Barbarossa Revisited: Strategy and Ideology in the East

Barbarossa Revisited: Strategy and Ideology in the East
Author(s): Jürgen Förster
Source: Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1/2 (Winter, 1988 - Spring, 1992), pp. 21-36
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4467404
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Barbarossa
Revisited:
Strategy
and Ideologyin the East
by JurgenF6rster
research
It is importantto emphasizethe developmentsof recenthistoriographical
with respectto the relationshipbetweenHitlerand his militarycommanders.In the
periodimmediatelyfollowingthe Second WorldWar,historianstendedto separate
the SupremeCommanderfrom the Wehrmacht,
suggestingthat the militaryleadership sawits roleas purelyprofessional,withno ideologicalcomponent.This wasnot
the case.Thelinkagebetweenstrategyandmassmurderin the warpolicyof the Third
Reich"makesit impossibleto posit a cleanwar,plannedand foughtby GermansolIn fact, the
dierswho somehowremainedinsulatedfrom theirpoliticalleadership"1
and
of
the
character
in
the
were
commanders
conflict,
ideological
caughtup
military
To
Fiihrer.
of
the
and
as
involvedin its implementation willingparticipants partners
say that the Wehrmachtwasresponsiblefor manycrimesin the SovietUnion and Yugoslaviais not to say that everyGermansoldierwas a criminalor was equallyguilty
of the crimesperpetratedin the name of the regime.
Hitler was not a discipleof Carlvon Clausewitz.The Fiihrerdid not view war
as a mere"continuationof politicalactivityby other means,"but as the highestexpressionof the life forceof a people.Fightingwasa wayof life, andwarthe necessary
tool in the handsof the responsiblestatesmanto acquirethe sufficientliving space
by whichthe nation'sfuturewouldbe secured:racially;economically;and militarily.
Since racialsurvivalwould lead peoplesto war,Hitlerhad pointedout to the army
field commanderson 10February1939,the nextEuropeanconflictwouldbe "purely
that is, totallya people'swar,a racialwar."He insisted
a warof Weltanschauungen,
thatthe officermustleadhis menin this newkindof warboth militarilyandideologically and that the entireofficer corps form his praetorianguardto aid him, as their
supremeideologicalleader,in achievingspecificideologicalobjectives.In this context
Hitler quoted Clausewitzthat it would be betterto die in the name of honor than
to surrenderin the nameof wisdom.2Consequentlyhe proclaimedbeforehis military
leaderson 23 November1939that the "racialwarhas brokenout and this warshall
determinewho shallgovernEurope,and withit, the world."3In the lightof his grand
politicalalternative,clearvictoryor total destruction,with survivalbeingcontingent
It wasin the
on militaryvictory,politicsand strategyhad becomeindistinguishable.4
against the Soviet Union where militant politics and politicalVernichtungskrieg
21
22
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
ideologicalstrategyachieveda symbiosis,wherethis totallynew kindof war,with its
social Darwinianpurpose,was fully realized.
Alan Bullockhas rightlypointedout that "of all Hitler'sdecisions"the decision
to wagewaron Russia"isthe one whichmost clearlybearshis own personalstamp,
This decisionwas madein the
the culumination(as he saw it) of his whole career."5
summerof 1940,whenGermany-despitethe crushingvictoryoverFrance- wasfacing
an unexpectedstrategicdilemma.Britainhad made it clearthat she would not surrenderand was hopingto havethe UnitedStateson herside one day.Timewas, once
again, workingagainstGermany.If the Wehrmacht,however,as Hitlerexplainedto
his top militaryadviserson 31 July 1940,wageda Blitzkriegagainstthe SovietUnion
in the springof 1941,all Britain'shopes wouldbe dashed."Not only wouldshe lose
her last possible continentalally but the United Stateswould then be less likely to
intervenein Europebecauseshe wouldhaveher handsfull fendingoff an aggressive
Japanwhich would not fear an advancesouthwardsonce Russiawas neutralized."6
Giventhe Fiihrer'sobsessionwiththe acquisitionof Lebensraumand the destruction
of "JewishBolshevism",it seems surprisingto manyhistoriansthat Hitlerjustified
his decisionfor a suddenblow againstRussia,aimingat the destructionof her life
force,not in termsof ideologicalcommitmentsbut in that of global strategy.There
canbe littledoubtthatbothideologicalconvictionandstrategicnecessitywereclosely
intertwinedin Hitler'smind, not only in the crucialsummerof 1940.The idea of acquiringLebensraumthroughthe conquestof Russia,the nucleusof Hitler'sideology,
was in itself an amalgamin whichGermanexpansionto the East, the extermination
of Bolshevismand the annihilationof Jewrywerecombinedwith strategicnecessity,
the doctrineof economic self-sufficiencyand worldpowerambitions.7
When the militarypreparationsfor OperationBarbarossawerealreadyfar advanced,Hitlerdefined- firstwithinthe smallcircleof his militaryadvisers,andthen
beforea largegatheringof seniorcommandersand their chiefs of staff-this campaignas morethan a mereconflictbetweentwo enemynation-statesandtheirarmies.
It wouldalso be a clash of antagonisticideologiesand races.The liquidationof the
"Jewish-Bolshevik
intelligentsia"wouldlead to the break-upof the Russianpeople.
Hitlerstatedopenlythat he wishedto see the waragainstthe SovietUnion conducted
as a "warof destruction"againstan ideologyand its adherents,whetheras functionarieswithinthe RedArmyor in civilianpositions.Theseenemycadresshouldbe eliminateddirectlyby the troopsand not by courts-martial.The officersmustunderstand
whatwasinvolvedin this kindof war,overcometheirscruplesand givethe necessary
ordersin accordancewith the feelingsof theirmen.8Suchguidelinesfor the warfare
in Russiacame neitheras a surpriseto the armynor did they fall on unpreparedterrain.The experienceof Polandhad not been forgotten.WhenGeneralFranzHalder,
the chief of the ArmyGeneralStaff, notedin his diarythe essenceof Hitler'saddress
of 30 March1941,he made a tellingside-note:"Severityis mildnessfor the future."9
This echoesHitler'sremarkof 17October1939whenhe had outlinedhis viewof the
Strategyand Ideology in the East
23
"harshracialstruggle"againstthe Polishpeople:"Wisdomand severityshouldspare
us anotherfight."10On 27 March1941Field-MarshalWalthervon Brauchitsch,the
commander-in-chiefof the Army (who had made himself an advocateof Hitler's
programmeagainstPolandon 7 February1940andtherebysuccessfullytakenthe edge
off the protestof individualcommandersagainstthe crimesof the SS),1'told his military commandersthat the troops should bewareof the German-Russianwar as a
"strugglebetweentwo differentracesand [should]act with the necessaryseverity."2
The differencebetweenthe warwith Polandand that with the SovietUnion was
that in the latterthe line betweenmilitaryandpolitical-ideologicalwarfarewaserased
beforethe first shot. The conceptof destructionformedan integralpartof strategic
planning.The Wehrmachtwas to be used as an instrumentalongsidethe SS. There
wasto be a divisionof labor.The Einsatzgruppenwereentrustedwith the systematic
exterminationof "JewishBolshevism."The differentmeansof the Wehrmacht,the
swift pincermovementsto destroythe bulkof the RedArmywestof the riversDnepr
andDvina,theliquidationof thepoliticalcommissarsandbrutalforceagainstBolshevik
inciters,partisans,saboteurs,and Jews,servedthe commonend:the quickbreak-up
of the Sovietstateand the pacificationof the conqueredterritory.This consciousfusion is not only obviousin the well-knownordersof certainarmycommandersin the
autumnof 1941,it can also be studiedin seniorcommanders'addresses,deployment
directives,andordersof thedaybeforethe attack.Theyhadbeenpresentat thegathering
at the ReichChancelleryon 30 March1941and took the initiativebeforethe High
Commandshad cast Hitler'sintentionsinto legallyvalidform.Forexample,General
ErichHoepner,who had been a memberof the militaryoppositionin 1938and who
diedhangingby pianowirefroma meat-hookfor his partin the coup of 20 July 1944,
wrote on 2 May 1941:
ThewaragainstRussiais an importantchapterin the strugglefor existenceof the German
nation. It is the old battle of the Germanicagainstthe Slav peoples,of the defenseof
inundation,andthe repulseof JewishBolsheEuropeancultureagainstMoscovite-Asiatic
be
the destructionof present-dayRussiaand it
must
this
battle
vism. The objectiveof
must thereforebe conductedwith unprecedented
severity.Everymilitaryactionmust be
will
to
exterminatethe enemymercilesslyand
iron
an
execution
and
in
by
guided planning
of thepresentRussian-Bolshevik
no adherents
systemareto be spared.13
totally.Inparticular,
andHitlerwithregardto the SovietUnion
betweentheWehrmacht
Therelationship
consensusbothon ideologicalmatters
in largemeasurebya considerable
wasdetermined
andGermany'srolein worldpolitics.The militaryleadersdid not merelycomplywith
Hitler'sdogmaticviews,they werenot merevictimsof their own professionaltradition. Germanexpansionto the East had long been justified not only in economic,
politicaland geographicalterms,but also in the social Darwiniansenseof the right
of the strongerin the strugglefor survival.The militaryleaders,too, believedthat the
dangersof Russiaand Bolshevismshould be eliminatedfor ever.The adversaryin
the Eastwasconsideredthe enemyper se. Had it not beenJewryand Bolshevismthat
24
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
had stabbed the armed forces in the back and had caused the downfall of Imperial
Germany in 1918?Thus, Operation "Barbarossa"assumed a higher justification than
the war against the "hereditary enemy" France. Yet it was "Hitler's triumph [in the
Westin 1940that] acted as an additional pacemakerfor moral indifference."14 Moreover,
"the idea of the vital needs of the German Volksgemeinschaftprovidedthe Wehrmacht
with something like a 'clear conscience' in its brutal conduct of the war in the East."'1
After his pronouncements on 3, 17 and 30 March 1941, Hitler played no visible
role in transforming Operation Barbarossa into a war of destruction against Bolshevism and Jewry. The implementation was left to his military staffs and the SS. Here
we have another typical example of the "mechanism of destruction" (Raul Hilberg)
in the Third Reich. Military administration was to be restricted to the area of operation, that is the combat zone and the rear areas of the armies and the army groups.
The SS was entrusted with "special tasks" within the army's area of operation. The
army command accepted the draft without any protest, even though they knew since
the Polish campaign what the "special tasks" of the SS meant. Thus, on 13 March
the Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht(OKW) issued "Guidelines for Special Subjects"
which also announced special orders for Operation Barbarossa governing the conduct
of soldiers and the functions of courts-martial.'6
The directives which gave the war in the East its singular character emerged out
of a routine bureaucratic process within the relevant departments of the Wehrmacht
such as: "Decree concerning the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction and Procedure in
the Barbarossa Area and Special Measures for the Troops in Russia" of 13 May 1941;
and "Guidelines for the Treatmentof Political Commissars" of 6 June 1941. Only the
"Regularizationof the Deployment of the Security Police and the SD within the Army"
of 28 April 1941 had required consultation with the SS.17In the center of the Army's
preparationsfor the war of destruction against the Soviet Union stood General Halder,
not Field Marshal von Brauchitsch or his oft-mentioned "GeneralOfficer for Special
Duties," GeneralEugen Miiller. Miiller had been subject since October 1940to Halder's
directives "regardingthe military jurisdiction within the army and against the population of occupied territories."Since the chief of the Army General Staff was convinced
that the troops must participatein the ideological war,the Army High Command drafted
a decree concerning the restriction of military jurisdiction and the treatment of political commissars on 6 May 1941.Courts-martialwereto be confined to the maintenance
of discipline. The troops were expected to deal themselves with civilians impeding or
inciting to impede the Wehrmacht. In cases where such "criminalelements" could not
be shot "while fighting or escaping," an officer was to decide whether they were to
be shot. The commissars, the "bearersof the Jewish-Bolshevik world view" within the
Red Army were to be executed after being taken prisoner on the orders of an officer
who had to identify the commissars in consultation with two other officers or NCOs.
Whereas, in the case of the limitation of military jurisdiction the legal branch
of the OKW had formulated the first draft, the initiative for the execution of the polit-
Strategyand Ideology in the East
25
ical commissarsclearlycame from the ArmyHigh Command.This evidencemakes
it highlyunlikelythat the massacrescarriedout by the Einsatzgruppencan be based
on the CommissarOrder,as HansMommsenclaims.18
Althoughthecommissarswithin
the Red Armyworeuniform,they werenot regardedas combatants,but as political
functionaries.The fear that if taken prisoner,such hardlinersmight continuedisseminatingpropagandain the Reichwas a majorfactordictatingthe shootingof politicalcommissars.Also importantwasthe hope for a speedierandless costlyadvance
that mightbe createdthroughdrivinga wedgebetweenthe apparentlydecentRussian
soldierandhis criminalpoliticalleadership.It waspreciselybecauseofficersandofficials in the High Commandswiththeirdistortedversionof post-1918Germanhistory
had authorizedthe abandonmentof internationallawin favorof politicalexpediency
that theyjustifiedtheseillegalmeasureswith the needto ensureabsolutesecurityfor
the Germansoldier.Hitlerhad pardonedsentencedsoldiersin Polandwithhis decree
of 4 October1939.In the war of destructionagainstthe SovietUnion soldierswere
givena pardonin advancefor shootingmeresuspectedpartisansandprisonersof war,
meaning,the commissars.Sucha preemptiveamnestywasa componentof the operational preparations.
In the formulationof the final decreesof 13Mayand 6 June 1941the OKWacceptedconceptsofferedin the draft of the OKH (ArmyHigh Command)of 6 May
1941.Brauchitschmadeamendmentsto both decreesbeforehe passedthemon to the
army.On the one hand, he laid the burdenfor segregatingand executingthe comon the shouldersof any officer. On
missarswithinthe RedArmy"inconspicuously"
of
the
the otherhand,the commander-in-chief
Armystressedthe dutyof all superiors
to preventarbitrary
excessesof individualsoldiersagainsttheSovietpopulation."Timely
action by everyofficer must help to maintaindiscipline,the basis of our successes."
Viewedagainstthe backgroundof the experiencein Poland,the army'sconcernfor
the disciplineof the troopswaswell founded.In the moreideologicalwaragainstthe
SovietUnionthe attemptto preservethe institutionalcontrolof violencewhilecalling
for ideologicallymotivatedmeasuresmust be seen as "ridingthe tiger."
Thatthe wholecomplexof ius in bellowasviewedas an irksomeobstacleto military necessitiesbecomesevidentfrom the personalinstructionsabout the "criminal
orders"given to intelligenceofficers and judge-advocateson armylevel by General
Miillerandhis legaladvisor,Dr.ErichLattmann.On 11June1941,forexample,Miiller
statedthat"feelingsof justicemustin certaincircumstances
givewayto militaryneceswere
to deal with guerrillas
and
the
be
would
troops
suspended
sity."Militaryjustice
and partisans by "going back to the old customs of war .... One of the adversaries
mustremaindeadon the field. Adherentsof a hostileattitudemustnot be preserved,
Therightof a populationto spontaneous,voluntaryuseof armsagainst
butliquidated."
an aggressor,accordingto paragraph2 of the Hague Conventionsof October1907,
wouldnot be respectedin this war.Any civilianimpedingor incitingothersto impede
wouldbe considereda guerrillaandshotbythe troops.Miillerstressed,
the Wehrmacht
26
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
however, that the troops should not be "unnecessarilyagitated or go berserk,"an attitude for which General Blaskowitz had criticized the SS in Poland on 27 November
1939.19 It is also interesting to note that the Wehrmacht denied the Soviet population
a right which in early 1924 some Reichswehr planners had considered as a "desperate
means" in the case of a French attack against Germany. Then, popular resistance was
seen as an integral element in an operational concept of total war at the end of which
a grand battle would lead to the "triumph of German mind over French matter."20
Returning from Miiller's and Lattmann's instructions on the "criminal orders," the
judge-advocate of the 11th Army summed up before the divisional commanders on
18 June 1941:"Each soldier must know that he has to defend himself against all attacks in battle: that in case of doubt he can either liberate or shoot arrested persons.
Each officer must know that he can shoot or liberate arrested persons, but that political commissars must be segregated and liquidated. Each battalion commander must
know that he can order collective punishments."21The last paragraph stemmed from
one of Halder's suggestions and meant that in cases of guerrilla attack where the individual offender could not be quickly identified, the burning of villages and/or mass
executions could be ordered.
On the eve of the attack on Russia, the German soldiers were informed about
Hitler's order of the day and about the "Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops"
of 19 May 1941, which had been issued by the OKW. In the latter, Bolshevism was
defined as the "deadly enemy of the National Socialist German Nation. It is against
this destructive ideology and its adherents that Germany is waging war. This battle
demands ruthlessand vigorous measuresagainst Bolshevik inciters,guerrillas,saboteurs,
Jews and the complete elimination of all active and passive resistance."22These guidelines and Halder's amendment to the draft agreement between the army and the SS
make it clear that Jews and Communists were singled out as a hostile group long before the memorandum of understanding between the Wehrmacht and the SS of 28
June 1941 that allowed for their selection and execution by the Einsatzkommandos
in the prisoner-of-war camps.23
The mixture of the traditional and the ideological attitude toward Eastern foe
becomes evident in two orders issued by General Joachim Lemelsen, commander of
XLVII Panzer Corps. Just a few days after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa
he condemned the "irresponsible, senseless and criminal" shootings of prisoners of
war, deserters and civilians:
This is murder!The GermanWehrmachtis wagingthis waragainstBolshevism,but not
againstthe unitedRussianpeoples.Wewantto bringback peace,calm and orderto this
landwhichhassufferedterriblyformanyyearsfromtheoppressionof a Jewishandcriminal
group.Theinstructionof the Fiihrercallsfor ruthlessactionagainstBolshevism(political
commissars)and any kind of partisan!People who havebeen clearlyidentifiedas such
should be taken aside and shot only by order of an officer. ...
A Russian soldier who
has been takenprisonerwhilewearinga uniformand after he put up a bravefight, has
Strategyand Ideology in the East
27
a rightto decenttreatment.... [Descriptions]of the scenesof countlessbodiesof soldiers
lying on the roads,havingclearlybeen killedby a shot throughthe head at point blank
range,withouttheirweaponsandwiththeirhandsraised,willquicklyspreadin theenemy's
army.24
The Germannotion of an ideologicaland ruthlessfight was counteredby Stalin
with his own concept of a mercilesspeople'swar against"GermanFascism,"a war
which would decidethe futureof Socialism.This people'swar would be led by the
Communistparty.Stalin'sappealfor a partisanwarbehindthe frontwasimmediately
viewedby Hitleras an opportunityto disguisehis exterminationprogrammeas antiOn the other hand, the expartisanmeasures,that means as a militarynecessity.25
of
forces
cesses the Sovietstate police'sspecial
againstcaptiveGermansoldiersand
Sovietpoliticalprisonersseemedto demonstrateto the Germansoldierthat the Red
methods,as had beenassumedbeforethe
Armyin fact employed"Asiatic-barbarian"
outbreakof the war.The Army High Commandrejectedthe Sixth Army'srequest
for reprisalsagainstSovietprisonersof warforthe shootingandmutilationof German
captiveson thegroundthat"eventheexecutionof largenumbersof themwouldhave- in
contrastto the Westernallies- no effect on the Russians,"it wouldonly lead to more
"violentanger"on both sides.26
Germansecuritypolicyin the occupiedterritoriesin theEastwasa complexmatter
eitheroverfromthe veryoutsetof the campaign.Militarysecurityandadministration
lappedor werejointlyconductedbythearmyandthe SS.Accordingto theirpre-invasion
agreement,the SS had a free handto carryout theirtask of eliminatingCommunist
functionaries,Jews,andsubversiveelementswithoutres' aintwithinthe areaof operations.Thearmy'sownplansfor militarysecuritywereinfluencedfromthe beginning
by the vast expanseof Russianterritory.So huge was the SovietUnion, that the SS
couldbeviewedas an additionalhelpforthepacificationof thecountry.DespiteStalin's
call for a partisanwar,which the Sovietshad made clear to the Germantroops by
leafletsprintedin German,the Wehrmachtsawonly a smallnumberof sabotageincidentsin the westernpartof the SovietUnion. In fact, the Germanswereactuallywelcomedin some villages.This was reasonenoughto avoidmeasuresthat wouldmake
the populationhostile towardthe Germaninvader.The commanderstried to strike
a "bargain,"
ensuringthe interestsof the Wehrmachtand those of the peacefulpopulation.If the peopleremainedquiet,worked,andobeyedgivenorders,thentheGermans
wouldminimizethe unavoidablesufferingby combattingresistanceactivitieswithreprisal executionschiefly of Communists,Jews and GreatRussians.
TheArmyHigh Commandwasdissatisfiedwiththisbargain.Forthem,German
troopshadnot dealtenergeticallyenoughwithactsof resistance.Moreover,theyknew
of detailedSovietinstructionsto politicalfunctionariesto formpartisanunits.Hence,
the ArmyHighCommandsupplementedthe relevantdirectivesof Mayand June 1941
with a specialorderfor the "treatmentof enemyciviliansand of Russianprisoners
of war"in the armygrouprearareas.Withinthis orderof 25 July 1941,Field-Marshal
28
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
von Brauchitsch
measures:
againmixedmilitaryandideological,punitiveandpreventive
"Theessentialrapidpacificationof the countrycan only be achievedif everythreat
on the partof the hostilecivilianpopulationis dealtwithruthlessly.All pity and softness are weaknessand constitutea danger.... The virulentworkof the supporters
of the Jewish-Bolsheviksystemin the first place"wouldlead to the renewalof guerrilla activitiesin alreadypacifiedareas.The guidingprinciplein all Germanactions
shouldbe the "absolutesecurityof the Germansoldier."The commander-in-chief
of
theArmyexpressedly
statedthatthepreventive
takingof hostagesas a guaranteeagainst
futureoffenses was unnecessary.Insteadhe justifiedreprisalsand collectivepunishments.27Militarycommandersstilltriedto avoidarbitrarymeasureswhichwouldonly
drivethe populationback into the hands of the Bolsheviks.GeneralKarl-Heinrich
von Stiilpnagel,for example,warnedhis troopsagainstmakingcollectivepunishments
indiscriminately:"If the Ukrainianinhabitantsof a locality cannot be convictedof
the initial act of violence,the village mayorswill be requestedto name Jewishand
Communistinhabitantsin the firstinstance.... In particular,the JewishKomsomol
membersareto be consideredthe mainexponentsof any sabotagemovementand of
Thatreprisalexecutionsneverthelessexceededthe set frame
formingyouthbands."28
becomesevident from an Army GroupCenterorderof 7 August 1941.The understandableirritationof the troopsafter attacksby guerrillasmust not lead to retaliation againstlocalities"justbecausethey happenedto be in the vicinity"of the scene
of the crime.Significantlythe Second Army reactedto this directivewith pointing
out that the troops would give up overreachingcollectivepunishments,if they were
givena guaranteethat the "experiencedspecialists,"meaningthe SS, wouldcarryout
energeticmeasuresagainstthe "dangerouselements"in their rear.29
The conscioususe by the armyof Jews and Communistsas scapegoatsin the
Ukraine,WhiteRussiaand in the BalticStatesprovesthat it was not only Hitlerand
the SS who construeda causalconnectionbetween"JewishBolshevism"andthe resistanceagainstthe Germanconquest.In September1941,GeneralMaxvon Schenckendorff, commanderof the rearareaof ArmyGroupCenter,initiatedan "exchangeof
in combattingpartisansbetweenthe armyandthe SS. SeniorSS officers
experiences"
such as Erichvon dem Bach-Zelewskiand ArthurNebe lecturedon "apprehending
commissarsand partisans"and on the "JewishQuestionwith specialreferenceto the
Eventhe "correct"
partisanmovement."
screeningof the Sovietpopulationwasrealistidemonstrated.
It
not
be
denied
that participantsin this coursehadlearned
could
cally
theirlesson:"Thepartisanis wherethe Jewis."30After a mop-upoperationnearMirgorodin the rearareaof ArmyGroupSouth,for example,the 62ndInfantryDivision
shot the "entireJewishpopulation(168souls)for associatingwithpartisans,"in addiThe same divisionadvocatedthe killingof the 120
tion to executing45 partisans.31
Jewsin Gadjacby SS units, becausetherewere"bandits"in this area.32Christopher
Browninghas convincinglyprovedthat similarthingshappenedin Serbia.In Sabac,
Strategyand Ideology in the East
29
"centralEuropeanJewishrefugees,mostlyAustrians,wereshot by troops predominantly of Austrianoriginin retaliationfor casualtiesinflictedby Serbianpartisans
on the Germanarmy!"33
The reprisalpolicyof the militarycommandersin Serbiawas
not merelyin compliancewiththe guidelinesissuedby Field-MarshalWilhelmKeitel
on 16 September1941,which demandedmassivereprisalsand summaryexecutions
of Communistsfor attackson Germansoldiers;34
but the militarycommandershad
alreadycarriedout reprisalexecutionsagainstCommunistsand Jewspriorto Keitel's
instruction,whichdid not mentionJewsexplicitly.SuchAnti-Jewishmeasuresby the
Wehrmachtthus distinguishthe Germanoccupationpoliciesin Serbiaand the Soviet
Union from that in France.Professionalismand ideology went togetherwell in the
East.As long as the massshootingof Jewsand Communistswas"perceivedand construedas a militarymeasureagainstGermany'senemies,it did not requirenazified
zealots (thoughsurelythose werenot lacking),merelyconscientiousand politically
obtuse professionalsoldiersto carrythem out."35A distinctionshould be made betweenthe exterminationpoliciesin the SovietUnion and Serbia.Whilein the latter,
"the mass murderof male Jews was accomplishedprimarilyby the GermanWehrmacht, though it certainlyreceivedwillinghelp from the Ordungs-and Sicherheitspolizei of the SS,"36in the formerit was the otherwayround.Babi Yar,the nameof
a gorgenearKiev,hasbecomethe symbolnot onlyof the crimesof the Einsatzgruppen
The
in the SovietUnion, but also of the supporttheyreceivedfromthe Wehrmacht.3'
individual
soldiers
from
commanders
to
orders
of
taking
military
frequent
prevent
The mainconcern
partin the murderof Jewsby the SS point in the samedirection.38
of commanderslike von Reichenau,von Salmuthand Karlvon Roqueswas the disruptionof discipline,not the ordered"constantclose cooperation"with the Einsatzgruppen.Therewere,of course,commanderslike von Tiedemannwho triedto draw
a distinctlinebetweenmilitaryactionsandpolicemeasures.It wasto provea futilefight.
The deliberateinterminglingof ideologicalwarfarewith militaryactionsin the
East, whichHitlerhad advocatedand whichthe ArmyHigh Commandhad willingly
acceptedin their short war illusion, took on a new form in the autumnof 1941.At
that time, the Wehrmachtwas not only facingorganizedand trained"partisanunits
and diversiongroups"underthe leadershipof regionalpartyfunctionariesor government officials, but was also short of troops in the vast rearareas.The solution was
of the hostileattievermoreruthlessactionsagainstactualandsuspected"supporters
This
becomes
clear
in thewell-known
and
Communists.
Jews
tude,"meaning
especially
ordersof the commandersof the 6th, 11thand the 17th Armies, Field-Marshals
Reichenauand Manstein,and GeneralHermannHoth. Theyall knewthat they had
to fight a fierceand stubbornenemyand called for the completeannihilationof the
Sovietwarmachineas wellas for the destructionof the Jewish-Bolshevik
system,and
for the "necessityof the severepunishinstructedtheirsoldiersto showunderstanding
ment of Jewry."This could only be understoodby the troopsas justificationof the
30
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
massmurderof EinsatzgruppeC. BeingevenmoreconcretethanReichenauandManstein,39Hoth turnedhis soldiers'thoughtsto Germanhistory,to the guilt (as he saw
it) of the Jewsforthe domesticconditionsafterthe FirstWorldWar:"Thedestruction
of those sameJewswho supportBolshevismandits organizationfor murder,the parThose ordersnaturallyhad consequences
tisans,is a measureof self-preservation."40
on the level of the troops whichthe commandershad knownsince September1939
and againstwhich Manstein'sappealat the end of his order,to maintaindiscipline
and preservemilitaryhonor, could not accomplishmuch.
Therewere,of course,othervoicestoo. Eachcommanderhad considerablelatitudeto provehimselfalthoughthe ArmyHighCommandhaddistributedReichenau's
orderto all armiesand armygroups,with the requestthat similarordersbe issued.
GeneralEberhardvon Mackensen,commanderof the III (motorized)ArmyCorps,
actedon 24 November1941.He demandedthe "ruthlesscombattingand extermination of hostileelements,"yet he warnedthe troopsnot to considereveryone as their
enemyjust becausehe wouldlook like a Bolshevik:in rags,unhygienic,unkempt.The
decisionwould rest with the officers, who should be carefulof denunciation.This
particularparagraph,however,was only one out of ten. The othernine wereguided
by the traditionalunderstandingof the treatmentof the populationof an occupied
hadnearly
country.Thefactthattheirinitiallyfriendlyattitudetowardthe Wehrmacht
come to an end was explainedby the unjustor psychologicallywrongconductof the
Germantroopsin the rearareas,as well as to the unavoidableconsequencesof warfare.The troops should not transfertheir hate of Bolshevismon to the population
which was not an "objectof exploitation,"but a "necessarypart of the European
economy"(sic!). The Germansoldiershould treatciviliansand prisonersof war in
the samemannerin whichhe wishedto be treatedin hardtimes.41Theimportantquestion here is which impactthis differentiatingorderhas had.
It is not sufficientto justifythe arbitraryandruthlessreprisalpolicyof the Wehrmachtin the SovietUnion by the need for "absolutesecurityfor the Germansoldier"
againstpartisanattacksor acts of sabotageby an incitedpopulation.Nor can it be
explainedby the factthat Germanmilitarydoctrinesince 1871had advocatedpolicies
of indiscriminate
retaliationandof preventiverepressionas the bestmeansof checking
The considerablediscrepancybetweenthe numberof "partisans"
partisanactivity.42
killedand Germancasualtieson the one hand,and the minordifferencebetweenthe
numbersof personsarrestedandlaterexecutedon the otherin the reportsof German
combator securitydivisions,both point to the ideologicalbackgroundof the Wehrmachtreprisalpolicy.Its disproportionis most strikinglydemonstratedby one report
of the 707thInfantryDivision,deployedin WhiteRussia.In one monthit shot 10,431
"captives"out of a total of 10,940,while in the claimedcombat with partisansthe
divisionsufferedonly sevencasualties,two deadandfive wounded!43
Amongthe shot
"captives"wereSovietsoldierswho, cut off from the main body of their army,had
Strategyand Ideology in the East
31
not reportedto Germanauthoritiesby set date,escapedprisonersof warand civilians
arrestedduringmop-up operations.This practicemore closely approachedHitler's
to shoot every
formulaof 16July 1941for the pacificationof the EasternTerritories:
thananti-partisanmeasuresconductedaccording
one "whomerelylooks suspicious"44
to militaryrules and practice.While many reportscan be classifiedas examplesof
self-corroboration
and self-fulfillingprophecyin the destructionof "JewishBolshevism,"thereis one that pointsto the opposite.Althoughthe Jewshatedthe German
administrationandthe army,whichwasnot astonishing,wroteGeneralHansLeykauf
to the WarEconomyOffice on 2 December1941,it could not be claimedthat "the
Jews as such representedany threatto the Wehrmacht."45
Althoughliquidationson a much largerscale than the shootingof Sovietcommissarswascarriedout by the Wehrmachtduringanti-guerillaoperations,the efforts
to playdownthe effect of the CommissarOrderafterthe warweremuchgreaterthan
to denythe army'sruthlessreprisalpolicy.Highly-placedpoliticalofficials and commissarscouldbe shot not only as suspectsin a hostileact, but also for merelyholding
a positionin the RedArmyor in the Sovietpowersystem,a practiceillegalby all interthe implementation
nationalrules.Arewe stillto believethatthe troopscircumvented
of the "criminalorder,"foundwaysto ignoreit, as somehistoriansmaintain,46
or that
officialreportsweredeliberatelymanipulated,as formersoldiersapologeticallyclaim?
The largenumberof executionslisted by the intelligenceofficers speakin too clear
a language.Moreover,the corpsfrequentlysimplyreported"negative."
This indicates
that no false reportshad to be made.The documentaryevidence,for example,contradictsboththe statementsof GeneralHeinzGuderianandColonel(ret.)HansRoschmann.47Guderian'sPanzerGroup2 is reportedto haveshot 183commissarsup to
and the LII Corps,of whichRoschmannwasthe quarterthe end of October1941,48
In his acmaster,is reportedto haveexecutedat least 15commissarsand politruks.49
tion report,the intelligenceofficer of PanzerGroup3 terselywrotein mid-August
1941that the "carryingout of the specialtreatmentof the politicalcommissarsdid
not entailanyproblemfor the troops"and that 170commissarshad been"separately
sent off."50That these termscamouflagedthe executionbecomesevidentfrom another reportof the same formation.On 17 July 1941,PanzerGroup3 informedits
superiorarmythat the staff had seizedtwo commissarsin plainclothesand had shot
them. Anotherintelligenceofficerviewedthe liquidationof the politicalcommissars
within the Red Army as the prerequisiteof the Germanvictory.51
A monthlater,therewasgrowingcriticismamongsomefield commandersof the
practicalresultof the CommissarOrder.They argued,as Rosenbergdid later with
regardto the ill-treatmentof Soviet prisonersof war,that the implementationhad
led to a stiffeningof the RedArmy'sresistance.On23 September1941,the ArmyHigh
Commandrequesteda reconsiderationof the OKW.Hitler refusedthis and similar
laterrequests.It wasonly in May 1942that the professionalpressureexertedby senior
32
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
commanders showed results. The Commissar Orderwas suspended in the area of operations in order to encourage the tendency of Soviet soldiers to desert. Military necessity had led to an alteration of an ideological goal. The same applies to the treatment
of Soviet prisoners of war.
Responsibility for prisoners of war during the Operation Barbarossa was shared
the
by
High Commands of the Wehrmacht and of the Army. Within the Reich, in occupied Poland and in the two civil administrativeprovincesin the East, the Reich Commissariats, responsibility was borne by the OKW, and in the area of operations by
the OKH. On 17 July 1941, the OKW, having reached agreement with the SS, decreed
that the armed forces were to
get ridof all thoseelementsamongthe prisonersof warconsideredto be Bolshevikdriving
forces. The special situation of the Eastern campaign therefore demands special
measures.... Whileso far the regulationsand ordersconcerningprisonersof warhave
beenbasedsolelyon militaryconsiderations,nowthe politicalobjectivemustbe attained,
whichis to protectthe GermannationfromBolshevikincitersand forthwithtakethe occupiedterritorystrictlyin hand.52
After an initial separation of civilians and prisoners of war by Wehrmachtpersonnel
according to nationality and political trustworthiness, the "specially trained"Einsatzkommandos then took over furtherselection and liquidation. The SS guidelinesprovided
for the elimination of commissars and functionaries of all ranks, agitators, fanatical
Communists and all Jews. Although the camps in the army's area of operations had
been included in OKW's decree, the Army High Command forbade the participation
of Einsatzkommandos in the selection of prisoners of war. Instead, the camp commanders were responsible for the "immediate isolation of politically intolerable and
suspicious elements, commissars and agitators" and were expected to deal with them
"in accordance with the special directives,"that is to say, to shoot them in line with
the decrees of 13 May and 6 June 1941. "This decision [of 24 July 1941] shows that
the Army leadership, unlike that of the Wehrmacht, was prepared to participate in
the systematic extermination of the political enemy, but not in the destruction of the
'racial enemy'."53The Jews were to be separated from the other prisoners and to work
at the front. On 7 October 1941,however,the Army High Command revokedthis ruling
and gave the Einsatzkommandos access to the camps in the area of operations, thus
adopting the practice obligatory in the Wehrmacht provinces since July 1941.
It is very likely that we shall never know the exact figures of those Soviet prisoners
of war who were selected and liquidated. Apologetic estimations speak of "some ten
thousands"; other assessments begin at 140,000 and go up to 600,000 prisoners of war
who were handed over to the SS. Likewise, the overall figure of Soviet prisoners of
war who perished while they were under German control is debated. It ranges from
1.68 million over at least 2.53 million up to 3.3 million, out of a total of 5.7 million
Strategyand Ideology in the East
33
Soviet soldierstaken prisonerbetweenJune 1941and February1945.54Behindthis
controversyover the extentof the mass killingsand the mass death lies, of course,
the debateoverthe causes.The massdeathwasnot causedby a relevantpre-invasion
order.Yetit wouldbe grosslymisleadingto explainthe greatriseof the mortalityrate,
whichbeganat the end of September1941,solely with circumstancesin the areaof
percentof the prisonersthatdiedup to the spring
operationsowingto war.Forty-seven
of 1942diedin campswithinthe Reich!Themassdeathmustbe ascribedto the prioritrauma
tiesof the Germanexploitationpolicy,whichwereinfluencedbythe ever-present
of 1918.Millionsof prisonersof war and largepartsof the Sovietpopulationwere
condemnedto death by starvationand endemicdiseasesin orderto feed the Wehrmacht and the Germanpopulation.Even Alfred Rosenbergadvocateda changeof
policy in a letterto Field-MarshallKeitelon 28 February1942.The ministerfor the
of prisonerswasresponthoughtthatthepastill-treatment
OccupiedEasternTerritories
sible for the stiffenedresistanceof the Red Army "andtherebyalso for the deaths
Thechangeof attitudetowardthe Sovietprisoners
of thousandsof Germansoldiers."55
it wascausedbythe necesof warcannot,however,be creditedto moralconsiderations;
sities of war,the immensecasualtiesof the Germanarmyat the EasternFrontand
the shortageof laborersin the Germanwareconomy.Theincreasing"worth"of Soviet
prisonersof warbroughtaboutan improvementin theirtreatment.The Germansnot
(Hilfonly made largeuse of them as workersin the Reich,but also as "volunteers"
beginningin October1941.Twoyearslater,50,000prisoners
swillige),in the Wehrmacht,
of warwereevenemployedin the serviceunitsof the ReplacementArmyin the Reich.s6
What a changeof policycomparedto Hitler'sremarkson 16 July 1941,that it must
neverbe allowedthat any one else than a Germancarrya weaponwest of the Ural
Mountains!
How does this documentationaboutthe planningand implementationof a war
debateon
of destructionagainstthe SovietUnion fit into the widerhistoriographical
NationalSocialism?In my opinionthe contrastingpositionsof so-called"intentionalists" and "functionalists"are unduly polarized. I would side with Christopher
can be viewed
Browning'smiddleposition.57The developmentof Lebensraumpolitics
butat the sametimeHitlermustbe credited
as evolutionaryratherthanprogrammatic
with makingthe keydecisionsin the summerof 1940,and in the springand summer
der
of 1941.Thetransformationof long-rangeconceptslikeLebensraum,
Vernichtung
mustnot be seenin a post-Barbarossa
perspective.
Juden,and Weltanschauungskrieg
between1939and 1941,with
"Naziracialpolicywasradicalizedin quantumjumps"58
waractingas a stimulant.The warnot only openedup favorableconditionsfor ideologicallyfixedaims,butalso shapedthoseobjectivesbyits ownmomentum.It speeded
solutionsfor them, while it also broughtforth manydifficultieswhichthen wereto
havean impacton the ideologicalgoals.Thelinkagebetweenmassmurderandstrategy
was not realizedbefore 1941.The ideology of Lebensraumwas transformedby the
invasionof Russia"froma doctrineof gradualracialconsolidationinto one of limit-
34
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
less expansion.In the processthe Nazi viewof a final solutionto the JewishQuestion
was radicalizedas well."59In September1939,the Polish intelligentsiahad been the
foremosttargetof the Einsatzgruppen.The Wehrmachthad alreadyactedruthlessly
againstinsurgents,but the "eliminationof all activeand passiveresistance"had not
been determinedon ideologicalgrounds.In the confrontationwith "JewishBolshevism"in June1941,therewasto be a divisionof labor.Whilethe Einsatzgruppen
were
targetedto carryout the eliminationof both the biologicaland politicalmanifestations of "JewishBolshevism,"the Wehrmachtwas to destructthe "Jewish-Bolshevik
withinthe RedArmyandthe potentialcarriersof resistance.In the wake
intelligentsia"
of the spectacularvictoryoverFrance,the same seniorofficer corps that had complainedabout the atrocitieswroughtby the SS in Polandtook no offense at waging
a Vernichtungskrieg
againstthe Soviet Union. It was declareda militarynecessity.
Strategyandideologyhadachieveda symbiosis.Thispointsto the "dialecticaldimension"of the Wehrmacht's
role in the "mechanismof destruction."It was inspiredby
ideology,but wasrationalin its implementationand in needfor justificationon nonideologicalgrounds.Jewsand Communistswerein fact and a prioriclassifiedas suspectedpartisansand shot.
Therewas to be anotherfusion throughthe invasionof Russia:the achievement
of Lebensraumand the Vernichtungder Juden. The vision of a purifiedGermanic
empirethroughthe destructionof its foremostenemywas backedby the euphoriaof
a victoryoverRussia.Strategyand the mass murderof EuropeanJewrywereclosely
connected.Auschwitzwas defendedat Stalingradtoo.
NOTES
1. Peter Paretin his reviewof Das Deutsche Reichund der ZweiteWeltkrieg,GermanStudies
Review, 8 (1985), 314.
2. Bundesarchiv,Koblenz, NS 11/28. Cited in JiirgenForster,"New Wine in Old Skins? The
Wehrmachtand the War of 'Weltanschauungen',1941,"Wilhelm Deist, ed., The GermanMilitary
in the Age of Total War(LeamingtonSpa, 1985), p. 305.
3. Helmuth Groscurth,TagebuchereinesAbwehroffiziers1938-1940(Stuttgart,1970),p. 414.
4. Cf. MichaelGeyer,"GermanStrategy,1914-1945,"
PeterParet,ed., Makersof ModernStrategy:
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ, 1986), pp. 583-84 and JiirgenForster,"The
The Effectivenessof the GermanMilitaryEstablishmentin the Second
Dynamicsof Volksgemeinschaft:
WorldWar,"Allan R. Millettand WilliamsonMurray,eds., MilitaryEffectiveness,vol. 3, TheSecond
World War(Boston, 1988), p. 181.
5. Quoted by J. P. Stern, Hitler: The Fuhrerand the People (Glasgow, 1975), p. 216.
6. William Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor: The Making of the Second WorldWar(London,
1985), p. 116. Cf. Jiirgen Forster,"HitlersEntscheidungfur einen Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,"
MilitargeschichtlichesForschungsamt,ed., Das DeutscheReichund der Zweite Weltkrieg,vol. 4, Der
Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 3-18.
7. KarlDietrich Erdmann,Die Zeit der Weltkriege(Stuttgart, 1976),p. 337 and Carr,Poland
to Pearl Harbor, p. 121.
Strategy and Ideology in the East
35
8. Cf. JiirgenForster,"DasUnternehmen'Barbarossa'als Eroberungs-und Vernichtungskrieg,"
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg,IV, 413-16 and 426-27.
9. GeneraloberstHalder, Kriegstagebuch TaglicheAufzeichnungendes Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942, vol. 3, n.p.
10. InternationalMilitary Tribunal(IMT), vol. 26.
11. Cf. HelmutKrausnickand Hans-HeinrichWilhelm,Die Truppedes Weltanschauungskrieges:
Die Einsatzgruppender Sicherheitspolizeiund des SD 1938-1942 (Stuttgart, 1981),pp. 103-104.
12. See CharlesB. Burdick'simportantreview,"Traditionand Murderin the Wehrmacht,"
Simon
WiesenthalCenterAnnual, 4 (1987), 329-36.
13. Ibid., p. 446.
14. Krausnick/Wilhelm,Die Truppedes Weltanschauungskrieges,
p. 112.
15. Manfred Messerschmidt,"The Wehrmachtand the Volksgemeinschaft,"Journal of ContemporaryHistory, 18 (1983), 735.
16. WaltherHubatsch,ed., Hitlers Weisungenfur die Kriegfiihrung1939-1945:Dokumentedes
Oberkommandosder Wehrmacht(Frankfurt, 1983), no. 21a.
Die 7ruppe
17. Cf. Forster,"DasUnternehmen'Barbarossa,"'
pp. 421-40and Krausnick/Wilhelm,
des Weltanschauungskrieges,
pp. 116-41.
18. Hans Mommsen, "The Relization of the Unthinkable:The 'Final Solution of the Jewish
Question'in the Third Reich,"GerhardHirschfeld,ed., The Policies of Genocide:Jews and Soviet
Prisoners of Warin Nazi Germany(London, 1986), p. 121.
19. Cf. Krausnick/Wilhelm,Die Truppedes Weltanschauungskrieges,
pp. 97-98.
20. Cf. Heinz Hiirten, ed., Das Krisenjahr1923:Militar und Innenpolitik 1922-1924(Diisseldorf, 1980), no. 184, pp. 266-72 and Michael Geyer,Aufrustung oder Sicherheit:Die Reichswehr
in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924-1936 (Wiesbaden, 1980), pp. 85-88.
21. Quoted by Forster,"Das Unternehmen'Barbarossa,"'pp. 438-39.
22. Ibid., p. 441.
23. Ibid., p. 423 and ChristianStreit, "The GermanArmy and the Policies of Genocide,"The
Policies of Genocide, p. 4.
24. Ordersof 25 and 30 June 1941.Quotedby OmerBartov,TheEasternFront,1941-45:German
Troopsand the Barbarisationof Warfare(London, 1985), pp. 116-17.
25. IMT, vol. 38, p. 88.
Das
26. Orderof 9 July 1941.Quoted by Jirgen Forster,"Die Sicherungdes 'Lebensraumes,"'
Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg,IV, 1,035.
27. Ibid., pp. 1,035-39.
28. Orderof 30 July 1941.Ibid., pp. 1,039-40.
29. Ibid., pp. 1,041-42.
30. Quoted by Krausnick/Wilhelm,Die Truppedes Weltanschauungskrieges,
p. 248.
31. Cf. Forster,"Die Sicherungdes 'Lebensraumes,"'p. 1,055.
32. Ibid., p. 1,046.
33. ChristopherR. Browning,"WehrmachtReprisalPolicy and the Mass Murderof the Male
Jews in Serbia,"MilitirgeschichtlicheMitteilungen, 33 (1983), 39.
34. IMT, vol. 34, pp. 501-504.
35. Browning."Wehrmacht
ReprisalPolicyandthe MassMurderof the MaleJewsin Serbia,"p. 38.
36. Ibid., p. 42.
37. Cf. Krausnick/Wilhelm,Die Truppedes Weltanschauungskrieges,
pp. 235, 237-38.
38. Ibid., pp. 239-40.
39. Cf. Matthew Cooper, The Phantom War:The GermanStruggleagainst Soviet Partisans,
1941-1944(London, 1979), appendices 4 and 5.
40. Quoted by Forster,"Die Sicherungdes 'Lebensraumes',"pp. 1,052-53.
41. Ibid., p. 1,054.
36
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
42. Cf. Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare:The Modern History of the InternationalLaw
of Armed Conflicts (London, 1980).
43. Cf. Forster,"DieSicherungdes Lebensraumes,"
pp. 1,055-56and Forster,"NewWinein Old
Skins?,"p. 317.
44. IMT, vol. 38, p. 88.
45. Ibid., vol. 32, p. 73.
46. See for exampleErnst Nolte, Der Faschismusin seiner Epoche (Munich, 1963),p. 437. He
simply ignoreshistoriographicalevidenceeven in his most recentpublication,Der europaischeBurgerkrieg 1917-1945:Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus(Berlin, 1987), p. 467.
47. Heinz Guderian,Erinnerungeneines Soldaten(Heidelberg,1951),p. 138;Hans Roschmann,
Gutachtenzu den VerlustensowjetischerKriegsgefangenerin deutscherHand von 1941-1945und
zurBewertungdes Beweiskraftdes sogenannten'DokumentNOKW2125'(Ingolstadt,1982),Annex3.
48. Bundesarchiv-Militdrarchiv,
Freiburgi. Br., RH 21-2/v. 638.
49. Ibid., LII Corps, 16041/43-45 and 16041/47. Roschmannsupports his assertion with the
quartermaster'srecords and leaves aside the reports of the intelligence officer.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. IMT, vol. 26, pp. 111-15.
53. Christian Streit, "The Army and the Policies of Genocide,"p. 4 (Note 23 above).
54. Cf. JiirgenForster,"Riickblickauf das 'UnternehmenBarbarossa':Die besondereQualitat
des Kriegesim Osten,"JorgeFriedrichand JorgeWollenberg,eds., Licht in den Schattender Vergangenheit:ZurEnttabuisierungderNurnbergerKriegsverbrecherprozesse
(Frankfurt,Berlin,1987),p. 128.
55. Quoted by Alexander Dallin, GermanRule in Russia 1941-1945:A Study of Occupation
Policies (London, 1957), pp. 417 and 421-22.
56. Cf. Forster,"Die Sicherungdes Lebensraumes,"pp. 1,058-61 and the orderof 27 January
1943, Bundesarchiv-Militarchiv,RH 53-23/58.
57. See his article on "Nazi ResettlementPolicy and the Search for a Solution to the Jewish
Question, 1939-1941,"German Studies Review, 9 (1986), 497-519.
58. Ibid., p. 519.
59. Ibid., p. 517.