weapon system effectiveness for the lav iii life extension program

Transcription

UNCLASSIFIED
WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
FOR THE LAV III LIFE EXTENSION
PROGRAM
CAEn WARGAME NICKEL TIGER
P. Dobias
LFORT
K. Sprague
LFORT
S. Bassindale
LFORT
D. Sinclair
Ajilon
J. Demaine
Ajilon
DRDC CORA TM 2009-038
September 2009
Defence R&D Canada
Centre for Operational Research and Analysis
Land Forces Operational Research Team
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS FOR
THE LAV III LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM
CAEn WARGAME NICKEL TIGER
P. Dobias
LFORT
K. Sprague
LFORT
S. Bassindale
LFORT
D. Sinclair
Ajilon
J. Demaine
Ajilon
DRDC CORA
Technical Memorandum
September 2009
UNCLASSIFIED
Authors
Original signed by
Dr. Peter Dobias & Dr. Kevin Sprague
Approved by
Original signed by
Dr. Dean Haslip
Section Head, Land and Operational Command OR
Approved for release by
Original signed by
Mr. Dale Reding
Chief Scientist DRDC CORA
The information contained herein has been derived and determined through best practice and
adherence to the highest levels of ethical, scientific and engineering investigative principles.
The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein, remain those of
the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of DND
or the Government of Canada.
© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2009
© Sa Majesté la Reine, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2009
Abstract
The Chief of Staff Land Strategy requested that an operational research (OR) study be
conducted to assess the effectiveness of a light remote weapon station (RWS) mounted on a
LAV III, in comparison to the current two-man Delco turret. The Land Forces Operational
Research Team (LFORT) consequently performed a wargame study to compare the
effectiveness of various weapon configurations for the RWS on LAV III vehicles in addition
to the currently used 25 mm cannon (baseline). The assessment was based on a series of
modeled scenarios whereby the vehicles performed convoy protection and patrol operations in
complex urban and open terrains during daylight conditions. The chosen locale allowed for
ambush and chance encounters with insurgent forces to occur. The study was denoted as
NICKEL TIGER. The BLUE force consisted of either a LAV Platoon or Company and in
some cases involved BLUE dismounts. The RED force consisted of dismounts having
machine guns or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at their disposal, in addition to softskinned vehicles and light armoured vehicles having either a medium machine gun (MMG) or
a 30mm cannon as the main weapon. In the study, the following weapon options were
considered for the RWS: a notional 25 mm low velocity (LV) cannon, a 40 mm automatic
grenade launcher (AGL), a .50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG), a 20 mm cannon, a 7.62
mm C6 machine gun, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The wargame results indicate
that the current weapon/turret configuration for the LAV III is the best option overall. The
performances of the 25 mm LV cannon and 40 mm AGL were comparable to the baseline
option in the open terrain scenarios, but they proved less lethal in the urban scenarios, in part
due to their lack of penetrability of structures that were providing cover for dismounted
insurgents. The .50 calibre performance was comparable to the baseline option in the urban
scenarios, but was not as effective in the open terrain scenarios. The 20 mm cannon was
evaluated as an excursion in a single, open terrain scenario. In that scenario, its overall
performance was similar to that of the .50 calibre HMG (beneath baseline, LV 25mm and
40mm AGL options).
i
Résumé
Le Chef d’état-major – Stratégie terrestre a demandé qu’une recherche opérationnelle (RO)
soit effectuée pour évaluer l’efficacité d’un système d’arme télécommandé (SAT) léger monté
sur un VBL III, en comparaison à la tourelle Delco à deux actuelle. L’équipe de recherche
opérationnelle des forces terrestres (EROFT) a par conséquent effectué une étude de jeux de
guerre en vue de comparer l’efficacité de diverses configurations d’armes pour le SAT sur les
véhicules VBL III en plus des canons de 25 mm (de référence) actuellement en utilisation.
L’évaluation était basée sur une série de scénarios modélisés où des véhicules effectuaient de
jour des opérations de protection de convoi et de patrouille sur des terrains urbains et
découverts complexes. L’emplacement choisi permettait des embuscades et des rencontres
aléatoires avec des rebelles. L’étude était appelée NICKEL TIGER. L’équipe des BLEUS
était composée d’un peloton ou d’une compagnie de VBL et, dans certains cas, comportait des
BLEUS à pied. L’équipe des ROUGES était composée de soldats à pied ayant à leur
disposition des mitrailleuses ou des grenades propulsées par fusée (GPF), en plus de véhicules
non blindés et de véhicules blindés légers avec mitrailleuse moyenne (MM) ou un canon de
30 mm comme arme principale. Dans l’étude, on a tenu compte des options d’armes suivantes
pour le SAT : canon de 25 mm faible vitesse (FV), lance-grenades automatique (LGA) de
40 mm, mitrailleuse lourde (ML) de calibre .50, canon de 20 mm, mitrailleuse C6 de 7.62 mm
et missiles guidés antichar (MGA). Les résultats des jeux de guerre indiquent que la
configuration arme/tourelle actuelle pour le VBL III est la meilleure option globale. Les
rendements du canon FV de 25 mm et du LGA de 40 mm étaient comparables à l’option de
référence dans les scénarios en terrain découvert, mais ils étaient moins mortels dans les
scénarios urbains, en partie à cause de leur manque de pénétrabilité des structures qui
protègent les rebelles à pied. Le rendement du calibre .50 était comparable à l’option de
référence dans les scénarios urbains, mais n’était pas aussi efficace dans les scénarios en
terrain découvert. Le canon de 20 mm a été évalué dans une excursion dans un seul scénario
en terrain découvert. Dans ce scénario, son rendement global était semblable à celui de la ML
de calibre .50 (sous les options de référence, de FV de 25 mm et du LGA de 40 mm).
ii
Executive summary
Introduction
The NICKEL TIGER study was conducted by the Land Forces Operational Research Team
(LFORT) at the request of the Chief of Staff Land Strategy to assess how well LAV III
vehicles mounted with a light remote weapon station (RWS) could fulfill their combat roles,
relative to the current configuration for the vehicles consisting of a two-man Delco turret
fitted with a 25 mm stabilized cannon and two C6 machine guns (baseline). LFORT carried
out a wargame to test and compare the effectiveness of various weapon configurations for the
RWS mounted on LAV III vehicles in addition to the currently used baseline. The assessment
was based on three scenarios consisting of the following:
•
Scenario 1: Convoy ambush in urban terrain;
•
Scenario 2: Combat patrol in urban terrain (open market square);
•
Scenario 3: Combat patrol in open terrain.
The BLUE force consisted of a mounted Infantry Platoon in Scenarios 1 and 2 and a
Company in Scenario 3. In Scenario 1, the RED force consisted of dismounts having machine
guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at their disposal. Weapons fire exchanges
typically occurred at close ranges (25 m – 200 m). Scenario 2 was gamed both with and
without BLUE dismounts. Also in Scenario 2, RED dismounts were supported by softskinned vehicles and light armoured vehicles having either a medium machine gun (MMG) or
a 30 mm cannon as the main weapon. Ranges of engagement were medium (400 m to 800 m).
Furthermore, civilians occupied the two urban scenarios (1 and 2) so as to make targeting
more realistic in that the gunner could not assume that every detection was an enemy and
therefore could be fired upon. The civilians typically ran for cover at the onset of the weapons
fire exchanges. Scenario 3 featured BLUE armoured vehicles against a variety of RED
vehicles at long ranges (up to 2000 m, but averaging near 1000 m) in the absence of
dismounts and civilians.
In the study, the following primary weapon options were considered for the RWS:
•
40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL);
•
.50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG);
•
20 mm cannon;
•
7.62 mm C6 machine gun (MG);
•
Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs);
•
25 mm low velocity (LV) cannon.
Differences in situational awareness capability between the baseline LAV III and those fitted
with an RWS were quantified by equipping the RWS variants with inferior sensing capability
in comparison to that of the baseline, reflecting the notion that viewing arcs for an RWS
configuration without an enhanced sensor capability would be restricted in comparison to that
of the two-man turret configuration. Also, the LAV III was modeled as being in a ‘hatches
down’ configuration as it was not possible to represent an exposed crew commander that
iii
could be killed by small arms fire or shrapnel, nor was it possible to model the pintle-mounted
C6 of the LAV III.
Results
According to the quantitative results of the three scenarios gamed and also the judgement and
insights of the wargame interactors, the current weapon and turret configuration of the LAV
III fighting vehicle is the most robust choice overall in comparison to the other options
gamed. However, in most cases the differences in performance between leading and nearleading options, although statistically significant, were not profound. Several RWS options
were comparable to the baseline in some of the scenarios, most notably when fitted with either
an LV 25 mm cannon or 40 mm AGL in more open terrain (Scenarios 2 and 3), and to a lesser
extent the .50 cal HMG in close urban combat (Scenario 1). None of the alternative options
scored consistently high in all three scenarios. Note that the 20 mm cannon cannot enter into
the overall evaluation since it was only present as an excursion in Scenario 3 (where it ranked
second). The LV 25 mm cannon, although a strong contender in Scenarios 2 and 3, performed
poorly in the close-action urban environment of Scenario 1. This seemed to be related to the
insufficient anti-structure capability of the modeled airburst ammunition utilized for this
weapon system which made it difficult to kill insurgents using walls or other structures as
cover. Coupled with the fact that the .50 cal HMG was mid- or bottom-ranked in the open
terrain scenarios when fighting armoured vehicles, and setting all scenarios as equally
important, the wargame results indicate that the best alternative to the current 25mm / C6
weapon system is the 40 mm AGL / C6. This weapon system was top-ranked in Scenarios 2
and 3 alongside the LV 25 mm / C6 option, and ranked third in Scenario 1 above the LV 25
mm / C6 option. AGL use in Scenario 1 had distinctive benefits and drawbacks. On the
positive side, 40 mm airburst rounds were lobbed over structures and made to effectively
impact hidden, dismounted enemies behind walls or on rooftops. On the negative side, the
close-action combat of Scenario 1 was impeded by the arming distance of the 40 mm AGL,
which was set to 36 m in the CAEn database. In this case the co-axial C6 MG was required to
engage proximal targets.
A few caveats must be included at this point to aid the comparison between the 40 mm AGL
and the LV 25 mm Cannon. First, an added consideration in extended range, open terrain
scenarios is that use of the 40 mm AGL may be increasingly problematic at longer ranges
against fast moving targets due to the low velocity and curved trajectory of these rounds, and
consequently their long flight time. Second, lack of a dual feed mechanism for the AGL limits
its flexibility for most RWS systems in comparison to the LV 25 mm Cannon.
Recommendations
From a turret/weapon mix effectiveness perspective, it is recommended that the current
configuration of the LAV III be maintained or improved upon through upgrades.
Also, it is recommended that before any of the RWS options are adopted, that sensing aspects
at all relevant ranges, in simple and complex terrains, be studied more thoroughly in terms of
the differences between synthetic vision and natural vision (eyeballs) when scanning the
environment to acquire targets under realistic restrictions for viewing arcs. In addition, the
nature of the vulnerability of the RWS to small arms fire requires more in-depth study. This
vulnerability must be assessed for any RWS candidate under consideration before a final
acquisition decision is made. Lastly, new developments in 25 mm low velocity ammunition
should be monitored closely, especially programmable airburst munitions (PABM) having
iv
significant penetrating power against structures common to an urban environment (e.g.,
concrete, brick).
P. Dobias, K. Sprague, S. Bassindale, D. Sinclair, J. Demaine, Weapon System
Effectiveness for the LAV III Life Extension Program: CAEn Wargame Nickel Tiger,
v
Sommaire
Introduction
L’étude NICKEL TIGER a été effectuée par l’équipe de recherche opérationnelle des forces
terrestres (EROFT) à la demande du Chef d’état-major – Stratégie terrestre pour évaluer
l’efficacité des véhicules VBL III comportant un système d’arme télécommandé (SAT) léger
à remplir leurs rôles de combat, en rapport à la configuration actuelle des véhicules
comportant une tourelle Delco à deux équipée d’un canon stabilisé de 25 mm et deux
mitrailleuses C6 (de référence). EROFT a effectué un jeu de guerre pour faire l’essai et
comparer l’efficacité de diverses configurations d’armes pour le SAT monté sur les véhicules
VBL III, en plus de la référence actuellement utilisée. L’évaluation était basée sur trois
scénarios sous forme de ce qui suit :
•
Scénario 1 : Embuscade de convoi en terrain urbain;
•
Scénario 2 : Patrouille de combat en terrain urbain (place de marché découvert);
•
Scénario 3 : Patrouille de combat en terrain découvert.
L’équipe des BLEUS était composée d’un peloton d’infanterie portée dans les scénarios 1 et 2
et d’une compagnie dans le scénario 3. Dans le scénario 1, l’équipe des ROUGES était
composée de soldats à pied ayant à leur disposition des mitrailleuses et des grenades
propulsée par fusée (GPF). Des échanges de tirs se sont produits typiquement à courtes
distances (de 25 m à 200 m). Le scénario 2 s’est déroulé à la fois avec et sans les soldats de
l’équipe des BLEUS à pied. Également dans le scénario 2, les soldats de l’équipe des
ROUGES à pied étaient appuyés de véhicules non blindés et de véhicules blindés légers
comportant une mitrailleuse moyenne (MM) ou un canon de 30 mm comme arme principale.
Les distances d’engagement étaient moyennes (de 400 m à 800 m). De plus, des civils
faisaient partie des deux scénarios urbains (1 et 2) de façon à rendre le choix des objectifs plus
réaliste puisque le canonnier ne pouvait pas tenir pour acquis que chaque détection était un
ennemi et pouvait par conséquent servir de cible. Les civils couraient se cacher dès le début
des échanges de tirs. Le scénario 3 opposait des véhicules blindés des BLEUS à divers
véhicules des ROUGES à de longues distances (jusqu’à 2 000 m, mais en moyenne près de
1 000 m) en l’absence de soldats à pied et de civils.
Dans l’étude, on a tenu compte des options d’armes principales suivantes pour le SAT :
•
lance-grenades automatique (LGA) de 40 mm;
•
mitrailleuse lourde (ML) de calibre .50;
•
canon de 20 mm;
•
mitrailleuse (M) C6 de 7.62 mm;
•
missiles guidés antichar (MGA);
•
canon faible vitesse (FV) de 25 mm.
Les différences dans la capacité de connaissance de la situation entre les VBL III de référence
et ceux équipés du SAT ont été quantifiées en équipant les versions du SAT d’une capacité de
détection inférieure en comparaison à celle des véhicules de référence, ce qui permettait de
tenir compte de la notion que les arcs d’observation pour la configuration du SAT sans
vi
capacité de détection améliorée seraient restreints en comparaison à celle de la configuration
de tourelle à deux. De plus, le VBL III a été modélisé comme étant dans une configuration à
« trappes baissées », car il n’était pas possible de représenter un chef d’équipage à découvert
pouvant être tué par le tir aux armes légères ou le shrapnel, et il n’était pas possible de
modéliser le C6 sur pivot du VBL III.
Résultats
Selon les résultats quantitatifs des trois scénarios des jeux de guerre et également selon le
jugement et les connaissances des interacteurs des jeux de guerre, la configuration actuelle
d’arme et de tourelle du véhicule de combat VBL III est dans l’ensemble le choix le plus
solide en comparaison aux autres options évaluées. Toutefois, dans la plupart des cas, les
différences de rendement entre les meilleures options et les options classées tout près, même
si statistiquement significatives, n’étaient pas profondes. Plusieurs options SAT étaient
comparables à l’option de référence dans certains des scénarios, particulièrement lorsque
équipé d’un canon FV de 25 mm ou d’un LGA de 40 mm sur terrain plus découvert (scénarios
2 et 3) et, à un moindre degré, la ML de calibre .50 en combat au contact urbain (scénario 1).
Aucune des options de rechange n’a obtenu de bons résultats de façon constante dans les trois
scénarios. Remarquez que le canon de 20 mm ne peut pas faire partie de l’évaluation
d’ensemble puisqu’il n’était présent que comme excursion dna sle scénario 3 (où il s’est
classé deuxième). Le canon FV de 25 mm, même s’il était un aspirant sérieux dans les
scénarios 2 et 3, a eut un mauvais rendement dans l’environnement de combat au contact
urbain du scénario 1. Ceci semblait être relié à une capacité anti-structure insuffisante des
munitions modélisées à éclatement aérien utilisées pour ce système d’arme qui rendait
difficile la neutralisation des rebelles cachés derrière des murs ou d’autres structures. Ajouté
au fait que la ML de calibre .50 s’est classée au milieu ou à la fin du peleton dans les
scénarios en terrain découvert pour les combats contre des véhicules blindés, et en établissant
tous les scénarios comme également importants, les résultats des jeux de guerre indiquent que
la meilleure solution au système d’armes 25 mm / C6 actuel est le LGA de 40 mm / C6. Ce
système d’arme s’est placé dans les scénarios 2 et 3 avec l’option FV 25 mm / C6, et s’est
classé troisième dans le scénario 1 avant l’option FV 25 mm / C6. L’utilisation du LGA dans
le scénario 1 avait de nets avantages et inconvénients. Du côté positif, des obus à éclatement
aérien de 40 mm ont été projetés par dessus des structures et ont eut un impact efficace sur des
enemis à pied cachés derrière des murs ou sur des toits. Du côté négatif, le combat rapproché
du scénario 1 a été entravé par la distance d’armement du LGA de 40 mm, qui était réglée à
36 m dans la base de données CAEn. Dans ce cas, la M co-axiale C6 devait engager des cibles
proximales.
Quelques mises en garde doivent maintenant être présentées pour aider à la comparaison entre
le LGA de 40 mm et le canon FV de 25 mm. Premièrement, une autre considération pour
grande distance, les scénarios en terrain découvert qui utilisent le LGA de 40 mm peuvent être
de plus en plus problématiques à de plus grandes distances contre des cibles mobiles rapides à
cause de la faible vitesse et de la trajectoire courbe de ces obus et, par conséquent, leur long
temps de vol. Deuxièment, l’absence d’un mécanisme à alimentation double pour le LGA
limite ses possibilités pour la plupart des systèmes SAT en comparaison au canon FV de
25 mm.
Recommandations
D’une perspective d’efficacité tourelle/arme, on recommande que la configuration actuelle du
VBL III soit gardée ou améliorée par des mises à niveau.
vii
On recommande également qu’avant d’adopter quelconque option SAT, d’étudier plus
profondément les aspects de détection à toutes les distances pertinentes, en terrains simples et
complexes, afin d’évaluer les différences entre la vision synthétique et la vision naturelle
(yeux) lorsqu’on balaie l’environnement pour acquérir les objectifs en restrictions réalistes
pour les arcs d’observation. De plus, la nature de la vulnérabilité du SAT au tir aux armes
légères exige une étude plus profonde. Cette vulnérabilité doit être évaluée pour tout candidat
SAT à l’étude avant d’effectuer toute décision finale en matière d'acquisitions. Finalement, les
derniers progrès des munitions à faible vitesse de 25 mm doivent être examinés de près, en
particulier les munitions à éclatement aérien programmables (MEAP) ayant une puissance de
pénétration importante contre les structures habituelles d’un environnement urbain (par ex., le
béton, la brique).
P. Dobias, K. Sprague, S. Bassindale, D. Sinclair, J. Demaine, Weapon System
Effectiveness for the LAV III Life Extension Program: CAEn Wargame Nickel Tiger,
viii
This page intentionally left blank.
ix
Table of contents
Abstract........................................................................................................................................ i
Résumé ....................................................................................................................................... ii
Executive summary ................................................................................................................... iii
Sommaire................................................................................................................................... vi
Table of contents ........................................................................................................................ x
List of figures .......................................................................................................................... xiii
List of tables ............................................................................................................................ xiv
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. xv
1.
2.
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
1.1.
Background ...................................................................................................... 1
1.2.
Aim................................................................................................................... 2
1.3.
Objectives......................................................................................................... 2
1.4.
Scope ................................................................................................................ 2
Methodology.................................................................................................................. 6
2.1.
x
Tools................................................................................................................. 6
2.1.1.
CAEn................................................................................................... 6
2.1.2.
Database Verification and Validation ................................................. 7
2.1.3.
Modeling vehicles in CAEn ................................................................ 7
2.1.4.
Modeling the two-man turret vs. RWS ............................................... 8
2.1.5.
Modeling anti-armour weapon systems .............................................. 8
2.1.6.
Other weapon systems......................................................................... 9
2.2.
Wargame interactors......................................................................................... 9
2.3.
Analysis ............................................................................................................ 9
2.3.1.
Statistical analysis ............................................................................... 9
2.3.2.
Ranking options ................................................................................ 10
3.
Scenario 1: convoy ambush, urban terrain .................................................................. 13
3.1.
3.2.
4.
Scenario description and setting..................................................................... 13
3.1.1.
General setting .................................................................................. 13
3.1.2.
Terrain............................................................................................... 13
3.1.3.
Forces ................................................................................................ 14
3.1.4.
Blue plan ........................................................................................... 15
3.1.5.
Red plan ............................................................................................ 15
3.1.6.
Games and replications ..................................................................... 16
3.1.7.
Measures of effectiveness ................................................................. 16
3.1.8.
Relative importance of MOEs........................................................... 17
3.1.9.
Measures of performance .................................................................. 17
Results for Scenario 1..................................................................................... 18
3.2.1.
Game history ..................................................................................... 18
3.2.2.
Qualitative: military judgements and insights................................... 18
3.2.3.
Quantitative results for Scenario 1 .................................................... 19
3.3.
Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1 ................................................................. 20
3.4.
Summary of Scenario 1 findings .................................................................... 22
Scenario 2: combat patrol, urban terrain ..................................................................... 24
4.1.
4.2.
4.1.1.
General setting .................................................................................. 24
4.1.2.
Terrain............................................................................................... 25
4.1.3.
Forces ................................................................................................ 25
4.1.4.
Blue plan ........................................................................................... 27
4.1.5.
Red plan ............................................................................................ 27
4.1.6.
4.1.7.
4.1.8.
4.1.9.
4.2.1.
Game history ..................................................................................... 29
4.2.2.
4.2.3.
xi
5.
4.3.
4.4.
Scenario 3: combat patrol, open terrain....................................................................... 36
5.1.
5.2.
6.
7.
5.1.1.
General setting .................................................................................. 36
5.1.2.
Terrain............................................................................................... 37
5.1.3.
Forces ................................................................................................ 37
5.1.4.
Blue plan ........................................................................................... 39
5.1.5.
Red plan ............................................................................................ 39
5.1.6.
5.1.7.
5.1.8.
5.1.9.
5.2.1.
Game history ..................................................................................... 41
5.2.2.
5.2.3.
5.3.
5.4.
Summary and recommendations ................................................................................. 46
6.1.
Summary ........................................................................................................ 46
6.2.
Recommendations .......................................................................................... 48
References ................................................................................................................... 51
List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms .................................................................................. 53
Distribution List........................................................................................................................ 55
xii
List of figures
Figure 1. Terrain layout for Scenario 1. The grid spacing is 100 m......................................... 14
Figure 2. Force dispositions for Scenario 1.............................................................................. 15
Figure 3. Terrain layout for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100 m......................................... 25
Figure 4. BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100 m. ...... 26
Figure 5. Terrain layout for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000 m....................................... 37
Figure 6. BLUE Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000m........................ 38
Figure 7. RED Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000 m. ........................ 39
xiii
List of tables
Table 1. Weapon System/Station Options ................................................................................ 10
Table 2. Scenario 1 Options ..................................................................................................... 13
Table 3. MOE Weights for Scenario 1. .................................................................................... 17
Table 4. MOE Results for Scenario 1....................................................................................... 19
Table 5. MOP Results for Scenario 1. ...................................................................................... 20
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1.............................................................................. 21
Table 7. Scenario 2 Options ..................................................................................................... 24
Table 8. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 2........................................................... 28
Table 9. MOE Weights for Scenario 2. .................................................................................... 29
Table 10. MOE Results for Scenario 2..................................................................................... 31
Table 11. MOP Results for Scenario 2. .................................................................................... 32
Table 12. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 2. ......................................................................... 33
Table 13. Scenario 3 Options ................................................................................................... 36
Table 14. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 3......................................................... 40
Table 15. MOE Weights for Scenario 3. .................................................................................. 41
Table 16. MOE Results for Scenario 3..................................................................................... 42
Table 17. MOP Results for Scenario 3. .................................................................................... 43
Table 18. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 3. ......................................................................... 44
Table 19. Rank Category Tally for Main Weapons Common to All Scenarios. ...................... 46
xiv
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to recognize the contributions made by reviewers of this report over
the multitude of iterations that preceded this final version.
xv
xvi
1. Introduction
1.1.
Background
Currently, the Canadian Forces relies on the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III in support of
infantry operations. The LAV III in its present configuration is equipped with the two-man
Delco turret armed with a 25 mm stabilized cannon. This configuration provides sufficient
versatility for a wide range of missions—from combat operations, through convoy force
protection, to peacekeeping. Nevertheless, it has been proposed that the current turret be
replaced with a light remote weapon station (RWS) for at least a part of the LAV III fleet.
One of the primary differences of making such a change is that the vehicle would be forced to
operate under reduced situational awareness (SA)—arcs of observation from vehicle body
hatches would be limited since the hatches would no longer be above the weapon station, and
episcopes would be more obstructed. Crew members (particularly the gunner) would spend
more time in the protected hull of the vehicle or with limited exposure, while still being able
to acquire targets and engage them via remote control of the weapons station. This has the
obvious benefit of providing more shielding to crew members from small arms fire, shrapnel,
improvised incendiary weapons (e.g., Molotov cocktails) and other such threats. However, it
comes at the expense of losing the SA benefits of having two crew members above the turret
scanning the environment. In addition, significant fire inhibit zones would be required to
protect crew members from their own vehicle weapon systems while observing the
environment through a hatch at lower elevation than the weapon station. Other possible
benefits of moving to a light RWS include apparent space and weight savings, however, the
extent of the savings are currently under investigation [1]. Any weight saved could be utilized
to add more body armour (under-armour especially) or free up carrying capacity for additional
equipment. On the downside, the RWS is not as heavily armoured as the two-man turret and
furthermore only supports less massive, lower recoil weapons in comparison to the 25 mm
cannon employed by the LAV III. The former point exposes the RWS to higher incidence of
firepower kills and the latter relates to the subject of this paper, that being to determine if a
combination of RWS-mounted weapons, supported by synthetic vision sensors only, can still
permit the LAV III to fulfill its varied combat roles.
An operational research (OR) study was requested in July 2008 by the Chief of Staff Land
Strategy to assess the effectiveness of various light RWS configurations. A part of the
analysis was performed by the Land Capability Development OR Team (LCDORT), with the
wargaming portion falling to the Land Forces Operational Research Team (LFORT).
Concurrently, LFORT was asked by the Director of Land Requirements 3 (DLR 3) to perform
a study to assess the effectiveness of the RWS mounted on a newly proposed Tactical
Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV), and compare it to the current reconnaissance vehicle
(Coyote), which is equipped with the same two-man turret as the LAV III. This analysis,
designated as NICKEL SCORPION, began in the fall of 2008 and will both draw on and
supplement the results of this study.
Therefore, LFORT performed a wargame study assessing the effectiveness of several possible
weapon configurations on the RWS for the LAV III and comparing them to the effectiveness
of the currently used 25 mm cannon. This study was designated NICKEL TIGER.
1
1.2.
Aim
The aim of this study is to compare the effectiveness of the current LAV III 25 mm cannon /
two-man turret with a set of possible main weapons fixed to a light RWS (~200-300 kg)
against mounted and dismounted targets in complex urban and open terrains.
1.3.
Objectives
The objective of the study is as follows:
•
1.4.
To aid in the determination of whether or not a light RWS fitted with one or more of
the available weapon options can effectively fulfill/replace the role of the 25 mm
cannon / two-man turret on a LAV III in a number of different scenarios against a
variety of mounted and dismounted targets in urban and rural terrain.
Scope
The scope of the study was as follows:
2
•
This project was based on the results of two scenarios gamed at the Platoon level and
one scenario at the Company level. The two Platoon level scenarios included a
convoy operation in urban terrain and a combat patrol in urban terrain. These two
scenarios allowed for short to medium range engagements (up to 800 m). The
Company level scenario considered a combat patrol in open terrain, which allowed
for long range engagements (up to 2000 m);
•
Each scenario utilized a slightly different set of weapon options. Due to this fact, the
specific options utilized for each scenario are reported in that specific section of this
report;
•
Due to time constraints, the sensing differences between the two-man turret and RWS
were modeled in a granular fashion based on the notion that SA for the RWS vehicle
would be limited in comparison to that of the two-man turret baseline (see Section
2.1.3). Also, the LAV III was modeled as being in a ‘hatches down’ configuration as
it was not possible to represent an exposed crew commander that could be killed by
small arms fire, nor was it possible to model the pintle-mounted C6 of the LAV III;
•
The RED Force included dismounts, soft-skinned vehicles and lightly armoured
vehicles (armoured personnel carriers (APCs)) such as the Russian BTR-60 and
BRDM. Not all RED units were present in all scenarios; and
•
The Close Action Environment (CAEn) software system was used as the wargaming
tool for modeling the scenario. A brief description of CAEn appears later in this
document.
The following additional assumptions have been made for this study:
A1. External support, such as close air, indirect fire or direct fire, was not modeled;
A2. The composition of the RED Force remained constant for each individual scenario;
A3. Each BLUE vehicle variant remained constant for each individual scenario;
A4. Since no single RWS was under investigation1, the only differences in the vehicles
modeled were the sensing capability (as noted above) and the weapons mounted on the
RWS. In particular, for lack of detailed data, the chance of a firepower kill was the same
for both vehicles.
A5. Sensors could not be destroyed by small arms fire as the software does not permit
sensor kills. Thus sensors performed properly until the host vehicle was killed.
A6. Differences in weapon reload times that would likely exist between RWS and nonRWS weapon mountings were not modeled2. Since the scenarios are of short duration, it
was expected that reload times would not significantly contribute to the final results.
Furthermore, since no particular RWS was under study and the vehicle configuration and
weapon loading mechanisms were not fixed (e.g., under armour reloading3 vs.
ammunition box(es) mounted on top of the vehicle), reliable data for this aspect was not
attainable.
A7. With the exception of the anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), all weapons were
provided with more ammunition than they were expected to require. In part, this was due
to not fixing the particular RWS under investigation or the ammunition feed/storage
mechanisms. Also, it allowed the vehicle and weapon system files to remain constant
from one scenario to the next.
A8. It was assumed that airburst ammunition rounds would not damage buildings and
walls within the urban scenarios, which were of concrete/brick construction. Other rounds
had varying degrees of affects on such structures.
1
At project inception, it was desired that the RWS not be specified (i.e., make, model, etc.) since
procurement options were open and there were many potential contenders.
2
The wargame software does not directly model single feed versus dual feed mechanisms for weapons.
If two types of ammunition are available, either can be loaded and fired, subject to a reload penalty
time for switching ammunition types. The reload penalty also applies when replenishing an unloaded
(empty) weapon. This was not adjusted to take into account the configuration of the RWS and
additional time it may take to reload the weapon. This assumption impacts Scenario 2 (Section 4),
wherein BLUE engaged both mounted and dismounted RED forces using the RWS. The weapon most
impacted is the 40mm AGL, since to the knowledge of the authors, dual feed 40mm AGLs are not
available. Dual feed mechanisms are available for LV25mm-type weapons (e.g., the ATK Light Weight
25mm [2]), .50 calibre machine guns (e.g., the ATK .50 calibre Bushmaster [2]), and of course the
baseline 25mm cannon. All other weapons considered only utilized one variety of ammunition.
3
As per, for example, the Oto Melara Hitrole RWS
(http://www.otomelara.it/OtoMelara/EN/Business/Land/Hitrol/index.sdo).
3
A9. The following ammunition loads and burst rates were used in the CAEn wargame for
each weapon system:
a. 25 mm Cannon: 105 rounds (rds) high-explosive incendiary tracer (HEIT), 105
rds armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot - tracer (APFSDS-T), burst
rate of 3 rds (load capacity 160 rds) 4, 5;
b. C6: load of 1740 rds, burst rate of 4 rds (load capacity 220 rds)6;
c. .50 calibre (cal): load of 300 rds Standard (Std), 300 rds AP, burst rate of 7 rds
(load capacity 220 rds);
d. 40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL): 300 rds high-explosive dual purpose –
armour piercing (HEDP-AP) at a burst rate of 1 round , 200 rds Std at a burst rate
of 3 rds (load capacity 48 rds);
e. 20 mm Cannon: 200 rds armour-piercing discarding sabot (APDS), burst rate of 3
rds (load capacity 100 rds); and
f.
Anti-tank guided missile (ATGM): 2 rds;
g. Low velocity (LV) 25 mm Cannon: load of 210 rds air burst (AB), 105 rds
armour-piercing (AP), burst rate of 3 rds (load capacity 160 rds).
A10. The AGL was modeled as the Stryker AGL (Mk 19) and the ATGM was modeled as
the Javelin. The LV 25 mm cannon was notional and modeled as a less-lethal version of
the 25 mm cannon (similar in terminal effects to expectations of a Lightweight (LW)
25mm cannon), but having greater lethality against vehicles than the 20 mm cannon and
also the .50 cal HMG7. The 20 mm cannon was modeled as the 20 M 621.
4
A load of 210 rounds (rds) armour-piercing discarding sabot tracer (APDS-T) was also available for
the 25 mm cannon, but was not used in any of the scenarios.
5
The real LAV III has a 150 round bin and a 60 round bin with the ability to switch between them
(dual feed). The standard load is 150 rds APDS-T and 60 rds HEIT or vice versa. The modeled LAV III
carries a balanced load of 105 rds each of HEIT and APFSDS-T ready ammunition to maintain a
constant configuration when transitioning from scenarios against vehicles to those against dismounts.
6
The standard load for the LAV III co-axial 7.62mm machine gun is 440 rounds.
7
The effects of the modeled AP round against armoured vehicles are also in line with expectations of
LW 25 mm HEDP ammunition, at time of writing. Detailed ballistics and terminal effects were not
available for this weapon which was under development at the time of the study.
4
5
2. Methodology
2.1.
Tools
For the conduct of this study a combat modeling tool, CAEn, was used for modeling the
scenarios. The generated effectiveness data was organized using the Post-game Analysis Tool
(PGAT) [3], and analyzed using Microsoft Excel.
2.1.1. CAEn
CAEn [4] is a close-combat interactive wargame that allows human interactors to play out
conflict scenarios by controlling synthetic representations of military equipment on a
synthetic battlefield. It is also capable of producing numerous non-interactive ‘replications’ of
a scenario previously gamed by the interactors. It is a multi-sided, multi-layered model that
simulates combat systems and the environment at the tactical level. CAEn is a versatile tool
for simulating ground combat mostly at the individual soldier, section and platoon levels and
is capable of modeling many of the factors that influence the mission outcome. The
interactors are wargame players that have military experience appropriate for the study at
hand. They control the movement of forces and react to detections and engagements by
interacting with the computer, each through a personal computer screen, keyboard, and
mouse. The screens provide each player with a two-dimensional, map-like overhead view of
the battlefield and representations of various “sensor-eye” viewing as applicable (see
illustrations in Section 3.1, for instance). In the overhead view, icons represent the forces
involved and an array of menus allows the user to control his/her icons. The probability of
each system detecting and killing other systems must be accurately defined in the CAEn
database (see Section 2.1.2, below). The replications are created by re-running the interactive
game under a regeneration of the random chance events (e.g., ‘re-rolling the dice’ for
detection, hit and kill probabilities). CAEn’s replication capability allows the analyst to
generate large amounts of data for subsequent analysis.
CAEn results, like those of any wargame/simulation, are affected by the assumptions and
modeling techniques used by the model’s developers. For example, the user interacts with a
graphical screen that provides perfect SA of the players’ own forces. Therefore, it may be
necessary to input external controls, such as start times for activities to account for
communication delays, on those users who would not normally have access to battlefield
management systems which allow commanders near-perfect command and control
capabilities. Human factors such as training, morale, fatigue, fear and aiming error are not
explicitly modeled. Consequently, weapon systems perform at their theoretical maximum
rather than at their operational norm. These and other modeling limitations/anomalies do not
diminish the CAEn output credibility, but require consideration when evaluating results.
CAEn, while unable to provide definitive absolute outcomes for particular battles, is a
powerful tool for supporting analyses of a wide range of options, such as operational impact
assessment, and including the effectiveness of combat systems, technology alternatives, force
structure alternatives and the development and validation of new and current Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for different operations like conventional warfare,
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in urban and rural environments.
The study was conducted using CAEnXP Version 9.3.0.11 and DRDC CORA’s unclassified
CAEn database. The parameters of the weapon systems that were used were defined in
conjunction with the subject-matter experts (military staff and interactors).
6
2.1.2. Database Verification and Validation
The Canadian CAEn database maintains representations of the various units in a wargame
including vehicles, weapon systems, dismounted soldiers, and sensors. The units within the
database were originally derived from JANUS, a previous wargaming system and predecessor
of JCATS. Subject-matter experts (SMEs) (military, defense scientists, interactors) typically
provide the data to fill in the CAEn system unit templates. In cases where hard data was not
obtainable, military judgment was used. The SMEs test the system effects to confirm that they
are in line with performance expectations. Wargaming activities do not commence until
confidence is obtained for the modeled entities and their interactions. Methods of testing vary
from study to study. To date, references for most units in the database are catalogued,
however, in most cases the methods of data transfer, assumptions made and test results
gathered have not been formally recorded and are generally not traceable.
2.1.3. Modeling vehicles in CAEn
Vehicles in CAEn are modeled using the following parameters: acceleration, speed, size,
number of sensors, types of sensors, types of weapons, types of ammunition, and a type of
vehicle (e.g., tracked, wheeled, up-armoured). For NICKEL TIGER, all of the required
information was gathered from Jane’s [5]. The base vehicles used in the wargame are
described in the CAEn database documentation and are indexed as follows [6]:
•
LAV III is Unit 26;
•
BMP-2 (OPFORCE) is Unit 59;
•
BRDM (OPFORCE) is Unit 68;
•
BTR-60 (OPFORCE) is a modified Unit 55 (BTR-70) possessing lighter armour.
Of all the enemy systems, the BLUE vehicles (LAV III) were only vulnerable to the RPG’s
fired by dismounts and the 30 mm cannon mounted on the BMP-2.
The base LAV III vehicle in the CAEn database (Unit 26) was modified as specified below in
order to capture the proposed differences between the baseline LAV III and the RWS variants.
Time constraints did not allow for a detailed sensor model to be developed. Differences in
SA were quantified by equipping the RWS variants with inferior sensing capability in
comparison to that of the two-man turret configuration. The justification follows. In a ‘hatches
down’ configuration (i.e., no possibility for natural vision scanning), episcopes in the baseline
LAV III would be higher and less restricted in view than they would be with an RWS
configuration—in the latter case they would be mounted on the vehicle body and obscured by
the weapon station itself. In the former case the episcopes stem from the turret. In a ‘hatches
up’ mode under an RWS configuration, natural vision scanning also would be impeded by the
RWS equipment, whereas the view in the baseline configuration would not be so obstructed.
Consequently, to capture these differences in a coarse manner, the RWS version was modeled
as having a weapon sight only. This weapon sensor was kept constant for all weapon
configurations, including the baseline. The 2-man turret (baseline) version was modeled as
having an additional sensor compared to the RWS. This sensor simulated a 360 degree, topof-vehicle view (called the ‘eyeball’ sight). No other sensors were utilized.
The sensing differences are best likened to the vehicles being in a ‘hatches down’
configuration (both RWS and baseline options), since it was not possible to represent an
exposed crew commander of the baseline LAV III that could be killed by small arms fire or
shrapnel.
7
The sensors used in Nickel Tiger on the BLUE side were:
•
Eyeball: max dist. 1000 m, magnification x 1, Field of View (FOV) 1.047 radians8,
eyepiece diameter 0.040 m; and
•
Optical 25mm sight, narrow field of view (NFOV): max dist. 5000m, magnification
x7, FOV azimuth (AZ) 0.072 radians, FOV elevation (EL) 0.029 radians, eyepiece
diameter 0.039 m.
The weapons and ammunition selected by the unit are designated in the ammunition target
files. The unit will automatically select the default weapon. The interactor can override the
automatic selection during a wargame if he or she so chooses.
2.1.4. Modeling the two-man turret vs. RWS
There were two differences assumed between the turret and the RWS—one was the weapon
systems, and the second difference was the sensors, as discussed above in Section 2.1.3. The
turret was modeled as having a top-mounted, 360 degree view sensor.
2.1.5. Modeling anti-armour weapon systems
The anti-armour (AA) weapons are modeled based on the information provided in Jane’s [5].
The considered parameters include the minimum and maximum range, velocity of a round,
time of flight, and armour penetration. BLUE weapons in the study having anti-armour
capability are as follows: 25 mm cannon, LV 25 mm cannon, 20 mm cannon, .50 calibre
HMG, 40 mm AGL and ATGM. It must be noted that the LV 25mm was not available in
Jane’s, and was modeled based mainly on projections of its capabilities relative to other
weapon systems. Specifically, as mentioned in Section 1.4 (Assumption A10.), it was
assumed that the LV 25 mm would have greater lethality against armoured vehicles than the
20 mm cannon or .50 calibre HMG, but less lethality than the 25mm cannon.
The accuracy and destructive power of AA weapons (e.g., a weapon firing armour-piercing
rounds) is represented by tabulated values located in the CAEn single-shot kill probability
(SSKP) file. The SSKP file is used to determine if a round has struck the target and the
consequent damages. The possibilities include: no damage, mobility kill, firepower kill,
combined mobility and firepower kill, and catastrophic kill. In the damage determination the
angle of strike, the natural cover of the vehicle, movement of vehicle and shooter, thickness of
armour, and explosive reactive armour (ERA) or other add-ons are considered.
High-explosive (HE) weapons are generally not modeled against armoured targets, but rather
against dismounted soldiers. To enable modeling IEDs, an HE weapon with anti-armour
capabilities was added to the database.
AA weapons can also be used against structures. The penetrating power of the round, in
conjunction with its HE power, is weighed against the relative strength of walls. The relative
strength can be adjusted to represent the material and quality of the wall. If the round is
sufficiently powerful to knock down or punch a hole through a wall, it will. Depending on the
calibre, it might require more than one round. For example, bunker buster rounds have been
designed and added to the CAEn database [7]. These rounds can quite easily knock down
8
Although a typical FOV for a person is approximately 160 degrees, 60 degrees was chosen to
represent that part of the FOV concentrated on for scanning purposes and which is non-peripheral.
8
walls and entire buildings if enough rounds are used. A limitation of CAEn is that the
smallest hole it is able to represent is one square meter. Thus, even holes created by small
calibre rounds are at least one meter square. The limitation leads to an over estimation of the
effect of the .50 calibre HMG within the urban settings of this study (Scenario 1 (Section 3)
and, to a lesser extent, Scenario 2 (Section 4)).
2.1.6. Other weapon systems
A number of small arms were considered in the modeled scenarios. Dismounted BLUE forces
used the C7A1, C8 and C9 light machine guns (5.56 mm), as well as the Carl Gustaf antiarmour weapon. RED employed the AK47, PKM, and the RPG 16. These simulated weapons
rely on parameters from the standard Canadian CAEn database.
The effects of small arms on personnel are modeled using the CAEn body armour file. If a
bullet is aimed and fired at a dismounted unit the aiming errors, velocity, and time of flight
are weighed against the size, cover, speed, and body armour of the target unit. The round will
either hit and kill, miss entirely, or hit and be rendered ineffective by the unit’s body armour.
2.2.
Wargame interactors
The CAEn wargame interactors are involved in scenario design, unit design, and they also
play out the various sides in a wargame by controlling the CAEn units over a two-dimensional
(2-D) plan view of the battlefield with the additional option of viewing limited scenes in three
dimensions (3-D). Two or three wargame interactors were utilized, depending on the scenario.
At minimum, one BLUE player and one RED player commanded friendly and opposition
forces respectively. In the urban scenarios, a third interactor controlled the movements of
civilians. The interactors for the study have had military combat experience, in addition to
varying levels of experience with the two-man turret and RWS configurations.
2.3.
Analysis
The results of the study are dependent upon the assumptions made for the sensor and weapon
capabilities. No human factor considerations were available at the time of this study, therefore
assumptions needed to be made with respect to target acquisition timing for both the RWS
and the turret. This has to be kept in mind when considering the results of this study.
There are two types of results presented in this study:
Qualitative Results. Qualitative results were based on Military Judgments and Insights (J&I).
They are the opinions of the wargame interactors gathered during and after the gaming, and
should be considered in relation to the quantitative results and analysis. The results of J&I are
based on careful synthesis of players’ observations during wargaming combined with
individual expertise and background. J&I are supported by quantitative analysis where
possible.
Quantitative Results. Each interactive game was replayed twenty (20) times using the
automated CAEn replicator. Quantitative results are based on the statistical analysis of
specific measures of effectiveness (MOEs) extracted from the CAEn replication output files.
2.3.1. Statistical analysis
The results for the individual measures (MOEs) are presented as mean (average) values
together with 95% confidence intervals [8] and are reported for each option. For a given
9
option, the MOEs were combined to obtain final scores for the analyzed options. These final
scores are also presented as mean values together with 95% confidence intervals. The options
were ranked using a software tool called ‘Breakpoint Analysis with Nonparametric Data
Option’ (BRANDO) [9]. BRANDO employs statistical significance testing and analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to determine how options should be grouped together and also how the
groups should be sorted from best to worst. A group constitutes an equivalence class in the
sense that the mean values of options within the group are considered not to be significantly
different from one another. However, members of one group are considered to be significantly
different from members of other groups. This allows one to both group and rank the options.
2.3.2. Ranking options
The various turret and weapon system combinations evaluated through wargaming are listed
in Table 1. Options combining a C6 with another weapon had the C6 mounted co-axially.
The options were measured and ranked based on their performance in some or all of three
distinct scenarios. For brevity, the options are assigned call signs.
Table 1. Weapon System/Station Options
Option Call Sign
Station
Weapons
Scenarios
Baseline
Two-man Turret
25 mm cannon + C6
1, 2 and 3
LV25mm/C6
RWS
LV 25 mm cannon + C6
1, 2 and 3
HMG/C6
RWS
.50 cal + C6
1, 2 and 3
AGL/C6
RWS
40 mm AGL + C6
1, 2 and 3
HMG
RWS
.50 cal
1, 2 and 3
C6
RWS
C6
1 and 2
20mm
RWS
20mm cannon
3
ATGM
RWS
ATGM
3
For option ranking, an absolute scale was devised for each MOE to minimize rank-switching
in case one or more options happened to be removed from consideration in the post-analysis
stage9 [10]. Scores for a given MOE were percentage-based and ranged between zero (0) and
one hundred (100), with 100 being the most favourable for BLUE. This scoring system was
common for all measures in a given scenario to enable consistent comparisons across them.
The detailed option scoring tables were scenario dependent, and are shown in Sections 3.2.3,
4.2.3 and 5.2.3. In the end, the options were scored based on a numerically computed
weighted sum of the individual MOEs to obtain the final weighted scores (and ranks) of the
considered options, or aggregate MOE scores. In general, the higher an option’s score, the
higher its rank, although high variance and/or close mean score values can obscure option
distinctiveness.
9
To reiterate, the scales used to score MOEs did not depend on the data collected. For instance, the
highest MOE value was NOT assigned a rank of 100% and then used to scale other values relative to
that maximum.
10
As indicated in Section 2.3.1, the ranking of the options was categorical and was based on
significance testing to determine equivalence classes via BRANDO [9].
Rank categories for options were determined as follows:
1. The options were sorted from best to worst, based primarily on the mean value of the
weighted sum of MOEs for a given option (as per the software BRANDO). That is,
the weighted sum of the individual MOEs determined the rank category of an option;
2. BRANDO was used to determine how to group the options. This does not change the
order of the options in step 1, it merely separates them into statistically ‘equivalent’
groups (the mean values of distinct groups are statistically separable).
3. All options in the highest scoring group were assigned a rank of ‘1’;
4. All options in the second highest scoring group were assigned a rank of ‘2’, and so on
until all options received a rank value.
The main caveat about this process is that options that are not significantly different from one
another by a simple T-test might end up in different rank categories. Another issue is that
small scale differences in one study might still be split into several rank groups whereas
relatively large differences in another (similar) study may be grouped together as one. As with
all ranking schemes, however, hard boundaries must be determined somewhere. The latter
issue can be addressed by defining a numerical ‘Effect Size’ such that any differences less
than this quantity are ignored in the ranking process. Although such a quantity introduces
some arbitrariness into the option ranking process, it also introduces a sense of realism, or in
other words a ‘reality check’, with regard to what constitutes a difference that will matter to
the decision maker10. In general, through effect size or some other means, attention must be
paid to differences in MOE scores in addition to the rank-order to help quantify performance
variances. Furthermore, the rank does not necessarily reflect absolute suitability and it is
possible (albeit rare) that other factors, such as a judgement by the authors, may weigh in to
alter the rankings. Such instances are highlighted if and when they occur. In any event, the
actual scores and confidence levels also appear in the option ranking tables to help the reader
better discern finer differences between the options.
Sensitivity of the rank order with respect to variations (i.e., uncertainty) in the relative MOE
weights was also tested. This technique provides a measure of the robustness of the rankings
under a wide variety of weighting schedules. If the rank order does not change under the
sensitivity analysis, it means that the manner in which the sponsor weighed the importance of
the individual MOEs factors out of the determination, up to the range of variation
investigated. In this case, the rank order boundaries can be considered as ‘black and white’.
On the other hand, if the rank order of an option changes substantially in the sensitivity
analysis, then the result is not robust and lies within what might be considered a ‘gray area’ of
the decision making boundaries—depending, of course, on the definitiveness of the original
weighting scheme. As an example, the rank of the option may depend heavily on a particular
decision weight (or range of weights) being assigned to a particular MOE.
10
Defining an ‘Effect Size’ was not deemed necessary for this study.
11
12
3. Scenario 1: convoy ambush, urban terrain
3.1.
Scenario description and setting
This scenario tested the options in a convoy escort/force protection role in a close urban
environment. The ranges of engagement were between 25 and 200 m.
Table 2. Scenario 1 Options
Option Call Sign
Station
Weapons
Baseline
Two-man Turret
25 mm cannon + C6
LV25mm/C6
RWS
HMG/C6
RWS
.50 cal + C6
AGL/C6
RWS
40 mm AGL + C6
HMG
RWS
.50 cal
C6
RWS
C6
3.1.1. General setting
The BLUE Force (Infantry Platoon) was tasked with escorting five supply vehicles along a
route that includes traversing a built-up area containing a number of buildings. The ranges of
engagement were very close due to the terrain. The options listed in Table 2 were considered
for this scenario. The options included one (1) turret configuration while the remainder
utilized the RWS configuration.
3.1.2. Terrain
The terrain used for this scenario was custom built to incorporate the features required for the
study. Figure 1 shows the area of interest—urban terrain consisting mainly of city streets and
buildings. The grid spacing in the figure is 100m. The light green dots in the figure represent
trees (most are on the West (left) side of the figure), and Northward the light green shading
represents a tree line. In order to test the weapon systems in close quarters, the scenario had
been set to ensure that the BLUE Force had limited mobility and was unable to leave the site.
An IED placed at the main T-junction in the roadway caused the lead LAV to halt, forcing the
convoy to stay and fight as manoeuvrability was too restrictive to allow for continuation along
the route. All of the buildings are one storey with windows and a flat roof top, with the
exception of the most northerly building which is a three-storey building. The roads that the
convoy traversed are considered to be hard packed.
13
NORTH
Figure 1. Terrain layout for Scenario 1. The grid spacing is 100 m.
3.1.3. Forces
The RED and BLUE force dispositions are shown in Figure 2. The BLUE Force consisted of
an Infantry Platoon of four LAV III vehicles that had the task of escorting five supply vehicles
to a forward base. The LAV III vehicles were outfitted as per Table 2. The supply vehicles
had no fighting capability for the interactive gaming. The LAV III vehicles were positioned
in the convoy to provide maximum control and protection under the circumstances.
The RED Force consisted of eight insurgents. They were armed with two rocket propelled
grenade (RPG) launchers, two machine guns (PKM) (7.62 mm) and four assault rifles (AK47)
(7.62x39 mm). The following were the ammunition loads for each weapon system; AK47 –
300 rds, PKM – 880 rds and RPG – 3 HEAT rds. The RED Force also had one IED which
was used to disable the lead vehicle of the convoy, effectively stopping the convoy.
There were twenty civilians included in the scenario in order to make targeting more realistic
and challenging in that the gunner could not assume that every detection was an enemy and
therefore could be fired upon. They were located alongside the road and near buildings. The
civilians were neutral with regard to the two warring parties. When first detected, RED and
civilian dismount entities are not distinguishable from one another. BLUE only engaged
targets positively identified as RED. Minimal separation distances between RED dismounts
and civilians or unidentified detections were not enforced as a rule of engagement.
14
Figure 2. Force dispositions for Scenario 1.
3.1.4. Blue plan
BLUE’s objective was to ensure the safe arrival of the convoy to the forward base. The
BLUE Force had a chosen route and part of this route included traveling through a built-up
area, which could not be avoided. The BLUE Force had set TTPs for any situation that may
be encountered while on a convoy escort task. In this case, however, BLUE’s action reduced
to defending the convoy on the spot as best they could under the restrictive set of
circumstances given. BLUE manoeuvrability was limited to near the road. Since the purpose
of the study was to assess the performance of the vehicle weapon systems only, BLUE
dismounts were not gamed. Such a decision, which is at the discretion of the Platoon
Commander, is entirely realistic in this scenario. The reason is that the RED ambush
(described below) involves significant machine gun fire, RPGs and likely shrapnel. In such a
case, if the Commander perceived that it would be better to fight the vehicles rather than
expose the soldiers to the gunfire and shrapnel, then dismounts would not be used until the
Commander deemed appropriate.
3.1.5. Red plan
Initially, the RED Force had positioned themselves in hidden positions in and around the
buildings. Their intent was to attack the convoy and cause maximum casualties in a quick and
well planned action. The attack was initiated with the detonation of an IED on the first
15
vehicle in the convoy11. The intent here was to stop the convoy at a place of RED’s choosing
by targeting the first vehicle. While the BLUE Force surveyed the situation and followed
their TTPs (previous section), barring early identification and elimination by BLUE a RED
RPG gunner fired at the rear of the convoy with the aim of boxing it in. As well, targets of
opportunity within the convoy were engaged by other insurgents along the RED-occupied
strip of territory.
3.1.6. Games and replications
As part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint themselves
with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce any learning curve effects that may have
been present. The actions of RED and BLUE forces are scripted to be realistic and as
consistent as possible between individual runs, as opposed to trying to explore a wide set of
varying circumstances. Otherwise, with only a few games played per option it could become
extremely difficult or even impossible to distinguish between options if the main variable in
the game happened to be, for example, RED behaviour. Once players were familiar with the
scenario, each of the weapon options was gamed four times for a total of 24 games. For each
game played, 20 non-interactive replications were generated.
3.1.7. Measures of effectiveness
The following MOEs were used to assess the relative capabilities of the BLUE Force in
Scenario 1. Each is defined such that the higher the value of the MOE, the more favourable it
is for BLUE:
•
BLUE Residual Combat Strength. This measure represents the combat capabilities of
BLUE after the battle and assesses the effectiveness of RED fire. A destroyed or
disabled BLUE vehicle counted against the residual combat strength (RCS). Each
vehicle could be counted as disabled once only and upon the first instance of damage
to that vehicle not including the IED (see Footnote 11). The RCS was calculated as
((initial number of LAVs) – (Number of killed or disabled LAVs)) / (initial number of
LAVs) x 100%. A score of 100% corresponds to zero losses and completely intact
combat capabilities in terms of vehicle fighting systems (irrespective of ammunition
expended, battle fatigue, etc.); 12
•
% RPGs Prevented. While not every RPG fired kills a LAV, the number of shots that
the RPG gunners were able to launch provides information about the effectiveness of
BLUE in swiftly eliminating this threat. Consequently, this measure supplements the
information provided by the number of BLUE kills (RCS). It helps to distinguish
between the ability of RED to fire at LAVs and their ability to actually cause damage.
For the purpose of scoring, an inverse measure—the percentage of RPGs that were
not fired—was used13.
11
The Scenario was scripted such that the IED event would force the Commander of the lead vehicle to
halt, but not affect the vehicle systems or damage it otherwise. The vehicle could still fire from a fixed
position until sufficiently damaged by subsequent RED fire. The first such instance of post-IED event
damage for this vehicle factors into the BLUE RCS.
12
Note that, in the wargame, small arms fire by RED cannot disable the sensors on a BLUE vehicle.
Thus the vehicle sensors are assumed to operate at their maximum capability until the vehicle itself is
disabled by a catastrophic vehicle kill.
13
The usefulness of this measure depends somewhat on the consistency of how the RED forces were
played by the RED commander. Recall that the interactors practice to keep the behaviour of the forces
16
•
% RED Losses. The number of RED killed provides information about the lethality of
BLUE weapon systems against dismounted personnel in an urban environment. The
Percentage of RED Losses MOE is computed as (number of RED killed) / (initial
number of RED) x 100%.
3.1.8. Relative importance of MOEs
Table 3 contains the weights of individual MOEs arrived at in consultation between the
research team and the sponsor. The weights convey the relative importance of each MOE to
the decision concerning which option is better. A sensitivity analysis was performed to
quantify the dependence of the outcome on the relative MOE weights that were chosen.
Table 3. MOE Weights for Scenario 1.
Measure of Effectiveness
Weight (%)
BLUE Residual Combat Strength
40
% RPGs Prevented
30
% RED Losses
30
TOTAL
100
Since all of the MOEs were expressed as percentages (on a scale of 0 – 100%), it was
straightforward to assign an overall score to all of the options. To compute the overall scores,
the MOE percentages were simply multiplied by the weights of individual MOEs and then the
values were summed.
3.1.9. Measures of performance
A set of measures of performance (MOPs) were used to provide further insight into the
results. The MOPs characterize weapon performance rather than operational effectiveness
towards achieving the mission goal, and therefore were not used in ranking the considered
options. However, they still can provide useful information, or flag potential problems
associated with a particular option. The following MOPs were used:
a. Time of Engagement – RED by BLUE. This measure considers the time between
the first RED killed and the last RED killed to assess the effectiveness of the
BLUE fire.
under their control as consistent as possible. Note that this measure potentially could fail if all four
vehicles were destroyed before all of the RPGs were expended. The data indicate that this possibility
did not occur in any of the 480 replications.
17
b. Time of Engagement – BLUE by RED. This measure was defined as the time
between the IED explosion and the last RPG fired. It served as an indicator of
how fast BLUE was able to identify the main RED threat and eliminate it14.
c. Range of Engagement. This is the average engagement range at which a
particular type of ammunition round was fired, resulting in damage or destruction
of an enemy target. It may also be interpreted as the average killing distance.
3.2.
Results for Scenario 1
3.2.1. Game history
All of the games played out according to the initial plan. There were no problems or
difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE plans. Recall that the scenario was set up so that
BLUE was not able to avoid the ambush or escape it once initiated. RED fought to the last
man. The key to BLUE success was to identify the threat early and to eliminate the RPG
gunners quickly, as it was the only weapon that could damage the LAVs.
3.2.2. Qualitative: military judgements and insights
J&I are the opinions of the wargame interactors gathered during and after the gaming. It
should be considered in relation to the quantitative results and analysis to follow. The
following J&I were gathered for Scenario 1:
i.
It was believed that the Baseline option (25 mm / C6) was the best for this scenario.
One of the contributing factors was the extra set of sensors (‘eyeball’) available for
this option.
ii.
The interactors also noticed that, due to the close ranges in this scenario and a
dismounted RED Force, the C6 was used a lot and was quite effective in all options
that contained a C6.
iii.
The AGL/C6 option was believed to be the worst for this scenario. This was mainly
due to the close engagement ranges as contrasted to the arming distance required for
the AGL (36 m). As well, the concern for this option was the collateral damage.
iv.
It was also noted that the 40mm AGL could be useful in an indirect role. This was
dependent upon the location of the RED Force. If the RED Force was hiding around
a corner, in a room or on the top of a building, then the AGL could be very effective.
v.
The larger calibre weapons (i.e., 25 mm cannon) allowed for better penetration of
buildings and structures. This allowed for the destruction of RED even if they tried to
hide behind walls.
14
Note that this measure can potentially backfire in the event that both RPG gunners manage to fire all
of their RPGs before being eliminated. The data indicate this possibility did not have a significant
affect on the values (occurred in 2 of 480 replications).
18
3.2.3. Quantitative results for Scenario 1
A summary of the computed MOE values for Scenario 1 together with their corresponding
95% confidence intervals appear in Table 4. With regards to the first MOE (BLUE RCS),
recall that the lead vehicle, although stopped by the IED, could still fight until subsequently
damaged (see Footnote 11) and the rear vehicle, although targeted by an RPG gunner, has
only a chance to be hit before the RPG gunner is killed (getting a shot off in time was not
automatic). As stated previously, the IED did not directly enter into this measure.
On BLUE RCS, the Baseline option and the HMG option performed the best whereas the
LV25mm/C6 option performed the worst. The options that recorded the lowest number of
LAVs killed (Baseline and HMG) were also the ones that had the lowest number of RPGs
fired (i.e., the highest %RPGs Prevented), which is in line with expectations. The worst
performers with regard to the %RPGs Prevented MOE were the LV25mm/C6 and the C6,
wherein one third of all of the available RPG rounds were used, on average (2 rounds fired of
6 available). There was less differentiation between the options with regard to the %RED
Losses MOE, since the game was played in such a way that almost all of the RED were killed
(RED fought to the last man).
The best overall score was attained by the current baseline, making it the top-ranked option
for Scenario 1. The two .50 calibre options ranked second. However, it is easy to see from
Table 4 that the HMG option (.50 cal only) was very nearly top-ranked, with a mean score of
93 compared to 94 for the leading option. This point is discussed further in the sensitivity
analysis below (Section 3.3). The AGL/C6 option ranked third ahead of the LV 25 mm and
C6 options, which shared the bottom rank category (fourth). After discussions with the
interactors, it was determined that the most likely reason for the poor performance of these
two particular systems were the (modeled) characteristics of the respective ammunition. The
LV 25 mm ammunition was the AB round, but it did not have the explosive force of a 40 mm
HE ammunition, or the penetrability of a standard 25 mm round or a .50 cal round. Therefore
it was more difficult to eliminate RED hiding in buildings or on roof tops. The same holds
true for the 7.62 mm round. This led to longer survival times for the RED RPG gunners and
enabled them to cause more damage.
Table 4. MOE Results for Scenario 1.
Weapon
Mix
BLUE
RCS (%)
%RED
Losses
%RPGs
Prevented
Total Score
(0..100)
weight
40%
30%
30%
Rank
Baseline
25mm / C6
96 ± 2
94 ± 2
90 ± 4
94 ± 2
1
LV25mm/C6
LV 25mm /
C6
83 ± 3
87 ± 3
68 ± 4
80 ± 3
4
HMG/C6
.50 cal / C6
93 ± 3
91 ± 3
81 ± 5
89 ± 3
2
AGL/C6
40mm AGL /
C6
89 ± 3
93 ± 2
75 ± 3
86 ± 2
3
HMG
.50 cal
96 ± 2
94 ± 2
89 ± 4
93 ± 2
2 (1)15
C6
C6
88 ± 4
88 ± 3
67 ± 5
82 ± 3
4
All Games
Call Sign
15
Despite significance testing results marginally to the contrary, the authors concur that this option
should be considered as top-ranked. See the discussion below for justification (Section 3.3).
19
The results for the MOPs appear in Table 5. The duration of the engagement of RED by
BLUE formed three distinct groups. The AGL/C6 combination was the most time efficient
with regards to eliminating the insurgents. Next in line, the Baseline, HMG/C6, HMG and C6
options performed comparably well, whereas use of the LV 25 mm weapon resulted in the
longest times. Obviously, in the LV25mm/C6 option, BLUE were not very effective in
reducing the RED threat. In terms of the duration of the engagement of BLUE by RED, the
Baseline option performed the best.
For the range of engagement (RgOE), maximum and minimum ranges were obtained. The
maximum range varied from 50 - 66 m. The minimum RgOE was almost at point blank (11 12 m). This was closer than the arming distance of the AGL (36 m), and helps to explain the
worse-than-expected performance of this particular system in the urban conflict environment.
Table 5. MOP Results for Scenario 1.
Time (sec)
Call Sign
RgOE (m)
Weapon Mix
RED by
BLUE
BLUE by
RED
Mean
Max
Min
Baseline
25mm cannon + C6
158
47
27
50
11
LV25mm/C6
LV 25mm cannon + C6
252
64
26
50
11
HMG/C6
.50 cal + C6
145
53
26
53
12
AGL/C6
40mm AGL + C6
96
73
31
66
12
HMG
.50 cal
170
63
28
56
12
C6
C6
150
101
29
65
12
3.3.
Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1
Following is a sensitivity analysis of the results for Scenario 1 focusing on the influence of the
assigned weights on the final rankings. As a test of rank-order stability, four possibilities were
considered:
i.
BLUE RCS, RED Losses and RPGs Prevented at 33.3% each (appearing as ‘Equal
Weights’, below);
ii.
BLUE RCS 80%, RED Losses and RPGs Prevented at 10% each (appearing as
‘B80/R10/P10’, below);
iii.
BLUE RCS 10%, RED Losses at 80% and RPGs Prevented at 10% (appearing as
‘B10/R80/P10’, below);
iv.
BLUE RCS 10%, RED Losses at 10% and RPGs Prevented at 80% (appearing as
‘B10/R10/P80’, below).
20
Table 6 contains a summary of sensitivity testing scores and final ranks for Scenario 1. The
results demonstrate that indeed the best options are the Baseline and the HMG, with the
HMG/C6 option consistently ranked second, independent of the weights assigned to the
individual MOEs. The AGL/C6 option most often ranked third, rising to second only when
heavy emphasis was placed on the %RED Losses MOE. The LV25mm/C6 and C6 options
were consistently bottom-ranked. Note that the HMG option is first in three of the four cases
tested—even under only a slight change in the weighting scheme—and in the single case
where it ranks second, the mean scores of the HMG and baseline options are identical, up to
the reported accuracy. Furthermore, in the base ranking scheme, the MOEs and final rankings
of the same two options are nearly identical. Since the MOE weights are at least somewhat
subjective, this analysis supports the notion that pairing the HMG option with the Baseline
option, in preference to the HMG/C6 option, is the most robust choice, given that the
HMG/C6 option consistently scored second under all variations in the weighting scheme
investigated. For this reason, the authors concur that it should be considered a top ranking
option for this scenario, alongside the Baseline option.
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1.
Total
Score
Rank
Total
Score
Rank
Total
Score
Rank
Equal
Weight
B80
R10
P10
B80
R10
P10
B10
R80
P10
B10
R80
P10
B10
R10
P80
B10
R10
P80
Total
Score
Rank
Equal
Weight
Call Sign
Weapon Mix
Baseline
25mm cannon + C6
93 ± 2
1
95 ± 2
1
94 ± 2
1
91 ± 3
1
LV25mm/C6
LV 25mm cannon + C6
79 ± 3
4
82 ± 3
4
85 ± 3
3
71 ± 3
3
HMG/C6
.50 cal + C6
88 ± 3
2
92 ± 3
2
90 ± 3
2
83 ± 4
2
AGL/C6
40mm AGL + C6
86 ± 2
3
88 ± 3
3
91 ± 2
2
79 ± 3
3
HMG
.50 cal
93 ± 2
1
95 ± 2
2
94 ± 2
1
90 ± 3
1
C6
C6
81 ± 3
4
86 ± 4
4
86 ± 3
3
71 ± 4
3
21
3.4.
Summary of Scenario 1 findings
For Scenario 1, J&I concluded that the current baseline (turret with 25 mm cannon and an
additional C6 machine gun) was the best of the considered options. This finding was
supported by the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, the J&I conclusion that the overall
performance of the 40 mm AGL was not overly impressive is also supported. However, while
in the J&I it was concluded that the C6 could be used quite effectively in the urban terrain, the
quantitative analysis suggested that the C6 on its own is not a viable option, especially if RED
can hide in buildings or on roofs. The LV 25 mm cannon airburst rounds lacked penetrating
power against walls making it difficult to engage insurgents using walls as cover, which
seemed to play a significant role in this scenario16.
Overall, the quantitative analysis suggests that the 25 mm cannon and the .50 cal HMG were
the most effective systems17. The sensitivity analysis confirmed that these findings are robust,
and almost independent of the weighting scheme used. Note, however, as a reality check that
the RED ambush was not very effective at destroying the BLUE vehicles in this scenario. The
BLUE RCS scores for all weapon systems indicate that overall, chances of losing a single
vehicle only varied by up to ~13% between the weapon systems, not including the IED that
halted the convoy. Furthermore, RED losses were always high and only varied by ~7%
between options. Whether or not this constitutes a practical difference from an operational or
strategic perspective depends on how the information is to be applied. For example, if the
BLUE vehicles were plentiful, the RED forces constant and the operation was of the ‘one-off’
variety, then the difference may not be overly significant. On the other hand, if, for instance,
the BLUE vehicles were scarce and twenty such attacks were to be expected in a given month,
or if the RED opposition forces became stronger, then the results very well could be
significant. As a final note, the ‘RPGs Prevented’ MOE showed the largest variation at ~23%
(~1.4 RPGs), and therefore best characterizes the differences between the options in this
scenario. To reiterate, the biggest difference was in how quickly the insurgent RPG gunmen
were killed or otherwise prevented from firing their weapons (e.g., suppression).
16
Note that, at the time of writing, programmable airburst munitions (PABM) for a Lightweight 25mm
cannon and having significant penetrating power are under development by ATK Inc (partially
demonstrated, to date, based on a personal communication with ATK Inc.).
17
It is interesting to note that the HMG option faired slightly better than the combined HMG/C6 option
when the sensitivity testing is taken into account, suggesting that perhaps having to choose between the
two machine guns decreased BLUE’s performance and that overall the HMG was a better choice than
the C6 for engaging the enemy. This notion is supported by the poor performance of the ‘C6 only’
option (bottom-ranked), but otherwise it is unsubstantiated and would require further study to confirm
or deny.
22
23
4. Scenario 2: combat patrol, urban terrain
4.1.
This scenario tested the options in an open urban environment. The ranges of engagement
varied between 400 and 800 m for vehicle-on-vehicle exchanges, and approximately 100 and
400 m when vehicles engaged dismounts.
Option Call Sign
Station
Weapons
Baseline
Two-man Turret
25 mm cannon + C6
LV25mm/C6
RWS
HMG/C6
RWS
.50 cal + C6
AGL/C6
RWS
40 mm AGL + C6
HMG
RWS
.50 cal
C6
RWS
C6
The BLUE Force (Infantry Platoon) was tasked with clearing a specific route through a builtup area. During the patrol they came into contact with mounted enemy forces on the far side
of a large city square. Upon contact, the enemy force dismounted, and used both vehicles and
dismounted troops against BLUE. This enabled the comparison of the effectiveness in
simultaneously engaging multiple types of targets at the given ranges.
The options listed in Table 7 were gamed in this scenario, which included one turret
configuration while the remainder utilized the RWS configuration. A subset of these options,
namely the first five listed, was gamed in two additional excursions. In one excursion, a
BMP-2 was added to the RED Force. No BMP-2s had been present in the main scenario. In a
second excursion, the BMP-2 was again present and the BLUE Force infantry dismounted to
combat the RED Force. The C6 option was not gamed in the excursions as it was deemed
unrealistic that it would be used against a BMP-2 armoured vehicle. In retrospect, there was
little value gained in gaming the C6 option in any scenario where RED armoured vehicles
were present (e.g., BRDM or BTR-60)18.
18
Having said that, the C6 assessment in urban scenarios combined with the ATGM assessment in the
open terrain scenario (to follow, in Scenario 3) provides an indication of how the combination ATGM /
C6 might fair overall, given that the C6 is not likely to be used against armoured vehicles and the
ATGMs are not likely to be used in urban scenarios due to collateral damage considerations.
24
City Square
4.1.2. Terrain
The urban terrain used for this scenario was custom built to incorporate the features required
for the study (Figure 3). The grid spacing in the figure is 100 m. The size of the city square is
approximately 700 m x 500 m. The terrain allowed for a chance contact to occur. With the
given combination of flat terrain, open space, and some available cover (buildings), it was
expected that a fair assessment of the weapon packages at medium ranges in an open urban
environment could be achieved.
4.1.3. Forces
BLUE Force and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 2 appear in Figure 4.
The BLUE Force consisted of an Infantry Platoon of four LAV III vehicles that had the task
of patrolling a particular route in an urban environment. The LAV III vehicles were outfitted
with the weapon systems as described above (Table 7). In one scenario excursion thirty-one
(31) BLUE dismounts were present, armed with six C9 light machine guns, five C8 assault
carbines, eighteen C7 assault rifles, one C6 machine gun, and one CARL GUSTAF short
range anti-armour weapon (medium) (SRAAW(M)). Note that this differs from doctrine in
that there were eight dismounts per section vehicle rather than seven dismounts as per
reference [11]. This difference reflects the reality as experienced by the wargame interactors
(for example, 1RCR roto 2, 2006-2007).
25
The RED Force consisted of eight insurgents. They were armed with two RPGs (3 HEAT rds
each), two PKM machine guns (880 rds each) and four AK47 rifles (300 rds each). These
RED dismounts were supported by up to three armoured vehicles (depending on the scenario
variant) and two soft-skinned vehicles as follows: one BMP-2 (excursions only), one BTR-60,
one BRDM and two Pickup trucks armed with 14.5 mm medium machine guns (MMGs). The
following were the ammunition loads for each vehicle weapon system:
•
BMP-2 (excursions only): 30 mm APT-160 rds, 30 mm HET-450 rds and 7.62 mm2000 rds;
•
BTR-60: 14.5 mm-2000 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds;
•
BRDM: 14.5 mm-500 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds; and
•
Pickup Truck: 14.5 mm MMG – 1100 rds.
Twenty civilians populated the urban scene in order to create a sense of realism with regard to
the challenges of target recognition in that the gunner could not assume that every detection
was an enemy and therefore could be fired upon. They were concentrated in the general
vicinity of the RED Force (top right, Figure 4). The civilians were neutral with regard to the
two warring parties, and typically headed for cover as soon as the engagement began. BLUE
responded to the presence of civilians as per Scenario 1 (see Section 3.1.3).
RED Force
Disposition
BLUE Force
Patrol
Figure 4. BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100 m.
26
4.1.4. Blue plan
BLUE’s objective was to patrol a specific route and clear any small pockets of enemy forces
encountered. As the BLUE Force approached the city square, they surprised a small group of
insurgents that had gathered in the opposite corner of the square. A follow-on engagement
occurred as BLUE advanced on the RED forces. This plan was the same for all of the
Scenario 2 games including those in which only the vehicles fought and also the excursion
whereby the infantry dismounted and fought alongside the vehicles. As per Scenario 1
(Section 3.1.4) the decision to dismount lies with the Platoon Commander or Crew
Commander. Realistically, the decision of if and/or when to dismount would be determined
after an initial advance to close in on the objective (the RED position), and would be based on
how the commander perceived the RED force strength relative to that of BLUE after the
advance and also the available cover offered by the terrain for dismounts.
4.1.5. Red plan
A small group of insurgents had gathered at the corner of the city square to regroup and
discuss their next intentions. They were completely caught off guard by the BLUE Force
patrol and quickly found themselves in a fire fight that they were not able to disengage from.
Their only course of action was to fight and destroy as much of the BLUE Force as possible.
As a part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint
themselves with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce any potential learning curve
effects. The actions of RED and BLUE forces are scripted to be realistic and as consistent as
possible between individual runs, as opposed to trying to explore a wide set of varying
circumstances. Otherwise, it could become extremely difficult or even impossible to
distinguish between options if the main variable in the game happened to be, for example,
RED behaviour.
Due to the large number of options tested, coupled with multiple scenario variants, time
constraints allowed for only one or two games for most scenario variants once players were
familiar with the games. For each game played, 20 non-interactive replications were
generated. Note that the results for the HMG and HMG/C6 options were combined, since the
same primary weapon (.50 cal) was used in both options and the C6, which was available only
in the HMG/C6 option, was not utilized by the interactors19. The combined options are simply
referred to collectively as ‘HMG’ in this section. The number of games and replications,
delineated by scenario variant and turret/weapon mix option, is shown in Table 8.
19
In fact, the C6 was used sparingly, if at all, by the interactors in all options having a second weapon
available for Scenario 2. Contributing factors were: 1) having vehicle targets to contend with required
more use of the main weapon; 2) the longer ranges of engagement provided more opportunity to use the
main weapon, especially in the case of the AGL; and 3) in the HMG/C6 option, the HMG and C6 are
similar weapons (both machine guns) that can be used to fulfill similar roles.
27
Table 8. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 2.
Scenario
Or Variant
Open Urban
Square
+BMP2
Opponents
+BLUE
Dismounts
Call Sign
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
C6
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
Main Weapon
25mm cannon
LV 25mm cannon
.50 cal
40mm AGL
C6
25mm cannon
LV 25mm cannon
.50 cal
40mm AGL
25mm cannon
LV 25mm cannon
.50 cal
40mm AGL
Total
Games
Played
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
4
2
2
1
2
1
Total
Replications
Processed
40
40
80
40
40
40
40
80
40
40
20
40
20
Similar to Scenario 1, the following MOEs were used to assess the relative capabilities of the
BLUE Force in Scenario 2. Each is defined such that the higher the value of the MOE, the
more favourable it is for BLUE:
•
BLUE Residual Combat Strength (RCS). As in Scenario 1, BLUE RCS is an
aggregate measure of the capability of the BLUE Force to be able to conduct another
mission, without reinforcements. For a mixed force of armoured vehicles and
dismounts, armoured vehicles are defined as contributing 80% to the BLUE RCS,
whereas dismounts contribute the remaining 20%20. The desired end state for this
MOE is 100%, corresponding to no BLUE losses. The relative contributions that the
various BLUE Forces made to this MOE were set by the authors and are somewhat
arbitrary. They reflect the notion that in this scenario vehicle losses have a large effect
on combat capabilities relative to dismount losses;
•
% RED Losses. Although slightly more complicated than its Scenario 1 counterpart,
this MOE still measures overall RED losses after the engagement. As with BLUE
RCS above, for mixed RED forces the various constituents must be assigned weights.
For a mixed force of armoured vehicles, soft-skinned vehicles and dismounts, each
constituent must be weighed relative to the others. When RED dismounts were
present with both types of RED vehicles, armoured vehicles were defined as
contributing 50% to this MOE, soft-skinned vehicles 30% and dismounts the
remaining 20%. When there were no dismounts, preserving the relative vehicle
weights leads to 62.5% for armoured vehicles and 37.5% for soft-skinned vehicles.
The desired end state for this MOE is 100%, corresponding to complete annihilation
of the RED forces. The relative contributions that the various RED Forces made to
this MOE were set by the authors and are consistent with BLUE RCS (above).
20
The RCS formula for dismounts is: ((initial_dismounts – dismounts_killed) / initial_dismounts)
x100%.
28
Table 9 contains the weights of the individual MOEs, arrived at in consultation between the
research team and the sponsor. The weights convey the relative importance of each MOE to
the decision concerning which option is better. A sensitivity analysis was performed to
quantify the dependence of the outcome on the relative MOE weights that were chosen.
Weight (%)
70
%RED Losses
30
TOTAL
100
In keeping with Scenario 1, the following MOPs were used:
a. Range of Engagement. The average killing distance for a given type of
ammunition; and
b. Ammunition Effectiveness. For a given ammunition type, this quotient is defined
as the total number of kills of the intended type (vehicle or dismount) divided by
the total number of bursts fired for the entire set of games. The kills represent
either disabled/destroyed vehicles (AP rounds) or killed dismounts (all other
rounds). To obtain the (effective) lethality per round, divide by the number of
rounds in a burst (see Section 1.4).
4.2.
4.2.1. Game history
difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE tasks.
The following J&I were gathered during gaming of Scenario 2:
i.
It seemed that the Baseline option was the best for this scenario. The combination of
the 25 mm and C6 in a turret configuration coupled with an extra sensor (‘eyeball’)
seemed to make a difference.
29
ii.
The C6 option appeared to be the worst in this scenario. This was deemed in part due
to its inability to destroy the RED Force vehicles.
iii.
It seemed as though the AGL was effective when fired at a dismounted RED Force
when they were hidden from direct fire.
iv.
An excursion was played, whereby the BLUE Force dismounted close to the
objective. It seemed as though there were no real gains achieved by doing this, as it
was the vehicle weapon systems that caused the majority of the RED casualties.
The quantitative results summarize statistical measurements made on the game replications of
Scenario 2 to reveal how well the options could be utilized by BLUE to meet mission goals.
Simply stated, the goal was to engage and eliminate RED, causing maximal damage at
minimal expense. The scenario variants were analyzed independently of one another. The
ranking of the options was categorical and was based on significance testing via BRANDO, as
described in Section 2.3.2.
Table 10 contains a summary of scores and final ranks for Scenario 2 using the primary MOE
weighting scheme of Table 9. Note that 95% confidence intervals are shown in Table 10 to
illustrate the amount of variation in the replication sets, however, they were not specifically
used to rank the options (see Section 2.3.2). Features of the three scenario variants are listed:
i.
Open Urban Square (basic): The .50 cal option ranked second. All others were in the
top-ranked group and were not significantly different from one another to warrant
further distinction.
ii.
+BMP-2 Opponents: As per item i., above, except that the C6 option was not tested.
iii.
+BLUE Dismounts: The Baseline option was the only top-ranked weapon mix in this
excursion. All of the remaining options gamed had significantly lower scores.
Furthermore, they were statistically indistinguishable from one another and thus all
were ranked second.
Overall, the Baseline option alone proved to be a good performer in all three scenario
variants. The HMG option consistently underperformed in comparison to the others (always
ranked second). The C6 option performed well in the scenario variant where it was available,
but mainly on the strength of BLUE RCS since it proved to be ineffective against RED
armoured vehicles. In this case, BLUE firepower was concentrated on the targets that could be
destroyed by the C6 (RED dismounts and soft-skinned vehicles) while engagements with
armoured vehicles were avoided.
30
Scenario
Or Variant
Open Urban
Square
+BMP2
Opponents
+BLUE
Dismounts
Call Sign
Main
Weapon
weights
Baseline
25mm
LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm
HMG
.50 cal
AGL/C6
40mm AGL
C6
C6
Baseline
25mm
LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm
HMG
.50 cal
AGL/C6
40mm AGL
Baseline
25mm
LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm
HMG
.50 cal
AGL/C6
40mm AGL
BLUE
RCS
%RED
Losses
Total Score
(0..100)
Rank
70%
51 ± 7
67 ± 6
48 ± 4
61 ± 7
81 ± 8
51 ± 9
42 ± 10
26 ± 5
31 ± 9
66 ± 8
37 ± 12
37 ± 9
53 ± 9
30%
97 ± 2
97 ± 1
93 ± 2
99 ± 1
39 ± 3
93 ± 3
91 ± 4
84 ± 3
87 ± 5
97 ± 1
90 ± 6
90 ± 4
82 ± 4
65 ± 5
76 ± 5
61 ± 3
72 ± 5
69 ± 6
63 ± 7
57 ± 8
43 ± 4
48 ± 8
75 ± 6
53 ± 10
53 ± 7
61 ± 7
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
MOP results are listed in Table 11. The range of engagement against vehicles was comparable
for the various weapon systems at approximately 500 m. The range of engagement against
dismounts measured between approximately 170-350 m.
In terms of weapon lethality against vehicles in this scenario, the 25 mm APFSDS-T 3-round
burst, the LV 25 mm AP 3-round burst, and the .50 cal AP 7-round burst were comparable at
approximately 0.4 or higher kills/burst. The 40 mm AGL HEDP AP grenade was slightly
lower at 0.3 - 0.4 kills/burst. For eliminating dismounts, the 25 mm HEIT burst, the LV 25
mm AB burst and the 40 mm AGL Std grenade proved more-or-less equally effective at
approximately 0.5 to 0.9 kills/burst. The .50 cal Std bullet (7-round burst) measured less than
.1 kills/burst. Note, however, that a machine gun is often used to provide suppressive fire,
which typically lowers the lethality measure, despite its obvious utility.
31
Scenario
Or Variant
Open Urban
Square
+BMP2
Opponents
+BLUE
Dismounts
4.3.
Call Sign
Primary
Weapon
Baseline
25mm
LV25mm/C6
LV 25mm
HMG
.50 cal
AGL/C6
40mm AGL
C6
C6
Baseline
25mm
LV25mm/C6
LV 25mm
HMG
.50 cal
AGL/C6
40mm AGL
Baseline
25mm
LV25mm/C6
LV 25mm
HMG
.50 cal
AGL/C6
40mm AGL
Ammo
Round
RgOE (m)
Ammo
Effectiveness
(kills / burst)
APFSDS-T
HEIT
AP
AB
AP
Std
HEDP AP
AGL Std
Std
APFSDS-T
HEIT
AP
AB
AP
Std
HEDP AP
AGL Std
APFSDS-T
HEIT
AP
AB
AP
Std
HEDP AP
AGL Std
544 ± 29
228 ± 17
558 ± 29
242 ± 16
522 ± 21
219 ± 13
535 ± 32
184 ± 12
268 ± 19
536 ± 22
206 ± 18
520 ± 23
244 ± 23
473 ± 17
166 ± 12
461 ± 23
257 ± 22
523 ± 21
232 ± 18
504 ± 33
212 ± 17
473 ± 26
221 ± 24
544 ± 33
348 ± 19
0.43
0.81
0.43
0.78
0.39
0.04
0.33
0.69
0.08
0.44
0.87
0.39
0.93
0.39
0.09
0.31
0.79
0.44
0.64
0.46
0.69
0.50
0.08
0.36
0.53
The following is a sensitivity analysis of the results for Scenario 2, focusing on the influence
of the assigned weights on the final rankings. As a test of rank-order stability, the following
MOE weighting possibilities were considered:
i.
BLUE RCS and RED Losses at 50% each (appearing as ‘Equal Weights’, below);
ii.
BLUE RCS 80% and RED Losses 20% (appearing as ‘B80/R20’, below);
iii.
BLUE RCS 20% and RED Losses 80% (appearing as ‘B20/R80’, below).
Table 12 contains a summary of scores and final ranks for the Scenario 2 sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity features of the three scenario variants are listed:
i.
Open Urban Square (basic): The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options were consistently
top-ranked, in agreement with the primary weighting scheme (Table 10). The main
inconsistency was that the ranking of the C6 option was quite unstable under
sensitivity testing, ranging from a rank of 1 to 4. Rank 1 was obtained only when low
emphasis was placed on the %RED Losses MOE. The Baseline option (25 mm / C6)
was ranked second in all cases followed by the HMG option which consistently
ranked third.
ii.
+BMP-2 Opponents: The Baseline, LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options were
consistently top-ranked in all cases and the HMG option ranked second, in exact
agreement with the results found using the primary weighting scheme shown in Table
10.
32
iii.
+BLUE Dismounts: The Baseline option consistently was the only top-ranked
weapon mix and all other options ranked second, in exact agreement with the results
found using the primary weighting scheme shown in Table 10.
Overall, it can be concluded that the rankings for Scenario 2 are robust, and nearly
independent of wide variations in the weights. The Baseline, LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6
options proved to be good performers in all three scenario variants. The HMG option
consistently underperformed in comparison to the others (always ranked second or lower).
The rank-order of the C6 option depended heavily on the weighting scheme used, and only
performed well when heavy emphasis was placed on BLUE RCS (and consequently, low
emphasis on %RED Losses).
Table 12. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 2.
Scenario
Or Variant
Open Urban
Square
+BMP2
Opponents
+BLUE
Dismounts
4.4.
Call Sign
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
C6
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
Total Score
Rank
Total Score
Rank
Total Score
Rank
Equal
Weight
74 ± 4
82 ± 4
70 ± 3
80 ± 4
60 ± 5
72 ± 6
67 ± 6
55 ± 4
59 ± 7
82 ± 4
64 ± 9
63 ± 6
67 ± 6
Equal
Weight
2
1
3
1
4
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
B80
R20
60 ± 5
73 ± 5
57 ± 4
68 ± 6
73 ± 7
59 ± 8
52 ± 8
38 ± 4
42 ± 8
72 ± 7
47 ± 11
48 ± 8
59 ± 8
B80
R20
2
1
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
B20
R80
88 ± 2
91 ± 2
84 ± 2
91 ± 2
47 ± 4
84 ± 4
81 ± 5
73 ± 3
76 ± 5
91 ± 2
80 ± 7
79 ± 5
76 ± 4
B20
R80
2
1
3
1
4
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
J&I combined with quantitative results establish the following three options as top performers
in the Open Urban Square scenario: Baseline (25 mm / C6), LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6.
Fidelity limits prohibit finer distinction between these three options based solely on the MOEs
of the Scenario 2 wargame. Furthermore, the MOPs do not portray any one weapon as
advantageous overall compared to the others. By and large, ranges of engagement were
comparable for the weapons as was ammunition effectiveness.
The HMG option (which is equivalent to the HMG/C6 option, in this scenario) consistently
ranked second or third, and in all cases beneath the top three identified above.
On the whole, under the primary weighting scheme variations in the total option scores ranged
from 15-20%, depending on the scenario. The variation was mainly due to BLUE RCS, since
RED Losses were consistently high with the exception of the C6 option. BLUE could expect
to lose anywhere from one to three of the four available vehicles in total depending on the
scenario variant and weapon selection—high enough to be of practical concern.
33
The sensitivity analysis revealed that, overall, the results are robust over a wide range of MOE
weight assignments. The only exception was the C6 option; the rank order of this option
varied drastically with the weighting scheme. This indicates that its success in the primary
weighting scheme is one-sided, depending heavily on high BLUE RCS emphasis.
34
35
5. Scenario 3: combat patrol, open terrain
5.1.
This scenario tested the options in a meeting engagement operation in open terrain. The
ranges of engagement were long, up to 2000 m, typically varying between 800 and 1200
meters.
Option Call Sign
Station
Weapons
Baseline
Two-man Turret
25 mm cannon + C6
LV25mm/C6
RWS
HMG/C6
RWS
.50 cal + C6
AGL/C6
RWS
40 mm AGL + C6
HMG
RWS
.50 cal
20mm
RWS
20 mm cannon
ATGM
RWS
ATGM
Scenario 3 featured a BLUE patrol encountering a mounted enemy force in open terrain
during a cordon operation. Both forces remained mounted. This scenario evaluated the antivehicle effectiveness of the considered systems at extended ranges. The BLUE Force was
tasked with seizing and securing an airfield and destroying any enemy pockets. The options
listed in Table 13 were gamed in this scenario. The 20mm and ATGM options were late
additions to the wargame, which underlies why they were not gamed in the other scenarios.
The options included one turret configuration while the remainder utilized the RWS.
36
Airfield
Town
5.1.2. Terrain
The terrain used for this scenario was custom built to incorporate the features required for the
study (Figure 5). The grid spacing in the figure is 1000 m. The terrain allows for chance
contact to occur. With the given combination of flat terrain and open space, a fair baseline
assessment of the weapon packages at extended ranges can be achieved.
5.1.3. Forces
BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 3 appear in Figure 6 and Figure 7
respectively.
The BLUE Force consisted of an Infantry Company of 12 LAV III vehicles that had the task
of securing the airfield (lower right, Figure 6) for future operations and destroying any enemy
pockets in open terrain. Enemy pockets were encountered as the BLUE Force moved towards
the airfield/town to complete their mission. The LAV III vehicles were outfitted with the
weapon systems as per Table 13. There were no BLUE dismounts present in this scenario.
The RED Force consisted of seven armoured vehicles and four soft-skinned vehicles as
follows: three (3) BMP-2s, four (4) BTR-60s and four (4) Pickup trucks armed with MMGs.
37
The following were the ammunition loads for each RED vehicle weapon system:
•
BMP-2: 30 mm APT-160 rds, 30 mm HET-450 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds;
•
BTR-60: 14.5 mm-2000 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds; and
•
Pickup Truck: 14.5 mm MMG – 1100 rds.
There were no civilians present in this scenario.
Figure 6. BLUE Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000m.
38
Figure 7. RED Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000 m.
5.1.4. Blue plan
BLUE’s objective was to secure the airfield and destroy any enemy pockets. The company
was to move to designated positions around the town in platoon formations, spread out, and
destroy any enemy forces that they encountered. Once in position, the BLUE Force would set
up to secure the airfield. Figure 6 shows the initial BLUE Force layout and the general
direction of their movement.
5.1.5. Red plan
The RED Force was attempting to seize the town and airfield by force. The town’s airport
was required for future RED Force activities. The RED Force was determined to seize the
town for their use at all costs. It was a crucial part of their overall plan that would affect
future RED activities. Figure 7 shows the initial RED Force layout and the general direction
of their movement.
39
As part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint themselves
with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce potential learning curve effects. The
actions of RED and BLUE forces were scripted to be realistic and as consistent as possible
between individual runs, as opposed to trying to explore a wide set of varying circumstances.
Otherwise, it could become extremely difficult or even impossible to distinguish between
options if the main variable in the game happened to be, for example, RED behaviour.
Due to the large number of options tested, time constraints allowed for only three games per
option once the players were familiar with the game circumstances. For each interactive
game, 20 non-interactive replications were generated. Note that as in Scenario 2, the results
for the HMG and HMG/C6 options were combined, since the same primary weapon (.50 cal)
was used in both options and the C6, which was only available in the latter option, was not
utilized by the interactors owing to the fact that the RgOE and the strength of the opponent
rendered it insufficient. The combined option was assigned the call sign ‘HMG’. The number
of games and replications for the various options is shown in Table 14.
Table 14. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 3.
Scenario
Or Variant
Call Sign
Main Weapon
Total Games
Played
Open Terrain
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
20mm
ATGM
25mm cannon
LV 25mm cannon
.50 cal
40mm AGL
20mm cannon
ATGM
3
3
6
3
3
3
Total
Replications
Processed
60
60
120
60
60
60
The MOEs utilized in Scenario 2 (above) were repeated for Scenario 3 with some changes.
They consisted of:
•
BLUE Residual Combat Strength. As per Scenario 2, but without BLUE dismounts.
Only armoured vehicles contributed to BLUE RCS. The desired end state for this
MOE is 100%, corresponding to no BLUE vehicle losses; and
•
% RED Losses. As per Scenario 2, but without RED dismounts. Armoured vehicles
contributed 62.5% of the weight to this MOE, while soft-skinned vehicles filled in the
remaining 37.5%. The desired end state for this MOE is 100%, corresponding to
complete annihilation of the RED vehicles.
Table 15 contains the weights of individual MOEs arrived at in consultation between the
research team and the sponsor. These weights are the same as those chosen for Scenario 2
and, as described above, convey the relative importance of each MOE to the decision
40
concerning which option is better. The overall score of an option is determined by a weighted
sum of the individual MOEs. A sensitivity analysis was performed to quantify the dependence
of the outcome on the relative MOE weights that were chosen.
Weight (%)
70
%RED Losses
30
TOTAL
100
In keeping with Scenarios 1 and 2, the following MOPs were used:
a. Range of Engagement. The average killing distance for a given type of round, as per
Scenarios 1 and 2; and
b. Ammunition Effectiveness. The total number of vehicle kills divided by the total
number of bursts of a given ammunition type fired for the entire set of games. Note
that there were no dismounts in this scenario, meaning that only one type of
ammunition was used for each weapon. To obtain the (effective) lethality per round,
divide by the number of rounds in a burst (see Section 1.4).
5.2.
5.2.1. Game history
difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE plans.
The following J&I were gathered during gaming of Scenario 3:
i.
The best option for this scenario seemed to be the Baseline option. It was noticed that
the earlier RED was engaged and destroyed, the better;
ii.
The worst option seemed to be the HMG option. The .50 cal heavy HMG was not
able to kill the RED Force vehicles quickly enough;
iii.
This scenario allowed for open, long range engagements. It was observed that those
weapon systems capable of effective long range engagements faired the best. In
particular, this was noticed with the 20 mm as it had a shorter range and less
effectiveness in comparison to the 25 mm;
41
iv.
The ATGM seemed to be effective, but it would always run out of ammunition (two
missiles only). Once this occurred, the depleted vehicle could not further contribute to
the remainder of the conflict; and
v.
The BMP-2 was a formidable target; it was the most difficult RED target to destroy.
Consequently, the BMP-2 destroyed a large number of LAVs.
The quantitative results summarize statistical measurements made on the game replications of
Scenario 3 to reveal how well the options could be utilized by BLUE to meet mission goals.
Simply stated, the goal was to engage and eliminate RED, causing maximal damage at
minimal expense.
Table 16 shows the MOE results for Scenario 3. Note that since this scenario did not involve
dismounts, the C6, a secondary weapon for several options and the only available weapon for
one of them, was not utilized. This fact made the HMG/C6 and HMG options functionally
equivalent. Thus they are shown in combination. Furthermore, the C6 option was not gamed
since the weapon does not provide sufficient firepower against armoured vehicles.
The ranking of the options was categorical and was based on significance testing via
BRANDO, as per Scenario 2. Note that 95% confidence intervals are shown in Table 16 to
illustrate the amount of variation in the replication sets; they were not specifically used to
rank the options (see Section 2.3.2).
Scenario
Open
Terrain
Call Sign
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
20mm
ATGM
Main Weapon
BLUE
RCS
%RED
Losses
weights
25mm cannon
LV 25mm cannon
.50 cal
40mm AGL
20mm cannon
ATGM
70%
60 ± 7
77 ± 4
53 ± 5
70 ± 4
57 ± 7
44 ± 5
30%
89 ± 3
90 ± 2
86 ± 3
90 ± 2
78 ± 5
73 ± 5
Total
Score
(0..100)
Rank
69 ± 5
81 ± 3
63 ± 4
76 ± 3
63 ± 6
52 ± 5
221
1
2
1
2
3
Table 17 shows the MOPs for the primary weapon of each option applied to Scenario 3. Note,
as mentioned above, that the C6 was not employed as a primary or secondary weapon in this
scenario due to its lack of lethality against armoured vehicle targets.
The range of engagement was comparable for the 25 mm, LV 25 mm and 40 mm AGL at
approximately 1100 m. The .50 cal, 20 mm and ATGM engagements occurred at closer
ranges on average, entering in at approximately 850 m, 940 m and 770 m respectively.
21
The rank of this option is questionable due to an anomalous game, as discussed later in this Section
and in the Summary (Section 5.4).
42
In terms of weapon lethality against vehicles, the ATGM topped the list at 0.7 kills/burst
(missile). This coupled with the RgOE results for the ATGM vs. other weapons suggests that
perhaps it could have been used more effectively—the ATGM is effective at longer ranges
than employed and the RgOE results indicate that opportunities for engaging RED at such
ranges existed. The 25 mm APFSDS-T 3-round burst and the .50 cal AP 7-round burst were
comparable at 0.3 kills/burst, and the remaining weapons (LV 25 mm, 40 mm AGL and 20
mm) measured approximately 0.2 kills/burst.
Scenario
Open
Terrain
Call Sign
Main Weapon
Ammo
Round
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
20mm
ATGM
25mm cannon
LV 25mm cannon
.50 cal
40mm AGL
20mm cannon
ATGM
APFSDS-T
AP
AP
HEDP-AP
APDS
Std
RgOE (m)
1116 ± 39
1094 ± 31
853 ± 23
1062 ± 43
941 ± 36
765 ± 51
Ammo
Effectiveness
(kills/burst)
0.28
0.21
0.29
0.22
0.21
0.70
The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options both ranked number 1 in the MOE table (Table 16).
In the second-ranked category, the HMG option and 20 mm option were roughly equivalent in
performance (both had a mean score of 63). As evidenced in Table 17, the marginally superior
lethality of the .50 cal 7-round burst was offset by a shorter range of engagement compared to
the 20 mm 3-round burst. The Baseline option was also ranked second, with the mean score
falling roughly midway between the other second-ranked options and that of the 40mm AGL.
The third-ranked category was filled solely by the ATGM option. As noted in the J&I
(above), the two ATGMs available per vehicle did not provide sufficient firepower to allow
BLUE to prevail in a head-on confrontation with the RED Force.
Had the lone C6 option been tested in Scenario 3, it surely would have ranked last, since no
RED kills would have been possible under the given circumstances.
It is surprising that the Baseline option (25 mm/C6) ranked lower on the MOE scale than the
LV25mm/C6. A model feature comparison with the LV 25 mm suggests that, in this scenario,
it should have done at least as well (better sensors, more lethal weapon). This conclusion is
further supported by J&I and the recorded lethality (Ammunition Effectiveness MOP is higher
for the 25 mm round, see Table 17). One reason that the LV 25 mm faired better than the
baseline 25 mm option was that significantly more LV rounds were fired down range (11.4%
vs. 8.4% of 105 available rounds per vehicle, on average). Even taking this into account,
however, evidence suggests that an unusual or unlikely game may have swayed the results.
Indeed, closer analysis of the individual games revealed an anomaly—in replications of the
first game of the Baseline option series, BLUE suffered unusually high casualties and BLUE
RCS came in at only 30%. Also, on average, replications of this game lasted nearly twice as
long as replications of the other two games with most of the BLUE casualties occurring long
after the other games had finished. This particular game turned out, by far, to exhibit the
largest deviation of any MOE within all of the Scenario 3 gaming sets. It is not unusual for
individual games to exhibit high variability, and with only three games played for each option,
43
one somewhat extreme result can have a large influence on the averaged quantities of interest.
Unfortunately, time and resource constraints did not permit more games to better stabilize
such effects. At any rate, it is worth noting that if the single, extreme game is dropped, the
Baseline option falls in line with the LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options as top-ranked. Having
said that, there is not enough evidence to simply do so and the point is discussed further in the
Summary (Section 5.4 below).
5.3.
Following is a sensitivity analysis of the MOE results for Scenario 3, focusing on the
influence of the assigned weights on the final rankings. The same four possibilities were
considered as in Scenario 2.
Table 18 contains a summary of scores and final rankings for the options in Scenario 3. The
final rankings for all variations in the weighting scheme are identical to those obtained for the
(unaltered) primary study weights (Table 16). The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options were
consistently top-ranked, Baseline, 20 mm and HMG options were mid-ranked, and the ATGM
option faired the worst in every case. Thus it can be concluded that the rankings for Scenario
3 are robust, and independent of wide variations in the assigned MOE weights. As a final
note, BLUE RCS was the better discriminator of the two MOEs, exhibiting a greater range of
variation than %RED Losses.
Table 18. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 3.
Scenario
Open
Terrain
5.4.
Call Sign
Baseline
LV25mm/C6
HMG
AGL/C6
20mm
ATGM
Total Score
Rank
Total Score
Rank
Total Score
Rank
Equal
Weights
75 ± 4
83 ± 3
70 ± 5
80 ± 3
68 ± 5
58 ± 4
Equal
Weights
2
1
2
1
2
3
B80
R20
66 ± 6
80 ± 3
60 ± 6
74 ± 4
61 ± 6
50 ± 5
B80
R20
2
1
2
1
2
3
B20
R80
83 ± 3
87 ± 2
80 ± 4
86 ± 2
74 ± 5
67 ± 4
B20
R80
2
1
2
1
2
3
J&I combined with quantitative results establish the following two options as top performers
in the Open Terrain scenario: LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6. Fidelity limits prohibit finer
distinction between these options based solely on the MOEs of the Scenario 3 wargame.
Mid-level performers consisted of the HMG and 20 mm options, both of which yielded
comparable performance results. The .50 calibre HMG option yielded higher weapon
lethality; however, it was at the expense of a closer range of engagement. The Baseline (25
mm cannon) was also mid-ranked. However, as an indicator of how well the weapon would
perform in this scenario, this ranking is suspect since 1) it directly contradicts J&I where it
was stated that Baseline option was the best; 2) the 25 mm cannon is modeled as a superior
weapon to the LV 25 mm cannon for this scenario (which was top-ranked); 3) The sensing for
44
the Baseline option is superior to that of the RWS options; and 4) a single, anomalously bad
game for BLUE is driving the statistical measures below the top-ranked threshold. Bearing in
mind all of the evidence, the author’s judge that realistically, the 25 mm cannon may be
considered as a top option for this scenario relative to the other weapon systems. For purposes
of evaluation in this study, however, the given ranking for the Baseline option must stand as is
(2).
The bottom performer of the options gamed was the ATGM option, owing to the fact that
only two ATGM missiles were available and the setting was a head-on confrontation with no
plans to disengage. Also, the range of engagement was the shortest, thus exposing BLUE to
higher lethality from RED weaponry. Given the high kill probability of the ATGM, it may yet
prove its worth as a controlled withdrawal weapon for disengaging the enemy, or in support of
other firepower assets.
On the whole, under the primary weighting scheme the total option scores varied up to 29%—
higher than the variation observed in Scenarios 1 and 2. The variation was mainly due to
BLUE RCS for all but the 20 mm cannon and ATGM options, which had a low result for the
RED LOSSES MOE. BLUE could expect to lose anywhere from three to seven of the twelve
available vehicles in total depending on the weapon selection—a figure that is certainly high
enough to be of practical concern.
The sensitivity analysis revealed that, overall, the results are robust over a wide range of MOE
weight assignments.
45
6. Summary and recommendations
6.1.
Summary
Overall in the three scenarios, the baseline weapon/turret mix, consisting of the 25 mm
cannon and co-axial C6 machine gun mounted on a two-man turret, was the most consistent
high-ranking performer (see Table 19 for a comparison of the (unaltered) rankings). This was
most evident in Scenario 1, which was typified by close-quarters urban combat. In that
scenario, both of the .50 calibre HMG options, with or without the C6, also performed well.
Next, the AGL/C6 option performed reasonably well compared to the top Scenario 1 options.
Lastly, the LV25mm/C6 and C6 options were the worst options for Scenario 1. Differentiation
in Scenario 1 results is mostly based on BLUE RCS and the ability of BLUE to effectively
eliminate the RPG gunners, since %RED Losses were comparable across all of the options.
These results for Scenario 1 are consistent with J&I, where it was indicated that having an
extra sensor available was advantageous when employing the Baseline option, and the limited
effectiveness of the AGL/C6 option was mainly due to the close ranges and the arming
distance required for the 40 mm AGL. The poor performance of the LV25mm/C6 option was
not commented on in the J&I, however post-analysis discussions suggested that it was
possibly caused by the lower performance of LV 25 mm AB rounds compared to both
standard 25 mm (lower penetrability) and 40 mm HE rounds (lower explosive power). This
lack of anti-structure capability provided the RPG gunners with a better chance of engaging
the LAVs while hidden behind walls or on rooftops. In Scenario 1 it was noted that, at the
time of writing, programmable airburst munitions (PABM) having significant penetrating
power are under development for a Lightweight 25mm cannon (see Footnote 16). The
availability of such a round could significantly increase the performance of the notional
LV25mm in urban terrain.
Table 19. Rank Category Tally for Main Weapons Common to All Scenarios.
Main Weapon
Baseline
25mm
LV25mm
AGL
HMG
# scenarios option was top-ranked
2
2
2
0*
# scenarios option was ranked second
1
0
0
3
# scenarios option was ranked third or below
0
1
1
0
Counts
*The HMG option was very nearly in the top-ranked group in Scenario 1, whereas the HMG/C6 option clearly ranked second.
The situation changes somewhat when moving to more open terrain and longer ranges. In
part, this was due to a lesser distinction between SA derived from Baseline versus RWS
sensor configurations coupled with a reduced requirement to penetrate structures that provide
cover for RED.
J&I combined with quantitative results establish the following three options as top performers
in both the Open Urban (Scenario 2) and the Open Terrain (Scenario 3) scenarios: Baseline
(25 mm / C6), LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6. Fidelity limits prohibit finer distinction between
the latter two options based solely on the MOEs of the two scenarios, however, the Baseline
option came in a close second in Scenario 3. Looking at the MOPs does not help to further
46
distinguish between the options; overall average killing distances and effective weapon
lethalities were comparable for all three options.
Mid-level performers in Scenarios 2 and 3 consisted of the HMG and 20 mm options, both of
which yielded comparable performance results in Scenario 3 (recall that the 20 mm was not
gamed in Scenario 2). The .50 calibre HMG options yielded higher weapon lethality;
however, it was at the expense of a closer range of engagement.
The bottom performer in Scenario 2 was judged to be the C6. It was not effective against
armoured vehicles and thus exposed an unacceptable vulnerability to the RED forces. Had
RED sent their armoured vehicles on attack and disengaged the remainder of their assets,
results suggest that BLUE may have been obliterated and few losses would have been
incurred by RED. The bottom performer in Scenario 3 was the ATGM option, owing to the
fact that only two ATGM missiles were available and the setting was a head-on confrontation
with no plans to disengage.
The sensitivity analysis for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 revealed that, overall, these results are robust
over a wide range of MOE weight assignments.
Taking both the qualitative and quantitative results from all three scenarios into account, in
addition to their sensitivities, it appears as though the Baseline option is the favoured choice
overall. However, it must be noted that differences in the performance of the Baseline option
compared to the HMG option in Scenario 1 were not profound, and neither were differences
between the Baseline option and the LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options in Scenarios 2 & 3.
The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options are particularly strong contenders; however, their
function in a close urban environment must be further assessed and possibly supplemented if
employed. In particular, ammunition for the LV 25mm with a higher lethality against
insurgents utilizing structures for cover would improve weapon performance in the urban
setting. The HMG and 20 mm options were mid-ranked overall, while the C6 and ATGM
options faired poorly. Note that since the C6 can only be considered as viable against
dismounts and the ATGM option is only viable against vehicles in open terrain, this coupled
with the fact that each performed poorly indicates that a combined ATGM / C6 option would
not fair well in the scenarios gamed in this study.
A few caveats must be included at this point to aid the comparison between the 40 mm AGL
and the LV 25 mm Cannon. First, an added consideration in extended range, open terrain
scenarios is that use of the 40 mm AGL may be increasingly problematic at longer ranges
against fast moving targets due to the low velocity and curved trajectory of these rounds, and
consequently their long flight time. This did not appear to be overly significant in the modeled
scenarios, but the results are subject to the fidelity limits of the represented entities and thus a
more in-depth analysis of the utility of the 40 mm AGL as an effective weapon against
moving targets at extended ranges would be prudent. Although hit and kill probabilities are
discounted in CAEn based on the motion of the firer and the target, an in-depth study of this
aspect of the wargame was not performed. Such a study must take into account any fire
control systems employed and the method of target acquisition for dismount and vehicle sized
targets at all required ranges (e.g., RWS synthetic vision sensor system vs. natural vision in a
‘hatches up’, limited viewing arc configuration). Second, lack of a dual feed mechanism for
the AGL limits its flexibility for most RWS systems in comparison to the LV 25 mm Cannon.
Third, the apparent LV 25 mm deficiency in urban terrain potentially could be remedied in the
near future via programmable airburst munitions (PABM) having significant penetrating
power. Such rounds are known to be under development at the time of writing by ATK Inc.
for their Lightweight 25 mm Cannon.
47
A final, but important point needs to be made here. The mechanism and synthetic vision
sensors of the RWS are more vulnerable than the ones protected by a turret. Thus the
likelihood of a firepower kill might be higher than considered in this study. Furthermore, the
RWS might be disabled using small arms (such as assault rifles or light machine guns) that
would not damage the current turret. With this knowledge, RED might try to target the RWS
(top of the vehicle), rather than firing at the centre of the mass as is assumed in CAEn. This is
something that should be considered carefully when evaluating vehicle kill probabilities for
future studies. On the other hand, for the baseline two-man turret, the ‘eyeball’ sensors could
not be destroyed either. Personnel kills via small arms fire for crew members in the turret
were not modeled.
6.2.
Recommendations
According to the quantitative results of the three scenarios gamed and also the judgement and
insights of the wargame interactors, the current weapon and turret configuration of the LAV
III fighting vehicle is the most robust choice overall in comparison to the other options
gamed. However, in most cases the differences in performance between leading and nearleading options, although statistically significant, were not profound. Several RWS options
were comparable to the baseline in some of the scenarios, most notably when fitted with either
an LV 25 mm cannon or 40 mm AGL in more open terrain (Scenarios 2 and 3), and to a lesser
extent the .50 cal HMG in close urban combat (Scenario 1). None of the alternative options
scored consistently high in all three scenarios. Note that the 20 mm cannon cannot enter into
the overall evaluation since it was only present as an excursion in Scenario 3 (where it ranked
second). The LV 25 mm cannon, although a strong contender in Scenarios 2 and 3, performed
poorly in the close-action urban environment of Scenario 1. This seemed to be related to the
insufficient anti-structure capability of the modeled airburst ammunition utilized for this
weapon system which made it difficult to kill insurgents using walls or other structures as
cover. Coupled with the fact that the .50 cal HMG was mid- or bottom-ranked in the open
terrain scenarios when fighting armoured vehicles, and setting all scenarios as equally
important, the wargame results indicate that the best alternative to the current 25mm / C6
weapon system is the 40 mm AGL / C6. This weapon system was top-ranked in Scenarios 2
and 3 alongside the LV 25 mm / C6 option, and ranked third in Scenario 1 above the LV 25
mm / C6 option. AGL use in Scenario 1 had distinctive benefits and drawbacks. On the
positive side, 40 mm airburst rounds were lobbed over structures and made to effectively
impact hidden, dismounted enemies behind walls or on rooftops. On the negative side, the
close-action combat of Scenario 1 was impeded by the arming distance of the 40 mm AGL,
which was set to 36 m in the CAEn database. In this case the co-axial C6 MG was required to
engage proximal targets.
From a turret/weapon mix effectiveness perspective, it is recommended that the current
configuration of the LAV III be maintained or improved upon through upgrades.
Also, it is recommended that before any of the RWS options are adopted, that sensing aspects
at all relevant ranges, in simple and complex terrains, be studied more thoroughly in terms of
the differences between synthetic vision and natural vision (eyeballs) when scanning the
environment to acquire targets under realistic restrictions for viewing arcs (see reference [12]
for preliminary work in this area). In addition, the nature of the vulnerability of the RWS to
small arms fire requires more in-depth study. This vulnerability must be assessed for any
RWS candidate under consideration before a final acquisition decision is made. Lastly, new
developments in 25 mm low velocity ammunition should be monitored closely.
48
Future Work
As a final note, it is recommended that environment-specific human factors considerations be
explored more carefully to better capture the nuances of target acquisition and time to having
a round on target under the operating constraints of the various turret/weapon/sensor
combinations under consideration, whatever they might consist of in future studies.
49
50
7. References
1. Pond G., Chapman B., Cazzolato F. (2009), A General Comparison Between Remote
Weapon Stations, Remote Turrets and Conventional Turrets (U), (DRDC CORA (under
review)) Defence R&D Canada - CORA..
2. Alliant Techsystems Inc. (online), ATK gun systems,
http://www.atk.com/ammo_PDFs/gunsystems.pdf (Access Date: August 2009)
3. Bernier, M.Y. (2001), CAEn Post-gaming Analysis (PGA) Tool (U), (DRDC ORD RN
2001/03) Defence R&D Canada - ORD.
4. Bernier, M.Y. and Jensen, G.K. (2005), CAEnXP Training Program (U), (DRDC ORD
TM 2005-16) Defence R&D Canada - ORD.
5. Jane’s Armour and Artillery, Jane’s Data Services, 2007-2008; Jane’s Ammunition
Handbook, Jane’s Data Services, 2007-2008; Jane’s Electro-Optic Systems, Jane’s Data
Services, 2008-2009; Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Data Services, 2008-2009.
6. Jensen, G.K. and Dobias, P. (2009), The DRDC CORA CAEn Database Documentation
v3.0 Volume I: Units, Weapons, Sensors and Ammunition (U), (DRDC CORA TN
2009-001) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.
7. Woodill, G. and Bassindale, S. (2006), Titanium Mongoose: Portable Multiple Effects
Weapon Study (U), (DRDC CORA TR 2006-21) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.
8. Box, G.E.P, Hunter, J.S., Hunter, W.G (2005), Statistics for experimenters: Design,
Innovation, and Discovery, Wiley, ISBN 978-0-471-71813-0, 2005.
9. Emond, E.J. and Turnbull, A.E. (2006), BRANDO: Breakpoint Analysis with
Nonparametric Data Option (U), (DRDC CORA TM 2006-40) Defence R&D Canada CORA.
10. P. Dobias, K. Sprague, G. Woodill, P. Cleophas, W. Noordkamp (2008), Measures of
Effectiveness and Performance in Tactical Combat Modeling (U), (DRDC CORA TM
2008-032) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.
11. LAV Company Tactics (Interim), B-GL-321-007/FP-001, DND/MDN 2003.
http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/B-GL-321-007-FP-001.pdf
12. Unrau, D. and Pyke, A. (2009), Final Report – TAPV Task Network Modelling: IPME
Based Task Network Modelling for the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle Project,
(under revision at time of writing), Defence R&D Canada.
51
52
List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms
AA
AB
AGL
AP
APC
APDST
APFSDS-T
ATGM
BMP
BRANDO
BRDM
BTR
CAEn
CF
CORA
DGLCD
DLR
DND
DRDC
ERA
FOV
HE
HEAT
HEDP-AP
HEIT
HMG
IED
J&I
LAV
LCDORT
LFORT
LV
MCDA
MMG
MOE
MOP
NFOV
Anti armour
Air burst
Automatic grenade launcher
Armour piercing
Armoured personnel carrier
Armour piercing discarding sabot – tracer
Armoured piercing fin stabilized discarding sabot – tracer
Anti-tank guided missile
Boyevaya Mashina Pechoty, meaning “fighting vehicle of infantry”
Breakpoint Analysis with Nonparametric Data Option
Boyevaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina, meaning “Combat
Reconnaissance Patrol Vehicle”
Bronetransportyor, meaning “armoured transporter”
Close Action Environment
Canadian Forces
Centre for Operational Research and Analysis
Director General of Land Capability Development
Director of Land Requirements
Department of National Defence
Defence Research and Development Canada
Explosive reactive armour
Field of view
High Explosive
High explosive anti-tank
High explosive dual purpose – armour piercing
High explosive incendiary tracer
Heavy Machine Gun
Improvised Explosive Device
Judgements and Insights
Light armoured vehicle
Land Capability Development Operational Research Team
Land Forces Operational Research Team
Low velocity
Multi-criteria decision analysis
Medium machine gun
Measure of Performance
Narrow field of view
53
OR
RCS
RgOE
RPG
RWS
SB
SME
SSKP
TAPV
TTP
54
Operational Research
Residual Combat Strength
Range of Engagement
Rocket-Propelled Grenade
Remote Weapon Station
Suicide Bomber
Subject Matter Expert
Single-shot kill probability
Tactical armoured patrol vehicle
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
Distribution List
Internal
Dr. Peter Dobias (hard copy, CD)
Dr. Kevin Sprague (hard copy, CD)
Maj Steve Bassindale (hard copy, CD)
DG DRDC CORA (CD)
DDG DRDC CORA (CD)
Chief Scientist DRDC CORA (CD)
Section Head, Land and Operational Commands (email)
LFORT (CD, hard copy)
LCDORT (CD)
CEFCOM ORT (CD)
CANSOFCOM ORT (CD)
CanadaCOM ORT (CD)
DRDC CORA Library (Hard copy, CD)
Total internal copies: 13
External
ADM(S&T) (for distribution) (CD)
DRDKIM 3 (CD)
Director S&T Land (CD)
DG DRDC Valcartier (CD)
CF College Library
Fort Frontenac Library
CFANS Library
COS(Ops) [DGLS] (BGen Poulter) (e-mail)
COS(Strat) [DGLCD] (BGen Tremblay) (e-mail)
COS LFDTS (Col MacLean) (e-mail)
DLS [DLSP] (Col M Lavoie) (e-mail)
G3 [DLFR] (Col C King) (e-mail)
DLCD (Col Crosman) (e-mail)
DLR (Col Lanthier) (CD, hard copy)
DLSE (LCol Bassarab) (e-mail)
DLSE 4 (LCol Lefebvre) (e-mail)
DLR 3 (Maj Sauvé) (e-mail, hard copy)
DLFD (Col Harvey) (e-mail)
DLCI (Col Saulnier) (e-mail)
DAT (Col Thomas) (e-mail)
DAD (Col Rutherford) (e-mail)
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
55
UNCLASSIFIED
International
Dr David Galligan (CD, e-mail),
Head Operations Analysis,
Defence Technology Agency,
HMNZ Naval Base Auckland,
Private Bag 32901
Auckland, New Zealand
e-mail: [email protected]
Document Exchange Manager (CD)
DSTO Research Library
Defence Science & Technology Organisation
PO Box 44
Pyrmont NSW 2009, AUSTRALIA
Dr. Jason Field (CD)
Land Battlespace Systems
Dstl Integrated Systems
Fort Halstead
Sevenoaks, Kent, UK, TN147BP
(for dist’n and library) (CD)
Chief Technologist
Land Battlespace Systems
Dstl Integrated Systems
Room 31, Bldg A3, Fort Halstead
Sevenoaks, Kent, UK, TN14 7BP
Mr. Bob Barbier (CD)
TNO Defence, Security and Safety
Information and Operations
P.O. Box 96864, 2509 JG
The Hague, The Netherlands
Director, US AMSAA (CD)
ATTN: AMSRD-AMS-S)
392 Hopkins Road
APG, MD 21005-5071
Mr. Patrick O’Neill (CD)
Chief, Combat Support Analysis Division
USAMSAA (ATTN: AMSRD-AMS-S)
392 Hopkins Road
APG, MD 21005-5071
Dr. James T. Treharne (CD)
OCA Division
Center for Army Analysis
6001 Goethals Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230
Mr. Robert Barrett (CD)
Chief, International Activities
Center for Army Analysis
6001 Goethals Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230
Dr. Neville J Curtis (CD)
Research Leader Land Operations Research
75 Labs
Land Operations Division
PO Box 1500
Edinburgh SA 5111, AUSTRALIA
Mr. John Hughes (CD)
HQ, TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC)
Programs & Resources Directorate (PRD)
255 Sedgwick Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2345
Total external copies: 32
Total copies: 45
56
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM
(highest classification of Title, Abstract, Keywords)
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)
1. ORIGINATOR (the name and address of the organization preparing the
document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared e.g.
Establishment Sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are
entered in Section 8).
DRDC CORA
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2
3.
2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (overall security classification of the
document, including special warning terms if applicable)
UNCLASSIFIED
TITLE (the complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in
parentheses after the title)
Weapon System Effectiveness for the LAV III Life Extension Program: CAEn Wargame Nickel Tiger (U)
4.
AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials—ranks, titles, initials not to be used)
Dobias, P., Sprague, K., Bassindale, S., Sinclair, D., Demaine, J.
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (month Year of Publication of document)
September 2009
6a. NO OF PAGES 51
6b. NO OF REFS 12
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (the category of document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report e.g. interim,
progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)
Technical Memorandum
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (the name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development. Include the address).
CLS DGLCD/COS Land Strat; DRDC CORA / LFORT
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable research and
development project or grant number under which the document was
written. Please specify whether project or grant.)
N/A
9b. CONTRACT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable number under which the
document was written.)
N/A
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (the official document
number by which the document is identified by the originating activity.
This number must be unique to this document.)
10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NOS. (Any other numbers which may be assigned
this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)
(X) Unlimited distribution
( ) Distribution limited to defence departments and defence contractors: further distribution only as approved
( ) Distribution limited to defence departments and Canadian defence contractors; further distribution only as approved
( ) Distribution limited to government departments and agencies; further distribution only as approved
( ) Distribution limited to defence departments; further distribution only as approved
( ) Other (please specify):
12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document
Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in 11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.)
NONE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
13. ABSTRACT (a brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the
abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in
the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages
unless the test is bilingual).
The Chief of Staff Land Strategy requested that an operational research (OR) study be conducted to assess the
effectiveness of a light remote weapon station (RWS) mounted on a LAV III, in comparison to the current two-man
Delco turret. The Land Forces Operational Research Team (LFORT) consequently performed a wargame study to
compare the effectiveness of various weapon configurations for the RWS on LAV III vehicles in addition to the
currently used 25 mm cannon (baseline). The assessment was based on a series of modeled scenarios whereby the
vehicles performed convoy protection and patrol operations in complex urban and open terrains during daylight
conditions. The chosen locale allowed for ambush and chance encounters with insurgent forces to occur. The study
was denoted as NICKEL TIGER. The BLUE force consisted of either a LAV Platoon or Company and in some cases
involved BLUE dismounts. The RED force consisted of dismounts having machine guns or rocket-propelled grenades
(RPGs) at their disposal, in addition to soft-skinned vehicles and light armoured vehicles having either a medium
machine gun (MMG) or a 30mm cannon as the main weapon. In the study, the following weapon options were
considered for the RWS: a notional 25 mm low velocity (LV) cannon, a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL), a
.50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG), a 20 mm cannon, a 7.62 mm C6 machine gun, and anti-tank guided missiles
(ATGMs). The wargame results indicate that the current weapon/turret configuration for the LAV III is the best option
overall. The performances of the 25 mm LV cannon and 40 mm AGL were comparable to the baseline option in the
open terrain scenarios, but they proved less lethal in the urban scenarios, in part due to their lack of penetrability of
structures that were providing cover for dismounted insurgents. The .50 calibre performance was comparable to the
baseline option in the urban scenarios, but was not as effective in the open terrain scenarios. The 20 mm cannon was
evaluated as an excursion in a single, open terrain scenario. In that scenario, its overall performance was similar to that
of the .50 calibre HMG (beneath baseline, LV 25mm and 40mm AGL options).
14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in
cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name,
military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of
Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus-identified . If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of
each should be indicated as with the title.)
Remote weapon station
Weapon effectiveness
Wargame
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

weapon system effectiveness for the lav iii life extension program

Transcription

Similar documents

Round 1 - God Hates Charades

SCE 093 Twentieth Century Fox

Models, Optimality, Experts and Alternatives

Converting Johnny Reb Scenarios to RFF

STAW Weapon Zero Premium Figure

campaign update 01: aranda fall of the aranda astrologistical center

Crossroads - Lake County Board of DD

Web-Based Context-Aware Science Learning