Seix Investment Advisors Perspective

BOUTIQUE PERSPECTIVE
Seix Investment Advisors
Perspective
ABOUT THE BOUTIQUE:
Seix Investment Advisors LLC
Seix Investment Advisors LLC (Seix) is a
fundamental, credit-driven fixed-income
boutique specializing in both investment
grade and high yield bond management.
Seix has applied its bottom-up, researchoriented approach to fixed income
management for over 18 years. The firm’s
success can be attributed to a deep and
talented group of veteran investment
professionals, a clearly defined
investment approach and a performanceoriented culture that is focused on
delivering superior, risk-adjusted
investment performance for our clients.
The Authors:
James F. Keegan
Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Investment
Officer
Jim is Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Investment Officer of Seix. Prior
to joining the firm in 2008, Jim was
Head of Investment Grade Corporate
& High Yield Bond Management for
American Century Investments. Jim’s
High Grade team sub-advises several
of the RidgeWorth Funds, including the
RidgeWorth Investment Grade Bond
Fund which won a Lipper Performance
Award in 2009. He has appeared on
CNBC and Bloomberg television, and
has been quoted in a range of national
publications. Jim has more than 25 years
of investment management experience.
Perry Troisi
Senior Portfolio Manager - Liquid
Markets
Perry is a seasoned Senior Portfolio
Manager focused on the Government
Related and Securitized asset classes
and a member of the Seix Investment
Policy Committee. Before joining Seix
in 1999, he was a Portfolio Manager at
GRE Insurance Group, where he was
responsible for all North American fixed
income assets within the Group. Perry
has over 20 years of experience in the
investment management industry.
Review of Fourth Quarter 2011
SIRP IN A ZIRP WORLD
Capital market volatility declined over the course of the final three months of 2011,
allowing for a pause in the treasury rally and, for most spread sectors of the bond market,
a chance to regroup and recapture some of the lost ground of the third quarter. Using
the VIX index (volatility of the S&P 500) as a proxy, the third and fourth quarters saw this
volatility measure with a similar average of around 30, but the two quarters were almost
mirror images of each other. The VIX began the third quarter very low and ultimately rose
to levels not seen since 2009; the quarter’s move was from 15.87 on July 1st to 42.96 on
September 30th. The fourth quarter then saw the VIX retreat to a 20.73 low on December
23rd before ending the year at 23.40. A trailing 10-year average for the VIX was 21.74 as
of December 30th, 2011. This return to normalcy in volatility afforded the stock market
a welcome reprieve, allowing the S&P 500 to advance nearly 12% and bring the yearto-date tally back in to positive territory (thanks to the dividends). This improved equity
market backdrop was kindest to the riskiest sectors of the bond market, as can be seen
by the impressive rebound in the high yield bond market. High yield posted impressive
total and excess returns following the stressful and negative returns experienced in
the third quarter. While total returns in the investment grade space were all positive in
Q4, corporate bonds and CMBS (commercial mortgage-backed securities) enjoyed the
strongest returns. For the full year, the effects of the third quarter are still evident as
treasuries yielded the best return and excess returns for most of the spread sectors were
still negative. Exhibit 1 provides all the detail.
Exhibit 1 – Returns Rebound as Volatility Declines
Q4
Total Return
Q4
Excess Return
YTD
Total Return
2011
Excess Return
Aggregate
1.12
0.29
7.84
-1.14
Treasury
0.89
n/a
9.81
n/a
Agency
0.48
-0.09
4.86
-0.25
RMBS
0.88
0.24
6.23
-1.06
ABS
0.23
-0.28
5.14
0.52
CMBS
3.11
2.49
6.02
0.47
Corporate
1.93
0.82
8.15
-3.67
High Yield
6.46
5.69
4.98
-2.40
HY - Ba/B
6.01
5.22
6.09
-1.57
HY - Ba
5.61
4.77
6.84
-1.55
HY – B
6.40
5.65
5.39
-1.58
HY – Caa
8.42
7.71
3.31
-4.81
HY - Ca-D
10.51
9.86
-12.41
-19.64
HY - Loans
3.08
n/a
1.06
n/a
11.82
n/a
2.11
n/a
S&P 500
Past performance is not indicative of future results.
Sources: Barclays Capital, S&P
Given the strong stock market returns over the quarter, the ability of the treasury
market to still hold, serve and post a modestly positive return in Q4 stands out for its
persistence. Most predictions for a robust stock market performance similar to this
most recent quarter would have certainly been married to expectations for higher
rates. In reality, the path that the broader markets took during the quarter allowed rates
to withstand some early pressure and recover into the year end. The stock market’s
quarterly gain was essentially an October phenomena as the S&P 500 was only up
about four points between the end of October and December 30th. The 10-year treasury
yield wandered back to 2.40% briefly on October 27th before recovering quickly and
BOUTIQUE PERSPECTIVE
SEIX PERSPECTIVE
spending most of November and December below 2%. Exhibit
2 illustrates the October correlation between the rising stock
market and higher yields followed by the subsequent decoupling
and move to lower yields against a stock market that manages to
salvage those heady October gains.
Exhibit 2 – 10-Year Treasury Yield (red) and the S&P 500 (white) in Q4
Source: Bloomberg
After October’s massive rally, the stock market had a downdraft
in November while the 10-year yield moved lower with it, but the
equity bounce from late November into the end of the year only
saw yields fall even further. The macro backdrop that prevailed in
the fourth quarter allowed for this persistent downward pressure
on treasury yields. The European Sovereign Debt/Banking crisis
remains front and center as the dominant wildcard for global
growth in 2012 and with it the prospective returns for most
traditional asset classes. Going into the end of 2011, clearly the
rates market and the stock market were sending different signals
into the new year.
Global Uncertainty Dominates in 2012
The global economic outlook for 2012 remains uncertain. The
outlook is replete with risks and lacks sustainable pockets of
strength that could help offset or cushion a potentially sharp global
downturn. Europe represents ground zero for all this uncertainty
and there are few encouraging signs that the Europeans have
moved closer to a credible solution to their economic and financial
imbalances despite the passage of multiple fiscal adjustment
programs throughout both the peripheral and core regions. Even
the massive liquidity injections by the European Central Bank
(ECB) Long-Term Refinance Operations (LTRO) to ease stress
in the financial system are not seen as real solutions to the
problems. It is more a “kicking the can” strategy that buys time, but
how much time it will buy is unclear.
Many analysts, investors, and policymakers make the mistake
of viewing Europe’s problems strictly through the lens of a fiscal
crisis. These analysts are quick to throw the U.S. and Japan in
Page 2
the same category with Europe, but this analysis is flawed and
has dangerous implications for policy formation and Europe’s
economic outlook. Outside of Germany, many of the problems
faced by the region are due to the Euro itself, whose value
has been more tied to the strength of the German economy
rather than to the weakness of many of the other European
economies. As a consequence, the Euro’s strength
has undermined the competitiveness of many
European economies, driving economic growth
dangerously low and with it the tax revenues that
are the life blood of these bloated governments.
The politicians in many of these countries either
fail to recognize this reality or are in denial
since they do not want to consider abandoning
the Euro as a serious option. Instead, they have
embraced the idea that fiscal profligacy is the
primary cause of their problems and massive
fiscal spending cuts have been and are likely to
continue to be the prescribed medicine.
The result of this will be deeper recession in
2012 for many countries, lower tax revenues,
and little to no progress on reducing fiscal
deficits. Structural reforms (i.e., labor market and
pension) will be used as a mechanism to achieve
an “internal devaluation” to address Europe’s competitive issues,
but such measures – if implemented – will take many years to
achieve the desired results. This approach will only deepen the
regions’ problems economically, socially, and politically.
A litany of different parties have been floated and refuted
as the “white knight” that can save the region, but the sheer
magnitude of problems always overwhelms the proposal. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has served as a lender of
last resort to financially troubled emerging market countries.
However, IMF programs cannot rescue countries that are trapped
in unsustainable exchange rate regimes and solvency crises.
The IMF’s involvement in Ireland, Greece, and Portugal predates
the infection of the core by the periphery; and by virtue of their
limited resources, 2012 will probably see the IMF role diminished
as the magnitude of the problems in Italy, Spain, or France begin
to flourish.
China is another often referenced player with an interest in
supporting the Euro region. History is often referenced given
that China, in 2008, was a critical component that supported the
global economy in a way few thought possible. Their government
ramped up public spending and turned a blind eye to reckless
lending by both the official and unofficial banking sectors.
Local governments went on a spending binge as well, with
ample access to cheap credit. Construction projects boomed and
with it demand for raw materials and commodities soared. The
ripple effects of these policies by China cannot be accurately
measured, but in a world where inventories had been pared down
to unsustainably low levels, the effects were critically important
to the global recovery.
BOUTIQUE PERSPECTIVE
SEIX PERSPECTIVE
China is now suffering the consequences of such aggressive
action. Going into 2008, China’s main imbalance was that
investment as a share of GDP was too high and domestic
consumption was too low. Today, that imbalance is dramatically
worse with even more overcapacity in the Chinese economy
posing a serious threat to their economic outlook. Property prices
are falling, economic growth is decelerating, and the Chinese
equity market is under stress, probably reflecting these risks.
This makes it highly unlikely that Chinese authorities will enact
another massive fiscal stimulus effort that will only fuel even
deeper imbalances. They will more likely cautiously hoard their
resources to use as a safety net for their own downside risk given
the uncertain growth outlook in their own region.
Aside from China, the balance of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India)
and many other emerging market economies are all confronting
problems of one kind or another related to the fall off in demand
from Europe. The depth of the problems varies from country
to country, but given their dependence on external economies
for growth, a global slowdown in 2012 would pose tremendous
risk to these emerging markets. While this may seem painfully
obvious to many, it has not prevented some market participants
or pundits to preach about “decoupling” and the potential for
these economies to offer assistance to the Euro region and
serve as a buffer to the growth slowdown caused by the crisis.
While clearly in a better position to deal with these challenges
today versus prior cycles, no emerging market countries, either
individually or collectively, are prepared to be the engine for
global growth.
Repetition is the Mother of Skill
Apart from the European crisis, we enter the new calendar year
with yet more debate about even more quantitative easing.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), through a litany
of speeches by its more dovish
members, has made it clear that
…we enter the new
the prospect of another round
calendar year with yet
of bond buying, QE3 for those
who are counting, is very much
more debate about
on the table in the first half of
even more quantitative
2012. Trillions upon trillions of
conventional and unconventional
easing.
stimulus and bailouts have been
unsuccessful at generating a
sustainable recovery, but more of the same is the only response
our policymakers seem capable of delivering. While it is not
effective in stimulating recovery, it has become very clear that
markets have become somewhat addicted to quantitative easing,
both directly and indirectly. This recovery has been the weakest
on record in the post-war period and the redundant policy
prescription only highlights the magnitude of the dilemma many
developed economies now face.
The U.S. and most of the developed world continue to attempt to:
A.) Solve structural problems with cyclical responses;
B.) Address solvency crises with massive liquidity injections and
unprecedented accounting and regulatory forbearance; and
Page 3
C.) Perpetuate a multi-year amortization or “kick the can” approach
with the hope that ultimately confidence and animal spirits will
reignite and jump start the economy such that sustainable,
organic growth returns absent any further stimulus.
It’s hard to call it anything more than a massive hope trade.
The strategy is unlikely to work as it is predicated on consumers
once again confusing debt with income and governments
confusing debt-financed consumption with sustainable economic
growth. Over the last few decades we watched the household
and financial sectors lever up and create a shadow banking
system that became as big, if not bigger, than the traditional
banking system. Simultaneously, the economy morphed from
a manufacturing and service-based economy into a leveraged
financial service-based economy where higher asset prices
(perceived wealth) became a function of debt and leverage rather
than income and earnings.
In the spirit of repetition, we want to rehash the nature of this
particular economic cycle. The Great Recession was a massive
balance sheet recession and the ensuing multi-year deleveraging
cycle is in its early stages. Further complicating the future is the
oncoming demographic wave the likes of which this country has
never seen before as 78 million baby boomers become eligible
for retirement over the next 17 years. The major problem for this
demographic is that they collectively have inadequate savings
with which to retire. Some of the critical implications of inadequate
savings are a.) The baby boomers will have to work longer thus
keeping wages lower than they otherwise would be, while further
exacerbating the youth unemployment situation; b.) There will
be pent-up demand to save rather than spend as they approach
retirement; c.) Persistent demand for investments focused on
income and return of capital (fixed income over equities); d.) Home
ownership rate mean-reverting to its historical rate (64%) against
the backdrop of an already troubling supply demand imbalance
that could be further exacerbated by baby boomer downsizing.
Short Term Memories: A Not Too Distant History
If we revisit the early part of the 2000s again, there were many
events and opportunities for policymakers and regulators to deal
with the threat of leverage and moral hazard that was building
up in the system. Coming out of the dot com bust as well as
the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the Fed chose to keep rates
exceptionally low, erroneously focusing only on goods and services
inflation (CPI and PCE deflator) while ignoring asset inflation that
was a direct function of the easy money and credit policy they had
championed. The ensuing credit bubble manifested itself in a wave
of financial engineering that introduced CDOs (collatalized debt
obligations), SIVs (structured investment vehicles), and sub-prime
MBS (mortgage-backed securities); with rating agency complicity
the Street found a whole new way to turn BB assets into AAA assets.
Given the easy money environment and its effect on valuations,
demand for these new investment vehicles expanded rapidly and
with every new turn of leverage the frenzy just ballooned and the new
“originate to distribute” model was off and running. The final straw
was the very unnatural extension of real estate pricing, creating a
national housing bubble that economists argued was not possible.
BOUTIQUE PERSPECTIVE
SEIX PERSPECTIVE
Why did policymakers, regulators, politicians and rating agencies
look past the warning signals along the way and ignore the
growing imbalances and problems? The simple answer is human
nature and this can generally be traced by following the money.
Asset inflation does give rise to the illusion of wealth and
prosperity. Consumers feel wealthier as their 401Ks and housing
prices rise; the mortgage refinance machine then made it easy to
monetize this new found wealth and finance a lifestyle beyond
their traditional means. Businesses in turn feel more comfortable
expanding as consumers spend more and more; governments
and politicians also benefitted from the increased tax revenues
that afforded even more public spending. Sadly, regulators either
stand aside for career advancement purposes or get pushed
aside by politically connected and appointed superiors, while
ratings agencies get blinded by the revenue and profit the cycle
provides their business model. Talk about conflicted interests! By
the time we got to 2007 the cracks began to appear and by 2008
the concept of “too big to fail” (TBTF) had matured into a beast
that no one knew how to slay.
The moral hazard of TBTF had its origins in the 1990s, with
the bailout of a prominent hedge fund (Long Term Capital
Management) serving as one of the
earlier flirtations with the policy.
TBTF at its core is an idiosyncratic
Failure and bankruptcy
concept that encourages moral
are essential in a
hazard, thereby preempting
market discipline and allowing
capitalist system.
institutions to become too
“systemic” and, as a consequence,
their failure too problematic. Failure and bankruptcy are essential
in a capitalist system. Without failure, the system degenerates
into “crony capitalism” where the profits are privatized and the
losses are socialized. By 2008, with the excesses of the prior
decade beginning to unwind, TBTF led policymakers to save Bear
Stearns while looking the other way regarding Lehman, only to
reverse course again to bail out AIG.
The inconsistent, seemingly ad hoc nature of the policy response
in and of itself illustrated how TBTF had rendered the authorities
impotent and incapable of addressing the disease (excessive debt)
rather than the symptoms. What followed in late 2008 and 2009
was a litany of liquidity measures and lending facilities, essentially
adding more debt on an already overly indebted system. Talk about
mixed signals! Sometime in the fall of 2008, with policymakers
staring into the “abyss,” the choice was made for an “amortization”
strategy (Japan). Instead of letting markets work and find clearing
prices for assets being shed by the weak and over levered,
policymakers instead are trying to amortize the losses embedded
in the system over as long a period of time as possible. As we have
written in previous perspectives, the U.S. has already experienced
a lost decade in terms of jobs, real median household income,
stock prices, and housing prices. It remains to be seen whether we
will experience a second lost decade, but based on policies that
are being pursued by policymakers and politicians, the signs are
not encouraging at this point in early 2012.
Page 4
Rates Likely “Lower for Longer”
Given the dramatic impact ZIRP (zero interest rate policy) has
played over the past three plus years it is helpful to review some
of the intended and unintended consequences of this policy.
ZIRP Goals/Intended Consequences
1.Keep interest rates low
2.Ease financial conditions
3.Force savers/investors to take more risk
4.Encourage dissaving
5.Increase stock prices
6.Slow/stop the deleveraging
Unintended Consequences of ZIRP
1.Very regressive policy that punishes savers and those on fixed
incomes while subsidizing banks and financial institutions
2.Raises commodity prices like food and energy
3.Creates distortions in the economy and financial markets
(misallocation of capital)
4.Discourages deleveraging and balance sheet repair
5.May actually reduce consumption as people need to save
more for a rainy day/retirement
6.Reduces citizens’ standard of living as purchasing power
declines
Beyond our frustration with the policy, we find it equally frustrating
how little attention is paid to the unintended consequences of
ZIRP. Given the scale of experimentation the FOMC has embarked
on over the past few years, market participants should be
interested in the costs and unintended consequences that result
from such policy. We offer this very limited list of ZIRP impacts/
distortions as a reminder that there is no free lunch and the
policy imposes a hefty cost on a broad swath of people, all in the
name of saving the financial system that has already been saved
according to the experts.
Each new calendar year historically kicks off with a debate about
the level of rates. Similar to the expectations of the past few
years, the 2012 consensus anticipates higher rates. While we
have no investment strategies that rely solely on the direction of
rates, we believe there are many real reasons why rates are this
low that extend beyond the overused “flight to quality” bias. First
and foremost, sub-par economic growth is the consensus over
most forecast horizons as a result of the massive deleveraging
that will continue for several years. As we enter the fourth year
of ZIRP, traditional risk averse investors are being forced out the
yield curve, pushing longer rates lower. Powerful demographic
trends are forcing more investors to seek safe income as their
investment horizon shortens. These same investors continue
to flee the volatility of the stock market leaving the risk/reward
profile to favor bonds; mutual fund flows since 2007 attest to
this bias. Using ICI data, for the years 2007 through 2011 taxable
bond fund inflows were approximately $797 billion; total bond
Page 5
fund inflows were $884 billion. Over the same period equity funds
suffered outflows of nearly $320 billion; domestic equity fund
outflows were even worse at $469 billion (See Exhibit 3). Finally,
regulation/repression going forward should continue to push
large institutional investors towards treasuries in the name of
safer risk-based capital requirements. The combination of these
critical factors, in tandem with the overarching amortization
strategy in place since 2008, makes the environment for low rates
very compelling. We anticipate a 1.50% to 2.50% trading range
for the 10-year treasury in 2012, with the yield curve remaining
directional, meaning a steeper curve when rates rise and a flatter
curve when rates decline.
$60k
Exhibit 3: Cash Flow
40k
Monthly Net New Cash Flow
BOUTIQUE PERSPECTIVE
SEIX PERSPECTIVE
20k
0k
-20k
-40k
-60k
-80k
2007
2008
2009
2010
Source: Investment Company Institute
Portfolio Positioning: Safe Income at a Reasonable Price
(SIRP)
2011 was all about our security selection, as most spread sectors
generated negative excess returns and we were overweight
spread assets for most of the year. Having been cautious about
the fundamental state of the economy and very wary of downside
risks that a weak economy can easily fall victim to, our sector
positioning was fairly defensive. The usage of structure in our
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) exposure and
an underweight to bank and finance risk within our corporate
exposure were critical drivers of performance in 2011; optimal
positioning across the yield curve that anticipated a flatter curve
also contributed significantly to returns.
While the volatility that permeated the third quarter dissipated
considerably in the fourth quarter, portfolio positioning stayed
fairly constant since September. Unfortunately, we remain in a
zero interest rate policy world, an environment that we are now
told may be with us until the end of 2014! Given the importance
of yield as a driver of returns, we continue to seek safe income at
a reasonable price. While growth improved in the second half of
2011, the full year saw GDP only expand by 1.6%. Expectations
for 2012 remain below potential, with the first half of the year
median outlook anticipating about 2% type growth. Given
this slow growth backdrop and the headwinds of a European
economy that is probably already in recession, our defensive
bias and desire for safe income still permeates our strategy.
Portfolios remain overweight investment grade corporate bonds,
although at a lower weighting relative to recent years, but we
will add select high quality exposure through the new issue
market when concessions offer opportunity. Corporate spreads
are likely to remain volatile, but valuations in select names offer
compensation for this risk.
RMBS exposure represents our largest sector overweight. The
portfolio construction, which still utilizes structure (CMOs) in
lieu of current coupon pass-throughs,
offers average life stability and
convexity that enhances the return
n Domestic Equity
profile over a more index-like RMBS
n Foreign Equity
n Taxable Bond
portfolio. Despite persistently low
n Municipal Bond
rates, prepayments remain muted and
the sector offers attractive yield over
such low treasury rates. We remain
modestly “up in coupon” after reducing
some of this exposure in Q3. Portfolios
continue to be overweight commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) as
well, but similar to Corporate Bonds, it
Estimated
is on the lighter side relative to recent
Weekly Net
New Cash
history. The exposure remains largely
Flow
2011
Jan
in seasoned, well structured exposure
2012
near the top of the capital structure.
Our core plus portfolios currently have
a 10% exposure to high yield bonds, an allocation we have held
since the sector came under pressure in August. We view this as a
neutral position for a core plus mandate. The sector offers spread
levels commensurate with the risk being taken and possesses a
better return profile than some of the higher yielding sectors of
the investment grade bond market, particularly financials.
We continue to remain void the “government-related” sectors
of the market, consisting mainly of agency debt (governmentsponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) as well as
sovereign and supranational paper. The sector overall has an
asymmetric risk profile from our perspective while offering very
little yield.
The rate rally in 2011 was lead by the long end of the yield curve.
Using 2s/10s as a proxy, the curve flattened about 106 basis
points (from +270 to +164). Having a trailing 10-year average in
the mid +150s, the curve is far more normal today than at any
point over the last few years. Hence, our yield curve flattening
strategy has been dramatically reduced as we enter 2012. Surely
the curve can flatten more, particularly in this “lower for longer”
environment, but the easy money from yield curve positioning
has been made and we prefer to be more opportunistic should a
rate spike create an unforeseen steepening in the curve.
BOUTIQUE PERSPECTIVE
SEIX PERSPECTIVE
Page 6
In summary, markets are likely to remain very binary, oscillating between “risk on” and “risk off” as we ebb and flow with the cross
currents of a synchronized global economic slowdown, a European bureaucracy attempting to save the Euro at any cost, and central
bankers continuing to provide excessive liquidity (QE/LTRO) in a thinly disguised effort at raising/supporting asset values in the name
of stability and growth.
This information and general market-related projections are based on information available at the time, are subject to change without
notice, are for informational purposes only, are not intended as individual or specific advice, may not represent the opinions of the entire
firm, and may not be relied upon for individual investing purposes. Information provided is general and educational in nature, provided
as general guidance on the subject covered, and is not intended to be authoritative. All information contained herein is believed to be
correct, but accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This information may coincide or conflict with activities of the portfolio managers. It is not
intended to be, and should not be construed as investment, legal, estate planning, or tax advice. Seix Investment Advisors LLC does not
provide legal, estate planning or tax advice. Investors are advised to consult with their investment processional about their specific
financial needs and goals before making any investment decisions. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
All investments involve risk. Debt securities (bonds) offer a relatively stable level of income, although bond prices will fluctuate
providing the potential for principal gain or loss. Intermediate term, higher quality bonds, generally offer less risk than longer term
bonds and a lower rate of return. There is no guarantee a specific investment strategy will be successful.
Past performance is not indicative of future results. An investor should consider the fund’s investment objectives, risks, and
charges and expenses carefully before investing or sending money. This and other important information about the RidgeWorth
Funds can be found in the fund’s prospectus. To obtain a prospectus, please call 1-888-784-3863 or visit www.ridgeworth.com.
Please read the prospectus carefully before investing.
© 2012 Seix Investment Advisors LLC is a registered investment advisor with the SEC and a member of the RidgeWorth Capital
Management, Inc. network of investment firms. The advisor and its employees do not provide tax or legal advice.
© 2012 RidgeWorth Investments. RidgeWorth Investments is the trade name for RidgeWorth
Capital Management, Inc., an investment advisor registered with the SEC and the adviser to
the RidgeWorth Funds. RidgeWorth Funds are distributed by RidgeWorth Distributors LLC,
which is not affiliated with the adviser. Collective Strength Individual Insight is a federally
registered service mark of RidgeWorth Investments.
• Not FDIC Insured • No Bank Guarantee • May Lose Value
RCBP-SA-1211