pembuangan bayi

PERKEMBANGAN TEKNOLOGI & PI R I BAH AN
NILAI KEKELU ARG A AN MELAYU
Yaacob Harun
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
PENGENALAN
Intipati perbincangan dalam kertas kerja ini berkisar pada sejauhmana nilai-nilai
kekeluargaan Melayu mengalami perubahan akibat perkembangan teknologi.
Adakah nilai-nilai utama dalam masyarakat Melayu, khususnya nilai-nilai
kekeluargaan akur kepada kehendak dan perubahan teknologi, atau sebaliknya
adakah nilai-nilai itu dapat bertahan walaupun masyarakat Melayu kini berdepan
dengan arus perubahan teknologi yang pesat.
TEKNOLOGI DAN BUDAYA: ASAS TEORI
Mengikut pendokong teori “technological determinism” seperti Leslie White, Marx,
McLuhan, Ogbum, dan lain-lain, perubahan teknologi mengakibatkan perubahan
pada masyarakat dan budaya 1 Dalam masyarakat di mana tahap perkembangannya
teknologinya tinggi seperti masyarakat peridustrian, maka tahap - keniajuan
masyarakat dan budaya dalam masyarakat tersebut juga tinggi, begitu juga
sebaliknya. Mengikut teori ini, struktur dan organisasi masyarakat, termasuk
falsafah, pengetahuan, dan nilai sentiasa akur kepada perubahan teknologi, malah
tunduk kepada kehendak dan perubahan teknologi, Seperti kata Ron Westrum
(1991), “ the very structure o f our society is related to the kind o f technologies that
we have”. Sebagai contoh, falsafah dan nilai kerjasama seperti terdapat dalam
masyarakat pertanian (di mana tingkat teknologinya rendah), tidak lagi dapat
dipertahankan dalam masyarakat perindustrian moden (yang berasaskan kemajuan
teknologi). Dalam masyarakat teknologi (technological society), falsafah dan nilainilai individualistis menjadi kelaziman.
Apabila teknologi menjadi penentu kepada sistem budaya, maka wujud apa yang
dikatakan budaya-tekno (techno-culture). Masyarakat yang dilanda oleh budayatelcno dikatakan masyarakat yang non-normatif, maksudnya, masyarakat yang tidak
berlandaslcan kepada sistem norma (normless society). Struktur masyarakat seperti
ini adalah sesuatu yang cair (fluid social structure) yang berubah mengikut
perubahan komponen utama, iaitu komponen teknologikal, dalam masyarakat
tersebut.
1 D aniel Chandler mengatakan, "the term, technological determ inism is used to refer to th e common
assum ption that new technologies are the prim ary cause o f m ajor so c ia l and h isto rica l ch a n g es at a
m acro level an d/o r subtle but profound social and psych o lo g ica l influences a t the m icro level o f
so c ia l structure ’’(Chandler, Daniel. [1996]. Shaping and B eing Shaped E ngaging w ith M edia)
Sumber: h ttp ://w w w .december.eo m /cin c/m ag /l 9 9 6 /feb/chan did.html
Persoalan timbul, adakah pendapat atau teori “technological determinism” ini betulbetul berasas, atau adakah teknologi dan perkembangan teknologi dalam sesebuah
masyarakat itu sebaliknya ditentukan oleh budaya. Bagi para pendokong teori
“cultural determinism” seperti Max Weber, Brian Winston, dan lain-lain, mereka
berpendapat kemajuan masyarakat (termasuk kemajuan teknologi) sangat
bergantung kepada falsafah dan nilai yang didokong oleh anggota sesebuah
masyarakat itu. Jika satu-satu aspek perubahan atau satu komponen teknologi itu
tidak selaras dengan sistem budaya atau tidak selaras dengan nilai utama dalam
masyarakat tersebut, maka besar kemungkinan berlaku penolakan terhadap
komponen teknologi yang dimaksudkan.' Brian Winston (1995:14) mengatakan,
"Social, political, and economic forces play powerful roles in the development o f
new> technologies ...inventions and innovations are not widely adopted on the merits
o f a technology alone... there must always be an opportunity as well as a motivating
social, political, or economic reason fo r a new technology to be developed”. Weber
(1904/1930) juga memberi contoh dengan mengatakan masyarakat Protestant maju
dari segi ekonomi dan juga dari segi teknologi sebab terdapat etika dalam agama
tersebut yang memberi rangsangan dan motivasi kepada penganutnya untuk berkerja
lceras dan mencapai kemajuan dalam hidup, kerana kemajuan yang diperolehi itu
selaras dengan tuntutan agama.
Berdasarkan kepada perkara-perkara yang disebutkan di atas, di sini saya cuba
meninjau perkara-perkara berikut:
•
•
•
Sejauhmana masyarakat dan budaya Melayu dipengaruhi oleh budaya-tekno.
Adakah masyarakat Melayu itu non-nonnatif yang tidak berpegang kepada nilainilai utama khususnya yang berteraskan agama (Islam) dan adat dan tundulc
kepada teknologi?
Adakah ’keadaan sebaliknya berlaku di mana nilai dan norma utama dalam
masyarakat Melayu mempengaruhi perkembangan teknologi, dan nilai dan
norma itu sentiasa dipertahankan walaupun dianggap ketinggalan zaman dan
usang? atau
.
adakah terdapat gabungan antara yang pertama dan kedua di atas di mana
sebahagian daripada nilai dan norma ditinggalkan, dan sebahagian lagi masih
dipertahankan, dan jika demikian apakah asas-asas yang dapat menyokong
keadaan tersebut.
Dalam kertas kerja ini saya menggunakan istilah masyarakat teknologi
(technological society) bagi merujuk kepada masyarakat yang sedang mengalami
perubahan teknologi pesat termasuk masyarakat Melayu, terutamanya yang terdapat
2 Pendekatan atau teori “cultural determ inism '' mempunyai kesamaan dengan SST (th e so c ia l
sh aping o f technology) seperti dikemukakan oleh M ackenzie & W ajcman (1 9 8 5 ). M engikut
pendekatan SST, “tech n ology d o es not develop acco rd in g to an inner tech n ica l lo g ic bu t is in stea d a
so cia l pro d u ct, p a tte rn e d by the conditions o f its creation a n d u se" (c.f. Robin W illiam s and D avid
Edge. [1996]. The S ocial Shaping o f Technology!. Research P olicy V ol. 25)
Sumber: http://science.consumercide.com/isocial shaping o f tech.him I)
2
di sektor moden (bandar). Folcus perbincangan seperti dinyatakan pada awalnya
hanya kepada nilai-nilai kekeluargaan Melayu dalam konteks masyarakat teknologi.
PERKEMBANGAN TEKNOLOGI & NILAI
KEKELUARGAAN MELAYU
Perbincangan tentang nilai kekekuargaan Melayu berkisar kepada empat isu polcok
iaitu perkahwinan, struktur keluarga, perubahan peranan wanita, dan jurang
generasi. Bagi saya ini adalah isu-isu penting dalam konteks perbincangan tentang
perubahan nilai dalam masyarakat teknologi.
Perkahwinan
Perkahwinan ditakrifkan sebagai hubungan (seksual) yang sah di antara lelaki dan
perempuan yang terkandung di dalamnya hale dan tanggung jawab tertentu.
(.Dictionary o f Sociology*, 1994:388). Dalam masyarakat Melayu yang beragama
Islam, perkahwinan yang sah (legal) itu mesti mengikut peraturan dan undangundang yang ditetapkan oleh Islam. Sebarang hubungan seksual antara lelaki dan
perempuan di luar ikatan perkahwinan yang sah tersebut adalah perbuatan yang
non-normatif.
Dalam konteks ini, tanpa diragui masyarakat Melayu sehinggi kini masih tetap, dan
akan terus memilih. perkahwinan sebagai insitusi yang membenarkan hubungan
kelamin secara sah. Walaupun amalan-amalan hubungan kelamin sebelum nikah
(pre-marital sex), atau hubungan seksual bebas (free-sex) dilakukan oleh sebilangan
pasangan muda-muda terutama di bandar, perbuatan tersebut tetap disifatkan
sebagai perbuatan terkutuk di sisi. agama dan adat. Pasangan yang terlibat, jika
tertangkap akan menerima akibatnya.
Kes-kes pembuangan bayi yang sering disiarlcan di dada akhbar, tidak lain tidak
bukan, disebabkan oleh ibu muda yang melahirkan anak tersebut tidak dapat
berdepan dengan cemuhan masyarakat dan keluarga. Sebagai jalan keluar atas
perbuatan terkutuk yang dilakukan hingga mengakibatlcan kehamilan luar nikah,
pembuangan bayi merupakan jalan keluar yang difikirkan paling praktikal dan
mudah. Ini menandakan sistem nilai dalam masyarakat Melayu tetap meletaldcan
institusi perkahwinan sebagai sesuatu yang unggul dan normatif.
Saya percaya selagi masyarakat Melayu masih beipegang kuat kepada nilai-nilai
keagamaan dan adat berkaitan dengan pola-pola hubungan seksual yang sah, maka
fenomina hubungan kelamin tanpa kahwin seperti lumrah berlaku di Barat dewasa
ini, tidak akan menjadi isu yang besar,' Walau bagaimana pun, masyarakat Melayu
Di A m erika Syarikat, mengikut US Bureau o f Census, 1998, terdapat sejumlah 4 ,236,000 pasangan
bersekedudukan tanpa nikah, berbanding dengan 439,000 pada tahun 1960. M engikut survei yang
dijalankan oleh Universiti Colombia, hanya 26% daripada wanita dan 19% daripada lekaki
berkahwin dengan pasangan bersekedudukan mereka. Satu survei lain, 40% daripada 13,000
pasangan yang bersekedudukan berpisah sebelum sempat mendirikan rumah tangga.
(M eera Chowdry, [2001]: littp://vvvv\v.boloji.com/fami 1v /0 0 104.him)
3
kini berdepan dengan cabaran ciptaan teknologi seperti pil pencegah kehamilan
(<contraceptives), kondom, kemudahan pengguguran, dan sebagainya yang
mendorong pasangan muda mudi, malah sesiapa sahaja, ke arah melalcukan
hubungan seksual bebas tanpa nikah.
Satu aspelc lain berkaitan dengan perkahwinan ialah pilihan jodoh. Dalam
masyarakat teknologi, pilihan jodoh kebanyakannya berdasarkan cinta. Pasangan
yang berkahwin telah terlebih dahulu berkenalan dan bercinta sebelum mendirikan
rumah tangga. Mereka mungkin mempunyai banyak perbezaan dari segi
latarbelakang keluarga, kedudukan ekonomi, tempat kediaman, dan taraf
pendidikan. Dari segi ini didapati, ukuran pemilihan jodoh seperti diamalkan oleh
masyarakat Melayu tradisi dengan nilai-nilai pilihan jodoh berasaskan hubungan
kekeluargaan, kesamaan kedudukan ekonomi ibu bapa, kesamaan tempat kediaman,
dan sebagainya, tidak lagi menjadi amalan. Malah perkahwinan di kalangan muda
mud: Melayu pada hari ini melampaui batas-batas kaum dan negara. Perkahwinan
campur (Melayu-Cina, Melayu-India, Melayu-Arab, Melayu-Inggeris, dll) tidak lagi
menjadi sesuatu di luar dugaan. Namun demikian, sebagai sesuatu yang normatif,
terutamanya dalam konteks Malaysia, pasangan yang berkahwin itu mesti keduaduanya beragama Islam. Ini kerana, di Malaysia hal-hal berthabit dengan keluarga
dan perkahwinan di kalangan orang Melayu masih tertakluk kepada ketetapan
perundangan Islam yang ditadbirkan oleh Mahakamah Syariah di setiap negeri dan
wilayah persekutuan.
Satu perkembangan menarik berkaitan dengan pilihan pasangan di zaman teknologi
ini ialah, selain pertemuan di masa lailiah, di tempat kerja, dan sebagainya, terdapat
pasangan muda mudi kini menjalinkan percintaan dan perkahwinan setelah
berjumpa dan berkenalan melalui internet. Kim “perkahwinan internet (internet
marriage)" sudah menjadi kian popular. Melalui internet juga, sesiapa sahaja boleh
mengiklankan diri untuk mencari pasangan hidup dengan meletakkan butir-butir
peribadi, termasuk gambar. Bagi yang benninat, tindakan susulan boleh dilakukan,
dan jika serasi dan sesuai, perkahwinan akan berlaku.
Zaman merisik, bertanya khabar seperti diamalkan oleh orang Melayu sudah lama
berlalu. Masyarakat Melayu kini juga tidak lagi berselindung di balik kata-kata
kiasan dan ibarat seperti “bunga di taman sudahkah berpunya” atau “burung di
sangkar sudahkah berteman” dalam mencari jodoh. Apa yang dilakukan alah
tindakan secara langsung (direct) oleh pasangan yang bakal berkahwin itu yang
disusuli kemudian oleh ibu bapa dan keluarga masmg-masing dalam mengatur dan
melaksanakan majlis pemikahan dan sambutan. Peranan ibu bapa dan keluarga
hanya sesuatu yang sekundar (secondary) bagi memenuhi tuntutan agama dan adat
semata-mata.
Keadaan di Indonesia mungkin berbeza kerana perkahwinan dibenarkan antara pasangan berlainan
agama dan pasangan itu boleh mengekalkan agama m asing-m asing selepas berkahwin.
4
Apabila perkahwinan masa kini lebih mementingkan kesesuaian perhubungan antara
dua individu sahaja dan tidak sangat mementingkan kesesuaian perhubungan antara
dua kelompok keluarga, iaitu ibu bapa bagi kedua-dua belah pihak, maka besar
lcemingkinan pasangan yang berkahwin itu menghadapi tekanan dan juga masalah,
khususnya yang berkaitan dengan keharmonian perhubungan mertua-menantu dan
juga dalam perhubungan sesama besan. Lantaranya, pasangan yang berkahwin itu
tidak mempunyai sistem sokongan (support system) yang begitu penting dalam
kehidupan keluarga, terutama sekali pada peringkat awal perkahwinan. Konflik
kahwinan (conjugal conflict), jika timbul, juga tidak dapat dibendung atau
ditenteramkan oleh pihak ketiga (dengan menyediakan sistem sokongan yang
diperlulcan). Ini, akhimya akan membawa kepada serakberai keluarga (family
diorganization) Tanpa sistem sokongan daripada ibu bapa, atau tidak mendapat
restu daripada ibu bapa, maka besar kemungkinan perkahwinan itu berakhir dengan
perceraian.6
Struktur Keluarga
Dalam masyarakat Melayu, seseorang itu pasti menjadi anggota sesebuah keluarga
pada setiap tahap dalam hidupnya. Semasa kecil, beliau menjadi anggota keluarga
orientasi, setelah berkahwin, samada beliau membentuk keluarga prokreasi sendiri,
atau terus tinggal dan menjadi anggota keluarga besar sebelah suami atau sebelah
isteri, dan apabila meningkat usia, beliau boleh tinggal bersama anak lelaki atau
anak perempuan yang telah berkahwin. Jarang sekali, seseorang itu tinggal
bersendirian sepanjang hayatnya. Ini bermakna institusi keluarga merupakan insitusi
unggul dalam masyarakat Melayu. Seseorang yang tidak mempunyai keluarga tidak
ubah seperti seorang yang telah mati. Namun demikian, struktur keluarga Melayu
tidak terkecuali atau terlepas dari dipengaruhi oleh gejala perubahan pada zaman
teknologi kini, Ada pendapat yang mengatakan keluarga adalah institusi yang
mengonglcong kebebasan individu (terutama kebebasan selcs muda mudi), sebagai
penjara kepada wanita (isteri) kerana terperangkap dengan tugas tradisi sebagai
J Kekuatan perkahwinan dan lcestabilan keluarga yang dibentuk oleh pasangan yang berkahwin atas
pilihan sendiri (lebih-lebih lagi tanpa restu daripada ibu bapa) sebahagian besamya bergantung
kepada kekuatan ikatan cinta di antara mereka. Jika ikatan cinta itu mulai pudar, maka perkahwinan
akan terjejas kerana asas-asas perkahwinan lain, misalnya sistem sokongan daripada ibu bapa tidak
mudah diperolehi. Namun demikian, kebebasan untuk menerajui hidup sendiri tanpa gangguan dari
ibu bapa dalam soal perkahwinan dan lain-lain merupakan nilai-nilai kehidupan di zaman pasca
m oden, dan ramai muda mudi Melayu turut mendokong nilai-nilai tersebut.
M engikut Jamilah Ariffin, bilangan ibu tunggal yang meningkat di M alaysia (melebihi 60 0 ,0 0 0 ),
sebahagiannya disebabkan oleh perceraian dan tindakan suami yang mengabaikan keluarga. (N ST 28
0 k t.2 0 0 2 ). Bercalcap tentang perceraian, baru-baru heboh dengan berita perceraian pasangan
Shamsudin L atif dan A zida Fazlina Abdul Latif, di mana Shamsudin menceraikan isterinya dengan
talak tiga m elalui SMS (short m essaging service). Perceraian itu dianggap sah oleh Mahakamah
Syariah Gom bak dengan syarat diperakui oleh Mahakamah. (NST 31 Julai 2003). Perceraian melalui
SM S teijadi disebabkan perkembangan teknologi, di mana ia tidak lagi dilakukan dengan cara biasa.
Selain itu, m esej Shamsuddin yang berbunyi “kaiau engkau tak keluar dari rumah emak bapa engkau,
jatuh tiga talak” menunjukkan hubungan beliau dengan keluarga isterinya bukanlah hubungan yang
harmonis. Ini merupakan contoh bahawa keluarga yang dibentuk selam a 18 bulan oleh pasangan
berlcenaan tidak mendapat restu oleh keluarga isteri. Adalah dilaporkan pasangan itu berkahwin di
Narathiwat, Thailand dan tidak pemah didaftarkan di Malaysia (UM , 5 Ogos 2003)
5
pengurus rumah tangga (homemaker), dan sebagai institusi yang meruntuhkan sifat
keindividuaan (individuality). [Elliot, 1986:2). Jadi, sebagai tindak balas untuk
membebaskan diri daripada "kongkongan" keluarga, maka berlaku amalan
perzinaan (adultery), seks bebas, homoseks, bersedudukan, kehamilan tanpa nikah,
sumbang muhrim, pembuangan bayi, bohsia, bohjan, deraan (anak, isteri dan
suami), konflik keluarga, dan pelbagai kegiatan anti-sosial yang lain.
Kita tidak dapat nafikan bahawa gejala negatif seperti ini bukan merupakan sesuatu
yang asing bagi penduduk Malaysia. Malah, ia menjadi amalan yang kian
meningkat dan berleluasa, terutamanya di bandar
Namun demikian, di sebalik mempunyai bibit-bibit seralcberai seperti dinyatakan di
atas, struktur keluarga Melayu dalam masyarakat teknologi, pada umumnya masih
berlandaslcan kepada faktor-faktor normatif. Orang Melayu masih tidak menerima
hakikat yang sesuatu keluarga itu dibentulc tanpa ilcatan perkahwinan yang sah di
kalangan lelaki dan perempuan. Jika ada pendapat yang mengatakan bahawa
institusi keluarga sudah berkubur (demise) berdasarkan hakikat wujudnya beberapa
opsyen atau bentuk keluarga (family form s) yang baru dalam masyarakat teknologi
seperti bersekedudukan (cohabitation), pasangan sama jantina (same-sex pairing),
perkahwinan gay dan lesbian (gay and lesbian marriages), ibu bapa tunggal (single
parent), dan sebagainya, maka opsyen dan bentuk-bentuk keluarga tersebut, pada
umumnya, masih belum mendapat tempat dalam skima nilai orang Melayu yang
beragama Islam.
Masyarakat Melayu juga tidak menerima amalan-amalan seperti pembentukan
keluarga dan kelahiran anak melalui "artificial insemination" jika sperma itu bukan
datang dari dari suami yang sah. Begitu juga kelahiran melalui perantaraan ibu
tumpang (surrogate mother) juga tidak diterima kerana tidak akur kepada faktor
normatif. Dari segi ini, saya berpendapat, sistem nilai orang Melayu yang
berteraskan Islam tidak akan terjejas walau setinggi mana kemajuan dicapai dalam
bidang teknologi.
Walau bagaimana pun amalan-amalan seperti perancangan keluarga (family
planning), dan "in vitro fertilization ” (IVF) oleh pasangan suami isteri bagi
mengatur kelahiran sudah diterima oleh masyarakat Melayu di Malaysia walaupun
timbul beberapa kontraversi. Ini menandakan bahawa teknologi boleh membantu
7 Sebagai contoh, berikut diperturunkan beberapa laporan akhbar tentang Ices atau gejala n e g a tif yang
berlaku di M alaysia pada tahun 90-an. Saya percaya, kes-kes seperti ini kian m eningkat p ad a m asa
kini:
a)Sejak SC A N (Suspected Child A buse and N eglected) ditubuhkan pada tahun 1985 h in g g a M ac
1995, terdapat 1440 kes deraan kanak-kanak, yang terdiri daripada 735 kes deraan fizik a l, 284 Ices
deraan selcsual, dan 421 kes kanak-kanak terbiar. (N ST , 30 Mac, 1995).
b)
Dari tahun 1984-1994, terdapat 4948 kes penginiayaan isteri. (BH , 26 N ov. 1994).
c) Hingga Septem ber 1994, terdapat 10,048 kes HIV, 115 daripada jum lah tersebut ialah k e s A ID S.
(NST, 27 N ov. 1994).
Majlis Fatwa Negara menjelaskan bahawa Islam membenarkan penggunaan embryo b e k u (frozen
embryo) bagi mengatasi kemanduian. Pasangan suami isteri Shahruddin Mohamad dan Khasnor
6
dalam pembentukan keluarga jika teknologi itu digunakan atas asas-asas yang tidak
bercanggah dengan ajaran agama, atau yang ditafsirkan sebagai sah di sisi agama
dan nilai utama masyarakat.
Perubahan Peranan Wanita (Wanita Kerjaya)
Dalam masyarakat teknologi, ramai wanita turut terlibat dalam pasaran buruh
menjalankan berbagai-bagai pekerjaan di luar keluarga. Mereka mempunyai
peluang yang luas untuk sama-sama dengan lelaki menyumbangkan potensi dan
kebolehan yang ada kepada masyarakat,! dan tidak lagi terpaksa terus terkonglcong
menjalankan tugas dan peranan tradisi sebagai surirumah (homemaker), Dengan
kemasukan wanita ke dalam pasaran buruh dengan menjalankan pelbagai pekerjaan
yang dulunya menjadi monopoli kaum lelaki bermakna:
•
•
•
•
•
•
tugas mencari nafkah keluarga adalah menjadi tanggung jawab bersama dan
bukan lagi terletak di tangan suami;
isteri mempunyai autoriti yang sama banyak dalam membuat lceputusan penting
mengenai keluarga;
sikap dominasi suarni ke atas isteri berkurangan;
isteii tidak lagi bergantung seluruhnya dari segi ekonomi kepada suami;
wujud bibit-bibit "persaingan" antara pasangan suami-isteri; dan
keluarga tidak lagi dapat menjalankan fungsinya dengan berkesan, 'khususnya
fungsi ekonomi dan fungsi pendidikan.
Kajian di kalangan kelas menengah di Amerika menunjukkan apabila suami isteri
terlalu menumpukan perhatian kepada pekerjaan masing-masing dan tidak
mempunyai kesempatan yang lebih untuk bersama keluarga, kerenggangan
hubungan yang membawa kepada halcisan cinta antara mereka akan berlaku.
Kadar perceraian meningkat apabila terdapat persaingan antara pasangan suami
isteri dalam bidang pekerjaan dan juga apabila golongan wanita merasai diri mereka
boleh berdikan tanpa bergantung kepada suami (Talcott Parsons, 1977).11
Sehubungan dengan itu, peijuangan kaum wanita
terutama sekali "untuk
melepaskan diri/membebaskan diri dari kongkongan serta dominasi kaum lelaki
Abdul Karim dari Sungai Buluh hingga kini mendapat 3 orang anak melalui program tersebut.
Penggunaan embryo beku untuk tujuan kehamilan adalah sama dengan program in vitro fertilization
(IV F) yang diterima oleh Majlis Fatwa Negara sejak tahun 1982. (Star Online, 8 Mei 2003).
9 M engikut Dr. Ismail Ibrahim, Pengerusi Majlis Fatwa Negara, teknik JVF dibenarkan o leh Isiam
jika pasangan suami itu masih berkahwin dan masih hidup, Jika berlaku perceraian, atau kematian
salah seorang daripada mereka, embryo beku itu perlu dimusnahkan, sebab ia bukan lagi embryo
yang sah bagi pasangan tersebut. (Star Online, 8 Mei 2003)
1Pada tahun 1991 misalnya, di M alaysia sejumlah 44.7% wanita terlibat dalam pasaran buruh di
luar keluarga (Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia)
11 Di Kuala Lumpur, sejumlah 60-70 peratus daripada 100-150 wanita yang minta nasih at tentang
penceraian dan kaunseling keluarga di JAWI terdiri daripada wanita profesional dan koperat
Perceraian banyak berlaku di kalangan keluarga berpendapatan RM 2000 ke atas. (N S T , 16 Feb.
1995).
7
(suami), mewujudkan ketegangan dalam perhubungan suami isteri. Saya
beipendapat, tiupan angin gerakan feminis yang kencang di Barat itu telah pun
sampai ke Timur. Ada di kalangan wanita (isteri) Timur kini, termasuk wanita
Melayu yang terbawa-bawa dengan semangat perjuangan untuk "membebaskan"
diri daripada "kongkongan" lelaki (suami) dengan mengambil tindakan "agresif'
seperti mendera suami (secara psikologi), bersifat anglcuh dengan kecapaian
pendidikan dan ekonomi mereka, tidak menghormati suami sebagai ketua keluarga,
dan sebagainya.
Walau bagaimana pun, pada umumnya, saya beipendapat majoriti para isteri
Melayu yang terlibat dalam pasaran buruh di luar keluarga masih mendokong nilainilai Timur, dan akur kepada nilai-nilai normatif. Mereka berkeija bukan sematamata untuk mencari kebebasan dan ingin berdikari. Mereka sedar peranan mereka
sebagai isten dan ibu tidak mudah hendak diabaikan, Penglibatan mereka dalam
pekeijaan di luar keluarga adalah untuk menambahlcan pendapatan dan
meningkatkan kedudukan ekonomi keluarga. Cuma yang perlu disedari ialah
mereka dibebankan oleh dua tugas sekaligus, iaitu sebagai pekerja dan sebagai
surirumah. Dengan tenaga dan masa yang terhad kadang-kadang menyebabkan
kedua-dua tugas yang dipikul itu tidak dapat dilaksanakan dengan berkesan.
Oleh sebab itu, ada pihak-pihak tertentu (para pendokong nilai-nilai normatif)
mensarankan wanita sepatutnya lebih menumpukan perhatian kepada keluarga dan
rumah tangga, kerana tugas itu adalah tugas asasi mereka. Pada keseluruhannya
perubahan pei'anan wanita dalam masyarakat teknologi meletakkan mereka dalam
dilema, iaitu untuk memenuhi tuntutan pekeijaan di satu pihak dan untuk memenuhi
tuntutan keluarga di pihak yang lain. Bagi yang berhenti kerja untuk memenuhi
tuntutan keluarga, bermakna mereka tidak terus tunduk kepada tuntutan dan
perubahan teknologi. 13
•
Jurang Generasi
Jurang generasi {generation gap) adalah “the difference in ideas, feelings, and
interests between older and younger people, especially considered as causing a
mutual lack o f understanding" (The New Penguin English Dictionary:582).
Perbezaan idea, citarasa, dan minat antara generasi, terutama antara ibu bapa dan
anak berlaku dalam semua masyarakat, lebih-lebih lagi dalam masyarakat teknologi.
12 Diperturunkan petikan verbatim ucapan Menteri Besar Kelantan tentang wanita yang berkeija,
“Seorang wanita, bila dia bekeija dengan Kerajaan, jadi cikgu ka, jadi apa ka, dia sendiri
bertanggungjawab pada rumah tangga dia. Samaada dia setuju atau tidak pun, sebagai seoran g isteri,
dia bertanggungjawab kepada rumah dia. Dalam masa yang sam a dia bertanggungjawab dengan keija
di pejabat dia...” (Maznah Mohamad: http://ww w.m alaysia.net/aliran/hi1ih9904.litm l')
Kajian yang dilakukan oleh Abdul Hamid Arshad (1 9 8 8 ) menunjukkan terdapat kecenderungan
yang meningkat di kalangan wanita M elayu untuk berhenti kerja, atau bersara awal ap ab ila tuntutan
keluarga menjadi begitu mendesak. Abdul Hamid Arshad melaporkan, 44.1% daripada 9 4 3 wanita
yang ditemubual berhenti ketja selepas berkahwin atas permintaan suam i, 26.7% berbuat demikian
untuk menguruskan keluarga, dan 10.5% berhenti keija untuk menjaga anak. (LPPK N, 1 9 9 8 )
Dalam masyarakat Melayu kini masih terdapat tiga generasi yang pada umunya
mendokong nilai, citarasa, dan amalan yang agak berbeza. Generasi pertama terdiri
daripada datuk dan nenek yang masih tinggal di kawasan luar bandar; generasi
kedua pula ialah generasi ibu bapa yang berhijrah dan kawasan luar dan seterusnya
menetap di bandar; dan terakhir generasi ketiga ialah generasi cucu yang lahir dan
dibesarkan di tengah-tengah pusat perubahan di bandar.
Perkembangan sahsiah atau personaliti seseorang itu sangat dipengaruhi oleh faktor
persekitaran (environment) sosial dan fizikal. Golongan yang dilahirkan, yang
dibesarkan dan yang terus tinggal dalam persekitaran yang sama di sepanjang hayat
lazimnya akan alcur kepada sistem nilai, citarasa, dan minat penduduk di
persekitaran tersebut. Bagi generasi pertama, misalnya, sistem nilai yang didokongi
mereka adalah sistem nilai luar bandar yang berlandaskan prinsip kerjasama, sifat
hormat menghormati, perpaduan kelompok, dan amalan normatif yang lain. Ini
berbeza dengan sistem nilai yang terdapat dalam masyarakat bandaran moden atau
dalam masyarakat teknologi yang memperlihatkan ciri-ciri kebebasan individu,
mementingkan diri sendiri, sifat non-normatif dan sebagainya yang dicanaikan atau
tercanai dalam proses perkembangan sahsiah generasi ketiga. Sistem nilai yang
didokong oleh generasi kedua pula boleh dikatakan sebagai sistem nilai yang
menggabungkan kedua-dua rangkap nilai di atas, tetapi itu pun bergantung kepada
keeenderungan mana yang lebih berat. Atas hakikat ini, maka tidak menghairankan
jika salam faham sering wujud antara generasi-generasi yang dimaicsudkan, dan
kerenggangan hubungan berlaku antara mereka, terutamanya antara generasi
pertama dan kedua. Kehadiran datuk dan nenek dari kampung, kadang-kadang tidak
begitu disenangi oleh anggota keluarga bandaran.
Lanjutan daripada perubahan peranan wanita yang dibincangkan di atas, fungsi
sosialisasi yang dijalankan oleh keluarga sedilcit sebanyak turut terjejas, Apabila
anak-anak tidak diasuh dan dibendung dengan sempurna oleh ibu bapa (terutama
oleh ibu yang turut keluar berkerja), maka mereka terbiar bersendirian sesama
mereka. Pengaruh rakan setara (peer group) yang kuat menyebabkan mereka
terbawa-bawa melakukan sesuatu di luar batasan agama dan adat. Jika telah sampai
pada peringkat ini, baru ibu bapa cuba campur tangan dalam urusan mereka serta
mengambil tindakan melarang dan mencegah, maka keadaan sudah terlewat. Gejalagejala lari dari rumah, terlibat dengan kegiatan-kegiatan anti-sosial seperti
penagihan dadah, kahwin lari (elopement), dan sebagainya adalah sebahagian
daripada akibatnya, Ini adalah manifestasi wujudnya jurang generasi dalam
masyarakat, termasuk masyarakat Melayu
14 Sebagai contoh, berikut adalah petikan akbar berkaitan kes salah laku rem aja di M alaysia pada
tahun 90-an:
a) Pada tahun 1993, jenayah ganas remaja terdiri daripada kes-kes beriktit: bunuh (12 kes),
percubaan membunuh (4 kes), rompakan berkumpulan termasuk mengguna senjata api (17 kes),
rompakan perseudirian (40 kes), rogol (53 kes), dan mengakibatkan kecederaan (111 kes).
Kebanyakan kes di atas melibatkan remaja berumur 16-18 tahun. (UM, 28 April 1994).
b) Gadis B ohsia kebanyakannya berumur 18 tahun ke baw ah dan lelaki B ohjan pula, kebanyakannya
berumur antara 18 hingga 22 tahun. (UM , 14 N ov. 1994).
9
KESIMPULAN
Sebagai penutup, saya berpendapat sistem nilai kekeluargaan Melayu masih banyak
dipertahankan walaupun masyarakat mengalami perubahan pesat yang dibawa oleh
teknologi moden. Apa yang berubah atau yang yang dipengaruhi oleh
perkembangan teknologi adalah amalan-amalan baru seperti perancangan keluarga,
kelahiran melalui tabung uji (in vitro fertilization), perkahwinan internet, dan
sebagainya yang tidak bercanggah dengan agama dan adat. Jika pun terdapat
kegiatan non-normatif, ia masih dalam lingkungan yang terkawal. Pihak Kerajaan
melalui berbagai-bagai kementeraian, dan agensi termasuk Kementerian
Pembangunan Wanita dan Keluarga, Kementerain Belia dan Sukan, Jabatan
Kebajikan Masyarakat, Jabatan Agama, Lembaga Pembangunan Penduduk dan
Keluarga Negara (LPPKN), Persatuan Ibu-Bapa dan Guru dan lain-lain, sentiasa
memantau segala tindakan dan kegiatan anggota masyarakat terutama golongan
remaja dari terjenimus ke dalam lembah kehancuran, hidup dalam suasana bebas
yang tidak berlandaskan kepada sistem nilai, dan peraturan normatif.
Wallahua’lam
c) Seramai 245 pelajar dibuang sekolah kerana tindakan salahSaku. Ramai pelajar lakukan rnaksiat.
(U M , 4 April 1995).
d) Sehingga tahun 1994, sejumlah 9,895 orang gadis berusia 21 tahun ke bawah lari dari rumal
(B H , 15 Jun 1995).
e) Pada tahun 1993, 675 remaja dimasukkan ke sekolah akhlak Tunas Bakti Jabatan Kebajikan
Masyarakat. (26 Jan. 1994).
f) Sejum lah 89 peratus daripada ibu bapa mengeluarkan kata-kata n eg a tif kepada anak-anak seperti
bodoh, bangsat, celaka, kurang ajar dll. (UM , 1 Feb. 1995).
g ) "............ Mak bapak dia orang bangang! Anak-anak bagi alasan bodoh pun m ereka tetap percaya'
(Petikan temubual BM dengan teman gadis bohsia, BM , 13 N ov. 1994).
10
RUJUKAN
Burges, et.al. 1971, The Family - From Traditional to Companionship. Van
Nostrand Reinhold Company. New York.
Djamour, J. 1965. Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore. London School of
Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology. University of London. The
Athlon e Press.
Elliot, F.R. 1986. The Family: Change or Continuity? Macmillan Education Ltd.
London.
Fletcher, R. 1966. The Family and Marriage in Britain. Penguin Books. Middlesex,
England.
Keesing, R. 1975. Kin Groups and Social Structure. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Kuo dan Wong (eds). 1979. Contemporary Family in Singapore. University of
Singapore Press.
Leslie, G. 1973. The Family in Social Context. Oxford University Press. New York.
Murdock, G.P. 1949. Social Structure. Macmillan Company. New York.
Leslie White. (1959). The Evolution o f Cuture. New York.
Ogburn, W.F. 1938. "The Changing Functions of the Family". The Family 19.
Parsons, T., 1977. "The Family in Urban America". Anderson M.-Sociology
o f the Family. Penguin Books. Middlesex. England.
Ron Restrum. (1991/ Technologies and Society: The Shaping o f People and Things.
Wadsworth Publishing Company. Belmont, California.
Smelser, N.J. (ed). 1970. Sociology: An Introduction. Wiley Eastern Private Ltd.
New Delhi.
Strange, Ii. 1981. Rural Malay Women in Tradition and Transition.
Publishers. New York.
Praeger
Winston, Brian. (1995). “ How Far are Media Bom and Developed”. D.J.
Mohammadi, Ali & Srebemy-Mohammadi, A. (eds). Questioning the Media: A
Critical Introduction. 2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks. CA:Sage.
Weber, Max. (1904/1930). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism.
Translated by Talcott Parson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Yaacob Harun. 1991. Keluarga Melayu Bandar: Satu Analisis Perubahan. Dewan
Bahasa dan Pustaka. Kuala Lumpur.
ARE RELIGIOUS VALUES UNIVERSAL?
Paul Morris
Professor of Religious Studies
Victoria University of Wellington
New Zealand
Introduction
A re religious values universal? After studying and teaching religious studies for nearly thirty years it is
hard n ot to recognise that there are indeed a plethora o f local, indigenous, and revivalist religious traditions,
both within larger religions and independent o f them. There are m any Judaisms, Islams, Christianities,
Buddhism s, Hinduisms and Daoisms. M y researches have led m e to the conclusion that the differences
betw een religious traditions are real and not easily reduced to any single pattern or m odel. But there are, o f
course, m any overlapping elements, conceptual, theological and most evidently historical. I am anxious
about any list o f universal values divorced from (he context o f their interpretation and application in living
religious com m unities Our values are those w e live rather than those w e m erely aspire to without direct
and im m ediate im pact on our daily lives. A ny list o f values w ill exclude and stigmatise those that fail to
fu lly accord with it. These failures will be deemed non-religious i f the list is religious or not fully human if
the list is a humanist one. The issues o f religious and cultural pluralism have never been more important as
w e continually step up the level o f our global interactions in a world where what happens anywhere
im pacts on us all. W e need to understand each other’s values as a matter o f great priority and urgency.
M a n y religious traditions and cultures claim forms o f universalism, that is true for ail. hi this paper,
h ow ever, I have chosen to focus on the best known claim for universalism the Universal Declaration o f
H um an R ights o f the United Nations. I want to say a few words about religions and human rights and then
exp lo re som e o f the alternatives to the UDHR and comments on the implications o f such alternatives.
The New Human R igh ts
T h e p o st-1 9 8 9 fall o f the Soviet Union world has witnessed a new centrality for human rights, or rather
hum an rights abuses, as evidenced in the foreign policies o f the U S and a number o f the governments o f the
‘W est’, or in the debates over the international Criminal Court. Human rights abuses have been invoiced as
legitim ation for the deposing of the Taliban and M ilosevic, the arrest and deportation o f Pinochet, the
in v a sio n s o f K osovo and Afghanistan, and Iraq. This new emphasis has often highlighted religious issues
and concerns a t what som e refer to as the new ‘Protestant Post-Cold War’ war against the enemies o f
C hristianity.1 For example, the US led Christian ‘global crusade’ o f the last decade against the barriers to
th e freed om o f religion on the part o f their fellow Christians, supported b y tens o f m illions and particularly
directed against the authorities in Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, ‘ungrateful’ Kuwait, and o f course, Iraq,
h a v e prepared the American public for military and other actions to liberate oppressed Christians and
others W hether the m illions o f dollars collected to bring the truth o f Christianity to ‘poor’ Muslims will
b ea r anything at all is another issue. There are, o f course, parallel campaigns regarding China over Tibet
and, s in c e 1 9 9 9 , Falun Gong.
Religion and Human Rights
R e lig io n and human rights-are .related in the scholarly literature in a number o f pertinent ways Iliere are
th o se w h o see the foundations and ongoing viability o f human rights as dependent upon religion, and those
that re c o g n ise these origins but insist that human rights is n ow independent institutionally and in terns of
its o w n established and w idely accepted discourse.4 There are even those who consider that human rights
m ora lity and action are a proselytising form o f secular religion There is also an extensive literature
e x p lic itly concerned with the human rights of religious liberty and the freedom o f b elief m ost often based
1
on U D H R Articles 2, 16, IB, 26, Articles IB and 27 o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the eight articles o f the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination o f All Forms of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The focus here is on issues such as the religious freedom
o f children, religious expression, religious hatred and discrimination, and religious coercion. M y concern
here, however, is with the tensions between religious values ana human rights, real and apparent. There are
books and articles and debates over specific issues, such as circumcision, ritual killing o f meat, animal
sacrifice, marriage arrangements, inheritance, burial and death customs, m edical treatment for particular
groups, ages o f consent, religious authority, customary religious law, religious education o f minors, and
whether Sikhs and Rastafarians should b e required to wear safety cycle helmets!
T he m odem liberal state and its individualistic rights theory has largely privatised religion and reduced its
legal scop e to ‘according to the (secular) law’ . So that, for example, Jewish law is reduced in m odem states
(excep t Israel where there is a unique situation) to the less than one tenth o f traditional law that happens to
coin cid e w ith our different versions o f Roman-Dutch law . This is lamentable as Jewish law, for example,
d oes not proceed from caveat emptor but ascribes responsibilities to sellers and buyers. Jewish law would
sen sib ly ban advertising to minors, insist that new enteiprises are for the communal good, and put
em ploym ent before profit. The same is true o f many traditional religious legal systems within the context o f
the m odem state.
U n iv e r sa l H u m an R ights?
T he sp ecific area that I want to address here arose out o f teaching last year’s LAWS 5 3 0 paper (an LLM
paper) at Victoria, and in particular the lecture b y a visiting official. H e contended, and he is not alone in
this, that ‘Asian values’ were a smokescreen for human rights abuses. This raises the question o f how w e
m ight understand the alternative, ‘other’ declarations o f human rights as part o f the wider debate over the
claim ed triumphant universalism o f the United Nations Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, and the
later conventions and instruments. Although the charge that the UDHR and U N covenants are vehicles for
W estern imperialism and colonialism is w ell made by Satrean anti-humanists and their post-structural
offspring, philosophical relativists, and others, the main opponents o f the U D H R as imperialistic, nonuniversal, and biased espousing Western or Christian11values have been non-Christian religious and cultural
groups, in the main Islamic, Jewish, African, Buddhist, Asian and so on. ,
W hat I intend to do is briefly explore and illustrate the claim o f bias, examine a number o f the alternative
declarations, and draw a conclusion from m y brief analysis. These charges are not new , being as old as the
U D H R itself. The Chinese representative for the Commission on Human Rights, Chang.Peng-chun, insisted
to n o avail that the U N declaration should reflect Chinese as w ell as Western values, although w e might
con sid er that his suggestion that the document framers liv e in China for a w hile before continuing was
w is e ly rejected.7 The delegate from Saudi Arabia requested Articles 16 and 18 be withdrawn as contrary to
Islam , and the failure to do this led to the Saudis abstaining. But it was not just Asians or M uslim s that
ch allenged the declaration, but leading Western scholars and commentators too. So, for exam ple, the
ex ecu tiv e board o f the American Anthropological A ssociation recorded in a memorandum to the U N that
the U D H R w ould be a ‘statement o f rights conceived only in terms o f the values prevalent in Western
E urope and America’.* The U S S R and five other states abstained, understanding the U D H R to be a
recastin g o f western capitalist values in the guise o f universal human rights. In a recent study, Morsink
contests the charges o f ethnocentrism arguing, from the evidence o f the many changes and amendments to
b e foun d b y comparing the various drafts o f the declaration, that the framers did indeed try and reflect
d ifferen t; alues and worldviews and that there were m any active participants in
debates from around
the w orld In fact, there were representatives from India and Lebanon but n o real African or other Asian
input, this b ein g all the more difficult in that in 1946-47 these areas were still largely colonised. _
T here has been increased recognition that different cultural and religious perspectives need to b e seriously
addressed in order to m ove beyond what amounts to an im plicit condemnation o f customary practices and
religiou s b eliefs. The U N thus far has generally been very poor on the recognition and respect for religious
and cultural differences. UNESCO still views culture as a useful vehicle for the delivery o f successful aid
not as p otentially different ways o f thinking or acting. The U N itself is committed to diversity — for
exam p le in its 1995 Education fo r Tolerance programme — but not, I think, difference. Values are indeed
2
held to b e universal, but indigenous and less developed peoples have culture and religion w hile ‘w e’ appear
to h a v e rational and universal rights. Cultures are to b e respected, according to the U N , but o n ly as they
change and adapt and adopt universal values and norms.
This debate is ongoing but I suggest misguided. It has been conceived as a debate between universalism
and the cultural relativism o f different cultures. This leads only to the requirement for a sort o f ‘catch-up’
b y other cultures. So, if w e recall the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme o f A ction from the World
C ongress on Human Rights:
All human rights are universal indivisible and interdependent and interrelated, The international
community must treiit human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and
with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional peculiarities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states,
regardless o f their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human
rights andfundamentalfreedoms. 10
H ere, religious, cultural, national, local and regional differences have been reduced to particularities
m easured against, and secondary to, a m udi larger and more comprehensive universal code. The academic
literature has been mostly positive about the developments at Vienna, and even authors11 w ho had objected
to the universal claims o f human rights now argue that nothing really has to change excep t that cultural
issu e s n eed to receive more attention in order to be incorporated into the universal framework, and that
cultural,, econom ic and social differences largely raise issues for the successful implementation o f universal
hum an rights rather than in the re-consideration and re-formulation o f these rights. Post-V ienna the focus
has la rg ely been on globalisation as the vehicle for the new era ‘new universalism that can and will
accom m odate cultural and religious differences’, ‘the indigenisation o f human rights’, or ‘diversity’ with
‘varying concepts o f rights’. But there has been little sustained debate abou these potentially different
^concepts o f human rights and the implications these might have for the UDHR 1A much m ore interesting
and sign ifican t debate would be about the real differences in values between peoples and different models,
contestation, and claims o f universalism.
•
T h e lead up to die Vienna World Congress served as a focus for different groups to articulate their
reservations about ‘Western’ universality and to formulate their own revised versions or declarations. The
in clu sio n o f culture has been radical, even if it appears that the implications o f genuine cultural diversity
h a v e n o t as yet been fully considered.
I f w e return to the issue raised at the beginning of this paper, prompted b y the U D H R itself and the widely
en d orsed refinements at Vienna, might w e attempt to take the claims for alternative rights m ore seriously
than the knee-jerk reaction as a deflection to conceal abuses? Are the values o f different religious and
cultural groups irreconcilable? Are they intended to be universal? What different fundamental principles, if
any, ground these claims for different values? The first question is what is out there and what w e might
in c lu d e here. I have limited the discussion to a small number of typical ‘declarations’. T hese are issued as
c o n sc io u s alternatives to the. UDHR and so the framers are committed to clearly distinguishing their
version s from the U N ’s. They mirror the UDHR in form and to a considerable extent in content. Designed
to p rom ote cultural and religious differences from the U N ’s universalism, they entail respect for traditional
va lu es and cod es and their re-formulation in declaratory quasi-UN form.
H u m a n R ig h ts in Islam
i w a n t to begin this section on Islam b y referring to a recent article b y Daniel P rice13 where, he
dem onstrates, in a study o f a sample o f twenty-three predominantly M uslim countries compared with nonM u slim developing nations, that, using U N criteria, the in fluence, o f Islamic political culture on
govern m en ts is statistically insignificant with regard to the protection o f human rights. I m ention this only
to m ake the p oin t that the influence of Islam is complex, the factors involved in a consideration of human
rights m a n ifold , that there are a wide variety o f Islamic viewpoints, and that this section is designed only to
in tro d u ce a number of statements and declarations for consideration.
A t this tim e there is an urgent need to understand something o f the claims made b y M uslim s that Islam
3
recognises human rights but that these are not identical to the UDHR. There have been a number of
different agreements and declarations made in the name o f Islam each with a particular history o f origins,
range o f acceptance and adoption. There is the Constitution o f the Iranian Republic o f Iran (1979), the
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981), the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam
(1990), the Arab Charter of Human Rights (1994 endorsed by the governments o f the member states o f the
League o f Arab States), together with a number of important statements on human rights from the Islamic
Conference, and various bodies o f M uslim lawyers and jurists. Most o f these understand human rights to
b e an integral part o f Islam and to have been so for much longer than these principles have been enshrined
in the U D H R b y the U N .14 As with the Saudi abstention at the time of the U D H R itself, these all share the
acknowledgem ent o f the,need to frame and recognise specific human ights and human rights in general in
the revelatory and authoritative religious traditions o f Islam. And, Islamic scholars, such as Abdul A ziz
Said, consider the UDHR to be Western and thus ‘parochial’ and exclusionary o f other cultures and
societies.
S o , for exam ple, in 1979 die Iranian Constitution promotes human rights ‘according to Islamic standards’,
or at the Islam ic Conference to discuss the UN Declaration on the Elimination o f All Forms of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) a collective reservation was entered b y Iraq
rejecting any provision ‘contrary to Islamic law, or to laws based on Islamic principles’. In fact, the
prim acy o f Islamic law is usually cited as the framework for Muslim adherence and acceptance o f the U N
human rights covenants. In a number o f instances there are marked differences between U N provisions and
those reflecting Islam, so for instance the death penalty is legitimated in Articles 1 0 ,11 and 12 o f the Arab
Charter o f Human rights, except for pregnant women and those under eighteen.
Sultan H ussein Tabandeh of Iran published A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration o f Human
Rights in 1968 for the Tehran International Conference on Human Rights. H e understood the U D H R to be
m ostly com patible with Islamic law and that it reiterates m any Islamic provisions, but in a number o f areas
it is not possib le to reconcile Islamic traditions with the U D H R .15 He discussed family law, divorce, and
rights in marriage, which are designed in Islam ‘to protect the family’, and the lim its on freedom o f thought
and expression as set b y Islamic law. Freedom to change religion, he also understood to violate Islamic
law . T he freedom o f expression issue and the 1988 fatwa against Rushdie served to highlight the chasm
betw een liberal Western conventions and laws and those o f Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic state.
H o w different are the Universal Islamic Declaration o f Human Rights (1981) and Arab Charter on Human
Rights (19 9 4 ) from the UDHR? The first thing to note is that in form, at least, both documents are
dependent upon the UDHR. The UIDHR begins with a prayer and acknowledgment o f Allah and continues
with the claim that there is no need for the UDHR at all as there is already a universal code in the Q u ’ran.
W ithin the framework o f an ‘obligation to establish an Islam order’, the U ID H R rejects all forms o f
discrim ination, enjoins protection and honouring o f the family, views ‘worldly pow er’ as a sacred trust’,
‘all econ om ic resources’ as ‘divine blessings bestowed on mankind, to b e enjoyed by all’, and insists that
all ‘p ub lic affairs’ be determined after ‘mutual consultation’ between those affected in accordance with the
‘law and public good . Muslims are obligated to refuse to do anything contrary to the Law regardless o f
w h o issu es the order and nan-transferable individual responsibility is mandated fir all. Freedom o f thought
and expression is recognised nut only so within the Law. Everyone has the right to earn their living
‘according to the Law’ and ‘all means o f production shall be utilised in the interest of the Ummat
(com m unity) as a whole, and may not b e neglected or m isused’. And, the poor have a right to share in the
‘w ealth o f the rich’. Clearly there are significant overlaps with the UDHR, but there is considerably more
empliasisTon the communaTand~colleetiye good and all nghtiTafe- accepted or limited by the compatibilities
or d ifferen ces with Islamic law.
M ost importantly, these Islamic declarations and statements reject the claim that human rights and
freedom s are given by nature, rather they are ‘gifts o f G od in accordance with the Islamic faith
ind it is
o n ly b y virtue o f this that (hey can be acknowledged as universal, ‘inalienable and irrevocable’. That is,
hum an rights ai significant, only in a theocratii order and the only human rights that matte are those
authorised b y the teachings o f Islam. A ll rights have corresponding duties, and each community has an
obligation to govern itself so as to ensure both that rights are protected and that duties can be discharged.
Individual rights must be subordinated and correlated with the common and collective good. Abdul A ziz
4
Said argues that the Islamic and Western values subscribe to different notion:; of freedom, with Webern
liberals obsessed with freedom from external ‘restraint’, an idea not found in Islam, versus the Mamie Idea
o f the freedom to fully contribute and participate in o n e’s community
In summary, the UIDHR is a very different document that goes a long way to support tho UDHR, but it (tie
sam e tim e re-frames it in terms o f obligations and duties that match rights within Hie context Of a
com m unity that provides the necessary framework for individual, family and corporate life. Another we®!
important aspect is the Law is non-coercive and cannot be seen as anything oihr.r if it Is perceived u
im posed on Islamic cultures from outside.
The U IDH R is w idely accepted and has hem cited in a
Shari’a court decision in Pakistan:
Asian Values
A se co n d arena for the challenging o f the Western nature of the UDHR and the claims of onlwsaJity Is
that o f the assertion o f discrete and different ‘Asian values’ , Asian values have been used to explain fte
grow th rates o f the Asian tiger economies and also more recently to go same way te acesitntfof 6 r
A sian crisis as w ell! Certainly after the crisis there is greater external scrutiny of flie- rMatteiffeip# between
■'hum an rights and programmes o f modernisation, and on the part o f many a eyBidiwi tfomt toe a « to m/hkh
these valu es are p u t Notwithstanding the fact that any coherent, agreed list of Allan
givttH ffe
d iversity o f religion, language, culture and political and legal system across Asia, to faim m tly p e s b k m ie
and u nlikely. W e w ill look briefly at three of the models of Asian values that developed ill f t e t990siu flte
aftermath o f increased US and Western influence In t e whole region after 1-989, ewdetif H t0 g 0 e fife
■continuing decolonisation o f the region as in Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in. Iff# , 'Iltesre h m M ( are
-most rea d ily associated with Prime Minis ter Dr Mahathir Muhammad of M akpia,
o f Singapore, L ee Kuan Yew, and China’s t e l President, Jiang 'Zemm,- Each, a lM i, to flitter am <m pf f m
claimed that there are values specific to Asia, suited- to' Asia, and ftp ssgertim &f
AiitU v&oes teas
been part o f an explicit attack on Western
values.
In. fee case o f D r Mahathir, he seeks to promote a! pan-Asia system of vsikueg ibat Mkess m$ m
MS
civilisation’ and which link bis majority Muslim pepakiiss
Use *Cooi*e^ii* i®lsafigg'm S ia fs fm e,
Taiwan .and Hoag Kong, He emphasises the significance p f A A a r ty a»J M sU ky saA B»S lljBMiijg «f
individual rightj h riie name of 'the communal. He deems the West as mettflfy 4e§saaafe m 4
the crisis of liberal democracy .and attributes this to its Joss w
Ma&afcir gedffiM dks«&M pIMfiSf
system based an ‘Asian, values’, More recently, he has aftacfesd! gkibsMsstfcrn
0m gfsefttil- ifest
Hows o f capital have a negative impact ,00, the devAopmg wadld, ia’,.
-ps#isr i§®» ife
M^fWiHstaie to the global companies, This move, fee- mgv.es, rrfaigg (Sis
m S teaa® rfgjWs flf fite
citizens o f 'these stales,19H e debate m et human sights bm ts&cmm eastesl to Mspsftfcif jjfttifapsgAyflfAk
state. 'Use. proiHiotioa of these Aslan, values has m t i p t m s ; fteeri essfffieMy ssiklsd M m Isawatae M
pofifical and dtvS rights in; Malaysia,
Lee ’K stm Yew and his ‘Singapore llebooif wntatd fljgfr
'ffif CssfesfisiajAjfess ifey hsUsd f c
d e«$eg3«sjl r f Singapore5® ‘s&eM soMmfayt* ®gafieg a nm km d tgateapjr'
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and traditions ( ‘spiritual civilisation’) and present policies of ‘socialist, ethical, and cultural progress’. The
principal policy was that human rights are ‘culturally specific’ and that the Chinese were committed to the
maintaining of order and stability and the Confucian values of ‘community harmony’ and ‘social harmony’.
Political and civil rights are secondary to the economic development designed to meet the basic needs of
the Chinese population. The paper also insists that human rights are within the ‘sovereignty of each state’
and that external and international pressures are to be resisted as an unwarranted attack on such
sovereignty. When the deputy chair of the ‘Human Rights Commission’ of China visited N ew Zealand, he
insisted that ‘national self-determination, stability, order and economic development were human rights’
and that N G O s and other governments were guilty of ‘double-standards’.
At the regional lead up meeting to the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in China in 1991, the
hosts developed a document on Asian values for discussion. At a conference in 1993 just prior to
Vienna, forty-nine countries including Japan and South Korea signed the 'Bangkok Declaration’
on Asian values. The Declaration reported that:
... while human rights were universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of
a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and
religious backgrounds.
Here, we can begin to see something of the issues that would be included in the Vienna
Declaration, including the significance of the differential, cultural context of human rights and the
‘right to development’. The Bangkok Declaration also insisted that the U N interpret human rights
within the framework of a state’s national and regional realities. These realities include values —
Asian values that focus on the collective and family rather than the individual, and understand
national interests to outweigh individual rights. As with Islam, above, duties are emphasised
alongside rights and the West is condemned for failing to fully recognise this. Stability and
harmony are stressed and the difficulties of maintaining these together with programmes of
industrial and commercial development.
In summary, the debate on Asian values leading up to the 1993 Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights has
had a significant impact on the Vienna congress and subsequent debates on the universality and cultural
specificity o f human rights. The social consensus theory of rights needs to be taken seriously as do the
values espoused by the advocates of Asian values. The absorption of collective or communal into the state
needs to be noted, as do the fears of the negative impact o f Western values on Asian societies.
Conclusion: Rhetoric or Relativism?
Even the briefest trawl through some of the literature exposes the difficulties with the current form of the
U D H R and the institutional settings for the implementation of human rights. Different cultures and
religious traditions do indeed have different values, different emphases and different modes of
authorisation and validation. The U N would do well to develop a framework to consider these issues in
detail. Beyond an empty debate between universalism and relativism, or the reduction of cultures and
tradition! as the backdroj for global development, including human rights, or a stark choice between
indm dud or collective rights, we can begin to develop with a greater degree of sophistication a more
nuanced account of the possibilities. W e need to take the rights to culture and religion as an integral part of
our individual rights and to develop models df the relationship between communal, tra d itio n a l arid
individual rights; W6 alsQ steed to recognise What I Call ‘pluralistic legitimation’, where parties can agree
to a shared Code on quite different grounds, so for example a Jew might accept articles of the UD HR as
deriving from God and another party from a rationalistic political philosophy. There is enormous scope for
the mutual understanding of different human groups, beginning With the recognition that individuals live
within culttires and in religious communities, and that these are the only context for the development of
human rights, and the articulation of differential human rights, that is, rights specific to particular groups
are necessary if the debate is to advance at all. There are important genuine developments to be found in
6
the Islamic, Asian, African, Jewish
Hindu and Buddhist declarations and codes of human rights,
including re-distributive systems of inheritance, ethical codes for food production and marketing, models of
communal responsibilities and collective duties, and subtle and sophisticated moral insights about human
rights and their cultural contexts.
To return to our starting point The last two decades under a single superpower have witnessed a new
intensification of the development of global market capitalism raising a raft of human rights concerns. In
large part in response to these pressures a number of religious and revivalist cultures in.developing states
have grown in prominence and political influence. Drawing on traditional moral codes and norms these
religious resurgence movements offer a critique of global capitalism and often the human rights regime
associated with -it, the UDHR. In some cases the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have
insisted on imposing human rights clauses and conditions in order to secure development funds as has the
U S in relation to the granting of ‘favored nation status’. The 'other’ human rights codes that we have
looked at above reflect the attempts to secure human rights in a global world that arise not just from the
capitalist West but from the cultures and religious traditions marginalised by just such a global capitalist
world order. They offer an invaluable source for necessary new thinking beyond the twin poles o f the
modernist mythologies of the individual citizen and the nation-state. These declarations and codes represent
ongoing debate and contestation. Further, it seems clear that a fair and equitable world irder will
necessitate a sustained debate and serious engagement with these alternative codes of human rights as the
only alternative to armed interventions and the external imposition of the UDHR. Even a siate-Rawlsian
like M ichael Ignatieff considers that intervention (query meaning o f first part of sentence) - military or
enforced economic — will not achieve positive human rights outcomes, and advocates, even if not taking
the views o f others seriously, a pragmatic approach to practical human rights while giving full recognition
to the need to re-think and re-establish firm foundations for human rights. Paradoxically, his view that
supporting states is better for stability than not doing so, or supporting sub-state elements, reinforces the
cultural arid religious specificity of human rights. While this is less than is called for above, it could make
a significant stage on the way to a genuine pluralism in human rights.23
Such a pluralism would have to give full weight to the differences in the religious and cultural values of
different groups.
7
Footnotes
s See Kurth (199B), where he discerns a ‘Protestant basis’ to US foreign policy and characterises this
contemporary Protestantism ‘as the pursuit of human rights and uninhibited self-expression’; on U S power
and human rights, see, Donnelly (199B), Evans (1996), and Little (1998).
2 See, van de Vyer &
J. Witte (1996); Evans (1997); Leigh (2002).
! Such as, Stackhouse (1998), where the claim is made that the foundations of human rights are essentially
‘theological’; for a fuller account, see Stackhouse (1984).
.
,
,
4 See, Henkin (1998), where the author acknowledges the grounding of human rights in religious faith but
argues that human rights morality and values are now autonomous of this heritage. On religious rights, see,
Evans (2000).
See Evans (2000); see, also Klug (2000).
The UD H R , of course, had Christian opponents although many agreed with Jacques Maritain, a member
of the drafting committee, who, it is held, failed to agree with a single principle but still considered the
declaration better than nothing (Maritain, 2001).
For a similar sentiment to the M F A T position by the CEO of the Asia 2000 Foundation of N Z , see Gibson
(1997) where he refers to ‘so-called Asian Values’ .
r Chang Peng-chun, Vice Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and head of the Chinese
delegation to the U N , was a member Of the U D H R drafting committee, Wang (1986) 119. See, Glenson
(2001); Gurewitsch (1973, 25). The Saudi objections were twofold; the U D H R failed to recognise that
rights are given to humankind by Allah, and that the Qur'an does not permit the right to change religion.
8 Nickel (1987, 68); ‘Statement on Human Rights’ - American Anthropological Association,
American
Anthropologist 49/4 (1947) 539.
See, Morsink (2000), the post-Nazi context is an essential dimension of the U D H R framework.
i0 Paragraph 5, my italics, United Nations 1993; see, Morris (1996).
1See, Pollis & Schwab (2000).
1 On the question of universal or global rights, see, Tharoor (1999-2000); Bradney (1993); Donnelly
(1998); Ladd (1983); Warner (1997); Thompson (1980); D . Little, J. Kelsay & A. Sachedina (1988); Milne
(1986); J. Nickel (1987); Panikkar (1982); Penncock & Chapman (1981); Pollis & Schwab (1979); Pollis &
Schwab (2000); Teson, (1985); Traer (1991); Swidler (1986); van de Vyer & Witte (1996).
13Price (2002).
1So, in the Statement from the Union of Arab Lawyers at the Seminar on Human Rights organised by the
International Commission of Jurists in 1980, the expressed aim was to ‘refiite the idea that the initiation arid
development of human rights must be ■attributed exclusively to Western culture’ and to record that ^Islam
was the first to recognise human rights almost fourteen centuries ago ... Islam through the centuries set up
guarantees and safeguards that have only recently been incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights’. In a similar vein, the report from the Union of Arab Lawyers (1986) proclaims ‘faith in the
principles in the Charter of the U N and the International Bill of Rights’ but equally insists on the ‘Islamic
interpretation of human rights ... best suited to the particular needs of the modern Arab world’. Said
(1979).
15Tabandeh (1970).
8
16On Islamic human rights, see: Farhang (1988); Hassan (1982); Human Rights in Islam (1982); Islam and
Justice (1996); Nasr (1980); Piscatori (1980); Tabandeh (1970); Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights (1981); and, Zakaria (1986). For a very different view, see Mayer (1991).
17See, Said (1979); also Sinaceur (1986); Jullundhri (1980).
Kelsay (1988); Mawdudi (1980); Mayer (1991); Mayer (1988).
See, M . Mahathir & S1 Ishihara, The Voice o f Asia —Tw >Leaders discuss the coming century (Tokyo:
Kodansha International, 1995) on the basis for ‘Asian values’ . The authors predict ‘end o f die western
world’ as it collapses under the weight of its hedonism, ‘materialism, sensual gratification, and selfishness’
leading to family breakdown of institutions, families, religions, and traditions; and Verma (2002).
On human rights in Buddhism and the Buddhist Charter on Human Rights, see: Keown (1995); Perera
(1998); Perera (1991); Unno (1988); and Thurman (1988); and on Hindu human rights, including the Vedic
Code o f Rights see, Mitra (1988); Panikkar (1982).
'O n the debates on human rights in Asia, see: Cooper (1985); Davis (1995); Feinerman (1989); Nathan
(1986); Peerenhoom (1990); Shen (1982); Y i (1989); Hsiung (1985); Rosemont (1988); Rouner (1998); Tai
(1988); and, Welch & Leary (1990).
n
See, Fishbane (1988); Goodman (1976); Kaplan (1980); Konvitz (1972); Polish (1982); Sidorsky (1979).
23 Falk (2001); Ignatieff (2001); also, Martin, Bloom & Proudfoot (1996).
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