The Naval Review

Transcription

The Naval Review

THE
NAVAL
REVIEW
TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND SPREADING WITHIN
THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER
ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had
formed a Naval Society:
Captain H. W. Richmond R.N.
Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N.
Commander the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett R.N.
Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N.
Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N.
Lieutenant H. G. Thursfield R.N.
Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A.
Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor)
It is only by the possession of a trained and
developed mind that the fullest capacity can,
as a rule, be obtained. There are, of course,
exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts
which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are
indeed rare. We are coming more and more to
recognise that the best specialist can be produced
only after a long training in general learning. The
grasp of principle which makes detail easy can
only come when innate capacity has been evoked
and moulded by high training.
Lord Haldane
Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance
with the Regulation printed herein, which should be
carefully studied.
Copyright under Act of 1911
Vol. 72
No. 1
JANUARY 1984
Contents
Page
EDITORIAL
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1
ARTICLES:
INTERDEPENDENCE: A DRUG OF ADDICTION?
PREPARATION OF SHIPS' COMPANIES FOR THE STRESS OF BATTLE
...
LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS -AN OPERATOR'S VIEW
...
...
...
...
...
...
MARITIME FORCES FOR THE FUTURE AS INDICATED BY THE FALKLANDS
EXPERIENCE
...
...
...
...
...
ASW. SLBMS AND THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE NAVY . . . . . .
...
...
...
RFA SIR GALAHAD -- THE DEMISE OF A GALLANT KNIGHT
...
...
...
WHY IS 'PWO' A DIRTY WORD?
...
THE VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
ANOTHER VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
THERE ARE JUST THREE THINGS
. . . . . .
...
...
...
...
THREE SWATOW LETTERS
...
...
...
...
...
...
CORRESPONDENCE . . . . . .
...
...
...
...
...
THE ROYAL DOCKYARDS
TECHNOLOGY
.
THROMBOSIS
.
GOTCHA!
MEA CULPA
LESSONS .
YACHTS AS STUFTS
OR SYMBIOSIS
.
THE SUBMERGED FLAT
.
NO
.
50 MIDDLE
.
THE
68
COST OF HIGH
.
LEARNING
COURTESY FLAGS FOR WARSHIPS
MORE
.
MODERN
EAST COMMANDO .
HMS GLORIOUS
REVIEWS -- I: NAVAL
PERIODICALS
AND OTHERS . . . . . .
REVIEWS -- 11: BOOKS . . . . . .
...
...
...
...
...
78
...
...
82
Editorial
The Annual General Meeting
T H E Annual General Meeting of The
Naval Review was held on 10 November
1983 at the Royal Naval Club. Reports on
the year noted the departure of a highly
popular and successful Editor in Rear
Admiral John Nunn; the continuance of the
South Atlantic Campaign as a major topic;
a high proportion of contributions coming
from the more junior officers; and steady
improvement in membership (see below)
and the financial position. The Naval
Review was judged to be in good heart.
The Trustees' decision on anonymity,
reported in the July 1983 issue, was
endorsed. Consequently, as before, we shall
publish over whatever byline the author
asks: nothing, a pseudonym, initials, name
or name and rank. In the last case, for
uniformity we shall use a standard format. If
an author does not specify his wishes, I shall
assume he wants to publish name and rank.
One further decision was made which
may change a few diaries. The Annual
General Meeting is to be shifted to the
summer. Consequently, by courtesy of the
Commanding Officer, the next Annual
General Meeting of The Naval Review will
be held on board HMS President in King's
Reach, London, at 5.30 pm on Wednesday
30 May 1984. The Wardroom Bar facilities
will be available after the meeting. Members
will be most welcome; they are asked to
identify themselves to the Quartermaster at
the top of the gangway as members of The
Naval Review.
Membership
Membership has been rising, but slowly,
and there must be many people - serving
officers particularly - who are not
members and who would get a great deal out
of joining for an outlay which is still
extremely modest. Moreover, an influx of
fresh minds would help us. If in 1984 every
one of our members recruited another, we
should be in an unprecedentedly strong
position. The Annual General Meeting fully
endorsed such a campaign, which was
suggested personally by our Chairman. So,
fellow-members, please: Recruit One More
in '84.
The Annual General Meeting also
endorsed the view that holders of Naval
Bursaries were entitled to membership and
would be most welcome as members.
This issue
Perceptive readers of our first article will
not be slow to see that I am bending the
guidelines set down in the last issue about
commissioned and submitted work, reprints
and so forth. However, no apology is
needed for reprinting Sir James Cable's
article from International Affairs, for it is
about the bedrock of strategy, a subject on
which we have been all too inclined to
accept the received wisdom.
On the Falklands, we are now well and
truly in the 'second-phase ball' stage. Piers'
wide-ranging article should provoke a few
tackles; J.M. W. and David Hart-Dyke have
covered more specific subjects from nearer
the base of the scrum. There is still a lot of
the field to cover.
Finally, an article on officers' training
appears over the signature of an officer
actually on the Principal Warfare Officers'
course. It is the first on such a subject for
some time, and particularly welcome even
to those who recall that The Naval Review
in some past years seemed to cover no topic
but officers' training. I hope more senior
readers will not be put off by the strings of
initials; we do publish glossaries from time
to time.
A long way after Voltaire
Those who know me will realise that there
are at least two contributions to this issue
with which I am in almost total
disagreement. This is a bullet an editor must
bite early, and say (a long way after
Voltaire) 'I disagree with what you say but I
will defend to the death your right to say it'.
That does not mean I shall, or can, print
2
EDITORIAL
everything; space does not always allow,
some contributions are not really
appropriate to the purposes of the Review,
and I do have a duty to protect members
from the nutty, the scurrilous and the
illiterate. If members think I am being overindulgent, or not indulgent enough, no
doubt they will let me know.
House style
There have been some helpful letters about
notes and references: too many for
individual reply, and contributors are asked
to accept this column's
grateful
acknowledgement by way of thanks. In
consequence I should be grateful if writers of
articles would note the following guidelines.
We shall use endnotes, not footnotes. An
endnote will be indicated by a small raised
figure at the appropriate place in the text.
Each endnote should contain enough
information to identify the reference: at
least the author, book title (or article title
and publication) and page reference. A date
is often useful, and essential for references
to articles in periodicals. Further endnotes
referring to the same work can, of course,
use the well-known if not well-loved
conventions such as 'op. cit. supran. 32'. . . .
In consequence of these guidelines we
shall not print bibliographies or lists of
references. Oh, and another thing about the
use of endnotes: if in doubt - don't.
Gift
A most generous gift of f 150 has been
received from Mr John Lott, an Australian
Member. It was made with no strings at all
and so has been added to our general funds;
it was most welcome, and is acknowledged
with gratitude.
Guinness Prize 1983
There were no less than ten candidates this
year for the Captain Guinness Prize,
generously awarded for an article written by
an officer of Lieutenant's rank or below.
This was a splendid situation to be in, but it
made selection difficult. In the end the
choice fell between a piece of what used to
be called Fine Writing and a cogent,
straight-forward account of an aspect of
battle; and for the life of me I could not
separate the two. The award is therefore
split (in accordance with precedent)
between Sub-Lieutenant John Gilbert for
his article 'Now that the War is Over' in the
July issue, and Lieutenant T. D. Cairns for
his article 'Operation Corporate - an Air
Operations Officer's Experiences' in the
April issue. Congratulations, and £50, to
each.
Exmouth Term 1913
Captain Godfrey French, CBE, a member
since 1919 and a great supporter of The
Naval Review, has sent me a copy of the
Seventieth Anniversary Booklet of
Exmouth Term, which joined the Royal
Naval College in May 1913. They have kept
16 anniversaries of this date since their 25th
in 1938. From all the more recent ones, a
loyal message of greeting has been sent to
Her Majesty the Queen.
The term had many distinguished
members, including Admiral of the Fleet
the Earl Mountbatten of Burma. But not
the least notable of its achievements was
this marvellous display of corporate pride
and loyalty, an example to us all. Exmouths
1913, a salute is due to you.
Interdependence: a drug of addiction?
(This article first appeared in International
Affairs, Summer 1983, and is reproduced
by kind permission of the author and
publishers, Butterworth and Co. Ltd. Editor).
NTERDEPENDENCE is the convenient
slogan commonly employed today to
explain and justify Britain's external
policies - economic, military and political
- the euphemism that masks the reality
of dependence and of the progressive,
if still partial, surrender of British
sovereignty.
The word can, of course, be given other
meanings. One of them is an equilibrium in
which, for any given state, the dependence
of national decisions on foreign views is
balanced by the dependence -of foreign
decisions on national views. An
equilibrium, however, can only be
distinguished from qualified independence,
on the one hand, or qualified dependence,
on the other, if the point of balance can be
accurately determined. In the rough
relativities of politics a concept so absolute
and so imprecise as interdependence is as
hard to establish in principle as it is to attain
in practice. It is at best an aspiration (as in
de Gaulle's proposal for an American British -French directorate of the Alliance)
and more often an excuse. '
Interde~endencecan also be regarded
., as
describing one of the characteristics of
international society. As Macaulay put it, in
1842:
in order that he [Frederick the Great]
might rob a neighbour whom he had
promised to defend, black men fought
on the coast of Coromandel, and red
men scalped each other by the Great
Lakes of North America.
The significance of this interdependence,
however, derives not from its objective
nature, but from the differing responses of
particular states. We are all individually
dependent on electricity, but for some of us
this is a luxury that operates the television
I
set; for others it is so vital that we instal an
emergency generator - if we can afford it;
while some aged pensioners can neither pay
the quarterly account nor change a bulb
without assistance.
Dependence and independence are more
useful concepts. Neither is ever absolute,
but they provide the two ends of a scale
which offers one way of comparing the
nations of the world. Near the middle, of
course, the gradations are often too small
to be read with much precision or
objectivity, but nobody would deny that the
Soviet Union is more independent than
Gibraltar. The test is perceived vulnerability
to the external environment and the
methods chosen for reducing that
vulnerability. Neither is objectively
determined. It could be argued, for
instance, that the Soviet leaders perceive
their country as more vulnerable than it
really is. Their preference for self-reliance
as the appropriate response is, however,
matched by Switzerland, for whom even
membership of the United Nations seems
an unacceptable derogation from
independence.
Naturally objective factors do influence
any choice between the advantages and
constraints of external assistance on the one
hand and the freedom and cost of selfreliance on the other. The conventional
wisdom, for instance, regards the
dependence so characteristic of Britain's
postwar policies as an inevitable response to
objectively established changes in the
international environment. An alternative
view, which this article seeks to explore, is
that dependence, dignified with the name of
interdependence, was an option which
Britain, together with some other countries,
happened to prefer. There were strong
arguments to support the choice, but they
were neither universally accepted nor
everywhere carried to such extreme
conclusions.
France, for instance, does not rely on
anyone else for her nuclear weapons; allow
I
I
I
I
4
INTERDEPENDENCE: A DRUG O F ADDICTION?
foreign military bases on her territory;
commit her forces to foreign command; run
to the International Monetary Fund for
loans with strings; often conform to
decisions reached without her consent or
send her prime ministers and opposition
leaders to kiss hands in Washington on the
occasion of their appointment.
France, admittedly, is now a richer
country than Britain. Is this cause or effect?
The attraction of external assistance is that
it reduces the need for domestic effort, a
therapeutic effect which may be
indispensable if the effort in question is
manifestly impossible, but which can
become habit-forming when it is not.
Causes of dependence
Britain's need for external assistance has
naturally varied from one period, and one
contingency, to another, but has tended to
increase as fast as its strength in relation to
other countries has diminished. The root
cause seems to have been relative economic
decline. That process began over a century
ago. Some of the reasons were external and
obvious, such as the maturing industrialization of countries with larger populations
and greater natural resources. The internal
reasons, generally agreed to have been no
less important, are more controversial.
Scientific principles suggest that preference
should be accorded to those explanations
first advanced as predictions rather than to
retrospective analysis.
In 1870, for instance, Lyon Playfair
warned the Philosophical Institution of
Edinburgh that 'this country is losing her
position among manufacturing nations the industrial supremacy of England is
endangered for lack of knowledge, in spite
of the practical aptitudes of her people'.'
He had profited from the growing
importance of his public position to
disseminate similar warnings ever since 1852
and he continued to do so until his death in
1898. His words were not unheeded, but
they evoked insufficient response from
their complacent audience. In 1871, after
all, the British output of pig iron exceeded
that of the rest of the world. Even then,
however, steel was becoming more
important and the following ratios illustrate
Britain's relative decline: United States,
Germany, Britain (1880) 1: 1:1; (1900)
10:6:5; (1913) 4:2:1.' What was even more
important was that the high technology
industries (into which Britain might have
diversified) were being increasingly
developed abroad: chemicals, automotive
p r o p u l s i o n , electricity, scientific
instruments, new inventions. Playfair had
all too much reason for his question (to the
British Association for the Advancement of
Science in 1885): 'how is it that we find
whole branches of manufacture, when they
depend on scientific knowledge, passing
away from this country in which they
originated, in order to engraft themselves
abroad, although their decaying roots
remain at home?'6 In 1983 his question can
still be asked and still awaits an answer,
though Playfair had indicated his own in
1870: 'let me ask you seriously whether you
think that this country can continue in a
career of prosperity, when she is the only
leading state in Europe that is neglecting the
higher education of the working classes,
and of those men above them whose duty it
is to superintend their labour?"
Playfair's prescription may have been
incomplete - historians have retrospectively suggested additional remedies - but the
accuracy of his prognosis has received a
confirmation too melancholy to bear
recapitulation. Nor did he confine his view
that 'the competition of the world has
become a competition of i n t e l l e ~ t 'to
~ the
purely economic sphere. Although
personally hostile to the very idea of war
and even to defence expenditure, he
attributed the outcome of the FrancoPrussian War to the fact that illiteracy in
France was 28 per cent, but in Germany
only 3 per cent. 'Knowledge is as important
as valour in modern combats'. lo
It would be going too far to argue that,
from the final quarter of the last century,
Britain had a real choice between a
domestic process of drastic modernization
and an external process of alleviating her
difficulties through the acceptance of
increasing dependence. Choices do not exist
in practical politics unless those who have to
make them clearly perceive the necessity, the
nature, the extent and the feasibility of the
choice. There was such a perception at much
the same period in Japan. So there was, after
1917, in Russia. In both countries, however,
only exceptional circumstances permitted so
decisive a preference for social transformation. It would thus be unfair to judge
British governments by such examples, not
least because of the exorbitant cost in human
suffering of Soviet independence.
Moreover, for most of the twentieth century
(the two world wars excepted) it was usually
possible for British governments to take the
comfortable view that Britain's problems
were sectoral, transitional and of external
origin and that they themselves were already
doing as much as could reasonably be
expected to solve them.
Between the Boer War and the Great War,
for instance, the army and navy were
extensively modernized, education was
improved and certain social reforms
initiated. Nothing was done about the
economy (by 1902 Britain was importing
steel). but this was not then accevted as a
responsibility and reforms in
other fields encountered so much opposition
as to suggest that it was politically
impracticable. Only during the two world
wars did widespread support exist for drastic
change and even this was narrowly focussed
on the immediate objective of military
victory. Nor did Playfair's successors, any
more than Playfair himself, usually
advocate comprehensive reforms. They
wanted changes unacceptable to the
conventional wisdom, but they too tended to
adopt a sectoral approach. Keynes, for
instance, invited as chairman of an official
committee in 1930, 'to review the present
economic condition of Great Britain', came
up with the short-term expedient of 'a
revenue tariff . . . because it will give us a
margin of resources and a breathing-space,
under cover of which we can do other
things.'" The revenue tariff was eventually
adopted and proved beneficial, but the
'other things' (Keynes had written as early as
5
1919 of Britain's need for 'a new industrial
birth')12 were naturally not done.
Imposing a tariff or seeking a foreign loan
may alleviate only the symptoms of disease,
but do offer a 'quick fix'. Radical reform is
usually open to the objection that its results
will be slow to appear. Moreover, it often
seems easier to persuade other governments
to acquiesce in an executive decision or even
to take one of their own, than it is to
mobilize an entire people for new and
socially disturbing exertions. Britain's
increasing resort to external assistance for
the solution of problems that, to the
retrospective gaze, now appear as the
progressive symptoms of domestic national
decline, may have been regrettable, but it
was always understandable.
Steps in decline
The first step had the innocent, almost
therapeutic character so familiar in the case
histories of addiction: the Anglo -Japanese
Alliance of 1902. There was a strong case for
it: the four British battleships and sixteen
cruisers on the China Station were not
enough to maintain British interests in the
Far East against a potential Franco-Russian
combination in those waters of nine
battleships and twenty cruisers. The
Japanese alliance did not merely obviate the
need for British reinforcements or for new
docks at Hong Kong: it eventually permitted
the withdrawal of those battleships to
strengthen the fleet in home waters. Even the
Kaiser, that harsh critic of British policy,
conceded that 'at last the noodles have had a
lucid interval'. l 3 Naturally there was a price
to pay, as various admirals and other
awkward characters argued at the time: the
British position in the Far East was
henceforth dependent on Japanese goodwill
and (after the victory of Tsushima in 1905)
without any corresponding Japanese
dependence on British goodwill. Britain's
first experience of the drug had nevertheless
been reassuring. The second Anglo Japanese Alliance was concluded in 1905and
the third in 1911. The side-effects took
another decade to reach a level then judged
to be unacceptable.
6
It was under the influence of the initial
euphoria that the various arrangements
were made that led to British continental
commitment in European war. This was a
major departure from the British tradition
of financing other people to do the fighting.
Whether or not the process was avoidable,
a point which will continue to be debated
until the arrival of the Third World War,
the outcome was profoundly damaging and
revived a form of dependence unknown to
Britain since the seventeenth century: on
foreign, in this case American, economic
assistance.
In the aftermath of the First World War
Britain was confronted with a curious
dilemma. Her two naval rivals were the
United States and Japan; alliance with the
first as insurance against war with the
second was unattainable and the opposite
combination seemed undesirable. Yet
Britain could not match the formidable
building programme threatened by the
United States against - it was scarcely
concealed - Britain herself. The Great
War had proved as profitable to the United
States as the Napoleonic War had to Britain
and the economic ratio between the two
countries was 3:l in favour of America. The
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 rescued
Britain from an arms race, but at the price
of conceding naval dominance in the Far
East to a Japan whose goodwill had to be
sacrificed with the alliance that had proved
so useful in the First World War. That was
the worst kind of dependence, for British
exposure to Japan was not compensated by
even a promise of American support. But
the alternative proposed in 1920 by Jellicoe
(who regarded war with Japan as inevitable)
was more than a declining British economy
could support: a Far Eastern Fleet of eight
battleships, eight battle-cruisers and four
carriers. And nobody seems to have
suggested abandoning such commitments
as could no longer be defended.
Britain's economy continued to languish.
The rejection in 1930 of the proposals put
forward by Mosley (thena Labour Minister)
for its regeneration through planned foreign
trade, public direction of industry and
credit-financed expansion was, as A. J.P.
Taylor says, 'a decisive, though negative,
event in British history'. l 4 The natural
sequel in 1931 was Britain's first peacetime
acceptance of economic and political
dependence. On 23 August Messrs J. P.
Morgan & Co. of New York informed the
British government that American bankers
would consent to rescue the pound provided
that the political terms already tentatively
accepted by a reluctant cabinet also 'had the
sincere approval and support of the Bank of
England and the City generally'.15 The
future still had similar humiliations in store
for Britain, but this was the last occasion on
which shame actually brought down a
British government.
Permanent dependence
So far open dependence (for anyone
reluctant to adopt a statistical approach to
hypothetical questions) had been confined
to periods of crisis. The turning point was
the Second World War, not just because of
the sheer extent and range of Britain's
dependence on the United States, but
because, for the first time, the British
people were taught to regard such
dependence as natural, lasting and even
virtuous. Admittedly the Churchillian
rhetoric was primarily intended for the
Americans, but the idea was disseminated
in Britain as widely as jeeps in the British
army. 'Give us the tools, and we will finish
the job'16 was a fine phrase for public
consumption, but Churchill knew as well as
anyone else that a great deal more than
Lend-Lease would be required before
Britain, the Soviet Union and the United
States could defeat a self-reliant Germany.
She had, after all, drastically transformed
her own economy and society for the
specific purpose of war during those 'locust
years' which Britain frittered away in selfdeluding reliance on imperial preference,
the League of Nations, collective security
and the French army. It is unfortunate that
those nations who pull themselves up by
their own boot-straps so often do so from
reprehensible motives, but need the Devil
have all the best tunes?
By 1945 the British had come to take
Lend-Lease so much for granted that they
were genuinely shocked at its termination,
resented the 'strings' attached to the
subsequent American Loan and accepted
Marshall Aid as no more than their due.
Britain became, and has remained, a client
of the United States.
What is a client state? In Britain's case it
means, first, dependence on the United
States for the management of the British
economy. Theextent of that dependence was
most brutally illustrated in 1956, when the
withdrawal of American goodwill resulted in
a run on sterling, the refusal of assistance by
the American-dominated IMF and the
abandonment of Britain's Suez adventure
(in which France had been willing to persist).
The circumstances were then admittedly
exceptional, but the loans and credit
facilities (together with their political
conditions) actually obtained by Britain in
1957, 1961, 1967 and 1976 from the IMF
were no less dependent on American goodwill. So was management of the British
financial crises of 1964 and 1966 or the
devaluation of 1967. In many of these
instances much emphasis was given at the
time to multilateral cooperation in rescuing
Britain from her temporary financial
difficulties. Efforts were made to represent
these transactions as no more than the give
and take inseparable from a universal and
inevitable 'interdependence' in international
financial relations. From time to time
examples were produced of British cooperation in smoothing out the transitional
exchange problems of other countries. It
never happened, however, that Britain had a
decisive voice in the grant of financial
assistance to another important country;
that she was able to impose political
conditions (not even to prohibit the purchase
of arms with British money by Argentina in
1983); that the United States - or France,
Germany, Japan or a dozen other countries
- were dependent on British goodwill. It
was always a one-sided relationship.
Part of the price was British deference
towards American policies in general.
South-east Asia provides an interesting
7
example. From 1954 onwards successive
British governments doubted, on different
grounds and with varying degrees of
conviction, the wisdom of the American
adventure in Indo-China. Only Eden risked
open, if limited, opposition at the Geneva
Conference of 1954 and he paid for his
temerity at Suez in 1956. The lesson was
learnt and later British reservations, even
when fuelled by the strong feelings of the
Labour Party between 1964 and 1970, never
found more overt expression than the
pinpricks, not even intended as such, of the
futile Wilson 'initiatives'.
Meanwhile Britain was involved in a
South-east Asian conflict of her own Confrontation with Indonesia from 1963 to
1966. This eventually proved to be the most
successful limited war anyone had fought
since 1945 - a three-year total of casualties
less than that of one day's fighting in
Vietnam or the whole of the much briefer
Falklands War. It also produced a peace
settlement that has so far lasted seventeen
years. At the time, however, the American
preference for appeasing Sukarno (then
regarded in Washington as a potential anticommunist leader) was vigorously pressed
on the British government at every level.
Even the author used to be telephoned at
home before breakfast by the United States
Embassy. That was what interdependence
meant in the 1960s.
Of course, Britain's dependence on the
United States was qualified. Whereas
Australia had to send troops to Vietnam
and France could voice open disapproval of
American policy, Britain occupied a middle
position. In Vietnam she got away with
expressions of sympathy and gestures of
non-military support. Malaysia was
encouraged to respond to American
initiatives and to take part in futile
negotiations, but British troops continued
their defence of Borneo. Such compromises
are only sensible in peripheral issues. It is
when American policies impinge on vital
British interests that the exertion of British
influence in Washington needs to be uninhibited. Unfortunately this is a condition
subject to more than economic constraints.
8
Since 1939 it has been not merely the
management of Britain's economy, but its
defence against external military challenge,
that has depended on American goodwill.
This military dependence has, to a
considerable degree, been imposed by
circumstances beyond Britain's control: the
emergence of the Soviet Union as an
unfriendly superpower with resources that
no British effort could have matched.
Britain's only alternative to dependence on
allies was the neutrality preferred by
Sweden or Switzerland. This was not an
option acceptable to British public opinion
in the postwar era, nor were other allies of
any value then available. Reliance on the
United States was, therefore, initially
almost inevitable. It has nevertheless
proved so habit-forming that this
dependence is now more extensive than was
originally foreseen. The constraints it has
imposed on Britain's policy and strategy,
no less than on the structure, deployment
and equipment of Britain's own forces,
have actually reduced Britain's chances of
responding effectively to certain kinds of
threat below the level of total war.
Nuclear issues
For instance, British nuclear weapons offer
a chance of excluding the British Isles from
the nuclear battlefield in a territorially
limited nuclear war, because the Soviet
Union might hesitate to risk the loss of
Moscow by bombarding Britain, if they
expected the United States to respect the
immunity of Soviet territory as long as the
continental United States remained
similarly inviolate. This chance, however,
can only be diminished by the presence of
American nuclear weapons, particularly
those intended for limited war, in the
British Isles. Deterrence demands an ability
to reward abstention that is no less assured
than the capacity to punish aggression.
Without a British monopoly of nuclear
weapons in the British Isles the British
government can scarcely count on being
considered in Moscow as un interlocuteur
valable. Unfortunately, British dependence
on the United States for ballistic missiles
and other essential components of the
British nuclear deterrent makes it difficult
for Britain to exclude American nuclear
weapons under American control or to
close any of the sixty-four American
military bases that make the British Isles
such an obvious target for those Soviet
missiles which cannot, in any case, cross the
Atlantic.
France, having herself developed a truly
independent deterrent, has no such
inhibitions and can cheerfully support the
deployment of American missiles anywhere
outside France. Her chances of escaping the
direct impact of territorially limited nuclear
war are undiminished - and greater than
Britain's. This too was predicted:
Late in 1947, when it was suggested
that Britain might rely on the United
States for the maintenance of her
nuclear striking force, Lord Tedder,
Chief of the Air Staff, voiced a general
feeling when he replied that this would
involve a close military alliance with
the United States in which Britain
would be merely a temporary advance
base, would involve complete
subservience to United States policy
and would render Britain completely
impotent in negotiations with Russia
or any other nation. l7
Military dependence is most obvious in
nuclear strategy, because the decision to
launch American missiles or aircraft,
wherever they are stationed, will inevitably
be taken in Washington. No government,
when faced by the mortal choice of nuclear
war, can be expected to subordinate
national interest to foreign wishes,
whatever undertakings may previously have
been given.'' In 1973, for instance, in the
course of a dispute with the Soviet Union
not involving the rest of NATO but
conkerning the Arab - Israeli War, United
States forces throughout the world were
placed on the alert (DEFCON 111except for
the Sixth Fleet, which went to DEFCON 11,
the highest grade short of war). According
to American sources the three US Air Force
strike bases and the Polaris submarine
facility in Britain were placed on the alert
before responsible British authorities were
even informed, let alone consulted. l9 As
long as there are American nuclear weapons
in the British Isles, British survival will
continue to depend on decisions taken in
Washington, perhaps in the course of
quarrels to which Britain is not a party.
Involvement in NATO
Britain's other commitments to NATO are
usually represented as n o more than her
share of an interdependence common t o all
the Allies. In fact, of course, some
members of NATO are more equal than
others. As Alliance strategy is ultimately
dependent on an American threat to
employ nuclear weapons, the United States
have a power of veto, as well as a capacity
for initiation, which is not generally shared.
France is best placed to abstain from any
conflict which, in her judgement, does not
directly threaten French interests. Britain's
dependence is perhaps the greatest of all,
for she not only has foreign bases o n her
soil, but the bulk of her army and much of
her air force in Germany. There may never
be a crisis in which Britain wants to
disengage from NATO, nor would this
necessarily be in her interests, but she
would undoubtedly find the process more
difficult than would some of her allies.
It can, of course, be argued that any
threat to any member of NATO must be a
general threat, as dangerous to Britain as to
anyone else; that such threats can only be
deterred or resisted by a united Alliance;
and that unity depends on locking all the
members into a permanent framework of
deployment and command as well as treaty
obligation. In the somewhat masochistic
language of the Ministry of Defence 'it is
politically important that all allies should
share the risks and burdens of providing for
deterrence and defence'. The assumption
may be correct, but it is worth noting that
nobody else is so deeply committed to the
practical application of the British
conclusion. Even the Germans deploy their
forces only to defend their own soil.
In the terms of the conventional wisdom
the defence of Britain is 'subsumed' -
9
always a suspect verb - by the collective
strategy of NATO. 'The direct defence of
the United Kingdom base', for instance, 'is
obviously vital' as 'a forward base for
operations in the Atlantic, a main base for
operations in the Channel and North Sea
and a rear base for operations on the
continent'. 2 1 This curious conception of
one's own country would be hard to match
elsewhere in the world. Perhaps in East
Germany?
The Falklands War may seem an
exception to the general principle of British
military dependence, but did not invalidate
this concept. It would never have happened
if the defence of British interests had not
been subordinated to the requirements of
NATO. Secondly, it could only be fought
because the reduction of the Royal Navy to
the 'small ASW force destined to protect
the first European resupply convoy','*
which was how Sir John Nott seems t o have
interpreted the requirements of the
American Supreme Commander, had not
then been completed. Thirdly, the process
had gone far enough t o make the war a
'near-run thing' in which Britain might not
have succeeded without the rather bare
minimum of American goodwill which the
operation actually enjoyed. Military action
in support of British national interests even for the maintenance of internal
security in northern Ireland - usually
requires the diversion of forces committed
to NATO and trained and equipped for the
needs of the Alliance.
The conflicting requirements of national
and collective purposes usually become
obvious only in time of crisis. Then the
forces of political dissent may be stimulated
by the conditions of an IMF loan or by
plans for the installation of new American
missiles. What is more important is the
intellectual conditioning which forty years
of dependence have imposed on successive
generations of British politicians, military
leaders, officials and t h e entire
establishment, many academics included.
During the Spanish Civil War, when Britain
was still a great power, one Spanish captain
related how often his confrontations with
10
the Royal Navy brought tears of rage to his
eyes and how he nevertheless had to tell his
officers: 'we must be prudent, we cannot
worsen our relations with England'.23 He
has had his revenge. Whitehall and
Westminster have long been dominated, to
an extent that has to be experienced to be
appreciated, by the primacy of good
relations with the United States.
This 'special', 'natural', 'close' (there are
fashions in adjectives) relationship is
unequal. The United States are not
dependent on Britain. Naturally it is
convenient to have bases and facilities
without tiresome strings. A second fiddle
can often usefully enhance the harmony of
the American theme. There are advantages
to the United States worth their cost, as
there are for the Soviet Union in keeping
Cuba afloat. Prudential considerations are
reinforced by custom, tradition, the ties of
a common language and cultural history.
The influence of association, on a footing
of notional equality, during the Second
World War is not quite dead. Britain may
now seem less important in Washington
than Germany or Japan or even that
awkward customer, France, but she still
gets more consideration than, strictly
speaking, she deserves. So, in Moscow,
does Finland, who shows greater deference
than Britain, but makes fewer material
concessions.
Alternatives
British dependence is real, but is it also
desirable or even inevitable? There can be
no undisputed answer to these questions. In
1945 opponents of the American Loan
denounced its acceptance as 'an economic
Munich', to which Keynes retorted that the
alternative was 'starvation corner'. Today's
advocates of greater economic independence are accused of proposing a
'siege economy'. At any given moment
there is a choice, even if this is not always
perceived as such, between the immediate
benefits of foreign goodwill and its ultimate
cost. Moreover, this choice is always
complicated by political and sentimental
considerations of a different kind from
what some regard as the strictly economic
or military arguments.
For instance, many of today's British
supporters of autarky are much influenced
by their anxiety to introduce or, in some
cases, to resist certain social changes in
Britain. It is partly because they expect their
internal measures to lead to the loss of
foreign confidence and goodwill that they
want, so far as possible, to free the British
economy from foreign constraints and to
insulate it against international
repercussions. Their opponents, on the
other hand, are not only more impressed by
the strength of these constraints and by
British vulnerability to repercussions: they
also regard the existence of constraints and
the danger of repercussions as buttressing
the kind of social structure and domestic
political orientation they prefer for Britain.
The old-fashioned patriots who resent
British dependence on foreigners are
balanced by those representatives of a more
recent conventional wisdom, who deprecate
nationalism and see dependence as leading
to the ideal of interdependence and the
greatest good of the greatest number.
Neither those who consider dependence
undesirable nor those who accept it as
inevitable are always actuated solely, or
even mainly, by anxiety to strengthen
Britain's international position.
Confusion is further compounded by the
interaction of economic and military
arguments cutting across the natural
division
between nationalists and
internationalists. Some of the former would
be glad to see Britain out of the European
Community and paddling her own commercial canoe, if they did not fear that this
would lead to withdrawal from NATO, to
neutralism and eventually to People's
Democracy. Some of the latter regard the
nuclear strategy of NATO as exposing
Britain to needless danger and to
involvement in conflicts unrelated to her
own survival, yet see Community
membership as so vital for Britain's future
that concessions may have to be made to
the strategic views of its more important
members. There is, at present, no
important political support for the idea that
Britain should be able both to operate her
own economy and society as she wishes and
also to attempt her own defence, let alone
for the drastic internal changes such
objectives might require. Perhaps (the point
will be further considered) this is an
impossible ideal, but the absence of a
comprehensive strategy is worth noting and not only by advocates of independence.
Even a genuinely internationalist course
would require an integrated approach 'to
economic, military, political and social
problems not now reflected in the spectrum
of British party conflict.
Compromise is as traditionally British as
its results are historically unsatisfactory,
but compromise there is obviously going to
be. How might it be slanted? It would
clearly be unrealistic, in view of the present
fragmentation of British political attitudes,
to expect much support for arguments that
dependence was intrinsically either
desirable or undesirable. Dependence can
only be judged by its contribution, whether
positive or negative, to some objective
generally accepted as possessing overriding
importance. The obvious candidate is the
survival of the British people.
Survival is not exposed to any direct
economic threat in the time-scale of
politicians and their voters. Even if 'it is
inevitable that the decline of British
economic power will continue unabated', 24
it will long be possible to argue that decline
as a nation compared to other nations, even
absolute decline over five or ten years,
masks actual improvement in the living
standards of the British people compared to
those of their parents and grandparents.
The efforts of economists to sound a tocsin
have fallen on deaf ears and are unlikely to
command a popular audience in the
foreseeable future.
The threat of war is quite another matter.
This already arouses sufficient
apprehension to constitute a significant
factor in British politics. It is a threat which
could become immediate at very short
notice. If it did, as Magnus Clarke argues
convincingly in The nuclear destruction of
11
Britain, the survival of the British people
would be at risk and, in some
circumstances, improbable. 25 There is thus
a strong case for holding that dependence is
desirable for Britain if it reduces the threat
of war, undesirable if it increases that
threat.
In principle, of course, it can d o either; in
practice, the problem is to select the most
advantageous position on the sliding scale
between the dependence that helps to deter
some threats and the independence that
helps to escape exposure to others. This
demands a difficult and uncertain
judgement of the likely nature of the threat.
It can be argued, for instance, that any war
threatening the survival of the British
people would necessarily be total and
general. If that assumption is correct, it
does not matter that dependence on the
United States has made the British Isles a
more obvious target for attack and largely
transferred to Washington what might
otherwise have been a British choice
between accepting national destruction and
making concessions. Nobody in the
northern hemisphere would escape the
consequences of total and general war, so
Britain's only hope is that the retaliatory
power of the United States will deter the
Soviet Union from initiating holocaust.
Similar conclusions could be drawn from
the assumption that Britain is so natural a
focus of Soviet hostility that only the fear
of American retaliation has prevented the
Soviet Union from exercising her
undoubted capacity to destroy the British
Isles.
These are somewhat improbable
assumptions. So is the opposite view that
Britain would be immune from all risk of
destruction or coercion if she adopted the
neutrality preferred by Austria, Finland,
Sweden or Switzerland. The British ~ e o ~ l e
lack the disciplined self-effacement needed
for genuine neutrality and Britain, even in
decline, is still too important a country for
her alignment to escape the interest and
competing pressures of both superpowers
and the resentment, even the active
resentment, of one or other of them.
12
Between these extremes a third view is
more plausible. The history of the last
thirty-seven years suggests that limited war
and coercive diplomacy are more likely
threats than total and general war. Britain is
perhaps over-committed to deterrence of
the gravest but least likely threat, underinsured against lesser but more probable
contingencies. Dependence is not a serious
handicap for the former, but it is for the
latter and for reasons that are two sides of
the same coin: dependence could suck
Britain into limited American quarrels that
would not otherwise concern her, yet
restrict British freedom of manoeuvre in
those quarrels which did not engage the full
power of the United States. Switzerland,
for instance, has preserved as much
freedom as anyone can to avoid
involvement in the quarrels of others, but
has taken active steps to reduce their
repercussions on herself. Swiss precautions
against nuclear fall-out are greatly superior
to British.
For Britain, however, a better example is
France, who has paid a smaller premium
for the deterrence of total war and
preserved her right of choice in limited war.
The appropriate British compromise would
be: no foreign bases in the British Isles; a
limited but independent nuclear deterrent;
an improved capacity for the conventional
defence of the British Isles and Narrow
Seas; a contingent, predominantly maritime
and not irrevocable commitment to NATO.
In the game of international poker Britain
needs t o be able to raise the ante to
significant levels, but can expect n o profit
from a permanent commitment t o the
maximum stake.
Possibilities and opportunities
Could this be done? It was certainly once
possible, as Britain demonstrated by her
reactions t o the McMahon Act of 1946, by
which the United States repudiated its
wartime agreements and prohibited the
exchange of atomic information with
Britain. Not only did Britain then proceed
to the independent development of nuclear
weapons, but she became the first country
in the world to use nuclear power to
generate electricity for public consumption.
Indeed, the postwar decade in Britain was
remarkable for its initiative and innovation.
Seeds of many kinds were sown for a
national renaissance which never came to
full fruition; perhaps this was because
dependence on the United States continued
unabated in other fields. It is tempting to
regard the Suez fiasco of 1956 as the turning
point in Britain's destiny, for Britain and
France were to draw opposite conclusions
from that humiliating experience: Britain
that she could no longer afford the
assertion of independence; France that she
must create the basis for it. In 1958, for
instance, the French prime minister, the
travails of the Fourth Republic
notwithstanding, signed the order for the
independent production of a French atomic
bomb, while de Gaulle's latest biographer
describes the humiliation of Suez as helping
to create the conditions for the General's
later return to power. 26 The British prime
minister, on the other hand, agreed in 1957
to the installation in East Anglia of
American THOR missiles, and in 1958 the
repeal of the McMahon Act enabled Britain
to resume nuclear dependence on the
United States.
In the light of subsequent French
achievements, at home and abroad,
economic as well as military, it is difficult to
argue that it was economically impossible
for Britain to pursue a more independent
policy after Suez. In 1957, after all,
Britain's gross national product was 50 per
cent greater than that of France.
Dependence was a British choice, a political
preference.
It would be foolish to suggest only one
cause for so complex a phenomenon, but it
is reasonable to put much of the blame on
the addiction to dependence acquired by
Britain's rulers - and by the whole of that
numerous class of young administrators,
civil and military, who would later become
rulers or advisers to rulers - during the
Second World War. The ability to retain
American goodwill was then and thereafter
often a condition for promotion. French
13
experience was different, thanks to General
de Gaulle, who always asserted French
independence in the face of greater
obstacles and without regard to the fury of
his more powerful and indispensable allies.
His example was not forgotten even amid
the divisions and dependence of the Fourth
Republic and it was entrenched for his
successors by what he achieved for France
after his return to power. 'President
Mitterand's Socialist government is
adhering to the main lines of de Gaulle's
foreign and defence policies. The basis of
them is national independence'. 27
c a n the British leopard now change its
dependent spots? So far the only serious
attempt has been to replace dependence on
the United States by dependence on
Europe. People forget - indeed many of
them now wish to - how far-reaching were
some ideas considered in British political
and official circles a dozen years ago:
European political union, European
defence cooperation, a common foreign
policy,
Anglo - French
nuclear
collaboration. Behind them all lay the hope
that Britain could recover, as a leading
member of a united Europe, some of the
relative power, prosperity and influence she
had lost as an American client. Little
progress was made in these directions even
under the initially optimistic Heath
administration. The high water mark (not a
spring tide) was perhaps the lead taken by
Britain in stimulating resistance to the
hegemony sought by Kissinger in his
notorious Year of Europe in 1973.
Enthusiasts in Britain hoped for more than
Europeans were ready for, but the
American-oriented British bureaucracy
imposed a constant check o n even such
progress as might have been possible. Their
resistance was greatly strengthened in 1974
by the return of a Labour government
suspicious of Europe and preferring
reliance on the United States. All that
remained was the hope that membership of
the European Community would somehow
revive the British economy as - so it was
suggested - it had revived those of
Britain's European competitors.
Whether European success was due to
association or to national effort is a
question too complex and controversial for
discussion here. The former theory,
however, was assumed to be correct,
applicable to Britain and made the subject
of a prediction duly falsified by experience.
In 1971 the British government of the day
declared that 'membership of the enlarged
Community will lead to much improved
efficiency and productivity in British
industry, with a higher rate of investment
and a faster growth of real wages'.2s The
following table shows roughly what
happened. 29
Table 1
Output, investment and income 1960 - 80
1960
Output per person
employed (1975 = 100)
Gross domestic fixed
capital formation f m
1975 prices
Real personal disposable
income Ern 1975 prices
1970
74
94.2
% increase
1960 - 70
27
1980
108.7
Vo increase
1970- 80
15
11905
19460
62
20761
6
11488
15313
33
20891
36
It may well be argued that this comparison,
quite apart from any statistical fallacies it
may embody, is not a fair test because it
takes n o account of the world depression
14
that developed between 1970 and 1980. On
this point the verdict of foreign experts is
instructive.
There were three seismic shocks to the
world economy: the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods monetary system from
1971 to 1973; the explosive rise of
world prices of raw materials from
1972 to 1974; and the oil crisis in
1973 -74. Very likely the deterioration
in Britain's economic performance is
related to these external shocks. As
already noted, all industrial countries
were adversely affected, but the United
Kingdom more so than the others.
Why? It was not just the occurrence of
shocks but British reaction to them
that seemed to matter. 30
This brings us back to our starting-point:
the significance of interdependence does
not derive from its objective nature, but
from the differing responses of particular
states. British responses to the challenges,
whether economic or military, of the
external environment have been more
dependent than those of other states. They
have also been less successful. Britain has,
for twenty years, fared worse, by every
economic test, than France, West Germany
and Japan, the last being the outstanding
example of the independent pursuit of
economic success by a country needing to
import most of its energy and raw
materials. Those smaller European
countries which avoided economic
dependence - Austria, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland - have long enjoyed
higher per capita incomes. Germany and
Japan, admittedly, have for years been
militarily dependent, but Germany, at least,
may claim to gain more than she gives.
Montgomery's boast, in 1948, 'at last we
had achieved that for which I had been
fighting - a decision that in the event of
war the British Army would fight on the
Continent of Europe''' may, thirty-five
years later, strike some of his countrymen
as a more doubtful benefit.
The economic and military history of
nations in any way comparable to Britain
exhibits considerable and idiosyncratic
differences, but there is little evidence to
support any general rule that the acceptance
of interdependence, even in the most
euphemistic sense of the term, is more
rewarding than national exertion animated
by national purpose. This proposition, so
cautiously advanced for other nations, may
be more confidently asserted of the British.
It is not merely that their fortunes have
declined in step with their acceptance of
dependence: this could be considered a
chicken and egg argument. British exertions
a l the national
have also been ~ r o ~ o r t i o nto
character of thkir kndeavour. Their finest
hour was in the summer of 1940 and the
British have never since been so united or so
ardent. Even the Falklands episode of 1982
- though war is repugnant and that war
was peculiarly unnecessary - brought a
pale reflection of the same spirit. The
British like to do their own thing.
They have been offered few
opportunities in recent years. NATO and
the EEC are little less alien and uninspiring
to the British than the IMF or GATT. If
there is to be a British recovery in
international terms, this will have to start at
home and be fuelled by a sense of national
purpose animated by a leadership perceived
as specifically British.
It is not obvious who could provide that
leadership. More than one British politician
would dearly like to stage a return from
Colombey les deux Eglises, but freedom
from foreign allegiances and the support of
an organized party do not seem to go
together. Nobody could achieve full success
without a comprehensive programme for
drastic domestic change and a Gaullist
readiness to run risks abroad. Any realistic
prediction must be that the British will
continue to accept the supplementary
benefits, and accompanying servitudes, of
interdependence rather than launch
themselves into the adventure of
independence.
It is, of course, possible to envisage a
more modest reduction in dependence
through the adoption of a deliberately
national approach to the conduct of
Britain's external relations. The multiplier
effect this can have is well illustrated by the
example of France. It was the style imposed
by General de Gaulle in 1940 which made
that country what it is today. The deference
which dependence has bred in British
governments has increased their dependence. A quarter of a century ago, for
instance, Mr Macmillan ensured that
American missiles in East Anglia were
equipped with the dual-key system for which
Mrs Thatcher is now reluctant even to ask.
Nevertheless, before ministers are seduced
by the idea of exploiting Britain's nuisance
value and relying on the doctrine of
'l'intendance suivra', they should reflect on
another essential ingredient of French
success. This was consistency of purpose and
uniformity of approach. Intransigence over
milk makes little impact when combined
with acquiescence on missiles. Style is more
important than is understood in Britain, but
it must reflect rather than replace policy. It
must also at least be followed by concrete
measures.
Apprehension about the prospects of
national survival and disillusionment with
external economic palliatives may conceivably provide a political base for a new
leadership to impart a different slant t o
compromise. The chances of success are
slender, for the time has clearly not yet come
for heroic remedies, but both leaders and led
will deceive themselves if they imagine that
Britain's addiction to dependence can even
be controlled, let alone reduced, without
experiencing some of the unpleasant sideeffects of withdrawal.
JAMES
CABLE
References
'As such it can be employed by both parties to a
dependent relationship: 'for those who wish the United
States to retain world leadership, interdependence has
become part of the new rhetoric, to be used against
economic nationalism at home and assertive challenges
abroad'. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power
and interdependence(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). p. 7.
lThomas Babington Macaulay, Frederick the Great
(London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longman, 1855),
pp. 30- 1.
jLyon Playfair, Subjects of social welfare (London:
Cassell, 1889), p. 307. Lyon Playfair (1818 -98). a Scot,
was Edinburgh Professor of Chemistry, a protege of the
Prince Consort, a constant gadfly, an MP, a minister and
ultimately a peer.
15
'Sir Robert Ensor, England 1870- 1914(0xford: Oxford
University Press, 1936). p. 106.
>Ensor, p. 227; Andrew Shonfield, British economic
policy since the war (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin,
1958), p. 255.
6Playfair, p. 234.
'Playfair, pp. 335 - 6.
aSee, for instance, the brilliant if profoundly depressing
book by Correlli Barnett, The collapse of British power
London: Methuen, 1972).
'Playfair, p. 141.
'OPlayfair, p. 283.
"R. F. Harrod, The life of John Maynard Keynes
(London: Macmillan, 195I), pp. 426 - 30.
"John Maynard Keynes, The economic consequencesof
thepeace (London: Macmillan, 1919), p. 238.
"Ian H. Nfsh, The Anglo -Japanese alliance (London:
Athlone, 1966), p. 221.
"A. J. P. Taylor, English history 1914- 1945 (London:
Pelican, 1970), p. 360.
Harold Nicolson, King George V(London: Constable,
1952), p. 463.
I6BBC radio broadcast, 9 February 1941.
"Margaret Gowing, Independence and deterrence:
Britain and atomic energy 1945 - 1952, Vol. 1: policy
making (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 185.
'#These undertakings, as described to parliament by Mr
Heseltine on 1 February 1983, are not, in any case, of a
particularly impressive character. President Truman
reaffirmed in 1952 'the understanding that the use of
these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint
decision of Her Majesty's Government and the United
States Government in the light of circumstances at the
time' (The Times, 2 February 1983).
"Michael M. Harrison, The reluctant ally: France and
Atlantic security (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981). p. 179.
''Defence in the 1980s: Statement on the Defence
Estimates 1980. Vol. 1(London: HMSO, Cmnd 7826 - I,
1980). p. 9.
"Defence in the 1980s. p. 32.
"Captain John 0. Coote RN, 'Send her victorious' in
Proceedings of the United States Navallnstitute, January
1983, p. 40.
l 3James Cable, The Royal Navy and the siege of Bilbao
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). p. 180.
"M. W. Kirkby, The decline of British economic power
since 1870(London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 136.
2JMagnus Clarke, The nuclear destruction of Britain
(London, Canberra, Croom Helm, 1982). passim.
16BernardLedwidge, De Gaulle (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1982), p. 227.
"Ledwidge, p. 383.
"The United Kingdom and the European Communities
(London: HMSO, Cmnd 4715, July 1971). para. 56.
29Compiledfrom the relevant tables in Economic trends
- annualsupplement 1982 (London: HMSO for Central
Statistical Office, 1982).
"Richard E. Caves and Lawrence B. Krause, Britain's
economic performance (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1980), p. 11.
"Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,
Memoirs (London: Collins, 1958), p. 505.
Preparation of Ships' Companies
for the Stress of Battle
HE WAR in the Falklands has been
carefully analysed in Naval circles and
the experience gained has been widely
promulgated. Much of this work has
concerned weapons, equipment and
training, but it has also been recognised
that the subject of human behaviour under
the stress of war and the preparation of
men for battle should be re-examined and
advice brought up to date. Much of the
following article has been included in a
recent paper by Flag Officer Sea Training.
It is hoped that publishing it in The Naval
Review will stimulate discussion with the
aim of increasing awareness of the
problems of stress and of the sensible
measures which can be taken to lessen its
effects.
It is important to remember, however,
that when the call came in 1982 the
performance of officers and men was
generally more than satisfactory and in
many cases exemplary. We should therefore
guard against over-reaction to the extent of
turning stress into a growth industry.
In the course of writing the paper the
author was in correspondence with many of
those who were there, some in command,
others in quite lowly positions. A retired
Army officer with World War I1 battle
experience provided some very helpful
comment. Some of their observations did
not fit naturally into the paper but are
nevertheless of great interest. Excerpts from
their letters to the author are published
anonymously as a form of postscript.
Stress
Stress has been variously defined. A
distinguished physiologist described it as
'the rate of wear and tear of the body',
while dictionaries generally associate it with
distress, pressure or strain. A certain
amount of pressure acts as a stimulant and
induces efficiency but there is a point on the
curve when over stimulation or stress
occurs, leading progressively to impaired
judgement, incorrect reactions and then to
physical failure. The preparation of men
for war must be concerned primarily with
maintaining the efficiency peak and
delaying the onset of the later stages in
which failures occur.
Acute battle shock
This is liable to occur during the action
itself and can manifest itself in two ways:
a. The victim is virtually paralysed and
often cannot talk, tends to stare wildly
around and appears unable to act and
respond normally. He may hide or run
away.
b. The victim prevents himself
thinking about the situation by
concentrating totally on one random
aspect of the task, thus shutting out all
distressing information, however vital
that information may be. This results
in people taking irrational decisions, as
they cannot, or will not consider all the
relevant facts. Men can appear to be
acting coolly and rationally.
Post action lethargy
This is a result of partly psychological and
partly physiological body reaction and
occurs in the period immediately post
action, as the danger recedes, the adrenalin
flow reduces and personnel relax. Men can
relapse from a very high state of alertness
into a very lethargic state, and may appear
unwilling to do anything for themselves.
Even simple tasks such as washing and
tidying up mess decks may seem too much
bother. Further action provides the
necessary stimulus to bring men up to speed
again provided a rest period is given.
Combat exhaustion
After 3-4 weeks' intense activity the
processes responsible for combating stress
become exhausted, through lack of sleep,
rest and food and require 10-14 days to
recover back to normal. During Operation
Corporate this condition was observed
among very hard worked staffs exposed to
prolonged danger, or those who were
already tired when they arrived at the battle
zone. Experience in the Second World War
showed that after a prolonged period of
combat, personnel tend to deteriorate
seriously and either perform their duties in a
very lackadaisical way, or act in a foolhardy
manner in the face of danger.
Delayed reaction stress
This may occur at any time, even years after
the action, and can manifest itself in many
ways: for example heavy drinking, marital
problems, depressions, anxieties not previously manifest, changed character. Simple
adjustments to changes of duties or routines
may become unacceptable to the man.
Causes of stress
The factors which contribute to the stress of
battle are mental and physical and
constantly interact. Individuals are
varyingly endowed with the ability to
withstand stress and fear but in general if a
man's physical and/or mental state(s) are
reduced, his willpower can be broken the
more readily and as Lord Moran points out
in his World War I book The Anatomy of
Courage, courage is willpower. Willpower
can be eroded by stress in a number of ways.
a. The unexpected. If individual or
group training and briefing has not prepared men for what they encounter, their
will to fight can be severely reduced.
b. The unknown. A man facing the
prospect of battle particularly for the
first time will be susceptible to fear not
just of death or injury but also of failing
under stress. This will be most marked if
he is alone, or at night.
c. Thesights and noise of battle. Action
can be stimulating particularly to those
who can see what is going on but the
unnerving effect of seeing human
carnage, or a badly damaged ship can
severely erode a man's will, as can the
constant battering by noise.
17
d. Mental and physical exhaustion.
However well men may be trained and
led they can only take the stress of
battle for so long. The length of time a
man can last before needing a break
will vary greatly from one individual to
another.
Combating stress
Fitness
Because of the very close link between
mental and physical fitness the first
prerequisite for battle preparation is that
men must be fit. Many sailors in ships lead
sedentary lives and enjoy a very high
standard of catering. Good food is an
important plus factor in an efficient and
happy ship, but there is considerable
evidence in the Fleet of overweight and unfit
men who are unable or unwilling to
control their intake of food or to take
regular and proper exercise. Furthermore,
over-eating is a well known refuge of people
under stress. It is not necessary for every
man in a ship to be a trained athlete at the
peak of physical condition but there is much
that can be done to improve the general level
of health and reduce unfitness. As a starting
point men must be persuaded that fitness is
right and depends as much on personal
habits as physical exercise.
Realism in training
The purpose of creating as much realism as
possible in training programmes is to reduce
the scope of the unexpected and unknown.
For obvious reasons men's lives cannot be
seriously endangered nor ships put at risk,
but properly applied imagination can create
circumstances which place men under a
degree of stress which when successfully
overcome markedly increases individual and
team confidence. The NBCD environment
provides the best opportunity for
confronting numbers of men with difficult
physical situations.
Leadership
There are very many factors which can be
grouped under this heading. It is not
proposed to attempt yet another definition
18
PREPARATION OF SHIPS' COMPANIIES FOR THE STRESS OF BATTLE
of leadership but there are a number of key
points which leaders at all levels should
keep constantly in mind:
a. Knowing your men. This may seem
obvious but it is worth restating that
only by a thorough knowledge of the
men under their command will leaders
be able to spot abnormalities in their
behaviour which could be the marks of
stress. There is furthermore a weight of
evidence which suggests that men do
not always behave according to type
when under stress. A leader must have
the best available feel for how his
individual men might react, and must
have some general knowledge of
human behaviour under stress.
b. Keeping men informed. The flow of
information on how the battle or its
preparations are going is a vital factor
in maintaining morale. It is
particularly important that men who
are not actively involved, especially
those waiting for something to happen
- for example, damage control parties
- are kept in the picture. It is not
sufficient however for a busy PWO to
grab a microphone from time to time
and utter a few esoteric war cries.
Sitreps should be used as a means of
sustaining confidence and morale and
thus should be carefully expressed.
Who is best suited to perform this task
must be a matter of individual choice
by Commanding Officers, but style is
just as important as knowledge. As a
matter of principle the Captain should
speak at key times and at regular
intervals as well as being seen about the
ship as often as possible.
c. Keeping men together. The Army's
Regimental System is the best example
of this, and they place much store in
the fact that men fight best when
amongst their friends. Ship's
companies can achieve great corporate
strength in a comparatively short time
by virtue of being 'cooped up in the
same steel box', but this can be
severely undermined by frequent
changeover of officers and men.
d. Keeping men occupied. Inactivity
breeds fear. Every means should be
used to create meaningful activity to
combat boredom and allay fear.
Weapon crews are comparatively easy
to occupy with alarm drills and loading
practices, but the problem is greater
for Damage Control and First Aid
teams. Nevertheless, local exercises
and even cleaning tasks can be useful.
e. Confidence in equipment. Royal
Naval people tend to be extremely
critical of their ships and weapons.
Much of this is healthy and 'improves
the breed' but it can be taken too far,
to the extent of undermining
confidence. The addition of extra close
range weapons did much to boost
morale in the Second World War and
undoubtedly helped in the follow-up
phase of Operation Corporate.
f. Belief in the task. This stems from
public support at home and good
information flow in the field. If men
believe that their lives are at stake, few
things can be as demotivating as the
thought that the cause is unjust or
cannot be won.
g. Mail and welfare. These are by no
means the least important factors in
this list. The uplifting effect of mail
arriving in the Falklands Task Force
has been widely commented upon. The
cost in logistic terms must have been
very great but clearly paid off.
Censorship may have to be imposed
despite its unpopularity. If so it must
be carefully planned and uniformly
applied. Concern for families at home
is a very real creator of stress and again
a good organisation in the UK helped
to alleviate worry.
h. Routines. Sailors are creatures of
habit and the keeping of good routines
is an essential part of maintaining
emotional stability.
i. Sleep. The onset of exhaustion will
be prevented, or anyway delayed, by
ensuring that men get adequate sleep.
Too much sleep, however, is addictive,
induces listlessness and should be
avoided. In teams closed up for long
periods of relative inactivity card and
board games and reading, as well as
professional instruction and discussion
should be encouraged.
j. History and tradition. A sense of
history and a feeling for the traditions
of the Service have been found to be
valuable in sustaining morale. A ship's
battle honours can be a useful focus.
The spiritual dimension
The presence of some sort of religious faith
can be invaluable in coping with stress and
fear. The evidence of this is enormous from the ability of Muslim Turks to cope
with prolonged mental torture in Korea to
Solzhenitsyn's ability to survive the Gulag
Archipelago; nearer to our own experience
Church attendance rose markedly during
Operation Corporate. The role of the
Chaplain is to promote and sustain this
faith. By virtue of his position and
experience he can offer counsel and advice
to those affected by fear and stress. He is
also likely to be more accustomed to the
facts of death and grief and should know
how to cope with them.
Although only a minority of sailors today
would profess a religious faith, in times of
adversity a greater number seek something
to cling to outside their own immediate
lives. It is important to recognise this and
for leaders to be prepared to create
opportunities for prayer.
Drugs and alcohol
There are no drugs which prevent or
alleviate stress while leaving other
important faculties unimpaired. However,
alcohol used in moderation can be
beneficial. The daily beer ration provides a
boost for morale without adverse effects,
though it presents logistic problems which
should not be underrated. Spirits are less
easy to control and should usually be
avoided.
Aspects of command
In war the attention of the ship's company
will become focussed on the Captain in a
19
way unlikely to be experienced in
peacetime, and in the conditions of
uncertainty and fear induced by the stress
of war the responsibility of ship command
is immense. This is most keenly felt by the
young Commanding Officer in his first
command. Conversely, experience of the
Falklands campaign emphasised the value
to the Task Force Commander of the more
mature and experienced ship Captains, even
though none of them had any previous war
experience. Thus it is clear that experience
in command, even though not in war, is a
great asset if the test comes. The deduction
must be that command experience should
not be over diluted, and that success in one
command should be a pre-requisite for the
next.
For the Commanding Officer to have the
reserves of strength necessary in extremis,
when all look to him for a lead, he must
learn to pace himself. Important aspects of
this are a proper diet, adequate sleep and
knowing how to relax even for very short
periods. The art of cat-napping has been
found very useful by many, but in order to
achieve the important few hours' continuous
rest a Captain must be able to turn over to
his Executive Officer when threat levels
allow. It follows that all Executive Officers
should be fully capable of taking
command.
Command in action. Most people will
suffer to some degree from stress in action
without necessarily being in a state of
shock. For example loss of a sense of time
was reported by some whose ships were
damaged during Operation Corporate.
Because thought processes are the more
easily disturbed functions the judgement of
those in positions of Command may well be
impaired to some degree. Thus it is essential
to formulate their plans and make their
intentions plain to all subordinates before
the action occurs.
Summary
A certain amount of pressure acts as a
stimulant to efficiency but over stimulation
causes stress and breakdowns. There are
20
various forms of stress caused by mental
and physical factors which interact. A
man's willpower can be eroded in a number
of ways, the principal ones being fear of the
unexpected and unknown, the unnerving
sights and sounds of battle, and exhaustion
both mental and physical.
A man's ability to withstand stress can be
improved by physical fitness, realism in
training and, above all, good leadership.
The pressures of ship command in war are
very great. In extremis all will look to the
Commanding Officer who must have the
reserves of strength to respond.
In conclusion it should be restated that
nothing new has been discovered about the
subject of human behaviour but it is
important, as memories of war recede,
not to forget the causes and effects of
stress and the comparatively straightforward measures for sustaining men's
performance.
J.M.W.
Postscript
Excerpts from correspondence with the author
'This ignorance of, or resistance to fear, is a
gift of God. The lack of it is a thing we can
do nothing about and for which we cannot
blame a man even when it takes the extreme
case of a man breaking down and becoming
hysterical in his first battle. Such people are
as genuinely unfit for military service as a
man with a weak heart.'
'Therefore I think that every man enters
his first battle with a liability and an asset; a
certain degree of appreciation of fear and a
certain natural resistance to it. If the degree
of appreciation and of resistance are both
great he will start by being very frightened
but he will not become more so; indeed
experience and other factors may enable
him to be less frightened. If both are slight
he may start quite happy but quickly
deteriorate into a gibbering wreck.'
'The value of whisky to keep one's brain
going, in small quantities is good. Another
is corporate spirit. Nothing is more catching
than panic.'
'A man should be taught that fear is
normal. The fact that his knees shake and his
teeth chatter under night bombing does not
mean that he is a coward. Knowledge that
other people are in the same boat may help.'
'Command thus becomes primarily a
matter of formulating and communicating
intentions right down the line before the
situation occurs. In a crisis your
subordinates should instinctively feel free to
react in the certainty of knowing what you
wish them to do.'
'It is the leadership of the person in
charge of the man's quarters which
becomes crucial. It is leadership at this level,
Leading Hands, Senior Ratings and Junior
Officers which is going to be most
important. It must be fostered and
developed and above all they must be
allowed to exercise it in peacetime.'
'I believe it is possible to assess a man's
capability to withstand battle stress albeit
inaccurately. I suggest it is a product of
Extroversion, Intelligence and Stability.'
'The sheer brutality of naval warfare
struck me forcibly. Little has really changed
since Trafalgar. I burst into tears frequently
and I know several others did. To my mind
that is a natural relief.'
'We found the old style GI appeared like
magic - they were, of course, not GIs or
trained in any similar way, but the older PO
or CPO who remembered GIs and saw the
need came forward and were magnificent
when in charge of young Bofors and
machine gun crews. I certainly found great
strength in early parade training.'
'I certainly had a tremendous feeling of
history as we pushed across the TEZ into
the jaws of S Carlos and what I believed
was certain death for many more than
actually occurred. The feeling was not of
making history but of generations of naval
officers sitting on my shoulder telling me we
were doing all right and that we would be
successful as long as we kept our
nerve.'
'The sense of history and the traditions
of the Service that keep you going when
things look black.'
'It is the Captain the sailors wish to hear.
In their eyes it is the Captain who is going to
pull them through - no one else. If his
sailors are going to die they must know that
he is part of the decision making process.
His greatest weapon is his sense of
humour .'
'I made a point of visiting as many
quarters throughout the ship as the
situation allowed, with the aim of being
seen by each man on board every day.'
'All leaders should have thought through
various unusual circumstances o r
emergencies. Reactions will then be more
automatic in the heat of battle, allowing the
leader that much more time for other
decision making.'
'The method of delivery of a broadcast
can have a most marked effect on the
listeners.'
'But please never forget the man in the
engine room or boiler room, the man in the
magazine and radar room, whose courage is
all the greater, if he does his job without
flinching, in that he has no help from the
thrill of action. (And it is his captain who
collects the gongs)! Lonely men are often
frightened men. But put a number of
individuals together in a group with a
common interest and you will often find
that the previously frightened individuals
are transformed. One of these is fear -the
fear of showing fear: the fear of the scorn
of your companions.'
'We had been working all night to try and
repair the ship and up to then had been
without sleep for nearly two and a half days.
Everyone seemed to be in a state of shock
and despair all day on Saturday and our
morale was very low. We got a delivery of
mail down in the engine room at about half
past nine that night and the ship's morale
went up by about five hundred degrees. I
spent a lot of time in the early hours
21
watching Antelope go down in flames and I
was very upset. She had only arrived that
morning and didn't really know what it was
all about, unlike us who had been under
attack constantly for nearly three days and
were really "battle-hardened veterans".'
'We were only four days away from
home and after being away for five months
missing Christmas and New Year with our
loved ones the news came as a bitter blow to
us all. Despite this the morale of the ship's
company once the news had sunk in was
quite high. This was probably due to the
fact that we had all been together for the
previous five months and were all in the
same boat so to speak.'
'A C P O with severe shock so bad that he
was rigid. I found out later that he had seen
one of the men trapped in a door with his
leg amputated and the door trapping him.'
'Throughout the whole thing it was
noticeable that calmness reigned supreme.
Maybe all that training at Portland and
other exercises had paid off in the long run.'
'A total of 28 casualties were reported
but the accurate figure is just over 40
because a lot of the shock cases recovered,
as did a lot of the exhaustion and smoke
inhalation casualties, therefore they were
not recorded. Many of the exhausted ones
were all right while they were fighting the
fires but as soon as they were relieved they
collapsed and were useless for a while until
they regained their senses. A lot of the
initial shock cases recovered very quickly
with little treatment. When we abandoned
ship and had time t o sit and reflect,
everybody suffered from some form of
shock, some deeper than others. Fear of a
strange ship. Fear of being hit again.
Sadness of losing friends, a ship, and all
your personal belongings. It's an incredible
feeling to see nearly everything you own
going u p in smoke; the only things you've
got left is the clothes you stand up in; it's a
very strange feeling.'
Lessons from the Falklands
- An Operator's View
HE Falklands War focused my mind
very sharply on what I wanted from my
ship and its weapon systems to combat the
threat. I now recall some of my thoughts
and experiences which will always influence
my actions at sea in the future, and which I
hope may be of interest to others.
First of all I must mention people.
Military technology is only one aspect of an
overall fighting capability. In war it is the
quality, training and skill of those who take
part that is crucial. Furthermore, it is high
morale which makes men endure and show
courage in times of fatigue and danger. It is
this quality, not so much an advantage in
numbers of men and weapons that counts.
Indeed, we were far outnumbered both in
the air and on the ground. High morale
cannot be achieved if men are not well
trained and if they do not have confidence
in their equipment and weapons.
Men must be well trained and maintain
high levels of practice. To help achieve this,
On Board training equipment needs to be
an integral part of our systems to give
operators practice, measure their
performance and assess how well command
teams are fighting their high technology
ships. Practice makes us confident which in
turn raises morale. In the Falklands we did
have confidence, but we could have had
more.
Now a word about the conditions in
which we fight. The environment in which
the sailor fights is a harsh one but if we
make a proper study of men at sea in their
working environment we can make life a
great deal better for them - such that they
can fight much better. In other words the
job must fit the sailor: that means the
equipment - and how and where he has to
operate it - must fit the sailor too.
Ergonomics is the word.
After a few days of war my key operators
in the Ops Room began suffering from
conjunctivitis. This was entirely due to the
poor colour and the small size of the
lettering on the Video Displays and Totes.
Add this problem to the fear and tension,
the cramped space, and the desperate
struggle to manipulate the ponderous
technology of the computer system, then
you can understand how difficult it was to
get a missile in the air to intercept 'pop up'
targets that appeared at high speed from
behind the hills. This was, of course,
thoroughly demoralising. I shall always
remember those pale and strained faces
with streaming eyes trying to detect the
enemy in the air and to get the system to
react speedily against it.
Designers should remember that most
men will always be just average people,
though they will always be trying their
hardest. You will not be able to have an
Operations Room full of geniuses.
Simplicity is the key. Systems and weapons
that are quick and easy to use are the ones
that count in the heat of battle. The
ergonomics must be right.
Now I come on to weaponry. Ships must
have both offensive and defensive weapon
systems. If a warship is to be credible it has
got to have the ability to hit hard in at least
one dimension, and, above all, to have the
ability to defend itself and survive in order
to hit hard again.
I believe in almost any situation, enemy
missiles or aircraft are bound to get through
the outer layers of air defence. Ships must
therefore have reliable, simple, and
effective Close Range weapons that can be
properly directed and controlled from a
Central Direction Platform on the Upper
Deck. It is difficult to understand why we
ever removed such guns and control
arrangements from ships. A ship's
company that knows its ship has good
Close Range weapons will assuredly have
high morale and a fighting spirit almost
regardless of the odds against them. In my
last desperate fight I had Sailors on the
LESSONS FROM THE FALKLA.NDS -AN
Upper Deck with machine guns and rifles to
try and fight off the Skyhawks and
Mirages. They felt better doing that than
nothing.
It is vital to have Close Range Weapons
Systems for our ships and it is vital that this
inner layer of defence is 100% reliable.
There is lots of scope for invention and
development here, whether it is hard kill
weapons such as missiles or guns, or decoy
or distraction devices. Again simplicity is
essential. Over-sophistication would be
dangerous. That brings me to reliability.
The harsh environment of the sea
demands robust equipment. The Sea
Harrier epitomised this in the Falklands. It
was the reliability both of the aircraft and
the Sidewinder missile, not sophistication,
that won the air battle. Furthermore, that
simple but brilliant invention of the skijump, which considerably eases the wind
restrictions on aircraft compared with the
conventional Carrier, ensured a rapid turn
round and an astonishingly high availability
of aircraft in the air. Another weapon that
impressed me was the helicopter launched
Sea Skua missile. I took a few on board just
before the war started, sent my helicopter
crew over to the supporting auxiliary ship
for a quick course on how to use it, and a
few days later the missile went into action.
We totally destroyed a patrol ship with 2
direct hits with missiles. That's my sort of
weapon; no time for maintenance or testing
- just press the button when you want it,
and it works! Reliability to me does not
mean a percentage figure; it means that any
weapon system will work the moment I
want it. There were times when mine did
not.
I would now like to discuss maintenance
and how I saw it last year. One essential to
grasp very early on in war is that you are on
your own. It is no use worrying the Flagship
with your problems or expecting a spare
part to appear out of the sky to overcome
your defects. If there is not a spare on
board you have to fix things yourself.
Besides, any stores organisation dependent
on helicopter transfers to ships several
thousand miles away from its depots is
OPERATOR'S VIEW
23
bound to have some shortcomings. I had
been trying for several days to get a spare
part for a vital bit of equipment, which was
life or death to me. Eventually a helicopter
arrived and instead of the spare part it
delivered a brand new fridge! We had to
exercise every form of craft skill,
innovation and ingenuity to keep on top
line, and I do not see that this will change in
any war. We somehow fixed our long range
radar in the middle of an air raid by using
the elements of a toaster from the sailors'
dining room. We used the steel legs of
swivel chairs bolted to the floor of the
helicopter to provide revolving machine
gun mountings. Miracles were achieved by
the Engineers in overcoming serious defects
which normally merited a return to harbour
for assistance. The doctor had to be a
dentist as well. I needed every one of my
ship's company and, not least, the most
junior operators and mechanics.
Ships need comprehensive ready-use
stores but we also need to encourage the use
of craft skills to effect repairs and solve
unforeseen problems. Having said that, our
two control radars for the missile system
needed too high a degree of skill and a
prodigious amount of hard work from the
maintainers to keep them going. These
essential systems have got to be more
reliable and less dependent on such high
calibre people. Furthermore, Built-in Test
Equipment to fault find accurately should
be part of the system and ready-use spares
must be available in a cabinet close by with
an easy identification and retrieval system.
This will avoid time-consuming searches in
the ship's central store rooms just when you
need your radars back on line as fast as
possible. This system, which the USN has
perfected in their latest ships, must be an
integral part of the design of any important
weapon system or equipment.
The combined experience of the
Argentinians and ourselves showed that a
modern electronic weapon system will only
perform to expectations in combat if proper
investment has been put into it all through
its life. Buying a weapon system is only a
beginning; it has to be supported by
24
LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS - AN OPERATOR'S VIEW
rigorous and realistic training, exercise
expenditure of weapons and first class
maintenance, spares and servicing. The
Harriers illustrated the right end of this
spectrum, and the Argentinian submarines
the wrong end.
Now, I will make a brief comment on the
threat, which I believe is just as relevant in
the future as last year. The things that
frightened me most, not surprisingly, were
the submarine launched torpedo and the sea
skimming missile. I would like to see all
industrialists and all our scientists turning
their minds to defeating these threats.
What's more, since both these weapons
explode and make holes in the ship near or
under the water line I would prefer to serve
in a ship where the Ops Room is near the
bridge and well above the waterline. No
amount of ergonomics will overcome that
inevitable marked drop in morale when
sitting in a Type 42 Ops Room right on the
waterline during an Exocet or submarine
attack! Why cannot all our ships be designed
with an Ops Room higher up in the ship?
Why put the whole command team - those
that fight the ship - more at risk than
anyone else?
Despite the ploys of manoeuvring and
firing chaff to decoy the sea skimmer, some
missiles are bound to get through because
you only have a few seconds in which to react
and if you get the drills even slightly wrong
you are just as likely to help the missile find
you or your friend. On top of this are the
problems of spurious radar contacts and,
worse, the potential interference that chaff
may cause to your own sensors and missiles.
A lot of trials, tactical thought and invention
are needed to develop sound reactions and
proper defence against sea skimming
-
missiles that get through the outer layers of
defence.
I will end my Falklands observations by
saying that advances in solid state microelectronics which give us much less bulky
processing equipment, combined with
vertical launched missile systems, should
give us the space we need to enable warships
to have sufficient weapons to meet the threat
and to defend themselves. If we make these
reasonably simple, easy to use and totally
reliable then you can be assured our men will
fight even better than they havein the past. It
may be the men at the front who win wars
but it is the Designers back home who make
it possible. Therefore, equipment and
weapons must be tailored for the man and
they must work in a rugged environment the
moment he wants them.
These are some of my views borne out of
my experiences in HMS Coventry in 1982,
which added to many others from many
sources have contributed to a new look at
our weapons, and our designs and
procurement for the future. The Falklands
experience gave us an invaluable measure of
our fighting effectiveness and we have been
able to identify our weaknesses. But we must
be careful to apply our weapon improvements and development of tactics to the
broader scenario of the North Atlantic and
to keep our eyes on our traditional potential
enemy. Above all, we must not forget the
wider operational lesson which is that the
war re-emphasised the need to maintain
versatile and balanced maritime forces to
defend our national interests, to deploy
them in the appropriate areas of interest and
to keep them proficient and ready. That
must remain our prime objective.
D. HARTDYKE
Maritime Forces for the Future as indicated
by the Falkland Experience
Introduction
URING the lifetime of many still serving
there has been a wholly unprecedented
advance in the technology available for the
conduct of maritime warfare, the principal
elements being as follows:a. Nuclear Warheads of such power
that no individual vessel can be made
strong enough to survive a direct hit or
'near' miss.
b. Guided Weapons that enable these
warheads to be delivered with great
accuracy over extremely long ranges.
c. Nuclear Engines which provide
virtually unlimited endurance even to
submerged submarines.
d. Developments in radar, sonar, and
electronic warfare that greatly extend
the range at which detection and
tracking are now possible.
e. Artificial
Satellites for both
surveillance and communications.
f. Improvements in the influence mine
which at one extreme make it
increasingly difficult to either hunt or
sweep, and at the other convert it into
a dormant Guided Weapon.
g. The development of the hovercraft
into a practical offshore vehicle, the
measurement of its remarkably low
influence signatures, and the
demonstration of its surprisingly large
towing power, accurate track keeping
capability,
a n d resistance t o
underwater explosions.
h. The development of the submerged
foil hydrofoil and the demonstration
of its outstanding seakeeping
capabilities for its size.
Any single one of these was bound to
have a significant effect on the conduct of
maritime operations; collectively they have
created a situation so radically different
from anything that has been known before
that we need to go back to first principles
and work out from scratch what sort of
warship we would require in the future.
This I endeavoured to d o in a series of
articles published in The Naval Review as
follows:a. Maritime Forces for Nuclear War
(Vol LIII No. 2 page 121).
b. Maritime Forces for Non-Nuclear
War (Vol LV No. 4 page 301).
c. Maritime Forces for the Inshore
War (Vol LXI No. 4 page 310)
(expanded in letter 'Guns Inshore' Vol
LXII No. 3 page 261).
The South Atlantic Operation provided
the first major test of some of these new
technologies, and in the absence of any
similar conflict in the near future, one
which is likely to influence our thinking for
a generation at least. But if we are to gain
the maximum benefit from this experience
it is essential that we appreciate that in
many respects this series of actions was not
fully representative of the sort of war that
we must primarily prepare to fight. Thus
fully half of the developments referred to in
the first paragraph were not involved at all,
and the Argentine capability in regard to
airborne Guided Weapons was very limited.
In order t o make this clear I have divided
this article into two parts. The first briefly
discusses the more important conclusions,
reached in those previous articles, which
appear to have been validated. The second
considers the extent to which these
operations were technically n o n representative of e,ven a non-nuclear war in
which major powers were involved on both
sides, for this must be our greatest concern.
In the main comment has been restricted
to the larger issues, for these are all too
easily overlooked if one allows oneself to
become too closely involved in detail.
Part One: Conclusions validated
The strategic position
'Both the United States and ourselves are
on the defensive. We may not choose how
.
26
MARITIME FORCES FORTHEFUTURE
the attack will be made, but we must be able
t o meet it when it comes.' (Vol LV No. 4
page 306).
It follows from this that such an attack is
likely to come at the time and the place
where it will be most difficult for us to
oppose, and precisely for that reason we will
be tempted to go to considerable lengths to
avoid the conflict. The danger is always that
this desire will still further prejudice our
already weak military position by inhibiting
the taking of vitally necessary precautions
for fear of giving provocation. The classical
historical parallel in this respect is the
Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941. There
we had built airfields on the coast so as to be
able to meet the invading force 200 miles out
to sea. But when the moment came the
Japanese ships (which had no air cover)
were allowed to steam in, anchor 7 miles offshore, and open fire before any attacks on
them were allowed. By then it was too late.
What successive generations of diplomats
and politicians seem to fail to recognise is
that the potential aggressor may already
have taken the decision to attack, and is
merely trying to create a favourable
opportunity. In such circumstances the
failure to take defensive measures only
serves to encourage him. This came out
clearly from the debate in the House of
Commons on 3 April, 1982, and this, one
hopes, will become compulsory reading for
everyone likely to be involved in a similar
situation in the future.
One useful outcome of the recent conflict
is the concept of a Maritime Exclusion Zone,
extending beyond territorial waters, which
can be established without a declaration of
war. But even so it should be realised that
defence plans which presume permission to
take overt preparations in advance of a
physical act of aggression may well fail
through lack of political will, especially in
the context of a potential nuclear war.
The new Capital Ship
(Vol L V No. 4 page 307,308)
The fitting to the Nuclear Submarine of a
Tactical Guided Weapon, which enables it
to strike at a surface force from a distance
greater than the defensive perimeter which
that force can sustain, makes the Nuclear
Submarine the Capital Ship of the current
era, for only another Nuclear Submarine can
offer effective opposition in the open ocean.
This was demonstrated by the establishment of maritime supremacy in the South
Atlantic, by the mere presence there of
Nuclear Submarines, before the surface
units of the Task Force arrived.
A number of extremely important
consequences flow from this change:a. Since Nuclear Submarines will
decide the outcome of the war at sea
they must be expected to absorb the
greater part of those resources devoted
to the construction and maintenance of
war vessels.
b. All other classes of ship must be
regarded as ancillary, and be priced
accordingly.
c. The validity of building specialised
anti-submarine escorts, which would
prove no match for a Nuclear
Submarine, needs to be re-examined,
and expenditure on this type reduced.
In future even Tactical nuclear
submarines will need to be fitted with
vertical weapon tubes as well as horizontal
ones. Besides increasing their anti-ship and
anti-air capability, they could also carry
weapons suitable for use against shore
targets. This would eliminate any future
need for the extraordinary exertions
required from the Vulcan force in order to
prevent the Port Stanley airfield being used
by modern, fixed-wing, fighter aircraft.
The role of the Aircraft Carrier and its
Aircraft
(Vol L V No. 4 page 308)
Since the aircraft carrier is no longer the
determining factor in the battle for
supremacy at sea, the principal roles which
remain for it, in order of importance, are:a. The ability to influence directly the
land battle
b. The conduct of amphibious
operations (including evacuations) in
areas remote from our bases.
c. Air Defence of Surface Forces.
'IIL
wc of the Nuclear
.I-I>I> L.~III:<O : I I , I ? . $ \ !
L!< " ,
.(,
ti#.?
kc>icc, invol\es a return to the
j ~ ~ \ t ~ f i c i i tl<sr
i o ~, ilie \i>,~,ic;: . > I . . ;;!, I t . , v : c , r s d ,
' i. \liooluorth Carr~er,based on
Be,lgrut/o. 1
, . I s i ! ! i ~'ii'~i
~ ~ <&':,: ~ ~p :~ : I I ~ L ~ . ,~
i>~p
l1u1i. Hitherto the lalge
a liircar i c ) t ! ! ~ : \ ~ I I Iiicc, i :~xh1.i :i., 1,: r. , I ! r
r
.
:
a
1 ~egardcd a\ the most
ma\ i111plicti ~ i i chi11I J C C '[;i\h i , , ~ !. L 11. -i!
i -r t
I Vai L\' No. 4 p. 309), and ~t1s
did i~oti % L 4 1 1 i L O l ~ a i c! O c<ltlt!ttvi,:I I \ ! , , , I ; : ,
l t . ? r r i that
Lontalner
denio~~strareJagalr: a,, I c+ i :ic ::. i ,
,I
t t~bedn\ well. We would not
Carrier!, i % h i ~ l I!I ~ V L . l>ct,~ldcS.i!,\/cC!1 . 1
t ,I:: ,
, I il'il
o u t t ~ t sof a~rcraft for all
i ~ r ~ i ~ i ec n\ cci~~ f;\I ] Soilti? ?.i:*-,i,:<!. I S , ( " ,:,
I
, J I ~ \ - - I I I some
L ' ~ could be prov~dedby
the former I4ic~rcil
coloii\ ( , I ' 1, ! : ci
it ts lien tne need arose. If however
1 11e c o I ; t ~ l ~ t ! ~ t(',I~ i ~i i' C
i ~ ' :111~'!..;:,
,. i:ll~.'J i ,L :i
I I ; ? , t i t ~111. t)pe are to survlve major
therel'~)rc in1r.11cj ' . i ~ : O ! I I ! I E I ~ t ~ i ~ i <l, Ii :!
r
secv~id -1a c ~ r c ~Ail
~ i l . o ~ c c ,i i . i i ; ! > ~ :)sinrr ddliid2~tc'! iollg enough to permlt t h e ~ vital
,tl.c:,clt
ro be \aved, they need to be f ~ t t e d
~urlclionis 1 0 ~ I I ; > [ ) :!tc
( : I ~! ~ I I C
! > ~I! i ! i ~ ' , a11d
.
.: i r i 11
\%hiclr will only bt: I
I b i i i *dllt~alamount of permanent
circun~\~itncesMII~:LI thc ! I L ) ; . I I I t i i . +l.l : ,,i , ,,\
jic~hapsIn the form of major
cannot be c~nplayccl. . . l i l t : ciit~lt~i,,, . i l ~ l l l l , t3 1~t 1r1 1 \ filled w ~ t hempty 40 gallon
I i(,A 1 V No. 4 pages 309 and
solutior~ is a new g c ' ~ i c ~ a t i o ~ ) I ~ ; ~ - ! \ L ~LL !
fllrcraft capat~lcoi ol~t.:
,ilin&.cil'i::~ ' i : s : t i I
Ti, i
, ,
TL,! that 5uch bhlps mould be
\ea or hol-c. I! 11ax h~(,ii\aid !rial ~v~:'rii:,r[ , I
get thi, and failccl. 811ilri.\~trilt,l1.,~. :I,!>>. ;. . O I ~ , t i . \ or,,irr!red and ~ o u l ddepend on
repl-ehclltb L11c 0 1 1 ~ ) c i ~ i u ~ ; r . ~ LII!L!..I
l ~ i ~ ~ ~L I c,ri
and i h e ~ rescorts for the11
which we are likely to \cc aircrair
dctcnce.
opposed to helicol~ters);ir sea 111 t l ~ elate
i theretoic belleke that me ought to have
19705. . . It i, t l ~ eail-craft, ;i5 tile Inost kcpt our ploirllse and sold Invmcrhle to the
expensive itern, ~ ' I l i ~ t \%ill
1
c t i ~ ~ : - - : i i ' , ' !!i.
\~1\:1;1!ldi15. thereby ensurlng the presence
type of carrlcr rccirii:cLl.' ( V o r I . \ h!,.4 r). ,r i o i ~ ~ l l l o n \ ~ e aaircraft
lth
carrler In the
page 310).
I'a~~iic., I : I * * ~ into the 21st Century, and to
For atnphibious ol>crati~l:is,! i i v.I.i~ci~
111c h n \ i p~oilcledourselves w ~ t hat least two
major stake i \ a land I'orcc co!npletely
\Ai~:ol\\or~
11 C arrlers instead.
dependent on ~ ~ a vzupport,
al
3 rl~ini~riurn
ot
three carriers,are required (Vo! 1,V No. 4 ~ ' 0 / 1 1 t 1 / ~ 1 1 ~ 1 ~
Ihc deci:,ii>~~to use a carrier as the
page 308). I'he logic behir~tl z l ~ ~ t ligiire
i
is
Ship for an Arrlphibious
simple. If one has oniy two, arid one i 5 p ~ ~ i:onirnand
t
out of action, 5O01u of the air et'l'ort 1s lost. Operatic111 l~eedsto be reviewed. As was
this
occasion,
With the defence ~ h u s weaherled, t!rc d e m o n s ~ r a t c d o n
chances of losir~g(he survivor are bound L O considel-ations relating t o aircraft
be increased. In a purely naval operatior1 it ope ratio^^:, will determine the geographical
would usually be prudent to consider positioti o f the carriers. and this may not be
withdrawing in~niediately,and acceptir~ga at all suitable for overall control by Task
limited defeat rather t h a ~ l a cornple~e Force Cornnrander. Even more important,
disaster. But in an amphibious operation the carriers are certain to be the prime
the immediate withdrawal oi thc naval targeta fur the enemy forces, and as has
forces means sacrificing any troop5 ashore. already been indicated, one of the most
It follows that two carriels ale on1) difiicull decisions which may have to be
sufficient when the risk of losing either can taced is whether to continue the operation
be regarded as minimal, mhich amounts to ai'rc: a cat-rier has been lost. It is most
the operatiorl being, from [he naval point ot ilritle5il-able that that decision should have
to he taken b)' a subordinate commander
view, effecti\.ely unopposed.
To be able to guarantee the availability o f because [he carrier which was lost was
three carriers at all times, without thc cost carrying tire 'Task Force Commander.
-
\.
g
.
(t!
.
~ I I L I L . "
28
MARITIME FORCES FOR THE FUTURE
The options appear to be, either:a. One of the Surface to Air Escorts
b. A dedicated HQ ship, which need
not be very large.
Escorts: Thefallacy of the General Purpose
Ship
'A Jack of all Trades is Master of none. A
General Purpose Ship will, in any of its roles,
be inferior to the specialist ship (for that
role) and inferiority is a luxury which we can
least afford.' (Vol LV No. 4 page 31 1).
As the effectiveness of surface antisubmarine escorts declines, 'and the Surface
to Air Missile is capable of Surface to
Surface use as well, the surface escort of the
future should be a specialised Guided
Weapon Destroyer' (i.e. one whose primary
function was Surface to Air Defence) (Vol
LV No. 4 page 311).
It was pointed out that the County Class
(and this also applies to the more recent Type
42) have only one long range Surface to Air
System, whereas the specialist ship would
have carried two. Such a ship should be able
to engage four aircraft at a time with its long
range system, whereas the Counties can only
engage one. This makes the General Purpose
Ship very vulnerable to mass air attacks, and
I noted that the Commanding Officer of
Coventry blamed the loss of his ship on mass
attacks which swamped her system's
capabilities. The inadequacies of the Type 42
proved to be so grave that a Type 22 had on
occasion to be combined with it to provide
support. Yet even this team provided less
than one would have expected from a true
specialist air defence ship. In effect it turned
out to be half a ship for the price of two, the
exact opposite of what the supporters of the
General Purpose Ship had claimed.
Without any doubt the most serious
deficiency which the South Atlantic
Operation revealed in our surface force was
a lack of Surface to Air capability, and for
this our policy of building General Purpose
ships must be held chiefly to blame.
Coastal defences
'The missiles which sank the Eilat (an
Israeli Frigate lost off Alexandria)
happened to have been mounted on an
FPB; they could as easily have been fired
from a lorry. Road mobile coast defences
are now technically feasible and surface
forces, even when these are provided with
air cover, can no longer approach close to a
hostile coast relying on intelligence to avoid
surface to surface defences'. (Vol LXI No.
4 page 3 11).
'It should be recognized as the height of
folly to commit an extremely expensive
ship, whose primary function is to provide
surface to air defence to the surface fleet, so
close to a hostile coast that its 4.5 inch
gun@) can be used effectively. And yet we
are prepared to sacrifice half the armament
of these ships (the Counties) and more than
half their effectiveness (as Surface to Air
Escorts) in order to obtain this option.'
(Vol LXI No. 4 page 313).
Glamorgan was struck by an Exocet fired
from shore; luckily the damage was not
particularly severe. In this she was
fortunate for she could as easily have been
sunk.
Bom bardment
'The naval gun is by no means an ideal
weapon for this purpose; its high muzzle
velocity, and flat trajectory, combined with
the instability of the floating platform, has
meant that it lacks accuracy, and, in hilly
country, has immense crest clearance
problems.' (Vol LV No. 4 page 3 11 and also
Vol LXII No. 3 page 261).
It is to be hoped that the results achieved
by the many thousands of rounds fired
against shore targets will be fully evaluated,
and the decision to retain the 4.5 inch gun
primarily for bombardment reviewed. It
would appear that on this occasion it was
not even able to prevent the use of Port
Stanley Airport to resupply the Argentine
garrison.
The losses at Bluff Cove
'Any vessel, or establishment, once it has
been detected and identified can be
destroyed. Concealment has become the
primary method of protection, and where
this cannot be achieved, reliance must be
MARITIME FORCES FOR THE FUTURE
placed on numbers, small size, and high
speed.' (Vol LXI No. 4 page 310).
Given that there were good tactical
reasons for using Bluff Cove (a point on
which I am in no position to comment), then
the losses that occurred there were due
primarily to our lack of suitable landing
craft for that supply task. Sir Tristan and Sir
Galahad are Landing Ships (Logistic); they
were too large, too slow and took far too
long to unload. Much better craft did exist in
the shape of the six SRN 4s now being
operated by Hoverspeed, but these had to
remain in the U.K. as we had not taken the
precaution of providing ourselves with the
means of transporting them overseas (LXI
No. 4 page 318). Hovercraft would have
been able to come and go long before the
Argentinians could react.
Summing up Part One
I feel that enough has been said to show that
many of the lessons we were forced to learn
the hard way were inherent in the technology
being employed and should have been
anticipated as they had been forecast in a
simple analysis made years earlier. This gives
me no satisfaction, for who can take any
pleasure in the knowledge that some of the
casualties and losses which we suffered
could have been avoided by designing ships
more suited to the tasks they would be called
upon to undertake?
But I would also suggest that it shows that
the situation is amenable to analysis, and
that the one I proposed seems to form a
reasonable basis from which to work in
future.
Part Two: Non-Representative aspects
Introduction
If anything this part may be more important
than Part One, and I recognise that it is also
bound to be more controversial. Where a
technology has been subject to the test of
combat there is some scope for differences
of opinion regarding the results, but that
scope is necessarily limited. Where no such
test has been applied the forecasts are
necessarily speculative, and there is much
more room for prejudice, my own included.
29
But when the earlier articles were written
none of these technologies had been tested
in battle, and the extent to which the
analysis proved successful where it has been
tested gives some confidence that it will
prove equally successful regarding the
remainder. Some assessment of the nonrepresentative aspects is essential if these are
not to mislead us.
Quite rightly considerable emphasis has
been placed on difficulty of the operation.
The Task Force was required to conduct an
opposed landing at a distance of 8,000 miles
from its U.K. Base, with the minimum of
preparation, and despite a firm political
undertaking, given many years earlier, that
no opposed assaults would in future be
contemplated. In brief, they, achieved the
impossible, and I have no wish to deny
them the credit which they so richly deserve.
But this must not be allowed to blind us to
the limitations of the forces by which they
were opposed.
By any standards the Argentine is a third
rate power. It had not fought a major war in
living memory, and many considered that its
armed forces primarily existed as the means
whereby their commanders exercise political
power. In particular:a. They possessed no NBC Weapons.
b. They possessed no nuclear
submarines.
c. Their Air Force, which was to prove
by far their most effective arm, was
mainly equipped with obsolete aircraft,
and they were forced to fight at such
extreme range that they could only
remain for a few minutes in the
operational area.
d. Their effectiveness in air to air
combat was low.
e. They had only six aircraft capable of
carrying the Exocet missile, and these
had only just been received. With these
they sank two major units. Had they
possessed a hundred such aircraft, and
weapons to match, the consequences
for the British Task Force would have
been disastrous.
f. Instead they were forced to make the
bulk of their air attacks at masthead
30
MARITIME FORCES FOR T H E FUTURE
height, and were further handicapped
by the repeated failures of the fuzes of
their 1,000 Ib. bombs.
g. It would not appear that they laid
any sea mines.
h. They possessed neither hovercraft
nor hydrofoils.
Sea tnines
The Task Force was accompanied by stern
trawlers fitted for minesweeping, so the
possible use of moored mines must have
been anticipated. These present little
problem since a single pass with wire will
remove all except 'delayed risers'. Had the
threat been from ground mines, the
problem would have been many times more
severe, particularly having regard for the
manner in which the Argentinians scattered
the land mines which they possessed.
Imagine the effect on the operation if
a. No surface ship could be allowed to
cross the 100 fathom line except in a
swept channel.
b. The only channel which could be
opened and maintained was the one
into San Carlos anchorage.
c. This would take several dhys to
clear thereby giving ample advance
notice of the intended landing place.
d. Throughout this period the
MCMVs would need constant air cover
as they were incapable of defending
themselves and irreplaceable.
e. Despite their efforts there was still a
distinct possibility that Cunberra, or
some other major unit, would be mined
as a result of a 'topping up' operation or
because a mine had been missed.
In Inshore Waters the biggest threat of
all, to the surface ship, can come from the
mine. I seem to remember being told that in
World War I1 more ships were sunk by
tnines than by all other means put together.
The nuclear submarine is a very expensive
vessel, and only major naval powers can
afford them. The mine is by contrast cheap,
and easy to lay, particularly in peace time.
The Russians, historically, have always
exploited the potential of the sea mine and
are prepared to do so again.
Hovercraft and Submerged Foil Hydrofoils
Neither side operated either hovercraft or
hydrofoils; the Argentinians because they
did not possess any, the Task Force either
because the need for them was not foreseen,
or, more likely, because we lacked the
means of transporting them overseas. As
has already been pointed out, the presence
of SRN 4s should have avoided the tragedy
of Bluff Cove.
Because historically we have had a worldwide commitment, we instinctively think in
those terms. Our ships are designed to be
ocean-going and to be lived in for long
periods. This means that they are larger,
more expensive, and more vulnerable than
they need be, and are by no means suited to
the high speed battle that can be expected to
develop in Inshore Waters in any future
European war. We learnt that lesson in
both the two World Wars, and we can
expect to have to learn it again in the
next, if there is one. What are needed
inshore are pure fighting machines, more
akin to aircraft in concept than the current
frigate. Not only would these be cheaper
than frigates, but in battle far more
effective.
But it will only be after a mine threat has
developed that the real value of these new
types of vehicle will be demonstrated. As a
result of improved mine technology, the
signature requirements for displacement
vessels have become so stringent that only a
very expensive, specially designed, MCMV
can go some way towards meeting them.
These are so few that they will be employed
only on routes of the highest priority. The
rest of Inshore Waters are likely to remain
closed to surface ships for the duration of
the war as there is insufficient Mine
Countermeasures effort even to establish
how severe the threat really is.
The relative immunity of hovercraft to
existing forms of mine has already been
demonstrated, and it must be anticipated
that this will, in some measure, apply to the
submerged foil hydrofoil as well because so
little of the craft is underwater, when foil
borne, and the foil should have a high
resistance to underwater explosions.
MARITIME FORCES FOR T H E FUTURE
But this does not mean that the two types
of craft are interchangeable. The hydrofoil
is more limited as to size, is potentially at
risk to snag-line mines, cannot operate in
ice of appreciable thickness, and is
vulnerable to the sort of heavy floating
debris that becomes commonplace where
heavy merchantship losses have occurred.
The hovercraft, on the other hand, is a true
amphibian, which in amphibious operation
is capable of landing its cargo dryshod,
right at the back of the beach. It has always
seemed strange that the country which
invented the hovercraft remains so
reluctant to exploit their undoubted
military potential.
As a result of the Fortress Falkland
Policy, which has been forced upon us, we
shall have for some years to keep several
frigates permanently on station in the South
Atlantic, and a similar number of
replacements refitting, giving leave,
working up, and in transit. This burden
could be reduced by permanently stationing
a few hovercraft of approximately 150 tons
in the Falkland Islands and rotating their
crews. To these should be added a stock of
mines which the hovercraft could lay if an
invasion was thought to be imminent. Such
a mine threat would impose a serious delay
to any seaborne assault, and increase the
time available for the deployment of
reinforcements from the U.K.
Conclusions
In the final phases of the South Atlantic
Operations a number of commentators
seemed to be suggesting that because the
actions were being fought mainly by surface
ships, this demonstrated that we now
required a primarily surface ship Navy. I
trust that the foregoing has exposed the
31
fallacy of that view. What these operations
showed was the extreme vulnerability of
even the most modern surface ships, when
opposed by a third rate power with largely
obsolete equipment, who suffered a major
geographical handicap in the areas where
the battles were fought.
Had we been opposed by modern forces,
and if sea mines had been used against us,
our casualties would have been far worse.
I suggest that the correct conclusions
which should have been drawn from this
Non-Nuclear War are these:a. The Nuclear Submarine has proved
itself to be the Capital Ship of this era.
b. We need to develop a cheaper form
of aircraft carrier so as to be able to have
at least three at short notice at any time.
c. Since the primary role of these
aircraft carriers is now to influence the
land battle, the aircraft for these can in
part be supplied by the RAF.
d. The most essential surface escort
now required is one with a Surface to
Air capability, and this ship should have
two long range systems each capable of
engaging two aircraft at a time.
e. We should reappraise the amount of
effort put into anti-submarine Escorts
since it is uneconomic to prepare for a
form of action which one is certain to
lose.
f. Thought should be given as to where
the Task Force Commander of an
Amphibious Force should be carried.
g. We will require operational
hovercraft for all forms of inshore
operation, especially where a mine
threat will exist. The money for these
should be found by reducing the
number of General Purpose Frigates.
PIERS
ASW, SLBMs and the
Strategic Nuclear Balance
HE CURRENT nuclear debate in Britain
and the rest of Western Europe is
concerned primarily with Theatre and
Tactical nuclear weapons. This is logical
enough as it is these categories that are
deployed in Europe. But this debate has
tended to obscure the parallel debate going
on in the United States, principally over the
idea of a nuclear 'freeze'. This controversy
is over the longer range Strategic systems,
some of which are deployed in the United
States itself. Many of the beliefs and
assumptions central to the theories of
deterrence have been called into question
for the first time since the late 1950s and
early sixties. The twenty years that have
passed since Sputnik, the 'Missile Gap' and
the Cuban Missile Crisis have seen the
establishment of a stable strategic nuclear
balance between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Both sides developed for the
first time a reliable and secure capability to
conduct large scale nuclear strikes directly
against each o t h e r ' s homelands.
Technological advances in the field of
nuclear weaponry proved, not as at first
feared, destabilising, but the opposite.
Throughout the 1960s and 70s both the
Superpowers became increasingly confident
of their ability to hit back with effect at the
other side even after being subject to a full
scale pre-emptive first strike. Strategic
weapons therefore increasingly came to be
seen as mutually self-cancelling. This
balance was institutionalised in the SALT
agreements.
Stability of the balance
There were three principal reasons for the
establishment of this central strategic
balance. A popular misconception is that
the two Superpowers possess far more
weapons, as embodied in the SALT
treaties, than they could possibly really
want, but are driven on by the dynamics of
the arms race. In fact the sheer numbers of
weapons ensure that no first strike could
possibly hope to destroy even all of the
relatively vulnerable land based systems.
Even five per cent of the total force could
wreak such devastation in retaliation as to
dissuade an opponent from such a strike in
the first place.
Secondly, attempts in the 1960s to
construct effective Anti Ballistic Missiles
(ABMs) soon proved that the technological
advantage, for the foreseeable future at
least, would always lie with the offensive.
The sheer expense involved in building a
comprehensive ABM system effectively to
shield either side from a full scale nuclear
strike was beyond even the United States,
even if it were technically feasible. Civil
defence would be of very limited
effectiveness. Since there could be no
defence against a nuclear strike, the only
answer was to deter one. The surety that
one's own ballistic missiles could not be
countered reinforced each side's confidence
in its ability to deter the other.
Finally, the development of Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) went
even further to enforce a strategic
stalemate. Two features of this kind of
weapon were particularly relevant - their
inaccuracy and their invulnerability.
SLBMs lacked the accuracy in their
navigation systems for them to be targeted
against an enemy's land based ICBM silos.
Such a counter-force capability, which the
ICBMs themselves did possess, was often
seen as synonymous with a first strike. The
relatively inaccurate SLBMs could only be
targeted against 'soft' targets such as cities.
They were thus only suitable for a
retaliatory second strike, and in no way
threatened pre-emption.
The current and foreseeable state of Anti
Submarine (ASW) technology equally
meant that the submarine based systems
were quite invulnerable to a first strike.
Even if all one's land based missiles were
ASW, SLBMS AND THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
destroyed in their silos and the air launched
systems destroyed on the ground, a massive
retaliatory capability would still remain
beneath the seas. This assured second strike
capability effectively precluded any
thoughts of a pre-emptive first strike.
SLBMs thus came to occupy a central place
in the strategic nuclear balance as the
ultimate expression of the concept of
deterrence.
Changing Assumptions
During the 1970s, as plans were advanced in
the United States for the next generation of
strategic systems, the traditional 'triad' of
air, ground and submarine based systems
almost seemed to be called into question
for the first time. While the Trident SLBM
programme proceeded unchecked, severe
doubts existed about the new MX ICBM
and the B1 bomber. As the cost of these
systems soared, for the very first time
funding became a major consideration in
the American deterrent. Doubts were
expressed about the survivability of the new
bomber in the face of the Soviet air defence
system, and the whole project was for a time
cancelled by President Carter, although the
programme was reinstated by President
Reagan. The MX is still a controversial
subject in the United States and its future
uncertain. Even if both systems are brought
into service, the Trident SLBM will still have
established itself as the mainstay of the
American deterrent.
The introduction of Trident has changed
some of the assumptions previously made
about SLBMs. Their invulnerability
remains, at least for many years to come.
But recent technology has given the system
an accuracy previously only possessed by
the ICBM. The principal advantage of the
ICBM over the submarine launched system
has gone. Hence it has been possible for
many in the United States to question the
whole future of MX. This new-found
accuracy has led many, particularly in the
various disarmament movements, to see
Trident as a first strike weapon. This
assertion is quite unfounded. The
possession of a secure second strike
33
capability by the Soviet Union continues to
make a first strike out of the question.
There is, moreover, no point in opting for
the very expensive submarine based option
if its missiles are intended to be used first.
Rather, the improved accuracy of Trident
increases the targetting options open to the
Americans, and allows the missiles to be
used in a damage-limiting role once a
limited nuclear strike has already been
launched by the Soviet Union, by
destroying land based systems as yet
unused. Nevertheless, the SLBM's
distinctive nature as a purely second strike
weapon has at least been blurred and may
have a de-stabilising effect more because of
perceptions as to its intended role than of
its actual place in the nuclear balance.
Current theories of nuclear deterrence in
the West have, naturally enough, evolved
largely in the United States. Unlike the
United Kingdom, where defence issues have
never interested more than a handful of
academics and theories of deterrence are
nearly all Government-inspired, there has
since the 1950s been a very large body of
independent academics in the United States
who have increasingly come to take the lead
in what is, after all, a very conceptual field.
This body of opinion, based in such
institutions as the Rand Corporation, was
increasingly consulted by successive
American administrations, and the
Departments of State and Defense, until an
academic, Doctor Henry Kissinger, became
first National Security Advisor and then
Secretary of State. These academics,
consulted by government but generally not
privy to Pentagon secrets, based their
evolving theories of deterrence on a number
of generally well founded assumptions. One
of the principal of these was the complete
invulnerability of submarine based systems
outlined above. Until recently this was a
valid assumption. Deep diving nuclear
submarines could remain quite undetected
if they so wished, until their missiles were
fired, by which time there was little point in
sinking them anyway.
However, recent technological developments in the field of ASW have gone a long
34
ASW, SLBMS A N D THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
way to undermine that assumption, and
with it the whole basis on which SLBMs fit
into the strategic nuclear balance. These
advances, principally fixed acoustic systems
and submarine and surface ship towed
array systems, have been developed in great
secrecy and in the case of the latter are only
now becoming operational. Their existence
and significance has so far gone largely
unnoticed outside official circles, and so
general theories of deterrence have not
begun to evolve to take account of these
new developments. The SLBM carrying
SSBN is no longer undetectable. Surface
ships can locate and track nuclear
submarines at ranges measured in tens of
miles rather than thousands of yards. The
West is fast developing the ability to know
the fairly exact whereabouts of the majority
of Soviet nuclear submarines, including
their SSBNs. Submarine based strategic
systems are no longer by any means totally
invulnerable.
The strategic significance of this is fairly
self-apparent. The Soviet Union can no
longer feel itself assured of a secure second
strike capability, able to wreak total
devastation on the United States. The
temptation to launch on warning must
increase as the security of one's retaliatory
capability is degraded. An atmosphere of
mutual suspicion and uncertainty must
result in the strategic relations of the two
Superpowers. Technological developments,
as feared for many years, may now prove to
be de-stabilising.
ASW and stability
This shift of the balance towards the
strategic defensive is at present quite onesided. Soviet submarines are very much
noisier than Western ones and so more
susceptible to detection by systems that rely
on the targets' own radiated noise.
Furthermore, the Soviets, always behind in
the field of ASW, have so far shown little
interest in comparable passive detection
systems and are currently a long way from
developing an equivalent capability. For the
foreseeable future, the only danger to the
West lies in an increasing sense of strategic
vulnerability and nervousness on the part of
the Soviet Union. There can be little doubt
that the strategic balance between East and
West would be more secure had these
advances not taken place. It is, however,
quite unrealistic to suppose that either side
would refrain from developing such a
capability once it had acquired the
technology. No country will deliberately
not develop the ability to counter enemy
forces of such power and significance. This
is particularly true of ASW, where the
West's new found ability to counter Soviet
nuclear submarines was so desperately
needed in order to combat the Soviet
Union's growing fleet of torpedo and cruise
missile firing submarines in the
conventional battle for the North Atlantic
and other areas.
The result of these developments is that
SLBMs are beginning to lose their principal
advantage over the cheaper ICBMs. There
is, moreover, a further significance to
SSBNs' new vulnerability. The destruction
of air and land based systems has always
required the employment of one's own
nuclear forces. In order to destroy enemy
ICBMs one had to strike first with one's
own. The damage thereby caused to the
other side's homeland in so doing would
ensure similar retaliation. This was a sure
deterrent to taking such action in the first
place. This logic was, of course, at the very
centre of the concept of deterrence and the
distinctions between first and second strike
capabilities. However, in countering
opposing submarine launched systems,
quite different conditions apply. SSBNs are
'taken out' by exactly the same means as
SSNs and SSGNs, by means of
conventional anti-submarine torpedoes and
other ASW weapons. Even where nuclear
weapons are employed, they are of a
specialised undersea type. In destroying
SLBMs no damage is caused to the owner
nation's territory. Such systems are
therefore not protected by a threat of
retaliation against the other country's
homeland. Because of this there are not the
constraints to attacking an opponent's
SLBMs as there are with ICBMs. The
ASW, SLBMS AND T H E STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
latter, moreover, if they are to be destroyed
at all, must all be dewoyed simultaneously,
for otherwise those not taken out will be
used immediately in a retaliatory strike.
Thiz is not true of SLBMs. Because their
destruction, involving no collateral damage
to territory, would not invite strategic
nuclear retaliation, there is no need to be
able to destroy all missile carrying
submarines simultaneously. It can be done
on a piecemeal basis as targets are detected.
Indeed, it might be preferable to proceed in
this manner as gradual attrition is less likely
to invite escalatory action than an all out
strike.
The new generation of SLBMs have more
than just improved accuracy. The ranges of
Trident and comparable Soviet systems
~ u c has the SS - N - 18 are in excess of
4,000 nm, comparable to some ICBMs. The
distinction between the two types of
systems has thus been further eroded. This
increase in missile range is of considerable
importance, particularly in view of the
advance5 in ASW outlined above. An
obvious consequence is that SSBNs have
very much larger areas of ocean in which to
operate. The days of regular Soviet SSBN
patrols off the eastern seaboard of the
United States must be numbered. The
greater flexibility in SSBN deployment
which increased range bestows will go some
way to offset the greater detectability of the
submarines. A severe problem will remain,
however, for the Soviet SSBNs deploying to
the North Atlantic and the Pacific, as in
both cases they have to transit through
relatively narrow 'choke points' such as the
Greenland - Iceland - UK gap. It is at this
stage that they will be most vulnerable.
However, their increased missile range may
be used to enable them to operate in more
restricted, not more open, sea areas. SSBNs
will not have to deploy far from their bases
to be within range of their targets. Soviet
Delta I11 submarines are able to hit targets
in the United States from the Barents Sea,
which is virtually the Soviet Union's back
yard. In such areas the Soviets can bring to
bear overwhelming, largely shore based,
conventional superiority. If SSBNs can be
35
attacked by conventional means, so they
can be defended by conventional means.
The advantages bestowed by local
conventional superiority in the strategic
nuclear balance were well illustrated by the
Cuban Missile Crisis, and the lessons of
that episode were certainly not lost on the
Kremlin. Exactly the same advantages
accrue to the Americans in waters adjacent
to the US. The difficulties and risks
involved for both sides in deploying
conventional forces, particularly o n the
surface, in such forward areas make the full
utilisation of the new ASW systems
impossible. The vulnerability of SLBMs
may not therefore be so pronounced after
all. One consequence of this line of
development will be a much greater
interrelation of conventional and strategic
nuclear forces, which hitherto have tended
to be regarded as quite separate.
Blurred distinctions
These developments in SLBMs, and the
means by which they are countered, have
obvious implications for the future
relationship between land and submarine
systems. The old distinctions of SLBMs
being purely inaccurate but secure second
strike weapons, and ICBMs being accurate
but vulnerable potential first strike weapons
are no longer entirely valid. Not only can the
new generation of SLBMs match the
previous advantages of ICBMs, but the
latter are 'fighting back' too. ICBMs, u p to
now housed in fixed, hardened silos, are
now becoming mobile. This development is
still in its infancy, and the MX, which has
the technology to combine mobility with
accuracy, may yet be mounted in existing
Minuteman silos. But the long term trend is
clear. The next generation of land based
strategic systems will be as mobile as the
existing theatre forces such as the SS20 and
Cruise already are. Land based missiles will
always be easier to detect than those beneath
the sea, but the problems of targetting
forces against them will become harder as
they are able to wander around the country.
Until now, it has been axiomatic of any
theory of nuclear deterrence that inaccurate
36
ASW, SLBMS AND THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
but invulnerable submarine based missiles
were inherently stabilising, while accurate
but vulnerable land based systems were
potentially destabilising, being suitable for,
and vulnerable to, first strikes. This
assumption is no longer valid. The fact that
the destruction of land based systems can
only be achieved by a nuclear strike, while
submarine based systems can be destroyed
without one, may mean that the latter are
all the more likely to be the subjects of
attack. The terrible consequences of
attacking land based systems may actually
make them less vulnerable than the
submarine based missiles, whose gradual
destruction by conventional means
involving no collateral damage may be far
more feasible. Recent calls for the
elimination of land based missiles in favour
of more SLBMs may therefore not be the
sensible measure conventional theories
would indicate.
With the future of Britain's small nuclear
deterrent vested in the Trident DS SLBM,
these developments are obviously of
concern to the UK. For such a small force,
only a counter city reprisal targetting policy
is valid, to be used as riposte for nuclear
strikes against the UK. For this role, the
increased accuracy of the new missile is of
little practical benefit. To suggest, as some
CND apologists have done, that Britain is
buying Trident as a first strike counter force
weapon is patently absurd. The increased
range of the system is however of use. It will
help to insure against significant
improvements in the Soviet ASW capability
in the future. Such developments, when
they take place as they most assuredly will
at some time in the future, will be of great
concern. With only one submarine
guaranteed to be on patrol, our SSBN force
must be even more sensitive to advances in
ASW than that of either of the
Superpowers. Trident's range will be used
to increase potential deployment areas. It
may also be that as the Soviet ability to
track our nuclear submarines improves,
consideration may have to be given to
operating SSNs in direct support of SSBNs
as a matter of course. The decision not to
proceed with the fifth boat, though
reducing programme costs significantly,
must be doubtful in view of the fact that the
assured invulnerability of our SSBNs will
not last for ever. Nevertheless, the decision
to opt for a submarine based deterrent is
still the right one as a small land based one
would be far more vulnerable still. The
security of our deterrent will ultimately rest
on Britain's ability to keep developments in
quietening submarines ahead of Soviet
ASW advances.
Technological advances in both SLBMs
and the means of countering them,
progressing through the 1970s and coming
to fruition in the early eighties, are
challenging some of the previously made
assumptions made about sea based
deterrent systems. They are no longer the
ultimate deterrents, inaccurate and
invulnerable, unsuitable for first strikes yet
not threatened by first strikes. The
improved accuracy of submarine based
missiles is of little real significance. With
the present and projected nuclear arsenals
of the Superpowers, a first strike is in the
realms of fantasy. Accuracy does no more
than increasing targetting options, though
there has been a certain blurring of the
SLBM's unique retaliatory nature. The
increased range of Trident and comparable
Soviet systems, the SS - N - 18 and
SS - N - 8, is likewise not going seriously to
change current deterrence theories and
policies, merely allowing greater flexibility
in submarine deployments.
However, the advances in passive
submarine detection systems are potentially
of enormous significance. In the first place,
Soviet SSBNs are no longer as invulnerable
as they once were, and Western boats
cannot expect to remain undetectable
forever. In consequence, the confidence of
either side in its ability to retaliate no matter
what scale of attack is launched first by the
other must be weakened. The result in times
of crisis may be to make each side a little
more nervous and trigger happy. The
second point is that SLBMs can be
destroyed by conventional means, involving
no collateral damage, even when small
ASW, SLBMS AND T H E STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
undersea nuclear weapons are used. The
elimination of the enemy's principal second
strike capability can therefore be done
without involving in itself a severe degree of
escalation. Such destruction is therefore all
the more likely to take place, particularly as
any major East-West conflict will certainly
involve a large scale conventional ASW
battle as the West seeks to take out Soviet
SSNs and SSGNs. In that situation, it is
hard to envisage the most lethal of all Soviet
37
submarines being deliberately left alone. It
is here that the greatest threat to the secure
strategic nuclear balance lies. Combined
with their own increasing mobility, these
developments mean a revitalised role for the
land based ICBMs, which because of the
far greater consequences of attacking
them, may in time become less vulnerable
than their sea based counterparts.
J. R. STOCKER,
BA
LIEUTENANT,
RN
Why is 'PWO' a Dirty Word?
INCE its inception in 1972, the PWO
concept has been the subject of much
controversy and debate. Gradually those
opposing the idea have been brought round
to the view that it is the only practicable
way to fight ships in modern warfare, and if
anyone still needs convincing, an analysis of
the Falklands War is probably a good place
to look.
One unfortunate fact remains, however:
the number of young seaman officers who
look forward to becoming PWOs is
drastically small. A recent informal study
revealed that of the last 150 seaman officers
completing their fleet boards, less than 10
were volunteers for a PWO career. The
remainder preferred to specialise in
aviation, submarines, hydrography or
diving. Evidently this result is fairly typical
at that stage, and in fact the overwhelming
view of young seaman officers during the
years before they go to HMS Dryad to do
the course, is that becoming a PWO is a
necessary evil - a huge barrier that must
regrettably be surmounted before other,
better jobs can be obtained. The purpose of
this article is to show that the reluctance
thus revealed is not just an extraordinary
anomaly, but is symptomatic of defects in
the way seaman officers are trained in
warfare. It may also reveal inefficiencies in
the PWO system itself.
The Sub-Lieutenant's view
So why is PWO such a dirty word amongst
young officers? A Midshipman or SubLieutenant in his fleet training works with
every department in his ship and thus
acquires a brief, perhaps slightly
superficial, but on the whole fairly
objective view of the job that each officer
does. The view he has of the PWO is of a
man extremely hard pressed at sea, and
overloaded in harbour with both
preparation for future exercises and a
backlog of administrative work - a man
who seems to have to work immensely hard
in order to keep on top of his job. Unless he
works closely with the PWO over an
extended period (which is rare) he may get
the impression that the rewards for doing
this extremely difficult and demanding job
are few, while the opportunities for
catching a blast from the Captain when
something goes wrong are many. The
officer under training will compare this
with, for example, the Flight Commander,
who has clearly defined objectives,
responsibilities and limits within which to
work, who runs his own independent
organisation, and who seems to have time
not only to master the job but also to enjoy
it. The functions of the PWO and Flight
Commander are so different that a direct
comparison is hardly valid, nevertheless to
38
an officer under training they represent two
alternative careers. The comparison has
been quoted because it reveals the two main
threads of the argument used by young
officers to explain why they wish to avoid
becoming a PWO, namely:
a. that PWOs appear to be very
heavily loaded, often finding it
difficult to keep on top of their job;
b. that PWOs d o not seem to gain the
job satisfaction that would be both
incentive and reward for all the extra
effort required.
The P W O image
The latter point is very much involved with
the image that is put over. Most young
seaman officers seem unaware that h PWO's
professional standards are as high as those of
any other specialist officer in the navy, that
his skill will at times determine whether a
ship survives or sinks, and that he is gaining
through his job by far the best possible
training for future command of a ship in
action. No second-class number this; it is
the key job, every bit as rewarding, if
carried out successfully, as any other, and
probably more so than most. These points
must be clearly made to young officers, and
indeed the status of PWOs in general might
be better recognised and their allocation of
administrative tasks (AIDLO and CBO are
the worst) adjusted accordingly. One is
tempted to call in a good PR firm armed
with films like 'PWO - YOUR LIFE IN
HIS HANDS' or 'PWO-THE MOVIE'.
The P W O Workload
But how often can this job be done
successfully? If the junior officer's view
that PWOs are very heavily loaded is true,
the answer to that question would probably
be 'seldom'. Reports from the Fleet,
however, indicate that PWOs are actually
doing well at the moment, and the verdict
after the Falklands War was that the PWO
system had been proved. Determining
whether PWOs are in fact being
overburdened with work to achieve these
results is very difficult. Opinions vary
widely on this, and in any case the
difference between, for example, a Carrie.
and a Frigate in terms of PWO loading is
very great. But the general impression is
that the life of a PWO at sea is a hard slog.
Before considering whether anything needs
to be done, or indeed can be done, to
change that situation it is perhaps worth
asking why i t is the case.
The warfare team
Two factors which have changed to an
important degree over the last 20 years are
particularly significant here: first, the
number of warfare officers appointed to
each ship, and secondly, the quantity and
complexity of exercises that a warship is
required to carry out.
Before the advent of PWOs, typical
manning for a Frigate or Destroyer would
have included a long-course-qualified G,
TAS and son~etimesC, backed up by SD
and SL officers employed as 'little G' and
'little TAS'. Today all that load is borne by
the two PWOs. The contribution of the SD
officer to the PWO system has never been
clearly defined and their potentially very
valuable assistance has not been put to
good use. This is perhaps one of the main
reasons behind the shortage in recent years
of Operations Branch senior ratings
volunteering for promotion. The situation
with young seaman officers is equally
unproductive. With the exception of a very
snlall number o f fighter controllers, none of
them is given any specific warfare
responsibilities between their OW and
PWO course. Each one is issued with a prePWO study guide, but the objectives of this
are very difficult to achieve in practice. In
some cases, officers simply do not have the
time to devote to it, but even if time is
available, the main problem is that a
darkened and busy Operations Room is not
an easy place from which to learn anything,
unless someone has time to explain what is
happening. The Warfare Team, officers
and senior rates alike, rarely have time to
devote to training pre-PWOs - they are
busy enough with their own jobs.
This means not only that young officers
can d o little to share the PWO's burden,
but also that they arrive at the P W O course
without any useful warfare background.
From that point on it is all very much
uphill, and of course this adds to the
impression gained that the PWO course is a
great mountain looming ahead.
As far as the second point is concerned,
the frequency of exercises required to
maintain the Fleet at a high level of
operational readiness has significantly
increased in recent years. Our operational
commitments are also substantial, and are
extremely demanding on ships and men
alike. In addition there has been a vast
increase in the background paperwork in
terms of signals, orders, records and
general administration. Whether this paper
proliferation is justified is a question
worthy of an article to itself, but the fact is
that today's PWOs are stuck with it.
But even if this does mean that the two
PWOs are bearing the whole of a heavy
warfare burden on their shoulders, does it
matter? Few would refute the old adage
that if you want a job done well you should
give it to a busy man. And of course a bit of
hard work, as they say, never hurt
anybody. But it must be emphasised
strongly that today's PWOs are not by any
means afraid of hard work - quite the
opposite in fact. The point at issue is
whether the job could be done more
effectively if the load were more evenly
spread. If PWOs were relieved of some of the
time-consuming but relatively straightforward aspects of their job, perhaps they
would be able to devote more time to, for
example, reflective analysis leading t o the
development of new tactics and procedures.
Training too, both of officers and ratings,
would benefit from the PWO's added
attention, and he might even be able t o spend
more time on the bridge. In order to put this
problem of load-spreading into some sort of
perspective, it is worth looking briefly at how
two other Navies cope with this situation.
Alternative solutions
In the Royal Australian Navy Frigates and
Destroyers carry three or four PWOs and at
present the Navigating Officer is also P W O
39
trained, though he rarely becomes involved
in the Operations Room work. All
Australian seaman officers will have at least
one job as an assistant P W O before doing
the full P W O course. During that time their
bridge watchkeeping takes second place to
Operations Room duties and many reach a
sufficiently high standard to run their own
watch as P W O by the end of that
appointment. Qualified PWOs thus have a
relatively light loading.
In the Dutch Navy, young officers, after
completing training, spend only two years as
bridge watchkeepers before qualifying as
PWOs. This allows the Dutch to have four
PWOs in each ship - U,A,C and AIO, the
latter being also the Navigating Officer. At
defence stations they work in two watches
but at all other times the workload is shared
evenly among the four.
Spreading the workload
How could we achieve a similar spreading of
the workload in the Royal Navy? There
follow three proposals which might be
worthy of consideration:
a. Appointing young seaman officers
to ships for a year as Assistant PWOs,
before taking the P W O course;
b. appointing a third P W O t o each
operational Frigate o r Destroyer;
c. employing S D officers as Assistant
PWOs, thus giving them a more clearly
defined role in the Warfare Team.
Any appointers reading this article will by
now have collapsed in helpless mirth. There
are just not enough officers available t o use
for such schemes. In fact therein lies one of
the problems; the P W O appointer is
considerably short of the numbers required
to meet current manning levels, let alone
any proposed increase. Some ships have at
present only one PWO, while in others
officers have had to remain at sea for
months longer than promised because of
the lack of reliefs. This all adds to the
'hard-done-by' image of the PWO, hence
fewer young officers want to become
PWOs and the downward spiral is
complete.
40
Because of this appointing problem, the
third PWO idea has to be ruled out straight
away. It may be looked at in the longer
term when either the supply of seaman
officers is much greater, as is the case in
Australia, or when the career pattern might
be adjusted along the lines of the Dutch
model in order to provide PWOs at an
earlier stage. For the moment, however, it is
totally impracticable.
The more effective employment of SD
officers must surely be looked at. They
have an immense contribution to make and
by positively harnessing their abilities, a
better career might emerge for them which
would both increase their job satisfaction
and encourage more senior rates to
volunteer for promotion.
The use of young seaman officers is,
however, the area where urgent action can
and should be taken. Here too the
appointing problem will be difficult, but
not necessarily insurmountable. Bringing
pre-PWOs into the warfare team would
achieve two important objectives: first, the
workload could be spread more evenly,
with the advantages quoted above;
secondly, the vast gulf between OOW
courses and the PWO course would be
bridged in a constructive way, thus the idea
of becoming a PWO would be a less
daunting prospect to junior officers.
Conclusion
The fact that few young seaman officers are
keen to become PWOs not only draws
attention to a perceived overloading of the
warfare branch, but also contributes to it
by reducing the number of officers
available to the PWO appointer. I have
argued that the amount of work required of
the warfare team has increased significantly
over the last 20 years, while the number of
officers on whose shoulders the burden falls
has been reduced. Drawing on the
experience of other Navies, three proposals
have been made which might improve the
situation. Increasing the number of PWOs
in each ship is not possible because of the
current shortage of officers; however
making better use of both SD officers and
young seamen officers must be an urgent
priority. By thus improving the PWO's 'lot',
one step would have been taken towards
improving the image of PWOs in the eyes
of young officers. At the same time, PWOs
at sea might find they are able to produce a
more effective warfare team, and thus gain
more satisfaction from their work.
The View from Westminster Bridge
H E last survey of events at Westminster
ended with the British public poised,
ballot papers in hand. They decided to stay
with the same team, eschewing both the
uncertain future apparently on offer from
Labour and the great unknown of the
Alliance.
Shortly after the election the Labour
Member, Mr. Bruce George, published a
useful examination of the influence of
defence in the campaign2. Much of it was
taken up with the reasons for Labour's
poor showing (although one was glad to
note Mr. George's safe return to
Westminster): the party's espousal of
unilateralism, its internal divisions and its
uncertain voice on nuclear matters generally
seemed to be prime causes. The Tories
appeared to have gained from their image
of stout resolution as exemplified by the
Falklands. The Alliance, on the other hand,
somewhat discordantly seeking the way of
moderation, picked up support as the
campaign went on but not nearly enough
even to maintain the strength they had had
in the old Parliament.
Unfinished business
The calling of the general election for June
with the dissolution of Parliament in May
left many of the House's Select Committees
with uncompleted business.
The Foreign Affairs Committee was not
able to complete its report on future policy
for the Falklands, but it did publish in the
minutes of its proceedings the greater part
of the chairman's draft report'. This
document naturally does not have the status
of a report formally accepted by the
Committee, but nevertheless it is indicative
of the way the majority of the members
regarded the issue. It is a sober and sombre
statement and probably much along the
lines that others who have tried to think
dispassionately about the future of the area
have also been driven to. In summary the
conclusion was that the record and attitude
of Argentina ruled out for the present any
thought of transferring sovereignty to her,
yet nevertheless negotiations
must
eventually start and that a lease-back.
arrangement is probably the best long-term
that could be agreed upon for the islands.
The Committee looked at the S A T 0 idea
and decided that 'it would prove costly and
would run counter to the entire thrust of
post-war defence planning'.
The Defence Committee, on the other
hand, was able to complete and publish two
reports during the dissolution period. Their
fourth of the session4 is a valuable review
of the progress that has been made on the
12 reports they had issued since 1979. The
fourth report
usefully
prints the
recommendations made as a result of each
enquiry and the action taken by MOD on
them. Included among the 12 were the
investigation of Sting Ray and the Trident
purchase decision (both in 1980-81), and
MOD organisation and procurement
(1981 - 82).
The Committee's 3rd report of the last
session dealt with the future defence of the
F a l k l a n d ~ .We
~ referred briefly to some of
the evidence in the last review. It is not
practicable to reproduce all 46 conclusions
and recommendations in the report. Those
likely to be of greatest interest to readers
only will be summarised (many dealt with
the airfield naturally): the South Atlantic
commitment should not indefinitely absorb
an unduly large part of our resources,
especially when there are restraints with
regard to other important defence
obligations; diplomatic developments are
not likely quickly to reduce the defence
needs of the Falklands; the MOD were not
willing to indicate where over-stretch in the
allocation of forces and resources is
occurring; a new major attack from
Argentina is unlikely but harassing
operations are conceivable; the deployment
of patrol craft and***6 should lower the
need for destroyers and frigates but not for
a submarine deterrent; the greatest scope
for reducing the size of the garrison is likely
42
T H E VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
to be in the area of logistic support; the
Falklands provide valuable training
opportunities; the deployment of Nimrods
cannot be justified by current threat
assessments; RFAs should be provided with
means for self-defence and the same should
be considered for at least some
merchantmen; no forces should be
stationed on the South Sandwich Islands
but forces on South Georgia should be able
to repel any invaders; servicemen should be
briefed on their responsibilities towards the
local environment and wildlife.
The Government's detailed response to
the report was published in October.' It
pointed out that forces in the South
Atlantic remain committed to NATO and
then went on to spell out the 'measures to
minimise the detriment to our contribution
to NATO'. The suggestion that the new
airfield should be made long enough to
attract civil air traffic was rejected. Naval
force levels are subject to review in the light
of the prevailing political climate. The
arming of RFAs and merchantmen is
receiving active attention. Maritime
reconnaissance is currently being effectively
carried out by Hercules aircraft based on
the Falklands.
Debates on the Queen's Speech
The Queen's Speech at the opening of the
new Parliament on 22 June contained
nothing revelatory on defence matters.
In the customary debate on the Address
which begins immediately after the state
opening Mr Dalyell quickly redeemed his
promise to return to the affair of the
sinking of the General Belgrano and did so
for nearly an hour, to the evident
annoyance of other Members. His purpose
was to call for a public enquiry into the
matter. One judged that this would not be a
particularly popular rallying cry. Mr Dalyell
subsequently paid a visit to Peru and
claimed later to have brought back even
more evidence to support his case.
The Lords debated foreign affairs and
defence on 23 June in the second of their
days allotted to the debate on the Address.
Baroness Young, translated to the Foreign
Office, opened for the Government. She
made it clear that the Government read the
election as having decisively rejected
Labour's views on defence: 'We therefore
go forward with the immeasurable
advantage of knowing . . . that we have the
backing of the electorate'. She covered a
wide field but in what might be thought to
be an entirely predictable manner. Lord
Cledwyn responded and deplored the
apparently low priority that the
Government had given to disarmament.
Lord Mayhew thought that the
Government had by no means been given a
clear mandate: the electorate had, in fact,
endorsed the Alliance's defence policy. He
drew particular attention to the refusal to
permit any account of Britain's nuclear
forces to be taken in either START or the
INF talks. Why was this? Because if Polaris
were to be included then inevitably Trident
would also have to be. Furthermore HMG
were not bringing sufficient pressure to bear
on the USA in order to make them
negotiate usefully at Geneva. We are not
obliged to follow the US lead in everything
- a point which would come up later in a
much more stark form.
Lord Cameron of Balhousie (formerly Sir
Neil Cameron) followed with his maiden
speech and admitted himself to be procruise, Pershing and Trident, and anti-'no
first use' of nuclear weapons.
Lord Chalfont commented on the few
resources devoted to arms control and
disarmament within government and
thought the role needed a full-time
minister.
Lord Gisborough devoted his short
speech entirely to the disparity in chemical
wea onry between East and West and
call d for a strengthening of NATO's
present negligible capability.
Baroness Vickers spoke of the
advantages of maintaining and improving
our presence in the Falklands - 'the static
gateway to the Antarctic'. They could have
been developed for a strategic role after
we lost Simonstown in much the same way
as they were used in the two world
wars.
!
Lord Boothby drew upon his long
experience to extract lessons applicable to
the future and in particular he expressed
dismay at the diminishing British naval
presence globally and singled out Gibraltar
especially. With four years ahead of them he
felt some confidence that the Government
would be able 'to put our defences in really
good order'.
Viscount Montgomery disagreed with
Baroness Vickers: 'Fortress Falklands' will
not achieve what the Government hope from
it. Only renewed relations with Argentina
will serve to bring about an improvement in
our standing with Latin America.
Lord Bishopston wound up for the
Opposition and Lord Trefgarne ended the
debate, speaking for the first time as a
junior defence minister.
The Commons
Foreign affairs and defence were the themes
for the Commons' fifth day of debate on the
Queen's Speech, on 28 June.
Mr Healey began by moving an
amendment to the humble Address that
amounted to a near total rejection of the
Government's foreign policy. The latter
part of his speech was an extended attack on
their proposals for nuclear weapons - they
were becoming uneasy at the cost of Trident
and there were signs that the reluctance to
put Polaris into the negotiations in Geneva
might be reconsidered; as for the new
theatre systems, 'Nobody now argues a
military case for them' and 'It would be far
better to recognise that the December 1979
decision was a mistake.' He ended by urging
all countries now to support a nuclear
freeze.
Sir Geoffrey Howe replied, speaking as
the new Foreign Secretary. He devoted little
time to defence issues and spent most of that
in deploring Soviet attitudes and policies.
Mr Enoch Powell appeared to have
undergone some sort of conversion with
regard to his beliefs about nuclear weapons
policy and, after a characteristically
logically ordered speech, ended by arguing
abandoning of the British independent
deterrent.
43
Mr John Morris, a former defence
minister, devoted his speech to the
Falklands campaign and more specifically
and most methodically to the Belgrano's
sinking. Like Mr Dalyell, he too called for a
formal enquiry into the matter.
Mr Amery admitted that he was saddened
by Mr Powell's speech and proceeded to
defend the Government's policy on nuclear
weapons. He stressed the length of time for
which we would expect to deploy Trident,
and that will not begin for another decade,
and he seemed willing to trust the
Government on the costing of the system.
Sir John Biggs-Davison made the same
point that others had done in debates since
the Falklands campaign, and regretted that
NATO ended at the tropic of Cancer, that
the vast area to the south is inadequately
defended by sea, and that a S A T 0 is needed
to complement the other alliance. Argentina
might be a member of it and the Falklands a
base.
Mr Foulkes also spoke of the Falklands
and maintained his critical attitude, as he has
done ever since the campaign to recover the
islands began. He spent much of his speech
on the projected airfield: 'A major step
backwards', 'regrettable', 'strategically
useless'. From that he turned to attack the
Falklands Islands Company.
Mr Heffer concluded for the Opposition,
ending his remarks with a restatement of
Labour's defence policy.
Mr Heseltine wound up the debate and
concentrated on defence, setting out yet
again the four 'pillars' for those unable to
recall them. As so often seems to happen
when the Secretary of State speaks,
Members became agitated and especially
when the minister sought to link the
previous administration with the decision to
modernise European theatre nuclear
systems; claim and counter-claim followed
each other to the end of the debate. The
Labour amendment was lost on the division
by 375 votes to 215.
Ministerial changes
We should note the changes in officeholders following on from the election.
44
THE VIEW FROM WEISTMINSTER BRIDGE
Mr Heseltine, Mr Pattie and Mr Stewart all
retained their jobs, but Mr (now Sir Peter)
Blaker was replaced by Mr Stanley as armed
forces minister and Mr Wiggin, Mr Blaker's
deputy, was replaced by Lord Trefgarne.
The consequentials of the Parkinson
affair brought with them a further change:
Mr John Lee replaced Mr Stewart as junior
procurement minister, a case of one
unknown quantity giving way to another.
The change in the leadership of the
Labour Party occasioned fewer changes in
the shadow defence ministers than at one
time seemed likely. Mr Silkin stayed, as did
Mr McNamara. Mr Denzil Davies returned
from a spell of shadowing his native heath
and Dr McDonald departed to cover
Treasury matters, not to be replaced.
The White Paper
The 1983 Defence Statement, held over
because of the impending election, appeared
on 6 July8, but showed every sign of having
been prepared long in advance. In summary
it may be said to be a reaffirmation of the
policy outlined in the 1981 White Paper
, the unavoidable
'The Way F ~ r w a r d ' ~with
mid-course corrections brought about in
consequence of the Falklands campaign.
The chapter on defence policy (always one
of the shortest in the annual statements)
ends on a positive note by suggesting that
the campaign only served to prove how right
the policy makers had been all along.
The practice, adopted in recent years, of
treating some aspect of policy in a modular
form has been continued. This year, for
instance, we have crisp essays on alternative
approaches to nuclear disarmament and on
new thinking on conventional warfare.
These are t o be commended.
The very next day after the publication of
the defence statement Mr Lawson made a
statement in the House on the need to
control public expenditure in consequence
of which he proposed to reduce cash limits
in the current year. The result would be to
remove f5OOM of overspending, much of it
by the MOD. Inevitably there was speculation about how safe.fhe projected defence
budget would be in the months ahead.
Mr Lawson's statement was fleshed out
somewhat by the Chief Secretary to the
Treasury, Mr Rees, on 27 July, when he said
that in the current year the gross reduction
in spending will be about f670M.
Further gloom followed in the
Chancellor's statement on 17 November in
which a further reduction of defence
spending was announced.
Gibraltar
On the same day that Mr Rees made his
statement, statements were also made in
both Houses on the future of the Gibraltar
dockyard, to the effect that it would close by
the end of 1984; it would be reopened
immediately as the Gibraltar Ship Repair
Company. Work on RFA vessels will be
provided by the MOD during the first years
of commercial operation. Other support in
the form of contracts and gifts of land and
assets will also be given.
Mr Duffy in the Commons raised a
number of points in reply including the
insistence on new working practices in
future and whether the proposals met the
Navy's needs in the area. Mr Stewart, the
then junior minister, was not very
forthcoming either in answering Mr Duffy
or the other Labour members who spoke.
Mr McQuarrie was more concerned with the
seeming generosity of the proposals and
whether the new owners would be able to
carry out their obligations.
Lord Trefgarne stressed in reply to Lord
Mayhew that arrangements for the naval
base were unchanged; indeed 200 men from
the dockyard would go to work at the naval
base. Lord Boyd-Carpenter wondered
whether the changes proposed for Gibraltar
would be seen by some as akin to the
announced withdrawal of Endurance.
Lord Merrivale wondered whether the
developing repair facilities at Algeciras
would pose a threat to Gibraltar? Lord
Trefgarne thought not.
The Type 23 decision
As just about his last act at the MOD Mr
Stewart announced on 18 October the
decision on the design of the Type 23 frigate.
As is now well known, the long, thin design
was preferred to the short, fat one
associated with the Thornycroft Giles S90
proposal. Mr Stewart said that the latter had
been rejected because it was too noisy for
ASW, had insufficient space and did not
meet requirements as regards speed, seakeeping, endurance and stability. He also
referred to criticisms that had been made of
the MOD'S naval design staff and said that
these were unfair and unjustified. A tender
for the first Type 23 is to be invited soon.
Commons defence debate
The Commons held its annual, two-day
debate on the defence statement shortly
before the summer recess, on 19 and 20 July.
It was interesting to note how frequently
certain themes were brought u p by speakers:
disarmament and the Government's
commitment to it, whether Britain's own
nuclear forces should be included in
negotiations, value for money in R & D, and
the significance of new conventional
military technology in raising the so-called
nuclear threshold.
The Secretary of State began with the
defence policy litany which has become so
familiar in recent months, including the
assertion that the Navy was safe with the
Tories. He was at pains to defend the
amount spent on R & D, £1.9 billion, or
more than 10% of the defence budget. He
attacked the notions of 'nuclear freeze' and
'no first use' and went on to justify HMG's
nuclear weapons policy. He then spoke of
our 'irreducible minimum deterrent' if there
were a breakthrough in the nuclear
negotiations, but would not be drawn
further.
Mr Silkin moved the Opposition's
amendment to the Government's motion to
approve the statement. He said that the
Government had always held ambivalent
views on the UN and on arms control. He
went on to speak of our diminishing ability
to sustain high defence spending and put
most of the blame for our failure to
maintain an adequate conventional
capability, and a naval one in particular, on
the decision to buy Trident.
45
Mr Critchley, pungent as ever, simply
asked a series of questions - on spending,
on START, on the Falklands cost, on
nuclear use policy, and, finally, on where
the Government will go in its defence policy.
Mr Russell Johnston, for the Liberals,
raised the question of the escalation that
Trident would represent; in the arguments
about costs this had generally been
overlooked. He attacked the Secretary of
State on what he claimed had and was being
done for the Navy: 'In general, is is the view
of many well-informed people that the
Navy is well under strength now and that
the situation will worsen.'
Mr Dalyell returned t o the South
Atlantic, but not to exhume General
Belgrano yet again. This time he
concentrated on the 'cant' about the
strategic importance of the Falklands, on
whether Polaris missiles had been taken
down there with the Task Force, and, at
greatest length, on whether our naval
strength in the area was distorting our
NATO commitment. For this last theme he
drew on the work of Dr Paul Rogers of
Bradford University who had concluded
that it was taking more than 25% of our
frigate and destroyer strength. lo
Mr Bonner Pink followed and suggested
that Mr Dalyell was becoming obsessive
about the Falklands. Nevertheless he too
was clearly concerned about distortions to
our naval strategy following on from the
decision to purchase Trident. His solution
was t o spread the cost over the whole
defence budget.
Mr Ashdown, an ex-RM officer, has
quickly emerged as a thoughtful Member
on defence issues. He pointed to what he
detected as contradictions in Government
policy - thus Trident is indicative of
distrust of our NATO allies, whereas our
willingness to allow cruise here and without
dual-key control implies total faith in the
senior partner.
Mr Ottaway, a new Conservative
Member, spoke of his nine years in the
Navy. He was concerned about anti-missile
defences and sceptical of the value of pointdefence systems; the only solution is t o have
46
interceptors controlled by AEW aircraft.
On the Type 23 design he spoke of his
uncomfortable experiences on the Bird class
patrol boats and urged the Minister to bear
in mind the new vessel's sea-keeping
abilities.
Mr Duffy summed up the first day of
debate for the Opposition. Again budgeting
came up, the priorities and our failure to
take on board the new thinking on
conventional arms to reduce our nuclear
dependence. H e thought that reassurance as
a policy leading to peace was receiving too
little attention; at the same time the biggest
problem in Alliance planning is resource
allocation. We need to stop behaving like a
great power and trying to d o all that they do.
Mr Stewart wound up the day's
proceedings. He spoke at greatest length on
naval matters. He thought that the
developing underwater threat was the main
recent change; new procurement plans for
MCM vessels were intended to combat this.
He went on to discuss naval procurement
machinery, which had been unchanged for
more than 20 years. He dismissed Mr
Dalyell's assertions and explained the
length of time it had taken to come to the
point of ordering Type 2400. Finally he
defended the Government's record on naval
modernisation and discounted statements
about the eventual size of the escort fleet.
Mr Pattie opened the second day's debate
by describing the new Army and Air Force
programmes. Mr McNamara replied. He
quoted from the beginning of the defence
statement: 'We cannot afford policies
based on emotion rather than logic. . .' and
said Labour agreed 100070,it was the only
part of the statement with which they did
agree. After once more attacking Trident he
went on to pick u p the references on the
preceding day to an irreducible minimum
deterrent. What did it mean? We want
Trident because we distrust the USA, but
there is no way in which we could use it
without American agreement. If we have a
minimal deterrent then why not Iran,
Argentina o r Libya?
Mr Amery believed in maintaining our
nuclear independence because who knows
whether the Alliance will endure for the
expected lifetime of Trident? He went on to
consider out-of-area threats and urge that
we make a contribution towards meeting
them.
Dr Owen said that he favoured the
promised annual 3% increase in defence
spending, but this continues only until
1986 - 87; if our Falklands policy is not reexamined before then - since the special
Treasury provision ends in the same year the defence budget will come under especial
strain. He urged the Government to try to
bring START and the INF talks together and
pointed to the American switch to counting
warheads. In this context it was all the more
important for the UK to define its minimal
deterrent. He further urged that HMG
should look closely at the Scowcroft
Commission's report on new US strategic
systems and, then, if the talks cannot be
linked, be prepared to negotiate bilaterally
with the USSR. 'Our handling of the Trident
issue would contribute to deep cuts in
strategic armoury and earn Britain once
again an international reputation as a
constructive force in the pursuit of arms
control and disarmament'.
Mr Wiggin, himself a former junior
defence minister, commented on the
problems of managing defence, a
department. unlike any other, added to
which there have been since 1979 no less than
13 changes in ministers, including seven
dismissals.
Nevertheless he did not advocate a return
to the old system of service ministers. But
rearrangement means that what was
formerly the job of nine ministers is now
done by five. He ended by outlining his three
worries: inadequate defence from air attack;
chemical warfare (others had mentioned this
too); and, inevitably, money.
Dr Gilbert, another former minister, said
that he was glad to be able to support his own
party's amendment to the motion. He saw
Trident, not as an anti-American weapon
but more as an insurance policy against
future changes. Nevertheless the Government had not been fair about spelling out the
cost of cheaper alternatives to the system.
Mr Churchill criticized what he saw as
contradictions in Labour policy: it could not
propose both reduced spending and more
conventional arms.
Mr George was scathing about his own
party's failings in the election campaign:
Labour failed to convince the electorate that
it was seriously interested in defence. In
future it must not say what it will abandon
but what it will provide for defence.
Mr Denzil Davies spoke last for the
Opposition. He claimed that there was no
coherence in Government policy. Another
defence review is inevitable and instead of
waiting for the Treasury axe to fall Mr
Heseltine should begin to think seriously
about defence. In particular the budget
cannot stand the strain of Trident.
Mr Stanley wound up for the Government. He began by commenting on the poor
attendance of the Opposition. On outof-area policy he promised the administration's serious attention. No change is
proposed with regard to Belize; but he was
not so forthcoming on the possible role of
new conventional technology, except to say
that it is under consideration. The debate
ended in a flurry of argument about
Labour's nuclear policy. The division on the
Opposition amendment was lost by 384 to
192 and the official motion was carried by
351 to 30.
Lords Defence Debate
The Lords did not debate the defence
statement until after the summer recess, on
25 October. The newly translated Viscount
Whitelaw opened for the Government. We
had yet another reminder of the four
components of our defence policy. Lord
Whitelaw was at pains to defend the record
on the Navy: under Conservative government 33 ships have been ordered, costing
f1,875M and currently 36 are on order. He
devoted some time to nuclear matters and
stated that in no way could our Polaris and
Trident forces be considered in the context
of INF talks. Our ballistic missile submarines 'are our ultimate guarantee of
national security'.
Lord Cledwyn spent the first part of his
47
speech on the economics of defence. Are we
getting value for money? Is defence spending
getting out of control? Will the commitment
to increase spending by 3% annually be
maintained? We need a Royal Commission
on defence. More specifically, what is now
the real cost of Trident? Will its purchase
adversely affect conventional arms
programmes?
Lord Mayhew called for a fresh look at
Soviet policies: are we dealing with a state
which is evolving or with one which is set fast
in its bad habits? He urged that the UK
should thke a more active role in
disarmament talks. Our NATO membership
does not preclude our having a view
independent of that of the USA. We should
be prepared to enter the INF talks: Polaris
has long been assigned to NATO and its
range is actually shorter than that of the
much vaunted SS - 20.
Lord Lewin followed, making his maiden
speech. He defended the Trident decision as
the only way to keep us in the nuclear
business. Polaris is based on 1950s
technology and even with Chevaline will last
only another decade. Without a successor to
Polaris its credibility would rapidly expire.
Earl Cathcart spoke about the way defence
was handled in the Lords and called for more
time to be given for debating it. Viscount
Trenchard, an ex-minister, spoke of the
problems of managing the defence budget.
He pointed out that probably 95% of next
year's budget is already committed. The
scope for saving lies with training and
research, and one economises there only with
great risk. Lord Trenchard criticised the view
that more conventional arms can be acquired
cheaply and that these will raise the nuclear
threshold. He was followed by Lord Carver,
who has been closely associated with a study
intended to achieve precisely this aim. He
defended the study's conclusions against
both the statements in the defence estimates
and of Viscount Trenchard. Finally he asked
for consistency in the setting of financial
targets and, in this regard, agreed with Lord
Trenchard about the chaos that can follow
from short-term cuts. He suspected the
Treasury of jiggling the accounts.
48
THE VIEW FROM W-E
STMINSTER BRIDGE
Baroness Vickers expressed concern about
the future of the dockyards: the reduction in
their capacity was bound to lead to a lower
reliability of the surface fleet. She asked for
progress on the restructuring of the yards,
preferably aiming for a reorganisation on a
civilian basis.
Much of Lord Hill-Norton's speech was
taken up with home defence, following on
from his involvement with the 'Defence
Begins at Home' group, but he found time to
cast doubt on the maritime pillar of our
defence policy; he said that we are 40%
under-subscribed to our NATO naval force
levels and he claimed that statements about
the future size of our escort strength were
misleading. He commented on the very brief
mention of STUFT in thedefence statement.
Who will guarantee their availability in the
future?
Lord Ironside wondered whether the right
design had been chosen for the Type 23. Had
the S90's sales prospects been taken fully
into account?
Lord Cameron of Balhousie defended the
Trident and Cruise decisions and the
exclusion of Polaris from the Geneva talks.
Lord Kennet, as so often, interjected some
fresh ideas into the debate by reference to the
Scowcroft Commission report, of last April
and recent statements and reports on 'Star
Wars'. Apart from President Reagan's
speech in March little of all this has made
much impact here, but the totality of their
eventual effect could be to knock the ground
from under the Trident decision. Perhaps
for the first time the inviolability of a
submarine-based deterrent could be called
into question. 'Where is our input into this
vast intellectual ferment in the USA? . . . .
Are our best and furthest-sighted brains
plugged in? I doubt it and I believe the task is
urgent .'
Lord Bishopston spoke finally for the
Opposition and speculated on the place of
the Falklands in the Government's defence
priorities. Littlehad been said about this, but
even less had been said about Belize. Were
the Government giving the wrong signals?
Lord Trefgarne wound up the debate in an
emollient manner. There was no division.
Cruise and other matters
On 31 October the Commons held its longexpected debate on the deployment of cruise
missiles in the UK - the first occasion on
which it had been so discussed since the
original decision to deploy was announced
nearly four years earlier. It is not practicable
to summarise it here but the frequently raised
issue of dual control must be singled out,
since it emphasises yet again the question of
the firmness of the Atlantic Alliance and the
trustworthiness of the USA. The actual
arrival of cruise in the UK was announced in
a statement by Mr Heseltine on 14
November.
During July the Report of the
Independent Review of the Radio Spectrum
(30 - 960 MHz), the Merriman report, was
published." This revealed that defence
accounts for the use of more than a third of
the radio spectrum available for broadcasting. So much hogging was obviously
unpopular with civil users and it could not
really be said that Dr Merriman did much to
reassure them, or to explain why so much of
the spectrum was needed. Rather feebly he
recommended that a committee of privy
councillors should review the situation
periodically.
Finally, it is appropriate to end by noting
that Falkland battle honours were announced on 25 October in answer to a parliamentary question from Sir Antony Buck. In
all 44 of HM ships, 15 RN air squadrons, 22
RFAs, RMAS Typhoon, and 32 STUFT
were included in the announcement.
Consideration of the annual Navy debate,
held on 28 November, must wait until the
next review.
TUMBLE-HOME
Notes
'Naval Review, July 1983, p. 224.
"Defence and the 1983 British Election'. B. George and
C. Pawlisch, ADIUReport, July/August 1983, p. 1 .
'HC Paper 380, 1982 - 83.
'HC Paper 55, 1982 - 83.
'HC Paper 154, 1982 - 83.
61n recommendationix: answers on a postcard please.
SCmnd.8951 - I . 11.
9Cmnd. 8288.
'''A note on the UK Naval Deployments in the
Falklands'. P. Rogers, University of Bradford, Peace
Studies Briefings, no. 14,21 July 1983.
"Cmnd. 9000.
Another View From Westminster Bridge
HE other day I leaned over the parapet
of Westminster bridge and watched the
river surging through on the flood tide. The
eddies round the piers of the bridge looked
just as menacing as I remembered them in
1942. Then, as an ordinary Wren learning
about boat handling in Petty Officer A. P.
Herbert's Water Gypsy, negotiating bridges
was never as easy as it looked. Officially we
were Minewatchers manning at night all the
bridges from Kew to Westminster, Chelsea
embankment and a lonely wharf by the
river at Wandsworth. This last was a very
unpopular post because reaching it in thk
blackout across acres of obstacles in a Gas
Light and Coke Co. yard was a nightmare.
The boat bit was for the few of us who
aspired to become boat's crew.
In 1943 the Germans launched a miniblitz on London. There was one night at
Westminster when the phone call
announcing Air Raid Warning Green
(raiders over the coast) was followed almost
immediately by the Red Alert, so that by
the time we had jumped out of our bunks in
nearby County Hall and rammed on our tin
hats it was very noisy and the shrapnel was
falling on Westminister bridge like
hailstones. It was a relief to reach the brick
huts in the middle of the bridge. Soon the
scene was like Dante's Inferno. Searchlights
were probing the sky already glowing red
from fires and the whistles and crrump of
bombs and the flashes of explosions were
very unnerving. A thump on the door
revealed A. P. Herbert clad in pyjamas,
duffel coat and tin hat. He often tied up the
Water Gypsy alongside Westminster pier
for the night and he had come to see if we
were all right. He joined us, peering out
into the river for any sign of parachute
mines. I have to say we never saw one,
although the Wrens on Putney bridge had a
lively time when a large unexploded bomb
lodged itself on the river bank beside the
bridge. During a lull A. P. gave us a lesson
on the stars, pointing out Orion,
Cassiopeia, Ursa Major . . . but the brain
was too numbed with fright to hoist it in.
No matter. The All Clear sounded and we
returned to our bunks. But not for long.
The bombers were back with ferocity. Out
on the middle of the bridge again a plane
was caught in a searchlight overhead and we
thought we were the target for the night.
(Too late, I married a Fleet Air Arm pilot
who said it was really quite difficult to
bomb a bridge from a height). Peering
down at the swirling waters of the Thames
we debated which bank to swim for if the
bridge was hit which seemed likely. A.P.
came back and questioned us about the
stars. Not being one to suffer fools gladly
he seemed disgruntled with our stupidity.
Of course that was Orion, Cassiopeia was
over there. Gradually the noise died down.
The air was heavy with the smell of cordite
and burning but as the dawn came there
along the river was St. Paul's Cathedral, a
shaft of sunlight illuminating the golden
cross on the dome. It was the most inspiring
sight, a sign of hope in that desolate scene
which has stayed with me ever since.
Someone decided that we ought to learn
how to defend ourselves so the police
taught us some Judo and issued us with
police whistles and said it was the best they
could do. A few nights later I was on duty
opposite Battersea Power Station. We slept
in the Lister Institute beside Chelsea bridge.
The sirens went and I pulled on my bell
bottoms, forgetting they were inside out.
No time to stop; clutching them under my
long watch coat, my opposite number and I
dashed along the embankment. The post
was just beyond the railway bridge. As we
got under the bridge a crowd of drunk
Yanks came at us. Self preservation being
the strong instinct it is, I let go the wodge of
naval serge around my middle and blew the
police whistle for all I was worth. The effect
was dramatic. The Yanks evaporated like
the dew and my bell bottoms sank to my
ankles!
The days on the river were marvellous.
Whatever the weather down in the heart of
50
ANOTHER VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
battle-scarred London, cheerfulness broke
in. The Water Gypsy, painted in naval grey
and flying the white ensign, ploughed her
way between Westminster and Tilbury.
Fitted into the schedule of delivering stores
and messages there were lessons in coming
alongside moored barges, picking up a
buoy, man overboard in Greenwich Reach,
much to the amusement of naval personnel
at the College and learning how to cope with
the heavy wash of the tugs who appeared to
be top of the pecking order. We learned the
tricks of the river, creeping along one side at
certain tides. Alas, I was never allowed to
steer under a bridge without A.P. hovering
anxiously. Ever after I nonchalantly tossed
his rum ration into the Thames thinking it
was cold tea, he regarded me with suspicion.
One day one of his fellow M.P.s came out
with us. We were down in the Pool of
London and crowded into the cabin eating
lunch. After a while the visitor said he
would like to go on deck and take a look
round. Before long the boat started lurching
about in an alarming fashion. The river was
always busy with tugs and barges and A.P.,
ever vigilant, shot up on deck. The redfaced Wren struggling to steer a course got a
sharp rebuke. But it turned out that A.P.'s
friend had side-stepped into the heads on his
way up and being a complete land-lubber
and baffled by the various levers, was
vigorously pulling the gear lever up and
down instead of the pump handle.
Before long Their Lordships thought we
would be better employed elsewhere and we
were disbanded and drafted to join the real
Navy as plotters, coders, boat's crew and so
on.
Sadly, today one can no longer see St.
Paul's Cathedral from the middle of the
bridge. A faceless concrete block rises
somewhere out of the south bank to obscure
the view. I wonder what happened to the
Water Gypsy. . . ?
Big Ben was striking the hour as I turned
away, reminding one that it was time for tea
and the events of 40 years ago were after all
just 'water under the bridge'.
JOANWILLOTT
Reflections on the Role of the Navy
WO INTERESTING aspects of the role
of the Royal Navy in particular, and
the role of other Naval forces in general,
have been brought again to my notice this
last week. First, I have just read John
Winton's book 'Convoy', and am
becoming more and more impressed by his
increasing authority as a Naval historian. I
had read just previously his 'Jellicoe', and
was pleasantly surprised to find that,
contrary to my expectation, he had
succeeded in presenting fresh facts about
that great man. What really interested me,
however, was his chapter on the great
Convoy controversy of World War I: I then
turned to his other work, and found a very
lucid and telling summary of the history of
Convoy, mainly in the two world wars, but
reaching back to the earliest times. Like
many others, I had long known of the
singular ability of the British Naval officer,
and our shipping authorities in Whitehall,
to forget all the principles of Trade
Protection so hardly fought for and
established over the centuries. What
brought me up sharply was re-reading that
seminal series of articles in The Naval
Review of October 1963, January 1964,
April 1964 and July of that year, by David
Waters. If anyone has forgotten or mislaid
in his mind the standing principles of Trade
protection, and indeed of the primary role
of the Navy, let him re-read these masterly
articles.
The question that we should ask
ourselves, as a matter of great urgency is
whether - or how far - the advent of the
nuclear-powered submarine, the satellite,
the submarine and air-launched long-range
missile, and the long-range passive sonar of
to-day, have altered or modified the
principles, which may be summarised as
follows:1 . Convoy is the most efficient means
of protecting our trade, when an
enemy mounts a serious attack upon it.
2. To attack trade (that is, ships), an
enemy must approach to within the
range of his weapons (whatever they
may be), and must beforehand collect
sufficient intelligence to enable him to
attack.
3. An escorted convoy thus becomes
the best means of carrying offence to
the attacker. Contrary therefore to the
repeated observations of countless
mistaken Naval Officers, and
Politicians, (including at various times
Admirals Jellicoe, Oliver, and Winston
Churchill in his less lucid moments)
convoy is not a defensive but an
offensive strategy.
4. Independent sailings, unless the
potential target's speed is very much
greater than the submarine attacker's,
will occasion very heavy losses.
5. 'Patrolling sea lanes', 'hunter-killer
groups', and the latest (I fear
American) concept of the 'defended
lane', are, like the late unlamented
'sanitised zone' mostly a waste of
resources, which could be better
employed protecting the targets - the
ships.
6. Other things being equal, the largest
number of ships that can be collected
together and escorted is the best for
defence. The reasons for this have been
very exhaustively examined by many
authorities, including both Waters
(supra) and Blackett.
In addition to the technical achievements
mentioned above, we have to include as
influential, the dramatic increase in size,
shrinkage in numbers, greatly increased
speeds, and greater dependence of the
Western Alliance on bulk cargoes including
oil. I eschew discussion of the influence of
the nuclear bomb or missile, since I am
convinced along with Lords Mountbatten
and Carver, that its use will almost certainly
trigger off the nuclear exchange, even if
used at sea.
Since the successful prosecution of a war
against our shipping depends upon the swift
and timely supply of intelligence, properly
evaluated and presented, I suggest that
51
52
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE NAVY
the most important influence of all may
well turn out to be the satellite. I a m in no
position to pontificate on the technicalities
of the satellite, but one hears sufficient
about it in the public press to make one
wonder - and worry. It seems from what
we have heard that the modern satellite can
sweep virtually the entire North Atlantic in
a single pass. Bearing in mind the
difficulties attending upon positive
identification of targets, t o use the satellite
as a means of targetting requires, one
assumes, evaluation systems of horrendous
expense and complexity. Nonetheless, one
must assume that a potential enemy could
think such an enterprise worth while.
I feel that is a most important subject,
and while knowing that it must necessarily
be hedged about with restrictions of all
types, I hope one may have some assurance
that these matters are the subject of serious
study. Trade protection is, after all, the
primary task of the Navy.
Last year, in the July 1982 issue*, the
writer drew attention to certain deficiencies
(or what he at any rate conceived to be
deficiencies) in the education of the Naval
Officer, and in the attitude of the Naval
hierarchy towards the need for effective
presentation of the maritime case. I wonder
if any improvements are yet discernible? If
the rate at which the Naval escort numbers
continue to dwindle is any criterion, I
rather doubt it. I read the latest article
(no.XIV) in the 'Letter from Australia'
series in the current issue with a cynical
sense of dPja vu. We have been here before,
with CVA 01, and (nearly) with the Assault
Ships - the latter saved only by the South
Atlantic, and now one supposes, by the
Lebanon crisis. Perhaps there are parallels
here with the R.A.N. Neither Navy seems
to be very good at convincing its own public
opinion as to its true role in the defences of
its own country and alliances, if 'Master
Ned' is correct. It is surely a lesson for every
Naval Staff that, in the missile age, every
plea for maritime effort, every submission
for military spending, on warships, on
support services, on manpower, has to be
argued against the accusations of
vulnerability, against the short war
theorists, and the many who think that 'it
will all be over before the Navies can get
there'. Which brings us back to the
education of the Naval Officer again. At
least we now have a fully-functioning
Maritime Trade Faculty, and there should
thus be no excuse for young officers not
appreciating fully the importance of the
Navy's role in Trade Protection. Every
officer should remind himself that, if it
were not for Trade, there would be no need
here for anything more than a Coastguard,
and a fishery protection squadron.
Let us hope to hear then from some
authoritative source that these matters are
being attended to, and that the Navy has the
necessary conviction, and can marshal the
facts to convince what has become, I fear, a
largely hostile or at best indifferent, world.
At least, if I am grossly at fault, I hope the
necessary corrective will be applied!
*The Uncertain Trumpet.
RFA Sir Galahad - The Demise of
a Gallant Knight
WRITE this article almost a year after
I RFA Sir Galahad was bombed and set
on fire by Argentine aircraft at Port
Pleasant off Fitzroy Settlement, Falkland
Islands, with such tragic loss of life and
horrendous injuries. A lot has been written
in that time, together with much
speculation both on television, newspapers
and in books, concerning the events leading
up to this tragedy, when not only 42 Welsh
Guards and 3 RAMC, but more pertinently
to me three of my Engineer Officers and
two of my Chinese crew, were killed and so
many others were badly burned.
Little has been written of the loss of my
officers and crew or of the desperate
injuries they sustained. I feel it would be
nice if their sacrifices could be recognised.
There was a general lack of factual press
reporting of the whole incident. The press
refer to it as the 'Bluff Cove Tragedy';
perhaps it sounds nicer than 'Fitzroy'! They
refer to Sir Galahad as HMS not RFA
(nothing is more disconcerting than to see
yourself on television news with the
caption: 'Captain Philip Roberts of HMS
Sir Galahad').
The Embarkation
On 2 April 1982 I received the signal with
the magic words 'Operation Corporate'.
At first I thought it was some paper exercise
that I and the Radio Officer had forgotten
about, but no, it was for real (and how).
The Falklands war had begun. We
proceeded at best speed to Plymouth,
arriving on 3 April. Our cargo exNorwegian exercises was quickly offloaded
and fantastic efforts were made by the
Dockyard to backload with ammunition,
rations, rigid raider boats, petrol, land
rovers, waterproofing kits and a whole host
of ancillary stores. This was completed by
the evening of 4 April. On the morning of
5 April we embarked some 350 Royal
Marines of 40 Commando, HQ and
Signals, 59 Commando, No. 1 Raiding
Squadron plus three Gazelles and their
crews from 3 Commando Brigade Air
Squadron. Ten Royal Corps of Transport
soldiers were embarked as part of the ship's
company to act as stevedores. Three Royal
Navy signalmen were also embarked.
My ship's officers were frantically storing
up with every conceivable item that we
thought we might need over the next ninety
days. Every available space was crammed to
capacity, as were the main fridges.
The sailing
Sir Galahad proudly set sail from Plymouth
at 1500 on 6 April with the Royal Marines
lining the ship's side, Gazelles ranged on
the flight deck, battle ensign flying. We all
felt very honoured to be setting off to do
our utmost for Queen and country.
The passage south
On the passage south to Ascension we
prepared ourselves for war by exercising
our NBCD teams, action stations, working
up our Gazelles (only the Flight
Commander had previously done ayy deck
landings; all the other pilots were new to the
game). As far as possible, we tried to
integrate the Royal Marines into the day to
day running of the ship; the OC Troops
attended my daily Heads of Departments
meetings where a lot of problems were
ironed out. LSLs had not originally been
built to embark so many troops for such a
long period. There were few facilities for
relieving the boredom and making life
easier in very cramped dormitories. There
was very little upper deck space left, due to
deck cargo, for physical training; even the
flight deck was overcrowded with three
Gazelles. I have to admire the spirit of the
Royal Marines. They remained
unremittingly cheerful throughout the
journey south. I received very few moans or
complaints from them; they were all
54
RFA SIR GALAHAD - THE DEA4ISE OF A GALLANT KNIGHT
desperately keen to get down there and get
on with the job.
At Ascension we spent ten days
frantically cross-decking Royal Marines
and our cargo. By now it had been decided
which LSL would be doing what at the
landing. This meant considerable
reshuffling of the cargo which had been
hurriedly loaded at Plymouth and at the
other ports where our sister ships had been
loaded. We did get a Bofors, 6 GMPGs and
a Blowpipe Missile launcher fitted here,
together with crews to fire them. We were
also allocated sandbags which after a great
deal of hassle we managed to fill and place
on the upper bridge deck as protection for
the GPMG crews.
In our role as logistic support ship we
sailed from Ascension loaded with WMR
and a mixed array of vehicles and with the
following embarked: Commando Logistic
Regiment, HQ and Sigs, elements of the
Field Dressing Station. We knew of the very
large Argentinian Air Force yet to be
neutralized and also of the many Exocet
missiles they were capable of deploying
against us.
So, on 30 April, in company with four
other LSLs, RFA Pearleaf, and our escort
HMS Antelope we set sail from Ascension
Island in the direction of South Georgia.
Commander Nick Tobin, CO of Antelope,
referred to us as his Chinese Navy (all the
ships he escorted were manned by Hong
Kong Chinese crews - approximately three
hundred in all), and through his good
leadership and particularly his strict
EMCON policy we achieved our passage
south without detection. He also very
bravely allowed us our first Gunex firing at
star shells he put up. A lot of Bofors ammo
was put up by the five LSLs, some of it
landing remarkably close to him!
Nearer South Georgia, HMS Antrim and
HMS Plymouth took over duties as escorts,
by which time we were getting down into
the roaring forties and were receiving our
first real taste of bad weather.
On 19 May we rendezvoused with
Fearless and the rest of the amphibious
group close to HMS Hermes and her carrier
task force. It was on my way by helo to
Fearless that I was able to get a bird's eye
view of this tremendous force of ships. The
D-Day plan was that the landing would be
at San Carlos in the early hours of 21 May.
Sir Galahad was required to anchor in San
Carlos with the rest of the LSLs, Canberra,
Norland, Europic Ferry and Stromness.
San Carlos
One hour before dawn, the LSL group
approached the northern entrance to the
Falkland Sound. We were in the last of four
groups; Fearless and Intrepid had gone in
ahead and inserted landing craft to secure
the beachhead. The first sign of any activity
was tracer flickering across the headland at
Fanning Head. We anchored in our assigned
anchorage just after launching our three
Gazelles which had been tasked in recce
duties in support of 2 Para. As the sun rose
over the hills at San Carlos it could have been
spring on a Scottish Loch. However, this
peaceful scene did not last for long. A
Pucara flew in and out of the hills and we
fired our first shots in anger. The sound of
that gunfire was surprisingly exhilarating.
However, our confidence was shortlived one of our Gazelles returned with very sad
news that the other two Gazelles had been
shot down, both pilots and a crewman
killed. Our first reactions were of shock and
anger but at the same time it put into
perspective our reasons for being there and
gave us a greater sense of purpose to rid these
islands of their unwanted invaders.
Apart from offloading ambulances and
men of the Field Dressing Station to Ajax
Bay, no further cargo was discharged on
D-Day.
It was not too long before all the ships in
San Carlos came under heavy air attack from
A4 Skyhawks and Mirage, bombs landing
within a quarter of a mile. These air attacks
continued all day and we were all relieved
when night time came as we had been told
that the Argentinians did not fly at night.
This proved true of their fighters. The only
threat that we had to contend with was of
underwater swimmers; we dropped scare
charges to counteract this.
RFA SIR GALAHAD - THE DEMISE OF A GALLANT KNIGHT
On 22 and 23 May we were subjected to
air attacks during daylight, and at first light
on 24 May we shifted anchorage to within
half a mile of Ajax Bay in order to speed
the discharge of cargo which was scheduled
to start that day. We passed very close to
the dying throes of HMS Antelope, our old
friend who had escorted us to and from
Ascension on the way down - a very sad
sight. Not long after we had anchored there
were several heavy air raids. It was during
one of these raids that we were hit by a
1000 lb bomb which ricocheted off the water
close to the bridge and passed through the
ship's side, tore its way through four steel
bulkheads and came to rest in a battery
charging room only some sixty feet from
where three hundred tons of ammo lay.
Fortunately, it failed to explode; otherwise
neither I nor any of my crew would be alive
today.
I sent for the bomb disposal squad and
evacuated all personnel to the after end of
the ship. After about an hour the bomb
disposal team arrived and after they had
examined it they advised me that the bomb
was in a very critical condition and the
slightest vibration would set it off. I decided
to evacuate the ship until such time as the
bomb could be made safe. The embarked
force were evacuated first by lifeboat to
Fearless. As they were mustered at the
lifeboats, another air attack followed and
we were strafed by cannon, sustaining
about twenty hits resulting in three injuries.
In the same attack, several Argentine
aircraft were shot down and each was
followed by a tremendous cheer from the
Royal Marines waiting to board their
lifeboats. It sounded like Cup Final day at
Wembley - it did our morale good which
was starting to flag at this stage. We all
eventually got off and dispersed to various
ships round San Carlos water, most of us,
including myself, ending up on RFA
Stromness where we were made very
welcome.
On the evening of 25 May, after a day of
very heavy air attacks, my Chief and
Second Engineer Officers, together with a
small team including an Electrical Officer
55
and two RCT crane drivers, returned to Sir
Galahad to provide services for the bomb
disposal squad from HMS Intrepid. The
bomb was removed from the ship in the
early hours of 26 May by an extremely
brave bunch of men.
Stromness had to sail at short notice on
the night of 25/26 May for South Georgia
to meet the QE2. I had agreed with
COMAW that my Chinese crew remain in
Stromness until the bomb had been
disposed of, but all officers, RCT ranks,
RN signalmen and ship's air defence team
would spend the night in Fearless and move
back to Sir Galahad when it was safe to do
SO.
With the bomb safely disposed of, we
transferred from Fearless. By this time, the
Chief Engineer Officer had restored all
services and the first thing we did was to
shift to a more sheltered anchorage out of
the main bomb runway. With the help of
RN Shipwrights we patched up the hole in
the ship's side with one-eighth of an inch
steel plate and backed this up with some
classic Phoenix damage control shoring.
This was a very Pifficult time for my
officers; not only were they having to do
their own duties but all the duties of the
absent Chinese. The Purser was doing
sterling stuff in the galley. He even put up
the crew from HMS Argonaut for bed and
breakfast while her bombs were being
defused. Likewise, the Deck and
Engineering Officers worked extremely
hard and I never heard any of them
complain. The RCT lads were invaluable
during this period.
By 30 May we were ready to sail from San
Carlos to proceed to the carrier group to get
back our Chinese who by now were
embarked in Sir Tristram. We had only
discharged approximately one hundred tons
of ammunition in this time, plus all the
vehicles stowed on the upper deck. The ship
by this time was like the proverbial tip. We
felt rather relieved to sail out of San Carlos
that evening and hopefully to restore order
if not some decent food, and above all to
get out of the firing line for a day or two.
56
Licking our wounds
On 31 May our Chinese crew were returned
by helicopter in atrocious weather
conditions. They surprisingly were all very
pleased to be back and straight away set-to
to clean up the ship and within an hour had
provided us all with a hot meal.
On 1 June we RASed fuel with RFA
Olna, and restored sanity to the Chief
Engineer Officer by getting a fresh supply
of cigars. I have never seen someone enjoy
a smoke so much before. I decided that it
was time I restored my own sanity and sent
for my steward. He provided us both with a
beautiful gin and tonic with ice and lemon
served on a silver tray complete with a bowl
of peanuts. Much to the amusement of all
on the bridge, we both enjoyed those
drinks. They were a happy relief after so
much tension.
Back to the Grind
On the night of 1/2 June we proceeded
Slack to San Carlos slightly perturbed as to
whether our one-eighth of an inch patch
would hold out at full speed into a Force 8
gale. However, only a slight amount
of water seeped through and all was
well.
We completed loading for Teal Inlet on 2
June and sailed that night for the carrier
group, spending all day on 3 June trying to
regain our allotted station within the task
group.
At first light on 4 June we negotiated the
winding passage into Teal Inlet and
anchored a mile off the settlement. When
daylight came it all looked rather peaceful
and we could see the mountains that
overlooked Port Stanley quite clearly. It
was at Teal that we finally discharged our
cargo of ammo and stores that we had
loaded a long time ago in Plymouth. On 4
and 5 June we fuelled about 95 helicopters;
they were queueing up like cars at an M1
filling station!
On 6 June after passing all our excess
avcat to Sir Percivale we sailed for San
Carlos, arriving at first light. The weather
in San Carlos was foul, blowing gale 8 or 9,
so no cargo was loaded on the 6th.
Our last run
On the morning of 7 June, I was briefed on
our next mission. The plan was to embark
352 Welsh Guards, complete with first line
stores, 30 G Coy SAS and 30 RAMC of 16
Field Ambulance together with their stores
and vehicles. At dusk on 7 June we were to
sail San Carlos down the Falkland Sound
and Eagle Passage to Bluff Cove, arriving
there three and a half hours before sunrise.
The Welsh Guards would be disembarked
and we were to sail Bluff Cove and arrive
off Fitzroy Settlement at first light on the
8th. Here we were to disembark 16 Field
Ambulance and sail Fitzroy later that
evening. The passages into both Bluff Cove
and Fitzroy were rather tricky especially at
night, the channel into Port Pleasant being
only four hundred feet wide with a bold dog
leg.
Throughout 7 June we loaded stores and
ammunition of the Welsh Guards and
RAMC plus Rapier Batteries and a Sea
King helicopter. We finally completed
loading in the early hours of 8 June and
because of the delay in loading in the early
hours of 8 June and because of the delay in
loading we did not have sufficient time to
get to Bluff Cove before daylight. This
necessitated sailing direct for Fitzroy
Settlement.
At 0200 GMT 8 June we weighed anchor
in San Carlos and proceeded down the
Falkland Sound at our very best speed. It
was a clear moonlit night; the coastline of
West Falklands was clearly visible. We
carried all the Welsh Guards in the tank
deck.
At first light we negotiated the very
narrow entrance to Port Pleasant and
anchored off Fitzroy Settlement about 3
cables to the east of RFA Sir Tristram, who
was still unloading ammo and stores. The
weather was bright and sunny with good
visibility - the hills and landmarks around
Port Stanley looked very close. Sir Tristram
had filled both the Mexefloat and one LCU
to capacity with ammunition. So the Welsh
Guards had to wait on board until these
assets had proceeded to shore, discharged
and returned to the ship. The Welsh Guards
RFA SIR GALAHAD - THE DEhdISE OF A GALLANT KNIGHT
were anxious to be landed at Bluff Cove
where they had originally been ordered to,
not Fitzroy. They had been told that the
bridge at Fitzroy over to Bluff Cove had
been blown and was not yet repaired. So it
was that only a handful of RAMC managed
to get ashore, and none of the Welsh
Guards, by 1715 when the OOW observed
two very low flying aircraft approaching the
ship fast on the starboard beam. He
immediately piped 'Action Stations' and at
the same time I entered the wheelhouse. We
both hit the deck behind the chart table.
The ship shuddered with the explosions.
Seconds later two more aircraft flew low
over the ship and again we felt explosions.
All ventilation was crash stopped, fire
alarm bells were ringing furiously on the
bridge panel. Smoke immediately started to
appear through the chartroom door which
had been blown open by the force of the
explosions. My immediate reaction was to
rush out to the bridge wings to assess the
damage. On the starboard side there were
flames and an enormous amount of black
smoke coming out of the accommodation
and engine room vent fans, and it was much
the same on the port side. On looking
forward, flames and smoke were shooting
out of the after hatch. I tried phoning the
engine room by sound powered telephone
but there was no reply. It became
immediately apparent to me that fires were
burning out of control in many places and
that the ship could not be saved.
Instinctively, I grabbed the ship's broadcast
system microphone, not knowing if it was
working, and made the pipe 'Abandon
Ship, Abandon Ship'. I learnt later that this
pipe had been heard in most parts of the
ship. I felt it very important that the after
accommodation be evacuated as quickly as
possible.
No. 4 lifeboat was swung out over the side
and had to be lowered shortly afterwards
because it was being enveloped in smoke. I
proceeded forward to supervise the launching of liferafts. By this time, helicopters were
already arriving to take off the wounded;
the Mexefloat and LCU were also quickly on
the scene as were two lifeboats from
57
Sir Tristram. By 1750 all the non-seriously
injured personnel and ship's crew had been
evacuated from the ship. By this time the
whole of the bridge front was burning
furiously and smoke billowing high into the
sky. Loud explosions, flames and shrapnel
were erupting from the after hatch.
All the remaining injured had been
evacuated to the forecastle and were being
cared for by 16 Field Ambulance medics
before being winched into a Sea King. The
evacuation of the badly wounded was a
slow and painful operation. The pilots of
the helicopters showed great courage and
determination, hovering close to the deck
despite the loud explosions and debris
which was being blown into the air. It was
very fortuitous that our foremast had been
lowered in order to increase our arc of fire.
This enabled the helos to hover four or five
feet above the deck, so speeding up the
evacuation of the very badly burned Welsh
Guards.
At 1815 the last of the wounded had been
lifted off. I bundled my Chief Engineer
Officer who had also been wounded up into
the helo and then hooked myself on - I
was the last to leave my ship. It was a
desperately sad moment for me. A well
ordered, happy and disciplined ship one
moment and a burning inferno the next,
and obviously at that time I did not know
which or how many of my officers or crew
had been killed o r injured.
The full story was, of course, well
recorded by the BBC camera team and
reported on by Brian Hanrahan. For me
and probably my officers, crew and all those
troops that we were carrying at the time,
and the relatives of those who were killed, it
was one of those sad moments of timing
because the media use those pictures as their
theme for the whole of the Falklands war,
showing them time and time again. It
certainly is disturbing for me to see them as
it must be for others who were there.
The aftermath
Because the Sir Galahad survivors had been
dispersed to several ships and to Ajax Bay
Hospital, it made it difficult to compile a
58
definite list of survivors for several days. The
eventual outcome was of course tragic in
extreme - fifty killed and many wounded.
The wounded were placed on board Uganda
and the remaining RFA survivors took
passage firstly in Atlantic Conveyor and
then British Test to Ascension Island. From
Ascension we were flown to Brize Norton to
a very warm but sober welcome.
Sir Galahad was a very happy ship and I
am proud to have commanded her and her
magnificent team of officers and men. The
number of awards and decorations only add
weight to the tremendous efforts they
contributed to the success of the Falklands
Campaign (2 George Medals, 2 Queen's
Gallantry Medals, 2 Queen's Commendations for Brave Conduct, and 2 Mentions in
Despatches). A tragic end to a gallant
knight.
P. J. ROBERTS,DSO
CAPTAIN,
RFA
There are just Three Things
H A V I N G quite recently retired I have
much enjoyed reading articles in these
pages written by those who saw active
service in the South Atlantic. As much
poorer fare I offer this lighthearted
reminiscence from more peaceful times. It
concerns a visit five years ago t o one of our
Caribbean dependencies, and in a different
sort of way it shows what Jack can do when
faced with the unexpected.
As the last call of a really splendid long
deployment - with home for Christmas
already in our minds - a frigate paid a day
visit to an island which has neither harbour
nor safe anchorage due to very deep water
off the reef. Ships have quite happily
dropped an anchor on the reef edge and
used the prevailing offshore wind for
keeping out of trouble, but as our visit was
for daylight hours only and the wind was
light I decided to remain underway. This
would also provide a good opportunity for
the new First Lieutenant to get the feel of
the ship while I was ashore paying calls. At
noon these were to be returned before we
held a reception for the Governor and some
forty guests under the Flight Deck awning
followed by lunch for all below.
Throughout the day various banyan and
sports parties were due to land and I
intended to sail at 1800 in order to clear the
islands before dark. The helicopter had
been rather busy lately and had been given a
day off. Such was the plan for what
promised to be a reasonably quiet and
relaxing day.
On arrival off the reef at 0800 the ship
assumed a 'harbour' state, the flight deck
awning was spread and accommodation
ladders prepared. A sea watch remained
closed up. On setting off by boat for my
calls I noticed that a small black elephant
had been painted on the ship's side. I
recognised this as the unofficial motif used
by another ship in the Squadron which had
lain alongside her Captain F in Nassau the
previous week-end. So already semialerted, as it were, for the unexpected, I
reached the shore and scrambled up a
ramshackle jetty to find myself on a dusty
deserted road. There was absolutely no one
about. Looking rather lost with sword in
one hand and portable stornaphone radio
in the other I became an object of interest
to various pairs of wide eyes peering from
behind the windows. Shortly a car arrived
and I was taken off to Government House.
On arrival there I waited upon His
Excellency who charmingly put me at ease
with the usual chatter which always
precedes discussion of more weighty
matters.
'Captain,' he said, a new edge of
firmness entering his voice, 'I appreciate
you are here for one day only, but there are
just three things I would like you to attend
to before your departure this evening.'
'I would be delighted to help you in any
THERE ARE JUST' THREE THINGS
way I can,' I replied.
'Splendid,' he continued. 'First there is
the problem of two tons of marijuana
which need to be removed from the island.'
I gulped. Apparently the smuggling had
been going on for some time. Fishing boats
operating from Colombia were dumping
caches of the stuff in various off shore
islands for picking up later by highspeed
launches which would attempt to run the
gauntlet of anti-narcotic patrols to reach
the lucrative markets of Florida. Countless
packages and cases had been collected in
and these now filled every possible lockable
space in the police compound. The
Governor did not wish to have this haul
destroyed locally due to difficulties over the
control and trust of the people available to
carry out the task.
'I would be most grateful if you could
carry it all away with you this evening; and
you may have noticed,' he added quickly,
'that there are not many people about,
which brings me to my second point.'
I now heard that a dangerous criminal
had escaped from jail - presumably to
make room for the marijuana. As a
convicted murderer his continuing presence
at large was terrorising the local population
and keeping many people indoors. He was
believed to be hiding somewhere in the
scrubland which covered the central part of
the island. The Governor would be
extremely grateful if a helicopter search
could be carried out so that this rascal be
brought to heel. I wondered what was
coming next but need not have worried as I
had already heard the worst.
'Finally,' he concluded, 'A small
domestic crisis had arisen which is beyond
local powers of remedy. The Medical
Officer's drains are blocked. Perhaps you
have some engineers who might be landed
to deal with this small matter.'
'All of these things would be easier with
more notice,' I said, 'But I will see what can
be done.'
'I look forward so much to seeing you on
board at noon.'
I smiled weakly and hurried out,
suddenly feeling an urgent need for a chat
59
with No.1, who soon answered my radio
call.
Yes, there were a few points arising from
my meeting with the Governor and had he
got a pencil - good. A working party was
to be landed as soon as possible - Guns, I
should think - with all available strong
gash bags and reels of heavy masking tape.
They should report to the police compound
and set to work to prepare the pot for safe
air transit by cargo net. The helicopter
should be brought to immediate notice and
the aircrew briefed - inshore flights being
used for a systematic search of the
scrubland - pity about the flight deck
awning and stanchions. A party of suitably
equipped 'engineers' was to be landed and,
yes, the reception would now be on the
forecastle and an awning would be needed
there. Otherwise everything else such as
steaming the ship and landing sports parties
should continue as planned. Yes, it was
lucky these ships had plenty of hands.
'Are you quite happy, Number One?
Over.' - pause - 'Affirmative. Out.'
Having done my bit for the moment I
was happy to resume my calls, and while
returning to the ship an hour or so later
I noticed that the Wasp was airborne and
that the offending elephant had
disappeared. Things had started to happen
and it would soon be time to receive our
guests.
The rearranged reception on the
forecastle appeared to be much enjoyed
with its added distraction of the occasional
angry noise of the helicopter passing by
with its strange underslung load. Soon we
moved below for lunch and some good
reports started coming in. The Flight
Commander thought he would need about
twenty sorties and these could be completed
before dark. The aircraft hangar was being
used as the cargo stowage and no problems
with this task were foreseen. Later he
reported that the close passage overhead of
the Wasp had caused the convict, in
curiosity no doubt, to stick his head out of
an elaborate hide. This had been spotted by
an alert aircrewman as the aircraft banked
steeply to reverse course at the end of a
60
THERE ARE JUST THREE THINGS
search run. The local police were homed in
by radio and soon had their back in
custody, presumably in a recently vacated
cell. As we were ushering the locals ashore a
triumphant black gang returned from the
drains, sensibly having left instructions and
equipment for dealing with any further
similar problems. The teams returned
having sportingly lost their matches, boats
were hoisted, awnings furled, and we
steamed away on time, recovering the
helicopter with the last of the loot as the sun
dipped to the westward. Later, on clearing
the coastal waters of the island group, the
marijuana was carefully shredded in our
wake and all traces of this strange cargo
were removed from the ship by midnight,
except for the sickly lingering smell. The
helicopter was returned to its rightful place
in the hangar and everyone not on watch
must have slept well that night.
I, for one, learned, or relearned, two
things from this visit. First, one should
never bank on a quiet and relaxing day in
any Caribbean island. They positively
bristle with the unexpected and one should
always be ready for anything. Second,
beware the easy charm of the British
diplomat, particularly at his post abroad.
He will be highly intelligent and
knowledgeable and a master of the written
and spoken word but he may not always
anticipate, confide or plan, especially when
short staffed. But looking back now on a
happy service life from a second career
ashore where working relationships are
somewhat different, I marvel at the
adaptability of our men and at the
incomparable skill and cheerfulness with
which they rise to the unexpected occasion.
These attributes, evident in such a small
way in the events I have described, were
seen in full measure at all levels afloat,
ashore and in the air throughout the
Falklands campaign. We must continue to
find opportunities to exercise them so that
they are always available for use when
really required.
B.W.
Three Swatow Letters
(These letters were written during 1939 by
Commander H. G . de Chair, in command
of HMS Thracian based in Hong Kong, to
his father, Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair. At
the time the Japanese forces were
completing their hold on eastern China, a
process which had begun in 1934 -Editor).
2 April 1939
at Swatow
ERE I am, back at Swatow with my
new crew. We had difficulty finding it
in the fog off Breaker Point and Good
Hope. Two days ago two big liners collided
there. The MarPchal Joffre (Messageries
Maritimes) rammed the Canton (P. & 0.
latest) amidships the starboard side, causing
serious damage. I got a very good fix this
morning in dense fog by running a line of
soundings, putting them onto a slip of paper
with same scale as the chart and making
them fit in. We anchored in 9 fathoms and
when the fog cleared slightly were able to go
straight to Cape of Good Hope 12 miles
distant. The sandbanks round Swatow are
awkward and interspersed with tiresome
rocks, so I found the exercise both
instructive and encouraging.
All is quiet here now but they had some
excitement last week. On Sunday 26 March
four seaplanes machine gunned a passenger
tender in the river (TaWak) and killed 15
Chinese and wounded 15. This was at
Quelfu, half-way up the Han river to
Kityang, where I went shooting last time we
were here. Then they dropped six bombs on
the railway station, quite a normal
procedure, and damaged the booking
office. They also made a lot of holes in the
locomotive's boiler and wounded a
policeman. Two more bombs dropped at
West Bund were aimed at junks but fell into
the mud.
Yesterday the wind got up after we had
secured and then it pelted with rain. Our
awning and stanchions both rather worse
for wear but the awning had been sloped.
An American destroyer USS Edsell
(DD219, Destroyer Division 14) arrived on
Monday at 3 p.m. from Manila. After
exchanging officer of the Guard calls I
called on her Captain, Lieut. Cdr. A. C. J.
Sabalot, a very nice fellow. He returned my
call on Wednesday and dined with me in the
evening. They had a bad trip from Manila
and missed Swatow by a large margin. Their
FX awning had been spread so they hove to
stern to wind! to furl it. Apparently the USS
John D. Edwards was the first foreign
warship to visit Hainan during the Japanese
occupation. Their Commodore was onboard
and t h e went down despite Japanese
protests. Various ships signalled them to
stop, follow me and zig zagged in front of
them, but apparently to no purpose. The
Commodore had the bit between his teeth
and flew what he called his 'What the Hell'
Pendant, consisting of a white flag with
question marks and exclamation marks all
over it. The Japs were so worried to know
what the flag was that they spent most of
their time trying to look it up. Finally in
desperation that came onboard to ask and
were told it was a new international signal.
When they said it was not in their book the
Americans said, 'Well, I guess your book is
out of date'!
Whenever Thracian comes to Swatow the
Chinese seem to get the wind up. A fair
amount of war stores have been coming in
in the past few weeks, several lorries,
telephone wires etc., also a lot of Japanese
cement apparently for Chinese use. Chiang
Kai Shek thinks Swatow of increasing
importance and appointed a Defence
Commissioner here a week ago. He arrived
about 28th March, Mr. Wah Ching Chung
(good old Scotch name). Defence
Commissioner of 'Chao San' (Chan Chau
and Swatow).
The pilot tells me he saw smoke off
Namoa at 0900/4, presumably from a
cruiser. So far we've had no air raid alarms
but last time machine guns made 30 holes in
the locomotive. The Chinese however
plugged them all with hard wood and
steamed the engine off to schedule
62
in the evening. So much for Japanese power
diving which was a pretty sight and very low
down, over the houses. I don't think the
Japs will try and take Swatow 'till about the
last: (a) the entrance is too shallow for ships
over 18ft. draught, and the entrance is
mined; (b) it would require an enormous
army to invest it properly; (c) it is much too
far round by road and has awkward swampy
country all round; (d) they are doing a
roaring trade in and out of here to and from
their ports up north and making much there
from customs dues etc.
I gather the Mayor ordered all women and
children to stand by to leave again, last time
we were here.
The goose and duck shooting is pretty
well over now but there are still some snipe
about. The people here are very hospitable.
On Saturday I am dining with the
Commissioner of Customs and Mrs. Asker
and tonight with Thompson who I go
shooting with. He is a coal merchant! Our
motor boat broke down so we borrowed
John Robinson's Active belonging to
Messrs. Run Bradley & Co. We give the
engineer one dollar per diem and provide
crew. The Consul lent us his for a day but
had always badgered me for bottom lines
and gear before so I felt there might be more
in it than met the eye.
My crew are so young and inexperienced
that I am glad we had a fortnight in Hong
Kong and 10 days here before our working
up programme. I am sending you The Naval
Review to read. I think Somerset* could
look at 'England's last Chance' with
advantage.
S.S. Wusang reported a small Japanese
trawler entering Bias Bay at 18.00, April
5th. Things have been quiet there lately. We
gave a successful dinner party in the
wardroom last night, attended by Lieut. Cdr
A. C. J. Sabalot USN, and three officers
from United States Asiatic Fleet, Destroyer
Division Fourteen, USS Edsell (DD219).
She is coming to Hong Kong on 14th April
and USS Bulmer with Commodore Stapler
onboard relieves her here.
This afternoon in common with H.B.M.
Consul Mr. C. Rene Lee, I called on His
Honour the Mayor, Co. Wuh Chu with his
Councillor and interpreter Mr. Chu Su Nan,
who is Cambridge educated. He told me that
the new Commissioner for Defence, General
Wah Ching Chung, is a Brigadier whose
division has been disbanded. They have sent
him to Swatow to make a job until there is a
proper one ready for him. My own view is
the one previously expressed and I am not at
all sure of the veracity of the statement.
I asked about the floating mines in the
centre entrance to the harbour. The original
field was laid in 1926 and some of the old
mines remain. It appears the authorities
removed a lot of the mines in 1938 and at the
mayor's instigation commenced a thorough
periodical examination and overhaul of all
the mines. Mr. Chu Su Nan promised to
inform the S.N.O. thro' Consul when the
examination was complete and to give a
report on the nature and condition of the
moorings. The work was necessarily slow
and entailed divers sighting each mine and
working down the mooring to examine the
sinker. He would not tell me the size or type
of mooring or weight of sinker but thought
it was considerably more than 200 Ib. He
thought almost half the floating mines had
been examined in the past months. I
explained that the Mayor's assurances that
the mines were periodically and carefully
examined would be a great comfort to
shipping firms using the port.
Mr. Chu expressed himself somewhat
forcibly on the subject of Britain whom he
considered soft and easily taken in by
Germany, Italy and Japan. He thought
Germany and Italy had the right idea. This
was I felt a bit of propaganda to encourage
the British to fight for China but I assured
His Honour that if I saw a British ship or
building being deliberately bombed or
attacked by Japanese aircraft, I would have
no hesitation in opening fire. Chu said I was
the first British Naval Officer he had heard
speak like that. The British he said are slow
to rouse, but now they are. . . . I hastened to
assure him that this was no new policy but
'Somerset de Chair was the writer's brother. He had
already been a Member of Parliament, and was at the
time the letters were written serving in the Army.
common sense based on experience in the
Spanish War as well as China. The Major
promised to return my call if time
permitted. I said we would play football
on Saturday if there were no aircraft
warnings that day, but not if there were, as
1,000 people at Chum Shen park would be
asking for trouble. On my arrival a guard of
four men presented arms and champagne
was provided. A very good brand. Chu said
they were not worried any more than
normal about the Japs coming.
I learned from Dr. Gauntlet in S.S.
Wusang, Hong Kong to Shanghai, that the
damage to Markchal Joffre had been far
greater structurally than that to the Canton
who appeared to be ripped from bow to
stern on her starboard side. Apparently
M.J. shivered his timbers a long way back
despite the outward appearance of nothing
worse than a dented stern. They collided in
fog off Breaker point just west of Swatow.
Our football match never came off on
Saturday. I had been ashore for lunch coolie chow - wellie nice with friends and
went back on board at about 2.00. At 2.15
we got a signal from Commodore to raise
steam and prepare for sea and at 3 an order
to proceed to assistance of S.S. Sagres
about 50 miles up the coast. We left at 3.29
and tried to get in touch with her by wireless
with no success. It was blowing hard, force
5, with a rough sea and moderate swell
against us. We went up at 24 knots on two
boilers. Two stokers and all the Chinese
stewards but one had been left on shore,
despite siren and Blue Peter messages. We
sighted Sagres just before sunset being
escorted up the coast by a large Japanese
destroyer and a trawler. As we got close a
submarine periscope was sighted. We shot
up between the destroyer and Sagres and
could get no answer from the latter who
had been captured with a prize crew
onboard and was flying the Japanese naval
ensign at the main, and red ensign at the
ensign staff. I hoisted the signal 'You
should stop, have something important to
communicate', and made 'Please stop' to
the destroyer - neither signal had any
effect and I piped 'hands to action stations'
63
(one 4-inch gun and one 2-pdr pom pom)
and converged on him from a bow bearing
as though to cross his bows. The Jap was
also at action stations (four guns, tubes
etc.) but stopped about 20 yards short of
my fo'c's'le. I signalled 'What is the
trouble?' and he said 'Never mind'. I
signalled 'Am sending boat' and he replied
'Wave is so big so very dangerous'.
We started rolling but the boat got across
safely. The Japs threw a rope ladder over
the side which was badly secured and gave
way but my 1st Lt. hauled himself up by the
guardrail and was taken to the bridge to see
the captain, Commander Suto, IJN. Then
they all went down to the wardroom and I
had some difficulty in keeping the ship to
leeward of the Japs. After a while we both
fell out our gun crews but I kept mine
hidden behind the chart house just in case.
The ship was rolling about 30 degrees either
way while we hoisted the whaler. Over half
my seamen are short service ordinary
seamen, so that a good proportion of these
were in the boat. The best hands had been
taken for action stations and the boat
nearly got swamped and smashed owing to
indifferent seamanship when being hoisted.
Lieut. Easey had been away about half an
hour and I consider he did well. He
protested repeatedly at seizure of a British
ship and said they must now let her go. Cdr.
Suto could not speak English but intimated
through a Lieutenant that his C. in C. had
ordered him to seize the ship and take her
into an examination anchorage for
thorough examination of cargo and papers.
He said she had no right to fly British
colours, she was taking 20,000 bags of
salt from Chauan Bay to Foochow for
the Chinese government and had no
manifest.
Easey said he knew the Sagres well as
British, Captain Moran had been a personal
friend of his for 2 years! The Japs said
'apparently British' but running for the
Chinese Government. Easey said we must
board her to verify their statements, but
they politely said 'Very sorry cannot allow
it'. They were most polite and apologetic all
the time and very sorry to cause so much
64
THREE SWAT13 W LETTERS
trouble, but with strict orders from their
C.-in-C. to take her in.
We pointed out that their action was
quite illegal and irregular and that they had
no right to seize a British ship. Not having
declared war on China they have no
Belligerent Rights and should have asked us
to verify any Breach of the Flag Neutrality
agreements.
I repeated my request to board Sagres
for examination of manifest and cargo twice, but was met each time with a refusal
'Very sorry I cannot allow it'! When our
whaler was hoisted the destroyer went
ahead and said 'Good Day'. I replied
'Thank you, I will follow'. I thought they
were fairly honest about the cargo of salt
but knew this was not conditional
contraband. The Japanese are maintaining
what they call a peaceful blockade of China
ports but we are not allowed to use force to
stop them seizing a British ship; it has to be
settled diplomatically and in prize court etc.
The Sagres was taken to Baku in the
Pescadores, some islands rather like Scapa
Flow near Formosa, and after following
'till 2 a.m. I was ordered back to Swatow,
feeling very disconsolate and wondering
whether I should not have attempted to
carry Sagres by boarding. I don't believe
the Japs would have dared to open fire but
if there had been a scrap I should have been
most unpopular just now. Orders are very
clear on this point. Sir Archibald Clark
Kerr, the British Ambassador in Shanghai,
passed through on Tuesday and he told me
I did everything that was possible, as also
did the Commodore who told me
afterwards that he was very sorry to have
put me in such an awkward position. I told
him he did not, and that being so near, I
should obviously have been sent - at any
rate to find out what was happening.
Coming u p we passed through Clipper
Road between Namoa Island and the
mainland and so avoided a good deal of
dusting: once clear we washed down
steadily over the bridge and lower yard but
it was all very exciting. We passed an
uncharted wreck quite close. Returning to
Swatow we ran a line of soundings in the
entrance and found that the bar had moved
into Sugar Loaf Channel or about a mile
up. Where the chart showed three fathoms
on the bar we got eight and seven and where
in the channel it showed six and eight we
got three and four, so I mean where are
you!?
Naturally the Douglas shipping agents
were rather upset about the Sagres being
seized and her delay is costing Mr.
Williamson 1,000 dollars a day. I met him
in Hong Kong and he was very grateful for
what we had found out. I felt like asking
for a court martial when I got back but
desisted after being suitably buttered up. I
feel I had it in my power to start an AngloJap war and to have avoided that was just
as well. Note: my parting instructions
from Commodore Dickens were 'You
won't be thanked if you precipitate an
incident '.
On Sunday 9th April and Monday I had a
sailing race against USS EdseN. The first
day in my whaler against the American in a
sort of Gunter lug cutter cum galley. We
started on a run from Edsell with the tide,
but on rounding Thracian they could make
no headway against it and got further and
further up river. I sent their gasoline gig
after them on rounding Edsell. Next day we
changed boats. This time we started in a
beat against tide from Thracian and had an
exciting race. I shifted strops and played
about with the lead of sheets a bit and
actually got this cow like affair to get to
windward. By dint of running close inshore
we beat them handsomely round the mark
and finished a good half mile ahead. We
dined with them that night and they said
they were drinking 'Ra-azberry Wine!' 'Say Captain I guess you showed us sump'n
today'.
On Monday the Mayor and Councillor
returned my call. We received them on the
Quarter deck and they stayed for lunch.
The Anglo-American Challenge Shield for
boat pulling presented by the Mayor was
placed in a conspicuous position on the
after gun stand grating. He watched the
start of Monday's race and was amazed to
hear we had won.
65
The Japanese captured Swatow on 21
June and ordered all foreigners and ships to
clear out by noon 22 June. They remained.
Japs refused to allow any ships in but Scout
forced the Tsinan in past four cruisers and
three destroyers who all hoisted 'stop' and
made it in English on their sirens. He
entered the narrow channel at 25 knots and
ordered Tsinan to follow at full speed. The
Jap forts then opened up to frighten him
and shells passed close overhead and burst
by the signal station. The Chinese troops
had all fled but forcing Tsinan in was too
early and no ships had been in since 26 June
until today when by agreement with
Captain Hayakawa in Yunagi I got
Yatshing in. She only had 14 bags of mail
but we got the military authorities to reopen the post office and next week I hope
all mails will be allowed. Captain
Hayakawa refused to meet Scout or Thanet
but received me on arrival quite pleasantly.
It is a case of 'Butter 'em up and slither
them down'. Tonight we were lucky and
put out most of a fire in one of their Army
launches. That should be worth several
ships in with mails and provisions, unless
they lost face over it.
Trade here is dead and the Japs slow
getting settled down. It is difficult to know
where it will end. It seems like a Swatow
swan song now.
We left Swatow at 7 a.m. on Wednesday
12th April and looked round Hai Chi Chiu
Bay before sunset and anchored under the
lee of Chilang point. I took Carey ashore
with me to inspect the light house. We
found it spotless and just painted. All
outhouses beautifully clean and the whole
station fit for the most exacting Admiral's
inspection. Mr Howell, the lighthouse
keeper, is a British subject tho' Chinese. He
has 4 Chinese Watch Keepers; his wife is in
Hong Kong. He has not seen her for 10
months and no British warships had been
there since the Sino-Jap war broke out 2
years ago. He came onboard and we gave
him some papers, bread, meat and
cigarettes. He normally lives on fish and
what he can shoot etc. A ship calls every 3
months. The Japanese won't allow him any
wireless and he daren't make or answer
signals. The Chinese soliders garrisoned in
the fort nearby came across the strip of
water to ask him if we were Jap. There are
only two old guns in the fort now and he
said these were rusted up. The chart showed
six. He told me about a large Jap bomber
and five pursuit planes which passed him at
10 a.m. that day. I intended to sail at 5 a.m.
for gunnery etc. off Hong Kong, going
down at 16 knots. However at 2 a.m. I
happened to wake up. The mosquitos were
bad and I observed fog round Chilang light.
We sailed at 3 a.m. and encountered slight
fog but not nearly as much as on the way
up. The ceiling was too low for anti-aircraft
firing. Carey, whom I gave a passage to on
the way down, was the No. 2 of Butterfield
& Swires at Swatow and is going to the
Hong Kong office. I'm afraid most of this
is shop but I thought you would be
interested. Much of it goes into my letters
of proceedings.
Sunday 9 July
At 10.30 I called on Mr Matsudaira the
Japanese consul with Mr Lee our own, and
his relief Bryant. We drank tea and got no
forarder. Matsudaira is a professional
opener up of ports for Japs e.g. Canton,
Tsingtao, Hai Amoy and Swatow. He is not
likely to remain here long. He is as clever as
a pet monkey and difficult to argue with.
8 July 1939
at Swatow
I arrived here yesterday after carrying out
an interesting mine-laying exercise at Hong
Kong. Our spacing was 9 feet out in 1050.
We carried a full load and laid eight
dummies in Port Shelter. It is good to be
clear of dockyard again and I am very busy
here.
Monday 15 July
Slipped and proceeded at 0600 to meet S.S.
Kaying from Hong Kong. The Japs would
not let her in so we went out and collected
160 bags of mail and 3 passengers. The Japs
would not let the passengers land although
residents, because they had no Japanese
Consular permits. Having protested
66
morning when in reply to a question I said
the Pillsbury had taken the passengers and
more surprised to see the Captain of USS
Pope onboard my ship when at the request
of their military authorities he shifted berth
past them.
We keep armed guards onboard S.S.
Yingchow. She can't go until papers are in
order and has discharged half her cargo of
bean cake, beans, etc. The Japs might have
let her complete discharge but probably
would not get coolies. I am keeping her
until I know where the owners want her
sent. All available coolies are employed by
Japs in rebuilding roads and aerodrome.
vigorously I arranged for them to return to
Hong Kong in USS Pillsbury with
Commodore Stapler USN. He came
onboard Thracian after seeing Matsudaira
and I feel has helped me a great deal. The
Japs were very hurt at first when the
Americans challenged them to a game of soft
ball but thought better of it later. They hate
to think we don't take their War seriously. I
may arrange an Anglo-American-Jap sailing
race but feel they will go up in smoke at the
idea. I now hear they have no sailing boats!
The Commissioner of Customs - Mr.
Asker (Swedish) is in trouble with the Japs
for remitting all money collected before the
Japanese occupation to the Chinese Bank at
Shanghai. The remittance was sent after
they arrived and was a large sum.
Their army and navy are bored with the
war and say it will last another 100 years.
They import hundreds of geisha girls in blue
uniform and have started their
headquarters behind the American
Consulate to keep the soldiers quiet.
The foreign community in Swatow and
Kachioh are quite happy but not allowed
out of doors after 8 p.m. I have started the
ball rolling by inviting Americans and our
new Consul to dinner tonight and have told
the Yunagi they are coming. They made no
comment.
I am going to send the S.S. Yingchow
away today. She can't discharge cargo and
requires a guard of one officer and 7 men
which is a severe drain.
July 22nd 1939
at Hong Kong
The Shanghai agents have sent Yingchow
up at last - good riddance. I arrived within
13 miles of Hong Kong at 0630 on 18th but
was sent all the way back to Amoy to escort
the Duncan who had run into a battle
practice target on leaving Wei Hai Wei after
dinner. Some say it was because she had
just won the Regatta! Anyway as it turned
out she could go faster than Thracian as our
port engine bearings were not feeling too
good, and our bows were patched up
temporarily.
I am sending Somerset some more dope
about the situation out here. I think our
policy of no reprisals is hopeless. When
dealing with children one has to use
children's methods, but that is always a
matter for higher authority.
11 July 1939
Yesterday I brought 167 bags of mail and 3
passengers in from S.S. Kaying. The mail
was delivered but the passengers not
allowed to land. I sent them back in USS
Pillsbury. Commodore Stapler USN went
to see Matsudaira the Jap Consul and put in
a good word for me. I was very grateful to
him for taking my passengers, one of whom
was a woman, as the Japs wanted me to go
out and bring in Wosang's mail and so I
refused but sent the Wosang on to Hong
Kong. My main object was to show the Japs
what a close liaison we have with the
Americans. They seemed surprised this
27th August 1939
I am anchored in Starling Inlet off Sha Tau
Kok, the Eastern end of our frontier into
China. It is rather fun. We have to stop
Japs from interfering with Chinese junks or
sampans in Mirs Bay, and have a liaison
with our troops ashore in case of need. We
were due to sail at 4 p.m. last Thursday but
at 3 a.m. plans were changed, I relieved
Scout here, Tenders and Scout rushed off
to their War Stations at Singapore at the
double and ships like Birmingham started
arriving. The Commodore's office was like
a beehive. I prefer the peace of Starling
Inlet, tho7it has great possibilities in case of
attack. I don't envy you at home with all
this war talk, but feel it must soon blow
over. If all goes well Thanet and I expect to
rearm early in September and cruise to
Shanghai and French Cochin-China. Since
the Russo-German non-aggression pact, the
Japs are much more friendly. Long may it
last. I sent their Jap army Commander here
a bottle of the best Japanese sake today, a
present to me from Captain Hayakawa of
67
Yunagi, but I didn't tell him that. I think
they prefer iced beer.
Pat is happy and sensible. She is packed
and ready to go to Manila at short notice,
but has no intention of going unless
ordered!
People living north of H.K. have been
given notice to move.
Very best love dear Dad,
from Graham.
Correspondence
THE ROYAL DOCKYARDS - THE
NEED TO GET VALUE FOR MONEY
Sir,-I write in reply to Commander Kerr's
letter from Rosyth, composed while 'on
holiday'. I write also as a retired officer who
well understands that, with the passage of
time, his detailed knowledge of the Service
and its problems becomes less certain, but
who believes his own experience to be
sufficiently recent and, in some ways,
unique enough to be of value in tackling one
of the more important of them; namely,
that of 'costs' which have now finally
assumed the catastrophic proportions they
have long threatened.
With regret, I find I can take little
encouragement from Commander Kerr's
letter. Indeed, it is truly astonishing that
nearly 20 damaging years have elapsed, or
will have elapsed, before the introduction of
some of the essential dockyard reforms
mentioned in my original article. Of these,
Budgetary Control of expenditure is among
the more important. That the impetus for
this should eventually have come from
politicians (notably, Mr Speed and Mr
Heseltine) rather than from management
(naval o r civilian) is humiliating, not least
because the tools have always been there to
be used by managers. T o inspire the degree
of interest which the true manager (as
distinct from the engineer o r technician)
should have in this task, it seems that
Commander Kerr's solution is to pay
civilian management (the backbone of the
yards) more. Leaving aside the questions
whether a civilian manager is, in fact, less
well paid than his naval counterpart (taking
into account overtime payments and
gratuities which are part and parcel of their
different conditions of service), or whether
his narrower expertise justifies a higher
salary (since the naval officer during his
career has to take on a far wider variety of
duties), experience shows that 'throwing
more money at a problem' has never solved
it; there can, indeed, be n o doubt that to
raise salaries for managers generally in
expectation of better performance would
only have the same effect as has been that of
paying bonuses to the workforce in advance
of proved increases of productivity, namely,
to increase costs yet again. Whatever the
rewards (or penalties) devised they must be
performance-related, as much for the naval
as for the civilian manager. If financial
reward is a real problem then the only sure
and certain way to solve that, within the
framework of the present, largely civilian
dockyard organisation, is first to produce
the savings out of which better salaries can
be paid since no one with any sense at all of
'historical perspective' can possibly expect
more money to be forthcoming. In passing,
it may be of interest to note that when
productivity bonus schemes were first
introduced into the yards, the suggestion
was made that a proportion of any financial
savings achieved through more effective
work should be reserved for supervisors
since obviously improvements would owe as
much to them as to the labour force.
Practical difficulties attended this proposal
but no effort was made to tackle them
positively (least of all by the 'managers'
union', the Institution of Professional Civil
Servants, fully supported by its members)
and we are all now stuck with the
consequences of this short-sightedness.
Fewer managers could, of course, be paid
more individually and navalisation might
enable the management tree to be pruned
but, contrary to Commander Kerr's belief,
that is not my preferred solution; rather is it
that the present organisation should be set
to work effectively, if for no better reason
than that one does not like to be defeated
when practical ways in which this could be
achieved have already been demonstrated!
What seems certain from Commander
Kerr's letter, however, is that there is little
enthusiasm for the difficult task of
achieving economies as an essential prerequisite for all other progress; instead it
appears to be shot through with excuses why
this cannot be done before an attempt is
68
made! For example, he fears that costsaving measures would lead to delays in
completion of refits, but this could only be
the case if the organisation were already
100% cost-effective. Clearly it is not, as
every comparison with US and French yards
has shown, and the 'technical difficulties' of
refitting modern warships, which I fully
appreciate, are the same for US and French
managers as they are for us. He also asserts
that 'the Fleet requires its ships refitted to
time, to quality and to cost, in that order'.
If that is so, then we have taken at least two
steps backwards since 1971 when the Chief
Executive, Dockyards, in an address to
dockyard officers at Gibraltar, stated quite
categorically that the yardstick for future
success was to be that of cost ('the pound
sterling' as he put it). If the Naval Staff
indeed insists on this order of priority in
peacetime then there is clearly something
wrong; the requirement should be to refit
ships on time to the standard laid down
within the cost allowed. In fact, as everyone
knows, too many ships take too long and
cost too much and, as the Falklands
campaign demonstrated, d o not measure up
to the material standard required. Thus we
have the worst of all three worlds and that
cannot be acceptable to government which
is the final arbiter.
Commander Kerr also says that the bonus
payable to individual workers must be
'comparable with the payment of a day's
overtime per week because no worker is
going to co-operate with a scheme which
improves his performance so much that it
deprives him of a Sunday on overtime unless
he receives equitable compensation.' He
adds that some Trade Union representatives
are responsible men, recognising the need to
maximise efficiency in the interests of their
members, but others are 'arbitrary and
obstructive'.
Surely this points to the way in which
problems of co-operation have to be
approached. Long, patient explanation of
the 'economic facts of life' has to be a
principal part of the daily diet. of the
modern manager (even though this, of
itself, is not a universal panacea) and the
effort, if my experience is any guide, will
probably have to be sustained over a period
of years. Motivation is all-important and
this is what lies at the heart of the matter. In
my day the message was 'Pull up your socks
and you will be rewarded' and it proved
possible with long and strenuous effort to
get it accepted in, admittedly relatively small
units of the workforce (about 150 men).
Nowadays the message has to be 'Pull u p
your socks or your job (and mine) will be on
the line'. Those of us who are fortunate
enough to be in work should not, in all
honesty, expect to get very much, if any,
material reward for better performance
since we have all, over the last 20 years or
so, paid ourselves much more than the
economy can afford, an indulgence for
which something like one-third of the total
numbers now unemployed are paying the
penalty. The aim must be, through
commonsense and reason, to discredit the
views and opinions of those who are
reluctant to co-operate, whether in
management, the workforce, or the unions
so that, eventually, they are isolated and
conform or leave.
Almost as astonishing as the failure to
move rapidly to some form of budgetary
control of expenditure by responsible,
accountable managers, is the length of time
it has taken to appreciate that there is no
more certain recipe for financial disaster
than the payment of bonuses to the entire
workforce of a yard in expectation of
improvements in productivity, rather than
payment at gang level for improvements
actually achieved. A plea for this, and for
greater devolution of responsibility,
coupled with individual accountability, to
local managements from a remote, overcentralised bureaucracy in the Ministry of
Defence, was made as long ago as 1965 in a
letter published in the January issue of The
Naval Review under the heading 'I'm all
right, Jack'. This course of action was only
taken after repeated failure, over a period of
three years, t o persuade senior civil servants
at Headquarters to show any interest in such
proposals; they were far more concerned
with vested interests than with efficiency.
70
CORRESPC
Readers may (or may not!) be faintly
surprised to learn that publication of the
letter brought the house down,
notwithstanding that the aims of the journal
were (or should have been) well understood
to include the 'stimulation of thought and
discussion' and that the views of junior
officers were 'especially welcome'. I was
informed by the Captain of the Dockyard at
Devonport that the first Lord (or Civil
Lord, memory is failing; at any rate, the
then Labour Minister Mr J. P. W.
Mallalieu) had seen the letter and that I
could expect to receive an expression of
Their Lordships' displeasure, it having been
construed as an attack on the 'unification'
of the Ministry of Defence! At the same
time the Admiral Superintendent was
instructed by the Director of Dockyards to
ask for my reasons in writing. The upshot
bordered on farce since, within a matter of
days, the Prices and Incomes Board had
published its report on the Industrial Civil
Service (covering t h e dockyards)
recommending precGely the same reforms:
No expression of displeasure was received
and the request for 'reasons in writing' was
watered down to a demand for proposals to
be re-submitted. As the Captain of the
Dockyard, who had given loyal support to
them throughout, said: 'Game, set and
match'! Unfortunately, it wasn't, since not
only were the proposals totally ignored but
even the authoritative PIB Report and that,
if one may say so, is not the way to deal with
'paperwork' much of which may be as vital
as it is certainly time consuming. In
Gibraltar, in the early 1970s, the report had
not even been heard of, despite the fact that
all the senior managers were UK dockyard
officers. Shortly after that the Board, whose
objective, courageous reports were the only
shaft of light in the rapidly gathering gloom,
was abolished by the Conservative Prime
Minister, Mr Heath, and all hope of orderly
progress into the future was lost.
I only recount these details as a warning.
The battle to contain and reduce costs is a
vital one; in times of peace, however fragile,
there is no more important task since, if this
particular 'battle' is lost then the 'war' (that
is the struggle to maintain viable defence
forces) will itself be lost. The Navy will
continue to shrink and ultimately disappear
for the simple reason that the economic and
financial climate for defence cannot get
better, only worse. Hence a monumental
effort will be required merely to hold the
present position. Now that it seems, at the
eleventh hour, some of the reforms which
have long been urged are being introduced,
success will depend very largely on
committed dockyard officers, naval and
civilian, particularly at middle-management
level. But is the nature and magnitude of the
task, and of the effort required, really
understood? I quote from the book 'Your
Disobedient Servant' by Mr Leslie
Chapman, who may be considered to have
achieved more than any other single
individual in constraining public
expenditure, but who has been singularly illrewarded:
'Finding the right people for the job
was in itself quite a task. The critical,
questioning approach to everything
which was the most important quality
required was not always to be found.
Another problem came from the
physical demands of the work.
Ordinary leave was often not taken in
full and no record was kept of what
must, in aggregate, have amounted to
tens of thousands of hours of
overtime.'
We need, somehow, in peace to inspire
the same effort as is freely given under stress
of war. Sacrifices have to be made,
fortunately not of life, but certainly in time
and money. If that has to be accepted in
order to overcome the effects of the
wasteful practices of the past thirty years or
so, then some comfort should be taken from
the realisation that there are many worse
evils.
D. T. WATTS
LIEUT.CDR,RN (Retd)
THROMBOSIS OR SYMBIOSIS?
Sir,-Deep in my bunker, 'on the other side
of the hill', may I venture to support the
defence offered by Commander Kerr
CORRESPO
against the criticisms voiced by Lieutenant
Commander Watts. Considerable effort has
been expended in rectifying procedures and
instituting controls, but I would not deny
that more needs to be done, especially.in the
orbit of managerial accountability.
Constraints, rather than inertia, preclude a
rapid resolution of the problems, but before
too much is expected, is there ever an
immaculate solution to any problem?
May I further submit that the
fundamental necessity that needs to be
adjusted, is 'attitude' - a noun also
expressed by Mr Winton in his letter in the
last edition. As this is a Journal read by
Naval Officers, I seek forbearance in
identifying facets of the Naval attitude, bar
one, but this should not be interpreted as
meaning that my particular glasshouse is
stone proof; it is not.
An impediment to change is surely the
refusal by the Treasury to acknowledge that
civilians employed within the Ministry of
Defence are not doing anything radically
different from their counterparts in Tax,
Social Security or Unemployment Benefit
Offices - Operation Corporate notwithstanding. There is a prime need for MOD
civilians to be disengaged from the Home
Civil Service, and for the introduction of
Departmental grades: for a rationalisation
of the multitude of different ranks into a
vertical progression, so that authority and
responsibility are clearly defined. Currently
it is too diffuse and the 'customer' can be
overlooked. Pay differentials have
deteriorated, as Commander Kerr quoted
- and are getting worse. Perhaps a P O does
deserve the renumeration of a Lieutenant
Commander in an egalitarian society, but it
does militate against motivation and
acceptance of responsibility, and it saps
commitment. If pay improvements
necessitate less personnel, then this places
emphasis on the level of service offered, a
re-appraisal of individual authority and the
delegation of responsibility to evoke
change. Those who envisage a pay explosion
should remember that anyone who has
experienced starvation never becomes a
glutton. We also have the tired, the lazy and
the inadequate, but the convoluted
dismissal regulations are biased in favour of
the individual rather than the organisation,
and it is that, not will-power, that defeats
us. The Employment Protection clauses
need to be abrogated for the departmental
civilians, and a compensating element
incorporated in the salary - more
expenditure, but one would get value for
money.
The RNSTS Management Board
evaluated the concept of a Supply Corps with executive personnel required t o wear
uniform. Its demise was shrouded in
mystery, and it is a matter of conjecture
whether it was still-born, rejected in the
confines of the Admiralty, or lost at the
Treasury. Perhaps one problem was of
access to the Wardroom? Had such an
organisation been inaugurated, it would
have greatly facilitated the amalgamation of
the three Supply Directorates; it would have
produced a firm foundation to build upon;
it would have enhanced motivation for the
individual, and conceivably, might have
enabled the RN to have more faith in the
organisation upon which it depends for
much of its existence.
Trade Unions were not established
specifically to inflict anguish upon Port
Admirals or ComClyde; they remain
whether one likes it or not, a segment of
twentieth century life. A 'life on the Ocean
Wave' may cause myopia in some, and be
restrictive in parts, but so was life in the
Albion or Bulwark; one learnt to live with
an embarked Commando! Negotiations
with craft and non-craft Unions can be
tedious, seemingly irrational and annoying,
but a similar experience could be gained
standing by a new construction ship at
Barrow. Progression 'up the greasy pole'
should not be dependent upon having the
Naval Discipline Act to enforce one's point
of view, whilst appointment to Flag Rank is
surely to test and develop the individual. Is
it possible that training in this sphere is
shallow or deficient, or is there something in
the Naval character that detests
negotiation? Perhaps the syllabus needs
reviewing. Despite the Secretary of State for
Employment, Board Members and irate
gentlemen in the Shires, Trade Unions will
not vanish.
As 'a stoker in the Ship of State', the
grapevine occasionally informs me that
certain venerable naval persons are anticivilian, are ardent in their representation to
navalise civilian posts, or are reluctant to
approve fundings for civilian establishments. Has the Royal Navy chosen to
ignore what the Army and the RAF have
learnt, that logistic support is costly, as
is materiel movement? Antiquated
storehouses, rudimentary racking and
handling systems, are not cost-effective,
and are labour intensive. One man, with a
forty year working life, is an expensive
proposition. Capital expenditure on such
infrastructure is never wasted, if used
judiciously; and whilst it might have less
profile than a Type 22, it would pay for
itself over two decades - did someone ever
balance this against a mid-life
modernisation programme? Did anyone
consider handing over areas of Chatham
Dockyard to the National Maritime
Museum or a Historical Trust, with the
quid pro quo of getting the Department of
the Environment to rescind its ancient
monument classification on the buildings at
Portsmouth o r Devonport, that continue to
bedevil the efforts of the respective
PTSO(N)'s in their struggle for more store
accommodation?
If the Treasury cost projections for
navalisation cannot induce a chance of
attitude towards the civilian element of the
Ministry, it needs to be recollected that
symbiosis is a two-way medium. Economic
constraints will increasingly cut the cake
and enforce a closer look at each other.
Further deterioration in the Service/civilian
interface can only be detrimental to the very
Service that each and every one of us in his
or her own way, is attempting to sustain
and protect. Perhaps we should learn from
'Master Ned' and his tales of woe, as to the
distancing of a Service from the very people
it exists to defend.
THE COST OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
Sir,-Two
points from Commander
Owen's thought-provoking paper (NR
October 1983) struck me with particular
force. Firstly the cost of a frigate appears to
have gone up from f36M in 1973 to an
estimated f150M in 1983, prices quoted in
1983 pounds: i.e. an escalation by a factor
of over 4 in real terms. Secondly the
statement '. . . there is little sign that the
rate of escalation of surface warship costs is
easing'.
This simple necessarily logarithmic graph
of the cost of a frigate relates these two
points:
f lOBn
f 1OOM
flOM
From the graph we see that, on the present
rate of escalation, a frigate will be costing
£1.2 Bn i.e. 1% of total Government
expenditure for a year by about 1997.
With this sort of escalation of unit costs,
any increase in the total sum of money
available such as the 'considerable increase'
called for by 'Gunzo' ('To refit or Nott to
refit', October 1983), will only have a very
temporary effect on numbers. For example
if the total budget for the procurement of
frigates were doubled this would buy just
five years.
One really cannot go on like this; on
anything like a fixed budget for surface
warship procurement, numbers of frigates
in the Navy would, if these increases in unit
costs continue, decline steadily as older
cheaper ships are phased out and fewer new
ships can be afforded. Ultimately there
would be one such vessel - immensely
sophisticated, very complex, extremely
powerful no doubt - but of course the
enemy can always arrange to be where that
ship is not! (The RAF are facing similar
CORRESPONDENCE
problems: two or three years ago I was told
that if trends continued there would be 0.8
combat aircraft in the RAF by 2005). The
only way that we could maintain reasonable
numbers of frigates would be to provide
regular large increases in the total sum of
money and this money simply is not
available.
Perhaps my graph, based on only two
cost figures, points too gloomy a picture in
quantitative terms but there can surely be
no argument about the general trend. Its
message is that the debate between 'quality
v. quantity' is now out of date: the choice
before the Navy is now rather more stark find ways of stopping cost escalation or
face either extinction or at least
emasculation as a significant force within a
few years.
How to stop the cost escalation? Various
approaches have been suggested.
Commander Owen suggests limiting ships
to one primary role. Some four years ago
('The Royal Navy: Quality v Quantity') I
suggested a new approach to warship
procurement based on starting with the
total money available and the minimum
number of ships required. This produces a
cost per ship which must not be exceeded
and requirements must be trimmed
accordingly. (It is interesting that we have
started to adopt this approach for the
procurement of the future main battle
tank). There are many other possibilities,
but all involve difficult choices.
May I end with an observation and a
suggestion? I am sure that the importance
and urgency of stopping and if possible
dramatically reversing cost escalation is
grasped by many people but this
appreciation is by no means universal. In
my present job I have to visit a wide range
of contractors many of whom are working
on MOD(N) contracts. All too often one
sees an expensive, bulky and heavy 'special'
being developed for the Navy: when
questioned the firm's people smile 'Well of
course the Navy prides itself on being
special'. Do the Navy really need to be
special so much of the time: because it is
certainly costing a lot of money.
73
My suggestion is that the need to get costs
down should be presented to all areas of the
Naval Service both uniformed and civilian,
to the Navy's contractors, to academics and
to others interested. This should be put over
not negatively ('the latest round of cuts')
but as a challenge. Get people thinking and
talking about the problem: let us hope, for
example, that the British Maritime League
will run a seminar or two on this subject.
What is wanted is more real capability for
the same or less money. I am sure that it can
be done but it needs new thinking, fresh
approaches, different ways of doing things,
learning from others, and a willingness to
compromise on some aspects which have
long been regarded as absolutes.
LANCASTER
GOTCHA!
Sir,-Ha! Rumbled! And by John Winton,
too!
He's quite right, of course. Not only were
those few page-referenced examples that he
quoted from my review brutally unfair, but
most of the rest as well. I was emulating the
journalistic technique of selective, out-ofcontext quotation, extenso argument and
suggestio falsi, aimed at boosting
circulation by the creation of an arresting
climate of controversy where none exists.
Whether, upon consideration of the totality
of the book and its carping tone, I have
actually been all that unfair to it, I will have
to leave the reader to judge. I don't think
that he will find it so.
John Winton says that 'the wonder is not
that the Navy had a bad press but that it was
not immeasurably worse'. That seems to me
to encapsulate rather neatly the false
attitudes taken towards the problem of the
Services and the media; the Navy got a
'good press'
because it performed
outstandingly well and, golly, how the truth
will out. One must not confuse reality with
the appearance thereof, nor accept that the
media should have the power to 'adjust' the
facts.
There's no doubt that there were some
very unsatisfactory aspects to the media
coverage of the crisis; I can d o no more than
74
CORRESPO
cite abler pens than mine, such as C. H.
Layman's review of the faulty 'Insight'
collection of newspaper articles (The Naval
Review January 1983), and some of the
points made by K.R.J.A. (The Naval
Review, April 1983) o r Bystander (The
Naval Review October 1982). It continues:
have you noticed how, whenever the BBC
scratches at the scab (less frequently
nowadays) on the telly, it's always that sad
picture of the Bluff Cove military disaster
on display behind the talking head, never a
re-hoisted Union Jack nor the middle-aged
Port Stanley woman weeping as the
Argentine APCs rumble by? I wonder why?
We've finally lost the Battle of the Belgrano
as well as the Battle of the News
Management Canard - nowadays there's
never a radio chat-show of the navelexamining kind that does not start with the
'given' premise that the Falklands Islands
war was a disgraceful example of the
manipulation of a simon-pure democratic
press by the self-interested military (read
Gotcha! on this). Despite the findings of the
Parliamentary Select Committee. Why so?
Now, far be it from me etc. etc., and I'm
as keen on the Press as the next etc. etc., but
I believe we need to examine our own
motives pretty closely. Why d o we cultivate
the press so assiduously? Is it to get voters to
vote for the Defence Vote? Is it a
recruitment aid? Is it because it's somehow
gratifying to see one's name in newspapers?
Is it to remind the British people of the
influence of sea power upon their history?
Whatever the motives, good or bad, I would
put in a plea for dignity in our relationships,
with a sharp admixture of competence. We
should certainly continue to appoint an
officer in each ship as P R O and make sure
he gets the right courses; we should continue
to push 'home town stories' and to make
sure that journalists are supplied with all the
legitimate facts that they may need. But I
think we need to resist their essentially
trivialising angles, the pandering bit; let me
cast around for an example. Ah yes, what
about those pictures of a grinning and
naked lady suggestively draped around
some piece of military equipment and
supported by a group of sailors, their young
unformed
faces registering mild
embarrassment? What are they for? We all
know that just as soon as the camera shutter
closes, she will hop into her dress and the
left-hand seat of her vicuna-coated agent's
Ford Granada and roar away. (If she's a
nice lass she may have tea with the lads on
their messdeck first). I suppose the idea is to
exploit the erotic tension between flesh and
monastic uniforms in order to sell the
newspaper, or something. Cry faugh!
Well, I'm rambling a bit, but I believe our
relationships with the media need to be
emotionless, professional and not too selfabnegatory. We are who we are, after all.
Finally, shome mishtake, surely, Ed;
please advise your proof-reader, apropos of
my review of John Watney's yachting book
in the last issue, that ginger snaps and
Stugeron are prophylactics against
seasickness, but a sturgeon isn't.
G. F. LIARDET
(Shorry, Liardet, never saw a Stugeron in
me life. Thinks: Ishould have known better
than to suspect him of a displaced R. Mea
culpa-Editor.)
THE SUBMERGED FLAT
Sir,-Commander Middleton's article 'The
Submerged Flat' reminds me of a few
personal reminiscences on the subject of
battleships' torpedo armament. My earliest,
apart from cadet instruction in the
Temeraire, was during the Reserve Fleet
Exercises in 1920, when the King George V,
Orion and Conqueror each fired two
torpedoes at picket boat targets; ours, I
noted at the time, described 'circular
patterns'. Gyro failure was blamed. A few
days later, a 'long range' firing at the light
cruisers Galatea, Royalist and Aurora was
more successful; although there were no
hits, the fish crossed the line, having mostly
run straight (distance about 5,000 yards).
During the Combined Fleet Exercises in
the twenties torpedoes were usually fired by
the heavy ships as part of the tactics planned
by the respective staffs. Comparatively
short ranges could be arranged by assumed
damage, low visibility, pilotage constraints
CORRESPONDENCE
etc., so long as properly running torpedoes
could cross the target line. Thus, in the
Spring 1922 exercises, Iron Duke, Benbow
and KGVwere ordered to fire two torpedoes
each at their opposite numbers of the 2nd
Battle Squadron - in our case the Malaya.
Ours ran well but passed ahead of HMS
Queen Elizabeth, the leading ship. Iron
Duke had to fire three, as her first broke
surface on discharge.
Shortly afterwards, the 1st Battle
Squadron (Revenge, Ramillies, Royal Oak
and Resolution) was ordered to fire 10
torpedoes each at the same targets and this
they completed in just over 15 minutes, a
fine performance, although we never heard
how successful it was.
For what it is worth, my opinion on the
value of capital ships' torpedo armament is
no different from Middleton's, though it
must be remembered that in 1922 the
Navy was still fighting the Great War, so far
as the two main Fleets were concerned: it
was an attitude that persisted too long,
perhaps.
Torpedoes are fascinating weapons,
providing they behave; submerged flats
would have served well as oil fuel tanks.
H. ST. A. MALLESON,
COMMANDER, R N
LEARNING MORE LESSONS
Sir,-About
'Moneybag's' article in the
October issue, when the Dauntless spent
some time around Malta in 1921 testing the
trial mounting of the multi-barrel pom-pom,
there were already critics among nonspecialists, based on the haphazard performance of the single gun mounting fitted in
destroyers at that time; would not the
failures multiply with the number of barrels?
P e r h a p s t h e lengthy p e r i o d o f
development was intended to take care of
mechanical design changes, but it would not
have improved the poor ballistics.
H. ST. A. MALLESON
MEA CULPA
Sir,-Thirty-seven
years in as a 3-striper
gives one the chance to ruminate on lessons
learnt during that time, while the deservedly
75
successful senior officers were too busy
competing with day to day events.
Materially, the fatal step was, of course,
to set up the MOD, a pot-mess which
hampered the services in favour of the
politicians. The point is important because
ballot-box government is not democracy but
is rule by faction intent on their own power,
with patriotism, if any, a poor second.
Also important was the surrender of the
tot for a shameful money bribe, because the
brushing aside of ancient rights is always
ominous.
Turning to personnel, the dire mistake
was the abolition of warrant officers, partly
for petty savings. Thus the splendid artizans
and highly qualified ratings had nowhere to
go, so 'technicians', university nobs, short
service men and upper yard-men all finish
up on the 'general list', another pot-mess.
The idea was for us all to haul together,
which we already did, even if drafty did have
to apologise for sending a few 7 and 5 men.
Then we have what used to be called a flap
somewhere, and no ships on the spot to deal
with it. Ah, yes, of course, no money,
although plenty of real wealth such as
shipyards and a couple of million spare
hands standing by to stand by. You have to
'borrow' the money from the bankers, who
just create it out of nothing and charge
interest. Not our part of ship? Yes, it
something well is! we are now paying over
ten thousand million quid a year in interest
alone on the almost entirely bogus 'national
debt'. Someone is sitting pretty, and it is not
the Andrew.
So here is the mea culpa; my generation,
who allowed it all to happen, owes our
reliefs a public apology for a bad turn-over,
and where better than in the N.R.?
If I am all adrift, I shall be pleased to eat
humble pie, which is better for the soul than
pot-mess, anyway.
P. R. WARD
NO COURTESY FLAGS FOR
WARSHIPS
Sir,-When the USS Connole (DE 1056)
visited Villefranche early 1983 she flew a
large French flag at her yardarm. When I
76
CORRESPC
asked what this was, the CPOs at the Fleet
Landing told me scornfully 'Courtesy flag,
of course'.
Men-of-war never flew courtesy flags,
they fired gun salutes on arrival instead, and
of course they need diplomatic clearance
before visiting a foreign port. I recall a termmate of mine sailing from a Gulf port soon
after his Survey Ship had arrived for a visit,
rather than submit to the demands of local
officials that his ship fly their national flag.
Can I please be reassured that, even if the
US Navy has adopted the Courtesy Flag
habit (which actually I doubt), Her
Majesty's Ships have definitely not?
M. R. HEALY
MODERN YACHTS AS STUFTs
Sir,-My contribution to the magnificent
Falklands war effort was, like that of most
Retired List officers, limited t o putting the
British viewpoint t o counter French opinion
which was curiously receptive to Hispanic
propaganda. The Navy did not even send
my son, who was tranquilly finishing his
Sub Lieutenant's courses and then
holidaying here on the Riviera, so the
bottom of the barrel was certainly not
scraped.
But I write to bring to notice the
increasing fleet of very large ocean-going
yachts which concentrate on the French
Riviera, at Venice and in Palma/Ibiza/
Marbella. As the Riviera Chart Agent (sole
stockist of Admiralty charts on the Cote
dLAzur) I count nearly all these as my
clients, and because the Red (and Blue!)
Ensign is regrettably a flag of Convenience
for yachts, most of them are British
registered. Thus I know say 25 yachts of
over 40 metres under British flag, mostly
thoroughly modern with long range,
watermakers, often a helicopter pad and
always the latest communications and
navigational fit. Most have Satcom, some
have two! with automatic telex etc. In short,
ripe for requisitioning in case of Falklands
repeat.
The owners - German brewers, Italian
commendatores and the like, working
through British offshore companies -
would be aghast, and have indeed told me
so; but if they choose Britain as a shipping
tax haven then they must accept the small
risk of having to help our war effort. And I
emphasise, there are more and more of
these wonderful ships, because there is no
recession for the really rich. They build in
Holland and Italy.
Interestingly, there is no Union problem
with crews of British yachts. The British
shipping unions have probably not noticed
these vessels, which rarely visit Britain, and
they tend to be designed for a nominal
maximum of 12 passengers thus escaping
much Merchant Shipping legislation.
If Naval Trade wishes to compile details
of these ships, I shall be happy to help. I
would even accept a dormant appointment
as Admiralty Requisitioning Officer,
Monte-Carlo!
M. R. HEALY
50 MIDDLE EAST COMMANDO
Sir,-Earlier this year Volume VI of the
Winston Churchill biography by Dr Martin
Gilbert was published. It covers the period
1939 - 1941 and is called 'Finest Hour'.
On pages 1,014 and 1,104 with footnote
2, this book contains allegations about 50
Middle East Commando at Castelorizzo
which are totally untrue.
These allegations were strongly
challenged by the Middle East Commando's
Historical Research Group, in that what
had been said was a serious deviation from
historical fact.
Dr. Martin Gilbert has apologised by
writing to The Times newspaper in the
following terms:"May I use the courtesy of your
correspondence column to right a wrong? In
a letter to his son in June, 1941, Winston
Churchill wrote of 60 British soldiers who
surrendered (as he expressed it) 'in droves,
and came out of caves with their hands up
like a lot of ridiculous loons'.
This comment was published in volume
six of the Churchill biography, together
with a footnote, for which I alone am
responsible, identifying these troops as
those involved in the attack on the Italian
CORRESPONDENCE
Dodecanese island of Castelorizzo four
months earlier. Evidence which I have now
seen (and ought to have sought earlier)
makes it clear that no such surrender took
place on Castelorizzo, and that the bravery
of the unit involved, 50 Middle East
Command, was considerable.
Whichever episode Churchill was in fact
describing, he could not have been referring
to the Castelorizzo attack, and I should like
to apologize unreservedly to all those who
took part in it, for the distress caused to
them by an inaccurate identification.
I should add that the second in command
of the Commandos at Castelorizzo, Major
(now Colonel) Stephen Rose, and both
company commanders - Captain (now
Colonel) Michael Borwick and the late
Captain Kenneth Hermon - were
mentioned in despatches for their services
during the battle, and that their unit
subsequently played a gallant part in the
evacuation of Crete, being finally left
behind on Crete to become prisoners-of-war
for four and a half years.
(Signed) MARTINGILBERT"
G . A. D. YOUNG,DSO,
COLONEL,RE
77
H M S GLORIOUS
Sir,-A publisher has asked me to write the
story of the aircraft carrier Glorious, from
her first inception as one of Fisher's 'Baltic
Project' cruisers in 1915, until her loss off
Norway in June 1940. As Naval Review
members will know this is a most interesting
subject, because Glorious and her air
groups in the Mediterranean played a major
part in the formative years of the naval air
arm in the 1930s, and the ship herself was
present in the Norwegian campaign - the
first real blooding (literally) of the Fleet Air
Arm.
May I appeal to those Naval Review
members who have any records or
reminiscences on Glorious to write to me? I
know that many such records have been
deposited in various archives, but these are
not always open to researchers and it would
be helpful to me to receive the information
firsthand. I will be very grateful for any help
that can be given.
JOHNWINTON
Bryn Clwyd,
Llandyrnog,
Denbigh,
Clwyd LL16 4 H P
Reviews-1:
Naval Periodicals and Others
MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT IN EXTENDED NATIONAL LIMITS
(a Seminar organised by the Nautical Institute and Navy International,
I0 November 1983)
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
NY International lawyer worth his salt
will rise with enthusiasm to the
question: what is the current state of the law
of the sea, and in particular what is the
validity of claims to 200 miles Exclusive
Economic Zones? On the 10 November
1983 an impressive array of speakers,
marshalled by the Nautical Institute and
Navy International, addressed the more
practical question: has the appetite of States
to extend their maritime jurisdiction
outstripped their capacity to police the vast
sea areas involved? The question was
prompted by the conclusion of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which was opened for signature on 10
December 1982, and which will come into
force 12 months after the date of deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification.
The 1982 Convention contains inter alia
the following. First, a restatement - with
amplification and amendments - of the
present legal position (governed by the 1958
Geneva Conventions and customary
international law) on internal waters, the
territorial sea and contiguous zone, the high
seas, and the continental shelf.
Amplification is to be found on such
matters as the definition of innocent
passage through the territorial sea.
Amendment is made, e.g., to the present
regime governing international straits:
where straits connect areas of high seas or
Exclusive Economic Zones, a right of
transit passage through territorial waters is
accorded to ships of all states, to submerged
submarines, and to aircraft. Secondly, the
Convention contains provisions according
to States the right to claim 200 mile wide
Exclusive Economic Zones. Over and above
the rights States already enjoy to exploit
the resources of the continental shelf, the
Exclusive Economic Zone confers sovereign
A
rights over fisheries and over the
conservation and management of the
resources of the Zone. The coastal state may
also subject to licensing scientific research
by ships of other states within the Zone.
Thirdly, and most boldly, the 1982
Convention not only declares the sea-bed
and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction to be 'the common
heritage of mankind', it also provides
machinery designed to achieve this aim.
Exploration and exploitation is to be carried
out either by an international agency (the
Enterprise), o r by States and their
companies in association with a related
international agency (the Authority).
Provisions are included requiring the
transfer of technology by undertakings
exploiting the sea-bed to the Authority.
It is well known that the United States has
asserted that it will not sign the Convention,
because of its opposition to the sea-bed
provisions, which it believes to be inimical
to its interests. The United Kingdom at
present takes a similar position. At the time
of the Nautical Institute's Seminar, 127
States had signed the 1982 Convention, and
6 had ratified it. The possibility cannot be
ruled out that the 1982 Convention may
ultimately come into force for some States
(not less of course than 60) but not for
others. The 1982 Convention would thus be
exclusively applicable in legal relations
between its parties. In legal relations
between non-parties, and between nonparties and parties, the 1958 Geneva
Conventions and/or customary law would
apply. The complications arising from this
situation might be more apparent than real.
For there is increasing evidence that the
United Nations negotiating process which
gave rise to the 1982 Convention may have
gone a long way towards establishing the
Exclusive Economic Zone as customary
REVIE
international law. An increasing number of
States have claimed either 200 mile fishing
zones, or Exclusive Economic Zones. Of
great practical significance must be the
position of the United States. Since 1976 it
has exercised fishery management and
conservation authority out to 200 miles
under the Magnuson Act. On 10 March
1983 President Reagan proclaimed a 200
mile Exclusive Economic Zone for the
United States. It becomes increasingly
difficult to deny that the process of claim
and acquiescence has given birth to new
rules of customary international law
binding on the great majority of States,
which accord at least exclusive fishing
rights, and probably the full range of EEZ
rights itemised in the 1982 Convention. It
will be noted that this fact, if it be a fact,
reduces considerably the incentive for
developed countries to ratify the
Convention. After all, customary law and
the 1958 Geneva Conventions serve them
tolerably well with respect to territorial sea,
contiguous zone, high seas, and continental
shelf rights. The width of the territorial sea
will no doubt look after itself under
customary law; significantly the United
States signals qualified acceptance of the 12
mile territorial sea (as per the 1982
Convention) in the Presidential declaration
of 10 March 1983. Deep sea-bed resources
would be exploitable, arguably (and the
United States and the UK d o so argue) out
with the Convention, as a feature of the
freedom of the high seas. It would not be a
travesty of the present legal position to say
that 200 mile limits have arrived, in advance
of the entry into force of the 1982
Convention. T o that extent the Nautical
Institute's Seminar was an assessment of
contemporary problems, rather than an
exercise in forward planning.
The papers delivered, and the discussion
they provoked, raised a number of
intriguing law enforcement issues. What
were the character of violations likely to be
encountered by the coastal state? What sort
of marine police force should a State
muster to enforce the law? Was unilateral
enforcement likely to be adequate, or were
measures of regional co-operation
necessary? What were the realistic response
times of vessels and aircraft in 200 miles
zones? What sort of vessels and aircraft
were appropriate for the job? What
methods of communications a n d
surveillance could be utilised to coordinate
maritime operations? Did satellite
surveillance have a role to play? What sort
of information about the seaways within
the 200 mile zones was likely to be
available, or could be made available?
Finally, how much in the way of public
expenditure was it practical to devote to
policing the various kinds of violation
which might occur within national
jurisdiction?
The adequacy of hydrographic
information
A point which is often overlooked in
assessing maritime law enforcement is the
importance of hydrographic information.
'The limits of the territorial sea, of the
contiguous zone, and even, in certain cases,
of the continental shelf depend upon
knowledge of the position of baselines
which derive from the low water lines of
mainlands, islands or certain drying rocks,
reefs or banks.' And once these matters
have been settled, extensive hydrographic
information is required if the safety of
shipping is to be ensured, pollution
prevented, dumping controlled, fisheries
protected, and the exploration and
exploitation of the natural resources of the
sea, sea-bed and sub-soil subjected to
control by the coastal state. While many
may have fondly imagined that States have
such information filed away in abundance
in government archives, the contrary is the
case. In 1977 a UN Group of experts
examined 84 coastal states with limited or
nonexistent capacity to undertake hydrographic surveying. The charts of no less
than 16 countries dated entirely from
before the First World War. A further 25
relied on charts compiled before World
War 11. Only 14 countries possessed charts
which included post 1970 work, and it
was only in 1970 that the widespread
80
REVIEWS-I
introduction of sidescan sonar allowed the
detailed examination of sea-beds of up to
100 metres depth. Lest this problem be seen
as uniquely one for developing countries, a
chart showing Admiralty surveys to 1982 of
British waters (to 200 miles) revealed less
than 30% coverage.
Fortunately, it seems that relatively
inexpensive
and straightforward
hydrographic equipment can provide
reliable information provided that the
personnel using it are properly trained. It
remains to be seen whether obtaining
essential hydrographic information will be
given sufficient priority by coastal states in
the years to come.
Problems facing law enforcers4
All the old problems facing law enforcers
remain, such as illegal immigration and
smuggling. Problems such as illegal fishing,
once only involving national jurisdiction
out to 12 miles or less, are now encountered
out to 200 miles. Continental shelf
jurisdiction brought with it the increased
risk of collision with oil installations, and
damage to pipelines. Terrorist threats to
platforms cannot be ruled out, but are
extraordinarily difficult to guard against.
Safety fairways may be organised to
provide invaluable guidance to ships
negotiating waters dotted with oil and gas
installations. With the increase in claims to
Exclusive Economic Zones, States may
wish to enforce anti-pollution legislation
against ships traversing their Zones, as well
as policing any licensing system they may
initiate to regulate marine research. Many
of these problems without doubt arise from
the recent tendency to subject to coastal
states' jurisdiction areas and activities
hitherto legally beyond their control. But
that is not the whole of the story. Old vices
may enjoy an unwelcome contemporary
revival. Thus in the South China Sea, and
off the coast of West Africa, attacks and
atrocities by latter day pirates (both inside
and outside' coastal states" territorial
waters) constitute a real hazard to merchant
shipping. ' Neither the jurisdiction of
coastal states, nor the universal jurisdiction
enjoyed by the warships of all states to
punish piracy on the high seas, have so far
proved effective to solve this problem.
The appropriate response
Coastal states without doubt have choices to
make in their responses to their recently
expanded responsibilities. They have to
make choices about the method of
organising law enforcement, e.g., should
they utilise a specialist para-military force of
impressive capabilities, like the US
Coastguard? O r an expanded branch of the
police services at sea? O r a combined
approach by the civil and military power, as
in the United Kingdom? Furthermore, a
coastal state has to decide upon the
appropriate vessels and aircraft with which
to equip its law enforcement units, and how
to deploy them to best effect. Should large
vessels patrol for days on end? O r should
smaller but faster craft respond to reports
from aerial surveillance units?' Or should a
State adopt a combination of approaches,
as in the United Kingdom? It must be
remembered that in the vastness of 200 mile
zones response times to suspected violations
may on average amount to many hours, and
the successful prosecution of law-breakers
may be quite rare. There may well be room
for experimentation with newly developed
models of high speed craft,' on the one
hand, and even airshipsYon the other (the
US Navy has maintained a watching brief on
airship capability over the years). Satellitelo
surveillance using synthetic aperture radar
has made great strides in recent years, and is
quite capable of detecting individual vessels,
and establishing their course and speed.
Present
disadvantages are that
identification of flag and number would not
seem to be feasible (as it is through aerial
reconnaissance), while the time taken at
present for computer assessment would lead
to an over slow response. Oil slicks,
however, would be readily detectable. It
must be stressed that in this field the pace of
technological development is extremely
rapid. A key factor in responding to
maritime
law-breaking
will
always
inevitably be an effective communications
IWS-I
and control system," whatever the means
of surveillance adopted.
A regional approach l 2
The law of the sea has been revolutionised
in the last 4 decades by the extension of
national jurisdiction from, broadly, three
mile territorial seas, to zones of national
jurisdiction extending as far as 350 miles
out to sea (in the case of some continental
shelf rights). International law has simply
recognised greatly expanded areas of
national jurisdiction.
T h e 1982
Convention, which aimed primarily at a
global regime for the sea, does in fact make
recommendations and provisions for
regional arrangements, e.g., in managing
the living resources of the Exclusive
~ c o n o m i Zone.
c
EEZ States are enjoined
to cooperate regionally. Workable sea
regimes are difficult to define, and existing
political groupings (such as the EEC) may
provide less than comprehensive regional
organisations to deal with such problems as
fisheries. What might be needed is not so
much a new regional regulating body as a
regional sea coordinating body, and the
application of modern information
technology to the problem of links between
States as a basis for planning.
Cost effective law enforcement
Maritime law enforcement can cost a good
deal of money. In allocating scarce resources
to the task, and in determining what is a
satisfactory level of enforcement, it is as well
to remember that the law is enforced not
merely for its own sake, but for the public
benefit. States may find that in these days of
extended limits they have claimed rights
which are not worth enforcing, simply for
the sake of it. l 3 It is interesting that the
United States, in declaring an EEZ on
10 March 1983, declared that it would not
exercise jurisdiction over marine research.
Perhaps it regarded the cost of exercising
81
its rights as outweighing any advantage
which would accrue.
A credible level of law enforcement on
matters of vital interests to States must be an
issue of common concern, irrespective of the
geographic location or political system of
the coastal State. l 4 Yet it may be unrealistic
in many cases to expect law enforcement at
more than a minimum deterrent level;
particularly in the waters of the less
developed coastal states. l5
DERRICK
WYATT
Notes
'Rear Admiral J . R. Hill opened the Seminar with an
assessment of the current international law of the sea.
Vice Admiral Sir Roderick Macdonald reported upon
both the signatures and ratifications to the 1982
Convention, and the position of HMG.
zCommander Beazley delivered a paper entitled 'The
Demand for Hydrographic Services'. A few points are
~ummarisedin the Report.
'Beazley, op. cit.
'These matters were included in papers by Captain
C. W. Koburger, 'Cost Effective Law Enforcement', and
Captain D. G. Hindle, 'Command and Communications
Offshore'. They were also referred to in Sir Ian
McGeoch's paper on 'Surveillance Techniques'.
'Miss A. Rutherford, a ship's officer, testified to the
seriousness with which these threats were taken on
voyages off the coast of Africa, and the difficulty of
taking effective protective measures.
6The US Coastguard was examined in Captain
Koburger's paper.
'Squadron Leader R. L. Crutchlow's paper on 'Use of
Aircraft for Maritime Surveillance' was delivered by
Wing Commander G. P. North. Vice Admiral Sir Ian
McGeoch delivered a paper on 'Surveillance
Techniques'.
8Mr. B. J. Russell delivered a paper on 'Applications for
High Speed Craft'.
9Commander R. H. Hillsdon delivered a paper on
'Airships and their Application'.
"Sir Peter Anson delivered a paper on 'Surveillance by
Satellite'.
"Captain Hindle's paper, note 4.
12Professor A. D. Couper delivered a paper on 'A
Regional Approach as a Means of Achieving Cost
Effective Law Enforcement'.
"Commodore Tobin, RNZN, made interesting
observations to this effect during the discussion period.
"As Captain R. Hart emphasised in his closing remarks.
"Sir Ian McGeoch spoke in this vein in his paper (note7).
Cdr. T. H. Foden testified to the great strides made in
recent years by the Nigerian Navy in responding to the
challenge of maritime law enforcement.
JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1983 - 1984
edited by CAPTAINJOHNMOORE
(Jane's-f 55)
As the definitive work of reference on the
World's
Warships, Jane's is still
unsurpassed, despite the appearance of
cheaper, equally glossy attempts to emulate
it, particularly abroad. That is not to say
that there are no shortcomings in some of
the information in it, but they are minor in
the wealth of fact contained in the book.
Not many private readers, certainly serving
officers, could afford to buy it at £55, and
many, like your reviewer, will buy pocket
versions, which are much cheaper and easier
to keep up to date. But Jane's certainly
maintains its standards as the major
reference work for libraries and those
deeply concerned with world maritime
affairs. Judging by the advertising in it, it
also has, or is expected to have, wide
readership amongst those who procure
Naval equipment, at home or abroad;
mostly, I suspect, abroad!
The foreword of this edition has been the
subject of a good deal of discussion in the
National and Maritime press, and the media
generally, in particular regarding its
comment about the 1981 Defence Review
and the Nott cuts, planned and real. I
suppose that it is inevitable in such a book
that comment on British maritime affairs
should include a good deal of special
pleading for the RN. At the risk of being
accused of comment rather than review, let
me say from the start that I wholeheartedly
agree with most of what Captain Moore
says in his foreword, and in principle it
deserves all our support. But that is not
enough, and the arguments must go much
further than those he puts therein; I believe
he has fallen into the same trap as have so
many well intentioned maritime
commentators and journalists in recent
years, by criticising what has been done,
with little acknowledgement of why, but
more importantly, without offering
practical alternatives. We have to
acknowledge that in a democracy, in a
declining economy, and with equipment
costs expanding faster than inflation,
something has got to give in our defence
posture; cuts have to fall somewhere! This
will go on for some time yet, and all the
evidence points to further major cuts this
decade; where should they fall, that is the
question?
By implication, I assume that the Editor
of Jane's believes that cuts should fall on
British Forces Germany - as I do; and he
refers to the 'Central Front Syndrome' in an
implied derogatory manner. But the case
must be argued. This must be done by all
who believe that HMG have got the
balance wrong, showing just what the
requirements for a Navy are, and what the
alternative options to cuts in the navy are,
too! Like many people brought up in the
days when the Royal Navy provided Britain
with major world wide power projection,
world wide policing at sea, and a protection
for a vast overseas trade, much of which
was with Commonwealth and Empire, he
has apparently assumed that the Maritime
need of this country, as an island, is selfevident. Perhaps it ought to be, it may still
be so to him, and it is hopefully clear to
most readers of The Naval Review; a few
years ago it may well have been self-evident
to most thinking members of the Great
British Public too. But it is patently not the
case with HMG today - and the Nott line,
modified perhaps by Corporate experience
(but not by much), is still the basis of
current policy. This was made clear by the
Secretary of State for Defence in his address
to the recent King's College Symposium on
'The Future of British Sea Power', on
8 November. To quote 'It is only here in
Europe that the Russians might see a chance
of a quick victory . . . by conventional
military means' and 'so I conclude that we
must certainly ensure that our contribution
to the Central Front is as cost effective as
possible. . . . But I also conclude that we
simply cannot afford to run down this
capability in order to enhance the UK's
Maritime Forces'. No, the case for
Maritime Power for Britain does not go
without saying any more and it must be
argued.
To play the Devil's Advocate for a
moment, why should Britain, as now one of
the poorer NATO and Western Nations,
provide any element of world policing; how
do we reconcile the changed pattern of
British trade with a large blue water Navy
when over three quarters of our exports are
to Continental Europe as are over half our
imports, and most of the rest is oil, with
little to the Commonwealth or old Empire?
(Source -Business Monitor). How relevant
is a deep water Navy to a 30 day war, which
is as long as the other Services say they can
fight for? Or is it to be argued that we need
a balanced Fleet in case another Falklands
Style operation becomes necessary in one of
our few remaining overseas possessions,
which successive Governments would, on
the whole, prefer to dispose of anyway? Do
we really need a balanced Fleet any more
for our Defences? In the foreword, the
Editor asks, in his comment on the smaller
Navies, (in the particular context of
Argentina) 'are Aircraft Carriers necessary
in a Navy which is unlikely to operate far
from Home waters?' Well, are they previous Governments have adopted just
this line with the RN? Of course there are
sound, in some cases incontestible,
arguments against all these glib and
politically convenient points, but they must
be put vigorously and succinctly at every
opportunity.
History shows that wars seldom start for
the expected reasons, at the expected time,
in the expected place, or indeed have the
forecast longevity - 'It will all be over by
Christmas' should surely be a forbidden
phrase for the rest of this century! It is one
of the greatest strengths of the RN that the
barely balanced Fleet, barely balanced for
national needs, nevertheless provides great
flexibility and variety of options when the
unexpected occurs, whether it is for
withdrawing defeated armies from
continental beaches or fighting a war 8,000
miles away with no shore support. Without
such a Fleet, whatever its shortcomings,
Mrs Thatcher would have had no options at
all for the recovery of the Falkland Islands!
This was in contrast to the other Services,
who, without in any way detracting from
their performance once they had been taken
to the battle by ships, provided no strategic
flexibility at all in the circumstances. But it
is not easy to argue a case for flexibility and
wide options, a 'cum-in-handy' service, in
the face of Government Ministers (and even
some Service Chiefs) who prefer taut,
compartmentalised scenarios which are
easier to manipulate to current political
needs, and who prefer to turn a blind eye to
history. If the Editor of Jane's is to venture
into the field of politics and strategy, as he
has done, and he wishes to have influence
on our maritime posture, then I feel he
needs to address these varied and diverse
points in his forewords in a future edition. I
believe he virtually acknowledges this need
- in his own words 'As the concern of this
book is with maritime affairs it is important
to investigate how the various countries'
maritime capability relates to the overall
policy of their governments and whether in
fact, those governments pay adequate
attention to the needs of strategy. What
sort of balance do they strike in considering
the maritime requirements of the
populations put in their care'. Well, what
are the requirements for the UK? I look
forward to reading the next edition of
Jane's!
A point well made in the foreword is that
many smaller navies, who have in the past
used second-hand ships which are now
running out of their useful life, are faced
with re-equipment problems. These are
similar to those faced by some of the
medium size navies some 25 - 30 years ago,
since when most of them - RNLN, RCN
for example, have abandoned whole areas
of capability such as organic Naval air
power. There is obviously plenty of scope
for the sale of cheaper warships to meet the
needs of such Navies, and somehow we
ought to be able to overcome the difficulties
raised by their Governments demanding the
84
REVIE
endorsement of RN purchase of ships
which, on the whole, will not meet RN
needs. From looking through this edition of
Jane's, my own impression regarding the
size and shape of world Navies is that as in
so many other spheres of military power,
the strength of the Super Powers increases
as the power of the rest decreases. There are
now only two Navies other than the USN
and the USSR Navies capable even of
modest operations away from their own
region - the RN and the FN, and both
these now have significant limitations,
although after 1982 our own capability is
viewed with renewed respect. Although
there are other Navies nearly as big as these
two, they are essentially regional or coastal
Navies, inhibited by cost and a recognition
of world power politics and their national
part therein. The imperial aspirations of
European and other states have long gone,
and imperialism is essentially the business
of the Super Powers.
The Editor elaborates on the changes
which are going on in the Super Power
Navies; in particular he points out the
problems of the USN where, as he puts it
'the institutions of this great democracy
have now reached a stage where their
influence on the country's defence is more
harmful than helpful'. H e describes well the
plethora of Congressional committees
which may be seen as democracy at work,
but has certainly inhibited the effective
deployment of the USA's resources to deal
with the Soviet world wide threat, by the
political preoccupations and concern with
trivia in defence equipment proposals, so
that sight of the aim and purpose is lost. H e
laments, quite rightly, the sad decline of the
US 'Great sea commerce' and later on,
under the more detailed discussion of the
USN, the weakness in MCM. It all has a
familiar ring, albeit on a grand scale.
In contrast, in discussing the Soviet Naval
programme, the Editor makes very clear the
great advantages they enjoy in military
matters generally, with n o need to adjust
their policies and activities to meet the
requirements of elections o r the electorate.
His succinct description of the Soviet
submarine programme is excellent, and
speculation on the possible deployment and
purposes of their Fleet and the possible
~ e r s o n n e l weaknesses therein is very
ieadable and persuasive. He highlights, too-,
the threat which accrues from the ex~ansion
of the Soviet Merchant Fleet, both in
political, economic and military terms. In his
discussion of Super Power relationships and
power politics he describes the 'huge Soviet
espionage apparatus' (in which the Soviet
Merchant Fleet has its place), and goes on to
refer to the Soviet Fleet being larger than is
needed for purely peaceful intentions. I
believe an occasional indulgence into trying
to 'think Russian' helps when such
statements are made. Surely, Soviet needs as
they see them in the context of Naval power
are, firstly, t o ensure the continuing
Government of the USSR by the CPSU;
secondly to be capable of challenging US
power world wide, to isolate the USA from
her Allies in Europe and elsewhere, and
replace US influence with Soviet influence as
opportunity arises; and thirdly winning the
support of the uncommitted by apparently
legitimate means. The Soviet Navy has a
major part in the attainment of these aims,
which the Soviets will pursue by all means
short of war with the USA - with the
possible exception of the first, a real threat to
~b~?$~would be the one thing I believe could
leaa'*them to deliberate opening of major
war. They have learned the value of sea
power in the attainment of these aims, and as
befitting their Super Power status believe
themselves entitled to a Super Power Navy.
The reference section of the book, which
is, after all, the main use for it, is generally
excellent. I found in one o r two places,
especially in the sections on the smaller but
perhaps quite important Navies, that some
of the information was a bit sparse. For
example information on sonar fits in
Swedish submarines and attack craft is
lacking - this is of interest to readers in the
light of recent S/M incursions! There are
some occasional typographical errors including for example, interchange of
photographs of HMS Droxford and HMS
Shetland.
REVIE
Jane's is always good to have around, a
good read, and a superb book of reference.
Long may it go on.
R.H.N.
THE SEA IN SOVIET STRATEGY
by BRYANRANFT
and GEOFFREYTILL
(Macmillan, London-£25.00)
Of all the sets of words in a book, the title
can be the most revealing. Sensational,
meretricious, emotive, woolly and
misleading - all these we have experienced
far too often from authors who, as
custodians of the printed word, should
know better. They d o their books no credit.
It is a pleasure, then, to meet a book
whose title so exactly fits its content and
purpose. Ranft and Till set out to place the
Soviet Union's maritime policies within its
general political a n d ideological
background, and that is an aim they pursue
without deviation. It is something that has
not been done for a long time on this side of
the Atlantic, and never so thoroughly. Their
method, as non-Russian-speakers, has been
to examine translations of the more
commonly-quoted Soviet strategic writers
such as Sokolovsky and Gorshkov, and to
make extensive use of Western
commentaries on Soviet theory and
practice; and to follow that with informed
and careful analysis. Just how probing that
analysis can be, those of us who attended
the King's College Seminars at the turn of
the eighties - which were one of the
starting points for this book - well know.
The pattern of the book is entirely suited
to its purpose. A couple of largely historical
scene-setting chapters followed by one on
foreign policy and one on strategy take up
the first 80 pages: quite rightly, for without
them the context would not be right. Nor
can they be skipped, in spite of the fact that
the best is yet to come. This consists of a
chapter on the development, and a longer
one on the missions, of the Soviet Navy,
with an 'Inventory' chapter between. The
writing, and the analysis, seem to become
sharper and more acute as the book goes on.
There is nothing prolix about it, and it is
very hard in such circumstances to
summarise the book's findings, but there is
one passage towards the end that, for me,
gets close enough:
'. . . .the Soviet Navy's tasks . . . . require
a mix of forces (surface, sub-surface and
air), a degree of sea control, and depend at
least in part o n the successful
accomplishment of other tasks. . . Admiral
Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy clearly
recognise in its versatility of purpose and
use the very essence of sea power. T o them it
is a flexible and general-purpose instrument
of state policy both in peace and war.'
This, in its quiet way, is a robust rebuttal
of those commentators who regard the
Soviet Navy as a single-purpose, single-shot
defensive force or, conversely, as an
instrument only of potential aggression. It is
typical of the book's balanced but by no
means derivative approach.
One other felicity is the consistent style. I
know both the authors but for the life of me
could not make out who had written which
bit. This is a tribute t o the authors' clarity of
writing and thought.
It seems to me that if you are looking for
one book about the Soviet Navy and its
purposes, this is the one you want. If you
are looking for a book to lead you into
further reading on the subject, this is the
one you want. If you are looking for a book
to bolster your prejudices, you may not
want this book, but you will surely need it.
Whether you can afford to buy it is
another matter. £25 for a 235-page book
(printed, I note, in Hong Kong) is not
realistic, and it is surely time these particular
publishers reviewed their pricing policy. It is
alarming because the important things the
authors have to say may not be read simply
because buyers - even libraries - are put
off. Nevertheless, I d o urge you t o secure a
copy somehow, and read it.
RICHARDHILL
AIR WAR SOUTH ATLANTIC
by JEFFREYETHELLand ALFREDPRICE
(Sidgwick and Jackson-£9.95)
This is an easily readable book recording in
great detail all the air activities in, and
86
REVIE
connected with, the Falklands campaign.
The way it is written reminds me vaguely of
a modern thriller - n o disadvantage in that.
The authors are respectively an ex-RAF
officer with much electronic warfare
experience and the son of a US Air Force
fighter pilot who has extensive contacts in
the Latin American Air Forces and speaks
Spanish. As a result a great many of the
combats and operations described have
quoted accounts by both the British and
Argentine pilots concerned. The book is
presumably factually accurate but,
understandably, in view of the backgrounds
of the joint authors the RAF contribution is
inclined to be given in greater detail than
that of the Fleet Air Arm.
The authors disagree with the official
White Paper figures of Argentine aircraft
losses, which is not surprising since the
latter were inevitably based on claims,
whereas the authors' figures were arrived at
after interviewing numerous Argentine
authorities and pilots. The total figures
confirmed by the authors is 102 against a
considerably higher figure in the
Government White Paper. The biggest
discrepancy is in losses from surface-to-air
missiles and gun systems - 20 as opposed to
52 in the White Paper - largely caused by
multiple claims for the same aircraft shot
down. There is very little divergence in the
air-to-air figures.
The enormous part electronic devices
play in modern warfare is apparent
throughout the book; missile and radar
warning devices; information when one's
own missile had locked on; not to mention
navigational aids, were fitted in most
aircraft and of course ships had even more.
But the outstanding point to my mind is that
these efficient devices result in the ship or
aircraft pilot's having only a few seconds in
which to take the appropriate evasive action
in most cases, which is a frightening thought
t o a person like myself whose experience
dates from World War I1 and a few post war
years.
Many unexplained episodes reported in
the Press and television coverage at the time
are elucidated, which I found very
gratifying: e.g. what caused the helicopter
carrying a number of SAS men to come to
grief with much loss of life? Its tail rotor hit
a large sea bird in flight which caused it to
crash.
The points which will particularly interest
readers may be listed as follows:Argentine:
a. The Mirages and Daggers (Israel
built copies of the attack version of the
Mirage) tried to induce the Sea Harriers
to attack them at great height which the
Harriers would not be lured into doing.
When the Mirages, Daggers and
Skyhawks attacked our forces they
flew close to the sea or land to be below
our radar screen thus causing combats
to be on the Sea Harriers' terms.
b. Due to this low flying, bomb
release was too low for the fuzes to arm
before hitting their target - hence
most bombs did not detonate.
c. The Argentine aviators appeared
to have little idea of air combat tactics
and suffered accordingly.
d. As a result of the early bombing
of Port Stanley airfield the Mirages
were redeployed to cover the mainland
airfields, thus removing any possibility
of the Argentines securing air
superiority over the Falklands.
e. The sinking of the General
Belgrano resulted in the Argentine
Navy being withdrawn to its home
ports (with the exception of one or two
small units) and taking no further part
in the conflict.
f. Of the two modern Argentine
submarines one was attacked off South
Georgia by helicopters and entered
harbour in a damaged state and was
deserted by her crew. The other,
operating to the north of the Falklands,
was hunted throughout the night of
1 May by three ASW Sea Kings backed
up by homing torpedoes, depth charges
and anti-submarine mortar bombs. She
escaped, but took no further part in the
conflict.
British:
1 . Harriers (or any type of aircraft
REVIE
capable of vertical take-off) were ideal
for operations from a carrier in the
conditions of weather, ship movement
and visibility experienced. Even then
one Sea Harrier was lost overboard
from HMS Invincible when she made a
tight turn causing it to skid sideways on
the wet deck and go over the side. The
pilot was rescued. The fully loaded
Harriers however could not lift off
vertically and used the ski-jump at the
fore end of the flight deck.
2. The account of landing a party of
SAS men on the Fortune Glacier above
the settlements of Leith and Stromness
in South Georgia to observe the
Argentine occupying troops in which
two Wessex helicopters were lost
illustrates the appalling weather
changes that can be experienced in the
Falklands area at short notice. The
third helicopter involved, an ASW
Wessex fitted with radar succeeded in
rescuing the SAS party: a remarkable
feat of flying.
3. Sidewinder was a most effective
air-to-air missile. 19 enemy aircraft
were destroyed in missile engagements
for 23 Sidewinders launched - a
success rate of 82%.
4. A Sea Harrier fitted with
Sidewinder missiles was something the
Argentine aviators could not deal with
except, if they had the speed, by
escaping from the area.
5. Flight refuelling on a scale not
visualised previously was remarkably
successful and enabled the large RAF
Vulcan sorties to take place from
Ascension Island.
6 . One wonders what would have
been done had not Ascension Island
been available as a staging post and
also as a base for the Victor flight
refuelling aircraft. One thinks of St
Helena which is further south and east;
but your reviewer does not know if it
has a suitable airfield.
7. Despite the cratering of one end
of Port Stanley airfield by the early
Vulcan sortie on 1 May the airfield,
with a shorter runway, was never out of
action. The Argentines flew in supplies
and took off wounded making 31
Hercules landings and 28 landings by
naval transport aircraft. But the
Vulcan's raid caused the Argentines to
reposition many of their Mirages to
protect their mainland airfields and
hence the Falklands were out of their
range.
8. The five Argentine Super ~ t e n d a r d
aircraft with Exocet missiles were a
serious threat. Actually one Super
Etendard was unserviceable - believed
cannibalised for spare parts; and of the
five Exocet missiles launched only two
found their targets - the other three
were decoyed away by chaff or
electronic air borne devices mounted in
helicopters.
The book has a series of appendices
giving the fate of aircraft lost and other
extensive information about sea and air
forces of both sides. There is also a good
number of photographs and a useful index.
Well worth reading, particularly if you
are an air enthusiast.
C.C.H.H.
CONVOY: THE DEFENCE OF
SEA TRADE 1890 - 1990
by JOHNWINTON
(Michael Joseph, 1983-4 14.95)
Mr Winton has provided a stimulating,
coherent account of the problems faced by
Britain in protecting its seaborne trade
during the two world wars against
submarines and, to a lesser extent, against
surface raiders. He has the knack both of
telling a good story and of weaving statistics
and analysis into his account. Although he
tells us little that is new, he has produced
one of those rare history books which really
is difficult to put down.
The first part of Mr Winton's book
outlines the well-known battle to persuade
the Admiralty to introduce convoys in the
First World War. His chapter explaining
why the traditional idea of establishing
convoys in wartime fell out of favour is
particularly interesting. Clearly the very
88
REVIE
dominance of the Royal Navy encouraged it
to embrace the heretical idea of protecting
the sea lanes rather than the merchant ships
which sailed upon them. Moreover, at sea as
on land there was great emphasis on the
importance of taking the offensive and it
took many years before officers could be
persuaded that convoys were not purely
defensive. But, if Mr Winton is right to say
that 'the Navy had turned its back on the
lessons of history', the historians themselves
were partly t o blame. Mahan, Colomb and
others over-emphasised the importance of
the great naval battle and deprecated the
value of attacks on commerce and thus of
the need t o protect ships against such
attacks.
By December 1916 Britain had lost 738
ships of over 2.3 million tons or one fifth of
all merchant ships with which it had entered
the war. It was the knowledge that defeat
would come, unless the submarine menace
were contained, which forced the Admiralty
t o experiment with convoys. Some of its
fears proved justified; by no means all the
merchant ships found it easy to stay in
convoys. As one exasperated naval officer
reported in 1917,
. . . 'the Herrnione gave considerable
trouble for the next 42 hours on
account of the Master steering a course
of his own, giving most contradictory
positions by wireless, not knowing the
rendezvous . . . and being most careless
of his code messages.'
Nevertheless, the problems proved far
less than many feared and the advantages
much greater than the most optimistic had
dared to hope. As the author points out, the
Germans had 172 submarines in commission in 1918 compared with 163 the year
before. It was not therefore that the number
of enemy vessels fell but that their
effectiveness was drastically reduced.
If I have a criticism of the author's
account, it is of the liberality with which he
sprinkles the epithet 'stupid' across his
pages for those who opposed the
introduction of convoy or advocated the
utility of mine barrages o r offensive patrols.
In retrospect it is easy to see that the
Admirals were mistaken and that convoys
should have been introduced when the war
began. But those involved were not
necessarily stupid. Arthur Balfour was First
Lord from 1915 to 1916. Of all English
politicians he had probably given most
thought to defence questions and the author
of those sensitive philosophic meditations
was not stupid. The explanation is much
more likely to be that hard-pressed decision
makers in totally unfamiliar circumstances
clung to their prejudices with ever greater
force and the prejudice against convoys was
deeply ingrained.
Indeed by the mid 1930s convoy was once
again being disparaged by ministers and
senior officers. Necessity forced their
reintroduction but there was still a tendency
in the first years of the Second World War
to send out anti-submarine patrols - a
practice which could be more dangerous
than effective as the loss of the carrier
Courageous to submarine attack quickly
proved. Convoy alone was to be far from
sufficient to deal with the more advanced
submarines and submarine tactics of the
Second World War and Mr Winton details
the process by which the problems were
gradually overcome by technical advances,
improved anti-submarine tactics and the
breaking of the German codes.
Mr Winton rightly has a good deal to say
about the use of aircraft to protect
merchant shipping. By the end of 1917 there
were 75 airships, 23 aeroplanes and 291
seaplanes and flying boats operating against
submarines. This number even increased in
the following year but the aircraft's main
role was to deter attack. During the war
only six attacks were made against convoys
with an air escort and only 5 ships were
sunk. Similarly in the Second World War it
was the aircraft's role in making it difficult
for U-boats to shadow convoys which was
particularly important. Conversely, until
the daylight attacks of 1944, the RAF's
attempts to destroy the submarines in their
ports were largely ineffective. Mr Winton
underlines once again the difficulty of
coordinating RAF and Admiralty efforts,
though he notes that their co-operation was
REVIE
fortunately far better than that of their
German equivalents.
This is mainly a book about the Atlantic
convoys but the author also looks at the
Mediterranean and briefly at Japanese
experience in World War 11. Fortunately
for the USA and Britain the Japanese were
even more hostile to convoys than the
British Admirals had been in the First
World War. It was not until November
1943 that they began to try seriously to
establish an effective convoy system and by
then it was far too late. It is a sobering
thought that the Japanese merchant marine
lost 108,000 men during the war (and 2,345
ships), against 30,000 lost by its British
equivalent.
Again Mr Winton tells the story very
largely from the point of view of those
attacked rather than from the
submariners'. Nevertheless he pays
handsome tributes to the skill of the
German submarine commanders,
particularly the 'aces' of the Second World
War, Gunther Prien, Otto Kretschmer and
many others. He could perhaps have put
greater stress on the trying conditions which
all submarine crews had to endure. Was it
such conditions or the bitterness of the
struggle as a whole which led to the
brutality of some of the incidents recorded
- the decision by a submarine commander
to leave 15 year old Cadet Dove to drown in
1917 because 'shooting was too good for
him' or the decision by another commander
the same year to take the Torrington's crew
from their lifeboat and then to leave them
on the deck of the submarine as it
submerged?
What of the future? Mr Winton's last
chapters concentrate mainly on the
technical developments which have taken
place since 1945. He detects a tendency for
the sea lanes heresy to reappear in the Royal
Navy in recent years as demonstrated in
exercise Ocean Safari and elsewhere. In a
sense he sees his role as reminding the Navy
and the public of the 'lessons' of the
past. He has performed his task with
skill.
PHILIPTOWLE
ERASER OF NORTH CAPE
by RICHARDHUMBLE
(Routledge & Kegan Paul-f 14.95)
In a recessional economy, both author and
publisher must keep the market in mind.
For whom was 'Fraser of North Cape'
written? The naval historian? Fraser's many
friends? The professional sailor? The
general library browser? There is much in
the book for all categories; and as each
brings its particular critical faculties t o bear,
it would be kind to remember that what one
might consider an improvement could lessen
the interest for others.
I fall into all four categories - albeit as
an amateur in the first; and this review will
attempt a four-eyed approach.
Historically, the book captured and held
my interest, particularly in respect of
Fraser's contribution to the preparation for
the Second World War and of his part in it.
Scharnhorst of course gets the fullest
treatment; but the general picture is well
painted too. Remarkable (and new to me)
was Fraser's astonishingly perceptive
'blueprint for grand strategy against a triple
enemy' written in 1938 while he was
Pound's Chief of Staff. The book does
particular justice to the importance of
Fraser's British Pacific Fleet appointment:
Humble really gets to the heart of the
political imperatives as well as describing
the unimaginable practical problems Fraser
faced and overcame.
The pre and post war eras make less
compelling reading - the post-war account
being very disappointing. Fraser's
enormous contribution to the creation of
NATO, his maintenance of morale in a warweary Navy, his responsibilities in respect of
the Korean war are dismissed in 30 pages of
a 386 page book. (Perhaps Admiral
Gretton, his Naval Assistant while he was
First Sea Lord, could remedy this for Naval
Review readers.)
As one who had the privilege of having
Lord Fraser's friendship, I give an S.206
Seven for character study. Probably his
warmth, sense of humour, wisdom and
humility had to be actually experienced to
be fully appreciated. Humble has a good
try; and perhaps it is between the lines of
how Fraser dealt with those who had those
qualities in lesser degree that one can
recapture more clearly how it felt to be in his
company. (Incidentally, while the
photographs are good, I am sure Fraser
would have wanted more of those with
whom he worked - particularly of those
who worked for him.)
This reviewer will not comment on the
several feuds mentioned except to opine that
they are objectively documented and to
state that his respect for Fraser is further
enhanced after reading Humble's account
of them.
The professional sailor will find an
exemplar of professionalism at every stage
of a long career. (No mention, by-the-by, of
Fraser's OBE at the end of his long stint in
Resolution. They are not normally handed
out to Commanders on promotion.) An
astonishing ability to de-centralise and to
relax. (How many of us would - even if
allowed - sit quietly for two hours every
day to think ahead? Fraser made the time.)
Thus, a mind always attuned to the
requirement of the future, be the context
gunnery improvement, air power, tactics or
political projection. Above all, devoid of
the clinical overtones of so much modern
'management technique', an example of
leadership based on genuine concern and
true humanity which remains utterly
relevant.
For the general library browser there is a
most readable account of life in transition
from the days when paintwork, to most,
came before fighting efficiency, through the
'tween-war years and t o the threshold of the
present day when everybody seems to
understand war better than the Chiefs of
Staff, and the Navy is thought of as
Beeching thought of the railways. The
browser may wish for more anecdotes; but
the author is wise not to have larded his
book too liberally. (I would only have
added one, because it said so much about
the man: Fraser and the Scharnhorst
survivors on board Duke of York, facing
each other at attention while the former
saluted the latter for a full, silent minute.)
Sir Henry Leach has called this book
essentially one about Fraser the man; but,
with respect, it is much more about Fraser
the sailor. 'There were many things which
he simply treated as private' is a quotation
from one of his closest friends. The
question of why this lovable and loving man
did not marry is not addressed in the text;
but perhaps it is completely answered in the
dedication of the book, made at Lord
Fraser's own request:
'TO T H E ROYAL NAVY'
Quite simply, he 'forsook all others', and
this realisation will add to the insights
provided by Humble's sensitive and
perceptive analysis.
PETERKIMM
MORNING GLORY: The Drama of the
Imperial Japanese Navy.
by STEPHEN
HOWARTH
(Hamish Hamilton-£ 12.95)
It is difficult to come to a clear verdict about
this book because it is one of that irritating
category which falls somewhere between
serious scholarship and journalism. Both of
these types of naval writing are perfectly
respectable - provided the reader knows
what he is dealing with and what he should
compare it to. But in this case I, at least,
didn't. On the one hand it generally reads
very well and makes effective use of the
personal accounts of some of the sailors of
the Imperial Japanese Navy and of their
various spectators. Through long extracts
from letters, diaries, postwar interviews and
official documents, Mr Howarth makes his
subject come alive. His material is plainly
arranged for dramatic effect: each chapter
starts off with a bang, a vignette of some
sort, which the rest of the chapter explains
o r puts into context. The stress on human
interest and the way the material is arranged
in fact makes the whole thing read as though
it were written by The Sunday Times Insight
Team.
And yet Mr Howarth plainly intends this
product of his considerable labours to be
taken more seriously than that. He has done
a good deal of research and, bearing in mind
that his subject is the very large one of the
rise and fall of the Imperial Japanese Navy
(and to the necessary extent the country that
produced it) has written a coherent and
absorbing account. He has much of interest
to say, especially about the early days of the
IJN. But nevertheless when measured
against the scholarship standards of Arthur
Marder's 'Old Friends: New Enemies' or
Paul Dull's 'A Battle History of the
Imperial Japanese Navy' it is clearly not in
the same league. For instance, no very clear
impression emerges of the Navy's strategic
policy in the interwar period; few
explanations are offered for the
extraordinary (over) complexity of its battle
and campaign plans in the Pacific War; the
critical failure of the Japanese to use their
own submarines properly or to protect
themselves against American and allied ones
is hardly mentioned; the Navy's relationship
with the Army is dealt with but cursorily.
There are faults of procedure too. The
inclusion of extraneous material
presumably on the basis that it's a good
story - like the death and alleged last words
of King George V ('Bugger Bognor') on
page 203 for instance. There is a certain
shapelessness in the narrative which makes
it difficult to pick out Mr Howarth's main
points. Probably worst of all, the author
perversely refuses to establish the
provenance of his information. There is not
a footnote or book reference from
beginning to end and so the attentive reader
has absolutely no way of assessing the
reliability or the novelty of what he's
reading. This does not relate so much to Mr
Howarth's own ideas (which seem generally
sensible) as to those of the many other
people he quotes. Normally one needs to
have some idea not only of what has been
said or written, but also by whom, t o whom,
where, when and why in order properly to
be able to establish its significance. The lack
of this information is a great shame as Mr
Howarth's material looks as though it ought
to be taken seriously. Sadly, his disregard
for some of the normal conventions of
modern historical scholarship make this
difficult.
In its way this criticism is a back-handed
compliment. The length, subject and
breadth of treatment displayed in 'Morning
Glory' are an indication of its potential
value to those interested in the
extraordinary story of the Japanese Navy.
Mr Howarth doesn't d o himself, his efforts
or his material full justice. Even so he has
provided us with enjoyable and stimulating
reading on a fascinating subject.
GEOFFREY
TILL
DIVE AND ATTACK
COMMANDER
WILLIAMKING,DSO,DSC, R N
(William Kimber-£9.95)
T o older readers of The Naval Review Bill
King's earlier book published in 1958, The
Stick and the Stars, will need no
introduction. It told the tale of the three
submarines he commanded with distinction
in the 1939-45 war and said something
about the difficulty he experienced in
settling down afterwards. T o some extent
this restlessness was assuaged by ocean
racing. In an endearing fashion he said then
'The first two years of our married life make
a complicated story' - he had married
Anita Leslie the writer - 'and require an
atlas and wind charts t o explain properly'.
He followed this up later, as he mentions in
this up-dated edition, with an epic singlehanded voyage round the world. This was to
d o the trick and so this edition happily ends
on a note of tranquillity, for he says 'The
winds of the world's great oceans had
finally blown away the shadows of those
years that had gone before in submarines'.
The shadows of those years merit rereading by old and young once more. His
command of Snapper in the North Sea for
the first 16 months of the war took its
harrowing toll. Shallow water in which he
'grounded' twice; the midnight sun in the
summer months which made it dangerous to
stay on the surface to charge batteries; the
trigger-happy 'friendly' forces, especially in
the air, and 75% submarine casualties, nearly caused him to ask for a relief. But this did
not prevent him becoming a most successful
and gallant captain. His description of a
surface night attack, for which he was
awarded his first DSO. is witness to this.
His next command Trusty, was not so
successful and started off ominously. His
attempt t o get a 'Snort tube' fitted, as he
had seen in a Dutch submarine, to allow
battery charging whilst dived, was to no
avail. This was followed by a spate of faulty
torpedoes and included one dreaded 'hot
run' when the torpedo started prematurely
in the tube at the start of an attack. After
Japan's entry into the war Trusty was sent
to the Far East and was lucky to escape the
fall of Singapore. Operating independently
in the China Sea Bill King eventually
brought Trusty back to Colombo after
many adventures.
By now he was really in need of a rest.
Thanks t o the deep understanding of
'Ruckers', Captain Ruck-Keene, at his
newly formed 1st Submarine Flotilla base at
Beirut, he found it. Idyllic ski-ing
expeditions in the Lebanon mountains, and
meeting the girl who was later to become his
wife, restored his health for his last wartime command, Telemachus.
This period was also spent in the Far East
and it was highlighted by the sinking of a
Japanese submarine on her first patrol.
Shallow waters, this time in the Malacca
Straits, were again a hazard and the
carrying-out of shore-landing operations
particularly dangerous and irksome. After
50 day patrols in stifling heat the end of the
war found them 'all reduced to irritated
skeletons'.
This new edition benefits from a number
of illustrations and diagrams and the ever
welcome Index. It is a pity that there are so
many misprints; your reviewer counted 17.
Notwithstanding, this book is bound t o
gain additional readers because it is a very
well written, courageous, human story.
PATRICK
TAILYOUR
!
1)
i
IN THE WAKE: The Birth of the Indian
and Pakistani Navies
by E. C. STREATFEILD-JAMES
(Charles Skilton-f 8.95)
Until the arrival of the Europeans in the
sixteenth century the many invaders of the
Indian sub-continent had all come
overland. From the end of the eighteenth
century until the third decade of the
twentieth the maritime defence of India was
assured by the Royal Navy and virtually all
India's overseas trade was carried in
European, principally British ships.
Although her coastline was vast and her
d e p e n d e n c e b o t h militarily a n d
economically on overseas resources
enormous, India had no maritime tradition
or experience; only a very tiny minority of
her population had even seen the sea.
Nevertheless the Honourable East India
Company's oldest fighting Service was its
Marine, founded in 1612; but, after the
Indian Mutiny, in which it fought loyally
and well, it had been transferred into a noncombatant force, responsible for trooping,
provision of station ships in the Persian
Gulf, and lights, buoyage and the maritime
survey of India. In 1922 the troopships were
sold, all officer recruitment suspended, and
the tiny Service almost ceased to exist.
Although a decision was taken in 1926 to
start building up a combatant force again,
little was done, because the army-orientated
Indian Government maintained that the
country could not afford both an army and
a navy. In 1934 the Royal Indian Marine did
officially become the Royal Indian Navy
but at the outbreak of war it only consisted
of some 1,500 officers and men and eight
small ships, with no proper infrastructure
and no regular or volunteer reserves. It was
still the 'soldiers' toy navy', controlled by
the War Department and responsible to the
Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell.
In the next five years, thanks to the two
Flag Officers Commanding, Fitzherbert
(1937-1942) and Godfrey (1943-1946), and
t o the devoted work of the small band of
regular RIN officers, a spectacular
transformation was achieved. Numbers rose
to nearly 30,000 men and women manning a
fleet of around 150 ships from escort sloops
to hnding craft; half a dozen well equipped
bases and communications centres serving
both the RIN and the RN were created;
modern training establishments set up and a
mini-Admiralty and proper Naval staff
installed in Delhi, where plans for a postwar navy to include cruisers and a carrier
REVIE
were formulated. It was a tremendous feat
and of immense value to the Allied cause.
On the other hand, the expansion had been,
inevitably, too rapid and the RIN was,
despite its wartime gallantry, unable to
stand the anti-climax of sudden peace and
the need to comply with the Finance
Department's insistence on large scale and
immediate reductions. An already difficult
situation was fatally exacerbated by the
political ferment preceding independence
and, in February 1946, strikes and disorders
broke out which developed into a wholesale
but shortlived mutiny. It was an
unpromising heritage for the future separate
Navies of India and Pakistan, but the speed
with which they both developed into
efficient ocean-going forces and the greater
awareness of the benefits of maritime power
in both countries did demonstrate that the
RIN had not laboured in vain.
Streatfeild-James, an ex-Dartmouth
cadet, joined the Royal Indian Marine as a
midshipman in 1921. He retired from the
Royal Indian Navy as a commander on
Independence. He thus saw both the good
times and the bad and as he served for most
of the war in various important staff
appointments he is well qualified to describe
and comment on the events sketched so
briefly above. His book is a very personal
account, written in a charming, oldfashioned style. It contains many amusing
anecdotes and is illustrated with some
interesting photographs. It will
undoubtedly appeal to all who served in the
RIN and to those who knew India in the last
thirty years of the Raj. I, who can make no
such claim, enjoyed it too but I was
nevertheless a little disappointed because it
did not add as much as I had hoped to my
knowledge of the RIN. The author tends to
avoid all comment on his brother officers
and superiors and tells us virtually nothing
about Fitzherbert or Godfrey, whom he
must have observed at close quarters;
Geoffrey Miles, who succeeded Godfrey as
FOCRIN, is not even mentioned. And yet it
was these three RN admirals who had the
final responsibility for doing battle with the
War Department and that 'cold-blooded
machine,
t h e Military F i n a n c e
Department', the dead hand of the India
Office in London and a British Admiralty
which demanded bricks but which would
not supply straw. It is a pity, because I fear
that there are ominous parallels between the
problems which faced the RIN and those
which now confront the Royal Navy: cooperation with the far larger Navy of an
ally, a hard hearted Treasury wilfully
ignorant of maritime problems, politicians
concerned with personal power, an
apathetic public and an army dominated
continent.
PATRICK BEESLY
BRITISH VESSELS LOST AT SEA
1939 - 1945
Crown Copyight: Second Edition
(Patrick Stephens, 1983-£9.95)
AXIS SUBMARINE SUCCESSES
1939 - 1945
Jurgen Rohwer: Second Edition
(USNI: published in UK by
Patrick Stephens-f 12.50)
The first of this seemingly comparable pair
is very little more than a straight reprint, in a
slightly reduced format, of two lists
published by HMSO in 1947. Its only claim
to being a second edition and to include
'much additional material' comes from the
addition of a not very coherent or
comprehensive, nine page, War Diary.
Essentially it is a list of warships lost and of
merchant ships lost or significantly
damaged. No attempt has been made to
correct it or to bring it up to date, and no
mention is made of the mass of amendments
which have not been included. This ignoring
of much information that has become
available since 1947, even since Roskill
finished his 'War at Sea' with those
comprehensive appendices, make the first
list esveciallv unreliable. Admittedlv it
would have been immensely expensive,
perhaps prohibitively so, to have published
a corrected text, but it is misleading to call
this obsolete reprint a second edition. One
wonders for whose benefit it can have been
published: it must be consulted with care.
The summaries of warship losses by year
i
I
i
I
I
and class, and by year and cause, are useful
and accurate: so is the analysis of cause
according to class: but the basic list of losses
according to year and class is dangerously
inaccurate. The second part of the first list,
dealing with landing craft, is very detailed,
and oddly touching compared to the first,
perhaps because they were by definition all
little vessels: 'lost overseas . . . broken back
. . . written off . . . sank at moorings . . .
sank in tow . . . abandoned at Chichester
. . .' all exercise the imagination.
The second list is larger, partly because it
includes ships damaged as well as sunk, and
partly because there were more vessels to be
listed.
It is less easy to comment on because less
is known by most naval readers about the
Merchant Navy and its losses than about the
Navy's own: so far as this reviewer can
testify, the main list (of British Merchant
vessels lost by enemy action) is very accurate:
he can vouch for the Mersey minutiae. Then
there are comprehensive lists of both
merchant ships and fishing vessels damaged
but not lost, and of 29 lost by
'miscellaneous war causes other than enemy
action' - mainly on our own mines.
It must remain to be seen whether 'this
long-awaited reprint of two rare collectors'
items will be much sought after by naval
historians and shipping buffs everywhere'.
Naval historians are likely to disappoint the
publisher's expectations because of the
disappointment they will experience.
'Shipping buffs' are another matter: older
readers may wonder who and what they are.
Caveat emptor!
The other book is a very different
production. The first edition has been out
of print since 1968, and the author decided
not to reprint it in the original German but,
with the help of the USNI, to undertake a
complete revision, and in English. Hence
this is a much more comprehensive and
commanding work than the other. The
latter's title concentrates on the losses: this
one is exultant with successes, although
inevitably they are defined in' terms of
losses. The emphasis is on the sinkers rather
than the sunk, and inevitably on the
U-boats themselves. But all their allies and.
their successes are included; the Japanese,
the half-forgotten Italians and the seldom
remembered Vichy French, Finnish and
Rumanian submarine forces. All their
doings are recorded in a compressed tabular
form, formidable in appearance and in
content. The footnotes are meticulous in
their detail and lend some life to the tables.
The first three hundred pages are a list of
attacks, grouped according to seven
geographical zones. The submarine, her
commander, her victim, its type,
displacement and position are given. Then
there are cross-referring lists of submarines,
of their captains and of allied convoys, and
an index of ships attacked, damaged or
sunk. The nature and the success of the
attacks are not always immediately clear,
and it is instructive to make sample
comparisons of the fortunes of a ship as
treated by the two books. Take the Sun
Demetrio. According to the British list she
was attacked by a raider on 5 November
1940, and sunk by a submarine's torpedo on
17 March 1942. Both lists agree on the
position of her sinking, but the German
editor lists only her loss. Perhaps the 1940
attack was not to be accounted a success.
Perhaps, too, it is wrong to compare the
pair; one focuses on the losses and the other
on the victors. but the latter were victorious
only because of others' losses and both
books therefore are based on sinkings. The
second deals with them more reliably than
the first, especially so far as warships are
concerned: the first has analyses which the
second lacks. Both are works of reference
rather than literature: the second is the
better, even though it also refers to shipping
buffs, a term to which I must admit taking a
perhaps illogical but certainly strong
dislike!
A. B. SAINSBURY
ROYAL NAVY FRIGATES - 1945-1983
by LEO MARRIOTT
(Ian Allan-£6.95)
This compact book details clearly and
succinctly the development of the British
Navy frigate as a separate class, not only as
the title suggests from 1945, but also the
main World War I1 classes, 'Rivers', 'Black
Swans', 'Castles', 'Lochs' and 'Bays'. The
book includes the post-war Conversion
classes, the 1951 Programme, the General
Purpose classes, including the admirable
'Leanders', the Type 21s, Type 22s, and
finally a look at the future with the Type 23.
In addition to the details on ship
developments, there are chapters on Gas
Turbines and Guided Missiles, which cover
not only propulsion but the progress in
AIO, Fire Control, and computery, which
have paralleled the march of the guided
missile to its present position of primacy in
Naval warfare. The effects of these
advances on manpower and maintenance
are also discussed.
There are a number of useful appendices,
including an Index of RN Warship Type
Designations (very useful to all those of us
who have become 'lost in the box' of the
Types 17, 18, 19,24 and other loss leaders of
long-gone Naval programmes!), Frigate
pendant numbers, RN gas turbine
development, Helicopters, and the
operations of frigates in the Falklands
operations. There are plenty of excellent
photographs, and a comprehensive
bibliography. For the history buff, there are
detailed accounts of alterations in
armament, sensors, bridges, and so forth,
and a summary account of every ship in the
older classes up to the 'Leanders', by
pendant number, and tables showing dates
of laying down, completion, launching, and
where appropriate, disposal.
A few minor corrections are required. On
page 11, Helmsdale was the UDE (now
AUWE) trials ship, not a training vessel.
Lieut. Comdr. Kerans' (Amethyst) name is
mis-spelt on page 15, as is the name of Loch
Quoich on pp. 23, 27. These are but minor
blemishes. A little more serious are the
errors in the sonar fits of some classes, for
example:p.41 Type 16: For Type 146 read
Type 164.
Pp.64, 69, 75: The 'Whitbys',
'Blackwoods', and 'Tribals' were all
fitted with Type 177 search sonar.
p.94: Of the 26 'Leanders', 16 were Type
177, and 10 Type 184.
p.105: All Type 21s were fitted with the
Type 184 search sonar.
p.113: All Type 22s are fitted with the
Type 2016 Fleet Escort sonar.
This reviewer much enjoyed this book. In
a mere 127 pages, the author admirably
summarises British frigate developments in
hulls, weapons, fire control and propulsion
from 1939 to 1983, and succeeds in
commenting upon and briefly analysing
such matters as the effect of Operation
Corporate on design, the missile threat, and
the effecrs of propulsion advances on frigate
performance. His approach to such
controversial things as the use of aluminium,
and AEW (or the lack of it) seems balanced
and logical, at least in this reviewer's
opinion. The author manages to approach
the problems of the future frigate (The Type
23) coolly and objectively, and summarises
the pre- and post-Corporate arguments
clearly.
T o sum up, therefore, this book is
recommended, both for the naval history
enthusiast, and for the enlightened amateur,
requiring guidance to pick his way through
the present-day jungle of type numbers and
acronyms with which we are all lumbered
these days. It should be in everyone's Naval
reference library: I look forward eagerly to
the author's next book (on submarines
perhaps?) and confidently commend it to
our readership.
H.L.L.
THE THREAT: INSIDE THE SOVIET
MILITARY MACHINE
by ANDREW COCKBURN
(Hutchinson-£9.95)
The aim of this book is to show that the
threat posed by the Soviet forces has been
grossly overestimated and that the NATO
Allies are wasting large sums of money o n
advanced equipment which is not needed.
The author is apparently of British
nationality, though he lives in New York,
and the book seems intended primarily for
the American market, for the American
spelling of words is used throughout and
96
REVIE
practically the only armed forces mentioned
are those of the USSR and the United
States.
Mr Cockburn is a very able writer, and he
has marshalled his argument so skilfully
that many people with only a superficial
knowledge of the subject may be persuaded
that our expenditure on defence should be
drastically reduced.
The author believes that the information
at his disposal is more reliable than that
obtained by the intelligence gathering
agencies of the Western Powers, and infers
that military authorities deliberately
exaggerate the effectiveness of Soviet
military equipment in order to support their
requests for additional expenditure.
However, a study of the evidence that Mr
Cockburn produces to confirm his
assessment of the incompetence of the
Soviet forces and the shortcomings of their
equipment shows that it is derived mainly
from such sources as defecting Russian
officers and emigrants, now resident in the
United States, who served their time in the
Soviet forces. Some statements are not
supported by any evidence at all; for
instance, that the Russian leaders watching
the annual parade through the Red Square,
'Know, for example, that the immaculate
troops beneath them in the square are from
parade divisions, which spend much of their
year practising in their camp at Alabino,
outside Moscow, and consequently receive
very little battle training. ' Another example
is that 'A close look at the operations of
Gorshkov's navy does indeed reveal the
same traits as in the other Soviet military
services. Stated briefly, the ships are illsuited for anything other than short
operations, and the sailors who man them
are deficient in both training and morale.'
Mr Cockburn does not restrict his
criticisms to the Soviet forces. He makes the
following outrageous statement about the
U.S. service men: 'It is a matter of record
that the troops to man these weapons can be
induced to seive only by granting massive
pay increases o r as an alternative t o
unemployment and that when they d o serve,
their educational attainments border on the
illiterate and their bodies are polluted by
drugs.'
In the opinion of this reviewer, Mr
Cockburn's book is rubbish, and dangerous
rubbish at that.
HUGHROGERS
BOOKS RECEIVED
The following books have been received and
are gratefully acknowledged. Space and
subject d o not allow a full review; it is
hoped that the following brief notices,
which are made without any value judgment
or recommendation, will be helpful in
bringing the books to the attention of
readers with specialised interests.
The Malta Frigate, by Showell Styles
(William Kimber, 189 pp., £6.95). Novel set
in the Mediterranean in 1798, based on an
historical central figure and incident.
The New Observer's Book of Warships,
by Hugh W. Cowin (Warne, 189 pp.,
£ 1.95). Familiar pocket-sized format, but
warships (including submarines) are new
subject-matter for one of these books. 179
photographs, with data and notes; 58 navies
covered.
Over the Top!, by Roy Carr, Arthur
Huddart and John R. Webb (Blandford
Press, 95p.). 62 cartoons from the team that
produced Up the Falklands.
World Army Badges and Insignia, by
Guido Rosignoli (Blandford Press, 446 pp.,
£8.95). Omnibus edition giving two books
in one, covering every sort of Army badge
since 1939. 'World' is a misnomer: only the
main NATO and Warsaw Pact armies are
given.
The British Infantry, 1660 - 1945, by
Frederick Myatt (Blandford Press, 227 pp.,
£6.95). This short history concentrates on
organisation and tactics and endeavours to
discount regimental differences.
Beyond the Dams to the Tirpitz, by Alan
W. Cooper (William Kimber, 253 pp.,
£10.50). History of 617 Squadron RAF
from the aftermath of the Dam Busters raid
to the end of World War 11.

The Naval Review

Transcription

Similar documents

Visit a Navy AutoSource Representative on-board

OLD NAVY - The Crossings at Fox Run

Ships at Sea: The Original Microgrids?

USS Abraham Lincoln - Virginia Ship Repair Association

Court visits scene of shooting

Ship Builders

SMARTWebMove makes PCS moves easier

Obituary - Navy Supply Corps Foundation

twenty-seven monuments worldwide commemorating twentieth

March 2011 - IPMS Boise