Tactical Airlift info

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Tactical Airlift
by
RAY L. BOWERS
. .
OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON. D.C.. 1983
Paperback Imprint
. 1999.
AIR
!/i,~~E
.
.";/ ry
tuseums
PROGRAM
o
~,
1Jb~
of Coagress CataloliDllD I'ubIkatIoD Data
BowelS,Ray L
TacIical Airlift.
(The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia)
BibYography
. Includes index.
1. Vietnamese Conflic:t. 1961-1975-Aerial
operations,
Air Forco-lf'lStory-VictDamcse
Conftict. 1961-1975.
It Series.
DS558.8.B68
1982
959.704'348
American. 2. United States.
3. Airlift, MilitarY. L TItle..
82-14256
Papelback Imprint 1999
For sale by the Superintendent' of Documents, U.s. Govemment
Washington, D.C. 20402
Printing Office.
I
The Author
Ray BowerswrotetfUshistoryduring1969-1977wbiIeassignedto
the OJIiceof Air ForceHistory.Washington.D.C., whoRlhe servedas
supervisoryhistorian of the Special Historics Bnmch. He holds a B.S.
degree from the U.S. Naval Academy (1950) and an M.A. in history
from the Universityof Wisconsin,Madison (1960). From 1960 to 1967,
be was a member of the history department, U.S. Air FoICCAcademy,
where he directed iDstmction in the military history program. His Air
Force :flyingcareer included duty as chief navigator, 34Sth Tactical Airlift
Squadron (C-130) in 1967-1968, where he participated in major Southeast Asian operationssuch as the iCheSanh and the Tet Offensiveresupply
efforts. He has written or edited many pubJications in military history,
and he presented "Air Power in Southeast Asia, A Tentative Appraisal"
at the 1978 military history symposiumat the Air Force Academy. He
retired from active duty as a colonel in 1977, and now serves as publications officerwith the CarnegieInstitution of Washington.
iii
Contents
Page
iii
v
vii
xv
TheAuthor.
Foreword .
PrefaCe. .
Photojraphs
Maps and Charts
. xxiii
.
Part One: The CounterinsurgencyYears,
1946-1964
L
. . . . .
The French War in Indochina.
H. The Troop Carrier Idea, 1954-1961. . . .
HI. Farm Gate and the Air CommandoTradition.
IV. The Dirty Thitty and the VietnameseAir Force
Transport
Arm. . . . . .
V. MuleTrain-The F'mt Year.
VI.
vn.
.
Tho Airlift System, 1963-1964
.
Air Supplyof SpecialForces. .
3
25
47
67
83
. 115
. 149
Part Two: The Yearsof the Offensive,
1965-1968
VIII.
IX.
X
XI.
.XU.
xm.
The Entry of the C-130, 1965-1966.
.
SearchandDestroy. . . . . . . .
The Airlift System in Growth, 1966-1967 .
Junction City and the Battles of 1967 .
The Khe Sanh Campaign .
Tet and the Battlesof 1968:
. . . .
XIV. TheAirForceCan'bous. . . . . .
. .
. 169
.203
. 241
. 269
.295
. 317
. 353
.
\
}
t
Part Three: Other Applications
XV. -The'AUXiliary
Roles. . .- .
XVI. AirliftinIrregularWarfare. . . . .
xvn. The War for Laos. . ..
.
.379
. 417
. 439
I,
1~
,i
Part Four: The Years of Withdrawal.
1969-1975
xvm. The Airlift System,1969-191i. - .
XIX. TheCampaignsof 1969-1971,Cambodia
and the Panhandle.' . . . . .
_467
. 493
xiii
,
Page
xx. TheCan'bouFon:e.1969-1972. . . . . . .
XXI. Tbe Easter Offeusivo-The Battle of An Lac. . .
XXll. The Easter Offensivo- The CountrywideResponse .
xxm.
The AdvisoryRole and the Vietnamese:Air Force
Airlift Arm. '"
.....
XXIV. Return to Cold War in Southeast Asia.
XXV. The 1975 Denouement .
XXVI. Reflections..........
. 521
.539
.559
. 581
.605
. 631
.649
Appendices
1. 2d AirDMsionOrganization,
July 1963. . . . .
2. 315thAir DivisionOrganization,
June1964. . . .
3. PacificAirJiftOrgauization,
March1968. . . . .
.663
.665
.667
.669
.671
. . . . .
.673
.675
.
.683
.685
.687
.689
.691
4. Peak Theater Airlift Fon:e Posture. March 31, 1968 .
S. Theater Airlift Force Posture, March 31, 1972. . .
6, AgreementbetweenChiefof Staft.U.s. Army and Chief of
Staff, U.s. Air Force, 6 Apri11966.
7. Workload, USAF AirliftForces in Vietnam. . . . .
8. Workload.CombinedForcesin Viebtam,1965-1972
(Cargo Only, Monthly AverageTonnages). . . .
9. Workload, PACAF Forces in Western Pacific, 1969-1972.
.
10. Workload. 315th Air Division, 1965-1968.
11. USAF Transports Lost in SEA (ExcludesRescue Aircraft) .
12. Historic Theater Airlifts (Passengexsand Cargo) .
.693
.807
.829
.835
Notes. . .
Glossary..
BibliographicNote
.lndex. "
.
. . .
.,
. .
xiv
I
xv. The AuxiliaryRoles
Versatility made the transport airplanes useful in numerous auxiliary
rotes in Southeast Asia. Some of these were specialized airlifts, medical
evacua'1ion. civic action hauling, overwater transport, and air logistics servico'in 'Thailand. Others, which required only slight changes to the basic
places. included ftareship work, leaflet operations, and explosive, incendiary, or chemical drops. Ships and crews of the 315th and 83~th Air
Divisions flew these missions as part of the theatet airlift effort. Other
applications of transport planes included gunshiP, spray, command and
control, rescue, and reconnaiSsance roles, all of wlricb required major aircraft modifications and were performed by special units dedicateCito theSe
purposes. These activities are not included in this study. Auxiliary applications, including the use of uansports and helicopters in irregular warfare
activities, reduced the number of ships, crews, and dying hours available
for the primary mission of tactical airlift in South Vietnam.
The four-engine transports of the 315th Air Division continued to
perform the overwater airlift role which had been their principal activity
before 1965. The ability of the C-130 Hercules and C-124 Globemaster
to carry fifteen-tonpayloads weDover fifteenhundred ttlilcs nonstop, allowed rapid deliveriesfrom the Philippines,Okinawa, and Japan to the
major b~
iri Vietnam. Cargo feU into five principal categories: ( 1)
offshore-procureditems, such as jungle boots from Korea and electrical
gear from Japan and Taiwan, (2) U.S. Anny and Marine equipmentfrom
Okinawa, (3) support materiel for Air Force units, (4) explosive
ordnance moyedby air from the Philippinesbecauseof seaport and storage
limitationsin VIetnam, and (5) items trarisloadedfrom offshorestrategic
airliftbecause of airfieldlimitationsin Vietnam.Airlift thus supplemented
surface shipping,helped overcome severe seaport bottlenecks during the
American buildup, and cut down deliveryand handling time for essential
parts and eqwpment. Although responsibiJitieswithin Vietnam rapidly increased for the offshore transports. the overwater workload (cargo. and
passengers) alsoincreaseduntillate 1966:1
.
319
AUXlUARY ROLES
SntaUin comparison with that of Military Airlift Command.. By 1963
MAC IQilitaryand contract transports WCIC.
hauling 150.000 passengers
and :45,000tons of cargo monthly to and from Southeast Asia. At first
MAC transports to VietnamIanded regularlyonly pt Tan Son Nhnt. Dec:t!Ssitating considerabletpnssbipment within Vietnam by the CoJJUJ1On
Service Airtift System. New airports opcried at Da Nq and Cam.Raub in
January 1966, and latm"at PJeiku,Bien Hoa. and Phu Cat. reducing the
the
need for redistn"bution.Major unit mOvementsby MAC aii-craft~
United States usually required further airlifts to operatiilg areas by inCOUftUytransports. Intro4uction of the C-5 Galaxy transport in tbe
summer of 1970 created new problems of in-c:o~try ~bution,
si~
C-S deliverieswere massive an4 initially the planes could land only at
Cam Raub Bay. Eventually,how~. C-5s could upload at Tan SoDNb1U
and etSewhe.re.9
The interisland use of MAC transports in the western PadIU;
(!.tM~~ ~~
~c.- t ~~-(O ~
~~"J
~
C-l ~O ~f5f><'r'"
..f.-OM 1""8- l~' 2(1)
~~
~
7016.
O\IWJf"WJer
.crY'Q..~.
~
the issue of possibleduplicationof effort. ~
Martin, in 19~, judged
that activitiesof tbe Pacific transport forces and )fAC were ~1eJnf;ntary and that coordination was g~ The ov~rlapping ~tings. Martio
concluded,gave a useful fkJtibBityin apportioningtasks. To ~t
~
use of theater C-130s in Vietnam,MAC ~ September 1966 in~
jts
interisl~ndlIauUngin the western Pacificby an amount equal to the work
of two C-130 squadrons. Shortly afterwards, CIN(::PACdirecte.daU subordinate conunands 19 ~ making xCquestsdim:t1y ~ MAC, ~stCad to
fprward all airlift requirements to WTO for apportionment of tasks between MAC and the theate~transports. Also m 1966. contract transports
took over airlifts of American ~ps from Vii:tnamto offshorecities for
. .
rest and recuperation visits. This R.&Rprogram, first authorized jn
April 1962, ~ad been exclusivelyserved by 31Sth Air Division C-J3~
and Air ForceC-S4s and C-118s.10
The eritical .need for C-130 lift in Vietn3IDduring 1968 brQught
further Ip~
to reduce use. of these plaacs in ovcnrater work. On
Febmary 13 ClNCPAC directed suboralDate coJipnands to limit airlift
requeststo Qirectsupportfor operations in Korea and Vietnam.On April S
the Deputy $ecretary of Def~se orde~ ~e use of C-13OSfor cwerwaler
ftigbu dtscOniinUed.MAC gradually undertook this woikIoad and opened
numerous pew routes in ~e western Pacific: during the neXt twelvo
months.ll .
.
The possibleuse of MAC transports for shipments~tween points in
Vietnam was studied by the ~th
Air Force in ~y 1968. The Joint
-The Military Air Tnmsport Service became the Military Air~ Command
011January I, J966. At the same time, the ~ Troop Carrier Squadron became t11e
22d Militaly Airlift Squadron aDd iu parent I5!J3d' Trabspon Group became ~
65th MiUwy Airlift Group.
".
383
TACfJCAL AIRLIFf
The allied air and ground forces of Joirit Task Force 116 that entered
upcountry Thailand in May 1962 depended heavily upon air traDsport as a
logistics ,lint to the principal Sea and airport at Bangkok. ~ting
in
Thailand during the deployment were two AUStralian C-130s, several British transports, three Bristol freighters of the New Zealand Air Force. and
four U.S. Air Force C-123s. Tbe-C-J23 detaclunont was part of a squadron.from TAC, which arrived in Thailand on June Ii. The 1238 were
ex~ed
to remain, at least until arrival of a Can'bou company recently
ordered to Thailand from the United States. JI$
. The C-1238 operated from Bangkok's Don Muang Ah-port under
miSsion control of the joint task force headquarters and its Air Force
component command. Most niissions were between Don Muang and the
principal upcountty~
(Takhli, Korat. Chiang Mai, Ubon,lind Udom),
eacb with ample runways of at least seven thousand feet. Only Don Muang
had ground controJled approach, VHF omnirange. and tacai1 equipment,
but each of the other fields possessed at least a control tower with VHF
radio and a low frequency radii> beacon. The Jnain operating problems
were the tra1Iic and parking congestion at Don Muang and the limited fuel
suppliesat the upcountrybases.69
. .
,
.
The diplomatic settlement at Geneva in july paved the.way for withdrawal of ,the aUieiI force. Looking to the possibility of futUre buildups in
northern Thailand. however. and seeking to reduce dependence on airlift.
the Americans acted to improve roads and nul lines across Thailand and
increase stocks of military equipment. At NaklionPbanom, in extreme
northeast. Thailand, a six thousand-foot airfield was constructed capable
of rec:eiving major troop units. Planners realized that another and larger
bwldup would require use of Air Force four-engine transports for crossThailand lift.80
The Air Force transports remained at Don Muang despite the with.drawal of the.joint task force. Their number was rednced to two 1235 by
early 1963 but increased to five in July 1964. Aircraft and crews were
rotated from units in Vietnam for two-week tours. Ground crewmen found
the routine difficult since most maintenance work was done at night to
prepare tbe ships for moming nnssions, and flight-line noise made daytime
rest difficult.. For the aircrews, howeyer, d~ in Thailand was a pleasure.
Most tIying was done in the daytime, and the long runways, Bat terrain, and
absence of enemy fire made the misSions easy. The 1235 made daily runs to
the American depot at Korat and regularly visited some eight other upcountry fields. Crews particularly enjoyed the custom of hauling ice cream
back from Korat to treat the Thai children waiting in line at Bangkok for
the retUrn of the "Good Humor" ship. E~tions
to" ~ ~ed
effort
were missions into the tempoary strip at Nakhon Phanom ihSUpport'ofthe
large construction effort. One shjp was de$troyed while attempting a landing at an upcountry strip, mistaken for Roi Et. Thai scheduling and m.is-
408
AUXILIARY ROLES
'tJ rftf., ~
Kt,fll-t
(depO{)-bus ~50t
sian control at Doll Muang were entirely separate from activities In South
Vietnam.-1
The expansion of U.8. Air Force strike aircraft in Thailand during
and after 1965 greatly increased cross-Thailand transportation requirements. Tbe C-123 detachment at Don Muang. now grown to six aircraft
was,'in September 1965, replaced by four C-130Bs from Mactan Isle
Airfield in the Philippines. C-130As took over in early 1966 and were in
turn replaced by C-I3OEs flom Ching Cbuan Kang in September 1967.
CQmparcdto a daByftyingrate of 4.4 hours daily per plane for the A- and
B-modets, the six C-130Es in June 1968 logged 7.8 hour$ daily per
plane. Monthly airlifted tonnage rose from sixtten hundred tons (inc1uding
three thonsand passengers) in late 1965 to more than five thousand tons
per IIIOntbthree years later. C-124s passing through Thailand sometimes
made one or two in-country flights to hauJ cargo too big for the C-130s.
Improvements in road, rail. II1'Idpipeline communications meanwhile made
an increase in air transport unnc:cessary,and the airlift role became primarily to move men, mail, spare parts, and emergency munitions, where
speed was important.U
Reorganized in April 1965, the Don Muang Transport movement
control was reestablished as Detachment 4, 31Stb Air Division, and included a maintenance staff as well as control personnel. Aircraft itineraries
gencraUyfollowed the monthly sdmduJes set up by the 315th Air Division,
with movement control publishing supplementary daily orders as necessary.
Since the heavy ftyini rate made it difficult to cope with emergencies,
additional C-130s were sometim,esbrought in for temporary needs. The
C-130 operation in Thailand was thtrefore a ptoject of the 315tb Air
Division, wholly distinct from the control or surveillance of the 834th Air
Division in Vietnam.8I
A new aerial port squadron was established in Thailand in April 1965
.and was ~~
the 6th Aerial Port Squadron in July. It replaced the
former detachment of the 8th SquadrOn.The port workload at Don Muang
was mainly to ~
cargo and passengers newly arrived in Bangkok for
further airlift to upcountry destinations. Detachments of the parent unit
functioned upcountry. The busiest (in order of activity) were the detachmmIs at KQrat, Udom, Ubon, TakhH, and Nathan Phanom. Growing
pains in the ThaiiIandport system tesembled".thoseexperienced in Vietnam
and were caused by the inexperience of newly assigned personnel, frequent
breakdown of materiel-handlina equipment" shortages of protected storage
$pace, and unreliable radios which made exchange of traffic information
difficult By mid-1966. however, the worst of these headacbes had been
mrmoulltJ!d.
Of
Like the C-123 crewmen earlier, 0.-130 aircmvs found the Bangkok
shuttle a welcome mange from the more difficuh iying in Vietnam.
Nearly all loadings were passeng.ers or palleti%edcargo, relatively easy
TACfICAL AIRLIFT
work for the loadmasters. The rigors of field or tactical operations
were seldom experienced. Passenger missions were usually round-robin
circuits linking Don Muang and the upcountry bases. An aircrew's
seventeen-day cycle at Don Muang usually involved morc flying than did a
duty cycle in Vietnam. However, most crewmen felt more than compensated by the opportunities for sightseeing and shopping in Bangkok, the
excellent arrangements for hotel billeting, transportation, and the rogWarity
of missionsflow.
.
A detachment of U.S. Army aircraft. mostly U-21s, also operated
from Don Muang managed by the airiift support branch of the MiJitaIy
Assistance Command, Thailand. Two Army Canoous bcga'n working with
the detachment in 1964, rotating from companies in Vietnam. When the Air
Force took over the Can1>ousin 1967, it continued the Don Muang shuttle.
Canoou missions usually flew one of three preplanned routes to U.S. Special Forces detachments that were inaccessiblc to the C-130s. Afteri a
reorganization in 1971, the Army flight detachment included seven U-21s
and two UH-l helicopters, now managed by the Army Support 'Command, Thailand. Given the small scale of the Army detachment'sc-capability
(less than tcn percent of the C-130 tonnage workload), tbe separation of
the Army and the Caribou transports from activities was in practice. a
harmless deviation from the principle of centralized management."
Transportation patterns shifted away from Don Muang in .1970, ."..
ducing irritation at d1e
American presence at Bangkok and easing
air traffic congestion. The C-130s moved to U-Tapao on the Gulf.-of
ThailaDd'in May 1970, and the main terminal of the 6th" Aerial Port
Squadron folJowed in JqJy..1iuiog'0DIya-port detachment/at J)iOn;<Muang.
MAC began airlifting.diiCdly toU-Tapiw, and by year's end most oHhe
depot storage activities fOrmerly at Bangkok had been moved.' Schedwing
of the C-130s was tbereafterdoae by the airtiftcontrol cemer at.U~Tapao.
-functioning under the PACAF airlift directorate. A Thai decisfon:tO"allow
direct entxy of Americ:anpersonnel into the upcountry bases in late .1~71
ised to ~.the
C-130 trans-ThaiJand.,wor]doad and l'C!!!!it withthe C-130 detachment from U-Tapao. For the itQt
months. two C-130s ftew.cdally in Thailand. taJdng off each .morning
from Tan Sod Nhut. Several130s retUrnedto U-Ta ao .
.
~..
.~bombing'of
"res
ietoam. And in 1 3 the enlargedU-Tapao force became tbeso1e
C-;l30airJift contingentin SoutheastAsia, with mission responsibilitics'in
ThaUand,
Cambodia,
andSouthVietnam..
__
e Air Force trans-Thailand effort was only a side endeavor"to the
much larger and more challenging operation in Vietnam. Thailand missions, mainly to major airfields with no threat of enemy fire, resembled the
operations of a civilian airUne. :rhe crews from the Pacific adapted 'easily.
and attained impressive flying hour and workload statistics. The:rotational
410
XIX. The Campaigns of
1969-1971,
Cambodiaand the Panhandle
. Combat airlift operations during and after 1969 were largely episodic,
lacking the sustained and sometimes desperate character of 19~8. The
several emergency and forward area lifts, however, were valued contributions to the allied war effort and demonstrated the Air Force's continuing
ability to undertake tacti!:8l missions.
Two major cross-border campaigns highlighted the ground war: the
1970incursion into Cambodia and the 1"971venture into Laos. In both the
Air Force airlifters sustained a high-volume effort. primarily hauling to
airstrips in the border regions of South Vietnam. Puring the Cambodian
campaign the transports landed at a number of forward fields, hauling in
troops, equipment, and supplies. Further movement into Cambodia was
primarily by belicopter. In 1971 the C-130s landed at the old Khe Sanh
base, although disappointing delays in runway rehabilitation limited the
extent of tbe Air Force contribution. Cargo drops and extractions were for
emergency use only, because they involved too ~uch cargo-handling effort
at the rcceivmg end for routine 1JSein mobile ground operations.
Modest-scale airlift operations continued into Cambodia after the
withdrawal of American troops from that country in mid-1970. Aidanded
deliveries into Phnom Penh supplemented surface lines of communications,
while airdrops intermittently supplied isolated units in the eastern half of
t!te country. Dp~estic American opposition to participation in Cambodia
accounted for the dominant Vietnamese role in the Cambodian lifts, and
gave urgency to programs to strengthen the small Cambodian Air Force
airlift arm.
Widespt:,eadcommunist attacks on the night of February 22123, 1969,
recalled"the 1968 Tet offensive. Several emergency airlifts helped stop the
enemy's bid, including 8 series of C-130 LAPES deliveries at the Tien
Phuoc dirt airstrip south of Da Nang. The war's first C-130 night drop
took place on the third night when an A-modcl crew under Capt. Curtis L.
Messex released fifteen cargo bundles over the runway at besieged Ben Het
west of Dak To.1 Meanwhile, Air Force and Marine C-130 drops supported renewed ground operati~)Dsin the A Shau Valley, and Air Force
C-7s landed on the valley's fifteen qunared-(oot clay runway at Ta Bat,
opened by U.S. Army engineers on June 13, 1969.' Two months later, the
C-130s spearheaded a new campaign sbiftiDg fOrces quickly ioto Du Dop.
493
CAMPAIGNSOF 1969-1971
border airstrips. A reminder of past search.and-destroy applications took
place in the summer of 1910 wheo the allies returned to the historic Kham
Duc airstrip. The object of this multibrigade operation was to interdict
enemy eommunications Bod destroy (orces in the mountainous border region. Allied heliborne w1its seized the airfield and nearby terrain on July
12, meeting no significant opposition. The airfield appeared untouched
since ~e May 1968 evacuation,and someitems of ordnance and construetiODequipment were found in salvageable condition. Runway rebabilitation
began promptly, and on July 17, C-123s made tWenty-seven landings on
the ~v8Jlable twenty.five hundred feet bringing in troops. equipment, and
supplies. The strip meanwliile was lengthened to thirty-five hundred feet,
permitting twelve C-130 landings the following day. The C-123s and
C-130s thereafter continued daily deliveries of rations, ammunitioo, and
large quantities of hel~copter fuel. On the ground at Kbam Duc were an Air
Force mission conmiander, a combat control team, and a team from the
15th Aerial Port Squadron.
Crews landing at Kham Due made steep, circling approaches and
departures which minimized exposure to ground fire. Communist shelling!
occasionaUy delayed or prevented landings. Other traffic delays resulted
from bunched arrivals, disabled aircraft on the runway, and the necessity of
sharing airspace with helicopters and active artillery-conditiops typical of
forw~ area operations. The airstrip closed down on August 26 after
withdrawal of most materiel, but the withdrawal was marred by the loss to
enemy fire of a Chinook with thirty-one persons. In all, Air Force airlifters
made 648 landings at Kham Duc--243 by C-130. 402 by C-123. and 3
I)y Caribou, bringing in over forty-three hundred troops and twenty..six
hundred t(jJJsof cargo. mainly from Chu Lai. Overall results of the operation were intangible since allied ground troops made few major contacts
withthe enemy..
.
.
The general. decline in tactical activity was unmistakable. Most unit.
nioVen1entswere routine, in 1J1aDY
caSes entailing troop and equipment lifts
to major terminals for departUre from Vietnam. Every six months the
C-130s made some oDe hundred round trips between Saigon and Bangkot, rotating units of the Royal Thai volunteer force. Although a standing
.
. Seventh.Air Force operation plan p~~d
procedures for airborne assault operations, there were DOactual paratroop operations. Frequent
practicemissions,bowever,assistedin training VIetnamesetroopers. Bladderbird aerial tanker missionsdid not declineuntil 1971, the usefulneSsof
the C-130 in the fuel..deliveryrole having won acceptance. Reducing the
aircraft's wing tank fuel raised C-130 payloads by as much as ten thousand pounds 9ver the previous.standard twenty-sixthousand-poundloading. The bladderbird missions were aiso vaiuable in aIiowingpilotS to
practiceshortfield,heavyweightl~ding skil{s.1
Responsibilitiesfor emergencysupply drops generally shifted to the
495
::XXII. The EasterOffensiveThe Countrywide Response
.. The spring offensive in Binh Long Province was one of three main
cosnpninist drives calculated to destroy South Vietnamese forces and toge~er to bring down the Saigon government. The heaviest blows came in
the far north where two North Vietnamese divisions began attacking southward from the demilitarized 2'Oneon the night of March 30; 1972. Another
division moved against Hue trom the A Shau Valtey. In the central highlands, two communist divisions opened attacks on March 31 and soon
swept over the old battlegrounds of Dak To, Kontuin, and Pleiku. M~while, in other regions, smaller forces stepped up guerrilla-like operations,
menacing towns, bases, and lines of communications. Communist officers
were told that Saigon "must be defeated while the U.S. is preoccupied with
the electionsand domesticproblems."1
In their 1972 spring offensive the communists in part abandoned their
customary tactics of camouflage and dispersion. Something resembliDg
cOnventional ground warfare ensued, particularly in the northern region.
Soviet and Chinese weapons were used in South Vietnam for the first rime.
These included the SA-7 antiaircraft missile, wire-guided missiles, bigger
and more mobiJe artillery weapons, and new rockets (possibly up to
2SO-mm). Some 350 enemy tanks were in South Vietnam at the outset of
the o1fensive and were backed by two hundred others in close reserve. No
Americaninfantryunits wereiDactivecombatduringthe campaign.2
Allied air power, including a substantial air transport contribution,
was unquestionably decisive in turning back the communist drives. A prolODgedairlift to battered Kontum rivaled in significance and drama the An
1..ocresupply. Demanding night-landing techniques, airdrop methods lately
worked $)ut at Ap Loc:, and adverse-weather aerial delivery system' equipment were all used at Kontum. ThrOughOut South Vietnam during the
spring and early summer, allied au-Hfters made a maximum effort, movmg
colintless units, hauling supplies, and lifting refugees. As the iDtensity of
fighting eased in July, the airliftcrs gradually returned to former levels of
activity, and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam resumed.
559
TACfJCAL AJRLIFf
Vietmun. where Vietnamese Air Force helicopteIS and transports labored
in difficult weather to overcome the region's ~ronic transportation problems. Communist road interdiction intermittetitly isolated the region from
Da Nang, intensifying the urgency of the airlift effort. The Vietnamese Air
Force during April attempted airdrops at several fire support bases south-west of Hue and at Quang Tri city. The smaIl size of the drop zones,
difficult weather, and enemy fire, aU contributed to disappointing results.
Serious shortages of food, munitions, and fuel set the stage for tbe May 1
Jan"of Quang Tri and the disorganized retreat toward Hue.1'
.
American and Vietnamese transports joined in supply drops to a
South Vietnamese blocldng force at Kompong Trach, in Cambodia, west of
Tay Ninh. Vietnamese C-123s in late April achieved a bundle recovery
rate of eighty percent although enemy ground fire steadily increased. An
initial U.S. Air Force C-130 drop on April 24 was successful using daylight container-drop techniques. The ship however received eighty-six hits. ·
Enemy gunners were apparently concentrated along the highway used as a
run-in guide by the drop crews. The Americans shifted to night drops, still
using the normal container-drop altitude of six hundred feet, but five of the
eight C-130s dropping at Kompong Trach during April received battle
damage. Soon afterwards tbe South Vietnamese force withdrew, but its
spirited action may have reduced enemy pressure in the delta provinces of
South Vietnam.lz
The few Air Force C-123s, C-7s, and C-130Bs still in the Far Bast
made modest contributions to the action. The ten C-123s at Tan Son
Nbut flew seventeen hundred airlift sorties during April, including numerous supply and refugee evacuation missions into and out of Song Be. The
final Air Force Caribou squadron made 811 airlift sorties in April before
being deactivated on May 1. Several C-7s and crews flew around-theclock radio relay orbits out of Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut, linldng tactical
, air control party personnel on the. ground with direct air support centers.
Meanwhile, the C-130Bs and crews of the Clark-based 774th Squadron
undertook tasks within Thailand from a reopened operating location at
U-Tapao. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in April approved a CJNCPAC Ie-
quest to extend the tenure of the 174th in the-FarEastintotbe
sommer.1ft
Mother. asset was the Military AirJift Command's C-141 force, accustomed to operating in and out of Vietnam from off shore. The C-141s
bad been successfully used for shipments entirely within Vietnam during
Lam Son 719 and procedures for such emergency usage subsequently had
been codified. Beginning OD April 21, 1972, MAC C-14ls agin. began
shuttling passeDgetSand cargo between Tan SODNhut and the other main
in-country bases, principally 1>&Nan~, B~ Hoa. and Pleiku. Planes and
·
The crew hit on April 24 over Kompong
next night at An Lac.
564
Trach
waS the one shot down the
-.
THE COUNTRYWIDERESPONSE
crews were based for one or more nights at Tan Son Nbut and performed
two or more days of in-country work before departing for offshore destinations. This C-141 eftort permitted the C-130s to concentrate on drops,
unit hauls, and deliveries to forward locations. During the week beginning
April 28, for example, the MAC transports flew 193 in-country sorties,
Ufting thirty.five hundred passengers and 1,630 toos of cargo, equal to
twenty.fi.ve percent of the total Air Force in-country workload. The project
la.sui~four weeks. Usually four C-141s worked in Vietnam daily although
the eftort expanded briefly to eight planes in latc April. A highlight of
the operation was the evacuation of 394 refugees in a single C-141 sortie
from Pleiku to Saigon on April30.IT
Despite such help the steppc<t.up effort in Vietnam seriously strained
the mcn of the 374th Wmg. Many aircrewmen found themselves exceeding
the thirty-day limitation of 12() flying hours. When not flying, crews found
rest difficult in the severely crowded billets at Tan Son Nhut. Some slept in
hallways, some enlisted aircrews and ground crews slept in the airplanes.
Tbe conditions prompted concern among ffigbt surgeons of the Seventh Air
Force and the 374th Wing. To meet the rising maintenance workload,
men were sent to Ching Chuan Kang on temporary duty from other Pacific
bases and individuals finishing Far East tours were invited to volunteer for
extensions. The maintenance supervisors, Colonel 10sue felt, were especially overworked.18
The critical situations at An Loc, Kontum, and Quang Tri at the end
of April made it apparent that the countrywide demand for more and more
airlift would continue. Select TAC C-130 units in late April received
preliminary notice to prepare for possible deployment to the Pacific. Upon
direction by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, TAC in early May sent ten C-130s
to the Pacific to replace aircraft out of service because of battle damage. In
recommending further augmentations the Joint Chicfs on May 10 informed
.the ~tacy
of .Defense that the Pacific force was already "committed at
near-maximum level." and that the Use of C-J41s in Vietnam had strained
MAC's capabilities elsewhere, forcing cancellation of most training. Two
TAC C-130 squadrons during May 13-IS. under Constant Guard IV,
left for.I79-day. temporary duty tours. with..the 374tb Wing at Ching Chuan
Kang. One squadron was from the 316th Wing whicb sent fourteen planes
to join two already in the Far East with Constant Guard III. The otber was
primarily from the 314th Wing at Little Rock. augmented from the 317th
Wing at Pope to make up a sixteeu.plane unit capable of all-weather cargo
delivery. Each squadron included support personnel and forty aircrews. All
aircraft flew the familiar transpacific route, and the last arrived on Taiwan
on May 19. Two days later the.first TAC planes and crews flew to Tan Son
Nhut. Thereafter, the TAC force shar~ in all in-country work, including
the critical effort at Kontum, and eventually took exclusive responsibility
for all in-country drops. Iii
.
.
565
.
.
.
XXIV. Return to Cold War
iri Southeast Asia
Most. Aineiicaos welcomed the Paris ~ts
iliat resUl~ in a
cease-fire hi Vietnam. Although the ceaSe-fire.was short of f1dI victory, it
seeme~febougb that the killing bad ended and tbat.sevend boodled AinericaDs impriSoned.in North Vietnam would soon be free. The, Air Forc:O
airiifters generSny shared these feelings a.nd were proud of, their roles in
attainingwhat.appcatcdto be ~acc withiionor.
.
For the ,airliftersthe furieswere busy and exhilarating.Q-43() crews
,
on January 2~, 1973, ~ade the Air Fofce'S tint pea~i
l8udings in North
Vietnam in newy two decades. In the weeks that followed, Her:cu1esciewmen took part in th~ erDotional prisotier-releIisC CereJIioDicsin HanOi~
Meanwhile,'other C-130 misSions in South Vietnam sped th~ telease of
communist personnel held by the allies. helping to assure thlit repatriationS
bythe~emy wouldcontinue.
.
'
'
,
After tJ1ecease...Jirethe Pacific C-130 force continued its routine
ovcrwater airlifts atui .flights in. Thailand. :Most ~hallenging was the air
supply effort to Cambodia where'inumse fighting ,contiJiueI:J.C-130 ctews
each ,day I8nded with munitions and .rice .at the PIniom Penh aiiport and
made drops to Cambodiab garrisons isolatCd at other pointS. American
tiombing ceaSed in Cambodia in August 1973,. but the airlift went, on
without Ii break. The survival Of the Phnom Penh regiine wltJlouc ques,iion
dePendecl orithe Surface and air lines Of communications thrOugh ~ch
Ametican. materiel. ftowed. Meanwhile, in Widespread regions of South
Vietnam the North Vaetnamese army gained st1't\ngth, now supplied and
reinforced ~tho11f:interferen~ by allied interdiction trom the air.
FoiiOwing the defeat of tbe communist ~sp~g inVasion, the Americans
return,ed to the policy of eocouraimg theSoUth Vietnamese to rely as uiucb
as pOssible on their own transports: The' 374th Wing in the early $u~r
of- 1972 briefly operated a ten-plane C-130 detachment from Nakhon
Pbanom. main)' to transport units from, Vietnam to Thailand. and soon
afterwards reduced the Tan So~ Nhut C-130 fOfte 10 twenty aircraft. A
final tragedy tooJc place on August 1.2wlien ~nemy fire claimed a C-130
taking off from sac Trang. Its fortY-three passengerS and Crewmen became
the war's last fatalities in Air Force C-130 oi?erations.1 .
60S
TACTICAL AIRLIFT
A potentially seriouS situation developed at Tan Son Nnut where the
Vietnamese Air Force's newly acqUired C-130s sat unprotected. Concerned by the possibility of shelling attacks, G.en. 10hn W. Vogt, Jr.,
commander of the Sevetith Air Force, on November 13 direc:kd the 374ih
Wmg detachment to give up its protected area. Despite the complete laCk
of forewarning, the detachplent promptly fleW out its aircraft and ~
and within tWeive hours aU but tWo of the Vietnamese planes were protccicd. The American 1305 thereafter operated from Nakpon Pb~om.
contirlbing to fly missiol'lSin South Vietnam, A foutteeD-maa..maiDtemmce
~.
aDd severai aircmVs temained at Tan SOn Nbut. Shortages of. spare,
ptirts and work faci1itiCsatNakhon,Phanom, Jiowever; soon forced a dtt in
the number of. dany .ons,
compounding the loss of work capacity
represented by tbe.-ata;fiyiog..time to and from Nathon Pbahom. Mean~
~ile the Vietnamese Air f:orce's temporary preoccupation with JCtraiDiilg
for the C-130s furtherClecreaSed ov~ran 1ift capability.2
To meet the rising backlogs, MDitary Airlift Command 0-1415 again
undertook hauls betWeen the mJljor South Viett1amese aidif;lds. The
C-141 missions usually originated at Clark, landed and reloaded at
Saigon, Da Nang, Nha Trang, and a~ain at Saigon before ~ingto
dark. The C-141s lifted tWeniJ..D.vehundred ions of cargo.and seven~
seven hundred passengers in 250 such Sorties during November and IJe.
cembe.r;JI
Airdrops remainedtbe exclusive responsibility of AWADS ships aild
crews from TAC, now called the Easter Bunny force. All releases were
from high altitude, rigged for either HALO or high-velocity descent; the
incidence of parachute malfunctions (streamers and high-openers) {Coo
mamed troublesome-one
bundle in six for HALO, one in ten for high
velocity. AWADS releases gradual1y became more numeroUs than GRADS
in piepaiation for closing the ground radar sites. An Lot remained a toeus
for drop activi.ties along with several familiar highlands camps including
:Ben Het, "DaleSCang, Duc Co, and" Ba To, aU of which yielded to the
enemy during the faU: Extremely small drop zones, enemy pressure OD
camp perimeters, and parachute malfunctions aU cut the effectiveness of
the drops. After only 51 of 340 bundles released at Minh Thanh were
recovered, tlIe MACV logistics section wrote, ''we appear to be supplyidg
the besiegers rather than the besieged." ~Ititough results were unimpressive
the airlifters in late-year operations refined the know-bow in high altitude
drops acquired in the difficult spring campaign. The Easter Bunny ships
and crews left Tan Son Nhut with the other C-130s in November, * thereafter continuing the drops out of Talehli and later U-Tapao.4
· One
of the two TAC C-130 ~uadrons
retUrned to tho United States In Sep-
tember 1972; the remaining unit rotated- its personnel periodi~lly from Lan8lcY
and Pope. C-130Es of the 374th Wing replaced the B-models in the KJong rotation
in July 1972.
.'
, .
aETQRN TO COlJ) WAR
SOIfl1lEAST
ASiA.1m.
'
o
(
.I! {
BURMA
v'
r
/
.....
f
r'
'",
.r' 'v'",.
.
NORTH,VIETNAM
,
(,
~
l_.
."
,
,,-..i
\"""'"".
}
,"
j
..
!
V'~TlANE~
l
"
1 ,..r"'~"""\
......
\.. UDORN. . ~
'.
NAKHON'
PHANqM~
"\
-..-'
"
.j
i
"
'
iQUANG
~
'.NGAI . .
.i
/!.
OAKTO
,.-'-'-'-'-~.:,
\
t..
'~
,.
. BANGKOK
.
~I
),
1
\
\~~,..
l
"
T~KHLI
.
"
\
I
I
_
'1. .QUA!'IG tltl
EVANS.~.
DA !'IANG
)
'.\
- .-.....
..
"
)
CHINA
HANOI.
'\.-'V")
1
,
<.....
r.,..'
~
.JJ
'0
'
~
,
!Jh'" 100NM
.-.
J.""'.~
CAMBODIA
~
,,.
....
/
...;.
.
.
.
DA LAT
.,,'
'.'
PHNOM PENH _.l8I.OC
1
PLEIKU
r.
NINH
TONLEOfAM
TAN- SON
1''''' / '. NHUT
·
'iJ' '~INH THUY'
.-/.
AN THO!1
(
,
(PHU Q
The NQkhonPbanoman4 tho Easter BunnyC-130s ~
~,im~
the scbcd\WDgaaad~tJO~ol
the TQD~
to
Nbut airlift con-
~l center.AnQ...ther
~troI -ceqterat U-Tapao managedthe C-13Qs
'(caU«fKIong)PrimarilyUsedfor lifts within'Thailand.As ~ the past,
airc~s and groundC(eWS
we~~rotated from Taiwanand re~ailtedin
Thailandfor cyclesof up to tWerityqays.!'
".
A fin~ incident of wai, one reP1in~ of c::o~tless ~
past, ~arked
~
final Jaours'before tQe ce~e..firc, ~$t1t
.
,
in th~
on tb~ gro~d ~t
607
.-
Appendix 7*
Workload, USA.F Airli,t Forces in Vietnam
Ahtfft C-1238 iDVIetJuma
.
CaTg",
Flying
toM
SOI'liu
Hours
1962
Jan
Pcb
Milt
Apr
May
JUD
Jul
Aua
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dee
296
418
508
545
751
1,102
1,132
1.454
1,473
1.295
1,439
1,278
493
'96
125
750
1,214
1.947
1,841
1,865
1,930
2,019
1.838
1,750
2,878
2,943
4,495
9.393
10.349
1S668
15,500
11,256
13.233
9,785
428
514
688
96S
1,224
1,364
1;438
1,787
2,115
2,401
2,573
2,198
1963
Ian
Pcb
Mar
Apr
May
Iun
Jul
Aug
'Scp
Oct
Nov
Dee
1,401
1,336
1,567
1.627
2,159
1,996
2,216
2,088
. 2,343
2,290
2,572
2,686
1,819
J.611
],727
1,823
2,691
2.424
2,998
2,'82
?,707
2,679
2,852
3,153
11,624
9,218
14,012
] 1,040
1$,337
12,417
16,373
13,766
13,707
13,794
14.004
16.047
2,027
2,27-1
2,179
2,299
3,321
2,816
2,884
3,098
3,328
3,34
3,8.50
4,478
.
PllRengers
1,638
2,m
·
Opa Rep-5 files at USAF wmd cen: rprts, 315th AD. Airlift ACIX)mp~~,
CY 65 and CY 66; rprts, Mat Analys Of1', 834th AD, Tactical Airlift Performance
AnIIlY8i:s,SEA, Dee 66, Dee 61, Dee 68, Dee; 69, Dee 70, Dee 71; Summary of 4;,.
OperllliDm, SDMthetlStAsia (Hickam AFB, Ha.waii, 1969-71): tabulations in 6492d
Combat CarlO Gp, History of Airlift in SVN, Dee 6t-Oc:t 62, Dee 17, 1962:
monthly hist data rprts, TAFTS-P2, Oct-Dcc 62: Donald F. Martin, History of the
War in Vietnam, October 1961-Decembe,. 1963 (Project CHOCO, Hickam AFB,
Hawaii, 1964): rprt, PACAF coDlpttOlJer, FY 64-65, in B. A. Whitaker aod L E.
PatenoD, Auault Airlift OperatlDtU(Project CHECO, Bictam AFB. Hawaii, 194'U:
tmIs, 3J5th TAW, 1969-72, 314th TAW. 1971-72, USSAOnth AFt 1973; rprts,
Airlift See, MACV (1-3), 1?72: CqmmQIU/StIIlll8 Book, 7th AF, Jun 72; Canqou
data for late 1966 from USARV: l'ACAF Tactical Airlift Summsry, Dee 69, Dee 70.
.675
TACflCAL
AIRLIFT
Aug
Sep
Oc:t
Nov (TSN
det only)
'J'Iuat~
Mi81oI!8"
~
Sortia
Flying
ROlin
P(l#etgt!1'6
CtUtlO,
tons
2,4
2,399
1.899
879
2.820
2.861
2.180
1.075
47,167
56.080
44.051
17.084
8,513
7,062
5,g1.7
2,850
C-130 ~
~...
884'I1a8I1aDd
1912
Nov
Pee
2,219
2,825
2.900
4.046
36,818
48,543
6,341
5.800
1913
Jail
Peb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun"
Iul
Aug
Sep
Oct
3.085
3.073
3,014
1,824
2,029
1,048
1,(i19
2.~70
1.825
2,479
4.199
4.175
4,418
2,~S
2.018
1.031
1,596
3.081
2.493
2,963
66,159
36,890
39.356
9,170
9,134
1,jOt
1/1.75
7,440
1,CTrl
7,637
7,132
8,944
7,933
7,531
8,601
2,031
8.129
13.so1
9,Oli
14,627
<:-130 Caqo DeI1Yeries80C8IIIbodia
Airlond
Sonia
A lrdrop
Sorties
Totlll.
tons
Dee
326
666
441
772
353
440
t38
116
116
54
33
50
6,661
11,786
7,438
8,092
5,558
7,064
1974
Ian
Feb
Mar
Apr-Jun total
IuJ-Sep to~ .
314
232
31
115
63
94
61
93
833
288
6,609
4,023
1,392
11,737
4,180
1973
July
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
.
UA AnDf CarIbou(1"') ... C-1. of 4831dWillI
I~
Ian
Fob
Mar
Ape
May
680
CtUtlO.
Ions
Flylnf
HOllrs
(J.s. Army
6,058
9.559
11.949
12,545
11,170
3.761
1028
7,066
7.776
7,600
24,376
56,040
69.126
78,438
69.414
2,421
6,379
7,537
7,802
"6,302
I
TACTICAL AIRLIFT
Aircraft, Jun 10, 1968; Itr, Gea William
W. MOmyer, Cdr 11h AF, to COMUSMACV, sub}: Re4uirementl for Additional STOL Tactical Airlift, Jon IS,
1968; memo, Lt Oen James V. Edmundson, Vice Cdr, 7th, AP, to Celr 7th AF,
subj: Reqmt for Additional STOL Tactical Airlift, Sep 25, 1968; bac:ksrOlind
paper, Dir/Plans. Hq USAF, aubj: TIm:c
Airlift CV-2 Sqdns, 'Jul 66; Program
Budget Decision no 421. OR/See Def.
sub}: CV-2 Aircraft, Dee 22, 1966; mas.
ICS to' CINCPAC. 072224Z Aua 68;
IDS8. Cdr 7th AP, to Cdr PACAF.
1~210Z AIlS 68; rprt, AFXOP stUdy
Gp, Dlr/Opns. Hq USAF. Tactical Air.
lift Problems, 1966.
n,~
3rd Qtr, CY 68, Oct IS, 1968;
!DIP 21321, 28099, and 30501, MACV
COC to CJCS, 1609HZ, 230656Z Sep,
and 140124Z Oct 68; hist, MACV, I,
113-174.
'$0. Msg 68-3, 834111AD to Dir/Opl
Rcqmtl, Hq tJSAP (for Moore from
McLaushlin), sub;: C-7A Aircraft in
SEA, Ian 19, 1968.
SI. 'Study, Brig Om Burl W. MeLaugblin, Cdr 834111AD, and Maj Gen
Robert R. Williams, USA, USARV. IUbj:
Review of Air Force C-7A Operations
in Support of the Army, Apr 18, 1968;
11f, Lt Qea Bruce Palmer, USA, Dep
CO USARV, to Cdr 7th AF, subj: Re.
quiremeats for Additional STOL Tactical
Chapter XV
The Auxiliary Roles
I. Msa DOP 5i048. PACAF 10 7th
AP. 17000$Z lu) 66; rpn, PACAF, Airlift Rprt for May 66. RCS: AF-J-~8;
Borden intvw, Nov 4. 1970; rpns. 315m
AD. Commander's Review. jun 30 and
Dee 31.1966; rprt, Joint LoJistics Review
Board. Monograpb no 2 (Ammunition).
1970, pp ID-I<41.
2. CINCPAC Jnstruction 4600.38, Apr
3, 1967; hist, 31Stb AD, JAIl-Iun 68, 1.
$~2:
study. 31Sth AD, PACAF C-
Iioo. Airlift Orpnization i1\the PACOM
~,Oct
1'. 1%6; memo, CoJ Charles
W. Lcafe8t, Aat Dep Dir/Plans for War
Plans, Dir/Plans. Hq USAF, to AFXPoo, mbj: PACAF Aiitift OrganiZation
Structure, Sep 2. 1966; msg XPD 91625.
Dir/PJans,. Hq USAF, to PACAF (for
Gea VOSt), 242232Z May 66: rprt. Airlift StaB Gp. Visit to pACOM Area, 11
Oct-tO Nov 65; telecon. Lt CoJ Stouapr
to Col Umpleby, CHWI'O. 141013ZNov
1.30
65; mil
~
~
Ape 67; atudy.
VC $1124, TAC
to Hq ti'SAF
Hq PACAP and Hq MAC, Theater Air- - (XOP arid XPD). 211940Z Sep 65.
tift Study CY 67. Ian 31. J967.
6. Rprt, Lt GeD Glen W, Martin, 10
3. Hist. 463rd TCW, lan-JUII 67. pp USAF. VISitto PACOM to Evaluate Air11-'2; hiat, 314tb. TCWr, Jm...Jun 67. lift, 27 Feb-12 Mar 66: study. Dirl
p 5; hist, 374th TCW, Jan-Jun 61. PI
Plans,:t:J'q~ACAF;Organizat(on of 3J5tb
18-19.
.
Air Division, DPLM 7S1S3, May 16,
4. Rprt, Joint LogisticsReviewBoard. 196i~ '.
Monograph no 18 (Transportation and
7. PACAF PAD 69-2, sub;: PACOM
Movement Contro!), 1970, pp 145-150;, Airlift Or,ani%ation. Scp 24. 1968; Itr.
3I51h AD Manual 20-3. Mission and Re- Col Charles W. Howe, Cdr 315th AD, to
.
sponsibiJitjes,
May I, 1~; _,
Lt CINCPACAP,sub;: ar. of PACAF
Col Bruce G. Gilbreth. Cb, Comm-Eledr,
3tStb AD. to oc-so. 315m AD. subj:
Airlift Mission Monitorina System, Feb
25. 1965,
.
5. Msg DOP Q2080. 3I5tb AD to.
PACAF. 2306SSZ May 66; memo, Lt
Oen Hewitt T. Wheless, Asst Vice CSAP
to Air Staft ascm:ies, subj: CSAF Deci.
Airlift System, Jun 12. 1967; msg 00403.
7th AF to PACAF. sub$: Or, of PACAF
Airlift System. Iun IS, 1967; ms.. CSAF
to PAC;AF (for Ryan from McConnell).
042251Z Mar 67; IDS8. DirIPIans, Hq
PACAF, to 315tk AD. et ai, 110431Z
May '68; hilt, 315th AD, Jao-Jon 61,
pp 10-26, Jui-Dee 67, pp 14-15. Jan-
760
I
NOI'BS
Jun 68. pp 10-36. 241-242, Jut 68-Apt.pp
176-177; hUt, 315th AD. Jul 6869. pp 1-2. 17-23.
.
Apr 69. p 10; lb' 0311-68. Ch. wro to
8. Hilt. ClNCPAC, 1969. I. 179, 1971, CINCPAC J-4, IUb); PACON Theater
I. 305; lUst, 315th AD, TiJI 68-JS" ~JiF-Tactical 0at8ize Airlift Capabilily, 1968;
69. 'vol I. pp xxii; n~ ~i1'IJft~, (3IStA- study, PACAF aDd MAC, Theata' AIrlift
AD). Jan 1S, 1969; Armd Forcn }o"r- Study CY 67, Ian 31. 1967.
MI. May 31. 1969, P 30.
--'- --- 15. Hist, 31Sth AD. Jut 68-1$ Apr
9. JCSM-593-66, MaDO for See Def, 69, I, 9-10; ltr. Cot John R. Geyer, 4O.5th
tubj: Deployment of Troop Carrier Ptr We. to 13th AF. subj; Nomination
Uniti. Sep 17. 1966:rpns. Dir/~
. for.the USAF FIt Safety Plaque. Jan 12,
ment~..
Hq USAF. USAF Mm.
19'12;hilt. CINCPAC, 1969, I. 180-181,
asement SIII.1IIDaI'Y,
SEA, Oct 12, 1970 1970. I. 210-211; rprt, DirlTransp, 7th
aft4 Apr 20, 1972; hist, 2nd Ac-r -POrt AF. Hist Data Record. Oct-Dee 71;
GP. Apr-Jun 71, tIP IS-16: rprt, Co! biIt, 20th Opas Sq, lan-Mar 70 throuah
Raymond Gaylor, Cdr 2nd Aer Port Ian-Mar 71; hilt, 463rd TAWS, AprGP. Jut 72, pp 34-36; hilt. MACV, -1966. JUII 71, pp 8-10, Jld-Dee 71, tIP 3, 21,
pp 292-294,1967, pp 771-712, 1968, lIP 24,27.
669-670; rprt. Jomf I..osiIdcs Review
16. Ltr. Philip P. Hi1bert. Dep U/Sec:y
Bel. Mooosrapb 18, J.osiItic Support in (IA), Dept AP, for CSAP. subj: Tac:dcal
the Vietuam Era; Tf8DII)OI1atioo aJfd Airlift, Jan 11, 1972; tpItS, PACAP, Tal>
Movement ControJ, pp 93:-,99: rprt. tical Airlift Summary, Dee 69. Dee 70,
MACV 1-4, Losi8dcal HbtOrica1 A<:tiv. Peb 71; hilt, CINCPAC, 1969, IV, 89itiCa,Oct 21,1967.
..
9t, 1971, I, 314-31.5; hist, 374tb TAW"
10. Rprt. Lt Gen Glen W. Martin. IG Ian-Mar 69, p 92; hista, 463rd TAW,.
USAF, Visit to PACOM to EV8Iuate 1969 throu8h 1971; hists, 314th TAW,.
AidJft, 27 Peb-12 Mal 66; study. PACA'P
1969 tbrouah 1970.
aDd MAC, 'IbeateE.,AirlifLStudy._CY 67.
17. Rprt, Maj William W. Burnett,
Jan 31,15161; bist, MAC, Py 66. pp.531&lei of Tour, May 3, 1965; KimbaI1
533; hilt, Dir/Opua Hq USAF, Jan-JUa
jotvw, Nov 4, 1970; Borden intvw, Nov
66. pp 20-22.
4. 1970; hilt, 3l.5tb TCGp, 1101-31 Dee
n. Memo, Paul B. NiUe, See Def, 63, P 3; Kennedy intvw, Peb 4. 1964;
for See AF, SICS. RIb;: Jntta..theafer Afr. Hawkes," Ap in Vietnam Operation,"
lift Opus. Apr 5, 1968; msg..AECVc,
AmuicmJ Aviation, (Apr 64), pp 16Geft 101m D. R,an, Va CSAP: t~ 21; Air Force Times (ltrs to editor).
PACAP, 301501Z Oct 68; hisr. D1i'/ Mar 3. 1971.
Opas, Hq USAF, Jan-JUD 68. pp.141-1L
.Rprts, MACV, Monthly Bva1ua142, Jul-Dec 68. pp 185-186; hist, 3tlth
tion, Pcb through Jul 66; hr, MACV J-4,
AD, lul 68, AIK IS, 1969, I. 71-75;
to Cdr 2nd AD. subj: C-123 Flare Suphist. ClNCPAC, I96&, -IV, l~.
pGa..-Commitmenll, Pcb 11, 1966: lb',
.131-]4]; kilt. MAC, Py 69, pp )74-1.1.
MACV J-4, to Cdr 7th AP, subj; C12. Rprt, Co) R. H. Goodell, USA, )23 Flare Support Commitments, Apr 5,
Cdr TMAs MACV, Debriefing Rprt .-l966;-rprt, Lt Col Hugh L Bayues, Cdr
(BOTR). Jut I. 1968, p 27; hilt, 7th Ap,
311th ACSq. Debriefing Report, Jut "
Ian-Iun 68, I, 79; McLaughlin intvw. 1966; lb', Col Georae L Hannah, Cdr
Apr 20.1970.
..
USth ACGp, to 315th AD, subj: UMD
. 13. JIist. 374th TCWg. Aug.-Dee 66, Change Request, New 16, 1965; Ib',
pp 29-)0; hilt, 314th TCWS, Ian-Jun 66; CO! WlJliam A Mc:Laushlio, Dir/Opna,
P 51; memo, Col Oliver C. Doan. Asst ,,3Uth ACW,. to 7th AP. Dir/Alrlift,
DCSIPen, PACAP, to CIS PACAP,
subj: July MONEVAL Rprt, Aui 5,
sub'; my Credit for C-130 Airaewa,
1966; rprt, 3l.5th AD, SignikaDt Airlift
Dee 8, 1966; CIarIt intvw, Nov 4, -me,..- Accomplilbments for )965; rprt, 315th
. 14. Rprt, OpRS Analysis Oft Hq ACWg. 3JSth ACWg Aixomplisbmentl,
USAP, :Aualyais of seA Airlift OpM, Jul 19. 1966.
Sep 66; IUCIDO.Eugene M.
~
SAF;-
.
19. Maj Victor B. ADtbony, The AF ill
to See: Del, subj: Inactivation of C-124 'SoU/Mast AM TGClic6and Technlqua
Sqdn at Hunter APB, AuS 3, 1965; msa of Nisht OpemtioM, 1961-1970 (Offl AP
00'23, DCS/Opns, 31Sth AD to P~'--HiIj;
Mar 73), pp 36-43. mss DOP
061435Z Apr 65; hist, IS03td Att Tr SOO2J. PACAP to 31Sth AD, et 4d.
Op; qtrl)', 1965; bist, ClNCPAC. 196B, U21S6Z Ian 65; IIISgDO 02M)'. DeSI
761
.
I
NOTES
rtrt. Laurerice E. Lynii, Qit/Ec:onOlDi" 27080SZ JUt 62; _8 ISO. 2nd AD to Dq
and Mobility 'Pon:es, Off See De! (Sys USAF, et lIl, 021002Z Oct 65: .Clark
Analy.~).. aubj: Trip R.P.rt, AIlJ 67; pp intvw, NoV 4, 1910; Peiry intvw, Nov 3.
1970; West intVW,May 5, 1970: Borders
IO-If; .lit, Bria. Gen William E. Bryan.
De, CIS MACV, to CG USARV, subj: intVW,Nov 4,1970: Blake intvw. May~,
Aviation Support of Am Loaistics Com- 1970.
mand Advisors, Nov 14, 1967: IDCIIIO, 62. RpJt,' Airiift Staff Gp, Rprt or
Cdr Marinc Refuel~ Transp Sq 152, to USAF 1t.irlift Staft Visit to .PACOM
Area, 11 Oct-tO Noy 65: stUdy, Hist
CO IslMAWg, subj: Command CbfoDiy, 13th AF, subj: The USAF Buildup
nololY, Nov 16, 1?65; rprt, MACV J-3
in Thaitand. I, 27-28: memo, Harold
to Hist ')Jr,. MACVi sub;: Jul 68 Hilt
S~,
AIlS 21. I~;
rp(I, MACV Brown, ~ AP, to ~ Det; subj: 'I'b&
1-4, .LOOSUM 9-68 'for Alia 68: Sep land ConstnJdi~ Prosram. Jul U, I~;
~
C-043. PACAF to CSAP (pen' for
22, 1968; rprtI, MACV, i:2trIy Evalua.
tion; Dee 67 and t:eti 68: Vice Adm McConnell .from Harril). l0062SZ Jut
Edwin B. HooPer, Mobility, Support, 66; tDSJ, PACAF to Dir/Plans, Hq
USAF, 13204SZ Jut 66: commander's
EridIlrance: .d Story of Naval OpeN.
tfD1UJlLogutic$ in. the. YieflUlm War, rmew, 31Sth AD, Sep 68, p A-4; hiat,
374th TCWg, Ju1-Sep 67. pp 8-9; biSt,
1965-1968 (J9aval Hill Diy, Dept/Navy,
(972), pp 146-141; fact sheet, USMarine 31Sth AD. 1966, I. 49, mag, DirlTact
FoR:es in Vietnam, Historic-.l Summary,
Opns. 3tSth AD, to PACAP, 13th AF;
060238Z Dee 67.'
.
Mar 65-Sep 61, 1961, vol IT.
.
63. .Rprt, Airlift Staff Gp, RepOrt of
51..}tact 8&_ 1-45 MACV, 81Ibj:
LoJiltie.AirIift AetivltY in RVN, Oct 21, USAF. Airlift StaIf Visit to PACOM
1968: brief, Dir/OPns, Hq USAF. mbj: Area, 11 Oct:"10Noy 65; biat, CINCPAC.
PCPIR:N-7-OO5, RaPid. Responic Air- 1961, pp 862-863: bist, 31Sth AD. JanJUD 65, P. 7. Jul-Dec 65, I. ~7; hist.
lift for SEA; May I, 1967.
58. Ltr, Lt Gen J. L Richardson, USA, 315th TCGp, Jan-Jun 65, pp 3-5; rprt,
Cdr, JTP-II6; to ClNCPAC, et al, Li Gen Glen W. Martin, tG USAF,
subj: AAR. Dee.8, 1962; rprt, AP ComP Visit. to. PACOM to Evaluate Airlift,
Feb 27-Mar t~ 1966.
.
Cd, JTF-!16, Hist of the APCC, JTP64. H~, 631Sth Aerial Port Sq, Apr116, New 2$. 1962; mt8 21S53A, 13th
AP to PACAP, 150850Z lun 62: Itr, AIlJ 65; f!ist, 6th Aerial Port Sq, JanJwi66; hist, 13th AP. 1965, II, 134;
Col William T. baty, Cdr'464th TCW..
to OOAWalter SWeeneY.Cdr TAC. sub;: PACAF sb 0-27, Apr 6. 1965: hill,
Trill Rprt, SBA,Aq 15, 1?61; bact- 315th TCGp, Jan-IUD 63, pp 3S-4Z.
65. Staft summ sbeeI, Col A. L Hil.
pound. ,.per, DirIPlaIll, Hq USAF,
pert, DCS/Plans, 7th AF, subj: ~7A
Mibj: US., 8ftCI .ADiccI Military Forc:c8
Tb,ai1ancf.,Jurt 8, 1'62.
Support fOr MACTHAI, Nov 6, 1966;
. '.5'. MIa A-cmr, MCC. JTF-1t6. to -ltr, Col Louis P. Lindsay,. Dir/Opris,
13th AP, 211515Z May 62; maa 19SB, 834th AD, to 7th AF, Dir/Plan.. sub;:
2nd ADVON to DJrIOpns, 13th AP, MACTHAI C-7A SupPort, Apr 25, 1967;
0143. CINCPAC to Cdr MACV,
May 13, 1962: msr J1S5B. 2nd ADVON ~
subj: JUSMAO Thailand Acfl keqmts,
to .13th AP, 290MSZ May 62; mq
6~1647~ UtJl AP. to JTP-116, 14093SZ Mar ;J, 1964; bist, 458th TASq, luJ.;.sep
lun 62;
62A1669, Utlt AF to 31Sth '68;)tr, Cot John I. Daniel, DCO/483rd
Air Div and. 1503111AN.. 160734 10ft TCWS, to Dir/Ops, 377th ABW" subj:
62; lU', IG 13th AF, to.601oth Tact Gp. C-7 ()pns, Fet> 29, 1972: ms, LG,
aubj: Accident Pmrcntion Survey, 6010th 7IJ3th AF to 13th AF. 131100z Mar
Tact Gp. NoY 23, 1962: PACAF reriew, 72: bist, MACTHAI, 1969, pp 31-32,
:Mar62.
.
1970;pp 12-14. 1971, p 12: 483rd TCWg
OPORD 70-5,. Dee 1" 1970.
60. DiriMii
~
OASD/ISA,
66.. Bist; MACi1:tAI. 1970.,pp 66-72;
/~
ot ~
~e,
hut 62,
P 154, Sop 62, p H4. Mar 63, p 174; hilt, CINCPAC, 1970. pp 347-349, 1971,
hilt, Dir/Plans, Hq. USAF, Jul-Dec 6~ pp' 315-311; bist, 3J4th TAW..' APrPP. 133. 18i-1SS, Jan-Jun 63, p 177; . Jun 10~ pp 48-49. Oct-Dec70. pp 26-27,
35, Jan-Mar 71, ~ 14-15, 42-44, Apr-:
bist, CJNCPAC, 1963, P. 107.
.
61. M8&. 1-257G, Znd ADVON to May 11, p 20; intvw, author with Maj
William T. Po8ey, Hq USAF; Mar 29,
PACAP (pen from Anthis to Moorman),
765
I
TACfJCAL AIRLIFT
1974; intYw. author with Ma; B. J. Clark.
Hq USAF, Mar 29, 1964; hiM. :r74th
TAWs. Jun-Sep 71, pp 34-35: msg,
PACAF to 13th AF. OS0222Z May 72.
67. Hilt, MACV, 1!)65; P 354; msg
JCS 002919. Joint $taft"J-3, to CINC,
PAC. n al. lS020IZ Dee 64; Itatf paper,
Atch to JCSM 847-64. 8Ubj: .Thai and
Filipino Contributions to the War Effon
in SVN. Oct 3. 1964; DOD Pt!ntagon
Pap«".. vol IV. pt Iv-c-1-(~). p xvi.
68. Ms&62-339J. 2nd AD to I>ACAP.
13th AF (pen from Anthis for Moorman
and Milton). 2223S0Z Oct 62; iusg,
CINCPAC to JCS. 230609Z Ian 63; insg
6300101.. 2nd AD to 13th AF. PACAF
(to Martin and Milton from Anthis).
101S30Z lap 63: IDSa 63-0037; P,ACAP
to Dir/Plan" Hq USAF. 221845Z Jan
63; msg 131. Ch, MAG China, to ctNcPAC, 040731Z Jan 66; msg 01180. CIS
MACV to CINCPAC, 130334Z Jan 66;
msg. ClNCPAC to Jcs. 29064SZ Dee
RT AP Victory Fiipt, Dee. 8, 1971: bid,
U4th AD, Ian-Iun 71. pp 70-71; I!ist.
MACV; 1966, pp 98-99. 1970. pp VIIS to VI-16. 1971, pp VI-5. ~17,
G-18; hist, USMACTHAI, ARnex B.Hin
CINCPAC, 1966. pp 152-153: Bear.
Employmt!tlt of Air. pp 4-1272. Ltr. Hq USAF ~DR
(Yuclkin)
to APXPD. subj: AasiaDineDt of Sbi
Australian Can'bou "eft to .SVN, )ul 2,
1~; IDS, PPLQC 32G6-64, PACAP to
AFXPD, Hq USAF. subj! Auatralian
Aid to RVN, JUD2.5, 1964; mil PFLOC.
PACAP to CSAF (APOD), 020446Z
Apt-64; msr. CINCPAC to JCS, 27203SZ
100 63.
73. Borders intvw, Nov 4, 1970; rpn,
Lt Col Harry G. Howton. Cdf 311th
TCSq, EOTR, Sep 6. 1965; JoJll'NJl of
MiIikuy Auistanct!, Dee 64, P .l79; hilt,
~
Air Div. 1 Jan-30 100 65, I, 94;
110, Cdr 2Dd Air Div, to MACV 1-3,
subj: MONBVAL, Oct 2, Nov 3, 1964,
and Ian 4, 1965.
66; daily staff journal, G-3 Advisory Sect,
CTZ, Oct 26 through Oct 28, 1967:
74. HJst, 3JSth TCGp, Jan-Jun .65.
hlst, MACV. 1965, pp 73. 37(J 371. 1966. pp 14-16; Mil, I.t CoI.F. Ackerson, Aat
pp71J..-87.
See, Joint Statr MACV. sub;: J-3 Briefinr:
69. Pad sbect, MACV. Third Country to COMUSMACV, subj: . ~\l8traJian
Assistance to GVN. May 8. 1964; IDSa, Bripde; Mar 12, 1966; 834th AD
US Embusy. Manila to See State, OPLAN 520-67, Utilization of RAAF no
30103SZ Oct 64; atch to ICSM 847-64. 35 Sqdn. Vietnam, Ian 1. .1967; mnb!)'
workin,a.-t,
COMUSMACV
and
IUbj: Thai and Filipino Contributions
to the War Effort in SVN. Oct 3, 1964: Ch, CIS Committee Aastralla. Nov 30,
memo. ICS to See Def (JCS 2343/484).
1967; lames T. Bear, Tlrt R..4AF Err
subj: Philippine Assiatan~ to SVN. Nov Solliheat AM.
(Hq PACAP. Prol
3, 1964; hist, NACV. 1%7. pp 277-280; CHECO, $ep 30, 1970). pp 29-40.
IDSg4193. US EmbaSl)' (Wilson) to See
75. A1"&le, "Roy8I AuatraJian Air
State, 061035Z Nov 67; hlst, 463rd Pon::e caribous in VietAam-t964 to
TAW.. Jan-Mar 68, pp 12-13.
1972," The Royal Air F_
Quarterly.
70. James T. Bear, The BmplO)'lfUnIof
summer 1972, pp 133-J36; Bear, RAAF,
AIr l1y the' Thah 4UUlKoretJIU III SEA. pp 29-43; rprt. Australian Fon:e Viet.
CHq PACAF. Proj CHECO, Oct 30, nam, Monthly Rpn for Nov 71. Dee I.,
1970). pp 4-7; bilt, NACV. 1965, P 1971; msa. Dir/Oph. 834tb AD to
372; fact Ibeets. MACFWMAO, Hq PACAP DOAL. 270237Z Dee 69i lUst.
MACV, sub;: Thai Military AssIsianee to MACV, 1971. p VI-5; mI, 00-02310,
RVN. Mar 7 and JUD 6. 1966; msg 7th AF to AFXOPFH,.. Hq USAF,
2CCR-00542,-2nd AD to CSAF, PACAP. 09tJ26Z I~ 67; rpi"t, Opns Analysis,
13th AF (peR fot Huris and MadduJl' Vte:CCSAP. Hq USAF, Analysia of SEA
from Moore). 300SS7Z Oct 64.
Airlift Opus, Sep 66.
76. Rpns, ExcbanllOO~
Tour Re7.1. Hist, 19th ACSq. 19th Sp Ops Sq.
19th TASq, Jul 66 throup May 71; fact ports, Maj Glen A. Bentz, Dee: 18. J968,
sheets. Free Worfd Mil Assistance Off, Capt William M. Harley. Dee 12, 1969,
MACV, subj: Thai Mil Assistana: to Capt Jack L Tmius, Apr 70. Capt Jamea
RVN, Jail J t. Mar 7, and IUD 6. J967: C. Bobick. Bep 70; hilt, MACV, I~O.
memos, PwMAO. MACV to SJS MACV, vol I, pp VI-14 to VI-U; Bear, R~..4F.
Iubj: Hist Summ (or Apr-Jun 66 and rip 40-43.
Jul-Sep 66; bac:1aroulid paper, MAC-'
77. Ms. XPD 84083, Dlr/P18ns. Hq
THAI, subj: RTAF VICtory Plight, lea
USAF. to PACAF, 30213SZ JUD65; mI,
1970J; fact sheet. MACV 1-5, subj: XPDO 78704, A8StDep Dir/PoJiey, Dirl
n
766
I