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TIBETAN REFUGEES IN SOUTH ASIA: IMPLICATIONS
FOR SECURITY
RSP DOCUMENTATION
-~- CENTRE
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DAWA NORBU
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
School of International Studies
Jawaharial Nehru University
New Delhi
Paper presented at the International Seminar on Refugees
and Internal Security in South Asia, organised by
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo
10 - 11 July 1994.
Hiimiu
302838205V
TIBETAN REFUGEES IN SOUTH ASIA: IMPLICATIONS
FOR SECURITY
DAWA NORBU
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi
Introduction
In terms of numbers, the Tibetan refugee problem is not so significant in comparison, for .
example; with those forced migrants from Mozambique (see Wilson 1992). Of the total Tibetan
population of six million, as claimed by the present Dalai Lama, 82,546 (Subba 1990) to 85,000
(Holborn 1975) are refugees, 80 per cent of whom are resettled in India with the second highest
concentration in Nepal. Even these figures , those sympathetic to the Chinese view maintain, are rather
exaggerated for political reasons (Grunfeld 1987).
However, the significance of the Tibetan refugee problem lies perhaps not so much on its
number. To most people in the 'free world', Tibetan refugees have signified not only the survival of
aunique culture but also a peaceful struggle for a just cause. They see often aid to Tibetan refugees
as humanitarian compensation o
fr their State's political inability to help the Tibetan cause. Besides,
since Tibetan refugees have been successfully rehabilitated in a relatively short time and have shown
concrete result in terms of self-supporting, aid donors have shown continued interest in the Tibetan
refugees. As several Western aid workers had commented, the Tibetan refugee problem is not a
'bottomless pit '.
i •
Genocide. Revolt and Flight
The Tibetan question is so controversial that even an innocent attempt that seeks to unearth
the causes for the post-1958 displacement becomes problematic . For such an attempt touches
indirectly one of the nerve-centres of the Sino-Tibetan controversy: why did the Tibetan 'serfs' escape
from the Chinese 'liberation'? Keeping such controversies in mind, we state briefly in what follows
the various reasons for the flight and the political context in which over 80,000 Tibetans, mostly
commoners (Goldste in 1978, Saklaini 1984; Subba 1990) escaped to the neighbouring South Asian
countries, mostly between 1959 and 1962.
Refugees as victims of Chinese genocide
Early studies sought to document the cases of genocide in Tibet which led to the mass exodus
in 1959. Perhaps most wellknown of such studies are the two reports by the International Commission
of Jurists (ICJ 1959 and 1966). The reports, based on interviews with select groups of refugees in
India, documented several cases of religious persecution , torture, forced sterilization, destruction of
families and so on, which indirectly occasioned the forced migration. These reports appeared at the
&
height of the cold war with which the Tibetan question became entangled and the lawyers' findings
exercised considerable influence in the 'free world'. It was not until early 1970s when the people 's
Republic "of China (PRC) made a come back to world politics that the International Commission of
Jurists ' reports on Tibet were questioned especially by New Left writers .
Differentiated policies towards inner and outer Tibet ultimately responsible
If what the international lawyers reported were true, their findings might have applied to Inner
Tibet but less in the case of Outer Tibet. This is implicit in Norbu 's book (1974) and in others as well
(Saklaini 1984, Grunfeld 1987). Later in an academic article Norbu (1979) sought to analyse the
causes and character of the 1959 revolt, following which most of the forced migration took place; he
tentatively concluded that one of the principal causes may be traced to the differentiated Chinese
policies towards Inner and Outer Tibet in the 1950s (Norbu 1979; Grunfeld 1987; Goldstein 1990).
By 'Inner Tibet ' the British officials referred to what Tibetans call Amdo and Kham, most
parts of which were already incorporated into the neighbouring Chinese provinces (Sichuan, Yunnan,
Gansu and Qinghai) before . 1951. And 'Outer Tibet ' included Central, Southern and Western Tibet
and some parts of Kham which were under the effective control of the Tibetan government in Lhasa
at the time of the Communist takeover. This part of Tibet is what the PRC calls the Tibet
Autonomous Region today; Kham and Amdo are excluded from , that Chinese conception of Tibet.
The provisions of the 17-point Agreement (1951) applied only to Outer Tibet.
This quasi-legalistic partition of Tibet sounded so 'legally correct ' to the Communist leaders
that they formulated and pursued two radically different policies: radical communist policy measures
in Inner Tibet and non-Communist liberal ones in Outer Tibet. In other words, the Communist leaders
treated , for all practical purposes, Kham and Amdo more or less exactly like China proper in terms
of general policy implementation such as ideological campaigns, land reforms much before Outer
Tibet experienced them. Such a radical policy, designed to replace core Tibetan Buddhist values and
key institutions by Chinese Marxist ones, was deeply resented and resisted widely in Inner Tibet
(Andrugtsang 1973). This then led to the first wave of displacement and forced migration from Inner
to Outer Tibet int he mid 1950s, and by 1959 in to south Asia.
One of the central assumptions in Norbu 's objective argument is that the population both in
Inner and Outer Tibet, despite minor regional variations, constituted an identifiable ethnic group,
sharing all the fundamental features of a common society: the same myths about racial origins,
common language unified by a single writing system, same belief system, common social structure
and similar life-style. It was, therefore, wrong on the part of Chinese leaders to base their policy
towards Inner Tibet on a legalistic fiction rather than on social facts. For Tibet, whether Inner or
Outer, was - and still is - a relatively homogeneous single culture. This means that Inner Tibet was
no less socially ready for the Chinese-imposed 'revolution* than Outer Tibet was where the
'revolution * was postponed until 1959 for political reasons. That is why first revolts broke out in
Inner Tibet by the mid 1950s, spreading gradually to Outer Tibet by the late 1950s. That also explains
the predominant role played by Khampas in the 1959 Revolt. Once the Tibetans revolted, the Chinese
authorities showed no mercy in repressing them along the lines reported by the International
Commission of Jurists.
Complex Motives for flight
Norbu's analysis sought to locate the major causes of the Tibetan Revolt and consequently
provided the political context of violence and lfight. One researcher (Palakshappa 1978, 16-17) in the
course of his field work among the Tibetan refugees in Mundgod (South India) interviewed 869
families with the view to determine their motives for the flight . His respondents gave five reasons in
the following order of descending importance .
The first and more general was the popular feeling of acute anxiety about the future of their
religion and culture under the Communist regime. They were afraid that they would not -be allowed
to practise Buddhism, and maintain their way of life. [This motive was emphasized also by
Haimendorfs informants (1990)]. The second and more specific reason was that numerous Tibetans
had heard about the atrocities committed by the Chinese in Lhasa such as torture and humiliation in
public for anyone unwilling
o t embrace Chinese Communism. A third reason was that the Chinese
authorities were obstructing endogamous marriages among the Tibetans, who were forced to take a
bride or a groom from the Chinese. This measure, they explained , was aimed at destroying 'their race
of which the Tibetans are so proud'. A fourth reason was the news that their leader the Dalai Lama
had escaped to India. [Saklaini (1984) also writes that many Tibetans she interviewed took to flight
after hearing about the Dalai Lama 's escape.] A fifth reason was the confiscation of property from
the propertied classes. Moreover, the Chinese had planned the take over in such a way that the
communities and families were split among themselves . The children were used to spy upon their
parents, the wife upon the husband. Thus, concludes Palakshappa, the occupation of Tibet by the
Chinese had created a sense of insecurity and this insecurity in their daily life was at the bottom of
the Tibetan migration.
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Planned Rehabilitation and Livelihood Strategies
A-major research focus in recent refugee studies has rightly been on livelihood strategies and
adaptive experience of refugees in their host countries. In these respects Tibetan refugee experience
is particularly instructive. Since they are generally considered as the 'model refugee community'
/( Haimendorf 1990), their experience, if not culture-bound, might have implications to other refugee
communities trying to reconstruct their lives in alien lands. This section, then, pays special attention
(/
to some of the salient 'secrets' of Tibetan refugee success in India.
Initial difficulties:
exhaustion, uncertainties
Since the rehabilititation of Tibetan refugees in South Asian countries have been more
successful than most other cases in the Third world, not many scholars have thought it significant to
record the early trauma and difficulties
experienced by refugees from Tibet.
Such experiences may be classified into two types: (i) psychological fear and physical
exhaustion involved in the process of flight; (ii) difficulties of physiological and linguistic nature in
adjusting to the Indian environment, The first set of difficulties varied almost in direct proportion to
the distance traversed by particular groups of refugees. For examples, refugees from me other sides
of Nepali (Coriin 1975) or Sikkimese border (Subba 1990) did not have to travel far to reach their
new habitat in the Himalayan states. The same or similar would by true of refugees settled in Bhutan
and Arunachal Pradesh (India), most of whom came from border towns and villages on the Tibetan
side. Their flight involved just crossing the Himalayan passes.
But refugees from far-flung areas of Tibet such as Kham, Amdo or Lhasa, were not so
fortunate. They experienced more trauma and fatigue. Most of them had to trudge for more than a
month while twenty days were often an average span of their trauma-filled flight. Many of them chose
to die en route out of fatigue, hunger and thirst rather than get tortured by the Chinese army (Subba
1990). Some refugees who have written about their experiences narrate that a terrifying fear gripped
them, fear that the Chinese soldiers might catch them before they could safely reach India, Nepal or
Bhutan (see The Dalai Lama 1962; Taring 1970; Norbu 1974).
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While me duration and intensity of their flight trauma varied with the distances they had to
travel, almost all the refugees from Tibet, except those remaining in the Himalayan foothills,
experienced debilitating difficulties
of health and cultural adjustment to the Indian environment. With
the exception of few Lhasa aristocrats who spoke some English or Hindi, the vast majority spoke only
Tibetan. Goldstein (1978) further notes that the refugees were nomads, monks, farmers and petty
traders, none of whose occupations, on the surface, offered any competitive advantages. They were
almost entirely pre-industrial or purely traditional .
Even more dangerous problems were associated with the Tibetan lack of resistance to tropical
diseases. Unaccustomed to the hot climate and low altitude, the most Tibetans developed skin diseases
and gastric disorders. They failed to make adjustment from the cool clear air of their homeland to the
tropical climate of India.
Ralph Hetzel (1968) wrote that leech and insect bites, heat scores, staphylococcus infections and
scabies were a constant problem. With no resistance to tropical diseases many Tibetans fell - and
continue to fall - easy victims to Tuberculosis, Cholera, Malaria etc., about which we will have more
to say later.
The psychological trauma has not yet completely faded away from the minds of refugees even
i on refugees
after thirty years in India. Tanka Subba (1990) found out that many of the older generat
continue to experience nightmares , waking up sweatsodden. Only when they realize that the traumatic
events had all happened about three decades ago do they feel relieved.
The refugees' fear of being captured by Chinese forces faded away once they crossed the
Himalayan passes and reached safely the cis-Himalayan regions. However, health problems , language
difficulties and general uncertainties continued to plague them for almost five years (1959-1963).
Perhaps most unforgettable difficulties were experienced in the two transit camps hastily set-up by
the Government of India, Misamari in Assam and Buxa in west Bengal . Between May and June 1959
the camp at Misamari handled 15,000 refugees. Inspite of the Indian emergency help, 167 children
and 65 adults died at the camp (BDL 1969).
The transit camp at Misamari wound up its operation in July 1960 and refugees were
dispersed to colder Himalayan regions where most of them were temporarily absorbed on road
construction work in 95 camps. The elderly lamas numbering about 700 were settled in Dalhousie and
aresidential lamasery for 1200 junior lamas was set up at Buxa. However, a small transit camp was
retained at the border to accommodate the steady trickle of refugees still crossing the Himalayas
despite the fact the Chinese side of the border was sealed by 1960.
The predominant mood of refugees during the early difficult years was one of uncertainty and
hope. They hoped that their difficulties were transitory and that soon they would be able to return to
their homeland . But even during the early difficult
years of exile, the refugees did not lose their sense
of humour which is characteristically Tibetan. Tanka Subba in his well researched book (1990)
narrates an interesting incident told by his informants. When they reached Misamari, refugees were
asked to cut their long pigtails and take off their woollen or sheep skin clothes, and wear cotton
pyjamas and kurta. Since there were no mirrors in the bamboo huts, refugees looked at one another
and laughed, exchanging nicknames and cracking jokes .
From trauma to successful settlement
The UNHCR report (Holborn 1975) noted that 1960-63 marked the quest for permanent
solutions to the Tibetan refugee problem in South Asia. The development of five major agricultural
(' settlements in India and several small ones in Sikkim and Bhutan, was initiated . The Government of
the State of Mysore (now Karaataka ) was the first to reply affirmatively to New Delhi 's request for
land on which to settle the refugees. An agreement was reached between the State and Central
Governments (in consultation with the Dalai Lama's representatives, to settle 3000 refugees on an
3,000 acre tract of land at Bylakuppe in Karoataka . In June 1962 the Government of Bylakuppe in
Bhutan granted enough land to settle about 3000 refugees with funds from the Indian Government,
in two separate settlements . These settlements received no outside assistance since 1965 but they
became self-supporting and emerged as 'one of the most successful' refugee communities in the world
of refugees (The Dalai Lama 1986:2 ). This self-estimate is corroborated by anthropologists who had
researched on the Tibetan refugees since 1966.
Melvyn Goldstein, the American anthropologist arrived at Bylakuppe in January, 1966 to do
field work among the refugees in South India. Within five years of starting the settlement from
scratch in 1962, the refugees at Bylakuppe had "became a tremendous economic success" by 1966
(Goldsrein 1978: 399). He observed "very little manifestation of the dysfunctional behaviour
commonly associated with the "refugee" syndrome. There was little incidence of mental and emotional
disorders and no incidence of alcoholism" (Ibid: 403). Girija, Saklaini, an Indian sociologist, did an
exhaustive field work and research on Tibetan refugees living in Dharamsala, Delhi and Dehradun
(Northern India) and her findings are similarly positive. She wrote that Tibetans have, on the whole,
successfully emerged from a self-sufficient barter economy into a competitive economy, and have
adjusted to the new situation which is a tribute to the Tibetan community in exile (Saklaini 1984,
216). She gives three reasons for the Tibetan success in India, Firstly, the Tibetans are hardworking
people. Secondly, their womenfolk also work as hard as men, if not more. And thirdly the Tibetans
have a natural instinct for trading (Ibid: 219).
The Tibetan refugee achievement is not confined to relative economic success in a country
where forty percent of the host population live below the poverty level. Tanka Subba, a Nepali
anthropologist, did intensive field work among the Tibetan refugees settled in Sikkim, Darjeeling and
Kalimpong (West Bengal) in mid 1970s. Among other things, Subba (1990: X) found out that 90.9
percent of the Tibetan refugees can speak Nepali, 84,5 percent Hindi and 44.8 percent can speak
English. Finally, the refugees ' preservation of their cultural identity and religious institutions have
been so successful that a wellknown European anthropologist has termed it the 'renaissance of Tibetan
civilization ' in exile. Professor Haimendorf (1990: 2) after surveying the cultural scene among the
Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal , concluded: "The ability of homeless and impoverished groups
of refugees to build and fund in foreign lands numerous monasteries of a remarkably high
architectural standard and their success in developing viable monastic communities similar to those
of Tibet is one of the miracles of the twentieth century.
The Impact of Refugees on
Host Population
Tibetan refugee settlements in India had been deliberately designed in such a way as to
recreate Tibetan society with its core values intact. Such a recreation of pockets of Tibetan culture
and society in India was not only the popular desire and determination of refugees from Tibet. It was
to a large extent, endorsed and even encouraged by the Government of India as a matter of policy .
,/• Two critical aspects of India 's policy towards the Tibetan refugees are - (1) the liberal
"nonassimilative" framework as reflected in the separate settlements, and (2) the broad "delegated"
authority of the Tibetan settlements in India (Goldstein 1978: 398). Such a benevolent policy ensures
Tibetan cultural identity and social autonomy in a sea of host population . This seemed understandable
in the 1960s but now it is coming under increasing criticism (Saklaini 1984; Subba 1990).
As we stated before ,one of the motive forces behind the forced migration from Tibet was the
Tibetan fear that their cultural identity and religious institutions were in danger of disappearance
under the Chinese rule. Most Indians sympathized with this concern even though their government
constantly harps on the theme of 'national integration*.
The creation of separate settlements for Tibetans meant in effect maintaining social and
cultural boundaries from the host society. This in turn means that the integration between the refugees
and the host population is limited to economic transactions in the market (Goldstein 1978;
Palakshappa 1978). In this section we enumerate the types of refugee impact on the host society.
Refugees ' economic impact on host
population
It may be surprising but true as observed by Palakshappa (1978) , Goldstein (1978) and
several others that Tibetan refugees have provided considerable job opportunities to many members
of the host population. In agricultural settlements most Tibetans employ rural Indian labourers to till
the soil, sow the seeds, and so on. An Indian anthropologist notes that such job opportunities have
smoothed the relations between the Tibetans and the Indians. Although local Indians might resent that
their land had been given to some outsiders, they 'feel satisfied ' that they (Indians) have benefitted
by the establishment of the Tibetan settlement . Atleast it provides the Indians with jobs continuously
through out the year , which many of them did not have before (Palakshappa 1978: 99).
Many members of me host population are employed by Tibetan refugees in other spheres too.
In Nepal numerous local Nepalis are employed in Tibetan refugee carpet factories, which are the
largest foreign exchange earner next
o t tourism. Moreover, increasing number of Tibetan refugees
are entering secondary occupations such as selling sweater in winter, running restaurants and hotels
etc. in which local workers are being employed as can be seen in Delhi, Dharamsala, Darjeeling,
Kathmandu etc.
The other beneficial type of refugee impact on host society is the extension of Tibetan
facilities to the host population. Most of the Tibetan settlements are located in remote parts of India
which had not received much attention from New Delhi in terms of developmental funds and projects .
With the establishment of Tibetan settlements in such areas, the surrounding Indian or Nepali villages
began to receive side benefits . Tibetan schools and hospitals are open to the host population as well.
While digging tubewells or making irrigation canals for the Tibetan refugees, foreign charity
organizations also have sponsored similar schemes for me surrounding local villages as well.
To such remote and poor villagers in India or Nepal , the establishment of a Tibetan colony
in their locality means new jobs , more business opportunities and new modern facilities. But their
elites see the phenomena of Tibetan success differently.
Tension Between refugees and
host elites
While poor villagers receive and appreciate the side benefits from the establishment of Tibetan
settlements in their localities, which have improved the local economy (Palakshappa 1978), their elites
see the political implications of refugees' economic dominance in their region. This is particularly true
in the Himalayan states. Thus, a Ladakhi intellectual resents the fact six important monastic
institutions in Ladakh are controlled by Tibetan refugees priest and also the fact Tibetan refugees in
the area have not learned Ladakhi. In order to champion his cause in general terms, and to bring the
point home to Indian authorities, he invokes threat to Indian 'national security* resulting from the
Tibetan settlements in the sensitive Himalayan regions (Stobdan 1991). This is of course the ultimate
card to ward off Tibetan refugee economic and cultural dominance.
In a similar vein a Nepali intellectual strongly objects to a Tibetan journalist 's remark Nepali
language and culture have 'invaded' Tibetan tongues and homes in Darjeeling and Sikkim. Dr. Subba
(1992) attacks me Indian government policy which grants cultural autonomy to Tibetan refugees, and
passionately predicts that Tibetan refugee determination to preserve their culture and their resistance
to learn local languages will engender conflict with host population . Both Subba and Stobdan talk of
pending ethnic conflict in the Himalayas as a result of Tibetan refugee economic and cultural
dominance. The example both of them cite is the case ofBhutan-Tibetan conflict of early 1970s. This
was actually an intricate case of a political intrigue in which the Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo
Thondup and a foreign agency were involved in Bhutan. Tibetan refugees in Bhutan were used as
scape-goat. It was, in fact, not a case of refugee-host conflict ,
While actual cases of host-refugee conflict have been rare in India, several scholars have
observed underlying tension between Tibetan refugees and host elites. It is a truism that the successful
outsider is the object of animosity and jealousy , and Tibetan refugees who have done comparatively
well in poor host areas - are no exception. In the case of the Himalayan regions Stobdan (1991, 69697) sees two reasons for the host-refugee tensions : (1) the prosperity of the Tibetan refugees and the
subsequent economic disparity between the native Himalayan population and the Tibetans; (2) the
perpetuation of the Tibetan cultural and religious chauvinism in the Himalayan region. This seems
particularly true in Bhutan, Northern Nepal , Sikkim and Ladakh (Corlin 1975, Haimendorf 1990,
Subba 1990, Stobdan 1991). Such Himalayan elite critics see foreign aid as the main reason for
L
Tibetan refugee economic success; they do not acknowledge the role of Tibetan entrepreneurship
(Devoe 1983) work ethics (Saklaini 1984) and organizational skills (Goldstein 1978) in the Tibetan
refugee achievement .
There appears to be more host-refugee tensions in the Himalayan regions man in the Indian
plains . This paradox may be explained as follows . Tibetan refugees in the Himalayan states share a
\ number of racial, linguistic, religious and cultural commonalities with most of the host populations,
expect the Nepalis (Subba 1990: 55-75). Such commonalities make the chances of more politically
ambitious among the refugees somewhat more 'realistic ' to involve themselves in local politics , which
is acutely resented by the indigenous middle-level elites as politically threatening . The centuries of
traditional Tibetan cultural dominance in the cis-Himalayan regions seems to lend credence to the
;• native Himalayan elites' fears and threat perceptions from the vigorous refugees.
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Such deep-seated fears and threat perceptions are virtually absent in the plains Indians' attitude
cowards the Tibetan refugees. T.C. Palakshappa (1978: 105) while doing his field work in Mundgod
.(South India) observed 'I did not notice any sense of inferiority or constraints when seeing the
Tibetans dealing with the Indians; it was, I felt, a competition between equals '. No South Indian
intellectuals have ever aired or articulated their resentment toward the refugees. In fact Palakshappa
( 1978; 110) concludes that the various side benefits that the host population have received from the
Tibetan settlement 'have gone a long way in developing more positive Indian attitude towards the
Tibetans'. In North India too, according to Saklaini (1994) who did extensive field work, no hostrefugee conflict appears apparent.In her survey she found that 76.92 percent of Indian attitude towards
the Tibetans refugees was positive (1984: 374) while 85 percent of Tibetan attitude towards the
Indians was positive (1984; 341).
Social Change in Tibetan
refugee society
Even though separate settlements o
fr Tibetan refugees were designed to carry on the core
cultural values of Tibetan civilization which entails the conscious maintenance of cultural and social
boundaries from the host society, me refugees are not closed to social change. Change is considerable
considering the fact the refugees migrated from a country completely closed to any outside influence
up to 1950 and also considering the fact that their settlements were designed to preserve their core
cultural values. These factors would have minimized the chances of social change in exile. Yet social
change is evident as we shall see in this section.
Clae Corlin (1975), T.C. Palakshappa (1978) and Girija Saklaini (1984) focused their works
on the theme of continuity and change in Tibetan refuges society. Such themes hold special attraction
to social scientists interested in the Tibetan diaspora. For a long time pre 1950 Tibet was perceived
as a paradigm of pure traditional society, and since refugees by definition are in a flux of change, it
is interesting to find out what has changed and what has persisted in exile. We focus on social change.
Sources of change are obviously emanating from the larger context of the host society, which
might question some Indian critics' view (e.g . Saklaini 1984; Subba 1990) that Tibetan refugees have
not assimilated any Indian values and institutions. Specifically, the large and complex education
system (with 85 schools and enrollment of 23,600 students) that the Government of India has
established for Tibetans is bringing out a new generation of Tibetans who have become the engine
of and advocates for social change in the refugee society. More generally, even the older generation
of common Tibetans are frequently exposed to the larger Indian system of political pluralism and
second-hand modernity, both of which have exerted considerable impact on the refugees.
In traditional Tibet it was customary for almost every family to send at least one member to
the monastic order. In exile this rate is definitely declining. Not only this: Saklaini (1984:160)
reported that nearly 16 percent of her respondents expressed their desire for change in the religious
order which would have been unthinkable in old Tibet. More dramatic changes are manifest in the
occupational structure. Saklaini's study reveals that out of ninety two respondents who were in Tibet
agriculturists, 75 percent have changed to business. Thus, she observed " a gradual shift from pre
occupation with other-worldliness to a conscious pursuit of worldliness " (Saldaini 1984: 219).
Palakshappa reports that the nuclear family is the common type of family in Mundgod, whereas in
traditional Tibet extended or joint family was the norm.He also observed that monogamy has become
the norm, whereas in traditional Tibet polyandry and polygamy were quite common (Palakshappa
1978: 66).
Although the younger generation is socialized into the Tibetan culture through their families
and the settlements, their boundaries have become porous through their education and general
exposure to the non-Tibetan world . Their mobility in educational or occupational spheres is far greater
fr their migrant parents . By the virtue of their education and new experiences, they are
than o
intellectually much better equipped to think beyond the confines of Tibetan culture and society. And
often they break the physical isolation of the separate settlements, bringing in new value orientations
from the outside and inducting them into their community. As Palakshappa writes, this new generation
has become Trojan horses ' for the culturally closed community.
Saklaini records changes in Tibetan youth stand on the following issues: religious, cultural 73,95 percent : political - 89.05 percent ; food habits - 96.60 percent and in dress styles - 100 percent
(1984: 326). Such changes become understandable when viewed against the background of youth 's
language skills: 98 percent read and write Tibetan, Hindi and English (Palakshappa 1978: 86). It is
this new generation that under the Dalai Lama 's influence , is projecting democracy, human rights and
environmentalism as constitutive of the new Tibetan identity (Mountcastie 1993) in the global context
of transnational discourse. But as Palakshappa (1978: 80) notes .despite their cosmopolitan outlook,
the new generation retain " a strong attachment to Tibet".
Security Implications
When we discuss the implications of Tibetan refugee presence in South Asian countries to
national and regional security, the task is neither easy nor pleasant . This is so despite our attempt at
dispassionate discussion. For where a few refugee elites were involved in security problems such as
ones in Nepal and Bhutan in the early 1970s, they had done so with the tacit approval and sometimes
even with active participation of concerned South Asian actors and a super power . If this is the case,
then it might be unfair to put the post-facto blame on Tibetan refugees for "creating" security
problems, national or regional when they (refugees) were used to achieve security objectives of
concerned states at that point of time.
The past, secret deployment of Tibetan refugees in security operations by some South Asian
states and the United States questions the neo-realist theory of national security. Such a theory
assumes the permanent and unchanging character of national security, whereas our discussion reveals
the changing direction of threat perceptions . Thus, at one point of time refugee operatives were
viewed as useful instruments of achieving the host government's security objectives; at another (later)
time as security problems. This makes the refugees as victims of changes in the regional, if not in
the international security environment. If also ref
l ects the typical problems of stateless persons:
refugees are basically at the political mercy of the host state, subject to its uses and abuses, as Tibetan
refugee experience in South Asia clearly demonstrates.
Being matters of such a sensitive nature, it is difficult to get access to ofc
ia
il
documents on
the subject. This state of affairs breeds speculation. However, the following case studies are based
on whatever South Asian and Western sources available to me as a critical insider since 1972. Such
adiscussion is necessarily tentative. However, let's look at the specific past cases which might shed
light on the present and future implications of Tibetan refugees to national and regional security in
South Asia.
In Nepal 's Mastang, some Tibetan guerilla bases operated from 1960 to 1974, with intention
of launching attacks across the border against Chinese occupation forces in western Tibet. They were
armed and financed .by me CIA. Subsequent western reports suggested that Washington got
Kathmandu 's approval for the base. This is not unlikely because almost immediately after Washington
achieved detente with Beijing in the early 1970s, Nepal decided to disarm the Khampa guerillas and
dismantle their bases.
In this case Tibetan refugees were primarily used as instruments of US containment policy
which was sold to Tibetan refugees as fighting for their cause, and to Kathmandu as enhancing its
northern security vis-a-vis China. This is clear from the fact that when they outlived American
purpose, the Khampas were disarmed, disposed and dispensed like spent bullets. Common refugees
from Tibet suffered a great deal in me kingdom following Kathmandu 's crackdown on the Khampas.
The Bhutan incident of 1974 is less clear because very little information is available. The
Bhutanese government named only Gyalo Thondup, and not the external power behind the plot . In
any case no common Tibetan refugees were involved in the incident. Bhutanese sources alleged that
there was an external plot to assassinate the then crown prince, in which an unnamed external power
and Gyalo Thondup were involved. In this case too common Tibetan refugees in Bhutan were
scapegoats of the abortive external political intrigues in Thimpu, about which the refugees had no
knowledge. Consequently, many refugees decided to leave decided to leave Bhutan and resettle in
India.
However, it must be admitted that both in Nepal and Bhutan cases, Gyalo Thondup was
involved. Though an elder brother of the Dalai Lama,Thondup is said to have often acted on his
own, Some times even using the Lama's prerogative (Norbu, 1991: 369). His involvement in Nepal
and Bhutan may be cases in point . His influence stems partly from his kinship to the Dalai Lama and
partly from his undeclared profession during the last three decades as the international intelligence
broker Legally, he is not a refugee; he carries a passport from a South Asian state.
/"••
On the whole the vast majority of refugee from Tibet have posed no security problems in
t
South Asia, national or regional . In this sense they differ from Afghan refugees in Pakistan or Sri
Lankan Tamils in India. Common refugees from Tibet tend to mind their business of livelihood which
Ihave triid to describe in this paper .
In a larger political sense, the two cases of security problems mentioned above were
ref
l ections of fluctuations in the international political system, especially the US-China detente of the
early 1970s. And the Khampa base in Mustang was a creature of the cold war, which enhanced
neither Nepal security nor Tibet 's freedom . In the post-cold war era characterized by the global
reduction of tension and the end of anti communists crusades, future possibilities of using Tibetan
refugees in security-related operations by regional or extra-regional actors may be limited . But as
the Tibetan refugees relatively prosper in relation to the poor host populations in South Asian
countries, chances of local politicians manipulating anti-Tibetan sentiments are likely to increase as
evident in the latest incident in Dharamsala (April 1994).
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