Turkish Politics and International Society during the Ozal

Transcription

Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade,
1983-93
Author(s): Berdal Aral
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 72-88
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284139 .
Accessed: 12/09/2012 07:03
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle Eastern
Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
Dispensingwith Tradition?
TurkishPolitics and InternationalSociety
during the Ozal Decade, 1983-93
BERDAL ARAL
TurgutOzal played a leading role in Turkishpolitics first as prime minister
(1983-89), then as president (1989-93). At first sight, he comes across as
a man of apparent paradoxes. He was part of a political tradition that
representedthe revolt of Anatolia (the Asian portion of Turkey) against an
elitist, Westward-lookingestablishment which tended to despise the values
and traditions of Anatolia (which in fact derived its vitality from Islam);
and yet, it was the same Ozal who enjoyed the unequivocal supportof the
USA and internationalfinancial institutions on account of his espousal of
free-market economy and support for US policies in the Middle East,
Caucasia and Central Asia. Ozal was also the man who most deepened and
widened Turkey's links with the Islamic world, to the extent that he was
often blamed by some secularists for harbouring 'fundamentalist'
ambitions; and yet it was under Ozal's premiershipthat Turkey applied for
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in April 1987
as the ultimate step in Turkey's search for 'recognition' as part of the
'Europeanfamily'.
To make sense of this apparent paradox, one has to locate its
background in the specific political culture that has evolved since the
establishment of a secular, Westward-looking and nationalistic Turkish
republic in the mid-1920s. Today these core values of Kemalism, the
doctrinal foundation of Turkish nationalism named after the founder of
the Turkish Republic, appear to have been internalized, owing either to
state coercion or to conviction, on the part of all the political groupings,
with the marked exception of Islamists. In the post-Second World War
era, Turkey's political rulers decided to change the course of Turkish
foreign policy from neutrality to military and economic alliance with the
Western world on the pretext of Stalin's territorialambitions over parts of
Turkish territory as contained in the Soviet memorandum of 1946.' This
new strategy was widely supported by mainstream political parties,
Middle EasternStudies, Vol.37, No.1, January2001, pp.72-88
PUBLISHED
BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY, 1983-93
73
including the conservatives, on account of security considerations and a
willingness to integrate Turkey into the 'civilized' Western world.2 In
such a milieu, the language of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism did
not necessarily coincide with the priorities of the Turkish ruling
establishment. Not unlike its predecessor, the Republican Peoples Party,
the conservative Menderes government formed by the Democrat Party,
which ruled the country from 1950 to 1960, identified itself with the
Western world. Its association with the USA and Britain evolved to such
an extent that, in the 1950s, Turkey literally became a mouthpiece of
Western interests in the Middle East.3However, despite such policies, the
Menderes government continued to enjoy widespread support from the
mostly conservative electorate until the government's overthrow by the
army in 1960.
The legacy of the Democrat Party led by Menderes,4has not however
died out in Turkey. Historically speaking, the ideological conventions of
conservative political forces in Turkey can be described as a blend of
conservatism which rejects political/systemic Islam, Western-oriented
foreign policy, and xenophobic nationalism that mistrusts most of Turkey's
immediate neighbours. That Turkey has been ruled by right-wing
governments (partly nationalistic, partly conservative) for the best part of
over fifty years of multi-party politics in Turkey should not come as a
surprise. Indeed, for Turkish politicians, the use of a universalist language
of Islam without specific ethnic and/or cultural references does not earn
sufficient political gains in a society conditioned (by official policies) to
believe in the particularisticideas such as 'the unique qualities of the Turks
and Turkey', 'the attraction and superiority of Western civilization', and
'the materialistic conception of the priority of economics and welfare over
other considerations of human life'. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
conservative political forces in Turkey have successfully deployed Islam as
part of the language of nationalism. This is the context in which to
understandOzalism and its similarities with, and differences from, the rightwing governments that preceded it.
The first thing to observe about Ozal was his ability to reconcile
contradictory elements and establish harmony between them. That his
Motherland Party consisted of four different political wings (Liberals,
Conservatives, Social Democrats, Extreme Nationalists) is a testimony to
Ozal's appetite for accommodation. Close to his death (1993) Ozal was
planning to overcome the polarization between secularists and antisecularists by overseeing a 'reform' in Islam that, in his view, would have
been accordant with 'modem conditions'. As he saw it, this reform would
74
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
make Islam more palatable to Western-oriented, secularist Turks who
resented the 'strictness', 'comprehensiveness' and 'moralistic overtones' of
the Koran and Sunna (two main sources of the Islamicfaith).This project
was also intended to 'demonstrate'that genuine Muslims were not
necessarily 'reactionaries',but ratherthey could be as 'modern' and
'civilized'as the secularists.5
Especiallyafterbecomingpresident6(in 1989), Ozal began to act as
thoughhe was an opponentof the regimein his searchto restructurethe
state and its links with the citizens.7In his fight againstthe primacyof
Kemalist principles, such as secularism,etatism, and (homogenizing)
nationalism,he actedas a rationalistandpragmaticperson.8WithOzal,the
will to catch up with the elusive 'contemporarycivilization', as had
hithertobeen sanctifiedby the official ideology,was replacedby the will
to catch up with the more concrete notions of the 'modern and
(economically) developed world'. Hence ratherthan prioritizing political,
ideological and culturaldispositions,Ozal laid particularemphasis on
economicsas such.9
It is also evident that Ozal was greatlyimpressedby the American
systemof politicalgovernance.Duringhis tenureas president,he disclosed
his plansfor a presidentialsystem.Howeverthisprojectnevermaterialized
on accountof powerfulopposition.Neverthelessthisdidnotdeterhimfrom
acting as though he was the presidentof a presidentialsystem." Ozal
wantedto stripoff theeducationalsystemfromthe statistyokeanddelegate
this matterto the communitiesthemselves.In his view, the principleof
competitionhad to prevailin the health service too.'' Ozal persistently
emphasized three fundamental freedoms in his speeches: freedom of
expression,freedomof religion,andfreedomof enterprise.Althoughsuch
emphasison classical freedomsseems too superficialin humanrights
debates, its significance in the Turkish context should not be
into
underestimated,
given thatthesefreedomshadneverbeentransformed
of the Turkishconstitutionsand
reality,despitethe contraryproclamations
statutes.
As partof his project,Ozalwantedto sparkoff a consciousness,among
peopleandwithinthe statealike,of the gloriousOttomanpast.In his view,
sooner or later,Turkeywould have to come to terms with its Ottoman
heritage.'2The Ottomanexperience,to him, containedmany lessons in
tolerance and pluralism. Ozal was convinced that, without 'peace at home',
his vision of a strong and influential Turkey would not materialize.
Therefore he wanted to put an end to the exclusion (by the state) of the
culturalmanifestationsof Islam, of the Kurdishidentity, and other repressed
identities. Indeed Ozal advocated a non-ideological state whose primary
task was to serve the citizens.3He believed that the mosaic of different
SOCIETY, 1983-93
75
cultures and identities would facilitate the formation of a dynamic and
efficient society which was at ease with itself and with others. Therefore, in
his view, the largely superficial polarization between 'Islamists' and
'secularists' on the one hand, and the 'Turks' and the 'Kurds' on the other,
had to be resolved. This meant that, ratherthan outlawing them, the views
and claims raised by Kurdish rights' activists and the Islamists (as the two
scapegoats of the republican regime, alongside socialists, since its
inception) had to be legalized.
Two peculiarities of his individual backgroundincreased his popularity
during his presidency: he was a civilian and he was religious. These
qualities were a rare breed among Turkish presidents since the
establishment of the Turkishrepublic in 1923. As he saw himself, Ozal was
a missionary who wanted to mastermindan Islamic renaissance in Turkey
throughblending religious tolerance with modern science and knowledge.'4
However Ozal's preoccupation with Islam, according to many secularist
Turkish intellectuals, was encouraged by the USA as part of its global
strategy to use 'neo-conservatism' as a means to keep pro-Westernregimes
in power.'5According to this view, it is irrelevant whether the religion in
question is Islam, Christianityor Hinduism, so long as it is stripped of its
revolutionary and anti-imperialistic content. Indeed, the 'Turkish-Islamic
synthesis', fashioned by the ruling establishmentin the wake of the military
takeover in 1980, which was supposed to reconcile nationalism with Islam,
was neither anti-Westernnor anti-capitalistic.'6Surely this view says a lot
about the truth.Nonetheless, it tends to portrayTurkishpolitics simply as a
by-productof American strategies, which surely is an exaggeration.Looked
through the prism of culture, identity and (domestic) politics, the case of
Ozal can equally be seen as an indigenous movement which sought to
reconcile modernity with the Turkish/Islamictradition. This article seeks,
inter alia, to emphasize certain aspects of Ozalism that are specific to
Turkey.
Ozal's international outlook was premised on the rejection of the
supposition of an inescapable hostility between the Islamic and the Western
world. He instead advocated the economic and political integration of
Muslim countries into the world system, even if it was patently dominated
by the USA and its allies. In Ozal's view, this was the only way for Muslims
to enjoy the fruits of modern science and technology, and to achieve
considerable economic growth. For Ozal, the ideal of an Islamic union was
therefore both unnecessary and impractical.'7
It is thus clear that Ozal's passion for 'reconciling the irreconcilable'
also extended into the sphere of foreign policy. Ozal sought to 'prove' that
76
Islamwas perfectlyreconcilablewitha capitalisteconomyandpro-Western
foreignpolicy.'8He was thereforeunconcernedwiththe Islamicpreceptson
imperialism,economic exploitation,or injustice.For Ozal, the Islamic
'connection'couldbe useful as a foreignpolicy instrumentto turnTurkey
into a regionalpower.To this end, he establishedcordialrelationswith the
withMiddle Eastern countries. Ozal wanted the
Islamicworld,particularly
Islamicworld to adoptsecularism,liberaldemocracy,and a pro-Western
outlookas the definingfeaturesof theirofficial ideology.9Gozen argues
that, 'TurgutOzal's sympathyfor the Muslimworldwas not less thanhis
sympathy for the Western world'.20 If this is true, one has to note that this
was partly an outcome of his strong religious faith which proclaimed
Muslims as 'brothers'. As he was familiar with liberal ideals and Western
way of life, he sought to blend them with Islamic values in a pragmatic
fashion.
However, his interest in the Middle East was also the result of his
genuine desire to see the establishment among these countries of an
economic pact based on free trade and economic co-operation.2'Ozal's illborn proposal to distribute Turkish waters through pipelines down to the
Gulf region (including Syria and Israel) was, in his view, to be a unique
contribution to the cause of peace in the Middle East. He even called the
project 'peace-water'.22 This project never materialized, mainly for two
reasons: first, it was too costly; second, it would give Turkey too much
political weight which no (Arab) Middle Eastern country was prepared to
accept.23This aborted attempt at least testifies to Ozal's belief in the
primacy of economics in international politics. He was convinced, for
instance, that the Greco-Turkish disputes could be resolved through
deepening economic links between the parties. He likewise formulated the
motto 'trade not aid' as a major principle of Turkey's relations with the
USA.24
Ozal'sultimateobjectivewas to installTurkeyas the leaderof a Turkic
world stretchingfrom the Adriaticto the great Chinese wall underthe
protective umbrella of pax Americana. The primacy of the Western world
and the Turkic republics in his world view, brought him closer to the
establishment. It is no wonder, then, that, in spite of the 'eccentricity' of
some of his views, his unorthodox activism, and strong religious
orientation, Ozal was never openly rejected by the Turkish establishment,
including the army, as an 'outsider'.25
Ozal believed that Turkish national interests generally coincided with
those of the USA in the Middle East, Caucasia and Central Asia. Ozal
reckoned that the USA could be infinitely destructive against its enemies.
He therefore conducted his policies on the basis of a pro-Americanbias. He
was convinced that Turkey did not possess the necessary means and
SOCIETY, 1983-93
77
resources to pursue an 'independent' strategy which could potentially harm
US interests.26
Not surprisingly, therefore, Ozal uncritically accepted the three main
roles envisaged for Turkey by the USA and its Western allies in the postCold War era: first, Turkey was to act as a bulwark against Iranian
(Islamic) influence in the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia.
Under this scheme, Turkey was to 'export' its secular and (liberal)
democratic model into these newly independent states as an alternative to
the radical Islamic model promoted by Iran.27Secondly, Turkey would
also play a vital role in Western, particularly US, efforts to constrain and
contain radical states and/or political movements in the Middle East,
such as Iran, Iraq and Hamas, as part of a pro-Western bloc of status-quo
oriented states; thirdly, the West would ensure that Turkey remained
committed to European integration. While the US would have
presumably supported Turkey's full integration with the EEC, the
Europeans seemed to perceive Turkey as a subordinate partner.Turkey's
qualified rejection for EEC membership in December 198928 was indeed
part of this European approach to keep Turkey at arm's length, without
necessarily letting it in. Although this strategy has frustrated the Turkish
ambitions to become a 'respectful' player in European politics, the fact
that the EEC Council of Ministers did not entirely rule out the possibility
of Turkish membership at some time in the future has at least given
Turkey's pro-Western establishment a pretext to cling to the EEC as the
frame of reference for Turkish foreign policy strategies. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Turkey felt the need to emphasize that it had not perceived the
Black Sea Economic Project of 1990 as an alternative to EEC
membership. Hence the need to reiterate the priority of the Western
world.. 29
Ozal's influence in Turkish politics and foreign policy became more
marked in the second half of the 1980s as the influence of the army began
to wane because of greater democratization. His influence became even
more conspicuous after his election by the parliamentas president in 1989.
This fact interestingly coincided with the historic changes that had been
taking place in eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and, partly, the Middle
East.30Looking retrospectively, Ozal seems to have been the only Turkish
political leader who had the necessary insight and vision to catch the
momentum of the time.
Ozal did not at all think that Turkey's geopolitical and strategic
significance for the Western world diminished with the coming to an end
of the Cold War.He instead saw the emergence of a Turkic world and the
developments in the Balkans as an opportunity to expand the Turkish
influence in international politics. According to Ozal, as a remnant of an
78
empire,Turkeywas boundto show close interestin territoriesformerly
ruledby the OttomanEmpire.3'This meantthatAtaturk'smotto 'peaceat
home, peace in the world', which precludedactive involvementoutside
Turkey'sborders,could no more be a valid principleof Turkishforeign
policy.Revolutionarychangesin the ex-SovietUnionandeasternEurope,
in his view, requireda broaderoutlookthanTurkey'shithertostatus-quo
orienteddisinterestin the externalworld.32
Ozal believed that,if Turkeybecamea memberof the EEC,Turkey's
internationalstandingwould likewise increase. He hoped that through
membershipno furtherquotas on Turkishtextile exports to the EEC
markets would be imposed.33 However, Turkey's continuous
condemnation by various European institutions and individual
governmentsfor systematicallyviolatinghumanrightson the one hand,
and the rejectionof its applicationfor membershipof the EEC on the
other,broughtOzal even closer to the USA. In contrastto Europe,the
questionof humanrightswas only of marginalconcernto the US in the
case of strategic allies like Turkey. Ozal also hoped, somewhat
paradoxically,to urge the US administrationto lobby the European
governmentsto admitTurkeyfor full membershipof the EEC.34
Ozal had
a sufficientarsenalin stock to securereasonableUS supportfor Turkish
demands:Turkey had no objections to the strategic designs of pax
Americanain a now unipolarworldandwas preparedto collaboratewith
the US in differentpartsof the world;as a secularandpro-Westernstate,
Turkeywas a bulwarkagainstIslamicexpansionismin the Caucasusand
CentralAsia. Ozal hoped that the range of activities that Turkeycould
performunderthe imperialwing of the USA couldpossiblyelevateit into
a regionalpowerin the New WorldOrder.
Ozal's pro-Americanreflexes, his pragmatismand willingness fully to
exploit externalevents to Turkey'sadvantage(althoughtime has proved
Turkeyto be amongthe losers)is graphicallytestifiedin the Gulfconflict,
to whichthis articlenow returns.
Immediatelyafter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitat the beginningof
August 1990, the UN SecurityCouncil(SC) ResolutionNo. 661, adopted
on 6 August 1990, imposedeconomicsanctionsagainstIraqto force its
withdrawalfromKuwait.35
FromthemomentIraqinvadedKuwait,theUSA
andthe UK seizedthe initiativein the SC. Accordingto this resolution,all
states,includingnon-members,were underan obligationto impose large
scale trade,economicand financialembargoeson Iraq.For this purpose,
a SanctionsCommitteewas set up to supervisethe implementationof
the resolution.
SOCIETY, 1983-93
79
Less than four months later, the SC adopted Resolution 67836on 29
November 1990 which seemed to sanction the use of force against Iraq.
This resolution authorized 'Member States co-operating with the
Government of Kuwait.. .to use all necessary means' to eject Iraq from
Kuwait if, by 15 January 1991, Iraq had not complied fully with its
obligations. Instead of relying on ChapterVII which governed the rules on
'collective measures' against violators of internationalpeace and security,
the resolution referredto collective self-defence of 'states co-operating with
the government of Kuwait'. This resolution was adopted simply to confirm
a de facto situation, since it was adopted after the massive deployment of
US and UK troops and equipment in the Gulf area. Therefore, this
resolution was politically biased and legally precarious.
However Ozal did not seem to have any qualms about the strategy
adopted by the US during the crisis. Indeed, at no point in the conflict did
Ozal raise any objections to the US motives, political strategy, or legal
posturing in the SC. He consistently justified his support for the US war
effort on the basis of the UN Security Council decisions.37The legality and
the legitimacy of these decisions, to him, were unquestionable. Even
before the outbreak of the Gulf war, Ozal had told CNN that the USA
commander in Incirlik could have used the air base whenever he wanted.38
All along, Ozal was aware of US intentions to destroy Iraq, and saw this
as an opportunity to recover the Mosul and Kirkuk regions of northern
Iraq for Turkey.39A confidant of Ozal refers to a meeting between Ozal
and US President Bush in September 1990 during which Ozal allegedly
asked for US support for his plans to annex Mosul and Kirkuk to Turkey.40
Upon Ozal's initiative, the Turkish parliament passed legislation
permitting the deployment of Turkish troops abroad and foreign troops on
Turkish soil. Turkish troops did not however join the coalition forces
against Iraq, as the military high command dissuaded Ozal from sending
at least a token force which he had been advocating.4 In his
uncompromising support for the US in the process leading to the Gulf war,
Ozal received little support from the Turkish public, the press, and the
military. Even some factions in his party objected to his posture.42This
lack of consensus came into the fore with the dramatic resignation of the
Chief of the General Staff along with the Defence and Foreign Ministers
during the Gulf crisis.
In Ozal's view, as Turkey was an importantregional power, it had to be
actively involved in the war against Iraq.43Under his presidency, Turkey
assisted the anti-Iraqi coalition in a number of ways: first, the Iraqi oil
pipeline that crossed the Turkish territorywas effectively closed; second,
Turkey extended the US-Turkish Defence and Economic Cooperation
Agreement until December 1991 which gave the US freedom to use its
80
military bases in Turkey;third,Turkeydeployed nearly 100,000 troops near
the Iraqiborder,which forced Iraqto move a substantialportion of its troops
to the north;last, but not least, Turkeypermittedthe US to launch air strikes
in northernand central Iraq from NATO air bases in Turkey.'
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the resulting crisis
gave Ozal a unique opportunityto 'prove' Turkey's continuing worth to the
Western world. The logistical and political support given by Turkey to the
US-led coalition against Iraq was primarilyplanned by Ozal. By adopting a
staunchly pro-American line throughout the crisis, Ozal wanted to
demonstratethat Turkey was an indispensable part of Western security and
strategic interests at a time when its worth was not sufficiently appreciated
by the US and Europe.45Ozal was convinced that a deterioratingTurkish
role would harm Turkishinterests. He believed that, in such an eventuality,
the US administrationcould easily be manipulatedby Greek and Armenian
lobbies.46Indeed soon after the US President had declared the dawn of a
'New World Order', the US Senate voted a draft bill on the 'Armenian
genocide' allegedly perpetratedby Ottoman Turks during the First World
War. At almost the same time, the US administrationaccepted the Greek
demand for an addendum to the US-Greek defence treaty on guaranteeing
Greek security in case of an armed attack from outside (presumably from
Turkey).47
As Turkey played a crucial role in the Allied victory against Iraq, Ozal
was certain that the US would be more supportive of Turkey in the future.
Indeed, before the war, in return for Turkish support, Ozal had been
promised by the US that Turkey would have received substantial
economic aid and extensive military equipment, while enjoying greater
access to the US market for textile products.48This promise was partially
fulfilled. In appreciation of the Turkish support during the Gulf war, the
US increased the security assistance and trade benefits enjoyed by Turkey,
doubled the quotas for Turkish textile exports, and intervened with third
countries to (partially) compensate for the economic and financial losses
suffered by Turkey as a result of the events leading to the Gulf war.49As
far as Europe was concerned, Ozal wrote a letter to the EEC member
states in March 1991 reminding them of Turkey's active contribution
during the Gulf war. Ozal argued that Turkey deserved a 'fairer treatment'
from its European partners.5"However European support was never as
firm as that of the US.
Ozal deemed that the terminationof the Cold Warand, connected with this,
the dismantling of the Soviet bloc in the beginning of the 1990s turned
Turkey into a model and centre of attractionin a vast geographical space
SOCIETY, 1983-93
81
from the Adriatic to Central Asia. Indeed it was widely expected that
Turkey would lead these countries towards the market economy and
multiparty democracy. However the economic problems faced by these
republics were too serious for Turkey to solve alone. Ozal knew well that
Turkey did not possess the necessary resources, such as capital, expertise
and technology, to satisfy their foreign investment needs. Therefore he
presented Turkey as a channel for Westernand Japanese investments in the
exploration, production and distribution of oil, gas and mineral riches of
these republics. Accordingly, Turkish businessmen tried to take part in
projects for which they had been short of capital and technology.5 Within
the confines of its economic resources, Turkey managed to allocate some
one billion dollars of aid and trade credits for these republics in 1992.52
Apparently, in spite of his genuine endeavours, Turkey failed to provide
significant economic assistance to the Turkic republics during Ozal's
presidency.53
To compensate for Turkey's lack of material resources, Ozal focused
his attention on international economic co-operation. Indeed Ozal played
a key role in the revitalization of the Economic Co-operation
Organization (ECO), originally set up between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan,
by extending its membership to five of the Turkic republics, namely
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (note that the dominant language,
Tajiki, is a Persian dialect) Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in February
1992. The ECO, which now embraces some 300 million people, was
designed to harmonize transport and communications, relax customs
tariffs, and establish a joint investment and development bank among
member states.54TheWestern world tended to encourage the tightening of
Turkey's relations with the Turkic republics in preference to Iranian
influence."
Under Ozal's presidency, Turkey also played an active role in the
establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone in December
1990. Founded among the littoral states, namely Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Georgia and Ukraine, along with Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Greece and Moldova, this trade pact was intended to encourage economic
co-operation and greater freedom of trade among member states. Ozal was
all too aware that, for the first time in 200 years, Turkey was 'free of
Russian pressures', a situation he wanted to exploit to the full.56
However, Turkey's involvement with the Turkic republics generally
produced less fruitful results than originally expected.57This was partly due
to the fact that, despite Ozal's enthusiasm, Turkey still lacked a 'practical
strategy' and the 'political will or diplomatic clout' to implement its plans
vis-a-vis the Turkic republics.58Also noteworthy is the fact that Ozal had
unrealistic expectations of these republics. To put it bluntly, Ozal was over-
82
optimistic(in his openingspeechat the Turkicsummitin Ankaraat the end
of October1992),whenhe proposedthe dismantlingof economicwallsthat
would eventually lead to the establishment of a free trade zone among
memberstates.59His project,which also includedthe free movementof
personsand services,as well as the establishmentof an investmentbank,
was politelyrejectedby otherparticipantsin favourof a looser economic
co-operation.6)
Ozal'sdisillusionmentwas also an outcomeof his failureto appreciate
the political, culturaland philosophicaldifferencesamong these newly
independentrepublicswhichrequiredin-depthstudies.He similarlyacted
as thoughno culturalor conceptualgaps existed betweenTurkeyandthe
individual Turkic republics. Indeed Ozal was part of a political
establishmentwhich viewed the Turkic republics as a homogeneous
whole whichneededthe helpinghandof Turkeyas the 'big brother'.This
missionaryzeal did not requirea deep understandingof their distinct
histories,ethnicandculturalcharacteristics,
politicaltraditions,collective
aspirations and a list of other specific features.6 Turkey's single-minded
preoccupation with 'spreading the Turkish model' (secularism, freemarket economy, Western-orientedexternal outlook, multi-party politics)
was an apparent testimony to the lack of a genuine dialogue between
Turkeyand these republics.That these countrieswere perhapsweary of
'alien' models in view of their lamentable experience with the Soviet
communist model did not seem to interest Ozal and members of the
establishment. Ozal saw economic assistance and foreign investment as
main vehicles to expand the Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. This self-centred pragmatism and lack of understanding probably
explains a great deal about Turkey's deteriorating influence and prestige
in these regions.62
During the Ozal years, although Turkey's human rights record still
remainedone of the worst among membersof the Council of Europe,
significant strides were made in this area. Under Ozal's premiership, in
January1987, the Turkishgovernmentrecognizedthe competenceof the
EuropeanCommissionof Human Rights to receive applicationsfrom
individuals or non-governmentalorganizations claiming to be victims of a
violation by the Turkish state.63This democratic opening appears to have
been an outcomeof Europeanpressuresand partof preparations
for the
Turkishapplicationto the EECto be madea few monthslater,as well as
Ozal's genuine concern with human rights.
Among Ozal's bold initiatives was the unbanning, in January 1991, of
the use of the Kurdishlanguage in public and the celebrationof the
Kurdishnew year.64
However,typically,Ozal was not only promptedinto
action by a concern with human rights per se, but he also saw the Kurdish
TURKISHPOLITICSAND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY,1983-93
83
problem as a symptom of a deeper malaise in Turkish politics. Ozal
wanted to achieve two primary objectives by increasing the sphere of
freedom enjoyed by the Kurds: first, to undercut the popular support
enjoyed by the PKK (KurdistanWorkers' Party), the political wing of the
Kurdish guerrilla group seeking independence from Turkey; second, to
improve Turkey's performance on the question of minority rights.65Ozal
was convinced that the granting of cultural rights, combined with
economic incentives, was the only realistic solution to the Kurdish
problem.66As Turkey was a remnant of a multiethnic empire which had
not interfered with the intra-community affairs of different ethnic and
religious communities, Ozal saw 'culturalpluralism' and 'decentralization'
as essential prerequisites for resolving some of Turkey's long-standing
social and political ills. This, in his view, was the Ottoman legacy of
political governance.67
Ozal knew well that Turkey's inflexible approachtowards the Kurdish
problem was an obstacle on the way to Turkish membership of the EEC.
Indeed the EEC Commission's report of December 1989 which considered
the viability of Turkish application for membership noted that 'within
Turkey.. .minority rights still fell short of EEC norms despite
improvements'66 This was also a major considerationbehind Ozal's liberal
handling of the Kurdishproblem. The 'Europeancontext' similarly played a
crucial role in the unbanningof the so-called 'thoughtcrimes' in April 1991
by the Turkishparliament.This time, as the president,Ozal was pivotal in the
adaptationof a reformpackage which abolishedArticles 141, 142, and 163 of
the penal code outlawing Communistand Islamist political activities.69
Apparently,Ozal's contributionto the improvement of Turkey's human
rights record was not less significant than his contribution to the
transformationof Turkishpolitics and economy. One should always bear in
mind that, in implementing his policies, Ozal was surroundedby forces of
status quo and, therefore, had to act with great caution and restraint.His
success indeed lay in his capacity to bend an extremely rigid system without
inviting violence in return.
From one angle, Ozal seems to represent a radical breakthroughfrom the
conventions of Turkish politics. His peculiar approach to Turkish politics
and foreign policy differed from those of his predecessors with its
dynamism, boldness, unorthodox style, and adaptability to changes in the
international environment.70Undoubtedly, Ozal was an intelligent, clever
and ambitious leader who sought to exploit external circumstances to
enhance Turkey's international stature and national interests. He was also
a leader who rarely hesitated to take initiatives and calculated risks
84
throughouthis political career.In spite of considerableobjections,he
starteda dialoguewith the GreekPrimeMinister,AndreasPapandreou,in
Davos, Switzerland,in 1989. Ozal visited Athenslaterin the same year.
His willingness to take the initiative became manifest again when he
invited the Kurdishleadersof northernIraqfor talks in the wake of the
Gulf war.7'Thatthis meantthe defacto recognitionof theirstatusweighed
little in his desireto exertTurkishinfluencein reshapingMiddleEastern
politics.
According to Ozal, the polarizationbetween different ideological
groups,both in Turkeyand abroad,was mostly arbitrary,as the fall of
communismtestified.He was ratherskilful in co-optinga heterogeneous
body of ideas and individualsinto his 'grandprojects'.The composition
of his partyas well as the contentof his politics seemedlike a patchwork
of contradictions. His party included a respectful number of
Turkists, conservatives and liberals in its ranks, which seemed to
strikea chordwith the electorate,as the victoryof his partyin the 1983
and 1987 elections testified. Meanwhile, Ozal persistently used
Islamic motifs to enhance the legitimacy of the Turkish state. He
wanted to turn Turkey into the patron of the large Turkic world,
and yet he endorsedthe Turkishdesire of full integrationwith the EEC,
althoughthis would inevitablylimit Turkishactionsvis-'a-visthe Turkic
world.72
Ozal wantedto transformTurkeyfrombeing an isolated,bureaucratic
In his crusadeagainstthe
andmilitaryrepublicinto an open democracy.73
official taboos,Ozalwas bothinnovativeandimaginative.He managedto
dischargethe energy and dynamismof a people long dormantdue to
traditionalthinkingand economic and political etatism.In the realm of
economics, Ozal sought to integrateTurkeyinto the world economy.74
Even his critics agree that liberalizationand transitionto a free market
economyare amonghis most durablelegacies.75Todaynone of the major
politicalpartiesin Turkeydareto opposethese economicpolicies for fear
of riskingelectibility.
One should also note that Ozal was among the first of the Turkish
statesmennot to have hesitatedto stress the 'Islamic'dimensionof the
Turkishnationalidentity.To him, ratherthanbeing a burden,this was an
assetthatcouldbe utilizedfor the stabilityandprosperityof the country.In
line with this assessment, he adopted a cosmopolitanapproachthat
transcendedthe parochialboundariesof ethnicityandnationalterritory.In
this sense, too, Ozal was uniquein questioningthe nationalistdiscourse
whichromanticizedaboutrepublicanism,
(rigid)secularismof the French
InTurkishpolitics,then,his rolewasnotdissimilar
type,andstate-centrism.
to thatof a revolutionary.
SOCIETY, 1983-93
85
Fromanotherangle,however,Ozalappearsnot to havebrokenwiththe
fundamentalsof Turkishpolitics,particularly
in the areaof foreignpolicy.
Likethoseof his predecessors,his externalpoliciesprioritizedtheWest.His
concernwithThirdWorldcountriesandinitiativeswas negligible.However
Ozalsoughtto establishconstructivebilateralandmultilateral
relationswith
other Islamic countries and the Turkic republics, especially through
economicdevices. Given the extentand depthof his commitmentin this
regard,he was undeniablyunique in the history of republicanTurkey.
However, not unlike his predecessors,he never attemptedto question
Turkey'smilitary,politicalandeconomicalliancewith the Westernworld.
On the contrary,his was the most comprehensivepartnership
with the US
since the Menderesgovernmentin the 1950s.Whathoweverdistinguished
Ozalwas his visionaryzeal to use the US as a leverageto turnTurkeyinto
a prominentregionalpower.He said: 'If we do not makemajormistakes,
the nextcenturywill be thecenturyof theTurks'
.76 Onlytimewill tell if this
prophecycomestrue.
NOTES
1. Mehmet Gonlubol and Haluk Ulman, Olaylarla TurkDiz Politikasi, 8th edition (Ankara:
Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993), pp.191-209.
2. At the time, pro-Islamicpartieswere banned in Turkey.
3. Philip Robins, Turkeyand the Middle East (London: The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1991), pp.24-279.
4. Soon afterhis deposition, he was hanged, alongside his Ministerof Finance and Ministerof
Foreign Affairs, for, inter alia, giving too much concessions to the (Islamic) 'reactionary
elements'.
5. Yavuz Gokmen, Ozal Yayasaydi (Had Ozal lived) (Ankara: Verso Yayincilik, 1994),
pp.300-1.
6. Ozal became presidentin 1989 upon his election by the parliamentfor a seven-yearterm.
7. Ahmet Altan, in Osman Ozsoy, Unliilerin TurgutOzal'la Hatiralari (Recollections of the
Famous with Turgut Ozal) (Istanbul: Tiirdav, 1994), p.144. On this rather paradoxical
position, see the interview with Cengiz (andar, a well-known Turkishjournalist and an
unofficial adviserto Ozal, conductedsoon afterOzal's death,in Metin Sever andCem Dizdar
(interviewers),Ikinci CumhuriyetTartiqmalari(The Discussions on the Second Republic)
(Ankara:Ba$akYayinlari,1993), pp.91-114.
8. AbdurrahmanDilipak, in Ozsoy, ibid., p.207.
9. See for instancehis speech duringthe ThirdEconomic Congress of Izmiron 4 June 1992, in
Ikinci CumhuriyetTartimalarl, 15-31.
10. Ramazan Gozen, 'Turgut Ozal and Turkish Foreign Policy: Style and Vision', Foreign
Policy, Vol.20, Nos.3-4 (1996), pp.69-101, 73. Especially during his presidency, in the
course of his active involvement in foreign policy, Ozal tended to bypass the division of
power as envisioned under the Turkish Constitution. He similarly disregarded the
bureaucraticmechanismswhich he saw as a stumblingbloc in decision-making.However his
attitude frequently caused strains in the government. His exaggerated statements about
Turkey's readiness to accept some one million Turks fleeing from Bulgaria in 1989 on
account of the Bulgarianpolicy of forcible assimilationallegedly resultedin the resignation
of the Foreign Minister in protest. (Ibid, pp.71-2).
86
11. Partof his speech in the ThirdEconomic Congress of Izmir, in 2. CumhuriyetTartlimalarl,
pp.28-9.
12. Sevinq (;okum, in Ozsoy, Unlulerin,p.163.
13. Mehmet Altan, in 2. CumhuriyetTartqmalari,pp.33-59, 56-7.
14. Cengiz 4?andar,in Ozsoy, Unliulerin,pp.140-4.
15. See, for instance, TahaParla, Tiirkiye'ninSiyasal Rejimi: 1980-1989 (The Political Regime
of Turkey: 1980-1989) (Istanbul:OnurYayinlari,1993), p.220.
16. Ibid.
17. Gbkmen, Ozal YaEasaydi,p.301.
18. Ufuk Giildemir,Texas-Malatya,second edition (Istanbul:TekinYayinlari,1992), p.360.
19. Gokmen, Ozal YaEasaydz,
p.235.
20. Gozen, 'TurgutOzal', p.77.
21. Ibid., pp.78-9.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Not unexpectedly,
Ozal played an active role in the Islamic Conference
Organization(founded in 1969). During his premiership,Turkeyheld a special status in the
StandingCommitteefor the Economic and CommercialCo-operationof this organization.
Ibid., p.81.
Ibid., p.82. Indeed most of Ozal's visionary designs vis-a-vis the Middle East never
materializedfor a number of reasons. First, the animosities in the Middle East (first and
foremost the 'Arab-Israeliconflict') were too deep to overcome through economic cooperation.Secondly, most of the Middle Easterncountrieswere too dependenton US and the
EEC countriesto forge close economic links among themselves (ibid., p.91).
Sabri Sayari, 'Turkey:The ChangingEuropeanSecurity Environmentand the Gulf Crisis',
TheMiddle East Journal, Vol.46, No.1 (Winter 1992), p. 18.
According to Gbzen, the military's apparentdocility towards Ozal was partly due to his
resignationto the fact that the securitymatterswere the exclusive realm of the military.Ozal
was discreet enough not to interfere with the 'military's business' (Gozen, 'TurgutOzal',
p.73), as he was all too aware that the only challenge to his authoritycould come from the
army,as the iron fist of the official ideology.
Guldemir,Texas-Malatva,p.97.
See, for instance, the article entitled 'An Ally Deserves Better', Time,28 Jan. 1991, p.63.
Similar observationsare made by Omer La9inerand Tanil Bora, 'Tiirki Cumhuriyetlerve
Tiirkiye:Ikinci Vizyon' (TurkicRepublics and Turkey:The Second Vision), Birikim,No.37
(May 1992), 7-16, p.16; Philip Robins, 'Between Sentiment and Self-Interest:Turkey's
Policy TowardAzerbaijanand the CentralAsian States', The Middle East Journal, Vol.47,
No.4 (Autumn 1993), p.601.
'Commission Opinion on Turkey'sRequest for Accession to the Community',Brussels, 20
Dec. 1989, SEC(89) 2290 final/2.
Robins, 'Between Sentiment',p.595.
Sayari, 'Turkey',p.17.
Cengiz (iandar,Nokta, 25 Nisan-1 Mayis 1993, Sayi 18, Ozel Ek, 31-32.
Ibid.
Atilla Eralp, 'The Politics of TurkishDevelopment Strategies', Andrew Finkel and Nukhet
Sirman (eds.), TurkishState, TurkishSociety (London and New York: Routledge, 1990),
pp.219-58, p.249.
Ihsan DuranDagi, 'Turkeyin the 1990s: Foreign Policy, HumanRights, and the Search for
a New Identity',MediterraneanQuarterly,Vol.4, No.4 (Fall 1993), p.64.
Resolution 661, InternationalLegal Materials, 1990, pp.1325-7.
Resolution 678, InternationalLegal Materials, 1990, p.1565.
Hulki Cevizoglu, KorfezSavapive Ozal Diplomasisi (Istanbul:FormYayinlari,1991), p.76.
Ibid., p.38.
Gokmen, Ozal Yasasaydz,p.93. The Council of the League of Nations handedover these two
regions, also claimed by Turkey, to British mandated Iraq in 1925, to which Turkey
reluctantlyconsented.
SOCIETY, 1983-93
87
40. Ibid., p.100. It must be noted that, at the time, the SC resolutionwhich authorizedthe use of
force against Iraq had not yet been adopted. Throughoutthe crisis, Ozal was continuously
blamed by the opposition for harbouringunrealisticambitionsand for his willingness to join
the war on the side of the US (Cevizoglu, p.39). However, after the war, Ozal opposed the
possibility of the disintegrationof Iraqas he came to realize thatTurkeywould not be among
the beneficiaries of such an eventuality.Indeed he became aware that the emergence of a
Kurdish state in the north of Iraq would only exacerbate Turkey's own Kurdishproblem.
(Sayari, 'Turkey',p.14).
41. Andrew Mango, Turkey,the Challenges of a New Role (London:Praeger, 1994), p.111.
42. Sayari, 'Turkey',p.16.
43. Cevizoglu, p.86.
44. Bruce R. Kuniholm, 'Turkey and the West', Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No.2 (Spring 1991),
pp.36-7.
45. Kutlay Dogan, TurgutOzal Belgeseli (The TurgutOzal File) (Ankara:TurkHaberlerAjansi,
1994), pp.318-19.
46. In Turkish foreign policy discourse, Greeks and Armenians are portrayedas the 'ardent
enemies' of Turkey.
47. Guldemir,Texas-Malatya,pp.95-6.
48. Kuniholm, 'Turkeyand the West', pp.34-8.
50. Newspot, 7 March 1991.
51. George J. Church, 'Across the GreatDivide', Time,Vol.140, No.16, 19 Oct. 1992, p.35.
52. The Economist, 25 Dec.-8 Jan.1993, p.82.
53. Robins, 'Between Sentiment',p.593.
54. Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, 1992, p.38792. At least initially, Iranwas inclined to see
the ECO as an incipient model of an Islamic common market,while Turkeylaid emphasis
on its economic side.
55. Keesing's ContemporaryArchives,Reference Supplement,1992, p.R.128.
56. The WashingtonPost, 24 Feb. 1993.
57. Suat Bilge, 'Bagimsiz Devletler Topluluguve Tiirkiye'(The Commonwealthof Independent
States and Turkey),AvrasyaEtudleri,Vol.1, No.4 (Winter 1995), p.91.
58. Robins, 'Between Sentiment', 1993, p.609.
59. Part of his speech can be found in Bilge, 'Bagimsiz Devletler', p.89. 'BBC Summaryof
WorldBroadcasts',Middle East, 2 Nov. 1992.
60. Ibid., p.90.
61. Laqinerand Bora, 'TuirkiCumhuriyetler',pp.12-14.
62. On the (partial) disillusionment of the parties see, Robins, 'Between Sentiment', 1993,
pp.593-5. Robins notes that, after gaining independence,these republics,ratherthan asking
for Turkey'smediation,wanted to establish directeconomic links with the West (p.593).
63. HumanRights Law Journal, Vol.1, Nos.3-4 (1990), pp.456-8.
64. Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, Vol.38, 1992, Reference Supplement,p.R.127. However
Ozal's bold initiatives on the Kurdishproblemwere confrontedwith strongobjections, even
from factions of his own party:Omer La9iner,'GeqiESiirecindeOzal ve ANAP' (Ozal and
the MotherlandPartyin time of Transition),Birikim,April 1991, No.24, 3-7, pp.6-7.
65. Ibid.
66. Among Turkishpoliticians, he was the only hope of Kurdishrights activists for a peaceful
solution to the Kurdishproblem ((andar, in Ozsoy, Unlilerin, p.233).
67. See the extensive interview of Mustafa(alik with Ozal, Tuirkiye Guinliigui,No.19 (Summer
1992), pp.5-23.
68. 'Commission Opinion on...' (note 28).
69. Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, April 1991, p.38159.
70. Dogan, TurgutOzal Belgeseli, p.315.
88
72. The membership, inter alia, requires common customs policies among EEC members
towards third countries. Besides the issues such as common customs tariffs, in case of
membership,Turkeywill be barredfrom special economic arrangementswith non-member
states without the priorauthorisationof the EEC.
73. Yilmaz Oztuna,in Ozsoy, Unliilerin,p.247.
74. (andar, in ibid., p.233.
75. Hasan Cemal, in ibid., p.220.
76. Gokmen, Ozal Yasasaydi,p.51. Ozal expressed this view on numerousoccasions. See for
instance his opening speech in the Third Ecoonomic Congress of Izmir, 4 June 1992, in
CumhurbaskaniTurgut Ozal'in 111H.Izmir iktisat KongresindekiKonuEmalari(Ankara:
Ba~babanlhk,1992); Cumhurba~kaniTurgutOzal'in '21. Asir Tuirkiye'ninve TurklerinAsri
Olacaktir'Konulu Konuimalari, Bursa-(elik Palas, 22 Mayis 1991 (Ankara:Ba,bakanlik,
1991).
Middle East Critique
Vol. 19, No. 1, 55–70, Spring 2010
The March 2009 Local Elections and the
Inconsistent Democratic Transformation
of the AKP Party in Turkey
SEBNEM GUMUSCU* & DENIZ SERT**
*University of Virginia
**Koc University
The Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, or AKP) was established
in 2001 by a group of former members of the Milli Gorus movement (National Outlook, or
MG) as a conservative– democratic party.1 Known as the yenilikciler (those who seek
novelty), a group of moderates seceded from the Islamist MG and proclaimed that they
were establishing a ‘moderate and democratic’ party. This was an important turning point
not only in the history of Turkish Islamism, but also in the trajectory of political Islam in
Muslim societies. The AKP with its platform based on economic and political liberalism
and social conservatism managed to garner a plurality of votes in its first general election
in 2002. With 34 percent of the ballot and 366 of the total 550 seats in the parliament, the
AKP came to power. Two years later, in 2004, the AKP participated in its first municipal
elections and succeeded in increasing its share of the vote to 42 percent. In the second
general elections in 2007, the party achieved a phenomenal political success by increasing
its share of votes to 46.6 percent. In the following 20 months, however, Turkish political
life experienced several crises, including the case asking the Constitutional Court to ban
the AKP on grounds that it was not a genuine secular party as laws required political
parties to be, debates over a new ‘civil’ constitution, a new court case against the ‘deep
state,’2 and many corruption allegations against the incumbent party. Consequently, in
the municipal elections of March 2009, the AKP, for the first time in its short history,
suffered a substantial loss in support, with its share of the vote declining to 39 percent.3
Correspondence Address: Sebnem Gumuscu, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA. Email: [email protected].
Deniz Sert, Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: [email protected]
1
For a detailed discussion, see H. Yavuz (2009) Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press); S. Gumuscu (2010) Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political
Islam in Turkey and Egypt, Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming.
2
The court case known as ‘Ergenekon’ involves several military officers, journalists, civil society activists and
professors who are accused of conspiring against the AKP government and preparing a coup d’etat. For a detailed
account of the case see S. Tayyar (2008) Operasyon Ergenekon [Operation Ergenekon] (Istanbul: Timas).
3
Turkish Statistical Institute (2009) 2009 Local Elections. Available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr, accessed 10
December 2009.
ISSN 1943-6149 Print/1943-6157 Online/10/010055-16 q 2010 Editors of Middle East Critique
DOI: 10.1080/19436141003594617
56
S. Gumuscu & D. Sert
Table 1. Number of municipalities won by major parties in 2004 and 2009
2004
2009
Party
Metropolis
City
Town
Metropolis
City
Town
AKP
CHP
MHP
DTP
12
2
0
1
46
6
4
3
483
130
72
32
10
3
1
1
35
10
9
7
447
170
129
50
Unlike other parties on the Turkish political scene, the AKP has been able to draw
electoral support from all provinces in the country. For example, in the March 2009
elections, as in the preceding ones, the AKP competed with the Demokratik Toplum
Partisi (Democratic Society Party, or DTP) in the regions with majority Kurdish
populations, with the Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, or MHP) in
conservative central Anatolia, and with the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican
People’s Party, or CHP) in western Turkey and metropolitan areas. Yet, in that election
the AKP lost some of its earlier support to all three of the aforementioned parties
(see Table 1).
Soon after the March 2009 municipal elections, many pundits claimed that the results
were due to a ‘normalization’ process that the electorate had undergone. According to
this view, the 2007 election results were ‘abnormal,’ because the electoral base of the
AKP could not be as large as 46.6 percent.4 We disagree with such explanations for two
reasons. First, such explanations ignore an essential characteristic of democracy, namely
the idea that elections are opportunities for the electorate to assess the performance of
incumbent governments. The assumption that there are ‘normal’ vote-shares for each
party in multiparty political systems betrays a fundamental lack of understanding about
democratic processes. Second, such a perspective cannot explain political change or
define political ‘abnormality.’ Simply put, parties do not receive the same percentage of
votes in every election. Instead of such an essentialist explanation, we believe that an
analysis of a party’s principles, objectives and policies is necessary to understand its
success and failure in elections. In a similar vein, we argue that the AKP’s success in the
2007 elections was due to its effective economic and political management during its
first term in office, while inconsistencies in its economic, political and social policies in
the second term led to a decline in its support in the 2009 municipal elections.
A comparative analysis of the two terms also enables us to engage with the debate as to
whether the AKP is an Islamist party. This analysis reveals that the party is indeed not an
Islamist party. However, its inconsistencies, particularly in the political and social
realms, also indicate that the AKP has not yet become a liberal democratic party either.
The period between the two elections has shown that the AKP in Turkey oscillates
between conservatism and liberal pluralism, and it still needs time to complete its
democratic transformation.
4
See, for example, E. Katircioglu, Secimler, kimlikler ve yeni siyaset [Elections, identities and new politics],
Taraf Newspaper, April 2, 2009.
The March 2009 Local Elections and the Inconsistent Democratic Transformation
57
Origins of the AKP
When the AKP was established in 2001, the founders defined it as a conservative
democratic party that promotes a free market economic system with minimal state
intervention in the economy, democratization and liberalization of the polity, and
conservatism in the society.5 The leaders of the new party claimed insistently that they had
taken off the MG ‘shirt,’ and at every opportunity denounced their Islamist background.6
As we will show below, the AKP indeed has departed from the MG line and adopted a path
with respect to the role of religion in politics, the perception of democracy, and human
rights and freedoms that is different from that of the MG. Moreover, coming to power in
2002, the AKP has pursued, designed, and implemented significantly different economic,
social and foreign policies compared with those of the MG, and the party, as laid out in its
program and official statements, strongly rejects Islamism as a social, economic and
political project.7 For the AKP, Islam is a religion that comprises norms and values that
render life meaningful for devout Muslims, but it is not an ideology and thus cannot be
offered as a solution for the economic, political and social problems that confront society.
The party program states that its central political project is composed of two main goals:
economic development and growth, and expansion of human rights and freedoms within
the broader aim of consolidating democracy.8 According to the AKP, religion plays no
explicit role in the attainment of these goals.
In contrast to the MG, which puts community before the individual, the AKP program
declares that the main goal of the party is to consolidate democracy and to protect human
rights and freedoms by placing the individual at the center of the political process.9 In the
AKP platform the primacy of community and the ethical order are left to individuals and
their rights. Accordingly, the AKP approaches the issue of human rights and freedoms
from a liberal perspective. In its central motto, ‘No one is free unless everyone is free,’ the
AKP communicates the message that it is concerned with all freedoms and rights of every
citizen.10 In line with a liberal understanding, the party urges the adoption of
internationally accepted standards of human rights as stated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final
Act.11
The AKP also is distinct in its approach toward political pluralism and political
competition among parties. For example, it sees political parties as civic organizations that
communicate individuals’ demands to the state while competing for power to address
these demands.12 Furthermore, it views political parties as integral parts of a wellfunctioning democracy, because they compete for power, and democracies function as
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
See AKP Party Program for details. Available at: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html,
accessed 8 December 2009.
In a 2003 interview published in a Turkish daily, Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the party, stated that they have
taken off the Milli Gorus shirt; see Interview with Tayyip Erdogan, Yeni Safak, December 12, 2003.
U. Tekin (2004) AK Partinin Muhafazakar Demokrat Kimligi [The conservative-democratic identity of the
AKP] (Ankara: Orient), p. 111.
Ibid., p. 143; see also the AKP Party Program, Introduction, pp. 5–9.
AKP Program, pp. 7 –8.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid., p. 14.
Ibid., p. 17.
58
healthy systems only in the presence of this competition. Moreover, success in this
competition does not deliver absolute power to the winners. The parties have to respect the
freedoms and rights of the minorities, and these rights should be brought under
constitutional guarantees.13
In addition to changes that it has adopted in its democracy, pluralism and human rights
discourse, the AKP also has diverted from the MG line in terms of policy. The AKP has
emerged as an ardent supporter of Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU),
presenting a stark break from the MG, an overt critic of the EU. Moreover, the AKP
adopted economic and political liberalism and aimed to reduce the size of the state so that
it only fulfills very basic functions such as defense, basic education and provision of law
and order while it leaves economic, political and social realms to free markets and the
private sector, local governments and civil society organizations. In this respect, the AKP
breaks with the statist line of the MG which upholds state interventionism in several
aspects of economic, social and political life. Thus, the AKP program and election
manifestos indicate a clear break with the MG tradition.14
AKP Performance in Power
Particularly in its first term in office, the AKP government acted in conformity with what
it had promised in its party program. Economic growth and privatization were priorities
of the party in this period. The government carried out large privatization schemes,
stabilized macroeconomic indicators, kept inflation and the budget deficit low and
successfully attracted foreign direct investment. Following a major financial crisis that
broke out in 2001, the party in its first term in office (2002 –2007) displayed a
remarkable economic success, with the Turkish economy growing on average 6.8
percent per year. Meanwhile, exports increased from US $45 billion in 2002 to US $107
billion in 2007.15
It was this phenomenal success upon which the AKP built its election campaign in 2007.
In his speeches, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan often cited numbers that indicated how
successful his government had been in its first term. Thus, it was not so surprising in July
2007 when the AKP received 46.6 percent of the votes. Indeed, many scholars contended
that the primary cause of the AKP’s electoral success was due to its success in economic
management.16 At least one study involving pre- and post-election surveys showed that the
13
14
15
16
Ibid., pp. 25–26.
S. Gumuscu & D. Sert (2009) The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development
Party in Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, 4(6), pp. 953–968.
It has to be noted that the Minister of State in the preceding government, Kemal Dervis, carried out significant
structural reforms to strengthen the Turkish economy in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis. These
reforms and the stand-by agreements with the IMF created a healthy Turkish economy that could benefit from
the expanding global economy between 2002 and 2007. In that respect, the AKP government benefitted
substantially from Dervis’s reforms in attaining economic growth. See further, E. Yeldan (2002) On the IMFDirected Disinflation Program in Turkey: A Program for Stabilization and Austerity or a Recipe for
Impoverishment and Financial Chaos?, in: N. Balkan & S. Savran (eds) The Ravages of Neo-liberalism:
Economy, Society, and Gender in Turkey (New York: Nova Science Publishers). For the statistics, see Turkish
Statistical Institute. Available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr, accessed 9 December 2009.
See, for example, A. Carkoglu (2008) Ideology or Economic Pragmatism? Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007,
Turkish Studies, 9(2), pp. 317–344.
59
primary reason why people voted for the AKP in 2007 was in fact economic pragmatism,
particularly people with less than a high school education.17
Also during its first term, the AKP government took several steps to consolidate
democracy, improve human rights and expand freedoms, measures undertaken to take
Turkey closer to EU membership. For instance, the AKP passed two constitutional
amendments (in 2002 and 2004) and enacted five laws that included several legislative
changes designed to harmonize Turkish law with EU standards.18 To ‘civilianize’ and
consolidate democracy in the country, the AKP government abolished the controversial
State Security Courts, made changes to the organization of the National Security
Council19 and its responsibilities in some state institutions20 and narrowed the scope of
the military courts. To safeguard human rights and freedoms, the government accepted
the supremacy of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) over domestic
jurisdiction, thus acknowledging the citizen’s right to a retrial in cases where the ECHR
might rule a penalty imposed by the Turkish courts conflicted with the European
Convention on Human Rights.
For further expansion of basic rights and freedoms, the AKP government abolished the
death penalty for all crimes, lifted the ban against broadcasting in languages other than
Turkish and facilitated instruction in native languages other than Turkish. To further the
freedom of expression, the government repealed a controversial clause in the law against
terrorism, made it harder to ban political parties and broadened the freedom of association
by lifting the obstacles to establishing and joining associations. To enhance gender
equality, the AKP government amended the Constitution and introduced the clause that
‘women and men have equal rights before the law’ and increased the penalties in the penal
code for honor crimes committed against women. Finally, to coordinate further steps to
improve the human rights regime, the prime minister appointed a minister who would
oversee improvements in human rights. All these steps taken by the AKP during its first
term in office enabled Turkey to secure candidacy status to the EU, and in 2005, the
accession talks officially began.21
All these political and economic achievements contributed to the AKP’s political
success in the July 2007 elections, when it increased its share of the popular vote to
nearly 47 percent and won 340 of the 550 parliament seats.22 The AKP managed to
attract votes from very diverse groups, including liberals, nationalists and conservatives.
Nationalists and conservatives are among the primary constituency of the party, and with
its economic performance the AKP managed to defeat other nationalist and conservative
17
18
19
20
21
22
Ibid., pp. 317 –344.
On the EU harmonization process, see Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Secretariat General for EU Affairs.
Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr, accessed 12 December 2009.
One such step was to appoint a civilian secretary to the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council, or
MGK).
For instance, before these changes the MGK had a right to appoint a member to the Board of the Higher
Education Institute and the Higher Board of Radio and Television Broadcasting.
For measures taken in relation to the EU harmonization process, see Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry
Secretariat General for EU Affairs. Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr, accessed 9 December 2009.
Despite the fact that the AKP increased its vote share in the 2007 elections, the seats it won in the parliament
slightly decreased compared with the 2002 elections because in 2007 four political parties passed the national
electoral threshold (10 percent of the popular vote) necessary to get a seat; only AKP and CHP had done so in
the 2002 elections.
60
parties competing for the same constituency.23 The reason liberals voted for the AKP
was the perception of the party as an agent of change for further democratization of the
polity and accession to the EU. The AKP’s economic and political performance in its
first term in office was the primary basis of this perception.24 However, despite this
success at the polls in 2007, the AKP’s performance in government began to deteriorate
during its second term in office. In the period after the general election and up to the
municipal elections in 2009, the AKP was perceived as being inconsistent in its
economic management and in its political and social policy-making; this perception
eventually would lose the party electoral support.
Economic Inconsistencies
Although the AKP had reaped the political benefits of the global economic expansion
during its first term in office, after 2007 it failed to take the necessary steps to reduce
the negative impact of the turning tide in the global economy. Specifically, between
the general and municipal elections, Turkey started to feel the adverse effects of the
growing global financial and economic crisis.25 The party could not adjust to the new
circumstances, and its economic policy-making remained paralyzed and ineffective in
the early stages of the crisis. Thus, at a time that demanded the government’s active
involvement in economic policy-making, it left major decisions to the free market. For
example, the government continuously postponed a stand-by agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) despite rising pressure from Turkish business
circles. The party also resisted calls from the industrial sector which demanded
reforms in the employment laws and regulations.26 Erdogan followed an extremely
liberal free-market approach, and his statements belittled the effects of the global
crisis on the Turkish economy. For instance, he blamed the managers and owners
of the companies in financial trouble for being incapable of running their businesses.27
In a similar vein, Erdogan called those people with credit card debts dishonest.28
Thus, he turned the crisis into a battle between the business world and economists
on one hand, and the government on the other hand. Meanwhile, Turkish industrial
production experienced a serious blow; exports declined, production decreased and
unemployment increased.
23
24
25
26
27
28
See further A. Carkoglu & M. Hinich (2008) The Changing Political Space of Turkey from 2001 to 2004, in:
S. Yazıcı, K. Gozler & F. Keyman (eds) (2008) Prof. Dr. Ergun Ozbudun’a Armagan [Essays in honor of
Ergun Özbudun] (Ankara: Yetkin Yayınevi), pp. 109– 136; and Carkoglu, Ideology or Economic Pragmatism?
pp. 317 –344.
C. Camci (2009) AKP: An Egalitarian Opportunity or a Threat for Liberal Democracy in Turkey?, ETHOS:
Felsefe ve Toplumsal Bilimlerde Diyaloglar, 2(4), pp. 1–24.
See further Country Report for Turkey, The Economist, 3 December 2009.
The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSIAD) has been vocal in criticizing the
government’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the economic crisis. For a sample of TUSIAD suggestions and
criticisms, see Chairwoman Yalcindag’s speech. Available at http://www.tusiad.org.tr/FileArchive/2008.12.
15-ADYKonusmaOECDToplantisi.pdf, accessed 3 December 2009.
Erdogan’s speech in Bolu, March 2009. Available at http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2009/03/23/haber,
60121934ED644BD4A8041DE90565FE5C.html, accessed 6 December 2009.
Erdogan’s speech in Eskişehir, March 2009. Available at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/default.aspx?aType¼ So
nDakika&ArticleID¼ 1071020, accessed 7 December 2009.
61
The effects of the crisis had become visible by 2008, when, after years of expansion,
economic growth slowed down to 1.1 percent. In the last quarter of 2008, the Turkish
economy shrank by 6.2 percent. Unemployment reached 11.5 percent in January 2008, and
it continued to rise throughout the year, reaching 15.5 percent by January 2009.
Unemployment was more severe in major urban centers than elsewhere, rising from 13.7
in January 2008 to 19 percent in January 2009. Industrial production dropped sharply in
early 2009, just prior to the municipal elections in March. For example, the industrial
production index, computed on a monthly basis, decreased by 21.3 percent in January,
23.7 percent in February, and 20.9 percent in March. In the same period, exports declined
by 25.7 percent in January, 24.9 percent in February, another 28.4 percent in March
2009.29 Erdogan’s attitude toward the economic turbulence, the government’s apparent
inability to manage the crisis, and the continuing deterioration of economic indicators
alienated many of the voters who had voted for the AKP in 2002 and 2007, when the party
had been perceived as successful in managing economic policy.
This perception of ineffectiveness in economic governance has constituted a primary
inconsistency for the AKP, which had based its raison d’être and performance criteria
primarily on economic indicators. Considering the context that preceded the 2002 general
elections, it was natural for the AKP to adopt economic growth along with
democratization as its primary goal. The 2001 economic crisis in Turkey had hit the
banking sector hard and had hurt the middle and lower classes.30 The parties in coalition—
the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Leftist Party, or DSP), the Anavatan Partisi
(Motherland Party, or ANAP) and the MHP—suffered a serious below in the 2002
elections as a result, and none won any seats in parliament, essentially leaving the political
scene to the AKP and the CHP.31
Furthermore, the AKP’s prime constituency is the devout bourgeoisie that has grown
and expanded in the aftermath of the economic liberalization in the 1980s. The provincial
entrepreneurs have turned into devout bourgeoisie during liberalization as they attained
economic growth and experienced substantial change in their lifestyles. The devout
bourgeoisie comprised a distinct status group, who also owned the means of production,
by fusing religious piety with capitalist activity to build a new class identity around
relations of production, consumption and religious devotion. The changes in economic
class and social status led to changes in the political preferences of the devout bourgeoisie
and creating an elective affinity between the new bourgeois class and pragmatic politics
that the AKP advocated.32 Because the devout bourgeoisie had gained its identity
primarily through economic activity and its successful blending of religion and
capitalism33 and because they desired to consolidate the free market economy, which
fueled their support for the AKP, the party’s perceived inability to manage the economic
crisis became a serious handicap.
29
30
31
32
33
Turkish Statistical Institute. Available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr, accessed 2 December 2009.
On the 2001 economic crisis, see further Z. Onis & B. Rubin (eds) (2003) The Turkish Economy in Crisis
(London: Frank Cass). The volume also appeared as a special issue of Turkish Studies, 4(2).
For the impact of the 2002 elections on the Turkish political scene, see Ali Carkoglu (2002) Turkey’s
November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning? MERIA, 6(4).
S. Gumuscu, Class, Status, and Party.
A. Insel (2003) The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102(2/3), pp.
297 –301.
62
In addition to its inability to deal with the economic crisis, the AKP became the target of
corruption accusations. In 2008, a court case in Germany revealed the close ties between a
private voluntary association and top AKP-appointed bureaucrats. According to court
documents, a Germany-registered non-governmental organization had raised funds
ostensibly for humanitarian aid to Indonesian earthquake victims, but in actuality it instead
transferred the funds to Turkey. The German court suspected that these funds were used to
finance the AKP’s political campaign.34 Such corruption charges against high-ranking
AKP members further marred the party’s image, which was built on ‘clean politics.’
Indeed, the party’s acronym, AK, suggests the Turkish adjective ak, which means white,
and connotes the party’s uncompromising attitude toward being clean and free
of corruption. Thus, the issue of corruption constituted another area of inconsistency
for the AKP.
Political Inconsistencies
A New Constitution
Since its establishment, the AKP set democratic consolidation in Turkey as a priority for
itself. In its first term in office the party took important steps and implemented a series of
reforms to make the polity more democratic. However, three main issues pertaining to
democratic consolidation had been left untouched in its first term in office. These issues
were Kurdish cultural and political rights, Alevi cultural and political rights, and
preparation of a democratic constitution that guarantees freedoms and rights for all
citizens including Kurds and Alevis. The AKP’s second term in office has had a mixed
record in these areas and includes many inconsistencies.
Right after the 2007 general elections, the AKP started its second term with an
ambitious project to prepare a democratic and civilian constitution to replace the
existing one written by the military junta in 1982. Given the mandate of the electorate,
the party was expected to build a grand coalition to write a new social contract and
instate a civilian and democratic constitution for the first time in republican history
since 1924. The fundamental features of the new draft were oriented to curb the excess
power of the president, to lift the headscarf ban in universities, and to redefine the
concept of ‘Turkishness’ in terms of citizenship and loyalty to the constitution. The
concept of Turkishness is significant for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey since
its current and vague usage allows for infringements on freedom of expression. Article
301 of the criminal code is an important example that frequently permits such
violations. For example, prior to 2008, Article 301 prescribed up to three years
imprisonment for insulting Turkishness, a term with ethno-religious connotations. On
April 29, 2008, the AKP-dominated parliament voted to change the Article after years
of equivocation, and jail sentences for insulting the ‘Turkish nation’—as opposed to
Turkishness—now are limited to two instead of three years, leniency is proscribed for
34
On the court case, see German prosecutors open new probe into Turkey-linked charity fraud, Turkey Daily
News ,online . . December 3, 2008. Available at http://www.turkeydailynews.com/news/119/ARTICLE/
1464/2008-12-03.html, accessed December 4 2009.
63
first time offenders, and cases only can be opened with the permission of the Minister
of Justice.35
The process, however, unfolded in a way that caused hopes for a new democratic
constitution to quickly disappear. The AKP brought together a group of academics, led by a
renowned constitutional law professor, Ergun Ozbudun, to write a draft, but refused to open
the process to other political actors, civil society organizations or ordinary citizens. The party
maintained secrecy around the whole process of writing the draft, and this approach prompted
different groups in society to severely criticize the secretive attitude and to claim that the
product of such an undemocratic process could not be democratic. Since a new constitution
signified a new social contract, its drafting could not be prepared by a single political party.
The process, these groups argued, should include as wide participation as possible.
Although the AKP kept postponing the public discussion of the draft constitution, it was
hacked and leaked to the press, igniting a series of new debates around the proposed
changes.36 While liberals supported the project of writing a civilian constitution,37 secular
groups focused on the implications of the draft constitution for the secular education
system and the headscarf ban in the universities and heavily criticized the government for
undermining the secular nature of the state.38
Amid these debates, the AKP quickly changed course and left the draft constitution
aside without making a formal statement as to the reasons. Instead, after the MHP signaled
that they would support a legal arrangement to permit women to wear headscarves in
public universities, the AKP proposed amendments to the existing constitution that would
lift the ban on wearing headscarves.39 This was a major inconsistency on the part of the
governing party that had promised to consolidate liberal rights and freedoms in a civilian
constitution, but instead gave up this project to solve the problem of a particular segment
in the society. Such a dramatic turn raised concerns among liberals and confirmed the fears
of the secular wing that the AKP indeed might be more sensitive to the expectations of
conservative groups in the society than it is to the rights and freedoms of all citizens.
The Kurdish Issue
Similarly, the AKP in its party program promised to address the Kurdish issue in the most
democratic way possible while acknowledging the multifaceted nature of the problem.40
35
36
37
38
39
40
Turkish and international human rights activists fear these changes still leave scope for unjust application of
the law. Many of the best known Article 301 cases were on grounds of ‘insulting Turkishness’ in relation to the
Armenian question. The accused included novelist and Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk and the TurkishArmenian journalist Hrant Dink. See further on Article 301, N. Fisher Onar (2009) Beyond Binaries: ‘Europe,’
Pluralism, and a Revisionist-Status Quo Key to Turkish Politics, Sabanci University Essay Contest Finalist,
pp. 15–19.
For a detailed account of the crisis see E. Ozbudun & O. F. Genckaya (2009) Democratization and
Constitution Making in Turkey (Budapest: Central European University Press), Chapter 6.
S. Alpay (2007) What does the draft constitution signify? Today’s Zaman, October 1, 2007.
For a detailed account of the content of the draft constitution and methodological and substantive criticisms
directed toward it see Z. Arslan (2007) Turkey’s Bid for the New Constitution, Insight Turkey, July 2007.
Secular groups severely criticized this abrupt turn by the AKP, claiming it proved they were correct with
regard to the intentions of the party in drafting a new constitution. These constitutional amendments would
form the basis of the court case against the AKP in the months to follow, as discussed below.
AKP Party Program, pp. 28–30.
64
However, a quick overview of AKP policies on the issue shows mixed results. Overall, the
AKP displays a tendency to develop solutions for the Kurdish question without any input
from Kurds themselves. For example, the AKP government has shown sustained
resistance to accommodating Kurdish actors. There seems to be no dialogue between the
AKP and the DTP, the major Kurdish party in the country and in the Parliament. The same
criticism also seems to be valid with regard to a dialogue with Kurdish civil society
organizations, as they complain of not being invited to city councils (Kent Konseyleri) by
AKP municipalities through which they can be integrated into local decision-making
processes. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ozcan have summarized the AKP’s main argument on
the Kurdish problem as: ‘The Kurdish problem is not about nationalism but rather forced
secularism and Turkish nationalism of the type enforced by Kemalist ideology. If we stress
common Islamic ties and brotherhood, we can enhance the country and also end the
conflict.’41 They also argue that AKP has been rather unsuccessful in either developing or
implementing a coherent policy to address the Kurdish problem, citing four reasons:
(1) Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s definition of the Kurdish question is
very different from that of the Kurdish actors, especially the PKK-led political
parties; (2) there is a major conflict between the state institutions and the [AKP] over
the conceptualization of the Kurdish issue and the foundations of the Turkish
Republic; (3) one of the primary fears of the [AKP] is that the Kurdish issue could
split the party and undermine its support in Turkish-Muslim provinces in central and
eastern Anatolia; and (4) the Kurdish issue has the potential to lead to a major
confrontation with the military.42
However, as already been discussed, the project of writing a civilian and democratic
constitution, which would promise a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, has been
shelved, while legal reforms still lack provisions on rights. To illustrate, as also stated in
the European Commission’s latest Progress Report on Turkey, the Anti-Terror Law is still
applied to prosecute and convict those expressing non-violent opinions on the Kurdish
issue.43 Regarding the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights, the AKP government
initiated 24-hour Kurdish language broadcasting in the state radio and television agency,
TRT; however, Kurdish has yet to be introduced in either the public or private school
systems, while Kurdish language schools are underdeveloped.
In 2008, the Turkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etudler Vakfi (Turkish Economic and Social
Studies Foundation, or TESEV) published a report on the Kurdish question, which
proposed steps to be followed toward resolving the issue. The headings of the report were
diverse, including issues such as disarmament of the PKK, dialogue with Kurdish political
parties and non-governmental organizations, a new constitution, legal reforms, GAP
Action Plan, industrial and trade policies, tourism, border trade, agriculture and livestock,
education, fight against poverty, children, women, seasonal labor, internal displacement,
41
42
43
H. Yavuz & N. A. Ozcan (2006) The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, Middle
East Policy, 13(1), pp. 102 –119.
Ibid., p. 102.
The European Commission Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p. 16. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf, accessed December 10
2009.
65
Table 2. Votes received by the AKP and the DTP in 2004, 2007 and 2009 elections
2009 Municipal45
2007 General
City
AKP
DTP
AKP
Diyarbakir
Van
Sirnak
Agri
Siirt
Hakkari
Turkey
31.5
34.3
30.8
28.9
35.0
20.6
38.8
59.4
48.3
60.6
37.2
37.3
73.7
5.7
40.9
53.2
26.9
63.1
48.8
33.4
46.6
DTP
2004 Municipal
46
46.6
32.1
51.2
22.1
38.7
56.2
5.2
AKP
DTP47
32.2
40.3
24.9
34.6
37.9
45.3
41.7
43.4
26.3
38.0
19.3
26.9
32.8
5.2
village guards, return of Kurds who were subject to forced migration, urban life,
Compensation Law, land mines, restoring justice, and strengthening local governments.44
The reforms regarding the economic aspect of the Kurdish question, such as industrial
and trade policies, and the GAP Action plan seem to be the ones upon which the AKP
government has been most successful. However, two questions remain in terms of their
validity regarding the Kurdish question. First, the economic policies are not policies
directed specifically to the Kurdish population. They are policies directed at the society at
large. Thus, looking at the performance of the AKP in the economic realm to assess the
party’s success at addressing the Kurdish issue is rather misleading. Second, to look at the
Kurdish issue solely from an economic perspective is problematic. As the TESEV report
also underlines, the issue has many aspects in different domains of life, i.e., sociocultural,
political, educational, etc. Despite the fact that the AKP in its party program acknowledges
these points, overall its report card has not been very promising on the Kurdish issue. As a
result, the party lost the major Kurdish cities that formerly had AKP municipalities such as
Van, Sirnak, and Siirt in the 2009 municipal elections. Table 2, below, summarizes the
transfer of votes between the AKP and the DTP in the last three elections.
The Alevi Question
The Alevi Muslims represent a sizable sectarian minority in Turkey,48 and this community
has been concerned with the state’s efforts to fuse Sunni Islam with Turkish national
identity within the framework of a secular nation-state. The state, despite its secular
claims, formalized and promoted a Sunni religious set of beliefs that it enforced on all
44
45
46
47
48
TESEV (2008) A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region for the
Government (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, TESEV Publications).
The candidates are equally important in the municipal elections. However, we report only the vote shares that
the parties got for the city assembly elections, not the vote shares that their candidates got.
The DTP ran as independents in the 2007 general elections to bypass the 10 percent national threshold.
The DTP made an alliance with the Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP, Social Democratic People’s Party) in
the 2004 municipal elections.
For accounts of the meaning of Alevism and Alevi religious practices, see G. Kocam & A. Oncu (2004)
Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial, Journal of Historical Sociology, 17(4), pp. 464–
489; for an account of the political and cultural demands of Alevis, see E. Nesriyat (1999) Tarihi ve Kültürel
Boyutlarıyla Türkiye’de Bektasiler,Aleviler, Nusayriler, [Bektashis, Alevis, and Nusayris in Turkey with its
Historical and Cultural Dimensions] (Istanbul: Ensar Nesriyat).
66
citizens, including Alevis, through the Directorate of Religious Affairs and a Directorate
of Pious Foundations. The Alevi concerns further were exacerbated when the military
regime in 1980 adopted a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (a doctrine combining Turkish
nationalism and Sunni Islam) and made religious education a requirement at elementary
and secondary schools. In this context, the Directorate of Religious Affairs built several
new mosques and appointed prayer leaders (imams) not only in Sunni towns and villages,
but also in Alevi communities.49 In reaction, some Alevis demanded representation within
the Directorate of Religious Affairs,50 while others rejected the idea of representation
altogether.
The AKP in its second term in office communicated its desire to ‘solve’ the Alevi
question. Accordingly, the government contacted Alevi groups in November 2007,
listened to their demands and inserted a separate section on Alevism in the text books used
for compulsory religion courses. However, Alevi demands go further. Alevis ask for
removal of compulsory religion instruction from the national educational curriculum;
turning the Madimak Hotel (where 37 Alevi intellectuals died in a fire started by Sunni
protesters on July 2, 1993) into a ‘museum of shame’; abolition of the Directorate of
Religious Affairs; and recognition of Cem Evleri (Alevi prayer houses) as places of
worship.51 The AKP has not delivered on any of these demands and, as with the Kurdish
question, it has followed a state-centered approach in dealing with the Alevi community.
Indeed, since the party first approached the Alevi issue, it has sought to co-opt some of the
Alevi groups at the expense of others instead of maintaining a dialogue with all Alevi
organizations.52 The Cem Foundation was the primary actor involved in meetings with the
government, while the AKP left the Alevi-Bektasi Federation, along with Alevis
represented by the Federation, out of these deliberations. In response, the Bektasi
Federation accused the government of trying to create a ‘state Alevism’ and of solving the
Alevi problem without incorporating the Alevis. Similar to the way it dealt with the
Kurdish issue, the AKP has been selective in its approach to the Alevi issue and preferred
to communicate with the Alevi groups that could be incorporated within orthodox Islam
rather than accommodating Alevis in their plurality. Thus the party, as it did with the
Kurdish issue, sustained an imposing attitude rather than a pluralist one.
Social Inconsistencies
Despite the fact that the AKP embraces a pluralist and liberal approach to social policies
in its program, the party’s leaders have shown that what the party understands of
49
50
51
52
G. Kocam & A. Oncu, Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial, p. 477.
For details see Cem Vakfi (2000) Anadolu Inanc Onderleri Birinci Toplantisi, 16–19 Ekim 1998, Istanbul:
Dedelerin, Babalarin, Ozanlarin Gorus ve Dusunceleri [The First Meeting of Anatolian Wise Men, October
16-19, 1998, Istanbul] (Istanbul: Cem Vakfı).
For a document released by Alevis on their demands see (1989) Alevilik Bildirgesi [Alevi Manifesto].
Available at http://www.alevi.dk, accessed December 1 2009.
The estimated number of Alevis in Turkey ranges from five to 20 million depending on the source.
Nevertheless, the majority of Alevis are represented by two major organizations: the Cem Foundation and the
Alevi-Bestasi Federation. These two organizations are at odds in their perception of Alevism and the proper
rights of Alevis. The Cem Foundation perceives Alevism as part of mainstream Islam whereas the AleviBektasi Federation insists that Alevism connotes a social identity that goes beyond religion and cannot be
assimilated in orthodox Islam.
67
pluralism is confined to political rights with limited acknowledgment of different social
identities. Adopting a socially conservative outlook that often intersects with Islamism,
the party shows little tolerance for different lifestyles and identities. The party officials
often raise the issue of morality and loss of identity as the prevailing problem in society.
This limited understanding of social pluralism has become more visible, particularly at
the local level where party officials have attempted to make social life more conservative.
Several AKP mayors, for example, have suggested moving restaurants that serve alcohol
to the margins of their area of jurisdiction. Other AKP mayors have wanted to build
gender-segregated parks.
The issue of alcohol consumption has been an important item on the agenda of the party.
The restaurants and cafes managed by the municipalities do not serve alcoholic beverages.
Meanwhile, the rental contracts of some restaurants that serve alcohol were cancelled by
AKP municipalities.53 Moreover, the AKP municipalities also used their authority in
giving and renewing alcohol permits to reduce alcoholic consumption by refusing to
renew the permits of some of the restaurants.54 This discretion allowed the municipalities
run by the AKP to start relocating such restaurants to the margins of their areas of
jurisdiction. For instance, the AKP-run municipality of Denizli banned alcohol in the city
and moved the alcohol-serving restaurants to the outskirts of the city.55 There is anecdotal
evidence that those bars that cannot renew their alcohol-serving permits turn themselves
into membership club houses where only members are allowed to be served alcoholic
beverages, thus, creating an emerging cleavage in Denizli’s society.56
One study also revealed that the AKP’s social policy of conservatism has created a
significant tide of conservative pressure on Alevis, unveiled women, university students
and non-practicing Muslims in different parts of the country.57 The interviewees for this
study revealed that while the AKP claims to side with the individual in its party program,
in practice the party only is willing to promote the rights of individuals against the state
establishment. When it comes to the society, the AKP seems to leave the individual to the
mercy of a community defined by a religious and traditional ethos.58 This attitude brings
the AKP closer to Islamism rather than democratic liberalism.
The study affirmed, moreover, the general anxiety in secular circles regarding the
AKP’s partisan approach to appointments of civil servants and bureaucrats. Partisan
appointments are not new in Turkish politics, as all past governments have preferred
appointing their supporters to bureaucratic posts instead of following a legal-rational
mentality and promoting merit-based selections. What is different in the AKP’s case is that
the party’s partisan appointments have clear ramifications for increasing conservatism in
the society and resulting pressure on individuals who follow different lifestyles such as
non-practising Muslims, secular men, Alevis, youth and unveiled women. These
53
54
55
56
57
58
‘İstanbul’da İçki Yasakları Yayılıyor! [Alcohol Bans are expanding in Istanbul!],’ Radikal Newspaper,
September 26, 2008.
Ibid.
B. Toprak, et al. (2009) Turkiye’de Farkli Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlik Ekseninde Otekilestirilenler [Being
different in Turkey: Becoming the Other on the basis of religion and conservatism] (Istanbul: Bogazici
Universitesi), p. 81.
AKP’li başkana 4. MURAT tepkisi, [Reaction to AKP mayor], Aksam Newspaper, October 11, 2005.
Toprak, et al., Turkiye’de Farkli Olmak, pp. 112–120.
Ibid., pp. 112 –120.
68
appointments are most visible in institutions of education and health. The managers in
many of these institutions are accused of discriminating against unveiled teachers, doctors
and nurses. According to an interviewee, these pressures encourage many civil servants to
change their attitudes and outlooks and conform to a conservative and pious image. For
instance, many teachers and civil servants who do not fast during Ramadan have begun to
pretend that they are fasting, even if they do not, to avoid such pressures.59
The period that followed the 2007 elections has been a time when fears that the AKP
harbors a hidden Islamist agenda have resurfaced. The party’s initiatives after the 2007
elections played a critical role in the process. As mentioned above, amid the debates on the
draft constitution, the AKP proposed a constitutional amendment aimed at lifting the ban
on headscarves in the universities. This move sparked an intense debate about veiling, the
role of religion in the public sphere and, most important of all, the AKP’s ‘hidden’ agenda
with regard to establishing an Islamic state.60 These debates culminated in the state
prosecutor submitting a case against the AKP to the Constitutional Court in March 2008.61
The prosecutor claimed that the AKP has been the base of anti-secular activities, as
evidenced by Erdogan’s speeches, the statements of AKP MPs and the actions of the
municipalities. The Court decided to cut the state’s financial support of the party rather
than to close it.62 This court decision confirmed that the AKP is not an Islamist party like
other MG parties, but it indicated that the AKP has yet to consolidate its conservative
identity and clearly delineate its understanding of the role of Islam in public life. While the
Court acknowledged the political legitimacy of the party by taking a decision against its
closure, it also acknowledged the general discontent about the AKP’s non-adjusted,
conservative/pro-Islamist policies by cutting its state financial support. This court decision
indicated that the AKP has yet to define and consolidate its conservative identity and show
precisely how this identity remains aloof from Islamism.
Conclusion
While investigating the reasons for the decrease in the votes of the AKP from 46.6 percent in
the July 2007 general elections to 39 percent in the March 2009 municipal elections, this
article argued that the notable decrease in AKP votes in less than two years is a result of
inconsistencies in the AKP’s economic, political and social policy-making during its second
term in office. By comparing the AKP’s performance in its first and second terms, we see that
the AKP was not as successful in its second term as it was in the first. The party simply could
59
60
61
62
Ibid.
E. Kalaycioglu (2005) The Mystery of the Turban: Participation or Revolt? Turkish Studies, 6(2), pp. 233 –
251; Turkey at Odds over Headscarf Ban, TIME, February 8, 2008; Turkey Divided on Headscarf Ban, BBC
News, February 11, 2008; and S. Tavernis Turkey’s High Court Overturns Headscarf Rule, The New York
Times, June 6, 2008. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/world/europe/06turkey.html,
accessed December 1 2009.
See The Case against the AK Party, The Economist, June 12, 2008; G. Jenkins (2008) Turkey’s Latest Crisis,
Survival, 50(5), pp. 5–12; and Z. Onis (2009) Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and
Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey, Mediterranean Politics,
14(1), pp. 21 –40.
The state, according to the Turkish Political Party Law, is one of the main sources of financial support for
political parties. The amount that the state would pay each party is calculated proportionately based on the
percent of votes received by the party in the most recent general elections.
69
not manage the effects of the global economic crisis on Turkey and ignored the demands of
both the business circles and the unions. Moreover, Erdogan’s statements regarding
the management of the crisis on the personal level alienated many voters in society.
The AKP’s political policy-making also was full of inconsistencies. Despite the fact that
the AKP program is based on consolidation of democracy and liberalism, and the fact that
the AKP did pursue these ends in its first term, in its second term, the party failed to
incorporate pluralism in its policy-making. It estranged the Kurdish and Alevi populations
by favoring certain groups at the expense of others. This non-pluralist, non-embracing, yet
imposing attitude contrasted with the party’s rhetoric of liberal democracy while creating
new cleavages within these communities.
The AKP’s second term in office revealed that social pluralism is also not well digested
by the party. The fact that different lifestyles are not welcome is well observed in the
party’s partisan appointments based on conservative lifestyles and piety. At the local level,
the party encourages conservatism as seen in the example of Denizli or as is sensed by
unveiled teachers and doctors and non-practising Muslim and Alevi civil servants.
While these inconsistencies are the reasons as to why the AKP suffered a loss in its
electoral support in the recent municipal elections, they also indicate that the party has not
yet completed its democratic transformation. Despite its rhetoric of liberal democracy and
pluralism in its approach to the Kurdish and Alevi issues, in practice the AKP adopts an
imposing attitude instead of a democratic and pluralist one. Particularly at the local level,
the party remains resistant to pluralism and close to conservative communitarianism.
These inconsistencies and oscillations indicate that the AKP has not yet completed its
journey from Islamism to liberal democracy.
References
Alpay, S. (2007) What does the draft constitution signify? Today’s Zaman, October 1 2007. Available at: http://
www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=123521, accessed December 2 2009.
Arslan, Z. (2007) Turkey’s Bid for the New Constitution, Insight Turkey, July.
Camci, C. (2009) AKP: An Egalitarian Opportunity or a Threat for Liberal Democracy in Turkey?
ETHOS: Felsefe ve Toplumsal Bilimlerde Diyaloglar, 2(4), pp. 1 –24.
Carkoglu, A. (2002) Turkey’s November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning? MERIA, 6(4).
———. (2008) Ideology or Economic Pragmatism? Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007, Turkish Studies, 9(2),
pp. 317–344.
Carkoglu, A. & Hinich, M. (2008) The Changing political space of Turkey from 2001 to 2004, in: S. Yazıcı, K.
Gozler & F. Keyman (Eds) Prof. Dr. Ergun Ozbudun’a Armagan [Essays in Honor of Ergun Özbudun]
(Ankara: Yetkin Yayınevi).
Cem Vakfi (2000) Anadolu Inanc Onderleri Birinci Toplantisi, 16–19 Ekim 1998, Istanbul: Dedelerin,
Babalarin, Ozanlarin Gorus ve Dusunceleri [The First Meeting of Anatolian Wise Men, October 16–19,
1998, Istanbul] (Istanbul: Cem Vakfı).
Ensar Nesriyat (1999) Tarihi ve Kültürel Boyutlarıyla Türkiye’de Bektasiler,Aleviler, Nusayriler [Bektashis,
Alevis, and Nusayris in Turkey with their historical and cultural dimensions] (Istanbul: Ensar Nesriyat).
Fisher-Onar, N. (2009) Beyond Binaries: ‘Europe,’ Pluralism, and a Revisionist-Status Quo Key to Turkish
Politics. Sabanci University Essay Contest Finalist.
Gumuscu, S. (2010) Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt,
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming.
Gumuscu, S. & Sert, D. (2009) The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development
Party in Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, 45(6), pp. 953–968.
Jenkins, G. (2008) Turkey’s Latest Crisis, Survival, 50(5), pp. 5–12.
Insel, A. (2003) The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102(2/3),
pp. 293–308.
Kalaycioglu, E. (2005) The Mystery of the Turban: Participation or Revolt? Turkish Studies, 6(2), pp. 233–251.
70
———. (2009) Secimler, kimlikler ve yeni siyaset [Elections, identities and new politics]. Taraf Newspaper,
April 2, 2009.
Kocam, G. & Oncu, A. (2004) Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial, Journal of Historical
Sociology, 17(4), pp. 464 –489.
Onis, Z. (2009) Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny
Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey, Mediterranean Politics, 14(1), pp. 21 –40.
Onis, Z. & Rubin, B. (Eds) (2003) The Turkish Economy in Crisis (London: Frank Cass).
Ozbudun, E. & Genckaya, O. F. (2009) Democratization and Constitution Making in Turkey (Budapest: Central
European University Press).
Tayyar, S. (2008) Operasyon Ergenekon [Operation Ergenekon] (Istanbul: Timas).
Tekin, U. (2004) AK Partinin Muhafazakar Demokrat Kimligi [The Conservative-democratic identity of the
AKP] (Ankara: Orient).
TESEV (2008) A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region for the
Government (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, TESEV Publications).
The European Commission (2008) Turkey 2008 Progress Report. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/Turkey_progress_report_en.pdf, accessed December 10
2009.
Toprak, B. et al. (2009) Turkiye’de Farkli Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlik Ekseninde Otekilestirilenler [Being
different in Turkey: Becoming the Other on the basis of religion and conservatism] (Istanbul: Bogazici
Universitesi).
Turkish statistical Institute (2009) 2009 Local Elections. Available at: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr, accessed
December 10 2009.
Yavuz, H. (2009) Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge University Press).
Yavuz, H. & Ozcan, N. A. (2006) The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, Middle
East Policy, 13(1), pp. 102– 119.
Yeldan, E. (2002) On the IMF-Directed Disinflation Program in Turkey: A Program for Stabilization and
Austerity or a Recipe for Impoverishment and Financial Chaos? in: N. Balkan & S. Savran (Eds) The
Ravages of Neo-liberalism: Economy, Society, and Gender in Turkey (New York: Nova Science Publishers).

Turkish Politics and International Society during the Ozal

Transcription

Similar documents

PDF

e-news-circular

Cajun Fried Turkey

turkey as a major supplier from mediterranean region 01/09/2015

here

READING CULTURE MAP

343-438 Addiyar Building, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai / UAE +971 4

US visit to focus on fight

Thanksgiving - Black

our PDF COMPANY PROFILE and