2. Market Organisation - SPUTNIC

Transcription

SPUTNIC – Strategies for Public Transport in Cities
2. MARKET ORGANISATION
2.1. Introduction
Throughout the whole SPUTNIC process it has become clear that the PT market is
undergoing big and essential changes. Current mega trends identified by the
SPUTNIC experts at the Budapest plenary meeting are the scarcity of public money
and the increasing liberalisation and privatisation. If PT wants to stand the competition
against individualised transport, there is a need to reconsider the current organisation
of the market and to spend public money in a more cost-efficient way. With the trend
towards tendering services and establishing Public Service Contracts (PSC) between
authorities and PT operators various cost and quality indicators are gaining
importance. Participants of the first SPUTNIC WG meeting agreed that the integration
of PT services and tariff systems among all operators within an urban area is
indispensable in order to fulfil the rising quality expectations of the customers.
For achieving these ambitious goals innovative financing models have to be applied,
cooperation among all actors in the PT market has to be fostered, tariff systems have
to be rebuilt and monitoring and incentive systems have to be established. In this
context the liberalisation and regulation issues play an important role. Therefore a
short overview on the state-of-the-art in liberalisation and regulation is given before
going into the four main topics of market organisation.
2.2. Institutional framework and cooperation
2.2.1.
Developments on EU level 7
15-20 years ago urban PT was usually run by the cities and railways were run by the
state. Rural PT was a mix of regimes and often of poor quality. There were hardly any
international operators, competitive tendering was very rare but this all changed during
the 1990ies. There are now several bus and rail companies operating all over Europe
(even world-wide), this has been made possible through the opening up of the markets
in some but not all MS. The old EU Regulation8 was not considered appropriate for the
new conditions.
The creation of a single open market for all goods and services is a founding principle
of the EU and competition has gradually been introduced in the utilities’ sector. The
main objectives of the European Commission (EC) White Paper on Transport in 20019
are to guarantee safe, efficient and high-quality passenger transport services through
regulated competition and to eliminate disparities between transport undertakings from
different MS which may give rise to substantial distortions of competition.
7
The following chapter is mainly based on the information given by SPUTNIC expert Peter Faross (EC, Directorate
General for Energy and Transport) at the second SPUTNIC WG meeting in Zagreb.
8
Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 of the Council of 26 June 1969 on Action by Member States concerning the
obligations inherent in the concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway
9
White Paper: European transport policy for 2010: time to decide,
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/white_paper/index_en.htm
10
In the preambles to the new Regulation10 the EC points out that studies and
experience from several MS show that regulated competition/tendering leads to more
attractive and innovative services at lower cost. In its first proposal for a new
Regulation the EC therefore wanted to promote, if not prescribe, controlled competition
or competitive tendering.
A new Regulation was proposed in no less than three versions: 2000, 2002 and 2005.
It is highly unusual to have three versions of a legislation proposal and this shows how
controversial the EC’s ambitions were. The reactions to the proposals and the motives
presented showed a serious resistance to changes in the PT sector.
The new Regulation EC 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and
by road has been published in the Official Journal 3 December 2007. The main content
points can be summarised as follows:
•
The Regulation covers all PT by rail and road (local, regional, interregional)
where compensation is paid or exclusive rights are granted. MS may apply this
Regulation to services by inland waterways
•
PSC are mandatory when compensation is paid and/or an exclusive right is
granted
•
The maximum contract length is 10 years for bus and 15 years for rail
contracts. 50% longer periods are permitted in specified cases
•
Authorities may provide services themselves (‘in-house’) or award contracts
directly to a ‘daughter company’. Such in-house or daughter companies are
blocked from taking part in tenders outside their own territory
•
When the authority goes ‘outside’ it must award contracts on the basis of a
competitive tendering. Certain exceptions are granted, rail contracts may
always be awarded directly
•
Greater transparency, clear appeal procedures and public reporting is
demanded
Additionally, the EC will issue an interpretative communication concerning concessions
and other contract matters.
SPUTNIC experts from Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEEC) agreed that the
Regulation could have a particularly dramatic effect in the new MS (as well as in
candidate and aspiring member countries), where PT administration is less evolved
than in the West. In the candidate state Croatia, for example, just three municipalities
have formal contracts with their PT operators;11 the rest operate at the whim of
politicians, with all the financial insecurity that this situation means.
At the second SPUTNIC WG meeting in Zagreb, operators said that the Regulation
could relieve them of the burden of socially motivated but unfunded discounts that
authorities today impose. This can be a serious problem, as passengers with
discounted tickets or passes often make up a huge share of ridership.
10
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on public passenger transport services by rail and by
road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st03/st03623.en07.pdf
11
SPUTNIC expert Branko Mikinac (HR) at the second WG meeting in Zagreb.
11
Reduced transport subsidies are just one possible impact of the new Regulation,
whose main purpose is to increase accountability and transparency in PT services.
HOT TOPIC: How to implement the EU Regulation 1370/2007 in order to trigger
performance and quality in Public Transport?
Throughout Europe, but especially in CEEC with their rocketing car ownership, PT is
threatened to lose market shares. The sector is characterised by traditional structures,
historically grown organisation models and a resistance to change. The new EU
Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger services can and should be the kick-off for
improvements!
In many countries, but particularly in countries in transition, relationships among
different levels of authorities as well as between authorities and operators are often
unclear. There are many discounts imposed by national legislation which are not linked
to financial responsibilities. National legislation must no longer force PT operators to
give discounts to various customer groups without proper compensation. Without clear
and stable relationships operators are prevented from long term business planning.
PSC with clear obligations to both parties (the authority buying the service and the
operator providing it) and transparent compensation rules must therefore be set up.
PSC are the indispensable backbone of efficient and effective market organisation
regardless if contracts are awarded by competitive tendering or not. The same applies
to the compensation requirements of the Regulation's Annex that must be observed in
either case. The final article of the Annex is worth highlighting:
The method of compensation [to the operator; ed.] must promote the maintenance or
development
of
- effective management by the public service operator, which can be the subject of
an
objective
assessment
and
- the provision of passenger transport services of a sufficiently high standard
The PT sector should respond to the requirements set up by lenders such as the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European
Investment Bank (EIB). Money is available for PT improvements but these institutions
justifiably require that the PT sector does something in return such as setting up PSCs,
establishing a long term business plan, introducing cooperation with the private sector
or improving performance in other ways.
2.2.2.
Relevant national and regional regulations
The regulatory framework determines the way in which transport services are
designed, planned and produced. The definition of transparent rules for the allocation
of responsibilities and sharing of risks between different agents of the system is thus
an indispensable tool for the management of PT.
Regulation on PT usually covers organisation (responsibilities), steering (planning) and
financing of PT on the different administrative levels (national, regional, local).
Obviously the competencies of the different levels should be in line with their
12
responsibilities stated by the law. For instance, if the national authority has the right to
impose concessionary fares, it should also be the national authority’s responsibility to
finance it. In all cases where competence and responsibility do not coincide, incentives
are likely to be a problem.
The degree of detailed legislation varies widely.12 In countries where deregulation of
PT is advanced (notably the UK), the governing legislation is less strict and rigid,
prescribing merely minimum standards and setting strategic rules. In other countries
with quite strong regulations (e.g. Switzerland), the laws (on different administrative
levels) regulate a variety of issues including:13
•
The responsibility of public authorities to provide (and finance!) PT (as general
public service)
•
The right of initiative (who can enter the market)
•
The process of contracting PT services
•
Conditions of tendering
•
Compensation mechanisms, e.g. for losses due to government imposed tariffs
•
Division of responsibilities among different administrative levels
Other issues are rather seldom regulated, as the discussion among the experts of the
second SPUTNIC WG meeting revealed:
•
The minimum amount of PT to be provided
•
The integration and coordination of interregional, regional and local PT and of
different modes
•
The possibility of authorities to additionally finance PT supporting measures
(e.g. bus lanes)
Across Europe, the right to operate urban PT in larger cities has traditionally been a
municipal function. Local authorities’ influence over public rail transport however is
significantly lower than over road transport. In many countries there is a striking lack of
regionally co-ordinated PT which is partly due to the absence of a regional level
authority with adequate legal and financial powers. In Bulgaria for instance the regional
entities have no legal power: there are only national and municipal laws – and different
ones for road and rail transport.14
In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the withdrawal of the central government from
local PT organisation left a financial and organisational vacuum that is now slowly filled
by new forms of regional and local organisations. Due to this process of change the
division of tasks, responsibilities and risks between the different authorities and
operators are often unclear. This leads to a market environment where efficient
production of services is quite unlikely. The problem of unclear task assignment and
missing leadership goes hand in hand with unstable and unclear regulatory framework
conditions that form a difficult environment for entrepreneurial behaviour and hinder
development. The lack of clear and binding laws and obligations allows politics to
12
See the LEDA project (Legal and Regulatory Measures for Sustainable Transport in Cities) that screened
legislation in all EU MS, 5 CEE countries, Norway and Switzerland (www.leda.ils.nrw.de)
13
Information given by SPUTNIC partner Dieter Egger (Rapp Trans) presented at the Second WG meeting
14
SPUTNIC expert Metodi Avramov (BG) at the second WG meeting
13
erratically interfere into the market which is – especially before election period – done
quite often as PT makes a very popular topic in local politics. As several SPUTNIC
experts from CEEC pointed out, it is a typical and widespread practice in pre-election
periods to grant fare reductions to certain groups of the population (=voters) which
creates a gap in the operators revenues that is not covered by the government’s PT
budget.
Having recognised these unfavourable legal framework conditions a number of new
MS are about to revise their legislation on PT – and those who did not so far will be
forced to by the EU regulation. The Czech Ministry of Transport is preparing a
proposal for a new national legislation on PT, in Latvia a new PT Act will enter into
force on 1 January 2008.15
Also in Western Europe regulations and organisation models of PT have been
changing over the last decade. However, SPUTNIC experts from Germany, France
and Sweden make clear that the development in the old MS is mainly driven by the
political and even more financial pressure to (more or less) liberalise the market by
introducing some form of competition. The development paths chosen by different
countries and different cities vary widely and in many countries it is an open debate
which organisation model is the key to fulfil both legal and economical requirements. In
other words, a form of organisation that is conform to law, provides the necessary
quality and amount of PT services at the least possible cost, gives leeway for
entrepreneurial behaviour and maximises customer orientation.
2.2.3.
Institutional set-up on regional / local level
The physical enlargement of the urban mobility scope and the split of PT tasks and
responsibilities (owing to the liberalisation of the PT market) are trends that are also
influencing the collaboration forms between authorities. For instance in the case of
Barcelona a strategic Transport Authority integrates all tactical aspects of PT for the
whole metropolitan PT network (information, ticketing and planning of PT services).16
According to SPUTNIC expert Zdenek Dosek (CZ) a similar approach has been
followed in Prague where ROPID17 is responsible for a common information and fare
system for the whole metropolitan area. With the implementation of ROPID as Public
Transport Authority (PTA) the Prague region has been able to break up the geographic
limits despite the traditional set-up of non-integrated services between the city area,
railway services and regional PT. Usually such a PTA becomes the PT ‘operator’ vis-àvis the public as it defines the common tariff, image, branding, visual identity etc.,
although the PTA itself might not operate a single bus or tram.
Experiences from SPUTNIC experts showed that besides this reallocation of
competencies a closer collaboration with related sectors such as land-use or road
authorities is needed. In ultimate consequence a Public Planning Authority is
responsible for not only PT but also for other transport and traffic matters within a city
or region such as parking policy and surveillance, bus lanes and priorities, traffic
calming, congestion charging, interactions with road users, cyclists and pedestrians
etc. In this, so far rare model, the authority produces an integrated plan including
urban and regional planning, transport planning for individual traffic and PT planning.
15
SPUTNIC experts Zdenek Dosek (CZ) and Rudite Revelina (LV) at the second WG meeting
VOYAGER, D3
17
Regionální organizátor Pražské integrované dopravy
16
14
Cooperation between neighbouring authorities must also be remembered. Old political
boundaries often determine boundaries between authorities and these may not reflect
today’s mobility patterns.
The form of cooperation between operators and authorities is largely dependent on the
relationship between the two entities. In the decreasing number of cases where
authorities are directly involved in the operational services, cooperation is an in-house
issue (e.g. in Zagreb, Croatia). Discussions among experts at the second WG meeting
however showed that in many cases, the (formerly state owned) operator is brought
under private law and the tactical part of production is split from the operational level.
The tactical level (e.g. the network design which constitutes a major success factor of
the overall PT service) is very often allocated to the authority or to an intermediate
organising entity (e.g. Riga, Brno, Warsaw, Sofia). However, the operator is closer to
the customer and therefore positioned best within the PT system to propose effective
and efficient adjustment to the service. The process of the development of new
services must therefore be based on a continuous dialogue between operators and
authorities, as it is e.g. the case in Germany or Switzerland. In Zurich for example the
traffic union “Zürcher Verkehrsverbund” (ZVV) assumes all tactical responsibilities of
PT in close collaboration with the 8 main operators of the whole region (the so-called
‘market responsible operators’). Although the ZVV is fully responsible for the tactical
level, the division of work between ZVV and operator is under constant development
and has been changed several times over the last decade. Whereas in former times
most of the tasks have been done in-house by the ZVV, currently a so called leadhouse-concept has been adopted where different tactical tasks of the ZVV are
outsourced to one operator each which fulfils the task (as ‘lead-house’) for all
operators of the region.18
Case box: the reorganisation of public transport Innsbruck19
The Innsbrucker Verkehrsbetriebe (IVB) was a local transport company owned by the
City of Innsbruck. The IVB got increasingly under pressure because of low productivity,
high personnel costs and thus growing deficits. The expected new EU regulation and
the growing competition in PT were the trigger to finally reorganise the local PT market
in 2000. The two tasks of ordering and providing PT services were clearly separated
between an ordering authority and an operating company. The former IVB became the
ordering authority and PT coordinator on behalf of the city with the following new
responsibilities: ordering of transport services, coordination of timetables and tariffs,
financing of PT based on PSC, marketing/public relations and monitoring of transport
quality. For operation of transport services a new, municipal transport company
independent from the IVB, the Inn Bus GmbH (IB) was founded. IB assumes the bus
operation, is paid by IVB according to their contract and works competitive.
2.3. Integration
In many countries PT networks and services did not adapt sufficiently to the urban
sprawl, resulting in declining market shares in semi-urban transport. Commuting
covers progressively longer distances, leisure and shopping activities are more spread
18
Interview with ZVV head of economics Yves Gaillard (led by SPUTNIC partner Dieter Egger)
based on: Christoph Schaaffkamp / Martin Baltes: Auf dem Weg in den Wettbewerb – Restrukturierung der
Innsbrucker Verkehrsbetriebe. In: Der Nahverkehr, Heft 4/2000, p. 21 ff.
19
15
out; therefore PT’s geographical set-up must match customers’ current needs and not
political borders of yesterday.
PT companies in an area or in a country are often operated independently with their
own responsibility for the ‘basic conditions’, such as routes, timetables and fares. This
model makes collaboration and integration of services and tariff systems and PT on
the whole very difficult. As a consequence, the different modes of PT are often not
used according to their strengths and advantages. There is little integration between
local and regional (and national) transport network, timetables, tariffs and services.
Traditionally everything to do with railways has been a state or central government
matter (except for metros and some suburban railways) whereas urban PT (bus,
tramway, subway) is organised and controlled by the local authorities which leads to
disintegration of the two systems.
This generalisation is primarily relevant for the countries in transition but similar
conditions certainly exist in mature economies as well. According to the SPUTNIC
experts from CEEC exceptions in the new MS are limited to few examples such as
ROPID in Prague, KORDIS JMK20 in Brno, KODIS21 in Ostrava (all Czech Republic),
Katowice/Poland and Budapest/Hungary.22
The experts from Brno, Kvetoslav Havlik and from Helsinki Timo Korsisaari both
pointed out that there are problems in interchange and timetable coordination between
several operators. Furthermore bad infrastructure causes capacity and timetable
bottlenecks which also is not helpful for a better PT integration.
Case box: KORDIS JMK (Brno, CZ) 23
All the existing transport modes in the large part of the Southern Moravia Region as
well as in its capital City of Brno are connected in the Integrated Public Transport
System of the Southern Moravia Region (abbr. IDS JMK). Under the same conditions
one can travel in local trains, regional busses, public city transport of Brno (trams,
busses, trolleybuses) and city transports in some smaller cities. In all these lines
passengers use the same tickets and pay the same prices for the same journey.
KORDIS JMK as the specific body – PT authority – was established by the Southern
Moravia Region (51%) and The City of Brno (49%) as a coordinator of the IDS JMK in
2002.
The difference to other integrated PT systems in the Czech Republic, e.g. Prague and
Ostrava is that KORDIS JMK not only was set up by one city (municipality) but even by
a whole region. This is very important for a successful PT integration because people
do not only ride inside a city boundary. The trips they make for labour and leisure
reasons mostly cover the city and regional areas.
The main objectives of KORDIS JMK and the IDS JMK are:
20
Koordinátora integrovaného dopravního systému Jihomoravského kraje
Koordinátor Ostravského dopravního integrovaného systému
22
Integrated public transport services in Budapest: first stage successful, Heves, Gabor, 2007, ELTIS (European
Local Transport Information Service), http://www.eltis.org/study_sheet.phtml?study_id=1543&mainID=458
23
Information provided by SPUTNIC expert Kvetoslav Havlik (CZ)
21
16
• Economical optimisation
• Integration of all PT modes
• Increasing the amount of users via the systematic offer of PT
• Introducing one single tariff system, transport conditions and information
Within IDS JMK timetables, network, tariff and services are fully integrated. The
network is organised in a hierarchic way: Railway and trams are the backbones of the
system, whereas buses mostly serve as feeder lines.
Equal interval timetable facilitates customer understanding. Timetables are made by
KORDIS JMK which also sets quality standards for their operators. The tariff system is
based on fare zones. Tickets have zone and time validity. All single and prepaid
seasonal tickets are valid on all transport modes within the IDS JMK area. Prepaid
tickets are strongly promoted by a 20% reduction compared to single tickets.
As a result of the systematic approach a high increase of passengers has been
achieved. In the first year after the integration the amount of passengers in Brno’s
surroundings increased by 18% and by another 7% the year after. The introduction of
IDS JMK stopped the declining trends of the local train passengers. After the
integration the amount of train passengers has been steadily growing.
KORDIS JMK is a forerunner for PT integration in CEEC. The experts in the first WG
meeting in Barcelona state that in most other CEEC PT integration is still low or
inexistent.
For example in Belgrade (Serbia) PT integration is still at a low level. Tariffs are
integrated on an urban and suburban level; however the state railway is not included.
In Belgrade, the directorate (part of the city administration that will soon become a
legal entity on its own) defines network and timetables; it awards public service
contracts (PSC) and tenders the services every 4 years.
In Zagreb (Croatia) PT integration is at a low level too. In the surroundings each
operator has its own tariff and customers need several tickets. In the City of Zagreb
itself there is an integrated tariff with Croatia Railways which are compensated for the
acceptance of the “urban PT tickets” by Zagreb municipality. In the regions passengers
can travel with several operators using only one ticket; however, the price of this ticket
simply equals the sum of the various part-journey tickets making it very expensive and
unattractive. In Zagreb region some form of integration is planned to be established
within the next three years; it is expected that the other regions then will follow the
Zagreb pilot.
In Warsaw (Poland) too PT integration is not very advanced. In Poland there are two
progressive regions with respect to PT integration: the region around Gdansk and
Gdynia, and Southern Silesia. In Warsaw the main barriers to PT integration are the
different responsibilities and the disperse management. Long distance trains are
administered by the state, regional trains by the regional administration and local
trains/metro by the municipality. Only the publicly operated buses, metro and trams
within the city of Warsaw have common tickets. Railway is not integrated.
17
Integration of PT is almost inexistent in the city of Riga (Latvia) where 70% of the
Latvian economy is concentrated. The city’s PT system is characterised by diverse
ownership and tariff systems. Railways are owned by the state, trams and trolleys are
owned by the municipality, buses are owned by a public operator and minibuses are
run by private operators. The applied fare reductions (e.g. for disabled people) also
differ with ownership – just as the level of subsidies. All this makes integration very
difficult. The integration of tram/trolley into the bus network has been discussed for
over two years, but without success.
SPUTNIC experts at the second WG meeting agreed that the integration of PT is the
crucial linchpin for its improvement and optimisation to attract more customers and
advance the modal split for the benefit of PT. Integration in PT covers different fields
such as:
•
Network and timetable integration
•
Tariff and fare integration
•
Service integration between different operators (e.g. PT information,
information systems, complaint management, ticket distribution)
•
Further integration between operators and third parties (e.g. integration of PT
with mobility services, integration of PT with transport planning, integration of
PT with town planning)
Complete PT integration could be summarised in this way: “One network, one
timetable, one ticket, one fare.”
2.3.1.
Network and timetable integration 24
Basis for the network integration is a general PT planning which includes all PT
transport modes in a respective area (conurbation or also wider area). When
integrating a network every mode should be used according to its strengths and
advantages, i.e.:
•
Light rail/ tramway/subway
to move high numbers of passengers within
conurbations
•
Regional railway
for speedy regional connections
•
Bus services
for area services to feed rail bound services
•
Ferry services
addition of public
circumstances
services
under
specific
By integrating a network it is possible to reduce parallel services and to connect
several transport modes at interchanges with each other. Interchanges enable tariff
and fare integration. They have to assure short, comfortable ways for passengers
without barriers and timetable integration. The reduction of parallel services between
different transport modes (e.g. railway and bus as the classic example) allows a more
economic provision of PT. The savings can be used for financing additional services –
for example for new lines or a higher frequency on existing lines.
24
The following chapter is mainly based on the information given by SPUTNIC partner Lutz Auerbach (VVO) at the
second SPUTNIC WG meeting in Zagreb and the corresponding discussions among the participants
18
For instance in the area of the PTA Verkehrsverbund Oberelbe (VVO) in Germany,
there exists a General PT Plan which covers the metropolitan area of Dresden as well
as the wider surrounding region (rural districts). This plan is the basis for all further
urban and regional PT planning and basically contains:
•
The integrated organisation and definition of PT
•
The definition of the desired PT service levels
•
The efficient adjustment of all transport modes
•
The setting of general quality standards for the whole PT
•
The requirements for PT financing
The following picture shows the VVO railway network plan including important tram
lines. The coloured globes represents the interchanges already completed or actually
in construction.
Picture 1: VVO railway network plan
Timetable integration goes hand in hand with network integration. To realise full
network integration a co-ordinated timetable for all transport modes in the concerned
area is essential. The timetables of all operators have to be harmonised and tuned.
For example the light rail lines could be the backbone of the system and all other PT
lines have to feed it. The timetable system has to have predefined changing times at
main interchanges to ensure the connections between the PT services.
19
The experiences from Brno (KORDIS JMK) and VVO show that in integrated networks
the different travel modes are used according to their individual strengths and
weaknesses (railway/subway as backbone, bus/tram as feeder lines). Such a system
relies on smooth interchanges and connected departures (usually combined with an
equal interval timetable). Possible benefits include more reliability, less travel time,
more efficiency (cost reduction avoiding parallel lines and network optimisation), higher
demand and revenue increase. Network and timetable integration requires a central
and coordinated PT planning.
2.3.2.
Tariff integration
25
Tariff and fare integration as part PT integration is essential for the customer’s use of
the PT system. In order to reduce the access barriers to PT the customer must be able
to use one ticket inside of a transparent and easy tariff and fare system. According to
the SPUTNIC experts in the first WG meeting it is still very common that a ticket or
pass is valid for local travel from A to B by metro, tram and bus but not on the railway
(e.g. Warsaw or Krakow, see case box below). There are even cities where you have
different tariffs for different operators providing the same service on the same routes
within the same area (e.g. Belgrade) or where tariff agreements do not exist at all (e.g.
Osijek/Croatia).26
Case box: Integrated ticketing and tariffs in Krakow (Poland) 27
Integrated ticketing and tariffs are only available within the city area. There is no
integrated ticketing between railway and other transport modes available. Within the
CIVITAS measure the city of Krakow will perform a pilot of an integrated ticketing and
tariff solution between the local PT and the national railway on the corridor
Krzeszowice-Krakow. With the integrated ticketing and tariff solution an increase of PT
use by 10% on the corridor Krzeszowice-Krakow is expected.
Analysis of gained effect from examined indicators shows that integrated tariffs and
ticketing in Krakow agglomeration will ease passengers’ use of PT. It is expected that
comparing results obtained from indicators describing the situation before/after
implementation will show that the transport system in Krakow agglomeration will visibly
improve.
We can differentiate different levels of tariff integration (from low level to high level):
•
Mutual acceptance of tickets between operators on the same route
•
Mutual acceptance of tickets between operators within the same network
•
Tariff unions
•
Transportation associations
25
The following chapter is mainly based on the information given by SPUTNIC partner Martin Ruesch (Rapp
Trans) and SPUTNIC expert Ernst Wittmer (CH) at the first SPUTNIC WG meeting in Sitges/Spain and the
corresponding discussions among the participants
26
SPUTNIC experts Wladimir Depolo (RS) and Branko Mikinac (HR) at the first WG meeting
27
http://www.civitas-initiative.org/measure_sheet.phtml?lan=en&id=374
20
Mutual acceptance of tickets between operators on the same route
Mutual acceptance of tickets between operators on the same routes is often a first
pragmatic step towards tariff integration. It allows the passenger to use different
operators on the same route with one ticket, even if the tariffs of the operators are not
identical. Such solutions often exist in smaller conurbations and/or among a limited
number of operators (e.g. Bratislava, Warsaw, Riga, Helsinki). The approach is simple
and does not need a complex organisation and procedures. The problem with this
solution is that it is difficult to distribute the revenues when the revenues are not
balanced due to different ticket distribution concepts and/or tariffs. Often, there is also
no harmonised tariff leaving the customer with paying different prices for the same
origin destination trip.
Mutual acceptance of tickets between operators within the same network
Mutual acceptance of tickets between operators within the same network is an
extension of the solution described above from routes to networks. It allows the
passenger to use different operators within a network with one ticket, even if the tariffs
of the operators are not identical. Such solutions exist often in smaller conurbations
and/or a limited number of operators (e.g. Chur/Switzerland, Warsaw, Belgrade). The
approach is simple and does not need a complex organisation. However, the
described problems of revenue distribution and different prices for the same trip
persist.
Tariff unions
A further step in the direction of tariff harmonisation is the establishment of tariff
unions. Operators (together with the authorities) agree on a joint and harmonised tariff
within an area or region. Operators are still independent with their own authorised
basic conditions (except for tariff) but they have formed a tariff union to provide
ticketing for single tickets or season tickets valid for several companies and routes.
Unfortunately, railway services often are not included in tariff unions; although there
are successful cases where the railway transport is integrated (tariff unions in
Germany and Switzerland, such as the Ostwind tariff union in Switzerland presented
by SPUTNIC expert Ernst Wittmer at the first WG meeting). In various countries the
tariff unions have been implemented in two steps: in a first step only the seasonal and
monthly tickets have been integrated (pass tariff union), in a second step also single
and multi-trip tickets (incl. day passes) have been integrated (integral tariff union).
Main reason for the two step approach was the harmonisation need and costs for a
common distribution system for single and multi-trip tickets. The approach needs an
organisational structure and agreements between the involved parties (usually
transport operator, authorities) to deal with the tactical and operational tasks in the
field of tariffs. Tariff integration does not necessarily need an organising authority. Also
pure operators’ associations can implement integrated tariff and fare systems. Tariff
unions are often lean organisations to harmonise fares and tariffs in an efficient way.
Tariff unions have usually no – or very limited – own staff. Tariff unions are to be found
often in smaller and medium sized conurbations (e.g. in Western Europe).
21
Dec‘08
SCHAFFHAUSEN
TNW
BS/BL/AG/SO
Dec‘08
OLTEN/
AARGAU
ZVV
ZÜRICH
JURA
Dec‘08
BERN/
SOLOTHURN
NEUCHATEL
BIEL
ST. GALLEN/ THURGAU/ BEIDE APPENZELL
ZUG
open
SCHWYZ
DAVOS
LUZERN/ OB& NIDWALDEN
Dec‘08
LAUSANNE
FRIBOURG
Berner Oberland
OBERENGADIN
Dec 07
GENEVE
TICINO
Dec‘08
Tariff union for all tickets
Tariff union for all tickets (planned)
Tariff union for passes
Transportation association
Picture 2: tariff unions and transportation associations in Switzerland
Depending on the tariff policy and the design of tariff zones, tariff unions can induce
additional costs such as check-through losses28 and harmonisation losses.29 These
costs arising with the implementation of an integrated tariff system have to be covered
initially by the financing authority. In some countries the obligation to reimburse such
costs is implemented in national and regional legislation (e.g. Germany). Later on, the
check-through and harmonisation losses should trail away by higher revenues for the
operators due to passenger growth thanks to the more customer oriented tariff system
and adjustments of the tariff system to earn more revenues (e.g. higher fares, change
in ticket assortment). The abolition of the described losses is crucial for the long-term
acceptance of the integrated tariff and fare system on the political side as well as on
the operator side.
Transportation associations
A last step is to set up an organising authority or transportation association, which is
also responsible for the marketing, strategy, network and timetable integration. Compared to tariff associations it has usually its own organisational unit with own staff.
28
Prior to the implementation of the integrated tariff system the customer travelling first by railway and after this by
bus needed two different tickets. Now he can use both transport modes with one ticket. This single ticket is cheaper
than using the two tickets before. This means less revenue for the operators.
29
Prior to the implementation of the integrated tariff system the customer had to pay for every kilometre of his
journey. Now he only has to pay for the number of price steps or fare zones he is passing through. So there might be
fewer revenues for the operator related to their old own tariff. Prior to the implementation of the new tariff system an
operator could impose a higher price level than others. He also loses revenues because of the new harmonised tariff.
22
Relating to tariff harmonisation these solutions are not different from tariff unions, but
additionally their focus is extended to strategic extension of PT, network integration
and promotion of PT. Transportation associations are widespread in Western
European countries (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, etc.). However,
apart from a very few examples in the Czech Republic (Prague, Brno, Ostrava),
Poland (Katowice) and Hungary (Budapest) tariff unions or integrated tariff systems do
hardly exist in the new MS or are at a very infant stage which weakens the competitive
position of PT and makes it a less viable alternative to the car. In many cases the
necessary know-how to set up tariff or traffic associations is missing.
Case box: the Verkehrsverbund Oberelbe (VVO, Germany) 30
The basic philosophy of the VVO tariff system consists of the idea that it must be
simple to understand for the customer and easy to handle for the operators. For that
reason VVO (organising authority) has chosen a type of tariff called fare-zone tariff
(Flächenzonen-Tarif). Unlike the honeycomb tariff or the kilometre tariff it does not
depend on the exact number of kilometres of a customer’s ride. The price and the
validation depend on the number of fare zones the passenger is crossing and on the
spent travel time. Tickets are valid on all transport modes in the VVO area such as
local and regional bus routes, tram lines, rapid mass transport lines and short distance
railway lines. The VVO tariff system consists of 21 fare zones generally defined by the
boundaries of the cities and rural districts. A fare zone in the VVO area has generally a
size of approximately 200 square kilometres.
The basic characteristics of this tariff system are
•
Large tariff/fare zones
•
Standardised ticket assortment
•
Uniform tariff regulations and
•
Distance to every central town is not longer than two fare zones
in order to provide
30
Information provided by SPUTNIC partner Lutz Auerbach (DE)
23
•
Transparency and ease
•
Customer orientation
•
Easy handling for operators
Requirements and other important aspects
Before the integrated tariff system is ready for implementation a number of facts and
aspects are to be taken into consideration. On the one hand the tariff should be easy,
transparent and reasonable priced for the customers; on the other hand the tariff
should ensure adequate revenues for the operators, i.e. at least the revenues prior to
implementation. The calculations to find this balance are quite complicated.
Especially SPUTNIC experts from the new MS pointed out that tariff harmonisation will
only be successful if levels of service quality are harmonised as well (operator with old
fleet at low prices and operator with new vehicles at higher prices operating within the
same network).
The implementation of an integrated tariff system in a region is not a cheap project.
The price level adaptation of the integrated tariff system compared to the former
several price levels induces costs – ‘check-through losses’ as well as ‘harmonisation
losses’. Other costs include expenditures needed for planning, sales and marketing.
Especially in the Western European countries (e.g. Germany) there is a strong trend to
increase the revenues of the users by differentiated tariff measures and
optimisations31. Tariffs may be differentiated according to type of service
(express/local) or peak/off peak. This includes also the cutback or reduction of socially
motivated tariffs. In regions with a strong modal shift policy the tariffs of monthly and
annual passes are usually subsidised.
Even without tariff integration measures, the existing fare systems in cities, regions
and countries undergoing rapid economic development still offer a high potential for
increasing revenues. Often the range of ticket types and their prices are not enough
tailored to the needs and demand of different clusters of customers. By focusing on
different target groups their different willingness to pay can be creamed off resulting in
higher revenues. However, SPUTNIC experts also reported that plans to increase fare
levels or to cut back reduced fares for preferential passes often face strong political
opposition.
The discussed practices on tariff integration show that the consequent introduction of
one ticket for all modes, operators and lines within an area can substantially increase
PT demand and revenues. Depending on the framework conditions the tariff
integration can be reached in two steps (1. step: passes, 2. step: single and multitrip
tickets). Sometimes it comes at a cost (harmonisation losses, coordination cost) which
however might be offset by higher revenues.
Revenue Distribution
As the customer buys the same ticket independent of which operator’s services he
uses, tariff and transportation associations often face the challenge of a fair distribution
31
Nutzerfinanzierte Tarifstrategien, VDV (Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen), 2005
24
of the total revenues to each single operator. In some European countries (e.g.
Netherlands, Switzerland, Scandinavia) demand related distribution schemes
considering passenger-kilometres and also number of trips have been successfully
established and are accepted.
Policies and objectives for tariff systems
A tariff policy usually pursues different objectives and it is sometimes even difficult to
state which is the main one. As the different objectives can be contradicting, there is
usually a trade-off between competing policies such as revenue maximisation and
social goals. According to a survey among the experts participating at the first WG
meeting main objectives of tariff policies include:
•
Harmonisation of different tariffs within an area
•
Maximisation of revenues (cost coverage)
•
Provision of basic mobility for all citizens
•
Provision of cheap mobility for certain user groups (e.g. students, elderly
people)
•
Improvement of modal split (minimise negative impacts of individual traffic)
The survey revealed that Western European countries rather focus on basic mobility
provision and ecological objectives (modal split) whereas in many new MS social
aspects such as the provision of cheap mobility are ranked quite high on the political
agenda, higher than maximisation of revenues or improvement of modal split for
instance.
Roles in setting tariffs and planning tariff measures
There is no optimal model for assigning the competencies with respect to tariff
decisions. Empiric evidence shows a certain degree of correlation between the type of
model practised and the competition in the PT sector. Different types of competition
can be distinguished (see figure 1 below):
•
Free competition: transport operators offer competitive services, tariffs are
defined only by operators
•
Regulated competition: common decision making relating tariffs and fares
•
Almost no competition: government monopoly, tariffs decisions at municipality/
government
Whichever model is chosen, it seems important that those who have the power to set
the fares are also liable for the consequences. In other words, if the authority has an
influence on tariffs, there is also the question of compensation if the tariffs do not cover
the costs (sometimes covered in national regulations).
Discussion at the first SPUTNIC WG meeting concluded that concession systems and
regulated competition seem to favour tariff and fare integration (e.g. Switzerland,
Germany) whereas completely deregulated competition does hinder any kind of tariff
and fare integration (e.g. in the UK).
25
mpetition seems to favour tariff and fare integration (e.g. Switzerland, Germany)
whereas completely deregulated competition does hinder any kind of tariff and fare
integration (e.g. in the UK).
division of tariff responsibility
tariff competencies
only at municipality
level
common competencies
of municipality and
transport operators
transport operators
define tariffs for
their own
public transport operator
municipality
extent of participation in tariff decisions
almost no competition
regulated competition
free competition
Figure 1: correlation of competition and tariff responsibilities
2.3.3.
Services integration
Service integration is another column of the PT integration and is attached to the kinds
of integration mentioned above. Service integration is important for the customer
satisfaction and includes things like overall passenger information, overall complaint
management, overall ticketing system etc. However, according to the SPUTNIC
experts from new MS services have not yet been perceived as part of PT integration
within CEEC.
In Western Europe, cooperation, acquisitions and mergers among operators are
getting more common. Successful cooperation is not only motivated by economies of
scale but also by economies of scope. As operators of the same urban area realise
that their common competitor is the car, they are increasingly interested in integrating
PT services and schedules as well as in sharing facilities such as customer call
centres. A further step is the integration of additional tactical services like ticketing or
sharing of customer data. For example within the Bus Ostschweiz holding company in
Switzerland a single management company provides all tactical and management
services for different operating companies.32 The mother company has also formed a
strategic alliance with the local railway service provider THURBO33 who operates the
common customer call centre. Finally a merger of the different operators is possible.
This can be a complete merger of the companies or an exchange of PT services and a
complete reform of the organisation of the PT network. Although the development of
integrated systems within a competitive market is a particular challenge as antimonopoly and fair trading laws actually forbid cooperation of competing private sector
operators, it can also be observed that liberalisation and competition in fact trigger the
32
33
SPUTNIC expert Ernst Wittmer at the first WG meeting
http://www.thurbo.ch
26
concentration of the PT market, as large companies operating internationally have
appeared in the market.
Case box: RESPLUS in Sweden 34
As described above regional integration of PT has already been achieved in many MS
and in Switzerland. Integration of regional and long-distance is more difficult; there are
for instance more actors involved with more diverse and complicated fare systems.
One example is the Swedish RESPLUS system.35
RESPLUS and its later development Resrobot is the customer interface; the
organisation behind it is Samtrafiken, a company founded on a voluntary basis in
1993. It is owned by train operators, shipping companies, inter-city bus operators and
all Swedish regional PT authorities. Samtrafiken has realised that almost all journeys
require a change or a connection and this must be accomplished in a simple and
secure manner. Therefore
•
Information about the complete journey, including connections, must be available
in one place
•
Timetables should be as co-ordinated as possible to make connection times
reasonable. Terminals and interchanges should be designed for easy use
•
It must be possible to purchase the complete journey with various modes of
transport in a single operation
The operators must collaborate so that connections are guaranteed within reason. If
connecting services cannot wait, passengers shall be offered alternative solutions. The
most important elements are:
•
Resrobot36, a system of coordinated tariffs and tickets that connects over 50.000
locations in Sweden. Searching can also be map-based.
•
Samtrafikplanen, a common plan for all train and bus traffic with rules concerning
minimum connection time, waiting times, and collaboration for 120 locations
where inter-city trains and regional transport connect
An example of a journey 14 may 2008 from Saltsjöbaden in the Stockholm suburbs to
Falsterbo in the extreme south-western Sweden is shown below. This 7-hour-journey
involves local train, metro, long-distance train and regional bus. The minimum
connection times according to Samtrafikplanen are taken into account. However, there
is no price information. All long-distance operators (rail and air) now apply yield
management where the price may change any minute according to demand and
supply. The actual booking and reservation is therefore not made through Resrobot
but through the rail operators’ websites.37
34
information provided by SPUTNIC partner Bertil Hylen (SE)
http://www.resplus.se/default.asp?language=2; similar schemes exists in Switzerland
(http://fahrplan.sbb.ch/bin/query.exe/en?) and Denmark (www.rejseplanen.dk); the EU-SPIRIT project aims at a
Europe-wide system http://euspirit.vbb-fahrinfo.de/hafas/query.exe/dn?switchEuspirit=yes
36
http://www.resrobot.se/pages/ChangeLanguage.action?lang_cd=en
37
www.sj.se or www.bokatag.se
35
27
07:28 - 14:10 travel time: 06:42 , changes: 3 Map Print|SMS|e-mail
Dep.timeFrom
Saltsjöbaden
07:28
station
07:57
Slussen
T-bana
Arr.time
Towards
07:50
Slussen T-bana Local train SL 25
Slussen T-bana
08:01
T-Centralen
T-bana
Underground SL 13
Ropsten T-bana
X 2000 SJ 525
Malmö Centralstation
Regional bus
Skånetrafiken 100
Falsterbo Strandbad
T-Centralen
T-bana
08:20
Stockholm
Centralstation 12:46
13:11
Malmö
Centralstation 14:10
2.3.4.
Transport
Stockholm
Centralstation
Malmö
Centralstation
Falsterbo
Strandbad
Other integration fields
With increasing market pressure strategic cooperation between operators and third
parties such as suppliers or facilitators becomes more important. The relationship
between operator and manufacturer has become more intensive, due to tools like
leasing and the hand-over of maintenance, but also more formalised due to the
widespread introduction of tendering for infrastructure and rolling stock. By outsourcing
of PT activities new third parties will be created who might have different conflicting
interests that hinder seamless and integrated traffic. For example in Belgium a
publicity company that is taking care of the bus stops is more interested in selling
advertisement space than providing a safe and comfortable waiting area for the
passengers.38 Other forms of vertical cooperation exist between PT operators and
other mobility service providers such as car sharing and bike hire (see case box).
Case box: PT and car sharing in Switzerland 39
The car sharing company “Mobility” in Switzerland has launched common services
with several PT operators.
Holders of a season ticket of the Swiss federal railways or the Zurich transportation
association get their annual membership for the car sharing company with a 30-50%
discount which offers them access to 2.000 vehicles, many of them located at over 300
railway stations. For sporadic customers there is also an offer called “click&drive”40 that
does not even require membership.
By collaborating with other mobility service providers such as car sharing companies
or taxi services PT can overcome its disadvantage of fixed routes and timetables and
offer a real and seamless door-to-door transport chain.
38
SPUTNIC partner Sebastian Emig (UITP)
Information provided by SPUTNIC partner Dieter Egger (Rapp Trans)
40
see www.mobility.ch
39
28
Cooperation with green energy and public health agencies can underline the
sustainable image of PT and the promotion of physical activity. Some Swedish rail
operators use only wind- or hydro produced electric power; this is used as a Public
Relations tool together with information about how little energy per passenger-km rail
transport needs.41 The cooperation of the PT operators in Zurich and Berne (VBZ,
Bernmobil) with two private health service providers and a public health agency
(Gesundheitsförderung Schweiz) resulted in a series of health exercises that can be
performed while waiting at the bus/tram stop.42
Another approach in the same direction is a demonstration within the GOAL Project
(funded within the EC-LIFE Programme) “Fit on the way – become fit at the pit-stop“.43
In order to distract passengers from focusing on waiting times at bus/tram stops and
during their journey, passengers were offered exercises that could be undertaken at
the bus/tram stops and in the vehicles (and subsequently at home or at their place of
work). These exercises were designed to help people relax and minimise stress. The
exercises were designed so they could be performed yet remain undetected by other
passengers.
The exercises were as follows:
•
Strengthening exercises while
standing and sitting
•
Balancing exercises while standing
and sitting
•
Relaxation exercises / breathing
exercises
•
Acupressure exercises
Picture 3: campaign “Fit on the way – become fit at the pit-stop“
Finally the collaboration with PT facilitators such as tourism industry can open up new
perspectives. For example in the tourist region Engadin in Switzerland the
collaboration between the local operators, the hotel industry and the mountain
cableways has not only lead to new sources of revenues (by including a certain PT tax
in the hotel price of each overnight stay) but also resulted in commonly developed allinclusive-products, in a common understanding among the different actors and in a
concerted marketing of PT services and of the whole region as environmentally sound
and PT friendly.44
To summarise, the experts in the first WG meeting concluded:
1. Integration reduces the entry barrier for using PT and increases demand and
revenues. The main challenges are the integration of tariffs and the setting up of a
41
SPUTNIC partner Bertil Hylen (SE)
SPUTNIC partner Dieter Egger (CH)
43
http://www.mobility-cultura.net/
44
Example presented by SPUTNIC partner Martin Ruesch at the third WG meeting
42
29
suitable organisational/institutional framework (transportation association, tariff
union) – possibly at no additional costs.
2. Integration possibilities and approaches depend on the local framework conditions
and the level of competition.
3. The main actors for PT integration are authorities, transport operators and
politicians (and transportation associations, tariff unions). For integration to be
successful co-operation between these actors is needed which can usually only be
achieved by a strong PT policy support. But the local/regional initiative by
authorities and PT operators is equally important.
4. Integration is even possible with a weak national regulation but it requires
local/regional initiative (policy, authorities, PT operators).
2.4. Contracts, incentives and monitoring 45
A number of European countries have witnessed in the last years significant changes
in the legal and organisational frameworks of local PT in order to ensure an
improvement in transparency, economic efficiency and quality of the service.
However, the “old framework” – urban PT run by the cities, railways run by the state,
poor quality rural PT a mix of regimes – still exists in many MS. Transport Authorities
with a regional multi-modal perspective are still rare. It is therefore encouraging that
Kosovo, starting from a very difficult position, intends to create a nation-wide system of
Transport Authorities46.
The EC now promotes development through the provision of an appropriate legal
framework at European level (see chapter 2.2). Nevertheless, it should be made clear
that whatever regulatory regime is in force, its success strongly depends on the
effectiveness of the relationship between authorities and operators. That is, one of the
main functional roles of authorities is to induce operators to conduct their business
towards the achievement of the strategic goals of the system (i.e. principal-agenttheory), for which complementary schemes of incentives and penalties are an
indispensable tool.
Quality expectations of existing and potential PT customers are increasing. The quality
level of PT plays a crucial role for maintaining and increasing the modal share of PT.
This holds especially true in the new MS where PT may risk becoming a service to
marginalised groups of society (the more affluent groups see the car as a good way to
show their newly attained position). Maintaining existing market shares might be even
more difficult in ‘mature’ economies, for instance long-term monitoring in Sweden of
public satisfaction with PT shows a slightly downward trend, although it is claimed that
the PT sector has gained a stronger customer focus.47
Liberalisation, separation and formalisation of the relationship between authorities and
operators are still in its infancy in many cities, regions and countries undergoing rapid
economic development. Frequently, the authority (buyer of services) and operator are
not transparently separated (in-house operator) which makes it difficult to control the
45
The following chapter is mainly based on desk research by the SPUTNIC partners as the WG meeting dealing with
this subtopic will take place after the time of writing
46
Information obtained at Sustainable Transport Policies Workshop in Gdansk, PL, arranged by SPUTNIC partner
REC 6-10 May 2008.
47
http://www.sltf.se/fileupload/ereportdok/Swedish%20Public%20Transport%20Barometer.pdf link to system
description, reports are only available in Swedish
30
efficiency and effectiveness of the service provision. The Annex of EU Regulation
1370/2007 requires that compensation rules and other relationships between
authorities and operators shall be clearly defined and published regardless if the
operator is in-house or not.
Contractual arrangements between the actors [PSC] in which risks are divided and the
terms of fulfilment are set out, are still not the rule. PSC is a relatively new concept in
these countries which does require reliable and sound legal framework conditions –
which are often missing. A particular problem mentioned by several experts of the
Market Organisation cluster is that according to national legislation operators are
obliged to give very large discounts (sometimes > 75%) to certain groups of
passengers. Compensation to the operators is in many cases unclear. This is not in
accordance with EU Regulation 1370/2007 and will have to be sorted out.
Quality and performance monitoring systems where certain financial and/or quality
indicators are constantly collected in order to control the fulfilment of the contract are
scarce. Such systems would not only enable the authorities and operators to improve
service levels but could also be used as a dialogue instrument to reassess the
organisation of local PT services.
The conditions of financial support from institutions like the EIB and the by EBRD were
also dealt with by experts in the Market Organisation cluster48. As a condition for
lending these institutions demand reforms and proofs of progress. Setting up a PSC
and/or involving new private actors were mentioned as examples as well as
commitment of support from local authorities.
2.4.1.
Public Service Contracts
Ideally contracting and tendering should be preceded by a sound knowledge about
what the customers really demand from PT. This may concern customer relations
more than market organisation but a study in the City of Porto/Portugal has indicated
some important areas.49 This study is noteworthy in two respects: first, it surveyed the
perceptions of both users and non-users, second, Portugal is a MS where the number
of cars/1.000 inhabitants has trebled in 15 years, and this shows that the PT sector
must be pro-active in order not to drop behind.
The study basically shows that people demand clean, air-conditioned buses with
friendly staff, a reliable and punctual service with good information provision and easy
interchanges with short waiting times. The price was not seen as a very important
issue and also car users acknowledged that using PT is cheaper than going by car.
With this background information the initial point is about minimum standards: on how
to construct the contract, incentives, monitoring, etc. Relations or contracts between
transport authorities and operators have been dealt with in numerous projects and
reports. The scope of the extensive EU MARETOPE project was to develop tools to
support decision makers (authorities) in particular and in general all groups of affected
actors, in the process of adaptation to change and management of transition periods,
48
49
Presentations by EBRD and EIB in the WG meeting in Leipzig 17-18 April 2008
www.civil.ist.utl.pt/thredbo9/proceedings/proceedings/Tuesday/WSA/2nd_Session/1049.pdf
31
which will be a reality which all local PT systems are likely to face in the coming
years.50 The “Guide to Contracts and Contracting in Public Transport” by Colin
Buchanan and Partners51 and the report “Contracting in urban Public Transport”
produced by various authors for DG TREN52 give a description of various types of
contracts and several examples. Finally, the European Committee for Standardisation
(CEN) published a few years ago a standard (EN 13816) which provides service
quality definitions, targeting and measurement in PT services.
Contracts can be categorised according to the form of risk division between authority
and operator according to this sketch:
Figure 2: risk allocation between authority and operator using different contract types, courtesy of Frode Longva,
TØI, Norway
The traditional gross cost contracts are now perceived as giving too few incentives for
the operators to suggest improvements at the tendering stage or to improve services
anyway. There is therefore a trend of transfer of risks from the authorities to the
operators through incentives or through various net cost contracts. Recent gross cost
contracts in the “New Scandinavian model” contain bonus/malus clauses for
cancellations, punctuality, staff behaviour, cleanliness, customer information and
number of passengers. Some of these are easy to evaluate or to measure, some are
influenced by external factors such as the weather and some are more ‘soft’ and have
to be measured through opinion polls or mystery riders.
In a recent paper53 some noteworthy developments in The Netherlands and Norway
are discussed. Positive and negative characteristics of different forms of quality
tendering in The Netherlands are summarised below.
50
http://www.tis.pt/proj/maretope/maretope.html
http://www.eltis.org/docs/Public_Transport_guide.pdf
52
ec.europa.eu/transport/clean/doc/2008_contracting_urban_public_transport_en.pdf
53
Quality tendering and contracting service design – Comparing the Dutch and Norwegian initiatives, Thredbo 9
conference
51
32
Figure 3: different forms of quality tendering, courtesy of Frode Longva, TØI, Norway
Apart from the pros and cons in the table the paper mentions that the more open forms
of competition in Amersfoort and Limburg resulted in a 50-60% increase in service
provision for the same price.
One should remember that The Netherlands have a lot of people in a small area,
Norway is the other way around. The twin cities of Skien/Porsgrunn (84.000
inhabitants) chose an incentive or performance contract where the contract is awarded
to those who are willing to pay the authorities the highest annual sum to operate a
contract with clearly defined incentives and freedom for market development. The
operator has scope for network and fare variations within a predefined framework but
one must bear in mind the small population anywhere in Norway.
2.4.2.
Monitoring
Independent of the contract model the authorities need a sort of monitoring or
controlling where certain financial and/or quality indicators are constantly collected in
order to control the fulfilment of the contract. Where performance indicators of different
operators are compared, these benchmarking figures can not only be used as
controlling instrument but for instance also as a basis for decisions with respect to
tendering. This approach is used by some PTAs in Switzerland who award contracts
directly as long as the corresponding operator performs effectively and efficiently
(compared to the benchmark) but who tender out the corresponding network where
performance indicators indicate an efficiency or quality below average.
33
Performance indicators include for example cost coverage, production cost per km,
customer satisfaction etc. As a consequence of the looming threat of direct competition
(through tendering) the authorities can establish a stronger position in negotiations
with operators. This benchmarking can also help to establish some sort of (indirect)
competition, even when there is actually no direct competition in or for the market.
Several in-depth analyses of contracts, incentives, monitoring etc. can be found in the
proceedings of the so-called Thredbo conferences54. (further information on
performance indicators see chapter 4.2.3)
2.5. Funding and Financing solutions
2.5.1.
Funding models
PT funding is an issue of highest priority, particular in the new MS. According to
several surveys55, capital financing of PT infrastructure and equipment is perceived to
be the most pressing transport problem of local authorities and operators in the new
MS. In the 1990s, funding for PT was cut back in the cities of new MS. In Budapest for
example, municipal subsidies to the PT companies were reduced by two thirds
between 1990 and 2000.56 The third WG meeting confirmed that also financing the
operations is a challenge especially in cases of low (social) tariffs and limited funds.
The lack of financial means and severe need to upgrade the ageing rolling stock leads
to a vicious circle where reduced service levels deteriorate the bad image of PT and
lead to declined patronage resulting in rising fares which cannot be justified as the
service levels are ever declining.
The most obvious source of PT funding across Europe are PT user contributions
(fares). However, with the exception of the completely deregulated regimes, fare levels
and structures are not determined on principles of supply and demand but within limits
established by the authorities. Due to the public service character of PT the
establishment of concessionary fares for user groups like students, elderly people etc.
is very common in Europe and even more in post-socialist countries (in Russia there
used to be 64 categories of people exempt from paying for travel on PT vehicles).57
SPUTNIC experts from CEEC emphasised that particularly in the new MS, operators
often are not compensated adequately for these heavy fare concessions imposed by
the state. The fare concession problem is best dealt with by a transparent transfer to
the operator of direct fiscal responsibility from the state for state imposed concessions.
Furthermore, if concessionary fares are based on social grounds it would be
economically more efficient to move the responsibility for social assistance from the PT
pricing agenda into an all-encompassing social protection system. Accordingly, several
past projects pursued specifically the overall financial health of the operating
enterprises, by having the governments commit to pay the full amount of requisite
subsidies and improve the subsidy calculation (e.g. Budapest, Riga).
54
http://www.civil.ist.utl.pt/thredbo9/proceedings/html/ws_a_by_id.htm
http://www.itls.usyd.edu.au/thredbo10/
55
CAPE project (1999), http://www.rec.org/REC/Programs/Telematics/CAPE/CAPE.html / A survey of PT in 6
cities of Central and Eastern Europe, REC, 2006
56
Heading down dead ends: Transport sector financing in Central and Eastern Europe, CEE Bankwatch Network,
2004
57
World Bank (2002): Urban Transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region
34
According to the SPUTNIC experts of the third WG meeting a main difference between
Eastern and Western Europe is that the new MS saw a decentralisation process in the
1990ies, when central governments reduced or withdrew their financial support for
local services, while municipal governments, newly given full responsibility for these,
could not provide the requisite subsidies. Although national governments in the new
MS have given up formally the patronage over municipal PT services, they retain
influence over decisions such as fares, fare discounts without acknowledging full
financial responsibility (see above). No new financial mechanism has been found yet
to replace the pre-1990 arrangement – a combination of subsidies from the state,
municipalities or local enterprises. As a consequence reliable and sustainable
operation financing models are missing.
Although tariff policy is usually a highly political issue we see quite some potential for
increasing the revenues from fares by better adapting the existing fare systems to the
customers’ benefits and their willingness to pay. This can be done, for instance, by
creating new ticket types that are tailored to the needs of specific user groups with
higher or lower willingness to pay. This approach is currently discussed in Germany.58
However, the share of PT fares related to the overall costs is in most European cities
fairly low (according to a survey among the experts participating at the third WG
meeting between 25% in Prague and 50% in Sofia59), usually because of social or
environmental reasons: the revenue-earning potential of PT gets entangled with
problems of affordability for low-income passengers and difficulties of tapping nonpassenger beneficiaries of PT infrastructure. When there is a market of choicetravellers, fares are kept low to keep them from switching to cars or attract them away
from cars.60
With growing financial pressure the importance of alternative sources of commercial
revenues (in addition to passenger fares) has been emphasised. However, the share
of such supplementary income varies largely, in the cities represented at the third WG
meeting between 1% and 13% of total turnover. Examples and ways for additional
revenues exist as many as businesses ideas.
Roughly, four categories can be distinguished:
•
Advertising: This is the main supplementary source of income for PT operators in
most European cities, although the significance of this business varies largely
•
Renting/selling of premises and facilities: PT operators can make use of their
premises and facilities by renting shops and offices, spaces for vending machines
(e.g. at bus stops), car parks or by leasing the right of way to use the infrastructure
or to communication companies in order to lay any kind of transmission wires. In
Dublin, buildings are hosting telecommunication masts, fibre optic cables are
58
VDV: Nutzerfinanzierte Tarifstrategien, 2005
this corresponds with the figures quoted in: Urban Transport Benchmarking Initiative Year Three: Public
Transport Organisation and Policy – Working Group report, July 2006,
60
Because of externalities, moving passengers from cars to PT can decrease total social costs in congested situations.
Also, common road use charges (based on fuel taxation) are lower than marginal social costs of motor vehicles in
cities. If road use prices cannot be adjusted upwards, then prices for the competing mode (PT) should be adjusted
downwards to correct the bias; see Urban Transport for development – A primer to the World Bank’s strategic
framework, Mitric, 2007
59
35
installed into railway track beds and overhead-lines are used to carry voice and
data signals.61
•
Providing additional services: In Stockholm, the underground metro has been
equipped with a mobile phone network, the access to which is rented to
telecommunication service providers thus generating extra income for the metro
company. Currently the project is expanded to offer WiFi-Internet-access in all busstop weather shelters.62 In Bucharest or Zurich, PT operators offer car services to
third parties (mechanic, electric, tin, dye work and vulcanisation), vehicle renting or
printing works. Similar services for maintenance are provided by PT operators in
Zagreb and Sofia. In Dresden the DVB (Dresdner Verkehrsvetriebe AG) offers
Sightseeing-Tours by bus.63 In Finland, PT operators offer freight services (see
case box Matkahuolto, Finland below).
•
Sales of products: Some PT companies make use of their extensive distribution
network by selling additional goods. In addition to travel tickets for the tube,
London underground ticket offices also sell tickets for major tourist attractions.
Other sales take more the form of merchandising making use of the image of PT.
The London underground name and symbol have a very strong brand association
with London and many people choose to buy these items (such as mugs, model
vehicles etc.) as a souvenir.64
These solutions often come along with new forms of co-operation, for example the
CarGoTram in Zurich (operator and the city’s waste disposal service) or the cooperation of Veolia with postal services and supermarkets in the UK or with
independent taxi operators in the United States.65 Some cities have also investigated
freight transport to city centre stores by means of metro/light rail tunnels.
The discussions among the experts of the third WG meeting led to the conclusion, that
there is still potential to increase these commercial side revenues in order to relieve
the financial pressure on PT. However, the average potential is limited to a maximum
of 5-10% of total turnover. Furthermore, risks such as neglecting restructuring
potentials or negative image effects have to be assessed carefully and a tight
controlling is needed.
Case box: freight services of Matkahuolto, Finland 66
Matkahuolto Group67 is a private service and marketing enterprise in the bus and
coach transport business. It is owned by private Finnish bus companies. Matkahuolto’s
freight service uses the group’s comprehensive scheduled bus network throughout
Finland. Of the daily bus services in operation, more than 20.000 carry freight to
almost 500 Matkahuolto offices all over the country. Matkahuolto organises the whole
transport chain whereas the transport of the goods is done by whatever bus company
first serves the necessary relation. The revenues are divided 50:50 between
Matkahuolto and the transporting bus company. On certain lines bus operators get
more money from freight than from passenger transport. Sometimes they remove
61
Urban Transport Benchmarking Initiative: PT Organisation and Policy, Working Group Report, 2006
SPUTNIC expert Lennart Jangaelv (SE) at the first WG meeting
63
SPUTNIC experts Branko Mikinac (HR), Metodi Avramov (BG) and Arne Beck (DE) at the third WG meeting
64
Exploring all the options, Line Jussiant, in: Public Transport International 06/2003
65
Examples presented by SPUTNIC expert Michel Quidort (Veolia) at the third WG meeting
66
Information provided by SPUTNIC expert Timo Korsisaari (FI)
67
www.matkahuolto.fi
62
36
passenger seats to have more space for freight transport – in addition to the usual
10m³ luggage room.
In general, the costs that cannot be covered by the commercial revenues of the PT
operators (fares and side revenues) are borne by the public authorities (for municipal
transport usually the cities).68 In some cases (e.g. in Germany) the operator is cross
subsidised by profits of other utilities within the same authority such as water,
electricity or waste disposal. However, cross subsidy could be a problem in terms of
distortion of competition; it also reduces transparency and hinders effective controlling
and benchmarking and thus reduces efficiency. The deregulation of the energy
markets will also make these transfers more difficult.
Funding can also be implicit, for instance trough fuel tax rebates for PT (e.g. the UK,
Ireland, Switzerland), exceptions of PT operators from corporate taxes (e.g.
Germany69) or government guarantees for borrowing.
Where PT is not funded from the authority’s general budget, there is a variety of other
types of public funding through taxes earmarked for PT purposes that all require
corresponding legal framework conditions. Usually, such taxes and levies try to tax the
indirect beneficiaries of PT such as:
•
car users benefiting from reduced congestion thanks to PT. Examples include fuel
taxes (e.g. 3% increase in 2003 in Italy earmarked for PT), vehicle taxes, road
pricing (e.g. congestion charging scheme in London) and parking fees. Several
SPUTNIC experts pointed out that by offering free car parking many cities in the
new MS miss an opportunity to raise funds for improving their general budget
(which means also less budget for PT) and indirectly subsidise car traffic. The
Budapest Urban Transport project70 (1995-2001) financed by the World Bank and
the EBRD, that aimed at keeping PT competitive, therefore not only included a
restructuring of the operating company BKV71, the establishing of a PSC, the
creation of the Budapest Transport Association, the replacement of 47 km of tram
tracks and of over 300 busses but also the establishment of a parking charging
system for the central area (financed by the ERBD).72
•
Employers through employee taxes, as an efficient PT system allows better
access to the employment catchment area. Examples include the “versement de
transport” in France (see case “versement de transport” box) and the
“Dienstgeberabgabe” for funding the metro in Vienna.73
•
Property owners: The development of new PT infrastructure often increases the
values of surrounding properties. The owners of these properties gain significant
windfall profits without covering parts of the costs. Value capturing refers to a
range of tools that enable the (partly) internalisation of these windfall profits (see
case box). It was calculated that the Jubilee Line extension of London’s tube could
68
69
survey among the participants of the third WG meeting
SPUTNIC expert Arne Beck at the third WG meeting
70
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=302081&menuPK=
302115&Projectid=P008494
71
Budapesti Közlekedési Zártkör•en M•köd• Részvénytársaság
72
Urban Transport for development – A primer to the World Bank’s strategic framework, Mitric, 2007
73
MARETOPE, D2
37
have been financed using only one third of the land value increases that arose in
the areas within a radius of one km around the new metro stations.74 For the Sofia
metro extension project a study predicted land values of adjacent land to increase
by 20%.75
•
Shopkeepers, trade and other industries: Shopkeepers profit from better
accessibility which improves their turnover. Many US cities use a supplement to
sales taxes for funding PT. Tourism industry profits from PT in terms of transport
infrastructure and in terms of a sound environment, quiet recreational areas,
attractive inner cities etc. For example in the famous Engadine tourist region (St.
Moritz, Switzerland) part of local and regional PT is funded by the hotels and by the
private mountain cableways; in this case the funding is not based on a tax but on a
voluntary agreement. Another funding source is the local tourism tax (paid per
overnight stay) partly earmarked for funding PT.76
Case box: the “versement de transport” in France
Under the name of “versement de transport” French authorities like cities and regions
can levy a tax from companies with more than 9 employees for financing local PT. The
tax is levied on the wage bill and is limited to a maximum of 0.5% (2.5% in the
conurbation of Paris). 180 cities and regions have introduced the “versement de
transport” since 1971 generating over 4 billion EUR annually for PT funding. More than
50% of the taxed regions lie in the conurbation of Paris. Part of the tax is reimbursed to
those who prove that they have provided permanent accommodation to their
employees near their place of work or who have wholly dealt with their transport. The
rest of the tax is used to finance PT. In the Paris metropolitan region 35% of overall PT
costs are financed by the “versement transport” (compared to only 25% by passenger
fares). There are also cases where PT travel is directly paid by the employer. Vice
versa, many employers still provide free parking, thus subsidising car travel. Although
the tax leads to distortions in competition due to the increase of production costs, its
negative impacts have been considered negligible so far.77 The World Bank however
states that the tax is not suitable for economically fragile low- and mid-income
countries and ineffective in the presence of a large informal sector.78
For the funding of large, single investments in infrastructure (not for operations) there
are additional funding models such as special purpose (or dedicated) infrastructure
funds that aim at providing extra funds external to the regular public budget (see case
box below). Other funding options include funds from the EU. In the 2007-2013 period,
the EU will distribute 308 billion EUR in Structural and Cohesion funds. Approximately
half of this amount will go to the new MS and the acceding countries of CEE. Thereof,
at least 40 billion EUR is planned to be invested in transport.
However, according to the countries operational programmes which specify how
exactly the funds will be used, the CEEC plan to invest much more EU funds into
roads and motorways than into any other mode of transport. Only 30% is to be used
74
Transport funding through land value gains – a new approach, Dave Wetzel, in: Public Transport International
6/2003
75
SPUTNIC expert Metodi Avramov (BG) at the third WG meeting
76
Case presented by SPUTNIC partner Martin Ruesch at the third WG meeting
77
Transport policy, financing, service public and transport law, VöV, 2005 (unpublished)
78
38
for railways and only 11% for other PT. Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia and Latvia do not
plan any or almost any funding support for urban PT. Hungary plans to use 1600 Mio.
EUR for PT in Budapest, Bulgaria plans to spend 300-400 Mio. EUR on the Sofia
metro extension and on infrastructure and rolling stock in urban areas.79
Case box: Dedicated Conurbation Fund (Switzerland) 80
Swiss conurbations face severe capacity problems in transport infrastructure (road and
rail, private and public transport) that go beyond the financial possibilities of the cities
themselves. Based on the insight that national support is needed the Swiss
Conurbation Programme was launched in 2001 in order to Initiate strategic spatial and
transport planning in the conurbations. In 2006 a national law was adopted that
creates the national special purpose infrastructure fund for funding the completion of
the national motorway network, contributions to main roads in rural areas and
measures to improve the transport infrastructure in cities and conurbations. For such
conurbation measures the fund disposes of approx. 200 Mio. EUR each year from
2011 until 2030. The national fund only covers a maximum of 50% of project costs.
Eligibility of projects depend on high requirements regarding organisation,
environmental/economic/social impact analysis, implementation and monitoring. In the
Zurich metropolitan area the funds will be used for improvement of the rail network
(with benefits for urban and regional transport) and for new urban tram lines. The
example shows that national funds can solve funding problems in conurbations given
the political will and good preparation.
Options that – according to the discussions at the third WG meeting – can be
implemented on the local level include the use for PT of parking fees, tourism tax and
road pricing revenues or value capture mechanisms. Still, these options all require the
necessary legal framework which usually has to be approved on the national level.
Options that are rather implemented on the national level include the use for PT of fuel
taxes or infrastructure funds. On EU level the Structural Funds in theory offer
additional funding options especially for CEEC. In practice however, these funds are
mostly not available for urban PT due to the diverging priorities set by the national
governments.
According to the World Bank the use of local surtax on gasoline – earmarked for PT
funding – is increasing. Columbia introduced a law in 1989 permitting cities to charge
such a surtax up to 25% (in Bogota). This innovation is credited with having powered
Bogota’s TransMilenio system.81 Still, the introduction of an isolated local tax can lead
to severe negative effects and market distortions (‘gasoline tourism’ etc.).
Other of the above mentioned methods are less well suited for rapidly developing
countries or difficult to introduce. Sales taxes for instance tend to be regressive and
thus colliding with poverty alleviation objectives. General land taxes would hold a
major potential as a source of funds, particularly in cities undergoing rapid extension.
That they have not been used is due to weak markets and poorly regulated land
development.82
79
CEE Bankwatch Network: EU funds for public and environment friendly transport; several SPUTNIC experts at
the third WG meeting
80
Case presented by SPUTNIC partner Martin Ruesch (Rapp Trans) at the third WG meeting
81
82
39
However, it is important to be aware that an ill-conceived conditionality in payments
can lead to perverse incentives. For instance, the funding system in Germany allows
for new investment but not for maintenance of infrastructure (which must be financed
from the general budget). Therefore a frequent strategy is “running down and complete
reconstruction” instead of proper maintenance. This system clearly does not provide
incentives to minimise life cycle costs.83
Case box: Value Capture Mechanisms
Value capture is a range of tools that enable the capture of external economic gains
due to the elaboration of PT infrastructure or operational services. For example the
development of new PT infrastructure might increase the values of surrounding
properties. When there is no value capture tool applied, the owners of these properties
gain significant windfall profits without covering parts of the costs.
In the United States, the mechanism for capturing a fair share of property price
increases has been established for decades. It started in California in 1951 and is now
known as Tax Increment Financing (TIF). Under TIF, the local authority designates an
area as TIF district. Within that district tax rates do not change from the standard
governmental rate. But when property prices rise the additional tax revenues repay the
costs of new infrastructure development.84
Land value capture is not very common in Europe, but has already been implemented
in a number of projects in Madrid (“pasillo verde”, extensions metro lines 1 and 10,
Parla tram).85
A slightly different approach was chosen in Copenhagen, where the land of a
development area was given for free to a (public) consortium with the obligation to
build and run a metro in order to develop the area. The revenues from the land sale
could be used for the funding of the transport infrastructure.86
2.5.2.
Financing issues
Due to the aforementioned problems with funding PT operation, PT is a heavy burden
on many cities’ budgets. Especially in the new MS, operating companies lacking stable
regulatory and institutional framework conditions and a coherent multi-year investment
plan are dependent on occasional grants from municipalities for fleet replacement and
thus not able to develop sound business plans. Against this plays the acute need for
renewal of neglected infrastructure, rolling stock and creation of new services to meet
changing mobility needs.
For reducing the burden of own investment funds, some authorities or operators in the
new MS make use of loans with international finance institutions (IFI) such as the
EBRD, the EIB or the World Bank. IFI loans bring rewards in creating pressure for
structural reforms (establishment of PSC and sustainable funding models) and costreductions within companies, as for example in Budapest, Sofia (see case box Sofia
83
Urban Transport Benchmarking Initiative Year Three: Public Transport Organisation and Policy – Working Group
report, July 2006
84
Developing a new agenda for infrastructure investment, Jay Walder, in: Public Transport International 06/2003
85
PPP in Madrid – Best Practice Case, Carlos Cristobal-Pinto, in: Public Transport International 06/2003 and
SPUTNIC expert Angeles Echevarría at the third WG meeting
86
Case presented by SPUTNIC partner Bertil Hylen at the third WG meeting
40
below) and a number of Polish cities. However, the conditions for reforms attached to
the loans are sometimes also a barrier to implementation as the local actors are
reluctant to change (e.g. non-implemented EBRD loans to the cities of Zagreb, Prague
or Warsaw).87 Although missing credit ratings might hinder smaller cities’ access to IFI
loans SPUTNIC experts from EBRD and EIB made clear that in most cases a solution
can be found given that the public authorities are committed enough to support PT and
to implement the necessary changes. Especially smaller cities in the new MS often
lack know-how for accessing IFI funds.
Case box: The Sofia Public Transport Project (Bulgaria) 88
Sofia knows a gross cost PSC based on vehicle-kilometres and the municipality also
compensates the operators for preferential passes. However, as all the money is spent
on operation, a loan was needed for financing investment into new rolling-stock. The
Sofia Public Transport Project was financed by the EBRD. The loan of 30 Mio. EUR to
the municipality of Sofia was used for the purchase of over 100 buses and the
refurbishment of trams. As a consequence of the loan agreement, the local PT market
was restructured (separation of the PT authority and the independent transport
operators) and new Public Service Contracts were signed. Furthermore the loan was
tied to the condition that procurement of the new rolling stock was executed under the
EBRD’s Policies and Rules.
The fact that the EBRD as lender differs from an ordinary commercial bank is
considered a strength (better loan conditions, no obligation for tendering the loan etc.)
as well as a weakness: as both lender and borrower are political bodies, decision
processes were sometimes long and complicated.
Within the private sources of financing, private loans, PPP and private finance
initiatives (PFI) are the most relevant ones.89 PPP/PFI are mostly used for specific
stand-alone projects and are quite difficult to apply when the system cannot raise
enough revenue to cover even operation costs, which is quite common in local PT.
The still quite rare PPP experiences in urban PT in Western Europe discussed at the
third WG meeting showed that PPP solutions can be promising financing models given
the necessary commitment of the public authorities. Discussions also revealed that the
involvement of major private companies might provoke public resistance to the project.
In the new MS PPP models are even less used for PT projects, among other reasons
due to legal barriers. Practical examples of PPP include a joint venture between the
city of Pforzheim/Germany and Veolia (all services operated by a joint company),
London underground PPP on infrastructure maintenance and a number of examples in
Spain where PPP in the last years has been discovered as an innovative approach for
financing urban PT infrastructure (West light rail, Las Tables light rail, Parla Tram and
metro line 8 to Barajas Airport – all in Madrid – and the underground network in Seville
or two tram routes in Barcelona).90
87
SPUTNIC expert Guido Bruggeman at the third WG meeting
Information provided by SPUTNIC expert Metodi Avramov at the third WG meeting
89
According to VOYAGER, the difference between PPP and PFI is related to the level of involvement of the
autorities. In general within a PPP the authorities are one of the fully responsible partners and bear a large share of
the financial and organisational risks. On the contrary within a PFI the risks are fully covered by the participants of
the special purpose company, while the authorities are customer. There are several mix forms available that include
the advantages of PPP and PFI.
90
SPUTNIC experts Arne Beck (DE) and Angeles Echevarria (ES) at the third WG meeting
88
41
2.6. Conclusions
Based upon the above statements the following conclusions can be drawn:
•
Especially in countries undergoing rapid economic development unstable or
missing regulatory framework conditions, unclear task assignments and
missing leadership form a difficult environment for entrepreneurial behaviour
and hinder the development of effective and efficient PT services.
•
The new EU regulation will lead to growing market transparency relating to
public service obligations and compensation. Overcompensation or
undercompensation of operators will no longer be possible. Although it allows
high flexibility and freedom for national and local authorities, many national
regulations will need to be adapted.
•
In many countries PT networks and services did not adapt sufficiently to the
urban sprawl, rather matching political borders than customers’ needs. PT
operators have to realise that their main competitor for customers is the car, not
other operators, nor other PT modes. The logical consequence of this insight is
complete integration of networks, timetables and tariffs of all different modes –
and even of other mobility service providers such as car sharing and bike hire.
•
By integrating a network it is possible to reduce parallel services and to
connect several transport modes at interchanges with each other. To realise full
network integration a co-ordinated timetable for all transport modes in the
concerned area is essential.
•
In order to reduce the access barriers to PT and attract more customers, the
passenger must be able to use one ticket inside of a transparent and easy tariff
and fare system (“One network, one timetable, one ticket, one fare”).
•
Successful integration is often achieved in a step-by-step approach, from the
mutual acceptance of tickets over tariff unions to setting up an organising
authority or transportation association.
•
The level of integration is in general higher in Western European countries than
in countries undergoing rapid economic development, where well integrated
systems are an exception. In many cases the necessary know-how is missing.
•
For integration to be successful cooperation between the main actors
(authorities, operators and politicians) is indispensable which can usually only
be achieved by a strong PT policy support.
•
Integration possibilities and approaches depend on the local framework
conditions and the level of competition. Integration is even possible with a weak
national regulation but it requires local/regional initiative (policy, authorities, PT
operators).
•
Legally enforceable PSC between the funding authority and the PT service
provider must clearly state the obligations of both parties, thus setting a clear
and stable framework for entrepreneurial production and long-term planning
and investment. The new EU regulation will further strengthen the importance
of PSC.
•
The traditional gross cost contracts are perceived as giving too few incentives
for the operators to suggest improvements at the tendering stage or to improve
services anyway. There is therefore a trend of transfer of risks from the
42
authorities to the operators through incentives or through various types of net
cost contracts.
•
Independent of the contract model the authorities need a sort of monitoring or
controlling where certain financial and/or quality indicators are constantly
collected in order to measure performance and to control the fulfilment of the
contract.
•
Quality and performance monitoring systems can also be used as a dialogue
instrument to reassess the organisation of local PT services. Comparing the
performance of different operators (benchmarking) can help to establish some
sort of (indirect) competition, even when there is actually no direct competition
in or for the market.
•
Even without tariff integration measures, the existing fare systems in cities,
regions and countries undergoing rapid economic development still offer a high
potential for increasing revenues.
•
Fare levels and structures are mostly not determined on principles of supply
and demand but within limits established by the authorities. Tariff policies
thereby pursue different objectives – often conflicting ones.
•
Particularly in the new MS, operators often are not compensated adequately for
heavy fare concessions (for students, elderly etc.) imposed by the state.
Although the new EU regulation bans these undercompensations, the lack of
reliable and sustainable funding models persists.
•
The share of PT fares related to the overall costs is in most European cities
fairly low (between 25% in Prague and 82% in London), usually because of
social or environmental reasons. The costs that cannot be covered by the
revenues of the PT users are most often borne by the municipality. However,
the increasing constraints of public budgets have to be offset by innovative
funding and financing models and alternative sources of revenues.
•
PT operators should actively explore the opportunities and risks of additional
business models in order to create supplementary commercial revenues
(advertising, services etc.). Such side businesses should be developed along
the strengths of PT while carefully assessing the related risks (image damages,
neglecting of cost cutting potential).
•
Alternative public sources are taxes earmarked for PT. Especially when new
PT services are being designed there is a range of possibilities to make the
beneficiaries pay – if the necessary regulations are given. Value capture is a
promising range of tools that enable the capture of external economic gains
created by new PT infrastructure or operational services.
•
By offering free car parking many cities in the new MS miss an opportunity to
raise funds for improving their general budget and do indirectly subsidise car
traffic.
•
On EU level the Structural Funds in theory offer additional funding options especially for CEEC. In practice however, these funds are mostly not available
for urban PT due to the diverging priorities set by the national governments
•
Loans with IFI such as the EBRD, the EIB or the World Bank or co-operations
with the private sector (Public Private Partnerships or Private Finance
Initiatives) offer potential to authorities or operators for reducing the burden of
43
own investment funds – under the condition that local authorities are committed
to support PT and prepared to implement reform measures.
44

2. Market Organisation - SPUTNIC

Transcription

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