The French Military Mutinies

The French Military Mutinies:
Algeria and the Secret Army
1958-1962
By Tom Cooper
I
n 1958 the French Army did
something which might have
seemed unthinkable in a
modern Western democracy: It rose
up and changed the government
in Paris. A similar mutiny followed
three years later, but this time it
was crushed—and this failure led
to the rise of a new, secret army.
Insurgency in Algeria
An insurgency began in Algeria
on 1 November 1954 with a series of
attacks against French and pied noir
("black foot," a term for Algerian-born
persons of European ancestry) colonial
targets. These attacks were carried
out by guerrilla groups belonging to
the National Liberation Front (Front
de Libération Nationale, FLN).
The FLN had been created by
Muslim nationalists who wanted
independence for the colony. It followed a similar pattern of insurgent
organization and strategy for the Cold
War. The FLN consisted of a political
organization which operated both
an underground infrastructure and
parallel regular and irregular units
for military operations. The FLN
employed a full range of tactics—propaganda, economic strikes, terrorism,
guerrilla warfare, and attempts at
conventional warfare. The goal was
to attrit French strength and morale,
forcing Paris to grant independence.
In 1954, the French Army was
recovering from the catastrophic
defeat in the colonial war in Indochina.
It entered this new conflict in Algeria
determined to win. This reflected
a new type of military leadership.
Officers who had served time in Viet
Minh prison camps learned lessons
French troops
confront Algerian
insurgents in the
Battle of Algiers.
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Algerie Francaise
France ruled Algeria from 1830, when its troops landed at Sidi Ferruch, until 1962,
when the tricolour ceased to fly over the country. The colony was dominated by European
settlers known as colons or, more graphically, pied noirs. Settlers farmed the best land,
enjoyed a virtual monopoly of political power, and imposed their own educational,
economic and administrative systems upon the country. However, Algeria was neither
a colony nor even a protectorate. Since the mid-19th Century, it was considered France
Overseas, a status officially confirmed by the French constitution of December 1948. This
was a technicality in which many Frenchmen believed passionately, legally justified by the
parliamentary representation of her three departments (Algiers, Constantine, and Oran).
Algeria’s population was primarily Muslim, and it exploded to eight million by the early
1950s. Only a small minority held French citizenship rights or significant property. Along the
coast, rural villagers accepted the authority of traditional community elders, whose obedience to the French administration was rewarded by various privileges. Age-old suspicions
persisted between the highland Berbers of the Aurés and Kabylia and the lowland Arabs.
The Muslim leadership class generally sided with the French, but during the insurgency
rarely signed up with French armed forces—even when they became a primary targets
of nationalist terrorism. Most of the native urban population was more restive, especially
trade unions. While the French generally considered the insurgents to be left-wing, the FLN
was primarily nationalist and demanded rights of self-determination—either in the form
of self-government, independence, or even complete integration with France. A vast and
largely unexploited hinterland was dominated by local tribes left to their own devices.
The conflict in Algeria developed into a three-cornered contest between the
Algerian nationalists, the French government, and the European colonists. Each
pursued different aims. Caught in the middle was the French military. This explosive
mixture led to savage fighting, mutiny in the army and the political crisis which
brought down the Fourth Republic in 1958 and challenged de Gaulle in 1961.

any negotiations with the FLN were
understood as a sign of weakness.
Total victory was the only option.
Since the military was believed to
be a bastion of Western civilization in
France, it took on the role of political
watchdog. It wanted to maintain
the status quo, buying time until the
native Algerian population would be
re-educated to Western standards.
The French Army became a
highly politicized force, standing
firm against Algerian insurgents
even if that entailed opposing civilian authorities in Paris. As the war
progressed, these attitudes would
harden—and turn into a military
Gen. Massu reviews French paratroopers in Algeria.
36
from the communist way of war. They
analyzed reasons for their defeat and
were determined to emerge victorious
in the future. This led to a new theory
on how to defeat insurgents, becoming known as guerre revolutionaire
(revolutionary war). The dilemma
was that the new doctrine was based
upon the strategy propounded by Mao
Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh—and bore
little relation to the situation in Algeria.
The Communist Party of Algeria
was rather weak and not particularly
popular among the native populace.
The FLN was an umbrella organization
which brought under control various
nationalist movements whose goal was
to end French rule in Algeria. While
gaining support from the communist
world, the FLN was not planning
to build a communist state. From
the standpoint of French military
theorists, the war in Algeria was not
just a colonial conflict but the latest in
a long line of radical revolutions that
were sweeping the world since Mao’s
victory in the Chinese Civil War. They
viewed the new war in Algerie francaise
(French Algeria) as a last-ditch stand
against communism. Consequently,
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(now Skikda) on 20 August 1955. This
prompted the French to abandon
political reforms. The army ruthlessly restored order in Philippeville,
while vigilante groups of pied noir
retaliated with a shocking ferocity.
French military victories continued
to grow in the following years, but they
alone could not restore the political
situation. The FLN reformed their
organization and replaced moderate
leaders with a new generation of
extremists. Morocco and Tunisia were
granted independence by France in
March 1956, who promptly opened
up sanctuary areas for the FLN. This
move forced the French military to
divert troops away from internal
security toward frontier protection.
In November 1956, the French military, including units based in Algeria,
participated in Operation Musketeer, a
joint airborne-amphibious operation
alongside the British and Israelis.
Musketeer’s objective was to seize
the Suez Canal, recently nationalized
by Egyptian President Gamel Abdul
Nasser. Nasser was a major supporter
of the FLN, and Paris saw the invasion
as a way to overthrow his government
rebellion against what was considered
and undercut the insurgents in Algeria.
to be a sellout on the home front.
Musketeer started out well. Allied
air raids destroyed much of the
Egyptian Air Force, while the Israeli
Military Victory and Political
Army swept across the Sinai. On
Disaster
5 November, Anglo-French forces
captured Port Said and seemed to
The first wave of FLN attacks drew
be securing the canal. The invasion
a ruthless military response from
led to an international uproar which
the French. By February 1955, many
pitted Moscow, Washington, and
nationalist leaders were dead or in
prison and their organization in tatters. the United Nations against Britain,
The FLN survived as recruits flocked to France, and Israel. London and Paris
were pressured into withdrawing
join the movement. When Paris tried
their expeditionary forces. To many in
to integrate the native and European
the French military, this was another
population at the local level, insurbetrayal by the home government.
gents deliberately massacred 123 pied
noirs around the town of Philippeville
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The exchange of attacks—often involving terrorism—between the ALN and
pied noir threw the city into anarchy.
The civilian administration took the
unprecedented step of handing over
complete authority to the French Army.
In January 1957, the 10th Parachute
Division moved into Algiers. Under the
command of Gen. Jacques Massu, the
Paras launched a series of raids into
the Casbah (the city’s older district, a
FLN stronghold), rounding up suspects
and breaking up an attempted general
strike. Exploiting intelligence collected through the torture of arrested
insurgents, the French destroyed the
ALN’s underground network. Over
3,000 insurgents died or disappeared
under army interrogation in what
French troops of the 4th Zouave Regiment in Algeria.
became known as the Battle of Algiers.
This was followed by further
Algiers in mid-1956. The objective was French victories along the Tunisian
Battle of Algiers
border. The French Army built an
to provoke massive French repression
elaborate barrier called the Morice
of the native populace which the FLN
The FLN’s military wing—the
Line, cutting off the ALN from its
could exploit via propaganda on the
National Liberation Army (Armée de
external bases. By the spring of
international stage as well as at home.
Libération Nationale, ALN) –opened
In the short run, this strategy backfired. 1958, the French Army was winning
a campaign of attacks in the city of
the war against the FLN/ALN.
However, this military success
provoked a major political backlash.
When substantiated reports of
torture were published in France,
public opinion recoiled in horror, while
1958: The Army Moves
native support for French attempts
at integration collapsed. The government began wavering, and senior
officers suspected Paris was going
to throw out their victory. The stage
was being set for the army to move.
The loss of political support from
Paris after the victory in the Battle of
Algiers produced deep dissatisfaction
for the army in Algeria, particularly
The French Military in Algeria
In the 1950s, Algeria was officially France’s 10th Military Region
and a base for 75,000 troops. It was organized into three corps
commands—Algiers, Constantine, and Oran—each that maintained
three divisions on average. Ground forces consisted of two types
of units: mobile (airborne and motorized) and static (sector). The
mobile units were built around the 5th Armored, and the 10th and 25th
Airborne Divisions. These units had the best men and equipment. In
comparison, sector units tended to be lower quality. Only 15 percent
of French forces in Algeria were professional soldiers: The rest
were recruited through the military draft and recall of reservists.
There were also 20,000 Muslim career soldiers in the French
army, with 20,000 conscripts serving in Tirailleur (light infantry)
battalions and Spahi (indigenous light cavalry) mechanized cavalry
regiments. In 1956, a new policy of mixing races within units was
introduced, and by 1959, most Tirailleur units were composed of
50 percent Muslim and 50 percent colon (settler) troops. Similarly,
metropolitan units consisted up to 25 percent of native conscripts,
reservists and volunteers. The total strength of the French Army in
Algeria rose to 400,000, and this figure was maintained until 1962.
French divisions were the size of reinforced brigades. This was
to enhance mobility, with French Armor doctrine calling for rapid
deployment and maneuver on the battlefield. The AMX series light
tanks were designed for this role. Airborne regiments had five
manuever companies, a reinforced battalion in strength. The companies
could be organized into two task groups
for independent action. The organization
proved its worth in the 1956 Anglo-French
Suez invasion, Operation Musketeer. French
forces deployed across the Mediterranean to
seize Port Said and occupy the northern end
of the Suez Canal—though the operation
was ended by a UN-brokered ceasefire.
There was also the Foreign Legion (Legion
Etrangere in French). This was made up of a
number of units, with volunteers enlisting from
countries around the world, though the cadre
was made up of French citizens. The Foreign
Legion had some of the most professional
as well as ruthless troops—and in Algeria,
some of the most politicized. 1st REP (Legion
Parachute Regiment) led the April 1961 coup
attempt in Algiers and was later disbanded for
its efforts. Other Legion regiments continue
to soldier on into the 21st century.

French Mechanized Division 1950s
XX
III
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