Organizational mess

Transcription

Organizational mess

The case of General "Jack" Lavelle
file:///Users/edmarek/Documents/Talking%20Proud/HistoryLav...
The case of General "Jack" Lavelle, the
suits double-crossed him
Go!
The organizational mess: the cardinal military rule, unity of
command, demolished.
March 23, 2007
We are going to try to explain the organizational mess that existed
when General Lavelle took command of the 7th AF in August
1971, age 55. We'll acknowledge up-front that this is not an
exciting read. We can say with certainty, however, that it's an
important one to understanding what happened in the
Vietnam-Laos War.
Let's start with what is meant by "unity of command," the number
one military organizational, command and control rule. Simply
said, a subordinate should have one and only one superior to
whom he or she is directly responsible.
Here is the organization chart that applied, 1966-1972. We wish to
stress that this organization chart focuses, in the main, on air
operations, which is the subject at hand. To narrow the focus even
more, for the most part our attention is on air operations over
North Vietnam. That's because this is where General Lavelle was
double-crossed by his superiors.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The organizational mess: the
cardinal military rule, unity
of command, demolished.
The "Rules of Engagement"
story in the Vietnam-Laos
Wars
The year 1968, a pivotal one
to this story; a reminder of
the significant events
Reconnaissance over North
Vietnam: the RF-4C
Phantom II and the 432nd
Tactical Reconnaissance
Wing (TRW)
Events leading to the
double-cross, a sad episode
in civilian control of the
military
The above chart, provided by Air Force Magazine, is a little hard
to read. Try to bear with us.
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is at the top of the chart.
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During the Vietnam Laos War, the JCS members included the
Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), the Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF),
and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The Commandant of
the Marine Corps (CMC) could meet with the JCS as a co-equal
whenever any matter concerning the Marines was under
consideration, which was most of the time. While each of these
officers served in a "joint" capacity (more than one military
service) with the JCS, most of their time and energy were spent
running their individual military services. They did that through
their civilian secretaries. Their job was to man, train and equip
their people to fight. Many think these men are combatant
commanders. Not so. They manage their individual military
services to assure they can provide the people and equipment to
the combatant commander that he needs.
During the Lavelle tour, 1971-1972, the following held those
positions.
General William Westmoreland,
CSA (1968-1972)
General John D. Ryan, CSAF
1969-1973
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., CNO,
1970-1974
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General Leonard, Jr., CMC,
1968-1971
General Robert Cushman, Jr., CMC
1972-1975
The chairman serves as the principal military adviser to the US
president, the secretary of defense, and when there was one active,
the National Security Council (NSC). Back in the days of
Vietnam-Laos, some senior military leaders questioned how much
authority the secretary of defense really had. We know of at least
one case, which we will report later, where a combatant
commander told the secretary he did not have an authority to stop
a search and rescue effort, that only the president had that
authority, and he demanded to speak to the president, from whom
he received approval to do what he wanted to do.
During the period of the Vietnam-Laos War, three chairmen of the
JCS served: General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, 1962-1964;
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, 1964-1970; and Admiral Thomas
H. Moorer, USN, 1970-1974.
General Wheeler (left on photo) and Admiral Moorer (seated to
the right of President Nixon on the right) were the two chairmen
during Lavelle's term with 7th AF.
The roles of the CJCS, the JCS and the supporting Joint Staff have
evolved and changed over the years, depending on the president,
the secretary of defense and the other personalities involved. That
means it has been a politically tough position to hold.
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In principle, the CJCS is the chief spokesman for the military and
chief military advisor to the secretary of defense and the president.
But the level of his influence and access have varied over the
years. During much of the Vietnam-Laos War, the secretary of
defense persistently overruled JCS advice and recommendations,
especially when JCS members advised that administration or
secretarial policies would not work.
Next on the chart are two commands, the US Pacific Command
(PACOM), a unified command, and the Strategic Air Command
(SAC), at the time, a specified command. They both reported to
the JCS. Both are combatant commands; i.e., they fight. They
draw their people and equipment from the individual services.
Present-day PACOM Area of REsponsibility (AOR) in yellow.
PACOM, a unified command, had a regional focus and was a joint
command. A unified command could set up sub-unified
commands; a specified command could not. For example, back in
the 1960s-1970s, we had US Forces Japan (USFJ) and US Forces
Korea (USFK), both of whom reported to PACOM.
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B-52 "Stratofortress" long range,
strategic bomber
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM)
SAC, a specified command, had a functional rather than
geographical focus, and, at the time, was an USAF-only
organization. Prior to the Vietnam-Laos War, SAC's main mission
was to conduct nuclear attacks. It kept that mission throughout the
war to the present though it has undergone considerable
organizational change. During the Vietnam-Laos War, SAC would
take on conventional attack missions using non-nucelar ordnance,
in close air support and strategic roles.
Inclusion of PACOM in the organizational chart for the Vietnam
Laos War was obvious; both those countries resided within its
geographical area of responsibility (AOR).
U-2
RC-135
SR-71
SAC was included because SAC B-52 long range, heavy bombers
were needed, as were SAC SR-71, U-2 and RC-135
reconnaissance aircraft. There was also some thought given to
employing nuclear weapons against North Vietnam, using SAC
resources. For our purposes, SAC issued its orders to its 8th AF in
Guam for the B-52s which flew out of Guam and Utapao Royal
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Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), Thailand.
Unified commands have service component commands
subordinate to them. In the case of PACOM , these were the
Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), the Pacific Air Force (PACAF), and US
Army Pacific (USARPAC). Each one of these had operational
commitments to the unified command, PACOM, but also reported
to their respective military service chiefs in Washington: the CNO,
CSAF, and CSA, all three of whom provided personnel and
equipment to these components.
In the case of the Vietnam War (not including Laos), the JCS
created the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, MACV.
It was a sub-unified command. MACV reported to PACOM. For
organizational chart purposes, it was on the same hierarchal level
as PACFLT and PACAF. We'll talk to that in a moment.
These two men were in charge of PACOM and MACV when
General Lavelle was commanding the 7th AF. General Creighton
Abrams, USA (right), was COMUSMACV from 1968-1972
(Photo credit: Lon Holmberg. Presented by Combat Camera).
General Abram's boss throughout his tour as COMUSMACV was
Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN (left), CINCPAC from
1968-1972 (Photo credit: Family photo. Presented by The
Washington Post.)
COMUSMACV was responsible for combat operations in the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) only, though later in the war he
would acquire control over the eastern part of southern Laos and a
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portion of North Vietnam on the other side of the DMZ.
Unraveling the tangle of control in Laos is harder, and we'll not
spend much time on it here. The US Ambassador, Vientiane, Laos,
CINCPAC, and CIA all had a hand in it. For our purposes,
CINPAC controlled air operations in Laos, except for southern
Laos, which COMUSMACV often controlled because it was so
close to the RVN.
All USAF air operations in Vietnam and Laos began covertly.
They became overt in Vietnam very quickly while they remained
covert in Laos for a very long time. The covert character of
operations in both countries in the beginning impacted an
important topic for later, the rules of engagement, or ROE.
We're going to present the organizational chart again so you don't
always have to go to the top of the page.
You will note that USARPAC is not on the chart, while PACFLT
and PACAF are, and the latter two are at same organization level
as MACV. This is where we have the first major breakdown in the
unity of command. In the best of all worlds, PACAF, PACFLT and
SAC would not be on this chart; instead, there would be one line
from PACOM to MACV and then to MACV's service
components. That was not to be.
PACFLT and PACAF had special responsibilities in Vietnam that
could not be exercised by MACV. There was a US Army Vietnam
(USARV) component. Remember, this chart deals mainly with air
operations; from an air operations standpoint, USARPAC had no
special responsibilities such as held by PACFLT and PACAF.
Therefore, there was no need to have it on this chart.
The combat organization from now on gets tricky.
Let's concentrate for the moment on
MACV. It was a sub-unified
command subordinate to PACOM. It
had three US components, two
ground force (US Army Vietnam and
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III Marine Amphibious Force), one
air force (7th AF), but you see no
naval force on this chart.
The Navy's integration with MACV
is a study by itself. We'll simply say
that a Naval Force Vietnam
(NAVFORV) was established in 1967, mainly to take care of
riverine forces and naval forces on the ground throughout
Vietnam. Naval air, however, remained outside MACV's authority,
and therefore it is not on this air-oriented chart.
The Navy refused to assign any of its
aircraft to the operational control of
MACV, 7th AF, or PACAF. Instead,
the Navy kept its tactical aircraft
under the control of its 7th Fleet
through Task Force 77 in the Gulf of
Tonkin. Task Force 77 (TF-77) was an
aircraft carrier battle strike force that
often had more than one carrier group
on station at a time. Their station was
referred to as "Yankee Station," in the Gulf of Tonkin, usually
positioned just south of the 17th parallel which ran through the
DMZ. Most Navy flights from TF-77 were over North Vietnam.
The USAF assigned 7th AF to MACV and 7th AF had forces
stationed throughout the RVN to respond to MACV operational
requirements in the RVN, a part of Laos, and a portion of North
Vietnam above the DMZ. For air operations over North Vietnam
above the 20th parallel, the 7th AF reported directly to PACAF.
PACAF had operational control of USAF tactical forces operating
over this sector of North Vietnam. SAC had operational control
over B-52 strategic bombing and SAC reconnaissance (SR-71,
U-2, RC-135) flights over Laos, the Gulf of Tonkin, and North
Vietnam.
This all means that MACV did not have operational control over
US combat flights over most of North Vietnam or Laos, with the
exceptions we have mentioned. MACV's main mission focus was
the war in the RVN.
The problem here for MACV, of course, was that the North
Vietnamese operated all the way from China through North
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the RVN. Segmenting
responsibilities for defeating an enemy that operated throughout
this broad region made life very difficult for everyone involved,
especially MACV.
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Route Packages in North Vietnam. Presented by Air Force Magazine.
The USAF and Navy divided North Vietnam into Route Packs,
also called Route Packages (RP). There were seven such RPs,
numeral one through 6A and 6B. Seventh AF, wearing its MACV
hat, was given operational control over RP-1, the southernmost
pack that bordered on the northern side of the DMZ. This was
because MACV had a lot of forces on the southern side of the
DMZ, and the North Vietnamese infiltrated across the DMZ in
small and very large numbers from RP-1. When MACV sent
ground troops into the DMZ to meet and destroy these enemies,
he needed to provide close air support and interdiction of the
forces and supplies on the other side of the DMZ.
Most Navy flights of interest to us for this report were over North
Vietnam. The Navy, through PACFLT, 7th Fleet and TF-77 was
responsible for RP-s 2, 3 and 6B. The USAF, as mentioned, was
responsible for RP-1, through 7th AF with its MACV hat; and RPs
4, 5, and 6A through 7th AF's line of command to PACAF. Hanoi
was in RP-6A (7th AF), and Haiphong port was in RP-6B
(TF-77).
Coordination between 7th AF and TF 77 was done through an Air
Coordinating Committee. The chairman of that committee was the
commander, 7th AF. Marine fighters over the RVN were
controlled by the Marine commander on the ground until 1968.
After that, they were controlled by 7th AF.
Perhaps you noted that there is an "Air Deputy" position off to the
side under MACV. Positioning that box off to the side means the
Air Deputy was a staff position, not a command position. In this
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role, he provided staff advice and staffing to MACV in air
operations matters.
We have thus far addressed multiple hats worn by General
Lavelle, which is the military way of saying he had multiple
bosses depending on the missions involved:
Commander, 7th AF, subordinate to MACV, responsible for
all USAF and Marine air operations over the RVN, a
portion of southeastern Laos, a portion of North Vietnam
above the DMZ (RP-1), except for those air operations
conducted by SAC anywhere in the theater.
Commander, 7th AF, subordinate to PACAF, responsible for
all USAF air operations in RPs 4, 5 and 6A in North
Vietnam, again except for those conducted by SAC.
Commander, 7th AF, subordinate to PACAF, which was in
turn subordinate to PACOM. We'll get to Laos in a moment,
but PACOM had operational control over USAF air
operations over Laos, and exercised that control over 7th
AF through PACAF.
Chairman, Air Coordination Committee, tasked to
coordinate USAF and Navy flights over North Vietnam.
Air Deputy, MACV, providing overall air operations advice
to MACV.
While this is an organizational mess, once you get the dust to
settle, it turns out that the commander, 7th AF had a way of
getting his hands in the cookie jar for just about all air operations
conducted throughout the theater. He just had to figure out which
door to enter, and how briskly. This required a consummate
politician.
Let's now turn to Thailand and Laos. Both were USAF and CIA
countries.
Air America Ramp at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base. Source: CIA. Presented
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by wikipedia.
Lewis Hatch IV (right), USAF pilot, with his Laotian marked O-1 Bird Dog
Forward Air Controller (FAC) aircraft, probably at Pakse, Laos, with his Laotian
backseat observer-communicator. Presented by The Ravens.
CIA's Air America conducted many air operations over Laos from
landing strips in Laos and from USAF air bases in Thailand. The
USAF flew aircraft over Laos for CIA from those same landing
strips in Laos and from USAF air bases in Thailand. Both the
USAF and CIA worked closely with the Royal Thai Air Force
(RTAF) and the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF), at USAF air
bases in Thailand and from landing strips in Laos. USAF pilots
flew RLAF marked aircraft on combat missions in Laos,
sometimes from CIA landing strips in Laos, sometimes from
USAF air bases in Thailand, and CIA Air American pilots did the
same. And, of course, USAF pilots flew USAF marked aircraft
over Laos on bombing missions there and on their way to bomb
North Vietnam, usually from USAF air bases in Thailand.
For our purposes, we will zero in on the many air bases in
Thailand that were used to launch USAF attacks against North
Vietnam.
Except for RP-1, the other USAF RPs (4, 5 and 6B) in North
Vietnam were operationally controlled by PACAF. SAC retained
operational control over its B-52s operating there. We will not talk
much about the SAC missions, but instead focus on what were
called the tactical fighter-bomber and reconnaissance flights over
North Vietnam. Most of these flew out of bases in Thailand.
To do this and make sense to newcomers to all this, we'll need to
address the legacy of Army Air Corps organization from WWII.
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Devastated
Japan's air, land,
and sea forces in
the South West
Pacific Area
employing
fighters and
bombers.
USAF's oldest
numbered AF.
Evolved from the
Hawaii Air Force.
Clobbered at
Pearl Harbor.
Returned the
favor against
Japanese on
strategic islands
in the Pacific and
Japan itself.
Known as the
"Jungle Air
Force," flew
fighters and
bombers
throughout the
Southwest
Pacific
Created for air
combat operations
in India and
Burma, but also
served in China.
Known for its
strategic B-29
attacks against
Japan's home
islands. General
Hap Arnold
saved this new
bomber for the
20th and Japan's
home islands.
Outgrowth of the
"Flying Tigers",
flying mostly from
China. Still bears
that nickname
today.
During WWII, four numbered air forces did the fighting in what
was known as the Southwest Pacific Area, SWA: the 5th, the 7th,
the 13th, and 20th. The 10th and the 14th AFs fought in another
theater known as the China-Burma-India Theater, the CBI. We
will not discuss the 10th and 14th here. The 20th AF did the
heavy, B-29 strategic bombing. It set the stage for the evolution of
SAC.
Following WWII, the 5th AF remained in Japan. The 7th AF
operated from Hawaii and the 13th AF from the Philippines. The
5th AF did most of the fighting in Korea, while the 13th AF
provided staging bases for people and equipment destined for
Korea. The 20th did some bombing in Korea. We'll not discuss it
any more either.
Let's hone in on the 13th AF. Following Korea, the 13th AF
remained at Clark AB in the Philippines, and prepared for future
contingencies. Generally, 5th AF took responsibility for Japan
including Okinawa, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Southeast
Asia fell under the 13th AF AOR.
When the suits decided to insert US
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air power to Vietnam, the 2nd
Advanced Echelon (ADVON)
organized under the 13th AF. That
occurred in October 1962. It
deployed fliers, maintenance people
and aircraft in Vietnamese Air Force
(VNAF) markings to Bien Hoa, RVN
in 1962. These aircraft were for the
VNAF, but the USAF people had to
train them. As you'll see, to train them our pilots had to fly them,
and training flights were flown in combat. That USAF people
were in Vietnam was not covert, much of what they were doing
was in the early days.
More and more aircraft and fliers kept coming, so the ADVON
was deactivated and the 2nd Division reactivated. It was
headquartered in Saigon and was responsible for all air support to
the Army of the RVN (ARVN). Remember, this was three years
before the Gulf of Tonkin (1964), which helps explain all the
covert activity.
The 2nd ADVON began with a wild assortment of propeller
driven aircraft and quickly began taking on jet aircraft as it grew
into the 2nd AD. By the end of 1965, it was in charge of some 500
USAF combat aircraft in the RVN.
The main point to remember here is that the 13th AF initially was
responsible for USAF air operations in the RVN, not the 7th.
Lt. General Joseph H. Moore, Jr.,
shown here viewing some
photography, served as the 2nd AD
commander from January 1964-April
1966, through much of the USAF
buildup and Rolling Thunder
bombing campaign against North
Vietnam. The USAF history, The
United States Air Force in Southeast
Asia, 1961-1973, provides fantastic
background on these early USAF
operations; we had access to its
Chapter IV: The Air War Against
North Vietnam."
When we refer to it in this report,
we'll simply call it the "USAF History." Here's a relevant excerpt:
"Coordination of USAF and VNAF air operations devolved
upon General Moore and his successors. Besides being
responsible to Washington authorities and the commanders
of the two unified commands, Admiral Sharp (CINCPAC)
and General Westmoreland (COMUSMACV), the 2d Air
Division commander also was required to work closely with
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the U.S. ambassadors in Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok. In
undertaking air strikes, political considerations were usually
paramount. For example, squadrons based in Thailand could
attack targets in North Vietnam and Laos but not in South
Vietnam. In June 1965 General Moore was assigned the
additional job of serving as MACV Deputy Commander for
Air Operations, but it did not greatly increase his authority
or alter his responsibilities for three separate but related
areas of operations- South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and
Laos.
"The President retained such firm control of the air
campaign against the North that no important target or new
target areas could be hit without his approval. His decisions
were relayed through Secretary McNamara to the Joint
Chiefs, who then issued strike directives to CINCPAC. The
latter, in turn, apportioned fixed targets and armed
reconnaissance routes among the U.S. Air Force, U.S.
Navy, and the Vietnamese Air Force."
While the 13th AF's 2nd AD was in Saigon and responsible for
the RVN, the 13th AF was also activating units in Thailand. We
are going to spend a little time on these bases. These were the
main bases from which USAF tactical bombing missions attacked
enemy forces, air interdiction and strategic targets in Laos and
North Vietnam. You will see they had a wide assortment of
aircraft to do this (we do not pretend to cover them all) and that
they began doing it early, way before the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, and continued doing it through the end.
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The air bases in Thailand. Presented by American Forces Thailand Network
unofficial web site.
Original members of the Able Mable Reconnaissance Task Force standing next to
an RF-101 "Voodoo. at Don Muang RTAFB, Thailand. Presented by Jeff Glaser's
The Secret Vietnam War: The United States Air Force in Thailand, 1961-1975."
RF-101 "Voodoo" reconnaissance aircraft were deployed to Don
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Muang RTAFB, Bangkok's main airport, as part of the Able
Marble Reconnaissance Task Force. They started flying missions
over Laos in 1961. To our knowledge, these were the first official
USAF missions flown from Thailand over Laos. F-102 "Delta
Daggers" were deployed there as well to provide air defense for
Thailand.
Thud Row, Takhli RTAFB Flight Line 1965. Photo courtesy Jimmy Butler.
Presented by Takhli.org
F-100 "Super Sabres" deployed to Takhli RTAFB in early 1961
from the US, and then rotations began with F-100s from Clark
AB, Philippines. The mission was Laos, and enemy infiltration
routes through Laos. KC-135 tankers arrived in 1965. The 355th
TFW moved from Kansas in 1965 with F-105 "Thuds." They flew
Rolling Thunder attacks against North Vietnam. F-111 "Ardvark"
bombers arrived in 1967. All F-105s were consolidated here in
1969. The 355th inactivated at Takhli in 1970. The 347th TFW
took over in 1973, flying F-111s. Tankers withdrew in 1973. The
347th moved to Korat in 1974. The base was closed and returned
to the Thai government.
US Army "Camp Friendship" is in the foreground, the cantonment area where the
first Air Force people at Korat RTAFB stayed. The RTAFB can been seen at the
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top of the photo. Photo taken in 1964 and presented by Photo Gallery for the 44th
Engineer Group (Construction), Camp Friendship, Korat, Thailand
A small USAF advisory team arrived at Korat RTAFB in 1962.
F-105D "Thuds" deployed from Japan in 1964. Other squadrons
rotated Thuds and F-4C Phantoms in and out from Japan and the
US through 1965. The 388th TFW took over in 1966, arriving
from Kansas, flying F-105Ds and Fs. EC-121 Airborne Early
Warning and Control aircraft arrived in 1967, known as "College
Eye." The F-105s were sent to Takhli in 1968 and the 388th TFW
became an F-4E wing. In 1970, a squadron of F-105s returned to
Korat known as the "Wild Weasels," equipped with F-105Gs
specifically designed to destroy SAM sites. In 1971, EC-130E
"Hercules" aircraft arrived carrying Airborne Battlefield
Command and Control (ABCCC) capsules inside. In 1972 EF-4C
"Wild Weasel" aircraft arrived along with F-4Ds and EB-66
electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. Also in 1972 A-7D "Corsairs"
arrived on temporary duty to conduct strike missions, and more
A-7s arrived to conduct search and rescue (SAR) support hitherto
done by propeller-driven A-1Es from other bases. Operations over
North Vietnam ceased in January 1973, over Laos in April 1973,
but continued over Cambodia employing mostly A-7Ds and F-4s
through August. Following the war, USAF aircraft and crews
remained. Aircraft were withdrawn over the next years and the
USAF returned the base to the Thai government in 1976.
Oblique aerial photo of Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, looking to
the Northwest - taken during Southeast Asian War of the 1960s. USAF photo.
Presented by wikipedia.
Navy Seabees began building the runway for Nakhon Phanom
RTAFB (NKP) in 1963, a tactical control squadron set up shop
there in 1964, and the 56th Special Operations Wing activated
there in April 1967. NKP was different from most other USAF
bases because of its special operations character. You name it,
almost every aircraft flown in the war landed here or operated
from here, including Air America, the Royal Laotian Air Force
and the Royal Thai Air Force. Main missions included SAR "Jolly
Green" helicopters supported by A-1E "Sandy" attack aircraft and
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A-1E "Skyraiders" flying just attack missions; EC-47 "Electric
Goon" electronic reconnaissance; AC-119K "Stinger" gunships;
O-1 "Bird Dog", O-2 and OV-10 "Covey" and "Nail" Forward Air
Controllers (FAC), including Raven FACs flying out of bases in
Laos; T-28 "Trojan" light attack; and A-26 "Nimrod" light tactical
bombers. We've likely missed some but you get the idea. It was
quite a gaggle, especially when CIA would bring in the odd-ball
aircraft it flew.
Udorn RTAFB, 1969.
An Air Force support unit deployed to Udorn RTAFB (also
known as Udon) in October 1964. F-104 "Starfighters" deployed
in November 1965, and kept on coming through 1966, conducting
escort and bombing missions. In 1966, the 432nd Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) was organized, first with RF-101
and RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft, then with F-4C/D fighter
bombers. EC-130 ABCCCs arrived in 1968, along with special
operations AC-47 "Spooky" gunships. In addition, this was the
Asian headquarters for CIA's Air America, which brought in all
manner of aircraft. Udorn also served as a "training" base for
Royal Laotian T-28 pilots. The base began phasing down in 1970,
but in 1972 ramped up with multiple F-4 Phantom units coming
from the Philippines and the US to engage in massive bombing of
North Vietnam begun that year. At that point in time, the 432nd
TRW was the largest wing in the USAF. The 432nd Wing
deactivated in 1975 and the base was returned to the Thai
government in 1976.
The 432nd TRW will be the focus of our attention in another
section of this report. It was central to the Lavelle story.
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Ubon RTAFB, June 1968. Presented by AFTN
The 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) arrived at Ubon RTAFB in
December 1965 as part of Rolling Thunder bombing operations.
We wish to note, however, the the Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF) flew from Ubon from 1962 through 1968 with the F-86
"Sabre", providing escort missions for USAF aircraft. The 8TFW
came with F-4C/D Phantoms, and brought in some F-104Cs that
upgraded to F-4Ds. By 1966 it had four squadrons, and added one
more in 1968. One squadron of the newly developed AC-130
"Spectre" gunship arrived in 1968. B-57 "Canberra" bombers
came in 1970 and EC-47 "Electric Goons" electronic
reconnaissance aircraft came in 1970. The wing continued fighting
over Laos through February 1973, and over Cambodia until
August. The base was closed in July 1974 and returned to the Thai
government.
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Utapao Royal Thai Naval Air Base (RTNAB). Presented by billfields.
Utapao RTAFB was originally a Thai navy base. The USAF
began arriving in large numbers starting in June 1966, building an
11,500 ft. runway. The 4258th Strategic Wing (SAC) activated in
June 1966, under the 3rd Air Division (AD) in Guam. It received
its first complement of SAC KC-135 refueling tankers in August
1966. SAC B-52D "Buffs" arrived in April 1967. In April 1970,
the 3rd AD in Guam was redesignated the 8th AF, and the 4258th
became the 307th Strategic Wing. The SAC U-2R "Olympic
Torch" high altitude reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Utapao in
July 1970, becoming the 99th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron
(SRS).
Much of the USAF's fighting force operated from these bases over
North Vietnam, Laos, sometimes the RVN, and later, Cambodia.
But the bases were 13th AF bases, and the 13th AF was located in
the Philippines. Somehow, the 7th AF in Saigon and 13th AF in
the Philippines had to coordinate the USAF's tactical resources in
Thailand with those in the RVN. The USAF was also covertly
flying out of landing sites known as Lima Sites throughout Laos.
Many of these aircraft came to Thailand at one time or another for
repairs and retrofits. Udorn RAFB was a major maintenance site
for many of them.
Let's get that organizational chart out yet again.
The 7th AF shared responsibility for USAF operations conducted
from bases in Thailand with the 13th AF through an organization
known as 7th/13th AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. As a general
rule, when the aircraft in Thailand were on the ground, they were
a 13th AF responsibility; when in the air, a 7th AF responsibility.
And please recall all the hats the commander, 7th AF had to wear
to employ these aircraft.
You will note that the 7th/13th AF set up had a commander. Major
General DeWitt R. Searles served in that position during General
Lavelle's command. Searles also served as the deputy commander
7th AF, and the deputy commander 13th AF. You will also note
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that this arrangement fell under PACAF, not MACV.
We'll not try to get into why we did not have a single commander
responsible for all air operations in North Vietnam, Laos and the
RVN. John T. Correll, writing "Disunity of Command" for the
January 2005 edition of Air Force magazine, tries his hand at it.
We commend it to you. After reading his article, and based on 20
years experience in the USAF that spanned 1967-1987, our gut
instinct is that each military service was sparring against the other,
specifically the USAF and Navy. Within the USAF, the strategic
guys had been in charge since WWII and the war was mainly
tactical with tactical guys rising to the top, so there was rivalry
there. And, as we'll see in the next section on the ROE, the
civilians in charge had no set strategy but instead were operating
by the seat of their pants from one day to the next.
There is no doubt, however, that this violation of the military rule
demanding unity of command was bad for our forces, and bad for
the war effort.
We have not yet even gotten to the rules of engagement (ROE)
issue yet. But you can see that General Lavelle, and his
predecessors and replacements, had to face very difficult
command and control challenges. We Americans have long
thought that our COMUSMACV, Generals Westmoreland and
then General Abrams, were commanding the war; they were not.
They commanded only part of the war, and had to beg and argue
for the rest. It is our view, and the view of many others, that the
effectiveness of air power in this war was adversely affected as a
result, and many airmen, soldiers, sailors , and marines died as a
result.
We'll close out this section with this map, presented by Air Force
Magazine.
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This is a nice map. Note the air bases in the RVN and those in
Thailand. By way of summary, most of the bombing of Laos and
North Vietnam was done from the bases in Thailand. The bases in
the RVN concentrated on close air support to troops fighting there,
but they also conducted air attacks against the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in Laos, especially in the southern panhandle, and into North
Vietnam just on the other side of the DMZ, in RP-1. Navy aircraft
attacked the RPs assigned to it mostly from TF 77 operating at
what was called Yankee Station, south of the DMZ, and in
international waters. Navy attacks in the North ranged roughly
from the Haiphong area south to RP-1 just north of the DMZ. The
USAF had most of northwestern North Vietnam from including
Hanoi. You see the three main passes through the mountains
separating North Vietnam from Laos, providing access to the Ho
Chi Minh Trail that traversed Laos and Cambodia with branches
into the RVN.
We've covered a lot of ground here, and it was complicated stuff.
Let's now turn to the ROE.
The "Rules of Engagement" story in the Vietnam-Laos Wars
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Organizational mess

Transcription

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