment and logistics
LOG
Vocabulary
OPS3OPS7OPS20/PLAN8/PLAN15
EW tools & procedures (deconfliction)
LINK/INTEL5
IO
TECHNICAL
Voice, Data, Email circuits
INFO/INTEL4/INTEL6/INTEL7
COMM15/COMM14/COMM13/COMM12/COMM6/
COMM5/COMM4/COMM2/OPS5/OPS15/OPS14
SA tools (LINK, etc.), CAS and network COMM6/COMM4/COMM3/LINK/OPS16/INTEL3/IN
tools
TEL4/INTEL7
EQUIPMENT
RAS hoses/connectors
LOG
Aviation Requirements
AIR
Amphibious requirements
OPS2
214
ANNEX 3: LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEETS
ALL (GENERAL) LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
LL #1
LL #2
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
A
B
C
D
Was an issue but
were prepared
Was an issue
and were not
prepared
Was not an issue
Did not experience
situation
No / limited plan for LNOs
(numbers, areas, ships e.t.c)
Terms of References used in
exercise documentation
wasn't available or releasable
to all participants.
Participants of planning or
other exercise conferences
(pre-post etc) weren't
identified/agreed.
C4 architecture design didn't
receive appropriate focus.
Info releasability was
poor/limited.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
PLANS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A
Was an issue but
were prepared
LL #1
Problems in possession
/access/reception of all
publications/ documents
related with the
cooperation.
LL #2
No or limited access to LL
data base from recent
exercises/operations due
to releasability issues.
Undetermined/not clear
superior's guidance
/intent.
Poor or no mission
analysis.
Not clarified participation
ambitions and training
expectations.
Not clear C2 structure and
reference doctrinal
material. Not clear
geographical and/or
functional divisions of
responsibilities.
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
LL #6
LL #7
LL #8
B
C
Was an issue and Was not an issue
were not prepared
Limited or no training
timeline.
Limitations/constraints
not included thus
expectations difficult to
be met by participants.
Lack of predefined
common set of TTPs .
215
D
Did not experience
situation
LL #9
Lack of predefined
methods of
distribution/dissemination
of orders and of command
and control authority.(e.g.
OPGEN, OPTASKS e.g.)
LL #10
No exploitation of preexisting documentation
(OPGEN, OPTASKS) for
such type of exercises.
Restrictions on
releasability of
orders/documentation of
the exercise.
Limitations with regards
to operational tempo not
clarified .
Exercise design didn't met
expectations /training
requirements (e.g. lack of
multiple threat scenario).
LL #11
LL #12
LL #13
LL #14
LL #15
LL #16
LL #17
LL #18
LL #19
LL #20
LL #21
LL #22
LL #23
LL #24
Warfare responsibilities
weren't shared among the
participants.
ROE info didn't follow
accepted standards.
All participants ROE
matrixes weren't
available to watch
standers to ensure
understanding of
restraints and constraints.
Limited or misuse of
TABORDS for the serials.
Not included in the Battle
Rhythm, not released
timely, not posted on the
predefined networks.
Problems with the
established Battle
Rhythm. Not enough time
for feedback and analysis
in order to ensure
continuity of
ops/exercise.
No or limited planning to
ensure linear increase of
proficiency and
interoperability by
rotating duties among
Exercise restricted areas,
waterspace management,
environmental restrictions
and safety procedures
above on and below the
surface were not detailed
/clear.
Limited or no face to face
meetings, site visits
/surveys, to ensure clarity
in all exercise aspects.
Pre-exercise
documentation wasn't
received timely or was not
clear.
No use of NATO formats
in order to avoid
releasability issues.
LNOs were assigned late
or had no experience for
decision making, couldn't
be embedded in the
command structure, had
limited or no expertise for
the exercise/ops. They
were not paired with a
designated and
corresponding ship POC.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
216
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
INTEL LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A
B
C
were prepared
were not
prepared
LL #1
LL #2
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
LL #6
LL #7
D
Did not
experience
situation
Foreign disclosure
requirements and guidelines
were not described/cleared.
Poor coordination of
intelligence preparation of
the Battle Space with all
participants. Intelligence
requirements were not clear.
No clear lines of authorities
were promulgated for data
base management
responsibilities, so picture
was not accurate with
regards to red tracks.
Poor coordination of
intelligence warfare
(information system in use ,
means for transferring data ,
info sharing policy , products
sharing e.t.c).
Intelligence gathering
capabilities and limitations
not clear/available to all
participants.
Commanders Intelligence
priorities were not clear.
Enemy COAs were not
produced with coalition
inputs.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
217
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
LL #1
Ships and Aircrafts
capabilities reviews were
not conducted . Unique
capabilities were not clear
and OPSTAT UNIT was not
utilized. Thus gaps and
redundancies were obvious
during the cooperation.
LL #2
Compatibility of various
landing crafts with
participating amphibious
ships was not clear.
LL #3
Comms terminology and
acronym reference were
not defined.
LL #4
Differences in National
Policies, ROEs, and safety
rules were not known from
watch standers .
LL #5
Communication doctrine for
voice and chat circuits was
not established and not
published through OPTASK
COMMS and OPTASK CHAT.
LL #6
Roles /responsibilities
matrix relating names/titles
of each watch stander on
the C2 nets to a common
role was not developed.
LL #7
Lack of list of the primary
national, coalition and
NATO publications that are
used for the
exercise/cooperation.
A
B
C
D
Was an issue but
were prepared
Was an issue and
were not prepared
Was not an issue
Did not
experience
situation
218
LL #8
C2 and Comms procedures
agreed were not briefed.
LL #9
Orders were not sent via
record message traffic no
matter how they were
initially disseminated.
LL #10
Comms /watch standers
limitations were not known
iot allow planning around
them.
LL #11
NSFS fire control
procedures/ terminology
and doctrine was not clear.
LL #12
OPTASKS didn't identify
appropriate C2 circuit for
tactical execution.
LL #13
"Safe to train" requirements
were not clear .
LL #14
Different
tactical/command/organiza
tion expectations e.g.
planning horizons, reports
objectives etc.
LL #15
Lack of voice comms or
inefficient use of voice
comms for overall tactical
C2.
LL #16
Not common use of units
designations and call signs.
LL #17
Different perception on
Warfare Commanders roles
and how these are
performed.
LL #18
Improper use of DIMS (in
terms of time ,info etc).
LL #19
Difficulties in message
traffic (routing indicators,
forwarding, recording , info
etc)
LL #20
Use of non NATO
terminology.
Not proper linkage of LNOs
with Ops watch standers.
LL #21
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
219
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
DATA LINK OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A
B
C
were prepared
were not
prepared
LL #1
LL #2
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
LL #6
D
Did not
experience
situation
Force COP
manager and link
systems
integration
capabilities not
efficient.
FTC's
management
experience in
conjunction with
link systems
integration
capabilities not
taken into
consideration in
planning .
COP cluttered and
capabilities of the
ships not taken
into consideration
for maximum
efficiency. No data
link LNOs
exchanged.
Problematic ID
doctrine , id
criteria , lack or
misuse of OPTASK
ID.
Force track quality
was not
determined for
each unit in order
to avoid dual
tracking.
Problems in use of
crypto material
and frequency
shift plan.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
220
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
SUB OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A
B
C
were prepared
were not
prepared
LL #1
LL #2
D
Did not
experience
situation
Waterspace
management plan
was not clear.
Submarine safety
procedures were
not clear/known to
all participants
/watch standers.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
INFO OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A
B
C
were prepared
were not
prepared
LL #1
LL #2
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
D
Did not
experience
situation
Lack of use of
common
terminilogy and
doctrine for info
ops.
Command and
control
arrangements
/authorities
/responsibilities
were not clear due
to lack of OPTASK
IO or poor data in
it.
IO orgs in the
theatre were not
identified.
IO goals abd
objectives were
not clear.
Force IO policy
was poorly
established.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
221
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
AIR OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A
B
C
were prepared
were not
prepared
LL #1
LL #2
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
LL #6
LL #7
D
Did not
experience
situation
HOSTAC info was
not up to date and
available to all
aviation planners.
Capabilities and
Limitations of
Helos were not
known and
available to all
planners.
No use of
common NATO
aviation
publications and
references.
No primary
network to support
ATO production
was defined.
Use of
DOTAH/FEEDER
for planning and
coordination of
Helo ops was
limited .
No use of ATO
NATO standard
format.
Poorly planned
comms
architecture
decreased the
capability of
sharing AIR
DUTIES (ADC,
REDCROWN etc.)
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
222
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
COMMS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
LL #1
No use of common
primary command
and control
information
network (e.g.
CENTRIX).
LL #2
Primary command
network
parameters were
not clear thus
interoperability
was reduced. (e.g.
enclaves, web
sites, passwords,
etc.)
Crypto
requirements
/availability/
compatibility
problems.
Information
systems plan was
not adequate to
support
operations.
Information
systems accounts
/registration
process were
problematic.
Training for the
use of information
systems was not
adequate to
support
operations.
Available chat
rooms not
adequate to
support
operations.
OPTASK CHAT info
was poor.
No coomms LNOs
between combined
forces iot ensure
continuity of
comms.
LL #3
LL #4
LL #5
LL #6
LL #7
LL #8
LL #9
LL #10
LL #11
LL #12
LL #13
LL #14
LL #15
LL #16
A
B
C
D
Was an issue but
were prepared
Was an issue and
were not
prepared
Was not an issue
Did not
experience
situation
Comms
capabilities and
limitations not
available to all
planners and
watch standers.
No execution of
comms checks
prior to exercise or
serials.
No use of NATO
crypto material.
Misuse of
HAVEQUICK.
Poor exploitation
of Message
Handling Systems.
No common set of
degrees of
confidentiality.
No management
of Maneuvering
nets. NATO
signaling methods
didn't applied.
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
223
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
LOG LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET
LL #1
LL #2
Capabilities and
limitations review
iot identify logistic
infrastructure
/engineering
compatibility was
poor or not
available to all
planners /watch
standers.
LL #4
Locations for
Logistic LNOs and
Forward Logistic
Teams were not
appropriate.
No use of standard
NATO
replenishment
procedures. (e.g.
(ATP-16, OPTASK
RAS etc.).
Shore based
logistic support
planning was not
adequate.
Expeditious
invoicing of
services was not
established.
Mechanism to
obtain approval for
repair services in
US shipyards was
not clear or
defined.
Medical planning
doctrine and
procedures were
not identified.
LL #6
LL #7
LL #8
LL #9
B
C
D
Was an issue and
were not
prepared
Was not an issue
Did not
experience
situation
Common logistics
format and
reporting
procedures were
not identified and
established.
Logistics LNOs and
Forward Logistics
team personnel
was not identified.
LL #3
LL #5
A
Was an issue but
were prepared
TOTAL As
TOTAL Bs
224
TOTAL Cs
TOTAL Ds
METRICS ON LESSONS LEARNED ASSESSMENT SHEET
A+B+C+D=NUMBER OF ALL LL
Sum (SumTotal As+SumTotal Cs)/Sum(SumTotal As+SumTotal Bs+SumTotal Cs)=L<=1
L is the final result.
225

Allied Interoperability Handbook - Combined Joint Operations from

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